

STHIRAMATI
MADHYĀNTAVIBHĀGAṬĪKĀ

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MADHYĀNTAVIBHĀGATĪKĀ

ANALYSIS OF THE MIDDLE
PATH AND THE EXTREMES

PROEFSCHRIFT TER VERKRIJGING VAN DEN
GRAAD VAN DOCTOR IN DE LETTEREN EN
WIJSBEGEERTE AAN DE RIJKSUNIVERSITEIT
TE LEIDEN, OP GEZAG VAN DEN RECTOR
MAGNIFICUS, DR. J. VAN DER HOEVE, HOOG-
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PREFACE

It is nowadays for a mere sanskritist no longer entirely impossible to translate, or rather interpret, one of those exegetical sanskrit treatises which belong to the great Buddhist-philosophical schools. The recent editions and translations of important sanskrit texts, the numerous treatises and standard works by great scholars, such as Sylvain Lévy, Th. Stcherbatsky, L. de la Vallée Poussin, E. Obermiller, and many others, afford such a mass of information, that even one who is not thoroughly acquainted with such almost indispensable languages as Tibetan, Chinese or Japanese, may find his way in this seeming labyrinth of subtle Buddhist thought. It is for this reason that I readily accepted a proposal made to me by Prof. J. Rahder, to translate into English the first part of Sthiramati's Madhyāntavibhāṅgikā, of which at that time two editions were just published; one by Professor Susumu Yamaguchi, the other by Professors G. Tucci and Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya.

When I had worked at this translation for a considerable time, the late Prof. Sylvain Lévy was good enough to inform me that Prof. Th. Stcherbatsky likewise was about to finish the same work. In his reply to a letter, which I had written to him, Prof. Stcherbatsky urged me to continue my work, referring to the two simultaneous translations of the Triṃśikā by S. Lévy and H. Jacobi. It was only then that I had the courage to finish the present work since, at first, I was of opinion that it had become superfluous under the circumstances. For I am only too well aware of the fact, that as a beginner my knowledge and abilities don't come up to the height of those of Prof. Stcherbatsky, the more so since it would have been impossible for me to accomplish this translation without the aid of his invaluable great standard works. That is why I wish to avail myself of the opportunity to express my gratitude for his kind encouragement. A short time ago, Prof. Stcherbatsky's version appeared in the Bibliotheca Buddhica. As my

publication was in the press then, I had no opportunity to read his work.

Many thanks are due to Prof. J. Ph. Vogel for the help which he has rendered in reading and criticizing my version of the translation, and for the valuable suggestions I received from him. I am greatly indebted to Prof. J. Rahder, who spent many hours in discussing with me the difficult philosophic problems contained in this text, and who was always willing to put his great Japanese, Chinese and Tibetan learning at my disposal. Finally I wish to express my gratitude to Dr. B. Ch. Cchhabra Shāstri for the kind suggestions I received from him.

Prof. Rahder was kind enough to compare my rendering of several obscure passages with that of Prof. Yamaguchi in the Japanese language.

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ABBREVIATIONS

- MVT.* = *Y.* 1. Sthiramati, *Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā*, Édition par Susumu Yamaguchi, Nagoya 1934.
 2. La traduction japonaise avec de nombreuses notes (Chūhenfumbetsuron-shakuso-yakuchū), Nagoya 1935.
 3. Le *Madhyāntavibhāgaśāstram*, mis en comparaison avec deux traductions chinoises et la version tibétaine,
 — Index de la *Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā*, Nagoya 1937.
- T.* *Madhyāntavibhāgasūtrabhāṣyaṭīkā* of Sthiramati. Part I, edited by Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya and Giuseppe Tucci, Calcutta 1932.
- AK.* *L'Abhidharmakośa* de Vasubandhu, traduit et annoté par L. de la Vallée Poussin, I—IX, Paris 1923—1931.
- AO.* *Acta Orientalia IX. E.* Obermiller, *The Sublime Science of the Great Vehicle to Salvation.*
 XI. Id. *The Doctrine of Prajñā-pāramitā* as exposed in the *Abhisamayālamkāra* of Maitreya.
- As. Maj.* *Asia Major*, 1925: J. Masuda, *Origin and Doctrines of Early Indian Buddhist Schools.*
- BL.* Th. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, I, II, Leningrad 1932, 1930.
- Bodhis. Doct.* Har Dayal, *The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature*, London 1932.
- CC.* Id. *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, London 1923.
- IHQ.* *The Indian Historical Quarterly.*
- JA.* *Journal Asiatique.*
- Jac.* H. Jacobi, *Triṃśikāvijñapti* des Vasubandhu, Stuttgart 1932.
- JGIS.* *The Journal of the Greater India Society.*
- Mél.* *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques*, I, II, III.
 II. L. d. l. Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamaka.*
 III. Id. *Note sur l'Ālayavijñāna.* E. Lamotte, *L'Ālayavijñāna dans le Mahāyānasamgraha.*
- MSA.* *Mahāyāna—Sūtrālamkāra*, édité et traduit par Sylvain Lévi, Paris 1907, 1911.
- Nirvāṇa.* Th. Stcherbatsky, *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, Leningrad 1927.
- PMV.* *Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti* = *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās* de Nāgārjuna avec la *Prasannapadā*, Commentaire de Candrakīrti publié par L. d. l. Vallée Poussin. *Bibl. Buddh.* IV.
- Siddhi.* L. d. l. Vallée Poussin, *La Siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang*, I, II, Paris, 1928, 1929.
- Th.d.D.C.* L. d. l. V. Poussin, *Théorie des Douze Causes*, Gand 1913.
- Triṃś.* 1. *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, Viṃśatikā* et *Triṃśikā*, publié par Sylvain Lévi, Paris 1925.
 2. *Matériaux pour l'Étude du Système Vijñaptimātra*, Paris 1932 (= Transl.).
- Viṃś.* See *Triṃś.*

Other abbreviations are easily intelligible.

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The material used: In the year 1928, the late Professor Sylvain Lévy had the good fortune to discover at Katmandu in Nepal a manuscript of the Sanskrit text of Sthiramati's sub-commentary on the Madhyāntavibhāga. This manuscript he entrusted to Mr. Susumu Yamaguchi, at present Professor in the Otani University, for the sake of revising and editing it. Having first published the text in five instalments in the Review of the Otani University, Professor Yamaguchi brought out an entirely revised edition in 1934 under the title of Madhyāntavibhāgaṭikā, to which he added an elaborate introduction discussing therein all textual matter, the authorship of the śāstra and the main points of the contents. Independently of Professor Yamaguchi, Professor Tucci, who had likewise discovered this text, published in 1932 in coöperation with Prof. Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya the edition of the first chapter of the Tikā, the Chapter on Lakṣaṇa, under the title of Madhyāntavibhāgasūtrabhāṣyatikā. I have used and compared both editions for my interpretation of this first chapter. Yamaguchi's edition has been denoted by Y., Tucci's edition by T. An excellent review of T.'s edition was published by the late Dr. E. Obermiller, in the Indian Historical Quarterly, vol. IX, pp. 1019 ff. In it he discussed its central conceptions and especially suggested numerous textual improvements, which in the main correspond to the readings as brought forward by Professor Yamaguchi in his edition. Another review, by Prof. L. de la Vallée Poussin, we find in the Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques, vol. I, pp. 400 ff. Prof. de la Vallée Poussin gives the integral text of the first 12 kārīkās and of the introductory śloka. In his "Some Aspects of the Doctrines of Maitreya[nātha] and Asaṅga", Prof. Tucci likewise discusses some of the main points of the Madhyānta. Further references we find in three more articles by Dr. E. Obermiller: The Sublime Science of Maitreya (Acta Orientalia, vol. IX; Nirvāṇa according to Tibetan Tradition (Indian Historical Quarterly, X) and The term Sūnyatā and its different interpretations (JGIS, I). Other references have been

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mentioned in the notes. As all textual matter has been discussed by Prof. Yamaguchi in his edition, by Professors Tucci and Bhattacharya in their edition and by Dr. Obermiller in his review, I refrain from repeating it here. For the sake of clearness however, I only wish to mention some particulars: The Madhyāntavibhāga is one of the five famous treatises inspired by the Bodhisattva Maitreya to the Saint Aśaṅga. It is a Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda text, strongly influenced however by Mādhyamika views. It was composed in kārikā form. On this kārikā, a commentary, a bhāṣya or vṛtti was written by Vasubandhu, Aśaṅga's brother, and on this bhāṣya again Sthiramati wrote his subcommentary or ṭikā. Both the kārikā and Vasubandhu's bhāṣya are partly quoted in the ṭikā. In the two editions these quotations are underlined. In my translation they are printed in bold printing-type. As to the authorship of the Madhyāntavibhāga different views prevail. According to Professors Hakuju Ui and G. Tucci, Maitreya[nātha] was a historical person, the real founder of the Yogācāra school. This is denied by Prof. de la Vallée Poussin (in his Introduction to the Abhidharma Kośa, p. XXVI) and by Dr. Obermiller in his different works. From the ṭikā of Sthiramati no internal evidence can be obtained as to this difficult and in my opinion not yet solved problem. I might refer in this respect to Prof. de la Vallée Poussin in Mél., I, p. 401: "La strophe d'introduction existe toute entière en morceaux dans la ṭikā;

śāstrasyāsa praṇetāram abhyarhya sugatātmajam /

vaktāram cāsmadādibhyo yatiṣye 'rthavivecane //

c'est-à-dire: "Je salue le fils du Bouddha auteur de ce traité—Maitreya, Bodhisattva de la 10e terre qui n'a plus à renaître qu'une fois — et celui qui a dit ce śāstra aux gens comme nous — c'est-à-dire Aśaṅga.....".

C'est Vasubandhu qui parle. Mais d'autres lisent sugatātmajaḥ. Alors, c'est Aśaṅga qui parle: "Moi, qui suis un Bodhisattva, je salue [Maitreya] l'auteur et révélateur.....". Aśaṅga est né dans la famille du Bouddha, soit par l'acquisition de la première terre, soit par la seule production de la pensée de l'Illumination." In both readings of this verse, Maitreya apparently appears as the true "revealer" or author of the Madhyānta. Only Aśaṅga's position is not clear. But Dr. Obermiller observes (IHQ., IX, p. 1024): "It

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is thus clearly said that Maitreya is the Bodhisattva abiding in the tenth Stage; he is evidently viewed as the future Buddha, the Ajitanātha, the successor to the religious realm of the Buddha 'Sākyamuni. It seems in the highest degree improbable that such a position could have been assigned to one of the Buddhist ācāryas, however celebrated he might have been". A plausible solution is suggested by Prof. Yamaguchi (Introd., p. XV f.) which I reproduce here:

“Nous apprenons ainsi que l'origine de ce çāstra a été transmis par Māitreya à Asaṅga et d'Asaṅga au commentateur Vasubandhu. Il faut, cependant, signaler à l'attention le fait que Vasubandhu affirme dans la strophe qu'Asaṅga, instruit par Māitreya et aussi par d'autres maîtres, n'a recueilli les instructions de ceux-ci qu'avec l'autorisation de celui-là. Cela signifie à mon sens qu'Asaṅga a synthétisé et systématisé les doctrines de ses maîtres précédents en s'appuyant sur celle de Māitreya, en qui il a toute confiance. D'Asaṅga, on connaît également le Mahāyānasamgraha comme ouvrage appartenant à la deuxième époque du développement de sa pensée, ainsi que l'informe M. E. Obermiller. Et si la mission d'Asaṅga dans l'histoire des doctrines du bouddhisme mahāyānique est, comme j'ai dit tout à l'heure, de synthétiser et de systématiser les doctrines de ses prédécesseurs, c'est-à-dire, de recueillir tous les mahāyāna (mahāyānasamgraha), non seulement le Mahāyānasamgrahaçāstra, mais aussi les autres ouvrages qui s'y rapportent, soit le Māhāyānasūtrālamkāra, soit le Dharmadharmatāvibhāga, soit le Madhyāntavibhāga, devront être, au point de vue d'Asaṅga lui-même, tous respectivement un Mahāyānasamgraha.

De tout ce qui précède nous pourrions conclure au sujet de la kārikā de notre Madhyāntavibhāgaçāstra que, même si elle était déjà comprise dans les doctrines des maîtres antérieurs, son système actuel devrait être attribué à Asaṅga. Naturellement on ne doit pas croire que le système lui soit apparu d'une manière surnaturelle par la révélation de Māitreya qui se trouve dans le monde Tuṣita, mais il n'en est pas moins vrai qu'Asaṅga a synthétisé et systématisé les doctrines de ses prédécesseurs. Sur ce point, deux hypothèses sont possibles pour nous: lors de la synthèse et de la systématisation des doctrines bouddhiques par Asaṅga, il y aurait eu parmi ses

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prédécesseurs un maître qui aurait exercé une très grande influence sur lui et qui serait parvenu à être honoré comme Māitreya-bodhisattva; ou bien, ces doctrines auraient été déjà transmises comme l'enseignement de Māitreyabodhisattva parmi les maîtres antérieurs à Asaṅga. Quoi qu'il en soit, le fait est que ce ṣāstra est attribué à Māitreyabodhisattva résidant dans le monde Tuṣita comme futur bouddha, objet de vénération de tous les bouddhistes. Et à mon avis, c'est qu'on estimait alors que l'idée profonde du mahāyāna n'avait jamais dû être exposée aux ṣrāvaka, qui n'auraient pu saisir que le sens littéral des Āgama, mais aux bodhisattva seulement, qui, eux, étaient à même de comprendre le sens caché (saṃdhyartha) du mahāyāna. Or, un tel sens du mahāyāna ne saurait être compris, bien entendu, par les hommes ordinaires; personne autre n'aurait donc pu être à même de le comprendre, et de l'expliquer que ce bodhisattva célèbre qui, selon la croyance, apparaîtra un jour dans ce monde comme bouddha succédant au Bouddhaṣākyamuni.

C'est ainsi qu'on aura été amené à tenir Māitreya pour l'explicateur du sens profond et caché du mahāyāna, tel que le démontre le titre même de Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, texte principal sur lequel s'appuyait l'école de Yogācāravijñaptivāda. Au cours du développement des doctrines du Mahāyāna, on est arrivé à insister avec plus de force sur le sens caché des paroles du Bouddha que sur le sens littéral de ses enseignements. Et en révélateur de ce sens caché, il me semble que le futur bouddha Māitreya s'est introduit dans le milieu des savants de l'école de Yogācāravijñaptivāda."

The Title and the Contents: At the end of the fifth chapter of the ṭikā, the Yānānuttaryaparicchada, the chapter on the Supreme Path, we find a short explanation of the title. The sanskrit original of that explanation has been lost, but was restored from the Tibetan by Prof. Yamaguchi, at p. 270 of his edition. Here I give a translation from the sanskrit:

"Because in this śāstra the Middle Path has been shown, which is beyond the extremities of eternalism [of the soul] and nihilistic materialism it is called Analysis of the Middle Path. It is an exposition as well as an elucidation thereof. And so it is the analysis of the Middle Path and the Extremes because it explains both of

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them. And here the Middle Path is the Advayadharmadhātu, the Monistic Ultimate Essence of Existence, the extremes being the imputation [of real, separate, phenomenal existence on the one hand], nihilism on the other hand. Some, [the extreme Mādhyamikas] maintain that the Middle Path is the Tathatā, the Unique Absolute because it implies the negation of the first extreme, [i.e. the extreme of real phenomenal existence]. But others [the vijñānavādins] say: It has been shown that it is the Abhūtaparikalpa, the Constructive Ideation, the Stream of Consciousness or the Ideal Reality [in which is implied] the negation of the first anta, [i.e. the separate reality of phenomenal existence] which is the Middle Path.

This Middle Path is difficult to comprehend but nevertheless essential. It is difficult to be understood because it is the object of that wisdom which transcends logic and dialectics, i.e. because it is the object of the Nirvikalpajñāna, the Pure Non-Discriminative Wisdom [of the Saints]. And it is essential because it cannot be known by the controversialists, the opponents. Its [mystical] essentiality (sāratā) has been explained according to the truth [as the activity of the Bodhisattva on the Path of Final Deliverance, for it consists of the obtainment and practising of the ten Pāramitās the ten Transcendental Virtues] (See Y. p. 201). The Middle Path is "Great", for it has been taught as the Bodhisattvacaryā, the Course of the Bodhisattva [who pursues the spiritual welfare] of himself and others. And so it is Universal (sarvārtham), for it has been taught with regard to the three "Vehicles", the Paths of the Hīnayānistic Arhats, i.e. the 'Srāvakas, the Hearers and the Pratyekabuddhas, and the Path of the Bodhisattvas, [i.e. the Mahāyāna]. Finally it means the renunciation of the Obscurations of Moral Defilement and Ignorance."

Summarily we have here the contents of the subject-matter as contained in the five chapters of the Madhyāntavibhāga. These successively are the chapters on Lakṣaṇa, Āvaraṇa, Tattva, Pratīpakṣabhāvanā and Yānānuttarya. In the first we find an exposition of the nine characteristics of the "stream of constructive thought", which are responsible for the thought-construction of the separate reality of phenomenal existence and an exposition of the true essence of the "stream of constructive thought", i.e. its Non-Substantiality or Absolute Truth. In the second chapter is contained

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a detailed explanation of the obscurations of moral defilement and ignorance which find their origin in this "stream of constructive thought" whereas in the third chapter, the chapter on the Absolute Truth, a profound analysis of the three aspects of existence in their relation to ten aspects of the Absolute Truth has been given. The fourth chapter contains a description of the 37 Bodhipakṣadharmāḥ, the practices and principles which are conducive to the attainment of Enlightenment and as such the counteragent of the obscurations of moral defilement and ignorance. They are described such as they are practised by the followers of the Hinayānistic 'Srāvakayāna and such as they are perfected by the non-discriminative wisdom (nirvikalpajñāna) of the Mahāyāna Saints. The fifth chapter describes the Supreme Path of the Bodhisattva.

Starting point and central conception of the idealistic system as set forth in the Madhyāntavibhāga is the Abhūtaparikalpa, which I have rendered by Constructive Ideation. By it is meant the foundation of phenomenal existence, not phenomenal existence itself. It is a kind of "Cogito, ergo sum" but without a real, individual thinker. It is "thought" here which is real, not the thinker (subject) nor that which is being thought (object). The Constructive Ideation is seen as a dynamic stream of consciousness, the component parts of which, i.e. the dharmas, the ideas or elements of existence arise in causally dependent origination. These elements, which we might call the noumena, being consciousness, are capable of objectivizing and are therefore responsible for phenomenal existence. As Dr. Obermiller has it (JGIS, vol. I, p. 113): "they are the substratum on whose basis the attribution of the superimposed essences and qualities is made: at the same time, as moments of consciousness, they are the agents, which bring about the superimposition, inasmuch as the habit of objectivizing forms a property of the stream of consciousness to which they belong." So, the Constructive Ideation constructs the phenomenal world, the world of the subject-object relation. The Phenomenal world cannot have for that reason, real, independent existence, since it is only a product of sense perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna). (See Y. p. 118). This Constructive Ideation therefore, although real in itself, is devoid of its superimposed, phenomenal aspect or to put it otherwise: From

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the transcendental point of view it is nonsubstantial inasmuch as this phenomenal aspect is concerned. And this being non-substantial, i.e. its Non-Substantiality is at the same time its true essence, its sole reality. As has been said before, the elements of existence, the "ideas" arise in dependent origination. Every dharma conditions all the other dharmas. Therefore there is no dharma, no "idea" which has an entire reality of its own. Existence cannot be seen as a "plurality" of realities, such as the Sarvāstivādins thought. For this would conduce to "realism". Only the Pure Idea, the "Whole" of the Stream of Consciousness is real and its component parts, the ideas are only real, inasmuch as they represent that "Whole". The Constructive Ideation is therefore conditioned existence. It is the Causally Dependent Aspect. And it is this very "Whole" which is the sole reality, the Ultimate Essence of Existence. Since this is the Whole, it is static and absolute, not subject to change or modification. It transcends the seeming plurality of the noumenal reality as well as the duality, i.e. the subject and object relation of the phenomenal world, and as such it is the Unconditioned, the Absolute Aspect. And since it is only the "Whole", the Unique Absolute which is real and existent it is at the same time, the real background of the unreality, i.e. the Non-Substantiality of separate phenomenal existence, such as this finds its expression in individual existence of living beings on the one hand and objective, external reality on the other hand. Hence, we have here two forms of Non-Substantiality which are from the transcendental point of view only one:

The Non-Substantiality of the Superimposed Phenomenal Aspect (1). The phenomena are non-substantial because they are the product of constructive imagination superimposed on and by the ideas which are, just as with the Mādhyamikas dependent and therefore relative. Now this Constructive Ideation, such as it is in itself, the "bare reality, free from the differentiation into subject and object" (Oberm.) has for its true essence this Non-Substantiality. The Non-Substantiality is in the Constructive Ideation just as this is in the Non-Substantiality. And this true essence which rises beyond constructive thought and which is the object of the Saints Contemplation, is the true background of the unreality of everything which is conceived as apart from it and

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external to it. Hence it is also Non-Substantiality (2).

We must not confound however this Absolute Essence with non-existence as such, for this would conduce to nihilism. And it is exactly the extremities of realism (samāropa) and nihilism (apavāda) which must be avoided. The Non-Substantiality as exposed here is not non-existence, but a reality although a reality which cannot be grasped by constructive dialectical thought. For it transcends every form of objectivity and becomes itself non-substantial as soon as it forms the object of discursive thought, or to put it otherwise, as soon as it is brought within the pale of a subject-object relation. It represents the pure, monistic principle of existence and forms as such the substratum of moral and spiritual purification. The Constructive Ideation or Ideal Reality is neither identical with, nor different from the Non-Substantiality. It is not different in so far as the ideas, the dharmas, are seen as (dynamic) manifestations of the Ultimate Essence. For the Ultimate Essence, the Dharmatā is to be recognized or inferred from the dharmas on which it depends. We might compare it to impermanence, which is being inferred from things impermanent. For things impermanent come and go, impermanence however remains. The Non-Substantiality is the Universal, the General Essence of all elements of existence and in this respect there is no difference. There is no identity however, in so far as the Constructive Ideation is responsible for phenomenal existence which is the product of its objectivizing capacity. The Constructive Ideation being neither different from nor identical with the Ultimate Reality is for this reason, in its true essence, likewise inexpressible. Inasmuch as it is not identical, it becomes the cause of the saṃsāra, i.e. phenomenal life such as this is conditioned by the twelve coöperating members of dependent origination, the twelve nidānas. The Constructive Ideation is then Avidyā, Ignorance or rather the Transcendental Illusion. And it is this Transcendental Illusion which is the immediate cause of passion (kleśa). Passion however produces action (karma) and both they are the causes of individual existence (janma). And as such the Constructive Ideation is the source of moral and spiritual defilement. And it is the Transcendental Illusion because it prevents the origination of that Transcendental Wisdom, which has for its object the Unique Absolute. So the Constructive

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Ideation is synonymous with the mind and the mental phenomena which are active in or belong to the three spheres of (empirical) existence, viz. the world of Carnal Desire or of Gross Bodies, the world of Pure Matter or of Etherial Bodies and the Immaterial Sphere. The Constructive Ideation is also called *bhrāntivijñāna*, i.e. consciousness which creates the illusory world of phenomena. Now, although the separate phenomena are unreal, the potentiality of creating this illusion is real because it is necessary for the attainment of final deliverance from the bonds of passion and ignorance. For if this *bhrāntivijñāna* should not exist, only the Non-Substantiality would exist and all sentient beings would be delivered without effort. Our empirical knowledge however teaches us, that nobody can be delivered without effort and therefore the illusion is necessary, must have some degree of reality as it conduces to the obtainment of Final Deliverance. For spiritual purification (*vyavadāna*) is established in relation to moral and spiritual defilement (*samkleśa*), a conception which has been developed fully in later, *tāntric* literature. (Cf. L. d. I. V. Poussin, *A propos du Cittaviśuddhiprakaraṇa d'Āryadeva*, BSOS, VI, p. 411 ff.).

The idealistic system of the *Yogācāra - Vijñānavāda* school as founded by *Maitreya-Asaṅga* is known by several names: *vijñaptimātratā*, *vijñānamātratā*, *cittamātratā*. "A pure Idea not differentiated into subject and object as a final Absolute, and reducing all other ideas to illusions" is assumed. (BL., I, p. 525). The system as exposed in the *Madhyānta* is called *abhūtaparikalpamātratā* (see p. 18, n. 7), which is expressive of the same Pure Idea and reducing likewise all other ideas to illusions. For exactly these very ideas are responsible for the wrong notion of the separate reality of the subject-object relation. Nevertheless, phenomena do exist as illusion and this must have a valid cause. Hence, the particular characteristic of the Constructive Ideation is explained. This particular characteristic is consciousness in its various differentiations. Consciousness is the structure of the Constructive Ideation just as the Constructive Ideation is the nature of consciousness. For this consciousness arises in the appearance of sentient beings, external objects, the empirical ego and the ideas, without any real external object. All the categories of phenomenal existence are merely internal reflections or phantasms of the mind and the mental phenomena.

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They are mere ideation and have no separate reality. Apparently the objective side of existence is denied by means of establishing the reality of its subjective side. For consciousness implies subjectivity. But whereas it has been shown that the objective side of existence has no reality of its own, the subjective side cannot be real, since subject and object are always mutually dependent. Therefore not only the separate reality of all phenomena is denied, but also the "mere ideation" itself, i.e. consciousness in its various manifestations. So first all objective phenomena are reduced to subjective ideas, subsequently all ideas to ideation and finally this last is merged in the Pure Idea of the Omnipresent Unique Absolute. To realize this, logic and dialectical thought are not sufficient, though the empirical validity thereof is not denied, and, as is clear from the text itself, even presupposed. The full realization is accomplished on the various stages and degrees of the Path of the Bodhisattva. It is a process of mystical contemplation and intuition which results in the cognition that, from the transcendental point of view, perception and non-perception are identical. For, where neither a perceiver nor the perceived is real, perception cannot be true perception. (Cf. *Mél.*, II, pp. 160 f). From this point of view the Unique Absolute and the Constructive Ideation are identical, or to put it in another way, there is no difference between Nirvāṇa and Saṃsāra inasmuch as its true essence is concerned. Starting from this point of view it could be incomprehensible how causes, conditions and effects can exist. For this reason, the *pravṛttilakṣaṇa*, the characteristic of activity - causation is explained. As has been said before, the Constructive Ideation in its quality of dynamic aspect of the Absolute is conceived as an uninterrupted stream of conscious moments which arise (and disappear again) in causally dependent origination. By means of their objectivizing capacity they are responsible for phenomenal existence, and as in this objectivizing capacity action is implied, we have here at the same time causation, since all activity necessarily involves its natural effects.

It is this action with its effects, which gives form to the stream of the conscious moments. For this stream in its totality is conceived as a subconscious and unconscious store of ideas, (*ālayavijñāna*) wherein all the seeds and germs of phenomenal existence

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repose. From these seeds seven other forms of active consciousness (pravṛttivijñāna) are developed which represent all the subjective and objective categories of phenomenal existence. And as phenomenal existence means activity, it leaves the traces of its activity behind in the sub-conscious store, as new seeds and germs of futur phenomenal life. We may therefore say that phenomenal life is the result of an "eternal play" of subconscious and conscious thought which condition each other. And it is exactly this "play" regulated by causes and conditions, which forms the internal activity of the Constructive Ideation. It is this real internal activity which is called bhrāntivijñāna i.e. consciousness which creates the illusory world of phenomena. And by realizing that this illusion is only "appearance" and not "reality", one understands its non-substantiality, which in its positive aspect is the Ultimate Essence of all elements of existence.

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WORSHIP. — THE STRUCTURE OF THE SCRIPTURE.

Y. p. 1.

T. p. 3.

Inasmuch as the learned commonly proceed to work after having paid homage to their spiritual preceptor and to the divine nature of faith ¹⁾, he [Vasubandhu] ²⁾, in order to make known that he is desirous of composing a commentary ³⁾ of the Madhyāntavi-bhāgasūtra while following the course of the learned, has proceeded in the analysis of the meaning ⁴⁾ thereof, after having first paid obeisance to the composer and to the expounder ⁵⁾ of the same. It is with regard to this, that he says:

“To the composer of this scripture, etc.” ⁶⁾

By acting thus, what good is obtained?

Merit ⁷⁾ is accumulated for them, who show obeisance to the virtuous and beneficent. And when because of their enterprised merit is accumulated, as removers of obstacles ⁸⁾ they will accomplish with slight labour [their] unvitiated [aims]. Or rather, all this: “To the composer of this scripture etc.”, has been said in order to bring out the authority ⁹⁾ of the sūtra-text and its composer, of the expounder and his commentary, by a right exposition of the doctrines of the composer and the statements of the expounder ¹⁰⁾.

Y. p. 2.

In this respect the authority of the sūtra-text is brought forward through the exposition of the subject-matter dealt with by the composer. For, the composer of this kārikā-scripture is Ārya Maitreya. “He is separated [from the attainment of Buddhahood] only by one birth; accordingly he has attained the highest culmination of the Bodhisattva’s supernatural faculties ¹¹⁾, power of memory ¹²⁾, degrees of intense penetration ¹³⁾, states of transic meditation ¹⁴⁾, controlling powers ¹⁵⁾ degrees of steadfastness ¹⁶⁾, and degrees of liberation ¹⁷⁾, and has entirely removed the obscurations ¹⁸⁾ on all the stages of Bodhisattva perfection ¹⁹⁾”. The commentary ²⁰⁾ acquires authority by means of being rightly set forth by the expounder. Now the expounder thereof is Ācārya Asaṅga. The venerable Master Vasubandhu after having heard it from him, composed a commentary upon it. Both of them were possessed of the highest wisdom; thence in consequence of their faculty of remembering and teaching an unerring knowledge, the

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meaning of the sūtra has here been taught by them without fail.

T. p. 4.

Thus the authority of the commentary is brought out. It is in this way that the sūtra-text and its commentary acquire authority through those individuals [whose words are regarded as] authoritative²¹). And they, who have their refuge in the dharma²²) understand the true meaning of the sūtra and the commentary. And when a well-defined judgment²³) has been formed, it derives its authority²⁴) from the confidence in the author and the expounder; it is not only authoritative because of its mere belonging to the traditional doctrines of the philosophers²⁵). Therefore the authority of the composer and the expounder is brought out.

Now it is to be explained which is the essential quality of a śāstra²⁶). What is it, that is called a śāstra? The [spiritual] information²⁷) revealed by means of an aggregate of names, words and syllables is a śāstra. Or rather, that information, which is imparted by means of such particular words as convey the supermundane wisdom²⁸), constitutes a śāstra. How is [that spiritual] information composed or explained? Since it has its origin in a composer or in an expounder, there is no fault with regard to the teachings²⁹) here. And as by [this] teaching there is a particular production of moral practice, transic meditation and higher wisdom³⁰), the righteous pupil abstains in bodily action, speech and thought from works which do not produce moral provisions³¹), and performs acts which do produce them. Or rather, a śāstra is a śāstra because it teaches as to its special character³²). And this is the character of a śāstra: That teaching, which by its repeated and concentrated practice becomes clear and evident and [therefore] puts an end to all passions with their residues³³). It rescues us from [phenomenal] existence³⁴) and from [re-birth in a realm of] misery³⁵), which is made horrible by incessant and enduring various violent pains³⁶).

Y. p. 3.

Therefore, because it rules over those enemies which are the passions and because it rescues from [phenomenal] existence and from misery, it bears the special character of a śāstra. And these two [advantages, viz. this ruling and saving] are found in the whole Mahāyāna and in the whole interpretation³⁷) thereof, and nowhere else. Therefore it is a śās - tra. And thus it is said:

“That which “chastises” our enemies, i.e. all passions and saves

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[us] from the misery and phenomenal existence, is, owing to its "chastising" ³⁸) and by virtue of its "saving" ³⁹) a śāstra. Those two advantages are not to be found in other philosophic doctrines" ⁴⁰).

T. p. 5.

Asya, "of this" means that there is a direct reference ⁴¹) to [the treatise], in consequence of one taking to heart the Madhyāntavibhāgakārikaśāstra which is a compendium of the seven subjects according to the Triple Vehicle, procuring the removal of the obscuration of Moral Defilement and of that of Ignorance ⁴²).

Praṇetāram, "to the composer" means "to the maker", ["to the author"]. Although this verbal root [nī] has the meaning of "to lead", yet owing to its being compounded with the preposition "pra" it must be understood in the special sense of "to make" ⁴³). For it is said:

Owing to a preposition [being added] a different meaning of a root must of necessity be acknowledged ⁴⁴) in like manner as the sweetness of Gaṅgā's waves [is changed by its mixing with] the ocean's brine.

Y. p. 4.

Sugatātmajam ⁴⁵), "Son of the Sugata"; Sugata [refers to him] who, having removed the obscuration of moral defilement with its residues and that of ignorance, has perfectly attained to the Apratiṣṭhita Nirvāṇa, the "Altruistic Nirvāṇa". And he, the Sugata, having removed all the obscurations with their residues possesses a full knowledge of alle the elements of existence ⁴⁶) and is the upholder of all [superhuman] power. He has a shape of inconceivable might ⁴⁷) like the wishfulfilling gem ⁴⁸) and is capable of putting into practice all the rules of altruism ⁴⁹) in behalf of all living creatures, without effort ⁵⁰). He has the special character of non-discriminative wisdom ⁵¹). His essential nature ⁵²) is the viśuddhi-tathatā, the Essence of Purity, since the non-discriminative wisdom arises therefrom. Sugatātmaja means "born from or in him, i.e. the Sugata" ⁵³).

Or rather sugatātmaja means "born with the essence ⁵⁴) of a Sugata". As has been said in another Sūtra: "He is born in the race ⁵⁵) of the Tathāgatas in consequence of his having obtained the character essential to a [Tathāgata].

If this be so, "to a Bodhisattva who [like Ārya Maitreya] abides on the tenth stage, all the things cognizable in all their forms

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appear, as clearly as a myrobalan fruit on the palm of one's hand; [the Bodhisattva at that time] is similar to one whose eyes are covered by a very fine veil" ⁵⁶). To a Buddha on the contrary [they appear] as to one, from whose eyes the cover has been removed; that is the distinction. And here "Son of the Sugata" refers to him who minds neither gain nor honour and whose authorship of the śāstra shows the perfection ⁵⁷) of his knowledge to compose a śāstra. [It also shows] the perfection of his compassion as well as the perfection of his wisdom ⁵⁸).

Vaktāram means "the maker of an expository treatise" ⁵⁹). This is connected with the word abhyarhya, "having honoured". Others say that it is also [connected with] "Son of the Sugata". And this again stands for Ārya Asaṅga. For this scripture has been revealed and explained to him through the spiritual influence of Ārya Maitreya as a continuation of the Doctrine ⁶⁰).

The word **ca**, "and" is used to express collectiveness or plurality and, as an additional word, to complete the pāda [i.e. metri causā]. Here it denotes that he has honoured also other Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, not only the author and the expounder.

Y. p. 5. To whom was he the expounder? **To us** ⁶¹) **and other such individuals**. [Those] of whom we are the beginning, they are individuals like we. To those individuals [he was the expounder]. And he explained the [original] teaching faultlessly, after it became clear to himself.

Abhyarhya ⁶²), "having honoured" means abhyarcya, "having paid homage". Abhitaḥ is equal to purataḥ, "before, in front, in presence of. [It therefore means that] he has through body, speech and mind revered and honoured him, who is as it were personally ⁶³) standing before him [i.e. before the commentator].

T. p. 6. [To the question]: "What shall you do after having paid obeisance to the author and the expounder of the treatise", he answers:

I shall exert myself in the sifting of the meaning, viz. I shall make an effort to determine the significance, to explain the meaning or to analyse [the subject-matter]. Here the locative ⁶⁴) conveys the sense of purpose. Thus it means: for the purpose of analysing the subject-matter. Here the subject-matter is in reality **the structure of the treatise** ⁶⁵). The subjects are seven in number which are explained in this treatise.

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For what purpose has this treatise been composed? In order to produce the true non-discriminative wisdom⁶⁶) of the Buddhas, the Blessed. And as it teaches as to the unreality of the elements of existence⁶⁷) [as separate entities], the removal of the obscurations of moral defilement and ignorance with all their residues⁶⁸) is achieved by reason of the production of the non-discriminative wisdom and by reason of the constant practice⁶⁹) thereof. Now about the unreality of the separate elements of existence, conflicting opinions⁷⁰) exist. [Some hold that] the “dharmanairātmya” is the voidness, the non-existence of all the elements of existence⁷¹). [Others maintain that it is] the exclusion of an agent, a subject of internal activity⁷²). Therefore, in order to refute this and in order to set forth the true “nairātmya”, this treatise has been undertaken.

According to others [this śāstra has been composed] in order to remove the non-understanding and the mis-understanding of those who do not understand or wrongly understand the characteristics, the obscurations etc., by producing a right knowledge [with regard to these subjects].

Or rather in order to remove the shrinking [which seizes] the heart⁷³) of the Bodhisattvas with regard to the aspects of the five-fold object of knowledge⁷⁴), to wit:

1. the Universe⁷⁵).
2. the living beings⁷⁶).
3. the Doctrine⁷⁷).
4. the Discipline⁷⁸).
5. the Skilful means⁷⁹).

which, each by itself, are hard to comprehend in consequence of endless differentiation⁸⁰), he says:

the Characteristics, the Obscurations, the Absolute Truth, [etc.]⁸¹).

Y. p. 6.

In this respect we have, to begin with, the establishment of the basic part of the treatise.⁸²).

Tatra, “in this respect” refers to the determination of the subjects⁸³) of the treatise, or to the treatise [itself]. Āditah, “to begin with” means prathamatah, “firstly”. The [word] “śāstra” means vivaraṇa, “interpretation, comment, explanation etc.”⁸⁴). The basic conception thereof, refers in short to a general summary⁸⁵) [of the subjects] or to the subjects as substrate⁸⁶) [of the śāstra].

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Just as the human body ⁸⁷), which is the substrate of the external as well as internal bases of cognition ⁸⁸) is called structure, body, in the same manner are those subjects which form the basis for the composition of the *sāstra*, its structure. And these seven subjects are "The Characteristics" etc. *Vyavasthāpanam*, "establishment" is called *prajñapti*, teaching, instruction; it means in reality "abhidhānam", naming, defining.

Now the basic part certainly will be recognized, while understanding the *sāstra*. Therefore it is useless to explain it at the beginning. No, it is not useless, for [it is done with a view] to confer benefit on the disciples ⁸⁹). For a disciple who has understood the meaning [of the subject matter, as a whole], easily becomes acquainted with the details when they are set forth. It is just as a horse, which when trained in a variety of ways ⁹⁰) runs without fear. It is not otherwise ⁹¹).

T. p. 7.

[The statement]: "These seven subjects are declared in this scripture" indicates that the basic part of the scripture is complete ⁹²). Ete, "these" refers to those "characteristics" etc. which are set forth. *Sapta*, "seven" is a numeral. It has been employed in order to know the limit ⁹³) [of the sumtotal of the subjects]. *Arthāḥ*, "subjects" are so called because they are desired; in other words: they are accomplished, achieved. *Asmiṅ chāstre* stands for "in this treatise, called *Madhyāntavibhāga*". *Ukta*, *uddiṣṭa* means "taught" or "determined". *Evam*, *tathā* is a particle meaning "for that purpose".

Lakṣaṇa, "characteristic" is so called, because through it [things] are characterized ⁹⁴). It is of two kinds, viz.: *saṃkleśalakṣaṇa*, the characteristic of defilement and *vyavadānalakṣaṇa*, the characteristic of purification. And here the characteristic of defilement is of nine kinds, beginning with "*abhūtaparikalpo sti*" ⁹⁵) and ending with "*saptadhābhūtakalpanāt*" ⁹⁶). In the remaining half the characteristic of purification has been explained ⁹⁷). Now, if you are right in your assertion that "lakṣaṇa is so called, because through it things are characterized", there must be a distinction between *lakṣaṇa*, the characteristic on the one hand and defilement and purification on the other ⁹⁸). No, that is not the case, for a *lakṣaṇa* is really the essential nature ⁹⁹) of things. For instance, the element of earth has the characteristic

Y. p. 7.

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of being solid ¹⁰⁰), and the element of earth is inseparable from solidity. Alternatively a lakṣaṇa [is so called] because it is characterized [by itself] ¹⁰¹). Thus defilement and purification are lakṣaṇas, for defilement is characterized by defilement itself and purification by purification itself.

Or rather the characteristic of both defilement and purification is of two kinds, to wit, a particular characteristic ¹⁰²) and a general characteristic ¹⁰³).

Āvaraṇa, obscuration, obstruction, screen ¹⁰⁴). This obscures ¹⁰⁵) the kuśala-dharmas, the good elements of existence ¹⁰⁶). Or the kuśala-dharmas are obstructed ¹⁰⁷) by it, for through it, they are prevented from originating ¹⁰⁸). This again is of fifty-three kinds ¹⁰⁹). **Tattvam**, Truth, Absolute Truth. This here is just "That". Its being is "Thatness" ¹¹⁰), viz., it is a non-confusion ¹¹¹) [of the mind as to the true nature of things]. This again is tenfold ¹¹²). Because it removes the vipakṣa, [the perverted life and views] pakṣa, [right] notion has here the meaning of **pratipakṣa**, anti-dote, remedy, and this is the Path. The repeated practising ¹¹³) thereof is [called] **Bhāvanā**, **Concentrated Contemplation** ¹¹⁴). **Avasthā**. As to the "degrees" of the [Path] ¹¹⁵), these are particular sequential progressions ¹¹⁶). Of these degrees again, there are nineteen kinds, to begin with "gotrāvasthā" ¹¹⁷). **Phalaprāpti** is the attainment of the fruit, and this consists of fifteen kinds, to begin with "vipākaphala" ¹¹⁸). **Yānānuttarya**; yāna, "vehicle, path" it is [called] because one proceeds by means of it. [This] Path, and its being unequalled is called "The supreme Path". It is threefold, viz., pratipattiyānuttarya etc. ¹¹⁹).

