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CONTENTS

The Object of Aesthetics . . . . . . *Felix M. Gatz* 3

Why Exhibit Works of Art? . . *Ananda K. Coomaraswamy* 27

The History of Art of the Future . . . . *Leo Balet* 42

Aesthetics of Stage and Screen . . . *Renato Poggioli* 63

The Logical Value of the Objects of Art . *James Feibleman* 70

A Note on the Nature of Tone . . . *Arthur V. Berger* 86

The Commonplaces of Visual Aesthetics
Richard Foster Howard 91

Prolegomena of Monistic Aesthetics . . . *Ernst Harms* 95

Style . . . . *Gustav E. Mueller* 104

Book Reviews 122

Notes and News 138

Bibliography of Aesthetic Theory, Criticism and Psychology of Art . . . . *Dr. E. N. Barnhart* 149

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The Object of Aesthetics

BY

FELIX M. GATZ

THE task of Aesthetics is to determine whether its object, the aesthetic, is relative, like, or homogeneous to that which is called reality and life, or if the aesthetic belongs to that sphere only in the manner of an isolated "island" in the sea of reality, an island realm having a structure of its own. What is the aesthetic? It is beauty, or art, or beauty and art? This problem constitutes the proper subject of this article. Since the problem cannot be solved without first determining the very essence and structure of beauty and art, the article naturally falls into two parts: I. The Essence of Beauty and Art, II. The Place of beauty and Art in Aesthetics.

PART I

THE ESSENCE OF BEAUTY AND ART

Any inquiry aiming to determine what beauty and art are must of necessity be a two divisional one. Firstly, we must learn what the *quidditas* of beauty and art is, what sphere we allude to by these terms. Secondly, we must learn what their *qualitas*, their requisite property is.

It may be maintained that the inquiry should be confined to the qualitas problem, that an investigation of the quidditas is superfluous since every one knows what beauty and art are. Were the remark made with regard to art alone, it would not be quite incorrect; for one can, indeed, put a finger on that which we call art. Without a doubt poetry, pictures, sculpture, architecture, and music come under the heading of art. This being established, the necessity of further inquiry is limited to art's qualitas prob-

lem, to the specific artistic qualities of this phenomenon. But the inquiry into beauty must deal with its quidittas too; for here there is no established exactitude as to what we refer to, or should refer to, when we speak of "beauty". Here the very sense of the word is something in the nature of a riddle. The mere definition of the phenomenon beauty, quite apart from the determination of its basic qualities, is a difficult problem which has no analogon in the investigation of the phenomenon art.

BEAUTY

To begin with, there are three different meanings of the word beauty the first two of which are frequently confounded. They are:

1). Beauty in contrast to truth, goodness, reality, etc., i.e. to non-beauty
2). Beauty in contrast to ugliness, i.e. to the unbeautiful or negative beauty
3). Beauty in contrast to the graceful, sublime, tragic, comic, etc. (Beauty in this sense, often called "classic beauty", has been grouped together with the graceful, sublime, etc. as an aesthetic modification or concretization.)

Although a sharp distinction must be made between beauty in the first and in the second sense, it cannot be denied that there is a certain connection between them. Beauty 1 (as we shall refer to it from now on) exists in various degrees and intensities. In other words, beauty can be that which it is, and which distinguishes it from non-beauty, in a high degree as well as in a degree so low as to approach the zero. It has, then, a degree-potentiality similar to that attributed by many metaphysicists to reality, being, and life. ("Omnia animata quamvis diversis gradibus.") In the case of beauty 2, this degree-potentiality becomes an active agent discriminating between beauty and ugliness. Beauty 2 is high degree beauty 1; it is the "very" beautiful in the sense of beauty 1. Uglinesss is low degree beauty 2, and therefore also low degree beauty 1. Beauty 2 and its counterpart ugliness are both, then, within the scope of beauty 1. — Beauty 3 is of lesser importance and will not be treated here.

Two groups of theories on the quidditas and qualitas of beauty 1 have appeared in the course of the historic development of Aesthetics. The first group maintains:

1). The quidditas of beauty is either both sensual and spiritual or purely spiritual.

2). The qualitas of beauty is its identity with non-beauty.

Plato in "Phaedrus" and Schelling in "Philosophy of Art" maintain for beauty a threefold identity: Beauty=truth=the good=the absolute. Plotin, and Schelling in "Bruno", advance a theory of twofold identity: Beauty=the good=the absolute. Schelling occasionally also sets forth the idea of the identity of beauty with the absolute alone. These thinkers viewed beauty and that with which they identified it as meta-physical. Theories identifying beauty with non-beauty are, however, not confined to speculative philosophy. In some parts of "Kalligone", Herder indentifies beauty with the agreeable, the true, and the good in an unmetaphysical sense. Schiller's concept of beauty as "living form", laid down in "Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man", also belongs to this type. Later it will be seen that Plato, Herder, Schiller, and Schelling also had concepts of beauty in which it is not identified with anything else.

There is a peculiar tendency inherent in the idea of the identity of different phenomena. In the beginning, concepts like "truth" and the "good" had certain definite boundaries. Truth, perhaps, was taken as a quality of statements on reality; good was considered a quality of behavior. So limited, truth and the good appear to be quite distinct and are easily understood and grasped. Since the earliest times, however, such clear and rational distinctions have conflicted with man's mystic intuition that all existing phenomena are somehow connected with each other. This feeling of the being-togetherness of all things is undeniably one of the profoundest experiences of the pantheistic as well as of the theistic mind. But when, in the search for this connection, one arrives at the idea that ultimately all things are *identical*, more is lost than was ever gained. Through the declaration of their identity, phenomena formerly believed to be different lose their individuality, and the mere words lose all their comprehensible meaning. — This is also true of beauty. If beauty is identified with truth, the good, or the absolute, or with all of them together, the meaning of beauty becomes absolutely unclear. Therein lies the failure of the above mentioned systems of philosophy. Because they identify beauty

with non-beauty, they are ineffectual in the quest for a useful, unambiguous solution to the problem.

The second group of theories on the quidditas and qualitas of beauty maintains:

1). The quidditas of beauty is sensual, sensually perceivable, sensual appearance.
2). The qualitas of beauty is either "heteronomous" or "autonomous".

The idea that the quidditas of beauty is sensual is so clear as to need no explanation. But this group's theories on the qualitas of beauty, being divided into two opposite factions, require special attention. The first faction by no means maintains that beauty is identical with anything that is not beauty, but merely maintains that beauty is the sensual appearance of something which is not directly perceivable itself. Here beauty is conceived as a symbol; the symbolized is not beauty; beauty is merely the indication of something else, something foreign, which is its true seed and meaning. It is from this other beauty-foreign element that beauty receives its substance, law, and order. The second faction holds that beauty is bound to the sensual alone, that it is pure sensual appearance, an appearance without an appearer, an appearance of itself. So conceived, beauty is not a symbol, expression, sign, or symptom of anything that is not basically beauty itself. It receives no law from outside, and therefore can be understood only through itself — not through reduction to any foreign phenomenon. It is quasi a substance which in se est et per se concipitur.

A phenomenon which receives its laws from something foreign to it, is *heteronomous*. That which stands under its own law, which is self-governed, is *autonomous*. Thus, all symbols can be called heteronomous; for their very meaning lies, not in themselves, but in that to which they point, i.e. in the symbolized. Phenomena not dependent upon others for their essence, existence, or meaning, phenomena which symbolize nothing and are understandable only through themselves, can be called autonomous.

An attempt to apply the alternative heteronomy-autonomy to the qualitas of beauty as conceived by the first group merely serves to emphasize the inefficacy of that group's theory; for the concept of beauty as identified with non-beauty is so indistinct that it cannot be classified under either member of the alter-

native. This group's beauty concept is neither entirely heteronomous nor truly autonomous. Its failure to clearly and acceptably determine what beauty is, however, can be explained: The conception of beauty as spiritual, while not untenable in itself, not dependent upon others for their essence, existence, or meaning, leads with psychological necessity to a qualitas solution identifying beauty with other spiritual phenomena as, for instance, truth, the good, or the absolute. Since such a qualitas solution, as previously shown, is untenable in itself, this group cannot be expected to arrive at a logically satisfying determination of beauty. Consequently, the ideas of these thinkers are interesting only from the historical and not from the systematic viewpoint.

The alternative heteronomy-autonomy is easily applied to the qualitas solutions of the second group: The first faction's solution is heteronomous, that of the second faction is autonomous.* There are, indeed, no principle objections to the theories of this group. The idea maintained on the quidditas is consistent and logically acceptable. So are both factions' ideas on the qualitas of beauty. Formal consistence, however, is no proof of correctness. One must still ask which of the two qualitas concepts is right—the heteronomous or the autonomous one. Let us then leave the history of beauty concepts and proceed on the basis of the second group's quidditas-idea toward a systematic investigation of the qualitas of beauty.

The phenomenon which heteronomy aestheticians describe, i.e. the sensually preceivable as referable to something behind or beyond its surface, does, without doubt, exist. The existence of that phenomenon which autonomy aestheticans speak of, i.e. autonomy of the sensually perceivable, is also unquestionable. The only question is which of the two phenomena is really BEAUTY? Nominalists maintain that word meanings are always arbitrary, and that there is no such thing as a "right" word. If such a stand were taken, there would be nothing to prevent us from call-

Note:Heteronomy concepts of beauty are to be found in Plato (Phaedrus), Herder, Schelling, Baumgarten, A. W. Schlegel, and Hegel. Autonomy concepts of beauty are to be found in Plato (Philebus), Aristotle, Hutcheson, Home, Winckelmann, Lessing, Kant, Schiller, Herbart, and Zimmerman.

ing the phenomenon in question "electricity" or "biochemistry" — which would be not only wrong but absolutely ridiculous. The question of correctness in using the word BEAUTY for sensual appearance as the manifestation of something other than itself, or for appearance as appearance, is not merely one of terminological irrelevancy. It is a problem of objective validity and importance.

One might escape making a decision by simply declaring — as Hutcheson, Home, and Kant did — that there are two "kinds" of beauty, a heteronomous and an autonomous kind. Such an escape has the exterior semblance of a solution. But it belongs to the popular "as well as" or "truth lies in the middle" type, and is in this case not a solution at all. The heteronomous and the autonomous concepts of beauty are so very different that they cannot be two "kinds" of the same phenomenon. They have nothing in common but the term beauty. He who believes beauty to be the right name for that which heteronomy aestheticians refer to has no right to simply consider that which autonomy aestheticians refer to another kind of beauty. Likewise, one who believes beauty is autonomous has no right to apply the term beauty to that which heteronomy aestheticians refer to. He who speaks of two "kinds" of beauty—heteronomous and autonomous beauty — is not less guilty of ambiguity than he who speaks of two kinds of triangles, three cornered and round ones. Such a maintainance as the latter would call forth a unanimous protest, "Why not call the round ones 'circles' or give them some other name of their own?" — Heteronomus "beauty" and autonomous "beauty" should have names of their own too, for they are not two kinds of the same phenomenon.

Beauty is either heteronomous *or* autonomous. This, however, is but a formalistic or negative solution to the problem. Its value consists only in its indicating that there is but one kind of beauty, that beauty is not both heteronomous *and* autonomous. Such a solution makes only a scratch on the surface of the problem. Yet, astounding as it is, such thinkers as Hutcheson, Home, and Kant were content with that surface decision; and many others have let it pass without protest.

Is beauty heteronomous or autonomous? It seems as if no more than an arbitrary answer can be given; as if one can with the same

right fix the term beauty on either the heteronomous or autonomous phenomenon. Ignorabimus? Is this to be the last word on a problem which has been the object of so many great thinkers' absorption? Shall we give way to those who maintain that there is no such thing as a "right" name for a thing?

Knew we nothing more of beauty than that it is sensual appearance, perceivable by the senses, there would, indeed, be no argument for or against reserving the term for either one of the two opposite concepts. But there is an assumption, quite concrete in nature, which we may and should use in making a decision on the heteronomy or autonomy of beauty: It is the assumption of a connection between beauty and *art.* — The very nature of that connection is for the moment unimportant. But if there is a connection, if beauty does have something to do with art, we have a starting point for an attack on and a solution of the beauty problem; for art is a far more concrete phenomenon than beauty— especially so long as we know nothing of beauty except that it is sensual appearance.

If beauty and art are related, the solution of the beauty problem is bound up with the problem of the essence of art. Thus, art shall dictate the decision on the essence, structure, and character of beauty. Therein lies our hope for determining the correct meaning and use of the term beauty. Thus Aesthetics of Beauty leads to Aesthetics of Art.

ART

The concepts heteronomy and autonomy are also applicable to art. Their relation to art — the very essence of which they characterize — may be elucidated through the concepts *content* (subject-matter) and *form.*

In referring to reality, one speaks of things or objects along with their relations to each other, and of happenings and actions. All these we may call "objects" of reality, or reality-objects, using the word object in its widest sense.

Such objects do not exist in reality only; we can see, taste, smell, and think them. When we do so, they become the "content" of sensual perception or thought. Objects and contents are, therefore, coordinates. Taken as they exist in their own way they are "objects"; taken as they exist in the mind, they are "content". The extent to which objects are modified in becoming con-

tent of the mind is an epistemological problem we need not touch upon here.

Objects of reality can not only become the content of the mind. Through man's activity they can in turn be projected back into the sphere of extra-mental reality. What we see we can put down on a plane by drawing or painting, and the sculptor can even reproduce it in a three-dimensional way. In a truly miraculous manner we are able to transfer objects into the language of words. Objects of reality can, then, be the content of language, the verbal arts, painting, graphic, and sculpture. In contrast to the latter three, language is not confined in the matter of content to visible objects.

The content of a landscape painting is a landscape, of a portrait a face or figure, of a lyric poem a feeling, and of a drama or novel an action. In every instance the content of the artwork is something that it shares or has in common with reality. This is principally true if the content is but a fictitious or imagined one. The content, being not specifically artistic, may be called "extra-artistic". It is readily apparent in some branches of art. Many aestheticians are of the opinion that all branches of art have, or at least should have, such content. When they fail to find such content — as in the case of abstract painting and sculpture, architecture, and music — they consciously or unconsciously construct one, lending it to the artwork by means of what is called Einfuehlung (empathy).

The content of artworks must be distinguished from the form. The manner in which the artist treats the content, the intervention of his artistry in adding to or substracting from the original reality-content, the changes and transformations made necessary by the idiom and limitations of the art-material, the compositional qualities the artist gives the content — all these modifications ranging from intended imitation to conscious deviation constitute the "form" of the artwork.

Art is heteronomous if it signifies or stands for something else through which alone it can be understood. Here heteronomy means foreign-significance. The foreign-significance of art is vested in the content which signifies or means objects of reality. It is, then, the content of art which is heteronomous. Art is autonomous if it neither points to, stands for, nor signifies anything but itself. Autonomy here means self-significance. Since

the two elements of art are content and form, and since the content is undeniably heteronomous, autonomy can only be a quality of the form.

Is there in art such a thing as autonomous form? In the verbal arts form consists of words; in painting of planes, lines, and colors; and in sculpture of curved planes. These elements can definitely be significant in themselves. Words and groups of words do, indeed, function as a mere conveyer of reality-content in life and science; but in verbal art they have rhythmic and sound patterns, quite apart from their foreign-significance, which have a meaning of their own and are self-significant. Colors, lines, and planes (flat and curved) are in reality merely the surface of objects, not the very objects; for this reason we look upon them as signs of the objects. But in art, they also have — apart from their foreign-significance — a pattern character which is self-significant. Thus, autonomous, self-significant form occurs in spite of heteronomous content.

There are branches of art — abstract painting and sculpture, architecture, and music — which neither have nor are capable of having extra-artistic content. That which has already been said about the autonomous form of painting and sculpture is equally valid for the form of abstract painting and sculpture. Architecture has no extra-artistic content; but it serves an extra-artistic purpose which the layman, unfortunately, often mistakes for content. Architecture's form consists of visually self-significant planes and volumes. Music, too, is void of extra-artistic content; its form consists of rhythms and tones that have self-significance. While rhythm occurs in other arts and even in life, measurable tones — based upon a set scale — occur only in music. Consequently, for the tone element in music, self-significance is not merely something possessed in addition to foreign-significance; it is the only quality of musical tone. Although music has no extra-artistic content, it does have analogy to content and to reality. Exactly speaking, it does not HAVE analogy, for analogy is not a genuine quality. Music merely tolerates contemplation under the viewpoint of analogy to other phenomena. Just as laymen confuse content with purpose in architecture, they confuse content with analogy in music.

It is most astonishing that branches of art which have heterono-

mous content can and do have autonomous form also. One might readily think that the existence of heteronomous content would exclude the presence of autonomous form in the artwork. It is, therefore, understandable that autonomous form is more easily recognized and grasped in those branches of art which have no extra-artistic, heteronomous content. The difficulty of discerning autonomus form in the presence of heteronomous content explains the fact that in the history of Aesthetics autonomous form was earlier recognized in content-free than in content-loaded branches of art.

Branches of art which have heteronomous content in addition to their autonomous form I call *partially* autonomous. Those which are free of content I call *totally* autonomous. Verbal arts, representational painting and sculpture, dance (sculpture in motion), and vocal music (music combined with words), are partially autonomous. Abstract painting and sculpture, artchitecture, and instrumental music are totally autonomous. The application of the term "Total" Autonomy to branches of art which are content-free is in no way problematic. But one might ask if those branches having autonomous form and heteronomous content, which I have called partially autonomous, might not with equal right be called partially heteronomous. My reason for using the term autonomous is based upon a specific idea: The momentum of autonomy is *essential* to art; it is what makes art *art.* — So viewed, the term autonomy, as applied to art, assumes a further meaning. It indicates not only that art has an autonomous factor; it further implies that autonomy is the very *essence* of art, is that which constitutes the very concept of art. If this be true, it is justifiable to call the art branches in question partially autonomous rather than partially heteronomous.

He who disputes the autonomy of art in this enlarged sense denies either the existence of autonomous form or its essentiality to art. He who denies its existence has simply failed to grasp the fact that words, colors, planes, and tones have — or at least can have — a self-significant character of their own. That they have such character need no more be proven than that lines, colors, and tones exist — nor can it. A blind or deaf person who cannot perceive colors or tones must either deny their existence or simply take on faith the statements of those who can see and hear.

He who is incapable of experiencing the self-significance of art phenomena is simply lacking in an "organ" possessed by artists and the art initiated. The existence of self-significant form is a fact about which we need not argue. We can only pity one who is unable to experience it.

The situation is quite different with one who recognizes the existence of autonomous form, but holds the heteronomous content to be more than, or just as, essential as the form. To him it must be proven that heteronomous content is really inessential to those branches of art which have it, and that the absence of heteronomous content in totally autonomous art branches does not exclude them from the realm of art. In substantiation of this contention the following thoughts are presented:

The essence of a thing is that which distinguishes it from other things, that which makes it individual, incomparable, unique. Man is not woman, child an adult, nor nature art. That is fact. It would be perverse to make an ideal or imperative of the contrary and to demand that man be feminine, woman masculine, child adult, nature art, and art nature. Just in their differences do phenomena serve a purpose, do they realize something without which the world would be a poorer, less colorful one. In other words, of two things fundamentally alike one, in the higher sense, is superfluous. An outgrowth of this belief is the medieval assumption that angels, in order to be perfect, must be and are different from each other because the creator, God, scorns mere repetition as superfluous and therefore undignified.

There are those who will say that it may be so with the angels, but that in earthly reality there are things the essence of which is not individual. Perhaps—if this pertains to phenomena which have been brought into existence without any activity on our part and which we cannot change. For such phenomena we need feel no responsibility. Art, however, is not one of these. Art is man's work, man's achievement, man's creation. It is for us to decide what she is and how she should be interpreted. She is our responsibility, dependent upon our will. She is what we want her to be! Therefore, it is up to us to make art something which is not in a higher sense superfluous and without sufficient raison d'être.

"Art is what we want her to be." That might be contested by some, but no one can doubt that at least the *idea* of art is what

we want it to be. Were we to pronounce content the very essence of those artworks in which it exists, we would be reducing art to a mere repition or duplication of reality, to something superfluous. Art has a truly profound and untransferable function only if she adds something new and unique to existing reality. Since content is a copy of reality — not a new phenomenon in reality, art's only hope of adding something new to the sphere of reality lies in its autonomous form. Therefore, we cannot seriously desire to declare content the very essence of art and form but the expression or clarification of the content. On the contrary, there is every reason to dẹclare autonomous form the very essence of art — also of those branches which have heteronomous content.

Only the analysis of concrete art as produced in the history of civilization can show whether it is really within man's power to create out of artmaterial works which have autonomous form. My previous analysis of the self-significance of words, colors, lines, planes, and tones has shown that man can do so. In art, the content — no matter how interesting and significant in itself — is always eclipsed by autonomous form. When the content of an artwork is subtracted, there remains an infinity, a world apart, a new world of its own which is a sphere of self-significant form.

There is a religious objection to the ideal of art's autonomy to be met with. If content is that which binds art and reality, and if reality is the work of God, how can it be inadmissable to duplicate and accentuate the God-created world by producing and interpreting art as a content-oriented? How can the artist and the contemplator of art be wrong in concentrating on reality-content, the counterpart of God's reality? Is such concentration not a form of worship? It is not — for the simple reason that God is a creator, not a copyist. Man should not make or concentrate on images of reality, but should rather aspire to emulate God by creating new forms of realities. This would be a higher form of worship.

Many wish to leave the concept of God out of the investigation of art and prefer to orient it around nature. If we do so, we must at least distinguish between natura naturata and natura naturans. A concept which holds art to be something other than a superfluous repitition of extra-artistic phenomena existing in the sphere of natura naturata, can be formed only under the guidance of the

idea of natura naturans, nature as creator. The latter alone can be the model or archetype for creating and interpreting art adequately. But to apply the idea of natura naturans to art is merely to demand that art be creative (i.e. that it have autonomous form), and that the content be considered inessential.

The question arises as to whether content is not inevitably of primary importance in those verbal products, pictures, and sculptures which have no autonomous form. The question rightly implies that the form of such products is not per se self-significant. Their form can be, but is not necessarily, autonomous. The form is heteronomous if the artist uses words, colors, lines, and planes as they exist and are interpreted in reality and life. Here words are only conveyors of heteronomous meaning, signs for ideas; and colors, lines and planes are but the surface of objects interpreted as mere signs of what is behind the surface. If the artist uses only this side of words, colors, etc. — neglecting as far as possible the self-significant quality which is principally theirs — the result will be form which, though by no means identical with content, is heteronomous. In such products content is indeed all important. But they are not *Artworks*, not even inferior *Artworks;* they are outside the proper sphere of art. Innumerable poems, dramas, novels, pictures, and sculptures are not artworks. This thesis may seem radical, revolutionary, and paradoxical to the layman; but it is not so to the aesthetician with true understanding of art. It will be greeted by artists with enhusiasm. And be it emphasized here that it does not spring from the principles of modernistic art, for it is valid from any truly artistic viewpoint that the number of artworks — not only of masterworks but of all works which have place in the realm of art — is depressingly smaller than the uninitiated imagine.

Reality-content is something which art has in common not only with reality but also with science. The latter's aim is knowledge of reality. Objects of reality and their relations are thus the content of science. This does not imply that science and reality are structurally identical. Science retains a structure of its own; for in order to make reality its content, science transforms it into a system of concepts and conceptual relations which are quite different from the image of an object reflected by a mirror. As compared to reality,

our systems of concepts are not of "real" but only of "formalistic" significance*. Therein lies the first difference between science and reality. The second is that reality is "real" while science is truth *on* the real, which makes science a phenomenon of totally different character. But in spite of their structural differences, science is and must be referred to reality; reality-content is essential to science.

If reality-content were essential to art, art would be a duplicate of science as well as of reality. There is no doubt that many so-called artworks are just that. Historical and psychological novels, for instance, usually stand hard by the boundaries of historiography and applied psychology. But, as it has been said before, such products are not artworks. Artworks are certainly not qualified to compete with science in the treatment of reality-content; for art, even pseudo-art, is always far inferior to science in this respect. Art is also far inferior to reality, for content — as it exists in art — is always much less brilliant and savory than the original reality-object. Thus, art, were reality-content its essence, would be doubly superfluous — firstly with reference to reality, secondly with reference to science. But art itself is not superfluous or senseless — not even when possessing reality-content. The senselessness lies in that false concept which regards content as essential to art.

Art is always autonomous by virtue of the autonomous form which is its very essence! This thesis is not only valid for totally autonomous artbranches which have no heteronomous content at all. It is equally valid for partially autonomous art-branches which have a reality content; for content exists, so to speak, outside the sphere of the artwork qua artwork. It may be compared to the title of a picture or a musical composition in that a title, like content, is not an integral part of the picture or composition as such. If that thought is taken seriously, the last vestiges of doubt that the term "partially autonomus" is more correct and appropriate than "partially heteronomous" will disappear; more than that, one may go further and contend that the term "partially autonomous" is not even autonomistic enough. Nevertheless, I think the term "par-

*NOTE: This is not too depressing for, as William James put it, so long as our idea of stairs coincides with the real stairs closely enough to prevent us from falling down, we can be satisfied.

tially autonomous" correct in that it properly indicates the difference between artbranches which have a heteronomous content (although the content is not an element of the artwork qua artwork) and artbranches which have no content at all. There is no need to deal with artworks which have no autonomous form; there are no such works of "art".

And now, having determined that art is autonomous, let us return to the investigation of beauty from whence we came.

BEAUTY, ART, NATURE.

We have said that there is a connection between beauty and art. The decision concerning the heteronomy or autonomy of beauty is, therefore, inevitably affected by the decision on the heteronomy or autonomy of art.

Although we have established the fact that art is autonomous, it is well to consider the consequences which would result if art were heteronomous. First of all, if art were heteronomous, beauty would be too. Accordingly, the term beauty would be rightly applicable to the sensually perceivable as an appearance or indication of something else.

It is rather unlikely to conceive of beauty being autonomous if art is conceived as heteronomous. Such a combination would not be impossible, but to accept it we would have to discard all idea of that vital connection between beauty and art which offers our only hope for a solution to the qualitas problem of beauty. At any rate, an autonomous concept of beauty could never proceed out of a heteronomous concept of art.

What, it may be asked, would our conclusion about beauty be if art were both heteronomous and autonomous? What if there were heteronomous and autonomous works within the same branch? The concept of art which gives rise to such questions is indeed wide-spread. It is a wrong one. Since heteronomy and autonomy exclude each other, they cannot be qualities of one and the same phenomenon. Therefore, heteronomous and autonomous phenomena cannot be considered two kinds of one and the same phenomenon "art". It is as inconsistent to speak of heteronomous and autonomous art as two "kinds" of art as it is to speak of heteronomous and autonomous beauty as two "kinds" of beauty. If one declares art autonomous, heteronomous works are no longer art; they have

nothing in common with art but material. If one declares art heteronomous, autonomous works are no longer art. Thus, de facto heteronomy aestheticians look upon autonomous works as being "empty decoration" rather than art — which is quite consistent from their standpoint. Similarly, autonomy aestheticians regard entirely heteronomous works as pseudo-art only. The latter are not only consistent but are also right, for their's is the right concept of art. But regardless of aesthetical creed, the fact remains that heteronomous and autonomous works cannot belong to one and the same branch of "art".

One is equally unjustified in speaking of heteronomous and autonomous branches of art. Many have done so, proclaiming poetry, painting, and sculpture heteronomous, music and architecture autonomous. If this classification were right, those who consider art essentially heteronomous would have to eliminate music and architecture from the proper realm of art. Those who consider art essentially autonomous would likewise have to condemn all poetry, painting, and sculpture to the realm of non-art — even the works of Shakespeare and Baudelaire, El Greco and Cézanne, Praxiteles and Maillol. The above classification is erroneous; for poetry, painting, and sculpture are by no means entirely heteronomous. The heteronomy of many poems, pictures, and sculptures does not speak for the heteronomy of the verbal and visual arts as such; it merely excludes such heteronomous products from these branches as branches of *art*. Any and all branches of art are autonomous. If there were heteronomous and autonomous branches, as above assumed, one or the other of them would be outside the scope of art. This principle should be acknowledged by everyone no matter which quality is considered essential to art.

