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
THE AMERICAN WAR.

(1861-62.)

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HISTORY
OF
THE AMERICAN WAR



BY
LIEUT.-COLONEL FLETCHER

SCOTS FUSILIER GUARDS

VOL. I.
FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR
(1861-62)



LONDON
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PREFACE.

THE AUTHOR was induced to undertake the task of writing an account of the present war in America from the knowledge that he had possessed peculiar advantages in watching the progress of some of its events, both on the Federal and also on the Confederate side.

Through the kindness of General M'Clellan, he was permitted to reside at the head-quarters of the Army of the Potomac during the campaign known as the Campaign of the Peninsula, which included the siege of Yorktown and subsequent battles up to the seven days before Richmond and retreat to the James River; whilst shortly afterwards, through the courtesy of both the Federal and Confederate authorities, he was permitted to enter and traverse the Southern States.

He had thus an opportunity of acquiring some insight into the state of both parties. Still, he cannot pretend that the principal matter in the account is the result of personal observation. It has been chiefly derived from the Rebellion Record, and from the volume of Confederate Despatches, both which have furnished valuable information; as have also the Acts of the Confederate

Congress, General M'Clellan's Report, and other works to which the Author was able to obtain access ; and, lastly, from the daily press, both English and American. There are, however, many obstacles attending the compilation of a standard history of the war, arising partly from the difficulty of procuring materials, as also from the violence of party spirit and a tendency to exaggeration in American writings which render the task of separating truth from falsehood especially difficult.

Whatever opinion may be formed of this book, the Author can honestly say, that he has endeavoured to write the truth, unbiassed by any leaning to either side. If his greater experience of the Federal Armies and his personal friendship for many of the officers might lead him to an undue sympathy for their cause, it would be counteracted by the admiration he feels for the indomitable spirit shown by the Confederates, evinced both by their gallantry in the field, and by the patience with which they have suffered the hardships and miseries of a war waged on their own soil and attended with peculiar trials.

Writing as he does on events which have occurred so recently, this narrative will be open to the criticism of many of the actors in those events, who are in possession of far more precise information than any that the Author could obtain. Should any inaccuracies or misstatements be noticed, the Author assures them that they are not the result of any party bias.

If in the course of the narrative, by any expression of

censure he should cause pain to those from whom he has received much kindness, he trusts they will believe that only the necessity of writing what he conceived to be the truth has led him to do so. Of one class of men he feels he can speak with unqualified respect. The officers of the old regular Army of the United States, whichever side they may have embraced, have well merited the admiration of their companions in arms in European Armies, both by their conduct in the field, and by their endeavours to mitigate the horrors of civil strife by adhering to the rules of civilised warfare. Their hospitality to English officers merits, and must insure, the gratitude of all who have visited the American Armies ; and it is with great pleasure that the Author avails himself of this opportunity of thanking them for their personal kindness towards himself.

Trusting that his work may be of service in enabling those who have not had leisure to follow out the events of the war to acquire some knowledge of its several phases, the Author ventures to lay before his readers this Volume, comprising a narrative of the first year of the war.

December 1864.

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HISTORY
OF
THE AMERICAN WAR.

THE FIRST YEAR.

CHAPTER I.

CAUSES OF THE WAR.

WHEN an appeal to arms has once been made, and when in consequence the passions of men have become excited to the highest degree—when not only are the belligerents affected, but when bystanders grow interested in the quarrel—it is a difficult task to dis sever from the mass of prejudice in which the question is involved the true origin of the strife. Still the task must be undertaken. The causes of war materially affect its character and mode of conduct ; they leave their trace on both the counsels of the leaders, as on the passions of the people ; they influence the conduct of the generals and the discipline of the soldiery ; therefore a narrative of a great war would be far from complete if the causes which led to it were not in a certain measure investigated. If such a course be considered necessary in relating the events of a war between two nations, much more must it be requisite when the conduct of a civil war, such as that which at present devastates so large a portion of the continent of North America, is traced out. It is proverbially the case

that in civil wars, men's passions become more intensely excited, and the hatred of either side to the other fiercer than when combating a foreign enemy; consequently it is of more material importance to ascertain the origin from whence such strife, engendering so great bitterness, has sprung. There is a peculiarity in the American war, which gives it a different aspect from that of almost any other which has ever previously been waged. It partakes in the character of both a civil and a foreign war. The combatants are derived from the same origin, and that at no distant date; they speak the same language, there is no difference in their religion, they have lived under the same form of government, have been in the enjoyment of similar guarantees of liberty and of equal privileges; yet they were, on both sides, possessed of forms of government subservient to the central power, which had, until the year 1861, welded them into one common nation. Therefore the portion which severed itself from that power was enabled, without violence and without the infringement of laws affecting the detail of the citizen's life, to commence a new existence as a nation. A geographical line separated the belligerents, and on either side of that line the unanimity of men's feelings was almost complete. Owing to these circumstances, the war soon assumed, in a partial degree, the characteristics of a struggle between two nations, although in the fierceness of spirit in which it was waged, and in the bitterness it caused, as well as in the difficulties attending a peaceful solution, it resembled a civil strife. On both sides the justice of the quarrel was argued on constitutional grounds, and even the most impartial judge must find great difficulty in arriving at a satisfactory conclusion. Putting aside,

however, for the present, the consideration of the ostensible causes of the war, let us glance at the actual position of the United States when it first broke out. Within the territory subject to its government was comprised an enormous area, extending from latitude 25° to latitude 42° . The men who inhabited this vast territory were from the same stock, and possessed much in common; yet many causes, more especially that of climate, tended to produce a variety of interests. Community of interest must be acknowledged to be the bond by which nations are united, and when that bond is severed, the nation as a unit seldom survives. Such has been the case with the American Republic. As first constituted, it consisted of thirteen States, being the thirteen colonies which rebelled against the dominion of Great Britain. Common danger and a common desire of nationality tended to draw these States together, and from them a government was formed which took the title of the Republic of the United States. A most unwonted course of prosperity followed; to be accounted for partly by the increase of the native population, but principally due to the emigration from Europe; and in seventy years the number of the inhabitants of the United States had augmented tenfold. This population was not, however, confined within the bounds of the thirteen original States, but spreading westwards, in a few years occupied territories far exceeding them in extent. These territories successively claimed a voice in the government and independence, as far as it was enjoyed by the States which first entered the Union. This was granted, and the new States were admitted on the same footing as their elder sisters; but the machinery which was adapted for the working of a government such as was contemplated by the founders

of the Union, proved insufficient for the strain so quickly, and of so great a weight, brought on it by such an increase of territory and population. Evils resulted which had been unforeseen, and, consequently, unprovided for. The wheels of the machinery certainly continued to work, but so great were the changes in the component parts, that the result differed considerably from that which was originally intended. In the very foundation of the structure on which the machinery was built there was likewise a crack, unnoticed as long as the wheels and pulleys continued to perform their original work, but only too apparent when the strain once bore on it. The several States were not so completely welded together as to prevent an ostensible and, viewed by one party, a justifiable ground of severance, which was not slow to be recognised when interest supervened. The States which first entered the Union in 1777 considered themselves to be sovereign States, possessed of the power and authority of separate nationalities, but, for purposes of mutual defence, forming a confederation, and resigning a portion of their separate sovereignties in order to construct a central power. This confederation was, however, so weak, that it was found necessary, in order to prevent its violent dissolution, to form another union of States based on firmer ground, which would ensure greater authority to the central government. Thus, in 1787, the constitution of the United States was framed, which, until 1860, was that under which the whole population of the several States, both old and new, lived. In entering this Union, each State abrogated a certain portion of its authority, reserving its own self-government, and whatever rights were not resigned by the provisions of the constitutions. No mention is made in the constitution of the

right of a State to secede from this Union ; those who advocate a constitutional right of secession allege that this right was reserved, whereas their opponents affirm that such a case could never have been contemplated. Again, the advocates of secession assert that the Union was a compact, of which the non-fulfilment of a part invalidated the whole ; whilst, on the other side, it is stated that parties to a compact cannot sever such compact unless by the consent of the whole contracting parties. Many have been the arguments, and much has been written on both sides ; the question, even to the most impartial person, is much involved, and admits of discussion. De Tocqueville, in his great work on America, alludes to it in these words :—

‘ However strong a government may be, it cannot easily escape from the consequences of a principle which it has once admitted as the foundation of its constitution. The Union was formed by the voluntary agreement of the States, and in uniting together they have not forfeited their nationality, nor have they been reduced to the condition of one or the same people. If one of the States chose to withdraw its name from the contract, it would be difficult to disprove its right of doing so ; and the Federal Government would have no means of maintaining its claims directly either by force or by right. In order to enable the Federal Government easily to conquer the resistance which may be offered to it by any one of its subjects, it would be necessary that one or more of them should be especially interested in the existence of the Union, as has frequently been the case in the history of confederates.’

These words, verified by the events of the last few years, read almost prophetically. Secession, not only

of one State but of several States, has occurred, and the interests of a majority have led to an attempt at coercion. There is, however, another ground on which the seceding States can base their right of secession; and it is a ground taken up more especially by Americans, as on it they derive their right to be a nation. In the Declaration of Independence, adopted in Congress July 4, 1776, the following passage occurs:—

‘ We hold these truths to be self-evident;—that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights governments are instituted among men, deriving their just power from the consent of the governed; that, whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter and abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organising its power in such forms as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and, accordingly, all experience hath shown that mankind is the more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security.’ Such are the words of the Declaration of Independence. This doctrine to an American is indisputable; but

Northern orators and writers deny that it is applicable to the case. By doing so, they become judges in their own cause, and commencing with the assertion that *their government is admitted to be the mildest and most beneficent ever organised this side Utopia*,* they enlarge on the heinousness of the crime of rebellion against it. On the other hand, the people of the Southern States allege that they have far greater grounds for revolution than had the colonies of Great Britain—that their wrongs have been deeper, and consequently that, according to the doctrine laid down in the Declaration of Independence, their right of separation from a government they hated was incontestable. Putting aside, however, the doctrine of the right of revolution, it is the constitutional legality of secession which they urge, and it is a curious fact that the very States which now advocate the opposite doctrine so strongly, were, when it suited their convenience, inclined to assert it. In 1812 Massachusetts and Connecticut disobeyed the mandates of the central government by refusing, on the call of the President, to march their militia † to the frontiers, and the Federal Government was constrained to raise the necessary troops elsewhere; whilst the party in the Republic the most vehement in the prosecution of hostilities, has more than once, by the mouths of its orators and press, advocated secession and disunion.‡ There is, however, some justice in the allegations of the

* Address delivered at the Academy of Music, New York, July 4, 1861, by Edward Everett.

† De Tocqueville.

‡ Mr. Jeff. Davis draws a distinction between the doctrine of nullification and secession. The former was the line adopted by Massachusetts, whilst Mr. Davis declares that the latter is the more constitutional. See *Rise and Fall of the Model Republic*, by James Williams, p. 390, note.

Northern States when they say, that as long as those of the South furnished the party in power, they were content to remain in the Union and share its benefits—when they were defeated they refused to submit, and seceded. To understand the causes which led to secession, some knowledge of the constitution of the United States is requisite. Each State is possessed of a governor and a congress, consisting of a senate and house of representatives, and has the management of its interior economy. The central government is composed, likewise, of the same materials—viz., a president elected for four years, a senate, and house of representatives: the first is virtually, excepting in the State of South Carolina, elected by universal suffrage. The senate is composed of two members from each State, irrespective of its size and population; thus the small State of Rhode Island is equally represented in the senate with the State of New York. The numbers sent to the House of Representatives, on the contrary, are dependent on the extent of the population. Originally one member represented a population of 33,000. At the present time the population necessary to return a member is 120,000. Owing to the comparatively far more rapid increase of population in the Northern and Western States than in those of the South, the number of representatives of the former increased in a much higher ratio than in those of the latter. Thus originally Virginia returned ten members, whilst New York only returned six.* Now Virginia returns eleven and New York thirty. The power, therefore, in the House of Representatives has gradually forsaken the Southern States for those of the North. In the Senate, however, the South long held a supre-

* *The American Union*, Spence.

macy, and from a desire on her part to retain it, arose the great struggle, which had its origin in the admission into the Union as States of the newly acquired territories. The question at issue was whether the new States should be slave or free. Should they become slave States, they would, in all probability, cast in their lot with the South; on the contrary, should slavery be declared unlawful, they would add to the power of the Northern States, and then those of the South would lose their influence in the Senate as they had already done in the House of Representatives. In the South, owing partly to the original stock from which the first settlers were sprung, and in a greater degree from the tendency to an aristocratic feeling common to large landed proprietors, the conservative element was more prevalent than in the Northern States. To these States the great tide of emigration brought over from Europe men imbued with strong Republican ideas, whilst the short period of domicile necessary in order to obtain the rights of citizenship often threw a large amount of power into the hands of the new settlers at a time when they could know but little of, and value less, the true interest of Americans. Thus the people of the American Union were divided into two great parties which, after frequently changing their denominations, termed themselves, previous to the commencement of the war, the Democratic and Republican parties. To the former belonged almost the entire South, and a great portion of what may be termed the higher orders of the North. Their principles in England would be termed Conservative, compared with those of their opponents; but they also held the doctrine of State rights in contradistinction to the augmentation of the power of the central government. The Republicans

were the Liberals of America, and to that party also belonged the Abolitionists, or Black Republicans. As long as territorial or geographical distinctions did not divide these parties, there was little prospect of secession. It had been threatened more than once, but a compromise was always effected.

When, however, the result of the election of Mr. Lincoln (the Republican candidate) was known, and it was perceived that the Republican party in the Northern States, notwithstanding the opposition of the entire South, had obtained the upper hand, advocating as they did, opinions hostile to the welfare of the South, some of the Southern States, seeing that their power in the government of the United States, after constantly diminishing, had departed, without even waiting for the accession to office of the obnoxious President, seceded from the Union. This course was much blamed by the Democratic party of the North, as they alleged, with some truth, that they were deserted by their allies in their utmost need. It was admitted that the Republican party had the majority in the House of Representatives. The President was now chosen from their ranks, and therefore it was clear that the only place where the battle could be fought was the Senate; but, owing to the secession of the Southern States, and the consequent withdrawal of their senators, the majority in that house would now be of the Republican party. The cause of the extreme hostility evinced by the Southern people against the Republican party, lay in the gradual extension of the principles of Abolition. The South, inheriting slavery from the first colonists, and being encumbered with a large negro population, *volens volens* were forced to submit to what many, even in the slave-holding States, considered an evil. Mr. Lincoln himself, in a speech which he made when

canvassing for the Illinois senatorship three years before his presidential election, spoke in these terms: 'My first impulse would be to free all the slaves, and to send them to Liberia to their own native land. This is impossible. What then, free them all, and keep them among us as underlings? It is quite certain that this betters their condition. I think I would not hold one in slavery at any rate; yet, the point is not clear enough to me to denounce people upon. What next? Free them and make them politically and socially our equals. My own feelings will not admit of this, and if mine would, we well know that those of the great mass of white people would not. Whether this accords with justice and sound judgment is not the sole question, if, indeed, it is any part of it. An universal feeling, whether well or ill-founded, cannot be safely disregarded. We cannot, then, make them our equals. It does seem to me that systems of gradual emancipation might be adopted; but for their tardiness in this I will not undertake to judge our brethren of the South.'

When, therefore, Southerners heard slavery denounced in the violent terms used by a portion of the Republican party, some of whom even sympathised with John Brown and his followers, who made a raid into Virginia in 1859, and when they perceived that that party had obtained the reins of power, they gradually became fearful that the rights guaranteed by the Constitution would be abrogated. In addition to these causes of dissension, there was still another which influenced more especially the cotton States—this was the tariff question.* In 1816 protective duties were imposed, under which the manufacturing interests of the Eastern States made great progress. These were

* *The American Union*, Spence, p. 171.

successively augmented, until, in 1832, when the increased tariff of 1828 came under revision, the State of South Carolina called a convention of her people and passed an ordinance, declaring the tariff null and void. This was followed by measures tending to secession, and to prevent such a misfortune, a bill was hurried through Congress, of which the purport was to effect a large, though gradual reduction of the duties on manufactures.* However, owing to various causes, the reduction did not take effect, and from 1842 the fiscal system of the United States has been continuously protective. Gradually this question, also, has become sectional or rather geographical, and tended, together with that of slavery, to imbitter the feelings of the Southern against the Northern States. The causes of secession may be thus briefly summed up as follows: the gradual loss of power by the Southern States—a loss felt with great severity by a proud and aristocratic race; the knowledge that wealth, equally with power, was leaving the Southern cities, and that the protective tariffs were increasing the prosperity of Northern seaports at the expense of their own; the bitter feelings engendered by the abuse lavished on the South by the Abolition party—abuse attended with grievous danger, if the accusation was true that Northern emissaries had attempted to incite insurrection among the blacks; the whole culminating in the evidence afforded by the results of the canvass and election of Mr. Lincoln, that the Republican party were united and powerful, and being so were able to bring a majority into the field, which would for ever keep the South from power; in fact, that the division of parties had ceased to be only that of opinion, but had become also geographical.

* *American Union*, Spence, p. 175.

CHAPTER II.

EVENTS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING HOSTILITIES.

THE great flood of desolation which, owing to the war, has spread over the once prosperous territories of the United States, may be likened to the devastation frequently caused by their own mighty rivers. The gradually accumulating materials of strife resemble the masses of trees, brush, and earth that often obstruct the stream—at first apparently trivial in their effect, but which gradually becoming welded together, dam up the waters, until, breaking through a weak place in the embankment by which they have hitherto been confined, they rush over the fields, destroying crops, houses, and villages in their course, and (but seldom returning to the old channel) seeking some fresh outlet to the sea. Possibly even the river separates into many streams, and although losing its former grandeur, yet confers greater benefits to man so subdivided than when united. The results of a vast inundation are, indeed, difficult to calculate, how much more those arising from revolution and war?

Having traced out, however slightly, the causes which led to secession, the immediate events which preceded the actual commencement of hostilities claim our attention. On November 7, 1860, it was announced at New York that Mr. Lincoln had been

chosen for the presidency. It is true that his actual election would not take place before four months had passed; but owing to a flaw which had gradually made itself felt in the machinery of the government, it was known to have been secured. The framers of the Constitution had intended to guard against the direct influence of universal suffrage in the appointment of the chief magistrate of the State, by confining the selection to a body of electors chosen by the people. It was their duty to weigh the claims of each of the several candidates, and to choose from among them whoever was best fitted for the office. But an abuse had crept in which completely defeated this intention; the electors were, indeed, appointed by the people, but each man was pledged to vote for a particular candidate; therefore whilst in form the Constitution was adhered to, in reality its intents was disregarded. So it happened that the final result of the canvass for the presidency became known in November 1860. The news was received with the greatest excitement in the cotton States, and in South Carolina at once resulted in action; a mass meeting was held at Charleston, the Palmetto flag was raised, volunteers, termed minute men, were enrolled, all Northern periodicals and newspapers, containing any matter savouring of abolition, were returned, and the State House of Representatives passed a bill on November 9, without a dissentient voice, authorising a meeting of the State Convention. The excitement spread through Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, and before the end of the year 1860 it was evident that a crisis had arrived in the history of the American Republic. The border slave States were, indeed, more moderate in their tone, and averse to violent measures before some compro-

mise should have been attempted ; but in so acting they brought upon themselves the displeasure of the more hot-headed enthusiasts of South Carolina. That State passed the ordinance of secession on December 20, 1860, and at the same time published the reasons that induced her so to act. She commenced with an allusion to the events of 1852, when she had been on the point of seceding, and saying that the provocation for so doing had increased since that time, she proceeded to put the case before the world in these terms :—

‘ And now the State of South Carolina, having resumed her separate and equal place among nations, deems it due to herself, to the remaining United States of America, and to the nations of the world, that she should declare the immediate causes which have led to this act.’ She then showed how the Constitution of the United States had been set aside by those States who had passed State laws contravening the law known as the Fugitive Slave Law ; how that a crusade against slavery had been proclaimed in the North ; how that the election of the new president had been secured by a sectional vote, and that the situation of parties from henceforth would depend on a geographical line. In fact, that the power had passed from Southern into Northern hands, and consequently that the South might expect in future to be deprived of an equal share of the new territories, and even fail to secure justice in the Supreme Court of Judicature, owing to that court becoming sectional in its politics. Such she alleged to be her grievances ; and she wound up in terms similar to those with which she commenced her declaration, and they, it must be allowed, have something solemn and grand in their tone :

‘ We, therefore, the people of South Carolina, by

our delegates in Convention assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, have solemnly declared that the Union, heretofore existing between this State and the other States of North America, is dissolved, and that the State of South Carolina has resumed her position among the nations of the world, as a separate and independent State, with full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and to do all other acts and things which independent states may of right do.'

Such was the declaration of South Carolina, and her course of action was followed, in the short space of about a month, by five of the other slave States—viz., by Florida on January 10, 1861; Alabama on January 11; Mississippi, January 11; Georgia, January 19; Louisiana, January 26; and Texas, February 1. Each State almost unanimously passed her ordinance of secession. Some set forth their reasons for so doing with more or less fulness; others abstained altogether from declaring them. Alabama laid great stress on the sectional vote which put President Lincoln and Vice-President Hamlin into office; whilst Texas, one of the last States that had been added to the Union, grounded her reasons of dissatisfaction on the non-fulfilment of the compact of union with the States. She alleged that her frontiers had been unprotected, and that the power of the Federal Government had been sought to be made a weapon to strike down the interests and property of her people and those of the other slave-holding States. These ordinances of secession were successively received with great rejoicing by the people of the South: bonfires were lit, the towns were illuminated, the militia paraded the

streets, the State flags were raised, often replacing the stars and stripes; orators addressed the assembled crowds, and, viewing the still doubtful course of the Northern States, arms were bought, the Federal arsenals seized, and in many cases the Federal forts occupied by the hastily levied militia of the South. The enthusiasm appeared universal; salutes were fired from the batteries round Charleston on the arrival of the news of the secession of each State; in fact, the edifice which had been raised less than eighty years ago fell to the ground amid the rejoicings of the sons and grandsons of its founders. In the slave-holding cotton States there appeared but one feeling, and that was in favour of the overthrow of the Union. There is something sad to look back on the rejoicings which heralded in a period of war and calamity, such as has reduced the apparently most prosperous country on the earth to a state of anarchy and confusion, the arena in which men of the same race and language wage war more bitterly even than the nations of Europe when arrayed in arms against each other. Still, up to this point, there had been no bloodshed or tumults, so common to periods of revolution. The machinery of the States' government was little affected by separation from the central power; all was conducted in order, and the adjustment of the customs' duties, the postal arrangements, and the transfer of Federal property were the chief points which required consideration, should the right of secession be allowed by the Northern States. In view of these arrangements, commissioners were sent from South Carolina, acting as an independent State, to the central government of Washington; but, in the meantime, in that State, and also through the other seceding States, the several forts and arsenals

belonging to the Federal Government, but weakly garrisoned, and in some instances not garrisoned at all, were seized on and occupied by the State troops under the authority of the several governors. Thus, at Charleston, Castle Pinckney, a small fort in the harbour, was garrisoned by State troops on December 28. On January 4, the arsenal at Mobile was seized, and Fort Morgan, in that harbour, garrisoned by the militia. In Florida, Fort Barrancas and the navy-yard of Pensacola were given up to the State authorities. At Augusta, the United States' arsenal was also surrendered. At New Orleans, the custom-house and mint were seized, and the forts in the harbour occupied; whilst even as far west as Arkansas, 9,000 stand of arms and 40 cannon were surrendered to the State authorities at Little Rock. To crown all, the commander of the Federal forces in Texas, 'General Twiggs,' surrendered the whole of the stores belonging to the Federal Government, and valued at \$1,209,500, to the State of Texas. Thus, in March 1861, the only forts held by Federal troops south of Virginia were Fort Sumter, in the harbour of Charleston; Fort Pickens, opposite the navy yard of Pensacola; and Keywest, an island off the coast of Florida. Of these, Fort Sumter claims especial notice, as it was there that the first shot which ushered in the war was fired. It is situated on a small island about the centre of the channel which leads to the harbour of Charleston, and between two and three miles from the city. The fort is of masonry, and heavily armed. In January 1861 it was garrisoned by a small force of the United States' regular army, and commanded by Major Anderson. Opposite Fort Sumter, on the mainland north of the channel, is Fort

Moultrie, which was also occupied by a weak garrison ; but, in view of pending hostilities, was evacuated by command of Major Anderson on December 29, the retreating garrison dismantling, as far as was possible, the fort, and burning the gun-carriages. It was this act which brought to a close the mission of the delegates from South Carolina sent to treat with the Federal Government. According to their statement, an agreement had been entered into between them and the central government that, pending negotiations relative to the surrender to the State authorities of the forts in Charleston harbour, no change should be made in the relative position of affairs, and that no act of hostility or any act tending to hostilities, such as the reinforcing of the forts, should be sanctioned by the President of the United States ; whilst, on the side of South Carolina, they promised that peace should be maintained. The destruction of property consequent on the evacuation of Fort Moultrie, and removal of the garrison to Fort Sumter, was viewed by the commissioners as evincing a hostile attitude, and therefore after sending a strong remonstrance to the President, which he declined to receive, they declared that their duties were at an end. Such were the acts of the Southern States during the two months which succeeded the declaration of the result of the presidential canvass. What, meanwhile, was the state of feeling in the North? On January 3, 1861, the Thirty-sixth Congress of the United States opened at Washington, and on the 4th the President (Mr. Buchanan) proceeded to deliver his message, purporting to give a resumé of the state of the country, and also the opinions of the Government on the condition of affairs. Both Houses were crowded, and the diplomatic corps were present in the galleries for the

first time, showing the intense interest that was felt in the pending crisis: the senators from South Carolina alone were absent. After setting forth the material prosperity of the country, Mr. Buchanan thus alluded to the action of the Southern States.

‘ Why is it, then, that discontent now so extensively prevails, and the union of the States, which is the source of all these blessings, is threatened with destruction? The long-continued and intemperate interference of the Northern people with the question of slavery in the Southern States has at length produced its effects. The different sections of the Union are now arraigned against each other, and the time has arrived, so much dreaded by the father of the country, when hostile, geographical parties have been formed. I have long foreseen and often forewarned my countrymen of the impending danger. This does not proceed solely from the claim on the part of Congress, or the territorial legislatures, to exclude slavery from the territories, nor from the efforts of different States to defeat the execution of the Fugitive Slave Laws. All or any of these evils might have been endured by the South without danger to the Union (as others have been), in the hope that time and reflection might supply the remedy. The immediate peril arises not so much from these causes, as from the fact that the incessant and violent agitation of the slavery question throughout the North for the last quarter of a century has at length produced its malign influence on the slaves, and inspired them with vague notions of freedom. Hence, a sense of security no longer exists round the family altar. This feeling of peace at home has given place to apprehensions of servile insurrection, &c. &c. Should the apprehensions of domestic danger, whether real or

imaginary, extend or intensify itself until it should pervade the masses of the Southern people, then disunion will become inevitable. . . . Sooner or later the bonds of such a union must be severed. It is my conviction that the fatal period has not yet arrived; and my prayer to God is that He would preserve the Constitution and the Union throughout all generations.' Mr. Buchanan then proceeded to show that the constitutional election of Mr. Lincoln gave no just grounds for dissolving the Union; but that he ought to be judged alone by his acts when he should come into power. That in the event of the Constitution being violated, the injured States, after having first used all peaceful and constitutional means to obtain redress, would be justified in revolutionary resistance to the Government of the Union. Mr. Buchanan then denounced the constitutional right of secession, but declared the right of revolution. He also distinctly laid down his opinion, that no power of coercion against a State had been delegated to Congress, or to any other department of the Federal Government. He quoted Mr. Maddison's opinion on the subject, and summed up in these terms: 'Without descending to particulars, it may be safely asserted that the power to make war against a State is at variance with the whole spirit and intent of the Constitution. Suppose such a war should result in the conquest of a State, how are we to govern it afterwards? Shall we hold it as a province, and govern it by despotic powers? In the nature of things, we could not, by physical force, control the will of the people, and compel them to elect senators and representatives to Congress, and to perform all the other duties depending upon their own volition, and required from the free citizens of a free state as a

constituent member of the Confederacy.' And further on he added, 'The fact is, that our Union rests upon public opinion, and can never be cemented by the blood of our citizens shed in civil war. If it cannot live in the affections of the people it must one day perish. Congress possesses many means of preserving it by conciliations; but the sword was not placed in their hands to preserve it by force.'

Happy would it have been for the American people if these words had been acted on; their utterance by the head of the Government of the United States might well tend to mislead the South as to the course of action which would be pursued by the central power. Still, Mr. Buchanan was a member of the Democratic party, the party which had been defeated at the last election, and whose opponents were on the point of succeeding to the reins of power. Possibly the views of the new Government might differ from those of the old, and the first expression of an opinion on the Republican side was eagerly awaited. It was, in fact, on December 22, 1860, previous to the meeting of Congress, that Mr. Seward, one of the leading men of the Republican party, and destined for a high place in the new Government, addressed a large meeting at New York. He was, of course, bound to be sufficiently careful not to commit his Government to any line of action, but the slighting and jocose manner in which he spoke of secession scarcely warranted the apprehension of a serious war. In these terms he alluded to the secession of some, and threatened secession of others of the cotton States: 'Just at this moment I am going back to Washington, for the purpose of admitting the State of Kansas into the Union, and I venture to say that for every State on this continent that will go out of the

Union, there stand already waiting at least two States that will be glad to come in and take their place. [Loud cheers.] Let South Carolina, let Alabama, let Louisiana, let any other of the States go out, and while they are rushing out, you will see Canada and all the Mexican States rushing in to fill up the vacuum.' He added, 'They say, when I was a boy, Massachusetts and some of the New England States got the same idea of contumacy for the common parent and want of affection for the whole family.' [Laughter.]

Again, on the subject of coercion, he drew the following parallel, 'The question then is, what in these times—when people are labouring under the delusion that they are going out of the Union and going to set up for themselves—ought we to do in order to hold them in it. I do not know any better rule than the rule which every good father of a family observes. It is this. If a man wishes not to keep his family together, it is the easiest thing in the world to place them apart. He will do so at once, if he only gets discontented with his son, quarrels with him, complains of him, torments him, threatens him, coerces him. This is the way to get rid of the family, and to get them all out of doors. On the other hand, if you wish to keep them, you have only one way to do it; that is, be patient, kind, paternal, forbearing, and wait until they come to reflect for themselves.' Mr. Seward, in conclusion, asked for sixty days, when he thought the political atmosphere would be much brighter and more cheerful. So ended his speech, which was received with loud and long-continued applause from the audience. There were, however, signs which gave warning of a different spirit than that displayed by the hopeful leader of the Republican party. The tone of the border States, led

by Virginia, and including North Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Missouri, showed an inclination towards the cause of their Southern neighbours, but also a strong desire for peace, as if a foreshadowing of the serious nature of the quarrel and of the time when they should become the battle-ground of the contending armies, sobered them. They were in favour of compromise on the side of the Union, but against coercion. Maryland evinced Southern tendencies, but still supported her governor, who was of the Union party. Delaware and Pennsylvania were also for compromise, but inclining to the Northern view, whilst New York and the New England States offered men and money to support the Union. The West had not declared itself so distinctly, but from them came the new President, and their leaning to Republicanism and abolition was well known. In the meantime the senators and representatives of the seceding States retired from their respective houses of congress, usually parting in kindness and even with signs of friendship, from their former companions. On January 21, a man, who was soon to fill a position which would bring his name prominently before the world either for good or evil, took his leave of the Senate. Mr. Davis, senator from Mississippi, arose, and on the ground that his State had seceded from the Union, and that therefore his functions in that House had terminated, signified his intention of withdrawing from the Senate. He had ever been, he said, a strong advocate of the right of secession, as pertaining to the sovereignty of the States; he drew a distinction between the doctrine of secession and that of nullification formerly advocated by some distinguished men from the South. A State had a right to secede, but not to remain in the Union and disobey the commands of the central

government. He insisted strongly that the secession of the States was not revolution. 'If,' he said, 'I had not believed there was justifiable cause, if I had thought the State was acting without sufficient provocation, still, under my theory of government, I should have felt bound by her action. I, however, may say that I think she had justifiable cause, and that I approve of her acts. In conclusion,' he added, 'there will be peace if you so will it, and you may bring disaster on every part of the country if you so will have it.' As he together with the other senator from Mississippi, and those from Florida and Alabama, were about to retire from the Senate, all the Democratic senators crowded round them and shook hands with them. Messrs. Hall and Cameron were the only Republican senators who did so. There were not wanting those who strove to arrest the evils which threatened the country, but no one stood prominently forward. At their utmost need the levelling results of Democracy made themselves visible; democracy had reduced the American nation, especially the Northern part of it, to a high but almost even level as regards education and intellectual attainments; whilst universal suffrage, and the manner in which elections were conducted, excluded even such superiority as had remained from enlistment into the services of the country. A plan of compromise was proposed by Mr. Crittenden, senator of Kentucky, and long debated on; but events succeeded each other too rapidly to allow of its final adoption, even if the Republican party, rendered by the secession of the Southern senators all powerful in the Senate, had agreed to adopt it. A peace convention, summoned by Virginia, and supported by the border States, under the presidency of ex-President

Tyler, for the same reasons, failed to produce any result. In the meantime, Mr. Buchanan, swayed by opposing interests and unqualified for the part he was called on to play, wavered, and his deeds partook of his doubts and hesitation. There was also a split in his cabinet, as, owing to his approval of Major Anderson's evacuation of Fort Moultrie and removal to Fort Sumter, his Secretary of War, Mr. Floyd, resigned his appointment, on the ground that faith had been broken with the Southern commissioners.

It was about this time that an event occurred which may be said to have occasioned the first direct act of hostility. A steamer, named the 'Star of the West,' was freighted at New York with stores and ammunition, and with 250 artillerymen and marines on board, put to sea on the night of January 5.* Rumour said she was destined for Charleston. This proved true, as on the morning of January 9, she was signalled at the entrance of Charleston harbour, and was seen approaching cautiously, owing to the extinction of the lights of the harbour, until within about three-quarters of a mile of Morris Island. A shot was then fired across her bows from a battery lately erected there: the steamer, however, displayed the stars and stripes, and continued on her course; the troops on board her had been put below and kept out of sight. Seeing that she did not take notice of the first shot, several others were fired at her, one of which took effect, and the 'Star of the West' then put about and returned to New York. It was expected by the State troops, who manned the batteries on Morris Island and at Fort Moultrie, that Fort Sumter would open fire on them in

* *Rebellion Record*, vol. i. p. 11.

order to cover the entrance of the steamer ; but Major Anderson, who throughout, and under most trying circumstances, appears to have acted with great judgment and humanity, wishing, if possible, to avoid shedding blood, abstained from hostilities ; the guns of Fort Sumter were, indeed, run out, but no shot was fired. Major Anderson contented himself with sending a letter of expostulation to Governor Pickens, of South Carolina, and with referring the whole matter to his own government. With that object Lieutenant Talbot was sent with despatches from Fort Sumter to Washington by permission of the authorities of South Carolina. The first shot had now been fired which was to commence a war of unparalleled bitterness. The government at Washington, although it must be conceded that they were placed in a position of great difficulty, cannot be acquitted of blame. They were well aware that any attempt at reinforcing Fort Sumter would be regarded as an act of war ; and, acting on this knowledge, they were fully entitled to send reinforcements ; but the underhand way in which the plan was carried out, and the absence of any instructions to the commander of Fort Sumter, argued a vacillation and a fear of responsibility unworthy of the government of a great country. However, their day was drawing to a close ; and March 4 was to see a new government inaugurated at Washington, opposed to a rival government already organised at the head of a confederation of the cotton States.

At an early stage in the secession of South Carolina, at a convention held at Charleston on December 26, 1860, it was resolved, if possible, to call a convention of the seceding slave-holding States, to assemble at Montgomery, Alabama, with a view to form a Southern

Confederacy based on the Constitution of the United States. On February 4, 1861, this plan was put into execution, and the following States sent delegates to the Convention at Montgomery—viz., Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina. A provisional government was formed on February 8, and acts passed regulating the powers of Congress, the compensation and privileges of the members, and the authority of the President. The Convention also proceeded to elect a President and Vice-President, naming Mr. Jefferson Davis, ex-senator of Mississippi, for the former, and Mr. A. H. Stevens for the latter office. The absence of all violent measures, and the ease with which the provisional government at once entered on its duties, forms a contrast to the manner in which governments constructed after revolutions usually act. The machinery of reconstruction was, however, in existence, and all its parts in working order; and when, later in the year, the constitution for the Confederate States came under consideration, but little change was made from that of the former United States. On February 18, Mr. Davis was inaugurated, and delivered an address to the Congress, terming it the Congress of the Confederate States of America. He commenced by a hope that the beginning of the career of the Confederacy would not be disturbed by hostile opposition to the enjoyment of the separate existence and independence which it had asserted, and which, with the blessing of Providence, it intended to maintain. He went on to argue that the action of the States was not revolutionary; that the Union had been a compact, the non-fulfilment of which the States, as sovereigns, were qualified to determine, and also to declare the time when it should cease to exist. He further showed that the Southern

people were an agricultural race, whose future policy must be peace and free trade. He hoped that peace would be preserved, but signified his intention of an appeal to arms in the event of interference, and he terminated his address with a compliment on the high resolve which actuated the whole Southern people, and their unanimity in the course they had adopted.

A few days after the inauguration of Mr. Davis, on February 15, commissioners from North Carolina were received by the Confederate Congress, with the view of admitting the State of North Carolina into the Confederacy, and also commissioners, at the same time, were appointed to treat with the government of the United States of America. Soon afterwards, on February 25, 1861, an Act was passed to declare and establish the free navigation of the Mississippi river. This was an important act, and it was hoped that it might influence the conduct of those Western States along whose frontier the Mississippi ran, and whose prosperity was materially influenced by its trade. Acts with a view to pending hostilities soon followed. On February 26, an Act passed for the establishment and organisation of a general staff for the army of the Confederate States of America, succeeded by another Act authorising the President to borrow, on the credit of the Confederate States, a sum not exceeding fifteen millions of dollars for the support of the Government, and to provide for the defence of the Confederate States. To meet this loan a duty of one-sixth of a cent per pound was to be levied on all cotton in the raw state exported from the Confederate States. Still more warlike in its tone was the Act dated February 28, 1861, its purport being to enable the Government of the Confederate States to maintain jurisdiction over all

questions of peace and war, and to authorise and direct the President to assume control over all military operations ; also to receive from the several States such arms and munitions of war as may have been acquired from the United States, and which were then in the forts, arsenals, and navy-yards of the said States ; also to receive into the service of government such forces in the service of the said States as may be tendered or may volunteer, in such numbers as he may require, for a period of not less than twelve months, the said forces to form part of the provisional army of the Confederate States, and to be officered by general and other officers, as the President, with the advice and consent of Congress, might approve.

Such were the first Acts of the provisional government of the Confederate States ; the Constitution was not agreed on until March 11, 1861. But although, to a certain degree, forestalling events, it is well here to notice its principal features before again passing over to the Northern side. Based as it is on the Constitution of the United States, it yet contains certain alterations of the greatest importance, and calculated to prevent many of the evil consequences which had been found by experience to interfere with its efficient working. Among the principal changes are the following : the new Constitution declared the President and Vice-President shall hold their offices for six years, instead of for four years, as per United States' Constitution, and the President shall not be re-eligible for election. The officers of the government shall continue in office, subject to their conduct ; only the higher officers changing with the President. Congress may by law grant to the principal officers in each of the executive departments a seat upon the floor of

either House, with the privilege of discussing any measures appertaining to his department. With reference to free trade, no bounties shall be granted from the treasury, and no duties or taxes on importations from foreign nations shall be laid to promote or foster any branch of industry. As regards the slave trade, the importation of negroes of the African race from any foreign country, other than the slave-holding States or territories of the United States, is forbidden, and Congress is required to pass such laws as shall effectually prevent the same. Respecting slaves, no law impairing or denying the right of property in negro slaves shall be passed. The method of amending the Constitution is thus provided for: the Constitution may be amended upon the demand of any three States for a convention of all the States, suggesting the amendments; and should the convention of all the States concur in the proposed amendment, and the same be ratified by two thirds of the States, they shall form a part of the Constitution. Such are the principal points in the new Constitution which differ from those of the old. There is, however, one striking omission in the preamble to the Constitution of the United States, which has been supplied in that of the Confederate States. In the former no acknowledgement is made of the presence or power of the Deity, whereas, in the latter, *the favour and guidance of Almighty God* is invoked. It is without the compass of this work to discuss the changes, whether for better or for worse, which were introduced, still a few words may not be out of place.

The extension of the term of office of the President will probably prove beneficial; his non-eligibility for re-election is a safeguard against an autocracy, and also prevents what has been too common in the United

States, a tendency to endeavour to gain popularity by advocating popular measures as the term of office expires, in order to secure re-election. The continuance in office of subordinate officers of Government must be to the benefit of the State, both as regards the working of its machinery, and also the curtailment of the too great patronage of the incoming President. The power of questioning the heads of departments in Congress is an advantage apparent to any Englishman. The guarantees for free trade are more stringent than in any other country, possibly in view of the evils from protection tariffs which the Southern States believe themselves to have suffered from the North. The laws respecting slavery are, of course, peculiar to slave-holding States, and involve questions entirely relating to that subject. Whilst with reference to the clause facilitating the amendment of the Constitution, time will only show whether it is productive of good or evil.

The Constitution of the Confederate States was unanimously adopted on March 11, 1861. In the North the progress of events had not tended to smooth the differences already existing between the antagonistic States and parties. The time approached when Mr. Lincoln would enter upon the office of President; and every step in his journey from Springfield to Washington was chronicled. He made speeches at Springfield, at Cincinnati, at Pittsburg, at Cleveland, and at other towns on the road; his object seems to have been to avoid committing himself to any line of conduct. A certain amount of buffoonery, and some sound sense, were to be found in his speeches, but they were of such a character, as regarded matter and style, that most countries would be ashamed to receive them from the mouth of the chief magistrate of the State. In his speech to

the people of Indiana, Mr. Lincoln gave some indications of the future policy he intended to adopt, but at the same time was careful to assure his audience that he was not asserting anything, but was merely asking questions for them to consider. He alluded to coercion and invasion in these words, commencing by asking: 'What is coercion? What is invasion? Would the marching of an army into South Carolina without the consent of her people and with hostile intent towards them be invasion? I certainly think it would be coercion also if the South Carolinians were forced to submit. But if the United States should merely hold and retake its own forts and other property, and collect the duties on foreign importations, and even withhold the mails from places where they were habitually violated, would any or all of these things be invasion or coercion?' Mr. Lincoln thought not. His chief point lay in recommending his fellow-countrymen to *keep cool* and keep their temper, and the trouble he assured them would come to an end.

Mr. Lincoln was well received at New York and Philadelphia, but owing to an intimation, received from the police, that there was a strong feeling against him at Baltimore, and that there might be disturbance and even danger to himself should his presence in that city become known, he secretly left his friends at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and accompanied by Colonel Lamont took the train to Washington. As he was not expected, he passed unrecognised through Baltimore, and reached Washington on the morning of February 23, disappointing the malcontents who, on the following day, when the train (by which it had been supposed that he would come) arrived at Baltimore, created a slight disturbance. On March 4 his inauguration as the

sixteenth President of the United States took place. The ceremony commenced by his kissing the thirty-four States of the Union, represented by thirty-four young ladies;* he was then escorted in procession to the east portico of the unfinished Capitol, at Washington, in front of which a platform had been erected. Everything having been arranged, Senator Baker, of Oregon, came forward and introduced Mr. Lincoln in these words:—‘Fellow-citizens, I introduce to you Abraham Lincoln, the President-elect of the United States of America.’ Mr. Lincoln then advanced to a small table, placed for his accommodation, and delivered his address. This address, like many of his previous speeches, conveyed to its hearers the idea of being a true exponent of the opinions of an honest but ill-educated man. Mr. Lincoln stated that he was strongly in favour of the maintenance of the Union, and was opposed to Secession. He was equally against the principle of coercion, provided the rights of the United States Government were not interfered with. He begged his fellow-citizens to think calmly upon the whole subject, and to take time. Why, after a plain and, in the main, sensible address, Mr. Lincoln should think it necessary to conclude with the following flowery sentence, only Americans can explain:—‘The mystic cords of memory, stretching from every battle-field and patriot grave to every living heart and hearthstone all over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of the Union when again touched, as surely they will be, by the better angels of our nature.’

The day concluded with a ball, and Mr. Lincoln took up his residence in the White House,† vice Mr. Bu-

* *Rebellion Record*, vol. i. p. 18.

† List of members of Mr. Lincoln’s government:—Mr. Hamlin,

chanan, who left Washington amid the acclamations of a crowd assembled at the railway station. According to the political opinion of its readers was the address received well or badly. The Republican journals praised it; the Northern Democratic papers did not disapprove of it; but the Southern and even Border States looked on portions of it as containing the menace of war. Even at this period the people of the Northern States refused to believe that those of the South were really in earnest in their wish to leave the Union. The country had enjoyed so great prosperity, and had hitherto contrived to evade or overcome the many difficulties that had so often threatened it, that men could not conceive the idea that the great Republic of the much-extolled Union had proved a gigantic failure. Confident in their own greatness, and overweening in their pretensions to excellence, the bitter pill of the humiliation of their hopes was indeed hard to swallow.

Vice-President; Mr. Cameron, Secretary for War; Mr. Wells, Secretary of the Navy; Mr. Smith, Secretary of Interior; Mr. Chase, Minister of Finance; Mr. Seward, Secretary of State; Mr. Blair, Postmaster-General; Mr. Bates, Attorney-General.

CHAPTER III.

FROM THE INAUGURATION OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN UP TO
THE END OF APRIL, 1861.

THE hostile attitude assumed by the Southern States in view of an anticipated attack by the North became every day more apparent. On March 5, Major-General Beauregard, who had served until lately as a major in the United States army, received orders from President Davis to proceed immediately to Charleston, and to take command of the force assembled there. This he accordingly did; and the increased energy infused into the work, and the more skilful arrangement of the batteries, soon evinced the presence of a military man competent to command. About the same time, Major-General Bragg, also an old officer of the United States army, but who was then in command of the volunteer force assembled at Pensacola, issued an order that no communication was to be held with, or supplies forwarded to, the United States fleet off the coast, or to the garrison at Fort Pickens. On the other hand, the Government at Washington issued orders of recall to the fleets of the Mediterranean and Pacific. Thus, although still nominally at peace, both sides prepared for war. A last attempt had indeed been made by the Confederate Government assembled at Montgomery to procure recognition and consequent peace, and with this

intent commissioners (as before stated) had been sent to treat with the United States Government. Mr. Seward, however, in his position of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, refused to receive them, on the ground that they could not be recognised as representing a foreign government; and the State Department also declining to acknowledge their official position, they left Washington on April 11, addressing to Mr. Seward before their departure a strong protest against the conduct of the United States Government.* Up to this date no decided line of action had been agreed on by that Government; the city of Washington had been filled with numerous place-hunters, seeking office under the newly-elected President, and Mr. Lincoln had had need of all his energies, and more than all his patience, to dispose of their claims. Affairs, however, became so threatening, and the situation of the garrisons of Forts Sumter and Pickens so critical, that longer action could not be deferred; and on April 8 the Government at Washington notified to Governor Pickens of South Carolina, and to General Beauregard, that supplies would be forwarded to Fort Sumter immediately—peaceably, if possible; if not, by force. Steps were also taken to guard against a threatened surprise of Washington by secessionists, and for this purpose guards were stationed at various points in the city, and the Capitol occupied by a detachment of troops, the first that had entered the building since the war of 1812. In the meantime the Southern States had not been inactive; the United States posts in Texas had been occupied by the State militia, and the regular troops put on board transports

* Names of Southern Commissioners:—Mr. T. Forsyth, Mr. M. J. Crawford, Mr. A. B. Roman.

and shipped off to the United States garrisons at Key West and Tortugas. The Southern Congress passed an ordinance for the purpose of raising and organising an army, and the Governor of Mississippi, 'Governor Pettus,' called out 1,500 men for the defence of that State. Reserves were stationed on the lines of railway leading to Charleston, ready to be forwarded, if required, to the works already erected in its vicinity. Gradually, about the first week in April, these reserves were called in and sent to man the works; whilst a floating battery which had been prepared in the dock at Charleston was towed down the harbour, and moored in a creek in Sullivan's Island. Such was the position of affairs when the above-mentioned communication was received by General Beauregard. He immediately communicated its contents to the Secretary for War of the Confederate States (Mr. L. P. Walker), and was directed without delay to demand the evacuation of Fort Sumter. On the receipt of this order, General Beauregard communicated with Major Anderson, commanding the fort, offering him the following terms:—That all proper facilities would be afforded for the removal of himself and his men, with their arms and property, together with all private property, to any post in the United States which he might elect; and that the flag which he had upheld so long and with so much fortitude under the most trying circumstances might be saluted by him on taking it down. General Beauregard's aide-de-camps, Colonel Chesnut and Captain Lee, were ordered to wait for an answer. To this demand Major Anderson returned a courteous refusal to surrender, but in consequence of another communication received from the Minister of War, General Beauregard again sent his aide-de-camps

to Major Anderson with a second proposal, couched in the following words:—

‘ Headquarters, Provisional Army, C.S.A.

‘ Charleston : April 11, 1861, 11 P.M.

‘ Major,—In consequence of the verbal observations made by you to my aids, Messrs. Chesnut and Lee, in relation to the condition of your supplies, and that you would in few days be starved out if our guns did not batter you to pieces—or words to that effect—and desiring no useless effusion of blood, I communicated both the verbal observation and your written answer to my communication to my Government. If you will state the time at which you will evacuate Fort Sumter, and agree that in the meantime you will not use your guns against us, unless ours shall be employed against Fort Sumter, we will abstain from opening fire upon you. Colonel Chesnut and Captain Lee are authorised by me to enter into such agreement with you. You are, therefore, requested to communicate to them an open answer.

‘ I remain, Major, very respectfully,

‘ Your obedient servant,

‘ G. T. BEAUREGARD,

‘ Major-General commanding.’

To this second communication Major Anderson replied by agreeing to evacuate Fort Sumter on the 15th inst., unless he should receive, prior to that time, controlling instructions from his Government, or additional supplies.


The latter stipulation not being considered satisfactory, as a fleet with supplies and reinforcements was known to be off the harbour, General Beauregard sent an intimation at 3.30 A.M. on April 12, that he would open fire on Fort Sumter in one hour's time. At 4.30 A.M. the

bombardment commenced. Before, however, describing its effects, it will be well to indicate in a few words the position of Fort Sumter as regards the city of Charleston and the batteries on the mainland. The city of Charleston is built on a peninsula of land between the Ashley and Cooper Rivers, which, at their junction, form the harbour of Charleston. The harbour proper may be said to extend about four miles in a south-easterly direction from the city. At the distance of about three miles, on a small island nearly midway in the channel, stands Fort Sumter, a masonry work containing two tiers of casemates and guns mounted *en barbette* on the parapet; the relief of the walls is about sixty feet. The southern side of the fort, which faces the bay formed by two islands named James Island and Morris Island, is the weakest portion of the fort.

These two islands, which bound the harbour on the south, are separated from each other and from the mainland by narrow creeks. A point of land extends northwards from Morris Island, and is termed Cummings Point; opposite to this point, on the northern side of the harbour, built also on an island formed in the same way as James and Morris Islands, and named Sullivan's Island, is Fort Moultrie. General Beauregard's batteries were erected at Fort Moultrie, on Sullivan's Island, and at Cummings Point, the distance from them to Fort Sumter varying at from 1,600 to 2,000 yards. On Morris Island were two mortar batteries, and on Cummings Point a battery termed the Iron battery, built of yellow pine logs, over which were dovetailed bars of railway iron. At 4.30 A.M., on April 12, fire was opened by the besiegers, but was not replied to from Fort Sumter until 7



CHARLESTON HARBOUR.



A.M., after the men had breakfasted. The garrison consisted of only 79 regular soldiers, and about thirty labourers employed on the fort, who, however, made themselves useful in working the guns. The supply of provisions was very small, and that of cartridges so inadequate, that the whole was exhausted at noon on the first day, and men were employed during the bombardment in making them with linen, blankets, &c. There were no sheers with which to mount the guns, until some timber happening to float past was hauled in, and sheers constructed from it. There was no weighing-machine for the powder, and the guns were without screws, scales, or tangents. Major Anderson directed his men to keep in the bomb-proofs, and not to attempt to work the guns on the parapet, which were exposed to the fire from the mortar batteries. The guns in the casemates replied to the besiegers' batteries during the whole of Friday, the 12th. The fleet remained outside the harbour visible from the fort, but unable to render any assistance. During the night of Friday the besiegers' batteries still continued to shell the fort, and the officers' barracks were set on fire three several times. On Saturday morning they were again on fire, and the attempts to extinguish the flames failing, the garrison were employed in removing the powder from the magazines. The fire became so hot, and the fort so filled with smoke, that the men could with difficulty breathe; whilst the expense magazines in the upper portion of the fort exploded. About the close of the day, a gentleman of the name of Wigfall, ex-senator, unexpectedly made his appearance at an embrasure of the fort with a white handkerchief at the end of his sword. It appeared that, without any authority, he had put out in a small boat to Fort Sumter, and

having effected a landing, asked for Major Anderson. On being brought before that officer he stated that he was General Wigfall, attached to General Beauregard's staff, and had come with terms of surrender. Major Anderson, seeing the hopelessness of a prolonged resistance, consented to give up the fort, on the same conditions as had been previously offered to him. It was afterwards ascertained that Mr. Wigfall had received no authority to act as he had done, but nevertheless the terms of surrender were agreed to by General Beauregard. They were, that the garrison should take all their individual and company property ; that they should march out with their side arms and other arms, with all the honours, and that they should salute their flag and take it with them. Thus ended the bombardment of Fort Sumter. It must be conceded that, placed in a very difficult position, without any direct orders from his Government, exposed to every influence, both friendly and inimical, that could be brought to bear on him, Major Anderson had before the actual commencement of hostilities acted in a most judicious and soldierly manner ; whilst in defending his post, he showed great courage combined with a desire to save his men from unnecessary risk. It is an extraordinary circumstance that the only casualties which occurred at Fort Sumter were after the surrender, and were caused by the bursting of a gun when the salute to the flag previous to the departure of the garrison was fired ; whilst on the side of the besiegers but three men were wounded, and those slightly. General Beauregard bore testimony to the gallant conduct of his adversary, and acted in the courteous manner becoming an officer forced by motives of patriotism to combat with one whom formerly he looked on as a friend and brother officer.

The garrison were put on board the transports which were lying off the harbour, and conveyed to New York. The fleet destined to the relief of Fort Sumter was too weak to attempt any assistance during the bombardment. There were but three small sloops of war mounting ten and eleven guns, and a cutter mounting but five guns. The remainder of the vessels were transports. The conflict may now be said to have in reality commenced; the effect of the news of the fall of Fort Sumter on both North and South was at once apparent. Throughout all the States and cities of the North the greatest excitement and indignation prevailed; the opposing parties forgot their differences, and Democrats and Republicans appeared only as Union men. Meetings were held, addresses were published, troops were levied, and but one determination existed, which was to revenge the insult offered to the American flag, and to punish the audacious traitors to what Northern Americans term the best and mildest Government in the world. On April 15, Mr. Lincoln put forth a proclamation which tended at once to give a definite direction to the excitement in the North, and to test the loyalty to the Union of those States on the border which up to this moment had wavered in their course. On the plea that the laws of the United States had been opposed and their execution obstructed in the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, the proclamation set forth that Mr. Lincoln had thought fit to call out the militia of the several States of the Union to the aggregate number of 75,000 men, in order to suppress the said combinations and to cause the laws to be duly

executed. The loyalty of the citizens was appealed to to aid this effort, and the following programme of operations put forward :—

‘The first service assigned to the forces hereby called forth will probably be to repossess the forts, places, and property which have been seized from the Union; and, in every event, the utmost care will be observed, consistently with the objects aforesaid, to avoid any devastation, any destruction of or interference with property, or any disturbance of peaceful citizens of any part of the country; and Mr. Lincoln hereby commands the persons composing the combinations aforesaid to disperse and retire peaceably to their respective abodes within twenty days from this date.’

In view, also, of the present extraordinary occasion, Mr. Lincoln at the same time convened a special sitting of both Houses of Congress, to assemble on the following July 4. Such was the proclamation issued on April 11, 1861; and, in order to put into execution its demands, a circular was sent from the War Office to the Governors of the several States, directing them to call out the militia in order to furnish troops in the following proportions :—

	Regiments.		Regiments.
Maine 1	Virginia 3
New Hampshire 1	North Carolina 2
Vermont 1	Kentucky 4
Massachusetts 2	Arkansas 1
Rhode Island 1	Missouri 4
Connecticut 1	Ohio 13
New York 17	Indiana 6
New Jersey 4	Illinois 6
Pennsylvania 16	Michigan 1
Delaware 1	Iowa 1
Tennessee 2	Minnesota 1
Maryland 4	Wisconsin 1

Each regiment was ordered to consist of 780 men, and the difference between the total thus raised—viz. 73,391—and the whole number demanded—viz. 75,000—was to be made up by troops from the district of Columbia. It remained now to be seen whether the majority of the people would support the Government. Up to the capture of Fort Sumter there had been apathy and even doubts as to the course which ought to be pursued with reference to the seceding States. There was not even unanimity on the subject in the city and State of New York. Now, however, all was changed, and no one in the purely Northern States could venture to express himself otherwise than as a Union man, prepared to support that Union by every means in his power. A species of feeling which the French would call *sentiment du drapeau* sprang up in the North and took the place of what is termed loyalty in other countries. The Press headed the excitement; mass meetings were held in the great cities of the North; men of all descriptions—those eminent as well as those unknown to fame—addressed the people. Union flags of enormous size and of every texture hung from the windows of the houses, from the public offices, and from the steeples of the churches. Military bands traversed the streets, and even in the churches such tunes as the ‘Star-Spangled Banner’ and the ‘Marseillaise’ were sung and played in place of the ordinary church music. Subscriptions were raised for the families of the volunteers, and sermons which strained Scripture to suit politics were preached. Ladies, of course, more than took their share of the popular excitement; colours were embroidered and presented to the rapidly mustering volunteers, and no pains were spared to add *éclat* to the military displays which were

fast becoming popular. In the midst of the universal enthusiasm, the serious business in hand was not neglected; a large sum of money to meet war expenses was voted by the legislature of New York, the Pennsylvanian banks offered a loan, and measures were taken to meet the call for troops. Massachusetts seems to have put herself prominently forward; more than the numbers demanded were soon ready, and despatched by rail and steamer to New York, from thence to proceed to the defence of Washington. New York followed in the same footsteps, and the little State of Rhode Island equipped her regiment and placed it under the command of Colonel Burnside. Pennsylvania called out her militia, but was scantily provided with arms. The West, Michigan, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, prepared for war. There was no talk now of conciliatory measures; the American flag, the stars and stripes, had been insulted, and vengeance must be exacted. Among the majority the openly declared feeling of attachment to the Union, or rather the fear of a loss of power should that Union break down, was probably the principal motive in urging them to pursue this course; but in some of the large cities another cause tended to arouse the energy of the wealthier classes. There were signs, which could not be overlooked, of a disposition to rioting among the populace, and it was feared, that should the excitement find no better vent, it might speedily turn to a rising of the lower orders in the great cities against the richer classes, and especially against those who belonged to the old Democratic party, which was known formerly to have had friendly relations with the South. The policy, therefore, was to turn the excitement into the legalised channels, and make all speed to despatch the

more unruly members of the community to what would probably soon become the seat of war. Whilst such was the state of feeling in the Northern States, the news of the fall of Fort Sumter, and the receipt of President Lincoln's message, aroused a spirit of defiance in the South. There were men in those States who foresaw the evils about to come, but the foreshadowing of such evil did not tend to weaken their resolution. In the South there was no doubt in the rectitude of the cause, and no hesitation in preparing to uphold it to the utmost. There, as well as in the North, the blessing of Heaven was invoked and the favour of God solicited on behalf of her children about to risk their lives in her behalf. If there was any difference, there was a tone of greater earnestness and deeper resolution in the people of the South than in the North: there was also fiercer hatred. The South felt that she was about to be invaded, and prepared with all the means in her power to defend her homes and firesides. Volunteers were mustered in Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina, ready to march north to the defence of the frontier; subscriptions were raised, and all the necessary preparations for war made. The decision of the border States was however looked for with some anxiety. Would they furnish the troops demanded as their quota in the War Office circular from Washington, or would they cast in their lot with the other slave States? Neither side were long left in doubt on this point. From Virginia, North Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri, refusals, couched in short and even insulting terms, were sent by the several governors. Governor Jackson of Missouri termed the requisition illegal, unconstitutional, revolutionary, inhuman, and diabolical, and

declared that Missouri would not furnish a single soldier for such an unholy crusade. This seemed to be the almost universal opinion of the border States, or rather those to the south of Washington. In Maryland there were divisions of council; and Delaware, although still protesting against coercion, yet agreed to furnish her regiment, stipulating that it should be employed only for the defence of the capital. Virginia and North Carolina soon followed up their refusal to furnish troops by declaration of secession: the former, indeed, called out her militia, but it was with the view of assisting the Southern Confederacy, in place of furnishing her quota to the Federal Government. At the same time a proclamation, in answer to that of President Lincoln's, was issued from Montgomery by President Davis, granting letters of marque to all those desirous of assisting the Government of the Southern Confederacy in repelling the threatened invasion, by arming private vessels; at the same time exhorting all persons in the Confederate States to preserve order, and forward, by all means in their power, the measures adopted for the common defence of the country. Before proceeding to trace out the course of subsequent events, a clear idea should be arrived at of the relative position of what may now be termed the contending forces. Until the commencement of the present war, the majority of Europeans had looked on the United States as one republic, differing but in form of government from the larger kingdoms of Europe. The distinct and separate existence of the States was scarcely comprehended, and the inhabitants of the South were even included under the term Yankee—a soubriquet properly applied only to the people of the New England States, but now common to all Northerners. The enormous extent

of country forming the United States was not properly understood, and, consequently, the great distances which separated towns and places not thoroughly appreciated. In fact, even in America itself, owing partly to geographical ignorance, partly also to a want of military knowledge, the means which would be required to attempt, with any prospect of success, an invasion of the Southern States, were not in the least understood. In view of the pending hostilities, it would be well to examine the great geographical features of the country, in order that a general idea of the operations may be acquired, before the study of each particular campaign be attempted. Irrespective of the states and territories of the Pacific, which, content for the present to remain in the Union, took but little part in the contest, the remaining thirty-two may be divided as follows:—In the North are the six New England States, which have the credit of being the most bitterly opposed to the South. In politics the majority of these States are Republican, and also of the Abolition faction. Adjoining these is the great State of New York, which, with her neighbour, Pennsylvania, and the smaller States of New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland, and the district of Columbia, may be said to form another division. The feelings of these States had been far less bitter against the South. New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, however, took up the cause warmly when hostilities commenced. Delaware inclined to the North as Maryland did to the South, 'both being Slave States,' and the latter probably prevented by her situation from joining the Southern Confederacy. The District of Columbia followed the fortunes of the capital (Washington).

The eight States of the West also embraced the

Northern side ; they are the States of Minnesota, Wisconsin, Michigan, Kansas, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and to these may be added the Northern portion of the State of Missouri, in a great measure colonised by Germans. The border Slave States, which held, during the first months of secession, a neutral position, are Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, North Carolina, and Virginia. Arkansas and Texas may be numbered among the Southern Slave States, as soon after the formation of the Confederacy they joined the six original seceding States,—viz. South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. The Western States joined eagerly with those of the North ; there were fewer demonstrations, and less speech-making, but the West forwarded to the seat of war the largest quota of troops, and these troops have had the credit from their enemies of being the best soldiers. It was at one time supposed in the South that the States bordering on the northern portion of the Mississippi would join with those holding the command of the outlet of that river to the sea ; but events showed that such an opinion was erroneous, as no State has evinced, by her deeds, a more warlike and hostile feeling to the South than that of Illinois. Irrespective of the artificial boundaries of states, there are certain natural features which should be borne in mind. The Southern States, comprehended in their largest view, may be said to be bounded by the Potomac, the Ohio, and the Missouri Rivers on the north and west, and by the river Rio Grande (dividing Texas from Mexico) and by the sea on the south and east ; whilst the great Mississippi River separates them into two portions. A straight line passing through the Southern States from the Potomac to the Rio Grande would be at least

fourteen hundred miles in length, whilst one drawn from Washington to New Orleans would be about one thousand. The total population of the United States as shown by the census of 1860, amounted to 27,477,090 free men, and, 3,952,801 slaves. Of these in the free States and including the Slave States of Delaware and Maryland, there were 19,614,885 free men and 88,986 slaves, and in the other slave States 7,570,224 free men and 3,860,571 slaves.

The scanty population, in proportion to, and in conjunction with, the enormous extent of country, draws attention to a feature which will materially influence the campaigns whose course we propose to follow. The distances over which it is necessary to transport troops are so immense, that an invading army must have recourse to other means of moving than the slow process of marching; thus rivers and railways present more important features in an American than a European campaign. The general aspect of the country, especially that portion of it which was so soon to become the theatre of the war, differs considerably from the countries in Europe in which the great campaigns of history have been fought. The settlements are few* and distant from each other, whilst the portion that is unreclaimed by man is still clothed with forest. Even in the earlier settled States, the forest covers a great portion of the country, much more so in those more recently civilised. The roads through the former are adapted only to the scanty traffic of the inhabitants, and are wholly unfitted for the transportation necessary for an army. Such being the case, the railways which intersect the country, become features of great strategical im-

* Compared with Europe, the country in even the most thickly populated districts of the United States is but thinly inhabited.

portance. Bearing these points in mind, the relative strength of the belligerents must next be considered. A comparison of the population of the Northern and Southern States shows that in that respect the numerical strength of the North was about three times greater than that of the South, if white men only are included. The other portion of the population, viz. the black, was looked on by many Northern men, at the commencement of hostilities, as an element of weakness rather than of strength to the South. It was supposed that insurrections of the slaves, or threatened insurrections, would necessitate the employment of a force at home, in order to preserve the internal peace of the country whilst war was raging on its frontiers. Such, however, has been proved not to be the case: the slaves have, on the whole, remained faithful to their masters,—there have been no revolts; a comparatively small number have escaped to the North, on the advance of the Federal armies; but, in general, the slaves have remained quietly on the plantations, and by their labour have supported the white population, who, when war had once broken out, almost to a man took up arms. In other ways, besides in population, were the Northern States the stronger. The South, for many years enjoying the riches of her agricultural products, had been content to purchase all the requirements of civilised life from the North. There were few manufactories of any description in the Slave States: all the most ordinary articles in use in daily life were imported from the North: clothes, shoes, saddlery, arms, powder, &c. Even salt was brought from Europe, and the more Southern States bordering on the Mississippi were fed by the corn-growing prairie States of Illinois and Iowa. Tobacco, cotton, rice, and sugar

were their chief productions. The fertility of the soil and peculiar adaptation of the climate for the growth of these commodities secured a rich return to the planters, without any great amount of labour. The carrying trade between the ports of the South and those of the North had also gradually fallen into the hands of Northerners; the ships were built in Northern ports and manned by Northern seamen. The Central Government was in possession of the fleet, and also of the small army which, until the present time, had been sufficient for the defence of the country. When, therefore, the Southern States separated from the North, and when war ensued, they were cut off from all their usual supplies; whilst a blockading fleet, despatched by the Federal Government, rendered the endeavours to avail themselves of the resources of Europe difficult. The great strength of the South, however, lay in her position. It was her policy to act entirely on the defensive, availing herself of the natural difficulties which interposed against the advance of invading forces, and which rendered a small army equal in efficiency to a far greater one. There were certain vulnerable points where the North could assail her, but they were limited in number, and could therefore be wholly or partially defended. The sea-coast was indeed open to attack, but there were but comparatively few places in the long extent of nearly 2,000 miles where troops could be landed with any prospect of producing effect. The principal cities of the coast—viz. Wilmington, Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, New Orleans, and Galveston—were situated in positions not difficult to render defensible; and the inhospitable nature of the country bordering on the sea, together with the absence of good harbours, precluded the pro-

bability of attempts at invasion on any great scale from that side. The great water highways, which in so many directions intersect the Southern States, were indeed vulnerable points, from the fact that the Northern cities were better able to equip and furnish gun-boats than the smaller and more agricultural towns of the South. Thus, during the first year of the war, owing partly to a want of resources in artillery, partly also to a sort of superstitious fear, the Southern troops, so brave in the field, succumbed to the fire of the big guns from these vessels. If the country from its local features was capable of defence, the population, owing to previous habits of life, soon became fitted to act as its defenders. The Southern population have preserved the love of field sports inherited from their English forefathers; fox-hounds are even still kept in some of the districts; and few men in the South are ignorant of the use of fire-arms, and especially of the rifle. In the Northern States bodily exercise is little appreciated,—a Northern American will usually drive rather than ride, and ride rather than walk. Their life also is so busy, so engaged in the struggle for wealth, that they have little leisure for out-of-door amusements. In the South, on the contrary, the planter has much time on his hands; he resides usually apart from towns or cities, and is thrown on his own resources for amusement. The great forests abounding in game, and the rivers filled with fish, offer him every inducement to out-of-door sports; and thus the training he receives during peace fits him for many of the duties entailed by war.

There is also another element in the life of the planter, which, in a certain measure, tends to qualify him for the higher duties of the army. The richer

planter, possessing many slaves dependent entirely on him in regard to food, clothing, medicine, and discipline, acquires habits of command and of organisation highly useful to the officers of an army. A man capable of managing the affairs of a large plantation and ruling his servants with order and regularity, has advanced far in the qualities necessary to make a good colonel of a regiment. Above all, in the present war a spirit of determination has been aroused, and a feeling that each man is fighting against a foreign enemy for all that he holds dear, has united the population of the South in one common bond, and together have gone far to remove the jealousies, the petty strife for power and for party, which have too often rendered abortive the effects of great heroism. The result of this predominant feeling was strongly evinced in the composition of the first volunteers raised by the several States. At once, on the promulgation of Mr. Lincoln's proclamation, when war was perceived to be inevitable, and when the declared object of that war was invasion of the Southern States, steps were taken to provide immediate means of resistance. A martial spirit had long existed in the South, and consequently the profession of arms was more generally followed by the sons of the Southern planter, than by those of the Northern merchant. A large proportion of the small regular army of the United States had, therefore, been officered by Southerners; and these men, when a question of priority of duty arose between loyalty to their State or loyalty to the central Government, generally decided on the former. In most cases they resigned their commissions, without endeavouring to invite the men under their command to follow their example; satisfied that their own allegiance to the United States ceased when the particular State to which

they belonged had left the Union, but feeling that the same circumstances did not generally apply to the private soldiers. In considering the question, a slight knowledge of the constitution of the regular army of the United States becomes necessary. This army, prior to 1861, consisted of less than twenty thousand men of all arms. Their principal duties lay in protecting the extensive frontiers of the country from the inroads of Indians. They were usually detached in small bodies to occupy the border forts, or to follow up into the prairies some Indian tribe guilty of predatory incursions. Until the close of the Florida war, a portion were employed against the Seminole Indians, but their chief and almost only traditions were the battles of the Mexican campaign. This army was almost entirely officered from one military school, the academy of West Point. The nominations to this school were usually the result of interest with the Government in power. For this reason, in addition to that above stated, the South furnished the preponderance of officers, her statesmen having for many years occupied the higher offices of the Government. At West Point, the young men received a most excellent but severe military education, not in any especial arm of the service, but in all branches of the profession—in engineering and artillery, as well as in the duties of the cavalry and infantry. At the termination of the course of education, usually about the age of three and twenty, they were subject to a strict examination, and, ‘in the phraseology of the place,’ *graduated* according to their respective merits. It sometimes happened that men obtained entrance to West Point who had no intention of entering the army ;

still they received the same professional training, and consequently, in their future vocation of life, carried with them some military knowledge. Those who graduated received commissions, according to the examinations they had passed, in either of the several branches of the service. All, or at least by far the greater proportion of the officers of the army, having thus been educated at the same school, retained an intimate knowledge of each other's character, qualifications, and attainments, far more so than is possessed by the officers of any European army, and this peculiar feature has had its influence in the conduct of the war.

The non-commissioned officers and privates of the American army were separated from the officers by a more marked line of distinction than in any European service. But few or no Americans entered the ranks; they were principally filled by Irish and Germans. The Irish were preferred to the Germans, as, although not so smart or amenable to discipline when in garrison, they were yet accounted better in the field, less disposed to complain at hardships, and possessed of more dash and enterprise in action. The men and officers were not united together by any great community of interests, and when on the secession of the Slave States many of the officers from the South resigned their commissions, and took service under the new Confederate Government, but few of the men followed their example. It was a great object to secure the services of these officers; generally they were highly-trained men, possessing more knowledge of the several branches of their profession than the average of European officers, yet not excelling in any of the especial arms, i. e. an American officer may often be found to un-

derstand the principles of gunnery, the rudiments of engineering, and the tactics of cavalry and infantry, and may thus excel the European officer ; but in the European armies more perfectly instructed officers of each arm are to be found than in a proportionate number of American officers. However, for the warfare they were about to be engaged in, as well as for the high position which many of those, even from the junior grades of the American army, were about to be called on to fill, their education and training were especially suitable. Well, on either side, have these officers done their work ; their influence has been felt through both the Northern and Southern armies, and if more in the latter than the former, it is owing to the fact that politics in the South have interfered less with military appointments and military operations than they have in the North. Still it must be a matter of satisfaction to any soldier to perceive how thoroughly the trained and educated officers have taken the lead, and how by their endeavours, whatever is chivalrous and honourable in war has been upheld. Quickly on both sides, as men rushed to arms, were their services sought, and, in the South, West Point officers were at once given the commands of regiments or placed on the staff of the army. How that army was originally raised it must be our purpose to enquire. As early as February 28, 1861, an act passed by the provisional government at Montgomery authorised the President to receive into the 'service of the Government such forces in the service of the Confederate States as might be tendered or might volunteer, in such numbers as he might require, for a period of not less than twelve months. The said forces to form part of the Provisional army of the Confederate States, and to be

officered by general or other officers, as the President, with the advice and consent of Congress, might appoint.