T. p. 8.

Saptamo 'rthaḥ, "The seventh subject" ¹²⁰). This is he says for the sake of regular succession. Only so many subjects are [here] explained and no others than these. Now, this regular succession [has been adopted] because it is in agreement with the supermundane knowledge ¹²²). And so it is that a Bodhisattva who is firmly fixed in moral conduct ¹²³), first should thoroughly practise the understanding of defilement and purification, when abiding on the stage of adhimuktīcaryā ¹²⁴). After that he should understand that which is an obstacle for him in regard of [the origination] of the good elements. For, as long as the [obscurations] are not destroyed, deliverance ¹²⁵) is impossible; and as long as they

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Y. p. 8.

are not recognized ¹²⁶) they cannot be discarded, as the defect ¹²⁷) is not discovered. For that reason, "the object ¹²⁸) [of the Saints concentration] owing to which the liberation of the mind from the obscurations is attained, is to be known as Tattva, Absolute Truth" ¹²⁹). [And] therefore, the repeated practice ¹³⁰) [of realizing] this object [of the Saint's concentration] owing to which there is a destruction of the obscurations, is to be understood as Pratiṣṭhā, Concentrated Contemplation on the Antidote. The [progressive] stages ¹³¹) of this Concentrated Contemplation on the Antidote, [i.e. Enlightenment], due to the [dialectical process of] decreasing the "perverted life and views" ¹³²) and increasing the Antidote ¹³³) are therefore to be known as goṭrāvasthā, the Stage of [Spiritual] Lineage ¹³⁴), etc. Then, while [the disciple] turns his thoughts towards the supermundane essences ¹³⁵), the "Fruits" ¹³⁶) [arise]. And these fruits are to be known as "The Fruit of Entering the Stream" etc. ¹³⁷) And all this is common ¹³⁸) to Śrāvakas etc. and Bodhisattvas ¹³⁹). As has been said in the sūtra: "Pasturing in the field of good conduct ¹⁴⁰), even a monk ¹⁴¹) becomes acquainted with the discipline of the Śrāvakas, pasturing in the field of good conduct, he even becomes acquainted with the discipline of the Pratyekabuddhas; even with the discipline of the Bodhisattvas he becomes acquainted, if he pastures in the field of good conduct." But the Supreme Path, the seventh subject, is [that] Supreme Path of the Bodhisattvas which is not shared [by the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas].

Others however say that the explanation of "Lakṣaṇa" has been undertaken first in order to make one experienced ¹⁴²) in the characteristics of defilement and purification. Defilement in this respect is obscuration; purification, Tattva, Absolute Truth. And because the removal of the obscurations is [achieved] through the realization of the Absolute Truth [the explanation of] "Āvaraṇa" and "Tattva" [respectively is undertaken immediately after "lakṣaṇa"] Next, in order to show the means by which these [obscurations] are removed, the Path with its subdivisions, being an Antidote ¹⁴³) [against them, has been explained]. The degrees in this respect [are set forth] for the purpose of pointing out the inferior, the intermediate and the highest subdivisions ¹⁴⁴) in the beginning, middle and end of this Path. And as the degrees lead

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towards their corresponding fruits, immediately thereafter the "Fruit" [is dealt with]. And all this is common to Bodhisattvas and Śrāvakas etc.; therefore in order to elucidate the mahāyāna-doctrine ¹⁴⁵) [which the Bodhisattvas have] not in common [with the Śrāvakas etc.], the "Yānāntaryā", the Supreme Path. [has been set forth].

T. p. 9. Others again say: "Lakṣaṇa" has been explained first, in order to make known the characteristics of "being" and "nonbeing" ¹⁴⁶). Having comprehended the characteristics, one must remove the obscurations and realize ¹⁴⁷) the Tattva, the Absolute Truth. Therefore immediately after [the chapter on Lakṣaṇa we have the chapters on] "Āvaraṇa" and "Tattva". The Concentrated Contemplation on the Antidote is here the means ¹⁴⁸) owing to which both the removal [of the obscurations] and the realization [of the Absolute Truth] are achieved. The various degrees of the Path form the gradation, the stages of advance ¹⁴⁹) of this [Concentrated Contemplation]. And the removal [of the obscurations] effected thereby is the "Fruit". In order to elucidate that immediately thereafter the Yānāntaryā, the Supreme Path [is explained], this order of succession [has been adopted] ¹⁵⁰).

Y. p. 9. Others however opine: "Lakṣaṇa" has been taught in order to remove [the false conceptions of] nihilism ¹⁵¹) and imputed realism ¹⁵²) [caused by] the delusion of the living beings ¹⁵³) with regard to the existence and non-existence of phenomena ¹⁵⁴). "Āvaraṇa" [is taught] for the sake of making him experienced in the obscurations, who has removed that delusion ¹⁵⁵). Since the "Absolute Truth" is obscured thereby, it is [taught] immediately after ["Āvaraṇa"] for the sake of the right understanding of it. And as the obscurations are removed through the fathoming of the Absolute Truth, issuing from the practice of Concentrated Contemplation ¹⁵⁶), immediately after "Tattva" the Pratipakṣabhāvanā, the Concentrated Contemplation on the Antidote [has been taught]. And for the sake of a right understanding of its subdivisions ¹⁵⁷), the degrees [are set forth]. By the degrees [of the Path], their "Fruits" must be produced; therefore "Phalam" is [taught] immediately after "Avasthā" just to make one thoroughly versed in it. All this [happens] when one has recourse to the Mahāyāna, the Great Path; thence the Yānāntaryā, the Supreme Path is taught in the end.

THE CHARACTERISTICS CONSTRUCTIVE IDEATION.

A. THE CHARACTERISTIC OF BEING AND NON-BEING.

Y. p. 10. Beginning with the characteristics, [the author] says in this respect:

K. I. 1 Constructive Ideation¹⁾ is real²⁾. In it duality does not [absolutely] exist. Non-Substantiality³⁾ however exists in it. In this [Non-Substantiality] too, that [Constructive Ideation] is found⁴⁾.

Tatra, "in this respect" means: It is with reference to [its] characteristic(s)⁵⁾ which belong to the seven subjects,⁶⁾ viz., "lakṣaṇa", "āvaraṇa" etc., indicated [according to the sūtratext] that he says: **Constructive Ideation is real**, etc. [The rule is]: "Like the [original] exposition⁷⁾ [of the doctrine] thus the exegesis⁸⁾ [thereof]", and as "lakṣaṇa" is expounded first, the [detailed] explanation of it is undertaken first in preference to the remaining [subjects].

Some maintain that, just like the horns of a hare, all the elements of existence⁹⁾ are in all respects Non-Existent¹⁰⁾. Therefore, in order to refute this entire nihilism¹¹⁾, he says: **Constructive Ideation is real**. Add: "svabhāvatas", real in itself.

It might be questioned: Is not here an inconsistency with the sūtra¹²⁾, for in the sūtra it is stated: "All the elements of existence are śūnya, non-substantial". No, there is no inconsistency. For [it has been said]: **In it duality does not [absolutely] exist**. Constructive Ideation, being free from the real existence of subject and object¹³⁾ is called śūnya, non-substantial, but not absolutely unreal [as a-reality-in-itself]. Therefore there is no inconsistency with the sūtra¹⁴⁾.

Now, if duality does not exist at all, just like the horns of a

T. p. 10. here, and the Constructive Ideation in reality¹⁵) exists, that is, according to Ultimate Reality¹⁶), then we have in this way the absurdity of the non-existence of Non-Substantiality¹⁷).

Y. p. 11. That is not the case, because: "**Non-Substantiality (however exists in it**". For the Non-Substantiality here means the being free from [the real existence of] subject and object and that is the Constructive Ideation. Non-Substantiality is not "nihilism"¹⁸).

If the Non-Substantiality is beyond dualism¹⁹) and existent in the Constructive Ideation, why then are we not delivered²⁰)? And if it exists, why is it not perceived²¹)? In order to remove this uncertainty, he says: "**In this [Non-Substantiality] too, that [Constructive Ideation] is found**". Because even in the Non-Substantiality the Constructive Ideation is found²²), you are not delivered. That is why it is not possible to perceive [the Non-Substantiality], just like the clarity of water [is not perceived] when it is dirty.

Or rather, it is in order to refute the [realistic] view of those, who are of opinion that sense-data etc.²³) exist, as [separate] realities²⁴), external to mind and mental states²⁵), that he says: "**Constructive Ideation is real**". It verily has a real, a substantial existence²⁶). [Its phenomena, i.e.] sense-data etc. do not exist apart²⁷) from it. They are unreal as independent entities²⁸). What is the reason? Because "**In it duality does not [absolutely exist**". For the Constructive Ideation does not perceive anything nor is it perceived by anyone. What is it than?

It is the bare reality²⁹) free from [the differentiation into] subject and object. Because [phenomena, i.e.] sense-data etc. are not perceived outside the consciousness, the consciousness arises in the appearance of sense-data etc.³⁰), as in a dream. And it is not possible³¹) that [the consciousness] should arise if its cause³²) [i.e. phenomena] did not exist. Therefore it is to be understood that just like in a dream, elsewhere too³³) the consciousness arises in the appearance of phenomena³⁴) without a [real, external] object of perception³⁵), because of the ripening of its own potentialities³⁶). Where there is no object³⁷) if a subject is absent³⁸), there can be no subject if there is no object. That is why phenomena do not exist separately from the Constructive Ideation.

If [you maintain that] there is no object, then there is neither

Y. p. 12. [an opportunity for] deliverance³⁹) [from the bonds of phenomenal existence] since an object-base of [moral and spiritual] purification⁴⁰) is missing. No, that is not the case, for [it is said]: **“Non-Substantiality however exists in it”**. The word “tu” however, has [here] the meaning of “yasmāt”, because. And the Non-Substantiality is based on purification. Although it is the principle of non-differentiation into subject and object⁴¹), you cannot say: “There is no mokṣa, no deliverance”, since the Non-Substantiality exists in the Constructive Ideation⁴²).

T. p. 11. Now, if it exists [in reality] in the Constructive Ideation, why, being existent⁴³) is it not perceived? It is not perceived because it is covered⁴⁴) by the Constructive Ideation, in the same manner as the untaintedness of the [absolute, infinite] Space⁴⁵) [is not perceived], and not because it does not exist⁴⁶). It is with regard to this, that he says: **“In this [Non-Substantiality] too, that [Constructive Ideation] is found”**.

Or rather, in order to refute [the extremity of] entire nihilism⁴⁷), he says: **“Constructive Ideation is real”**. Having so considered⁴⁸): Although there is neither entire non-existence⁴⁹), nor real existence⁵⁰) [of phenomena, the Constructive Ideation] exists as the essence of the transformations of vijñāna, consciousness⁵¹).

On the other hand he confutes those who hold that [phenomena, i.e.] sense-data etc. exist just as they appear⁵²), viz. as real, separate entities⁵³), independent⁵⁴) from the Constructive Ideation. In order to refute [this extremity of] false, imputed realism⁵⁵) [the author says]: **“In it duality does not [absolutely] exist”**. The true meaning⁵⁶) is that only the Constructive Ideation⁵⁷) exists [viz. as bare reality].

By some, the non-existence of duality is taken as extreme nihilism⁵⁸), e.g. just as the son of a barren woman⁵⁹). By others it is said that the śūnyatā of the elements of existence⁶⁰) is [to be understood as] the absence of individuality in internal activity⁶¹). Therefore in order to refute the Non-Substantiality in the sense of nihilism and to establish the true Non-Substantiality⁶²), he says: **“Non-Substantiality however exists in it”**. If it be really so that the Non-Substantiality should exist in the Constructive Ideation all living beings would be delivered without persevering effort⁶³), and this is an absurd supposition⁶⁴). That is not the

case, for "In this [Non-Substantiality] too, that [Constructive Ideation] is found". Indeed there is no deliverance in the non-purified⁶⁵) Non-Substantiality and as it requires great effort to become [morally and spiritually] purified when defiled⁶⁶), there is no deliverance without effort.

Y. p. 13.

Or rather, the lakṣaṇa, the characteristic is no other than the mentioned⁶⁷) characteristic of defilement and purification⁶⁸). Therefore in order to examine this characteristic of defilement and purification, he says: "Constructive Ideation is real" etc. The essence⁶⁹) of the Constructive Ideation is defilement because its characteristic nature is error⁷⁰). How is this to be understood? Since [the Constructive Ideation] is characterized by error. "Duality does not [absolutely] exist in it". And because it appears⁷¹) in the aspect of subject and object⁷²) which does not exist in itself⁷³) its illusive nature⁷⁴) is evident.

T. p. 12.

Now, in order to examine the nature of vyavadāna, purification he says: "Non-Substantiality however exists in it". For the essential nature of Non-Substantiality⁷⁵) is purification because it is the real background of the unreality of duality⁷⁶). And it is in this sense [viz. of purification] that even "the Path"⁷⁷) and "Extinction"⁷⁸) should be understood, since they both belong to the realm of Non-Substantiality⁷⁹). In order to show that purification is especially to be achieved⁸⁰) as an antidote⁸¹) against defilement, and that it does not exist irrespective⁸²) of this, he says: "atra", here, [i.e. in the Constructive Ideation]⁸³).

Now the following question may arise: If duality does not exist, why is here this illusion of the world⁸⁴), the more so, since [the Non-Substantiality] is existent⁸⁵)? Therefore [the author] states: "In this [Non-Substantiality] too, that [Constructive Ideation] is found". It is a false discrimination⁸⁶) in subject and object. It is as if there is [a real existence of] the aspects of elephants etc.⁸⁷) in an illusory image (phantom)⁸⁸), which [in reality] is void, non-substantial, as to the [real existence of] the aspects of elephants etc.

[The explanation of the term] abhūtaparikalpa, Constructive Ideation [is the following]: The duality in it is unreal, non-existent⁹⁰); or [the duality] is constructed by it⁹¹). And by means of the word "abhūta", constructive, unreal, he indicates that [the

phenomenal world] ⁹²) has no real existence ⁹³), in so far as it is imagined ⁹⁴) to have the nature of subject and object. By the word "parikalpa, ideation, imagination", however he indicates that an artha, an object ⁹⁵) does not exist, such as it is imagined [to exist]. In this way it has been made clear that [the Constructive Ideation] is characterized by its being free ⁹⁶) from [a real existence of] subject and object.

Y. p. 14. What then is it? The Constructive Ideation as a whole ⁹⁷) "includes the mind and the mental phenomena ⁹⁸) which relate to the past, the future and the present, represent cause and effect, relate to the three spheres of existence ⁹⁹), pertain to time without beginning, have their final issue in Nirvāṇa, and proceed in accordance with the stream of Phenomenal Life" ¹⁰⁰). Particularly however it is the false discrimination ¹⁰¹) in subject and object. In this respect the false discrimination in objects is the vijñāna, the consciousness appearing as "things" and "living beings" ¹⁰²); the false discrimination in subjects is the consciousness appearing as "ātman", ego-substance and "vijñapti", ideas representations ¹⁰³). **Duality means subject and object;** in this connexion the objects are sense-data etc. ¹⁰⁴), the subjects eye-consciousness etc. ¹⁰⁵). **Being free from the real existence** ¹⁰⁶) of **subject and object**, i.e. being free from a separate reality ¹⁰⁷) [of subject and object], that is the Non-Substantiality of the Constructive Ideation; but it is not meant that the Constructive Ideation should not exist [as a reality in itself]. The present case is similar to a rope which is non-substantial in so far as the nature of a snake [for which it may be mistaken] is concerned. The rope is at all times ¹⁰⁸) non-substantial in so far as it does not have the nature of that [snake] ¹⁰⁹), but it is not non-substantial in itself ¹¹⁰).

"In this [Non-Substantiality] too, that Constructive Ideation is found." And that is why it has been said that the [Non-Substantiality] cannot be perceived ¹¹¹), since it is contaminated by external, accidental obscurations ¹¹²), just as is the case with water etc. [which is polluted, and of which for that reason the purity cannot be seen]). **And so he observes** ¹¹³) that "this is non-substantial as to that, which does not exist in it" ¹¹⁴).

What does not exist and in what? Duality in the Constructive

Ideation. Therefore he considers the Constructive Ideation as non-substantial as to [the imputed real existence of] duality.

Again, that which is remaining here ¹¹⁵⁾ is the Existent ¹¹⁶⁾. Now, what is remaining here? The Constructive Ideation and the Non-Substantiality. These two do exist here; therefore, he who sees them as the negation of imputed realism ¹¹⁷⁾ and as the negation of nihilism ¹¹⁸⁾ understands them according to the truth ¹¹⁹⁾. In this respect, it is the negation of imputed realism because it shows that there is no duality in the Constructive Ideation; it is the negation of nihilism because it shows the real existence ¹²⁰⁾ of the Constructive Ideation, and of the Non-Substantiality.

T. p. 13.

It has been proved that the characteristic of Non-Substantiality is unperverted ¹²¹⁾. For, that which is non-substantial has real existence ¹²²⁾ and that, as to which it is non-substantial ¹²³⁾ does not really exist in that [reality] ¹²⁴⁾. The characteristic of Non-Substantiality is not unperverted, when [by it is meant] the existence of all ¹²⁵⁾ or the non-existence of all ¹²⁶⁾, for in that case, we should have to admit the non-existence of the very Non-Substantiality, which is a reductio ad absurdum.

If "things non-substantial" do not exist ¹²⁷⁾, the Non-Substantiality is not possible, since the Dharmatā, the Ultimate Essence is dependent on phenomena ¹²⁸⁾, just as impermanence etc. ¹²⁹⁾ [depends on things impermanent. On the other hand] there is no Non-Substantiality [possible] if duality [absolutely] exists.

If duality is [only] construction, imagination, just like the horns of a hare, how is it then possible that the Non-Substantiality of the Constructive Ideation does exist with regard to that [duality]? For, the sūnyatā is seen as the "voidness" of one thing with regard to another thing ¹³⁰⁾, just as when a monastery is devoid of monks.

Your reasoning is not to the point; a rope may appear in the shape of a snake ¹³²⁾, or a magic illusion ¹³³⁾ in [the shape of a] man and of other things, which [shapes] do not exist in themselves. [This rope or this illusion] is called sūnya, non-substantial, void, as to [the shape of] a snake, man and other things, in order to remove the [erroneous] notion ¹³⁴⁾ of anybody [in regard of the imagined existence of this illusionary snake, man, etc.]. In the same way, also the Constructive Ideation appearing ¹³⁵⁾ in the not

Y. p. 15.

in itself existing aspect of subject and object is called non-substantial, as to [that] duality¹³⁶) in order to remove the attachment¹³⁷) of the ignorant to the [erroneous] notion [concerning the real existence of subject and object as independent entities].

K. I. 2a. **There is neither a thing non-substantial, nor also¹³⁸) a thing substantial¹³⁹).**

Why has this śloka been composed?

In order to divulge that all things conditioned and unconditioned¹⁴⁰) have a nature of removed duality¹⁴¹). For hereby the implied meaning¹⁴²) of the doctrine of the Prajñāpāramitā, viz.: "All this is neither substantial nor non-substantial", becomes manifest as a repudiation of one-sidedness¹⁴⁴). Otherwise, the former would be inconsistent with the latter¹⁴⁵). Moreover [this śloka has been composed) in order to elucidate the "Madhyamā Pratipad", the Middle Path. Otherwise, one would be attached to the extreme [view] that there is only Non-Substantiality or to the extreme [view] that everything is "aśūnya", substantial (not non-substantial). Or this [śloka] has been made in order to recapitulate the refutation of nihilism and imputed realism¹⁴⁶). The Constructive Ideation [represents] the conditioned¹⁴⁷) since it possesses a "substance", related to cause and condition¹⁴⁸). The Non-Substantiality again, [represents] the unconditioned¹⁴⁹), since it has a nature of not being dependent upon these¹⁵⁰).

Vidhīyate means: it is taught in the Prajñāpāramitā and other texts. Sattvāt, "because of the existence", viz. of the Constructive Ideation, the conditioned is not non-substantial, since it has the Constructive Ideation as substance¹⁵¹). Asattvāt, "because of the non-existence", viz. of duality, [the conditioned] is non-substantial, as to the substance of subject and object¹⁵²). But since the whole (?)¹⁵³) of the Non-Substantiality exists in the Constructive Ideation, it is the "dharmatā", the Ultimate Essence, the Inherent Nature of it; and thus the Constructive Ideation exists even in the Non-Substantiality as the substance, the support of phenomena¹⁵⁴). In the same manner, even the unconditioned, as substance of the Ultimate Essence¹⁵⁵) is not non-substantial. It is, as a reality in itself, non-substantial¹⁵⁶) as to duality which is named non-existence¹⁵⁷).

T. p. 14.

Now this is the *Madhyamā Pratipad*, the *Middle Path*. In the *Ratnakūṭa* it has been taught: [To say: "It exists, O Kāśyapa", that is one extreme. [To say:] "It does not exist", that is the other extreme. The middle Way between both these extremes, Kāśyapā, is called the *Madhyamā Pratipad*, the *Middle Path*. It is the true cognition of the elements of existence¹⁵⁸). Thus the *Middle Path* has been taught, conformable¹⁵⁹) [to the exposition of the *Ratnakūṭa*] ¹⁶⁰).

Y. p. 16.

Sarvam, "all", i.e. the conditioned and the unconditioned. It is not *sūnya*, non-substantial in an absolute, one-sided sense¹⁶¹). For the Constructive Ideation and the Non-Substantiality thereof do exist in reality. Nor is it absolutely *aśūnya*, non-void, substantial, in consequence of the absence of duality [in it]. [To maintain that] "Nothing exists"¹⁶²) or "Everything exists"¹⁶³) would be extremes¹⁶⁴), not the *Middle Path*.

Thus he has [first] explained the Characteristics of Being and Non-Being of the Constructive Ideation. The Characteristic of Being is [absolute] existence¹⁶⁵) because [the Constructive Ideation] is characterized thereby¹⁶⁶); by [his statement:] "the Constructive Ideation exists", he therefore indicates the absolute existence of the Constructive Ideation¹⁶⁷). This is the real significance. In the same manner the Characteristic of Non-Being is non-absolute-existence¹⁶⁸) because [the Constructive Ideation] is characterized thereby. This again is the non-absolute-existence of subject and object as real, [independent] entities¹⁶⁹). Because in the Constructive Ideation duality does not exist, it has been said that even the Constructive Ideation does not exist in so far as it is substance of duality¹⁷⁰).

B. THE PARTICULAR CHARACTERISTIC.

Now he sets forth the svalakṣaṇa the Particular Characteristic¹⁾. What is the distinction between the sallakṣaṇa, the Characteristic of Being and the svalakṣaṇa, the Particular Characteristic? The Characteristic of Being is a universal, a general [characteristic]²⁾; the Particular Characteristic is a special, an individual property³⁾. If the Particular Characteristic had not been discussed here, what would be the consequence? In that case, the structure⁴⁾ of the Constructive Ideation would not have been explained. Therefore, in order to set forth the structure of it, it is said:

K. I. 3. **Consciousness arises in the appearance of things, sentient beings, (ego-) substance and ideas⁵⁾; its [external] object⁶⁾ does not exist and because of this non-existence, that [consciousness] neither exists.**

Or, since it has been shown that the Constructive Ideation exists as bare reality⁷⁾ free from [the separate reality of] subject and object, it is not comprehensible how sense-organs, objective sense-data and consciousness⁸⁾ are established⁹⁾ in this bare, real Constructive Ideation. Therefore in order to point out that this establishment is [to be understood] as a differentiated appearance¹⁰⁾ of the Constructive Ideation, he states that the Particular Characteristic of the Constructive Ideation is

T. p. 15. **the appearance as things, sentient beings, (ego-) substance and ideas, etc.**

Y. p. 17. Or, by the statement, "the Constructive Ideation is real", its mere existence¹¹⁾ is recognized, but not its nature¹²⁾. Nor is it understood, what is the cause of the attachment¹³⁾ to subjects and objects, even where [it has been stated that] no duality exists. Nor has it been explained yet, whence it is inferred that duality does not exist. Therefore, in order to explain [all] this, he says:

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[Consciousness arises] in the appearance of things, sentient beings, (ego-) substance and ideas, etc.

Vijñāna, consciousness is in this respect the nature of the Constructive Ideation¹⁴). And by this vijñāna is meant here [the consciousness] with its associates¹⁵), [i.e. the caittas, the mental-phenomena]. The consciousness however is considered to be principal¹⁶). The attachment to subjects and objects is in reality based¹⁷) on the appearance as things, sentient beings, etc.

“Its object does not exist, and because of this non-existence that [consciousness] neither [absolutely] exists.

That is the cause of the non-existence of duality. In this respect it is the “ālayavijñānā”, the store-consciousness together with its associates¹⁸), which appears as things and sentient beings. It is neutral, indifferent¹⁹), because it has a nature of retribution²⁰). The “kliṣṭaṃ manas”, the mind contaminated²¹) together with its associates appears as ego-substance. And this is called obscured and indifferent²²) because it is associated with passions²³). The six categories of consciousness beginning with visual sensation²⁴), appear as ideas, representations²⁵) [of sense-data] and are good, bad and indifferent²⁶). Therefore, by reason of the store-consciousness which is dependent on coöperating conditions²⁷) and which is contained in the driving force²⁸) [of phenomenal existence], these eight forms of consciousness together with their associates, appearing as things, sentient beings, ego-substance and ideas, respectively control²⁹) the five gatis, the five modes of phenomenal existence³⁰).

A certain peculiarity³¹) of the store-consciousness is the transformation³²) of the vāsanās, the impregnations [of the active forces which perfume as it were the store-consciousness], into good, bad and indifferent elements of existence³³). By force of that [transformation] the consciousness arises³⁴) in mutually differentiated appearances³⁵).

How is it, that the consciousness appears as a reflection³⁶) of things etc., when these things do not exist? For, if there is no existence of a man, a trunk cannot appear as such. [You are wrong], there is no inconsistency³⁷) [in our reasoning]. For, although it is the consciousness which appears as things, etc., the ignorant are attached to the [supposed] reality of things, existing separate

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from ³⁸) the consciousness, just as one who is suffering from ophthalmia sees unreal hairs ³⁹) [which he thinks to be real].

Y. p. 18. Therefore, in order to remove that attachment, it has been said: It is only the consciousness here, which appears as a reflection of things etc. Just as e.g. the unreal hairs which are reflected [before the eyes] of those, who are suffering from ophthalmia [do not exist, the consciousness] is without [a real, independent existence of] things, sentient beings, etc. Thus it has been explained that the Constructive Ideation, being dependent, relative ⁴⁰), has for its substance the eight forms of consciousness ⁴¹).

T. p. 16. As to the empirical reality of [sense-data, i.e.] visible matter etc. ⁴²) [consciousness] appears as the essence, the substance ⁴³) of visible matter, sound, odour, flavour, taste, tangibles and non-sensuous objects ⁴⁴) [i.e. mental phenomena], because of its being produced in the aspect [i.e. as the idea] thereof ⁴⁵). [Consciousness] in the appearance of sentient beings ⁴⁶) refers to [the store-consciousness] which appears as the five sense-organs [of the body] of one's own and other's individual streams of life ⁴⁷). It has the name of sentient being ⁴⁸), because it is the abode of exceeding attachment ⁴⁹) to the five sense-organs. Because it is attached by them or to them, it is [called] sattva, sentient being. The consciousness appears similar to that [sattva] ⁵⁰), by means of its being produced in the aspect thereof.

"Kliṣṭam Manas", the mind contaminated appears as ego-substance ⁵¹) because it is associated with the delusion as to [the real existence of] ātma, etc. For the mind contaminated is permanently associated with an illusion concerning the ego-substance ⁵²), with a false conception of the ego-substance ⁵³), with a craving for the ego-substance [i.e. with self-love] ⁵⁴) and with egotism ⁵⁵). And because these have the ego-substance as support-object ⁵⁶), the appearance of the mind contaminated as ego-substance is reasonable ⁵⁷).

The six categories of consciousness appear as ideas, as intimations ⁵⁸). Since [the six categories of consciousness] become manifest ⁵⁹) in the form of self-aspect of objective sense-data ⁶⁰), [i.e. as subject, as perceiver, the consciousness] appears as intimations of things by means of its being produced in the aspect thereof.

Its [external] object does not exist, viz. [the external object]

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of [the consciousness, which arises in] the fourfold aspect ⁶¹) [of things, sentient beings, ego-substance and ideas does not exist in reality]. For, in the appearance as things and sentient beings there is absence of ākāra ⁶²), [which means that they cannot be perceived in reality since they are no real external objects]; and the appearance as ego-substance and ideas, being appearance, has a false, unreal nature ⁶³). Because the appearances as things and sentient beings become manifest in the form of objects ⁶⁴), in the meaning of „anākāratva”, i.e. being without perception is implied the non-existence of real external objects ⁶⁵), since the appearances [as ego-substance and ideas], being of an unreal nature, cannot have real existence. The other two [i.e. the ego-substance and the ideas] however are not without perception ⁶⁶), since they become manifest in the form of grāhaka, subject, perceiver, self-aspect. [Their] unreal, phenomenal nature ⁶⁷) is really explained as the reason for the non-existence of real external objects. For “ākāra” is a mode of perceiving ⁶⁸) the ālambana, the object of cognition in its characteristics, such as impermanence etc. ⁶⁹) And this [mode of perception] does not exist in the [appearances either as things or sentient beings]; because they become manifest in the form of objects, the real meaning of “being without perception” is “to be no subject” ⁷⁰). Or, ākāra is the intimate and direct feeling of the object of cognition ⁷¹); and because this [intimate and direct feeling] does not exist in either [the appearance as things or as sentient beings, they are] without ākāra, because of the absence of cognition [in them] ⁷²).

Now if [the things and the sentient beings] are of a mutually distinct nature ⁷³) although they are both without ākāra, just as visible matter and the other [objective sense-data] as well as sight and the other [senses], what is this preponderance of the substance ⁷⁴) of consciousness at the expense of the objective sense-data and the senses, as these are generally known in current usage and didactical treatises, in consequence whereof the consciousness is conceived as a substance not being different from them ⁷⁵), after having repudiated ⁷⁶) them [as to their independent, separate existence]? Because it is impossible that objects should exist apart from it ⁷⁷) [there is this preponderance of the substance of consciousness]. This has thus been established: The consciousness

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being conceived as a single substance (as a monad ⁷⁸) by means of the respective special determination of the stream of life ⁷⁹), arises on account of its own potentiality ⁸⁰) in the appearance of different things etc., even where these different things in themselves ⁸¹) do not exist. For instance: The pretas, the ghosts see a stream full of pus, excrements, urine, etc., guarded on both sides by men, who carry rods in their hands. Human and other beings on the contrary perceive [a river] full of clear, cold water which is guarded by nobody. And the ascetics who practise the mental acts etc. of meditating the horrible ⁸²), constantly see the earth full of skeletons. And as far as those subjects of meditation are concerned which occupy the "entire" mind, viz., earth, water, fire etc. ⁸³), they see everything penetrated by earth, water etc. ⁸⁴) On the one hand the origination of the consciousness in a differentiated aspect is not possible without the object of its coming forth; [for this origination] is dependent on objects ⁸⁵). On the other hand [it is not possible] on account of the own-nature of external objects ⁸⁶), [since it has been proved that external objects have no real existence]. Therefore it is ascertained that the consciousness arises in its entirety in the resemblance ⁸⁷) of things, sentient beings etc., [even] without [the existence of] its real, external object. Because both the appearances as ego-substance and ideas become manifest in the aspect of subject, although no object exists, they are of an unreal appearance ⁸⁸). Or, in so far as a thing is constructed ⁸⁹) by the consciousness, it does not exist; therefore the nature of false, unreal appearance is dependent on an unreal support-object ⁹⁰), just as is the case, when some noise [is mistaken for the roarings] of tigers etc. And thus it is an admitted truth ⁹¹) that even a vijñapti, an idea (an intimation, a subject of knowledge) is non-substantial in so far as it is of an imputed substance [imagined] by another vijñapti ⁹²). And therefore the appearances as ego-substance and ideas have no external object, just as in the case of the consciousness [in the appearance] of things and sentient beings ⁹³).

T. p. 18.

Y. p. 20. **Because of the non-existence of a real external object, the consciousness thereof has no real existence** ⁹⁴). Because it discerns ⁹⁵), it is vijñāna, consciousness; since it has no [real] object it neither can have the nature of a knower, a perceiver ⁹⁶). Therefore, be-

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cause the external object does not really exist, the consciousness does not exist [in reality] as a perceiver. But not [does it not exist] as the reflection of things, sentient beings, ego-substance and ideas. For if [the consciousness] should not exist in that capacity, we should have to admit the absurdity of absolute non-existence⁹⁷), since the nature of the consciousness⁹⁸) has not been explained to be different from that⁹⁹) [reflection].

Now if the differentiation [into things etc. is due] to the nature¹⁰⁰) [of the consciousness] how then is the consciousness thereof possible? How is there [such] a mutual differentiation? It is thus: Because subject and object do not exist [as real independent entities] and because the consciousness in the appearance thereof has real existence¹⁰¹), that which has been asserted before, viz.: **"The Constructive Ideation is real. In it duality does not [absolutely] exist"**, has been made clear. Explaining [this] he says:

K. I. 4ab.

Hence it has been proved¹⁰²) that this [consciousness] has the nature of Constructive Ideation, i.e. it has been proved that these four [modes of] consciousness have the nature of Constructive Ideation.

Atas, "hence", means by reason of that, what has been said immediately before: **"Because of the non-existence of an external object, neither the [consciousness] thereof has real existence"**.

Again, in order to prove the reality¹⁰³) of the Constructive Ideation and the unreality¹⁰⁴) of duality, he says:

K. I. 4c.
T. p. 18.

For it exists neither such as [it appears]¹⁰⁵); nor does it [not] exist in every respect¹⁰⁶).

Or, atas, "hence" means "by reason of what is going to be said". Explaining this, he says: **For it exists neither such as [it appears]; nor does it not exist in every respect**. Because there is neither reality [in the consciousness] such as [it appears] nor non-reality [of the consciousness in itself] in every respect, it arises in the appearance of subject and object. In this respect [the consciousness] has no subject-nature even in these four modes of appearance, because they are respectively without perception and of unreal appearance¹⁰⁷). And it has no object nature because all the elements of existence are non-substantial¹⁰⁸) in so far as they are of a mutually superimposed substance [i.e. in so far as

they represent the phenomenal, superimposed aspect] ¹⁰⁹).

Y. p. 21.

And there is not absolute non-existence [of the consciousness], since it arises as mere illusion ¹¹⁰). Although [the consciousness] has no substantial nature ¹¹¹), [it exists] as the illusory] aspect in which it appears [and] which is called bhrānti, illusion ¹¹²); it is just like a magic spell. The word mātra, "mere" has the meaning of excluding, what is beyond it. Therefore it has been said: Because the consciousness [in its capacity of producing] illusory i.e., phenomenal existence is real ¹¹³), there is not absolute non-existence [of the consciousness].

Why again is the non-existence of this bhrānti-vijñāna not admitted, just as in the case of the non-existence of subject and object? For, it is not possible for anybody to perceive ¹¹⁴) its existent nature ¹¹⁵), since it has in reality a nature which transcends all objects [and subjects] of cognition ¹¹⁶). Because

K. I. 4d.

It is admitted, that deliverance [results] from the destruction ¹¹⁷) of that [illusion],

the non-existence of this [bhrānti-vijñāna] is not admitted. How then? Its existent nature is inferred from its capacity [to establish] the polarity of defilement and purification ¹¹⁸). **Otherwise**, if it should be admitted, that [the bhrānti-vijñāna] does not absolutely exist, then, **where no bond exists, deliverance ¹¹⁹) would exist neither**. For, if there were not even a mere illusion, there would be no bondage either because no defilement would exist; [and] as one can be delivered [only] after having been bound before, there would be no deliverance either.

Or, in order to refute other opinions ¹²⁰), as e.g.: „Why is it not admitted that the [bhrānti-vijñāna] exists, just as it becomes manifest ¹²¹), or that it does not absolutely exist?“, he says:

It is admitted, that deliverance [results] from the destruction of that [illusion], which really means that as long as this is not destroyed ¹²²), there will be bondage. This has been explained [by the statement]: **“Otherwise, where no bond exists, deliverance would exist neither”**.

There would be the absurdity of denying ¹²³) defilement and purification. In so far as the illusion ¹²⁴) becomes manifest as the real existence of subject and object, defilement would be eternal ¹²⁵), if this [manifestation] should [be absolute in itself, i.e.]

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exist according to the Ultimate Reality¹²⁶), and Nirvāṇa would not exist.

T. p. 19.

[On the other hand] if this mere illusion should not exist defilement would exist neither, and there would be the absurdity of an eternal purification. And in both cases, the exertion of those who strive after deliverance¹²⁷), would be vain. Therefore the reality of the Constructive Ideation must necessarily be admitted as well as the unreality of duality.

C. THE CHARACTERISTIC OF UNION.

Y. p. 22. He sets forth the *saṃgrahalakṣaṇam*, the Characteristic of Union¹). The union indeed is the characteristic²). Or rather, that by which the union is characterized³), is the Characteristic of Union.

And why has this [characteristic] been mentioned? For, it has been said here, that only the Constructive Ideation exists, [as a bare reality free from the independent existence of] subject and object.

[It has been mentioned] because in other sūtras⁴) three aspects⁵) of reality are taught. Therefore, in order to show that there is no inconsistency with the other sūtras, the union of these [three aspects in the Constructive Ideation] is explained here. Therefore the author of the commentary says: There is only the Constructive Ideation⁶), etc.

K. I. 5. It has been taught that there is an Imputed Aspect⁷), a Causally Dependent Aspect⁸) as well as an Absolute Aspect⁹), [respectively] in consequence of the things¹⁰), the Constructive Ideation¹¹) and the unreality of duality¹²).

Parikalpita, "imputed, constructed" it is called, because [the differentiation into] subject and object, although unreal¹³) since it is non-substantial in so far as its own-nature is concerned¹⁴), is imagined to have real existence¹⁵). On the other hand, although [subject and object] do not exist as real, [independent] entities¹⁶), it is called "svabhāva", "nature, aspect", because they exist in conformity to wordly, phenomenal experience¹⁷).

Paratantra, "causally dependent" means paravaśa, "ruled by others" because it is a product of causes and conditions¹⁸). A quotation is:

It is not imputed¹⁹), born [however] from conditions and absolutely inexpressible. For the paratantra-svabhāva, the Causally Dependent Aspect is the pure, wordly [phenomenal] domain [of experience]²⁰).

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The Unique Spiritual Principle of non-differentiation into subject and object²¹⁾ of the Constructive Ideation is the Pariniṣpanna Svabhāva, the Absolute Aspect. For this [Aspect] is unconditioned²²⁾ and it is perfect, absolute, since it is without change²³⁾. Therefore he says:

“That which is the perfect Non-Substantiality²⁴⁾ of the [Constructive Ideation, i.e. the Causally Dependent Aspect] in so far as this is of an imputed nature, is the Absolute Aspect, i.e. the sphere of the [supermundane] non-discriminative wisdom”²⁵⁾.

By “arthāt”²⁶⁾ is meant “arthādhipatyāt”, i.e. “by force of the things”. And in the same way “abhūtaparikalpāt” and “dvayābhāvāt” are to be explained. **For a thing, an external object is of an imputed nature.** [The word] “thing” [is used here in the connotations of] objective sense-data, sense-organs, ego-substance and ideas. And because it does not [absolutely] exist in the Constructive Ideation in so far as it is of an imputed nature, it is said that the Imputed Aspect has no real existence²⁷⁾. Moreover he states:

Y. p. 23.

T. p. 20.

[The Constructive Ideation is] not constructed²⁸⁾; but [false] discriminative thought is constructed by other false discriminative thought²⁹⁾; this has no real nature³⁰⁾; [for] the [supposed real nature] of that [false discriminative thought] is constructed by other false discriminative thought. **The Constructive Ideation is the Causally dependent Aspect.**

It is causally dependent because it is regulated³¹⁾ by others, i.e. by causes and conditions³²⁾. It is produced, but it does not exist by itself³³⁾.

The Pariniṣpanna-Svabhāva, the Absolute Aspect means the unreality³⁴⁾ of subject and object. Pariniṣpanna, perfect, absolute, it is called, because of its being perfect³⁵⁾, as perfection without change and as [mentally] unperverted perfection³⁶⁾. For the unreality of subject and object means here that the Constructive Ideation is free from [an independent existence of] duality³⁷⁾, but not the mere non-existence of duality³⁸⁾.

And thus the Constructive Ideation, owing to its being dependent on causes and conditions, is causally dependent. And it is imputed in so far as it becomes manifest³⁹⁾ in the forms⁴⁰⁾ of subject and

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object, which do not exist in themselves. And, owing to its being free from [the independent existence of] subject and object, it is Absolute. This is really the union, the relation⁴¹⁾ of the three Aspects of Reality in the Constructive Ideation.

Having in this way ascertained what should be ascertained concerning the Constructive Ideation, and having ascertained what should be removed⁴²⁾, the matter⁴³⁾ which must be realized has been shown.

THE CHARACTERISTIC OF THE MEANS TO PENETRATE INTO THE CHARACTERISTIC OF NON-BEING.

In so far as its characteristic of non-being has not been thoroughly understood¹⁾, the Constructive Ideation turns into the defilements of passion, action and birth²⁾. Therefore, in order to understand thoroughly the characteristic of non-being and in order to explain the means for it, he says:

K. I. 6a.

Y. p. 24

Resulting from the cognition, etc.³⁾

This [characteristic of non-being] is implied⁴⁾ in the Constructive Ideation. Or rather, it is the Constructive Ideation. The characteristic of non-being means the non-absolute-existence⁵⁾ of subject and object. The penetration into it means the getting acquainted with it⁶⁾. That by which one penetrates into that characteristic of non-being is the means [to acquire the knowledge of that characteristic]. And this [means] again is in two ways effective⁷⁾, being a special resource⁸⁾ and a methodical training in fathoming⁹⁾ the meaning of the Universality¹⁰⁾ of the Dharmadhātu, the Ultimate Cause of the elements of existence, the Unique Absolute. In order to point this [means] out, that verse has been pronounced.

