
THE JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM

CONTENTS

	PAGE
The Revulsions of Goya: Subconscious Communications in the Etchings.....	FREDERICK S. WIGHT 1
Music and Machines.....	CHARLES W. HUGHES 28
Nature and the Anti-poetic in Modern Poetry	
	WILLIAM VAN O'CONNOR 35
Nationalism, Internationalism, and Universality in Literature	
	JOSEPH REMENYI 44
The Functions of Aesthetics in Hegel's Philosophy	
	GUSTAV E. MUELLER 49
Relativism Again.....	BERNARD C. HEYL 54
Letters Pro and Con: VICTORIA K. BALL, IVY G. CAMPBELL.....	61
Reviews	
WOLFGANG STECHOW, HUGO LEICHTENTRITT, PAUL ZUCKER, ABRAHAM KAPLAN, ALFRED NEUMEYER, HELMUT HUNGERLAND....	66
Notes and News.....	73
Contributors	75

Published by

THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR AESTHETICS

THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR AESTHETICS

Organized in 1942 for the advancement of philosophical and scientific studies of the arts and related fields

President: C. J. DUCASSE, *Brown University, Providence, R. I.*

Vice-president: KATHARINE GILBERT, *Duke University, Durham, N. C.*

Secretary-treasurer: MAX SCHOEN, *Carnegie Institute of Technology, Pittsburgh 13, Pa.*

Trustees: IRWIN EDMAN (*Columbia University*), THEODORE M. GREENE (*Princeton University*), GLEN HAYDON (*University of North Carolina*), LESTER D. LONGMAN (*University of Iowa*), DOUGLAS MACAGY (*California School of Fine Arts*), THOMAS MUNRO (*Cleveland Museum of Art*), CARL THURSTON (*Pasadena, California*), ROSEMOND TUVE (*Connecticut College*), and officers.

THE JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS AND ART CRITICISM

Editor: THOMAS MUNRO, *Cleveland Museum of Art, Cleveland 6, Ohio*

Associate Editor: H. G. SCHRICKEL, *Brooklyn, N. Y.*

Managing Editor: MAX SCHOEN, *Carnegie Institute of Technology, Pittsburgh 13, Pa.*

Review Editor: HELMUT HUNGERLAND, *128 Indian Road, Piedmont 10, Calif.*

Editorial Council: HENRY D. AIKEN (*University of Washington*), ANANDA K. COOMARASWAMY (*Boston Museum of Fine Arts*), IRWIN EDMAN (*Columbia University*), PAUL R. FARNSWORTH (*Stanford University*), BERTRAM E. JESSUP (*University of Oregon*), HELMUT KUHN (*University of North Carolina*), CRAIG LADRIÈRE (*Catholic University of America*), HERBERT S. LANGFELD (*Princeton University*), BARCLAY S. LEATHEM (*Western Reserve University*), HUGO LEICHTENTRITT (*Cambridge, Mass.*), JOHN MARTIN (*Dance Critic, New York Times*), DEWITT PARKER (*University of Michigan*), WILLIAM S. RUSK (*Wells College*), JOSEPH T. SHIPLEY (*Editor, The American Bookman*), WOLFGANG STECHOW (*Oberlin College*), PAUL ZUCKER (*Cooper Union Art School*).

Manuscripts intended for publication, except book reviews, should be addressed to the Editor, and accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed envelope for return. Reviews and books for review should be sent to the Review Editor.

The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism is published quarterly, in September, December, March, and June, by the American Society for Aesthetics. It is manufactured by the Waverly Press, Baltimore 2, Md. \$4.00 a year; single numbers \$1.00. Completed volumes \$5.00. Single back numbers \$1.25.

Communications regarding subscriptions, advertising, or change of address for the Journal, and regarding membership in the American Society for Aesthetics, should be sent to Dr. Max Schoen (address above).

THE JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM

THE REVULSIONS OF GOYA: SUBCONSCIOUS COMMUNICATIONS IN THE ETCHINGS

FREDERICK S. WIGHT

1. The Caprices

In the year 1793, when the storm of the French Revolution was at its height, Spain wrapped herself tighter in intolerance and turned a deaf ear to the outside world. In this year Goya's life underwent a crisis that took the form of serious illness and resulted in a permanent and profound deafness: *El Sordo* he was called, and he withdrew perforce from the gay and brilliant life of a successful portrait painter in Madrid. His affliction brought to a term his triumphant and flattering intimacy with the Duchess of Alba: where he had entertained he now bored. The frivolity of the lady hardly deserves the artist's bitterness, nor is it likely that his own rejected love was as strong as he imagined, but she dramatized for him all that he was denied. In brief, it was the eighteenth century that Goya was forced to abandon, just as he had brought it to such excellent terms.

After his recovery his painting takes on a new maturity and depth. Plainly the artist has undergone much the same development out of his enforced humility that we see in the life of Rembrandt or Beethoven, and we move in an atmosphere of strong male compassion. Portrait painting, however, was too limited a form of expression for the maturing and isolated Goya, and it is in this second phase of his life that he took up the graver. The etchings fall into four series: The Caprices, which were etched between seventeen ninety-five and ninety-seven; The Disasters of War, in which Goya recorded the horrors of the Napoleonic invasions, between eighteen eleven and twenty-one; The Tauromaquia, or The Art Of The Bull Ring, finished in eighteen fifteen; and the Proverbs or Follies, completed in eighteen nineteen. These plates were not begun until Goya was forty-nine, and when he died at the age of eighty-one he was contemplating a further series. They are thus the work of his late years and they bear a certain relationship to his own periods of illness as well as to the illness of the times.

It was a period of revolution; when Goya rejected the eighteenth century he was in the same situation as the other revolutionary spirits of the age. But he did not tear off the calendar and embrace the next political faith. He was a destructive moralist without politics; he dealt in terms of flesh and blood and emotion and his criticisms of society are so basic that there is no room for an ideology, and that is why he has no date. Taken together the etchings consti-

tute one of the most powerful and disquieting manifestations of the human spirit ever drawn. Blake is pale beside them, and to compare them with the profound religious drawings of Rembrandt is to set the damned beside the saved. For Goya leans on nothing. The surface of his world has broken down until when he looks within he sees wholly believable monsters, and without he sees the monstrous actions of men.

Before attempting to unravel this snarl of the horrific, the bizarre and the factual, it should be said at the outset that this essay is written with a certain *parti pris*. It is assumed that a work of art is a communication of an emotion and that this emotion has its roots in the subconscious. Further, one should expect the dominant emotion to stem from a very early period in the artist's life, and to be counterpointed with, or disguised by, a surface and contemporary subject matter—if that subject matter be present. Granted this point of view, we should not be bewildered or nonplussed by the withdrawal of the surface subject matter; in fact, we should often welcome its withdrawal in our attempt to find out what the work of art is actually about; a difficult but wholly rational problem. In the works we have to consider, the surface communication may be in the field of social criticism, political satire, folklore or witchcraft, or absent altogether. On the other hand the profound emotive material is present at all times and it requires to be understood.

It is significant that the famous self-portrait stands at the the head of the *Caprices*, like a capital letter, announcing that here follows something of the artist's self. The first forty-two of the eighty plates that Goya published are given to mordant satire and social comment not too remote from the world of Hogarth and Rowlandson. On the surface we are in the eighteenth century, and the main theme is the frailty of women, inviting a conventionally light and facile treatment. But soon there is a change, from the satiric to the bizarre to the horrific: the turning point is the etching of Goya asleep at his desk (plate 43) where he is surrounded by cats, bats, and owls, and the desk bears the legend 'The sleep of reason breeds monsters.' The plates that follow plunge deep into the phantasmagoria of witchcraft; they interlard the comment on the life of the time with an obscure and violent life of their own which boils up from some lower level.

The *Disasters of War* also begin with surface subject matter which is in turn overwhelmed by resurgent subconscious material before Goya has done. But here the long account of mutilation, murder and execution seems to satisfy a thirst for the expression of violence and to appease the subconscious, and the plates remain objective illustration until almost the end of the series; it is only in the last thirteen of the eighty-three plates that the phantasmagoria wins out.

In the *Tauromaquia* the artist is content with realism. Here in the bullring is violence enough, deliberate, formal and invoked. But in the final series, the *Proverbs*, Goya again gives himself up to fantasy. These plates are obscure and disturbing, and one feels that they cut deeper than the late *Caprices* which after all reflect early fears distilled out of folklore and witchcraft; but the Prov-

erbs depict a more personal psychic world of a child triumphant at the end of life, and are disturbing precisely because the man who etched them has no longer a personal vindictiveness.

When Goya etched the *Caprices* he sensed that the plates would be obscure and he wrote comments to go with the captions. And it is at once arresting that these comments do not serve to clarify, a fact which is ordinarily explained away by the anti-clericalism and *lèse-majesté* of the etchings. The artist is supposed to be deliberately putting us off the track to save himself from persecution. It is true that a certain number of the *Caprices* might have made trouble for the author, but the really revolutionary etchings come later; and Goya's comment has a curious air of naiveté: although it is often beside the point it is always emphatic, and one has the impression that he considered it pithy. With or without the explanation that he was skirting persecution, one may reflect that the same inner reasons for obscurity and disguise were operating when he etched the plates and when he commented upon them. An artist rarely succeeds in saying more about his work than he says in it.

We must study the plates themselves and here and there the wording will piece in. It is then that we find symbols repeated and situations developed from plate to plate, and like the outer events of experience, one of these etchings illuminates the next. Goya has a cast of persons and monsters who play out his dramas; like the characters of the cinema they occur over and over, and we expect that they too have a flesh and blood reality that will prove quite obvious and commonplace once it is unmasked. And the plots and incidents repeat themselves and develop themes. But one cannot move from plate to plate in their original sequence; not that we are suggesting that the order should or could be changed, but Goya has a way of keeping all his themes going at once. Since they are basic, they do not conclude, but continuously recur.

To begin with the cast. There is a disreputable younger woman and an unsavory duenna to accompany her. The part of the younger woman is either played by the Duchess of Alba or by another woman whom we will get to know, although not to the last plate do we see them together. Often the old woman has two beldame companions, and then they play the part of witches. There is an important older man with a physiognomy which we will also get to know; child goblins; and dead children of foetal appearance. These creatures are assisted by an infernal menagerie; according to the metamorphoses of witchcraft they are humans bewitched into animal form, a view with which we will have no quarrel. If they are symbols of persons to Goya, so they had better be for us.

We have seen Goya dreaming, surrounded by his cats, bats and owls (plate 43). This is not the first appearance of birds; with human heads they have been met in plate 19. The ass appears in plates 37 to 40, but quite in the surface field of social satire: as the pedant, the appreciator of music, the worshipper of pedigree, the physician, the sitter for his portrait. Plate 42 is an inversion, the ass riding the man; at this stage it is only a pun, but later on it will be developed into a symbol of authority and hierarchy on the back of the common man. To round out the menagerie, a monkey plays to the ass and paints his portrait, the monkey

being a sardonic reference to the artist's own ugliness. There are two apes in the background of the early witches' sabbath (plate 46), and the central figure is a rat. The ubiquitous bird is a parrot by plate 53, although it is difficult to tell Goya's parrot from his owl. The goat first appears in plate 60. The dog appears very late (Disasters of War, plate 40), and the horse still later (plate 78). There is a wolf in plate 74. In one of the plates of the Proverbs there is an elephant. There are lion faces on a few men, but it is probable that these faces are only Goya's cats, as we shall see. Of this herd, the monkey, the parrot—which is still the owl—and the lone elephant are the literary inexperienced symbols. The wolf, too, is dragged in as an obvious symbol of a rapacious government. But Goya's significant and formidable animals, the cat, bat, rat, owl, goat, dog, horse, and ass are a barnyard and quite available assortment such as he might have known at a very young age. It should be noted that the bull, the Spanish symbol of masculinity and challenge par excellence, does not occur in the subjective drawings. Goya's bulls are all realistic: presumably he first saw them at an age when he consciously remembered. He was brought up in a village and then in a city, and doubtless he had no early experience of cattle. The artist's animals then are not exotic, and it is precisely because they were familiar from an early age that Goya is able to invest them with so much emotion.

When we liberate this cast on the stage we move from the contemporary surface toward the early, the obscure, and the profound. In such a progression it seems clearer to point out at once where we are going and to state the conclusion of the matter. We are exploring emotions which stem from two basic themes: the *fear of being eaten* and *sensations of flight*. Children are eaten by witches (Caprices, plates 44, 45, and 47), and by dogs (Disasters of War, plate 81, and see the woman being eaten in Proverbs, 10); and the cat has intentions on the bird. But the cat and bird warfare is human cannibalism, too, as we shall discover. Now ideas of cannibalism stem from the age of cannibalism when the infant feasts on its mother. And the infant Goya has been told to fear a very natural-seeming thing: that women-witches are ready to turn about and feast on him. Such is the threat that he must have heard; undoubtedly it was something heard rather than seen, since his affliction was deafness; and he is only able to explore the threat and make it visible after he is protected from hearing it again.

In the etchings it is the women who attack children, yet Goya drew a Chronos eating his children and painted it for his dining-room in his old age. Here Goya was doubtless more Chronos than child, for he had outlived eleven of his twelve children and subconsciously reabsorbed them. And the canvas has a precedent; there is in Madrid a canvas of Chronos eating his children which Rubens painted in his old age.

The notion of flight is equally early, going back to the time when the child is habitually carried; it is the women who take the child flying, and Goya visualizes them as witches, naked and undisguised, as he has heard them described. He insists that men fly too, but this is an emendation of his own, so he has to provide machinery. Men are disguised as birds or bats, and finally he rationalizes the fancy by equipping them with artificial bat wings.

For Goya the flight has an objective, which we must consider even though it takes us outside the field of the etchings. Among the miscellaneous plates there is an etching of a building on a rock, realistic enough, although the rock has a somewhat symbolic shape. It foreshadows that strange canvas in the Prado of two figures flying; they serve as a target for one of Goya's numerous firing squads, and there is a city on the rock as a haven in the rear. This was one of the 'dark' paintings which Goya did to decorate his own home. It is possible that this haven which can only be reached by a man in precarious flight is woman herself; possible also that it is her symbol, the second story of a house.

To turn back from these ultimates to the beginning. Plate 2, following the initial self-portrait, shows us a young woman wearing a mask as she is led to the altar, followed by two collaborative old harridans, and the title is 'They swear to be faithful yet marry the first man who proposes.' The same subject recurs in plate 14. Goya equates these brides with the worst of their kind, and he parades his mistrust of women through a number of plates. The frailty of women is facile satire, and Goya still suffers from the levity with which the Duchess of Alba encouraged and dismissed his love. We see women lead men to violence (plate 8); bring them to death (plate 10); and despoil the dead for a superstition (plate 12). But these women survive to take council with their disreputable duennas (plates 15, 17, 28, 31), and to scorn their mothers (plate 16). Goya indulges his spleen to the point where he takes pity on his victims: when they have fallen into the clutches of the Inquisition (plates 23, 24), and when they are thrown into prison (plates 32, 34).

But in truth men are no better (plate 5); they are brigands (plate 11), fools (plate 18), and fops (plates 29, 35). So far we are on the surface of eighteenth century society. But now consider a more sobering symbol. In plate 2 the bride wears a mask. So who is she? In 'Life is a masquerade' (plate 6) a masked man and woman grope toward each other. This questioning of identity cuts deeper than mere satire on marriages of convenience. The dandy eyes a woman through his monocle, and 'Not even so can he recognize her', Goya comments (plate 7). We are not then what we seem and reality is not on the surface. There is someone we do not recognize. In plate 3 two children cling to their mother in fear of the shrouded bogeyman, but she only peers at him with a puzzled, tender curiosity. That the woman accepts what the child cannot, appears to Goya the heart of the injustice.

Two etchings should now be considered together, as they point succinctly to the persistence of early emotion with which we are to deal. The hideous adult-child in leading strings (plate 4) is the subconscious picture; and by way of contrast we have the perfectly conscious and lucid memory of a washerwoman spanking a four year old who has broken a water jug (plate 25).

Now turn to three plates (19, 20, 21) which lead from social satire into the iconography of witchcraft. Here birds appear as symbols for the first time. The title, 'All will Fall', naturally enough suggests the snaring of birds and men: it is quite understandable that a symbol which will have profound significance makes such a plausible and easy entrance. Birds with men's heads hover about a harpy, more woman than bird, who perches on a dead branch. One of these

birds wears a cocked hat, sword, and sash; another is cowed; the one which hovers nearest has the head of Goya himself; and one fancies that the harpy is the Duchess of Alba. Below in the foreground three women (the first appearance of the three witches) have just plucked alive one of the man-headed birds; they hold it by the wings and are cheerfully removing the last feather from the tail.

It is much the same story in the next etching (plate 20). Here two young women seconded by their duennas are sweeping three plucked and naked bird-men out the door. Only two of the faces of these creatures show, and they seem to be both portraits of the same man as he is swept out in successive stages. We notice the resemblance to the profile of the bird-man being plucked in the preceding plate, and turn to the portrait that Goya painted of the Marques de Villafranca, the husband of the Duchess of Alba. If this is he, and the suave, obsequious middle-aged face with the high bridged nose suggests it, this is something less than kind. For as he is driven along, cautious, naked and abashed, two large birds are coupling in the shadow of the loft overhead.

We note here that the bird is established as a male symbol and that he is badly used, decoyed, plucked and beaten about by women. The women tend to keep their natural shape; even the harpy of plate 19 is less transformed. The bird then is a one-sided symbol or metaphor in the antagonism between men and women, and we rather expect some symbol with the same degree of disguise to play opposite it. And we find it in the next plate.

Here (plate 21) the battle and the sympathy go the other way. Just as we saw before, Goya is unwilling to let women have the final triumph or to preserve his bitterness toward them. The harpy is now the victim. She is in the clutches of three judges complete with robes, swords and wigs. The judges pluck her; they are busy ripping off her feathers with their teeth if not devouring her alive, for the most natural reason in the world—because they are cats. Having seen so much, we know that in Goya's child psyche the desire between men and women was equated with the desire of the cat for the bird: one simply wishes to eat the other. And here are the sexual implications now explicit enough in the cannibalistic relation between woman and child.

Having seen that the cat as well as the bird can be the male, pause for an instant at plate 24, the second representation of a woman about to be executed by the Inquisition. As she rides to her death two judges ride beside her and eye her; they are not quite cats, but their faces are recognizably close to the cat faces of the judges eating the harpy in plate 21. And now when we come again to Goya's dream (plate 43) we are better aware why it is that he is haunted by the cat, the bat and the owl. The owl is the creature whose face bears some resemblance to a man's but more to a cat's: the owl and the cat are, as it were, cannibalistic mates, and the bat is halfway between, with some of the characteristics of each. And Goya's bats have large cat ears.

We now turn past the dream plate and enter, once and for all, the world of witchcraft. 'They spin' (plate 44) shows us three fates who are really hideous old witches. A bunch of dead children hangs providentially from the ceiling—they will not starve. In the next etching (plate 45) another dreadful three have

a basket of dead children along side as they huddle attended by their bats and cheerfully take snuff together. And is there a relation between this feast of the witches and the three women who were plucking the decoyed bird-gallants of plate 19? If there were any doubt that the fear of cannibalism was the basis of the more superficial distrust of women, Goya himself at once clears this up in his comment. He gives this plate (45) the title, 'There is a lot to suck.' 'At eighty,' he comments, 'they suck little children dry; they who do not live more than eighteen suck big children. It looks as if a man is born into this world and lives just to have the marrow sucked out of him.' Here is the subconscious once more using a figure of speech to say just what it means.

Of the remaining plates of the *Caprices*, those which deal with witchcraft present much less difficulty once it is seen that they deal with subjects of interest to a child or display such images as would occur to a child. There is the homage to the infernal teacher—the rat (plate 46); homage to the chief witch when a child is being sacrificed (plate 47). Demons have the bad manners to spit at people (plate 48), or are gluttons (plate 49). They have their toenails cut (plate 51); witches must be gone before daylight (plate 71); they point at the stars, and they have an extra child or two and a bag to take with them. As mere goblins the demons help about the house at night (plates 78, 79, 80).

Once we have reached the subject of witchcraft, ideas of flight are never far off. Plates 60, 66, and 68 are given over to the subject of one witch teaching another to fly. In the latter two the neophyte witch is by contrast young. The bird, the bat, and the cat are about; in plate 60 the gigantic goat with forelegs vaguely human completes the family. Two witches are fighting and hurtling through space (plate 62), oblivious of the tiger sized cats, one in the sky, the other reaching for them as they fall. Since they fly they are birds and a likely prey for the cats.

In 'Vows' (plate 70) a witch takes an oath of allegiance to two evil powers which ride on the back of a baleful bird and hold an infernal scripture with the pincers of an inquisitor, and the bird and book suggest vaguely a demoniac lectern. The witch who is being initiated rides on the shoulders of another witch or demon. The whole fantasy has a remarkable evolution, which will lead us out of these lower regions.

The dark and obscure 'Bon voyage' (plate 64) presents another such assemblage on the back, this time, of a demon with wings. And Goya remarks, 'If it were day the whole crew would be brought down with guns', reminding us at once of the painting he was to do later of the two figures in flight within range of a firing squad with the city on the rock behind them.

Yet in the very next etching 'Where is Mama going?' (plate 65),¹ here is this fantasy in the light of common day. The persons that Goya believes deserve to be shot down prove to be two grown men and a heavy woman piled on the back of a wretched and staggering father of a family, and the ferocious family cat clings to a parasol and rides high overhead. All the members of the family are naked. The owl is here, and the father is astride of it so that it is a mask for

¹ See Fig. 1. (Photographs by The Cleveland Museum of Art.)



FIG. 1. WHERE IS MAMA GOING? (GOYA, *Caprices* 65)

or an equivalent to, the male genitals. This fancy has occurred before (plate 52), and in plate 48 the cat's head functions so for the flying female demon.

Now in this naked tribe, does Goya represent his own parents, himself and a brother, all stark as poverty on a hillside above a village? Before insisting upon it we must do a little more comparing. Turn to 'It is better to do nothing', (plate 73). Here we have three people, clearly a family. The aggressive young woman with her peering expression reminds us of the woman peering at the bogeyman and holding the frightened children (plate 3). She is younger and thinner if it be the same, and about the age of the woman in the following 'Don't cry, idiot' (plate 74). Now take a look at the woman of 'Will no one set us free?' (plate 75). Here certainly she is the same as the peering woman in the bogeyman (plate 3) and it is not hard to see her features on the fat older woman in 'Where is Mama going'.

As for the father who staggers under the load of his family, he has the same long nose crowding down over a scrubby line of mustache as the listless father of 'It is better to do nothing' (plate 73); and he could also be the husband in the mismated couple of plate 75, although here the face is very foreshortened. We will discover this face again. Meanwhile, to conclude with 'Where is Mama going', if we are dealing here with the Goya family, the two grown men who are incubi on their father's back must be Goya and his brother. Goya, then, would be the one on the left, with the grinning face and the square ended nose, the one, of course, who has the demon cat behind him.

We should expect to trace this face. It occurs in plate 56—a plate we are reserving. It is the child in 73 and the goblin in 74. In the former, the child gloats over the father who believes it is better to do nothing, and appears to hold him prisoner, for the father holds over his hands a skein of yarn which the child is busily balling up. The child is identical with the goblin of the next plate (74), where it now turns the tables on the mother and frightens *her*, a theme repeated in the Proverbs (plate 4) where the same dancing and straddling child (clicking castanets) has become a giant in order to terrify his parent. And the monkish garb of the demons and goblins is after all much what a child might wear, with a hood over his head. In 'It is better to do nothing', then, we are looking at a portrait of the unhappy Goya family as surely as we see these mismated parents tied together in plate 75.

But in plate 75 the man and wife are not merely tied together and straining to part. There is a huge bird that causes the blight, with its foot on the woman's head. We need not doubt that this bird is a member of the family, possibly a grandparent of Goya's and one of the old women who encourages loveless marriages. This creature wears spectacles. Are they just there because the owl is a spectacled bird, and are the wavy little lines just the indication of the barred feathers? It may be the other way around; perhaps the owl looks like the spectacled old woman, and the wavy lines may be lace around her head. I think it is Goya's grandmother who is the witch.