This was followed by another act, passed March 6, 1861, 'authorising the President to employ the militia, and military, and naval forces of the Confederate States, and to accept the services of one hundred thousand volunteers for a term of not less than twelve months, either as cavalry, mounted riflemen, artillery or infantry, in such proportion of these several arms as he might deem expedient.' It was not, however, in consequence of these proceedings, but rather by the spontaneous action of the people, that the army of the Confederate States originally came into existence.

During times of peace in several of the towns there had been volunteer companies formed, partly for amusement, partly in view of future requirements. They were composed of the young gentlemen of the town and of the adjoining plantations. These companies, as soon as hostilities appeared imminent, placed themselves at the disposal of the several governors of the States, and volunteered for service beyond the borders of their particular State. By some, objections were raised that, through accepting the services of these men, fitted in many cases by education and position for officers, the States would denude themselves of the future means of organising their forces. But the danger was felt to be so great, and the threatened invasion of Virginia so imminent, that this objection was overruled, and the companies were at once despatched to certain central camps or depôts, prior to being forwarded to the frontier. The steamers and railways of the South soon became crowded with the volunteers, who, as they passed through the country, augmented their forces by recruits from the several plan-

tations. On all sides the enthusiasm was unbounded. Provisions were laid out for the troops at the railway stations; presents of clothing were given; whilst banners, embroidered by the ladies of the towns and villages from which the volunteers came, were presented to the several regiments. At the central camps, the companies were formed into regiments, the higher officers in some instances being appointed by the Governor of the State, or, as was the case with the companies' officers, elected by the men. The President having the right reserved to him of commissioning the generals and staff of the several brigades and divisions. Ordinarily the colonel or lieutenant-colonel of the regiments, and the higher officers of the staff, were or had been either officers of the regular army or pupils of West Point. The unselfishness and absence of personal ambition in these first-raised volunteers were very remarkable; often a rich planter would raise a company, even providing it with arms and clothing, and then, feeling his own ignorance of military affairs, would arrange that the command should be given to some other poorer, but better instructed man, whilst he himself would serve in the ranks. Camps were formed at Corinth, New Orleans, Montgomery, and at other central places in the several states, and when the companies had been organised into regiments, and drilled as far as was possible, they were transported to the menaced frontier. There was much that was peculiar in what may be termed the interior economy of these first regiments of volunteers; the men and officers were usually of the same station in life, many of the private soldiers were wealthy, and when stationed in the vicinity of towns were received into the best society the place could afford. Yet discipline was carried on

with all the exactitude and even rigidity of the regular army, the code of which is fully as severe as that of any in Europe. The black servants, in many instances, accompanied their masters to the field, and when in camp cooked for them ; but the anomaly often occurred, that the black servant was allowed more liberty than his master, the private soldier. After the war had assumed larger proportions, and the vast resources required to carry it on became apparent, other regiments, formed of a different class of men, were raised. The men of the first-enrolled regiments of volunteers were allowed furloughs, and on their raising companies or regiments were given commissions. Their wealth and position often enabled them to do this ; whilst their previous training and the habits of discipline acquired in the ranks were of great assistance in their new position as officers. In addition to the force of volunteers, for which provision was made in the Confederate Congress, steps were taken to lay the foundation of a regular army and navy. With regard to the former the intention was not so much actually to enrol such a force, as to give rank and position to the officers of the regular army who had joined the Confederate States, and who followed the profession of arms as their means of livelihood. Under both the Federal and Confederate Governments when the war commenced, officers in the army frequently held two ranks,—one designating their proper position in the regular army, the other their local and temporary rank in the volunteer forces. Thus, an officer, although holding merely the position of captain in the regular army, would yet frequently have the temporary rank of brigadier-general of volunteers. The first levies forwarded to Washington by the Northern States were

not of the same materials as those from the South, the richer classes usually sought and attained the position of officers, and the private soldiers were, with some exceptions,* enrolled from the working-classes, actuated partly by motives of patriotism, partly by those of pay, and were composed of Americans intermixed with a large number of foreigners, especially of Irish and Germans. This difference may be partly accounted for from the fact that the dense population of the Northern cities afforded a greater facility for the enlistment of troops, and also that the war in the North was more a war of policy than a war of patriotism. Not that many of those engaged in it were uninfluenced by the highest motives, but it was a war of the strong against the weak, and soon assumed the characteristics of a war of invasion. There was no question in the Northern population of defending their homes, and protecting their families from a foreign foe ; the North almost immediately took the offensive, and with but few exceptions have maintained it ; whilst the South have with some difficulty and great efforts preserved a successful defensive attitude, and suffered the evils of a war waged on her own soil. The first object of the Federal Government was to secure the safety of Washington, menaced by the secession of Virginia ; for this object volunteers were hurried down from the New England States and from New York ; the former being the first in the field. As the regiments passed through New York and Philadelphia, a warm welcome was bestowed on them ; they were hailed as the upholders of the Union, the champions of the Stars and Stripes ; so far their course was prosperous. But the same railway that passed through


* Such as the 7th New York regiment.

Philadelphia, *en route* for Washington, traversed also the streets of Baltimore. In that city a strong feeling in favour of the seceding States prevailed, and also a peculiar dislike to the people of New England. When, therefore, on April 19, the population of Baltimore heard of the approach of a Massachusetts regiment, they became violently excited, and assembled at the terminus of the Philadelphia and Baltimore line. At that place it was the custom to remove the engines from the carriages, and to draw the latter by horses through the town on rails to the terminus of the Baltimore and Washington line. As the railway trucks or cars (as they are termed in America) moved slowly through the streets, the assembled mob commenced to throw stones at the soldiers. The men then got out of the cars, and endeavoured to march through the town; the mob closed in on them; the men being half drilled and undisciplined moved on as rapidly as they could without much attempt at military formation, and, to their credit, for some time abstained from firing on the populace. As they neared the Washington terminus shots were, however, fired,* both by the troops and by persons in the crowd armed with revolvers. The soldiers hurried into the cars, a few discharged their fire-arms into the mob, and the train then moved off. The loss in killed and wounded on the side of the troops was two killed and eight wounded. On that of the citizens nine killed and three wounded. In the meantime a small body of Pennsylvanian troops, which closely followed the Massachusetts regiment in a different train, hearing of the disturbance and the reception they would probably meet with, returned to Philadel-

* On which side the firing commenced is doubtful.

phia. The wounded soldiers were treated with great kindness, and a communication sent to Governor Andrews, of Massachusetts, informing him of the disturbance and the result.* The Mayor of Baltimore also placed himself in communication with President Lincoln, requesting him to abstain in future from sending any troops through Baltimore. This point was so far conceded, that the route through Annapolis in place of that through Baltimore was selected for their transit. There is no doubt that from motives of policy this concession was made; the Government were at that time too weak to attempt to coerce so large a city as that of Baltimore; and there were symptoms during the late disturbance which showed that although at that time the higher classes took no actual part, or rather did not put themselves prominently forward, and although the mayor used all efforts to preserve peace, yet that a little more pressure or provocation would incite the whole of the citizens of Baltimore to join the cause of the South; and possibly the action of Baltimore would only be a precursor to that of the State of Maryland. For these reasons the Government of Washington yielded, and troops were forwarded by steamers to Annapolis; and having been assembled there, were directed to proceed by rail, if possible—should, however, the railway have

* The answer of Governor Andrews to the Mayor of Baltimore affords a curious illustration of American customs with regard to the dead—customs which have developed themselves to a great extent in the present war, where the process of embalming has been extensively practised. The answer was as follows:—‘I pray you cause the bodies of our Massachusetts soldiers dead in battle to be immediately laid out, preserved in ice, and tenderly sent forward by express to me. All expenses will be paid by this Commonwealth.—
JOHN A. ANDREWS, Governor of Massachusetts.’



COUNTRY ROUND BALTIMORE.



been destroyed, by marches—to Washington. These measures drew forth a remonstrance from Governor Hicks, of Maryland, who at the same time urged on Mr. Lincoln to withdraw the troops from that State, and to stop all hostile proceedings, also suggesting that the two opposing parties of the North and South should seek the arbitrament of Lord Lyons, the British Minister at Washington. This remonstrance was of no avail. Mr. Seward, in Mr. Lincoln's name, responded by declaring that the force to be brought through Maryland was intended for nothing but for the defence of the capital. That the national highway which that force should take had been selected by Lieutenant-General Scott as the route which was farthest removed from the populous cities of the State, and 'with regard to the proposal respecting Lord Lyons, Mr. Seward maintained that no domestic contention whatever ought to be referred to any foreign arbitrament, least of all to that of an European monarchy.' The troops at Annapolis were placed under the command of Brigadier-General Butler,* who occupied the heights round the town, and took possession of the rail to Washington. In the meantime the rail between Philadelphia and Baltimore was held by the Federal Government; and as their power increased, measures were taken to prevent any future trouble from the citizens. Thus Maryland may be said to have been secured from participating in the secession of the Southern slave States; she sent many of her sons to fight for their cause, but as a State she was preserved to the Union, suffering much, however, in consequence of, to use an Americanism, the *Southern proclivities* she had evinced.

* A Massachusetts lawyer.

The secession of Virginia, and her fixed resolution to oppose by force any attempt to march troops through her territory, rendered it necessary on the part of the Federal Government to take precautions lest the arsenals of Harper's Ferry at the junction of the Shenandoah and Potomac Rivers, and the Gosport navy yard at Norfolk, Virginia, should fall into the hands of the secessionists. The arsenal at Harper's Ferry was in charge of Lieutenant Jones, of the United States army, and a small body of men. On April 18, on a report reaching that officer announcing that a body of Virginians were marching from Winchester with the intention of capturing the arsenal, he set fire to the building and destroyed nearly 15,000 stand of arms, and then withdrew with the men under his command to the Maryland shore of the Potomac. On April 20, steps were taken to secure the fleet stationed off Gosport navy yard from capture by the State troops of Virginia. Previous to this date Governor Letcher, of Virginia had telegraphed to General Taliaferro, commanding the State troops in Norfolk closely adjoining the navy yard of Gosport, to sink vessels in the channel, and to erect batteries along the shore, in order to prevent the egress of the fleet. To a certain extent these orders were fulfilled; but the measures taken were not sufficient to prevent the entrance of the steamer Pawnee from Hampton Roads. Immediately on her arrival, the marines and seamen, together with a volunteer regiment, were landed at the navy yard, and whilst the gates were held by the troops, and the guns of the vessels pointed on the town, the work of destruction commenced. The stores of small-arms were destroyed, and also a great portion of the machinery in use in the navy yard.

The most valuable property was transferred to the Cumberland man of war, as also were the seamen of the Pennsylvania and men belonging to the other ships, together with the employés of the navy yard. The place was then fired, and as the Pawnee with the Cumberland in tow passed down the harbour, the flames burst out from the barracks and the other buildings, and also from the several vessels lying off the navy yard. The following is the list of vessels burnt :—The Pennsylvania, 74 guns ; Delaware, 74 ; Columbus, 74 ; steam frigate Merrimac, 44 ; frigate Baritan, 45 ; frigate Columbia, 44 ; sloop Germantown, 22 ; sloop Plymouth, 22 ; brig Dolphin, 8 ; a powder-boat, and the frigate United States (in ordinary). The Merrimac was only partially burnt, and, being subsequently raised by the Confederates, was reserved for important work at a future period of the war. After the evacuation of Harper's Ferry and the Norfolk navy yard, the only place held by the Federal Government in the State of Virginia was Fortress Monroe, a strong work situated on the point of land between the James and York Rivers at their junction with the Potomac. Off this fort, at Hampton Roads, were concentrated the residue of the United States fleet left from the destruction of the ships at Gosport, and by them the mouths of the York and James Rivers were blockaded ; the blockade of these rivers and of those of North Carolina having been decreed in a separate and subsequent order to that of April 19, in which President Lincoln had announced the blockade of the coasts of the six original seceding States, as also of Texas. In the last-named State affairs had not prospered with the Federal Government. A Colonel Van Dorn, who had lately resigned his commission in the United States

army, and had been appointed to the command of the State troops of Texas, obtained by his energy the capitulation of the United States regular troops at Saluria, and thus the whole of the State was secured to the Southern Confederacy. A month had, indeed, produced great changes in the aspect of affairs. South of the Potomac along the coast, Fortress Monroe, Fort Pickens, and the islands of Key West and Tortugas were the only places which owned the supremacy of the Federal Government. A blockade of the coast had been declared, and a decree issued that the privateers sailing under the letters of marque of the Confederate Government should be treated as pirates. The frontier States of the Northern Federation were divided into three military districts, comprising Washington, Annapolis, and Pennsylvania, to which was soon to be added a fourth, including Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, of which Major-General M'Clellan was appointed to the command. Volunteers in far greater numbers than were demanded—but, as it soon appeared, in fewer than were required—were hurried from the several States, and collected in camps at Fortress Monroe, at Washington, and at Cairo, a town situated at the junction of the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers. The Potomac below Washington was watched and patrolled by steamers formerly used for the passenger traffic to Aquia Creek, but now armed, and as far as possible equipped, for war. Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, divided in opinions, or endeavouring to preserve neutrality, were suffering the evils which neutrals must suffer in times of civil strife. The names, soon to become either illustrious or notorious, were growing familiar to men's ears. Colonel (now General) Lee, one of the best officers of the

United States regular army—a large landed proprietor, and the descendant, by connection, of the great Washington—had joined the South, when his State, ‘that of Virginia,’ seceded. He was now in command of the troops of the Confederacy and the State troops of Virginia, and was rapidly organising his forces in places soon to become as widely known as the great battle-fields of Europe. General Scott, the successful general in the Mexican campaign, and hitherto the hero of the Americans, was commanding in chief at Washington, whilst younger men who were soon to supplant him were rapidly coming to the front. The Massachusetts General Butler, shrewd, high-handed, and unscrupulous, was already evincing qualities that would earn the gratitude of his Government, but might insure the hatred of those over whom he had the rule. His conduct in Maryland during the time he was occupied in securing the passage of troops through that State showed capacity, and proved him to be a man who might be useful to his employers. In the West, General M’Clellan had been appointed to a command. He had formerly been an officer of the United States army, and was one of those who had been selected to proceed to Europe during the Crimean war, in order to report to his Government on the state of the English, French, and Russian armies. He had since then retired from the service, and had been employed as manager of the Illinois central railway, but when war broke out resumed his former profession. A Rhode Island regiment was under the command of Colonel Burnside, also one of those who was soon to gain a higher position; whilst on the Southern side, Generals Beauregard, Bragg, and Van Dorn had already signalled themselves. The Presidents of

the rival Confederacies had put forth their proclamations. The message of Mr. Davis on April 29 to the Congress of the Confederate States, set forth with great fulness the causes of secession, the first steps taken to procure a peaceful solution of the difficulty, the gradual warlike tone of the North, ending in threatened invasion, and the consequent measures taken by himself in organising armaments for the purposes of defence. He spoke of the enthusiasm of the people, of their confidence in the rectitude of their course, and of their dependence on Providence. In April 1861, war had already commenced, but it required time to convert the population of a peaceful country into armed men sufficiently trained and equipped to be enabled to proceed to acts of hostility against each other. Neither side was prepared for war ; men's words were violent and their passions strong, but some delay was required before their deeds could keep pace with their will. Europe at this time could hardly realise the facts which each mail announced. Little was understood of the respective merits of the case, and consequently many wrong ideas and false prophecies were circulated.

CHAPTER IV.

FROM THE BEGINNING OF MAY TO THE BATTLE OF RICH MOUNTAIN.

It is curious to watch how quickly and yet with what successive steps the contest assumed the characteristics of a foreign war waged between two powerful countries. It is true that the phraseology of the Federals designated their opponents as rebels, and their statesmen endeavoured to represent facts in such a manner as to induce the Governments of Europe to take the same view, but their acts did not bear out their words. The Confederates were necessarily recognised as belligerents, and it was only in certain localities and under peculiar circumstances that the war retained any of the features of a civil strife. In the meantime the Triennial Congress of the Confederate States had commenced their second session at Montgomery, and exercised all the functions of Government, and, it must be allowed, exercised them in general with a moderation and a consideration unusual in times of revolution. On May 6, 1861, an Act passed recognising the existence of war between the Northern States and the Confederate States, 'and empowering the President to use the whole land and naval forces of the Confederate States to meet the war thus commenced, and to issue letters of marque and general reprisal in such form as he should see fit, against the vessels, goods, and effects of the Government of the

United States.' The Act, however, excepted the States of Missouri, Kentucky, Maryland, Delaware, and the territories of Arizona, New Mexico, and the Indian territory from the effects of this declaration. The commencement of war having been thus officially recognised, additional steps were taken to provide measures of defence ; and for this purpose more extended powers were conferred on the President. A paper currency was substituted for metal, the operations of the mints were suspended, and money and bullion directed to be transferred to the Treasurer of the Confederate States. The exportation of cotton, except through the seaports of the Confederate States or through Mexico, was made a penal act. A new port of entry was established at Sabine Pass, situated at the mouth of the Sabine River in the State of Texas, and arrangements entered into for the organisation of a mail route through Louisiana and Texas in lieu of those closed by the Federal Government. With reference to debts owing to Northern creditors an Act was passed on May 21, which does not appear consistent with the honourable conduct of the Government of a great power, and which only the most exceptional circumstances could justify. The provisions of this Act are as follows :—

'The Congress enacts that all persons in any way indebted to individuals or corporations in the United States of America (except the States of Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri, and the district of Columbia) be and are hereby prohibited from paying the same to their respective creditors, agents, or assignees, pending the existing war waged by the Government against the Confederate States, and any one of the slave-holding States before named. Any person indebted as aforesaid shall be and is hereby authorised to pay the amount of

his indebtedness into the Treasury of the Confederate States, in specie or treasury notes, and shall receive from the treasurer a certificate, countersigned by the registrar, showing the amount paid and on what account, and the rate of interest which the same was bearing. Such certificate shall bear like interest with the original contract, and shall be made redeemable at the close of the war and the restoration of peace, in specie or its equivalent, on presentation of the original certificate. All laws and parts of laws militating against this Act be, and the same are, hereby repealed.' Considering that the Southern States had lived for so long a time under the same Government, had been so intimately connected by trade with those of the North, and had profited by the energy and resources of the merchants of the Northern cities; considering, also, that war according to modern ideas is not waged against individuals, but against Governments—the action of the Confederate Government in this instance cannot be defended, unless other grounds for their conduct should exist than those hitherto apparent. With regard to the army, an Act was passed to authorise the President to receive regiments of volunteers to serve during the existing war, unless sooner discharged; the President appointing field and staff officers, the men electing their companies' officers. Control of the telegraph lines was also given to the President, and all officers engaged in transmitting intelligence through the Confederate States were required to take an oath to support and maintain the constitution of the Confederate States of America, and not knowingly, directly or indirectly, to transmit through the telegraph any information calculated to injure the cause of the Confederate States, or to give

aid or comfort to their enemies. The wisdom of this measure became apparent from the fact that secrecy regarding the movements and numbers of troops, was preserved far more strictly in the South than in the North, where no check had as yet been put on either the press or the telegrams. The inferiority of the Southern troops in respect of numbers and equipment rendered additional precaution necessary, and that it succeeded is apparent from the fact that whilst from the very commencement of the war in almost every encounter the Southern troops were outnumbered by those of the North, yet the latter have with scarcely an exception believed that the superiority of force lay on the side of their enemies. The Southern Confederacy received additional strength from the secession, on May 6, of the States of Tennessee and Arkansas, the latter State making over to the Confederate Government the United States arsenals at Little Rock and Fort Smith. Up to this time the Confederacy had been ruled by a Provisional Government, but on May 21 an Act passed to put in operation the Government under the permanent constitution of the Confederate States. This Act provided for the election of a President, a Vice-President, and members of the House of Representatives on the first Wednesday in November 1861, and ordered that the members of the House of Representatives should meet on February 18, 1862, and elect a speaker, and the senators a President of the Senate; and that the President of the Senate should on February 19, 1862, open all certificates, and that the votes for President and Vice-President should then be counted; the President to be inaugurated on February 22, 1862. Having thus provided for a permanent Government, the House decreed

that the Provisional Congress should adjourn to Richmond,* Virginia, to meet there on July 20, 1861. The object of this move † was in order to be near the seat of war, and also to evince the importance attached to the accession of Virginia to the Southern cause. More than moral support was, however, required for Virginia; a large force numbering 68,000 men was concentrated on her borders for the purpose of attacking her, and the army at present organised in the South to meet this force was very small. Mr. Davis summed up the numbers in his message of April 29. He stated that there were at that time in the field at Charleston, Pensacola, Forts Morgan, Jackson, St. Philip, and Pulaski, 19,000 men, and 16,000 en route for Virginia. This army was certainly increasing from day to day, but the Act of Congress fixing the enlistment of volunteers for the term of the war rather than for any specified shorter period, although subsequently proved to be wise, yet tended at first to check the recruiting. A vote of thanks had been passed in Congress to General Beauregard and his army for the capture of Sumter, and as it was believed that the chief point of attack would be Virginia, and as General Beauregard had inaugurated the war by a success, he was ordered to resign his command at Charleston, and to proceed to the Virginian frontier. The forces on both sides were now drawing together, and it will be well to enumerate in detail the several generals. On the Southern side General Twiggs, who had lately commanded the United States forces

* The city council of Nashville, Tennessee, appropriated \$750,000 for a residence for the President of the Southern Confederacy, as an inducement to remove the capital there.

† Speech of Mr. Howill Cobb, at Atlanta, Georgia, May 22.

in Texas, was appointed Major-General in the Confederate service, and assigned to the command of the troops in Louisiana. Colonel Van Dorn was in Texas; General Bragg at Pensacola; General Pillow at Memphis, including under his orders the forces assigned for the defence of the Mississippi River; General Johnston, formerly one of the senior officers and quartermaster general of the United States army was in the Shenandoah Valley, in the vicinity of Harper's Ferry; General Beauregard at Manassas Junction, in Virginia; General Lee was occupied in the War Office at Richmond, and in organising the forces as they arrived there from the South. These several appointments were made during the month of May and the commencement of June. In the meantime the Federals had not been idle. As we have already seen, all active opposition to the Federal Government had been crushed at Baltimore. Mr. Lincoln had temporised with the Governor of Maryland and the mayor of the city, until he was possessed of sufficient power to demand, and in case of refusal to enforce his demands. The rail between Baltimore and Philadelphia was occupied by Federal troops, and the bridges guarded; at Relay House, on the line to Washington, a battery had been erected and the same precautions taken. The guns of Fort M'Henry were turned on the city, and under cover of them and those of a gunboat anchored in the harbour, troops had been landed, and marched without hostile demonstration through the streets to a height called Murray's Hill, overlooking the Baltimore and Philadelphia rail. Here a fort was erected and occupied by Federal troops. By these energetic measures the direct route between the North and Washington was secured. General Butler's services

were now transferred to a post nearer the frontier ; he was despatched to Fortress Monroe, where a force of between four and six thousand men had already been concentrated ; he was raised to the rank of Major-General, and a department assigned to him extending from Fortress Monroe over Eastern Virginia to the summit of the Blue Ridge Mountains. More and more did the war assume the character of one of invasion ; it was no longer contended that the vast army collected at Washington was intended merely for its defence ; the cry of '*On to Richmond*' had been raised, and preparations were made to give effect to the evident desire of the Northern States. On May 3, Mr. Lincoln issued a proclamation calling for the 42,000 volunteers to serve for a period of three years, unless sooner discharged ; he also directed the increase of the regular army by the addition of eight regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, and one of artillery ; and of the navy by the enlistment of 18,000 seamen.

It was a great object to secure to the Union, if possible, the State of Missouri. Her Governor, Mr. Jackson, had peremptorily refused to furnish the quota of troops demanded in the first proclamation of Mr. Lincoln, but at the same time had himself issued a proclamation advising peace on the ground that Missouri had at that time no war to prosecute. In view, however, of the unsettled state of the country, he counselled the citizens of Missouri to make ample preparations for their own protection, and to appropriate a sum of money in order to place the State in a posture of defence. It was evident that Governor Jackson leaned to the side of the South, and that a great proportion of the people of Missouri, especially those of the south and west, were of his opinion. Still the city of St. Louis and the northern

portion of the State was partially colonised by Germans, who belonged almost to a man to the Republican and Abolition party. Opposite the city of St. Louis on the left bank of the Mississippi, was the State of Illinois, unanimous in favour of the Union; whilst the river below St. Louis, between it and Cairo, was partially under the command of the Federal Government. A small detachment of United States regular troops was stationed at the arsenal at St. Louis, under Captain Lyon, an energetic and, as events proved, an able officer. By good management on his part, aided by some Illinois militia, the arms from the arsenal were removed from the disaffected town of St. Louis to the Illinois side of the river. This was accomplished without bloodshed; but on May 10 a collision ensued in which the lives of many citizens of St. Louis were sacrificed. It appears that, in pursuance of the order of the Governor of the State, the militia had been called out, and encamped in the neighbourhood of the city at Lindell's Grove. Another volunteer force had likewise been enrolled, consisting principally of Germans, or, as the Americans term them, Dutchmen; they were denominated the Home Guard, and had their place of rendezvous in the vicinity of the arsenal. About 2 P.M. on May 10, this force was collected together, and with some pieces of artillery (the whole under the command of Captain Lyon) was marched through the streets of St. Louis to Camp Jackson at Lindell's Grove. General Frost, who commanded the State militia, was advised of their approach, but either from incredulity of the fact that an attack was in contemplation, or from supineness, took no measures of resistance. He addressed a despatch to Captain Lyon, stating that the militia were a legal force called out by the Governor of the State,

and assuring him that there was no intention of making any attack on the United States arsenal. To this Captain Lyon made no response until he had occupied the avenues leading to Camp Jackson, when he demanded the surrender of General Frost and the militia, offering at the same time to release those who would take an oath of allegiance to the constitution of the United States. General Frost called a hasty council of the officers of his staff, and agreed to surrender; but few, however, of the men took the oath of allegiance, and the majority were marched as prisoners between the files of the Home Guard through the streets of St. Louis to the arsenal. Hitherto all had been accomplished without bloodshed; but a vast crowd, generally sympathising with the militia, had in the meantime collected, and commenced pressing round the troops. Some blows are said to have been dealt, and the men of one of the leading companies, 'Germans,' discharged their muskets into the crowd, happily with no effect, and in this part of the column the officers put a stop to the firing; but at the same time, the troops in the rear believing that those in front had been attacked, opened fire, and the result was that twenty-five civilians were killed and wounded. The people were greatly excited, and it was feared that the city would fall into the hands of the mob: steps, however, were taken to preserve peace, and the secessionists, either numerically too weak, or cowed by the energetic conduct of Captain Lyon, took no steps to avenge their fellow-citizens. On the 14th, General Harney, who had been appointed to the command of the Department of the West, issued a proclamation, urging the people of Missouri to remain true to the Federal Government, and to refuse compliance with the provisions of the Act passed by the General

Assembly of Missouri, and termed the Military Act, as that Act could only be regarded in the light of an indirect secession ordinance. In alluding to the affair at Camp Jackson, General Harney justified the conduct of his predecessor, alleging that many of the militia there assembled were secessionists, and that two of the avenues of the Camp bore respectively the names of Davis and Beauregard. An agreement was subsequently entered into with General Price, commanding the State militia, by which it was arranged that he, General Price,* should preserve peace among the people of the State, and thereby render any employment of force by General Harney unnecessary. Such half-measures were, however, impossible in the existing state of affairs: declarations of neutrality on the part of separate States were in fact proceedings of hostility to the Federal Government; as the power of making such declarations and acting in accordance with them, by refusing to furnish troops, or to allow of the passage of troops through their territories, argued a right of sovereignty on the part of the States, against which very right the Federal Government were in arms. General Harney was shortly afterwards removed from the command of the West, and was replaced by Major-General Fremont, under whom Captain Lyon, raised to the rank of a brigadier-general, was appointed to serve in Missouri. By him affairs were soon brought to an issue, and civil war commenced west and south of St. Louis. Before, however, following the course of events in that distant State, it may be well to trace out the commencement of the campaigns of Eastern and Western Virginia. A large force had been collected at Washington, the Poto-

* General Price's proclamation, June 4, 1861.

mac below the city was patrolled by gunboats, at Fortress Monroe a fleet and army had been collected, but still the capital was not secure. The Confederates held Harper's Ferry, about fifty miles from Washington and higher up the Potomac, and the heights opposite to and almost overlooking the city were in the hostile State of Virginia, and unoccupied by Federal forces. On May 24, or rather the night of the 23rd, an expedition left Washington with the object of seizing on these heights and occupying the city of Alexandria, situated a few miles lower down the Potomac on the Virginian shore. The expedition consisted of about 13,000 men; a portion of it marched over the Long Bridge leading across the Potomac, other troops crossed the river a short distance higher up; whilst a regiment of Zouaves, under the command of Colonel Ellsworth, embarked on board a steamer, with the object of effecting a landing at Alexandria. The sloop of war Pawnee anchored off the town to cover the landing by her guns, should any opposition be attempted. Such, however, was not the case. A small picket of cavalry stationed in the place rode off after firing a few shots as the boats from the Pawnee approached. The townspeople, seemingly unprepared for any attack, were asleep, and offered no resistance to the troops. The Zouaves landed about 4 A.M., and marched towards the Orange and Alexandria Railway depôt, being met in the town by the troops which had crossed the Long Bridge. So far all had proceeded quietly: a small body of cavalry were taken prisoners, and also some Confederate officers who were staying at the hotels. After the troops had marched through the town, Colonel Ellsworth on his way to the telegraph station perceived a Confederate flag still flying from an hotel called the 'Marshall House.' His regiment was

at the time engaged in displacing the rails near the depôt, and he was accompanied by only three or four officers and four of his men. Instead of ordering the landlord to remove the flag, or sending a corporal's guard to do so, Colonel Ellsworth himself rushed upstairs, climbed to the roof and cut down the flag. Having accomplished his object, and as he was descending the stairs, he was met by the proprietor of the hotel, Jackson by name, who presenting a double-barrelled gun at his breast shot him dead. One of the men who had accompanied Colonel Ellsworth, immediately shot Jackson through the head, and followed up the shot by running his bayonet through the body. Sentries were then placed at the doors of the hotel, and no further violence resulted. The affair caused great excitement both in the North and South, the press on either side claimed Colonel Ellsworth or Jackson as patriots and martyrs. Both were exalted as heroes, and their deeds, according to the bias of the writers, either stigmatised as those of ruffians, or commended as worthy of the great patriots of antiquity. To unprejudiced observers, the conduct of both must be a subject of censure. It was no part of the duty of a colonel of a regiment to enter a private house and violently to remove a flag flying from its roof. Colonel Ellsworth's youth and want of education as a soldier must be urged as an excuse for his behaviour, and the punishment he met with was far heavier than the offence deserved. At the same time the provocation offered to Mr. Jackson, and his probable ignorance of the occupation of the town by the Federal forces, can afford no excuse for an act of assassination, which might possibly have been praiseworthy if performed by a heathen, but which is perfectly unjustifiable according to the laws

of Christianity. Colonel Ellsworth's body was conveyed to Washington, where it was laid in state, and visited by thousands of people. The regiment of Zouaves was kept on board a steamer in the river, as the men threatened to burn the town of Alexandria in revenge for the death of their colonel.

Steps were taken in the meanwhile to occupy permanently the position that had been gained on the 24th. Forts were erected commanding the approaches to Alexandria, and also on the heights immediately overlooking the Potomac in the vicinity of the Long Bridge, and thus a commencement was made in the construction of the fortifications which were destined ere long to crown every height in the vicinity of Washington, and to convert the capital of the United States into a vast entrenched camp. For this species of work the troops were well adapted, many of the regiments from Maine and from the Western States were composed of men accustomed to a life in the woods, and especially handy in the use of the axe. Numbers of mechanics and also of men possessing a knowledge of engineering were to be found in the ranks, and proved very useful in the construction of bridges, the repairs of railways, the erection of field-works, the formation of abattis, and other works of field engineering. Major-General M'Dowell, an officer of the United States regular army, was placed in command of the troops on the south side of the Potomac, and the greater portion of the district hitherto assigned to General Butler, namely, that north of James River and east of the Alleghany Mountains (excluding Fortress Monroe), transferred to him. At the end of May, the positions of the Northern forces and their approximate numbers were as follows:—

South of the Potomac, Brig.-Gen. M'Dowell . . .	21,000
At Washington, Brig.-Gen. Mansfield . . .	22,000
Fortress Monroe, Major-Gen. Butler . . .	9,000
West Pennsylvania, Major-Gen. Keim . . .	16,000
Cincinnati and West, Major-Gen. M'Clellan . . .	13,000
Cairo and its vicinity, Brig.-Gen. Prentiss . . .	6,000
Baltimore, Brig.-Gen. Cadwallader . . .	5,000
Philadelphia, Major-Gen. Patterson . . .	3,000
	<hr/>
Total	95,000

Of this number, however, some were not yet armed, and the whole in a very imperfect state of organisation and discipline. Skirmishes were frequent along the line of the Potomac, usually resulting in little loss to either party. Like all young and undisciplined troops, the men were fond of using their rifles, but careful not to expose themselves to those of the enemy; therefore much powder was wasted at long ranges, in firing at sentries and pickets, and little harm done. The gunboats now and then interchanged shots with the Confederate batteries erected at Sewell's Point, near Norfolk, at Mathias Point on the Potomac, and near the mouth of the Rappahannock River. These skirmishes, both naval and military, were magnified by the Northern press, and eagerly watched by the people, unused to the realities of war. A more important operation was attempted in Western Virginia, where a portion of the population showed signs of a wish to separate from Eastern Virginia, or the Old Dominion as it is called, and to remain in the Union. A detachment of troops, principally from Ohio, but comprising one Virginian regiment, took possession of Grafton on the Baltimore and Ohio line of rail, and of Parkersburg on the left bank of the Ohio River. The former were under the command of Colonel Kelly. On June 3 a further advance

was made on Philippi, a small town on the Monongahela River, twenty miles south of Grafton, where Colonel Porterfield, in command of a force of Confederates of between six and seven hundred, was reported to be stationed. A night march was made by the Federals, who were numerically superior to their opponents, and the Confederates were completely surprised and driven across the river. The loss on both sides was very slight, on that of the Federals only two wounded and two missing; of the former, Colonel Kelly, who commanded the Virginia regiment, was one. The Confederate commander Porterfield * was in consequence of this disaster removed, and General Garnett appointed in his place as general of the Confederate troops in Western Virginia. About the same time an expedition was planned by General Butler against a Confederate force stationed at Big Bethel, about fifteen miles from Fortress Monroe on the road to Yorktown. A considerable number of Confederate troops under the command of Colonel Magruder, formerly an artillery officer of the United States army, were concentrated at Yorktown, and from them expeditions were frequently sent with the object of harassing the Federal troops in the vicinity of Fortress Monroe. An advanced post of the Confederates was stationed at Big Bethel, where some slight field-works had been erected. This detachment consisted of 800 North Carolina volunteers and 360 Virginians, with a battery of five howitzers and one Parrot rifled gun, the whole under the command of Colonel D. H. Hill. The position was strong, as the forest concealed the numbers and situation of the defenders, and some swampy ground protected their

* Colonel Porterfield was subsequently acquitted of all blame.

flanks. A small picket of cavalry had been detached to the front, to a place called Little Bethel. On the night of June 9, by General Butler's orders, four regiments were marched from the camp at Yorktown under the command of General Pierce. Two were detached in order to outflank the enemy, whilst two were marched directly to the front along the Fortress Monroe and Yorktown roads. Owing to a blunder the two supporting regiments of each column, viz. those of Colonel Benedix and Colonel Townsend, mistaking each other for the enemy, came into collision, and Colonel Townsend's regiment, receiving the fire of both musketry and artillery, incurred the greater loss. The result of this unfortunate mistake was that two of Colonel Townsend's men were killed and twenty-nine wounded. The regiments in front hearing the firing, and supposing that the enemy had cut off their retreat to Yorktown, drew back until they reached their supports; when the mistake having been discovered, the whole column marched forward to the attack of Big Bethel. All hope of surprising the enemy being at an end, a direct attack became necessary. But neither was the military knowledge of the officers nor the discipline of the soldiers equal to the task. The troops were badly handled, the men were exposed unnecessarily to the fire from guns and riflemen on whom they could inflict no injury in return; they had not sufficient dash to attempt a rush at the battery, and a retreat ending in a route ensued. The Federal loss was severe. During the engagement reinforcements of two additional regiments from Fortress Monroe arrived on the field, and four other regiments were held in readiness to march to the front. The Confederates, fighting on the defensive under cover of breastworks, incurred but

the very slight loss of one killed and seven wounded ; whilst that of the Federals was over one hundred. On the Federal side an officer of the name of Captain Winthrop * was killed whilst gallantly endeavouring to lead on the troops. He was standing upon a log of a tree exposed to a severe fire, and was shot whilst waving his sword and inciting his men to follow him. The Confederates, who spoke very disparagingly of the conduct of the majority of the Federal troops, bore testimony to his gallantry. The effect on the Confederates of the affair at Great Bethel was to lead them to underrate their adversaries ; they were aware of the great disparity in numbers between the forces engaged, and omitted sufficiently to estimate the advantage they themselves possessed in the defensive position they occupied, it being comparatively easy for young troops to await an enemy behind cover, whilst it is very difficult to induce them to march over the open exposed to a heavy fire. The Americans of the Northern States are brave, but unwarlike. The men are possessed of intelligence superior to that of the ordinary European troops ; but this very intelligence induces to misfortune. They are not content with a simple obedience to orders, but are agitated by the idea of flank attacks, masked batteries, &c., whilst the habit of exaggeration so common to Americans leads them to overestimate the numbers opposed to them, and the dangers they are called on to encounter. The volunteer officers at the commencement of the war were often from the same class as the men, and possessed few of the qualifications which might have compensated for their want of military instruction.

* Captain Winthrop was known in America as the author of a well-written novel.

Long reports of the affair at Big Bethel were made by the various generals and colonels of the Federal troops; that of General D. Hill, commanding the Confederates, deserves notice for its brevity and for the tone in which it is written. He concluded with the following sentence:—‘Our Heavenly Father has most wonderfully interposed to shield our hearts in the day of battle. Unto His great name be all the praise for our success.’ With few exceptions the *regular* officers on both sides have been modest and good men, and their despatches contrast favourably with those of many of the volunteer generals. Subsequent to the check inflicted on the Federals at Big Bethel, affairs remained *in statu quo* for a considerable time on the Yorktown peninsula, and no further advance, until at a much later period of the war, was attempted from Fortress Monroe. A movement was, however, in progress in the vicinity of Washington. It was considered important both for political and military reasons that the Confederates should be driven from Harper’s Ferry, as in order to render assistance to the population of Western Virginia, and to dispossess the Confederates of the extensive territory west of the Alleghany Mountains, an advance up the Shenandoah Valley, in conjunction with a movement of General M’Clellan from the neighbourhood of Grafton, was considered advisable. The former could not be attempted whilst the Confederates held Harper’s Ferry; nor could the direct communication be reopened between Baltimore and Washington and the Western States by the Baltimore and Ohio rail. For the security of Washington the possession of Harper’s Ferry was also important, as, should it remain in the hands of the Confederates, in the event of a direct

advance into Virginia, a considerable force would be required to watch it, in order to prevent a flank attack on the capital, or a movement against Baltimore. In order to drive the Confederates from so important a position, the troops under the command of General Patterson, numbering about 20,000, were gradually advanced from their camps in Pennsylvania (in the neighbourhood of Chambersburg) to Greencastle and Gettysburg, and towards the frontier of Maryland. General Cadwallader, from Baltimore, was placed in command of a brigade under General Patterson, and General Banks assigned in his place to the command at Baltimore. At the same time troops were marched up the left bank of the Potomac to Rockville.

The object of General Patterson's movement appears to have been to turn the position of Harper's Ferry by crossing the Potomac higher up the river near Williamsport, and so to march direct on Winchester. General Johnston, in command of the Confederates at Harper's Ferry, finding his position untenable, his force, about 7,000, being very inferior in numbers to those of his adversary, commenced his retreat on June 16, and sent a portion of his army, together with his sick and heavy baggage, by train to Winchester. On the 17th he set fire to the railway bridge (which crossed the Potomac at Harper's Ferry), and to other public buildings, and retired with his whole force in the direction of Winchester. He had previously caused the bridges over the Potomac at Point of Rocks and Berlin to be burned, in order to secure his right flank. On the 19th he changed the direction of his march, and moving westwards occupied Martinsburg, detaching Colonel Hill to Romney. At Martinsburg General Johnston offered battle to General Cadwallader, who had


crossed the Potomac with his brigade ; but the Federal general declined and withdrew to Hagerstown. The main body of the Confederates then retired to Winchester, where General Johnston established his head-quarters ; the task of watching the Potomac being entrusted to Colonel Jackson and the cavalry under the command of Colonel Stewart. There were constant skirmishes between the two armies, but with little or no result. On June 19 a detachment from General A. P. Hill's command, under Colonel Vaughan, attacked a small force of Federals at New Creek Junction on the Baltimore and Ohio rail, eighteen miles west of Cumberland, and defeated them, capturing a colour and burning the railway bridge. On July 2 General Patterson's force again crossed the Potomac, and after a skirmish with the rear-guard of the Confederates under Colonel Jackson, occupied Harper's Ferry and the right bank of the river. On July 15 General Patterson again advanced to within seven miles of Winchester, towards Smithfield, apparently with the object of threatening General Johnston's right. News, however, reached General Johnston which determined him to disregard the force in his front, and to move his army to the relief of General Beauregard at Manassas. In the skirmishes on the Potomac there was little loss on either side ; there was much firing from artillery and rifles, but the want of skill of the combatants and the cover afforded by the forest and underwood, prevented the loss of many lives. The very excellence of the arms induced to their inefficiency, as the men were tempted to fight at long ranges instead of coming to close quarters.

In the meantime General M'Clellan having organised a force of about 15,000 men (principally of Western

troops) in the vicinity of Grafton and Clarksburg, Western Virginia, advanced against the Confederate troops under the command of General Garnett, an old officer of the United States army, until lately commander of West Point. General Garnett had taken up a position about seven miles from Beverley, with the intention of covering the approaches to that place. His force consisted of about 6,000 men, with a small proportion of cavalry and artillery. The country in this part of Virginia is well adapted for the purposes of defence.* The great chain of the Alleghanies separating Eastern and Western Virginia affords innumerable positions for an army acting on the defensive. Adjoining the main chain of mountain are other lesser ridges, running in a parallel direction, and between these ridges flow various streams, tributaries of the Cheat, and Monongahela Rivers, eventually entering the Ohio River near Pittsburg. On one of these lesser ridges, called Laurel Hill, General Garnett selected a position covering the main road leading from Philippi to Beverley. To another part of the same ridge, named Rich Mountain, separated from the former by a creek or stream at a distance of some few miles, he detached Colonel Pegram with a force of about 1,600 or 2,000 men, in order to command the road leading

* The western slopes of the Alleghanies, and the country adjoining the north branch of the Potomac, is still entirely covered with the primeval forest, a few trappers or hunters being the only inhabitants of vast districts. The forests abound in game, and bears, wolves, and even elks and panthers find a shelter among the almost impenetrable woods and thickets of rhododendron which clothe the hill-sides, and conceal the course of the numerous streams and rivulets. The Baltimore and Ohio rail traverses the wildest part of this district, but merely passing through it has done little as yet towards opening it out to civilisation.

to Beverley from Weston. On July 11 General M'Clellan's force halted at a short distance from Rich Mountain. Early on the morning of the 12th four regiments were detached under the command of General Rosencranz, to turn the left of Colonel Pegram's position by a path through the forest. The rain was falling in torrents as the men advanced up the steep sides of the hill. As they approached the summit they were received by a steady fire of artillery and musketry, which, however, was levelled too high, and inflicted but little injury. The force continued to advance, and finally drove the Confederates down the mountain, completely routing them, without the assistance of the main body under General M'Clellan, who was prepared to attack the position from the front. Acting under General M'Clellan's orders, Colonel Rosencranz pushed on at once to within three miles of Beverley, and General Garnett, ascertaining that his position had been turned, evacuated Laurel Hill, and also moved in the same direction. Colonel Pegram, finding his men demoralised by the defeat, and being in a wild country without provisions or ammunition, surrendered with about 600 ; whilst the remainder under Colonel Tyler joined General Garnett. That general having ascertained that the road to Beverley was already occupied by the Federals under Colonel Rosencranz, changed the direction of his retreat, and moving northwards by mountain roads attempted to reach St. George on the Cheat River. General M'Clellan detached General Morris in pursuit, and sent orders to two regiments at Cumberland to join General Hill at Rowlesburg on the Baltimore and Ohio rail, in order to cut off the retreating Confederates. On the 13th General Morris's advanced guard came up with the rear of General Garnett's



SCENE OF THE CAMPAIGN OF WESTERN VIRGINIA

force at Carrock's Ford on the Cheat River. The Confederate rear-guard attempted to hold the right bank of the stream, General Garnett himself riding up to the most advanced skirmishers to encourage them. Conspicuous on horseback, the general became a mark for the Federal riflemen, and a sergeant of the Seventh Indiana regiment taking a deliberate aim at him shot him, and he fell from his horse dead. The Confederates retreated, abandoning the greater portion of their baggage, and under Colonel Taliaferro succeeded, after suffering terrible hardships and losing many men through starvation and exposure, in reaching Monterey, on the eastern side of the main chain of the Alleghanies. In this campaign General M'Clellan captured seven guns, the greater portion of the camp equipments and baggage of the Confederates, together with nearly 1,000 men, including the 600 who had surrendered under Colonel Pegram, his own loss being very slight—under fifty men.

General Garnett was the first officer of any note who had as yet fallen. When his body was carried into the Federal camp, it was at once recognised by three of his former brother-officers, one of whom had shared a room with him for four years at West Point. All bore testimony to his gallantry. The compliment paid by General M'Clellan in the address to his troops appears to have been well deserved; he thanked them not only for their gallantry in the field, but also for the humanity they had shown to the prisoners. Short as it was, the results of the campaign were not unimportant. The Confederate General Wise, who, early in June, had organised a force of about 4,000 men, and advanced as far as Charleston on the Kanawha River, where he was opposed by General Cox, hearing of the result of the

battle of Rich Mountain, retired to Lewisburg on the Greenbrier River at the foot of the Alleghany Mountains. Thus the Federal line was pushed forward from the Ohio River to the Alleghany Mountains, a distance of about one hundred miles, and a large portion of the people of Western Virginia, who had shown symptoms of a wish to separate from the Eastern portion of the State and to remain in the Union, received the support of the Federal army. To such a point had the Union sentiment been carried in the Western portion of Virginia, that a convention had assembled at Wheeling, and, on the grounds that revolution was acknowledged as a fundamental right by the fathers of the Republic, took measures to separate from Eastern Virginia, and proceeded to elect a Governor and the usual State officers for the Western portion of the State, binding them by an oath not only to support the Constitution of the United States, but also to defend the Government of Virginia as vindicated and restored by the Convention assembled at Wheeling, on June 11, 1861. It remained to be seen whether the Government at Washington, professing as they did to be engaged in war for the Constitution, would recognise the unconstitutional secession of a portion of a State. The progress of affairs tended to involve the Government in other difficulties besides that of the recognition of Western Virginia, and among others were the anomalies arising from the slavery question. As the institution of slavery was recognised by the Constitution, it did not become the Federal generals, professedly fighting for that Constitution, to advocate abolition, or to encourage the flight of the slaves from their masters. The question then arose, what course should be pursued? Cases frequently occurred when the masters of such fugitive slaves applied

to the Federal generals for their restoration, in accordance with the laws of the United States. Viewing the question simply on legal grounds, the slaves ought certainly to have been given up. But this course of proceeding was naturally antagonistic to the abolition sentiments of many of the officers and men. General M'Dowell (a Democrat) forbade all fugitive slaves from coming into his lines or being harboured there. General Butler, on the other hand, received them, and in order to overcome the difficulty of so doing, professed to regard them as contraband of war, basing his argument on the grounds that the slaves were used by the Confederates in building batteries and throwing up works, and therefore became a species of property equally contraband of war as gunpowder and arms. This term was quickly adopted and became popular in the North, and the name negro gave way to the new term contraband. Unfortunate was the lot of the unhappy blacks. Either tempted by hopes of freedom, or desire of change, or deserted on the plantations by their masters, who retired before the invading armies, they congregated in the Federal camps. The men were there forced to labour for small, and sometimes only nominal, wages; whilst the women and children, unaccustomed to provide for themselves, and deprived of the care of their masters and mistresses, became the prey of vice, disease, and death. These evils had already commenced at Fortress Monroe, but not as yet to the extent to which they developed themselves as the war progressed. Another difficulty arose out of the complicated nature and objects of the war. In Baltimore writs of *habeas corpus* were issued against certain persons belonging to, or confined in Fort M'Henry. These writs were disregarded by the

officers in command of the fort, and the civil officers appointed to serve them were refused admission. The legality, or the contrary, of such acts involved a question of much consequence in regard to the liberty of the American citizen, and it became a matter of grave discussion among the high legal authorities. The chief point under consideration being, whether the President could, of his own authority, suspend the *habeas corpus* act, or whether the power of so doing was alone held by Congress. A decision was given by Chief Justice Taney, who ruled, 'Firstly, That the President, under the Constitution and laws of the United States, could not suspend the privilege of *habeas corpus*, nor authorise any military officer to do so. Secondly, that a military officer had no right to arrest and detain a person, nor subject him to the rules and articles of war, for an offence against the laws of the United States, except in aid of the judicial authority, and subject to its control; and if the party should have been arrested by the military, it was the duty of the officer to deliver him over immediately to the civil authority, to be dealt with according to law.' Such, probably, is the Constitutional view of the question, although Chief Justice Taney's decision was disputed by other legal authorities. The position of affairs was, however, so critical, and the importance of overpowering the people of Baltimore so great, that high-handed measures were supported by both the Government and people of the United States. The latter indeed have, in several instances, proved themselves to be more anxious to procure the subjugation of their Southern neighbours than to preserve the guarantees which secure to them their own liberty. Mr. Lincoln, in his message on the opening of the Congress at Washington on July 4th, which was, indeed, a sad comment on the rejoicing usually accompanying

the commemoration day of the American Republic, drew attention to the *habeas corpus* question. After alluding to the events that had happened since he made his inaugural address, especially to the action of Virginia and the impossibility of recognising a neutrality of the border States, which would prevent the marching of troops through their territories, Mr. Lincoln acknowledged that the writ of *habeas corpus* had, in some instances, been suspended by the general commanding, but justified such a course of action by the necessity of the times. He did not, however, allow that the act of such general was illegal, but stated that it would probably form a case for the opinion of the Attorney-General. He then proceeded to ask for a grant of men and money in these terms:—‘It is now recommended, that you give the legal means for making this contest a short and decisive one; that you place at the control of the Government for the work at least 400,000 men and \$400,000,000. A right result at this time will be worth more to the world than ten times the men and ten times the money.’ He then proceeded to argue that the wish to leave the Union was not that of the majority of the people of the Southern States, but that many acted only under coercion. And with regard to the future policy of the Government towards those States after the rebellion had been crushed, he used these expressions:—‘After the rebellion has been suppressed, the Executive deems it proper to say that it will be the purpose then, as ever, to be guided by the Constitution and the laws, and that he probably will have no different understanding of the powers and duties of the Federal Government relative to the rights of the States and the people under the Constitution than that expressed in

the inaugural address. He desires to preserve the Government, that it may be administered for all, as it was administered by the men who made it.' At the same time were submitted to Congress the reports of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy.

They were elaborate documents, containing much that was interesting respecting the number and organisation of the military and naval forces, and also some remarks which the events of the war have since falsified. Mr. Cameron, Secretary of War, commenced his report with an enumeration of the various forts and arsenals which had been seized by the Confederates. He then, in allusion to the enthusiasm of the Northern people and their unanimity in taking up arms for the Union, said, 'that at that time the Government presented the striking anomaly of being embarrassed by the generous outpouring of volunteers to sustain its action. Instead of labouring under the difficulty of monarchical Governments—the want of men to fill its armies (which in other countries had compelled a resort to forced conscriptions)—one of its main difficulties was to keep down the proportions of the army, and to prevent it from swelling beyond the actual force required.' Well would it have been for the Federal Government if the same difficulty had continued during the course of the war as attended its commencement. The total force in the field was computed as follows :—

Regulars and volunteers for three months and for the war	225,000
Add to this fifty-five regiments of volunteers for the war, accepted but not yet in service	50,000
Add new regiments of regulars	25,000
Total force	310,000
Deduct three months' volunteers	80,000
Force for service after withdrawal of three months' men	230,000

The regular army had been increased by a regiment of twelve companies of cavalry, numbering 1,189 officers and men; a regiment of artillery of twelve batteries, of six pieces each, numbering 1,909 officers and men; and by nine regiments of infantry, each regiment containing three battalions, numbering 2,452 officers and men in each regiment—making a maximum increase of the regular infantry of upwards of 22,000 men. The increase of infantry was stated to have been comparatively large, in accordance with the recommendation of General Scott. The report recommended that the enlistment for the regular army should be limited for three years, and that at its termination a bounty of one hundred dollars should be granted to each man. Also that the organisation of the army should be changed and assimilated to that of the French, allotting three battalions to each regiment. The additional regiments of the regular army were to be officered partly from the old regular army, partly by civilians—those destined for the higher grades to be either graduates at West Point, or men who had served in the field—and partly also by the promotion of deserving non-commissioned officers. A sum of \$185,296,397 was demanded for the requirements of the army for the year commencing June 30, 1861. The appropriation of a sum was also recommended for the purpose of reconstructing, maintaining, and working such railways and telegraph lines as should be required for the use of the army. Also it was advised that, in view of the former life and diet of the volunteers, additional vegetables and fresh meat should be issued to the troops, to that laid down in the regulation dietary. Also that the troops in the field should be supplied with waterproof capes and blankets. The report stated that at the commencement of hostilities

some difficulty had been felt from a want of a sufficient supply of arms, as owing to the 'bad faith of those entrusted with their guardianship, they had been taken from their proper depositories, and distributed through portions of the country expected to take part in the contemplated rebellion.' The defect had been remedied by doubling the force at the Government manufactory at Springfield,* and by purchasing arms from private manufacturers and from Europe. Arrangements had also been made for purchasing rifled cannon and rifling the smooth-bored ordnance. The report concluded with an allusion to the defection of so many of the officers of the regular army, and partially accounted for it in a curious manner. It seems that a board of visitors to the West Point Military Academy had made a special reference to the system of discipline, which (to quote the words of Mr. Cameron's report) 'it appears, from facts obtained upon investigation, ignores practically the essential distinction between acts wrong in themselves, and acts wrong because prohibited by special regulations. The report states that no difference is made in the penalties affixed as punishments for either class of offences. It is argued, with reason, that such a system is directly calculated to confound in the mind of the pupil the distinction between right and wrong, and to substitute in grave moral questions habit for conscience.'

Such a method of reasoning, applicable to schoolboys, appears absurd when applied to the conduct of the men who had become the leaders of the Confederacy, who had served for many years in the army,

* The Springfield rifle resembles the Enfield, and is said by Americans to be equal to that arm. The ammunition of one serves for the other.

had grown old in the service, and were accounted among its best officers. The report of Mr. Welles, Secretary of the Navy, commenced with an enumeration of the naval force of the United States, as it existed on March 4, 1861. The total number of vessels were ninety, carrying, or designed to carry, about 2,415 guns. Excluding vessels on the stocks, those unfinished, stationary store ships, &c., the number was made up as follows :—

	No.	Guns.
Ship of the line	1	84
Frigates	8	400
Sloops	20	406
Brigs	3	16
Store ships	3	7
Steam frigates	6	212
First-class steam sloops	5	90
First-class side-wheel steamers	4	46
Second-class steam sloops	8	45
Third-class screw steamers	5	28
Second-class side-wheel steamers	4	8
Steam tenders	2	4
Total	<u>69</u>	<u>1346</u>

Of this force the following were in commission, the remainder being in ordinary, dismasted, &c.:—

	No.	Guns.
Frigates	2	100
Sloops	11	232
Store ships	3	7
Screw frigate	1	12
First-class steam sloops	5	90
Side-wheel steamers	3	35
Second-class steam sloops	8	45
Third-class screw steamers	5	28
Side-wheel steamers	3	5
Steam tender	1	1
Total	<u>42</u>	<u>555</u>

The vessels had a complement of about 7,600 seamen, and about 2,500 marines. Nearly all were on foreign stations. Of the officers, 259 had either resigned their commissions, or been dismissed the service since March 4; among others Captain Buchanan, superintendent of the Washington Navy Yard, and Lieutenant Maury, in charge of the Observatory, an officer possessing a European reputation for his scientific attainments.

From various losses, such as the destruction of ships at the Norfolk Navy Yard, &c., the vessels left at the disposal of the Navy Department shortly after March 4 were only sixty-two. To these were added 'by purchase' twelve steamers carrying from two to three guns each, and three sailing vessels, and nine other steamers (chartered) carrying from two to nine guns each. There were also several small craft temporarily in the service of the Department. Nearly all the ships on foreign stations had been recalled, and the vessels employed for the blockade of the coast of the Southern States divided into two squadrons, termed the squadron of the Atlantic coast and the squadron of the Gulf. The first consisted of twenty-two vessels, under the command of Flag-officer S. Stringham, and the second of twenty-one vessels, under Flag-officer W. Mervine. A flotilla of small steamers for service on the Potomac had been organised under Commander Ward, who was soon afterwards killed in an engagement. With regard to iron-clads and floating batteries, nothing as yet had been done; but Mr. Welles recommended that a board should be appointed to inquire into and report on the subject.

In conclusion, an estimate was submitted amounting to \$30,609,520.29 for the service of the navy for the

year commencing June 30, 1861, being considerably more than double the estimate of the last year's expenditure. Little in this report was said respecting the river flotillas of gunboats, which were soon to play so conspicuous a part in the war; and it was left for the Confederates to give the first lesson to the world of the value of iron in the construction of ships.

To provide for the increased expenditure of the country a loan became necessary, and on July 10 there was a warm debate in the House of Representatives respecting the propriety of authorising the Secretary of the Treasury to contract one. The Government, however, succeeded in passing their bill by the very large majority of 149 to 5. Among the minority was Mr. Vallandigham of Ohio, who had spoken strongly against the proceedings of the Government, and had even counselled peace. The bill authorised the Secretary of the Treasury to borrow on the credit of the United States a sum of \$250,000,000, for which he was authorised to issue certificates of coupon, registered stock, or treasury notes—the stock to have interest not exceeding 7 per cent. Two other bills passed shortly afterwards; viz. on July 10, in the Senate, authorising the employment of 500,000 volunteers, and appropriating \$500,000,000 for the purpose of suppressing the rebellion; and on the same day, in the House of Representatives, a bill authorising the President to close the ports of the seceding States. Such were the first proceedings of the Congress at Washington.

Before continuing the narration of military operations, it will be well to take a retrospective glance at the position of the armies. The line of the Potomac was held by the Federals from its mouth (where General Butler occupied a point on the right bank at

Fortress Monroe) up to Cumberland, Maryland, far above Washington on the upper part of the river. From its mouth to Washington the Potomac was patrolled by armed vessels, and the right bank carefully watched; not, however, so carefully as to preclude the erection of Confederate batteries. Washington was gradually assuming the appearance of a vast entrenched camp, whilst on the Virginian side a large army was anxiously awaiting orders to advance on Richmond. Above Washington, the right bank of the Potomac was watched by a detached corps under Colonel Stone as far as Point of Rocks; whilst a large force under General Patterson had already crossed the river at Harper's Ferry, and was within a few miles of Winchester. Between General Patterson's force and that under General M'Clellan was a gap in the line, although the base of operations of both, or rather their means of obtaining supplies, may be said to have been the Baltimore and Ohio rail. The neutral State of Kentucky covered the right of the Federal line west of the Alleghanies. Again, at the entrance of the Ohio into the Mississippi at Cairo, a large Federal force had been collected, and in Missouri a campaign had already opened favourable to their arms. The blockade of the coast had been commenced, although it was far from sufficiently complete to prevent the importation of warlike stores, the exportation in return of cotton, or of the escape to sea of a few privateers.* In the South, the men soon to acquire fame in the war were rapidly rising to high rank in the army—Colonels Magruder and Hardee had been raised to the rank of Major-General. General M'Culloch was in command of the troops in

* Among the latter were the privateers Sumter and Jeff Davis, the former commanded by Captain Semmes.

Arkansas; General Price of those in Missouri. Colonel Jackson had already acquired fame under General Johnston in the Shenandoah Valley; and Colonel Stewart's cavalry had, at this early stage of the war, proved useful in protecting the long line of the Upper Potomac; whilst the two General Hills had signalled themselves respectively at Big Bethel and on the Upper Potomac. The command of the Valley of the Mississippi had been assigned to Bishop, now General, Leonidas Polk, who, educated as a soldier, justified the resumption of his former profession by the justice of the cause and the exigencies of his country.

There could be no doubt that a great battle would soon be fought in Virginia. The Northern press and people were impatient of delay, and the Southern journals wrote as if they were only anxious lest a compromise should be effected without the opportunity offering itself to the South of avenging the insults that had been inflicted on her. One of the Northern journals (the 'New York Herald') had, indeed, made a suggestion to the effect that it would be far more profitable, instead of engaging in civil war, that the North and South should join their forces for the purpose of driving the British power out of Canada, and the Spanish power out of San Domingo. This was, however, only a commencement of the puerile attacks which the American press has thought proper to make, from time to time, on the great powers of Europe, and on England in particular. Those powers seemed little disposed to interfere in the quarrel; the Queen's proclamation of May 15 cautioned her subjects to preserve a strict neutrality, and her Government determined to prohibit privateers from bringing prizes into British ports; whilst, in all questions relating to America, the French

Government was in complete accordance with that of England. By adopting this line of action England pleased neither party; the North expected sympathy, and the South hoped that the necessity of obtaining cotton would have prevented her from recognising the blockade. In both North and South a feeling of hostility for the mother-country was engendered, which, however, far from manifesting itself towards individuals, seemed an additional incentive to show, by great kindness towards any Englishman visiting America, that the ill feeling was directed against the nation as a whole, and not against the individuals composing it.

CHAPTER V.

THE CAMPAIGN AND BATTLE OF BULL RUN.

IT was on July 16 and 17, 1861, that the advance of the army from the lines of Washington commenced. The clamour of the press, the excitement and impatience of the people, the shortness of the period for which a great portion of the troops had been enlisted, all conduced to urge the authorities to order an immediate advance, although the officers accustomed to deal with regular armies—and who, by practice and study, were cognisant of the difficulties to be encountered in campaigning—were fully aware of the deficiencies of the volunteer troops placed under their command. Men there were in sufficient numbers, armed and clad in uniform, but disciplined very imperfectly, under the guidance of officers for the most part ignorant of the very appearance of a soldier, formed into regiments, but unprovided with the machinery of a staff—with the *matériel* of an army, but with none of the organisation necessary to utilise it—excited by an evanescent enthusiasm, but without the deep-rooted motives which lead men to face death—puffed up with vanity, and gratified by the idea of the magnitude and power of the army and the nation, but not imbued with the military *esprit de corps*—in fact, a crowd of civilians dressed and armed to represent soldiers,

but possessing few of their qualifications. Such was the force, under the command of Brigadier-General M'Dowell, destined for the defeat of the Confederates and for the capture of Richmond. It was known that the army of General Beauregard was stationed in the neighbourhood of Centreville, about twenty-five miles from Washington, and that General Johnston was in the Shenandoah Valley. It was also known that the two armies, although distant from each other about fifty miles, were yet connected together by a rail and line of telegraph. Still, their junction was considered to have been sufficiently guarded against by the position of General Patterson, who was supposed to be able to hold General Johnston engaged, whilst the main force under General M'Dowell marched against General Beauregard. This arrangement was, however, rendered abortive by the behaviour of the troops of General Patterson. They were mostly composed of Pennsylvanian regiments, and were volunteers enlisted for three months. As the termination of their period of service approached, it became apparent that few would consent to remain one day longer than the period for which they had originally enlisted. In vain the general entreated them to re-engage, if only for ten additional days; the officers, indeed, declared that they were not unwilling to do so, but the men absolutely refused. Only four regiments out of the army of about twenty thousand consented to remain. The others alleged as their ground of refusal that they had been *badly treated by their States, that their pork was unfit to eat*, and that they received *often but two or three crackers * per day*. How, then, could

* Anglicè, biscuits.

General Patterson act? He was forced, at the most momentous crisis of the campaign, to withdraw from his post, and to retreat from the enemy's country towards Harper's Ferry and the State of Pennsylvania. On the 15th he advanced from Martinsburg to Bunker's Hill, on the road to Winchester; but on Tuesday he commenced a retrograde movement to Charleston, about twenty miles from Winchester, and from thence retired on the 20th and 21st to Harper's Ferry. When the news of the great battle of Manassas was received by his army, and the consequent baseness of their conduct dawned on them, they were loud in their expressions of hatred and fury against their general. He was received with hisses and shouts of anger by the troops on parade—by the very men who had tended to cause the failure of the campaign by their want of patriotism, and by conduct unbecoming soldiers professedly fighting for their country. What plea can be urged for them? They were not mercenaries fighting merely for pay; they were citizens of Pennsylvania who had taken up arms in the cause of, and were animated professedly by the most devoted love for, their country. It can hardly be supposed that to such men the absence of home comforts and the hardships of a few weeks' campaign would be sufficient to induce them to desert the cause. To what, then, can their conduct be attributed? Are the calculations and arrangements of trade so imbued in the minds of Americans that even what they believe to be their most sacred duties are subservient to engagements which might suffice to bind apprentices, but are scarcely such as usually tie the hands of men armed for a holy cause? Or were the men lukewarm in that cause, and ignorant of a military

spirit—were they also deficient in the feelings of patriotic citizens? Possibly to all these causes, as also to the carelessness in regard to their men of ignorant regimental officers, is the defalcation of General Patterson's army to be attributed. However, it was necessary that some one should be sacrificed; and, as it was easier to get rid of the general than to punish the troops, it was ordered that Generals Patterson and Cadwallader should be honourably discharged from the service of the United States. These events, occurring contemporarily with the advance of General McDowell's army, were productive of the gravest results, as we shall have occasion to notice.

The numerical strength of the Federal army which marched from the lines around Alexandria, Arlington Heights, and Washington, was about 53,000 men. This number was made up as follows: viz. 50,000 volunteers, mostly infantry, and 3,000 regular troops, comprising artillery, and a small proportion of cavalry. Many of the volunteer regiments had a few guns, or even a battery of artillery, attached to them; but only a portion of these batteries had been organised into a proper artillery force. Among the volunteer regiments were several clothed in the dress, but possessing few of the characteristics, of Zouaves; and it was the delight of the press to narrate anecdotes of these men, to evince the recklessness which they were supposed to have imbibed with their loose breeches. The army was divided into five divisions, and each division into an unequal number of brigades; they were commanded as follows:—

1ST DIVISION. *Brigadier-General Tyler*.—Comprising: 1st Brigade, Colonel E. D. Keys; 2nd Brigade, Brigadier-General Schenck; 3rd Brigade, Colonel W. Sherman; 4th Brigade, Colonel J. Richardson.

- 2ND DIVISION. *Colonel Hunter*.—1st Brigade, Colonel A. Porter; 2nd Brigade, Colonel A. Burnside.
- 3RD DIVISION. *Colonel S. Heintzelman*.—1st Brigade, Colonel W. Franklyn; 2nd Brigade, Colonel O. Wilcox; 3rd Brigade, Colonel O. Howard.
- 4TH DIVISION. *Brigadier-General T. Runyon*.—Composed of New Jersey troops.
- 5TH DIVISION. *Colonel D. Miles*.—1st Brigade, Colonel Blenker; 2nd Brigade, Colonel Davies.

The artillery of the army consisted of 49 field-pieces, of which 28 were rifled. All the batteries excepting two were fully horsed.*

Many of the senior officers commanding divisions and brigades belonged to the regular army, but were totally unpractised in the movements of large bodies of men, few having had any experience beyond the tactics of a regiment or company. The army moved in four columns, composed of the four divisions, with one division, the fourth, in reserve. 16,000 men, in addition to the above-mentioned force, under General Mansfield, were retained as the garrison of Washington, and guards were also detached to take charge of the bridges over the Potomac and the entrenchments on the right bank of that river. The four roads by which the columns advanced, viz. the Georgetown Turnpike, a branch from the Leesburg and Centreville Road, the Little River Turnpike, and the Old Braddock Road, converged together in the neighbourhood of Centreville. The 1st Division, under General Tyler, marching by the first of these roads, formed the right column; the 2nd and 3rd the centre; and the 5th, advancing along the Old Braddock Road, the left. The 4th Division followed in rear.

The right column commenced its march at 2 P.M. on

* Major Barry's (chief of artillery) report.

the 16th, and halted for the night at Vienna, a station on the London and Leesburg rail, and the scene of a repulse suffered some weeks past by a Federal reconnaissance. The other divisions marched at 8 A.M. on the 17th. The columns advanced cautiously, as the enemy were known to be in the vicinity, and the wooded undulations of ground prevented any distant view. The leading companies encountered some slight obstructions from trees felled and thrown across the road; and at Fairfax Court House, which the advance occupied about noon on the 17th, there was a slight skirmish, resulting in the loss of an officer and two men 'wounded.' On the night of the 17th the position of the several divisions was as follows:—The 1st Division bivouacked between Germantown and Centreville, three miles from the latter place. The 2nd occupied Fairfax Court House, a small hamlet, consisting of a few houses. The 5th were on the left of the second, at the junction of the Old Braddock Road with the road which connects Fairfax Court House with Fairfax Station. The 3rd occupied Fairfax Station on the Alexandria and Richmond Railroad, and also Sangster's Station, on the same line, about a mile and a half in advance. The want of discipline among the troops showed itself in acts of plunder and incendiarism at Fairfax Court House and Germantown, for which there was no excuse, as the men were well supplied with food, and no acts of hostility on the part of the inhabitants afforded any plea for marauding. Indeed, a great part of the male population had deserted their homes, and were serving in the ranks of the Confederate army. In consequence of these infractions of discipline, General M'Dowell issued an order on July 18 directing officers commanding regiments to detail a

certain number of men to act as a police force to apprehend marauders, in order that they might be punished, not as soldiers, but as civilians. The order stated that any person found committing 'the slightest depredation, killing pigs or poultry, or trespassing on the property of the inhabitants, would be reported to head-quarters, and the least that would be done to them would be to *send them to the Alexandria gaol.*' The events of the four following days tended, however, to prevent marauding more than any order of the general commanding. The Federal army was now concentrated, preparatory to the anticipated battle. The exact position of the Confederate force was unknown, but the vicinity of the enemy and his design to offer battle was not doubted. Many civilians, among them members of Congress, had accompanied the army, prepared to witness the triumph of which no one in the North expressed a doubt.

In the meantime, what preparation had the Confederate Government made to meet so large a force? At the beginning of June General Beauregard had established his head-quarters at Camp Pickens, near Manassas Station, on the Richmond and Alexandria rail, and at the junction of that rail with the line to Strasburg, in the Shenandoah Valley. To this camp the various regiments from the Southern States had been despatched, and were there organised into brigades, and perfected, as far as time would admit, in their drill. On June 5, General Beauregard issued a proclamation, which tended to inflame the minds of the soldiers against the North, by accusations directed against Mr. Lincoln's Government and the troops in its service, for which hitherto there had been little or no grounds. On July 20 the army under General Beauregard's command

numbered nearly 28,000 men and 49 guns. A small portion only consisted of cavalry. This force included a brigade under the command of General Holmes, a regiment termed Hampton's Legion, and 6,000 men and 20 guns of the army of the Shenandoah, which had all been telegraphed for by General Beauregard when he heard of the actual advance of the Federals.* The junction of General Johnston's army (viz. the above-mentioned army of the Shenandoah) with that of General Beauregard had been left to the decision of the former officer, as he was senior in rank to General Beauregard, and also could alone judge of the possibility of making the movement in the face of the Federal army in the Shenandoah Valley. Owing to the defalcation of General Patterson's troops, the sole difficulty that general had to encounter was the want of transport; but although the two armies were connected together by the Manassas Gap Railroad, yet the means of transportation had been so overtaken that only the above-mentioned 6,000 men of the army of the Shenandoah were actually in the field on the morning of the 21st. After their junction with General Beauregard's force, termed the Army of the Potomac, the following was the organisation in brigades: †

General Ewell's Brigade	General Jackson's Brigade
General Holmes's ,,	General Bee's ,,
General D. Jones's ,,	General Bartow's ,,
General Early's ,,	General Bonham's ,,
General Longstreet's,,	General Cooke's ,,
Colonel Evans's demi-Brigade.	

The 13th Mississippi and the Hampton Legion were not brigaded. The cavalry was under the command

* Official report of General Beauregard.

