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# THE ARTS IN RECONSTRUCTION

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Planning for the postwar period, especially for the occupied and the conquered countries, has been focused upon military occupation and policing, relief, medical care and rehabilitation, political reorganization, agricultural and industrial restorations and operations, control of money and banking and distribution of commodities and similar activities. It is hoped that by careful and foresighted planning of all these practical arrangements and technical operations, and the establishment of new boundaries with new governments and a new international government to police the world, reconstruction of social order and restoration of customary modes of living will be achieved.

As we read reports of the actual situation since fighting ceased, these many and varied plans and programs, however necessary, desirable and promising, however complete in their meticulous attention to the complex social, economic and political needs, seem negligent of the most crucial task of all—namely, human and cultural reconstruction.

It must be evident that the bombing and all other wartime events have brought not only the destruction of homes, factories, railroads, utilities, schools and universities and other forms of devastation but, in addition, for many people, have destroyed much of their traditional ideals, the cherished beliefs, and customary assumptions by which they have attempted to make their lives orderly and meaningful.

This war, following so closely upon the First World War, has accelerated the breakdown of the historically developed European culture (spelled with a small "c" and used in the anthropological sense), which long before the war had been disintegrating. The underlying conceptions and assumptions, the customary patterns of thinking, acting and feeling by which, and for which, western people have lived, worked and reared their children, maintaining social order and pursuing the goals and aspirations of their traditions, all these have suffered either collapse or profound alteration during this war.

All the varied plans for social, economic, political, juridical and international reconstruction are predicated upon the existence and operation of these cultural traditions, since all these proposals assume that the different peoples will continue to exhibit some regular pattern of thinking, of orderly conduct and of feelings; will continue to practice the self-discipline and the highly ritualized, symbolic conduct which make these social, economic, political, juridical and inter-national arrangements operate.

The people themselves, the men, women and children, the youths and maidens, who are the carriers of culture, the bearers of traditions, the actors and the operators of these organizations and social practices, have greatly suffered from the

war. Not only have they been starved or badly undernourished, exposed to hardships, cruelties and atrocities; but they have lost much, and for some, all of that naive, often passionate, faith in their traditional beliefs and practices as the only right and necessary way of living. Many have also developed a cumulative emotional reaction to life from these traumatic experiences of wartime. They are filled with hostility or overwhelmed by despair, either burning with an intense, corrosive hate against those who have mistreated or misled them or sunk in an apathy of hopeless resignation. Everywhere people are ridden by anxiety because they can look forward with no dependable expectations for their future.

Probably never before have there been so many people emotionally disturbed and these strong feelings, as we know from cumulative studies, must find some release or expression, direct and overt, or disguised and surreptitious. If allowed to pour out their hate and resentment, people will exhibit every form of violence and destruction, as reports of "incidents" already have shown. If restrained by military or police force, these feelings of hate and hostility will poison and sabotage the efforts at social reconstruction and restoration, with a series of political crises and outbreaks.

However strongly we may emphasize the economic basis of social order and the imperative need of food, shelter and protection for existence, we must recognize that man lives primarily by memories and expectations. He must believe in something, must aspire and hope and strive, as daily he links his past, represented by traditions, with a future he pictures in terms of his customary expectations and aspirations.

When a people no longer hope nor expect anything, but merely "endure the slow misery of existence," they undergo progressive demoralization. They can find no energy for rebuilding their individual and group lives. They have no feeling of urgency for maintaining standards of conduct or attempting any achievement beyond mere survival. They are overwhelmed by apathy or paralyzed by despair. So long as relief is provided, people thus apathetic can exist on a minimum level of subsistence, but they have ceased to live as a people.

The people of Germany present an especially perplexing problem. Conquered by military force and subjected to all the drastic punishment, retaliatory measures and demands for reparation now being imposed upon them, many are sullen, resentful and suspicious. Most of them will have lost all faith, unable to believe in anything or anyone after the collapse of national socialism. If we face squarely the question of how the German people, who cannot be wiped out as a people, are to be treated, especially after the punitive measures have been applied, we must wonder what can we do or say to them that will have any meaning or effect. How can we persuade them to change their traditional culture, their dominant character structure, their way of life, so that they can learn to participate peacefully in European affairs and join in maintaining world order? We can punish and destroy and by force compel them to change everything we can reach and to "accept" democratic practices. But how can we replace their traditional patterns of thinking, of acting, of feeling, their customary patterns of human relationships, the innermost core of their personalities? Can we coerce them by force and prolonged military occupation into changing their image of themselves as a "master race," the supreme nation? The historical record

plainly shows that "a cultural heritage in the long run never submits to force, but itself vanquishes force in the end".

Likewise with the Japanese whose cultural traditions give them an orientation to life we find difficult, if not impossible, to understand. We can occupy their home lands, disarm them, punish the war criminals and order them to reorganize their political and economic life. But none of these measures will touch the traditional beliefs and assumptions of their religion, their philosophy, their law, their family life, out of which come the way of life and dominant character-structure of the Japanese people. So long as they continue to maintain their traditional culture unchanged we cannot expect them to become supporters of world order, because those traditions foster a belief in their divine origin and their mission to rule the world. Moreover, their traditions make self-government by the people themselves exceedingly difficult, if not impossible under an Emperor-God to whom the first duty is reverent obedience.

In the face of this situation, this overwhelming emotional disturbance and this widespread cultural breakdown and, above all, this baffling task of reconstructing German and Japanese culture, we must look to the arts as the only mode of communication which can reach people and begin to transform their hostility and resentful hate into more constructive channels, giving them courage and hope for the future. It has been the historic rôle of the arts, especially the drama, to do what must be done if there is to be any human and cultural reconstruction.

Never was a time more ready for the dramatist. The whole world today is ready, emotionally aroused as never before, waiting for the resolution of the drama to free them from the conflicts and frustrations of their destructive feelings and paralyzing anxieties, so they can take up again the persistent tasks of life. Only the dramatist, speaking with the power of aesthetic expression, can effectively focus the attention of a group and organize and redirect their emotions through the catharsis he provides. The dramatist compels each one of his audience who are ordinarily shut within their private worlds, to see and hear and feel together, because each shares the same aesthetic experience, accepting the common images and symbols on the stage for his own private personal problems and hopes. Thus the drama offers the most promising instrument for the group therapy that a disorderly and despairing world so desperately needs today.

Moreover, only the drama can fully and effectively express the new assumptions and expectations, and persuade people to accept this reconstruction which is essential today because their traditional beliefs and patterns have become empty and meaningless, no longer capable of providing the guidance and courage people need for living.

If these assertions seem too bold or even fantastic, we must remind ourselves that the arts, especially the drama, have been performing these functions throughout the ages. In almost every culture we find the drama, aided by music and the dance, as the instruments through which the basic perplexities and the emotional needs of people are met, their daily anxieties and their sense of guilt and hostility are released, so they are able to live and meet their daily tasks. We need only remember our own commercial movies to recognize this function of the drama and its provision of phantasies.

This emphasis upon the drama and its presentation in moving pictures and

radio is justified because the immediate situation calls for the dramatic approach and the use of the most effective techniques now available to communicate with people. If the German and the Japanese people are to have a new image of themselves as a people, a new set of values, especially human values and purposes, and are to develop the character structure appropriate to the attainment of those values, then only the drama can provide the aesthetic experiences for such transformations. No other means are available to bring about a reformulation of their masculine and feminine rôles, of the relation of husband to wife, the reconstruction of parent-child relations, the redirection of adolescent aspirations and adult strivings. No other instruments or program can create the new sensibilities, the concern for the dignity and worth of the individual personality which are essential to the democratic way of life.

But all the arts are needed for this Promethean task, since the new hopes and patterns must be portrayed in every medium, reiterated by and orchestrated among all the arts, each in its chosen way and medium, helping to create the new awareness and sensibilities, the new patterns of conduct that recognize the common man and create the feeling about events and people needed for this human and cultural reconstruction.[1]

Primarily this creative work must be done by the artists of each country who belong to the people and have grown up in the culture, and so can speak the language and use the ideas and symbols they will recognize. Probably the artists who can and will speak most clearly and effectively will be those who have suffered like their compatriots during the war, but can transform their suffering into the creative endeavor of art.

Among the youths and younger men and women in each country are the potential artists of tomorrow. To find these few individuals and give them the encouragement and assistance they may need to do this creative work offers an opportunity for imaginative philanthropy to contribute to the future of Europe in a most promising way. It is depressing to think of how much money and effort will probably be spent in attempts to restore dying institutions and obsolete patterns, and how little will be available for this essential creative work in the arts through which European culture must renew itself. It is to be hoped that some individual or foundation will have the imagination and courage to undertake this most promising and significant contribution to the future.

In the light of what happened to the artist, especially in certain countries where the authorities tried to dictate what he should think and do and how he should create, no one must tell the artist what he must do in this situation. But we can in many ways aid the artists to recognize this opportunity and become aware of this urgent need for the help which they alone can give. Moreover, we can assure the artist, especially the dramatists, that today in talking moving pictures and radio as well as the stage of living actors, there are immense new resources for his use, with unprecedented new technical devices of tremendous potency for arousing peoples' feelings, such as the sound controls developed in the Experimental Theatre at Stevens Institute in Hoboken. Moreover, there is music with all its potentialities, not only to move people, to arouse and to

[1] *Cf.* writer's paper, "Art and Living." *Amer. Mag. of Art*, 1924.

calm them, but also to interpret feelings and characters, thereby enhancing the power of the drama for these tasks.

This, however, is not a short term program of immediate postwar reconstruction, gigantic and complex as that will be. We in the Western nations face, from now on, the stupendous undertaking of renewing Western European culture, the historically developed body of ideas, beliefs and assumptions, of patterns of conduct, of rituals and symbols, of institutions and formal practices, served by all our modern tools and technology.

It is becoming increasingly clear that the basic assumptions and organizing concepts of Western European culture have become progressively incredible, inadequate and intolerable. They are no longer congruous with the new climate of opinion which is emerging with relativity, space-time, field theory and their many implications and which, with ever increasing acceleration, is rendering many of our traditions obsolete, even archaic.[2]

Our ancient beliefs about the nature of the universe and how it operates, including the venerable traditions of man's place in that universe, of man's relations to his society and of human nature, these fundamental assumptions of our culture, expressed in religion, philosophy, law, education, and especially in the arts, plus many of the customary ways of believing and feeling, predicated upon those traditions, all these have been losing their once unquestioned and unquestionable validity for more and more people. If we are to have any order and meaning in our personal lives and in our society, if we are to conserve our enduring human values and our persistent aspirations toward human dignity, we must renew our traditional culture, providing equivalent formulations for all these obsolete, archaic assumptions and developing new patterns and rôles through which we can live more sanely and fully and can more nearly approach our enduring goals and values.[3]

It seems clear that, however these basic dimensions of a culture were originally created and formulated, they became operational in the lives of the individuals only as they were communicated through the arts. We have had a western European culture which generations have believed in, guided their lives by, because the basic assumptions and beliefs of that culture were transmitted by parents to their children and reiterated by the artists who told people what to believe and feel and teach their children.

Our Christian tradition was established because it was painted, sculptured and dramatized and sung for a thousand years. Thereby the intellectualized statements and subtle abstractions of theologians, of philosophers, of jurists, were transformed by aesthetic experiences into meaningful and directive patterns in our lives.

[2] *Cf.* the writer's paper, "Science and Culture," *Scientific Monthly*, June, 1940, Vol. L, pp. 491–497.

[3] "And particularly must we rely on the humanists—the historians, the philosophers, the artists, the poets, the novelists, the dramatists—all those who fashion ideas, concepts, and forms that give meaning and value to life and furnish the patterns of conduct. It is they who really construct the world we live in, and it is they who with sensitive awareness to human perplexity and aspiration and with the power of imaginative presentation can speak effectively to a distracted world." Rockefeller Foundation, *Annual Report for 1941*, p. 40–42.

Here we see, then, that we must wait upon the artists to become fully aware of the emerging new climate of opinion, the new conceptions and new criteria of credibility now appearing—and to accept the task of translating these highly abstract and relatively meaningless ideas (at least to most people) through the aesthetic experiences they can create for us. We especially need new symbols for this cultural renewal, to replace those which now perpetuate the archaic concepts that defeat our efforts to live in the present. The essence of a culture is that it provides man with a symbolic world of meanings and values in place of the geographical world of nature. Man with a large brain and imagination cannot merely exist on a level of physiological functioning and organic impulse; it is too boring. He must have a culture to provide ideas and aspirations to live by and for, and art and symbols to guide his conduct; but his culture and his art must be credible and congruous with his advancing ideas and techniques.

Above all, we must wait upon the artists to create the new sensibilities—the awareness and the feelings of sympathy and concern which can transform the bare, abstract idea of human dignity and the worth of the personality into the daily conduct and feelings of individuals. If we really want a democratic social life with world order, the artists must create and maintain the sensibilities which are essential to democracy as a way of life.

Moreover, for understanding other peoples and their culture, their character structure, their design for living and their traditional ways of feeling, we have no more valid sources than their arts, wherein what they live by and for, the sanctions they obey and the purposes they serve, are presented in their essential, their quintessential, expression. Both for understanding a culture and for access to the sensibilities and feelings of a people, the arts provide the major approach. The arts, therefore, offer our chief resource for developing the awareness and understanding, the acceptance of the cultural diversities all over the world which must be accepted and orchestrated into world order.[4]

The museums, with their collections of art and archeology and of anthropological materials, have an unrivalled opportunity to help create this awareness of other cultures and more sympathetic approach to and acceptance of these various designs for living.

This is the prospect we must face, now that the war has ended. This is the tremendous task we must undertake, and for such an undertaking we must give the artists the fullest opportunity and all necessary assistance and encouragement to play their historic rôles in one of the crucial periods of human history. In view of the shabby treatment we usually give the artist, even those who profess to value the arts and concern themselves with Culture (capital "C"), we must vigorously re-assert the primacy of the artist and his essential rôle in the reconstruction we must undertake. Individually and as a group, all those who recognize this must demonstrate to a skeptical and indifferent public that aesthetic experiences are indeed the keys to the future, because, as D. H. Lawrence told us, "it is the way our sympathies flow and recoil that really determines our lives."

[4] *Cf.* the writer's paper—"World Order and Cultural Diversity." *Free World*, June 1942.

# THE CONCEPT OF TRAGEDY IN MODERN CRITICISM

GEORGE KIMMELMAN

"It is Art alone," Havelock Ellis correctly remarks, echoing Gaultier, "which justifies the pains and griefs of Life by demonstrating their representative character and emphasizing their spectacular value, thus redeeming the Pain of Life by Beauty."[1] To judge from the many critical discussions which have attempted for the past three or four decades to deal with tragedy, and which have, moreover, maintained that its authentic spirit is not to be found in modern literature, one would gather that this genre is almost completely alien to the world of art and that it could be more appropriately evaluated within the fields of ethics, religion, psychology, or metaphysics than encompassed within the scope of aesthetics. One is driven to this conclusion by studying the works, not only of those critics who would explain tragedy by defining it in restricted axiological concepts or by reducing it to mere neuro-physiological adjustments, but also of those academic critics who, genuinely interested in perpetuating the "pure" literary tradition, only succeed in repeating uncritically the formulations of Aristotle's *Poetics*.

While it is true, as many literary historians have shown, that the historical development of tragic literature itself has effected changes in some phases of the Aristotelian concept,[2] almost all modern critics still insist upon definite criteria which must characterize a drama, for instance, before it can be accurately described as "tragic." These include (a) the "struggling" protagonist who pits his "will" against his fateful antagonists, the Gods, Nature, Society, or his own destructive impulses; (b) the mood of "exaltation" associated not only with his "heroic" deeds but also with the ends for which he is destroyed; and (c) the power to achieve a "catharsis" by means of "pity" and "terror."

In spite of the gradual, democratizing processes, as well as the development of of various coöperative movements—social, economic, political—of the past two centuries, almost all our critics are still rooted in the individualistic psychology of the Renaissance. In their insistence upon a "conflict" theory of tragedy, they are naturally reflecting those intellectual movements and ideological tendencies which have become an integral part of our capitalist civilization; viz., personal initiative, competition, aggressiveness, Darwinism, Hegelianism, "militant" Christianity, etc. What has happened, unfortunately, is that the theory has been so oversimplified and grossly applied as to neglect the more subtle aspects of tragic drama and to violate the very essence of the tragic spirit itself. One has only to recall here the controversies at the turn of the century of Brunetière, Archer, Jones and others who tried to ascertain what type of "conflict," if any, was considered necessary for the drama. Lest the reader think that such discussions are just another incident in yesterday's annals of dramatic criticism, he

[1] *Impressions and Comments* (Boston, 1914), p. 208.

[2] E.g., Thorndike, A. H., *Tragedy* (Boston, 1908); Nicoll, A., *The Theory of Drama* (London, 1931); Campbell, L. B., *Shakespeare's Tragic Heroes, Slaves of Passion* (Cambridge, 1930); Note particularly Calverton, V., "Sociological Criticism of Literature" in *The Newer Spirit* (New York, 1925), pp. 19–51.

has only to turn to many contemporary comments on the plays, for instance, of Chekov or Maeterlinck—not to mention those of O'Neill, or the modern novel—and learn to his surprise, perhaps, that their "static" nature automatically removes them from the category of "tragic" literature. Instead of considering "conflict" or "action" part of a complex, aesthetic pattern interwoven with other factors such as motivation, suspense, dialogue, causation, theme, etc., the critics have abstracted it out of context and attributed virtues to it which neither life nor art can substantiate. "Conflict" is not an end in itself; it is only a means to an artistic end. As far as drama is concerned, there must, of course, be "enough" of it to keep the play moving, the tempo depending upon whether the playwright is working in the tradition of Elizabethan "blood" or the Japanese Noh tragedies. Since the drama is also popular entertainment, this problem must be further related to those factors connected with audience responses and sheer theatrical effectiveness, as distinct from those involved in the questions of pure literary art. For an interesting discussion of a theory of tragic drama diametrically opposed to those emphasizing "conflict," the reader may profitably consult Yeats's "The Cutting of an Agate," Maeterlinck's *The Treasure of the Humble* and Andreyev's "Letter on the Theatre."

As we proceed to examine the accepted picture of the tragic protagonist, we are compelled—once we assume the non-aesthetic premises of the critics—to enter immediately the field of ethics, psychology, and metaphysics. Although the critics never cease stressing that tragedy is not written to "justify God's ways to men" or that the tragic world must not be trivialized by "poetic justice" and didacticism, the very nature of the subject-matter as they present it, viz., the "problem of evil", demands a discussion within some broad normative framework. In the first place, the critics have failed to differentiate between the tragic and the heroic character. They have, furthermore, given a rather restricted meaning to "heroic," in that it describes actions not of subtlety, delicacy, or subdued power but those unbridled, violent and grossly demonstrative. But since a heroic character is one whose deeds and ends are admirable or praiseworthy, how are we to reconcile such definition with people who are destroyed by the overwhelming vices of perfidy, lust for power, jealousy, egotism, cynicism, etc., let alone the complicating afflictions of mental pathology, e.g., Macbeth, Tamburlaine, Othello, Lear, Coriolanus or Timon? What are we to say about the "values" of such unmitigated criminals as King John or Richard III? The "heroic", in other words, is not restricted even to mean generalized, indiscriminate "action," but it is further trivialized to signify mere *activity* of the most destructive sort. "Explaining" *Richard III*, for instance, by ascribing its qualities to Marlowe's alleged influence or to Shakespeare's immature period of "pseudo-tragedies" is only evading the issue.[3]

[3] Some characteristic methods on the part of critics to circumvent these and other allied difficulties consist of: (a) choosing only those characters that substantiate a specific theory but neglecting others that may possibly refute it; (b) discussing theories of tragedy in general without concrete references to plays, novels, or short stories; (c) employing over-all descriptions like "Greek," "Elizabethan," or "Shakespearean" tragedy whenever important distinctions are called for as those, for instance, between an Aeschylus and a Euripides, a Heywood and a Jonson, or between *Romeo and Juliet* and *Troilus and Cressida;* and (d)

In the second place, the critics condemn the protagonists of modern literature because they do not "struggle" enough; they are victims of resignation, vacillation, and impotence who have been dealt with not only in the field of dramatic criticism but also in that of poetry and the novel by such critics as Petersen, Wilson, A. Wilder, Beach, Hartwick, Hatcher, Kazin and others. Many reasons have been adduced to account for the so-called nontragic character of our protagonists, but they can not be considered as valid explanations. These include: an uninspiring theology (Buck, Drew, Dixon), a non-moral cosmology (Krutch, Lippmann, Edman), a dehumanizing science (the Neo-Humanists and contemporary "classicists"), a lack of "national feeling" (Courtney, Hamilton), pacifistic politics (Brooks, MacLeish, Mumford), "decadent" capitalism (the Marxian critics).[4]

Let us turn our attention to a few typical examples offered in proof of the "struggle" theory. (a) Philo Buck and Elizabeth Drew maintain that the Hebrews, in contrast to the Greek or Elizabethan playwrights, were incapable of creating tragic literature because they had no "challenging" heroes. As Buck phrases it, "to the Hebrews evil was only disobedience,and suffering was justice meted out in full measure for their sins."[5] Job, says Drew, is a passive victim of a grandiloquent and senseless bully."[6] The comparison, by the way, between the Book of Job and an Elizabethan tragedy is illogical since the former is merely a fragmentary dialogue and the latter a fully developed art form. But even by their own comparison, their untenable concept of "struggle" has led these critics astray. Both consider Ibsen a master of tragedy, and yet they fail to see that *Ghosts*, for instance, presents a problem of evil similar to the Hebraic concept as

attributing ethical, philosophic, or metaphysical conceptions to a work of art without textual justification.

[4] Any adequate discussion of these reasons would take us beyond the intended scope of this essay; we can only indicate some major weaknesses. First, "strong national feeling" has existed in many other countries besides those of Periclean Greece or Elizabethan England, but it has not always produced great tragedy. Second, the Krutchians fail to see, as we shall point out, that the tragic spirit can be rooted in a humanistic as well as in a theological or cosmological ethic. Third, by interpreting science in axiologic terms instead of treating it as a neutral methodology, and by still thinking of it in 19th-Century concepts of "mechanism," "materialism," etc., the critics are merely repeating some Victorian anxieties. It was Wordsworth who said some final words on this subject, not Thomas Huxley. The "feel" of human experience (art and aesthetics) can never be threatened by hormonology or astro-physics. Furthermore, scientists do not lead dehumanized lives, and critics should not take too seriously the *obiter dicta* on the physical and normative sciences offered by writers. The power of the artist's work derives from his art and not from his intellectual marginalia or "ideology." Those interested in the present "battle of the books" among the "neo-classicists," the "official" litterateurs and the "scientific humanists" may refer to the following examples: the symposiums, "On the Brooks-MacLeish Thesis," *Partisan Review*, (Jan.–Feb., 1942), pp. 38–48; and "The New Failure of Nerve," *Partisan Review*, (Jan.–Feb., 1943), pp. 2–39; "Thirteen Arrows at the Heart of Progressive, Liberal Education," Hook, S., *The Humanist* (Spring, 1944), pp. 1–10; "Great Books in Education," Hook, S., *The New Leader* (May 27, June 3, 1944). The latest attack from the "left" is James T. Farrell's *The League of Frightened Philistines* (New York, 1945) especially pages 3–11, 90–135.