Now as we come closer to the family, turn to 'The betrothal' (plate 57). It is a scene of formal alliance with the bride's relatives all about. Goya comments, 'See them overcome the bridegroom by showing him who the parents, grandparents, great-grandparents, and great-great-grandparents of the young lady

were, but who is she? He will find this out later.' Well, the woman wears a dog's mask, not a compliment in any language. Here we have the uncertainty as to personality again, and here, since according to Goya dogs eat children, we have a touch of cannibalism. The husband is lulled to sleep, his huge head trustfully in the woman's lap, while her fingers soothe his forehead: and here surely is the same portrait as the father of 'It is better to do nothing' (plate 73) and 'Where is Mama going' (plate 65). It is quite likely that Mama is going nearer to the gallant in the cocked hat standing behind her. This gallant with his exaggerated hooked nose is of course the beaked bird again, wherefore he eyes balefully the pontificating figure of the judge beside him, for the judge, we remember (plates 21 and 24), is the cat. In this scene the war of cat and bird is carried on from the two sides of the family, and the mysterious spectacles mounted as a lorgnette, as was the fashion of the eighteenth century, are raised aloft behind, but no one looks through them, for everyone is deliberately blind. We may well conclude that Goya's distrust of women has an early beginning, and that his father fumbles into his own deception from the day of his marriage. It is likely that his mother's pedigree and his father's poverty were chronically contrasted, and Goya sympathizes with his father—poor fool. Yet Goya himself leaned on the worn claims to gentility of his mother's family, for he was born in the eighteenth century and had to survive in it.

Goya's inescapable *contempt for his parents* is therefore the driving force behind his resistance to all the false claims of authority; his defiance is ingrained, and all he can do is to give it a moral basis and outgrow what is merely personal and petty. This he will not utterly achieve until late in his life. But in the meantime he looks about him with his perennial high anger for particular targets. He sees women grovel before the cassock of a monk hung on a tree (plate 52) while old men listen to the pratings of a parrot (plate 53); a man on crutches abases himself before the 'Blockhead with the baton of a commander' (plate 76), although it is the commander's business to make men on crutches. In 'Now one, now another' (plate 77), an ancient and decrepit nobleman rides on the shoulders of his valet to play picador to the straw bull that another grovelling lackey plays against him, the lackey careful not to charge his master directly and offering him an easy mark. This may well be a jibe at a contemporary statesman; the old man is undoubtedly a particular portrait. Goya has another version of this fancy in a drawing and the features are unquestionably the same. This theme, Goya's contempt for the caballero who rides a man, we shall see repeated in the Proverbs in one of the greatest plates. And there is one more blast against authority which cannot be passed over. 'Look, are we not wonderful' (plate 63), and Goya comments, 'See two nice and respected witches out for a ride.' One figure has the ears and something of the features of an ass on his heavy face; the other is a hawk-man with talons on hands and feet; he has a beak, a heavy eyebrow, a low forehead and black hair. These riders are astride of two amorphous creatures with the heads of asses and coarse-haired bodies somewhat resembling bears. The riders, in conversation, might be pausing for a moment in a hunt; they might be military commanders of a war ago. A crowd in the background

keeps at a respectful distance. There is little difficulty in seeing the heavy faced rider with the ass's ears as Charles IV; the hawk is more of a problem. But, will the reader turn to Goya's portraits of Ferdinand VII, either 160 or 167 in Augustus Meyer's catalogue, and judge for himself? Here is a father and son who would strain anyone's capacity for reverence; but their mounts, the bears with the asses' heads, look idiotically content: they are the Spanish public.

This is the companion piece to the famous 'Hasten Death' (plate 55) where Queen Maria Luisa, in appalling caricature, tries on a bonnet in a mirror while her lovers stand dead on their feet with boredom.

But we must come back to the more deeply personal, and end the Caprices as we began them on the theme of Goya's distrust of women. 'You cannot escape' (plate 72), shows us a young woman in a petticoat enticing and pretending to flee from four lecherous male gallants that have bird and bat wings. Goya gives her the blame: 'No one escapes who wishes to be caught'. We are back with the 'All will Fall' theme (plate 19) of the snared birds and the harpy. But this woman is not the Duchess of Alba; we recognize her as that other woman of plates 73, 74, 75, and 3, the earliest and youngest version of the artist's mother. The airiest version, she is almost a woman in flight; almost a witch.

It has taken us most of our time to explore this image of the other woman. The Duchess is easily recognizable, on the other hand, and we have been saving the etchings which deal with her. We see her in flight on the backs of three old witches in 'Volaverunt' (plate 61) and Goya calls her fashion's fool in his comment. In this plate the Duchess has butterfly wings on her head and she spreads out her black mantilla to give herself the wings of a bat. Flying boldly across the zenith of society the Duchess is a companion piece to what we take to be the self-portrait in 'Ups and downs' (plate 56) which represents Goya at the peak of his career in Madrid, supported by a satyr who holds him up by the legs while Goya grins for joy, his hair on fire and fireworks in each hand. But the satyr has already lost his balance and two small figures such as Goya have already gone head over heels. 'Fortune', says Goya, 'is unkind to those that court her. Ambition she rewards with emptiness. Those who have risen she often punishes with downfall'.

We have identified the Duchess as the harpy of 'All will Fall', and 'How they pluck them' (plates 19 and 21); she is unmistakably the tantalizing woman of plate 9; the woman of plate 12 might well be she; and plates 5, 7, and 16 are a low-life caricature of her style. But there were at least two further plates which Goya had the compunction to suppress. The more important, 'The dream of lies and fickleness' (plate 81), was too explicit a summation of the artist's bitterness. In this etching the Duchess is double-faced with the butterfly wings in her hair. She lolls at full length, caressing the forehead of the wretched Goya with one pair of her lips. She gives him one of her arms and he clutches it. Her other hand reaches back to a sly, groveling finger-to-nose figure who might be a pimp taking money if she were a prostitute. The scene is a barren plain and in the distance there is a castle under a dark sky. So much for Goya's estimate of her aristocratic love. But this is not all the cast. Another two-faced woman, not

beautiful now and never as lovely as the Duchess, lies sprawled against her in the foreground. She too reaches back a self-compromising hand to the pimp. Still closer in the foreground, looking away from her, there is a mask with empty sockets, propped on two elbows, the forearms mere cloth bundles like the mask itself. It watches a snake about to devour a desperate toad. Well, the mask has a face that we now recognize by the long nose coming down to the upper lip: it is Goya's father. So prompted, we see too that the woman is Goya's mother, although this version is a lewd and haggard one; and the upper part of her body is back to, so that her breasts are denied.

The father is blind and does not suffer; Goya is deaf but he sees and suffers. The snake is the Duchess, or both women, and the toad is Goya's ugly self.

It is only now at the end that Goya brings together the two women who he feels have betrayed him, identifying them and yet making it clear that they were not the same; they were only alike. And here are Goya and the shadow of that shadowy man, his father, with the women who were better bred than themselves. This is on the scale of Dürer's *Melancholia*. An artist must have some disguise to himself when he is impelled to describe such things.

2. *The Disasters of War*

A weak father, an arrogant, dissatisfied mother, a distraught child: it is a formula to breed ferocity if the child is capable of it. There is a full measure of enjoyment of violence in the 'Disasters Of War'; Goya would not be a Spaniard if he were not on the side of the victor as well as the victim. In the end he emerges with a sense of dignity which is somehow never lacking in the Spaniard, and a sense of justice and pity and a complete exemption from conventional emotion, which is another matter. That Goya was not warped either by his early experience or by the experiences of war which he records is the measure of his moral stature, his genius, his vitality. He was able to embrace humanity as a whole and find parallels to his own bitterness in its fate, and to allocate his vast contempt where he felt it to be due. He emerged from the period of the Napoleonic invasions with an unlimited contempt for war, glory and the soldier. He sees the needless, the least justified, the extraneous violence, which gives away the show.

These scenes of violence, carnage, mutilation, drown out the subconscious; the primitive is now on the surface for all men to see. The very subject matter takes the place of the material for which we are in search; and it is only toward the end of the series that the subconscious reasserts itself. Two details or aspects, however, are of interest to us. Hanging, or death off the ground, is a guilty conclusion to the ideas of flight, and there is a great deal of such death in the series. And the men who execute and are shot tend to have infantile proportions; they have puppet bodies; their arms and legs are too short and they spread them in an un-adult fashion. To go outside the etchings, this is particularly noticeable in the famous painting of the 'Third of May'.

But, in the midst of the scenes of war, suddenly there is a cutback; we come to an etching which transfers us back to the regions with which we have grown

familiar. 'He exults in his penknife', is the curious and surely youthful title, and we see a figure in a struggle with a great dog and apparently cutting its throat. That this is a life and death struggle is obvious enough if we turn to plate 81 toward the end of the series and see the same great dog now still larger and feasting wholesale on human beings who appear to be children. These are the earliest ideas of kill or be killed, and when Goya equates them with war he is right enough.

Then again we are back on the grim surface. As in the Caprices, Goya is not content with his main theme, his condemnation of war, and he strikes out in every direction at targets of opportunity. We see what he thinks of the excessive worship of relics and the dead (plate 66), and the needless tenderness for images (plate 67). In 'What Folly', (plate 68) there is a man seated, straddled with his spoon in his hand and presumably a bowl in his lap. He wears the cowed garb of a monk, but is it not rather the cowed child with which we are familiar, now grown? The background is all dolls and masks and large, dim, forgotten figures busy with the masquerade of existence. All this is folly and sham. What matters is to have one's soup and sit by oneself and eat it down like a child. Living is reduced to such forthright terms. And in the next plate (69) Goya goes on to express his opinions of death. That, too, is nothing—'it speaks for itself'.

The next etching, 'They do not know the way', is much the 'blind leading the blind' theme, except that in this version the actors are not beggars. Here dim figures from the higher walks of life are bound together by a rope and weave circuitously down into a trench. In 'Contrary to the general interest', a recording devil of an inquisitor, doubtless a portrait, sits in a high place writing in the book of intolerance and listening to all ill winds with the ears which are the wings of a bat. A portrait, too, must be the man-faced vampire bat which sucks and devours the body of a dead man in 'The results' (plate 72). But now with the recurrence of the bat we are back again in early material, and the next etching, 'Cat's Pantomime' (plate 73), shows us an owl attacking a cat which sits on a kind of altar while a multitude assists and a priest bows down. Admitting that the worship of the cat is witchcraft, one has the immediate suspicion that this plate and the one before it are the same theme in two different guises. The bat devours the man, the bird attacks the cat; this is the primal conflict for Goya, the sexual, violent relationship between people in its simplest terms: one wishes to eat the other. And so the war throws him back into the trauma of the conflict of his parents; and when the cat and owl fight he is forced all the same to bow down and worship the violence (like the rest of mankind), for they *are* his parents.

In this world the wolf is the government (plate 74) and the parrot is the prelate in prayer (plate 75), to whom kings, asses, dogs, and two-faced men listen. The fantasy of the bird carries over into the next etching where the 'Carnivorous vulture' (plate 76) has no wings left. They are stripped and broken. He is all that is left of the Napoleonic Eagle and a man is driving him out with a pitchfork while the crowd behind goes about its business, not bothering to watch. The plucked bird fantasy which began as private bitterness is now on a political level.

The next plate (77) is a repetition and a development. We see the prelate again, now a man and archbishop, a bird of a different feather but still in flight as he balances on a tightrope over the heads of an admiring crowd. 'Will no one cut the rope?' is the title, and the rope is already knotted several times. The prelate with his arms out somewhat resembles the Napoleonic eagle, but he is in less desperate case; he also recalls the pose of the Duchess of Alba in flight. One fancies that this is almost deliberate, it is so obvious. True believer that he was, Goya must have considered that it was the clergy that repulsed his love for the church; only this position would save him from blasphemy. This distinction is made clear in one of those amazing cutbacks to the subconscious which is the subject of the next etching, 'He defends himself well' (plate 78).

What we see is a white horse attacked by a pack of dogs and holding them off, biting one, kicking out with both hind feet. In his arraignment of the church, just as in his attack on women, Goya feels that he has gone too far and his sympathy swings the other way. The white horse balancing on two legs is surely the archbishop balanced on one, and the pack of dogs is the mob trying to bring him down. But this white symbol is not exactly the prelate; on the contrary, as Goya distinguishes it, the symbol is the true church, for in the very next plate (79) the white symbol has become a woman, the Truth, now killed by the pack who are once more human and mostly prelates and clerics. They bury her while a bishop officiates. The pack has conquered. But—'Will she rise again?' Goya asks (plate 80). In a baroque, confused drawing the light bursts from the prone figure of Truth while the clerics, gentlemen, and at least one cat stand about her and look on.

Goya has been struggling toward an image of woman on which he can rely: the personified truth. But there is still something in him which will have its say and the last three plates of the series are a strange conclusion enough. 'Horrible Monster' (plate 81) is the dog feasting on humanity. There is no escape from this trauma; it is too close to life. But in the very next plate (82) 'This is the truth', Goya announces. It is a drawing of a bearded husbandman with his mattock, standing beside a woman from whom the light radiates. There is a basket beside them presumably containing a child, and by the basket stands the now faithful dog. There is garnered wheat and a bough heavy with fruit. This would be a sentimental conclusion indeed to so much horror and violence. But no sooner does Goya accept with a whole heart the adult relationship between men and women than this emotion displays and dramatizes itself. The last plate (83) called, curiously, 'Infamous profit', is one of the drawings of soldiers ravishing women beneath an arch. Even when it is understood, desire for Goya is a thing of dread.

3. *The Proverbs*

The Proverbs, or as Goya preferred to call them, the Disparates or Follies, are the last and most personal of the etchings. On the surface they are a sardonic comment on the mad behavior of mankind; but these are generalizations charged with an emotion as early as it is persistent. The plague spots of society are the

never healed wounds of the artist. The moral indignation is the ennobling of what was once a private sense of wrong.

We must not expect new themes. What we will find are new guises and new conclusions. We find private forgiveness and a shifting of blame.

Again Goya returns to the main theme of the *Caprices*, the frailty of women. But now he blames the blindness and stubbornness of human behavior. Individuals are now merely victims in Goya's eyes, and there is no single villain any more. The *Proverbs* are therefore less bitter and more pessimistic; there is less of violence and more of mood, of summation, of conclusive statement.

Of the twenty-two plates, seven (1, 5, 7, 11, 16, 20) deal with the lot of women. Goya is more concerned with their plight than with their behavior, and his sympathy is on their side.

Plates 1, 7, and 16 attack the rigidity of marriage. In the first, 'Feminine foolishness'—nothing could be more cautiously obscure than the titles—six women toss or carry several figures in a blanket. Two puppets go soaring aloft and a naked figure of a boy or man lies huddled in the blanket along with an ass which, if it is not dead, is certainly unresponsive and complacent. The six women are to be seen as one and the same: we have here six stages of marriage. The woman on the left is young and guileless; the next—moving clockwise round the ring—is disillusioned; the third is weary and bitter. The fourth's face is not seen; the fifth is haggard and savage and bending under the load. The sixth, with her back to us, is about to put down the blanket; she has had enough. And the husband has been the ass all along. So much for the folly of mismatched domesticity.

Here, as in all the *Proverbs*, there is a thin glaze of satire over something unbearable underneath. But we are now prepared to understand this murky depth of emotion, since we know that it is the artist's parents who are the mismatched couple, and the unbearable life is his mother's. But pity is a transferred emotion; the drive stems from the sense of loss to the person immediately concerned. The center of anguish, in this etching, is the naked cowering boy in the blanket.

If this boy is Goya, what about the two puppets? Who are they? For immediately we recall the family piled together in 'Where is Mama going' (*Caprices* 67) where there are two grown sons. Well, when you are tossed in a blanket, says Goya, you are alive and cowering, and when it is someone else, it is only a puppet that goes flying into the air—there are two ways of looking at it. Goya has handled this theme before when he painted women tossing a puppet in a blanket for the tapestry cartoons. It was a gay scene then, but it is not so gay and nearer the truth when it looms to the surface again half a century later. Goya, may we hazard, has been tossed in a blanket himself. If he had only seen this happen to someone else the sympathy would hardly exist, and it would not be so persistent an impression of something disagreeable.

Here then is an early experience of flight, and a painful one. But there is something more here. When he is being tossed, those who toss him, in every direction, are his mother. What is happening then? There is something earlier behind this tossing in a blanket. He is being evicted playfully or forcefully

from his mother's bed. For there is something odd in the etching which needs explaining; it is the puppets who go flying out—while one more child clings and cowers—but the ass of course has never been thrown out and never will be. It is his bed and he is at ease. And so the tragedy of marriage is the tragedy of a particular marriage of which Goya is the victim. He wishes that the ass—this incongruous beast—were thrown out, but it does not happen that way.

Observe how the imagery is that of a child. Children are puppets. The women romp. They have the straddling childish posture that we now associate with the child goblins. The action is a game or a prank. And the man you don't like is an ass.

'Matrimonial Extravagance' (plate 7)² shows us two incredible beings, male and female, grown together back to back like Siamese twins. Their feet are double-ended and ten-toed. Though these creatures are hopelessly grown fast to each other, it is in such a way or posture that they cannot mate; they merely impede each other and face two ways. Their faces are a subconscious vision of the primeval, not to be seen again until we reach Picasso. The male, the less primitive of the two, points a finger, half pleading, certainly accusing, at a nightmare figure of a prelate in a ghoulish throng. For there is an audience. The strange creatures that look on are still appalled by the distress of this wedded monster. But they have no intention of doing anything about it. The ghastly prelate is denying the appeal at the same time that he exonerates himself. He has nothing to offer.

Here is a physical figure of speech to describe the mismated, the second one that Goya offers us. Let us turn back to the earlier one. 'Will no one set us free?' (Caprices, plate 75). In that etching Goya's parents were only tied together, and we speculated whether the owl which has a foot on the woman's head might not be the grandmother, one of the old women who manage such marriages, and whether the wavy lines of the barred feathers were not her mantilla. In this second version of the theme, next to the priest who yawns his innocence, is an old woman with a black shawl over her head and she displays the unmistakable beak nose of Goya's owl. She is the unrelenting villain. You have only to look at her eye fixed on this married monstrosity. When we said that there were no villains in the Proverbs we were too sweeping.

In the distant group to the right behind the female side of the monster there is a head which we suspect to be Goya's, if for no other reason than that his cat's head, large as his own, hangs over his shoulder and glares, we may be sure, at the aged bird-woman across the way.

Then if this is marriage, what is the remedy? Goya says his say on divorce in the 'Exhortation' (plate 16). Here are six people in a loose chain, and what appears to be Goya's bird in the background, sitting on horseback. The dominant figure of the group is a terrified woman. She clings to the hand of her husband who is at arm's length from her in the foreground listening to an advocate with shyster written all over him like the advocates of Daumier. On the other side of the distracted woman a priest holds her other hand and whispers

² Fig. 2.



FIG. 2. MATRIMONIAL EXTRAVAGANZA (GOYA, *Proverbs 7*)

privately to her car. Finally there are two gabby figures behind the priest. The nearer one has two faces, the one toward the woman harrowed with sympathy, the other split ear to ear with a foul glee. The further figure has quite simply three faces, two looking each way and the third straight up from the top of the scalp, and all three of them gloat.

There are other expressive complexities. The priest who whispers to the woman and holds her hand has another backward looking face on his elbow, which wears a jovial, lewd leer. The husband's arm to which the woman still holds has another hand and forearm which comes forward as he brings this hand to his head in shambling indecision, as though he were holding a hat in place in windy weather. And the husband's other arm on the side of the advocate both reaches forward in groping protest and reaches with a second hand into his pocket.

This scene is still the tragedy of the woman, the disgrace before the world. If this is the remedy, Goya says, it is no better than the disease. He has lived through this too.

Having admitted woman's plight—for the Spanish woman lived in quite oriental bondage—Goya considers her sensual reward, and he reconsiders what liberties she may allow herself. And this time there is no condemnation. Three etchings (plates 5, 10, and 11) all introduce the symbol of the horse and bring us back to ideas of flight. In 'Folly on the Wing' (plate 5) a hippogriff gallops away into a black sky with a woman and man astride him. The man rides behind her with his arms around her embracing her, and her hands are in the air and her hair flies back over his shoulder. We are back in Goya's days of gallantry. Here is the infatuated man flying too high in the world.

But there is more here than recollection of adventures for which the Duchess of Alba was once the symbol. The hippogriff is more bird than horse, with a beaked head with a horse's teeth, a bird's neck as well as wings, a feathered tail and taloned feet. The woman's fingers appear too sharp; there is something sinister about her coarse manelike hair. It is she who is in the saddle if there be one; horse and rider are a pair. Here is the bird and something of the cat but they seem to join together and become one body in a different manner than by eating each other. The subconscious is nearer to admitting their real employment.

The mere man, the intruder, is in an awkward situation. In 'Feminine foolishness' (plate 1) Goya was in the blanket with no more than an old half-dead ass of a male parent. Still this ass was in a kind of sensual flight, off the ground, supported by its mate. From half-dead ass to wild horse in flight with the woman astride, the symbol is not so different, but the male symbol is now much more formidable. Turn back to 'Bon voyage' and 'Where is Mama going?' (Caprices, 64 and 65) and we see the effective demon turn downtrodden husband and father by daylight. The fact is that however the child may mock the old man in the daylight, he has a deadly rival to compete with in the field of desire in the dead of night. So it is here; the ass is now a horse of another color, and Goya, hanging on to its mate, is in for a dangerous ride.

Needless to say, horseback riding is an activity highly charged with sensual

symbolism and harks back to the child being carried by the parent. In the dramatic ride which Goya imagines, the man child conceives himself astride of a soaring white creature much larger than himself, in the night, with a woman in his arms, the upper half of a woman, the only part that he yet knows. This is a guilty and forbidden activity, and it might perhaps lead to that other kind of flight of the 'Disasters of War', a man swinging from a rope.

Now turn to the 'Young woman on a bucking horse' (plate 10),³ one of the most famous and effective of Goya's etchings. The woman is not yet mounted; the horse holds her clothes in his teeth and is in the act of swinging her onto his back. Her arms are in the air; her expression is one of abandonment and delight.

There is more taking place in this etching than the sensuous abandonment of the woman to the stallion. In the background are two vast, appalling animals couchant. One of them eats a woman down while the other watches with a lamplike eye. This is the alternative for a woman, to be watched eternally and gradually consumed, or to be swept madly away. The background is domestic life, another version of 'Feminine folly' (plate 1).

Several things should now be noted. The woman who is being carried away has the same face, with its completely shadowed eyesockets, as the woman in the third stage of marriage in 'Feminine folly', whose face is already tragic, whose patience is exhausted, who is an easy victim. It is then Goya's mother. But the horse is not a part of the domestic scene which takes place in the background. He is the alternative to it. He is black, and the hippogriff was white. There is no place for any image of Goya here since we are outside the family.

Note too that Goya is not content with his shift in symbols. If you look closely at the muzzle of the horse you see that its nostrils are also eyesockets, and there are lines running up the horse's nose which form the laid back ears of a cat. Since it is Goya's cat, he seems to intrude his symbol here, in contact with the woman after all.

The beasts in the background are of course simply the family dog who is there to gnaw you down or watch you forever. We have seen him at the former occupation in plate 81 of the 'Disasters of War'. But who is it that eats the woman, as the cat eats the bird, if not her mate? The dog who consumes the woman is as much the husband as the horse who carries her off is her lover.

We have then almost all of the material of the Caprices here in subtle recapitulation. Woman and husband and lover; sensuous and guilty flight; but if the woman is in flight she is a bird, and that is why she is held by the teeth of the cat whose head is the horse's muzzle. In the background the woman is slowly being eaten by a mate, and here is the fear of cannibalism. And since the woman is being taught to fly and accepting the lesson, she is taking the skyroad to witchcraft. All the trauma are at work.

'Foolish precision' (plate 20) is another version of the woman on the horse theme. We see a female circus rider standing on the back of a white horse which balances on a slack rope. There is a dim, admiring audience for a background. Here is an extraordinary feat of entertainment. Horse and rider have

³ Fig. 3.



