THE ETHICAL END OF PLATO'S THEORY OF IDEAS

BY

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UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON

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A THESIS APPROVED FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS IN THE UNIVERSITY
OF LONDON

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Περὶ τίνων δὲ δὴ διενεχθέντες καὶ ἐπὶ τίνα κρίσιν οἱ δυνάμενοι ἀφικέσθαι ἐχθροί γε ἂν ἀλλήλοις εἶμεν καὶ ὀργιζοίμεθα; ἴσως οὐ περίεργόν ποι ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ λέγοντος σκόπει εἰ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τό τε δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν. ἆρα οὐ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν περὶ ὧν διενεχθέντες καὶ οἷς δυνάμενοι ἱκανὴν κρίσιν αὐτῶν ἔλθειν ἐχθροὶ ἀλλήλοις γιγνόμεθα, ὅταν γιγνώμεθα, καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ σὺ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι πάντες;

Συμπόσιον 7 C.

Ὧδε οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς ἄδικον, ἀλλ' ὃν οὗτοι τε δικαίως ἀποθνήσκουσι, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῷ ἀμηχανώτερον οὐδέν ἢ ὃν ἂν μηδεὶς ἀποθνήσκῃ δικαίως. περὶ τούτου καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια βεβαιοῖ καὶ οὐδαμοῦ τοι καὶ ἀναισθήτως. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τούτου γνώμης σοφία καὶ ἄγνοια ἀλήθειας, ἡ δὲ ἀγνοοῦσα ἀμαθία καὶ κακὴ ἀναγκάζει αὖ ἕτερα ἄλλοις ἀποκρίνεσθαι καὶ σοφίαν δὲ μὴ πολιτικὴν ἀναπεφήνασιν ψυχρόν, ὦ δὲ τέχνας βάναυσον.

Θεαίτητος 176 B.

PREFACE

THE following essay is published in the form in which it was approved for the Degree of Master of Arts in the University of London: it contains many things that I should not have included *εἰ μὴ θέσιν διαφυλάττων*.

In particular, I should like to say a word in explanation of the 'Additional Note' on page 60. The notion there expressed was never intended as a piece of genuine Platonism; it was put forward as a more or less fanciful apology for Art from the modern point of view. So far as bodily perceptions go, the Idea is of course *ἀχρώματός τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος καὶ ἀναφὴς οὐσία*: yet an artist who had cultivated Dialectic might conceivably be regarded as directing the eye of his soul towards the eternal pattern, and as so imitating, not a copy, but reality itself. But such a 'conceit' is obviously not Plato.

F. A. C.

July, 1909.

CORRIGENDA, ETC.

Page 14, n. 3, read *Eth. Eud.* viii. 13.

" 18, l. 9 from foot, insert 'been' after 'it may have'.

" 30, n. 4, the bracket should close after 'Socratic'.

" 37, n. 4 (ad init.) insert 'Jackson, *l.c.*'

" 39, n. 4, after *καθ' ὑπεροχὴν* add '(which explains the psychological theory of *Resp.* 500 c–501 A)'.

" 53, n. 3, add 'Cf. Aristot. *de An.* A. 5. 411 b 5'.

" 60, l. 17, for 'the' read 'the author's'.

" 60, n. 1, read *κτλ.* Note 1, 2.

" 63, n. 3, l. 2, for ἄλλα read ἀλλά.

" 83, delete note 3.

" 87, add, as footnote to last paragraph: 'That the earlier Theory of Ideas was not mathematical is made plain by Arist. *Met.* M. 4. 1078 b 9 περὶ δὲ τῶν ἰδεῶν οὐθὲν αὐτῶν οὔτε τὸν κατὰ τὸν ὁρισμὸν τρόπον, οἱ μὲν γὰρ οὐθὲν ἔφασαν εἶναι τῶν φυσικῶν φύσει, ἀλλ' οὐ τοιοῦτον τὸν ἄνθρωπον οὐδὲ τὸν ἵππον ἔλεγον οὐδὲν εἶναι.'

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NOTE

Prof. R. Adamson's *Lectures on the Development of Greek Philosophy* (Edinburgh, 1908) were unfortunately not available until the bulk of this paper had been written. It may be noted that the present contention is supported in part by Prof. Adamson's opinion as expressed on p. 77: 'The final question which appears throughout all the minor discussions of the Socratic ethics, What is the Good the knowledge of which constitutes virtue? never is answered by Socrates himself. At times under the pressure of it he seems to approximate to a kind of utilitarianism; at other times a thing is held to be good when it fulfils its function; but no definite answer is anywhere given, and it is obvious in Plato that a sense of this deficiency in the Socratic ethics lay at the foundation of much of the theory of Ideas.'

THE ETHICAL END OF PLATO'S THEORY OF IDEAS

THE famous passage of the *Phaedo* in which the Platonic Socrates recounts his experiences of previous philosophy may be taken as typical of Plato's general attitude towards his predecessors. The dissatisfaction there expressed amounts to this: that the earlier philosophers failed to make any general interpretation of nature from their discoveries. Their theories were not so much inadequate, as unworthy, to explain the problem of the universe. Anaxagoras, with his doctrine of *νοῦς*, had come nearest to an intelligent hypothesis, which should prove that all things are constituted in the best possible manner; but he had broken down in the use of his ultimate and final cause, leaving men no nearer to an infallible and all-embracing explanation.

Now this review in the *Phaedo*[1] was undertaken for the purpose of leading up to a proof of the immortality of the soul. No previous philosophy, Plato shows, could provide sure foundation for such a belief: some final cause is necessary, some 'design' in the universe, before we can be convinced. This, then, is the real reason why Plato finds previous systems unsatisfactory—that they fail to give assurance concerning the most important of human concerns. And not only is the question of Immortality left without an answer: the whole province of knowledge, in any true sense of the word, is unexplored; and, for the successor of Socrates, this means that the practice of virtue, the conduct of life, is impossible, since true virtue must depend on true knowledge.

From this point of view, then, the rise of Plato's distinguishing system may be studied. The Theory of Ideas,

[1] For a full discussion of this passage see Appendix A.

in its earlier stage, should be regarded not merely as a metaphysical or epistemological doctrine from which various ethical teachings may subsequently, and more or less accidentally, be deduced; but rather as a philosophy whose object is above all to provide a consistent theory of ethics, since such theory is possible only with a consistent theory of reality and knowledge. The philosophical systems of Socrates' predecessors had all been inadequate in the direction of ethics: it was Plato's object to develop a rational and sound basis for conduct. And this he did by establishing an absolute transcendental standard of right and wrong.

A very brief review will make manifest this common failing of the Pre-Socratics. Most of them made no reference whatever to ethical problems: they were content to investigate the world around them, and in such physical studies they were successful enough—for subsequent opinion does not agree with Pindar's taunt (*τοὺς φυσιολογοῦντας ἔφη Πίνδαρος ἀτελῆ σοφίας δρέπειν καρπόν*).[1] But, as Prof. Burnet points out, 'the traditional maxims of conduct were not seriously questioned till the old view of nature had passed away. . . . Later still, the prevailing interest in logical matters raised the question of the origin and validity of knowledge; while, about the same time, the breakdown of traditional morality gave rise to Ethics.'[2] Amongst such *γηγενεῖς*[3] may be classed the Milesians and the Eleatics —whose teaching culminated in mere sterility. Xenophanes, it is true, attacked certain religious doctrines, but he must be regarded as a satirist rather than a philosopher, or even a theologian. Anaxagoras, tried in the *Phaedo*, has already been found wanting. Empedocles in his approaches to ethical teaching merely repeats scraps of Pythagoreanism:

[1] Fr. 209 (Bergk). Cf. Adam on *Rep.* 457 B.

[2] *Early Greek Philosophy*, ad init.

[3] *Soph.* 246. These people who *διισχυρίζονται τοῦτο εἶναι μόνον ὃ παρέχει προσβολὴν καὶ ἐπαφήν τινα, ταὐτὸν σῶμα καὶ οὐσίαν ὁριζόμενοι* may represent either materialists generally or in particular (as Kennedy suggests) the Atomists. He says they must be the same as the *σκληροὶ καὶ ἀντίτυποι* (*μάλ' εὖ ἄμουσοι*) of *Theaet.* 155 E.

δειλοὶ πάνδειλοι κυάμων ἄπο χεῖρας ἔχεσθε, and the like. The Atomists indeed formulated, so far as we can judge from the fragments of Democritus, a very serviceable ethical system; but then Democritus was a contemporary, not a predecessor, of Socrates—and by Plato he was persistently and obtrusively neglected. Indeed, the only notice which Plato seems to have taken of him was to wish that all the copies of his works might be collected and burnt.[1] 'The story,' says Dr. Adam,[2] 'whether apocryphal or not, shows that in antiquity Democritus was regarded as the high-priest of materialism.' And Diogenes goes on to say that the reason why Plato never alludes to him, even when he has to contradict his theories, was his fear of coming to blows with the best of all philosophers![3] Thus there is certainly no need to discuss the influence of Democritus' ethics on Plato's; for, in spite of certain superficial resemblances,[4] their ways of thought were fundamentally opposed.

There remain only Heraclitus and the Pythagoreans, both of whom figure largely, though in very different ways, in the early history of ethics.

The ethical teaching of Heraclitus may be summed up in the maxim δεῖ ἕπεσθαι τῷ ξυνῷ. Now, without making so much of the λόγος doctrine as did the late Dr. Adam in his Gifford Lectures,[5] it may fairly be argued from fr. 92 (τοῦ λόγου δὲ ἐόντος ξυνοῦ) that τὸ ξυνόν is the λόγος; and it seems no less clear that 'the *Logos*, regarded on its

[1] Diog. Laert. ix. 7. 8; he quotes from Aristoxenus.

[2] *l. c.*, p. 268.

[3] πάντων γὰρ σχεδὸν τῶν ἀρχαίων μεμνημένος ὁ Πλάτων οὐδαμοῦ Δημοκρίτου διαμνημονεύει, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἔνθ' ἀντειπεῖν τι αὐτῷ δέοι, δῆλον ὅτι εἰδὼς ὡς πρὸς τὸν ἄριστον αὐτῷ τῶν φιλοσόφων ὁ ἀγὼν ἔσοιτο.

[4] e. g. Fr. 28 ἁμαρτίης αἰτίη ἡ ἀμαθίη τοῦ κρέσσονος. Fr. 38 ἀγαθὸν οὐ τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μηδὲ ἐθέλειν. Fr. 10 εὐδαιμονίη οὐκ ἐν βοσκήμασιν οἰκεῖ οὐδ' ἐν χρυσῷ· ψυχὴ οἰκητήριον δαίμονος. And esp. fr. 13 οἱ θεοὶ τοῖσιν ἀνθρώποισι διδοῦσι τἀγαθὰ πάντα καὶ πάλαι καὶ νῦν, πλὴν ὁπόσα βλαβερὰ καὶ ἀνωφελέα. τάδε δ' οὐ πάλαι οὔτε νῦν θεοὶ ἀνθρώποισι δωρέονται ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ τοίσδεσι ἐμπελάζουσι διὰ νόου τυφλότητα καὶ ἀγνωμοσύνην.

[5] In particular his explanation of fr. 2 (τοῦ λύγου τοῦδ' ἐύντος ἀεὶ ἀσύνετοι γίνονται ἄνθρωποι κτλ.) seems very doubtful.

material or corporeal side, is Fire'. Now most of the stray fragments of Heraclitus which refer to conduct are connected with our maxim in one or other of these identifications. If 'the common' be taken as equivalent to the *Logos* or universal wisdom, then the greatest evil and folly will be to live as men usually do, setting up their own judgment—*ὡς ἰδίην ἔχοντες φρόνησιν*. The orderly principle of the *Logos*, moreover, will make against aggression of any kind; hence, says Heraclitus, *ὕβριν χρὴ σβεννύειν μᾶλλον ἢ πυρκαϊήν*, and again *μάχεσθαι χρὴ τὸν δῆμον ὑπὲρ τοῦ νόμου ὅκως ὑπὲρ τείχεος*. If, however, we regard *τὸ ξυνόν* from the material point of view, we reach the most famous of all Heraclitus' utterings, that the 'dry soul' (i.e. that which is nearest to Fire, the *common* element) is wisest and best—*αὔη ξηρὴ ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη*. This saying, too, seems the only one that contains any practical moral advice: it may well have arisen from observation of the symptoms of drunkenness, and it can certainly be taken as a warning against that vice. But for the rest his ethical teaching appears to have been altogether unserviceable: even when intelligible, it is too vague and theoretical; but the greater part requires Socrates' 'Delian diver' to fathom it.[1]

So much then seems clear, that, unpracticable though it may have been, Heraclitus himself had some sort of ethic, and that it was no outcome of his doctrine of flux. But, while his ethical teaching died and bore no fruit, his physical theory (*ὡς πάντα ῥεῖ*) blossomed out—according to the traditional view—into the relativism of Protagoras and its antinomian developments. This view we owe to Plato, who in the *Theaetetus* identifies the Protagorean doctrine *πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος* with the Heraclitean flux. If 'all things change and nothing remains', he argues, then each man is the measure of reality for himself; for Plato agrees with all the ancients in interpreting the dictum of the individual: *ὡς οἷα μὲν ἕκαστα ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τοιαῦτα μὲν ἔστιν ἐμοί, οἷα δὲ σοί, τοιαῦτα δὲ αὖ σοί*.[2] On the side of cognition Plato further identifies both doctrines with

[1] Diog. Laert. ii. 22.

[2] *Theaet.* 152 A. Cf. *Cratyl.* 385 C.

sensationalism, declaring that Theaetetus' definition of *ἐπιστήμη* as *αἴσθησις* is the same as the 'homo-mensura'. And he then proceeds to point out that this theory must hold of things moral as much as of anything else; and while he acknowledges that Protagoras does not develop the subversive theory of morality which should, in his view, follow from such relativism, he makes plain the inconsistency of the position. It is important to notice how fairly Plato treats his opponent; as Grote rightly says, there is no warrant whatever in Plato's discussion 'for those imputations which modern authors build upon his dictum, against the morality of Protagoras'.[1] He does not even charge the partial Protagoreans (*ὅσοι γε ἂν μὴ παντάπασι τοῦ Πρωταγόρου λόγον λέγωσιν*)[2] with immoral doctrines: for although they deny the real existence of such things as Justice and Piety (*ἐν τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ ἀδίκοις καὶ ὁσίοις καὶ ἀνοσίοις, ἐθέλουσιν ἰσχυρίζεσθαι ὡς οὐκ ἔστι φύσει αὐτῶν οὐδὲν οὐσίαν ἑαυτοῦ ἔχον, ἀλλὰ τὸ κοινῇ δόξαν τοῦτο γίγνεται ἀληθὲς τότε, ὅταν δόξῃ καὶ ὅσον ἂν δοκῇ χρόνον*), yet, he fully admits, they do draw the line when it comes to the Beneficial and the Good (*περὶ δὲ τἀγαθὰ οὐδένα ἀνδρεῖον ἔθ' οὕτως εἶναι ὥστε τολμᾶν διαμάχεσθαι ὅτι καὶ ἃ ἂν ὠφέλιμα οἰηθεῖσα πόλις ἑαυτῇ θῆται, καὶ ἔστι τοσοῦτον χρόνον ὅσον ἂν κέηται ὠφέλιμα, πλὴν εἴ τις τὸ ὄνομα λέγοι*[3]—and of course the same holds in the case of individuals). Such a reservation is inconsistent; and Plato accordingly censures the inconsistency, but not the morality, of Protagoras and his adherents.

At the same time it is certain that there were those who found in the Protagorean doctrine a very convenient justification for their lawless practice. Gomperz[4] rightly says that while we know little about the context of the homo-mensura tenet, one thing at least is certain, that 'it cannot possess an ethical meaning; it cannot be the shibboleth of any moral subjectivism, to which the sentence has not

[1] As an example of such imputations take Prof. Archer Butler's: 'the great object of the doctrine of Protagoras,' he says, 'was to unsettle the principles of moral obligation, by denying the permanence of moral distinctions.' *Lectures on Ancient Philosophy*, p. 354.

[2] *Theaet.* 172 B. [3] *Theaet.* 177 D. [4] *Greek Thinkers*, vol. i, p. 451.

unfrequently been turned in the hands of popular expositors. It is a contribution to the theory of cognition', and, in itself, nothing more. Any immoral significance would have to be read into the dictum by those who were desirous of finding it there; and that such violence was committed we know from the famous line of Euripides[1]

τί δ' αἰσχρόν, ἢν μὴ τοῖσι χρωμένοις δοκῇ;

—to which Plato is said to have retorted

αἰσχρὸν τό γ' αἰσχρόν, κἂν δοκῇ κἂν μὴ δοκῇ.

'Nothing,' says Dr. Adam, 'could illustrate more clearly the opposition between the Platonic and the Protagorean standpoints.'[2] It would be truer to say, between the Platonic standpoint and that which Plato considered the legitimate inference from the Protagorean—and still more the meaning which certain people for their own purposes chose to put upon it.

Such then, according to Plato, is the necessary outcome of the flux theory of Heraclitus when applied to ethics; and Plato appears to have believed quite sincerely in the truth of this historical development. But the way in which he establishes the connexion is notoriously faulty:[3] he is driven to invent certain esoteric interpretations of the Protagorean doctrine, which we can hardly suppose to have existed outside Plato's imagination. And this indeed is the only evidence we have for making Protagoras a philosophical descendant of Heraclitus. The one Heraclitean school of which we have any knowledge—*οἱ ῥέοντες*, as Plato scornfully calls them[4]—was composed of people like Cratylus, who were so far from exercising the multifarious activity of Protagoras that they finally abstained even from speech.[5] If a man who only moved his finger (*τὸν δάκτυλον*

[1] Fr. 19 (Nauck). The line is parodied by Aristophanes (*Frogs* 1475). The story is given by Stobaeus (*Flor.* 5. 82).

[2] *l. c.*, p. 275. [3] This question is treated more fully in Appendix B.

[4] *Theaet.* 179 D. Cf. the reference in *Cratyl.* 440 C.

[5] Arist. *Met.* Γ. 5. 1010 a 10 *ἐκ γὰρ ταύτης τῆς ὑπολήψεως ἐξήνθησεν ἡ ἀκροτάτη δόξα τῶν εἰρημένων, ἡ τῶν φασκόντων ἡρακλειτίζειν, καὶ οἵαν Κρατύλος εἶχεν, ὃς τὸ τελευταῖον οὐδὲν ᾤετο δεῖν λέγειν, κτλ.*

ἐκίνει μόνον) was capable of any sort of ethical theory at all it would surely be fatalistic, and very far removed either from the relativism of Protagoras or the lawless results that were supposed to follow from it. So that Plato's identification of Protagorean and Heraclitean doctrine is altogether extremely doubtful.

Moreover, as already noted, the 'homo-mensura' tenet seems to have had nothing whatever to do with conduct. Such ethical fragments of Protagoras as we possess suggest no harm of the 'blameless nightingale of the Muses'.[1] The famous utterance about the gods shows merely an open-minded agnosticism;[2] his praise of the patience and calm resignation of Pericles points to a lofty outlook upon life;[3] while the two claims which Plato puts into his mouth represent him as teaching a virtue which at the worst need only be classed with the partial δημοτική τε καὶ πολιτικὴ ἀρετή that was not based upon true knowledge. There is surely nothing immoral in undertaking to 'make men good citizens', in teaching a young man this lesson: εὐβουλία περὶ τῶν οἰκείων, ὅπως ἂν ἄριστα τὴν αὑτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῖ, καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνατώτατος ἂν εἴη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν.[4] And the same may be said of his view as expressed in *Theaetetus* 167: it is only from Plato's point of view that there is any harm in maintaining that the function of the σοφός (or σοφιστής) consists in turning men, not from Falsehood to Truth, but from the worse to the better[5]—ἔπει οὔ τί γε ψευδῆ δοξάζοντά τίς τινα ὕστερον

[1] Gomperz sees an allusion to the fate of Protagoras in the fragment of Euripides' *Palamedes* (Nauck, 588) ἐκάνετ' ἐκάνετε τὰν | πάνσοφον, ὦ Δαναοί, | τὰν οὐδέν' ἀλγύνουσαν ἀηδόνα μουσᾶν.

[2] περὶ μὲν θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω οὔθ' ὡς εἰσὶν οὔθ' ὡς οὐκ εἰσίν κτλ.

[3] Fr. 9 (Diels) ap. Plut. τῶν γὰρ υἱέων νεηνιῶν ὄντων καὶ καλῶν, ἐν ὀκτὼ δὲ ταῖς πάσησιν ἡμέρησι ἀποθανόντων νηπενθέως ἀνέτλη· εὐδίης γὰρ εἴχετο, ἐξ ἧς πολλὸν ὤνητο κατὰ πᾶσαν ἡμέρην εἰς εὐποτμίην καὶ ἀνωδυνίην καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖσι δόξαν· πᾶς γάρ τίς μιν ὁρῶν τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πένθεα ἐρρωμένως φέροντα, μεγαλόφρονά τε καὶ ἀνδρεῖον ἐδόκει εἶναι καὶ ἑαυτοῦ κρείσσω, κάρτα εἰδὼς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἐν τοιοῖσδε πράγμασιν ἀμηχανίην. Plato himself gives similar restraint as a mark of the ἐπιεικὴς ἀνήρ. *Rep.* 387 E, 603 E.

[4] Plat. *Protag.* 318 E. Cf. *Rep.* 600 C.

[5] See Appendix B. It is assumed that the Protagoras Speech in the

ἀληθῆ ἐποίησε δοξάζειν· οὔτε γὰρ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δυνατὸν δοξάσαι, οὔτε ἄλλα παρ' ἃ ἂν πάσχῃ, ταῦτα δὲ ἀεὶ ἀληθῆ. ἀλλ' οἶμαι πονηρᾶς ψυχῆς ἔξει δοξάζοντα συγγενῆ ἑαυτῆς χρηστὴ ἐποίησε δοξάσαι ἕτερα τοιαῦτα, ἃ δή τινες τὰ φαντάσματα ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας ἀληθῆ καλοῦσιν, ἐγὼ δὲ βελτίω μὲν τὰ ἕτερα τῶν ἑτέρων, ἀληθέστερα δὲ οὐδέν.

Indeed, the only charge which can with any authority[1] be brought against the morality of Protagoras, that of having been the first to 'make the worse appear the better reason', has really nothing to do with the case. 'The imputation here cast on Protagoras' profession,' says Mr. Cope,[2] 'is rather that of logical than of moral obliquity and error, though no doubt the latter may also be implied.' The reference is doubtless simply to his theory of logical contradiction,[3] any ethical application being discountenanced by the words which follow in *Theaet.* 167 C (*τοὺς δέ γε σοφούς τε καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ῥήτορας ταῖς πόλεσι τὰ χρηστὰ ἀντὶ τῶν πονηρῶν δίκαια δοκεῖν εἶναι ποιεῖν*).

It is thus clear that there is no justification for attributing to Protagoras anything immoral either in doctrine or practice; and it is equally clear that Plato makes no such charges, but treats him throughout with respect and even with veneration.[4]

How then comes it about that Plato opposes Protagoras so persistently? Why is it that he regards the Protagorean doctrine, when consistently applied to conduct, as intrinsically false and subversive? The answer to such questions is of the first importance, for it gives the key to Plato's

Theaetetus represents the teaching of Protagoras as Plato understood it. This point seems to be proved conclusively in Dr. Schiller's *Plato or Protagoras?*

[1] Arist. *Rhet.* B. 24. 1402 a 23 *καὶ τὸ τὸν ἥττω δὲ λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν τοῦτ' ἐστίν. καὶ ἐντεῦθεν δικαίως ἐδυσχέραινον οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὸ Πρωταγόρου ἐπάγγελμα· ψεῦδός τε γάρ ἐστιν καὶ οὐκ ἀληθὲς ἀλλὰ φαινόμενον εἰκός, καὶ ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ τέχνῃ ἀλλ' ἐν ῥητορικῇ καὶ ἐριστικῇ.*

[2] Note, *ad loc. cit.* (Cope and Sandys's edition).

[3] *πρῶτος ἔφη δύο λόγους εἶναι περὶ παντὸς πράγματος ἀντικειμένους ἀλλήλοις.* Diog. ix. 51 (R. P. 229).

[4] As is suggested by the whole tone of the *Protagoras.* In 328 B Plato quotes the way which Protagoras arranged for the payment of his fees. 'Such is not the way,' Grote well remarks, 'in which the corrupters of mankind go to work.'

whole attitude towards ethics. He censures Protagoras' teaching, not because it is 'immoral', but because it is unphilosophical, because it divorces virtue from knowledge and wisdom and truth, because it regards only practical consequences, and denies the existence of a standard of right and wrong. The point at issue, indeed, is not one of practical morality at all: it is the difference between two fundamentally opposed views of philosophy—between 'intellectualism' or 'rationalism' (to use modern, and somewhat loose, names) on the one hand, and 'relativism' or 'humanism' on the other. Dr. Schiller[1] maintains that Protagoras was the first great pragmatist: so be it—he stands already condemned from the Platonic standpoint. All 'Humanism', ancient or modern, must fall before the Platonic elenchus, for the fundamental error is the same in all. To the claim which Protagoras made[2] of turning men from a worse to a better (*not* a truer) frame of mind, Plato would reply '*How* better?', 'Better in reference to *what*?' The answer of Protagorean and other Humanism is that everybody knows very well what is meant: that common sense requires no test but practical consequences, that truth is nothing transcendental or abstruse, but simply 'what works'.[3] And it proceeds to illustrate the position by examples which either beg the question or else are entirely irrelevant,[4] since they do not refer to problems of conduct. But, as Plato points out in the words prefixed to this essay,[5] it is only in questions of conduct that there is any difficulty in finding a standard of reference: *τάδ' ἐστὶ τό τε δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν . . . περὶ ὧν διενεχθέντες καὶ οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐπὶ ἱκανὴν κρίσιν αὐτῶν ἐλθεῖν ἐχθροὶ ἀλλήλοις γιγνόμεθα.* Other disputes can be settled with ruler and scales; but we can never hope for

[1] *Plato or Protagoras?* e. g. p. 18 'the difference between Protagorean and modern Humanism concerns only a subordinate point of terminology'.

[2] *Theaet.* 167 C.

[3] Cf. James's *Pragmatism*, p. 76, &c.

[4] e. g. *loc. cit.*, p. 22: 'If I am short-sighted and you are not, your visual perceptions will be "better" than mine. But this will not make them "true" to me'.

[5] From *Euthyph.* 7 C.

any certainty about questions of conduct until we have established an undeviating and universal standard by which to test them. This standard resembles in its fixity the Ideal Beauty as described in the *Symposium*:[1] *πρῶτον μὲν ἀεὶ ὂν καὶ οὔτε γιγνόμενον οὔτε ἀπολλύμενον, οὔτε αὐξανόμενον οὔτε φθῖνον, ἔπειτα οὐ τῇ μὲν καλόν, τῇ δ' αἰσχρόν, οὐδὲ τοτὲ μέν, τοτὲ δὲ οὔ, οὐδὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ καλόν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ αἰσχρόν, οὐδ' ἔνθα μὲν καλόν, ἔνθα δὲ αἰσχρόν, ὡς τισὶ μὲν ὂν καλόν, τισὶ δὲ αἰσχρόν . . . ἀλλ' αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ μεθ' αὑτοῦ μονοειδὲς ἀεὶ ὄν.*

Now the whole purpose of Plato's early philosophy—such is the contention of this essay—was to provide the required ethical standard. Protagoras had denied the possibility of any but relative truth, and, consequently, the possibility of Knowledge; but Virtue, he asserted, was attainable, since it had nothing whatever to do with truth or knowledge. Plato, on the other hand, following his master Socrates, taught that Virtue *is* Knowledge; but whereas the only knowledge that Socrates recognized was *φρόνησις*,[2] practical knowledge, the knowledge of consequences, Plato insisted on the necessity of a truly scientific knowledge, whose object lay altogether beyond the flux of phenomena. Such an object he found of course in the Ideas, those eternal, immutable, absolute entities, of which alone real *ἐπιστήμη* was possible. It was to the Ideas, and in particular to the Idea of Good, that he looked for the ethical standard which all previous philosophy had failed to supply. In his old age, when his mind seemed to grow religious rather than metaphysical, Plato found that the ultimate reference must be to God: *ὁ δὴ θεὸς ἡμῖν πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἂν εἴη μάλιστα, καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἤ πού τις, ὥς φασιν, ἄνθρωπος*,[3] he says; whilst the best man will be he who resembles God most nearly. Nothing could show more conclusively how

[1] 211 A.