† No divisional organisation had as yet been attempted.

of General Stewart, and the artillery was attached to the several brigades, two batteries being held in reserve. Up to June 17 the Southern army of the Potomac was on the south or right bank of the stream of Bull Run, excepting General Bonham's brigade, which occupied Centreville, detaching pickets to Fairfax Court House. These pickets retired on ascertaining that the whole Federal army was advancing, and withdrew to the woods bordering the left bank. The stream of Bull Run, soon to become so well known as the scene of the first great battle of the war, rises in the Bull Run Mountains about twenty-five miles from its junction with the stream of Cedar Run, where the two, uniting together, form the Occoquan River, a tributary of the Potomac. Its course in the neighbourhood of Manassas is through steep banks clothed with thick woods, with here and there cleared spaces. The stream is in some places deep, but possesses several fords, and, where the main road from Centreville to Warrenton meets it, is crossed by a stone bridge. The country around is so thickly clothed with woods that the strength, movements, and position of troops can be easily concealed; although it is not so completely covered as to prevent the recurrence of several open fields or clearings, in crossing which they would be exposed to fire. The ground slopes gradually up from the banks of the stream, that on the left or northern bank being the higher. It was General M'Dowell's intention to make a reconnoissance in force, in order to ascertain the exact situation of the enemy, and, if possible, to dislodge him from any position he might have taken up. For this purpose the 1st Division—viz. General Tyler's—was ordered to march at 7 A.M. on the 18th on Centreville, where it was

supposed the enemy had erected field-works. At 9 A.M. the advanced brigade, under command of Colonel Richardson, arrived at Centreville, but found that the Confederates had evacuated the place and the works they had erected eight hours previously. After advancing about a mile farther, Colonel Richardson's brigade halted, whilst General Tyler executed a reconnaissance with a squadron of cavalry and two light companies from the same brigade. Finding the enemy posted on the banks of the stream of Bull Run, General Tyler ordered up the remainder, with Sherman's brigade as a reserve; also two rifled guns and two 12-pounder howitzers, under the command of Captain Ayres of the regular artillery. The point of attack was Blackburn's Ford, about half way between the places where the Centreville and Warrington Road and the Alexandria and Manassas rail cross the stream. The Confederate position extended along the right bank from Union Mills to the Stone Bridge, a distance of about eight miles. Immediately opposite the advancing Federals on the right bank of the stream, with skirmishers stationed in the woods on the left bank, were the brigades of Generals Longstreet and Bonham—the former defending Blackburn's, the latter Mitchell's Ford. The action commenced about midday by the Federal guns opening on the Confederate position at a distance of about a mile and a half. The fire was unproductive of any result; and failing to force the Confederates to show their force or the position of their batteries, the guns were advanced nearer the stream, and were supported by the 2nd and 3rd Michigan regiments, the 1st Massachusetts, and the 12th New York. The Confederate guns then opened, accompanied by a brisk musketry fire from the infantry posted along the right

bank. Two smooth-bored 6-pounders, which had been pushed forward across the stream on the east of the Centreville Road, also opened fire, but were subsequently withdrawn, whilst two regiments of General Early's command were moved up to reinforce General Longstreet. Although covered and partially protected by the woods, one of the Federal regiments, the 12th New York,* unable to stand the fire, broke and ran, accompanied in their flight by the small body of cavalry. The remaining three regiments retreated in fairly good order. A small force of Confederates was again pushed forward across the stream by Mitchell's Ford, and took up a position on the ridge to the east of the Centreville Road, from which place they harassed, by their fire, the retreating Federals. It is due to Colonel Richardson to say, that he applied to General Tyler for permission to lead the three regiments which had behaved fairly well again to the attack; but General Tyler, declaring that the object of the reconnaissance had been fulfilled, declined to accede to his request. According to the Federal accounts, their loss consisted of only 19 killed, 38 wounded, and 26 missing; of which the New York regiment, which had behaved so badly, had only 6 killed and 18 wounded. General Beauregard, however, whilst estimating his own loss at 15 killed and 53 wounded, declared in his official report that about 64 Federal corpses were found near Blackburn's Ford, besides 175 stand of arms, many of which had been thrown away by the Federals in their flight. The results of this skirmish (for it was little more) were important. The position occupied by the enemy was proved to be too strong to be attacked with any

* A portion of two companies of this regiment stood their ground.

prospect of success by the raw troops of the Federals. There were no entrenchments or masked batteries, to the agency of which the Federals were so accustomed to attribute their defeats, but the nature of the ground afforded a position easy to be held by troops determined to fight and acting on the defensive, whilst the first prestige of success was with the Confederates. The idea of a direct attack against the enemy's front was, therefore, abandoned, and fresh combinations became necessary to effect a movement against his flank. The ill-organised volunteer force could not be moved, nor could the necessary supplies be brought up and issued as quickly as in the case of a regular army, and two whole days were allowed to pass before the great attack was made. These two days were of great importance to the Confederates. On the 20th General Johnston arrived at General Beauregard's head-quarters, accompanied by 6,000 men of the army of the Shenandoah, and 20 guns. The remainder of his army had been ordered to follow, as soon as possible, leaving only a rear-guard to watch General Patterson. General Stewart with his cavalry (but a small force) had joined the Confederate army of the Potomac some short time previous, but other regiments, as has before been stated, had been moved up from Richmond during these two days. On his arrival at head-quarters, General Johnston would, by right of seniority, have been entitled to take the command; but with rare unselfishness, and with a full approval of the plans of General Beauregard, he waived his privilege and agreed to serve under his junior officer. A determination had been formed by General Beauregard, with the consent of General Johnston, to move forward and to attack the Federal army at Centreville; but owing to the detention, from a

want of transport, of a portion of the army of the Shenandoah, the plan was changed on the morning of the 21st before daylight, and arrangements were made to meet the attack of the Federals, which then appeared imminent.

The position occupied by the Confederates extended for about nine miles along the right or southern bank of Bull Run. Their left rested on woods, a short distance above the Stone Bridge on the Centreville and Warrenton Road, and their right watched the lower course of the stream at Union Mills Ford. Commencing from and including Union Mills in the vicinity of the point of crossing of the Alexandria and Richmond rail, there were eight fords and one bridge by which passages over the stream could be effected, viz. Maclean's Ford, about a mile and a half above Union Mills, Blackburn's Ford, Mitchell's Ford, Island Ford, Ball's Ford, Lewis Ford, the Stone Bridge, and Sudley Spring Ford. At 4:30 A.M. on July 21, the Confederates were drawn up in three lines, watching these various fords. The second line or supports was in close proximity to the first line, and the reserves were placed at but a short distance in rear. Commencing from the right, the first line consisted of Ewell's brigade, occupying the ground in rear of Union Mills, and joining in line with Jones' brigade at Maclean's Ford, Longstreet's at Blackburn's Ford, Bonham's at Mitchell's Ford, and Cooke's at Island and Lewis Ford, extending to the Stone Bridge, where was General Evans' demi-brigade, which formed the extreme left of the position. In support, counting as before from the right, were Holmes', Early's, and Jackson's brigades. Whilst in rear, about the centre of the line, concealed by pine woods, were the reserves, consisting of such of Bee's and Bartow's


brigades as had arrived, Barksdale's Mississippi regiment, and Hampton's Legion. The cavalry, under Stewart and Radford, were in the vicinity of some open ground between Mitchell's Ford and the Stone Bridge; and the artillery, distributed among the brigades, commanded the approaches to the fords. The whole force numbered, according to General Beauregard's despatch, 27,833 men and 49 guns; but of these men a large proportion were armed merely with shot guns and old fowling-pieces, whilst the artillery was usually of small calibre, ill-supplied with ammunition, and worked by men totally unpractised in its use. Such was the disposition of the Confederate army, as day dawned on the morning of Sunday, July 21. In the meantime, on the evening of July 20, an order was issued from General M'Dowell's head-quarters, at Centreville, declaring his intention and mode of attack, and assigning to each division its several duties. The plan of operations was to turn the Confederate left, obtain possession of the Centreville and Warrenton Road, and if possible to destroy the railroad leading from Manassas to the Valley of Virginia,* and so prevent reinforcements from arriving from General Johnston's army.

In view of these operations, the following orders were issued:—'The 1st Division (General Tyler's), with the exception of Richardson's brigade, will, at 2.30 A.M. precisely, be on the Warrenton Turnpike to threaten the passage of the bridge, but will not open fire until full daybreak. The 2nd Division (Hunter's) will move from its camp at 2 o'clock in the morning precisely, and, led by Colonel Woodbury, of the Engineers, will, after passing Cub Run, turn to the right

* Or Shenandoah Valley.



BATTLE GROUND OF BULL RUN.



and pass the Bull Run stream above the ford at Sudley Springs, and then, turning down to the left, descend the stream and clear away the enemy who may be guarding the lower ford and bridge. It will then bear off to the right and make room for the succeeding division. The 3rd Division (Heintzelman's) will march at 2:30 A.M., and follow the road taken by the 2nd Division, but will cross at the lower ford after it has turned as above, and then, going to the left, take place between the stream and 2nd Division. The 5th Division (Miles') will take position on the Centreville Heights (Richardson's brigade will for the time form part of the 5th Division, and will continue in its present position). One brigade will be in the village, and one near the present station of Richardson's brigade. This division will threaten the Blackburn Ford, and remain in reserve at Centreville. The commander will open fire with artillery only, and will bear in mind that it is a demonstration only he is to make. He will cause such defensive works, abattis, earthworks, to be thrown up as will strengthen his position.' In these orders no mention is made of the 4th Division, which was still in reserve between Centreville and the lines round Washington. By a numerical comparison of the two armies, it will thus be seen that, on the morning of the 21st, the Federals were superior to the Confederates, without reckoning their 4th Division, which was not engaged. It is difficult to understand why, at so important a crisis, a portion of it at least was not brought into the field. On the 20th the men were served out with three days' rations, and on the morning of the 21st, according to orders, the divisions commenced to move; but, owing to a delay in the 1st Division leaving camp, the march of the

whole column was impeded for two or three hours. At about 6 A.M. the 1st Division reached the position assigned to it, and halted near the Stone Bridge, which had been slightly fortified by the Confederates. General Tyler opened fire on the opposite woods, occupied by Cooke's brigade, without receiving any reply from the Confederate batteries, as the range of their guns (only 6-pounders) was too short to be of service; the skirmishers, however, belonging to Colonel Evans' demi-brigade on Cooke's left, commenced and kept up a slight fire; but Colonel Evans becoming satisfied that the attack directed against him was only a feint, and fearing lest his left should be turned, moved his demi-brigade in the direction of Sudley Springs, and took up a position in rear of a house called Carter's Mansion, at right angles with the stream of Bull Run. Events proved that he was right in his supposition. About 10 A.M. the leading brigade of Colonel Hunter's division, under Colonel Burnside, crossed the ford at Sudley Springs. The men advanced very slowly, as they stopped at the stream to fill their canteens, and thus delayed the march of the rear brigades. Colonel Burnside was supported by Colonel Porter's brigade, comprising the greater portion of the regiments and batteries of regulars belonging to the army. Colonel Evans, in face of this force, held his ground as well as he was able, and was reinforced by the four regiments under Generals Bee and Bartow, and by Imboden's battery. Still, however, the Federals pushed on, and Heintzelman's division was enabled to cross the stream and to take up its position on the left of Burnside's brigade, that of General Porter acting as a support. General McDowell himself was on the field, and sent an aide-de-camp to order General Tyler to push

forward two brigades of his division and a brigade of Heintzelman's, which had remained by special orders in rear. These three brigades crossed about 800 yards above the Stone Bridge, and took positions on the left of the Federal line. Perceiving that the main attack was directed against the left of the line, Generals Beauregard and Johnston rode up from the place in rear of Mitchell's Ford, selected as their head-quarters, and by their personal influence animated the troops. Still, however, the Confederate line was driven back. Hampton's Legion and Jackson's brigade were brought up in support, also Holmes' and a portion of Bonham's brigade. The Confederates at this time (about noon) occupied a plateau of ground on which were two small houses, called Robinson's and Widow Henry's;* the plateau was partially covered with pine woods, which afforded good shelter for riflemen, and partly cultivated in small fields, whilst two watercourses, tributaries of Bull Run, intersected it. Two roads also crossed the plateau, meeting each other at right angles near Widow Henry's house, one (the turnpike) leading to the Stone Bridge, the other leading to Sudley Springs. It was the object of the Confederates to retain possession of this plateau, whilst equally, on the other hand, were the endeavours of the Federals directed to its capture. More than once the latter drove their opponents down its eastern slopes. Cooke's brigade, however, still retained possession of the banks commanding the Stone Bridge, its left having been thrown back, and formed the pivot on which the Confederate line, at right angles to the stream of Bull Run, rested.

* The owner of this house, an old lady, was killed in her bed by a round shot which passed through the house.

Thirteen field-pieces, consisting mostly of 6-pounder guns, replied to the Federal batteries. Such was the position of affairs at noon. The Confederate left had been turned, and their forces driven back. In the meantime the Confederate right and the Federal left had scarcely fired a shot. Orders sent by General Beauregard to General Ewell to advance across the stream at Union Mills had miscarried, and when that general received fresh orders, about 10:30 A.M., the movement was considered to be too late, and was therefore countermanded. An artillery fire was kept up by Richardson's brigade (Federal) against General Jones' and Longstreet's positions at Blackburn's Ford, for the object of occupying the attention of these officers, and preventing them from reinforcing their left wing. With a similar object, viz. to prevent the sending of reinforcements to the Federal right, General Beauregard ordered an advance to be made across the stream by General Longstreet. Soon after 12 o'clock General Johnston left the field and repaired to Lewis House, in order to hasten the reinforcements expected every hour to arrive by the rail from the Virginia Valley. Well was it for the Confederates that that part of General M'Dowell's plan which comprised the seizure of the railway had not succeeded. About two thousand men, consisting partly of troops from the army of the Shenandoah, partly of Hill's Virginia regiment, arrived, and were successively and as quickly as possible despatched to reinforce the hard-pressed troops on the Confederate left. Before their arrival General Beauregard had attempted to regain the plateau, and General Jackson is especially mentioned as having led his men forward with determined valour, capturing

a portion of Rickett's battery.* Again, however, were the Confederates repulsed and driven down the wooded slopes. Then General Beauregard, feeling that the crisis of the day had arrived, placed himself at the head of his reserves, and ordered the whole line to advance. This was about 2:30 P.M., and the reinforcements † arrived during the movement. They took position on the left of the advancing line, together with General Early's brigade, which ought to have arrived sooner, but whose orders had miscarried. The Federals were driven back, a portion of Colonel Stewart's cavalry charged, and the rout was complete, not, however, without considerable loss on the Confederate side. It was in this last attack that Generals Bee and Bartow were slain.

The Confederate generals do not appear to have been aware how complete the rout was. General Porter's regulars, indeed, retained their organisation, and formed line near Carter's Mansion; but the battle was lost, the volunteer force of the Federals was completely demoralised; the Fire Zouaves, distinguished by

* This was partially owing to the mistake of a Federal officer, who was uncertain to which side the advancing troops belonged, and abstained from firing.

† The total number of troops which arrived during the action as reinforcements to the Confederates was 2,884; viz. 2,334 of the army of the Shenandoah, and 550 Hill's Virginia regiment.—General Beauregard's official despatch.

The prompt arrival of the reinforcements at this critical moment was owing to General Kirby Smith, who was in command of the troops which were coming by train from the Shenandoah Valley. On hearing the firing he ordered the train to be stopped, and the troops to form at once and march to the ground, instead of allowing the train to proceed to Manassas Junction.

their uniform, were especially conspicuous in the flight. Through Bull Run the mass of troops hurried, and Colonel Radford and Lieutenant-Colonel Munford, with six companies of Virginia cavalry, were pushed forward in pursuit. The remainder of the Confederate force was also in the act of following the enemy down the Warrenton Road to the Stone Bridge when a report reached General Beauregard, proved afterwards to be false, that the Federal reserves were threatening the position at Union Mills. The pursuit was stopped, except by the cavalry. Still the Federals ran; the trains of baggage wagons, the ammunition wagons, and the artillery became mingled together. Some of the regular batteries attempted to stay the pursuit; but the demoralisation of the army was complete; the artillerymen cut the harness and deserted the guns, and men and officers hastened in one confused mass to Centreville. The regular officers and some others attempted to stem the torrent. All was in vain; and at the bridge over Cub Run the greater portion of the artillery was abandoned. Perceiving that the battle on the right was irretrievably lost, General M'Dowell hastened to the reserves at Centreville, and ordered General Blenker's brigade (consisting principally of Germans) to advance along the Warrenton Road, and to endeavour to stem, or at least to protect the flying troops. At the same time he countermanded the orders to retreat, given by General Miles, stationed opposite Blackburn's Ford, to Colonels Davis and Richardson, directing those officers to take up a position to cover Centreville, and at the same time reinforcing their brigades by two regiments of General Runyon's division. About sunset most of the demoralised, flying troops were behind the Centreville Ridge; but it was found impossible to rally

them. Divisions, brigades, and regiments were mingled together: the men were footsore, weary, and hungry. All sorts of rumours pervaded the crowd; the very name of cavalry was sufficient to produce additional terrors and confusion among the miserable fugitives; and the whole mass hurried on to Washington, flying although none pursued. Blenker's brigade, together with the regulars, and a portion of the reserves at Centreville, retained their organisation, and although tired out by upwards of thirty hours' marching and fighting, covered the retreat into the lines. General M'Dowell stated in his report the condition of affairs. He wrote:—

‘By sundown most of our men had gotten behind Centreville Ridge, and it became a question whether we should or not endeavour to make a stand there. The condition of our artillery and ammunition, and the want of food for the men, who had generally abandoned or thrown away all that had been issued the day before, and the utter disorganisation, and consequent demoralisation, of the mass of the army, seemed, to all who were near enough to be consulted—division and brigade commanders and staff—to admit of no alternative but to fall back; the more so as the position at Blackburn's Ford was then in the possession of the enemy, and he was already turning our left. On sending the officers to the different camps, they found, as they reported to me, that our decision had been anticipated by the troops, most of those who had come in from the front being already on the road to the rear, the panic with which they came in still continuing and hurrying them along.’

As alluded to in this report, the brigades on the Confederate right received orders from General Johnston to advance against Centreville; but when

night closed in General Bonham, the senior officer, ordered his own brigade and that of General Longstreet to fall back to Bull Run. Thus the Federal retreat from Centreville to Washington was comparatively unmolested. Few armies have ever sustained a more humiliating defeat, and it is only by studying the official reports of the Federal officers commanding the several brigades and divisions, that a full knowledge can be acquired of the utter demoralisation of the troops. The reports of the regular officers are by far the most reliable, those of some of the volunteer generals evincing a lamentable ignorance of military matters. There is one striking fact regarding the battle which cannot fail to attract notice. On both sides only a portion of the troops were really engaged. On the Confederate side this was partially owing to a miscarriage of the orders sent to Generals Holmes and Ewell, and is thus adverted to in General Beauregard's orders :—' In connection with the unfortunate casualties of the day—that is, the miscarriage of the orders sent by courier to Generals Holmes and Ewell to attack the enemy in flank and reverse at Centreville, through which the triumph of our arms was prevented from being still more decisive—I regard it in place to say, a divisional organisation, with officers in command of divisions, with appropriate ranks, as in European services, would greatly reduce the risks of such mishaps, and would advantageously simplify the communications of a general in command of a field with his troops.' In fact, there was a want of organisation in both armies, such as would have entailed their defeat if opposed to European troops. The generals in command were unprovided with a sufficient staff, and were forced to give their attention to details when they should have been

engaged in directing the whole. On the Federal side, the want of military order and regularity was apparent from the very commencement of the campaign. Theirs was, for raw troops, a more difficult task than that of their opponents. They were acting on the offensive, and by the nature of their attack, there was the greatest need of punctuality and energy on the part of the generals of division removed from the direct supervision of the commanding general. General Tyler appears to have shown little enterprise in his operations against the Stone Bridge: a bold attack on that position, and the consequent occupation of the whole length of the Centreville and Warrenton Road, would possibly have been productive of grave results, during the time Generals Hunter and Heintzelman were pressing the Confederates from the direction of Sudley Springs; whilst the conduct of General Miles, in ordering the brigades of Davis and Richardson to retreat without any directions from General M'Dowell, appears most extraordinary. The long range of their artillery was, and has been on many occasions throughout the war, especially at its commencement, a disadvantage rather than a benefit to the Federal army. Both generals and troops preferred using long-range arms to coming to close quarters, consequently much time and ammunition was wasted in firing into woods and at imaginary bodies of the enemy. In addition to the failure of General Patterson to cooperate with General M'Dowell, the slowness of the advance of the Federals from Washington allowed of the concentration of the Confederate troops. General M'Dowell was anxious to reach Centreville on the 17th, and so to fight on the 19th instead of the 21st; but the regiments, who had only marched from Vienna (six miles), were so fatigued that they

either could not or would not push on six miles farther the same evening. Their fatigue was partially caused by delays and dawdling, consequent on the ignorance of the rules of marching on the part of the officers, and by the undisciplined state of the troops; and also by the absence of good marching qualities in Americans, and their inability to carry* even the slight weight required in light marching order. General M'Dowell was, indeed, placed in an awkward position, and his words best describe it:—

‘I could not, as I have said, push on faster; nor could I delay. A large and the best part of my forces were three months’ volunteers, whose term of service was about to expire, but who were sent forward as having long enough to serve for the purpose of the expedition. On the eve of the battle the 4th Pennsylvanian regiment of volunteers, and the battery of volunteer artillery of the New York 8th Militia, whose term of service expired, insisted on their discharge. I wrote to the regiment, expressing a request for them to remain a short time, and the Honorary Secretary of War, who was at the time on the ground, tried to induce the battery to remain at least five days; but in vain. They insisted on their discharge that night. It was granted, and the next morning, when the army moved forward into battle, these troops moved to the rear at the sound of the enemy’s cannon. In the next few days, day by day, I should have lost ten thousand of the best armed, drilled, officered, and disciplined troops in the army. In other words, every day which added to the strength of the enemy made us weaker.’†

* See General M'Dowell's official report of the battle.

† Ibid.

Who would not pity a general in command of such an army, of troops who, when their comrades are marching into action, move to the rear to the sound of the enemy's cannon? Of the conduct of the majority who composed the army which fought at Bull Run, it will be sufficient to quote the words of their own generals. General M'Dowell, after having described the arrival of the enemy's reinforcements, wrote :—

‘They threw themselves in the woods on our right, and towards the rear of our right, and opened a fire of musketry on our men, which caused them to break and retire down the hill side. This soon degenerated into disorder, for which there was no remedy. Every effort was made to rally them, even beyond the reach of the enemy's fire, but in vain. The battalion of regular infantry alone moved up the hill opposite to the one with the house on it, and there maintained itself until our men could get down to and across the Warrenton Turnpike, on the way back to the position we occupied in the morning. The plain was covered with the retreating troops, and they seemed to infect those with whom they came in contact. The retreat soon became a rout, and this soon degenerated still further into a panic.’ Again, subsequently, he wrote :—‘In the panic (at Cub Run) the horses hauling the caissons were cut from their places by persons to escape with, and in this way much confusion was caused, the panic aggravated, and the road encumbered.’ Further on, in alluding to the losses of the several regiments, the general stated :—‘The officer commanding the 11th New York Zouaves, and Colonel Heintzelman, say that the returns of that regiment cannot be relied on, as many of those reported among the casualties have absented themselves since their return, and have gone to New York.’

The shameful conduct of the Zouaves* was referred to in several of the official reports. General A. Porter, an officer of the regular army, thus alluded to this regiment:—‘The evanescent courage of the Zouaves prompted them to fire perhaps a hundred shots, when they broke and fled, leaving the batteries open to a charge of the enemy’s cavalry, which took place immediately. The marines also, in spite of the exertions of their gallant officers, gave way in disorder.’ Again, in the report of General Heintzelman (also an officer of the regular army):—‘In the meantime, I sent orders for the Zouaves to move forward to support Rickett’s battery on the right. As soon as they came up I led them forward against an Alabama regiment, partly concealed in a clump of small pines in an old field. At the first fire they broke, and the greater portion of them fled to the rear, keeping up a desultory fire over the heads of their comrades in front; at the same moment they were charged by a company of Secession cavalry on their rear, who came by a road through two strips of wood on our extreme right. The fire of the Zouaves killed four and wounded one. . . . Colonel Farnham, with some of his officers and men, behaved gallantly; but the regiment of Zouaves, as a regiment, did not again appear on the field.’ With such an army what calculations could a general make? Panic may be excused in any troops, especially in raw levies; but when men cannot be rallied even out of fire, when they are totally deaf to every remonstrance of their officers, and when even the very officers share the demoralisation and panic of the privates, when the army continues its flight even when no danger threatens and no

* The regiment had received the soubriquet of the Ellsworth Avengers.

enemy pursues, what hope remains of accomplishing any enterprise? Of the losses of the Federal army, the following is General M'Dowell's statement :—' The killed amounted to 19 officers and 462 non-commissioned officers and privates, and the wounded to 64 officers and 947 non-commissioned officers and privates. The return of the missing was very inaccurate, the men supposed to be missing having fallen into other regiments and gone to Washington—many of the Zouaves to New York.'

On the Confederate side, General Beauregard estimated his own loss as 269 killed and 1,483 wounded. He stated that the Federal dead were not numbered, but that the prisoners, including wounded, which fell into the hands of the Confederates, amounted to not less than 1,600 men, and that among the captured Federalists were officers and men of forty-seven regiments of volunteers, besides some nine different regiments of regular troops, detachments of which were engaged. The trophies of the battle he summed up as follows :—

' Some 28 field-pieces of the best character of arm, with over 100 rounds of ammunition for each gun ; 37 caissons, 6 forges, 4 battery wagons, 64 artillery horses completely equipped, 500,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, 4,500 sets of accoutrements, over 500 muskets, some 9 regimental and garrison flags, with a large number of pistols, knapsacks, swords, canteens, blankets, a large store of axes and entrenching tools, wagons, ambulances, horses, camp and garrison equipage, hospital stores, and some subsistence stores.'

Such was the battle of Bull Run. On the 22nd the Federal force was again within the lines of their

entrenchments, a great portion on the left bank of the Potomac, and some even on their way to New York. The Confederates, satisfied with the bare victory, did not seek to reap its fruits. Their generals do not appear to have been fully aware of the utter demoralisation of their opponents, and their own army, although fitted for acting in defensive positions, required fresh organisation before attempting offensive operations. The weather had also changed, and the rain rendered the condition of the roads so bad as to be almost impassable. Still these reasons do not sufficiently account for their apparent want of energy in not assuming the offensive. Political considerations may possibly have influenced military operations. The South professed to be acting entirely on the defensive, and it was no part of their policy to unite the whole North against them, more strongly than hitherto, by an attack on the Federal capital. President Davis was on the field in person, and was a witness of the success of the cause of which he was the leader. It is alleged that he was strongly in favour of an immediate advance, but that his opinion was overruled by the generals in command. From whatever cause it arose, the fact remains, that the Confederates failed to seize the opportunity which so unlooked for and complete a victory presented to them. In the meantime, how was the news of this terrible disaster received in the North? The most exaggerated statements regarding the magnificence of the advance of the Federal army and the incidents of the march had been promulgated by the Northern press. The most trifling skirmishes had been elevated to the rank of decisive victories; the valour, discipline, and enthusiasm of the troops had been described as surpassing anything ever before seen in the world; and the people

of the North were taught to expect a short campaign terminated by a brilliant victory. The first check to this unbounded confidence was the receipt of the account of the skirmish of the 18th, announcing the repulse of General Richardson's brigade. This, however, was declared of little consequence, the object of the reconnoissance having been effected; whilst the news telegraphed from the scene of action of the 21st, announcing the brilliant success of the Federal army, fully compensated for the trifling disappointment of the 18th. Despatch followed despatch, each as it arrived increasing the enthusiasm and delight of the crowds assembled round the telegraph offices of Washington, New York, and Boston. The army was said to be everywhere successful, the troops full of enthusiasm, marching to the battle-field singing patriotic songs; and the newspaper offices were covered with sensation placards setting forth the glorious victory. Then came an ominous silence, and in a few hours afterwards the same newspaper offices were placarded with sensation paragraphs of a different description; whilst sorrowful crowds surrounded them, reading 'Utter rout of the troops,' 'Stampede to Washington,' 'All our batteries captured,' &c. &c. Sorrow and despondency for the moment took possession of the minds of the Northern people. The President and some of the Cabinet had passed much of their time at the telegraph office at Washington, and at last, when the utter rout of the army could no longer be doubted, left it to consult on their future line of conduct. Only, however, for the moment did despondency prevail, and then followed fresh enthusiasm and stronger determination. The Secretary of War, directed by President Lincoln, telegraphed at once for General McClellan to come to

Washington, and also sent messages to the Governors of the Northern States, directing them to forward reinforcements as speedily as possible. A message was likewise despatched to the Governor of Fort M'Henry, to put him on his guard to repress any disturbances at Baltimore. Washington, in the meanwhile, was crowded with the mob from the battle-field, a few regiments retaining their organisation, but the majority scattered through the city and the camps—the men in the streets, the officers drinking at the bars of hotels, both forgetful of their duties and even of their disgrace. Stragglers arrived at Philadelphia and New York, and were soon followed by the three months' men, who had deserted their country at its greatest need. These régiments were received by their fellow-countrymen with no expressions of disapproval; on the contrary, their return was frequently celebrated as a triumph. Whilst the city of Washington was in its worst state of confusion, some Confederate prisoners were marched through the streets, and were insulted and with difficulty preserved from the violence of the mob of scoundrels which thronged the thoroughfares. Great was the grief and disgust of General M'Dowell when he heard of these acts, and he did what lay in his power to atone for them. Supported by General Mansfield, in command at Washington, he took measures to restore order in the camps and city, and to force the stragglers, both officers and men, to rejoin their regiments. In a few days after the battle reinforcements commenced to pour in from the North and West; General M'Dowell, pending the arrival of General M'Clellan, took up his head-quarters at Arlington Heights, and the city was secured against a surprise. The Confederates had missed their opportunity. There

is no doubt that if they had advanced immediately after the battle, Washington must have fallen. They did not do so, and the spirit of the North revived. To their credit be it said, that in place of giving way to vain regrets, the Northern people, although acknowledging and even exaggerating, if possible, their defeat and disgrace, at once took steps to remedy the misfortune; and recognising their previous mistake, commenced to prepare for the struggle, which they clearly saw was of a more serious nature than they had anticipated. In the meantime, General Scott, the former hero of the nation, sustained a large share of the blame of the defeat. Before the advance into Virginia he had been charged with procrastination and want of energy, and, yielding to the popular clamour, he had sanctioned a movement which his better judgment condemned. Now those who had taunted him with delay turned round and blamed his weakness in giving way to the popular cry. A debate on the subject took place in the House of Representatives, in which there were mutual recriminations between the Democratic and Republican members. Whilst these events were happening in the North, the receipt of the news of the battle created the greatest joy in the Southern States. For some days immediately following the victory, tidings were eagerly expected of an advance on Washington, and a termination of the war by the capture of the Federal capital; and when it was at length realised that the army had continued stationary, and that no immediate offensive movement was contemplated, the previous exultation gave way to disappointment. Still enough had been accomplished to excite to the utmost the confidence of the Southern people in their army, and to arouse in their minds a contempt

for the North and for the Federal soldiery, which entailed subsequent disasters. The army also learned to despise its enemy, and consequently the only roads to success, viz. organisation and discipline, were in a great measure neglected during the weeks and months which followed the battle of Bull Run. General Beauregard advanced as far as Munson's Hill, a few miles from Alexandria, his pickets even approaching the Chain Bridge, only four miles above Washington. For many months did the two armies remain facing each other. The Confederates, unprepared for an attack on the strong entrenchments which covered Alexandria and Washington, were eager to draw the Northern army from their works, in order again to fight in the open. The Federals, on the contrary, profiting by the lesson they had learnt, and under the command of a man who fully understood the requirements of an army and the time it would take to supply them, remained within their lines, preparing for a future campaign.

The result of the battle of Bull Run was productive neither of unmixed evil to the North nor unmixed profit to the South. It taught the former to put her shoulder to the wheel, and to employ her whole resources in the future conduct of the war; whilst it led the latter to despise her enemy, and consequently to neglect the means necessary to demand success; it also led her people to place greater confidence for the time being in the successful generals of Bull Run than in the head which ruled at Richmond—in the President, who, through good fortune and evil fortune, was alone equal to the task of directing the Republic.

It was on the very day previous to the battle that the Confederate Congress met at Richmond, when the President delivered his message. He spoke confidently

of the prospects of the Confederates, and congratulated the Congress on the accession to the Confederacy of North Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and Arkansas. He then drew attention to the conduct of the Federal Government, to its acts of aggression, and to the spirit of ferocity in which (he alleged) it was carrying on the war. He alluded to the treatment experienced by the crew of the privateer *Havannah*, and to their imprisonment as felons in place of being acknowledged as prisoners of war; and stated that he had been forced in retaliation, and in order to repress such acts, to pursue the same course towards a similar number of Federal officers. With regard to the refusal of the Government at Washington to acknowledge the neutrality of States, and also to the suspension of the *Habeas Corpus* Act, he urged that these acts were but additional motives for insisting on a final separation from the States who owned its power. In conclusion, he drew attention to the material prosperity of the Confederate States, and to the cool and confident courage which the people had displayed in the preparations to meet the enemy. On the following day President Davis departed for the seat of war. The Congress meanwhile met pursuant to order at twelve o'clock on the 22nd, and as it was proceeding with the regular business of the day, Mr. Memminger, of South Carolina, rose in his seat and begged leave to interrupt it whilst he read the following letter:—

‘Manassas: January 22.

‘MRS. JEFFERSON DAVIS,—We have won a glorious though dear-bought victory. Night closed on the enemy in full flight, and closely pursued.

‘JEFFERSON DAVIS.’

The official despatch was then read, and was followed by four resolutions. First:

‘Resolved,—That we recognise the hand of the most High God, the King of Kings, and Lord of Lords, in the glorious victory with which He has crowned our arms at Manassas, and that the people of these Confederate States are invited, by appropriate services on the ensuing Sabbath, to offer up their united thanksgivings and prayers for this mighty deliverance.

‘Resolved,—That we deeply deplore the necessity which has washed the soil of our country with the blood of many of our noble sons, and that we offer to their respective families and friends our warmest and most cordial sympathies, assuring them that the sacrifice made will be consecrated in the hearts of our people, and will there enshrine the names of the gallant dead as the champions of a free and constitutional Government.

‘Resolved,—That we approve the prompt and patriotic efforts of the Mayor of the city of Richmond to make provisions for the wounded, and that a committee of one member from each State be appointed to cooperate in the plan.

‘Resolved,—That Congress do now adjourn.’

On the 23rd President Davis returned to Richmond.*

* The Confederate Government.—President, Jefferson Davis, of Mississippi; Vice-President, C. H. Stephens, of Georgia. Cabinet: Secretary of State, R. Toombs, Georgia; Secretary of Treasury, C. Memminger, South Carolina; Secretary of War, L. P. Walker, Alabama; Secretary of Navy, S. L. Mallory, Florida; Postmaster General, J. R. Reagan, Texas; Attorney General, J. P. Benjamin, Louisiana.

CHAPTER VI.

CAMPAIGN IN MISSOURI.

DURING the months which immediately preceded the battle of Bull Run, and whilst General M'Clellan accomplished his successful campaign in Western Virginia, war had commenced in Missouri. It will be remembered that about the middle of May, after the affair at Camp Jackson, an agreement had been entered into between the Federal General Harney and General Sterling Price, commanding the State militia, by which the latter promised to maintain order among the people, whilst the former declared that on that guarantee he would have no wish to make any military movement, which might create excitement and jealousies. But the Federal Government disapproved of the act of the general, and removed him from his command, leaving (pro tem.) General, late Captain, Lyon in charge of the military affairs of Missouri. That officer followed up the energetic conduct he had pursued in the capture of Camp Jackson, by sending detachments to various places with the object of preventing secession demonstrations, and dispersing any State troops which might attempt organisation apart from that sanctioned by the Federal Government. He also ordered and effected the seizure of considerable quantities of arms in the city of St. Louis. These acts

produced a strong remonstrance from Governor Jackson and General S. Price, and the former demanded of General Lyon the disbanding of the Federal troops in Missouri. The demand was made on June 11, and as it met with a decided refusal, Governor Jackson left the city of St. Louis on the evening of the same day, taking the train to Jefferson city, from which place he issued his proclamation. In it he set forth the insults and grievances that had been endured by the people of Missouri, and with a view to prevent a continuance of the same, showed how he had entered into an agreement with General Harney. He pointed out how that agreement had been nullified by the Federal Government, and how by a personal interview he and General Price had attempted to come to some arrangement with General Lyon, submitting to him certain propositions. These propositions were : ‘ That he, Governor Jackson, would disband the State Guard and break up its organisation ; that he would disarm all the companies that had been ordered out by the State ; that he would pledge himself not to organise the militia under the military bill ; that no arms or munitions should be brought into the State ; that he would protect all citizens equally, in all their rights, regardless of their political opinions ; that he would repress all insurrectionary movements in the State ; that he would repel all attempts to invade it from any quarter, and by whomsoever made ; and that he would thus maintain a strict neutrality in this unhappy contest, and preserve the peace of this unhappy State ; and he further proposed that he would, if necessary, invoke the assistance of the United States troops to carry out these pledges.’ General Jackson went on to say that these propositions were rejected by General Lyon, who refused to disband


the Home Guard, and insisted that the Federal Government should move and station its troops in all parts of the State, and, in fact, reduce it to the same condition as Maryland. This he (the Governor) would not submit to; he therefore issued his proclamation calling the militia, to the number of 56,000, into the service of the State, for the purpose of repelling invasions, and for the protection of the lives, liberty, and property of the citizens of Missouri. As this proclamation was a complete defiance to the Federal Government, and as Governor Jackson was not in possession of a sufficient force to resist the troops under General Lyon, he determined to abandon Jefferson city. On June 14, accompanied by General Sterling Price, with the small force of State militia under his orders, Governor Jackson withdrew to Booneville, a town on the south bank of the Missouri River, about forty miles above Jefferson city. Hostilities may now be said to have commenced. By General Lyon's orders, Colonel Siegel, a German who had served with distinction on the revolutionary side in Europe during the wars of 1848-49, pushed forward with some regiments of Germans as far as the Gasconade River; whilst an expedition under the command of General Lyon proceeded up the Missouri River and threatened Booneville. Finding himself too weak to hold the place, General Price resolved on abandoning it, which was accordingly done after a slight skirmish. The Confederates retreated in two columns; one moving in a south-westerly direction away from the river, the other by boats to Lexington. It was General Price's object to withdraw from the neighbourhood of the Missouri River, and to induce the Federal generals to follow him into a wild and hostile country at a distance

from their communications and from their supplies. A great portion of the State of Missouri was still uncultivated, and but thinly inhabited; there were but few railways, and these only extending to a comparatively short distance from St. Louis. The Federals were in possession of the town of St. Louis and of a great extent of the stream of the Mississippi, which bounds the State to the east. Their steamers also allowed them to move troops up the Missouri River, and thus to hold a direct line of communication through the very heart of the country. In addition to these advantages, a great portion of the three lines of railway had been taken possession of by detachments of troops from St. Louis; and although the trains were frequently hindered or stopped by guerillas,* yet, in the main, they were of great service to the Federals. The first of the three lines running from St. Louis connects that city with Jefferson city, and continues as far as Georgetown, following the right bank of the Missouri River for a considerable distance. The second is from St. Louis to Rolla, a town situated nearly in the centre of Southern Missouri, about 100 miles from St. Louis. The third runs due south to Potosi and Irontown, a district valuable for the supplies of coal and iron which it affords. The country to the north of the Missouri River should not be included in the disputed territory. The sympathies of its inhabitants were principally with the Federal cause, and it was far removed from the States which formed the Southern Confederacy. It may therefore be said that the Federals were possessed of the great advantage of holding three sides of the country which became the theatre of the war, that is,

* The irregular troops of the Confederacy received the name of Guerillas from the Federals.

the northern part of Missouri and the highway of the Missouri River, the State of Illinois and the River Mississippi, and to the west the State of Kansas, colonised by men strongly opposed to the Southern cause. The Confederates, as the State party of Missouri may now be termed, held the Southern frontier formed by the State of Arkansas, a State even more recently colonised and more thinly settled than Missouri. Both sides were even less prepared for war, as far as related to arms and supplies, than the Eastern States of the Union and of the Confederacy; but the Federals had in those respects greatly the advantage. The troops under General Price's command were armed for the most part with shot guns, many not armed at all; they were unprovided with wagons and tents, and were almost entirely without artillery. For these reasons, the Confederate general determined on giving up the greater portion of the State and withdrawing towards the frontiers of Arkansas, where General M'Culloch, the commander of the Southern forces in that State, was making preparations for his assistance. For this purpose General M'Culloch issued a proclamation on July 1, to the inhabitants of Arkansas, inviting them to assemble at Fayetteville near the south-western frontier of Missouri, and desiring them to bring whatever arms they had, or, if unprovided with any, to come unarmed and he would furnish them, so that every effort might be made to assist their brethren of Missouri. In two columns the Confederates moved—the first from Booneville, in a south-westerly direction, to Warsaw, under command of Governor Jackson; the second, directly south from Lexington, under Generals Rains and Stark, recently appointed brigadier-generals by Governor Jackson. In consequence of severe illness,

General Price was unable to take the field in person. The first column, after surprising a Federal detachment and capturing some stands of arms, reached Cedar County, where it formed a junction with the force from Lexington; the total numbers amounted to about 3,600, of which nearly 600 were unarmed. A large portion of the force consisted of men on horseback armed with shot guns, and called cavalry, and attached to the army were four small pieces of artillery, for which there was not a proper supply of ammunition. The Federals in the meantime had not been idle; Colonel Siegel had moved southwards to Rolla, and thence about 100 miles southwest to Springfield, where he arrived on June 23; whilst General Lyon prepared to march from Booneville and to cooperate with him. The object of the Federals was to crush what they termed the rebellion before it had gained head, and before the generals in command had organised their forces. From the position of the troops at the beginning of July, it will be seen that the Confederates, having united their two columns, were able to attack a portion of the Federal force before the remainder could afford support. It became also a necessity for them to do so, as Colonel Siegel, underrating his opponents' strength and ignorant of the junction of the two columns, advanced from Springfield to Neosho, and thus closed the routes to Arkansas. On July 1 he entered Neosho, the principal town of Newton County, and there learnt of the junction of the two Confederate columns. Notwithstanding this information, he received instructions from Brigadier Sweeny, who had arrived at Springfield, to attack, and for this purpose marched northwards to Carthage. The Confederate force was moving on the same place, and on July 5, about eight miles north of Carthage,



SCENE OF THE CAMPAIGNS OF MISSOURI.

A R K A N S A S

the two armies met. The country is undulating, and what is termed a prairie country, over which woods are interspersed. The action was commenced between 9 and 10 A.M. by the Federal artillery, which played upon and usually dispersed the Confederate cavalry whenever they attempted to form for the purpose of attack. The Confederate artillery, owing to the short range of the guns and the bad ammunition, were unable to reply with any effect. Soon after midday the Confederate infantry advanced, whilst their cavalry threatened to turn the flanks of the Federals, and even to get between them and their baggage-train, which was three miles in the rear. Colonel Siegel, therefore, ordered his troops to retire across a creek or stream called Dry Fork Creek. This they accomplished, covered by their artillery. The Confederates still continued to advance, and as the Federals had destroyed the bridge over the stream, they threw timber into its bed and so crossed over. The cavalry in the meantime threatened the Federal communications, but did little more, as a few shells from the artillery quickly dispersed them. The Federals continued their retreat through Carthage, where they attempted to make a slight stand, to Sarcoxia, in the direction of Springfield. The loss on either side was very slight. The armies preserved a respectful distance from each other, and the action on the part of the Federals was fought principally with the artillery. Colonel Siegel acknowledged to 13 killed and 31 wounded; the Confederate loss was about 50 killed and 125 wounded; their accounts also state the Federal loss to have been far greater than was admitted. In this battle the advantage certainly remained with the Confederates; in numbers they were considerably superior, but they were ill supplied with artillery,

and the arms and appointments necessary for infantry. On neither side does there appear to have been much hard fighting. General Price joined the army on July 6, and received reinforcements of 2,000 men, under Generals M'Culloch and Pierce, from Arkansas. In order to organise his army General Price retreated to Cow-skin prairie on the Indian frontier, whilst Colonel Siegel, retiring in an opposite direction, effected a junction with Generals Lyon and Sweeny at Springfield. With the exception of skirmishes in various parts of the country, resulting in the destruction of railways and private property, there were no military operations until the beginning of August. The Federals concentrated their troops under General Lyon at Springfield, whilst General Price, having formed a junction with General M'Culloch, augmented the force of State troops under his command by a considerable number of organised regiments of Texans, Louisianians, and Mississippians, in the pay of the Confederate Government. Owing to the poverty of the country, the army occupied camps at distances from each other in the south-western corner of Missouri, near the Indian frontier and that of Arkansas. In the meantime General Fremont arrived at St. Louis; he had been appointed to the command of the new military district of the West, which comprised the State of Illinois and the States and territories to the west of the Mississippi, as far as the Rocky Mountains, and including New Mexico. Under him, General Pope, an officer of the regular army, was appointed in command of Northern Missouri, and General Lyon continued in that of the southern portion. The country was subdivided into smaller military districts, and placed under martial law, especial precautions being taken to guard the railways.

The form of civil government was not neglected, although its power had passed into other hands. A State Convention was assembled at Jefferson city, which deposed the existing Governor of Missouri (Mr. Jackson), and elected in his place Mr. Gamble, a Union man. Thus the State of Missouri was divided into hostile governments and hostile camps. Governor Jackson, the legally-elected Governor, issued a proclamation on August 5, declaring the dissolution of the political connection between the State of Missouri and the United States; and Generals Price and M'Culloch prepared to march from their cantonments to enforce its provisions.

On July 28 the Confederate army, under Generals M'Culloch, Pierce, and Price, were concentrated at Cassville, ninety miles south-west of Springfield. The organisation of the two forces—viz. those in the pay of the Confederate Government and those of the State of Missouri—were kept distinct, and the rank of the generals, and their consequent priority of command, occasioned a want of unanimity in conducting operations in the field; whilst a certain jealousy arose between the officers who had been educated at West Point and those who had but lately taken up arms. There was at first some hesitation on the part of General M'Culloch in agreeing to march against the Federal force at Springfield, knowing as he did the deficiencies of his own army both in organisation and in supplies. General Polk, however, commanding the Confederate forces in the South-west, ordered an immediate advance; and on the first week in August the army marched in three columns, under Generals M'Culloch, Pierce, and Price—General M'Culloch assuming the chief command. The total numerical strength of

the Confederate force was 5,300 infantry, 6,000 cavalry, and 15 pieces of artillery. The men were generally armed with shot guns and old rifles with flint locks; their clothes were in rags, and many were shoeless. The baggage-train was left behind, and the troops during the march suffered much from want of food and water. On August 8, the army arrived at Big-springs, one mile and a half from Wilson's Creek, and about ten miles from Springfield, and on the 9th advanced to Wilson's Creek, when it was the intention of General M'Culloch to march at once on Springfield. A heavy storm, however, came on; and as the men were unprovided with cartridge-boxes, and had only twenty-five rounds of ammunition, and no means of obtaining a fresh supply, it was determined to defer the attack until the following day.

The delay caused a material change in the plan of operations. General Lyon, hearing of the advance of the Confederate forces, and of their halt in the vicinity of Wilson's Creek, marched from Springfield with the purpose of forestalling the attack by an offensive movement. The Federal force consisted of six regiments and a half of volunteers, about eight hundred regulars, sixteen pieces of artillery, and a small force of cavalry, comprising a total of between six and seven thousand men. At 5 P.M. on August 9, the Federals left Springfield in two columns, one headed by General Lyon in person, the other, consisting of two regiments and six guns, by Colonel Siegel. About 1 A.M. the advanced guard of the first column came within sight of the Confederate picket-fires, undiscovered by the enemy. At 6 A.M. the action commenced, and General Rains, in command of the Confederate pickets, sent to apprise General Price that the whole force of the

Federals were moving to the attack. At the same time General Siegel, advancing by the Fayetteville Road, attacked the Confederate right at the point where the above-mentioned road crosses Wilson's Creek. The two attacking columns acted entirely independently of each other; the nature of the ground, thickly wooded and broken into hills and valleys, prevented cooperation. There was little systematic plan in the action. The Confederate pickets appear to have allowed the approach of the Federal force without giving warning to the main body; whilst the Federal commanders seem to have acted with no preconcerted plan, and in ignorance of each other's proceedings. The Confederates possessed the advantage of acting on the defensive in a difficult country, and, by the false movements of the Federal commanders, were placed in a position where they could in turn bring the bulk of their force to act on portions of that of the enemy. General Lyon pressed forward on the right, crossing Wilson's Creek above the Confederate position; the Confederates were taken by surprise, and were driven back a short distance. General Price, however, urged on his men, and the battle continued with varied success until about 9 A.M. At that time General Price ordered a fresh attack on the heights gained by the Federals. An Iowa regiment occupied them, and General Lyon, although previously wounded, putting himself at their head, led them forward to meet the enemy. At that moment two slugs, fired from a shot gun, struck him in the breast, and he fell from his horse dead. For the moment, notwithstanding the loss of their general, the Federals repulsed the attack. In the meantime Colonel Siegel had turned the right of the Confederate position, and in fact occupied the height across the road almost

in their direct rear. In this position he hoped to be able to cut off the retreat of the Confederates should they be defeated by General Lyon.* About half-past 8 A.M. his skirmishers reported that General Lyon's troops were approaching by the Fayetteville Road. Colonel Siegel's men, therefore, received orders not to fire, and the Union flag was waved as a signal to those whom they supposed to be their comrades. At once two batteries opened on the Federals, and a strong body of what were believed before to be Iowa troops, but which proved to be those of General M'Culloch, moved to attack the right of Colonel Siegel's position. Then, to quote Colonel Siegel's report—'It is impossible to describe the consternation and frightful confusion which was occasioned by this important event. The cry, "They (Lyon's troops) are firing upon us!" spread like wild fire through the ranks; the artillerymen, ordered to fire and directed by myself (Colonel Siegel), could hardly be brought forward to serve the pieces; the infantry would not level their arms until it was too late. The enemy arrived within ten paces of the muzzles of our cannon, killed the horses, turned the flanks of the infantry, and forced them to fly. The troops were throwing themselves into the bushes and by-roads, retreating as well as they could, followed and attacked incessantly by large bodies of Arkansas and Texas cavalry. In this retreat we lost five cannon, of which three were spiked, and the colours of the Third, the colour-bearer having been wounded and his substitute killed. The total loss of the two regiments, and the artillery, in killed, wounded, and missing, amounts to 892 men.' General M'Culloch

* Colonel Siegel's official report.

having thus defeated the column directly opposed to him, was able to send succour to General Price on the Confederate left, and about eleven o'clock ordered up the reserves under General Pierce. The Federals were now commanded by Major Sturgess, who was the next officer in rank on the field when General Lyon was killed. They maintained, for about an hour, a stout resistance; but, on the arrival of General Pierce with the Confederate reserves, were driven from the positions they had occupied in the morning, and retreated to Springfield. Little or no pursuit was attempted by the Confederates. The battle on the Federal right had been hardly contested, but on neither side, owing probably to the rawness of the troops, were any tactics worthy of the study of a military man shown. The losses, as stated by both Federal and Confederate generals, were nearly equal; General M'Culloch estimated the Confederate loss at 265 killed, 800 wounded, and 30 missing, whilst the Federal loss was computed at 223 killed, 721 wounded, and 292 missing,* of which the greater portion of those reported as missing belonged to Colonel Siegel's brigade. The bad conduct of a regiment of three-months' men belonging to that brigade is mentioned in some of the reports; the men are stated to have agreed to remain ten days beyond their term of enlistment, but, when exposed to a heavy fire, to have repented of the agreement, and to have made their escape as soon as they possibly could. Colonel Siegel saved one of his pieces of artillery,† by the rather questionable expedient of forcing prisoners

* Official reports.

† 'Siegel lost five guns, the other being brought away by Captain Flagg, who compelled his prisoners, some sixty in number, to draw the artillery off the field.'—*St. Louis Democrat*, Aug. 15.

he had captured to drag it from the ground. The result of this battle, named that of Wilson's Creek by the Federals, and of Oak Hill by the Confederates, was that the Federals evacuated Springfield, destroying a portion of their stores, and retreated to Rolla.

In General Lyon the Federals lost an officer who had shown no common energy and talent in the execution of difficult and embarrassing duties; possessing the advantages of military training and experience, he believed in the justice of the cause in which he fought, and being an Abolitionist from the New England States, was free from trammels and scruples which, at the commencement of the war, sometimes caused hesitation among officers of the Democratic party.

The thanks of the Confederate Congress were tendered to General M'Culloch and the officers and men under his command for the important victory they had gained, and a resolution was passed to aid 'the State of Missouri in repelling invasion by the United States, and to authorise its admission as a member of the Confederate States of America.' The Confederate Congress also recognised the Government of which Clairbourne F. Jackson was the chief magistrate to be the legally-elected and regularly-constituted government of the people and State of Missouri. Notwithstanding these resolutions, Missouri was left in a great measure to fight its own battles. General M'Culloch and the troops under his command retired shortly after the battle of Wilson's Creek to the frontier of Arkansas, and on General Price and the State forces fell the onus of the campaign.

CHAPTER VII.

FROM THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN TO THAT OF BALL'S
BLUFF.

FOR a short period following the battles of Rich Mountain, Bull Run, and Wilson's Creek, there was a pause in the important military operations. The North became aware that to succeed in an offensive campaign great preparations were necessary, and learnt at the same time that there was some truth in the maxims of the art of war, which even young America could not afford to disregard. In the meanwhile important acts were passed both in the Confederate and Federal Congress. The former commenced their work in July, and devoted their time principally to providing for the conduct of the war.

The thanks of Congress were voted to General Joseph E. Johnston and General Beauregard, together with the officers and men under their command, for the victory of Manassas, and the latter was raised by the President to the rank of general in the army of the Confederate States, making up the number of generals to four, viz. Samuel Cooper, Robert E. Lee, Joseph E. Johnston, and P. G. Beauregard. Authority was also granted to the President to grant commissions to raise volunteers in the States of Kentucky, Missouri, Maryland, and Delaware, upon conditions that the officers holding such commissions should not receive rank or

pay until the regiments or battalions had been raised and mustered into the service. It was the design of the Confederate Government to induce the whole of the slave-holding States to adopt their cause, and in all Acts levied against the citizens and States of the North especial exceptional clauses were introduced referring to Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri, the district of Columbia, and the territories of Arizona, New Mexico, and the Indian territory south of Kansas. Thus, in the Act respiting alien enemies, in which the President was authorised to remove all citizens of the United States upwards of fourteen years of age, the above mentioned States and territories were excepted. On August 8, an Act passed authorising the 'President to ask for and accept the services of any number of volunteers, who might offer their services as cavalry, mounted riflemen, artillery, or infantry, not exceeding four hundred thousand, to engage for a period of not less than twelve months, nor more than three years, after they should be mustered into the service, unless sooner discharged,' and on the 21st another Act passed authorising the President to accept the services of volunteers 'of such kind and in such proportion as he might deem expedient to serve for the defence of exposed places and localities, and any other special service.' Not only were provisions made for the land forces of the Confederate States, but an Act was passed and large sums appropriated for the construction and maintenance of a navy, as also to provide gunboats and other floating defences on the Mississippi River.*

* On August 24, an appropriation was made of the following sums for the navy for the year ending February 18, 1862 :—

'For the purchase and building of gunboats for coast defences of

Many of the provisions of this Act were, however, never carried out, and some were delayed so long that the evils against which they were intended to guard occurred before the means of resisting them were perfected. To furnish the necessary money for the payment of the principal and interest of the public debt incurred by these and similar expenses, the issue of Treasury-notes was authorised, and also a war-tax for their redemption imposed, according to the following provisions, viz.: 'Fifty cents upon each one hundred dollars in value of the following property, viz.: real estate of all kinds, slaves, merchandise, bank stock, railroad and other corporation stocks, money at interest and invested by individuals in the purchase of bills, rates, and other securities for money, except the bonds

the Confederate States, the sum of fifty thousand dollars; for repairing and fitting the steamer Merrimac as an iron-clad ship, the sum of one hundred and seventy-two thousand five hundred and twenty-three dollars; for raising the ships of the line, Columbus, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and the brig Dolphin, the sum of twenty-five thousand dollars; for pay, subsistence, and other wants of five hundred additional ordinary seamen, &c. &c. &c., ninety thousand dollars; for medical supplies and surgeons' necessaries, the sum of four thousand dollars; to pay employés at the Navy Yard, Norfolk, Virginia, from July 1, 1861, to February 18, 1862, the sum of six thousand seven hundred dollars; for floating defences for New Orleans, Louisiana, eight hundred thousand dollars; to construct submarine batteries for the destruction of vessels, fifty thousand dollars; to construct a centrifugal gun, invented by Charles S. Dickinson, five thousand dollars; for expenditures in the ordnance department of the Navy Yard at Norfolk, for the year ending February 18, 1862, one hundred and fifteen thousand and fifty-two dollars; for the construction, equipment, and armament of two iron-clad gunboats for the defence of the Mississippi River and the city of Memphis, one hundred and sixty thousand dollars; and for the construction of four gunboats for coast defences, four hundred and twenty thousand dollars.'

of the Confederate States of America, cash on hand or in deposit in bank or elsewhere, cattle, horses, mules, gold watches, gold and silver plate, pianos, and pleasure carriages.' In retaliation for Acts passed by the Federal Congress, and for the method of conducting the war alleged to have been pursued by the Northern generals, an Act was passed on August 30, 1861, 'for the sequestration of the estates, property, and effects of alien enemies, and for the indemnity of citizens of the Confederate States and persons aiding the same in the existing war with the United States;' the property of the citizens of the before-mentioned slave States excepted. This Act bore reference to an Act entitled the Confiscation Act, which passed in the Federal Congress, and was approved by President Lincoln on August 6, 1861. Whilst the interior government of the Confederacy and the war policy towards the Federals were regulated by the Congress, a species of declaration was put forth under the guise of a resolution, referring to the views of the Confederate Government on maritime law. It was entitled 'A Resolution touching certain points of maritime law, and defining the position of the Confederate States in respect thereto,' and was worded as follows:—

'Be it resolved by the Congress of the Confederate States—1st, That we maintain the right of privateering, as it has long been established by the practice and recognised by the law of nations; 2nd, That the neutral flag covers enemies' goods, with the exception of contraband of war; 3rd, That neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under enemies' flag; 4th, That blockades, in order to be binding, must be effectual—that is to say,

maintained by a force efficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy.'

This resolution was soon after followed by an Act to empower the President to appoint two commissioners to such foreign nations as he might deem expedient, in order to represent the Confederate States, either separately or unitedly; and it was in carrying out its provisions that events occurred which nearly caused a rupture between the Federal Government and that of Great Britain.

The great difficulty experienced by the Confederate Government lay in providing arms and equipments for their troops. The Tradegar Works at Richmond, established previous to the war, were increased in size, and were able, in July 1861, to complete two heavy guns and two light field-guns, together with a considerable quantity of shot and shell per week. The machinery for the manufacture of arms captured at Harper's Ferry was transferred to Fayetteville, North Carolina, and a large number of operatives were organised to work at the new establishment. Percussion-cap machinery was set up in Richmond, and also measures taken to convert the flint-lock guns into percussion arms. Large supplies of stores were imported notwithstanding the blockade, which, during the earlier period of the war, was almost nominal; and some of the articles most required in the South were furnished by Northern merchants, and smuggled into the country from the Federal States. The currency in Richmond was already in an unsatisfactory condition; the smaller coin had almost disappeared from use, and paper (or shin plasters, as the notes were termed) had taken its place. A convention of the principal banking corporations was held on July 25 at Richmond, in order to consider and

propose some method of arranging the finance of the country. A report was adopted by this convention, recommending that one hundred millions of dollars in Confederate notes should be put in circulation by the Government, that the people and banks should take them as specie, and that the interest on larger bills should be at the rate of $7\frac{3}{10}$ per cent. per annum. Notes of the denominations of \$5, \$10, and \$100, in the opinion of the Committee, ought not to bear any interest. The Governors of the States supported the central Government. Governor Harris, of Tennessee, called out 30,000 volunteers, and issued orders that all arms in the State of Tennessee should be sent to the military authorities at Nashville, Knoxville, and Memphis. The important military positions of Cumberland and Wheeler's Gaps, passes in the Alleghany Mountains between Kentucky and Tennessee, were occupied by troops under General Zollicoffer, appointed to command Eastern Tennessee, and Governor Harris entered into negotiations with President Davis in order to make arrangements for the transfer of the army of Tennessee to the Confederate States. There were some slight changes in the Confederate ministry. Mr. R. Toombs, the Secretary of State of the Southern Confederacy, resigned his office, preferring to serve his country in the field rather than in the cabinet. He was immediately appointed Brigadier-General in the Confederate army, and Mr. Hunter was assigned to the vacant office in the Government. A little later Mr. Braxton Bragg succeeded Mr. L. P. Walker as Secretary of War. On July 1, the State of Virginia published an ordinance, decreeing that any citizen of Virginia continuing to hold office under the Government of the United States after July 31 should be for ever banished

from the State, and that any citizen of Virginia who might hereafter undertake to represent the State of Virginia in the Congress of the United States, in addition to the penalties above mentioned, should be deemed guilty of high treason; and his property should, on proof thereof, be confiscated to the use of the State. In consequence of this order, six Government clerks in the public departments at Washington resigned their appointments. More and more widely separate, during each succeeding month, did the two parties, or rather people, become. Kentucky still endeavoured to maintain neutrality, and was denounced as an enemy by the more violent portion of the New Orleans press. On August 17, a meeting was held at Louisville, Kentucky, professedly for the purpose of advocating peace, but which soon showed signs of division in itself—one party protesting that peace could alone be secured by adherence to the Union; the other urging a strictly neutral action on the part of the State, tantamount to a refusal to obey the Federal Government. Such was the position of affairs in the Southern Slave States during the months immediately succeeding the battle of Bull Run. Much assuredly had been done, but not enough. President Davis, indeed, foresaw the importance and magnitude of the struggle which awaited the South; but the people, intoxicated by their first success, and unused to restraint, did not sufficiently support him. Valuable time was lost, and means of defence neglected, which entailed the death and sufferings of thousands, and which the energy displayed by the South at a subsequent period could not entirely atone for.

At Washington, General M'Clellan, the successor of General M'Dowell, was busily engaged in reorganising

the army. A proper but still insufficient staff were allowed him, and his Provost-Marshal, 'General A. Porter, a regular officer,' did what lay in his power to infuse some degree of order into the military crowd at Washington. On July 30, General M'Clellan issued an order forbidding officers and men from leaving their camps and regiments to visit Washington without passes, and sentries and patrols were stationed in various parts of the city to enforce its fulfilment. The sale of intoxicating drinks to the men of the army, in the district of Columbia, was forbidden by an Act of Congress; and General Butler, at Fortress Monroe, issued a similar order, reflecting more especially on the conduct of the officers. Some restraint on the press was also attempted. General M'Clellan summoned a meeting of the several representatives of the newspapers at Washington, and requested them to abstain from publishing any descriptions which might afford aid and comfort to the enemy. The Government held the power of forbidding the transmission through the post-office of refractory newspapers, and this power was not infrequently exercised. The general had a hard task before him. His chief difficulty lay with the officers; the great majority had been elected by their own men, and many were not only incapable, but absolutely bad. Congress took the matter in hand, and passed a Bill authorising the President to dispense with the services of inefficient officers; a qualifying examination was also instituted, and by these means the army was weeded of many men unfit for their position; in the course of eight months three hundred and ten officers were dismissed the service, or their resignations accepted. These reforms were not carried through without difficulty. More than one regiment mutinied.

The 79th New York regiment, encamped near Washington, refused to march into Virginia, and was only forced into obedience by the employment of regular regiments, who surrounded the mutineers, and were ordered to fire on them in case of continued disobedience. There were also riots among Pennsylvanian regiments, in consequence of claims which the men alleged had been left unsettled. These were, however, exceptions to the conduct usually displayed by the troops; as a rule, the men were quiet and well-conducted. In consequence of the early period at which marriages are contracted in the United States, a great proportion of the army consisted of married men, and were taken from trades and professions which do not usually furnish soldiers to European armies. Thus it is recorded, that in one regiment there was a company composed of school teachers, and in another mention is made of a company containing so many printers and men connected with newspapers, that, on the capture of a printing press, the types were immediately set up and a newspaper started. There were frequent reconnaissances and skirmishes from the lines in front of Washington and along the banks of the Upper Potomac, but they were often conducted without authority, and resulted in the destruction of private property and in the slaughter of pickets and sentries, without producing any ultimate benefit to the cause. Thus, a major and lieutenant of the Federal army are related to have started for the picket line armed with a Sharp's rifle and fifty conical bullets. They made a fire and commenced heating their shot. One, with a cloth, dropped the shot into the gun, whilst the other, being the best marksman, fired at some haystacks visible in the enemy's lines. After a few shots, the

hay-ricks, according to the account, were set on fire, and the two officers returned satisfied with their achievement. About this time the Federal army received a visit from Prince Napoleon, who likewise obtained permission to proceed to the Confederate camp. He was accompanied through the Federal lines by General M'Dowell and his staff, who escorted him as far as the out-pickets, when the Prince, riding forward with his attendants, was received by the Confederate picket and taken to General Beauregard, and by him conducted over the battle-field of Bull Run. The sanction by the Government of the Prince's passage through the Federal lines, with the avowed intention of visiting the camp of the enemy, and his reception within the Federal lines on his return, was a tacit acknowledgment of the recognition of the Confederates as belligerents. On August 3, the Senate confirmed the appointment of the following officers, viz.: Major-Generals M'Clellan, Fremont, Dix, and Banks, and Brigadier-Generals Hooker, Curtis, M'Call, Sherman, Lander, Kelly, Kearney, Pope, Heintzelman, Porter, Stone, Reynolds, Hunter, Franklin, Rosencranz, Buell, Mansfield, M'Dowell, and Meigs. Many of these men acquired celebrity or notoriety during the course of the war. Major-General Wool was appointed to the south-eastern district of Virginia, with head-quarters at Fortress Monroe—General Butler retaining a subordinate position under him.

Several important Acts had in the meantime passed through Congress, and obtained the sanction of the President. The creation of a national loan had been authorised, and various sums voted for the increase of the army and navy, for the construction of fortifica-

tions, for the indemnification of the States for expenses incurred for the defence of the United States, and for the augmentation of the pay of the troops, &c. &c. On August 6, an Act received the sanction of the President, entitled 'An Act to confiscate the property used for insurrectionary purposes,' and this, as has been before mentioned, called forth an Act of reprisal from the Confederate Congress. The people were in favour of ultra measures; the Republican party were in the ascendant; and violent means were taken to convert suspected secessionists into Union men. In several of the northern towns, even in the reputedly well-conducted States of New England, the offices of journals advocating doctrines displeasing to the mob were broken into, the printing presses destroyed, and in some instances the editors tarred and feathered, and ridden on rails through the market places until they took the oath of allegiance, and made a promise never to offend again. The Government used more legitimate measures to suppress all papers holding opinions opposed to the administration, and in a short time the hitherto free press of America became as subservient to the authorities as that of any country in Europe under an autocratic government. The right of free discussion, together with that of a free press, was likewise interfered with by the mob. At Indianapolis a convention of the peace party assembled in the Court House, and were addressed by the Hon. R. Walpole; disturbances arose, and in the evening the hotel in which Mr. Walpole and his friends were residing was visited by a mob, who forced them, under threats of personal violence, to take the oath of allegiance to the Union. Between the tyranny of a mob in some

districts, and the military regulations of others,* much of the freedom so long enjoyed by the American nation disappeared. The majority of the people were, however, so engrossed in the war, and so resolved to submit to sacrifices to accomplish the end they had set before them, that they resigned their guarantees of freedom without regret, and almost without notice.

In order to provide for the immediate defence of the capital, subsequent to the disaster at Bull Run, several regiments had been detached from Fortress Monroe and sent to Washington, consequently the Federal lines at that station were contracted, and, on a rumour of the advance of General Magruder, the village of Hampton was evacuated. The Confederates advanced, and the village, either accidentally or purposely, was burnt; the church, one of the oldest in America, and built of bricks brought from England, also perished in the con-

* The following order was issued relative to army correspondents:—‘ War Department, Adjutant-General’s Office, Washington, August 26, 1861.—By the fifty-seventh article of the Act of Congress, entitled “ An Act for establishing rules and articles for the government of the armies of the United States, approved April 10, 1806,” holding correspondence with, or giving intelligence to the enemy, either directly or indirectly, is made punishable by death, or such other punishment as shall be ordered by the sentence of a court-martial. Public safety requires strict enforcement of this article. It is therefore ordered that all correspondence and communications, verbally or by writing, printing, or telegraphing, respecting operations of the army or military movements on land or water, or respecting the troops, camps, arsenals, intrenchments, or military affairs within the several military districts, by which intelligence shall be directly or indirectly given to the enemy, without the authority and sanction of the General in command, be, and the same are, absolutely prohibited, and from and after the date of this order persons violating the same will be proceeded against under the fifty-seventh Article of War. By order,

‘ L. THOMAS, Adjutant-General.’

flagration. The guns of Fortress Monroe and of the fleet protected the Federal camp in their immediate vicinity, and, as fresh reinforcements arrived, General Wool was enabled to organise an expedition against a portion of the coast of North Carolina. The object in view was to destroy the forts built on sandbanks and commanding the inlets to Pamlico and Albemarle Sounds, and either to occupy them or to block up the narrow channels through the reefs and sandbanks which afforded ingress and egress to the Confederate privateers, and to vessels of light draught engaged in running the blockade. The expedition, consisting of two frigates, a sloop of war, three gunboats, and transports with 820 men on board, left Fortress Monroe on August 26, and arrived off Fort Hatteras on the 27th. About a third of the troops were landed on the morning of the 28th, under cover of the fire from the vessels; but the wind springing up, the disembarkation ceased, and the troops already on shore were left to act for themselves until the 29th. On the 29th, the fleet approached and shelled Fort Hatteras. Fort Clark, 'a small work,' had been evacuated by the Confederates and occupied by the Federal troops. The commander of Fort Hatteras (Flag-officer S. Barron), finding that the place was untenable, and that his men were suffering from the shells from the fleet without being able effectually to reply to the fire, sent propositions of surrender to General Butler. The terms were, that the fort, stores, and arms should be given up, but that the officers and men, the former with their side arms, should be allowed to retire. These terms were refused, and, after a short deliberation, Flag-officer Barron surrendered unconditionally. He, his officers, and men, were made prisoners of war. The articles of capitulation were


signed on the part of the Confederates by S. Barron, flag-officer, Confederate States navy, and W. L. G. Andrews, major commanding Forts Hatteras and Clark. Thus, notwithstanding General Butler's refusal (as stated in his despatch) to give an official title to the officer commanding rebels, the position of these officers was recognised in the articles of capitulation, and a step made towards the acknowledgment of the Confederates as belligerents. Two gunboats, of sufficiently light draught to pass the bar into Pamlico Sound, and the military portion of the expedition, were left to hold the forts, whilst the fleet, together with General Butler, returned to Fortress Monroe. By the capture of Fort Hatteras a footing was obtained from which future expeditions could be directed against the State of North Carolina. Whilst the campaigns of Eastern Virginia and Missouri were in progress, the effects of the battle of Rich Mountain were shown in the action of the Wheeling Convention assembled in Western Virginia. The object aimed at, as before mentioned, was no less than the construction of the western portion of Virginia into a separate State, under the name of the State of Kanawha. The question of the legality of this act was submitted to the Government at Washington, and drew forth a letter on the subject from Mr. Bates, the Attorney-General. The letter was unofficial, but sufficiently established the opinion of the law officers on the matter.

Mr. Bates laid great stress on the 'importance, not to say necessity, in this terrible crisis of the national affairs, of abstaining from the introduction of any new elements of revolution, and of avoiding as far as possible all new and original theories of government.' The plan adopted by the United States Government with regard


to the insurgent States was, he stated, 'to avail itself of all the sound and loyal elements of the State, and to form a State Government as nearly as possible on the same model, and claiming to be the very State which was in part overthrown by the successful rebellion.' This course Mr. Bates advocated, but termed the proposed line of proceeding of the Wheeling Convention a new and hazardous experiment. To whatever conclusion the Convention might arrive, there were others to be consulted or to be overcome before the separation of Virginia could be accomplished. The Confederate Government were not prepared to surrender Western Virginia without a struggle, but determined to organise a campaign, with the object of obtaining possession of the fertile valley of the Kanawha, and of the country to the northward, from which General Garnett had been driven. For this purpose the ex-United States Minister of War, General Floyd, was sent from Richmond, in August, to reinforce General Wise, who, after the battle of Rich Mountain, had retreated to Lewisburg, on the Greenbrier River, whilst General R. Lee was assigned to the command of the remains of General Garnett's army at Monterey. General Floyd, as the senior officer, took command over General Wise, although the two bodies of troops, viz. the old army of General Wise and the reinforcements under General Floyd, do not appear to have been sufficiently amalgamated, nor do the two generals seem to have acted with perfect accord.