FIG. 3. YOUNG WOMAN ON A BUCKING HORSE (GOYA, *Proverbs* 10)

worked out a spectacular and harmonious relationship and reap the rewards of exhibitionism for their act. The woman's face is that of the woman in the first happy stage of marriage in 'Feminine Folly' (plate 1). It is a female triumph. The white horse—the husband—is well trained and in hand. For good measure Goya throws in a little castration: the horse's tail is docked.

Here is the successful emancipation of women. Such an outcome is conceivable, says Goya, but it is too difficult to be believed. Such balance and cooperation would be a wonder to see. Things simply do not work out this way. The touching thing is that Goya imagines impossible circumstances in which the world would have admired his family instead of treating them as they were treated in the 'Exhortation' (plate 16).

He has one more might-have-been comment upon his mother in the 'Folly of poverty' (plate 11). The central figure here is a two-headed woman. Her arms are raised in an anxious helpless gesture. One head bows down to a collection of benighted persons, four women and a remnant of a man who lurk in the dark entry of a building that might be a convent or a church. The woman's other head looks back unhappily over her shoulder at two faint figures in the light behind her. We see what appears to be a beautiful young girl with her hand out in an appeal, not to be helped, but to stay the two-headed woman. The remaining figure, such of him as we see, is a wild and mad oldish man who is evidently led by the girl.

We know who the two-headed woman is by now and we see that there is a conflict. The woman is painfully, regretfully leaving the madman to the care of the daughter and is making obeisance to these four women and one man who lurk in the entrance. Of these four women we do not see the face of the first; the second is middle aged; the third is a crone; and the fourth rises up from the very depth of the tomb. The man is so old that he is bent double and goes on crutches. These are the ancestors. The four women take us back to the 'Betrothal' (Caprices, plate 57) on which Goya comments: 'They are showing him who the parents, grandparents, great-grandparents, and great-great-grandparents of the young lady were', and these are the four past generations on the maternal side which Goya is now showing us.

This etching follows immediately after the etching of the woman carried away by the stallion. We saw no resentment nor condemnation there; and it is interesting that in his old age Goya is condoning the lover and goes on in the following etching to show that he considers the real betrayal, the abandonment of the unkempt wretch in favor of these ancestral mummies. For Goya this is the real poverty and not the almost mendicant wandering of the father and daughter.

Goya deals once more with this theme of the repudiation of the dead past. The dead branch etching, 'Strange folly' (plate 3), parades a family group sitting idly, hands hidden in lap, while they listen smugly to a tale that is told by a hooded, gesticulating interlocutor. The speaker is a woman and we may be sure that she is old: she holds the family spellbound and is certainly telling them about themselves. The mantle that covers her has a bold barred pattern and the blanket on the knees of the old man opposite her is shaded to continue this barred effect. It reminds us at once of the barred feathers of the owl; but of course

the whole family is a bird brood now, huddled in false safety on the rotten branch so the cat will not get them. This is the ancestral nest.

Goya has now had his last say on his original theme, the frailty of women. His resentment has now gone over into a universal judgment: he condemns the institution of marriage as he knew it. This leads him to condemn the paralyzing worship of the family. Having repudiated so much, he now strikes out once more in all directions at the customs of mankind. Soldiers are again pilloried in the 'Folly of fear' (plate 2). They who disclaim fear are frightened by a bogeyman. In the foreground a vast, shrouded apparition stands over a squad of soldiers who are either lying asleep in the field at night or are knocked down by their fear. The latter is more probable since there is a company in the background serving a cannon. One soldier with his sword raised runs away, and one with something of Goya's features props himself in an easy position and grins at the apparition—he has seen the life-sized head of a man peaking out of the sleeve that serves it for a cowl. The apparition is a fraud and he knows it. In the priest frightening the soldier we have something of the church bullying the state.

But this cassocked apparition we have seen before. It is the 'Bogeyman' (Caprices, plate 2); only now it is blown up until grown men are the size of children compared to it, and so the child frightens his elders turn about. This revenge motivates the 'Big booby' (plate 4). The booby is simply a very large child dancing, a child big enough to reverse the proportions between himself and his father. Now it is the father who hides behind the skirt of a woman. But this female figure is suspiciously like a church image that the man interposes. One suspects another jibe at the church; and perhaps Goya resents the inability of his faith to stand between himself and his childhood trauma, and protect him.

This child who is frightening the man is the same who frightens the woman in 'Don't cry, idiot' (Caprices, 74); the same as the child with the broad smiling mouth in 'It is better to do nothing' (Caprices, plate 73), which we know for Goya himself. Under each arm is a hideous ghost head; something of Goya's father is in the head on the left, something of the disclaiming priest of 'Matrimonial extravagance' (Caprices, plate 7) in the other.

The parallelism between the opening of the Proverbs and the Caprices is now worth noting. 'Feminine foolishness' (plate 1) is the working out of just such a marriage as we solemnized in 'They swear to be faithful' (Caprices, plate 2). 'The folly of fear' is the inversion of the 'Bogeyman' (Caprices, plate 3). And the child of gigantic proportions, the 'Big booby' (plate 4) is the counterpart of the child-adult (Caprices, plate 4). Eventually, of course, there is a divergence, but there is significance in the persistence of the opening motifs.

'Universal Folly' (plate 9) is another attack on hierarchy, or on the family expanded into a symbol of hierarchy. In this obscure etching the family is piled into a pyramid much as we saw it in 'Where is Mama going?' (Caprices, plate 65). Down below an old man studies a book. Near the top an infant in a woman's hands gives the impression, and doubtless has the impression, that it is in flight. Two actions take place in this scene. A catlike old nurse enters from the right holding in her arms a litter of kittens. They are on a lace covered cushion and the nurse is elaborately dressed. Before her in the midst of the scene

two elderly figures, male and female, kneel ceremoniously to receive the kittens, as though they were princes of the blood. We are not surprised that this elaborately dressed pair on their knees is more cat than human. By contrast to this important event an infant figure on the left is struggling to climb a last step up to the level of the family. He seems to be observed by one adult who points to the darkness whence he came, perhaps calls attention to him and perhaps warns him off. This heavy child has heavy adult features and is somehow already a man. He comes into the crowded family which will not recognize him for what he is, while the reverence is for the royal kittens. And so Goya enters history.

The gap between this conscious allegory and its substratum may not be very great. The basic imagery may be founded on nothing more obscure than the child's natural jealousy that the kittens were made much of and petted in his stead.

'The people in sacks' (plate 8) is a satire on society, costumes and manners. These are the helpless people, the deliberately helpless. They cannot work; they refuse to use their hands, they cannot reach each other. What they can do is pay court to the tallest and haughtiest of their number, bowing, bending, facing his way, even bowled over by one look from him. They can also divide in cliques: a second group has turned its back.

Is not this again the child turning the tables? These people are swaddled like the infants of Mediterranean lands. Helpless, sexless, unformed; except for their heads they are not yet born.

Undoubtedly the behavior of society is shockingly infantile. In 'Three gentlemen and three ladies dancing' (plate 12) these people act like children although some of them are far from young. Here again is the straddling posture of infancy as they all jog around alone with their arms in the air balancing them. Goya has pointed out the age of the emotion and the result is a hideous farce.

This childhood vision of a dancing world goes on in the 'Carnival' (plate 14). Two clowns with something of the old soldier about them wrangle and dispute and hop while a dandy of uncertain sex and no clear personality swaggers alone, and a protesting cleric is shoved forward. In the background is a monk on stilts. Here too is the anonymous audience. We make out a fat man lying down and a judge attentive to a young woman. These last two we have seen before in 'How they pluck them' (Caprices, plate 21). The monk on stilts is close to the scarecrow priest of 'Fine feathers make fine birds' (Caprices, plate 52).

These characters all appear to be the stock in trade of the eighteenth century theatre. Goya is not satirizing real life, but the travesty of it. He is satirizing experience for which there is no counterpart in his early days; or at any rate the artist feels none. We are therefore puzzled by the lack of content until we realize that there is nothing underneath simply because this is the stage, and this is a late experience. This etching is thus a somewhat literary piece and has much of the hollowness which it satirizes.

'Familiar folly' (plate 19) is the attack on the soldier once more. The soldier apparently commands and then attacks a scarecrow while a vaguely derisive audience looks on. But the soldier is himself a scarecrow. Nothing can be

seen of him but his outline; nothing can be said of him since he has no personality. This is pure Cervantes. And again this is literary drama, on the surface. The very absence of obscurity or anything that confuses the issue suggests that here too there is nothing hid. Emotionally this plate belongs with the more objective etchings in the "Disasters of War".

Along with these last two etchings we should consider another which has something of the same hollow and theatrical quality. 'Animal foolishness' (plate 21) shows us an elephant standing on the edge of an arena which may or may not be a ruined Roman Amphitheatre; at any rate it is a ring where he is expected to perform. Four wise men of the east in robes and turbans, vaguely oriental attire, attempt to cajole the behemoth. One shows it a book in which we can see ten separate stripes of printing: these are the commandments. Another jingles bells at it. A third man preaches at it. The fourth is considering a dignified departure. The elephant, tuskless and of a swollen emasculated shape, is puzzled, peaceful for the moment and distinctly unimpressed. The great beast is the still unsovereign people of Spain.

Tuskless or not, the elephant is a symbol of power and of threat. We feel the uncertainty as to whether he is angry and the absence of help if he were. The wall is too broken to restrain him, though high enough to imprison a man. The elephant has a naked muscular aspect; the surface of its shoulders and loins suggests a man as much as a beast; its trunk is partially swollen. But the elephant as a symbol of power is drawn from literary experience and Goya has no impulse to confront it with one of his images that are really expressive of fright. The old men in the pit have nothing of the victim about them in their shape or nature. We simply know intellectually that they are ill-advised to linger where they are.

We come now to one of the greatest etchings Goya ever graved, the 'Foolish fury' (plate 6)⁴ sometimes called the 'Mad picador'. A man with a picador's lance is astride of a hideous deformed human being who turns up a snarling face as the lance rests on his neck. The rider has a mad eye, a haggard air, and clothes that hang on his frame. He moves to attack a younger figure who stands with his back toward us, his feet wide and firmly planted, his head down, in the defensive attitude of a man who knows how to defend himself with a knife. To the right foreground is an enigmatic figure of a woman who is turned away faceless, hunched and waiting. These men are fighting for her, the basic object of their desire.

In the immediate background stand two figures close together, a grubby priest and a woman, who await the outcome with no great concern. Still further back a powerful woman and two listless men appear between us and a great broken wall of masonry that closes the scene. Above the wall the sky is dark as night.

We have usually dealt first with the surface satire, but in this etching the subconscious material invites us at once, it is so simple and available. The long nosed haggard old man is the artist's father. He rides down the figure still subject to him, between his legs, and attacks the young man grown old enough to

⁴ Fig. 4.



FIG. 4. FOOLISH FURY (GOYA, *Proverbs* 6)

resist. The mother is on the side of the son, if for no other reason that that he etched the plate, but they stand with their backs toward each other. No one else is concerned in this quarrel. Here is a triangular plot cast with adult human beings: there is a minimum of disguise.

So much for the great theme, the basis of all violence. On the conscious surface we are not surprised to find that it is transposed into an attack on hierarchy and the nobility; on those who demand a filial reverence. For Goya this is the war between the man who stands and can fight on his feet and the man on horseback, the caballero. If this is not clear we have only to turn back to an earlier treatment of the same theme, 'Now one, now another' (Caprices, plate 77) where we see the aging nobleman playing picador with a manservant for a mount. The man on horseback quite literally is a man who has men under him, and that was the right way to draw him. And the younger man has enough of hierarchy beaten into him still to regard the noble as a father and to be restrained by all that the relationship implies. He might win easily but he can only defend himself against madness and injustice. The fight takes place in the presence of—and for—those who do nothing, listless under the wall of feudalism, although they are all grouped on the young man's side.

There is an intolerable mad ecstasy in the caballero as he attacks the one uncowed figure in his world. But for all that he is sinister he is not contemptible, since he is mad. He is Don Quixote two centuries later, and I think that Goya had the Don in mind. If this is humor it is a humor like Swift's, so fierce that no one can share it with the author.

With this great plate even the theme of justice in human behavior draws to a close. Goya has not worn it out, but he himself is worn down, and the statement again grows more personal, the feeling more valedictory. 'Pure folly' (plate 15) follows directly upon the 'Carnival', and we have still the same feeling of characters on the stage. But this is not a drama to be mocked. It is a struggle to rationalize ideas of death.

The plate has two quite distinct stages. In the earlier one there are subterranean fires flashing up from the left hand corner, and the characters on the platform in the center look down, and one central figure points down with one hand and upward in the opposite direction with the other. A large curtain swags across the scene overhead, and to the right dim figures stand on the shoulders of other men, reaching up, struggling with the curtain, attempting to raise it higher or get it in hand. And behind the fires of hell there is a broken bridge.

In the final version the bridge and the fires have vanished; instead a soldier falls headlong into an abyss and an ecclesiastic rides forward on muleback led by a subservient monk. Otherwise the plates are the same. To the right kneel two figures, the nearer in a gentleman's coat with an empty sleeve. A stick or crutch obtrudes from the sleeve to support the weight.

It is significant that Goya begins the plate with a representation of hellfire which he later decides to blot out, simply appeasing the gulf by throwing in the soldier and leading the priest politely that way. The infernal light dies out and what takes its place is the intellectual light of day as the curtain is run up. And by this clearer light we see that the kneeling noblemen are merely theatre

props; or if they are alive they are merely propped in the attitudes of faith. But this is a transition scene. The curtain is not yet raised and the stage hands are having all kinds of difficulty with it. It is a moment when the audience is not expected to be looking or it will see too much.

These men on other men's shoulders, are they not then in flight, preoccupied with the regions overhead, this city on the rock, this upper region, or second story which Goya always wished to explore? Goya has been able to banish hell. But the interest in the upper region persists, although the curtain is never quite raised, and the mystery is to remain one always.

'Loyalty' (plate 17) presents an ailing and frightened old man with an enormous bald and swollen head sitting with clasped hands surrounded by as disquieting a throng of Job's comforters as one could wish to see. A priest, a man intent on administering a clyster, and five quacks and mountebanks approach him with the most unbounded enthusiasm of suggestion. In the background a man on horseback sits soberly waiting: there is a journey to be made. Only the sick man's dog presses close to him. The invalid is in deadly fear. His face is swollen until his whole head is in infantile proportion to his body. This plate follows immediately on 'Exhortation' which was an attack on the legal profession on the surface. It is natural that Goya should follow it by an attack on the medical profession, surely an equally easy mark at that date. Goya despises the pretensions of medical or spiritual assistance because he is sure that an old man dies like a sick child mocked by those who feign to comfort him. And in the meantime a figure on horseback waits: there is a sort of flight ahead.

'An old man wandering among phantoms' (plate 18), such is the title, but it is really the ghost of an old man risen from his body. It is a dreadfully frightened old man and the phantoms are numerous enough. The most important has the face of an old woman. She is a harpy with a bird's body and wings, and she greets Goya with what may be pity in a harsh nature. Surely the face is yearning and intent. Goya points a finger her way but he looks in another direction as he drifts upward from his corpse. A birdfaced man swoops toward him. Still further to the left a heavy old man seems to be at the height of a hop, or else floating in space. The bat and the owl are here too, and unrecognizable faces populate the dark. The fear of what goes on in the dark is ingrained in Goya. It is the strongest thing he knows. Why should he expect it to be different if he is himself after death?

This is the denial of 'Pure folly' (plate 15); of death being 'Nothing—it speaks for itself' (Disasters of War, plate 69) and such brave rationalizations. Like Hamlet, Goya expects to sleep, perchance to dream, and he dreads the never solved activities of night.

The two remaining plates have some obscure connection. 'The Birdmen' (plate 13) is a rationalization, an inventive toying with the artist's lifelong ideas of flight. Men soar with mechanical bat wings; there is a sense of quest, of lonely exploration in a dark sky. These men have the air of last survivors. The muscular flyer with the stoical unhappy face Goya means for himself. There is no expectation that he will reach any goal. The wings are batlike, but we see that they are barred too, like the wings of the owl, and like the mantle

of the woman who harangues the family on the dead branch. It is possible that a woman wearing such a striped mantle carried Goya some seventy years before the etching was made.

Yet in this etching he is still active, still searching and soaring. He does not allow many other competitors at this altitude with himself.

There are five flyers. In the last etching, 'Foolish extravagance' (plate 22), there are five bulls cavorting. Here is a final libidinous assertion, that Goya himself says is beside the point. It is the vital superfluous extravagance of nature. A bull turns a somersault. There is no sense in this. It is not human; but it is as human as all the people he has drawn cavorting together. Life is animal spirits. Nothing else stands out against the dark.

MUSIC AND MACHINES

CHARLES W. HUGHES

It might appear that the musician need have little interest in machines, unless we regard all musical instruments as mechanisms for producing tones. The machine, however, cannot be ignored. From very early times to the present the musician has been influenced by mechanical contrivances and has written music which reveals his attitude towards them.

On Assyrian and Egyptian bas-reliefs we may see long lines of toiling serfs dragging huge monolithic statues by means of ropes. Man was able to compel human units to work together to attain a desired result long before he was able to devise machines which were capable of producing comparable effects. Thus the earliest machines were organized groups of human beings. These human machines were regulated and their efforts coordinated by shouts and cries, by a rhythm marked by the clapping hands of the overseer, the measured and laborious tread of the workers, and, no doubt, by their monotonous chants. It was organized work in groups which led to the work-song: the sailor's chanty, the cotton chopping song of Southern field-workers, the boat song. Experiments in modern factories have trained operatives to make routine movements timed to coincide with musical rhythms. This, in a sense, is an attempted revival of the ancient practice of working to music.

Throughout the Middle Ages and the Renaissance there was a slow but persistent development of water and wind power, of saw and grist mills. Very gradually the machine replaced the laborer. Work-music survived where gang labor persisted. It died when mechanical contrivances finally replaced the human machine. The chanty vanished before the steam-winch. The gangs of field laborers diminished or disappeared before the tractor and the cultivator. Boats were urged forward by a rotating propellor rather than by men straining at their oars.

During this long period the musician evolved an expressive language. His

thoughts gained a certain independence of words. Instrumental music assumed greater importance. One of the earliest instrumental compositions which suggests the movement of a machine is "Di molen van pariiis" ("The Mills of Paris"). In a sonnet by Simone di Golino Prudenzianni (which was transcribed after 1429) this piece is said to have been performed on the positive, a type of small chamber organ. The great leaps in the left hand part evidently depict the reluctant turning of the mill-wheel.¹

The aesthetic problem involved in the imitation of the machine by an artist had, however, been considered much earlier. In an interesting passage in the *Republic* Plato treats imitative art with severity, and in particular the performances of a poet who "will attempt to represent the roll of thunder, the noise of wind and hail or the creaking of wheels, and pulleys . . ."²

Not all early machines performed such practical tasks as grinding grain, sawing wood, or killing one's enemies. Many devices were elaborate toys which were intended only to be amusing. Isaac de Caus devotes many pages of his "New and rare inventions of water-works"³ to mechanical birds which whistle and move their heads rather than to devices which perform useful work. This fairy-land of mechanics was shared by early musicians. After all, they were court servants eager to divert their patrons, not peasants watching their yellow grain turn to flour. An atmosphere of elegant diversion is reflected in the charming "Les Petits Moulins à Vent" by François Couperin. The rapid and repetitious figuration was intended to suggest the revolving sails of the mills. In "Les Cyclopes" by Rameau, the percussive note-repetitions picture vividly the rhythmic hammering of these mythical blacksmiths.

Surely the best known of all the compositions presumably descriptive of the rhythms of the smithy is Handel's "Harmonious Blacksmith". One may admit that the frank and straightforward character of the air is not ill-suited to the title. It was not, however, until Handel had been dead for over half a century that an edition of this work appeared with the title which has clung to it ever since.⁴ The story that Handel sought shelter from a shower at the home of the parish clerk and blacksmith of Whitehall, William Powell, who sang as he worked at the anvil, is of even later date.⁵

Certain works of a more recent date still reflect the fairy-tale atmosphere of elaborate and complicated toys. The golden cockerel which warned old King Dodon of invasion in Rimsky-Korsakoff's opera of the same name is a familiar example. Less familiar is the mechanical nightingale in "Le Rossignol," Stravinsky's fairy-tale opera.

¹ This composition has been recorded by Joseph Bonnet as Victor 18413-A. The version published by Bonnet in "An Anthology of Early French Organ Music," New York, 1942, page 3 varies greatly from a transcription published in Arnold Schering, *Studien zur Musikgeschichte der Frührenaissance*, Leipzig, 1914, page 66.

² Plato, *Republic*, Book III, Jowett translation.

³ The English translation of this work appeared in London in 1701. The French edition, which appeared in 1644, was itself derived from Salomon de Caus, "Les raisons des forces mouvantes avec diverses machines" (Frankfort, 1615).

⁴ This edition appeared in 1820. See R. A. Streatfeild, *Handel*, New York, 1909, page 84.

⁵ Newman Flower traces the story to a letter which appeared in the London Times in 1835. See his *George Frideric Handel*, London, 1923, page 120.

The association of clocks with mechanical figures, or indeed with mechanical musicians, was an ancient one. Certain examples were almost as much puppet-plays as time keepers. Gazari, who wrote towards the beginning of the thirteenth century, describes a water clock which was so contrived that a miniature sun and moon rose and set in the proper sign of the zodiac. The hour was indicated by birds which dropped balls into bronze vases below them. The effect was enhanced by a little orchestra of mechanical musicians, two trumpeters, two drummers, and a cymbal player, who marked the sixth, ninth, and twelfth hours with their music.⁶

Effects of a similar kind were incorporated in older organs, no doubt to amuse the non-musical members of the congregation. On a humbler scale the attractions of the hurdy-gurdy were increased by a display of mechanical figures which danced as the organ-grinder turned the crank.

One of the most curious byways of the world of machines is the attempt of ingenious men to reproduce mechanically the movements of animals and of human beings. Descartes was aware of such automata, because in developing his theory of the human body as "a machine made by the hands of God" he uses such devices as an illustration to make his concept clearer.⁷ If, however, it was possible to fashion men and women who moved by clockwork, the same could be done for musicians.

One of the most ingenious of these attempts was Vaucanson's faun "that plays on the German-Flute; on which it performs twelve different Tunes, with an Exactness which has deserv'd the Admiration of the Publick". This automaton was submitted to the Royal Academy of Sciences at Paris who duly declared it "to be extremely ingenious".⁸ Better known to most musicians because of his association with Beethoven was Maelzel who numbered a mechanical trumpeter among his inventions. This figure was able to play not only the military calls and marches used by the French and Austrian cavalry but also marches and lively airs by Dussek, Pleyel and Weigl.⁹

The automaton was a more elaborate relative of the puppet or the marionette. No less a composer than Haydn wrote music for the marionette theatre on the Esterhazy estate. The marionette, which moved as its controlling strings were pulled by the unseen operator, eventually became a tragic symbol of a human being manipulated by fate. Most musicians, however, were satisfied to imitate the jerky movements of these manikins. Sometimes the title has served merely to label a series of characteristic pieces like the "Marionettes" (Op.38) of Edward

⁶ See Abbot Payson Usher, *A History of Mechanical Inventions*, New York, 1929, pages 148-151. A fascinating development which cannot be discussed here is the evolution of audible signals which sound the hour or its subdivisions. The mechanical birds of the clock of Gazari were succeeded by bells, by carillons which might be manually operated or sounded automatically. The bells, real or simulated, which strike the hour in such symphonic works as the "Domestic Symphony" of Richard Strauss or the "Dance Macabre" of Camille Saint-Saëns should not be neglected nor the more elaborate clock-chime in the "Hary Janos Suite" of Kodaly.

⁷ René Descartes, *Discourse on Method*, Part V.

⁸ Jacques de Vaucanson, *An account of the mechanism of an automaton, or image playing on the German-flute*, London, 1742, translated from the French by J. T. Desaguliers.

