


Translation

No. 230.



THE RUSSIAN-JAPANESE WAR.

Translated from supplements of the Marine Rundschau,  
by Second Lieutenant H. Hossfeld, 30th Infantry, from December  
16, 1904 to December 28, 1904.

First Supplement.

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Introduction.

The political controversy which has just forced the two great powers of East Asia to take up arms against each other, first came into public notice about two years ago. At that time two great nations, both of them imbued with a manifest sense of power and a youthful strong aspiration for aggrandizement and increase of power, suddenly realized that they were rivals for the predominance in the coast regions lying between them, and to which neither of them as yet possessed a legitimate title. The coasts of Corea and North China are the natural outlet to the ocean for Russia's continental land masses, and for the island empire of Japan they are the door to the adjacent large continent which offers the most natural market for her products and a field for her surplus population.

The nations dwelling on these coasts are not themselves able to regulate or even protect commerce, they must be governed or tutored at least. Only the power that rules them can fully utilize that coast in regard to its economical interests.

During the war with China, 1894-5 Japan had demonstrated what value she placed upon the possession of this dominion. At the same time she had also proven that she had become a power, well capable to contend with even a European power

for this dominion and which, once established in the contended territory, could not be influenced by the same means as other Asiatic states.

Russia recognized her adversary here and became aware of the fact that she had to prevent it, in order not to be forever cut off from the ocean. Therefore, continually strengthening her military power in the far East, she first of all prevented Japan from getting a foothold in those coast districts by interfering in the treaty of peace between Japan and China, by leasing Port Arthur from China, by occupying Manchuria during the Chinese Boxer War and by trying to obtain important concessions in Korea.

Japan stood alone at the end of her Chinese war and her forces which had been victorious, but which were at the same time weakened through the war, were not sufficient to resume immediately the fight with the European enemy. To accomplish this she had to forge new arms first and to procure to her politics a secure foundation in the form of alliances and isolation of the enemy.

In this she seems to have succeeded, and thus she commenced the fight in order to recover from the enemy his acquisitions by means of the sword.

#### The mutual preparations.

During the last eight years both belligerents have been calculating on the possibility of a war, and have been increasing their military powers at the place of the anticipated theater of operations continually.

Japan settled upon a fixed plan. As she had to cross the water in order to reach the disputed lands, she first of all built a modern navy.

Six battle ships, six armored and six protected cruisers, with torpedo boats seemed to her to be a naval power which

Russia would never be able to establish at a station so far from her home country. It was this force on which the systematic construction of the navy was based, and was reached by means of great expense according to programme in 8 years.

Against assistance to the enemy by other naval powers Japan assured herself by an alliance with the most powerful one.

But Russia did not hesitate to outdo every addition to the Japanese navy by an increase of her naval power in East Asia. With this end in view it even sacrificed her former leading position in Europe, constructed still more ships, and during the recent years every ship as soon as it was finished and completed its trial trip, was sent out to East Asia.

If Russia (could) could always maintain the supremacy of the sea in this race, this would be the best protection against a Japanese attack, and under this protection she could obtain and carry out her intentions among the nations of the coast without great risk.

But this supremacy seems to have ceased, at least temporarily, at the moment when the Japanese programme was completed.

During the latter half of the past year up to the arrival of the "Retvisan", the same number of Russian ships was opposed to the six Japanese battleships in East Asia, because the completion of the newest Russian types was continually delayed contrary to expectation, whereby the Japanese ships under construction, as mentioned, were completed according to programme.

Thus at the time when the exchange of the diplomatic notes began, there existed an equilibrium as to the ships available in the theater of war, and it is not improbable that this state of affairs led to the political action of Japan.

This proportion was soon to change again during the following period:

In December 1903, the number of the Russian battleships was increased to seven by the arrival of the "Tsarvitch", by sending the "Oshyabuya", the number could be increased to eight, and in the course of the two following years Russia could count with the completion of five more battleships, which were already in a more or less advanced state of construction.

However the fact that Russia had succeeded to reenforce her East Asiatic station far ahead of what Japan had provided for in her first programme, caused the latter in the meantime to adopt at the end of 1902 an additional naval programme, according to which three more battleships, three armored cruisers, and the corresponding accessories were to be constructed.

The difficulties which the financing of this plan created (a dissolution of the Imperial Diet, and the rejection of other important legislation being unavoidable) have at last led to the conviction that a continuation of this race cannot be economically continued any longer by the smaller and poorer country, and this recognition has probably furthered the resolution, to use the present favorable condition of preparation on both sides for action.

After having once formed this resolution, everything was done to guarantee success to such extent, as was possible with the available means.

For this purpose the cruisers "Moreno" and "Rivadavia" (now "Nishin" and "Kassuga") which had just been completed at Genoa for Chile, were bought; two new battleships were ordered in England to be completed within 27 months, and according to rumor, negotiations are now pending in Chile for more purchases.

Although a part of these reinforcements can arrive in the theater of war only after the crisis, nevertheless they will form a reserve for the losses, without which the adversary would possess a considerable preponderance in the ships already under construction.

But in these days besides the ships, navy yards, docks, and coal are required in naval warfare. The dependence of modern fleets upon these things has become so essential, that a conduct of war of long duration is impossible without them. The Japanese have thoroughly understood this and have accordingly used the years of preparation for a careful extension of their navy yards, for the construction of ample docks, for the uplifting of the iron and coal industries, and for the improvement of their interior lines of communication by means of railroads; the government plants of repair and equipage have been protected by modern fortifications.

But Russia has also worked in this direction by enlarging the fortifications of Vladivostock and Port Arthur, and by creating the extended connection with the home country on land, which in case of emergency may also be considered an excellent line of communication for the naval war in supplementing the waterway.

In this field of preparation the difficulties were considerably greater for Russia, because the works she constructed, could find no support from existing industries or in those that were to be created, but she had to import all plants and armament from the far distant home land.

Russia had therefore apparently behind her enemy as regards measures for the maintenance of the navy during the war.

This fact may be of great influence regarding the conduct of the naval war, as, on the one hand, the nation which is short of opportunities for repairing and equipping, will easily, in order to save her ships, incline toward the defensive and passiveness, while, on the other hand, the nation which is first ready with her repairs after a naval battle, holds supremacy at sea for a time at least.

This will be of great importance in the present war as the conditions require the aggressor to start the war on land across the sea.

The Japanese army has been increased upon a fixed plan since the Chinese War. In that war the field army consisted of seven, whereas it has now thirteen divisions. At that time its force was estimated at about 70,000 men; now it consists of about 190,000 combatants.

How many of these, and whether or not parts of the home army will be available on the Asiatic continent, will depend upon the degree to which the Japanese can secure the sea to themselves.

It is known that the Russians have not missed any opportunity to increase their military force in the far East. The first great additional force was sent to Vladivostock by sea during the negotiations for peace between China and Japan in 1895, and later at the death of the Empress of Korea in 1896. The Chinese Boxer War gave occasion for sending especially large masses by way of the Siberian railroad.

It may be assumed that all these reenforcements have remained in the far East.

From the concentrations of troops which took place at the end of the past year on the Yalu, the Korean boundary river, it may well be said that still more troops did arrive.

The outsider will hardly be able to ascertain in detail how many more troops the Siberian railroad has conveyed into the theater of operations and of what strength the entire Russian force consists at present. It will be safe however, to assume that the Russians on land dispose of a considerable numerical superiority.

Such a superiority is certainly needed for the mere defense of the extensive territory occupied, especially as the loyalty of the inhabitants cannot be depended upon.

The formation of a third Siberian Army Corps, ordered only recently, but which may have been prepared a long time ago, indicates the assumption that an excess in strength for an offensive movement on land was not reached as yet, and that the forwarding of troops is still in full swing.

Of the best concentrations proper of both sides only very little has yet been made known. Since September of last year Japan has continually increased her navy until at the end of December, it contained all the modern vessels. Thereafter most of the time the navy was practicing off Sasebo. During December many steamers were fitted up as transports in different ports. The coal yards were filled up to their limit capacity by importing coal from outside, and lastly, two days before breaking off the diplomatic relations, all reports about forces available were stopped at the only two cable stations of the country, and afterwards only the mobilization of three divisions and their embarkation at Moji was made known.

During the winter the Russian navy was divided into two squadrons, the Gros, with its base at Port Arthur, continued to make trips, the purpose of which has not yet been revealed, whereas the armored cruisers spent the winter in Vladivostock.

The proportion of the forces.

In estimating the forces of which both belligerents could avail themselves at the beginning of the war, without entering into the particulars not yet sufficiently known, the following would be the result:

On the sea the material is about equal, Russia has one additional battleship at hand, the Japanese battleships average to be slightly stronger, and have the advantage of great homogeneity. As to armored cruisers and smaller craft, Japan is numerically superior.

In personnel the Japanese navy seems to have the advantage. Even before the first encounters newspaper reports hinted that there existed little confidence in the leaders within the Russian squadron. In addition to this a part of the Russian battleships were but a short time in commission. Any one who knows how important it is that the crew should be thoroughly conversant with all parts of the ship in order to handle it properly, will appreciate the importance of this disadvantage.

Japan can count with certainty on being reenforced by two well armed armored cruisers, i. e. those brought in Genoa. They had passed Singapore as early as the 6th of February. Russia's reenforcing squadron (1 battle ship, 1 armored cruiser, 2 protected cruisers and torpedo boats) is still so far away, that the fact of its dispatch alone becomes an operation of the war.

By the possession of ample, protected coal supplies and sufficient dry docks, the Japanese navy is enabled to execute free movements and to start boldly, whereas the Russian navy is forced, in a certain way, because of a lack of these things, to set a high value on the preservation of her ships and is limited in the mobility.



In spite of equal forces these advantages could mean for the Japanese navy the excess of power, which is necessary for carrying on the offensive.

A comparison of the mutual land forces would be too premature, because Russia is still able to reenforce at liberty, and Japan can hardly know at this time, how many troops she can send across the sea.

#### The general situation of the War.

The political aims force Japan to the offensive. Russia, for the most part in possession of the contended regions, can await the enemy. There is only one way for Japan to reach her aspirations in this war. She must obtain supremacy at sea and conquer the territory which she desires to take from the enemy, by an army sent across the controlled sea. Then it is of importance for the fate of the offensive army transferred; that its own navy keeps the reinforcements and means of communication across the sea under her protection and control.

There are two possibilities for Russia. Either she gains the supremacy of the sea from the start, and thus deprives the enemy of the base for his offensive war, or she tries while avoiding a battle, to prevent the enemy from using the sea for his transports and shipment of supplies, and to destroy the field army, thus weakened, with her troops on land.

According to events thus far, Russia has not felt strong for a contest for the supremacy at sea, and has therefore chosen the second way. Whether this was correct or not the future will show. But the situation thus created puts the Japanese navy to the task of defending the naval roads against molestation by the hostile naval forces, which avoid a decision in battle.

THE APPORTIONMENT OF THE NAVAL FORCES.

From the events to date we derive the following for the apportionment of the mutual naval forces at the moment of the beginning of the war:

A. THE JAPANESE NAVY.

<u>First Squadron.</u>	<u>Squadron of Convoys:</u>	<u>Convoys.</u>
(Vice Admiral Togo.)	for transports to	for transports to
Battleships:	Chamulpo.	Masampo.
Asahi,	"Takachiho"	Heigen,
Mikasa,	and a great number	Seigen, and
Shikishima,	of cruisers, probab-	probably others.
Hatsutse,	ly the other ones,	
Yashima,	as: Nanima,	
Fuji.	Chiyoda,	
	Okitsukima, and	
First Cruiser Division:	eventually the	
Issume,	Mutsujima-Class,	
Asama,	a number of coast	
Tokiwa,	torpedo boats.	
Swats,		
Yakumo,		
Tzuma.		
Second Cruiser Division:		
Chitose,		
Takasago,		
Kasagi,		
Yoshino.		
Three or four Divisions		
of large torpedo boats.		

In principle the Japanese have thus united all the modern ships in a battle squadron, evidently for the purpose of destroying the Russian gros or of keeping it in check; while the transports are protected by squadrons of older types as convoys in such numbers that detached Russian cruisers cannot get at them.

Furthermore it is to be assumed that observation from Vladivostock has been established.

B. THE RUSSIAN NAVY.

<u>Main Squadron (in Port Arthur)</u>	:	<u>Squadron of Cruisers (in Vladivostock)</u>
(Vice Admiral Stark).	:	Rossia,
Battle ships:	:	Rurik,
Patropavlovsk,	:	Gromovse,
Polkava,	:	Bogatyr,
Sevastopol,	:	Two transports.
Peresvvet,	:	
Pobieda,	:	<u>Re-enforcing Squadron (in Red Sea).</u>
Retvizan,	:	Oslyabya,
Tsarevitch.	:	Dmitri Donskoi,
	:	Aurora,
Cruiser Division:	:	Almas,
Bayan,	:	four torpedo boats.
Diana,	:	
Pallada,	:	
Askold,	:	
Novik,	:	
Boyarin,	:	
Varyag.	:	
Two divisions of large torpedo	:	
boats.	:	

Besides these were a number of older protected cruisers and gun boats either in the harbors or detached. Finally a large number of torpedo boats in Port Arthur and Vladivostock.

THE EVENTS.a. The first shot.

According to the Japanese version the first shot had been fired on the 8th of February from the Russian protected cruiser "Koryez". The "Koryez", putting out from the harbor of Chemulpo, met the convoy squadron of the transports bound for this harbor, and is said to have opened fire upon the torpedo boats belonging to this squadron.

If this proves to be the truth, one may take it for granted that the torpedo boats came as close to the "Koryez" that she had to fire upon them for her own safety. The torpedo boats also fired their torpedoes, but had no effect.

According to the general condition of matters and the apprehension which the Russians showed at the later events, they could hardly have had an interest to hasten the outbreak of hostilities.

And the Japanese night attack upon Port Arthur surely had no connection with this encounter.

b. Engagements of the two main squadrons.

At the rupture of the diplomatic relations the Russian squadron was in Port Arthur, but apparently ships were detached to different nearby harbors. For what purpose they were detached is to the present no clear, perhaps they were merely used as posts of observation, which were to report or prevent possible disembarkations of the Japanese troops before the declaration of war. One of these detachments, the one at Chemulpo, was not withdrawn quickly enough and consequently has fallen in the hands of the Japanese.

On account of the growing tension the ships belonging to the main force had been sent from the inner harbor to the roadstead. Considering the narrowness of the channel of Port Arthur, which only permits the larger vessels to go out singly, this measure was absolutely correct.

But the roadstead, being entirely open toward the sea, affords no protection whatsoever from torpedo boats. Obstacles cannot be established and an advanced girdle of cruisers requires an excessive number of ships.

In addition to this the well known moorings facilitated to the Japanese the discovery of their targets considerably.

Nowhere could the Russian main squadron offer a better opportunity to the hostile torpedo boats than by remaining in the roadstead of Port Arthur over night.

What reason it had to remain here in spite of this and not to go out on the open sea at least during the night, can only be explained later on.

At any rate the Japanese took advantage of it.

During the night of the 8th and 9th of February, the torpedo boats of the first Japanese squadron, followed by the latter, - which probably intended only to increase the panic by firing between- attacked the Russian ships, being moored on the roadstead of Port Arthur, and hit the armored cruiser "Pallada" amidship, the battleship "Tsarevitch" in the stern, and the battle ship "Retvisan" in the bow, with their torpedoes.

They are said to have deceived the cruiser "Pallada" on outpost duty by using Russian signals, and to have established in advance all moorings by espionage; this is a ruse de guerre well known to every commander of a torpedo boat, but not always used successfully against every antagonist, but may occasionally prove to be effective.

The Russians are said to have put out nets. Perhaps they relied too much upon these; that they were surprised by the attack cannot very well be doubted.

After the first targets were fired, apparently against the cruiser "Pallada", a sharp firing was opened, and it may be assumed that a number of the attacking boats were damaged by it. Reports about this will come out only by degrees.

The damages sustained by the ships must have been of a more trifling nature than is usually expected from a torpedo shot, as all three ships were able to enter the harbor under their own steam.

At any rate this bold attack has very much enhanced the chances of victory for the Japanese in an eventual battle for the supremacy of the sea.

On the following day the Japanese proved that by the attack of the torpedo boats they only desired to prepare for a battle with the main force of the enemy. At sunrise of the 10th day of February the light cruiser division of the Japanese squadron could be seen in front of Port Arthur; it watched

the harbor in a semi-circular formation, ready to notify its own squadron, should the hostile main squadron put to sea.

They evidently tried to chase these scouts away with the seacoast artillery, but as this was unsuccessful the Russian ships, that were still intact, weighed anchor and drove them off. The Japanese cruisers retired to their main squadron. Before these forces the Russians apparently withdrew under the guns of their fortress. The Japanese followed with all their ships and opened a sharp fire at 5000 m. to which the Russian ships and coast fortifications responded.

The aim of the Japanese was evidently the Russian squadron. But they did not approach it for a decisive battle at close range, because they did not desire to have the fire ~~desire~~ of the shore batteries thrown in during a decisive battle.

However the firing on both sides must have been very heavy, from the reported Russian damages and losses, although it lasted only about a half hour considering the rather long range. The Japanese have certainly had losses also, although up to the present only general hints have reached the public.

The attacking squadron ceased firing about noon and withdrew out of sight in a southeastern direction.

From the Russian side nobody seems to have followed the withdrawing enemy, although it is of vital importance for the defender at sea, to remain constantly in touch with the attacking forces, if he does not wish to be continually surprised.

During the 10th of February Port Arthur did not see any enemy. Probably the Japanese used the day to repair their ships, to disembark the wounded and to save the ships that were seriously damaged.

The Russians evidently withdrew most of their ships into the inner harbor and began to repair the damaged ones.

Either with the right spirit that the attack was to be continued incessantly until the annihilation of the enemy, or perhaps on account of the report that the Russians had entered the inner harbor, the Japanese reappeared in front of the harbor on the 11th of February and, as their very object of their attack lay in the inner harbor, commenced to bombard it. As to the result nothing is yet known. But as it was demonstrated that the aggressors could throw their projectiles into the inner port from the sea, the many ships are in an unfavorable situation, because even their putting forth to sea could be made impossible, as in such an attempt, all the hostile ships would direct their fire on that ship which would just be in the channel.

The fact that these ships are limited to the inner harbor, leaves many guns useless for battle.

During the last few days reports regarding Japanese attempts to make a landing in rear of Port Arthur, have increased.

Everything indicates that the first Japanese squadron aims with great energy at annihilating the main force of the Russians in its own harbor, as it does not come forth for battle in the open sea.

If the Japanese have sufficient strength for it, this method is preferable to a blockade, as it attains its ends, the securing of the supremacy of the sea, more perfectly than the latter, which considering the modern war appliances, is also for the blockading force very dangerous.

#### The beginning of the war on land.

In order to carry on a war on land across the sea it is necessary to attain the supremacy of the sea. All actions necessary to accomplish this, need not always be undertaken in sequence as regards time.

According to events known so far, the Japanese began the fight for supremacy at sea and the war on land, which depends on the former, simultaneously, for at the same time, we hear of the first engagements of the two main forces in front of Port Arthur, we receive also reports of large disembarkations in Chemulpo and Masampo and rumors of landings at still other parts of Korea, which have not been verified so far.

We cannot doubt that a certain boldness is necessary, to build on a foundation which must first be created. And in case the Russian squadron, based on good information, should have outflanked the Japanese squadron on the sea and then fallen upon one of the transports, it could have easily destroyed same and its convoy and thereby have inflicted considerable loss to the Japanese on land and sea.

The situation for the Japanese would have been still worse if their squadron had been beaten by the Russians in a sea fight,--which possibility, considering the proportion of strength, could not entirely be disregarded,--and Russia had obtained dominion over the sea; then all chances of Japan for a successful continuation of the war would have been lost, and the armies that might have been landed, would not have escaped destruction.

But it may be assumed that the Japanese knew well for what purpose they risked such dangers,--perhaps the rapid occupation of Korea or the seizure of the Emperor of Korea constitutes an item for them of an importance which we will be able to recognize only later. Perhaps, also they were perfectly sure as to the intentions of the enemy to remain on the defensive. And finally it may be supposed that they escorted the transports which were in most danger, with the main squadron itself, apart from the squadron of convoys, or that



before sending the transports, the main squadron had gained such close touch with the hostile main squadron in such manner as to be able to force it to battle at the proper time, before it could approach any such transport.

Now the restraint of the hostile main squadron certainly affords no protection to a transport against single cruisers. As protection against these cruisers the Japanese escort their transports by special convey-squadrons, which seem to be formed of their older, but mostly still very serviceable cruisers.

On the 9th of February such a squadron encountered the Russian "Varyag" and "Koriets" in the harbor of Chemulpo, asked them to leave the harbor in order not to disturb the landing of the troops, and then destroyed them in an engagement that lasted four hours by their numerical superiority, as may be assumed. At the end of the engagement the Russian ships withdrew to the archipelago, where they were abandoned by their crews, because they were "hors de combat"; one is said to have been blown up by the commander, and the other to have fallen into the hands of the Japanese, presumably as a wreck.

According to reports so far received the transports are said to have landed 8000 men in Chemulpo, who are said to have marched immediately to Seoul, entrenched there and are said to have taken the Emperor of Korea into custody.

Chemulpo is situated most advantageously for the advance on Seoul, also it was the most dangerous place for landing in Korea on account of the vicinity of Port Arthur.

At Masampo, where troops have also been landed, the matter is the reverse. The travel across the sea was the least endangered, on account of the shortness of the route and the vicinity of the Japanese points of support, on the

other hand, the route across the country was the longest to the probable theater of the operations on land.

Whether the Japanese wished to keep open two doors, or to advance in two columns, whether they considered the one road as a means for the concentration of troops, or the other as a permanent road on which fresh troops and supplies were to be moved, further developments can only demonstrate. The longer they succeed to hold the Russian main squadron in Port Arthur, the safer will be the use of Chemulpo to them.

#### The war against commerce.

A number of reports regarding the seizure of Russian merchant ships by the Japanese proves, that the active aggressor has also employed the warlike measure of injuring the naval trade of his opponent.

The seizure of Russian steamers in this instance has a closer relation to the war proper than in other cases, because nearly the entire Russian shipping in these waters is for the purpose of supplying the Russian government depots. It is true, Russia has created a second road of supply by the construction of the Siberian railroad, this on account of the East Asiatic possessions; this road cannot be attacked from the sea. Whether or not this road will be able to carry the loads, otherwise shipped by sea, besides the troops, will have to be proven during this war.

According to reports thus far received, the following steamers are said to have been seized: during the occupation of Masampo the steamers "Manchuria" and "Shilka", in the strait of Korea the "Jekaterinoslaw" and "Argan" and four whalers. 2000 troops are said to have been captured by the Japanese during the seizure of these steamers.

A number of Russian ships which had been seized in Japanese ports during the beginning of the war, were released, after having been granted a delay until February 16th for putting to sea.

The Japanese government has declared the following articles as contraband, besides the articles generally recognized as such:- eatables, coal, and gold and silver coin, if they are on the way to those places where they could be used for war-purposes.

The by no means small number of prizes which the Japanese have taken in the immediate vicinity of their own waters show how much the Russian government in East Asia was surprised by the real outbreak of the war, otherwise it could have secured itself from these disagreeable losses by timely warnings.

During the period of tension, shortly before the rupture of diplomatic relations took place, Japan directed all important ships on all oceans to enter neutral harbors; consequently up to the present time no losses to the Japanese merchant shipping have been reported.

End.

Thus far the course of the war shows that Japan acts upon a bold, clearly considered and most carefully prepared plan. Forcéd by her political intentions to enter the territory of her opponent, she has secured to herself an advantage by use of surprise, in restraining the hostile squadron, at least for a time, in its harbor, and by transferring simultaneously troops to Korea, she has placed under her power a part of the territory for which the war was undertaken. To continue the war, she will have to destroy first the main squadron of the enemy, next she will have to clear the sea

of the remaining Russian naval forces. As long as the Russian main squadron remains intact, the danger as regards reverses on sea will continue to exist from this quarter. To a thorough guarding by a mere blockade the situation of Port Arthur opposes considerable difficulties, especially as long as the defender is still able to form on the roadstead.

Two things occur to us as regards the actions of the Russians: firstly that they allowed themselves to be surprised in spite of a tension, threatening for a long time, and secondly, that their main forces were apparently systematically separated. While the main squadron was in Port Arthur three armored cruisers with an admiral in command, were in Vladivostock.

We can hardly assume that considerations of the conditions of the harbor or of winter repairs only have led to the latter. It is more probable that strategical intentions exist. Perhaps it was the intention to have always one group at disposal, to operate against the lines of communication or the base of the hostile invading army, while the Japanese fleet was bound to remain in touch with the other group. This may be explained in the near future, for apparently the Russian cruiser squadron has left Vladivostock. Should the supposition as to its strategical task prove to be correct, the Russian leadership runs danger of the united Japanese fleet destroying the components of the Russian navy one by one. Whether or not this is correct under the particular circumstances of the case, only consequent events can demonstrate. In general the uniting of all forces for the purpose of annihilating the hostile main force is the more correct way for the attainment of the object of war.


Comment: "None".

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Translation

No. 230.



THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR,

translated from supplements of the Marine Rundschau, by  
Second Lieutenant H. Hoesfeld, 30th Infantry, from December  
29, 1904 to January 14, 1905.

Second Supplement.

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Both belligerents have taken elaborate measures to prevent the events from the theater of war from reaching the public. It is strictly prohibited in Japan, in pursuance to a manifesto, to publish any statement whatever regarding movements of troops or events connected therewith. Telegraphic messages are only permitted when sent in languages known to the postal authorities (Japanese, French and English) and the three cable stations, through which all communications with foreign countries have to pass, have been placed under military supervision. The movements of troops in the country itself are said to take place principally at night. The reports of the Japanese admirals are constantly given out with the following addition: "We sustained no losses".

On the other side viceroy Alexeyeff has shut down altogether for private business all telegraph lines leading through Manchuria. The cable from Port Arthur to Chefoo is of course under military control as long as it remains intact at all. As however, not considering the latter, all telegraphic communications from the theater of war to the outside world, will have to pass either through Manchuria or through Japan, it has happened, - on account of the intentions of both belligerents of permitting nothing to become known, - that the theater of war is actually cut off from the wires of the world.

Besides, Russia is at work to interpose the sending out of news in other directions. All strangers are removed from the regions threatened with attack, and a multitude of Japanese who apparently were sent there before the outbreak of the war for the purpose of supplying their country with news, is said to have been located.

Neither belligerent can very well be blamed for such procedure. For, every intelligence that reaches the public, facilitates the conduct of war for the opponent, whom it will reach as well as neutrals.

On the other side the spreading of disagreeable events may not only make difficult the leadership, but may even become an important factor for the outcome of the war, especially for the reason that both opponents are situated with their armies in a region where the population will always side with that party whose prestige is the greater.

For those however, who follow this war solely for the purpose of war-scientific study, the difficulty will result from these conditions that they can form an opinion only on the basis of meager rumors. Later on material and conclusions drawn therefrom will often have to undergo rectification.

All statement, made herein, can therefore never claim historical certainty, but must always be regarded as suppositions based on a combination of what has become known, also in places, where it is not expressed in the form of the narration on account of the more convenient way of writing.

As far as can be verified, the second bombardment of Port Arthur on February 11th, mentioned in the preceding supplement, has not been of such importance, as one was inclined to attach to it after the first reports.

If an attack has taken place at all, it can have been at best nothing but a harassing by a few cruisers, which are said to have attempted at sunrise on the 13th, to throw a few shells in the inner harbor, but were repulsed by the fire of the coast fortifications and by the dispatch of a division of ships.

The Japanese main squadron has for the present interrupted its operations against Port Arthur. The motives herefor may either be the damages sustained during the engagement of February 9, or the threatening of the transports by the Russian cruiser squadron.

The Japanese have established a line of outposts consisting of cruisers between Chemulpo and Shantung.

The Japanese main squadron has not been seen anywhere during the last days. This may lead to the conclusion that it returned to the Korean Strait, either for the purpose of protecting the transports still sailing between Shimonoseki and Masampo-Fusan against an incidental attack of the Russian cruiser squadron, or to repair its damages, or to take on board coal or perhaps ammunition.

It would then become the task of this cordon to report in time any attempt of the Russian main squadron to leave the Gulf of Pe-chi-li.

This main squadron has in the meantime made the necessary repairs on the damaged ships in Port Arthur.

Another attack by torpedo boats was made against Port Arthur during the night of the 13th and 14th of February, during which only two boats were able to approach singly, with a two hours' interval, the entrance of the harbor. The boats took advantage of a snow storm, as to make it as difficult as possible to be discovered. The commanders make the

assertion that each has observed at least one hit. Considering the weather referred to however, errors are easily committed in this respect. No damages have been reported from the Russian side thus far.

The Russians are said to have sailed out of Port Arthur on the 14th of February.

The Russian cruiser squadron had left Vladivostock as already mentioned in the last report. The ice conditions there have been exceptionally favorable this year, and have caused no difficulty to the exit of the vessels. They apparently have then crossed over to the Tsugaru-Strait, there they destroyed a Japanese steamer and were enveloped in a snow storm for three days. Whether or not this rumor from the Russian side coming, will prove to be correct or whether it was spread for the purpose of disturbing possible combinations regarding the whereabouts of this squadron, will only transpire later on. In any case it seems as if the Japanese have not found this squadron up to date.

It will be safe to attach for the present no credence to the rumors regarding the torpedo attacks from Aomori against this squadron, especially to the tremendous success, as is claimed. For it is well to assume that the Russians, conscious of the fact of being on a war cruise, have at present employed all measures of precaution against torpedo boats.

The following attempts of landing of the Japanese which are all said to have been unsuccessful, and partly even under considerable losses, have been reported:

On the 9th at Duff Bay at the narrowest place of the Liao-tung Peninsula; on the 10th at Pigeon Bay, on the south west point of Liao-tung; on the 11th at Junkan in the Talienswan Bay; on the 12th appearance of vessels on the roadstead of Tatungkan and of a multitude of lights on the roadstead of Ying-Kow (Newchwang).



If these reports do not originate from the excited phantasms of the inhabitants at all, nothing but a "coup de main" could have been contemplated.

To judge from the positions in the first three cases the rear of Port Arthur, especially the Eastern Railroad, must have been the object.

Ying-Kow (Newchwang) is the point of junction with the Eastern Chinese Railroad to Taku-Peking, Tatuncan is situation on the flank of the Russian Yalu position. As to the latter it can only have been an attempt to reconnoiter the ice conditions.

In the meantime the landing of troops at the main bases of the war on land, Chemulpo, Masampo, Fusan and Gensan is continued.

The Emperor of Korea has surrendered to the column from Chemulpo, the Russian embassy has left Seoul and has embarked on board the French cruiser "Pascal" with the remnants of the crews of the Varyag and Korietz.

From the disposition of the Japanese line of reconnaissance it may be assumed that no further troops will be sent to Chemulpo at present. If this proves to be correct, the column pushed so far ahead, across the sea, has had mainly the object of seizing the government of Korea and perhaps of forming a protection for the Fusan column which has to move on the longer road through a mountainous country.

On the Russian side the mobilization is still in progress, the 10th of February having been fixed as its first day.

Work on the armament of the fortifications is pushed hard. In the important towns at night all lights are extinguished, in order not to offer to the hostile ships any point of reference for the navigation at night.

Similar measures regarding lighthouses have been announced by the Japanese Government, this of course can only be construed as to be intended against the Russian squadron.

The bays that might be of advantage to the enemy are made inaccessible by mines. During the performance of this kind of work with the mine ship "Yenisser" on the 11th of February went down, in running against one of her own mines.

Map of the southern point of Liao-tung.

Port Arthur, the surrounding bays and the terminus of the  
Eastern Chinese Railroad

Soundings are given in fathoms.

1 fathom =1.8 m., 3 fathoms =5.5 m., 4 fathoms =7.3 m., 5 fathoms =9.1 m.

About the disposition in the field of the Russian Army of course can at present just as little clearness be obtained as about the intended form of the Japanese advance, as every thing is only in the preliminary stages.

Plan of the Engagement off Chemulpo.

Russian ships, Japanese ships.

Scale.

The hatched spaces represent marshes which become dry at low water. The ---- lines represent the limits of sand-banks and shallow water with less than 5 m. depth.

The headquarters of the Russian commander in chief ( -literally- war direction) have been transferred from Port Arthur to Harbin.

Doubtful symptoms are arising among the inhabitants in rear of the Russian positions. An attempt was made to deceitfully blow up the railroad bridge across the Sungari. Up to the present every disturbance of this Russian main line of

communication has been prevented, and this is certainly due to the numerous railroad guards.

Details of the engagement off Chemulpo.

From the reports thus far received the following may serve as a description of the engagement which took place off Chemulpo with the convoy squadron of the Japanese transports.

On the roadstead of Chemulpo side by side with different ships of neutral powers were at the rupture of the diplomatic relations the Russian protected cruiser "Varyag", the gunboat "Korietz" and the transport "Sungary". (The military features of these vessels will be found in the "table of naval strength of the belligerents).

It may be assumed that these ships had received no reports regarding the beginning of the state of war, as the rupture of the diplomatic relations was not considered as the beginning of the actual war by the Russian commander-in-chief. (                      -war direction). Towards evening of the 8th of February appeared in the outer harbor off Chemulpo the Japanese squadron under Admiral Urin, consisting of the armored cruisers "Chiyoda," "Mamiva", "Takachiho", the destroyer "Miyako", one gunboat and six torpedo boats. It was conveying transports. Apparently the "Korietz" has put to sea the same evening in order to investigate the matter, and the torpedo boats have approached her so closely as to compell her to return firing to the roadstead of Chemulpo. The Japanese squadron then dropped anchor at a point where the channel becomes wider, 8 miles from the town.

It was probably their intention to use for the landing of troops the marshes situated in front of the town of Chemulpo which on account of the very strong change of the seasons

becoming entirely dry at low tide and become then a good landing place. As it was obvious that the Russian ships would not have been idle onlookers during a landing there, it was necessary first of all to destroy them. Admiral Urier requested them therefore on the morning of the 9th to leave the harbor and if not that he would attack them in the harbor. Presumably this request was made only on account of the neutral vessels. These would have been imperiled during an attack on the roadstead, and that is the reason that the Japanese endeavored to avoid it.

In spite of the overwhelming numbers, the two Russian ships did not intend to throw up their cause from the beginning. It is possible that they were in hopes to fight their way to the fork of the various entrances to the harbor and then to escape, one ship by her superior speed, and the other possibly by using the Western Channel, which would have been sufficiently deep for herself, but too shallow for the large Japanese ships.

At any rate they weighed anchor towards noon and entered bravely into the unequal fight under the strains of the national hymn.

As soon as the Japanese perceived this move they weighed also anchor and opened a formidable fire upon the enemy at a distance of about two miles; they had left their anchorage with the same bearing as their enemy, and were gradually enveloping him. (See sketch.)

After a cannonade that lasted about half an hour the Russians must have come to the conclusion that it was impossible to pass; they consequently withdrew to the roadstead of Chemulpo. The Japanese ceased firing, presumably for the purpose of not endangering neutral vessels.

Being confronted by the impossible task of saving their ships, the Russian commanders decided, at least not to let them fall into the hands of the enemy in a serviceable condition. The crews were taken off during the afternoon and both ships and the Sungari were exploded. The crews took refuge on board the French and Italian ships. The French cruiser "Pascal" entered into negotiations with the commanding officer of the Japanese transports regarding the future of the crews.

The Japanese maintain that they have had no losses, the losses of the Russians are reported as to be one officer and forty men killed, 464 men wounded, rather high figures. Thirty-four Russians were taken into the field hospital, established by the Japanese in Chemulpo.

As to the naval artillery during the engagement, to the Japanese 4 heavy and 42 medium guns, 2 Russian heavy and 13 medium ones were opposed. One of the Japanese ships was a modern armored cruiser, whereas the Russian ships were only protected by armored decks. Apparently the Russians did not approach the enemy within torpedo range.

Additional reports of the engagement near Port Arthur.

Reports thus far received, including the latest report of Alexieff do not offer as yet a sufficiently clear picture of the tactical events regarding the torpedo boat attack and the engagement under the guns of Port Arthur. According to the observation of an eye-witness on board the steamer "Columbia", presumably not a professional one, the Japanese first of all directed their fire on the damaged vessels still lying anchored in the entrance. That there was slow firing on both sides is manifest from the rather long ranges. Apparently the Russian ships have sailed up and down the roadstead, the

cruisers seem to have made an attempt to advance on one side around the wing of the Japanese line, in order to fire on the torpedo boats or lighter vessels in rear. The "Novick" advanced with particular boldness and her commander was consequently decorated with the St. Georg's Cross by the viceroy. Reports about the damages sustained by Japanese ships, uncertain in many instances, and entirely denied by the Japanese, seem to confirm the damaging of one battle ship, destruction of a protected cruiser and of three large torpedo boats.

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MAP OF PORT ARTHUR.

From an English sea-chart. The forts are the former Chinese ones, on which the Russians presumably have based their works. Soundings are indicated in fathoms.

It is striking in the reports of Alexieff regarding the damages of the "Poltava", "Askold", "Diana" and "Novik", that the damages should be located under water, firstly because according to the experiences of the Chinese War and the Spanish American War hits below the water line are something infrequent, secondly, for the reason that these damages could have been repaired within three days. It may therefore be possible, that the report means to indicate that damages had occurred within the compartments below the water line, for instance either on account of hits coming from above through the armored deck, or on account of the effect of shell explosions.

The enclosed map gives the scene of these engagements, and it may be seen how the roadstead is entirely open towards the sea, and how it is void of every cover against a sudden night attack.

### TACTICAL CONCLUSIONS.

Without sufficient knowledge of the details of the engagements to date, it would be entirely too early to attempt at this time to draw tactical conclusions from the events of this war.

Two points however, are manifestly worthy of discussion that it cannot be omitted to refer to them at least.

In the first place may be mentioned that the success of the first torpedo boat attack might be regarded as proof by those who possess an antipathy against the large vessels, on account of their cost, that the large vessels are not needed for conducting a naval war, but that the much cheaper torpedo boats are sufficient.

It is known that in France this idea has prevailed for quite a while even in the navy; but it is also known that the defenders of this "jeune école" after devising the construction of a fleet according to their ideas, have finally come to the conclusion that extremely large ships would constitute the ideal material for a model fleet.

Notwithstanding the fact however that during the torpedo-boat attack from the 8th to the 9th of February, as already shown in the preceding supplement, manifestly favorable conditions existed for the torpedo boats, it must be reasoned that the question as to large or small vessels cannot very well be answered from the fact alone that one or the other has once been successful in war.

That there is a possibility for brilliant success also for the torpedo boat must of course be admitted, otherwise it would have no right of existence. But the large vessel and the torpedo boat have entirely different tasks and fields for employment, and they are needed in naval war in conjunction with each other.

Security of the sea by means of torpedo boats is observed, an attack against hostile coasts even more; the weather alone will definitely limit the employment of torpedo boats, whereas the large commercial liner and war vessel can still pursue their objects undisturbed.

The following reasoning should be considered:

If the Japanese had not possessed a main squadron of large vessels, the Russians would have had no urgent cause to remain at night outside of the easily protected inner harbor. But if they could have remained within the inner harbor, the torpedo boats would not have approached.

The Japanese were well aware that they could win the necessary advantages for the torpedo boats only by means of the main force of large vessels, and consequently had their main force in reach for the attack. It is furthermore shown by their attitude later on, that they considered the torpedo boat attack, even after it had proved successful, only as a preparation for the main battle, the fight of the large vessels.

The other striking point is the quickness with which the protected cruiser Varyag was put out of action. It is true the superiority of the opponent in artillery was considerable, but that a so-called "large cruiser" can be shot entirely to pieces during a fire lasting half an hour/ (see the large figures of losses) can only be explained by the fact that on account of speed and savings of displacement no armor was provided for the ship. It appears that against modern heavy artillery the power of resistance of a vessel protected by an armored deck only, is insufficient.



## THE ATTITUDE OF THE NEUTRALS.

A war between great powers affects always more or less the interests of neutrals, a naval war more than the mere war on land, as the theater of the former during time of peace constitutes the general route of commerce and the route to the possessions of all nations, and as two of these nations, the two belligerents, have undertaken to exercise certain rights within a section of this general route-(i. e. right of search, extinguishing of coast lights, blockading of harbors by mines, and interruption of commerce by blockade-). Therefore nearly all powers must assume a certain position with reference to every naval war and their position will always influence the same; often history has sufficiently demonstrated that in instances the attitude of the neutral powers can decide, disregarding the success of arms.

In dispensing therefore for an instance with the real object of this essay, which is to follow up not the political, but only the war scientific features of the East Asiatic war, it is necessary to summarize the facts regarding the political positions of the neutrals. Most powers have only one interest in connection with this war, i. e. that the war remains confined to the two belligerents and to the scene situated in the immediate vicinity of the object of the war, Korea and Manchuria. As the opponents are separated by the sea, the molestation of navigation and commerce, on the seas approaching the other objects of war, i. e. the Yellow and Japanese seas, cannot be avoided. A further spreading is not desirable on account of the considerable disturbance of commerce caused by it, which in turn is the principal factor in the general economy.

The United States of America has given official expression to this desire, the justice of which was acknowledged by all powers.

However for a coalition for the eventual enforcement of the localizing of the war, England and Austria were not available. England has explained its declining that it cannot overlook the consequences of such a proceeding, Austria stated that it had no interests in East Asia.

Furthermore all European powers, the United States and Egypt have announced their neutrality, either by a declaration directed to one of the belligerents or by means of orders issued in their countries, in which the subjects or citizens were admonished to observe the duties of neutrality.

Although it appears as if both belligerents would have to fight the quarrel out among themselves, it must be mentioned however, that several powers have recognized causes which compelled them to take special measures on account of this war. England has allowed it to be known that it could not afford to sanction a complete subjection of Japan in view of its alliance with this nation. The treaty of alliance, as is known, remains operative until the end of 1906 and places the obligation on England, to come to the aid of ~~xxx~~ Japan with its forces, as soon as any other power participates in the war against Japan.

The existence of this treaty explains why England made several preparations for war at the first moment. (Orders to officers on half pay and offers of the reserve, to hold themselves in readiness.)

France, which on account of the dual alliance with Russia stands more closely related to it, has announced through its statesmen that it could not be forced in any way into the war, as it is under no obligation to aid Russia, even in the case of Japan finding active allies. Besides this it is said that all French war vessels at the East Asiatic station have been concentrated in the French harbors of the Indian colonies.

Shortly after the opening of the war the Netherlands and Denmark concluded a treaty of arbitration, a token of political approachment, which has recently come into custom. Holland, in addition has emphasized that it feels itself compelled to secure its neutrality in Dutch India as well as at home, by the vigilance of its navy.

Denmark has undertaken in part a mobilization and occupation of its coast defenses for the protection of its neutrality.

China has announced its neutrality upon suggestion of Japan, but is concentrating considerable masses of troops on the Manchurian frontier "for the purpose of securing its neutrality."

To enter closer upon the possibilities which might arise from these measures in the future, is not the object of this work. It suffices to know the facts in order to follow the events of the war.

Disregarding entirely an active participation, it is possible that those neutrals who have possessions in the vicinity of the theater of war or on the naval route, which may be used for reenforcing, may become immediate factors with regard to the naval war. These are England as possessor of Wei-hei-wei and of most coaling stations between Rotem and the Yellow sea, the United States as possessor of the Philippines, France of Indo-China, Germany of Tsingtan, Holland on account of its Indian Islands, and finally Denmark and Egypt as possessors of the passage from the Baltic and of the Suez Canal, respectively.

It has to be seen how the different powers wish to apply the pliable duties of neutrality regarding permission of passage, equipment and remaining of the belligerents in their harbors.

Thus far only Egypt has had an opportunity to demonstrate its position in this direction, in permitting the belligerents to take on coal to last to the next coaling station, to remain in the harbor up to 24 hours, and to pass through the Suez Canal without delay.

M.

LIST OF THE NAVAL FORCES OF THE BELLIGERENTS.

Remarks: The oldest vessels or less effective ones of each class are marked by black frames and are enumerated separately.  
Under "Armament" Roman figures designate the number, the Arabic ones designate the caliber of the guns. T = Torpedo tubes.

A. AT THE THEATER OF WAR.

RUSSIA							JAPAN						
No.	Name and date of launching	Displacement in tons.	Armament	Draught in meters	Coal capacity in tons.	Speed in knots	No.	Name & date of launching	Displacement in tons	Armament	Draught in meters	Coal capacity in tons.	Speed in knots
1.	Petropawlowsk, 1894	11400	IV 30.5, XII 15, XXXVIII 4-5, 6T.	7.9	1000	16.5	1	Fuso 1877/98	3800	IV 24, 11 15, IV 12, XV 4-5, 3T	5.5	350	13
2	Poltawa, 1894	11000	IV 30.5, VII 15, XL 4-5, 6T	7.9	1000	16	2	Chin Yen, 1882-95	7300	IV 30.5, IV 15, X 4-5, 3T	6.1	1000	14
3	Sevastopol, 1895	11800	IV 30.5, XII 15, XL 4-5, 6T	7.9	1000	16	1	Fuji, 1896	12600	each IV 30.5, X 15, XXIV 4-5	8.1	1200	18
4	Pressvuyet, 1898	12700	IV 25, XI 15, XX 8, XXVIII 4-5, 5T	7.9	1200	18.5	2	Yasakima, 1896	12500	5T	8.0	-	18.5
5	Pobieda, 1900	12700	IV 25, XI 15, XX 8, XXIX 4-5, 5T	7.9	1200	18.5	3	Shikishima, 1898	15100	IV 30.5, XIV 15, XX8, XII 4-5, 4T	8.3	1400	18.
6	Retvisan, 1900	12900	IV 30.5, XII 15, XX8, XXXII 4-5, 6T	8.3	2500	18	4	Hatause, 1897	15200	each IV 30.5, XIV 15, XX8, XII 4-5, 4 T.	8.2	-	19
7	Tsarevitch, 1901	13200	IV 30.5, XII 15, XX8, XX 4-5, 6-T	7.9	1500	18.5	5	Asaki, 1899	15400		8.3	-	18
							6	Mikasa, 1900	15400		8.3	-	18.5

ARMORED CRUISERS							ARMORED CRUISERS							
1.	Varyag, 1899 ) Diana, 1899 ) Pallada, 1899 ) Askold, 1900 ) Bogatya, 1901 )	6500 6700 6800 5900 6600	XII 15, XIII 8, X 4-5, 5-T VIII 15, XXIV 8, VIII 4, 3T VIII 15, XXIV 8, VIII 4, 3 T. XIII 5, XII 8, X 4-5, 6 T XIII 5, XII 8, VIII 4-5, 4 T	5.9 6.4 6.4 6.2 6.1	1300 1400 1400 1100 1500	23 19 19 23.5 24		1	Itsukushima, 1889 } Matsukima, 1890 } Nashidate, 1891 }	4300 each	each I 32, XII 12, VI 8, VI 5, 4 T.	6.1 6.1 6.1	680 680 680	16 16 16
1	Rurik, 1892	11700	IV 20, IV 20, XVI 15, VI 12, XII 4-5, 6 T.	8.3	2800	18.5	1	Asama, 1898 } Tokiwa, 1898 }	9900 each	each IV 20, XIV 15, XII 8, VII 5, 5T	7.4 7.4	1200 1200	21.5 21.5	
2	Rossia, 1896	13700	IV 20, XVI 15, XXII 8, XXXVI 4-5, 5T	8.6	2300	19.5	2	Iakumo, 1899 } Issumo, 1899 }	9800 9900 each	IV 20, XII 15, XII 8, VII 5, 5T each IV 20, XIV 15, XII 8, VII 5, 4T	7.2 7.4	1200 1200	20 20.5	
3	Gromovoi, 1899	13800	IV 20, XVI 15, XX8, XXXVIII 4-5, 4 T	7.9	2300	20	3	Iwate, 1899 } Asuma, 1899 }	9500 7700 each	IV 20, XII 15, XII 8, VII 5, 5T IV 20, XIV 15, X8, VI 5, 4 T	7.2 7.3	1200 1100	20 20.5	
4	Bayan, 1900	7700	II 20, VIII 15, X8, VII 5, 5T	6.7	1100	22	4	Niskin, 1903 } Kassuga, 1903 }	7700 each	I 25, IV 20, XIV 15, X8, VI 5, 4T	7.3	1100	20	

PROTECTED CRUISERS							PROTECTED CRUISERS.						
1	Novik, 1900	3100	VI 12, VIII 4-5, 5 T	5.0	600	25	1.	Isumi, 1883	3200	I 25, VI 15, VI 5, 3 T	5.6	400	17
2	Boyarin, 1901.	3300	VI 12, VII 4, 5 T	4.8	600	22.5	2.	Waniwa, 1885	3700	VII 15, VI 5, 4 T	5.7	800	18
							3.	Takachiho, 1885	3700	XI 5, VI 5, 4 T	5.7	800	13
							4.	Tehiyoda, 1900	2400	X 12, XV 5, 3 T	4.3	400	19
							5.	Akitoukima, 1892	3200	IV 15, VI 12, X 5, 4 T	5.3	550	19
							1	Yoshino, 1892	4200	IV 15, VII 12, XXII 5, 5 T	5.2	1000	22.5
							2	Suma, 1895	2700	II 15, VI 12, XII 8, 2 T	4.6	800	20.
							3	Kasagi, 1898	5000		5.4	1000	22.5
							4	Chitase, 1898,	4800	each II 20, XIV, XII 8, VI 5, 4T	5.4	1000	20
							5	Takasago, 1897	4200		5.2	1000	22.3
							6	Akashi, 1897	2800	II 15, VI 12, XII 5, 2 T	4.8	600	19.5
							7	Nilaka, 1903			5.0	600	20
							8	Tsushima, 1903	3400	each VI 15, X 8, IV 4	5.0	600	20
							9	(Otawa), 1903	3000	II 15, VI 12, VI 8.	4.8	875	21

DESTROYERS.						
1.	Yayoyama, 1889	1600	III 12, VIII 5, 2 T	4.1	350	20
2.	Hiyako, 1897	1800	II 12, X5, 2 T	4.0	400	20
3	Chikaya, 1900	1800	II 12, X8, 5 T	3.0	250	21.5

TORPEDO BOATS.

RUSSIA

JAPAN.

(Y, Yarrow type, Th, Thornycroft, J. Japanese construction, S Schichan type, N. Normand type, F. other French types.)