[2] Though he used the name *ἐπιστήμη*. Aristotle (who of course distinguished intellectual from moral virtues) censures him for this: *καὶ ὀρθῶς τὸ Σωκρατικόν, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἰσχυρότερον φρονήσεως· ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐπιστήμην ἔφη, οὐκ ὀρθόν* (*Eth. Eud.* 13. 1246 b 33).

[3] *Laws* 716 C. It is merely a theological way of expressing the *ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*.

great Plato must have thought the importance of demolishing the Protagorean position. Such a pointed reference in his latest work justifies one in assuming that Plato's youth was largely employed in rendering possible an advance upon the 'relativist' ethics.

Thus true virtue was now for the first time possible, because the foundation of Knowledge on which it must rest was now first laid. Knowledge must be cultivated—so it seemed to Plato in his youth—not for its own sake but for that of the virtue which it rendered possible. 'The ethical need,' says Windelband,[1] 'drove Plato beyond Sophistry, and led him to fight Protagoras the more energetically with Protagoras' own relativism. If there be virtue of any sort, it must rest upon other than relative knowledge, which alone the Sophists considered.'

But before passing on to Plato himself it will be necessary to discuss the two sources which suggested to him the connexion of virtue with knowledge. One of these influences, that of Socrates, is undoubted. The other, that of the Pythagoreans (who have been mentioned already as, with Heraclitus, the only predecessors of Socrates who dealt with ethics), is more conjectural—though in reality it may have equally, if not more, important in the development of Plato's thought. The evidence which we possess regarding the Pythagoreans is so scanty, and of such doubtful authenticity,[2] that we can never hope to understand their teaching fully, nor to estimate aright their place in the history of Greek philosophy. But this much at least is certain: that their influence on Plato was very great;[3] that their interest was largely directed towards conduct and religion; and that

[1] *History of Ancient Philosophy*, p. 190 (Eng. trans.). It should be added that this way of treating 'Sophistry' as though it were a definite school of thought is old-fashioned, and, 'to say the least, misleading' (Dr. Jackson, in *Encyc. Brit.*). Gomperz calls it 'illegitimate, if not absurd, to speak of a sophistic mind, sophistic morality, sophistic scepticism, and so forth' (vol. i, p. 415).

[2] Thus Prof. Burnet in the second edition of his *Early Greek Philosophy* entirely rejects the Fragments of Philolaus.

[3] As is proved, e.g. by Arist. *Met.* A. *passim*. The influence of Pythagoreanism on the Ideal Theory will be discussed in Appendix C.

in matters of religion they were closely connected with Orphism. Here again we are brought before an obscure subject; but for present purposes it is enough to say that Orphism, originating in a wild Oriental worship of Dionysus, spread widely over Greece as a brotherhood practising a quieter esoteric form of religion. Its chief feature was the performance of certain mysteries or Orgia, whose function it was to purify the soul. For, the Orphics held, the mere fact of the soul's imprisonment in a body was evidence of former sin: the idea is familiar in the form *σῶμα σῆμα*,[1] which with others like it plays so large a part in Platonism. Moreover (to quote Dr. Adam[2]) 'as soon as the doors of the prison-house close round her, the soul has entered upon what the Orphics variously called the "circle" or "wheel of generation" and the "circle of Necessity", a long and weary circuit of birth and death which must be traversed before we can return to the place from whence we came'. Now release (*λύσις*) from this 'circle' and all its 'appalling vicissitudes' can be gained only by a process of *κάθαρσις*, which consisted according to the Orphics chiefly in abstinence from animal food and the performance of the ritual prescribed in the Orgia.

Such was the belief which Pythagoras, driven from his home by the tyranny of Polycrates,[3] must have found at Croton. It is very possible that the *θίασος* he there led had previously been an Orphic brotherhood; it is quite certain that he incorporated into his teaching many elements of Orphism. In particular, he adopted the Orphic view of the need of purification for the soul; and he introduced *Knowledge* as an element in this *κάθαρσις*.[4]

The importance of this step can hardly be exaggerated, for it foreshadows the most characteristic feature in Socratic and Platonic thought—that Knowledge is to be cultivated for the sake of the soul: in another, though cognate form, that Virtue is Knowledge. With the Pythagoreans them-

[1] e. g. *Gorg.* 493 A, *Crat.* 400 B.
[2] Adam, *l. c.*, p. 104. Cf. R. D. Hicks, Introd. to *de Anima*, pp. xx, xxix.
[3] Diog. Laert. viii. 3. [4] Cf. Adam, *l. c.*, p. 193.

selves 'Knowledge' was confined as a rule to mathematics and harmonics, studies which afterwards played so important a part in the propaedeusis of the *Republic*; but while Plato no doubt prescribed[1] mathematical studies very largely on account of their power to produce *ἀπορία*, that feeling of wonder[2] which is the beginning of wisdom, the Pythagoreans found a moral and mystic significance in the numbers themselves. Hence it comes about that Pythagoras is mentioned in the *Magna Moralia*[3] as the first to deal with virtue; but he made the mistake, we are told, of identifying the virtues with numbers, so rendering his theory useless. We cannot rest satisfied with a philosophy that explains justice as a numerical product of multiplication: *οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀριθμὸς ἰσάκις ἴσος*, as the author gravely remarks. Thus the real importance of the Pythagoreans in the development of moral philosophy must be sought rather in the connexion which they established between knowledge and conduct; for they seem to have looked upon mathematical studies as a means of purifying the soul. Mystical as these doctrines of *λύσις* and *κάθαρσις* may appear, they were infinitely more suggestive than a fanciful application of mathematics: they bear fruit not only in the myths of the *Phaedrus*, *Gorgias*, and *Republic*, but also in the philosophical *μελέτη θανάτου* of the *Phaedo*.

Thus the influence of Pythagoreanism must be held partly accountable for Plato's addiction to ethical speculations, and in particular for his assuming so intimate a relation between knowledge and virtue.

But there was, of course, a nearer and more direct influence to lead him in this direction. 'Socrates autem primus philosophiam devocavit e caelo et in urbibus conlocavit et in domus etiam introduxit et coegit de vita et moribus rebusque bonis et malis quaerere,' so run the

[1] *Rep.* 524 D. (But in *Laws* 741 A Plato seems to suggest an ethical value in the study of Mathematics.)

[2] *Theaet.* 155 D *μάλα γὰρ φιλοσόφου τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, τὸ θαυμάζειν· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλη ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας ἡ αὕτη.* Aristotle held the same view: e. g. *Met.* A. 982 b 12.

[3] 1182 a 11.

famous words of Cicero.[1] Socrates was the first philosopher who really dealt with ethics; leaving aside the physical speculations of his predecessors *περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀεὶ διελέγετο.*[2] His peculiar character, which united, as Grote[3] points out, a 'strong religious persuasion' with 'great intellectual originality', led him to his fundamental principles, that *οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνει*, and the definition of virtue as knowledge. Aristotle in his survey of the development of philosophy attributes to Socrates the introduction of general definitions and of induction;[4] he might well have added the definite treatment of morality. This, indeed, is the most wonderful sign of his originality; there is, it is true, a doubtful tradition that his 'master' Archelaus treated of ethics, and originated investigations for which Socrates got the credit.[5] But the one sample of his teaching that has come down to us suggests a very different attitude from that of Socrates: *ἔλεγε . . . τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν οὐ φύσει, ἀλλὰ νόμῳ.* For not only was the antithesis of *κατὰ φύσιν* and *κατὰ νόμον* absent in its formal character from the conversations of Socrates;[6] its moral significance was still more alien to the whole spirit of his teaching. 'It lay in the Socratic tradition to harmonize nature and law instead of setting them in opposition to one another; for Xenophon makes his master defend civil law against Hippias as a standard of justice on the ground that its dictates agree with the inspirations of nature.'[7] So that one cannot attach any importance to the statement of Diogenes. In fact there is probably no truth in the story at all, since it is expressly stated by Plato that Socrates had no teachers.[8]

[1] *Tusc.* v. 10. Cf. *Acad.* i. 15.

[2] Xen. *Mem.* i. 1. 16.

[3] *History of Greece*, chap. 68.

[4] *Met.* M. 4. 1078 b 27 *δύο γάρ ἐστιν ἃ τις ἂν ἀποδοίη Σωκράτει δικαίως, τούς τ ἐπακτικοὺς λόγους καὶ τὸ ὁρίζεσθαι καθόλου· ταῦτα γάρ ἐστιν ἄμφω περὶ ἀρχὴν ἐπιστήμης.*

[5] D. L. ii. 4 *ἔοικε δὲ καὶ οὗτος ἅψασθαι τῆς ἠθικῆς. καὶ γὰρ περὶ νόμων πεφιλοσόφηκε καὶ καλῶν καὶ δικαίων· παρ' οὗ λαβὼν Σωκράτης τῷ αὐξῆσαι αὐτὸς εὑρεῖν ὑπελήφθη.*

[6] As is deduced by Benn from the fact that the antithesis does not occur in any of the Socratic dialogues of Plato.

[7] Benn, p. 33.

[8] *Laches* 186 C *ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν . . . πρῶτος περὶ ἐμαυτοῦ λέγω ὅτι διδάσκαλός μοι οὐ γέγονε τούτου πέρι.* Cf. R. P. 239 b.

We owe it probably to the Greek love of finding some originator for everything—the same tendency that traced all laws back to Solon or Lycurgus, and all music to Orpheus and Musaeus.[1] Thus we may rest satisfied with the traditional view, as expressed by Cicero,[2] that Socrates was the first to deal distinctly 'de virtutibus et vitiis omninoque de bonis rebus et malis'.

It is, moreover, true that certain of the Sophists, notably Prodicus, had treated of problems connected with everyday conduct; but as they never sought to go beyond particular cases, or to base their rules for action upon generalizations, their treatment of morality cannot be considered philosophical. What has been said of Protagoras applies to a sophist like Prodicus:[3] his teaching was not, in itself, immoral; but, like the house that was built on sand, its foundations were unsound, and must give way under the stress of dialectic scrutiny.

This is not, however, the place to attempt any general account of Socrates' teaching: it will be sufficient to examine the following questions, which here demand attention: How was his teaching an advance upon that of Protagoras? How was it defective from the Platonic standpoint? And how did it lead up to Plato's own philosophy? These questions are so closely bound up with one another that it is impossible to treat them quite separately; but we can at least start with the first.

The main advance which Socrates made in dealing with matters of conduct has already been indicated. His search for λόγοι of universal import lifted him above that scepticism which marked both Protagoras' and perhaps his own early teaching.[4] 'Moral error, Socrates conceived, is largely due

[1] So Zeller (*Presoc.* ii. p. 393): 'These statements seem to have arisen from the impossibility of conceiving the supposed teacher of Socrates to be without an ethical philosophy. . . . That Archelaus accomplished anything important in the sphere of ethics is improbable, from the silence of Aristotle, who never once mentions him.' Cf. Zeller's *Socrates*, p. 53.

[2] *Acad.* i. 15.

[3] But not to Hippias, Polus, Thrasymachus, &c. (at least as represented by Plato).

[4] Dr. Jackson's art. 'Socrates' in *Encyc. Brit.* (p. 236): 'Socrates' theory of

to the misapplication of general terms, which, once affixed to a person or to an act, possibly in a moment of passion or prejudice, too often stand in the way of careful or sober reflection. It was in order to exclude error of this sort that Socrates insisted upon *τὸ ὁρίζεσθαι καθόλου* with *ἐπακτικοὶ λόγοι* for its basis. By requiring a definition and the reference to it of the act or person in question, he sought to secure in the individual at any rate consistency of thought, and, in so far, consistency of action.'[1] Consistency, then, is the distinguishing feature of Socrates' teaching; and it was the first time in Greek thought that consistency had ever been made possible—or even consciously desired.

Yet, great as the importance of this advance may have been, Socrates still fell short of Plato's standard. For though he had risen—to adopt the Platonic terminology—above the level of Ignorance, he had not yet attained to that of Knowledge; indeed, he may even have held that Knowledge is unattainable. His doctrine, as much as that of the ordinary popular moralists, must in consistency have been classed by Plato in that intermediate state which lay between Ignorance and Knowledge. *ηὑρήκαμεν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅτι τὰ τῶν πολλῶν πολλὰ νόμιμα καλοῦ τε πέρι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μεταξύ που κυλινδεῖται τοῦ τε μὴ ὄντος καὶ τοῦ ὄντος εἰλικρινῶς.*[2] It is true that the universality of Socrates' conceptions distinguished them from the maxims of the unreflective multitude; but it cannot be denied that they fell outside the province of Knowledge, since only *τὸ παντελῶς ὄν ἐστι παντελῶς γνωστόν.*[3] Lying as they did *μεταξὺ ἀγνοίας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης* they must belong to *δόξα*; and as a matter of fact their characteristics are exactly described in the account of *δόξα*

education had for its basis a profound and consistent scepticism,' &c. This view, however, seems to imply that *τὰ ἔμπαλιν πάθη* recounted in the *Phaedo* are those of the historical Socrates. But v. Appendix A.

[1] Jackson, *l. c.*, p. 237.

[2] *Rep.* 479 D, and Adam, *ad loc.*

[3] *Rep.* 477 A. It might even be contended that the Protagorean position would fall in the class of *ἀγνωσία*. For Protagoras, as has been shown, denied the possibility of truth and knowledge; but since knowledge is of *τὸ ὄν*, such doctrine as he had must refer to *τὸ μὴ ὄν*.—*μὴ ὂν δὲ μηδαμῇ πάντῃ ἄγνωστον.*

which follows. For Plato says of *δόξα* that it is fallible (*μὴ ἀναμάρτητον*),[1] and that it apprehends the many and not the absolute One.[2] Now the Socratic *λόγοι*, not being based on the knowledge of reality, were liable to error; and, paradoxical as it may sound, they did not, for all their being *καθόλου*, apprehend the true universal. What they sought was *a ἓν ἐπὶ πολλῶν*, not *the ἕν* which is *αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό*.[3] In other words, the Socratic universal was not the Idea; and for Plato true Knowledge could have the Idea alone for its object, since the Idea alone is *παντελῶς ὄν*. Again, the Socratic *λόγος* had only a conceptual, and not a substantial existence: there could be for Plato no knowledge of what existed only in the mind. We find in the *Parmenides* this very criticism. The young Socrates (who may fairly be taken to represent the young Plato[4]), in explaining the nature of his 'ideas', first calls them *νοήματα*, which exist *οὐδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι ἢ ἐν ψυχαῖς* (132 B). 'Is not this,' asks Waddell, 'a natural course for one to pursue who had just come from the school of "general definitions" which Aristotle directly ascribes to Socrates—what could such definitions be but *νοήματα*? We have before us, in fact, *τούς τ' ἐπακτικοὺς λόγους καὶ τὸ ὁρίζεσθαι καθόλου* as Aristotle describes them.' Parmenides is made to criticize this doctrine severely;[5] and Socrates accordingly

[1] 477 E. [2] 479 E.

[3] The transition is seen in the early dialogues of Plato: e.g. *Euthyphro* 5 C, 6 D.

[4] Cf. Waddell's *Parmenides*, p. xxix: 'as Socrates never held the views here ascribed to him, we are entitled in the youthful Socrates to perceive the youthful Plato, and to regard the opening statement of the dialogue as an intentional notification by Plato of the character of his own early theorizing upon metaphysical questions.' [The present writer is aware of the uncertainty of any theory as to the date and subject of the *Parmenides*; but as the question was too large to discuss here, and it was necessary to adopt one view, he has throughout followed the guidance of Prof. Jackson (v. *Journal of Philology*, vol. xi).]

[5] On the ground that if the Idea is a *νόημα*, this *νόημα* must be of something that is the same in all. But since *τἄλλα τῶν εἰδῶν μετέχει* (and *εἴδη* = *νοήματα*) then either (1) *ἐκ νοημάτων ἕκαστόν ἐστι καὶ πάντα νοεῖ* or (2) *νοήματα ὄντα ἀνόητά ἐστι*—both of which are impossible. It seems highly probable that we have here a record of the actual reasoning which led Plato to hypostasize the Socratic *λόγοι*—or rather, to revise his own early theory that reality consisted of mental concepts. He may have defined the steps of his argument more

[illegible]

[illegible] Knowledge. It is [illegible] Knowledge [illegible] The difference [illegible] Knowledge of [illegible] and Knowledge [illegible] Knowledge may be [illegible] This Plato's answer would be 'Knowledge of the Ideas—in particular, of the Idea of Good': and that is the reading which is usually put on the word ἐπιστήμη.[2] Socrates however could supply no definite or consistent answer. Theoretically, no doubt, he said that Virtue is Knowledge of the Good: but in practice 'this addition still leaves his criterion as wide and indefinite as it was *before*. . . . For what is the good? . . . Doing already when he came to write the dialogue; but the general process of thought must have been the same as what is here put into the mouth of Parmenides.

[1] Arist. *Met.* M 4. 1078 b 30.

[2] e.g. *Rep.* 476 C, 478 B, 505 B, *Gorg.* 454 B *sqq.*, &c. In *Phaedr.* 247 C it is the ἀχρώματός τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος καὶ ἀναφὴς οὐσία, ἄντως οὖσα . . . περὶ ἣν τὸ τῆς ἀληθοῦς ἐπιστήμης γένος. Cf. *Phileb.* 61 E ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης διάφορος, ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμενα, ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ μήτε γιγνόμενα μήτε ἀπολλύμενα, κατὰ ταὐτὰ δὲ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἀεὶ ὄντα δοκεῖ, κτλ. The objection in *Parm.* 133 B that the Ideas are ἀγνωστα is answered by the theory of ἀνάμνησις.

what is good is acting up to the conception of the corresponding action, in short, knowledge in its practical application.'[1] Thus in the actual conversations of Socrates, the Good takes on the colour of the particular subject of inquiry. He denied emphatically the existence of any one universal Good which had no particular reference: *ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, εἴ γ' ἐρωτᾷς με εἴ τι ἀγαθὸν οἶδα ὃ μηδενὸς ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, οὔτ' οἶδα, ἔφη, οὔτε δέομαι* (Xen. *Mem.* iii. 8. 3). Hence *τὸ ἀγαθόν* is found to be the customary, the expedient, the useful, or even the pleasant.[2] 'Utility, the immediate utility of the individual, thus becomes the measure of conduct and the foundation of all moral rule and all legal enactment.'[3] So that Virtue, instead of being Knowledge in the Platonic sense of the word, is merely a knowledge of consequences: it is, to quote John Stuart Mill, 'an affair of calculation, and the sole elements of the calculation are pains and pleasures. . . . The standard of the *Protagoras* agrees with that of the historical Socrates, who throughout the *Memorabilia* inculcates the ordinary duties of life on hedonistic grounds, and recommends them by the ordinary hedonistic inducements—the good opinion and praise of fellow citizens, reciprocity of good treatment, and the favour of benevolent deities' (*Dissertations*, iii. p. 342). And when he sought for a more philosophical explanation of the Good, he

[1] Zeller's *Socrates*, p. 123.

[2] e. g. *Mem.* iv. 4. 12 *φημὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ τὸ νόμιμον δίκαιον εἶναι.* Our duty as citizens compels us to obey the laws of the state; our duty to the gods those *ἄγραφοι νόμοι* which they have made. Cf. iv. 6. 6. In iv. 6. 8 *τὸ ἀγαθόν* is actually identified with *τὸ ὠφέλιμον.* Virtue may be advised because its consequences are more pleasant to oneself, and also because vice leads to punishment from fellow men; but there is as well the fear of God to act as a deterrent: *ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα λέγων οὐ μόνον τοὺς συνόντας ἐδόκει ποιεῖν ὁπότε ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὁρῷντο, ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἀνοσίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ αἰσχρῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁπότε ἐν ἐρημίᾳ εἶεν* [there is a curious parallel in Genesis xvi. 7–13], *ἐπείπερ ἡγήσαιντο μηδὲν ἂν ποτε ὧν πράττοιεν θεοὺς διαλαθεῖν.* (*Mem.* i. 4. 19). And yet this lofty teaching is after all only the fear of consequences. The Good is never in so many words identified with *ἡδονή*, 'but he frequently inculcates the practice of the virtues on account of the pleasures which they bring' (v. *Mem.* ii. 1. 19; iv. 5. 9). 'Moreover if Socrates actually did sometimes call Pleasure Good, it is easier to understand how the Cyrenaics could have fathered their Hedonism upon him' (Adam, Introd. to *Protag.*). Cf. Zeller, p. 126.

[3] Jackson, *l. c.*

actually fell into the vicious circle[1] of identifying it with virtue or wisdom. Dr. Jackson[2] is doubtless right in finding in the *κομψότεροι* of *Rep.* 505 (who supposed the *ἀγαθόν* to be *φρόνησις*) a direct reference to Socrates, although, as Adam[3] observes, 'Plato's criticism applies to himself, in common with the other pupils of Socrates, and was doubtless intended to do so.' Plato, however, by referring knowledge to the hypostatic *ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*, avoided the otherwise inevitable regress. (It may also be suggested that Socrates too was guilty of the *πλάνη* of identifying the good with *ἡδονή*—although, as has been observed, he never does so explicitly.)

Thus, in spite of his advance upon the empirical morality of his predecessors, Socrates had no sound metaphysical basis for his ethics.[4] It would, however, be most unwise to underrate his importance, since, as has been seen, his general definitions not only made for consistency, but also pointed the way for Plato. For just as Socrates said that Virtue is Knowledge, and that Knowledge is (*inter alia*) of *λόγοι*, so Plato repeated the first proposition—though by providing an adequate object for Knowledge he raised the theory from what was after all little better than prudential empiricism into the first scientific system of Ethics that had appeared in Greek thought. To use his own images, it was a change

[1] *οἱ τοῦτο ἡγούμενοι οὐκ ἔχουσι δεῖξαι, ἥτις φρόνησις, ἀλλ' ἀναγκάζονται τελευτῶντες τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φάναι. καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, γελοίως. πῶς γὰρ οὐχί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ ὀνειδίζοντές γε, ὅτι οὐκ ἴσμεν τὸ ἀγαθόν, λέγουσι πάλιν ὡς εἰδόσιν; φρόνησιν γὰρ αὐτό φασιν εἶναι ἀγαθοῦ, ὡς αὖ ξυνιέντων ἡμῶν ὅ τι λέγουσιν, ἐπειδὰν τὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φθέγξωνται ὄνομα* ('when they utter the mysterious word'. Adam).

[2] Jackson, *l. c.*, p. 237.

[3] Note, *ad loc.*

[4] It would be too much to say that he remained a sceptic throughout, since his quest of the general indicates a belief in the possibility of some sort of knowledge. Dr. Jackson (*Journal of Phil.* xiii. p. 249) maintains that the 'incomplete Protagoreans' of *Theaet.* 172 A who held that 'while all *φαντάσματα* are equally true, one *φάντασμα* is better than another, and that the *σοφός* is one who by his *λόγοι* causes good *φαντάσματα* to take the places of bad ones' are intended to represent Socrates. Although the grounds for this identification seem extremely slender it may perhaps be true, provided it be taken to refer to Socrates only in his earlier days, before he had conceived *τὸ καθόλου ὁρίζεσθαι*.

from the lower segments of the Line to the highest,[1] an ascent from the dimness of the Cave to the all-illuminating rays of the sun—*ὃς ἔκγονός τε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φαίνεται καὶ ὁμοιότατος ἐκείνῳ.*[2]

It was, however, only gradually that Plato matured the fruits of his early Socratic training; and in his earlier dialogues we find abundant instances of his master's ways of thought. Thus, to take but a few examples, in the *Crito*[3] the Good is conceived of as the customary, in the *Protagoras*[4] as the pleasant, in the *Euthydemus*[5] and throughout the *Republic*[6] as the useful and the expedient: *κάλλιστα γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο καὶ λέγεται καὶ λελέξεται*, he exclaims in 457 B, *ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὠφέλιμον καλόν,*[7] *τὸ δὲ βλαβερὸν αἰσχρόν.* Such

[1] Adam (*Rep.*, vol. ii, p. 157) points out that the lower half of the line includes *δοξαστά* as well as *ὁρατά*. Accordingly among *δοξαστά* are contained *τὰ τῶν πολλῶν πολλὰ νόμιμα καλοῦ τε πέρι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων* (479 D); and it has been shown that Socrates' teaching ranked as *δοξαστόν*. In 484 C such people are called blind, *μηδὲν ἐναργὲς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔχοντες παράδειγμα* whereby to test *τὰ ἐνθάδε νόμιμα καλῶν τε πέρι καὶ δικαίων καὶ ἀγαθῶν.*

[2] *Rep.* 506 E.

[3] v. esp. 50 A–51 E. Cf. the reason given against suicide in *Phaedo* 61 C *οὐ γάρ φασι θεμιτὸν εἶναι.*

[4] 333 D, 353 C, &c. (The whole argument as to *ἀρετή* being *διδακτόν* is also Socratic. Cf. the *ἀβλαβεῖς ἡδοναί* of *Rep.* 357 B. If the *Protagoras* be regarded as representing Plato's own view rather than that of Socrates—an unnecessary and dubious supposition—it is open to explain the whole hedonistic argument with Bury (*Philebus*, Introd., p. xxvii) as 'of the nature of a *reductio ad absurdum*, by which the right view is only hinted at indirectly. The general result is to show that, if we equate Good with Pleasure and evil with Pain, then the art of living will consist in rightly estimating the proportions of Pleasure and Pain—whether present or future—which result from our actions. Consequently, Virtue is to be found in Metretic Science as applied to pains and pleasures. From which we deduce the conclusion that an outside criterion, the intellectual factor, is necessary in order to render Pleasure an intelligible object of life's pursuit.' So that, with this interpretation, the *Protagoras* appears to call, indirectly, for the Theory of Ideas as the moral standard. The later hedonism (e.g. *Laws* 732) is discussed below, p. 57.

[5] 289 C–292 E. Cf. Zeller's *Plato*, p. 437.

[6] Cf. also 458 E. Krohn notes that *τὸ ὠφέλιμον* settles the sort of poetry that is to be allowed (386 C, 398 A); it sometimes makes lying permissible (389 B); it decrees that an incurable man shall not be allowed to cumber the ground (407 E); it underlies the selection of rulers (412 D, 431 E); and it supplies the test of the value and beauty of *σκεύη* and *ζῷα* (601 D) (*Studien*, p. 370). Cf. *Gorg.* 499 D.

[7] For *καλόν* as including *ἀγαθόν*, v. Adam, *ad loc.*; also Zeller's *Plato*, p. 507.

utilitarianism, as Krohn points out, 'dringt bis in seine letzte dialectische Conception vor': *ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα . . . ᾗ δίκαια καὶ τἆλλα προσχρησάμενα χρήσιμα καὶ ὠφέλιμα γίγνεται* (505 A). Again we can see plainly that Plato adopted the view that *ἀρετή* is *ἐπιστήμη* without having at first any clearer notion of the nature of *ἐπιστήμη* than Socrates had had. He developed his own distinctive theory in order to provide the possibility of knowledge—and consequently the possibility of philosophic and true virtue; but until he had conceived the Ideas his Virtue had to be founded on a knowledge that was no truer than the Socratic. Of this there are many examples in the *Republic*,[1] particularly of course in those parts that deal with general and unphilosophical education. In like manner Plato accepted the Socratic method of searching for universal principles in matters of conduct, and together with the method he borrowed the terminology of Socrates. Thus we find in the earlier dialogues a non-technical use of the terms which afterwards became part and parcel of Dialectic: such words as *εἶδος*,[2] *ἰδέα*,[3] *παράδειγμα*[4] are used in reference to *λόγοι* that are neither transcendental nor 'separate' (*χωριστά*), i. e. which have not yet been hypostasized. It is, however, necessary to bear in mind that Plato never formulated a fixed terminology[5]: *ἔστι δ', ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐ περὶ ὀνόματος*

[1] e. g. *Rep.* 366 C, 374 D, 382 A, 409 A sq., 413 A, 589 C.