[5] *Literary Criticism* (New York, 1930), p. 258.

[6] *Discovering Drama* (New York, 1937), p. 178.

they have presented it. In secular language, Mrs. Alving has precipitated the family tragedy because she has been too good a servant of conventional morality. By refusing to leave her husband (by *not* "struggling"), she has resigned herself to her fate no less than Job has to his. Joseph Krutch,[7] in contrasting Mrs. Alving to old Ephraim in O'Neill's *Desire under the Elms*, contends that she can make no appeal to the tragic imagination because, unlike the old man who identifies himself with God's will, she does not "belong" to anything. But in obeying Pastor Manders she, too, identifies herself with God's will. Incidentally, although Ephraim may be a deluded man, Krutch, who recognizes this fact, insists upon describing him as one that has attained "dignity," "elevation" and "grandeur"! (b) Drew argues that if the Mannons in O'Neill's *Mourning Becomes Electra* had only been made to know the truth about their neuroses and motivated to "fight them," the play would have been a successful tragedy. She repudiates the viewpoint of Millet and Bentley, whom she quotes as saying that in showing people "trapped by forces within themselves, their subconscious complexes," the play reflects the "courageous acceptance of the implications of the scientific world view. . . giving its effect of tremendous tragedy". After all, she insists, "we are not rats in traps". Suppose, then, the Mannons had submitted their malady to psychiatric treatment. Can anyone seriously agree with Drew that "success in struggle would have produced a conclusion of harmony. . . corresponding to the *Eumenides*"? The fundamental dividing line, in other words, between O'Neill and Aeschylus is reduced to the mere factor of "struggle". But, on the other hand, suppose that the Mannon curse were so deeprooted as to be beyond medical salvation. Would they not have remained helpless "rats in traps," and therefore unfit subjects for tragedy? Apparently not, for she surprisingly informs us that their "failure would then have had the irony essential to tragedy".[8] (c) The reductio ad absurdum of the "struggle" theory is reached by Herbert Muller, who tells us that "the pleasure of tragedy indeed finds constant expression in the language of common men. 'It doesn't matter whether you win or lose, it's how you play the game.' "[9] Since all of us ostensibly love a struggle, regardless of the participants, causes, motivations, or the purposes which it serves, the contest per se is all that matters. This is a divorcement of means from ends equalled only by that of W. M. Dixon, who admits that though we "hate the inhumanity" of, say, a Medea, a Tamburlaine, a Macbeth, we do admire their "strength, courage, and will," just as in daily life we "approve of men we know and at the same time disapprove."[10] One wonders whether in actuality Professor Dixon admired Himmler's and Hitler's "will" and simply "disapproved" of their "inhumanity".

The fundamental weakness of the theory, along with its alleged "heroic" protagonist, is that it narrowly circumscribes the wide range and qualitative variations within human motivation. To be profoundly interested in man's fate is to realize, as has been suggested, that the Kingdom of Heaven is entered by different paths. "Each man to his own salvation", sagely remarked Anatole France in

[7] *The American Drama Since 1918* (New York, 1939), pp. 99–100.
[8] Op. cit., p. 200–201.
[9] *Modern Fiction* (New York, 1937), p. 115.
[10] *Tragedy* (London, 1925), pp. 203–204.

another connection. If we accept Buck's conclusion that tragedy is "life that plucks victory from the very jaws of defeat" and that its "profit is to lose the world, but to gain one's soul,"[11] who then is to decide that the profit is to be awarded only to those who "take up arms," but denied the pacifist, the mystic, the ascetic, the stoic, the epicurean, the meek or the martyred? What were the "victories," one has a right to ask, of Lear, Othello, or Macbeth; of such innocent victims as Cordelia, Desdemona, Lady Macduff and her children, Hecuba, Andromache, or Titinius; of those like Antigone, Hippolytus, Brutus, Hamlet, or Rosmer, whose very virtues led them to destruction? Ironically enough, they could not even achieve the actual victories of many unheroic protagonists like Oblomov or Lord Jim. The critics in substance evidently agree with Machiavelli, who condemned Christianity because it taught men to "endure evils, not to perform great actions." His comment at least had validity, if we recognize the premises of his anti-Christian bias; the critics' "struggle" theory has none, since it implies an allegedly apodeictic scale of human behavior and values which, however, is confirmed neither by life nor all of art. While we shall presently argue for a type of heroic tragedy in which humanistic values are involved, we must learn to differentiate between the so-called "victories" of the protagonist and our own sense of exaltation which his life and death may have inspired. Hamlet's noble heart, says Edgar Singer Jr., may crack in an agony "we can in no wise share",[12] but we do make its virtue our own.

In the meantime we who are living through the horrors of war and conquest can ill afford to accept an ethic which associates "heroism" with bloody dictators but not with the enslaved, whose only weapon as yet may be simply "to endure". Our contemporary tyrants could do no better for their morale than read some of our critics. They would be inspired, no doubt, by the thought that the tragic heroes of Elizabethan dramatists were "part and parcel of England's imperial destiny,"[13] or that on the "crest of the wave of tragedy one must feel joyously; . . . the opposite pole to the tragic. . . is the sordid view"[14] (Edith Hamilton, referring to English and Greek tragedy). We have a right, nay, a duty to inquire also into the thoughts and feelings of imperialism's victims whose lives expressed then, as well as now, a tragedy born out of their very "sordidness". Incidentally, it is difficult to reconcile the cynicism and morbidity of Webster, Chapman, or Tourneur with England's joyous "destiny". It is one thing to define personal tastes by saying, for instance, that we prefer plays that are swift-moving, or that we care not whether the protagonist be demoniac as long as he reveals what is commonly called "strength" or "will"; but it is something else to maintain that such bald preferences fully encompass the rich complexities of tragic drama.

The very plays which the critics present as examples of heroic conflict actually offer us no such cases of clear-cut "struggle" at all. Macbeth and Othello, for instance, are not engaged in what is usually referred to as "spiritual" combat with greed or jealousy. When we first meet Macbeth, he is already a helpless

[11] Op. cit., p. 283.

[12] "Aesthetic and the Rational Ideal" in *On The Contented Life* (New York, 1936), p. 53.

[13] Courtney, W. C., *The Idea of Tragedy* (New York, 1900), p. 44.

[14] *The Great Age of Literature* (New York, 1942), p. 232.

victim of his compulsion. It is true that he vacillates for a few short moments, but even then he does so, as Lady Macbeth explains, only because he has to perform the murder himself. Othello, more than Macbeth, is held captive throughout the play by his affliction. He is never free enough to recognize fully the causes of his torment and to confront them in "struggle." Both Macbeth and Othello do fight, but the combat is purely physical and directed toward removing those who stand in the way of their contorted self-realization. Important to note also is the fact that the most dramatic or absorbing situations need not be those in which obvious "conflict" is manifested. Rather are they to be found in the tensional, revelational moments during which, for example, Lady Macbeth taunts her husband, Iago agonizes Othello, Hamlet pleads with Gertrude, Brutus and Cassius question each other, Rosmer confronts Rebecca West, or—on a smaller scale perhaps—Ethan Frome learns of Mattie's leaving, Chekov's *Three Sisters* listen to the music of the passing regiment, or Gorky's Luka in *The Lower Depths* comforts the dying woman. Similar instances are legion in the works of Hardy, Conrad, James, Mann, Proust, Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy and others.

In the third place, the critics include among their charges against modern tragedy that its characters, unlike those of Greek or English literature, are not "free" agents but victims of a "mechanism" allegedly characteristic of the scientific viewpoint referred to earlier. Here, too, unfortunately, we find words used without any psychological or ethical precision. Just what do the critics mean by "freedom"? Freedom should imply not only the obvious absence of external restraints but also a clear recognition of all those limitations which nature, society, temperament, etc., have imposed upon us. Freedom is the realm of being which functions within definite necessities, these in turn ever changing as we increase our knowledge and develop our personal and societal controls. Our freedom increases, then, to the extent that we apprehend the order or orders of both our external and internal worlds; only under such conditions can we bring an intelligent uniformity and sequence to bear upon our lives. The unfree, on the other hand, are the ignorant, the irresolute, the slaves of whim and confusion. They are the very ones, in other words, who are the protagonists of classical and Elizabethan tragedies and whom the critics strangely enough refer to as "free"![15]

John H. Lawson, another "struggle" theorist, has attempted to deal fully with the problem of "will" and "necessity" from the standpoint of modern psychology. Although he attacks the position of many literary critics, as well as some "bourgeois" schools of philosophy and psychology, his own vague conclusions are in many ways no different from those whom he criticizes. Like the critics whom we have been discussing, he too agrees that "The modern stage has taken for its special province the actions of people who *don't know what they want.* Hamlet is aware of his own vacillation; Tartuffe seems to be aware or his own deceit".[16]

[15] The critics can find no possible refuge in Aristotle's *Anagnorisis*, the protagonist's realization either of his own errors or of the conditions precipitating his doom. This is merely a dramatic technique unrelated to the problem of freedom because such realization (e.g., Macbeth) does not swerve him from his previous course of destructive action to a new and "freer" life. Neither can the critics adopt the position that the protagonist begins enslaved but develops into freedom, because in many instances (e.g., Oedipus Rex) his life is tragic by the very fact that it is *irrevocably* fated.

[16] *Theory and Technique of Playwriting* (New York, 1936), p. 88.

(Italics, J.H.L.). The writers, continues Lawson, are influenced by Freud, whose theory of motivation denies free will; and they, therefore, can not create characters of purposive "action". (a) Lawson is confusing an awareness of our weaknesses with our conscious desires. We, like Hamlet, may know our neurotic afflictions, but we are also aware of our "wants" and ideals. (b) Freud never contends that we are mere instruments of blind forces, since even our subconscious patterns are mechanisms of adjustment and control. Our complete culture, moreover, is the result of man's conscious efforts to utilize these very mechanisms by the well-known techniques of restraint, sublimation, etc. A Freudian writer, then, may choose to analyze a character's subconscious complexes, but it does not follow that the character has to be action-less for that reason, nor that he has to be devoid of conscious purpose.[17] (c) One would expect a "left" critic like Lawson to draw important conclusions from the criticism which he levels at the modern writer. Instead of directing his attack upon Freud (who is himself, according to Lawson-Marx orthodoxy, a characteristic product of our society) he should have asked why it is that writers feel compelled to deal with so-called bewildered protagonists. Perhaps, as not only our artists record but our psychologists, economists, and sociologists report, it is because our much-vaunted civilization has rendered mass bewilderment inevitable. The early period of capitalist expansion permitted a relative freedom of ideas and movement for large sections of the population, including our writers. But under present conditions of coercive statisms, accelerated corporate powers, totalitarian regimentation, insecurity, war, etc., what can one expect but a depersonalization attended upon such mass frustration and absolutism, let alone a mere bewilderment? One could possibly argue that the royal or aristocratic protagonists had a relatively easier task in coping with their problems than have their "petty-bourgeois" and "proletarian" successors. Freed from mass economic and social pressures, the former could at least afford the luxury of focusing their attention upon purely personal afflictions, and they could also enjoy a freedom of movement by means of which they exercised their destructiveness. Actual freedom in terms of *individual*, moral actions has almost ceased to have any practicable significance in a world such as ours; it can assume full meaning only within the

[17] Perhaps it is this conception, besides the power of tradition, which prevents many critics from noticing in the early protagonists the same objectionable traits which they castigate so sharply when found in the moderns. Even when they admit the presence of such traits they will lavish a sympathy upon the former which they deny to their contemporaries. Hamlet (if we are to believe some of the critics) can afford to be afflicted with psychic shock, melancholic psychosis, sexual and anxiety neuroses, rationalizations, necrophilism, etc., and still retain his admirable, tragic qualities. On the other hand, a Peter Slavek (A. Koestler's *Arrival and Departure*) is either condemned or treated with clinical objectivity, because his political convictions and deeds are façades for alleged psychological maladjustments. In other words, he is damned if he "acts" and he is damned if he does not, as though psychological, neurological or physiological "explanations" have anything to do with the quality of the protagonist's experiences which the writer is primarily interested in conveying to us. Perhaps the Greek and Elizabethan "heroes" are enjoying such enviable reputation only because their creators never had the apparent disadvantage of knowing psychoanalysis. After all, if we are consistently to apply the "psychological" technique of the critics, we might find that the much-vaunted Elizabethan courage, for example, is nothing more than a hidden fear or a refined obstinacy or a wish-to-die, etc.!

context of *group* efforts directed toward a fuller democratic life. This is the important theme of the times in so far as it relates itself to the questions of modern tragedy which Lawson and others like him raise but never adequately answer.

Finally, we shall now turn our attention to the factor of "exaltation" customarily associated with the protagonist's "personality" and the alleged ends for which he dies. Paraphrasing Shelley, Buck says, "the measure of the greatness of tragedy is the wealth of the personality displayed in the struggle". "Personality" explains the spectator's "exaltation" or "elevation" in watching the agonized torments of an Oedipus, a Lear, or a Hamlet. The "greatness" of the protagonist, continues Buck (his remarks are typical of others as well) is demonstrated by the "forces engaged" and the quality of the "grief". The characters in modern literature suffer only "physical grief", are "damaged and flawed" by their experiences, not "released and purified" like those in the older plays and novels.[18] To begin with, the critics never compare two protagonists who are similar as to motivation, intellectuality, profession, or sensitivity. They usually counterpose a Hamlet to an Emperor Jones, a Lear to a Clyde Griffiths, a Faust to Masefield's Nan. Why not, for example, a more logical comparison between the quest of the good life in *Faust* with that in *War and Peace*, *The World's Illusion*, *Eyeless in Gaza*, *For Whom the Bell Tolls*, *Man's Fate*, or *Bread and Wine*? Here Faust, Peter, Christian, Anthony, and the others at least share common, sophisticated interests which naturally have greater "significance" than those described in *The Tragedy of Nan*, once we grant to begin with that the problems of the intellectual have more appeal for us than the tribulations of the ordinary man. The question, therefore, as to which character is allegedly "released" or "damaged" is secondary to something more fundamental, viz., the kind of person the writer has chosen to portray. Note also the critics' additional assumption that it is not the characters themselves but they who seem to know to what exact extent grief can be "mental" in one case and only "physical" in another,or just what kind of suffering can "purify" and what kind, "flaw". How O'Neill's so-called psychoanalytic and actionless characters suffer merely "physical" grief whereas the classical and Shakespearean extroverts of violent activity suffer "mentally" is not explained.

The critics also are guilty of a further illogicality in comparing a character with a "personality". The former is a completely realized and objectified individual possessing a life of his own apart from that of his creator. But a "personality" as even Buck admits is a character plus the philosophic attitudes or temper of the writer, such as one finds, for instance, in Faust, Hamlet, or Jean Christophe. The "myriad-minded" Hamlet is not only the gentle and pathetic prince but also Shakespeare's intellectual eclecticism, suspended judgments, or ironical broodings, depending upon our interpretation of the play-wright's "philosophy". There are hundreds of characters throughout modern literature whose verisimilitude can equal or even surpass that of Shakespeare's, and there are writers whose knowledge or philosophic profundity exceed his by far. (Where his unique genius lies will be indicated later.) Are the critics asking us to assume, then, that the "exaltation" in *Hamlet*, for instance, derives from some joyous or heartening philosophy characteristic of Shakespeare's mind? Something like this is

apparently suggested in their insistence that he in contrast to the moderns has "faith in human nature," that his protagonists do not die "in vain" because they have accomplished important goals, their own or those of society.

Let us consider Hamlet as an example of one who achieved his end, ridding Denmark of a usurper. We question very much whether the idea of personal vengeance effecting medieval justice can elicit a feeling of exaltation in a modern audience. Aside from a thematic remoteness, there are other factors militating against the "pureness" of the victory: Hamlet's mental aberrations, personal ambitions, his acts which are not initiated by himself but practically forced upon him, the deaths of the innocent, the chance elements involved in his so-called success, the untried mettle of Hamlet's successor—Fortinbras, supplementary considerations such as the "disease" imagery[19] of the entire play, the question whether Hamlet is to be evaluated as a person or merely appreciated as a symbol of ancient cult-ceremonials,[20] etc. To the Marxists, for example, Fortinbras' accession to the throne can be no occasion for "exaltation" since he is just another figure of feudal oppression. Had he been, at least, a "bourgeois" symbol like Napoleon, his rule would have presaged social progress.[21] According to others, however, also sympathetic to the Marxist viewpoint, the supposedly progressive Renaissance spirit latent in *Hamlet* and more obviously manifest in *Macbeth* is not an unmixed blessing. To C. Caudwell Shakespeare's protagonists reveal the immoderate, measureless will-power so characteristic of early, capitalist "accumulation,"[22] and to K. Burke the ideology of the day was not vigorous or hopeful enough to counteract the playwright's personal "bleakness" of outlook as expressed in *Hamlet*.[23] "Exaltation," in other words, does not seem to be so clearly indicated as some of the critics would have us believe.

Perhaps we are to look for it not in the ends sought by a noble Hamlet but in the victory of society, of a cosmic or "moral order" over some evil-doer. Here too the critics find themselves in a dilemma: they inform us that tragedy admits of no didacticism, that it is not intended to "justify the ways of God to man," etc., and yet Shakespeare's tragedies show us a faith in a moral world against whose laws the protagonists "dash themselves in vain" (Courtney).[24] The "exaltation" apparently resides in the fact after all that "the wages of sin is death" or that "crime does not pay". Even secular-minded critics like K. Burke, for instance,

[18] Op. cit., pp. 281, 283, (280–284).

[19] Spurgeon, C., *Shakespeare's Imagery: And What It Tells Us* (Cambridge, 1935), pp. 316–320.

[20] Murray, G., "Hamlet and Orestes" and "The Molpe" in *The Classical Tradition in Poetry* (Cambridge, Mass., 1927), pp. 28–49, 205–240. In this connection see also Harrison, J., *Themis* (Cambridge, 1912).

[21] Smirnov, A., *Shakespeare* (New York, 1936), pp. 24–27, 59–66.

[22] *Illusion and Reality* (London, 1937), pp. 73–91.

[23] *Counter-Statement* (New York, 1931), pp. 249. A few years later Burke expressed the conviction that Shakespeare was suffering from an ambivalence which prevented him from accepting wholeheartedly the values of his day. *Macbeth*, for instance, reveals its author's confused conception of ambition, a character-trait which, according to Burke, became the "essence of vocation" in the new culture, but which was "punishable pride" in the ethics of medievalism. *Attitudes towards History*, Vol. 1, (New York, 1937), p. 29.

[24] Op. cit., p. 66.

still continue to discuss tragedy in terms of "guilt", "expiation," and "sacrifice".[25] Aside from the controversial question whether Shakespeare is to be described as a traditionalist, a skeptic, a political propagandist, an ironist, a cynical opportunist, a pessimist (the critics must not forget that Schopenhauer and his followers are "exalted" by the victories of evil!) or the proponent of all those various views which readers have insisted upon attributing to him, one thing must be made clear. The term "exaltation" can not be employed intelligently in so far as the protagonist's "goal" is concerned, unless we indicate our ethical preferences in connection with means and ends. We can logically no more apply that term to the deeds of an evil character than we can the term "heroic". Whatever we shall find the nature of the tragic spirit to be, we must recognize its manifestation in the truly "exalted" art of heroic literature. The heroic protagonists are those who have either prevented the values of their culture from being subverted by retrograde movements and reactionary individuals, or who have actually furthered progressive, humanistic ideals in science, art, politics, morals, religion, etc. Logically only heroic tragedy is capable of generating the mood of exaltation which, moreover, can be most fully enriched and dignified if the protagonist is also a "free" man as we have described him earlier. He, as well as the unfolding theme of the whole tragedy, moves toward a nobility to the degree that he has stripped himself of those vices which enslave ordinary mortals and has gone down to defeat instead before the mistakes of his own finite intelligence, or the elements of chance, or the overwhelming power of his opposition.[26]

Any attempt to divorce the subject of "exaltation" from ethical means and ends has led the critics as we have seen to a meaningless glorification of "struggle". Why we should feel "elevated" at a spectacle of sheer conflict is never explained; neither can it be, especially when we remember that man is not the only member of the animal kingdom that can fight, particularly when cornered. We could say that witnessing a combat excites or stimulates us by arousing the pugnacious impulses associated with self-preservation, but tragedy is not distinguished by its therapeutic power to fortify us biologically or physiologically. Detective tales, prize fights, athletic contests, or even adrenalin hypodermics at times could serve the same purpose. That instinctual reactions form an integral part of the aesthetic response in tragedy is, of course, true. But tragic "exaltation", not only in our own concept of the heroic but even as presented by the critics in terms of man's so-called "spiritual" or "higher" nature, can not be logically reduced to or reconciled with mere atavistic reflexes. Neither does one gain very much by elaborating, as Muller, Mumford, and others have, allied rudimentary responses into an aesthetic theory where not only tragedy but all forms of creation are "explained" by an "immortality-urge".[27] But even the

[25] *Permanence and Change* (New York, 1935), p. 248.

[26] Thematic and ideological implications in modern drama are dealt with, for example, by E. Flexner in *American Playwrights: 1918–1938* (New York, 1938) and M. Gorelik in *New Theatres for Old* (New York, 1940), as well as by J. Lawson in the work already referred to. Material related to the modern novel of heroic tragedy may be found in *Science and Criticism* (New Haven, 1943) and *Modern Fiction* (New York, 1937) by H. Muller and in *No Voice is Wholly Lost: Writers and Thinkers in War and Peace* (New York, 1945) by H. Slochower.

[27] E.g., Mumford, L., *The Condition of Man* (New York, 1944), pp. 3–15.

substitution of this phylogenetic concept for the biological one can apparently offer little "exaltation" because, as Muller admits, tragedy's proclamation of "triumph over death" is merely an "illusion of escaping mortality".[28] The very proponents of the "struggle" theory who find themselves in disagreement with the position of I. A. Richards (as well as his followers) are closer to his aesthetic principles than they themselves realize. Richards has merely stated in blunt language what is always implied in their own theory. According to Richards the "joy" in tragedy is the result of body equilibrium or "synaesthesia", a state which incidentally can be induced just as well by looking at a landscape or rug design! "Exaltation" for Richards is merely an "indication that all is right here and now in the nervous system".[29] This is the logical dead-end of divorcing art from the aesthetic response.

One of the main reasons for the traditional tendency to discuss tragedy especially in terms of morals, religion, or metaphysics rather than of art or aesthetics is the persistent failure to appreciate the dynamic nature of man. How is it, the theorists of tragedy have always asked, that one continually beset by ill-fortunes and fated for suffering, disintegration, and death, can yet be made to enjoy those very evils? Just as Thespis and Aristotle felt compelled to justify dramatic art before the practical-minded and puritanic accusations of Solon and Plato respectively, so writers since then have tried if not perhaps to justify, at least to explain the so-called unique appeal of tragedy. Their discussions have generally consisted in attempts to discover therein what they call the "redemptive" elements of evil.