No	Names and date of launching.	Displacement in tons.	Armament	Draught in meters	Coal capacity in tons	Speed in knots.	Number	Names and date of launching.	Displacement in tons	Draught in meters	Armament.	Draught in meters	Coal capacity in tons	Speed in knots.
1	Vesadnick.....	410	Torpedo-Gunboats. IX 4-5, 2 T .....	3.0	-	20		Toyohashi, 1888   1897 .....	4100		Torpedo Depot Vessel II 12, IV 5 .....	5.1	860	12.5
2	Caidameck .....	435	IX 4-5 2 T .....	3.0	-	20		Tatsuta, 1894 Torpedo Destroyer.	900		II 12, IV 5, 5T. ....	3	150	21
	Large Torpedo Boats		Small. Torpedo boats.					Large Torpedo Boats			Small Torpedo Boats			Coast Torpedo Boats
	Armament: 2T, 1-II 8, III-V 5		I-6 No. 201-206) Different types (75-140 tons)					Harbor Torpedo Boats.			(That may be employed on the high seas). Armament: II-III T 35, I-III 4-5			(Armament: 2-3T 35, I-II 4-5 Prior to 1895: 25 NS.Y. 50 Tons 7 Knots.
1	Lieut. Buirakoff ) 250 tons			7	Y. 23 tons,	12 knots (No. 91	1	Akebono ) Y			1. Fukuya S 20 knots.			20 S. 80 tons, 20 knot
2	Gendor ( 30 knots						3	Ikazuma ( 311 tons			2. Kotaka Y 19 "			10 I 50 " 20 "
3	Reichitsui 2 T VI-5		17-20 knots.) tons				4	Snazuma ) 31 knots.			3. Shiratako S 7			15 Y&I. 110 tons 24 knots.
4	Rayschehi						4	Sazanami (			1. Hayabusa ) N			
5	Rastoropni						5	Oboro (			2. Kasagi ( 152 tons			
6	Ssilni 220 tons		7-10. No. 208-211 (120 tons (25 knots				6	Murakumo ) Th.			3. Honezum ( 29 knots			
7	Sreditii 27 knots						7	Shinonome ) 279 tons			4. Chidsii (			
8	Smyelii						8	Shiranuhi ( 30 knots			5. Astoka ( I			
9	Skoroehessi )						9	Yugiri (			6. Hato ) 152 tons			
10	Storogulehi (						10	Kagero (			7. Hilari ( 29 knots			
11	Skorki ) 220 tons						11	Usugumo (			8. Kori (			
12	Strashmii ( 27 knots						12	Shirakumo )			9. Kiji (			
13	Stroinii )						13	Asashivo ( Th. Y			10. Tsubans (			
14	Statnii (						14	Akatsuki ) 381 tons			11. Kamone ( 1			
15	Boyevoi )						15	Kasumi ( 31 knots			12. Sagi ( 152 tons			
16	Bditshui (						16	Harusame )			13. Uzma ( 29 knots			
17	Bespechtadni						17	Hayatorii ( I			14. Hashitaka (			
18	Bestrochuii } 350 tons						18	Asagiri ( 361 tons			15. Okori (			
19	Beschumuii } 27 knots.						19	Murasame ) 29 knots						
20	Boicki													
21	Burmii )													
22	Unimatelnii )													
23	Ulastnii (													
24	Vrosevei ) 310 tons													
25	Vnuchitaluii ( 26 knots													
26	Vynostovii )													

From the period after 1895.

SPECIAL SHIPS.  
(Vessels with asterisk have armor protection to some extent).

RUSSIA

JAPAN.

No.	Names and date of launching.	Displacement in tons	Armament	Draught in meters	Coal capacity in tons.	Speed in knots	No.	Names and date of launching	Displacement in tons.	Armament	Draught in meters	Coal capacity in tons.	Speed in knots.
Gun Boats							Gun Boats.						
1	Dehigit, 1873	1300	II 15, IV 10, X 4-5	4.9	-	10	1.	Sokol, 1866	600	)	3	-	7.5
2	Beabsinik, 1878	1300	II 15, IV 10, X 4-5, 2 T	4.3	300	13	2	Chinhoku, 1879	)	)	3	-	8
3	Sabyaka, 1878	1300	IV 10, XII 4-5, 2T	4.3	315	14	3	Chinnan, 1879	)	)	3	-	8
4	Koroyez, 1886	1300	II 20, I 15, IV 10, VI 4-5, IT	3.2	200	13	4	Chinsei, 1879	)	) Several light Rapid	3	-	8
5	Manobur, 1886	1400	II 20, I 15, IV 10, VI 4-5, IT	3.2	200	13	5	Chinto, 1879	)450	)fire & automatic guns	3	60	8
6	Sivutsh, 1884	1100	I 23, VI 15, VI 10, V 4	2.8	250	10.5	6	(Chimpan, 1881	)	)	3	-	8
7	Bobr, 1885	1200	I 23, VI 15, VI 10, V 4	2.8	250	11	7	(Chinhu, 1881	)	)	3	-	8
8							8	Amagi, 1877	900	VI 12, IV 5	4.0	-	10
9	Gilyak, 1897	1300	I 12, V 8, IV 5	-	-	11.5	9	Iwaki (or Banyu) 1878	700	I 15, I 12, II 3	4.0	-	10
10							10	Tsukushi, 1881	1400	II 25, IV 12, 13, II 5	4.4	-	14
11							11	Akagi, 1886	600	IV 12, VI 5	3.0	-	10
12							12	Moys, 1886	600	II 15, IV 5	3.0	-	10
13							13	Chokai, 1887	600	I 21, I 12	3.0	-	10
14							14	Atago, 1887	600	I 21, I 12	3.0	-	10
15							15	Neiyen, 1887	2200	I 23, II 12, V 5	4.2	300	10
16							16	Oshima, 1891	600	IV 12, IV 5	3.0	140	13
17							17	River gun boat Uyi 1900					
Coast Defense Vessels.							Coast Defense Vessels.						
1	Grenyachi *, 1892	1700	I 23, I 15, IV 8, X 4-5, 2T	3.7	125	13	1.	Tsukuba, 1851 1871	2000	VIII 16, III 4	5.5	180	8
2	Otwashnie, 1892	1900	I 23, I 15, IV 8, X 4-5, 2 T	3.7	125	13	2.	Kaimon, 1877 1882	1400	II 17, VI 12, I 8	5.0	190	12
							3.	Tenriu, 1878 1883	1500	I 17, I 15, IV 12, I 8	3.2	200	12
							4.	Kongo *, 1877.	2300	III 17, VI 15, II 8, II 5, 2T	5.3	350	13
							5.	Niyel *, 1877.	400				13
							6.	Saiyen *, 1883	2500	II 21, I 15, I 8, VI 5, 24T	4.7	240	15
							7.	Katanagi, 1885	)				12
							8.	Janato, 1885	)1500	II 17, V 12, I 8, IV 4-5	4.6	114	12
							9.	Musashi, 1885	)				12
							10.	Takao, 1888	1800	IV 15, I 12, 13, IV 4-5, 2 T	4.0	270	15

Supply and Auxiliary Vessels

Nine ships: Janissei, 1899  
Amur, 1898  
Alent  
Kamchadal.

Squadron Transports: Tungas, Jernack, Jakut.  
Icebreakers: Nadeyda.

The nine transports of the Volunteer Fleet have been placed under the authority of the Secretary of the Navy, of these are at the theater of war: Voronesh, Jakaterinoshao, Kasan and perhaps others.

Auxiliary Cruisers

Lena, 1895, 10000 tons, 19.5 knots.  
Angora, 1898, 10,000 tons, 19.5 knots

Supply and Auxiliary Vessels.

Nine ships:  
Cable ships: Okinawa Maru, 2300 tons.  
Hospital ships: Nakuai Maru, 2500 tons.  
Kosai Maru, 2800 tons.  
Genkai Maru

Repair Ships:

Other 22 auxiliary ships: The government can dispose over 86 steamers of the subsidized lines.

Auxiliary Cruisers.

Three vessels of over 8000 tons, 17 knots

## B SHIPS EN ROUTE TO THE THEATER OF WAR.

JAPAN

RUSSIA  
Reinforcing squadron (towards end of January in Red Sea)

No.	Names and date of launching	Displacement in tons	Armament.	Draught in meters	Coal capacity in tons	Speed in knots.
1.	Osslyabya, 1898	12700	Battle ships. IV 25, XI 15, XX 8, XXVIII 4-5, 5 T	7-9	1200	18
1.	Dmitri Donski, 1888	6200	Armored Cruisers VI 15, X 12, XXVIII 4-5	7.8	900	16.5
2.	Amora, 1900 (only armored deck)	6700	VIII 15, XXIV 8, VIII 4, 3 T	6.4	1400	19.
1.	Almas, 1903	3300	Protected Cruiser IV 8, IV 5, 5T	4.9	550	19

## Torpedo Boats

High sea-boats  
 Buinii )  
 Bravi )  
 Blastyachchi ) 350 tons  
 Bystri ) 26.5 knots  
 Bleidavi ) 18. V 5  
 Besuprechni )  
 Bodrii )

Small Torpedo Boats.  
 No. 212 )  
 No. 213 )  
 No. 221 ) 150 tons  
 No. 222 ) 27 knots.

## Auxiliary Vessels

Orel, 1888 7600 tons ) 18 knots.  
 Saratow, 1891 8700 " )  
 Colliers

## C.

Ships in commission in seas from which exit is not barred.

## Battle ships

1.	Imp. Alexander II, 1887	9700	II 30.5, IV 23, VIII 15, XVIII 4-5, 5T	7.8	1000	15
2.	Imp. Nikolai, 1889	9700	II 30.5, IV 23, VIII 15, XVIII 4-5, 6T	7.3	1000	14.5
3.	Navarin, 1891	9700	IV 30.5, VIII 15, XXIV 4-5, 6 T	8.4	1200	15.5
4.	Sissoi Veliki, 1894	9100	IV 30.5, VI 15, XXIV 4-5, 6 T	7.8	1000	15.5
5.	Admiral Ushakoff, 1894	4200	IV 25, IV 12, XVI 4-5, 4 T	5.7	400	16
6.	Admiral Soenyavin, 1893	4200	IV 25, IV 12, XVI 4-5, 4 T	5.7	400	16
7.	Gen. Admiral Aprakin, 1896	4200	III 25, IV 12, XVI 4-5, 4 T.	5.7	400	15
Armored Cruisers						
1.	Vladimir Menomarch, 1882	6000	VII 15, IV 12, XII 4-5, 3 T	8.0	1100	15
2.	Admiral Nachimoff, 1885	8600	VII 20, X 15, XVI 4-5, 3T	8.4	1200	15
3.	Panyat Asova, 1888	6700	II 20, XIII 15, VII 5, 3 T	8.2	1100	16
4.	Admiral Korniloff	5800	XIV 15, XVI 4-5, 6T	7.7	1000	13



RUSSIA

JAPAN.

No.	Names and date of launching	Displacement in tons	Armament	Draught in meters	Coal capacity in tons	Speed in knots
1.	Asia, 1874	2500	Protected Cruisers, II 15, VII 10, IV 4	4.9	750	12
2.	Kreisser, 1875	1700	II 15, IV 10, VI 4-5, 1 T	5.1	-	11
3.	Afrika, 1877	2600	I 15, IV 10, II 8, 3 T	5.3	950	11
4.	Rynda, 1885	3000	X 15, IV 8, VIII 4, 3 T	6.1	450	13
5.	Svetlana, 1896	3800	VI 15, XII 4-5, 2 T	5.7	400	20

Torpedo Vessels

1 Torpedo destroyer, 3 Torpedo gunboats, 35 large boats with names, 61 small boats  
No. 100 - 152, 78 harbor boats No. 1 - 78.

SPECIAL SHIPS.

Gunboats

1	Yorsh, 1874	)		2.2	-	6
2	Vina, 1877	)				
3	Vicbi, 1879	) 350	each I 28			
4	Burun, 1879	)				
5	Doshdy, 1881	)				
6	Gred, 1881	)				
7	Snyass, 1881	) 400	each I 28	2.3	-	7
8	Gross, 1881	)				
9	Burya, 1881	)				
10	Nayaesdnik, 1878	)	III 15, IV 10, VI 4, 2 T	5.0	200	11
11	Plastun, 1878	) 1300	III 15, IV 10, VI 4	4.4	200	11
12	Vaestnik, 1880	)	III 15, VI 10, VI 4, 1 T	4.7	200	11

Coast Defense Vessels.

1	Pervnyes, 1868	3300	VI 20, VII 15, II 12, IV 10	5	250	6
2	Netron Menya, 1864	3300	XII 20, III 15, 1 T	5.4	250	8
3	Kremi, 1865	4000	VIII 20, VII 15, VI 8	5.9	330	6.5
4	Smertch, 1864	1800	II 28, IV 8	3.5	100	7
5	Charedaika, 1867	2100	IV 28, IV 8	3.8	100	7
6	Adm. Lassaroff )	)				
7	" Greig )	)				
8	" Spindoff ) 1868	) 3500	each 1 - III 28, VIII 4-5	5-6	250	9
9	" Chichagoff )	)				
10	Knyazo Posharski, 1867	5100	II 20, I 15, IV 8, 2 T	7.5	350	10
11	Hinin, 1869-78	6000	IV 20, XII 15, VIII 4-5, 3 T	7.7	1000	14
12	General Admiral, 1873	4700	VI 20, I 15, VIII 8, X 4, 2 T	7.4	800	12
13	Duke Edinburgski, 1875	5000	IV 20, V 15, VI 10, 2 T	7.9	800	12
14	Pyotr Veliki, 1872	9700	IV 30.5, IV 8, X 4-5, 2 T	7.9	1200	12
15	Otvashni, 1892	1500	I 28, I 15, XI 4-5, 2 T	4.4	-	14
16	Chrabri, 1895	1500	II 20, I 15, XIII 4-5, 2 T	3.4	-	14.5

D. SHIPS UNDER CONSTRUCTION

RUSSIA					JAPAN								
No.	Names & date of launching	Displacement in tons	Armament	Draught in meters	Coal capacity in tons	Speed in knots.	No	Names & date of launching	Displacement in tons	Armament	Draught in meters	Coal capacity in tons.	Speed in knots.
1	Imperator Alexander II	13700	Battle ships each IV 30.5, XII 15, XVII 4-5, 6 T.	7.9	1250	18	1	A (with Armstrong)	1600	Battle ships. each IV 30.5			
2	Borodino												
3	Aryol												
4	Knyaz Sennaroff												
5	Slava												
6	Imperator Pavel I.												
7	Andrei Perosvani												
1	Oleg ( 2 intended)	6700	Armoured Cruisers XII 15, XII 8, VIII 8, 2 T Protected Cruisers	-	1100	23	3	3 intended					
1.	Senchur	3100	VI 12, IX 8, 5 T	4.7	600	24		2 intended		Protected Cruisers 2 intended			
2	Isumno												
			TORPEDO VESSELS 5 large torpedo-boats							TORPEDO VESSELS 5 small torpedo boats			
			SPECIAL SHIP							SPECIAL SHIPS			
			Gunboat Chivinetz, 1300 tons,	13	knots					River gun-boats- Sumida, Fushimi			

FORT CROOK, Nebraska, January 14, 1905


The translator has endeavored to reproduce the German spelling of the Russian names in English, it is recommended that these names be verified in the proper English naval books or almanacs.

Very respectfully

H. Rossfeld  
2nd Lieutenant, 30th Infantry.

Translation

No. 230



THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR,

translated from supplements of the Marine Rundschau, by Second Lieutenant H. Mossfeld, 30th Infantry, from January 16th, 1905, to January 31, 1905.

----THIRD SUPPLEMENT.----

Chronological recapitulation of past events.

February 6: Rupture of diplomatic relations. The Japanese fleet and transports leave Sasebo and Maji. All telegraphic communications with Korea interrupted.

February 7: Seizure of the Russian steamers "Yekaterinoslav" and "Argun" in the Strait of Korea by the Japanese.

Evening: Disembarkation of the Japanese at Tusan and Masampo.

February 6- 8: Russian cruisers from Port Arthur reconnoitring at sea, without seeing anything of the enemy.

February 8: Afternoon. The "Korieta", leaving Chemulpo, meets the convoy squadron of the Japanese transports.

Evening: The Japanese disembark at Chemulpo 2500 men, who at once march on Seoul.

February 8- 9, during night: Attack of the 1st 2nd, 3rd Japanese torpedo-boat divisions, consisting of 30 large boats, against the Russian squadron on the roadstead of Port Arthur. The Retvisan, Tsarevitch, and Tallada are damaged, two Japanese torpedo boats suffer damage.

February 9: Engagement lasting about 3/4 of an hour between the first Japanese squadron and the Russian main squadron under the batteries of Port Arthur.

The Russian ships "Poltava", "Diana", "Askold", "Novik", and the Japanese ships "Fiyi", "Ivate", "Jakumo", two torpedo-boats, and perhaps a small cruiser, more or less damaged.

In Chemulpo the Russian ships "Varyag" and "Korieta", after engagement with convoy squadron of the Japanese transports, are

blown up by order of the commander. The Japanese assume in Seoul the supreme power over Korea.

February 10: The Russian cruiser squadron leaves Vladivostok.

February 10- 11, during night: Ineffective attack of Russian torpedo boats from Port Arthur.

February 11: The Russian cruiser squadron destroys the Japanese steamer "Nakanura Marie" in the Strait of Tsugaru.

The Russian mine ships "Yenissei" sunk while laying mines in the bay of Talienvan, in running on one of her own mines.

February 12: The Russian cruiser "Boyarin" suffered damage by running on mine in Talienvan-Bay.

February 13- 14: Attempt of attack on Port Arthur by Japanese torpedo-boats during snow storm.

February 15: The large Russian steamer "Manchuria" loaded with materiel of war is seized by the Japanese.

February 16: The new cruisers "Nishin" and "Kasuga," bought in Genoa, arrived unmolested in Yokosuka.

February 19: The Russian gun-boat "Manchur" lying in the harbor of Shanghai ordered by the Chinese government to leave the harbor, and is forced to disarm, because it did not wish to leave.

February 20: The Japanese Admiral Kamimura commanding the 1st Japanese cruiser division and re-enforced by one battle ship, reports, after a reconnoitring trip, that the Russian cruiser squadron has returned to Vladivostok.

February 23: Parts of the Russian re-enforcing squadron in the Red Sea, return to the Mediterranean.

February 24: at night, Japanese attack on the harbor of Port Arthur with torpedo boats, and steamers filled with explosives, repulsed by the "Retvisan" and shore batteries.

#### FURTHER COURSE OF EVENTS.

The strenght of the Japanese fleet at the theater of war has received in the meanwhile a considerable encrease through the

arrival of the two armored cruisers "Nishin" and "Kasuga", both bought in Genoa.

Off Singapore the ships took on board the Japanese crews which were sent there on a steamboat, and arrived in Yokosuka on February 16th without accident. They are said to have been in such good condition, that it was possible to send them to join the fleet after a delay of 36 hours, during which they took coal on board and had their equipment completed.

The Japanese have secured to themselves an additional reinforcement by the purchase from Chile of the small battle ship "Captain Prat", of the cruiser "Chacabuco", (sister-ship of the Japanese "Takasago) and of the large torpedo boats "Almirante Condell", for which negotiations have been pending for some time.

Finally the acquisition of the so-called "Korean Navy" has given to the Japanese fleet of transports an increase of five steamers.

On the other hand, also the Japanese seem to have suffered losses during the engagement of Chemulpo. The Russian ambassador Pavloff insists that the "Asama" suffered damage on her fore turret, and that the "Takachiko" and a torpedo-boat were sunk.

The Russian re-enforcing squadron ("Oslyabya", "Dmitri Donski", "Aurora", three steamers of the volunteer fleet and torpedo-boats) has not yet advanced beyond the Red Sea. It is even said to have received orders for the return home, and two of the attached steamers of the volunteer fleet have already passed through the Suez Canal on their home journey.

If this order has really been given, the consideration of the coal supply alone cannot very well have been the cause. For, disregarding the fact, that the necessary coal could well have been obtained by successively using the harbors of the various nations on the route to East Asia, of which more definite information will be given later on, at the worst recourse could still be had to colliers, which could be bought and taken along.

It would rather appear that the cause for the recall is the policy of the government to protect itself from the possibility of further material losses, as they may occur, should the Japanese succeed to force this re-enforcement into battle with a superior force, before it could join the East Asiatic main squadron.

This line of thought would conform to the often repeated view in the Russian press, that the naval war is only of secondary importance for the Russian conduct of the war in East Asia. Then the re-enforcements sent out during the last years would have had only the purpose of preventing the war by their impression.

If, from the Russian point of view at least enough importance were attached to the naval war as to its relative weight for the final outcome, it would only be natural that the passage of the re-enforcements were forced by co-operation with the forces already at the theater of war.

According to English newspaper reports it appears as if the Russians have sustained a further loss without interference of the enemy. On the 12th the cruiser Boyarin ran in the Tallenvan Bay on a mine laid by the Yenissei and is said to have been beached in a damaged condition. The extent of the damages is not yet clear. The mines are said to have become loose during a storm which came up towards evening of the eleventh.

In Newchwang the gunboat "Siouch" is frozen in, one gun was taken off for the armament of a fortification.

The gunboat "Manchur" which was at Shanghai at the outbreak of the war, is blockaded by two Japanese vessels, cruising in front of the mouth of the Yangtse river, one, the "Akitushima has left on the 21st for Wusung. If the "Manchur should intend to put to sea, she would have to pass close to this point, and could be reported with certainty to the second Japanese vessel outside of the harbor.

In the meantime the Chinese government, upon request of the Japanese consul, directed the "Manchur" to leave, and as she could

not comply with this order, she was requested to disarm.

During the landing at Masampo the gunboat "Rasboinick" may possibly have fallen into the hands of the Japanese. Although these losses constitute nothing of importance on account of the small fighting value of the ships concerned, they will not be without influence upon the morale of the Russian fleet, and the Japanese have gathered in, a number of advantages of this kind by a surprise recklessly employed but also carefully prepared at the beginning of the war.

Also in harassing the commerce of the enemy and as regards shipments of supplies to Port Arthur, the Japanese have again had several successes.

It is said that on the 15th of February the steamer "Manchuria" of 6200 tons, belonging to the East Asiatic Company, with large quantities of munitions of war, bound for Port Arthur, was taken to Sasebo, and on the 16th the steamers "Bovcik and "Vadeshda" belonging to the Ochotsk Kamchatka Company, were seized at Hakodate by the cruiser "Takao".

The cargoes consisting of food stuffs, of a number of Norwegian steamers, chartered by the principal Russian commercial houses in Port Arthur, and the American steamer "Coptic" have been retained in Nagasaki.

Nevertheless it would be premature to speak at present of an indisputable Japanese supremacy at sea, for disregarding that the Russian naval forces at Port Arthur and Vladivostok are still strong enough to inflict serious reverses, commercial lines are still strong enough to inflict serious reverses, commercial lines are still entering and leaving Port Arthur, and have doubtless one or the other article of contraband on board of which Japan has designated so many. The Japanese of course appear to feel more independent than the Russians, for whereas the Russians have at least thus far carried on the shipment of supplies on sea, the Japanese have ordered immediately after the first victories large

quantities of coal from England and rice shipments from Bangkok.

Several stories of suffering of neutral vessels have been reported from the theater of war.

The German steamer "Emma" was erroneously seized by the Japanese, but later on restored to liberty with excuses.

In Port Arthur a number of neutral vessels, in the harbor at the outbreak of the war, was detained, and partly employed in transporting the Japanese inhabitants out to town.

To several ships was the use of Port Arthur as harbor of refuge refused. The German steamer "Pronto" and the English "Fuping" were fired upon on the roadstead of Port Arthur, the former on account of mistaking her for an attacking torpedo boat during night. The English steamer "Chinping" was fired upon when approaching Dalny, finally the P. & O. steamer "Mongolia" was searched in the Red Sea by the Russian re-enforcing squadron, commanded by Virenius.

Similar events have happened at all times during naval wars and can never be avoided. Also speculative ship owners have never been deterred by them from navigating in waters affected by the war, as they can always ask for higher freights for the dangerous voyage, and can insure against possible loss by war insurance, which the ship owner has to defray.

The above mentioned "Manchuria" is said to have been insured with English companies for 80,000 pounds sterling. The insurance premiums for vessels, bound for the theater of war, have of course gone up considerably.

The reports regarding the activity of the main forces of the opponents, since the first blows, are scarce. The Russian cruiser squadron has sent a telegram to the viceroy on the 15th of February, and the crew of the steamer, which was seized in the Tsugaru Strait, has arrived in Nagasaki on board a German steamer coming from Vladivostok. Accordingly one of the ships, perhaps the



auxiliary cruiser "Lena", is supposed to have been in Vladivostock on the 15th with the captured crew.

The Japanese first squadron has encreased its first cruiser division ("Yakumo", "Irvate", "Azuma", "Idzumo") by one battleship ("Hatsuse") and has sent it, commanded by Admiral Kamimura, in search of the Vladivostok squadron. This group arrived on the 20th in Fusan with the report, that the Admiral had come to the conclusion that the Russian vessels, excepting the "Gromoboi" and another vessel (whose name is apparently misspelled), have returned to Vladivostok. How far this opinion is correct cannot be established.

The repairs on the Russian main squadron were contained in Port Arthur. During the night from the 10th to the 11th the Russian torpedo boats put forth from Port Arthur for attack, but returned the following morning without having found the enemy.

On different days groups of Russian ships left for the purpose of reconnoitring, but as it appears, in each case without meeting the enemy.

The Russians refer to the Japanese torpedo boat attack on the morning of the 14th as an invention. It will be safe to assume, in order to come nearest to truth, that an attack was attempted, but that it failed completely.

In a heavy snow storm, in which the torpedo boat sees just as little as the large vessels and batteries, it is easily possible to err as to position and bearing, and such an error may have led the commanders to the assumption of having fired upon the enemy, without actually having approached at all the entrance to the harbor.

Finally at 2:45 A. M. on the 24th, according to the latest reports of vice-roy Aleseyeff, Japanese torpedo boats attempted to take four steamers, laden with explosives, to the harbor entrance of Port Arthur, but were repulsed through the vigilance of the "Retvisan", then still lying in the entrance, and by her fire as well as that of the shore batteries. Two steamers were sunk by the fire of the guns, two were beached, and eight torpedo boats

fled with losses to the ships awaiting them outside. A number of unexploded torpedoes were found. Three Russian cruisers took up the pursuit of the torpedo boats, but were recalled.

The undertaking of the Japanese corresponded with their inclination to foolhardy surprises, which they have demonstrated thus far. The small entrance channel of Port Arthur suggests the idea, to temporarily cut off the harbor from the sea by obstructing the channel. In case the undertaking had succeeded, not only the ships lying in the mined harbor would have been rendered useless for operations, but also those outside would have lost every chance for replenishing armament and equipment, and for repairs which might eventually have become necessary.

These prospects made a certain stake worth while. The steamers must have been of considerable dimensions, in order to fill the width of the entrance which amounts to 180 m. It is assumed that the explosives were placed on board for the purpose of accelerating the sinking of the vessels, and that the principal cargo consisted of stones and cement.

The fact that the "Retvisan" was still lying in the entrance makes it appear as if her draught on account of her leak was still too great to permit her to pass through or, as English periodicals maintain, that the only complete dock in Port Arthur is not yet sufficient for the largest battleships, and that it is therefore the intention to make the repairs with the ship grounded.

The position of the "Retvisan" may have appeared to the Japanese as facilitating their project, as she could have been used for obstruction if they had succeeded to completely wreck her by firing some more torpedoes. But this time they met with a disappointment, for this "Retvisan", although unable to move, but still able to employ all her fighting strength, frustrated the undertaking.

Against an enemy on the alert a "coup de main" can never be counted upon to be successful. Nevertheless it would be wrong to

discard surprises entirely, if the necessary stake of strength can be spared. For, a hold, although sometimes unsuccessful undertaking, will always have a better influence upon education and morale, than idleness. It is noteworthy that half of the steamers were simply beached. The assumption lies now that the Japanese permitted these dangerous vessels to drift towards the entrance. Then, of course, the prospects for their arrival at places, where they actually would have obstructed the entrance, would have been very slight. It may also have been that the vessels, in order to sacrifice as few lives as possible, were insufficiently manned, or were rendered useless for maneuvering very quickly on account of hits.

About the Japanese casualties nothing is known and probably nothing will become public in the near future, on account of their method employed in this respect.

Every trace of the Japanese main force has been lost since the attack on Port Arthur.

The fact that Admiral Kamimura has delivered his report, regarding the reconnaissance in the Japanese Sea, at Fusan, might lead to the conclusion, that the main squadron has its base of operations there. The position in the Korean Strait would have certain advantages, if it were assumed, that the Japanese commander in chief did really worry about the Russian cruiser squadron.

Fusan has telegraphic connection with Seoul and Chemulpo, and via Tsushima-Sassebo with the entire Japanese telegraph net. The squadron chief would therefore here be in the best position to receive every report regarding actions against the Japanese coast towns and also reports from the line of outposts between Chemulpo and Shantung, as mentioned in the preceding supplement. He would be able to meet in the

easiest manner a possible junction of the two Russian main squadrons, in whatever manner it might be contemplated, and he would be in a reasonable distance from the west coast, which may also be said of the east coast on account of the Inland Sea, and would finally cover directly the line of communication Shimonoseki Fusan (Masampo). The disposition here may explain best why we have not received any news regarding this main force.

On the other side it has been reported that the Japanese were transferring at present the base for the war on land entirely to Chemulpo, and were sending numerous troops, including the guards already landed at Fusan, by sea to that point. It has been mentioned before that this would be of great advantage for the continuance of the war on land, as a saving of half the length of Korea is made in the first stages of the advance, and as the roads here are much better for the march to the front.

In view of the presence of the Russian main squadron in Port Arthur the transportation of these troops can only take place under the immediate cover of the Japanese main squadron.

If the above report is correct, the events with the Japanese fleet during the last weeks may have been as follows, as far as is possible to ascertain considering the scarcity of news:

After the withdrawal from Port Arthur a line of out posts was established, consisting of the protected cruisers of the 1st squadron and perhaps of the squadron of Admiral Uriu, at the narrowest point between Shantung and Korea, connecting with Chemulpo, which were to report the Russian main force in case it would try to leave the Gulf of Pechili. The torpedo boats had their base on the Elliot Islands or at Chemulpo, and had the task to make attacks against Port Arthur in conjunction with several protected cruisers, for the

purpose of harassing and damaging the Russian main squadron, and of ascertaining its whereabouts.

The main squadron then went to the Korean Strait in order to protect the same against the Russian cruiser squadron. Admiral Kamimura was detached to search for the cruiser squadron, and as may be assumed, to force it into battle. After he had not succeeded he probably assumed the protection of the Korean Strait with his forces against this squadron. The battleship squadron however was conveying the transports to Chemulpo.

Serious encounters on land have as yet not taken place.

#### THE ATTITUDE OF THE NEUTRALS.

England and France have continued their preparations for war. England has ordered its channel squadron to Gibraltar.

In France the cruisers "Desaix", "Kleber", "Amiral Aube", were placed in readiness, the torpedo boat depot vessel "Eclair" with two sub-marine boats has been ordered to Saigon, a reenforcement for Indo China, consisting of 2 cruisers and a number of large torpedo boats, is being prepared, and appropriations for the strengthening of Saigon are said to have been asked for. The government declares that a reenforcement for Indo China was already planned before the outbreak of the war.

Special measures were resorted to in Sweden by calling out the naval militia of Gotland, and by placing ships in readiness, in Portugal it is the intention to send a vessel to Macao and Loanda, each, and to mobilize a number of troops. Spain, strikingly seems to be in a hurry with its measures of security. It is reenforcing the garrison of the Canary Islands and is said to intend to close the harbor of Ferrol and to be asking for considerable appropriations for the

purpose of defense.

#### USE OF NEUTRAL PARTS BY THE BELLIGERENTS.

Besides Egypt, England and France have in the meantime made known their views regarding the use of their harbors by the belligerents.

England has announced that the following rules will apply to war vessels of the belligerents in its harbors and in those of the colonies, viz: stay of 24 hours, taking on board sufficient subsistence and coal to last to the nearest harbor, belonging either to the belligerent or to a neutral power, if the latter is the nearest; use of British or British Colonial ports by the same ships only once in three months.

The clause "or to a neutral power" appears to be rather elastic. Litterly taken, a ship in Aden for instance, would accordingly obtain only enough coal to last to Djibonti. Practically however, the proviso as to how far coal should be obtained, is always pliable within certain limits, as it is never stated that the quantity of coal should be measured by the requirements of an economical speed.

Consequently a rigorous interpretation of the above clause would only then be expected, when it were intended to create manifestly difficulties, which would mean favoring the cause of the other party.

France has prescribed no limits to the squadron of Wirenius as to length of stay, or as to quantities of coal and provisions taken on. This is entirely in accordance with its custom practiced in all past wars, as it has always demanded that the belligerents should not use its harbors as bases for operations, and that no arms or ammunition be taken on board within these ports.

If also the other neutral powers adhere to their positions taken in former wars regarding use of their harbors, which would be the most probable, both belligerents may expect the following:

China grants 24 hours stay after provisioning and coaling etc. to the destination, use of Chinese harbors only once in three months.

Netherlands: 24 hours stay, coal to the nearest harbor of belligerent, frequent use of Dutch ports at discretion of belligerent.

Portugal: Use of harbors without restriction.

Denmark: 24 hours stay, coal to the nearest harbor of belligerent; use of harbors only once in three months.

Italy: 24 hours stay, coal only in case a longer stay has become impreative; use of harbors as often as is desired.

A Russian man of war, leaving Liban for East Asia would be able, according to the foregoing, to obtain coal as follows:

At Cherbourg (France), after the ship has sailed					1130 miles.
" Lisbon (Portugal	"	"	"	"	829 "
" Bizerta (France)	"	"	"	"	1013 "
" Port Said (Egypt,)	"	"	"	"	1225 "
" Djibonti (France,)	"	"	"	"	1294 "
" Colombo (England,)	"	"	"	"	2250 "
" Batavia (Netherlands,)	"	"	"	"	1850 "
" Manila (America,)	"	"	"	"	1516 "
" Port Arthur,	"	"	"	"	1655 "

A ship with a modern radius of action would therefore be able to obtain coal by ordinary means without violation of neutrality.

For the dispatch of a whole squadron the size of the quantities of coal needed might indeed cause difficulties.

#### CONTRABAND OF WAR.

Only one of the belligerents, Japan, has thus far announced its view regarding contraband of war. For Russia is this matter only of importance so far as it has an interest to have as few things as possible regarded as contraband, in order that the shipment of supplies on sea by neutrals to the regions threatened by the war, be restricted the least possible.

The Japanese announcement designates the following as contraband:

1. Arms, ammunition, explosives and raw materials, and machinery for their manufacture, cement, uniforms, articles of equipment for army and navy, armor plates, materials and machinery for the construction and armament of ships, and all other articles that can be used for war purposes, in case they pass through hostile territory or are consigned to such place or to hostile troops or parts of the hostile fleet.
2. Subsistence stores, beverages, harness, forage, wagons, coal, wood, coin, gold and silver bullion and materials for telegraphy, telephones, and railways, in case they are enroute to hostile troops or to such hostile points, where they can be used for war purposes.

The designation of subsistence supplies as conditional contraband of war displeases the Americans, as the delivery of subsistence supplies to both belligerents has been thus far to them a considerable business.

The mental source for coal supply has been England. Here the question might be asked, to what extent will coal consigned to either Russia or Japan be considered contraband in European waters? The English government has answered this question in an entirely pertinent fashion, that this could not be decided in general, and that whoever delivers coal to any of the belligerents does so on his own risk.

In reality there is no danger as yet for shipments to Russia and Europe.

Colliers consigned for Japan are in danger in the Atlantic from the Russian training squadron, consisting of "General Admiral" and "Kreisser", in the Mediterranean from the returning vessels of the dissolved Mediterranean squadron, "Imperator Nikolai 1,"



torpedo gunboat "Abrek", and repair ship "Okean", in the Red Sea from the squadron commanded by Wirenius.

## ADDENDA TO THE 2ND SUPPLEMENT, MARINE RUNDSCHAU.

Covering sheet for Page 31,  
or paste over page 81.

## JAPAN.

No	Name and date of launching	Displacement in tons.	Armament	Draught in inches.	Coal Capacity in tons	Speed in knots.
			Battleship.			
12	Captain Prat 1890	7000	IV 24, V 12, VIII 12, X 4-5, 4 T.	12 777	400	18
			Protected Cruiser.			
1.	Chacabuco 1898	4200	II 20, X 12, XI 8, 5 T	5.2	1000	23

## Torpedo boat.

Torpedo destroyer Almirante Condell (dispatch boat.) 750 tons 19 sea miles.

Scale to maps of southern point of Liaotung.  
(page 16)

Scale.

Scale to plan of Port Arthur.

(page 18-19.)

Scale.

Fort Crook Neb. January 31, 1905.


Respectfully submitted without remarks.

(Signed) H. Hassfeld,

2nd Lt. & Batt. Q. M. & C, 30 Inf.

Translation

No. 230.



THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR,

translated from supplements of the Marine Rundschau, by  
Second Lieutenant H. Hossfeld, 30th Infantry, from February  
1, 1905, to February 10, 1905.

Fourth Supplement.

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Chronological recapitulation.

February 22: Detachment of the Japanese army begins advance  
from Seoul on Ping-Yang.

February 24: The Japanese endeavor in vain to obstruct the  
channel-entrance of Port Arthur by the sinking of steamers.

The Russian reenforcing squadron for East Asia under  
command of Virenus reenter the Suez Canal.

February 24/25, at night: Two Japanese torpedo boats are  
destroyed in front of Port Arthur by the fire of the shore  
batteries and of the Retisvan.

February 25: The 1st Japanese squadron bombarded at long  
range the Russian cruisers lying in the roadstead of Port  
Arthur, and the harbor for a short period.

Japanese cruisers cut off a Russian torpedo boat in  
Pigeon Bay.

February 27: Cossacks meet Japanese advance troops 215 km.  
south of the Yalu.

Further course of events of war.

It was supposed in the last supplement that the Japanese  
fleet on or about February 20th was conveying a large number  
of transports. Subsequently or during the disembarkation  
from the transports, the fleet renewed its attack against the  
squadron in Port Arthur. The Japanese evidently consider it  
the safest course, to cover the transports during the passage

in open water by sending the fleet along, but to secure the disembarkation of troops, by directing it to find the hostile fleet and to engage it energetically. This may be feasible as long as only transfers of bodies of troops with limited war material for the first needs are concerned, especially as the enemy has apparently resigned entirely to create difficulties for the Japanese in their transfer of troops to Korea.

It appears as if the subsistence of troops in Korea has been rendered independent from home supply on account of the very thorough preparations in time of peace. At different points of the country large quantities of provisions and forage have been brought up and deposited by Japanese merchants and commissaries.

But as soon as these supplies are used up, it will become necessary to maintain a regular supply service across the sea. This cannot be made secure in any other manner than by a complete annihilation of the hostile fleet. But as the main force does not wish to put forth from Port Arthur, the capture of this place will be the only way leading toward it.

The Japanese must have still other causes which make the capture of Port Arthur desirable.

First of all they consider it a kind of national debt of honor to win back the spoils of the Chinese War, taken away from them by Russian interference in the treaty of peace, now, after they have created under so many sacrifices the necessary field force.

Nothing could add more to the maintainance of the people's enthusiasm for the war, even when the conflict should prove to become protracted and to require many sacrifices, if the capture of this place would at last be realized.

The territory around Port Arthur is the only section of the theater of war which is without doubt recognized as Russian possession. Whereas against a permanent occupation of Korean and Manchurian territories it may finally be interfered by one or the other interested power on the ground that it constitutes the seizure of neutral states, whose integrity Japan itself announced to defend, no objection exists with regard to the Kwantung possessions. If Japan has acquired this by way of conquest, it may safely count upon to keep it after a victorious termination of the war and to gain by it the place on the Asiatic continent for which it is fighting already its 2nd war within a decade.

Since several weeks rumors are afloat about the intention of the Japanese to take a column across the sea to the Manchurian coast (to Shan-hei-kwan or Newchwang). Such an undertaking might become very important if China should become encouraged to participate in the reconquering of Manchuria for which sufficient liking appears to be among the Chinese people.

For this undertaking however, the fall of Port Arthur would become essential, because, according to the position of the place, even unimportant remnants of the fleet, and even a few small torpedo boats might become dangerous for the undertaking from this point.

It also appears as if the attack against the harbor entrance of Port Arthur, mentioned in the preceding supplement, did not only have the significance of a single offensive act for the mere harassing of the enemy, but should also demonstrate the beginning of a renewed advance of all the forces against Russia's naval center in East Asia.

The following details connected therewith have become known: The five steamers selected for the obstruction of the channel entrance were conveyed by the 1st Japanese squadron to the Liaotung promontory during the night of February 23/24 (see map on page 16). Then the torpedo boats advanced with the steamers toward the harbor entrance, hugging the high coast west of the roadstead of Port Arthur, whereas the main force went into position in front of the roadstead. The points where the steamers should be blown up and sunk were carefully assigned to them, the torpedo boats were to accompany them and to receive the crews who were to take to the boats after the fuses had been ignited. All lights on the steamers and torpedo boats were extinguished. The steamers were manned by sailors, the leading one was commanded by a commander, the others by lieutenants. The strength of the crews has been given in various figures. The report that only two men at the wheel and three machinists had been present on each steamer, does not seem to be correct, as in all thus far more rescued men have been reported. Other sources give the number as an aggregate of seventy-seven heads for the five steamers.

The cruisers "Bayan", "Aakold", "Nervick" were lying in the roadstead of Port Arthur, the "Retvisan" was grounded in the entrance. The large searchlights of the coast fortifications were playing continuously upon the roadstead.

At 2.45 the first steamer became visible in the light of the searchlight, and, when still three miles from the entrance, was at once taken under fire by the "Retvisan" and by the batteries near Hwang-chuishan and Electric Search Light (see map p. 18/19), received hits causing a leak forward, and ran astern on the beach; the succeeding steamers left the column obliquing toward starboard, whereby the second steamer

received a hit in the rudder and drifted, unable to maneuver, also on the beach west of the roadstead; the other three steamers went on under full steam, one however was soon hit under the water line and sank. Only the fourth and fifth steamers approached the entrance; the former sank close to the light house, the fifth obliques too far east and consequently missed the entrance, sinking near the Hwangchinshan-shore. The crews took to the boats, but on account of the heavy fire were unable to reach the torpedo boats which were already making good their escape. The boats consequently endeavored to escape close to the west coast; but before they were able to reach their fleet the sea became rough; 19 men were beached and taken prisoners, 1 officer and 28 men drifted out to sea and were able to make an island where they obtained a junk for China and were later on taken in by the Japanese consul in Che-Foo; one man was killed in a boat, seven were picked up on the high sea at 3 p. m. by the fleet and returned to Sasebo on March 1st.

During the attack the Russian cruisers lying in the roadstead weighed anchor, pursued the Japanese torpedo boats for a short distance, but were recalled by signal and ordered to search the roadstead for torpedoes which might possibly be adrift. The Japanese main squadron appeared at dawn on the horizon, probably awaiting its boats, but departed soon with an eastern course. It is said to have been seen from Wei-hai-wai, steering east and south-east.

It seems as if at night the Russians employed large torpedo boats for the purpose of patrolling the bays near Port Arthur, suited for a possible landing; two of these boats were especially assigned each night to Pigeon (Golobinaya) Bay. It is obvious that these boats can report a disembarkation at night more certainly and above all more rapidly than any

observation post without search-light on land. Of course the danger of being out off from Port Arthur is very great for these boats. This, however, seemed to be immaterial to the Russians as long as the boats would give the alarm on time.

This time the "Bayan" and "Askold" were sent after the withdrawing enemy for observation. "Nork" on this day was to escort back the outpost boats from Pigeon Bay to Port Arthur. At the beginning of darkness the "Bayan" and "Askold" returned.

During the night of February 24/25 two Russian flotillas put forth for a night attack.

The Japanese however had thrown out large torpedo boats off the roadstead of Port Arthur, Pigeon Bay and Dalny, for observation. Those in front of Port Arthur were encountered by the Russians when putting forth, the Japanese eluded. The Russians not finding the hostile main force during the night, returned on the forenoon of February 25, without results, whereas hostile cruisers were already reappearing in the roadstead. No proper cooperation of the cruisers and torpedo boats when pursuing the withdrawing enemy was manifested from all appearance.

During the night the Japanese torpedo boats guarding Port Arthur found themselves obliged to gradually close in on the entrance to the harbor, especially after the moon had disappeared. The "Retvisan" and the batteries on this occasion opened fire several times, one boat being caused to sink by a battery, one or even two additional ones having been destroyed by the "Retvisan". The wreck of one boat was beached.

On the morning of the 25th the Japanese main force, consisting of 6 battleships, 6 armored, 4 protected cruisers, two torpedo boat destroyers and 8 torpedo boats reappeared in front of Port Arthur. The cruisers "Bayan," "Askold" and



"Nevik" weighed anchor in order to protect their just then returning flotillas against the approaching Japanese cruisers. Thereafter the entire Japanese squadron advanced, and took these cruisers from 10:50 to 11:35 at a range of about 6000 m. under fire.

The Russian cruisers retreated before the overwhelming force to the inner harbor leaving the continuance of the fight to the shore batteries. The Japanese admiral recognized from the entering of the cruisers that the report of his flotilla, regarding a successful blocking of the harbor, was based on a mistake.

This was evidently a very disagreeable discovery. The protected cruisers were detached, whereas the other ships apparently advancing toward the harbor with a broad front, commenced a heavy bombardment against the works on the inner harbor. According to Russian reports most shots have been "short", only two shells landed in the city, no damage of importance was done.

The squadron turned about shortly. Some disorder was created in the line during the turn and the Russians claim to have observed hits during the movement. The Japanese then put out to sea. The battleship "Yashima" and the armored cruiser "Asama" and "Tokina" are said to have arrived in Sassho in a damaged condition.

The protected cruisers in the meantime turned their attention on Pigeon Bay.

The two Russian torpedo boats stationed there for the night were this time not escorted back to Port Arthur at the right time before the appearance of the Japanese fleet. Upon the approach of the cruiser division one of the two boats succeeded in getting through between it and the shore, the other one was cut off and beached. The cruisers took it under

fire for about 20 minutes. Apparently the crew had left the boat, for at the end only one man was wounded. The Russians believed this prolonged firing in Pigeon Bay to be the preparation for a landing and dispatched at once reinforcements to the scene. When these arrived the cruisers were just steaming off. For the better protection of Pigeon Bay artillery has now been stationed there permanently.

On the following day the Japanese squadron remained in the vicinity of Port Arthur, showed itself several times during the day, but made no attack, at night it observed the channel entrance, but was not seen any more thereafter, in spite of the fact that the Russians searched daily the sea with cruisers and torpedo boats for 60 miles from Port Arthur.

The Russians are fearing an early landing in the vicinity of Port Arthur. Without such landing a capture of Port Arthur would not be possible. Here of course the Russians must prevent a landing with all available means, although they may have had their own intentions in permitting the landing of troops in Korea.

It is noteworthy that the commandant is already predicting in his proclamation to the garrison a possible cutting off of the Port Arthur position from Manchuria by land forces. As long as the Russian troops are in possession of *Manchuria* and of the base of the Liaotung Peninsula, it may be assumed that a besieging corps in front of Port Arthur would find itself in a very precarious situation, even if the landing itself were successfully effected.

Thus far no explanation for the inactivity of the Russian battleships can be found. Why are they lying in the harbor, whereas the unprotected cruisers are engaging the entire hostile main force in the open roadstead? Why is it that the numerous Russian torpedo boats put to sea so seldom? Why do

they not endeavor at least, even if they are unable to find the hostile main force, to create havoc in Chemulpo?

One is gaining more and more the impression as if the Russians had completely become accustomed to the idea of saving their forces, which has repeatedly found its expression in declarations and proclamations. No one will doubt that waiting is in the nature of the defensive, and nobody would consider it justified that the weaker one should blindly force the stronger one into a decisive battle. But the defense ought to use its available forces for the purpose of molesting, fatiguing and wearing out the enemy. If these forces are saved up, they will usually at the end fall in the hands of the active aggressor, without having been of any use whatsoever. The history of wars has proved this at all times.

Also the Japanese conduct of naval war leaves many a question unanswered. If the Japanese have recognized that they must take Port Arthur -and that seems to be the case- they are making comparatively slow progress.

The first brilliant effect during the night of February 8/9 is followed by a cannonade at midrange lasting scarcely one hour, and then for a period of over two weeks nothing at all is done. Why is the first advantage not further followed up, why was the so-called "demoralized" enemy allowed to recover his morale and make the necessary repairs?

In lieu of this they prepare a new effect -obstruction of the harbor entrance-, which was unsuccessful; another cannonade at long range follows, and then once more a pause. This does not constitute the irresistible "forward", which solely lends strength to the attack. Even losses could not sustain the delay, for the Japanese had to be prepared from the start, that the annihilation of the Russian main force on sea would require a stake, and the attacking force can

much less afford to save its strength than the defense. Besides, anything the Russians gain in time is influencing the reinforcement of their entire position in East Asia.

Nothing has been heard lately of the Russian cruiser squadron; according to one report it is said to have been in Vladivostock on February 23.

The commandant of Vladivostok in one instance reported a hostile squadron in front of the harbor. As the date is still unknown, it is impossible to ascertain whether it was the cruiser division under Kamimura on its reconnoitering trip as mentioned in preceding supplement.

At Weesung appeared besides "Akitushina" also the cruisers "Idzumi" and "Suna", for the purpose of guarding the gunboat "Manchu", a very considerable force. Further negotiations are being held with China regarding the "Manchu". The Japanese apparently desire to attain more than mere disarming; China, as long as it intends to remain neutral, cannot acquiesce in an open surrender. The importance which the Japanese attach to the removal of this vessel may be found in the extended Japanese Yangtze trade, which already seems to be influenced by the fear for the enemy lying in Shanghai harbor.

The Russian reenforcing squadron under Admiral Virenus has actually returned to the Suez Canal. "Duritri Donskoi" which arrived in a damaged condition, was granted a stay of 5 days by the Egyptian government, for the purpose of making the necessary repairs. A portion of the torpedo boats has already entered the Mediterranean, the other ships are said to be following.

This squadron has sought to make use of its journey through the Red Sea toward the North for the purpose of seizing colliers en route from Europe to Japan. It proceeded during

the day in close order, at night in a broad extended line slowly along the usual route, stopped every south going steamer turned its search-light on them and sent a torpedo boat in each case to search. Three English steamers with coal for Japan were seized en route, the squadron remained at anchor in the Bay of Suez and seized three additional steamers with cargoes for Japan.

The prizes however were released by order of the czar, presumably because they were taken before the Russian declaration regarding contraband was made public.

#### The war on land.

During the first disembarkations of the Japanese from February 7th to 9th, it may be assumed that only advance troops were landed, to whom were assigned defined preparatory tasks, as the seizure of the government in Korea, establishing of telegraphs, securing places of disembarkation and shelter for the troops.

Up to February 22nd the following troops are said to have been disembarked:

In Chemulpo: The 12th division; the 2nd and division of guards are said to be following; in Gensan: 12000 men; in Masampo and Fusan; unknown numbers.