The army advanced, towards the latter end of August, by the Lewisburg and Charleston Roads; and the Federals (a small force) retreated, their rear-guard disputing some of the positions. The main body of the Federals, under General Cox, held a position about six miles east

of the Gauly River, near its junction with the Kanawha, whilst a force under Colonel Tyler held Carnifex Ferry, a few miles up the Gauly River. As the united columns of Generals Floyd and Wise advanced against General Cox, their right rear became threatened by Colonel Tyler's force from Carnifex Ferry. General Floyd, therefore, determined to leave General Wise to watch General Cox, whilst he himself, with a force of about 1,750 men, proceeded to engage Colonel Tyler at Carnifex Ferry. On his arrival there he found that the Federals had crossed the river and retreated, having sunk the boats. However, he succeeded in raising the ferry boat, and conveyed his infantry and two guns across the Gauly. Through an accident the ferry boat capsized, and was carried over the rapids, and thus all means of transporting the artillery and cavalry over the swollen river was at an end, until a fresh boat could be built. This the quartermaster-general undertook to do, and the next day the remainder of the force was safely ferried over. In the meantime Colonel Tyler, hoping to surprise the Confederate force before the whole of it had crossed the river, marched on Carnifex Ferry, and encamped within two miles of General Floyd's position. Early on the 26th, that general becoming aware of the proximity of the enemy, resolved to anticipate their attack. He, therefore, ordered the Virginian regiments to advance, and coming suddenly on the Federals, whose pickets were so close to the main body as to be of no use, completely surprised and routed them. General Floyd then proceeded to entrench himself on the right bank of the Gauly River at Carnifex Ferry, and prepared for an advance, as soon as he had made sufficient preparations, to the Lower Kanawha, as by so doing he would place



SCENE OF THE CAMPAIGN OF THE KANAWHA VALLEY.



himself in rear of General Cox, and between him and his base of operations on the Ohio. This plan was prevented by General Rosencranz, who was commander-in-chief of the Federals in Western Virginia. He had collected his forces in the neighbourhood of Weston; and having left General Reynolds at Cheat Mountain to hold the passes and the roads to Weston and Grafton, proceeded to march to the relief of General Cox. His line of march was by Bull Town, Sutton, and Birch River, and on the evening of the 9th he encamped between the latter place and Sutton, about eighteen miles from Carnifex Ferry. The country, thickly covered with forest, and almost mountainous in its character, traversed by but few roads, and intersected with numerous rivers and streams, was sufficiently difficult for the movements of armies. On the 10th, the march was resumed, and in the afternoon, after advancing eighteen miles, the Federals arrived opposite the entrenched line of defence held by General Floyd. At 3 P.M. a reconnoissance in force was organised in order to ascertain the enemy's strength and position; but towards evening what had been intended merely as a reconnoissance assumed the dimensions of a general engagement, and night only put an end to the battle. General Rosencranz wished to give his men rest before the final attack, which he intended should take place on the following morning. About daybreak, however, a contraband came into the Federal camp and stated that the Confederates had retired. The pickets were pushed forward, and the news was found to be true. General Floyd, fearing that he would be overwhelmed by a junction of General Cox and General Rosencranz, and being unsupported by General Wise, decided on retreating across the Gauly

River and effecting a junction with that general. This he accomplished with the loss of some camp equipments, baggage, and arms, and joined General Wise on the Charleston Road, about fifteen miles from Gauly Bridge, and fifty-five miles west of Lynchburg. The combined army then retired to Sewell's Mountain, where General Wise established an entrenched camp, whilst General Floyd retreated to Meadow Bluff, on the road to Lewisburg. The Federal army advanced in the same direction, but slowly, and did not attempt any pursuit.

Almost cotemporary with the action at Carnifex Ferry, a series of skirmishes (they can scarcely be termed battles) had taken place between the force under General Lee and that under General Reynolds at Cheat Mountain. General Lee had endeavoured to surround and capture the troops entrenched there; but meeting with an obstinate resistance, he abandoned the attempt, and resolved to march to the relief of General Floyd, and to unite the whole Confederate army in the Kanawha Valley. This he accomplished, and concentrated his force at Sewell Mountain about the end of September, having left a detachment of about 2,500 men, under General H. A. Jackson,* to guard the road leading to Staunton, and the line of the Greenbrier River. After the junction of General Lee with Generals Floyd and Wise, General Rosencranz, finding himself outnumbered, retreated to the Gauly River unmolested by the Confederate force.

Nothing further on a large scale was attempted in Western Virginia. There was a skirmish on October 3 between General Reynolds and General H. A. Jackson

* Not Stonewall Jackson.

on the Greenbrier, occasioned by the march of the former from Cheat Mountain for the purpose of attacking the Confederate lines, which resulted in the repulse of the Federals. Thus the two armies remained nearly in the positions they had occupied previous to the campaign; the Federals holding the country west of the Alleghanies, the Confederates occupying the mountains and the Greenbrier Valley. General Lee, after the unsuccessful campaign of the Kanawha, was recalled, and placed in charge of the coast defences of South Carolina and Georgia, and General Wise was ordered to Richmond. General Floyd, with a brigade, still continued in the field, and, advancing along the left bank of the Kanawha by Fayetteville, harassed the communications of the Federals, and fired on the steamers which carried supplies to the army. He was, however, too weak to stand against General Rosencranz, who concentrated his forces with the object of attacking him in the neighbourhood of Fayetteville, and so compelled him to retreat to his former position near Lewisburg. There can be no doubt that the Confederate campaign of Western Virginia was a failure: there was an absence of combination in the movements of the several generals; and, in the Kanawha Valley, Generals Floyd and Wise do not appear to have acted in perfect unanimity, or to have effectually supported each other. It may be alleged as an excuse that the troops employed can scarcely be considered as soldiers, and that the nature of the country is so wild and unfitted for the movements of large bodies, that criticisms which could be justly applied to an European campaign have little weight in the present instance. Both these causes might mar the best-conceived strategic plans; but it would be unfair not to award the

credit due to General Rosencranz for his march previous to the battle of Carnifex Ferry, or to General Reynolds for his successful defence of the Cheat Mountains.

During the autumn months, occupied by the campaign of Western Virginia, nothing beyond reconnaissances was attempted by the army in and around Washington. The time was spent in drill, and in raising fresh fortifications on every height on both sides of the Potomac. The Confederate pickets were almost within sight of the Capitol, and their batteries partially blockaded the river. Many stories were narrated of the vast works which General Beauregard was said to have erected on Munson's Hill; and it must have been a matter of some surprise when, on the morning of September 28, the advanced pickets of General Richardson's brigade reported that those of the enemy opposite to them had been drawn in. General M'Clellan was immediately communicated with, and, accompanied by his staff, rode at once to General Richardson's quarters. The brigade was ordered to advance; the flanks of the hill were turned, and the summit occupied; the Confederates had disappeared; they offered no resistance, and the famous batteries resolved themselves into a slight mound of earth mounted by two large stove-pipes.* General Beauregard had withdrawn his army to Centreville. Some of the Federal troops disgraced themselves on this occasion by incendiarism and the plunder of private property—conduct which called forth a stringent order from General M'Clellan. It was a short time previous to the occupation of Munson's Hill that the

* It is said that General M'Clellan was personally aware of the nature of the works on Munson's Hill, although their appearance deceived the majority of the army.

Prince de Joinville, accompanied by his two nephews, the Comte de Paris and the Duc de Chartres, arrived at Washington. They were kindly welcomed by the Government and by General M'Clellan, who proposed that the young princes should serve on his staff. Pleased with their reception by the general, and feeling a strong personal regard for him, believing also that the cause for which the North was fighting was that of order and freedom, the princes accepted the appointment. In so doing they have incurred much blame from English critics; but before passing judgment on their conduct it would be well to weigh properly the motives which might have actuated them in their decision. In the first place, they were Frenchmen, and to Frenchmen, in a greater degree than to any other nation, is military glory an object of attainment. They were debarred from any career in their own country, and, unless in a foreign service, were unable to obtain the education and experience necessary to make officers. Between their family and the Government of the United States friendly relations had long existed. The war was avowedly waged for the purpose of supporting the Constitution, and whilst travelling in the Northern States it was impossible for them to learn the arguments urged by the other side. The princes were also much gratified by what they saw of General M'Clellan, who possessed the power of acquiring the esteem and even affection of all with whom he was brought in contact. They did not come to America with the object of engaging in the war, but were travelling there when it broke out, and embraced the occasion of profiting by the experience of a campaign, proffered to them by General M'Clellan. They entered the service with the rank of captains of volunteers,

stipulating that they were to receive no pay, and that they should be free to resign their appointments whenever they might wish to do so. Under these conditions they agreed to serve, and General M'Clellan had no officers on his staff who performed their duties better. It was towards the end of October that General M'Clellan decided to send out a strong reconnaissance towards Leesburg, in order to ascertain what movements the enemy were making, and whether they were concentrating their forces in that direction, with the intention of crossing the Potomac into Maryland. With this object he directed General M'Call, on October 19, to occupy Drainesville, about eighteen miles to the north-west of Washington, and issued the following order to General Stone, in command of the troops at Poolesville :

‘ Poolesville: October 20, 1861.

‘ To BRIGADIER-GENERAL STONE,—General M'Clellan desires me to inform you, that General M'Call occupied Drainesville yesterday, and is still there. Will send out heavy reconnaissances to-day from that point. The general desires that you will keep a good look-out upon Leesburg, to see if this movement has the effect to drive them away. Perhaps a slight demonstration on your part would have the effect to move them.

‘ A. V. COLBURN,

‘ Assistant Adjutant-General.’

On the receipt of this order General Stone proceeded to Edwards' Ferry, on the Potomac, about three miles from Poolesville, with General Gorman's brigade reinforced by two infantry regiments and a squadron of cavalry, and ordered Colonel Lee to march to Conrad's Ferry with a regiment called the Tammany regiment,

a battalion of the 20th Massachusetts and two guns. Conrad's Ferry is about three and a half miles from Edwards' Ferry, higher up the Potomac, and between the two ferries lies Harrison's Island, overlooked by steep bluffs on the right bank of the river. The island was occupied by five companies of the 20th Massachusetts regiment, under Colonel Devens, whilst two guns were placed in position at Conrad's and Edwards' Ferries, in addition to the two which (as before stated) accompanied Colonel Lee's detachment. On the afternoon of the 20th, General Gorman advanced to the river and opened fire on the woods which covered the right bank of the Potomac, at the same time making feints of crossing the river at Edwards' Ferry. The fire was not replied to, no enemy showed himself, and at dusk the brigade marched back to their camp. Later in the night scouts (or, in European phrase, patrols) were sent out by the colonel of the 15th Massachusetts, who, on their return, reported that they had discovered a small camp of the enemy near Leesburg. With the object of surprising this camp,* Colonel Devens was ordered about midnight to take four companies of the regiment stationed at Harrison's Island and to march towards Leesburg. Colonel Lee was ordered to support him, and General Gorman was directed to push forward a reconnoissance from Edwards' Ferry also in the direction of Leesburg. Colonel Baker's brigade, consisting of three and a half regiments, received orders at the same time to be in readiness to cross the Potomac at dawn. In the meantime General Evans, commanding the Confederate forces at Leesburg (the same who had previously distinguished himself at Bull Run), became aware of the operations

* General Stone's official report.

directed against him. At midnight on the 19th, he concentrated the 7th brigade on the Leesburg and Washington Road, taking up a strong position north of Goose Creek, and early on the morning of the 21st received reports from his pickets that the enemy had crossed the Potomac. The 17th Mississippi regiment, supported by a small force of cavalry and infantry, was immediately ordered to drive back the advancing Federals, although it was not until later in the day, and until General Evans became certain of the real point of attack, that the main body of the Confederates was brought into action. In the meantime Colonel Devens (Federal), after ascertaining that the information given by the patrols on the previous night was false, and finding himself attacked, retired on the supports under Colonel Lee. General Stone remained at Edwards' Ferry, but directed Colonel Baker to attempt the passage of the river from Harrison's Island with his brigade, reinforced to five regiments and a half. This was accordingly done about 10 A.M. on the 21st. The transport of troops across the river was slow, owing to the deficiency of boats, and the want of proper organisation and supervision on the part of the officers. Notwithstanding, about midday the Federals formed line in the woods on the bluffs; three light field-guns had been ferried over, but the officers in charge were wounded early in the action, and the guns were of little service. About 2 P.M. the Confederate supports, consisting of two regiments (the 8th Virginia and 18th Mississippi), arrived on the field, and, soon after 3 o'clock, the 17th Mississippi regiment was brought forward. The Confederates advanced, trusting to their musketry and bayonets (they had no artillery), and as they advanced the Federal line gave way. In

vain Colonel Baker tried to rally the men: he was struck several times, and fell whilst attempting to do so. The Federals then broke and ran towards the river. They swarmed down the steep bluffs, pursued by the Confederates, who shot and bayoneted them as they ran. They crowded along the bank of the river, throwing away muskets, accoutrements, and clothing; those who could swim plunged into the stream, those who could not surrendered themselves prisoners; a few crept up and down the river's bank and succeeded in reaching Conrad's and Edwards' Fords; but, according to the Federal accounts, nearly one half the force engaged were either killed, wounded, or captured. The few boats were soon swamped, and one larger than the rest, crowded with the wounded and the flying, sunk in midstream. No attempts were made by the Federals to cover the retreat by artillery fire from the left bank; in fact, it was almost impossible to do so without killing as many of their own men as of the enemy. General Stone appears to have remained at Edwards' Ferry in complete ignorance of the disaster which had befallen Colonel Baker's brigade. He stated in his report that he was awaiting the advance of Colonel Baker before ordering General Gorman's brigade on the left to move forward. On the news reaching him of Colonel Baker's death, he hurried to Harrison's Island, but arrived only in time to witness the complete defeat of his men. Telegrams had in the meantime been sent to General Banks, commanding the district, and fresh troops were hurried up, too late, however, to take part in the action. The Federals attributed their defeat to the overwhelming numbers of the enemy; but it appears from the numerical statements of the Confederate general, as well as from calculations based on the detail of the regiments

engaged, that the Federal troops actually brought into action fully equalled, if they did not surpass, in numbers those of the enemy; whilst, if the brigade of General Gorman at Edwards' Ferry is reckoned, the superiority was considerably on the Federal side. The Confederate general estimated his loss at 153 killed and wounded, and 2 prisoners. He claimed to have captured 710 prisoners, 1,500 stand of arms, and 3 pieces of cannon. The Federals acknowledged to a loss of nearly 1,100 men. The result of the battle (called that of Ball's Bluff) was telegraphed to General M'Clellan, who ordered three brigades of General Banks' division to reinforce General Stone, and to entrench themselves on the right bank of the Potomac near Edwards' Ferry. On October 22, General M'Clellan arrived in person on the field of action, and having ascertained the futility of any further attempt, withdrew his forces from the Virginia side of the river.

The Federal accounts endeavoured to underrate the magnitude of the disaster at Ball's Bluff, but the truth gradually crept out, and the wrath of the Government fell on General Stone, who was soon afterwards sent as a prisoner to Fort Lafayette.* A portion of the blame was laid on those who had the arrangements for transporting the troops from Harrison's Island to the Virginian shore. A sufficient number of boats had not been provided, nor was a proper detachment left to take charge of them, and in the event of a repulse to prevent them from being overcrowded; the real reasons, however, for the defeat lay deeper. The plan of operations was badly arranged and feebly executed. It was more than a feint, and yet scarcely appears to

* A fort in the harbour of New York.

have been a serious attack ; if it was the latter, why was so large a portion of the troops kept idle during the whole of the day? Again, for what purpose were the feints made of crossing the river on the 20th? They do not seem to have been intended to conceal any real attempt to do so, as the passage was not effected until the 21st. The absence of a proper staff and of the proper chain of responsibility was one of the great causes of failure at Ball's Bluff, as at Bull Run. The general was not informed of the action of the inferior commanders, and among the latter a want of decision and of commanding authority was apparent after the death of Colonel Baker. The miserable system of making war on pickets, and of individual enterprises on the part of commanders of companies and regiments, was partially the cause of the reverse. It does not appear by whose orders Colonel Devens was sent in the middle of the night, in a wooded country, to surprise a camp that had no existence except in the imagination of a patrol ; the only result of the expedition was to give warning to the enemy, and so to allow time for him to concentrate his force, and to attack the Federals on the bank of the river before they were ready to advance. The troops seem to have shown little courage or enterprise ; those opposed to them were not superior in numbers, were not so well armed, and were totally unprovided with artillery. The loss sustained in killed and wounded was during and owing to the flight to the river, and that in prisoners consequent on the impossibility of re-crossing it. Altogether the affair at Ball's Bluff was not creditable to those who were engaged in it. There were, without doubt, instances of individual courage. Colonel Baker especially distinguished himself ; he was a man

much respected by Mr. Lincoln and by many of the leading men of the Government ; by his own exertions he had risen from a very low station in life to be senator for Oregon, and he met his death in endeavouring to infuse into his men the courage which he himself felt.

On the side of the Confederates, General Evans handled his men well. Uncertain from what point the attack would be made, he prepared to meet it either from Drainesville or from the Potomac, and held the 7th brigade well in hand, concentrated in a central position. The general was well supported by the men and officers under his command, and the result was a complete victory. The prisoners were sent under escort to Manassas. Exchanges of prisoners were now virtually sanctioned by both Governments, and they, as well as the wounded on either side, were treated with consideration. The surgeons who had remained in charge of the Federal wounded after the battle of Bull Run refuted, on their return to Washington, the absurd and false reports circulated by the Federal press regarding the inhumanity of the enemy. For a considerable time after the battle of Ball's Bluff, no movement was made by either army in Virginia. The rain and cold of the winter months, and their necessary accompaniments of impassable roads and swollen rivers, became a bar to offensive operations, even if the Federal general had been willing or ready to undertake them : whilst the extensive works around Washington rendered any attack on the Capitol by the Confederates hopeless. President Lincoln added to his list of generals ; among others raised to that rank were Captain Meade of the Topographical engineers, Colonel Casey, also of the regular army, A. M'Cook, R. Milroy, all of

whose names were to become known during the future campaigns of the war. A strong foreign element pervaded the army; military adventurers of all sorts flocked to Washington. It was even alleged that General Garibaldi* had offered his services to the Federal Government, should the contest have the freedom of the slaves for its object; but on his receiving Mr. Seward's reply that such was not the case, the offer was not repeated. Later in the year there were skirmishes on the Upper Potomac, in which there was much firing with little loss to either side. Colonel Kelly made a successful reconnoissance as far as Romney, on the south branch of the Potomac, and with the loss of one killed and a few wounded drove the Confederates from the town, capturing some guns and commissariat wagons. General Ord likewise, at Drainesville on the Leesburg Road, encountered and defeated a body of Confederates under General Stewart. On the other hand, General Milroy attempted to advance from his position on the Cheat Mountains in Western Virginia, and was driven back by the Confederate troops under Colonel Johnston, stationed on the Staunton Turnpike. These isolated expeditions were productive of no results commensurate with the loss of life and the suffering they occasioned to the inhabitants of the country; they may, perhaps, have served to train the troops, and to prevent them from incurring the evil effects of idleness in camp, but in determining the result of the war they had no influence. The command of the army had virtually been in the hands of General McClellan for some months, although General Scott was nominally the commander-in-chief; but the latter general's age and

* Semi-official notification which appeared in the American papers.

infirmities rendered him unable to fulfil the increasing duties of the office, and on October 31 he sent in his resignation. A special cabinet council was convened for the purpose of taking the subject into consideration, and on the following day the resignation was accepted, and General Scott's name was permitted to be placed on the list of retired officers, without reduction in the pay or allowance he had enjoyed. Complimentary orders were issued to the army, both by the President and by General M'Clellan, setting forth the great services that the retiring general had performed towards his country. He had served in his youth in Canada, and had commanded the American army in the Mexican campaign; for many years he had been the idol of his countrymen, but had outlived his popularity and his influence. A new generation had sprung up, and a war commenced on a scale which completely threw into the shade the campaigns in which he had been engaged. On General Scott's retirement, the command of the army devolved on General M'Clellan; and it was no light task which he undertook. The army, as stated by the Secretary of War,* consisted of upwards of 640,600 volunteers and 20,000 regular troops, and this vast force was unprovided with the proper channels of responsibility, and required not only to be commanded, but even to be constructed. General M'Clellan was directed to make his head-quarters at Washington, and from thence he had to superintend the movements of the armies at a distance, as well as to watch over details of discipline in the force around Washington—details which in European armies are generally left to the supervision of subordinates.

* Secretary of War's report to Congress, December 6, 1861.

CHAPTER VIII.

CAMPAIGN IN MISSOURI AND KENTUCKY.

PREVIOUS to General M'Clellan's appointment to the command of the army, important events had occurred in Missouri. The battle of Wilson's Creek gave to General Price the command of the south-western portion of the State, leaving the northern and eastern districts, together with the course of the Missouri River, under the nominal jurisdiction of General Fremont, the Federal commander in the West. Nominal it may be said to have been, as through the length and breadth of Missouri guerillas and partisan leaders roamed, pillaged, and made war for and against the cause of the Union, unrestrained either by civil law or the discipline of armies. In view of the unsettled condition of the State, General Fremont issued a proclamation, on August 30, declaring martial law, and condemning all persons found in arms within what he termed the lines of the army of occupation to trial by courts-martial, and, if found guilty, to be shot. The property, real and personal, of those who either had or should take up arms against the United States was adjudged to be confiscated to public use, and their slaves declared free men. The lines of occupation were laid down as extending from Leavenworth, by way of Jefferson city, Rolla, and Irontown, to Cape Girardeau on the

Mississippi River. This proclamation was the cause of much discussion, and created considerable dissatisfaction throughout a great portion of the Northern States, and even met with the disapproval of President Lincoln, not on the grounds of the legality of a proclamation of martial law, but in consequence of the declaration of the freedom of slaves. President Lincoln, in fact, ordered so much of the proclamation to be altered, as to make it conform with the Act of Congress passed August 6, 1861, entitled 'An Act to confiscate property used for insurrectionary purposes,' which Act declared that any person employing slaves in any labour or work calculated to injure or oppose the lawful authority, or permitting their slaves to take up arms against the Government of the United States, should forfeit all claim to their labour. The Act did not declare the slaves to be free, only that their services should be lost to their owners. It remained to be seen whether General Fremont was possessed of sufficient military power to carry out any of the provisions of his proclamation. Towards the latter end of August General Price resolved to march north from Springfield, to assist by his presence, and that of the State troops under his command, the guerilla bands in Northern Missouri.* With between four and five thousand men and seven pieces of artillery, he commenced his march, trusting to receive reinforcements from the population of the country. He sent a detachment to protect his left flank, and to seize on Fort Scott, on the frontier of Missouri and Kansas, which was effected after a skirmish with Generals Lane and Montgomery, in command of some Kansas irregular

* *First Year of the War*, by Pollard.

troops. On September 10, General Price's army was between Harrisonville and Warrensburg, at a place called Ross Hill, and was about to encamp when news arrived that Federal troops were marching from Lexington to Warrensburg, with the intention of making arrests and taking possession of the money in the Warrensburg Bank. Determined, if possible, to prevent the accomplishment of these objects, and to surprise the Federal detachment, General Price hurried his men forward, fasting and almost tired out; indeed so much so that the infantry and artillery were forced to halt, whilst the general himself pressed forward with the mounted men. The Federal detachment had, however, received information of the intended attack, and retreated to Lexington, closely followed by General Price. A skirmish took place in the streets of the town on the morning of the 12th; but the Confederate general, unwilling to risk a general engagement, of which the success would be doubtful, with a portion of his force, fell back a short distance to await the arrival of his infantry and artillery. The whole army was not united until September 18. The Federal force, of about 3,000 men,* under the command of Colonel Mulligan, was entrenched in Lexington, having hastily fortified a portion of the town and erected a small fort called Fort White, which, together with some buildings termed the Masonic College, were included within the entrenchments. The whole of the artillery consisted of five 6-pounders and two 6-inch mortars, the latter ill supplied with ammunition. The inhabitants of the place and surrounding country were in favour of

* The numbers are variously stated in Federal accounts as 2,400 and 3,500. General Price estimates the number of prisoners captured at the surrender of Lexington at 3,500.

the Confederates.* General Price was anxious to collect all the reinforcements possible before undertaking the siege of the town; he therefore directed General Aitchison to proceed to Liberty, a small town on the left bank of the Missouri River, and to order the State Guard to march at once to Lexington. The force consisted of three regiments of infantry, one and a half of cavalry, and some field artillery. They marched from Liberty, and were in the act of crossing the Missouri River at Blue Mills Landing, about six miles from the town, when their rear-guard was attacked by the Federals under Colonel Scott, who had been engaged in watching the Confederate force in that district. A skirmish ensued, in which the Federals were driven back with some loss, and the Confederate force continued their march to Lexington. The place, or rather the lines, of entrenchment were invested on all sides excepting the north or river side. General Rain's division occupied a position to the east and north-east, and General Parsons' one on the south-west of the works. On the 18th, the suburbs of the town were entered, and General Slack's division, under Colonel Rives, was sent to capture and destroy a steamer and other boats on the river, in order to cut off the retreat of the Federals to the north bank. At the same time, General M'Bride's and General Harris's divisions occupied, after some opposition, the bluffs on the river bank. On the morning of September 20, General Price caused batteries of hempen bales to be constructed on the bluffs occupied by Generals M'Bride and Harris's divisions, which proved of great service;

* The term Confederates is applied to General Price's troops to avoid confusion; properly speaking, the troops under his command were exclusively from Missouri, and were State Rights men.

and on the evening of the 20th the Federals, short of ammunition and cut off from the river, from which they obtained their supply of water, surrendered. Although the fighting had continued for some days, General Price estimated his loss at only 25 killed and 75 wounded. The fruits of his victory he summed up as 3,500 prisoners,* 7 pieces of artillery, and a large quantity of arms, clothing, ammunition, and stores, in addition to the great seal of the State, the public records, and 900,000 dollars in money which had been taken from the bank, and which General Price ordered to be restored. The capture of Lexington was a great although transient success to the Confederate cause in Missouri. General Price in his march from Springfield, his successive repulses of the several Federal detachments advancing to the relief of Lexington, and in his conduct of the attack on the entrenchments, evinced the qualities of a good officer and able commander. General Fremont, in his despatch to the President, acknowledged that he had been out-manœuvred. He stated that reinforcements under General Sturgis (a portion of whom had been defeated at Blue Mills Landing) attempted to effect the passage of the river on the 19th, but, in consequence of the capture by General Price of the whole of the boats, had been compelled to retire without effecting anything; also that the forces under General Lane from the south-west, and Davis from the south-east, had been unable to arrive in time to be of service. In the same despatch General Fremont alleged his intention of taking the field in person, and hoped that he would be able to destroy General Price's force, either before or after its junction with General

* This number possibly includes prisoners captured in the skirmish at Blue Mills Landing and at Warrensburg.

M'Culloch. The prisoners captured at Lexington were well treated, paroled, and sent under escort to Hamilton, a station on the St. Joseph Railway, where they were released. The Confederate force under General Price's orders had increased from about 5,000 men to upwards of 20,000; the greater portion consisted of the inhabitants of the surrounding districts, and were wanting in arms and military stores. Isolated as he was from the main army of the Confederates, and exposed to the attacks of the combined Federal forces from St. Louis, Northern Missouri, and Kansas, General Price determined to retire from Lexington and effect a junction with General M'Culloch. He, therefore, disbanded a portion of his army,* leaving the town of Lexington in charge of the inhabitants, and retreated to Neosho, where he found General M'Culloch in command of about 5,000 men. At Neosho the Missouri Legislature passed a formal order of secession, and elected delegates to the Congress of the Southern Confederacy. After General Price's retreat, a Federal detachment effected an entrance into Lexington, and released some of the officers captured at the fall of the place; General Fremont also occupied Springfield. Thus the fruits of General Price's campaign were lost, and the two armies held the same positions as before the battle of Wilson's Creek. Missouri was indeed suffering the evils of civil war; in all parts of the State partisan warfare was carried on, and skirmishes were continually occurring, which were magnified to the dimensions of battles by the newspapers, and even by the grandiloquent reports of inexperienced officers. As a State, Missouri was lost to the Confederacy, on both its south-eastern and south-

* Probably the country people unprovided with arms, and to whom he could not hope to furnish sustenance during the march.

western frontiers great battles were to be fought, but the operations of the armies of the Confederacy were destined to have reference more to the defence of the adjoining States of Arkansas, Kentucky, and Tennessee, than to offensive campaigns in Missouri itself. Troops were sent from the State to both armies, and on either side Missouri regiments were to be found, but the main portion of the State remained under the dominion of the Federal Government.

General Fremont's proclamation, as has been stated, had given offence to the Government at Washington; his high-handed measures, the state which he affected in his household arrangements, jealousy of his influence with the German population, combined to increase his unpopularity, whilst the failure of his military operations gave an excuse for his removal. Serious charges were preferred against him by Colonel Blair, an officer whom he had placed under arrest, and who was released by a special order from General Scott; and although General Fremont was subjected to no trial, yet on November 2 he was deprived of his command, and the Department of the West conferred on General Hunter. His removal was the cause of considerable dissatisfaction to the German troops under his command; and so great was the disorganisation of the army, that it was considered advisable to abandon Springfield and to retreat to Rolla. The former place was again occupied by General Price, who remained there until the spring of 1862. The enormous expenditure incurred by General Fremont during his command in the West was a ground of complaint, and formed matter for an imperfect investigation by commissioners sent by the central Government. There appears to have been great corruption among his subordinates, and but little

supervision on his own part; whilst considering the forces at his disposal, comprising both volunteer troops from the neighbouring States, and the regular regiments from Utah and California, little had been accomplished. The forts which he erected, ostensibly with the view of protecting, possibly with that of overawing, the city of St. Louis, were useless for both purposes, were raised at an enormous cost, and remain as a standing monument of engineering ignorance. One of the last acts of his administration was an agreement with General Price, subsequently ignored by his successor, for the purpose of mitigating the miseries of the war and confining it as far as was possible to the armies in the field. Its objects were creditable to both generals, but the power of entering into such an arrangement was beyond that of a general acting under orders. On the Confederate side General Price and Governor Jackson considered themselves entitled to act for the State of Missouri, but General Fremont could only legitimately carry out the orders he received from Washington. Jealousy of the power and growing influence of General Fremont on the part of the central Government might possibly have been the true cause of his removal, but his own conduct and want of success as a general afforded a sufficient excuse, and indeed legitimate grounds for suspending him.

General Fremont's successor, General Hunter, remained but a short time in command of Missouri; he was transferred to Kansas, and the Department of the West conferred on Major-General Halleck.* The North-western portion of Missouri was assigned to

* General Halleck had been a pupil at West Point, and had served with some distinction in the Mexican war. He had subsequently practised as a lawyer in California.

General Pope,* who acted under General Halleck's orders, but who commanded the greater portion of the former army of General Fremont. Towards the end of December, General Pope accidentally surprised a large body of recruits who had been organised in North-western Missouri, and were marching to reinforce General Price. He had been informed by General Halleck of their probable line of march, but had failed to obtain any information of their movement; indeed, he had indited and even forwarded a despatch to General Halleck, complaining that the information given was false, and that he had been sent on a fool's errand. As the despatch was actually on the road to its destination, his pickets brought news of the near vicinity of a large body of Confederate troops, the very troops he was in search of. General Pope immediately recalled the aide-de-camp who was conveying his former despatch, and ordered an advance against the Confederates, who, finding themselves outnumbered and surrounded, surrendered as prisoners of war. General Pope then drew up another despatch, describing in rather grandiloquent terms the dispositions he had made of the force under his command, and the successful termination that had attended them.† The number of prisoners captured in this affair is stated as 1,300. No further operations of any moment were attempted on either side in Missouri in the year 1861.

Kentucky had, in the meantime, suffered the usual fate of neutrals too weak to enforce their neutrality; and, like Missouri and Virginia, was destined to become one of the battle-grounds of the war. There were two

* An officer of the regular army.

† The circumstances were related by an officer connected with the army in Missouri.

parties in the State; the majority were in favour of the Union, but were opposed to the Abolition faction, whilst a large minority, including some of the leading men, inclined to the Southern side. The organisation of two bodies of troops, called respectively the State Guards and the Home Guards, was commenced by the opposing factions. The first-mentioned corps, under General Buckner, were composed of men favouring the Confederate cause; the other corps, of those who desired union with the North. The latter received assistance in arms and stores from the Federal commanders of the ports north of the Ohio River. On August 19, Governor Magoffin, of Kentucky, sent letters to both the Federal and Confederate Presidents, urging them to respect the neutrality of the State. In his letter to President Lincoln, he complained of the formation and organisation of a large body of soldiers within Kentucky in the pay of the United States Government, officered by men appointed by President Lincoln, and furnished by the United States authorities with ordnance, arms, and munitions of war; and he urged that this force should be withdrawn from the limits of Kentucky. In his letter to President Davis, Governor Magoffin merely asked for an assurance that the neutrality would be continued to be respected by the Confederate Government. In reply to the communication, Mr. Lincoln declined to order the removal of the force complained of, on the grounds that such a course was opposed to the popular wish of the State. He also drew attention to the absence, in Governor Magoffin's letter, of any intimation of a desire for the preservation of the Union. From President Davis, Governor Magoffin received an assurance that the neutrality of the State would be

respected so long as the Federals were not permitted to enter its territory for the purpose of invading Tennessee.

On September 5, the Kentucky Legislature assembled in Congress, and Governor Magoffin delivered his message. He complained of the lawless raids into the territory of Kentucky by both belligerents; he insisted on the right of the State to maintain its neutrality, and advocated the passing of resolutions recommending the disbanding or removal of all military bodies not under the State authority. He denounced President Lincoln's war proclamation of April 15 as illegal, and justified his refusal to furnish the troops demanded. Whilst in speaking of what he believed to be the feelings of the people of Kentucky, he said—'I have never understood that they will tamely submit to the unconstitutional aggression of the North, that they renounce their sympathy with her aggrieved sister-States, nor that they will approve of a war to subjugate the South.' In conclusion, he defined his line of conduct in these words—'My respect for State rights and State sovereignty will make me bow in respectful submission to the people so long as I am a citizen of Kentucky.' Notwithstanding the evident inclinations of the Governor, the Legislature passed a resolution requesting him to call out the State troops to repel invasion, and to ask for assistance for that purpose from the United States Government. In vain Governor Magoffin vetoed the Bill: the Houses passed the resolutions over his veto, and on September 30 he was consequently obliged to issue a proclamation calling out 41,500 men, to repel the invasion of Kentucky by the troops of the Confederate States. In the meantime General Zollicoffer, commanding the Confederate forces

in Tennessee, had occupied the mountains in the vicinity of Cumberland Gap, on the Kentucky borders, and signified his intention of holding his position until the Federal forces had been withdrawn from the State. There was much in the natural features of Kentucky which rendered its occupation of great importance, both to the Federal and Confederate armies. Along the whole of the northern frontier runs the Ohio River, which formed a highway for the Federal gunboats and transports. Into the Ohio debouch two large navigable rivers, the Cumberland and Tennessee, which, traversing Western Kentucky, pass through the centre of Tennessee. Bounding Kentucky on the west is the Mississippi River, intersecting the very heart of the Confederacy; whilst on the south-eastern border are the Cumberland Mountains, through the passes of which are the only roads leading into Eastern Tennessee. Three important lines of railway also traverse the State: two connect the towns of Cincinnati, Louisville, and Evansville on the Ohio, with Nashville, the principal town in Tennessee; and one, touching the Mississippi River at Columbus, forms the direct line of communication with Memphis, New Orleans, and Mobile. The possession of the Cumberland Mountains, of points on the Ohio and Southern Railways, of fortified places on the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers, and of Columbus on the Mississippi, 'the terminus of the Southern Railway,' was of the greatest importance to the defence of the Confederacy. On September 4 General Polk took possession of Columbus, whilst General Jeff. Thompson cooperated with him by occupying positions on the Missouri side of the Mississippi River. He justified the infringement of the neutrality of Kentucky by urging the military necessity of securing

that important place before the Federals, who were threatening it both from Cairo and from the Missouri bank, should seize on it. Two days later General Grant * occupied Paducah, at the point of entry of the Cumberland River into the Ohio, with a small force of the United States troops, assisted by two gunboats.

Soon afterwards United States troops under General R. Anderson crossed the Ohio and took possession of Louisville, whilst General Crittenden, assigned by the Legislature to the command of the State troops of Kentucky, summoned them to assemble at various appointed places, for the purpose of cooperating with the United States forces and driving the Confederates from the State territory. Captain Foote, † a naval officer, was also appointed to command the fleet on the Western rivers. On the Confederate side President Davis, estimating the importance of the campaign in the West, which threatened each day to commence, despatched General Sydney Johnston, one of the best officers of the old regular army, to command the Western department of the army of the Confederate States, including the troops under General Zollicoffer, as well as those under General Polk. On September 22 the general issued an address, justifying the entry of the Confederate troops into Kentucky by the threatening attitude of the Federal Government, but at the same time affirming that he was willing to withdraw his army from Kentucky whenever he had satisfactory evidence of a similar intention on the part of the United States. General Buckner in the meantime was engaged in organising a force of Kentuckians,

* At a later period Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the West, and subsequently of that of Virginia.

† Subsequently raised to the rank of flag-officer.

opposed to the action of their Legislature, at Bowling Green, a position commanding the rails to Nashville and to Clarksville on the Cumberland River. General Buckner was in the service of the Confederate States, but the force with which he had marched into Kentucky was mainly composed of natives of that State who had embraced the Confederate cause. On September 19 the first skirmish took place between General Zollicoffer's men and some of the Home Guards at Barbourville, near Cumberland Gap: it was unimportant itself, but was the commencement of the civil war which was soon to devastate the country, and to inflict hardships on the population, greater and of longer duration in consequence of their former prosperity. Especially unhappy was the condition of Kentucky: the elder portion of the population—remembering the growth and prosperity of the United States, brought up in their youth with strong feelings of affection for the Union at a time when party spirit was subservient to the welfare of the nation—retained during the commencement of hostilities their desire to remain as an integral portion of the great American nation. The younger men—reflecting less on the evils of war, embittered by the insolence of the North, and angry at the attitude assumed with reference to the Slave question—sided generally with the seceding States. Thus in Kentucky, as in Missouri, civil war in all its horrors commenced; but owing to the greater material prosperity of the former, and her more abundant means of providing for the wants of armies, her suffering was augmented in proportion to her greater fertility and denser population. Skirmishes, generally leading to plundering, burning, and devastation, commenced; the lines of the two hostile forces were not as yet

determined, and the horrors of irregular warfare were inflicted on the population. Railways were destroyed, canal locks broken down, roads constructed with great engineering skill torn up, and the State, which at the commencement of hostilities indulged the hope of trading with both sides, and so maintaining a profitable neutrality, became the cockpit in which the battles of the contending forces were to be fought.

About the centre of Kentucky, near Danville, at Camp Dick Robinson, the Federal troops were collected and organised, prepared either to oppose General Zollicoffer's advance from Cumberland Gap, or that of General Buckner from Bowling Green. They occupied the most fertile portion of the State, called the Blue Grass Country, and famous for its rich pasturage. Detachments from the main body were pushed forward along the two roads connecting Danville and Lexington with London, and occupied a position which they termed Camp Wild Cat, in a mountainous and well-timbered country. On October 21 a skirmish took place between the advance of General Zollicoffer and the forces at Wild Cat under General Schoepf, in which the latter general held his position; the action was fought amongst the forest and mountains, and there was little loss on either side. General Schoepf remained at Camp Wild Cat until the middle of November, when on a false report reaching him that the Confederates were advancing from Bowling Green with the intention of cutting him off, he ordered a retreat. The weather had become wet and stormy; the roads were deep in mud, the streams almost unfordable; the troops were undisciplined, and the officers ignorant of the principles of marching; consequently when the retreat commenced the men straggled, abandoned their knapsacks

and accoutrements, and fell exhausted from fatigue and exposure. Commissariat and ammunition-wagons* were abandoned, and many of the sick, subjected to the inclemency of the weather, died. In fact, the retreat partook of the character of a flight, although the enemy made no attempt at pursuit. The troops were reorganised and concentrated at Crab Orchard, in the neighbourhood of Stanford, where they remained until the close of the year.

At the very time that General Schoepf was retiring from an imaginary enemy, General Zollicoffer, apparently equally ignorant of his adversary's proceedings, retreated from Cumberland Ford to Cumberland Gap, and occupied his former position in the defiles of the Cumberland Mountains.

Whilst frequent skirmishes, unproductive of results, were occurring in Eastern Kentucky, a more important expedition was planned by General Grant, who had assumed the command of the Federal forces at Cairo in place of General Prentiss, removed to Western Missouri. It was of great moment to the Federal cause to obtain command of the River Mississippi; but, in order to do so, it was not only necessary to force a passage with gunboats, but also to clear the districts in the vicinity of either bank of the numerous Confederate detachments. Combined movements for this purpose were therefore planned. The Federals, as has before been stated, occupied a strong position at Cairo, where the Ohio River enters the Mississippi; they also had a camp on the Missouri shore, about thirty miles higher up the river at Cape Girardeau, and another at about seventy miles to the north-west

* Federal account of the retreat.—*Rebellion Record*, vol. iii. p. 394, Documents.

from Cape Girardeau, at Pilot Knob, the termination of the rail from St. Louis. A force was also stationed at Paducah, about fifty miles east of Cairo, on the Ohio and Tennessee Rivers.

The Confederates, under General Polk, occupied Columbus, rather more than thirty miles in a straight line from Cairo. A detached column of troops under General Jeff. Thompson also manœuvred in South-western Missouri, and threatened the Federal garrison at Pilot Knob.

Such was the position of the contending forces towards the end of the month of October. In order to relieve the garrison at Pilot Knob and to clear the immediate neighbourhood of the Missouri bank of the Mississippi, a column, under Colonel Plummer, was ordered by General Grant to march from Cape Girardeau to Frederickstown, where General Jeff. Thompson was reported to be. On the 21st an engagement took place at a short distance to the west of Frederickstown, resulting in the retreat of the Confederates, with the loss of one gun and a few men captured. The so-called battle was little more than a skirmish, but was a success to the Federals, inasmuch as the garrison at Pilot Knob was relieved from any danger of immediate attack.

With the intention of preventing reinforcements from being sent either to General Price or General Jeff. Thompson, an expedition was planned against Columbus; and General Grant, with about 3,000 men, proceeded down the river in transports from Cairo on November 6. At the same time he directed General Smith, commanding at Paducah, to make demonstrations in the same direction, and to march detachments to Mayfield and to Ellicott's Mills, about twelve miles

distant from Columbus, in order to threaten the enemy's position from the Kentucky side of the river. The expedition was termed by General Grant a reconnoissance, but appears to have been planned with a view of making a serious attack on the enemy's position should opportunity offer. A small body of cavalry and a battery of artillery accompanied the force. During the night of the 6th the transports anchored nine miles south of Cairo on the Kentucky shore, and at daylight on the 20th steamed down the river to a point about two miles above the Confederate batteries. They were then moored close to the right bank of the river, and the troops disembarked. A thick forest, stretching for some distance inland, clothed the bank. Two companies from each regiment were extended as skirmishers; the rest of the force formed line as well as they could among the trees, and the whole of the troops, with the exception of a small reserve left to protect the vessels, marched forward along the bank of the river towards Belmont. In the meantime, General Polk was not unaware of the attack about to be made on him, but was uncertain whether the main body of the Federals was marching on Columbus on the Kentucky bank, or on Belmont on the Missouri side. He anticipated an attack on Columbus, as that place was the key of the position, the bluffs on the left bank completely commanding the low ground on the right; therefore, the main body occupied Columbus, whilst a small force only were stationed at Belmont, under Colonel Tappan, who had strengthened his position by an abattis of felled trees. The Federals advanced, pushing back the Confederate skirmishers, until they arrived in the vicinity of the camp. The Federal right was then extended so as almost to surround the camp on the

land side, and Captain Taylor's battery opened on the tents. The infantry pushed forward; the 27th Illinois regiment * was the first to clear the abattis, and was soon followed by the other regiments of General M'Clermand's brigade. The Confederates, overpowered by numbers, and wanting in ammunition, were driven to the very edge of the river. Immediately their camp was fired by the Federals; but the flames giving notice of the repulse of the Confederates, drew on the attacking force the fire of the batteries on the bluffs at Columbus. The guns were however levelled too high, and but little damage was done. Still the Federals were driven to take refuge in the woods which surrounded the camp. Up to this point success had inclined to the Federals; but General Polk, perceiving that no attack was intended against his position at Columbus, despatched reinforcements to Colonel Tappan. For this purpose General Pillow landed with a considerable force, and attacked the Federals in the woods. They fought well, and three times repulsed their opponents; but, under cover of this attack, a fresh force under General Cheatham, and directed by General Polk in person, ascended the river for a short distance, and, crossing it, endeavoured to cut off the Federals from their transports. This movement was perceived by General Grant, and an immediate retreat ordered before General Polk had time to perfect his arrangements.

As the Federals hastened to their transports, but little order was preserved; knapsacks and accoutrements were, as usual, thrown aside. The men did not, however, abandon their arms, but kept up a fire into the woods on either side of the retreating column, when, as the troops approached the transports, the

* General M'Clermand's official report.

gunboats opened fire and covered their reembarkation. The Federals captured two guns, but lost the caissons and baggage-wagon belonging to Captain Tyler's battery. The expedition accomplished little or nothing; the troops behaved on the whole well, and the officers appear to have exposed themselves and led their men on with sufficient courage; but after the arrival of the reinforcements from Columbus, the Federals were outnumbered, and as, owing to the configuration of the land, they could not hope to hold the captured camp, they were forced to abandon the fruits of their success and to retreat before they were finally cut off from their transports. General Grant in his despatch acknowledged the assistance he had received from the two gunboats which accompanied and protected the troopships; but it seems strange, unless they were overpowered by the batteries at Columbus, that they were unable to prevent the passage of the river by General Cheatham. General Grant estimated his loss at about 400 men killed, wounded, and missing; that of the Confederates was about the same, or perhaps rather greater. Colonel Tappan's regiment and General Russell's brigade, under General Pillow, suffered the most severely. Both sides claimed a victory, the Federals on the score of their first success, the Confederates on that of the ultimate repulse of the attacking force. The detachment sent from Paducah took no part in the operations, nor did they effect any diversion to the troops under General Grant. On the following day a boat with a flag of truce was sent to Columbus, and an informal exchange of wounded prisoners was proposed; but General Polk, with regret, declined to accede to it, alleging orders received from the Secretary of War at Richmond. Thus terminated for the year

1861 the operations on the Upper Mississippi. Later in the month General Thomas, in command of the left wing of the Federal army in the vicinity of Danville, advanced in the direction of Bowling Green as far as Columbia ; and, cotemporaneously with the engagement at Belmont, an expedition under General Nelson, formerly a naval officer, engaged in a slight affair with a Confederate irregular force near Picketon in Eastern Kentucky. The Confederates, under Colonel Williams, were ill provided with arms, ammunition, and in fact nearly all the requirements of an army, and retreated, after a skirmish, to Pound Gap on the Virginian frontier.

During the latter months of the year, the party in Kentucky favourable to the Confederate Government had not been idle. Defeated in the Congress of the State, they elected a governor whose opinions coincided with their views, and on December 13 Mr. G. W. Johnson issued his message as Governor of Kentucky. At the same time delegates were sent to the Provisional Government at Richmond, and Mr. H. Burnett, formerly a member of the House of Representatives at Washington, but expelled on account of his political opinions, and Judge Monroe, were sworn in as senators for Kentucky in the Confederate Congress. The Kentucky Congress, who had supported the Federal cause and forced Governor Magoffin to exercise his duty as Governor in favour of the Northern armies, were unprepared to coincide entirely with the ultra opinions or to submit to the acts of Mr. Lincoln's Government. About the end of September, certain arbitrary arrests had been made at Louisville, Kentucky ; and, amongst others, ex-Governor Moorhead was seized and conveyed beyond the limits of the State. This the Kentucky Legislature protested against, and demanded the

return of the political prisoners. They also prepared a strong remonstrance against General Fremont's proclamation, and against the policy attributed to Mr. Cameron, Secretary of War, of arming the slaves. In fact, symptoms became apparent that the public opinion of Kentucky, which at first had inclined to the Union, was gradually veering round to the Confederate side. In Tennessee, on the contrary, there were signs that, although the majority of the population were strongly in favour of the cause of the Southern States, yet that a certain portion inhabiting the mountainous region of Eastern Tennessee would not willingly submit to a change of government and nationality. Small bands of men roamed through the mountains, and endeavoured to assist the Federal cause by burning railway bridges and destroying the communications of the Confederate troops: these acts were summarily punished, and the perpetrators shot or hanged. The campaign of Kentucky, if such it can be called, for the year 1861 may be said to have closed with the affair at Belmont.* It required time for the Federal Government to organise the fleet of gunboats and transports necessary for the navigation of the numerous rivers, and which in subsequent campaigns proved such important and in fact necessary adjuncts to the operations of the armies. The time was better employed by the Federals than by the Confederates, and, in tracing out the course of the future campaigns of the West, it will be seen how terrible were the results to the Confederacy of the neglect of the defence of the rivers.

* Although Belmont is actually on the Missouri side of the river, yet it had reference more to the Kentucky than the Missouri campaign.

CHAPTER IX.

MILITARY AND NAVAL OPERATIONS ON THE COAST.

IT will be remembered that one of the first acts of hostility on the part of the South was the seizure of the navy-yard of Pensacola (Alabama), followed by preparations for the bombardment of Fort Pickens on the opposite island of St. Rosa. Affairs had remained stationary on both sides for a considerable time ; neither did General Bragg consider himself sufficiently strong to attack Fort Pickens, nor were the Federal fleet powerful enough to engage the batteries around the navy-yard of Pensacola. Fort Pickens was occupied by a regiment of regular troops, whilst the 6th New York volunteers, called Billy Wilson's Zouaves, were encamped near the shore of the island, about one mile from the fort ; the whole were under the command of Colonel Browne. St. Rosa is a long narrow island, which closes the entrance to Pensacola Bay, and Fort Pickens is situated at its westernmost end, immediately opposite to the Confederate Fort M'Rae. On October 9, about 2 A.M., a detachment of Confederate troops numbering about 1,200, under Brigadier-General Anderson, landed on St. Rosa island about four miles from Fort Pickens, and marching directly on the Zouaves' camp, surprised the sentries, drove in the pickets, dispersed the hastily assembling regiment, and burnt

the camp. Reinforcements were sent from the fort by Colonel Browne, some of which, losing their way in the darkness of the night among the bushes and sandhills with which the island is covered, were captured. As day broke the Confederates, fearing that their retreat would be cut off by the Federal steamers, retired; and the Federal regular troops from the fort, feebly assisted by the volunteers, followed the retreating enemy to their boats. As the surprise had disorganised the Federals, so had success brought confusion among the raw troops of the Confederacy; regiments and companies became mingled together without order or regularity, and in the darkness fired on each other. The expedition returned to Pensacola. The loss on the Federal side was about seventy killed, wounded, and missing;* that of the Confederates was probably slightly greater. Little was accomplished by the expedition, excepting the *esprit* it infused into the Confederate troops, who were wearied of the arduous but uninteresting duties of raising batteries, and were anxious for more exciting employment.† After the engagement of October 9, affairs resumed their former

* Colonel Browne's report. The Confederate reports state the loss to have been greater.

† Colonel Wilson's (commanding the Zouaves) report of the affair is very quaint. After describing the engagement in language different from what is usually employed in official documents, he concludes as follows:—

'Yesterday five Americans and two ladies escaped from Pensacola, and gave us all the news of how they describe the terrible victory. We (the Zouaves) lay on our arms every night. I have slept but very little this week. I don't feel well. I have got the diarrhœa. We will want eight hundred uniforms.

'Your obedient servant,

'WILLIAM WILSON,

'Colonel Commanding.'

tranquillity until November 22, when Colonel Browne, who had been much provoked by the surprise of the Zouaves' camp, determined, according to the words of his despatch, to '*punish the perpetrators of an insult on his country's flag.*' He therefore requested the cooperation of flag-officer M'Kean, commanding the naval squadron, who willingly assented, and at daylight on the 22nd the vessels of war Niagara and Richmond prepared to take up their positions to open fire on the enemy's works. About 10 A.M. the guns from Fort Pickens commenced the bombardment, which was taken up by the Niagara and the Richmond, and responded to by Forts M'Rae and Barrancas, and by other batteries erected along the shore; the two small Confederate steamers that were lying off Pensacola escaped, and steamed up the harbour out of reach of the enemy's guns. The Federal vessels were unable, on account of the shallowness of the water, to approach near enough to the Confederate batteries to produce much effect by their fire; nevertheless, the bombardment continued without intermission, but with very little damage to either side, during the whole of the 9th. On the following morning it was renewed, but owing to a change in the wind, which caused a reduction in the depth of the water, the vessels could not approach the batteries so near as on the previous day. About 3 P.M. the town of Warrington, situated in rear of one of the Confederate batteries, was set on fire by the shells from Fort Pickens, and nearly the whole of it was burnt. The bombardment ceased at night. The loss on the Federal side was one killed and five wounded; that of the Confederates about the same. At the conclusion of his report of the bombardment, Colonel Browne noted down

some facts which he considered worthy of attention on the part of the military and naval authorities. He advocated the use of light draught gunboats for service in the Gulf of Mexico, armed with rifled guns, without which he (Colonel Browne) considered ships to be inefficient; he also spoke highly of Parrott's* rifled guns, and desired that a dozen 30-pounders might be sent to arm the works at Fort Pickens. It was soon after the attack on St. Rosa Island that a gallant attempt was made by the Confederate naval force at New Orleans to destroy the United States blockading squadron, and so to reopen the port for commerce. Commodore Hollins, formerly an officer in the United States navy, was in charge of the Confederate fleet at Algiers, the naval station at New Orleans, and had prepared a description of vessel unused hitherto in war, with which he hoped to effect the destruction of the enemy's ships. Some time previous a rumour had reached the officers of the United States fleet, that a ram, which was designated by them as Hollins' Turtle, was lying at Algiers prepared to make a descent down the river. Still for many months nothing had appeared, and the monotony of the duties of the blockading squadron was only varied by watching the proceedings of the small Confederate river steamer Ivy, which every now and then steamed down the passes (as the mouths of the Mississippi are called), and interchanged shots with some of the United States vessels. Like many great rivers, the Mississippi, after a course of more than 3,000 miles, enters the sea by several outlets, rendered difficult of ingress and egress to large vessels by sand-


* The Parrott gun, much used in the American service both for field and siege artillery, is a cast-iron rifled gun, with a wrought-iron band or reinforce at the breech; it is a muzzle-loader.

bars which extend across their mouths. These outlets or passes are many in number, the principal being Pass à L'Outre, South-east Pass, South Pass, and South-west Pass; and to guard these passes was the duty of the blockading squadron. It was during a cloudy dark night on October 12, that the United States squadron, consisting of the steamers Richmond and Preble, the ship Vincennes, the steam gunboat Water Witch, and the Frolic, a small prize schooner, was anchored near the mouth of South-west Pass. The Preble was moored a short distance ahead, and on the starboard bow of the Richmond; the Vincennes lower down on the opposite side of the river, nearer the entrance of the pass. The Richmond was engaged in coaling, when at a quarter to 4 A.M. an alarm was given that a steamer was in close proximity to the ship. In another moment a blow was felt, and it was found that the ram (for such the steamer was) had struck the ship abreast of the port fore-channels, tearing the coaling schooner from her fastenings, and forcing a hole through the ship's side.* It appears that the ram Manassas, together with the Confederate river steamers Tuscarora, Calhoun, Ivy, M'Rea, Jackson, and the tow-boat Watson, with five barges, had left the forts which defend the Mississippi River at 12 midnight. The Manassas led the way, with orders to go right in among the fleet, and to run down the first vessel she could get at, sending up a rocket at the instant she made the attack.† These orders were punctually fulfilled; the Manassas put on a heavy head of steam, and dashed on in the supposed direction of the enemy's vessels; she passed the Preble, probably without seeing

* Official report of Captain Pope.

† *New Orleans Crescent* of October 14.

her, and struck the Richmond. The crew of the Richmond instantly repaired to quarters, and as the ram passed abreast of the ship the entire port battery was discharged at her. The ram sent up her rocket, and immediately three bright lights appeared descending the river. These were the fire-barges, directed by the Tuscarora and Watson. They were cut adrift on the stream, and floated down towards the United States squadron. The Preble in the meantime had seen the ram, and opened fire on her. She was struck, but the shot was almost ineffectual in penetrating her iron armour. However, some part of her machinery received damage, and she drew off. The fire-vessels were now approaching, followed by the Tuscarora and Watson. Perceiving the danger, Captain Pope, commanding the United States squadron, ordered the Preble, Vincennes, and Water Witch to slip their cables and drop down the river. This they did, the Water Witch taking the schooner Frolic in tow. The fire-ships drifted with the wind, and stranded on the western shore, together with the schooner from which the Richmond had been coaling. The Confederate steamers pursued the retreating squadron, which attempted to pass the bar at the mouth of the pass. In doing so the Vincennes and Richmond grounded; but the latter swung round, and was thus able to bring her broadside to bear on the advancing enemy. Shots were exchanged at long ranges, the Confederate artillery proving to be better than that of the Federals. The captain and crew of the Vincennes, owing (as the former stated) to a mistake in the signal from the Richmond, abandoned the ship, first lighting a fuse with the intention of blowing her up. Fortunately the fuse became extinguished within one inch of the



THE MOUTHS OF THE MISSISSIPPI.

powder magazine, and the captain received orders from Captain Pope to return to his ship and use the best means he could to get her off the bar. The Confederate vessels, unable to follow the enemy beyond the mouth of the pass, and finding that their fire was productive of little effect, returned to Algiers, where the *Manassas* went into dock for repair. The *Richmond* and *Vincennes* were subsequently towed off the sand-bank by the steamer *M'Clellan*, the latter with the loss of some of her guns, which had been thrown overboard to lighten her.

The attack was well conceived and gallantly carried out on the part of Commodore Hollins, and it is no small distinction to Lieutenant Warley, in command of the ram *Manassas*, that he was the first to inaugurate the system of fighting with iron-clad vessels. Captain Pope, commanding the United States squadron, appears also to have acted with promptitude and discretion after the attack had commenced. Unable to manœuvre in the narrow channel and shallow waters of the pass, he was forced to retreat. Perhaps sufficient look-out had not been kept by the squadron, which was evidently, and by his own confession, completely surprised; still, as far as he was concerned, he seems to have done his duty well. It is more difficult to account for the hasty abandonment of the *Vincennes* by her captain and crew.

During the autumn months an alarm had spread through the cities of the Southern coast, that a great expedition on the part of the North was in preparation, comprising both a large military and naval force. The object of attack was not known; but Wilmington, Charleston, Savannah, and even Mobile and New Orleans felt that each and all were threatened.

Comparatively with the long extent of sea coast there are few good harbours in the Southern States ; but in almost all places where the conformation of the land furnished shelter for shipping, cities have been built, which were hastily fortified on the commencement of hostilities. It was of great importance for the Federal Government to possess stations for their fleet along the coast, for the purposes of the blockade and to serve as depôts, from which aggressive operations could be directed against the several cities. Already the Federals held Ship Island off the coast of Mississippi, Key West off Florida, and Hatteras off North Carolina ; and it remained to secure a place from which attacks could be directed against the cities of Savannah and Charleston. About mid-distance between these two places lie several islands and lagunes, and among them stands the village or small town of Beaufort. Leading up to Beaufort, and forming a harbour capable of containing a large navy, is Port Royal entrance, and to that place was the expedition directed. The land force was under the command of General Sherman, the naval force under Commodore Dupont ; the former rendezvoused at Annapolis (Maryland), and proceeded from thence in transports to Hampton Roads, where they arrived on October 22, and found the fleet awaiting them. In consequence of the delay of some of the transports, and on account of the unfavourable state of the weather, the expedition did not actually sail until October 29. The North, considering the short time that had elapsed since war had commenced, had exerted herself and put forth her strength in organising this armada. There were in all fifty vessels, excluding the coal vessels. Of these twenty-seven were ships of war, including sixteen gunboats carrying each one

11-inch Dahlgren gun,* one Parrott rifled gun, and two 20-pound howitzers ; the remainder being frigates and sloops of war carrying from sixteen to twenty guns each. The land force consisted of three brigades, and comprised an army of at least 15,000 men. The troops were generally from New York and the New England States. The expedition carried with it the necessary stores and munitions for a campaign, including surf-boats for landing the troops, and tools and materials for entrenching. The whole of the detail and arrangements connected with the transport vessels, including even the order of sailing, were in charge of the quartermaster of the army. The coal vessels, under convoy, sailed on October 28, and were ordered to rendezvous off Savannah, in order to deceive the enemy as to the real point of attack. The fleet and transports left Hampton Roads on the 29th, the weather at first promising well, but changing when the fleet was off Hatteras. A gale sprung up, which increased in violence during the 1st and 2nd of November, and the ships were utterly dispersed ; on the morning of the 2nd only one sail was in sight from the deck of the flagship † (the Wabash). The sailing-orders of the fleet were known and published in the South almost as soon as they were issued, and many were the speculations and great was the anxiety of the population of the Southern

* The Dahlgren gun is much used in the American service, both on board vessels and also as a gun of position. It is of cast-iron, smooth bored, and has a great thickness of metal at the breech ; in shape it much resembles a soda-water bottle. It takes its name from its inventor, Captain Dahlgren. The largest guns in the American service are of this pattern ; some have been cast and used which carry a ball of 430 lbs. weight.

† Commodore Dupont's report.

cities on the seaboard as to the object of attack. The storm of the 1st and 2nd was hailed as a boon, and comparisons were drawn between the strength and subsequent fate of the Spanish armada and that of the fleet which had sailed (in Southern opinion *) with corresponding objects, and of which hope suggested that the fate might be similar. Vain were these hopes; † with but little loss the fleet anchored off the bar at Port Royal on November 4, augmented by the arrival of one of the blockading squadron from Charleston. The bar lies ten miles to seaward, and as all aids to navigation had of course been removed, and as there were no features on shore of sufficient prominence to make any bearing reliable, it was with some difficulty that the channel was sounded and buoyed. ‡ However in three days this was accomplished, and the lighter transports and gunboats crossed the bar and anchored in the roadstead of Port Royal. A few shots were exchanged between the gunboats and what was termed the Mosquito fleet under Commodore Tatnall; § but the latter, composed of small vessels and utterly inadequate to the task of resisting the powerful fleet of gunboats, retired, and were not pursued.

The defences of Port Royal were under the command of General Ripley, who had done his best in a short period of time to fortify the place. On the extreme ends of the islands which flank the

* *Richmond Examiner*, Nov. 4.

† Two transports foundered, but the crew and troops were rescued.

‡ Commodore Dupont's report.

§ Commodore Tatnall, formerly in the United States navy, is well known to Englishmen for the assistance which he afforded to the wounded at the attack on the Peiho forts in China.

entrance he had raised two earthworks, called Forts Walker and Beauregard. The first, mounting 23 guns, erected on the island of Hilton Head, is situated on the western; the second, mounting in all 16 guns,* on Ecling's Island, on the eastern side of the entrance. The troops at Hilton Head, under the command of General Drayton, consisted of about 1,800 men, of which 500 formed the garrison of Fort Walker, the remainder being held in reserve to resist the anticipated landing of the Federals. Fort Beauregard, the smaller of the two forts, was commanded by Colonel Dunovant, and garrisoned by the 12th Carolina regiment.

On the morning of the 5th, the frigates Wabash and Susquehanna successfully crossed the bar, and the remainder of the day was employed in laying out the channels and in reconnoitring the Confederate position. On the 6th, stormy weather prevented any attack; but on the morning of the 7th the ships took up their respective positions, preparatory to bombarding the forts. The channel between the two forts is about two and a half miles in width, and the frigates and steamers received orders to sail or steam in succession up the channel, past Fort Walker, delivering their fire as they passed, and then turning round to engage Fort Beauregard. The former, being the more formidable of the two forts, was to be considered the principal object of attack. The action commenced soon after 9 A.M., and continued for about four hours, during which time the greater number of guns in the two forts were dismounted or otherwise injured. Finding their position untenable, the officers in command ordered the forts to be evacuated,

* There were two distinct batteries in Fort Beauregard.

which was done with some loss and in considerable disorder, owing to the ground in rear of the works being swept by the guns from the ships. Knapsacks, blankets, &c., were thrown aside; but the men retained their arms, and carried off the wounded. The garrison of Fort Walker escaped to the opposite side of the island, where they found some Confederate steamers, which conveyed them to Bluffton. That of Fort Beauregard was transported in flat boats to St. Helena Island, and from thence to Beaufort Island, and so to Pocatoligo, a station on the Charleston rail. The Confederate loss, as compared to that of the Federals, was severe. The latter estimated the killed and wounded at 32, whilst in Fort Walker alone the Confederates lost upwards of 100. The attack was entirely conducted by the naval force, and the forts, after the withdrawal of the Confederate garrisons, were at first occupied by marines, but were subsequently handed over to General Sherman. The trophies of the action were 43 pieces of ordnance. On the 9th three of the gunboats were ordered to reconnoitre the Beaufort River, as it was not known whether the Confederates were in force in the neighbourhood. The gunboats proceeded cautiously, but no signs of the enemy were visible. On reaching Beaufort, they found the place entirely deserted by the white population, who had fled on the news reaching them of the entry into the river of the fleet, carrying away with them a portion of their slaves, but leaving the larger number on the plantations; consequently, at Beaufort there was disorder and confusion. The blacks had broken open some of the shops and stores, and had commenced to plunder the property of their former masters. This state of

affairs was soon remedied by the officers and crews of the gunboats, and great numbers of the slaves, entertaining vague hopes of freedom, resorted to Hilton Head, where they were put to work on the fortifications. This course of proceeding was in accordance with the directions issued by Mr. Cameron (Secretary of War) to General Sherman, who was ordered to employ the services of any persons, whether fugitive from labour or not, who might offer themselves to the national Government. Loyal masters were to receive compensation from Congress for the loss of service of such persons. The men were to be organised in squads or companies, but it was expressly stated that a general arming of the blacks for military purposes was not intended. The occupation of the forts at the entrance of Port Royal Harbour, and its consequent acquisition as a station for the United States navy, was a success of some importance to the Federal cause, as it enabled them to threaten the two cities of Savannah and Charleston, and also more effectually to blockade their harbours. With the limited means under their command, and being, as they were, without a navy, its loss must be considered a misfortune, but not a disgrace to the Confederate Government. Later in the year, during the month of December, naval expeditions were sent to reconnoitre and to take possession of Otter Island, commanding the entrance to St. Helena Sound, between Port Royal and Charleston, and of Tybee Island, situated at the mouth of the Savannah River, and near the entrance of Warsaw Inlet, which is in fact a second channel of the Savannah River, and separates from the main stream a short distance below the city of Savannah. These expeditions met with no opposition, and detachments from General

Sherman's force were sent to garrison the several positions. The news of the success at Port Royal was received with great rejoicing and exultation in the North. Not only were the people gratified on account of the material benefit derived from the occupation of the harbour, but the bitter feeling of revenge indulged against the State of South Carolina was in a slight degree satisfied by the occupation of a portion of her soil, and the raising of the Stars and Stripes over one of her towns. Still, another and more violent scheme of vengeance was in preparation against the offending State, which was nothing else than to destroy the harbour of Charleston. Fighting, as the Northern people professed to be, with the object of restoring the Union, to which (as they so frequently alleged) the majority of the inhabitants of the South were anxious to return; fighting avowedly with these objects, they employed means at variance with their professions. They were about (should their intention be successfully carried out) to destroy, not to blockade, one of the finest harbours of the coast, and the destruction was not to be temporary but permanent; the city (her harbour being closed) was to fall to ruin as completely and almost as quickly as if destroyed by bombardment or conflagration. The press of the Northern States, supposed to represent the opinions of the people, viewed this approaching evil, not with feelings of regret, but of exultation; the anticipated revenge was very sweet, and the proceeding was characterised as forming an instance of *poetic and religious justice*.* To accomplish the object, sixteen old whaling vessels were purchased and filled with stones; they were assembled at Port Royal, and on December 17, under convoy of the U.S. ships of war, sailed for the entrance of Charleston Harbour. The

* *New York Tribune* Correspondent.

fleet was under the command of Captain Davis, who had been selected for the duty, and the plan of closing the harbour was on the principle of placing obstructions in such a manner on both sides the crest of the bar that the same forces which created the bar might be relied on to keep them in their places. The old whaling vessels were to be sunk in the channels checker-wise, and care was to be taken not entirely to block up the outlets for the current, as in that case the strong stream running out of the harbour would quickly force a fresh passage, but to destroy the entrance usually used by ships, leaving other minor channels open, which were believed to be extremely difficult for navigation, and which would yet afford a sufficient means of exit for the stream. On the 19th the fleet was assembled off Charleston Bar. The channel was buoyed out, and the position marked where each ship was to be sunk. On that evening the work commenced, and was continued through the following day, when the whole of the sixteen vessels, with the exception of one, were sunk in the channel; the remaining vessel (the Robin Hood) was set on fire, and lighted up the sky as the United States flag-ship left the bar at Charleston. Then it was that the Northern press announced that *Charleston Bar was paved with granite, and that the harbour was a thing of the past.* Vain, however, were the efforts of man to destroy Nature's works; the strong currents, disregarding the weak obstructions, soon cleared a way into the ocean, and the scheme of the destruction of Charleston Harbour was recorded as another among the many failures which attended Northern enterprises.*

* Subsequently, towards the end of January 1862, other vessels laden with stones were sunk in Maffit's Channel. The American

During the year 1861, the blockade of the Southern ports was very inefficient, and in addition to trading vessels which continually performed passages between these ports and the West India islands, others, commissioned as ships of war or in the service of the Confederate Government, effected their escape. Among these were the Nashville and the Theodora; on board the latter, on October 12, were the two Commissioners which President Davis had been empowered by Congress to send to England and France. Mr. Mason and Mr. Slidell, together with the wife, son, and three daughters of the latter; Mr. Eustace, secretary to Mr. Slidell, with his wife; and Mr. M'Farland, secretary to Mr. Mason, safely accomplished the passage from Charleston to Havannah. Mr. Mason was the accredited Commissioner of the Confederate States to England, and Mr. Slidell to France. Having arrived safely at Havannah, and being under the protection of the Spanish flag, they made no secret of their office or the intentions of their journey, but quietly awaited the arrival of the British royal mail-steamer, and took their passage in her for England. The United States Consul at Havannah had, however, watched their arrival with some uneasiness, and, influenced likewise by the presence in the harbour of numerous vessels assembled with the intention of running the blockade, telegraphed to Captain Wilkes to bring the United States sloop of war San Jacinto from Trinidad to Havannah.* This he accordingly did.† On November 7, the mail-steamer

Government, through its ministers, assured foreign nations that a temporary blockade, and not the permanent destruction of the harbour, was designed.

* *National Intelligencer*, Nov. 1.

† *Times*' narrative, Nov. 28.

Trent left Havannah, with the Confederate Commissioners on board, and proceeded on her course until she reached the old Bahama channel on the 8th, when a steamer was observed ahead, showing no colours. On approaching her, Captain Moir, commanding the Trent, hoisted the British ensign, which met with no response until the vessels were within a furlong of each other, when the stranger fired a shot across the Trent's bows and hoisted the American colours. As no notice was taken, a shell was fired, which burst within a hundred yards of the Trent. Captain Moir consequently stopped the engines, and a boat was then lowered from the American vessel, which proved to be the San Jacinto, and the crew, consisting of two officers and a small number of armed men, boarded the Trent. The officer in command of the boat, Lieut. Fairfax, demanded of Captain Moir a list of the passengers, which was refused; but Mr. Slidell, hearing his name mentioned, came forward, and was soon followed by Mr. Mason, Mr. Eustace, and Mr. M'Farland. Lieut. Fairfax then signified his intention of carrying them on board the San Jacinto, but Mr. Slidell claimed the protection of the British flag, and all refused to leave the Trent, except under forcible compulsion. Captain Moir and the British mail agent protested strongly against their removal, and against the conduct of the United States officers in searching the vessel; the passengers also, comprising men of several different nations, were vehement in the expression of their opinion on the unwarrantable conduct of the United States officers. In the meantime other armed boats from the San Jacinto approached the ship, and marines were put on board. Finding that resistance was useless, Messrs. Slidell, Mason, and their two secretaries, accompanied Lieut. Fairfax, and were taken to the San

Jacinto, their wives and families remaining on board the Trent, although Captain Wilkes offered them a cabin in his ship. That officer, in his report to the Secretary of the Navy, stated that 'it had been his intention to have taken possession of the Trent, and to have sent her to Key West as a prize, for resisting the search and carrying passengers (viz. the Southern Commissioners) whose character and objects were well known to the captain; but the reduced number of his officers and crew, and the large number of passengers on board the Trent bound to Europe, who would have been put to great inconvenience, decided him to allow them to proceed.' The Trent, therefore, continued on her voyage, whilst the Confederate Commissioners were taken to Fortress Monroe.

Very different was the manner in which the news of the event was received in the two countries. Immediately on its promulgation at Liverpool, a meeting was called, and great indignation expressed at the insult offered to the British flag and nation; this was followed, as the news quickly spread through the country, by similar outbursts of feeling, but people were at first more amazed than indignant; such an insult, without some justification, could not be conceived; it was thought that some unknown reasons or excuse must exist for so unwarrantable an outrage. Some considered, and it was the tone adopted by a portion of the French press, that Mr. Lincoln's Government intended to provoke war, in order to cover their failure to suppress the so-called rebellion of the South; others were of opinion that some subtlety of international law afforded a legal justification for an act otherwise so grossly at variance with the preconceived practice of nations in their dealings with each other. There

was therefore a pause before the full burst of indignation broke forth. The question was allowed to remain in the hands of the Government, who referred it to the law officers of the Crown. When, however, the decision of the law officers became known, one opinion and one purpose united the whole English nation; it was felt that at length a time had come when a stand must be made against the insolence of the American people, and that war would be infinitely preferable to the disgrace of allowing such an insult to pass unnoticed, and to the consequent abrogation of the rights and power of a great nation. It was felt that on such a subject no debate should be permitted, the men taken from the protection of the British flag must be instantly restored, and unless that was done war must be declared. To those ignorant of the character of the American nation, and even to others who had some knowledge of their disposition, opinions, and mode of action, the latter event appeared probable, when the account reached England of the manner in which Captain Wilkes' action had been approved in America. Immediately the news was received in that country, the people and press appeared almost to have become insane with delight. The city of New York, represented by the Common Council, thanked Captain Wilkes for his bold and patriotic conduct in arresting the Commissioners, and offered him the hospitality of the city. At Boston, where he was ordered to convey the prisoners, a similar reception awaited him. The newspapers vied with each other in applauding his conduct and in defying England.* The 'New York Times' wrote in this strain: 'There is no drawback to our jubilation. The

* There were some notable exceptions among the press to the tone of ill-feeling against England.

universal Yankee nation is getting decidedly awake. As for Commodore Wilkes and his command, let the handsome thing be done. Consecrate another July 4 to him; load him down with services of plate and swords of the cunningest and costliest art. Let us encourage the happy inspiration that achieved such a victory.' Such is a specimen of the opinion of the American press; but some will say that the press would not exhibit the real opinions of the educated portion of the people. Allowing such to be the case, let us turn to the speeches made by some of the men in high positions. Let us see what line the Governor of the State of Massachusetts, Mr. Andrew, took in his speech at the great Boston banquet, given in honour of Captain Wilkes. He commenced his speech as follows:—'It did not need the events of the last few days to render the name of Wilkes historic on the pages which record our naval annals (cheers), but it has been given to that commander, not only to place himself, by an act of conspicuous patriotism and good judgment as well, upon a niche higher than that which he had before attained, but also to perform one of the most illustrious services which have rendered this war memorable (cheers). To him and to all who assisted and counselled and aided him in that enterprise, the American people, with one accord and with unanimous judgment, agree in ascribing, not only wise and prescient judgment, but also manly and heroic success' (cheers). Governor Andrew went on to say that he was present when the Secretary of War received the telegram which announced the event, and assured his audience that he had not been behind the Secretary in the cheer which followed the announcement. Further on in his speech Mr. Andrew made the following allusion

to the nationality of the vessel from which the Commissioners had been taken : ‘ And that there might be nothing left to crown the exultation of the American heart, Commodore Wilkes fired his shot across the bows of the ship that bore the English lion at its head ’ (cheers). Judge Bigelow, who spoke at a later period of the same banquet, considered that Commodore Wilkes had acted from the noble instincts of his own patriotic heart, and concluded his speech as follows :— ‘ We desire peace with all nations at this juncture ; we desire peace especially with England ; but I trust we shall not buy peace at the cost of our own degradation (prolonged and hearty cheering). Let me conclude these remarks by offering, as a sentiment, the United States and England. We all desire peace with England, but I trust we shall never ask anything that is not right, and we shall never submit to anything that is wrong ’ (loud applause).