That such efforts have proved unsuccessful, even when assayed by those like the theologian and metaphysician who have made such studies their profession, is an undeniable fact of man's intellectual history. The theorists of tragedy, whenever they have not at the same time been designers of metaphysical systems like Hegel or Schopenhauer, have turned to tragic literature, hoping, perhaps, to find satisfactory answers there which eluded them in their other ontological studies. One thinks in this connection not only of the critics whom we have been discussing but especially of such men as Burke, Fontenelle, Schiller, Hume, Nietzsche and others. If, however, we are to judge from their comments, we must conclude that the tragic writers too had little to offer them by way of "redeeming" evil. Nietzsche, incidentally, even made a virtue of necessity. Having come to the conclusion that no man could ever offer any reasonable explanation for evil, he went so far as to chide Euripides for debasing his art with a futile, Socratic philosophy which tried to solve the problem by identifying evil merely with human ignorance. Our "struggle" theorists may also be making a particular virtue of their own necessity, since they perhaps can find no "redemption" either.

Many critics detect a possible answer to this vexatious problem in the historical transfer from the theological to the humanistic foundations of tragedy. Thus, according to them, Euripides, as well as Elizabethan and modern playwrights,

[28] Op. cit., (New York, 1937), p. 115.

[29] *The Foundations of Aesthetics* (with C. K. Ogden and J. Wood, New York, 1925), pp. 72–91; *Principles of Literary Criticism* (Fourth Edition, New York, 1930), pp. 245–246.

"redeems" evil in that he places it within the control of man.[30] One can argue, of course, for the advantages of science or of a naturalistic ethic, but neither these nor any melioristic philosophy—conservative, liberal, or revolutionary—can ever "redeem" evil. Evil may be secularized and partially controlled but since (in any fully ontological sense) it remains inexplicable, it can not be logically "redeemed". It can only be mitigated or assuaged. It was not a Schopenhauer who first articulated for us in terms of philosophic "Weltschmerz" what every sentient being knows and feels, viz., that evil is immanent and ineluctable. It was the father of tragic drama, Aeschylus himself, who in attempting to absolve the gods from complete responsibility for our suffering by positing some hidden, malevolent power, expressed what has always been the very essence of our "tragic sense of life" and therefore of our tragic literature.

What are such terms, used throughout all the ages, as Fate, Destiny, Fortune, Caprice, Accident, Chance, Contingency, etc., but mere names for forces which man has never been able to comprehend or cope with? When he tries to define, he is forced once again to speak in terms of that which can only be described as something inscrutable, incalculable, perverse, incongruous, ironical. Definitions will always escape him, because he is attempting the impossible. He can never imprison the tragic spirit, either in words or in deeds. One might as well venture imprisoning life itself. The tragic spirit is rooted in irony and ultimate pessimism. It shows us man, whether facing the irrevocable past, the obdurate present or the unpredictable future, confronted by eternal disparities between his plans and his achievments; his ideals and reality; his potentialities and frustrations; his desires and their consequences. He is the victim of unintelligible pain, slow decay, unmerited suffering, and inevitable destruction.

Three possible objections to our concept of the tragic spirit must be met at this point, two from the traditionalists and one from the neo-Marxists. These objections are also part of the critics' attempt to "redeem" the evil in tragedy. The traditionalists admit that tragedy does reflect what Drew calls the "ghastly picture of natural and human injustice and cruelty"[31] but argue that Shakespeare, for instance, in showing us also examples of devotion, tenderness, etc., "somehow" impresses us with the "ultimate values" of these virtues and not of evil.[32] Furthermore, as Krutch and others maintain, the characters in Elizabethan and Greek tragedy at least feel their passions to be "important". Our conception of immanent evil would seem to be verified only by modern tragedy where, as Krutch complains, events do not "come to an end"[33] but go on; but in the older plays a problem is solved and the curtain descends upon a note of thematic finality or what the critics call "reconciliation". "The wheel," says Drew, "has come full circle,"[34] or as Muller phrases it, there is "an account squared and written off the books".[35] As for the neo-Marxists they object that our concept is reactionary

[30] Q. v., *Euripides the Rationalist* (Cambridge 1895), pp. 73–75.
[31] Op. cit., p. 205.
[32] Op. cit., p. 207.
[33] Op. cit., p. 75.
[34] Op. cit., p. 205.
[35] Op. cit., (New York, 1937), p. 112.

in that it provides no basis for the viability of any moral order. The coöperative commonwealth toward which mankind is progressing will be a society, they predict, where evil will be reduced to a negligible minimum or abolished altogether.[36]

We offer the following answers to these objections: (a) Our concept of the tragic spirit in no way precludes the existence of those human virtues referred to by the critics. Even if a writer attempted to do no more than merely reflect life photographically, he would have to include them since they are an integral part of our existence. To say that tragedy deals with evil is not to say that human virtue is excluded from the picture. *Tragedy reflects the relationship of forces between the two.* One of the most poignant elements of tragic art derives from the very fact that the incidents exemplifying those virtues are so few in number in proportion to the catastrophic events and that tenderness, devotion, and love seem like such fragile weapons in coping with the overwhelming, irresistible forces confronting them. This fact is doubly underlined by those ironical incidents in which the innocent are made to suffer and the virtues themselves are responsible for the protagonist's destruction. Drew's expression "somehow" is very illuminating; it is a confession of pure faith, and it reveals her inability to find textual verification for the "*ultimate* value" of human virtue (italics G.K.). She, as well as the other critics, can no more logically reconcile the evils depicted in tragedy with "ultimate" virtues than can the older religionists with an omnipotent God. The emphasis throughout tragic literature, especially in the case of the non-heroic, is upon the "ultimate" character actually of evil, not of good. The contention, incidentally, that the Greek and Elizabethan people believed their passions to be "important" whereas modern man does not can not be taken too seriously. Has anyone ever existed who was not egoist enough to think his passions not only "important" but precious and even unique? If Krutch still thinks, for example, that ardor and its tragic consequences vanished with Romeo and Juliet or with Antony and Cleopatra, he has only to open his morning newspaper. (b) With regard to the so-called note of finality in the older tragedies, here too the critics are confusing art with their own metaphysical assumptions and are not even consistent in upholding the latter. Macbeth's personal account may perhaps be "squared" (note again the neat, didactic touch), but how is such specific and terminated incident to be reconciled with those allegedly timeless principles underlying tragedy, those connected with "moral orders", "cosmic purposes", etc? What should concern a "metaphysical" critic is not Macbeth's death but that greed, usurpation, and bloodshed still stalk the world. No, the "reconciliation" which the critics are referring to belongs neither to the world of reality nor to any clearly-indicated metaphysic of their own. Actually they are dealing with the world of art, in this case specifically with dramaturgy. The "wheel (which) has come full circle" is a theatrical convention: the "end" of Aristotle's "fable" or the "resolution" of Freytag's plot-structure.[37] (c) To the

[36] E.g. Feuer, L., in "Ethical Theories and Historical Materialism," *Science and Society*, (Spring, 1942), pp. 242–272, who maintains that in a "class" society ethics is only ruling-class "ideology" and that under classless communism alone will it assume its proper function as a mere unhampered branch of descriptive sociology.

[37] Some critics attempt to justify their theological or metaphysical interpretation of tragedy by an appeal to "origins," viz., the ritualistic roots of the ancient Greek drama.

neo-Marxists we should suggest that, granted the complete realization of the socialist ideal in so far as maximum productivity and social equality are concerned, and granted further the absence of societal coercions which will make possible for the first time in history, as Marx indicated, man's "free" decisions, evil would still remain no matter how refined. Man can be conditioned possibly to the most civilized responses, but he will never obliterate the "pangs of dispriz'd love", of disappointment, of time's fleeting, the "error of judgment or frailty" and the haunting vision of death. To deny this is more than a dogmatic misrepresentation of Marx's own viewpoint; it is a futile attempt like the others we have been discussing to negate the immanent character of the tragic spirit and therefore of life itself.

If such then be the essential nature of tragedy, how can man, the theorists insist, be induced to contemplate, let alone enjoy it? What mysterious fascination does it exercise upon him? The innumerable explanations offered throughout the history of aesthetic theory have in many cases been so bizarre only because they have underestimated man's inquisitive nature. The theories have assumed that he is not an active, socialized being but a passive individualist whose interest can be aroused only by that which promises to comfort, fortify, exalt, or edify him. Actually, not only man but many of his biological predecessors exhibit a keen, self-initiated, experimental curiosity about everything in the immediate environment, pleasure being derived even from experiences which are mildly painful. The answer, therefore, to the question as to how the writer arouses our interest in and makes us enjoy the problem of evil is relatively simple. All he has to do, to begin with, is merely to tell us about it; and being the inquisitive creatures that we are, we listen. Neither does he have to be an exceptional craftsman to involve us further, since he is appealing not only to our most fundamental instincts, emotions, and interests but he is presenting characters with whose catastrophic destiny we can most readily identify ourselves. We may not be tormented by their particular problems, but fear, yearning, tribulations, frustrations, death, and the feeling of human kinship which these elicit are always close to the core of human consciousness.[38]

Assuming, thus, the first step in which the writer has both captured the tragic spirit and engaged our tragic emotions, since he has at least reflected life itself, what does he do next? Being an artist and not merely a photographer, he proceeds to mitigate the poignancy of the evil which he is presenting. Having al-

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Such an appeal if conducted consistently would exile altogether the tragic spirit from art. Its approach is further suspect because it does not do full justice to the origins of art itself. While it is true that early magic and religion are connected with man's struggle for existence, it is also true that in the Greek ritual, for example, we find (as Harrison, Nietzsche, and others have shown) the arts of chanting and dancing. Any appeal to "origins," moreover, must at least be thorough; it should not stop conveniently at the ritualistic but proceed to those neurophysiological levels noted in some of the other theorists.

[38] Since the tragic spirit permeates every value which man considers vital to his being, we can readily understand why its compelling presence has made itself felt not only in the narrative art of drama, novel and short story, but also in music, sculpture, and painting. Its poignancy can be immortalized as well in the compressed lines of a lyric or rendered forever memorable by the simple gesture of a great actor.

ready dealt with the intellectual or ideational technique of mitigation, the thematic exaltation associated with heroic tragedy, we shall now note the additional artistic or aesthetic techniques which he employs not only in the heroic but also in the vast tragic literature which lies beyond it.

(1) It is important to remember that in reading or watching a tragedy, we are not responding to a life-situation but to an imaginary world. This implies more than that we are merely looking at the world through the eyes of the writer. It means first, that we have accepted his aesthetic premises whose fictive character we never lose sight of throughout the entire aesthetic experience; second, that all our responses are consequently muted, detached, and that they fulfill themselves not in any overt acts but only within the aesthetic consciousness itself; third, that they are generally organized into an artistic pattern or configuration; and fourth, that this imaginary world especially when peopled with a vast array of characters so as to create the microcosms of a Shakespeare, an Ibsen, a Conrad, or a Dostoyevsky possesses such unique characteristics that its tragic subject-matter seems just remote enough from our own world to save us from any immediate pain. Since so many critics are under the impression that the primary function of literature is to provide us, as the phrase has it, with "vivid emotions" or "intensified experiences"; and that tragedy is grandest when it deals with "blood", "terror", and "monstrous, archaic desires and fears"; and that it is "addressed primarily to our interest in the passions" (Krutch),[39] it is small wonder that they feel impelled to seek for "redemptive" elements ostensibly capable of allaying these very instinctual intensities aroused by tragic art. Actually, the aesthetic response consists not in any luxuriant emotionalism but in the conative-affective-cognitive pattern common to all complex human reactions with those modifying factors indicated above.[40] The first mitigative technique, therefore, is the initial attentiveness of the reader himself and the writer's artistic organization of his subject-matter. Related to this attention and organization is the sensuous pleasure derived from such theatrical factors, for instance, as decor, instrumental and choral music, colorful costuming and pageantry, lighting effects, symmetrical arrangements of groups, the graceful gestures and appealing voices of the actors, the formal beauty of plot-structure, supplementary "stage-business", etc.

(2) Consistent with our assumption that man is primarily interested not in escaping but in experiencing life(which helps explain the appeal that the most elemental realism or naturalism has for many people), we must reject the catharsis idea, either as commonly interpreted or as conveniently improvised to fit some moral or psychological theory. What we have referred to thus far as the tragic

[39] Op. cit., pp. 98, 112, 113.

[40] Nahm, M. C., in *The Aesthetic Response: An Antinomy and its Resolution* (Philadelphia, 1933) attempts to provide a psycho-biological basis for Edgar Singer, Jr.'s Concept of Tragedy developed in his *On the Contented Life* (pp. 3–58). Nahm rejects the idea of an intensive emotionalism in the aesthetic response but in so doing substitutes mere homiletics for aesthetics and also completely neglects, as does Singer, all non-heroic tragedy. My own comments on the aesthetic consciousness are to be found in "Max Eastman and the Aesthetic Response," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* (Fall, 1943), pp. 27–36.

emotions are the generally affective reactions elicited from us by our own or our fellow-man's tragic destiny. These reactions include not only pity and terror but all the feelings of sorrow, alienation, shock and kinship which admit us to the society of human tribulation. What happens during the aesthetic experience is that we are reliving those tragic emotions which are always part of us, their sharpness being mitigated because they are being projected toward an integrated pattern. This projection enables us to experience them "objectively", as it were, and to be relieved from the tensions which the tragedy is imposing upon us.[41] Any attempt to include here a theory of catharsis which merely stresses the purging of "archaic desires and fears" is entirely uncalled-for. We can no more accept the therapeutic than the religious, metaphysical, or moral explanations for tragedy. We do not read or contemplate tragic art as a purifying aperient, an immunizing toxin, or an emotional stabilizer. Unless, of course, we are to engage in fruitless discussions dealing with the personal tastes of the idiosyncratic who unfortunately have been accepted by some critics as the norm in "explaining" the appeal of tragic art. Tragedy on this basis is supposed to satisfy or "sublimate" impulses related, for example, to sadism, bloodlust, egotistic superiority, the "death-wish", masochism, self-righteousness, etc. A word as to pity and terror: the latter does not occupy a position of importance among the more sophisticated audiences today as it did among the superstitious Greek, Roman, and Elizabethan playgoers. Especially is this true also of those who have seen or read the plays repeatedly. There is, no doubt, an experience of subdued fear as well as of awe, wonder, and bafflement-emotional states elicited from us by the nature of the subject matter itself. Furthermore, compassion, sympathy, or commiseration approximate more accurately those feelings usually described under "pity". We should feel a kinship not only with the heroic protagonist but with all who are deserving of it; our pity is reserved for the pathetic, the weak, and—when we feel justifiably superior—the wicked. What must be guarded against is any effort such, for instance, as that of Lessing or Bergson to attribute an over-intellectualization to the pity and terror traditionally associated with tragedy. To take a more recent example, when Lewisohn pleads for a tragic terror which will inspire the thought that we may have "wronged our brother or violated his will" and for a "reconciliation" that will impart "a profound sense of that community of human suffering which all force deepens and all freedom assuages"[42], he may be describing our sober reflections after we have witnessed some heroic tragedy, but his words surely do not apply to the aesthetic experience itself.

(3) A great deal of "exaltation" which the critics have attributed to the moralistic or cosmological conceptions of the writer actually derives from the mere subject-matter and its transmutation into the magic of pure art. Consider the aesthetic premises of a "romantic" conception such as one finds especially in the Elizabethan drama. Here is an art which paints both universe and people in

[41] Emotional projection can be experienced also in the release through crying, in the heartsease of a plaintive melody or of a simple tale that touches a secret sorrow. Andre Gide's Philoctetes tells us, "I took to telling the story of my sufferings, and if the phrase was very beautiful, I was by so much consoled; I even sometimes forgot my sadness by uttering it." This is quoted by E. Wilson in *The Wound and the Bow* (Boston, 1941), p. 288.

[42] Lewisohn, L., *The Drama and the Stage* (New York, 1922), p. 23.

terms of the grandiose. It is a world of overpowering majesty, of volcanic forces and destruction. The characters in it seem to be part of this colossal elementalism with their turbulent passions and exaggerated torments. By following the Renaissance tradition (based upon classical conceptions) whose rudimentary characterology viewed man as being ruled by single, predominating impulses such as greed, jealousy, or pride, the writers were able to accentuate these and thus impart to their dramatic characters an almost super-human stature. When alongside these characters are placed the "personalities" referred to earlier, those of multiple or contradictory compulsions, against a spectacular background of "pomp and circumstance", as well as the grandiloquent speeches and sweeping gestures, we are naturally energized by this teeming life before us. We experience pleasure not only in the spectacle of human and cosmic power but in the tonic contemplation of the strange, the paradoxical, the mysterious, the awesome, etc., inherent elements of the tragic. That the premises herein described are purely aesthetic in that they need be rooted not in any particularly "romantic" or "realistic" conception or in any specific philosophy is attested to by their presence in such various plays, for example, as *Macbeth*, *Deirdre of the Sorrows*, *Elizabeth the Queen*, or *Saint Joan*, and in such novels as *War and Peace*, *The Titan*, or *Of Time and the River*. The contemplation of the spectacular provides us with an additional source of mitigation, in making us realize that we personally are not the only ones who suffer; even the "mighty" share our common destiny. As we watch "the sufferer bound to the world by bonds of sorrow. . . we lose all eagerness of temporary desire, all struggling and striving for petty ends. . . we see, surrounding the narrow raft, illumined by the flickering light of human comradeship, the dark ocean on whose rolling waves we toss for a brief hour."[43]

(4) With such realization on our part comes a further questing which is not motivated by intellectuality—since the writer has already persuaded us as to the futility of seeking any rational explanations for evil—but suggested by techniques of an aesthetic universalization. Our interests are naturally involved in the specific problem before us but the methods employed in its presentation propel us beyond the immediate and generate a mood in which we seem to be contemplating the spectacle from the viewpoint of infinity. The writer achieves this by (a) the characters' soliloquizing upon "eternal" questions, the mysteries of birth, human folly, justice, immortality, etc.; (b) the traditional closing scenes during which the protagonists give vent to resigned or philosophic utterances and leave us, after our tensional interest in their fate, with our feelings of relief and wonder; (c) the utilization of the supernatural, of the pathetic fallacy, of atmospheric effects in connection with darkness, gloom, bleakness, impending doom; and (d) creating a feeling of vast spaces, of the immensities of nature, of the sweep of history, and of timelessness.[44]

[43] Russell, B., *Philosophical Essays* (London, 1910), pp. 67–68.

[44] For interesting comments on Shakespeare's imagery which creates these feelings, the reader should consult C. Spurgeon's analysis of *Antony and Cleopatra* (Op. cit., pp. 349–354). The concept of "time" in the modern novel is treated thoroughly by E. Muir in *The Structure of the Novel* (New York, 1929), pp. 63–133; by E. M. Forster in *Aspects of the Novel* (New York, 1927), pp. 28–99; and by J. Beach in *The Twentieth Century Novel* (New York, 1932), pp. 35–55, 177–230, 337–530.

(5) There is the mitigation which comes from intellectual clarification. Although this technique is found to some extent in Greek and Elizabethan drama through the choral chant and the soliloquy, it is utilized to the fullest degree in modern literature. This clarification makes its strongest appeal to those who are interested in analysis. Instead of aesthetically removing us from the centre of the tragedy by means of universalization, clarification focuses our attention upon the heart of the problem and forces us to confront its evils through the mind of the writer or his characters. What is important to stress here is that we are not stimulated necessarily by any expressed or implied "solutions" but by the writer's courageous and honest attempt to seek the sources of destroyed, human values. Of course, if his analysis leads him not only to logical causes but also to programmatic suggestions and idealistic goals as in heroic tragedy, then our aesthetic pleasure may be more fully enhanced. But he need do no more, as Ibsen maintained, than merely ask questions, not answer them. The writer's illuminating insight may express itself in an analysis of human motivation such as one finds in a James, Conrad, Dostoyevsky, Pirandello, or Mann; of group interaction as in Galsworthy, Shaw, or Rolland; and of individual and social maladjustments as in Chekov, Huxley, Malraux, Farrell, or Silone. Important to remember also is that though the writer may avail himself of all the scientific instrumentalities at his disposal (biology, psychology, the social sciences), he must be artist enough to use them only as *supplementary* techniques of analysis and explanation. The characters, for instance, of Sophocles or Shakespeare transcend the limitations of a "humours" personality[45] just as the ones in George Eliot, Hardy, or Mann transcend the limitations of a physiological psychology, a mechanistic instinctivism, or a subconscious atavism respectively. Neither can the writer hope to convey to the reader or spectator the warmth of human experiences by means of a mere scientific terminology. In order to accomplish this fully, he must be a poet, with all that such mastery implies especially as related to the factor of aesthetic mitigation.

(6) For the sophisticated and sensitive mind there is no greater power of enchantment than the art of poetry. This is not the place to unfold its wonders; others have already accomplished this throughout the history of literary criticism. We can only indicate here the importance of poetry in the realm of tragic drama. We shall purposely avoid the poetic art of the tragic novel and the short story because that would necessitate an analysis of "style", carrying us beyond the confines of our subject. We have only to recall some famous scenes in Greek, Elizabethan, or modern drama, scenes depicting repellent horrors, physical and

[45] Shakespeare's genius in characterization accomplished more than this. As E. E. Stoll has shown in his refutation of the "procrastination" theory, Hamlet, for instance, as far as the Elizabethan tradition was concerned, represented a typical protagonist of a revenge-tragedy in which the hero must vacillate, feign madness, accuse himself, etc., in order to prolong the play. This, according to Stoll, makes for illogical motivation. It creates an atmosphere of what Goethe called "episodic intensification." Yet in spite of such restrictions of plot and theatrical convention, Shakespeare overcame them by creating characters who, as Stoll readily admits, are individualized by their realistic utterances. Note in this connection the delightful victory of Falstaff over Stoll's attempt to dismiss him on the ground of psychological disunity. *Shakespeare Studies* (New York, 1927), p. 485.

mental afflictions, ruthless criminality, or unforgettable pathos to prove to ourselves the aesthetic power of poetry both to metamorphose tragic evil and to transfigure malevolent characters.[46] What, we ask ourselves, would be the nature of our aesthetic responses had such scenes been written in prosaic language? We have no exact way of knowing, but one can imagine that it would be similar in some respects to the many harrowing moments we have all experienced in watching or reading those plays offering us what is commonly-called "stark realism". "Dialogue without poetry," correctly observes J.H.Lawson, "is only half-alive. The dramatist who is not a poet is only half a dramatist.[47]" It is important to note, of course, that no writer will ever become a poet merely by taking thought. If poetic drama is to fulfill its function with regard to the mitigating qualities of its aesthetic pattern, it must be an organic whole and not a mechanical composite. Only by the artistic moulding of sense, sound, and rhythm through the mastery of symbol, indirection, assonance, alliteration, euphony, compression, imagery, idiom, metre, etc., can the dramatist lift his work from the levels of mere transliteration to those of poetic imagination.