Taken as a whole, they appear to have been the divisions which were mobilized at the outbreak of the war (Guards, I, II, and XII.)

On February 12th the 3rd and 4th divisions were mobilized about 8 days later one commenced to talk about preparing transportation for a landing on the Liaotung Peninsula. From this might be assumed that the 3rd and 4th divisions are now ready for that purpose.

The column which was disembarked at Chemulpo rendezvoused at Seoul and commenced the march on the highway to Ping-Yang

on February 23. Ping-Yang itself was occupied by the Japanese as early as February 24. According to rumors the garrison is said to have been taken by sea from Chemulpo to Haidshu or Talong Bay for this purpose.

On the Russian side the 3rd Siberian Army Corps was evidently pushed forward on the highway to Fengwang-shang; it has occupied a defensive position on the right bank of the Yalu, across the highway from Widshu to Antung, and has quickly dispatched advance troops, consisting of the Transbaikal-Cossack Brigade, apparently reenforced by infantry detachments to Ping-Yang.

On February 27, a detachment of this Cossack brigade encountered Japanese cavalry between Anju and Ping-Yang, defeated them, capturing some horses and then arrived before the city wall of Ping-Yang, where it received fire on February 28th, and then retreated.

Additional Russian patrols were sent forward against Gensan. A second main column is said to have advanced parallel to the 3rd Army Corps through the eastern portion of north Korea.

Thus far nothing is known about events with the other Japanese columns.

A table showing the formation of the two armies will probably appear in the next supplement.

#### Contraband of war.

On February 27th Russia has finally given to the public its declaration regarding contraband of war. It considers as such:

a Small arms of every description, and guns, mounted or in parts, also armor.

b Accessories to fire arms and ammunition, projectiles, fuses, bullets, caps, cartridges, empty shells, powder,

salt peter, sulphur.

c Articles or accessories used for exploding, as mines, dynamite, pyroxilin, various other explosives, condutions, and all appliances necessary for mining.

d Artillery Engineer and troop train materials, as gun carriages, limbers, cartridge and loading chests, field forges, field kitchens, tool wagons, pontoons, trestles, barbed wire, horse harness for trains.

e Articles of equipage and clothing, as cartridge boxes, knapsacks, saber knots, cuttrisses, intrenching tools, drums, camp kettles, saddles, harness, uniforms, tents, etc.

f Ships bound for a hostile harbor, even under a neutral flag, if they are apparently built for war purposes, as may be determined from the construction of their hulls, and from the arrangement within, and from other features; and furthermore if they are en route to a hostile port for purposes of sale or delivery to the enemy.

g Every kind of ship engines, and boilers, either mounted or in parts.

h Every kind of fuel, as coal, naphtha, alcohol.

i Articles and materials for telephone lines, telegraphs and railroads.

k In general all articles or objects which can be used in land or naval warfare, also rice and provisions, furthermore horses, beasts of burden, and other animals which could become of use in warfare, if they are shipped on account of or are consigned to the enemy.

The declaration continued further on: "The transportation of hostile troops, the forwarding of hostile telegrams and letters, placing at the disposal of the enemy war ships or transports, are prohibited. Neutral ships with contraband of war of kindred character may not only be seized, but also

confiscated according to circumstances."

The Russian declaration compared with that of Japan does not appear any milder or less elaborate.

Of the articles placed by Japan under the heading of contraband, Russia omits only "coin". On the other hand it has added all varieties of fuel, horses, letters, telegrams and ships which could be employed as war vessels by the enemy eventually. The last rule is of importance because Japan is not yet able to build the large battleships in its own yards; from the Japanese point of view a similar proviso would have less real value, because Russia is building its largest vessels itself.

The Russian declaration is more drastic in not discriminating between conditional and absolute contraband, thus, for instance, coal and provisions will only be seized by the Japanese in case they are en route to points where they are to be used for war purposes by the Russians, however, under all circumstances, as long as they are consigned for Japan or shipped on its account.

This, of course, is of the greatest disadvantage for England and America; they are supplying coal and meat respectively, and objections have consequently already been raised in these countries to the effect that Russia should regard also these articles as conditional contraband only.

Russia, in declaring telegrams as contraband, has probably only contemplated the transmittal of telegrams by ships.

The duty to prevent either belligerent from sending telegrams over neutral lines, cannot very well be imposed upon any neutral power, for this would oblige it to introduce means of supervision and control, which would not only prove costly, but also detrimental to its own commerce.



Never in any former war has a neutral power prohibited the use of its wires or cables to belligerents.

However strange as it may appear, the present war has already established a precedent in this matter.

The government of the Netherlands has found it expedient on account of the war, to prohibit the telegraphs of the Dutch Indies to both belligerents as far as even messages are concerned, and for the purpose of securing the enforcement of this prohibition, it has forbidden the sending of messages in languages unknown to the postal officials or cipher messages, as long as the key is not deposited at the telegraph office from where the message is to be sent.

Whatever may have been the cause for this step, may perhaps be cleared up later.

That a different conception of law on this point is in existence with the great powers, is shown by the report that in America the idea of laying a connecting cable from the American cable system to Japan, was publicly discussed, this in order to secure Japan's connection with the world during the war.

M.


Fort Crook, Nebraska,

February 10, 1905.

Respectfully submitted without comment.

H. HOSSFELD,

2nd Lieut. 30th Infantry.



Translation

No. 230. THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR,

translated from supplements of the Marine Rundschau, by Second Lieutenant H. Hossfeld, 30th Infantry, from February 11, 1905 to February 28, 1906.

FIFTH SUPPLEMENT.

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Chronological recapitulation.

February 29: Japanese vessels occupy Hai-yun-tan of which Thornton harbor is suitable as base of operations for naval vessels.

March 6: A Japanese squadron under Admiral Kaminura bombarded Vladivostok.

March 8: The "Retvisan" is raised and taken in the inner harbor of Port Arthur. Admiral Makaroff assumes command of the Russian naval forces.

March 10. Engagements between Russian and Japanese torpedo boats in front of Port Arthur. The Russian large torpedo boat "Stereubashi" is annihilated.

The bombardment of the new town of Port Arthur by the Japanese 1st squadron.

Further course of the war on sea.

The main force of the first Japanese squadron after the attack against Port Arthur on February 25, has again apparently abandoned the Yellow Sea for a short period and perhaps has taken on coal and made repairs in Japan.

An auxiliary base was created for cruisers and torpedo boats, and probably also for the vessels conveying transports to the west coast of Korea, by the occupation of the island of Hai-yun-tan, which possesses the Thornton harbor. The island belongs to the Russian lease-sphere of Kwantung, and up to the beginning of war was used as signal station, and

coaling base for torpedo boats, but was evacuated by the Russians on February 23; it is situated at a distance of 90 miles from Port Arthur, and of 100 miles, in round figures, from the mouth of the Taitong river (Chinampo).

An Austrian steamer coming from Vladivostok and stopping at Hakodate, reported during the first part of March, that the Russian cruiser squadron had again put to sea from Vladivostok on February 29. The Japanese have now divided their main fleet. Admiral Kamimura was sent into the Japanese sea with the second squadron, consisting of five large vessels, two protected cruisers and torpedo boats, for the purpose of searching for the Russian cruiser squadron and of destroying it, while Admiral Togo with the balance of the ships (fourteen in all) is again operating against Port Arthur.

The second squadron was formed from the new cruisers "Nishin" and "Kassuga", and from vessels detached from the first squadron. Granted that these vessels represent only armored cruisers/ the 2nd squadron would be superior to the Russian cruiser squadron just the same.

The fortunate passage of the two vessels, bought in Genoa, in connection with the success of the first torpedo boat attack has enabled the Japanese to oppose at present superior forces to both divisions of the hostile fleet. The material superiority in both instances of course is not only very great, and an active, determined opponent might overcome this superiority, if a fortunate moment should come to his aid, and moments of temporary weakness may in the course of time always be found with our enemy. But it may well be assumed that the Japanese have drawn the conclusion from the attitude of the Russians thus far, that they can risk dividing their forces as the enemy has done from the beginning.

The intention of the Japanese to conduct the war on land on both sides of North Korea simultaneously, is evidently also playing its part in this matter. To this end it is of course also necessary to secure the supremacy in the Japanese Sea, and this can only be accomplished after the destruction of the Russian cruiser squadron, since it has shown that it intends to remain in this sea.

Bombardment of Vladivostok on March 6.

(see enclosed map).

Admiral Kamimura on the 3rd or 4th of March has apparently left in search for the Russian cruiser squadron. As thereport of the Austrian steamer could not be relied on to any great extent, and as also several days had passed since the reported departure of the enemy, the admiral proceeded first of all directly for Vladivostok. He arrived off Askold Island on the morning of March 6th, and dispatched his torpedo boats to the bays north of it, which are used by the Russian ships as the exterior anchoring places, and then entered the Ussuri Bay, east of the Muravieff Peninsula, on which Vladivostok is situated. His two protected cruisers were left behind as outposts near Askold Island. In case the hostile squadron approached from the outside, they would have to report it in time, to enable the main force to take favorable position for the battle at the proper moment.

The main force proceeded northward along the coast, keeping out of range until it arrived opposite the city, where it believed to be outside of the sector of fire of the nearest shore battery. It then approached the coast within 8500m. and opened fire with the heavy and medium calibers against the portion of the harbor stretching from east to west; here the war ships are habitually moored and at this point are also the wharves and barracks located.

The firing commenced at 1:25 P. M., and ceased at 2:15 P. M. Approximately 200 shots are said to have been fired. Several houses were destroyed in the city, one shell landed on the parade ground of the Siberian Equipage. One woman was killed, one sailor was wounded seriously, other persons were lightly injured.

The Russian batteries did not reply. If the opinion of the Japanese admiral that he was outside of the sector of fire of the foremost works, is correct, the reason may be assigned to the fact that for the works which could reach him at all, i. e., the ones further to the rear, the range was larger than they were accustomed to fire at. The Japanese must have fired at considerable distance. If they stood off the coast at a distance of 8500 m. the part of the city under fire was at a range of 12000 m.

The bombardment had evidently the purpose to entice forth the Russian cruiser squadron in case it was in the harbor. The Japanese could well count upon that if they bombarded the town from a position where the crest fortifications could not reach them, the ships lying in the harbor would come forth in order to overcome with their artillery the defect in the plan of the works. Then at least the Japanese would have been sure that the Russian vessels were again or still in Vladivostok, and could have commenced the blockade.

But since no Russian ships appeared till some time after 2:00 o'clock, the Japanese again steamed off. They had to withdraw from sight of land before dusk, lest the torpedo boats of Vladivostok knowing their course, should make a night attack.

Perhaps Kamimura was in hopes that on the day following the bombardment at least one or the other ship would be sent out from the harbor to ascertain the whereabouts of the

aggressor. He consequently reappeared on the morning of March 7th in the Ussuri Bay, ordered all adjacent anchoring places to be searched, approached once more the eastern entrance to the harbor, but was unable to discover any ships. He then concluded that the Russian cruiser squadron was not in Vladivostok. Kamimura searched in addition Possiet Bay, but could not see anything of the enemy there. To what base he then "retired" as he expresses it, is still unknown.

Attack against Port Arthur on March 10th.

It appears as if the attacks of Admiral Togo against Port Arthur have in a routine manner been begun with torpedo boat action.

During midnight of March 9/10, the Japanese first squadron reappeared in front of Port Arthur, and dispatched 2 divisions of large boats against the roadstead for a night attack. The boats apparently carried mines for the purpose of endeavoring to render the harbor entrance impassable.

There were no Russian ships in the roadstead. The boats however were discovered by the search lights, whereupon the shore batteries opened a heavy fire on them.

The "A" division then fell back to the Lianteshan promontory, the "B" division, in spite of the heavy fire of the shore batteries, endeavored to lay mines; to what extent it was successful, is still unknown.

During this undertaking Japanese cruisers appear to have thrown shells into the city, for it is spoken of dead and wounded in the town as due to the night attack.

A Russian torpedo boat flotilla put to sea at 2:50 A. M. At about 4 o'clock it encountered the "A" division off Lianteshan promontory. An engagement at short range ensued, during which both sides sustained losses in men (the Russians among others 4 officers wounded, the Japanese 7 dead, 1 officer

12 men wounded), but apparently no boats were lost. The Russians say that they destroyed a Japanese boat by a torpedo, which the Japanese contest. A steam pipe on one of the Japanese boats shot to pieces.

The boats then dispersed into various directions.

Toward 6 o'clock a second Russian flotilla put to sea, but returned after half an hour, because the hostile cruisers were approaching, and the day was dawning which made it impossible for them to get past. Meanwhile also the Japanese "B" division had discontinued the work in the roadstead and fallen back toward the sea. Hereby it observed the two large boats "Raeshitelni and "Sterebugshi", which after the engagement off Lianteshan had deviated toward the sea, making for the harbor, attacked them and damaged the engine of the "Sterebugshi", which had to stop and began to sink. With the exception of four men the crew jumped into the water and drowned, four machinists were made prisoners. The "Raeshitelni" escaped to the harbor.

When Admiral Makaroff noticed the danger of the two boats of being cut off, he put forth to their rescue with the "Novik". But before he could prevent the loss of the "Sterebugshi", the Japanese main force with cruisers in the lead approached, the latter taking the torpedo boats under cover. Against these overwhelming forces the Novik was obliged to turn back.

It is obvious that these torpedo boat massacres mean nothing for the course of the war. Noteworthy is however that those boats which were supported by the superior fleet of large ships, emerged victoriously.

All Russian boats employed without this support have thus far attained nothing, but boat after boat has been lost.

The Japanese squadron chief dispatched toward 6 o'clock A. M. a cruiser division to the Taliénwan Bay, a second one consisting of "Takasago" and "Chihaya" to the western bays of Liaotung, evidently for the purpose of searching for torpedo boats. A third cruiser division was left in front of the roadstead of Port Arthur as flank observers for the intended indirect bombardment of the city. The battleships then went to anchor west of Lianteshan, and opened an indirect fire from this point on the new town and the inner harbor from 9.15 to 12.45, firing over the intervening country and mountains. The distance from here lies between 12000 and 13000 m. The bombardment nevertheless appears to have been effective. A number of houses in the new town is reported destroyed, the "Retvisan" was again hit, two machinists being killed. The following casualties are mentioned: at the batteries, six dead and four wounded; on the ships, one dead and five wounded; in the town, 4 civilians killed and several wounded; in connection herewith should be taken into consideration that the Russians are evidently not counting in the lightly injured.

The Russian batteries have fired in intervals, presumably while the hostile main force proceeded to its secure position, and later on on the cruisers; they claim to have damaged one of them seriously.

After the cessation of firing the various parts of the Japanese squadron assembled and put to sea, and were not seen on the following day.

Russian ships went out to reconnoiter on March 11, but have not encountered the enemy thus far.

#### The war on land.

Encounters on land of any importance have as yet not taken place, it is therefore still impossible to produce a coherent picture of the mutual movements or positions.



According to reports thus far received, the Russians seem first of all to have had the intention of concentrating their main forces near Mukden and Liaoyang, and of establishing a primary defensive position at the mouth of the Yalu across the Seoul-Mukden highway. For the protection against a turning movement or perhaps for the purpose of directing an attack against the right flank of the aggressive forces, a corps of troops was evidently put in march on the highway on the east coast of Korea.

This disposition was made with the expectation that the main column of the opponent would march from Seoul over Pingyang into South Manchuria. The activity of the Japanese thus far, and the conditions of roads would point to this.

Recently the report was received that an entire army corps is being retained at Harbin and that it is to remain there in spite of the difficulty of obtaining shelter. This would indicate that the Russians have already decided to concentrate far in rear. This may have been done for the reason that still much time is required to transport superior numbers to East Asia or that the Russians do not desire to fight between the Chinese troops concentrated on the Manchurian border to a grave extent, on one side, and the Japanese on the other. Or the Russians have become dubious as to whether the Japanese after all, instead of directing the main attack from Seoul against Mukden, would march from Northeast Korea (Placksin Bay or possibly Possiet Bay) into Central Manchuria. As long as there exists no reliable information on this point, it would appear to be better to keep a reserve for both emergencies in readiness.

Into which direction the Japanese offensive will further develop, is thus far actually unknown. According to reports they are disembarking troops both on the west and east coast of North Korea.

Up to the present nothing has been said about the organizations constituting the eastern column. Fusan appears to be garrisoned solely as supply harbor. The railway Fusan-Seoul, which was still incomplete at the outbreak of the war, has been finished, and is used as the main line of intermediate bases. The Japanese railway battalion is constructing a field railway from Seoul to Ping-yang.

The roads in Korea seem to create much difficulty for both columns. The fact however, that the Russians observe the defensive on land and that they are accomplishing nothing on water, has enabled the Japanese to advance a considerable distance on both sides. The main forces of the western column were pushed forward to Pingyang by transporting them on sea to Haidshu and Chinampo. The reported disembarkation of 2500 men in the Plaksin Bay constitutes presumably the preparation of a similar advance of the Eastern column from Gensan to Pukchin near Chestakeff harbor, or still further to the front.

The cavalry on either side appears to be in touch in the west as well as in the east.

Although the thawing snow and the spring floods may prevent a rapid advance of the Japanese in the near future, the concentration of troops will increase gradually to such an extent, that a beginning of movements, and consequently also of events on the theater of war on land may be expected at a time not far remote.

In order to be able to follow this up, it will be appropriate to produce a picture of the strenght of the armies on both sides, and the conditions of their dispositions.

The Russian army.

The sketch-enclosure No. 1, shows the distribution of the entire army of the Russian Empire over the total area,

and the connection by rail at the districts lying outside of the main railroad- not with the home country.

The entire army has not been mobilized for this war, but solely the troops of the vice-regency of the far East, and of the Siberian military district.

If in addition to this, a mobilization of the two army corps of the military district of Turkestan is mentioned, the truth of which cannot be ascertained, it could not have been ordered for the purpose of using these army corps in the East Asiatic theater of war. Thus far the district of Turkestan has only through Europe connection by rail with the Far East.

Enclosure No. 2 shows the troops of the vice regency and of the Siberian district previous to the outbreak of the war, as well as the planned mobilization- formations. The mobilization-order designates as first day of mobilization the 10th day of February for the vice-regency, and the 15th day for Siberia.

For the purpose of filling the organizations up to their war strength, the following are available, viz: men of the reserve who line in the two districts, furthermore the reservists of the Perm and Vyetka provinces, which however belong to the European military district of Kasan; this is not under mobilization; these provinces are connected by rail only with the Siberian road and not with the European system; finally the designated officers of the reserve from all parts of the country. The third battalions of the rifle regiments which had but two battalions before the outbreak of the war, are organized from assignments from the European army corps. Volunteers from all parts of the country are admitted as reservists (Ersatz-truppen -troops used to fill vacancies caused by casualties).

From the troops of the vice-regency and of Siberia, augmented or mobilized in this manner, have been formed, no counting the local garrisons: three Siberian army corps, two cavalry divisions, three infantry reserve divisions. The third army corps and the cavalry divisions (from the 2nd and 3rd cossack-reserves) were newly organized, the infantry reserve divisions were taken from the Siberian reserve brigades in conformity with the mobilization plan. It is striking that for the formation of the 3rd army corps two thirds of the troops, formerly of the 2nd corps, and those not belonging to any corps, were selected. The reason for these transfers may be the casual distribution of troops at the outbreak of war.

In addition to the mobilization of troops in East Asia a reenforcement from Europe is contemplated, which for the first will probably be limited to one army corps. From the fact that appointments for a fourth Siberian army corps have been promulgated, the conclusion may be drawn that the reenforcement will not consist of an entire European corps, but of smaller units, detached from the several European corps, which when assembled, shall constitute the new Siberian corps.

A question as to what force Russia may be able to employ against Japan during the war, is useless.

All arrangements made thus far point to it that Russia believes for the present to get along with four army corps, two cavalry divisions, and three reserve divisions in addition to the local garrison.

Whether or not these troops will suffice, the Russians will be able to determine only during the war.

Enclosure No. 3 represents the disposition of the East Asiatic army as far as it can be assumed from reports thus far received.

Therefore the Manchurian army, the portion destined for operations will, after the completion of its concentration amount to about 210 000 men in round numbers.

The Siberian railroad constitutes the most important expedient for the concentration of the forces as well as for their maintainance during the war.

As to the capacity of the latter various opinions have been formed. The only official statement we possess, is to the effect that the minister of railroads has declared that after the completion of some sidings, it would be possible to run five trains daily from Europe, two with troops and three with supplies, and also that it would be possible to slightly increase the speed. From this it would appear that the service of the road has at first been less satisfactory, and the presumption would not be wrong that the road has thus far managed only four trains daily, which, considering the total length, the large station intervals (up to 55 km.), and the fact that it is only a single track road, is not at all surprising. One train on this road will transport but 500 men.

The interruption by Lake Baikal, which at the time had to be crossed by marching over the ice, because the ice-breakers could not do any efficient work, and the ice railroad was too dangerous for the transportation of men, causes a delay of one to two days, and an enormous accumulation of cars near Irkutsk, because the passage across the ice can only be accomplished by day light and means a long march (38 km.) which can only be undertaken by the troops and supplies arriving during the day, on the following morning.

If it be considered now that the road has to transport from Europe alone of active troops:

32 third battalions		16 days of departure,
36 battalions	)for the (	
	)IVth (	
6 batteries	)army	(about 22 days of depart-
1 battalion of pioneers)	corps	(ure.

(assuming that the cavalry and trains of the IVth corps are taken from Cossacks and Siberia), the last of these troops will be able to arrive in Harbin only after 66 days, i. e. not before the middle of April.

In order to increase the East Asiatic forces to the planned strength, the road must further transport:  
on its entire length:

The officers of the reserve and the new staffs, the reserves of the Perm and Vyetka provinces; on portions of the road more or less extended: the reserves of Siberia, the 2nd and 3rd reserves of the Transbaikal-Cossack army the reservists, not considering the transportation of supplies which the road will have to render, since the connection by sea has been lost. One can therefore understand when Russia, as it has officially announced, does not contemplate to have all the forces concentrated before the middle of June in the Far East to be available for the field, which forces it considers necessary for a decisive conduct of war on land during the present war.

#### The Japanese Army.

The sketch, enclosure No. 4, shows the distribution of the Japanese army in time of peace. The available thirteen divisions are divided into three armies in time of peace. As this arrangement corresponds to the geographical location of the divisions, but has not been used for the defensive thus far, i. e. as far as the division into three armies is concerned, it would serve only for purposes during time of peace (inspection), or it may signify the division for the defensive.

The Japanese soldier serves three years with the colors, four years in the reserve, five years in the territorial army, and in addition is liable for service in the "landsturm" (general levy of the people) from the 17th to the 40th year

of age. A considerable number of surplus recruits serve in the second reserve (Ersatz-Reserve) instead of serving with the colors and in the reserve.

The peace strength of the troops is approximately half or still less, of the war strength.

During the mobilization the ranks of the line are first filled from the reserves, then a reserve-brigade for each division of the line is formed, from the balance the 2nd reserve is organized.

During the war 1894/95 the reserve brigades were employed from the beginning with the invading army for the purpose of garrisoning and also for "Etape"\* purposes.

The territorial army constitutes the real garrison of the country in addition to the special fortress -and militia-organizations; it replaces the divisions of the line in their respective districts, for each regiment of the line a corresponding reserve-formation, but of less strength, is substituted.

According to reports at hand it appears as if also in Japan the entire army was not mobilized simultaneously, but by divisions in succession as it was desired to send them off. The fact that the embarkation could only be effected by single echelons in succession, and that a simultaneous mobilization or even a concentration of all field troops at one embarkation-point would have entailed an overburdening of the railroads and perhaps a delay of the first echelon on that account, not considering the probable expense, may have been the reason.

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Translator's note.

\* Etape-troops- troops holding intermediate bases and handling and guarding supplies from the base to the line of operations. There is no proper military expression in the English language for Etape.

In the meantime, however, all men of the reserve and 2nd reserve were called in for March 4th, and all troops have therefore been put on a war footing at the present moment; it may also be assumed that all reserve -and 2nd reserve- organizations have at least been formed at the concentration-points.

The strength of the divisions of the line and of the reserve-brigades amounts to an aggregate of 340 000 men with 780 field pieces in round figures.

The Japanese railroad system, compared with those of European states, is of course not yet well developed, the roads in most parts are single tracked, have high gradients, slow speed and small cars. The lines, however, were built in accordance with the mobilization plans, i. e. for two emergencies, firstly for the home defense, and secondly for the concentration of all troops at the Inland Sea, whereupon the embarkation of armies used for the offensive, for invasion across the sea, was contemplated. The time necessary for the simultaneous concentration of all divisions is estimated to be 50 days.

The Inland Sea is extremely well suited for this purpose, because the main portion of the merchant marine will be found in its harbors even in time of peace, and also because harbors for embarkation and space for the fitting out of the largest troop transports are available, furthermore the concentration can be managed under the best protection against hostile naval forces. Even should the Japanese not hold the supremacy at sea, an expeditionary force might lie here in waiting to be dispatched to Korea as soon as the hostile fleet were withdrawn for one day only.



According to an estimate the Japanese merchant fleet is able, after having detached the necessary supply vessels (hospital ships, colliers, ammunition and repair vessels) for the battle squadron, and without abandoning the most urgent postal and coast service, to transport about two divisions with artillery and trains simultaneously across the sea.

The embarkation of the division complete lasts, considering the very good preparations and judging from former experiences, three days, the disembarkation, under less favorable conditions in Chemulpo and Chinampo at least five days. Including the time required for the preparation of the steamers for the following trip and counting the necessary additional time taken up by unavoidable delays, each army echelon of two divisions would occupy the fleet of transports for at least 16 days. If 10 days are added for the mobilization of the 1st echelon, the transfer of all divisions of the line to North Korea, counting from February 6th, would last until the end of May.

Whether or not the Japanese will first land the entire army, before making an advance, is another question.

M.


Fort Creek, Neb. February 28, 1905.

Respectfully submitted without remark.

H. HOSSFELD,

2nd Lieut. 30th Inf'y.

Translation  
No. 230.



THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR,

translated from supplements of the Marine Kundschau, by Second Lieutenant H. Hassfeld, 30th Infantry, from March 1st 1905 to March 14th, 1905.

SIXTH SUPPLEMENT.

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Chronological recapitulation.

March 22: Fifth attack of the Japanese fleet against Port Arthur.

March 27: Sixth attack of the Japanese fleet against Port Arthur. Second unsuccessful attempt of obstructing entrance by the sinking of vessels.

COURSE OF WAR ON SEA, CONTINUED.

After the attack of the Japanese fleet against Port Arthur on March 10th, the Russian fleet under Admiral Makarov put to sea from Port Arthur, has apparently remained outside for a few days, and then returned. According to the news available Makarov did not immediately follow the withdrawing main force of the enemy, but commenced his advance only on March 12th, i.e. after one day had passed. It appears therefore that it was not his intention to remain in touch with the aggressor, but to chase off the observation cruisers, and to keep the enemy in the dark as to his future plans. The desire of keeping his ships on the move may also have prompted him, for with the defense, idleness has the worst effect upon the morale of the men.

On March 13th, twenty to thirty shots are said to have been exchanged with Japanese ships, probably cruisers. An encounter with the Japanese main force has apparently not taken place. The main force appears to have returned to Sassebo after the bombardment, where the damaged torpedo boats and probably also

ships, as may well be assumed, have been repaired.

Also Admiral Kamimura returned to Sassebo after his unsuccessful reconnaissance of Vladivostok.

Both squadrons, after being once more united, put to sea on or about the evening of March 19th, for a new attack against Port Arthur.

#### FIFTH ATTACK AGAINST PORT ARTHUR ON MARCH 22ND.

At 2:00 P.M. March 22, a Japanese division of torpedo boats, consisting of two large boats, appeared in the roadstead of Port Arthur, but was noticed in time and fired on by the batteries and three gunboats, which were on guard in the roadstead. The division retired remaining under fire for twenty minutes.

At 4:00 o'clock A.M. another division, consisting of three large boats, advanced to the roadstead, but was repulsed by fire in the same manner. As usual, the Japanese claim, to have sustained no losses.

At 7:00 o'clock A.M. the Japanese main force, formed in three divisions of six vessels each, (one division consisted of battleships, two of cruisers) with four dispatch boats in the lead, was sighted from Port Arthur.

Towards 9:00 o'clock the main force divided, the battleship division and the torpedo boats took position at a point between Liantishau and Pigeon Bay, one of the cruiser divisions remained south, the other southeast of the harbor entrance at considerable distance.

Two of the battleships, "Fuji" and "Yashima", received orders to bombard the inner harbor over the mountains of the Liantishan similarly to the last bombardment.

But this time the Russians had also prepared for indirect firing, and apparently before the Japanese opened fire, presumably after the two afore named ships had cast anchor, the

"Retvisan" at 9:20 commenced also to fire over the mountains at the two vessels. Its projectiles are said, according to a Japanese statement, to have fallen in great numbers around the "Fuji", but of course without causing any damage.

As soon as the Japanese fleet was sighted, the Russian squadron commenced to abandon the inner harbor, one ship at a time only being able to pass the narrow channel, for the purpose of forming for battle.

The Japanese counted five battleships, and four torpedo boats, according to the Russian statement only cruisers went out.

The Japanese thought that the appearance of the Russians in front of the entrance was to entice them into battle under the hostile shore batteries, to this they could not be induced however.

The Russian batteries and cruisers fired on the Japanese cruiser division.

At 10:00 o'clock A. M. a Russian battery observed that a Japanese cruiser was struck by a shell and that it steamed off subsequently.

At 11:00 o'clock the Japanese fleet assembled and disappeared with slow speed toward south-east.

In all the Japanese are said to have fired 100 shots into Port Arthur and its vicinity. The damages are said to have been inconsiderable. The Russians mention as casualties five dead and ten wounded. The Japanese have thus far kept silent as to the final result of the day.

#### FURTHER COURSE OF THE WAR.

According to an official statement of the Russian government the repairs on the "Retvisan" and "Pallada" were completed in the meantime, this is of importance for the condition of the Russian fleet, as now only the "Zessaarevitch" has not yet been repaired, the only one left of the vessels which were damaged

during the first torpedo boat attack. With the "Zessarevitch" the nature of the damage inflicted seems to render repairs without a dry dock impossible. Various propositions for the improvising of a dock by damming, and draining of a portion of the harbor basin, have thus far not been realized practically.

The Russians have failed once more to follow the withdrawing enemy immediately.

Only as late as March 26th Admiral Makarov has apparently sailed out with his entire squadron, as he says, for the purpose of reconnoitering several islands. At this occasion he met a Japanese merchant steamer which he sunk. Towards evening he returned to the harbor.

On the following day the Japanese made a new attempt to obstruct the harbor entrance.

The interval of time since the preceding attack is not sufficiently long to warrant the supposition that the Japanese returned again to Sassebo for repairs. It must therefore be supposed that they either did not sustain any serious damages on March 22, or that the damaged ships only were sent back. This may also be the cause for not entering into a fight during the undertaking of March 27th, but of merely taking stone laden vessels, and torpedo boats to the roadstead for the purpose of obstructing the harbor entrance.

#### SIXTH ATTACK AGAINST PORT ARTHUR ON MARCH 27th.

On March 27th at 2.00 o'clock A.M. after the moon had risen, six Japanese torpedo boats, accompanied by four merchant steamers, prepared to be exploded, appeared in the roadstead of Port Arthur. The torpedo boats were in the lead for the purpose of conducting the steamers to their proper places; the steamers were armed with light guns (37 cm. Hotchkiss cannons) to keep off small vessels, they also possessed one life boat each for the purpose of saving their respective crews; the vessels were laden

with explosives and provided with electrical fuses. The steamers measured about 2000 tons and are said to have been comparatively new.

This detachment was followed at great distance by ships of the main force, presumably cruisers, which during the advance were to attract the attention of the defense by firing upon the works. The detachment of steamers laden with explosives was however observed at 2:15 o'clock by the guard ships "Bobr", and "Otvashuy", and fired at by these vessels and the batteries. The torpedo boat "Ssilin" which was then on guard, made a dash against the leading steamer, and caused it to sink by a torpedo directed against its bow. The following two steamers obliged toward starboard and rannon the beach under Golden Hill, the last steamer retired and was wrecked west of the entrance on the remnants of one of the Japanese vessels beached here during the first attempt of obstruction. According to a Russian statement the crew of but one steamer made their escape in a life boat.

Several of the Japanese torpedo boats threw themselves upon the torpedo boat "Ssilin" which had fired the successful shot against the leading steamer "Ssilin" was badly shot to pieces and unable to maneuver, drifted on the beach under Golden Hill, was however floated the following forenoon and taken to the harbor.

The Japanese torpedo boats were then driven off by a fire which was continued until 4.00 o'clock A.M.

The Russian losses were one officer and 6 men killed, one officer and 12 men wounded, all of the "Ssilin"; the Japanese casualties were 1 officer, 3 men killed, 3 officers, 6 men wounded.

At 5:00 o'clock A.M. the batteries were again called to arms, because the Japanese torpedo boats had re-appeared. For a short period they were fired at, but as they did not come any nearer, the firing was discontinued.

The Japanese squadron appeared at six o'clock A.M. on the

horizon, whereupon the Russian large vessels left at once the harbor in order to form line in the roadstead. Several batteries opened fire, but ceased soon on account of the great distance. After the line was formed, the Russian squadron advanced toward the enemy. The cruisers "Bayan", "Novik", and "Askold", which were in advance, approached within extreme range. The Japanese squadron however turned and withdrew in a southeastern direction, which caused the cruisers to soon abandon their fire on account of the great distance.

At 10:00 o'clock the Japanese had again disappeared from view of Port Arthur. Admiral Makarov returned to the harbor.

A large torpedo was found drifting in the roadstead and was exploded.

The many artificial undertakings of the Japanese against Port Arthur prove, that they feel themselves by no means strong enough to risk a decisive attack against the same.

On the other hand the desperate attempts to obstruct the harbor entrance indicate, that, also after the primary success on sea, it is only the Russian fleet, which is in their way, and which they are striving to cripple by all means. The importance of this fleet for the continuance of the war has of course increased, since it has ceased under the new leader to remain voluntarily passive. Should the Russian fleet in this manner succeed to keep off the Japanese invasion, until Russia has concentrated in the theater of war overwhelming land forces, it would answer its purpose, although after the first losses it is without doubt inferior to the Japanese fleet.

#### THE WAR ON LAND.

The transfer of the Japanese troops to the continent has apparently been interrupted. Thus far, besides the first army corps, no further Japanese troops were disembarked in Korea.

The first cavalry brigade and the artillery reserve seem to be

still missing with the first army. It is possible that these troops have been assigned to other units in the meantime.

The organization of a second army from three divisions is being talked about since the last month. This army has been assigned to Liantung for disembarkation, but has thus far not appeared on this side of the sea, separating the opponents.

It can hardly be explained otherwise as that the Japanese are still fearing the Russian fleet, and that they do not like to maneuver with large transports in its immediate vicinity.

On the other hand, they may not have had the intention to march their entire army through Korea. The few and bad roads and the difficulty of subsistence in the poor country made this probably appear impossible of execution.

Then activity was therefore applied first of all to attempts of battling up the Russian fleet, and the transfer of further land troops was stopped. The first army of Korea appears to have the sole object of securing the country for a line of etapes, as line of retreat in case of reverses, and as object for negotiations for peace. Of course the Japanese occupation of Korea will not be without significance for the war in Manchuria, for they will either bind a portion of the Russian troops to the Korean frontier, or may find an opportunity of invading Manchuria at the proper moment and of co-operating with the other forces there.

Since the beginning of March this Japanese first army is advancing slowly on the main road from Seoul to Wiju.

On March 8th reconnoitering cavalry appeared on the Chinch-angang (the river on which the town Andyu is situated.)

On March 17th Japanese infantry intrenched on the left bank of this river, on the 18th Paktshoen and on the 19th Yongpyoeng north of this river were occupied.

The Russian cavalry, of which the main force, as already



stated, advanced at the end of February as far as Andyu, and the patrols as far as Pingyang, has retired, keeping in touch with their points.

According to reports, which cannot be believed however as far as numbers are concerned, strong columns of Russian troops are said to have been sent across the Yalu to oppose the advance of the adversary.

It appears as if the Japanese cavalry evaded the Russian patrols in most cases, a number of minor patrol encounters have consequently been without results.

The Russians then made several advances in larger numbers. On March 17th 200 cossacks were ordered to prevent the hostile cavalry from crossing the Paktshoen river, three Japanese squadrons retired before them.

On March 23rd two sotnias were to ascertain how many Japanese had already crossed the Ching-chang-anoy, they had to retire from Paktshoen, after recognizing that it had been occupied in the meantime by two companies and three squadrons.

On March 28th five sotnias were dispatched to Choengdshu where they encountered cavalry and infantry (according to their statement four squadrons and five companies were gradually united), they had to return after a fight lasting 1 1/2 hours.

The engagement appears to have been very stubborn on both sides. The Russians mention three men killed, four officers and twelve men wounded, and maintain to have inflicted heavy losses to the Japanese. The Japanese state that the heavy losses have been on the Russian side and admit only one officer and four men killed and one officer and eleven men wounded.

At present the situation in Korea seems to be as follows: the main force of the Japanese first army is concentrated at Ping-Yang, a strong advance guard, according to some statements,

a division has secured the crossings over the Ching-chang-ang and Paktshoen rivers. It should be noted that they control here the western terminus of the cross-roads leading from Gensan and Port Lazareo over the mountains.

Whether the Russians have actually thrown large numbers of troops across the Yalu, and whether in the energetic action of the Russian reconnaissance indications for an offensive movement against the Japanese, landed on Korea, should be seen, it at present is impossible to say. The Russians furthermore seem to be preparing also for a possible landing of the Japanese in the Gulf of Pechili. In particular Newchwang and the mouth of the Liau river, which is now beginning to become ice free, are being fortified and the troops being concentrated there.

Accordingly the Russian troops seem to represent at present five groups, viz: one on the Yalu, one on Liaotung and towards Newchwang, one on the Tumen river, and a reserve held back near Harbin. As soon as the principal direction of the Japanese offensive has been ascertained, further concentration will presumably be undertaken.

In the meantime the commander in chief of the Mauchurian army, General Kuropatkin, has appeared in the theater of war. Periodicals have often news to the effect that in addition to the planned Siberian corps still other European corps will be dispatched to the front. From the opinion on the war, expressed by the new commander in chief, it is possible that he has already now succeeded in convincing the authorities that the originally planned troops will not suffice.

#### THE WAR AGAINST COMMERCE.

On the field of war against shipping trade the Russians appear at present to be more active than the Japanese, although not quite as successful.

Since the prizes taken by the Japanese during the first two weeks of the war, nothing further has become known in that respect;

these prizes fell into their hands, because Russia at the time of the outbreak of the war had not taken any precautionary measures.

A blockade of Port Arthur or Vladivostok is neither effectively or on paper in existence. Steamers carrying coal, provisions and other contraband have at various times passed the Tsugaru Strait and arrived at Vladivostok or were taken into Port Arthur.

The armored cruiser "Dmitri Donskoi" is cruising in the Mediterranean since March 12th, on the main route to Alexandria and the Suez canal. A large number of ships was stopped and searched, but apparently without capturing any "good prize" thus far.

But that Russia is counting on prizes in the near future, is demonstrated by the establishment of prize-courts at Liban, Sevastopol, Port Arthur and Vladivostok.

It is mentioned in regard to the Japanese steamer "Yeserik" which was laden with contraband, that it succeeded to pass through the Mediterranean without molestation. This is not at all surprising, for a single cruiser can in no possible way effectively blockade the Mediterranean.

On the other hand, however, the fear for the Russian vessels in the Mediterranean has caused the Japanese government, to take its colliers from Cardiff around the Cape, on account of which the price of the coal has of course gone up.

Otherwise both belligerents are continuing to buy coal in England; on March 18th, Russia is said to have purchased over 80,000 tons, simultaneously Japan closed a deal for over 100,000 tons.

#### ATTITUDE OF THE NEUTRAL POWERS.

The American government, in a special message to its citizens and press, has ordered the strictest neutrality.

The sale to Japan of the Chilean ships "Captain Prat", "Chacabuco", and "Almirante Condell", has been frustrated through the loyalty of neutral Chile. The purchase was closed before the war by an American merchant, acting as agent, but was made dependent of the approval of the Chilean congress. This approval however will now only be given in case it is guaranteed that these ships will not be sold to either belligerent.

Russia is still in doubt as regards the faithfulness of the Chinese neutrality. Apparently the Russian Ambassador at Peking has requested the Chinese government to withdraw its troops behind the great wall as proof of its loyal intentions.

Sweden has obstructed the waters of Gotland with mines.

France is actively negotiating with England in regard to all colonial questions pending at present between the two powers. Perhaps both are in hopes to induce each other more easily to concessions in view of the present uncertain condition of world politics.

#### DETAILS OF THE TORPEDO BOAT ENGAGEMENT ON MARCH 10th.

Several interesting details regarding the torpedo boat engagements in front of Port Arthur, as mentioned in the 5th supplement, have become known in the meantime. Accordingly the Japanese A-division during the engagement off Liantishan promontory consisted of three large boats, viz: "Asashivo", "Kasmini" and "Akatsuki"; the "Shirakumo", formerly belonging to this division was absent. These three boats were conducting a fire against six Russian vessels for approximately half an hour at short range. The hostile boats approached in several instances so closely, that the Russians were able to throw hand grenades, the fuses of which did not burn however. Collisions appear to have been successfully avoided.

According to the statement of an eye witness all participating boats were damaged more or less by fire. One

Japanese boat received a hit below the water line which caused two compartments to become filled, and which submerged the magazine; on board the "Akatsuki" a hit destroyed a steam pipe in the boiler room, causing injuries to the men there. On the third boat the platform of the 7.5 cm gun was hit by a shell, destroying the chart house and the machine telegraph; a 4.7 cm shell went through the hull above water without causing any further damage. On all boats the upper deck fixtures, smoke stacks and decks were perforated in various parts by shell fragments. In spite of all this every boat could be taken back to the harbor at home. The longest repair on the Japanese side is said to have required four days.

The Russian boats were armed in all with six 7.5 cm and eighteen 4.7 cm. rapid fire guns, the Japanese boats in all with three 7.5 cm. and fifteen 5.7 cm. rapid fire guns.

During the second torpedo boat engagement in front of the roadstead the large torpedo boats "Sasanami", "Shinonome" and "Usugumo" on the Japanese side were pitched against the two Russian boats "Steregetshi" and "Reshitelni". The Japanese in all were armed with three 7.5 cm. quick firing guns and fifteen 5.7 cm. of the same description, the Russians possessed two 7.5 cm. and six 4.7 quick firing guns.

The Russians tried to escape, the "Reshitelni" succeeded, the "Steregetshi" however was cut off by the "Sasanami", which apparently at first fought alone against it during the close fight. The Japanese first of all concentrated their fire on the 7.5 cm. quick firing gun of the "Steregetshi", destroyed the same and was then opposing with one 7.5 cm. and five 5.7 cm. quick firing guns the three 4.7 cm. quick firing guns of the Russians. The Russians offered brave resistance but were overwhelmed in succession. As the engine of the "Steregetshi" was also damaged in the meantime, the Japanese succeeded to board

the vessel. Of the 55 members of the crew 30 were already killed at this moment, several locked themselves up in the cabins and could not be gotten out.

Of the four prisoners taken by the Japanese, two were severely wounded, two rescued from the water. The Sazanami of course was also hit, two killed are mentioned.

The comparatively large losses and the numerous damages may be traced back to the fact that this was a fight at the shortest range possible. It should be noted however, that in spite of the numerous quick firing guns, which were used in both engagements, not more than one boat was actually annihilated. The "Steregetshi" was a boat of 220 tons, the Japanese boats measured 280 to 300 tons.

It appears therefore that the effect of the 5 cm to 6 cm. guns against boats of this size is not decisive.


H.

Fort Crook, Nebraska, March 14th 1905.

Respectfully submitted,

(Signed), H. HOSSFELD.

2nd Lieut. 30th Infantry.



THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR,

translated from supplements of the Marine Rundschau, by  
Second Lieutenant H. Hoefeld, 30th Infantry, from March  
15th, 1905 to April 11th, 1905.

SEVENTH SUPPLEMENT.

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Chronological recapitulation.

March 27: Declaration of a state of war at Newchwang.

March 28: Engagement of outposts near Chengshu.

April 7: Statement of Japan announcing that all of Korea  
has been evacuated by the Russians.

April 8: Assault of a Japanese patrol on Sosalin Island in  
the estuary of the Yalu.

April 12: Seventh attack against Port Arthur. Sinking of the  
Russian flagship "Petrovlovsk" with the squadron chief  
Admiral Makarev on board, while sinking a mine in the road-  
stead of Port Arthur. The Russian battleship "Pobieda" is  
damaged by a mine.

April 14: Eighth attack against Port Arthur.

Course of the war on sea continued.

The Japanese fleet was not in touch with the Russian  
ships from March 28th to April 12th. During this period a  
council of war is said to have taken place in Japan. If this  
rumor proves to be correct, it may be supposed from the events  
thus far, that the purpose of the council was the future base  
for the second army. The transportation of this army across  
the water was begun, but again interrupted. The first echelon  
which comprises the 4th division, had put to sea, but appa-  
rently was not disembarked, but was left at Chemulpo loaded  
on transports, and the balance of the second army, which was  
already concentrated for the purpose of embarkation, has re-  
mained in Japan for the present. As presumed before, this

army was not designated to go to Korea, but to be either landed on the Liantung Peninsula, or to be taken to the Manchurian coast in the Gulf of Pechili. It may have been the intention originally to effect this landing only after the annihilation of the Port Arthur fleet.

As now, however, this annihilation, in spite of the repeated attempts, has not as yet been realized, and as the Russian fleet seems to develop greater activity indeed, the Japanese were confronted by the question whether they should wait still longer with the war on land or whether they should risk the disembarkation of the second army, in spite of the fact that the hostile fleet was still able to operate, or whether they should modify the points for attack on land.

A rumor to the effect that the 4th division has been disembarked on the left bank of the estuary of the Yalu, which is occupied by the first army, would point to the latter. In the meantime a new change has again transpired at Port Arthur, which may create another change in the Japanese initiative.

After the departure of the Japanese fleet on March 27th, Admiral Makarev with his squadron or parts of it went out to sea several times, (among other occasions once as far as to the island of Haiyuntan), until the Japanese fleet commenced a new offensive movement under Togo on April 13th.

Seventh attack against Port Arthur on April 12th, 1904.

The Japanese fleet designated for the new operation was apparently composed of the following vessels, viz:



<u>1st squadron:</u>	<u>2nd squadron:</u>	<u>3rd squadron:</u>
(battleships):	(large cruisers):	(small cruisers):
(speed:18 knots.)	(speed 20 knots).	"Chitose", 22.5 knots.
"Asahi"	"Asama",	"Takasago", 22.5 "
"Mikasa", ?	"Tokino",	"Kasagi", 22.5 "
"Hatsuse",	"Yokumo",	"Yoshino", 22.5 "
"Shikishima",	"Izumo",	"Akashi", 19.5 "
"Fugi",	"Iwate", ?	"MUTAKA", 20.0 "
"Yashima".	"Azuma",	
	"Nishin",	
	"Kassuga".	
	:	

Large torpedo boats.

<u>1st division:</u>	<u>2nd division:</u>	<u>3rd division:</u>	<u>4th division:</u>	<u>5th division:</u>
"Asashino",	"Ikazuchi,"	"Sazanami"	"Murakumo",	"Harusane"
"Kasumi"	"Inazuma"	"Shinonome"	"Spirami"	"Hayatori"
"Akatsuki"	"Oboro"	"Usugumo"	"Yagiri"	"Asagiri"
	"Akebono"		"Kagero"	"Murasame"

Torpedo boats.

9th division: "Chidori", "Misasagi", "Monazuru", "Hayabusa".

14th division: "Tsubame", "Atotaka", "Hato", "Kari".

Auxiliaries.

Mine ship "Koryo Maru".

The 4th and 5th divisions of large torpedo boats, the 14th division of torpedo boats and the mine-steamer "Koryo Maru", reached at midnight of April 11/12 the roadstead of Port Arthur, and succeeded, in spite of the activity of the Russian search lights, in laying floating mines in different places.

During the night the Russians stationed a cruiser immediately in front of the entrance of the harbor as guard-ship; this cruiser was amply provided with quick firing guns and had the nets put up; further out, about the Liantshan-promontory due east, torpedo boats were patrolling as outposts.

Apparently favored by the inclement weather, the Japanese succeeded in getting past these torpedo boats unseen. The Japanese evidently did not approach the harbor entrance, but laid the mines on one side of it in the roadstead, where the Russian squadron has habitually maneuvered during the engagements. At any rate, it appears as if the mining was not observed at all.

At dawn six light Japanese cruisers (the 3rd squadron) with additional torpedo boats made their appearance on the horizon, apparently observing Port Arthur.

The Russian division of outposts must have returned to the harbor in the meantime, without encountering the Japanese who had then accomplished their night work, except two boats, the "Strashnu" and another one, which on account of the inclement weather during the night had lost connection with their division, and were now at 6 o'clock a. m. endeavoring to reach the harbor alone. As soon as they were observed by the Japanese cruisers, their torpedo boats at once steamed toward them in order to out them off. "Strashnu" was reached by the Japanese 2nd large torpedo boat division and sunk, while the second Russian boat went past.

Apparently "Bayan" was doing guard duty on this day near the harbor entrance. When she perceived the arrival of the Strashnu, she weighed anchor and came to her assistance, but was unable to prevent her from sinking, she rescued however, as it is said, five men of the crew. The Japanese boats retreated before the "Bayan" toward their cruisers.

In the meantime, at about 8 o'clock, Admiral Makarov with his flagship "Petrovlevsk", the battle ships "Pobeda" and "Peresvyet", the torpedo destroyer "Gaidamirc" ? and five torpedo boats sailed out, and after the "Bayan" had joined him, advanced against the Japanese cruisers. According to the Japanese version the "Askold", "Norvik" and "Diana" also participated in the attack.

The Japanese small vessels were apparently sent far ahead, while the main force was still out of sight, but was keeping connection with the former by wireless telegraphy.

The Russians then chased the Japanese cruisers off to a distance of about 15 miles east of Port Arthur.

The Japanese delivered a slow fire, but were able to remain at such a great distance, on account of their superior speed, that they did not sustain any damages. In the meantime the Japanese first squadron, having been notified by telegraph in regard to the movement of the enemy and also the "Nishin" and "Kasuga" were approaching bearing on the Russian ships for attack. The latter immediately faced about in view of the overwhelming forces, and returned, arriving under the protection of the fortifications of Port Arthur before the Japanese main force could approach within effective range.

The Russian ships, presuming that now a bombardment of Port Arthur would follow, formed for battle in front of Golden Hill." During this maneuver, however, the flagship "Petrovlevsk" and the battleship "Pobeda" struck mines.