⁹ George Grove, *A Dictionary of Music and Musicians*, London, 1880, Vol. II, page 194.

Macdowell. The uneven rhythms, the angularity of Eugene Goossens' "The Marionette Show" (from the "Four Conceits", Op. 20) bring us closer to the essential nature of the creature. To these we may add the "Pupazzetti" of Alfredo Casella. The most splendid marionette piece of all, however, is indisputably the ballet "Petrouchka" by Stravinsky. Here irony, mock emotion, and a kind of mechanical and heartless brilliance all enter into a puppet tragedy.

Occasional scenes in early operas reveal with unconscious vividness the attitude of court circles towards early industrialism. In Lully's opera "Isis", for example, vengeful Juno delivers Io, beloved by Jupiter, to a fury. Among the realms of terror through which hapless Io is driven are the forges of the Chalybes. A chorus of smiths sings to a vigorous air, "Strike, Strike, Work without ceasing." At the close of the scene, the Chalybes press close to Io, brandishing half-forged swords, spears, and halberds. Io casts herself into the sea in desperation, still pursued by the vengeful fury. The mythological trappings of the plot do not disguise the fact that a blacksmith's forge was regarded as a suitable setting for a scene of terror and torment. Thus the musician and the ruling groups, whose views he inevitably reflected, depicted machines as ingenious playthings or regarded useful forms of labor as dreadful spectacles. Lambranzi's nail-maker's dance, which is described in his "New and Curious Dance-School" of 1716, however, merely utilizes the movements of the blacksmith as the basis for a novel and amusing stage dance.

Composers early realized that an essential feature of the movement of most machines is uniform and persistent repetition. The musical equivalent of this characteristic is the repetition of a sequence of tones. This might be carried out freely, as in Couperin's "Les Petits Moulins à Vent". It might take the form of a theme which is persistently repeated in the lowest part, a ground bass. In an early German cantata, the "Jahrmarksgauner" of Sebastian Knüpffer, which depicts the street life of a German town, the song of the scissors-grinder is so accompanied. The composer might repeat a brief figure or melodic design in any register. This is the ostinato of the musician. Wagner's Forge or Nibelung Motive, which is employed in the music-dramas of the "Ring" cycle, sometimes assumes the character of an ostinato, a device which was to become a cliché of the modernists of the 1920's.

It is strange that the Industrial Revolution, which had so fatal an effect on handicrafts, coincided roughly with one of the great epochs of music. In a period of wholesale pollution of the landscape, a period which was distinguished by ruthless human exploitation and equally ruthless profit-taking, music did indeed remain as a great affirmation of human personality and of human emotion.

Yet if the music of the Romantic period represented a great affirmation, it also represented an escape. In a time when machines were more and more dominant, conspicuous, and unavoidable, music ignored the machine. It is true that Schubert's lover muses to the sound of a mill-wheel, but that was a pleasantly obsolete machine which had the double merit of picturesqueness and antiquity. Gretchen sings to the sound of her spinning-wheel in Schubert's famous song, and Senta's companions sing a charming spinning chorus in Wagner's "Flying Dutchman".

Nevertheless, the great masters pay little attention to the machine. Only Wagner, in amazing scenes which remain unusual if not unique, depicted the tragedy of industrial exploitation. The passage in "Rhinegold" in which Alberich forces the Nibelungs to heap up the treasure which they have mined and wrought for him is an overwhelming evocation of terror and brutal servitude. This scene differs from much machine-music because it reveals not only the rhythms of the forge but also the suppressed rage and terror of the workers. Wagner thus displayed a deeper understanding of his art than the composers of the twentieth century who were often fascinated by machine-rhythms only, ignoring the emotional impact of the machine on the lives of the workers.

It is this objectivity, this lack of human feeling, which perhaps prevented later machine-music from obtaining complete success (except in the ballet). Yet much as we may resent the lack of emotion in some modern music as a perverse avoidance of the precise quality which lends music its surest appeal, we must also recognize a certain suitability in this approach to the machine and to the factory-made product. Lewis Mumford has pointed out that the characteristic mark of the production of the automatic machine is the absence of any trace of hand-work.¹⁰ Each unit is identical. Each is completely objective, completely divorced from the human hand or the hand-directed tool. Honneger's "Pacific 231", amazingly realistic in its suggestion of the gradual acceleration of a heavy locomotive, illustrates this musical objectivity.

Soviet composers have written some of the best-known modern hymns to the machine. This is completely understandable in view of the spectacular and rapid industrial developments in that country. There too, the beneficent rôle of the machine has not been marred by the exploitation of the worker or by selfish profit-taking by the factory owner. The Russians share with us a rather simple and often naive admiration for the biggest, the fastest, the most impressive installations. Their composers have set this attitude to music. Mossolov's "Steel Foundry", Prokofiev's "Pas d'Acier", Meyfuss' "Dnieper Dam" are compositions of this kind. Often the musical style combines harmonic and rhythmic sophistication with the stark primitivism which dominates so much modern music. These are, however, early Soviet compositions.¹¹ More recent music will probably reveal tendencies of quite a different kind.

Although a considerable number of American compositions mirror our interest in the machine, some of them are slight and sensational studies by composers in search of novelty; some are amusing genre pieces. We have yet to find a composer who can express the feel and the bigness of the T.V.A.

During the introductory section of Herbert Inch's set of orchestral variations entitled "Answers to a Questionnaire", the composer warms up in imagination on the typewriter. We hear a staccato rhythm punctuated by the sound of a bell as a line is completed. An upward rush in the strings suggests that the car-

¹⁰ Lewis Mumford, *Technics and Civilization*, New York, 1934, pages 358-359.

¹¹ A very remarkable scene in the moving picture "Alexander Nevsky", in which the Teutonic Knights charge across the ice, suggests an analogy between the ordered advance of these armored soldiers and an attack by tanks. The analogy is strengthened by the music which Prokofiev wrote for this scene.

riage has been pushed back for a fresh start. To this composition we may add Adolph Weiss's "The Railroad Train", Emerson Whithornes's "The Aeroplane" and "Ferry Boat", George Antheil's "Second Sonata, The Airplane", Colin McPhee's "Mechanical Principles", Carlos Chavez' "H.P., Dance of Men and Machines", Juan Castro's ballet "Mekhano", and the very amusing "Little Train of Caipira" by Heitor Villa-Lobos.

The ultimate in depicting the machine is the actual introduction of the machine itself into the orchestra. Audiences here are familiar with the wind-machine in Strauss's "Don Quixote". Milhaud has employed the cracking of whips, whistles, and hammer blows in "Les Choéphores". Villa-Lobos has utilized the metronome in a movement of his "Suite Suggestive", and Erik Satie has introduced the typewriter and the auto horn into the score of his "Parade". American audiences will have heard more frequently the four French taxicab horns in Gershwin's "An American in Paris". Luigi Russolo tried to replace music with an assemblage of especially constructed noise-making machines which were presented at a concert in Paris in 1921. Possibly the most sensational attempt to employ machine sounds in the orchestra was Antheil's "Ballet Mécanique" with its airplane propeller and battery of player-pianos. The player-piano was itself a most formidable machine. Its qualities were exploited by Alfredo Casella in a composition entitled "Machines Agricoles".

A composer may concentrate on the machine. He may at the same time express the human reaction to the machine. This reaction varies with the relationship of the worker to the machine and the use which society has made of the machine. Thus we may have the terror and oppression of the slave working in the mines or turning the heavy mill-stone. We may have the elegant diversions of the aristocrat who listens to the music of his automatic organ or watches mechanical birds pirouette and warble. We have the sullen and hopeless misery of the early factory worker. We have, finally, the free worker who finds in the machine a liberating force. For all these aspects and uses of the machine composers have found music, at first hesitatingly, then with a surer and firmer touch.

Whether it was due to the fact that the Romantic composers represented a point of view which found the machine ungrateful save as an antiquarian accessory, or was a result of the characteristic time-lag of musical development, the graphic arts of this period concerned themselves with mechanical themes long before they were considered proper material for modern musicians. We may instance the Currier and Ives steamboat and railroad prints and Turner's picture of a railroad train. Designs based on mechanical elements occurred as early as the seventeenth century and were frequent in the work of the abstractionists and cubists of the present century.

A point was reached where the machine could no longer be denied. Even though the title does not show that the composer has chosen a mechanical theme, the rhythms of the machine obtrude themselves. The graceful perpetual motion of early composers assumed the implacable and persistent movement of tireless arms and wheels of steel. It is from this point of view that Paul Rosenfeld writes of Stravinsky, "with Strawinski, the rhythms of machinery

enter musical art. . . . Through him, music has become again cubical, lapidary, massive, mechanistic. . . . Above all there is rhythm, rhythm rectangular and sheer and emphatic, rhythm that lunges and beats and reiterates and dances with all the steely perfect tirelessness of the machine".¹² Certainly such a movement as the finale of Prokofiev's Seventh Piano Sonata with its implacable, percussive, and toccata-like figurations would have been inconceivable in music had not the inhuman rhythms of the machine shown the way.

In spite of the reluctance of the musician, the whole pageant of technological progress has been mirrored by musical instruments. Clockwork gave us the Swiss music-box, steam the lusty circus calliope. Even the advent of illuminating gas was reflected in a strange fantasy of Kastner who multiplied the singing flame of the physics laboratory so as to form a musical instrument, the Pyrophone.¹³ Electricity not only controls phonographic reproduction and projects radio broadcasts from continent to continent, it also has found expression in a whole series of instruments of which the Theremin and the several forms of electric organ are perhaps the most familiar examples.

Thus the musician cannot evade the infiltration of the machine, even in his own art. A superficial observer might say that music was one of the last surviving handicrafts. It was indeed one of the last crafts to succumb to mass production. But it has finally succumbed. The composer and the performer have functions which may be fairly compared to those of the inventor and pattern-maker in industry. Once they have finished their work it passes to automatic machines which produce uniform replicas in the form of phonograph records or the sound-tracks of movie-films.

With the intrusion of the machine into the productive cycle of the musician, the human creator is pushed farther and farther from his audience. Where once the composer played directly to his audience, we now find the printer and the printing-press, the engineer and the recording machine, the manufacturer of phonograph records, the complex of machines which is the modern broadcasting station, all intervening before the music emerges from the loud-speaker and at last reaches the listener. The musician cannot ignore the machine for it is part of his world. It affects him and it influences his music. He can, indeed, no longer effectively reach the new musical public of the present day without the aid of a whole series of elaborate mechanisms.

¹² Paul Rosenfeld, *Musical Portraits*, New York, 1920, pages 191-192.

¹³ Georges Frédéric Eugene Kastner, *Le pyrophone, flammes chantantes*, Paris, 1876.

NATURE AND THE ANTI-POETIC IN MODERN POETRY

WILLIAM VAN O'CONNOR

T. S. Eliot and some few others have pointed to similarities between late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, and modern poetry. The debt to the metaphysicals has been documented. And since the revival of Skelton the kinship of the moderns with the earlier Tudors has been made more obvious. The similarities, of course, do not amount to likeness. The Renaissance poet, moving away from a circumscribed spiritual world, had found access to the natural world. Fairly soon, however, a symbol in abstract form intervened between the poet and the natural world. Insofar as the modern poet is similar to his Tudor forebears he attempts to rediscover the natural world. In one of his poems Allen Tate speaks of an "age of abstract experience," and in "The Last Days of Alice" he comments that

Turned absent minded by infinity
 She cannot move unless her double move,
 The All-Alice of the world's entity
 Smashed in the anger of her hopeless love.

We, too, back to the world shall never pass
 Through the splintered door, a dumb shade-harried crowd
 Being all infinite, function, depth and mass
 Without figure; a mathematic shroud.

Tate has stated the problem historically in his essay, "A Reading of Keats,"¹ which focusses on the mutual isolation of considerations of physical and spiritual love. Keats recoiled from any attempt at reconciling the experience of physical love with his idealization of the beloved. The relationship "between the heavenly and earthly Aphrodites had been in effect the great theme of Lucretius and St. Augustine, and it informed dramatically *The Divine Comedy*. It was perhaps the great achievement of the seventeenth century English poets to have explored the relations of physical and spiritual love." Keats, participating in the romantic attitude, was not able to experience the love which Donne had experienced. "In the interval between

So must pure lovers soules descend
 T'affections, and to faculties,
 Which sense may reach and apprehend,
 Else a great Prince in prison lies.

and this:

But Love has pitched his mansion in
 The place of excrement;
 For nothing can be sole or whole
 That has not been rent

—in the interval between Donne and Yeats there was evidently a loss in the range and depth of Western man's experience as that experience was expressed

¹ *The American Scholar*, XV, 1 (Winter, 1945-46), 55-63.

in the imagination, and not merely in the Goethean or Wordsworthian good-will towards comprehensiveness or the inclusion of a little of everything."

The Tudor world which made Donne's poetry possible seems to have been a period of equilibrium and of balance in ways which no subsequent period has been. In poetry the degree of balance of Donne's contemporaries and predecessors is implied in their attitude toward the physical. Their ability to reconcile the spiritual and the physical precluded the likelihood of social convention being placed like a silkscreen between a poet's experience and his expression. The world of moderns like D. H. Lawrence, Ezra Pound, T. S. Eliot, Robinson Jeffers, and a number of younger poets, can be more clearly understood if it is examined in the light of this history.

The pull away from the Tudor balance of mind, reflected in their acceptance of the physical, can be inferred from Nicholas Berdyaev's² studies of the Renaissance as the focal point for explaining the development of the modern world. According to this thesis, humanism, by regarding man as a part of nature, eventually "divorced the natural from the spiritual man." The Renaissance itself is the expression of a dualism in which the spiritual consciousness of the Middle Ages was opposed to the natural in which man participated. The defects of the medieval emphasis inhered in the refusal to allow sufficient freedom for individual creativeness, which must be largely in terms of the natural world. (Berdyaev's thesis, if applied to England, would have to include consideration of the society of Chaucer as in part a Renaissance expression, the justification for which is readily evident in the easy "naturalism" of the Canterbury pilgrims and Chaucer's own frequent bawdiness.) "The Renaissance represented the discovery both of nature and antiquity. This communion with the natural foundations of human life and the discovery of creative forces in the natural sphere prepared the ground for humanism." Man "feels the liberation of his force and a profound direct communion with natural life." It would seem to follow, from these beginnings, that poetry would be strengthened through a closer relationship with the physical, with nature. And for a time it was strengthened.

Students of Renaissance literature have shown how easily the physical world—the sea, trees, and animals—was "humanly dramatized, somehow converted to the nature of man." The Renaissance poet could do this because he had an inherited conviction to support his "notion of how the natural and the human fitted into a scheme created by a personal divinity."³ In the periods subsequent to Donne the poets found that the natural and supernatural no longer hung in easy balance. Pope is, as Mizener shrewdly observes, the last great poet who is able (and he is obliged to do so very tactfully) to use serious comparisons of nature, the supernatural and man's life. When a people look upon nature as somehow possessing the same kind of life they possess in themselves their poetry will extend into areas of metaphor, feeling and belief otherwise closed to it.

The Renaissance had conceived of nature, Berdyaev puts it, as being "divine

² *The Meaning of History*, Scribners, 1936, *passim*.

³ Arthur Mizener, "Some Notes on the Nature of English Poetry," *Sewanee Review*, LI, 1 (Winter, 1943), 27-51. This is a brilliant analysis of the way in which spiritual and natural elements in poetry gradually fell into separate spheres.

and living, something with which man had to commune and blend. The first great discoveries of natural science contributed further to this progress. But the age of enlightenment in spite of all its faith in reason lacks this enthusiasm for the knowledge of nature." Intending to control nature, post-Renaissance man withdrew from it, began to study it "objectively," in terms of scientific symbols. The purpose of this study was to organize the universe into an understandable system. The emphasis from Galileo, through Newton, Descartes, Locke, Hume, *et al.*, was on effecting this understanding through an abstract system of measurement. The concrete, sensuous qualities of the world, not readily subject to measurement, were described as "secondary" considerations. Thus, as Whitehead put it, exclusive acceptance of this emphasis implied that the "poets are entirely mistaken. . . . Nature is a dull affair, soundless, scentless, colorless. . . ." We are not concerned here with a thumbnail history of modern philosophy but merely with pointing out that the symbols of the scientist and philosopher were at an even further remove from the symbols of the poet in reflecting the physical world. These symbols, functioning as organizing principles, were adequate for explaining a version of "reality." The damage occurred when this version was held to be *the* reality. Men in the post-Renaissance world turned away from a conjoined delight in the physical in themselves and in the promise that an understanding of the mysteries of nature would be achieved. But before it is possible to consider the history of the lost sense of physical immediacy, it is necessary to ask in what way the physical may be said to *inform* poetry.

A clearer than usual understanding of the concept "experiencing nature," as the literary historians say, can be achieved through a brief recapitulation of Ernst Cassirer's⁴ "symbolic system." He explains, for example, that a species of insect lives *organically* within its environment because it is equipped with a "receptor system" by which "it receives outward stimuli and [an] effector system by which it reacts to them. . . . They are links in one and the same chain." It is possible therefore to think of the insect as organically related to its environment. "Yet in the human world we find a new characteristic which appears to be the distinctive mark of human life. . . . Man has, as it were, discovered a new method of adapting himself to his environment. Between the receptor system and the effector system, which are found in all animal species, we find in man a third link which we may describe as the *symbolic system*. . . . There is an unmistakable difference between organic reactions and human responses. In the first case a direct and immediate answer is given to an outward stimulus; in the second case the answer is delayed. It is interrupted and retarded by a slow process of thought."

Cassirer and the whole body of semanticists concerned with the function of symbols in man's thought processes have shown that man does not live in a "merely physical universe"; he lives, so far as his thought processes are concerned, largely in a "symbolic universe." Much, that is, of man's social and religious life is lived in part through the functioning of symbols. Convention, too, insofar as it depends on thought, is maintained through symbolic words and acts.

⁴ *An Essay on Man*, Yale University Press, 1944, 23-41.

So far as man's thought and actions are dependent upon symbols he does not "confront reality immediately; he cannot see it, as it were, face to face. Physical reality seems to recede in proportion as man's symbolic activity advances. Instead of dealing with the things themselves man is constantly conversing with himself. . . . His situation is the same in the theoretical as in the practical sphere." The poet, as well as the scientist and philosopher, experiences nature through the symbolism of words.

The symbols of the scientist, regardless of their consistency and practical usefulness, are abstractions of an understanding of the functioning of the universe. It is jargon therefore to speak of "getting at" or "experiencing reality" through any scientific or philosophical system. The symbols of the poet insofar as these differ from the symbols of science or philosophy are (like those of ritual and myth) necessary complements to them. In the symbols of poetry, at least, the world of the senses is held to be relevant to understanding. The language of the poet, however, should, as it were, revitalize itself by passing through the physical world it images.

This is not to say that the symbols in the language of poetry arise from a direct participation with the physical world. The world the poet images is the one his age conceives. With the decline in the spiritual emphasis it might have been expected that the physical, the natural, would have come to the fore in poetry. The "reality" the seventeenth century began to conceive was composed of abstract symbols. The sense of the physical was gradually diminished. And to this attitude social convention added its sanctions. (The influence of Puritanism likewise accelerated the diminution. Insofar as the Lollards and other medieval reforming sects were, in their asceticism, the antecedents of the Puritans, the Christian opposition to an easy acceptance of the physical was carried into the modern world.)

The details of the cultural factors, and their expression as conventions, that caused the loss of the Tudor sense of physical immediacy require the attention of an able social historian, one who can see the whole configuration.⁵ The history of the idiom from Marvell on indicates that a cultural revolution had occurred. Following the brief period of cerebral and witty poetry the idiom was gradually "elevated"—and the eighteenth century concern with "poetic diction" became inevitable. Or the development can be told briefly, through implication, by noting that in the "latter Renaissance and the period which followed all the arts became fine or refined arts. . . . Not the good, the life-giving elements in literature but its possible beauty was stressed." Literature became *belles lettres*.

Indications of an over-objectification of nature, of attempted withdrawal from it, occur most obviously in "refined" attitudes toward sex and excrement. The literary historians have explained the conflicting excesses of the Commonwealth Puritans and Restoration Royalists, Victorian prudery and the revolt of the Twenties. Pornography appears as compensation for unnatural conventional forms of personal delicacy. The antitheses are evident. But there is a

⁵ Maurice J. Quinlan's *Victorian Prelude* might be taken as an illustration of the kind of history needed.

vulgarity and vigorous coarseness that brings much Tudor literature gustily alive. It is an evidence of natural animality—and not in opposition to forms of idealism or spirituality—that may prove to be a state of equilibrium in such matters—with many consequent implications for English poetry.

The tendency, until quite recently, to write off John Skelton as a curiosity or as a wanton churchman was caused perhaps by the inability of period sensibilities subsequent to the Tudors to accommodate him. Skelton, strongly anti-romantic, used the direct and pungent idiom of contemporary speech. The modern rediscoverers of Skelton have found little that is wanton but much that is passionate, serious, and frank. The anti-poetic elements he employs are startlingly similar to those of the moderns.

Sche sware with her ye xulde not dele
For ye war smery, lyke a sele,
And ye war herey, lyke a calfe;
Sche praiid ye walke, on Goddes halfe!

Robert Graves in his "John Skelton" supplies the reason for the interest in him.

He struck what Milton missed,
Milling an English grist
With homely turn and twist

The appeal is, as Graves says, not only in his idiom but in his direct handling of a commonplace subject matter. The implication of our finding evidences of Skelton's idiom in Hopkins, Eliot, and Auden is that they felt the need for an idiom appropriate to a more forthright attitude toward the natural. It was an attitude common to the Tudors. John M. Berdan in his study of the Eulenspiegel stories in Tudor England notes that while they are "indescribably filthy" they are not "at all obscene." He notes the disapproval of Mackenzie, the Victorian editor of them, and adds his own comment: "There are classes today who greet such anecdotes with approving roars, but they are not among the most cultured. So the natural deduction is that in the sixteenth century such classes formed a large percentage of readers. Rude and boisterous, the life deadened their sensibilities. Their nerves required strong stimulus to cause them to react. *Stink* is a good old English word that is now banished from polite society, together with the conditions it implies. Both the word and the fact, as is shown by the *Howleglas*, were in good standing in the sixteenth century." In modern poetry, which was just getting under way in 1920, the year Berdan published his study, the word *stink* is in good standing. Indeed, the recent shift in sensibility is best explained in comparative studies of sixteenth century and modern attitudes.

Cleanth Brooks⁶ observes that "Aldous Huxley's lovers, 'quietly sweating palm to palm,' may be conveniently taken to mark the nadir of Petrarchism." The Elizabethan, of course, was not "taken in" by the Petrarchan prettiness: like Donne, in "The Ecstasy," he felt no impasse between the biological and the

⁶ "The case of Miss Arabella Fermor," *Sewanee Review*, LI, 4 (Autumn, 1943), 505-525.

spiritual, and could experience either the spiritual in terms of the physical or the physical in terms of the spiritual.

Where, like a pillow on a bed,
 A Pregnant banke swel'd up, to rest
 The violets reclining head,
 Sat we two, one anothers best.
 Our hands were firmly cimented
 With a fast balme, which thence did spring,
 Our eye-beames twisted, and did thred
 Our eyes, upon one double string;
 So to 'entergraft our hands, as yet
 Was all the meanes to make us one,
 And picture in our eyes to get
 Was all our propagation
 But O alas, so long, so farre
 Our bodies why doe wee forbear?
 They are ours, though they are not wee, Wee are
 The intelligences, they the spheares.
 We owe them thanks, because they thus,
 Did us, to us, at first convey,
 Yeelded their forces, sense, to us,
 Nor are drosse to us, but allay.

Brooks' explanation of our inability to have it (the physical or the spiritual) both ways is that we are disciplined in the tradition of "either-or" rather than in that of "both-and." "Flesh *or* spirit, merely a doxy or purely a goddess (or alternately, one and then the other) is more easily managed in our poetry, and probably, for that matter, in our private lives." In his discussion of Pope's attitude toward Belinda, Brooks points to a number of double meanings, observing that an understanding of them indicates how Pope brings the "real" world into focus against the world of courtly convention. Among his illustrations are a number of lines with "sexual implications." But this level of the poem's meaning is covertly treated, only hinted at. Thus Belinda's exclamation,

"Oh hadst thou cruel! been content to seize
 Hairs less in sight, or any hairs but these!"

carries on, unconsciously, the sexual suggestion."