Such were the opinions expressed by men of note. The Secretary of the Navy in a letter to Captain Wilkes stated his approval of his conduct, and in the House of Representatives a resolution was passed tendering him the thanks of Congress for his arrest of Messrs. Slidell and Mason. A preamble and resolution were subsequently proposed, and unanimously adopted, requesting the President to direct the confinement of Messrs. Slidell and Mason in the cells of convicted felons, until Colonel Corcoran and Colonel Wood * should be treated by the Confederates as the United States had treated all prisoners taken by them on the battle-field. Still there were wise and

* These officers were held as hostages for the Southern privateersmen, who were confined and were to be tried as pirates by the Northern courts.

moderate men in the North who held opinions at variance with the popular cry. The Cabinet were silent; Mr. Lincoln made little allusion to the matter in his address, and it was said that General M'Clellan and other superior officers of the army regarded the line of action untenable. The French princes regretted the event, and deemed the conduct of Captain Wilkes as unjustifiable. The foreign legations at Washington expressed their opinions freely to Lord Lyons (the English minister) respecting the illegality of the action. Lord Lyons himself maintained his customary dignified bearing, awaiting instructions from the Home Government.

In the South, not only the news of the course taken by Captain Wilkes, but also that of the exultation of the Northern Americans, was received with the greatest delight. War was believed to be imminent between Great Britain and the Northern States; it was well known that the former would demand redress for the insult offered her, and even among those who were supposed to understand the character of their former fellow countrymen, it was thought that so much of what must be termed bluster would be followed by energetic action. The first outburst of enthusiasm and delight in the North was followed by enquiries, which gradually became more anxious, as to the course which England would probably adopt. The various authorities on international law were consulted, and opinions strained to suit the case; supposed parallel instances were quoted, and the good sense and just conduct of England were alleged as a reason for her submitting quietly to the unpleasant, but strictly legal, action of Captain Wilkes. That the ommissioners should be given up was never hinted

at; such a course could not be for a moment entertained. Still the Cabinet remained silent. Then the first news reached America of the opinion held on the matter in England, and the anger of her people. This, however, was treated as John Bull's natural bluster, and was, Americans argued, to be followed by a return to good sense and prudence. Soon afterwards the British Government messenger with despatches arrived in America, and it became known that the instant surrender of the Commissioners was demanded by the British Government, whilst a rumour spread that the demand would be acceded to by the American President. Great was the indignation, not only among the masses, but even in the Senate of the United States. Mr. Hale made a violent speech in the House, advocating war rather than the humiliation of acceding to the demands of the British Government. Still the American Government made no sign. Mr. Seward had indeed taken upon himself a great responsibility; he appears almost to have stood alone, and by his courage in defying public clamour, and in acting both legally and rightly, he has deserved the gratitude of his countrymen. In all probability he saved his country from a war with the greatest naval power, assisted by the greatest military power of Europe. On the first receipt of the intelligence, Mr. Seward sent a despatch to Mr. Adams (American minister in London) stating that Captain Wilkes had acted in the matter on his own responsibility and without instructions from the Government, and that the subject, therefore, was free from the embarrassments that might have ensued if the act had been specially directed. On the very same day on which this communication was sent from Washington,

a letter was despatched from Earl Russell to Lord Lyons, in which, after alluding to the event, Lord Russell stated that Her Majesty's Government trusted that the Government of the United States would, of its own accord, offer such redress as alone could satisfy them, namely, the liberation of the four prisoners, and their delivery to Lord Lyons, that they might again be placed under British protection, with a suitable apology for the aggression committed. This communication Lord Russell desired Lord Lyons to forward to Mr. Seward. Mr. Seward replied at length, discussing the question in all its bearings, and acknowledging that the action of Captain Wilkes was contrary to the principles advocated and practised by the United States. He concluded by informing Lord Lyons that the four persons were held in military custody at Fort Warren, in the State of Massachusetts, and that they would be cheerfully liberated. He requested Lord Lyons to indicate a time and place for receiving them. Thus terminated an affair which threatened to involve at least two powerful countries in war. The Southern Commissioners were quietly conveyed from Fort Warren to Providence, where they embarked on board Her Majesty's ship 'Rinaldo,' and were taken to Halifax, from whence the ordinary passenger steamer carried them to England. The arguments used by Mr. Seward, the absence of the apology demanded by Lord Russell, and the decided tone taken by the French Government, as represented by a despatch from M. Thouvenel, all united in soothing the feelings of the American people. Some acknowledged that they had been wrong, and that it showed the qualities of a great nation to freely acknowledge error; others were convinced by the attitude of France, who

had long been looked on as the friend of America in contradistinction to England, whilst a portion of the press and the people (and that not the most respectable) justified the submission to England only on the ground of necessity, and alleged that a time would come when, after they had settled their own difficulties, they would revenge themselves for their present humiliation. The Southern people were naturally disappointed, and effected extreme disgust and contempt for the conduct of the Yankees. Indeed, the boastful tone of the latter, followed by so total an alteration when serious results appeared probable, afforded grounds for the allegations of the South. That England was really in earnest there could be no doubt. Cotemporary with the despatch of Lord Russell's letter, reinforcements had been sent to Canada, together with munitions of war for the few fortifications England possessed in that colony. As the Government messenger was crossing the Atlantic, two battalions of guards were also making their way to Canada. The despatch of these troops had an especial significance, as it was known that they were only sent abroad when war was supposed to be imminent. The Canadians were also prepared to make the necessary sacrifices required of them by war ; they had long been greatly irritated by the tone adopted towards them by Americans, as also by the slighting manner in which their country and themselves were spoken of, and they were anxious to show that the attitude assumed by the mother country met with their unqualified approval. England, satisfied with the material results of her policy, did not insist on the apology she at first required ; and the Trent affair, followed as it so quickly was by important events in their own Continent, soon gave place in

the minds of Americans to considerations on the great war in which they were engaged.

It is pleasing to turn from the perusal of paragraphs in the American papers relating to the Trent to those which announced the death of the Prince Consort. The events were almost cotemporaneous; but, although there was so strong a feeling against England, yet the American people, appreciating in a very high degree the qualities of England's Queen, felt deeply for her in her sorrow. The 'National Intelligencer,' after announcing the event and speaking in strong terms of the noble character, both of the late Prince Consort and the Queen, concluded in the following words:—

'No passing cloud in the diplomatic relations of the two countries will be suffered to check the natural impulse of the American people at the present moment. May we not rather hope that it will only afford the better occasion of revealing how sincere is the friendly feeling really existing between the two peoples, and how impossible, as well as unnatural a thing, would be a war between them!'

During the aggressive operations on the Southern coast, the Confederate cruisers had not been idle. The *Sumter*, under Captain Semmes, and the *Nashville*, under Lieutenant Pegram, were gaining a terrible notoriety among the captains of the Northern American trading vessels; and the failure to capture these vessels was a cause of irritation to a nation which prided herself on her skill in ship-building. The *Nashville* had run the blockade at Charleston towards the end of October, and, after touching at ports in the West India Islands, had crossed the Atlantic to South-

* Alluding to the sympathy felt for the Queen in America.

ampton, on her passage capturing and burning an American trading vessel, the Harvey Birch. Whilst she was in dock at Southampton, the United States sloop of war Tuscarora arrived at the same place, and precautions were consequently taken by the English Government to prevent any collision between the two vessels in British waters. The Nashville eventually effected her escape, unmolested by her more powerful antagonist.

CHAPTER X.

INTERIOR CONDITION OF THE CONFEDERATE AND FEDERAL STATES UP TO THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR 1861.

It must be understood that the Confederate States had, since their secession from those of the North, been ruled by a Provisional Government. It required time to organise and to put into force the machinery for the construction of the Government as determined by the Constitution. On November 6, electors had been chosen for President and Vice-President, and also members for the Congress, which it was settled should assemble at Richmond on February 18, 1862, when the votes for the two high offices in the Government should be counted. In the meantime the Provisional Congress met for its fourth Session on November 18, and on the following day received the message from President Davis.* In it he congratulated the Congress on the general results which had attended the course of the war. The agricultural prosperity of the Confederacy had been great, whilst her manufacturing industry had never previously been so flourishing. The means of the Confederate States for manufacturing the necessaries and comforts of life within themselves were increasing as the conflict continued, and (Mr.

* Mr. Davis filled the office of Provisional President before his election to the post of President in the following year.

Davis assured the Congress) they were gradually becoming independent of the rest of the world for the supply of such military stores and munitions as were indispensable for the war. The operations of the army had been successful, as testified by the succession of glorious victories at Bethel, Bull Run, Manassas, Springfield, Lexington, Leesburg,* and Belmont. New States had been added to the Confederacy, and the people of Missouri had conducted a war in the face of great difficulties with spirit and success. In allusion to Kentucky, Mr. Davis disclaimed all intention of coercing the State, and declared that the Confederate generals would withdraw their forces from her soil, if those of the Federals would do likewise. He assured Congress that he should regard it as one of the best effects of the march of the Confederate troops into Kentucky, if it should end in giving to her people liberty of choice and a free opportunity to decide their own destiny according to their own will. The attention of Congress was next directed to the interior condition of the States, both as regarded the conveyance of the mails—rendered difficult by the absorption of the ordinary means of transportation for the movement of troops and military supplies—and the insufficiency of the rolling stock of railroads for the accumulation of business, resulting both from military operations and the obstruction of water communication by the presence of the enemy's fleet. The condition of the Treasury was alluded to, and Mr. Davis stated that the financial system already adopted had worked so far well, and promised good results for the future; also that the depreciation of the Confederate Treasury note was guarded against by the provision that those notes

* Called Ball's Bluff by the Federals.

should be convertible into Confederate stock, bearing eight per cent. interest, at the pleasure of the holders, thus insuring them against a depreciation below the value of that stock; and that the stock itself would not be subject to any considerable fall so long as the interest should be punctually paid. The payment of the interest had been secured by the imposition of taxes for that purpose. An increase in the railways through the Southern States was recommended, by the construction of a rail from Danville in Virginia to Greensborough in North Carolina, thus completing three main systems of communication through the Confederacy, two of which already existed—viz. one from Richmond along the seaboard, and the other through Western Virginia, to the Mississippi. Mr. Davis then alluded to the increased repugnance to any reconstruction of the Union by the people of the South, which he stated was owing to the illegal acts of the Government at Washington, and also to the barbarous manner in which hostilities had been carried on.

After some reflections on the capture of the Southern Commissioners, and allusions to the non-efficiency and consequent illegality (according to the received law of nations) of the blockade,* Mr. Davis concluded his address in the following words—‘ While the war, which is waged to take from us the right of self-government, can never attain that end, it remains to be seen how far it will work a revolution in the industrial system of the world, which may carry suffering to other lands as well as to our own. In the meantime we shall continue the struggle in humble dependence on Providence, from whose searching scrutiny we cannot conceal the

* Referring to the Treaty of Paris.

secrets of our hearts, and to whose rule we confidently submit our destinies. For the rest we shall depend upon ourselves. Liberty is always won when there exists the unconquerable will to be free, and we have reason to know the strength that is given by a conscious sense not only of the magnitude but of the righteousness of our cause.' The Acts of the Congress in this its fourth session, were mainly directed to carry out the plans sketched by the President. The States of Missouri and Kentucky were finally received into the Southern Confederacy, and the number of representatives which each State should send to Congress, settled. Aid also was voted to them in the form of a grant of money. The thanks of Congress were given to General Price for the capture of Lexington, to General Polk for the victory at Belmont,* to General Evans for gallant conduct at the battle of Leesburg or Ball's Bluff, and to Colonel Johnson for the affair in the Alleghany Mountains, in western Virginia. Large sums were appropriated for the military and naval services, one million of dollars being granted for floating defences for the western rivers, and a special act passed for the organisation of a force consisting of one or more brigades, and termed the Maryland line. Money was also voted for connecting the Richmond and Danville, and North Carolina railroads, and a loan granted for making a railway from Selma, in Alabama, to Meridian, in Mississippi, thereby affording a direct communication with the Mississippi River, in place of the circuitous course by Mobile. These Acts passed in February, 1862, but the lines of rail were not completed until a much later period of the war. With

* Claimed as a victory by the Confederates.

regard to Maryland, a resolution was carried that, 'No peace ought to be concluded with the United States, which did not ensure to Maryland the opportunity of forming a part of the Confederacy.' Measures were also taken to organise the distant territory of Arizona, and sums granted towards paying, either in money or in kind, the several Indian tribes on the western frontiers.

A portion of the tribes on the frontier hitherto subsidised by the American Government, had embraced the Confederate side; whilst some retained their allegiance to the Federal authorities. The subsidy of the former was stopped by order of the Congress at Washington, and was directed to be paid, as per treaty, by that assembled at Richmond. These tribes resided at distances so remote from the usual seat of operations, and were so few in numbers and powerless in organisations, that they exercised little or no influence on the war. In the Indian territory, on the Verdigris River, there was an action, towards the close of the year, between a force composed of Texans and Indians, under Colonel Cooper (a Confederate), and the Indians who had embraced the Federal side, under a chief called Opothleyholo, apparently without any great result. It was recorded that the Creeks did not scalp their prisoners, because the enemy was of their own people, which would argue that the tribes were divided among themselves. These skirmishes on the frontiers of civilisation, which had, previous to the great war, afforded the principal active occupation for the American army, no longer possessed interest beyond the immediate locality in which they occurred. The course of events nearer home was sufficient to cause anxiety in the minds of the Southern planters. The Federal naval expeditions, making their

way into what may be termed the inland waters of the Atlantic coast, brought dismay to the inhabitants, but tended to evince how much their patriotism triumphed over all motives of interest; the planters refused to trade with the invaders, and the appearance of the smoke of the Federal steamers, was the signal for putting the torch to the accumulated stores of cotton. Bales on bales, for the want of which thousands in Europe were reduced almost to starvation, were burnt by their possessors, who preferred the poverty entailed upon them by the loss of their crops and the withdrawal of their labourers, to any dealings with the hated Yankee. The South, even at this early period, began to feel the effects of the blockade; one of the principal necessities of life had hitherto been habitually imported from Europe, and the absence of salt works threatened to be a serious calamity to her people. Salt had been extensively used on the plantations for the purpose of curing the pork, which formed the ordinary food of the negroes; it was now required to preserve the meat necessary for the support of the armies. Wine, tea, and coffee began to be numbered among the luxuries of life, only to be enjoyed by the very wealthy. Substitutes were, however, manufactured; spirits were extracted from fruit, and a decoction of rye took the place of coffee; the cultivation of cotton was to a great extent abandoned, and the fields were sown with Indian corn. Manufactories of different sorts rose in the several inland towns; the homespun brown cloth of the country, rough, but serviceable, afforded clothing for all classes, from the private soldier to the general and the richest planters; whilst attempts were made, which ultimately proved successful, to supply shoes—that most necessary part

of the soldier's equipment. Near Atlanta, and at various other places, powder-mills were raised, and works established under the supervision of the Government for the manufacture of small arms, and other munitions of war. The slaves, as a rule, remained faithful to their owners; a small portion refused to follow their masters into the interior when the plantations on the coast were abandoned, but this was owing more to their utter dismay and helplessness when deprived of supervision and care, to which they had been accustomed, than to any organised plan of resistance to authority.* Whilst all classes were uniting together to adopt measures for the preservation of their country, a calamity almost as terrible as bombardment by the enemy, befel the city of Charleston. On the night of December 11 the alarm-bell proclaimed that a fire had broken out. The buildings in the vicinity of the burning house, mostly of wood, afforded food for the flames, and the conflagration soon spread through the most opulent portions of the city. The dismay was very great. Numbers of families deprived, consequent on the exigencies of the times and the requirements of the army, of their natural protectors, in vain sought help and safety. Through the whole night the conflagration raged. The fire companies, assisted by the troops under General Ripley, endeavoured unsuccessfully to arrest its course. Whole streets, markets, and churches were burnt, until at last the expedient of blowing up houses in the path of the flames was resorted to; and this measure, together with the effects of a shower of rain, diminished, and at length put a

* Brigadier-General Drayton's report, commanding third military district, South Carolina.

termination to, the violence of the fire. Great indeed was the misfortune that had befallen the city of Charleston, and the sympathy excited in her behalf was evinced by a resolution proposed and unanimously adopted by the Confederate House of Representatives, to the effect that the sum of \$250,000 should be appropriated as an advance on account of any claims of the State of South Carolina upon the Confederate States. The condition of the city, once so rich and prosperous, was at that time deserving of pity. Threatened by invasion from the land by the Federals at Beaufort, her harbour doomed to annihilation by the stone fleet, and, at the same time, a prey to the most destructive of all elements, her sufferings might even have moved the pity of her enemies, who, however, only saw in the calamities which had befallen her a just retribution for her rebellion, and a punishment still inadequate for her secession.

A few weeks after the delivery of President Davis's message to the Confederate Congress, President Lincoln transmitted his message to the Congress at Washington. There was less decision in its tone, and the line of policy advocated was less clearly defined than in that of President Davis. The burden of the message was contained in the phrase, so frequently used by Americans of the Northern States, *the Union must be preserved*. No direct allusion was made to the Trent affair; but attention was directed to the necessity of defences for the coast, as also for the rivers and lakes of the Canadian frontier. A sop was given to the Republican and Abolition party by a recommendation that the sovereignty of Hayti and Liberia should be recognised. Congress was congratulated on the state of the finances, the condition of the army and navy, and the patriotism

of the people. Some interior reforms in the courts of law were proposed, and the question of establishing military courts to try civil cases in the territories of the rebellious States, when occupied by the Federal armies, was referred to Congress. No allusion was made to the several actions in which the Federals had been engaged; and whilst the States of Missouri and Kentucky were sending delegates to the Confederate Congress, Mr. Lincoln affirmed that the former was comparatively quiet, and could not again be overrun by the insurrectionists, and that he believed that the latter was decidedly and unchangeably ranged on the side of the Union. The occupation of Hatteras, Port Royal, Tybee Island, near Savannah, and Ship Island, together with the reported popular movements in behalf of the Union in North Carolina and Tennessee, demonstrated, in Mr. Lincoln's opinion, *that the course of the Union was advancing steadily southward*. With regard to the principles advocated by the leaders of the Southern cause, Mr. Lincoln saw fit to deliver a solemn warning. He stated that the insurrection was largely, if not exclusively, a war upon the first principles of popular government—the rights of the people, and that the abridgement of the existing right of suffrage was aimed at. In fact, Mr. Lincoln considered that, in his position as President, he would not be justified should he omit to raise a warning voice against the approach of returning despotism. Mr. Lincoln concluded his message with a disquisition on the connection between capital and labour, affirming that the prosperity of the United States during the past seventy years had been owing mainly to their system of popular government. He also ventured on the prophecy that there were those living who, if the Union should be

preserved, would see it contain 250,000,000 people; and that the struggle in which they were engaged was not only for the present time, but also for a vast future.

Few can read the messages of the two Presidents without being struck with the difference in their character. In Mr. Davis's message, a clear line of policy was indicated, a definite course of action marked out, and a positive aim placed before the Congress and the people. In that of Mr. Lincoln there is evident doubt and uncertainty. Political parties required conciliating, and the course of policy could not be avowed, as future events would probably influence not only its actions but its principles. The anomaly of conducting a war of invasion on the avowed principles of liberty, and in accordance with the right of revolution asserted in the Declaration of Independence, presented difficulties which Mr. Lincoln did not attempt to deal with, but which he was contented to conceal under vague assertions and prophecies, and under the declaration, which was sure to find favour among his hearers, that *the Union must be preserved.*

There was a struggle on the part of the Northern Government to conduct the war, avowedly waged for the protection of the Constitution, without violating its provisions. As each month passed by, and as the progress of each succeeding event developed some fresh difficulty, so did the constitutional restraints become less respected. The very guarantees of freedom came to be regarded as trammels to a powerful executive; and whilst many of the constitutional restraints (as regarded the so-called rebel States of the South), were set aside without much difficulty, so were the liberties of the people of the Northern States trenched upon

when they were found to be inconvenient to the action of the central power. The writ of Habeas Corpus had been suspended by the President in the district of Columbia, and fresh directions were issued regarding the treatment of fugitive slaves. Mr. Seward, in a letter addressed to General M'Clellan, dated December 4, 1861, drew that general's attention to the fact that slaves, fleeing from their masters in the State of Virginia, who were residing within the lines of the enemy, had been taken and lodged in gaol by the police at Washington, acting as they had done in accordance with the provisions of the Fugitive Slave Law; and Mr. Seward required General M'Clellan to cause the arrest by military authority of the parties who had made the seizure—i. e. of the city police of Washington. Mr. Seward founded this order upon the Act of Congress of August 6, 1861, entitled 'An Act to confiscate property used for insurrectionary purposes,' and affirmed that the hostile employment of the slaves constituted a full and sufficient answer to any further claim to service or labour. Possibly Mr. Seward may have been right in the directions he issued; but their wording carried evidence of the existence of dissensions between the Government and the State authorities of the district of Columbia. The report of the Secretary of the Treasury was second in interest only to the President's message. Mr. Chase estimated the cost of the war up to July 12, 1862, at \$543,406,422, or about £112,000,000, and that the public debt on the same date would be \$517,372,802, or £107,000,000, which showed an increase in the debt during the first year of the war of \$426,504,974, or £88,000,000. Of this increased public debt, present and prospective, the Government had already negotiated \$197,242,588,

leaving, according to Mr. Chase's estimates, about \$200,000,000 to be provided for, probably by loans.* The ordinary expenditure of the country, together with the interest of the national debt and a surplus fund to provide for its repayment, were to be furnished by an increase in the direct taxation on property, by augmented duties on certain specified articles, and by the proceeds of the customs and other miscellaneous sources, making the yearly revenue \$90,000,000. Mr. Chase, after setting forth the value of the real and personal property of the loyal States, considered that the sum, although large, would be raised without any great detriment to the prosperity of the country.

According to precedents taken from the great war waged by England with France, the estimates of expenditure were very light, and the amount proposed to be raised by taxation, in comparison with that acquired by loans, and consequently added to the national debt, very small. Notwithstanding, Mr. Chase enunciated his budget with the statement that the idea of perpetual debt was not of American nativity, and should not be naturalised. At this period neither side anticipated a long war: the South leaned too much on the expectation of European intervention, and the North buoyed themselves up with hopes that a great battle would decide the fate of the war, and that that battle would assuredly terminate it in their favour. Even General M'Clellan, usually guarded in his language,† committed himself by the assertion that *the war cannot last long: it may be desperate*. Nothing assuredly is more remarkable in the history of this

* The exact sum according to calculations was greater.

† Speech delivered on Nov. 2 at Washington, on the reception of a sword from the city council of Philadelphia.

great war than the buoyancy of hope and carelessness for the future evinced by the rulers and people of the Northern States. The latter was visible not only in the interior government of their own country, but, as was shown in the Trent difficulty, in their dealings with other nations. England, as has been seen, was sufficiently powerful to exact reparation for the injury ; but in another instance of a more palpable violation of the privilege of neutrals, the weakness of the power on whom the insult was inflicted prevented an enforcement of redress. In the month of November General Sumner was on his way, with a detachment of regular troops, from San Francisco to New York. On board the Pacific steamer Orizaba were two ex-senators and the late Attorney-General of the State of California. These persons General Sumner saw fit to arrest, and, in violation of the rights of the neutral State of New Granada, and in defiance of the remonstrances of her rulers and people, he conveyed them as prisoners across the Isthmus of Panama. The strength of the detachment under General Sumner's command prevented any attempt at rescue by the inhabitants. The long course of prosperity enjoyed by the American people, and the marvellous development of resources and power which their country had shown during the past seventy years, had exercised an influence on the character of the nation similar to that which is frequently noticed in individuals. As a nation they had become proud and self-sufficient, and were often regardless of the rights and feelings of their neighbours. These characteristics, prior to the secession of the South, were shared by the whole American nation, but, subsequent to the commencement of the war, appear more especially to belong to the Northern portion of the

Union. The defeat at Bull's Run was for a short time a check on their self-esteem ; but the energy displayed by the nation to remedy that defeat, and its apparent remarkable fruits, restored their self-confidence, and, it may be said, their self-conceit. The reports of the Secretaries of War and of the Navy showed that, at the close of the year 1861, there were in the service of the Federal Government upwards of 640,000 volunteers, upwards of 20,000 regular troops, and 22,000 seamen and marines. It must be allowed that in the efforts used to raise and equip so enormous a force in so short a time, the Northern Americans afford an example of energy rarely equalled. It may be that the youth of the nation, which was partially conducive to so great energy, was also the cause of faults which detract from the credit due to it, and that more serious disasters and greater suffering were requisite to check the evil and to develop the worth which existed in the character of the American people. The war had commenced in favour of the South by the brilliant victory of Bull's Run ; but the greater resources of the North, and her command of the sea, joined to the overweening confidence of the South induced by her first successes, together with her disposition to rely on external aid rather than on her own efforts, had caused the tide to turn, and with the spring of 1862 commenced a series of disasters which finally roused the people of the South, showed them the true character of the struggle in which they were engaged, and developed the stubborn resistance which has few parallels in the history of the world.

CHAPTER XI.

CAMPAIGN OF KENTUCKY AND TENNESSEE.

GENERAL M'CLELLAN, soon after his appointment to the command of the army of the Federal States, prepared for the information, and at the request of, President Lincoln, a memorandum, in which was sketched out the scheme of operations which he considered advisable, and the means required to carry it out. In this paper he showed that the important strategical point was Eastern Virginia, and that there the struggle must be fought out. The other operations he considered to be in themselves of minor importance, but essential as conducive to the success of the main object of the campaign. He recommended that a strong movement should be made on the Mississippi, and that the Confederates (or rebels, as they are termed in the document) should be driven out of Missouri. As soon as it should become clear that Kentucky was cordially united with the North, an advance, he declared, ought to be made through that State into Eastern Tennessee, for the purpose of assisting the Union men, and of seizing the railroads leading from Memphis to the east. He recommended that the passes into Western Virginia from the east should be securely guarded; but, unless the political condition of Kentucky should render it impossible or inexpedient to make the movement upon Eastern Tennessee through that State, no operations from

Western Virginia ought to be conducted against Richmond. Every effort, he urged, should be made to organise and equip regiments in Western Virginia, in order to render the Ohio and Indiana regiments available for other operations. The importance of occupying Baltimore and Fortress Monroe was pointed out, together with the necessity of concentrating a large army in the vicinity of Washington, as by that means the number of troops guarding the Upper Potomac could be diminished, no general, in advancing into Pennsylvania, being able to leave so large a garrison on his flank and rear as that of Washington. With regard to the number of troops required for these extended operations, General M'Clellan reiterated his opinion that the main army should be concentrated in Virginia, and demanded—

Infantry, 250 Regiments	225,000
Artillery, 100 field batteries of 6 guns each	15,000
Cavalry, 28 Regiments	25,500
Engineers, 5 Regiments	7,500
Total number of men	<u>273,000</u>

This immense army was to be exclusive of the garrison of Washington and other places, and it was advised that from 5,000 to 10,000 Western troops should occupy Western Virginia, 10,000 protect the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 5,000 garrison Baltimore, and 2,000 Fortress Monroe ; whilst, should Kentucky declare for the North, 20,000 men were considered sufficient for the campaign of Eastern Tennessee ; the numerical strength of the force required for the descent of the Mississippi being left to the determination of its commander. A strong naval force, in conjunction with a fleet of transports, was considered essential for coast operations, and in order to seize the important seaboard

towns of the Confederacy. The opinion of General M'Clellan in regard to the importance of railroads is worthy of consideration. He wrote thus :

‘It cannot be ignored that the construction of railroads has introduced a new and very important element into war, by the great facilities thus given for concentrating at particular positions large bodies of troops from remote sections, and by creating new strategic points and lines of operations. It is intended to overcome this difficulty by the partial operations suggested, and such others as the particular case may require. We must endeavour to seize places on the railways in the rear of the enemy’s points of concentration, and we must threaten their seaboard cities, in order that each State may be forced, by the necessity of its own defence, to diminish its contingent to the Confederate army.’

General M'Clellan acknowledged that the force he demanded was large, especially that of the main army ; but he considered that the end proposed, namely, the termination of the war in one campaign, was fully commensurate with the means employed. He proposed not only to ‘drive the enemy out of Virginia and occupy Richmond, but to occupy Charleston, Savannah, Montgomery, Pensacola, Mobile, and New Orleans ; in other words, to move into the very centre of the enemy’s country, and crush out the rebellion in its very heart.’ Although events have proved that the carrying out of the plan was attended with far greater difficulties than were then foreseen, yet it must be acknowledged that the memorandum was most ably drawn up ; and that, although the author of it has been cast aside, yet that in the main his scheme has been put into execution. Where, as in Northern America, nothing is kept secret from the public, the main features of the plan

of the approaching campaign became known, and were announced in the daily press. Its vastness was pleasing to the American mind, and the scheme of encircling the seceding States by armies was compared to the action of a great serpent enfolding and crushing its victim in its coils; thus the 'anaconda scheme' became the popular name for the approaching campaign. Preparations for aggressive movements were made during the end of 1860 and the commencement of 1861 in Missouri, Kentucky, Western Virginia, the Shenandoah Valley, and Eastern Virginia, whilst combined naval and military expeditions were organised to attack places on the coast of North Carolina, Georgia, Florida, and Louisiana; and it was alleged that nothing could resist the vast armies and flotillas, both on the land, on the sea, and in the inland waters.

The campaign commenced in Kentucky, as it was of great importance to secure that powerful State to the Union, as also to open the channel of the Mississippi to the Federal gunboats and to the trading vessels of the Western States. Before, however, the plans of the Federal generals were matured, and during the first month of the new year, the campaign in Kentucky was inaugurated with a battle, which was in a great measure brought on by the Confederates, and was apart from the general plan of the campaign as arranged by their opponents. The Western district had been conferred by President Lincoln on General Halleck, who had made his head-quarters at St. Louis, and, under him, General Grant commanded the forces on the Mississippi in Western, and General Buell, also an officer of the regular army, the forces in Eastern, Kentucky.

The Federal army in Eastern Kentucky occupied

Somerset and Columbia, towns to the north of, but in the vicinity of the upper part of the Cumberland River, whilst General Zollicoffer, in command of the Confederate troops which had fought the battle of Wild Cat, in the autumn of 1861, had pushed forward in the month of November to a position on the left or southern bank of the upper part of the Cumberland River, and had pitched his camp at Mill Springs. He subsequently crossed the river and fortified a position on the northern bank at Beech Grove. Here he was joined by General Crittenden, who had recently been appointed Brigadier-General, and who, being the superior officer, took command of the force. It was with great difficulty that the Confederate generals procured supplies for their troops during the winter months; the south-western portions of Kentucky and Eastern Tennessee were thinly inhabited and but partially cultivated, whilst foraging parties from the enemy rendered difficult the passage of supplies up the Cumberland River from Nashville. Under these circumstances a movement either of advance or retreat was necessary, and after a council of war the former was resolved on. The situation of the Federal forces was supposed to present a favourable opportunity for attack. General Thomas was known to be in the vicinity of the Confederate entrenched camp, having advanced from Columbia as far as a place called Logan's Cross-roads, where he was awaiting the arrival of the troops under General Schœpf* from Somerset. Much rain had fallen during the month of January, the roads were almost impassable, and Fishing Creek, a small tributary of the Cumberland River, over which General Schœpf's force

* Generals Thomas and Schœpf were subordinates of General Buell.

would have to cross, was supposed to be so much swollen that his junction with General Thomas was considered for the present impossible. Influenced partly by the condition of his own army, partly by the situation of the enemy, General Crittenden ordered an advance. At midnight on January 18 the troops paraded, and commenced their march. The first column, commanded by General Zollicoffer, consisted of four regiments of infantry and four guns; the second, under General Carroll, in support, of three regiments and two guns, the reserve of one regiment and two battalions of cavalry.* Two companies (or, in European phrase, troops) of cavalry formed the advance-guard. It will be perceived that the Confederates were poorly supplied with artillery; but the nature of the country, undulating and thickly wooded, was unfavourable to that arm. General Thomas had (as has been before mentioned) arrived on the 17th at Logan's Cross-roads, about ten miles north of the Confederate entrenched camp, and had issued orders for General Schœpf to join him as soon as possible. The force actually present under his command on the morning of the 19th consisted of four regiments of infantry, one battalion of engineers, and one battery of artillery, as two regiments of infantry had been detached on the 17th on a foraging expedition.† About 5.30 A.M. on the 19th, the cavalry videttes of General Thomas's army gave warning of the approach of the enemy, and Colonel Manson, commanding the second brigade, consisting of two regiments, took up a position on the road to oppose his advance until reinforcements

* In America a regiment of cavalry is divided into battalions and companies.


† General Thomas's official report.

should arrive. General Thomas immediately rode forward, and ordered up Colonel M'Cook's brigade of two regiments and a battery of artillery. At the commencement of the action the Confederates were enabled to drive back the Federal regiments opposed to them for a short distance; but as the supports came up, and the forces were more equal in numbers, the Federals held their ground. About 8 A.M. the action became general, and soon afterwards General Zollicoffer, riding forward in front of his men, and probably missing his way in the woods, found himself in front of a Federal regiment. He was recognised, and several rifles were pointed at him. Colonel Fry, commanding the 4th Kentucky, drew his revolver, and General Zollicoffer* also drew his and fired, wounding Colonel Fry's horse. Colonel Fry, more accurate in his aim, fired, and the general fell from his horse dead. His loss, at the critical moment of the action, produced depression among the men. General Crittenden put himself at their head, but the Federals advanced and drove back their opponents, who retreated in considerable disorder. During the action three additional regiments, under General Carter, had arrived as reinforcements for the Federals, and later in the day the two regiments which had been detached on the 17th, and three regiments under General Schœpf, also came on the field. General Thomas followed the retreating Confederates, but apparently without attempting an energetic pursuit, as far as their entrenchments, in front of which he halted for the night, and contented himself with throwing shells into their camp. During the night the

* There appears to be a doubt whether the general or his aide-de-camp fired.

Confederates, unprovided with rations and the necessary supplies to enable them to hold their entrenched position, and fearing lest they should be cut off, retreated across the Cumberland River. The crossing was effected by the aid of a small steamer, which had made its way with supplies for the army from Nashville some days previous. The men only effected a passage; neither would time allow of the transport of the *matériel* of the army; neither were there a sufficient number of boats to convey the wagons, horses, and artillery, which, together with the camp equipment, fell into the hands of the Federals when their troops occupied, on the following morning, the deserted entrenchments. General Thomas reported the capture of 12 pieces of artillery, a battery wagon, and two forges, 150 wagons, and upwards of 1,000 horses and mules. His own loss he estimated at 14 officers and 232 men, killed and wounded. The Confederate loss must have been more severe, and during the retreat of the army to Monticello, and afterwards to Gainsboro' in Tennessee, the privations and suffering they underwent were very great. The thinly populated country could not supply means of support for so large a body of men, and the whole of the transport of the army having been abandoned, the soldiers carried nothing with them but what was on their backs. The battle of Mill Springs was the most serious disaster that had as yet befallen the Confederate armies. The troops do not appear to have behaved with their wonted firmness, as in the numbers actually engaged the Confederates were probably superior to the Federals. In the equipment and working of the artillery, the advantage lay with the Federals. On neither side did the cavalry play any considerable part. Indeed, the nature of the country,

and the absence of the requisite military training for either men or horses, have during the war prevented either the Confederate or Federal cavalry from performing the duties usually assigned to that arm in European armies. Eastern Kentucky was now completely in the hands of the Federals, but its possession was not of so great importance, either in a political or military point of view, as that of the Western part of the State, as it was through Western Kentucky that the rivers and railways passed which afforded an entrance into Tennessee, and so to the heart of the seceding States. During the month of January, strong reconnaissances of combined military and naval forces had been pushed forward from Cairo in the direction of Columbus; shots had been interchanged between the river steamers of the Confederates and the Federal gunboats, but no serious attack on the Confederate position had been attempted since the affair at Belmont. The Tennessee River, and not the Mississippi, was the real object of attack. The line of defence taken up by General Sydney Johnston, commanding the Confederate armies of the West, extended from Bowling Green on the right to Columbus on the left, which places were connected by a railroad passing through Russellville, Clarksville, and Paris, and crossing both the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers, the former at Clarksville, the latter a short distance south of the Kentucky and Tennessee state lines. It was of great importance to preserve this line of rail, and also to defend the course of the two above-mentioned rivers, which debouch from Tennessee within a short distance of each other, and at about 70 miles from their points of entry into the Ohio River. With these objects two forts had been erected; viz. Fort Henry, on the right



SCENE OF THE CAMPAIGNS OF KENTUCKY AND TENNESSEE.

bank of the Tennessee River, a few miles north of the Kentucky state line, and Fort Donelson, on the left bank of the Cumberland River, about 15 miles to the south-east of Fort Henry, near Dover, in Tennessee. The defences of Fort Henry consisted of a bastioned earth-work, of which the river face mounted eleven heavy guns, one only being rifled. In addition to the fort itself, there were lines of entrenchments of considerable extent, consisting of a slight earthen parapet and abattis, connected with the river and the fort, and owing their strength partially to creeks and swamps in the vicinity of the river. About a mile and a quarter below the fort an island divided the stream into two parts, of which the main channel was on the western side; that on the east, when the waters were low, being too shallow for the passage of gunboats. The relief of the fort above the river was about twenty feet, and the higher ground on the opposite side of the stream commanded it. A considerable force under General Tilghman, of about 2,600 men, only a portion of whom were properly armed and disciplined, occupied the entrenchments, whilst a detachment of artillery, of 75 men, garrisoned the fort. Such was the position of affairs on February 4, when the fort was threatened by the Federal army and fleet, under General Grant and Commodore Foote. The expedition, consisting of ten regiments of infantry, with a proportion of artillery and cavalry, had embarked in transports at Cairo on February 1, and, convoyed by seven gunboats, had proceeded up the Tennessee River to a point about four and a half miles below Fort Henry. Here the troops were landed, and, on February 5, General Grant issued his orders for the attack. The object in view was to surround

and cut off the garrison of Fort Henry from Fort Donelson on the land side, whilst the naval force, assisted by the troops, were to engage the fort from the river. To carry out this plan, the first division, under General M'Clermand, was ordered to march from camp at 11 o'clock A.M. on February 6, and, proceeding up the right bank of the river, to take up a position on the road from Fort Henry to Fort Donelson. Two brigades of the second division, under General C. Smith, were directed to march at the same hour along the left bank of the river, and occupy the heights commanding Fort Henry; whilst the third brigade of the second division received orders to advance up the right bank of the river, moving directly on the fort, and to be in readiness to assault the works. The fleet, under Commodore Foote, consisting of four partially iron-clad and three wooden steam gunboats, was to leave their station off the camp at the same hour. The gunboats carried in all fifty-four guns, although only those at the bows were used during the action that ensued.* The roads along which the troops moved were deep in mud, owing to the rain which had fallen on the 2nd and 3rd, and it soon became evident that the fleet would arrive in front of the fort before the troops could reach the position assigned to them. At 12.30 P.M. on the 6th, the action was commenced by the gunboats. The rise of the river had made the water sufficiently deep to allow them to proceed up the eastern channel, and they were formed in two lines at about 1,700 yards from the fort. The first line was composed of the four partially iron-clad gun-

* The gunboats on the Western waters during the early campaigns were usually river steamers or ferry boats, armed with heavy guns, and altered, so as to be adapted for their use.

boats—viz. the Cincinnati, Commander Stembel (the flag-ship); the Essex, Commander Porter; the Carondelet, Commander Walker; and the St. Louis, Lieutenant Paulding: and the second line of the three wooden vessels—the Conestoga, Lieutenant Phelps; the Tyler, Lieutenant Gwin; and the Lexington, Lieutenant Shirk—which took position astern and inshore of the first line. The fire was opened by the flag-ship at 1,700 yards' distance, and was taken up by the other gunboats, and replied to vigorously by the fort. The gunboats gradually decreased their distance, only the bow guns of the iron-clads being used, in order to avoid the exposure to the enemy's shot of the vulnerable part of the vessels. The action had lasted about fifty minutes when a shot struck the Essex, entering the starboard boiler and filling the boat with steam. A large number of the crew (28) were scalded and otherwise injured by the steam, and the Essex, disabled, dropped astern. The remaining gunboats continued to move forward until they were within 600 yards of the fort, when the Confederate flag was lowered and a white flag hoisted, proclaiming the surrender of the place. The action had lasted one hour and fifteen minutes, and seven out of the eleven guns of the fort which bore on the river were disabled, when General Tilghman, who himself conducted the defence, surrendered. The garrison were made prisoners of war. The loss on either side was not actually great, although large in proportion to the number of men engaged. In the gunboats, irrespective of the 28 men scalded on board the Essex, there were 2 killed and 9 wounded; on the Confederate side 5 killed and 16 wounded. The main body of the Confederates—unable, on account of the situation and construction

of the entrenchments, to defend them against the naval and military force of the Federals, and too weak in numbers to meet the troops in the open—retreated, under Colonel Heiman, to Fort Donelson. During the retreat there was a slight skirmish between the rear-guard and the Federal cavalry, and some of the field artillery was abandoned. Thus fell Fort Henry, the key to the Tennessee River, and, together with Fort Donelson, the chief positions in the centre of the Confederate line of defence. Its situation had been badly selected. The heights on the left bank of the river commanded the fort; and although an attempt had been made to construct a work on these heights, yet it was unfinished, and useless on the day of the attack. The force under General Tilghman's command was composed of raw troops, armed principally with shot guns; the cavalry entirely so, being unprovided with either sabre or pistol. The general's position was one of great difficulty. He was aware of the importance of defending the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers; but his attention had been more especially directed to the latter, as he considered that on Fort Donelson depended the safety of the Confederate right wing at Bowling Green. He had himself superintended the construction of Fort Donelson, but was not responsible for the selection of Fort Henry as a point of defence.* The sudden rise of the river cut off all lines of retreat excepting one, and it was to cover the retreat, and to delay the gunboats, that General Tilghman ordered the defence of Fort Henry. He was in the fort when the bombardment commenced, and being anxious to hold the place for as long a time as was possible, and seeing

* General Tilghman's official despatch.

that if he and his staff deserted the fort, the men, who were but few in number, would hardly be induced to work the guns, resolved to remain in the fort and to share its fate, and therefore handed over the conduct of the retreat to Colonel Heiman, his second in command. That officer spoke of his superior officer's conduct in the following high terms, when, in consequence of General Tilghman's capture, he reported the circumstances of the retreat. He wrote: 'I may be permitted to state that the self-sacrificing heroism displayed by General Tilghman and his staff, in this terrible and unequal struggle, challenges the admiration of all men, and entitles him to the gratitude of the whole Confederate States.' *

The fall of Fort Henry opened the course of the Tennessee River to the Federal gunboats. The three wooden vessels under Lieutenant Phelps were immediately ordered to proceed up the river as far as the depth of water would permit, in order to destroy the bridge of the railway between Dover and Paris, and to capture or sink any of the enemy's vessels they might encounter. The expedition met with complete success. Lieutenant Phelps proceeded as far as Florence, in Alabama, having destroyed the railway bridge according to orders, and captured three steamers and a partly-finished gunboat, besides compelling the Confederates to burn six other river steamers. He also took possession of camp equipage and other stores on the river's bank. No opposition, excepting a few rifle shots fired from the shore, was offered to his progress, and he returned to Fort Henry on February 10. It certainly argued a want of foresight, either in those who

* Colonel Heiman's official report.

directed the defences of the Western States, or in those to whom was assigned their execution, that no obstruction had been placed, or fort erected, excepting the weak works at Fort Henry, to prevent even so feeble a squadron of gunboats from proceeding up the river, through the State of Tennessee into that of Alabama, and almost to the very centre of the seceding States.

Not only did the capture of Fort Henry afford an entrance for the gunboats into the Tennessee River, but it also gave General Grant a base from which he could operate against Fort Donelson. This advantage he was not slow to avail himself of. On February 12, he marched from Fort Henry with the divisions of General M'Clelland and Smith, consisting of about 15,000 men, having detached six regiments with orders to proceed by water, and under convoy of a gunboat, to the Cumberland River. About 2 P.M. on the 12th, General Grant's force encountered and drove in the Confederate pickets under Colonel Forrest, two miles from Fort Donelson, and proceeded to invest the works. For their defence a strong body of Confederate troops had, on the fall of Fort Henry, been hurried forward, as the importance of the position, which hitherto does not seem to have been sufficiently regarded, was now fully appreciated. On February 9, Brigadier-General Pillow received orders from General Johnston (commanding the Confederate troops in the West) to repair immediately to Fort Donelson, and to take command of the place. He arrived there on the following day, and used all the means in his power to prepare for its defence. Its garrison then consisted principally of the troops which had retreated from Fort Henry, and who were dispirited owing to their

reverses.* Batteries had already been erected to command the river; these were increased in size, and additional guns mounted to complete their armament. Eight 32-pounders, three 32-pounder carronades, one 8-inch columbiad, and one rifle gun, a 32-pounder, were placed in position on the works. A small fieldwork adapted for infantry overlooked the batteries, which were also commanded by the surrounding heights. Consequently, it was found necessary to run a line of entrenchments along those heights, consisting of detached works on the right of the Confederate line (considering it to be facing the west), and of a continuous parapet defended by abattis on the left, covering and enclosing within the circuit the small town of Dover,† where there were depôts of commissary and quartermaster's stores.

The length of the river line which bounded the position on the north was about one mile, whilst that of the entrenchments on the land side was about two and a half miles long, and varied in its distance from the river from one-fourth to three-fourths of a mile. The line of entrenchments, which was not nearly completed on the morning of the 12th, was constructed of felled trees, covered by a thin coating of earth, and formed a scarcely sufficient protection from even field artillery. Running up from the river, and separating the Confederate position almost into two sections, was a broad and deep valley, which had become flooded by the rise of the river.‡ The surrounding country was clothed with oak woods, varied occasionally with pine groves, and intersected by streams. It was hilly in

* General Pillow's official report.

† Ibid.

‡ Brigadier-General Buckner's official report.

its character, and other heights overlooked in some localities those on which the entrenchments had been erected. To Major Gilmer, an engineer officer, the arrangement and construction of the works had been entrusted, and he remained to take part in their defence. The garrison, as has been already stated, at first consisted almost entirely of the troops which had previously been stationed in the vicinity of Fort Henry, but they were reinforced, on the night of February 11, by a portion of the second division of the central army of Kentucky, detached from Bowling Green and Russellville. These brigades, consisting of about 4,250 men, were under the command of Brigadier-General Buckner. It was by General Johnston's express orders, that the forces of the several generals were concentrated at Fort Donelson; and in compliance with those orders, on February 13, General Floyd entered the place with the troops under his command, having marched from Cumberland city. There were thus concentrated at Fort Donelson, on the 13th, a force of about 14,000 men, comprising the remainder of General Tilghman's division under Colonel Heiman, the reinforcements under General Buckner, and those under General Floyd, including the cavalry under Colonel Forrest. The command of the whole army devolved on General Floyd as the senior officer, and by him that of the two wings was allotted severally to Generals Pillow and Buckner. Thus General Pillow commanded the left wing, and General Buckner the right. The three generals had never previously acted together. All had been engaged in operations which may be said to have been independent, and there was no unity in the army collected at Fort Donelson, nor does General Floyd appear to have been possessed of either the high rank

or eminent qualities sufficient to ensure the complete subordination, or rather perhaps the perfectly unselfish cooperation, of those under his command.

The first attack on the Confederate position was made on the 13th, when General Buckner commanded the right wing, Colonel Heiman the centre, and General B. R. Johnson the left, the two latter under General Pillow; whilst General Floyd, who had arrived on that morning, was in command of the whole. The Federals, as will be remembered, had arrived opposite the Confederate entrenchments on the 12th, but the whole of the army was not concentrated until the 14th, as it required a longer time for the regiments which made the circuit by water to reach their destination, than for those who had marched across the strip of land from Fort Henry. The right of the Federal army was under General M'Clermand, and the left under General Smith, when the attack of the 13th—which had more the character of a strong reconnaissance than of a real attack—commenced. A column was pushed forward up the valley which divided the right of General Buckner's division from General Heiman's brigade, and was repulsed principally by the artillery fire of the batteries belonging to the former, which were posted on heights overlooking the valley. The loss on either side was not great; it fell more severely on the Federals than on the Confederates, as the latter were fighting on the defensive, and were sheltered behind trees and broken ground, besides having the advantage of their entrenchments. The weather had been mild, and tolerably warm; but on the night of the 13th rain and snow fell, and the sufferings of the troops, especially of the wounded, on both sides, was very great. The Federals were far better supplied with

food and clothing than their antagonists; but during the heat of the previous day many regiments had thrown away their blankets and overcoats,* and consequently suffered in the night for their improvidence. On the same day, the 13th, one of the gunboats, the Carondelet, interchanged several shots with the Confederate water batteries; but the main attack of the gunboat flotilla did not take place until the 14th. On that day the reinforcements, consisting of the regiments which had been sent round by water from Fort Henry, and others from Cairo and Paducah, reached General Grant, and were posted, under General Lewis Wallace, in the centre of his line between Generals M'Clermand and Smith, and slightly to their rear. General M'Clermand also pushed forward his right, until he had invested the whole of the left of the Confederate position, excepting a strip of swampy ground near the river. This was accomplished without much resistance. About 3 P.M. on the same day, Commodore Foote made an attack with the six gunboats under his command, possibly with the expectation of success equal to that which had attended his movements on Fort Henry. His force consisted of four iron-clad and two wooden gunboats.† They advanced in a crescent shape, five vessels in the front line, and one at a short distance‡ in rear, which fired shells into the Confederate batteries

* The carelessness of the Federal troops as regarded clothing and accoutrements was frequently shown, both in the Eastern and Western armies. As an instance, a Federal general in Virginia, wishing to do a good turn to a gentleman on whom he had quartered himself, told him to send a cart into the woods after his brigade had passed, and he would be sure to fill it with the blankets the men had thrown away during the march, the day being hot.

† Commodore Foote's report.

‡ General Pillow's report.

over the other gunboats. The vessels opened fire at a distance of upwards of a mile from the batteries, but the officers in command were directed not to reply until the gunboats had approached much nearer. Gradually they advanced, until within the short distance of 400 yards of the batteries. Then the Confederates, having waited until they were well within range, replied vigorously, and the battle continued for one hour and a quarter, when all four of the iron-clad gunboats had received such considerable injuries as to necessitate their withdrawal from the contest.* It was remarked by the Confederate artillerymen that the shot from the 32-pounder smooth bores produced little effect on the iron-clads, but that the principal damage was inflicted by the 10-inch columbiads and 32-pounder rifled gun. During the same day, viz. the 14th, a council of war had been held, when General Buckner urged the necessity of attacking the Federals before their reinforcements should have landed and taken up their position. This was agreed on, and General Buckner's division paraded for the attack; but that of General Pillow was not ready at the time named, and by the latter general's advice the attack was postponed, and another council of war was summoned to meet during the night.† This delay was fatal, as events proved. The cold weather had continued during the 14th, and the ground was thinly covered with snow. At the council of war assembled on the night of the 14th the critical position of the Confederate force was considered, and it was resolved to attempt to reopen the communication with Nashville

* Commodore Foote's report.

† General Buckner's report.

by Charlotte, and, by giving up the position at Fort Donelson, to save the greater portion of the Confederate army. An attack on the Federal right was therefore ordered for the following morning. General Pillow, commanding the left wing, was directed to attack General M'Clermand, and, turning his right flank, to drive him back towards the front of General Buckner's position. General Buckner was to assist the attack, and clear a passage by the Wynnes Ferry Road. There were two roads which led from Fort Donelson to Nashville—the Wynnes Ferry Road and the Randolph Ford Road, the latter being nearer the Cumberland River than the former. At 4 A.M. on February 15, General Pillow was on the ground, but his advance was delayed by the absence of a brigade which had not received its orders in time to get into position; it was not therefore until 5.15 A.M. that the column commenced its march. In about half an hour General Pillow's force became engaged with the enemy, who were in position in front of their encampment, awaiting the attack. General Pillow, who was in column of route, took some short time to get his men into a proper formation for attack.* General Buckner's division had in the meantime moved forward to occupy the entrenchments vacated by General Pillow, having been himself delayed by the non-arrival of a regiment from the garrison of Fort Donelson, which was to hold the lines he was about to vacate: the slippery state of the roads, half covered with ice, also delayed his march. Should the attack succeed, and the communications with Nashville be opened, it was arranged that the duty of forming the rear-guard of the retreating army should devolve on General Buckner. Therefore he was anxious

* General Pillow's report.

to save his men as far as was possible, and drew them up partly in column and partly in line near the entrenchments vacated by General Pillow, protected by a slight undulation of the ground from the enemy's fire. Nevertheless he ordered his artillery to open on the left flank of the enemy's columns engaged with General Pillow. The Federals under General M'Clermand, assisted by General Lewis Wallace, opposed General Pillow, but at 9 A.M., when General Buckner pressed their left, and General Pillow attacked them in front, they gave way. The want of ammunition was alleged as a principal reason for their retreat. The Confederate column under General Pillow advanced, General Buckner formed on their right, and the cavalry under Colonel Forrest charged and captured some field guns. But there was little organisation on the part of the Confederates; brigade and regimental commanders were left without definite orders, and there appears to have been a misunderstanding between Generals Pillow and Buckner, and a want of proper supervision on the part of General Floyd. General Buckner had obtained possession of the Wynnes Ferry Road, and was prepared either to march on Charlotte and Nashville by that road, or, holding it (whilst the remainder of the army moved by the lower road), to cover their retreat, and thus to form the rear-guard. The subsequent events of the day are almost incomprehensible. General Buckner was engaged in holding his position, and was expecting a portion of his artillery and a regiment which had not quitted the lines to join him, when he received orders from General Pillow to retire, and ascertained that that general had forbidden both his artillery and reserve from leaving the entrenchments. Under these circumstances General

Buckner commenced a retreat, but was met by General Floyd, who expressed much surprise at the order he had received. Nevertheless, after communicating with General Pillow, General Floyd himself ordered the retreat to be continued; and General Buckner, after a retrograde march of two miles, regained with his exhausted troops the position in the entrenchments which he had held in the morning. Before, however, the whole of his force had entered the lines, General Smith's division, forming the Federal left, attacked his right, and effected a lodgment in a portion of the entrenchments. The battle lasted two hours. A heavy column threatened Buckner's left, whilst his right was vigorously attacked, and, when evening closed in, the Federals under General Smith retained possession of the works they had captured. In this action, at first favourable to the Confederates, afterwards, through inconceivable confusion of orders, adverse to them, General Grant acknowledged to the loss of upwards of 1,000 men; about 250 or 300 of which had been captured by the Confederates, and immediately placed on board steamers, and conveyed up the river. In fact, the retreat of the Confederates to their entrenchments was tantamount to a defeat; they had failed in their attempt to force the Federal lines, and so in securing a line of communication with Nashville; their troops were tired and disheartened, besides suffering greatly from the inclemency of the weather, and they were, moreover, encumbered with an additional number of wounded. Again, therefore, to consider the proper line of conduct to be adopted, was a council of war called. It met, like the last, during the night—or rather early in the morning—at General Floyd's headquarters, in a house in Dover. Generals Floyd, Pillow,

and Buckner were the only three generals who formed the council, although other officers were present and witnessed the extraordinary proceedings that ensued. The business was opened by General Floyd, who requested the opinion of the other two generals as to the course which should be pursued in the emergency in which the army was placed. General Buckner spoke out; he set forth the condition of the troops under his command, their fatigue, their losses, and their sufferings from cold and exposure; he referred to the small amount of ammunition still available, and gave as his opinion that an attempt at a sortie, exposed as the troops would be to a far superior force of the enemy, and also to the fire of the gunboats (as the water batteries would be abandoned), would be a virtual massacre of the army, more disheartening in its effects than a surrender. In this opinion General Floyd coincided, and the impression left on both General Floyd's and General Buckner's minds was that General Pillow also agreed. The latter officer asked whether the position could be held for one day longer. General Buckner reiterated his former opinion, stating that with his weakened and exhausted force he could not successfully resist the assault which would be made on him at daylight by a vastly superior force. He further remarked, that he understood that the principal object of the defence of Fort Donelson was to cover the movement of General S. Johnston's army from Bowling Green to Nashville, and that, if that movement was not completed, it was his opinion that an attempt at further defence, even at the risk of the destruction of the entire force, should be made, as the delay of even a few hours might ensure the safety of General Johnston's force. In reply, General Floyd remarked that General John-

ston's army had already reached Nashville. General Buckner then stated that, in his opinion, the general officers owed it to their men to obtain the best terms of capitulation. General Floyd coincided with the opinion. It was understood that General Pillow also agreed.

With regard to himself, General Floyd said that he would die rather than surrender, but acknowledged that he allowed himself to be influenced by personal reasons. General Pillow then remarked—addressing himself to General Floyd—that there were no two persons in the Confederacy whom the Yankees would prefer to capture more than himself and General Floyd, and asked General Floyd's opinion as to the propriety of his accompanying him should he attempt to escape. General Floyd answered that every man must decide for himself, and having ascertained that General Buckner would remain and conduct the negotiations of surrender, he gave over the command to General Pillow, who immediately passed it on to General Buckner. General Buckner, seeing that no time should be lost, as daylight was approaching and an attack was apprehended, called for pen, ink, and a bugler. General Pillow left the room, and was asked by Colonel Forrest, commanding the cavalry, what he (Colonel Forrest) should do. To this General Pillow replied, 'Cut your way out;' and Colonel Forrest then left to make the necessary arrangements for the march. General Pillow again returned to the room, and stated to Generals Floyd and Buckner, who had remained there, that he wished it to be understood that he had thought it would have been better to have held the fort another day, in order to await the arrival of steamers to transport the troops across the river. To this General Buckner

answered by recapitulating his reasons for considering that course impossible. General Floyd then applied to General Buckner for permission to take with him his brigade, which request was granted, provided that the troops should have departed prior to the capitulation. General Floyd gave orders for his brigade, principally composed of Virginia regiments, to parade immediately. The remainder of the troops were ordered to the entrenchments, excepting the 20th Mississippi regiment, which remained to cover the embarkation of General Floyd's brigade. Great was the confusion at the landing-place as they went on board the steamers; stragglers from every regiment and brigade poured down to embark, as the news of the approaching capitulation had spread through the army. Daylight dawned, and General Buckner—fearing an attack on the transports by the enemy's gunboats, and also that his own honour as an officer would be impugned if the embarkation was longer delayed—sent urgent orders for the last steamer to get under way. This, at length, was accomplished, and the 20th Mississippi and crowds of stragglers were left on the shore.* Colonel Forrest in the meantime marched by the lower road, already deep in water through the overflow of the river, and succeeded, with the cavalry under his command, in effecting his escape, excepting his rear-guard, consisting of Overton's cavalry, which was cut off and forced to return to the lines.

Whilst these events were occurring, a proposal of an armistice until twelve o'clock on the 16th (the communication being dated that morning), in order to

* It appears that General Pillow accompanied General Floyd on board the steamer, and did not march with the cavalry.

determine on terms of capitulation, was sent to General Grant by General Buckner. General Grant returned as answer that no terms except unconditional and immediate surrender would be accepted, and that he proposed to move immediately upon General Buckner's position. To this communication General Buckner responded by stating that he was compelled by circumstances to agree to the terms, which he designated as ungenerous and unchivalrous. Orders were then sent by General Grant for the prisoners to be marched as quickly as possible to some place near the village of Dover, where they should receive two days' rations, preparatory to embarking for Cairo. The prisoners were to be allowed their clothing, blankets, and such private property as could be carried about their persons, and commissioned officers their side-arms. The place was immediately occupied by the Federal troops, and the river by the gunboats. General Grant announced, in his despatch dated February 16, that he had captured from 12,000 to 15,000 men,* at least forty guns, and a large amount of stores, horses, mules, and other public property.

The loss during the four days' actions on the Confederate side amounted to about 1,200, possibly about the same number effected their escape, and the remainder of the garrison, including a small reinforcement which had arrived during the siege, surrendered. The fall of Fort Donelson, following so quickly on that of Fort Henry, was a terrible blow to the Confederate cause in the West.

* The number of soldiers captured could scarcely have been more than 12,000, if the estimates of the strength of the garrison given by the Confederates are correct; indeed, the Confederate estimate of the numbers captured, according to Pollard, was only 5,079. General Grant's despatch was written immediately after the capitulation, before he could have been fully informed of the details.

During the battle, and prior to the capitulation, General Johnston finding that the force under his command was too weak to hold the extended line he had taken up, and becoming aware of the apathy evinced by the people of Kentucky to the Confederate cause, withdrew his forces from Bowling Green, and concentrated them at Nashville, Tennessee. Bowling Green was then occupied, on February 16, by General Mitchell's division of General Buell's army.

Before tracing out the results immediately following on the fall of Fort Donelson, it will be well to glance back on the events which accompanied its surrender. Both the scheme of the campaign and its execution on the part of the Federal generals are deserving of praise. The sudden attack on Fort Henry, followed by the concentration of forces opposite Fort Donelson, appear to have taken the Confederates by surprise. At Fort Henry the works on the right bank of the river were incomplete, and consequently useless when the attack commenced; and at Fort Donelson, not only were the lines of entrenchment unfinished, but the troops necessary for the defence were absent, and only hurried forward without sufficient instructions, and under officers unknown to each other, at the last moment. Indeed the Confederates seem to have undertaken more than they could accomplish; they marched an army into Kentucky of strength insufficient to cope with the Federal forces of the West, and that army was obliged to rely on itself, and received little support from the population. No doubt, if positions on the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers had been well fortified and well garrisoned, they would have proved not only formidable outworks for the Confederate line of defence, but would have acted as doors to close the

entrance into the two important rivers of the Western Confederacy; but the condition of those places was such, that when attacked by the Federals they only served as temporary checks to their advance, at the risk of the loss not only of their defenders, but also of the stores and armament with which they had been provided. The Federal troops, according to the testimony borne by their enemies, fought well, and even at this early period of the war a distinction was drawn by the Confederates between the relative good qualities of the Federal Western troops and those of the Eastern States, the more especial objects of their hatred. During the battle of the 15th the Confederate soldiers behaved with great courage, but they were badly handled.* A striking testimony to the good effects of closing with the enemy is borne by Colonel Baldwin, who commanded a brigade in General Buckner's division. In his report the following sentence occurs:—'I would beg leave to remark here that the efficiency of the smooth-bore musket, and ball and buck shot cartridges, was fully demonstrated on this occasion (i. e. the battle of the 15th), and to recommend that our troops be *impressed* with the advantage of closing rapidly with the enemy, when our rapid loading and firing proves immensely destructive, and the long range arms of the enemy lose their superiority.' †

The closing drama of the scene, the council of war before the capitulation, discloses much which, to a military man, must appear contrary to the usual pro-

* How can totally inexperienced officers handle large bodies of men well?

† In the Italian campaign of 1859, when General Garibaldi's ill-armed troops first came in contact with an Austrian regiment, the same tactics are said to have been found successful.

ceedings of officers entrusted with high command. General Buckner seems to have been the only one of the three generals who showed decision of character and a right appreciation of the responsible duties of a general. When others failed he undertook grave responsibility, and unaffected by the conduct of the two superior officers, who even by their own statement abandoned the troops entrusted to their command, fulfilled one of the most unpleasant duties which can fall to the lot of an officer.

General Floyd, in resigning the command, avowed himself to be influenced by personal motives ; that is, he well knew the hatred entertained for him by the Federals, who accused him of furnishing arms to the Southern States during the time he acted as Secretary of War to the United States Government ; and he was probably fearful of the treatment that might await him from their hands. General Pillow's expression of opinion, either during or subsequent to the council of war, that the place could be held for another day, is of no avail in exculpating him from the charge of avoiding the responsibility of taking the command that properly devolved on him, and which, if he had done, would have enabled him to put his opinion into practice. The phrase stated to have been used by both generals, that they would die rather than surrender, is unworthy of officers high in rank, who have far more important duties to perform than those involving merely their own lives or feelings.

That President Davis disapproved of the line of action adopted by the two senior officers in command at Fort Donelson, and drew a distinction between their conduct and that of General Buckner, is evident from the fact that he deprived General Floyd of the

command which was assigned to him by General Johnston after the fall of the place, and that he did not again employ General Pillow; whilst, after General Buckner had been exchanged and returned to the Confederate States, he again placed him in a high position. The immediate effect of the fall of Fort Donelson was the advance up the Cumberland River of the Federal gunboats as far as Clarksville, and the decision on the part of General Johnston to abandon Nashville and to take up a position further south. Accordingly, the Confederate army encamped on the right bank of the Cumberland proceeded to cross the wire bridge, and to march in the direction of Murfreesborough. Great was the excitement, anger, and alarm among the population of Nashville when they found that no attempt was to be made to defend their city, and that they were to be given up to their enemies. Governor Harris of Tennessee issued an address, calling on the Legislature to remove to Memphis, and ordering the records of the State to be conveyed there. He justified the surrender of Nashville by a statement of the circumstances which had preceded it. He pointed out how dilatory the citizens had been in furnishing labour to erect defences round the city; he also showed how he had furnished to the Confederate Government, from the State of Tennessee, a larger number of men than they had been able to arm, and, as a partial remedy to that defect, how he had called on all citizens to give up their fowling-pieces for the use of the troops. Having thus exhausted the country of men and arms, he was unable, when deserted by the Confederate army, to hold the city of Nashville with State troops. Nevertheless he issued a proclamation calling out the militia of the State, appointing commanders over them, and

ordering them to assemble at Knoxville, at Chattanooga, and at General Johnston's head-quarters, wherever they might be. As each division of the army defiled over the bridge, the despair and confusion in Nashville became greater. All sorts of wild rumours found circulation. The momentary arrival of the Federal gunboats was expected, and the officers in charge of the army stores, catching the alarm, commenced the destruction, instead of the removal, of the provisions and supplies. The storehouses, filled with large quantities of provisions, were either broken into by the mob or voluntarily opened by those who had the management of them, and their contents were distributed among the poorer citizens. The steamers in the river and the railway trains were laden with the stores which could be saved, the guards impressing able-bodied men to assist in the work. Numbers of the population fled by rail, river, and private carriages, and the roads south of Nashville were thronged with fugitives. As the day passed, and the gunboats did not make their appearance, some order and regularity in saving the Government property was attempted, but it was too late; vast quantities were destroyed, given away, and stolen, and two large unfinished steamers on the wharf were burnt. On February 25, the first brigade of the Federal army reached Nashville, under General Nelson; it was a portion of the force under General Buell's command, which had followed the retreating Confederates from Bowling Green, and had been conveyed up the river in transports from Clarksville. General Buell immediately issued orders with the intention of calming the excitement of the population, assuring them that discipline would be maintained among the troops, and declaring that no arrests should be made unless by order

of the commanding general. The Mayor of the city waited on General Buell and formally surrendered the place, receiving assurances from him that the people should be protected, and that the commerce of the city should not be interfered with, excepting so far as regarded the sale of spirituous liquors, which was forbidden. General Johnston accomplished his retreat from Nashville without molestation, and took up a position in the vicinity of Murfreesborough, about thirty miles to the south, and on the line of rail between Nashville and Chattanooga. The defence of Northern Tennessee was for the time abandoned, and the whole line of the Cumberland River given up to the Federals. The right wing and centre of the Confederate army had thus been driven back; and it became necessary to order the retirement of the left wing, which held Columbus on the Mississippi. Instructions to that effect were issued by the War Office at Richmond, through General Beauregard, who had been placed in command of the army of Mississippi, to General Polk, and that officer immediately took steps to carry out the arrangements necessary for the removal of the guns and stores accumulated there. During the autumn a line of defence had been prepared about forty miles south of Columbus, near the Tennessee State line, embracing the small village or town of New Madrid on the right bank, the mainland in Madrid Bend, and Island No. 10.* To these entrenchments General Polk proceeded to remove the force under his command, partly in steamers, partly by land; and Columbus was evacuated by the Confederates on March 2. On the 3rd, the Federal cavalry

* General Polk's official report.

from Paducah, followed shortly afterwards by the gun-boats under Commodore Foote, arrived off the place, and formally took possession of it. The Confederates had removed the greater portion of the armament and stores, but a few guns on the entrenchments, and some shot and shell, remained as trophies to the Federal army. The Confederate left wing was therefore established on the Mississippi River at Island No. 10, in advance of the centre and right; and the line of defence for the Western States now extended from Island No. 10, on the left, through Jackson, Tennessee, where General Beauregard had established his headquarters, to Murfreesborough, where what had formerly been the right wing and the centre were united under General Johnston. Thus General Polk's force formed the left, General Beauregard's the centre, and General Johnston's the right of the Confederate line. During the two months of January and February the whole of Kentucky and the northern part of Tennessee, besides the navigation of two large rivers, had been wrested from the Confederates; but even the reverses which entailed this loss were only precursors to others which befel their armies during the early part of the year 1862, the darkest period of the history of the Confederacy.

It was indeed under far from favourable auspices that the President of the Confederate States commenced his term of office. One cannot say that he then undertook the duties of President, for he had long fulfilled them; but it was on February 19 that the electoral votes were counted, and Mr. Davis was unanimously elected President of the Confederate States of America, and Mr. A. H. Stephens Vice-President. On the 22nd, the ceremony of inauguration took place in front of

the building set apart for the use of the Congress of the Confederate States. The locality was well chosen to give effect to so important a ceremony. The city of Richmond, which has been compared to ancient Rome in the number of hills on which it stands, is built on both banks of the James River, which is navigable for vessels of large size even up to the city itself. The larger portion of the town stands on the left bank of the river, and covers the hills which rise at steep slopes from the water side. On the most prominent of these hills the Capitol, as the united Houses of the Senate and Representatives are termed, has been erected. It is of Grecian architecture, and commands an extensive view over the city, the river, and the fertile and well-wooded country to the south. In front of the Capitol is an open place, and on this spot, near the statue of Washington, the highest officers of the Confederate States met, in order to receive the address from the new President. In it he reiterated the principles for which the Confederate States were fighting; he contrasted the arbitrary acts of the Federal Government with the unrestricted liberty enjoyed by those under the Confederate rule; he showed how the mode in which hostilities had been waged on the part of the North would of itself prevent any return to the Union; he spoke of the rapid increase of the Confederacy from six to thirteen States; and asserted that, though for the moment the tide was against them, yet that the final result in their favour was not doubtful. Then he spoke of the trials and difficulties which the people had already undergone, and which they could not hope for some time to escape from; but he pointed out how trouble had aroused feelings of patriotism, virtue, and courage—that it was perhaps the will of Providence

that the people should be taught the value of their liberties by the price they were forced to pay for them—and that the recollections of the great common contest in which the several States had been engaged should serve as a bond of union between them. The President did not shrink from avowing the misfortunes which had lately befallen the Confederate arms. He termed the present time, when the provisional government had just given place to the permanent government, the darkest period of the struggle, and acknowledged that, after a series of successes and victories, the Confederate armies had recently met with serious disasters. Notwithstanding, he felt sure that, when in heart the people resolved to be free, disasters would but tend to stimulate them to fresh resistance.

During the long course of the war it has never been the policy of either the President or the greater generals of the Confederacy to conceal or gloss over misfortunes and defeat. They appear to have depended so entirely on the deep feelings of the people as to be sure that defeat, far from inclining them to weak submission, would add an incentive to fresh exertions. It was not only in the West that the evils of war pressed hard on the people of the Confederacy during the early part of 1862. The Eastern coast had been invaded by a vast expeditionary force; and it must be our task, having left for the present the States of Kentucky and Tennessee, to trace the events which had occurred on the seaboard cotemporary with the operations of the Western armies.

CHAPTER XII.

OPERATIONS ON THE COAST DURING FEBRUARY AND
MARCH 1862.

IN the before-mentioned memorandum drawn up by General M'Clellan, Commander-in-chief of the Federal armies, and submitted to the President as a synopsis of the projected campaign against the Confederate States, the following recommendation was made:—‘An essential feature of the plan of operations will be the employment of a strong naval force to protect the movements of a fleet of transports intended to convey a considerable body of troops from point to point of the enemy’s sea-coast; thus either creating strong diversions, and rendering it necessary to detach largely from their main body, in order to protect such of their cities as may be threatened, or else landing and forming establishments on their coast at any favourable places that opportunity might offer. This naval force should also cooperate with the main army in its effort to seize the important seaboard towns of the rebels.’