Within the concept or territory of art, one can and must make far-reaching distinctions as, for instance, Apollinic-Dionysic, Classic-Romantic, Classic-Baroque, Multiple Unity in the Variety-Intense Unity in the Variety. More important, perhaps, is the evaluating distinction Perfect-Less Perfect. These distinctions, however, must by no means be considered as being on the same level with heteronomy-autonomy. They are mere subdistinctions which can be made within the frame of either heteronomy or autonomy of art, and are valid in both instances. —

We have decided that art is autonomous. Beauty, being bound by connection to have like character, is therefore also autonomous. Thus, through this inquiry into art we have reached a solution to the problem of beauty: The quidditas of beauty is sensual appearance; its qualitas is autonomy. It is a conclusion for which we are indebted to Art Aesthetics.—

It has frequently been stated in the course of this investigation that art is autonomous sensual appearance. The point has now been reached where that characterization must be supplemented by the statement that the autonomy of sensual appearance which is art has been created by the human mind with or out of some particular material — taken from nature — which has assumed different character than it had originally. Herein lies the difference between art and beauty. Beauty as autonomous sensual appearance is, so to speak, art that has not yet been affected by the creative energy of man. Beauty, therefore, is only art-*likeness*, art-*nearness*, art-*analogy*. It is *artliness* — if a term may be coined. Thus, the concept of beauty is contained in the concept of art. This is the relation between beauty and art.

The concepts of beauty and art presented here are a complete refutation of the popular maintenance that beauty is the content, object, or purpose of art. These popular beliefs do not always owe their incorrectness to a heteronomous conception of beauty and art. They may even imply an autonomous idea of beauty and art. They are nevertheless wrong, for beauty is only art-likeness; and it is a mistake to make mere art-*likeness* the center of art itself by declaring it the content, object, or purpose of art.

All of the ideas just presented pertain to beauty 1, to beauty in contrast to non-beauty. Out of it grow the concepts of beauty 2 and of ugliness. — —

In order to characterize beauty 2 and its counterpart ugliness one must again refer to art. This time, however, the reference will be different from that used in determining beauty 1. There we looked to art in order to *find* the concept of beauty. Now we shall refer to art only in order to *illustrate* the concepts of beauty and ugliness.

I have said that one must add to the characterization of art as autonomy of sensual appearance that its autonomy is man-

created. But not even the combined statements suffice to characterize all art completely; for the essence of perfect art cannot be expounded through the concept of autonomy alone. That which is self-significant has no symbolic relatedness to other phenomena, but it has a coherence of its own. Such coherence, however, need not necessarily be a significant, intense one in which all parts or elements are organically related to each other. Organic coherence is traditionally called *wholeness* or *totality;* it is *self-sufficiency.* Although autonomy = self-significance and self-sufficiency are by no means identical, artworks can have both. When applied to artworks, the idea of totality has also been expressed by the term *unity in the variety.* Self-sufficiency in the sense of totality or unity in the variety is that quality which distinguishes those artworks we call masterpieces.

In as much as a poem, picture or sonata has autonomous form — i.e. presents words, lines, planes, colors, rhythms, and tones as self-significant phenomena — they are artworks. As we know, only a small number of the existing poems and pictures fulfill this requirement. In the majority of them, words, lines, etc. are not used or presented as self-significant; they are presented rather as mere means for describing objects or reproducing reality-content. But when so used, they belong to the domain of reportage or illustration. They stand outside the realm of art, between art and instruction, and closer to the latter. In the field of music, the percentage of products belonging to art is greater than in the field of verbal works and pictures. This is due to the fact that tones, having little or no reality describing ability, can scarcely be applied in any but a self-significant manner. The distinction and difference between the few masterworks of art and those products which, due to their autonomous form, are included in the realm of art, lies in the degree of unity presented in self-significant variety. It is this unity we refer to in speaking of an artwork's "significance." Such significance is "self-significant". It does not exceed the bounds of autonomy but grows on the soil of autonomy as its ripest fruit. It is that in which art culminates and comes to its completion and perfection. In other words, autonomy perfects and completes itself in the intense unity of abundant self-significant variety, in self-sufficiency = totality. Totality fulfills the promise of autonomy.

If beauty 1 is characterized as art-likeness, beauty 2 and ugliness must also be characterized in terms of art. It has been shown that there are two types of artworks—significant and less significant. The first have significant self-significance, the latter insignificant self-significance; the first have autonomy plus self-suffciency, the latter only autonomy.

In as much as beauty 2 is high degree beauty 1, it is art-likeness which has intense unity in the variety; it is likeness to perfect art. Ugliness, being beauty 2 of low degree, is art-likeness having little or no unity in the variety; it is likeness to imperfect art, i.e. to art which has autonomy but lacks totality.

The characterization of beauty 2 as sensually perceivable unity in the variety affords an opportunity to mention here that widespread concept of beauty as rooted in pleasure which is the mainspring of Kant's aesthetics and the tenet of the layman.

Kant's main concept of beauty is obviously autonomous. The popular concept expressed in the phrase, "a thing is beautiful if it pleases", permits two pairs of interpretations. One revolves around the alternative heteronomy-autonomy. In the autonomy aesthetical version, the pleasure evoked is held to be disinterested and contemplative in character. This is also Kant's contention. In the heteronomy aesthetical version, the pleasure involved is thought to be emotional and voluntaristic. — The other pair of interpretations revolve around the alternative relativism-normativism. From the relativistic standpoint, pleasure is the *cause* and substance of beauty; a thing is beautiful because it pleases. From the normatistic standpoint, pleasure is merely the *effect* or, at the utmost, the *criterion* of beauty; a thing pleases because it is beautiful.

The concept of beauty expounded by Kant and sustained by the layman concerns beauty 2 the right concept of which is autonomous and normative. The autonomy of beauty 2 results from that of beauty 1 within the scope of which it exists. The normative character of beauty 2 may be clarified through the equation beauty 2 = unity in the variety. A thing which is beautiful (i.e. "very" beautiful) pleases by its unity in the variety. It is not beautiful because it pleases, but pleases because it has unity in the variety. There is, then, a certain positive relation between beauty 2 and pleasure. But the relation is in no way essential; for the existence of unity in the variety — the element which should, and usually

does please — is in no way threatened by its failure to please everyone. Pleasure, therefore, is in no way constitutive to the concept of beauty 2. It is still less essential to beauty 1; for beauty 1 — which is merely autonomous sensual appearance — is, if at all pleasing, not more so than other phenomena. Pleasure as an essential element is, therefore, excluded from both beauty 1 and beauty 2.—

The problem now is to define the realm in which beauty can present itself. That it cannot be the realm of art is clear, for beauty is only art-*likeness* while art is really *art*. Beauty can dwell in nature — though it need not. Obviously, beauty, being sensually autonomous, can exist only in that side of nature which is perceivable. It is not enough, however, to say merely that nature can be the carrier of beauty only in so far as it is perceivable. In order to carry beauty, nature must have an element which is purely perceivable. But where does nature exist as purely perceivable, i.e. as pure appearance or, as it has been called, aesthetic nature? Not in the physical world, for there nature is much more than perceivable. It exists in the appreciation of a perceiving mind. Therefore, nature as the bearer of beauty resides only in that unique kind of ap-perception which concentrates upon the visual and abstracts all else. Nature in this sense can, then, be art-like; more specifically, it can be visual-art like, i.e. painting and sculpture like. Aesthetic nature or natural beauty (they are identical) exist in the human contemplation, i.e. by and through the activity of the human mind. Beauty 1 and aesthetic nature are merely viewpoints of man's contemplation. The application of that viewpoint is entirely a matter dependent upon man's will. The objects of nature which "have" beauty, or to which it clings, can neither contribute to nor control it. In the strict sense, they can neither compel nor forbid man to consider them under the beauty viewpoint.

Beauty 2 and ugliness, however, are not dependent upon man's will. True, it is up to us to take the initiative by contemplating objects of nature under the beauty viewpoint; but once that has been done, the structure of the object's sensual appearance will itself determine whether it belongs under beauty 2 or ugliness. Unity in the variety, or lack thereof, is inherent in the very appearance of the objects. Thus, one may say that beauty 2 and

ugliness are more objective, more object-governed, than beauty 1. —

Let us now consider the relation between art and nature. The well known standpoint of the art-aesthetical theory of Naturalism is that art should be nature-like. The very contrary is true. Art is not nature-like, and it is foolish to demand that it become so. While nature in its full reality has nothing to do with art, nature as purely visual is art-like. It is interesting to note that the conclusion of this systematic investigation coincides with that of such thinkers as Oscar Wilde whose views were by no means the result of systematic deduction. Wilde, too, recognized art as the alpha and omega of nature, and maintained that art is the model and archetype of nature in so far as the latter has beauty at all.

When man views nature under the category of beauty 1, i.e. as art-like, she sometimes makes him a return gift in the form of an "inspiration". This is especially true if the fragment of nature so viewed happens to show unity in the variety, happens to be "very" beautiful. Nevertheless, if in recreating the visible on a plane, the painter holds himself slavishly to the actually seen, i. e. to the source of his inspiration, he is a copyist or an illustrator, not an artist. An artist regards the source of inspiration as just that, and does not take it as a model. He does not simply reproduce nature, not even in these rare instances in which it shows unity in the variety (i. e. beauty 2). Instead, he re-creates the seen, giving it a still richer and more intense unity and a greater variety.

It is principally possible for one without the painter's skill to view nature as art-like, but actual cases are rare. It is, of course, far more difficult to view nature from this standpoint than art, a landscape than a lanscape-picture; for in creating a lanscape-picture, the artist — if he is a good one — relieves the layman of considerable work by emphasizing the visually significant elements of the landscape, eliminating from and adding to the original aspect until he achieves a high degree of unity in the variety. There is no doubt that the more a picture (or any other artwork) is distinguished by totality the easier it is to grasp its autonomy. Likewise, the more nature shows beauty 2 the easier it is to bring it under the viewpoint of beauty 1. While the artist looks at nature from the viewpoint of beauty 1 even when it is lacking in beauty 2, the layman is usually unable to bring himself to looking

at nature under the viewpoint of beauty 1 (i. e. autonomy of sensual appearance) even when it shows art-like unity in the variety (beauty 2). Happy is the layman who is at least able to experience an artwork as *art;* he may in good faith leave nature to the artist.

TERMINOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES

Since the term beauty is to be reserved for autonomous sensual appearance, it is desirable to find another name for that phenomenon which heteronomy aestheticians, like the layman, refer to as "beauty". Schiller termed it "Grace". But since that term and its adjectival form "graceful" are also used to designate something that belongs in a group with the sublime, tragic, comic, and "classic" beauty (beauty 3), it would be advisable to give some other name to beauty as heteronomously conceived. It might be called "Charm".—

In as much as beauty 1 and beauty 2 are art-like, it would be possible to eliminate the term beauty altogether, and to speak instead of art-likeness. The word "aesthetic" might also be substituted: the noun form, "the aesthetic", for beauty 1; the adjectival form, "aesthetic" (preceeded by "little" or "very") for beauty 2. But the adjective "aesthetic" is also easily misunderstood because it is used as the adjectival form of the science of Aesthetics as well as for the object of that science. One calls "aesthetic" any reflection within the bounds and from the standpoint of the science of Aesthetics (as different from logical, ethical, psychological, or historical reflections — i.e. form the standpoint of or with regard to Logic, Ethics, Psychology, or History). One also speaks of the aesthetic attitude in the sense of contemplativity — in contrast to the cognitive attitude of science and theoretical philosophy, and to thinking intended to direct action. This ambiguity can be avoided, however, by using the word "aesthetical" as the adjectival form of the science Aesthetics, and reserving "aesthetic" as the adjectival form of the noun "the aesthetic". Thus, the aesthetician's research is *aesthetical* while the artist's attitude is *aesthetic.* To carry it further, one may say that the good aesthetician is one whose *aesthetical* research is based upon an *aesthetic* attitude toward the arts, while there are good artists who do not have an *aesthetical* attitude towards art, i.e. who

are not aestheticians. The distinction, so frequently misunderstood by layman, between aesthetician, i.e. scholar of Aesthetics, and the aestheticist or aesthete — who contemplates everything under the viewpoint of art and art-likeness — need not be elaborated upon here.

Much speaks, indeed, for the elimination of the term "beauty" which has caused so much confusion. Schiller once wrote in desperation: "Oh that someone dared to take the concept and even the word beauty out of circulation." (Moechte es doch einmal einer wagen, den Begriff und selbst das Wort Schoenheit . . . aus dem Umlauf zu bringen"). His motive in suggesting the elimination of the term beauty was to facilitate recognition of art autonomy which is often obscured, he felt, by the common habit of connecting a heteronomous concept of beauty with art. The word truth which he suggested as substitute is, however, completely inappropriate and even wrong. Such a substitution would bring us no nearer the goal, for beauty is not truth but art-likeness.—

In conclusion I wish to present an idea which, I am well aware, has the disadvantage of being most paradoxical. If we use the terms art-likeness or the aesthetic for beauty, the word beauty is made free for other usage — for any usage one may choose to put it to. It can therefore be used to designate even the phenomenon referred to by heteronomy aesthetics of beauty, i.e. for that which I have declared is not "beauty" at all! It can be so used, however, only *after* art-likeness has been declared the term for beauty as autonomous sensual appearance. If after such a declaration the term beauty were given a heteronomous meaning, it would indeed no longer have any bearing upon art; and nothing I have said of beauty as autonomously conceived would be valid for it. Nevertheless such usage would not be a contradiction of my previous maintenance that beauty is autonomous. On the contrary, the new terminology could claim to be based upon the recognition of beauty as autonomous and art-like, and on the subsequent substitution of the term art-likeness for autonomous "beauty". The situation here is parallel to many in life: After something has come to pass, the world is different than it was before. *After* the term "beauty" has been supplanted by art-likeness, the term may permissibly right about face and assume the opposite mean-

ing, i.e. become the term for heteronomous sensual appearance. Such dialectic of word meanings is an analogon to the dialectic of concepts maintained by Hegel. Whether such a terminological procedure is practical or not is another question. It is brought up here not as a suggestion but as a theoretically interesting possibility.—

Only the future can tell whether the term Beauty is to be eliminated and replaced by another term in Autonomy Aesthetics. In Aesthetics of Art it is not necessary to even look for a substitute, for the discussion of art problems can go on without speaking of beauty at all. Whether there is such a thing as an aesthetical discipline of beauty — as a part of Aesthetics of Art, as an Aesthetics of Beauty coordinate with an Aesthetics of Art within one science "Aesthetics", or as an entirely independent discipline — is a question which will be taken up in Part II of this article. Part I concludes with the theses, substantiated herein, that beauty is autonomy of sensual appearance, i.e. art-likeness, and that art is man-created autonomy of sensual appearance which culminates at its peak in totality,—*autarkia.*

(Part II: The Place of Beauty and Art in Aesthetics, next issue)

Scranton University.

Why Exhibit Works of Art?

BY

ANANDA K. COOMARASWAMY

WHAT is an Art Museum for? As the word "Curator" implies, the first and most essential function of such a Museum is to take care of ancient or unique works of art which are no longer in their original places or no longer used as was originally intended, and are therefore in danger of destruction by neglect or otherwise. This care of works of art does not necessarily involve their exhibition.

If we ask, why should the protected works of art be exhibited and made accessible and explained to the public, the answer will be made, that this is to be done with an educational purpose. But before we proceed to a consideration of this purpose, before we ask, Education in or for what? a distinction must be made between the exhibition of the works of living artists and that of ancient or relatively ancient or exotic works of art. It is unnecessary for Museums to exhibit the works of living artists, which are not in imminent danger of destruction; or at least, if such works are exhibited, it should be clearly understood that the Museum is really advertising the artist and acting on behalf of the art dealer or middleman whose business it is to find a market for the artist; the only difference being that while the Museum does the same sort of work as the dealer, it makes no profit. On the other hand, that a living artist should wish to be "hung" or "shown" in a Museum can be only due to his need or his

vanity. For things are made normally for certain purposes and certain places to which they are appropriate, and not simply "for exhibition"; and because whatever is thus custom-made, i. e. made by an artist for a consumer, is controlled by certain requirements and kept in order. Whereas, as Mr. Steinfels has recently remarked "Art which is only intended to be hung on the walls of a Museum is one kind of art that need not consider its relationship to its ultimate surroundings. The artist can paint anything he wishes, any way he wishes, and if the Curators and Trustees like it well enough they will line it up on the wall with all the other curiosities".

We are left with the real problem, Why exhibit? as it applies to the relatively ancient or foreign works of art which, because of their fragility and because they no longer correspond to any needs of our own of which we are actively conscious, are preserved in our Museums, where they form the bulk of the collections. If we are to exhibit these objects for educational reasons, and not as mere curios, it is evident that we are proposing to make such use of them as is possible without an actual handling. It will be imaginatively and not actually that we must use the mediaeval reliquary, or lie on the Egyptian bed, or make our offering to some ancient deity. The educational ends that an exhibition can serve demand, accordingly, the services not of a Curator only, who prepares the exhibition, but of a Docent who explains the original patron's needs and the original artists' methods; for it is because of what these patrons and artists were that the works before us are what they are. If the exhibition is to be anything more than a show of curiosities and an entertaining spectacle it will not suffice to be satisfied with our own reactions to the objects; to know why they are what they are we must know the men that made them. It will not be "educational" to interpret such objects by our likes or dislikes, or to assume that these men thought of art in our fashion, or that they had aesthetic motives, or were "expressing themselves". We must examine *their* theory of art, first of all in order to understand the things that they

made by art, and secondly in order to ask whether their view of art, if it is found to differ from ours, may not have been a truer one.

Let us assume that we are considering an exhibition of Greek objects, and call upon Plato to act as our Docent. He knows nothing of our distinction of fine from applied arts. For him painting and agriculture, music and carpentry and pottery are all equally kinds of poetry or making. And as Plotinus, following Plato, tells us, the arts such as music and carpentry are not based on human wisdom but on the thinking "there."

Whenever Plato speaks disparagingly of the "base mechanical arts" and of mere "labor" as distinguished from the "fine work" of making things, it is with reference to kinds of manufacture that provide for the needs of the body alone. The kind of art that he calls wholesome and will admit to his ideal state must be not only useful but also true to rightly chosen models and therefore beautiful, and this art, he says, will provide at the same time "for the souls and bodies of your citizens". His "music" stands for all that we mean by "culture", and his "gymnastics" for all that we mean by physical training and well-being; he insists that these ends of culture and physique must never be separately pursued; the tender artist and the brutal athlete are equally contemptible. We, on the other hand are accustomed to think of music, and culture in general, as useless, but still valuable. We forget that music, traditionally, is never something only for the ear, something only to be heard, but always the accompaniment of some kind of action. Our own conceptions of culture are typically negative. I believe that Professor Dewey is right in calling our cultural values snobbish. The lessons of the Museum must be applied to our life.

Because we are not going to handle the exhibited objects, we shall take their aptitude for use, that is to say their efficiency, for granted, and rather ask in what sense they are also true or significant; for if these objects can no longer serve our bodily needs, perhaps they can still serve those of our soul, or if you prefer the

word, our reason. What Plato means by "true" is "iconographically correct." For all the arts, without exception, are representations or likenesses of a model; which does not mean that they are such as to tell us what the model looks like, which would be impossible seeing that the forms of traditional art are typically imitative of invisible things, which have no looks, but that they are such adequate analogies as to be able to remind us, i.e. put us in mind again, of their archetypes. Works of art are reminders; in other words, supports of contemplation. Now since the contemplation and understanding of these works is to serve the needs of the soul, that is to say in Plato's own words, to attune our own distorted modes of thought to cosmic harmonies, "so that by an assimiliation of the knower to the to-be-known, the archetypal nature, and coming to be in that likeness, we may attain at last to a part in that 'life's best' that has been ap-appointed by the Gods to man for for this time being and hereafter", or stated in Indian terms, to effect our own metrical reintegration through the imitation of divine forms; and because, as the Upanishad reminds us, "one comes to be of just such stuff as that on which the mind is set", it follows that is not only requisite that the forms of art should be adequate reminders of their paradigms, but that the nature of these paradigms themselves must be of the utmost importance, if we are thinking of a cultural value of art in any serious sense of the word "culture". The *what* of art is far more important than the *how;* it should, indeed, be the what that determines the how, as form determines shape.

Plato has always in view the representation of invisible and intelligible forms. The imitation of anything and everything is despicable; it is the actions of Gods and Heroes, not the artist's feelings or the natures of men who are all too human like himself, that are the legitimate theme of art. If a poet cannot imitate the eternal realities, but only the vagaries of human character, there can be no place for him in an ideal society, however true or intriguing his representations may be. The Assyriologist Andrae is speaking in

perfect accord with Plato when he says, in connection with pottery, that "It is the business of art to grasp the primordial truth, to make the inaudible audible, to enunciate the primordial word, to reproduce the primordial images — or it is not art." In other words, a real art is one of symbolic and significant representation; a representation of things that cannot be seen except by the intellect. In this sense art is the antithesis of what we mean by visual education, for this has in view to tell us what things that we do not see, but might see, look like. It is the natural instinct of a child to work from within outwards; "First I think, and then I draw my think". What wasted efforts we make to teach the child to stop thinking, and only to observe! Instead of training the child to think, and how to think and of what, we make him "correct" his drawing by what he sees. It is clear that the Museum at its best must be the sworn enemy of the methods of instruction currently prevailing in our Schools of Art.

It was anything but "the Greek miracle" in art that Plato admired; what he praised was the canonical art of Egypt in which "these modes (of representation) that are by nature correct had been held for ever sacred". The point of view is identical with that of the Scholastic philosophers, for whom "art has fixed ends and ascertained means of operation". New songs, yes; but never new kinds of music, for these may destroy our whole civilization. It is the irrational impulses that yearn for innovation. Our sentimental or aesthetic culture — sentimental, aesthetic and materialistic are virtually synonyms — prefers instinctive expression to the formal beauty of rational art. But Plato could not have seen any difference between the mathematician thrilled by a "beautiful equation" and the artist thrilled by his formal vision. For he asks us to stand up like men against our instinctive reactions to what is pleasant or unpleasant, and to admire in works of art, not their aesthetic surfaces but the logic or right reason of their composition. And so naturally he points out that "The beauty of the straight line and

the circle, and the plane and the solid figures formed from these . . . is not, like other things, relative, but always absolutely beautiful". Taken together with all that he has to say elsewhere of the humanistic art that was coming into fashion in his own time and with what he has to say of Egyptian art, this amounts to an endorsement of Greek Archaic and Greek Geometric Art — the arts that really corresponded to the content of those myths and fairy tales that he held in such high respect and so often quotes. Translated into more familiar terms, this means that from this intellectual point of view the art of the American Indian sandpainting is superior in kind to any painting that has been done in Europe or white America within the last several centuries. As the Director of one of the five greatest museums in our Eastern States has more than once remarked to me, From the Stone Age until now, what a decline! He meant, of course, a decline in intellectuality, not in comfort. It should be one of the functions of a well organized Museum exhibition to deflate the illusion of progress.

At this point I must digress to correct a widespread confusion. There exists a general impression that modern abstract art is in some way like and related to, or even "inspired" by the formality of primitive art. The likeness is altogether superficial. Our abstraction is nothing but a mannerism. Neolithic art is abstract, or rather algebraic, because it is only an algebraical form that can be the single form of very different things. The forms of early Greek are what they are because it is only in such forms that the polar balance of physical and metaphysical can be maintained. "To have forgotten", as Bernheimer recently said, "this purpose before the mirage of absolute patterns and designs is perhaps the fundamental fallacy of the abstract movement in art". The modern abstractionist forgets that the Neolithic formalist was not an interior decorator, but a metaphysical man who saw life whole and had to *live* by his wits; one who did not, as we seek to, live by bread alone, for as the anthropologists assure us, primitive cultures provided for the needs

of the soul and the body at one and the same time. The Museum exhibition should amount to an exhortation to return to these savage levels of culture.

A natural effect of the Museum exhibition will be to lead the public to enquire why it is that objects of "museum quality" are to be found only in Museums and are not in daily use and readily obtainable. For the Museum objects, on the whole, were not originally "treasures" made to be seen in glass cases, but rather common objects of the market place that could have been bought and used by anyone. What underlies the deterioration in the quality of our environment? Why should we have to depend as much as we do upon "antiques"? The only possible answer will again reveal the essential opposition of the Museum to the world. For this answer will be that the Museum objects were custom made and made for use, while the things that are made in our factories are made primarily for sale. The word "manufacturer" itself, meaning one who makes things by hand, has come to mean a salesman who gets things made for him by machinery. The museum objects were humanly made by responsible men, for whom their means of livelihood was a vocation and a profession. The museum objects were made by free men. Have those in our department stores been made by free men? Let us not take the answer for granted.

When Plato lays it down that the arts shall "care for the bodies and souls of your citizens", and that only things that are sane and free, and not any shameful things unbecoming free men, are to be made, it is as much as to say that the artist in whatever material must be a free man; not meaning thereby an "emancipated artist" in the vulgar sense of one having no obligation or commitment of any kind, but a man emancipated from the despotism of the salesman. If the artist is to represent the eternal realities, he must have known them as they are. In other words an act of imagination in which the idea to be represented is first clothed in an inimitable form must have preceded the operation in which this form is to be

embodied in the actual material. The first of these acts is called "free", the latter "servile". But it is only if the first be omitted that the word servile acquires a dishonorable connotation. It hardly needs demonstration that our methods of manufacture are, in this shameful sense, servile, or denied that the industrial system, for which these methods are indispensible, is unfit for free men. A system of "manufacture", or rather of quantity production dominated by money values, presupposes that there shall be two different kinds of makers, privileged "artists" who may be "inspired", and under-privileged laborers, unimaginative by hypothesis, since they are asked only to make what other men have imagined. As Eric Gill put it, "On the one hand we have the artist concerned solely to express himself; on the other is the workman deprived of any self to express". It has often been claimed that the productions of "fine" art are useless; it would seem to be a mockery to speak of a society as free, where it is only the makers of useless things, and not the makers of utilities, that can be called free, except in the sense that we are all free to work or starve.

It is, then, by the notion of a vocational making, as distinguished from earning one's living by working at a job, regardless of what it may be, that the difference between the museum objects and those in the department store can be best explained. Under these conditions, which have been those of all non-industrial societies, that is to say when each man makes one kind of thing, doing only that kind of work for which he is fitted by his own nature and for which he is therefore destined, Plato reminds us that "more will be done, and better done than in any other way". Under these conditions a man at work is doing what he likes best, and the pleasure that he takes in his work perfects the operation. We see the evidence of this pleasure in the Museum objects, but not in the products of chain-belt operation, which are more like those of the chain-gang than like those of men who enjoy their work. Our hankering for a state of leisure or leisure state is the proof of the fact that most of

us are working at a task to which we could never have been called by anyone but a salesman, certainly not by God or by our own natures. Traditional craftsmen whom I have known in the East cannot be dragged away from their work, and will work overtime to their own pecuniary loss.

We have gone so far as to divorce work from culture, and to think of culture as something to be acquired in hours of leisure; but there can be only a hothouse and unreal culture where work itself is not its means; if culture does not show itself in all we make we are not cultured. We ourselves have lost this vocational way of living, the way that Plato made his type of Justice; and there can be no better proof of the depth of our loss than the fact that we have destroyed the cultures of all other peoples whom the withering touch of our civilization has reached.

In order to understand the works of art that we are asked to look at it will not do to explain them in the terms of our own psychology and our aesthetics; to do so would be the pathetic fallacy. We shall not have understood these arts until we can think about them as their authors did. The Docent will have to instruct us in the elements of what will seem a strange language; though we know its terms, it is with very different meanings that we nowadays employ them. The meaning of such terms as art, nature, inspiration, form, ornament and aesthetic will have to be explained to our public in words of two syllables. For none of these terms are used in the traditional philosophy as we use them today.

We shall have to begin by discarding the term *aesthetic* altogether. For these arts were not produced for the delectation of the senses. The Greek original of this modern word means nothing but sensation or reaction to external stimuli; the sensibility implied by the word *aisthesis* is present in plants, animals, and man; it is what the biologist calls "irritability". These sensations, which are the passions or emotions of the psychologist, are the driving forces of instinct. Plato asks us to stand up like men against the pulls of

pleasure and pain. For these, as the word passion implies, are pleasant and unpleasant experiences to which we are subjected; they are not acts on our part, but things done to us; only the judgment and appreciation of art is an activity. Aesthetic experience is of the skin you love to touch, or the fruit you love to taste. "Disinterested aesthetic contemplation" is a contradiction in terms and a pure non-sense. Art is an intellectual, not a physical virtue; beauty has to do with knowledge and goodness, of which it is precisely the attractive aspect; and since it is by its beauty that we are attracted to a work, its beauty is evidently a means to an end, and not itself the end of art; the purpose of art is always one of effective communication. The man of action, then, will not be content to substitute the knowledge of what he likes for an understanding judgment; he will not merely enjoy what he should use (those who merely enjoy we call 'aesthetes' rightly); it is not the aesthetic surfaces of works of art but the right reason or logic of the composition that will concern him. Now the composition of such works as we are exhibiting is not for aesthetic but for expressive reasons. The fundamental judgment is of the degree of the artist's success in giving clear expression to the theme of his work. In order to answer the question, Has the thing been well said? it will evidently be necessary for us to know what it was that was to be said. It is for this reason that in every discussion of works of art we must begin with their subject matter.