Resulting from the cognition [that all phenomena are] "Mere Ideation"¹¹⁾ a non-perception of external objects¹²⁾ arises.

Now the nature of the "Mere Ideation" is free from [the independent existence of] objects of perception and from sense objects¹³⁾; the consciousness arises¹⁴⁾ in the appearance of sensedata, etc. by reason of its own potentiality¹⁵⁾, but external objects consisting of visible matter etc. [separately from the vijñāna] do not exist. That is why, resulting from the cognition of a "grasper"¹⁶⁾ (a subject) one penetrates into the non-perception of objects.

T. p. 21

Thus, in the following manner it must be examined: [It might be said that during the process of] arising, or [when it has already] arisen¹⁷⁾ the consciousness should depend on objects¹⁸⁾. In this respect it is not possible that [the consciousness], during its process of arising should depend on objects, because this

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arising [vijñāna], does not exist [yet] ¹⁹). Neither [is it possible that the consciousness, when already] arisen [should depend on objects], because [the consciousness, when] arisen, exists as a substance, an essence which appears [in the aspect of some] object ²⁰). And there is no other act ²¹) of the consciousness, except the arising as a substance which appears [in the aspect of some] object. And it is [conventionally] said that, when performing this act, the vijñāna depends on objects. Or if there should be efficiency ²²) of an object of cognition ²³) in the consciousness ²⁴) when it is already present, but not during its arising, the objective condition ²⁵) would not be the producer of the consciousness ²⁶) [appearing in the aspect of some object]. And to assume such a supposition would be absurd. [On the other hand, if it might be assumed that] a [real] present object of cognition is being perceived, this will be inconsistent with the momentariness, the continual decay of things ²⁷). And it is not possible that an object of perception is being perceived by the consciousness if there is no preponderance of the substance [of the consciousness] as aforesaid ²⁸).

Now, if it is admitted that there is a preponderance of the substance of [consciousness], when it is perceiving an object of cognition, even then we should come upon the absurdity that it perceives indeed an already existing object of cognition ²⁹) different from the perception ³⁰) of the preponderance of the substance [of the consciousness] elsewhere, in a different place ³¹).

Y. p. 25.

Another opinion is that the objective condition of arising consciousness is something impermanent ³²). And because this [condition] is different from the remaining conditions [viz. the hetu-, the samanantara- and the adhipatipratyaya] ³³) by its being the cause of consciousness appearing in its own aspect ³⁴), [we may ask whether] for this very reason it is imagined that the atoms ³⁵) of visible matter etc., or the aggregate ³⁶) of those [atoms] should exist as object of perception. Even in both cases there is no object of perception. For, although all consciousness arises in the appearance of jars, woven clothes and other things, it does not appear [in the shape of] atoms ³⁷). And although the aspects [i.e. the ideas] of the things are consciousness appearing in a differentiated way ³⁸), [as separate, particular phenomena], the object of cognition could

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not be different ³⁹⁾ [from these aspects of the consciousness and differentiated into atoms]. For there would be the absurdity, that the very eye and other [sense-organs, by means of which objects are perceived] would have the nature of object of cognition ⁴⁰⁾.

And also he who thinks that the combined ⁴¹⁾ atoms become an object of cognition, but are not objects of perception separately ⁴²⁾, could he be confuted here? For, if [the atoms are combined [and as such object of cognition], we must admit that they have, each by itself, the nature of object of cognition. [For a part cannot have another nature than the whole. In this case the atoms are] not [object of cognition] as a combination ⁴³⁾. In this respect [the objection must be raised that, at the time that an object of perception is perceived] no knowledge ⁴⁴⁾ of atoms appearing each singly by itself is produced. In like manner [there is no knowledge produced of the object of cognition] appearing as the combination of those [atoms]. Therefore it is not possible that the atoms should have the nature of object of cognition. Neither is the aggregate of the atoms object of cognition as it cannot be a cause ⁴⁵⁾, though the designation [of it] exists ⁴⁶⁾. For it is admitted that just as the samanantara- and other pratyayas, the ālambanapratyaya, the objective condition also is a cause of vijñāna, consciousness ⁴⁷⁾. Therefore it is not possible, that even an impermanent [thing] is object of cognition ⁴⁸⁾. Moreover if there should be an object of cognition in impermanence ⁴⁹⁾ even past and future would be object. But it has been proved that in dreams etc. the consciousness exists, without a [real, external] object of cognition ⁵⁰⁾.

T. p. 22.

Some however are of opinion, that the consciousness in dreams and so forth is not without an object of cognition, because [they consider] the mental image ⁵¹⁾ to have the nature of an object of perception. The mental image again is the reflected image of a thing ⁵²⁾ [and as such it has] the nature of the viprayuktasamskāras, the things which are neither material nor mental ⁵³⁾. For, if there is no object in dreams and so forth, there cannot be a mental image thereof [in dreamconsciousness], just as the reflection of a face cannot succeed if not such a thing as a face exists.

[Against this it might be adduced that] the consciousness, either arising or arisen has no mental image as object of perception, because of the non-existence [of arising consciousness] and be-

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Y. p. 26.

cause of the continual decay of things⁵⁴) [which makes it impossible for arisen consciousness to perceive things], as formerly stated. Consciousness is indeed the reflection of things in as much as it is appearing as things⁵⁵). Therefore it is not possible that the mental image has the nature of the things which are neither material nor mental⁵⁶). And it must necessarily be admitted that the consciousness has the aspect of external objects⁵⁷). For, if the [consciousness] were without this aspect there would be no respective special determination of object and subject⁵⁸).

Another opinion however is, that the object of cognition in a dream and in such meditations as the meditation on the horrible⁵⁹) is in reality an immaterial, non-resistant, penetrable visible [object]⁶⁰). But, even of that [object of perception] the non-resistance and the belonging to the sphere of mere thought⁶¹) is contradicted, because it consists of colour and shape, etc.⁶²). And in the śāstra no other non-resistant, penetrable visible [object] is described, than the mere "avijñāpti", the "non-information", the "unmanifested matter", the "vehicle of moral qualities"⁶³). Therefore [this object of perception] is mere productive imagination⁶⁴), mere construction. But another [doctor] maintains that in dreams the object of consciousness is an object of direct experience⁶⁵), [i.e. an experience preceding one's dreams], because one who is blind from birth⁶⁶) does not perceive blue and other colours in his dreams.

It is not true⁶⁷) that one who is blind from birth does not perceive colours in dreams. But he does not know them by name because he did not come to learn their conventional designation⁶⁸), as it is impossible for someone else to convey by words [the knowledge of colours to the blind]⁶⁹). And if one sees correctly in a dream a [previously] perceived [object], why is it not admitted that thus even one who is blind from birth sees colours? For he must have perceived colours in previous existences.

[The colours] which appear in his dreams he did not perceive in his present life. For, [of one who is blind from birth] there is not any difference between the state of waking and the state of sleep, as far as past, future and present experience are concerned. Therefore, the [opinion that] consciousness in dreams must have for its object a previously experienced thing is merely

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false imagination ⁷⁰). For it is a fixed opinion ⁷¹) that, because the past does not exist ⁷²), the consciousness, being without [any] object [whatsoever] ⁷³), arises in dreams as the reflection of external objects ⁷⁴). Thus, we have to cultivate the knowledge ⁷⁵) that we cannot perceive objects, by the definite cognition that they have the nature of Mere Ideation ⁷⁶).

Resulting from the non-perception, [i.e. the negation] ⁷⁷) of external objects ⁷⁸), the negation of the "Mere Ideation" arises. Owing to the unreality ⁷⁹) of objects one understands the unreality even of the "Mere Ideation" just as one penetrates into the unreality of thought-objects ⁸⁰) by force of the [cognition, that there is] only "Mere Ideation", since no constructed object exists, which is external to the consciousness. There is no subjectivity ⁸¹) possible if no object exists. For, the corresponding subject can only be established in relation to objectivity ⁸²). **Thus one penetrates into the characteristic of non-being of subject and object,** which are both of an imputed nature; [but this characteristic of non-being] has not been shown of the Constructive Ideation [itself] ⁸³).

T. p. 23.

Y. p. 27.

Why again does he not set forth from the very outset that the "Mere Ideation" does not exist? For, as the subject depends on the object one might easily penetrate into the non-existence of an external object which is to be perceived ⁸⁴) because the nature of object of perception has been eliminated ⁸⁵). [For there would be no subject which could perceive that object of perception]. Otherwise [if we should have denied the "Mere Ideation" from the very outset] a negation of [all] existence would be the result, since in that case there would be no [illusory] mutual dependence ⁸⁷) of subject and object.

Now at the conclusion of the first "immeasurable period of æons" ⁸⁸), immediately after the "Path of Accumulating Merit" ⁸⁹) [the Bodhisattva] proceeds [gradually] and enters that stage of transcendental wisdom, which is beyond the imputations of the separate reality of subject and object ⁹⁰). This occurs in the following manner: Resulting from the [cognition that all phenomena are] "Mere Ideation", the concentrated state of mind, attended by its retinue ⁹¹), called "Uṣmagata", Degree of Heat becomes manifest; it is the first essential feature ⁹²) of the Super-

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mundane Path⁹³) and is a concentrated meditation⁹⁴) on the non-existence of visible matter etc. Immediately following [the samādhi] called "Mūrdha", Degree of the Climax [becomes manifest]. And this is followed by the Samādhi, called "Kṣānti", Degree of Steadfastness, which corresponds to the non-perception, [i.e. the negation] of the subject [as a separate reality], resulting from a negation of all objects [as separate realities]. As soon as this is realized [the Bodhisattva] has recourse to the non-perception, the negation of "arthas", external objects, [and in agreement with this] contemplates⁹⁵) the negation even of the "Mere Ideation". Accordingly the Samādhi attended by its retinue called "Laukikāgryadharmā", Degree of Highest Mundane Virtues becomes manifest together with the Highest Wisdom, etc.⁹⁶). Immediately following we have the "Darśanamārga"⁹⁷), the Path of Illumination, and it is there indeed that the [Bodhisattva] enters the first stage⁹⁸) by realizing the Omnipresent Unique Absolute⁹⁹). And although this is an exact judgment¹⁰⁰), it is not an aspiration, an arbitrary or voluntary judgment¹⁰¹) in the manner of an "apramāṇa", an "Immeasurable", etc.¹⁰²).

While pointing out that perception has a real nature of non-perception, he says:

K. I. 7ab. **In consequence of that**¹⁰³), **it is an ultimate fact**¹⁰⁴) **that perception has a real nature of non-perception**¹⁰⁵).

Or rather, that which has been previously asserted, viz.: "In the Constructive Ideation duality does not [absolutely] exist", has been realized because it is thus intuited introspectively¹⁰⁶) through this ākāra, this idea, this aspect [of perception which has a real nature of non-perception]. And while explaining this, he says: **In consequence of that it is an ultimate fact that perception has a real nature of non-perception.** "In consequence of that" means:

Y. p. 28. Because there is no perception if there is no external object of perception. "Upalabधि, perception" [is used] if [the existence of] one of the three, viz. object, agent and instrument [or process of cognition]¹⁰⁸) is assumed¹⁰⁹), although even this triad is not possible if [one of them] should not exist¹¹⁰): Therefore it is an ultimate fact that perception has a real nature of non-perception.

T. p. 24. Hence the author of the commentary says: **Because perception is not possible, if no external object of perception exists.**

K. I 7cd.

Consequently, the identity¹¹¹⁾ of non-cognition and cognition¹¹²⁾ should be admitted.

Because perception has the nature of non-perception, [their] identity, i.e. their sameness¹¹³⁾ should be understood. For there is no difference between the non-cognition of arthas, external objects and the cognition of the "Mere Ideation", since, [according to Ultimate Reality, neither of them] exists¹¹⁴⁾, [as stated above]. In order to remove the mutual inconsistency between the words perception and non-perception he says: It is said that there is perception¹¹⁵⁾ owing to the appearance [of the vijñāna in the aspect] of unreal objects¹¹⁶⁾. But nothing whatever is [in reality] perceived by it, since the arthas, the objects have no [real independent] existence. Hence there is no inconsistency [between the words perception and non-perception]. But, although [perception] has in reality a nature of non-perception, [this is to be understood] according to Ultimate Reality¹¹⁷⁾

Others say: The cognition of objects by ignorant people where no object exists and the non-cognition of objects by the Saints should both be known to be identical since they have equal characteristics¹¹⁸⁾, just as in the case of the non-perception [and perception] of an illusory serpent¹¹⁹⁾. That is why he says: It is said that there is perception, owing to the appearance [of the vijñāna in the aspect] of unreal objects, although it has a real nature of non-perception; it is just like expounding the non-perception [i.e. the negation] of an illusory serpent. Another [doctor] again maintains: The identity of both the cognition and the non-cognition [of a subject] should be understood, even in the two cases that a subject is cognized by the ignorant and not cognized by the Saints on account of the non-existence of things, since [in both cases] equally a subject is absent¹²⁰⁾ where no object has real existence. Hence he says: [It is said that] there is perception owing to the appearance [of the vijñāna in the aspect] of unreal objects, etc. Some persons however are of opinion that it is as an antidote against imputed Realism and Nihilism¹²¹⁾ that he states: **Consequently, the identity of non-cognition and cognition should be admitted.**

Y. p. 29.

Since, on account of the unreality of external objects perception does not exist as real perception¹²²⁾, it has been said that it

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ultimately ¹²³) does not exist. In cognition the nature of perception is not removed neither the nature of non-perception added. How then? They are indentical in so far as they are both beyond discriminative, constructive thought ¹²⁴). Therefore the identity of cognition and non-cognition should be understood to be Absolute, intuited introspectively ¹²⁵), regardless of [the extremities of] imputed realism and nihilism. And it is said:

T. p. 25.

Here there is nothing that is to be removed and absolutely nothing to be added; the Truth must be only directly perceived, and he who sees the Truth becomes delivered ¹²⁶).

If this be so, why then is vijñapti, ideation called perception? Because, both in current usage and in the didactical treatises it is admitted [that there is perception] owing to the appearance [of the vijñāna in the aspect] of unreal objects, although it has a real nature of non-perception.

E. THE CHARACTERISTIC OF DIFFERENTIATION.

He sets forth the Characteristic of Differentiation.

It has the character of [the three spheres of existence, viz.], the World of Carnal Desire or of Gross Bodies ¹⁾, the World of Pure Matter or of Ethereal Bodies ²⁾ and the Immaterial Sphere ³⁾. It is the differentiation of the Constructive Ideation ⁴⁾, i.e., its diversity. "Characteristic of Differentiation" means that it is differentiation indeed which is the characteristic, since the Constructive Ideation is characterized by it.

And for what reason is [this] characteristic of differentiation discussed? For it seems to be impossible ⁵⁾ that the Worlds of Carnal Desire and Pure Matter [could exist] in the mere Constructive Ideation [in which no duality exists, as stated above]. [If one should assume that] through a differentiation into spheres of existence a discrimination into Saints, [ordinary worldly beings], etc. ⁶⁾ would not obtain, [whereas this differentiation is attended] by a [corresponding] differentiation into defilement and purification ⁷⁾, a great and absurd transgression of the doctrine would be the consequence. In order to remove the anxiety that [such a thing would happen], the Characteristic of Differentiation has been set forth.

On the other hand it is believed that the Constructive Ideation exists only where reasoning ⁸⁾ and judgment ⁹⁾ exist, but not otherwise. Hence, in order to remove that [wrong opinion], the characteristic of differentiation has been explained.

K. I. 8ab.

The Constructive Ideation however, this is the Mind and the Mental Phenomena which belong to the three spheres of existence ¹⁰⁾.

But it is not [limited] merely [to] vitarka and vicāra, reasoning and judgment. Just as the elements of matter ¹¹⁾ are [divided into] primary and secondary elements ¹²⁾, the Constructive Ideation also is [divided into] citta, [fundamental] mind and caittas, [derived] mental phenomena. It is not only citta, [fundamental]

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mind. And they, [the citta and the caittas] form the essential nature of that which belongs to the three spheres of existence¹³). They consist of three Dhātus, because they are divided into the Spheres¹⁴) of Carnal Desire or of Gross Bodies, of Pure Matter or of Ethereal Bodies and the Immaterial Sphere. Now the twenty kinds of worlds beginning with the Naraka¹⁵) which proceed from this Constructive Ideation, they form the Kāmadhātu. The seventeen kinds [of heavens] beginning with the Brahmakāyikā, they form the Rūpadhātu. The four aspects beginning with the Ākāśānantyāyatana, the Abode of Infinite Space, they form the Ārūpyadhātu¹⁶). Again somebody else says: The Kāmadhātu is the domain of desire in which sensual attachments¹⁷) have not yet been renounced, and the notions of "rūpa", pure matter, have not yet been caused to disappear¹⁸). The Rūpadhātu is the domain of Pure Matter in which sensual attachments have been renounced but in which the notions of "rūpa" have not yet been caused to disappear. The Ārūpyadhātu is the Immaterial Sphere in which the attachments to carnal desire and to pure matter have been renounced and the notions of "rūpa" have been caused to disappear. Others maintain: The Kāmadhātu is the sphere in which sensual attachments are inherent¹⁹). The Rūpadhātu is the sphere in which the attachments to pure matter or ethereal bodies are inherent. The Ārūpyadhātu is the sphere in which the attachments to "ārūpya", the Formless, the Immaterial are inherent.

T. p. 26.

Others again pretend: The Kāmadhātu is the Sphere of Carnal Desire in which permanent perversions²⁰) [of the mind] have become the support²¹) of the [different] kinds of mental unrest²²). The Rūpadhātu is the Sphere of Pure Matter in which the states of transic, abstract meditation²³) cause the renunciation of the different kinds of mental unrest. The Ārūpyadhātu is the Sphere in which the states of transic, abstract meditation cause the renunciation of the different kinds of [mental] unrest as well as [mental] ease²⁴). Others again say: In the Sphere of Carnal Desire, those aspects of [sense-] consciousness as odour and taste²⁵) have not yet been destroyed. In the Sphere of Pure Matter those aspects of [sense-] consciousness as odour and taste have been destroyed. In the Immaterial Sphere the aspects of fifteen classes [of elements represented in the composition of an

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individual stream of life] ²⁶⁾ have been destroyed.

Now, whereas in all these expositions [it has been set forth] what are these [three planes of existence], these expositions require indeed supplementary explanations, because the expositions, not explained [here] before, should necessarily be explained [as yet]. In this connection [however] we cannot discuss the Constructive Ideation any further, [apart from the fact that it will be dealt with subsequently, in another relation].

Y. p. 31.

F. THE CHARACTERISTIC OF THE SYNONYMS.

Next he sets forth the Characteristic of the Synonyms, viz., while explaining the division into citta, mind and caittas, mental phenomena, he explains the characteristics of the synonyms [applied] to the Constructive Ideation.

In what manner?

The mind and mental phenomena come forward [and are active] ²⁾ through the productive imagination ²⁾ of a real, independent nature and the special qualities ³⁾ of a thing imaginable ⁴⁾. The mind and mental phenomena [on the one hand] and the Constructive Ideation [on the other hand] are synonyms in as much as their inherent nature is concerned, since they both [correspond to] the perception ⁵⁾ of a real substance ⁶⁾ and the special qualities of a thing.

Vijñāna, [pure] consciousness [or pure sensation] ⁷⁾ is in this respect the perception of a mere thing, [just as it is in its generality]. The word "mere" [has been employed in order to denote] the elimination of the special characteristics. It means in reality that the special characteristics are not perceived, that there is perception of the substance, the general character of a thing only ⁸⁾. The feelings ⁹⁾ and other mental phenomena mean the perception of the qualities of a thing. For they arise in that place where there is a special characteristic of a thing ¹⁰⁾. A thing (a substance) has in this respect such special characteristics as appertain to delight and sorrow ¹¹⁾; [the contact with this state of things produces] a condition of mental satisfaction ¹²⁾, [c.q. dissatisfaction] and the grasping, the apperception ¹³⁾ of it is vedanā, feeling. There is a qualification of objects which is characterized by such designations ¹⁴⁾ as "man" and "woman" and so on and the apperception of this is saṃjñā, ideation, faculty of concepts (capable of coalescing with a word) ¹⁵⁾. In the same manner the other [mental phenomena] must be dealt with according to circumstances. And thus, these [mental phenomena] are associated ¹⁶⁾ [to the mind] since they

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have the same base and the same object of perception¹⁷⁾, since they are simultaneous¹⁸⁾ and have the same substance¹⁹⁾, but not because they should have the same aspect [of apperception]²⁰⁾. For, in that case there would be the absurdity that the vijñāna, the pure consciousness would not be different [from the mental phenomena]²¹⁾.

Some [doctors] are of opinion that the caitasas, the mental phenomena are to be understood here in the sense of special, different characteristics of the mind²²⁾. Indeed, this very vijñāna arises in a manifold variegated appearance, as all sorts of independent things²³⁾, just as in the case of the [many] eyes in the [one] tail of a peacock.

T. p. 27. And how [is it possible that] one becomes a variety? For in daily usage it is believed that a variety, a manifold has the characteristic of "not-one", of "many"²⁴⁾; therefore, don't say that "one" could have the nature of "many".

If the independent, [separate] elements of existence²⁵⁾ should be "pariniṣpanna", absolutely real, [in their separateness], there would be this contradiction [that "one" should be "many"]. But because they are merely illusion, error, this contradiction does not exist, the more so since it has been said:

K. I. 4c. For it **neither exists such as [it appears]; nor does it not exist**
Y. p. 32. **in every respect.**²⁶⁾

That is not the case. [It is not true that the mental phenomena should be special characteristics of the mind]. For, there is an inconsistency with the words of the sūtra, viz.:

„Vedanā, saṃjñā, cetanā²⁷⁾ and vijñāna, these dharmas are "coexistent"²⁸⁾ they are not separate, standing apart"²⁹⁾. And "saṃsarga" is indeed the simultaneousness of [all] existent things³⁰⁾; that is why this sūtra does not teach him in this sense, who believes that the dharmasvabhāva, the real nature of the elements of existence is not absolute³¹⁾.

G. THE CHARACTERISTIC OF ACTIVITY-CAUSATION.

Next he sets forth the **Characteristic of Activity-Causation**, in order to explain the difference between cause and effect which one might not comprehend, considering that only the Constructive Ideation exists and nothing else. Therefore the Constructive Ideation is characterized as the substance of cause and effect.¹⁾ And because [this] characteristic is really origination, causation²⁾, [we speak of] the characteristic of origination, causation, activity. Origination again is twofold:

a. The origination of an uninterrupted sequence of moments³⁾, the predominance whereof produces that experience of the present [life] which is defilement⁴⁾.

b. The origination of re-birth⁵⁾, the predominance whereof produces in future that defilement which is passion, action and birth⁶⁾.

Here the characteristic of origination is explained as the origination of the uninterrupted sequence of moments. The origination of re-birth he will explain as the characteristic nature of defilement⁷⁾.

K. I. 9a. **The one is consciousness in its quality of condition⁸⁾.**

By "the one" is meant here the ālayavijñāna, the store-consciousness. Because it is, as condition of causation⁹⁾, cause¹⁰⁾ of the remaining seven forms of consciousness, it is [called] consciousness in the quality of condition.

K. I. 9b. **The other is the experiencing, the enjoying¹¹⁾, consciousness.**

Y. p. 33. Complete the verse by adding: It is the fruit, the result¹²⁾ thereof, [viz. of the ālayavijñāna]. This [consciousness] again is sevenfold. It is the pravṛttivijñāna, the consciousness of activity, and since it is employed as a means of experience¹³⁾ it is [called] the experiencing [consciousness].

K. I. 9cd. **In it the mental phenomena are experience, exact discrimination¹⁴⁾ and action, volition¹⁵⁾.**

The implied meaning of "in it" is that the mental phenomena,

being in [that store-] consciousness, are also the fruit, the effect thereof; for they are [in reality] vijñāna and share its good or bad destiny¹⁶).

T. p. 28.

Indeed, because the store-consciousness is the condition of the other forms of consciousness, it is [called] consciousness in the quality of condition. It is called ālaya, "store, receptacle", because all impure elements of existence¹⁷) "repose"¹⁸) in it, in the quality of effect and because it ["reposes"] in them as cause¹⁹); vijñāna it is [called] because it represents the world of the sentient beings²⁰) and the inanimate world²¹) by appearing as such. And this [ālayavijñāna] is indifferent-neutral²²) because it is the retribution, [i.e. the maturing] in every respect [of all moral or intellectual antecedents = bijas]²³). And it is pratyavijñāna, consciousness in the quality of condition because the seed²⁴) of all impure dharmas is attached [to it] and because it is the "condition in the quality of cause"²⁵) of the other active forms of consciousness. The pravṛttivijñāna, having that [ālayavijñāna] as a condition, is experiencing [consciousness]. From this ālayavijñāna [the pravṛttivijñāna] proceeds; the real significance is that it arises while having that [ālayavijñāna] as a condition. How does it arise? The pravṛttivijñāna, although evolving²⁶) from the ālayavijñāna fosters²⁷) in the ālayavijñāna the seed which is the producer of a similar²⁸) and not yet arisen pravṛttivijñāna. Because from this fostered seed, which contains [the potentiality of] the different transformations and various evolutions [of phenomenal existence]²⁹), again arises a similar pravṛttivijñāna, the pravṛttivijñāna comes into existence conditioned by that [ālayavijñāna].

[If we admit this] shall we not have the absurdity then, that even the ālayavijñāna is an experiencing, a receiving [consciousness] and the pravṛttivijñāna a consciousness in the quality of condition? For [the store-consciousness] is the "support" of the experience of [indifferent feelings, i.e.] the feelings of neither displeasure nor pleasure³⁰) and [the active forms of consciousness] "perfume" [or impregnate] the vāsanās³¹), [the latent sub-conscious] germs [of active life and thought] in the store-consciousness.

There is no "perfuming" of the germs possible without³²) a con-

dition-substance³³) [of those germs, i.e. the store-consciousness]. As has been said in the Abhidharmasūtragāthā:

Y. p. 34.

“Whereas all dharmas repose³⁴) in the vijñāna, this [reposes] in them likewise; eternally they are the effect and cause of one another”³⁵).

[The absurdity suggested here, need] not be the consequence. Why? Because it is difficult to indicate³⁶) the feeling³⁷) of that [ālayavijñāna]. It is not defined as having an experiencing, an “enjoying” nature whereas the pravṛttivijñāna is [defined as such]³⁸). It should rather be known as something superior³⁹), just like the sun. Accordingly, the pravṛttivijñāna, the active consciousness is indeed the basis of the experience of the threefold feeling⁴⁰), not however the ālayavijñāna, the store-consciousness. And here is expressly meant [that the ālayavijñāna is] hetupratyaya, condition in the quality of cause but not only a mere pratyaya, a mere condition. Accordingly, the ālayavijñāna comprises by the predominance of the good and bad elements⁴¹) the vipāka- and niṣyandaphalavāsanās, the impregnations of the “effect of retribution” and of the “natural outflow-effect”; and by the predominance of the neutral, indifferent elements⁴²), the ālayavijñāna is the hetupratyaya, the condition in the quality of cause of all the impure elements without exception; the pravṛttivijñāna however is the adhipatipratyaya⁴³), the condition in the quality of “regent” of the ālayavijñāna. And thus, it is not absurd [to call] the pravṛttivijñāna a pratyaya, a condition, although it is not a hetupratyaya, a condition in the quality of cause⁴⁴).

T. p. 29.

Vedanā, feeling is upabhoga, experience, “enjoyment”. By upabhoga [is understood] that exactly the three kinds [of feeling, i.e. pleasant, unpleasant and indifferent] will be enjoyed; the true meaning is that they are experienced⁴⁵). Vedanā, feeling resembles the essence of the qualities of phenomenal existence⁴⁶). And it is exactly for the sake of a direct and intimate feeling⁴⁷) of that [essence] that the ignorant are attached to the things of phenomenal existence. Others however hold that vedanā, feeling is not only upabhoga, experience but also arthopalabdhi, definite cognition of (sense-) objects. That is not to the point however because it is inconsistent with the commentary: upabhoga, experience or enjoyment is vedanā, feeling. And since the arthopalabdhi, the

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definite cognition of (sense-) objects is not different from vijñāna, consciousness, it is not possible for it to be a caitasa a mental state ⁴⁸).

Samjñā, ideation, is the exact discernment ⁴⁹) of that which has been felt ⁵⁰), [by vedanā-upabhoga] since it consists of the grasping, the "abstracting" ⁵¹) of the different special characteristics, such as pleasure etc.

The Saṃskāras are those "forces" which produce ⁵²) (set in motion or condition) the vijñāna, the consciousness in the upabhoga and the samjñā. They are cetanā, volition, manaskāra, faculty of attention, mental acts etc. ⁵³).

Or rather vedanā is upabhoga just because there is a spontaneous and appropriate ⁵⁴) experience of an object of perception and ⁵⁵) because there is a [corresponding] experience of effects which are to be felt as pleasant etc. ⁵⁶). In the same way, because vedanā is the experience of sense-objects and of the [corresponding] effects [thereof] ⁵⁷), it is [called] upabhoga, experience, enjoyment. Samjñā is discernment because it discerns the characteristics of sense-objects ⁵⁸) as empirical characteristic signs ⁵⁹). The saṃskāras, the forces are the "switchings" ⁶⁰) of the consciousness to another object of perception. Hence, it is by the predominance of the volitions ⁶¹) etc. that the vijñāna partakes of another object of perception ⁶²). By the word "etc." are understood desire ⁶³) etc. Herewith has been explained wherefrom, of what nature and to what purpose there is pravṛtti, origination, activity.

H. THE CHARACTERISTIC OF DEFILEMENT.

Next he sets forth the Characteristic of Defilement.

The manner in which the defilements of passion, action and birth¹⁾, while evolving and being active conduce to the Universal Suffering²⁾, is the characteristic of defilement. This again has been set forth in order to show that even where no ātman, no ego-substance [absolutely] exists³⁾, the saṃsāra, the phenomenal existence is produced because of its being mere Constructive Ideation⁴⁾.

K. I. 10ab.

Because it enshrouds⁵⁾ and because it establishes⁶⁾; because it leads⁷⁾, because it embraces⁸⁾ etc.

It is with regard to the pravṛttipakṣa, the [world of phenomena in its] dynamic, evolutionary [aspect] that the twelve-membered chain of dependent origination⁹⁾ has been explained here. Now in consequence of the enshrouding the Universe is defiled. This termination of the sentence [i.e. the Universe is defiled] belongs to all [the separate parts of the Kārikās 10 and 11ab.¹⁰⁾ At the question: "Whereby or in what manner is [the Universe], on account of its being enshrouded, defiled?", he answers: By Ignorance [i.e. by the Transcendental Illusion]¹¹⁾. For this forms an obstruction to see things [i.e. existence, phenomenal and absolute] in their true nature, just as they are. Indeed, because the essential nature of avidyā is "non-vision"¹²⁾, true knowledge¹³⁾ does not arise in so far as the object, the "sphere"¹⁴⁾ of that true knowledge is hidden. Hence, because [its function is] to obstruct the origination¹⁵⁾ of true knowledge, avidyā is the obstruction of true knowledge. And this again, [only] exists in regard to the transcendental, supermundane wisdom¹⁶⁾. [The bhūtarśana] originates subsequently¹⁷⁾ and is acquired subsequently¹⁸⁾ [i.e. after the realization in highest trance of the transcendental supermundane wisdom, or Unique Absolute]. It understands that [supermundane wisdom]¹⁹⁾ The application thereof²⁰⁾ is the result of study²¹⁾, investigation²²⁾, and medi-

T. p. 30.

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tation²³). That is why it is called true real insight. And because the "Transcendental Illusion" is the obstruction thereof, it is the condition²⁴) of the saṃskāras the "formative forces of phenomenal existence"²⁵). In this manner the Universe²⁶) is defiled by Avidyā on account of its being enshrouded [thereby].

Because it "establishes"²⁷), the Universe is defiled. As regards the agent, place or object of this "establishing" he says: The "formative forces" [establish] the Karmavāsanās, the "impregnations of the acts" in the (store-) consciousness²⁸).

Y. p. 36.

The formative forces in this respect are those corporeal, vocal and mental acts, which are of a meritorious, non-meritorious and non-agitated nature²⁹) Because they prepare a new birth³⁰) they are formative forces. Because of the "establishing"³¹) [they prepare a new birth] i.e. they cause to grow that which is not yet impregnated³²). And this it is which is denoted by the word saṃskāra. But [they do] not [comprise] all [karma]³³). And since they are capable of projecting a new birth by the predominance of "Ignorance"³⁴), but not by their mere existence³⁵), it is said that the saṃskāras are conditioned by "Ignorance". Therefore they prepare a new birth of one whose wisdom does not yet exist but not of one who has obtained wisdom³⁶). And it is not solely owing to its predominance that avidyā is called the condition of the saṃskāras, [but especially] because it is the universal [and simultaneous] condition³⁷). For it gives origin³⁸) [to the whole process of phenomenal existence, i.e. the saṃskāras, etc.]. Indeed, because avidyā is associated with all the "passions", it is the samānyapratyaya, the common and simultaneous condition even of the cetanā, the "volition"³⁹), the "will" which has its origin in and arises together with the kleśas, the passions, just as it is the samānyapratyaya of the passions, which have their origin in and arise at the same time as [avidyā itself]. And it is the samānyapratyaya even of the meritorious saṃskāras⁴⁰) which follow the hope and desire for different, better rebirths and enjoyments⁴¹). Now, so far as [this] simultaneous origination is concerned, avidyā which arises⁴²) together and at the same time with those [passions], is the Universal and simultaneous condition.

Therefore, because avidyā, existing and arising together with them, is the samānyapratyaya even of the non-agitated⁴³)

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[saṃskāras] which arise simultaneously with the views that are detached from those [good and bad] states of consciousness⁴⁴), it is called the pratyaya, the condition of the saṃskāras, the formative forces.

“Vijñāna” is to be understood here in the sense of “Ālaya-vijñāna”, store-consciousness, but not in the sense of “Pravṛttivijñāna”, active consciousness⁴⁵). For it is not possible that a pravṛttivijñāna that has come to an end [in a certain individual existence]⁴⁶) is led into the condition of re-birth. [Nor is it possible that] “good and defiled” exist simultaneously in it [as they do in the Ālayavijñāna]⁴⁷); and the karmavāsanās are not established in it by the formative forces⁴⁸). As to the karmavāsanās, what is it really that is called karmavāsanā? They are the seed of a future birth⁴⁹) [and as such] “cause-substance”⁵⁰). In the same manner the grain of rice is the seed [and as such] the cause-substance of the origination of [new] sprouts, through a development in the end which depends on certain conditions such as land, ashes, manure and so forth.

Y. p. 37.
T. p. 31.

“Pratiṣṭhāpana”, establishing, is explained here by a synonym “ropana”, causing to grow⁵¹). It means the augmentation from the very beginning of the seeds [of a new birth] in the vijñāna-santāna, the “stream of life”, the “stream of consciousness”⁵²). For no seed is “conceived”⁵³) of any *dharma*, either impure or pure, which did not exist before. In this way it is by the saṃskāras that the world is defiled, owing to their laying the seeds of re-birth in the vijñāna.

In consequence of “leading” the world is defiled. Since the agent, the place or the object of [this] leading are not known, the commentator says: In consequence of [its] being conveyed by Vijñāna to the place where it will take birth⁵⁴). “Leading” means that the impregnations of acts⁵⁵) which have become the seed of a new existence⁵⁶) are conveyed to the place where they are to take birth⁵⁷) from the place of their departing⁵⁸) [a previous life] in consequence of the action of continuance⁵⁹) by the act-perfumed life-consciousness⁶⁰).

Now if this be so, the pratisaṃdhivijñāna⁶¹) “the first moment of a new life, the moment of conception” is not conditioned by the saṃskāras, the prenatal and formative forces. It has been shown

that on the contrary the purvakālabhavavijñāna, the existence after the conception and before death is dependent⁶²) on the formative forces. For it is not possible that an effect proceeds from a cause which has disappeared⁶³). [It is admitted that] those who have attained the concentrated transic states and existences of the Ārūpyadhātu⁶⁴), the Immaterial Sphere, are reborn even there where they depart [viz. in the Ārūpyadhātu]. But in what manner is in this connexion the condition of birth in the Immaterial Sphere attained? As nāmarūpa, the complex of "soul" and body, the embryo?⁶⁵).

On account of the "embracing"⁶⁶) the world is defiled. As regards the agent or object of [this] "embracing", [the commentator] says: (Because) the "personality"⁶⁷) [is embraced] by nāma and rūpa, by "soul" and "body". For nāma and rūpa are the five skandhas. And these, in the course of "reincarnation" and in the [successive] stages of prenatal existence, viz., Kalala, arbuda etc.⁶⁸), but previous to the formation of the six-sense-organs are nāmarūpa which is conditioned by vijñāna. Thus, by the particular development of that [nāmarūpa] a differentiation into "homogeneous existences"⁶⁹) is effected. And it is said that the ātmabhāva the "personality" is embraced by the nāmarūpa because a differentiation into different "personalities" results from a differentiation into such "homogeneous existences" as human beings, animals and so on, after this [nāmarūpa] has come into existence⁷⁰). Or rather because [the nāmarūpa] exists from the beginning as cause-substance⁷¹) of the whole [personality] it embraces it indeed until "death". Or rather he shows that, because the personality is embraced by nāmarūpa, they are separate [from each other] although not different; just as "everything conditioned"⁷²) is enclosed by the five skandhas [and still is separate from them]. But with the "apparitional beings"⁷³) the six sense-organs indeed, have only vijñāna as condition [and not nāmarūpa]. Therefore it should be understood that [only] according to circumstances⁷⁴) nāmarūpa has vijñāna as condition.

Y. p. 38.

T. p. 32.

Because of the "completing"⁷⁵) [the world] is defiled. As regards the agent or object of the "completing" [the commentator] says: It is the support, the body⁷⁶) comprised by nāma and rūpa [which is completed] by the ṣaḍāyatana, the [formation of the]

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six sense-organs. For in the "nāmarūpa"-state, the body is called incomplete⁷⁷⁾ because the eye- and other sense-organs⁷⁸⁾ are [still] absent. And although in this state the sense of touch⁷⁹⁾ and the faculty of the intellect⁸⁰⁾ are [already] present, yet [the śarira or ātmabhāva] is incomplete, because the "base", [i.e. the body with its sense-organs]⁸¹⁾ together with the "based", [i.e. the mind and the mental phenomena]⁸²⁾ are still to be completed⁸³⁾. In the state of [the formation of] the six sense-organs however, the āśraya, the personality, the human complex becomes complete because [the development] of the eye- and other sense-organs is accomplished⁸⁴⁾. And the kāya-āyatana, the sense of touch becomes complete because the eye- and other sense-organs which are dependent thereon⁸⁵⁾ have become full grown.

In what manner are the eye- and other sense-organs dependent thereon? [They are dependent thereon] because they function in connection with that [sense of touch]⁸⁶⁾. And also the mana-āyatana, the faculty of consciousness, comprised⁸⁷⁾ by the six forms of consciousness becomes full grown because the human complex has been wholly completed at that time. Now just because the members and sub-members⁸⁸⁾ [of the body] have been completed, since exactly in the state of [the formation of] the six sense-organs the human complex has been completed, the world is defiled by [this formation of] the six sense-organs.

Because of the "definite perception" [caused] by the three"⁸⁹⁾ the world is defiled. For a triad [is spoken of] because of the "concourse"⁹⁰⁾ of a sense-organ, an object and consciousness. The definite perception [which results from] that threefold modification⁹¹⁾ of the sense-organ which is liable to arouse pleasant and other feelings⁹²⁾ is [called] sparśa, "definite sensation", "contact". Hence it is called sparśa, because it is that "contact-knowledge" which arises in concomitance with the aspects of the modifications of the sense-organs⁹³⁾. Or rather, sparśa, "definite sensation", having the "śaḍāyatana", the "six bases of cognition" as condition produces the threefold modification of the sense-organ which is concomitant with pleasant and other feelings⁹⁴⁾.

Because of the "enjoyment"⁹⁵⁾ [acquired] by means of feeling

T. p. 39.

[the world is defiled]. For vedanā, feeling is “consumed”⁹⁶) by tṛṣṇā, “thirst”⁹⁷). It means in reality that it is enjoyed, tasted [thereby]. Or there is enjoyment of vedanā because the fruit of meritorious and other acts is enjoyed⁹⁸). Or rather upabhoga, “enjoyment” means here the experience⁹⁹) of vedanā, feeling. And where pleasant and other [feelings] are experienced the world is defiled by lust¹⁰⁰), hatred¹⁰¹) and folly¹⁰²), just because of the fostering of pleasant and other¹⁰³) [feelings].

T. p. 33.

Because there is projection¹⁰⁴) [the world is defiled]. Now, since neither the agent nor the object of [this] projection are known the commentator says: **The agent is “craving”, “thirst” and the object [i.e. the result] is re-birth projected by the acts**¹⁰⁵). [Here follows an explanation of] karṣaṇa, projection. Tṛṣṇā, craving resembles water¹⁰⁶). It is the causa of a desire for a “body” in a new existence, indiscriminately in all the destinies¹⁰⁷). [This new existence is] projected by the “feeding”, of the “seeds” of that new existence¹⁰⁸) in the [ālaya-] vijñāna [and this “feeding” is accomplished] by the saṃskāras, the formative, prenatal forces. [These seeds are “moistened” by the craving-water and it is exactly] by this moistening that the re-birth is “harmonized” with birth and birth [itself] fixed¹⁰⁹).