To assist in carrying out the scheme thus sketched out, an expedition under General Burnside, composed of troops from New England and the States on the eastern seaboard, in conjunction with a fleet under Commodore Goldsborough, was organised and assembled at Annapolis and Fortress Monroe. Clear directions, both

verbal and in writing, as to the object and conduct of the expedition were furnished to General Burnside by General M'Clellan. The flotilla was ordered to proceed to Hatteras Inlet, of which possession had been obtained during the previous autumn, and after providing for the safety of the garrison at that very important station, General Burnside received directions to make Roanoke Island and its dependencies the first point of attack. He was then to fortify the island, and, in conjunction with the fleet, to seize and hold the debouches of the canal from Norfolk. Following this an assault on Newbern was to be made, and if possible the southern line of railroad through Goldsborough to be occupied, and the Wilmington and Weldon Railway to be destroyed. The town of Beaufort, defended by Fort Macon, was next to be attacked and the port opened, whilst operations against Wilmington were pointed to as the eventual objects of the expedition. Such were the orders issued by General M'Clellan, and it remained for General Burnside to carry them out. There was complete unanimity of feeling, and even personal friendship, between Generals M'Clellan and Burnside; both had been at West Point, both had left the army; but in civil life they had been brought into intimate connection, General M'Clellan having been the manager and General Burnside a subordinate of the Illinois Central Railway. In addition to the military objects of the expedition, political motives also had their weight in determining its destination.

During the early period of the war there was a generally received opinion in the Northern States that a large proportion of the people of North Carolina still nourished in secret an affection for the Union, which would be divulged should a sufficient force arrive in

the State to overpower the dominion of a powerful minority, assisted by the weight and influence of the neighbouring States of the Confederacy. Therefore, with this double object in view, the expedition was organised and assembled at the mouth of the Potomac River. On January 12 it left Fortress Monroe, and after encountering rough and stormy weather, anchored inside Hatteras Inlet on the 17th. The fleet remained at this station for three weeks, and it was not until the beginning of February that an advance was ordered. The defences of Roanoke Island were under the command of the Confederate General Wise, who, however, reported to General Huger, commanding the district of North Carolina. Preparations had been made to meet the attack ; but, as was proved, of not sufficient magnitude to repel the large force which was about to be launched against the Confederate defences. The division under General Burnside's command consisted of three brigades, under Generals Forster, Reno, and Parke, and a brigade under General Williams stationed at Hatteras Inlet, which took no part in the attack. The fleet, comprising in all, with transport and store-ships, about sixty-five vessels, consisted of twenty-six gunboats. To meet this large force, the Confederates had but seven gunboats, under Commodore Lynch, and, including the supports which subsequently arrived, about 1,500 or 2,000 men.*

On February 5, the expedition left Hatteras Inlet ; the gunboats moved in advance of the transports which conveyed the troops, whilst others of lighter draught,

* There is much discrepancy between the Confederate and Federal estimates of the numbers ; the Confederate accounts state the number of troops to have been less than 1,800, the Federals considerably more.



SCENE OF BURNSIDE'S OPERATIONS ON THE COAST.

set apart especially for operations on the coast, flanked the column, prepared to silence any hostile demonstrations from the swampy shores, which were often approached within short range by the transports. There was little to invite invasion in the aspect of the North Carolina coast. Nothing could be seen from the decks of the vessels but reeds and swamps, bounded on the horizon by an unbroken line of dark cypresses and pines. No habitations, excepting an occasional shed used during the shad and herring fisheries, evinced the presence of man, whilst the very names of the surrounding districts suggested ideas of only gloom and desolation. The great dismal swamp and the lesser dismal swamp occupy the north-eastern districts of North Carolina, and their names fully bespeak their character.

The distance between Hatteras Inlet and Roanoke Island is thirty-eight miles, and very slowly through the whole of the 5th the gunboats and transports steamed along the narrow channel. On the night of the 5th the fleet anchored about ten miles from Roanoke, and on the 6th advanced a short distance nearer; but it was not until February 7 that the attack commenced. Roanoke Island divides Pamlico Sound from Albemarle Sound, and is situated about mid-distance between the long bar of sand which shuts off the inland sounds from the Atlantic Ocean, and the mainland of North Carolina. Two channels, termed Roanoke Sound on the east, and Croatan Sound on the west, of the island, afford entrances into Albemarle Sound, and it was through the latter, or westernmost sound, that it was intended to force a passage. The Confederates had not attempted to erect any defences on the southern end of the island, their attention being confined to closing the northern outlet from Croatan Sound.

There three batteries had been erected on the Roanoke shore called Weir's Point Battery (the most northern), Fort Blanchard, and Pork Point Battery, and on the mainland one named Red Stone Battery on Fort Forrest.* Between Pork Point Battery and Fort Forrest piles had been driven and some old vessels sunk to obstruct the channel; the former had not been done very efficiently, owing to the impossibility of obtaining the necessary machinery for driving in the piles. About the centre of the island, a short distance to the south-east of Pork Point Battery, an entrenchment had been thrown up, covered on the flanks by marshy ground, for the purpose of hindering, and, if possible, preventing the advance of a land force through the island. The situation was very unhealthy, and even the black labourers had suffered greatly in erecting the batteries in the low and marshy ground. The general himself had not escaped from sickness, but was laid up with illness and was unable to conduct the defence, which on land devolved on Colonel Shaw, whilst the small fleet of seven gunboats were under the command of Commodore Lynch. In the morning of February 7, the Federal gunboats entered the narrow channel of Croatan Sound, and were signalled at 10.30 A.M. by one of the gunboats of the Confederate squadron. The action commenced about 11.30 A.M. at two miles distance, the Confederate gunboats retiring slowly with the intention of drawing the Federals under the guns of the batteries. About noon the firing became general, both from the forts and gunboats, and an attempt was made by the Confederates to land a reinforcement of men (sent from the mainland by

* Total number of guns mounted in the batteries, thirty-six.

General Wise) on the island. The formation of the shore and depth of water compelled them to attempt this operation under fire, but owing to the advance of the Federal gunboats, and the determination of Commodore Lynch to retire with his squadron behind the sunken obstructions, the barges which contained the troops were forced to abandon their object and to retire to the northern end of the island, where they were run ashore, and with some difficulty disembarked the troops. The engagement continued during the whole day, with little loss to either side; on that of the Federals there were but five killed and ten wounded, including five who received injuries from the bursting of a gun on board of the gunboats. On the Confederate side, one gunboat, the Curlew, was sunk, but her crew escaped. At 6.15 P.M. darkness put an end to the firing. In the meantime the transports had effected an entry into Croatan Sound, and were assembled in rear of the gunboats and out of range of the Confederate batteries by 4 P.M. General Burnside then gave orders that a landing should be made on the island, which was accomplished at a place called Ashby's Landing, about the centre of the western shore, a short distance to the south of Pork Point Battery. Some of the gunboats covered the landing; by 6 P.M. about 4,000 men had been put ashore, and by 11 P.M. the whole division had landed. On the following morning a few shots were fired between the Federal gunboats and the batteries, but the Confederate gunboats had retreated, and the boats from the Federal vessels were employed in removing the obstructions across the channel. At 9 o'clock the troops advanced. The country was swampy and covered with forest, and a single road or cart track led from the landing to the

Confederate works. The Confederates, as has been stated, had entrenched themselves in a position protected on either flank by a marsh, and had cut down the forest in front and in rear of their entrenchments so as to have a clear place for the range of their guns, and for the purpose of manœuvring. The Federals advanced in three columns, the centre under General Forster, the left under General Reno, and the right under General Parke. The artillery, consisting of six 12-pounder boat-howitzers, accompanied the expedition. At first, after leaving their encampment, the troops marched in a single line by the road, but soon the flanking columns debouched to the right and left, and forced a way through the forest. The Confederates trusted to the strength of their position, supposing that the marshy ground on either side would protect their flanks ; but the overwhelming force opposed to them, added to the fact that the marshes were found to be practicable, soon compelled them to abandon their entrenchments, which were entered almost simultaneously by the regiments of General Reno's brigade followed by those of General Parke's and General Forster's. The pursuit was undertaken by portions of Generals Parke's and Reno's brigade, and the Confederates were followed up to the shore. Some effected their escape in boats which were quickly towed away by a steamer ; many, however, were captured, including two boats conveying the wounded, which were compelled to return by the Federal fire.

The greater portion of the Confederate troops surrendered to Generals Reno and Forster, and the whole of Roanoke Island, including the batteries erected for its defence, fell into the hands of the Federals. The Confederates do not appear to have offered a very obstinate resistance ; the gunners manning the batteries

and the crews of the gunboats fought well on the 7th; but on the 8th the troops seem to have been disheartened, and to have yielded up their position easily. Probably the fear of being cut off by the gunboats from retreat to the mainland, and the disheartening effect of the large force opposed to them, had an influence on the men. The Federal loss was reported at 35 killed, and about 200 wounded; among the former the colonels of the 10th Connecticut and of the d'Epineuil Zouaves (Colonel Russell and Lieutenant-Colonel Viguier de Monteuil). The Confederates, according to their own statements, lost 23 killed and 58 wounded. Among the killed was Lieutenant Wise, the son of the general, who, on the day previous, had been sent by his father with a reinforcement from the mainland. He received two balls, one in the arm and the other in the lungs, and two additional wounds whilst he was in the act of being carried off the field. He was placed in one of the boats in order to be conveyed to the steamer, when the boat was forced to return, and he, with others of the wounded, was captured. He was most kindly treated by the Federal officers, but died during the night. The capture of Roanoke Island was immediately followed by the pursuit of the Confederate gunboats. A squadron, under Commander Rowan, consisting of fourteen gunboats, was detached for that purpose, and weighed anchor on the afternoon of the 9th for Elizabeth city. On the 10th, the Confederate gunboats, protected by a small battery on the shore, were seen drawn up in line, in the narrow channel which leads up to Elizabeth city. Commodore Rowan engaged them, and the crews of the Confederate gunboats, after setting fire to their vessels, abandoned them, and fled for the shore. Four were thus burned,

one was captured, and two escaped into the canal which connects Elizabeth city with Norfolk. Shortly following this expedition was another, which had for its object the reconnaissance of the Chowan River, navigable for about 75 miles from its entrance into Albemarle Sound. Information had been given to Commander Rowan that there were several Union men in the small town or village of Winton, on the Chowan River. To develop this Union sentiment two gunboats and a detachment of Hawkins' Zouaves were sent up the river. On their approach to Winton, a small force was seen drawn up on shore, who received the Federals with a volley of musketry. The troops were consequently landed under cover of the gunboats, and the place burned, with the exception of the church. As the gunboats steamed up the rivers of North Carolina, the inhabitants abandoned their homes and fled, and even the most sanguine Unionist failed to discover any trace of Union sentiment among the white population of that part of the State.

The capture of Roanoke Island, and the consequent occupation by the gunboats of Albemarle Sound, not only gave the Federals command of the course of the Roanoke and Chowan Rivers, the former navigable for 120, the latter for 75 miles, but it also placed them in a position to threaten the great naval *dépôt* of Norfolk, connected with Elizabeth city by a canal, and by rail with Weldon on the Upper Roanoke; whilst it afforded them a secure *dépôt* for stores, and a place of assembly for operations against the towns on the Tar and Neuse Rivers, which flow into Pamlico Sound. Thus far the plan of operations sketched out by General McClellan had met with complete success. Following the programme, General Burnside made prepara-

tions for an attack on Newberne. The gunboats and transports were assembled inside Hatteras Inlet, and on March 12 started for that place. During the night the flotilla anchored off Slocome's Creek, eighteen miles distant from the town, near the mouth of the Neuse River; and on the following morning the troops disembarked. Rain had fallen heavily on the previous day, and the roads were deep in mud. The troops marched twelve miles, dragging with great difficulty the boat-howitzers with them. The gunboats moved slowly up the river, and shelled the works which skirted the road along which the troops marched. About eleven miles from the landing place an abandoned Confederate entrenchment was passed, and soon afterwards the enemy's pickets were encountered, and the troops halted for the night in close vicinity to the railway which connected Newberne with Beaufort. At daylight on the following day, the 14th, the attack commenced; General Reno's brigade, forming the left wing, and advancing along the railway; General Forrest's the right wing, moving along the main road; and General Parkes' brigade forming the support, and keeping as far as was possible in the centre of the line. The Confederate troops, composed principally of militia, under General Branch, occupied a line of detached forts* of low relief; that on the right, Fort Thompson, near the railway track, being about four miles from Newberne, whilst the others, viz. Fort Ellis, Fort Lane, and Union Point Battery, were about one mile apart, and at decreasing distances from the town. The trees in front of the forts had been partially cleared, but not sufficiently to prevent them from affording cover for the

* The forts consisted of low earthwork unriveted.

attacking force.* Consequently General Reno's advanced regiment, finding the Confederates strongly posted in Fort Thompson, fell back under cover of the forest, and kept up a fire on the work. The other regiments pursued the same course; and the boat-howitzers and two rifled guns, placed between the two brigades, also opened fire. The fire of the enemy in position caused great loss among the Federal troops, and the 21st Massachusetts were ordered forward to storm the work. Four companies entered the fort from the railway track, but were driven out over the parapet. The 4th Rhode Island came to their assistance, and the fort was retaken. Like all raw troops, the Confederates were very susceptible of their flank being turned, consequently, when the fort on the right of their line was captured, and they also perceived the gunboats moving up the river, they fell into some confusion, the whole Federal line advanced, a retreat ending in a flight commenced, the guns of Fort Ellis were thrown down the embankment, Fort Lane was blown up, and the Confederate troops fled across the railway bridge over the Neuse. This they succeeded in burning, by means of a raft laden with cotton and spirits of turpentine, which was set on fire and floated down against the piles of the bridge, and by so doing delayed the advance of the Federals. Notwithstanding, General Forster's brigade effected a passage by means of a small steamer that had been captured by the gunboats. About the same hour that the troops commenced the attack, the gunboats moved up the river. The obstructions placed

* This is a defect often observable in American field works; it is difficult to avoid, as usually the country is so thickly clothed with forest as to render the task of clearing the trees to a distance beyond the range of the modern rifle very difficult.

by the Confederates in order to detain the vessels under the guns of Fort Ellis proved but a slight hindrance; they were quickly passed, and the vessels arrived off the town shortly before the Federal army had reached the bank of the river. Trains conveying the troops and citizens of Newberne were seen by the crews of the gunboats hurrying from the place, and a few shells were fired at them. When the Federals entered and took possession of the town they found it almost deserted. The greater part of its inhabitants had fled to Goldsboro', more willing that their houses should be burned than that they should afford shelter to the hated Yankee. The Confederates fired the town before they retreated from it, and, notwithstanding the efforts of the crews of the gunboats and the troops, a great part of it was burnt. General Burnside did what lay in his power to conciliate the people and to repress any violence on the part of the troops. He stated his loss to have been about 91 killed and 466 wounded. The guns of the forts, numbering between thirty and forty, some field-artillery, two small steamers, some sailing vessels, and naval stores, were captured either during or after the battle. Shortly after the fall of Newberne, Washington, situated at the mouth of the Tar River where it enters Pamlico Sound, surrendered to a detachment of gunboats under Lieutenant Murray: the batteries had been dismantled and the entrenchments abandoned prior to the arrival of the Federals, and the town was given up without any resistance.

Up to this point General Burnside's expedition had accomplished the task sketched out for it. The Federal arms had, everywhere along the coast of North Carolina, met with complete success, and it only remained to be seen whether the population of the State would

welcome the invaders as friends or would continue to regard them in the same light as they were looked at by the neighbouring Confederate State.

The conduct of the inhabitants of Newberne proved that in that town there was little sympathy for the Federal cause; but a great deal was written during this period of the war, both in the despatches of officers and the reports of newspaper correspondents, of the deep under-current of Union feeling which lay at the bottom of the seemingly hostile attitude of the people. General Burnside, following the wise directions of the commander-in-chief, abstained from proclamations beyond those tended to assure the people of his friendly disposition towards them. General M'Clellan had worded his order in the following terms:—

‘I would urge great caution in regard to proclamations. In no case would I go beyond a moderate joint-proclamation with the naval commander, which should say as little as possible about politics or the negro, merely state that the true issue for which we are fighting is the preservation of the Union, and upholding the laws of the general Government, and stating that all who conduct themselves properly will, as far as possible, be protected in their persons and property.’*

It is curious to watch how, step by step, the war changed its objects, and how the more violent party, or rather the party whose aim was most clearly defined, as is the case in all great civil convulsions, gradually obtained the upper hand. During the first year of the war the conduct of the armies was principally in the hands of the Democrats, and an effort was made by the superior officers to carry it on with the object of vindi-

* General M'Clellan's order to General Burnside.

cating rather than of violating the provisions of the Constitution. Generals M'Dowell, M'Clellan, and Burnside all belonged to the Democratic party, and all showed an anxiety to restrain the increased bitterness which each month of the war developed, and to manifest that they were fighting rather for the reconstruction of the Union than for the conquest and humiliation of the South. General M'Clellan thus defined the object of the war :—

‘By thoroughly defeating their armies, taking their strong places, and pursuing a rigidly protective policy as to private property and unarmed persons, and a lenient course as to private soldiers, we may hope for a permanent restoration of a peaceful Union. But in the first instance, the authority of the Government must be supported by overwhelming physical force.’* During the time occupied by General Burnside's expedition in reducing to submission the several towns on the coast of North Carolina, Commodore du Pont had sailed south from Port Royal, and had captured the towns of Fernandina and Jacksonville on the northern coast of Florida. No resistance had been offered ; Commodore du Pont found the defences of Fernandina and Amelia Island abandoned, and was enabled to pass them with vessels of light draught, and to proceed up both the St. Mary and the St. John rivers. The town of Jacksonville on the latter river was occupied, although a portion of it was burned by the retreating Confederates. Some animus was said to have been displayed by the guerilla forces of the neighbourhood in selecting certain mills and houses to be burned, which were the property of

* Memorandum addressed by General M'Clellan to the President in August 1861.

Northern men who had settled at Jacksonville and were engaged in the lumber* trade. These reverses on the coast were severe blows to the Confederate States, and tended to raise the spirits of the North, which had been slightly depressed by the want of success which attended their arms during the preceding summer. The Federal gunboats established a prestige, which it took a long time to reduce to its proper proportions; men who feared not to encounter far more than their numbers in the field, yet hesitated and often yielded to alarm when exposed to the fire of the more weighty artillery of vessels against which they could offer little resistance. The loss to the Confederacy of so many places on the seaboard rendered the blockade of the remainder more easy, and the attempt, of which there were symptoms during the first months of the war, of creating a Confederate navy appears to have been postponed, if not quite abandoned.

* Lumber is the word used in America for timber. Great quantities of the live oak are exported from Florida.

CHAPTER XIII.

CAMPAIGN IN MISSOURI AND NEW MEXICO.

IN order to carry out a contemporaneous narrative of the several campaigns, it is requisite, in disregard of the great extent of country which separated the armies, to travel from the shores of Virginia to the westernmost limits, not only of the theatre of war, but even of civilisation. The contending armies of Missouri had gradually moved in a south-westerly direction, and on the confines of Missouri, Arkansas, and the Indian territory, was fought one of the most hardly-contested battles of the early period of the war. It will be remembered that at the close of the year 1861, General Price had established the head-quarters of his army at Springfield, where he also erected huts to shelter his men during the winter. There he received supplies of clothing, and was reinforced by about 4,000 men, raised principally from the State of Missouri. The greater portion of his force was composed of State troops, but on Missouri joining the Southern Confederacy, one brigade was transferred to the Confederate army. In the month of January news reached General Price that the Federals under Generals Curtis and Sigel* were concentrating troops at Rolla and Lebanon. Considering himself too weak in numbers to meet the force they would bring against him, General Price applied

* This name is often written Siegel, but in the American reports the *e* is omitted.

for assistance to the Confederate commanders in Arkansas, and in the expectation and hope of receiving reinforcements from them he held his position at Springfield until February 12. On that day his pickets were driven in, and finding himself about to be attacked by the combined Federal force, he retreated with little loss to Cassville, and thence to Cross Hollows on the frontier of Missouri, Arkansas, and the Indian territory.* At that place, towards the end of February, his rearguard was attacked by General Curtis, and General Price continued his retreat to Boston Mountains, about fifty miles to the south of Cross Hollows, hoping to form a junction with General M'Culloch. The command of the Confederate troops in the trans-Mississippi department, had been conferred during the month of January, 1862, on General Van Dorn, an officer of the old United States army, who had established his headquarters at Pocahontas, in Arkansas, where he was busily engaged in preparing for the approaching campaign. Having been advised of the retreat of General Price, and of his junction with General M'Culloch, he determined at once to proceed to their camp at Boston Mountains, and to put himself at the head of the combined army. He also issued orders for General Pike, who had organised a small force of Indians, to join him there. On March 4, General Van Dorn, at the head of the combined forces of General M'Culloch and Price, numbering about 16,000 men, marched from the camp at Boston Mountains by the Fayetteville road, with the object of attacking General Curtis. In the meantime General Curtis had crossed the Missouri State line into Arkansas,

* General Price's official report.

and had concentrated the three divisions of his army in the neighbourhood of Sugar Creek, a short distance to the south of Pea Ridge on the Fayetteville road, where he had fortified his position with slight earthworks and abattis. General Sigel's division formed the right, and was stationed near Bentonville, about seven miles distant from the remaining two divisions. The three divisions of the Federal army were under the respective commands of General Sigel, acting Brigadier-General Jeff. Davis, and acting Brigadier-General Carr. After passing through Fayetteville, General Van Dorn, informed of the strong position occupied by the Federals, and hoping to turn their right, and even place himself in the defile in their rear, diverged in a westerly direction from the Fayetteville road, and marched on Bentonville. There, on March 6, he encountered General Sigel's division, and nearly succeeded in cutting it off; however, that general, with considerable skill, and availing himself of the advantages of ground in order to cover his retreat with artillery, succeeded in extricating himself from the perilous position in which he found himself placed, and retired on the main army. The right flank of the Federals had been turned by General Van Dorn's movement, and there was danger lest the road directly in their rear, the only retreat open to them, should be occupied by the Confederates. This road passed through a range of thickly-wooded hills, and formed a defile which could be easily obstructed. To avoid the danger, and 'defeat the plan of the enemy,' General Curtis, on the night of the 6th or morning of the 7th, issued orders for a change of front to be effected by throwing back his left, the right still maintaining the position it occupied at Sugar Creek Hollows, but

becoming, after the movement had been executed, the left of the army. Thus, at dawn on the 7th, the position of the Federal army was at right angles with its position on the 6th, and the former right division, under General Sigel, now became the left of the army,* that of General Davis the centre, and that of General Carr the right. The line was formed across Pea Ridge, the right on Cross Timber Hollows, the left on Sugar Creek Hollow.† The right wing, under General Curtis, was opposite to the division of General Price, where was also General Van Dorn. The action commenced about 9 A.M. on the 8th by an engagement between Colonel Osterhaus' cavalry, which had been pushed forward from General Sigel's division to cover the change of front, and some Confederate cavalry belonging to General McCulloch's division. The Federal cavalry were driven back, and General Jeff. Davis' division was ordered forward to their assistance. In the meantime the right wing, under General Carr, was vigorously assailed by General Price. The low brushwood and numerous hollows and ravines afforded shelter to the Confederate troops as they advanced, and enabled them to engage the Federals at close quarters, where the shot-guns, loaded with buck-shot, with which they were armed, proved even more deadly than the rifles of the Federals.‡ The Confederates pushed forward vigorously, and the Federals were driven back. Feeling that the success of the attack on the Federal right was of the greatest importance, as it would cut off their army from its communication,

* In fact the army was clubbed.

† General Curtis's official report.

‡ Account by an officer of the regular army.—*Rebellion Record*, 1862, p. 260. Documents.

General Van Dorn sent orders to General M'Culloch about 2 P.M. to hold his position, and, if possible, advance on Generals Sigel and Davis, so as to prevent the Federal left wing from sending reinforcements to their hard-pressed right. This order never reached General M'Culloch: even before it was written he, together with General M'Intosh, his second in command, had fallen. The troops, intermingled among the brushwood, had been engaged in what may be termed bush-fighting; and one of the enemy's skirmishers, creeping close up to General M'Culloch, who was on horseback, and conspicuous from his dress, shot him dead.* His loss and that of General M'Intosh created confusion among the troops; Generals Sigel and Davis pushed forward, and for the time the Confederate right was driven back. Still, on the other hand, imminent danger threatened the right wing of the Federals, and General Ashboth, from General Sigel's division, was ordered to reinforce General Carr. He received the orders about 4 P.M., and arrived in time to enable General Carr to hold his ground until night closed in, and ended the engagement of the 7th. On the Federal right the Confederates had been successful, and General Van Dorn established his head-quarters in close vicinity to the position occupied in the morning by General Carr. On the left, owing principally to the fall of the two generals, the Confederate right had been repulsed; but, on the whole, on the night of the 7th the advantage lay with the Confederates, who had captured guns both from Colonel Osterhaus and General Carr, together with a considerable number of prisoners and

* Pollard's *First Year of the War*.

commissariat stores, and who also occupied a position which rendered it imperative for the Federals to fight on the following morning, in order to reopen their communications with Missouri, whilst it left the option to General Van Dorn of accepting or declining the battle. The night of the 7th was passed in great anxiety at the Federal head-quarters, where it was felt that the battle of the morrow would be for safety and even for existence. During that night and the early morning of the 8th the divisions were concentrated and placed in position for the anticipated action. General Jeff. Davis' division was ordered to form the right, General Carr the centre, and General Sigel the left. About 8 A.M. the battle commenced. The Confederates held a range of steep wooded hills, and to dislodge them from this position was the task principally allotted to the artillery. General Sigel manœuvred the artillery of his division well, and gradually advanced his infantry under cover of the fire. The Confederate guns replied, but, either from a want of skill on the part of the artillerymen, or from their inferior description of guns and ammunition, the fire was not equal in execution to that of the Federals. The Federal line advanced, and General Davis' division on the right commenced to turn the enemy's left. The Confederate artillerymen withdrew their guns, of which a few were captured; the infantry also retreated, and about 10 A.M. the battle had terminated. General Sigel's division was pushed forward to follow up the retreat, but the country was totally unfitted for the employment of cavalry, and both armies appear to have been exhausted; the Confederates especially so, as in the battle of the 8th they displayed little of the energy which they had evinced in that of the 7th. On either side guns were captured

and prisoners taken, and the loss in killed and wounded was about equal. The Federals, by their success on the 8th, had regained their communications and re-established themselves in a secure position ; whilst the Confederates, by their retreat, lost all the advantages they had acquired in the hard-fought battle of the 7th. Still, the battle of Pea Ridge, or Elk Horn, was not a decisive victory, as it was described in the Northern journals, and even in the Houses of Congress at Washington ; it was one of those indecisive actions so frequent during the war, in which many lives were lost with but little advantage to either side. General Curtis, in his official report written soon after the action, described his cavalry as ‘ pursuing the enemy through the mountains, scouring the country, bringing in prisoners, and *trying* to *find* the rebel Major-General Van Dorn, who had command of the entire force.’ This announcement of the complete rout and dispersion of the enemy scarcely agrees with the words used in the same despatch, ‘ that the rebel force retired in great confusion, but *rather safely* ;’ nor does it tally with the fact that a flag of truce bearing despatches was received from General Van Dorn on the following day, at the Federal headquarters, requesting General Curtis to allow a burial-party to be sent to inter the dead. The request was conceded, but General Curtis remarked in his reply on the barbarous method of fighting which had been used by the Indians who served with the Confederates. He stated that many of the Federal dead had been found tomahawked, scalped, and otherwise mangled. On this a correspondence ensued between the two generals. General Van Dorn, in answer to the allegations, trusted that General Curtis had been misinformed as to the facts alleged, as the Indians who formed part of his

army had been regarded for many years as civilised people; and at the same time he charged the Germans with murdering many of his men who had surrendered themselves prisoners. This was of course denied, General Sigel, on the other hand, accusing the Confederates of shooting Germans who proposed to surrender. In fact, as is usually the case when opposing parties are enraged against each other, each side believed that the misdeeds of the enemy afforded excuse for their own. However, in no other great battle of the war were Indians employed. They were said to have been of little service at Pea Ridge, as although individually brave, yet their numbers were too few, and they were too unaccustomed to the method of fighting in use among modern troops, to be of much service in the vast armies employed on either side; the noise and sight of the artillery is said to have astonished and terrified them, although in their own wild warfare they had always shown sufficient courage.

Both in the numbers engaged on each side, about 16,000, and in that of the killed and wounded, about 1,000, the two armies were nearly equal; if there was a difference, it existed in the superiority of the Federals, both in their numbers and in the loss they sustained. The greater slaughter on their side was on the 7th, whilst on the 8th the Confederates suffered severely from the artillery fire. The repulse of the Confederates at Pea Ridge (for repulse it must be called, as their attack failed) secured to the Federals the possession of Missouri. Bands of guerillas continued to roam through the State, but, excepting on the bank of the Mississippi River, little of importance occurred for a considerable time. Far to the west of Arkansas, beyond the Indian territory among the sand

hills and thinly settled districts of New Mexico, the war had extended. A small force of Texans, under General Sibley, had invaded the State, and were opposed by Colonel Canby, who had under his command a mixed force of regular troops and volunteers. The want of water, and the consequent almost barren nature of the greater portion of the country, rendered the employment of large bodies of men impossible. The Federal troops held certain forts and positions, from which the Confederates were unable to drive them, from the want of a sufficient artillery. In some instances actions, or rather skirmishes, took place in the open, and according as the result favoured either party, so was that side able to ravage the farms and levy contributions on the settlers of New Mexico. The population took but little part, and showed little interest in the struggle: if they inclined to either side, it was to that of the Federals, probably because they were the stronger, and had, by their occupation of the country, bound the principal inhabitants by motives of interest to remain faithful to the cause of the North. The principal engagement was dignified by the name of the battle of Valverde; it was fought between the Texans under General Sibley, and the garrison of Fort Craig under Colonel Canby, on February 21, 1862. In this action the Texans obtained an advantage, but not of sufficient importance to give them possession of the fort; however, they occupied for upwards of a month the principal towns of New Mexico, Santa Fé, and Albuquerque. The forts, viz. Forts Union and Craig, remained in the hands of the Federals, and their garrisons were sufficiently formidable to undertake an offensive campaign in the spring. Skirmishes ensued between the two armies, which resulted in the

determination of General Sibley to abandon the territory, leaving his hospitals at the towns of Santa-Fé, Albuquerque, and Socorro. In concluding his report of the campaign, General Sibley expressed his opinion that, excepting for its political geographical position, the territory of New Mexico was not worth a quarter of the blood and treasure* expended on its conquest. The neighbouring Indians had taken advantage of the intestine troubles of the territory, and the Navajoés and Apaches had carried off an innumerable number of sheep; indeed, their depredations were so great, that General Sibley determined to encourage private enterprises against the Indians, and to legalise the enslaving of them.† New Mexico was removed at far too great a distance from the seat of war to be in itself of importance to either party. As a means by which the Confederates could communicate with the Pacific coast, its occupation might possibly have possessed some value; but their Government could spare no resources for distant enterprises, as all its energies were required for the protection of the very heart of the country, menaced by the vast armaments organised by the enemy during the winter months.

* The treasure principally consisted of Confederate paper money.

† General Sibley's official report.

CHAPTER XIV.

CAMPAIGN IN EASTERN VIRGINIA.

WHILST the success which had attended the Federal arms during the commencement of the year 1862 roused the enthusiasm and excited the hopes of the people of the North to the highest degree, it also rendered them impatient of the inaction of the great army of Virginia, henceforth to be known as the army of the Potomac. The Young Napoleon, as it was the fashion to call General M'Clellan, had as yet, to vulgar eyes, done little. He had, indeed, made an army out of the discordant elements remaining from the battle of Bull Run; he had trained officers, organised the artillery and transport services, and reduced the crowd of men placed under his command to something resembling soldiers in appearance and discipline. But this was not enough for the people, or for a great majority of their representatives in Congress. Greater brilliancy of action was required, and the Young Napoleon was called on to vindicate the name that had been bestowed on him. The more ignorant the critics the more bitter were their criticisms; and men, even among those in high positions, who, previous to the commencement of the war, had never seen a brigade of troops together, talked of strategy and planned campaigns as if they had studied military affairs from their

boyhood. The force deemed necessary for active operations has already been given, as stated in the memorandum addressed by General M'Clellan to President Lincoln ; it was subsequently estimated more minutely in a report made to the Secretary of War, and was as follows :—

	Men	Guns.
Column of active operations . . .	150,000 . .	400
Garrison of the city of Washington . .	35,000 . .	40
To guard the Potomac to Harper's Ferry .	5,000 . .	12
To guard the Lower Potomac . . .	8,000 . .	24
Garrison for Baltimore and Annapolis .	10,000 . .	12
Total effective force required . .	208,000	488

or an aggregate, present and absent, of about 240,000 men.* On October 15, 1861, the number of troops in and about Washington, inclusive of the garrison of the city, the troops on the Maryland shore, and the garrison of Baltimore, was a little over 143,000 ; but by March 1, 1862, the total number had increased to 193,142 fit for duty, with a grand aggregate of 221,987. The actual number of troops demanded had been almost reached, but other requirements besides men were necessary before the army could move. The manufacture of arms had scarcely kept pace with the demand, consequently, the regiments as they arrived in Washington were ordered to remain on the Maryland side of the Potomac until they were equipped, when they were assigned to their respective brigades and divisions on the right bank. The infantry was organised in brigades consisting of four regiments, and when the troops had been somewhat disciplined and instructed, divisions of three brigades

* M'Clellan's report on the organisation and campaign of the army of the Potomac, p. 46.

were gradually formed. The same care was extended towards the artillery and the cavalry, although the latter arm was never, in General M'Clellan's opinion, so strong as it ought to have been. The regular infantry, collected from distant parts, was formed into a reserve, to be employed at critical moments; such a body being considered of especial importance in an army composed of raw and imperfectly disciplined levies. Great attention was given to the organisation of an effective artillery force, an arm of the service highly estimated both by General M'Clellan, and by most of the other Federal commanders. In July, 1861, the whole of the artillery was composed of nine imperfectly equipped batteries, whilst in March, 1862, it consisted of ninety-two batteries of 520 guns, 52,500 men, and 11,000 horses, fully equipped and in readiness for active service in the field; a sufficient evidence both of the activity of the Ordnance Department and of the energy of General Barry, chief of artillery. The field-batteries were assigned to divisions, not to brigades, in the proportion of four to each division, one of which was to be a battery of the regular artillery, whilst the artillery reserve of the whole army was to consist of 100 guns. The Engineer Department was increased from its at first small and inadequate organisation by the employment of volunteer regiments composed of men who, by their former professions and education, were, to a certain degree fitted for its duties. It was divided into two distinct services, that of the engineer service, properly so called, and that of the topographical engineers, a branch of more than ordinary importance in a country which had never been properly surveyed, and which was as little known for the purposes of military movements as in the days of the

campaign of Washington.* The Medical Department, the Quartermaster-General's Department (devoted in the American army almost entirely to the transport service), and the subsistence department, all required creation and organisation before offensive operations could be attempted; and it was during those months, when, according to popular opinion, General M'Clellan was lying idle in Washington, that the necessary organisation of the forces was, up to a certain point, completed. If the difficulties which beset the General of the Northern army were great, backed as he was by the resources of a powerful and rich country, and by the unlimited command of supplies from Europe, how much greater must have been those of the men to whom was allotted the task of preparing the Southern army for the expected campaign. The want of manufactures in the South was but poorly compensated for by the comparatively small quantity of supplies which reached her from Europe in vessels running the blockade; consequently, as regarded arms, equipment, clothing and medical stores, the army of the South was far from equal in efficiency to that of the North. But, in the deep-seated determination of her people, in the adaptation of the natural features of her country for purposes of defence, and, in addition to all, in the man whom she had selected to place at the head of the nation, the South was superior to the North; and it remained to be seen whether she would produce officers capable of utilising the advantages she possessed, and, notwithstanding the superiority both in men and material with which they would be forced to contend, of conducting an efficient defence, and of leading her

* The maps of the Yorktown peninsula of the time of Washington were referred to during General M'Clellan's campaign, in the absence of better information.

armies to victory. It had been General M'Clellan's plan from the very first to operate against Richmond from the lower part of Chesapeake Bay, by way of Urbana on the Rappahannock. This place could be approached by vessels of heavy draught, was within only one march of West Point, on the York River (which he considered the key of that portion of the country), and three of Richmond. The surrounding country was less thickly wooded than that in the vicinity of Washington, the soil more sandy, and consequently less deep, and the spring about a fortnight earlier. By occupying Urbana, the Confederates would be forced to abandon the line they held near Manasses, in order to cover Richmond and Norfolk, together with the defences on the Yorktown peninsula, and they would be unable to retain the batteries on the lower Potomac, which had since the commencement of the war inflicted a semi-blockade on the capitol, and, if they had not produced much injury, had been a standing insult to the power of the North. This plan did not, however, meet the approval of President Lincoln, who was fearful lest, in the absence of the army, the enemy should make an attempt against Washington, and preferred the simpler plan of marching directly from the lines round Alexandria against the enemy's entrenchments at Bull Run. Consequently, without consultation with the general whom he had placed in command of the armies of the United States, on January 27, 1862, he issued an order that on February 22, 1862, there should be a general movement of the land and naval forces against the insurgent position, and, referring especially to the army of the Potomac, he directed 'that all the disposable force of the army of the Potomac, after providing safely for the defence of

Washington, be formed into an expedition for the immediate object of seizing and occupying a point upon the railroad southwestward of what is known as Manasses Junction, all details to be in the discretion of the commander-in-chief, and the expedition to move before or on February 22.' General M'Clellan considered it to be his duty to remonstrate against this order, and, by permission of the President, he again urged his reasons for desiring a different line of operations. His remonstrance so far prevailed on the President that he ordered enquiries to be made respecting the transport necessary to move the army from the lines round Alexandria to the proposed base of operations on the lower Chesapeake; but in the meantime so strongly urged the destruction of the Confederate batteries on the lower Potomac, that a reconnoissance was allowed by General M'Clellan to be made, and a report sent in on the practicability of attacking them. This report confirmed General M'Clellan's preconceived opinion, that the batteries were so connected with the lines occupied by the enemy, that any attempt on them must necessarily be made by a strong force, and that it might possibly bring on an action in a place disadvantageous to the Federals. Not only on the south was Washington partially blockaded, but the destruction and occupation by the Confederates of the Baltimore and Ohio rail had cut off the city from direct communication with the west, and the reconstruction of that line of railway was of almost equal importance, in the eyes of President Lincoln, with the opening of the Potomac. This could not be effected unless certain points were occupied which would cover and guard the line, and, in General M'Clellan's opinion, the possession of Winchester and Strasburg were necessary

for that object. Earlier in the year reconnaissances, ending in unimportant engagements on either side, had been pushed forward both from the Federal forces guarding the Upper Potomac, and from General Jackson's (Stonewall) division defending Winchester. On January 3, the Federal troops occupying Bath were forced to retire to Hancock, and even beyond that town, which lay for a short time at the mercy of the Confederate guns; and on the 7th of the same month Colonel Kelly pushed forward a brigade from Romney and surprised the Confederate troops at the little Cacapon river, driving them back with small loss to either side. These independent operations were sanctioned, and even partially encouraged, at the Federal head-quarters, as they served to accustom the troops to the work and hardships of campaigning, hardships which were increased in the above instances by the cold and snow of a January in Western Virginia. On February 20, General Banks' division and two brigades of that of General Sedgwick were pushed forward across the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, whilst one brigade of General Sedgwick's division remained on the left bank to watch the river between Great Falls and the Monocacy river. This operation enabled the Federals to commence the reconstruction of the railway bridge at Harper's Ferry, and to open the rail as far as Hancock.—It was about this time, or rather earlier, that a change took place in the War Department at Washington, occasioned by the resignation of Mr. Cameron, and his appointment as minister to St. Petersburg, Mr. Stanton taking his place as Secretary of War. Mr. Cameron's resignation drew forth a letter from Mr. Lincoln, complimenting him on the manner in which the duties of the office had been performed; there were,

however, some (perhaps political enemies) who regarded his appointment to St. Petersburg as a species of honourable banishment, consequent on the malpractices in the department under his control. Mr. Stanton, the new Secretary of War, continued to maintain an ostensible confidence and friendship with General M'Clellan, but the measures which followed soon after his appointment, and the gradual attempts to weaken the power of the General, evinced a disposition at variance with his avowed sentiments. It has already been seen how certain orders materially affecting the army were issued, not only against the advice, but even without the knowledge, of the general commanding-in-chief; these were followed by two other orders, emanating directly from Mr. Lincoln, but in all probability issued in accordance with the recommendations of the Secretary of War. The first had reference to the interior economy of the army, and directed its formation into corps, and the appointment of generals to command such corps. This order was issued without any consultation with the general commanding, and, although partly in accordance with his views, was yet so far at variance with them, that it directed the immediate appointment of such officers, naming those senior in rank, without deferring it until General M'Clellan should have been able, after the experience of a campaign, to select the generals best qualified for command. The order was evidently made with the intention of lessening the authority of the officer in chief command, which may be gathered from order No. 3, dated March 8, 1862, directing—

‘That no change of the base of operations of the army of the Potomac shall be made without leaving in and about Washington such a force as, in the opinion

of the General-in-Chief *and the commanders of army corps*, shall leave said city entirely secure. That no more than two army corps (about 50,000 troops) of said army of the Potomac, shall be moved *en route* for a new base of operations, until the navigation of the Potomac from Washington to the Chesapeake Bay shall be freed from the enemy's batteries, and other obstructions, or until the President shall hereafter give express permission. That any movements, as aforesaid, *en route* for a new base of operations, which may be ordered by the General-in-Chief, and which may be intended to move upon the Chesapeake Bay, shall begin to move upon the bay as early as March 18, and the General-in-Chief shall be responsible that it so moves as early as that day. Ordered that the army and navy cooperate in an immediate effort to capture the enemy's batteries on the Potomac, between Washington and the Chesapeake Bay.

‘ ABRAHAM LINCOLN.’

This order, authoritative in its tone, was impossible of execution, owing to the want of the requisite transports, which were under the direct control of the Secretary of War. It was therefore simply disregarded, the organisation of the army into corps was postponed, and on March 9, in consequence of information received by General M'Clellan, the army of the Potomac commenced a forward movement. News had arrived at the Federal head-quarters of the intention of the Confederate general (General Joseph Johnston*) to withdraw from the lines near Manasses, in order to concentrate his army in a position where he could

* Not to be confounded with General Sydney Johnston, commanding the army of the west.

assist General Magruder, commanding the defences on the Yorktown peninsula, should he be attacked, or in the event of an attempt being made to advance on Richmond from the Rappahannock, whence he could intercept the enemy's march. In view of this movement of the Confederate general, and pending the arrival of the transports necessary for the conveyance of the troops to the new base of operations, which General M'Clellan tenaciously and wisely held to, orders were issued to the army of the Potomac to march from their lines and advance towards Centreville.

General M'Clellan's own words best explain the motives for the advance. 'The retirement of the enemy, and the occupation of the abandoned positions which necessarily followed, presented an opportunity for the troops to gain some experience on the march and bivouac preparatory to the campaign, and to get rid of the superfluous baggage and other impedimenta which accumulate round an army encamped for a long time in one locality. A march to Manasses and back could produce no delay in embarking for the Lower Chesapeake, as the transports could not be ready for some time, and it afforded a good intermediate step between the quiet and comparative comfort of the camps round Washington and the rigours of active operations, besides accomplishing the important object of determining the positions, and perhaps the future designs of the enemy, with the possibility of being able to harass his rear.' *

Such were the true motives of the advance from Washington which took place about the beginning of

* M'Clellan's report, pp. 118, 119.

March. Very different were those conceived by the people and their organs, the newspapers. The secret of General M'Clellan's plan to attack the enemy from the Lower Chesapeake had been well kept from the people of the North, and, until forced to be divulged to certain persons in the confidence of the Government, was unknown to the Confederates.* The nation, therefore, expected that an attack would be made on the position near Manasses, and that the disgrace of Bull Run would be effaced on the very ground on which the battle was fought. It was, therefore, with deep feelings of disappointment that they learned that the Confederate army had retreated, and that the nature of the roads and the swollen state of the various rivers precluded any pursuit. General Stoneman, with a light division and some cavalry, was indeed pushed forward on the road to Gordonsville, as far as Cedar Run; but he accomplished little. The railway had favoured the retreating army, and by its assistance the stores and munitions of the Confederate army had been dispatched to the rear some considerable time previous. As the Confederate troops retired they tore up the rails, burnt the sleepers, and pulled down the bridges, so as to render the track useless to the enemy. The country, thinly inhabited, had been already exhausted by the Confederate army, and even the comparatively small force under General Stoneman found it impossible to

* Numerous spies in the employment of the Confederate Government, and acting from strong feelings of attachment to the South, resided at Washington, and had access or were related to some of the highest officers of the State. It was probably by means of them that the general commanding the Confederate army of Virginia was informed of General M'Clellan's plans, even when they had only been divulged to Mr. Lincoln and his advisers.

exist in such a desert when removed from their base of supplies. It was whilst the head-quarters of the army of the Potomac were at the small village of Fairfax Court House that an aide-de-camp of General M'Clellan drew his attention to a document which had appeared in a newspaper of the morning, termed the 'National Intelligencer.' It contained the following important order :—

‘Executive Mansion, Washington :
‘March 11, 1862.

(President's War Order No. 3.)

‘Major-General M'Clellan having personally taken the field at the head of the army of the Potomac; until otherwise ordered, he is relieved from the command of the other military departments, in retaining the command of the department of the Potomac. Ordered further, that the departments, now under the respective commands of Generals Halleck and Hunter, together with so much of that under General Buell as lies west of a north and south line indefinitely drawn through Knoxville, Tennessee, be consolidated and designated the Department of the Mississippi, and that, until otherwise ordered, Major-General Halleck have command of said department. Ordered also, that the country west of the department of the Potomac and east of the department of the Mississippi be a military department, to be called the Mountain Department, and that the same be commanded by Major-General Fremont. That all the commanders of the departments, after the receipt of this order by them, respectively report severally and directly to the Secretary of War, and that prompt, full, and frequent reports will be expected of all and each of them.

‘ABRAHAM LINCOLN.’

It will scarcely be believed that this important order, virtually depriving General M'Clellan of the command of the army, was issued, not only without any previous notice, but actually without even the formal communication of the intention of the President. General M'Clellan first received the information that he had been deprived, at the very outset of a campaign, of the command of the army from a public print. Mr. Lincoln had been living on terms of intimacy and avowed friendship with the General only a few days previously, all the time aware of the *coup d'état* he was meditating. He allowed the General to leave Washington, and then, freed from his personal influence, issued the order depriving him of command. Surely no European statesman would have pursued such a course. It required the cuteness of two American lawyers, placed by universal suffrage in positions they were unqualified to fill, to invent and to put into execution so gross a plan of deception. It was neither the first nor the last of the means taken to thwart the General, apparently under fear lest his success should invest him with popularity and consequent power greater than that of the conclave at Washington. General M'Clellan, in a true spirit of patriotism, cheerfully assented to the order, and expressed himself perfectly willing to serve in any position the President might choose to place him: he did not even utter a reproach for the deceit which had been practised upon him. In only one way can such a course as that adopted by Mr. President Lincoln be excused. Should he and his advisers have received proof that General M'Clellan intended to use his vast influence to upset the Government and proclaim a military dictatorship, then, possibly, any indirect means to lessen the power

which they could not openly attack might be justifiable. But the most bitter enemies of the general have never urged such an accusation against him. During the whole of his career he showed himself loyal to the cause he had adopted. An avowed Democrat, he endeavoured, unless expressly ordered to the contrary, to conform to the constitutional laws of his country; and, as a soldier and gentleman, he tried to mitigate the evils of war to the unoffending inhabitants of the country in which he campaigned, whilst he preserved the courtesies customary between belligerents in dealing with the generals opposed to him—courtesies which could neither be appreciated nor understood by the class sent to represent the American people in Congress.*

To resume the narrative of the campaign. A strong reconnaissance was pushed forward as far as the Rappahannock River, and a portion of General Sumner's corps was ordered to remain until relieved by other troops, in order to guard the lines of Manasses, whilst the main body of the army was on the 11th marched back to Alexandria, for the purpose of embarkation to Fortress Monroe. Even this short campaign had demoralised the troops, and, to Europeans accustomed to the regular armies of England and the Continent, the unsoldierlike appearance of the regiments on the line of march, and the want of supervision by proper staff officers, were points which could not fail to be remarked.†

* In the year 1862, General M'Clellan was the only Northern general of whom the people of the South spoke with respect; not so much on account of his professional qualification as a general as for his personal character, evinced by the discipline he maintained in his army during the campaign of the Yorktown peninsula.

† Testimony of an eye-witness who watched the return of the army.

On March 13 a council of war was assembled at Fairfax Court House, in order to consider the President's last order relating to the army. It consisted of the generals commanding army corps, viz. Generals M'Dowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes, and the following resolutions were agreed on:—

‘I. That the enemy, having retreated from Manasses to Gordonsville, behind the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, it is the opinion of generals commanding army corps that the operations to be carried on will be best undertaken from Old Point Comfort, between the York and James Rivers: provided, 1st, That the enemy's vessel Merrimac can be neutralised; 2nd, That the means of transportation sufficient for an immediate transfer of the force to its new base can be ready at Washington and Alexandria to move down the Potomac; and, 3rd, That a naval auxiliary force can be had to silence, or aid in silencing, the enemy's batteries on the York River; 4th, That the force to be left to cover Washington shall be such as to give an entire feeling of security for its safety from menace. (Unanimous.)

‘II. If the foregoing cannot be, the army should then be moved against the enemy behind the Rappahannock at the earliest possible moment; and the means for reconstructing bridges, repairing railroads, and stocking them with material sufficient for supplying the army, should at once be collected for both the Orange and Alexandria and Acquia and Richmond Railways. (Unanimous.) N.B. That, with the forts on the right bank of the Potomac fully garrisoned, and those on the left bank occupied, a covering force in front of the Virginia line of 25,000 men would suffice. (Keyes, Heintzelman, and M'Dowell.) A total of 40,000 men for the defence of the city would suffice. (Sumner.)’

These resolutions were assented to by General M'Clellan and immediately communicated to the War Department. On the next day the following reply was received:—

' To Major-General G. B. M'Clellan.

' War Department: March 13, 1863.

' The President having considered the plan of operations agreed upon by yourself and the commanders of army corps, makes no objection to the same, but gives the following directions as to its execution:—

' 1. Leave such a force at Manasses Junction as shall make it entirely certain that the enemy shall not repossess himself of that position and line of communication.

' 2. Leave Washington entirely secure.

' 3. Move the remainder of the force down the Potomac, choosing a new base at Fortress Monroe, or anywhere between here and there, or, at all events, move such remainder of the army at once in pursuit of the enemy by the same route.

*' EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.'*

Under certain conditions the movement to the Yorktown peninsula was thus pronounced by the council of war to be the one most advisable, and was sanctioned by the President. General M'Clellan at once commenced preparations for the purpose of putting the plan into execution, and to fulfil such of the conditions as lay under the authority of the general commanding the army. He issued minute directions to General Banks, directing him to entrench himself strongly in the vicinity of Manasses,* to rebuild the railway from

* Minute directions as to the defences at Manasses were drawn up in accordance with General M'Clellan's orders by Lieut.-Colonel

Washington to Manasses and to Strasburg in order to open communications with the Valley of the Shenandoah, and to place a strong force both at Strasburg and Manasses, with block-houses at the railway stations. To extend his pickets as far as Warrington Junction and the line of the Rappahannock, and to keep up constant patrols by means of cavalry, both in the Shenandoah Valley on the right, and to the Occoquan on the left, and also in the direction of Leesburg, in order to prevent the enemy from passing his pickets and getting in his rear.

To General Wadsworth, General M'Clellan gave orders respecting the defences of Washington. He directed him to pay especial attention to maintain the forts and their armaments in good order, as also the railways, canals, dépôts, bridges, and ferries; and besides occupying these forts, to carefully guard the approaches to Washington by means of advanced guards; and also to use his best endeavours to forward and facilitate the movements of all troops destined for the army of the Potomac. In issuing these orders, General M'Clellan showed that he regarded and intended that the force under General Banks should be considered as a portion of the army detached for the defence of Washington; and including that division, he estimated the number of troops withdrawn from the army of the Potomac for that especial service, at 73,456 men, 109 pieces of light artillery, and 32 pieces of heavier ordnance;* besides almost 4,000 men who were expected

Alexander.—Colonel Alexander's letters. General M'Clellan's report, pp. 147, 149.

* The number is made up as follows:—At Warrenton, 7,780; at Manasses, 10,859; in Shenandoah, 35,467; on Lower Potomac, 1,350; under General Wadsworth, 18,000; total, 73,456.—General M'Clellan's report.

shortly to arrive from New York. With regard to the stipulations of the Council of War, other than those which the General could fulfil, it will be necessary to take a retrospective glance at an event which occurred during the very time when the army was advancing to Manasses, and which not only engaged the attention of America, but which caused a revolution in the naval tactics of Europe. In Hampton Roads, off Fortress Monroe, a considerable naval force had been collected, and thence the expeditions which had proved so destructive to the Southern coast had sailed, at the beginning of March. The fleet consisted of the Cumberland, of 24 guns; the Congress, 50 guns; the St. Lawrence, 50 guns; the steam-frigates Minnesota and Roanoke, 40 guns; and was under the command of Captain Marston, of the Roanoke. The Cumberland and the Congress lay off Newport News, about three hundred yards from the shore; the Congress about two hundred yards south of the Cumberland; whilst the remainder of the fleet were anchored off Fortress Monroe, about nine miles east of Newport News.* It was well known among the officers of the Federal Navy that the Confederates had refitted the frigate Merrimac, which it will be remembered was sunk by the Federals on the evacuation of Norfolk Navy Yard; but her complete reconstruction, and the nature of her armament, both offensive and defensive, was not understood. Yet the plan of refitting the sunken vessel had been formed as early as June 1861, and to put it into execution Lieutenant J. M. Brooke, the originator of the scheme, was sent to Norfolk Navy Yard, and, together with Mr. Williamson and Mr. Porter, at once

* Vide map, p. 350.

proceeded to construct from the sunken vessel a shot-proof steam battery. The ship was cut down, her ends submerged, and the iron plating to protect her sides was prepared at the Tredegar Iron Works at Richmond. Experiments were made as to the resistance of iron to shot, and of the angle of inclination best adapted for the same purpose, and the vessel, after her reconstruction, presented the appearance of a sunken house, with the smoke-jack protruding from the water. The eaves of the casemates, together with the ends of the vessel, were submerged, and a ram was added in order that she might serve both as a battery, and as a machine which by main force might sink an opposing vessel.

The armament of the Merrimac, rechristened the Virginia, consisted of ten guns,* not of heavy calibre as compared with the large guns recently in use in the American service, neither were her steam powers very great, her engines being too weak for the size of the vessel. However, about 11 A.M. on March 8, the Virginia or Merrimac, by which name she is better known, under the command of Captain Buchanan—the officer who had previous to the war been in charge of the Washington Navy Yard—cast loose from her moorings at the Navy Yard, Norfolk, and made her way down Hampton Roads. About 1 P.M. the look-out vessels of the Federal fleet signalled her approach, and orders were immediately issued by Captain Marston, of the Roanoke, for his own vessel, the Minnesota, and the St. Lawrence, to get under weigh, which they accordingly did with the assistance of steam tugs. The Cumberland and Congress had previously perceived her, and

* Eight broadside guns, one at the bow, and one at the stern.

had beat to quarters and prepared for action. In the meantime, accompanied by the Patrick Henry, six guns, the Jamestown, Raleigh, Beaufort, and Teazer, of one gun each, the Merrimac approached. Her speed was not great, being less than five knots per hour. At about one mile distance the pivot guns of the Cumberland opened on her, but with no effect. She continued tranquilly on her course, not replying to the fire of the Cumberland. As she approached the Congress, she opened on her with grape from her bow gun, and passing her on the starboard side, received her broadside and gave one in return. She then fired into the Cumberland, which poured several broadsides into her, but with no effect, as the balls were described as *bouncing upon her mailed sides, like india-rubber*.* Still she proceeded onwards; the Cumberland could not in any way avoid her, and she struck her starboard of the main chains, knocking a large hole in her side near the water-line, and driving the vessel back upon her anchors with great force. The Merrimac backed, and discharged her guns at the Cumberland, killing five men. The Cumberland replied, although the water was pouring in at the hole made by the ram, and the action continued for about the space of half an hour. The Merrimac stationed herself about three hundred yards from the Cumberland, and every shot told on the wooden vessel. Still the crew of the Cumberland manned her guns and replied rapidly, whilst the horrors of fire were added to that of the artillery and the prospect of sinking, in consequence of the vessel having been set on fire by one of the Merrimac's shells in the fore part, and only saved from burning

* Statement of the pilot of the Cumberland.—272, *Rebellion Record*.

by the exertions of the crew. In the meantime, she continued to sink deeper and deeper, and the water rushed in at her ports. Then, when resistance was impossible, so many of the crew as were unwounded attempted to escape. Some succeeded in swimming to land, others were saved by the small boats from the shore, but the greater number of the wounded perished; and out of a crew of 400 men, not more than 200 or 250 escaped. The flag was never struck. The Cumberland sank, and her hull grounded on the sands 54 feet below the surface of the water, her pennant still visible flying from the topmast. All bore testimony to the gallantry of her crew, and of her commander, Lieutenant G. M. Morris. Her captain (Captain Radford) was not present, as he was on duty at a court of inquiry on board the Roanoke; and although he made every attempt to reach his vessel, he was unable to do so, only arriving on the shore in time to see his ship sink. Having sunk her first antagonist, the Merrimac next turned her attention to the Congress, which was left to fight the battle alone, as neither the Minnesota, which had grounded about one mile and a half from Newport News, the Roanoke, or the St. Lawrence could approach near enough, from want of sufficient depth of water, to render material assistance, even if the assistance of those wooden vessels could have been of use. The Merrimac took up a position about 250 yards from the Congress, and raked her fore and aft with shells, whilst one of the steamers attending her kept up a fire on her starboard quarter,* and the Patrick Henry and Jamestown also inflicted

* Report of Lieutenant Pendergrast.—*Rebellion Record*, p. 269. Documents.

considerable damage on her. Lieutenant Smith, commanding the Congress, was killed, and many of the crew; the command devolving on Lieutenant Pendergrast. Only two guns could be brought to bear on the Merrimac, and the men who manned them were swept away by her fire.* Seeing that resistance was hopeless, and that there was no prospect of help, Lieutenant Pendergrast ordered the colours to be hauled down. A boat was sent from the Merrimac, and soon afterwards a tug, with orders that the crew should leave the Congress and come on board the tug, as the captain of the Merrimac intended to fire the vessel. At this time the troops and artillery lining the shore opened fire on the tug, although the Congress had surrendered. The tug consequently hauled off, and the Merrimac again fired into the Congress. After firing several shells into her, she drew off for the purpose of engaging the Minnesota; and what remained of the 200 men who composed the crew of the Congress were conveyed to the shore in small boats. The vessel was set on fire either by her own crew or by the Merrimac's shells, and about midnight blew up. In the meantime, the Merrimac endeavoured to approach the Minnesota, but, owing to the shallowness of the water, could not come near enough to use her guns efficiently. Her accompanying gunboats fired some long range shots, which inflicted a slight loss, but they were driven off by the heavier guns of the Minnesota, whose ten-inch pivot-gun was also brought

* Our two stern guns were our only means of defence. They were soon disabled, one being dismounted, and the other having its muzzle knocked away. The men were knocked away from them with great rapidity and slaughter by the terrible fire of the enemy.— Lieutenant Pendergrast's Report.

to bear on the Merrimac, but without any apparent effect. About 7 P.M. the Merrimac and the two gunboats which accompanied her in her attack on the Minnesota hauled off, and returned to Norfolk. The wonderful success of the Merrimac caused great rejoicing through the Confederacy. On an element which hitherto had been monopolised by the North she had been successful to an unhoped-for degree; and when she returned to Norfolk on the night of the 8th it was announced that on the following morning she would proceed to the destruction of the Minnesota and such other of the Federal fleet as would venture to engage her. Her loss in the action was only two killed and eight wounded, but among the latter was her commander, Captain Buchanan, who had evinced great courage and skill in manœuvring his vessel. Two of her guns had the muzzles shot off, the anchor and the flagstaffs were shot away, the smoke-jack and steam-pipes were riddled, the prow was twisted, and the armour somewhat damaged; but, with the exception of the injury done to her ram, she had suffered little material hurt. Sad indeed appeared to be the fate of the Federal fleet on the night of the 8th. No effort of courage or seamanship could avail them, flight seemed to be their only safety, and the Minnesota was lying aground, exposed, without power of resistance, to the attack of the Merrimac. No assistance appeared possible, but at this crisis, about 10 P.M., there steamed into Hampton Roads a small vessel, insignificant in appearance, and resembling a raft more than a ship of war. This proved to be the newly constructed iron battery called the Monitor. She was immediately ordered to proceed to the assistance of the Minnesota, and at 2 A.M. on the 9th placed

herself alongside the stranded vessel. Then the captain and crew of the *Minnesota*, although ignorant of the untried powers of the *Monitor*, still felt that they had a friend who could at least show fight against their impregnable enemy. Different in appearance was the *Monitor* from any vessel that had previously been used in war. Her deck, unprotected by any bulwark, rose about two feet above the water, whilst from it projected a turret about nine feet high and a small box-looking place at the stern, used as a pilot-house. In the turret she carried her sole armament—two eleven-inch 168-pounder Dahlgren guns. She had been built at New York by Captain Ericsson, and was launched on January 30, some doubts having been felt at the time of her launch as to whether she would float. On February 27, having proved seaworthy, she had left New York under the command of Lieutenant Worden, and although she encountered a heavy gale in her way, yet arrived safely at Fortress Monroe, at the very time she was most wanted.* During the night she

* Description of the *Monitor*:—The *Monitor* was constructed in two parts, an upper and a lower vessel; the upper vessel above the water-mark being shot-proof. Length of upper vessel, 172 ft.; length of lower vessel, 124 ft. Depth of upper vessel, 5 ft.; depth of lower vessel, 6 ft. 6 in. Breadth of upper vessel, 41 ft. 4 in.; breadth of lower vessel, at top, 36 ft., at bottom, 18 ft. The sides of upper vessel, constructed of 25-inch thickness of oak, were coated with plates of iron of 5-inch thickness. The turret, built of 8-inch plates of rolled iron, increased in thickness near the port-holes to 11 in. Deck of 8-inch thickness of oak, coated with 2-inch plates of wrought iron. The pilot-house, which was found to be of insufficient strength, was built of 9-inch plates of forged iron. The *Monitor* drew 10 ft. of water. Height of turret, 9 ft.; diameter, 21 ft. Armament, 2 Dahlgren guns, carrying shot or shell from 162 to 168 lbs. weight; recoil of guns, 4 ft. Deck from 2 to 3 ft. above the water. The cabins were airy, they were below the water and

remained in the vicinity of the Minnesota, but between her and Fortress Monroe, and consequently concealed from any vessel approaching from Norfolk. About 6 A. M. on the 9th the Merrimac, ignorant of her new antagonist, and with the damage inflicted on her during the previous action unrepaired, rounded the point of land at the mouth of the Elizabeth river. She was accompanied by the Yorktown and Jamestown. The captain of the Minnesota immediately beat to quarters, prepared to sell his ship as dearly as possible, and to destroy her rather than surrender. The Merrimac, however, passed on in the direction of the Rip Raps, and then turned into the main channel from Hampton roads. The captain of the Minnesota then signalled to the Monitor, who immediately placed herself within range of the Merrimac's guns, and directly between her and the Minnesota, covering the latter as far as was possible for a vessel of her dimensions, her small bulk contrasting strongly with the size of the Merrimac.* The approaching combat was eagerly watched, not only by the crews of the Federal fleet, but also by the garrison of Fortress Monroe, and the troops encamped on the adjoining shore, whilst the Confederates from their batteries on Sewell's Point gazed on the new adversary pitted against the Merrimac. The two vessels gradually neared each other, each doubtful of the strength of her antagonist. When within about one hundred yards' distance, the Monitor opened fire, which was immediately replied to by the

lighted artificially day and night. The commander's post was in the pilot-house, whence he directed the steering of the vessel and the movement of the turret, in order to bring the guns to bear.

* Captain Van Brunt's (commanding the Minnesota) report.—*Rebellion Record*, p. 267.

Merrimac. At the commencement of the action the firing was very rapid, but as each vessel tested the strength of her antagonist and her own means of defence, it became slower and more accurate, the distance between the combatants varying from fifty to two hundred yards. The Monitor had the greater speed, and was more easily turned than her opponent, and was at first supported by the guns of the Minnesota, which fired over her deck, two of the shots falling short of their destination and striking her. The Merrimac, which had commenced by firing into the Minnesota, was quickly obliged to devote the whole of her attention to her small but formidable opponent, and consequently changed her position ; in doing so she grounded, but succeeded in getting afloat again, and steamed up the harbour towards the Elizabeth river. The Monitor kept near her, when the Merrimac, turning rapidly round, steamed directly at her, and struck her on the side. The spectators of the combat hoped or trembled lest the shock should sink the Monitor, but the Merrimac's ram was broken, and her weak engines were insufficient to propel her with the necessary speed, consequently she inflicted no damage, a slight mark on the iron-plating being all the signs left of the impact of so heavy a body. The action continued ; the Monitor, immediately after being struck, firing a shot into the iron roof of the Merrimac, and the latter directing her guns more especially at the turret and pilot-house of the Monitor. At length, between 1 and 2 P.M., the Monitor withdrew, probably in consequence of her commander being injured in the eyes by a shot which struck the pilot-house. The captain of the Minnesota then supposed that his hour was come, and prepared to destroy rather than to yield his vessel : but to his

delight he saw the Merrimac and her two accompanying gunboats steam up the river towards Norfolk.* There were no men killed on either vessel; on board the Monitor, Lieutenant Worden was wounded, and two seamen were momentarily stunned from the concussion of the shot on the turret.† Either side claimed a victory. The Federals alleged that they had driven off the Merrimac, the Confederates that the Monitor had retreated from the contest, and that it was only owing to the fact of the Merrimac having received injuries during the action of the previous day, that she was prevented from obtaining a more decisive victory. Confederate officers alleged that the breakage of the ram, caused by the blow struck against the Congress, alone saved the Monitor; but they allowed that, although the principle of the construction of the Merrimac was good, yet that its execution was defective, especially as regarded the engines, which were far too weak for the size of the vessel. They also admitted that the armament of the vessel was not sufficiently heavy. Still, in contradistinction to the opinion of the Federal Navy Department, they maintained that the mode of construction employed in the Merrimac was more adapted to the service required from a ship of war than that adopted in building the Monitor. The Federals were of a different opinion. Naturally proud of the success attained by a perfectly new description of vessel, they gave way to boasting, and appeared to ignore the fact that, after the experience gained in the contest, other governments beside their own would be able to construct vessels equal if not superior to the Monitor, and also that, although a vessel of that description might be well adapted for coast defence,

* Captain Van Brunt's (commanding the Minnesota) report.

† Engineer Stimer's letter to Captain Ericsson.

yet it was very doubtful whether she would be able to live in a sea. Almost immediately on the result of the action becoming known, a bill was introduced into the Senate to authorise the Secretary of the Navy to construct various iron vessels, both for coast and harbour defences, and also for offensive operations against the enemy's forts. The two combatants, each aware of her adversary's strength, did not again engage; the Monitor remained as a sentinel over the ships and transports at Fortress Monroe, the Merrimac continued by her presence at Norfolk to guard the entry into James river. Nothing in recent maritime history has excited so great interest, or so completely caused a revolution in naval tactics, as this combat between the Merrimac and the Monitor. The ease with which the wooden vessels were destroyed on the first day, and the invulnerability of the Merrimac to the heaviest guns in use in the American navy, proved that a complete change was requisite both in the construction and armament of ships of war. The renewal of the combat under altered circumstances on the succeeding day, and the immunity from danger enjoyed by the crew of the Monitor, added to the weight and size of the guns she carried in a manner so different to that of any vessel previously constructed, turned the attention of Europe to the new description of vessel, and caused questions to arise whether the entire system of naval architecture would require alteration. The Federals, in immediate want of iron vessels, ordered several Monitors to be built; the English, content for the time to wait, gained the experience that vessels of that description were not seaworthy,* although they might be of great

* This remark must not be taken as applying to the turret ships more recently constructed by Captain Coles, which have not yet been sufficiently tested.

service for operations in inland waters, and for the defence of harbours. The commanders of both the Merrimac and Monitor deserved and obtained the highest credit for the manner in which they had fought their ships; both were forced by circumstances to make the first trial of the offensive and defensive powers of their vessels in the presence of an enemy, when the slightest flaw would have proved fatal. Indeed, an apparently very slight flaw nearly caused the loss of the Monitor; the plates of her pilot-house were rudely shaken and somewhat damaged by a shot, and not only was her commander almost blinded, but the very eye of the vessel itself was nearly put out, as the crevices in the pilot-houses were the only places from which any view of external objects could be obtained, and therefore the sole means of steering or manœuvring the vessel and her guns. The greater portion of the crew were so completely out of the reach of shot, being below the water-line, that they were scarcely aware of the action which was going on, and in which they bore so prominent a part. Bravely did the last of the wooden vessels of war die: the Cumberland sank without surrendering, the Congress only yielded when resistance was perfectly hopeless. Unhappily for the Merrimac, and indeed for the Confederacy, the officer who had fought so well was forced by his wound to give up the command, and, as will be seen, her future was unworthy of the brilliant commencement of her career. The stipulation contained in the agreement to General M'Clellan's plan by the council of war will now be understood. As long as there was a doubt whether the Merrimac could pass the batteries and ships at Fortress Monroe and Hampton Roads, so long would it have been the height of rashness to have moved the army in trans-

ports to that neighbourhood. Even at the present time the line of the James River could not be used, as the Merrimac, although not daring to attack the Monitor, the batteries, and the ships of war at Hampton Roads, combined together for her destruction, yet maintained a strict watch on the entrance to the James River, and even kept the Federal fleet and batteries continually on the *qui vive*. The Monitor was always in readiness to steam out in case of her adversary's reappearance, and three or four powerful and swift steam vessels were prepared to run directly at her with the full power of their engines, and so to endeavour to run her down should she succeed in passing Fortress Monroe. With these precautions, which the Navy Department considered * sufficient to neutralise the power of the Merrimac, General M'Clellan was of opinion that the stipulation of the council of war had been fulfilled, and consequently prepared to put his plan into operation, and to change his base from the lines round Alexandria and Washington to Fortress Monroe. An official report of the proposed plan of operations was required by the War Department, which, as it is concise and explains clearly the general's views, conveys a better idea of the approaching campaign that can be obtained in any other way.

'The proposed plan of campaign (wrote General M'Clellan) is to assume Fort Monroe as the first base of operations, taking the line by Yorktown and West Point upon Richmond as the line of operations, Richmond being the objective point. It is assumed that the fall of Richmond involves that of Norfolk and the whole of Virginia; also that we shall fight a deci-

* Vide General Key's evidence; p. 146, M'Clellan's report to Congress.

sive battle between West Point and Richmond, to give which battle the rebels will concentrate all their available forces, understanding as they will that it involves the fate of their cause. It therefore follows : 1st, That we should collect all our available forces and operate upon adjacent lines, maintaining perfect communication between our columns ; 2nd, That no time should be lost in reaching the field of battle. The advantages of the peninsula between the York and James Rivers are too obvious to need explanation. It is also clear that West Point should as soon as possible be reached and used as our main depôt, that we may have the shortest line of land transportation for our supplies and the use of the York River. There are two methods of reaching this point : 1st, By moving directly from Fort Monroe as a base, and trusting to the roads for our supplies, at the same time landing a strong corps as near Yorktown as possible, in order to turn the rebel lines of defence south of Yorktown ; then to reduce Yorktown and Gloucester by a siege, in all probability involving a delay of weeks perhaps. 2nd, To make a combined naval and land attack upon Yorktown the first object of the campaign. This leads to the most rapid and decisive results. To accomplish this the navy should at once concentrate upon the York River all their available and most powerful batteries. Its reduction should not in that case require many hours. A strong corps would be pushed up the York, under cover of the navy, directly upon West Point, immediately upon the fall of Yorktown, and we could at once establish our new base of operations at a distance of some twenty-five miles from Richmond, with every facility for developing and bringing into play the whole of our available force on either or both banks of the James. It

is impossible to urge too strongly the absolute necessity of the cooperation of the navy as a part of this programme ; without it the operations may be prolonged for many weeks, and we may be forced to carry in front several strong positions, which by their aid could be turned without serious loss of either time or men. It is also of first importance to bear in mind the fact, already alluded to, that the capture of Richmond necessarily involves the prompt fall of Norfolk ; while an operation against Norfolk, if successful, as the beginning of the campaign, facilitates the reduction of Richmond merely by the demoralisation of the rebel troops involved ; and that after the fall of Norfolk we should be obliged to undertake the capture of Richmond by the same means which would have accomplished it in the beginning, having meanwhile afforded the rebels ample time to perfect their defensive arrangements ; for they could well know from the moment the Army of the Potomac changed its base to Fort Monroe that Richmond must be its ultimate object. It may be summed up in few words, that, for the prompt success of this campaign, it is absolutely necessary that the navy should at once throw its whole available force, its most powerful vessels, against Yorktown. There is the most important point, there the knot to be cut. An immediate decision upon the subject matter of this communication is highly desirable, and seems called for by the exigencies of the occasion.'