We take account, in other words, of the *form* of the work. "Form" in the traditional philosophy does not mean tangible shape, but is synonymous with idea and even with soul; the soul, for example, is called the form of the body[1]. If there be a real unity of form and matter such as we expect in a work of art, the shape of its body will

[1] Accordingly, the following sentence (taken from the *Journal of Aesthetics*, I, p. 29), "Walter Pater here seems to be in the right when he maintains that it is the sensuous element of art that is essentially artistic, from which follows his thesis that music, the most formal of the arts, is also the measure of all the arts" propounds a shocking *non sequitur* and can only confuse the unhappy student.

express its form, which is that of the pattern in the artist's mind, to which pattern or image he moulds the material shape. The degree of his success in this imitative operation is the measure of the work's perfection. So God is said to have called his creation good because it conformed to the intelligible pattern according to which he had worked; it is in the same way that the human workman still speaks of "trueing" his work. The formality of a work is its beauty, its informality its ugliness. If it is uninformed it will be shapeless. Everything must be in good form.

In the same way *art* is nothing tangible. We cannot call a painting "art". As the words "artifact" and "artificial" imply, the thing made is a work *of* art, made *by* art, but not itself art; the art remains in the artist and is the knowledge by which things are made. What is made according to the art is correct; what one makes as one likes may very well be awkward. We must not confuse taste with judgment, or loveliness with beauty, for as Augustine says, some people like deformities.

Works of art are generally *ornamental* or in some way ornamented. The Docent will sometimes discuss the history of ornament. In doing so he will explain that all the words that mean ornament or decoration in the four languages with which we are chiefly concerned, and probably in all languages, originally meant equipment; just as furnishing originally meant tables and chairs for use and not an interior decoration designed to keep up with the Joneses or to display our connoisseurship. We must not think of ornament as something added to an object which might have been ugly without it. The beauty of anything unadorned is not increased by ornament, but made more effective by it. Ornament is characterization; ornaments are attributes. We are often told, and not quite incorrectly, that primitive ornament had a magical value; it would be truer to say a metaphysical value, since it is generally by means of what we now call its decoration that a thing is ritually transformed and made to function spiritually as well as physically. The use of solar

symbols in harness, for example, makes the steed the Sun in a likeness; solar patterns are appropriate to buttons because the Sun himself is the primordial fastening to which all things are attached by the thread of the Spirit; the egg and dart pattern was originally what it still is in India, a lotus petal moulding symbolic of a solid foundation. It is only when the symbolic values of ornament have been lost, that decoration bcomes a sophistry, irresponsible to the content of the work. For Socrates, the distinction of beauty from use is logical, but not real, not objective; a thing can only be beautiful in the context for which it is designed.

Critics nowadays speak of an artist as *inspired* by external objects, or even by his material. This is a misuse of language that makes it impossible for the student to understand the earlier literature of art. "Inspiration" can never mean anything but the working of some spiritual force within you; the word is properly defined by Webster as a "supernatural divine influence". The Docent, if a rationalist, may wish to deny the possibility of inspiration; but he must not obscure the fact that from Homer onwards the word has been used always with one exact meaning, that of Dante, when he says that Love, that is to say the Holy Ghost, "inspires" him, and that he goes "setting the matter forth even as He dictates within me."

Nature, for example in the statement "Art imitates nature in her manner of operation", does not refer to any visible part of our environment; and when Plato says "according to nature", he does not mean "as things behave", but as they should behave, not "sinning against nature". The traditional Nature is Mother Nature, that principle by which things are "natured", by which, for example, a horse is horsey and by which a man is human. Art is an imitation of the nature of things, not of their appearances.

In these ways we shall prepare our public to understand the pertinence of ancient works of art. If, on the other hand, we ignore the evidence and decide that the appreciation of art is merely an

aesthetic experience, we shall evidently arrange our exhibition to appeal to the public's sensibilities. This is to assume that the public must be taught to feel. But the view that the public is a hard-hearted animal is strangely at variance with the evidence afforded by the kind of art that the public chooses for itself, without the help of museums. For we perceive that this public already knows what it likes. It likes fine colors and sounds and whatever is spectacular or personal or anecdotal or that flatters its faith in progress. This public loves its comfort. If we believe that the appreciation of art is an aesthetic experience we shall give the public what it wants.

But it is not the function of a museum or of any educator to flatter and amuse the public. If the exhibition of works of art, like the reading of books, is to have a cultural value, i. e. if it is to nourish and make the best part of us grow, as plants are nourished and grow in suitable soils, it is to the understanding and not to fine feelings that an appeal must be made. In one respect the public is right; it always wants to know what a work of art is "about". "About what", as Plato also asked, "is the sophist so eloquent"? Let us tell them what these works of art are about and not merely tell them things about these works of art. Let us tell them the painful truth, that most of these works of art are about God, whom we never mention in polite society. Let us admit that if we are to offer an education in agreement with the innermost nature and eloquence of the exhibits themselves, that this will not be an education in sensibility, but an education in philosophy, in Plato's and Aristotle's sense of the word, for whom it means ontology and theology and the map of life, and a wisdom to be applied to everyday matters. Let us recognize that nothing will have been accomplished unless men's lives are affected and their values changed by what we have to show. Taking this point of view, we shall break down the social and economic distinction of fine from applied art; we shall no longer divorce anthropology from art, but recognize that the anthropological approach to art is a much closer approach than

the aesthetician's; we shall no longer pretend that the content of the folk arts is anything but metaphysical. We shall teach our public to demand above all things lucidity in works of art.

For example, we shall place a painted Neolithic potsherd or Indian punch-marked coin side by side with a Mediaeval representation of the Seven gifts of the Spirit, and make it clear by means of labels or Docents or both that the reason of all these compositions is to state the universal doctrine of the "Seven Rays of the Sun". We shall put together an Egyptian representation of the Sundoor guarded by the Sun himself and the figure of the Pantakrator in the oculus of a Byzantine dome, and explain that these doors by which one breaks out of the universe are the same as the hole in the roof by which an American Indian enters or leaves his *hogan*, the same as the hole in the centre of a Chinese *pi*, the same as the luffer of the Siberian Shaman's *yurt*, and the same as the foramen of the roof above the altar of Jupiter Terminus; explaining that all these constructions are reminders of the Door-god, of One who could say "I am the door". Our study of the history of architecture will make it clear that "harmony" was first of all a carpenter's word meaning "joinery", and that it was inevitable, equally in the Greek and the Indian traditions that the Father and the Son should have been "carpenters", and show that this must have been a doctrine of Neolithic, or rather "Hylic", antiquity. We shall sharply distinguish the "visual education" that only tells us what things look like (leaving us to *react* as we must) from the iconography of things that are themselves invisible (but by which we can be guided how to *act*).

It may be that the understanding of the ancient works of art and of the conditions under which they were produced will undermine our loyalty to contemporary art and contemporary methods of manufacture. This will be the proof of our success as educators; we must not shrink from the truth that all education implies revaluation. Whatever is made only to give pleasure is, as Plato put it, a toy, for the delectation of that part of us that passively submits

to emotional storms; whereas the education to be derived from works of art should be an education in the love of what is ordered and the dislike of what is disordered. We have proposed to educate the public to ask first of all these two questions of a work of art, Is it true? or beautiful? (whichever word you prefer) and what good use does it serve? We shall hope to have demonstrated by our exhibition that the human value of anything made is determined by the coincidence in it of beauty and utility, significance and aptitude; that artifacts of this sort can only be made by free and responsible workmen, free to consider only the good of the work to be done and individually responsible for its quality; and that the manufacture of art in studios coupled with an artless manufacture in factories represents a reduction of the standard of living to subhuman levels.

These are not personal opinions, but only the logical deductions of a lifetime spent in the handling of works of art, the observation of men at work, and the study of the universal philosophy of art from which philosophy our own "aesthetic" is only a temporally provincial aberration. It is for the museum militant to maintain with Plato that "we cannot give the name of art to anything irrational".

Boston Museum of Fine Arts.

The History of Art of the Future*

BY

LEO BALET

THIS paper is a plea for the good rights and for the necessity, of the new, synthetic form of the history of art.

Unfortunately it is not possible to argue for this cause without attacking the specialized form, or, more precisely, without attacking some excesses of the latter.

I cannot help doing this, since one of the excesses, the *substantialization* of specialization, militates directly against the natural development of art history from the lower, the specialized, to the higher, the synthetic form.

This excess, along with all the others, is the necessary result of the contradictions inherent in specialization from the very beginning.

They are, therefore, not explicitly willed by the specialists. For the last twenty years they themselves have become to a certain degree the victims of their system.

However, not even the system can be made fully responsible for these excesses, as the system itself is conditioned by a series of material and spiritual events which, on their turn, were conditioned by other ones, etc.

In view of all these factors, it will hardly be necessary to emphasize that I am only interested in the things and not at all in

* Cf. Leo Balet: "Nécessité d'une Synthèse totale de l'Histoire de l'Art" in "Deuxième Congrès International d'Esthétique et de Science de l'Art" Paris 1937, Tome II, p. 76, and Leo Balet "Synthetische Kunstwissenschaft" in "Zeitschrift für Aesthetik und Allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft", Berlin 1938, XXXII vol., p. 110.

the persons, even when things and persons seem to be fused in my exposition.

What is synthetic history of art?

Let me begin by indicating what the word synthetic does not mean.

It will be superfluous to mention that synthetic in our sense is not to be understood as something artificial, a kind of substitute, an "Ersatz" for the genuine history of art.

In order to prevent this misconception I have been advised to use the word "comparative", in place of "synthetic".

However, comparative means less than synthetic.

Comparative history of art confines itself to stating the parallelism between the facts, without giving any explanatory comment. However, not only *parallel* facts have to be explained, but *divergent* facts as well. This must be done by disclosing their (contradictory) unity.

Professor Baldensperger of the Sorbonne and of Harvard, the former editor of the "Revue d'Histoire de Litérature comparée" is the outstanding individual of the comparative school.

The word "synthetic" is also used for a selective compendium, or a summary of all that has been written on a certain subject or a certain period. I refer here to the "Revue de Synthèse historique", edited by Professor Henri Berr of the Sorbonne. The two books, in which the eminent scholar explains his system: "La Synthèse en Histoire" (Paris 1911) and "L'Histoire traditionelle et la Synthèse historique" (Paris 1921) are of great importance.

Synthesis in this sense is not equivalent to what I understand by synthesis.

My negative explanation of the word "synthetic" requires a few more words on a series of works edited by outstanding scholars, as for example Pirenne, Cohen, Focillon's "La Civilisation occidentale au Moyen Age" (Paris 1935), Réeau et Cohen's "L'Art du Moyen Age, Arts plastiques, arts litéraires et la civilisation française" (Paris 1936), Pirenne, Renaudet, Perroy, Handelsman, Halpern: "La Fin du Moyen Age. La désegrégation du monde medieval" (Paris 1931).

These books are most valuable contributions to the history of economy, society, philosophy, religion, art and literature. Apart from this they are for us particularly significant since they empha-

size unambiguously the necessity of synthesis. What then could be implied from the intimate cooperation of these specialists, as, for instance, Pirenne (economy and society), Cohen (philosophy and literature), Focillon (the arts), etc. if they were not convinced of the logical relationship between the different fields?

For all that, these publications are not *synthetic* art history. They are transitional forms of art history, because they only suggest a synthesis, which is entirely left to the readers to formulate.

Up to now I have defined only negatively, what I mean by "the synthetic form of art history." Let me now try to determine it positively, which is likely to be best done by comparing the new synthetic form with the old specialized form, out of which it grew.

The relation between these two forms can only be understood dialectically.

Synthesis is to a certain extent the negation of the specialized or analytic form, as synthesis continues where the analysis came to an end. On the other hand synthesis is the affirmation of the specialization, as it is entirely based on the latter: it could never have come into existence and it could not continue existing without the latter.

What strikes us in the first place, when comparing both forms of history of art, is the difference in the constitution of the *cells* of both sciences.

The cell of specialized history of art is the single fact, the isolated fact, whereas the cell of the synthetic form is just that which is between the facts, the logical relationship.

It will be apparent from this statement, that, although the two forms are to a certain degree opposite, there can be no question of antagonism, at least not from the point of view of the synthesists.

They do not underestimate the immense value of the researches by the great specialists, who confined themselves to stating, delimiting, ordering and registering facts. On the contrary, no one appreciates their pioneer work more, no one can be more grateful than the synthesists, who entered on their inheritance and tried to continue their work and to make it bear fruit.

This does not mean, however, that the synthesists are without any criticism. They see the dangers which attended the specialization from the very outset, and the excesses to which the internal

contradictions compulsorily lead, just as they have an open eye to its great advantages.

About a hundred years ago, as history of art began to make its way as a science, the first thing to do was to collect, to test scientifically, to delimit as exactly as possible, to order and to register the up to then chaotic scientific material.

In order to fulfil this important task it was necessary to separate, *of course provisionally*, the domain of art from the other domains of life, with which it forms a practically unseparable unity.

But as soon as one begins with specializing it is hardly possible to stop. Through the specialization the material increased to such an extent, that subspecializations soon proved to be indispensable in order to master the steadily growing material. These subspecializations extended the material further and further and urged new divisions and so on.

The scholars are nowadays so thoroughly specialized and the special fields put such tremendously high requirements on them, that there seems to be no outlet for them to come to any synthesization whatsoever, although the synthetic history of art was from the outset the objective of specialization. In this way the specialists are compelled by their method itself to perpetuate what was originally provisional: they substantialized the specialization.

Substantialization is the worst thing that can happen to a science. Knowledge which excludes in principle unlimited expansion of itself — which will also be the case when it accepts as a specialized science a one-dimensional extension, but declines on principle a multi-dimensonal extension — is in a state of dissolution, is about to reduce itself to the absurd.

Besides this substantialization could not be but an irresistible inducement for many of the specialists to exaggerate the one-dimensional extension and to lose themselves in futilities.

All facts which can be conducive in any way to the only scope for which art has been created: the reexperience of the artist's experience, are useful.

But I wonder what may be the use of those facts which have only been researched for their own sake.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, when the great periods of art history had not yet been fully researched in a really scientific way, there was no great danger for the specialists to

strike into blind alleys. In the twentieth century, however, after the chief periods have been sufficiently researched, the danger of going astray in mere trifles has become imminent. We only need to turn up the great art magazines to convince ourselves of the deplorable overproduction, which specialists of rank themselves are laughing at.

Will our approach to the work of a painter be supported by the statement, that his birthplace was not situated on the spot where his fellow countrymen have placed a commemorative tablet, but thirty yards away? How much time is wasted in the research of such ridiculous details!

What is the use of all these investigations of the adventures, the family affairs, the relatives, etc. of individuals who came into chance contact with a certain artist? Do they help us to come into closer relation with his works? I really do not think so.

An article in "The Art Bulletin" (June, 1941, p. 132 ff.) deals with the Dyon equestrian statue of Louis XIV by Le Hongre. The author reports that on March 18, 1686 the contract with the sculptor was signed. Mansart had to supervise the work. It was completed by December 31, 1690. In May, 1692, the statue was moved to the banks of the Seine and "eventually transported by boat" to Auxerre. The weight of the monument was 19½ tons for the horse and 8-4/5 tons for the rider. The monument came to rest in a barn in the hamlet of La Brosse, "four and a quarter miles along the road to Dyon." "In 1720 Pierre Morin, engraver and inspector of bridges for Burgundy and Bresse, brought the statue to Dyon packed on two huge drays drawn by thirty yoke of oxen" — (the ages of the oxen have not yet been researched). "The wagons arrived on September 19 and 21 respectively . . . " And so it goes on for pages and pages and pages.

Do the editors of "The Art Bulletin" really believe that these details will contribute anything to the understanding of Le Hongre's statue as a work of art?

History of art cannot but degenerate into planless history around art as soon as it loses sight of its only reason for existing.

I have traced so far the first danger inherent in specialization and leading to the substantialization of the specialized form, which resulted in blocking the natural development of the history of art

from the lower, specialized to the higher, synthetic form, and in a senseless overproduction in nearly all fields.

Another danger, which in the future proved to be fatal, was the following:

The continuous and exclusive occupation of the specialists with only one category of works of art could not but gradually wear out the conception of the original intimate connection between the different works of art themselves, and between the works of art and the other manifestations of life of the same period.

The result was here, that some scholars, accidentally looking for an explanation of a change of style, were led to interpret an autonomous evolution into the arts — as if art were an organism! — or to introduce surreptitiously a phantastic set of physiological laws, derived from the natural sciences (ebb and flood, seasons, ages, etc.) into the historical development. These ghostly laws were then supposed to control the changes of style. Of course, the material had often to be distorted to make it fit the phantastic autonomous evolution or the still more phantastic cycle theories.

All these theories were attempts to explain the changes of style of each kind of art for itself.

My experience, as far as it goes, has taught me that a change of style of one art has always been coterminous with a change of style of all the other arts. And not only this, but during all the centuries the arts were always changing at the same time that the form of economy, society, politics, philosophy, religion, morals, and sciences, changed, and of course in the same direction.

As the autonomists and the cycle theorists will never be able to give a plausible explanation of this coincidence, which cannot be accidental because of its reiteration without a single failure, I think we may relegate their theories to the realm of fancy.

The next point of difference between the specialized and synthetic history of art is the *body of the science.*

If the cell of the specialized history of art is, as we have seen, the isolated fact, it will be obvious that the body of science can only be a collection of isolated facts.

Each fact is self-contained and forms a truth by itself, independent of the other facts. More facts can be added, or the collection can be abridged, but the remainder is left unimpaired.

If we want to be informed about the style of architecture of the

twelfth century in France, we will find the most detailed report of the successive changes in the construction of the churches of the former period, where and when they took place, how they spread over the different regions, how each region had its own characteristics and developed in its own way, till at last the new style was there in its full glory. According to the size of the book we are given a more or less complete list of the principal cathedrals with all significant details about the groundplan and the elevation, the interior and the exterior, the sculptural and pictorial decoration, the later renovations and restorations, the architects, etc., etc.

The greater part of these facts are of importance, but if we take the standpoint that history ought to be an account not of things as far as they have already happened, but of things as far as they are in a state of happening, and that the latter requirement can only be fulfilled by disclosing the logical relations between all these things, I should think that these collections of facts are, notwithstanding their great scientific value, not yet *history of art*. They only provide the necessary material, out of which the real history of art has yet to be built up.

For a real history of art we need to know not only the facts, but also as far as possible what is behind and between the facts. We want to understand them; we have to see them as parts of the whole of life to which they belong; we have to know how all these parts are interrelated, and how all these manifestations of life in a certain period form a dynamic unity.

In reference to these considerations the specialized histories of art do not breathe a single word.

The body of *synthetic* history of art is dependent on its cell of science, in the same manner in which the body of specialized history of art was the consistent result of the nature of the elements out of which it was constructed.

Synthetic history of art is, therefore, not a collection of facts, but a structure of relations, integrated into a relative unity. The facts are not reported for the sake of themselves, but only as far as they are the bearers of the relations. The facts are consequently no longer isolated here; they are disindividualized and subordinated to a certain whole of life, which in its turn is subordinated to a greater whole, and so on infinitely. Thus the disindividualization of

the facts did not cause the individualization of the whole. By no means. The whole is disindividualized in its turn by its integration into a higher unity, which in its turn, etc., etc.

The sovereignty of the facts in the old specialized histories of art is already specious in the special make-up of these works.

Every important fact is so to say crowned by an asterisk, which refers the reader to the foot of the page, where he finds an explicit birth-certificate. On some pages more space is given to footnotes than to the proper text. These pages look, of course, awfully learned and dignified with their long beards.

The synthetic history of art has dethroned the fact and proclaimed the sovereignty of the relation. The facts, on which the relations were built up, are simply taken over from the trustworthy collection of facts, without making any fuss about their provenience. The asterisks disappear, unless in case the extreme singularity or the unlikeliness of a thing should demand a short reference.

It seems to be difficult for the specialists to realize this devaluation of the old values, this shifting of the center of gravity from the facts to the relation between the facts, which necessarily changed the outward appearance of the books of the synthesists.

The specialists miss the "scientific character", the imposing beard.

Another thing which seems to be hard for them to get over is the lack of an index.

In a specialized work, in other words, in a collection of facts, an index is indispensable. I cannot see, however, the reason for an index in a synthetic work of history of art. Is it to get information about a fact? Well, then better turn up a specialized work. You will find the facts there in much greater detail. And if you were inquiring after a certain relation, let me say, between the facts A and B, the pages on which this direct relation is dealt with will not suffice. The facts A and B are related themselves with other facts, and these again with others, and so on. In the relation A:B all other relations are contained. Therefore, if such a book should have an index, it would have to refer for every single relation to all the pages, to the whole book.

The word *relation* needs some further explanation, and herewith we come to the third point of difference between specialized and synthetic history of art.

Some one might question, are the facts in a specialized work not at all related? Of course, they are. But the relation here is only an *outward* one, — personal, spatial or temporal. In other words, the facts are grouped around a person, or they are connected by the special limits of a country, a town, a school, etc., or by the temporal limits of a period.

The relations, on the other hand, which compose the essence of a synthetic work of history of art, are *logical* relations.

It follows from what I have said that the outward relation between the facts in the old history of art and the inward relation in the new one will influence the ordering of the material each in its own way.

The specialist will use the chronological order, whereas the synthesist will regard the chronological order only as far as the logical order, which is primary for him, allows him to do so.

We can understand that many a specialist will be startled when the author of a synthetic history of art, in order to disclose a logical relation, jumps at random to and fro over the fences of decades and even centuries. It is likely that the specialist will deeply resent this neglect of the sacred chronological order and reject the logical order of the synthesist as disorder.

It is herewith, as it was with the dethronement of the sovereign fact and the dismissal of the index. Things have to be seen and judged not from an absolute standpoint, but relatively.

After all that I have said about specialized and synthetic history of art — and herewith I come to the next point of difference between them — it will be evident that their *objects* differ too.

The specialized history of art tries to give an answer only to the questions "what?" and "how?", whereas the synthetic history of art tries to answer the questions "whence?" and "why?".

The former is, therefore, bound to a relative completeness of the *facts*, the latter to a completeness of the relations between the different groups of facts.

Completeness of relations in the synthetic history of art does not imply a completeness of single facts. For example, a work on the change of style of architecture in the twelfth century in France need not give a survey of all the principal French cathedrals of this period, but it has to describe the characteristic style innovations of the *groups* of churches, and has to

mention only those buildings — which from the standpoint of the specialists may often be of only secondary rank — in which these characteristics are outstandingly visible. The synthesist needs this general characterization of the new style of architecture, in order to demonstrate the relation between the architecture, the philosophy, and the polyphony of this period, all three being typical manifestations of the rationalistic spirit in this century.

This incompleteness of the *single* facts in synthetic histories of art may be, notwithstanding the completeness of the *groups* of facts, another cause for misunderstandings from the viewpoint of the specialists.

Before moving to another point I want to mention in passing that the *result* of each form of history of art responds to the *object*: the specialized form provides knowledge, the synthetic form understanding. That understading is higher than simple knowledge of facts and dates, and, therefore, synthetic history of art is a higher form than specialized history, needs no further explanation.

Now the fifth point of difference.

As the specialized history of art sees it as its task, to collect, to delimit, to order, and to register the scientific material, it will be evident that its attitude toward the foreign domains (society, philosophy, religion, literature, music, etc.) is strictly negative.

The objective of synthetic history, on the other hand, is to state and to explain the logical relations between the facts and to disclose their logical unity. Therefore, synthetic history cannot be expected to make a stand at the limits of its *own* domain.

This does not mean that synthetic history of art would ever try to return to the old universal history, from which it specialized about a century ago. The specialization, which was historically conditioned then and there, can never be undone.

The synthetic history of art will, consequently, notwithstanding the extension beyond its own limits, remain history of art, since the foreign fields exist only for it under the aspect of its own domain, art.

The range of the specialized history of art is strictly limited to its own confines, although within these limits an unlimited indulgence in the tiniest details is possible.

The range of the synthetic history of art is unlimited, but with-

in this unlimitedness the object of knowledge, which from the very beginning on was fixed, will effectuate a certain selection, and thus bounds will be set to the potential boundlessness.

The next point of difference between the specialized and the synthetic history of art is the *method.*

The method of science is never arbitrary, it will always be conditioned by the object of the science.

The object of the specialized history of art are the facts. Therefore the method most appropriate to this object is the "exact" method.

What does the word "exact" mean?

The qualification "exact" comes from the specialists themselves. The inauguration of art history as a science was coterminous. with the beginning of the blooming period of the natural sciences, and so the specialists were from the outset aiming at the same precision, accuracy and truth as their colleagues of the physics and chemistry departments.

The reasonableness of their tendency is unquestionable.

The cell of the specialized history of art is the single fact, the self-contained, unrelated fact.

But the fact could not have its existence by itself, if it did not also find its truth in itself; in other words, its truth had to be unconditioned, final.

The old history of art consequently stands or falls by the finality of the truth of the single facts.

The synthetic history of art cannot do anything with this so-called "exact" method; it cannot possibly be "exact" in the sense the specialists are, — more precisely, as the specialists *think* they are.

The reason is obvious. The object of the synthetic history of art is not the single fact, but the relation between the facts.

I have already suggested that a relation is never self-subsistent. On the contrary, every relation implies an *infinity* of subrelations.

A "final" truth is, therefore, excluded.

In synthetic history knowledge can only be found on the endless way of knowing. It is, therefore knowledge which is never complete, never final, but which can be increased infinitely, without ever coming to an end.

This method of thinking and knowing is called the *dialectic* method.

Please do not mix up this conception of *subjective* dialectics, which is based on the book, "Theorie der Dialektik," by the former Freiburg professor, Jonas Cohn, with the conception of *objective* dialectics of the Marxists, who consider dialectics to be not a method of thinking, but a method of being, — e./g. — the law of the process of development in nature and in life.

The great majority of specialists turn up their noses at a method, which is not "exact"; science which is not "exact", they say, does not deserve the name of science.

I will try to make it clear that this conception is puerile.

If we divide 10 by 2, the quotient is 5. We need no further arithmetical operations. 5 is, so to say, a "final" truth.

If we divide 10 by 3, the quotient is 3.33333333333 etc. We can continue infinitely. The result will be more and more exact, the farther we proceed. A "final" result, however, is excluded.

Would it not be insensible to reject the second arithmetical operation on the ground that an "exact", a "final" result is not obtainable?

There are, of course, more reasons for the necessity of the dialectic method in history. For instance:

The division of the happening into periods is not conceivable without dialectics. In fact there are neither beginnings nor ends. Before every beginning is another beginning, and before this one another, and so on.

The so-called beginning is not the beginning of the period, but only the rather arbitrary beginning of our conception of the period.

In the same way, there is no end. All that ever has been continues being, maybe in a hardly recognizable form, but it will always be there.

Thus the end of a period is just as arbitrary, just as subjective, as the fixation of its beginning.

This is the reason there are no two specialists who agree on the beginnings and the ends of the art periods. Sometimes they differ for more than a hundred years. Their desperate efforts (at Congresses of History of Art) to come to a general agreement, and their belief that such an agreement is possible, proves their mechanistic way of thinking.

Another point to prove the necessity of dialectics:

Time cannot be conceived of without recourse to dialectics.

The specialized history of art can do without it, because it (*provisionally*) eliminated the category of time: it was obliged to reduce the happening of the things into things that have happened.

The synthetic history of art was obliged to restore the category of time and evoked therewith a number of insoluble contradictions.

In the first place, what is time? Is the present moment passing and time standing still, or is the present moment standing still and time going on?

Can there be a question about "the present", as we speak of the past and the future? Is there a present? Or is there only a continuous transition of the future into the past, or of the past into the future?

Between future and past is nothing but an imaginary limit.

Does a "present" without any extension, and, therefore, without time, belong to time?

Similar contradictions arise as soon as we try to describe a development, — for instance, the contradictory identity of a thing that changes. Within about seven years our body has changed so completely that no atom of the former body is left. Nevertheless it is the same body.

It would lead us too far afield were I to expatiate on the necessity of the dialectic method in synthetic history of art. Let me rather refer to the best book that has ever been written on this subject, Jonas Cohn's "Theorie der Dialektik" (Leipzig 1923). Those who would not agree with Cohn's idealistic philosophy need not be scared away from this excellent study. The point at issue for us is the *method*, which is not modified the least by the kind of philosophy to which it is applied.

One point I have yet to make.

The famous "exactness" the specialists are so very proud of is in fact no exactness at all.

Their partial truths are not "final", as they pretend them to be. They are just as conditional as the "truths" of the synthetic history of art.