Because of a continued fettering¹¹⁰) [the world is defiled]. As regards the agent, place or object of this continued fettering he says: [It is the vijñāna which is fettered] **by the upādānas**¹¹¹) **to lust, etc., since they are favourable to the birth, the coming to actual life of the vijñāna, the life consciousness**¹¹²). By means of the four passions which are characterized by attachment¹¹³), desire¹¹⁴) and covetousness¹¹⁵) the vijñāna is projected by the acts [of the previous existence]; the result is that the vijñāna is fettered¹¹⁶) to [these upādānas, in the new birth], since they are favourable to the birth, the coming to actual life [of the vijñāna at the time of conception]. The upādānas are kāma, concupiscence; dṛṣṭi, heresies; śilavrata, ritualism and ātmavāda, belief in the real substantial existence of the ego, the self. For, the vijñāna, the life-consciousness proceeds and descends¹¹⁷) in a new birth by force of desire and covetousness.

Because of the “confronting with”¹¹⁸) [a new birth, the world is defiled]. Here also, when questioned about this by some one,

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he states: **Because a performed act is directed as "bhava" in order to produce the "maturing" of a new birth** ¹¹⁹). The fettering of the vijñāna [results from] acts which have been performed formerly [in a previous existence. These acts] produce re-birth. They exist [in the ālayavijñāna] in the state of "vāsānā", "seed" and have as fruit the "ripening" ¹²⁰) [of that seed, viz., a new birth]. Because they [are active in a previous existence and] acquire origination ¹²¹) [in a new existence] they are bhava, "existence", [or rather] "becoming", active ¹²²) as well as projected ¹²³). Hence they are directed towards an actualization, an origination [in a new existence]. In this way the world is defiled because there is a directing towards a new birth by [and as] bhava.

Y. p. 40.

Owing to "suffering" ¹²⁴) the world is defiled ¹²⁵) by birth and by decay and death ¹²⁶). Thus, when the realization ¹²⁷) of a new-birth is accomplished, because of "bhava", the procreative act, [the world] is defiled. For the vijñāna, the life-consciousness coagulates ¹²⁸) in sperm and blood from the very beginning at [the moment of] the impregnation. Likewise [the world] is defiled because [the embryo, the foetus) wallows midway between the stomach ¹²⁹) and the abdomen ¹³⁰) of the mother. And [the world] is also defiled, because it is inevitable that the mother [is subject] to difficulties with regard to [the taking of] food and restricted in her freedom of movement ¹³¹). Again [the embryo] leaves [the womb] by a narrow and impure channel and in this manner, too, the world is defiled. Now, all that is born is robbed of the sweet [possession of] youth and life ¹³²) by bald-headed and grey-haired ¹³³) age and by Death who is wont to sever nāma and rūpa, "soul" and "body". And thus again the world is defiled ¹³⁴).

The world is called "jagat", Universal Motion because it moves ¹³⁵). This means in reality that it [i.e. the world, phenomenal existence] moves on from a common universal condition ¹³⁶) towards momentariness ¹³⁷). "Kliśyate, is defiled": The true meaning is that [phenomenal life or wordly existence] is afflicted by birth, decay, disease ¹³⁸) and death and so forth in [all] the three spheres of existence ¹³⁹), since it consists of its coming and going ¹⁴⁰) as a regular uninterrupted sequence of [coherent]

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T. p. 34. moments¹⁴¹). Others however maintain that "klisyate, is defiled" means that [phenomenal life] is not purified¹⁴²). So this twelve-fold [chain] of dependent origination which is characterized by defilement, originates as the "opposite" of purification¹⁴³) by reason of its eleven "functions"¹⁴⁴) of which the first is "chādanāt"¹⁴⁵). It is an uninterrupted and regular sequence, starting from avidyā along the line of a gradual development of each previous stage into the next one.

Again, [asked] of how many kinds the [universal] defilement consists which has been briefly explained to consist of this twelve-fold [chain] of dependent origination, [the following] has accordingly been stated: This very twelfefold [chain] of dependent origination is:

K. I. 11cd. "Threefold and twofold defilement, sevenfold".

The word "ca"¹⁴⁶), "and" is used in the connotations of collectivity and repetition. Because saṃkleśa, defilement is in reality kleśa, passion it is [called] kleśasaṃkleśa, defilement through passion. The same is the case with karmasaṃkleśa, defilement through action and janmasaṃkleśa, defilement through birth, individual existence¹⁴⁷). For kleśa, passion is defilement because by its action it hurts oneself and others¹⁴⁸). As has been said in the sūtra¹⁴⁹): He who is subject to attachment and overcome by passion thinks upon disturbing the peace of himself; he also thinks upon disturbing the peace of others; he even thinks upon disturbing the peace of both [himself and others]. This applies also to dveṣa, hatred and moha, folly. And [kleśa, passion] is also saṃkleśa, defilement because it produces¹⁵⁰) the defilements through action and birth. Accordingly the acts project individual existence [i.e. a new birth] by the predominance of passion. [But] with him who has seen the truth¹⁵¹), the projection of a new birth is absent even if there are acts [performed by him] extant. For [karma]¹⁵²) develops¹⁵³) the seed of a new birth by means of the activity of passion¹⁵⁴). And it is in reality the cause¹⁵⁵) of the defilement through birth, because [at the time of the conception] it fetters the defiled mind¹⁵⁶) to the [actual] reincarnation¹⁵⁷) in a new birth. Therefore, because the arhat, the "saint" has no defiled mind he is not bound by actual reincarnation. And Karma, action, pure as well as impure, is defilement because it has

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the characteristic of bodily and mental exertion in present actual life ¹⁵⁸) and because it produces "maturing" ¹⁵⁹) in future time [i.e. the maturing of a new birth]. And janman, too, is defilement because it is the abode of all calamity and mischief ¹⁶⁰).

Defilement is threefold because of a twofold differentiation of the cause ¹⁶¹). The defilement through passion is avidyā, ignorance, *trṣṇā*, thirst, craving, and the "upādānas", the passions. For exactly this triad has as substance *kleśa*, passion. The defilement through action [becomes] the *saṃskāras*, the formative forces and *bhava*, action that produces "reexistence", because even these two have karma, action as substance. But there is the following difference: Karma, action, existing in itself, by its own right ¹⁶²) constitutes the *saṃskāras*, the formative forces; and karma, action, in the condition of seed ¹⁶³) is *bhava*, action that produces "reexistence". The defilement through birth [constitutes] the remaining members [of the twelvefold chain of dependent origination], viz., *viññāna*, life-consciousness, *nāmarūpa*, the "embryo", *ṣaḍāyatana*, the six sense-organs, [i.e. the six bases of cognition], *sparśa*, "sensation", "contact", *vedanā*, feeling, *jāti*, actual birth, *jarā*, decay, old age, and *maraṇa*, death. For, [all] these are contained in *janma*, individual existence.

Defilement is twofold. It is differentiated as cause and effect. T. p. 35. **Defilement as cause [is represented] by those members which have the nature of *kleśa*, passion and karma, action. Defilement as effect [is represented] by the other members.** Karma, action and *kleśa*, passion [which respectively comprise the members *saṃskāra*, *bhava* and *avidyā*, *trṣṇā*, *upādāna*] have in this respect the nature of defilement in the quality of cause ¹⁶⁴) because they are engaged in the production of an individual existence, which consists of birth, decay, death and pain ¹⁶⁵), and to which also belong [the prenatal states of] *viññāna*, [*nāmarūpa*, *ṣaḍāyatana*, *sparśa*] and *vedanā* ¹⁶⁶). And defilement in the condition of effect [is represented] by the remaining [members], i.e. *viññāna* etc. because they are the effect of karma, action and *kleśa*, passion.

Again, this [chain of] dependent origination is **sevenfold defilement**. For, it is a sevenfold cause, being the cause of:

1. *viparyāsa*, "perversion".
2. *ākṣepa*, "projection-establishment".

3. upanayana, "leading".
4. parigraha, "embracing, enclosing".
5. upabhoga "experience, reception".
6. ākarṣaṇa, "procreation".
7. udvega, "commotion".

Y. p. 42.

Avidyā, ignorance is in this respect the cause of viparyāsa, perversion. For, that which has come into existence by reason of ignorance is called "perversion", because it errs with regard to the "truth" in so far as it considers the impermanent to be permanent and so on. The saṃskāras, the formative forces are the cause of ākṣepa, "projection, establishment", because they establish in the vijñāna, the seed of individual existence comprising four members¹⁶⁷) [of the chain of dependent origination]. Vijñāna, life-consciousness is the cause of "leading" because of its being led into the sphere of conception-birth¹⁶⁸) from death [in the previous individual existence]. The nāmarūpa, the "embryo" and the ṣaḍāyatana, the six sense-organs [or bases of cognition] are the cause of "embracing" because [the vijñāna, the life consciousness which is being] led [into re-birth], is embraced [and differentiated] by them in those categories of beings, of which each has [certain characteristics] in common¹⁶⁹) [as e.g. man, animal, etc.]. With reference to the womb of the viviparous¹⁷⁰) etc. it has been previously stated that there is embracement only by nāmarūpa, the "embryo"; here [however], referring to the "apparitional beings" it is understood that there is embracement also by the six sense-organs. Or rather, at first the intention was to explain that by nāmarūpa is to be understood the "holding together" of the mere "personality", the "body"¹⁷¹). Here however, no contrast [is made] between the full grown and not yet full grown [personality]¹⁷²).

Sparśa, "definite sensation", and vedanā, "feeling" are the causes of experience [or] enjoyment because they experience or enjoy the "retribution" of good and bad actions as "experience originating from a cause"¹⁷³).

Trṣṇā, craving, upādāna, attachment, and bhava, "becoming", are the causes of "procreation".

Those, common trival people [who are in the grip of] the retribution of enjoyed acts¹⁷⁴) have a craving for all sorts of

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feelings. [This results into] an increased craving¹⁷⁵) which is attracted to concupiscence etc. by means of a craving for [pleasant feelings] and a craving to avoid [unpleasant feelings]¹⁷⁶). Now the attachments to that [concupiscence etc.] are the causes of acts, which become the acts of a previous existence¹⁷⁷) and have the potentiality of producing a new birth¹⁷⁸). They exist in the state of *vāsanā*, "seeds" which, being ripened, become *bhava*, "becoming" or "the procreative act", since they assume a function to produce retribution in accordance with what has been projected. And *trṣṇā*, *upādāna* and *bhava* are the causes of procreation because this [*bhava*] is projected, i.e. directed, by means of *trṣṇā*, craving, *upādāna* attachment and *bhava*, the procreative act¹⁷⁹) in order to realize¹⁸⁰) the new-birth, projected, [i.e. established] by the formative forces. Or, *trṣṇā*, *upādāna* and *bhava* are the causes of procreation because they direct the *kar-mavāsanās* the "impregnations" of the "acts" by the predominance of craving which either corresponds to *chanda*, desire or *rāga* passion¹⁸¹).

Birth, decay and death are the causes of commotion. That is the case here because one experiences, when the birth is projected, sorrow in endless variety in such and such a group of sentient beings¹⁸²). It is the pain [which inheres in] birth, decay and death as well as the pain of grief and lamenting and the pain of dejection and mental unrest¹⁸³).

Now, the definition "defilement is a threefold" indicates that
Y. p. 43. *kleśa*, passion is a universal, a common cause, and *karma*, action a non-universal, a special cause of [all individual] existence¹⁸⁴). For, passion is a common cause for the "sprouting" of [all] individual existence just as the earth etc. [is a common condition for the growth of all kinds of vegetation]. The acts however are a special cause [of individual existence], just as a [particular] seed [is a special cause] of [some particular] plant. For, individual existence is differentiated by the differentiation of that [*karma*, action - seed]. Or rather, although the three periods of past, present and future [according to absolute truth] do not really exist here, [the author] nevertheless explains the fruits, of passion and action [from the relative, phenomenal point of view].

By the definition "[defilement] is twofold", he points out that

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this is only cause and effect. There is no other "creator"¹⁸⁵) or "experiencer"¹⁸⁶) here, who is subject to defilement. Or rather, only action and passion are indeed the cause here. For it has been taught that the existence as well as the non-existence of individual existence [respectively depend on] the existence and non-existence of both [passion and action]. Hence individual existence is indeed the effect, the fruit thereof. That is why he shows that it is no cause or effect [which in reality exists] here, but that [they] always [exist in] the state of the five skandhas.

Again, by the statement that the cause is sevenfold, it has been shown that [the chain of] dependent origination is twofold. For it is characterized by projection and realization. In this respect, it has been explained that the characteristic of projection [is represented] by seven members of the [chain of] dependent origination. For, the agent, the manner and the object of this projection have been shown.

The characteristic of "realization" [is represented] by five members. It is a realization of what has been projected. [Here follows a short explanation of] the manner in which it is accomplished and also of the distress [which accompanies] this realization. What is the agent of this projection? The formative forces, which are conditioned by Ignorance. In what manner [are they conditioned by Ignorance]? Ignorance forms such saṃskāras which are good, bad and non-agitated, in so far as one, being mistaken as to the true nature of the absolute truth¹⁸⁷) gets entangled into perverted ideas¹⁸⁸). In what manner is the projection accomplished by these saṃskāras? [The projection is accomplished] because they develop [i.e. impregnate] the seeds in the vijñāna and therefore fix birth in futurity. What is the object of the projection? That which is potential of re-birth, i.e. the "embryo", the "six bases of cognition", "definite sensation" and "feeling" respectively.

By what agent is the realization effected of that which has thus been projected? As has been explained, [is realized] in regular course by those attachments which are conditioned by that craving which originates while depending on those feelings which arise here, because they are projected previously [in a former individual existence]. In what manner is this the cause of the realization?

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- T. p. 37. [The upādānas] develop those acts which exist in the state of "vāsanā, "seed" in the vijñāna, the [store-] consciousness. Since various formative forces are being developed, manifold impregnations-of-acts are present in the vijñāna. That through which the nature of re-birth is present here [i.e. in this life] is called, bhava the "procreative act" or "becoming". And this is dominated by the upādānas, the attachments. And again, what is this realization? The actual birth in future time, of that, what has been projected, i.e. of nāmarūpa, etc. And what sorrow [accompanies] this [individual existence]? Decay and death resulting from the loss of sweet youth and life.

[Some people] however say, that the "cause of leading" might be meaningless in this case. That is not to the point. For this would undo the knowledge¹⁸⁹), that when one existence has been completely cut off by death a new birth-existence arises.

All these defilements originate in consequence of the Constructive Ideation, since the mind and mental phenomena are the basis of defilement. For it has been said:

- K. I. 8ab. The Constructive Ideation however, this is the Mind and the Mental Phenomena which belong to the three spheres of existence¹⁹⁰).

SURVEY OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE IDEATION.

This is a survey of the Constructive Ideation. A detailed exposition serves to understand [the subject] thoroughly but a concise exposition just serves to remember the subject. Therefore, the subject-matter is set forth here in both ways:

The characteristic of being. The Constructive Ideation is real.

The characteristic of non-being. Duality [however] does not exist in it.

The particular characteristic. Consciousness arises in the appearance of things, sentient beings, ego-substance, and ideas.

Y. p. 45.

The characteristic of union. [It has been taught that there is an] Imputed Aspect, a Causally Dependent Aspect as well as an Absolute Aspect.

The characteristic of the means to penetrate into the characteristic of non-being. Resulting from the cognition [that alle phenomena are "mere-ideation"] a non-perception [of external objects] arises.

The characteristic of differentiation. The Constructive Ideation however, this is the Mind and the Mental Phenomena which belong to the three spheres of existence.

The characteristic of the synonyms. Vijñāna, [pure] consciousness [or pure sensation] is in this respect the perception of a mere thing. The feelings and other mental phenomena mean the perception of the qualities of a thing.

The characteristic of activity-causation The one is consciousness in its quality of condition, the other is the experiencing, the enjoying [consciousness].

The characteristic of defilement. Because it enshrouds and because it establishes; because it leads, because it embraces etc.

The nine characteristics of the Constructive Ideation have been explained. Now he sets forth in what manner the Non-Substantiality¹⁾ is to be understood. What is the relation [between them]? It has been recognized by him that, whereas the Constructive Ideation is defilement²⁾ as well as the background of the knowledge of the elements of existence³⁾, the Non-Substantiality is purification⁴⁾ as well as the penetration into the Ultimate Essence of things existing, [i.e. the Absolute]⁵⁾. Immediately after the exposition of the Constructive Ideation he therefore, sets forth, in what sense the Non-Substantiality should be understood:

K. I. 12a. **The Essence**⁶⁾, moreover the synonyms⁷⁾, etc.

Y. p. 46. [The Non-Substantiality] in this respect is characterized by that [monistic] essence which transcends the reality as well as the unreality⁸⁾ [of phenomenal existence], because, in its various forms, it pervades everything. [It is explained by] its different names, its synonyms. For these, while expressing similar qualities, denote the characteristics of its "activity". Although [the essential nature of the Non-Substantiality is], just like infinite space⁹⁾, undifferentiated and beyond discriminative thought¹⁰⁾, [we speak of its] differentiation [in so far as we see] a difference in its being united with the "external" defiling forces¹¹⁾ and in its being separated therefrom. And [we speak of] a sixteenfold differentiation in so far as [the Non-Substantiality is seen in its imputed aspect i.e. in so far as] reality is ascribed to individual existence and to the separate elements of existence¹²⁾. The logical proof¹³⁾ [conveys] the reason¹⁴⁾ for showing the different [aspects] of the Non-Substantiality. Again, what is the reason that the Non-Substantiality should be understood by means of these [different] aspects. Since it is the object of purification¹⁵⁾, it is to be known in accordance with its essence, by [those sentient beings] who are desirous of spiritual purification¹⁶⁾. In order not to be deluded as to similar doctrines in other sūtras [we must pene-

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trate into the nature of the Non-Substantiality] by means of its synonyms. The meaning of a synonym should convey the exact meaning of [the word of which it is] a synonym: the Non-Substantiality in this respect is defined as the object of purification. Because it is purified as soon as [its] defilement is destroyed [one should understand it] by means of its differentiations, in order to produce the exertion [which is necessary] to renounce this defilement. It must also be known by means of the logical proof [which establishes these] differentiations. For a differentiation [of the Non-Substantiality] might easily be realized if the logical proof concerning this differentiation is thoroughly understood, although, [viewed in the light of the Monistic Essence of the Absolute] there is no change¹⁷) [whatever in the Non-Substantiality].

THE ESSENCE OF THE NON-SUBSTANTIALITY.

[In the Kārikās] the Essence [of the Non-Substantiality] is expounded first. Consequently it is asked: **What is meant by the Essence?**

K. I. 13ab. By the **Essence of the Non-Substantiality** should be understood **the unreality of duality** ¹⁸⁾ as well as the **real background of that unreality** ¹⁹⁾

Duality i.e. subject and object does not substantially exist ²⁰⁾ in the Constructive Ideation or as Constructive Ideation, because it is of an imputed nature ²¹⁾. **Now, the real background of this unreality of duality is the Essence of the Non-Substantiality.** We should understand that in the Kārikā [the last syllable of "sūn-yatā"] has been omitted metri causa.

Y. p. 47.

T. p. 39.

What is it, that is really meant by this real background of the unreality [of duality]? The unreality [of the separate existence of duality] finds its background in the Monistic Essence of Absolute Existence ²²⁾. Otherwise, if the Non-Substantiality, [i.e. the Monistic Essence] should not be the [sole] reality of that [duality], duality would be real in itself. Therefore he says: **So the essential nature** ²³⁾ **of the Non-Substantiality has been elucidated. It is the Monistic Essence,** [i.e. the real background] **of the unreality** [of phenomenal existence. This monistic reality however should not be understood in the sense of objective, empirical reality]. It has not the character of an entity ²⁴⁾. The word "bhāva, existence, background" is added here [in order to denote that the reality of the Non-Substantiality is absolute and transcendental]. Since the word "abhāva, non-existence" is [in itself already] expressive of the unreality of a thing, the meaning thereof could be understood even if we should omit the word "bhāva existence". But if we should do so we would in reality maintain that there is no difference between the essence of the Non-Substantiality and the unreality, [i.e. the non-existence of phenomenal existence]. And [because of this nihilistic standpoint] the unreality of pheno-

menal existence would be understood to be an independent, non-relative fact ²⁵), just like the unreality of the horns of a hare. [In this case the Non-Substantiality could not have] the character of Dhārmata, Ultimate Essence of things existing. It could not be compared then, e.g., to the duḥkhatā, the nature of pain [which depends on a substratum of painful phenomena]. Therefore it has been said that the unreality of duality is Non-Substantiality. And the [Monistic Essence], the real background of this unreality, existing in the Constructive Ideation, [i.e. in the objectivizing consciousness or causally dependent aspect of existence] is likewise called Non-Substantiality ²⁶). And it is in this way that we should understand [the Non-Substantiality] as Ultimate Essence of things existing ²⁷): For the elements of existence in their unreal, superimposed aspect are comprised by [i.e. depend on] real existence ²⁸).

Or rather [if you say that] the Non-Substantiality is the unreality (or non-existence) of duality, it is not understood in what sense "abhāva" is used here since this word denotes a general meaning ²⁹). In order to show that the absolute unreality, the absolute non-existence ³⁰) [is meant here], it has been said: It is the absolute existence [of the Undifferentiated Monistic Essence, which is the background] of the unreality of duality in the Constructive Ideation. For the antecedent non-existence ³¹) as well as the subsequent non-existence ³²) inevitably require a substratum [on which they depend] ³³). And it is impossible that the reciprocal non-existence ³⁴) could depend upon itself alone ³⁵), because [in reciprocal non-existence is implied that] two things are mutually dependent. Therefore it has been taught that the Non-Substantiality is exactly the absolute non-existence (or unreality) of subject and object because in its essence it is the substrate-cause of the unreality of [phenomenal] existence ³⁶).

If the Non-Substantiality is the essence of [phenomenal] unreality, why is it called "Paramārtha", Ultimate Reality? Because it is the object ³⁷) of the paramajñāna, the highest Ultimate Wisdom. And this "object" should not be understood in the sense of a "thing-substance", an entity ³⁸). But we should compare it to impermanence, [i.e. a "reality" which is the essence and general character of things impermanent]. Moreover, this [Ultimate Rea-

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lity] is not non-existence [or unreality] as such ³⁹). For (it has been said);

K. I. 13c. **That which is the true nature of the unreality of the [duality in the Constructive Ideation] is neither real, nor even unreal.**

Y. p. 48. **Why is it not real? Because it is the unreality of duality.** For in case that it should be real [in the sense of empirical reality], duality could not be unreal from the absolute point of view. And it could not be then the Ultimate Essence of the Constructive Ideation, [i.e. of the bare reality free from the differentiation into subject and object, the causally dependent aspect of existence, the noumenal world which is the true foundation of existence] ⁴⁰).

Y. p. 263. **Why is it not unreal? Because it is the "real background" of the unreality of duality.** For the unreality of duality is not independent unreality. [Duality is not unreal in consequence of its own nature, but in consequence of the absolute nature]. If the Non-Substantiality should be unreal [in a phenomenal sense], duality would be real and also in this case [the Non-Substantiality] could not be the Ultimate Essence of the Constructive Ideation, in the same way as the nature of pain and impermanence [is the essence of painful and impermanent phenomena]. It has been said [that the Non-Substantiality is] neither real nor unreal because it is the true nature of the unreality of those [separate] permanent and blissful essences and qualities ⁴¹) which are superimposed [on the real component parts of the stream of consciousness, on the ideal world] by those sentient beings [who are deluded as to the real nature of Absolute Truth], on account of their perverted knowledge ⁴²).

T. p. 40

Again, if the Non-Substantiality is the Dharmatā, the Ultimate Essence of the Constructive Ideation, [we may ask] whether it should be explained as different or as non-different therefrom. Therefore he says: **This is the essence of the Non-Substantiality:** It is indeed the true nature ⁴³), [the background] of phenomenal unreality, of rather it is that [absolute] existence, in which the negation ⁴⁴) of [separate] phenomenal reality is implied. It is therefore

K. I. 13d. **an Essence neither different ⁴⁵) from nor identical ⁴⁶) with the Constructive Ideation.**

If it should be different, the dharmatā, the Ultimate Essence

could not be different from a dharma, an element of existence. What do you mean? If [the Non-Substantiality should be different from the Constructive Ideation, i.e. from the component parts of the stream of consciousness] it would have the character of a dharma, different from the other dharmas; it would itself become a dharma. For only the dharmas are different from each other. But it is not possible that a [certain] element of existence, a dharma could become the dharmatā, the Ultimate Essence of another dharma. For in that case we would have a regressus ad infinitum ⁴⁷⁾: [If a dharma could be at the same time dharmatā and a dharma, every time anew] we should have to search ⁴⁸⁾ for other dharmas [who could be the dharmatā of the other ones] and this would be absurd. It is the same with the nature of impermanence and the nature of pain. Just like impermanence is not different from things impermanent and the nature of pain not different from painful phenomena so also is the sūnyata, the Non-Substantiality not different from things non-substantial.

If [the Non-Substantiality] should be identical [with the Constructive Ideation], it neither could be the object and support of purification ⁴⁹⁾ nor the general essence ⁵⁰⁾. The Path [of Final Deliverance] is purification, because it purifies [the Non-Substantiality from the accidental defiling forces]. If [the Non-Substantiality] should not be different from the Constructive Ideation it would neither be different from the dharmasvalakṣaṇa the particular essence of the elements of existence, and as such it could not be the object and support of the Path. And in this case it could not be the sāmānyalakṣaṇa, the general essence, since this would coincide with the particular essence. [And if we should nevertheless maintain that it is the general essence, it would be characterized by] mutual differences ⁵²⁾, just as in the case of the [separate] elements of existence as such ⁵³⁾. In consequence thereof the [conception of] universality ⁵⁴⁾ would not be valid here. On the other hand, because the particular essence would not be different [from the general essence] there would be no differentiation as to the particular forms of the entities and also in this case the [conception of] universality would not exist. For a general essence depends on differences. Or rather, because [the Constructive Ideation, i.e. the ideal reality] is to be purified ⁵⁵⁾ [from the

Y. p. 49.

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superimposed aspect, i.e. the phenomenal world] and because this purified Constructive Ideation is the very Non-Substantiality itself, we must say that the Non-Substantiality is the object, viz. the support-object of purification. It is not the phenomenal world in its particularity, in its separateness, which could be the support-object of purification, for in that case all sentient beings would be "pure", [i.e. delivered from the bonds of phenomenal existence without effort ⁵⁶].

If [the Ultimate Reality] is not to be defined either as different from or identical with ⁵⁷) [the Constructive Ideation] why do you not support the doctrine of the nirgranthas? Indeed, if one does not distinguish the identity and difference of the empirical reality of a thing, he supports the doctrine of the nirgranthas ⁵⁸). But since the Non-Substantiality is not an empirical entity, there is no fault in the reasoning here.

So this Non-Substantiality has the character of *asat*, non-being, the character of *abhāvasvarūpa*, true nature of non-phenomenal existence and the character of the Unique Principle, of the Undifferentiated Monistic Essence ⁵⁹). In this manner it has been made clear that [the Non-Substantiality] is beyond ⁶⁰) the characteristics of identity and difference.

This is the explanation of the Essence of the Non-Substantiality.

THE SYNONYMS OF THE NON-SUBSTANTIALITY.

T. p. 41.
K. l. 14.

An explanation of the synonyms ⁶¹⁾ follows here:

Summarily the synonyms of the Non-Substantiality are:

Tathatā, The Absolute Essence; Suchness.

Bhūtakoṭi, The Limit of Reality; The Absolute Point of Existence.

Animitta, Deprived of Characteristics; The Formless.

Paramārthatā, the Absolute, the Ultimate Reality.

Dharmadhātu, The Unique Absolute; the Ultimate cause of the elements; Realm of Ideas.

A synonym makes clear that there are different names for the same thing. Because it defines the meaning of [the word of which it is] a synonym, it is called synonym. In other sūtras these definitions are explained as mere Non-Substantiality. And although these five synonyms, being preëminent, are mentioned in the gāthā, there are still other synonyms not explained here. They are to be known from [other] scriptures, e.g.:

Y. p. 50.

Advayatā: The Real Unique Principle of Non-Duality.

Avikalpadhātu: The Sphere of Non-Constructive-Thought.

Dharmatā: The Ultimate Essence of the Elements of Existence.

Anabilāpyatā: The Inexpressible.

Anirodha: The Everlasting ⁶²⁾.

Asaṃskṛtam: The Unconditioned.

Nirvāṇa.

Asked as to the real meaning of these synonyms, he explains them here: These words are not subordinate ⁶³⁾, [i.e. they do not define attributes or qualities of the Non-Substantiality] but they convey the direct, absolute meaning:

K. I. 15.

We have the synonyms, respectively, in consequence of its immutability ⁶⁴⁾ and in consequence of its being without perversion ⁶⁵⁾. Because the impermanence [of phenomenal existence is implied in it]. Because it is the object-sphere [of the meditation] of the Āryas, the Saints and because it is the immediate cause ⁶⁶⁾ of the Dharmas of the Āryas.

THE SYNONYMS OF THE NON-SUBSTANTIALITY

In this respect it is **Tathatā, Suchness, Absolute Essence**, because it has the nature of object of the knowledge concerning the any modification ⁶⁷). And in order to explain this he says: **Because of its being, "Suchness" it is eternal.** This means that it is eternally not changed ⁶⁸) because it is always unconditioned. It is the **Limit of Reality** because it is beyond perversion, [of the mind]. For *bhūta*, "real" means "unperverted" and "true"; *koṭi*, the "highest point" means "the extreme limit" beyond which there is nothing which can be known. *Bhūtakoti* therefore is called *bhūtaparyanta*, "The Extreme Limit of Reality" ⁶⁹). Why is the "Tathatā" called "jñeyam", "to be known", "cognoscible"? Because it has the nature of object of the knowledge, concerning the purification from the *jñeyāvaraṇa*, the "Obscuration of Ignorance" ⁷⁰). For it is beyond perverted knowledge, viz., it is beyond the imputations of realism and nihilism. This he affirms by saying: For [the Tathatā] cannot become the object of perverted knowledge ⁷¹). Indeed, perverted knowledge is *vikalpa*, discriminative or discursive thought. And because the Tathatā [transcends every possibility] of being cognized by discursive thought, it cannot become the object of perverted knowledge. It is exempt from characteristics because the characteristics are annihilated. Here the being without characteristics is to be understood in the sense of annihilation of characteristics ⁷²). In order to elucidate this, he says: For all characteristics are unreal, do not exist.

T. p. 42.

The Non-Substantiality [itself] is non-substantial [in so far as it is cognized] by means of the characteristics of the conditioned as well as of the unconditioned. Therefore it is called "without characteristics". And because [in the light of the Monistic Essence of the Absolute] there is no characteristic whatsoever, [even conditioned as well as non-conditioned existence] are exempt from them. [And here the phenomenal and ideal] unreality of alle characteristics is identical with [and dependent upon] the unreality of the characteristics [ascribed to the Non-Substantiality] ⁷³).

It is **Paramārthatā, Ultimate Reality** because it is the object-sphere of the wisdom of the Saints ⁷⁴). For, *paramam*, "supreme" [stands for] *lokottarajñāna*, transcendental wisdom. The object thereof is the supreme object, the Ultimate Reality. Explaining this he says: For it is the object-sphere of the Supreme Wisdom.

THE SYNONYMS OF THE NON-SUBSTANTIALITY.

It is the Dharmadhātu, the Ultimate Cause, because it is the cause of the Āryadharmas, the Saintly Properties.

Y. p. 51.

By the word dharma is meant the Āryadharmas, the Properties of the Saints. These begin with right belief ⁷⁵⁾ and end with the ultimate wisdom of perfect deliverance ⁷⁶⁾. Because [the Dharmadhātu] is the cause ⁷⁷⁾ thereof, it is [their] base ⁷⁸⁾. This he explains by saying: **For the properties of the Saints originate in dependence on this [base]**. Because the word "dhātu" is also employed in the sense of "a thing which has a form by means of its particular character" ⁷⁹⁾, he says: **Dhātu stands here in the sense of cause**. We may compare it to element of gold, the element of copper or the element of silver [which are causa materialis of pieces of gold, copper or silver]. The synonyms which are mentioned in other sūtras must be defined exactly by the same method as to their inherent true meaning.

THE DIFFERENTIATION OF THE NON-SUBSTANTIALITY.

Since the Non-Substantiality, in so far as its true nature is concerned, is beyond the existence of subject and object, he considers a differentiation [thereof] impossible and asks: **How is the differentiation of the Non-Substantiality to be understood?** Or rather, he puts the same question because it has been said that immediately after [the exposition of] the meaning of the synonyms the differentiation should be known. For the Constructive Ideation is called defilement⁸⁰). And the removal of this Constructive Ideation we call purification⁸¹). Now, during the process of defilement and purification there is, besides the Non-Substantiality, nothing which is subject to defilement or purification. Therefore in order to point out that at the time of defilement and at the time of purification it is only the Non-Substantiality which becomes defiled and purified, he says:

K. I. 16a. **Because [the Non-Substantiality] is defiled and purified, there is a differentiation of it.**

Since he does not know when [the Non-Substantiality] is defiled and when it is pure, stainless, he asks: **At what time is it defiled, at what time is it purified?** He answers:

K. I. 16b. **It has stains⁸²) and it is stainless⁸³), etc.**

It has been established that the [Non-Substantiality] is subject to defilement and free from defilement by means of its relation to the "Non-Revulsion"⁸⁴) and "Revulsion" of the "Personality"⁸⁵). The Non-Substantiality does not manifest itself to those ignorant persons who are attached to [the separate reality of] subjects and objects and whose minds⁸⁶) are "stained" by such defiling faculties as rāga, passion and so forth⁸⁷), because they do not understand it or misunderstand it, and it is with regard to them that it has been said that the Non-Substantiality is defiled, stained.

T. p. 43. Just like the Infinite Space, the Non-Substantiality manifests itself directly in its primordial lustre⁸⁸) to those saintly wise men, whose minds are not subject to confusion⁸⁹), in consequence of their fathoming the Absolute Truth⁹⁰), and it is with regard to

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them that it has been said that [the Non-Substantiality] is free from stains. This is the insight in the dialectical relation⁹¹⁾ of the Non-Substantiality to defilement and purification: It is not impure in so far as its true absolute nature is concerned, because it is pure, translucent by nature.⁹²⁾

If [the Non-Substantiality] should be stained! Indeed, a differentiation in degrees⁹³⁾ [of sequence, of temporal order] is not perceived without change. And change is the natural result of origination and destruction. That is why he asks: How is it possible that [the Non-Substantiality] is not impermanent⁹⁴⁾, if it is endowed with the peculiar characteristic of change?⁹⁵⁾ Indeed there is no other change [of the Ultimate Reality] except [the change] from the phase⁹⁶⁾ of defilement⁹⁷⁾ to the phase of purity. But the Tattva, the Absolute Truth, such as it exists in itself, does not change into another substance because it becomes free from accidental defilement⁹⁷⁾. Because

K I. 16cd.

such purity is meant as the purity of water, gold, infinite space, [the Non-Substantiality] is not impermanent⁹⁸⁾. Although water, gold and infinite space [have accidental defilements], they are free from the nature of impurity because they are the negation⁹⁹⁾ of that [defilement] in so far as their own-nature is concerned. In the same manner [the Non-Substantiality] is in reality pure, both at the time of having accidental defilements and at the time of being liberated therefrom, even without obtaining another substance¹⁰⁰⁾. It is in this way that even the Non-Substantiality is defiled by accidental obscurations. And although it does not become changed in so far as its real nature is concerned it [nevertheless] becomes purified by reason of the removal of those [obscurations]. For, if you maintain that one and the same thing¹⁰¹⁾ has first an essential nature of defilement and afterwards a pure nature, the quality of an essential and substantial change¹⁰²⁾ is not denied; but [if you say that] both the [characteristics of defilement and purity] are accidental qualities, [it is only the change from the phase of defilement to the phase of purity which] is not denied. That is why this [change due to accidental qualities] does not affect¹⁰³⁾ [the Non-Substantiality] in its essence.

THE SIXTEENFOLD NON-SUBSTANTIALITY.

Because in the chapter concerning the differentiation all the different [aspects of] the Non-Substantiality are to be explained he says: **The Non-Substantiality is sixteenfold because there is a further differentiation here.**

It becomes sixteenfold by reason of a differentiation of the substratum¹⁰⁴), [viz. of the categories to which the Non-Substantiality is applied]. There is no differentiation however in the real absolute background of the unreality of duality¹⁰⁵). This sixteenfold Non-Substantiality is enunciated in the Prajñāpāramitā¹⁰⁶). It begins with the adhyātmaśūnyatā and goes on as far as the abhāvasvabhāvaśūnyatā. It is briefly to be explained here as:

Y. p. 53. **The Non-Substantiality of the enjoyer¹⁰⁷) and the enjoyed¹⁰⁸),**
K. I. 17ab. **of the body thereof¹⁰⁹) and of the receptacle¹¹⁰).**

T. p. 44.

Because the Non-Substantiality is the real unique principle of all the elements of existence, it is their general essence¹¹¹). Therefore he shows that its manifoldness has the nature of the manifoldness of the categories¹¹²) [to which it is applied]. It is not possible to explain its manifoldness in a different manner.

To begin with it should be made clear what is meant by the enjoying subject, in order to be able to renounce the affection for it and the attachment to it. For this affection and this attachment become obstacles to obtain Buddhahood and Final Deliverance. Immediately following, the enjoyed object must be explained; next the support, i.e. the body, the frame¹¹³) of these two and [finally] the "receptacle" of these "personalities", i.e. the inanimate world¹¹⁴). [These explanations serve] to remove the [false] notion of self-love¹¹⁵). For [this notion] strengthens [the false conception of the real existence of] an enjoyer. Such are the four categories [of phenomenal existence]. The Non-Substantiality applied to them is called "vastuśūnyatā", the Non-Substantiality of the four categories [of phenomenal existence].

In the first place we have the Non-Substantiality of the "en-

joyer" ¹¹⁶), [who is replaced by] **the internal bases of cognition** ¹¹⁷). These begin with the sense of vision (the eye) and extend as far as "manas", "the faculty of the intellect or consciousness". For an enjoyer different therefrom does not exist. And because the eye and the other [sense-organs] exhibit their activity in experiencing objects, there is the overestimation ¹¹⁸) that especially in the sense-organs an experiencer, an enjoyer of the [external] world exists. Therefore the Non-Substantiality of the internal bases of cognition, i.e. the eye etc., is called the Non-Substantiality of the enjoyer.

The Non-Substantiality of the enjoyed ¹¹⁹) [which is replaced] by the **external [bases of cognition]**. These begin with rūpa, colour, and extend as far as the dharmas, the non-sensuous objects. Because they are experienced as real existing objects they are the enjoyed, "the experienced". That is why the Non-Substantiality of the external bases of cognition is called the Non-Substantiality of the enjoyed. **The physical body of both the enjoyer and the enjoyed, is their support or frame**, for it is exactly in this frame that they are inseparately connected with each other, [viz. the mutual dependence of subject and object is an internal proces of constructive thought, conditioned by the physical existence of a sentient being]. Therefore **the Non-Substantiality thereof is called the internal as well as the external Non-Substantiality.** ¹²⁰). The "receptacle" is the **inanimate world**. Since this is known as the abode of all sentient beings, [i.e. of the animate world] he says: **Because of its extensiveness the Non-Substantiality thereof is called the great Non-Substantiality** ¹²¹). The word "vastu", category of phenomenal existence [must be] connected with each [of the four aspects just mentioned here].

Y. p. 54.

When a **Bodhisattva**, who is a yogi, a devotee, deliberately ¹²²) and thoroughly thinks ¹²³) about the Non-Substantiality of these four categories of objects of knowledge, then again he clings to the false conception of the [separate reality] of phenomenal characteristics ¹²⁴), be it in a different manner. When by the **knowledge** ¹²⁵) of the **Non-Substantiality** it is apprehended that the internal as well as the external bases of cognition etc. are non-substantial, [the Non-Substantiality, being the object of that knowledge, is brought within the pale of] attachment to subjects

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and objects, and this is false discrimination ¹²⁶). [False discrimination it is also if we say that the Non-Substantiality of] these categories of phenomenal existence such as it is apprehended by that knowledge of the Non-Substantiality, is an aspect of the Ultimate Reality ¹²⁷). In order to reflect on these two kinds of false discrimination, which are the characteristics of the delusion existing on the stage of the yogi ¹²⁸), we have [as antidote] respectively the Non-Substantiality of Non-Substantiality ¹²⁹) and the Non-Substantiality of Ultimate Reality ¹³⁰). Abridged, they are explained as jñāna, knowledge, and akāra, aspect. Or rather, in so far as the Non-Substantiality has the nature of object [of knowledge] is has been said that this knowledge is also non-substantial. **The Non-Substantiality of this** [knowledge] in so far as this is concerned with subjects and objects, is **Non-Substantiality of Non-Substantiality**. And if we say that [the Non-Substantiality of] these categories of phenomenal existence is **Ultimate Reality**, just like it has been apprehended by this knowledge of the Non-Substantiality, **the Non-Substantiality of this aspect is the Non-Substantiality of Ultimate Reality**. Why is that so? Because the Ultimate Reality is non-substantial as to the imagined, superimposed aspect. And here we have again another clinging to [phenomenal] characteristics which becomes a dīsturbance in the process of spiritual realization of the Non-Substantiality. For, empirical reality ¹³¹) is imputed to that [transcendental reality], for the sake of which a Bodhisattva practises ¹³²) this realization of the Non-Substantiality. In order to reflect thereupon, the [following kinds of] Non-Substantiality, beginning with the saṃskṛtaśūnyatā and extending as far as the sarvadharmāśūnyatā have been expounded.

And why does [a Bodhisattva] **practise** [the realization of the Non-Substantiality]?

K. I. 18a. **In order to obtain the two kinds of purity** ¹³³).

Until [he gains] the purity of the Buddha-Elements he practises [the realization] of the Non-Substantiality. The true meaning is that he trains himself in the Non-Substantiality. **The two kinds of purity are the conditioned** ¹³⁴) **and the unconditioned**. They are the Path and Nirvāṇa and it is with regard to them that we speak, respectively of the Non-Substantiality ¹³⁵) of the conditioned and

Y. p. 55.

the Non-Substantiality of the unconditioned ¹³⁶).