Such were the views of General M'Clellan with regard to the approaching operations. That they were sound in conception has been since proved by the events of more than one campaign ; that they failed in execution was owing to causes for which

a great portion of the blame must be borne by the President and his Government, and a minor portion must be charged to the army of the Potomac and to those who commanded it; and yet it was a grand army which paraded on the heights above Alexandria prior to its embarkation for the Peninsula. Although the men were not clothed and accoutred with the neatness and precision of the armies of Europe, and although there was a want of uniformity in age and size, yet, as far as physique went, many of the regiments equalled in appearance the picked troops of the Old World; indeed, few regiments could compare in height and size with the brigade composed of the lumberers or woodmen of Maine. The army defiled past the general, who had secured the affection and confidence of the troops in a wonderful degree considering how little of active service had as yet been attempted; still it was to General M'Clellan that the organisation of the army was due, and, contrasting its appearance with that of the dispirited rabble which he had been called on to command in the previous autumn, it must have been a matter of great satisfaction to him to witness their present appearance. They had recovered from the disorganisation caused by the march in the wet and mud from Fairfax Court House, the numerous stragglers had rejoined their ranks, and the whole army was animated with hopes of a successful campaign in a fresh country. The health of the troops was on the whole good. During the winter, some regiments, especially those from the country districts and thinly populated States, had suffered from low fever and measles, consequent on the crowding of the troops in tents, together with the ignorance or neglect of sanitary arrangements and cleanliness. It was remarked that those regiments

who had remained during the cold, snow, and wet of the winter covered only by the *tents d'abris*, enjoyed better health than those for whose use had been provided the more durable and apparently more comfortable Sibley * tents ; the latter, often heated by stoves, becoming so close and hot as to engender fevers. The rations of the men were not only good, but excessive ; and the amount of transport necessary to provide the Federal soldier with what in European armies would be termed luxuries, but which he considered necessities, became so great as materially to obstruct the movements of the army and to prevent any operation at a distance from water communication. The wagons and teams furnished to the Quartermaster and Commissariat Departments were excellent, but the teamsters, being civilians, were not subject to the same control as soldiers would have been. There was a great deficiency, or rather absence of any means of supplying ammunition to the troops in the field, a defect which became apparent in the ensuing campaign. Notwithstanding these causes for criticism, the appearance of the army was very formidable. Unfortunately there laid other defects deeper than those which appeared on the surface. The want of officers, of men who *could* command, was the great weakness of the Federal army ; with all their Republican notions, the men were willing enough to obey, if they only had over them officers who knew how to command. This was a radical defect, and one for which the very organisation of Northern society prevented any remedy but such as the experience of a campaign and training in the field could effect. There was also, among the people and their representa-

* The Sibley tent is a species of bell tent, but heavier than those in use in the English army.

tives, a jealousy of the power, and a fear of the aristocratic ideas, engendered by military authority in the superior generals; consequently the staff allowed to them was in reality very inadequate. Although on paper, General M'Clellan's A.D.C.'s appeared numerous, yet a large majority of these officers were detached to serve with other generals, in order to enable them to make up a staff of any efficiency. On General M'Clellan's staff were many foreigners, including among them the two French Princes. These young officers, during the time the army was before Washington, during the advance to Centreville, and subsequently to Cedar Run, and during the preparations for the embarkation for the Peninsula, were of the most material assistance to the general. Whilst the preparations for the embarkation of the army of the Potomac were being pushed forward, an engagement had taken place between a portion of General Banks' force and that under General Jackson, resulting from the flank movement of the former from the Shenandoah Valley in order to occupy the position assigned to him at Manasses by General M'Clellan. At the time of the retreat of General Johnston's army from Manasses, General Jackson was at Winchester, in the Shenandoah Valley, and may be said to have formed the left of that army. In front of General Jackson, at Charlestown, was General Banks, and when, consequent on the retreat of the main army, General Jackson retired, General Banks advanced, and occupied Winchester on March 12 and 13. The retreat of the Confederates had been ably covered by the Virginian cavalry, under Colonel Ashby, a gentleman of that State, who had taken up arms when the war broke out, and was rapidly acquiring the reputation of an excellent cavalry officer. The division

of General Shields* advanced beyond Winchester as far as Strasburg, higher up the Shenandoah Valley, but finding General Jackson occupying a strong position in that neighbourhood, and being unwilling to engage him in a place where he was comparatively near General Johnston's army and also of reserves reported to be stationed at Luray and Washington, General Shields fell back on the 20th to Winchester. On the same day the first division of General Banks' *corps d'armée* commenced its march by way of Berryville to Centreville, and on the 22nd the whole force had left Winchester, with the exception of General Shields' division of three brigades and the Michigan cavalry. Having received information of this movement, General Jackson again advanced, and approached Winchester, Ashby's cavalry driving in the pickets. A skirmish ensued, in which General Shields received a wound in the arm from a splinter of a shell, and was unable to take part in the subsequent battle, although he issued his orders from Winchester. Winchester is approached from the south by three roads, viz. the Cedar Creek road on the west, the Valley turnpike or Strasburg road in the centre, and the Front Royal road on the east. About three and a half miles from the town, on the Strasburg road, is the little village of Kernstown, and on a ridge north of that village a position was found to cover Winchester, and was occupied by Colonel Kimball's brigade.

About two miles to the front—about half a mile from Kernstown—General Jackson had drawn up his army, including in his line the three roads which lead to Winchester. The woods concealed his movements and the number of his troops, whilst Colonel Ashby's

* Belonging to General Banks' force.

cavalry prevented the too near approach of any reconnoitring party. It was the opinion of Generals Banks and Shields that General Jackson would not hazard an engagement so far from his resources; consequently the former departed for Washington, leaving General Shields in command. However, in the afternoon of the 23rd, reports came in from the out-pickets that there were symptoms in the Confederate army of an advance, and Colonel Sullivan's brigade was pushed forward and placed in position on the left of that of Colonel Kimball—Colonel Tyler's brigade being still held in reserve. About four o'clock P.M. the action commenced by an attack on the Federal left, which appears to have been a feint, as it commenced by a fire of artillery at too long ranges to be of service, and subsequently only resulted in an affair between the skirmishers of either army. Under cover of this feint, General Jackson strengthened his left, which being perceived by Colonel Kimball—who, in the absence of General Shields, was commanding in the field—that officer sent to General Shields for directions. General Shields ordered up his reserve, consisting of Colonel Tyler's brigade, and directed an immediate attack on the Confederate left. Colonel Tyler's brigade was ordered to make the attack, and succeeded, after an obstinate resistance, in driving back the enemy's left. The other brigades advanced, and the Confederates retreated, leaving two pieces of artillery, four caissons, and about 300 prisoners in the hands of the Federals. The superiority of the forces engaged was probably in favour of the Federals. The Confederate numbers were estimated by their own accounts to have been about 6,000,* whilst that of the Federals was little

* Pollard's *First Year of the War*.

less than 8,000. General Banks, having been informed of the action, hastened back to Winchester, and ordered General Williams' division, on the march to Centreville, to retrace its steps and to reinforce the troops engaged in the battle of the 23rd. During the night of the 23rd General Shields collected all his disposable forces, drawing in the various guards left in his rear to keep open the communication, and on the morning of the 24th he ordered an advance against the Confederates, who had taken up a position about five miles south of the battle-ground of the previous day, and were expecting reinforcements. These were prevented from arriving consequent on the swollen state of the Shenandoah River, and General Jackson ordered a retreat. This was conducted in good order as far as Woodstock, to which place the Federals, now commanded by General Banks, advanced. There the pursuit was abandoned, consequent on the exhaustion of the troops.* Thus ended the battle of

* There is something absurd in General Shields' report of the Confederate retreat. He commences with an acknowledgment that 'he (the enemy) entered on his retreat in very good order, considering what he had suffered.' He goes on to say that 'the pursuit was kept up with vigour, energy, and activity, until they reached Woodstock, where the enemy's retreat became flight, and the pursuit was abandoned because of the utter exhaustion of our troops.' That is, that when the object of the pursuit was on the point of attainment, and when the enemy's retreat had commenced to degenerate into a flight, the pursuit was abandoned, and the principal fruits of the victory lost. Can this be so? Is it not rather that, like the accounts of voyages in old books of travel, what is seen is described with fair accuracy, but the author glides into the marvellous when he attempts to describe what he has only heard or imagined? As long as the Federals were following up the retiring enemy they perceived that he conducted his retreat in good order; when, however, they abandoned the pursuit, they drew on their imagination for his subsequent behaviour.

Winchester, or, as named by the Confederates, that of Kernstown. Both sides seem to have shown gallantry, and the attack on the Confederate left was well executed by Colonel Tyler's brigade. General Shields, in concealing the number of his troops, and so inducing General Jackson to attack him in a position he had himself selected, showed good generalship, and deserved the success which he gained. Still the movement of General Jackson was not unproductive of a certain degree of benefit to the Confederate cause. It proved, or caused to be believed, that the Confederates were still in considerable force in the Shenandoah Valley, and consequently resulted in the detention of General Banks in that locality with an augmented force. This prevented the proposed occupation in force of the lines of Centreville, and consequently created so great uneasiness at Washington that the plans proposed by General M'Clellan were, as will be seen, subjected to fresh changes, which materially affected the results of the campaign in the Peninsula. We must now return to the main army. It had been General M'Clellan's first intention to have embarked his army by successive corps, headed by the 1st Corps, under General M'Dowell, which was to have effected its landing some four miles south of Yorktown, in order to turn the Confederate defences at Ship Point and Big Bethel. Owing, however, to the want of sufficient transport to embark a whole *corps d'armée* at once, it was determined to move by successive divisions; and in place of the 1st Corps, the divisions of the 3rd Corps under General Heintzelman were first embarked, with orders to land and encamp in the vicinity of Fortress Monroe. This was accordingly done, and, waiting until the greater portion of his army was on its way to the Peninsula,

General M'Clellan remained at his headquarters in the neighbourhood of Alexandria. Whilst he was there, and only a few days previous to his own embarkation, he received a letter from Mr. Lincoln, in the following terms :—

‘MY DEAR SIR,—This morning I felt constrained to order Blenker’s division to Fremont, and I write this to assure you that I did so with great pain, understanding that you would wish it otherwise. If you could know the full pressure of the case, I am confident you would justify it, even beyond a mere acknowledgment that the Commander-in-Chief may order what he pleases. Yours very truly,

‘A. LINCOLN.’


By this order General M'Clellan was deprived of 10,000 men, which he considered he could ill afford to lose, but was partially relieved by an emphatic assurance from the President, that no other troops should in any event be taken from him or in any way detached from his command.* He was further permitted temporarily to attach Blenker’s division to General Banks’ corps, in order more securely to guard the Shenandoah Valley. On April 1, 1862, the headquarters of the army of the Potomac embarked on board the Commodore, one of the large river steamers so peculiar to America, and proceeded on their way to Fortress Monroe. The Potomac, as the Commodore proceeded down the river, was crowded with steam transports filled with troops, their high decks rising one above the other, covered with soldiers, who, as the head-quarter steamer passed, cheered their favourite general. Long lines of sailing vessels, carrying the stores, the artillery, and the cavalry, were on their way to the same destination, whilst small gunboats patrolled the

* General M'Clellan’s report, p. 135.

river, lest the Confederates should again seek to occupy their batteries at Mathias Point. The weather was bright and fine, and the signs of spring became more marked as the troops proceeded southwards. There were few symptoms of life on either bank of the Potomac, as the white men had left for the war, and the houses on the tobacco plantations and the surrounding negro dwellings were almost deserted. Vast quantities of stores had been accumulated in and around Fortress Monroe. Guns, of a size never before used in war, were lying on the wharfs waiting to be placed in battery; whilst Hampton Roads was crowded with transports and store-vessels, watched over by the little Monitor, and by the war steamers of the fleet. It was from flag-officer Goldsborough, commanding the fleet, that General M'Clellan first heard that he could expect but little assistance from the navy. The Merrimac completely closed the James River, and the fear of her attacks prevented the cooperation in the York River of the more powerful vessels of the fleet. Little other information was to be obtained at Fortress Monroe. General Wool, in command of the place, knew next to nothing of the movements or strength of the enemy; and the maps of the country were so false and inaccurate, that little reliance could be placed on them. The white population were entirely inimical to the Federals, whilst the reports received from *intelligent contrabands* were of a nature more fitted to afford sensation paragraphs to the newspapers than to assist the decisions of a general. However, as it was of great consequence to clear the Yorktown Peninsula of the Confederate troops under General Magruder, before the whole of General Johnston's army should have marched his assistance, the orders to advance were given on the

3rd ; and on April 4th, 56,000 men and 100 guns were landed, and the greater proportion were on the march for Yorktown. It was on the very night when the advance was ordered that a telegram reached General M'Clellan, informing him that the troops and garrison at Fortress Monroe were withdrawn from his command, and that he was forbidden to detach any men from that place without General Wool's sanction. This order was in direct opposition to one that had been issued at Washington only a short time before the departure of General M'Clellan, which placed Fortress Monroe and its dependencies under his control, and authorised him to draw from the garrison a force of 10,000 men. The new order not only actually weakened his force, but placed the base of operations out of the supervision and control of the general commanding the army in the field ; it was also an additional evidence of the work of his enemies at Washington, and of either the weakness or treachery* of the President. Nevertheless, the divisions marched from their encampment near Fortress Monroe on the 4th ; two divisions of the 4th Corps, under General Keyes, were ordered to proceed by the James River road ; whilst four divisions of the 3rd Corps, under General Heintzelman, were directed to march on Big Bethel and Howard's Creek, and, if possible, to cut off any detachments of the enemy which might be in garrison in the works near Shipping Point. It will be well now to see what preparations had been made by General Magruder to offer resistance to so formidable a force. During the winter months he had erected

* More probably of the former, as Mr. Lincoln's public character was more remarkable for the absence of virtues than for the presence of actual vices.



SCENE OF McCLELLAN'S OPERATIONS IN THE PENINSULA.

a line of works extending from Ship Point on his left, to the Warwick River on his right, through a line of wooded and swampy country, intersected by creeks or streams which emptied themselves either into the James or York Rivers; this line he considered he could hold with 20,000 or 25,000 men, as the right, on the James River, would be defended by the Merrimac, and the left by the batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester Point. Owing, however, to the small number of men under his command (11,000), he was forced to abandon this line, and to prepare another at a short distance to the rear, embracing a front from Yorktown to a point on the Warwick River, a distance of about thirteen and a half miles, and covered by the Warwick Creek, which he dammed up to render it unfordable, guarding the dams with batteries and lines of entrenchment. The defences of the little village of Yorktown consisted of a single enceinte, flanked by bastions at the angles, the works unrevetted, of low relief, and the ditch dry and shallow. There were formidable water batteries commanding the York River, which was also guarded by similar works on Gloucester Point. Connecting Yorktown with the defences of Warwick Creek were two forts joined together by a parapet and trench, scarcely worthy of being dignified by the name of a curtain, whilst the five dams, covered by entrenchments, completed the line of artificial defences; the swampy and difficult nature of the country, and the concealment which the vast forests afforded to the position of the defenders, formed the main strength of the line, and rendered it difficult for the attacking force to estimate the numbers of the enemy opposed to it. When the army of the Potomac landed at Fortress Monroe, the lines of defences were

not completed, owing to the withdrawal (by order) of a large body of negroes which had been attached to General Magruder's army, to construct fortifications.* The small force with which General Magruder determined to oppose the advancing enemy was disposed as follows—6,000 men garrisoned the important posts of York Town and Gloucester Point, whilst 5,000 were detached to watch the long line of works stretching across the Peninsula. General Magruder knew that, if he could only hold the enemy in check for a few days, assistance would be sent him from General Johnston's army. The weather favoured his bold resolution ; it had been clear and fine during the week preceding the Federal advance, but on their first day's march heavy rain fell, and the roads became almost impassable. The columns struggled along the deep and muddy tracks shut in by forests, and the effect of their far superior numbers and their powerful artillery became in a great measure neutralised. On the 5th the march was resumed, there was some slight skirmishing near Howard's Bridge, but the works there and at Shipping Point were found deserted, and it was not until the left column under General Keyes approached Lee's Mills that any serious opposition was encountered. There the head of his column, and the skirmishers detached to the flanks, found themselves under a heavy fire of artillery, whilst the river in their front (Warwick Creek) prevented a further advance. General Keyes reported that the work could not be taken by assault, and General M'Clellan, unaware of the small force opposed to him, and perhaps mistrusting his raw and inexperienced troops, unwilling also to lose life in an assault, for an object

* General Magruder's official report.

which he believed could be otherwise obtained, determined to await the landing of the remainder of his army and his heavier artillery before attempting an attack. Fatal was the delay. General Magruder, in his official report, stated that when he saw his adversary engaged in throwing up counter-batteries to his own, in place of assaulting him, and when he watched the arrival of the reinforcements which each day added to his own force, anxiety as to the result of the attack passed from his mind. But General M'Clellan's plans were based on the supposed knowledge that the 1st Corps, under General M'Dowell, would shortly land near Gloucester Point, and, overcoming any resistance that might be offered to it, would turn the enemy's defences at Yorktown by marching on West Point. He had left General M'Dowell at Alexandria, the last to embark, as he felt sure that the President would not venture to detach that corps from his command. Great, therefore, was the indignation and surprise at the Federal headquarters when a telegram reached General M'Clellan, from the Adjutant-General's office at Washington, containing the following order :—

‘GENERAL M'CLELLAN,—By directions of the President, General M'Dowell's army corps has been detached from the force under your immediate command, and the general is ordered to report to the Secretary of War : letter by mail.

‘L. THOMAS, Adjutant-General.’

It appeared, according to the statement of Mr. Lincoln in a letter to General M'Clellan, that fears for the safety of Washington, rather than political motives, had induced him to commit this fatal blunder. The latter had

probably influenced him with regard to the withdrawal of General Blenker's division from the army of the Potomac, as having assigned a separate command to General Fremont, who was at the head of a large political party, it was necessary to furnish him with troops from the other armies, although the operations in Western Virginia could influence but little the result of the campaign. This might account for the removal of General Blenker. But other reasons must be sought for that of General M'Dowell's corps. Probably political motives were in that case, as in the other, at the bottom of the scheme, but they may possibly have been concealed from the President by his advisers, and a shorter way tried, of effecting their purpose by working on his fears for the safety of Washington. Ignorant of military, and, indeed, of most other matters of which a knowledge is expected from men in high positions, weak in character, and consequently obstinate, Mr. Lincoln was singularly unfitted for the station of life he was called on to fill, whilst the almost unlimited power with which he was invested tended to render his failings more apparent and more mischievous. His very character for honesty was a misfortune, as it afforded a sort of counterpoise to his other defects, and also led men to suppose that his straightforward dealing in private life would be carried out in his public acts. He professed, and probably had, a sincere regard for General M'Clellan; but, when no longer under his personal influence, was easily led by the people around him, and consequently acted in a way which little became the ruler of a great country, and which even his most lenient critics must allow to have had the appearance of duplicity. In fact, his own personal fears, and those of the other members of the Govern-

ment,* when any movement by the enemy in the direction of Washington was made, became a byword and subject of amusement in the army of the Potomac. At the same time that Mr. Lincoln withdrew a *corps d'armée* from General M'Clellan's command, he urged an immediate assault on the enemy's works, saying that the country would no longer stand delay, and again reiterating his opinion that a direct movement by Manasses would have been a better mode of marching on Richmond than a transfer of the scene of operations to the Peninsula. In so far as regarded an assault on the enemy's lines, Mr. Lincoln's opinion was probably correct; but as he was believed to be totally uninfluenced by any knowledge of the strength of the enemy, either as regarded numbers or position, and to look upon the matter as a question of policy only, his mere assertion that it would be well to adopt such a course had no influence on the general commanding the army. General M'Clellan made up his mind that the works could not be taken by assault, and therefore commenced a siege in due form, which gave time to General Johnston, first, to collect his army in the Peninsula, and, secondly, to prepare entrenchments nearer Richmond, to which he could retire when he so wished it, and when he became too hardly pressed by the enemy in front of Yorktown. Among the forests in front of Yorktown, and between it and the Warwick River, the army of the Potomac encamped. The principal depôt for stores was changed from Fortress Monroe to Shipping Point, and the great labour commenced of

* The fears entertained for the safety of Washington so soon after the battle of Winchester argue that the results of that battle were not considered to have been decisive, and were very different from the great victory trumpeted abroad by the Federal press.

preparing roads, erecting bridges, and filling up swamps in order to allow of the transport of the guns, ammunition, and stores requisite for so large an army. It was in these works that the American soldier especially distinguished himself; the men went through an amount of hard labour, without murmur or complaint, which would have tested severely the discipline of an European army. Miles and miles of road had to be corduroyed, or planked with logs, and often after rain the corduroy would sink, and fresh timber covered with brushwood had to be placed over it. Many of the officers and men, from their former habits of life, possessed a knowledge of rough but practical engineering, most useful in such works as they were now engaged in. It was some considerable time before the stores and ammunition for a siege were brought to the front, and it was whilst he was conducting the operations before Yorktown that General M'Clellan received information of a fresh reduction of his power. Already had the armies of the West been removed from his jurisdiction, and General M'Dowell's corps retained nominally for the defence of Washington. More new military departments were now formed: that of the Shenandoah Valley was given to General Banks, whilst the portion of Virginia east of the Blue Ridge and west of the Potomac and the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad, including the district of Columbia and the country between the Potomac and the Patuxent, was formed into the district of the Rappahannock and allotted to General M'Dowell. This appointment was the cause of great irritation on the part of General M'Clellan's friends, as it was alleged that General M'Dowell had, in the absence of his chief, intrigued for his own advantage. However, subsequently, that officer

had an opportunity of clearing himself from these imputations, and of proving that the appointment was made unsolicited by himself. By reason of these fresh distributions, there remained in April to General M'Clellan, who in March commanded the whole of the army of the United States, only that portion of it which was before Yorktown. General Wool was not under his orders, neither was General Dix at Baltimore, nor General M'Dowell at Fredericksburgh, with all of whom perfect cooperation was almost necessary to secure success, and cooperation of such a kind as is usually the result of the exercise of controlling authority. If General M'Clellan had been unsuccessful, or had otherwise proved himself incapable, no one could blame the Government for removing him; but the underhand manner in which his plans were thwarted and his power circumscribed, before he had had any opportunity of proving his ability, would almost argue that the rulers at Washington were equally fearful of his success as of his defeat. The nation was, indeed, reaping the fruits of its system of government; men who in other countries would never have risen beyond the narrow sphere for which they were fitted were, in America, invested with power which few constitutional governments possess, and brought the petty ideas of small minds to bear on the destinies of their country.

CHAPTER XV.

CAMPAIGN OF TENNESSEE.

DURING the time occupied by the army of the Potomac in the advance to Centreville, and the subsequent change of the base of operations to Fortress Monroe, the Federal army and navy in the Tennessee and the inland waters had not been idle. The command of the whole Western district had been allotted to General Halleck ; but, whilst he retained his headquarters at St. Louis, his subordinates continued the offensive campaign, which had been so successfully commenced by the capture and occupation of Forts Henry, Donelson, and Columbus, and the city of Nashville. Generals Grant and Buell continued to advance into Tennessee, whilst General Pope and Commodore Foote conducted the operations on the Mississippi River, and endeavoured to reduce the new position which the Confederates had occupied after the evacuation of Columbus. As Columbus may be said to have formed the left of the first line of defence taken up by the Confederates to cover Tennessee, so may Island No. 10 be considered as the left of their second line, extending from thence through Corinth to Murfreesborough and Cumberland Gap. It had, however, the disadvantage, irrespective of its actual position considered for purposes of defence, of lying at too great a distance from the main army,

and consequently of being subject to the danger not only of being cut off from communication with that army, but from the knowledge of its isolation acting badly on the temper of its defenders. Its actual position was not well adapted for defence. The island is situated at the southern point of a peninsula of land formed by one of those sharp bends common to the Mississippi River. Immediately beyond the island the river, which until then had flowed in a southerly direction, turns almost directly to the north, consequently the small town of New Madrid, situated on the right bank of the river, is, although twelve miles lower down than Island No. 10, considerably to the north of it. The land on the left bank rises considerably higher than that on the right, which is low and swampy. The island itself is flat, and partially covered with timber. This was the place that had been selected to guard the Mississippi, and its defences had been constructed under the superintendence of General Beauregard, who was in command until the last days of the siege, when he handed it over to General M'Call. The successful defence of the island from its situation depended greatly, if not entirely, on the possession by its defenders of the town of New Madrid, and of the higher ground on the left bank of the river. This was apparent to the Federal general, and whilst Commodore Foote with his gunboats engaged the attention of the defenders of the island from the upper river, General Pope himself led an expedition against the force occupying New Madrid. On February 28 a skirmish took place between the troops under his command and some irregular cavalry, and shortly afterwards a detachment under General Plummer was sent to take possession of a point on the right bank ten miles below

New Madrid, and to erect a battery there for the purpose of preventing reinforcements from being brought up the river. But General Pope did not consider himself sufficiently well provided with artillery to attack the entrenched position at New Madrid, therefore he sent to Cairo for siege guns, and three 32-pounders and an 8-inch mortar were, in a very short space of time, shipped from Cairo and transported across the narrow neck of land which separated General Pope from the position held by the gunboats, and were then placed in battery opposite the Confederate entrenchments at New Madrid. The defenders appear to have shown great supineness in thus allowing General Pope to occupy a position from whence he was enabled to cut off the garrisons both of New Madrid and Island No. 10 from any assistance which might seek to reach them by water. He was allowed almost unopposed to erect his batteries, which were completed on March 12, and which he used principally against the gunboats and shipping in the river. On the night of the 13th there was a heavy storm of rain and thunder, and under cover of the darkness the Confederate garrison evacuated New Madrid, and sought shelter either with that of Island No. 10, or in the works on the left bank. Thus, with scarcely any loss, General Pope obtained possession of New Madrid, and was able completely to isolate Island No. 10 from the Lower Mississippi. Large quantities of stores fell into his hands, the evacuation of the place having apparently been made hastily and without much order; its easy capture afforded a fresh triumph to the Federals, and the news of the surrender of the other defences was eagerly expected.

Although New Madrid had been surrendered so easily, yet the Confederates had no intention of giving

up the position they had so long prepared and so carefully fortified on the island. The siege endured for a considerable time, and the gunboats, owing to their construction, were found to be of much less service when engaging the batteries down stream than when employed in the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, advancing, as they did at Forts Henry and Donelson, up stream against the enemy's works. Their broadside batteries could not be brought to bear, and, owing to the swiftness of the current, it was found necessary to advance stern foremost, and the heavier guns having been placed in the bows, the lighter artillery only could be brought into action. The fire from the mortar vessels, owing to the difficulty of anchoring them steadily in the swift current, was not very accurate or destructive.* It was also found that although the defenders were, by General Pope's successful operations, cut off from river communication with the South, yet that by means of their garrisons on the left bank of the river they were enabled to hold intercourse with the main army. Two projects were therefore formed by General Pope and Commodore Foote : the first was to cut a channel across the narrow neck of land which separated New Madrid from the upper attacking force, and so to enable the gunboats to get in rear of and below the defences ; the second was to transport a portion of General Pope's force to the opposite bank, and to sweep the enemy from the batteries which overlooked the river from that side. The second scheme so far depended on the successful execution of the first, as it was requisite first to construct the canal, in order to enable the transports necessary to carry

* *Times'* Correspondent, March 25, 1862.

the troops across the river, to reach New Madrid. To dig a canal through the isthmus was a work of considerable difficulty, as the requisite length was twelve miles, and the land was partially covered with half-submerged timber, to cut through which considerably augmented the labour. Still, the work was accomplished by the first week in April, without any molestation from the Confederates, and apparently without their knowledge. Their attention was distracted by the heavy fire from the gunboats and mortar batteries, both from those on the mortar-boats and the larger ones, 13-inch mortars, from the shore: an expedition was also fitted out from the fleet, which succeeded in landing near the upper battery and in spiking six guns. A gallant action was likewise performed by Captain Walke, commanding the Carondelet, who ran his vessel past the whole line of the Confederate batteries, both of those on the island and the batteries of lighter guns on the Tennessee bank. This happened on the 4th April, and on the 6th the gunboat Pittsburgh also succeeded in a similar attempt, whilst on the same night four steamers, together with a considerable number of transports, were brought through the canal, and, concealed by the trees, waited at its mouth for the orders to enter the Mississippi River. On board these transports was Payne's division, and being thus provided with the necessary means for crossing the river, General Pope directed an immediate attack on the batteries on the Tennessee shore. A place for landing the troops was selected, and the Carondelet ordered down to silence any batteries that might attempt to interfere with the disembarkation. Without any opposition, General Payne's division landed; and, advancing at once up the bank, drove back the defenders of the batteries. The troops

on the Tennessee shore, as also those who garrisoned the island, seem to have lost all self-possession as soon as they perceived that a successful attempt had been made to cut them off from their communications. Without order, and in much confusion, the defences of the island were abandoned, and a flag of truce was despatched to Commodore Foote, for the purpose of negotiating its unconditional surrender. A great portion of the garrison had escaped to the Tennessee side of the river, some sought refuge in the woods and swamps, but a large number surrendered to General Pope, and those that remained on the island to Commodore Foote. General Beauregard had left the place a few days before the surrender, and betaken himself to the main army of the Confederates. Previous to his departure he installed General M'Call in command, who, on his appointment, issued a somewhat boastful order, considering how soon it was followed by the surrender of his command.* On neither side, with some notable exceptions, have the proclamations or despatches of the generals been remarkable for the conciseness which in Europe is considered adapted to military writing. However, for the actual loss of the position General M'Call does not seem to have been to blame. The mischief was, in a great measure, done when General Pope was permitted, after but little

* General M'Call's Order:—'Soldiers, we are strangers each to the other; let me tell you who I am. I am a General made by Beauregard and Bragg for this command, when they knew it was in peril. They have known me for twenty years; together we have stood on the fields of Mexico. Give them your confidence now, give it to me when I have earned it. Soldiers, the Mississippi Valley is entrusted to your courage, to your discipline, to your patience. Exhibit the coolness of last night and hold it.

'W. D. M'CALL, Brigadier-General Commanding.'

opposition, to capture New Madrid ; subsequently, when the canal was constructed without interference ; and at the last day of the siege, when the defenders of the batteries on the left bank permitted the landing of the enemy's force, and their march from the river, after a resistance so trifling that General Pope was enabled to state, in his report, that he had accomplished an enterprise of such importance without the loss of a single life. A large number of prisoners, of guns, stores, and ammunition, including a floating battery constructed for the defence of the island, fell into the hands of the Federals, together with four steamers afloat, and two which had been sunk, but which could be easily raised. The fall of Island No. 10 opened the Mississippi River to the gunboats for a considerable distance, and as they had previously been enabled to navigate the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers, so were they now in possession, to an even greater extent, of the Mississippi. In the Confederacy the disappointment and regret at its loss was very great, the more so as it was unlooked for. Up to General Beauregard's departure, the bulletins issued spoke of continued and firm resistance ; the garrison had endured a bombardment for several days, and their batteries were but little injured ; the unconditional surrender of the place so soon afterwards was, therefore, totally unexpected. A want of discipline among the troops, and of authority among the officers, is said to have been one of the causes for the hasty abandonment of the place. When the idea spread among the men that they were gradually becoming surrounded by the enemy, they showed signs of uneasiness and demoralisation, which the actual dangers of the bombardment could not inspire ; the officers

lost control over them, and each man sought his own safety.*

Both the Federal land and naval forces showed energy and courage in the prosecution of the siege; the flank march of General Pope to New Madrid was well conducted, and the subsequent construction of the canal deserves credit both for its conception and its execution. The gunboats, although not playing so considerable a part as they had done at Fort Henry, yet performed their work well; and the enterprize of the captains of the Carondelet and Pittsburgh, in running the gauntlet of the batteries and so placing their vessels at the disposal of the general, was accompanied with the success which so bold an attempt deserved. Thus far the advance of what may be termed the right of the great army of the West had been successful. It will be remembered that, after the fall of Forts Henry and Donelson, the centre under General Grant, and the left under General Buell, had united in the vicinity of Nashville, whilst the main army of the Confederates had retired to Murfreesborough. Thus the first object of the campaign had been gained, by the total withdrawal of the Confederates from the State of Kentucky, and by the occupation of the capital of Tennessee. It now became necessary for the Federal generals to fix upon a second objective point. Two lines were open to them, either to make Eastern Tennessee their line of march, taking the small towns of Cleveland or Chattanooga, on the Upper Tennessee River, as their point of attack, and so to afford assistance and encouragement to the Union men

* As the Confederate despatches regarding the surrender of Island No. 10 are not published, it is difficult to obtain a correct idea of the reasons which led to its so rapid abandonment.

and Union sentiment reported to exist in East Tennessee ; or inclining to the West, and availing themselves of the possession of that portion of the Tennessee River north of Florence (Alabama), to make that town, or Corinth, on the great trunk line of rail which intersects the Confederacy, their object of attack. The first plan would necessitate a long march through Tennessee without the assistance of water communication, and opposed by an enemy possessing the advantage of a line of railroad in his rear, which he could destroy as he retreated, and thus necessitate a slow advance on the part of the aggressive force. The second line promised more rapid results. By operating on the Tennessee River, the whole benefit of the river, not only for transport, but for the material assistance afforded by the gunboats, was open to the Federals ; it also gave them the opportunity of forcing General Johnston to retire from Murfreesborough without a battle—as, by placing a considerable force on the Tennessee River, his left flank would be turned, and his communications with Western Tennessee and with the State of Mississippi, as also with the river Mississippi, would be seriously impeded, if not entirely cut off. In adopting this line of operations, there might be a risk of exposing the town of Nashville and the State of Kentucky to the danger of an attack by General Johnston's army. But Nashville was capable of being fortified, and the command of the Cumberland River gave considerable advantages to the Federals. The people of Kentucky had also shown no great enthusiasm for either side, the majority of its population being rather in favour of the Union ; therefore there was not much to induce a second advance into Kentucky on the part of the Confederates,

when the whole of the South-west was seriously threatened by the enemy. The second line of attack was partially adopted by the Federal generals; nevertheless, they so far divided their forces as narrowly to escape defeat in detail. General Grant, after the capture of Nashville, proceeded with his army down the Tennessee River to a place at a short distance below Savannah (Tennessee) called Pittsburg Landing. There he collected stores and materials, in order to form a depôt from which he should march on Corinth, and so possess the railroad leading to Memphis, with possibly the ultimate intention of cooperating with one of the many expeditions which had been sent to attack the seaboard of the Confederacy. But in the meantime General Buell, with the other portion of the army remaining at Nashville, prepared to march on the same point by land. Thus General Johnston at Murfreesborough, by means of the railway, was enabled, should he so wish it, to effect a junction with the forces in Mississippi, and thus bring the whole army of the West to act on General Grant before General Buell, by the slower process of marching, could arrive to his assistance.

The army of the Mississippi was under the command of General Beauregard, to whom it had been allotted at the commencement of March, and who retained the chief command until General Johnston, the senior officer, arrived. He had done his best, during the month in which he had held the command, to collect and organise an efficient army. The Governors of Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana had been called on to furnish additional troops, and General Bragg, with the forces which had occupied the camps round Pensacola, arrived to form part of the army of

the Mississippi. General Polk also, after the evacuation of Columbus, brought two regiments, and served in person under General Beauregard.* These forces were collected in and around Corinth, and were stationed severally on the Corinth and Tuka and on the Memphis and Charleston Railways, with the object of protecting these lines, and of checking any advance of General Grant from Pittsburg Landing. Thus there were in Tennessee on either side two armies, those under Generals Grant and Buell on the Federal side, and those under Generals Johnston and Beauregard on that of the Confederates. The Confederates had however this advantage, that General Johnston, with a railway in his rear, was possessed not only of the benefit of acting on interior lines, but, should an opportunity present itself, of combining his forces with those of General Beauregard, and of falling on the army of General Grant before a junction could be effected with it by General Buell. This advantage General Johnston determined to avail himself of, and on General Beauregard's applying to him for a brigade to assist in resisting any advance on General Grant's part, he not only complied with the request, but moved his entire force in the same direction, and on April 1 arrived at the cantonments of General Beauregard's army in the neighbourhood of Corinth.†

General Beauregard then became second in command of the whole army. So far the plan had been successful; but although nominally formed on the model of a European army, yet the forces of the Confederacy were not, in the opinion of the senior officers, sufficiently advanced either in organisation or discipline to permit of a forward movement. Notwithstanding, the

* General Beauregard's official report. Confederate reports of battles, p. 209.

† General Beauregard's official despatch.

opportunity which presented itself offered so great inducements that General Johnston determined to avail himself of it. It was known that General Buell was using every endeavour to come to the assistance of General Grant, and it was of great importance to attack the latter general before the reinforcements should reach him. Consequently it was resolved to advance, and measures were taken to place the newly arrived regiments and brigades under proper divisional and brigade commanders. This was not actually accomplished until April 2, and on that very night orders were issued for the forces to march on the following morning. The army was divided into three corps and a reserve. The first corps, commanded by Major-General Polk, of two divisions ; the second by Major-General Braxton Bragg, two divisions ; the third by Major-General Hardee, one division ; and the reserve, of three brigades, under Brigadier-General Breckenridge. In addition there was a force of cavalry, under Brigadier-General Gardner, consisting of 4,382 men ;* making a total, as enumerated by General Beauregard, of 40,355 men. It was hoped that the army would have reached the enemy's position in time to attack on the 5th, but owing to the narrow roads, the thickly wooded country, the want of practice of the men in marching, added to a drenching rain which fell on the 4th, the troops did not reach their destination until the afternoon of the 5th (Saturday), and therefore the attack was deferred until the following day. For about three weeks General Grant had occupied a position at Pittsburg Landing, but, although he well knew that he was in the vicinity of a considerable force of the enemy,

* It would be wrong to number the cavalry by sabres, as the greater proportion were armed with shot guns.

no entrenchments had been thrown up, and even the ordinary precautions of protecting the front of the position by abattis had been neglected. For the latter there could be no excuse, as the surrounding country was almost entirely covered with forest. In fact, there had been little or no order in the disposition of the several divisions; they seem to have been allowed to occupy positions according to the fancies of their several commanders, and probably remained on nearly the same ground that they occupied when they first landed from the transports. The Federal army had not been divided into corps, but consisted of six divisions, commanded respectively by Generals Prentiss, Sherman, M'Clermand, Hurlbut, W. H. L. Wallace, and L. Wallace, and could not have numbered less than 40,000 men.* Thus the two armies were about equal in strength, but the Federals had the advantage of holding a position which with care they might have rendered very difficult of attack; they also possessed the assistance of gunboats, and their men were much better armed and equipped than their opponents. On the other hand, the Confederates were commanded by better generals, and the men were each and all personally interested in the struggle, fighting as they were for their very homes and existence. The position occupied by the Federals was at a distance of about twenty miles from Corinth, on the left or west bank of the Tennessee River. There was no village or town, but two log huts, and a road leading down a ravine

* The despatches of the generals contain so little information, and are written usually so badly, that it is very difficult to obtain from them any information. A full and well-written description of the battle appeared in the *Cincinnati Gazette*, taken from the account of an eye-witness. The number of regiments in the army of General Grant was about fifty-eight.

between high bluffs, marked the landing. At a short distance above Pittsburg Landing, a small creek, termed Lick Creek, enters the Tennessee, and about the same distance below it another creek, named Snake Creek, also flows into the river. Running into Snake Creek, and rising near the source of Lick Creek, is Owls Creek, which partially encircles the south-western side of the plateau on which the battle was fought. The plateau slopes gradually from a ridge near Lick Creek towards Owls Creek, and is almost entirely covered with forest, but generally not of sufficient thickness at the bottom to prevent the movements of troops. It is intersected by several roads leading to Corinth, by Big Bethel and Monterey, to Purdy, and to Hamburgh Landing. On Friday, the 4th, the Confederate advanced skirmishers commenced feeling the Federal positions, and General Grant moved General L. Wallace's division to Adamsville, in the road to Purdy, apparently jealous of an attack on his right from that direction. On Saturday, the 5th, the skirmishing along the line of pickets continued during the greater part of the day; still the Federals seem to have been lulled into a fatal security, and to have made up their minds that no attack of any importance was contemplated on the part of the enemy. Owing to the irregular manner in which the outpost duty was performed in the Federal army, and to the system which prevailed of continual picket firing, little attention was paid to the sound of musketry, which continued at intervals during the day, and the main army remained in their cantonments without making any preparation to receive an attack. The advanced division, that of General Sherman, occupied a position about five miles from Pittsburgh Landing, fronting a slope covered with wood and bounded by a ravine, on the right of a small

log cabin termed Shiloh Church, which has given its name to the battle. One brigade of his division, under General Smith, separated from the rest, lay on the left of the entire line, about three miles distant from the main body of the division, and occupied ground on the left or northern bank of Lick Creek, but commanded by higher bluffs on the right bank. To the left of, and partially overlapped by, the main body of General Sherman's division, lay that of General M'Clermand; and to his left, but with a gap in the line, owing to General M'Clermand's division having been extended too much to the right, was that of General Prentiss, connected on its left with the detached brigade of General Sherman. These three divisions formed the first line, but neither had the positions of the divisions or that of the several brigades been well selected, nor had sufficient advantages been taken of the capabilities of the ground for purposes of defence. The second line, or reserves, was composed of two divisions, commanded by General Hurlbut and General W. H. L. Wallace, and stretched across the road leading from Corinth, about one mile from the landing. The remaining division, under General Lewis Wallace, remained in the position it occupied on the 4th, some miles below Pittsburgh Landing, between Crump Landing and Purdy. Such, on the morning of April 6, was the position of the Federal army. At daybreak the attack commenced, the Confederates advancing in four lines. The first line, commanded by Major-General Hardee, was composed of his own corps and a brigade of that of General Bragg, and was ordered to march in line directly against the front of the Federal position, the right of the line resting on Lick Creek, the left on Owls Creek, the cavalry on the flanks, and the artillery in the rear of the infantry and

in the intervals between the divisions.* The remainder of General Bragg's corps, minus the garrison of Corinth, formed the second line, and preserved a distance of 500 or 1,000 yards from the first line. These two corps, viz. the third and second, were the attacking force; the first corps, under Major-General Polk, formed the support, and the brigades under General Breckenridge the reserve, the latter slightly to the right of General Polk's corps. About 7.30 A.M. the first line became engaged; the Federal pickets were rapidly driven in, so rapidly as not to allow of time for the divisions to which they belonged to get under arms. The left of General Sherman's line, consisting of Colonel Hildebrand's brigade and the greater portion of General Prentiss's division, were thrown into confusion. Many of the regiments were not under arms. Some of the men were cooking, others cleaning their rifles, many of the officers were in bed, when the Confederates under General Hardee rushed into their camps. Then ensued a scene of wild confusion; officers were shot lying in their tents, men whilst seeking their arms and running to the rear, endeavouring to find refuge in the thick woods and behind a neighbouring ridge, where an attempt at a formation was made. A portion of Prentiss's division was drawn up in something like order, but in an open space of ground, where the men were exposed to the fire from the woods. These were quickly driven back. General Prentiss became

* General Johnston's orders to Major-General Hardee:—'He will make the proper distribution of the artillery along the line of battle, remembering that the rifle guns are of long range, and should be placed in very commanding positions in rear of the infantry, to fire mainly on the reserves and second line of the enemy, but occasionally will be directed on his batteries and heads of columns.'

separated from his division, which, indeed, regarded as an organised body of troops, ceased to exist. Three regiments of this division, together with their general, were captured, and marched to the rear. The main brunt of the Confederate attack had fallen on the centre of the Federal line, on General Sherman's left, and on General Prentiss's division; time was therefore allowed for the other brigades of General Sherman, including the detached brigade of General Smith, to form line. The former had just time to seize their arms, when the left of the Confederate line came sweeping on them; for a short period they offered some resistance, but not sufficient materially to check the rapidly advancing enemy, or to necessitate the employment of the Confederate supports under General Bragg. These were not brought into action until what may be considered as the second line of the Federals, consisting of General M'Clermand's division, were encountered drawn up on some rising ground. For the time little notice was taken of the detached brigade on the Federal left; the Confederates, eager in the pursuit of General Prentiss and Sherman's division, passed by them, advancing through the forsaken camps and capturing the greater part of the field artillery left on the ground. The first serious resistance they met with was from M'Clermand's division. This division, hearing firing to their front, at first supposed it to be merely the guards and pickets discharging their firelocks prior to cleaning them, a practice but too common with the raw troops of the Federals. But they were soon undeceived, and General M'Clermand hastened forward two brigades to take the place of those on General Sherman's left which had been driven back; these were young troops, and, being brought under fire probably

for the first time, in the midst of the confusion and panic of the defeated brigades were unable to hold their ground, and retired. General M'Clermand then threw back his left, his right still connected with those regiments of General Sherman's division which had stood firm. He (General M'Clermand) had now taken up a position parallel with the Corinth Road, at nearly a right angle with the line of his former camp. There he prepared to make a stand; but, notwithstanding all General Sherman's efforts, the whole of his brigades retired or fled, leaving General M'Clermand's right exposed. General Bragg's line of fresh troops, which had with difficulty been held back, now advanced to the attack, whilst a portion of General Breckenridge's reserve attacked General Smith's brigade, taking advantage of the high ground on the southern bank of Lick Creek, and, under cover of a heavy fire from the artillery, crossing Lick Creek and driving back the brigade by a close fire of musketry. General Polk's corps was now brought up to reinforce the left of the Confederate line. General M'Clermand was driven back, and by 10.30 the whole of the first line of the Federal army was in utter rout and confusion. Still there remained Hurlbut's division, and those of the two Generals Wallace. Only one of the latter was available, as that of General Lewis Wallace had been detached some miles distant to the right. These two divisions, well handled, strongly posted, and possessed of good artillery, withstood the enemy from 10.30 A.M. to 4 o'clock P.M.; in vain the Confederate brigades were led forward against them. General Bragg in person superintended the attacks; but each successive wave as it advanced was thrown back by the steady fire of the infantry in the woods, backed by a powerful

artillery. About this time General Johnston was killed ; he was on horseback, commanding in person the right of the line, when he was struck in the leg by a rifle bullet. Unheeding the wound, believing it to be slight, his mind engaged in directing the movements of the army, he continued on horseback, and it was only when he perceived by the weakness occasioned by the loss of blood that he was actually dying, that he became aware that an artery had been cut, and that only a few moments remained for him to live. Although the centre of the Confederate line was held in check, the right, driving back Smith's brigade, continued to advance, and the left under General Polk also pushed forward ; then Hindman's and Wallace's division retired, and the Federal army, between 4 and 6 o'clock in the evening, lay apparently at the mercy of their foes within a circuit of less than a mile round Pittsburgh Landing. Here would have been the time to complete the victory ; one effort more, and the routed, dispirited, and disorganised mass would have been driven into the river. General Lewis Wallace's division, eagerly expected, had not arrived ; no order to march had reached him until 11.30 A.M., and when he attempted to cross Snake Creek, for the purpose of reinforcing the right of the line, he found that the Federal army had been driven back, and what had been their encampments were in possession of the enemy. Fearing to expose his division to the risk of being cut off, he took the main road, and only reached Pittsburgh Landing early on the morning of the 7th. General Buell's advanced guard had, indeed, appeared on the right bank of the Tennessee, but only the advanced guard, and too few to be of service. It was, indeed, an opportunity for completing the victory. Why was it not seized ? The

Confederate troops were weary, were hungry—as, like all raw and undisciplined soldiers, they had consumed the five days' rations issued to them during the first three; but, above all, they were disorganised by their success. The men, and even some of the officers, in place of pushing forward, spread through the deserted camps, plundering and lading themselves with spoil;* consequently, the attacking columns were weakened, and the burden of the battle thrown upon those who adhered to their colours. But even this will not fully account for the absence of the last attack. One effort more, and not only would victory the most complete have been secured, but the march of General Buell would have been rendered futile. It was well known by General Beauregard that he was in close vicinity, and that in a short time his forces would reinforce those of General Grant. At this hour was General Johnston's loss felt. He would in all probability have led on the last attack; but his successor, influenced by the condition of the army, refrained from doing so, and sent orders to the brigades, which were actually preparing in the darkness of the evening for one last effort, to withdraw.† The gunboat fire might have assisted in accomplishing this result; but the evidence of one of the highest officers of the Confederate army showed that the men soon perceived that the large shells fired at random into the woods produced more noise than actual damage.‡ As in most of the battles in America, there was little of the direct supervision of the commanding generals on either side. General Grant seems to have left the battle principally to the commanders of

* General Beauregard's official report.

† General Bragg's official report.

‡ Ibid.

the divisions and brigades, and even General Johnston contented himself with the supervision of one wing of his army. This may have been partly owing to the wooded nature of the country, but more to the want of the proper channels of communication, and of the knowledge, acquired usually in European armies by long training, of handling large bodies of men. Little can be said for the conduct of the Federal troops composing the first line of their army. Neither had the generals or the men performed their part well. The commanding general had shown an absence of forethought in not preparing for an attack after more than one warning. The generals of divisions and brigades had exercised little supervision in allowing the outpost duty to be so inefficiently performed, and the positions of the pickets so badly selected as to render them of no service. The men gave way to panic; and, to use the words of a general of the Federal army, the *front line broke and fled without firing a shot.** The divisions of the second line behaved well, and formed a rallying-point on which many of the broken regiments re-formed. But the landing-place at Pittsburg was a sight that must have caused pain to any soldier: it was crowded with fugitives, who hid themselves behind trees, unmindful of the exhortations of some of their officers, who were anxious to reform their regiments and brigades.† A large number of prisoners, including one division under General Prentiss, the greater part of the artillery of two divisions, and many colours, fell into the hands of the victorious army; besides a vast amount of stores and

* General Hurlbut's report.

† The Federal accounts own to this disgraceful scene. *Vide* General Buell's report.

private property left in the deserted camps. The stores and plunder were of little service to the Confederates. It was dark when the battle ended; during the night the rain descended in torrents, and it was impossible to collect, or issue to the troops, the provisions lying scattered over the ground. Consequently the men remained almost without food during the evening of the 6th, and on the morning of the 7th found themselves opposed to a fresh army which had arrived during the night. General Buell had left Columbia, about forty miles south-west of Nashville, on the 2nd, and his advanced division, under General Nelson, had reached Savannah on the 5th. Then the sound of firing had been heard, and General Buell put himself on board a steamer and went to General Grant's headquarters. He soon became aware, both from the heaviness of the firing and from the crowds of stragglers and fugitives who lined the bank, that a serious battle was being fought. General Grant had left the landing and gone to the front, but had directed that General Nelson should, immediately on his arrival, be ferried across the river. To carry out these orders General Buell sent a despatch to that officer; but having ascertained that the roads on the right bank were impracticable for artillery, he directed him to send his guns by steamers, and at the same time gave orders for the rear divisions of his army to hasten forward, leaving their baggage trains behind. One brigade of General Nelson's division reached the left bank in time to participate in the last stand made by the Federals on the evening of the 6th. The remainder of the division crossed during the night, and that of General Crittenden arrived by steamers from Savannah. These two divisions were immediately pushed forward, and took up a

position in front of General Grant's lines. Early in the morning of the 7th General M'Cook's division arrived, and four batteries belonging to those of Generals Nelson and Crittenden. In addition to these three divisions, that of General L. Wallace marched into the camp about 1 A.M. Thus reinforcements of at least 20,000 men must have reached General Grant during the night of the 6th and 7th. About 5 A.M. the Federal line advanced; it was composed of General Nelson's division on the left, of General Crittenden's division, and, about one hour later, of General M'Cook's division. These three divisions belonged to General Buell's army; in addition, General L. Wallace's division, and portions of General Hurlbut's, General Sherman's, General M'Clermand's, General Prentiss', and General W. Wallace's divisions were on the field:* the two latter, deprived of their commanders by the capture of General Prentiss and the severe wounds of General W. Wallace. The chief brunt of the battle of the 7th fell upon General Buell's army. The troops which composed it were of longer service, and were better disciplined, than the majority of those of General Grant's army. The attack commenced on the left by the advance of General Nelson's division over the

* General Buell, in his report, sums up in the following terms the assistance he received from General Grant's forces:—'I found upon the ground parts of about two regiments, perhaps one thousand men, and subsequently a similar fragment came up of General Grant's force. The first I directed to act with General M'Cook's attack, and the second one was similarly employed on the left. I sent other straggling troops of General Grant's force immediately on General M'Cook's right, as some firing had already commenced there. I had no direct knowledge of the disposition of the remainder of General Grant's force, nor is it my province to speak of them. I regret that I am unable to name those that came under my notice in the way I have stated, for they rendered willing and efficient service during the day.'

ground which the Confederates had evacuated after the battle of the 6th. Driving back the pickets, General Nelson soon found himself in front of the main body of the Confederate forces, and about seven o'clock A.M. the whole line was engaged, the Federal left thrown forward. The Confederates opened with artillery, which was replied to by the Federal batteries; but it was evident that the Confederate army were merely fighting to cover their retreat. Their left, under General Bragg, held the right of the Federal forces, composed of General Grant's troops, in check during the greater portion of the day, and only retired when their commander found that the main body of the army was in retreat. About 10.30 the Confederate right made a determined stand, and repulsed the attacking forces; but these were reinforced by a fresh battery of regular artillery, which had landed during the morning, and again assumed the offensive. The greater portion of the guns and colours captured by the Confederates on the 6th were retaken on the 7th by the Federals. They had been left for the most part in the field, and were abandoned in the retreat. No attempt at pursuit was made. The Federals advanced but little beyond the position occupied by the first line of General Grant's army on the 6th, and, finding that the attack had ceased, the Confederate army retreated leisurely to Corinth. The losses during the two days' battle, as reported by General Beauregard, amounted to an aggregate of 10,699—i.e. killed, 1,728; wounded, 8,012; missing, 959. That of the Federals, according to their own returns, numbered 13,661—i.e. killed, 1,735; wounded, 7,882; missing, 4,044. The principal loss had fallen on General M'Clermand's, W. H. Wallace's, Hurlbut's, Sherman's, and Prentiss' divisions, of which Prentiss'

and W. Wallace's furnished by far the greater proportion of the missing.

To the Confederates must be awarded the credit of conducting a retreat in good order before far superior forces, and with troops worn out by marches, exposure, and hard fighting; but it would be unjust to withhold the praise due to General Buell and the troops under his command, both for the energy they showed in taking up their position on the night of the 6th and 7th, and for the gallant manner in which they performed their duties during the battle of the 7th. They resisted the demoralisation of the troops which surrounded them, and marching through the crowd of fugitives, through the hospitals overflowing with wounded, and over the field strewn with the corpses of their fellow-countrymen, they took up their position in front of the beaten troops, and maintained it during the day. It is said that the appearance of these troops, and their behaviour when marching to the front, was very different from that of the younger levies. There was no boasting, cheering, or yelling in their ranks; they seemed to know that they had a serious task before them, and to be resolved to carry it through. With regard to the defeated divisions of the previous day, they probably performed their work fairly well on the 7th, as although a Federal army is easily disorganised and dispirited, it as quickly recovers itself.

General Bragg, in the official despatch in which he gave an account of the action, summed up the causes of the failure to complete the overthrow of the Federals on the evening of the first day's battle. He wrote as follows: 'The want of proper organisation and discipline, and the inferiority in many cases of our officers to the men they were expected to command, left us

often without system or order, and the large proportion of stragglers resulting weakened our forces, and kept the superior and staff officers constantly engaged in the duties of file closers. Especially was this the case after the occupation of the enemy's camps, the spoils of which served to delay and greatly to demoralise our men. But no one cause probably contributed so greatly to our loss of time, which was the loss of success, as the fall of the commanding general. At the moment of this irreparable disaster, the plan of battle was being rapidly and successfully executed under his immediate eyes and lead on the right. For want of a common superior to the different commands on that part of the field, great delay occurred after this misfortune, and that delay prevented the consummation of the work so gallantly and successfully begun and carried on, until the approach of night induced our new commander to recall the exhausted troops for rest and recuperation, before a crowning effort on the next morning. The arrival during the night of a large and fresh army to reinforce the enemy, equal in numbers at least to our own, frustrated all his well-grounded expectations, and, after a long and bloody contest with superior forces, compelled us to retire from the field, leaving our killed, many of our wounded, and nearly all the trophies of the previous day's victories.'

General S. Johnston's death was deeply felt through the Southern Confederacy. He had been accounted one of the best officers of the United States army, and had the benefit of such military experience as the later wars on the North American continent could afford. He graduated at the West Point Academy in 1820, and served in the Black Hawk war against the Indian tribes. He then emigrated to Texas, where he was

engaged in the war between Texas and Mexico, and in action with the Cherokee Indians. He subsequently served in the Mexican war as the colonel of a volunteer Texan regiment. When additional regiments were raised for the United States army, Colonel S. Johnston was appointed to the colonelcy of the 2nd Cavalry, and in 1857 was sent in command of the United States forces to the Great Salt Lake city, to reduce the Mormons to obedience. Since then, until the breaking out of the war of Secession, he had retained the command of the military district of Utah. When the news reached him of the secession of the South, General Johnston repaired to New Orleans from California, having resigned his commission in the Federal service. He then proceeded to Richmond, where he was at once invested by President Davis with the command of the Department of the Mississippi. At the time of his death General Johnston was sixty years of age, but hale and strong.* His loss was the more regretted, as it was felt that the slightest surgical aid might have saved a life so valuable to the cause he had embraced. In announcing the news of the first day's battle to the Confederate Congress, President Davis bore witness to the worth of the late general, and the serious loss which his death had occasioned to the Confederacy. He spoke of his own personal friendship for the deceased, and thus alluded to his great qualities: 'In his death he has illustrated the character for which through life he was conspicuous, that of singleness of purpose and devotion to duty with his whole energies. Bent on obtaining the victory which he deemed essential to his country's cause, he rode on to the accomplishment of

* Pollard's *History of the War*.

his object, forgetful of self, whilst his very life-blood was fast ebbing away. His last breath cheered his comrades on to victory. The last sound he heard was their shout of victory. His last thought was his country, and long and deeply will his country mourn his loss.'

The Confederates, General Breckenridge forming the rear guard, fell back to the position the army had occupied on the night preceding the battle, and on the following day to Mikey's house, three miles in rear, which they held unattacked for some days, their cavalry being pushed forward nearly as far as the battle-ground of the 6th. General Beauregard sent a despatch to General Grant, asking permission to bury his dead; this request was refused, as the duty had been already performed, and General Grant was unwilling to allow parties of the enemy within his lines. Thus ended the battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburg Landing—indecisive, like the majority of the battles of the war. The victory of the first day raised the spirits of the Confederate troops, and in some degree compensated them for their defeats at Forts Henry, Donelson, and also Island No. 10, the news of which reached the army soon after the battle.

Hitherto success had crowned the Federal arms in the West; their operations on the coast had also inflicted wounds on the Confederacy, of which the worst had not yet been felt; and the very capital of the South was menaced by the best appointed army America had ever equipped for the field. The victory of the first day at Shiloh was a counterpoise to these disasters; and although the army was robbed of the fruits of its valour, and retreat ensued, yet its *morale* was not injured, since the men felt that, opposed to the great odds they encountered on the second day's battle, no other course was open to them. On

the other hand, the Federals secured to themselves the advantage of a base of operations on the upper part of the Tennessee River, from which they could not only organise a fresh campaign, but also inflict considerable injury on their opponents, by detached expeditions. Although during the first day's battle several of the regiments had not behaved well, and the generals had evinced a want of knowledge of their duties, yet on the field many of the superior officers had distinguished themselves. General W. Wallace fell mortally wounded; and General Sherman, an officer of the old regular army, was especially mentioned as conspicuous for bravery on the field; he was wounded in the hand, but continued during the action to do what lay in his power to rally his broken divisions. Few can refrain from pitying an officer in command of men of whom he is forced to write in an official dispatch in these terms:—'My division was made up of regiments perfectly new, all having received their muskets for the first time at Paducah. None of them had ever been under fire, or beheld heavy columns of an enemy bearing down on them, as they did on last Sunday. To expect of them the coolness and steadiness of old troops would be wrong. They knew not the value of combination and organisation. When individual fear seized them, the first impulse was to get away. My third brigade did break much too soon, and I am not yet advised where they were during Sunday afternoon and Monday morning.* It was to General Sherman that a reconnoissance of the Confederate position was entrusted on the morning of the 8th, but the troops under his command had not recovered from their demoralisation, and on the charge through timber by

* General Sherman's official despatch.—*Rebellion Record*, p. 409. Doc.

some of the enemy's advanced cavalry, the regiment of infantry drawn up in support of the skirmishers, to use General Sherman's own words, *without cause broke, threw away their guns, and fled*, although *the ground was admirably adapted to a defence of infantry against cavalry, it being miry and covered with fallen timber*. Some time elapsed before any attempt was made to advance on Corinth; but an expedition was sent under General Mitchell to seize on a part of the great trunk line of railroad which intersected the Confederacy, and connected Memphis on the Mississippi with Eastern Tennessee, Western Virginia, and Richmond, and thus to cut off the army under General Beauregard with direct communication with the army of Virginia. This operation was successfully accomplished, with little resistance from the Confederates. General Mitchell marched from Fayetteville south-east of Columbia, Tennessee, during the second week in April, and seized on the railway depôt and village of Huntsville. From thence he detached expeditions in the trains he had captured both to the east and to the south, occupying the line of railway from Decatur to the bridge over the Tennessee River near Stevenson, on the junction with the direct line of railway to Nashville through Murfreesborough. There was a slight skirmish to obtain possession of the bridge, and also between a battery of artillery and some cavalry opposed to a railway train. The guns are described as bringing to the railway engines; but one of the engineers, unperceived, put on a heavy head of steam, and ran the gauntlet of the artillery and cavalry. The latter attempted an ineffectual pursuit, but was, of course, soon distanced by the engine. A few days afterwards a strong reconnaissance was sent from Pittsburgh Landing to

Eastport, Mississippi, in transports, and escorted by the two gunboats Tyler and Lexington, which had done good service on the evening of the 6th, at the battle of Shiloh. The troops succeeded in repulsing the guard of cavalry stationed to protect the Mobile and Ohio rail, and in destroying the bridges. They returned to Pittsburgh Landing on the same evening without any loss. Here may be said to have closed the first period of the spring campaign in the West. An important resolution was about this time formed by President Davis and the Government at Richmond. It was to give up for the present the defence of the trans-Mississippi States, or rather of that of Northern Arkansas and Missouri. The line of defence adopted by the Southern Confederacy was believed to be too extended, and beyond the resources at the command of the States. Therefore, the troops under Generals Van Dorn and Price were removed from their own States, and received orders to join General Beauregard at Corinth.* It was no common sacrifice required of these men. They were called on to leave their homes and families unprotected, and to wage war far removed from their immediate interests. Their compliance redounds the more to their credit, as this sacrifice was not required from soldiers, but from a large portion of the able-bodied population of those thinly-inhabited States. Soon after the withdrawal of General Van Dorn's forces, the Federal cavalry occupied Pocahontas, in Arkansas. Little, however, of interest occurred for a considerable time in the trans-Mississippi States, if that of Louisiana be excepted, where one of the most serious and unexpected misfortunes that had yet befallen the Confederacy was soon to occur.

* Pollard's *History of the War*.

CHAPTER XVI.

OPERATIONS ON THE COAST.

THE preparations made for war purposes during the spring of 1862 through the Federal States must have been on a scale which has seldom been equalled. Not only had the armies and flotillas of the West been amply supplied with arms, stores, and *matériel*; not only had those of Virginia been equipped in a manner which has seldom previously been attempted with armies of so great numbers; but the various districts assigned to generals on the coast had also been furnished so sufficiently with men, stores, and artillery, that during the time when public attention was chiefly concentrated on the campaigns of Virginia and the West, these generals were enabled to undertake separate operations for the reduction of the various forts which defended the entrances to the harbours and cities of the seaboard States. From Port Royal an expedition had been fitted out against Fort Pulaski, from Roanoke against Fort Macon; whilst a still larger naval and military force was lying off the mouth of the Mississippi, prepared to force an entrance up to New Orleans. The first of these expeditions, in point of time, was that organised by General Hunter against the fort which defended the entrance to the Savannah River. It will be remembered that, after the capture of

the harbour of Port Royal, various reconnaissances from the combined naval and military force stationed there had been sent to reconnoitre, and to take possession of the islands at the mouths of the Savannah River, and of those in the immediate neighbourhood of Port Royal Harbour. Among others, Tybee Island, on the south or right bank of the Savannah River, had been taken possession of. It is a low, swampy island, through which, in order to afford communication between the landing-place and the opposite or river side, a causeway resting on fascines and brushwood was necessary. Fronting the island, about the centre of the Savannah River, also on a small island, stood Fort Pulaski, at the distance of about eighteen miles from the city of Savannah, and supposed to form one of its main defences. It was situated in a position something similar to that of Fort Sumter, which it likewise resembled in its construction. It was built principally of brick, and armed with forty-seven guns, mounted *en barbette* and in casemates, and garrisoned by a force of 300 men under Colonel Olmstead. Erected previous to the invention of rifled cannon, and armed with guns of more than sufficient calibre to prevent the approach of shipping, the place was considered strong, and both the preparations for its bombardment and its subsequent reduction afforded proof how completely the new species of artillery had changed the requirements of fortifications. The Federal force detached for its reduction consisted of four regiments of volunteers from the Eastern States and some companies of engineers; these troops were under the command of Brigadier-General Benham and Brigadier-General Veile, whilst the whole conduct of the siege operations was in charge of Captain and

acting Brigadier-General Gillmore.* General Hunter, commanding the district, was present, but remained on board the fleet, with the exception of the time during which the bombardment was going on. The fleet, under Commodore Du Pont, took no part in the siege other than by affording a detachment from the flag-ship Wabash to man one of the batteries. It was resolved to attack the fort from the south-eastern side, and to place the batteries on Tybee Island ; at the same time occupying the left bank of the Savannah River with a force sufficient to intercept communication with Savannah, furnished with artillery of calibre large enough to repulse any attempt of the Confederate gunboats to bring succour to the fort. The erection of batteries to play on the gorge of the work also formed part of the plan, but the difficulties encountered by General Veile in the transport through the mud and swamps of the heavier artillery, together with the risk of erecting the batteries in an exposed situation under the fire of the fort, prevented their completion in time to be of service during the bombardment. Without any obstruction from the guns of the fort, but with considerable expenditure of labour, eleven batteries, mounting thirty-six guns, were erected on Tybee Island fronting the south-eastern face of the fort, the salient angle looking east, and also the north-eastern face. The object aimed at was to dismount the barbette guns by means of the mortars, and then, breaking and firing through the masonry of the front forces, to explode the magazine placed in one of the angles at the gorge of the work. The batteries extended in an oblique line of about one and a half

* The same officer who subsequently failed in the attack on Charleston.

miles in length, and varied in distance from the fort from one to two miles.* It is difficult to account for the fact that the besiegers were allowed to erect their batteries without any opposition from the guns of the fort. It appears as if the defenders, confident of the strength of their walls, and relying on the distance at which the bombardment would necessarily take place to weaken the force of the breaching batteries, were content to remain quiet and refrain from expending their ammunition until the siege had actually commenced. The mortar batteries opened at 7:30 A.M. on April 10, and kept up a well-sustained fire during ten and a half hours. It produced scarcely any effect. The artillerymen had received little instruction, and were unskilled; the fire consequently was not accurate. At 8:30 A.M. the rifled guns and heavy columbiads † opened, and continued to fire during nine and a half hours. The defenders replied vigorously both from the casemates and the barbette guns of the fort, but,

* Number and armament of batteries :—

No.	Distance
1. Three 13-inch mortars . . .	3,400 yards.
2. Three ditto ditto . . .	3,200 „
3. Three 10-inch columbiads . . .	3,100 „
4. Three 8-inch ditto . . .	3,045 „
5. One 13-inch mortar . . .	2,750 „
6. Three 10-inch ditto . . .	2,650 „
7. Two or one 13-inch ditto . . .	2,400 „
8. Three 10-inch ditto and one 8-inch columbiad . . .	1,677. „
9. Five 30-pounder Parrotts and one 24-pounder James . . .	1,620 „
10. Two 42-pounder and two 32-pounder James . . .	1,620 „
11. Four 10-inch mortars . . .	1,685 „

† Columbiads are smooth-bored guns, usually of heavy calibre.

although their fire was said to have been accurate,* no loss was sustained by those who manned the batteries; thus in more than one respect did the siege of Fort Pulaski resemble that of Fort Sumter just one year previous. A slight breach was effected in the south-eastern face of the work during the 10th, and two of the barbette guns on the fort and three in the casemates were silenced; on the Federal side some of the guns were rendered ineffective through either faults of construction or defect in mounting, but none were injured by the enemy's fire. During the night the bombardment was continued by the mortar batteries, for the purpose of fatiguing and harassing the garrison,† and detachments were posted to protect the batteries against any attack from the troops at Savannah. On the 11th the fire recommenced with considerably greater accuracy than on the previous day, the breach was widened, and about noon the parapet between the embrasures on the south-eastern face fell down, and thus the reverse side of the gorge of the fort was exposed to the fire of the batteries. Preparations were then ordered for storming the work, and scaling ladders were made, but about 2 P.M. Colonel Olmstead, having called his officers together and pointed out the hopelessness of a further defence, hauled down the Confederate colours and surrendered. It appeared that his magazine, by the fall of the wall on the south-eastern face, had become exposed to the fire of the batteries, and consequently, although the garrison had sustained no loss, excepting that of three men wounded, further defence was impossible. The mortar fire had

* This could scarcely have been the case, as none of the guns in the Federal batteries were dismounted by the enemy's fire.

† General Benham's report.

produced but little injury, the chief damage having been inflicted by the rifled projectiles, although the heavy shot from the columbiads had done much to shake the masonry. General Gillmore, on the lowering of the Confederate flag, immediately proceeded to the fort and received its surrender from Colonel Olmstead, who together with the other officers gave up their swords. The garrison, both officers and men, with the exception of eighteen sick, were made prisoners of war; the latter (the sick) were immediately exchanged. Although the fall of Fort Pulaski was productive of none of the anticipated results, as it did not entail or lead to the capture of Savannah, yet it served to swell the Federal triumphs, and also afforded practical proof of the change which rifled projectiles had effected in the science of fortification. General Gillmore, in his report, summed up the general deductions he had made from the siege:—

‘1. That mortars (even 13-inch sea-coast) are unavailable for the reduction of works of small area, such as Fort Pulaski. They cannot be fired with sufficient accuracy to crush the casemate arches. They might after a long time tire out any ordinary garrison.

‘2. Good rifled guns, properly served, can breach rapidly at 1,650 yards distance. A few heavy round shot, to bring down the masses loosened by the rifled projectiles, are of good service.

‘3. That no better piece for breaching can be desired than the 42-pounder James. The grooves, however, must be kept clean.

‘4. Parrott guns throwing as much metal as the James would be equally good, supposing them to fire as accurately as the Parrott 30-pounder.’

Such, at that time, were General Gillmore’s opinions;

they may possibly have received some modifications from the experience he has subsequently gained.

The fall of Fort Pulaski created much disappointment in the South. After the first day's bombardment a telegraphic despatch had been circulated through the States that the enemy's batteries had been silenced ; therefore the rapid reduction and surrender of the place on the following day fell as an unexpected blow. Little result followed from its capture by the Federals. The defences of Savannah were strengthened, and a force retained in the neighbourhood of that city and Charleston sufficient to repulse any attempt to capture either place. A more profitable conquest, and as easily acquired, was that of Fort Macon, defending the entrance to the harbour and town of Beaufort, in North Carolina. The capture of Newberne by General Burnside had put him in possession of the line of railway connecting that town with Beaufort, and as he was, by means of the fleet, likewise master of the sea, he was enabled to cut off the garrison of Fort Macon from all assistance either in the way of men or supplies. Nevertheless the place was defended by an old officer of the army, Colonel White, and he determined to hold out as long as might be possible. On the 25th, the besieging batteries having been prepared, orders were sent by General Burnside to General Parke to open fire ; this was done, and the bombardment continued until 4 P.M., when a white flag was hoisted on the ramparts of the fort, and the place surrendered. The action had been watched with considerable anxiety and interest by the inhabitants of Beaufort, many of whose fellow-citizens and relatives formed the garrison of the fort. The news of the capture of Fort Macon had been long expected in the North, and its ultimate fall, occurring as

it did at a time when more important conquests claimed the attention and raised the hopes of the Northern States, did not receive the notice which at another time would have been bestowed on it. Its capture was, however, of great benefit to General Burnside's force, inasmuch as it allowed of a safe port of entry for the vessels which furnished the necessary supplies to the army of occupation in North Carolina; the port of Beaufort being greatly preferable to the navigation of Hatteras Inlet, Pamlico Sound, and the Neuse River. General Burnside had closely followed the plan of operations sketched out for him by General McClellan, and had established a firm base on the coast of North Carolina; nevertheless no Union sentiment showed itself, the population remained firmly hostile to the North, and the Federal army occupied and held the country simply as conquerors. Martial law was proclaimed at Beaufort, and the place so far enjoyed tranquillity and, whilst under the command of General Burnside, fair treatment.