Lee Simonson's remark that the playwrights who are unable or unwilling to "employ the intensification of poetic speech" thereby "fail to create characters who are incandescent and illuminating at their climactic moments"[48] is confirmed by Joseph Krutch in his comments on O'Neill's *Mourning Becomes Electra.* Krutch's evaluation of the play has an especial significance for us not only because he has abandoned his earlier position developed in *The Modern Temper* with its emphasis upon the metaphysical foundations of tragedy, but because he has come to the realization that even a naturalistic ethic does not alone guarantee a successful tragic art. Its roots are to be sought elsewhere as he has now discovered, in the poetic powers of the writer. Describing the scene in which Orin is apostrophizing his father's body, Krutch says, "What one longs for with an almost agonized longing is something not merely good but incredibly magnificent, something like 'tomorrow and tomorrow and tomorrow' or 'I could a tale unfold whose lightest words. . ' If the language came we should be swept aloft as no Anglo-Saxon audience since Shakespeare's time has had an opportunity to be."[49] Whether an "incredibly magnificent" language is all that prevents O'Neill's play from achieving the tragic grandeur of Shakespeare does not concern us here. What does interest us in this case is the confirmation by a

[46] We can see, for instance, Ajax maddened by alienation, Philoctetes agonized by rotting flesh, Lavinia with severed hands and tongueless mouth, Ophelia in her derangement, Medea planning the children's murder, Clytemnestra imploring Orestes to spare her life, Hubert coming to kill Prince Arthur, Macduff's child being murdered, Lear's final realization of Cordelia's devotion, Deirdre pleading with Conchubar for Naoise's freedom, or Elizabeth watching Essex go to his chosen doom. Incidentally, so perfect is the illusion of transfiguration that no less than a Stopford Brooke under its spell can say of Macbeth, "Everything he says is poetically said" (*On Ten Plays of Shakespeare*, London, 1905, p. 200)—as though every other criminal too in Shakespeare were not a "poet." According to Brooke's logic, he might have added that Macbeth was also somewhat of a "philosopher." Such, indeed, is the magic power of art!

[47] Op. cit., p. 298.

[48] *The Stage is Set* (New York, 1932), p. 436.

[49] Op. cit., p. 119.

sensitive critic who agrees that it is poetic mitigation which accounts for the exaltation of tragedy. If to the beauty of poetry we add the artistic organization of subject-matter, the muted detachment of the imaginative world, the patterned and projected emotionalism of the tragic response, the sensuous delights of "pure theatre", the energizing effects of cosmic and human power, the aesthetic universalization, and intellectual clarification, we can begin to appreciate the magic of that "redemption" which it is solely the artist's craft and vision to conjure into being. As Havelock Ellis (with whose comment we shall also conclude our discussion) reminds us: "The mother who seeks to soothe her crying child preaches him no sermon. She holds up some bright object, and it fixes his attention. So it is the artist acts. He makes us see. He brings the world before us, not on the plans of covetousness and fears and commandments, but on the plane of representation; the world becomes a spectacle. Instead of imitating those philosophers who with analyses and syntheses worry over the goal of life, and the justification of the world, and the meaning of the strange and painful phenomenon called Existence, the artist takes up some fragment of that existence, transfigures it, shows it; There! And therewith the spectator is filled with enthusiastic joy, and the transcendent Adventure of Existence is justified. Every great artist. . . thus furnishes the metaphysical justification of existence by the beauty of the vision he presents of the cruelty and the horror of existence. All the pain and sadness, even the ugliness and the commonplace of the world, he converts into shining jewels. We see the face of the world as of a lovely woman smiling through her tears."[50]

[50] *The Dance of Life* (Boston, 1923), p. 333.

## PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS OF STYLE IN ART

HELMUT HUNGERLAND

In discussions of psychological analyses of art and artistic creation, a distinction should be made between (a) studies which aim to determine the causes and conditions of artistic creation in general (without reference to the style of groups or individuals) and (b) studies which aim to determine the causes and conditions of forms or styles of artistic creation (in reference to groups or individuals).[1] While the conclusions of studies of the first type might, for instance, state that artists paint pictures or write poetry because they are frustrated, the conclusions of studies of the second type might, for instance, state that the typical characteristics of the Gothic style can be traced back to the fact that the artists who created the Gothic style were schizoids. In other words, in the first case one attempts to discover the psychological differences between artists and non-artists; in the second case one attempts to show why a certain group of artists are expressionists while some other artists are classicists. Obviously, general theories

[1] Such studies can be either group studies or studies of individual cases.

as to the causes of artistic creative ability will tend to influence investigations concerning the differences between different forms or styles of artistic expression, but the two approaches distinguished above can and should be considered separately. In this paper I propose to deal mainly with studies of the second type.[2]

In studies of the second type, which are concerned with the psychological causes of formal characteristics of works of art, one can differentiate two problems (formulated as questions):

1. Is it possible to show a direct and simple causal relation between certain form characteristics and certain emotional and mental states (especially disturbances), regardless of general attitudes or characteristic personality traits?

2. Is it possible to show a simple and direct causal relation between certain form characteristics and an artist's personality (as a more permanent and pervasive system of traits and capacities)? [For example: dignity and frankness of an artist's personality "expressed" in accentuation of horizontal lines, clear colors and a simplicity of composition.] These two problems are raised in the following two quotations:

(a) "One feels the strained emotions and the passionate confidence [van Gogh] placed in pigment as a medium of expression . . . in his *Sunflowers*. . . . "[3]

(b) Van Gogh's paintings " . . . record the successive stages of his mental illness. His madness is clearly expressed in his later *Cypresses*."[4]

The first quotation asserts that from van Gogh's paintings one can infer his peculiar emotional state, while the second quotation affirms a simple correspondence between van Gogh's style of painting and drawing and his disease. From these quotations it seems permissible to infer the following assumptions (which, I believe, are held not only by Miss Gardner or Mr. Greene), namely, that an artist's emotional state is expressed (in terms of a simple and direct correspondence) in his work and that a mental disturbance, which affects the artist's whole personality, is "expressed" in his style.

I propose to use the case of Vincent van Gogh to test the assumptions stated above. The simplest and most necessary requirement for an investigation of the relationship between van Gogh's disease and his artistic style is (a) to describe the nature and chronology of the disease carefully and correctly and (b) to consider his artistic expression in relation to the disease (chronology as well as general character).

Concerning the diagnosis of the disease: van Gogh's somewhat sensationalized end was used by the adversaries of the modern movement to discredit his work as well as that of other moderns as the products of "madmen."[5] The legend of van Gogh's "madness" thus established found its way into the literature on art and has been uncritically accepted and perpetuated even in our days (*cf.* Greene, as cited above). The first scientific study of the case of van Gogh was made by

[2] Studies of this sort are of interest to art-historians because they may shed light upon questions concerning the development and changes of styles; they are also of interest to art education, therapy, etc.

[3] Helen Gardner, *Art through the Ages*, New York, 1926, p. 469.

[4] Theodore Meyer Greene, *The Arts and the Art of Criticism*, Princeton, 1940, p. 304.

[5] Cf. Kenyon Cox, "The 'Modern' Spirit in Art," *Harper's Weekly*, March 15, 1913; reprinted New York, 1924.

Jaspers (1922),[6] who concluded that the artist suffered from schizophrenia. The same diagnosis is offered by Prinzhorn (1923),[7] Westermann-Holstijn (1924),[8] and Riese in his first study (1925).[9] The evidence presented in support of this diagnosis is not very strong, and a second group of authors, after a careful investigation of the material available, came to the conclusion that the diagnosis of schizophrenia was untenable and that van Gogh suffered from *masked* or *psychic epilepsy*. The authors in this second group are Birnbaum (1922),[10] Evensen (1926),[11] Doiteau and Leroy (1928),[12] and Riese in his second study (1926)[13] (who thus confirm and revise the diagnosis of Drs. Peyron and Rey who examined and treated van Gogh).

While the securing of the correct diagnosis dismisses all theories which consider van Gogh's art as caused by or indicative of insanity, it does not solve the problem concerning the causal relationship between disease and style-characteristics. The question relevant to this problem can be formulated as follows: Is it possible to demonstrate in the work of van Gogh signs and indications which are characteristic of and causally related to his psychic epilepsy?

It is of interest to note that all authors, regardless of their diagnoses, agree that the disease did not influence negatively the artistic quality of van Gogh's work. Those authors (Jaspers, Westermann-Holstijn, Prinzhorn) who maintain the theory that a schizoid state of mind is favorable to artistic creative activity, hold that the disease released creative energies which strengthened and intensified the artistic work; i.e. they use van Gogh's case, as they interpret it, to illustrate their theory. The other authors (Birnbaum, Evensen, Doiteau and Leroy, Riese II) deny that the disease caused or changed van Gogh's art and style, i.e. they conclude that psychic epilepsy neither caused van Gogh to become a painter nor did it cause his particular style of painting.

It is not possible in this brief paper to review all the evidence in support of the latter conclusion, and I merely present the three main factors which support it.

(1) The outbreak of the disease (December 1888) is not coincident with a change of style.
(2) The stylistic development is continuous or unbroken by sharp changes.
(3) The disease did not stimulate artistic creation.

[6] Karl Jaspers, *Strindberg und van Gogh, Versuch einer pathographischen Analyse unter vergleichender Heranziehung von Swedenborg und Hölderlin*, Leipzig, 1922.

[7] Hans Prinzhorn, *Bildnerei der Geisteskranken*, Berlin, 1923 (2nd ed.). In a later article Prinzhorn seems to have become doubtful of his diagnosis, but he does not commit himself definitely in favor of another diagnosis. Cf. Hans Prinzhorn, "Genius and Madness," *Parnassus*, vol. II, no. 1 (1930), pp. 19–20, 44.

[8] A. J. Westerman-Holstijn, "Die psychologische Entwicklung Vincent van Goghs," *Imago*, vol. X (1924), pp. 389–417.

[9] Walther Riese, "Über den 'Stilwandel' bei Vincent van Gogh," *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, vol. 98 (1925), pp. 1–16.

[10] Karl Birnbaum, "Von der Geistigkeit der Geisteskranken und ihre psychiatrische Erfassung," *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, vol. 77 (1922), pp. 509–514.

[11] Hans Evensen, "Die Geisteskrankheit des Vincent van Gogh," *Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Psychiatrie und Psychisch-Gerichtliche Medizin*, vol. 84 (1926), pp. 133–153.

[12] Victor Doiteau and Edgard Leroy, *La Folie de Vincent van Gogh*, Paris, 1928.

[13] Walther Riese, *Vincent van Gogh in der Krankheit*, München, 1926.

Now it might be argued that, although one cannot point out a direct causal connection between van Gogh's style and his disease, the disease nevertheless determined his style "indirectly" by determining his personality. Disregarding for the moment the ramifications of the assumption which is implicitly contained in the above statement, namely, that the style expresses the artist's personality, this argument does not seem supported by facts, because there is no break or change in van Gogh's personality coincident with (a) the formation of his style nor (b) with the beginning of his painting. Furthermore there are no cases known in which epilepsy caused artistic creativeness.

The only argument left for those who want to reconcile van Gogh's continuous (self-consistent) stylistic development with the thesis that his style was determined by his disease would be to consider the disease as a sort of congenital mechanism. However (entirely aside from medical evidence and considerations) this argument would seem to lead to the conclusion that the disease as a direct cause of the style can be dismissed and that the continuous (self-consistent) stylistic development corresponds to a continuity (self-consistency) of personality (the disease being from the very beginning an important part of the structure of the personality). I suggest, therefore, that we analyze briefly the assumption just indicated, namely, that the artist's style is the expression of his personality. Such an analysis necessitates a clarification of the concepts of personality as well as of style.

For our purposes G. W. Allport's widely accepted definition of personality seems most suitable. Allport defines personality as "the dynamic organization within the individual of those psycho-physical systems that determine his unique adjustments to his environment."[14] It is of interest to note that this definition stresses growth and adjustments to environment (which, however, should not be misunderstood as "*merely reactive adaptions*" to environment[15]) and that, although one can presume a certain degree of consistency in the manner of adjustments maintained over a period of time, such a consistency is not made a part of the definition.

On the other hand "style" is a class concept—a comprehensive construct—and as such usually implies a certain amount of consistency over a period of time. It is of course possible and logically quite correct to imagine an artist who creates only one work of art and to speak of his style as exemplified in this work.[16] It is equally possible to imagine that an artist paints two landscapes in the morning which can be classified as belonging to one style, while in the afternoon he produces two more landscapes classifiable as belonging to another style. In general, however, the retrospectively established concept "style" is applied to a number of works of art which were produced over somewhat longer periods of time than one afternoon or one morning and which have certain characteristics in common by means of which they can be classified together. "Style" should of course not be understood as something unchanging or unchangeable. One look at an artist's life work will show that his style developed and changed (within limits), but

[14] Gordon W. Allport, *Personality*, New York, 1937, p. 48.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 50.

[16] In this case the work would be the only member of its class.

this changeability is not the same as the change and growth which is implied in Allport's definition of "personality." In the case of "style" what is *interpreted* as "growth," or "change," is nothing but the fact that a class can contain varieties of the same species. Each of the species, if I so choose, can be set up as a separate class or style. In other words, if it is preferable to emphasize the difference between individual works of art rather than the characteristics they have in common, one can break up the class "style-of-an-artist's-work" into smaller classes which may be called his style of certain periods (e.g. youth, age, etc.). And there may, of course, be cases in which no such class as "style-of-life-work" can be established.

In the case of "personality" (in the sense of Allport's definition) the possibility of such deliberate subdivisions does not exist. "Dynamic organization" implies that there is a certain amount of predictability in the individual's reactions and adjustments to his environment, but even if one would assume that no such predictability existed and that the overt behavior of an individual was entirely unpredictable from one day to another, one would still deal with the same personality (which might be characterized by its unpredictability) while it would be meaningless to speak of the "style" of a number of paintings which have no characteristics in common. "Personality" as defined by Allport refers to a living organism which may or may not act consistently (in the sense that its behavior is predictable), but whose continued existence cannot be denied. "Style" refers to the objectified results of the behavior of such organisms which can be arranged in classes according to the common formal characteristics which they exhibit.

The statement "style expresses an artist's personality," then, is meaningful only if the term "personality" is used as referring to recurrently exhibited characteristics of overt behavior which permit one to classify such behavior under the heading "personality" in the way in which works of art can be classified as belonging to a style.[17] Using the term in the manner specified above, the assertion "style expresses an artist's personality" refers to the following situation: we observe that part of an artist's life which is not *directly* related to his painting, e.g. his social intercourse, his family life, his business transactions, etc., and we discover that in various situations he acted more or less consistently in a manner which may be described as "straightforward." Next we examine his paintings and we find that they have certain formal characteristics in common which permit us to describe this artist's style of painting as "impressionistic." There are given in this situation a sector of behavior and a product of behavior. Each of these two are sufficiently continuous (self-consistent) as to warrant such general classifications as "straightforward" and "impressionistic" respectively. The question at issue, however, is whether the self-consistency of these two phenomena permits us to infer that they are mutually consistent. This question can be answered in the affirmative only if the painter in question is completely integrated, i.e. it presupposes a complete unity of personality. Allport and Vernon clarify the questions involved here by saying that one must distinguish the following two issues: (1) "the assumption that an individual is essentially self-

[17] This necessitates a qualification of Allport's definition in the sense that a consistency of a number of adjustments is presupposed.

consistent in his personality and that this self-consistency of personality is reflected in some direct and uniform fashion in his actions," (2) the assumption that expressive acts are self-consistent. They add that the second is logically prior to the first and far more accessible.[18] The "self-consistency of expressive acts," which Allport and Vernon affirmed experimentally, finds its (material) counterpart in our case in the recurrently exhibited form characteristics in terms of which the style of paintings was defined. The question, however, remains whether or not such self-consistency of expressive acts in various fields must imply a unity of personality. It can be inferred obviously when different fields are not only self-consistent within themselves but if there is also a direct corresponding relation between those various fields.

In order to explain the seeming contradictions or inconsistencies in expressive behavior Allport and Vernon suggest that two meanings of "consistency" be distinguished in this context. (1) Acts of overt behavior in different fields of expression (e.g. speech and posture) may be directly related to one another—they *correspond*. (2) Acts of overt behavior in different fields of expression may differ and yet still be harmonious (consistent) in the sense that they express different aspects of a single complex state of mind—they are *congruent*.[19] Allport and Vernon claim that, if due consideration is given to congruent relationships, the results of their investigations lend support to the contention that "there is some degree of unity of personality, that this unity is reflected in expression, and that, for this reason, acts and habits of expression show a certain consistency among themselves,"[20] and that "furthermore, the evidence indicates that there is congruence between expressive movement and the attitudes, traits, values, and other dispositions of the 'inner personality.' "[21]

Of course it would be foolish to deny that "there is some degree of unity in personality," but it seems that the introduction of a "congruent" relationship, while very helpful in some cases, also presents certain difficulties. For instance the term can be used to explain *all* non-corresponding acts, traits, etc. as congruent—an explanation which would simply state the obvious, since they all belong to the same individual which exhibits them. On the other hand the term can be used to imply a causal interrelation between certain corresponding acts and certain non-corresponding acts in the sense that the one always requires the other.[22] In the latter case one would be obliged to account for non-corresponding acts or traits, etc. by means of "psychic mechanisms" (or whatever term may be preferable) such as "compensation," "overcompensation," etc. Again, it cannot be denied that the notion of "compensation" and similar concepts prove to be helpful for the understanding of some forms of behavior, but it seems to me that there are also a number of cases in which non-corresponding acts or

[18] Gordon W. Allport and Philip E. Vernon, *Studies in Expressive Movement*, New York, 1933, p. 173.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 21, e.g. (1) A person can speak rapidly and excitedly and can accompany his speech with rapid and wild gestures. (2) A person can speak slowly with apparent calm and yet his posture may show tenseness and excitement.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 171.

[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 247–248.

[22] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 174," . . . congruent (meaningful) interrelation. . . ."

attitudes can co-exist without forming such a congruent relationship, being united merely by the fact that they are performed or maintained by the same individual.

The main conclusions which can be drawn from the material presented can be summarized as follows:

(1) Not all behavior or products of behavior are expressive of an individual's personality in the sense that there is a direct and corresponding causal relation between dominant and persistent personality traits and typical and consistent formal characteristics of behavior or the products of behavior.

(2) There seems to be evidence to support the assumption that various subsystems of personality can function *relatively* independently and hence that the relation between the resultant behavior patterns and products of such behavior patterns need neither be corresponding nor congruent.

(3) There is a need for further clarification of congruent relationships between the various patterns of expressive behavior in the sense that certain families of congruent behavior need to be described and delimited.

(4) There is a need for *descriptive* categories for the classification of artistic expression.

## MUSIC AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS[1]

WARREN DWIGHT ALLEN

The Greeks had no word for "progress"; they looked backward to a "golden age" when human affairs were perfectly ordered. They knew nothing about "harmony" in the modern sense, and they were too individualistic and too artistic to develop anything like the march seriously. Their soldiers marched to the aulos and their choruses marched in dramatic festivals, but always with the emphasis on Dance. So neither the march nor the idea of progress was developed by them in the realms of music and philosophy.

The Romans used a Latin word, *progressu*, but with no concept of the meaning it has for us today. They must have happened upon march harmonies of a sort, with their *lituus*, *cornu*, *tuba* and *buccina;* and they marched all over the known world. But the Roman musical march was purely functional; no works of art were "composed" in march form.

The march, as a sonorously harmonized form of *art* music, and the *idea* of progress as a powerful tool of thought could not and did not emerge until the late 17th century.

Action comes before thought. Men marched with and against each other for

[1] This article elaborates upon a statement made by the author in *Our Marching Civilization*, Stanford University Press, 1943, p. 46, in which he expressed belief that it is possible to find a "correlation between music and social progress, the interpendence of the two in emotional states and national achievement." As he remarked on p. vii, The musical march is "one barometer of progress (along certain lines) in society."

centuries, but only within the last two hundred-odd years has the idea of marching onward been applied to the study of history. The march, the most triumphant of all forms of nationalistic music, has a history exactly parallel to that of the magnificent idea of progress in human affairs.

"The idea of progress" is a creed, a belief that mankind is marching forward, slowly but surely, to better things. This optimistic belief, that in spite of all setbacks, progress is automatic and inevitable, has been examined critically by many competent authorities.[2] Modern social scientists have agreed that so-called "laws of progress" were figments of romantic imagination; that progress is certainly *not* "part of the universe, like the unfolding of a flower," as Herbert Spencer believed. Learning the hard way, we have had to admit that if we are to make progress, it must involve some effort on man's part. But the belief in automatic progress still persists, because it is so pleasant to feel that somehow the effort will not be necessary.

In music the ordinary march is a very simple, often a banal form, played for the simple purpose of putting many feet down regularly, all together, one after the other, *in order to progress* from here to there. When the march first emerged, however, it was a thrilling novelty. By the nineteenth century, march music could enthrall an audience for a whole evening. Taste has changed; no modern audience would be likely to enjoy Wagner's Rienzi, written in march form from beginning to end.

Serious composers feel toward the march just as modern historians feel about the idea of progress. But whereas the latter has been studied seriously, the march has not. Little attention has been given to this form of music which has helped for three centuries to instil the belief in progress and to keep it alive in the minds of men. The march, like the idea of progress, has become fundamental in the average person's musical thought—so much so that nobody notices it.

The ingredients of the march are obviously as old as the act of marching. The voice of command, the percussive noise and excitement with which evil spirits and enemies are driven away, and the trumpet calls arousing buoyant heroism are universal in historical time and space. But these elements could not be organized consciously into an art form until Western Europeans had revived the lost techniques of infantry drill and orderly organization of large armies. After the fall of the Roman Empire and its break-up under the feudal system, the disciplines under which imperial legions marched over Europe were forgotten, at least in the West. The dominant power was spiritual, not military.

During the first fifteen centuries of the Christian Era, the only music which affected large masses of people was the music of the Church. This fact is apt to be exaggerated; the student of music history often gets the impression that *all* musical expression was dominated by the Church. Obviously this could not be entirely true. Dance music, love songs, soldier songs and military signals were not controlled by the church authorities; such music was merely tolerated—and

[2] J. B. Bury, *The Idea of Progress, An Inquiry into its Origin and Growth*, London, 1920. Jules Delvaille, *Essai sur l'histoire de l'idée de progrès jusqu'à la fin du XVIII me siècle*, Paris, 1910, and F. J. Teggart, *Theory of History*, New Haven, 1925, give surveys of the literature.

ignored. When people danced, made love, and fought battles, they needed and used the music of bodily movement.