[2] e. g. *Rep.* 400 A, 402 C (*τὰ τῆς σωφροσύνης εἴδη καὶ ἀνδρείας κτλ.* The exact meaning is doubtful; but Adam does not take *εἴδη* of the developed Ideas), 402 D, 433 A, 445 C, 454 A, 510 D. So *Meno* 72 C, 80 A, *Symp.* 210 B. The example in *Euthyphro* 6 D is specially interesting, as showing the early use of *αὐτό* without any particular import. (Cf. ib. 5 D, 1 *Alc.* 129 B, *Rep.* 438 B *αὐτὰ ἕκαστα, αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη* (N.B. the non-philosophical use of *παρουσία*), 559 A, &c.) For similar use of *παρουσία* cf. *Gorg.* 497 E, 506 D.

[3] *Euthyph. l. c.*, *Rep.* 507 E, 544 C, *Hipp. mai.* 289 D, *Phaedrus* 237 D, *Theaet.* 184 D.

[4] *Euthyph.* 6 E, *Rep.* 529 D, 409 A, 472 C.

[5] Cf. Diog. Laert. iii. 64 *πολλάκις δὲ καὶ διαφέρουσιν ὀνόμασιν ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ σημαινομένου χρῆται· τὴν οὖν ἰδέαν καὶ εἶδος ὀνομάζει καὶ γένος καὶ παράδειγμα καὶ ἀρχὴν καὶ αἴτιον.* It is perhaps possible, though very difficult, to find a distinction between Plato's use of *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα*. (Cf. Thompson on *Meno* 72 C.) In *Phaedrus* 259 A *διαλεγόμενοι* is used of *τέττιγες*. We have, however, *ὃ ἔστι* as a technical term in *Phaedo* 75 C *περὶ ἁπάντων οἷς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα τὸ ὃ ἔστι*.

ἀμφισβήτησις, οἷς τοσούτων πέρι σκέψις ὅσων ἡμῖν πρόκειται (Rep. 533 D).

Again, for both philosophers the beginning of wisdom consisted in that self-knowledge[1] which showed up one's own ignorance; but whereas from the state of *ἀπορία* or *νάρκωσις* which resulted, Socrates tried by his 'maieutic' art to give birth to generalizations,[2] it was Plato's aim to elicit the knowledge of the Ideas which (as explained by *ἀνάμνησις*) was already in the soul. 'This conception,' to quote Nettleship,[3] 'of self-knowledge—which is at once the spur to moral progress and the evidence of the inexhaustibility of moral truth—Plato embraced and assimilated in all, and more than all, its original significance; and the synthetical tendency of his mind naturally led him to seek a systematic expression for what Socrates had put forth as occasion served or required.'

Such then was the theory that Virtue is Knowledge as Plato received it from Socrates. But that theory gives rise to obvious and notorious difficulties—difficulties which result indeed from the peculiar character of Socrates. 'Himself blessed with a will so powerful that it moved almost without friction, he fell into the error of ignoring its operations, and was thus led to regard knowledge as the sole condition of well-doing.'[4] In spite of his genial tolerance, his very strength of will must have made him almost incapable of understanding the weakness of others.[5] Judging by himself, he imagined that where *ἐπιστήμη* was present, there could be no possibility of wrongdoing, and so declared, generally, that *οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνει*. His own explanation of sin was simply that there must have

[1] e.g. *Charm.* 169 D, 1 *Alcib.* 130 E, *Phaedr.* 229 E, *Phaedo* 60 E.

[2] Cf. *Phaedr.* 266 B.

[3] *Lectures and Remains*, i. p. 248.

[4] Cf. e.g. Xen. *Mem.* i. 2. 1 *Σωκράτης . . . πρῶτον μὲν ἀφροδισίων καὶ γαστρὸς πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἐγκρατέστατος ἦν, εἶτα πρὸς χειμῶνα καὶ θέρος καὶ πάντας πόνους καρτερικώτατος κτλ.* Cf. *Symp.* 217 A sq. And for his powers of drinking, ib. 176 C, 214 A, 220 A *Σωκράτη μεθύοντα οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἑώρακεν ἀνθρώπων.*

[5] 'What hand and brain went ever paired?
What heart alike conceived and dared?
What act proved all its thought had been?
What will but felt the fleshly screen?'

been ignorance, perhaps temporary, in the soul: at the moment of temptation the present 'pleasures of sin' had overridden and expelled the knowledge of their future consequences. In other words, Socrates denied the possibility of incontinence, as is pointed out by Aristotle: *ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις πῶς ὑπολαμβάνων ὀρθῶς ἀκρατεύεταί τις. ἐπιστάμενον μὲν οὖν οὔ φασί τινες οἷόν τε εἶναι· δεινὸν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἐνούσης, ὡς ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἄλλο τι κρατεῖν καὶ περιέλκειν αὐτὸν ὥσπερ ἀνδράποδον. Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ ὅλως ἐμάχετο πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὡς οὐκ οὔσης ἀκρασίας· οὐθένα γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνοντα πράττειν παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον, ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν.*[1]

An even more searching criticism is made by the author of the *Magna Moralia.*[2] He observes that Socrates, by defining the virtues as branches of knowledge, did away with the irrational part of the soul (since knowledge is confined to the rational element), and consequently with these emotions and passions. This indeed is the commonplace objection found with the Socratic position—that it ignores human frailty: 'video meliora proboque' and the like are quoted against it. And another point arises from Aristotle's (?) use of the word *ἐπιστῆμαι* (in the plural); for it suggests what would, from the Platonic point of view, appear a very serious flaw in the Socratic structure, viz. that he considered, not one Knowledge, but many knowledges—special sciences dealing with Courage, Temperance, or Justice. And that such was actually the case is evident on every page of the *Memorabilia*, to say nothing of the 'Socratic' dialogues of Plato.

[1] *Eth. Nic.* vii. 3. 1145 b 21. Grant remarks that 'the omission of the article before *Σωκράτης* seems to show that the real man, and not the personage of Plato's dialogues, is referred to, but yet the words of the passage before us have obvious reference to Plato's *Protagoras* 352 B' [esp. *ἀτεχνῶς διανοούμενοι περὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης, ὥσπερ περὶ ἀνδραπόδου, περιελκομένης ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων*]. The inference to be drawn is plainly that, as before indicated, the *Protagoras* does present us with the historical Socrates. Cf. *Eth. Nic.* vi. 13.

[2] 1152 a 16 . . . *οὐκ ὀρθῶς δὲ οὗτος* (Σωκ.). *τὰς γὰρ ἀρετὰς ἐπιστήμας ἐποίει, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν εἶναι ἀδύνατον. αἱ γὰρ ἐπιστῆμαι πᾶσαι μετὰ λόγου, λόγος δὲ ἐν τῷ διανοητικῷ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐγγίνεται μορίῳ. γίνονται οὖν αἱ ἀρεταὶ πᾶσαι κατ' αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ τῆς ψυχῆς μορίῳ. συμβαίνει οὖν αὐτῷ ἐπιστήμας ποιοῦντι τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀναιρεῖν τὸ ἄλογον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς, τοῦτο δὲ ποιῶν ἀναιρεῖ καὶ πάθος καὶ ἦθος· διὸ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἥψατο ταύτῃ τῶν ἀρετῶν.*

Further, since the Socratic test of right and wrong was, as we have seen, merely a hedonic *μετρική*[1] of the effects which any particular action would in the long run bring upon the doer, it would evidently be open to each man to assess those effects according to the standard of his own inclinations — provided only that he took a sufficiently general and consistent survey of them. And such, in fact, was the development of the original doctrine actually made by various of the Socratic schools. It was indeed nothing but the Protagorean view, that each is the measure of all things for himself, applied this time to conduct. Nor could there be any better proof of the insufficiency of an ethical theory that possesses no eternal, unchanging, absolute standard of reference. Socrates himself (as we learn from both Xenophon and Plato—nowhere perhaps better than from the eloquent panegyric of Alcibiades[2]) was saved by his peculiar personality from falling into any extreme, either of asceticism or the reverse; but his doctrine undoubtedly opened an easy door to individualism in morality. And yet, even in his own case, a 'Virtue' which could permit him to give the counsel which he bestowed upon Theodote[3] may well give us pause. It would be wrong to lay too much stress upon a particular incident, or to forget the difference between ancient and modern opinion on this topic; but when all allowances have been made one cannot but feel how great a gulf is fixed between such morality and the lofty views expressed by Plato in the *Laws*.[4] And it is hard to ascribe the advance to anything but the fact that Plato held consistently, throughout his life, to an absolute standard of right and wrong—while Socrates did not.

[1] Cf. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* x. 2. 1173 b 20.

[2] *Symp.* 215 sq. [3] Xen. *Mem.* iii. 11.

[4] *Laws* 836 sqq. Of course the morality of the *Laws* is far removed from that found in e. g. *Phaedrus* or *Symposium*: the change was doubtless due in part to Plato's increasing years. But then the years would only root him the more firmly in the belief of an absolute standard. (As for the points about the communism of the *Republic* which are objectionable to modern taste, it must be admitted that they never fall so low as this chapter of the *Memorab-*[1]

In the light of this discussion it will not appear an exaggeration to say that the ethical teaching of Socrates was for theory either unintelligible or else a truism, and for practice a sounding futility. There is no need to travesty his doctrine[1] in order to substantiate such a statement. Obviously virtue is 'Knowledge at once of end and of means irresistibly realizing itself in act'[2]: the trouble is to acquire that Knowledge. When its nature is further sought we find that Socrates is 'confessedly using the term as one which neither he nor his interlocutors could adequately define'.[3] And, in matters of daily life, if the Knowledge that determines virtue be so fleeting and subjective as to be sometimes lost and sometimes counterfeited by ignorance, it seems hardly worth the wear of winning.

Therefore before the theory could satisfy Plato it would have to be freed from its imperfections. According to the view maintained in this essay, the Platonic philosophy arose out of the attempt to make rational the Socratic ethic, which, as Plato received it, was metaphysically and psychologically unsound. If virtue is knowledge, we must provide the possibility of knowledge. If nobody sins willingly, we must explain how it happens that (as it seems) people *do* sin willingly. The metaphysical difficulty Plato removed (as has already been indicated, and as will be further shown) by confining 'Knowledge' to Knowledge of the Ideas; the psychological difficulty he removed, or attempted to remove, by his tripartition of the soul.[4] By the differentiation

[1] It is travestied, e. g. in *Eth. Eud.* i. 5. 1216 b 3 *Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν ὁ πρεσβύτης ᾤετ' εἶναι τέλος τὸ γινώσκειν τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ ἐπεζήτει τί ἐστιν ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ τί ἡ ἀνδρεία καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς· ἐποίει γὰρ ταῦτ' εὐλόγως. ἐπιστήμας γὰρ ᾤετ' εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ὥσθ' ἅμα συμβαίνειν εἰδέναι τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην καὶ εἶναι δίκαιον. ἅμα μὲν γὰρ μεμαθήκαμεν τὴν γεωμετρίαν καὶ οἰκοδομίαν καὶ ἐσμὲν οἰκοδόμοι καὶ γεωμέτροι.* Cf. Stewart on *Eth. Nic.* i. 8. 1098 b 24. It is unfairly stated also in *Eth. Nic.* iii. 1116 b 4. In *Prot.* 345 D the words of Simonides are caricatured, after the manner of a Sophist, into the doctrine that *οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνει.*

[2] Jackson, *l. c.*

[3] R. D. Hicks, *l. c.*, p. xxviii.

[4] We have the authority of the *Magna Moralia* for supposing that this was Plato's object in 'dividing' the soul *εἴς τε τὸ λόγον ἔχον καὶ εἰς τὸ ἄλογον* (1182 a). The division was at first into these two elements alone; afterwards *τὸ ἄλογον* was subdivided into *θυμοειδές* and *ἐπιθυμητικόν.* In this

of faculties Plato saved the Socratic theory from the absurdity of a soul, which, though one and indivisible, was nevertheless divided against itself. For, now that there were several members in the soul, it became intelligible to speak of dissensions and *στάσεις* amongst them (e. g. *Rep.* 444 A sq, 554 D sq., *et passim*). Knowledge might be held, truly and consistently, by the rational element, the 'charioteer of the soul' (*τὸ ἡγεμονικόν*, *τὸ κυβερνητικόν*, as it is called in the *Republic*), and yet its commands be weaker than those of the irrational nature: the strength of *τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν* might be greater than that of *θυμός*, Reason's ally, and the nobler steed unable to drag his partner into the upward way. There was no longer any question of the lower elements going against the knowledge they possessed; for they were, by their very nature, incapable of getting the true wisdom: *ἡ γὰρ ἀχρώματός τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος καὶ ἀναφὴς οὐσία ὄντως οὖσα ψυχῆς κυβερνήτῃ μόνῳ θεατή*[1]—it is only the noblest portion of the soul that finds its pasture in the fields of truth.[2] Those who fall short of the beatific vision do so through the turbulence of their passions, *πᾶσαι δὲ πολὺν ἔχουσαι πόνον ἀτελεῖς τῆς τοῦ ὄντος θέας ἀπέρχονται, καὶ ἀπελθοῦσαι τροφῇ δοξαστῇ χρῶνται.* All are capable of virtue, since all possess reason, and all have in some prenatal life beheld reality; this knowledge they must try to recover by the power of *ἀνάμνησις*, difficult though that may be: *πᾶσα μὲν ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ φύσει τεθέαται τὰ ὄντα, ἢ οὐκ ἂν ἦλθεν εἰς τόδε τὸ ζῷον· ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι δὲ ἐκ τῶνδε ἐκείνα οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἁπάσῃ.*[3]

respect Plato's division resembles the Pythagorean. (See Appendix C.) It may be further noted that Plato might have attempted to solve the difficulty by distinguishing between the *ἕξις* and *κτῆσις* of knowledge, as in the simile of the *περιστερεών* (*Theaet.* 197 C). The passage referred to, however, does not deal with moral problems; nor does it serve to explain even the question it is brought forward to explain.

[1] *Phaedrus* 247 C.

[2] Ib. 248 B. *νοῦς* is said to be cognate with Reality and Truth (*Rep.* 490 B, 518 C, 611 E).

[3] 249 E. A human soul *must* have beheld truth: *οὐ γὰρ ἥ μήποτε ἰδοῦσα τὴν ἀλήθειαν εἰς τόδε ἥξει τὸ σχῆμα. δεῖ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον συνιέναι κατ' εἶδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν ἰὸν αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἓν λογισμῷ συναιρούμενον· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἀνάμνησις ἐκείνων ἃ ποτ' εἶδεν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ συμπορευθεῖσα θεῷ κτλ.* (249 B).

Thus the Knowledge that determines virtue is confined to the λογιστικόν element of the soul; it is Knowledge of the eternal verities, gained in the celestial journey with the gods, and recoverable only by *ἀνάμνησις*. And human nature 'then shows likest God's'[1] when (as in the harmony that causes *δικαιοσύνη*) the highest part of soul has supremacy over the others (*αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι ψυχαί, ἡ μὲν ἄριστα θεῷ ἑπομένη καὶ εἰκασμένη ὑπερῆρεν εἰς τὸν ἔξω τόπον τὴν τοῦ ἡνιόχου κεφαλήν κτλ.*). Beneath the allegory of the *Phaedrus* can be discovered a firm psychological basis for this ethical doctrine: that the soul possessed of true knowledge cannot, of its own accord, fail to translate that knowledge into right action;—though one may well feel loath to reduce that gorgeous imagery to the bare outline of a formulated dogma.

But Plato's psychology is in turn open to many objections. For it is not consistently maintained[2] (such at least is the common view); it fails to explain the phenomena of soul[3]; it is so crude that Plato cannot have intended it for more than a metaphor.[4] There is indeed a certain amount of truth in each of these criticisms; but their weight is lessened by the fact that this peculiar psychology was conceived for the specific purpose of rationalizing the theory that Virtue is Knowledge.[5] Therefore when Plato requires the tripartite view of soul for his argument, he uses it[6]; when (as e.g. in

[1] The divine mind being nurtured by pure intelligence alone : *θεοῦ διάνοια νῷ τε καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ ἀκηράτῳ τρεφομένη.*

[2] Because it is put forward only in three dialogues (*Phaedr.*, *Rep.*, *Tim.*).

[3] v. Gomperz, vol. iii, p. 74.

[4] Archer-Hind, Introd. to *Phaedo*, p. xxxiii sq.

[5] This point is indubitably proved by the way the tripartition is introduced in *Rep.* 436. Plato lays down the general principle *δῆλον ὅτι ταὐτὸν τἀναντία ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν κατὰ ταὐτόν γε καὶ πρὸς ταὐτόν οὐκ ἐθελήσει ἅμα, ὥστε ἂν που εὑρίσκωμεν ἐν αὐτοῖς ταῦτα γιγνόμενα, εἰσόμεθα ὅτι οὐ ταὐτὸν ἦν ἀλλὰ πλείω.* Hence it is absurd to say that a man or a top can be both in motion and at rest: we must distinguish their various parts. Similarly *soul* cannot simultaneously both desire and loathe the same thing: there must be one part that desires and another that loathes. The nature of the examples given (the case of a man who refrains from drinking though he desires to drink, and the story of Leontius in 439 E) makes plain that the psychological theory is intended to explain ethical problems.

[6] In *Phaedrus* 246, 248, *Rep.* 435 B, 602 C, 612 A, &c. (The examples in *Tim.* 69 sq. do not concern the present argument.)

discussing its immortality) he needs a single indivisible soul, he takes that aspect.[1] Nor is there here any fundamental inconsistency. It is only the embodied soul that is regarded as tripartite—precisely because it is only with the embodied soul that ethical questions arise. Plato saw plainly enough the difficulties of a 'Faculty Psychology',[2] but he had no other means of explaining the breach between knowing and doing. Although he uses such words as *εἴδη*, *γένη*, or even *μέρη* for the 'parts' of soul, yet he seems to regard them rather as aspects or modes of mental activity:[3] 'the two lower *εἴδη*,' says Archer-Hind, 'are consequent upon the conjunction of soul with matter, and their operation ceases at the separation of soul from matter.' Hence the soul in its true essence is *one*, *ἓν γενόμενον ἐκ πολλῶν* (443 E); but this unity is possible only when the two lower parts obey the *λογιστικόν* element (586 E). And here Plato shows that the real purpose of all this theorizing is ultimately practical. *Δικαιοσύνη* consists in the carrying out of its own *ἔργον* by each portion of the soul; the whole aim of the *Republic* is to show how *τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν* is possible. The philosopher alone can fulfil these conditions: *τῷ φιλοσόφῳ ἄρα ἑπομένης ἁπάσης τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ μὴ στασιαζούσης ἑκάστῳ τῷ μέρει ὑπάρχει εἴς τε τἆλλα τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν καὶ δικαίῳ εἶναι, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς τὰς ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστον καὶ τὰς βελτίστας καὶ εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν τὰς ἀληθεστάτας καρποῦσθαι.*

The relationship between the parts of the soul is, however, so difficult to explain that Plato does not attempt to do so except by means of *εἰκόνες*.[4] It is pictured in the allegory of the winged horses and their charioteer in the *Phaedrus*; it stands *μείζω τε καὶ ἐν μείζονι* in the fabric of the State, and again in the strange creature of Book ix,

[1] Especially of course in *Phaedo*.

[2] e. g. *Rep.* 611 B: nothing that is *σύνθετον ἐκ πολλῶν*, he says, can be *δίδιον*. Cf. Appendix A, p. 77 n.

[3] *Rep.* 439 B; 572 D suggests that Plato thought of 'an ego as a separate and distinct entity', as is deduced by Krohn from the participles *ἐγείρας*, *ἑστιάσας*, *πραΰνας*, *κινήσας*, *ἡσυχάσας*. v. Adam, *ad loc.*

[4] *Phaedrus* 246 A.

that is made up of man, lion, and many-headed monster. But if it is argued from this that Plato never meant the tripartition as anything more than a metaphor,[1] we shall have to include the Idea of Good under the same category —since Plato never explained its nature in any but metaphorical language. His object was to provide a system of ethics, and this he accomplished by means of his theory of Soul: he discovered the nature of justice and the means of its practice, both in the State and the individual; but he was not immediately concerned with any incidental difficulties to which his psychology might give rise.[2] As Aristotle[3] says in a similar connexion: *ταῦτα δὲ πότερον διώρισται καθάπερ τὰ τοῦ σώματος μόρια καὶ πᾶν τὸ μεριστόν, ἢ τῷ λόγῳ δύο ἐστὶν ἀχώριστα πεφυκότα καθάπερ ἐν τῇ περιφερείᾳ τὸ κυρτὸν καὶ τὸ κοῖλον, οὐθὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ παρόν.*

Enough has been said to show the intimate connexion between Plato's peculiar psychological theory and his ethics. It will be shown later on how important a part this theory plays in the development of the State; for, just as in the soul knowledge is the property of the rational element alone, so in the State it is the corresponding section, the *φιλόσοφοι*, who alone possess knowledge. Consequently the only hope of Justice in the State is that its rulers shall be philosophers, since then only can the rational element command and control the others.[4]

It is, however, time to return to the metaphysical side, and to substantiate the contention of this essay, viz. that Plato developed the earlier theory of Ideas in order to provide a basis for ethics. The only certain account we possess of the origin of that 'theory' is the so-called *λόγοι οἱ ἐκ τῶν*

[1] Rohde (*Psyche*, 3rd ed., p. 272, n. 5) says that the view that Plato never intended the 'Dreitheilung der Seele in vollem Ernst, sondern immer nur als von einem halben Mythus, einer nur einstweilen giltigen Hypothese' will not appear credible from an unbiased reading of the passages that deal with it.

[2] For the possible Pythagorean origin of the theory, v. Appendix C.

[3] *Eth. Nic.* i. 13. 10.

[4] Rep. 428 E sq., 473 D sq.

ἐπιστημῶν, as given by Aristotle in the first book of the *Metaphysics*.[1] This may be summarized as follows: Plato had been so educated by Cratylus in the Heraclitean doctrine of flux that he came to believe there could be no knowledge of sensible phenomena, and this view he afterwards upheld (*ἁπάντων τῶν αἰσθητῶν αἰεὶ ῥεόντων καὶ ἐπιστήμης περὶ αὐτῶν οὐκ οὔσης, ταῦτα μὲν καὶ ὕστερον οὕτως ὑπέλαβεν*); but Socrates, who concerned himself with moral speculations and not at all with Nature as a whole, sought for the universal in moral matters (*Σωκράτους δὲ περὶ μὲν τὰ ἠθικὰ πραγματευομένου, περὶ δὲ τῆς ὅλης φύσεως οὐδέν, ἐν μέντοι τούτοις τὸ καθόλου ζητοῦντος*), and was the first to apply his mind to the making of definitions. He thus showed Plato that definitions must be of something other (*περὶ ἑτέρων*) than sensible phenomena (for these being always changing cannot be generally defined). Therefore Plato called these other things 'Ideas' (*οὕτως μὲν οὖν τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ἰδέας προσηγόρευσε*), and supposed that all *αἰσθητά* exist by the side of them (*παρὰ ταῦτα*) and are called after them (*κατὰ ταῦτα λέγεσθαι*); for 'the many' which have the same name as the Idea exist by participation in the Idea (*κατὰ μέθεξιν*). In the other passage (*Met.* M.) Aristotle adds that it was not Socrates, but his successors, who 'separated' or hypostasized the Ideas;[2] and there too it is expressly stated that the *ὁρισμοί* from which the Ideas arose were ethical (*Σωκράτους δὲ περὶ τὰς ἠθικὰς ἀρετὰς πραγματευομένου καὶ περὶ τούτων ὁρίζεσθαι καθόλου ζητοῦντος κτλ.*).

Now there is no reason to doubt the general accuracy of this account. If it is at all coloured by Aristotle's own point of view, it is in the direction of making the Ideas more purely intellectual and less ethical than Plato intended them to be.[3] But even so, it is made abundantly plain that

[1] *Met.* A. 6. 987 b 29 sq. Cf. *Met.* M. 4. 1078 b 7 sq.

[2] *ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν Σ. τὰ καθόλου οὐ χωριστὰ ἐποίει οὐδὲ τοὺς ὁρισμούς· οἱ δ' ἐχώρισαν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ἰδέας προσηγόρευσαν.*

[3] Cf. Adam, *Gifford Lectures*, p. 425: 'Aristotle, for his part, represents the Ideal Theory as originating in an attempt to find a sure foundation for knowledge and knowledge only; but when we read the dialogues of Plato himself, we cannot but feel that there were other and hardly less powerful

the Ideas were developed out of ethical generalizations; in other words, that the first concepts to be hypostasized were ethical in character. The natural inference is, surely, that Plato's first concern was to work out a scientific theory of conduct. Knowledge at first seemed valuable to him not so much for its own sake as because it was the condition of virtue.[1] Later on, as he freed himself more from the trammels of Socratic thought, his philosophy tended to become more and more metaphysical and less ethical; and yet throughout supreme importance is attached to any doctrine which may affect the human soul. But in his early days it would have been impossible for Plato not to have been peculiarly interested in ethics: as the pupil of Socrates he was bound to concentrate on such topics. This bias may perhaps have been due less to the bent of Plato's own mind than to the accident of his connexion with Socrates; but this at least is the way he actually did develop. It is doubtless the accident of his father's having been a physician that gave a biological colour to the whole of Aristotle's work;[2] but nobody for that reason would deny his interest in natural history. And yet (perhaps owing to the one-sidedness of Aristotle's representation, exaggerated by commentators) it is common enough to find the view maintained that 'Plato is before all things a metaphysician: ethics, politics, logic, physics are to him so many forms of applied metaphysics'[3]—that his interest in ethics is only

impulses at work.' Also Grant (*Ethics*, i. p. 182): 'Each of the two had his own peculiar earnestness: Plato's was a moral earnestness, he seems never to have left out of sight the overwhelming importance of everything by which the human soul might be improved or deteriorated; Aristotle's was a scientific earnestness, showing itself in a desire to sift and examine everything, and to state the naked truth, as it appeared to him, regardless of consequences.'

[1] Thus in *Phaedo* 115 E inaccuracy of expression is censured because *οὐ μόνον εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο πλημμελές, ἀλλὰ καὶ κακόν τι ἐμποιεῖ ταῖς ψυχαῖς*.

[2] Cf. A. E. Taylor's *Aristotle on his Predecessors*, p. 13.

[3] Archer-Hind's *Phaedo*, p. x. The statement is of course true in the sense that Plato based his ethics, politics, &c., on metaphysics. But to speak of these as 'so many forms of applied metaphysics' certainly seems to suggest that they appeared to him as of quite secondary importance. Far truer is Zeller's remark (*Plato*, p. 435): 'The philosophy of Plato is primarily ethical.

secondary and derived; in other words, that his years[1] of training under Socrates failed to imbue him with his master's spirit, to which the study of human conduct seemed the one supremely important matter, leaving him for heritage nothing but the cold inductive method of searching for abstract universals altogether unrelated to humanity.

Thus, had it been only because of his intercourse with Socrates, Plato must necessarily have devoted his energies at first to ethical questions; but there was another powerful influence to drive him towards placing his theory of conduct on a firm footing. We have seen already the serious importance which the Protagorean teaching assumed in Plato's eyes, and how Plato's first object may well have been to establish that standard of truth and reality whose existence Protagoras denied. But besides Protagoras there were others of the Sophists, who, by the distinction they drew between 'the natural' and 'the conventional',[2] and by the consequent depreciation [3] of ordinary social arrangements which they deduced from it, seemed to Plato to be undermining morality. This antithesis has already been mentioned in connexion with Archelaus (who is said to have first employed it); and it was there pointed out that Socrates was opposed to the opposition of *κατὰ φύσιν* and *κατὰ νόμον* —doubtless because of the subversive tendency it was likely to develop in the sphere of conduct. Thus Plato may well have received from his master the desire to counteract this

He starts from the Socratic inquiries on virtue, which furnished the material for the earliest development of his dialectic method, and for those conceptual determinations from which the doctrine of Ideas eventually sprang,' &c.

[1] viz. from 407 (?)-399 B.C.