D. S. Savage⁷ finds it "instructive to compare Donne's *Satyres* in their original form with the versions made by Pope." In *Satyre II* Donne writes

But hee is worst, who (beggarily) doth chaw
 Other wits fruits, and in his ravenous maw
 Rankly digested, doth those things out-spue,
 As his owne things; and they are his owne, 'tis true,
 For if one eate my meate, though it be knowne
 The meate was mine, the excrement is his owne.

⁷ "Poetry and Nature," *Poetry*, LXI (December, 1942), 496-504.

Allen Walker Read in "An Obscenity Symbol," *American Speech*, IX, 4 (December, 1934), 264-278, traces the history of certain low words, and, incidentally, indicates the degree of "refinement" of ages subsequent to Chaucer.

After passing through Pope's mind and refined sensibility the idea remains but its embodiment as an image is lost. A gross image becomes an epigram.

Wretched indeed! But far more wretched yet
Is he who makes his meal on others' wit:
'Tis changed no doubt, from what it was before;
His rank digestion makes it wit no more:
Sense, pass'd through him, no longer is the same;
For food digested takes another name.

The analysis from Brooks and the illustrations from Savage suggest a history. (If further evidence were needed, we might remember that Pope found it necessary to emasculate the couplets of Chaucer.) The elemental and physical in Donne are not hidden, as they are in Pope. Somewhere in the history of poetry between Donne and Pope convention spread a veneer between the poet's realization and reality. That a proper "reading" of the elements in *The Rape of the Lock*—and they seem much in evidence—has had to await so recent an examination indicates further that subsequent generations of readers did not expect to find such a degree of actuality, however obliquely presented, in a polite poem.

The relationship of the poet with the physical world—his attitude toward the natural—affects his poetry in at least two major ways. The degree of his awareness of his physical being, in contrast to his intellectual or spiritual being, is likely to influence his choice of subject matter, his attitudes toward the physical both in himself and in the physical world about him. Inevitably these attitudes dictate the nature of the vocabulary and to a large extent the poet's idiom. The earthiness of Gascoigne is experienced in the simple word and the immediacy of its impact. The delicacy of Alice Meynell or Marianne Moore is experienced in words thinned by social refinement or lightened by intellectual gracefulness.

Each poet writing in the idiom of his generation, however much he may vary it, is obliged to consider existing associations and current circumlocutions. A poet contributes to the character of the idiom of his time, he does not give it its general character. Both Browning and Hopkins, despite their efforts to find the idiom to express their personal virility, remain Victorians. If the idiom of Donne could support an attitude toward the physical that the more attenuated idiom of Tennyson could not support, the explanation lies largely in the attitudes of their different societies. If there is, e.g., a similarity between the poetry of the metaphysicals, when, as Eliot said, intellect was "immediately at the tips of the senses" and of some moderns who manage an "emotion that is blood to the bone of thought," the similarity can be explained in terms of common attitudes in the intellectual climates of the two periods. In Robert Penn Warren's "Original Sin: A Short Story," the mysterious is not grasped in the evanescent generalities of the Victorians. Each element that composes the image is from our experience of the natural world.

Nodding, its great head rattling like a gourd,
And locks like seaweed strung on the stinking stone,
The nightmare stumbles past, and you have heard
It fumble your door before it whimpers and is gone.

Once again we are attempting to understand ourselves through symbols that arise from other than a rhetorically heightened nature.

Wordsworth, of course, insofar as he tried to restore communion with the "organic world," was attempting to destroy a set of conventions and to create an idiom that would make the expression of it possible. The evidence of Wordsworth's own usually attenuated idiom, however, is proof enough that his "nature" was more immaterial than physical. Nature was romanticized. Comparisons of Keats with Shakespeare, for example, cannot be pushed very far because Keats romanticized sex and Shakespeare, except in play, did not. Despite the intensity of their apostrophes to nature, the Romantics were not quite able to accept the physical reality of themselves with anything approaching Tudor frankness.

The characteristic treatment of nature throughout the nineteenth century was belletristic. Occasionally, as in Tennyson's "Nature red with tooth and claw," the Victorians suspected that in their pretty concern with nature they had "got hold of the tiger's tail." Unable to accept the physical in themselves they were repelled by the aspects of nature not readily subject to idealization. The ambiguousness of the Victorians' position was to some extent to be reconciled by the more truly "naturalistic" emphasis of our own time. Their conventions, burdened with the accretions of many generations, could no longer be borne. D. H. Lawrence became the excessive voice of the reaction.

Essentially Lawrence believed in Life as the supreme force and value. Man as biological organism participates in the endless vital flow. Lawrence's dogma was that the individual should not frustrate himself, through egoism, intellectualism, or idealism, by attempting to impede the flow. He exclaimed against forms of cultural or physical mechanisms which impede personal submission to the endless vital process. In his poetry these concerns carried him from a preoccupation with sex to the impersonal world of animals, birds, fruits and flowers. One can hardly avoid agreement with the opinion of Savage that "Lawrence's view of life, his 'biologism,' which is a similarly retrogressive dissolution back into primary life, implies a refusal of spiritual values. It leads concurrently to the dissolution of personality and the dissolution of art. . . ." Lawrence of course was attempting a revolution, to reverse the direction of a cultural landslide that had been moving for more than three centuries.

The poetry of Robinson Jeffers, also, seems most easily explicable in terms of a nature from which man has withdrawn. "Mr. Jeffers," Yvor Winters puts it, "is theologically some kind of monist. He envisages, as did Wordsworth, nature as Deity; but his Nature is the Nature of the text-book in physics and not that of the rambling botanist. . . . Nature, or God, is thus a kind of self-sufficient mechanism, of which man is a product, but from which man is cut off by his humanity. . . ." Set against the aspects of nature Jeffers chooses, man is inconsequential. His tragedy becomes a pathetic gesturing. The only positive teaching of Jeffers, apparently, is the need to escape into nirvana. For all his concern with nature, Jeffers, preoccupied with perversion, fails to consider man as natural. Like Lawrence, but without his espousal of life, he is seeking a solution to man's long dissociation from the natural.

Professor Frederick A. Pottle's comment on A. E. Housman's judgment of eighteenth century poetry is that insofar as our own sensibility, like Housman's, "is organized in much the same fashion as Wordsworth's, we are largely incapacitated for feeling the poetry of Pope"—and therefore likely to agree with Housman. Since the advent of Pound and Eliot the modern sensibility has hardly been organized in the fashion of Wordsworth. Neither the sensibility of Wordsworth nor Housman seems peculiarly similar to our own. (Indeed, recent studies of Pope indicate that his virtues are more available in terms of our sensibility than they were for that of Wordsworth or Housman.) The kinship there is, leaping the immediate past, is strongest with the metaphysicals. Seemingly the process of dissociation and withdrawing from an awareness of our physical selves could not be pushed beyond the point reached by the Victorians. That we have not recovered the Tudor frankness in all matters relating to the body is evidenced by Freud's studies and exposition of our period's excessive "anal consciousness" and all but psychopathic preoccupation with personal cleanliness. The occasional scatological reference, like this from Pound, seems deliberately *épater le bourgeois*:

and the *laudatores temporis acti*
claiming that the sh-t used to be blacker and richer
and the fabians crying for the petrification of putrefaction,
for a new dung-flow cut in lozenges

Our ability to accept frankness in sexual matters, following an initial period of flaunting a new freedom, seems secure and is hardly in need of documentation here.

The history of Yeats' poetry typifies the break of the moderns with the Victorians. In the latter part of the century he, along with other members of the Rhymers Club, was using an idiom which represented the last remove from physical reality before, for the poet, there must be utter silence. Randall Jarrell has made a catalogue of words from this period of Yeats' work—*dream, rose, heart, tender, faery, peace, high, lofty, foam, flame, cloud-pale, pearl-pale*, etc.—that indicate the degree of passivity to which the romantic impulse had devolved. The catalogue from his later poetry—*foul, crazy, bone, blood, naked, dumb, ditch, hate, rag*, etc.—is filled with words which imply an almost violent change in his point of view. Eventually Yeats accepted the shift in sensibility that had taken place, most noticeably during his middle years. Recognizing its validity and the necessity for it, Yeats strove to adapt himself to it. And although he was unable to divorce himself, perhaps never intended or wanted to, from certain romantic glossings, he came to see the world in greater fullness and with greater honesty and was able to write such a passage as that quoted above from Tate's study of Keats.

The anti-poetic element in modern poetry, illustrated in the lines from Yeats, is most valuable in that it implies an effort to restore a sane perspective. Insofar as it has come into usage, and then into vogue, as the rhetorical sign of opposition to the exclusively "poetic" it is a pose and valueless. But used by such poets as the later Yeats, Eliot, Pound, Williams, Warren, Shapiro, and some others,

it helps to restore the Tudor equilibrium in matters of the body. Fecundated by "poetic" insight it makes possible lines like these from Eliot's "Preludes":

Sitting along the bed's edge, where
You curled the papers from your hair,
Or clasped the yellow soles of feet
In the palms of both soiled hands.

—or even Hart Crane's

The phonographs of hades in the brain
Are tunnels that rewind themselves, and love
A burnt match skating in a urinal.

The anti-poetic element in Shapiro's poetry, for example, is a part of his sense of man *alive*, thinking, feeling, and dying. With Yeats, he would know "the whole man—blood, imagination, intellect, running together." Donne's employment of "The Flea" in memorializing his love—

This flea is you and I, and this
Our marriage bed, and marriage temple is;
Though parents grudge, and you, w'are met,
And cloystered in these living walls of Jet.—

has its parallel in Shapiro's "The Fly":

O hideous little bat, the size of snot,
With polyhedral eye and shabby clothes,
To populate the stinking cat you walk
The promontory of the dead man's nose,
Climb with the fine leg of a Duncan-Phyfe
The smoking mountains of my food
And in comic mood
In mid-air take to bed a wife.

It seems more than accidental that the "ugly" should be functional (Shakespeare abounds in illustrations) in the poetry of two periods, one an age discovering man's relationship with the physical, the other an age striving somewhat desperately to rediscover it.

NATIONALISM, INTERNATIONALISM, AND UNIVERSALITY IN LITERATURE

JOSEPH REMENYI

The creative spirit speaks one language but has various expressions. This truism, although majestic in its perspective, is sometimes scorned by writers and scholars who argue that the really distinctive or unique traits of literature are national, hence universality is an illusion—convenient perhaps—but not a fact.

No critic worthy of the name denies the influence of national roots in literature. Taine's race-milieu theory emphasizes the significance of national roots. Van Wyck Brooks's interest in New England regionalism emphasizes it. A character in Dostoevsky's *The Possessed*, a man named Shatov, well expresses it in his remark: "To be with your people signifies to believe that thus all humanity will be saved." James Joyce, away from his country, could not ignore Dublin and the river Liffey. Without Ireland, which he could not endure, he had no universe to endure. Thomas Wolfe's letters to his mother, in spite of their sometimes adolescent and confusing tension, reveal an almost religious attachment to the national roots of his soul and his art.

Unfortunately, in a militant world the universality of great writing is easily dismissed by prejudice and expediency, especially when the latter serve the interests of those in power. Many critics, in an effort to glorify the national aspects of literature or at least the relationship of literature to *couleur locale*, ignore its universality and its basic principles. They seem to forget that the symbol of Pegasus in Greek mythology is not a denial of universality; on the contrary, the wings of Pegasus indicate flight beyond the purely local or national boundaries of imagination and communication. Laudable it surely is to be proud of one's national literature, but it is either a misreading of its essential character or malice to substitute narrow patriotism for universality.

With such a point of view literature easily becomes a weapon of intolerance. Students of history know, for example, that in the past men surrendered their peaceful lives to wars because a better peace was promised. Coercion, often with the aid of literature, played a part in their submission to war; in modern times propaganda serves the same purpose.

Yet throughout history one also observes the universality of the creative imagination even in time of war. What makes this influence interesting is that even in times of hostility there are analogous expressions in the poetry of nations whose people speak a different language, and who may be at war with each other. In the songs of the *troubadours* or the *minnesängers* one discerns loveliness, pensiveness, mirth, and the spirit of chivalry, which, despite national rhythms, transcend personal or local significance. The need of emotional release simultaneously established an identical creative pattern among both French and German poets. In the holocaust of the first World War and its aftermath, Giuseppe Antonio Borgese in Italy, Erich Maria Remarque in Germany, Georges Duhamel in France, all tried to counteract the wretchedness of human fate with the hope of a permanent peace. In post-war England Siegfried Sassoon, in America John Dos Passos, were likewise philosophical on war and peace. These writers and poets did not abandon their national roots; nevertheless they produced works which honored the universal dream of peace at a time when nationalism exalted militarism.

Universality should not be applied only to those poets and writers who spoke of love and nature, and a lasting peace. Man often accepted warfare in a manner that was approved, nay, instigated by poets and writers. The *Iliad* or the *Nibelungen*-cycle could be considered "war-literature." Indeed, much folklore is related to man's martial disposition. Nationalism, as defined in modern

times, is unknown in these works; but there are illusions and delusions in folk-poetry from which nationalism received its ideology and strength in later centuries. Such works appealed to human impulses in search of glory and excitement. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries Maurice Barrès in France, Gabriele D'Annunzio in Italy, and Rudyard Kipling in England supplied this universal, if militant psychology.

Great literature is essentially universal, but it need not destroy national roots. As it is inherent in man to have a nationality and to be human, so in great writing we may find both national and universal qualities. The troubled soul of man is a universal reality and the limited and unlimited vistas of his troubles find expression in masterpieces. It is strange and sad that this simple fact cannot be taken for granted.

Internationalism no less than nationalism is a substitute for universality in literature. Internationalism is an intelligent recognition of the interrelation of nationalism and universality; it is an intelligent recognition on a world-wide scale but—and this should be stressed—it is not an organic part of literature, as a creative force. There is no international literature, only an international understanding of the national qualities and the universal values of literature.

Concern with literature is inevitably a concern with humanity; alas! an interest in humanity is not inevitably an interest in literature. It is significant and not the least encouraging that, in the popular edition of Charles A. Beard's and Mary R. Beard's excellent *History of the United States*, Herman Melville and Mark Twain are not mentioned. Is it because as creators they could not be pigeon-holed into a conventional and national historical pattern? Some historians seem to forget that the creative mind needs totality; even Mallarmé's obscure suggestiveness looks for intelligibility. A cryptic word is clearer than no word at all. *Castis omnia casta*; if to the pure everything is pure, to the creative mind and to the connoisseur the basis for the interest in literature is its relationship to total human destiny.

While there are critics and readers who recognize the fallacy of a totalitarian cultural nationalism, they seem to subscribe to the view that there is an international literature. Their sympathy for a world of international justice leads them to the misguided conclusion that, as an organic expression of the creative force, there exists an international literature. To them nationalism is an antiquated term; without perceiving the interdependence between nationalism and universality, they are hostile to attempts which, in their judgment, reveal kinship with conservatism. Their lack of aesthetic sensitiveness is prone to make them unjust to literature not in accord with their obsessive internationalism. Once upon a time drawing-room ladies would sniff with disdain at "too-advanced" literary works. These protagonists of international literature will say that Maxim Gorky's *Mother* or Herman Heyermans' *Hope* or the novels of Upton Sinclair command attention as "international literature." The error is obvious; the social and political aspects of these works, their symbol of class-struggle, suggest an identification of ideas with creativeness. Gorky, the Russian, Heyermans, the Dutch, Sinclair, the American, offer experiences of restricted expressiveness; but Gorky, the former vagabond, Heyermans, the social minded

writer, Sinclair, the harasser of capitalism, fit into the kind of limited comprehension for which such critics and readers are prepared.

There is, however, an "international literature" which neither accidentally nor implicitly has substantial literary qualities, yet the adjective "international" is properly used, and the "literature" upon which the adjective throws light has sophisticated and less sophisticated protagonists and imitators. Such plays, novels, stories, or verses are entitled to the term international literature; they represent international taste, manners or mannerisms, which are the "glory" of theaters in Paris, London, New York and other metropolitan cities; and, insofar as novels, short stories and "light verse" are concerned, they are the "successes" of publishers. They expose man as he pursues the pleasures of a superficial existence; the inscrutable interests them as a stunt. A mastery of stage technique or a fluency of writing must be admitted in some of the better writers. Such authors are not literary failures, as they do not pretend to produce works of pure artistic quality. Sometimes, as with Ferenc Molnar and Noel Coward, their plays or novels turn out to be literature, though not in the larger sense of the word; a clever compromise between form and structure, an atmospherical constancy to national roots (Molnar: Budapest; Coward: London) bring their works into the orbit of creativeness. This proves only that when a writer creates something worthwhile, his talent cannot be separated from his national background and from universality.

Of course, internationalism cannot be excluded from the terminology of literature, but is a much misused or maligned term. The fact is that one does not condemn internationalism by asserting that it is a doctrine that points the road towards universal understanding; internationalism in regard to literature is a symbol of diversity recognizing the synthesis of nationalism and universality. Ulysses's return from Troy emphasizes the vitality of national roots; his wanderings symbolize the space-time pattern of universality; and the enjoyment of the Odyssey everywhere is an international response.

Creative expression springs from motives other than those of nationalism or internationalism. The universal sound of the human voice warns us against the worship of bias; it also warns us against the assumption that other attributes of creative expression are of less importance. Transparent nationalism in either a poem or in a novel may weaken its aesthetic value; it may emphasize banality or didacticism. The *French* qualities of Charles Baudelaire, the *Russian* qualities of Alexander Pushkin, the *American* qualities of Emily Dickinson possess unique symbols only because of the unique personality of the writers.

When one speaks of "various expressions" in connection with the *universality* of literature, one must understand the *personal* joy and anguish of poets and writers. Creative works, even the seemingly playful, are attempts to relate the human spirit with the enigma of destiny. A creator is never an expatriate; wherever he is, he addresses the universe. Ultimate reality is his host, though frequently an inhospitable one. Notwithstanding T. S. Eliot's assertion that creativeness is a process of depersonalization, the truly great writer bleeds his own blood, sighs his own sighs, and shouts his own laughter. That is, evidently, a commentary on the inevitability of "varied expressions," without which liter-

ature would be much less interesting; it would be only a means of instruction and persuasion. But literature, as an artistic experience, must seek perfection aesthetically; it is paradoxical, yet nevertheless true, that the artistically realized inner life of the poet, his individuality that isolates him from the inartistic, is the link between his national self and the universality of his creation.

It is this artistic essence that the critic and the reader share when the will of the creative spirit is perfectly expressed; it is this artistic essence that rejects a distinctly political or sociological evaluation of literature. This intangible magic is the eternal renewer of the human spirit. Creation, as an organic unit, speaks one language but has various expressions; it imitates itself, that is, imitates the mystery of fate, but it also awakens new worlds through manifold expressions. It reconstructs the unknown and makes the known exciting. Greek and Roman, medieval and Renaissance, eighteenth century and modern philosophers devoted much thought to an explanation of literature. Some of their conclusions were ambiguous; others were accepted or refused by later epochs. Nevertheless, in our disheartening and mechanical world it is more necessary than ever to insist that human dignity is served by creative expression. While literature approaches life in terms of nationalism and universality, and while its external sequel is international enjoyment and edification, the creative mind, confronted by a world of chaos, refuses to succumb to formless empiricism. In the ordeal of life the supreme order of a sonnet is the result of choice related to meaning.

There are critics, especially economists, political writers and aesthetic relativists, who disagree with these views. They resent the "vagueness" of aesthetics. They clamor for "facts," or dwell upon the anarchy of taste. They regard the "mysticism" of aesthetic vocabulary as outmoded, and attribute to it reactionary motives. They are oblivious to the fact that every expression, including a statistical tabulation, is inexact in relation to the final interpretation of life. Words that uphold values are reliable; *nationalism*, *internationalism* and *universality* are just such words when used in their proper and larger sense.

It is also wrong to say that it is not a timely task to concentrate on the nature of literary terminology and on its application to the creative process. What is permanent cannot be untimely. Symbols are the aids, not the tyrants of clarity. Many questions of scientific and other inquiries are still unanswered; therefore it is logical to say that there are aesthetic objectives not clarified completely. To isolate the problems of literature from the common and uncommon problems of contemporariness on account of the war, implies cruel liberties on the part of those who are blind to the triumph of such destructive views. In the nightmare of life the password of light should be aesthetic order. In a practical world run amuck, order thus understood would symbolize harmony of nationalism, internationalism and universality in the same sense as form symbolizes harmony in the world of creative imagination. This correlation between the *raison d'être* of literature and human fate is not a will-o-the-wisp. Should it be considered as such, then double-talk and double-dealing would continue as the inevitable pattern of conflict, and evil, as an incoherent but powerful force, would co-exist with the hopelessness of the human struggle.

One meets gifted writers who are unable to realize their vision of universality.

They know that self-realization is not sufficient. They are hurt by their own incompetence. In such instances the creative strain is greater than the result of the creative effort. Much modern literature is a pathetic or bizarre symptom of unconquered form. There is no substitute for perfection. In a genuine *ars poetica* the standard of literary greatness can never be second-rate. There can be revaluation of literary works, but there cannot be a revaluation of the postulate of perfection. Form rescues man from the vanity of imperfection. This is, indeed, the paramount contribution of literature to life; it compels man, endowed with a "God-bearing" imagination, to recognize his affinity with the All, despite his graceless tendency to abandon the roots of his dignity.

Literature does not save man for eternity, but it does suggest that poor mortals may find some order and meaning in the uncertain structure of everyday experience. The proper understanding of the significance and relationship of nationalism, internationalism, and universality in literature should help us in our struggle to recognize great literature, and through it to understand the confusing forces everywhere about us.

THE FUNCTION OF AESTHETICS IN HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

GUSTAV E. MUELLER

If we consider Hegel's system as the last great metaphysical synthesis of European philosophy, then all significant voices which become audible in the century after Hegel's death may be said to be raised in angry protest against this synthesis. But they combat Hegel in the most irreconcilable and opposite directions. There is nothing in common among those opponents, except that they are all dissatisfied with this dialectical idealism. And this process occurs on all fronts, in all disciplines of philosophy. The irrationalistic metaphysics of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche attacks Hegel's supposed panlogism, whereas scientism, which restricts knowledge to exact sciences, accuses Hegel of a wild, romantic irrationalism. In politics the confusion is particularly prolific. For liberals Hegel is the reactionary eulogist of the Prussian state, although the said state viewed him with concern as an archliberal and prohibited his last essay on the English Reform Bill from appearing in print. National Socialists denounced him because of the universalism of his Reason, of his Christian religion, and of his European, humanistic, cosmopolitan outlook. Franz Böhm, the Nazi philosopher in Heidelberg, declared that Hegel is the greatest corrupter of German youth, who must be forgotten, because to refute him would take a lot of logic. But anti-Nazis see in him the father of National Socialism, on account of his doctrine of world-historical peoples and their mission which is not subject to moral codes or legal systems embodied in particular states. Marxism and communism, likewise, swear by the word of Marx that he has refuted Hegel and replaced idealism by historic materialism; but critics of Marxism find that

Marx borrowed a few thoughts from Hegel and applied them to his political purposes.

In philosophy of religion Hegel is blamed for having given the Christian orthodoxy a new lease on life, but both liberal and neo-orthodox Christians see in him their greatest danger because he translates their own Christian religions into a symbolic language whose real meaning is philosophy and not "varieties of religious experience."

Aesthetics makes no exception. *Ita est*: Zimmermann, Danzel and others charge that Hegel has undone the progress made by Kant in freeing aesthetic from logic and ethics and putting it on its own feet as an independent philosophical discipline. They think that Hegel has regressed to the eighteenth century rationalism of Baumgarten, according to which beauty is a disguised instruction of general truths, a sugarcoated application of the bitter medicine of pure thought.