K. I. 18b.

And always for the salvation of the sentient beings.

It is said: "The salvation of the sentient beings is in all respects and at all times to be pursued by me ¹³⁷). The Non-Substantiality thereof is [called] the absolute, supreme Non-Substantiality ¹³⁸).

K. I. 18c.

And in order not to renounce phenomenal existence ¹³⁹), [the Bodhisattva practises the realization of the Non-Substantiality. It is said]: "For the sake of the sentient beings phenomenal existence should not be renounced by me". If the Bodhisattva should renounce phenomenal existence, he would confine himself to the enlightenment of the "hearer" ¹⁴⁰) and he would not obtain the enlightenment of the Bodhisattva. The Non-Substantiality thereof is the Limitless Non-Substantiality ¹⁴¹). Again, asked as to the necessity of pointing out this Non-Substantiality he says: The [śrāvaka] is tired of phenomenal life because he does not see the Non-Substantiality of limitless phenomenal existence. Therefore he forsakes it.

K. I. 18d.

And for the sake of inexhaustible goodness ¹⁴²).

"The roots of virtue ¹⁴³) are not destroyed by me." **Even in the Nirupadhiṣeṣa Nirvāṇa, the Nirvāṇa without residue ¹⁴⁴)** [the Bodhisattva] **does not shake them off;** and this signifies that he does not renounce them. If this be so, how is the realization of the Nirvāṇa without Residue attained then? It is an established truth that even in the Nirvāṇa without residue, the Cosmical Body ¹⁴⁵) of the Austere Buddhas which is of unaffected, pure substance ¹⁴⁶) does not cease, although the body which is a ripening, a retribution of the affected elements ¹⁴⁷) does not exist [therein]. Therefore the Non-Substantiality thereof is called the Non-Substantiality of Non-Renunciation, the ceaseless Non-Substantiality ¹⁴⁸).

T. p. 46.

K. I. 19a.

And in order to purify the Element of the Spiritual Lineage ¹⁴⁹) [of the Buddha, from the accidental defiling forces, the Bodhisattva practises the realization of the Non-Substantiality.

The Non-Substantiality thereof is the Non-Substantiality of the original [Buddha-] nature ¹⁵⁰) [existing inherently in men]. And this he establishes by saying: **The element of the Spiritual Lineage is the primordial nature ¹⁵¹)** [of the Buddha].

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How should one understand this? It is the absolute, inherent nature, viz., it is the absolute inherent nature which has no beginning. It means in reality that it is not accidental¹⁵²). Just as in the beginningless phenomenal existence¹⁵³) there are beings endowed with consciousness and beings without consciousness¹⁵⁴), in the same way there are some here whose six bases of cognition are [governed by] the Element of the Spiritual Lineage of the Buddha¹⁵⁵) and others [whose six bases of cognition are [governed by] the Element of the Lineage of the Śrāvaka, the "hearer"¹⁵⁶) [or by the the Element of the Spiritual Lineage of the Pratyekabuddhas]. Since it is beginningless and since it is being transferred from one existence to another¹⁵⁷) the Element of the Spiritual Lineage is not of a casual, accidental nature as in the case of the difference between consciousness and unconsciousness. Others however maintain that the Element of the Spiritual Lineage [of the Buddha] should be understood here in the sense of "Tathātva", "Suchness" or the "Absolute" since all sentient beings are possessed of "the Element of the Spiritual Lineage of the Tathāgata", the "Essence of Buddhahood"¹⁵⁸).

Y. p. 56.

K. I. 19b.

In order to obtain the principal and secondary marks¹⁵⁹) [of excellence and corporeal beauty of the Buddha, the Bodhisattva practises the realization of the Non-Substantiality]. Hence the Non-Substantiality of these principle and secondary marks of the Supreme Beings is called the Non-Substantiality of the Marks¹⁶⁰).
Moreover

K. I. 19cd.

the Bodhisattva practises the realization [of the Non-Substantiality] in order to purify, the elements of the Buddha.

Because in the end [of this Kārikā] the word "prapadyate, practises"¹⁶¹) has been employed, it is in all instances to be used here: "The Bodhisattva practises the realization of the Non-Substantiality in order to obtain the two kinds of purity; and so he does in behalf of the salvation of the sentient beings".

[Asked as to the question]: Which of the Buddha-elements [are to be purified] he answers: The [ten] powers, the [four] "grounds of self-confidence"; the [eighteen] "special and extraordinary attributes"¹⁶²). Briefly it has been taught: "I must exert myself to obtain all the elements of the Buddha". For this reason [the realization of the Non-Substantiality] is called concentrated

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contemplation¹⁶³). The Non-Substantiality of this contemplation is called the Non-Substantiality of all the elements¹⁶⁴) [of the Buddha]. Of what kind is the contemplation here? It is an uninterrupted contiguous application of [intuitive] knowledge with regard to the objects of [this] knowledge.

T. p. 47.

Now for the present, the establishment¹⁶⁵) of these fourteen kinds of Non-Substantiality, viz. the Non-Substantiality of the internal [bases of cognition] etc. up to the Non-Substantiality of all the elements [of the Buddha] should be understood in this way. Again, [asked as to the question] what is the Non-Substantiality of the "enjoyer" [and of the other categories] here, what the Absolute Nature, he answers:

Y. p. 57 &
p. 263.
K. I. 20.

The unreality of the individual and of the separate elements of existence is here the Non-Substantiality; the real background of this unreality is in this connexion Non-Substantiality different therefrom.

Non-Substantiality is in this respect the unreality of the individual and of the separate elements, that is, as has been said before, [the unreality] of the four categories of phenomenal existence. And the real background¹⁶⁶) of this unreality, [i.e. the Undifferentiated Monistic Essence] is likewise Non-Substantiality. Now the unreality of the individual and of the separate elements of existence is [called] the Non-Substantiality of "non-existence"¹⁶⁷), i.e. of "phenomenal existence". The real background of this Unreality is [called] the Non-Substantiality as "Monistic Essence" of "phenomenal existence"¹⁶⁸) Why again are these two [aspects of] Non-Substantiality dealt with in the end? In order to point out the Essence of the Non-Substantiality. And why is the Non-Substantiality once more explained? [In order to avoid realism and nihilism], viz. in order to avoid the imputations of a separate reality of the individual and the elements of existence and in order to avoid the negation of the reality of the Non-Substantiality thereof. He establishes the Non-Substantiality of phenomenal-existence in order to avoid the imputations of a separate reality of an "ego" and of the separate elements of existence. And [he establishes] the Non-Substantiality as the Monistic Essence of phenomenal existence in order to avoid the negation of [the Ultimate Reality of] that Non-Substantiality. If one should

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not admit the Non-Substantiality of phenomenal existence, he would get entangled in such absurdities as ascribing objective reality¹⁶⁹) to the "ego" and the separate elements of existence. [And it is exactly this objective separate reality which is] a construction of the mind¹⁷⁰), [superimposed on the real substratum of ideal reality which is formed by the component parts of the stream of consciousness]. If one should not admit the Non-Substantiality in the sense of True Monistic Essence of noumenal reality, he would deny the Non-Substantiality itself and this would be a *reductio ad absurdum*. For in that case we should have to admit the objective reality [of phenomenal existence, i.e.] of individuals and of the separate elements of existence, as aforesaid.

In the common opinion of the ignorant a [real and separate] experiencer exists in the internal bases of cognition which have as their nature the *vipākavijñāna*, the consciousness of retribution [i.e. the store-consciousness]¹⁷¹). The Internal Non-Substantiality in this respect, means the unreality of the individual experiencer¹⁷²) and of the separate essences and qualities¹⁷³) ascribed to the organs of sense and consciousness, as well as the real background of this unreality. In the same way the ignorant assume a [real and separate] object of experience in the external bases of cognition whereas it is the nature of these bases to appear as sense-objects and mental (non-sensuous) objects¹⁷⁴). In this respect the external Non-Substantiality means the unreality of the individual object¹⁷⁵) of experience and of the separate essences and qualities imputed to the sense-objects and mental objects, as well as the real background of this unreality. The internal-external Non-Substantiality means the unreality as well as the real background of this unreality of the physical existence of an individual experiencer and of the separate essences and qualities imputed by the ignorant to the sense-objects etc. with regard to this physical existence, i.e. the body, the frame. The great Non-Substantiality is the unreality of the animate world¹⁷⁶) and of the separate nature imputed to it with regard to the inanimate world. It is also the real background of this unreality.

The unreality of a "knower"¹⁷⁷) with regard to the knowledge of the Non-Substantiality in so far as this knowledge is of an imputed, constructed essence and the real background of this un-

Y. p. 58.

T. p. 48.

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reality is the Non-Substantiality of the Non-Substantiality. In the same way we have the Non-Substantiality of Ultimate Reality. This means the unreality, as well as the real background of this unreality, of an individual perceiver of aspects of Ultimate Reality in so far as these are of an imputed, constructed essence. Now the Bodhisattva practises here the realization of the Non-Substantiality for the sake of [those forms of Non-Substantiality] which begin with the Non-Substantiality of the conditioned and end with the Non-Substantiality of all the *dharmas* [of the Buddha]. They are the unreality, as well as the real background of this unreality, of the individual and of the separate essences and qualities imputed with regard to the Path¹⁷⁸), *Nirvāṇa* and so forth up to the elements of the Buddha, in all of which the Bodhisattva should train himself. For there is no subject¹⁷⁹), agent¹⁸⁰), or individual in conditioned reality, [i.e. in ideal reality]. And even the conditioned itself is unreal in so far as it is of a nature superimposed on it by the ignorant.

These sixteen [forms of] Non-Substantiality which the Bodhisattvas do not share¹⁸¹) with the *Śrāvakas*, summarily have been taught as a counteragent¹⁸²) of all false discriminations and conceptions and in order to reveal the real esoteric meaning of all the *sūtras*. And here the *Bhagavat* has taught the object¹⁸³) of the Non-Substantiality, the real nature¹⁸⁴) of the Non-Substantiality and the spiritual training of the contemplation¹⁸⁵) of the Non-Substantiality. The object of the Non-Substantiality in this respect [comprises] the "enjoyer", up to the elements of the Buddha. And this again has been taught in order to convey the knowledge that the Non-Substantiality pervades¹⁸⁶) all the elements of existence. The real nature of the Non-Substantiality means the true nature of phenomenal unreality as well as the true nature of the real background of this phenomenal unreality [viz. the Undifferentiated Monistic Essence of the ideal reality]. The real nature of the Non-Substantiality again has been taught in order to show that, as a counteragent of the false imputations of realism and nihilism¹⁸⁷), it has the nature of transcending all false conceptions¹⁸⁸). The spiritual training of the contemplation of the Non-Substantiality begins with [the effort] to obtain the two kinds of purity and ends with [the effort] to obtain¹⁸⁹) the

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elements of the Buddha. And this again has been explained in order to show to one's self and others that the magnificence of the perfections of the "Body of Bliss"¹⁹⁰⁾ and of the "Cosmical Body"¹⁹¹⁾ [of the Buddha] is to be attained by means of the spiritual training of the contemplation of the Non-Substantiality. **In this sense we should understand the differentiation of the Non-Substantiality:** It is defiled in its phase of having [accidental] impurities¹⁹²⁾, it is pure in its immaculate phase¹⁹³⁾ [as true essence of the elements separated from all that which represents a construction of the mind]. And the sixteen aspects which have just been explained here should be known as the internal and other forms of Non-Substantiality.

THE REALIZATION OF THE NON-SUBSTANTIALITY.

(The Non-Substantiality logically proved).

Immediately after the differentiation [of the Non-Substantiality] its realization ¹⁹⁴) has been taught. Hence it is asked now: **How is the realization to be known?** What is it that is realized here? The nature of defilement by reason of the accidental secondary defiling forces ¹⁹⁵) and the nature of essential original purity ¹⁹⁶). With regard to the realization of the nature of defilement he says in this respect:

If this defilement should not exist, all mortals would be delivered.

Deliverance ¹⁹⁷) means the renunciation of defilement. And the renunciation of this defilement is [effected] by means of the concentrated contemplation of the Path ¹⁹⁸). Now in case that the Non-Substantiality of the elements of existence should not be defiled by the accidental secondary defiling forces, irrespective of the non-origination of the counteragent all sentient beings would be delivered without effort because of the non-existence of defilement. For the word "irrespective of" [expresses] that there is, as it were, an origination [of the counteragent]. "Without effort" means in reality "without counteragent". But since there is no deliverance of the sentient beings without the counteragent, we should necessarily admit that [as long as it manifests itself] in the condition of common wordly being ¹⁹⁹) the Absolute Essence is defiled by reason of the accidental impurities [which cling to it]. So the defilement of the Non-Substantiality has been realized. Now realizing the differentiation of purification, he says:

If this purity should not exist, the effort would be vain, viz. [the effort] of the mortal beings. Now, if [the Non-Substantiality] should not be [originally] pure, [all] exertion to obtain salvation would be vain, irrespective of the origination of the counteragent. For the word "irrespective of" [expresses] as it were the non-

origination [of the counteragent]. For even through the constant contemplation on the counteragent [the Bodhisattva] would not succeed in his effort to obtain the purification thereof and defilement would not have [that dialectical] nature of accomplishing deliverance, [i.e. purification]. But it is in no way acknowledged that the effort to acquire salvation should be fruitless. Therefore, because of the constant practice of [meditating on] the counteragent, i.e. because of the removal of the accidental secondary defiling forces, the purity of the Non-Substantiality necessarily must be admitted. Thus the purity of the Non-Substantiality ²⁰⁰) has been realized.

Here defilement depends upon a substrate ²⁰¹) of defiled elements, purification upon a substrate of pure elements. But it is not admitted that either defilement or purification manifestly ²⁰²) exist in the Non-Substantiality. For there is interdependence of the [defiled and pure] elements of existence ²⁰³) in the Ultimate Essence.

K. I. 21b. Hence he says: **"All mortals would be delivered"**. For, here by "mortal beings" is meant the *causa materialis*, the substrate-cause ²⁰⁴) of that [defilement and purification]. Or, in the contrary case, if the Non-Substantiality itself should be primordially defiled or pure, [i.e. defiled or pure in its true essence], its relation ²⁰⁵) to the mortal beings would not be clear. For it has been said that the defilement or purification of the mortal beings is accomplished in consequence of the defilement or purification of the Non-Substantiality. And if the Non-Substantiality is defiled in the condition of the ordinary wordly being and pure in the condition of the Saint ²⁰⁶), then even this here has been admitted to be true:

K. I. 22ab. **It is neither defiled ²⁰⁷), nor even non-defiled. It is not even pure ²⁰⁸), nor is it impure.**

Y. p. 61. **In what manner is it not defiled nor even impure ²⁰⁹)?** It is pure since the two kinds of purity ²¹⁰) explain its [pure] nature. And here he quotes the scripture: [It is pure] **because the "Mind" is by nature bright ²¹¹)**. And here the word "Citta", Mind is to be understood in the sense of "Cittadharmatā", the "Absolute Nature", the "Ultimate Essence" of the Mind, for the mind [itself, being the source of discriminating wisdom, is for this reason also] characterized by accidental defilement ²¹²).

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In what manner is it not non-defiled, nor pure ²¹³)? Moreover it is defiled because it is made known by reason of the two [kinds of] negation ²¹⁴). And he shows that it is **defiled by accidental defilement**, but not in so far as its original nature is concerned. And here also it is according to scripture that [the Non-Substantiality] is contaminated by accidental secondary defiling forces.

Now, since the differentiation [of the Non-Substantiality] has been explained to be twofold, viz. by means of the nature of defilement and by means of the nature of purification, why again is it called fourfold? According to some, in order to point out the differences [which result] from the Mundane Path ²¹⁵) and the Transcendental Path ²¹⁶). For the Mundane Path is defiled by the stains which belong to its own stage ²¹⁷), but not by [the stains which belong to] the lower [stages], since it is the counter-agent thereof. The Supermundane Path however, although impure in so far as it is differentiated into inferior, intermediate and [highest stages] ²¹⁸), is pure since it is uninfluenced by defiling agencies ²¹⁹). That is not the case with the Non-Substantiality, [since this is influenced by defiling agencies, in so far as it is applied to the categories of phenomenal existence]. Now whereas it has been explained that [the Non-Substantiality] is not defiled [in its true essence], some again maintain that it has been said that it is not impure, in order to distinguish it from [the Non-Substantiality of] the eye ²²⁰). For the eye and other sense-organs, although they are not defiled in so far as they have an unobscured and indifferent nature ²²¹), have no pure nature because they are influenced by [external] defiling agencies; therefore they are said to be impure. [Hence, the Non-Substantiality applied to them is impure.] Now, if we should assume that the [Non-Substantiality] is not defiled [in so far as the eye and other sense-organs are not defiled], then we must for the same reason maintain that it is not pure. For [the Non-Substantiality, being also unobscured and indifferent] would be different from those elements of existence which are favourable [to Final Deliverance] as well as from the elements which are influenced by passions ²²²). Now the "favourable" and "influenced" elements are involved in phenomenal existence ²²³). So they are not non-defiled. But they are

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pure in so far as they strive for [a good, a pure] retribution ²²⁴), [i.e. in so far as they assist in attaining Final Deliverance]. That is not the case with the "Absolute Essence" ²²⁵). For this is defiled and non-pure [only] in its defiled condition, [i.e. only in so far as it is seen in its relation to phenomenal existence]. Thus the tenet that there is a differentiation of the Non-Substantiality by reason of defilement and purification has been realized here.

SURVEY OF THE NON-SUBSTANTIALITY.

Summarily the Non-Substantiality is to be known by means of its Essence and by means of its general arrangement²²⁶) "Essence" is to be understood here in the sense of unreality as well as in the sense of real background of unreality. And unreality means here phenomenal unreality, i.e. unreality of duality. And in this sense we should understand [the Undifferentiated pure Monistic Essence in the rôle of] the real background of the unreality of duality. This Absolute Existence however must be interpreted neither in a realistic nor in a nihilistic sense, as has been said before.

Y. p. 62.

T. 51.

It is in its Essence beyond being and non-being as well as beyond identity and difference. Now this is the Essence of the Non-Substantiality. Hence, it is neither different from nor identical with the Constructive Ideation. Such is the survey of the Non-Substantiality in so far as its Essence is concerned.

And what is the survey with regard to the general arrangement? Its general arrangement is to be known by means of its synonyms, for they convey its meaning. It is also to be known by means of its differentiation and its realization. After the explanation of the "Essence", the "Synonyms" and so forth, the counteragents of the four secondary defiling forces are mentioned:

- 1) the Svalakṣaṇa, the Particular Essence.
- 2) the Kamalakṣaṇa, the Essence of Action.
- 3) the Samkleśavyavadānalakṣaṇa, the Essence of Defilement and Purification.
- 4) the Vidyālakṣaṇa, the Essence of Wisdom²²⁷).

Y. p. 263.

The Particular Essence in this respect serves as a counteragent of false discrimination²²⁸). For this consists of such [affirmative and negative] judgments as: "There is existence, there is non-existence; there is both existence and non-existence; there is identity, there is difference". The Essence of Action [serves as] a counteragent of the fear²²⁹) of those who remain sceptics²³⁰),

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[even] after having been taught as to the essence of the Non-Substantiality. These actions [lead to the realization] of the “Non-Illusion”²³¹) and the “Absolute Essence”²³²) [as well as to the realization of] “Non-Perverted Wisdom”; [they also lead to] the renunciation of all characteristics; they are the actions which abide in the Sphere of the Transcendental Infinite Wisdom and those which are the cause-substance of the attainment of the Āryadharmas, the “Elements of the Saints”. The Essence of the Differentiation [serves] to remove the indolence²³³) of those lazy inert people who are full of all sorts of misconceptions, just because they heard something about the true nature of the Non-Substantiality as well as about the actions [which serve to realize the Non-Substantiality]. The Essence of Wisdom [serves] to destroy the doubt²³⁴) of those doubtful people [who put such questions as]: “In what manner is the [Non-Substantiality subject to] defilement or purification?”

Here ends the Subcommentary on the First Chapter
of the Madhyāntavibhāgaśāstra, the Chapter
on Lakṣaṇa.

INTRODUCTORY

1. Y. śrāddhādevatā; T. iṣṭadevatā, favourite deity.
2. Y. aham; T. svayam.
3. bhāṣya.
4. Y. and Oberm. ad. I. H. Q. IX, p. 1025:
tadarthavibhāṅgāya; T. tadarthaviniścāye.
5. pranetṛ = Maitreya; vakṛ = Aśaṅga.
6. According to T. this pāda forms part of the first Kārikā. This is denied by Y. on the ground of Kouei-Ki's commentary. Cf. p. IX of his Introduction. Prof. d. l. V. P. in his review of Y.'s edition, partly adheres to the same view. Cf. Mel., I, p. 401: "La strophe d'introduction existe toute entière en morceaux dans la ṭikā". Prof. d. l. V. P. restores this introductory verse and continues: "Le śāstra commence par la définition du sujet, l'énumération des sept points et chapitres". Both Y. and T. ignore this second verse, which is according to Prof. d. l. V. P. the first Kārikā. Y. thinks that the opening Kārikā of the Lakṣaṇapariccheda is the first Kārikā. In this transl. Y.'s numbering is followed.
7. puṅya.
8. viḡhnavināyaka.
9. gauravotpādanārtham.
10. T. reads: by referring to what has been correctly taught by the composer, expounded by the expounder and explained.
11. abhijñā, Cf. Har Dayal, Bodhis. Doct., p. 106.
12. dhāraṇī, id. p. 267.
13. pratisaṃvid, id. p. 259.
14. samādhi, id. pp. 153 and 233.
15. vaśita, id. p. 140.
16. kṣānti, id. p. 209.
17. vimokṣa, Cf. Oberm., I. H. Q. IX, p. 1026:
"In this passage the 8 vimokṣas or Degrees of Liberation from materiality (M. Vyutp. 70) are evidently meant."
18. āvaraṇa.
19. Cf. Oberm., I. H. Q. IX, p. 1024.
20. Y. vṛtti; T. bhāṣya.
21. Y. ye pudgalaṃ prāmāṅikurvanti etc.;
T. ye pudgalāḥ prāmāṅikās etc.
22. dharmānusārin; Oberm. op. cit. p. 1026 reads dharmapratīsārin:
"..... as we have it in the case of the four pratīsaraṇas mentioned in the M. Vyutp. (§ 74) and one of which, viz. the dharmapratīsaraṇa is certainly meant here." Cf. also A. K., IX, pp. 246-8.
23. niścaya.
24. prabhāvanā.
25. tārkaḡamamātreṇa; T. 's reading differs considerably. Cf. Oberm. op. cit. p. 1026: "The whole sentence must be completely changed".
26. śāstrarūpa.
27. vijñāpti.
28. lokottarajñāna.

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29. prajñapti.
30. śīlasamādhiprajñā.
31. Y. sambhāra; T. samyakkarman. Cf. Oberm. A. O. XI, p. 128, sambhāra-pratipatti, the Action of Accumulation of the factors conducive to Enlightenment.
32. śāstralakṣana.
33. savāsanākleśaprahāṇa.
34. bhava.
35. durgatī.
36. T's reading slightly differs. Cf. Oberm. op. cit. p. 1026.
37. vyākhyāna.
38. sāsana.
39. trāṇa. The word śāstra is formed by the composition of the two roots "śās" and "tra" (= trai).
40. Cf. Y. p. 3 n. 3: Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti, p. 3. See also Conc. of Nirv. p. 84, where the translation of "tac chāsanāt trāṇaguṇac ca śāstram" is omitted, and Obermiller, op. cit. p. 1026, who states that the kārikā is from Vasubandhu's Vyākhyāyukti and who refers to Bu-ston,
41. pratyakṣopadeśa.
42. kleśajñeyāvaranaprahāṇa.
43. Y. viśeṣārthako draṣṭavyaḥ; T. karaṇe etc.
44. Y. anyatra nipate and p. 5, n. 3, Ms. anyaḥ pratiyate, which is T's reading. Prof. V. P. in Mēl. I, p. 401, n. 1 observes: "Corrigez le nipate de Y. en niyate", which is in accordance with P. M. V., p. 5. See also the translation in Conc. of Nirv., p. 85: "..... violently dragged into another place.....". See T. n. 32.
45. Y. p. 3, n. 6: "Dans le manuscrit, on voit avant le mot "sugātātmajam" une phrase que nous retrouverons plus tard (p. 5, Note 1). D'après le tibétain elle ne devrait pas se trouver ici". T. adheres to the order of the MS.
46. sarvadharmāvabodha.
47. acintyaprabhāvavigraha.
48. cintāmaṇiratna; Cf. Oberm. A. O. IV, p. 148.
49. sarvārthacaraṇa; Cf. H. Dayal, Bodhis. Doctr. p. 254.
50. anābhogena; Cf. Oberm. A. O. IX, p. 115: "As every kind of exertion is, with the Buddha, pacified, he, in acting for the sake of other living beings, has no thought-construction as regards the essence of the work to be done, the agent and the object. Neither does he enter upon a close examination of the details".
51. nirvikalpakajñāna.
52. tadātmatvam.
53. Sugata is an epithet of the Buddha. See e.g. the Saddharmapuṇḍarika. Sugātātmaja is a Bodhisattva, and refers in this case either to Maitreya or Aśaṅga. Cf. Mel. I, p. 401.
54. ātmanā.
55. vaṃśa.

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56. Cf. Oberm. op. cit, p. 1024.
57. sampat.
58. There is an important difference between Y.'s and T.'s reading of this sentence. Cf. Oberm. op. cit. p. 1027; Mél. I, p. 401.
59. vyākhyāna.
60. Y. dharmasantānena; T. dharmeṇaparamparayā; Oberm. op. cit., p. 1027: "dharmasrotasā". "This is the equivalent of dharmasrotaḥ, which is the name of a state of transic meditation, peculiar to the Path of the Bodhisattva, beginning with its initial Stages. The sense is that Asaṅga, through the blessing of Maitreya and by the force of the Dharmasrotaḥ-Samādhi which he is said to have attained, has cognized the meaning of the śāstra". Oberm. refers in a note to Bu-Ston, Transl. vol. II, pp. 141, 142 and Sūtrālamkāra, XIV, 3.
61. Cf. Mél. I, p. 401: "...et celui qui a dit ce śāstra aux gens comme nous c'est à-dire Asaṅga...". C'est Vasubandhu qui parle.
62. See n. 45 and Y. p. 5, n. 1.
63. sāksād iva.
64. saptamī.
65. śāstraśarīram. Cf. Y. Introd. p. XVII: „parties fondamentales du traité”.
66. samyagnirvikalpajñāna. Cf. T.
67. dharmanairātmya.
68. savāsanākleśajñeyāvaraṇaprahāṇa.
69. abhyāsa.
70. Y. virodhavāda; T. viṣamavacanam.
71. Y. sarvadharmarahitatā; T. °nāstitvam.
72. Y. antarvyāpārapuruṣavyatiriktatā; T. °nāstitvam.
73. cittasamkoca.
74. pañcākārajñeya.
75. lokadhātu.
76. sattvadhātu.
77. dharmadhātu.
78. T. vinayadhātu.
79. upāyadhātu. These five dhātus constitute an arthapratīsamvid, i.e. a "reflective, absolute and irrevocable knowledge of all phenomena in all their characteristics with regard to the extent and manner of their existence". (Cf. H. Dyal, Bodhis. Doctr. p. 264). See also E. Lamotte, Saṃdhinirm. sūtra, p. 222 & p. 268. "L'objet du Tathāgata, c'est les cinq sphères: les êtres, l'univers, La Loi, la discipline et les moyens disciplinaires”.
80. anantaprabhedatva.
81. Cf. Mél. I, p. 402: lakṣaṇam hy āvṛtis tattvam pratipaksas[sya]bhāvanā avasthā phalasya lābho yānānuttaryam [eva ca]. This is according to T. the first kārīkā, a view which is not supported by Y. See his Introd. p. IX.
82. the structure.
83. artha.
84. T. śāstra is that which has been explained (vyākhyātam).
85. piṇḍārtha.

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86. āśraya.
87. kāya.
88. bāhyādhyātmikāyatana.
89. śiṣyānugrahārthātvād.
90. T.; Y.: "which, when it has seen the [race] ground" (bhūmi) (?) etc.
91. Y. & Oberm. op. cit. p. 1027, nānyathā; T. nānyatra.
92. samāptam.
93. paryanta.
94. lakṣyante'nena.
95. kārikā I, 1a. See Y. pp. 10 ff. Transl. p. 10.
96. Kārikā I, 11 d. See Y. p. 40 ff. Transl. p. 53.
Cf. Mel. I, p. 403, 12.
97. śūnyatālakṣaṇam, See Y. pp. 46 ff. Transl. p. 61.
98. The reasoning of the opponent apparently is, that since a lakṣaṇa characterizes something, here also saṃkleṣa and vyavadāna are characterized by lakṣaṇa instead of characterizing as lakṣaṇa. So he solves the compound as a tatpuruṣa instead of as a bahuvrihi.
99. svabhāva.
100. kharalakṣaṇa.
101. lakṣyate tad.
102. svalakṣaṇa. See Y. pp. 16 ff. Transl. p. 18.
103. sāmānyalakṣaṇa.
104. Cf. Oberm., A. O. XI, pp. 108—110; "Obscurations of Moral Defilement and Ignorance"; N. Dutt, Aspects, p. 133, "the two screens viz., that of passions and that hindering true knowledge"; Suz., Stud., p. 590, "that which hinders the realisation of the truth. The two hindrances are conative and intellectual. The latter is easier to destroy than the former, for the will to live or the egoistic impulses are the last thing a man can bring under complete control"; E. J. Thomas, History, p. 239, "Obstruction". Siddhi, p. 566 ff.
105. āvṛṇōti.
106. Cf. A. K., IV, p. 33.
107. Y. vṛiyante; T. āvriyante.
108. utpattivibandhād.
109. See Y. pp. 64 ff.
110. tattvam.
111. Y. aviparyāsa; T. aviparītam.
112. See Y. pp. 110 ff.
113. abhyāsa.
114. Cf. Siddhi, pp. 606 f.: Le Bhāvanamārga est essentiellement la répétition du savoir pur". (nirvikalpakajñāna). See also Oberm., A. O. XI, p. 121.
115. Y. Introd. p. XXV, „l'échelle d'oeuvres".
116. santānenotpattivīśeṣaḥ.
117. See Y. pp. 188 ff. Cf. Siddhi, pp. 562 ff.
118. See Y. pp. 182 ff.
119. See Y. pp. 199 ff.

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120. Y.; T. "The seven subjects".
121. niyama.
122. lokottarajñāna.
123. śīlapratīṣṭha.
124. Cf. Siddhi, p. 731; H. Dayal, *Bodhis. Doctr.* pp. 53 f., 278.
125. vimukti.
126. T. avijñātam; Y. avijñānam (?).
127. doṣa.
128. ālambana.
129. Cf. Oberm. op. cit. p. 1027: tattvam ity avagantavyam; Y. tat tattvaṃ vedī-
tavyam.
130. prayoga.
131. avasthā.
132. vipakṣahānī.
133. pratipakṣavṛddhī.
134. Cf. Siddhi, p. 562; A. O. XI, p. 109.
135. Lokottaradharmā.
136. phala.
137. Y. srotaāpannaphala; Oberm. op. cit. p. 1027: srotaāpattiphala.
137. In general there are four principal classes of Buddhist Saints known: 1. Sro-
taāpanna, he who has entered upon the stream; 2. Sakṛdāgāmin, he who
returns once to this life; 3. Anāgāmin, he who never returns; and 4. Arhat,
he who has attained the highest end of the Buddhist life. Cf. Suz. Stud.
p. 378 and Masuda, *Orig. & Doctr.*, pp. 25—27.
138. sādharmaṇam.
139. Cf. T. and Oberm. op. cit. p. 1027.
140. śrāvakaśikṣācārāgocarasamudācāram; for references, see R. D. & St.,
Pāli-Engl. Dict., ācāra & gocara.
141. pravrajita.
142. kauśalotpādanārtham.
143. saparivārapratipakṣamārga.
144. mṛdumadhyādhimātra.
145. °naya.
146. sadasallakṣaṇam. Cf. Y. p. 10 ff. and Transl. p. 10 ff.
147. sāksātkartavyam.
148. upāya.
149. tāratamyam.
150. anukrama.
151. apavāda.
152. samāropa. Cf. Suz. Stud. p. 165, "the negative as well as the positive way
of viewing the world".
153. Y. sattva; T. citta, mind.
154. Y. and Oberm. op. cit. p. 1028: sadasaddharma sammohād; T. bhāvābhā-
vadharmamohād.
155. prahīṇasammoha.
156. tattvapratividdhābhāvanayā.
157. tatprabheda.

1. abhūtaparikalpa. This is the central conception of the idealistic Yogācāra-vijñaptivāda particularly as set forth in the Madhyāntavibhāga. Cp. the following translations: Yam., p. XVIII: La pensée vainement discriminante. Tucci, On some Aspects, etc., p. 31: The unreal imagination; p. 33: Wrong ideation. Obermiller, *IHQ.*, IX, pp. 1019 ff.: The real cognition of the unreal objects; process of constructive thought; incorrect thought-construction; a really existing mental activity or consciousness which constructs its objects; the constructing mind. Oberm., id., p. 1021, n. 11, refers to the teaching about the ayoniśomanaskāra as contained in the Uttaratantra, pp. 133 & 187. S. Lévi, *Trimśikā*, transl., pp. 35 & 39: L'imagination de ce qui n'existe pas. H. Jacobi, *Trimś.*, pp. 47 & 55: Wahnvorstellung von etwas Nichtseiendem. L. d. 1. V. Poussin, *Siddhi*, pp. 416 ff.: Fausse imagination, ou imagination d'inexistant; imagination de choses irréelles; p. 424: La pensée qui imagine fausement; id. *Mél.*, I, p. 402, n. 2: L'idée fausse; *Mél.* II, p. 62: Des pensées erronées. D. T. Suzuki, *Studies etc.*, p. 384: False judgment. S. Lévi, *MSA.*, XI, text, p. 64, transl., p. 117: L'imagination inexistante. E. H. Johnston, *Saundarānanda*, text, p. 94, XIII, 51, transl., p. 76: False conception (of an object), Cf. *Mel.*, I, p. 387. Grousset, *Les Philosophies Indiennes II*, p. 124.
2. asti.
3. śūnyatā.
4. Cf. Yam., *Introd.*, pp. XVIII & XIX; *Siddhi*, p. 424.
5. lakṣaṇam adhiḥṛtya.
6. Y., bhāva; T., artha.
7. uddeśa.
8. nirdeśa.
9. sarvadharmāḥ; the whole process of Phenomenal Life.
10. Y., sarvathā niḥsvabhāvāḥ, devoid of an essential nature; T., °avidyamānāḥ.
11. sarvāpavāda.
12. sūtravirodha.
13. Y., grāhyagrāhakasvarūparahita; T. omits svarūpa.
14. Y., na tu sarvathā niḥsvabhāvāḥ, but not absolutely without an essential nature; T., na sarvathā svabhāvato nāsti. Cf. *Nirvāṇa*, p. 204, n. 3.
15. svabhāvataḥ. Cf. *Nirvāṇa*, p. 187, n. 3 & p. 180 = tattvataḥ, from the transcendental point of view.
16. paramārthataḥ.
17. śūnyatābhāvaprasaṅga. We have here a reductio ad absurdum: since duality on the one hand does not exist and on the other hand is the equivalent of Non-Substantiality, the Non-Substantiality itself should neither exist.
18. Y., na śūnyatā nāstītvam bhavati; T., vidyate.
19. advayā.
20. amukta.
21. Y., grhṇate; T., grhyate.
22. vidyate.

23. Y., rūpādayaḥ; rūpa, Cf. Nirvāna, p. 39, matter; p. 46, sense-data; p. 116 physical object. CC., pp. 7, 11, 96, 97.
24. Y., dravyatvena.
25. Y., cittacaittebhyo 'nyatra; T. 's reading of this sentence differs considerably: ... cittacaitasikā rūpato dravyataś ca santīti, ... that mind and mental states exist as rūpa and dravya. Cp. Yam., p. 11, n. 1. I prefer Yamaguchi's version to that of Tucci, since it agrees better with the sense of the text.
26. Sa evāsti dravyataḥ; Cf. Triṃś., text, p. 16, 16, vijñānam punaḥ pratityasamutpannatvād dravyato'sti; transl., p. 65: . . . il faut donc admettre qu'elle a une existence substantielle; Jac., p. 4.
27. tadvyatiriktam.
28. nāsti dravyataḥ; Cf. Oberm. IHQ., p. 1021.
29. Y., bhāvamātram; T., vastumātram; Cf. Oberm., op. cit., p. 1021.
30. vijñānam rūpādyābhāsam.
31. na yujyate.
32. kāraṇam.
33. anyatrāpi.
34. arthābhāsam.
35. nirālambanam.
36. svabijaparipākād, because of the ripening of its own seed. The consciousness here is the ālaya-vijñāna, the store-consciousness containing the seeds of all elements of existence.
37. grāhya.
38. grāhaka.
39. mokṣābhāva.
40. viśuddhyālambanā.
41. grāhyagrāhakarāhitatā.
42. See below, p. 81 ff.
43. vidyamānā.
44. āvṛtatvāt.
45. ākāśanairmālyavat.
46. asattvāt.
47. sarvāpavāda.
48. iti kṛtvā.
49. sarvam asan.
50. sadātmakam.
51. vijñānapariṇāmānā. The phenomena, although they have no reality of their own, exist as transformations or modifications of vijñāna. Cf. Triṃś., text, p. 16, transl., p. 64, Jac., p. 3.
52. yathaiva prakhyāyante.
53. svabhāvataḥ.
54. pṛthak.
55. abhūtasamāropa.
56. abhiprāya.
57. abhūtaparikalpamātra.

58. Y., chedarūpa; T., ucchedarūpa. Cf. Nirvāṇa, p. 28, Simple materialism goes under the name of uccheda-vāda, against which Buddha is reported to have made an emphatic protest. But simple materialism in India, as elsewhere, is nirvāṇa at every death (dehacchedo mokṣaḥ) without retreubtion for one's deeds in future life; p. 106: That Unique Reality (dharma-tā) which neither can be determined as annihilation (uccheda), nor as one of the Eternal Principles.
59. vandhyāputravat.
60. dharma.
61. antarvyāpārapuruṣarahitatā. Cf. Oberm., JGIS., I, 2, 1934, p. 117: The meanings of śūnyatā would then appear in short as follows: — In Hinayāna — Non-Substantiality, as the negation of the enduring, indivisible, and independent substance of the Ego or individual soul, etc.
62. bhūtanairātmya.
63. aprayatnena.
64. mokṣaprasaṅga.
65. aviśodhita.
66. Y., saṃkṣipta; T. & Ms., saṃkṣiptā ... and as it requires great effort to purify the defiled [Non-Substantiality]. According to Yam.'s version it is the abhūtaparikalpa, which is defiled.
67. Y., abhidhāna; T., ukta.
68. saṃkleśvyavadāna.
69. svabhāva.
70. bhrāntilakṣaṇatvāt.
71. prakhyāna.
72. gāhyagrāhakākāra.
73. svātmany avidyamānena.
74. bhrāntisvarūpa.
75. Y., śūnyatāsvabhāva; T. vyavadānam śūnyatāsvabhāvam, the essential nature of purification is Non-Substantiality.
76. dvayābhāvasvabhāvatvāt. Cf. Oberm., JGIS., I, 2, p. 113.
77. mārga.
78. nirodha = nirvāṇa.
79. śūnyatāprabhāvitatvāt.
80. mārgayitavya.
81. vyavadānapakṣa.
82. prthaktvam.
83. The third pāda of the first Kārikā runs: śūnyatā vidyate tu atra.
84. Y., loko bhrānta; T., lokabhrānti.
85. Y., tasyām vidyamānāyām; T., tad astīti.
86. vikalpa.
87. hastyākārādayaḥ.
88. māyā.
89. śūnya. See Yam., p. 13, n. 2.
90. abhūtam.
91. parikalpyate 'nena vā.

92. Y., ayam; T., atra.
93. tathā nāsti.
94. yathā parikalpyate.
95. Cf. Yam., Ālambanaparīkṣā, JA, 1929, p. 47: Tib. don, skr. artha; tib. yul, skr. viṣaya; nous traduisons ces deux termes par "objet".
96. vinirmuktam.
97. aviśeṣeṇa, indiscriminately.
98. citta and caitta.
99. traidhātukāḥ.
100. saṃsārānurupāḥ; For this sentence, cf. Oberm., IHQ., p. 1021.
101. vikalpa.
102. arthasattvapratibhāsam.
103. ātmavijñāptipratibhāsam. See below p. 18, Kārikā I, 3.
104. rūpādi.
105. cakṣurvijñānādi.
106. °bhāvena rahitatā.
107. Y., viviktatā; T. rahitatā; Cp. Oberm., op. cit., p. 1028.
108. sarvakālam.
109. atatsvabhāvatvāt.
110. svabhāvena.
111. Y., tad agraḥaṇam uktam; T., tad grahaṇam ayuktam.
112. āgantukāvaraṇopakliṣṭatvāt. See below p. 60 f.
113. Y., samanupaśyati; T., samyaganupaśyati; Cf. Oberm., op. cit., p. 1028, who refers to the Prajñā-pāramitā-sūtras and the Bodhisattva-bhūmi, p. 47, where the same sentence appears.
114. yasmin (T., yatra) yan nāsti tat tena śūnyam.
115. atrāvaśiṣṭam.
116. sat.
117. anadhyāropa.
118. anapavāda.
119. yathā bhūtam prajānāti. Cf. T.; Oberm., op. cit., p. 1028: . . . as we have it always in the Prajñā-pāramitā and in the Bodhisattva-bhūmi, p. 47.
120. Y., astitva.
121. aviparītam.
122. tasya sadbhāvāt.
123. yena śūnyam.
124. tatra.
125. sarvabhāva.
126. sarvabhāva.
127. Y., śūnyasaṃjñāyām asatyām; T. śūnyam ity abhāve.
128. bhāvāyattatvāt.
129. anityatva.
130. anyena hy anyasya śūnyatā.
131. Y., prabhāsate; T., prakhyāyate.
132. sarpākāra.
133. māyā.