[2] The subject has been well treated by Grant, *Aristotle's Ethics*, vol. i, pp. 151 sqq.; also by Benn, 'The Idea of Nature in Plato (*Archiv für Gesch. d. Phil.* ix).' The *locus classicus* is Arist. *Soph. Elench.* xii. 8: it is there stated that this antithesis was the commonest sophistical device for creating paradoxes, so that it appears to have been used rather 'as a mode of arguing than as a definite opinion about morals' (Grant). It is amusing to note that Plato makes Callicles accuse Socrates of this very trick (*Gorg.* 483 A *ὃ δὴ καὶ σὺ τοῦτο τὸ σοφὸν κατανενοηκὼς κακουργεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ἐὰν μέν τις κατὰ νόμον λέγῃ, κατὰ φύσιν ὑπερωτῶν, ἐὰν δὲ τὰ τῆς φύσεως, τὰ τοῦ νόμου*).

[3] *ἦν δὲ τὸ μὲν κατὰ φύσιν αὐτοῖς τὸ ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ κατὰ νόμον τὸ τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκοῦν.* Arist. *l. c.*

tendency by ascertaining exactly the meaning of *φύσις* and the dictates which might be regarded as *κατὰ φύσιν*. For hitherto no definite significance had been given to *φύσις*. By the Sophists it was used simply as a name to juggle with: 'Nature' was called in 'to support crude, paradoxical, and anti-social doctrines' (Grant). We have several famous examples of the applications they made of it in the dialogues of Plato; and though these are (as Grant remarks) 'dramatic and imaginary', yet 'we may fairly conceive them analogous to what was occasionally heard uttered in Athenian society'. Thus Hippias in the *Protagoras* declares that kinship of spirit makes men fellow citizens, *φύσει, οὐ νόμῳ· τὸ γὰρ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φύσει συγγενές ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ νόμος, τύραννος ὢν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, πολλὰ παρὰ τὴν φύσιν βιάζεται* (337 C, D); a doctrine which may sound plausible to modern ears, but which would have deleterious effects on the ancient idea of the city-state.[1] Callicles in the *Gorgias* asserts that, according to nature, might is right, and incidentally justifies theft[2] and invasion.[3] *φύσει μὲν πᾶν αἴσχιόν ἐστιν ὅπερ καὶ κάκιον, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, νόμῳ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν*,[4] adding that only a mind vitiated by too long study of philosophy would think otherwise.[5] So Thrasymachus in the *Republic* defines *τὸ δίκαιον* as *οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον*.[6] And Glauco, accepting the view that laws have been made in the interest of the weaker, explains the origin of this arrangement by a theory of social contract.[7]

[1] Adam indeed (*Gifford Lectures*, p. 283) regards this as a glimpse of 'the other and more humane conception of Nature, according to which men are naturally not enemies, but kinsmen. . . . The words . . . convey the notion of a brotherhood among men of learning and culture, analogous in some degree to the Stoic community of wise men'. Such an interpretation is, however, extremely conjectural. And even if it were true, we may well doubt whether Plato would not have dreaded any broadcast dissemination of such an anti-social doctrine. He himself had certainly panhellenic (v. *Rep.* 469 B sq.), and probably cosmopolitan leanings (v. *Rep.* 427 B, 499 C); but then his cosmopolitanism would be founded on a sound ontology, not the vague and shifting *φύσις* of Hippias.

[2] *Gorg.* 484 B. [3] 483 D (Xerxes). [4] 483 A.

[5] 484 C sq. [6] *Rep.* 338 C.

[7] *Rep.* 359 sq. (v. Adam, *ad loc.*). Cf. also *Rep.* 364 A (*δόξῃ καὶ νόμῳ*) and 381 A, where the distinction between *φύσει* and *τέχνῃ* is made—afterwards

Now the grave dangers likely to result from such theories (and there can be no doubt about their prevalence in Athens at this time [1]) must have impressed themselves most forcibly on a mind like Plato's.[2] If existing laws and customs were to be abandoned because they were contrary to Nature, it became above all things urgent that Philosophy should come to the rescue; and its duty would be to explain—as all the physical philosophers had failed to do—what φύσις actually was.[3] No one had yet discovered a 'primary, fundamental, and persistent' element, 'as opposed to what is secondary, derivative, and transient';[4] Plato was the first[5] to develop any possible account of such a conception. Hence we should expect to find Plato establishing some theory of φύσις; and, by deducing from his Nature the true dictates of Nature, refuting the immoral and anti-social teaching of a Callicles or a Thrasymachus. And this is what we do in fact observe. In describing the Ideas, Plato not

worked out fully in *Laws* 889 A–890 A. Finally, Plato reached a unity between Nature and Convention; for in *Laws* 714 C we read that the function of laws is to safeguard the actual constitution of the particular state for which they are made, καὶ τὸν φύσει ὅρον τοῦ δικαίου λέγεσθαι κάλλισθ' οὕτω.

[1] v. esp. Adam, *ad. Rep.* 337 A.

[2] He refers to such dangers in *Theaet.* 172 B when speaking of the 'partial Protagoreans'.

[3] Cf. Adam, *Gifford Lectures*, p. 429: 'In any case, the need for asserting the objective reality of the moral standard may well have seemed to Plato all the greater on account of the teaching of the Sophists,' &c. Adam, however, supposes Plato's polemic to have been aimed particularly at Protagoras. This no doubt is partly true: Protagoras, as the champion of νόμος, would tend to disparage existing customs as 'conventional'. But Plato must have been even more concerned to withstand such upholders of φύσις as Hippias and Thrasymachus, since the dangerous interpretation which they put upon 'the natural' would be still more disastrous in its results.

Adam well illustrates the importance of this opposition by its manifest effects upon Athenian policy. 'By no other argument [than that of ὁ φύσει ὅρος τοῦ δικαίου] was it possible even to attempt to justify the imperial rule of Athens in the eyes of a nation which regarded the independent city-state as the only legitimate form of polity' (*l. c.*, p. 282).

[4] Prof. Burnet (*l. c.*, p. 13) gives this as what 'in Greek philosophical language φύσις always means'.

[5] The Sophists of course gave no systematic account of φύσις; most of them indeed (like Socrates) relinquished physical speculation as vain and unprofitable. Still less had they any consistent account to offer of τὸ φυσικὸν δίκαιον.

only emphasizes the notion of their reality in Nature, but even employs the very word *φύσις* as one of the commonest means of distinguishing them. For Plato, Nature meant the world of Ideas, not 'physical patterns to be found in the sensible world, of which we should naturally think, in spite of the warning of Proclus, *εἴωθε γοῦν ὁ Πλάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ νοητὰ φέρειν τοῦτο τὸ τῆς φύσεως ὄνομα*'.[1] Passages to prove this statement are to be found throughout the dialogues, excepting of course the Socratic dialogues, in which we should not look to meet any mention of the antithesis.[2] It was Plato, and not Socrates, who saw the importance of investigating the pretentious appeals to *φύσις* made by the Sophists, since thus alone there was a chance of re-settling, and this time upon a sound basis, the moral rules of the multitude.

Now an examination of the principal places in which this use of *φύσις* (as equivalent to the Ideal world) occurs undoubtedly goes to substantiate the view here maintained, that Plato was intent on establishing a theory of *φύσις* in order that he might settle current morality. For although it is true that the Ideas generally are described as existing in Nature,[3] and while the crudest of them have their abode also *ἐν τῇ φύσει*[4], yet by far the majority of

[1] Waddell, *ad Parm.* 132 D.

[2] Benn (*l. c.*, p. 37) goes so far as to make the more frequent use of *κατὰ φύσιν* and *κατὰ νόμον* into a canon for marking the lateness of dialogues.

[3] *Parm.* 132 D (already referred to as showing the step of hypostasization). Relinquishing the description of Ideas as *νόηματα* existing *οὐδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι ἢ ἐν ψυχαῖς*, he says *τὰ μὲν εἴδη ταῦτα ὥσπερ παραδείγματα ἑστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τούτοις ἐοικέναι κτλ.* He could have given no more characteristic account of the Ideas.

[4] Even 'such half-jocular instances' (Taylor) as the Ideas of *σκευαστά*: *οὐκοῦν τριτταί τινες κλῖναι αὗται γίγνονται· μία μὲν ἡ ἐν τῇ φύσει οὖσα, ἣν φαῖμεν ἄν, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, θεὸν ἐργάσασθαι* (*Rep.* 597 B). Only *one* bed can have been wrought *ἐν τῇ φύσει* by God—whether of His own will or by necessity (597 C); and it is this bed, existing *ἐν φύσει*, that is made by the *φυτουργός*, and imitated by the *δημιουργός* (597 D). In *Phaedo* 103 B we read of an Idea of relation existent in Nature: *αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίον οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο, οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει* [i. e. whether regarded as immanent or transcendent]. If there be any such thing as *τὸ τῇ φύσει ὄνομα*, Plato states in the *Cratylus* (esp. 390 sq.) that it can be known only by the dialectician, who has knowledge of the Ideas. Cf. *Rep.* 473 A.

instances are found to refer to aesthetic and moral Ideas.[1] Mr. A. E. Taylor,[2] indeed, goes so far as to say that 'except where the theory has to be made intelligible to persons who are assumed to stand outside the strict philosophic curriculum of Plato's school, all the cases which occur are those either of (1) mathematical, moral, and aesthetic "norms", or (2) of organic types and the organs and elements which enter into their composition'. And he proceeds to reduce these classes ultimately 'to one common type, that of mathematical relation'. With his second group we are not concerned in an examination of the earlier Theory of Ideas; but we may accept his account of

[1] The aesthetic and the moral are hard to distinguish in Greek thought (*πᾶν δὴ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καλόν*, *Tim.* 87 C); but the examples may be roughly classified as follows:—

(1) Aesthetic: *Rep.* 401 C, where it is ordained that the *δημιουργοί* of the City are to *ἰχνεύειν τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ τε καὶ εὐσχήμονος φύσιν*, because of the results that such workmanship will produce on the young citizens. This is not yet the fully developed Idea of Beauty, *αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό μεθ' αὑτοῦ μονοειδὲς ἀεὶ ὄν*, of *Symp.* 211 B; but, both in language and thought, it is on the way towards that real Beauty. This latter is found in Book v (476 B): ordinary *φιλήκοοι καὶ φιλοθεάμονες τάς τε καλὰς φωνὰς ἀσπάζονται καὶ χρόας κτλ. . . . αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ καλοῦ ἀδύνατος αὐτῶν ἡ διάνοια τὴν φύσιν ἰδεῖν τε καὶ ἀσπάσασθαι.* There are but few (*σπάνιοι*) to whom that power is given. So in *Phaedrus* 254 B the Idea of Beauty, recalled by *ἀνάμνησις* of a previous existence, is called *ἡ τοῦ κάλλους φύσις*: while in 249 E that existence in the Ideal world is *φύσει—πᾶσα μὲν ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ φύσει τεθέαται τὰ ὄντα* (though in this case *φύσει* means perhaps 'by its very nature' and goes with *ψυχή*).

(2) Moral and Political: *Rep.* 501 B. The institutions of the City must be ordained by philosophers, after the pattern of Ideal Justice which exists in Nature: *ἀπεργαζόμενοι πυκνὰ ἂν . . ἀποβλέποιεν πρὸς τὸ φύσει δίκαιον καὶ καλὸν καὶ σῶφρον καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα.* Cf. Adam, *ad loc.*, for a refutation of Bosanquet's interpretation of 'natural'. In the domain of Politics too we find an undeveloped *φύσις* as the goal of the first sketch of the City (cf. Adam on 370 A). 428 E shows exactly why *ὅλη σοφὴ ἂν εἴη κατὰ φύσιν οἰκισθεῖσα πόλις*: it is because the rational element will rule; just as in *Tim.* 30 B we read *διὰ δὴ τὸν λογισμὸν τόνδε νοῦν μὲν ἐν ψυχῇ, ψυχὴν δ' ἐν σώματι συνιστὰς τὸ πᾶν συνετεκταίνετο, ὅπως ὅτι κάλλιστον εἴη κατὰ φύσιν ἄριστόν τε ἔργον ἀπειργασμένος.* In *Polit.* 308 D it is said that the truly Ideal City, *ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἀληθῶς οὖσα ἡμῖν πολιτική*, will consist only of selected citizens.

[2] *Mind*, N.S. xii. p. 6. It may be noted that in *Rep.* 525 C we find Ideas of Numbers described as *φύσις*. Mathematics must be truly studied *μὴ ἰδιωτικῶς, ἀλλ' ἕως ἂν ἐπὶ θέαν τῆς τῶν ἀριθμῶν φύσεως ἀφίκωνται τῇ νοήσει αὐτῇ*. This last qualification should be noticed: *φύσις*, the Ideal, can be known 'by thought alone'.

class (1) as proving the position of this essay. For, deep as Plato's interest in mathematics may have been, even before his intercourse with the Pythagoreans, we can hardly suppose it to have outweighed his natural bent towards ethical investigations, fostered as it was by the influence of Socrates. So that if M. Milhaud and Mr. Taylor are right in finding that 'the metaphysical problem suggested by the existence of the mathematical concept is the very basis of Plato's whole theory', it must be with the proviso that Plato subsequently introduced this mathematical relation into a theory which in the first place arose almost entirely from ethical speculations. One might indeed say 'entirely', but for the fact that Plato was also desirous of solving by his Ideal Theory the puzzles which Zeno had started as to the possibility of predication; but this object was certainly subsidiary, and 'with clearer views about relations and negations the paradox of Zeno ceased to perplex'.[1] Plato doubtless repeated certain attributes of the Parmenidean *τὸ ὄν* in his specification of the Ideas;[2] but it would be rash to lay more stress than that upon the Eleatic influence on the Theory of Ideas.

We are thus justified in ascribing the conception of the Ideas in large part to Plato's desire for a rational theory of *φύσις*, from which might be deduced a consistent and 'anti-sophistic' system of ethics. Moreover, while the references quoted (in note 1, p. 41) all tend to prove the validity of this position, there is one passage which even by itself seems to place it beyond dispute, viz. the famous speech of Socrates

[1] Jackson, art. 'Socrates', *Encyc. Brit.* He shows that Plato, in order to meet the Eleatic puzzles, added 'to the fundamental assertion of the existence of eternal immutable ideas', the objects of knowledge, two subordinate propositions, viz. (1) 'the idea is immanent in the particular', and (2) 'there is an idea wherever a plurality of particulars is called by the same name'; and that these 'two supplementary articles' were afterwards withdrawn. Plato certainly deals frequently with the question of Predication (e. g. *Crat.* 439 D, *Phaedo* 101–103 E, *Rep.* 523 C sq., *Theaet.* 154 C, 182 D); but, important as it seemed to him, he never lays the same stress upon it as he does upon moral problems. Adam's note on *Rep.* 523 C undoubtedly exaggerates the importance of Predication in the development of the theory of Ideas.

[2] e. g. *Rep.* 507 B, &c.

in the *Theaetetus* (176A–177A) where he expounds in lofty and impassioned language the doctrine of *ὁμοίωσις θεῷ*. It is not easy to persuade men, he says, that the customary motives of virtue are of no avail—*ἵνα δὴ μὴ κακὸς καὶ ἵνα ἀγαθὸς δοκῇ εἶναι· ταῦτα μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὁ λεγόμενος γραῶν ὕθλος*. Virtue must be practised for its own sake,[1] for the likeness to God which it imparts, and not for the vulgar rewards coveted by the multitude. The wages of sin they know not: *οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἣν δοκοῦσιν, πληγαί τε καὶ θάνατοι, ὧν ἐνίοτε πάσχουσιν οὐδὲν ἀδικοῦντες, ἀλλὰ ἣν ἀδύνατον ἐκφυγεῖν*. The real penalty consists in the life that must be led, both in this world and the next, by the man who assimilates himself to the ungodly pattern: *παραδειγμάτων, ὦ φίλε, ἐν τῷ ὄντι ἑστώτων, τοῦ μὲν θείου εὐδαιμονεστάτου, τοῦ δὲ ἀθέου ἀθλιωτάτου, οὐχ ὁρῶντες ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, ὑπὸ ἠλιθιότητός τε καὶ τῆς ἐσχάτης ἀνοίας λανθάνουσι τῷ μὲν ὁμοιούμενοι διὰ τὰς ἀδίκους πράξεις, τῷ δὲ ἀνομοιούμενοι*. These patterns, like that other *ἐν οὐρανῷ ἴσως παράδειγμα*, are established for ever in Reality and Nature:[2] they are none other than the Ideas—*τὸ φύσει δίκαιον καὶ καλὸν καὶ σῶφρον καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα*. At length we have discovered the eternal and absolute criterion by which all questions of conduct must be judged. True knowledge is knowledge of these *παραδειγμάτων ἐν τῷ ὄντι ἑστώτων*, and its function is to make manifest the only commendable motives for pursuing virtue or shunning vice.

It is thus abundantly plain that Plato's purpose in initiating the Ideal Theory was above all things ethical. Further, it seems likely that at first he dealt with only those classes of Ideas which were required to solve the problems that lay before him. If the view already taken of the *Parmenides* be correct (viz. that we have there an account of Plato's own philosophical development), we find that he started by admitting (1) Ideas such as *ὁμοιότης, ἕν, πολλά, καὶ πάντα ὅσα νυνδὴ Ζήνωνος ἤκουες*: and (2) *οἷον*

[1] Cf. *Symp.* 208 D.

[2] The extreme similarity to the words of *Parm.* 132 D necessitates the identification of *ἐν τῷ ὄντι* with *ἐν τῇ φύσει*.

δικαίου τι εἶδος αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πάντων αὖ τῶν τοιούτων. In other words, he assumed the existence of those Ideas which would help to settle the puzzles of Zeno and the ethical problems suggested by Socrates;[1] other Ideas, like Man, Fire, or Water, he is doubtful about, while γελοῖα (οἷον θρὶξ καὶ πηλὸς καὶ ῥύπος) he utterly refuses to consider. Such reservations obviously mark the initial stages of a philosophy; and Plato accordingly puts into the mouth of Parmenides his own mature criticism of himself. 'The theory,' he says, 'is incomplete. He implies that it might have been expected to include and account for physical objects, as well as moral or intellectual conceptions; that it will not be complete until it does include such objects, even the most insignificant of them; and that he looks forward to a time when Socrates' [i.e. the Platonic philosophy] 'will so far gain the victory over his boyish aversion as to make that important stride in speculation' (Waddell). His expectations were fulfilled: the Ideal Theory came later to include an explanation of the entire universe; but its roots must be sought in the field of ethical inquiries first cultivated by Socrates.

So much may be inferred from what is at least a possible view of the origin of the Ideal Theory. It would, however, be unsafe to lay much stress on any arguments drawn from such a source, since all accounts of that origin must necessarily be conjectural and disputed; nor is it possible to discuss here the various other accounts of it that have been given. Certainly the latest, that of Prof. Burnet, who regards 'the earliest form of Platonism as practically

[1] This view (which Adam declares 'not unlikely') is in part derived from Waddell's Introduction to the *Parmenides* (p. xxix). It is, however, only partially true to say that 'the Theory of Ideas itself began with the hypostasization of Justice, Goodness, and so forth, and afterwards enlarged its scope so as to include the other inhabitants of the Ideal Sphere' (Adam, p. 428); for such expression leaves out of account the first class of Ideas mentioned in *Parm.* 130 B. No doubt the importance of these latter is much less than that of δίκαιον καλὸν ἀγαθὸν κτλ., and probably they are placed first only for dramatic reasons (the presence of Parmenides and Zeno); but they should not be altogether disregarded—as apparently they are by Waddell.

indistinguishable from Pythagoreanism',[1] tends (whatever truth it may contain) to emphasize the ethical significance of Plato's first draft of the Theory.[2] Again, Lutoslawski, laying particular stress on *ἐξαίφνης* in *Symp.* 210 E, supposes that the conception of Ideas arose out of a sudden apprehension of Ideal Beauty—in part 'the result of the long previous development of Greek art'.[3] This view seems far-fetched and unlikely to receive general credit; but, if there be any truth in it, the close connexion between *τὸ καλὸν* and *τἀγαθόν* suggests that it will run at least not altogether counter to the position maintained in this essay.

So, too, if the Megarian origin of the Ideas be accepted, that view will go to confirm the position here maintained. For we know that Euclides dealt with the Good, reducing all other conceptions to its nature: *οὗτος ἓν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀπεφαίνετο πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι καλούμενον· ὅτε μὲν γὰρ φρόνησιν, ὅτε δὲ θεόν, καὶ ἄλλοτε νοῦν καὶ τὰ λοιπά.*[4] Now, though this *ἀγαθόν* can have been no more confined to ethical Good than was Plato's *ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*, yet it must undoubtedly have included the conception of ethical Good. So that, if Plato received his early training in the school of Megara, he may well have heard there an application of rudimentary Ideas to problems of conduct.[5]

[1] *Early Greek Philosophy*, 2nd ed., pp. 354–6.

[2] The connexion between Pythagoreanism and the ethical side of Platonism has been already touched upon (pp. 15–17), and will be further discussed in Appendix C.

[3] Plato's *Logic*, p. 235.

[4] Diog. L. ii. 106.

[5] Too much stress must not be laid on this argument. The Megarian Theory of Ideas, first suggested by Schleiermacher's interpretation of the phrase *οἱ τῶν εἰδῶν φίλοι* (*Soph.* 246 A), is still a bone of contention to most scholars. Prof. Jackson is strongly against Schleiermacher's view. So Campbell (note, *ad loc.*) says, 'We have no authority for supposing that the Megarians departed so far from the Eleatics as to admit a plurality of *εἴδη*.' Prof. Adamson, however, points out (*Development of Greek Philosophy*, p. 88) that 'in the face of the discussions in Diodorus Cronus in regard to movement, &c., it cannot be held that the Megarians consistently and unambiguously maintained the Eleatic position of the singleness of Being. They certainly admitted a plurality of intelligible units. . . . But if there be independent grounds for assigning the conception of plurality of being to the Megarians, then every reason disappears for refusing to recognize here

But whatever may have been the historical beginning of the Theory of Ideas, this much is certain: when Plato had once obtained a sound theory of ontology and epistemology he was at liberty to work out in detail the ethic which was its final cause. At first sight it might perhaps seem that so transcendental a philosophy could avail but little in settling the problems of human life. And this, indeed, is the criticism which Aristotle so pertinaciously makes of the Ideas, and especially of the Idea of Good.[1] Aristotle's objections, however, are so well known, and the unfairness and superficiality of most of them have been so frequently discussed, that there is no need to treat of them again here. Nothing, indeed, could prove more convincingly the eternal soundness of Plato's philosophy than the trivial and unintelligent remarks of the *Magna Moralia*[2] (which on this point probably reproduce, though in a debased form, Aristotle's own opinion): Plato went wrong, he tells us, *τὴν γὰρ ἀρετὴν κατέμιξεν εἰς τὴν πραγματείαν τὴν ὑπὲρ ἀγαθοῦ, οὐ δὴ ὀρθῶς· οὐ γὰρ οἰκεῖον. ὑπὲρ γὰρ τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀληθείας λέγοντα οὐκ ἔδει ὑπὲρ ἀρετῆς φράζειν· οὐδὲν γὰρ τούτῳ κἀκείνῳ κοινόν.* Truth and Virtue have nothing to do with each other: what an echo of Protagoras!—*ἃ δή τινες τὰ φαντάσματα ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας ἀληθῆ καλοῦσιν, ἐγὼ δὲ βελτίω μὲν τἀ ἕτερα τῶν ἑτέρων, ἀληθέστερα δὲ οὐδέν.* He is trying to dethrone that very absolute standard which Plato, in defiance of Protagoras and even of Socrates, has been at such pains to establish; in a word, he denies the possibility of any judgment in morality but the conventions of the multitude or the fleeting sensibilities of the individual. Reality and truth, so far from being unrelated to *ἀρετή*, form the indispensable foundation on which its practice is possible, and the one criterion by which its value can be estimated. The Theory of Ideas is the touchstone[3] whereby we may test our golden deeds.

the Megarian doctrine: there is no other doctrine known to us, not even any form of Plato's theory of Ideas, which could be described so accurately in the terms used in this passage'.

[1] e. g. *Eth. Nic.* i. 7.

[2] 1182 a.

[3] Cf. *Gorg.* 486 D.

Leaving, then, these arid and meaningless objections, we may proceed to show, very briefly, from Plato's own works how he actually did found the conduct of every department of life upon knowledge of that Good which Aristotle considered so entirely unserviceable. The Theory of Ideas not only idealized the conception of ἔρως, but taught refinement and discretion in practice. Dialectic, or study of the Ideas, formed the culminating branch of the education of those philosophic rulers who both perfected themselves and enabled their less gifted fellow citizens to live virtuously according to their lights. It was the same Theory which settled the conflicting views as to Pleasure that neither Socrates nor Plato, in his early days, had been able to decide. It taught the function and the art of poetry and rhetoric, and was the basis of all Plato's aesthetic. And finally, by the hope of immortality which it secured, and with which it was inseparably connected, the Ideal Theory rationalized and encouraged that μελέτη θανατοῦ after which Pythagoreanism had blindly striven, thus supplying the only true motive and goal for a just and holy life—ὁμοίωσις θεῷ.

The limits of this essay do not permit a detailed discussion of these different topics, fruitful as such discussion might be. We must, therefore, rest content with indicating merely the lines on which Plato applied his fundamental doctrine to each of these cases. To adapt his own phrase, ὑπογραφὴν δεῖ νῦν θεάσασθαι, καὶ τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀπεργασίαν παριέναι.

Ἔρως, as the intellectual impulse from which the philosophic life arises, may fitly stand first. Now Socrates had employed the word as a part of his accustomed εἰρωνεία: he spoke playfully of φιλοσοφία, τὰ ἐμὰ παιδικά,[1] and called himself ἐραστὴς τῶν διαιρέσεων καὶ συναγωγῶν.[2] But such jocular allusions are very far removed from their Platonic developments. *Ἔρως* in Plato's handling ascends the brightest heaven of philosophy: ὅ γε ὄντως φιλομαθὴς . . . οὐκ ἀμβλύνοιτο οὐδ' ἀπολήγοι τοῦ ἔρωτος, πρὶν αὐτοῦ ὃ ἔστιν ἑκάστου τῆς φύσεως ἅψασθαι.[3] So in *Rep.* 403 C, he says, δεῖ

[1] *Gorg.* 482 A. [2] *Phaedr.* 252 B. [3] *Rep.* 490 B.

δέ που τελευτᾶν τὰ μουσικὰ εἰς τὰ τοῦ καλοῦ ἐρωτικά. Similarly in *Rep.* 501 D φιλόσοφοι are called τοῦ ὄντος τε καὶ ἀληθείας ἐρασταί; the ἐρωτικός takes rank with the philosopher,[1] since he is an expert in the ἔρως ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ,[2] the love that leads to wisdom. The result of a god-sent μανία,[3] the best gift of heaven, it arises from ἀνάμνησις of the Ideas awakened by the beauty of their sensible copies[4]—and more particularly by the beautiful form of the ἐρώμενος.

The more poetical and mystical side of Plato's erotic teaching is, however, so well known[5] that it need not be discussed again; we are here concerned rather to show how its lofty visions were capable of producing moderation in passion. Nor, indeed, is it wonderful that, with so exalted a view, Plato should declare that ὁ ὀρθὸς ἔρως πέφυκε κοσμίου τε καὶ καλοῦ σωφρόνως τε καὶ μουσικῶς ἐρᾶν,[6] that the best love seeks to find the attributes of God in the beloved (so causing ἐνθουσιασμός in the lover),[7] that the ἔρως θεῖος is of τῶν σωφρόνων τε καὶ δικαίων,[8] or that the soul which has left the body after a life devoted to philosophy (ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦσα καὶ τῷ ὄντι τεθνάναι μελετῶσα) is able to throw off all traces of the coarser passions—πλάνης καὶ ἀνοίας καὶ φόβων καὶ ἀγρίων ἐρώτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κακῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀπηλλαγμένη.[9] Σωφροσύνη is the mark of all genuine ἔρως, since the memory τῆς τοῦ κάλλους φύσεως that awakens love perceives it μετὰ σωφροσύνης ἐν ἁγνῷ βάθρῳ βεβῶσαν.[10]

But besides the more general aspects of the σωφροσύνη caused by his high view of ἔρως we may note how, even in the most questionable region of Plato's treatment, his παιδεραστία μετὰ φιλοσοφίας is saved from excesses by philosophic knowledge of the Ideas. Above all things, the

[1] *Phaedr.* 248 D. [2] *Meno* 70 B, *et passim.* [3] *Phaedr.* 245 B; cf. 244 A.