Sed contra est: Rudolf Haym in his book *Hegel und seine Zeit*, which appeared in 1855, says that Hegel has on the contrary subordinated all reason, logic and cognition to aesthetic principles. He sacrifices truth to an artistic delight to create an artistic whole, a system as a work of art. Lange, in his *History of Materialism*, repeats this charge in saying that what Hegel's metaphysics amounts to is a sort of pseudopoetry, a poetry in concepts, which is an artistic achievement good for emotional edification.

Ita est: Wilhelm Dilthey calls Hegel's aesthetics a content-aesthetics, by which he means that it is concerned with the ethical ideals that move the heart. Art renders such objective spiritual contents sensuously articulate, and thus participates in a historical process that is fundamentally educational.

Sed contra est: Soeren Kierkegaard claims that Hegel's aesthetics makes man melancholy because it seduces him to be irresponsible, preventing him from ethical seriousness, barring him from ethical existence.

Ita est: For various empirical, positivistic, pragmatic, psychological, technical, historical and sociological approaches to aesthetics, Hegel's aesthetics need not be studied because it is "speculative" and one can not consult it like a dictionary on any exact detail. "Speculative" was supposed to be a killing word like "taboo."

Sed contra est: Aestheticians of pure art, as for example the circle around Stephan George, find Hegel's aesthetics pedestrian and too much filled with stuff and information.

Ita est: Older Hegelians, Rosenkranz and especially F. Vischer, who has written a monumental six-volume work on aesthetics, emphasize the processional, evolutionary aspect of Hegel's aesthetics. This is also the standpoint of Bosanquet's history of aesthetics. He says: "Any vanishing element in being replaced by something which better harmonizes with the systematic and causal process as a whole, is giving way before necessities. . . . Beauty is the show or semblance of the Idea. . . . But the Idea as such is the concrete world process" (p. 336).

Sed contra est: Helmut Kuhn in his book *Die Vollendung der klassischen deutschen Aesthetik durch Hegel*, and again in his Hegel chapter in Gilbert and Kuhn's *History of Esthetics*, says: "Spirit is wholly immersed in reality, materialized in

history¹; and such history, at any rate the history of art, has no future. . . . There is no want of art in his perfect cosmos, and, as a consequence, no striving after new aims. Art is viewed as a phenomenon of the past" (p. 438).

I suppose that I now should follow my Thomistic exposition in so many *ita est* and *sed contra est* with the proper *respondeo dicendum*, taking up point by point. But this being a rather tedious method which would constantly presuppose what we want to know, namely what the function of aesthetics in Hegel's philosophy is, I shall confine my *respondeo dicendum* to the last point.

The statement quoted from Kuhn mainly refers to three pages early in the general introduction of Hegel's aesthetics, which seem to justify it. But although these passages seem to sound similar to the statement, they nevertheless do not say the same thing. I quote: "Only a certain circle and level of truth is capable of being rendered in the element of a work of art. . . . A deeper conception of truth, however, is not so akin and friendly to sensate materials as to be expressed adequately by them. We have gone beyond that stage where we could have worshipped works of art and held them to be divine; the impression they make on us is of a more reflected kind. . . . Thought has transcended art. . . . Art remains, as far as its highest meaning is concerned, a thing of the past. . . . It invites us to contemplative reflection, which does not intend to produce new art, but to recognize scientifically what art is."

Now does this say that "art has no future"? Does it say there is "no want of art"? Does it view "art as phenomenon of the past"? It seems to me, Hegel makes none of those rather nonsensical assertions. What he says is simply that art has ceased to function as philosophy, which it can do only when philosophy is a mythical worldview capable of poetic and artistic rendering, exemplified by Hegel in the mythical Greek and the equally mythical Christian Middle Ages. He says, secondly, that a philosophical comprehension of art is not artistic, but logical, and that such a philosophical aesthetics is not a technical recipe to manufacture art.

The whole passage, I would further interpret, is directed against a Romantic aestheticism, as it was promulgated at one time by Schelling, who proclaimed art as the organ of philosophy, through which alone man apprehends what reality is.

If Hegel's philosophy intended to reconcile contradictions and oppositions, it was, judged by such effects, not successful. The contradictions hated to be reconciled. What, then, shall we do with them? There are three logical possibilities.

We can assume them all to be true. Then four pairs of mutually exclusive negations would reduce Hegel's aesthetics to the mumbo-jumbo of a confusion greater than which none can be conceived.

We can, secondly, assume that one set of assertions is true as against the other set of contradictory assertions. Then Hegel's aesthetics is rescued from four of his critics, while the other four reduce it to that which he wanted above all to avoid, namely to several very onesided and abstract notions, which still would remain at odds among themselves.

¹ This sounds more like Marx than Hegel; it overlooks the function of "negativity" in Hegel's thinking.

Or, finally, we may assume that none of the critics is just to the Hegelian aesthetics, because they all do not use the logic of concrete thinking on which it is based and which it presupposes. They then would all fail to see the function of aesthetics in Hegel's philosophy.

It is this last assumption which we propose to explore.

Take the central definition of beauty as the absolute in the art-form of a sensuous show. This definition does not subject art to reason, or reason to art; it does not absorb aesthetics by ethics, nor does it destroy ethics by aesthetics; it neither drowns art in an endless historical-processional relativism nor does it bring evolution to an artificial stand or condemn art to be perfect as a past achievement; it does not close doors to any detailed experiences, nor is it obtuse to the pure ideality of art.

What this definition does do is to think of the aesthetic sphere of creations and enjoyments as a peculiar modification of the whole of life, and at the same time to differentiate it from other equally important functions of life.

It is rooted in the dialectical logic of philosophy, which is not identical with the formal logic of object sciences, but includes the latter. All rationalistic misunderstandings of Hegel, and all irrationalistic attacks on him, are due to the failure to pay attention to this relation of dialectical and formal logic.

Logic is fundamentally dialectical in that reason comprehends, criticizes and limits itself. Formal logic, however, is not attentive to this fundamental logical self-reflection, because it is absorbed by another question, namely how reason comprehends and criticizes the given sense data. Given perceptual materials, by being apprehended in logical forms, are transformed into facts or objects of knowledge. This transformation of the given is, though, never quite successful. The materials remain obstreperous and resist complete rationalization. Object knowledge, hence, is dialectically understood as this concrete struggle to bring unity and rational order into an irrationally given and objecting material. Object knowledge is a dialectical unity of those rational and irrational, conceptual and perceptual opposites. Such a process of empirical knowledge, guided by its own formal goal of consistency, is a real, concrete process of life. Life as such a struggle for cognitive clarity concerning the given, reveals a living reality as seeking clarity and consistency without being or having it.

Reason is not rationalistic. It limits itself. Only an undialectical reason may become fanatical and rationalistic and insist that general abstractions are or reveal what is. But reason is not restricted by the material principle of what is given in somebody's perception. Logic is not confined to scientific knowledge. The scientific process is not the only form of life that is important to philosophy. And as philosophy is a thinking comprehension, both of cognitive and of non-cognitive forms and functions of life, it must have a logic enabling it to make true statements concerning those noncognitive values of existence.

This, then, is the function of aesthetics in Hegel's philosophy: to think logically how the noncognitive realm of aesthetics helps in constituting that which truly is. The logical universe of being is a self-differentiating unity, in which cognitive as well as noncognitive processes of life are equally real and equally important. This implies that man, whether predominantly engaged in scientific, practical-moral, or artistic pursuits, can not find and maintain the harmony and totality

of his existence, if he does not become philosophical in understanding the mutual limitations of all of his functions in their dialectical-logical necessity. Man is completely human only when he understands what he lives.

We return once more to the definition that beauty is the absolute in the art-form of a sensuous show. This definition may be transformed to read: it is in art and in art alone that the idea of an absolute, self-determining, and all comprehensive whole of reality can be reconciled with sensuous appearance. This is the mission and the philosophical justification of art.

The world of the senses, *mundus sensibilis*, as such is irrational and superficial; it is literally nothing but surface. It is completely alien to any kind of comprehension. It is being in its abstractest immediacy. But as appearing, the sense-datum is appearing to somebody whose perception it is. As such it is a reciprocal being-for-others.

The sensuous surface, then, is no longer taken in its abstractness by itself, but it is interpreted as a medium which mediates one and other, you and me. It thus becomes a transparent gesture revealing essential or living reality. As such an expressive and qualitative gesture of life the sensuous world can be freed from the duality of one and other, you and me. It may be freely created to express a common life and a common feeling. It then becomes an artistic symbol in which this common life is felt.

But this is still insufficient. Art must collect all sensuous moments into a finality, in which a change in one place would disturb the whole composition; and into a self-explaining totality, which is perfection of form. Then and only then is the reconciliation complete, which makes of art not only a symbol of life, but also a finite symbol of the idea.

Several reviewers of the *World as Spectacle*² have informed the public and the author, in varying tones of disapproval, that he is a "Hegelian." I know him well enough to say that this is a questionable statement. I remember that the author has found a large part of Hegel's writing unintelligible verbalism, and that he has never subscribed to Hegel's system. All this does not prevent him from also finding most valuable rewards in studying one of the greatest thinkers of history, just as he has found similar rewards in the study of many others. Philosophy can not afford to ignore Hegel. What counts is not what Hegel or anyone else has found or said, but whether it is true or not.

"What is true is everlastingly present. What is not true is obscurantism, error, and opinion; or arbitrary strivings and transitory tendenciousness". (Hegel, W. W. Frommann, V. 328)

² Philosophical Library, New York, 1944.

RELATIVISM AGAIN¹

BERNARD C. HEYL

"As there are different beauties, all of equal grace, in different bodies, different judges of like intelligence will judge them to be of great variety among themselves, each according to his predilection." Dürer.

A pernicious and prevalent idea claims that there are only two possible critical positions toward evaluation. Accordingly we must either be subjectivists or objectivists, nihilists or absolutists. No middle ground is possible. This idea, which has been the major source of criticism of my book, *New Bearings in Esthetics and Art Criticism*, needs refutation.

In the following pages I hope to show that a third position, relativism, is one that presents basic differences from both subjectivism and absolutism.² An understanding of these differences should prove that relativism is the most satisfactory theory for the formulation of value judgments and should thus eliminate the alleged necessity for accepting either of two unsound alternatives.

Relativism and Subjectivism

According to subjectivism, value is best defined in terms of an individual response which, in the case of aesthetic value, ordinarily is an immediate emotional state that delights. It follows that the critic's evaluations are matters of individual tastes which are at once self-justifying and incapable of justification. They are unreasoned, arbitrary, intuitive preferences or likings. What *I* like is good and what *I* prefer is better. *De gustibus non est disputandum*. Thus subjectivist criticism is purely personal and impressionistic in that it aims to record in writing sensations experienced in the presence of a work of art.

According to relativism, value may also be defined in psychological terms. Like subjectivism, that is to say, one aspect of relativism holds that value exists, not ontologically, but psychologically—as, for example, "the qualitative content of an apprehending process." Though this similarity between their theories allies relativism with subjectivism and differentiates both from absolutism, relativism, unlike subjectivism, insists upon the necessity and importance, when evaluating, of deliberation and reflection. Mere preference and liking, though an essential condition, is an insufficient one for the activity of valuing, since that activity should in large measure depend upon the rational factor of thoughtful inquiry. This distinction between subjectivist and relativist theory—a distinction that one may also apply when differentiating "taste" and "judgment"—may be further elucidated, following John Dewey, by contrasting certain words in pairs, the first word indicating the preference of subjectivism, the

¹ The problems discussed in this essay are by no means new. Because of their importance, however, and because contemporary art criticism is, in the main, undistinguished, a reconsideration of critical theories seems desirable and timely.

² Throughout I shall use the word "absolutism" rather than "objectivism" since the latter seems peculiarly subject to ambiguous interpretations. If anyone prefers to call either the absolutism or the relativism here discussed "objectivism," he is raising, of course, only a verbal problem.

second, the conclusion of relativism: desired and desirable, satisfying and satisfactory, admired and admirable. Thus relativist criticism is largely based upon cognitive judgment, upon a serious, reasoned discrimination between good and bad, better and worse.

The significance of these differences between subjectivism and relativism appears in the divergent answers these positions give to such crucial critical questions as the following: are some appreciations better than others? can superior artistic judgments be cultivated? is education in the Fine Arts possible?

The subjectivist critic, if he is consistent, must answer these questions negatively. Since value for him is an immediate and emotional, an unreasoned and unreflective state, he cannot show *why* one taste is superior to another, or *how* tastes may improve. Thus he cannot sensibly maintain that an unsophisticated, untutored evaluation is worse than his own. He can merely point out that it is different. These, then, are the disastrous consequences of subjectivism; for, as John Dewey explains, "The conception that mere liking is adequate to constitute a value situation makes no provision for the education and cultivation of taste and renders criticism, whether aesthetic, moral or logical, arbitrary and absurd."³

The relativist critic takes a very different stand. Believing that value is conditioned to a considerable extent by deliberation and reflection, he affirms that artistic sensitivity and appreciation may be enormously enhanced, perhaps even acquired, through training and experience. He is convinced, for example, that the change from one's youthful appreciations to those of maturity reflects genuine improvement: that, in some significant sense, Dickens is superior to Dreiser, Giotto to Taddeo Gaddi, Beethoven to Bruckner. Again, he claims that the judgment of the expert critic is superior to that of the naive amateur who "knows what he likes," in that the critic's choice has been made through enlightened artistic knowledge and experience. He will therefore attempt to explain, as specifically as possible, why the evaluations of the mature man and of the expert are the finer ones. Unlike subjectivism, then, relativism recognizes and elucidates the important fact of growth and education in artistic sensitivity.

In at least one other important critical respect subjectivism and relativism notably differ. Subjectivist criticism, being wholly personal, intuitive and impressionistic, does not require standards. How, indeed, could standards of any sort be useful to a type of criticism which evaluates solely by expressing immediate pleasures and displeasures? Since standards cannot serve its aims, subjectivism is logically correct in repudiating them.

Relativism, on the other hand, finds critical standards of the utmost importance.⁴ Though these differ markedly, as I shall later explain, from the standards of absolutism, they nonetheless give relativist criticism a special and important sort of objectivity totally absent from subjectivism. They form, that is to say, a specific frame of reference toward which specific evaluations are directed. If, then, relativist standards are clearly expounded, specific value

³ "The Meaning of Value," *Journal of Philosophy*, February, 1925, p. 131.

⁴ For a more complete analysis of relativist standards, see the author's *New Bearings in Esthetics and Art Criticism* (New Haven, 1943).

judgments become universally comprehensible. By elucidating his standards the critic enables his audience at least to *understand* his evaluations. This principle, which I call "Logical Relativism", is perhaps the most stabilizing one in criticism.

We may cite an example to illustrate the efficacy of logical relativism by noting diverse ratings accorded Bramantino's Adoration of the Magi in the National Gallery, London. Adolfo Venturi admires the picture greatly, finding in it an effect of "regal splendour" and a supreme example of the art of balancing cubistic masses. This judgment is based upon a standard which values highly formal compositional effects. Berenson, on the contrary, though granting that the picture is "winning", finds in it no evidence of serious art. This verdict is readily comprehensible too, since we know that, for Berenson, serious art must present notable tactile values, movement and space composition. A third, and still less exalted appraisal of the painting, will be given by one who, like myself, considers the standard of "associative form" a basic one. According to this standard, the painting is inferior since certain gestures, postures and expressions seem affectedly conceived and ill related to the given theme, The Adoration of the Magi. All three judgments are comprehensible since we know the standards upon which they are based.

A more extended discussion of relativism than is necessary for my specific aim would show that values are conditioned by, and relative to, specific cultural groups and periods. This conviction of the relativist further distinguishes his position from subjectivism by the spread and duration of its values. Whereas subjective evaluations are logically binding only for the individual and for the moment, relative ones are binding, *ordinarily*, for particular groups of people during a particular cultural age. Ordinarily, that is to say, since some few evaluations are agreed upon by many types of people in many different ages. This occasional widespread agreement in no sense, however, proves that values have absolute subsistence; rather, it is the natural consequence of certain rare emotional and intellectual qualities that are common to the majority of mankind.

Since the foregoing critical positions differ in these several ways, it seems reasonable to differentiate them by using different terminology. If he wishes to do so, one is at perfect liberty, to be sure, to call relativism a "type of subjectivism" or an "enlightened subjectivism," but by doing so he would be muddling, in a field where lucidity is all too rare, vital critical distinctions.

Relativism and Absolutism

According to absolutism, value is best defined as a quality that is intrinsic to the object in the sense that it has ontological subsistence and is independent of any relation to the mind. It follows that the absolutist critic will believe in the existence of absolute, ultimate standards and will hold that there is one and only one "correct taste," "right judgment," "real estimate," or "true verdict." His concern, therefore, will be to strive to achieve that perfect and infallible evaluation which, given his assumptions, must exist.

Relativism, we have seen, accepts, as one of its aspects, a psychological definition of value. It also accepts, however, a definition of value which centers

one's attention primarily on the object and which, therefore, *seems* to associate it with absolutism. This definition considers value as a *relational* property of an object or as the *capacity* of an object to produce an effect upon someone. It is a *potential* quality which becomes actual only in a transaction with an individual. To explain this meaning concretely: a work of art is valuable in the same sense in which milk is nourishing and cyanide poisonous.

Now some "*objectivists*" will assert that *their* notion of value is precisely this relational one. Realizing that values are in some way connected with human relationships, and being unwilling, therefore, to contend that they exist in a realm of pure and eternal forms, these objectivists will repudiate absolutism and will claim that the relational interpretation of value, since it correctly explains their views, should be called "objective" rather than "relative". Or, instead of distinguishing between absolutism and relativism, they will prefer to distinguish between "absolute and relative objectivism." This preference, I must insist, is essentially a verbal one which should in no serious way affect the present discussion. Anyone who wishes for the remainder of this paper to substitute for the term "relativism" either "objectivism" or "relative objectivism" is entirely free to do so.

The relativist further believes that values are significantly dependent upon one's culture and environment, upon one's temperament and experience. His standards, contrasting with the allegedly fixed and infallible ones of the absolutist, are flexible and tentative. As a critic, he denies that there are unchangeable and absolute evaluations and urges, rather, that value judgments are largely conditioned by individual attitudes, particular social groups and specific civilizations.⁵ His theory and practice, unlike those of absolutism, make no pretensions to timelessness and to universality.

Though to attempt with any fulness either to challenge absolutism or to defend relativism is a task beyond the scope of this essay, we may point up the foregoing paramount distinctions between them by trying to understand what each position entails in the light of concrete illustrations.

What stand shall we take, for example, toward the acceptance of certain well known opposed cultural ideals? Is Communism right for Russia and wrong for America? Is suicide honorable in Japan and dishonorable in America? Is polygamy good in Islam and bad in Christendom? Is homosexuality justifiable in ancient Greece and unjustifiable in America? Was Plato right or wrong in condemning the family as a legal and ethical institution and in abolishing it from his republic? Was the Paideia of the Greeks correct and the Paideia of the Persians incorrect? Are Quakers right or wrong in condemning the use of alcohol?

The absolutist, affirming that moral codes are unchangeable, will assert that there is one, and only one, correct or true attitude toward communism, suicide, polygamy and so forth. The relativist, affirming that the values of moral codes

⁵ Though one may effectively argue that much modern art is created as a reaction *against* contemporary capitalist society, this very reaction indicates the great influence of that society upon the art that rejects it.

vary with the varying ideals of society and surroundings, may accept as a positive value for its own culture many divergent creeds, though he may himself reject one or all of them. He will be impressed, moreover, by the absurd spectacle of absolutists of different times and places fundamentally disagreeing and will draw the conclusion that the absolutist position is, in fact, a decidedly provincial one.

We may further contrast absolutism and relativism by considering the types of standards to which each subscribes. For the absolutist critic these standards are universal, fixed and eternal. But what examples may one name? What standards of this sort can one apply? Surely they cannot, in any significant sense, be concrete. For if a critic cites as his absolute standards certain reasonably specific qualities which seem to him of ultimate value—for example, plastic form and rhythmic movement in painting—he at once encounters another critic who evaluates these qualities quite differently. If he should claim that *his* particular standards alone characterize all painting that is genuinely art, he is being at once presumptuous and question-begging. If one selects standards of a more abstract nature, there will not, to be sure, be such disagreement. If one asserts, for example, that “unity” or “harmony” or “communication” or “beauty” or “expression” is essential to the best art, there would be quite general agreement, *provided* the meanings of these terms were not too carefully defined but were left sufficiently general and vague. But is it not obvious that, as the specific applicability of standards to works of art diminishes, their critical usefulness and significance diminish also? The most abstract standards are surely the most empty, therefore the most futile.

There is one standard, currently accepted by Crocean critics, which, if satisfactory, would staunchly support the absolutist position toward evaluation. According to Lionello Venturi, the absolute standard of judgment is to be found, not in any object, but in the soul, imagination, or artistic personality of the painter. Here we find, he claims, an absolute, intrinsic value. Critical conclusions are right or wrong since they are based upon this quality, that is, upon the personality or imagination of the artist. The aim of criticism is to reconstruct artistic personalities and to discover whether they have expressed themselves well or badly. In Croce’s terminology, the absolute or objective value of a work of art depends upon the degree of harmony between the artist’s intuition and expression, or “between the poet’s vision and his handiwork.” In simpler language, has the artist successfully fulfilled his intention?

Unfortunately for the absolutist position, this supposedly ultimate standard has proved vulnerable for two principal reasons. First, how is the intention of the artist and its success to be accurately determined? No lesser names than Henri Focillon, T. S. Eliot and Roger Fry have in recent years asserted that the critic and the artist often find different meanings in a work;⁶ and, as John Dewey remarks: “It is absurd to ask what an artist ‘really’ meant by his product; he himself would find different meanings in it at different days and hours and in different stages of his own development.”⁷ Second, by so stressing the import-

⁶ *New Bearings in Esthetics and Art Criticism*, pp. 113–114.

⁷ *Art as Experience*, New York, 1934, pp. 108–109.

ance of an exact balance between the intuition and expression of the artist, Crocean critics seem to put at a premium sheer technical perfection and to ignore distinctions in value between the important and unimportant, between the major and the minor. Artistic perfection becomes the sole criterion, artistic greatness or significance is ignored. In addition to these two general objections to the standard in question, a highly concrete and personal one may be added. When Lionello Venturi concludes, specifically on the basis of his own theses, that the *Bathers* by Renoir in the Tyson Collection is "anti-artistic" and lacks "the creative spirit of Renoir, his joy, his grace, his animation,"⁸ he vitiates, for one critic at least, his entire argument.

In a number of ways the standards of relativist criticism differ basically from those of absolutism. They are, to begin with, empirical criteria, not rigid rules, which have been evolved from human choice and experience. They are working hypotheses or codified principles which critics formulate as they study and appreciate works of art. Unlike the unalterable prescriptions of absolutism, they are tentative and flexible, as already pointed out, in that they may at any time be revised.

Again, relativist standards differ greatly from absolutist ones in respect to their specificity. Because of the underlying assumptions of absolutism, that position, we saw, reasonably necessitates critical standards that are abstract rather than concrete, vague rather than definite. According to relativism, on the other hand, standards may be as specific as one chooses to make them. The varying ideals of diversely constituted critics may all be used as frameworks for their particular evaluations, one critic establishing a criterion of "significant form," another of "life-communicating quality," a third of "simplicity and restraint," a fourth of "realism" and so on. *Provided they are reflected upon and intelligently formulated*, these and many other principles are acceptable to relativist theory.

That diverging or even opposed standards are tenable in relativist criticism should surprise no one. Whereas absolutism claims that, if one of two contradictory criteria is to be accepted, the other is to be rejected, if one is right, the other is wrong, relativism, recognizing the dependence of values upon differing cultures and temperaments, asserts the legitimacy of many different claims. Relativism believes, that is to say, that ideals, hence values, of all sorts change from period to period and that, within one period, there are differently constituted yet equally sensitive and cultured critics who naturally subscribe to varied, yet equally valuable standards and judgments. These beliefs, which one may conveniently term "Psychological Relativism," are corner stones of relativist theory and practice.

An enormous amount of empirical critical evidence supports the contentions of psychological relativism.⁹ While the presentation of any substantial portion

⁸ *The Art Bulletin*, December, 1944, p. 273.