All this music inspired by action and movement, however, was for small groups. No great central power found it advantageous to control the physical movements of human beings. For the first few centuries, the Church Fathers were obliged to combat the waning power of the Roman Empire and its pagan music. Some found it necessary to protect the faithful against the sensuous city music and military melodies of Rome; but after Rome became the center of spiritual rather than secular rule the medieval popes were wise enough to see that they merely needed to control the sacred music of thought and contemplation. Ever since that time, Catholic policy has been tolerant of, or indifferent to, secular music and activities carried on outside the Church.

The music of medieval power, therefore, was the contemplative music of Gregorian chant. Medieval plainsong was kept as "pure" as possible by ecclesiastical authority, in order that men's thoughts might be equally pure. This was accomplished by fostering a style of melody which excluded, as far as possible, all suggestion of regular bodily movement. The theory seems to have been that so long as the Church could control the music of contemplation, men's minds would be fixed upon the life to come—on the supreme, eternal truths of revealed religion. With men's minds and ideals molded thus, what could there be to fear in harmless dance-music, drinking songs, love songs, and soldier songs? Dancing, carousing, love-making and fighting were merely temporal diversions in our short life here below.

It became very important to record *church* music correctly so that the thoughts and aspirations of all Europe would be controlled by the ruling spiritual power. Necessity, in this case, was the mother of an invention—our system of musical notation. Mnemonic signs began to be used as soon as Gregory had stabilized the power of Rome and extended missionary work to the British Isles. With the centering of musical arts in the monasteries, a totally new phenomenon—the practice of group-singing around church melodies—made it possible for Northern experimenters to invent staff notation for high and low voices. Harmony was the unique result.

It was *not* necessary for several centuries (until the 13th century, to be exact) to have a system for writing down the music of bodily movement. Dance music, drinking songs, and battle melodies were not thought to be important, as just observed; but there was another reason for not writing them down. Secular music for amusement was *private property*. The wandering minstrels of medieval Europe, the purveyors of dance music, and the field trumpeters for feudal princes were craftsmen jealous of their repertoire. If some of their tunes became common currency, it was because they were simple enough to need no notation. Everybody repeated them, as millions repeat melodies today, without ever seeing the printed notes.

Musical notation, therefore, was invented in order to spread, teach, standardize, and preserve the difficult melodies and harmonies of the Church. Plainsong was recorded in order that the faithful everywhere might sing the same prayers of peace, hope, and aspiration. Early harmonies were recorded by daring *com-*

*posers*, a new kind of artist who saw possibilities in the improvisations of gregarious monks.

Composition was a new kind of art, indeed—the art of writing down vertical combinations symbolizing different pitches and harmonies, together with horizontal, linear symbols symbolizing measured melodies in different rhythms. The emergence of this art was made possible by profound social and political changes. The change from spiritual to temporal power explains the shift from contemplative plainsong conditioned by words and tones to modern music conditioned by harmony and measure—music which was to activate men's bodies for dancing and marching as well as for contemplation. The simple, measured music ignored by medieval monks became the basis of modern music and of the march music with which secular rulers have controlled mankind.

A German historian of the march cites The Crusaders' Song by Walther von der Vogelweide as the first recorded example.[3] Minnesinger songs were often fairly regular in meter, but that does not make the Crusaders' Song a "march." Knights and Minnesingers were not marchers. The former rode horses and the latter sang poetry.[4]

According to Froissart (Bk. I, part I, ch. 322), Edward III entered Calais in 1347 to a "grand foison" of martial sounds, with a great variety of instruments. Such "entry music" was not written down as a form of composition, however, until three hundred years later. The first military marches in notation were little more than one-note "music" for drums. This must have been very thrilling even as late as the end of the 17th century, because when Lully, court composer for Louis XIV, wrote a little four-measure drum march for the Duke of Savoy, he received a munificent present in return.[5]

### MOTION IN ENGLISH MUSIC AND POLITICS: THE "TRAIN OF THOUGHT"

Rulers were already defining national characteristics with marches when Charles I signed the following order in 1631:

"Whereas the ancient custom of nations hath ever bene to use one certaine and constant forme of march in the warres, whereby to be distinguished one from another. And the march of this our English nation, so famous in all honourable achievements and glorious warres of this our kingdome, in forraigne parts (being by the approbation of strangers themselves, confest and acknowledged the best of all marches) was through the negligence and carelessnesse of drummers, and by long discontinuance, so altered and changed from

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[3] Heinrich Spitta, *Der Marsch*, Berlin, 1931, p. 5.

[4] For a purely poetic interpretation of the *Kreuzfahrerlied*, hear Curt Sachs' version in the *Anthologie Sonore*, Vol. II, No. 18. H. J. Moser interprets the *Kalenda maya* of the Troubadours as a march rhythm in *2000 Years of Music*, Parlophone, R1018.

[5] This was the march (not very exciting today):



(Preserved by Philidor and quoted by G. Kastner, *Manuel de mus. mil.*, Paris, 1848, p. 115.

Artistic idealizations of battle-music appear in musical composition in the 16th century; first with Claude Jannequin's "Bataille de Marignan" (1515), choral program music in which voices imitate drum calls and other signals. William Byrd also wrote a "Battle March" for harpsichord.

the antient gravitie and majestie thereof, as it was in danger utterly to have been lost and forgotten.

"It pleased our late deare brother Prince Henry to revive and rectifie the same by ordayning an establishment of an certaine measure, which was beaten in his presence at Greenwich, anno 1610. In confirmation whereof we are graciously pleased at the instance and humble sute of our right trusty and right well beloved cousin and councellor Edward Viscount Wimbleton, to set down and ordaine the present establishment hereunder expressed, willing and commanding all drummers within our kingdom of England and principalitie of Wales, exactly and precisely to observe the same, as well in this our kingdom as abroad in the service of any forraigne prince or state, *without any addition or alteration whatsoever*. To the end that so ancient, famous and commendable a custome may be preserved as a patterne and precedent to all posteritie."[6]

Each one of the drum-phrases described above accompanied certain steps and evolutions, all symbols of obedience to power. To set men in motion upon certain fixed signals was satisfying proof to a ruler of his power over matter by means of orderly motion.

Seventeenth-century scientists were greatly concerned with "Laws of Motion." According to Descartes' *Principles*, all the variety in matter, or all the diversity of its forms depends on motion, and God is the First Cause or Prime Mover. Descartes' pronouncement that "all motion is of itself in a straight line" came a generation before Newton's First Law of Motion in his *Principia Mathematica* (1687): "Every body continues in its state of rest, or of uniform motion in a right line, unless it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed upon it."

In the meantime, Thomas Hobbes, apologist for absolutism, endeavored to explain physics, society and psychology in terms of Motion, defining the latter as "a continual relinquishing of one place and acquiring of another." (*The English Works*, Vol. I, *Concerning Body*, Part II, 10.)

After Hobbes came John Locke, whose theories of civil government contradicted the former's defense of power. Locke denied that mechanical motion offered a suitable explanation of thought processes. He found a "rise, progress and gradual development" of the intellect from simple to complex ideas, and decided that man gets the perception of motion entirely through a constant train or succession of ideas in the mind.

Both Hobbes and Locke, therefore, assumed a "train of thought." One evidently felt that that train of thought was and should be set in motion and controlled by absolute power; the other felt that man could control and observe that succession in his own mind.

The British adherence to Locke's point of view after 1688 was of tremendous import to the future development of representative government in the English-speaking world. The Anglo-Saxon train of thought, as described by Locke, began to give the march a new and wider orientation.

When Charles I ordered the preservation of a certain march in 1631 as a purely mechanical symbol of personal power, that march was localized; it merely ordered certain steps and evolutions. Motion was directed from a center of authority,

[6] See Francis Grose, *Military Antiquities respecting a History of the English Army*, London, 1788, V. II, pp. 250–251, for the complete march, also the article, "March," in Grove's *Dictionary of Music and Musicians*.

and the only people affected were the soldiers who obeyed and the spectators who applauded.

A century after Charles I, and a generation after Locke, George Frideric Handel was writing oratorios for the British public, great choral dramas in which the English participated with a national enthusiasm unique in the history of choral music. They did so, as Paul Láng points out, because they saw in these great choruses of victorious Israelites the triumphal progress of the British Empire under God's guidance.[7] Most of these great choruses are in march measure, and the "Hallelujah Chorus" from the *Messiah* is the most triumphal march of them all. Nobody has ever really marched to it, perhaps; at least not on foot. Millions have marched with it in thought and feeling.

Ever since 1688, the English-speaking world has looked upon Empire as "a constant train or succession of ideas in the mind," not with the literal, continental notion of land-subjugation. Ships cannot march, literally; they can only symbolize a march of progress visualized in the Lockian manner. Couple that fact to notions of popular sovereignty and freedom, and we find a concept of the march quite different from that entertained on the Continent.

Europe consists of ground or soil which has been trampled upon, marched over, conquered and reconquered, won and lost, for centuries. Britain and the Americas consist of island and continental areas defended, since 1688, by a concept known as "freedom of the seas," meaning freedom for trade, religion, and the arts. The Anglo-Saxon with creative ability has therefore developed and spread the democratic arts of civil government envisioned by Locke. The continental European, living in constant fear of or desire for land conquest, has put his creative energies into the fine arts, achieving special superiority in music. The continental idea of the march may account for the fact that when Hegel idealized the "progress of the human spirit," he envisaged it travelling "from East to West for Europe is absolutely the end of history, Asia the beginning." Anglo-Saxons have ignored that insult, as they have not done badly with the land-march themselves.[8]

Hegel's belief in straight-line progress had a British antecedent—Newton's law of motion. Newton, to be sure, saw no social implications in his law that every body moves in a right line unless compelled to do otherwise; but if the word "nation" be substituted for "body," it serves to indicate a rule for power politics as well as for the universe. The "nation," as we know it, was a creation of the 17th century; the idea of progress and the march both helped to create it.

In Lewis Mumford's *Culture of Cities*, attention is called to the straight, wide avenues pushed through Baroque capital cities of Continental Europe during the 17th century. These avenues replaced the tortuous, winding streets of the Middle Ages which led to the Cathedral. The Baroque avenue led to the ruler's palace and provided room for national armies marching straight ahead in regular

[7] *Music in Western Civilization*, N. Y., 1941, p. 524.

[8] It is far from being an exclusively continental conception, of course. Sir John Hawkins, in his *General History of the Science and Practice of Music* (1776) quotes Sir Roger Williams, an Elizabethan soldier, in his nationalistic reply to a French criticism of the English march: "slow as it is, it has traversed your master's country from one end to the other."

file. This change took place precisely at the time when straight-line march melodies over vertical chords came into musical arts, replacing the free, irregular, winding melodic lines of Medieval and Renaissance music.

All forms of the march can be found in 17th-century England, from the stately pavanes of the Elizabethans and the masques put on by the first Stuarts, the psalm-tune marches of the Puritans, the rowdy parody-marches sung by the Cavaliers in reply, and the Irish jig-march, "Lilliburlero," (which helped to pull James II from his throne), down to the marches for orchestra and choir by Henry Purcell.

After the Restoration, a new type of church anthem was initiated by Purcell, with joyous secular elements inspired by French court music. The prelude to "Rejoice in the Lord Alway" is a brilliant piece of march music—the sort of measure to which Louis XIV and his *corps de ballet* were making triumphal "entries" across the Channel.

Finally, in 1740, Dr. Thomas Arne composed "Rule Britannia," one of the first of the great modern national odes in march form. In 1746 Handel quoted Arne's opening phrase, in the "Occasional Oratorio," with the words, "War shall cease, welcome Peace," instead of the line, "When Britain first, at God's command."

### TRIUMPHAL PROGRESS IN MUSIC AND THEORY UNDER FRENCH ABSOLUTISM

England, after decades of bloody civil war, solved her internal problems and began to work out her salvation along democratic lines by 1688, while the autocratic Louis XIV was at the height of his power.

Both the musical march and the idea of progress were formulated in France with Gallic logic, clarity, and precision. Added to that was the element of sumptuousness associated with the Grand Monarch and his host of satellites. The march, therefore, was very theatrical, part of Versailles' elaborate paraphernalia for display.

Curiously enough, the thinkers under Louis XIV who made statements about progress frequently made reference to music and the theater. Fontenelle, one of the first to think of progress in modern terms,[9] remarks in one of his essays that the songs and operas of his day were far superior to those of the past. This expresses the pride with which many Frenchmen looked upon the arts of that grandiose era, but it expresses more than that in the history of ideas. The late 17th century marked the climax of the great quarrel of the Ancients and Moderns. It has already been shown that this quarrel was not merely in the realm of literature, but also in that of music.[10]

An amusing argument has come down in the literature on the subject, written by Claude Perrault in 1681.[11] This argument, in the form of a dialogue, is on the respective merits of Italian opera, representing the "ancient" tradition, and of

[9] "Men will never degenerate, and there will be no end to the growth and development of human wisdom." (From an essay by Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle, "On the Ancients and Moderns," 1690.)

[10] See W. D. Allen, *Philosophies of Music History*, N. Y., 1939, pp. 38 ff., for fuller discussion of this quarrel and its relation to music.

[11] Quoted in its entirety in *Philosophies of Music History*, as cited, pp. 43–44.

French opera, representing the "modern" exponents of progress. Charles Perrault, a brother of this author, in that same decade, wrote a four-volume *Comparison of the Ancients and the Moderns.* Like Hobbes, he thought in terms of motion, but not in terms of psychology. His reference to motion was in use of a theatrical analogy when he saw the arts and sciences "driven underground" during wars and restored "during the happy reigns of great monarchs," "to reissue with the same abundance with which they vanished." The note of Augustan triumph appears when Perrault rejoices "to see our century arrived in some sort at the highest perfection."

On the whole, French philosophizing in the late 17th century was more artistic than scientific in its tone; more given to praise of the status quo. Hobbes, Locke and Newton, with their sober reflections on psychology, government, religion, ethics, and physics, offer a striking contrast to their contemporaries across the Channel who believed with Charles Perrault that "very likely we have not many things for which to envy those who will come after us."

March music in France had little of the folk-element and variety found in English march music from Charles I to George I. March music for Louis XIV was functional music for conquering armies, brilliant "entry" music for the numerous appearances of the monarch and his court, and sumptuous processionals for the ballet. It was all very flattering to His Majesty, the Roi Soleil, but it had no popular appeal.

Jean Baptiste Lully (1632–1687, originally Lulli), born in Florence, was one of a long line of Italians who made good as naturalized French composers. In addition to his great lyric tragedies and impressive church music, in which we find frequent use of the march form, Lully wrote many marches for the French Army, from simple drum-marches to pieces scored for brasses, oboes, bassoons, and drums. Many of them were preserved by André Philidor and are reprinted in Kastner's *Manuel général de musique militaire*, published in 1848, when march music was at the height of its glory.

Lully's marches are sometimes in triple measure, and there seems to be no set number of measures required in a march period. The measure may even begin on a weak pulse, giving the effect of dancing rather than of marching. In other words, both the march and the idea of the march were off to a versatile, brilliant start under Louis XIV, but neither was simplified for popular use.

The nation which seems to have done most to standardize and popularize the march in its present form was Germany. The German love of symmetry and order demanded that march music be regular; that it be simple enough for everybody. The history of the march in Germany is bound up with the history of German folk music, and vice versa; the history of the French march is bound up with the history of the theater.

Unfortunately, one tendency in mid-18th-century France was to march backward. *The idea of progress was reversed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, with his popular "Back-to-Nature" philosophy which argued that civilization was a mistake. Made plausible by the corrupt indolence of the Court, this philosophy led to a negative, destructive revolution which had little in common with the progressive, forward-looking revolt in America.

The absolutism of the Bourbons was followed by the absolutism of the Terror. The terrorists were followed by the fiery Corsican, Napoleone Buonaparte, whose imperialistic absolutism set a new pattern for European conquest. Napoleon, with supreme disregard for human dignity, set all the other nations afire with patriotic nationalism. His most tragic mistake was the awakening of the double eagles of Prussia and the marching spirit of the German *Volk*. *La Marseillaise* back-fired, because the French were much like the disunited, artistic, dramatic Greeks. Both fell prey to neighbors on the march. When a German general told Rouget de Lisle that his stirring tune had killed 50,000 German soldiers, he described a vicious circle, which has gone on ever since and has set back European progress for centuries.

### THE MARCH AS AN EXPRESSION OF POPULAR GERMAN SENTIMENT

"The march must unite its solemn, manly, strong, and cheerful character with a dignified simplicity, free from all musical vanity and speculative, refined flourishes (Schnörkelei)."[12]

The march has always been a very serious matter in Germany, not a mere vehicle for dramatic pageantry, as in French and Italian Grand Opera. The German has never tolerated any nonsense about the march; the jig-marches of other nations find little place in his military music. Even dance music, in Northern Germany, is march-like in character. Sentimental German folk and student songs are often slow march tunes sung with a feeling of devotion and *Innigkeit*. The idea of the march is deeply ingrained in German romantic music and musical theory.

There was little or no philosophizing about the March and the idea of progressive motion forward in the turbulent, suffering Germany of the 17th century. In the late 17th century, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, however, influenced by French and English reasoning, expressed the optimistic belief that "each created being is pregnant with its future state, and it naturally follows a certain course, if nothing hinders it."

This was a theory, not of mechanical motion, but a prophetic hint of the Romantic doctrine of Evolution, in which the idea of progress was applied to biology.

"On account of the infinite divisibility of the continuous, there always remain in the abyss of things slumbering parts which have yet to be awakened, to grow . . . to advance to a more perfect state. And hence no end of progress is ever reached." (*On the Radical Origin of Things*, 1697.)

Such reasoning was rare in 17th-century Germany. Leibniz was better known in Paris than in his native country. He had no such influence on his countrymen as Hobbes, Locke, Descartes, Newton, and Fontenelle had on theirs. Not until one hundred years later did German philosophers idealize the march. When they finally did so, it was with true German thoroughness, with the aid of Blood and Iron.

Little did Leibniz, the great humanist, realize that some of the "slumbering parts" yet to be awakened in his own country were the military drum-marches of

[12] *Mendels Musikalisches Konversationslexicon* Leipzig, 2nd ed., 1881, vol. VII, pp. 78–79.

15th-century mercenary soldiers, the battle-songs of 16th-century Landknecht infantry, and the 17th-century Prussian marches. Nor did he realize that the Prussian glorification of the perfected military march would be blessed by Hegel in his metaphysical defence of progress by conquest. Hegel told his students at the University of Berlin that

"The history of the world travels (like the sun) from east to west, for Europe is absolutely the end of history, Asia the beginning. . . . The east . . . knows only that *one* is free; the Greek and Roman world, that *some* are free; the German world knows that *all* are free. The first political form therefore which we observe in history, is despotism, the second, democracy, and the third monarchy,"[13]

It is said of Hegel that "the prospect of democratic advances almost made him ill." Nevertheless, this Hegelian poison was swallowed eagerly, even in democratic America. By 1852 American readers were learning from a disciple of Hegel that "a nation is progressive only on the condition of war"; that every nation which advances, advances by conquest."[14]

Meanwhile, in 1817, the following order had been issued by the King of Prussia, showing that King Charles' drum marches of 1631 had "advanced to a more perfect state," and that the spirit of absolutism found the same use for them:

"In order to come to the aid of regiments in the choice of good military marches, I have arranged for the publication of a selected collection of compositions which have proved their worth, and I have ordered a set for each regiment. Since the army will in this way have access to *good* music, it is therefore my will that *no other marches shall be played for parades* and reviews, especially when I attend in person."
Berlin, Feb. 10, 1817 Friedrich Wilhelm[15]

This royal decree is obviously typical of absolutism in general; it is also symbolic of the fear which made European rulers tighten up their restrictions after the removal of Napoleon. It is also typical of the attitude of militaristic states; such states know the dangers of revolutionary and non-militant music.

The "goose-step" of the Prussian army on parade offers another illustration of the rigidity with which the army functioned and its effect on Prussian manners.[16] Above all it illustrates the feeling of superiority and contempt with which the Prussian surveys the rest of mankind.

Royal absolutism which decreed every march, every step, with a feeling of superior rightness, went hand in hand with Hegel's philosophy of the Absolute, and with his belief in the progress of the human spirit, to which reference has already been made. His belief that the spirit of humanity had reached the height of its powers in the Prussian State was very flattering to the King, and the philosopher was decorated for his profound metaphysical argument for North German superiority.

[13] *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, tr. from the 3rd German ed., by J. Sibree, London, 1894, rev. ed., 1900.

[14] Victor Cousin, *Course of the History of Modern Philosophy*, tr. by W. Wight, N. Y., 1852. See *Our Marching Civilization*, as cited, p. 24.

[15] Quoted by Ludwig Degele, *Die Militärmusik, ihr Werden und Wesen, ihre kulturelle und nationale Bedeutung*, Wolfenbüttel, 1937, p. 119.

[16] German pedagogues under the Prussian influence even taught piano students to lift their fingers to ridiculous heights as a matter of instrumental discipline.

Hegel was not the first philosopher to argue that the march forward of the German people would show the path of culture and civilization for the rest of the world. Similarly implicit uses of the march idea had appeared with the idealists of the *Sturm und Drang* period. Speaking of Education, Herder wrote, about 1790:

"God acts upon earth only by means of superior, chosen men. . . . Only amid storms can the noble plant flourish . . . revolution is as necessary to our species as the waves to the stream, that it be not a stagnant pool." *Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of Man* (IX, I).

In 1800, J. G. Fichte, in *The Destiny of Man*, was equally optimistic about the progress of his *Volk*, the chosen people:

"No work which bears the imprint of reason . . . can be utterly lost in the progress of the times, . . . All those rude outbreaks of force, before which human power vanishes into nothing . . . can be nothing else but the final struggle of the wild mass against the *lawfully progressive*, life-giving systematic course to which it is compelled, contrary to its own impulse. They can be nothing but the last concussive strokes in the formation of our globe, now about to perfect itself. . . ."

Of course these philosophers were mystic thinkers with the highest ideals; glorification of militarism was remote from their minds. Nevertheless, the Prussian soldier has ever since been quite certain that his army is the providential instrument by which "the last concussive strokes" are to be struck which will then compel the rest of the globe to follow "the lawfully progressive, life-giving systematic course" laid down by a General Staff and Gestapo.

The Prussian military march is in a very realistic sense a flowering of the brutal marches of mercenary soldiers. Like the latter, the Prussian soldier admits frankly that he fights for money and for loot; he sings lustily, in the eighth verse of "Fridericus Rex," the favorite march of the German Army:

Mit Pomade bezahlt den Franzosen sein König;
Wir kriegens alle Woche bei Heller und Pfennig.
*Kotz* Mohren, Blitz und Kreuz Sakkerment,
Wer kriegt so prompt wie der Preusse sein Traktament?
Fridericus, mein König, den der Lorbeerkranz ziert,
Ach hättst du nur öfters zu plündern permittiert![17]

The beautiful sentiments in that verse contrast strangely with Hegel's idealistic picture of the march of the human spirit. They also provoke contrast with the march songs of Anglo-Saxon soldiers.