[4] Ib. 244 D; hence the pre-eminence of ὄψις (cf. *Rep.* 507 C) over the other senses, though even by it φρόνησις οὐχ ὁρᾶται (250 D).

[5] It has been treated in particular by Dr. W. H. Thompson (Appendix to his *Phaedrus*). Cf. Zeller's *Plato*, pp. 191-6. The development of ἔρως, through its various ascending stages, is traced in *Symp.* 208 E–212 A. In 210 B it leads to perception of the essential unity of all beauty, and so to that of the Idea. Cf. Lutoslawski, *l. c.*

[6] *Rep.* 403 A. [7] *Phaedr.* 253 A. [8] *Laws* 711 D. [9] *Phaedo* 81 A.

[10] *Phaedr.* 245 B.

good of both parties (and especially of the *ἐρώμενος*[1]), is to be sought in such a relation; hence *παιδεραστία* and *φιλοσοφία*, he tells us, ought to meet in one (*ξυμβαλεῖν εἰς ταὐτό*), *εἰ μέλλει ξυμβῆναι καλὸν γενέσθαι τὸ ἐραστῇ παιδικὰ χαρίσασθαι.*[2] Consequently mere affinity is not sufficient, *ἐὰν μὴ τυγχάνῃ γέ που ἀγαθὸν ὄν.*[3] Finally, though Plato was still Greek enough to treat with comparative leniency occasional lapses into a vice which personally he strongly deprecated,[4] yet it must be noticed that he puts forward *φιλοσοφία*, knowledge of the Ideas, as the only deterrent: *ἐὰν μὲν δὴ οὖν εἰς τεταγμένην τε δίαιταν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν νικήσῃ τὰ βελτίω τῆς διανοίας ἀγαγόντα,*[5] all will be well. Evil is due to neglect of philosophy, *ἐὰν δὲ δὴ διαίτῃ φορτικωτέρᾳ τε καὶ ἀφιλοσόφῳ*, and will be but rare, *ἅτε οὐ πάσῃ δεδογμένα τῇ διανοίᾳ*[6] *πράττοντες.* But the refining influence of his philosophy is most clearly seen in the change which it wrought in Plato's opinion on this very subject. A life spent in the pursuit of Dialectic leads him in his old age to speak of vice 'in terms of unequivocal reprobation'.[7] Thus the Ideal philosophy is by no means fruitless of practical results in its application to *ἔρως*; on the contrary, it enables the philosophic lover *μοναχοῦ . . . τίκτειν οὐκ εἴδωλα ἀρετῆς . . . ἀλλὰ ἀληθῆ, ἅτε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἐφαπτομένῳ· τεκόντι δὲ ἀρετὴν ἀληθῆ καὶ θρεψαμένῳ ὑπάρχει θεοφιλεῖ γενέσθαι, καὶ εἴπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπων ἀθανάτῳ καὶ ἐκείνῳ.*[8]

Passing to the subject of *πολιτική* or 'social ethics', it may be said that there is no aspect of life on which the influence

[1] *Symp.* 209 B. [2] Ib. 184 C. [3] Ib. 205 E.

[4] For *Rep.* 468 B need not be considered as more than (as Thompson calls it) a 'concession to the popular sentiment of the day'.

[5] *Phaedr.* 256 A, C.

[6] *διάνοια* has not here of course its technical sense (as in *Rep.* 510 A) of 'discursive' reason (as Adamson translates it). Cf. Thompson's *Meno*, p. 291.

[7] Thompson, *l. c.* Cf. *Laws* 838 E, 841 D. The same advance may be noticed in other matters. *Ἔρως* has little to do with the distasteful 'eugenics' of the *Republic*; but in *Laws* 839 A conjugal affection is encouraged: *κατὰ φύσιν μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον κεῖται, λύττης δὲ ἐρωτικῆς . . . καὶ μοιχειῶν πασῶν . . . εἴργεσθαι ποιεῖ . . ., γυναιξί τε αὐτῶν οἰκείους εἶναι φίλους.*

[8] *Symp.* 212 A.

of the Ideal philosophy is more marked. This may be due partly to its importance in the *Republic*; but in addition to that accidental predominance it was considered by Plato as *πολὺ μεγίστη καὶ καλλίστη τῆς φρονήσεως*.[1] Plato puts into Socrates' mouth the claim of being perhaps the only Athenian who was able *ἐπιχειρεῖν τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικῇ τέχνῃ καὶ πράττειν τὰ πολιτικά*, the reason being that he considered the good of the citizens, not their pleasure (*οὐ πρὸς χάριν λέγων, οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἥδιστον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον*[2]). But, in the present state of affairs, such wisdom was not regarded; *οὐκ ἐθέλων ποιεῖν ἃ σὺ παραινεῖς . . . οὐχ ἕξω ὅτι λέγω ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ*. Hence, as an historical fact, both Socrates and Plato held aloof from politics.[3] The political ignorance,[4] simplicity, and foolishness of the philosopher, *ἡ ἀσχημοσύνη δεινή, δόξαν ἀβελτερίας παρεχομένη*, are elaborately described in the wonderful passage of the *Theaetetus*.[5] A philosophic training (at least if prolonged *πόρρω τῆς ἡλικίας*) appeared to an average Athenian gentleman like Callicles as ruinous to the noblest constitution; he could not help regarding adult philosophers with ridicule, indignation, and contempt.[6]

Such charges Plato reviews and dismisses in *Republic* vi.[7] By the simile of the ship whose crew drug the pilot and then *πίνοντάς τε καὶ εὐωχουμένους πλεῖν ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς τοὺς τοιούτους* Plato shows his scorn for the vulgar detractors of philosophy, and at the same time gives them a terrible warning. *Πολιτική* is no fit study for the mob: so long as the Athenians continue *χαλκέως καὶ σκυτοτόμου συμβουλεύοντες τὰ πολιτικά*,[8] it is not likely that the philosopher's guiding will be followed. *ἐὰν μὴ οἱ φιλόσοφοι βασιλεύσωσιν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἢ οἱ βασιλῆς τε νῦν λεγόμενοι καὶ δυνάσται φιλοσο-*

[1] *Symp.* 209 A.

[2] *Gorg.* 521 D, E. It need hardly be said that this *βέλτιστον* is not the Platonic *ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*.

[3] *Apol.* 23 B, *Rep.* 496 C–E, 592 B. Plato casts reflections on Athenian statesmen in *Rep.* 488 B, 516 C.

[4] *Theaet.* 174 B. Cf. *Gorg.* 484 D.

[5] 173 C–175 B.

[6] *Gorg.* 484 C sqq. Cf. *Phaedr.* 249 D.

[7] 487 E–489 C. Cf. the philosopher's revenge in *Theaet.* 175 C sq.

[8] *Prot.* 324 C.

φήσωσι γνησίως τε καὶ ἱκανῶς, καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ταὐτὸν ξυμπέσῃ, δύναμίς τε πολιτικὴ καὶ φιλοσοφία . . . οὐκ ἔστι κακῶν παῦλα ταῖς πόλεσι, δοκῶ δ' οὐδὲ τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ γένει.[1] This idea is the key to the *Republic*; but the philosopher can accomplish nothing without such an Ideal State, *μὴ τυχὼν πολιτείας προσηκούσης· ἐν γὰρ προσηκούσῃ αὐτός τε μᾶλλον αὐξήσεται καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἰδίων τὰ κοινὰ σώσει.*[2]

Having laid this foundation Plato proceeds to set forth in detail the training of the philosophic *φύλακες*. Their education includes not only the elementary studies of music and gymnastic, and the later 'propaedeutic' studies of Book vii, but also a prolonged and arduous training in Dialectic, which leads eventually to direct apprehension of the Ideas. Now it is plain that, in a State which we are founding *οὐ μὴν πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντες, ὅπως ἕν τι ἡμῖν ἔθνος ἔσται διαφερόντως εὔδαιμον, ἀλλ' ὅπως ὅ τι μάλιστα ὅλη ἡ πόλις,*[3] the luxury of so protracted an education cannot be allowed for its own sake: our principle must be the same as Milton's, 'Not taking thought of being *late*, so it gave advantage to be more *fit*.' This most liberal of educations is given solely that the ruling class may be able to fulfil its political functions: they *owe* this service to the State in repayment for their *τροφὴ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων*;[4] they have been produced simply *ὥσπερ ἐν σμνήνεσιν ἡγεμόνας τε καὶ βασιλέας, ἄμεινόν τε καὶ τελεώτερον ἐκείνων πεπαιδευμένους.*[5] It is true that as a climax we may allow

'The happy few,
Who dwell on earth, yet breathe empyreal air'

to devote themselves to contemplation of the Good;[6] but that is only after they have spent a blameless life of self-sacrificing usefulness (*γενομένων πεντηκοντουτῶν τοὺς διασωθέντας καὶ ἀριστεύσαντας πάντα πάντῃ ἐν ἔργοις τε καὶ ἐπιστήμαις πρὸς τέλος*). Moreover, although *τὸ μὲν πολὺ πρὸς φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίβοντας*, they must take their turn in managing public affairs and in educating the next generation of

[1] *Rep.* 473 D.
[2] Ib. 497 A.
[3] Ib. 420 B; cf. 576 D.
[4] Ib. 543 C.
[5] Ib. 520 B.
[6] Ib. 540 A, B.

guardians. The life of the φύλαξ is no bed of roses: ἐπιταλαιπωροῦντας, we read, οὐχ ὡς καλόν τι ἀλλ' ὡς ἀναγκαῖον πράττοντας. They must be forced back into the Cave, and must, however unwillingly, accustom their eyes again to its darkness.[1]

Thus by the illustration of the Ideal City Plato shows how practical the object of philosophy should be. Philosophy might be advantageous to oneself, since it provides an aim in life, as well as profit and pleasure;[2] but it was less for one's own sake than for others' that it should be studied.[3] Mere theoretical and unapplied study Plato is the reverse of commending: a man may be clever but a rogue;[4] nor is he much worse than those ἐν παιδείᾳ ἐωμένους διατρίβειν διὰ τέλους, since such *dilettanti* ἑκόντες εἶναι οὐ πράξουσιν, ἡγούμενοι ἐν μακάρων νήσοις ἔτι ἀπῳκίσθαι.[5] Nay more, such purposeless philosophizing seemed to Plato as subversive to morality as the influence of the Sophists, which it resembled. It corrupted the young, leading them ὥσπερ σκυλάκια to worry their elders with the fangs of eristic they had so lately cut;[6] or even worse, it caused μισολογία, the greatest of all evils.[7] Against such effects Plato was always on his guard. 'He was persistently haunted by a sense of the awful danger of tampering in any way with the securities of the moral life, of the fatal discords that one jarring word might introduce into the complicated harmonies of the soul.'[8] If the study of philosophy was not to have beneficial results upon mankind, it would be better to leave it altogether alone.[9] It is strange, indeed, that any careful reader of Plato should fail to perceive the deep ethical purpose that underlies the most abstruse developments of his philosophy.

The objection, however, may naturally be raised that if, according to Plato, virtue be truly attainable only through

[1] *Rep.* 520 C, 539 E. [2] Glauco in *Symp.* 173 A, C.
[3] Cf. *Rep.* 500 D, 528 A. Cf. the test of the πολιτικὸς ἀνήρ in *Meno* 100 A οἷος καὶ ἄλλον ποιῆσαι πολιτικόν. [4] *Rep.* 519 A.
[5] Ib. 519 C. [6] Ib. 539 B. [7] *Phaedo* 89 D.
[8] Shorey, *The Idea of Good in Plato's Republic*, p. 213. (Cf. also pp. 220, 221.) He refers to *Prot.* 314 A, *Laches* 187 B, *Rep.* 608 B, &c.
[9] Cf. *Rep.* 451 A.

knowledge of the Good, and if that knowledge be possible only to the survivors of an education lasting at least fifty years, then his ethical theory is indeed visionary and impracticable, and his system of education an unserviceable ideal. But to the latter objection one would answer that Plato's conception of education as a *τροφή* [1] of the whole nature, a *περιαγωγὴ ψυχῆς ἐκ νυκτερινῆς τινος ἡμέρας εἰς ἀληθινήν*,[2] a *περικοπή* of the sensual appetites which *ὥσπερ μολυβδίδες . . . περικάτω στρέφουσι τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ὄψιν* [3]—that such an ideal cannot fail to inspire the teacher, unrealizable though he may feel it to be: *ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπιχειροῦντί τοι τοῖς καλοῖς καλὸν καὶ πάσχειν ὅ τι ἄν τῳ συμβῇ παθεῖν*.[4] One has only to read Nettleship's essay in *Hellenica* to understand the living power of Plato's Theory of Education;[5] whilst the recurrence of the *Republic* as a set book for pedagogical examinations in the Universities proves its value even under modern conditions.[6]

So to the former criticism it must be replied that the high requirements of Plato's ethics are, from his own point of view, fully justified. Plato makes no scruple of insisting that but few are chosen: *ναρθηκοφόροι μὲν πολλοί, βάκχοι δέ τε παῦροι*.[7] He has a contempt for *τὸ πλῆθος* as great [8] as that of Heraclitus,—though he is less bitter than *ὁ κοκκυστὴς ὀχλολοίδορος*.[9] The many can never attain to that true virtue which, *ἡγουμένης ἀληθείας*, includes *τὸν ἄλλον τῆς φιλοσόφου φύσεως χορόν* (viz. *ἀνδρεία, μεγαλοπρέπεια, εὐμάθεια, μνήμη*).[10] But Plato is very far from supposing that they

[1] Cf. Nettleship, p. 71. [2] *Rep.* 521 C. [3] Ib. 519 A.

[4] *Phaedr.* 274 A.

[5] Cf. Dr. Adam's advice to a schoolmaster to 'read and re-read' this essay. 'It gives,' he says, 'the best ideal I know of after which a schoolmaster or teacher should strive' (*Memoir*, p. xli). Nettleship has indeed dealt so finally with the subject of Plato's Theory of Education that no more need be said of it here.

[6] The modern teacher cannot however fall back upon *ἀνάμνησις* as it is used, e. g., in the *Meno*; and its substitute, heredity, is often the reverse of an ally.

[7] *Phaedo* 69 D; cf. 76 B, *Theaet.* 176 B, *Phaedr.* 250 A, B.

[8] *Rep.* 494 A *φιλόσοφον ἄρα πλῆθος ἀδύνατον εἶναι.* 535 A *οὐ γὰρ νόθους ἔδει ἅπτεσθαι* (*φιλοσοφίας*), *ἀλλὰ γνησίους.* Cf. 576 C, *Gorg.* 474 A.

[9] Timon ap. Diog. Laert. ix. 6.

[10] *Rep.* 490 C.

cannot be virtuous at all: under the guidance of the philosopher-*φύλακες*[1] they may practise a partial virtue, *ἡ δημοτικὴ καὶ πολιτικὴ ἀρετή* as it is called in the *Phaedo*.[2] Hence the enormous importance which attaches to the philosopher: he has not only to be virtuous himself, but to superintend the virtue of the masses. For such a task it is essential that he have a genuine acquaintance with the Good: *οἶμαι γοῦν δίκαιά τε καὶ καλὰ ἀγνοούμενα ὅπῃ ποτε ἀγαθά ἐστιν, οὐ πολλοῦ τινος ἄξιον φύλακα κεκτῆσθαι ἂν ἑαυτῶν τὸν τοῦτο ἀγνοοῦντα, μαντεύομαι δὲ μηδένα αὐτὰ πρότερον γνώσεσθαι ἱκανῶς*.[3] Thus the fact that the multitude cannot rise to the truest virtue is all the more reason why those whose *ἔργον* it is to rule should receive so elaborate an education.

Knowledge of the Good furnishes so far-reaching an insight that the *φύλακες* will be able to descry the *ἔργον* of each individual in the State—thus enabling him *τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν* (i. e. to be just): which, it may be added, is perhaps the hardest task for the modern schoolmaster. Further, it allows the philosopher to justify the means by the end in a manner somewhat repugnant to present day morality. Since the only real lie, *τὸ ὡς ἀληθῶς* (or *ἄκρατον*) *ψεῦδος*, is the lie in the soul,[4] the *φιλόσοφος* may resort to *ψεύδη ἐν φαρμάκου εἴδει*,[5] like the *γενναῖον*

[1] *Rep.* 500 D sq. Cf. 540 A, B.

[2] 82 B. The subject is treated exhaustively in Archer-Hind's Appendix. He distinguishes two main varieties of this vulgar *ἀρετὴ ἄνευ φρονήσεως*. We are here concerned only with that described in *Rep.* 500 D sq. *δημοτικὴ ἀρετή* which has no philosophic guidance (being founded only on *δόξα*) is valueless, even when *θείᾳ μοίρᾳ παραγιγνομένη* (*Meno* 99 E); but when ordained by one who possesses *ἐπιστήμη* it is 'no longer a contemptible thing'. The philosopher 'does not construct it on any utilitarian basis' [this statement should be somewhat qualified], 'but out of his knowledge of ideal truth. . . . Yet, as the multitude hold it, it is utilitarian . . . thus they are still, though in a far more refined sense, *δι' ἀκολασίαν σεσωφρονισμένοι*' (Archer-Hind, p. 152). Presumably the souls of those who have practised such superintended virtue may in another incarnation be promoted to the rank of philosophers: the other class will pass into bees or wasps or ants, *ἢ καὶ εἰς ταὐτόν γε πάλιν τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος, καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἐξ αὐτῶν ἄνδρας μετρίους* (*Phaed. l. c.*),—though a far more terrible fate is given in *Rep.* 619 C to the man *ἔθει ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετῆς μετειληφότα*.

[3] *Rep.* 506 A. [4] Ib. 382 B, 485 C. [5] Ib. 382 C, 389 B, 459 D.

ψεῦδος of *Rep.* 414 B–415 A, or the κλῆροι κομψοί which fraudulently regulate marriages.[1] (It has been already observed how such utilitarianism colours the Idea of Good, ᾗ δίκαια καὶ τἆλλα προσχρησάμενα χρήσιμα καὶ ὠφέλιμα γίγνεται.[2]) Thus, like St. Paul, ὁ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφος must be 'all things to all men, if haply he may win some'.[3] In fact, so far from idly dreaming the impossible, Plato goes out of his way to make philosophy consider the weakness of actual humanity:[4] in the department of πολιτική knowledge of the Ideas connects itself intimately with everyday life.

In the matter of Pleasure, again, it was the Ideal Theory which first brought Plato to a distinct and certain doctrine. We have seen that Socrates, in common with some of the Sophists, was at times inclined to Hedonism, and that from this tendency in his teaching arose the Cyrenaic development. Plato apparently started by sharing the views of his master (e. g. in the *Protagoras*);[5] but afterwards he seems to have turned violently anti-hedonistic. 'Thus the *Gorgias*,' says Bury,[6] 'emphatically maintains that, so far from

[1] *Rep.* 460 A. [2] Ib. 505 A.

[3] Since parallels between Plato and St. Paul are frequently drawn it may perhaps be not too fanciful to see a resemblance in the ἀρετὴ ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας to 'works' uninformed by faith. Moreover, just as both the vulgar ἀρετή and the 'works' are superficially good, so neither Plato nor St. Paul has any desire to induce lawlessness by his censure of customary morality; on the contrary, Plato seeks to establish such virtue on a sound basis; while St. Paul uses exactly similar language with regard to the Law (νόμον οὖν καταργοῦμεν διὰ τῆς πίστεως; μὴ γένοιτο· ἀλλὰ νόμον ἱστῶμεν. Rom. iii. 31; cf. chap. vi, &c.). It may be added that, as Plato has no patience with abstract purposeless philosophy, so St. James declares faith without works to be dead, since ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ἡ πίστις ἐτελειώθη (James ii. 22).

[4] It makes no difference whether ἡ ἐν λόγοις κειμένη πόλις can ever exist on earth or not (592 B): the point is that its internal constitution is formed so as to regulate men as they now are.

[5] According to the view of the Dialogue taken in this paper: but v. Bury, *Philebus*, p. xxvii.

[6] *l. c.* 'Socrates' is so set against Pleasure in the *Gorgias* that his opponent declares the result of his teaching would be τὸ ὥσπερ λίθον ζῆν (434 A). In 506 C sqq. he recapitulates the arguments, that: (1) τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν; (2) τὸ ἡδὺ πρακτέον ἕνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ; (3) ἀγαθόν consists in the presence of ἀρετή, which in all cases παραγίγνεται τάξει καὶ ὀρθότητι καὶ τέχνῃ.

pleasure being the highest good or right object of universal pursuit, it is, on the contrary, better to suffer the pain of injury than to inflict injury, and better to suffer the pain of just punishment than to escape unpunished and unreformed. And a similar purely hostile tone to the claims of Pleasure is observable in the discussion in *Republic* ix (580 D ff.), which deserves close comparison with that in the *Philebus*, as emphasizing the fleeting, illusory, and impure character of most kinds of pleasure (esp. 583–4), and ascribing the best and truest kind to the philosophic life of contemplation (586 E).'[1] In all these earlier discussions there is, then, but little mention of the Ideas—indeed, the only direct mention occurs in the passage last referred to.[2] Consequently Plato is not able to come to any final decision on the subject of Pleasure, since such a decision 'requires that it shall be reduced, as it were, to the same common denominator as Knowledge and the Good '.[3]

This final decision is made in the *Philebus*.[4] The object of that Dialogue is to determine the relative places of Wisdom

[1] It is emphatically stated (*Rep.* 607 A) that *ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη* must not be allowed to rule in the City *ἀντὶ νόμου τε καὶ τοῦ κοινῇ δεὶ δόξαντος εἶναι βελτίστου λόγου.*

[2] Indirectly there does seem to be a reference to knowledge of the Ideas. For Thompson (Introd. to *Gorgias*, pp. ix, x) proves 'the substantial identity of the notions of Justice or Virtue which are briefly sketched in the *Gorgias*, and thoroughly worked out in the *Republic*'. But since *δικαιοσύνη* (in *Rep.*) consists in the *ἁρμονία* (whether in macro- or microcosm) caused by the supremacy of *λογιστικόν*, it follows that the *σωφροσύνη* (of the *Gorgias*), which consists in *κόσμος* or *τάξις*, must also depend ultimately on the direction of Reason—i. e. knowledge of the Ideas. Further, the same authority holds that *μέτρον* in the *Philebus* is only a more abstract term (as suiting the metaphysical character of that Dialogue) for *κόσμος* or *τάξις* of the *Gorgias*. So that here too may be traced, in a rudimentary form, the notion that the Good formed the ultimate standard by which to judge Pleasure.

[3] Bury, *l. c.*, p. xxiii.

[4] 64 A sqq.: e. g. *καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον τοίνυν τῶν τριῶν πρὸς τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὸν νοῦν κρίνωμεν· δεῖ γὰρ ἰδεῖν ποτέρῳ μᾶλλον ξυγγενὲς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἀπονεμοῦμεν.* In 52 A it is observed that the final appeal must be *πρὸς ἀλήθειαν.* We find, by the illustration of colour, that *ἡδονή* is most true and beautiful when painless and pure (53 B). Again (53 C) it is proved that *ἡδονή* cannot be the Good (cf. 54 D) : for, if it is always a *γένεσις*, not an *οὐσία*, it must always be a means, not an end.

and Pleasure; and the only criterion by which the choice can be made is the Idea of Good, in its three aspects of *ἀλήθεια*, *μετριότης*, and *κάλλος*. Tried by each of the three, Pleasure is found wanting: for (1) *ἡδονὴ μὲν γὰρ ἁπάντων ἀλαζονίστατον* (whereas *νοῦς* is *ἤτοι ταὐτὸν καὶ ἀλήθεια ἢ πάντων ὁμοιότατόν τε καὶ ἀληθέστατον*). (2) *οἶμαι . . . ἡδονῆς μὲν καὶ περιχαρείας οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων πεφυκὸς ἀμετρώτερον εὑρεῖν ἄν τινα,—νοῦ δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήμης ἐμμετρώτερον οὐδ' ἂν ἕν ποτε.* (3) Whereas *φρόνησιν μὲν καὶ νοῦν . . . οὐδεὶς πώποτε οὔθ' ὕπαρ οὔτ' ὄναρ αἰσχρὸν οὔτε εἶδεν οὔτε ἐπενόησεν οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς* κτλ., yet *ἡδοναί* (*καὶ ταῦτα σχεδὸν αἱ μέγισται*) are frequently accompanied by *τὸ γελοῖον ἢ τὸ πάντων αἴσχιστον*. Hence our verdict is that though the Good must be awarded the first place, *μυρίῳ γ' αὖ νοῦς ἡδονῆς οἰκειότερον καὶ προσφυέστερον πέφανται νῦν τῇ τοῦ νικῶντος ἰδέᾳ*. Pleasure, in fact, comes *πέμπτον κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν*, and then it includes only those *ἡδονὰς ἃς ἔθεμεν ἀλύπους ὁρισάμενοι, καθαρὰς ἐπονομάσαντες τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς, ἐπιστήμαις, τὰς δὲ αἰσθήσεσιν ἑπομένας*.

Thus the Idea of Good, so far from being utterly remote from human concerns, provides a certain and accurate solution — its mathematical accuracy is indeed almost amusing—of the conflict which all must face. It is the 'Choice of Hercules' over again: but instead of a pretty little apologue we have now an incontrovertible proof. The Platonic 'Good' does not seem to be so hopelessly *οὐ πρακτόν* after all. It leads Plato to take a much wider and more sympathetic view of life than was possible in his anti-hedonistic period. Hence in his old age we find him returning to a position which superficially seems identical with that of the *Protagoras* (*Laws* 734 A). But, to quote from Mr. Benn's essay on 'The Idea of Nature in Plato',[1] 'since writing the *Protagoras* Plato has learned, as the *Philebus* and *Timaeus* show, to interpret Pleasure as an index of a healthy and normal condition, so that to accept it as a guide is now, in his opinion, more clearly equivalent to placing oneself under the guidance of nature;

[1] *Archiv für Gesch. d. Phil.* ix, p. 40.

and this is why he now ventures to avow that "no one if he can help it will allow himself to be persuaded to do what is followed by more pain than pleasure" (663 B); and to declare on another occasion, in language as strong as Bentham's, that "pleasures and pains and desires are by nature the most human thing of all, and on them every mortal necessarily hangs and depends" (732 E).'

Plato's aesthetic doctrine, again, is especially interesting, for it shows very clearly how his whole outlook on life was dominated by ethical considerations; whilst the permanent value of his conceptions is proved by the art they have inspired. There can be no doubt about Plato's real love for poetry, and for art generally: when he is forced to make hard regulations he feels that *φιλία γέ τίς με καὶ αἰδὼς ἐκ παιδὸς ἔχουσα περὶ Ὁμήρου ἀποκωλύει λέγειν.*[1] The idea of Beauty permeates all his philosophy. 'The loveliness of virtue as a harmony, the winning aspect of those "images" of the absolute and unseen, Temperance, Bravery, Justice, shed around us in the visible world for eyes that can see, the claim of the virtues as a visible representation by human persons and their acts of the eternal qualities of "the eternal", after all far outweigh, as he thinks, the claim of their mere utility.'[2] His own inclinations, if, as a private individual, he could have given them free play, would certainly have been all in favour of art, and of those artists whom he considered divinely inspired. And yet, as a matter of fact, his hostility to art is notorious—so much so that it has often seemed to his admirers quite incompatible with his temperament. But the explanation lies in the fact that Plato was concerned above all with character and conduct; anything, however desirable, which may harm that, must go: *οὐ γὰρ πρό γε τῆς ἀληθείας τιμητέος ἀνήρ.*

It was then on ethical and religious grounds that Plato excluded poetry and the other arts from the Ideal State. And it must be remembered that 'he was thinking less of

[1] *Rep.* 595 B. Cf. 607 C. Cf. Adam on 501 B.