The truth, for example, of the fact "Bach was born in 1685," which all the specialists call final, is dependent on the axioms of Euclid, the truths of the chronology, the astronomy, the cosmology, etc. etc., which on their turn base on other truths, and so on.

The "exactness" of the specialists is imaginary. It is the renunciation of the last exactness for fear of its unattainableness.

"Exactness" can only mean the attempt to be as exact as possible.

But are the synthesists not driving towards the same end? Properly speaking the latter are more exact than the specialists, since they, for instance, do not absolutize relativities, which specialists do professionally and continuously. The isolation of the facts from the other facts, — in other words, the negation of the relations of the facts, is an unscientific absolutization of a relativity, which might be necessary at the beginning of history of art as a science, but becomes inexcusable as soon as this early necessity has ceased.

The synthesists, on the contrary, will never omit emphasizing the relativity of all that has happened and all that was and is happening, since this is the basis of synthetic history of art.

And now the last point of difference:

It is beyond doubt that every period has its own form of economy, its own form of society, its own form of government, its own philosophy, its own style of art, literature and music, and, of course, also its own form and method of science. In the different countries this general form will be shaded according to the special territorial (material) conditions and the special character of the old forms out of which the new ones developed.

We can put this phenomenon in a word: all manifestations of life are historically conditioned, and, therefore, they are without any exception interconnected. A change of the whole of life cannot but cause a change of each and all the parts which constitute the whole, and a change of one of the parts cannot but have its influence on the totality.

The period which began about the middle of the nineteenth century and lasted till about the end of the World War was a period of hyperindividualism, similar to the era from 1450 till about 1550, when the Church had completely lost her influence on life, and no worldly power was still on hand (absolutism did not start before the middle of the sixteenth century) to resist the extravagances of individualism in nearly all domains of life.

For the eminently individualistic character of the period 1850 to 1920 I only need remind my readers of the philosophers Stirner (the author of "The Ego and his Own") and Nietzsche (1844-

1900), who taught that the individual is the measure of all things, that the right of the individual goes as far as his might reaches, etc., and of the great figures of capitalism, who practiced Nietzsche's superman theory in trade and industry.

The form of art history of this period, the specialized form, was the perfect expression of the prevailing hyperindividualistic view of life.

I have already had occasion to mention briefly the individualistic character of the specialized history of art, which reached its culminating-point in the first decade of the twentieth century.

The cell of the science is the individual fact, the body of the science a collection of facts, which do not give up their individuality in the grouping.

Not only the object, but also the subject of the science, the specialist himself, strikes a pronouncedly individualistic attitude.

There was no question of any cooperation, of any planning in this period. Every one had his own way, did just what he liked. "Chacun fait plus ou moins ce qu'il veut, de telle manière que, non seulement dans les congrès, mais aussi au sein des instituts, on parle et on écrit sans s'inquiéter l'un de l'autre," complained Joseph Strzygowski, the president of the Eighth International Congress for History of Art.

Every year three or four books were written on exactly the same subject.

In years of jubilees dozens of books were published on the occasional victims: Rembrandt, or Goethe, or Bach, or Mozart. They seldom brought anything new; they were mostly useless compilations of the great standard works, if not compilations of compilations.

Every year new histories of art were, and are still edited, although the shelves of the libraries are bending and creaking and groaning under the burden of the old ones. It would be a great event if at least one of them were anything else than the usual annoying stamp collection of facts and dates, but the new ones are all composed, or better, compiled, in the same old way. The only changes are the illustrations and the aesthetic approach of the author.

These are some of the blessings of individualism.

One may wonder whether books like "La Civilisation Occidentale au Moyen Age" (Paris 1935) by Pirenne, Cohen and Focillon, or "Arts plastiques, Arts littéraires et la Civilisation française" by Réau and Cohen are not specimens of cooperation. I do not think so. The fact that two or three authors publish their individual researches, each in his own domain, in one volume, is not yet cooperation. How individual each one's contribution was, is evident from the following facts.

Henri Pirenne's part could be published separately in an English translation ("Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe" New York 1939) and perfectly understood without referring to the parts by his colleagues Cohen and Focillon.

In the work by Réau and Cohen you can find interpretations of the same fact by one author, which are quite contrary to the interpretations by the other author.

It is an undeniable fact that from the very beginning art has by Pirenne, Renaudet, Perroy, Handelsman and Halphen the fence between the domains of the five authors have disappeared. However, if I am well informed, this was achieved not through cooperation *during* the composition, but only through editing of the text, through piecing together the individual contributions *after* the individual composition was finished.

The individualistic attitude is especially manifest in books and articles, which contain principally either utterly subtle and acute and delicate and refined speculations *beside the question*, or material that is no longer serviceable to the only object of art history: the preparation of the ground for living through the works of art.

It is an undeniable fact that from the very bginning art has been exclusively created as a means of communicating inner experiences.

Art has never been created as a trapeze for the intellectual acrobats of later generations, nor as a show case for the display of useless futilities, that have been grubbed out in archives. Besides, the only ones who press their noses flat against the glass behind which these valueless valuables are exhibited, are generally the author himself, and two or three specially initiated hyperspecialized subspecialists.

The publications just mentioned are typical for the later indi-

vidualistic period. The art historian is here no longer the humble and anonymous servant of the artist, which he should be; on the contrary, the artist — and the greater he is, the better, is subordinated to the intellectualism of the sovereign art historian.

We find this elevation of the tiny self over the great masters of the past everywhere:

In the domain of aesthetics in the presumptuous attitude of the subjectivists (Victor Basch, Bergson, Delacroix, Lalo, Laudry) who do not care for the intention of the artist; if *they* enjoy his work as beauty, the work is settled; then it *is* a realization of beauty, whatever the purpose of the creator of this work might have been.

In the domain of music, where we are thrown upon the continuous reproduction of the old works, this individualistic attitude is most provoking, especially in the performances of eighteenth century music.

However, for the past twenty years the era of individualism with its tremendous achievements, but also its tremendous defects is in a state of transition, the tempo of which is recently accelerating in such a way, that we are nearly taken with dizziness.

The fundamental relation between community and individual is shifting.

Before approximately 1920 the economic, social, political, etc. collectivities were completely subordinated to the individual, or at least, to a relatively small group of individuals; after 1920 the general tendency is: subordinating the individual to the collectivity.

Individualism has not stopped herewith, and will never stop: nothing that existed can ever cease to be. We may even say that nowadays the possibilities of cultivating one's individuality are greater and more stressed than they ever were, and are gradually extending to larger and larger circles. But the individual capacities and capabilities are now cultivated in the first place for the sake of the whole, and for the individual only as far as he is a part of it. In a word, the collectivity is no longer there for the sake of the individual, but the individual is there for the sake of the collectivity.

What kind of collectivity?

Here the opinions differ. The Nazis and Fascists believe in the

collective of the race, the socialists in the collective of the workers of all countries, the Christians in the collective of the children of one and the same God Father, and in America the individual importance has come to be seen in its relationship to the welfare of the whole of the burghers of the States.

The worth or the worthlessness of each of these different opinions does not interest us in this context. Momentous for us is only the irrefutable fact, that the period of individualism is gradually passing away, and that for the last twenty years all over the world a process of disindividualization is going on, which cannot be stopped.

It is utterly significant that over the same period the leading historians of art have been lamenting over a crisis in their field.

I will only quote what Professor Joseph Strzygowski said: ("L'avenir des méthodes de recherches en matière de beaux arts" in "Office des Instituts d'Archéologie et d'Histoire de l'Art" Paris 1937). "Nous nous trouvons devant un chaos et il nous faut essayer aussitôt que possible, d'arriver en commun à une nouvelle construction. En ma qualité de président, du huitième Congrès international d'Histoire de l'Art j'ai, en 1907 déjà, soumis cet état de choses á la discussion de cette réunion . . . Cependant, aucune amélioration ne s'est produite et trente ans plus tard, c'est l' Office international des Instituts d'Archéologie et d'Histoire de l' Art qui entreprend de nouveau de porter remède à cette situation."

All kind of reasons have been given for this crisis.

The proper reason, which up to now has never been hinted at, is, in my opinion, the growing discrepancy between the no longer purely individualistic form of life and the still purely individualistic (specialized) form of history of art.

In the last twenty years life and history of art have lived away from each other. Life lived on, and changed, and changed, recently in a tempo, with which it is hardly possible to keep pace, and in the midst of this general disindividualization, the form of history of art has remained unalterably the same as that of a century ago.

Outside the sanctuary of the highpriests of history of art all forces are driving at synthesization.

Inside the sanctuary all continues in the same rut.

The specialists are not even aware that their students are nearly

getting sick of these endless recitations of facts and dates, and facts and dates, and nothing else than facts and dates.

Again and again the students could not stand it any longer. It no longer remained a secret grumbling. They suddenly blurted out their discontent, as, for example, the Student Council curriculum committee of City College, New York, did in **1939**: "The aesthetic studies at our College instill a distaste for art, music and literature in the minds of many students." They requested courses designed to bring the particular subject into a relationship with society. In other words, synthetic history of art, synthetic history of literature, synthetic history of music.

Maybe this report stimulated the Board of Higher Education to expedite their preparations for the introduction of 'courses in humanities at all the colleges of the City of New York, such as are already being given at the Universities of Wisconsin, Chicago, and Florida, in order to pull down the walls between the different departments, and make an end of the fatal isolation of all the disciplines. Humanities is the first step to synthesization.

In all vital centers of U. S. A. we meet the same trend toward synthesization.

"Yale is concerned," says President Charles W. Seymour, "to have philosophy brought into fruitful relationship with the social studies and with studies in government, economics, anthropology and law." And last year therefore Professor Hendel was appointed to inaugurate systematic work in this field.

At Harvard the tendency has been for many years to break down the barriers separating the departments, wrote "The Times" under the glorious heading: "Harvard system to offset stress on specialization."

Dean Landis of the Harvard Law School recommended in his last annual report "to bring professional students into contact with the techniques of other sciences and other disciplines." He mentioned economics, psychology, anthropology, medicine and governmnt as studies that the apprentice attorneys may be asked to look into—not as separate subjects but integrated "in the teaching of law itself." Any one should realize that law is an inseparable part of all human experience, he said. And the Editorial of "The Times", which brought this important message, added: "Perhaps in time we

will get back to the old ideal of a republic of learning, *in which no scrap of knowledge lives to itself alone — nor any one individual to himself alone.*"

The next day Charles S. Mirkin wrote in answer to this Editorial: "Your editorial comment deserves, in my opinion, four stars — using four stars as a symbol of the very best possible. Being a practitioner of medicine for almost twenty years, it pleases me to note that at last the molders of public opinion sense the fact that the pendulum toward specialization is swinging too far. The plea for a more moderate view is needed. A great service to humanity will thus be rendered. One of the great dangers of specialization is the fact that specialization of itself is endless, even the specialists specialize among themselves. The second evil is the superority complex that develops in the specialists . . . The third abuse is that the specialist and the super-imposed specialist become so narrowed in viewpoint that the services of a placement practitioner are needed."

Walter Gropius, chairman of the Harvard School of Architecture, pleads for synthesization in his special domain in the following words ("Task", Summer 1941, p. 34): "Absorbed by the great task of conquering nature through individual specialization in science during the last generations, we lost touch with the totality of life and with its social implications. Beyond that advancing civilization achieved by the minute analysis of the scientist, education has now to lead the way towards a new social culture. For that, then, youth must be primarily prepared by a constructive system of education which has to put the emphasis of its efforts on social integration rather than on specialization."

Interesting is the attitude of Professor Dr. R. Planck, the great scholar of the quantum theory. In 1937 in Karlsruhe he pointed to the amazing development of the different sciences and the lack of an organic synthesization of the specialized knowledges, so that we sorely feel the need of a closed scientific view of the world. From the exact natural sciences, Planck assures us, a nearly continuous way leads to the cultural sciences (Geisteswissnschaften), and past them to the arts, and on the boundary posts we find the names biology, psychology, sociology and history.

These few quotations, which could easily be multiplied, give evidence that the general tendency is to synthesize, in accordance

with, and as the reflexes of, growing disindividualization in economic and social structures, government and politics, just as specialization was the reflex of individualism in the period that now lies behind us.

Before concluding I find it necessary to emphasize that the synthetic history of art implies as great a number of contradictions as the specialized history of art did, and might just as well develop defects endangering the sound development of art history.

The fact that synthetic history of art is a higher form may be an inducement to an overestimation of the new and an underestimation of the old history of art.

Such an attitude could lead to a neglect of the elements of the science, the facts, on which any synthesis has to be and can only be built up.

The inevitable result would then be a superficiality and a shallowness such as we have never seen in specialized works.

The synthesist can never be at the same time a specialist. He will always be thrown upon the latter, apart from the fact that there are still many periods which cannot yet be synthesized, since the material is not yet collected, delimited, ordered and registered. Only specialists will be able to analyze these periods and do the preparatory work for the synthesists.

Therefore, if ever the day should come when the synthesists will stand around the grave of the last specialist, it would mean not only the end of specialization, but also the end of the whole history of art.

Thus not replacement of specialized by synthetic history of art but intimate cooperation of both, is what we are in need of. And this aim can only be attained after removing the greatest present obstacle to a sound development, *the fatal substantialization of specialization.*

Brooklyn College.

Aesthetics of Stage and Screen

BY

RENATO POGGIOLI

THE aesthetics of the arts of dramatic representation are liable, more than any other, to disintegrate into rhetoric. In other words, there is the tendency to formulate a series of practical norms which constitute a body of precepts from which it is then possible to draw accurate and definitive distinctions of *genre.* This follows naturally from the enormous weight these arts give to technique which is a fundamental element of them. Technique is the voltage which overcomes, by the intensity of action, the enormous resistance of the material and by its sometimes miraculous results can rise to the level of a modern magic.

The differentiation of genre, the contrast of aesthetic and technical distinctions, are most apparent if the arts of the theater and the screen can be compared. The differences are very real, notwithstanding the fact that both are dependent on the work and supervision of a director and that they are in a way grouped together because of his nominal identity in both arts. Actually, the director who works for the stage and the director who deals with the screen are two distinct artists, completely different and contradictory. Except that the same word is used to describe both, there is nothing which relates or unites them: the ends they seek, the means and the tools they adopt, their very relation as creative artists toward the fruits of their labor, in all these things they differ amazingly, and I might also say they go so far as to be in opposition one to the other.

The first distinction between them is of a metaphysical character: it consists in their different concept and use of the categories

of time and space. On the stage time and space preserve the same fatality that they impose inexorably on the will and desires of men in real life and in earthly existence. To give an overly simple example of this fatality: a chair, motionless on the stage, will remain for the duration of a whole act equally distant from the eye of a given spectator, and the pendulum clock hung from a papier-mache wall, while it may indicate a false hour, nevertheless calculates precisely the actual length of a dialogue or scene. The famous Shakesperian and romantic revolt against the three classic, Aristotelian unities is no more than a merely conventional reform, because it reduces itself to the geographic suggestions of pure and simple stage directions and is limited to an assumption of temporal values that are impossible for the ten minutes of a regular intermission. But it did not succeed in creating a fourth dimension nor in endowing the actors with any Ariel-like talents, for they remain subject as always to the impassable limits of motion.

The movie director, on the other hand, can condense or prolong the intervals of time and space as he pleases. In his case the rhythm of the action and the particular cadences of alternation are not dictated by the need for contiguity or continuity. One can say that on the screen, contrary to the old formula, *natura facit saltus.* The movie director can make us pass in immediate succession from the complete picture of a person to a close-up of a mouth or a hand. He can throw on the screen the most epic, unreal and vertiginous gallop and then he can dissect the motion of a man on horseback through the syncopation and artificial paralysis of slow-motion. He can, if he likes, carry us away to a real country, he can film an "outside" of the Sahara desert. But in relation to the surroundings it ostensibly reproduces, the most realistic stage scenography remains as conventional as the wood placards of the Elizabeth stage which stipulated "forest" or "castlet."

There is an even more essential distinction to be established between these two different types of artists which has to do with the concrete, human value of their work. It must be said that the screen director is a creator, an evocator, while the theatrical director is nothing more nor less than an interpreter. As everyone knows, he serves, or ought to serve, the dramatic, literary work that he is producing. For that matter, the liberties that are taken or the mutilations that are imposed on the living body of the script (and

even the hypertrophic tendencies of modern directing which induce the so-called "rejuvenation of the classics") never quite succeed in changing the innate character of an imaginative inspiration. That essence will remain intact through all the distortion and revision of that translation which is called a production. The screen director, on the contrary, knows absolutely nothing of that formula "In the beginning was the Word" and in fact without any scruple he subordinates the more or less detailed, chaotic outline of the scenario to his own stylistic exigencies and his particular poetic motives.

The numerous active elements that are subject to the dictatorship of the stage director, like the stage designer and the actors, are aware of the fact that it is a subordinate authority they obey. Similarly, they do not fail to realize how valid their own intervention is in producing the laborious, complicated miracle of a play. Although they keep to their subordinate position, the actor and the stage designer know that they bring the original, unpredictable influence of their own personalities to the rehearsal and preparation of the play. In this way they are able somewhat to guide the hand of the director in composing and modelling the material of the theatrical art in quite unforeseen ways. That artist is faced with a difficult, hopeless task. He must foresee everything, only to declare unconditional surrender before the siege and attack of the unforeseeable.

The movie director, on the contrary, can welcome the surprises and rebellions of the unexpected with a light heart. He cherishes the absolute certainty that he can kill them or cure them later, in the final and creative phase of his work which is called montage. For all that it comes last, he must have a predetermined, unified sense of the montage from the first scene he shoots. Then, as if he were cutting the Gordian knot, he resolves all the complex empirical and irrational problems, and especially the creative problems of his work. When he has assembled, as if on an anatomical table, all the rolls of films and begins to select the shots of one or more scenes and to compose the sequences, or when, in other words, all the research and accomplishment of the artistic and technical effort that he has guided are reduced to pure matter, crystallized and inert, he blows upon them like God on the clay of Adam and evokes the vital, unmistakable character of the work which no one before him could foresee. What he creates may appear to be a mosaic, but in

reality it is a composition. Thus he brings forth a new artistic creature, born of his own inspiration, like Minerva from the head of Jove. At this fatal, decisive moment, the work of a director who is preparing a film can be compared to that of an engraver who, in every tracing on the copper, divines with conscious skill the final effect that the first printing will produce.

It is the aesthetic factor of montage which determines the particular nature of the film actor. He cannot under any circumstances consider himself as a conscious, reasoning collaborator in the film because of the use of close-ups and the speed of flashbacks. On the contrary, he must humiliate himself to the level of an anonymous, unwrought object which assumes in the film the same relief that in a still life is taken by colored fruit on a white dish. The exceptions of a Charlie Chaplin or a Greta Garbo prove rather than disprove the rule. And the counter-proof is that normally it is impossible to transplant an authentic stage actor to the screen. He is absolutely incapable of adjusting himself to such extremes of the fragmentary and the passive. The stability of the frame within which he functions and the fidelity which he owes to the real laws of time and space serve to keep alive in him anawareness of the frame and perspective and give him that sense of being a central, active element of the performance. Furthermore, even in the most complicated scenes, which have been carefully worked out and fused, he represents every time something that is irreproducible, something that is always new.

The public, when it goes to one or the other of these two kinds of productions, finds itself in completely different situations. In the case of a play, a new or special edition of a pre-existing work is presented to its view. In the case of the film, it can follow the mechanical reproduction in facsimile of an original work, perfect in itself. If we want to compare these two artstic genres to the reading of a book, we could say that the reader of one leafs through a manuscript, and the other reads the text in any one of a number of editions. All of which means that in the theater one recognizes and appreciates the author through the script of the amanuensis who has transcribed him; in the movies one judges directly and definitively the one person responsible for the work of art.

Using a comparison again, we can say that the relation between the film and its creator is the same as exists between the composer

and the record incised with his music. The theatrical director shares rather the character of the orchestra leader who conducts the performance of a composition not his own. But the orchestra conductor can at least enjoy the privilege of taking an active part in the performance for which he is responsible and is somewhat like a cavalry officer at the head of his troop. The stage director, like a useless, superfluous demiurge, must take himself off and disappear before the curtain goes up. Impotent, he can watch the performance from the wings without being able to intervene with so much as an unseen, unheeded gesture. At that moment he resembles a father or a teacher who has spent long years in bringing up and educating a child, and having accompanied him to the threshold of the schoolroom, has to wait on the doorstep for the results of the examination. His torment, both as man and artist, consists in this mortal separation from his creature at the precise moment when it must prove itself.

But the acute paradox of his relationship with the actor is only one particular, contingent episode in his creative tragedy. Let us consider, for example, the two quintessences of the screen and stage performance, i.e., the animated cartoon and the puppet theater. Both appear to be minor genres, but in substance they are typical and in both almost all the secondary elements of the two major arts are eliminated. The hybrid monster of reciter and mime is sacrificed on the altar of pure, synthetic fantasy by being reduced to the lines of a drawing or the strings of a marionette. Nonetheless, the positive and negative relationship between the author of the animated cartoon or puppeteer and the product of their work remains the same as that of the two other directors. In fact the one can create his own world from nothing and succeeds even in abolishing the influence of flesh and blood actors. His rival, the puppeteer, is always a slave to the text that must be read, although it can be anonymous or taken from folklore, and given his nature as performer, he cannot leave his audience with the model of a transcendent, definitive performance. Every form of scenic art is condemned to a futile aspiring after the absolute and to a rigid imprisonment within the confines of the immanent. No daring attempt at abstraction has ever availed to save it, anymore than has the tragic or comic character of the classics, the "living mask" of the moderns, or the "super-puppet" envisaged by Gordon Craig.

Recently the movies and also the animated cartoon have stolen acoustic values, such as voice and sound, which had seemed to be the exclusive and inalienable property of the theater and have thereby enriched immeasurably the already vast keyboard of expression. In the case of at least a few screen masterpieces it has been possible to subordinate these new values as well to the synthetic control of the director who, capturing them on the sound tract, removes them once and forever from the anarchy of the casual and the arbitrary.

The one point where cinema and theater coincide is the negative one of error which, in both cases, consists in the failure of either to observe the inner laws of its art. The worst film is the one that disobeys its function of evocation and narration for the sake of a "beautiful shot" or indulges in a poetic "sequence" quite as much removed from the course of action as a picture when it is taken from its frame. The worst stage director is one who renounces his duty of externalizing in action the latent dynamism of the dialogue and the psychology of the characters in order to stylize his productio nas a consciously aesthetic composition. The two-dimensional nature of the screen and the three-dimensional character of the stage are the means and not the ends of expression in the two arts. The film that leans toward the impressionistic and picturesque, like "don Quixote" of Pabst, and the theater that strives for the architectural and statuesque, like some productions of Tairov, are sinning against nature. They prostitute their own moving and romantic qualities for something that is merely static and fragmentary.

Even the most vulgar and mediocre old hands of the theater never fell into such mistakes. They erred, if at all, on the side of excess with their cult of the *deus ex machina* and their dramatic climaxes. In the field of the film, it is primarily the Americans and the Russians who perceive the need for movement and rhythm. The Americans have understood these two essentials almost exclusively in terms of content or plot, whereas the Russians have translated them into formal, stylistic problems. They have been led in this direction by their unparalleled artistic instinct and perception, and perhaps also by a particular historical contingency. Both the severest critics and the most unreserved admirers of the Soviet films condemn them as unilateral and artistically impure because they

are governed by the whip of social and political regimentation. However, they fail to realize that the proscribed theme, the fact that material is limited to objects like the Revolution, civil war and Bolshevik factories has one great merit: it has eliminated any possible over-preoccupation with subject matter and has forced the director to express his creativeness and originality rather in the line and cadence of his film. The American movie, on the other hand, is on an endless search after novelty, novelty of background, locale, adventure and plot, with the result that it often falls into merely passive description, or even into didactic vulgarization.

The theatrical performance is rescued from the dangers of dualism of form and content because, being subordinate to the text, it is of a secondary rather than primary nature. Like every work of translation, theatrical interpretation is a problem of style and taste; it is a kind of exquisitely formal research. However, from this relative aesthetic and even technical inferiority there is a positive moral consideration to be deduced in compensation which allows the stage director to win in the end over his much more privileged antagonist. In spite of its youth and with the exception of a few masterpieces, the screen ages precociously, while every season the stage, like the phoenix, is reborn from its own ashes. The stage director can renew and revive his creature continually; he can discard faded or old-fashioned gowns to deck it out in fresh, shining costumes. With a touch or gesture, he can restore its youth. In other words, although his devices are more ephemeral, he collaborates in the immortality of Sophocles and Shakespeare, of Calderon and Moliere.

Brown University.

The Logical Value of the Objects of Art

BY

JAMES FEIBLEMAN

THE philosophy of art requires both art and philosophy. A theory of aesthetics to be valid must be deducible from some valid metaphysics and consistent with the actual practices prevailing in the world of art. This is easier to say than to verify. How many will agree, for example, about the valid metaphysics? Nevertheless, the problems exist; and as attempts have already been made to solve them, so they will continue to be made in the future, perhaps one day successfully. In an essay, little more comprehensive can be attempted than the barest outline of what such a scheme could be. The suggestion rather than the full exposition of a position leaves much to be desired, and any statement which is neither argued nor defended can claim to set forth only the program for a theory. Until later essays can carry the development, the reader is left to expand the hypothesis for himself and to do his own verification as to its agreement, or disagreement, with experiences in the ways of art. In the meantime it should be possible to discern behind these notes the metaphysics in terms of which they are rendered systematic.[1]

We may begin with the role of the artist, since it is he who, in the popular opinion, is responsible for there being any art at all.

[1] See Feibleman, *In Praise of Comedy*, ch. IV; and Friend and Feibleman, *The Unlimited Community*.

It is true that he may be considered to be near the beginning of the temporal sequence in the production of a work of art, since without artists it is unlikely that there would be much art. There would be some, however, for objects of art exist which were never the products of human hands. Consider, for instance, those wonderful wood carvings which have been modelled by the actions of rivers; few would deny their artistic merit.

Although the first place in importance must be reserved for the work of art, the artist has his own significance, which can only be explained in terms of reaction. He is that human being whose extraordinary awareness renders him capable of serving as a medium for the functioning of the artistic method. He is a kind of sensitive receiving mechanism for the apprehension of value in communicable form; that is, value in the range of symbolism where most significance and least material prevail. The passivity of his role has been underestimated; he is not a creator but a discoverer of beautiful things. The works of art for which he is given credit were always possible and are only actualized by him. Thus the artistic impulse is a drive instigated from without, from the beautiful aspects of external existence, and not originally an inner urge of the artist. Although the artistic method works on external material *through* him and not *from* him, still it could not work *without* him. Only by chance can objects get themselves transformed into aesthetic objects without some assistance. But from the point of view of an object, in order to achieve the condition of art, the logical thing to do, so to speak, is to be provided with the services of an artist.

If everything that could be called art were to exist only inside the mind of the artist, it would be logical to consider aesthetics a branch of psychology. Just the opposite is true, however. The psychology of the artist is a branch of psychology, not of art. Its domain adjoins more closely to those of other divisions of psychology than it does to aesthetics. The impulse toward artistic endeaver, the materials upon which the artist works, and the finished work of

art, all exist externally to the artist and come to him from the outside. The actual world, we may almost say, is responsible for those alterations of some of its parts into works of art, since the conditions as well as the stimulus of art are in one sense foreign to the artist. He meets those conditions and reacts to that stimulus simply because, given his own capacity for sensibilities, he has to As any great artist will testify, the conception of a work of art comes to him and asks to be executed. If he should ignore it, the request then becomes a command. Its production in either case is merely a result of his obedience.

The distinction between the artist as passive and as active executor of the artistic process lies in the difference between skill and technique. The skilled artist simply reacts to the artistic stimulus in a naive, i.e. an uncontrolled, way. The "primitive", that is, the untrained, artist does not lean upon any objective technique, as the trained artist does. Training requires control; it demands active participation in a way which is not explained so readily by the notion of reaction. The mind of the artist is involved in the process, but the process, as well as the finished product, are more easily seen to be independent of the artist himself.

Once a work of art has been completed, the usefulness to it of the artist, *qua* artist, comes to an end. He now stands outside it as completely as does any other spectator. As a critic of even his own work, he can have therefore only the status of an amateur. The statement of the psychological processes undergone by the artist while actively engaged in the production of a work of art cannot be adduced as an evaluation or full explanation of the value of the work of art itself. The work of art leads a life of its own, just as the artist does; it has its own value and validity, and engages upon its own adventures.