134. grāhanivartanārtham; T., reads: grāhyagrāhaka nirākaraṇāt. (??)
135. prakhyāyamāna.
136. dvayena śūnyam.
137. abhiniveśa.
138. Y., nāpi vā; T., nāpi ca.
139. Cf. Mel., I, p. 402 where the whole kārikā is given: na śūnyam nāpi cāśūnyam tasmāt sarvaṃ vidhīyate/ sattvād asattvād sattvāc ca madhyamā pratipac ca sā// no. 3. Plusieurs mots manquent dans le MS.; mais voir Madhyamakavṛtti, p. 445. See below.
140. sarvaṃ saṃskṛtam asaṃskṛtaṃ ca.
141. Y., viḡatadvayatvam; T., dvayavirahitam eveti. Cf. Oberm., op. cit., p. 1028, who gives the better reading °virahitva.
142. abhiprāyatā.
143. niṣkṛta.
144. Y., ekāntapratikṣepa; T., °pratipakṣa.
145. pūrvāparaviruddham.
146. apavādasamāropapratīṣedha.
147. saṃskṛtam = paratantrasvabhāva.
148. hetupratyayapatibaddhātmalābhād.
149. asaṃskṛtam = pariniṣpannasvabhāva. See below p. 26 ff.
150. tannirapekṣatvāt.
151. Y., abhūtaparikalpātmatvena; T., °ātmakam.
152. grāhyagrāhakātmanā.
153. Y., śūnyatāyās tu sarvaṃ; Y., p. 15, n. 4, "sarvaṃ" ne se trouve pas dans le tibétain. "sarvaṃ" serait sattvād; T. omits sarvaṃ, which does not give a clear sense. See his n. 154.
154. dharmirūpeṇa.
155. dharmatārūpeṇa.
156. Y., svarūpaśūnyam; T., svarūpataḥ śūnyam.
157. Y., abhāvasaṃjñakena; T., niḡsvabhāvam iti.
158. dharmāṇām bhūtapratyaveksā. Cf. Nirvāṇa, p. 204, n. 3: His Spirit (i.e. of the Buddha) is . . . a living and sympathizing Spirit which distinguishes subject, object and the separate things of the pluriverse by pratyavekṣaṇa-jñāna; Oberm., A.O., XI, p. 119: pratyavekṣaṇa-jñāna, the Wisdom of the Buddha precisely cognizing all the separate elements of existence. In the Trīmś. vicāra is explained as pratyavekṣako manojalpa eva, etc., rendered by S. L. as: le parler mental en état de considération détaillée qui observe ce qui a été préalablement acquis en disant: C'est cela. On dit donc qu'elle est l'état subtil de l'Esprit. (Transl., p. 101); Siddhi, pp. 683, 690.
159. anulomakṛtā.
160. See Staël-Holstein, Kāśyapaparivarta, § 60, p. 90.
161. ekāntena śūnyam.
162. sarvanāstītvam.
163. sarvāstītvam.
164. anta.

BEING AND NON-BEING

165. Y., sattvam eva sallakṣaṇam; T., sallakṣaṇam abhūtaparikalpo 'sti, which does not correspond to the next sentence.
166. sattvena lakṣyate.
167. sat.
168. asattvam.
169. °bhāvena.
170. dvayātmanā.
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THE PARTICULAR CHARACTERISTIC

1. Cf. Central Conception, Nirvāṇa, Buddhist Logic: "Thing in itself; BL., I, p. 557: The particular is the thing "in itself", the universal is (just as with Hegel) the thing "in the other" (sāmānyalakṣaṇa). Suzuki, Studies, p. 457: Individuality, or individual marks which distinguish one class of beings from another; for instance, matter has its own characteristics as distinguished from mind, and mind from matter and so on. Id., Essays, III, p. 226: self-aspect, self-character, Masuda, Orig. and Doctr., p. 48: The individual aspects. Oberm., A.O., XI, p. 131: The particular essence of an element of existence.
2. sāmānyam; Cf. Suz., Stud., p. 452; sāmānyalakṣaṇa, generality, or those marks that are common to all things conditioned, such as impermanence, pain, emptiness, and egolessness. Oberm., A.O., IX, general essence, general character. BL., I, p. 557 etc., Universals.
3. viśesa.
4. śarīra.
5. arthasattvātmavijñaptipratibhāsam.
6. artha. Cf. Siddhi, p. 127: une chose qui lui (i.e. Vijñāna) est extérieure.
7. Y., abhūtaparikalpamātratā.
8. indriyaviśaya vijñānam.
9. vyavasthitam.
10. pratibhāsabhedena.
11. Y., tatsattvamātram; T., tatsadbhāvamātram.
12. svabhāva. Cp. T. and Oberm., op. cit., p. 1021.
13. abhīniveśakāraṇam.
14. vijñānasvabhāva.
15. saśamprayoḡam. Cf. CC., pp. 30, 31, 36. A. K., V, p. 104; II, p. 153. See below p. 40 ff.
16. pradhānena-grhītam. Cp. T. and Oberm., op., cit., p. 1028.
17. °nibandhana, connected with.
18. See n. 15. Cf. Triṃś., text, p. 20, transl., p. 74, Jac., p. 14. Siddhi, p. 143: L'Ālayavijñāna, depuis toujours et jusqu'au moment de la réalisation de l'āśrayaparāvṛtti, est, dans tous ses états (avasthā), associé avec cinq Caittas qui sont en effet "universels" à savoir avec sparśa, manaskāra, samjñā et cetanā.
19. avyākṛta, non-defined. Cf. Siddhi, p. 152: vyākṛta, défini: on nomme ainsi le Dharma bon ou mauvais parce qu'il produit un fruit agréable ou désagréable, parce que son espèce est plus discernable que celle du Dharma non-défini: il peut donc être défini. L'Ālayavijñāna, n'étant ni bon ni mauvais; est avyākṛta, non-défini.
20. vipākatva, Cf. Siddhi, p. 167: vipākavijñāna, le Vijñāna qui est rétribution, parce qu'il est le fruit de rétribution des actes bons et mauvais qui projettent le Saṃsāra. Ce nom convient au huitième Vijñāna des Pṛthagjanas, des Saints des deux Véhicules, de tous les Bodhisattvas; car chez tous ces êtres il y a des Dharmas non-définis qui sont de rétribution. Mais ce nom s'arrête à la terre des Tathāgatas, où ne reste plus que du bon.
21. Cf. Suz., Stud., Index. & p. 178; Triṃś., text, p. 18, transl., p. 70, le Mental Passionné.

22. Siddhi, p. 265: les Caittas du Manas sont exclusivement *nivṛta-avyākṛta* (A. K., II, p. 315). etc. Cf. CC., p. 102, *nivṛta* = *āchādita* = *kliṣṭa*. They are indifferent for the progress towards Final Deliverance and always "obscured" by promoting the belief in an existing personality.
23. Kleśa; Cf. Triṃś., text, p. 23, transl., p. 80; Siddhi, p. 225: Il est accompagné de quatre Kleśas, de la catégorie souillée-non-définie. Siddhi, p. 255. See n. 57.
24. *caḥsurvijñānādiṣaṭkam*. Cf. CC., pp. 10, 17, 100. Siddhi, p. 289 ff. and nn. 42—44.
25. *vijñaptipratibhāsam*: Cf. Triṃś., text, p. 18, *rūpādiviṣayapratyavabhāsatvāt caḥsurādivijñānam ṣaṭprakāram api viṣayavijñapti*, transl. pp. 70, 71, Jac. p. 11.
26. *kuśalākuśalāvvyākṛtam samaprayogam*. Cf. Triṃś., 8 bcd & 9, text, pp. 24 & 25, transl., p. 84, Siddhi, p. 289: Le troisième *pariṇāma* est la perception du sextuple objet; bonne, mauvaise, ni l'une ni l'autre. Ou, d'après Hiuan-tsang: Le troisième est sextuple: il consiste dans la perception d'objet, bonne, mauvaise, ni l'une ni l'autre. Siddhi, p. 296: La perception qui constitue les six *Vijñānas* est associée avec les *Caittas* (ou *Caittas*) universels, spéciaux, bons, avec les *Kleśas* et *Upakleśas*, et est susceptible des trois *Vedanās*.
27. *sahakāripratyayāpekṣād*; The *ālayavijñāna* depends on the other seven forms of (active) consciousness, viz. the *pravṛttvijñāna*. Cf. Siddhi. p. 459, *sahakārihetu*, cause auxiliaire.
28. *samudayasatyasaṃgrhīta*. Cf. *Nirvāṇa*, p. 16.
29. *prabhavanti*.
30. The five destinies are the hells, animals, pretas (ghosts), human beings and gods. In *Mahāyāna* scriptures often a sixth *gati*, viz. of the *Asuras* is mentioned. Cf. A. K., III, pp. 11—15.
31. *viśeṣa*.
32. *pariṇāma*.
33. *kuśalākuśalāvvyākṛtadharmā*. Cf. CC., p. 100 f.
34. *prajāyate*.
35. *parasparabhinnābhāsam*.
36. *ābhāsam*; Cf. BL., II, p. 41: *ābhāsa* = *pratibhāsa*, an idea, or representation (of the object). See also Coomaraswamy, *The Transform. of Nature in Art*, Ch. VI.
37. *doṣa*.
38. *prthagarthāstitvam*.
39. *taimirikasya keṣoṇḍukādivat*. Cf. Triṃś., p. 16, 7, transl., p. 64.
40. *paratantra*. The *abhūtaparikalpa* corresponds to the *paratantrasvabhāva*, the causally dependent aspect of reality. See below p. 27.
41. *aṣṭavijñānavastuka*. There is a close correspondence between this classification of the eight forms of consciousness as explained here and the three transformations (*pariṇāma*) of *vijñāna*, as set forth in the Triṃś. (K. 2 etc.) and Siddhi.
42. Y., *rūpādibhāveṇa*; T., °*vastu*.
43. *svarūpeṇa*.

44. dharmāḥ. Cf. CC., p. 97 & BL., I, p. 528. See n. 24.
45. tadākārenotpannatvāt. Cf. BL., I, p. 517: ākāra = ābhāsa = sārūpya. Siddhi, pp. 124—142; p. 124: ākāra signifie "aspect": le sens ici, est "mode", "manière d'être". L'ākāra du vijñāna, de tout Vijñāna, est la Vijñapti, la "connaissance" [ou "l'action de connaître", vijñaptikriyā]. Car c'est dans la Vijñapti que le Vijñāna a son ākāra, ou manière d'être. See below nn. 62 and 68.
46. sattvapratibhāsam.
47. yat pañcendriyatvena svaparasantānayoḥ. This sentence is quoted in the Siddhi, pp. 138, 139: Sthiramati pense que la Vipākavijñāna d'une certaine personne se développe en les organes des autres: "Le Vijñāna apparaît semblable aux cinq organes du corps de soi et des autres". See also Siddhi, p. 237.
48. Y., sattvākhyā, the appearance, aspect of sentient being; T. sattvākhyateṣu, because [the consciousness] is the abode of exceeding attachment to the five sense-organs, which belong to a sattva,..... Cf. A. K., I, p. 17 & CC., p. 32 sattvākhyā. Mas., Orig. & Doctr., p. 50 gives the Sarvāstivāda point of view: "sentient being" (sattva) is a provisional name (which is applied to) the actual continuation (santāna) of upādāna (= "the citta and caitasika" which hold the sense proper and the sense-organs). See Siddhi pp. 138, 139 where it is discussed whether the Vipākavijñāna develops itself into the sense-organs of other "personalities" (Sthiramati) or into the visible bodies (le "support des organes", indriyāśrayāyatana) of others (Dharmapāla).
49. adhikasaktisthānatvāt.
50. tadābhāsam; similar to these [sense-organs] (?). Cp. nn. 46, 47, 48.
51. ātmapatibhāsam.
52. ātmamoha.
53. ātmadrṣṭi.
54. Y., ātmaṛṣṇā; T., ātmasneha, which corresponds to Triṃś., Kārikā 6.
55. asmimāna; Triṃś., K. 6, ātmamāna.
56. ātmālambanatvāt.
57. See n. 23 and Siddhi p. 255:
1. ātmamoha: c'est l'Avidyā, ainsi nommée parce qu'elle cause illusion concernant l'Ātman; parce qu'elle fait qu'on ne voit pas le non-Ātman.
 2. ātmadrṣṭi: c'est l'Ātmagrāha (partie de la satkāyadrṣṭi), le concept d'Ātman, par lequel on conçoit comme Ātman des Dharmas qui ne sont pas Ātman.
 3. ātmamāna: c'est l'orgueil qui, s'appuyant sur l'Ātman supposé, exalte la pensée.
 4. ātmasneha: c'est l'amour de soi qui produit un profond attachement pour l'Ātman.Ces quatre sont nommés kleśa, 1. parce qu'ils troublent-sallissent la "pensée intérieure" (Ālayavijñāna) de telle sorte que les "Vijñānas extérieurs" (pravṛttivijñāna) sont toujours "corrompus", saṃkṛiṣṭa (sāsrava, bons, mauvais, non-définis); 2. parce qu'ils font que les êtres transmigrent et ne peuvent pas s'échapper.
58. Y., vijñāptipratibhāsam; T., °pratibhāsāni. Cf. CC., p. 12.

59. prakhyānāt.
60. viṣayagrāhakarūpeṇa.
61. catuṣṭayasyākārasya.
62. °anākāratvāt. See nn. 45 and 68.
63. vitathapratibhāsatvat.
64. grāhyarūpeṇa.
65. arthābhāve kāraṇam.
66. anākāra. T. 's reading of this sentence slightly differs.
67. vitathapratibhāsatvam.
68. ākāro hy ālambanasyānityādirūpeṇa grahaṇaparakāra. See nn. 41 and 58. Cf. Siddhi pp. 291 & 292: Car le sextuple Vijñāna a pour "nature" la perception de l'objet et c'est par cette même perception qu'il a son "aspect". [En d'autres termes: l'activité du Vijñāna, c'est-à-dire la perception est son aspect]; pp. 141, 142: L'ākāra (c'est-à-dire le darśanabhāga, la Vijñapti ou acte de connaissance) du huitième Vijñāna etc. Prof. S. Lévi (Triṃś., transl., p. 62, N. 1.) translates ākāra by "morphème" (pour atténuer autant que possible l'idée d'une représentation d'un objet extérieur) and refers to A. K., VII, 13: ālambanagrahaṇaparakāra, "la façon dont on prend l'objectif". See nn. 45, 62.
69. anityādirūpeṇa.
70. anākāratvād agrāhakatvād ity arthaḥ. Things and sentient beings who are themselves only transformation of consciousness (See n. 32), i.e. of the store-consciousness, appear as objects and cannot have for that reason "ākāra", i.e., "a mode of perceiving the object of cognition in its characteristics", since an object can only be known by a subject and not by an object itself. Therefore, on the one hand they cannot have an external object, on the other hand in their quality of appearance, modification of consciousness, they cannot be real external objects. The appearance of the consciousness as ego-substance and ideas, i.e. as subject, is an unreal appearance since its objects (things and sentient beings) are likewise unreal and cannot be applied in this particular instance to the former two, since these appear as object. Whereas the subject is unreal and the object mere consciousness a real external object cannot exist.
71. ālambanasamvedanam. Cf. BL., II, pp. 362f, 385, n. 6.
72. Y., upalabdhyabhāvād anākārah; T. anālambanatvam anākāratvam, the being without ākāra means the being without an object of cognition.
73. parasparabhinnam svarūpam.
74. ātmātīśaya. Cf. Triṃś., text, p. 16 ll. 25 & 28; transl., p. 66: un surplus de soi; Jac., p. 6: Zuwachs ihres Wesens.
75. abhinnarūpam.
76. nirākṛtya.
77. tadvyatirikta.
78. Y., pratyekātmagrhitam.
79. Y., cittasantānapratiniyamena; T., °pratiniyatvāt. Cf. Triṃś., p. 34, l. 5, transl., p. 104, Jac. p. 44. A. K., II, p. 185: "La série (saṃtati = santāna), c'est les saṃskāras du passé, du présent et de l'avenir, en relation de

- causalité, qui constituent une série ininterrompue". It replaces the idea of personality. See also Siddhi, p. 458.
80. svabijāt, litt. because of its own seed. Cf. Viṃś., p. 5, Kārikā 9 and comm., transl., p. 49f., Kitayama, p. 245, and pp. 41ff.
81. bhinnārthasvarūpam. T. 's reading of this sentence slightly differs.
82. aśubhamanasikārādyabhyastāḥ, For the aśubha-bhāvanā, méditation of the horrible, cf. A.K., VI, pp. 148—153: L'aśubhā est la contemplation de l'objet de la connaissance visuelle (p. 149); elle est non-désir (p. 152); elle n'a pas pour résultat l'abandon des passions, mais seulement l'arrêt des passions, car elle est un acte d'attention portant, non sur la réalité, mais sur une représentation volontaire; portant, non sur la totalité des choses, mais seulement sur une partie du visible du Kāmadhātu (p. 150); l'ascète est maître de l'acte d'attention et considère l'univers rempli de squelettes (p. 151); par visible il faut entendre couleur et figure..... elle contemple le visible comme horrible et non pas comme impermanent. See also "The Buddhist Meditation", by N. Dutt, IHQ., XI, pp. 710—740, where ten Aśubhas are mentioned: The ten aśubha (unpleasant) objects of meditation refer to the ten states through which an uncared for corpse passes before it is completely destroyed. The meditator, as in the case of paṭhavī, (See n. 83), tries to convert the corpse into a concept, and then as usual gets rid of the five nīvaraṇas or hindrances to religious life, and induces the ecstasies by gradually doing away with vitakka, discursive thoughts, vicāra, discriminatory thoughts, pity, joy and sukha, happy state of mind.
83. pṛthivyādīkṛtsneṣu etc. Cf. N. Dutt, op. cit., pp. 716—719: "In the Buddhist meditational practices the word "Kasiṇa" (= kṛtsna) is applied to those subjects of meditation which occupy the "entire" mind, and as such does not give scope to the rising of any other thought". The author mentions ten kasiṇas, viz. the meditations on earth; water; fire; wind; blue colour; a spot of light; limited space (i.e. openings in a wall or a window).
84. This whole passage exactly corresponds to Viṃś., Kārikās 2—9. See also Siddhi p. 137 and Mēl., III, p. 164.
85. arthapratibaddhātmalābhasyārtham antareṇa.
86. arthasvarūpāt.
87. sarvam arthasattvādinirbhāsam.
88. vitathapratibhāsatvam.
89. parikalpyate.
90. vitathālambanatvād vitathapratibhāsatā.
91. siddhānta.
92. vijñāptyantaraparikalpitenātmanā. Cf. Y., p. 19, n. 7: Viṃś., p. 6, l. 19. See also Transl. p. 51 and n. 1; Kitayama, pp. 24, 249.
93. Y., arthasattvavijñānasya; T., arthapratibhāśasya.
94. asat. Cf. Mēl., I, p. 402, n. 4: asatya, faux.
95. vijānati. Cf. Siddhi, p. 292: ils sont nommés vijñāna parce qu'ils "discernent" (paricchid, vijñā) l'objet.
96. Y., vijñātrtā; T., vijñānam tad api, even the consciousness thereof cannot have real existence.

THE PARTICULAR CHARACTERISTIC.

97. sarvathā'bhāvaprasaṅga.
98. vijñānasvabhāva.
99. tadvyatirekeṇa, to be without that reflection. Cf. BL. II, p. 215, N. 1.
100. tadbhinnasvabhāve sati.
101. sadbhāva.
102. siddham.
103. astitva.
104. abhāva.
105. Y., na tathā (-bhāvāt).
106. Y., (na) sarvathābhāvāt (Cf. Mél., I, p. 402, n. 5). T. reads: "na tathā sarvathābhāvah", changing the abl. °bhāvāt into the Nom. °bhāvaḥ. This he thinks to be clear from the fourth and fifth lines of his text-edition (p. 18): tathā na bhavati sarvathābhāvo'pi na bhavātīti (n. 197). Yam. however reads: na tathāstitvān na ca sarvathā nāstitvāt. The purpose of this Kārikā is to explain that the vijñāna has the nature of the abhūtaparikalpa, so there is no need of the change mentioned above.
107. See above p. 21.
108. sarvasya śūnyatvāt.
109. vijñāptyantaraparikalpitena cātmanā. See above p. 22 and n. 92; p. 27.
110. bhrāntimātra.
111. Y., ātmatvenābhāva; T., svayam asad api.
112. Y., na tu yad ākāreṇa pratibhāsate sa bhrāntir; T., omits na tu, in my opinion rightly. Y. 's reading must be understood in the sense of: na tv abhāvo etc.
113. bhrāntivijñānasya sadbhāvāt. Cf. Mél., I, p. 402, n. 5.: vijñāna d'illusion.
114. Y., kalpayitum; T., parikṣitum.
115. Y., astitvam; T., sadbhāva.
116. sarvavijñānaviṣayātikrāntatvāt.
117. Y., tatḥsepāt; T., tatḥsayāt. Cf. Mél., I, p. 402, n. 5.
118. saṃkleśavyavadānapakṣasāmarthyāt.
119. mokṣa.
120. parābhiprāya.
121. yathā prakhyāti.
122. aparikṣiṇa.
123. °apavādadoṣaḥ.
124. Y., bhrāntir udbhāsītāpi; T., paśvādeḥ pratibhasa, the appearance as cattle etc. i.e., the phenomenal, (illusory) world.
125. nitya.
126. paramārthataḥ.
127. mokṣārthinām yatnaḥ.

1. saṃgraha means here the mutual relation of the three Aspects of Reality such as they are united in the Constructive Ideation. See below. In a more detailed manner they are explained in the third chapter of the MVT. In that chapter the relation of the three Aspects of Reality to the ten forms of Reality (tattva) is set forth. Cf. Yam. 's edition, pp. 110—165 and in particular "Mūlatattvam", pp. 111—113. See also Siddhi, pp. 540, 541.
2. Y., saṃgraha eva lakṣaṇam; T., saṃgrahasyaiva lakṣaṇam, it is the characteristic of union.
3. yena lakṣyate.
4. Cf. Triṃś., Kārikās 20—25; Lañk. S., II, Nanjio, pp. 130 ff., Suz., transl., pp. 112 ff., Stud., pp. 157—162; Siddhi, p. 514, bibliography.
5. svabhāva, nature. Cf., Oberm., IHQ., IX, p. 1022.
6. T. reads abhūtaparikalpamātrakṣaya, there is only the Constructive Ideation, [in its quality] of "abode" [of the three Aspects of Reality] (?).
7. kalpita.
8. paratantra.
9. pariniṣpanna.
10. arthāt; Mél., I, p. 402, 6: arthatas.
11. abhūtakalpāt; Mél., id., °kalpatvāt.
12. dvayābhāvāt. Cf. Yam., p. 116 where the same Kārikā is quoted.
13. abhūta.
14. svabhāvaśūnyatvāt.
15. Y., astitvena; T., astīti.
16. dravyato sat.
17. vyavahāratas. Cf. Suz., Stud., p. 444: In conformity to the wordly way of thinking.
18. hetupratyayapratibaddhajanmakatvāt.
19. Y., akalpitaḥ (See p. 274 of his edition); T., kalpitaḥ. From the words "anabhilāpyaś ca sarvathā", absolutely inexpressible, it is clear that the pure Paratantra, i.e. the Absolute Aspect of Reality such as it is revealed in its causally dependent aspect, is meant here. Therefore, it cannot be "Kalpita", imputed, constructed, since it would not be different from the Parikalpitasvabhāva, the Imputed Aspect of Existence. In the Triṃś., Kārikā 21 a b, it is said: paratantrasvabhāvas tu vikalpa pratyayodbhavaḥ, Siddhi, p. 526: Le Paratantra, c'est le vikalpa qui, en effet, naît des causes. In this particular instance however, we may not confuse vikalpa and kalpita. The former here means: "thought", i.e. the citta and the caittas, the mind and the mental phenomena; the latter, the constructed or imagined world of phenomena (subject and object), which has no real, independent existence. Cf. Siddhi, pp. 526 ff.
For vikalpa and parikalpa, "pensée et imagination", see Siddhi p. 516.
20. śuddhalaukikagocara. Cf. T., n. 217: "For śuddhalaukika see śuddhalaukika-jñānagamyatvāt in Triṃś., p. 40; (l. 24., Transl., p. 117, Jac., p. 56); Gaudapāda-kārika, IV, 87." Cf. Suz. Stud., p. 397: gocara, a field for action, an object of sense, a general mental attitude one assumes towards the

- external world, or better a spiritual atmosphere in which one's being is enveloped.
21. dvayarahitātā. Cf. IHQ., IX, p. 1022. Triṃś., Kārikā 21 cd, text, pp. 39, 40; Siddhi, pp. 527, 528: Le Pariniṣpanna, c'est la perpétuelle privation de Parikalpita du Paratantra. T., n. 219.
 22. asaṃskṛtatvāt. Cf. Siddhi, pp. 534 ff.
 23. nirvikāratvena. Cf. Triṃś., Text, p. 40, l. 1, transl., p. 115, 116: avikārapariniṣpattiyā sa pariniṣpanna. Elle est absolue, parce qu'elle est absolument sans changement.
 24. atyantaśūnyatā.
 25. avikalpajñānagocara. Cp. n. 21. and Oberm., Doctr. etc., A. O., XI, pp. 94, 95: "The elements in their causally dependent aspect, being viewed as devoid of all that is ascribed to them by constructive thought, appear as unique and undifferentiated, and as representing thus the Absolute Reality." avikalpajñāna here means nirvikapaljñāna, immediate direct knowledge of which the object is the Tathatā or the Pariniṣpanna. Cf. Siddhi pp. 529, 530.
 26. Y., arthatas. See Kārikā I, 5 and n. 10.
 27. Y., asat.; T., parikalpitasvabhāvo 'bhāvasyeti (??).
 28. Y., akalpita. The Paratantra is contingent reality, not imagined, imputed.
 29. vikalpo hi vikalpāntarakalpitaḥ; T. 's reading differs: vikalpās cāvikalpās ca etc., and the discriminative thought and the negation of discriminative thought (?) is constructed by other discriminative thought. The meaning of this verse is not very clear, unless we take vikalpa here in the sense of parikalpa. Cf. Triṃś., Kārikā 20: Yena yena vikalpena yad yad vastu vikalpyate/ parikalpita evāsau svabhāvo na sa vidyate// Siddhi, p. 515: Telles et telles choses sont imaginées (conçues d'une manière imaginaire) par tels et tels imaginants: [le mode sous lequel elles sont conçues] c'est leur nature imaginaire, qui n'existe pas. See the explanation of this verse by Hiuan-Tsang and Nanda. (p. 517). See also p. 529 f.: Le Vikalpa n'est pas vide de Vikālpa; il est une succession de Vikalpas qui s'engendrent les uns les autres telle une cascade de reflets, d'échos, de māyās. Les Vikalpas existent vraiment: mais ils sont faux, sont des abhūtaparikalpas, puisque tous sont, de leur nature même "informés" (par le Parikalpita ou) par la notion d'objet et de sujet.
 30. svabhāvo nāsti.
 31. tantryate.
 32. hetupratyaya.
 33. T., n. 225: Triṃś., text, p. 39, l. 26. Cf. Transl., p. 115, Jac. p. 55.
 34. abhāva = non-existence.
 35. pariniṣpannatvāt, omitted by T.
 36. nirvikārapariniṣpattiyāvīparītapariniṣpattiyā. Cp. n. 23. Cf. Siddhi, p. 527 where two kinds of Pariniṣpanna are mentioned: Le Pariniṣpanna, c'est la nature complète, achevée, réelle des Dharmas.Est aussi P. le "conditionné pur" (anāsrava saṃskṛta), c'est-à-dire la pensée en effet est vraie-réelle, étant exempte de méprise (aviparīta).
 37. Cp. n. 21.

THE CHARACTERISTIC OF UNION

38. dvayasyābhāvamātram.
 39. prakhyānāt.
 40. °rūpeṇa.
 41. saṃgrhīta.
 42. Y., prahātavyam pariñāya; T.,parihāya, having removed what has to be removed (?).
 43. vastu.
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1. अपरिज्ञाता. See p. 10 ff.
2. क्लेशकर्मजानमसाम्क्लेशा; Cf. Siddhi, p. 480 ff.; 718: Les fous se méprennent sur l'artha, produisent Kleśa et Karman, tournent dans le Saṃsāra, et ne s'efforcent pas d'obtenir la délivrance pour la considération du Citta. Bu-Ston, I, p. 9 and nn. 53-56. See p. 46 ff.
3. उपलब्धिं साम्प्रित्या. Cf. T., n. 230 and Mél. I, p. 403, where readings of the entire kārikā are given. In a note Prof. d.l. V.P. gives an interpretation which I translate here: "Resulting from the cognition of the vijñaptimātra a negation (non-perception) of objects (viśaya) follows; resulting from the negation of objects, the negation of the vijñaptimātra follows". See below.
4. Y., उपलक्ष्यते; T. 's reading slightly differs: "This [characteristic of non-being] is the characteristic of the Constructive Ideation; or rather it is in the Constructive Ideation". This might be the better reading since in the first Kārikā (Yam.) it has been said that the Constructive Ideation exists, is real. Only its content, the illusory appearance as subject and object has no real independent existence.
5. असत्त्वम्.
6. अवबोधः.
7. कुशलः.
8. निश्चयविशेषः.
9. प्रतिबोधप्रयोगः.
10. सर्वत्रागर्थाः.
11. विज्ञप्तिमāत्रा.
12. अर्थानुपलब्धिः.
13. ālambana and artha = viśaya. For the difference between the viśayas and the ālambanas cf. CC., pp. 59, n. 1 and p. 97. The former are the five varieties of sense-objects (colour, sound, odeur, taste, tangibles) and mental objects, with regard to the six indriyas, the organs of sense and consciousness; the latter are the same, but now with regard to six categories of consciousness.
14. प्रवर्तते.
15. स्वबीजारिपकāt, by reason of the ripening of its own seeds.
16. ग्रāhaka. In a previous chapter (See pp. 18 f.) it has been explained that the ālayavijñāna appears as things (artha) and sentient beings (sattva). These, although appearing as object have no objective reality of their own. The Klišṭam manas and the six categories of consciousness appear as subject, i.e. as ego-substance (ātma) and ideas (vijñapti). It has been said here that resulting from the cognition of the vijñāptimātra, the non-perception (i.e. the negation) of external objects follows. Apparently by "vijñāptimātra" Sthiramati means the six categories of consciousness (and the kliṣṭam manas?). The word "pravartate" (see n. 14) indicates that the pravṛttivijñāna (i.e. vijñāna 1-7, see below pp. 42 f.) is meant here. Yam. in his Japanese transl. says that acc. to Hiuan-Tsang and Dharmapāla the ālaya-vijñāna is meant. Cf. in this respect the verses 36 & 37 of Vasubandhu's Trisvabhāvanirdeśa, quoted by T. in n. 230 in which all

phenomena are reduced to "cittamātra", mind-only. The seeming admittance of the real existence of a subject by Sthiramati only forms part of the methodical and dialectical argumentation that no external reality exists. In the second part of the Kārikā, also the subject will be denied in so far as its objective reality is concerned. Real is only the Dharmadhātu, the Ultimate Essence of the elements of existence, which transcends both subject and object.

17. utpadyamānam utpannam vā.
18. viṣayam ālambeta.
19. Cp. T.: In this respect there is no perception of objects by the arising [vijñāna], because it does not exist [yet].
20. viṣayapratibhāsāmanotpannatvāt. Similar argumentations we find in Trīmś., text, p. 17 and Nirvāṇa, p. 173 ff.
21. kriyā.
22. vyāpāra. Cf. Nirvāṇa, p. 167 ff.
23. ālambana.
24. Cp. T. vartamānair eva vijñānair vyāpāro. See n. 16.
25. ālambanapratyaya. Four conditions coöperate to produce visual or other forms of consciousness or sensation.
 - 1) hetupratyaya. The condition in the quality of cause. It includes all the saṃskṛta dharma, all the conditioned elements of existence, represented by the store-consciousness with its good, bad and indifferent sub-conscious potentialities (bīja) of future phenomenal existence and by the seven forms of active consciousness which leave the traces (vāsanā) of their activity behind in the store-consciousness. (See p. 42 ff.)
 - 2) samanantarapratyaya. The condition in the quality of preceding moment of consciousness. "It represents the immediately preceding moment in the stream of thought and is thus intended to replace the Ego or the inherent cause of the Vaiśeṣikas." (BL., I, p. 138.)
 - 3) ālambanapratyaya. The condition of the mind and the mental phenomena in the quality of object. "La chose qui existe, sur laquelle s'appuie la pensée et les mentaux, qui est connue par la pensée et les mentaux qui naissent semblables à elle." (Siddhi, p. 444.)
 - 4) adhipatipratyaya. "The efficient, decisive or "ruling" condition, is the cause which settles the character of the result, e.g., the organ of vision in regard of visual sensation." (BL., I, p. 139) The six internal bases of cognition (the eye etc.) are meant here. Cf. A. K., II, p. 299 ff; Siddhi, p. 227 ff., p. 436 ff. Nirvāṇa, pp. 164 ff.
26. Y., vijñānotpādaka; T. utpatti.
27. Y., kṣaṇabheda (see Y., p. 274); T. kṣaṇabhaṅga. For the impermanence of the elements, cf. Siddhi, p. 156 ff. and CC., p. 37 ff; Prasannapadā, Bibl. Buddh., IV, p. 4: tatra niruddhir nirodha/ kṣaṇabhaṅga nirodha ity ucyate/ Dasgupta, Hist. of Ind. Phil., pp. 163 f. BL., I, p. 79 ff.
28. ātmātiśaya; Cf. BL., I, pp. 513, 514: It is incomprehensible namely that knowledge should abandon its residence, travel towards the external material thing, seize its form and return home with this booty — as the realists

- assume. See also supra, p. 36.
29. utpannam ālambanam.
 30. darśanād anyad.
 31. anyatas. The meaning of this sentence is not very clear.
 32. nirudhyamāno'rtha. This is a refutation of the Vaiśeṣika point of view. Cf. *Vimś.*, transl. p. 51, n. 2: Dans ce système les Atomes Ultimes sont imperceptibles, des espèces de points géométriques, indéfiniment petits, et conçus comme sphériques; on ne peut d'ailleurs que les inférer. Ils sont éternels. Ils se groupent entre eux pour former des combinaisons impermanentes en nombre variable. C'est seulement à partir de trois atomes groupés que naît l'impression de grandeur et de longueur. See also Randle, *Indian Logic* etc. pp. 86 ff. Siddhi, p. 26 ff.
 33. See n. 25.
 34. svākārapratibhāsavijñāna, the consciousness appears in the aspect of the objective condition.
 35. paramāṇu.
 36. samūha.
 37. When the consciousness perceives a thing, it takes the aspect of that thing. The consciousness however never perceives the atoms which constitute this thing and therefore cannot take the aspect of these atoms.
 38. Y., vyatirekatas.
 39. vyatiriktam. T.'s reading of this sentence slightly differs. And the consciousness (which appears) in the aspect of a thing (litt., arthāntara, another thing) has no object of cognition which is different from (this aspect. Hence it cannot perceive atoms on the one hand and take the aspect of a different thing on the other hand).
 40. ālambanatvaprasaṅga. Every visual sensation requires its objective condition. The eye is adhipatipratyaya not ālambanapratyaya. If the latter should be different from the visual sensation for which it is responsible, the eye itself would be the ālambanapratyaya and this is absurd. See n. 25.
 41. samudita.
 42. pratyekam. Cf. Siddhi, p. 44: L'objet de la connaissance est les paramāṇus, pratyekam, théorie Sarvāstivādin.
 43. samudaya.
 44. Y., jñānam (see p. 274 of his edition); T. vijñānam.
 45. kāraṇatvāsambhavāt. Cf. BL, I, p. 519.
 46. prajñaptisataḥ.
 47. See above nn. 25 & 32.
 48. Y., ālambanam; T., ālambanapratyaya, objective condition.
 49. Y., nirodhatvam; T. niruddha eva, in something which is disappearing, ceasing.
 50. See for this atomistic theory and its refutation, Vasubandhu, *Vimś.*, text, pp. 6—8, *Triṃś.*, text, p. 16; Dignāga, *Ālambana Parikṣā*, translated by Prof. Yamaguchi and Henriette Meyer, JA., 1929, and discussed in BL., I, p. 518 ff; A. K., III, p. 213, Dasgupta, *Hist. of Ind. Philos.*, II, pp. 20 f.
 51. nimitta. Suz. Stud. appearance. cf. p. 156: "by Appearances are meant

- qualities belonging to sense-objects such as visual, olfactory, etc.
52. arthapratibimbam, Suz. Stud., image.
 53. See for the viprayuktasaṃskāras, Masuda, Origin and Doctrines etc., As. Maj. II, p. 29; A. K., II, pp. 178—244; Siddhi, pp. 53—71; Siddhi p. 53: "Les cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras sont des Dharmas qui n'appartiennent pas à la catégorie du Rūpa, n'étant pas couleur, etc., qui n'appartiennent pas à la catégorie du citta, n'étant ni pensée ni associés à la pensée. — Les Theravādins, les Sautrāntikas, Harivarman ne connaissent ou ne reconnaissent pas cette catégories". and n. 2: "Les viprayuktas (cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras) ne sont pas, comme le Rūpa, un développement (pariṇāma) de Pensée-et-Mentaux (cittacaitta), mais bien de simples désignations de certaines aspects ou états de rūpa-citta-caitta. — Non seulement ils ne sont pas "à part" du citta (comme les Asaṃskṛtas, voir p. 72, n. 2), on doit dire qu'ils ne sont pas "différents", "distincts" de rūpa-citta-caitta".
 54. Y., nirodha; T., pratiṣedha (6). See above, p. 30, n. 27.
 55. arthapratibhāsatvāt.
 56. viprayuktasaṃskārātmakam. For, from this it follows that the image is vijñāna, and therefore mental. See in this respect, Siddhi pp. 8 ff. "Développement du vijñāna."
 57. arthākāram.
 58. grāhyagrāhakaniyama. Cf. Siddhi, p. 458.
 59. See above p. 22, n. 82.
 60. apratighaṃ rūpam. Cf. Sidhi p. 47: "Du Rūpa apratigha on peut dire que, étant Rupa comme le sapratigha, il n'est pas une chose réelle, ou encore que, étant apratigha, il ne peut pas être Rūpa. Nous avons constaté que le Rūpa sapratigha, qui se manifeste avec les caractères de Rūpa (materialité, dirions-nous, figure, couleur, etc.) ne peut être regardé comme une réalité à part du vijñāna. A plus forte raison le Rūpa apratigha, qui ne présente pas ces caractères, n'est pas plus un réel Dharma de Rūpa que la pensée et les mentaux". A. K., I, p. 53: "On appelle sapratigha ce en quoi et à l'égard de quoi la connaissance (manas) peut être empêchée de naître par un (corps) étranger; apratigha, l'opposé".
 61. manomātraviṣayatvam.
 62. varṇasamsthānādi. Cf. CC., p. 11.
 63. Cf. CC. pp. 7 & 99: Among the physical elements there is one called avijñapti which broadly corresponds to what we might call the moral character of a person: for some special reasons it is entered by the Sarvāstivādins in their physical class (rūpa) but other schools include it in mind. See also A. K., I, p. 20; IV, p. 3 and Siddhi, p. 50.
 64. kalpanamātram. Cf. BL., I, p. 555, Index.
 65. anubhūtartham. Cf. Viṃś., text, p. 9, l.l.; Kitay. p. 260.
 66. jātyandha.
 67. T. omits the first "na"; he reads: "For, one who is blind from birth does not perceive blue and other colours in his dreams". This must be a mistake, since the argument adduced here, has exactly been stated in the previous sentence.

68. avyutpannasamketatvāt. Cf. BL. II, pp. 165, 263 ff.
69. Cf. BL., II, p. 264, n. 11: The usual example is the impossibility to convey by words the knowledge of colours to the blind. But. Cf. T. n. 262: For ācaṣṭe Tib. ākhyātum śaknoti.
70. parikalpamātram.
71. niścaya.
72. atīstasyābhāvāt. Cf. Nirvāṇa, p. 115; CC., pp. 42 & 76 ff.; Masuda, Origin etc., p. 31. BL., I, p. 84 ff. This is in particular the Mādhyamika point of view.
73. nirviṣayaṃ vijñānam.
74. arthābhāsam.
75. bhāvyaṭe. Cf. Mel., III, pp. 239, 241.
76. Y., vijñaptimātratvenopalambhāt.
77. anupalabdhi, a "judgment of non-perception", Cf. BL., I, pp. 363 ff & 555.
78. Y., viṣaya; T., artha.
79. abhāva, non-existence.
80. manogrāhya; Cf. Yam., p. 26, n. 3: "mano" n'est pas traduit dans le tibétain.
81. grāhakatvam.
82. grāhyatvāpekṣayā.
83. See Y., Kārikā I.
84. Y., upalabhyārtha; T. ālambanīyārtha.
85. Y., ālambanasvabhāvavināśāt.; T., ālambanarūpasya vastuno vināśāt.
86. Y., bhvāvāpavādam; T., vastu-.
87. Y., parasparanirapekṣatvāt.
88. kalpāsamkhyeya: A. K. III, pp. 181 ff.; 183 ff.; iv, p. 224; Siddhi pp. 731—733; H. Dayal, Bodhisattva Doctrine. p. 77 ff.; J. Rahder, Daśabhūmika-sūtra, p. XV; Obermiller, Bu-ston, History of Buddhism I, pp. 119 ff.; Id. Doctrine of Prajñā-pāramitā, etc. A. O., XI, pp. 60, 61: "As regards the time which is considered to be necessary for the attainment of Buddhahood, there are two different theories which are to be met with in the different texts. According to one, the whole Path of the Bodhisattva is considered to have the duration of three immeasurable periods of æons. The first of these is considered to last from the beginning of the Path of Accumulating Merit, the second from the first stage up to the seventh, and the third from the eighth stage till the tenth. According to the other theory one "immeasurable period" includes the Path of Accumulating Merit, another the Degrees of Heat and of the Climax (uṣmagata and mūrdhagata) in the Path of Training, and a third one — those of Steadfastness (kṣānti) and of Highest Mundane Virtues (laukika-āgra-dharma). Thereafter, on each of the ten stages, the Bodhisattva is considered to abide during three such periods, so that the whole course of training and the process of accumulating virtue and wisdom is considered to have the duration of 33 immeasurable periods of æons". For "uṣmagata", "mūrdha", etc. See A. K. VI, pp. 163 ff.; Obermiller, Doctr. etc. A. O., XI, pp. 20 ff.; 35 ff. etc. Masuda As. Maj., II, pp. 25 ff. nn. 2 & 3.
89. sambhāreṣu niranantaram.