The English King who ordered that certain marches be played in his presence, "without any addition or alteration whatsoever" lost his head a few years later. After the Restoration, in 1660, monarchy came back, but since 1688 the English have managed to reconcile it with democracy, thus completely disproving the Hegelian dogma that monarchy should displace democracy, that the latter is only one step removed from despotism.

[17] Words by W. Alexis (1832), set to music by Carl Loewe (1837). Taken from *Alte und neue Lieder*, Leipzig, about 1926; a very popular song-book supervised by the Prussian Folk-Song Commission under the Weimar Republic.

Now the Puritans who beheaded Charles I were Protestants, so the question naturally arises, "Why did German Protestants fail to put their kings in their proper places as servants of the people?" The answer is found in the different attitudes of German Lutheran and other branches of Protestantism toward secular affairs. Martin Luther saw to it that the German Reformation was not a revolution against oppressive secular authority. His part in putting down the Peasants' Revolt, the first democratic rebellion in Western Europe, is well known. From that time to the present, no democratic movement in Germany has ever had a chance.

### THE OPPOSITE OF THE MARCH IDEA IN BAROQUE ARTS

The Protestant Reformation, in the very nature of the case, could be expected to develop musical arts which were vigorous, assertive, and authoritative. The Lutheran chorale, the Calvinist psalm-tune, and the processional hymns of the Anglican Church all contrast strongly with the serene music favored by Rome, from unmeasured, monodic plainsong to the sonorous polyphony and harmonies of Victoria and Palestrina.

The Counter-Reformation had its militant aspects, of course, but the arts cultivated by this movement—the Baroque arts of architecture, painting, and music—were the most amazing syntheses of mysticism and sensuousness that the world has ever known.

The arts of the Baroque, beginning in the late 16th century and continuing through the 17th, were designed to attract, to bring back those who had strayed from Mother Church—to counteract with sensuous appeal and mystic, lofty beauty the two-fisted theology and thumping, marching assertiveness of the reformers.

The music of the Counter-Reformation was the antithesis of march-music, and those who promoted it were not at all interested in progress. The idea of progress was heresy. The only march-music was the music for gorgeously arrayed clerics and laymen in festival processions and pageantry. Music for multiple choirs of voices, brass and strings arose to the lofty domes of 17th-century churches along with the fragrance of incense. On the domes were painted clouds which gave the illusion of an open roof. The Protestant who came into contact with such arts simply stopped protesting and surrendered in awe and reverence. No Protestant communities ever prospered in cities adorned with Baroque art.

These baroque arts were theatrical; consequently, the music of the Catholic Church, from 1600 to 1900, gradually accepted the march idiom, not as a symbol of "progress," but to enhance the magnificance of the service. Pope Pius X called a halt to this in 1903, but even he, while demanding a return to traditional ideals in appropriate sacred music, allowed for "progress of the arts" (*Motu proprio*, II, 5).

### THE ROMANTIC MARCH OF PROGRESS

The Counter-Reformation saved the Catholic Church, but could not stem the tide of marching nationalism. The march form, under Northern influence,

came to dominate music and theory, but the Catholic Baroque influence tempered it in Central Europe. As a result, the greatest music the world has ever known emerged on a great highway which ran from Naples up to Protestant Leipzig and Catholic Dresden, with Vienna at the center, and lateral roads leading to Paris and London in the west and to Bohemia and Russia in the east.

The music of the great masters of the classical period, from the birth of Bach and Handel (1685) to the death of Beethoven and Schubert (1827–8), combines the strength of the German march idiom with the expansive, unfettered *joi de vivre* of the Gallic and Italian Catholic countries. The Enlightenment was less successful in synthesizing the modern idea of progress with the belief in eternal verities of timeless significance.

The march and the idea of progress gained ascendancy in the 19th century. Baroque music was condemned as bizarre and unconformable to the academic laws of regularity laid down by pedestrian theory. The Great Powers were so well balanced that they contested with each other in military band festivals.

As for The Idea of Progress, it became for the Western World a new religion. The doctrine, dogma, or "Law" of inevitable, continuous improvement was "proved" by the example of a marvellous, harmonious European civilization, the climax of centuries of slow, painful development through the ages. The term "Concert of Nations" indicated the belief in harmony. The military band, playing marches, was called a *Harmonie.*

Progress was God and God was progress, and the March was the hymn of praise which pervaded all thinking. Everyone who sang, sang something akin to the spirit of Browning's marching verse:

> "The year's at the Spring
> The day's at the morn. . . .
> . . . .
> God's in His Heaven,
> All's right with the world"

Robert Browning, like many another Englishman in the 40's, believed that sincerely, and trips to sunny Italy confirmed it. Of course there were rumblings of discontent on the continent, but this young man had nothing in common with two young Germans who were certain that all was wrong with the world and had well-intentioned theories which have helped to make it worse.

The Communist Manifesto and the other futile revolutionary events, in 1848, did not shake the belief in Progress. With the Gothic revival and romantic admiration for the medieval mind, Faith and Belief were reinstated in place of the Goddess of Reason who had made so much trouble in France not long before. Intellectuals who could no longer accept the Biblical doctrine of Creation turned eagerly to the equally dogmatic belief in Evolution, the new and fashionable word for the slow, gradual, continuous progress by which the universe was gradually getting better and better, day by day.

The belief in progressive Evolution was first elaborated in poetry by Charles Darwin's grandfather, Erasmus. Just before 1800 Erasmus Darwin anticipated

Oken's poetic method in science in his *Loves of the Plants.* Without going into the various kinds of evolutionary theory elaborated later in prose by Lamarck, Darwin, and Spencer, it suffices here to point out that Science, like Religion, came to be worshipped in the Romantic Era in a fog of poetic Beauty.

Of course, not all 19th-century music and poetry were based on the march form. This claim would manifestly do injustice to the wealth of song, dance, sonata, symphony, and the chamber music of the era, and to the finest examples of Victorian and Continental poetry. However, poetry and poetic music often did adopt the march form in such a way that the feeling of progress forward was intensified—with gentle sentiment for those so constituted, and with passionate fervor for the rest. If there are those who think this interpretation an exaggeration, it may be because the "scientific method" retaliated against the emotionalism of the 19th century by trying to be entirely *dis*passionate. The influence of Art upon Society can never be understood by those who do not know the meaning of passion. The Idea of Progress came to be a matter, not merely of intellectual reason, but of superficial sentiment on one hand and *passionate belief* on the other.

*When a new faith spreads among a people, the ritual adopts old forms of poetry and music, and adapts them to hymns of praise and devotion to the new belief.*

Just as the early Christians adapted old arts and old melodies from pagan antiquity and from the Orient; just as the Lutherans slowed up old folk-tunes to make chorales; just as the English adopted an old galliard dance tune for "God Save the King"; just as an heroic English drinking song became the hymn for American democracy; just as the Nazis made a romantic old folk-song into the most brutal march in history; so the march came to be the liturgical hymn of Progress throughout the Western World.

Great syntheses of the arts and sciences were attempted in the name of progress. Wagner's *Gesamtkunstwerk* and Herbert Spencer's *Synthetic Philosophy* were contemporary attempts along this line. Wagner claimed to be formulating "The Art of the Future," but in this art we find many magnificent apotheoses of the conventional, conservative march form, from *Rienzi* to *Parsifal.* Among the *First Principles* of Spencer's synthesis was his ultra-conservative opposition to socialism, resulting from his "belief that it would stop the progress to a higher state and bring back a lower state."

### THE FUNERAL MARCH OF PROGRESS

In 1871 Henry Ward Beecher proclaimed that the Lord had entrusted the leadership of Europe to progressive, spiritual Prussia.[18] But at that very moment, Wagner was composing *The Twilight of the Gods.* Siegfried's Funeral March was indeed a prophetic funeral march for the idea of progress. After that, Wagner, formerly high priest of the triumphal march of progress, wrote no marches except Isolde's passionately personal funeral march and the cloistered processional for the Knights of the Grail in *Parsifal.*

Thereafter, composers and theorists began to abandon the march as a basis for musical art. Meanwhile the crew of the progress balloon began throwing out

[18] See *Our Marching Civilization,* as cited, p. 19.

theoretical ballast to keep her in the air. But in 1917, Igor Stravinsky, in exile, with instinctive social insight, wrote, in spite of his disclaimer that nothing matters save "*la matière sonore*," a "Triumphal March of the Devil," in his *Story of a Soldier*. The balloon of progress lay on the fields of Flanders, completely deflated.

With the demise of the idea of progress as a belief in automatic, universal betterment, millions of people have come to regard progress as impossible and unattainable in this age of insane destruction. The belief in the *possibility of progress* must not be allowed to disappear. If it does, the history of music and of everything worth while is finished.

## AESTHETICS AND PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICAN COLLEGES

THOMAS MUNRO

Like all other sciences, aesthetics was hatched in the parent nest of philosophy. It has hesitated long on the edge of the nest, before flying out to set up one of its own. Its elder brother, psychology (formerly known as "mental philosophy") went through the same pangs of separation a few decades ago. Psychology has grown mightily since, and has brought back many a choice morsel of knowledge to its elderly parents. Aesthetics as a formal, academic subject still feels most at home under the sheltering wing of philosophy.

Since the eighteenth century, it has held a somewhat uncertain place as a member of the philosophical family. Its position is not unlike that of a late and unexpected arrival, a rather unsought and accidental infant, come to bless the old age of a couple whose other children have long since grown up. The infant's awkward attempts to walk and do things for itself are entertaining but a little embarrassing, among its well-poised older brothers. It often talks too much, and uses big words which it does not understand. When the family counts noses, in planning a picnic or assigning tasks to be done, its existence is sometimes forgotten.

Aesthetics is sometimes listed among the recognized branches of philosophy, sometimes not. The student can read a long list of recent histories of philosophy and surveys of contemporary problems, without discovering that aesthetics exists, or that any great philosophers have been concerned about art. "Introductions to philosophy" are worth noticing these days, as the nearest approach to comprehensive philosophical systems. Our philosophers have apparently given up writing new systems of their own, but they do occasionally produce these brief epitomes for the young. Friedrich Paulsen's *Introduction to Philosophy*,[1] still used since William James endorsed it in 1895, does not mention aesthetics among the branches of philosophy—logic, ethics, epistemology, and metaphysics. Neither art nor aesthetics is mentioned in its Index. Other

[1] Tr. by F. Thilly. Holt, N. Y., 1895. First ed., Berlin, 1892.

textbooks containing no aesthetics (or less than one tenth of one percent) are Bertrand Russell's *The Problems of Philosophy*,[2] R. B. Perry's *Present Philosophical Tendencies*,[3] Vergilius Ferm's *First Adventures in Philosophy*,[4] Howard Selsam's *What is Philosophy (A Marxist Introduction)*,[5] and W. A. Sinclair's *Introduction to Philosophy*.[6]

On the other hand, several older introductions to philosophy had chapters on aesthetics, or aesthetic value, or "the beautiful"—for example, those by G. T Ladd (1890) and W. T. Marvin (1912). R. W. Sellars[7] includes aesthetics ("a reflection upon the nature of beauty whether in art or in nature") along with ethics in axiology (theory of values) as one of the main divisions of philosophy. G. T. W. Patrick's *Introduction to Philosophy*[8] has an unusually long chapter on "Aesthetic Values," with sections on objects of beauty, the science of aesthetics, art periods in history, the art impulse, the fine arts, art and morals, art and social morale, the play motive, the imagination, theories of the beautiful, empathy, the psychology of aesthetic experience, music, and beauty as ideal value. Recent introductions by D. R. Major,[9] Durant Drake,[10] G. W. Cunningham,[11] and C. B. Garnett[12] have sections on aesthetics or on beauty.

*Philosophy in American Education*, the vigorous new book by a commission of the American Philosophical Association,[13] omits aesthetics from its list of "the basic courses in philosophy" (history of philosophy, ethics, logic, and metaphysics). But it does emphasize art as one of the "specific extraphilosophical subject matters" which should be analyzed by philosophy. "Philosophy," it says, "can fit into such programs of mutual aid between related humanities in three principal ways: (a) through the analytical disciplines of aesthetics and philosophical linguistics; (b) by contributions to the history of ideas; (c) in its interpretation and criticism of the moral and speculative ideals expressed in literature and the arts."[14]

Histories of philosophy in English often pay little attention to aesthetics or the philosophy of art, passing quickly over important works on the subject by leading philosophers. In Bertrand Russell's new *History of Western Philosophy*,[15] "aesthetics" receives three brief index references; "art" none. Hegel's monu-

[2] Holt, N. Y., n. d.

[3] Longmans Green, N. Y., 1919.

[4] Scribner's, N. Y., 1936.

[5] International Publishers, N. Y., 1939.

[6] Oxford, London, 1944.

[7] *The Principles and Problems of Philosophy.* Macmillan, N. Y., 1926.

[8] Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1924, 1935.

[9] Doubleday Doran, N. Y., 1933.

[10] *Invitation to Philosophy.* Houghton Mifflin, 1933.

[11] *Problems of Philosophy.* Holt, 1935.

[12] *Quest for Wisdom.* Crofts, N. Y., 1942. (Thanks for several of these titles to Jared S. Moore, professor of philosophy at Western Reserve, who has taught aesthetics there for many years.)

[13] B. Blanshard, C. J. Ducasse, and others. Harper, N. Y., 1945.

[14] P. 236.

[15] Simon and Schuster, N. Y., 1945. *Cf.* histories of philosophy by Thilly, Rogers, W. T. Marvin, and others.

mental *Aesthetik* (translated as *The Philosophy of Fine Art*, in four volumes) is not mentioned in the account of that philosopher; neither are the works of Santayana and Dewey on aesthetics.

What recognition is paid to aesthetics by philosophy departments in our leading universities? This would make an interesting survey, but perhaps it would be fairer to wait until normal conditions return. A casual glance through the catalogues indicates a good deal of difference in this respect. The Harvard Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, in its *Official Register* of February 1, 1945, lists aesthetics among the topics in systematic philosophy on which a candidate for the Ph.D. may work. The list comprises eleven subdivisions of the field, and is thus notably longer than most traditional lists of the "branches" of philosophy. It includes metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of science, logic, philosophy of mathematics, ethics, philosophy of history, aesthetics, social philosophy, and political philosophy. However, the Harvard philosophy department announces no regular course on aesthetics during 1945–46; the nearest approach seems to be a half-year course by R. B. Perry on "General Theory of Value, with Special Reference to Aesthetic, Moral, Political and Religious Values."[16] The Yale philosophy department omits aesthetics entirely from its list of "disciplines" in philosophy, from which the candidate for a Ph.D. may choose.[17] These are metaphysics, ethics, and philosophy of religion.

The California, Princeton, and Columbia departments of philosophy stand out for their comparatively strong emphasis on aesthetics. At the University of California in Berkeley, the chairman of the art department is a philosopher, Stephen C. Pepper, who is Professor of Philosophy and Aesthetics. This arrangement gives an unusually close tie between the two departments, and many students work in both. Courses in aesthetics are given by Pepper and by Edward Strong, while Jacob Loewenberg teaches one on the philosophy of literature.[18] Princeton indicates philosophy of art as one of its graduate subjects, and T. M. Greene has been giving a course on it. Plan I, for undergraduates, is a chance to combine philosophy with art and literature—a good grouping. This plan heads the list of possible combinations, the others linking philosophy with social studies, natural science, religion, or American civilization.[19] At Columbia, Irwin Edman has a graduate and an undergraduate course on the philosophy of art, and a graduate seminar and graduate research course on the philosophy of art and criticism. Helen H. Parkhurst presents in Barnard a well-developed series of courses on aesthetics, and an excellent plan for linking them with other relevant subjects. Aesthetics is listed here as one of the four major subdivisions of philosophy, in connection with which the student is advised to take certain courses in music, fine arts, psychology, anthropology, and the literatures. Her own courses are on general aesthetics, the aesthetics of poetry and prose, and the history of aesthetic theory. From the catalogue descriptions,

[16] *Announcement of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences*, Mar. 31, 1945.

[17] *Bulletin of the Graduate School*, 1944–45.

[18] *General Catalogue*, Fall and Spring, 1945–46.

[19] *Undergraduate Catalogue*, 1944–45. *Cf.* Bowers, D. F., and Greene, T. M., "Graduate Work in Philosophy." *Journal of Higher Education*, vol. XVI, no. 4, April, 1945, p. 179.

it would seem that they bring in a generous amount of content from the arts and psychology, with comparative analysis of forms in different media. This is far ahead of the general level of development at the present time.

Persistent disagreement on the status of aesthetics in philosophy has not prevented numerous American philosophers from writing books about it. William Knight's *Philosophy of the Beautiful* has a chapter on "The Philosophy of America," which reviews a surprising list of aestheticians from 1815 on—now mostly forgotten, alas!—down to Gayley and a youthful John Dewey in 1887. Since then, substantial writings on aesthetics have appeared under the names of Santayana, Whitehead, Dewey, Parker, Prall, Ducasse, Chandler, Pepper, Gilbert, Flaccus, George Boas, Parkhurst, Edman, Kallen, T. M. Greene, Morris, Nahm, and others, in the philosophy departments of Harvard, Columbia, Princeton, Brown, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Ohio, California, Duke, Johns Hopkins, Bryn Mawr, Northwestern, and the New School for Social Research. This list is far from complete; it omits several able writers, especially some who have recently begun their work in this country. But it is long and honorable enough to make one wonder why the subject of aesthetics itself is still so often treated as an orphan stepchild in American philosophy departments. If someone happens to be around who wants to teach it, well and good; if not, the lack is apparently not considered very serious. Few philosophy departments are inclined to develop aesthetics, as at Barnard, into a diversified program of detailed courses. One or two half-year courses of a highly abstract nature, on beauty and aesthetic value, are usually considered ample. Few departments assign more than one instructor to the field.

For this slow development, many reasons can be given, including a lack of demand on the part of students. But would there not be more demand if aesthetics were differently taught? One stumbling-block has been the traditionally narrow conception of aesthetics as restricted to the abstract study of beauty and aesthetic value. When this is all aesthetics deals with, it can never attract many students to pursue it very far.

Some philosophers in this country and in Germany have gone to great pains to exclude from aesthetics a number of subjects which, everyone concedes, are closely related to it. Unfortunately, these hair-splitting distinctions are still being made, to the continued bewilderment of students and the public. Thus Helmut Kuhn, writing on "Philosophy of Art" in the new *Encyclopedia of the Arts*,[20] begins, "In order to determine the purpose of a philosophy of art, we must distinguish it from aesthetics . . . Aesthetics, the philosophical analysis of beauty, may be distinguished from the study, philosophical or otherwise, of art as a form of human productivity . . . This dualistic notion sprang from a desire to emancipate the luxuriant growth of the modern study of art in its various aspects (sociological, anthropological, psychological, and so forth) from the tutelage of a conservative and classicistic aesthetics. It is reflected by the double-barrelled title of the most important periodical in the field, the *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und Allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*, founded by Max Dessoir in 1906." A little

[20] Ed. by D. D. Runes and H. G. Schrickel. Philosophical Library, N. Y., 1946.

inconsistently, Dr. Kuhn later concedes to aesthetics "the traditional privilege of covering the whole area of both beauty and art." He marks off "within aesthetics a sector more specifically devoted (I) to the problems of art as a type of human productivity, (II) to the study of the relations between the multiple arts, and (III) to the location of art within human life." He ends by labelling "this triple branch of aesthetics 'philosophy of art.' "

Dewitt H. Parker, writing on "Aesthetics" in the same *Encyclopedia*, begins with what sounds like a roomy definition: "The purpose of aesthetics is to discover the generic characteristics of fine or beautiful art, and to determine the relation of art to other phases of culture, such as science, industry, morality, philosophy, and religion." Not content with this welcoming gesture, he begins at once to exclude this and that. "Aesthetics is sharply distinguished from the history of art, which is concerned, not with the essence of art, but with the filiation and development of styles and schools. Sometimes the scope of aesthetics is broadened to include the beautiful in nature and human life, but when this is done, it tends to lose definiteness of content. . ." It appears, too, that neither the psychology of art nor art criticism is really a part of aesthetics; they are "two disciplines closely related to aesthetics in content and history."

All this meticulous specification as to what is really aesthetics, and what is not, sounds like a discussion of who should and who should not belong to some exclusive club. It recalls the ancient, pre-evolutionary conception of the branches of human learning, which divided the universe into a lot of neatly fenced-off compartments, with "no trespassing" signs on each. It recalls the arbitrary attitude of early theorists toward the arts themselves—that each art had certain limits, which it must not cross over into the "province" of some other art. Such theorizing would be a harmless indoor pastime if it did not operate to hamper the growth of a major field of knowledge, and of students' experience therein, by setting up a mass of fussy little regulations on what should or should not be included in courses on aesthetics. The more sensible aestheticians, including Professors Kuhn and Parker, usually ignore these distinctions in practice, and do not hesitate to talk about art under the heading of aesthetics. Says Brand Blanshard, "we must learn to think straight about what art is trying to do, which is the business of aesthetics."[21] But others seem to take the narrow concept of aesthetics as an excuse for neglecting the subject-matter of the arts. "It is up to the particular arts to teach this subject-matter," they imply. "Let the fine arts, music, and literature departments cover it. Let the psychologists cover the psychology of art." Of course, the psychologists usually don't have time for it either, and of course no one of the particular art departments can undertake to cover the whole field of art in a comprehensive way. It is in many ways a philosophical task, as Dr. Kuhn implies in calling it "philosophy of art."

If the philosophy departments will do the job under that name, and define "philosophy of art" broadly enough, well and good. Most American writers now treat "aesthetics" and "philosophy of art" as coextensive. If people can

[21] "Education as Philosophy." *Swarthmore College Bulletin*, vol. XLII, no. 4, 7th month, 1945. Dr. Blanshard has recently been appointed Professor of Philosophy at Yale.

agree to call the field "philosophy of art," or "science of art," or "art theory," or *Kunstwissenschaft*, one name will do as well as another. It would not be hard to coin a better name than "aesthetics," if one could start from scratch. But "aesthetics" has achieved more general use than any other term, and it is commonly defined so as to include these closely related fields. So why confuse the issue by needless distinctions, and a needless multiplicity of labels? The important thing is to get the job done somehow: to start, in a concerted and vigorous way, systematic investigation of the arts and related types of human experience; to develop instruction in American colleges for the sake of all interested students, and to provide adequate facilities for advanced research.

This is not to say that the distinctions quoted above are false or entirely useless. It is important to distinguish between factual and evaluative studies; between observing works of art and defining general aesthetic categories, etc. These are different tasks, emphases, and approaches within the subject of aesthetics, which should be distinguished as well as interrelated. But it is harmful to erect them at the start into restrictive boundaries for the whole subject; to fence off a little realm of abstract value-theory, and obstruct free traffic between it and its neighbors. A precise definition of the limits of aesthetics is not urgently needed at the present stage. If made at all, it should be made in terms of more and less. When art criticism becomes sufficiently general and fundamental, covering a wide range of art and scrutinizing value-standards, it becomes aesthetics. When art history becomes sufficiently general and fundamental, revealing major culture-epochs, styles, trends, and causal relations, it becomes aesthetics. When psychology discloses main recurrent factors in personality and social behavior which affect the creation and use of art, it becomes aesthetics. When semantics deals constructively with aesthetic terms and meanings, it becomes aesthetics.