We may view the artistic method in action, as we have been doing, or we may attempt to make a more logical analysis of it. For there does exist an universal and logically consistent method

of art, susceptible of abstraction from the particular instances of its exemplification. Artists at work at any date and place rely implicitly upon a constant procedure. The actual relations of things and events having merely pedestrian value suggest by means of induction the abstract hypothetical possibility of constructing other things which can reveal new relations, and in terms of which greater value can be actualized. The hypothesis is next exemplified actually by deduction in a concrete work, the production of which is guided and corrected analogically in terms of the symbolic value sought by means of the hypothesis.

Thus far we have said nothing which would distinguish the making of a work of art from the making of a better mouse trap. All makers are engaged in imitating the independently ideal. The only difference between an article of utility and a work of art is that the latter is affectively referential. The article of utility illustrates in action its own value: it can be used. The work of art has no use *as* a work of art other than to refer significantly to greater value: it is a symbol, and its symbolic value is its only meaning. The artistic method is the method of *making;* what is made depends upon the level of reference involved. Works of art are peculiarly referential objects; they are good for nothing, we may say, except the reference to beauty.

We cannot verify the steps which have been taken in any particular past instance of the artistic method, but let us for the purposes of illustration suppose that we can. We may then imagine that there was an ordinary chair in Van Gogh's bedroom, a chair which other persons had viewed many times without having had it suggest anything to them. To Van Gogh, however, it suggested the possibility of an ideal chair, and he almost felt the impact upon himself of the sensation of this ideal. It made him reach for it, so to speak, and in this process occasioned in his mind an universal diagram, which was certainly accompanied by an image, of the chair as it ought to be. Van Gogh, then, with the diagram of the chair in the

foreground of his conscious mind, proceeded to imitate it with paint on canvas. The result is a painting, which falls as far short of Van Gogh's diagram as the diagram itself does of the ideal, but which is nevertheless aimed at the ideal.

The artistic method consists in the imitation of things as they ought to be. Plato conceived art as imitation, but thought that art was engaged in imitating things as they are. He said that there are three beds: God's ideal bed, the carpenter's actuality, and the painter's imitation, and he concluded that the painter as the producer of the most diluted version was "thrice removed from the truth."[2] He assumed, of course, that the painter was, in the production of his bed, imitating both the others, but in that assumption there was an error. For the ideal bed is suggested to the painter's mind by the carpenter's actuality, yet it is the ideal alone which the painter is imitating. Thus he is no further from and no closer to the ideal than is the carpenter. Both are producing beds in imitation of the ideal, but they produce different kinds of beds for different purposes. Without the carpenter's bed, it is doubtful if there would be any painter's: their uses are different, and assuredly, the carpenter's is a prerequisite for the painter. But as value theorists never tire of pointing out, a great politician may be dependent upon his cook, but that does not prevent the art of ruling from being something higher in value than the culinary art. The painter's bed is "higher" in value than the carpenter's.

The artistic method is seen to be a logical process involving both the inductive and the deductive methods, inseparably weaving into a single context both actual things and the abstract logical possibility of value. The most important part of the process, it must be admitted, is the artistic induction which is the logical opposite number of what has been called "artistic intuition". But since from the point of view of logical analysis, it consists in the choosing of premises for deduction, the fact remains that such inductive proces-

2. *Republic, X*, 596-8.

ses, and indeed the whole artistic method, rests upon the prior assumption of a logical scheme in terms of which the inductions are made. Thus, although the insight of the "creative" mind is an indispensable tool in the production of works of art, it yet remains true that the process as well as the final product of the system itself, possesses a strictly logical structure. The "genius" of the artist lies largely in his ingenuity in choosing premises, his foresight in selecting just those premises which will be abundantly suggestive of actual deductions. Once they have been chosen, he may exercise the remainder of his ingenuity in the determination of what deductions may be drawn. In a perfect work of art, all possible deductions are drawn.

It should be added parenthetically that although the artist is seldom if ever explicitly aware of the logic in which he is involved, this is not to detract from his contribution, which is considerable, but merely to call attention to the fact that the end-product of the artistic process is entirely independent of the artist. The artistic method is a dependable one, since even explicitly held artistic theories which are false do not necessarily mislead artists in their work. There are such things as artists who do good work from bad theories. The reason for this is that all artists at work are actually following the true artistic theory which they hold implicitly. But in the artistic method, as in the scientific one, to work from a theory does not mean necessarily to be conscious of it.

With an abstracted artistic method, it will not be possible for everyone to become an artist. It will mean, however, that artists can be aided in the development of their activity, and that apprentices can be taught more than the imitation of the style of their masters. Small artists will be able to advance art a little, instead of not at all, just as petty scientists manage to contribute to the progress of science. And, finally, critics and appreciators will have a guide to the understanding and hence also to the feeling of the beauty of particular works of art.

But that the abstract logical structure of the work of art is important to esthetics has become increasingly evident as we have proceeded in our investigation. It will be well at this point, therefore, to discuss the logic of art apart from artists who rely upon it in the artistic method and as distinct from the particular works of art which exemplify it.

All concrete things and events, like abstract systems, possess formal structures. This formal structure consists in a set of postulates, a chain of deductions which necessarily follow, and rigorous conclusions. This is not always the way in which the thing or event has been constructed historically, and it is not necessarily the way in which it is apprehended psychologically. But it is the logical form which the work of art has by virtue of what it is. The formal structure of a thing or event can only be examined by considering that thing or event in quasi-isolation from its environment. A thing or event may be abstracted from its context in the stream of actuality and considered as a self-contained system. The fact that the postulates may be implicit rather than explicit, the deductive implications inherent in the structure itself, and the conclusions tacitly pointed toward the meaning of the thing or event as a whole, does not alter the fundamentally logical validity of the structure.

Now, what is true of concrete things and abstract systems is also true of works of art. For works of art also have their formal structures, though these are not so readily obvious. As a matter of record, a close inspection of any work of art will bear out the truth of this contention. In arts which require a sequence of time for their expression, such as music, the drama, or the novel, the logical structure is more obvious than in others, such as the plastic arts of painting and sculpture.[3] But the structure is equally present in both

[3] Of course all concrete works of art require time for their unfolding. It is in time that the appreciation of a small piece of sculpture may take place. What is meant here is rather that some works of art, e.g., a fugue, requires a time sequence for their expression, whereas a carving is intended to be grasped as a whole, and there is no unfolding in the same time sense.

types of art. As Plato said, "order in motion is an imitation of the stable".[4] For instance, the "theme and variations" scheme of many musical scores has a logical form which lies, fairly obvious, at the surface. Indeed it is well known that any thorough musical appreciation must be grounded in an understanding of the form of the composition. The theme, or themes, announces the postulates, and the variations illustrate the deductions which are drawn from them. In the novel much the same holds true. The characters and situations as the reader finds them at the outset are here the postulates; the actions and interactions of the characters are the deductions drawn; and the climax presents the necessary conclusions toward which everything else has moved. What is true of music and fiction is equally true of every other kind of work of art: the effectiveness may always be closely identified with a rigorous logical scheme which is present even if never presented as such.

We have next to examine the relation between logical scheme and effectiveness. A logical scheme may be present in every effective work of art but does not itself constitute that effect. Logic does not constitute value but amounts rather to a limitation on it. Logic delimits value, and the logic of art is in other words describable as the structure of beauty. What we have just said of logical relations may now be applied to value elections. Every thing and event is both a center of forces and a radiator of forces. As a center of forces it may be considered itself to consist in the value of its parts to the whole. As a radiator of forces it may be considered to consist in the value it has as a whole for other wholes. Thus, beauty may be defined as the intrinsic relations of things, the perfect harmony of parts in the whole. And goodness may be defined as the extrinsic relations of things, the worth of wholes for other wholes. Thus the beautiful and the good are functionally related. A cameo is not likely to be as "good" as a mural, but is more likely to be perfected, although both cameo and mural contain some goodness and some

[4] *Laws*, II, 653-4.

beauty. Any good may be viewed as beautiful by considering a whole and its value for another whole, as themselves embraced as parts within a still larger whole. Thus, beauty can never be good enough, which is another way of saying that beauty by itself is never enough.

In the field of art, then, the conception and the materials are the objective postulates in the framework from which an inferential network of values is derived and set forth. Art exemplifies the universal value through the particular object, and works of art are insights into the perfect world of possibility.

A knowledge of the nature of the work of art is most essential to the proper functioning of art criticism. Thus, the critic of art must have in his equipment an acquaintance with the principles of esthetics. Criticism can only be valid in terms of the knowledge and appreciation of formal structure through the understanding of the objective occasion for feeling. Thus, objective criteria must be the main concern of the critic. Grades of artistic value are discoverable in terms of the analysis of their formal structures. At present, only logical criteria are available: the critic must judge in terms of the ambition of a work of art and its actual achievement. At what was the artistic method in a particular instance aimed, and how close did it come to its mark? What are the postulates of a given work of art, and how fruitful have been the inferences made from them, that is, how general is their range of inclusion and how self-consistent is the system of the deductions themselves? How much of the world does a work of art organize, and how well? The value of a work of art can best be assayed through an analysis of its logical form and extent. The limitations of language are such that we can only communicate a knowledge of logical relations. The communication of values can only be accomplished through their logical relations or through another work of art, and thus has little place in art criticism.

The logic of art is thus the tool of the critic, who must train himself to be erudite rather than nervous. Critics without the proper

philosophical preparation are merely highly impressionable people. In this sense, we have few art critics today. We have only those persons who set their sensibilities above the average, pretending to feel more reliably than most. Of course, the *De gustibus* maxim is within limits valid: we do actually feel what we think we feel. Yet to accept this canon as sufficient for the criticism of art is to render us all equally art critics, for no one is willing to admit that his sensibilities are lower than another's. No one really believes that the value of a work of art is purely a matter of opinion. It is not enough to feel correctly and to make from such feelings accurate judgments in the evaluation of works of art, even supposing this to be uniformly possible. The critic must also be prepared to explain why he holds the opinions which he has, and purpose can only be *explained* in terms of formal structure. He will not be prepared to do this so long as he holds esthetic value to be subjective. Criticism, in other words, can only be in terms of ambition and achievement — not the ambition and achievement of the artist, however, but of the work of art itself.

In addition to the shortcoming that critics today judge works of art from purely subjective feeling on the assumption that such feeling is the value of art, there is a further limitation in present day criticism. This is its decidedly negative approach. We do not have critics in the grand sense; we have only criticizers. The true critic must take the affirmative view; he must regard the shortcomings of any artist as his own special liability, and should feel obliged to shoulder the collective responsibility for the production of good work. He should be an agent of the artistic, and not a patronizing spectator who through his special gifts is entitled to remain situated above the battle. Logic may be negative, but the organization of wholes containing value are positive in function and permit the analysis of value in positive terms. Thus, the critic while dealing in logic has something positive to set forth.

If the value of a work of art is objective to the critic, it is

equally so for the appreciator. The value inheres in the work and lies potentially apprehensible in the relation between the work of art itself and the perspective in which the appreciators can be placed. By perspective here is meant not merely physical perspective. The addition of certain knowledge or the acquisition of special interest constitutes an important alteration in the perspective of an appreciator. To one who has already enjoyed Rembrandt but who fails to like El Greco, a little additional knowledge of problems and aims might be of assistance. Art appreciation, however, does not consist in any relation between work of art and appreciator, such that in the absence of an appreciator the value fails to exist. It is possible for a work of art to have great esthetic value without anyone being in a position to apprehend it. The value is actual, not only to an actual appreciator, but also to a possible perspective. It exists actually in any work of art having value, and is potentially present for appreciation. The flower that was born to blush unseen must have sweetness in order to be able to waste it on the desert air. Thus questions of taste and enjoyment properly belong to the psychology of art. To be an appreciator of art means to be placed in a certain perspective wherein the value of works of art can be felt, and this requires certain knowledge and peculiar sensibilities. A work of art is a power in the world, available to all those in whom interest develops its impact upon them.

Art is not a mere matter of entertainment, except to those who regard it passively. It is an affair in which the return is apt to be in direct ratio to the extent of the investment. It brings pleasure but requires a definite strain. The enjoyment of beauty requires extreme attention, but it does not call for violent action. The reaction to the impact of art is passive and consists chiefly in love. By means of works of art, love finds an unlimited object of its affection common to all members of society. Such works are the particular symbolic media through which the individual members of society can feel together the love which constitutes the universe. But love

cannot, like hatred, be resolved through action. Hence the act of loving is eventually an unendurable tension. It reveals a perfection which is unattainable and hence occasions a stress upon the appreciator. This is the demand of the extensive value of the good, which lies outside any work of art, no matter how large its intensive value of beauty. Thus, while the beauty of art is more diffused than the acuteness of the ugly, it is also, so far as actuality goes, limited. Art alone is not enough, even though it be an ingredient essential to the purposive life.

We have reached a point in the exposition at which it should be possible to exemplify our position by some cursory remarks in evaluation of contemporary movements in art. Great works of art are not especially helpful in illustration, since their perfection must be felt to be fully appreciated. But most movements which adopt principles and attempt to work from them, are apt to produce work which is faulty; and in the description of faults rather than in perfections the bare bones of principles more readily show through.

We shall term successful art classic. Classic art deals with what is true and therefore perennially actual. It tends toward an absolutistic logical view in that it is mainly concerned with what remains the same. It always strives to copy the ideal of what ought to be, and is thus affirmative and positive, revealing the intrinsicness of value for its own sake. An example is the sculpture of Phidias. Less successful art may be termed romantic. The romantic is concerned with those values which were actual but are now remote, the lost particularity of things and events, vividity which cannot be recaptured, events flowing by in the temporal order. It copies the actual, or what is, and is thus concerned with the immediate and the half-impermanent. These two movements, the classic and the romantic, are themselves the classic (or the romantic) alternatives which are always available to the artist and which do not exist absolutely pure in any work of art but are always mixed elements. Individual movements, however, tend to stress one as against the

other and so impart a partisan character.

All modern movements in art are predominantly romantic, in keeping with the nominalistic interests of the age which demand that actual physical particulars be alone regarded as real. Realism,[5] for instance, would reproduce, faithfully and photographically, actuality just as it is and without any affective symbolization or tendencious selection in favor of eternal values. It seeks to imitate the actual rather than the ideal, and is thus romantic. But this movement, in the alembic of the artistic method, is itself a value which is, fortunately for its success as art, unrealistic. It cannot avoid imparting symbolic value to that which it works over, and so emphasizes detail to a degree which it never claims in anyone's actual experience. Responsible for the vogue of the cinema and the novel, realism in art has been carried too far. Few cameras or human eyes are as tediously insistent upon insignificant description as are the scenes and characters in the novels of Sinclair Lewis. Yet such an insistence carries with it the implied aesthetic import of atomic particuliarity: the whole, it says, is nothing but the sum of its parts. This is bad philosophy as well as bad art.

Primitivism is in many respects the opposite of realism. It calls for simplification of presentation and hence for the elimination of insignificant detail. So called because it is native to all forms of art in primitive socities, it is accomplished in civilized societies only by the conscious exaggeration of simplicity. In civilized societies it occurs as a decadent movement — exercising healthful effects on artistic production. It is good when it eliminates the insignificant, but bad when it eliminates the significant as well, as it frequently does when it goes too far.

Movements in art help to reveal the fact that a work of art is a social object. That is to say, its meaning can be said to exist only at the level of society, since it is part of the organization of

5 Realism in aesthetic theory is the equivalent of nominalism in philosophy. Realism in philosophy, at least in the medieval sense, is the opposite of nominalism.

relations between human individuals. Its production is due to an actual person; its appreciation may be occasioned by one or more others.[6] Thus two persons at least are involved in the artistic process from production to appreciation. In addition, there is the actual thing or event which occasioned the initial reaction in the artist; and there is also the material upon which he works and which exists at a very low level indeed when considered apart from its artistic context. An actual landscape may suggest to the artist the altogether different picture which he wishes to paint, and the materials, such as oils and canvas, are in themselves almost worthless in comparison with the changes he manages to make in them. Altogether, the artistic process is a complex affair, involving materials, persons and aesthetic values to be apprehended, and its end-product is an equally complex organization. But the resultant value is independent of materials and of persons: it cannot be limited to the values of the materials or of human beings.

As social objects, works of art are indicative of the civilizations in which they are produced, being products of many of their influences. Saracenic art has much in common with other elements of Saracenic culture. But despite this close cultural affiliation, art always manages to be a little in advance of the conditions under which it arises. A degenerate civilization is most assuredly one which has reached its period of decline while so-called "degenerate" art may be very great art indeed, destined to survive by many centuries the period which produced it. The artist is "ahead of his time" by definition, since it is possible rather than actual values that he pursues; thus he walks in the vanguard of culture. The judgment of society can never be final as to the value of any given work of art.

Those who, like Schopenhauer, deprecate philosophy in comparison with art, fail to understand not only that the truth is always an aesthetic spectacle, but also that every work of art also con-

[6] Of whom the artist himself, of course, may be one.

tains the germ of a philosophy. Great art always reveals wide truth, but then so does philosophy. The presence of aesthetics as a branch of philosophy is evidence of its immaturity. Philosophy, the great mother of theory, is proudest of her children when they come of age, and, leaving the parental roof, set up in business for themselves. Aesthetics can only be a pure theory and a practical discipline, and justify its nurture by philosophy, once it has broken away from philosophy and thereby made possible the establishment of independent relations with it.

In the future, one important task of art is to learn how to make progress. If we look back over a long enough period, we can already discern some evidence of an advance. Art already has developed somewhat. Velasquez and Cézanne, for instance, certainly mark an improvement over the cave drawings of southern France and Spain' although it must be admitted that some would deny this. The progress is not in perfection of organization but rather in extent of material, but this is an improvement none the less. The cave artist did what he tried to do as well as the more modern artists, but his efforts were not as ambitious. The bulls he drew are as perfect expressions as are the apples of Cézanne and the women of Velasquez, but they do not express as much. The direction of artistic progress is toward the inclusion of more value while continuing to integrate equally well that value which is included. There is, it must be confessed, a feeling among the artists and art appreciators of today, that such notions as function, measurement, and progress in art are modern notions taken over from physics, and as such inimical to art. But the forces of nature are no less forceful for being known analytically. Control is a product of knowledge; and so it can be in the world of art. The logic of art does not wish to substitute art theory for art. The advancement of aesthetics can lead to greater art, since it does not restrict by its analysis.

The great failure to achieve progress of any magnitude in art

is evidenced by the continued inability of artists to learn very much from their predecessors. One generation of artists does manage to teach a little to those of the next. The use of fresh materials, like Duco, can be readily acquired, and so can new techniques, like perspective. But the lessons of aesthetic value must be painfully learned by each artist for himself. Artists do not yet understand how to build upon one another's work, as scientists can; they still start painfully from the beginning. This shortcoming, however, is not their fault, but should be laid at the door of aestheticians who have not yet worked out the principles. Contrary to current opinion, the use of the tools of reason does not preclude intuition, anymore than it has in scientific endeavor. Artists will certainly learn some day. When they are able to avail themselves of mathematical formulation as well as of artistic intuition, the jump forward will be immense, and human life will acquire a new intensity, hitherto undreamed. There is a suggestion of the future in Kant's association of the aesthetic with the faculty of judgment, even though he did nullify the vision by resting it on subjective grounds. Human sensibility can advance no faster in acuity and extension than art makes possible. For the aim of art is to appreciate and increase the apprehension of value, just as science seeks to understand and control the relations, of the actual universe, so that between the complementary endeavors of art and science, in Unamuno's phrase, the universe can be handed back to God in order.

A Note on the Nature of Tone

BY

ARTHUR V. BERGER

THE differentia of tone is commonly acknowledged to be pitch. Pitch is a *sui generis* auditory quality which all but the tone-deaf know by direct experience. Experience of pitch involves the consciousness of a continuum in which a given sound is at a fixed point higher or lower than a second sound. If the second sound is higher than the given one, the given one will be lower than the second sound. Conversely, if the second sound is lower than the given one, the given one will be higher than the second one.

The words "higher" and "lower" suggest space. But if pitch is an attribute of the sound world, how can it have spacial character? Sound, though it may be generated in space, comprises a separate dimension of the world on parallel footing, so to speak, with space. Space may be seen and felt, while sound may be only heard.

It should be observed, however, that the pitch continuum embodies serial order. Now, serial orders, possibly as a result of verbal inadequacy, frequently borrow terminology from spacial or temporal realms. Thus, we say the number 10 is higher than 4, when obviously we do not mean necessarily higher in space. We say similarly, the letter A comes before B. Serial orders simply have parallel structure, or are isomorphic with spacial and temporal orders. It is in this sense, whatever may be the historical reason for the choice, that we say one tone is higher or lower than another.

2. What precisely do we mean when we say only tones have pitch? If we mean that this sound which is now heard as having pitch is now and forevermore a tone, that sound which is heard now as having no pitch is now and forevermore a noise, we find to our confu-

sion that sounds which ordinarily seem to us to be noises under certain circumstances manifest pitch. And conversely, sounds which under certain circumstances are heard as having pitch, at other times manifest no pitch.

Thus, if I strike the desk with my pipe, I produce a sound which seems to have no pitch. If, however, I strike the floor immediately afterwards, I find the sound to differ from the first sound, not in intensity (if I have used the same force), nor even, or perhaps slightly, in timbre, but in pitch. Or the same thing may be worked up as in the familiar experiment: When a single stick is dropped, the sound produced is found to have no pitch. When several graded sticks are dropped, a scale, or melody, or familiar intervals, or fortuitous intervals are heard.[1]

To avoid the contradiction presented by such instances, the more fastidious qualify the definition of tone thus: tone has regular, or determinate, or clearly defined pitch; noise has irregular, or indeterminate, or unclearly defined pitch.[2] The sounds in the above instance are summarily dismissed as noises.[3] For if the pitch is not apparent at all times, it is said to be not clearly defined. In other words, the average of all instances is taken into consideration in defining it.

In disposing of one contradiction, however, we expose ourselves to another and more serious one. Music we have generally thought to be constituted of tones. An aspect of music and of music only, is melody. Melody, everyone will agree, is pitch pattern. Since the series of sticks produces melody, and since melody is proper to music alone, the sounds produced by the series of sticks must have constituted music. But if music is an art of tones, how is it possible for it to be constituted of noises?

3. It seems to me these difficulties have their origin in a lack of a clear notion of the object of aesthetic analysis. The physicist talks of natural processes, an isolated external stimulus, the wave structure of a vibrating stick or air-shaft or string that has been set in motion. He maintains, perhaps legitimately from his point of view, that the sound of the stick, whether isolated or in the serial part,

[1] Stumpf, C. *Tonpsychologie.* Vol. II, p. 500 ff.

[2] C. C. Pratt. *The Meaning of Music* (N. Y., 1931). p. 40.

[3] Henry J. Watt. *The Psychology of Sound.* (Cambridge, England, 1917). p. 37-8.

is a noise, since in each case it gives rise to the same irregular vibrations, and tone in the laboratory is defined by regular vibrations.[4] The physiologist, and also the psychologist who currently looks at auditory experience from the physiological viewpoint, talks of the response to the external stimulus as defined by the vibrations of the nerve fibers of the inner ear. And he too finds that in both cases the structure of the object under consideration is the same. The ear is strained by the disorder of the sound, or some such thing.

It is palpable that we who deal with music as an art are not concerned with a Beethoven Symphony as so many ordered and so many disordered physical stimuli or physiological responses. We are concerned, rather, with directly perceived qualities resulting from a transaction between the physicist's external stimulus and the physiologist's internal response. The physical object must be before us and it must be vibrating, and our aural receptors must be functioning. But we as conscious observers of immediate qualities define as tone not the physical object which generates it, nor the transverse waves in the ether, nor the physiological activity of the inner ear. It is rather a mode of the apprehended, resulting from the immediate transaction between this particular vibrating object in this particular context, and this particular observer with this degree of consciousness, plus the physiological mechanism to receive the external stimulus. In the words of Professor D. W. Prall, "The qualitative presentation — and this is a redundancy; for all that is directly presented is qualitative — the qualitative presentation of our world is just the aesthetic field. Not qualities recognized and tabulated and removed from their own felt mode of appearance, but qualities concretely had. Not a hue at no specific intensity, or a hue of specific intensity without spacial spread or temporal duration; but the red of this rose or of this structural steel of a bridge that is being built."[5]

The importance of context, juxtaposition, relationship in all our activities and experience is well known. These are no less the weapons of the artist. The artist explores the surface of the world gratuitously. In his absorption, he sees a richness of meaning and emotion and form which the casual observer is naturally unaware of, since

[4] John Redfield. *Music: A Science and an Art.* (Knopf, N. Y., 1928) p. 30.

[5] D. W. Prall. *Aesthetic Analysis.* (Crowell, N. Y., 1936). p. 5.

the latter is constantly passing through these objects to the things they conventionally symbolize or to the use they perform: a siren equals "time for lunch"; a door-bell equals "someone at the door"; a desk is "to write upon"; a chair is "to sit upon". The same applies to daily human and political events which we pass by in our haste, or accept at their face value, while the artist probes and contemplates.

The artist's perceptions are such, moreover, and he is so conversant with his field, that he sees the possibilities of richer and more absorbing qualities which may be had by the juxtaposition or relating of simpler qualities not contiguous in nature. Now these qualities, compounded from simpler qualities, exist nowhere else but in the specific relationship of parts of the objects here presented, even though they may be potential in the constituent parts. And only in the apprehension of these relationships may they be had.

4. We conclude then, that the qualities are not the sum of the constituents, but are embodied in their (the constituents') relationships. And these qualities reside only in the transaction between the presented constituents and the unanaesthetized observer; and they may be had only when the relationships have been discriminated. In the case of the sticks, we have a simple instance of how a quality which is not, or is only potential, in the isolated constituents, is found to be present in their combination. Thus, we say the individual sticks had no pitch, but pitch was embodied in the relationship of several sticks — relationship, namely, in terms of high or low. Or, to put it differently, in the one case, the sounds were simply apprehended as noises, in the other case as tones.

This may seem to place musical experience on a highly subjective plane, but only because most of us identify objectivity with physical or physiological or mathematical data or with touched mass. We refuse to recognize perceived qualities as equally objective. The experience of tone is perfectly objective — or as objective as any transaction is. It is objective, moreover, even though I cannot localize it in space at a specific, tangible point — namely in the piece of wood that gave rise to it. The tone is not the piece of wood or its vibration, but what I apprehend. The tone is not the sound *qua* sound, but the result of my discriminating one of its aspects. Thus, even psychologists admit that the sound itself may be hybrid; that noise and tone have no discrete division between them, but oc-

cupy overlapping spheres. It is said that no musical sound can be produced without the accompaniment of noise and that few sounds are wholly devoid of pitch.[6]

When the isolated stick was dropped, the pitch was difficult to apprehend because a conflicting noise element came between it and our perception. To hear the sound as a tone it was necessary to break through this shroud of noise. We did so by listening to several sounds in succession, since the essential experience of pitch, as we have seen, is in terms of relative height and depth. Moreover, we all know how comparison of similar objects may make us aware of a subtlety in one or both of them which had previously escaped us — provided that the objects are identical in every, or almost every, aspect but this one. We quickly pass over the identities and are immediately directed to the differences. Thus, the sticks were alike in timbre and intensity, but different in pitch. And the existence of but one difference among several sticks therefore directed us to an aspect we had not observed in one stick isolated. Clearly this is a matter of discrimination, or shift in attention, of apprehension. To recognize it as such is to avoid the contradictions involved in the generalized statements concerning the isolated phenomenon — the phenomenon independent of context and of the observer. Such statements are, for example, that the sound *is* in both cases a noise; that the sound *is* at once a noise and not a noise; that the sound *is* in both cases a noise with a pitch. The substitution of apprehension for the copulative clarifies matters. Thus, we say more accurately, the sound is first *apprehended* as a noise, and subsequently as a tone.

5. The following is what has been thus far established: Pitch *is* the differentia of tone. But a tone is not a sound *qua* sound. Tone is, rather, the quality of a transaction between a given sound and a conscious observer — a transaction in which pitch is discriminated.

The conclusion to be drawn from this is that not isolated tones, but the conditions under which tone is apprehended, are the object of any investigation which seeks to explore the nature of tone. To take the structure of a sound which is apprehended as a tone and to maintain this structure as defining the essence of tones, is, in view of what has preceded, untenable, since the sound *qua* sound is not

[6] Watt (op. cit.). p. 15; Robert Morris Ogden. *Hearing*. p. 106. (N. Y. Harcourt. 1924).

the tone, but may be a hybrid of noise and tone. The tone is the mode of the apprehended, the quality of the transaction, and the nearest we can get to an analysis of this quality is through the analysis of the conditions present when the quality is such. Thus, the conditions of our apprehending the sound of the stick as a tone had something to do with our hearing successively the sounds produced by more than one stick of different pitch. But some sounds are of a kind that may be easily apprehended as tones when they occur in isolation, in which case the conditions of our apprehending tone must be in each isolated sound as given. Thus, certain sounds are, in accordance with the function and nature of tone, more tonal or more musical than others.