90. grāhyagrāhakahavikalpātītāṃ jñānabhūmim. Cf. Oberm., A. O., XI, p. 84.
91. saparivāraḥ samādhiḥ. Samādhi avec vitarka et vicāra, Cp. A. K. VIII, p. 182 f. Nirvāṇa, pp. 6—9 etc.
92. prathamāsvabhāva.
93. lokottaramārga. The Path of the Ārya, the Saint. Cf. A. O. XI, pp. 16, 17 & 36. A detailed exposition of the Path we find in MVT., V.
94. bhāvanā.
95. Y., bhāvayan, See p. 274 of his edition.
96. prajñādisahitaḥ.
97. darśanamārga.
98. prathamam bhūmim.
99. sarvatragadharmadhātu.
100. tattvamanaskāra.
101. adhimuktimanaskāra.
102. apramāṇa. Cf. A. K., VII, pp. 196—203:

p. 196: Quatre Apramāṇas ou immesurables. Bienveillance, maitrī, pitiē, karuṇā, joie, muditā, indifférence, upekṣā. On les nomme Apramāṇas parce qu'ils s'appliquent à un nombre d'êtres immesurable, tirent à leur suite un mérite immesurable (fruit d'écoulement), produisent des fruits (de rétribution) immesurables. Parce qu'ils s'opposent à l'hostilité, etc.

p. 200: Pas d'abandon (des passions, kleśa) par les Apramāṇas. Car les Apramāṇas ont pour terre, ou lieu de leur production, les dhyānas fondamentaux; car ils comportent un "jugement" (manasikāra) arbitraire ou volontaire (adhimukti), non pas un jugement exact (tattvamanasikāra); car ils ont pour objet les êtres vivants (sattva), non pas les caractères généraux des choses.

II. 325. adhimuktimanaskāra. Cet acte d'attention ne porte pas, sur ce qui est (bhūtārthe); il procède de l'adhimukti, c'est-à-dire de l'imagination constructive; il préside aux contemplations d'aśubhā, des apramāṇas, des vimokṣas, etc. See also p. 22, nn. 82 & 83.
103. tataḥ, see below. n. 107.
104. siddha.
105. nopalabdhisvabhāvatā.
106. pratyātmavedyatvāt, Cf. Oberm., A. O., XI, pp. 32, 119.
107. See n. 103: Hence, the meaning of the Kārikā is: Because there is no perception if there is no external object of perception, (upalabhyārtha) it is an ultimate fact that perception has a real nature of non-perception.
108. bhāvakarṭṭkaraṇa.
109. anyatamat parikalpyeta.
110. Y., reads: etat tritayam api abhāvād na yujyate; T. karmābhāvad....., because of the non-existence of karma, object. Cf. BL., II, p. 389: "Is it not bad logic to assume the immanent existence in one real entity of the relations of object, subject and instrument (or process of cognition)?" and n. 4: tasminn eva karma-karṭṭ-kāraṇa-bhāvo na yujyate etc. See also p. 390.
111. samatā.

112. nopalambha.
113. tulyatā.
114. Y., asattvād aviśeṣataḥ; T., viśeṣābhāvāt.
115. Y., upalabdhi; T. anupalabdhi, non-perception Cf. n. 287 of his edition:
 "This sentence is also in ll. 2-3 of the MS. In both the places in Vasubandhu and Sthiramati's texts we read upalabdhīh and not anupalabdhīh".
 It is not clear why T. should read anupalabdhi, as this does not fit into the context of the next sentence.
116. abhūtārtha.
117. paramārthatas.
118. Y., lakṣaṇatulyatvāt; T., samalalakṣaṇatvat.
119. sarpabhrāntyanupalabdhivat. Cf. BL., II, pp. 403 f.
120. grāhakābhāvāviśeṣāt.
121. samāropāpavādapratipakṣeṇa.
122. Y., upalabdhisvarūpatvenābhāvāt.
123. Y., svarūpeṇa.
124. nirvikalpatayā.
125. pratyātmasamatā. Cf. A. O., XI, p. 119; Suz. Stud., pp. 421 ff.
126. This is a quotation from the Abhisamayālaṅkāraprajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstra, Bib. Bud., V, 21. Cf. T. n. 292, who gives many references; See Oberm., Uṭtaratantra, transl., A. O., IX, p. 235; id. Doctr. of Prajñāpāramitā, etc., A. O., XI, p. 99: "Here there is absolutely nothing that is to be removed (from the unique Essence of Existence), and nothing that could be added (to it), etc.; p. 118: "Ref. to Nirvāṇa which is not something to be produced anew".

1. kāmādhātu.
2. rūpadhātu.
3. ārūpyadhātu.
4. Cf. T., n. 294: Vasubandhu says tatra abhūtaparikalpasyaiva prabhedalak-
ṣaṇaṃ khyāpayati.
5. ayogāt.
6. āryapudgalādibhedā.
7. vipakṣapratipakṣabhedāt. This corresponds to the statement of p. 24 ff.
where it has been said that the bhrāntivijñāna is needed in order to acquire
deliverance. The differentiation of the three Dhātus forms the content of
the bhrāntivijñāna. The corresponding differentiation of the ordinary worldly
beings and Saints denotes the stages of the Path of Final Deliverance.
8. vitarka. Cf. A. K., II, pp. 173—176; BL. II, p. 20, 21; CC., pp. 104—105.
9. vicāra. T.'s reading slightly differs.
10. Y., abhūtaparikalpas tu cittacaittas tri dhātukāḥ. T. reads abhūtaparikalpāḥ
This kārikā is quoted in the Triṃś. Cf. the text, pp. 35 & 39 (tri &
traidhātukāḥ); transl. pp. 106 & 115; Siddhi p. 516: "Tout Citta-Caitta des
trois Dhātus, c'est-à-dire tout Citta-Caitta impur est imagination d'irréel
(ou fausse imagination)". (Cp. Siddhi pp. 416, 417 & 523). See also
Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, Sagāthakam 459, ed., Nanjio, pp. 322, 323; transl.
Suz. p. 260: cittam vikhalpo vijñaptir mano vijñānam eva ca/ ālayam
tribhavaś ceṣṭā ete cittasya paryayaḥ//. The Citta, discrimination, thought-
construction, Manas, Vijñāna, the Ālaya, all that which sets the triple world
in motion, are synonyms of Mind; Daśabhūmikasūtra, ed., J. Rahder, p. 49,
E: cittamātram idam yad idam traidhātukam.
11. rūpam.
12. bhūtāni bhautikam ca. Cf. CC., p. 36: "The division of the elements of
matter into primary and secondary (bhūta and bhautika) and of the mental
elements into fundamental and derivative (citta and caitta) approaches very
nearly the relation of substance and quality. The secondary are supported
(āśrita) by the primary, and this connexion is inseparable; the one cannot
appear without the other. In the Buddhist interpretation they are, neverthe-
less, separate elements although linked together by the laws of causation,"
etc.
13. tridhātukasvabhāvaḥ.
14. avacara.
15. Narakādyākārā viṃśati prakārāḥ. It is the consciousness itself which appears
as Naraka, etc. Therefore the word "ākāra" has been used here.
16. Cf. Masuda, Origin and Doctrines, p. 43, n. 1, who mentions only 10
aspects of the Kāmādhātu, instead of the twenty, mentioned here. See also
A. K., III.
17. kāmāraḡa. Cf. A. K., VIII, p. 197.
18. Y., avibhūtarūpyasaṃjnāḥ; T., avidhūta (?) Cf. A. K., VII, p. 204:
vibhūtarūpyasaṃjñā, qui a fait disparaître la notion du rūpa.
19. anuśayita.
20. Y., satatavikṣepāḥ; T., nityam vikṣiptāḥ.

THE CHARACTERISTIC OF DIFFERENTIATION

21. Y., āśrayabhūtāḥ; T., avasthitāḥ, have become the cause of.
 22. caitasikaduḥkha. Cf. CC., p. 48 ff.
 23. samāhitāḥ.
 24. sukha.
 25. gandharasatadvijñānābhāsāḥ.
 26. pañcadaśadhātvaḥbhāsāḥ. Cf. CC., p. 97.
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1. pravṛttatvāt.
2. kalpanā.
3. svabhāvaviśeṣa.
4. abhūtaparikalpyavastu; T., n. 313: Tib. abhūtaparikalpa for parikalpya.
5. dṛṣṭi.
6. svarūpa.
7. Cf. CC. p. 6 and passim.
8. vastusvarūpamātropalabdhi.
9. vedanā.
10. viśeṣarūpeṇa, Cf. A. K. II, p. 177: "La connaissance (vijñāna) discerne l'objet bleu, etc.; la sensation le sent agréablement, etc.; la notion en saisit la caractéristique, etc. — Ou bien: la connaissance perçoit l'objet, d'une manière générale, en tant que perceptible, les mentaux le perçoivent dans ses caractères speciaux (viśeṣarūpeṇa); la sensation en tant que susceptible d'être senti agréablement; la notion en tant que susceptible d'être défini, etc."
11. āhlādakaparitāpakatvaviśeṣa. Cf. Siddhi, p. 145: "L'Abhidharmasamuccaya (Nanjio, 1199) enseigne que le Sparśa est le support de la Vedanā. Parce que le sparśa est le principe proche et predominant dans la génération de la Vedanā. Les caractères (nimitta) d'agréable, etc. qui sont saisis par le Sparśa, sont tres voisins des caractères d'avantageux, etc. (āhlādaka, paritāpaka.....) qui sont saisis par la Vedanā. Le Sparśa est donc plus important que tout autre Caitta dans la génération de la Vedanā: "Triṃś., text, p. 20: "Vedanā anubhāvasvabhāva sa punar viṣayasyāhlādakaparitāpaka tadubhayakaraviviktasvarūpasākṣātkaraṇabhedāt tridha bhavati sukha duḥka aduḥhasukha ca"; transl., p. 75; Jac., p. 16; Siddi, p. 147: "la nature de la Vedanā est "éprouver les caractères favorables, délicieux, ni l'un ni l'autre de l'objet". etc.
12. saumanasyādīsthānam. Cf. A. K., III, p. 108: "La vedanā mentale comporte dix-huit variétés, parce qu'il y a six upavicāras de satisfaction (saumanasya), six de dissatisfaction (daurmanasya), six d'indifférence (upekṣa): upavicāras de satisfaction relatifs aux visibles, aux sens, aux odeurs, aux saveurs, aux tangibles, aux dharmas; de même pour les upavicāras de dissatisfaction et d'indifférence".
13. grahaṇam.
14. Y., vyavahāralakṣaṇa; T., vyavahāraprajñāptilakṣaṇa.
15. Cf. CC., pp. 6, 17, 100; Siddhi pp. 148, 149: "la Saṃjñā a pour nature de saisir des "caractères" de l'objet. Elle a pour acte (quand elle est mentale) de produire les divers noms-et-paroles. Lorsque les caractères de l'objet sont établis — "Ceci est bleu, pas pas-bleu" — alors seulement peuvent être produites des expressions qui correspondent à ces caractères.
16. saṃprayuktatvam. Cf. Triṃś., text, p. 19; Siddhi, p. 143.
17. āśrayāmbanasamatābhīḥ.
18. kālasamatā.
19. dravya.
20. ākāra.
21. Cf. Siddhi, p. 128: "L'objet du Vijñāna, c'est le nimittabhāga; l'aspect du

Vijñāna, c'est le darśanabhāga. (D'une part, image blue; d'autre part, acte de connaissance qui voit l'image blue). Mais ces deux Bhāgas doivent avoir un point d'appui (āśraya): existe ce qu'on nomme le dravya, la "chose", qui est le point d'appui et la nature même des deux premiers Bhāgas et qu'on nomme svasamvittibhāga, le Bhāga qui est "conscience"..... La pensée et les mentaux sont de même point d'appui. ("le même moment de l'organe, indriya, organe de l'oeil etc., organe du manas") (see p. 127). Ils sont d'objet semblable, non pas de même objet; car le vijñāna saisit l'image bleue en tant que bleue, la vedanā la saisit en tant qu'agréable, etc." (Here is a difference with the explanation as given in our text; "āśrayālambanakāladravayasamatābhiḥ", from which it might be inferred that mind and mental phenomena do have the same object and not only a "similar" (= semblable) object). "Ils sont d'aspect distinct: car l'action (kriyā) du Vijñāna est de percevoir (vijñapti); l'action de la vedanā est de sentir, etc. Les "choses" en question (vijñāna et ses associés) sont "en nombre égal" (un vijñāna, une vedanā, etc.), mais leur aspect est différent; car les "natures" du vijñāna, de la vedanā, etc. sont distinctes". See also A. K., II, p. 178, 34d: "La pensée et les mentaux sont associés en raison de cinq égalités ou identités, identité d'appui, d'objet, d'aspect, de temps; égalité dans le nombre des dravyas. etc." (In this explanation, which represents the Vaibhāṣika-Sarvāstivāda point of view, mind and mental phenomena have the same ākāra, the same aspect).

22. cittaviśeṣāḥ.
23. Y., tādṛśasvarūpādīnā vicitrpratibhāsam; Cp. T., n. 320.
24. Y., naikam; T., anekam.
25. dharmasvabhāvaḥ.
26. See p. 23; T., n. 321: not traced. (?)
27. Y., citta. (?)
28. saṃsr̥ṣṭa, co-existent. Th. d. D. C., p. 12.
29. viśaṃsr̥ṣṭa. This quotation we find in the A. K., III, p. 106 "Le Sarvāstivādin. Mais le Sūtra dit: Vedanā, saṃjñā, cetanā, vijñāna, ces dharmas sont mêlés; ils ne sont pas à part". "Mêlé" signifie "né ensemble" (sahotpanna). De ce Sūtra nous concluons qu'il n'est pas de vijñāna, vedanā, saṃjñā au cetanā qui ne soient simultanés".
30. Y., satām yugapac ca; T., satām yugapat saṃyogaḥ. In n. 324 T. observes: Tib. (read MS. (?)) adds here ca which is not supported by Tib. Cf. A. K., III, p. 107:
 "(Sautrāntika)... La question se pose donc si vedanā, cetanā, saṃjñā sont déclarées mêlées parce qu'elles ont même objet — c'est notre opinion — ou parce qu'elles sont simultanées, comme vous le dites. Le aibhāṣika — Le terme saṃsr̥ṣṭa s'entend de choses simultanées, etc.". See also St. Schayer, Ausgew. Kap., XIV, pp. 40—54.
31. apariniṣpannam. The argumentation here is a refutation of the "realism" of the Sarvāstivādins who ascribe reality to the dharmas, the elements of existence such as they are in themselves, as well as of the "nihilism" of the extreme Mādhyamikā, who deny all separate reality of the dharmas.

THE CHARACTERISTIC OF THE SYNONYMS

The Vijñānavādins likewise deny the separate reality of the dharmas, but they admit their reality in so far as they form the component parts of the stream of consciousness and represent the causally dependent aspect of existence. Their true nature is the Pariniṣpanna Svabhāva, the Immutable Absolute, but they are not absolute in themselves.

1. hetuphalabhāvena.
2. pravṛtti.
3. kṣānaparamparā. (Cf. Schayer, *Ausgew. Kap.* pp. 81—95; kṣānasantāna & dharmasantāna; CC. XI, Impermanence of the Elements, pp. 37—43; Siddhi, p. 156).
4. upabhogasaṃkleśa. Cf. S. Lévi, *MSA*, transl., p. 6, n. 5: upabhoga, & I. 7, p. 8. la note sur anābhoga.
5. janmāntara.
6. kleśakarmajanmasaṃkleśa.
7. See below, p. 46, and Siddhi, p. 215 f.
8. pratyayavijñānam.
9. hetupratyayabhāvena. Cf. Siddhi, p. 93.
10. hetu.
11. aupabhogikam.
12. phala.
13. upabhogaprayojanatvāt.
14. pariccheda.
15. preraka.
16. Y., ekayogakṣematvāt; T., vijñānasya siddheḥ sukhasya caikatvāt: Cf. Siddhi, p. 125; *Triṃś.*, text, p. 19, transl., p. 72: "dans une commune sécurité, ou dans un risque commun"; Jac., p. 13; Lamotte, *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra*, pp. 55; Siddhi, p. 153: ".....Les Caittas, Dharmas associés, sont toujours de la même espèce, bonne, mauvaise ou non-définie, que le Citta, qui est roi".
17. sāsrava dharmāḥ. Cf. CC., p. 49: The elements of life which are characterised by a tendency towards life, commotion and turmoil, i.e. "influenced" by passions.
18. āliyante. See below, n. 35. Cf. *Triṃś.*, text, p. 18, ll. 24—26; Siddhi, p. 108 n.l.; p. 107; p. 96 ff.
19. hetubhāvena.
20. sattvaloka.
21. bhājanaloka, Cf. A. K., III, p. 138,, "Le monde réceptacle". Siddhi pp. 97 ff; p. 135, "Le huitième Vijñāna ou Vipākavijñāna, par la force de la "maturation" (paripāka) des Bijas communs, se développe en l'apparence du monde réceptacle, couleur, etc.: c'est-à-dire en grands éléments et en "matière dérivée".
22. avyākṛtam. Cf. CC. p. 31 ff., "The resulting event is always indifferent (avyākṛta) in the moral sense, because it is a natural outflow of a previous cause, and is supposed not to be produced voluntarily. This moral law is also called Karma"; *Triṃś.* p. 21; Siddhi p. 152. By avyākṛta is understood, that the ālayavijñāna, admits good and bad impressions alike and is therefore neutral, indifferent. It is the result, and therefore also the origin of good as well as bad "Karman".
23. ekāntavipākatvāt.
24. bija.
25. hetupratyaya.
26. pravartāmanam.

27. Y., pariṣṣayati; T., vistārayati.
28. tajjatiya.
29. Y., parināmaviśeṣalābhāt; Cp. T.
30. aduḥkhāsukhavedanopabhogāśrayatvāt. Cf. A. K., II, p. 115; Siddhi, pp. 143, 147, 149 ff.
31. Y., vāsanābhāvanāt; T., āliptatvāt.
32. Y., vyatirekeṇa, without; T., antareṇa.
33. pratyayabhāva.
34. ālina.
35. In a note Yam. refers to the Mahāyānasamgraha. See also Mel., III, pp. 175 & 252.
36. durupalakṣyatvāt.
37. vedanā.
38. Cf. Siddhi, p. 149 and Triṃś., K. 4a: "C'est l'indifférence que est ici la Vedanā".
39. prakaraṣagatam.
40. Y., upabhogatrividhavedanāśrayatvam.
41. kuśalākuśaladharmāhipatyāt. Cf. CC., pp. 101 f.
42. avyākṛtadharmā. Cf. Siddhi, p. 464: 1. vipākaphala, fruit de rétribution. — Des Dharmas non-définis qui sont vipākaja (c'est-à-dire le huitième Vijñāna qui est réellement vipāka, mais qui reçoit aussi le nom de vipākaja-avyākṛta, et les sept autres Vijñānas quand ils sont vipākaja), Dharmas personnels (svāsāntānika, par opposition aux Dharmas d'autrui et aux choses), qui sont créés par des Dharmas bons-impurs et mauvais. 2. niṣyandaphala, fruit d'efflux. — Des Dharmas pareils (sabhāga) amenés par la pratique du bon, du non-défini, du mauvais. (Le supérieur est fruit de l'inférieur, non réciproquement); et encore un fruit subséquent se développant en harmonie avec un acte antérieur. p. 91: "Avec la niṣyandavāsanā comme condition en qualité de cause (hetupratyaya), les huit Vijñānas naissent dans la diversité de leur nature et de leurs caractères. C'est ce qu'on nomme niṣyandaphala, parce que le fruit est semblable à la cause. Avec la vipākāvasanā comme condition en qualité de régent (adhipatipratyaya) est créé le huitième Vijñāna: celui-ci reçoit le nom de vipāka parce qu'il correspond à l'acte ākṣepaka, parce qu'il constitue une série perpétuelle; sont créés les six premiers Vijñānas: ceux-ci correspondent aux actes paripūraka, naissent du vipāka et sont nommés vipākaja, et non pas vipāka, car ils sont interrompus. Toutefois vipākajas et vipāka sont nommés vipākaphala, parce qu'ils sont différents de leurs causes". etc.
43. adhipatipratyaya.
44. T.'s reading differs. But Cf. Siddhi, p. 436.
45. anubhūyate.
46. bhavarasasārasarūpā.
47. samvedanā.
48. For, vedanā and vijñāna would be identical, if vedanā should be "arthopalabdhī".
49. pariccheda.

50. vedita.
51. udgrahaṇa. Cf. Siddhi p. 148: "Le Saṃjñā a pour nature de saisir les "caractères" de l'objet (viṣayanimitta-udgrahaṇa)" etc .etc. See also p. 148, n.l.: CC. p. 18: "Ideas (saṃjñā) are defined as operations of abstract thought, as that which "abstracts" (udgrahaṇa) a common characteristic sign (nimitta) from the individual objects. Even the definite representation (parichitti) of a colour is brought under this head. It is exactly what in later Indian philosophy, Buddhist as well as Brahmanical, was understood by "definite" (sa-vikalpaka) cognition. etc."; Cp. T.: "sukhādiviṣeṣod-grahaṇātmakatvena vedanā paribhogāḥ saṃjñā".
52. pravartaka.
53. cetanā, manaskāra. Cf. A. K., II, p. 154; Siddhi, p. 149: "La Cetanā a pour nature de "conditionner" (abhisamskāra) la pensée (Citta et Caittas); elle a pour acte de manœuvrer la pensée au bien, etc. C'est-à-dire: la Cetanā saisit l'objet en ses relations avec le bien, etc.; saisissant ce caractère de l'objet, elle fait l'action: elle manœuvre la pensée de telle sorte que celle-ci produise le bon, le mauvais, le non-defini"; p. 146: "Le Manaskāra a pour nature de "ployer" (ābhoga) la pensée (citta); il a pour acte de diriger (avarj) la pensée vers l'objet (ālabana), etc." CC. pp. 15—24, 100—101.; p. 19: "Volition (cetanā) is defined as the mental effort that precedes action. It is an element or a force which enters in the composition of a personal life (santāna) It is synonymous with the law of moral causation (karma) and likewise with the force of vitality, the "elan vital", which in the Buddhist system replaces any conscious agent, whether soul or God or even a conscious human being. A moment of this kind of will accompanies every conscious moment (citta)".
54. yathāsvam.
55. Cp. T., n. 359: For ca Tib. vā, or.
56. sukhādivedanīyakarma.
57. viṣayakarmanor upabhukti.
58. viṣayacihnam.
59. vyavahāranimittam. Cf. CC. p. 18.
60. ābhoga. See n. 53.
61. cetanā.
62. ālambanāntaram bhājate.
63. chanda. Cf. Triṃś., Text, p. 20 ll. 1 ff.; A. K., III., pp. 100 ff.; Siddhi, pp. 143 ff.

1. kleśakarmajanmasamkleśah: Cf. Siddhi, pp. 480—502; p. 215: Par samkleśa, il faut entendre kleśa, karman et phala, la passion, l'acte et le fruit, en d'autres termes le samudayasatya et le duḥkasatya, en d'autres termes le Saṃsāra. — Tout Dharma favorable au Saṃsāra est "de samkleśa"; p. 480: termes qui contiennent les douze bhavāṅgas (ou membres du Pratiyasamutpāda) d'Avidyā à Jarāmaraṇa. See also L.d.I.V.P., Théorie des Douze Causes and A.K., III, pp. 60—118. The three samkleśas are also discussed in the fifth chapter of the MVT. See Yam., p. 238 ff. See also Mél., I, p. 403: Le samkleśa est triple: kleśa (avidyā, tṛṣṇā, upādāna), karman (saṃskāra et bhava), jāti(?) (les autres membres); il est double, hetu (kleśa et karman) et phala (les autres membres); il est septuple en raison de sept causes: avidyā, cause de viparyāsa; saṃskāras, cause qui projette. Tout cela en raison de neuf fausses conceptions, bhāvalakṣaṇa, abhāvalakṣaṇa, svalakṣaṇa..... See also n. 147.
2. parikleśa.
3. Y., asato 'py ātmanaḥ; T., anātmakam api.
4. abhūtaparikalpamātratvāt.
5. chādanāt.
6. ropanāt.
7. nayanāt.
8. samparigrahāt.
9. dvādaśāṅgaḥ pratiyasamutpāda. See n.l. The pratiyasamutpāda is also explained in MVT., III, the chapter on "Tattva". See Yam., p. 148ff.
10. The verses 10 and 11 ab. (See Mel., I, p. 403) are chādanād ropanāc caiva nayanāt samparigrahāt / pūraṇāt triparicchedād upabhogāc ca karṣaṇāt // nibandhanād ābhimukhyād duḥkhanāt kliśyate jagat. / The words "kliśyate jagat" must be connected with "chādanāt", "ropanāt", "nayanāt" and so on.
11. avidyā.
12. adarśanātmakatvāt.
13. bhūtadarśanam.
14. viśaya.
15. utpattivibandhanāt.
16. Y., lokottaraprajñā; T., lokottarajñānam. See below nn. 18 & 19.
17. tatpṛṣṭhodbhavāt.
18. tatpṛṣṭhalābhāt. The bhūtadarśana corresponds to the pṛṣṭhalabdhajñāna. Cf. Oberm., Doctr. of Prajñāpāramita, A.O., XI, passim and Subl. Science, A.O., IX, p. 211, n.l.: "The Wisdom of a Saint abiding on the Path is of 2 kinds: 1) The wisdom at the time of intense concentration (samāhita-jñāna) having for its object the Unique Absolute and 2) the Wisdom that is acquired subsequently, after the termination of the trance (pṛṣṭhalabdhā) and is directed upon the objects of the Empirical World".
19. tadavagamāt. But cf. A.O., XI, p. 240: This kind of knowledge is directed towards the separate objects and elements of the empirical world, and cognizes them as resembling an illusion. it is empirical and disagrees with that at the time of intense concentration, Only with the Buddha these

- two kinds of knowledge are not in conflict with each other.
20. Y., tatprayoga; T., tannibandhanam.
 21. śrutamayī (prajñā).
 22. cintāmayī.
 23. bhāvanāmayī. Cf. A.O., XI, p. 20 & Ā.K., VI, pp. 139—144; p. 143: La sagesse śrutamayī est une certitude qui procède du moyen de connaissance nommé "parole d'une personne qualifiée"; la prajñā cintāmayī est la certitude née d'un examen rationnel; la sagesse bhāvanāmayī est une certitude née du recueillement.
 24. pratyaya, condition and cause.
 25. See below n. 29.
 26. jagat.
 27. See n. 6.
 28. Cf. Triṃś., Text, p. 36, Kārikā 19, transl., p. 108; Siddhi, p. 473: a. karmaṇo vāsanā: les Bijas de l'acte Le Karman, acte, qui est puṇya, méritoire, apuṇya, déméritoire, āniñjya, non-agité. Il s'agit ici de l'acte bon mais impur (kuśāla sāsrava) et de l'acte mauvais (akuśāla); p. 475: Tout acte est acte de pensée (cetanākarma)... Il imprime (ādadhāti) dans le Mūlavijñāna des virtualités (śakti, sāmānyā) ou Bijas qui produiront son fruit. Ces virtualités reçoivent le nom de vāsanā, "parfumage" ...Elles sont en effet la vapeur, l'exhalation de l'acte; et elles sont produites par l'imprégnation que crée l'acte. Les virtualités constituent une série ininterrompue jusqu'au moment où elles sont mûres: quand la dernière virtualité crée le fruit. L'acte, la sorte, est le suprême Adhipatipratyaya ou condition directrice, de la production du fruit de rétribution, soit général, soit particulier.
 29. Y., puṇyāpuṇyāniñjyasvarūpam; T., °āñejyasvabhāvam. Cf. Ā.K., IV, 46, pp. 106—108; p. 106: Il y a trois actes, 1. méritoire (puṇya) 2. déméritoire (apuṇya), 3. non-agité (āniñjya). 1. à-sentir-agréablement, 2. à-sentir-désagréablement, 3. à-sentir-ni-désagréablement-ni-agréablement. 1. est l'acte bon du Kāmadhātu. 3. l'acte non-agité est l'acte bon d'au-dessus..... L'acte bon du domaine du Kāmadhātu est ce qu'on appelle l'acte "méritoire", puṇya, parce qu'il purifie, parce qu'il produit une rétribution agréable; p. 107: L'acte bon d'au-dessus, c'est-à-dire du domaine des deux sphères supérieures, est nommé "non-agité" āniñjya; n.l.: La pensée āñeñja, fondement du pouvoir magique (iddhi) est, dans Visuddhimagga, p. 386, une pensée qui ne s'incline pas (na iñjati) vers le rāga etc. Ce n'est pas la pensée du quatrième dhyāna, mais une pensée bonne et recueillie (samāhita). etc. p. 109: L'acte mauvais existe seulement dans le Kāmadhātu; n.l.: la rétribution de l'acte bon est sensation agréable lorsqu'elle a lieu dans le Kāmadhātu et dans les trois premiers dhyānas; Ā.K., III, p. 84; Le sot (bala, Pṛthagjana) accomplit la triple action, corporelle, vocale, mentale, en vue du sukha, sensation agréable, et de l'aduḥkṣasukha, sensation d'indifférence: action non-méritoire (apuṇya), en vue de la sensation agréable de cette vie; action méritoire (puṇya) en vue de la sensation agréable d'une vie future dans le Kāmadhātu; action "invariable" (āniñjya)

en vue de la sensation agréable des trois premiers dhyānas et de la sensation d'indifférence des étages supérieurs. Ces actions sont les saṃskāras qui sont en raison de l'avidyā. See also Siddhi pp. 473 ff. and Mādhyamakavṛtti, pp. 334 f.

30. punarbhavam abhisamkaroti.
31. Y., pratiṣṭhāpanāt. See p. 274 of his Edition. "Establishing" has here the meaning of projection. Cf. Siddhi, p. 481, "l'Avidyā et les Saṃskāras qui projettent les Bijas de cinq fruits (Vijñāna, Nāmarūpa, Saḍāyatana, Sparśa et Vedanā)". See also n. 51.
32. Y., apraṇihitam; T., aropitam.
33. na tu sarvam; Cf. Siddhi, p. 482: Les actes qui ont leur origine dans cette Avidyā, sont les Saṃskāras: ne font partie de cet Āṅga, ni les actes "à sentir dans cette vie". (qui produisent une partie de la récompense particulière de cette vie), ni les actes auxiliaires, complémentaires, paripūraka, qui produisent une partie de la récompense particulière de la vie à venir ou des vies à venir. See also n. 36.
34. avidyādhipatyāt.
35. na sattāmātreṇa.
36. Cf. Siddhi, p. 492: Les actes bons-impurs des Āryas, ayant pour cause adjuvante la Vidyā, étant en opposition avec les Bhavāṅgas, ne sont pas compris dans les Bhavāṅgas (ne sont pas saṃskārāṅga). Nous sommes donc assurés que les Āryas ne font pas d'acte produisant la réexistence (punarbhava), car ils n'ont ni méprise à l'endroit du futur fruit de souffrance, ni désir de réexistence, (vu qu'ils ont coupé les Bijas de l'Avidyā āveṇikī, l'Avidyā subtile, toujours en activité, qui offusque la réalité, empêche qu'elle soit connue. See also below p. 53 and n. 151.
37. sāmānyapratyaya. Cf. Th. d. D.C., p. 9: Divers passages du canon montrent, en effet, que l'ignorance qualifie tout existence, la fait durer, et qu'il faut rapporter tous les membres de la chaîne à la „pensée erronée”: si la sensation (vedanā) agréable (ou désagréable) produit la soif (ou le dégoût), c'est qu'elle procède d'un contact auquel l'ignorance est associée; c'est l'ignorance qui fait de la sensation un "membre" (aṅga), c'est-à-dire un élément causal de l'existence: car la sensation ne produirait pas la soif s'il n'y avait pas l'ignorance chez celui qui sent, dans le manas (esprit) qui entre en contact.
38. sammutthāna. Cf. A.K., IV, p. 37: "Ce par quoi l'action prend origine. Ce qui est cause (hetu) et samutthāna, hetusamutthana. Ce qui est samutthāna au moment même de l'action, tatkaṣaṇasamutthāna. Le hetusamutthāna projette (ākṣepaka), c'est-a-dire produit. Il est donc promoteur. Le tatkaṣaṇasamutthāna est contemporain à l'action; il est donc second moteur. Mais quelle est, sur l'action, l'efficace du tatkaṣaṇasamutthāna, efficace par laquelle il en serait le second moteur? Si le tatkaṣaṇasamutthāna manquait, l'action n'aurait pas lieu, fut-elle même projetée (ākṣipta) par le promoteur; comme, par exemple, l'action n'a pas lieu lorsque celui qui a projeté une action (J'irai au village) vient à mourir." Siddhi p. 488: "En ce qui concerne la création (samutthāna) de l'acte, la seule Avidyā." Avidyā is here the

- hetusamutthāna, the saṃskāras, the tatksaṇasamutthāna.
39. Cf. CC., p. 19: "Volition is defined as the mental effort that precedes action, etc."; Siddhi, p. 149: Tout acte est acte de pensée (cetanākarma). See n. 28. See also Th. d. D.C., p. 10, 2.
 40. See n. 29 and Siddhi p. 474: D'après le Yogaśāstra, "l'acte puṇya est l'acte bon (kuśala) qui produit comme rétribution une bonne destinée" etc.
 41. bhavabhogabhedaprārthanā.
 42. tatsahabhūtāvidyā.
 43. āniñjya. See n. 29 and Siddhi, p. 474: d'après le yogaśāstra "l'acte āniñjya est l'acte bon qui produit comme rétribution une existence de Rūpadhātu ou d'Ārūpyadhātu, et aussi l'acte qui est senti dans ces deux Dhātus.
 44. tadbhūminiḥsaraṇadṛṣṭi. The meaning apparently is that the non-agitated acts do not exist in the Kāmadhātu. See for this question, Siddhi, pp. 474, 484, 494.
 45. See above, pp. 42 ff.
 46. Y., vyuparamapravṛttivijñāna-; T., santānocchedena pravṛttivijñānena. The pravṛttivijñāna is not, like the Ālayavijñāna, a "continual stream". Cf. Siddhi, p. 156 ff.; p. 157: De même que le fleuve, frappé par le vent, donne naissance à des vagues sans que son courant soit interrompu: de même l'Ālayavijñāna, en raison des causes et conditions, sans que son flux perpétuel soit coupé, produit les Vijñānas actuels; p. 93: Ces six Vijñānas ne sont pas à proprement parler Vipāka, puisqu'ils sont discontinus. Siddhi, p. 398 f.
 47. See above p. 19 ff. and Siddhi, p. 92. The meaning is that good, bad or non-defined acts which are accomplished by means of the seven active vijñānas, indiscriminately leave their "traces" (i.e. the vāsanās, the "seeds") behind in the ālayavijñāna.
 48. See n. 28.
 49. anāgatasya janmano bijam.
 50. hetubhāva.
 51. See n. 31 and Siddhi, p. 92: Les Vijñānas actuels "parfument-créent" les Bijas: ils placent (ādhā) des Bijas nouveaux ou accroissent les Bijas préexistants.
 52. vijñānasantāna = Ālayavijñāna "fleuve sans coupure". Cf. n. 46 and Siddhi, p. 93. This sentence is not very clear. Y. reads anāsravasyevāpūrvam; T., anāsravasya vā 'pūrvam.
 53. ādhīyate, deposited.
 54. utpattisthāna.
 55. vāsanā.
 56. punarbhava.
 57. upapattisthāna. Cf. A.K., VI, pp. 137—139 & VI, p. 216; p. 138: "Par upapatti, il faut entendre une naissance ou une existence caractérisée par une certaine sphère (kāmadhātu etc.), une certaine destinée (dieu, homme, etc.), un certain mode de naissance (naissance de la matrice, de l'oeuf), un certain sexe, etc..... La cause de l'upapatti est l'action (karma).....
 58. cyutisthāna. Cf. A.K., III, p. 131: Le terme cyuta est l'équivalent de cyuti,

- mort; le terme *udbhava*, l'équivalent d'*upapatti*, naissance; pp. 134 ff.
59. *santānavṛtṭyā*. Cf. Th. d. D.C., p. 14 ff.
60. *karmaparibhāvitena vijñānena*, Cf. A.K., III, p. 124: *karmaparibhāvitavijñāna*, le *vijñāna* considéré comme *vijñānabīja*, "le semence qu'est le *vijñāna*", que l'acte développe ou parfume; p. 126: La *manaḥsamcetanā*, qui est acte. projette (*ākṣipati*) une nouvelle existence (*punarbhava*); cette nouvelle existence, ainsi projetée, est produite (*paribhāvita*) par l'acte. La *manaḥsamcetanā* et le *vijñāna* sont donc les deux aliments qui font naître, qui sont semblables à la mère, qui sont la chose capitale pour la production de l'existence de l'être qui n'est pas né.
61. Cf. CC., p. 107 and A.K., I, p. 33: "la pensée-de-conception d'une nouvelle existence"; See n. 62.
62. Cf. A.K., III, p. 45: Qu'est ce que le *pūrvakālabhava* auquel nous avons dit que l'*antarābhava* est pareil? Celui-ci est antérieur à la mort, postérieur à la conception. *Bhava*, existence, être, les cinq *skandhas*. Dans l'ordre *antarābhava*, les cinq *skandhas* entre deux destinées; *upapattibhava*, les *skandhas* au moment de l'entrée dans une destinée, au moment de la *pratisamḍhi*; *pūrvakālabhava*, tous les *skandhas* des moments postérieurs jusqu'au *marañabhava*, dernier moment de la destinée et qui sera suivi d'un nouvel *antarābhava*; III, p. 43; L'acte qui projette la *gati* ou "destinée" — une existence infernale, etc. — est le même acte qui projette l'existence intermédiaire par laquelle on va à cette destinée. Par conséquent l'*antarābhava* a la forme du futur *pūrvakālabhava* de la destinée vers laquelle il va; III, p. 118: ... le *pūrvakālabhava* existence proprement dite,
63. The *saṃskāras* condition not only the first moment of a new existence, i.e. the moment of reincarnation, but the whole existence, starting from the moment of conception up to death. The *vijñāna*, the vital and spiritual principle descends to the womb at the moment of conception. The conception-reincarnation is not the cause of the new existence, since it is a disappearing cause. See also n. 155 and p. 53.
64. *Ārūpyasamāpattilābhinaḥ*. Cf. A.K., VIII, pp. 133 & 134: Les *ārūpyas* — c'est-à-dire les recueils et les existences du domaine de l'*Ārūpyadhātu* — pour le nombre et la nature, sont comme les *dhyānas*. Il y a quatre *ārūpyas* et chaque *ārūpya* est double, "de naissance" et "de concentration". Les "Naissances" ont été définies dans le troisième chapitre (III. 3). Quant aux concentrations d'*ārūpya*, de leur nature et en général, elles sont concentration "application de pensées bonnes à un seul objet". En raison de cette double similitude, la *Kārikā* dit que l'*ārūpya* est comme le *dhyāna*. See also III, pp. 3—5; VIII, p. 143; Suz. Studies, Index pp. 388, 389; Har Dayal, Bodh. Doctr. pp. 229—231; Masuda, Or. B. Schools, p. 43, n.l.: *Samāpatti* is a synonym for a state induced by the practice of ecstatic meditation. There are altogether eight *saṃpāttis*, the first four *saṃpāttis* being the four *dhyānas* in the *rūpa-dhātu* and the last four being the four *brahma-lokas* in the *ārūpa-dhātu*. etc.; CC. pp. 10, 52, 105.
65. *nāmarūpavat*. But cf. Th. d. D.C., pp. 15, 16: Quand le recommencement

- d'une nouvelle existence a lieu dans la sphère non matérielle (arūpa), le vijñāna ne cause pas nāmarūpa, mais seulement nāman. A.K., III, p. 85: Avec le vijñāna pour antécédent (purvāṅgama) le nāmarūpa naît dans cette destinée. C'est les cinq skandhas, conformément à la définition du Vibhanga: "Qu'est-ce que le nāman? Les quatre skandhas immatériels. Qu'est-ce que le rūpa? Tout rūpa; p. 94: Les quatre skandhas immatériels, vedanā, saṃjñā, saṃskāra, vijñāna, sont nommés nāman. Car nāman signifie "ce qui ploie". CC., p. 107: nāma-rūpa, the five skandhas in the embryo before the formation of the (six) sense-organs; Th. d. D.C., pp. 16—18, 30; Siddhi pp. 481 ff. A.K., III, pp. 60 f.
66. T., saṃparigrahāt.
67. ātmabhāva. Cf. A.K., IV, p. 101: "la personne" = āśraya; A.K., II, p. 255. A considérer une existence, le premier état embryonnaire (garbhāvasthā) est cause semblable des dix états: cinq états embryonnaires, kalala, arbuda, peśin, ghana, praśākha; cinq états postembryonnaires (jātavasthā), bala, kumāra, yuvan, madhya, vṛddha. Le second état embryonnaire est sabhāgahetu de neuf états (arbuda vārdha), et ainsi de suite. Un moment antérieur de chaque état est cause semblable des moments postérieurs de cet état. See also IV, 53, p. 119 ff.; III, p. 62, n.l.: In Buddhistic sanscrit literature, ātmabhāva (Pali, attabhava) commonly occurs in the meaning "body". (See F. Edgerton in BSOS., VIII, p. 501) This cannot be the case here since the ātmabhāva is comprised not only by rūpa but also by nāma.
68. Kalala, arbuda, peśin, ghana and praśākha. The first stages in the formation of the foetus. See n. 67.
69. A.K., II, p. 229: nikāyasabhāgacitta, la pensée d'une existence homogène. II, p. 195: Qu'est-ce que le "genre" (-sabhāgatā) La sabhāgatā est ce qui cause la ressemblance des êtres vivants; La communauté de nature des êtres vivants. Chaque être vivant possède sa propre sattvasabhāgatā. On dit cependant que la sattvasabhāgatā est générale, parce qu'elle n'est pas différenciée. La concevoir comme unique et éternelle, c'est l'erreur des Vaiśeṣikas. See also CC. pp. 24 etc.
70. Y., tasmīṃs cotpanne.
71. hetubhāvena vyavasthānāt.
72. sarvaṃ saṃskṛtam. Cf. CC., p. 98.
73. Cf. A.K., III, p. 127: aupapāduka & upapāduka: matrice des êtres apparitionnels: les êtres qui naissent d'un coup, avec les organes non manquants ni déficients, avec tous les membres et sous-membres. On les nomme, "d'apparition", parce qu'ils sont habiles à l'acte d'apparaître (upapādana) parce qu'ils naissent d'un coup (sans stade embryonnaire, sans semence et sang); tels les dieux, les êtres infernaux, les êtres d'existence intermédiaire; p. 28: Hommes apparitionnels, les hommes du commencement de la période cosmique (prāthamakalpika); p. 29: Les Nāgas et les Garuḍas sont aussi apparitionnels; Quelle est la meilleure matrice? La matrice apparitionnelle, etc. etc.
74. yathāsambhavam.