⁹ Some of this evidence is cited in the following works: F. P. Chambers, *The History of Taste*, New York, 1932; E. E. Kellett, *The Whirligig of Taste*, London, 1929; E. E. Kellett, *Fashion in Literature*, London, 1931; Joan Evans, *Taste and Temperament*, New York, 1939; B. C. Heyl, *New Bearings in Esthetics and Art Criticism*, New Haven, 1943; Henri Peyre, *Writers and Their Critics*, Ithaca, 1944.

of this evidence is clearly impossible in a short essay, the citation of a few characteristic samples will at least indicate what kind of critical facts impress the relativist.

A historical study of the ratings accorded any artist or his work, for example, will in all probability reveal remarkably diverse value judgments, not only between the most sensitive critics of different periods but between those of the same period. For Leonardo's contemporaries, his caricatures seemed typical of his art, his *S. John* a success; for us, the caricatures are decidedly exceptional in his *oeuvre*, the *S. John* a failure. For Dr. Mather, *The Last Supper* "is perhaps the most impressive picture in the world;" for Langdon Douglas it is unconvincing in its artificiality, exaggeration, bombast. Differences of critical opinion today are equally striking in regard to more recent art. Though an absolutist might argue that diversity in evaluations upon painting, say, since 1870 may be accounted for because the closeness and newness of this art make its meanings for us difficult, should he not be uneasy when confronted with the bewildering diversity of evaluations upon earlier 19th century art? The work of Gericault, according to Wilenski, is "coarse and derivative," yet Fry tells us that this painter "was almost the most gifted artist of the 19th century." Professors A. M. Friend and P. J. Sachs, the two most gifted teachers of French painting I have known, evaluate the art of Delacroix in opposite ways: for Friend this art is exaggerated, artificial and unimportant; for Sachs it is vital, stirring and great. Whereas some of the best contemporary critics sum up their views upon Millet by the terms "insincere" and "sentimental," others conclude that he is a convincing and profound artist. Such diversity of opinion, I submit, may be multiplied almost indefinitely. For, as Hume somewhere remarks, "As the variety of taste is obvious to the most careless enquirer; so will it be found, on examination, to be still greater in reality than in appearance."

Does not this psychological relativism, the absolutist will surely ask, make knowledge impossible, judgment pointless and value illusory? Only, we reply, to those who, because of their persistent demand for absolutes, blindly deny, misinterpret or attempt to explain away critical empirical facts. To all others the recognition of relativity and of multivalence is both realistic and reasonable. "It shifts the issues to firmer grounds, in fact removes the issues from the realm of illusion—the realm of eternal truths that turn out to be so strangely contradictory and so temporal—by bringing them within the scope of intelligent inquiry into actual conditions."¹⁰ In short, the irreducible critical differences which make absolutism seem unintelligible and absurd, are readily accounted for by psychological relativism.

What bearing will this relativism have upon the critic's attitude toward his evaluations? I would emphasize two prime considerations. First, each critic should realize, deep down, that his appraisals are markedly relative since they depend in part upon his particular psychological make-up, philosophical outlook and cultural environment. He should therefore remember that equally competent, though differently constituted critics, may disagree with his evaluations, and he should recognize as fully as possible, difficult though it may be to do so, the reasons for and the reasonableness of other claims. Second, he should

¹⁰ H. J. Muller, *Science and Criticism*, New Haven, 1943, p. 17.

affirm his judgments with the full realization that, *for himself and for others with comparable background and basic attitudes*, they are the accepted and correct ones. They are not the unarguable preferences of the subjectivist, but are thoughtful, reasoned appraisals. They are as binding and as true for him as any evaluations subscribed to by an absolutist.

The foregoing considerations evidently determine in large measure the policy that a *teacher* should employ. Recognizing the validity or truth of his opinions *from one point of view*, he will communicate them as convincingly, persuasively and enthusiastically as he can. Recognizing also, however, their relativity, he will never attempt to force their acceptance, but will rather explain in what sense differing judgments may be correct and why the quest for the values of absolutism is a foolish and futile one.

In conclusion I wish to urge that critical relativism is not merely a cautionary attitude evolved in order to avoid certain difficulties inherent in other theories. It is a distinctive position which differs radically from subjectivism and absolutism and which, therefore, should be carefully distinguished from both. It cannot, to be sure, be formulated with exactitude. Thus, for example, since the relativist cannot define with finality the competent, cultured, sensitive or expert critic, his position is, to a degree, unavoidably imprecise. But as Aristotle insists, the accuracy of conclusions necessarily varies according to the field under investigation. In his own words, "Our discussion will be adequate if we are content with as much precision as is appropriate to the subject-matter; for the same degree of exactitude ought no more to be expected in all kinds of reasoning than in all kinds of handicraft. . . . Let each of the views put forward be accepted in this spirit, for it is the mark of an educated mind to seek only so much exactness in each type of inquiry as may be allowed by the nature of the subject-matter."

LETTERS PRO AND CON

TO THE EDITOR:

After reading Hilaire Hiler's article, "Some Associational Aspects of Color,"¹ certain comments occur to me. The article can be divided into two sections, the second of which seems to me an original and worthwhile contribution to the color field. Mathew Luckiesh in *Color and Colors*² has included a chapter called "Poets are Painters," in which he lists many quotations wherein the associational aspects of color are suggested. He catalogues these quotations under six distinct color headings. Mr. Hiler does more than this. He has systematized the associational meanings of color as disclosed in literature with respect to slight variations in hue. He has inferred that, after making the necessary allowances for cultural preconditioning, slight variations in hue bring distinct and uni-

¹ *Journal of Aesthetics*, IV, 4, p. 202, June, 1946.

² Luckiesh, M., *Color and Colors*, N. Y.; D. Van Nostrand Co., 1938, pp. 188-202.

versally accepted divergence in derived psychological associations. This hypothesis is interesting, new, and should challenge further study.

The first part of Mr. Hilér's article is a plea for scientific definiteness in describing those nuances of color which are later made the basis of the study of associational meanings. No one would question the necessity for this. I would disagree with Mr. Hilér, not in regard to the need but in regard to the basis which he would suggest for systematization. Inasmuch as he devotes approximately one half of his article to a criticism of present bases and to an explanation of his proposed basis, I find that I am not in accord with a considerable portion of Mr. Hilér's work. Hence—this letter.

Mr. Hilér has by implication opened up broader horizons than he has specifically denoted. For instance, he says that, "it would hardly seem necessary . . . to dissect and criticize existing systems." Then in almost the next breath he says that they are, "in general too arbitrary, insufficiently relativistic and elastic. They are also unnecessarily complicated as to registration and terminology." This, it seems to me, is fairly drastic criticism. Should one let it go unchallenged or should one take up the cudgel in behalf of at least the officially I.S.C.C. accepted system? To do the latter would require many words and the combined knowledge of many colorists.

Next, Mr. Hilér describes the characteristics of a system which he could accept, the implication again being that present systems are inadequate in these respects. He suggests his own thirty hue circuit as an ideal. Before passing to the positive merits which he claims for his system, it is interesting to view it in the light of several objections he raises to other systems.

Why, for instance, label another system as being too arbitrary and then suggest one which was personally conceived? The existing systems, of which the Munsell and the Ostwald are certainly the most important, may each have originated in the mind of one man, but they have been subject to a great deal of impersonal logic since their inception. Since 1919,³ for instance, the Bureau of Standards has been studying and amending many of the Munsell standards. To my knowledge the Hilér system has not been submitted to such discipline.

Again Mr. Hilér suggests his own system because existing systems are "insufficiently relativistic." By this I should assume Mr. Hilér to mean that in other systems there is not the possibility of relating the various fields of color work to one another. By the various fields, I mean the physical, the psycho-physical and the psychological. As a division of the physical, one should likewise mention the aspect of the physical which deals with transmitted or reflected light,—in other words with the colorants, namely, the pigments and dyes. In referring to criticism of other systems, Mr. Hilér cites an article by Bond and Nickerson.⁴ In this article the conclusion is drawn that one reason the Munsell system is more valuable is because "the three-dimensional concept of hue, value and chroma is identifiable with the psychological and psycho-physical concepts used in color-

³ Tyler, J. E. and Hardy, A. C., "An analysis of the original Munsell system." *Journal of the Optical Society of America*, XXX (1940), pp. 587-590.

⁴ Bond, M. E. and Nickerson, D., "Color-order Systems, Munsell and Ostwald," *Journal of the Optical Society of America*, XXXII (1942) pp. 709-719.

imetry, while the three dimensional concept of Ostwald's full color—black content and white content is not." Inasmuch as Hiler's next step is to systematize his colors in a method similar to Ostwald, the Bond and Nickerson criticism of the unrelativity of the Ostwald system would hold equally true of the Hiler system. Thus it is to his own rather than to other systems that he should look when he says "unrelated."

Mr. Hiler makes some direct claims for his own system. He speaks first of its asymmetry, but does not elaborate this point. Then he says that the ideal system "should coincide with the objective facts and limitations of materials for their formulation in a systematic manner." He is referring to the desirable possibility of easily reproducing the material color standards with opaque pigments. In making this suggestion I think Mr. Hiler is right. It is certain that any system would be of greater use if its material standards could be readily duplicated with available pigments. This coordination between colorant medium and ordered standards is an accomplished fact in the commercial world. I refer to the coordinated color work that has been done by groups of concerns which manufacture wallpaper, paint, textiles and home furnishings in general. Their system and recipes for coordination are, of course, trade secrets. The public is only shown the results under such beguiling but unscientific names as Hope Turquoise, Pacific Lime and Peace Blue.⁵

The suppression of color recipes is not altogether selfishly motivated. It is not as simple to reproduce a material color as Mr. Hiler indicates. The surface to be covered in relation to the opacity of the pigment, the fastness and chemical nature of the pigment, its spectral reflectance or transmission curve, the size of its granules,—these are all variables in the equation. Any recipe would have to be highly specific in order to be effective.

Moreover, as desirable as recipes for reproduction of material color standards would be, one must realize that they represent only one small cog in the whole machinery of color coordination. Even to the practical painter this cog is only of minor importance. It is part of his craftsman's equipment, but it is second to the psychological ordering of his color concepts. In the end his chief concern is with color effects. Thus a system which orders the colors with regard to their psychological effects is his first need.

That his thirty hue circuit is so ordered is the third claim which Mr. Hiler makes for it. Mr. Hiler is not the first author to make this claim for his system. Mr. Birren says that his "rational color wheel" has been so ordered.⁶ The sponsors of the Munsell system have apparently likewise given this matter some thought. In a letter written to me in June, 1939, by Mrs. Blanche Bellamy, then of the Munsell Color Company, in reply to a query concerning a similar question, she says, "the claim that Munsell colors are not truly classified as visual sensations is just as misleading as to say that the notes on a certain piano were not truly classified as auditory sensations if one or two of the notes were not in perfect tune. Munsell colors have been classified on the basis of the very

⁵ Textile Color Card Association, *Woolen Color Card for Spring 1946*.

⁶ Birren, F., *Monument to Color*, N. Y.; McFarlane, Warde, McFarlane, 1938, p. 31.

best visual methods available⁷ and through enthusiastic cooperation of many scientists in the color field, improvement of the visual basis of Munsell colors is being worked out steadily. If ————— is really sincere, he will join with those who are experts in the color field in their research which aims to make the Munsell system better."

The third aspect of Mr. Hiler's proposed basis for color systematization, following his denunciation of other systems and his proposed substitution of one based on his own hue circuit, deals with a suggested basis for color terminology. Here, it seems to me, he is like the horticulturist who wishes to preserve the common garden variety of name because of its connotative interest and yet wants to discriminate in choice between *Aquilegia Canadensis* and *Aquilegia Caerulea*. His solution is the correlation of these two types of names, the commonly used and the scientific, by some super dictionary which would likewise contain the whimsical fashion names. Scientific correlation between wave length and material color standard has already been accomplished both for the Ostwald and the Munsell systems.⁸ Likewise the correlation between the Munsell terminology and the Maerz and Paul *Dictionary of Color Names* is in progress.⁹ The ISCC-NBS method of designating colors is standard for the specification of drugs and chemicals. Although its designated number of colors is necessarily limited (slightly over 300), nevertheless it provides a non-numerical designation like a dictionary, and yet the designations are systematic like those of a system. The boundaries between groups of colors accord as closely as possible with common usage, but they have been expressed in terms of the Munsell color system. Mr. Hiler is not charting unexplored country in his citing a need for correlated color terminology.

Thus, although I value the part of Mr. Hiler's article which systematizes literary color references, and although I recognize the need for a scientific color system as a background for just such psychological color studies, I would feel that the important bridgeheads for this work had already been made. Even though I may, like Mr. Hiler, not have "the mathematical capacities" to comprehend the scientific engineering involved, it seems to me that it would neither be wise to destroy these bridgeheads nor to try, while thus inadequately equipped, to form new ones. Would it not be better to keep them and, utilizing our particular talents, to strengthen the positions which are weak or untenable? Mr. Hiler is to be thanked for calling attention to some of these.

VICTORIA K. BALL

⁷ (May I add that these are discussed in detail in, Newhall, S. N., "Spacing of the Munsell Colors." *Journal of the Optical Society of America*, XXX, 1940, p. 617.)

⁸ Granville, W. C., "Colorimetric Specification of the Color Harmony Manual from Spectrophotometric Measurements." *Journal of the Optical Society of America*, XXXIV, 1944, pp. 382-395. Glenn, J. J. and Killian J. T., "Trichromatic Analysis of the Munsell Book of Color." *Journal of the Optical Society of America*, XXX, 1940, pp. 609-616.

⁹ Judd, D. B., *Color Systems and Their Inter-relation*, p. 26 (a paper prepared for a Symposium on color jointly sponsored by the Inter-Society Color Council and the Illuminating Engineering Society. Spring Lake, N. J., Sept. 9-12, 1940.

TO THE EDITOR:

In the March, 1946, issue of *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, Mr. Munro writes: "At the present stage some breadth and balance can be secured through supplementing philosophical aesthetics with selected courses in the arts. It is a question how much integration can be achieved through combining a list of specialized courses in different arts, even with the aid of philosophy" (p. 187).

That a worthwhile amount of integration may be obtained with little more than the conditions Mr. Munro states, has been shown, I believe, by the successful functioning of an undergraduate major, "Aesthetics and The Arts," which some of us here at Wells College instituted in the year 1939-40 and which has since then been functioning successfully. Report of our experience may be of interest and help to others contemplating or working on the erection of such a field of study.

For this undergraduate field of specialization we require the following:

1. A year course in aesthetics, of which the first semester deals with the psychological principles underlying art creation and works of art, art appreciation and criticism; the second, the philosophical ones.

2. A basal course in each of the arts of Fine Arts, Literature, Music.

3. Two or more advanced courses in that one of the three arts which a student chooses as her art of emphasis. (A student generally elects to take at least three, more often four or five.)

4. A year thesis on an aesthetic problem upon which a student can work in the field of her special art. This thesis is supervised by the art instructor and the aesthetics instructor in cooperation.

5. A year seminar conducted by the aesthetics instructor and one or more instructors in each of the three arts. An aesthetic problem is chosen for study, and instructors and students meet together for three hours at regular periods (at present, every three weeks) for presentation of papers (often research) or talks on the subject chosen. Free discussion follows. The subject for this year has been 'Form and Content and Their Relation'; last year it was 'Symbolism.' Toward the end of the second semester each student is allowed a seminar period for the presentation of her thesis. After its presentation, the thesis is discussed by all the instructors and students. We find these group discussions are one of the most valuable aspects of the major.

The week following each "group" seminar, the aesthetics instructor meets with the students and discusses with them the aesthetic implications of the report presented the week before. The week following this the student has conferences with those instructors supervising her thesis.

We have found that the students feel not only that aesthetics and the arts have been integrated, but that really there is no sharp line of division between the two. They appreciate it that no one art has been studied as an isolated subject but all art as one human endeavor. And yet they feel that they have "specialized" sufficiently—in their advanced courses in one of the arts and in their thesis emphasizing the aesthetic approach in their chosen art. The in-

structors feel the give and take we have in our study and discussion of a chosen problem from the different art angles very stimulating and helpful.

At Wells College we have the system of "comprehensive" examinations. This means that at the end of the senior year a student takes no course examinations in her major field, but "stands" for all of the courses she has had in it. Two three-hour written examinations and an oral (generally one hour) are given. A free time of about two and a half weeks is given the student for review for these examinations. Of course, without these comprehensive examinations, the integration which we think is present in our major 'Aesthetics and The Arts' might not be so great—but in colleges where such examinations are not held, probably some other way of examination might be worked out that would be successful.

There are several criticisms I have heard made against such an educational venture. First, it is too extravagant of instructors' time. My answer is that it is high time that, at least for undergraduates, our over-specialization in one subject be decreased, and the instructor could without harm omit one of his other courses for the sake of the work in 'Aesthetics and The Arts.' Moreover the seminar keeps instructors alive, a desirable thing for colleges, and allows them to think aloud in public (a consumation the human species seems not averse to; one for which he is willing to expend some time). The second criticism is that aestheticians are not trained in both psychology and philosophy. But some of us are, and with aesthetics growing in the colleges, persons so trained should become increasingly available. The third criticism is that such a major spreads too thin over too many fields. But when one recalls that aesthetics is made the core while "the arts, the range," this does not seem true. Moreover, is it not time in college teaching that the arts be approached more from the side of aesthetics and less from the exclusively historical angle? The study of aesthetics is not superficial, even though it seeks its material in part from the different arts.

IVY G. CAMPBELL

REVIEWS

BENESCH, OTTO. *The Art of the Renaissance in Northern Europe; its Relation to the Contemporary Spiritual and Intellectual Movements*. Cambridge, Mass., 1945, Harvard University Press, pp. 174, 80 plates. \$7.50.

This book points to a serious gap in art-historical literature; inspired by Max Dvořák's teachings, it starts on an important task. But it does not adequately fill that gap, makes many a step in the wrong direction, and contains dangerous generalizations. It has not been allowed to mature.

This may partly be due to the fact that it consists of a series of lectures which, though "enlarged and provided with notes", would not in this case, make a book, in contrast to the same author's excellent volume on "Artistic and Intellectual Trends from Rubens to Daumier". Another cause of failure is the author's vague handling of the term "relation". In one case, this means the reflection of a general concept of the time in the work of the painter; in another an adaptation, by the painter, of a specific item from one or the other spiritual

or intellectual movement of his day, then again a stylistic resemblance to some such movement. These variegated observations are presented without succinct order and mixed with purely art-historical, often rather detailed items of style and biography. A few examples must suffice to prove these contentions, the reviewer leaving aside most of his criticisms pertaining to art-historical data and to bibliographical lacunae.

In the first chapter, entitled "Medieval Heritage and the New Empiricism", a good summary of the art of Dürer is given. But this summary contains nothing which justifies the startling statement made in the second chapter ("Extremists in Art and Religion") that the "*intentional revival* of features of medieval art, past for one or two (*sic*) centuries, is a symptom which we notice in both masters, Dürer and Grünewald alike", that "in both it signifies a modern, advancing trend", and that "Dürer's great static nature, thinking in tectonic terms, found its counterpart in the heroic centuries of early and high medieval art from 1000 to 1300" (p. 35). Actually, only a vague "affinity" is pointed out (p. 20). As to Grünewald, the author is to be commended for stressing the importance of Feurstein's discovery of the connections between the Isenheim altar-piece and the writings of St. Bridget, but it is a far cry from there to an "*intentional revival* of features of medieval art". And what is "extreme" in Grünewald's "relation to the contemporary spiritual and intellectual movements"? His art is just as taciturn about this as is his life record (*pace* a few "Lutherische Schartecken"). That the strange drawing resembling a *Trinity* (which, unfortunately, has found its place on the jacket of this book dealing with Renaissance problems) "must have been anathema to an orthodox Catholic mind" (p. 36), is an unwarranted assumption, since we do not know its meaning at all (rightly or wrongly, most scholars tend to interpret it as a "diabolical Trinity"—a very old "Catholic" concept, not a "mockery"). Even more strangely, the author tries to support his statement (p. 36), that "the representation of the Trinity in the form of three male persons (i.e., something quite different from Grünewald's drawing) was frequently considered as heretic in the sixteenth century", by the case of the Vienna potters'—not bakers'—altar of the early sixteenth century being removed in the eighteenth (p. 147, note 12)! Yet we do know that the three-headed Trinity was represented up to the time of the Council of Trent, when it was first condemned, and even beyond that, until it was again forbidden in 1628 (see Didron's *Iconography* and Schlosser's *Praeludien*, p. 34).

In chapter III, which deals with "The Discoverers of Landscape in Painting and Science", the progressive features of the Danube School (long a favorite of the author) are convincingly connected with Paracelsus. The next chapter sums up the main aspects of "Reformation, Humanism, and the New Notion of Man". Its last paragraph, which pertains to Holbein's "Erasmus im Gehäus", invites special comment. The author calls this woodcut "a kind of printed epitaph for the humanist", ignoring the fact that Holbein scholars seem to agree on a date of about 1535, prior to its appearance in a posthumous edition of Erasmus' works, and prior to his death. And by remarking (p. 69): "Terminus in the woodcut indicates the end not only of Erasmus' life but also of his epoch of culture, one of the greatest in European history", the author makes a particularly unfortunate "short-cut". The herm on which Erasmus leans was indeed considered by him a *Terminus* (it was really a Dionysus) and interpreted as a symbol of the "term" of life; and in his earlier years he seems to have thought of it as a rather "medieval" *memento mori*. But here, Erasmus puts his hand on *Terminus* with an almost caressing gesture, and he seems to say that life fulfills itself within its limits, that death not so much finishes as it defines life. In other words, Erasmus and Holbein, working together, do not mark the end of an epoch but rather the beginning of a new one.

Chapter V ("The Pictorial Unity of Late Gothic and Renaissance; the Masters of the Netherlands") is almost purely art-historical. The center of chapter VI ("Soul and Mechanism of the Universe") is Pieter Brueghel, whose art is interpreted along the lines familiar from Dvořák's and Tolnay's research. The author's characterization of Brueghel's earlier works (the chronological differentiation is not clearly followed up, but this seems to be the idea) as reflecting the *mechanism of the universe* (p. 98) in the automaton-like behavior of his figures, is convincing, as is, to a degree, the presentation of his later works as indicating

"the proud attitude of the creative man toward (the) universe" (p. 105)—although it is somewhat distressing to find that the *earlier* attitude of Brueghel is the one "which in the later (*sic*) sixteenth century also dominated the systems of the philosophers B. Telesio, T. Campanella, and Giordano Bruno, of the astronomers and geographers" (p. 98), and the very different *later* attitude is likewise supported by a quotation from Bruno (p. 105).

In chapter VII ("The Ancient and the Gothic Revival in French Art and Literature"), frequent use is made of parallelizations between art and literature, with some excellent results. But here, too, one often wonders how much real "relationship" exists between the quoted examples, e.g., in the case of a rather casual Fontainebleau picture with a "courtly couple" pausing nonchalantly in a landscape, quite aloof from some hard-working laborers in the fields, and the magnificent lyrics of Du Bellay's *Song of a Winnow*. This seems to be the kind of comparison which defeats its own purpose.