Mills College.

The Commonplaces of Visual Aesthetics

BY

RICHARD FOSTER HOWARD

THERE have been many books and pamphlets written on "How To Look at Pictures" and many lectures delivered by professors of art, museum people, and artists on this subject. My only excuse for repeating it is that I have found certain formulæ to be useful in presenting this material to the thousands of people who constantly come questioning, seeking a standard by which they can see the widely varying objects which we call art. Naturally, these formulæ are not original, but have the virtue of conciseness and condensation. They are a starting point for thought and, I believe, can be used by the least experienced person.

What is a work of art? I like to begin by quoting Arthur Pope. "In order to be a work of art, an object must have an emotionally appreciable order." Actually, this concise statement contains the germ of a whole theory of aesthetics. The three words "emotionally," "appreciable," and "order" suggest the entire field. Each one is equally important. The quality of a work of art depends entirely upon the degree to which each of these words is fulfilled.

The best way to consider them is in reverse. Therefore, let us put the last word "order" first in our consideration. Of course there are many other words which might be used to describe the same series of facts, but the word "order" is general enough to include not only design and composition, but the less tangible aspects of the organization of a work of art.

The qualities of order, in a work of art, are the old familiar ones of unity, balance, and sequence. In their simplest terms, unity means oneness or repetition; balance means opposition or contrast;

sequence means regular change from one thing to another.

The elements of a pictorial or plastic art are lines, planes, volumes; value relations (the relation of light and dark); and color.

Magnitude and direction are properties which may be applied to lines, in one dimension, to planes, in two dimensions, and to volumes, in three. These elements may also be straight or curved, although actually straightness or curvilinearity are merely aspects of direction. Color has the properties of hue (that is, whether it is red, orange, green, blue, or violet, etc.) and of intensity (whether it is, for instance, a dull, neutralized color, or a red as red can be). We do not need here to be disturbed by the physical, psychological, and physiological properties of color, with their complex concepts of primary colors, complementary colors, the amount of energy in various parts of the spectrum, or other difficulties which can be explained only by exhaustive study of the particular fields which are concerned with color as a phenomenon.

Now if the three qualities of order are applied both to the elements of art and to the properties of those elements, we have the essence of design. An unbelievably vast series of possibilities can be formed from the combinations and permutations of these qualities, properties, and elements. One can also here make a bow to the old familiar "unity in variety" as a consequent attribute of these combinations and permutations.

Actually, of course, there is one more element in an orderly design, but I have separated it from the others because it partakes equally of the other two aspects of this simple aesthetic dictum first quoted. I refer to subject matter. It, too, should have unity, sequence, and balance, and should be related in an orderly manner to the lines, planes, volumes, values and colors. It is less tangible but equally real. It looms too large in the aesthetic feeling of the untrained, chiefly because the emotional aspect of aesthetics is their only recourse.

A clear analysis of the other aspects of our definition of a work of art is made slightly difficult until we remember that "emotionally apreciable" are modifying phrases of "order." Keeping that in mind, it is apparent that the second word refers to the analogy of art to language, and immediately solves the recurring question as to why some people can't understand it. How could they? It is a strange language to them. The rules of design which I have out-

lined above are the grammar and syntax of art. Pictures and objects are its vocabulary. One can "pick up" a foreign language without studying its grammar, but much of its meaning is lost thereby, and expression in it is most difficult. A small vocabulary will suffice for superficial travel, but understanding of the literature of the language is possible only with a large one. Art is precisely analogous. The qualities, properties, and elements of design should eventually become automatic to the student of art. His vocabulary should be constantly enlarged. The "appreciability" of art will thereby continually increase. There are dialects in art, which can be understood by the observer only when he is familiar with their variations from the commoner forms. The artist, in turn, should clarify his medium of expression and be consistent within it.

The expression of orderly subject matter, however, can scarcely be considered without the emotional motivation. Emotion in art may run the full gamut of human feelings. To mention a few of the less obvious types of emotion, landscapes may be inspired by nostalgia, the feeling for places remembered or even imagined. Still life may be motivated by the rather obscure emotion related to the desire to enjoy the textures of things. There are both pure and mixed emotions possible in art. The pure emotions, which are the goal of some artists, are concerned with design; the satisfaction derived from an orderly arrangement of colors, a subtle combination of lines, a bold relation of volumes. These must enter into any work of art, and are responsible for the attempts at abstract visual art. They are rare, however. Much more common are the pictures, sculptures, and decorative objects which combine these "pure" emotions with the more literary aspects of subject matter. Religious, sociological, and sentimental emotions, very strong in human thought, have provided many a great work with its primary motivation. It should always be remembered, of course, that these emotions without the other aspects of our definition will result in bad art.

One more analogy will aid in understanding. Music and poetry could both be fitted into this scheme. Emotionally appreciable order will define good music or good poetry. One vast difference exists between them and the visual arts, for they are both temporal in essence. That is, one note or one word is followed by another in

time. The only visual art of which this is true is the motion picture. Temporal rhythm, related to the heart beat, to walking or riding, to existence itself, gives an advantage to music and poetry. Moreover, the latter also has one further advantage. It is couched in words, and from our earliest days, words are our primary means of education. Many people have forgotten how to think in other terms than words. The great musician thinks in terms of melody, harmony, and timbre. The great artist in the visual arts thinks also in terms of color, line, volume, value. To learn to think likewise, avoiding verbal translation, is the necessary accomplishment in understanding the arts.

I would like here to acknowledge my debt to Professor Arthur Pope of Harvard University, under whom I explored many of these ideas some ten years ago. Anyone writing on this subject must have so great an obligation to him as to be impossible to separate an original contribution from his ideas. The chief virtue I here claim is brevity.

Dallas Museum of Fine Arts.

Prolegomena of Monistic Aesthetics

BY

ERNST HARMS

I.

A SURVEY of the development of aesthetics since it began to be a modern science a hundred years ago, stumbles again and again over a dualistic concept which can be traced back to the philosophical influence of Immanuel Kant. It teaches that the creation of art must be separated from art enjoyment. The latter is supposed to be the major relationship of any aesthetics to their subject. The creation of beauty must be severed from the enjoyment of it, in order to obtain a scientific insight into that domain of life which occupies itself with the gifts of the muses. This separation results in de-humanizing experience in the arts. If as is thought by the dual aesthetics, the experience of creating is reserved only for a small and genial nobility of artists — just as certain human beings believe they are aristocratically equipped with occult abilities — there would be no reason for the average individual to strive for the creation of any kind of art. This means that in one blow all yearning effort that results in folk-art and in an active beautification of life would automatically be killed. Moreover, if normal human beings enjoy art only in an uncreative manner, they experience it as an extremely low form of pleasure. It is Kant himself who is responsible for the theory that we do not desire the stars, but merely enjoy their sparkling appearance.

I. In reality, it is not scientifically valid to separate creation and enjoyment in the world of beauty. The artist probably desires more joy than anyone else from aesthetic matters. He revels in

the pleasure of beauty. He enjoys living with beauty and creating it so much that, if necessary, he gladly renounces all the other — and to him lower—pleasures which civilization offers. Furthermore, he usually has more influence in forming the public's enjoyment of art than do the aestheticians. As to the enjoyment of art, every instance of it, is a kind of intellectual or even aesthetic creation. In its major content it is a truly creative process. One seldom can enjoy fully the aesthetic qualities of an object of fine art unless one knows and understands how it is made, even if this does not mean that one could repaint the picture himself or compose the music one has heard. It is also true, even in the more elementary forms of aesthetic expression, that there is inherently a desire to share in their creation. We want to hum melodies, to do dramatic imitations, to compose poetry. We like to whittle and do needlework. We are all impelled by an urge to perform for ourselves some individual aesthetic expression. This is not fine art, but it is creative and is the spirit of art. It is the spirit which has created folk-art, one which even the most superficial aestheticians must accord a place in the hall of fame which they commonly consider as their own domain. Even if the expression of a creative desire in art has been tragically frustrated in urban people of western civilization —and the dualistic aesthetic theory has doubtless played a part in the frustration—any appreciative living with art is always characterized by a profound unity of striving to create and enjoy it at the same time. Against the negation of aesthetic dualism there should be placed the positive thesis that without a striving toward art creation no real enjoyment is possible, and without profound pleasure in aesthetic values there is no creation of great art.

2. Because of such considerations as these, aesthetics of the dualistic kind must yield to a more realistic approach for the understanding of the human relation to beauty. By "realistic" is meant the theory of aesthetic relation which presupposes a practical living with art. I have always thought it a basic necessity to take a *monistic* conception as a starting-point. I have always found it untenable to begin the building of a scientific structure upon an unbridgeable gap, such as inheres in the dualistic contradictions. And I have always attempted to investigate any special field against the background of total experience. The totality serves as an illumination

for the separately conducted inquiry. The mass of knowledge continuously acquired during our journey through life takes on a corrective function. Because of it special analysis and classification of individual facts do not sacrifice their unity with the larger reality. In the general conception of a basic monism, I have tried also to develop a monism for the world of aesthetic experience. It is irrelevant to begin an inquiry into what beauty may be by speculating upon certain objects of fine art or even by launching into an exhaustive discussion of the meaning of beauty in ancient Greece. The de-humanized approach of the dualistic conception does not perceive that experiencing beauty is an expression that is peculiarly inherent in human beings. No animal experiences beauty, although some of them appear beautiful to us and use a formal or colorful make-up as sex-attraction in periods of propagation. The desire for whatever is beauty is a faculty peculiar to the human mind or psyche. It appears in primitive man as well as in a child from his earliest beginnings. There could not be a more realistic and at the same time a more monistic foundation for any system of aesthetics than to start with this psychological fact of a general innate trend toward beauty. Whether we call this quality of our mind a propensity or identify it with some notion formulated by any of the psychological schools, this question is one for further study in psycho-typological discrimination, which is one of the things we have discovered through modern psychology. There are, naturally, various modes of aesthetic experience. Some are creative, some purely imitative and some merely passive enjoyment. All modes, however, grow out of a general monistic striving to experience beauty. Some aestheticians have attempted to define the striving for beauty as man's expression through form. The concept is too onesided. One may with equal truth describe thoughts or the contents of a story as beautiful. It is a mistake not to realize that experiencing beauty is phenomenologically an aboriginal capacity, on a par with seeing, hearing, thinking or feeling. The aesthetic capacity needs not to be explained in words that define it in terms of each other. For every human being knows what beauty is, no matter what name or language he uses for it.

3. A human being is able to think about all of his perceptions of the outer world and about the experiences of his own inner nature. Equally as fundamental as this capacity to think is the aesthe-

tic sense, which a human can also apply to any element of his experience. This fundamental character is the reason why I consider a monism to be the only correct basis of aesthetics. We cannot achieve that basis if we are misled in a blind alley of abstract dualism. We must take aesthetic reality as we correctly experience it — on the one hand as the fundamental sense already described and on the others as the forms and manners which express it. The expression must, of course, be a *pluralistic* one. We see the aesthetic yearning flooding through all avenues of human expression, the active as well as the passive ones, conditioning every capacity of man. There can be observed an infinite variety of arts and artistic products. For the most part, we merely try to classify them and apply to the finished products some technical laws of psychological theories. The results are semi-intellectual and dualistic aesthetics, but they do not give us the key to the whole world of beauty, which must be one of *Pluralistic Monism.*

Our aesthetic propensity, the monistic basis for all aesthetic life, is so fundamental that it permeates practically every human experience and so inevitably creates an infinity of art activities and art forms. There exists no truer method and system for a science of the arts than the identification of art activities and forms with the expression of different psychic forces, together with the instruments of expression. The whole world of the arts is thus an aesthetic cast made from the rest of human experience.

4. Most abstract philosophers begin doctrinal teaching on the fundamentals of human experience with a consideration of space and time, which are for them the basic categories, or coordinates of their whole picture of the world. Indeed, space and time appear fundamentally amalgamated with the aesthetic urge, or propensity, in many so-called arts. The spatial quality of our bodies appears in the world of arts as sculpture. The larger space which is expressed in a form that is also a protective part of our environment appears in the world of the arts in architecture. Just as every reality has some underlying natural law, so the space expression of the aesthetic urge has its natural law in what we call balance. All our present intellectual aesthetic notions have to do with an expression of form. However, as soon as we change our experience from an intellectual to a psychological one, the one-sideness of

the formalistic approach is obvious. Is balance merely "the formal arrangement of two or more formal entities", as some super-aesthetician once formulated it? Certainly not. Balance is also a vital element of our psychic experience. We know that to move in space, on two legs in an upright attitude, is the most fundamental physiological difference of man from the other beings on the earth. Psychologists have until to-day failed to determine what the sense of balance is which keeps man upright. I do not hesitate to call it one of the manifestations of our aesthetic sense or aesthetic propensity. The factor which I want here to make as impressive as possible is that aesthetic living is deeply connected with our entire nature. So far as its psychological significance is concerned balance is the same whether we experience it in the highest form of architectural expression in a beautiful Renaissance building, or if we walk erect or try to stand poised on our toes. The same thing holds true if we examine our time experience which is considered by our abstract "demiurgs" as equally fundamental. Just as we are unable to recognize space without any medium of expression, so also time becomes reality for us only as a movement. We experience time most concretly by following the hand of the clock and we "follow" time in our steps to the rhythm of music. In every moving factor in art, we experience expressed time. But we could not really measure time, if it were not divided into parts perceivable to our "time sense." Like the ticking of a watch or metronome, music and every experience of time is based upon the exact following on an element of time which we call rhythm. Rhythm is not a formal abstraction from the realm of tone. Our ethnologists have discovered that one of the earliest functions for the aesthetic expression of rhythm was in the so-called worksong. It helped the handicrafter and plowman to time their work more exactly by using not only manual force but the whole aesthetic nature. In the present day technical and mechanical means time everything for us so perfectly that we have nearly lost our profound capacity for creative rhythm.

5. Happily, most of us do not live in abstract world conceptions, confined to space and time; our experience necesitates more vital psychologies, even in our spiritual vitiated time. The fact that we have theoretically recognized a number of diferent psy-

cologies makes it dificult to show exactly what I have in mind. It is that there is a profound relationship between aesthetic and art expression and the driving forces of our psychic nature. Long years of study, however, have brought me to the conclusion that there is one form of psychology, not very widely used at present in America, which provides a key to the psyche-art relationship. John Dewey used it in his early textbook of psychology and George E. Vincent in his social psychology. This key form is successful primarily because it is richer in expression and not so uniform as is, for instance, behaviorism. I have always felt that this *structural psychology* itself contains a kind of aesthetic quality which makes it an easy key to the psychological dynamics of the arts. In its most simple form, structural psychology divides human psychic activities into three main clases, that of the intellect or thinking, that of feeling or emotions, and that of the will or volition. All of the events of our mental life seem to go back to one, or usually several, of these three fundamental psychic expressions. Even the most complicated act can be analysed into elements of the three. They, together with the Ego, the directing element of the whole psychic life, make up the ground material of our inner being. The multiplicity of our psychic expressions, however, origmates in the different combinations which are possible for these three elements. In a scientific discussion, a lecture or the reading of a book, the forces of thinking are predominant. In personal outbreaks of fury or in athletic competitions the whole psychic life is in possession of volitive forces. In a folksong, sung with a full heart, emotion holds sway. But, there must also be considered the mixture of these three basic forces. In a Sunday sermon which calls not only on the head but in the heart, emotional forces join with intellectual. But in the sermon of a passionate zealot — a Savanorola type — the volitive forces are aroused with those of the intellect. These examples will be enough to illustrate the structural viewpoint.

6. But now back to our aesthetic considerations. We said above that the aesthetic urge tends to amalgamate with any form of human experience, and we mentioned space and time. These are only the two most abstract elements. Everything that comes into man's range of experience from the outside can equally well

become a factor in some kind of aesthetic transformation. The very senses with which we perceive the outer world are aesthetic vehicles. We see, hear, taste and touch and have language for communications. The extent to which sense perceptions are material for aesthetic life is commonly known. The big red apples on our neighbor's tree are not merely objects for which we envy him. Their colors, as truly as tones of music, are sources of delight. "Taste" is popularly connected with gourmandism and is considered as a lower asthetic expression — if at all. But the word has more serious meaning in our monistic conception of aesthetics. "Good taste" is a widely used term, even outside of the art world. Furthermore, all kinds of human communications are perfect materials for artistic expression — from the crudest gesture to language, which is the magic product of men. To repeat once more — nothing exists in the world of experience which cannot be made an object of aesthetic life.

7. Aside from the ontography a monistic psychology of the arts must have as a second part, a study of the *Psychological Structure* of the experience of creative and receptive expressions in the arts. We promised above a study of the aesthetic structure by means of thinking, feeling, and will-differentiations. We shall see how this psychic activity builds up the art expressions like an infinitely fine network of interlaced arteries. If we look at first generally upon the world of the arts as it is conventionally divided, we must say that, for instance, plastic, expressing wordless physical form, is predominately an art of volition. Painting which expresses harmony and uses colors on a flat canvas is doubtless primarily an expression of feeling. All poetical arts, developed through the use of words to express thought contents, are certainly at first glance, intellecual arts. But if we develop this concept, we also find, aside from such predominating factors, other psychic dynamics at work. Let us first consider the poetical arts. Drama with its acting, handling and temperamental outbreaks is doubtless an art strongly under the influence of volitional dynamics. Lyrics, the psychic groundnote of which is sentimentality and feeling, is naturally an emotional form of poetics. Finally, epics and prose in their thoughtful and rational form of expression, are primarily intellectual forms of poesy. Similarly we are able to distinguish all three forms of psycho-dynam-

ics, for instance, in painting. Line and contour here must be considered as the intellectual element. The use of color expresses primarily emotion and the use of plastic mödelling, which each painting also contains, springs from a volitional urge. If we study artists who have excelled in the development of one of these three psychic elements of painting, we can be sure that they represent psychological types of either a specific volitional, emotional, or intellectual character. Piero Della Francesso or Mantegna are, in this regard, volitional artists. The fine lyrics and poesy and harmonious coloring in fra Angelico's painting denote a predominately emotional temperament. Leonardo Da Vinci and other painters who start from design or chiaroscuro in their painting — showing a scarcity of color — are the intellectual artists of the world of color. Finally, an example from the realm of the tones: The three elements of music are rhythm, harmony and melody. Strongly rhythmic music calls up volition. We want to move feet, hands and even head. Harmony, however, it appears, is an element of feeling or balance of emotions. We fellow melody with our musical forms of the multiplicity of structural influence which psychic rationality just as we follow the course of a thought. In this space it is possible to point out only sketchily the most important forms of the multiplicity of structural influence which psychic constitution has in the world of aesthetic creation. But I hope the little which has been shown, is impressive enough to unveil how profound is this relationship to creative as well as to non-creative art expression.

8. There is yet a third fundamental aspect which we must present in our survey of basic viewpoints of a monistic aesthetics. I want to speak of this third viewpoint as the *Interrelationship of the arts*, or better, the *understanding of the arts by aid of their relationships*. We express such understanding every day. We speak of "colorful music," "plastic writing," and of "poetic painting." I have already mentioned above such use in the discussion of taste and of balance. Indeed we see in this phenomenon of nominal interrelationship of aesthetic qualities, that there must be, at bottom, an attitude of our psyche, which permits us to feel corresponding quality in different arts. If forms one more example of our monistic propensity, which acting everywhere, is an underlying factor. It is "pluralized" and varied, but it is the

same and can be identified in the various forms which it itself mirrors. It is not a mere playing with words, when we use expressions from one field of the arts in another. Just as our general aesthetic sense amalgamates with any natural or mental factor and creates the arts, so the individual "principle" of one art is in some respects amalgamated to the others. In reality the principle primarily involved in music is also contained in architecture. Our color-sense paints not only on canvas, it also "paints" with words, as did the Swiss poet Konrad Ferdinand Meyer, whose words call up such marvelous colorful imagination in the reader. It is the same aesthetic principle wherever it is applied. Any scientific system of aesthetics will be better able to teach insight into the real qualities of the creations of the arts, if it recognizes the importance, how to see, hear, and feel these interrelations of the aesthetic qualities.

Style

BY

GUSTAV E. MUELLER

IN beauty the purposelessness of life is enjoyed as pure appearance. Art works out the fusion of soul and body as the fusion of a particular surface with a particular mode of life. This artistic creation imitates beauty, we behold our life in the mirror of a world symbol, we enjoy life as if it were wholly present in an individual experience, in a derealized appearance of the work of art.

But art is more than imitation of beauty. It is more than an individual crystallization of the aesthetic synthesis. If it were that and only that, it would never raise an issue, it would not be a challenge, eagerly debated. But works of art sometimes become storm-centers of those who defend and those who abhor them. Revolutions are often heralded in works of art. Plato says that the change of musical scales harbingers revolutions. There is violence about taste, good taste, bad taste. This taste of the artist is revealed in the style of his work. As a controversial matter of good and bad, better and worse the problem of style is a moral problem, a problem of conduct, a social problem. The question of aesthetics is how to reconcile or how to understand this non-aesthetic evaluation in relation to the non-combative innocence of beauty.

Approaching the work of art from the point of view of its style means to meet the artist speaking to you and demanding of you an answer: Yes or no! And he does not only speak as an individual, he also speaks as representative of his group, his class, his nation, and his tradition. Every work of art, so considered is a call requesting an affirmative or a negative answer. You can not remain indifferent or neutral; the great artists are intense personalities who force you to take a stand. Is the way they see the world agreeable

to the way you see it? Is their feeling for life compatible with your time? The struggle for and against taste is a sign that art is alive, that it touches us.

There are several detours on which the challenge of taste is dodged. One is the scientific way. It knows all about the work of the artist, it furnishes interesting information concerning the time and environment, the beloved "influences". Analysis knows who has copied what from whom. It may be useful and instructive concerning details of bygone times, the knowledge of which may help to bridge historical gaps. But this is only a menial function, if it is taken too seriously it is more a hindrance than a help and tends to bury the work in an intellectual avalanche.

A second way is the study of techniques. It confuses style with the external forms of presentation. Such techniques can be learned, especially in architecture and music, which arts have a well developed grammar. But just as the knowledge of grammar in language does not make a great stylist, the technical connoisseur of other art-grammars does not meet the question of style adequately. He may become an expert in distinguishing method of presentation without understanding what they express. For example: Renaissance painting prefers clear, sharp outlines, arranges its space in distinguished stripes or planes of foreground, middle- and background, intends a closed symmetrical kind of composition, emphasizes many parts and balances them equally one against the other. And this manner of presentation may be contrasted to the Baroque form, which blurs outlines, prefers a continuous movement and depth, tends to keep its composition open and replaces the multiplicity of equally important parts by a unity of a total effect. But what does this reversal of taste mean? Why does an artist feel compelled to replace one manner of presentation by its opposite? To what extent is it a mere convention behind which the lack of an individual conviction is hidden? Such questions reveal the real, the living ground of style. Analysis of techniques merely states impersonal symptoms.

A third method to avoid the challenge of style is — paradoxically — the artistic one. If the work is felt to be genuine, if it is good art, if I can enjoy it, what do I care for its style? In this enjoyment the critic becomes one with the artist in the work. His apprehension is a reproduction, artistic itself. And many works of art, although

of different, perhaps even of diametrically opposed styles, may be open to such an intuitive identification with them. Nevertheless, there are bound to be limits, the distinction what is good and bad will sooner or later emerge, and wherever that distinction creeps in, the problem of style has emerged and demands an answer.

The technical and artistic study of works of art develops the style expert, the connoisseur. Show him a fragment and he will spot the artist and the time. It is the same kind of intimate acquaintance that makes you recognize a friend from his gait even when he is far away and turns his back to you.

Such individual, unique and historical styles are functions of the world-views which are the soul finding embodiment in the body of habits of life, institutions and realized values which we call cultural or national epochs. And works of art and their style are often the only documents extant to reveal the philosophical character of those civilizations, the signs of a dialectic of life. A history of aesthetics would show the correspondence between the theories of art and the art practices; there are analogies between the Chinese philosophy and its art-symbolism; between the Hindu theosophy and the style of the Vedas, between the Hebrew religion and the style of the Bible; between the Pre-socratic nature and form-philosophies and the Homeric and archaic Greek style; between the idealism of the Attic tragedy and Platonism; between the Sophistic movement and the drama of Euripides; between the philosophy of Roman history, its architectural marching arches and Virgil; between the Stoic and Epicurean philosophy of life and the idyllic, novellistic and formalistic art of Hellenism; between the mystic aesthetics of Plotinos and the allegory and transcendency of medieval art; between the pride in subjective perspectivism and naturalism of the Renaissance painting and the glorification of appearance as reality in the Renaissance philosophy; between British empiricism and meandering associations of the British novel; between German idealism, Beethoven's Ninth and Goethe's Faust; between the skyscraper and a rational business civilization. Such analogies and correspondences, however, do not lead us to the comprehension of style as a philosophical problem, they only furnish a material which proves that much, that style is a function of world-views, is an expression of practical philosophies of life embodied in cultures; these analogies are the phenomenology, not the philosophy of style.

Individual, historical, national styles are exclusive, but beauty is not. The question is: how can I enjoy styles opposed to my own or opposed to each other? How can I reply to the very personal question contained in a real style with Yes and also reply to its very opposite with Yes? One possibility seems open, and that is to develop such a comprehensive and dialectical philosophy of life, that different and opposed styles can be understood as partial grasps of a total situation. If we are right in assuming that styles are functions of worldviews, practical evaluation of existence, then these evaluations must be understood in their relative necessity, as necessary moments of life as a totality of tensional or dialectical opposites. In order to develop such a dialectic philosophy of taste, it is further imperative to find style-constants, principles of style that are not confined to one historical or individual expression. Such constant and recurrent possibilities are, of course, quite inadequate to describe or exhaust this particular style of this particular work. But at least they would be helpful to solve the philosophical paradox of the style-problem.

II.

The style first recognized by aesthetics is the sublime. It is also the oldest. The archaic art in architecture, in sculpture and in literature begins with it. The creation of the world by the act of an absolute will and decree in the Bible, the emergence of worlds out of chaos in the cosmological myths of many people, the super-human, abstract forms of the early plastic arts as well as the heroic exaggeration of early sagas, all tend in the direction of the sublime. Longinus in his treatise of the sublime already sees in it a tremendous terror, a shudder which gives the mortal creature a feeling of his insignificance. The Neoplatonic aesthetics is oriented in the sublime: Plotinos says that beauty does not reside in the regular form or in pleasant materials, but in the intensity of a life which shines through the visible symbol. A mystic unity of the soul touches you and makes appearance transparent. Plotinos then lays the foundation for the sublime and allegoric character of most of Christian-Gothic art. Appearances of this world are chiffres, hieroglyphic signs, signals revealing a transcendent reality and its eternal order. Like lightning in the night the sublime illuminates the darkness of our ordinary experience and its light touches us with a presentiment of a wholly other and better world. It challenges our

ordinary certainties and the importance of living. Beauty is nothing but the beginning of the terrible, as Rilke writes quite in the spirit of this Neoplatonic tradition.

Kant defines the sublime as the impression of a power immeasurably great in comparison with the measure of our finite faculties. This may be stated negatively by saying that the sublime prohibits an easy identification or loving "empathy". It is forbidding, abstract, anti-organic. It tends to emphasize strictness of form over "infeeling" and familiar content. The "immeasurably great" may be apparent, according to Kant, in symbols of spatio-temporal infinity, or of dynamic forces, or of the superiority of the spirit over vital interests. In all forms the triviality of existence is shown up, man looks into the abyss of his annihilation.

Spatio-temporal sublimity shimmers through the "starry vault above me"; when the dusty and noisy quarrels of the day have cleared away and the symbol of an eternal, immutable order blinks down silently without reproach or blame or praise. The same sublime silence surrounds the oasis of life in the endless desert. Or the darkness of the night itself is felt to be the presence of a formless and secret mystery which enshrouds and dissolves the hard and finite forms of the every-day; ocean of life beneath the ripples of gushy passions.

Dynamic sublimity breaks or swells the finite appearing surfaces. They seem to resist and are overpowered. The tempestuous roar of the heavy sea in storms, the ragged and broken residues of mountains which are reminiscent of immeasurable forces of volcanic upheavels of the earth, or of "immeasurably great forces" working through countless ages were always felt as sublime in this sense.

In human life this dynamically sublime is present in forms of vital heroism: Many Shakespearean characters are sublime through nothing but their indomitable energy of carrying out their destructive will; they are descendants of the gods and heroes in the old Germanic sagas, ruthless riders into their own death. Beyond them loom monsters, satanic symbols of irrational powers like the beasts and visions of apocalyptic doomsdays, the devil himself, who appears in many shapes as befits his protean nature.