[2] Walter Pater, *Plato and Platonism* (p. 245): the whole of Chap. x is most illuminating.

the inherent possibilities of Art, than of actual Greek Art and poetry': [1] Plato's quarrel was not so much the *παλαιὰ διαφορά* with poetry as such, as a censure of the evil qualities which he found in Homer or Hesiod.[2] The same considerations led to his judgments on painting, the plastic arts,[3] drama,[4] and music.[5] So powerful is 'the ethical influence of aesthetic qualities' [6] that we can allow these arts into the City only in their best and simplest form: *μέγας γὰρ ὁ ἀγών, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, μέγας, οὐχ ὅσος δοκεῖ, τὸ χρηστὸν ἢ κακὸν γενέσθαι, ὥστε οὔτε τιμῇ ἐπαρθέντα οὔτε χρήμασιν οὔτε ἀρχῇ οὐδεμιᾷ οὐδέ γε ποιητικῇ ἄξιον ἀμελῆσαι δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς.*[7] If only Poetry can prove herself *οὐ μόνον ἡδεῖα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὠφελίμη πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας καὶ τὸν βίον τὸν ἀνθρώπινον*, we shall be only too glad to receive her—*ἄσμενοι ἂν καταδεχοίμεθα.*[8] Nothing could be plainer than that Plato's objections to Art were primarily ethical: Art, as then practised in Greece, was detrimental to the character; even at its best, 'Art, as such, as Plato knows, has no purpose but itself, its own perfection—*ἆρ' οὖν καὶ ἑκάστῃ τῶν τεχνῶν ἔστι τι συμφέρον ἄλλο ἢ ὅτι μάλιστα τελέαν εἶναι;*' [9] For purposes of moral training Art was either harmful, or, at least consciously, useless. (Cf. *Gorg.* 501 D sq.)

But, as usual, Plato would not be content until he had brought the Theory of Ideas to bear upon the subject under discussion. So far the arguments against Art have been of a more or less empirical nature: before they can be finally accepted they must be proved *ἐκ τῆς εἰωθυίας μεθόδου.*

[1] Adam on *Rep.* 598 A.

[2] e. g. their tales of the gods (*Rep.* 377–89), and of heroes (ib. 391–2). Cf. 607 A.

[3] Ib. 401 B.

[4] Both comedy (ib. 606 C) and tragedy (ib. 605 C) are proscribed. The influence of acting is bad for the character (ib. 395).

[5] Only the Dorian and Phrygian modes are allowed (ib. 389 sq.).

[6] The phrase is Pater's. Cf. esp. ib. 401 B . . . *ἵνα μὴ ἐν κακίας εἰκόσι τρεφόμενοι ἡμῖν οἱ φύλακες ὥσπερ ἐν κακῇ βοτάνῃ, κτλ.*

[7] Ib. 608 B.

[8] Ib. 607 C, D.

[9] Pater, *l. c.* He says that Plato 'anticipates the modern notion . . . "art for art's sake"'. But Plato would never have pushed the theory to the lengths expressed, e. g. in the Preface to *Dorian Grey.*

Plato's own devotion to Poetry was such that he could not willingly exclude her in the way that his sense of duty bade him; and he therefore seems anxious to receive the support of the Ideal Philosophy. Hence it is not very wonderful that (as Adam says)[1] he 'bases his unfavourable verdict on what must be admitted to be a narrow and scholastic interpretation of his own ontology', for he was glad enough to find any application of it which would strengthen his reason against the pleadings of a life-long affection.[2]

The metaphysical grounds on which Plato objects to Art are well known, and need not here be detailed. The artist makes but a second-hand imitation of the really-existing *παράδειγμα*: *εἴπερ μιμητής ἐστι, τρίτος τις ἀπὸ βασιλέως καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας πεφυκώς.*[3] Even the object that he copies has no existence, so that his art is only a *μίμησις φαντάσματος.*[4] So far from knowing *πάσας μὲν τέχνας, πάντα δὲ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια τὰ πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ κακίαν καὶ τά γε θεῖα*, he knows nothing at all; for who would be content with making *εἴδωλα* if he understood reality?[5] or if any of the poets had been useful to the State in legislation, strategy, invention, or any other human activity, would they have been treated so poorly?[6] No, *τοῦ μὲν ὄντος οὐδὲν ἐπαΐει, τοῦ δὲ φαινομένου*:[7] in fact he will not even possess right opinion as to the value of his work—*οὔτε ἄρα εἴσεται οὔτε ὀρθὰ δοξάσει ὁ μιμητὴς περὶ ὧν ἂν μιμῆται πρὸς κάλλος ἢ πονηρίαν.*[8] After so crushing a defeat poetry will no longer cause Plato any hesitation: except where its influence is directly beneficial —*ὅσον μόνον ὕμνους θεοῖς καὶ ἐγκώμια τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς*—it cannot be admitted into the City.[9] And if we feel any symptoms of yielding to our former love, we must resort to this final

[1] On *Rep.* 598 A.

[2] This must not be taken to mean that Plato was insincere in seeking a metaphysical justification for what he had already determined on other grounds. It is simply a question of the order in which the arguments shaped themselves in his mind.

[3] Ib. 597 E. [4] Ib. 597 A. [5] Ib. 599 A. [6] Ib. 600 D.
[7] Ib. 601 B. [8] Ib. 602 A. [9] Ib. 607 A.

Additional Note.—It may seem strange to us that Plato places the *δημιουργός* higher than the *ζωγράφος*; but we must remember the poor estimation in which painters were held by the Greeks. We should be inclined to say

decision, *ἐπᾴδοντες ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, ὃν λέγομεν, καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἐπῳδήν, εὐλαβούμενοι πάλιν ἐμπεσεῖν εἰς τὸν παιδικόν τε καὶ τὸν τῶν πολλῶν ἔρωτα.*[1]

And yet, in spite of all Plato's strictures, there is no doubt that the Ideal Theory has been most fruitful in this very matter of Art. It not only provides an absolute standard of taste, but, as Adam points out, 'it is also a historical fact that Plato's vision of a transcendent standard of Beauty, "everywhere and always and in all relations beautiful," has fired the imagination of artists in more than one generation, and was in particular the inspiring motive of the art of Michael Angelo, in whose lifetime the famous Academy at Florence made Platonism live again.'[2] Nothing could clear Plato more triumphantly from the charge of sterility: 'out of the eater came forth meat, and out of the strong came forth sweetness.'

that while the workman copies the phenomenon, the artist directly imitates the Idea; yet this thought does not seem to have occurred to Plato. A passage like *Rep.* 472 D can surely suggest nothing of the sort. In spite of what Adam says, the *ζωγράφος* who paints a *παράδειγμα, οἷος ἂν εἴη ὁ κάλλιστος ἄνθρωπος*, is not credited with any apprehension of the Ideal man. He is simply doing what Socrates mentions (Xen. *Mem.* iii. 10. 2) *ἐκ πολλῶν συνάγοντες τὰ ἐξ ἑκάστου κάλλιστα οὕτως τὰ σώματα καλὰ ποιεῖτε φαίνεσθαι.* Indeed, the only artist who could paint direct from the Ideal world would be one who had been all through the philosopher's education; and his duties as *φύλαξ* would hardly allow him leisure for anything so trivial as making *εἴδωλα*.

[1] *Rep.* 608 A. There is also the argument from Psychology, that the lower and rebellious element of the soul delights in excessive emotions (604 D–605 B), and that these are fostered by tragedy. The heaviest charge of all is that it demoralizes *καὶ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς*. Moreover, Plato elsewhere (*Meno* 99 C) repeats the Socratic opinion that poets wrote *οὐ σοφίᾳ, ἀλλὰ φύσει τινὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες* (*Apol.* 22 C). And yet such *ἐνθουσιασμός*, even though it comes *θείᾳ μοίρᾳ* (*Meno*, *l.c.*), and is a branch of the divinely-sent *μανία* (*Phaedrus* 245 A, 248 E)—and, incidentally, though the inspiring god be Apollo, the patron of the City—yet is ranked only at the third remove from Reality. Plato is certainly loyal to the Ideas!

[2] *Gifford Lectures*, p. 428. He refers (note on *Rep.* 598 A) to J. A. Symonds's *Renaissance in Italy*, vol. ii, p. 323: 'Michael Angelo, seated between Ficino and Poliziano, with the voices of the prophets vibrating in his memory, and with the music of Plato sounding in his ears, rests chin on hand and elbow on knee, like his own Jeremiah, lost in contemplation, whereof the after-fruit shall be the Sistine Chapel and the Medicean tombs.' Michael Angelo did, so to say, paint directly from the Ideal.

The subject of Rhetoric need not detain us long. Its nature is discussed at length in the *Gorgias*—the type of Rhetoric there considered being of course that practised by ordinary orators and taught by Gorgias. In 453 A Gorgias admits that *πειθοῦς δημιουργός ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορική* is a fair definition; but he is unable to answer satisfactorily the question, Persuasion as to *what*? Socrates, therefore, proceeds to class *ῥητορική* with *ὀψοποιία* as an art whose end is mere gratification:[1] both are branches of *κολακεία*.[2] Thus, as it is ordinarily employed, Rhetoric is hurtful;[3] its only real use is to enable a man to expose his own injustice.[4] This leads Socrates to the consideration of a higher sort of Rhetoric, which aims at the improvement of the audience.[5] At this point there arises the need of some standard (which such men as Miltiades, Themistocles, and Pericles did not possess) other than a man's own interest: *ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιστον λέγων, ἃ ἂν λέγῃ ἄλλο τι οὐκ εἰκῇ ἐρεῖ, ἀλλ' ἀποβλέπων πρός τι*;[6] Hence we reach the final definition of Rhetoric, which depends upon Dialectic or knowledge of the Ideas: it is to the Ideas of Justice and Temperance that the true orator will look, endeavouring to produce similar qualities in the minds of his hearers.—*πρὸς ταῦτα βλέπων ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐκεῖνος, ὁ τέχνικός τε καὶ ἀγαθός, . . . πρὸς τοῦτο ἀεὶ τὸν νοῦν ἔχων, ὅπως ἂν αὐτοῦ τοῖς πολίταις δικαιοσύνη μὲν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς γίγνηται, ἀδικία δὲ ἀπαλλάττηται, καὶ σωφροσύνη μὲν ἐγγίγνηται, ἀκολασία δὲ ἀπαλλάττηται, καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ἀρετὴ ἐγγίγνηται, κακία δὲ ἀπίῃ.*[7]

Similarly it is argued in the *Phaedrus* that the orator must have Knowledge, or else he will put good for evil, unwittingly (260 A–C). If *ῥητορική* be *τέχνη ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων*,[8] he must evidently know exactly *whither* he is leading the minds of his audience. Therefore the rhetorician must not only understand psychology: he must also learn the method of Dialectic, and moreover what

[1] *Gorg.* 462 D. [2] Ib. 463 A. [3] Cf. ib. 502 E.
[4] Ib. 480 B; and, in a secondary way, to defend himself against an unjust enemy.
[5] Ib. 503 A. [6] Ib. 503 E. [7] Ib. 504 D. [8] *Phaedr.* 261 A.

is acceptable to God—*ἐὰν μή τις τῶν τε ἀκουσομένων τὰς φύσεις διαριθμήσηται, καὶ κατ' εἴδη τε διαιρεῖσθαι τὰ ὄντα καὶ μιᾷ ἰδέᾳ δυνατὸς ᾖ καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον περιλαμβάνειν, οὔ ποτ' ἔσται τεχνικὸς λόγων πέρι καθ' ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ.*[1] The road is long, but with such high ends in view we cannot wonder at that; while even the objects of vulgar Rhetoric can be best attained by this method.[2] Thus the training of the true *ῥητώρ* is the same in many ways as that of the Dialectician.[3] 'Yet,' as Zeller says,[4] 'they do not absolutely coincide. The philosopher instructs his hearers by imparting truth, and guides them methodically to discover it; the rhetorician seeks only to persuade, and to work upon their wills and inclinations: and, as the majority of mankind is incapable of scientific knowledge, he can rely only on probabilities, and must not hesitate to deceive those whom he wishes to convince.' We have seen how the *φύλαξ* of the *Republic* must employ this kind of Rhetoric: it is in fact the channel through which he teaches to the populace that *δημοτική τε καὶ πολιτικὴ ἀρετή* which is the highest they can attain. So that the Ideal Theory not only explains the art of true Rhetoric, but shows when its practice is justifiable.

This 'persuasion' of the multitude on the part of the philosopher is illustrated by the use to which he puts the doctrine of immortality. 'In the true Platonic system of ethics immortality plays no part,' as Archer-Hind says.[5] But since the many cannot, as we have seen, ever rise to the conception which renders possible a true moral code, 'the best they can do is to accept one from the philosopher

[1] *Phaedr.* 273 E; cf. 277 B.

[2] Ib. 274 A.

[3] It is noticeable that knowledge of the good, the just, &c. (*τὸν δικαίων τε καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐπιστήμας ἔχοντα* 276 C) will keep a man from the barren habit of writing—except *παιδιᾶς χάριν*. The noblest work, and that which best suits the philosopher, is the improvement of others' minds by the art of Dialectic: *πολὺ δ' οἶμαι καλλίων σπουδὴ περὶ αὐτὰ γίγνεται, ὅταν τις τῇ διαλεκτικῇ τέχνῃ χρώμενος, λάβων ψυχὴν προσήκουσαν, φυτεύῃ τε καὶ σπείρῃ μετ' ἐπιστήμης λόγους, οἳ ἑαυτοῖς τῷ τε φυτεύσαντι βοηθεῖν ἱκανοὶ καὶ οὐχὶ ἄκαρποι ἀλλὰ ἔχοντες σπέρμα, ὅθεν ἄλλοι ἐν ἄλλοις ἤθεσι φυόμενοι τοῦτ' ἀεὶ ἀθάνατον παρέχειν ἱκανοί, καὶ τὸν ἔχοντα εὐδαιμονεῖν ποιοῦντες εἰς ὅσον ἀνθρώπῳ δυνατὸν μάλιστα.*

[4] *Plato*, p. 514.

[5] Introd. to *Phaedo*, p. xiv.

. . . But the philosopher must hold out some inducement for the people to receive his teaching; and this inducement may be derived from immortality. The philosopher will persuade the people to follow his precepts by showing that a life of intelligent virtue is the forerunner of free intellectual enjoyment in the invisible world, but a life of vice can only lead after death to helpless cravings for bodily pleasures which are out of reach. So by deducing immortality from the ideal theory, Plato uses that theory to provide a working code of morals for those who are incapable of rising to the only true and rational virtue.' To this may be added the threats of eternal punishment which Plato (borrowing perhaps from Pythagoreanism) holds over the incurable sinner;[1] to say nothing of the degrading transmigrations which a life of vice entails. All these 'inducements' to virtue follow directly from the doctrine of immortality.

But it cannot be too strongly insisted upon that such considerations are merely popular: with the philosopher they will have no weight. He will pursue virtue for its own sake, not for that of any external punishments or rewards, as do *οἱ δι' ἀκολασίαν σεσωφρονισμένοι*. Mindful of his high origin he will fear nothing but the effects of vice on his own nature—

'And think how evil becometh him to slide,
Who seeketh Heaven and comes of heavenly breath;'

his only dread is alienation from God here and hereafter.[2] It is true that Plato suggests that for the *θεοφιλής* 'all things work together for good', even in this life; *οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὑπό γε θεῶν ποτε ἀμελεῖται ὃς ἂν προθυμεῖσθαι ἐθέλῃ δίκαιος γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐπιτηδεύων ἀρετὴν εἰς ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ ὁμοιοῦσθαι θεῷ*.[3] But it is not for such *νικητήρια* that he runs; for after all they are obtainable only in the visionary City of the Just. Yet if that City can never be established, the good

[1] *Gorg.* 525 B–D, *Rep.* 616 A, *Phaedo* 113 E.

[2] It is only the philosopher who can join the company of the gods after death: *Phaedo* 82 B, 108 C. Cf. 107 C.

[3] *Rep.* 613 A. There is here perhaps an echo of Socratic thought: cf. *Apol.* 41 C.

man will still seek to found it in himself[1]—*ἑαυτὸν κατοικίζειν*. His endeavour will be to grow like to God, and this he can accomplish only by the aid of philosophy. Constant intercourse with the unchanging nature of the Ideas – *τεταγμένα ἄττα καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἀεὶ ἔχοντα*—will assimilate him gradually to the divine: *θείῳ δὴ καὶ κοσμίῳ ὅ γε φιλόσοφος ὁμιλῶν κόσμιός τε καὶ θεῖος εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ γίγνεται.*[2] Hence his education will derive far more from the study of philosophy than from the scurrilous tales told by poets of the gods: indeed, these must not be permitted at all, *εἰ μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ φύλακες θεοσεβεῖς τε καὶ θεῖοι γίγνεσθαι, καθ' ὅσον ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον οἷόν τε.*[3] Finally, this *ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ* is depicted as an escape (*φυγή*) from the evils of this life; since *οὐκ ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακὰ δυνατόν*, the only help for the righteous man is to attempt *ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε φεύγειν ὅτι τάχιστα.* And this 'escape', this 'becoming like to God', means the intelligent philosophic practice of virtue: *ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι.*[4] Thus *ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν*, which is 'the ethical end for man',[5] cannot be achieved except through Knowledge of the Ideas.

This notion, Orphic or Pythagorean[6] in origin, of philosophy as a deliverance from the evils of this life and its bodily conditions, is elaborated in the *Phaedo*. The body is there spoken of as a prison,[7] from which escape is possible only when soul is freed from body. This separation, *λύσις*

[1] *Rep.* 592 B.

[2] Ib. 500 C, D. He will even attempt to produce this result in the people, so far as they are capable of approaching *τὸ θεοειδές τε καὶ θεοείκελον* (501 B). And after all man as such is *οὐράνιον φυτόν, οὐκ ἔγγειον* (*Tim.* 90 A).

[3] *Rep.* 383 C. The overwhelming importance of education is shown by *Phaedo* 107 D *οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἔχουσα εἰς Ἅιδου ἡ ψυχὴ ἔρχεται πλὴν τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς*, κτλ.

[4] *Theaet.* 176 A sq.

[5] Adam, *ad Rep.* 613 A. It recalls, as he says, 'the old Pythagorean maxims *ἕπου θεῷ, ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ θεῷ*. Cf. *Laws* 716 C (already quoted), and *Rep.* 540 A.

[6] See Appendix C.

[7] e.g. *Phaedo* 62 B. In 82 E occurs the forcible phrase *παραλαβοῦσα αὐτῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἡ φιλοσοφία ἀτεχνῶς διαδεδεμένην ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ προσκεκολλημένην, ἀναγκαζομένην δὲ ὥσπερ διὰ εἱργμοῦ διὰ τούτου σκοπεῖσθαι τὰ ὄντα*, κτλ. Cf. the Pythagorean notion of *σῶμα σῆμα*, which is referred to in *Phaedr.* 250 C, *Gorg.* 493 A, *Crat.* 400 C.

καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος, is in effect Death;[1] but usually the soul has grown so 'clotted by contagion' with the corporeal that she cannot escape even then.[2] With the philosopher, however, it is different: his whole life has been a 'rehearsal of death', *μελέτη θανάτου*; hence in his case alone is the deliverance complete.[3]

Now this *μελέτη θανάτου* consists in the study of Philosophy, and the life that such study demands. The captivity of the soul is due to three causes in particular: (1) mistaking sense impressions for truth: *δοξάζουσαν ταῦτα ἀληθῆ εἶναι ἅπερ ἂν καὶ τὸ σῶμα φῇ*;[4] (2) indulging in bodily pleasures—thus undoing the work of Philosophy;[5] (3) considering that what awakens such pleasures must be most surely true—*ὃ πάντων μέγιστόν τε κακῶν καὶ ἔσχατόν ἐστι*.[6] The first and the last of these causes are in a sense intellectual—Philosophy is plainly the cure for them; whilst the second will be eradicated as the soul grows in wisdom. For the soul of the philosopher understands the folly of binding herself in the fetters from which *φιλοσοφία* has loosed her, by indulging again in bodily pleasures: on the contrary, *γαλήνην τούτων παρασκευάζουσα, ἑπομένη τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ ἀεὶ ἐν τούτῳ οὖσα, τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ θεῖον καὶ ἀδόξαστον θεωμένη καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνου τρεφομένη, ζῆν τε οἴεται οὕτω δεῖν ἕως ἂν ζῇ, καὶ ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ, εἰς τὸ συγγενὲς καὶ εἰς τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀφικομένη ἀπηλλάχθαι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κακῶν*.[7]

Thus the doctrine of Immortality will encourage virtue even in the philosopher: *καλὸν γὰρ τὸ ἆθλον καὶ ἡ ἐλπὶς μεγάλη*.[8] Its influence will not be direct, as in the case of

[1] *Phaedo* 67 D. The same definition of *θάνατος* is given in *Gorg.* 524 B.

[2] *Phaedo* 81 C *διειλημμένην . , . ὑπὸ τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς*: soul becomes *σύμφυτον* finally. *τὸ σωματοειδές* may be taken (in view of 80 B; cf. *Theaet.* 155 E) as equivalent to *τὰ φαινόμενα*: hence she can be freed only by philosophy, which will raise her above the phenomenal world to that which is *τοῖς ὄμμασι σκοτῶδες καὶ ἀιδές, νοητὸν δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ αἱρετόν* (*Phaedo* 81 B).

[3] Ib. 80 E *et passim*. [4] Ib. 83 D, cf. 81 B.

[5] Ib. 84 A. For thus soul becomes so *σωματοειδής* that soon after death she falls back into another body, *καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἄμοιρός ἐστι τῆς τοῦ θείου τε καὶ καθάρου καὶ μονοειδοῦς συνουσίας*.

[6] Ib. 83 C. [7] Ib. 84 A. [8] Ib. 114 C.

Additional Note. It is perhaps hardly necessary to point out that the doctrine of Immortality and the Theory of Ideas are inseparably connected.

the multitude, but it will be none the weaker for that. Immortality demands the preparation for death; and that *μελέτη*, while it enables the philosopher to face death cheerfully and calmly,[1] at the same time compels a life of austerity and freedom from the tyranny of the body.[2] When that stage of purification has been reached by the soul, and not before, Philosophy will

> 'Tell her of things that no gross ear can hear;
> Till oft converse with heavenly habitants
> Begin to cast a beam on the outward shape,
> The unpolluted temple of the mind,
> And turns it by degrees to the soul's essence,
> Till all be made immortal.'

The philosophy that inspired such a conception—and still more the passage that follows in *Comus*—can hardly be charged with uselessness for morality.

Thus the promise of early Platonism is abundantly fulfilled. The Idea of Good provides the moral standard which Protagoras had thought unnecessary and impossible. Those who have no such standard, *μηδὲν ἐναργὲς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔχοντες παράδειγμα μηδὲ δυνάμενοι ὥσπερ γραφῆς εἰς τὸ ἀληθέστατον ἀποβλέποντες κἀκεῖσε ἀεὶ ἀναφέροντές τε καὶ θεώμενοι ὡς οἷόν τε ἀκριβέστατα*,—they are indeed blind; nor can they possibly make enactments concerning beauty, goodness, and justice in this world unless they understand the eternal archetypes in heaven.[3] They have 'no single aim of duty which is the rule of all their actions, private as well as

Without the belief in pre-existence (which is signified in the soul's being eternal) the notion of *ἀνάμνησις* would be meaningless—and with it will fall the psychological foundation of the Ideal Theory. Again, the middle part of the *Phaedo* (as interpreted in App. A) is taken up with showing that Immortality is a necessary corollary to the Theory of Ideas.

[1] It is of course the express purpose of the *Phaedo* to prove that *φαίνεται εἰκότως ἀνὴρ τῷ ὄντι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίψας τὸν βίον θαρρεῖν μέλλων ἀποθανεῖσθαι καὶ εὔελπις εἶναι κτλ.* (63 E). Cf. *Rep.* 486 B.

[2] Plato speaks in no mystical sense about the hindrances caused by the body and by *νοσοτροφία* (*Rep.* 407 C) . . . *πρὸς μαθήσεις ἀστινασοῦν καὶ ἐννοήσεις τε καὶ μελέτας πρὸς ἑαυτὸν χαλεπή, κεφαλῆς τινὰς αἰεὶ διατάσεις καὶ ἰλίγγους ὑποπτεύουσα καὶ αἰτιωμένη ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ἐγγίγνεσθαι, κτλ.*

[3] *Rep.* 484 C.

public',[1] no pattern by which to mould themselves or their fellow citizens.[2]

We have seen further that this transcendent Good is by no means inapplicable to the concerns of daily life.[3] For 'until a man learns what it is that makes the different sorts of goodness intrinsically good, his possession of them is only the hold of opinion and not of knowledge. The knowledge of the Good will fill up to their full measure all the inchoate ideas of morality which we have thus far come across. This is the highest object of knowledge (*μέγιστον μάθημα*), and in it all the utmost aspirations of the speculative spirit will find satisfaction'.[4] And as Shorey observes, the Idea of Good is 'the fulfilment of the treatment of the *ἀγαθόν* in the minor ethical dialogues';[5] the reason that these dialogues are 'tentative or negative' being simply 'the inability of Socrates and his interlocutors to show how the proposed definitions, if accepted provisionally, represent the Good'.[6] 'There are many virtues,' he says, 'but there must be one *εἶδος* or form which causes them to be virtues—*δι' ὅ εἰσιν ἀρεταί*.'

So far Shorey is right: the Idea of Good is primarily an ethical standard; as *θριγκός* of the Platonic philosophy it must necessarily have some bearing on conduct; it does

[1] *Rep.* 519 D, Jowett's trans. [2] Ib. 540 A.

[3] That it is as practicable as the Aristotelian *εὐδαιμονία* is admitted even by Stewart (on *Eth. N.* i. 7. 6–8): 'In this section Aristotle virtually maintains all that Plato contended for in his doctrine of the Idea of Good. As the Idea of Good is the unity of good things and that by reason of which they are good; in other words, as it is that definite system or order, by belonging to and subserving which, particular things are said to be good rather than pleasant or otherwise attractive to mere sense, so happiness is that orderly and beautiful life in relation to which, and only to which, man's powers and opportunities have any significance.' And if it be contended that the Platonic Good was open to the philosopher alone, it may be replied that Aristotle's final definition of *ἀρετή* insisted on its being *ὡρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν* (*Eth. N.* ii. 6. 15). Aristotle, too, thought that virtue was possible for the multitude only through the philosopher's guidance (cf. Archer-Hind's *Phaedo*, p. 153). And yet the *θεωρητικὸς βίος*, which Aristotle places as the climax of felicity, has no claim to serve the common weal.

[4] Nettleship, *Lectures* vol. ii, p. 216. [5] Shorey, *l. c.*, p. 239.

[6] Ib. p. 220. He proceeds to illustrate the point from *Meno*, *Laches*, *Charmides*, *Protagoras* (349 E), *Gorgias* (468 E), *Republic* (333 E, 367 B), &c.

mean, as Shorey says, 'a rational, consistent conception of the greatest possible attainable human happiness, of the ultimate laws of God, nature, or man that sanction conduct, and of the consistent application of these laws in legislation, government, and education.'[1] But when he regards all the rest that Plato says of the *ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* as 'poetic vesture' which must be 'stripped off' before its meaning can be truly known, he is not only committing unintelligent vandalism, but obscuring the whole significance of Platonic thought.[2] For Plato's conception of the universe was not anthropocentric; and the Good is infinitely more than a moral standard for man. It is the creative cause of the world, and lies beyond all existence, *οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος.*[3] The Good rose far above the purpose for which it was originally conceived; it is a 'measure', but for that very reason it must be perfect and entire, *ἀτελὲς γὰρ οὐδὲν οὐδένος μέτρον*,[4] and must indeed be identified ultimately with God Himself[5]—since, in the last resort, *ὁ δὴ θεὸς ἡμῖν πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἂν εἴη.*[6]

Moreover, the Good is presented in the *Republic* as 'the true and ultimate object of all creation—the *οὗ ἕνεκα* of the whole universe and every part thereof, and consequently the regulating law of everything which exists, so far as it exists, both organic and inorganic, and the *πρῶτον φίλον* for which the whole of Nature, with greater or less degree of consciousness, for ever yearns and strives'.[7] Nothing, indeed, could be more characteristic of Plato, and of that *θεωρία παντὸς μὲν χρόνου πάσης δὲ οὐσίας* which he professed, than that what he developed first as an ethical standard should turn out eventually to be nothing less than the final cause

[1] *l. c.*, p. 239.