On the "Petrovlevsk" by the detonation of the mine a magazine was probably exploded simultaneously, in an instant a huge column of fire and smoke made its appearance, and the ship vanished within two minutes. The squadron chief with his chief of staff and the crew, consisting of over 500

men, went down. The following only were rescued, viz: the commandant seriously wounded, two officers, three naval cadets, and 52 (according to other reports 85 men, in addition thereto Grand Duke Kyrill Vladimirovitch. All the rescued were more or less seriously wounded.

The "Pobyeda" sustained from the mine a leak amidship on the starboard side. The ship however remained afloat and was able to retreat to the inner harbor without assistance.

It is only natural that these entirely unexpected events caused disorder in the Russian line. The danger was imminent that still more ships might strike mines. As there was no time to search for mines, -the ships believed themselves in the center of a mine-field-, they are said to have shot into the water around the ships, in order to destroy any mine that might possibly be in the vicinity, or to detonate them in this manner. No other accident took place however, and ship after ship gradually entered the harbor.

The Japanese fleet, which was observing these events, remained at a great distance, and beyond range steamed several times up and down in front of the roadstead. The Russian batteries and ships occasionally fired, but without effect. Toward noon the Japanese fleet as usual went out to sea, but detailed small vessels to observe the roadstead during the night and the following day.

The Russian losses on this day were: one battleship, a large torpedo boat and about 500 men, of these a leader who possessed the highest esteem and the entire confidence of his subordinates, and who through his personality had succeeded in a short time to render once more active a fleet which through its first losses had become so depressed as to remain entirely idle. The Japanese report one man wounded.

At variance with the attempts heretofore to bottle up the Russian fleet in the inner harbor of Port Arthur, the latest operation was undertaken for the purpose of crippling the same by losses.

From the Japanese version it appears as if Admiral Togo desired to entice his opponent into battle on the open sea, and as if the mines were only to be considered as a second iron in the fire, in case the Russian fleet should try again to go into battle under the protection of the fortifications.

If this is the case, the distance of 15 miles for which the Russians were drawn away from their base before the hostile squadron became visible to them, was selected too short. If it is considered that any commander would rather prefer to fight a battle than to allow himself to be pursued, at a distance of three miles from the enemy, a superiority of speed of 2 knots, as the Japanese battleship-squadron possesses it over the Russian vessels, would require at least 60 to 70 miles, if proper reconnaissance on the part of the slower fleet were lacking, and under normal visibility (hostile squadron could be recognized at a distance of about 10 miles), in order to force a battle.

The conditions would become more favorable for the faster vessels during cloudy weather, or better yet, if they could conceal themselves in a fog, but in such cases it would be entirely improbable that the one who does not desire the battle would chase a couple of cruisers for miles.

But according to the methods employed by the Japanese thus far, it is possible that the mines were their main object, and that the entire operation was mainly conducted for the purpose of causing the Russians to form for battle under the forts where the mines were.

It is noteworthy that the Japanese did not take further advantage of the confusion among the enemy.

Without their leader, under the depressing effect of the formidable catastrophes, handicapped in their maneuvers by the idea of having another explosion under their ships at any time, the Russians found themselves in such a precarious situation that perhaps a torpedo attack might have succeeded even at daylight. Also the activity of the coast batteries seem to have been paralyzed on account of the events taking place in front of them; and, a decisive fire at effective range, perhaps in conjunction with a torpedo boat attack against the hostile ships feeling their way, might have led to a complete annihilation of the opponent.

If in spite of all this the Japanese admiral solely looked on from a distance, this may be attributed to two causes: either the Japanese mines were distributed so irregularly in the roadstead that he could not afford to come any nearer without running the risk of encountering one himself, or the Japanese were determined to avoid staking any ships, as they have no reserve in this line, while the Russians still possess a reserve in the ships of the Baltic fleet.

The Japanese leadership would suggest the latter. The Japanese have always endeavored to attain success with small means without large risks. Their large vessels, since the first engagement in the roadstead of Port Arthur, were not again exposed to the hostile arms.

Fortune has been unusually favorable to them. If it be considered that only isolated bunches of mines could be laid in the wide roadstead of Port Arthur during half a night, and that the flagship had to strike just one of them, and that by a particular interchaining of circumstances the admiral had to go down on her, it must be acknowledged as an evidently unusual accident on the part of the opponent.

But whether the Japanese will continue to be able to attain the decision of the war without large risks in their

favor, will have to be seen, and should they bind themselves in this respect, that is to risk a little, a powerful weapon would be presented to an active defense in this manner to wrest the initiative from the opponent.

The success of the Japanese on April 13th, is once more a proof for the correctness of their views of the former French "jeune école" and of the adversaries of large vessels.

If it is possible to annihilate a large, expensive ship, within a few minutes by the much cheaper submarine weapon, it would appear that for nations which cannot afford to keep large battleships superior to their opponents, torpedo, mine and submarine craft would become the proper weapons, in order to meet successfully their enemies on the sea.

In drawing deductions from the present events for kindred considerations, it must not be overlooked that it is not the weaker one but the stronger one of the two opponents, who has been able to benefit from the submarine arms. Russia possesses a very extensive department of mining, especially in the Russian navy this branch has been strongly emphasized both as to material and personnel, Russia owned in East Asia at the outbreak of the war more large torpedo boats than Japan.

After having become without doubt inferior in battleships to the Japanese after the first attack at Port Arthur, it was especially up to the Russians to endeavor to reestablish the equilibrium by torpedo-boat attacks, or to tie up the Japanese fleet by mines in the harbors, regularly used for purposes of repair and equipage. The Russians have not been lacking the spirit of enterprise during the last days. Nevertheless they have not brought a torpedo near one of the large ships of the enemy, not one mine was laid in front of the harbors. The truth is the Russians were not strong enough in large

ships in order to approach the enemy with torpedo or mine vessels.

Feeling itself too weak to accept a battle with the hostile fleet on the high sea, the Russian battle fleet was unable to follow the enemy either on the sea or off the coast or at his anchorage; without support from the battle fleet, the torpedo boats and mine vessels would have been annihilated by the lighter vessels of the enemy before they could have accomplished their object.

Another conclusion is to be drawn from these conditions, i. e. in naval war all advantages are on the side of the offensive. The one who on account of too great an inferiority of means has lost from the start every chance for the offensive, will hardly have success at sea.

Eighth attack against Port Arthur, April 15, 1904.

During April 15th only single observation cruisers could be seen in front of Port Arthur.

On the morning of the 14th toward 2 o'clock, the Japanese 2nd, 4th and 5th divisions of large torpedo boats and the 9th torpedo boat division appeared in the roadstead and searched for mines, three of which are said to have been exploded. The Japanese claim that these were Russian mines.

Toward 8 o'clock a. m. the light cruisers (3rd Japanese squadron) arrived and were joined by the torpedo boats; at 9.15 o'clock the Japanese 1st and 2nd squadrons appeared. The "Nishin" and "Kassuga" were detached at a point west of Liantshan from where they bombarded the fortress and town of Port Arthur again indirectly until about noon, firing in all 188 shots.



The Japanese 1st squadron and the remainder of the second sailed to and fro beyond range in front of the roadstead, and fired at a battery recently established on Lian-tshan, which according to the statement of Admiral Togo, was silenced.

The ships lying in the inner harbor, the "Pobyseda" included, replied to the fire of the two large cruisers indirectly, and are said to have forced these finally to abandon the bombardment.

At 12.40 P. M. the Japanese withdrew once more to the sea.

According to Russian accounts the damages in the town and works were slight, the casualties of the garrison were: 5 men wounded; of the population: 7 Chinese killed, 3 wounded.

Thus far the Japanese have not mentioned anything regarding their losses.

Vice-Admiral Skrydlov has been appointed successor to Admiral Makarov; the viceroy Admiral Alexseyev has assumed command in person over the naval forces and hoisted his flag on the "Sevastopol" until his (Skrydlov's) arrival.

The Russian cruiser squadron is said to have left Vladivostok on April 14.

The Russian fleet in East Asia, not counting in several old ships without fighting value, is now composed of the following vessels, viz:

At Port Arthur:	:	At Vladivostok:
Battleships	:	Large cruisers:
"Sevastopol"	:	"Hurik".
"Poltava"	:	"Rossiya"
"Peresavyet"	:	"Gromoboi."
"Retvisan" )	:	Large, badly protected cruiser
"Zessarevitch" ) under repair	:	"Bogatyi".
"Pobyseda" )	:	6 torpedo vessels.

Large cruiser :  
     "Bayan" :  
 Large, badly protected cruisers: :  
     "Diana", :  
     "Pallada" :  
     "Arkold" :  
 Small cruiser "Nevik" :  
 19 large torpedo boats, :  
 of these a number is damaged: :

#### The war on land.

The Russians did not offer any strong resistance to the advance of the Japanese first army, but have remained on the right bank of the Yalu.

The Japanese have approached the left bank of the Yalu in several columns, and on April 2nd occupied Senkhou and Yenampho. During the advance on Widshu they surprised a detached post with balloon, and took possession of the camps of the Russian Yalu-timber-trading-company in Yenampho.

The Russian cavalry which had been south of the Yalu until that time, retired in a north-eastern direction, probably via Usan. Rumors regarding contemplated flanking movements or an advance of this cavalry against Japanese troops en route from the east coast of Korea (Gensan) are being heard. This cavalry probably is entrusted to keep in touch solely with the right wing of the Japanese, in order to recognize in time any turning movement against the Russian position on the left wing.

On April 7th the Japanese ambassador at Seoul has informed the Korean government that the Russians have abandoned North Korea and requested punishment for the inhabitants who had acted as guides for the Russians.

A commandant was appointed for the Japanese garrison troops in Korea. The Japanese railway battalion is constructing a field railway from Seoul to Widsu.

The 4th division which originally belonged to the 2nd army was disembarked on or about April 10th, as previously mentioned, in Yenampo, so that four divisions should now be in readiness.

The Japanese troops are said to be suffering severely from sickness, some kind of beri-beri is said to have become epidemic with the first army and consequently already additional troops to make up the deficiencies have been necessary.

Several old gun boats, for instance the "Kaimon" were detached for the purpose of assisting in reconnaissance and guard duty at the estuary of the Yalu.

The Russians on the right bank of the Yalu are holding Antung and Minliencheng which places they have fortified; a main reserve is kept in readiness at Fengwanheng. Armed junks are used on guard duty on the river.

Patrols of either side advance as far as to the islands situated in the center of the Yalu one of which was used by the Japanese in the Chinese-Japanese war during the bridging of the stream.

Encounters between the patrols of the opponents have repeatedly taken place.

On April 8th a Japanese patrol of 50 men was annihilated on the island of Samolin, after a party of Russians which was then on the island, first permitted them to land and then attacked them; on April 12th a fight took place between a boat of the "Kaimon" and several Russian guard junks.

News from the east side of Korea is missing.

At Newchwang the Russians are preparing for a defense with growing energy. After the river was declared free from ice, the city was declared to be in a state of war, the merchant vessels have left the harbor, commerce has ceased. As Newchwang is legally a treaty port and as it has besides the Japanese and Russian trade a strong English and American commerce, it was believed that England and America might protest against the declaration of state of war. However this they did not, but even recalled their gunboats which were there at the time.

Vigilance in Newchwang against a Japanese disembarkation appears to have developed into nervousness; on different occasions during the last days, ships, boats and lights were fired at, without real events taking place. It conveys the impression as if the Russians had certain information that this place or its vicinity had been selected by the Japanese as a point for disembarkation.

On the other hand rumors are increasing regarding preparatory measures of the Japanese for a landing west of Shanhaikwan; as surveys, purchase of maps, ordering of supplies; such a landing, however, would only be possible under a violation of Chinese neutrality, as this part does not pertain to the Russian district of occupation.


H.

Fort Creek, Neb., April 11, 1905.

Respectfully submitted.

Sgt. H. HOSSELD,

2nd Lieut. 80th Infantry.



THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR,

translated from supplements of the Marine Rundschau, by  
Second Lieutenant H. Hossfeld, 30th Infantry, from April 12th,  
1905, to May 20th, 1905.

EIGHTH SUPPLEMENT.

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Rectification: In the recapitulation of the 7th supplement,  
"April 12th" should read "April 13th", and "April 14th" should  
read "April 15th", also on page 80, 4th line from below,  
"April 13th should read "April 14th", and 2nd line from below  
"April 14th" should read "April 15th".

Chronological recapitulation.

April 16th: Cossacks surprise Sengtyin on Flacksin Bay  
(East Korea).

April 23rd to 27th: Cruise of the Russian cruiser squadron  
along east coast of Korea. Two Japanese coast  
steamers and the transport "Kinshin Maru"  
destroyed.

May 1st: The Japanese 1st army effects victoriously the  
crossing of the Yalu north of Widyu.

May 2nd to 3rd, at night: Ninth Japanese attack against Port  
Arthur. Third attempt to obstruct harbor en-  
trance by the sinking of vessels.

May 5th: Beginning of the disembarkation of the 2nd army  
near Pitsevo.

Course of war on sea, continued.

In the preceding pamphlet the rumor was mentioned that  
the Russian cruiser squadron had left Vladivostok on April  
14th. On April 16th additional news was received that a body  
of cossacks had assaulted the town of Sengtyin on the east  
coast of Korea, in the vicinity of Flacksin Bay; that they

had pillaged the Japanese colony and burned the consulate. There appears to have been no Japanese garrison in the town or it must have retired before the superior force.

These two indications of commencing activity of the Russians on the east coast of Korea caused the Japanese to dispatch at once their 2nd squadron with torpedo boats, and perhaps some small cruisers, under Admiral Kamimura, to the Japanese Sea.

The reports spread at the beginning of the war, regarding large disembarkations of Japanese troops in East Korea, do not seem to confirm actual conditions. Presumably only garrison troops were placed in the towns inhabited by the Japanese colonists, especially Gensan, in order to calm the people in regard to a possible Russian attack and to protect the Japanese colonies against a Korean insurrection. The landing of these troops, of course, has the same appearance as the disembarkation of the command, detailed to make preparations for an army at Chemulpo, and it is possible that the rumor regarding a new base for operations on the coast of the Japanese Sea, originated from this source; the Japanese in their own interest, of course, will add to this rumor.

The Japanese are not liked in Korea, and they will have to figure at all times that whenever the Russians appear as the stronger ones, the people will rebel against the Japanese. Such a local insurrection, considering the general unpopularity of the Japanese, may spread easily over the whole country and thus endanger the Japanese line of staples.

As has become known in the meantime, the first advance of Kamimura against Vladivostok on March 6th was principally undertaken for the purpose of calming the east coast. He steamed along the Korean coast on his way to, as well as from Vladivostok and showed his ships at Gensan. This time he seems

to have followed the same route. He was on April 24th or 25th in the vicinity of Vladivostok, but could not approach on account of fog, as he explains.

Cruise of the Russian cruiser squadron from April 23rd to the 27th.

In the meantime Counter-Admiral Jessen with his cruiser squadron ("Ressiya", "Rurik", "Gromoboi", "Bogatyr" and two torpedo boats left Vladivostok at daybreak of April 23rd. The "Rurik" returned to the harbor on April 24th through causes still unknown. The other ships appeared in front of Gensan on April 25. They remained five miles outside of the entrance of the harbor; the two torpedo boats were sent out for the purpose of searching the harbor for Japanese vessels. They found only the small coasting vessel "Goyo Maru" of 500 tons, sent the crew ashore and sunk the ship. A body of men was sent ashore presumably to reconnoiter; they found out that four torpedo boat destroyers had left early in the morning. The Japanese inhabitants fled from their houses. The garrison did not dare to fire, because a bombardment of the town was threatened in this case.

After four hours the torpedo boats returned to their squadron. The latter went to sea and encountered on its voyage still another freight steamer with war supplies. The "Gromoboi" took the crew and a Japanese detachment (12 Japanese and 15 Koreans) on board and sank the ship by effecting a leak in the engine room with gun cotton. Finally at midnight the cruisers met the Japanese transport "Kinshin Maru" of 2380 net registration tons.

The steamer was armed with four 4.7 cm. quick firing guns. She had on board coal for the Japanese squadron, ammunition and provisions, in addition thereto were present a colonel of the General Staff, the ninth company of the 37th

Regiment of Infantry (4th division) which was not as yet placed on a war footing, and more than one hundred coolies and passengers. According to the Japanese version the company had reconnoitered in the vicinity of the Yoen, (about 70 km. south of Sengtyin) on the road along the eastern coast, and was to be taken back to Gensan by the steamer. The latter was to be conveyed by torpedo boats, but had lost the same toward evening on account of foggy weather. The vessel took the Russian warships for the Japanese squadron and signalled, as it is claimed by the Russians that she had coal for the squadron. The Russian admiral sent the armored cruiser "Rossiya" alongside, while he with the main force remained about 1500 m. distant. The "Rossiya" ordered the captain and most of the ship's officers on board, and then dispatched armed boats to the steamer and searched her. A portion of the crew and coolies endeavored to abandon the ship in boats, but were overtaken by the Russian steam launches and captured. According to the Russian version the six infantry officers and the remainder of the crew and coolies surrendered at once, while a portion of the soldiers locked itself up and resisted capture. After nearly one hour the admiral signalled to abandon the ship. As soon as the Russian boats had cut loose, the soldiers came on deck and fired after them, wounding in one boat the man at the rudder and four men. Thereupon the Rossiya fired with guns and torpedoes at the ship. A torpedo which took effect amidship caused her to sink. The Japanese claim that a portion of the soldiers and coolies succeeded in saving themselves in life boats and reaching land after two days on the island of Simpho (Shestakoff-Harbor). The Russians made the following prisoners, viz: 17 officers (among them evidently the ship's officers included), 20 soldiers, 85 coolies, and 61 members of the crew.



Including the crew of the steamer which was sunk by the Gremoboi, the Russian squadron had on board 210 prisoners.

The squadron, taking the high sea, now returned to Vladivostok, arriving there on the evening of April 27th without incident.

Admiral Kamimura arrived at Gensan one day after the departure of the Russians, after he had returned from his voyage to Vladivostok.

The news which he received here caused him to await first of all the pending arrival of the "Kinshin Maru"; but as she did not show up on April 27, he went to sea for the purpose of searching for her. As he could not find her on the route to her destination, he at once left for Vladivostok, arriving there during the night of April 28/29, i. e. one day after the Russian squadron. During the night he dispatched torpedo boats to the eastern entrance, which were noticed on shore, and entered toward 7 o'clock a. m. with the entire squadron (ten cruisers and six torpedo boats are mentioned) Passing Askold Island, the Ussuri Bay, but could not undertake anything on account of the fog, as he says, and left again toward 10 o'clock a. m.

It may be noticed that the Japanese, before advancing against the Russian cruiser squadron, always permit the same to gain the open sea, where it is difficult to find it.

The question might be raised, why do they not guard Vladivostok or at least use light forces for the purpose of reconnaissance? The causes may be found in the following:

Considering the great distance between the two approaches of the harbor of Vladivostok (see map in 5th supplement), it would become necessary, in order to guard successfully both entrances, to station a group of cruisers and torpedo boats in front of each, and in addition thereto a squadron should

be stationed permanently at a suitable midway position. This squadron would have to be superior by all means to the total strength of the vessels to be guarded. As a temporary abandonment of these positions would render the entire undertaking useless, and as it is difficult to create in the vicinity a secure base of operations for the regular supply of coal and provisions, and for the protection of torpedo boats during inclement weather, and as the home bases are over 400 miles distant, an additional number of ships would be required to relieve the others at regular intervals. Furthermore, it should be remembered that only the most modern vessels can be employed against the speed of the Russian cruisers (one over 20, two about 20, and one 18 1/2 knots).

Such a class of ships Japan has not at its disposal, as long as its main force is still needed in the Yellow Sea. But mere observation by light cruisers is impossible of execution for the Japanese fleet. There are only three small cruisers that possess superiority in speed over the armored cruisers of the Russian cruiser squadron, and the "Bogatyr" is superior not only in fighting strength, but also in speed.

Finally, observation alone would be of no value whatsoever, if the necessary fighting body were not held in readiness, to take advantage of same. Considering the great distance from the operating main body of the fleet in the Yellow Sea, a light observation-detachment would sooner or later be exposed to annihilation.

The Japanese, therefore, seem to properly confine themselves to the search for the Vladivostok squadron with a superior detachment of their fleet, trusting more or less to good luck, whenever trustworthy news about the departure of that squadron is received. Should they encounter it once on one of these trips, they will destroy it if possible; until that time they will have to accept its molestations.

Ninth attack against Port Arthur.

On April 23rd the Russians experienced another accident from mines in front of Port Arthur; 1 officer and 20 men were boat while laying new mines or clearing away old ones in the roadstead. The frequent explosions of mines seem to have produced a mine panic in the entire Yellow Sea. It is stated that it is possible to encounter loose mines everywhere, even on the high sea.

On May 3rd, 1 o'clock a. m. the batteries of the eastern shore of Port Arthur again sighted torpedo boats. In addition to the guard cruisers in front of the entrance, the Russians lately kept also the gunboats in the roadstead at night.

After the latter and the batteries had opened fire on the boats, the boats withdrew to the open sea. They constituted the advance guard for another attack with blockade vessels.

This time the Japanese had prepared twelve vessels of 2000 to 3000 tons, and advanced toward the entrance, at variance with the old way, not in one, but in three groups, from different directions, partly under the eastern, partly under the western shore, in order to divide the attention and fire of the enemy.

The groups hove in sight with intervals of half an hour; they were, as formerly, led by torpedo-boats which were to protect them against hostile boats and to receive the crews.

All batteries and the guard ships fired at everything that came in sight. Torpedo boats attacked.

According to the Russian version, three vessels of the first group were destroyed by artillery, two of the second group struck mines, two were shot to pieces; of the third group one vessel was sunk by a mine, one by the fire of the guns, the third one was beached.

The commander of the gunboat "Gilyack" reports that he destroyed two torpedo-boats.

The general firing lasted until 4 o'clock a. m., an immense quantity of ammunition was expended during the same; the batteries and ships fired in all 2500 shots, not counting in the machine guns.

The blockade steamers fired with light quick firing guns.

One man was wounded on the torpedo boat "Bozevoi", no further losses were sustained by the Russians.

According to Japanese reports, 8 officers and 36 men were rescued from the crews of the blockade steamers; 1 officer, 6 men were killed; 8 officers, 15 men were wounded; 14 officers and 74 men are missing; 30 men were made prisoners in their boats; two boats drifted on the beach wrecked.

The work of rescuing must have been difficult, because the sea became rough during the firing of the Russians.

At dawn 10 Japanese torpedo boats appeared on the horizon, waiting for returning boats. At 9.30 a. m. the Japanese squadron appeared for the purpose of verifying the result of the operation, and again went out to sea toward noon. Observation ships, however, were left in front of the roadstead also during the following days. These, however, do not appear to have prevented Russian torpedo boats from entering the Gulf of Pechili. According to the report of Admiral Togo, the entrance is said to be obstructed as to make it impossible for large vessels to pass. If this proves to be correct, the two of the 12 blockade-steamers, which were not destroyed by the Russians must have been sunk at the proper places.

On May 4th the Japanese squadron appeared in front of Takushan, evidently for the purpose of creating the impression with the Russians that a disembarkation was contemplated at

that point, whereas on May 5th the disembarkation of the Japanese second army actually commenced at Pitsevo.

#### The war on land.

As already mentioned, the Russians advanced on the East-Korean coast, assaulted on April 16th the town of Sengt-yen, and are said to have advanced as far as Gensan toward the end of April, but did not attack the town. The scope of this advance is not yet clear. Judging from the celerity with which it was executed, it can have been only a cavalry maneuver for the purpose of disturbing the opponent.

On the western coast of Korea the first encounter has taken place, the Japanese first army pushing back the Russian Yalu-corps, and accomplishing thereby the crossing of the Yalu and a subsequent entry into Manchuria.

As the war on land has entered a new stage, it might be appropriate to repeat to memory the principal dates of the course of war on land up to this point, which may be accomplished through the following chronological recapitulation:  
 January: There are 800 Japanese guards for railroads and telegraphs in Korea, Russian guards are on the Yalu and near the timber concessions.

Beginning of February: The Japanese transport provisions to Korea, and make preparations for quarters in the Japanese colonies.

February 6 to 16: Mobilization of the Japanese Guards, 2nd and 12th divisions.

February 8: 2500 Japanese advance-troops disembark at Chemulpo, occupying Seoul February 9th. The Japanese garrison Fusan, Masampo and Gensan.

February 10 to 16: The Japanese erect fixtures for disembarkations in Chemulpo.	February 11: The Russian 3rd East Siberian Rifle brigade and Transbaikal-Cossack brigade dispatched from Liangyang to the Yalu.
February 16 to 22: Disembarkation of the Japanese 12th division in Chemulpo, with subsequent march to Seoul.	February 18: Cossacks in Widyu.
February 23: Japan's treaty with Korea. Main body of the 12th division commences advance from Seoul to the Yalu, advance guard has already occupied Phengyang.	February 19: Capture of a Japanese patrol in Widyu.
February 23 to 29: Disembarkation of the trains of the 12th division in Chemulpo.	February 23: Cossacks in Antyu.
March 2: Shifting of the Japanese point of disembarkation to Chinampo.	February 29: Cossacks before the walls of Phengyang.
March 3: Japanese advance troops near the Chinchangang (Antyu).	March 3: Cossacks fall back on Antyu.
About March 11 and subsequent days: Disembarkation of the division of the guards in Chinampo.	Cavalry mutually in touch.
March 23: Japanese advance-troops cross the Chinchangang.	
March 28 and subsequent days: Disembarkation of the 2nd division in Chinampo.	

March 28: Engagement near Tengdin between Russian cavalry and the advance guard

March 30: Beginning of the advance  
on Widyu.

April 4: Japanese advance troops  
occupy Widyu and Yenamphe.

April 7th: Formation of a special  
garrison-army for Korea under  
General Haraguchi.

The crossing of the Yalu by the Japanese.

(See sketch).

After the advance guard of the Japanese first army had reached on April 4th the left bank of the Yalu near Widyu and Yenamphe, it first of all made the necessary preparations for defense in throwing up entrenchments, and in fortifying both towns. The entire population was removed from Widyu.

A regular boat patrol service was established to the islands located in the river.

The observation of the very wide estuary of the river was assigned to a flotilla of gunboats, to which at times also torpedo-boats and armed boats were added; these were probably taken from the fourth squadron of elder ships, detailed to convey the transports.

In the meantime the main body of the army closed up, and was distributed along the river bank toward north. Under the protection of the gunboat flotilla, supports were taken on transports as far as Yenamphe. Bridge-material and pontoons for the crossing were gotten up; heavy artillery (12 cm.) to be employed for the purpose of forcing a crossing was placed in readiness.

On the Russian side apparently only the Transbaikal Cossak-Brigade under General Mishtshenko and the 3rd East Siberian Rifle-Brigade under General Kashtalinaki were opposed to the Japanese first army as late as March,

After these troops had retired across the Yalu, keeping in touch with the enemy, they seem to have received a slight re-enforcement from the 6th East Siberian Rifle Brigade. This detachment, consisting of 5 to 6 regiments and 5 batteries, not including the cavalry, was under the command of Lieutenant General Sassulitsh, who had still other troops near Fengwancheng.

The cavalry, after having completed its duties in front of the line, was assigned to the right wing, where the open terrain was adapted to its movements, and was ordered to observe the estuary. The infantry appears to have posted sentinels along the entire right bank of the Yalu, and on the islands in the river from Antung in a northern direction, as far as Japanese troops could be located on the opposite bank; two large bodies of troops seem to have been held in readiness in Antung and opposite Widyn, and a reserve apparently far in rear, on the highway to Fengwancheng. The river was patrolled on boats and spies were sent as far as to the points occupied by the Japanese. The artillery appears to have been distributed over the positions opposite Widyn and Antung.

A series of encounters between the patrols of the opponents took place until the middle of April on the islands and on the river, often with very considerable losses on both sides.

On April 8, for instance, a detachment of 50 men of the Japanese was annihilated on the island of Bomalin, opposite Widyu.

On April 21, a Russian detachment of 2 officers and 32



men attempted an assault on the Japanese Pontoon-park, but was discovered in time, and repulsed by artillery fire with a loss of more than half its men.

On or about April 20th the Russian patrols observed an upward movement of Japanese detachments along the river from Widyu.

During the time from April 23 to 25 the Japanese reconcoitered with strong detachments, which crossed on pontoons at various points, and on the 25<sup>th</sup> put up a bridge between Widyu and one of the islands.

On April 26th the leader of the Japanese army, General Kuroki, took possession of all islands between the two banks in front of the Russian position by a simultaneous attack of the 1st division and a portion of the division of the guards. The Russian outposts at these points retired to the right bank. Their retreat was covered by the Russian artillery.

During the attack the Japanese flotilla of gunboats engaged the right wing of the Russians, in exchanging a number of shots with the Russian outposts.

During April 27th the Japanese entrenched on the islands, placed batteries in position at suitable points on the same, and constructed more bridges across the eastern branch of the river to the islands. The Russians endeavored to disturb their work by the fire of artillery.

The advance on April 26 had the appearance of a preparation for a crossing of the river just north of Widyu. As the Russian reconnaissances had established prior to this also the concentration of strong forces in the vicinity of Widyu, the Russian artillery directed its fire, which was continued during the succeeding days with intervals, mainly in this vicinity.

On April 26, however, a small Japanese detachment crossed the river considerably further north, and occupied an eminence near Chussan, north of the junction of the Aiho, the right tributary of the Yalu.

As the Russians had already observed for a week that Japanese detachments were moving up stream, they established an outpost near Chussan, which was dispersed, however, on account of its small strength. The Japanese entrenched and also brought a mountain battery to the eminence. Under cover of this position the 12th division then commenced on April 29 to bridge the river near Suku.

As soon as General Sassulitch reconnoissance the purpose of this advance, he gave orders on the forenoon of that day to retake the Chussan hills with a strong detachment and with the assistance of artillery, and to force the Japanese back to their bridge under construction. The Japanese were obliged to take their bridge partly to pieces and to take their positions under cover. During the night, however, the bridge was again put together, and during the early morning such strong Japanese detachments crossed the river over it that they were able by an enveloping attack to force the Russians to evacuate once more the Chussan hills. The Russian detachment retired across the Aiho river and occupied the ferds on the right bank.

At about 10 o'clock a. m. the Japanese commenced to fire from an extended, well intrenched artillery-line, a little north of Widyu, with two batteries 12 ca. and from four to six field batteries, on the Russian artillery position opposite Widyu, and on the right bank of the Yalu. The Russians, according to their statement, were only able to reply with one battery. The bombardment lasted the entire day, both sides suffering losses.

The gunboat flotilla engaged during the bombardment the right wing of the Russians near Antung in delivering a fire on the infantry and cavalry for about one hour.

Under cover of the artillery duel and the division of the guards completed towards evening the bridges from the islands to the right bank, and crossed the river during the night; the second division followed.

On the morning of May 1st the general attack against the Russian position commenced.

Through lack of reliable maps of the battlefield, only a very general picture can be drawn regarding the course of the combat notwithstanding the multitude of accounts published; later on this picture will probably need correction, because for the position on the map of the places mentioned in the battle reports, only data regarding the wings and the advance and retreat, throw some light on the subject. The enclosed sketch, therefore, as regards names of towns and of the terrain, is based solely on suppositions derived from descriptions, and merely represents a picture how the course of events might be assumed according to the accounts thus far received.

As can be seen from the foregoing, the Japanese troops were with their main force on the morning of May 1st on the right bank, the Russians were holding the plateau across which the highway leads to Manchuria. They also held Antung, and in the vicinity south of it the Transbaikal Cossack Brigade was stationed.

The Japanese commenced their attack at 4 o'clock a. m. with an overwhelming fire from the artillery line north of Widyu, and from the islands, against the Russian artillery stationed on the plateau, and against the flank of the infantry which appeared on the Aiho.

The superiority in artillery on the side of the Japanese must have been enormous; the three divisions in all, not counting the siege artillery, disposed over 18 field batteries, whereas on the Russian side only three batteries were available.

The situation was so manifestly unfavorable and the losses soon so severe that between 6 and 7 a. m. General Sassulitch gave orders to abandon the positions and to reconcentrate further in rear.

The subsequent withdrawal of one of the Russian batteries prompted General Kuroki to give the order for the general advance, which took effect at about 7 o'clock. On this occasion the 13th division traversed the Aiho river, the men being to their breast under water. The opposing Russian forces took advantage of this moment, inflicted as many losses as possible, and then retired before the mass of the attacking forces. The Russians were driven from the plateau towards 9 o'clock. They then occupied a second position, probably on higher ground commanding the plateau, and from there delivered a fire with artillery, machine-guns and infantry, against the Japanese on the plateau. The Japanese were obliged to proceed to the attack against this second position towards noon; they succeeded in outflanking the enemy on account of their numerical superiority on the left wing.

As the danger became imminent to be thrown off the highway entirely and to have his retreat cut off, General Sassulitch dispatched the 11th regiment from the reserve position to the counter attack against the right wing of the Japanese with orders to make the withdrawal of the troops which had been in battle, on the highway possible.

This counter-attack, however, was soon brought to a stand still by the Japanese onslaught, the regiment then endeavored to fulfill its task by assuming a defensive position

which it held with extreme tenacity, until from all sides enveloped, it was just able to fight its way through. The other regiments of infantry succeeded in reaching the highway, the artillery and the detachment of machine guns, of which most of the horses were killed, however, were unsuccessful. The latter therefore went into action near the eleventh regiment and opened fire, until the Japanese approached so closely that the guns had to be disabled, so that they would not fall in the hands of the enemy in serviceable condition. Three batteries of eight guns each, and eight machine guns were lost in this manner.

During the forenoon the gunboat-fleet and a fleet of armed boats attacked simultaneously with artillery fire the Russian troops near the lower part of the Yalu. Antung was abandoned by the Russian troops at 11 o'clock a. m. after the town had been set on fire.

The casualties of the day must have been enormous on both sides. According to the last Russian account 70 officers, 2524 men were killed, wounded or missing; the Japanese counted at first 700, later, however, they stated that the second attack had cost them an additional 300, and finally they assert that during the search of the battlefield another 300 killed were found, and that there was a possibility of still finding more. From the denying of losses, thus far employed by the Japanese, these statements may prove that the Russian account regarding the enormous losses of the Japanese, has not been unfounded entirely. On the other hand the Japanese made prisoners of 20 officers and 300 men and captured 24 field pieces and 8 machine guns, although in an unserviceable condition. A large number of wounded was found among the prisoners.

It is evident that the Russians have fought excellently from the fact, not considering the Japanese casualties, that they occupied with only three regiments (i. e. 9 battalions), and three batteries, an army consisting of three divisions (i. e. 36 battalions and 18 batteries) for a whole day.

The method of the Japanese consisted apparently in leaving the enemy in the dark as to their intentions, in scattering their troops along the left bank of the Yalu, and in making preparations for a crossing at different, widely separated points.

The available forces of the Russians at the Yalu were altogether too weak to prevent the Japanese army from crossing. Consequently one can only assume that it was the intention of the Russian commander-in-chief, to inflict serious losses to the enemy at this point, in order to deprive him for a while of the desire for a further advance, and to gain time in this manner. Considering the condition in which the Japanese army was supposed to have been, due to the winter march through Korea, and to alleged diseases among the men, this supposition could have appeared well founded. It is however very doubtful whether the strategical purpose could justify the enormous losses in guns, prisoners, and the consequent loss of prestige. Guns mean for Russia more delay, because they have to be shipped from the home country, as far as is known to the present, and the loss of the military reputation may easily affect the attitude of the remainder of Asiatics.

Furthermore it appears strange that the Russians even on the decisive day, held a proportionately large portion of their available force at the lower Yalu, near Antung. Whatever cause led to this, will probably only transpire later. This part of the country could only be brought into relation

with the Japanese advance, if it were anticipated that the Japanese would advance not toward Fengwanchen, but on the coast route toward Liantung. On the third day after the Yalu battle, however, the Japanese started to move in the former direction, i. e. two divisions on the highway, and one division in the valley of the Aiho, on the right of the road. On May 6th the troops occupied Fengwanchen, which had then been abandoned by the Russians without serious resistance.

Disembarkation of the Japanese second army near Pitsevo.

The crossing of the first army to the right bank of the Yalu was followed by the disembarkation of the second army on Liantung-peninsula. One division of this army was landed on May 5th at Pitsevo. The attempt of May 3rd to bottle up Port Arthur, had apparently the purpose to cover the disembarkation of this army and its reserves from any interference of the Russian ships. The attempt of obstructing the harbor entrance was either successful, or the leader must have believed that a landing could be dared, even without a complete obstruction, as he would not have to fear much more from the Russian fleet, since its losses of April 23.

At any rate, the Japanese will have to remain with the fleet in the vicinity of Port Arthur for the following days, in order to cover the transports, even if the entrance to the harbor should be open for small vessels only, and thus will be exposed to Russian torpedo boat attacks more than heretofore. It is of interest that the Japanese procedure corresponds thus far literally with that employed in the Japanese-Chinese War. Then they also marched an army through Korea, crossed the Yalu at precisely the same point as this time, fought for the same plateau, and landed the second army, detailed to capture Port Arthur, at the same place as this time.

The troops, after having been disembarked, spread over the line Pitsevo-Port Adams, and out the railroad leading to Port Arthur.

Continuance of the concentration of troops on both sides.

In Russia general satisfaction has been expressed regarding the smooth course of the mobilization of troops, and of the transportation of troops to the theater of war. In not promising any exaggerated feats from the start, a feeling of satisfaction has now been created, since no important disturbances have occurred.

In the formation of the Manchurian army several changes were made in the original program. The East Siberian Rifle brigades were changed into Rifle divisions after the regiments were placed on the three battalion footing. The field artillery was strengthened by sending a number of batteries from the home country to the front; each of the Rifle divisions appears to have received its own artillery brigade, consisting of three to four batteries. The fourth army corps appears to be composed of the 2nd and 3rd Siberian reserve divisions.

The rumors about the sending of European units, when sifted down, affect the reserve divisions from the military district of Kasan, and the tenth and seventeenth army corps, of which each has already furnished a brigade for East Asia.

Vice-Admiral Skrydloff was appointed commander-in-chief of the fleet; two squadron chiefs, one for the 1st and one for the 2nd Pacific squadron are under his orders. The appointment of a second chief proves that the newspaper reports regarding the sending of a second squadron, consisting of the ships of the Baltic fleet, are founded.



Large fleets of colliers are said to have been chartered in England for the transportation of coal to Port Arthur, Dalni, or Vladivostok, and partly for the Mediterranean.

The mobilization of the Japanese army is progressing slowly in comparison with primary expectations. Thus far are ready only the three divisions of the first army, and only recently those of the second army, which at one time is quoted to consist of two, at another of five divisions.

As regards finances for the conduct of the war, both belligerents have, contrary to their assurances at the beginning, turned to foreign countries. Japan is negotiating a loan of 10 million sterling at 6% for a term of 7 years each, in England and America respectively, after an internal loan of 100 million yen has been highly successful, due to the patriotic spirit of the people; in France Russia is seeking a loan of 800 million francs, offering treasury bonds at 5% for three years.

#### Events affecting international law.

At the beginning of April, the viceroy of the Far East published the following declaration:

"In case neutral ships, with correspondents on board, who may be able to convey information to the enemy by means of improved apparatus, not provided for as yet in the treaties now in force, are found by the Russian fleet in the latitude of Kwantung or within the sphere of operations, such correspondents will be regarded as spies, and ships provided with such apparatus will be condemned as lawful prizes".

This declaration was communicated to the powers by the Russian central government. It was aimed at an English correspondent who was observing the events around Port Arthur on a special steamer, fitted with a wireless telegraph apparatus, and who was sending messages to the English wireless telegraph station at Weibaiwei.

No power has raised a protest against the Russian measure. America, however, announced that the laws governing naval warfare ought to be modified with regard to wireless telegraphy.

On May 4th the Russian gunboat "Chrabri" is said to have stopped a P. and C. steamer, bound for East Asia, and to have searched for the Japanese mail, presumably letters for the Japanese government, which, as will be remembered, were declared contraband by the Russian government.


H.

Fort Creek, Neb., May 30, 1905.

Respectfully submitted:

H. ROSSFELD,

2nd Lieut. 30th Inf'y.



Translation

No. 230.

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR,

translated from supplements of the Marine Rundschau, by Second Lieutenant H. Hossfeld, 30th Infantry, from May 21st, 1905 to July 10th, 1905.

NINTH SUPPLEMENT.

Chronological recapitulation.

- May 6: Vice-roy Alexeyev leaves Port Arthur.
- May 9: Headquarters of the vice-roy transferred to Mukden.
- May 12: The Japanese torpedo boat No. 48 belonging to the 3rd squadron, encounters a mine in Ken-Bay, and sinks.
- May 14: Railroad connection between Port Arthur-Kiangang cut.
- May 15: The Japanese battleship "Hatsuse" strikes two mines and sinks. "Fugi" (Yashima) severely damaged by a mine.
- May 15: The armored cruiser "Kassuga" rams the small cruiser "Yoshino", causing the latter to sink.
- May 16: Disembarkation of Japanese near Seniutshen; the troops march on Kaitshu.
- ? The Russian large cruiser "Bogatyi" strikes rocks at Vladivostok, and is lost.
- May 20: The torpedo boat destroyer "Akatsuki" is damaged by a Russian shell; many of the crew are killed.
- May 22: Kaiping is bombarded by the Japanese.
- May 25: Admiral Skrydloff, the commander-in-chief of the East Asiatic naval forces, arrives in Vladivostok.
- May 26: The second and third Japanese armies take the heights of Naushan under the supreme command of General Oku.
- May 27: Admiral Togo blockades the harbors of Kwantung and Liantung.

Beginning with the battle of the Yalu, a period commences, in which the activity of the fleets goes hand in hand with that of

a portion of the army, but otherwise it plays a more secondary role for the most part. We will therefore treat of the land and naval war not any further separately, but jointly, and according to the course of the events.

As regards the attempt of obstructing the harbor entrance of Port Arthur on May 3rd, the description of which, from the Russian point of view, we gave in the preceding pamphlet, the following may be added from the official report of Admiral Togo. According to his account, the following vessels took part in the action, viz: the two old gunboats "Akagi" and "Chokai", the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th flotillas of destroyers, the 9th, 10th and 14th torpedo boat flotillas, furthermore a number of steamers, which, strange as it may seem, are not enumerated.

The leader of this fleet is said to have given orders en route, on account of the bad weather, to interrupt and to abandon the undertaking. This order however did not reach the various ships, at any rate, was not obeyed by them, and consequently, from Admiral Togo's account, eight steamers made for the harbor entrance at full speed. Five of these approached the extreme end of the entrance, and "Kikawa Marie" and "Totomi Marie" broke the chain across the entrance, and entered the latter. Three steamers sank before they could reach the extreme end of the entrance. The passage was considered impossible for cruisers and battleships. The damage done to a steam pipe of torpedo boat No 67, and a break down in the engine room of the 1st class torpedo boat "Astoka", are the only damages mentioned. A large number of the steamers crews drowned, and that may explain why so many details have not become known. The torpedo vessels had to suffer a great deal on account of the rough sea.

Therefore, compared with the Russian account, a number of deviations, especially as regards the number of the steamers may be noticed. It is hardly possible, however, that the commanders

of the torpedo boats or the captains of the steamers, could have determined, in a dark and stormy night, whether or not the entrance had been obstructed. Even if two had succeeded in gaining the entrance, the fact of obstruction would depend firstly upon the width of the channel, and secondly upon the place and the direction, in which the steamers sank.

#### THE NORTHERN THEATER OF WAR.

The casualties of the two armies in the battle of the Yalu are given, according to the official lists, as follows, viz:

On the Japanese side: of the guards: Killed, 1 officer 20 men; wounded: 7 officers, 122 men; of the 2nd division. Killed; 1 officer, 84 men; wounded; 13 officers, 305 men.: of the 12th division: killed; 3 officers, 76 men; wounded, 5 officers, 263 men.

On the Russian side the total loss in killed and wounded is given as 70 officers and 2324 men, including prisoners.

The expected energetic advance of the Japanese northward has not been realized. As already mentioned in the preceding pamphlet, Fengwansheng was occupied on May 6, apparently without resistance. This, however, seems to have been accomplished only by reconnoitering forces, before which the Russians retreated, it being their task, to remain permanently in contact with the enemy, and also to gain information regarding the movements of his outposts. As to the movements of the Japanese main body nothing trustworthy has become known, neither anything regarding the distance, which it has advanced in one or the other direction. If the reports are to be credited, the army of Kmoki has been divided into three parts, the first of which is advancing in the direction of Fengwansheng with more or less rapidity, and has entrenched there now, i.e. north to north-east; a second detachment marched in the direction of Haicheng, Newchwang, and finally the third one to Sinyan, Kaiping. That the original

army of Kmoki should have been separated into these three parts, far distant from each other, is hardly conceivable, and if the partition has at all taken place in this or in a similar manner a part of the army, landed near Pitsevo, and a portion of the second army, landed near Taknshan, have either been added as re-enforcements, or a specially organized contingent of troops. The original strength of Kmoki's army is estimated at 60,000 to 70,000 men. 70,000 Japanese are said to have been landed near Taknshan and Pitsevo, and from these, according to the English reporters opinions, 50,000 were added to the northern army. We remark, that the correctness of these figures is not warranted, and that they are mentioned here, because they were published at the time also in the German papers, and silently taken for correct. From the beginning it was, absurd that only 20,000 or even 30,000 troops should have been assigned to the task of occupying Liantung and finally capture Port Arthur, for Port Arthur alone probably has a garrison of about 30,000 men, and as the continuous skirmishes of the last weeks on Liantung demonstrated, the number of the Russian troops on this peninsula is much larger than was formerly assumed. Taken as a whole, one has very little information regarding the strength and location of troops, and consequently is dependent upon a good deal of precaution in judging and constructing combinations. Fact is only, that the Japanese advance is taking place very slowly in a northern direction. This may be due to the terrain, which without roads to speak of, is extremely unfavorable for the movement of large bodies of troops, and to the necessity of recurring connection to the rear. The division of the forces may perhaps also be due to these circumstances to a certain extent, as the marching of columns, several kilometers in length, on narrow, bad roads, is not only tiring but also dangerous. The change of direction of the detachments in the direction of Haicheng and Kaiping has led to the

supposition that the Japanese leader intended a large enveloping maneuver in Moltkean fashion, especially as about the same time unquestioned rumors became loud that Japanese forces had appeared east, respectively, north-east from the line Lianyan-Mukden. This is noteworthy, as no one knows whence this contingent of troops is coming, it does not seem to be strong, and to be merely engaged in observing the Russian positions. It may be possible rather that a portion of the troops which were landed during the first months on the east coast of Korea, has marched northward and then inland. At the same time the available forces of the Japanese appear barely sufficient for the execution of such a maneuver against the Russian position, for otherwise their movements would not only be quicker, but also different. For instance, a special column marching on Kaiping, would not be necessary if an enveloping of the Russian position north were contemplated. The special purpose of this column the clearing and occupation of the coast towns and ports in the Bay of Liantung is, however, just as apparent as useful for the Japanese position. In assuming that first of all the Japanese desired to occupy also the entire southern region, including ports and points of disembarkation west of Liantung, and then only to advance north for the offensive, after a sufficient reenforcement of their forces, and continuously securing their rear connections, one will approach the truth more closely. That this advance is executed in a concentrated manner, or at any rate simultaneously from different points, is probable, and imperative from the nature of the country.

We are also entirely in the dark with regard to the position and strength of the Russian army, and it can only be assumed with some degree of certainty that it is based on Lianyan on one side, and on Mukden on the other. Russian reports show, however, that the reconnoitering cavalry is

constantly in contact with the enemy, and thus the supposition expressed in the papers, that the Russian army permitted itself to be surprised, and that it was in desperate straits, may not correspond with the facts.

Numerous cossack detachments have appeared in northern and eastern Korea for some time; they act as a harassing element and conduct an arduous guerilla war. On May 10th a detachment of cossacks attacked Antyu, but was repulsed. On May 20th they succeeded in taking the town, inflicting serious losses on the Japanese. Although these cossack troops are not considered a direct danger, as reported from Tokio, they cannot, however, be ignored in time as a dangerous disturbance in rear.

Newchwang was still in possession of the Russians on May 21st, and re-enforcements were expected.

We shall return to the situation in Manchuria in detail in the next supplement.

#### THE WAR ON LIANTUNG.

After the disembarkation at Pitsevo had commenced on May 5th, on a large scale, Admiral Alexeyev and Prince Boris Vladimirovich left Port Arthur at 2:00 A.M. May 8th, in order to reach Harbin; there, since May 9th, headquarters of the viceroy has been established. This departure was taken as proof, that Port Arthur was not prepared for a landing of the Japanese whereas it proves just the opposite.

As regards the extent and the places of the various disembarkations a multitude of rumors were afloat; among others a landing in the Bay of Kinchan was reported in conjunction with the disembarkation of the troops at Pitsevo. The report, received shortly afterwards, that the connection by rail was interrupted, seemed to confirm the rumor, and consequently the report, that the line Port Arthur-Lianyung was again open,



met with general scepticism; but as it became known to be a fact, one would incline toward the opinion that the 1st report of the cutting of the line, was based on an error. Both reports however, were incorrect, the events seem to have taken place as follows:

Soon after the disembarkation at Pitsevo had commenced, two Japanese regiments advanced on the road toward Pulantien (Port Arthur), while additional detachments were sent out into different directions from the point of disembarkation, for the purpose of reconnoitering and securing the landing. The Russians received information regarding the approach of the fleet of transports as early as May 2nd through their coast guard stations, and small reconnoitering detachments endeavored to come in contact with the enemy from various directions; one detachment left Pulantun on the aforementioned road, encountered the Japanese reconnoitering party, and retired after a short fight. The two Japanese regiments apparently did not go any further than Tan-tsia-fang, situated about midway, and only the outposts reached Pulantien on May 6th, and fired at a passing mail train without causing any damage. Pulantien was evacuated by the Russians without resistance, probably with the belief, justified by the circumstances, that superior forces were following. But already on the following day the Japanese evacuated again Pulantien, and retired again in the direction of Pitsevo, how far, is not known. As cause for this is given, that stormy weather interrupted the disembarkation of the troops, and that the detachments, which were sent ahead, feared being cut off, without re-enforcements from Pitsevo. If indeed the road bed had been rendered useless during this day, it can only have been of minor importance, and the repair, subsequently made, as the Russians claim, is entirely likely; perhaps "the interruption" of the traffic meant only the annoyance of passenger trains

by the Japanese outposts. On May 10th, General Kuropatkin reported to the Czar, that the road had been repaired, and that Lieutenant Colonel Spindonoff had still taken a train with war supplies to Kinchan; Spindonoff then succeeded in returning with the engine to Lianyang without being molested. This took place four days after the disembarkation at Pitsevo had commenced, and considering the short distance from there to Pulantien, unforeseen circumstances must have considerably delayed disembarkation and advance of the troops.