Examples of the sublime breaking of finite forms in painting may be seen in Greco's daemonic and restless movement upwards, some of his saints are like flickering flames, or in Rembrandt's "clair-

obscure", wherein outlines of ordinary things are strangely dissolved in a supernal stream of light battling with an unilluminated darkness.

But the finite forms need not be broken, they may be swelled. This results in the gigantic, the majestic sublimity. Michelangelo tends towards this baroque kind of sublimity throughout, it is his dominant tone. There is a supernatural, superhuman power which rests content in its potentialities. Homer's Zeus on the Olympus nods and the gods tremble, he does not have to hurl his bolt. His bird, the eagle is a messenger of his sublime and irrestible power, soaring quietly in the ether. The majesty of a nation may be felt in the unfurled flag or in the monarch — the Oriental, Egyptian and Assyrian statues of their kings, sitting in absolute repose, hewn in colossal size in rocks represent the original form of this potential, effortless, majestic, sublime. In this shape the "immeasurably great" is bound by a severe form adequate to the infinite content.

Spiritual sublimity triumphs over the forces of nature, regardless how great or ferocious they may be. The moral will may appear as sublime when it sacrifices existence to its chosen vocation. The will to truth may apppear as sublime when it follows its chosen course no matter where it will lead. Plato's Socrates is sublime and is akin to the tragic hero King Oedipus who pursues his investigation of truth although it leads to his own destruction. Faust is sublime in his restless experimenting pursuit of wisdom. There is also a sublimity of feeling as in Hamlet, where all the foreground actions are cast against this melancholy and sublime background of the feeling of dissonance and uncertainty. Religious love appears in the sublime legends of the Christian religion, in art for example in Dante's Hell, Purgatory and Heaven.

Most aestheticians, who have written on the sublime style, have overemphasized the negative, the aweful, the horrible or melancholy effect of the sublime. This is natural, since the sublime appears as disagreeable to the animal will for a comfortable existence. It threatens the friendly habit of life. The voice of the prophetess Cassandra frightens and destroys illusions of happiness. But the sublime may be felt as positive. The Psalms or the hymns to the sun are sublime but they are so because they are elevating. There is a sublimity of plenitude, a sparkling, jubilant, exuberant, foam-

ing stream of power and of agundance which means to express the inexhaustible cornucopia of life. There is solemn and festive sublimity of adoration and divine presence.

The sublime style strains the aesthetic synthesis to a breaking point: *It expresses by means of seusuous appearance that which denies the sufficiency of sensuous appearance.* The step from the sublime to an involuntary ridiculousness, therefore, is short. The mere gesture of the sublime without authority is comic, while a will for a sublime plenitude without an adequate content degenerates into an empty pomp, "majestic" paraphernalia, domesticated sublimity. Such a will for the sublime without the power is pathetic.

We saw how Plotinos found his concept of the sublime style in contrast to the classical style of the beautiful. *The beautiful* is the central aesthetic style which directly "imitates" Beauty as aesthetic synthesis. Its classical formula is that of a complete unity in a manifold and a balance of all contents, evoking an equilibrium of enjoyment. *While the sublime seems to transcend appearance in appearance, the beautiful is immanent in appearance, wholly present and satisfied in itself.* It allows empathy, a happy feeling and resting in its presentation, it absorbs all of our faculties and interests in a relaxed synthesis. It may present suffering and evil, but they are completely outbalanced by the quiet joy in colours and shapes, proportions and rhythms, they are are dark colours giving depth and plasticity to a well rounded composition. The beautiful is a style in which aesthetic love comes to its blessed fulfillment, in which the soul enlivens its embodiments, in which soul and body are one fusion and harmony.

When we mention this style we think of Homer and Phidias, Raphael and Mozart. Their art puts you in a serene and harmonious mood. You feel a world where everything has its place, a world of clarity and wholeness, resting securely in its measure. Their love of clarity, of clean decisions, of pure and transparent order, of well defined limits, of soft transitions and mediations, of ease and perfection of movement — this classical form corresponds to the positive and optimistic attitude, to the restless affirmation of life in its concreteness and presence.

In nature the beautiful appears in mild and fertile and cultivated regions, lovely scenes, well composed gardens, balanced en-

sembles of lakes and hills, of forests and fields. There must be a balanced variety within an apparent unity.

Since the beautiful entirely entrusts itself to its sensuous surface, and since this appearance can be diminished in size, the beautiful has a tendency towards finesse and minuteness. As such it becomes the charming or graceful. Rococo porcelains are perhaps the best example of this. It is the sphere of idyllic arts, in nature the pastoral charm of a healthy life. The simple beauty of a melody or the intimate intrigue of a still life may express this love for what is noble and good in its earthy finitude.

The beautiful is often in danger to become too easy or too sweetish. If the sensuous surface is released from this classical form it becomes the basis of the style of *impressionism*. Plato saw in it the analogy to philosophical empiricism and sophistry.

It is the style of sheer vitality as lust and pleasure-hunting, as such the extreme opposite to the sublime. Its form is chaotic, harsh, characteristic, a succession of shred and patches of momentary experiences, sentimentally soft or luxuriously swelling, sweet and intoxicating, gaudy and glaring, boisterous and noisy. In refined form it becomes the vague and ambiguous, the smutty or coquettish play with half revealed and half hidden attractions of sense. As conventional fashion this style is a middle between lack of nature and lack of soul, neither vitally flowering nor spirited and superior. It must have sudden surprises and restless changes.

III.

Plato's moral censure passed upon this impressionistic exhibitionism as an "art flattering the tastes of the many", clearly indicates the problem of style from which we started. If we want to understand and not merely condemn or praise styles, we must penetrate them and recognize in them their practical background in ethical worldviews. Life as ethical conflict is reflected in the styles of art.

Vital passion breeds and imagination furnishes images. But longing and satisfaction are separate phases of the same action, their practical satisfaction is partial and does not last. As a practical will to preserve individuality as a fighting center of passion, it is never completely successful, but only partially so. The appetite is larger than the possible fulfilment. The possible fulfillment is bound

to the one small course of realization which is open to the one individual and this course is conditioned by all the real antecedent and circumstantial limitations of individual actions. But in art all these limitations seem to disappear in the daydreaming of phantasy invested in an object. Longing and satisfaction seems to become one and the same; we strive to identify ourselves with what appears outside of ourselves and this striving is gratified, striving and experience become one; and our real limitations, with which our actions in a real world are beset, disappear also and we are master of a whole gamut of possibilities.

The impressionistic style, then, can be understood as the true replica of vital desires: erotic love to be one with the other and the egotistic desire to overpower and devour the other are vicariously gratified. The instability of vital appetites, due to the instability of the sense-impressions mirroring these passions, gives rise to the whining and fugitive impressionistc style described above.

But man is not only an individual fighting for its selfpreservation and selfprocreation. He also is. As being he represents a universe, an unseen and ungiven totality and coherence of things, which is present in his belief and in his thought. He can believe in a universal being because he himself is. Being is also subject thinking itself. This is infinity, not the endless succession of events in space and time. As infinite thinker man is open, he questions the given to find deeper foundations than the obvious ones, he unhinges certainties for the love of truth. As being he is able to treat others not only as means to his private and individual ends, but as ends in themselves, as representing the same unseen but believed and thought universe of truth which he feels to represent in himself as well. In this love for being in the other man is not only infinite but spiritual. And as such he can see in the quiet majesty of nature the symbol reflecting the infinite and the spiritual.

From this basis we understand the sublime style as artistic and symbolic mirror of human infinity. This insight explains the paradox of the "immeasurably great", which is never given in nature, because all forces in nature are measurable; and it also explains the other paradox of the sublime style, that appearance is used to reflect its insufffficiency. Man is not pure spirit. His spirituality needs his individuality, which wants to be fed and which wants to

rest, which is needed to carry out and carry through his spiritual mission among and with and against other individuals.

This reliance of the spirit on individuation leads to the necessity of institutions, of states and schools and churches, in which something of the infinite passion for being and truth can be preserved and handed from generation to generation. The steps in the direction of truth are small at a time, the wisdom of individuals sinks to the grave with them. They need vessels to preserve and to accumulate results. Such institutional embodiments of the spirit are practical values. We know them as the totality of culture achieved at a certain time in a certain nation. Most people live in these institutional laws and orders as if they were ultimate in themselves. They take the embodied values without asking for grounds of their possibility. Confucius and Aristotle were such minds, while Laotse and Plato were the founders, not only preservers. This rootedness in a secured civilization is the practical background for the classical style of the beautiful, the measured fullness of life.

We can now arrive at a first solution of our problem: The universe is not real outside or apart from contrasted spheres or particular dimensions of being, a sphere is not real outside and apart from an ultimate and radical individuation. Human existence, living mirror of the universe, is neither complete nor human if it is not infinitely open and spiritual, and spirituality has no existence apart from contrasted spheres of cultural activity, and no cultural activity can be existential outside or apart from individuals who carry it out. Beauty is nothing apart from its realization in art, art is impossible without individual and basically conflicting styles. We need many and conflicting styles because without them art would not mirror the totality of human life as a totality of dialectical tensions. All aesthetics, therefore, who fight for one style at the expense of another live in the problem, but they do not understand it. The classical aesthetics, for example, abstracts its theory from the style of the beautiful which is taken as a norm or model. But it is not possible to bring life to a standstill in this style of centrality. The aesthetic synthesis demands a dialectic unity of opposite styles, while Beauty remains at the same time above the struggle, one of the spheres of totality within the life of reason.

Conflicting styles are necessary aspects of a dialectical life. They are matters of emphasis. The sublime aspect is founded in the spir-

itual meaning, universal unity appearing to sense. The beautiful is this same appearance of meaning seen as complete in itself. Impressionism emphasizes the appearance as such without being able to wrest it entirely from its unity. There can be no sublime work which is not also beautiful, and the quiet dignity of beauty can remind us of sublimity. We can not appreciate by reason or by the heart or by the senses alone. In the sublime the idea breaks into the world of sense announcing its insufficiency, in the beautiful the same idea gains a dignified presence, the characteristic loses itself in details. The conflict of styles is a conflict of emphasis within a dialectical struggle, point and counterpoint.

The work of art is not complete without its style. The style animates it, makes it a concrete individual. The sense-appetites are many, surfaces to them appear as provisional and empirical constellations, called things, arbitrary units. But these sensuous aspects move and in their movement exhibit a wholeness, a mutual and increasing interdependence, unity appears as their soul, the manifold of sense-surface is the developed unity, unity is the completed manifold, inseparable from its life its selfrealization in this object, in this space and time. The aesthetic object is a steady continuity of contrasting sides, lines and curves, tensions and relaxations. Every moment has its own life, its own say, its own appearance, but at the same time it is completely determined by the unity which it helps to build up. The beautiful and the sensuous style, therefore, can be separated as little as the sublime could be separated from the beautiful.

IV.

The three style-constants which we discussed may be set aside as all belonging to a serious or objective kind of style. Over against it is the realm of *humour* in its many modifications. It refuses to take the objective seriously, it plays with it, asserts in such play the sovereignty of the subject. That is why the step from the sublime to the ridiculous is so dangerously short—the sublime also transcends apeparance, and if this transcendence is not felt any longer, the symbol of sublimity may become comical; the dove, then, does not represent the holy spirit but is just a funny bird in the upper corner of a picture.

Man is a laughing animal. Laughter and smile are the existen-

tial forms of the aesthetic attitude. The comedian answers the tragedian, who takes negative things as fetters against which he chafes, under which he suffers, by laughing about them. The one balances the other as Aristophanes balances Aeschylus; in Plato's Symposium Socrates convinces Aristophanes that the same man ought to write tragedy and comedy. Socrates was himself this same man, tempering his sublime wisdom with his irony, supreme form of humour. Ugly faun carrying golden images of the gods inside, Alcibiades calls him.

Humour is aware of all human limitations; smiling a good-natured smile, the humorist reconciles himself to all these infirmities, which he can not change, but which he can make appear to be worthy of a superior love in spite of them. The fat-bellied drunk Silenos on his donkey, the greedy Faun and Satyr, the ugly dwarf and dumb devil, are spontaneous creations of humour in the Greek and Germanic mythological imagination.

Humor also is infinite. The subject takes the liberty to draw the world into his play. The world appears as a conjury of inherent self-explosive moments, arbitrary connections, strange coincidences. The humorist shuns above all else logical consistency which would pull him out of his own subjective sovereignty into the seriousness and objectivity of things. Humor sheds its flashlight on all things transforming them at random, like Titania in Shakespeare's Midsummer Nights Dream transforms the ass headed one into a romantic lover. Things do not look funny, not in-and for themselves, their ridiculousness is loaned to them by humor. In a good comedy the participants don't know themselves how ridiculous they are, they behave in deep earnestness, and the less they are aware of their role, the funnier they appear. The playful superiority and contemplative aloofness is essential to humor. The same things that appear ridiculous as appearance may become tragic if you are drawn into them yourself, unless, indeed, you have the power of Till Eulenspiegal and develop a "gallow humor". This comical borrowing is stronger when it concerns a personality which might be expected to know better, than when it concerns a thing. A nose, which looks like a potato, and yet pretends to be a nose, may look funny, but the distracted professor who is invited to stay on account of rain and then goes home to get his toothbrush, is funnier because his action looks as if it were purposive. Sometimes the

artist is humorous while his characters are not as for example Byron's Don Juan, sometimes the artist may be objective while his persons are humorists like Goethe's Reineke Fox, or both artists and his figures are humorous like Sterne's Tristram Shandy or most works of Jean Paul. In this kind of romantic humor the aesthetic surface itself is constantly disrupted, a play playing with itself. "I am only a play, I am only art, don't take me too seriously". From low to high forms of humor there are many degrees. A form is the joke and the caricature. The sexual joke and the caricature drawn with malicious intentions express a dissatisfied, distorted vitality which takes a snarling revenge for its own inhibition. These satirical or aggressive forms of humor are unfree, they are too much affected or fascinated by their limitations to have a free laughter.

A good portraitist said that every portrait is really a caricature. This shows caricature on the way to a free humor. The good portrait is a caricature because it sees through the limitations of every human individual. It also shows that painting is a more subjective art than sculpture, whose monumental types could not bring out so well this humorous smile of the portrait.

The broad center of humor is the grinning confession of the animal nature in man. Aristophanes comedy, Shakespeare's Falstaff and his kin, Dutch painting, the grotesque gargoyles on the Gothic domes, Rabelais' horse laugh in the Gargantua are examples. In Greek humor this style is expanded in exposing the animal nature in the gods to the relieved consolation of mortals. There is only a slight change from this to the parody and the mock-heroic imitation of mythology.

Within this style there are many shades from the coarse burlesque humor to the fine subdued smile or the humor of a droll naivete, from phantastic exaggeration and bragging to the touching helplessness of innocents abroad or lambs among wolves, from the involuntary humor of situations to the inward humor of youthful fancies as for example in Tom Sawyer.

The humorous style reaches its peak, where it deals with the discrepancy of universal ideas or values and their representatives. Aristophanes in the "Clouds" blasts intellectual pretensions under the mask of Socrates who sat as spectator in the theater. Soc-

rates in the clouds pretends to be deep, learned, clever, useful while in reality he is merely "corrupting the youth". Aristophanes does to his Socrates-Sophist what Socrates does himself: ironising pretensions. Erasmus achieves a similar humor in his Praise of Folly from the opposite angle. Folly foolishly praises herself, but what she says is the wisdom of the political-animal kingdom. This is intellectual humor.

Cervantes' **Don Quichote** contrasts the dreamy idealism of the knight of the sorry figure with the earthbound greediness of Sancho Panza's common sense — but the two extremes do not make one complementary whole but merely a complex inadequacy. The fight for lost causes, the martyr without a church, universal ideals that are always betrayed, values whose bearers do not even know what they are supposed to represent are themes in this sublime and moral humor. Moliere's Tartuffe is a similar peak in the long range of humorous works with reference to the institution of the church.

The dialectical-moral struggle of life is the common background for both the tragic and the comic, the serious and the humorous style. All earthly greatness is infected with earthly smallness and disfigured by ugly limitations. Is this sad or is it humorous? It is both. A dignity without humour is infallibly ridiculous, involuntarily so. In art the temporal is one with the essential, the fugitive one with the eternal. All things aesthetic balance between tears and smiles. Tragic serious art is one with the humorous. The low, comic contradictions of our existence are at the same time tragic, because they show man in his degradation. And the tragic hero is not without the healing peace of humor, because he ascribes such an absolute importance to himself.

Laughter reconciles us to the meanness of existence but also from the futile battle for higher ends, because it teaches to view the whole with the eyes of aesthetic love. Even the most miserable existence is seen by humour to have power over the ideal, and quacking geese may save a capitol. Homer's blessed gods laugh when they behold the earthly spectacle, their divine comedy. To the moral sense this attitude is brutal or heartless, because it views things as if we were removed from the scene of battle, as if aesthetic peace was spreading over it. But in this the humorous style once more proves itself to be the most aesthetic style, just as essential as the beautiful, which occupies the center of the serious styles.

The difference between the serious and the humorous style, like the difference between the sublime, the beautiful and the sensuous, is a matter of emphasis; opposites belong and constitute the same aesthetic unity of transcendence and immanence, ideality and existentiality in the symbol which we call a work of art.

V.

In art the nineteenth century is the loss of style. It is the first century in the history of Western civilization which does not have a style of its own. Instead there is a random collection of all styles of the past, a chaos of tastes; museum experts make the guide for people without a taste of their own; curiosity for stuff unformed produces a so-called experimental aesthetics, while on the other hand art evaporates into mere techniques, a sale of goods carried by virtuosi, technicians of building, of the music hall, of the theater. There is no obliging content, no common world.

All this may mean what Spengler says it means: the decline of the West, the end of the Renaissance civilization. But it also may mean something positive. It may mean that we have grown beyond the possibility of an exclusive style. The artist, in possession of all techniques and of all styles, is confronted with the problem of creating a style of no particular historical complexion.

In terms of style: *the artist may smile not only on the limitations of all other forms of experience but also on the limitation of his own art-form. He then becomes an ironical artist.*

Irony says the opposite of what it means. But it also means what it says and expects the listener to understand this duality.

As style it appears in the comic as well as in the tragic irony. Comic irony lends a seeming life to unserious pretensions in order to explode them. The tragic irony is a selfannihilating movement unknown to the tragic hero himself. He believes to further his ends which in reality, for the knowing audience, leads to his self-destruction. The fact that irony is both humorous and serious points to irony as a universal principle of style. As such it is the courage to face the aesthetic ideal in its worldly existence, to create art in the face of a secret and intimate knowledge that its solution is only symbolic and not a real solution of the dialectical problems of life. *Irony is the selflimitation of art as style-principle.*

The aesthetic idea is the totality of life-functions mirrored in the appearing surfaces of arts. It is unity of appearance as ap-

pearance. Its individual events and surfaces mean more than they seem. They do not remain fleeting transitions, but they reveal concrete unity. At the same time they do remain fleeting transitions, humble things which they were before the magic torch of beauty made them luminous. To create them as vessels of the eternal and yet to know that they are not eternal permeates the whole creation with the taste of irony.

Mortality is thus an ingredient function of the aesthetic idea itself, because it demands the sensuous to appear and to make beauty appear. But this demand involves death. It subjects beauty to the lot of all other mortal things.

Irony is melancholy, insofar as it reflects on this necessity of subjecting the idea to this lot of all mortal things. Works of art are born to live apart from life, they are made to live in a dead symbol. Irony lives in this paradox when it engraves the fragile vase with the image of all living good. Ironic imagination hears itself as tone-sequence, sees itself in colours and shapes, unfolds as objective process, but keeps remembering that this thing in which it appears is only a thing, that it is not one with the enthusiasm of imagination. Irony is *dialectical.* It is the truthfulness of art which admits that the universe is a creation outside of the artist in the work, and yet at the same time not objectively there but within him. It is a universe of its own creation, it is not the true image of the universe itself but nevertheless appears as if it were. Irony limits art within art, the possibility of a supreme style. It is through this limitation that imagination is made fertile; it entrusts its most precious vision to the very unprecious and profane medium. Self-annihilation becomes one with the idea itself. The idea posits its own destruction and since outside of the idea there is no beauty and no work of art, beauty demands its own death as a condition of its perfection.

Irony collects and mediates seriousness and humour, inwardness and externality, the ideal and its own negation or limit. It smiles and weeps at the same time. It is the Platonic Eros, the daemon of philosophy and art, spanning heaven and earth, powerful and impotent, longing and replenished at the same time. Irony is in art what dialectic is in philosophy. Dialectic knows all things in logical form but also knows logically the limitations of the logical form. It invites the nonlogical and irrational as a part of

its world of opposites and tensions. Life as a unity of opposites, of past and present and future, is a dialectical struggle, whose mature expression in art would be an ironical style, artistic maturity.

VI.

We conclude with some remarks on the ugly. In general the ugly is an aesthetic contradiction, as the error is a logical and evil a moral contradiction. Such contradictions are the attempt of particular functions to fain independence or to break through universal norms.

In this first general sense the ugly is a violation of beauty as aesthetic synthesis. It occurs when the theoretical preconditions of aesthetic reality run away with it in a sugar-coated lesson, or when the moral purposes degrade beauty to propaganda purposes, or when the private subject is detected behind the leaky draperies of art or when the surface is not a surface in itself but leads away from itself into a scientific object-world. *Ugly in this sense is a leak in the density of the symbol.*

From the point of view of the work of art, the ugly is a violation of the law which distinguishes one art from the other. When a building is built as if it were a statue, when a statue dissolves into picturesque effects or architectural abstractness, when painters want to tell stories or musicians paint, or poets think that they have to be experimental scientists, there is a weakening of the peculiar force and purity of possible effect and we have a second kind of ugliness: A beauty in a wrong place .

As a problem of style the ugly would be a discrepancy between the will of a style and its lack of convincing execution. When the will to be sublime leads to nothing but empty pomp or rhetoric, when the beautiful is merely sweet by avoiding the dark depth of life, when the supposed humor is trivial and flat, in all such cases we have ugliness as style deficiency.

There is, however, a legitimate problem of the ugly. We have described it as function of humor. Humor laughs at our natural and moral limitations. Weakness of character or deformity of appearance, the decrepancy of old age or the disfigured dwarf or childish clumsiness are among the shapes of humorous art. The ugly here is not aesthetically ugly, it is on the contrary reconciled to beauty by humorous love.

The ugly in this moral or natural sense leads to the highest triumph of the aesthetic love of man, which is the love of his unity in soul and body achieved in the symbol of art.

The University of Oklahoma.

Book Reviews

LOUIS W. FLACCUS: *The Spirit and Substance of Art*, New York, Crofts, Third Edition, 1941, New York, 593 pp.

The third edition of this useful text-book brings the discussion of the various fundamental arts up-to-date. There is new material on tragedy; also analysis and appreciation of some of the striking recent movements in the arts such as the modern expressionistic dance, non-objective painting, and surrealism. A whole chapter is devoted to the cinema, its relation to time and space, to the other arts, to the ends of information, amusement, and true imaginative creation. There are a few new paragraphs of special comment, e.g., on regionalism. The Appendix by Paul Krummeich on the creative process in music has been done over.

—KATHARINE E. GILBERT.

IRA O. WADE: *Voltaire and Madame du Chatelet — An Essay on the Intellectual Activity at Cirey.* Princeton University Press, Princeton. 1941. xii. 241 pp.

This scholarly essay forcefully presents its thesis that the Cirey period for Voltaire, from 1733 to 1749, from his thirty-ninth to his fifty-fifth years, was far from being a mere love episode, barren for his literary and philosophic labors, howsoever much the period may have been previously so characterized. As proof, the author turns to Madame du Chatelet's translation of and interpolations to Mandeville's "Fable of the Bees," her work on Newton, for which she was far better prepared than Voltaire, and particularly her "Examen de la Genése." It is in this last work with its five volumes and its more than seven hundred pages that Professor Wade finds his best evidence. It consists of an extended, critical analysis of each of the books of the Bible, both of the Old and the New Testament. It leaves unturned none of the absurdities emphasized by hostile biblical criticism, particularly that of the critical deism of its day. A comparison of its pages, its style, its arguments in the very order of their presentation and in many instances unmistakable phraseology with some of the works of Voltaire, which, though published after the period, must have been fashioned while the influence of this remarkable woman was greatest upon Voltaire. The author refers particularly to the "Sermon des cinquante," "Examen important de Milord Bolingbroke," and "La Bible enfin expliquée par plusieurs aumoniers de S.M.L. R.D.P.," the last with its typically Voltairean puzzling letters. The im-

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portant conclusion drawn from this survey, three-fourths of which is devoted to an admirable summary and consideration of the "Examen de la Genése," is that there is no gap in the intellectual development of Voltaire because of Cirey but rather a continuous, explicable growth from youth, the English sojourn, through Cirey to Berlin and Ferney. How much of this was Voltaire and how much Madame du Chatelet the author leaves for interesting speculation. It is unfortunate that so perspicuous a style and so painstaking a scholarly endeavor should be jarred by some "none-ares," "not ases" and "not-ors."

—LESTER E. DENONN.

THEODORE MEYER GREENE: *The Arts and the Art of Criticism.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940, 690 pp.

A brief review of a big book obviously cannot do justice to the book or to the reviewer's complete judgment of it. *The Arts and the Art of Criticism* is a big book. It is written on a monumental scale with a solid, architectonic, closely knit structure which gives it a bulk of subject matter much greater than the number of pages would indicate. This suggests an extraordinary feat of organization and condensation, the more remarkable as space is frequently given to summaries and diagrams of the stages of exposition.

But the book is also big in its probable place in the history of aesthetics. It is the most complete recent statement of an idealistic (or as I prefer to call it, organistic) aeshetics, and the only statement entirely free from the Hegelian dialect. It is Hegelianism digested and integrated into the modern intellectual vernacular. It seems to me that for some time, it is likely to be the standard expression of this philosophical attitude in aesthetics, and consequently to have a place in modern aesthetics comparable to that of Dewey's *Art as Experience*, which may be regarded as a standard statement of the pragmatic or contextualistic aesthetics.

Consistency of philosophic attitude is, in my judgment, an important intellectual virtue in aesthetic theory, especially where a synoptic view of the field of aesthetic values is desired, or where justifiable criteria of aesthetic criticism are sought. This virtue, with certain qualifications to be noted, Professor Greene's work has.

At the same time the work is empirical. The theoretical framework is used to illuminate and integrate, never as a platform from which to speculate. As if to accent this point there are two hundred and ninety-nine illustrations of the visual arts appended to the book. As soon as any important point is made, it is immediately exhibited in its variations through the six major arts in turn — music, dance, architecture, sculpture, painting, and literature. This method is schematized in a master diagram folded into the back of the book.

Another virtue of the book is that it is almost entirely free from polemical discussion. Professor Greene takes note of the subjectivistic position in aesthetics and drops it with these words: "I cannot here review the arguments which have been urged in support of the subjectivistic position, but must content myself with a brief indication of the alternative position which I have adopted" (p. 4). How much better this is than the old dogmatic way of calling his opponents unkind names with various

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degrees of subtlety! And how much better to drop the issue and go about his constructive business than to enter into an issue that would take five hundred pages for itself to explain adequately!

Altogether I regard the book as admirable. It is clear that its merits so single-mindedly attended to imply their opposites as lacks. A solid, massive book is not a light and easy book. A book that sticks close to structure and evidence lacks the zest of imaginative exploration. A book that is firmly organistic lacks the insights of other attitudes. But had Professor Greene tried to give us all these, he could not have given us what he did. To criticize Professor Greene along these lines is to fail in realizing the great value in what he did give. For the same reason, one must not criticize his book for the lack of certain traits of spontaneous and intuitive genius, such as Hegel and F. H. Bradley possess, for then the book would not have been the stolid granitic structure that it is. Yet these lacks are characters that we should properly wish to have realized elsewhere in our cultural achievement.

Relevant critical comments on Professor Greene's work should probe within the categorical limits of his conceptual structure and among his empirical materials. There is no doubt much to be worked over here, which will render his book an excellent base for seminar study. I will enumerate a few of the things that bother me within these limits of criticism:

(1) For an organistic aestetics there is too much emphasis on the "abstract universal," or genus, species, substance, property, essence etc. These concepts are almost always close to the surface, and show up persistently in the classificatory structure of the exposition of the text, but they come out openly in Part III on "Artistic Content" and appear to me to distort Professor Greene's descriptions and intent here or seriously to disrupt the consistency of his exposition. It leads also to a neglect of the action of the "concrete universal" in this context where it is particularly illuminating in art.