[2] Cf. Adam, *Republic*, vol. ii, p. 172. Shorey's interpretation gives an entirely wrong meaning to the words *ἀρετή* and *ἀγαθόν*, which in Greek are never confined to ethical good.

[3] *Rep.* 509 B. [4] Ib. 504 C.

[5] Ample reasons for this identification are given by Adam, *Gifford Lectures*, pp. 442 sq. [6] *Laws* 716 C.

[7] Adam, *Republic*, vol. ii, p. 172.

of the universe. We return in fact to where we started: the *Phaedo* shows that nothing but a teleological explanation could satisfy Plato—*οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπεῖν προσήκειν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ περὶ ἄλλων ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον.*[1] And if when dealing with physical phenomena Plato took so wide a view, how much more essential would he deem it when the subject was the most important of all, *καλῶν τε πέρι καὶ δικαίων καὶ ἀγαθῶν*?

Thus Knowledge of the Good means an understanding of the entire *κόσμος*, and the working of all its parts. Until a man reach that standpoint from which he can perceive not only the fitness of each member for its own function but also the general purpose that it serves, he cannot be said, in the truest sense, to have attained virtue. Small wonder that the dialectic training lasted so long, since in this life, indeed, it could never be completed; but on that very impossibility the philosopher based his surest hope of another life, in which, no longer seeing 'through a glass darkly', he might come to direct apprehension of the Good. So vast is his conception that Plato can find no words to express it: like God, the Good is past finding out, *καὶ εὑρόντα εἰς πάντας ἀδύνατον λέγειν.*[2] Accordingly he falls back upon the image of the Sun, *ὃς ἔκγονός τε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φαίνεται καὶ ὁμοιότατος ἐκείνῳ.*[3] Yet the most glorious object in the visible universe is an inadequate figure of the Good, and must not be mistaken for 'the Maker and Father of all'; even the Sun is 'but a moment's mood of His soul', and is

> 'lost in the notes on the lips of His choir
> That chant the chant of the Whole'.

[1] *Phaed.* 97 D. [2] *Tim.* 28 C; cf. *Rep.* 506 D sq. [3] *Rep. l. c.*

APPENDIX A. ON *PHAEDO* 95 E–105 E

THE difficulties of this passage are so notorious that it seems necessary to discuss the interpretation of it maintained in the present essay, viz. that we have here a sketch of the development of Greek Philosophy as far as the Theory of Ideas; further, that Plato's intention is to show the inadequacy of all previous systems for anything connected with morality—and, in particular, for proving the immortality of the soul.

To begin with, there are at least three possible interpretations of the words *ἐγὼ οὖν σοι δίειμι περὶ αὐτῶν* [sc. *περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τὴν αἰτίαν*], *ἐὰν βούλῃ, τά γε ἐμὰ πάθη.*

(1) The view that the account given is that of the actual philosophical development of Socrates is now usually regarded as untenable. Socrates may perhaps have been acquainted with the physical speculations of the Ionians and others—indeed, he could hardly have helped knowing something of their teaching; but, according to all the evidence[1] we possess, he had a very low estimate both

[1] The evidence of Xenophon is as follows:—

(*a*) *Mem.* i. 1. 11–15, from which we learn that (i) Socrates considered physical speculations as of very secondary importance compared with *τἀνθρώπινα εἰδέναι*, and in fact despised the *φυσιολόγοι*: *ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς φροντίζοντας τὰ τοιαῦτα μωραίνοντας ἀπεδείκνυε.* (ii) He thought it impossible to reach any certain results in such matters (*ταῦτα οὐ δυνατόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώποις εὑρεῖν*),—witness the disagreement between the various physical philosophers (*τοῖς μὲν δοκεῖν ἓν μόνον τὸ ὂν εἶναι, τοῖς δ' ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος, κτλ.*). (iii) Further, he asked what practical benefit such speculators could bring to themselves or others. Could they by their knowledge (if they ever got it) hope to affect the winds and seasons? (iv) Consequently, Socrates confined his inquiries to human affairs: *αὐτὸς δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀεὶ διελέγετο.*

(*b*) *Mem.* iv. 7. 6. Socrates, indeed, considered such studies impious (as did Xenophon himself, *l.c.*, sup.): *οὔτε χαρίζεσθαι θεοῖς ἂν ἡγεῖτο τὸν ζητοῦντα, ἃ ἐκεῖνοι σαφηνίσαι οὐκ ἐβουλήθησαν*, and went on to accuse Anaxagoras of insanity. But for his own part *μέχρι τοῦ ὠφελίμου πάντα καὶ αὐτὸς συνεσκόπει καὶ συνδιεξῄει τοῖς συνοῦσι.*

Aristotle also says emphatically *Σωκράτους δὲ περὶ μὲν τὰ ἠθικὰ πραγματευομένου, περὶ δὲ τῆς ὅλης φύσεως οὐθέν, κτλ.* (*Met.* A. 6. 987 b 1).

Cf. also Plato, *Apol.* 19 B. In answer to Meletus' charge that he *περιεργάζεται ζητῶν τά τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ οὐράνια*, Socrates replies that he understands *οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρόν* of such matters; ironically adding that he is far from despising such knowledge, if a man possess it.

It need hardly be added that the 'Socrates' of the *Clouds*, slung up in his

of the accuracy and the value of such investigations. Indeed, he considered Nature a far less instructive object of study than his fellow men: *τὰ μὲν οὖν χωρία καὶ τὰ δένδρα οὐδέν μ' ἐθέλει διδάσκειν, οἱ δ' ἐν τῷ ἄστει ἄνθρωποι* (*Phaedr.* 230 D).

(2) The view that Plato is here 'recounting his own experience',[1] though held by many authorities, is exceedingly doubtful. For, as Zeller[2] points out, 'the influence on the earlier formation of Plato's mind which can alone be certainly attested [Arist. *Met.* i. 6], viz. of the Heraclitean philosophy, is obviously not touched upon here.' It is true that the *πῦρ* of *Phaedo* 96 B is probably that of Heraclitus; but there is no mention of the flux doctrine—which is the part of Heracliteanism which Aristotle considers so important in the mental development of Plato. 'Nor does the passage in the *Phaedo*, on the whole, convey the impression of a biographical account' (Zeller).

Further objections to this view will appear in what follows.

(3) The remaining view, that the passage is (again to quote Zeller) 'rather an exposition of the universal necessity of progress from material to final causes, and thence to the Ideas', is in every way more satisfactory. Plato is in fact giving a sketch (somewhat similar to that of Arist. *Met.* i) of the development of philosophy up to his time.[3] The theories of Anaximander, Anaximenes, Empedocles, Heraclitus (as seen above), and probably of Alcmaeon, are passed in review,—and all rejected as failing to explain causation. Even Anaxagoras, whose doctrine of *νοῦς* gave Socrates such wonderful hope, is found in practice to be equally disappointing: he, as much as any of his predecessors, failed to discover the final cause of the universe. Indeed, it is (says Plato) simply a misnomer to apply the name of 'cause' to anything but *τὸ βέλτιστον*:—previous thinkers err in *ἀλλοτρίῳ ὀνόματι προσχρώμενοι' ὡς αἴτιον αὐτὸ προσαγορεύειν.*

Thus 'the Good' is the true *αἰτία γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς*, and

basket to investigate *μετέωρα*, is too obvious a caricature to be taken at all seriously. [May Plato possibly be hitting back at Aristophanes when he speaks in the *Theaetetus* of the lawyer, puzzled in turn by the philosopher, as *λιγγιῶν τε ἀπὸ ὑψηλοῦ κρεμασθεὶς καὶ βλέπων μετέωρος ἄνωθεν* (175 D)?]

[1] Archer-Hind, *ad loc.*

[2] *Plato*, p. 10, n. 18.

[3] It may be contended that Plato's habit is rather to depict the mental progress of a typical individual. Still, in the history of the microcosm we are at liberty to read that of the race.

it is this *αἰτία* which Greek thought has endeavoured vainly to reach. And yet until it be discovered we cannot prove indisputably the immortality of the soul (*Phaedo* 96 A), for so only can we answer the question, *τί τὸ ὂν ἀεὶ γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, καὶ τί τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν ἀεὶ ὂν δὲ οὐδέποτε*; (*Tim.* 27 E). Such a cause previous thinkers seem blindly to have sought after; such a cause[1] Socrates would gladly have learnt, whether by his own investigations or another's (99 C). But since he failed to discover this final cause (*ἐπειδὴ δὲ ταύτης ἐστερήθην*) he was compelled to have recourse to the second-best[2] *means of investigating this cause.* (It is important to notice that what he speaks of is the *δεύτερος πλοῦς ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας ζήτησιν.*)

Up to this point Plato's account has been plain enough; but the mention of the *δεύτερος πλοῦς* has given rise to interminable disputes amongst commentators. The phrase obviously implies some *πρῶτος πλοῦς ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας ζήτησιν.* Now since the *αἰτία* required was *τὸ ἀγαθόν*, this *πρῶτος πλοῦς κτλ.* would evidently be that which would lead most directly up to the Good. This *πρῶτος πλοῦς* Socrates fancied he had discovered in Anaxagoras' doctrine of *νοῦς*, since such teaching, had it been consistently developed, must have employed no other cause but the first in its explanation of the universe. But, when this last hope failed (for the *φυσιολόγοι* had certainly been of no avail), Socrates found that he must leave the *direct* investigation of the Good, and betake himself to the indirect—the *δεύτερος πλοῦς.*

Moreover, besides its impracticability, Socrates feared the danger of such attempts at immediate intuition of the Good. Just as those who look at the sun itself are apt to have their eyes injured by its brilliance,[3] so Socrates thinks he must guard against a similar 'blinding of the whole soul' if he attempt the direct investigation of the true *αἰτία.* In previous speculations the mind had been shielded from the glare by the medium of *φαινόμενα*—the secondary physical

[1] *τῆς τοιαύτης αἰτίας.* That the *αἰτία* Socrates sought was that *ὅπῃ ἂν βέλτιστα ἔχῃ* (in other words, *τὸ ἀγαθόν*) is made abundantly plain by the whole of Chaps. xlvi and xlvii. He wanted some teleological explanation of the Universe.

[2] There can of course be no other valid explanation of *δεύτερος πλοῦς.* The argument here is like that of Simmias in 85 C, D.

[3] Cf. *Laws* 897 D *μὴ τοίνυν ἐξ ἐναντίας οἷον εἰς ἥλιον ἀποβλέποντες, νύκτα μεσημβρίᾳ ἐπαγόμενοι, ποιησώμεθα τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, κτλ.* The same figure is used in Xen. *Mem.* iv. 3. 14 *ὁ πᾶσι φανερὸς δοκῶν εἶναι ἥλιος οὐκ ἐπιτρέπει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἑαυτὸν ἀκριβῶς ὁρᾶν, ἀλλ' ἐάν τις αὐτὸν ἀναιδῶς ἐγχειρῇ θεᾶσθαι, τὴν ὄψιν ἀφαιρεῖται.* Cf. *Rep.* 515 E.

causes set up by the early philosophers and even by Anaxagoras; but now that philosophy was giving up this means of approach it must find some other means to soften the dazzling nature of the Good. And this new method is precisely the *δεύτερος πλοῦς*, the indirect way which Socrates himself travelled in his philosophy; and in Plato's hands it will turn out to be nothing else than the Dialectic Method, which leads the mind from phenomena to the Ideas, and so, by means of the Theory of Ideas, ultimately to the Good itself.

It will be seen that this account involves a somewhat unusual explanation of Chap. xlviii; but a passage of such notorious difficulty is surely open to any new interpretation which may render it less unintelligible. Besides, the explanation here adopted requires only the transposition of the opening sentences, reading the words *βλέπων πρὸς τὰ πράγματα τοῖς ὄμμασι καὶ ἑκάστῃ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐπιχειρῶν ἅπτεσθαι αὐτῶν*[1] after *ἐπειδὴ ἀπειρήκη τὰ ὄντα σκοπῶν*. The passage will then run as follows: *Ἔδοξε τοίνυν μοι, ἢ δ' ὅς, μετὰ ταῦτα, ἐπειδὴ ἀπειρήκη τὰ ὄντα σκοπῶν βλέπων*[2] *πρὸς τὰ πράγματα τοῖς ὄμμασι καὶ ἑκάστῃ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐπιχειρῶν ἅπτεσθαι αὐτῶν, δεῖν εὐλαβηθῆναι μὴ πάθοιμι ὅπερ οἱ τὸν ἥλιον ἐκλείποντα θεωροῦντες καὶ σκοπούμενοι· διαφθείρονται γάρ που ἔνιοι τὰ ὄμματα, ἐὰν μὴ ἐν ὕδατι ἤ τινι τοιούτῳ σκοπῶνται τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ. [τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ ἐγὼ διενοήθην, καὶ ἔδεισα μὴ παντάπασι τὴν ψυχὴν τυφλωθείην.*[3]*] ἔδοξε δή μοι χρῆναι εἰς τοὺς λόγους καταφυγόντα ἐν ἐκείνοις σκοπεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν κτλ.*—and may be literally translated:

'It seemed then to me after this, when I had given up investigating reality by looking at phenomena with my eyes and attempting to grasp them with each of my senses, that I must take care not to suffer what they do who gaze at the sun in an eclipse. For some of them have been known to lose their eyesight, if they do not look at the sun's image in water or some other such substance. [Such a danger I perceived in my own case too, and I was afraid lest my whole soul might be blinded.] It seemed to me

[1] These words have been suspected by Dr. Jackson and Mr. Archer-Hind; and certainly they cannot yield any satisfactory sense in their usual position. It is, however, surely better to transpose than to omit, provided a plain meaning can be found for the words in their new place. For a similar transposition of doubtful words cf. *Phaedo* 66 B—by Schleiermacher (v. Archer-Hind, *ad loc.*).

[2] For an even larger concourse of participles cf. *Gorg.* 494 C *καὶ δυνάμενον πληροῦντα χαίροντα εὐδαιμόνως ζῆν.*

[3] This sentence (likewise suspected) certainly looks like a gloss; but with the above change it is at least harmless—which it was not before.

then that I must take refuge in hypotheses (or general conceptions, the Socratic definitions), and examine the truth of existence in them.'

Before going further it may be noticed that this explanation not only provides a meaning for the words transposed, but also affords an interpretation of Chap. xlviii more in accordance both with the whole passage (*Phaedo* 95 E–101 E) and with the parallel passages in *Republic* vi and vii. And it may be mentioned in passing that one has no longer to explain *τὰ ὄντα* by the impossible sense of 'phenomena',[1] nor *τὰ πράγματα* by the equally impossible meaning of 'ideas'.[2] This latter difficulty, it is true, is superseded by Mr. Campbell's explanation, quoted in Appendix II of Archer-Hind's *Phaedo*; but since that interpretation contains so many doubtful points it may not be amiss to criticize it briefly. Mr. Campbell's theory is based upon his 'making the eclipse a material part of the similitude'; he then goes on to draw the following parallels:

(1) *ἥλιος* = *τὰ ὄντα*, i.e. ideas.

(2) *ἥλιος ἐκλείπων* = *τὰ ὄντα*, eclipsed in the form of *γιγνόμενα*, or material nature.

(3) Image of *ἥλιος ἐκλείπων* in water = image of *γιγνόμενα* in *λόγοι*, i. e. Socratic universals.

Now in the first place it is surely against all canons of criticism to interpret fully all details of such a simile: *οἱ τὸν ἥλιον ἐκλείποντα θεωροῦντες καὶ σκοπούμενοι* are presumably astronomers investigating the nature of the sun in an eclipse. In an eclipse, because it is the only time when it is possible to see anything of the sun at all, and consequently the only time when astronomers would think of looking at it. Besides, the fact that the sun is in eclipse would decrease its power of dazzling. So that to make the eclipse 'a material part of the similitude' spoils the whole meaning of the passage. Plato intended the eclipse as an ornamental addition or a touch of homely colour, recalling the occasions when people would be seen staring at the sun: it is no part whatever of the meaning of the allegory.

Secondly, it may be objected that Mr. Campbell, although not expressly omitting the *ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* from the 'Ideas' with which he identifies *τὰ ὄντα*, does not sufficiently

[1] As Jackson does, *J. of Phil.* x. p. 137.

[2] *αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα* (66 D), which Archer-Hind quotes to prove that *πράγματα* = Ideas, is of course quite different. In 103 B *πρᾶγμα* evidently means a particular phenomenon. Besides, how could one look at Ideas *τοῖς ὄμμασι*?

emphasize the supremacy of the Good.[1] For it is plain that, whatever else ἥλιος may represent, it must here stand for the αἰτία which Socrates had attempted to discover; and it is no less plain that this αἰτία = τἀγαθόν. So that, even from the passage under discussion, it appears that the parallel intended is ἥλιος = τἀγαθόν. And the truth of this explanation is rendered even more certain by the analogy of corresponding passages in the *Republic*.[2] In 506 E Plato

[1] This supremacy of the Good over the other Ideas is seen in the following passages of the *Republic* :—

(*a*) 508 C, where we obtain the ratio ἀγαθόν : ἥλιος = νοῦς καὶ τὰ νοούμενα : ὄψις καὶ τὰ ὁρώμενα.

(*b*) Now in 508 B we read that ὁ ἥλιος ὄψις μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, αἴτιος δ' ὢν αὐτῆς ὁρᾶται ὑπ' αὐτῆς ταύτης, i. e. ἀγαθόν, though not actually νοῦς, is the cause of it, and ἀγαθόν must be perceived by νοῦς.

(*c*) From 508 E we see that it is ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα which τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρέχει τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις (i. e. the objects of knowledge, the Ideas) καὶ τῷ γιγνώσκοντι τὴν δύναμιν (i. e. power to exercise the faculty of knowledge or νόησις) ἀποδίδωσι. Thus (and cf. esp. what follows) the Good is distinguished from the Ideas, since it provides them with their ἀλήθεια. Moreover, just as φῶς and ὄψις are not, but are *like*, the Sun; so ἀλήθεια and ἐπιστήμη are like the Good (ἀγαθοειδῆ), but inferior to it (ἀλλ' ἔτι μειζόνως τιμητέον τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕξιν). And v. esp. 509 B, where the Good supplies Ideas not only with the gift of being known, but καὶ τὸ εἶναί τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπ' ἐκείνου αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι, οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος.

(*d*) That the 'eye of the soul' would be blinded by the sight of the Good is shown by *Rep.* 515 E.

(*e*) A comparison of *Rep.* 516 B and 517 B makes it quite clear that—

(i) In the simile, the cave-dweller will be able last of all to see the sun itself : τελευταῖον τὸν ἥλιον οὐκ ἐν ὕδασιν . . . ἀλλ' αὐτὸν καθ' αὑτόν. Moreover he will go on to reason that the sun is the cause (τρόπον τινὰ πάντων αἴτιος) of all ὁρώμενα.

(ii) In the world of νοητά (ἐν τῷ γνωστῷ), it is the Good that is seen last (τελευταία ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα), and that with difficulty (καὶ μόγις). And here too one must go on to reason that it is the Good which is the cause, πάντων ὀρθῶν τε καὶ καλῶν αἰτία, and which ἐν τῷ νοητῷ dispenses ἀλήθειαν καὶ νοῦν.

(*f*) *Rep.* 533 A. Socrates declines to expound the Good itself, as he thinks Glauco would no longer be able to follow him (cf. *Symp.* 210 A). For he would no longer be looking at an image, but at truth itself: οὐδ' εἰκόνα ἂν ἔτι οὗ λέγομεν ἴδοις, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἀληθές. Now this statement comes after the description of the propaedeutic studies (πάντα ταῦτα προοίμιά ἐστιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ νόμου, ὃν δεῖ μαθεῖν) which lead up to Dialectic. But it is not till after a prolonged course of Dialectic that one can grasp the real nature of the Good (532 A), this course embracing an investigation of each other Idea, without sense perception—ἐπ' αὐτὸ ὅ ἔστιν ἕκαστον. Hence all that has gone before 533 A, including *the other Ideas*, must be transcended by the Good (cf. 508 E, 509 B).

[2] It may perhaps be questioned how far it is justifiable to explain the simile of the *Phaedo* by that of *Republic* vi. But it is generally admitted that the only way of explaining the ὑποθέσεις of the *Phaedo* is by the help of *Rep.* 506–518. Moreover, if, as seems highly probable, the *Phaedo* was written shortly after the *Republic*, it is inconceivable that Plato should have changed the terms of so prominent a similitude.

[The reasons for supposing that the *Phaedo* followed the *Republic* are thus

refuses to expound the nature of *τἀγαθόν* (*αὐτὸ μὲν τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τἀγαθὸν ἐάσομεν τὸ νῦν εἶναι*); accordingly he takes as

summarized by Mr. R. K. Gaye (following in the main Dr. Jackson) in his book on *Plato's Conception of Immortality*, chap. v :—

(1) The difference of tone. 'In the *Republic* Plato takes up a far more confident attitude with regard to the possibility of the attainment of knowledge than he does in *Phaedo*', which may perhaps show that he is 'beginning to feel doubts which he finds it difficult to set at rest'. This is not conclusive, for obviously the argument cuts both ways.

(2) Doctrinal development. v. *Rep.* 611-612 A, where the principles of the method for investigating into the true nature of the soul are given—and this method is evidently carried out in *Phaedo*. This argument also is not conclusive.

(3) A much more cogent argument can be found by comparing the proof of the immortality of the soul in *Rep.* x with that of *Phaedo*. It seems certain that 'to any one having the *Phaedo* before him the flimsiness and insufficiency of the argument for immortality in *Rep.* x could not fail to be obvious' [for there is no *proof* that *ἀδικία* is really the *ξύμφυτον κακόν* of the soul]. 'In my view,' says Mr. Gaye, 'the proof of the immortality of the soul in *Phaedo* is intended to correct and supersede the proofs in *Phaedrus* and *Rep.*, which must by this time have been regarded by Plato as inadequate.' Cf. E. S. Thompson, Introd. to *Meno*, p. lv.

In addition to these,

(4) A fourth argument may perhaps be drawn from the fact that the ideas of *σκευαστά* found in *Rep.* x do not occur in *Phaedo*. However, as Mr. A. E. Taylor points out, 'such half-jocular instances' are used only when (as in *Rep.*) 'none of the interlocutors are philosophic companions of Socrates. Hence the comparative avoidance of technical terms of the school, and the use of "popular" illustrations. Socrates adopts a different tone when he is talking with philosophers like Simmias and Cebes.'

(5) Something may possibly be deduced from the psychological theories of the two dialogues. That of the *Phaedo*, although vitiated by its explanation of the spiritual in terms of the material (e.g. the famous example in 84 D), at least avoids the *ἀπορία* caused by the theory of the *Republic*. For by an application of the Eleatic elenchus we might thus criticize it: The Ideal State is ultimately composed of individuals, and every individual is tripartite. But the relation of the three elements in any individual is (according to the *Rep.*) inexplicable unless studied 'writ large' in the State (*μείζω τε καὶ ἐν μείζονι . . . τὴν τοῦ μείζονος ὁμοιότητα ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἐλάττονος ἰδέᾳ ἐπισκοποῦντες*, 368 D). Thus a fresh Republic must be constructed to explain each individual in the Republic, and so on to infinity. The argument is indeed similar to the *τρίτος ἄνθρωπος* of Aristotle: we are reduced to the absurdities of the indefinite regress.

Plato however appears, quite inconsistently, to assume that the members of the *ἄρχοντες* class consist entirely of the *λογιστικόν* element; the *φύλακες* entirely of *τὸ θυμοειδές*; the *δημιουργοί* entirely of *τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν*. So that at the time of writing the *Republic* he does not seem to have noticed this difficulty. But it is such an obvious flaw in his psychological theory that he may very probably have perceived it soon afterwards, and so have dropped this explanation in the *Phaedo* and all subsequent dialogues.

This can hardly be set forth as a very conclusive proof; at the same time it may be asked whether Plato would be likely to expound the psychological doctrine of the *Republic after* that of the *Phaedo*.

But whatever view be adopted as to the relative chronological order of the *Republic* and *Phaedo*, it seems to be universally admitted that they must have been written somewhere about the same time; and for the purposes of this paper, so much is sufficient. For, if they were separated by no long interval, the simile of the sun *must* have had in each the same significance, standing for the Idea of Good.]

εἰκών the Sun, ὃς ἔκγονός τε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φαίνεται καὶ ὁμοιότατος ἐκείνῳ. Cf. 508 B, where we read again of the Sun as τὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔκγονον, ὃν τἀγαθὸν ἐγέννησεν ἀνάλογον ἑαυτῷ.

Thus we can establish the parallel: ἥλιος = τἀγαθόν. But so dazzling is the brightness of the Good, that one cannot look at it without some medium. What then are the εἰκόνες in which, as it were, Socrates beheld the Sun; the medium through which he sought to attain understanding of the Good itself?

The εἰκόνες apparently represent at first the Socratic λόγοι, the general definitions (καθόλου) from which arose the hypostatic Ideas of Plato. The change from λόγοι to Ideas is typified in the *Phaedo* by the alteration of phraseology: contrast 99 E with 100 B. The real medium, therefore, through which Plato proposes to reach the Good is the Theory of Ideas. The λόγοι (of 99 E) are not the Ideas themselves, but they develop into Ideas as the progress is further traced.

It is quite true that the first λόγος which Plato ὑποτίθεται is in fact the Ideal Theory; but that is not the same as identifying λόγοι with Ideas.[1] What Socrates in effect says is this: 'Since I was afraid to investigate the ultimate αἰτία directly, I had recourse to the second-best method of approaching this αἰτία, viz. that of general definitions or hypotheses. But I am very far from admitting [οὐ γὰρ πάνυ συγχωρῶ is an obvious *litotes*] that this method (ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σκοπεῖν τὰ ὄντα) is inferior to that of the physicists (ἐν ἔργοις). I called it a δεύτερος πλοῦς, it is true;[2] but that is only because what might *a priori* seem the πρῶτος πλοῦς is both impracticable and dangerous.' (Cf. Simmias' remark, 85 D. What Socrates takes is τὸν γοῦν βέλτιστον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λόγων καὶ δυσεξελεγκτότατον—the πρῶτος being more than ἀνθρώπινος.) He then goes on to describe what is practically the Dialectic Method of *Rep.* vi and vii (and of the *Meno*): ὑποθέμενος ἑκάστοτε λόγον (= ὑπόθεσιν) ὃν ἂν κρίνω ἐρρωμενέστατον εἶναι, ἃ μὲν ἄν μοι δοκῇ τούτῳ συμφωνεῖν τίθημι ὡς ἀληθῆ ὄντα, καὶ περὶ αἰτίας καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων

[1] λόγοι is never used in the sense of Ideas. οἱ ψιλοὶ λόγοι of *Theaet.* 165 A is another matter. Prof. L. Campbell, *ad loc.*, refers to this passage, and says λόγοι = διαλεκτική, which is (indirectly) true.

[2] This answers the objection that Plato would not speak of the Dialectic Method as a δεύτερος πλοῦς. It is really the μακροτέρα ὁδός of *Rep.* 511 B, which is a very long and tedious πορεία compared with the short-cut of Anaxagoras—if only that had led anywhere! And (as shown above) we have not here an account of the mental development of either Socrates or Plato. This explains too the curious phrase τιν' ἄλλον τρόπον αὐτὸς εἰκῇ φύρω, 97 B.