Perhaps only a demonstration was made near Kinchan, or one wanted to ascertain whether a landing was feasible. Taking into consideration the concentration of Russian troops at this narrowest point of Kwantung, and the shallow water in the bay, extending far out, a landing may be considered well nigh out of question.

On May 14th, Pulantien was reoccupied by the Japanese, and the connection by rail finally cut; the road bed is said to have been destroyed for a distance of 20 km.

At Port Arthur everybody was conscious from the start of the seriousness of the situation, and a manifesto of General Stoessel, dated May 7th, seemed to indicate, that everybody was now thrown upon his own resources, everyone should stake everything in order to hold out until the arrival of relief.

Admiral Witthoefft, after the departure of vice-roy Alexeyev, assumed command over the naval forces at Port Arthur in the absence of, and until the arrival of Admiral Skejdloff, who was appointed to succeed Makaroff; in the meantime he has arrived in Vladivostok with little chance to ever reach Port Arthur.

Admiral Witthoefft appears to have been extremely active; the Japanese commanders of the observation squadron heard since May 5th on various occasions loud and frequent

explosions from the direction of Port Arthur, and reported upon same; these reports created the rumor that the Russians were destroying their ships, lest they should fall into the hands of the Japanese after the capture of Port Arthur. Actually, however, the steamers which were sunk near the harbor entrance were successfully blown up, and removed as far as they prevented ships from passing; it may be assumed that the passage was never entirely obstructed.

By means of carrier pigeons regular communication is said to have been established between Liangyang and Port Arthur.

It appears that the Japanese fleet or portions of the same have frequently bombarded Port Arthur, the bombardments were short in every instance; nothing regarding the effects has been reported. In addition to this the roadstead is being permanently watched by cruisers.

For the purpose of convoying transports, for the preparation of disembarkations on the east coast of Liantung, and for the purpose of removing mines, a new squadron has apparently been formed under the command of Rear Admiral Kataoka. It is designated the 3rd squadron, but seems to be composed differently from the description in pamphlet No. 7; it is very probable that the fleet has been entirely reorganized. We presume from the reports that the following vessels belong or have belonged to Kataoka's squadron, viz: the armored cruiser "Nishin", the small cruisers "Itzushima", "Miyako", a number of gunboats and torpedo vessels.

While it can hardly be believed that ships of this squadron should have bombarded Dalny, it has been shown that the squadron, on several occasions, bombarded the coast wherever troops were to be landed and in that manner prepared for a second disembarkation in the most effective manner.

Admiral Kataoka endeavored several times to make Kerr Bay available for disembarkation, the bay possesses a well protected and deep anchorage. On account of the reports that these ships had bombarded the coasts, the Russians seem to have constructed considerable earth works at that point. Kerr Bay is also important on account of its strategical value, as from there the right wing of the Russian position near Knichan could easily be flanked.

The inner portion of the bay, as apparently all bays and coast waters of Kwantung, was rendered dangerous on account of mines, and Admiral Kataoka is said to have permanently employed the 2nd, 6th, 12th, 20th and 31st torpedo boat flotillas for the purpose of searching for mines. When the torpedo boats No. 46 and No. 48, tried to explode one of the mines encountered by them, the mine apparently exploded too soon, at the moment when No. 48 was very close; it may also be assumed that the boat struck a floating mine without perceiving it at all. The boat is reported to have broken into two nearly equal parts, and to have sunk at once; 1 officer and 6 men were killed, 7 were wounded.

The high numbers of the Japanese torpedo boat flotillas do not agree with the number of torpedo boats of the fleet, if it were not to be assumed that also the smallest groups are called "flotillas".

On May 14th, the small cruiser "Miyako" experienced the same fate in Kerr Bay; "Miyako" struck a mine and sunk at once. The crew, excepting 6 members, was saved.

About the same time rumors were heard that the Russians were destroying the harbor and docks of Dalny by means of high explosives, or that they at least endeavored to do so. These rumors appears to have been verified just as little as the bombardment of this mercantile harbor by Admiral Kataoka.

On May 15th the Japanese fleet suffered a serious reverse by the sinking of the battleship "Matsuse" and of the small cruiser "Yoshino. The loss of the "Matsuse", according to the reports of Admiral Togo and of Admiral Witthoefft appears to have occurred in the following manner: A squadron consisting of battleships and cruisers, was cruising in front of Port Arthur, reconnoitering, the cruisers were probably forming the outer line, whereas the battleships stood further off the coast. The report of Admiral Witthoefft mentions three battleships and three cruisers. The flagship of Admiral Togo seems to have been more distant, as it appears from Admiral Togo's report that he did not witness the incident. Unfortunately it is not clear from the reports whether the battleships were steaming in close or open order, and consequently no deductions can be drawn, as to whether the mines were loose or regularly laid, which from the observation of Admiral Witthoefft, the first battleship struck. An explosion was observed, the ship inclined toward the starboard side, pitching violently toward the bow, blowing off much steam. As the position of these ships has been unanimously estimated at ten miles from Port Arthur, the inclining and pitching must have been very strong to be observed at that distance, especially as it is expressly stated in the report that the accident was witnessed from Golden Hill. The ship stopped, two cruisers at once approached and took measures to lower their boats. This, however, does not appear to have been done, and the damaged ship left toward the open sea in company with the cruisers. From the two smokestacks of the ship, Admiral Witthoefft draws the conclusion that she belongs to the "Fugi" class, but the "Mikasa" and "Asahi" possess each also but two smoke stacks, and consequently it may also have been one of these two vessels. It is remarkable that Admiral Togo is omitting entirely this incident in his report.

Nearly immediately thereafter, when a battleship with three smoke stacks, i. e. either the "Shikishima" or "Hatause", was about at the same point, according to the observation from Port Arthur, which can only mean that the ship was in the same gauge as the vessel previously damaged, a violent explosion was observed amidship and soon after a second one, according to Admiral Witthoeft's statement, one similar to the one that took place on board the "Petropavlovik". The ship sunk within a few minutes.

Here two reports confront each other. The Russians seem to assume that like on board the "Petropavlovsk", the explosion of the mine caused another one of the magazine, and of the boilers, whereas Admiral Togo reports that the "Hatause" struck two mines in succession. As 300 of the crew were rescued, among them the commandant and the chief of the division, the Japanese version is probably the correct one, however it is noteworthy that according to the statement of the Russians, who made their deduction from the actual appearance, the first explosion took place amidship, whereas Admiral Togo states that the first mine disabled only the rudder. At any rate that much can be determined from the two accounts that several explosions took place. While the other Japanese ships were engaged in salvage work at the place of the accident, sixteen torpedo boats and one cruiser, according to other reports, several Russian cruisers left Port Arthur with the intention of attacking the Japanese cruisers, however, are said to have repulsed them without inflicting any losses. On the following day three Japanese torpedo boats appeared at the place of accident, but were chased off by the "Novick".

Admiral Witthoeft maintains in the same report that the light coast artillery destroyed three torpedo boats in Kerr Bay; the Japanese reports do not mention this.

On the following day a collision took place between the armored cruiser "Kassuga" and the small cruiser "Yoshimo"; the latter sunk and the crew, excepting 19 men, perished. This incident seems to have also taken place in the Strait of Chili or a little further south, and it is stated in the report of Admiral Togo that there had been a dense fog.

On the Japanese side it is maintained that the Russian statement that besides the "Hatsuse" still another Japanese ship was seriously damaged by a mine, was based on a misunderstanding of the accident, and that only the "Hatsuse" and "Yoshimo" were concerned. In opposition to this the following may be mentioned: From Port Arthur the sinking of the "Hatsuse" and the serious damages inflicted upon another vessel, which, in company with two cruisers, slowly went to sea, could be observed. The "Yoshimo", however, according to the Japanese account, sunk in a dense fog, and therefore could not have been observed from Port Arthur, or by cruising Russian torpedo boats, and without doubt two incidents, locally entirely distinct, must have taken place; whether and how far they were apart according to time, is unknown, as Admiral Togo does not mention the time of ~~xxx~~ the day with reference to, the loss of the "Yoshimo" in his report.

According to the news available, it is probable that several separate small units of ships were cruising in the strait of Chili, in order to prevent a molestation of transports sailing for the Gulf of Liantung by Russian light forces: three battleships, a number of cruisers and torpedo vessels within view of Port Arthur and a group of cruisers, among them the "Kassuga" and "Yoshimo" in the vicinity of the Miantan-Islands or Shantung; there a fog may have been, whereas further north ~~was~~ the air was clear.

Because Russian mines rendered the sea unsafe beyond the three miles limit, frequent comments were published in the English and American press, a desire for an intervention was also expressed. To this it may be added that it has not been proven and that it is impossible to prove, whether the mines in question were laid there, or whether they had become loose and were drifting below or above the water surface. It is furthermore impossible to decide whether they were Russian or Japanese mines. Without doubt there is a danger for neutral shipping, but besides the duty of making good losses in materiel, it will hardly be possible to exact anything else from the belligerents. It is impossible to forbid them to lay mines, and the mines cannot be made to remain at their anchorage, neither is it feasible to ascertain whether or not they have been torn loose.

On May 16th the squadron of Rear Admiral Togo approached the harbor from Senichen, and 51 transports commended with the disembarkation of troops. The Japanese advanced in the direction of Kaichu.

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Another Japanese squadron was organized from the coast-defense vessels "Fuso", "Hei Yen", "Sei Yen", and the small cruiser "Tsukushi" under the command of Admiral Hosoya. This squadron appears to have been employed to cover the disembarkations near Pitsevo and Takushan, since the cruiser squadron of Kataoka is engaged further south.

Finally, another squadron is placed under the command of Rear Admiral Togo, not to be confounded with the Vice-Admiral of the same name/ and has been assigned to the north-east coast of Liantung with orders to cover and prepare disembarkations, etc. The composition of the squadron is not known.



On May 20th the Japanese torpedo boat destroyer "Akatsuka" when approaching the roadstead of Port Arthur was struck by a shell, 25 men were killed. The vessel must have been injured very seriously, for it cannot be assumed that 25 men were standing together on the upper deck, it is also safe to assume that more than one shell inflicted the damage.

The Japanese are said to have bombarded on May 22nd, the fortifications near Kaiping and to have sent a landing party ashore thereafter, these destroyed the telegraph lines and the electrical mines; the squadron then proceeded to the Bay of Kinchan, probably for the purpose of preparing a landing at that point. It is safe to assume that a disembarkation on a large scale took place during these days; it is very probable that the time was selected in such a manner, as to enable the disembarked troops to at once join the corps which had been landed near Pitsevo, and which was approaching from Pulatien. The heavy artillery was probably landed in Kinchan Bay or in Hand Bay, about due north of Lin-shu-tun-promontory or Talienvan, respectively; this bay is situated directly opposite of Kinchan-Bay, and with it forms the narrowest part of Kwantung. Whether the disembarkation took place at this point or on the opposite shore, can only be ascertained when the Russian position near Kinchan becomes exactly known.

It is impossible to gain a clear view, as to when and where during the past weeks and on what scale, the several landings on Liantung took place. Without doubt, each landing was planned with great caution, and in each instance demonstrations were made at other points before they were begun, which is actual proof that the Japanese never believed the entrance of Port Arthur completely obstructed. Every vessel of this fleet including all armored cruisers and gunboats were used for the purpose of keeping the coasts of the Liantung Peninsula from Takushan to Kaiping under control.

It has been stated that this energetic, complete, and apparently sudden operation for the capture of Port Arthur, would signify a modification of the present plans, and that the loss of the "Hatsuse" was the cause. This does not seem to be the case. The loss of the "Hatsuse" and "Yoshimo", and perhaps serious damages which were inflicted to other ships, are certainly felt by the Japanese fleet, so much the more because it has no reserves to draw from. But if this loss had not taken place, the same necessity to capture Port Arthur with the utmost haste, would have been paramount. The dispatch of the Russian reserve fleet from the Baltic is becoming more and more probable, and, if at its arrival in Asiatic waters, Port Arthur be still in the hands of the Russians with a squadron still very respectable, which in the near future will again be fully capable of action, the Japanese supremacy of the sea might become endangered. Regardless of the difficulty and perhaps the impossibility of changing completely within a few days the disposition of such an immense and complicated machine, the distribution referred to, of the various squadrons and groups of cruisers shows clearly that all preparations for a blockade of the Liantung Peninsula and for the disembarkations at the various points had already been made before the accidents took place.

In the system thus far followed, of keeping their plans and operations entirely secret, the Japanese have again been successful; another proof of this method is the fact that now four armies are suddenly present on the East Asiatic continent, to wit:

The first army under General Kuroki, headquarters probably at Fengwang-Cheng.

The second army under General Oku, disembarked near Pitsevo and Takushan(?); the greater part of which has marched to Kinchan.

The third army under General Negi; this army has been organized especially as a siege army, and is said to consist of two divisions, with a considerable artillery park; only on the occasion of the storming of the Kinchan-lights has its presence become known.

The fourth army under General Medzu; it was said to be still undergoing mobilization, and not yet ready for transportation. It is said to be intended for Kaiping or for the west coast of Liantung.

The strength of the several contingents is not known, just as little as that of the garrison of Port Arthur, in proportion to which the siege army has probably been organized with the corresponding excess. At any rate, in estimating the troops landed thus far, it would not be too high in speaking of a total of 150 000 men; the disembarkations of troops at Takushan-i, e. for the northern theater of war and for the direct and indirect reenforcement of Kuroki- are continued.

It should be noted that the Japanese have <sup>taken</sup> possession of Liantung with an extraordinary employment of forces, and that besides cutting the railroad, they have rendered it impossible for Russian troops from the north to attack the siege army of Port Arthur from the rear. This caution demonstrates a higher estimation of the Russian forces north than the purely defensive strategy of Kuropatkin would suggest. As far as we may judge from a distance, a relief of Port Arthur from the north overland would not have been feasible, for, in spite of PortArthur, the final decision will remain in the north and every detachment taken from Kuropatkin's army would render the outlook for the Russians more unfavorable. General Kuropatkin is said to favor this policy to the extreme, and

to be willing to leave Liantung as well as Port Arthur to themselves, but is said to have met with a different view from the part of viceroy Alexeyev. Perhaps from this the presence of proportionately large contingents of troops on Liantung exclusive of the garrison of Port Arthur, may be explained, which, however could not stop the course of events and barely retard it; they however contributed in attracting correspondingly large Japanese masses of troops, and may therefore also be the cause, of the slow progress, or of the apparent standstill on the northern theater of war, where the army of General Kuroki is (perhaps) not yet sufficiently strong for the offensive, besides his line of communications being threatened by hordes of cossacks.

At any rate, the isolation of Port Arthur was an event which according to the situation had to take place sooner or later, as soon as the supremacy of the sea was incontestably in the hand of the Japanese; now the event upon which the Russians were counting for months, is on the verge of taking place, and consequently there seems to be no reason to speak of a special mishap of the Russian conduct of war. After the loss of the "Petropavlovsk" the fate of Port Arthur was sealed in a certain sense, as far as it had to countenance the isolation and siege from that stage. To hold out and gain time is its only chance now.

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It is said according to Russian reports that the damaged ships in Port Arthur are being repaired with zeal and success. However it is not known whether the "Zesarevich" and "Retvisan" are included herein. The lighter vessels appear to leave the harbor of Port Arthur on every occasion and to put to sea. Of course, apparently without success, unless the sinking of the "Hatsuse" be regarded as an indirect success of the activity of the Russian torpedo boats.

Everything seems to be quiet at Vladivostok lately, once in a while it is stated that Japanese warships have been sighted in the distance; besides, the Japanese are said to have established a base and coaling station for a number of torpedo vessels and perhaps several small cruisers, in Port Lazareff; details are not known, but it is not improbable that it is preferred after the last excursion of the Vladivostok squadron, to exercise a closer observation of the harbor. That such an observation by inferior naval forces is insufficient and cannot fulfill its purpose, has already been discussed.

The Russian squadron received a great blow through the loss of the large armored cruiser "Bogatyr". The latter, during the period between May 15th and 20th, in a heavy fog, went on a rock in the vicinity of Vladivostok, and in such a manner that the ship had to be given up. Details are not known. The entire crew was saved, the light guns and ammunition were removed and the wreck was rendered useless by explosion.

Admiral Skrydleff arrived in Vladivostok on May 25 and assumed the command held by Rear Admiral Jessen until that time.

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Also the new battleship "Orel" has had many a mishap. At the beginning of the past month she went aground on the occasion of a trial trip in the Neva, and could only be floated after considerable work, but without being damaged. When she afterwards lay in Kronstadt, for the completion of her armament or for the purpose of making minor repairs, she was found one morning grounded, fortunately the water was shallow, and on the 24th the "Orel" was again pumped out and afloat undamaged. Nothing official has transpired about the causes of this mysterious accident, only many rumors. The Russians

state that during the evening or night, valves or torpedo tubes had been maliciously opened, in order to scuttle the ship. The probability of this cannot be disputed, but it may not be impossible that Japanese emissaries, who according to their looks, may not have been of Japanese nationality, endeavored to retard the mobilization of the Baltic squadron in this manner. Other suppositions are that the water entered through the shaft tubes, or that rivets or armor bolts had been overlooked.

The question of reenforcement on land for the Manchurian army has been taken up energetically, after the battle of the Yalu. The following organizations are being mobilized with the greatest celerity and put en route at once, viz: an Orenburg-Cossack division, an Ural-Cossack division, furthermore the 10th Army Corps (Charkows) and the 17th Army Corps (Moscow) reserve organizations for all East Siberian troops have been decided upon, also the formation of a balloon detachment.

The Russian government intends to dispatch with the Baltic fleet also a number of auxiliary cruisers to East Asiatic waters, and as such, the vessels of the volunteer fleet are first of all to be considered. These would be the following ships, viz: "Smolensk", "Orel", "Saratoff" and "St. Petersburg". All these vessels can be armed, they possess a speed of 18 to 20 knots; "Yaroslaff", "Kastroma", "Vladimir", "Kieff", "Tamboff", and "Wovonez" carry partially armament and have a maximum speed of 13 knots. The two twin-screw steamers "Kerson" and "Moskeva" are interned at Port Arthur, also the "Angara" and "Lena" and the twin-screw transport "Kasan" which was used as hospital ship.

## THE STORMING OF THE HEIGHTS OF KINCHAN.

(See sketch).

We present the following illustration, based on material at present (May 30th); the reports regarding names of localities do not agree with the maps, and therefore will have to be amended later on. After the troops which had been landed at Pitsevo had joined those disembarked further south, they advanced, four divisions strong, on Kinchan. The artillery seems to have taken a permanent position on the heights north of the town. The Russians held a strongly fortified position on the range of Nanshan, which occupies the entire width of the isthmus south of Kinchan. The fortifications had been prepared for a long while and were rendered stronger by a number of mines, wire-entanglements and ditches, in addition to their natural strength. The position was held by a division of the field army, and two field batteries, besides, -to judge from the number of guns captured by the Japanese,- a large number of medium and heavy siege pieces, and perhaps also naval guns were placed in position.

General Fock was in supreme command of the Russian forces, General Oku, the leader of the 2d army which was reinforced by the 3rd army under General Negi, commanded the Japanese forces. The 3rd army was equipped with siege artillery and consequently was landed in the vicinity of the battle field, as we have already mentioned.

The advance against the Russian position commenced on May 25th toward midnight amidst stormy weather and darkness. The troops entered the village of Kinchan without encountering resistance, which is in the report of General Oku expressly mentioned.

Toward 4.40 A. M. May 26, they had advanced so far that the artillery should have commenced to open fire on the Russian position; a thick fog, however, caused a delay of about one hour, and then fire was opened on both sides with vehemence; also a Japanese squadron whose composition is not known as yet, took a hand, and delivered an enfilading fire on the left wing of the Russians.

Toward 9 o'clock the fire of the Russians seemed to relax, and then the Japanese infantry advanced: on the left wing the 3rd division, in the center the 1st division, on the right wing the 4th division, while another division was apparently held in reserve. The left wing was suffering under the fire of a Russian armed steamer which was lying in the Bay of Talienwan, also from four field pieces, which were brought into action near Tadung-fang-dushen, i. e. a German mile south.

Map of Kinchan and vicinity.

X X X

The battle continued with the same vehemence until 5 o'clock and remained undecided; especially the left wing of the Japanese suffered enormous losses and was at the point of retreat; also the 1st division at the center was exhausted. Then the 4th division, i. e. the right wing, after the annihilating fire of the squadron had shaken this portion of the Russian position, succeeded in storming the heights. This decided the battle; also the 1st and 3rd divisions reached the heights after a short and violent hand to hand struggle, the Russians abandoned the position and retreated.

As it is stated, the Japanese found the mine wires and cut the same.

The Russians then retreated to Port Arthur, at any rate beyond Ssanshilipu and Nankwanling; a pursuit does not appear to have taken place, at least not energetically.



According to Japanese reports the victors captured: 68 guns of various calibers, 10 machine-guns, 50 mines, 3 search-lights, rifles, ammunition and other war material.

General Oku reports the Japanese casualties as 3500, those of the Russians as 500

We shall refer again to the participation of the Japanese fleet, as soon as details in this respect become known; it appears from the report of General Oku that the fleet effected the decision by her fire on the left wing of the Russian position, and offers, if this be true, a brilliant proof, how a fleet, aided by geographical conditions can add to the reenforcement of a wing of an army.

The statement in the report of General Oku that a Russian armed steamer (?) had fired on the left wing of the Japanese position from the direction of Dalny, should be noted.

On the day of the battle, i. e. on May 27th, the commander-in-chief of the Japanese naval forces, Admiral Togo, announced the blockade of the coast of the Liantung Peninsula, as far as the coast is situated south of the line Port Adams (Pulantien)- Pitsevo, and called the attention of all neutral shipping to the consequences of this proclamation.

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W.

Fort Crook, Nebraska,

July 10, 1905.


Respectfully submitted:

H. HOSSFELD,

2nd Lieutenant, 30<sup>th</sup> Infantry.

Translation

No. 230.



THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR,

translated from supplements of the Marine Rundschau, by  
Second Lieutenant H. Hossfeld, 30th Infantry, from July 11,  
1905 to September 30, 1905.

TENTH SUPPLEMENT.

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Chronological recapitulation.

May 27th: The second army under General Oku advances from  
Nanshan southward.

May 29th: Dalny evacuated by the Russians; gunboat "Bobr"  
annihilated.

May 30th: Dalny occupied by the Japanese.

May 30th: Victorious engagement of the Japanese near Kwan-  
tienhsien.

Beginning of June: Admiral Skrydloff puts to sea from Port  
Arthur with the cruiser-squadron.

June 7th: The Japanese occupy Hsinyan.

June 7th: The Japanese occupy Saimatze.

June 11th: The Russian garrison evacuates Sinkan.

June 13th: Accident on board the mine-ship "Taioku-Maru".

June 14th: Japanese torpedo boats fire on Russian troops  
near Tsiao-ping-tan.

June 14th and 15th: Battle of Wafangku.

June 15th: The Russian corps "Baron Stackelberg" retreats to a  
position north of Wafangku.

June 15th: The Russian Vladivostok squadron destroys the  
transports "Idzumi-Maru", "Hitachi-Maru", and  
"Sado-Maru" in the Strait of Korea.

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## EVENTS ON THE SOUTHERN THEATER OF WAR.

The participation of the naval forces in the battle of Kinchan.

The following vessels were detailed to support the Japanese attack against the heights of Nanshan, viz:-

the armored coast defense vessel: "Hai Yen" (1887), draught 5 m.

the gunboat	"Tsukushi" (1883),	" 4.5 m.
" "	"Chokai" (1887),	" 3 m.
" "	"Akagi" (1887),	" 3 m.

In all, these four vessels represented the following number of guns, viz: three 25 cm., two 21 cm., two 15 cm., eight 12 cm., one 7.6 cm. and five 4.7 cm. In addition to these a number of torpedo vessels is said to have been attached to the squadron.

From the composition it may be supposed that this was the squadron of Admiral Hosoya, to which we referred in the preceding pamphlet. The coast-defense vessels "Fuse", "Sei-Yen" belong also to this squadron, although they were not mentioned in the reports of the battle of Kinchan, but may have cooperated or given cover against molestation from the sea. As the "Chokai" and "Akagi" have less draught than the "Hai Yen" and "Tsukushi", it may be assumed that they and the torpedo boats approached the coast closer, and that two lines were formed, which perhaps delivered a fire on the Russian position from different directions.

According to the reports, the ships opened fire simultaneously with the energetic advance of the troops, i. e. on the morning of May 26th, at dawn, but apparently had to interrupt the fire shortly until afternoon. The cause for this interruption is not clear; at any rate, the assumption that it was a consequence of attacks of Russian torpedo boats, is not correct, but it is probable that the bad weather and the heavy sea rendered it impossible for the vessels to

remain within range without being exposed to the danger of grounding on account of the shallow water. However, some Russian torpedo boats are said to have made an attack in which one was beached; nothing has become known regarding an attack, or a successful one, and it may be taken for granted that the torpedo boats, considering the heavy sea, did not cause a delay in the bombardment, lasting nearly 12 hours.

Finally towards 5 o'clock P. M., just when General Oku had ordered the charge along the whole line, the squadron succeeded in taking again a position within range, -the Japanese report mentions expressly an improvement of the weather-, and in taking a decisive part in the battle.

According to the report of Oku, this seems to have been a very critical moment.

The Japanese left wing, consisting of the 3rd division, was, heavily pressed by the fire of the Russian gunboat "Bohr", of the torpedo boat destroyers "Boiky" and "Buiny", and of a battery near Talienwan, besides it was threatened by a turning movement of the Russian reserves; also the right wing was already forced to draw back, in order to avoid a flanking movement. General Oku desired to bring this dangerous situation to an end, and hoped, when he ordered the charge, first of all, to compel the Russians to retreat by his center; a hope which proved to be erroneous, for the 1st division was beaten off with heavy losses. Then Haseya's squadron intervened, assisting the right wing, and consequently decided the battle. At this point the Japanese are said to have advanced through the shallow water, under the protection of the guns of the ships, in order to avoid the numerous land mines and obstacles, and in this manner the vessels were able to still continue their fire, without endangering the Japanese troops, the latter, as viewed from the ships, being approximately in line with the Russian position.

The charge of the heights of Nanshan therefore offers a teaching less of a successful cooperation of army and navy. Of course, corresponding geographical conditions are primarily the necessary requirements, but when the further consequences are considered, it may well be imagined that strategy can render a search for such conditions profitable, as far as they represent the "locus minoris resistentiae" (point of least resistance.) This may principally apply to turning movements on a large scale, which may have to be executed along the coast under constant cooperation of the navy. The latter, of course, must at least be in possession of a temporary supremacy at sea.

Japan, by the nature of this war beyond the sea, has been restricted to a permanent cooperation of army and navy from the beginning, and it has worked well; also during the crossing of the Yalu the Japanese flatbottom gunboats have rendered excellent services.

Remarkable remains the participation of the "Bohr", "Boiky" and "Ruiny", which fired on the right Japanese wing from Hand-Bay or Linshutun, apparently during the entire period. The thick fog on the forenoon of May 26th does not make it appear unusual that they were able to take position there, but we find no explanation for the fact that they were able to hold their own, and that they were not annihilated by some Japanese vessels, for instance by the squadron of Admiral Kataoka, which was previously stationed on the east coast of Liantung or Kwantung; the water there is considerably deeper than on the west coast, and if, as it must be assumed, wind and tide came from the west, the weather conditions were surely not such as to prevent the Japanese ships from getting there.

The blockade of Port Arthur does not appear to be at all effective in the sense of the word, for also subsequently we have heard continuously of the departure of Russian torpedo boats as well as of cruisers.

"Boiky" and "Buiny" appear to have returned to Port Arthur. It is however not impossible and almost probable in a way that these two boats have been confounded with those that made the attack from the west side; then one of them was beached or destroyed.

The Japanese did not take up the pursuit, and the Russian rear guard remained for the night at Sanshilipu, a German miles from Hanshan, in order to cover the retreat of the remainder of the troops.

It needs to be emphasized in view of the different accounts that the Russians did not suffer any loss in field artillery; that they could not withdraw the heavy guns, mounted on emplacements long ago, could not be questioned. All they could do was to render them useless, and that they did.

Just as little does the battle of Kinchan stand for a humiliating defeat for the Russians in the true sense of the word. They could not conceal from themselves that the position could be held temporarily only, in view of the impossibility, as some Russian newspapers have so correctly stated, of preventing a participation of the Japanese naval forces with flanking fire.

If the Russians had possessed the supremacy at sea in these waters or had rendered the supremacy of the Japanese fleet questionable, matters would have looked different, and as the report of General Oku shows, he would have charged the heights of Hanshan in vain.

The Japanese lost in this battle 151 officers and 4170 men, the Russians 30 officers and 800 men.

## COURSE OF OPERATIONS ON KWANTUNG AND LIANTUNG, CONTINUED/

On the following day General Oku advanced, and the Russian rear-guard evacuated without a fight Sanshilipu; also Taliensan was occupied on the same day by Japanese troops.

On May 29th the Russian garrison evacuated Dalny, and the gunboat "Bobr" is said to have been destroyed by her crew at that place. In the harbor entrance several small vessels are said to have been sunk, these, indeed, could hardly represent any serious obstacles for Japanese ships, and could easily be overcome. Rumors regarding the destruction of the piers have not been confirmed, only one dock appears to be damaged.

On May 30th the Japanese troops occupied Dalny, and a large number of serviceable railroad cars, which the Russians were unable to burn in the hurry, fell in the hands of the Japanese.

Reliable information regarding the present position of the siege troops is not available; whether, and what lines outside of the main works of Port Arthur are held by the Russians is also unknown.

## The garrison of Port Arthur.

Commandant: Lieut. General Stoessel.

Chief of Staff: Major General Rosnatowski.

## Field troops:

7th East Siberian Rifle division:

Major General Kondratenko,

Lieut. Col. Naumenko (Chief of Staff)

1st Brigade: Maj. Gen. Zerpitzki.

2nd Brigade: Maj. Gen. Gorbатовski.

7th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Battalion:

Colonel Mechmandarov.

4th East Siberian Rifle division:

Maj. General Tok.

Lt. Col. Dmitrewski (Chief of Staff).

1st Brigade: Maj. Gen. Andre de Bui.

2nd Brigade: Maj. Gen. Madjacin.

4th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade:

Colonel Irmom.

Fortress troops:

Commandant: Lieut. General Ssmirnov,

Chief of Staff: Lieut. Colonel Choestow.

3 battalions of fortress artillery 1 fortress torpedo company.

1 company of fortress sappers. 1 fortress telegraph company.

A total of approximately 40,000 men.

On June 14th the siege line was said to have extended about from Chien-chen-tse to Lung-wantung, covering a distance of 25 km. and from 18 to 25 km. distant from Port Arthur.

Nothing certain is known regarding the strength of the besieging army. Considerable reinforcements have doubtlessly been added to the three divisions of General Oku, or are still arriving. It may be assumed that the entrance to Dalny was cleared of mines and that a permanent guard service prevents the Russian vessels from laying any more there. In this manner the Japanese obtained an excellent harbor for the disembarkation of troops, and especially a good landing for heavy artillery. On account of the state of blockade, the disembarkations and their scope are entirely beyond any assumption.

On May 30th four Japanese gunboats and the same number of torpedo vessels undertook a reconnaissance in force of the outer roadstead of Port Arthur. The vessels, which were fired at vehemently from the coast works, apparently noted newly constructed batteries and electrical search-lights on the promontory of Liantshan. One of the torpedo boats was struck



by a shell; nothing is known regarding the extent of damage or of the loss of life.

On June 6th the small cruiser "Chitose" also observed on the height of Liantishan apparatus for wireless telegraphy.

On June 4th the Russian gunboat "Gaidamak" and the torpedo boat destroyer "Gromyachi" are said to have been sunk by mines in the roadstead of Port Arthur, and at the same time the Russians report that a large Japanese ship had struck a mine near Taliensan and that she had sunk. More recently the Russians deny the loss of the two vessels.

All these rumors can only be briefly noted; every control, even every probability for or against is entirely lacking.

Some truth may be contained in another rumor, it being persistently reported in the Russian press for weeks, and not having been officially denounced as incorrect from Tokio, i. e. The battleship "Yashima, which, as we know, struck several mines in company with the "Hatuse", was seriously damaged and endeavored to reach home port, she is said to have sunk on her way.

The sister ship "Fugi" is said to have been placed on the beach on one of the Kwantan Islands, because she was also damaged by a mine.

As at least a serious injury to the "Yashima" cannot be questioned, the Japanese have at present by no means more than four battleships available for service, probably less than that.

To draw any conclusion, free of objection, in regard to the present proportion of strength of the two fleets, is not very practicable, because we do not know how many, and which of the Russian ships in Port Arthur are ready for service. It is reported that a number of cruisers was abandoned and their artillery practically removed, in order to

employ the guns on land, whereas the rumor regarding the approaching readiness of the battleship "Caesarevich" seems to hold out.

The war of mines is being continued, and the squadron of Kataoka is still constantly occupied with search for and clearing of mines in the bays of Liantung and Kwantung on the east coast. Probably on account of the frequent accidents which have befallen the several ships and boats during this work, a large number of divers are now employed in the search for mines.

On June 15th the steamer "Taioku-Maru" was distributing mines in front of Port Arthur; one of these exploded, killing 1 officer and 18 men, and wounding 9. The Japanese report to the effect that the steamer had been laying mines "in the entrance", does sound very euphemistic, and if translated "on or in front of the outer roadstead", may conform to actual facts. As the steamer did not sink/ it must be assumed that the mine exploded before she went into the water, or that the work was performed in haste. In the former case the steamer should have received injuries at any rate, although her vital parts may have remained undamaged.

It has been repeatedly reported that the "Kovik" put to sea in company with torpedo boat destroyers, and perhaps it is due to the onesidedness of the reports that nothing has become known regarding any possible positive events during these excursions.

At any rate, it remains significant that even the Japanese reports still mention on June 10th the appearance of torpedo boat destroyers off Talienwan; this admits the conclusion therefore that the present strength of the Japanese fleet, its various tasks distributed over an extended space, which it has to solve, being considered, is not sufficient to

protect from molestation even the bays and waters close to Port Arthur.

A small encounter secured on June 14th near Tsiao-ping-tan; here several Japanese torpedo boats fired on Russian land troops during a reconnaissance of the coast. The "Novik" left at once and pursued them, whereupon the latter endeavored to induce the cruiser to come out on the open sea.

The danger of mines therefore appears to keep all Japanese ships whenever their draught is larger than that of the torpedo boats, at a considerable distance from the coast. Consequently the Russians are in a position to lay mines anew in waters which shortly before have been cleared of same.

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Regarding the sinking of the small cruiser "Yoshima", which, as we know, was rammed in a fog on May 15th by the armored cruiser "Kasuga", the following details have become known: The ram of the "Kasuga" struck the "Yoshima" on the port side near the engine room and destroyed the electrical machinery serving for the interior illumination, causing immediate darkness in all compartments. Leak-pads were brought out, or it was at least attempted, however, without success, which could only be expected considering the width and length of the leak. The order to lower and man all the boats followed, this was done, one boat on the starboard side being excepted, as it was expected that the ship would turn over toward port. She turned however, toward starboard, and so quickly that the boats could not get out of the way; the masts and davits struck the boats close to the vessel, capsizing or crushing them to pieces. This speaks for the great loss of life; the commandant was either drowned or committed suicide.

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The isolation of the fortress of Port Arthur from land and sea suggests how extremely important it is in such a situation to possess a wireless telegraph station, and especially one whose power and other features permit of communication at the greatest distances. Such an apparatus, however, is hardly available at Port Arthur, although a station has recently been established on the height of Liantishan, as has been mentioned. Apparently through this station Port Arthur has entered into communication with the Russian consulate at Cheefoo, on whose flag-staff, as stated by the Japanese, has been installed a wireless telegraph apparatus. The Japanese consul protested against this to the Chinese authorities, designating the toleration of the wireless service as contrary to the law of neutrality.

However, should an invested fortress be in possession of a station installed for great distances, it would prove to be of immense value for it. Port Arthur would then be able to remain in constant communication with the headquarters of General Kuropatkin, and above all, also with the Vladivostok squadron under Admiral Skrydloff. This seems to be very important just at the present, since after the considerable losses of the Japanese fleet, a synchronized action of the Port Arthur squadron and of the three Vladivostok cruisers in the Yellow Sea might well be considered feasible.

For the dispositions of the supreme command of the army, the knowledge of the situation in and around Port Arthur is of the highest importance; also indirectly, for instance to know the strength of the Japanese siege army, the disembarkations on Liantung being now entirely beyond Russian control.

Up to the present this may constitute one of the most important lessons of the war.

## EVENTS ON LIAONTUNG NORTH OF KWANTUNG.

Shortly after the battle of Kinchan the news was spread that the Russian main army, grouped around Lianyang had commenced the march south, for the purpose of relieving Port Arthur. Even if Kuropatkin had 200000 men available, this was to be doubted for the following reasons:

The march of so large an army with the maintenance of supplies and communication to the rear through a nearly roadless country, by itself is a difficult proposition, and in this case is rendered entirely unpracticable on account of the approaching rainy season. Furthermore, the army of General Kuroki is not very far off and occupies a dangerous flanking position for any southern advance. It may not, or not yet be strong enough for any offensive movement against Lianyang, but it is entirely too strong to risk a march south past this army.

First of all Kuroki's army would have to be defeated by all means, and as it has occupied and fortified excellent positions in the mountainous country, the offensive of Kuropatkin would constitute an extremely hazardous undertaking. He could only think of trying to relieve Port Arthur were he so strong as to hold Kuroki entirely in check with one part of his army, and that the other part would still suffice to match the Japanese forces on Liantung and Kwantung, at the same time keeping open the communication to the rear; but considering the extension of the latter, this is entirely out of the question. In making an estimate of the strength of this Russian army, it must also be considered that a very considerable contingent, estimated at 50,000 men, is needed for the constant guarding of the railroad, and must therefore be deducted. The railroad connecting the army with Europe, represents not only the sole means of reenforcing it, but also

is only artery of life; when the safe guarding of this road is considered, even Port Arthur disappears far in the background. Things look different, however, in case, as it recently seems to appear, Kuroki's army is concentrating towards the line Hsinyan-Kaiping, i. e. in a souther direction.

The origin of these rumors may be found in the despatch of a large detachment to Liantung under General Baron Stackelberg, for the purpose of harassing the Japanese troops located there. No one has hardly entertained the intention of penetrating as far as beyond Kinchan, in view of the facility and rapidity with which Japanese troops may be disembarked at any moment on the peninsula.

The strength of the detachment "Stackelberg" is not positively known. It was reported from Newchwang on June 2, that General Stackelberg was marching with 14000 men towards Wafangku. Wafangku is situated in the latitude of Fuchow, at the crossing of the railroad and the Fuchow-Ho river. The troops, arriving from Kaiping, have probably marched partly along the track and partly on the road Kaiping-Fuchou, which, towards front, is about 20 km. distant from Wafangku.

This Russian force, later on estimated at 40,000 men, has had engagements with Japanese troops under General Negi(?) ever since the beginning of the month. From the course of events to date, one may draw the conclusion, although the names of the localities of the engagements can for the main part not be found on the maps, that Russian detachments, acting alone, already penetrated during the last days of May as far as to the line Pulantien-Pitsevo, and that they became engaged with Japanese forces, which were also weak, under changing fortune. On May 29th Baron Stackelberg arrived with considerable reinforcements in Newchwang, whereas Japanese reinforcements advance against Wafangku from the south.

It is evident that the failures of the Russians, as subsequently reported in the press, cannot have been of any serious character, because they were still at Wafangku, after a nearly three weeks' fighting, and besides, they were still able to send their wounded by rail to Lianyang.

#### THE BATTLE OF WAFANGKU ON TELISSU.

As it appears, the army corps of General v. Stackelberg caused such molestation and constituted such a menace north of the line Port Adams-Pitsevo, and besides received continuously such reinforcements that General Oku found himself obliged to make an advance with three, probably, however, four divisions and a considerable force of artillery. As it appears the outposts of the two armies met as early as June 12, south of Wafangku, at a point situated west of the railroad and south of Wafangku. According to the reports, General Oku is said to have advanced independently, according to some versions with three, according to others with three columns. On the afternoon of the 14th an energetic artillery fire opened against the Russian position, which was probably located a little south of Wafangku and evenly east and west of the railroad. The Japanese, as it appears, advanced partly along the railroad track, partly in the valley of the Fuchou river from west to east, the third column finally advanced east of the track in the valley of the Sha river, which runs parallel to the railroad as far as its upper course is concerned. The village of Telissu is said to be situated near the railroad and south of Wafangku. Some reports mention that the left wing of the Russians was stationed near Tawan-cheng, this, however, does not seem probable. On account of the considerable numerical superiority of the Japanese, the Russians transferred their primary position still further south, about six versts from Wafangku. On the evening of the 14th the battle had to be broken off on account of the darkness

and the Japanese apparently brought their artillery into position during the night on several hills west and east of the Russian position, from where they commanded the latter.

On the morning of the 15th the fight began and lasted the entire day. Baron Stackelberg intended at first to advance with his right wing to the offensive, but finding the left wing of the Japanese reenforced by an additional division, was consequently thrown on the defensive; also the entire reserve had to be ordered up, probably for the purpose of prolonging this right wing, the Japanese left wing having executed a successful turning movement. The Russians at first had the advantage on their left wing, and here also the Japanese were obliged to bring up reserves. The Japanese cavalry is said to have executed a decisive turning movement against this wing of the Russians, causing Baron Stackelberg to retreat in order to avoid a complete surrounding of his forces. He is said to have retreated to a position north of Wafanku. The immense difficulties of the terrain rendered a pursuit for the Japanese impracticable.

As regards the strength of the two armies, the force of the Japanese is estimated at from three to four divisions, besides their superiority in artillery must have been very considerable. The strength of the Russians is estimated at one army corps; they lost 20 guns, one color, 1000 men and 800 prisoners. The casualties of the Japanese are said to have been 900 men, of which 8 officers were killed and 14 wounded; The mutual figures of casualties however have not as yet been definitely determined.

Regarding the strength of the opponents, one cannot fail to be impressed that the figures on both sides are taken too high. This is shown by the casualties which when scrutinized, are not very considerable. At the same time all kinds of



rumors are afloat that Japanese troops are marching south from Sinyan, in order to cut off the Russian retreat. These and other rumors are still beyond control, it is, however, safe to assume that the battle of Wafangku will have a continuation unless the Russian detachment should receive orders to abandon definitely its expedition to the south, so hopeless from the beginning, and unless it should succeed in passing unmolested the line Kaiping-Heinyan.

Surprising and interesting is the fact that General Oku commanded this army, as it was thus far generally believed that he was directing the siege of Port Arthur, and that General Nogi was stationed north with several divisions for his protection from the rear; this is a further proof, how impossible it is to keep track of the strength of the Japanese troops and of their distribution on Liaotung or Kwantung. If the reports be true, that the 5th, 7th and 11th Japanese divisions fought at Wafangku, and that besides a reserve was available, but that at least the 1st, 3rd and 4th divisions, which, as is known, fought at Kinchan, were present before Port Arthur, the total strength of the troops on Liantung or Kwantung must amount to 100,000 men. It is however, better to leave this question unanswered for the present.

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From the beginning it was probably not expected that the Russian detachment would hold its own for any length of time on Liantung, and the only explanation possible, may be found in an attempt of gaining time for Port Arthur as well as for Kuropatkin. On the other hand, it is so contrary to any previous strategy of the Russian commander-in-chief, to make such a move with entirely insufficient forces that it appears probable as if he had acted by order from higher authority.

The afore-mentioned rumor, regarding a movement to the south of Kuropatkin's army, was immediately followed by another i. e. that the Japanese northern army under Kuroki were advancing north or west. The strength of this army, at the time of the crossing of the Yalu, was three divisions. At present, from the various reports no one can doubt that considerable reinforcements have arrived from Takushan, where disembarkations have noncontinuously been going on. However, the growth of the Russian army, without regard to its original strength, is probably considerably quicker, for the army is at least receiving 2000 men daily. Also in this case it was very doubtful from the start, whether General Kuroki would resort to the decisive offensive before the southern forces could be withdrawn.

Skirmishes among outposts have, since the last days of the past month, taken place along the entire line of the very extended Japanese position, and whenever they assumed a more serious character, it was probably caused through the lack of cavalry on the Japanese side, forcing the latter to employ foot troops in reconnoitering duty. Besides, the tendency seems to be manifest, to strengthen the position in occupying some suitable points, and these being situated in front of the original position, an advance must indeed be admitted, although it may possess a defensive character strategically. Considering first the north-east wing, we find that troops have been sent forward from General Kuroki's headquarters as far as Saimatze during the last three weeks, and also from Kwanthiensien. The highway leads from this village to Sainatze in a north-western direction, and is not very far from the Yalu river.

After an engagement had taken place on the 29th near Aiyang, northeast of Fenghwancheng, the Japanese on May 30th

advanced against Shaoko, north-east of Kwantienhsien, and a fierce fight ensued, lasting until late in the night. The Russians retired through Chanlin-Pass towards north-west, and in this manner rendered a pursuit impracticable. On the following morning the Japanese followed, steadily marching on the road in a north-western direction, chasing the cossacks before them under a continuous fire, the latter retreating to Saimatze. Here, during the succeeding days continuous fighting with changing fortune took place. During the first days of June the Japanese succeeded in taking the place, on the 7th of June, however, they were forced to abandon it, and to leave it to the Russians, that is if the reports are to be credited. On the same day, however, the Japanese were sufficiently reenforced, giving their forces the strength of a brigade, thus causing the Russians to retreat and the village of Saimatze returned once more into the possession of the Japanese. Fortifications were at once constructed at this point. On one side Saimatze is situated on the Pa-ta-ho, on the other, one of the roads leading to Lianyang; the village is admirably protected by mountain passes, situated at its front, but is just as little adapted for the offensive as it can be used for the defensive. Outposts are said to have been posted from here towards west as far as Lianshan-gwan. The more recent operations of the left wing, comprising the 10th division, as is said, are not only more important, but have also a more offensive character. If this be true, it was this division which attack on June 7th the Russians near Hsinyan, and repulsed them; consequently it appears that Hsinyan has fallen only now in the hand of the Japanese, whereas it had been reported some months ago, although contradicted in the meantime. The Russians retreated in the direction of Kaiping, whereas the Japanese fortified at once their position in Hsinyan.

A squadron of nine vessels appeared on the same day before Kaiping and bombarded the coast line. This must have been the squadron of Real Admiral Togo, which had been reported stationed in this region some time ago. The bombardment served probably only the purpose of a demonstration, for no disembarkation followed; perhaps it was intended to search a certain portion of the roadstead for mines, as the squadron lowered boats according to Russian reports.

The operation of the Russian detachment Stackelberg, previously mentioned, and perhaps the existing anticipation that the present strength of the Russian main army might afford by further reinforcements of the aforementioned detachment, explain the sudden advance of the Japanese left wing in the direction of Hsinyan-Kaiping. Only in holding this line can the movements of further Russian forces towards south be minimized, and those already on Liantung cut off. All depends on the strength of the Japanese troops operating on this line, as well as on their mobility or advance, and on whether and when they will be able to carry out their intentions. It must however be assumed that their strength is also here more than the one single division, primarily available at this point. The vicinity of the point of disembarkation of Takushan renders these reinforcements very probable. Therefore it is possible that the troops of Baron Stackelberg, so hardly pressed from the south, may have to face, during their retreat, another enemy, perhaps superior in numbers. That nothing has become known regarding a further advance beyond Hsinyan, does not obviate the fact, however, for the general features render an advance in that direction very probable.

According to a report of Admiral Togo, dated June 11th, The Russians are said to have evacuated Yunkow, and Chinese report that all ports and points of disembarkation in the Gulf of Liantung, and also the port of Newchwang are being blockaded.

From the above-mentioned movements of the Japanese northern army, it can hardly be doubted that the army does not represent one command, not even in the least manner, its extension being immense, from Saimatze to Hsinyan; near Saimatze and at the center near Fenghwancheng, the troops are decidedly in a defensive position, whereas the left wing is entirely restricted to the offensive, or, at any rate, to a further advance, and is by the nature of the country also assisted therein. The object of operations of the left wing compared with that of the center and right wing, is entirely different, for the latter Kuropatkin's army is the object, for the former, however, the Russian detachments at Liantung. Considering the immense distances, and the great difficulties of the terrain, which, in the course of the next weeks, on account of the approaching rainy season, will become impassable, according to the opinion of men who know the country: operations at this point will probably at present be suspended. A concentric operation on a large scale of the troops of Kuroki against Kuropatkin, as the English press will have it, is under these conditions entirely out of the question the left wing has at present indeed become independent, and it is safe to assume that later on it will not again be under direct orders of Fenghwancheng headquarters. It may be assumed that Japanese troops will soon be disembarked in the vicinity of Kaiping; therefore the railroad connection would also here be interrupted, and furthermore the highways could be barred quicker if a contingent of troops having been disembarked, would work in cooperation with the 12th division from

the west, than if the latter would have to march through from the east. Finally the possibility remains that Kuroki has shifted his center of gravity entirely over to the left wing.

A field railway from Anchou near the estuary of the Yalu to Fenghwancheng is reported completed, and the outposts of Kuroki's center have been pushed towards north as far as Summentze on the Hsiao-Tso-Ho.

Nothing is known regarding the exact position of the Russian main army, but it may be assumed that it is located between Lianyan and Mukden, its front towards south-east. The service of security and information, is, as it appears, very carefully conducted, the cossacks remaining permanently in contact with all points of the Japanese position.

Frequently disembarkations of Japanese troops on the north-east coast of Korea have been reported, no details, however, have become known, just as little has transpired regarding the activity of the cossacks in Northern Korea. At one time it was said that they had been driven back by Japanese troops, and that they were not able to subsist any longer in the poor country, then again it is reported that they are dangerously harassing the Japanese, and that the Koreans treat them more friendly than the Japanese.

#### THE CRUISE OF THE VLADIVOSTOK SQUADRON.

On June 11th a rumor was current that the Russian Vladivostok cruisers had appeared on June 7th at a distance of 30 miles from Fort Arthur, and that they were fired at and chased in the fog by Japanese ships. As no confirmation was received, and neither Admiral Skrydloff mentioned this encounter in his telegram regarding the cruise, it remains very uncertain. As fact is only known that the ships left Vladivostok during the first days of June. Whether Admiral Skrydloff had any intention or took at all the possibility

into consideration of uniting with the Port Arthur squadron is impossible to say with certainty; however, it may be assumed probable, from what has become known thus far, that he had, at first at least, only the harassing of the enemy, and especially of the Japanese transports in view. On June 15th the Russian cruisers were in the strait of Korea and sighted a Japanese transport with troops on board. After the men had been allowed to abandon the ship in boats, a permission which was accepted by a portion of the men, the ship, "Idzumi-Maru" was her name, was sunk, two other transports, discovered later, the "Hitachi-Maru" and "Sado-Maru", experienced the same fate; the former vessel had troops, the latter horses, and railway material on board. The crews having refused to surrender, the steamers were fired at with torpedoes and guns and sunk. According to the statement of Admiral Chrydloff, these three steamers possessed an aggregate tonnage of about 15000 tons. Besides the Russians are said to have also sunk two sailing vessels in the same vicinity.