The last chapter ("Related Trends in Arts and Sciences of the Late Renaissance") is at the same time the most captivating and the most controversial of all. Correlations between the fine arts, music, and science, are put forth with vigor, brilliance—and sometimes with real recklessness. It is probably true that "the creative mind at a given historical moment thinks in certain forms which are the same [this seems too strong!] in arts and sciences" (p. 127). But in approaching this delicate problem, it is mandatory to compare only those things which are comparable. This prerequisite is certainly not fulfilled when the author illustrates Copernicus' theory which "rooted up the geocentric anchor hold of man and threw him into the space of the universe" with Tintoretto's *St. Mark Rescuing a Slave* because "the main figure falls upside down into the picture like a messenger from another celestial body". In addition to that, disturbing things happen to facts and dates. "Thinking in terms of mathematically defined space increased in arts and sciences in the second half of the sixteenth century" (p. 127); are Tintoretto, Vasari, El Greco, Spranger, conspicuous for "mathematically defined space"? Tycho Brahe's return to a kind of eccentricity "is a scientific parallel to the medieval revival in the fine arts" (p. 132); but Brahe wrote in 1588, and the medieval revival in the fine arts started in the 1520's and just about ended around 1588, after having reached a climax at the time when Copernicus' concentric system came into being! Worse: "These artists (i.e., Uytewael and Bloemaert) display a dexterity and virtuosity in their works which we also find in contemporary music, for instance in the compositions for clavichord and organ by Jan Pietersz Sweelinck of Amsterdam" (p. 135); but to define the works of Sweelinck in terms of dexterity and virtuosity makes just as much sense as it would with Schütz, Bach, and Mozart; and as long as we cannot penetrate to the real, the fundamental similarities between the works of Sweelinck and the Dutch painters of his time, it would seem much more valuable to call the reader's attention to the magnificent and really "revealing" portrait of that same Sweelinck painted by his own brother Gerrit Pietersz (Darmstadt). And what shall we say of this last but one paragraph of the book: "Dürer at the beginning of the Northern Renaissance had freed the realm of spirit from its medieval metaphysical limitations through a new empiricism. Kepler at its close, living exactly one century after Dürer, maintained the sovereignty of the creative spirit over the realm of empirical experience". Empiricism minus sovereignty of the creative spirit, thy name is Melancholia! No, this does not work—not this way.

It seems to this reviewer that the basic difficulties of a book like this are clearly stated in note 1 to the Introduction, where it says: "The task of the historian of our time is to keep strictly to the problems of his proper field, but to demonstrate them under the visual angle of the cultural totality of which they form a part". The crucial point is: How can the historian of our time demonstrate his own problems "under the visual angle of the cultural totality" without first having attained a mastery of that totality?

WOLFGANG STECHOW

ESCHMAN, KARL. *Changing Forms in Modern Music*. Boston 1945, E. C. Schirmer Music Co., pp. 180.

This book of 180 pages is devoted to an explanation of what the author calls "the newer musical rhetoric," or in other words to an analysis of the problem of form in modern music.

In eleven chapters the author surveys his ground. He justly claims that the prerequisite for the understanding of the complicated new music is "the ability to discover what actually exists in the music itself." This investigation is carried out with skill, insight and thoroughness. Numerous extracts from modern scores serve as paradigms for the author's demonstrations. To follow his reasoning properly, the reader ought to be well versed in the theory of music and should have much actual experience in contemporary music. What he gets here is not a systematic technical textbook, entering into subtle details, but a "fact finding" book, a discussion of the general principles dominating the practice of the most advanced contemporary music.

Thus one looks about in vain for an explanation of modern free, polytonal or "atonal" harmony. But its application and effect in modern composition are discussed in the chapter, "Musical Sentence and its Harmonic Punctuation." The reader is not taught how to obtain the often startling and puzzling effects of modern harmony, and its laws are not shown, but he learns what it is good for in the modern work of art. The marks of punctuation (another expression for the good old cadences) have been changed in modern music, but even the boldest modernists still attach value to the equivalent of "sentences" or periods. In this otherwise very informative and interesting chapter I miss a discussion of the new means of closing a piece of music. Indeed, a history of varying methods of close through the centuries, from 1200 to 1945, has not yet been written, I believe. We get, however, some information on partial closes, or intermediate cadences in recent works. Examples from Scriabine's ten piano sonatas illustrate this point.

This chapter, as well as the following chapters, "Phrase Determination in Melodic Inflection" and "The Measure of the Rhythm," are highly involved and demand great efforts of the reader to understand their contents. It is, of course, easy enough to criticize this lack of clearness and simplicity of deduction, but very difficult to present these subtleties of modernistic music in easily intelligible ways. I am afraid that very few readers will profit from the discussion of Hauer's "atonal" tropes and Schönberg's twelve tone series. The actual sound effect of these hardly-ever performed works is generally unknown even to advanced musicians, and the mostly unplayable quotations do not help the reader to make this seemingly chaotic music more intelligible. Anyway, most of the works discussed are hardly obtainable at all in America to a student eager to gain acquaintance with modern methods. He would have to look for them at the Library of Congress, and as he never hears them, he cannot possibly derive positive insight from the mere aspect of the enigmatic scores. The chapter on "The Modern Variation Principle" yields easier profit from the author's summarizing remarks on page 129, and from the fact that the variations by Mahler and Copland here analyzed are actually accessible to an inquisitive student. Remarks on "The Modern Sonata" and "The Fugue in Modern Music" are the most readable portions of the entire book.

The young student of modern music will find most of the book too involved and will anticipate little fun studying it earnestly. More mature composers and scholars interested in the matter may be the ones likely to profit from the book. But even they will turn more to the author's summarized statements, to his propositions, taking them for granted. The proof of these propositions is laborious, dry reading.

The appendix to the book, with analysis of Scriabine's Fifth Sonata and Schönberg's Suite, Opus 25, is useless, as no key to the system of analysis applied is given. Most readers cannot understand what the author is driving at. The analysis of Berg's opera "Wozzeck," by Erwin Stein, is interesting to look at on paper. To an actual listener its principles are hardly noticeable at all. Having heard "Wozzeck" half a dozen times in Berlin, I can testify that hardly anything of the highly involved formal structure became conscious to me.

HUGO LEICHTENTRITT

SITTE, CAMILLO. *The Art of Building Cities*. New York, 1945, Reinhold Publ. Corporation, pp. 128, illus.. \$5.50.

JUSTEMENT, LOUIS. *New Cities for Old*. New York, 1946, McGraw-Hill Book Co., pp. 232 with 24 pl. \$4.50.

The first and very excellent translation into English of Camillo Sitte's classic *Der Staedtebau* has now been published. Introductions by Ralph Walker and Eliel Saarinen evaluate rightly the importance of this basic work on city planning, comparable only to the writings of Raymond Unwin. Since 1889, when it appeared first, generations of architects and city planners had been influenced by it, and no technical development, no new problems of traffic, hygiene, slum clearance, or real estate have changed the fundamental ingenuity of its approach. For in it the emotional qualities of city planning as a visual art were stated for the first time since the late Baroque period. And Camillo Sitte already anticipated a development which was to culminate in Le Corbusier's "City of Tomorrow." Walker fittingly characterizes this development in his prefatory note as "From cell to cell—a cell in a housing hill to a cell in a larger heap (the mass production factory or the skyscraper); from artificial life to artificial work, dwellers and workers in cells, travelers in cells." Sitte was the first who stabilized the elementary categories in which a city planner must think. Sitte's examination of the relationship between buildings, monuments and public squares, of the various possible forms of these public squares, etc., as well as his ideas about the axial direction of streets, the location of individual buildings and monuments, the differences of southern and northern space concept, etc., are today as true as ever. This statement does not mean that social, economic, and technical conditions do not play a decisive rôle in city planning. Of course they do; modern planning is unimaginable without taking these considerations as the base for the layout. As an artist, however, the modern city planner must begin, as always, with a vision of formed space, and he must articulate this vision by the above mentioned functional needs. He must include the calculations of the engineer, the social worker, the hygienist, the surveyor and the real estate man, but he should not change into one of them.

Carefully selected pictures illustrate the ideas, partially taken over from the original drawings of Sitte, partially new photographs. Thoroughly modern as Sitte's approach is, the book is an absolute "must" as a counterweight to the many books on city planning which emphasize only the solution of certain modern problems. Arthur C. Holden's "Supplementary Chapter on the Significance Today of Sitte's Artistic Fundamentals" proves this point by applying Sitte's principles to specific problems of Washington, D. C. and London today. There is no other proof necessary. The aesthetics of modern city planning, as well as of the city planning of the past, will always have to refer to Camillo Sitte.

Out of a different world comes Louis Justement's *New Cities for Old*. When Justement gives its subtitle as *City Planning in Terms of Space, Time and Money*, however, this label does not seem to be quite correct. The importance of money, of the political background, of financing and administration for city planning is clearly outlined, but one looks in vain for a clear spatial concept. The main part of the book is devoted to a case study of the development of Washington D. C., and here also the very worthwhile suggestions of the author are more money-dictated than space-minded. Thus, as much as one agrees with Justement's criticism of existing evils, one is not able to derive definite artistic concepts from his given examples. Without any doubt, his suggestions in individual cases represent valuable improvements, but they do not represent valuable general ideas, to be applied under changed circumstances. This procedure is very interesting for the city planner who grapples with similar problems, but it is too specific to serve as a directive for a general approach.

PAUL ZUCKER

PEPPER, STEPHEN C. *The Basis of Criticism in the Arts*. Cambridge, Mass., 1945, Harvard Univ. Press, pp. 177. \$2.50.

"Sound criticism," according to Mr. Pepper, "is the application of a sound philosophy to works of art." A sound philosophy, in turn, is "nothing more than as complete a systematization of the world's evidence as can be made," each such systematization constituting what Mr. Pepper has called a "world hypothesis." The book is an application to aesthetics

of four major world hypotheses: the mechanistic, contextualistic, organistic, and formistic. With each the author associates a characterization of the aesthetic field and a conception of the function of criticism.

Mechanism (exemplified by Santayana) defines the aesthetic field in hedonistic terms. The mechanistic critic is "an expert in the ways of pleasures in special regions of experience." Contextualism (Dewey), as explained by Mr. Pepper, defines the aesthetic field in terms of "voluntary vivid intuitions of quality." The critic analyzes and exhibits details of structure for the benefit of the spectator, so that these may be "funded in the full realization of the work in its total fused quality." The organistic viewpoint (Bosanquet) stresses organization, and defines aesthetic value as the "integration of feeling." The critic recreates in the process of judgment what the artist has created. Formistic aesthetics (Plato and Aristotle) defines aesthetic value in terms of conformity to norms: aesthetic value consists of "perceptions satisfying in themselves to the normal man." The formistic critic judges "the effectiveness and worth of the work of art in establishing emotional balance and in attaining for the individual the satisfactions of normality."

Mr. Pepper's own position on these various conceptions of art and criticism is straightforwardly eclectic: "The only element of novelty in the standpoint of these lectures is the thesis that there are at present a number of equally adequate criteria. . . ." But eclecticism with regard to often conflicting standards can scarcely be said to provide a "basis" of criticism, but only a description of the types of criticism: it restates the range of possibilities that constitute the problem.

Such a result is a consequence, I think, of Mr. Pepper's conception that the ultimate basis of judgments of value are definitions. "Men used to think of norms as the basis, which was right enough except that norms have to be defined. . . . We now clearly see that the basis of the whole matter is a definition." Unfortunately, only a few pages are devoted to an elaboration of this fundamental idea, and it remains obscure to this reviewer why the fact that norms must be defined makes definitions the basis of judgments of value. Concepts of physics must also be defined, but one would not therefore suppose that the bases of physical theory are definitions rather than empirical hypotheses. Mr. Pepper does, to be sure, construe definitions as having an empirical content, but the relation between this factual content and judgments of value is not explicated.

At bottom, the difficulty concerns the bearing of the "world hypotheses" on specific standards and standpoints of criticism. Mr. Pepper promises to be "empirical throughout," and maintains that "all that the philosophy does is to see that all the relevant facts are brought into consideration." Such an aim is unexceptionable, but in Mr. Pepper's procedure it is the philosophy itself which determines what is relevant, and this determination is not recognizably empirical. There is no doubt that each metaphysic finds some types of criticism more congenial than others, and in some cases purports to provide a basis for these types. What is problematic is whether the putative "basis" is indeed sound, and whether it does in fact warrant the theory of criticism associated with it. It is just these assumptions that Mr. Pepper takes for granted from the outset.

ABRAHAM KAPLAN

MAYOR, A. HYATT, *The Bibiena Family*. New York, 1945, H. Bittner & Company, pp. 38, 53 plates. \$12.50.

This exquisite volume is the first English book on a family which provided the courts of Europe for one hundred and fifty years with the magic of infinite space in Baroque pageantry and theatre. The text is written by the Librarian and Associate Curator of Prints of the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York, and a finer one has not been read by the reviewer for a long time. It can serve as an ideal introduction into the psychology of the dynastic age. The author presents his heavy luggage of erudition in easy flowing and brilliant formulations. "They (the Bibienas) sprang their surprising illusions of distance at a time when men were beginning to shudder at the eternal silence of infinite space." For the initiated it is appropriate quotation from Pascal, for the other it is a thought provoking sentence. The information on technical, sociological and aesthetic matters is abundant

and compressed. An effort is made to differentiate between the designs of the individual members of the family, a task especially difficult in a group enterprise of five generations of artists who took pride in being as much alike as possible. From Bologna to Mannheim and Bayreuth their theatrical mission can be traced, and while much of it has vanished with the extinction of the candle light which once brightened the scene of their witchcraft, some of it has endured only to suffer annihilation from aircraft during the recent war (Parma, Teatro Farnese, Mannheim, Jesuitenkirche). Added to the text is a family tree handsomely designed by Jean Wong, while the coat of arms granted to the Bibienas by the Elector of Bavaria in 1740 has been executed equally well by Fritz Kredel.

The full page reproductions are distinct and refer to drawings and engravings, nearly all of them in private and public collections of the country. Several photographs from the theatre of Bayreuth give an illustration of the translation of design into the three dimensional reality of actual architecture. No. 36, an engraving of 1740 by Giuseppe Bibiena showing the courtyard of a Gothic castle, is an unusually early example of Neo-gothicism. The last reproductions dramatically demonstrate the freezing of Baroque dynamics in the work of the youngest of the Bibiena, about 1775.

ALFRED NEUMEYER

SOBY, JAMES THRALL. *The Prints of Paul Klee*. New York, 1945, Curt Valentin, 40 plates, pp. 15 text.

It was a particularly felicitous idea to bring out the prints of Paul Klee, and Valentin is to be congratulated on the excellent quality of the publication. While one might disagree as to the wisdom of including some of the early prints in this collection, they may, on the other hand, be useful to those who are interested in studying the line of development of Klee's work. Such a comment is negligible in view of the value of making available to a large public the graphic work of one of the great figures of modern art.

The book consists of forty separate plates and of fifteen pages of text to which is added a catalogue of Klee's prints compiled by his widow in 1945. This list should prove to be useful for purposes of research.

It is only in relation to the text that I have some criticism to offer. Mr. Soby traces the development of Klee's graphic work from its beginning in the *Jugendstil* to his Bauhaus period, and this account is interspersed with appreciative comments on the aesthetic value of the various prints. Now, there is very little argument concerning the aesthetic value of Klee's work, and it would seem that a more thorough analysis of what exactly constitutes the value would be of greater interest, and of more use, at this point. I am referring to such passages as the following one selected at random. "... the curling line leading from the woman's nose in HOFFMANESQUE SCENE might be the invention of a child . . . , but it leads to a flower-like form of the utmost urbanity in draftsmanship. . . ." Statements of this kind can hardly be accepted as satisfactory analyses of the aesthetic value of Klee's work—the value of which, it should be clearly understood, is in no way disputed here. Precisely because we are ready to recognize its aesthetic value, we expect an analysis that is adequate to the works of Paul Klee and responsible to the pictorial facts, and which justifies in terms of the components of the compositions the aesthetic values which are recognized in them. Modern art is in great need of that kind of critical analysis and an opportunity was missed in an otherwise very valuable publication.

H. H.

NOTES AND NEWS

(Readers are invited to send in items for publication in this department. They may deal with activities of the Society, personal news about individual members, or events of general interest in the field, such as academic appointments, research projects, lectureships, and publications.)

PERSONAL ITEMS

The Editor has received good news concerning RICHARD MÜLLER-FREIENFELS, author of *Psychologie der Kunst* and editor of the *Zeitschrift für Aesthetik*. He had asked an American army friend to get in touch with our distinguished colleague if possible, and with others formerly active in aesthetics. "It was no trouble at all," writes his informant, "to contact Professor Richard Müller-Freienfels at the address you gave, Innestrasse 38, Berlin-Dahlem. I was rather doubtful whether I would find the Professor there because the place is in the midst of a residential area requisitioned for American personnel. Therefore, I was pleasantly surprised to find him still living at this address. It so happens that the second floor of Professor Müller-Freienfels' house had been bombed out, so the whole place was passed up by our billeting officers. Both the Professor and Mrs. Müller-Freienfels are alive and in good health. She is teaching at the American University here and they appear to be enjoying very pleasant relations with quite a few highly placed people at this Headquarters. The Professor has been inactive since 1942, when the Nazis placed him and his publication on the index, but he expects to resume his teaching activities in the near future."

HERBERT READ of Beaconsfield, England, author of *Art Now* and many other books on art and aesthetics, joined the A.S.A. on his recent visit to this country. He is helping us to get in touch with other British scholars in the field.

C. J. DUCASSE was in Los Angeles during the Spring Semester, as Flint Visiting Professor of Philosophy at the University of Chicago.

RENÉ WELLEK is going from the University of Iowa to Yale, as Professor of Comparative and Slavonic Literature.

HELMUT HUNGERLAND is Professor of Aesthetics and Chairman of the Graduate Division of the California College of Arts and Crafts.

HENRY D. AIKEN has been appointed Associate Professor of Philosophy at Harvard.

W. S. RUSK, R. M. OGDEN, VIRGIL C. ALDRICH, and IVY CAMPBELL read papers on symbolism in art and aesthetics at the Middle Atlantic States Art Conference, held at Cornell University on June 1, 1946.

HOUSTON PETERSON has left Cooper Union to do radio work, lecturing (under the management of Roxanna Wells), and writing. He recently edited *Great Teachers* (Rutgers University Press) and will remain as Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers.

PAUL M. TRAVIS, chairman of the Cleveland Society for Aesthetics, spent the summer painting in Arizona.

HENRY HUNT CLARK has retired as Director of the Cleveland School of Art, and has been succeeded by LAURENCE SCHMECKEBIER, Professor of Art at the University of Minnesota.

AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR AESTHETICS

When this issue went to press, the 1946 annual meeting of the A.S.A. was scheduled for September 5, 6, and 7, at the Chicago Art Institute. A report will be published in the December issue.

The *Cleveland Society for Aesthetics* met twice during the spring. On April 6 at the home of Professor and Mrs. Joseph Remenyi, Dr. Max Fisch spoke on "Art and Science in Early Anatomy," illustrating with lantern slides. The Society held a joint meeting with the Ohio Valley Art Group, composed largely of college teachers of the arts, as guests of the Department of Fine Arts at Oberlin College on May 25. Professor Edward Warder Rannells of the University of Kentucky, chairman of the Art Group, read a paper on "Aesthetic Expression and Learning"; Professor Lucius Garvin of Oberlin, a paper on "How Can a Work of Art Have Meaning?" The group was entertained at a dinner and a play in the evening.

PACIFIC COAST DIVISION

Third Annual Report covering the Period from May 5, 1945 to June 15, 1946.

Southern District. Two meetings were held by members in the Los Angeles area; one on October 13, 1945 at the California Institute of Technology, Pasadena. The speakers were: Thomas M. Beggs, Evelyn B. Bull, Helmut Hungerland, Helen L. Mathews, Alois J. Schardt, Raymond S. Stites. The second meeting was held on February 9, 1946 at Pomona College, Claremont. The speakers were: Edmund A. Cykler, Henry P. Eames, Theodore M. Greene, Micklos Rozsa, Carl Thurston.

Central District. Three meetings were held by members in the San Francisco Bay area; one on October 21, 1945 at the Dominican College at San Rafael. The speakers were: Helmut Hungerland, Manuel Olguin, Ralph B. Perry, Jr., Sarah W. Taylor. The second meeting was held at Stanford University on March 2, 1946. The speakers were: Helmut Hungerland, Dan Mendelowitz, Jeffery Smith, A. Torres-Rioseco. The third meeting was held on March 24, 1946 at the Dominican College at San Rafael. The speakers were: Alexander Nepote, Ann O'Hanlon, Stephen Pepper, Catherine Rau.

The second David Wight Prall Memorial Lecture was presented by Prof. John R. Reid, Stanford University, on May 18, 1946 at Berkeley. The title of the lecture was "How Ought We To Talk About Values?"

The fourth annual meeting of the Pacific Coast Division was held on May 25th-26th, 1946, at the Los Angeles County Museum. Henry P. Eames, Carl Thurston, and J. Donald Young organized the meeting. The speakers were: Arnold Elston, Matila Ghyka, Helmut Hungerland, Bertram Jessup, Hunter Mead, Raymond S. Stites, Carl Thurston.

At the business meeting on May 25, 1946 it was moved and passed that

(A) the Pacific Coast Division of the American Society for Aesthetics be organized into three districts as follows: (1) the Southern District, to comprise that area of California south of the Santa Clara Valley; (2) the Central District, to comprise that area of California north of and including the Santa Clara Valley; (3) the Northern District, to comprise Oregon and Washington; each of the said districts to be free to organize itself as the members in the district desire.

(B) the action taken at the 1945 annual meeting establishing an Executive Committee be rescinded, and the following substituted: the policies and practices of the Pacific Coast Division of the American Society for Aesthetics shall be determined by an Executive Committee which shall consist of the Secretary of the Pacific Coast Division *ex officio* and of one representative from each of the three districts; said representatives to be elected by their districts each year before the annual meeting and to take office at the close of the annual meeting. It shall be the duty of the three elected members of said committee to act as the nominating committee for the office of the Secretary of the Pacific Coast Division. It is further moved that the present elected members of the Executive committee shall continue to serve until the next annual meeting.

(C) the Secretary of the Pacific Coast Division shall be elected *viva voce* by the members present at the annual meeting; that he shall take office at the close of the annual meeting; and that he shall hold office for one year. Helmut Hungerland was elected secretary of the Pacific Coast Division.

The following resolution was passed: Resolved that, since the declared purpose of the American Society for Aesthetics is "to promote study, research, discussion, and publication in aesthetics", and since "membership shall be open to persons who are interested in furthering the purpose" of the American Society for Aesthetics "through publication, or teaching, or in some other way", the Pacific Coast Division approves and encourages the formation and conduct of seminars, discussion groups, etc.

SEMINARS IN AESTHETICS

East Bay Area: During the fourth year of its existence the seminar continued to meet regularly once a fortnight under the direction of Mr. Hungerland, with increased attendance. The discussions were guided by the program of study adopted in August 1944

and were concerned with problems of art criticism and value judgments, particularly as they relate to modern art. The material presented in the discussions of the past two years is at present being prepared for publication in book form. *San Francisco*: The seminar has been meeting regularly every third week since January under Mr. Hungerland's direction, with papers by him and by David Goldshur, Dorothy Mercer, and Robert Utter.

CONTRIBUTORS

FREDERICK S. WIGHT, writer and painter, lives at Chatham, Mass., and is in charge of educational work at the Institute of Modern Art in Boston. He is the author of *South* (a novel), "Picasso and the Unconscious" (*Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, April 1944), and other books and articles.

CHARLES W. HUGHES, of White Plains, N. Y., is assistant professor of music at Hunter College in New York City.

WILLIAM VAN O'CONNOR, at present a Rockefeller Foundation Fellow at work on a book in literary criticism, is the author of *Climates of Tragedy*, and of articles in *American Scholar*, *Kenyon Review*, *Poetry*, and other journals.

JOSEPH REMENYI is professor of comparative literature at Western Reserve University. He has written many articles in English and Hungarian on contemporary literature in these and other countries, and is also known as a poet in Hungary.

GUSTAV E. MUELLER is professor of philosophy at the University of Oklahoma, and author of *The World as Spectacle*.

BERNARD C. HEYL is professor of art at Wellesley College.

VICTORIA K. BALL is assistant professor of home economics at Western Reserve University.

IVY CAMPBELL is professor of philosophy and psychology in Wells College.

WOLFGANG STECHOW is professor of fine arts at Oberlin, and is on the Editorial Board of the *Art Bulletin*.

HUGO LEICHTENTRITT, formerly of Harvard, wrote *Music, History, and Ideas*.

PAUL ZUCKER is professor of art at Cooper Union, in New York City.

ABRAHAM KAPLAN, assistant professor of philosophy at the University of California in Los Angeles, was a Guggenheim Fellow during 1945-6.

ALFRED NEUMEYER is Director of the Art Gallery at Mills College in Oakland, California.