75. pūranāt.
76. Y., śarira; T., ātmabhāva.
77. aparipūrṇa. Cf. A.K., III, p. 61; p. 62, n.1.: Qu'est-ce que le nāmarūpa? Après le pratiṣaṃdhicitta et avant que les quatre organes matériels ne soient produits. (Le kāyendriya, organe du tact est acquis tout de suite). Dans cet intervalle, avant que le ṣaḍāyatana ne soit au complet, il y a cinq périodes (avasthā) kalala, arbuda, peśin, ghana, praśākha, qui ensemble font la période de nāmarūpa. Qu'est-ce que le ṣaḍāyatana? Quand sont produits les quatre organes matériels, les six āyatanas sont au complet.
78. cakṣurādyāyatana.
79. kāyāyatana; Cf. CC., p. 96: Kāya-indriya-āyatana.
80. manaāyatanam. Y., p. 38, n. 3: N'est pas traduit dans le tibétain. Cf. CC., p. 96: mana-indriya-āyatana.
81. āśraya. See n. 76, Cf. A.K., III, 126: L'āśraya, c'est le corps muni d'organes, qui est le point d'appui, de ce qui est appuyé (āśrita) sur lui: à savoir de la pensée et des mentaux (cittacaitta). L'aliment en bouchées fait croître le corps, le sparśa fait croître la pensée.
82. āśrita.
83. Another translation of this sentence is: Because the organs of sense and consciousness together with the five varieties of sensation and intellectual consciousness are not yet full grown.
84. abhinirvṛttitas.
85. taccakṣurādyāśritānām.
86. tatpratibaddhavr̥ttitvāt.
87. samgr̥hita.
88. aṅgapratyaṅga Cf. A.K., III, p. 204, n. 3: "sarvāṅgapratyaṅgopetāḥ", "ayant tous les membres aux organes complets et intacts"; A.K., III, p. 27, n. 4: Les membres aṅga, sont les mains, les pieds, les sous-membres sont les doigts, etc.
89. trayaparicchedāt.
90. samnipāta, cp. T. n. 417.
91. triprakāro vikāra.
92. sukhādivedanotpattyanukūla.
93. The text of this sentence is not very clear. Y., reads: ata eva yam (MS. evāyam) indriyavikārasādrśyaṃ spr̥ṣatī tadākāratayeti sparśa ucyaṭe. T. adheres to the reading of the MS. In n. 419 he gives the Tib. version: ata eva ya indriyavikāras tadākārasādrśyaṃ spr̥ṣatīti sparśa iti.
94. It is evident that sparśa, although a caitta, a mental state, must be here a moment of consciousness (vijñāna) modified in coördination with the modification of the sense-organ which in its turn is modified in coördination with the modification (i.e. the 3 qualities, the 3 special characteristics, agreeable, disagreeable, neutre) of the object. That is why we may ultimately say that sparśa is the (first) connexion between consciousness and its object. Cf. Trimś., text, p. 20; transl. p. 74; Jac. pp. 14—15; A. K., III, pp. 95 ff., CC., pp. 55 ff.; BL., II, pp. 311 ff; p. 347; Siddhi p. 144: Le Sparśa est le discernement de la modification de l'organe, modification produite quand

a lieu le concours de la triade: organe, objet et Vijñāna. Le concours, c'est quand l'organe et l'objet produisent le Vijñāna. A ce moment a lieu une modification de l'organe qui est favorable à une sensation agréable, dés-agrable, neutre. (L'organe est affecté d'une certaine manière lorsque avec l'objet il produit le Vijñāna). En conformité avec cette modification, pareil a cette modification, a lieu le discernement de la qualité qu'a l'objet de pouvoir être senti d'une manière agréable, etc. Ce discernement s'appelle Sparśa. Ce discernement "touche" l'organe par le fait qu'il est en harmonie avec la modification de l'organe; ou bien on peut dire qu'il est touché par l'organe (parce qu'il s'harmonie avec la modification de l'organe). D'où son nom de Sparśa. C'est pourquoi, bienqu'il consiste dans le discernement de la modification de l'objet, il est défini: "discernement de la modification de l'organe". BL., II, p. 347, n.l.: sādrśya (= sārūpya tad-ākārātā viṣaytā) is here not simple similarity, but a Buddhistic technical term, "coördination" which is here meant to explain the connexion between consciousness and its object, etc. etc. Cp. also Jacobi, p. 15, n. 61, who thinks that vijñāna remains unchanged, in contradistinction to the Siddhi, etc.

95. upabhogāt.
96. upabhujyate āsvādyate.
97. Cf. Th. d. D. C., p. 24 ff.
98. Y., puṇyādikarm(aphal)opabhogāt.
99. anubhava.
100. anurāga.
101. pratigha = dveṣa.
102. moha. Cf. Triṃś., Kārikā 11 & Siddhi, I, p. 343 ff.: "Les Kleśas sont le Rāga, le Pratigha, le Moha, la Vicikitsā, le Māna, la Mauvaise vue". Ces six recoivent le nom de kleśa parce qu'ils constituent les Mūlakleśas, les Kleśas fondamentaux.
103. paripoṣanāt.
104. Y., karṣanāt; T., saṅgrahāt.
105. karmākṣiptapunarbhava.
106. udakakalpayā tṛṣṇayā.
107. ātmabhāvābhilāṣā; Cf. Th. d. D. C., p. 25: bhavatrṣṇā, soif des existences, de l'existence (dans la sphère supérieure du Kāmadhātu).
108. Y., (punarbhava) bijaparipoṣaṇena; T., omits punarbhava.
109. Y., yad ārdriḥṭya punarbhavam utpattau upayukta utpatim cāvasthāpayati tat karṣaṇam. T's reading differs. Cf. Siddhi, pp. 456, 484, 488, 495; p. 484: Réunis, la tṛṣṇā et l'upādāna "mouillent", d'une part, les bijas provenant de l'acte qui sont ākṣepaka, d'autre part, les bijas des cinq Āngas, Vijñāna, etc., qui sont ākṣipta. Des lors ces six catégories prennent le nom de bhava, parce qu'ils sont tout proches du futur bhava, de la future existence..... p. 488: Tous les Kleśas sont capables de provoquer l'acte et de mouiller l'acte. Cependant, en ce qui concerne la première opération, la force de l'Āvidyā est dominante,..... En ce qui concerne la seconde opération, la force de la tṛṣṇā est dominante, car il est dit que la

- tr̥ṣṇā mouille comme l'eau. Pour que soit engendrée cette pousse qu'est le bhava (bhavāṅkura), l'acte doit être arrosé a plusieurs reprises. Afin de marquer la succession des mouillages, on distingue la tr̥ṣṇā et l'upādāna. Au contraire, la création de l'acte ne comporte pas répétition: c'est pourquoi on nomme la seule Avidyā comme cause de l'acte. L'upādāna comprend tous les kleśas; mais, la tr̥ṣṇā étant capitale pour le mouillage, on dit que l'upādāna est la tr̥ṣṇā accrue (tr̥ṣṇāvivr̥ddhi).
110. nibandhanāt.
 111. Cf. Siddhi, pp. 484 ff. Th. d. D. C., p. 27: "la cause de la force qui projette l'acte" (karmākṣepakaraṇa), (Madhyamakavṛtti, XXVI, 6.)
 112. vijñānasyopapattyanukūleṣu kāmādiṣu. Cf. Madhyamakavṛtti, teṣu kāmādiṣu yaś chandarāgas upādānam. (Th. d. D. C., p. 26, n. 1).
 113. Y., abhiniveśa, omitted by T.
 114. chanda.
 115. rāga. Cf. Siddhi, p. 344, Il a pour nature l'attachement souillé au bhava (l'existence à venir) aux bhavopakaraṇas. Son action est d'arrêter l'Alobha (racine du bien) et d'engendrer la souffrance, car c'est par la force de la soif que naissent les Upādānaskandhas.
 116. Y., nibandhayaty avasthāpayati ca; T., nibandhanam ārohati.
 117. Y., vartate; T. avatiṣṭhate.
 118. ābhimukhyāt.
 119. punarbhavavipākādānāya.
 120. vipākaphalam.
 121. Y., prativṛttilambhanāt; See p. 275 of his edition.
 122. sadbhūta (bhava).
 123. ākṣiptabhava. Cf. Th. d. D. C., p. 30: Enfin, et les deux scolastiques sont ici d'accord, upādāna étant considéré comme une tr̥ṣṇā effective, et non comme un acte, on sera porté à voir dans le terme bhava l'acte même qui crée le bhava, l'existence, la réexistence. D'où la définition bhava = karmabhava = l'acte réfléchi (abhisamkāra), bon, mauvais, neutre. Et tout acte qui va à l'existence, c'est karmabhava. Bhava = l'acte qui produit la réexistence. Cet acte est les cinq skandhas parce qu'il les produit, et parce que, étant du corps, de la voix, de la pensée, il est en effet rūpa..... vijñāna." See n. 179.
 124. Y., duḥkhitāt; T., duḥkhatas. See his n. 437. The Tib. reading points to the word duḥkhanāt. Cf. Mel., I, p. 403.
 125. Y. reads kliṣyante jaganti, the worlds are defiled(?).
 126. jāti, jarāmaraṇa.
 127. abhinirvṛtti. Cf. Th. d. D. C., p. 31 & Siddhi, p. 456, 4.
 128. sammūrcchana.
 129. āmāśaya.
 130. pakvāśaya.
 131. The meaning of this sentence is not very clear. Y. and T. differ considerably.
 132. yauvanajīvita.
 133. khālitvāpālityādi. Cf. A. K., III, p. 88; Siddhi, p. 485.

134. Cf. A. K., III, p. 64: La jāti, c'est la nouvelle réincarnation. Après la mort, les cinq skandhas au moment où a lieu la réincarnation, c'est la jāti. — Le "Membre" qui reçoit le nom de vijjāna lorsqu'on examine l'existence présente, reçoit le nom de jāti lorsqu'on examine l'existence future; p. 88: En raison du bhava, au moyen de la descente du vijjāna, la naissance (janman) à venir (anāgata), c'est la jāti, qui comporte les cinq skandhas, étant nāmarūpa de sa nature; p. 65: Le jarāmarāṇa jusqu'à la vedanā. Depuis la jāti jusqu'à la vedanā, qui est ici nommée vid. — Quatre membres de l'existence présente, nāmarūpa, ṣaḍāyatana, sparśa et vedanā sont, en ce qui concerne l'existence à venir, désignés par l'expression jarāmarāṇa, douzième membre de la serie duodénaire. p. 88.
135. gacchati.
136. Y., sabhāgavakāśāt = Avidyā, the Transcendental Illusion; T., sajātiyāvasthātaḥ.
137. Y., kṣaṇāvakāśam.
138. vyādhi.
139. traidhātuka.
140. Y., ājavamjavibhāvena; T., javajavibhāvena. See his n. 447 Cf. Nirvāṇa p. 197: Phenomal life consists in its coming and going, dependent every time upon a changing substratum (tad tad upādānam āśritya) of elements. It then evolves obeying to causal laws. St. Schayer. Ausgew. Kap., pp. 83—85.
141. kṣaṇaparamparayā. Cf. Siddhi, p. 505:prabandha, saṃtāna, paramparā. C'est l'existence qui comporte ājavamjavibhāva, aller et venue, qui est jarāmarāṇaparamparasambandha (Madhyamakavṛttī, p. 218, 529).
142. na vyavadāyate.
143. vyavadānapakṣa.
144. Y., -prakārārthena; T., -ākāreṇa; Cf. Mél., I, p. 403: "Onze opérations des douze membres du pratīyasamutpāda". Here eleven functions are mentioned and not twelve since the two members jāti and jarāmarāṇa are classified in one group. Cf. in this respect Siddhi, p. 488, where eleven particularities of Avidyā are mentioned.
145. See p. 46, n. 5.
146. Cf. T., n. 450.
147. Cf. Mél., I, p. 403: "Voir Sublime Science, 136, où Oberm. lit jāti qui, pour moi, est douteux. C'est le saṃkleśa de vipāka ou de duḥkha; jāti s'entend souvent de la "naissance" proprement dite". See also Oberm., Bu-ston, p. 9 & p. 146, nn. 54, 55, 56: Guṇamati in his Vyākhyāyuktiṭikā enlarges upon this subjectAccordingly, the members 1, 8 and 9 of the formula of Evolution (i.e. avidyā, ṛṣṇā and upādāna) form "the defilement of passion" (kleśasaṃkleśa), — the members 2, 10 (saṃskāra and bhava) — the defilement of former deeds, and the remaining seven (vijjāna, nāmarūpa, ṣaḍāyatana, sparśa, vedanā, jāti, and jarāmarāṇa) the "defilement of birth" (jāti-saṃkleśa). See. n. 1.
148. svaparātmano vyābādhakatvāt.
149. Cf. Y. p. 40, n. 6; Aṅguttaranikāya, III, 54. See also Rh. D. & St., Pali-

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- Engl. Dict., cinteti & vyābādha. T., n. 455: M. Vyutp. p. 137.
150. Y., utpādatvāt; T. pravartanād api.
151. dṛṣṭasatyasya. See n. 36.
152. Karman = saṃskāra and bhava.
153. bhavikaraṇāt.
154. kleśasamudācareṇa, passion in activity, Cf. A. K., V, p. 55, rāgasamudācāra, concupiscence en activité.
155. Y., kāraṇatvam; T., kāraṇam.
156. kliścitta.
157. pratisandhi. See n. 61.
158. tadātve.
159. vipākadāna. See n. 119.
160. sarvopadravāspadatvāt. Cf. A. K., IV, pp. 86, 126.
161. hetor dvidhābhedāt; The twofold cause is kleśa and karman. The fruit janman.
162. svarūpāvastham. Cf. Siddhi, p. 481: Āṅgas qui projettent.
163. bījāvastham. Cf. Siddhi, p. 484: Āṅgas qui engendrent.
164. hetusaṃkleśatvam.
165. T. reads (sa) jarāmaraṇādīnavam ca janma, which agrees with "jarāmaraṇa śokādi, vieillesse, mort, chagrin". Cf. Th. d. D. C., p. 31: Warren, p. 202. Le terme "maladie" (vyādhi) est suggéré Bodhicaryāvatāra, IX, ad finem. According to T. n. 466, "this sentence is clear neither in skt, nor in Tib.
166. Cf. Th. d. D. C., p. 42.
167. caturāṅgātmanjanmabīja. This, in contradistinction to Siddhi, p. 481:l'Avidyā et les Saṃskāras qui projettent les Bījas de cinq fruits. (vijñāna, nāmarūpa, Ṣaḍāyatana, Ṣparśa et vedaṇā), Here vijñāna is omitted.
168. Y., upapattiviśaya. T., janmaviśaya.
169. nikāyasabhāgapariḡrahāt.
170. jarāyujādikaṃ yonim abhipretya. See n. 73. Cf. A. K., III, pp. 26 ff: Il y a là quatre "matrices" (yoni) des êtres, êtres nés de l'œuf,nés du chorion (éléphant etc.),..... nés de l'exsudation des éléments terre, etc., (vers, insectes etc.)..... matrice des êtres apparitionels: les êtres qui naissent d'un coup, avec les organes non-manquants ni déficients, avec tous les membres et sous-membres etc. etc.
171. ātmabhāvamātra. See n. 67.
172. See n. 77.
173. sakārāṇenānubhavana.
174. Y., upabhuktakarmavipāka; T., bhuñjānaḥ karmavipākam.
175. See n. 109.
176. tatsamyogaviyogaṭṭṣṇayā; Cf. Th. d. D. C., p. 25.
177. purvabhūtam.
178. paunarbhavikam.
179. omitted by T. See n. 123.
180. abhinirvṛtti.

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181. See nn. 114, 115.
 182. sattvanikāya.
 183. Cf. A. K., III, p. 83, n. 5.
 184. sadhāraṇāsadhāraṇahetu.
 185. kāraka. Cf. Mahāvvyutp., 207, No. 10 (ed. Wogihara).
 186. vedaka. Cf. Mahāvvyutp., 207, No. 12.
 187. tattva.
 188. Y., viparīta.
 189. Y., adhiḡamaṃ nirākaraṇārtham; T. apakaraṇāt.
 190. See p. 37.
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NON-SUBSTANTIALITY

1. For the *Sūnyatā* see in particular: T. Obermiller, *The term Sūnyatā and its different interpretations*, JGIS., I, pp. 105—117; Id. *A Study of the Twenty Aspects of Sūnyatā*, IHQ., IX, pp. 170—187; Id.; *Nirvāṇa according to Tibetan Tradition*, IHQ., pp. 211—257.
2. *saṃkleśa*.
3. *dharmāvabhodāśrayam*. The Constructive Ideation represents the causally dependent aspect of existence. It is formed by the component parts of the stream of consciousness (the noumena), which are "the substratum on whose basis the attribution of the superimposed essences and qualities is made." (the phenomena.) (Cf. JGIS., I, p. 113.)
4. *vyavadānam*. Cf. Siddhi, pp. 214 ff. *Par la salissure de la pensée, l'être est sali; par la pureté de la pensée, l'être est purifié.*
5. *dharmatāvadhāraṇam*.
6. *lakṣaṇa*.
7. *pariyāya*.
8. *bhāvābhāvapratiṣedhātmatā*. Lit.: which is the essence of the negation of existence and non-existence.
9. *ākāśa*.
10. *nirvikalpatva*.
11. *āgantukopakleśa*. Cf. Siddhi, pp. 362 ff. See below.
12. *pudgaladharmasamāropa*.
13. *sādhana*, the realization.
14. *yukti*.
15. *viśuddhyālabhanatvāt*.
16. *viśuddhyarthibhir*.
17. *vikāra*.
18. *dvayābhāva*.
19. *abhāvasya bhāva*. Cf. JGIS., I, p. 113.
20. *vasturūpeṇābhāva*.
21. *parikalpitātmakatvāt*. Duality represents the Imputed Aspect of Existence, superimposed on the causally dependent aspect.
22. *astitvam*.
23. *lakṣaṇatvam*.
24. *bhāvarūpalakṣaṇam*.
25. *svātantryam evāvagamyate*.
26. We find the explanation in the mutual relation of the three aspects of existence. See pp. 26 ff. and JGIS., I, p. 113.
27. *dharmatārūpatā*.
28. *abhāvasya bhāvalakṣaṇapariṅhātāt*. The Constructive Ideation is ideal (noumenal) reality. It is the dynamic aspect of the Immutable Absolute Reality, the *Pariṇiṣpanna Svabhāva*. Its component parts, the dharmas are capable of objectivizing and are therefore responsible for the superimposed, phenomenal aspect. Because the phenomenal world depends on the noumenal reality, we may say that the Absolute Reality is not only the Ultimate Essence of its noumenal, dynamic aspect but also of its phenomenal aspect. And it is Ultimate Essence because every dharma is real only in so far as

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- it represents a moment of that Ultimate Reality.
29. sāmānyavācivāt.
 30. atyantābhāva.
 31. prāgabdhāva.
 32. pradhvaṃsābhāva.
 33. svopādānād anyatra.
 34. anyonyābhāva. Cf. Randle, *Indian Logic*, p. 330 and *Nirvāṇa*, p. 195 ff.; Oberm. *IHQ.*, X, pp. 217 & 236.
 35. ekāśrayatvam.
 36. bhāvasyābhāvalakṣaṇopādānāt.
 37. viśayatvāt.
 38. vastutva.
 39. abhāvasvabhāva. the real nature of non-existence, of a Non-Ens.
 40. It is not possible that one entity could be the essence of other entities.
 41. nityasukhabhāvābhāvāsvarūpatvāt.
 42. sattvasya viparyāsatvena.
 43. svarūpam.
 44. pratiṣedha.
 45. na pṛthaktva.
 46. (na) eka. The second na is omitted metri causā.
 47. anavasthā.
 48. dharmāntaram anveṣṭavyam.
 49. viśuddhyāmbanam.
 50. sāmānyalakṣaṇam.
 51. mārgāmbanam.
 52. parasparato bheda.
 53. dharmasvarūpavat.
 54. sāmānyatā.
 55. viśodhyārtham.
 56. Cp. p. 24.
 57. anyānanyatvenāvaktavyā.
 58. This is a refutation of the Jaina doctrine of the sapta-bhaṅgī, i.e. "the Syādvāda, the doctrine of It-can-be: There is something which exists eternally, objects are eternal as matter, but this matter can assume all possible forms and qualities." (Wintern., *Hist. of Ind. Lit.*, II, p. 575; Das Gupta, *Hist. of Ind. Phil.*, I, p. 179 ff; Schubring, *Die Lehre der Jainas*, p. 107 f.)
 59. The three characters mentioned here refer to the three aspects of existence. They are also explained in the third chapter of the *MVT.*, p. 118, respectively as abhāvaśūnyatā, atadbhāvaśūnyatā and prakṛtiśūnyatā. Just like the horns of a hare, the superimposed (phenomenal) aspect is unreal. It is the result of sense-perception and inference (pratyakṣa-anumāna) but has no independent reality. The causally dependent aspect is real, but does not exist such as it is imagined by the ignorant. It is the bare, ideal reality free from the differentiation into subject and object and is known by the "pure wordly knowledge", the knowledge which is acquired after the concentrated con-

- templation in Highest Trance. The absolute aspect is the primordial nature, the real background of the unreality of the superimposed phenomenal aspect.
60. *vinirmukta*.
 61. Cf. Siddhi, pp. 649 & 743—761; *Sam̐dhinirmocanasūtra*, pp. 28, 29, 221, 229; *Suz.*, *Stud.*, p. 429 and *passim*; A.K., VII, p. 96; VIII, p. 185; *Oltramare*, *Théosophie Bouddhique*, pp. 304—310; A.O., IX, p. 251 & XI, p. 114.
 62. T. reads *nirodha*, destruction, impermanence. The immutability and permanence of the Unique Absolute implies the impermanence and destruction of the separate, unreal phenomena.
 63. Y., *gaṇa* T., *kalpita*, constructed.
 64. *ananyathā*.
 65. *aviparyāsa*.
 66. *hetutvāt*. Cf. Siddhi, p. 748 where these synonyms are quoted from the MV.
 67. *avikāra*.
 68. *nityaṃ tathātīvāt*; Cf. Siddhi, p. 746: les deux notes qui caractérisent la *Tathatā*, la note "vrai" et la note "immuable". (*Tathatā*, parceque toujours identique, dit *Vasubandhu*). On voit les avantages de cette traduction: elle contraste le *Pariniṣpanna*, qui est vrai et immuable, avec le *Parikalpita* qui n'est ni vrai ni immuable, et avec le *Paratantra* qui est vrai, mais qui n'est pas immuable.
 69. Cf. Siddhi, p. 751; *Bodhisattvabhūmi*: L'objet du savoir de pure intuition, c'est la suprême identique réalité, au delà de laquelle il n'y a rien, qui est l'extrémité du connaissable. (Comparer J. Rahder, note sur la septième *Bhūmi*, p. 246, dans *Daśabhūmi*).
 70. Cf. Siddhi, p. 566 ff: Ayant à leur tête la *Satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* qui admet comme réels les *Dharmas* qui sont imaginaires, les *Dr̥ṣṭis*, *Vicikitsā*, *Avidyā*, *Rāga* *Vihimsā*, *Māna*, avec les *Upakleśas*. Ces "erreurs" couvrent ou voilent la vraie nature du *jñeya*, "ce qui est à connaître"; ils font obstacle à la *Bodhi*. Donc *Jñeyāvaraṇa* et *Āvaraṇa*.
 71. *viparyāsāvastutvāt*. T., For *avastutvāt*, Tib. lit. *abhāvāt*.
 72. Y., *nimittanirodha*; T. — *virodha*. Cf. Oberm., *IHQ.*, IX, p. 1030. Siddhi, p. 748.
 73. *animitta evānimittaḥ*. The meaning of the sanskrit text is not very clear. Cf. T., n. 572: MS. *animitta eva*. From Tib. it cannot be ascertained whether here is masculine or neuter gender. Siddhi, p. 749: Elle est *Ānimitta*, parceque toutes les notes (*nimitta*) de *Rūpa*, de *Vedanā*,..... de *Bodhi*, s'apaisent en elle.
 74. *āryajñānagocarativāt*; Cf. Siddhi, p. 749: *Paramārtha*, parcequ'elle est "réalisée" par le savoir suprême, le *Nirvikalpakajñāna*.
 75. *saṃyagdr̥ṣṭi*.
 76. *saṃyagvimuktijñāna*.
 77. *hetu*.
 78. *dhātu*. Cf. Oberm., *Nirvāṇa*, *IHQ.*, X, p. 204 ff. and Siddhi, p. 694: *dhātu* signifie "réceptacle", parce qu'y ont place d'infinites et sublimes grandes qualités. Ou bien *dhātu* signifie "cause", parce qu'il produit les biens mondains et supramondains des cinq véhicules. N. 1 refers to the *Triṃś:*

- "āryadharmahetutvād dhātuḥ / hetvartho hy dhātuśabdah" which almost verbally corresponds to the reading of the MVT.
79. svalakṣaṇopadāya. Cf. A.K., III, p. 6: dhātu, ce qui porte (dadhāti) un svalakṣaṇa (à savoir les Kāmas etc.) See also p. 7 and I, p. 37.
80. saṃkleśa. Cf. pp. 29 & 46 ff.
81. viśuddhi.
82. samalā.
83. nirmalā. Cf. Oberm., A. O., IX, p. 149: The Absolute mingled with defilement is the fundamental element which is not delivered from the bonds of the passions and is called the Essence of Buddhahood (as it exists in all the living beings). The Immaculate Absolute is the same thing as the exclusive property of the Buddha and consisting in a total metamorphose (of all the elements of existence).
84. āśrayāparāvṛtti.
85. āśrayāparāvṛtti. For "the metamorphose of the elements constituting the personality of an ordinary individual into component parts of the 3 Bodies of the Buddha at the time of final Enlightenment" (A. O., IX, pp. 100 ff) see Siddhi, pp. 609—612 and pp. 661, 667; p. 610. Le mot āśraya, au sens passif, signifie "ce sur quoi s'appuie". Il s'agit du Paratantra, car s'appuient sur le Paratantra d'une part les Dharmas souillés, d'autre part les Dharmas purs. Tous les Dharmas conditionnés, saṃskṛta, sont Paratantra. Toutefois c'est le huitième Vijñāna, jamais interrompue, qui est le support des Dharmas souillés et purs. "Souillés" c'est-à-dire ce qui est faux, ce qui est Parikalpita. "Purs", c'est-à-dire ce qui est vrai, le Pariniṣpanna. La Parāvṛtti "révolution", sera donc double: parāvṛtti-expulsion du souillé, parāvṛtti-acquisition du pur. Par la répétition assidue du Nirvikalpakajñāna est coupé la lourdeur grossière (dauṣṭhulya) des deux Āvaraṇas qui est dans le Mūlavijñāna. Par la révolution-expulsion des Kleśas, on acquiert le Mahāparinirvāṇa; par la révolution-expulsion du Jñeyāvaraṇa, on réalise la Mahābodhi". A detailed exposition of this subject we find in the MSA., IX.
86. cittasantāna.
87. rāga. See the Char. of Defilem., n. 102.
88. virajaska, free from dust.
89. aviparītacetas.
90. tattvajñānāt.
91. āpekṣikā.
92. prakṛtyā prabhāsvaratvāt. Cf. J. Rahder, Daśabhūmika-Sūtra, Bhūmi IX, D, p. 74.
93. avasthābheda.
94. anitya.
95. vikāradharmiṇitvāt.
96. avasthā.
97. āgantukamalāpagamāt. Cf. A.O., IX, p. 105: All the elements constituting a personality as well as the defiling agencies and the Biotic Force which produce them are regarded as totally unreal by themselves, and called

forth by the force of illusion. They are always spoken of as the occasional, the accidental defiling elements which cannot affect or alter the element of the Absolute. The latter, as we have it with every individual excepting the Buddha, is represented as concealed under the coverings of this accidental defilement, but by no means damaged by it.

98. Cf. Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra, XI, 13.
99. atatsvabhāvatvāt.
100. svabhāvāntara.
101. bhāva.
102. vikāradharma.
103. sprśati.
104. vastubheda.
105. dvayābhāvasvarūpa.
106. Cf. T., n. 593. who enumerates the sixteen forms of śūnyatā, mentioned by Vasubandhu and who refers to the Mahāvvyutpatti, § XXXVII, (18 forms) and to the Laṅkāvatāra, p. 74-75, (7 forms). See also the eighteen forms in the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, Ed. Lamotte, VIII, p. 224 ff.
107. bhoktṛvastu = the subject.
108. bhojanavastu = the object.
109. taddehavastu.
110. pratiṣṭhāvastu.
111. sāmānyalakṣaṇa.
112. vastunānatvena.
113. adhiṣṭhāna = deha = śarīra = the physical existence or "personality".
114. bhājanaloka, the anorganic world.
115. ātmīyasneha.
116. I. bhoktṛśūnyatā = adhyātmaśūnyatā, the Subjective Non-Substantiality.
117. adhyātmikāyatanāh. See p. 19 ff.
118. abhimāna, pride, self-conceit.
119. II. bhojanaśūnyatā = bāhyaśūnyatā = The Objective Non-Substantiality. See p. 20.
120. III. adhyātmabāhyaśūnyatā, the Non-Substantiality of both the Subjective and Objective.
121. IV. mahāśūnyatā.
122. savitarka. Cf. CC., p. 104.
123. yoniśomanaskāra.
124. anyo nimittagrāha.
125. jñāna. The Transcendental Wisdom cognizing the Non-Substantiality. (Cf. Oberm., Stud. of the Twenty Aspects. IHQ., IX, p. 173.)
126. vikalpa.
127. paramārthākāra.
128. yogibhūmibhrāntinimitta.
129. V. śūnyatāśūnyatā.
130. VI. paramārthaśūnyatā. Cf. Oberm. op. cit., p. 175: "The Relativity of the Ultimate Reality. The latter, that is Nirvāṇa, is devoid of the essence of the Nirvāṇa (as of a separate entity), in as much as it represents the mere

- separation (from the phenomenal elements)." T.'s reading of this sentence differs. See his nn. 608, 609.
131. bhāvasvarūpatvam.
 132. pratipadyate = prapadyate. Cf. T. n. 617.
 133. śubhadvaya.
 134. saṃskrtam = abhūtaparikalpa = paratantrasvabhāva = the stream of consciousness in its causally dependent aspect, i.e. the bare reality free from the differentiation into subject and object or the pure wordly existence as foundation of the Path.
 135. VII. saṃskṛtaśūnyatā.
 136. VIII. asaṃskṛtaśūnyatā.
 137. This a quotation from the Prajñāpāramitā. It is the Buddha who is speaking.
 138. IX. atyantaśūnyatā.
 139. saṃsāra.
 140. śrāvakabodhi. T. reads bhūmi instead of bodhi.
 141. X. anavarāgraśūnyatā.
 142. akṣayāya śubhāya. Subha is kuśala. Cf. Siddhi, p. 699.
 143. kuśalamūla. Cf. A. O., IX, p. 194.
 144. Cf. Siddhi, p. 671: Nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa: la Tathatā sortie de la douleur du Saṃsāra. D'une part, les Kleśas sont épuisés: d'autre part, est également épuisé tout upadhi (qui pourrait servir de support à la douleur.) See also p. 702 and Oberm., Nirv., IHQ., X, p. 219 ff.
 145. dharmakāya. Cf. Siddhi, p. 703 ff and 762 ff; IHQ, X, p. 257: The Cosmical Body (dharma-kāya) = the Absolute Truth = the Unique Essence of the elements = the Pacification of the Plurality = the Principle of Extinction or Negation of Phenomenal Existence = Nirvāṇa in the true and ultimate sense.
 146. anāsravabhāva. "The sāsravadharmas are those elements which are influenced by avidyā and the passions and characterized by a tendency towards life, commotion and turmoil. The anāsravadharmas, are influenced by prajñā, Transcendental Wisdom and exhibit a tendency towards reduction of life, appeasement of commotion and even annihilation. The first correspond to the ordinary man, the second make up the Saint." (Cf. CC., pp. 49, 52, 96 ff.). See also MSA., p. 75, n. 23; Siddhi, pp. 694 ff.
 147. sāsravadharmavipākakāya. Cf. Siddhi, p. 768: Vipākakāya, corps de rétribution ou Rūpākayā, corps matériel, ou Janmakāya, corps de naissance, le corps qui est né dans le jardin de Lumbinī, le corps muni de marques qu'a produites la pratique des Pāramitās.
 148. XI. anavakāraśūnyatā.
 149. gotra. For "The special theory of the fundamental element of the Absolute, otherwise called the Essence of the Buddha or the element of his lineage" see Oberm., Sublime Science, A.O., IX, and Siddhi, pp. 562, 721 ff.
 150. XII. prakṛtīśūnyatā.
 151. prakṛti.
 152. svābhāvīkam = anādikālikam = anāgantukam. Cf. Siddhi, p. 704: Svābhāvīkakāya, ainsi nommé parce qu'il est le svabhāva, la "nature" même

- des Bouddhas. C'est le pur Dharmadhātu des Tathāgatas, etc.
153. anādisaṃsāra.
154. kiñ cic cetanaṃ kiñ cid acetanam.
155. buddhagotram.
156. śrāvakādigotram. Cf. A.O., IX, p. 103.
157. paramparāgatatvāt. Cf. A.O., IX, p. 206: With reference to the Germ as being in an inconceivable manner derived from the Absolute (and as becoming finally developed into the latter) it is said: — This (Germ) derived from the Absolute, beginningless and transferred from one existence to another, is as it were a special property of the 6 (internal) bases of cognition.
158. tathāgatagotrikatvāt. This is the standpoint of the Mādhyamikas. Cf. A.O., IX, p. 104.
159. lakṣaṇa & anuvyañjana. Cf. A.O., IX, pp. 248, the 32 corporeal marks of a superman. See also n. 162.
160. XIII. lakṣaṇaśūnyatā.
161. See n. 132.
162. balavaiśāradyaṅīkādi. Cf. Har Dayal, Bodhis. Doctr., pp. 19 ff.
163. Y., vibhāvanā; T., vibhāvayati: For this reason he meditates upon it.
164. XIV. sarvadharmāśūnyatā.
165. vyavasthānam.
166. sadbhāva = real existence.
167. XV. abhāvaśūnyatā.
168. XVI. abhāvasvabhāvaśūnyatā.
169. astitvam.
170. parikalpitasvarūpa.
171. vipākavijñānasvabhāva. Cf. Siddhi, p. 167.
172. bhokṭṛpuṅgala.
173. kalpītalakṣaṇa.
174. rūpādivijñāpti.
175. bhojanasyātmīyasyābhāva.
176. sattvaloka.
177. jñāṭṛ.
178. saṃskṛtādi.
179. svāmin.
180. prayokṭṛ.
181. asādhāraṇa.
182. pratipakṣa.
183. viśaya.
184. svabhāva.
185. bhāvanāprayojana.
186. vyāpakatva.
187. adhyāropāpavāda.
188. sarvaḍṛṣṭīniḥsaranātmakatva.
189. Y., prāptaye; T. śuddhaye. See his n. 655.
190. rūpakāya. The Rūpakāya represents the Saṃbhoga-kāya, the "Body of

Bliss" as well as the *Nirmāṇa-kāya*, "the numerous Apparitional bodies which are its emanations, and are working for the weal of all living beings as long as the world exists". (A.O., IX, pp. 110, 111 and Siddhi, p. 705). See also n. 147.

191. dharmakāya.
192. samalāvasthā.
193. nirmalāvasthā. See no. 97.
194. sādhanam.
195. āgantukopakleśaṃkliṣṭatā. The upakleśas meant here are vikalpa, false discrimination; bhaya, fear; kausīdya, indolence and saṃśaya, doubt. See the Survey of the N-S. Cf. Siddhi, p. 362 where 20 upakleśas are mentioned.
196. svabhāvaviśuddhatā.
197. vimokṣa.
198. mārgabhāvanataḥ.
199. pṛthagjanāvasthā.
200. viśuddhiprabheda.
201. upādāna. Cf. *Nirvāṇa*, p. 197.
202. sāksāt.
203. dharmaparatantratvāt. See n. 85.
204. tadupādānam; Cf. T., n. 675: Tib. taddhetukam for tadupādānam; *Nirvāṇa*, p. 195, n. 4: From the Buddhist point of view the terms pratitya "relative to a cause" and upādāya "relative to a substratum" are equivalents.
205. sambandha.
206. āryāvasthā.
207. kliṣṭa.
208. śuddha.
209. Cf. T., n. 681: "Vasubandhu's reading in accordance with the Tib. is kathaṃ nākliṣṭā nāpi śuddheti." (In what manner is it not non-defiled nor even pure?).
210. The Path and *Nirvāṇa*.
211. prakṛtyaiva prabhāsvaratvāt. The cittadharmatā = cittasvabhāva = nirvikalpakajñāna. Cf. Siddhi, pp. 125, 416 ff., 585 ff. See also Lañk. S., ed., Nanjio, p. 77, 15 & p. 300, 12; A.O. IX, p. 105; R. Kimura, A Historical Study etc., p. 81: The original Mahāsaṅghikas held that the original nature of the human mind (vimala-citta-svabhāva) is naturally pure.
212. Y., cittasyaiva malalakṣanatvāt; T., cittasyaivalakṣaṇatvāt, n. 685; Tib. adds mala.
213. viśuddha.
214. pratiśedhadvayāt. The unreality of the "Ego" and the unreality of the separate essences and qualities superimposed on the elements of existence.
215. laukika mārga. The Path of the Bodhisattva "while he is still an ordinary mundane being and has not yet attained the position of a Saint" (A.O., XI, p. 36). It comprises the Saṃbhāramārga, the Path of Accumulating Merit and the prayoga-mārga, the Path of Training. Cf. Siddhi, p. 267. and *Triṃś.*, p. 24; Transl., p. 83, n.l.: Le chemin mondain est, par définition,

NON-SUBSTANTIALITY

- incapable d'anéantir le Mental Passioné; il ne peut conduire qu'à la suppression des Passions de l'étagé des Subhakṛtsnas. See also MVT., III, p. 156.
216. lokottara mārga. Cf. Siddhi, p. 606 ff.
217. svabhūmika. Cf. Oberm., I H Q., IX, 1030; Siddhi, p. 726 ff; A. O. XI; J. Rahder, La Carrière du Saint Bouddhique, BMFJ, II, 1.
218. mṛdumadhyā (dhimātra).
219. anāsravatvāt.
220. cakṣurādi, the organs of sense and consciousness.
221. Y., anivṛttāvyaḥṛtatvāt; T., anāvṛta. The sense-organs as such are indifferent for the progress towards Final Deliverance. Cf. CC., p. 102 and A.K., II, p. 315.
222. Y., kuśālasāsravād viśeṣanārtham; T., kuśālasāsravād viśeṣārtham.
223. saṃsāraparyāpannatvāt.
224. iṣṭavipākatvāt. Cf. A.K., IV, p. 106: L'acte bon (kuśala, śubha) est salutaire, parce qu'il est de rétribution agréable (iṣṭavipāka) et par conséquent protège de la souffrance pour un temps (: c'est l'acte bon impur, kuśālasāsrava); ou bien parce qu'il fait atteindre le Nirvāṇa et, par conséquent, protège définitivement de la souffrance (: c'est l'acte bon pur). L'acte mauvais (akuśala, aśubha) est pernicieux: c'est l'acte de rétribution désagréable. L'acte dont Bhagavat ne dit pas qu'il est bon ou mauvais, l'acte non-défini (avyākṛta) n'est ni salutaire, ni pernicieux.
225. dharmatā.
226. vyavasthāna.
227. T., gotralakṣaṇa, the essence of the germ, of the Unique Absolute, the Spiritual Lineage of the Buddha.
228. vikalpa.
229. bhaya.
230. anādhimukta.
231. abhrānti.
232. tathatā.
233. Y., kausīdya; T., ālasya.
234. saṃśaya.
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