There is no distinct subject of aesthetics in the nature of things. There is a set of diverse phenomena, called "aesthetic" and "artistic," which can as yet be only roughly marked off. There is a varied group of intellectual approaches to them, for the purpose of raising and answering as well as possible a number of different problems, which seem important to different generations. Aesthetics as a subject will thrive best by freely admitting many scientific, critical, artistic, historical, and educational approaches to its counsels; by admitting many different types of data and hypotheses, whether or not they conform to some preestablished definition of what aesthetics ought to include. In educational administration, as in organizing college departments, some marking off of fields is necessary for practical purposes. But it should never be too exact or obstructive to new approaches, which may seek to cut across the old boundaries.

At the present time aesthetics, or the group of subjects loosely designated by that name, is growing too large to be adequately taught within the limits of the ordinary philosophy department, however well-disposed some individual philosophers may be. The philosophical nest is elastic enough to accommodate a sizable fledgling. But there are limits to the growth of any one branch of philosophy, especially when a small department is expected to cover the whole traditional field.

One disadvantage of the term "philosophy of art" is that it seems to tie the subject down to its prescientific status as a branch or a mere application of philosophy. The term "philosophy of mind" was similarly inadequate for scientific psychology. *Kunstwissenschaft* implies science, rather than philosophy, of art. Moreover, "philosophy of art" seems to leave out some important aesthetic phenomena which occur outside the realm of art.

Meanwhile, other college departments are extending in the direction of *Kunstwissenschaft*, especially when the philosophers are indisposed to do so. In almost every college, someone on the faculty is interested in problems of general art theory. He may be in the art department, or the English department, or the psychology department, or the history of religion department, or elsewhere. In American colleges, the demarcation of subjects is so flexible that one can expand a course on "art appreciation" or "literary criticism" indefinitely, unless some colleague protests, by bringing in for "background" and "comparison" a variety of materials which should nominally be taught by someone else. For this reason it is hard to discover, from a casual survey of catalogues, just how much aesthetics is being taught in American colleges. Many a course on the history of music or the contemporary novel includes more general aesthetics than its teacher could easily defend on strict theoretical grounds. This is a practical and very American way to let a subject grow, with freedom for different approaches, and for growth along the line of least resistance, in the hands of anyone who seems able and inclined to foster it.

Sometimes the next stage is to group several of the arts together for better integration, with or without the help of philosophy. Sarah Lawrence College seems to get along without benefit of professional philosophers, but it groups the visual arts, music, dance, and theater arts under one heading, "The Arts," with several theory courses. Rudolf Arnheim teaches the psychology of art. Stephens College combines several arts under the title "The Humanities." There is a department of Aesthetics, Art, and Music under Katharine Gilbert (a philosopher) at Duke, whereas Antioch's department of Art and Aesthetics has been headed by Stites, primarily a fine arts man. The writer's own courses on aesthetics at Western Reserve University are given in the art department, in cooperation with the Cleveland Museum of Art.

Some of the most substantial contributions to aesthetics in this country, as in Europe, have been made by persons concerned primarily with the visual arts: for example, Lewis Mumford (a free-lance writer), Coomaraswamy at the Boston Museum of Fine Arts, Helen Gardner at the Chicago Art Institute, A. P. McMahon at New York University, and A. Torossian at California. Some have been made by literary critics such as R. G. Moulton, I. A. Richards, F. C. Prescott, and Louise Dudley; some by psychologists such as Münsterberg, Langfeld, Witmer, Seashore, Schoen, Ogden, Meier, and Farnsworth; some by ethnologists such as Franz Boas at Columbia. In these ways and others, aesthetics is being approached "from below," as Fechner advised, but with solid factual materials from the arts and various sciences. One source of strength in the American Society for Aesthetics and in this *Journal* has been the support which they have received from persons in all these fields.

In approaching aesthetics from any single artistic or scientific point of view, there is an obvious limitation. A certain subdivision of the field, a particular type of phenomenon, is likely to be emphasized to a degree inconsistent with a balanced, comprehensive view. At the present stage some breadth and balance can be secured through supplementing philosophical aesthetics with selected courses in the arts. It is a question how much integration can be achieved through combining a list of specialized courses in different arts, even with the aid of philosophy.

As the subject grows, it will eventually be found advisable to set up distinct departments of aesthetics. Such departments will be separate from philosophy to the extent that psychology has become separate. Let us hope that they will continue to deal with their materials in a philosophic way, through searching criticism of assumptions and methods, along with breadth of synthesis. They will use many of the old philosophical concepts and hypotheses, along with new ones of their own. They will not ignore the old problems of beauty and value, but will approach them with more equipment for intelligent evaluation, in the shape of new knowledge about the arts and their relation to human nature. (Some of this new aesthetic insight may supply American philosophy itself with a much-needed tonic; a fresh approach to its own, non-aesthetic problems. But that is another question.)

It is pleasant at this stage to dream of a fully developed, independent department of aesthetics in a major university, properly staffed and equipped with materials and modern apparatus for studying and experimenting with all the arts; close to museums, libraries, concert halls, and theatres; distinct from specialized departments of philosophy, psychology, literature, music, and visual arts, but cooperating actively with them. An opportunity exists for some university to be the first to build one.

## A REPLY TO VAN METER AMES'S "NOTE ON A HISTORY OF ESTHETICS"

KATHARINE GILBERT AND HELMUT KUHN[1]

### I

The mind of Mr. Ames, disturbed in various ways by *A History of Esthetics*, puts the disturbers of the peace under the obligation of trying to restore the lost calm and confidence. His "Note" at the same time provides the occasion for a restatement of the general purpose and scope of the *History* as the authors conceived it.

We hoped to trace the growth and fortunes of what in the process of time defined themselves as the important aesthetic problems, such as that of art to

[1] Part I is by Katharine Gilbert; Parts II and III are by Helmut Kuhn. The article by Ames was published in this JOURNAL, Sept. 1945, vol. IV, no. 1.

life, to nature, to beauty, to a model, to craftsmanship and design, to mathematical order and physical structure, and to a reality or essence transcending natural appearance. This was to be done in such a way as not only to record faithfully men's conflicting thoughts from century to century, but so as to let light shine through those theories upon the persisting problems as such. In the "Preface" to the *History* this desired result was called "that fullness of significance which distills from the long-sustained process of all the definings." Illustrations were pointed to: a meaning to be gathered from the varying evaluations of the art of rhetoric in Plato and Aristotle, another suggested by the verbal contradiction regarding mathematical concepts with St. Augustine and Blake. But it is the problem of the relation of art to society which seems most to agitate Mr. Ames, and it is of what he feels to be our inhumane and lagging treatment of this that he most complains. For he obviously could not complain of a general failure to treat this problem. It entered the *History* in Chapter I in the discussion of the Sophist's relation to democracy, his "choice of words and the way he puts his sentences together" in order to win "the applause of the multitude." The problem turned its hundred faces about through hundreds of pages and made its exit at the very end with T. S. Eliot, "critic of his time," who is gently charged by us with too little faith in a future fertility in the Waste Land. If a reader got no farther than the first three chapters of the book, he would find even there presentation of the social implications of persuasive speech, that potent Janus-like skill able either to serve or damn the people. Already in this early type of an "art that moves" both "brutal pressure" and "will to save mankind," the two poles of our critic's concern, show themselves with Gorgias and Socrates. Here assuredly are the naked bones of the social problem. Flesh is fastened on them not only with the explicitly sociological thinkers of Chapter XVI in nineteenth century France, but also with Sidney's peerless poet "who bestows a Cyrus on the world to make many Cyruses," Shaftsbury's conviction that "nothing is so congenial to the liberal arts as the reigning liberty of a people," Dubos, Rousseau, Kant, and surely very valiantly with Ruskin and Morris. The abundance of material of this sort in the *History* proves beyond question our great interest in the general problem of art's relation to society. Our fault is then rather that we are neither, in our critic's sense, (1) up-to-date and moving with the times, nor (2) consistently humanitarian.

It should go without saying that characterizations of living aestheticians are in principle irrelevant to a history. This would follow from the very nature of a history even if, a practical publisher did not require an unanticipated degree of compression in the manuscript. A history of aesthetics is committed to the story of deeds done, not further modifiable by their doers, and visible in some perspective. Where should a history of ideas end? Of course, the answer is not clear-cut either as to where it should begin or end, because there is no ultimate beginning, and the ideal end would be the present instant if this did not move, and if it could be contemplated with objectivity. We believed a survey of the current scene not part of our main task, but the appropriate content of a supplementary work. It is hardly culpable "hanging-back" to try to do one's proper business.

Since we so interpreted our task, we are "disturbed" in our turn by Mr.

Ames's remark that we "hang back from the trend of life and art." If it is hanging back to try to see any new intellectual phenomenon in the light of history and tradition then we admit our fault. If, for example, we had found it possible to characterize the present day influence of the aesthetics of Jacques Maritain but had been prevented from stating that this position, though lively today, stems from St. Thomas; or if we had found it possible to sketch certain basic doctrines of current semanticism and at the same time had not been allowed to see its roots in medieval nominalism, we should have found this stricture prohibitive. There seems to be in the charge of "hanging back" a postulate, veiled at first, but showing itself at the end of the "Note." There it appears that John Dewey's *Art as Experience* supplies a "better way" of handling aesthetic problems than the hard labor and trying tortuousness of the history. The climactic position given to Mr. Dewey's "societal" aesthetics breeds the suspicion that the objections to us are virtually instruments in the writer's progress toward the announcement of a book of singular wisdom. Both Mr. Ames and also Mr. Kallen in his recent two volumes devoted to tracing "the relations between the ideas of beauty, use, and freedom in western civilization from the Greek to the present day"[2] seem to imply that the full meaning of the problem of society and the artist has first flowered with John Dewey. To this one can only answer that not one consummation, not even that of Mr. Dewey, nor one orientation, that toward the future, was before us for appreciation, but precisely what Mr. Ames finds "confusing," and which is, it would seem, for him the only alternative to faith in the position of a single school. Our choice was to study the many traditions in their mutual involvement, process of self-criticism, and instructive careers. In so far as any reader should start the book assuming that in one man's work, even in that of a forward-looking philosopher of our time, the rounded answer has been given to the many-sided meaning of art and beauty, he is bound to be disturbed by apparent inconsistencies in quotations and comments and by the complexity of the strands of thought.

However, since Mr. Dewey's views do carry great weight with our critic, it is gratifying to be able to suggest from Dewey's chapter on "Art and Civilization" the outlines of our reply to the charge of inadequate humanity. "The theories that attribute direct moral effect and intent to art fail," Mr. Dewey declares . . . "they miss a sense of the *way* in which art exercises its humane function." He then proceeds to say, quoting Mr. Garrod, that poetry "teaches as friends and life teach, by being, and not by express intent."[3] The upshot of his remarks is that the humanity of art is found not in this or that isolable proposition, but in the loving spirit and imaginative handling of the whole work. We would like to think that in the handling of the whole of our History there was convincing evidence of that "humanitarianism" which our critic kindly says he knows pertains to us, but alas seems to have got wind of from some other quarter than the *History*.

[2] *Art and Freedom*, by Kallen, Horace M., Duell, Sloan and Pearce, New York, 1942.

[3] *Art As Experience*, by Dewey, John, Minton, Balch & Co., New York, 1934, (pp. 346 ff.)

II

*Ideas in and out of Time*

One of the problems at issue between Professor Ames and the writers of *A History of Esthetics* concerns the confidence with which progress can be asserted as a fact. We endeavor to become wiser, but we are not sure whether we shall actually be wiser to-morrow than we are to-day. Similarly we are not certain whether scholars fifty years from now will be ahead of us in knowledge. They might go off on the wrong track and thus become even more ignorant than we are. Again, comparing our own knowledge with that of our predecessors we are sometimes but not always justified in congratulating ourselves on our advance. As we look at the present time, numerous trends become visible. But of that general "trend of life and art," about which Professor Ames speaks with confidence, we have only a hazy idea. And if a clear-cut idea of this trend were before us, it would still be necessary to ask whether it is in the right direction. It might go astray, in which case it would be a good thing to "hang back."

Hegel regarded history as the progressive self-disclosure of truth, and relics of this view linger on in modern Pragmatism. The authors of *A History of Esthetics* wished to fight shy of this crypto-theology, to place experience above a preconceived pattern of progress, and to face the past with an open mind. They had some reservations about the importance of time and sought to avoid idolatry of the past as well as of the future. In the order of importance they put the understanding of ideas first, their historical locations second. In this manner they came to see that authors of all ages had something to say to them. Wary of the dogma of progress, they turned to the past with a view to furthering progress —their own progress in knowledge in the first place, and also that of others by providing a stimulant for intellectual growth.

Every thinker, no doubt, is a child of his age. He lives and thinks under conditions which either favor or impede his enterprise, render one type of achievement easy while placing another type in jeopardy. This applies to ourselves. We are favored by an age of vast information and boundless curiosity. But we also live in a time of great upheavals and spiritual disorientation and therefore find it difficult to organize our findings into a balanced whole. We are in danger of starving in our riches, and the study of the past becomes a lesson in humility. Others made more of their scanty possessions than we make of our plenty.

To come late in the order of time is among the favorable conditions. It offers advantages for which the scholar should be profoundly thankful. This is his chance for progress. But he has to seize that chance by learning from those before him. If he fails to do so and instead blindly believes in progress as the trend of life, he shall progress towards ignorance and barter his birthright as the heir of an ancient tradition for the pottage of modernity. To further true progress by correcting this error seemed a goal worth pursuing.

One should render unto the past what belongs to it, neither more nor less. "Or is the world what it was more than what it is becoming?", asks Professor Ames as though the idea were absurd. If so, philosophy ever since Plato and Aristotle has been based upon an absurd assumption. It is assumed that deter-

minateness is fundamental to Being or Reality. Since the past is determinate and the future is not, the past to a higher degree than the future exhibits the characteristic features of "what is." This is why Aristotle, in seeking to express what we now call "essence," devised a term which denotes the pastness of Being, *τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι*. The argument, it is true, even if advanced in a less crudely simplified form, is not above doubt, and it has been challenged by more recent philosophies. The ontological primacy of the future is implied in Marxism and Darwinism, and it is elevated to a doctrine in the activism of Giovanni Gentile, one time Mussolini's philosophical counsellor, and in Martin Heidegger's existential ontology. But we need not examine here whether this modern metaphysical futurism, with its curious affinity to radical political movements of various kinds, is philosophically right. It is sufficient to point out that art, at any rate, since it delights in the determinate and tangible features of this world, leans heavily on the past. Mnemosyne is still the mother of the Muses. The arts bestow a humanly imperfect kind of permanence on things fair, excellent, and worth being enshrined for recollection. In this fashion they discover futurity in things past and protect the growth of a world to come against the blight of oblivion. One might speak paradoxically of a prophetic recollection. Aeschylus' *Oresteia* conveys a vision of justice which transcends the poet's age. Yet the drama culminates in the celebration of an event of the mythic past, the foundation of the Areopagus.

The Positivists, beginning with Saint-Simon, undertook to reform the artist, or at any rate the poet, by putting him together with the scientific engineer and the social planner on a three men committee for the acceleration of progress. The recommendation did not go unheeded. In literature we got criticism of society in Ibsen's manner, indictment of bourgeois culture in Samuel Butler's manner, denunciation of social evils in Zola's manner, the moralist nostalgia of the common man gospel in the manner of Tolstoy and John Steinbeck; we got things good and bad, ranging from venomous pamphleteering to high-minded preaching; and finally we got Bernard Shaw. But on this line we did not get any poetry. And those who toed the line and yet wrote poetry, and sometimes even great poetry, did so either before joining the committee or during escapades from orthodox progressiveness. This is true of Victor Hugo, Zola, Tolstoy, Ibsen, Walt Whitman, and many others. Compare, for example, the portrayal of Monsieur Bienvenu in the early chapters of *Les Misérables* with the atrocities in the subsequent books, *L'Abbé Mouret*, a modern version of the story of the Garden of Eden, with *Germinal*, or Walt Whitman's hymnic praise of "vast immortal suns," "pensive moons," and the "burial of the stars" with his Victorian vagaries on "cathedral industry." The poet proves unreformable. No social planner or humanitarian, however high-minded, is permitted to interpose his ideas between the poet and his vision. He is what he has always been, according to his *τί ἦν εἶναι*. He travels with a sealed message. We ought to resist the temptation of treating him as a mail-carrier who gracefully delivers messages indited for him by the engineers of Utopia.

In order to deal properly with things in time—works of art or theories about them—it is necessary to relate them to principles out of time.

III

*Art at War and at Peace with Life*

Professor Ames thinks the writers of *A History of Esthetics* are too lenient with those truants from progress which in the latter part of the nineteenth century banded together in the art for art's sake movement. In addition we seem to him inconsistent. Those aesthetes despised the bourgeois, while we, their admirers, regret in good bourgeois manner the passing away of representation. But is not modern art with its unclassical eccentricity "a continuation in some respects of the nineteenth century art-for-art movement"?

The art for art's sake movement, with men like Poe, Gautier, Flaubert, Baudelaire, Whistler, and Pater among its leaders, needs neither apology nor absolution. Thanks to them poetry is still alive to-day. I know not of a single major contemporary poet, French, German, English, or American, whose art is not profoundly indebted to those advocates of artistic aloofness. Mallarmé, Rimbaud, Valéry, Rilke, George, T. S. Eliot, W. H. Auden—they all have been disciplined by the masters of "pure form." Against the modern spirit of propaganda the art-for-art school defended artistic craftsmanship and thus secured for art a new lease of life. The perfect world which Comte anticipated and in whose service he and his followers wished to marshal artistic inspiration has not yet emerged. Meanwhile we are grateful to a group of devotees to artistic perfection for disagreeing with Comte and allowing art to survive in our tragically imperfect world.

The votaries of art for art's sake affected a revolting indifference to the struggles, hopes, and fears of mankind. But there is no need to upbraid them for their lack of fellow-feeling. They had to pay dearly for it. A great sadness of spirit tinctures all their works, and the history of their lives is almost without exception the record of self-imposed loneliness and ultimate failure. The English speak with good reason of a "lost generation" of their poets. No doubt, the philosophy of aestheticism is erroneous. There is no such thing as an art for art's sake. Life is one, its presiding purpose is all-pervasive, and an art divorced from it and occupying its own autonomous sphere of beauty is unthinkable. But the error of the art-for-art doctrine, far from being a mere blunder, is the significant misinterpretation of a real predicament. To discover the underlying truth is easier now than it was at the time the theory came into existence.

The proponents of art-for-art thought they turned away from life to Beauty impassive and aloof. Actually they turned away from certain forms and tendencies of contemporaneous life, and by their refusal to "play the game" passed an implicit judgment on those forms and tendencies. The artistic perfection to which they aspired does not express indifference to life, but it is at variance with the difformity, confusion, and vain complacency in our lives. The sombre and forbidding beauty that Baudelaire conferred upon his best poetry is a more damning indictment of modern society than the censures of social critics.

The truth barely espied or misconstrued by the nineteenth century aesthetes has come out in the open with their contemporary disciples. The development of Mr. T. S. Eliot's art from his early decadent poems with their bitter but

nonchalant mockery at life to the great affirmation of the "Four Quarters" reveals the gradual shedding of the error of aestheticism. The tension between poetic vision and contemporary scene becomes explicit and develops into a major theme of poetical meditation. Symbols such as the Waste Land and the Place of Disaffection, with Mr. T. S. Eliot, or the Winter Night with its "thorough levelling," in Mr. W. H. Auden's Christmas Oratorio, denounce the era whose pangs gave birth to them. This is the unpleasant fact we have to face: we cannot believe in the truth-telling virtue of poetry and yet, sheltered by the dogma of progress, continue to live at peace with our age. Unfortunately poetry is no longer required to enlighten us. In the winter of the year 1945, with millions starving in Europe, faith in the progressive "trend of life and art" must base itself on Tertullian's principle: *credo quia absurdum.*

Poetry has retreated a long way not from life but from a large sector of the manifestations of contemporary life. Mr. T. S. Eliot found it possible to provide a pageant for Canterbury Cathedral. But to think of him as celebrating the coronation of George VI in an ode seems odd, and it is utterly grotesque to imagine him, or any other poet of rank, dedicating a panegyric to the opening session of the United Nations Organization. However, at other periods of history occasions of the same type would have appeared a subject matter not beneath the dignity of the greatest of poets. Pindar exercized his muse to magnify public events of less dignity, and so did Horace, Dante, Milton, and Goethe. The poet's traditional willingness to place his art in the service of public life contrasts with the plight of the contemporary poet Strigelius as portrayed in Jules Romains' *Men of Good Will.* In despair over his failure to find a Maecenas to whom he might pay poetical homage, or some duke inviting him to immortalize his nuptials, he turns for poetical inspiration to—the dictionary.

The decay of tradition in the visual arts and their flight from representation reveals under a somewhat different form the same progressive estrangement from the contemporary environment. We imagine a Chinese artist of the Zen period at work, painting a wild goose swooping into the bulrushes, or Buddha seated. With every stroke of his brush he performs an act of faith—faith in the tradition of his art which he promotes by adding to the attainments of his predecessors, faith in the universe whose visible features he portrays with a fresh vision though along lines traced for him by earlier masters, faith also in the society which taught him to worship Buddha and to love Buddha's animal brothers, and which shares his delight in the lineament of feathers and reeds. As we then turn to the Italian master of the Quattrocento or to a northern painter of the Baroque era, we are confronted with a different world, but the relation of these Western artists to their world is much the same as that of their oriental fellow-artist. This relation is radically changed in this latter-day period of ours, though the situation now arising is not a novelty. There are precedents in other civilizations. The modern artist, no longer grounded in the loyalty of a growing tradition, hunts for a suitable style "to express himself," wavering between the uncouth expressiveness of earliest art (archaism) and the ruthless expressiveness of an anticipated total release from inhibitions (futurism). Since the objects of

traditional significance are rejected, a similar hunt for a suitable subject matter begins, again resulting in an oscillation between extremes: from the things visible to everyone all the time (realism) to the things visible to nobody at any time (sur-realism)—with historicism and exoticism as intermediate positions.

Wistfulness is vain and regret fatuous in recording these facts. Measured by their grave significance much of recent aesthetics seems irrelevant. Or shall we take these observations lightly and think of, say, Picasso, with his erratic career, as a gallant hussar in the vanguard of painters, adventurously sallying forth into the unexplored land of our brilliant future? Whoever leans towards this complacent view of modernism is advised to study, for example, Van Gogh's struggles as reflected both in his works and his written confessions. He may find the master engaged in the excruciating endeavor to convey by the picture of a yellow rose on a withering bush by the wall surrounding the lunatic asylum the ideas and feelings which, Van Gogh remembered, former masters used to express by painting Jesus in the Garden of Gethsemane.