Apparently two Japanese squadrons were dispatched after the Russian cruisers, Admiral Kuroki with an unknown number of cruisers and a torpedo boat flotilla under the command of Admiral Trunoda. It may be that Admiral Trunoda either commanded a larger contingent of ships or a coast-station, and that the above-mentioned torpedo boat flotilla belonged to the latter. Apparently they did not succeed in even sighting the Russians. The latter sailed north and were sighted several times in the vicinity of the Japanese west coast. Among others they seized the English collier "Allan" and sent her to Vladivostok to the prize-court. Another steamer was searched, and released later. The Russian squadron then returned to Vladivostok without being molested by Kamimura's squadron.

On the 19th Admiral Kamimura arrived again at his base of operations, probably in or near the Strait of Korea, without having sighted the Russian ships.

Probably the future will throw a little more light on these interesting events. One thing seems to be certain from the action of Admiral Kamimura, that is that the Japanese can spare only a few ships for the Vladivostok squadron. This is apparent from the haste with which the Japanese squadron chief returned to the Strait of Korea, probably for the purpose of establishing here at least a service of observation which would work in any emergency.

It is not known of which ships his squadron consists, the report made by an American correspondent that it consisted of six protected cruisers, does not seem likely. With such ships Kamimura would not be able to destroy the Russian armored cruisers, neither could he afford to expose his fleet to their fire, but he must at least have three or four armored cruisers, therefore nearly all the vessels which Japan has still available of armored cruisers.

In view of the losses in ships to the present day, and intensive occupation of the Japanese fleet around Liantung, a blockade of Vladivostok, as it has been announced feasible on various occasions cannot be thought of at all.

#### THE NEUTRALS.

The Grand Council in Peking has addressed a note to the Russian ambassador in which attention is called that the Russian troops when leaving districts in the neutral zone, should not destroy the buildings belonging to the inhabitants, or it would have to be regarded as a serious breach of the laws of neutrality. The Grand Council also telegraphed these instructions to General Ma with orders to communicate them at once to the Russian officers.



In connection with the above, the Japanese notified all Chinese officials that the use of wireless telegraphy by the Russians or Russian agents would be considered a breach of neutrality. When asked in the English Lower House, the acting secretary of the foreign office explained that the British government had made no representations to the belligerents in regard to floating or drifting mines, but that it would take the matter into careful consideration; that one is not inclined to acknowledge an extension of the historical three mile limit.

To this may be added that an extension of the above mentioned zone would be of no avail, for the current may take the mines out to sea so far that it would be impossible to speak of any limit at all. The main point, however, before which probably all international rules will come to grief, is the impossibility, as already mentioned, in the preceding pamphlet, of ascertaining to which party the encountered mines belong, and furthermore, where they were originally laid, and whether they were anchored or free from the beginning.

#### RUSSIAN REINFORCEMENTS.

During the first week of June, the mobilization of the Fourth Siberian Army Corps, which was commenced recently, is said to have been completed and the corps was reported present in Lianyang; this signified a reinforcement of 45,000 men in round figures.

The mobilization of the 5th and 6th Siberian Army Corps is contemplated next.

An ukase of the Czar, dated June 6th ordered an immediate mobilization of the First Army Corps, under the command of General Baron v. Meyendorff.

#### A JAPANESE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN MANCHURIA.

At the beginning of June Marshal Yamagata was appointed viceroy and commander-in-chief in Manchuria. Baron Kodama was appointed Chief of Staff. It is safe to assume that Yamagata will not influence the initiative of the several army commanders, but that the appointment signifies rather that the theater of operations is already considered permanently occupied.

#### THE SECOND JAPANESE DOMESTIC LOAN,

was made without difficulty and, according to reports, has been over subscribed four times.

W.

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
Fort Crook, Neb. Sept. 30th, 1905.

Respectfully submitted:

H. ROSEFELD,

2nd Lieut. 30th Infantry.

Translation  
No. 230



### THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR,

translated from supplements of the Marine Rundschau, by Second Lieutenant H. Hossfeld, 30th Infantry, from October 1, 1905 to January 20, 1906.

#### ELEVENTH SUPPLEMENT.

##### Chronological recapitulation.

- June 21: The Japanese troops occupy "Hsungotoheng" on Biaotung.
- June 23: Commencement of hostilities around Kaiping and in the mountain passes west and east of the Japanese position.
- June 23: Admiral Witthaft leaves Port Arthur with his squadron, and returns on the evening of the same day.
- June 27: The Takushan army occupies Phengshuiling.
- June 30 or July 1: The torpedo boat "Lieutenant Beniakoff" arrives in Newchwang:
- July 3: The "Lieutenant Beniakoff" arrives again at Port Arthur.
- July 3: Destruction of two Japanese torpedo boats in the roadstead of Port Arthur.
- July 4: The steamer "Cheltenham", having been seized by the Vladivostok squadron, arrives in Vladivostok in charge of a Russian detachment.
- July 4 and 5: The vessels of the Russian volunteer fleet, "Smolensk," "Petersburg", and "Orel", pass the Dardanelles.
- July 5: The Japanese gunboat "Kaimon" strikes a mine near Taliénwan and sinks.
- July 7: A portion of the English East Asiatic squadron leaves Wei-hai-wei with sealed orders.
- July 9: The army "Oku" occupies Kaiping.
- July 11: The auxiliary cruiser "Petersburg" detains the English steamer "Menelaos" in the Red Sea for the purpose of search.
- July 14: The English steamer "Peiping" is seized by the Japanese auxiliary cruiser "Hong-Kong Marie".

July 14: The English steamer "Malacca" is seized and taken to Suez by a Russian detachment.

July 15: The German imperial mail steamer "Prinz Heinrich" detained by the auxiliary cruiser "Smolensk".

#### THE NORTHERN THEATER OF WAR.

It is necessary more than ever, to mention in advance that not only the details but also the character of operations have been entirely beyond control during the past four weeks, and are still so to-day. The reports from the Russian and Japanese camps are contradicting as to contents, and one cannot help but to be impressed, that the telegrams or reports of the Russian and Japanese commanders-in-chief, intended for the public, do not correspond with the facts, and that intentionally.

Neither can any consistency be established in this case.

We refrain therefore, from entering into the smaller encounters of incontrollable movements of troops.

In general it must be remarked, however, in view of the tendency of the press, which is getting more pronounced and sharper on this point, that the retreat of the Russian advance troops before the advance of the Japanese army, must not be regarded as a series of Russian defeats. The last weeks have proved the correctness of our statement, and that a general southward movement, i.e. a strategical offensive of the army "Kuropatkin", was never thought of. This idea was only conveyed by the dispatch of the corps "Stackelberg", and the advance of indeed very strong reconnoitering forces south and southeast. The latter was conditioned by the concentration and local reinforcement of the Japanese armies, whereas the dispatch of the corps "Stackelberg", as already mentioned in the last pamphlet, cannot be retraced to the initiative of General Kuropatkin. From all appearance General Kuropatkin has consistently adhered to his original plan of operations, which bound and limited by the circumstances, was based upon the strategical defensive. Where

his main force is , is of course not known. During the last weeks, the village of Tashikiau was mentioned several times, it is situated midway between Kaiping and Haicheng. That this should be true, is very improbable on account of the damage of being flanked from northeast by the army "Kmoki", or of being even attacked in rear, and of being cut off from the line of communication. This does not exclude, that Tashikian represents a center of operations of a subordinate character, and that it is in constant communication with the position of the main army, as a base for the reconnoitering forces towards north.

The fear expressed after the battle of Wafangku, that the corps "Stackelberg" would be cut off by the concentive march of the army "Oku" from south towards north, and of the left wing of Kmoki on the line Hsinyan-Kaiping, has not been realized. Apparently the army "Stackelberg" was more mobile than the enemy, and especially General Oku cared more for a systematic occupation, including all places formerly held by the Russians, than for a hasty pursuit with the prospect of doubtful success. The immense local difficulties, which were to be encountered during an advance on the line Hsiuyan-Kaiping, have also been underestimated. Such an advance seems to have been entirely impossible on account of the mountain features, including passes, which then were all still in the possession of the Russians. In addition, a few days after the battle of Wafangku, the rainy season commenced, rendering all operations very difficult.

After the battle of Wafangku, the army "Oku" advanced on the great highway in the direction of Kaiping. Its left wing was based on the coast, its right extended to the mountains east of the great highway. On June 21st, the town of Hsiung-yo-cheng was occupied by the Japanese troops without resistance. On June 23rd, the engagements for the possession of Kaiping commenced and during the same period the battle began along the whole line

of the Japanese position for the possession of the mountain passes, which open the way towards north and northeast.

Let us throw a glance at the Japanese position as it was then, and as it is approximately to-day. The left wing is represented by the army "Oku", whose main force is moving onward on the great highway Kaiping-Yinkow, or will move onward. Its next object will probably be to capture Yinkow, and then to advance on the great highway towards Lianyan, west of the railroad.

For several weeks a third army the Takushan army is mentioned in the Japanese telegrams. We do not know whether these troops which probably were disembarked off Takushan, constitute an independent army, or whether they are under the command of General Kmoki; their strength is also unknown, although several estimates mention two or three divisions with 23000 men each, and 36 guns. We are inclined to believe that these troops constitute merely a considerable re-enforcement of the left wing of the 1st army, and united with the latter, are advancing on the road from Hsinyan towards west, and then towards north west in the direction of Tashikian. At the point, where the road changes direction to the north Chipaulin pass is situated, which came into the possession of the Japanese during the latter days of June.

A second road leads from Hsingan directly in a northwestern direction towards Haicheng, and thence from Phengshuiling across the left spur of the mountain chain; here is the Talin pass situated, whose capture is not yet exactly known as to date, but which must also have taken place during the latter days of June; the same applies to the other two passes, which are situated farther east on the road leading to Lianyan, i.e. the Wa-tse-ling pass, and north of it the Phengshuiling pass. It is safe to assume that this Phengshuiling pass is meant, for corresponding to the length of the Phengshuiling mountains, there are a number of passes, generally known under the same name.

Finally the Motulin pass, so often mentioned for several months, is also situated in the Phengshuiling mountains, on the road leading from Fengwangcheng past Sumenntse and Lianshankwan to Lianyan. Over all these roads, of which only the first one, near Kaichou, is one of the so called great highways, the concentric advance of the Japanese troops is executed. At the end of the month of June all the passes were already in possession of the Japanese, or were partly marched through.

The troops forming the flank guard at the northeast wing around Saimatze and Aiyangyamon must be distinguished from those advancing. That this guard is very necessary, is demonstrated by the continuous fighting around these places, and on the roads nearby. How strong the Russians are at this point, is entirely beyond calculation.

On account of the beginning of the rainy season, the roads already very poor during the dry season, are said to be hardly passable, and especially the passes are reported to represent regular mires. The advance is consequently executed very slowly, and when the decisive actions announced for the last months will take place, is entirely uncertain.

The army "Oku", after crossing the railroad, is now west of the Manchurian railway, and in possession of a comparatively large and good road to Lianyan. The Russian positions must be shifted accordingly, which doubtless has been accomplished long ago, by changing the front, primarily directed towards south southeast, considerably towards west, in order to prevent attack in flank from there.

It is impossible to enter into details, as the reports are too uncertain, being contradicted from day to day.

General Kuropatkin estimates the strength of the Japanese army at 8 to 9 divisions. According to this calculation the army Knoki in its original unchanged condition would consist of 3 divisions, the guards of the 2nd and 12th, Oku's army of three

to four divisions, among these the 5th, 11th and 8th, and finally the so called Takushan army of 2 to 3 divisions.

A concentric advance of these forces in view of the indicated local and climatic difficulties, in in the true sense of the word, nearly out of the question, especially as far as synchronism is concerned.

On June 27th the Takushan army occupied Phengshinling north-west of Hsiuyan. Fighting has been reported in the vicinity of Kaiping (Kaichow) ever since June 23; this place was taken by troops of the army "Oku" on July 9. As it was to be expected, a stubborn resistance was not offered by the Russians, and it is safe to assume, that none will be made at Yinkow (Newchwang.)

It has been rumored that this place has fallen into the hands of the Japanese, but it does not appear thus far to be the case.

#### THE SOUTHERN THEATER OF WAR.

No reliable news regarding the situation in and around Port Arthur can be obtained. According to the most recent reports the siege is directed by General Iditti, and the artillery under the command of Colonel Sato. Accordingly it would appear that General Nodzu, who at first was said to command the troops before Port Arthur, is in command of the Takushan army. On June 18th it was reported by the Russians that the heavy siege guns were brought into position in front of Port Arthur. No further details have since been obtained. As to the various engagements, sorties, etc. near, and from Port Arthur, their origin is so uncertain that it is better, not to enter upon them any closer.

Neither can any reliable information be obtained from the various rumors afloat regarding engagements between Russian and Japanese torpedo boats, or between the latter and the coast fortifications. The report regarding these events are either contradicting, or one side denies everything and anything, that



the other side assets. We must now remark that the Russian reports compared with those of the first months of the war, are very much less reliable.

The departure of the Russian squadron from Port Arthur on June 23, deserves to be noted.

According to the report of Admiral Togo and Witthoeft, although contradicting each other on many and very important points, about the following appears to have transpired:

The Russians succeeded in repairing the battleships "Zesarevitch", "Retvisan", and "Pobieda", rendering them once more sea worthy and capable of action. Admiral Witthoeft therefore had again at his disposal six battleships, i.e. besides the three afore named, the "Poltava", "Ssevastopol", and "Peresvyet", to these must be added the three large cruisers "Pallada", "Diana" and "Askold", the small cruiser "Nork", and according to the Japanese report about 13 torpedo boats. In case these repairs were thoroughly executed, it would mean a good showing in view of the conditions at Port Arthur, as regards docks, presence of trained mechanics in the yards etc. But as the ships have thus far stood no test of a prolonged cruise, bad weather, etc., it would be premature to comment upon them.

According to the Russian statement, Japanese torpedo boats laid mines in the roadstead on the evening preceding the departure of the fleet, and were chased off. This would suggest that Admiral Togo had knowledge of the intended maneuver; he probably noticed indications on the outside. The following morning at 8:00 o'clock the Russian squadron steamed out, and seems to have been in the roadstead at 11:00 o'clock. Here they anchored, and a number of small vessels consisting of torpedo-boats, boats of various types, and small steamers searched the strip of water systematically for mines which the squadron intended to use when leaving the roadstead. A considerable number of mines were found

and this caused the Russians to believe that the torpedo vessels had laid these mines on the preceding evening. On the afternoon the squadron weighed anchor and steamed toward the sea in line ahead, the cruisers and torpedo boats being distributed at the point and flanks. Admiral Togo received notification by wireless telegraph from one of the observation cruisers in front of Port Arthur, as soon as the sortie from the inner harbor began. According to his report, his entire force assembled at once at the place of rendezvous previously designated for such an emergency by squadron orders, in such a manner that the movement could not be observed from the roadstead. After having cleared the coast, Admiral Witthoefft, with bearings southeast, sighted the Japanese squadron on the starboard side ahead, as it was endeavoring to pass his point and to open fire on the same. The Japanese squadron according to Admiral Witthoefft's statement consisted of 4 battleships, 4 armored cruisers, a number of small cruisers and 30 torpedo boats. The number of the latter is probably considerably exaggerated. The Russian squadron chief considered this force of the enemy so superior that he thought he could not risk the battle, and turning he steamed back to the roadstead of Port Arthur. Whether this was executed by turning around or by a change of direction cannot be established from the reports. At 8:00 o'clock the vessels of the Japanese squadron swung into line, apparently with the intention of approaching the enemy with the utmost speed in an oblique line, and if possible of delivering an effective fire. The distance was too great however, and at dusk Admiral Togo ordered the vessels to swing again into line ahead, the squadron being once more headed for Port Arthur and considerably behind the Russian squadron. At the same time his torpedo boats received orders to attack the Russian squadron without delay. The first boats according to the report of the Japanese Admiral, attacked the rear vessels at 9:30 when the squadron was still

heading for the roadstead in line ahead. It is not clear whether these vessels were cruisers or battleships. An hour later Admiral Witthoeft cast anchor, and beginning from this moment the Japanese torpedo boats made about eight attacks with short intervals. The moon was up and consequently the torpedo vessels were operating under unfavorable conditions. The Russians maintained at first that the attacks had all been unsuccessful, whereas the commandant of the torpedo boat "Lieutenant Buriakoff" stated at Newchwang, that they had merely been indifferent. Admiral Togo however, stated in his first telegram that the sinking of one battleship had been observed with certainty, and that the ship in question had been torpedoed twice; that one battleship was missing on the following morning, and that it was an established fact that another battleship and a cruiser of the Diana class either "Pallada" or Diana, apparently unable to maneuver were towed into the harbor.

Admiral Witthoeft stated, that the squadron anchored in the roadstead because the condition of the water did not permit the entering of the inner harbor, and that the squadron was then under effective protection of the coast batteries; in contradiction of this the Japanese maintain that the coast artillery on account of the location of the anchorage, was unable to enter into the fight. The Russians deny their own losses and claim to have seen how at least two Japanese torpedo boat destroyers were annihilated; this is completely contradicted by the statements of Admiral Togo. It must be observed, however, that later reports of the Japanese squadron chief do not mention the heavy losses of the Russians with the same categorical certainty, but they were apparently reduced by him.

Whatever the case may be, however, the purpose for which Admiral Witthoeft put to sea, is still not clear to our mind. He knows doubtless that the roadstead of Port Arthur was permanently watched by cruisers, and that the main body was in the vicinity, where it could be reached. Consequently he had to expect a fight.

He knew also that the shallowness of the water would not permit him to enter the harbor during the evening. The clearing away of the mines on the morning of June 23d, requiring so much time and labor, proves that the Admiral had made up his mind in regard to a sortie.

As reason for his return he offers the oppressing superiority of the enemy in numbers, which induced him not to give battle beyond the range of the coast fortifications; he also states, that he observed the intention of the Japanese cruisers and torpedo boats to push between him and Port Arthur. The last reason can only be substantiated if it be shown that the Japanese intended to endanger the return to the roadstead by means of floating mines, as they did before the destruction of the Petropaulovsk. It is however doubtful whether the Japanese vessels with such an intention could have prevented the Russian squadron, which was then still far out at sea, from pursuing its plans. It is therefore clear that it was solely an anticipation. But if this existed at all, it proves without doubt, that Admiral Witthoeft had from the start the intention to return to the harbor; it was afterwards stated from Japanese and English sources that he intended to reach a neutral harbor or even Vladivostok. It would be useless to dwell any longer upon the possibility of executing such intentions, but if they did exist, it might be possible that Admiral Witthoeft gave as reason the danger of being cut off, for the purpose of veiling the same. As to the superiority of the Japanese squadron, this was certainly not true as to materiel to such a degree, that the Russian squadron could not offer to give battle.

It would be better for the Russian cause if the Japanese would suffer a defeat with losses, than if the Russian squadron were shut up in a neutral harbor, or in the case of Port Arthur being captured, it would fall into the hands of the victor, or if it were destroyed in order to avoid the latter.

Finally that the Russian squadron cast anchor in the roadstead during the night, is after the experiences of February 8/9 inconceivable.

As has been shown, the whole undertaking is entirely incomprehensible.

It has been said before that an effective blockade of the roadstead of Port Arthur is not in existence. On June 29th the torpedo boat "Lieutenant Buriakoff" succeeded, coming from Port Arthur, in entering Newchwang; as early as the following day it returned without incident. Its mission must have been of the greatest importance, although nothing in regard to it has become known.

On July 3rd, the same day on which the "Lieutenant Buriakoff" returned from its mission to Newchwang, to the harbor of Port Arthur in good condition, the Japanese torpedo boats endeavored after dusk to approach the harbor entrance. The coast batteries observed the boats in time, two of which they sank; it is possible that a third boat was destroyed of which it is reported that the smoke stack was shot off, for only one boat was reported as having escaped. As the report originates from a non Russian or Russian friendly source, the Japanese losses are probably not exaggerated.

On July 5th, the Japanese gunboat "Kaimon" ran on a Russian mine in the gog not far from Taliemvan, and sank; the commanding officer, 2 officers and 13 men were drowned.

An attack of Japanese torpedo boats is said to have taken place in the roadstead of Port Arthur, nothing is known regarding the outcome.

#### THE ENGLISH SQUADRON LEAVES WEI-HAI-EVEI.

On July 7th a portion of the English squadron, consisting of four battleships and 4 cruisers, proceeded to sea with sealed orders from Wei-hai-evei. This was doubtless due to differences between the English gunboat "Espiegle" and the Russian military

authorities. The "Espiegle" which up to this time had been stationed at Newchwang, had set out for Chingwangtao; the Russians in view of the state of war, had objected to the cruises of the neutral gunboat, and a Russian gunboat had come to anchor in the mouth of the Liaoh, possibly for the purpose of preventing the passage of the "Espiegle". The "Espiegle" soon afterwards arrived at Newchwang. Nothing further regarding this incident has become known.

#### THE VLADIVOSTOK SQUADRON.

The Vladivostok squadron which is not commanded by Admiral Skeydloff, but by Rear-Admiral Besobrasoff, is continuing to cruise in the Japanese Sea and in the Strait of Korea, without Admiral Kammira having succeeded thus far in forcing it to give battle. Nothing coherent with reference to the activity of the two admirals has become public.

The cruiser "Bogatyi" is reported to have been floated and towed to Vladivostok into dock; hopes for a speedy repair are being entertained.

The English steamer "Cheltenham", bought by Japan, and having a displacement of 6000 tons, was stopped by the Vladivostok squadron near the Strait of Korea; it was found that she had railroad material on board, she was sent to Vladivostok with a Russian detachment, arriving at that port on July 4th. The local prize court declared this capture and that of the collier "Allanton" (not "Allan") as justified.

Five submarine boats, shipped in parts are reported to have arrived at Vladivostok. A photograph, apparently just then taken, proves that one submarine boat was already there, even at the time when the harbor was still covered with ice.

#### THE RUSSIAN AUXILIARY CRUISERS IN THE RED SEA.

The Smolensk, Petersburg and Orel, vessels of the Russian volunteer fleet, passed the Dardanelles on July 4th and 5th, and

proceeded for Port Said.

Later on Russian volunteer vessels were seen in the Red Sea, apparently for the purpose of searching neutral ships for contraband.

On July 11, the Petersburg stopped the English steamer "Menelaus," searched her, and after a delay of four hours permitted her to continue her voyage.

On July 15th, the Imperial mail steamer "Prinz Heinrich" was held up by the "Smolensk", and forced to give up the Japanese mail. Of this two mail bags, destined for Nagasaki, were confiscated, the other bags were transferred to the English steamer "Persia", which was stopped for that purpose; the Persia is bound for Bombay.

The English steamer "Malakka" was seized on July 14th, she is said to have carried arms and ammunition, and was taken through the Suez Canal by a Russian escort.

It is said that the German chancellor at once interposed an objection, and that the English department of foreign affairs took similar action.

The English steamer "Peiping" was seized by the Japanese auxiliary cruiser "Hongkong Marie" on July 14th, details of this incident one still missing.

#### CALLING OUT OF THE NAVAL RESERVISTS FOR THE RUSSIAN WAR PORTS.

An Imperial ukas of July 6th, calls out all naval reservists who thus far have not been summoned, for the completion of the crews of the Baltic war ports, with the exception of Orenburg and Finland. In order to fill up the crews at Sevastopol, the reservists of the districts of Taganog and Rostow and of from counties of the government of Cherson have been called out.

#### AN ANGLO RUSSIAN AGREEMENT.


has been published during the early days of June; it has as object the protection and regulated pursuance of the seal fishery in the Behring Sea, in which the English are very much interested. Russia is at present not in a position to protect the seal banks from

from destruction by Japanese robbers, and has left it to England to look after her interests, and has placed the harbor of Petropawlowsk as coaling station at the disposal of the English ships concerned. The English government has accepted the proposal and also the Japanese government is said to have itself expressed as willing to do everything for the prevention of trespasses by Japanese seal hunters. The agreement has not been made public in its entire form.

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Enata supplement #10, page 129: The commander in chief in Manchuria is Marquis Oyama.





Translation

No. 230

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR,

translated from supplements of the Marine-Rundschau, by  
Second Lieutenant H. Hossfeld, 30th Infantry, from January  
21st, 1906 to April 18th, 1906.

TWELFTH SUPPLEMENT.

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OPERATIONS IN MANCHURIA UP TO AUGUST 15, 1904.

In order to be able to picture to oneself the relation between the various operations on land to date, it will be opportune to recall to memory once more briefly the most important events since the crossing of the Yalu by the Japanese.

On May 1st, the 1st Japanese army (Kuroki), consisting of the division of the guards and the 1st and 12th divisions had fought for and accomplished the passage across the Yalu, and reached Fengwancheng on May 6th, Kwantienshien, situated near the extreme right flank was simultaneously occupied.

Troops were pushed to the front to an average distance of 35 km. from Fengwancheng on the roads leading to Lianyang, Haicheng, and Hainyan, afterwards everything was quiet until June 23rd. During this period losses were replaced, and the reserve brigades, pertaining to these troops, brought up. Beginning May 15th the advanced troops were reported as having fallen back slowly. It is probable that they were ordered to cover the disembarkation near Yakushan, and that the 1st army would consequently have to await the advance of the other armies.

At the Yalu, the Japanese were opposed to the 3rd and 6th rifle-brigades, and to Michenko's brigade of cossacks, the former two retreated on the road to Lianyang, the latter

mainly in the direction of Haicheng.

Remnenkampf's division of cossacks, which in the meantime had arrived from the north, clung to the right wing of the Japanese army, and also endeavored, but in vain, to operate in rear against the line of communication.

It is assumed that the mutual positions during the first half of May were as shown on the following sketch:

SKETCH.

AFTER THE PASSAGE ACROSS THE YALU, MIDDLE OF MAY.

Legend: Arabic figures: divisions; 2: 2nd rifle division; 1: 1st reserve division; ———: road used during the Japanese advance; =====: Russians; =====: Japanese;

Remarks. The hachures on the sketch have reference to the principal ridges only, otherwise the entire country east of the railroad is mountainous, that west of it, flat.

In the meantime, on May 5th and during the subsequent days, the 2nd army (Oku), consisting of the 1st, 3rd and 4th divisions, 1st cavalry brigade, and 1st artillery brigade, were disembarked at Pitzevo, the cavalry brigade looked after the security along the line Pulantien-Pitzevo towards north, the main body advanced as far as Kinchou undisturbed, won the entrance to the peninsula of Kwantung on May 26th in the battle of Kinchou, and occupied Dalny on May 30th. Here the 2nd army was relieved by the 3rd army (siege corps under Nogi), consisting of the 5th and 11th divisions with reserve brigades and siege park, whose first units were apparently landed in Kerr Bay, and turned then at once north, in order to press the Russian Manchurian army away from the besieged fortress into the interior of Manchuria. It defeated General Stackelberg, who pushing on towards south, had broken through the thin Japanese cavalry-screen, at Wafangku on June 14th and 15th, and followed as far as Hsiungyecheng (June 21st) not altogether too rapidly.

At the beginning of May, the 4th army, commanded by Nodzu was organized from the 10th, 6th and 9th divisions in Japan. Portions of this army\*, among which probably the 10th division, were disembarked at the end of May at Takushan, the remainder was probably employed as reenforcement for the besieging corps of Port Arthur, where an energetic defense, even after the occupation of the isthmus of Kinchou, contested the outlying terrain so successfully that the corps which was assigned to the actual siege, did not prove sufficient.

The Takushan detachment of the 4th army occupied Hsinyan on June 7th. Simultaneously the 1st army pushed a detachment (possibly the entire 12th division) towards Saimatze, on the road leading from Kwantienshien across Paliling-pass to Lianyang.

During the middle of June, the 1st army and the Takushan detachment commenced their movements towards the crest of the Fengshuiling, and in such a manner as to encounter simultaneously on June 25th the Russian advance troops, posted in the passes of these mountains. Without finding any serious resistance, they obtained possession of these passes by means of advance-guard engagements during the period from June 25th to 29th, to wit:

the Paliling-pass on the road from Sainvatze to Lianyang,  
 the Fengshuiling-pass) on the roads from Fengwancheng to  
 the Motuling-pass        ) Lianyang,

the Watzeling-pass on a road leading from Fengwancheng  
 to Simucheng-Haicheng,

the Taling-pass on the road Hsinyan-Haicheng,

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\* The 1st and 2nd armies are continually referred to in the Japanese reports, but only a "Takushan-detachment" is mentioned, whereas on the other hand the appointment of Count Nodzu to the command of the 4th army is known.

the Chipanling-pass on the road Hsiuyan-Tashichiao, and the Fensingling-pass between the two last named.

Should the maps prove to be accurate in this case, it would appear that the detachment at the Watzeling-pass remained considerably in rear, also that it could not have actually reached the principal ridge. Furthermore it is not known whether this detachment belongs to the 1st army or to the Takushan detachment; as it appears later, it advanced with the latter, it is probable at any rate, that on account of the mixing of names or of the inaccuracy of the maps some confusion has been created, which for the present cannot be cleared up.

The passes were prepared for defense by means of field fortifications, and a lull occurred, lasting until the middle of July, which probably was utilized for the purpose of regulating the reenforcements, or perhaps for a shifting of the masses in rear of the advance troops guarding the passes.

On the Russian side, during May, half of the 31st and half of the 35th division, also from Vladivostok, half of the 8th rifle division, were concentrated into southern Manchuria; the recently organized 4th Siberian army corps, which at the end of May had arrived at Lianyang, and which consisted of the 2nd and 3rd Siberian reserve divisions, was pushed on to Kaichou, at the time, the corps "Stackelberg" made its advance against Liantang, and served the latter, after his defeat, as a support.

The following sketch shows the positions during the beginning of July:

During the first half of July, several small changes took place on the Japanese side:

The 2nd army advanced to Kaichou, which it occupied without resistance being offered on July 9th. The northern

column of the 1st army advanced about 20 km. further west on the road, on July 13th, during an engagement which originated in this movement, Rennenkampf, the chief of the Transbaikal-cossack division, was wounded.

The next two southern columns of the same army advanced into the passes, situated 15 to 20 km. in advance of the principal mountain ridge (Lanholing and Siackaolin-pass), previously vacated by the Russians, and established themselves there.

During these days, the Russians received notice of more important movements in rear of the 1st Japanese army. Kuropatkin therefore reenforced the 3rd Siberian corps under Keller with the 9th division (of the 10th army corps), just arrived from Europe, and ordered him to make a reconnaissance in force in the direction of Motuling pass. He carried out his orders on July 16th and 17th, but failed, in spite of the fact that he made a sudden start at night, and was able under cover of fog to approach the hostile works very closely; he claimed that on account of the nature of the mountains, his artillery could not come into action. The enemy disposed over strong reserves and pursued to the Yanseling-pass, which he was, however, not yet able to take.

In this operation the Russians lost about 1000 men.

On July 18th and 19th the northern column of the 1st Japanese army advanced again about 20 km. and occupied, after overcoming more or less strong resistance, Sihoyang, whence it established lateral communication with the neighboring column through a river-valley.

In view of these considerable, but apparently not expected forces, which the two northern Japanese columns manifested during these events, and with respect to the danger, which a further advance by the same would bring upon the

Russian troops, still posted near Tachichiao, and along the railroad, the Russian troops,

SKETCH.

==== Russians; ===== Japanese.

after these engagements were reenforced by the remainder of the 10th army corps, which had just arrived, so that now nearly a whole army corps was posted on each of the two most northern roads, on which the enemy might advance (a little less on the most northern than on the southern).

In the meanwhile the Japanese halted here for the time being, and only dispatched covering detachments for their right flank further north, where according to all appearance, the cossack division disappeared without fighting.

The 2nd army (Oku), however, renewed its advance on July 21st, and appeared before Tachichiao, where the 4th Siberian army corps was holding a strong position on the heights.

On July 24th an artillery duel of 15 hours' duration took place at this point, in which, according to the majority of the reports, the Japanese artillery succumbed. As, however, towards evening the Russian chief observed on his left flank the preliminaries to a turning movement, he withdrew his troops under cover of night to Haicheng; the Japanese occupied Tachichiao on July 25th. Their cavalry brigade, which had been dispatched into the plain west of the railroad, occupied the harbor of Yinkow, previously evacuated by the Russians, and prepared the same at once for a landing station. In the engagement near Tachichiao the Japanese lost: 12 officers, 136 men killed; 47 officers, 848 men wounded. The losses of the Russians are estimated as 60 officers and 600 men.

Simultaneously with the 2nd army, the Takushan detachment and the command in Watzeling-pass (which possibly may belong to it), resumed the advance. The last named command conquered on July 22nd the Pshanlin-pass on the principal mountain ridge, both then advanced slowly in the direction of Simucheng. This movement is believed to have added to the abandonment of Tachichiao by the Russians.

Finally, on July 30th, all Japanese columns of the 1st, Takushan, and 2nd army took up the advance, and on July 31st attacked simultaneously with a strong display of force, the Russian positions near Jushulintsa, situated on the most northern road, near Yanselin pass on the next southern road, and in front of Simucheng, respectively.

The Russians held their own for one day, delivered several counter-attacks, administering severe blows to the Japanese, but retired on August 1st, along the entire line, north as far as Anping and Tanhoyuan, south of Haicheng, and thence in the direction of Lianyan, as far as Anchanchan. The 2nd army occupied without a fight Haicheng on August 3rd, its cavalry entering Newchwang at the same time. The Takushan detachment followed closely the 2nd army.

The 1st army pushed reconnoitering or covering detachments north beyond Taitcho, which has been taken as indications for an enveloping movement of the Russian position at Lianyang from the north, cutting off the railroad in rear.

The following casualties and losses were mentioned:

Russians:

at Yushukintsa: 290 officers, 1500 men, 8 guns.  
 at Yanselin-pass: 8 " , 149 " prisoners  
 at Simucheng: ?

Japanese: 40 officers, 906 men

8 " , 286 "

196 killed. 600 wounded.

At Yanselin-pass, Count Keller, chief of the 3rd Siberian army corps, was killed by a shrapnel.

The most recent positions are indicated on the following sketch.

No further changes took place until August 15.

SKETCH. (Beginning of August)

===== Russians. ---- ===== Japanese.

Reenforcements of the armies now in progress.

As previously stated, the Russians had come to the conclusion that the force of 4 Siberian army corps, designated at the outbreak of the war for the Manchurian army, did not suffice.

Consequently the organization of the 5th and 6th Siberian army corps from the military district of Kasan was ordered first of all, besides the 10th, 17th, and 1st European army corps have thus far been mobilized; the 19th is said to have just received the mobilization order.

The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Siberian corps were organized from parts of all European corps, the 4th, 5th and 6th by the mobilization of divisions of the reserve, the European corps, however, were mobilized as they existed by calling out the reservists, only the artillery, as far as it did not already consist of quick-firing batteries, was taken from other corps possessing quick-firing guns.

In addition to the foregoing, the following organizations have been or are being mobilized for the Manchurian army, viz: 2 divisions of cavalry (1 Orenburg and 1 Dow-cossack division), 1 brigade of cavalry (Caucasian volunteers: cavalry brigade); of special service: 1 Field mortar regiment of 4 batteries at six 15 cm. mortars; 1 East Siberian siege park; a number of East Siberian mountain batteries (No. 8 is mentioned). Of these new troops, the 10th army corps, as already mentioned,



arrived at Lianyang before the fighting of July 31st, the 17th army corps must have arrived there during the first part of August; thereafter, however, only freight trains were dispatched for several days, whereupon the 5th, 6th and then the 1st army corps, in the order named, are scheduled to depart.

The capacity of the Siberian railroad has been increased to eleven double through trains daily; up to present there was an interval of 40 days between the arrival of the first and last troops of an army corps.

The Circumbaikal road is said to have been completed on August 15.

On July 6th, the landsturm (opolchenye) was called out in the Siberian military district, and the organization of the men with previous service of this class was order to consist of 4 brigades at 6 "drushines" at about 1000 men each. These brigades are to perform the duties of guards for that portion of the railroad which is as yet situated beyond the effective sphere of the enemy, and will therefore release a portion of the frontier guards for service in the field.

On Sachalin the landsturm has been called out for some time and has been instructed in military duties ever since.

The organization of an expeditionary corps for Vladivostok has been reported from Japan.

Besides the 2nd cavalry brigade and the 2nd artillery brigade, of which it is not known whether they are still at home, or with the Takushan army, or at the siege of Port Arthur, it appears as if only the 7th and 8th divisions of the line were still at home. The location of their districts in the extreme northern portion of the empire (see map in 5th supplement) would suggest that they are intended for an operation against northern Russian territory, and the severe

crippling of the Port Arthur squadron as well as of the Vladivostok squadron, to which we shall refer later, would offer an opportunity for this at the present.

Besides, there is no doubt that it is of the greatest importance for the Japanese, in view to the approach of the Russian Baltic squadron, to gain possession of not only Port Arthur, but of Vladivostok, or at least to render them useless as naval bases by destroying their yards and docks.

For it must always remain the final aim of the Japanese to render it impossible for the enemy to carry on a naval war in East Asia.

At any rate, the foregoing rumor regarding the destination of the troops, presently undergoing mobilization, will have to be treated as a supposition only. According to an English newspaper report, the following reserve organizations are said to have been concentrated in addition to the home battalions, taken from the reservists, viz:

52 regiments of infantry at 3 battalions of 600 men each,  
36 regiments of cavalry at 3 squadrons of 160 horses each,  
24 batteries of 8 guns each.

If this report be correct, an increase of the reserve brigades (2 regiments of infantry, 1 squadron of cavalry, 1 battery) to reserve divisions (4 regiments of infantry, 3 squadrons, 2 batteries) must be assumed.

As these reserve brigades were to be added to the field army, the measure would mean a considerable reenforcement of the armies in the field.

#### THE SIEGE OF PORT ARTHUR.

As we have cited in detail in the preceding supplements, the Russians did not offer any resistance whatsoever to the disembarkation at Pitzevo, but delay the advance against Kwantung of the landed army on May 16th from the mountains

north of Kinchou, and on May 26th from the Nanshan hills, on the isthmus south of Kinchou, and especially at the latter point inflicted considerable losses to the enemy.

After occupying Dalny on May 30th, the Japanese established outposts across the peninsula, a little in advance of the railroad junction Sanshilipu, and remained in this position until the middle of June. During this pause, the 2nd army (Oku) appears to have been relieved by the 3rd (Nogi); furthermore, as already stated, Talienwan Bay was cleared of mines, also a channel for the entrance of ship into Dalin was prepared, this harbor was thereafter used with advantage as a landing point for the reinforcements of the troops, and later as a siege and artillery park.

During the middle of June, the advance troops were pushed forward to the line of Yin-chentse-Hsiku Bay, the advance was accompanied along the coasts by gunboats and torpedo boats, which, preceding the points of the troops, were to ascertain a possible counter advance of the enemy along the coast, or to flank his positions from the sea. Also the Russians dispatched torpedo boats along the coasts for the purpose of observing the approaching siege armies. These vessels had various encounters, without entering into any serious engagement however.

The garrison of the fortress offered thus far no further resistance, but occupied a position on the heights of the Hsishan mountains, and on the hills on the eastern bank of the Langwangho.

On June 26th, the besieging forces advanced in three columns on the two roads leading from Sanshilipu and from Dalin to Port Arthur, and also along the sea coast, to the attack against this Russian position, torpedo boats again accompanying.

## SKETCH.

"Showing positions on Kwantung peninsula from May 16 to August 8. The Russian positions are marked by Roman figures as I, II, III, IV, the Japanese positions by dotted lines with dates"; the translator.

Although the latter endeavored to deliver an effective flanking fire against the Russian position, the attack came to a stand on the souther coast; as soon as however the center column advanced during the day so far as to threaten the left flank of the Russians on the coast, the latter retired toward evening to the right bank of the Langwangho, the Japanese advance troops now holding the left bank.

On July 3rd and 4th, however, the Russians, assisted by ships, retook the heights along the coast on the left bank of the Lungwangho, and apparently held them until the end of July, whereas the Japanese intrenched immediately in front of them.

The Japanese, during this time, disembarked continually siege guns and reenforcements at Dalin.

Beginning with the day of the capture of the isthmus of Kinchou, the southern point of Liantung was declared blockaded. This blockade, according to the situation was to accomplish the following, viz:

- a) security of the troop ships, transports for the guns and material for the besieging army;
- b) security of the wings of the siege troops, which by necessity had to touch the sea on both sides;
- c) to prevent supplies from entering the fortress by sea and to cut off communication;
- d) to prevent a sortie of the Russian armored squadron from the besieged fortress.

The latter was the main object, for although political and national considerations rendered the capture of Port Arthur desirable to the Japanese, the decisive motive for the entire seige consisted in the absolute necessity of destroying this squadron, before it could be able, by means of repair and reenforcement from the home country, to threaten again the Japanese command of the sea, and therewith render the outcome of the whole war questionable.

The blockade was directed by the "Chief of the united squadron", Admiral Togo, with the following forces\* at his disposal, viz:

First squadron (Admiral Togo).

Dispatch boat "Yayeyama".

1st division:	3rd division (Derva):
battleship "Mikasa",	large cruiser "Yakumo",
" " "Asahi",	" " "Asama",
" " "Fugi",	small cruiser "Chitose",
" " "Shikishima"	" " "Takasago",
large cruiser "Nishin",	" " "Kasagi",
" " "Kassuga".	" " "Akashi".

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5 divisions of large torpedo boats (the division at 2 to 4 boats).

Third squadron (Vice-Admiral Kataoka).

5th division:	6th division:	7th division:
"Chin Yen",	"Idzumi",	"Fuso", "Hei Yen",
"Matsushima",	"Akitsushima",	"Sai Yen", "Tsukushi",
"Itsukushima",	"Chiyoda",	"Akagi", "Chokai",
"Hashidate".	"Suma".	"Oshima", "Maya", "Uyi".

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\* The organization into subdivisions is based upon comparison of several single reports; in general it will probably produce a correct picture, although the assignment of the several ships cannot be ascertained.

5 divisions of torpedo boats (the division at 5 boats.)

The base of operations for the fleet was established at the Elliott Islands, 70 miles from Port Arthur, 50 miles from Dalin, and 15 miles from the landing point at Pitzevo; this base as well as the landing points were protected against torpedo boat attack by obstacles.

It appears that the 1st squadron patrolled the east and west coasts of the Peninsula of Liantung, and furnished in addition thereto the convoy-vessels for the transports. But as Admiral Togo was exercising supreme command over both squadrons, he was able to call repeatedly for gun boats of the 3rd squadron, to participate in operations against the roadstead of Port Arthur, thus husbanding the large modern ships.

The entrance to the harbor of Port Arthur was guarded by day by cruisers, during the night by torpedo boats.

After the accidents of the "Hatsuse" and of the "Yashima" the main squadron apparently did not approach again the coast, on account of a justified fear of mines, but held itself merely in readiness near the base of operations, in order to resist a possible sortie of the Russian main squadron on the open sea.

For the purpose of harassing the fortress from the sea, detachments of gunboats and torpedo boats were dispatched against the harbor entrance of Port Arthur at short intervals, partly to reconnoiter the condition of the entrance, which the Russians had at once commenced to clear after the last attempt of obstruction, partly to lay mines, and partly to resist the lighter vessels of the enemy, in order to prevent them from making attacks against their base of operations, the landings or the wings of the army.

On these occasions several gunboats were hit by the shore batteries, one mine ship was damaged during the process of mining by the explosion of one of her own mines.

At night the Russians closed the harbor entrance by means of boom and truss obstructions, which were defended by their gunboats and shore batteries, patrolled the roadstead with torpedo boats and searched for mines day after day. In spite of all these precautions some damage seems to have been done by mines during the minor sorties which took place.

These sorties were frequent, they were, however, undertaken mainly by the "Novick", and by the torpedo boats, and were always confined to the immediate vicinity of the coast, without ever reaching the bases of operations of the enemy.

These vessels participated on various occasions in reconnaissance and bombardment of the wings of the besieging army.

The Japanese blockade succeeded neither in completely confining the lighter Russian vessels to the blockaded area, nor in severing entirely the communication by sea for the exchange of news and supplies. The besieged forces were continually able to send out letters and dispatches on junks, and to witness their return loaded with provisions. Also the torpedo-boat "Buriakoff", as mentioned in the preceding supplement, reached Newchwang from Port Arthur, and returned; even a steamer laden with guns and ammunition is said to have been taken into Port Arthur from Yinkow on July 21st.

According to Japanese reports, the Russians established wireless telegraph connection with Cheefoo.

The blockading fleet, therefore, did not accomplish its duties, mentioned previously under b) and c). Frequent fog, and above all the danger of encountering mines, which also obliged the observation cruisers to stand far off the coast,

rendered the blockade difficult. How far, under these circumstances, the actual safety of the blockading vessels and of the transports of the besieging forces, is to be credited to the effect of the blockade or to the lack of enterprise of the torpedo-boats of the blockaded forces, can at present not be answered.

The first attempt by Admiral Witthoefft to break through on June 23, was beaten off by the blockading fleet, as described in the 11th supplement, and at the same time caused fresh injuries to the Russian ships from torpedo-boat attacks, which put one of the battleships (Sevastopol) out of commission for at least the following month.

After the repulse of July 3rd and 4th, the Japanese siege-army was apparently obliged to employ a portion of the siege guns for the repetition of the attack against the heights of Lungwangtang. It required nearly all of July to transport them to this point and to prepare the position. Finally on July 26th at dawn, after a preparatory energetic bombardment, a general attack along the whole line commenced against the Russian position extending from Yopilasa mountain to the height of Lungwangtang.

At the latter point the attack was supported by the fire of a portion of the 3rd Japanese squadron, i. e. of the old, but heavily armored ships "Chin Yen", "Itsukushima", "Matsushima", "Hashidate", "Chiyoda", which were in turn accompanied by 2 small cruisers and 30 torpedo boats for security.

The Russians, in the meantime, had strengthened their positions by entrenchments, had distributed a large number of guns along the line and resisted stubbornly. The cruisers "Bayan", "Askold", "Pallada", "Novick" and the gunboats were sent against the Japanese ships.



They kept under cover of the Eastern coast forts and fired at the Japanese. The "Bayan" struck the stern of the "Itsukushima" with a 21 cm. shell, whereupon the latter left the firing line, and soon after went out to sea, accompanied by the remainder of the Japanese vessels.

During this retreat "Chiyoda" encountered a mine, and drifted towards Talienswan Bay, her bow deeply submerged.

The battle continued uninterrupted for three days, without the Japanese succeeding to penetrate the positions of the Russians.

On the 27th, upon request of the commandant of the fortress, Admiral Reitzenstein with the "Bayan", "Retvizan", "Pallada" and "Askold", and Admiral Leshinsky, in charge of the harbor defenses, with the gunboats "Otrvashin", "Gremyachi" "Gilyak" sailed along the southern coast and fired at the left wing of the Japanese until 3 P. M. The "Novick" with 12 torpedo boats covered the division against surprise from the sea. The Japanese fleet was unable to prevent this, as it did not care to venture with its modern vessels close to the coast on account of the mines, and also because the division was too strong for the old vessels, on account of the presence of the battleship "Retvizan". Upon returning to the harbor the "Bayan" was injured by a mine, but, as reported, not seriously.

On the eve of July 28th, General Stoessel was able to report that all attacks of the Japanese were beaten off. His troops suffered a loss of 40 officers and about 1500 men, the Japanese casualties must have been very considerable, as they had delivered assault after assault.

As, however, as early as July 30th, the Japanese, according to Russian reports, 5 divisions strong, renewed their attacks, and at the same time the entire blockading fleet, consisting of 4 battleships, 4 large cruisers, 10 small cruisers and 48 torpedo-boats, appeared, so that General Stoessel could not count upon a support from his own fleet for the repulse of the land attack, he withdrew his troops to the last prepared position in front of the cordon of forts, which extended from the right bank of the Tachehe to the Wolves mountains north, and fired from here at the enemy now moving forward to the position previously occupied.

Under these circumstances the Japanese apparently advanced at once against the new position. When the Russians on account of the demonstration of the fleet, expected the principal attack on the southern coast, the Japanese took the Wolves mountains north of the town on the evening of the same day.

During the following days the Japanese established batteries in rear of and on the conquered positions, and in a night landing occupied the hills between Louisa Bay and Vosmi-Korablei Bay. On August 6th, the new town and harbor were bombarded by the batteries erected near Wolves mountains.

On the 8th a fifteen hours' bombardment of the position on the right bank of the Tache (Takushan, Siagushan), and of the forts of the eastern cordon, the guns of which were able to participate in the engagement for this last outlying position, took place. Towards evening the Takushan hill was taken with the loss of many lives, was however retaken by the Russians in a counter attack on August 9th.

During the following days, the bombardment of forts, town and harbor was continued with interruptions.

On the 10th the Russian fleet attempted to break through the blockading line, to this we shall refer later more in detail; on the 12th the main body of the fleet appears to have been back once more.

On the 11th the Japanese troops were again fired on by two Russian gunboats, who were chased off by two Japanese gunboats.

A number of violent assaults took place on the 14th and 15th of August, during which some ground was apparently gained north, but in general, most of them were beaten off.

On the 16th the commander-in-chief of the Japanese army, Marshal Oyama, who, in the meantime had assumed in person the direction of the siege, addressed to General Stoessel, in connection with the permit of the Japanese emperor for the removal of the non-combatants, the request to surrender the fortress under the following conditions: Free withdrawal of the garrison with a view to join the army of Kuropatkin, transportation of the civilians to a point to be determined by the Japanese admiral, surrender of the ships now in the harbor, viz: "Retvisan", "Sevastopol", "Pobyeda", "Peresroyet", "Poltava", "Bayan", "Pallada", 4 gunboats, and twelve or more torpedo boats" (from English newspaper reports). 24 hours were offered as time for reflection. General Stoessel declined, however, the offer at once, and prohibited the departure of the non-combatants for Japanese territory (the larger portion, as far as not needed for the management of the fortress and of the wharf, appears to have already been sent away on junks across the sea), he also refused to grant a three days' truce, which the bearer of a flag of truce proposed under the pretext that the Japanese wanted to bury their dead.

The progress of the siege to this point is indicated on the sketch on page 150.

THE PORT ARTHUR SQUADRON'S ATTEMPT TO BREAK THROUGH THE LINE  
ON AUGUST 10th.

The permanent forts are situated on an average of only 5 km. from the inner roadstead of Port Arthur. There was therefore no necessity for the enemy to penetrate the actual cordon of forts, in order to render it dangerous for the Russian squadron to remain within the fortress.