ἁπάντων, ἃ δ' ἂν μή, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ. What that Dialectic Method means is perhaps most concisely stated in *Rep.* 511 B *αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος* ('the argument by itself') *ἅπτεται τῇ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνάμει, τὰς ὑποθέσεις ποιούμενος οὐκ ἀρχὰς ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ὑποθέσεις, οἷον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὁρμάς,*[1] *ἵνα μέχρι τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου* [i. e. the Idea of Good] *ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὴν ἰών, ἁψάμενος αὐτῆς, πάλιν αὖ ἐχόμενος τῶν ἐκείνης ἐχομένων, οὕτως ἐπὶ τελευτὴν καταβαίνῃ, αἰσθητῷ παντάπασιν οὐδενὶ προσχρώμενος, ἀλλ' εἴδεσιν αὐτοῖς δι' αὐτῶν εἰς αὐτά* [as Adam reads in his latest edition], *καὶ τελευτᾷ εἰς εἴδη.*

It will be seen that the discussion which follows in the *Phaedo* is conducted entirely in accordance with these directions (v. esp. 107 where the first *ὑποθέσεις, καὶ εἰ πισταὶ ὑμῖν εἰσιν, ὅμως ἐπισκεπτέα σαφέστερον*). Cebes, however, is made, with dramatic propriety, to complain that he does not understand Socrates' meaning. 'But,' replies Socrates, 'what I mean is nothing new, but what I never cease talking about. To explain to you the sort of cause I am investigating I'll have to go back to our old well-worn friends the Ideas [*τὰ πολυθρύλητα* often so used] and start from them. I assume the existence of an absolute Beauty and Good and Magnitude and so forth [the words *αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό* must mean nothing less than full-blown hypostatic *ἰδέαι*: we have got beyond Socratic *λόγοι*]; if you will grant me these, and allow their existence, I hope to make plain to you from these [*ἐκ τούτων*, from the Ideal Theory] the ultimate cause of the universe, and to prove the immortality of the soul.' This postulate Cebes of course grants at once; likewise the consequences [*τὰ συμβαίνοντα* in the language of Dialectic] which Socrates deduces, that particular things are e. g. beautiful because they share in the Idea of Beauty. Socrates then generalizes to the *ὑπόθεσις* that the cause (*αἰτία*) of anything is the Idea; he is not interested here in the relationship between Idea and particulars—*εἴτε παρουσία*, he says, *εἴτε κοινωνία εἴτε ὅπῃ καὶ ὅπως προσγενομένη· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο διισχυρίζομαι, ἀλλ' ὅτι τῷ καλῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ καλά*—indeed he finally expresses the connexion no more clearly than by a dative case. But this much at least he regards as *ἀσφαλέστατον*: that particulars are somehow *caused by the Ideas.*

This hypothesis is indeed the first *λόγος* which Socrates *ὑποτίθεται* in accordance with 100 A;[2] it serves to shield us from the glare of the ultimate *αἰτία* itself. And from this *ὑπόθεσις* he goes on to deduce, as one of the *συμβαίνοντα*, the

[1] Cf. *Symp.* 211 C.

[2] Cf. Adam, *Republic*, vol. ii, p. 175.

immortality of the soul. We have obtained at least a working hypothesis to explain *τὴν αἰτίαν γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς*, and, as we read in 95 E, before that was reached it would be impossible to prove adequately *ὡς ἀθάνατον ἡ ψυχή*.

We are not here concerned with Plato's proof of immortality; it need only be said that the one which follows is based upon (and indeed inseparably connected with) the Theory of Ideas. It remains, however, to examine the difficult passage in 101 D–E. Plato has proceeded, after making his first *ὑπόθεσις*, to quote various illustrations of its validity. He ends by insisting that he can admit no other cause but the immanence (or whatever it may be) of the Ideas: secondary causes *καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς τοιαύτας κομψείας ἐώης ἂν χαίρειν, παρεὶς ἀποκρίνασθαι τοῖς σεαυτοῦ σοφωτέροις· σὺ δὲ δεδιὼς ἄν, τὸ λεγόμενον, τὴν σαυτοῦ σκιὰν καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν, ἐχόμενος ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς τῆς ὑποθέσεως, οὕτως ἀποκρίναιο ἄν.* [The sentence *εἰ δέ τις . . . διαφωνεῖ* has been rejected by Prof. Jackson on very sufficient grounds.] Now what is meant by this 'certainty of your hypothesis'? In the context[1] it can hardly refer to anything but the *ὑπόθεσις* which Plato has just made and employed in the cases that followed, viz. that the *αἰτία* of anything is the Idea—or, more generally, the assumption of the Ideal Theory. Whatever happens, he says, you must cling to the Theory of Ideas as the one sure foundation of all reasoning as to causation.

Now the word *ὑπόθεσις*, as is shown clearly by Mr. E. S. Thompson,[2] has two distinct senses: (1) an assumption—the meaning which is nearest to its original sense (*τῷ ὄντι ὑποθέσεις, οἷον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὁρμάς*). This seems to be the meaning of the word here: your assumption is the Theory of Ideas, and that you must cling to at all costs.

(2) 'There is,' says Thompson, 'a special Platonic usage of the term, to indicate a provisional definition of a common term or concept. This usage goes back to Socrates. . . . Cf. Xen. *Mem.* iv. 6. 13 *ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἐπανῆγεν ἂν πάντα τὸν λόγον ὧδέ πως.*'[3] The word, however, may owe this sense

[1] Cf. 100 D *τοῦτο γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀσφαλέστατον . . . καὶ τούτου ἐχόμενος ἡγοῦμαι οὐκ ἄν ποτε πεσεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι . . . ἀποκρίνασθαι ὅτι τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ καλά.* Cf. 105 B *λέγω δὴ παρ' ἣν τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγον ἀπόκρισιν, τὴν ἀσφαλῆ ἐκείνην, κτλ.*

[2] On *Meno* 86 E, q. v. for examples.

[3] Probably the example he quotes from *Gorg.* 454 C (*ἵνα σὺ τὰ σαυτοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὅπως ἂν βούλῃ περαίνῃς*) is rather a case of the first usage. 'That you may rather develop your own views in your own way in accordance with the premisses assumed' (W. H. Thompson).

to an older than Socrates even. According to Prof. Burnet,[1] 'The technical terms used in Plato's *Parmenides* seem to be as old as Zeno himself. The *ὑπόθεσις* is the provisional assumption of the truth of a certain statement, and takes the form *εἰ πολλά ἐστιν*, or the like. The word does not mean the assumption of anything as a foundation, but the setting before oneself of a statement as a problem to be solved (Ionic *ὑποθέσθαι*, Attic *προθέσθαι*).' If this be true, the technical use of the word is really Ionic, while the ordinary Attic sense of 'assumption' is preserved when there is no such special sense.

Now it is most easy to explain the present passage by supposing that Plato employs the word *ὑπόθεσις* first in its ordinary (Attic) sense, and then in its technical (Ionic and Eleatic) sense (= *ἀρχὴ ἀναπόδεικτος*). He continues: *ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτῆς δέοι σε διδόναι λόγον* [sc. of your original assumption], *ὡσαύτως ἂν διδοίης, ἄλλην αὖ ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθέμενος ἥτις τῶν ἄνωθεν βελτίστη φαίνοιτο, ἕως ἐπί τι ἱκανὸν ἔλθοις, ἅμα δὲ οὐκ ἂν φύροις* [better than *φύροιο*] *ὥσπερ οἱ ἀντιλογικοὶ περί τε τῆς ἀρχῆς διαλεγόμενος καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἐκείνης ὡρμημένων, εἴπερ βούλοιό τι τῶν ὄντων εὑρεῖν κτλ.* The two usages were not so rigidly distinct that Plato could not thus pass from one to the other. In any case we have here undoubtedly the language of Dialectic as set forth in *Rep.* vi and vii. The words *ἄλλην αὖ ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθέμενος ἥτις τῶν ἄνωθεν* [i.e. more general] *βελτίστη φαίνοιτο* evidently refer to the process of rising from one hypothesis to another, testing each carefully, and rejecting (*ἀναιρεῖν*) all that are found untenable, until at last one reaches the *ἀρχὴ ἀνυπόθετος* or Good. This completes one half of the Dialectic Method—the *συναγωγή* of Socrates and the *Phaedrus*; the other half, *διαίρεσις*, consists in a descent to *τελευταί*. 'The moment we pass from *ὑποθέσεις* to the *ἀγαθόν*, our *λόγοι* will thereby receive the attestation which they have hitherto lacked, and will be converted from *ὑποθέσεις* into *ἀρχαί*, whence we may descend to conclusions (*τελευταί*) as much more certain than the *τελευταί* of the geometer, as certified *ἀρχαί* are more certain than uncertified *ὑποθέσεις*.' (Jackson, *Journal of Philology*, l. c.)

The meaning of the *Phaedo* passage is now plain. The examples which have just been given—that the cause of one man's being taller than another is the *παρουσία* of *μέγεθος*, of the fact that two is two must be due to *μετάσχεσις τῆς δυάδος*—are not sufficiently general to

[1] *Early Greek Philosophy*, 2nd ed., p. 361, n. 4.

satisfy an opponent. You must therefore, clinging of course still to your first assumption that causation is due to the Ideas, proceed to lay down other and more general (*τὰ ἄνωθεν*) cases, until you reach one which will satisfy your opponent (*ἕως ἐπί τι ἱκανὸν ἔλθοις*). The *τι ἱκανόν* cannot be taken to mean the Good, the *ἀρχὴ ἀνυπόθετος*[1]; the expression is far too vague and unemphatic for anything so important. Nor indeed would such a transcendent idea be in place. We do not here require the second (*διαίρεσις*) process of Dialectic. What has been done is sufficient for the argument in hand; Plato merely warns us that it is not sufficient to satisfy the demands of the dialectician: we have not yet completed the *μακροτέρα ὁδός*. Until the *ἀρχὴ ἀνυπόθετος* (i. e. *τἀγαθόν*, the *αἰτία* Socrates was at first seeking) has been reached, it is impossible to work out its results (*τὰ ἐξ ἐκείνης ὡρμημένα*), though an *ἀντιλογικός* would try to mix up the two processes (the *συναγωγή* and *διαίρεσις*) and to take as certain *ἀρχαί* what are in reality only unattested *ὑποθέσεις*.

APPENDIX B. ON THE *THEAETETUS*

I. Plato identifies the doctrine of Protagoras with (1) the Heraclitean flux-theory, (2) sensationalism (Theaetetus' definition of *ἐπιστήμη* as *αἴσθησις*). But (*a*) he establishes the first identity by extremely weak reasoning; while it is certain that (*b*) theories (1) and (2) are contradictory.

(*a*) Plato, in order to prove his point, maintains that Protagoras taught esoterically (*ᾐνίξατο—ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ ἔλεγεν*) to his *μαθηταί* two interpretations of his doctrine:

(i) That All is Motion (*ὡς τὸ πᾶν κίνησις ἦν*), Motion being the principle of Preservation, Rest that of Corruption.[2]

(ii) That there is no Existence (*οὐδὲν ἔστιν, ἀεὶ δὲ γίγνεται*)—which development he uses in particular to link Protagoras with Heraclitus.

We cannot, however, suppose that Plato found any trace of such doctrines in the writings of Protagoras. And although Protagoras' theory is connected with that of Heraclitus by Sextus Empiricus,[3] yet, as Prof. Campbell points

[1] Cf. Adam's *Republic*, vol. ii, p. 175. '*ἱκανόν τι* is not the unhypothetical idea, although it may very well happen in any given case to be a *ὑπόθεσις*, of Good.'

[2] Plato himself develops this idea in *Phaedr.* 245 C.

[3] R. P. 228 *φησὶν οὖν ὁ ἀνὴρ* (Πρωταγόρας) *τὴν ὕλην ῥευστὴν εἶναι, κτλ.* It is well to remember Grote's warning, that *ὕλη* was not used in this philosophical sense until the time of Plato and Aristotle (*History of Greece*, vol. vii, p. 50, n. 1).

out,[1] 'there are three sources, independent of Protagoras, from which the account of Sextus may have been derived: the Cyrenaics, the *Theaetetus*, and Aristotle.'

So that on the whole we may judge that it was Plato's addition (not to say misrepresentation) to make the doctrine of *ἄνθρωπος μέτρον* 'the type of a contemporary theory, and interwoven with that of Heraclitus'.[2]

(*b*) Heraclitus would never have said that knowledge is sensation. On the contrary our senses are so deceitful that they present to us an appearance of permanent Being in what is ever changing. *κακοὶ μάρτυρες ἀνθρώποισιν ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ ὦτα βαρβάρους ψυχὰς ἐχόντων.*[3] 'What our senses perceive,' says Zeller,[4] 'is merely the fleeting phenomenon, not the essence; the eternally living fire is hidden from them by a hundred veils; they show us as something stiff and dead what is really the most movable and living of all things.' Knowledge is not of the flux of phenomena, but of the *Logos*, the all-directing principle: *ἓν τὸ σοφόν, ἐπίστασθαι γνώμην ἣ οἵη τε κυβερνῆσαι (?) πάντα διὰ πάντων.*[5] And a little of such wisdom, unlike mere information (*πολυμαθίη νόον οὐ διδάσκει*[6]), is hard to win; but like gold it is worth the labour of getting: *χρυσὸν οἱ διζήμενοι γῆν πολλὴν ὀρύσσουσι καὶ εὑρίσκουσιν ὀλίγον.*[7]

It is thus evident that Plato had no right to identify Heraclitus' doctrine with sensationalism. Also another reason is seen for dissociating Protagoras from Heraclitus. Nothing could be more alien to the view of knowledge just quoted than *ἄνθρωπος μέτρον* and its corollaries: indeed, Heraclitus would doubtless have included Protagoras along with Hesiod and Pythagoras, Xenophanes and Hecataeus, as having missed wisdom in the quest of *πολυμαθίη*.[7] 'The greatest clerks are not the wisest men.'[8]

II. Secondly, it may be noted that Protagoras probably did not intend his doctrine to be 'pushed to its minutest results, according to the Megarian method,—not only "man" but "each man", not only so, but "every creature", and even

[1] In his *Theaetetus*, p. 253. [2] Ib., p. 255.

[3] There is no need to adopt Bernays' *βορβόρου ψυχὰς ἔχοντος*. He objects that *βάρβαρος* could not have meant 'rude' in the time of Heraclitus. But of course it bears its usual meaning: 'Eyes and ears are bad witnesses to men if they have souls that understand not their language' (Burnet). Cf. Zeller, *Pre-Soc.* i. p. 90 n.

[4] *l. c.*, p. 88. [5] Fr. 65 (R. P. 40). The reading is doubtful.

[6] Fr. 16 (R. P. 31).

[7] Fr. 8 (R. P. 44 b). Thus interpreted by Zeller (*l. c.*, p. 91 n.).

[8] W. H. Thompson (Archer Butler's *Lectures*, p. 199 n.).

the same person at different times'.[1] Still the deduction is a very natural one: surely the *ὗς ἢ κυνοκέφαλος* is the measure of reality for himself—indeed Plato's gibe recalls the familiar story of Mr. F. H. Bradley's dog. If Aristophanes' *ψύλλα*[2] were to measure its leaps it would undoubtedly do so in terms of its *own* feet! So that Plato does not seem to be putting a very unfair interpretation on Protagoras' words.

III. As for Plato's interpretation of the maxim, 'which gives a sharpness and precision to the term *ἄνθρωπος*, as equivalent to *ἕκαστος ἡμῶν*, which it probably had not when first used,'[3] the truth seems to be that the distinction between man *qua* human being (the genus) and man *qua* individual belongs to a later stage of thought, and never occurred to Protagoras. But so far as he consciously intended either meaning, it is certain that he thought rather of the individual. For it is impossible to believe Gomperz's[4] view, that 'the reference is not to this or that specimen of the genus, not any individual Tom, Dick, or Harry, but universal man. The sentence has a generic and not an individual significance'. In spite of all his reasoning the traditional interpretation seems secure. As Dr. Adam says,[5] 'unless we follow the Platonic explanation of the text, we must suppose that throughout a large part of the *Theaetetus* Plato is fighting a shadow; and we must further believe that all the ancients from Plato and Aristotle down to Sextus Empiricus either misunderstood or deliberately traduced the doctrine of Protagoras.' Thus Plato merely pushed to its logical conclusion the legitimate meaning of the tenet.

IV. On the ethical side, as has been shown in the text, Plato treats Protagoras fairly enough. The following points may be added:—Although (in 157 D) Plato makes Theaetetus agree that *ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλόν* are things which have no real existence (*μή τι εἶναι ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαι ἀεί*), yet this is intended only to refute a particular argument, and indeed to lead up to what he admits later on (177 D)—that in the case of such notions nobody (even including those who make justice mere matter of convention) would dare to press the relativity theory to its necessary issue: e. g. to affirm that what is beneficial (or good) for a city is beneficial only

[1] Campbell's *Theaetetus*, p. 255.

[2] *Clouds* 144 *ἀνήρετ' ἄρτι Χαιρεφῶντα Σωκράτης*
ψύλλαν ὁπόσους ἄλλοιτο τοὺς αὑτῆς πόδας.

[3] Campbell, *l. c.* [4] *l. c.*, p. 453. [5] *l. c.*, p. 274.

so long as it remains in force, and no longer. Finally (186 A) *καλὸν αἰσχρόν, ἀγαθὸν κακόν* are found to be especially (*ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα*) classed amongst those qualities which are perceived directly by the mind (*αὐτὴ δι' αὐτῆς ἡ ψυχή, κτλ.*). The essence of these the mind 'considers in relation to that of each other, thinking over the past and present with a view to the future'.[1]

From this last statement there arise two interesting proofs of the connexion of Good with Knowledge.

(1) In 186 E we read that the objects of *αἴσθησις* have no share of reality or truth (*οὐ μέτεστιν ἀληθείας ἅψασθαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐσίας*). But *ἐπιστήμη* is necessarily of *ἀλήθεια* and *οὐσία*. Therefore *ἐπιστήμη* is not *αἴσθησις*. And the conclusion may be drawn that, since *ἀγαθὸν κακόν* and such qualities are not the objects of *αἴσθησις*, but are cognized immediately by the soul, they 'partake of truth and reality'—in other words, are the objects of *ἐπιστήμη*.

(2) Perception of the Good means the foresight of consequences. Now since one test of knowledge is prediction, this regard *πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα* in connexion with the Good implies a relationship between it and Knowledge. Any notion of good which is not based upon Knowledge will give you no surety as to the future.

Here the pragmatist would seem to score off Plato. 'The appeal to the future,' says Dr. Schiller,[2] 'leads to a triumphant vindication of the Humanist interpretation. For *how* does the future decide between two rival theories of truth? By the value of the consequences to which they severally lead. That is precisely the meaning of the pragmatic testing of truth by its consequences.'—And, one must add, precisely the old *petitio* of pragmatism. For when to-morrow comes and we have to 'try it and test its worth', we shall be just as much in need of an absolute standard whereby to measure the 'consequences' of to-day's actions. The appeal to the future in no way precludes the necessity of a standard.

Besides from the Platonic standpoint the reasoning is fallacious, since it neglects the other feature of Knowledge which Plato always insists upon, viz. the ability to give an account of itself.[3] Now Humanism would never be able,

[1] *καὶ τούτων μοι δοκεῖ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα πρὸς ἄλληλα σκοπεῖσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀναλογιζομένη ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὰ γεγονότα καὶ τὰ παρόντα πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα.*

[2] *l. c.*, p. 24.

[3] e. g. *Rep.* 531 E *ἀλλ' ἤδη, εἶπον, μὴ δυνατοί τινες ὄντες δοῦναί τε καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι λόγον εἶσεσθαι ποτέ τι ὧν φαμεν δεῖν εἰδέναι*; Cf. *Rep.* 510 C, *Phaedo* 76 B,

in the Platonic sense, *λόγον δοῦναι*. Consequently, though it might work for a while, its *ὀρθαὶ δόξαι* would soon fly away like the statues of Daedalus—and the pragmatist would be left with nothing to go by but the passing whim of the moment. And of course the 'appeal to the future' is directed by Plato against the sensationalist theory rather than the Protagorean;[1] and, as has been shown, the two are not identical. So that Plato is not in reality attempting to destroy Pragmatism with pragmatic weapons.

APPENDIX C. PYTHAGOREAN INFLUENCE ON EARLY PLATONISM

Although it would be convenient for the purposes of the present contention to accept Prof. Burnet's views as to Pythagoreanism, yet it seems impossible to do so. The views alluded to are set forth in the new edition of his *Early Greek Philosophy*, pp. 89, 321, and 354–6. To his first statement there can be no great objection: the *Phaedo* may well have been 'written under the influence of Pythagorean ideas'. Nor is it impossible that 'the Pythagoreans at Thebes used the word "philosopher" in the special sense of a man who is seeking to find a way of release from the burden of this life' (p. 321); the most that can be said is that it is a conjecture based upon no direct evidence.[2] If the statement be true it certainly does not prove that Plato could not use the word *φιλοσοφία* to mean anything that was not Pythagorean. Socrates, we are told in the *Phaedo*,[3] was bidden: *μουσικὴν ποίει καὶ ἐργάζου*. He obeyed the order by practising 'philosophy', *ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὔσης μεγίστης μουσικῆς*.[4] Now if Plato intends the word to have its Pythagorean sense, he also means to put an entirely new significance upon it; thus showing that the 'release', *λύσις*, or *κάθαρσις*, from evil can be effected only by knowledge of the Ideas. So far from proving that the

Phaedr. 336 C, *Polit.* 286 A, *Theaet.* 175 C, *Symp.* 202 A, *et passim.* The idea is of course Socratic, v. Xen. *Mem.* iv. 6. 1 *Σωκράτης γὰρ τοὺς μὲν εἰδότας τί ἕκαστον εἴη τῶν ὄντων ἐνόμιζε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν ἐξηγεῖσθαι δύνασθαι.*

[1] *Theaet.* 178 A.

[2] It is most assuredly not proved by the fact (if it be a fact) of Pythagoras having invented the word *φιλόσοφος* (Herac. ap. Diog. Laert. i. 12); for there is nothing to show that he gave it any more than the literal sense.

[3] 61 A.

[4] There is a similar coupling of the *φιλόσοφος* and *μουσικός* in *Phaedr.* 248 D.

Ideal Theory was Pythagorean, the *Phaedo* indicates that it was a novelty due to Plato.

More serious objection must be found with the arguments on pp. 354–6. The reasoning of the passage inevitably recalls Prof. Sidgwick's[1] phrase about 'commentators like Stallbaum, who treat their author as if he was a shorthand reporter of actual dialogues'! Because Simmias or Cebes is made by Plato to accept willingly a particular view, does it follow that the Simmias or Cebes of actual life must necessarily have done so? No doubt Plato regarded dramatic probability: but the same argument would lead us to ascribe strange views to the historical Socrates! The fact that the Ideal Theory is not introduced as a novelty is no proof that Plato was not its inventor. 'Plato is very careful to tell us that he was not present at the conversation recorded on the *Phaedo*': quite true, for that was the actual fact. But to infer that the theory was therefore not Platonic is a most extraordinary piece of reasoning. Plato needed the Theory of Ideas for the purposes of the Dialogue (to prove immortality, &c.); accordingly he introduces it into his fiction—although he does not alter the fact of his own absence. He does not trouble to prove the existence of the Ideas—*ὃ θρυλοῦμεν ἀεί*—for that was not his way: such proof was not required by the plan of the Dialogue.[2] It is somewhat hard on Plato to rob him of his birthright because he does not choose to be inartistic.

Prof. Burnet lays stress on Aristotle's statement that there is 'only a verbal difference between Plato and the Pythagoreans'.[3] But a fair reading of Aristotle's words makes it manifest that he is referring, not to early Platonism at all, but to the later mathematical stage of the Ideal Theory: *κατὰ μέθεξιν γὰρ εἶναι τὰ πολλὰ τῶν συνωνύμων τοῖς εἴδεσιν. τὴν δὲ μέθεξιν τοὔνομα μόνον μετέβαλεν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ Πυθαγόρειοι μιμήσει τὰ ὄντα φασὶν εἶναι τῶν ἀριθμῶν, Πλάτων δὲ μεθέξει.* There is no reference whatever to a Pythagorean theory of things existing through imitation of the Ideas: it is imitation of *numbers*. Plato in his later days doubtless made much the same statement, substituting *μέθεξις* for *μίμησις*, but employing the Pythagorean *ἀριθμοί*. But Prof. Burnet would hardly contend that such was the nature of Plato's early Theory of Ideas.

[1] In his essay on the Sophists (*Journ. of Phil.*, vol. v, p. 69).

[2] Besides, reasons have been shown (in Appendix A) to suppose that the *Phaedo* is later than the *Republic*: and even in the *Rep.* there is no actual 'proof' of the Ideal Theory.

[3] *Met.* A. 6. 987 b 9.

Again, on p. 356 we read: 'It is certain that the use of the words εἴδη and ἰδέαι to express ultimate realities is pre-Platonic, and it seems most natural to regard it as of Pythagorean origin.' Probably most words in Plato's vocabulary had been used before by other philosophers; but that surely does not prove that Plato borrowed his terminology from previous thinkers. Still less does it prove that the meaning he put on the words was the same as theirs. It really seems extraordinary that Plato cannot be allowed the credit of choosing his own vocabulary. Thus e. g. Sir A. Grant suggests that the name of εἶδος or ἰδέα was 'borrowed probably from Democritus, who spoke of the "forms" of things being emanations from things themselves, and constituting our knowledge of the things'.[1] Surely Democritus (at least on *a priori* grounds) would be the last person from whom Plato would borrow anything; besides, what resemblance is there between the Ideas and the atomistic emanations? It is easier to believe that the origin of the words was Pythagorean; but easiest of all to suppose that Plato used them himself, with his own meaning, without conscious borrowing from any one.

Thus on every ground it seems impossible to accept Prof. Burnet's conclusion, that there is a point where 'Pythagoreanism becomes practically indistinguishable from the earliest form of Platonism'. The amount of Pythagorean influence which may safely be inferred has been indicated in the body of this essay: but beyond that one is not justified in going.

Similarly Plato may be supposed to have thought for himself of the tripartition of the soul. It is true that we have the doubtful evidence of Plutarch[2] for attributing the same theory to Pythagoras; but even he does not say a word to suggest that Plato borrowed the notion. Moreover, Zeller[3] refuses to allow the theory to the original Pythagoreans: nor does it accord well with what we know of their psycho-

[1] Edition of *Ethics*, i. p. 201. Diels (*Dox. Graec.*, p. 171) quotes from Irenaeus 'quod autem dicunt [haeretici] imagines esse haec [i. e. vacuum et atomos] eorum quae sunt manifestissime Democriti et Platonis sententiam edisserunt. Democritus enim primus ait multas et varias ab universitate figuras expressas descendisse in hunc mundum'. This evidence, however, is late, and not really to the point.

[2] *Epit.* iv. 4 (Diels, *Dox. Graec.*, p. 389) Πυθαγόρας Πλάτων κατὰ μὲν τὸν ἀνωτάτω λόγον διμερῆ τὴν ψυχήν, τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔχειν λογικόν, τὸ δὲ ἄλογον· κατὰ δὲ τὸ προσεχὲς καὶ ἀκριβὲς τριμερῆ· τὸ γὰρ ἄλογον διαιροῦσιν εἴ τε τὸ θυμικὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν. The double dichotomy is certainly Platonic.

[3] *Pre-Soc.* i. p. 479.

logy.[1] And even if they had so divided the soul, the thought is not so profound that Plato could not have reached it independently. It is, however, possible that Plato may have followed the guidance of Alcmaeon in placing the highest part of soul (*Tim.* 73 C, D *τὸ θεῖον σπέρμα . . . ὃ δ' αὖ τὸ λοιπὸν καὶ θνητὸν τῆς ψυχῆς κτλ.*) in the head ; and the information may have reached him through Philolaus.[2] So that this piece of physiology seems to be the only part of the Platonic theory of soul that can with any certainty be attributed to Pythagorean influence.

[1] It is noticeable that the *Phaedo*, which is admittedly the most Pythagorean of the Dialogues, contains no hint of the tripartite soul.

[2] Cf. Zeller, *l. c.* Cf. Plut. *l. c.* 5 *Πυθαγόρας τὸ μὲν ζωτικὸν περὶ τὴν καρδίαν, τὸ δὲ λογικὸν καὶ νοερὸν περὶ τὴν κεφαλήν.* Philolaus, fr. 13 (Diels, *Fragmente*, p. 254). See also Archer-Hind on *Phaedo* 96 B (where the reference is most probably to Alcmaeon) ; and R. D. Hicks, Introd. to *de Anima*, p. xxiii.

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