Although the air of tragedy hovers over the modern artist's struggle for art, the delight he wrests from the reluctant soil is all the more precious.

## REVIEWS

KERNODLE, GEORGE R. *From Art to Theatre.* Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1945. Pp. 255, 62 illus. $5.00.

Professor Kernodle's book is a sheer delight, since it belongs to the very few studies on specific problems of the history of civilization which combine a thorough philological reliability with real and broad vision. The work represents the successful attempt to bring in closest connection two fields whose intimate relationship has been realized before only in very special respects: the stage and the figurative arts. We all know about the activities of painters and architects for the stage, especially during the Renaissance and Baroque periods; we are aware of the influence of the medieval mystery plays on the sculptural decoration of the cathedrals of the Middle Ages, etc. The influence, on the other hand, of stage setting on the representations in illuminated manuscripts, on the backgrounds of stained glass, of tapestries, and of paintings has been generally accepted. However, Kernodle is the first to show how directly the general tradition of visual arts has been mirrored in stage settings.

The extreme of illusion, on the one hand, with its climax in the Italian Renaissance stage, and of formal symbolism, on the other hand, of the Dutch and the English stages, have often been studied and valuable single conclusions have been drawn. Certain problems, nonetheless, could only be solved by a horizontal comparison of the simultaneous development of the stage in various countries, juxtaposing their visual form with the whole tradition of art. The compromises between illusion and symbolism so characteristic for Restoration and Baroque theatre, for instance, can not be understood if one sees the perspectival realism of the Italians merely as the complete contrast to the formal symbolism of the Elizabethan stage. Kernodle proves them to be the ends of a chain of many transitional links. The influence of the arcade background of the ancient theatre, of the side tower of the mystery play and the partial survival of all these elements in later forms of the stage on book illustration, carved stone altars, stained glass windows and even wall tombs, as well

as of the *tableaux vivants* on the stage setting, becomes evident. The interest of painters and draftsmen, from the early miniaturists to Rubens and his contemporaries, in certain stage devices, such as the ship, the castle, the arcade façade, etc. and the employment of these elements in figurative arts can be followed up conclusively in Kernodle's exhaustive study.

It is not the place here to discuss his conclusions, sometimes surprising, about the development of the architecture of the Rederyker façade, about the Elizabethan stage, etc. These problems and many of the later Baroque stage are of interest primarily to the art historian and the historian of the theatre. However, for the aesthetician, the importance of this work lies in Kernodle's tendency to emphasize the general tradition of the various epochs and the visual conventions familiar to every contemporary of the respective periods. This explains his interest in the *tableaux vivants*, in pageants and in many other transitory creations which in their totality contribute to the long desired "history of taste," not yet written. And the relationship between general taste and the individual work of the creative artist represents one of the major problems of aesthetics. Thus Kernodle's excellent contribution to the history of the theatre broadens its scope beyond its original goal and becomes of general importance.

PAUL ZUCKER.

MUMFORD, LEWIS. *City Development. Studies in Disintegration and Renewal.* New York, Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1945. 248 pp. $2.00.

WRIGHT, FRANK LLOYD. *When Democracy Builds.* Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1945. 131 pp., illustrated. $4.00.

CHURCHILL, HENRY S. *The City Is the People.* New York, Reynal & Hitchcock, 1945. 186 pp., illustrated. $3.00.

HILBERSEIMER, L. *The New City. Principles of Planning.* Chicago. Paul Theobald, 1944. 192 pp., 142 illus. $5.95.

Four new books on city planning bring the problems of civic art to the fore again. For their authors, art and aesthetic evaluations are of only secondary importance. Social, economic and technical ideas are expounded as basic factors, the only possible approach to city planning in our time. Nonetheless, aesthetic considerations inseparably connected with these basic factors have not become obsolete and are actually inseparable from them. The romantic "civic art" which ruled planning from 1890 until World War I makes it understandable that the authors become almost apologetic when they touch the realm of aesthetics.

By far the most important of these four publications is Lewis Mumford's *City Development.* He actually succeeds as he has done in all his earlier publications, in the complete integration of ethical, political, social and technical questions. *City Development* represents a collection of six individual papers, all of them published before, but not accessible now. Although the first was written as early as 1922, and the last three deal with specific questions like regional and city planning in Honolulu, the social foundations of Post-war Building and an analysis of the post-war plan for London, the unity of vision is surprising. The same thorough historical knowledge shown in Mumford's well known works on *Technics and Civilization* and *The Culture of Cities,* combined with a rare general human wisdom and a deep social consciousness in his fight against "Megalopolis" lifts these essays far above everything else written in this field. One would like to quote page after page, but still better, to declare this classic of urban sociology a MUST, not only for the aesthetician who will find here a cogent integration of the physical elements in town structure with aesthetic elements, but for everyone who has a say in town development. "A fresh canvas of human ideals and human purposes is necessary," based on Mumford's aims, "space for living, cultural as well as physical decentralization . . . , the bringing together of urban and rural pursuits and interests and the revivication of regional and economic societies." The aesthetic consequences of these ideas are shown, as are the reasons for the aesthetic failures of the past, in the historical part of the book.

A sharp contrast to Mumford, although agreeing in the tendency towards decentralization, is Frank Lloyd Wright's *When Democracy Builds*. This book, too, combines lines of thought developed already in earlier publications. Emphasis on broader spacing, intelligent use of the newly found mechanical means will create an organic architecture as "an eternal idea of human freedom." "Architectural values are human values." Landscape and the given ground shall develop new forms of a new architecture where the sense of space becomes more real. Wright's theory of the Free City and his criticisms of the sins of the past prove the broad and persuasive vision of the author, as do the model of his ideal Broadacre City and many of his planned and executed projects. They "accord with nature" —however, we still think that the works of this great creative artists—the Broadacre City and his houses and buildings—express his ideas more convincingly than his writings, where the impact of emotion does not always clarify the issue.

Churchill, in his *The City is the People*, gives a clear and readable survey of the ideas which rule modern city planning. Of these four books it is the easiest to read, because he develops the approach towards modern city planning out of a transparent historical survey without going into too many details. The illustrations of past, present and future planning with their excellent captions clarify the problem, which he approaches entirely from the social viewpoint. "We are seeking new physical urban settings as we are seeking new social and economic patterns." In agreement with his basic suppositions, we will understand that even from the merely artistic point of view his principal statements are correct: "While nothing can redeem bad architecture, bad city planning can ruin the greatest designs . . . architecture and city planning are one and the same."

Hilberseimer's *The New City* develops ideas along the lines of the forementioned publications, emphasizing especially the hygienic needs, led by consideration of sunlight and smoke distribution, using mostly Chicago examples. His historical survey is less convincing than Churchill's and, of course, than Mumford's. Many of his historic statements are rather rash and superficial without sufficient historical knowledge; Michelangelo was surely not the first to "discover free space as a new city element," etc. But his concept of city planning as "the ordering of things in themselves and their relationship with each other," and the attempt to apply this principle to specific solutions, is clearly developed. Even Hilberseimer, the most rational among the four authors, dedicates one chapter to the *art* of city planning, and recognizes that "the means remain always the means." Materials and proportions, perspective and location are analyzed as to their artistic importance. Of course, "problems could not be solved on the basis of formal aesthetic consideration," but rational analysis of social conditions and technical possibilities alone will surely not create the city as a work of art. It is a promising symptom that even the most functionally and rationally minded city planners begin to realize this fact. There is no danger that they will revert to the merely formal and monumental romantic panorama aestheticism of the nineteenth century.

PAUL ZUCKER.

KATZ, ADELE T., *Challenge to Musical Tradition: a New Concept of Tonality*. New York Knopf, 1945. Pp. 408. $5.00.

This is not a book one can read conveniently. In fact it is not a book at all, but a course of lectures on analysis for advanced university students, who have before them the works of the masters discussed in detail, and to whom their professor lectures, constantly explaining the principles involved at the piano and at the blackboard. To find all this printed on more than four hundred pages, and to be obliged to read it, is so laborious an effort that I doubt whether in all America more than six persons will actually make so heroic an effort. Though the reviewer is greatly interested in harmonic and structural analysis he has not been able to devote to the book the months of study it requires. He admires the author's profound insight into most complex problems, and he confesses his sympathy with the exhaustive thoroughness of the discussions. The most readable and valuable portions of the book are the general discussions about the constructive art of the great masters J. S. Bach, Phil. Em. Bach, Haydn, Beethoven, Wagner, Debussy, Stravinsky and Schönberg.

The main thesis, with which this reviewer agrees, is that the concept of tonality is one of the most important structural laws, and that it is a fundamental mistake to give it up in favor of the recent "atonality." There are, however, in the author's "challenge to tradition" certain omissions hard to understand in so thorough an investigation. In vain did I look for a discussion of Hugo Riemann's theory of harmonic functions, which greatly simplifies the understanding of more complicated harmony. Had the author looked into the two volumes of Chopin analysis by H. Leichtentritt she would have found a simpler explanation of harmonic complication than her own round-about, laborious method. Also in H. Leichtentritt's *Musikalische Formenlehre* she might have found an ally, twenty years older, in her "challenge to tradition," which, after all is not so unique and novel a theory as she is inclined to believe. With all that, nothing so serious and exhaustive has so far been published in America.

HUGO LEICHTENTRITT.

McMAHON, A. PHILIP. *Preface to An American Philosophy of Art.* Chicago 1945, University of Chicago Press, pp. 194. $2.50.

In his *Preface to an American Philosophy of Art* Mr. McMahon takes the position of a neo-Aristotelian. In the first chapter, named The Natural History of Art, he traces post-Renaissance aesthetic theory, finding much subsequent confusion caused by the failure to distinguish between metaphysical and ethical idealism and between art and beauty. There follow chapters on rational and romantic idealism in Germany as preludes to one on Hitler, The Absolute Artist of Romantic Idealism. Turning next to the ideas of Socrates, Plato, Plotinos, and Aristotle, the author finds in them a sounder basis for American aesthetics and in a final thirty pages suggests appropriate characteristics. The volume provides intelligent and stimulating reading.

A few quotations will indicate the nature of the American aesthetics Mr. McMahon urges. "The characteristics of the earliest recorded systematic thought about art which have a direct relation to basic American insights are, first of all, moral idealism and intellectual naturalism. Of almost equal value are Aristotle's concepts of technique and of causation." "Reality is, after all, a relation rather than a substance." "All objects of immediate experiencing are objects of cognition, conation, and affection." "Logical, ethical, and aesthetic qualities cannot be denied in the work of art when it is actually an object."

But unfortunately the author takes the position, now of an advocate, now of an historian, with a degree of confusion as the result. Moreover, he is at times the prosecuting attorney, and at others, the counsel for the defendant. The omission of Hegel and Nietzsche, of James and Dewey, except for oblique references, indicate the first limitation; the witticisms about Schlegel's "loving soul" and Schiller's "beautiful soul" immediately preceding frank admiration for Wackenroder's ideas, the second.

A further impression which suggests that the book would have greater value for a seminar than for a beginner's class is the bifocalism. All philosophers may be permitted a single pair of glasses—indeed consistency may make them desirable—but when a philosopher is at one and the same time driving toward a realistic rather than an idealistic goal and attempting to prove that Hitler is a direct product of the former, he is clearly suffering from bifocal lenses.

Indeed, one is tempted on occasion to question whether Mr. McMahon is not illustrating, rather than giving an illustration of, the confusion between ethical and metaphysical idealism—"The transcendental I was a flattering device to justify extreme intellectual arrogance, and to this end it was directed by the romanticists." Again, "The views of Hitler [are] . . . the most conspicuous recent expressions of romantic idealism in art." Regimentation suggested in Plato's *Republic*, arrogant heroes of Elizabethan drama, and, on the other hand, German music before Wagner come to mind, and one regrets that an insane dictator is allowed to confuse an aesthetic discussion. Incidentally, Americans are culturally romantic, as well as realistic, in their thought-forms.

But when in the last pages, having limited "art" to the "arts of design", the author disposes of his "tactile reduction", dismisses empathy in a few lines, and points out that art

has other than aesthetic qualities, while aesthetics deals with more than art, the reader is likely to warm up—for a good argument, and to hope that Mr. McMahon's next book will be a detailed philosophy of art for a world where thought is not bound by cultural limits—a sociology of art.

WILLIAM SENER RUSK.

BROOKS, CLEANTH, and HEILMAN, ROBERT B. *Understanding Drama.* New York 1945, Henry Holt and Co., pp. VIII + 515. $2.25.

This book, in the authors' own prefatory words, "is primarily a manual for reading drama, with the essentially modest aim that such a term connotes. . . ." Its "modest aim" is so cleanly and fully carried out that one hastens to agree with the authors that it has "all the importance . . . that the richest and fullest definition of *reading* must imply."

For understanding drama, close analysis of structure and technique, such as here presented, is indispensable. Much of this understanding is common property, existing dispersedly in the wide literature of the field. Much is within the competence of any serious reader to develop for himself. But nowhere else is it so readily at hand in a single volume, so solidly and systematically presented. Also, in no other work is the drama as art form laid out so effectively in its basic principles by the method of sustained induction.

By this laboratory method the student is led to think through to the principles as they are revealed before him in actual specimens of dramatic writing, rather than, as in so much discourse on the drama, to accept merely reasoned generalizations supported by discursive examples from outside the text.

As specimens, the book includes in its main part eight plays entire, presented in order of complexity, from *Everyman* to Ibsen's *Rosmerholm.* Each is detailedly analyzed to reveal actual handling of basic dramatic problems, which are set forth in general before reading of the plays begins. Additionally, in an appendix, leading questions on some fifteen widely selected plays are raised for further analysis.

A second appendix contains in adequate handbook scope an historical sketch of the drama. A glossary in two parts, one giving extensive expositions of important dramatic terms such as "motivation" and "tempo", the other brief definitions, completes the work.

BERTRAM E. JESSUP.

## NOTES AND NEWS

*(Readers are invited to send in items for publication in this department. They may deal with activities of the Society, personal news about individual members, or events of general interest in the field, such as academic appointments, research projects, lectureships, and publications.)*

### PERSONAL ITEMS

CARROLL C. PRATT, Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University and a former trustee of the A.S.A., has been appointed head of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Ankara, Turkey, for 1946–47. He is on leave of absence, and expects to return to Rutgers at the end of the year. This appointment was arranged by the U. S. State Department, Division of Cultural Cooperation. Dr. Pratt is an organist and musicologist as well as psychologist, and is the author of *The Meaning of Music* and *Psychology: The Third Dimension of War.*

The paper on "The Aesthetics of Alfred Rosenberg," presented by A. R. CHANDLER at the Cleveland meeting of the A.S.A. in September, 1944, constitutes one section in *Rosenberg's Nazi Myth,* published by the Cornell University Press in October, 1945.

The *Encyclopedia of the Arts*, by DAGOBERT D. RUNES and H. G. SCHRICKEL, is out and in the bookstores—a portly volume of nearly 1100 pages, which will be reviewed in a later issue. The Philosophical Library, of 15 East 40th St., New York 16, which publishes it, informs us that a 33% discount will be granted to members of the A.S.A. on this book (list price $10.00) and on Max Schoen's *Enjoyment of the Arts* (now selling for $3.00). Several members of the Society contributed articles to both books.

A translation of Guyau's *Les problèmes de l'esthétique contemporaine*, Book I, is being published by De Vorss and Co., 843 South Grand Ave., Los Angeles. The author, HELEN LAWRENCE MATHEWS, is active in the Pacific division of the A.S.A.

The *Art Bulletin* for September, 1945, published a detailed review by JOHN ALFORD of *The Future of Aesthetics*, edited by Thomas Munro. It quotes at some length from the conference reports which were published there, and comments favorably on the Society and the *Journal*. Professor Alford is now at the Rhode Island School of Design in Providence.

An article by J. DONALD YOUNG of Occidental College, in the November 1945 *College Art Journal*, is entitled "Art in the Liberal Arts College: How it has been Taught and How it Should be Taught." It carries on a discussion begun in the symposium on "Art in the Post-War World," in the Journal of Aesthetics, vol. III, no. 9–10.

MYRON SCHAEFFER is now South American representative of the Arthur Judson Concert Bureau.

## THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR AESTHETICS: ANNUAL MEETING

The *Second Annual Meeting* of the Society was held at Hunter College, New York, on November 23rd and 24th, 1945. The program was as follows:

*Friday afternoon, November 23: General Theory. (C. J. Ducasse presiding)*

Major Hazards in Defining Art—*Carl Thurston*, Pasadena, Calif.

An Emotionalist Critique of Artistic Truth—*Lucius Garvin*, Oberlin College.

A Report of a Dynamic Criterion of Beauty—*Bob Rainey*, Canton, O.

The Problem of Plato's "Ion"—*Craig LaDrière*, Catholic University of America.

The Function of Aesthetics in Hegel's Philosophy—*Gustav E. Mueller, University of* Oklahoma.

*Saturday morning, November 24: Art, Science, and Communication. (Katharine Gilbert presiding)*

The Function of Art and Fine Art in Communication—*Milton C. Nahm*, Bryn Mawr College.

Psychoanalytic Comments on the Problem of Art and Communication—*Ernst Kris*, New School for Social Research.

A Balance between Aesthetic Theory and Practice—*Ralph Pearson*, Nyack, N. Y.

The Science of Art—*R. M. Ogden*, Cornell University.

Art and Science Inseparable—*Van Meter Ames*, University of Cincinnati.

*Saturday afternoon: The Arts. (Max Schoen presiding)*

The Problem of Defining and Classifying the Arts—*Thomas Munro*, Cleveland Museum of Art.

The Relation between Baroque Art and Baroque Musical Forms—*William Fleming*, Syracuse University.

Machines in Music—*Charles W. Hughes*, Hunter College.

Towards a Societal Critique of Painting—*Helmut Hungerland*, Piedmont, Calif.

A dinner and smoker were held on Friday evening at Hunter College, with C. J. Ducasse, President of the Society, presiding. The Board of Trustees held meetings on Friday and Saturday afternoons, reports of which will be communicated to members.

At the business session of the Society on November 24th at 2 p.m., the Secretary-Treasurer gave his financial report and also the financial report as managing editor of the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism. These reports were approved.

Dr. John Alford proposed that a committee be appointed to explore the possibilities of cooperation between the American Society for Aesthetics and the College Arts Association on matters of common interest, especially in regard to the preparation of college teachers of

art, the content of courses in art and aesthetics, and relations between them. It was moved and seconded that the President appoint a committee to investigate the possibilities of such a cooperation. Motion passed. Dr. Thomas Munro suggested that the College Arts Association may wish to hold a session on Aesthetics with members of the American Society for Aesthetics participating, and that the American Society for Aesthetics might hold a session on the visual arts with members of the College Arts Association. It was moved and seconded that this matter be investigated. Motion passed. The President later appointed Dr. Munro as chairman of the committee for such cooperation, and Dr. Munro appointed Drs. Alford and Stechow as additional members.

## TRUSTEES

Replacing GEORGE BOAS, STEPHEN C. PEPPER, and CARROLL C. PRATT, whose terms have expired, the following have been elected for three-year terms: GLEN HAYDON, Head, Department of Music, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N. C.; DOUGLAS MACAGY, Director, California School of Fine Arts, San Francisco, Calif., and ROSEMOND TUVE, Department of English, Connecticut College, New London, Conn.

## DIVISIONAL MEETINGS

*The Pacific Coast Division* of the A.S.A., San Francisco Bay Area Section, met for a conference on aesthetics on October 21st at the Dominican College, San Rafael, Calif. The speakers were: *Helmut Hungerland*, on "Contemporary Painting"; *Manuel Olguin*, on "Modern South American Novelists"; *Ralph Barton Perry, Jr.*, on "Contemporary Painting"; and *Sarah Wingate Taylor*, on "Modern Novelists of the United States." *A. W. Foshay, Douglas MacAgy*, and *Manuel Olguin* were the executive committee, and 110 persons attended.

*Cleveland* and *Oberlin* members of the A.S.A. met on November 17th at the home of *Prof. and Mrs. Arthur Shepherd*. A paper by Prof. *F. Karl Grossman*, on "Style in Music," was read with musical illustrations and discussed.

On recommendation of an organizing committee composed of Joseph Remenyi (Chairman), Otto Ege, Finley Foster, Thomas Munro and Arthur Shepherd, it was voted to organize a *Cleveland Society for Aesthetics*, and to take the following steps:

1. The original membership in the Cleveland Society for Aesthetics shall consist of all present members of the American Society for Aesthetics residing in Greater Cleveland and Oberlin. Additional members residing elsewhere may later be individually invited.
2. In order to limit the size to a number convenient for discussion, membership in the C.S.A. shall thereafter be by invitation only; that is, by vote of members in that organization at the time, on the recommendation of the Membership Committee. Membership in the A.S.A. will not automatically entitle one to membership in the C.S.A.
3. Admission to, and membership in, the C.S.A. is to be contingent on membership in the A.S.A., including payment of dues for the current year (at present four dollars per annum, including Journal subscription). Membership in the C.S.A. shall cease if and when membership in the A.S.A. lapses.
4. There shall be no additional dues for the C.S.A.
5. Officers shall be a Chairman and a Secretary, to be elected annually at the November or December meeting, to hold office for the succeeding calendar year.
6. The Chairman is to appoint an Executive Committee of five members. Within the Executive Committee he is to appoint two sub-committees, one on Membership and one on Program, to hold office during the calendar year. He is to be an ex-officio member of both sub-committees. The program sub-committee shall arrange for programs, places of meeting, and for host or hostess if any.
7. Membership in the C.S.A. shall be limited to fifty members.

8. Policy for meetings:
(a) Refreshments, if any, are to be simple and inexpensive.
(b) Some technical papers are to be presented, and are to be announced as such. Other papers of more general interest are also to be presented.
(c) Discussion is to be partly prepared in advance by the Program Committee, by asking certain members to lead it after the paper has been presented.

9. Each member may bring as guest husband or wife, who may participate in discussion but not vote. Permission to bring other guests must be secured in advance from the Chairman.

## CONTRIBUTORS

WARREN L. ALLEN is Chairman of the Division of Music at Stanford University, and author of *Philosophies of Music History.*

LAWRENCE K. FRANK, psychologist, is Director of the Caroline Zachry Institute of Human Development, 17 E. 96th St., New York 28, N. Y.

KATHARINE GILBERT is Chairman of the Department of Aesthetics, Art, and Music at Duke University, and Vice-President of the A.S.A.

HELMUT HUNGERLAND is review editor of the *Journal.*

BERTRAM E. JESSUP is Assistant Professor of English and Aesthetics at the University of Oregon.

GEORGE KIMMELMAN, of Philadelphia, wrote "Max Eastman and the Aesthetic Response," in the *Journal* for Fall, 1943.

HELMUT KUHN is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina.

HUGO LEICHTENTRITT is author of *Music, History, and Ideas.*

WILLIAM S. RUSK is Professor of Fine Arts at Wells College.

PAUL ZUCKER is Professor of Art at Cooper Union.