Only as long as the outlying terrain up to at least 10 km. in front of the town remained in the hands of the defender, offered the fortress adequate protection for the squadron. After the abandonment of the position Lungwangtan to Yupilasu hill on August 30th, the attacking forces were enabled to erect batteries, which, during the first week of August, could sweep the inner harbor with their fire. About the time of the abandoning of the above position, the repairs on the "Sevastopol" were completed, and the squadron, with the exception of the damaged "Bayan", for whom it was not deemed advisable to wait, was capable of leaving the harbor with approximately full strength. The defense appears to have been conducted with due regard to the progress of the work on the ships. Admiral Withoefft, who was chief of staff of Makaroff, and who, upon the death of the latter, had assumed command of the squadron by virtue of seniority, - Pessbrascov, the recently appointed squadron chief not being able to reach the fortress - received from outside (either from the Czar or from Admiral Skrydloff) orders to leave and to conduct the squadron to Vladivostok - thus the Russian version.

Admiral Withoefft, consequently ordered on the 10th of August, from 5 to 8.30 A. M. the torpedo boats, cruisers, and battleships out in the roadstead and formed there as follows:

Ahead, a mining detachment, covered by the gunboats and the 2nd torpedo-boat flotilla; in rear the "Novick"; following her in line ahead the battleships "Cesarevich" (Wilhofft), "Retvisan", "Pobiyeda", "Pereswyet" (Prince Uchtomski), "Sevastopol", "Poltava"; the cruisers "Askold" (Reitzenstein), "Pallada", "Diana"; finally opposite the flagship on the flank, the 1st division of torpedo boats (8 boats of the "B" class).

The vessels proceeded up to 10.15 A. M. cautiously behind the mining detachment across the space next to the roadstead, rendered unsafe by the enemy. The mining detachment with its guard was then dismissed and returned to Port Arthur; the squadron received the signal "for Vladivostok", for the execution of which all commanders had received specific instructions, presumably for an emergency like the dispersion, or injuries of single vessels, and went under way, first with 8, later 10, and towards noon 13 knots. It is presumed that no better speed for any length of time could have been developed neither by the slow vessels of the "Poltava class", nor by the modern ships "Cesarevich" and "Retvisan" which probably were only superficially repaired.

One must assume that on the Japanese side one or two light cruisers with torpedo-boats of the 1st squadron observed the roadstead of Port Arthur; that gunboats of the 3rd squadron patrolled the coast, that the main forces of both squadrons were held in readiness at the bases of operation off the Elliot Islands and at Dalni, and that a chain of wireless telegraph stations was established between the outposts in front of Port Arthur and the flagship of the fleet, either by ships or by means of stations on land on that portion of Kwantung, already occupied by the Japanese.

The chief of the fleet received intelligence by wireless telegraph as early as 6.30 A. M. that the enemy was leaving the inner harbor. Admiral Togo at once gave orders to all parts of the fleet (with the exception of those vessels detached for special purposes, as he claims), to assemble. The places of rendezvous were provided for in general for this emergency. Before the Russian squadron went under way, eleven cruisers and 17 torpedo-boats had assembled in front of it within view, and were continually signaling its movements to their own main squadron. This main squadron, consisting of "Mikasa" (Admiral Togo), "Asahi", "Yugii", "Shikishima", "Nishin" and "Kasuga", had proceeded to the vicinity of the south of Round Island, and from there steered towards the enemy in such a manner that it was able to approach near enough after noon for a duel at extreme range.

At 12.30 P. M. the Japanese main squadron, by a change of direction towards the opponent, decreased the distance to 80 km. turned again back to its former course and opened fire.

The Russians responded at once, endeavored, however, to increase the distance by a change of direction towards starboard, probably with the intention of getting past the opponent and of avoiding the battle.

The maneuvers of approaching by the Japanese and of turning by the Russians were repeated several times, finally after  $3/4$  of an hour, the former appeared to have turned around and changed to a traversing fight ( ), during which the traversing distance became 32 km.

By traversing the Japanese arrived in rear of the Russians, but do not appear to have turned at once, so that the latter could claim of having "broken through", and were able to proceed towards the Shantung promontory with the

highest average speed (probably 13 knots). During the first portion of this fight, the unarmored Russian cruisers, which were in the line, suffered injuries and compelled their chief to leave the line, in order that the cruisers would receive better cover on the starboard of the battleships.

In the meantime the Japanese cruisers and torpedo boats assembled beyond effective range in front of the hostile point, and the Japanese main squadron, at full speed and with a parallel course, also remaining at a respectable distance laterally, came up again on the port side. As soon as it stood again north, it drew gradually off towards starboard, in order to pass the point. As the distance was hereby reduced to 7.3 km. at 5 P. M., the Russians opened fire, concentrating the same mainly on the leading vessel of the hostile fleet, the "Mikasa", which was hit several times, as proved by the numerous dead and wounded. The Japanese, on their part, concentrated their fire on the "Cesarevich". In order to prevent the contemplated enveloping movement of the Japanese, the Russian point turned again towards starboard. Suddenly, at 5.45 P. M., when the fight was hottest, the bridge of the "Cesarevich" was struck by a 30.5 cm. shell, the admiral was killed, the commander and the remainder of the personnel on the bridge either killed or wounded, and there was no one left to exercise command for the time being. Deprived of her commander on the bridge, the ship described a circle towards starboard, those in rear maneuvered to turn out; the line of battle became disordered. When finally the "Cesarevich" was settling aft, along the line, she signaled "senior officer assume command".

Under these circumstances, the chief of the Russian cruisers, Admiral v. Reitzenstein, deemed it most prudent to utilize the superior speed of his division, in order to

run past the point of the Japanese main squadron and through the line of hostile cruisers, for the purpose of taking the cruisers only to the point of destination. He signaled to the "Novick", "Pallada" and "Diana", "follow the chief", and being himself on the "Askold", proceeded with highest speed towards a division of the 3rd squadron, consisting of the "Matsushima", "Itsukushima" and "Hashidate", between the cruisers of the 1st squadron and the 3rd squadron; a large cruiser of the "Asama" type, which endeavored to bar his way, was obliged, according to his version, by a lucky hit, to turn off; a torpedo boat division which attack him, failed to be effective, one of the boats is said to have been sunk by a 15 cm. shell, and he succeeded, in spite of a heavy fire of 7 cruisers, lasting for 20 minutes, in company with the "Novick", to pass between them, who then took up a pursuit, but were on account of their inferior speed soon left behind. The "Diana" and "Pallada" followed the swarm of cruisers then leaving the battlefield of the main squadron at a greater distance.

The fight between the main squadrons seems to have continued for some time in an eastern direction, although with less speed. According to the Japanese version, the Russian line did not again become disordered. The "Retvian" started toward the Japanese line on her own accord, to a ramming or torpedo attack, but was forced to return by a general rapid fire.

At 7.30 P. M. the "Mikasa" was also struck on the bridge a number of officers being killed or wounded, the admiral remaining unharmed.



The Japanese claim that they increased their fire after the dissolution of the Russian line, but they did not approach any closer, neither did they employ torpedo boats. At 9 P. M. darkness put an end to the firing at great distances, but also prevented the Japanese chief to ascertain, on account of the great distance he had maintained, the whereabouts of the opponent. He merely saw that a portion of the battleships sustained injuries.

Only several days later was he able to come to the conclusion from reports of the vessels and torpedo-boats left behind for the observation of Port Arthur, that 5 battleships and 1 cruiser had separated during the fall of darkness, and returned singly to Port Arthur, this was confirmed later.

Admiral Togo also dispatched a detachment of cruisers and torpedo-boats to the Shantung promontory on the evening of the 10th, in order to attack the enemy, in case he proceeded further east, during the passage of the promontory. Other boats endeavored to bar the road to Port Arthur, attacked the battleships returning singly, several times, but without effect.

The Russian battleships "Retvisan", "Sevastopol", "Pobyeda", "Peresvyet" (Prince Uchtomski), "Poltava", the large cruiser "Pallada", and about three torpedo-boats returned to Port Arthur.

The "Cesarevich", whose rudder and engines also sustained injuries, remained for forty minutes at the same place, and having cleared herself to some extent, and after the battle had passed by, tried once more to proceed to Vladivostok, but it appeared soon that she could not run more than 4 knots per hour, on account of the injuries sustained, besides her boilers required so much coal that the supply available would not have lasted to Vladivostok; she sailed

therefore to Tsingtan, where she arrived at 11 P. M., and disarmed on the morning of the 15th. During the night she came among the Japanese torpedo-boats, whose attacks she repulsed, however; she received no hit from a torpedo.

The "Askold" and "Novick" ran during the darkness at a speed of 20 knots per hour and consequently drew soon away from the pursuing Japanese cruisers (a sign that their speed had already materially been reduced on account of the arduous blockade duty). Under cover of darkness the "Askold" reduced her speed, detached the "Novick" in order that the latter could take advantage of her full speed, and finally went to Shanghai for repair, after she had ascertained the extent of her injuries, and because the consumption of fuel, in consequence of the absence of two funnels, one disabled boiler, and the necessity for continuous blowing, was too great; here she went into dock, and was disarmed, after extended negotiations, by order of the czar on the 25th. She escaped the Japanese torpedo-boats by passing Shantung at a great distance. The "Novick" arrived in Tsingtan at 11 A. M., took on sufficient coal to carry her to the next Russian harbor, and proceeded to sea before 24 hours had elapsed early on the 12th, passed through the Van Diemen Strait south of Kinshin on the 15th, sailed along the east coast of Japan and reached Korsakow Bay at the southern point of Sachalin on the 20th, presumably for the purpose of replenishing her coal supply. The Japanese cruiser "Tsushima" found her here during the afternoon. The "Novick" put up a fight for  $3/4$  of an hour, during which the "Tsushima" was struck in the bunkers, and the "Novick" had her rudder room filled with water. When the Japanese were reenforced by the "Chitose" on the 21st, the "Novick" was beached and abandoned by her crew.

The "Diana" finally arrived in Saigon on the 20th of August, where, on the 25th, she received orders to disarm. She had been attacked by torpedo-boats off Shantung, but was not hit in spite of the fact that 9 torpedo were fired at her.

One ("Eurin") of the torpedo-boats which accompanied the squadron during its breach through the line, was beached south of Shantung promontory; her crew escaped to Wei-hai-wei, whence it was taken to Hongkong on board the transport "Humber" of the English squadron. Three other torpedo-boats ("Beshuming", "Bespodshadny" and "Bastrashny") took refuge in Tsingtan, one ("Grossovei") arrived in Shanghai; all have been disarmed in the meantime.

The casualties of this battle are as follows:

On the Japanese side:

"Mikasa"	killed 4 officers, 29 men;	wounded 10 officers, 78 men.
"Yakumo"	" 1 " 11 " "	" 10 "
"Hishin"	" 7 " 9 " "	" 2 " 15 "
"Kassugo"	" - " - " "	" - " 10 "
"Asagiri"	" - " 2 " "	" - " - "
one torpedo boat	" 1 " "	" - " 8 "

Besides casualties on board the "Chin Yen" and "Idzumi".

Total killed and wounded: 225 men.

On the Russian side.

"Czarevitch",	killed 7 officers, 10 men;	wounded 7 officers 40 men
"Askold"	" 1 " 11 " "	" 4 " 44 "
"Novick"	" - " 2 " "	" - " - "
"Diana"	" 1 " 3 " "	" - " 23 "

On board the ships which returned to Port Arthur:

killed 2 officers, 38 men; wounded 21 officers, 286 men.

Serious injuries to ships are denied by the Japanese as heretofore. That Japanese vessels were struck is shown by the foregoing casualties; the losses on the "Mikasa" are

greater than those on the "Czarevitch", as can be seen.

It is stated by the Russians that a large Japanese ship and a torpedo boat were sunk, and that two large vessels sheared out of the line in a damaged condition.

The following injuries to Russian ships have thus far become known:

The "Czarevitch" received 15 heavy and about 300 light hits; bridge, including all navigating apparatus destroyed; masts about to fall; funnels pierced in many places; leak in gangways caused by shell; injuries to rudder and engines; one gun disabled. The "Askold": two funnels shot to pieces, during the fall of the forward one, one boiler rendered unserviceable; the other funnels perforated in many places; the draught having become weak, it became necessary to blow hard, even for a slow speed, and enormous quantities of coal were used; one port-gun unserviceable; four holes below, six above water-line.

"Pallada": 12 holes.

"Retvisan": received eleven hits from shell fire.

"Diana": one hole by shell.

"Peresvyet": both signal poles, one heavy gun and electrical installation unserviceable.

#### THE SEA-FIGHT IN THE STRAIT OF KOREA ON AUGUST 14th.

On the same day, when the Port Arthur squadron began its ill-fated attempt of breaking through, the Pacific cruiser division, consisting of the "Rossya" , "Gromoboi", and "Rurik", left Vladivostok. It appears early in the morning of August 14th at the northern entrance to the Korean Strait. What it has been doing during the period from the 10th to the 13th, is not clear, for it did not need that much time for a journey of about 500 miles from Vladivostock to the place where the fight occurred.

The 2nd squadron under Vice-Admiral Kamimura was stationed in the Strait of Korea, based on Takeshiki on Tsushima.

<p>2nd division:</p> <p>"Idzumo", (Kamimura)</p> <p>"Tokiwa"</p> <p>"Azuma",</p> <p>"Iwate" (Misu)</p>	<p>4th division:</p> <p>"Takeshiko" (Urin),</p> <p>"Naniwa",</p> <p>and presumably "Nataka",</p> <p>"Tsushima".</p>
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At least one torpedo boat division.

Kamimura's orders were to prevent the cruiser division from entering the Yellow Sea.

He sought to carry out these orders in permanently guarding the Strait of Korea; this was the only defile on the direct route to Vladivostok to the Yellow Sea, which he was able to guard actually with his forces. As already shown, it was too weak to carry out a blockade of Vladivostok, neither could it allow itself to be enticed into the Yellow Sea too far, for there it would be unable to prevent with any degree of certainty the enemy from getting past, or even to observe him. But should the enemy sail around the east coast of Japan, he would have to pass twice through Japanese defiles (the Tsugaru Strait, and one of the straits of the Rinkin Islands), and Kamimura could then count upon timely reports, so that he had still a good chance from his central position of cutting the opponent off.

During the night from August 10th to 11th Kamimura received notice from Admiral Togo at Takeshiki (telegraphic communication exists from Dalai to Chemulpo, through Seoul-Fusan to Takeshiki), that the Port Arthur squadron had broken through; that a portion had turned towards the Strait of Korea, and that it might be presumed that the Vladivostok squadron was approaching from the other direction. He therefore established outposts in both directions (presumably

attaching harbor boats from Takeshiki), and commenced to cruise with his main squadron, consisting of four armored cruisers, between the south-eastern coast of Korea, and the northern point of Tushima.

On August 14th, at 4 A. M. as he was steering southward from the Korean coast, the cruiser division from Vladivostok was sighted on the port side at a distance of 100 km. with a southern course. The Russians apparently sighted the opponent later than they were seen by him, for they changed, still at a point 42 miles from Fusan, and 36 miles from the most northern fireship of Tsushima, the course towards west into the northern part of the Strait of Korea. Kammimura taking advantage of this, drew up in front of the course of the enemy, and allowed the latter to come up.

As soon as the Russians observed the opponent, they swung about and endeavored to escape into the open Japanese Sea with a north-eastern course, but were not able to get up full speed as quickly as the enemy. The latter followed at once, drawing up at the same time in rear of the Russian line ahead in such a manner as to be able to deliver a fire through the column with all his ships, whereas the leading Russian vessels were masked by the rearmost one. According to Russian accounts, the Japanese commenced firing at 110 km. but according to their own statement, they concentrated the volume of the fire on the Russian rear vessel, the "Ruik", and soon struck the same in the stern.

In order to extract himself from the very unfavorable position, the Russian chief first of all discarded his intention to escape into the open sea, and turned towards north. The "Ruik", however, was unable to follow this maneuver, her rudder being injured in the meantime. She signalled "rudder damaged", and received the reply "steer with the engines",

but was unable to keep up. The Japanese continued to pour out a terrible fire at the "Rurik"; in order to cover her and to give her time to straighten out, the Russian chief turned, passed with the two other ships between the "Rurik" and the hostile line, and then again turned towards north.

Towards 8 A. M. the latter approached the Korea coast within 2 miles. Being hereby obliged to turn off, the Russian chief changed direction towards the north and at the same time signalled to the "Rurik" "for Vladivostok". At first she followed at some distance in the wake of the two other ships; the Japanese main body pursued at a distance of 35 km.

In the meantime also the "Naniva", the "Takashiho", and a small cruiser ("Nataka"?) had arrived from various parts of the Korean Strait, where they presumably had been on outpost duty, and took part in the pursuit.

All Russian ships suffered severely under the Japanese fire, which was exceedingly effective at the short range. At 8.30 A. M. the "Rurik" commenced to settle aft, the "Naniva" and "Takashiho" remained with her, whereas the four large Japanese cruisers continued their pursuit of the "Rossiya" and "Gromoboi". These two ships were already so badly injured by shots, that they did not consider facing about and assisting the "Rurik", the only hope they entertained was that she would be able to cope with the smaller enemies, and that they would be of more use to her in drawing away the large ships. Kamimura continued the pursuit of the "Rossiya" and "Gromoboi" until 10 o'clock, without being able, however, to approach nearer than 35 km., he then suddenly turned toward starboard, crossed the wake of the enemy, delivering a short general rapid fire, and then ran back to the point where the "Rurik" had remained.

The "Rurik" in the meantime had suffered more and more from the fire of the small cruisers, which at extreme and medium range were circling around her, she fired as much as she was able to, but finally could only use two guns, her mizzen fell, finally she began to settle deeper at the stern. In order to prevent the ship from falling into the hands of the enemy, the ports were opened and the sinking consequently accelerated, with her bow up she went down. The crew had prepared itself for the sinking of the ship, presumably all hands were called on deck, a large portion is said to have been equipped with life preservers, and thus the greater part was saved, the weather being entirely calm, by the Japanese ships and by a torpedo-boat division, which, in the meantime had also appeared on the battlefield, and made prisoners. The impression is conveyed, as if the sinking was caused not so much by the injuries sustained, but by the measures of acceleration of the crew, which, deprived of its arms for a continuance of the fight, could only prevent a capture of the ship.

When Admiral Kamimura returned from the pursuit of the "Rossiya" and "Gromoboi" the fate of the "Rurik" was already sealed.

The following casualties are mentioned:

Japanese: killed 2 officers, 44 men; wounded 7 officers, 65 men. The Russians not regarding the crew of the "Rurik" (719 men, of which 600 were made prisoners: the "Rossiya": killed, the commander, wounded 6 officers; the "Gromoboi": killed 4 officers (among these the commander); on both vessels killed 135 men, wounded 307 men.

Thus far the following injuries have become known: the "Rossiya" eleven, the "Gromoboi" 5 leaks.



In order to judge the effect of arms, it is interesting to note the large number of injuries below water in both sea fights, although no torpedo hit was mentioned. Before one can draw any conclusions, however, more accurate statements regarding the location and extent of the injuries must be awaited. It must also be taken into consideration that of the ships engaged in the battle of August 10th, the "Askold", "Pallada", and "Diana" possessed no armor near the water line, but only a comparatively weak armored deck, and that the "Rurik", "Gromoboi" and "Rossiya" were not armored at the stern, which during the retreat was exposed to the fire the most.

On August 10th were present:

On the Japanese side:

	30.5 cm.	25 cm.	20 cm.	15 cm.	12 cm.	guns.
On the line	16	1	6	52	-	
Outside of the line	7	2	10	28	58	
Total	23	3	16	80	58	

On the Russian side:

On the line:	12	8	-	60	-	
Outside of the line:	--	-	-	28	6	
Total	12	8	-	88	6	

On August 14th:

On the Japanese side:-	4	16	78	-	
On the Russian side: -	-	12	48	6	

The available reports are not yet sufficiently reliable for any tactical conclusions, but that much may be seen from the available news that the cruiser division, after encountering the enemy suddenly, perhaps in consequence of insufficient alertness, so that it could not avoid a fight any more, fought the same in a very unfavorable position, in which it could utilize only a small portion of its fighting energy

against the fullest employment of the artillery fire of the opponent. Although its strategical problem at the beginning may not have consisted in a battle with Kamimura's squadron, but in the preservation of its ships for the purpose of uniting with the Port Arthur squadron, or in any other object, the question is still left open, whether it was correct, to accept in the interest of this strategical problem the unfavorable tactical conditions of a pursuing fight at medium range, and whether it would not have been much better, after the battle had become unavoidable, to fight the same according to tactical considerations only, and with one object in view, to not only injure as many hostile ships as possible, but to destroy them.

The same thought will overcome the disinterested observer in considering the Russian steps in the sea fight of August 10th, even more impressively.

In this case the Russian chief had orders to take his squadron to Vladivostok, because it could not remain any longer in Port Arthur. According to the spirit of the strategical intentions of the Russian naval council it is possible that the preservation of the 1st East Asiatic squadron until the arrival of the 2nd squadron from the Baltic, appeared necessary, and that a sacrifice of the same was considered faulty.

Whether Admiral Withoff received corresponding orders, or whether he understood the strategical situation in this manner, he left Port Arthur at any rate with the intention of solving his problem by avoiding an encounter with the hostile main squadron.

How he could have counted at all upon a success of this plan, when he went to sea the same day; and used four hours from the appearance of the first ship on the roadstead to

to the clearing of the vicinity of the fortress by the squadron, is, however, not easily understood; possibly he presupposed that the Japanese had lost more in speed in consequence of the arduous blockade than was actually the case, or that they would not dare, in view of the Baltic squadron, to sink their large vessels in battle, it is also possible that he was deceived through false reports regarding the blockading main squadron being engaged in repairs or coaling.

Certainly he could soon recognize that his suppositions in this direction did not prove to be correct, and that he was obliged to accept battle. Consequently the situation changed to an altogether different one than had been the basis for his plans or orders, and now he had to reassess the consequences from the new situation, i. e. as he could not preserve his squadron intact until uniting with the Baltic squadron, to make it his sole object to weaken the enemy, so that the Baltic squadron alone be superior to him later.

This, however, could only be attained by fighting the battle at decisive ranges, and solely according to tactical principles as completely as possible.

This decision ought to have been so much easier for the Russians, as, according to the proportion of forces, the battle was not at all hopeless for them, they being able to match 6 battleships against 4 battleships and 2 large cruisers of the enemy.

Only injuries could be expected from the firing at extreme range.

But with these the Japanese had the advantage, even if both sides should suffer alike, because they had the means for repairing near by in abundance and under protection, whereas of the two Russian bases, which can be considered, one was already reached by the projectiles of the besieging forces

and the other one will probably be made in time, not far distant, the object of a hostile attack.

What the Russians need, are losses of ships of the enemy; these, however, as regards battleships which are the main object, can only be effected by a decisive battle at short range with all arms.

The outcome of the battle also indicates a better proficiency in firing of the Japanese at the distant ranges, another reason for the Russians to force the near fight instead of establishing distances by evading the enemy, which he could only use to his own advantage.

How far the Russians, who retreated to Port Arthur, would have been able notwithstanding their injuries to make their way to Vladivostok, can, of course not be decided from the distance.

It is apparent that their presence in Port Arthur at the present stage of the siege will be especially inopportune, and that it will be very difficult to make repairs.

#### THE CRUISER WAR AND THE NEUTRALS.

As was mentioned in the preceding supplement, the cruiser divisions of Vladivostok, before it met its fate on August 14th, executed, besides the attack on the Japanese troop transports in front of the Strait of Shimocseki, still two other cruises, one at the beginning of July in the Korean Strait, in which the cruiser "Cheltenham" was taken, and one along the eastern coast of Japan from July 19th to August 1st. During the former cruise, the division was sighted by Kamimura's squadron, was pursued for a while, but not overtaken, and consequently returned to its harbor unharmed.

At the same time the auxiliary cruiser "Lena" accompanied by a torpedo-boat division from Vladivostok, ran to

Gensan, fired there at the Japanese colony, and destroyed a coast steamer and a sailing vessel in the harbor. On July 19th the "Rossiya", "Gromoboi" and "Rurik" under Rear Admiral Yessen, left Vladivostok anew, passed through the Tsungam-Strait between Nippon and Yesso into the Pacific Ocean, and along the Japanese east coast as far as Yeddo Bay, cruised from July 23d to 29th 50 to 75 miles south of the same on the shipping routes to Yokohama, returned on the 30th again along the Japanese east coast and arrived on the afternoon of August 1st safely in Vladivostok.

Hostile ships were sighted only in the Tsungaru Strait: during the outgoing cruise, a torpedo boat division from Ominato followed for a while at great distance; during the return, the mine-vessel "Takao", a ship like the Sei Yun and 7 torpedo boats endeavored in vain to keep up.

That it was possible for the cruisers to remain so long in front of Yokohama, is so much more astonishing, as their cruise through the Tsungaru Strait was already known in Japan on the 30th; it appears that the Japanese did not credit the Russians with such a daring undertaking, and consequently had taken all seaworthy vessels, even torpedo-boats, from the war harbor Yokosuka.

The impression on the Japanese commercial circles was great, as early as August 21st, the entire shipping was kept in the eastern harbors. Great fear reigned for two especially valuable steamers with subsistence valuing £ 180000 and £ 200000 respectively, which were just expected during this period from America. Perhaps they were the object of the Russian cruise, both arrived, however, safely. The following vessels were seized: the English steamer "Knight Commander" with 3500 to 4000 tons railroad material from New York via Europe-Shanghai, bound for Yokohama or Kobe, value of the

cargo £ 50000; the steamer "Arabia", sailing under the German flag, but leased to the Portland and Asiatic Steamship Company for some time, with 1200 tons of railroad material and 205,000 bags of flour, bound for Yokohama, Kobe and Nagasaki; the steamer "Thea" sailing under the German flag, but leased to a Japanese concern, of 1613 tons, with fish from America, bound for Yokohama; furthermore: a Japanese coasting steamer and four Japanese junks.

With the exception of the "Arabia", who was sent to Vladivostok under a prize-crew, all seized vessels were sunk, under the pretext that they did not carry sufficient coal to make the journey to Vladivostok. The crews were taken on board the Russian cruisers.

The "Smolensk" and "Petersburg" cruisers of the volunteer fleet which were sent into the Red Sea at the beginning of July, continued their activity there until the end of July. After the "Malacca" they seized the English steamers "Ardova" and "Formosa" and the German steamer "Skandia".

At the beginning of August these cruisers disappeared beyond reach of the world's news service. According to rumors one was on August 14th in Hodeido (Yemen), where the Turkish authorities refused permission to take provisions on board, the other made a sudden appearance near the cape recently.

Almost like a relief of these vessels, the cruisers "Don" and "Ural", recently equipped in Liban, proceeded at the beginning of August to sea; the "Ural" sailed for the Mediterranean, where she, according to her reports, watched about 200 steamers, laden with contraband, searched several ships thus far, but seized none. The "Don" appears to have sailed south along the west coast of Africa, being probably of the opinion that the ships carrying contraband, after the Red Sea had become unsafe, would take the route around the cape.

Of the means of naval warfare, the cruiser war is naturally the one which makes the neutrals suffer the most, on account of the interference which also affects their legitimate trade on account of the exercise of the right of search necessary for the conduct of the cruiser war, and on account of the cases of illegitimate destruction of neutral property, not always unavoidable, due to errors in carrying out the law, or other measures of force from the part of the cruisers. Whoever carries on a cruiser war, must therefore have correctly weighed beforehand, whether the advantages which he can expect from this warfare, will pay for the difficulties which he certainly will have with the neutral powers. In Russia, at least according to newspaper reports, two diverging opinions on this subject seem to be in existence with the competent authorities. This, of course, could only be the worst for the execution of the cruiser war.

As could be expected, the activity of the Russian cruisers in the Red Sea and in the Pacific, aroused the protest of the nations engaged in world shipping, by which, with and without consideration of the treatment of questions affecting the law of war on sea, almost everything the Russian cruisers did was declared as unjustified.

Questions affecting international law and the law of war must not be approached by moral conceptions of the private or criminal law. These according to experience, constitute the best arbitration between the wants of the single person and the interest of the whole within a nation, the law of war is intended to furnish arbitration between the interests of the belligerent and those of the neutral powers.

Such an agreement may, on account of naval warfare, appear almost impossible, as the theater of a naval war is also the field of activity for neutral shipping, and as the latter is more or less disturbed and injured by each warlike

action at sea. There are, however, two points, which bring the interests of the neutral powers closer to the wishes of the belligerents.

Firstly, as a rule, it is in the interest of the neutral powers as well as of the belligerents, or at least of one of the latter, that no other states be drawn into the war. Then, however, every neutral power must consider that it may some day find itself a belligerent, and will therefore in its own interest insist that international law does not deny the means to the belligerents, which some day it may want to use itself.

These points oblige the neutral powers to accept even material sacrifices, and only within the above considerations, will they endeavor to secure satisfaction in each case from the belligerent.

In this manner international usage is formed, and who, in a single case does argue the law with one of the belligerents, must not leave the common interests of the neutral powers and belligerents unconsidered.

Naturally the governments interested can survey these incidents better than the individual persons injured by the war, and consequently we find these cases treated more quietly by the governments than by the people.

In the present case public opinion was strongest in England. It was said that half of the English shipping would be tied up, because the route to Asia were closed, and the insurance companies were asking unbearable premiums, the coal trade were being crippled, etc. etc.

That this is exaggerated is evident, but the English government found cause to use the seizure of the "Malacca" in the Red Sea and of the "Knight Commander" in the Pacific for diplomatic procedure against Russia.



It would lead too far, to dwell in detail on the many points argued in connection with the Russian cruiser war, only the principal attacks on the actions of the cruisers will be referred to.

Public opinion took principally exception to the following points:

In Germany:

1. Seizure of the entire Japanese mail from the mail steamer "Prinz Heinrich", under the pretext that Japanese government letters (the "dispatches" of the Russian declaration of contraband) were among the same. The mail was searched over on board the Russian cruiser, and, with the exception of two bags, was transferred to the next following mail steamer, the two seized bags, after a number of letters were taken out, were forwarded later.

2. Seizure of the steamer "Scandia" because she had small quantities of ammunition on board (the steamer was, however, released after a short while in Suez, after it had been officially stated that the ammunition was destined for Australian colonies. )

In England.

1. Exercise of the right of search at great distance from the theater of war (Red Sea, Atlantic, Mediterranean).

(Note: It is evident that especially during this war the probability of encountering ships carry contraband (materials of war, coal) in the Red Sea and near the Cape is very great, in spite of the distance from the theater of war.)

2. Extension of contraband over coal and provisions in general.

3. Converting the ships of the volunteer fleet into auxiliary cruisers, after they had obtained free passage through the Dardanelles under the commercial flag.

#### 4. Sinking of neutral vessels suspected of carrying contraband.

The diplomatic action of England referred only to points 3 and 4, and, as far as can now be seen, England received as answer the assurance from the Russian government that the vessels of the volunteer fleet would be ordered to desist from seizing commercial steamers, but in regard to the sinking of prizes by proper naval vessels, Russia cites the regulations referring to prizes of 1895, which were not objected to by any one hitherto, and in which this procedure in certain cases of military necessity (impracticability of taking the prize to a home port on account of unseaworthiness, lack of coal, apparent danger of recapture by the enemy, disturbance of operations) is expressly provided for.

#### DESTRUCTION OF THE RUSSIAN TORPEDO BOAT "RESHITELNI" IN THE CHINESE HARBOR OF CHEEFU.

Whereas the Russians had come into conflict with the interpretation of international law by the neutral powers through their cruiser war, the Japanese, who had acted thus far very cautiously in this field, violated the same still more bluntly by an attack within a neutral harbor.

After the sortie of the Russian squadron from Port Arthur, the torpedo-boat "Reshitelni" of the 2nd torpedo-boat flotilla was sent with dispatches from Port Arthur to Cheefu. She arrived there safely, but was observed by the observation vessels in front of the harbor, was pursued and finally blockaded by a cruiser and a torpedo-boat. According to instructions received for this emergency, she disarmed and made a declaration to that effect to the Chinese Admiral Sah who was in the harbor with three small cruisers. During the night, however, the large Japanese torpedo-boats "Kasumi" and "Asashivo" entered the harbor, made fast near the "Reshitelni"

sent a detachment on board in spite of the Chinese declaration that she had disarmed, took charge of her after a short hand to hand fight with the crew, and towed her out of the harbor.

The Chinese admiral omitted to prevent the capture by force.

Russia through the intermediation of France protested at Tokio, China asked for the restoration of the "Reshitelni", but Japan declined both on the ground that the capture was justified, because Cheefu as well as other Chinese regions had become a part of the theater of operations, and ceased to be neutral, on account of their use by the Russians for war purposes (telegraph station, wireless communication, source of supplies), besides that the "Reshitelni was not completely dismantled. (The latter, of course, if Cheefu were at all to be considered neutral, would be meaningless).

#### RE-ENFORCEMENTS OF THE FLEETS.

Whereas in Eastern Asia the 1st East Asiatic squadron endeavors to solely preserve itself, and the Manchurian army endeavors to protract the war, the work on the completion of the 2nd East Asiatic squadron is pushed on in Petersburg and Kronstadt with the utmost energy, this squadron is designed to appear under the command of Rear Admiral Royestwensky on the theater of operations, and to reenforce the naval forces under Skrydleff, in order to enable the latter to wrest the command of the sea from the Japanese.

The exact composition of this squadron is not yet known. It will probably consist of the following:

The battleships "Alexander III", "Oslyabia", "Navain", "Ssissoi" Veliki"; (it is also to be assumed that still one or more of the vessels of the "Borodino" class, nearing completion ("Enyas Survaroff", "Aryol" or "Borodino") will join.) The large cruisers: "Admiral Nachimoff", "Imitri Donskoi",

"Aurora" (possibly "Oleg" in case she is completed); the small cruiser "Almaz", and torpedo-boats.

An ample fleet of colliers, water-supply, and repair-ships will have to be added, in order to be independent, for a while at least, from the assistance of neutral powers during the long journey, and if necessary, the theater of war.

Newspapers report as time of departure the beginning of September.

As regards sea-routes between the Baltic and the East-Asiatic Sea, the one through the Arctic north of Asia or America cannot be considered on account of the insecurity of navigation and the ice, there remains therefore only those through the Suez Canal (13500 miles), around the Cape of Good Hope (16100 miles), and around Cape Horn (21700 miles). The former route appears to be the most convenient, on account of being the shortest; whether its use will be feasible will depend on what confidence one will have in England's attitude at the time of departure of the squadron; the route around Cape Horn would render it most difficult for the Japanese fleet to ascertain the appearance of the squadron on the theater of war in time, but, as under certain conditions - if all the new ships join-, this squadron may be strong enough to be a match for the Japanese fleet even before joining the 1st East Asiatic squadron, this point alone would hardly have much weight.

Should the Russians succeed to take the second squadron of the afore described strength to the theater of operations, and find there either still serviceable remnants of the 1st squadron, or the Japanese fleet diminished by one or two more battleships by the activity of said 1st squadron, they ought to be able to expel the Japanese fleet from the sea, thus the line of communication of the Japanese army would be

cut off, without it, it could not hold its own for any length of time, even with excellent bravery and leadership against the Russian armies, which are continually reenforced by the railroad, or against armies formed and organized anew, and the war, from a military standpoint would be lost for the Japanese.

The far seeing, seafaring Japanese are fully conscious of this danger.

For this reason Japan is straining every effort to come as soon as possible into the possession of Port Arthur and of the remnants of the 1st squadron within, for this reason the commander-in-chief has taken personal command before Port Arthur and, according to recent news, is weakening the field army, in closest contact with the enemy, in favor of the siege for this reason, an operation at a far distant point, the attack on Vladivostok is under preparation, although no final decisive action has been fought on either of the two theaters of operation. All hinges on the Japanese coming into quick possession of the Russian ships in Eastern Asia, and of the naval depots, so that the threatening Russian Baltic squadron will find no support or assistance from that direction,-i.e. that the naval war in Eastern Asia will be rendered impracticable for the Russians: an exceedingly drastic picture of the decisive influence which the naval warfare can exert upon the entire conduct of the war.

In connection herewith it seems that the Japanese are still making efforts for the increase of their fleet. Attempts of private agents to purchase warships of small powers, have been reported repeatedly. Thus far they have all been unsuccessful on account of the spirit of neutrality. The Japanese naval league is agitating and collecting for an increase of 10 medium sized vessels. But how are they to be built during

the war? Fleets cannot be stamped out of the soil like armies. Who does not want to lose in naval warfare, will have to build beforehand whatever he will need in ships for victory.

H.

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Fort Crook, Neb., April 18, 1906.

Respectfully submitted:

H. ROSSFELD,

2nd Lieutenant, 30th Infantry.

WAR DEPARTMENT.  
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF  
No. 7565-0  
SEP 25 1906

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

translated from supplements of the Marine Rundschau, by <sup>MILITARY</sup> Lieutenant H. Hessfeld, 30th Infantry, from April 19, 1906 to June 7, 1906. <sub>INFORMATION DIVISION</sub>

-----Thirteenth Supplement-----



THE OPERATIONS IN MANCHURIA UP TO OCTOBER 1ST.

During the first part of August the Japanese armies, as was stated in the last supplement, completed their concentric advance against Lienyang so far, that contact was established among them, and that they were able to make a last halt in secure positions, from which the commander-in-chief, Marshal Oyama, could begin a general attack. A pause of about 14 days was utilized to appertion the reservists, who were sent up, to replenish and store ammunition and supplies, and to establish closer communication between the three armies. On August 23, these armies formed a nearly uniform curve, which, at a distance of about 40 Km encircled Lienyang from southwest to east, and consisted of eight divisions, including the reserve-brigades, of the 1st cavalry-brigade, and of the 36 batteries of the two independent artillery-brigades, distributed throughout the army. On the left wing, the Oku-army, consisting of the 6th, 3rd, and 4th divisions, connected with the railroad north of Haicheng; west, a brigade was pushed into the plain of the Liao. In immediate contact with the 4th division toward east, stood the Nedzu-army, to which now besides the 10th also the 5th division belonged. The Kuroki-army formed the right wing, in communication at signal distance, and stretched out loosely toward north-east, its right wing connecting with the southern bank of the Taitache, and consisting as heretofore of the 12th, 2nd and Guards-divisions.

The pause in the operations gave the Russian army time, to improve the fortifications south and south-east of Lienyang, on which the work was being rushed for months past, and at the same time, to

receive the reinforcements arriving from Europe, the greater portion of the 5th Siberian army corps. On August 23rd, the Russian outpost occupied the range of hills near An-shan-shan and a position east thereof, facing the Japanese cordon at a distance of about 15 Km; in rear of the outpost the 1st and 3rd Siberian corps and the 10th (European) army corps held the main highways leading to a number of earthworks, which extended from the railroad at intervals of 6 Km around Lianyang to the Taitso, barring the descent from the mountains into the plain. They were mostly armed with fieldpieces, but otherwise resembled almost permanent fortifications; their principal disadvantage consisted in several places south-east being commanded by the mountain range proper. Near, and in Liayang, which was furthermore encircled by a second, and tighter cordon of fortifications from south-west to east, stood the 2nd and 4th Siberian army corps, and the main force of the cavalry as a reserve.

MAP, SHOWING BATTLE OF LIAUYANG (AUGUST 26TH).

Fortintel = cordon of forts; Russische Vorposten = Russian outpost; Japanische Vorposten = Japanese outpost  = Russians;  = Japanese. On the right bank of the Taitso, to which several ponton-bridges led across besides the railroad bridge, stood one division of cossacks, and the 17th European army corps, which arrived a month previous, and had sent ahead a portion of its troops toward east. Under cover of this corps the 5th Siberian army corps assembled, which was just arriving and almost entirely present.

The paper strength of the Russians is estimated to about 237000 men; in reality about 180,000 men are said to have been available in the following battles. With the Japanese, these actually present, may have reached the normal strength, as they received continually reinforcements for the various organizations; at any rate, it may be assumed, that their strength scarcely went beyond 200,000. However, their artillery, numbering about 550 pieces, was considerably superior to the Russian. It was apparently Marshal Oyama's plan, to hold the enemy from the south and south-east, and in the meantime, to have the Kuroki-army execute a turning movement, which



should cut the Russians off from their line of communication. His means were altogether insufficient for the purpose of turning the wings from both sides; the plan, above indicated, alone required an energetic and costly following up by the southern front, in order that the communication with Kuroki would not be severed, and that the latter would not run danger to be cut off by a hostile wedge forced between.

The Japanese executed cautiously the prepared movements from August 24 to 29, in advancing firstly from the south, then along the whole line, against the Russian outpost, engaging the latter in a number of engagements, which wound up with a retreat of the entire hostile line to the fortified principal position. The Russian troops fought gloriously everywhere, and the Japanese captured few spoils and prisoners; only at the south, a Russian battery fell into the hands of the Japanese, - it was completely submerged in a mire and had to remain there, - in spite of the fact that one brigade under Major General Rutkovski, who was killed thereby, was sacrificed in a rear-guard action. But the Japanese attained their object just the same. General Kuroki succeeded after having repulsed the scouting hostile troops, in pushing his division towards north, in the vicinity of the Taitcho, and in preparing there a crossing at two points, for which purpose he carried with him pontons and other materiel. The Russian service of information was a failure here; the highly swollen river appeared to the Russians to be a too strong natural obstacle, and the Japanese movements on this wing remained undiscovered.

It appears that Kuroki was at this time merely in telephonic communication with the main portion of the army, in which he was, of course, not disturbed by the Russians.

On August 20, Marshal Oyama commenced the attack proper. The two southern armies advanced on this day and on the succeeding ones against the opposite Russian fortifications, delivering assaults after assaults, they having been prepared by the artillery in each case. They suffered considerable losses hereby, without reaching their object, but also the Russian positions were severely handled, and as the right wing was threatened to be outflanked by the continually onward thronging enemy, Kuropatkin saw himself obliged to gradually place on the prolongation of the line the greater part of the reserve kept back in Liauyang, probably the 4th Siberian army corps and the 71st division of the 5th corps, so that the battle was now also raging in the plain

-4-

west of the railroad.

In the east, a portion of the Kuroki-army, presumably a division at most, in delivering a frontal attack against the opposite enemy was given a similar task, and under cover of this division, the main portion of this wing began to cross the river as early as August 30th, and to establish itself on the heights of the opposite bank, after the weak Russian forces posted there, had been dispersed.

When Kuropatkin was informed on the 31st in regard to the crossing, it was completed and Kuroki had commenced to push a portion of his troops towards northeast, in the direction of the chain of hills of the Yentai-mines.

Hereupon Kuropatkin decided to throw his main body against Kuroki, and to leave only sufficient forces opposed to the other armies of the enemy, as were necessary to hold the opponent south of Liauyang.

#### Sketch showing battle of Liauyang (August 31)

 = Russians,  = Japanese.

Whether this entire operation signifies already a retreat north with simultaneous cover against Kuroki's flank attacks, is not certain, the Japanese represent it as such, the Russian papers, however see in it a plan which will lead to victory. At any rate, the railroad was, as early as August 31st crowded by uninterrupted transportation going north.

During the night of August 31/September 1st, the cavalry and the first Siberian army corps were led across the river, the Third Siberian and the 10th army corps followed during the course of the day, whereas the remainder, i. e. the 71st division and the 4th Siberian army corps, without being seriously engaged, retreated to the inner cordon of Liayang, and occupied the same in company with the 2nd Siberian army corps, which was already there. The Japanese contented themselves with the occupation of the vacated outer cordon; they were completely exhausted, and in need of a breathing spell. However, they gained hereby possession of positions from which they were able to direct artillery fire on the Russians, retreating from Liayang, and at the railroad transportation.

In the meanwhile to the 17th Army Corps, which was already previously posted north of the Taitseho, had fallen the task of holding the right bank of the river, until the approach of the main body, and the 54th Division of the 5th Siberian army corps, which was located further north, received orders, to occupy several hills, which commanded the hostile approach in the vicinity of the Yentai-mines. Kuroki's rear guard succeeded on the evening of September 1st, in taking the Gykwantun hill, the advanced position of the main body of the 17th corps, so that here, on the morning of September 2nd, an energetic and costly assault had to be delivered by this corps, in order to recapture the position. The 54th division, located north of the aforementioned hill, in the meantime established itself on the hills assigned to it, in a good defensive position, and General Oilon, commanding the division, decided he could spare a portion of his troops; he consequently sent them to the assistance of the advance guard of the 17th corps. This detachment, however, on its way was held up by the advancing troops of Kuroki, and repulsed, and with such energy did the Japanese follow up this repulse, that also the forces on the hill were run over, and that they had to be picked up by the approaching 1st Siberian army corps.

In this manner Kuroki, whose entire army, at a distance from its trains, and separated from the main army, found itself a moment ago in a very unfavorable situation, gained a position of security, from which General Kuropatkin could expel him only with great sacrifices, and the commander-in-chief did not believe, that he could ask any further sacrifices from his already severely handled troops.

Kuropatkin therefore ordered the retreat north, and this began on the evening of September 2nd, whereas a flank guard, posted between Yentai and the Taitseho, prevented a further advance of Kuroki. The latter was too much exhausted, to undertake serious operations against the line of retreat during the following days, and thus the retreat proceeded orderly and without undue haste, partly by rail, partly along the railroad, also the greater part of the provisions stored in Liauyang were taken along in spite of the bombardment to which the railroad station was exposed, whereas the armies of Oku and Nodzu were already firing at, and assaulting

the inner works from the immediate vicinity. During the night of September 3/4, General Kuropatkin ordered the abandonment of the positions, and when the Japanese occupied the town on the following morning, the Russians had already destroyed the ponton bridges in rear and put fire to the railroad bridge. The latter, however, was saved by the Japanese, and was repaired and rendered serviceable after a few days; greater attempts to disturb the retreat, were not undertaken by the victor. Only on September 5th occupied Kuroki Yentai, after it had been abandoned by the Russians.

Only the Japanese published statements regarding their casualties; they are said to amount in all to 21,000 men, of these 136 officers killed and 464 wounded. The Oku-army stood the largest proportion of these figures, and its repeated frontal attacks costed (cost) very much blood. Of the Nedzu-army, one single regiment, the 20th of the 5th division, lost on September 2nd during the persistently renewed assault upon the inner works of Liauyang from 1200 to 1300 men; the companies were finally led by non-commissioned officers.

Correspondents, present at the battle, estimate the casualties higher, up to 30000 men, the estimates regarding the Russian casualties reach the same figure.

It should be noted, that the reports, contradictory to former ones on the subject, call the Arisaka-field piece inferior to the Russian material, as well in regard to rapidity of fire as in regard to range; if the Japanese artillery had the advantage in spite of this, so was it due to a better instruction in firing, and also due to its appearance in greater masses.

During the week, following the battle, the Russians concentrated around Mukden, little is known as regards their future plans, neither whether they are preparing to accept a new battle at this point, should the Japanese follow, or whether Kuropatkin intends instead, as is presumed, to retreat to the northern fortified position on the hills of Tieling. How far this news is correct, which has been repeated since the beginning of October, that the Russians had already commenced to press south for the purpose of another attack, cannot be verified at the time this goes to

print; perhaps the reports merely anticipate the Russian intentions for the future.

A still denser darkness covers the last operations of the Japanese, who have advanced their outposts as far as to the Hunho. From time to time minor out-post skirmishes are reported, which indicate close contact. Besides, it is constantly rumored that the Japanese are advancing considerable bodies of troops toward east; on September 25th, they are said to have occupied Taling, -pass, about 30 km. south of Mukden. Those, who knew the country, declare however a turning movement in the east, on account of the impassable mountain range as out of question. The Japanese main body is evidently still standing near Liauyang and Yentai; General Oku has advanced a detachment towards west, in the direction of Sinmingting. Liauyang is being prepared as a base for the winter.

#### THE EVENTS IN FRONT OF FORT ARTHUR UP TO October 1st.

Since General Stoessel declined on August 16th to comply with the demand of surrender, almost no authentic news regarding the events on land near Port Arthur has penetrated to the outer world; the Japanese keep complete silence and in St. Petersburg, only a few brief and unimportant messages from the fortress were made public. The information service consequently depends solely upon the unreliable news from Chufoo. However, from comparison of all the various sources the conclusion may be drawn that during the days from the 19th to the 22nd, from August 27th to 30th, and from the 19th to the 23rd of September fierce engagements for the capture of several Russian advanced positions took place, mostly on the northern side of the cordon of fortifications, whereas small skirmishes seemed almost daily.

#### SKETCH OF PORT ARTHUR.

The prearranged meeting place of the parlementaries on August 16th was situated 500 paces north of the village Shuiahying, which was therefore then not yet occupied by the Japanese, apparently

because they were prevented from it by a Russian work (Kuropatkin redoubt?) on an isolated hill, rising south of it (the village) East, they stood behind cover of the Takushan crest, parallel to the mountain range, on which the permanent fortifications are located; northwest they had penetrated as far as Pigeon Bay, and commenced to place siege guns into position at the northern beach of the bay.

Attacks of August 19th to 22nd are said to have been directed mainly against the northwest side where the hills of Ishan Fort were mentioned as the object, latter attacks were also directed against the north side. Infantry positions constituted principally the result of the engagements and also provisional emplacements for field guns on the outer slope of the fortifications proper, for it is reported in several instances that the Japanese took a fort by assault, but that they were unable to hold it on account of the annihilating fire of the Russian artillery. But as they know themselves how to profit from every opportunity for the purpose of pushing their artillery further to the front, certain positions are said to be in existence, which can be reached by the effective fire of either party, and must consequently be avoided by both.

Whereas the assaults up to the middle of September were apparently all beaten off in general, the Japanese conquered during the fights from September 19th to 23rd after an energetic artillery bombardment, two redoubts on the north side, which covered the basins of the waterworks, among these apparently the Kuropatkin work south of Shinshiyang, and destroyed according to General Steessel's report, the waterworks. An energetic sortie of the garrison on September 25th turned out to be unsuccessful in recapturing this important position. Should the entire watersupply be cut off from the fortress, which is still contested by the Russian news it means, that the garrison is now mainly dependent on the unhealthy ground water wells of the Chinese area; there is, however, a suitable distilling apparatus at the wharf, but its use will require a lot of coal, and whatever is still left of the coal supply must be carefully husbanded for the ships which are still seaworthy.

In general, there is little known of reliable details of the engagements on land. During the night of August 24th, the Japanese attempted to take by surprise one of the principal forts on the east side, and having been repulsed, still endeavored twice an assault which led to a bayonet struggle, but were beaten off in both instances. During the night of September 1-2, a Japanese battery got into a mine field on the northwest side, and suffered severe losses. On the morning of September 23rd, a Japanese detachment succeeded in taking on High Hill (probably Etseshan on the northwest side) several advanced positions of the Russians and to establish machine guns there. A platoon of Russian engineers approached however during a sortie closely, and expelled the garrison by means of hand grenades, which were thrown into the positions.

The siege army consists of the 1st, 9th and 11th divisions, with their respective reserve brigades and a large siege park. There is no reliable news regarding positions, caliber and number of the siege guns, but that much has been ascertained that the inner town, the wharf, and the harbor are being bombarded ever since the beginning of August.