Almost cotemporary with the capture of Fort Macon, a reconnoissance attended with but little results was made by order of General Burnside in the direction of Norfolk, from Elizabeth city. The force under General Reno encountered the Confederate troops at South Mills, about thirty-five miles from Elizabeth city, and after one of the usual indecisive actions both forces fell back, the Confederates to another position in order to cover Norfolk, the Federals to their transports. The latter left behind them some of their wounded, under care of a surgeon, who on the reembarkation of the Federals fell into the hands of the enemy. However, General Reno had retained possession of the field of battle for six hours, and therefore considered himself entitled to claim a vic-

tory. The affair was of little importance in itself, although the demonstration against Norfolk from the south may have furnished an additional motive to the Confederate Government to determine on its evacuation, which subsequently took place. These several expeditions and conquests on the coast were thrown into the shade by an event which occurred far to the south, and which placed in the hands of the Federals the largest city and the most important port of the Southern States. New Orleans, or the Crescent City, had been especially prominent in its secession sympathies, and Louisiana had been among the first of the States to join the Southern Confederacy. Not only had the native population of New Orleans joined heart and soul in the cause, but several regiments had been formed from the foreign element so numerous in the city. Personal interest there, as in other of the Southern cities, had given way to the desire of freedom from Northern rule, and the merchants of New Orleans and the rich planters of the Southern Mississippi had readily consented to the sacrifice of wealth and competence for the uncertain hazard of war. To some of the latter the case appeared to fall especially hard; they were the sons or grandsons of those who, during the great French revolution, had incurred banishment and loss of property through adherence to their political opinions, and having in a new country acquired fortune and surrounded themselves with the luxuries and civilisation of old France, were again to see their estates destroyed and their property scattered to the wind, not by domestic turbulence, but by a foreign foe. Partly owing to their descent, partly also from the influence of climate, the characteristics of the Louisiana troops were different to those of the more northern of the Confederate States. They were said to be fiercer

and more violent, and perhaps also less amenable to discipline, than the army of Virginia; whilst in the city of New Orleans, at the beginning of the war, there were acts committed* which contrasted unfavourably with the usual scrupulous adherence to the principles of justice practised in the other great cities of the Confederacy. Many of the Louisiana regiments had been among the first to march North for the protection of Virginia, and subsequently for the defence of the West, where they fought bravely at Shiloh; but the defences of the Crescent City had been neglected, and she was destined to experience the humiliation and injury inflicted by the presence of a foreign and bitterly hostile foe. Situated on the left bank of the Mississippi River, within ninety-four miles of its entry into the Gulf of Mexico, the city extends six miles along the river bank. It was the boast of its inhabitants that the internal water navigation which centred in her ports extended upwards of 17,000 miles; she was the chief cotton mart of the world, and upwards of 1,000 flat-bottomed boats might, in former times, have been counted lying off the Levee, laden with the productions of the interior; whilst hundreds of trading ships and steamers from all quarters of the globe crowded her wharves. Such had been her condition previous to the secession of the Confederate States. Since the blockade her commerce had been ruined, and her whole attention turned from trade to war. As has already been narrated, her river fleet had engaged, with honour and with success, the blockading squadron, and rumour reported that it had since

* Such as the forcible impressment of foreigners to serve in the army.

been greatly increased, and that two additional iron-clads would render any attempt at an attack by water on the part of the enemy hopeless. But the winter months had been allowed to pass without the completion of the vessels. One, at least, was to have been ready on February 1, but even April arrived and she was not completed. A security for which there was little justification appears to have lulled the inhabitants, and rendered them apathetic as regarded their defences. Few doubted that the forts at the mouth of the Mississippi would be able to prevent the passage of any ships, and it was even alleged, after the fall of Island No. 10, that her great danger lay, not from the south but from the north—from the descending rather than from the ascending fleet of the enemy. There were, speaking generally, two lines of defences. The outer line comprised the two forts, Philip and Jackson—the first situated on the left, the second on the right bank of the Mississippi—and between which a boom or chain had been constructed to block the channel, and to detain any hostile vessels under the guns of the forts. This line also included the forts which closed the various entries into Lake Pontchartrain, and commanded what may be called the inland water communication with Mobile.

The second line was intended only as a defence against any infantry force which might succeed in effecting a passage through the swamps and forests extending along the banks of the Mississippi between New Orleans and the sea. Where this line crossed the river two batteries had been erected, as an additional safeguard against an attack by the river, and were prepared with the object of repulsing any small number of vessels which might force their way past the forts.

The importance of this second line of defence was, however, so little regarded, that some of the larger guns were removed from the river batteries, and placed on board steamers set apart for the defence of Lake Pontchartrain. To reinforce General Beauregard, the whole of the Confederate army had been marched to Tennessee, one company alone remaining in the city. To replace these troops, volunteers for ninety days, to the number of 3,000 men, had been raised, not one half of whom had received muskets, the majority being armed with shot guns.* In Forts Jackson and Philip were garrisons, composed for the most part of regular troops, many of whom had formerly served in the United States army, and were consequently mostly foreigners. Still they were accounted good troops, and, under Confederate officers, were believed to be animated by feelings of loyalty for the cause they had embraced. The whole of the defences of the State of Louisiana were under the command of Brigadier-General Lovell, an officer of the regular army, who had succeeded General Twiggs; the coast defences were under the more immediate charge of Brigadier-General Duncan; whilst the garrisons of the two forts, Jackson and Philip, were under Lieutenant-Colonel Higgins. These forts were regularly constructed works, erected before the war, for the purpose of defending the Mississippi; consequently, their strongest faces were towards the river. They were casemated, and were armed with between seventy and eighty guns, the majority of which were of calibre far inferior to the artillery which is considered sufficiently powerful to resist the attack of iron-clad shipping, or to reply to

* General Lovell's report.

the guns with which vessels of war are now armed. Brigadier-General Lovell was aware of this deficiency, and applied to Richmond for heavier guns, especially for 10-inch columbiads. After the evacuation of Pensacola by the Confederates, he renewed his application, and at length received some 42-pounders, and three 10-inch columbiads, which were sent to Fort Jackson, and only mounted a few days before the attack commenced. A raft or boom had been constructed and thrown across the river between the two forts, but it was feared, even at the time it was made, that it would be unable to resist the spring floods. This anticipation proved correct, as the boom was swept away towards the end of February: however it was hoped that at least one of the iron-clads would have been ready to take its place, or rather to render it needless; but, as both were still unfinished, a second boom was constructed, under the superintendence of Colonel Higgins, from funds furnished by contributions from the city. It consisted of a line of old schooners, anchored at intervals, with bows up stream and thoroughly chained together amidships, as well as stern and stem. In addition to these defences, a fleet, comprised of seven river steamers, protected and partially made shot-proof with cotton bulkheads, and prepared with iron prows to act as rams, were ordered to cooperate with the forts; and subsequently the steam ram Manassas was stationed at a short distance above Fort Jackson, with her steam constantly up, prepared to act against any hostile vessel which might cross or pass through the boom. This river fleet was under the command, previous to the attack, of Captain Stephenson, subject to orders from Brigadier-General Duncan. His instructions were: 'To be in the stream above the

raft, with such boats as had stern guns, in order to assist the forts with their fire, in case the enemy should attempt the passage, as well as to turn in and ram, at all hazards, all such vessels as might succeed in getting above the raft. He was also required to take entire control of the fire barges, to reconnoitre the enemy above the head of the passes, and to keep a watch boat below every night, near the point of woods, to signal the approach of the enemy,' as it was known that a hostile fleet had succeeded in crossing the bar at South-west Pass, and were stationed about two-and-twenty miles below the forts. Such was the position of affairs at the beginning of April.

During the early months of the year a formidable expedition of the combined naval and military forces had been prepared in the Northern ports, and despatched to Ship Island, off the coast of Mississippi, the rendezvous of the Federal fleet engaged in the blockade of the Mississippi River. The naval force was under the command of Commodore Farragut, and included a fleet of about thirty armed steamers and twenty-one mortar vessels, under the especial orders of Commodore Porter. To this force had been added a considerable body of troops under General Butler, who had formerly commanded at Fortress Monroe. The troops were chiefly from the Eastern States, and had sailed from Northern ports in February. They had since been stationed at Ship Island, and had attempted nothing except an unimportant reconnaissance of the adjoining coast. There were two lines of attack open to the Federals—one by Lake Pontchartrain through the inland waters, the other by the Mississippi River. It was doubtful which line the Federal commanders would adopt. At first it was reported that they in-

clined to the former, but subsequently the attack by the Mississippi River was resolved on. The Confederates had sufficient time to make all preparations to receive the enemy, as nearly three weeks elapsed before the whole of the Federal fleet had with great difficulty been brought over the bar at South-west Pass. Having effected the passage, Commodore Farragut selected a station for his fleet twenty-two miles below the forts, and gunboats were sent up the river with orders to keep off any of the enemy's vessels which might attempt to reconnoitre or annoy the fleet, and also to shell the woods on either side of the river, to clear them from the Confederate sharpshooters and swamp-hunters who had been detached with orders to harass the crews and pick off the men and officers from the shore. In this the gunboats were assisted by the rise of the river, which overflowed the woods adjoining it, and compelled the sharpshooters to retire. Pilot Town, a small watering-place, was taken possession of, and converted into hospitals for the fleet and troops. The latter in transports were shortly afterwards conveyed through Pass à l'Outre to Sable Island, and from thence, partly by the assistance of a steamer, partly by the exertions of the troops themselves, were dragged up in smaller boats to a position twelve miles in rear of Fort Philip, whilst subsequently two schooners from the mortar fleet occupied a bayou in rear of Fort Jackson. For a short time after the passage of the fleet over the bar the garrison of Fort Jackson retained possession of the telegraphic wire nine miles below the fort. Gradually, however, as the enemy advanced, the posts were torn down and the guard driven off. On April 9 the first reconnaissance from the Federal fleet, consisting of two of the Federal gunboats, pushed

forward to within range of the guns of Fort Jackson, in pursuit of one of the Confederate reconnoitring steamers ; and on the 13th several other of the Federal gunboats showed themselves round a point of woods two miles below the fort. Two days previously the Confederate defences had sustained an injury, which proved to be of great consequence, by the breaking up of the boom or raft. This was occasioned partly by a storm, which scattered the schooners and broke the chains, partly also by the breaking loose of some of the fire-rafts stationed above the boom, which drifted against it. These fire-rafts had been tied to the banks of the river above the fort, and were intended, on the approach of the enemy, to be towed into the current and floated down on him, with the double purpose of damaging his shipping and lighting up the river, in the event of an attack being made by night. They proved a complete failure, and inflicted more injury on their friends than on their foes, as, either owing to mismanagement or to the unavoidable effects of the force and direction of the currents, they floated against the wharves of Fort Jackson, not only setting them on fire, but lighting up the batteries for the benefit of the enemy's artillerymen. On April 16 two of the mortar boats were towed into the stream, and opened fire on the fort ; but it was not until the 18th that the bombardment really commenced. Then the whole of the mortar vessels and some of the gunboats opened fire. Fifteen of the former were concealed behind the point of woods, and the remaining six hauled out into the stream. Fort Jackson and Fort St. Philip replied, but with little effect, owing to the want of guns of sufficiently long range and to the inferior description of powder. The bombardment continued with little in-

termination during the 19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd, and 23rd, the point of attack being principally Fort Jackson, where several of the guns were disabled, and the quarters in the bastions set on fire. The flames were extinguished before they had done much damage, but in so doing both men and officers lost the greater part of their blankets and bedding, which, steeped in water, were used to smother the fire. The hardships of the garrison were likewise increased by the rise of the river, which flooded part of the terreplain of the fort. On the 20th no fire-barges were sent down the river, and the Federals, taking advantage of the darkness, and under cover of a heavy fire, sent up one of their gunboats to cut the chains and drag off some of the remaining schooners which impeded the channel. This, in defiance of the guns of Fort Jackson, they succeeded in doing. On the 22nd; on the arrival off the forts of the iron-clad Louisiana, General Lovell ordered the whole of the river fleet to be placed under the command of Captain T. K. Mitchell, of the Confederate States navy, with the view of enforcing more order and regularity into the operations of the fleet. The machinery of the Louisiana was so incomplete, that, except as a floating battery, she could be of little use. Nevertheless, General Duncan, anticipating an attack and attempt to pass the batteries, strenuously urged that she should be towed down below to the boom, and this request was likewise seconded by a telegraphic message to the same effect from General Lovell. Captain Mitchell, however, pleaded the incompleteness of his ship, the want of a proper tug, and the drunkenness of the crew of one of the volunteer river fleet which had been assigned to him as a tender. In fact, there appears to have

been little discipline or authority among the fleet. Not only were the naval authorities seemingly at variance with the military, but the river fleet was distinct from the Confederate States navy, and their officers refused to acknowledge Captain Mitchell's authority. Little could the Confederates, opposed to so formidable a force, commanded by experienced officers, afford to throw away any chance; and the intestine disputes and the effects of a want of discipline were productive of terrible evils. On the 23rd, General Duncan's anticipations of immediate attack were strengthened by the movements of the Federal fleet, and he again sent warning to the naval officers, impressing on them the duty of keeping the river lighted by fire-barges. To his astonishment, not a single barge was sent down during the night of the 23rd; the river remained in complete darkness, only lit up by the shells of enemy. The bombardment continued all night, increasing in violence towards the morning. About 3.30 A.M. the larger vessels of the Federal fleet were observed to be in motion, and a last warning was sent from the fort to the naval authorities. The time had arrived when the final attack was to be made. The Federal fleet, under command of Commodore Farragut, was formed in three lines, with the design of engaging the forts, and, if possible, of breaking through the line of defences. Should the attempt succeed, the mortar batteries, under Commodore Porter, were to remain to complete the bombardment, and, with the assistance of the military, the reduction of the forts. The leading division of the fleet, under Captain Bailey — consisting of the following vessels, the Cayuga, Pensacola, Mississippi, Oneida, Varuna, Katahdin, Kineo, and Wissabichon — were ordered to engage Fort St.

Philip, and were to be followed by the second division, under Commodore Farragut, consisting of the Hartford, Brooklyn, and Richmond; whilst the reserve, under Commander Bell, was composed of the Scioto, Iroquois, Pinola, Winona, Itasca, and Kennebec. To these were added five steamers of the mortar flotilla, ordered especially to engage the water batteries. The orders were carried out with alacrity and without confusion; the leading division, headed by Captain Bailey in the Cayuga, passed the forts on the morning of the 4th, with little damage from their fire, owing to the darkness. The fire-rafts had not been sent down the river, and the smoke from the guns, added to the obscurity of night, so completely concealed the ships that the artillerymen in the forts could only regulate their fire by the flashes of their opponents' guns. Immediately on passing the line of fire of Fort St. Philip, the Cayuga found herself in the midst of the river flotilla. The Morgan, iron-clad, and the Manassas immediately made towards her, with the intention of running her down; but, eluding their attempts, she engaged the flotilla with her guns, and compelled the surrender of three.* The Varuna, Oneida, and the remainder of the first division, pressed on to her assistance. The former was attacked by the Morgan, and, less fortunate than the Cayuga, was struck in the bows, and immediately afterwards received a blow from another of the rams. Finding her sinking, her commander (Commander Boggs) ran her ashore, still continuing to use his guns.† The Varuna sank, but her crew escaped;

*. Captain Bailey's report.

† Commander Boggs' report.

her adversary, the Morgan, much damaged in her action with the Varuna, surrendering to the Oneida. The second division had in the meantime come into action, and the flag-ship (the Hartford), whilst engaged with the batteries of Fort St. Philip, found that one of the fire-ships was being pushed forward against her by the ram Manassas. She caught fire, and in a moment was in a blaze all along the port side, half-way up to the main and mizen-tops.* Her position was that of great danger, but the crew were able to extinguish the flames; and although she was distinctly visible to the garrison of Fort St. Philip, yet, owing to some of the guns in the batteries having been dismounted, and to the necessity of replying to the broadsides of the reserve division, no fire could be directed at her. The Hartford backed clear of the fire-raft, and passed the line of fire. The Confederate ram Manassas, after encountering the Varuna, engaged the Mississippi, but, missing her blow, ran ashore, and received the fire of her antagonist. She was riddled with shot, and having been abandoned by her crew, floated down the current a helpless wreck, and subsequently blew up below the forts. Her appearance, as she floated down the river, caused some consternation among the mortar fleet, until her condition became known. As day dawned, and the smoke cleared away, the Federal commander discovered, to his surprise,† that the fleet had passed the forts, and that the enemy's river flotilla had been either destroyed or so much injured as to be useless for aggressive purposes. Consequently, he determined to push on for New Or-

* Commodore Farragut's letter.

† Ibid.—*Rebellion Record*, p. 522. Doc. Vat. IV.

leans. A few of the vessels of the rear division had become entangled in the broken raft, or otherwise injured, and were consequently unable to pass the forts; but the majority of the fleet effected their object, and the injuries received by the forts, and the continued fire from the mortar vessels, prevented the garrison from sufficiently profiting by the situation of the disabled ships to complete their destruction. The Federal fleet, still headed by Captain Bailey, proceeded onward to New Orleans. As the river was high, their guns overlooked the surrounding country, and a regiment of troops encamped on its banks was forced to surrender.* On the morning of the 25th, the advanced division encountered the batteries of the second line of defence at Chalmette. *These, being ill provided with either guns or ammunition, were soon silenced by the flag-ship. No obstacle now remained between the fleet and New Orleans, excepting burning steamers, cotton-ships, and fire-rafts, which, floating down the current, proclaimed the devastation that was taking place. General Lovell himself narrowly escaped capture. On the 23rd, he had gone down to the forts, to endeavour by his presence to overcome Captain Mitchell's scruples with regard to moving the iron-clad Louisiana to the position assigned to her, and whilst he was in the vicinity of the forts the attack commenced, and it was with some difficulty that he was able to effect his return to New Orleans. In the meantime, great was the confusion and dismay in the city. People could not believe the reports of the passage of the enemy's fleet. They were so confident in the strength of their defences, and had so

* Captain Bailey's report.

persuaded themselves into the belief that no danger menaced them, that the first news was viewed with incredulity, and it was only when the enemy's guns were actually heard, as they engaged two batteries of the second line of defence, and when shortly afterwards the hostile fleet actually appeared off the Custom-house, that men believed the news. What steps were then to be taken? The situation of the city, entirely exposed to the enemy's guns, and totally unprovided with any means of defence, forbade the hopes of an attempt at resistance. General Lovell, in command of about 3,000 raw troops, without artillery, saw clearly that he could do nothing, and determined to retire at once to Camp Moore, seventy-eight miles on the Jackson Railroad, whilst the line of retreat was yet open to him. A few of the volunteers obeyed his orders and accompanied him, but the greater number of the ninety days' men disbanded and returned to their homes. His staff remained in the city; and worked diligently to save the Government and State property. This in some measure they were able to effect, but were prevented from doing all they might have done by the difficulty of procuring labourers to work for them, owing to a fear among the men of punishment from the Federals, and to their unwillingness to receive Confederate paper money in payment of wages.* Still much of the property was saved. The Confederate troops having abandoned the city, the civil force resumed its authority, and it was to the Mayor of the city that Captain Bailey applied for the surrender of the place, having first had an interview with General Lovell, when that officer declared that, unwilling to subject the city to bombardment, and out of regard to the loss of life that

* General Lovell's report.

would ensue, among the women and children as well as the men, he would withdraw his troops. A lengthy correspondence ensued between the Mayor and Commodore Farragut, who in the meantime had arrived, and had stationed his ships at intervals off the Levee, commanding the city with their guns. The chief point, after the surrender had been agreed on, was respecting the forms to be pursued in lowering the Confederate flag, and hoisting the Stars and Stripes. The Mayor wrote a long despatch to Commodore Farragut which under the circumstances in which he was placed savoured of bombast and absurdity, and at the same time he provoked General Lovell to an offer of returning with his troops to New Orleans, in consequence of that officer's feeling a slur to be inflicted on him by the assertion of the Mayor, that he yielded the place because it had been abandoned by the troops. General Lovell in fact returned to the city, and held a personal interview with the Mayor, in which the latter declined the general's offer, which could only have resulted in the total destruction of the city, and in terrible loss of life to non-combatants. The question as to who should lower the State flag, whether the Mayor or the Federal authorities, was at length settled by Commodore Farragut's sending a detachment of sailors and marines, who hauled down the flag of Louisiana and hoisted the Stars and Stripes upon the City Hall. The position of Commodore Farragut when he first arrived off the city was one which required caution. The city certainly was in his power, but an enemy possessed of two strong forts, besides an iron-clad battery and war steamer, was in his rear, and he was thus separated from the remainder of his fleet, from the military force, and from his supplies. It would therefore have been impolitic by any harsh measures to have provoked the turbulent

and passionate population of the city to desperation ; indeed, it is alleged that they were recovering from the consternation which the sudden appearance of the fleet had caused, and were even planning resistance to the land forces by cutting the Levee and laying the country under water, when the news reached the city of the surrender of the forts. After the passage of the fleet, when morning dawned, Commodore Porter perceived that the apparently formidable iron-clad Louisiana and other steamers had been left almost uninjured, and that on him devolved the task of reducing the forts, and defending his own fleet from the attack of the Confederate ships. The military force had been already sent round to the rear of Fort St. Philip, and steps had been taken to cut off the garrison of Fort Jackson, when, on the morning of the 24th, Commodore Porter sent a demand for the surrender of the forts. This was refused, and preparations were made to resume the bombardment. The garrisons of both forts had hitherto behaved with great gallantry, and had done their duty well, but when they perceived that their communications with New Orleans had been cut off, not only by the fleet but by the land force under General Butler, signs of discontent showed themselves in Fort Jackson. The officers, influenced by strong feelings of love for their country and resolution to undergo the utmost for the cause, were fully determined to continue the defence. The forts had suffered comparatively little injury, and in all probability would have been able to have held out for a considerable time, had the soldiers of the garrisons been animated by the same feelings as their officers, but the men were for the most part mercenaries ; many had served in the ranks of the old army of the United States, and the ties which bound them to the cause they

had adopted were not strong. During the bombardment they had stood to their guns well and gallantly, but during the reaction which followed the excitement of the siege, and when the garrison was employed principally in the tedious work of repairing the defences, when rumours reached the men that New Orleans had surrendered, and when they saw that they were cut off from retreat by General Butler's troops, a mutiny suddenly broke out, and during the night of the 27th, without receiving any warning, the officers found themselves powerless; the men seized the guns, and turned them from the ramparts; some they spiked, even firing at any officers who attempted to hinder them. Many deserted with their arms, and others endeavoured to force the St. Mary's cannoniers who remained faithful to join in the mutiny. By great exertions the officers were enabled so far to regain their authority as to induce them to await the issue of a surrender. On the following morning a boat was therefore sent to Commodore Porter, stating that the forts would be given up on the terms he had proposed, viz. that the public property, arms, and munitions should be handed over to the Federal authorities, but that the officers and men, the former retaining their side arms, should be suffered to depart on parole not to serve again until duly exchanged. These terms were agreed on by Commodore Porter, who, under the circumstances of the two fleets being separated, and communications between them cut off by the forts, and ignorant of the condition of the garrisons of the forts, did not consider himself justified in demanding an unconditional surrender. He immediately repaired to Fort Jackson, where it was explained to him that the articles of capitulation could not include the naval force, which was not under

General Duncan's command. Whilst Commodore Porter was in the fort discussing the terms of capitulation, the Louisiana, on fire, was observed drifting towards the batteries and the ships. Commodore Porter drew attention to this apparent breach of faith, and enquired whether there was powder on board her. General Duncan could give no information on this point, and Commodore Porter, after warning the captains of vessels to provide for their safety, continued the business of the capitulation. The Louisiana shortly afterwards blew up, her guns, as they became red-hot, exploding, and throwing shot and shell in various directions, happily with little injury. At the explosion, a portion of the fragments wounded one of the garrison of Fort St. Philip. After the surrender of the forts, Commodore Porter proceeded to enforce that of the steamers. This was soon effected; and, in retaliation for what he considered the infraction of the rules of war by the officers in setting fire to the Louisiana and sending her down among the ships during the time negotiations were taking place, he made them and the crews of the vessels prisoners, and sent them to the North. It is due to these officers to say that General Duncan, in his report, stated that he believed the Louisiana was set on fire previous to the Federal boats coming to anchor abreast of the fort. Previous to the surrender, a rumour had reached General Lovell that such had already taken place, and in consequence he ordered the evacuation of the forts on Lake Pontchartrain. This order was subsequently countermanded, but too late. The troops had left the forts; some deserted and returned to their homes, others repaired to Camp Moore. The gunboats and armed steamers on Lake Pontchartrain were destroyed, although General Lovell had suggested the possibility of their effecting their

escape to Mobile. In consequence of the surrender of the forts, General Butler's force became free for other operations, and was without delay conveyed up the river to New Orleans, the 26th Massachusetts regiment being left as a garrison for the forts. In the general's despatch to Mr. Stanton, dated April 29, there were already indications of the fate reserved for the city at his hands. He concluded the despatch as follows :

'I find the city under the dominion of the mob. They have insulted our flag—torn it down with indignity.' This outrage will be punished in such a manner as, in my judgment, will caution both the perpetrators and abettors of the act, so that they shall fear the *stripes*, if they do not reverence the *stars*, of our banner. I send a marked copy of a New Orleans paper containing an applauding account of the outrage. Trusting my action may meet with the approbation of the Department,

'I am, &c. &c.,

'BENJAMIN F. BUTLER.'

This despatch alluded to an occurrence which had taken place previous to the occupation of the city by the Federal forces, when the United States flag hoisted over the Town Hall by Commodore Farragut's marines was torn down by a citizen of New Orleans. General Butler's conduct in dealing with the perpetrator of this deed was only one of the many acts which have called down on him the hatred not only of the Confederate nation, but also of a large portion of the people of Europe. There is no doubt that he had a most difficult part to play, but the manner in which he performed disagreeable duties, and the coarseness of his tyranny, have earned for him the deepest detestation of those over whom he ruled with despotic authority

The name of Butler will take its place, among the people of the Confederacy, in the same category as those of the most cruel and odious of the tyrants of the Old World. Before following out the course of events at New Orleans, and the several acts of her Governor, it will be well, in order to pursue the narrative of the cotemporary events of the war, to trace out the immediate effects which the fall of the city exercised on the military operations of the West. Soon after the surrender of the forts the Federal steamers ascended the river for a distance of 120 miles, as far as Baton Rouge. No opposition was made to their advance, and the town of Baton Rouge was given up without resistance. One of the richest tracts of country in America thus fell under the power of the Federals. The banks of the Mississippi between New Orleans and Baton Rouge are, or rather were, cultivated with the greatest care; the sugar plantations extending along the river sides surrounded the residences of the richest planters, and the various manufactures and machinery necessary for the cultivation and preparation of the crop. In the immediate vicinity of New Orleans and Baton Rouge no cotton was grown, the climate not being suited for its cultivation;* but the various rivers and streams flowing into the Mississippi passed through the heart of the cotton districts, and it remained to be seen whether self-interest would so far prevail over patriotism as to induce its cultivators to bring their accumulated stores of cotton to the new market that had been opened to them.

There was no Union sentiment in the State of Louisiana. The town of Baton Rouge had given most unmistakable proofs of its sympathy for the Confede-

* In ascending the Mississippi from New Orleans, the first cotton plantations are seen after passing Natchez.

rate cause ; out of a voting population of 1,300, it had furnished 875 men for the Confederate army and 240 for the home-guard of the town. But nothing could be done to resist the gunboats, and after receiving the surrender of the place they passed up the river to Natchez, which likewise, unprepared for any defence, yielded to Commander Palmer, of the Iroquois steamship. Such of the Confederate flotilla as had escaped destruction and capture at New Orleans had gone up the river, and had either taken refuge in the numerous tributaries of the Mississippi, or had joined Commodore Hollins on the upper waters. The fall of New Orleans, and the capture of the rich cities and country on the banks of the Mississippi, materially affected the movements of the army at Corinth, as it deprived General Beauregard of the resources derived from a large and fertile tract, in some measure from communication with the States west of the river, and also from the means of recruiting his army from New Orleans. It likewise exposed him to the more remote danger of an attack in his rear from the Mississippi River. The blow fell the more heavily on the Confederates, as it had been totally unforeseen and unexpected ; it influenced their whole system of defence, and although it did not for a moment shake the resolution of the people, yet it was felt to be the most serious injury that the Federal arms had as yet inflicted. Charleston took warning, and increased her preparations for defence, and there were not wanting those who blamed the lack of spirit among the people of New Orleans in submitting to the conqueror rather than undergoing the last extremities of war. Few, unless those imbued with fanaticism, can blame the course adopted by the Mayor and citizens of New Orleans in refusing to

involve themselves in the calamities of a hopeless resistance to superior forces, in a city totally incapable, according to the rules of war, of defence. More reasonable was the censure of those who pointed to the neglect of the proper means of defence prior to the passage of the forts by the ships, and to the delay which occurred in completing the iron-clad vessels, which would probably have rendered the advance of the Federal fleet to New Orleans almost impossible. An unreasonable confidence had been placed in the power of the two forts to obstruct the river, and little or nothing had been done to form other lines of defence in the event of these failing. The military authorities blamed the officers of the regular and volunteer navy, who indeed seem, by their want of unanimity and enterprise, to have laid themselves open to censure. After the action had commenced, the captains of the several vessels doubtless behaved with gallantry; but previous to the attack the naval authorities do not appear to have exerted themselves in a manner which the emergency of the case demanded. On the other hand, the mutiny of the garrisons at the forts completed the disaster, and must in a certain measure be laid to the door of those in command, inasmuch as they should have known, and if possible guarded against, the temper of the men, whereas by their own showing they were completely taken by surprise. Did this arise from the system of the old United States regular army, carried out in the treatment of these remnants of the regular regiments, which involved and almost encouraged a more complete separation between officers and men than in any European army, where the same language is spoken, and where each rank forms part of the same race? Mutual recriminations

were made on all sides; the central Government was censured for not providing a sufficiency of heavy guns, that of the State for not exerting herself for her own defence, knowing as she did the difficulties of the central power, and the distance which separated her from its fountain-head. The effect of the capture of New Orleans, and the various successes of the Federal armies, influenced materially the opinion of Europe with respect to the war. There were those who knew the country and the people of the South, and who still retained confidence in her future success; but there can be no doubt that the majority of the people of Europe took a different view, and that it required many victories, and continued evidence of the obstinacy of the States of the Confederacy, to enable them to regain the prestige lost by the fall of New Orleans.

The complete evacuation of the forts and navy-yard of Pensacola followed as an immediate effect of the raising of the blockade of the Mississippi, and the consequent freedom for other operations of the large Federal fleet. For some time previous it had been resolved to give up the position. General Bragg had withdrawn the larger portion of the troops from its vicinity, and many of the heavy guns and stores had been despatched to other places. It was left to the discretion of General S. Jones to determine when the final destruction and abandonment of the forts and navy-yard should be carried out. On the reception of the news of the fall of New Orleans, he considered that the time had come to put his orders into execution. He knew that he could not hope successfully to resist the force that would be brought against him, and also that the valuable stores accumulated at the navy-yard of Pensacola were much needed

at Mobile. Therefore he made the necessary dispositions to remove the machinery, and to withdraw the small force, mostly of raw troops, from the fort and town. The task was not easy, as the Confederate lines were directly in view of the works on St. Rosa Island and of the garrison of Fort Pickens, whilst a Federal flotilla had been signalled as lying off Fort Morgan, at the entrance of Mobile Harbour, in close proximity to Pensacola. The stores, unarmed troops, and sick were first removed and sent to Mobile. Quaker guns, or dummies, were mounted on the works in place of the heavy ordnance; the sheers in the navy-yard were half-cut through; all the valuable coal, machinery, and large quantities of copper, lead, brass, and iron, even to the lightning-rods and leaden gutters, were either placed on the railway train or loaded in a small river steamer, for transmission to a place of safety up the river. At length, on the night of May 9, the infantry were marched out of the town, the sentries on the ramparts were removed one hour later, and three companies of cavalry recently brought from Montgomery were detailed to apply the torch to the public buildings, and complete the destruction of the place.* As the flames burst forth, the garrison of Fort Pickens first became aware of the work that was going on, and immediately commenced a furious bombardment. This still further assisted the destruction, without inflicting any loss on the Confederate troops. In the meantime Commodore Porter had arrived, and the military and naval authorities demanded the surrender of the place. The mayor of the town came on board the *Harriet Lane*, and promised that, as far as lay in his power,

* General Jones' report.

order should be preserved in the town. A detachment of troops under General Arnold immediately proceeded to occupy the place, and to endeavour to save what remained of the forts and navy-yard. The Confederates had spared private property, and the town of Pensacola was uninjured, save from the effects of the fire from Fort Pickens.

All the harbours along the coast of the Confederate States, with the exception of Galveston (Texas), Mobile, Savannah, Charleston, and Wilmington, were now (in May 1862) in the hands of the Federals. Notwithstanding, a brisk trade was carried on between Europe and the Confederate States. The small island of Nassau, one of the Bahama group, became the great *entrepôt* for the commerce with England, and steamers continually and almost regularly ran from thence to Charleston or Mobile.* The blockade may have been ineffectual, but the general results of the progress of the war during the year 1862 were much in favour of the Federals. The fact was acknowledged by President Davis, who, with true policy, preferred to make the people of the Confederacy aware of the danger that menaced them, and to trust to their courage and patriotism for means to meet it, rather than to flatter their hopes by false accounts of success. A fast-day was ordered to be observed throughout the Confederate States, and prayers were directed to be offered up in the several places of worship on Friday, May 16, for the strengthening and protection of the national

* 'A published list of the vessels which had arrived at Nassau from the Confederate States, dating from the commencement of the blockade up to April 12, 1862, showed that fifty-eight in all had arrived safely at Nassau, thirty-five since January 1, 1862.'—*Nassau Guardian*, April 12, 1862.

armies. The month of May 1862 was the darkest month in the history of the Confederacy. On all sides the Federal armies and navies were slowly, but apparently surely, advancing; the territories which acknowledged the sway of the Confederate Government were greatly narrowed, although that very circumstance allowed of a more complete concentration of force for the defence of the heart of the seceding States. It remained to be seen whether the army under General M'Clellan, the army that had received the greatest care, and on which the highest hopes were placed, would attain the object put before it, and by the capture of Richmond complete the successes of the spring of 1862, and the close of the first year of the war.

CHAPTER XVII.

CAMPAIGN IN EASTERN VIRGINIA.

THE weather during the first weeks of the siege of Yorktown had been cold and wet, and the Federal army, although well fed and clothed and, owing to their numbers, not hardly worked, suffered from its inclemency. General M'Clellan, when the three *corps d'armée* which still remained under his command had arrived in the lines before Yorktown, had in the field a force of nearly 90,000 infantry, 55 batteries of artillery (making a total of 330 field-guns), and about 10,000 cavalry, besides a siege-train of 103 guns.* The troops were bivouacked in the forests which covered the country between the James and York Rivers, and quickly constructed for themselves huts out of the timber. The engineer depôts were established in two deserted Confederate forts near Cheeseman's Creek, on the York River, and the siege-train was landed near the same point, about a mile and a half from what was to become the first parallel. The few remaining inhabitants of this quiet and usually almost-deserted part of Virginia saw with dismay and amazement the arrival of this great force. Their fences were pulled down to serve as corduroy for the roads, and their oyster-beds,

* This force does not include the garrison of Fortress Monroe, of about 10,000 men.

from which in peaceful times they supplied the markets of Baltimore and New York, became a source of sustenance and amusement for the Federal troops. The able-bodied men were serving in the Confederate army, and only the old and the women remained. These were unmolested by the soldiers, who were well-behaved and orderly. The vast number of steamers and sailing-vessels requisite for the supply of so large an army were moved up from Fortress Monroe to Shipping Point, in order as far as might be possible to shorten the distance of land transport, which was greater even than would be required for an European army, as the Federal volunteers were accustomed to and expected better rations and greater comforts than are usually supplied to regular troops. Their opponents, if in some ways they benefited by the wet weather, inasmuch as it delayed the siege operations, yet suffered from the hardships that it entailed. Few in numbers, the duty of guarding the trenches and furnishing the outpickets fell heavily on them. They were continually harassed by the fire of the enemy's artillery, and for rations had neither coffee, sugar, nor hard bread, but subsisted on flour and salt-meat. Animated by the hope of relief from the Confederate army of the Potomac, they held their lines, and no murmurs were heard on account of the hardships they endured.*

The Federal army, whilst it felt the whole line of the enemy's works, prepared for an attack on their left—i.e. on the town, or rather village, of Yorktown. In front of Yorktown General Heintzelman's corps were encamped, of which the advanced division had at first pitched their tents within easy range of the enemy's

* General Magruder's report.

batteries, but were subsequently forced to retire by their fire. Next to General Heintzelman was General Sumner's corps, and on the left that of General Keyes. Between the several corps and divisions good roads were constructed and lines of telegraphic wire laid down. The head-quarters camp was pitched at the distance of about a mile and three-quarters from the enemy's works, in front of a large grove of trees, and very near a farmhouse, said to mark the site of General Lafayette's head-quarters during the former siege of Yorktown when it was held by the English. The Confederates, either unaware of the vicinity of the head-quarters or unwilling to expend ammunition, refrained from shelling the camp, although it was within easy range of their batteries.

After carefully reconnoitring General Magruder's position, General M'Clellan decided that Dam No. 1 on Lee's Mills was the weakest point in the line, and on April 16 ordered General Smith to force a passage across the stream (Warwick Creek) at that point. On the side of the stream occupied by the Federal pickets a cleared space of ground, extending from the woods to the bank, sloped gradually down to the water. On the Confederate side the ground was lower, and covered almost to the water's edge by thick forest. The action commenced by a fire of artillery, the Federals bringing eighteen pieces of artillery to play on the slight earthworks, or rather trenches, which the Confederate pickets had raised to obtain cover. On their side only three guns were in position; two only were employed in the action, as the nature of the ground precluded the use of the other gun. About 3.30 P.M. a Vermont regiment was ordered to advance and cross the stream. This they did with great gallantry. The water was deeper

than had been anticipated, and the pouches of the men became wet. However, they continued to advance, and succeeded in obtaining possession of a line of rifle-pits usually occupied by the 15th North Carolina Regiment. That regiment, aided by the 16th Georgia, attacked them, and endeavoured to drive them back; but Colonel M'Kinney of the 15th North Carolinas fell, and the two regiments were forced to retire. The supports, under Colonel Anderson and General Cobb, were brought up and gallantly led forward, General Cobb especially distinguishing himself; whilst the whole of the second division, under General M'Laws, acting by express orders from General Magruder, were hastened forward.

General Magruder felt the importance of holding the position, as, should his line have been broken at that point, the wings of the army would have been separated, and he would probably have been forced to give up his system of defence. The supports, advancing rapidly through the woods, sprang into the rifle-pits, and drove back the Vermont regiments,* which had been left almost unsupported to sustain the attack; they retired, and many were killed and wounded in recrossing the stream. General M'Clellan in person witnessed the last incidents of the action. The loss was greater on the side of the Federals than on that of the Confederates, as the latter were covered by the forest, and also, when they had regained them, by the rifle-pits. The Vermont regiments behaved well, but it appears strange that no arrangements had been made for reinforcing them after their passage across the stream. General Smith, after the engagement, en-

* Other Vermont regiments or companies had been sent across to sustain the first regiment that attacked, but it does not appear that these regiments were properly supported.

trenched himself in a position immediately overlooking the dam and the enemy's works, in order, to use General M'Clellan's own words, 'to keep them under control, and prevent the enemy using the dam as a means of crossing the Warwick to annoy us.' This was but a poor result of an aggressive movement on the part of an army far superior in numbers to their opponents.

About this time reinforcements were constantly arriving for General Magruder's army, and all idea of breaking the Confederate lines otherwise than by the operations of a regular siege was abandoned. In the meanwhile, about the end of April, General Franklin's division, which had formed part of General M'Dowell's corps, arrived at Shipping Point: it consisted of about 10,000 men, and was one of the best organised and disciplined divisions of the army, having been formed more especially under the eye of General M'Clellan. It was at one time supposed that this division would be sent to Gloucester Point, in order to do the work that had been assigned to General M'Dowell's corps; but General M'Clellan, yielding to caution, and fearing lest one division should be numerically too weak for the task, retained it on board the transports near Shipping Point. The siege was now vigorously prosecuted, and the first parallel was constructed, at about the distance of a mile from the batteries of Yorktown. Advantage was taken of the broken character of the ground, and the approaches were, with much engineering skill, conducted along the creeks and ravines which flow into and adjoin the York River. The weather was fine and clear, the spring foliage had just commenced, and the well-made roads shaded by tulip-trees, the white oak, and the ilex, interspersed with flowers such as grow in English shrubberies, seemed more adapted for approaches to a country house than to batteries and

redoubts. Deep creeks capable of floating heavy barges intersected the country in the immediate front of the works at Yorktown, and one of these, named Wormby Creek, afforded a means of transport for the heavier mortars. The batteries were usually erected under cover of and concealed by the woods, and it was intended when they were ready to open fire to clear away the trees in front of the embrasures. The same system of engineering was adopted and, indeed, many of the same books were used by the American engineers as by those of the English army; consequently some of the younger officers, adhering too closely to the rules laid down in these books, and forgetting that the increased thickness of parapets and the shape and size of the projectiles used in modern warfare would necessarily tend to change the measurements, committed blunders in the erection of the batteries and their magazines.

The work was, on the whole, very well performed. Little opposition was offered by the garrison; during the day few shots were fired, although in the evening, about the time when the working parties were relieved, the batteries generally opened on them. Little damage was done, and the loss inflicted was very small. When the weather was clear one of the balloons* attached to the army usually ascended from the vicinity of General Heintzelman's head-quarters, and sometimes provoked a fire from the enemy's batteries. There were few results from these balloon reconnaissances; little was seen, although much was imagined; the trees effectually concealed the numbers and positions of the enemy's troops, and no idea could be formed of the nature or relief of the works when viewed from so great an altitude. One of the

* There were three attached to the army.

Federal generals, General Fitzjohn Porter, narrowly escaped capture by the enemy when in the balloon. The rope which attached it to the ground broke, and the general ran the risk of being carried into the enemy's lines; but having some knowledge of ballooning, and retaining his presence of mind, he opened the valve and let himself down. The four steam gunboats—viz. the *Penobscot*, *Marblehead*, *Wachusett*, and *Yankee*—took up a position between two and three miles from the Yorktown batteries, and amused themselves in shelling the place at long range with very little effect. They did not often venture within range of the enemy's batteries, which took very little notice of them.

About the last day of April Battery No. 1, constructed on a point of land about two miles from Yorktown, opened fire. It was mounted with five 100-pounder and one 200-pounder Parrott guns. The fire was principally directed against the water-batteries and the shipping lying off the wharves, which brought the provisions for the Confederate army from the upper districts. It was very inaccurate, not so much from the fault of the guns as from defect in the ammunition. The Confederate batteries replied, their gunners having obtained a good direction but not good range, therefore their shot and shell passed over and beyond the battery. In all fourteen*

* Number and armament of batteries :—

Battery
No.

1. Five 100-pounder Parrott guns; one 200-pounder Parrott's. Distance from enemy's batteries, 3,800 yards.
2. Three $4\frac{1}{2}$ -inch 33-pounder Rodman's; five 20-pounder Parrott's; seven 30-pounder Parrott's. Distance, 2,000 yards.
3. Six 20-pounder Parrott's. Distance, 1,900 yards.
4. Ten 13-inch mortars. Distance, 4,000 yards from Gloucester Point.

batteries and three redoubts were erected to subdue the enemy's fire prior to an assault. The heavy 13-inch mortars were brought round in barges and landed in the battery they were to occupy close to Wormly's Creek; the other guns were conveyed through the trenches into their batteries during the night. As the approaches neared the town the pickets and working parties were subject to the fire of the enemy's sharpshooters, and a perpetual warfare was carried on between the two. Little injury was inflicted on either side, as the combatants were careful to avail themselves of cover. The Federal sharpshooters were generally armed with Sharp's breech-loading and revolving rifles, and the regiment called Bardan's Sharpshooters carried heavy rifles with telescopic sights, adapted possibly for firing into embrasures but totally unsuited for service in the field.

The rumours and stories from the advanced parallel enlivened the monotony of the siege, and in the mean-

Battery

No.

5. Four 20-pounder Parrott's. Distance, 1,600 yards from Red Redoubt.
6. Six 10-inch mortars. Distance, 2,000 yards from Red Redoubt.
7. Six 20-pounder Parrott's.
8. Six ditto ditto.
9. Ten 10-inch mortars.
10. Seven $4\frac{1}{2}$ -inch Rodman's; three 100-pounder Parrott's.
11. Four 10-inch mortars.
12. Ten 10-inch mortars. Distance, 1,600 yards from town.
13. Six 20-pounder Parrott's.
14. Three 100-pounder Parrott's; one 100-pounder James.

Redoubt

- A. Three 12-pounder smooth-bored fieldpieces.
- B. Ditto ditto
- C. Ditto ditto

Some of the guns in the more recently-erected batteries were not in position when the evacuation took place.

time, among the divisions in the vicinity of headquarters, the men were regularly drilled and perfected in discipline. There was a great difference between the several divisions; some consisted of very raw troops, who, in common with many of their officers, were ignorant of the simplest details of marching and outpost duty, whilst others had the appearance of regular soldiers. The outpost duty was not well performed; but the Confederates, apparently equally ignorant, or else content with the inactivity of their opponents, attempted no sallies or other hindrances to the prosecution of the siege.

Thus passed the month of April, and during the first days of May it was daily rumoured that the batteries would open fire on the town. The several parallels had been nearly completed, the communications between the different batteries secured, and the trenches and approaches presented the appearance of well-regulated roads. All was ready, when on the early morning of May 4 the outpickets noticed an unusual silence along the enemy's lines, and advancing cautiously ascertained that his pickets had been withdrawn, and that the Confederate army had retired. On the previous night a bright light had been perceived in the direction of Yorktown, but no other signs indicated the approaching evacuation of the place, and it was not until 4 A.M. on the 4th that news was brought to headquarters that such an event had taken place. The cavalry and horse artillery were immediately ordered out in pursuit, and the whole army put in motion with the same object. A feeling of disappointment prevailed through the Federal army. The preparations made for reducing the place were on so vast a scale that success appeared certain, and a repetition of the same tactics as had foiled the Federals at Manassas

appeared to have had the same result at Yorktown. It was felt also that the country eagerly expected a battle and a decisive victory, and that the people would not be satisfied with the barren occupation of the deserted works. General Johnston had indeed attained his object in delaying the Federal army for so long a time before his lines: he had already prepared defences nearer Richmond, where he would be unexposed to operations in his rear, which threatened him at Yorktown from General M'Dowell's corps at Fredericksburg.

During the time the army was encamped before Yorktown the Merrimac made her appearance for the third time in Hampton Roads. She was accompanied by the Jamestown and Yorktown, and four smaller vessels. Immediately on her approach being signalled the numerous transports, schooners, &c. got up sail and left the roads for a safer position beyond the guns of the fort. The steamtugs gave their assistance, and in a very short space of time the forest of masts between Fortress Monroe and Sewall's Point had disappeared, and no vessels remained on the water excepting the Confederate squadron and two French and one English ships of war. The Federal fleet declined the combat, and with steam up remained at their usual moorings. During the greater part of the day the Merrimac remained in Hampton Roads, bidding defiance to her former antagonists and to the rest of the Federal fleet, but to no purpose. They would not risk an engagement; and although actually before their eyes, and almost within range of their guns, three schooners were carried off by armed boats from the Confederate ships, they made no movement beyond firing a few ineffective shots at long range. They probably acted judiciously, as should the Monitor

have engaged the Merrimac and incurred defeat, a wholesale destruction of the transports and vessels off Fortress Monroe would in all likelihood have been the result, and the success of General M'Clellan's operations would have consequently been imperilled. Still it was galling to the *esprit de corps* of the American navy to see the Merrimac carrying off the vessels under their eyes, and in the presence of ships of war of two of the great European powers. Unwilling to contend against the powerful batteries of Fortress Monroe, as well as the Federal fleet, the Merrimac retired with her consorts and the three prizes to Norfolk.

To return to Yorktown. About 9 A.M. on the 4th of May four regiments and one squadron of cavalry, with four batteries of artillery, under General Stoneman, advanced by the road passing to the south or left of Yorktown in order to follow the retreating column. The pickets were pushed forward up to the ramparts of the town, and a passage was made over the parapet in order to avoid the torpedoes or concealed shells, which had been placed by the retreating enemy in the gates and roadways, and which had already killed two men of the advanced pickets. As far as burying these implements of destruction in the roads and gates, the Confederates were justified, as they impeded the pursuit, the cavalry especially being forced to proceed with great caution; but they were also charged with concealing torpedoes in dwelling-houses and near springs of water, for which the same excuse could not be urged, as their explosion would only result in the probable death of one or two individuals; therefore, in order to save risk to his own men, General M'Clellan directed that the prisoners should be employed in removing them. Seventy-three guns of position had been

left on the ramparts, together with three rifled guns burst into many pieces. Everything else of any value had been carried off, and on the roads hardly an evidence remained of the march of the large army which had so recently occupied and retreated from the works. At a short distance within the town, the house which had once been the head-quarters of Lord Cornwallis stood uninjured by the bombardment. Having passed outside the town, the cavalry, supported by Hooker's division some miles in rear, advanced along the Williamsburgh Road. The balloon which had been sent up from Yorktown brought news that the retreating column could be perceived at a few miles distant, and the evidence of picket fires still burning, and a carriage in flames, gave signs of the near proximity of the Confederate rear-guard. Their retreat had been conducted in excellent order; there were no stragglers, and little of the débris which might be expected from the baggage of so large a body of men. About eight miles from Yorktown a portion of the cavalry were detached by a cross road to open a communication with the Lee's Mill Road, running almost parallel with the Yorktown Road, and joining it in the near vicinity of Williamsburg. Along this road Smith's division had been ordered to march, and it was hoped that a portion of the Confederate rear-guard would have been cut off. Their retreat was, however, too well managed. They were assisted by the weather, which was bright and clear, and the roads consequently hard. The country, although more thickly inhabited than that to the south of Yorktown, was yet covered with wood, and the cavalry were forced to advance with great caution at a foot's pace. The retreating columns had marched along the roads, and done no damage to

the farms they had passed through. All looked bright and smiling, and presented a great contrast to the condition of the country a few days subsequently. The small town of Williamsburg, about fourteen miles from Yorktown, is one of the oldest settlements in America, and formerly contained the residence of the English Governor of Virginia. The red brick houses, something resembling in character those of the older villages on the banks of the Thames, the church, the remains of Lord Dunmore's (the last governor's) house, all bring back remembrances of England. In front of the small town, at the distance of one and a half miles, the two roads from Yorktown and Lee's Mill, leaving the woods, unite, and traversing large fields of cleared and well cultivated land, enter the town. On these fields several earthworks had been erected by the Confederate general, the more advanced one, Fort Magruder, commanding the junction of the two roads, whilst other small redoubts overlooked the cross roads which might afford a means of advance for the enemy. In front of these redoubts trees had been felled, and an abattis constructed. About 3.30 P.M. General Stoneman's advanced guard of cavalry debouched from the woods, and came within sight of the Confederate rear-guard close to Fort Magruder.

The 6th United States cavalry had been sent in skirmishing order into the woods on the right of the road, and one battery of artillery was brought quickly to the front, and opened fire on a group of officers and a regiment of cavalry about 900 yards to the front. The fire was immediately replied to by the fort, and General Stoneman finding himself opposed to a considerable force, and unable with cavalry to storm earthworks, retired. The fort continued to fire into the woods, but

effected little damage. An aide-de-camp of Governor Sprague of Rhode Island, who had accompanied the army as a volunteer, was wounded. During the day the Duc de Chartres had acted as an aide-de-camp to General Stoneman, and had been of considerable service. The 6th United States cavalry covered the retreat, keeping back with much gallantry the superior force of the enemy. General Stoneman was forced to abandon one gun of the leading battery, which had stuck in the mud, and remained immovably fixed there. The infantry division, detained by confusion in the line of march, owing to General Smith having left the main road from Lees Mill, and entered by a cross road the Yorktown and Williamsburg Road, thereby crossing the march of General Hooker's division,* arrived after the skirmish had terminated. General Sumner, who had been ordered by General M'Clellan to take charge of the operations in the front, whilst he himself remained to superintend the advance of the troops, reached the ground in the evening, and ordered an immediate attack on the works in front; owing, however, to the lines being thrown into confusion whilst moving through the forest, and to the approach of darkness, the attempt was abandoned, and the troops bivouacked in the woods.† During the night heavy rain fell, and continued with little intermission for twenty-four hours, reducing the roads to slosh and mud, and rendering necessary in many places a corduroy or planking. This change in the weather greatly impeded the Federal advance. The whole of the shipping and gunboats had in the meantime moved up to Yorktown, and in an inconceivably short period of

* General M'Clellan's report.

† Ibid.

time the harbour at Cheesman's Creek and Shipping Point had been abandoned, and the depôts transferred to Yorktown: this was effected without danger, as Gloucester Point, equally with the rest of the lines, had been abandoned. It was General M'Clellan's intention to push forward by water General Franklin's division, supported by Generals Sedgwick, Porter, and Richardson, to the right bank of the Pamunkey River opposite West Point, and thus to turn the Confederate defences in the Peninsula. With the object of superintending this operation he had remained in the vicinity of Yorktown on the 4th and morning of May 5. About 7.30 A.M. on the 5th, the battle of Williamsburg commenced. The action was commenced by General Hooker's* division, of three brigades, belonging to General Heintzelman's corps, who had marched during the early part of the night by the Lees Mill and Yorktown Road, and had bivouacked in the forest; General Hooker commenced the action by sending skirmishers into the woods, and then deployed his brigades on either side of the road, bringing up at the same time his artillery. As soon as the advanced troops passed beyond the line of forest, and were slowly engaged in making their way through the abattis, the forts opened on them, and they were vigorously attacked by the Confederate rear-guard formed of a part of General Longstreet's division. The Federals were driven back with the loss of five guns, and with difficulty held the belt of wood which sheltered and concealed them from the Confederate fire. Generals Couch and Casey's divisions were in the meantime advancing slowly to their assistance, but were greatly

* General Hooker had formerly been for a short time at West Point, but had not graduated there or served as an officer in the United States army.

retarded by the mud and rain; and being inferior in discipline to some of the other divisions of the army, were less adapted for marching. Consequently General Kearney's division, moving through the woods on their flanks, outmarched and passed the column, excepting one brigade of Couch's division (General Perks), which arrived at the scene of action almost simultaneously.* General Kearney, who had had experience in warfare, both in Mexico and during the campaign of 1859 in Italy, when he accompanied the French army, led his men gallantly under fire, and advancing beyond the right of General Hooker's division, held the Confederates in check. General Perks' brigade took up a position on his right, and on the right of Perks' right was General Smith's division of three brigades. Thus there were nine brigades of the Federal army engaged. The Confederates were much less numerous, but had the advantage of position, and also of a concentrated system of defence. The Federal line of battle was without plan or order, each division leader did what seemed good in his own eyes: the three generals commanding corps, viz. Generals Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keys, were on the ground, but, owing to the nature of the country and the inefficiency of their staff organisations,† exercised little control over their divisions. None of these generals had had long practice in handling large bodies of men, and the senior officer, General Sumner, although a most gallant and fine old soldier, possessed few of the qualifications to fit him for the command of an army. Consequently, the superior

* General Kearney had taken General Hamilton's place, as commanding a division, a few days previous to the battle.

† The staff organisation is here meant, not the officers of the staff, who were often overworked.

numbers of the Federals availed them but little, and the advance of the army received a serious check. Aides-de-camp of General M'Clellan's staff, who had been sent forward with the advanced divisions, hurried back with information of the state of affairs, and reaching General M'Clellan, who, unaware of the serious nature of the engagement, was superintending the embarkation of General Franklin's corps, gave him the first intelligence of the unsatisfactory condition of the army in the front. The whole extent of the road for twelve miles from the scene of action to the lines round Yorktown was encumbered and blocked up by the advancing brigades. Artillery, cavalry, infantry, and baggage were intermingled in apparently inextricable confusion. The rain fell in torrents, the roads were deep in mud, and the men straggled, fell out, and halted without orders, so that the column of route of the Federals resembled much more the line of retreat of a defeated than the advance of a successful army. There were no staff officers to superintend the line of march, or to urge on the lagging regiments; the cannon boomed in front, but, apathetic alike in advance as in retreat, the American soldiers did not press forward to the sound. After hearing the accounts from his aides-de-camp, General M'Clellan, having first given orders for Generals Sedgwick and Richardson's divisions to advance by land instead of by water, mounted and rode directly to the front, which he reached about 5.30 P.M. During this time, General Sumner had directed General Smith to detach one of his brigades across a dam, and creek on his right, in order to turn the Confederate left. General Hancock was sent, and advancing through the woods occupied two redoubts, which had not been garrisoned by the enemy, and threatened to turn his flank, and

even to cut off the troops engaged with General Hooker. Perceiving this, the Confederate general directed an attack on the redoubt occupied by General Hancock, and that officer, after repeatedly and in vain sending for reinforcements, and on receiving an order from General Sumner to withdraw, retired slowly. Just previous to this event General M'Clellan arrived on the field, and immediately he was recognised was received with loud cheers, which were taken up along the whole line of the Federal army. Recognising at once the importance of reinforcing General Hancock, he ordered the remainder of General Smith's division, consisting of two brigades, to move to his assistance. Before they arrived, General Hancock, after retiring slowly for a short distance, turned upon his pursuers and, according to General M'Clellan's report, attacked and drove them back at the point of the bayonet. This was the final incident of the battle; night closed in, and the last gun was fired about seven o'clock. The men bivouacked cold, wet, and hungry on the field of battle, in the line of woods they had occupied in the morning. The army had received a serious check, which, if the Confederate general had been able to take advantage of it, might have been converted into a disastrous defeat. General Hooker's division had suffered severely; brigades, divisions, and regiments were mingled promiscuously together; the supply trains could not reach the front, owing to the state of the roads; and it was evident that the Federal army could not renew the attack on the morrow.* Nevertheless, General

* General Heintzelman reported to General M'Clellan during the night that General Hooker's division had suffered so much that it could not be relied upon next day, and that Kearney's could not do more than hold its own without reinforcements.—General M'Clellan's report, p. 185.

M'Clellan, confident in the plan he had determined on, and with a just appreciation of the movements of his opponent, countermanded the orders of advance of Generals Sedgwick and Richardson's divisions, and directed them to proceed to West Point by water. On the following morning, the 6th, the Federal army entered Williamsburg without any opposition, as the Confederates had retired during the night. This retreat was unavoidable, as their left flank and rear would otherwise have been open to attack from the divisions which had been sent to West Point. The Federal loss at the battle of Williamsburg was stated by General M'Clellan to have amounted to 456 killed, 1,400 wounded, and 372 missing, making a total of 2,228. As the Confederates engaged were inferior in numbers, and were acting on the defensive in a strong position, their loss in the battle must have been much less; but a great proportion of their wounded in the hospitals at Williamsburg fell into the hands of the Federals, and the advanced cavalry picked up and brought in as prisoners a considerable number of stragglers. Many of the dead were still lying on the ground when, two days after the battle, General M'Clellan rode over the field. The enemy had retired, many prisoners had fallen into his hands, some cannon abandoned on the line of retreat had been captured by his cavalry, and he claimed Williamsburg as a victory. Yet he appeared to feel regret at the terrible misery of a civil war more than joy at his own success. The men opposed to him were, or had been, his own personal friends and brother officers—one of them had been present at his marriage; and General M'Clellan, although staunchly loyal to the cause he had adopted, was far too good a patriot, a gentleman, and a soldier either to glory over

the opportunity of vengeance, or to nourish ill feeling against honourable men who differed with him in their views of duty. The army appeared to participate in the feelings of their general. The troops marched from the battle-field directly into the town of Williamsburg, where the inhabitants did not attempt to conceal their strong sympathy for their countrymen of Virginia; but no crimes were committed, property was respected, and none of the outrages often but too common in European armies were perpetrated on the helpless population. One great cause for the absence of crime was the fact that there was no drunkenness among the men of General M'Clellan's army: this may partially be attributed to the stringent orders against the sale of spirits, but redounds to the credit of the troops, inasmuch as they endured hardship and fatigue without the issue of stimulants, and without murmuring at their forcible deprivation of them—a deprivation which did not extend to the officers.

The action at Williamsburg enabled the Confederate army to retreat almost without molestation to Richmond; the Federal army was not in a condition to pursue, and a cavalry force was alone sent forward to watch the line of march. On the 6th the weather cleared up, and in a very short time the roads had resumed their firmness, except in places much overhung by trees. General M'Clellan took up his headquarters in one of the principal houses in Williamsburg, the army bivouacking in the open plain between the town and the field of battle. A temporary depôt for supplies was established at Queen's Creek on the York River, and the wounded were shipped from thence to Yorktown, where steamers quickly conveyed them to their homes and hospitals in Northern cities.

General Franklin's division, together with those of Generals Sedgwick, Porter, and Richardson, had in the meantime gone up the river to West Point, the place where the Pamunkey and Mataponey Rivers join, and where the two united together take the name of the York River. Opposite the village of West Point, on the 7th, the advanced brigades of General Franklin's division disembarked on the right bank of the Pamunkey River. The place selected was an open space of ground fringed with woods. Here the Federals were attacked by General Whiting's division, and, assisted by the fire of the gunboats, held the ground they had occupied, but were useless in effecting any injury on the column which was retreating before General M'Clellan. In fact, General Johnston, by the battle of Williamsburg, gained the object for which he had fought. He had secured the safe retreat of his army, together with their baggage and supply train, and although forced by the configuration of the land, and the superiority of the Federals on the rivers, to abandon the peninsula of Yorktown, yet did so in a manner which redounded to his credit, and insured the safety and efficiency of his army.

On the 8th, General Stoneman, with a combined force of artillery, cavalry, and infantry, moved out of Williamsburg with the object of opening communications with General Franklin, and on the two following days the remainder of the army advanced in the same direction. As the regiments defiled past the head-quarters, General M'Clellan showed himself at the door of the house, and was loudly and enthusiastically cheered. The troops were in good spirits, browned and hardened by the exposure and work they had gone through, and altogether as fine a body of men as a general could

wish to command. But even then, at the commencement of the day's march, there were symptoms of the want of organisation which is so great an element in the failure of the Federal armies : the proper distances between brigades, regiments, and companies were not preserved, and the knapsacks and accoutrements of the men were put on so carelessly that their proportionate weight and inconvenience were much increased. It was not so much that these deficiencies in order and regularity existed, as that they passed unnoticed and without comment. One of General M'Clellan's plans had been to form a picked corps, in order to establish a standard for the rest of the army, and, after the manner of the French, to possess a body of men who could be relied on when the crisis of a battle occurred. For this purpose he kept together the division of the regular troops, augmented by some of the best volunteer regiments ; but in doing so, he had to contend against the republican prejudices of the nation, and the jealousy with which the regular troops were regarded by the volunteers. It was unfortunate for the army that such an idea could not be thoroughly carried out, as there existed no model on which the raw regiments could be formed. Another element of weakness in the Federal army lay in the manner in which it was recruited. The greater number of the old regiments, having once departed for the seat of war, received no recruits, but were allowed to dwindle gradually away. If reinforcements were wanted, fresh regiments, with new and untried officers, were sent to the field ; therefore, the great benefit otherwise derived from experienced soldiers was in a great measure lost. The interference of the politicians with the discipline of the army and the functions of the general was also another

cause of evil. Not only was political influence brought to bear on the appointment of officers, but, as was proved in a case that occurred whilst the army was before Yorktown, the general in command was precluded from inflicting merited punishment on an offending regiment through the influence brought to bear on the President by the representatives of the State from which the regiment had been recruited.

The head-quarters left Williamsburg on the 9th, and on the 10th arrived at Roper's Meeting-House, nineteen miles in advance, from whence communications were opened with Eltham, on the Pamunkey River, where a depôt for stores was established. The march of the army, encumbered by long trains of baggage, was necessarily very slow, and the head-quarters remained for three days at Roper's Meeting-House. It was during that time that the news arrived of the evacuation of Norfolk by the Confederates, and the occupation of the place by the Federal troops under General Wool. The forces of the Confederates were too weak in numbers to allow of the assignment of sufficiently strong detachments to isolated positions. It became evident that, owing to the operations of General Burnside from the neighbourhood of Elizabeth City, and to the evacuation by General Johnston of the lines at Yorktown, the town and navy-yard of Norfolk would soon be cut off from communication with Richmond. The garrison would therefore be left to its own resources, and a large number of troops would be required to insure an efficient defence. These troops could neither be spared from the army requisite to protect Richmond from General M'Clellan's force, nor from that assigned to the defence of the Shenandoah Valley. Therefore, the Government at Richmond

resolved to save as much as might be possible of the stores collected at Norfolk navy-yard, to destroy the remainder, and then to abandon the place. Orders to this effect were issued to Major-General Huger, commanding the troops, who at once proceeded to put them into execution. The houses, and so much of the machinery as could not be removed, were burnt, and the dry-dock mined and greatly damaged, whilst several steamers and other vessels were also destroyed. This was effected by May 10, and the Confederate force, leaving a small rear-guard to protect the retreat, marched out of Norfolk on the road to Richmond. On the same morning, General Wool, who, in anticipation of the effect which the fall of Yorktown and the retreat of General Johnston would exercise on the garrison of Norfolk, had prepared an expedition for the purpose of attacking the town, landed a considerable force near Sewall's Point, and marched on Norfolk. The advanced-guard encountered some resistance at Tanner's Creek, which was successfully defended by the Confederates for the purpose of burning the bridge, and thus forcing the Federals to adopt another line of march. On approaching the town, General Wool was met by the mayor, who formally surrendered the place, and a garrison of Federal troops was immediately sent to occupy it. Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Chase were witnesses of the occupation, for considering that no opposition was offered, it cannot be called the capture of Norfolk. The former issued a general order dated from the town, in his capacity of commander-in-chief, in which he thanked Major-General John Wool, and the forces under his command, *for their skilful and gallant movements*, although the achievement was more owing to the success of the main army under General McClellan

than to any skill or courage on the part of the garrison of Fortress Monroe. Irrespective of the advantage which the possession of Norfolk gave to the Federals, it was productive of an event which inflicted more injury on the Confederates than the actual loss of the town and navy-yard. The Merrimac or Virginia, under Commodore Tatnall, who had succeeded Captain Buchanan in command when that officer was wounded, and which had been for so long a time the terror of the Federal fleet, was abandoned and blown up on the day succeeding the evacuation of Norfolk. After the occupation of the place, both shores of the James River came into possession of the Federal troops, who were therefore enabled to cut off the vessel from her necessary supplies. This rendered her removal from her position off Craney Island necessary, and induced her commander to resolve on taking her up the James River above the lines occupied by the Federal troops. In order to do this it was requisite, according to the opinion of the pilot, to lighten the ship, which was accordingly done, and by exerting themselves during the night the crew so effectually performed their work as to reduce her draught to twenty feet six inches ; but by so doing they exposed the undefended portion of the vessel to the enemy's fire, as the iron plating no longer covered the sides as far as the water-mark. This rendered her comparatively useless for action, but as flight was the object, the defect was not of so great consequence. When, however, the work having been performed, Commodore Tatnall ordered the pilot to take her up the James River, the latter declared that, owing to the prevalence of westerly winds, the depth of water had decreased, and that he was unable to pilot the ship beyond Jamestown Flats, where the shore

on either bank was occupied by the Federal troops. Commodore Tatnall then resolved on destroying her. He could not hope successfully to engage the enemy's fleet, and he did not consider that he could place her in a secure position in the James River; therefore, rather than incur the risk of capture, he took measures to abandon and blow her up. Accordingly, on May 11, she was run ashore near Craney Island, her crew were marched to Suffolk, and from thence to Richmond, and the vessel was set on fire, and exploded about 5 A.M. This was a sad and unexpected termination to so glorious a career as that of the Merrimac. It excited great indignation through the Confederate States, to which was added the additional weight of the opinion of the Court of Enquiry assembled to investigate the causes of her destruction. Commodore Tatnall alleged that he had been deceived with reference to the depth of water in the James River, and accounted for the deception practised on him by the unwillingness of the pilot again to engage in action. The destruction of the Merrimac at once opened the James River to the Federal gunboats, who, now that their formidable antagonist no longer existed, were not slow to avail themselves of the opportunity offered to them. The Galena, the Arovstook, the Monitor, Port Royal, and Nangatuck steamed up the James River on the 15th, under the command of Commander Rodgers, and without opposition advanced within twelve miles of Richmond. Here, under the guns of an entrenched position called Fort Darling or Drury's Bluff, a line of obstructions consisting of sunken vessels stretched across the river and barred further progress, whilst the banks were lined with sharpshooters who picked off the men from the decks of the gunboats. The Galena and Monitor approached

within six hundred yards of the batteries, but the guns of the latter proved useless, as they could not be elevated sufficiently to reach the work constructed on the bluff. The armour of the Galena was also not strong enough to resist the shot, and several of the iron rivets which joined her plates together were driven in, and inflicted injury on the crew. Notwithstanding, the engagement continued for upwards of four hours, when the gunboats were repulsed. The brunt of the action had fallen on the Monitor and Galena; the wooden gunboats had remained about half a mile below the fort, and neither received or inflicted much injury, excepting such as resulted from the bursting of the 100-pounder Parrott gun on board the Nangatuck. At this time the defences of the James River were not strong, neither were there many guns mounted on the batteries, the protection of the river having in a great measure been entrusted to the Merrimac. Owing, however, to the defects of the Federal gunboats, they proved sufficient to defend the channel, until measures could be taken for the construction of more formidable works. The possession of the James River as far as Drury's Bluff was at first unproductive of much effect on the movements of the main army under General M'Clellan. Prior to the occupation of Norfolk and the events which attended it, the direction of the march had been determined on, and he had resolved to abandon the line of the James River, and adopt that of the Pamunkey, from whence he would be able to supply his army by water, and also have the use of the rail running from the Pamunkey to Richmond. Another advantage offered itself in the adoption of this route; the army would be in nearer proximity to General M'Dowell's corps at Fredericksburg, and would also

with greater facility be enabled to pass the Chickahominy, a narrow but deep stream flowing into the James River, and affording a strong line of defence, by which the retreating Confederates could cover Richmond. With these objects in view, the army marched to Cumberland on May 13, where a temporary depôt for stores was established. The place chosen for the encampment of the three divisions immediately surrounding the head-quarters was a large well-cultivated plain, stretching from the forest to the Pamunkey River. Wooded heights overlooked the encampment, and the numerous tents of the army, the vast trains of wagons, the powerful park of artillery, together with the fleet of steamers and transports, presented a striking contrast to the usually quiet country. Hitherto, the troops had generally bivouacked in the woods, where their numbers and appearance had been concealed; but the more open and cultivated country in the neighbourhood of Richmond afforded places for encampment, where views of the larger portion of the army could be obtained, and where its size and magnitude could be appreciated. To an Englishman there was something peculiarly sad in the devastation of this beautiful country; the first inhabitants had evidently been settlers from Kent, and had given the same name to their new county, perpetuating the remembrance of the old familiar places in their new abodes. The churches and the monuments on the graves all spoke of England, and of a time when Virginia formed a part of the British dominions. Even in the construction of the houses, a resemblance could be traced between the large picturesque chimneys of the farm-houses in Kent and those of the New Kent in Virginia. If such reflections could not fail to strike an Englishman, how much more must the reminiscences of the county have affected every thinking

American, not blinded by the passions aroused by civil war.

The advanced-guard of the Federals actually occupied the property, although they respected the house, of the descendants of Washington. Here that great man had lived, and within a few miles stood the church in which he had been married. The whole country must have been familiar to him, and the cause he fought for presented many points of resemblance with that in which his fellow-countrymen in Virginia were now engaged. He likewise had resisted the oppression of a powerful Government, and acted on principles for which they were now sacrificing their lives and property. The estate of the White House had descended through a connection of General Washington's to the Lee family, who were now its owners, and who had embraced with heart and soul the Confederate cause. When the family departed from their house on the approach of the Federal army, Mrs. Lee left a note on the table requesting that it might be respected in consideration of its former owner and its historical interest. As a curious coincidence, almost the first officer who entered it was a cousin of the Lee family, who had continued to serve in the United States army, and commanded a regiment of cavalry. General M'Clellan strictly complied with the request of the owners of the house, and not only forbade any of his troops to enter the premises, but even abstained from doing so himself, preferring to encamp in the adjoining field. This leniency and kindly feeling towards an enemy called forth many animadversions from the more violent partisans in the North, and the question was even brought before Congress, where occasion was taken by the enemies of the general to urge accusations against his want of patriotism, shown in his leniency towards the men in arms against the

Republic. Near the White House on the Pamunkey, the final depôt for stores was organised, and a base of operations established for the direct advance on Richmond. The distance to Richmond was about eighteen miles, and there were three roads by which the several columns of the army could advance. The march of the troops had hitherto been much delayed by rain, and the advanced-guard, still under the command of General Stoneman, had failed to overtake the enemy. Little was known of his movements in the Federal camp. General Johnston had conducted the retreat with great order and regularity, and no signs of the march of the army remained to show the direction it had taken. About this time two additional *corps d'armée* were formed, and commands given to Generals Porter and Franklin, two of the younger generals in whom General M'Clellan had especial confidence. The corps under the command of General Porter included the division of regular troops. In three columns the army marched on the Chickahominy, the right consisting of General Porter's corps supported by that of General Franklin, by the roads north of the Richmond and Pamunkey rail; the centre of General Sumner's corps, by the rail itself; the left of General Keyes' corps, supported by that of General Heintzelman, by the New Kent Road. By the 21st May the advanced guard of the right column, under General Stoneman, had reached the Chickahominy at New Bridge. General Sumner was within three miles of the stream, and General Keyes within a short distance of Bottom's Bridge, about two miles lower down. The bridges over the Chickahominy had either been destroyed or were guarded by the Confederate troops, and the Federal army came to a halt, whilst preparations were

made for the purpose of effecting a crossing. On the 26th, the railroad, which had been but little damaged by the Confederates, was in working order, and a great portion of the supplies were brought by train almost up to the tents of the troops. The advance to the Chickahominy may be said to have closed the second period of the operations of General McClellan's army. The first period comprised the siege and capture of Yorktown; the second the battle of Williamsburg and the march on Richmond. As yet the Northern people, intoxicated by their successes in the West and on the coast, had been disappointed of the great battle which was to insure the capture of Richmond. Rumour each day in New York announced its fall, and the unopposed march of the army to within a few miles of the city excited the hopes of the ignorant masses, only too credulous of all that tended to magnify the power and greatness of the Federal Republic. Already the most severe and cruel measures against the rebellious States were advocated by members of both Houses of Congress, in the event of their conquest, which was almost daily expected. Punishment was to be meted out in no sparing measure on the leaders, and the Republican party, forgetful of the provisions of the Constitution, proposed to rule the Southern States as conquered provinces are held in subjection by the military monarchies of Europe. Measures were proposed for immediate emancipation, for arming the negroes, for confiscation of property, proving, if any proof was needed, that the safety and welfare of the people of the South lay only in successful resistance.

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
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