Their most important object, the fleet, is continually within the fire zone, and the Chinese reports speak anew of severe injuries, which have already rendered the greater part of the ships unable to fight, and unseaworthy. Against this supposition, which may be of some value, must be mentioned on account of the complete absence of reliable news, that the Russians still continue to search for mines in the entrance, and that the Japanese fleet has appeared on several occasions before Fort Arthur from its base on the Elliot Islands, and especially during the periods, during which the hours of two succeeding high tides would have permitted the Russians to leave and reenter on the same day.

The command over the Russian ships was transferred to Countersadmiral Wiren at the end of August, who commanded thus far the Rayan efficiently.

his predecessor, Counteradmiral Uchtomski, is said to be undergoing an official investigation, because he returned to Port Arthur on August 10th in violation of strict orders. The new squadron chief is regarded by the Russians as an extremely efficient naval officer; one may presuppose in him the knowledge that he must, if it be still possible, risk his entire squadron, in order to decrease the Japanese fleet by at least several fighting units, in order to render the attainment of the command of the sea easier for the second Pacific squadron.

There are some more or less reliable reports regarding single events outside of the entrance to be mentioned.

Towards 8:00 p. m. on August 18th, a Russian gunboat of the "Otwashui" type encountered a mine near Liautichan, and sank.

On August 23rd the SEVASTOPOL left the harbor in order to fire at the Japanese land positions; she struck a mine hereby, as was observed by the Japanese torpedo-boat destroyer Asashuvo and had to be towed back to the harbor, listing toward starboard, and her bow being partly submerged. The NISSHIN and KASUGA fired during the same day at the works of Laulutsin.

On August 24th, during the evening two Russian torpedo boat destroyers encountered mines in front of the entrance; one was still able to return to the harbor, the other sank.

On August 31st seven Russian harbor tugs and steam boats searched the front of the entrance for mines; towards 2:30 p. m. one of them struck a mine and sank.

A similar accident is said to have befallen a Russian mining detachment on September 20th.

On September 2nd, a Japanese torpedo boat struck a mine in front of Tache Bay; on the 3rd, the Itsukushima had a similar accident; the former is said to have sunk during her withdrawal.

At the end of September a Japanese gunboat met with the same fate when maneuvering in Pigeon Bay.



## OTHER EVENTS.

The second Pacific squadron, as far as it was completed, was stationed since the beginning of August in the roadstead of Kronstadt for the purpose of maneuvering, and thence went to Reval on September 11th. Here it is awaiting the arrival of the battleship "OREL", the large cruiser "BLEG", and the small cruisers "SEMSHTSHUK" and "ISUMRUD", who are said to be scheduled to leave Kronstadt about the middle or end of October; then it is contemplated to commence the journey.

The two auxiliary cruisers "PETERSBURG" and "SMOLENSKI" made their appearance on August 20th off the east coast of South Africa; the excitement, created hereby in England, was only appeased, when the Russian government asked England to locate the two cruisers, and to transmit to them the order for return, which thus far, had not reached them. On September 6th, the English cruiser "FOOTE" met the auxiliary cruisers off Zanzibar, and completed her mission; on September 23rd they arrived at Suez, and on September 30 in Algiers on their way to Liban.

The auxiliary cruiser "NOV", which was expected from Liban, has remained for some time in Vigo and is said to have proceeded for the Mediterranean. No news has been received from her or from the "URAL" for several weeks, but since the beginning of September, the "TAREK", a third cruiser from Liban, is controlling the shipping in the Eastern Atlantic. In Las Palmas, where she went for the purpose of replenishing her coal supply, she was refused to take any supplies on board by order of the Madrid government; she interrupted her coaling, which had already begun, and proceeded again to sea.

The fourth of these cruisers, the "KUBAN", does not appear to have left. One of the vessels, purchased by Russia, is, as the English premier declared to the speakers of the shipping unions on August 25th, of English origin; she appears to have sailed under the name of FRANCHE-Comte, and been purchased through a French agent.

On September 6th two Japanese auxiliary cruisers appeared off KoreaKorsk, and sent boats to the wreck of the "NOVIK" Here the crews were fired at from land; after they had returned to their vessels, and the latter had again proceeded to sea, the Russians found nine mines or torpedoes, placed in position on the wreck,

On the following day two Japanese cruisers are said to have appeared, and to have destroyed completely the still floating hull by means of torpedoes.

The former commander of the "NOVIK" a second class vessel, Captain Schultz, is said to have been appointed successor of the severely wounded 1st class Captain Dabitch, commanding the GROMOSOI. This cruiser, in the meantime, completed her repairs in Vladivostek, similarly as the ROSSIYA and BOGATYO.

#### THE PRESENT SITUATION.

The operations against Liauyang have evidently given to the Japanese a great victory, and have increased their supremacy in Southern Manchuria considerably; the consciousness of having driven a bravely fighting opponent, almost equal in numbers, from strongly fortified positions, will give new nourishment to the warlike spirit of the army. In spite of all this, worry and discouragement is manifested in Japan in the appreciation of the successes obtained, the longer the more, as one cannot leave it concealed to oneself, that the object proper, to envelope the enemy and to cut him off from his line of retreat, has not been reached, and that the same has now disappeared in the distance further than ever. Although it appeared from the numerous declarations of leading men at the beginning of the war, that a long duration of the war would have to be anticipated, the surprisingly quick successes of the first months created a strong underestimation of the opponent, and consequently sanguine hopes were permitted to originate; now the change in the views has a so much more serious effect, as one has learned in the meantime to appreciate

the presence of the war burdens, and as one has now also been taught a different lesson as to the military capabilities of the Russians. One of the influential men of the country, Count Okuma, believed it therefore necessary to prepare his countrymen for an at least two years' duration of the war, and to suggest to them, for the heavy sacrifices required for it, careful householding also on the field of finance.

That the Russians, on the other hand hoped for a better result of the day of Liauyang, cannot be doubted. However General Kuropatkin understood to withdraw his army by a retreat timely begun, which all professionals call a masterpiece, although shaken, but as a firm whole from the envelopment of the enemy, and in this manner to put off the decisive blow in spite of a lost battle for an indefinite period. For his opponent, who was himself shaken, had to leave him space and time, in order to straighten out his ranks; and in the meantime the season has progressed so far, that it has become too late for the Japanese to undertake operations on a large scale, although an advance on Mukden or even beyond that point need not to be left out of the question.

The experiences of the winter 1894 - 1895 will presumably dictate to them in general a certain caution in all operations, which will approach very closely the going into winter quarters, formerly as common.

Herewith Russia is gaining time, and consequently much; for her hopes are set upon the reinforcements, which are possible in the meantime on land and sea, by which she believes her superiority on both fields secured.

The delaying result of the battle of Liauyang has therefore attached an increased importance to the departure of the second Pacific squadron; it will still be able to take a decisive part, even if it should only arrive in Eastern Asia after the completion of the winter pause. This prospect in turn, calls to the attention of the Japanese more pronouncedly, of what significance the timely destruction of the ships, still at Port Arthur, must be to them. The presumption,

that General Negi, after the severe failures of the last months, has received orders to commence a systematic siege of the fortress in order to spare his troops, speaks for itself; as soon as the news of the actual departure of the second Pacific squadron will have reached Japan, such considerations will have to be disregarded.

#### FURTHER WAR PREPARATIONS.

In the course of the month of September the 1st (European) army corps, under General v. Meyendorff, will have arrived at Mukden; the fourth Siberian corps, under General Sobolyev, and the 4th Don Cossack divisions, which are following immediately <sup>in</sup> rear, may all be in Manchuria at the close of October.

On September 30th, the first transport train of the 5th corps, Lieutenant General Nylov, left Russia; further mobilizations are being expected. Since September 26th, the Circumbaikal railroad has been ready for use, the time of departure of an army corps, which was formerly estimated at 40 days, does not extend any longer that far, one may therefore anticipate that the afore-mentioned troops will be assembled in Manchuria by the close of November. It is the intention to create then two separate armies; General Grippenberg, at this time in Wilna, has been appointed commander of the second army. The assignment of the corps as well as the position which General Kuropatkin will occupy in regard to this new organization, is not yet known.

From the rapid succession of the troop-transports, which are only at times interrupted by pauses of several days, reserved for the supply-trains, it appears that the Russian management feels itself equal to the formidable task, which the winter supply of the considerably increased army demands. The harvest in Manchuria has been an extremely good one.

Its greater part, of course, already benefits the Japanese, who in general will find few serious difficulties for their magnificently organized supply department. Beginning at Dalni, where now their principal landing point is situated, they have already commenced to modify the railroad, which was left them by the Russians without

rolling stock, for their own material, in closing up one rail to the width of the Japanese gage (1.06 m. compared with the Russian of 1.524 m.) In sawing off the projecting ends of the ties they precluded at the same time the possibility for the Russians to again repair any length of the track which they might be able to reconquer during a favorable turn in the war. At the beginning of August Japanese trains were already running as far as Kaichan; on October 1st, the first Japanese locomotive engine is said to have reached Liayang.

For the distribution of the supplies the management has established a regular relay-service with Chinese carts, each driver taking his load one days' journey ahead, and then returning. This requires frequent unloading, but makes supervision easier, each of the thousands of drivers knows his road perfectly, and improvements of the roads have a better prospect for success.

At present there are also the communications via two secondary disembarkation points at the disposal of the Japanese; west, there is YinKow, whence the supplies can be transported partly by rail, partly in boats to the upper Liau and to the Hunho; east, there is the estuary of the Yalu, whose one point of storage, Antung, is connected by a kind of a field railway with Fenguancheng and Liaukwanshan. This track, on which the cars are pushed by coolies, is, at the time, being prolonged towards north. At the close of November, however, the mouth of the Liau, and during December, the Yalu will be closed by ice; then, however, the railroad under construction from Seoul to Widshu may be counted upon, the work on it being pushed with all energy. Also the line from Fusan to Seoul, which has been under construction for three years, is said to near its completion then, of course only temporarily, with wooden bridges, and climbing curves instead of the more extended tunnels. The originally assumed standard width (1.435 m.) is said to have also here been supplanted by the Japanese narrow gage. A branch line is connecting the excellent harbor of Masampo, which formerly constituted the principal bone of contention between the two powers.

On September 25th, an Imperial manifesto appeared, which increased the age limit of those, liable to serve in the 2nd reserve, to 37 years, and suspended the discrimination between the first and second reserve. In this manner five additional increments have become available for the war, on the continent, and all conscripts may be sent to the existing organizations. The last measure would alleviate the lack of superiors, especially of officers, under which the usefulness in war of the reserve organizations suffers. In regard to the former organization of the reserve little reliable information is available; each of the eleven divisions in the field seems to have its reserve brigade with it; however, there must have been created still a number of independent reserve organizations, of which the denomination is not even known.

Their employment is required by the necessity of holding the occupied territory by the military, and securing for the armies the line of communication and supply.

The numerical strength of all mobile forces, which Japan is able to put forward, does not appear to exceed a half million, if the statements regarding the organization of the army, already prepared in time of peace, be taken as a basis. The highest authority on this subject, Marshal Oyama, for 1901, gave as total of those liable to military service between the ages of 17 and 40, 539280 men. However, herein are apparently only those counted, who have actually served in the active army, limited in size; but one may rely upon the energy and determination of this 45 millions people, that it will be able in the course of the months, to produce useful organizations even from the great mass of undrilled older men, who are liable for military service.

The numerical preponderance of Russia does, therefore, not by any means seem to be assured for the spring; but anew the question arises: Where will Admiral Rostyestvenski then be with the second Pacific squadron?

THE RUSSO - JAPANESE WAR.

Translated from supplements of the Marine Rundschau, by Second Lieutenant H. Hoesfeld, 30th Infantry, from June 8, 1906, to August 13, 1906.

FIFTEENTH SUPPLEMENT.CHRONOLOGICAL RECAPITULATION:

- July 20th to 31st: Raid of the Vladivostok cruisers along the Japanese coasts.
- July 24th: The Russian torpedo boat "Leitnant Burakoff" was hit by Japanese boats in a fog, and sank.
- July 25th: The Japanese occupy Tashichiao and Yinkow.
- July 26th to 28th: The Japanese force the garrison of Port Arthur back to the line Louisa Bay - Wolves Mountains, Sakushan.
- July 30th: The Wolves Mountains were taken by assault by the Japanese.
- July 31st. General Kurcki beat off an attack of the Eastern Detachment under General Count Keller, and occupied the Motienling passes.
- August 9th: Takushan and Sakushan (in front of the east side of Port Arthur) taken by the Japanese.
- August 10th: Sortie of the Port Arthur squadron.
- August 11th: Return of the greater portion of the vessels to Port Arthur.
- August 14th: Battle between Japanese and Russian cruisers in the Strait of Korsa, the "RUUK" sunk.
- August 13th to 15th: Japanese operations against the west side of Port Arthur.
- August 15th: Cessarevitch disarmed in Tsingtow.
- August 20th: The "NOVIK" after an engagement with the Taushima beached at Korskorsk.
- August 19th to 23rd: Infantry attacks against Port Arthur, great losses; the Japanese gained possession of 174m. hill, and of the Banyusan redoubts.
- August 23rd: The "SEVASTOPOL" receives a leak from a mine in front of Port Arthur.
- August 24th: The "ASKOLD" dismantled in Shanghai.
- August 30th to Sept. 3rd: Battle of Liauyang; retreat of the Russians.
- September 3rd: The "ITSUKUSHIMA" damaged by a mine.

- September 15th: The DIANA disarmed in Saigon.
- September 15th: The HEIYEN encountered a mine in Pigeon Bay, and sank.
- September 19th to 23rd: Infantry attacks against the North, and west side of Port Arthur; the Japanese retained the 180m. hill (Ishan) and the works near the reservoir.
- October 8th to 19th: Battles along the Shahe.
- October 12th: Second Pacific Squadron left Liban.
- October 22nd: Incident in the North Sea.
- October 26th to 30th: Japanese approaches in front of Port Arthur pushed forward to the counterscarps of the northern forts.
- November 3rd to 5th: The Second Pacific squadron split up, continues the voyage from Tangier.
- November 25th: The division of Admiral Felkersahm passed through the Suez Canal.
- November 28th to December 3rd: Admiral Restyestvensky in Libreville.
- November 30th: The Japanese take by assault the 203m. hill west of port Arthur; the SAIYEN encountered a mine and sank.

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## THE SITUATION IN MANCHURIA.

About the middle of October the two opposing armies struggled with each other in a battle, lasting ten days; the troops engaged, the stubbornness which the two opponents manifested, and also the casualties sustained, surpassed those of Liauyang considerably. At present it is impossible to give a continuous presentation of the events in detail on account of the insufficiency of all news. Non-professionals, however, may not miss the same, for if considered as a whole, the number of the October battles appears in spite of the gigantic employment of force only as an episode, which has hardly changed the general situation; at most, it seems to have prolonged the period of fatigue on both sides into the severe winter.

It be therefore only briefly stated, that General Kuropatkin ordered the advance of considerable forces on his left wing at the beginning of October, who were to envelope the advanced positions of the Japanese Eastern flank, and to roll up the latter, whereas the balance of the army was to hold the enemy to his positions. Marshal Oyama received timely information in regard to this movement, which is not at all surprising for the beginning of the offensive had been formally ~~we~~ announced several days previous, he consequently withdrew his right wing to a prepared principal position, shifted all the troops he could spare to the left, and whereas now the attacking Russians encountered first of all nothing, and then assaulted the field fortifications, situated further in rear, Oyama hurled his main force at the proportionately weak, remaining portion of the Russian fighting line, which only very late, received support from the further in rear concentrated mass of the reserve. The result was as follows: the Russian left wing, cut off from communication and also weakened, had to retreat towards northeast under great difficulties. The center and the right wing were gradually pressed towards north, and by means of continuous counterattacks were only able to make a stand 10 km. in rear, where they occupied the Shabo line. In this case it was of great importance, that a brigade under General Putilew succeeded on October 16th in reconquering and holding a lone hill, already occupied by the Japanese and which commanded

a wide and flat terrain south of the river. By this means the retreating movement of the Russians came to a standstill, and a hastily prepared line of defense, which was linked to this Keypoint, offered more resistance to the Japanese than they were able to overcome with their exhausted forces. They consequently commenced in time to strengthen by means of field fortifications their own front, which is said to be at several points as close as a few hundred meters to that of the Russians; and as both sides, worn out, and engaged in the hasty preparation for the winter, endeavored to avoid new battles, we behold at the setting in of the frost the curious picture of two large armies pitched closely against each other in a long drawn out line; the outposts pushed together, partly within hearing distance, behind them the lines of field fortifications, and the men sheltered in hastily thrown up or dug down earth-quarters, now frozen hard, but which at least keep out the worst of the cold. The mean temperature in these regions averages in December  $+9^{\circ}$  C., in January  $-17^{\circ}$  C., this fact alone will render impracticable larger operations, in which the troops could not be sure of finding new shelter. Skirmishes, of course, occur continually along the entire line, also both sides interrupt occasionally the monotony by artillery bombardments, during which the Japanese select especially Putilow hill as target, christened recently thus after the deed of General Putilow. However, it appears, as if both armies intended in the main to remain in their present positions during the winter, and to utilize the enforced rest for a thorough preparation for the spring.

The strength of the Russian army, which at Liauyang was estimated at about 185,000 men, had been increased up to the October battles, by the 1st European, and the 6th Siberian Army corps, probably also already by the 4th Don Cossack Division, i. e. by about 70,000 men, whereas the casualties of the days near Liauyang, and of the succeeding weeks, approximately 20,000 men were to be deducted. Of the 235,000 men, which accordingly Kuropatkin had at his disposal during the October battles, about 45,000 men were said, according to newspaper estimates, to have dropped out in the course of this bloody episode. Behind the shipment of the 8th European army corps which commenced at the beginning of October, therefore, first of all considerable reinforcements of reservists, apparently about 70,000 men, followed,

who were to fill the gaps in the existing formations. Then follows the dispatch of a further reinforcement of over 100,000 men of European troops, which commenced at the beginning of November and presumably will be completed in February. It comprises the 1st to 5th (independent) rifle brigades, the 16th and 4th Army corps with a recently assigned cavalry division, and six recently organized mountain batteries at eight guns each. In February, accordingly, the Manchurian army may possess a strength of 360,000 men.

The number of the Russian guns, which at the beginning remained far behind that of the opponent, has been considerably increased during the last months; although the October battles caused the loss of 43 guns, of which 24 constituting a complete battalion, were captured in a night assault, the artillery, now available, is estimated at over and above 900 guns.

In the meantime the final decision in regard to the organization of the Russian forces, at least in rough outlines, has become known. The viceroy, Admiral Alexeyeff, has been ordered home; in his stead General Kuropatkin has been entrusted with the supreme command on land and water. The Manchurian army is divided into three armies. The first army to which apparently belong the 1st, 2nd and 3rd and 4th Siberian, and the 10th European army corps, is commanded by General Linevitch, to whom, as commander of the coast district, had fallen heretofore a rather unimportant role. General Gripenberg, as already mentioned, was appointed to the command of the 2d army, he has already commenced the journey from Wilna, his former sphere of action, for the front. The same applies to the leader of the future third army, General Baron Kaulbars, who heretofore commanded the troops of the military district of Odessa.

The nominal command of the first Pacific squadron was transferred from Vice Admiral Besobrasoff to CounterAdmiral Yessen, Chief of the Vladivostok cruisers heretofore.

As regards the situation and conditions of the Russian armies, little can be heard due to the strict censorship; it is to be noted, that during the latter part of November it was emphasized in an official

battle report, that prisoners, having been brought in, were found to have worn woolen underwear and lined coats.

In regard to the Japanese since the battle of Liauyang, where most of the reporters left the armies, in order to telegraph undisturbed, still less reliable news than formerly has reached the outside world. The strength of their eight divisions has apparently again been filled up, after the October battles, with reservists as was the case after the day of Liauyang, in the October battles, they lost according to their own statements about 16,000 men and 14 guns. Besides this, a reinforcement by the last two divisions which remained at home, the 7th and 8th, is presumed; from other sources, however, it is reported, that the former was sent from Dalni to Port Arthur. It seems improbable that independent organizations of the reserve besides the brigades attached to each division -- are already to be found at the front. A large portion of the available organizations will have been utilized as occupation troops in Korea and at Liauyang, which have received their own organization under the Generals of Divisions Hasegawa and Nishi, the instruction of new troops in pursuance to the amended army law, will still require more time, even if the necessary armament and equipment be already in the country. However, Japan, should her present plans in Manchuria, not contrary to expectations, be still offensive, can, confiding into the capacity of the nearly completed continental railroads, afford to wait a few more weeks, in order to replenish first of all the supplies on the theater of operations, and to carry across new troops only shortly before the approach of the second Pacific squadron, which will render the interruption of all lines of communication at least for some time probable. As careful organizers, the Japanese have taken the most unfavorable view of the case, that this interruption might become permanent, and it is said in one report that the continental armies could get along with the supplies now on hand, for five months, without communication with the home country. This, however, would only mean putting off, but not averting the final disaster, whereby political contingencies are, of course, not taken into consideration. For the question is not how long the approaching Russian squadron will be able to interrupt the lines of communication between island and continent, but whether it will be able

to destroy them, or whether the Japanese maritime forces can prevent the opponent from doing it. The decision must be quick and final, as long as both opponents have made up their minds as to purpose and object. This seems to be the case with the Japanese fleet.

#### THE SIEGE OF PORT ARTHUR.

At the beginning of November the censor permitted for the first time detailed news of the reporters, accompanying the besieging army of Port Arthur, to reach the outside world, and the darkness which was enveloping the events taking place at that point since the beginning of August, has begun to disappear as far as it is admitted by the inaccuracy of the topographical names.

At that time the Japanese troops encircled the fortress in a loose cordon, which in the east touched the sea near Lungwangtung, and stretched across the wolf's mountains, conquered on July 30th, towards Louisa-Bay. The left wing, as is still the case at present, was formed by the 11th, the right one by the 1st division, whereas the 9th division occupied the center. The Russians were located at a distance of about 10 to 15 km on the opposite side; with their center already withdrawn to the outer positions of the fortress-cordon proper, they were in the southeast still supported by the outlying hills Takushan and Sakushan, their left wing extended across a mountain chain, having three prominent knolls, the 174-m-hill, the 180-m-hill ("Ishan?") and the 200-m-hill (Etseshan?) and stretching in a northwestern direction towards Louisa Bay, offering still prepared exterior positions to the defense.

The first 12 cm-siege guns arrived from Dalni at the end of July; they were mounted behind the folds of the wolf's mountains and commenced on August 7th to bombard the city and the harbor. The distance amounted still to about 10 km; at any rate, the departure of the fleet on August 10th may be assumed as having been considerably accelerated on account of the bombardment.

In the east, about simultaneously, three batteries of 7.5 cm or 12 cm naval guns, of whose origin nothing certain is known, and four 9 cm howitzer batteries were emplaced, and these in conjunction with the field artillery commenced on the afternoon of August 7th to fire at

the Russian positions of Takushan and Sakushan. The guns of the neighboring forts participated in the artillery duel; but they were unable to prevent the field pieces of the two hills from being silenced towards evening, and that after dark Japanese infantry advanced to the foot of the mountain and there intrenched. On the following day a pouring rain rendered the slopes slippery and the Japanese charging columns were severely handled by the fire from the forts, and partly also from the Russian gunboats, which delivered a fire from the sea at their positions, in spite of their futile attempts. Only on the evening they succeeded, after having bombarded both hills for a while during a furious cannonade, to seize Takushan unawares. In front of Sakushan the charging troops had to remain in their approaches for the following night; but this hill was also taken on the morning of August 9th. Their losses in the entire operation amounted to 1,400 men, about 100 killed were left behind by the expelled garrison. The Russians were no longer able to reconquer the positions by means of a belated sortie. Although the fire from the permanent forts did not permit the victors to remain on the heights proper they were however enabled to push their enclosing cordon to a position directly in rear of the knolls.

In the west two Japanese brigades reached and took during the night of August 13-14, during a strong rain, the northwestern positions of the Russians; during the following night they advanced against the hills, located further in rear, but had to retire after a hard struggle, as they were unable to overcome the wire-obstacles, confronting them under the glare of the searchlight and the concentric fire from the adjacent forts. On one of the succeeding days the Russians appear to have abandoned the exterior positions.

A pause, lasting three days, followed, in the course of which 20 additional siege guns, which had just been received, could be mounted on the western welf's mountains. Into this period falls the previously mentioned call on General Stoessel for capitulation. After he had answered in the negative on August 17th, began on the 19th the preparation for a general assault by the artillery, which commenced on August 20th, and was probably designed so as to deliver a feint against the right flank whereas the main force was thrown against the center, the outerworks of the northern front.

Here on a knoll of the Kikwanshan-ridge, sloping down towards northeast, two earthworks were situated, which are called "Banyusan" by the Japanese; further west, on the slope of the "Erlungshan" was situated the redoubt "Royusan", and 400 m. south of Shuishiyang a similar work, the Lungyen redoubt. The river valley situated between the two was closed by the four corner bastions of an extended trapezium shaped work, in front of which a ditch 7 m. wide was located. (Probably the redoubt of the waterworks, and the Kuropatkin Fort are meant by the two last named redoubts, which we referred to in supplement XII) Southwest of Shyishiyang was to be found the flat chain of hills, which, beginning at the 174 m. hill, extends in front of the fortress cordon, also occupied by the Russians.

Before the onslaught of the western division the Russian left wing withdrew on August 19th to its principal position. The 174-m hill, whose summit carried a provisional earthwork with two 12 cm. five field guns and four machine guns, enclosed by wire entanglements, ditches and sand embankments, was now attacked from two sides, and on the 20th was taken after a furious bombardment. In spite of a continuous artillery fire from the neighboring forts the Russians did not again succeed in expelling the Japanese garrison.

Less fortunately were the attacks against the northeast front executed. However the Japanese succeeded in taking on August 19th, during the first assault the parallels in front of the Royusan redoubt below Erlungshan, and on the 20th the assaulting column in front of Shishiyang penetrated as far as to the earthworks of the closing fort in the valley. However the Japanese were again expelled from these positions and the eastern division only accomplished on the 22nd under heavy sacrifices to take the two Banyusan works, situated in front of the Kikwanshan, without being able to acquire a secure hold on the ridge proper. One battalion followed closely upon the heels of the retreating Russians up to the main fort and entrenched at the foot of the latter; during a sortie executed by a strong Russian force during the night of 23-24 it was again driven

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cut, and, although the attempt of cutting the garrison off from the Banyusan works proved a failure, the Japanese suffered heavy losses.

During the same night the right Japanese wing endeavored in vain to take the 203-m hill from the position recently won; the assault failed also here, because the defenders turned the light from their search-lights in time on the attacking troops, and they were able to deliver at the closest range a fire at the enemy, who, blinded by the light, encountered the wire entanglements.

The Japanese lost in the entire operation 14000 men and in return only gained possession of the strongly exposed 174-m hill, and of the two Banyusan works; these were almost daily bombarded until the 6th of September, and the defense is said to have cost about 100 men per day on account of the continuous attacks of the Russians.

During the succeeding weeks the Japanese consequently avoided a battle at close range, and merely beat off the sorties of the garrison, with the exception of September 3rd, when a brief attempt was made to take the 203 m. hill unawares. Otherwise they utilized this period in increasing the siege artillery by six 15 cm. naval guns, and in filling up their ranks, which had been considerably thinned out; for the army had lost since the capture of Manshan about 20,000 men in battle; in addition thereto beri-beri, the accompanying symptom of the hot season, had taken away about 16,000 and other diseases still 8,000 more men from their available forces. The artillery remained active during the entire period.

On September 19th, a new attack began, which was this time directed against the western portion of the cordon, from Etseshan to the Royusan lunette. On the 20th after a stubborn battle the latter and the earthwork in the valley were taken with the bayonet; the guns (8 field pieces, several machine guns and two small mortars) were disabled in time by the garrison. This meant for the Russians, as already before mentioned, the loss of the waterworks, the pumping station being situated outside of the works. On the same day the Japanese took by assault the 180-meter hill and threw the garrison back on Etseshan; but they did not succeed in taking this work either on this or the following day, notwithstanding repeated costly



assaults, which were simultaneously directed from the north, west, and southwest. The work, a large rectangle with casemates, which presumably were covered by two strong steel plates under a thick earth covering, contained two heavy guns, three field pieces and three machine guns. There being a free field of fire all attacks were beaten off. Consequently the Japanese were unable to hold the abandoned Ishan Fort, but had to content themselves with entrenchments behind the crest.

The Japanese losses from September 19th to 24th amounted to about 3500 men.

Several weeks followed which were set aside for artillery and pioneer work. On October 1st six 28 cm. howitzers, of which four were emplaced on the wolf's mountains and two opposite the western front, entered upon their work. On October 2nd, the former are said to have directed their fire upon the harbor, visible from the wolf's hills, and to have hit the Pabieda.

On October 11th and 12th, the Japanese took two railroad bridges, situated behind one another at the foot of the fortified hills; on October 16th they succeeded in taking by assault from the Banyusan works a third knoll. Hashimakeyama, which is situated still closer to the main forts of Kikwanshan, and in entrenching there.

October 26th opened with a renewed general attack against the northern front, which consisted alternating of artillery bombardments and attempted assaults, and is said to have cost the Japanese up to October 30th 7,000 men. Again a decisive success was not attained; at various points the Japanese reached the glacis, were able to entrench and to sap ahead to the counter scarfs of the fort ditches, but all assaults undertaken from here failed, also several attempts of blowing up with dynamite the protruding caponeers in the ditches proper, were unsuccessful. The Russians, however, were not able to expel them again from their positions close to Erlungshan and Sungshan.

The northern front opposing hard rock to the pioneer work, which was again resumed, the besiegers on or about Nov. 6th, seem to have once more concentrated their forces against the 203 m. hill in the

west (Itaeshau), but also without success this time; the same apparently holds good for an attack against the northeast facing Kikwan forts, in which on November 25th, the Japanese reached one of these work, but were finally beaten off with heavy losses. An exterior position, situated between Kikwan and Banyusan, was taken at the same time by the Japanese, during a sortie it was retaken, however they succeeded in a night operation under General Inouye, in occupying the work anew and for good.

Beginning November 26th, the besieging army repeated its infantry attacks simultaneously from the north and west. On the north side they succeeded in crossing the ditches of the forts, which they had approached closely by sapping; on the west side, however, they expelled on November 30th after severe fighting the garrison of 203 m. hill from its works, and consequently deprived the besieged forces of an important advanced position, which heretofore had kept the enemy on the west side at a considerable distance from the fortress cordon. Whether the Japanese will be able to establish themselves on the summit of the hill, the highest on this side, is still doubtful, for, although the opposite cordon of forts is by 50 m. lower, a number of guns will be able to concentrate its fire upon this one point, and will at least be able to render the mounting of guns very difficult. However the capture means an important step forward, which permits the besiegers now to attack also in the west the fortress cordon proper, and consequently to expose the mental strain under which the small garrison must be prepared for attacks, to a considerably higher test of elasticity. The hill, also offers an opportunity to look into the western portion of the basin of Port Arthur and consequently for directing the fire of the siege guns by lateral observation.

As regards the situation in Port Arthur proper, little reliable news is of course obtainable. The besiegers maintain, that the Russian batteries possessed only little ammunition, and had ceased to fire with fuses; both statements may not be improbable, a last

remainder of ammunition, however, if divided up economically, may last for a long while yet, especially at the present, after the besieged garrison has learned to appreciate by experience the defensive value of its fortifications. Subsistence and water, although not of the best quality appear to be still available for a long time to come. For some time it could not well be assumed, that the ships of the squadron could any more be used for any important operation; it is mentioned in the reports of the besieging army that the bombardment had been directed against the balance of the forces afloat, and that it had destroyed them. During the first week in December the besieging artillery selected once more the fleet very thoroughly as a target, and in official reports the destruction of the several ships one after the other has been quoted. Only the Sevastopol is said to have escaped from this fire, and to be moored at present in the outer roadstead close to the Tiger Peninsula. Of the torpedo boats it is claimed, that they withdrew from the annihilating bombardment to a position behind the hospital ships.

This enormous expenditure of ammunition may well justify the conclusion that the Japanese confidence in the nearby final victory, is not as definite as utterances of the press may have led us to believe. It is a fact that with the exception of the Sevastopol none of the ships has made any attempt to withdraw from the annihilating bombardment, which proves the former supposition, that they were abandoned and dismantled for a long time passed; it may also be assumed that the besiegers knew it. The entire bombardment stands therefore merely for a tranquilizing maneuver, intended for the Japanese public, which wanted to be positive, during the growing unrest caused by the approaching relief squadron, that no more reinforcements from the besieged fortress could be expected for it.

The squadron, as such, therefore seems to have disappeared from the theater of operations for good, without having done justice to the great task, assigned to it in this war. The guns, and crew may however form a valuable addition to the defense of the fortress, and may have been rendering better services for some time past, than

they would have had occasion to perform in their proper profession.

Only torpedo boats have occasionally appeared in front of Fort Arthur. Nine of them made a sortie on October 12, in order to fire at the Japanese left flank, as they had often done before. However they were soon forced back into the harbor by Japanese destroyers; one of them, apparently Hamsame encountered hereby a mine and was obliged to proceed to Dalni for repair.

On November 16th, the Rastovopuy slipped through the blockade and took dispatches to Chefoo. The commander came to an agreement with the Chinese authorities to dismantle his boat; but as soon as two Japanese destroyers appeared in front of the harbor he considered it best to blow the Rastovopuy up and in this manner to avoid any engagement of which he apparently could not promise himself any success.

In the meantime it has become known that the Japanese fleet utilized the period of leisure, which it acquired by its success in August, for the purpose of sending the ships in turn to the home wharfs for overhauling and repair; the outgoing Russian squadron, therefore, will find itself pitched against a crew perfectly seasoned and experienced in naval warfare on ships excellently managed and reliable in all details.

A portion of the fleet, probably the older vessels, continues to perform the guard and blockade duty in front of Port Arthur. During the capture of 203 m. hill gunboats cooperated from Pigeon Bay, one of these the gunboat Saiyen, a large protected vessel, which once was captured from the Chinese encountered on November 30 a mine hereby, and sank. The greater portion of the crew is said to have been saved.

The Japanese ship which on September 18th struck a mine in Pigeon Bay and sank, was the old armored gunboat Heiyen, also formerly belonging to China. Of its crew, consisting of 210 men, only four men were saved, which was ~~due~~ due to the rough sea.

Towards the end of September, the last ship under construction in Japan, the small cruiser "Otowa" a sister ship of the Tsushima, joined the fleet.

#### THE SECOND PACIFIC SQUADRON.

The second Pacific squadron started on its journey from Liban on October 14th, of the forces belonging to it on paper, the cruisers Oleg and Izumud remained behind from the start, also five torpedo boats had to stay because their completion was delayed. The other ships proceeded in groups towards the southern entrance of the Langeland Belt, took on coal at this point, and after a 2 days' stop continued their journey northward through the Baltic whereby two tugs, connected by a chain preceded them for the purpose of clearing away mines. In Aalbek Bay the fleet replenished anew its coal supply and left the Danish waters on October 20th, in order to proceed towards the Channel, separated according to divisions. In the order of march, observed heroby, and also during the journey until Tangu, the four ships of the Borodino-class were formed into a division, the three older battleships (Islyabya, Nayama, Sissol Weliki), and the Admiral Nachimoff, armed with six 20 cm. guns represented the second division. The three small cruisers Almas, Swelana and Yemtshug sailed as a division, also the two large cruisers Dmitu Donskoi and Aurora, and the seven torpedo boats formed two groups, each accompanied by a steamer. These were the Korea with the Bravy, Besupretshuy, also the kitai with the Buing, Bodey, Bistig and Syedowy.

Regarding the events, which transpired during the passage of the squadron through the North Sea, some darkness still prevails; an international commission of professionals, as is known, has been convoked for the purpose of ascertaining the most probable from the multitude of contradicting statements and opinions. According to what has leaked out from Russian statements, it seems to appear, that the several divisions were proceeding with short distances, but independently behind each other, that the group ahead, the Aurora and Dmitu Donskoi, to which the auxiliary vessel Kamshatka was attached for protection, lost its charge during the night of October

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20-21 in a fog or on account of some damage to her engine, and that it left her to herself, also that four torpedo boats, which together with their accompanying steamers and the three small cruisers were supposed to constitute the point, were delayed on account of a mishap or of the uncertainty in the navigation, but at any rate did not keep their proper position. On the evening of the 21st of October towards 6:30, the flagship, which originally with the 1st division, and the accompanying vessel "ANADYE" formed the rear party, received the wireless message from the KAMTSHATKA" then standing aft, that four torpedo boats were discovered steaming ahead of her, and that she had opened fire at them; that two of them had escaped, and two had been destroyed during the attack. The actual basis for this message cannot as yet be clearly seen; a German and a Swedish steamer, which happened to be in close proximity of the KAMTSHATKA at that time, were also involved, but that they should have been the proper target, cannot well be assumed from the result, none of the steamers being hit.

At the same time the squadron-chief learned from this message how and why the auxiliary vessels had remained behind, and is said to have ordered the two large cruisers, then speeding ahead, and with which he was also in wireless communication, to either allow the KAMTSHATKA to come up, or to withdraw from the torpedo boats reported in rear, by increasing the speed.

Counter-Admiral Enguist, who commanded the two cruisers, is said to have decided for the former course.

At 12:30 A. M. the 1st division met a flotilla of fishing steamers from Hull, which lay before the nets under under a S. S. E. wind on an about E. N. E. course, and passed its eastern wing, after the second division had shortly before crossed the flotilla further west, throwing its searchlights on it. Then the flagship of the 1st division, or the accompanying steamer ANADYE observed at port ahead two dark shadows, which seemed to move at high speed, and under the influence of the previous impressions, the observing officers, among whom doubtless the admiral himself must have been, were surely convinced, that these were the two torpedo boats which escaped from the

"Kamtshatka". The fire of the bow-armorment was directed upon them. Now it may also be assumed that at the same moment the crews of the broadside batteries from lack of experience at sea, could not any longer master their excitement, and that they fired on their own authority at the outlines of the fishing steamers, which they believed to be hostile torpedo boats. One of these, the mission ship "Alpha" at once extinguished lights, because she believed to be safe in that manner; a second steamer the "Crane" received a hit, causing a leak, her lights went out, her rudder was damaged and very unfortunately it happened that the steerless vessel, with the course she had taken up during the attempt of escape, hove just on the Russian division. In this manner an explanation may be found, how the commanding officer believed to recognize again these two torpedo boats, which at first disappeared suddenly in the darkness, in two of the boats, which seemed to attack him from the side, and which had remained with lights out concealed among the fishing smacks. The result of the firing, whose duration the Russians give as seven to nine minutes, the fishermen, however, as twenty minutes, was the following; the Crane sank, two men were killed and five wounded more or less seriously on her, and three other fishing smacks, the Aurora was hit by five shots, the priest of the ship being killed. Whether or not the cruiser returned the fire is not known.

The psychological events, which come hereby into question, are based as every naval officer knows upon fallacies in the observation, which so frequently occur, and which only practice and experience at sea will guard against. They would, however, not have led to the disastrous consequences, had not the lack of experience at sea on the several vessels as well as in the fleet as a whole rendered a rigid leadership impossible.

On the following morning, the Aurora and Kamtshatka were still seen in the vicinity of the point of accident, the Kamtshatka even fired one more shot at a nearby fishing steamer. During the 23rd of October the several groups entered the Channel, and whereas the

three first torpedo boats arrived at Cherbourg at 3:00 p. m., the others at 9 p. m., and were coaling there, the remaining vessels continued their journey until the assembly of the squadron in Tangier on November 3rd, to which point a portion of the vessels proceeded directly, whereas the 1st division stopped at Vigo for a sojourn lasting several days, and several small cruisers chose the neighboring bays for the purpose of taking on coal. From Tangier, at the beginning of November, the squadron was divided up, and the formation of subdivisions as heretofore was on this occasion entirely changed. Admiral Roostyestvensky took in person the first, and half of the Second Division (Odyabya and Admiral Nachimow) as well as the two large cruisers around the Cape of Good Hope. He remained with these ships in Dakai from November 12th to 16th and in Libreville (Sabun) from November 28th to December 3rd, in order to coal; his average speed until Dakai, amounted to 9 miles, after that a little over 7 miles, from which might be inferred that the journey was utilized for exercises and maneuvers.

The second admiral, Counter Admiral Foelkersahm, hoisted his flag on board the Sissol Weliki and took this ship, the Nawarin, the three small cruisers and the torpedo boats through the Mediterranean. The vessels having partly coaled in Algiers and partly in Biserta, arrived together on November 9th and 10th in the Suda Bay, remained here eleven days, and proceeded then on to Port Said, which was reached on November 24th. The passage through the canal offered nothing to be commented on; the canal administration, whose position is well defined by the convention of Constantinople and by the Egyptian neutrality rules based thereon, did everything to accomplish its duty smoothly and quickly. The small shipping coming from the opposite direction was suspended for the entire period, the ocean steamers going north were placed into the sidings in time; consequently, the torpedo boats which left Port Said on the morning of November 25th reached Suez as early as 4:30 p. m., which represents a 10 mile speed. The vessels which followed closely in rear, but which probably were



not permitted to exceed the canal speed of 10 kilometers, remained for the night in the Ritter Lakes at anchor, and arrived on the afternoon of November 26th, also at Suez. The two armored ships were towed, which signified a more than usual precaution.

The Egyptian government met the Russian apprehension of hostile movements even still further. Police forces guarded the anchoring places in a wide circle, camel riders as military patrols accompanied the ships on both banks of the canal.

This division left Suez on November 27; it is lying in Djihont since December 2nd. It is supposed to join Admiral Rostjsevsky in Madagascar; as there exists only a distance of 2,000 miles between these points, it will have at its disposal ample time for exercises and maneuvers.

In the meantime, on November 16th, also the third division of the squadron, fitted out in Liban during October, entered upon the journey. It consists of the large cruisers Oleg, the small cruiser Isumrud, the three auxiliary cruisers Tuck, Daipi, (formerly Petersburg) Rion (formerly Smolensk), the five torpedo boats Pronsitelug, Prosevlivy, Resoy, Grosny, and Gronky. The ships, after an eight days' stop off Fakkeberg and Skagen, and after the torpedo boats had coaled in Cherbourg and off the Spanish coast, arrived in Tangier at the beginning of December, and thence continued the journey to Port Said on December 6th. The transport Okean is reported to have joined them in Tangier.

Already the division has sustained damages on several occasions; the Oleg was obliged to remain behind at Skagen half a day for repair; the torpedo boat Pronsitelug (240 tons) had its injured stern repaired in Frederikshavn, the sister torpedo boat Prosevlivy arrived with a hole in the bow, caused by its anchor during a heavy sea, at Brest and underwent repairs for five days. It appears to be following the division all alone. Little has thus far been said about the technical capability of the ships that went ahead; with reference to the arrival of the 1st division in Vigo it was mentioned, that two ships had to undergo repairs, lasting more than 24 hours, and

and the torpedo boat Bravy was dispatched to the Furus from Sunda Bay, for the purpose of having her engine overhauled.

The uncertainty regarding the reception which the second Pacific squadron would find en route with the various countries, whose dominion it had to touch, formed one of the chief difficulties during the preparations for the journey, however in reality thus far the obstacles proved to be smaller than Russia suspected. From the part of England, after the August proclamation of the governor of Malta, it was evident that she would refuse every hospitality to the outgoing ships and it was to be expected that the English press and Japan as one and the same party would proclaim this construction as the only one justified. France, however, remained faithful to her principle, i. e. to restrict ships of belligerents the least possible in their natural rights; Morocco followed her example, and also Egypt, to the astonishment of English hot spurs, who would like to see in it nothing but the British colony, has followed strictly the rules, the adherence to which is prescribed by an international treaty. Less welcomed was the squadron in Spain. Her government did not promulgate any rules of neutrality, it may therefore be supposed, that she will follow the stipulations of former times, in which the French view may be found reflected. The 1st division which entered Vigo, and the cruisers Svetlana and Almaz which stopped at Villagarcia and Marin, were instead refused every permission for a delay of any length of time for repairing and were prohibited to coal, and only after an energetic insistence were the Russians able to obtain 400 tons per ship. The approval for a longer sojourn Spain then promulgated in a manner, so as to show that she was willing to acquiesce in order not to disturb the inquiry of the Hull incident. Another state, upon which the strict attitude of England on the neutrality question is reflected is Denmark. She, at first, in conformity with her neutrality rules, permitted coaling in Denmark waters; in November, however, the cruiser Isunrud who wanted to obtain coal off Frederikshavn, was obliged to go beyond

the three miles limit for the purpose. The firmness of the Portuguese neutrality rules, according to which a short delay and coaling were not prohibited, has not been tested.

The small confidence, which Russia could place in the neutral hospitality, has had the good effect for the preparation for the journey of the squadron, that its entire fleet of auxiliary vessels was increased to such an extent that it was assured to be self sustaining. In addition to the already mentioned two motherships for torpedo boats, the Korea and Kitai, a hospital ship belongs to the squadron, the former steamer Orel of the volunteer fleet, who had been rebuilt in Tonlon on account of a French private firm a repair ship, the Kamshatka, fitted out in Krenstadt for this purpose and who is said to be manned by the best personnel of mechanics of the Petersburg wharfs, forms also a part of the squadron. Besides a foundry, a blacksmith's shop and a number of tool machines the ship is said to be equipped with a sucking box unassembled, and with spare parts, according to the pattern of the ones used by the Port Arthur wharf during the summer for the purpose of working under water on the damaged ships. At that time large boxes were built from balks, which were open above and on one side, and were placed with this side, edges covered with felt in such a manner on the exterior of the ship, that they could be emptied by means of a pump, and would then represent a free working space. The transport Okean is intended for purposes similar to those of the Kamshatka.

A special division of the auxiliary vessels is formed by the supply ships, which, for the greater part, originate from Russian firms, whereas several ones were purchased in foreign markets.

They were obtained as follows, viz:

Kiery	5500 tons gross)	
Veronesh	5600 tons gross)	
Saratoff	5400 tons gross)	
Yaroslaw	4500 tons gross)	from the volunteer fleet
Tamboff	4400 tons gross)	
Kostroma	3500 tons gross)	
Knaes Cortshakoff	3300 tons gross)	
Jupiter	4000 tons gross	from Northern Steamship Company, from the Russian Steamship and Com- mercial Company,
Mercury	4000 tons gross	from the same company,
Anadyr	7100 tons gross	formerly Franche Comte, built by Vickers,
Malago	4800 tons gross	from the Russo East Asiatic Ss. Company,



for Vladivostok or Sasselo, and that for the outgoing fleet, the one was undoubtedly permitted and the government wanted to prohibit the other? Now, the last statement is not entirely correct, for as the example of the above-mentioned 13 steamers shows, the government admits straight freight to neutral ports, also for the outgoing fleet; and only the chartering of vessels for the purpose of following the fleet has been declared as inadmissible.

The Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870 prohibits in detailed stipulations, the belligerents from procuring any vessels from England for the purpose of military or naval service, and a vessel which follows as accompanying ship a squadron, will have to come within the meaning of this act.

At any rate, when compared with the free shipping of all contraband to war ports or blockaded harbors, one misses also here the discrimination of conscience. The logical deduction herefrom, i. e. the knowledge that the Foreign Enlistment Act with its one-sidedly strict clauses is restricting the English shipping trade to an unnecessary degree, one cannot help but suspecting. Partly, the English press would rather see, that also the other states should follow the English interpretation, and would draw the deduction that the entire coal supply for the Russian fleet signify a breach of neutrality.

That Japan would like to adopt such an interpretation in her present situation is only natural; her protests to the English government had the effect, that at the beginning of December the steamer Captain W. Menzell was prohibited from taking on coal in Cardiff above her own needs, because she had shown by her previous journey that she had followed the Russian fleet. The steamer Bengalia, however, who is supposed to carry 12,000 tons of coal to Batavia, has left the harbor unmolested.

#### DETAILS.

In remarkable contrast to this press-campaign stands the unhampered and business-like quietness, with which American firms, according to the news in the daily papers furnish contraband of the

strongest character to both belligerents. Accordingly, the Lake Torpedo boat Company in Bridgeport, Connecticut, and the Five River Ship and Engine Company, Quincy Point, Massachusetts, have, for quite a while, a number of submarines, under construction, of which presumably 30 for Russia, and 50 for Japan; five of the latter, of the new Lake type, are said to have arrived in Yokohama at the end of November, presumably unassembled; Russia has been getting boats of the Protector type before this, two of these are said to have recently been shipped to Vladivostock. As has been shown in supplement XIV, page 187, no objections can be raised against these transactions as far as the law is concerned; the other belligerent holds in his hands protective means against the same, consisting of blockade and capture of prizes. When, and to what extent these boats will furnish a useful weapon in the hand of their receiver, is a question, which cannot be answered at all, as there are hardly any experiences available as regards the practical possibilities of the boat-types.

It is of special interest, that at the beginning of October, some shrewd agents bought for Russia a new turbine-boat of Yarrow under false pretenses, and that they were able, in spite of English vigilance, to take her from the Thames to Liban. The value of the vessel for actual service may be very small, but if the Russians intended to transform it into a torpedoboat, the conclusions should have been near, that a similar maneuver could not be very difficult for the Japanese, an item which may explain the nervousness of the Second Pacific squadron to some degree.

At the beginning of October it was stated of the Vladivostock cruisers, that their repairs had been completed; in November, news which could not exactly be verified, was received, that the Gromoboi had foundered in a trial trip, and that she had been compelled to return to the dock in a serious condition. From the undisturbed communication with the country in rear, and from the similarly smooth communication on the sea, which the loosened Japanese blockade has left to the harbor, it may properly be assumed, that also for very extended repairs material and mechanics are available. The forma-

tion of ice in the harbor begins only at the close of December, and it never becomes so strong as to prevent large ships from going out; the present inactivity of Counter Admiral Yassen may be explained from his intention of preserving the ships, in order to execute a sortie at the opportune moment, and in making a wide detour, to meet the relief squadron.

As to the method, with which the Japanese fleet intends to solve its well defined problem to catch the approaching enemy and to beat him, nothing penetrates to the outside. The nucleus of the fleet has regained by a period of recreation and repair in the wharfs the height of the physical and technical preparedness, which will warrant the fullest employment of its war experiences. Admiral Umi is said to have proceeded south with a small force. This may signify a far advanced torpedo operation for which the Pescadores would first of all be selected as a waiting station. However, the date of departure would seem to have been selected ~~unwisely~~ early; and from what has become known as regards Admiral Togo's intentions thus far, it is probable, that he will endeavor to keep all his forces united, in order to force the issue by one blow. To compare the strength of the two fleets according to the tables, and to connect therewith discussions of their probable prospects, is useless. If the means in material are not altogether too different, and this is apparently not the case, then the spirit will decide, which gives life to the dead mass. Where the clear will, and the better action is to be found, to that side will victory turn also in the approaching encounter.

Finis.