(2) Partly, perhaps, as a consequence of this deficiency, one does not find in the text as much weight and detailed description given to the "creative imagination" in the artist and to the "recreative imagination" in the appreciator and critic as one would expect. The aesthetic values tend to freeze and crystallize in the work of art, instead of working dynamically with the work of art as a center and a source for a coherent organization of the feelings and perceptions of actual minds. One almost gets to thinking of medium, and form, and content as properties of an independent object, rather than as analytical aspects of an active integrative process. Even Professor Greene's constant insistence upon "artistic quality" as the essential intuited feel of the work of art in appreciation does not dispel the static impression, but comes rather as the noting of another important property in a work of art. This effect is unfortunate, for not even contextualism does such full justice to the dynamic element in art as organicism traditionally and logically does.

(3) This static quality accounts also, I believe, for the paradoxes of Professor Greene's doctrine of "artistic truth." Other reviewers have criticized him for adopting this doctrine at all. My criticism is that he does not carry it far enough in consistency with his prevailing organistic presuppositions. It is nothing new that in organistic terms, the greater the work of art the greater its truth. For in organicism value is empiric-

ally identified with coherence, and truth is identified with the coherence of judgments. Coherence of artistic experience in an integrated work of art is, therefore, quite appropriately called artistic truth, the more so as the greater the amount of this inegrated experience the more it draws in actual judgments. No paradox arises in this way of dealing with the matter. But Professor Greene begins to make his treatment of the matter unnecessarily difficult when he sharply distinguishes a judgment from a proposition, the former being an act of averment and the latter the object of that act characterized by the properties of truth or falsity (p. 425). The status of a proposition in terms of his philosophical presuppositions then becomes highly problematical. Even for subsistent realists or nominalistic naturalists the status of a proposition is a problem. Why should Professor Greene borrow trouble when he has a theory of judgment congenial to his categories in which no such problem arises? To call a work of art an expression of a proposition is thus truly a paradox, if not a confusion. The same criticism holds of his treatment of consistency and correspondence (cf. p. 437). The one eventually means coherence and the other empiricism, so that the two together mean empirical coherence, which is the traditional organistic theory of truth. Professor Greene does not literally endorse a correspondence theory of truth. He calls it merely one generic criterion of truth which is his peculiar way of saying what all organicists have said of correspondence, that it is only "fragmentary" and exhibits only a limited aspect. These paradoxes would all disappear if he talked of judgments and coherence in the traditional way. His various types or stages of criticism, culminating in "artistic greatness," would then fall into place without paradox or strain. In spite, however, of the perversity of the treatment, Part IV on "Principles of Criticism" seems to me a fitting climax to a richly integrated book.

University of California.

—STEPHEN C. PEPPER.

WARREN DWIGHT ALLEN: *Philosophies of Music History.* New York: American Book Company, 1939.

Dr. Allen's book is one of several recent musical studies which must win from the scholarly world a real measure of respect and admiration for America. That world is not always aware of its own frequently aberrant interpretations of its subject-matter. To detect and then to reveal these in the huge literature of music history has been Dr. Allen's herculean task. If we are sometimes reminded of the Augean stables, we also gratefully recognize that they have been cleaned.

He shows how several early fallacies (such as the belief in the divine origin of music) have perpetuated themselves by transformation into new notions (such as that of music as an organism, governed by apparently biologic law) which are as undemonstrable as the idea of divine origin. He evokes philosophic doubt as to the "evolution" (Spencer-wise, from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous) of this organism, and attains thus to a profound distrust of all analogy as the basis of historic interpretation. In revealing the vices of classification he perhaps underestimates its usefulness; but his irony is salutary.

His own philosophy is not disguised. He hopes that we may come

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The book probably could not have been made easier to read than it is. It betrays an alarming erudition, but does not display it. This is not a text-book. Rather, it is an antidote for the subtle mental poisons which text-books distil.

—DONALD N. FERGUSON.

ROGER FRY: *Last Lectures*. Introduction by Sir Kenneth Clark. Cambridge: University Press; New York: The Macmillan Co. XXIX + 370 pp. 1939. $5.00.

Few writers on art have had the influence in England exerted by the late Roger Fry. Like Ruskin in the 19th century, Fry made taste to the extent that any one man can. Not only did he influence the public to like what he himself liked, but he was able to formulate principles of approbation which a large section of the public was willing to adopt as its own.

These principles, clearly and simply stated, form the backbone of these *Last Lectures*. Art to secure Fry's approval had to have "sensibility" and "vitality." The former of these qualities appears in the distinction between a straight line drawn by a ruler and one drawn freehand. The ruled line is accurate but mechanical; the freehand line is inaccurate but sensitive. It reveals "theoretically" "something about the artist's nervous control, and secondly, something of his habitual nervous condition, and finally, something about his state of mind at the moment the gesture was made." (p.22). A sensitive line registers very subtle changes of form, changes which are not determined by any mechanical formula but which occur rhythmically like, we might say, the meter of a line of poetry. A line of English poetry overlies a mechanical pattern of accents, but it — except in doggerel— never perfectly exemplifies the meter. Its deviation from the meter is of course produced by accents determined by length of vowels and rhetorical emphasis. Fry's sensibility would seem to be that quality in the visual arts, in line, surface, design, and the other elements: the interplay between mechanical pattern and living form.

"Vitality" is a quality more difficult of definition. "It seems to me," says Fry (p. 40), "very mysterious, and I find it difficult to allege any explanations of why it occurs when it does, by what exact process the artist gives the illusion; and yet further I do not know quite what value we ought to attach to the quality, or what its relations are to other aesthetic qualities." Vitality thus is not the quality of living things reproduced in works of art; it is the quality of works of art which appear to be alive. No further definition is given by the author, but since he reproduces a large number of illustrations which exemplify in his mind what he does not define, the reader is at least provided with the opportunity to make the idea precise for himself.

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their products but to judging them. The net result is that most Greek and Egyptian art is condemned as lacking in sensibility and vitality, most Negro and Chinese art is praised for possessing them. The word "most" must be taken seriouly in this sentence; Fry was willing and able to distinguish between good and bad examples even in fields which he disliked.

The best test of the soundness of Fry's principles would naturally appear to be their harmony with his readers' own taste. Most readers of the generation of your reviewer would agree with Fry's choice, though perhaps not with his reasons for it. The generation which became articulate after the World War — let us say roughly in the '20's — would be inclined to think more of subject-matter and less of what Fry would call the purely aesthetic qualities of works of art. But for purposes of understanding — not judgment — it is valuable to know just what the result of his theory would be.

When a theory of criticism is such as to reject the bulk of the art of two civilizations, one ought to hesitate in adopting it. If criticism makes judgments about values which are true and false, then something would appear to be wrong when they contradict the judgments of thousands of other people. It is not relevant to point out that thousands of people have been wrong about, for instance, the shape of the earth. The shape of the earth was not determinable by appeal to evaluations. The aesthetic values of Egyptian and Greek art were determined by the satisfaction which they gave to people who made them and those who looked at them. The almost exclusive frontality of Egyptian sculpture could not have been aesthetically displeasing to Egyptians any more than the hieratic character of Byzantine painting could have been displeasing to the art patrons of Byzantium. If such works of art displease one of our contemporaries, is that due to their lack of aesthetic value or to his lack of understanding?

Johns Hopkins University

—GEORGE BOAS.

SIEGFRIED GIEDION: *Space, Time and Architecture: The Growth of a New Tradition.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941. xvi. 601 pp., 321 illustrations.

The wonderful book before us for review comes out of an adventure in international scholarship. Dr. Giedion, a Swiss, held the annual Charles Eliot Norton Professorship of Poetry at Harvard. The committee of selection interpreted the term poetry (as permitted by the founder) so very broadly as to include what to many seemed a very strange subject — the study, among old-fashioned utilitarian buildings, of the authentic beginnings of the new architecture and its aesthetic, together with a re-evaluation of Baroque, Revivalism, and Art Nouveau from the modernist's point of view.

Language difficulty in this case took the uncomfortable form of a dilemma — if the lectures were delivered, with ease, in French, they would be accessible to the conventional audience within the wider University circle; Dr. Giedion chose the difficult alternative of delivering them in English in order to reach the young architects for whom his words had a genuine inspiration. Instead of living an easy academic life during his lectureship he journeyed far and wide over the United States so that

their products but to judging them. The net result is that most Greek and Egyptian art is condemned as lacking in sensibility and vitality, most Negro and Chinese art is praised for possessing them. The word "most" must be taken seriouly in this sentence; Fry was willing and able to distinguish between good and bad examples even in fields which he disliked.

The best test of the soundness of Fry's principles would naturally appear to be their harmony with his readers' own taste. Most readers of the generation of your reviewer would agree with Fry's choice, though perhaps not with his reasons for it. The generation which became articulate after the World War — let us say roughly in the '20's — would be inclined to think more of subject-matter and less of what Fry would call the purely aesthetic qualities of works of art. But for purposes of understanding — not judgment — it is valuable to know just what the result of his theory would be.

When a theory of criticism is such as to reject the bulk of the art of two civilizations, one ought to hesitate in adopting it. If criticism makes judgments about values which are true and false, then something would appear to be wrong when they contradict the judgments of thousands of other people. It is not relevant to point out that thousands of people have been wrong about, for instance, the shape of the earth. The shape of the earth was not determinable by appeal to evaluations. The aesthetic values of Egyptian and Greek art were determined by the satisfaction which they gave to people who made them and those who looked at them. The almost exclusive frontality of Egyptian sculpture could not have been aesthetically displeasing to Egyptians any more than the hieratic character of Byzantine painting could have been displeasing to the art patrons of Byzantium. If such works of art displease one of our contemporaries, is that due to their lack of aesthetic value or to his lack of understanding?

Johns Hopkins University

—GEORGE BOAS.

SIEGFRIED GIEDION: *Space, Time and Architecture: The Growth of a New Tradition.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941. xvi. 601 pp., 321 illustrations.

The wonderful book before us for review comes out of an adventure in international scholarship. Dr. Giedion, a Swiss, held the annual Charles Eliot Norton Professorship of Poetry at Harvard. The committee of selection interpreted the term poetry (as permitted by the founder) so very broadly as to include what to many seemed a very strange subject — the study, among old-fashioned utilitarian buildings, of the authentic beginnings of the new architecture and its aesthetic, together with a re-evaluation of Baroque, Revivalism, and Art Nouveau from the modernist's point of view.

Language difficulty in this case took the uncomfortable form of a dilemma — if the lectures were delivered, with ease, in French, they would be accessible to the conventional audience within the wider University circle; Dr. Giedion chose the difficult alternative of delivering them in English in order to reach the young architects for whom his words had a genuine inspiration. Instead of living an easy academic life during his lectureship he journeyed far and wide over the United States so that

he might judge the American designs, as he had the European, from first-hand knowledge. And he worked long hours in the creation of his book, which called for a monumental task of compilation, an immense labor of integration, appreciation, and interpretation, not to mention an exacting editorial job in which he shares honors with the Harvard Press.

The resulting volume, which presents a considerable amount of new material, is obviously a classic in the field: "Undoubtedly the best book of its kind" (Gropius); "enough lines [of investigation] are opened by the Swiss visitor to occupy a generation of young American scholars (Hitchcock) — yet it reads like a detective story, and architectural students say that once started on it, they have read it the night through — unable to put it down. That is indeed a rare phenomenon in a book which is in several respects a veritable encyclopaedia with a high standard of accuracy.

The singularly absorbing character of the text comes from the fact that it reveals the increasing dynamism of all the truly living architecture since the seventeenth century. The surge started in the Baroque period, with its movement of mass in space, exemplified first by undulating walls and later by extraordinary interpenetration of voids and solids in the interiors. The solution of the insistent problem of bringing man into systematic contact with nature began in the Baroque period also — for such people as the court at Versailles. As the decorative dynamism of the Baroque subsided, the industrial revolution brought about innovations in structure, which underwent dynamic and revolutionary development at the hand of the great architects and engineers of the nineteenth century. There resulted a new conception of space relationships. As a matter of course the advanced architects of the twentieth century have quite abandoned the classic mode of arranging solid walls to form a static building, for the new mode of creating dynamic arrangements of space. Now this dynamism is communicated to the individual building, to the building group, and indeed to larger areas where considerable populations are brought into systematic contact with nature. This crescendo of scope and power in living architecture represents three centuries of logical growth, as Dr. Giedion's book clearly shows. No one can finish the volume without sensing what a wonderful instrument we have in the new architecture for making the world a better place to live in, unless it bleeds to death before the city of the future can be created.

Harvard University

—KENNETH JOHN CONANT.

SEIROKU NOMA: *Japanese Sculpture.* Tourist Library, Japanese Government Railways, 100 pp.

One opens a guide-book for tourists with the certitude that it intends to direct the sight-seeing individual towards some unavoidable and obvious mediocrities such as the Cathedral of Cologne or the Buddha of Kamakura. Through Noma's *Japanese Sculpture,* the Japanese Board of Tourist Industry breaks with this time-honored tradition. The book assumes that the traveller may be of normal intelligence and sensitive to fine art. Thus the tourist is presented with a history of Japanese sculpture, not through a history of events, culture, religion or other substi-

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tutes, but through a sequence of styles, complete from prehistory to the present.

There is a dignified appreciation and an illuminating analysis of materials and technique, an intelligent classification of subjects, a short list of sites and museums, and an excellent choice of illustrations in the book. The pardonable neglect of the Chinese background and a useless "new" spelling of Japanese names should not prevent this book from being considered the best study of its kind.

Institute of Fine Arts, New York University.

—ALFRED SALMONY.

CARL THURSTON: *The Structure of Art.* The University of Chicago Press. 1940. pp. ix add. pp. 181.

This is an excellently planned book on the principles of visual form and written in an admirably readable and clear style. For this reason it is most regretable that the author should have found it desirable to introduce his work with a tirade against philosophical and psychological aesthetics quite irrelevant to his theme. Mr. Thurston's complaint is that when the aesthetician is a philosopher he "leads off with a definition of beauty or a one-word definition of art and proceeds to wring it dry", and when he happens to be a psychologist "he is still more likely to attack some single facet of art from a single angle." He charges both with a reluctance to "study art rigorously in terms of cause and effect", because they say nothing "about the practical problems that have to be wrestled with by an artist who is trying to create art or a layman who is trying to understand it."

The question may be raised whether it is not in fact Mr. Thurston who is guilty not only of wringing a single facet of art dry but also of mistaking the very letter of art for its spirit. Is it really true that the "very essence of aesthetic experience lies in the way in which each ingredient interacts with every other?" If this were so then all experience would be aesthetic, since all experience is of organized wholes, and that is all that can be meant by ingredients interacting with each other. The artist, if he is creative, does not set out to construct a pleasing object; his struggle with his material is compelled by the urgent need to give perfect expression to overwhelming vital experience. There can be no rules for such experience other than those commanded and demanded by the experience itself. What Mr. Thurston writes about is not, as he would have it, the cause of art, for a work of art is not a thing, no matter how well constructed; it is a personality, a living reality, which defies structural analysis. It is this living reality of art that the aesthetician, whether as philosopher or psychologist, seeks to discover, and for this reason it is quite proper that he should leave the study of the details of artisanship to textbooks of composition.

Carnegie Institute of Technology.

—MAX SCHOEN.

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RUTH C. CHILD: *The Aesthetic of Walter Pater.* New York. Macmillan Co. 1940. 158 pp.

In the present day when the social values and function of art are so constantly emphasized the philosophy of art for art's sake is not only labelled outdated and outmoded but is difficult to see clearly and to understand. Miss Child feels that Walter Pater has been misunderstood and his views on art dismissed intolerantly becaue of the changes in viewpoint which the past half-century have brought about. She is concerned in this book to present an analysis of his aesthetic theory and through revealing the framework of his critical and aesthetic thought to justify his views and to establish his significance.

Though he belonged to the self-conscious "aesthetic movement" along with Rossetti, Morris, and Swinburne, Pater stood sharply apart from these men through his utter lack of bitterness toward the philistine world and through his intense concern with the moral order which he upheld and defended. He was far from being an exponent of the shallow side of art for art's sake doctrine for he insisted on the ethical function of the arts in developing higher and finer qualities of the spirit in mankind. Miss Child feels that the doctrine of the autonomy of the arts in his hands at least was a well-balanced theory but that he has suffered through his advocacy of it because of the censure which the extreme and shallower followers of the movement attracted to themseives. His view of art as fulfilling an ethical end is allied with his view of life itself as an art. A later generation's failure to realize his intense ethical concern has led us to regard his injunctions to live with a "quickened sense of life", with "balance, unity with one's self, consummate Greek modelling" as the height of preciousness.

Miss Child has performed an excellent service in clarifying Pater's views on art and their relations to this times. Yet despite her insistence on Pater's stature as a significant and independent critic which she feels has been denied him through a following generation's misunderstandings of his views, I believe she fails to support her brief. Pater was eclectic. He drew heavily an Platonic philosophy without adhering consistently to it or enriching it. He was one with his times in his insistence on the ethical purposes of art and accepted the tradition uncritically. He adopted wholeheartedly the Greek ideals which wrought so remarkably on English university life of the nineteenth century. Even though the doctrine of art for art's sake was "established in philosophical theory" and traces back to Hegel, Kant and Schiller, this does not mean that Pater drew on or formed an aesthetic theory for his criticism. His critical instrument was not a rounded and wide theory but his personal sensitivity wedded to a fine gift for expression. His interest was not aesthetic values or standards, nor their justification, nor in discussions of theories, but in responding sensitively to beauty, in describing felicitously his impressions, and in living in harmony with the finest. He simply was not interested in developing a standpoint for assessing aesthetic value. As he wrote in "Marius", "But our own impressions . . . How reassuring, after so long

a debate about the rival *criteria* of truth, to fall back upon direct sensation, to limit one's aspirations after knowledge to that!" To him the essence and end of criticism was to find the 'formula' of a writer, or artist, to sum up his individuality in a phrase or two. He formulated his critical standpoint in his "Studies in the History of the Renaissance" where he wrote:

"The function of the aesthetic critic is to distinguish, to analyze, and separate from its adjuncts, the virtue by which a picture, a landscape, a fair personality in life or in a book produces this special impression of beauty or pleasure, to indicate what the sources of that impression is, and under what conditions it is experienced. His end is reached when he has disengaged that virtue, and noted it . . . for himself and others."

We would regard him, rather than as a critic, as one who distilled, through the instrument of his own sensitivity moulded by his times, into a vial of a glitteringly brilliant yet austere style, the aesthetic and moral humors of those years.

—E. N. B.

LEAH JONAS: *The Divine Science; the Aesthetic of Some Representative Seventeenth-Century English Poets.* New York: Columbia University Press. 1940. 292 pp.

The writer on the aesthetic theory of poetry and its criticism of England's seventeenth century suffers from a dearth of material. From 1602 when Daniel published his "Defense of Rime" to 1668, when Dryden wrote his "Essay of Dramatic Poesie" there was no whole work whose purpose was purely critical. Dr. Jonas, in seeking to understand the complex changes in English poetry following its Elizabethan glory, turns to the poetic theory underlying the work of influential and representative poets. The object of her study was to disclose what common threads lay beneath the variegated pattern of the poetry of this century with its many schools and styles. Her sources were the writings of the poets themselves wherein they expressed their opinions of the goals and techniques of their art. The poets, in contrast to the silence of the critics, have left considerable material in preface or notes, in answering or forestalling criticism, and in references to the poetic creations of their own or of their contemporaries.

The poetry of the seventeenth century was characterized by several enduring attitudes expressed explicitly by a number of outstanding poets and found implicit throughout their work. There was the conception of the divine purpose of poetry as the teacher of virtue to mankind. Poetry was held to be an instrument forged with a social purpose. Allied to this view were the concepts of feigning and of fame. Through invention and fiction virtue is taught and fame is a powerful incentive to the moral life. Following the Renaissance writers, poetic forms were ranged in a hierarchy from the lofty ode and epic to the humble and trivial satire and pastoral. Poetry was didactic and pervaded with religious and moral sentiments. Apart from this view of the major poets, though influenced by it,

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were the lyricists, narrower in scope, more individual, moree concerned with perfection of form and the practice of their art.

Dr. Jonas brings out admirably the poetic views of the major poets of the century and the minor lyricists and religious writers, drawing from their poetic works and other writings. The poetic beliefs of poets are extremely interesting and of value in their own right. Perhaps it was due to the temper of the time with great emphasis on poetry as the conveyor of moral truth that was alien to far-reaching critical vision into the stuff of poetry itself.

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RAY FAULKNER, EDWIN ZIEGFELD, GERALD HILL: *Art Today, an Introduction to the Fine and Functional Arts.* New York: Holt, 1941. 358 pp. 214 illus.

This introduction to the arts which was developed primarily for the college student but is eminently suitable for the general public, does an excellent job of showing, in its first part, how art fits into the life of the individual and the community, in homes, in the community enterprise of parks, playgrounds, and schools, and in industry and commerce. Its third section, detailling the problem of materials and processes where the potentialities of clay, stone, plastics, and wood are discussed, is equally well done. The book is well illustrated with photographs and reproductions of art objects.

It is the second part that is open to serious criticism. Here the authors deal with the "principles of organization which influence the development and forms of art objects, the selection and arrangement of parts, the choice of shapes, colors, textures, and spaces." Two principles are discussed: "Form follows function" and "Variety in unity". How can thee well-worn ideas be said to be "principles of art" in the meaning of that terms as synonymous with a "rule or ground of action", or "governing law of conduct"? Can we agree with the statement that " . . . the desire to have form follow function, to secure variety in unity, and to produce a measure of balance, dominance and subordination, and rhythm mark the work of artists in primitive and sophisticated, Oriental and Occidental, democratic and autocratic societies."? Can it really be said that artists have been primarily actuated by a desire to produce objects which will have these characteristics, for the sake of these characteristics only? Certainly not. Artists have been moved to create works which will excite, agitate, sooth, cajole, overawe, please, mystify, and otherwise effect human beings. To "explain" art we must work from the kinds of impacts the art objects create to why they do so in terms of all the factors that can be seen to influence that response: arrangement, color, "plastic elements" certainly but first of all the significance to them as human beings of a certain period, of the things depicted, whether female nude, fish or flower. Such a pseudo-principle as "variety in unity" simply does not explain the effect of art objects on us nor serve to distinguish one type from another or even good from bad art, despite the author's assertions that it does so serve. It has often been termed a 'formal' principle but that implies the separation of form and content and

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brings in that dubious aesthetic standpoint. (The authors do a good job of clarifying the various meanings the word "form" can have until they bring Bell's "significant form" in.).

The principle of "form follows function" is equally weak and if translated into this proposition: The form (shape, construction, part to part relations) of objects are solely determined by their function, and this is sufficient to render them beautiful, is simply not true. The authors' own illustration of the changes of body design of the Ford automobile over a period of years proves our point. Its automotive function has remained precisely the same. Its body construction and appearance has altered, but not to accord with change in function but in response to the changing demands of fashion. Now its lines are streamlined, its body shiny and sleek, its upholstery colorful. But it is still a car and though in performance superior to its ancestors, we cannot explain changes in body shape or line as due to mechanical alterations of engine or transmission. Form here has followed fashion, not function. Further, to use the term function to cover *uses* of a house or car as well as *properties* of paints, organizations, textures and so forth, is to create profound confusion.

It seems to us that to use such principles as these as the bases for teaching appreciation is to work at the problem of sharpening sight and increasing sensitivity from the wrong side and for two reasons. First, these so-called principles are vague, so very general they fit everything and explain nothing. Hangovers from a classical aesthetic theory, they are more cliché than principle. Secondly, to begin with "formal" principles of "design", "compositions" and "form" is to begin far from living human interests. The separation of form from content is one of dubious value unless strictly handled; to lead students effectively into art experiences through an aesthetic analysis of the basis of form and other abstractions is more dubious still.

—E. N. B.

LOUIS DANZ: *Personal Revolution and Picasso.* New York and Toronto: Longman's, Green and Co. 1940. 165 pp. 1 plate.

Mr. Louis Danz, author of "The Psychologist Looks at Art", which was published several years ago, describes how he discovered on looking at Picasso's "Guernica" mural that art is "haptic" and not "cerebral". Extending the usual reference of haptic to the sense of touch he uses it to cover all "emotive happenings which take place inside the body". Since art stirs us haptically it is "physiological" instead of "psychological". Drawing on some experiments which show the tendency of irregular figures perceived visually to be reconstructed later from memory in more geometrically regular shapes than they were when seen, and the fact that only regular geometric figures partially falling on the blind-spot of the eye will be completed so that the whole form is seen, he finds an urge toward geometrical configuration in man which extends through nature. "Man and nature are interlocking geomathic constructs." Structure and form of all kinds is given through "geomathics" which is "the meaning of geometry and mathematics before they are what they become", and

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"potential design for feeling." The energy which completes and enlivens these forms is the haptic. Here is the ancient dichotomy of form and content: "geomathics" the form and haptic emotion the energy creating and infusing it.

Some good insights and frequent more than clever remarks are offset by the ecstatic style of short staccato sentences and an attempt at an artless, childlike excitement and naivete that does not carry conviction long. Though the views expressed may have affected a revolution in Mr. Danz, and we do not doubt his sincerity, they seem in essence scarcely new and though phrased in unusual terms no new light is thrown on the usefulness or validity of the distinction of form and content.

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CHARLES H. CAFFIN: *How to Study Pictures.* New York: Appleton-Century Co. 1941. Revised edition, 544 pp. 60 pl.

This book, long used for teaching appreciation of art to students and the public, has been revised and new material added on El Greco, Vermeer, Ingres, Cézanne, Monet and Degas, Matisse and Picasso and the American moderns. The means used for presenting the works of art selected is the parallel method. In each chapter typical works of two painters are reproduced, analyzed and discussed in detail, different methods of technique and composition presented with miscellaneous biographical and historical information.

While it may not be entirely wise to entrust the education in aesthetic sensitivity of the young and the public to the aesthetician, surely his services are needed in a supplementary way to cut out the dead wood of poor aesthetic theory and confused approaches to art. Books on explaining art to the layman with few exceptions, and one thinks of Herbert Read, have remained far too long on a level of rhapsodic emotion and unclear concepts. The whole field is in need of a vigorous cleansing of antiquated ideas and questioning of the assumptions on which education in art has proceeded.

While this book is not as open to criticism as many on art are and though the newly added chapters written by Roberta M. Fansler and Alfred Brussele, Jr. are excellent, it is built essentially on worn-out standards and old approaches. It would hardly be worthwhile to criticize these were they single instances but since they are so widespread in this field it does seem worthwhile to mention two of them. First, the assumptions underlying the educational approach. Most authors on art appreciation as does Mr. Caffin, fail entirely to inform their readers how they are to carry what they have gained from their book over into the discriminative eenjoyment of other works of art. The only injunction given in this book is the highly dubious one: to "see (a painting) through the eyes of the artist who painted it." What is meant by "art appreciation" is never explained. The reader is given no technique of looking at pictures nor any attempt made to prepare him to look at other pictures with an informed and sensitive eye. The book is built almost entirely on the history of European painting from the thirteenth century in Italy to the contemporary scene, devoting only eight pages to American painting today. Is to know this history in its high-lights, the names of Italian

"potential design for feeling." The energy which completes and enlivens these forms is the haptic. Here is the ancient dichotomy of form and content: "geomathics" the form and haptic emotion the energy creating and infusing it.

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masters and with whom they studied and how long, the necessary preparation for the appreciation of art?

Secondly, the aesthetic standards employed. In common with so many others, this book takes the painting of the High Renaissance in Italy to be the golden measure of all art and of a beauty never again to be attained. It is true that in some chapters other points of view appear, especially in those added, but by and large this is the one basic aesthetic standard which is implicit throughout. Giotto "made strides toward natural truth", and with Masaccio and others brought about an "emancipation of painting from the flat formalism of Byzantine art." "Painting was emancipated and set upon that sure and certain path along which it marched with gathering splendor toward the climax of the high Renaissance of the 16th century."

To judge all paintings by this standard or to "explain" them by its light is to fail completely. Furthermore, this viewpoint is not carried out consistently for we find some painters criticized for their "prosy realism" and "mere recognizing of facts." How does this differ from the rendering of "natural truth"? While there is a great concern with the "sentiment", chiefly religious, which the works express, there is never a clear statement of how it is brought out nor a reconciliation of naturalistic fidelity and expressiveness. Finally, what age is further in spirit than our own from the high Renaissance? Modern man, self-questioning, nervous, insecure, inward-turning, stands poles apart from the confidence and assurance which produced Renaissance art and with his vision much further into the nature of man himself and the universe. Surely there is a more direct connection between a modern individual and his own times than with the Renaissance, and hence more points of contact with present art than with expressions from that period. Why not start him out with art with which he is familiar and which expresses attitudes and sentiments which he finds in himself and others and which depicts the present scene about him rather than with the delicate religious sentiments and cultural interests of a world long dead which he or we can never hope to recover or fully understand?

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EMERY NEFF: *A Revolution in European Poetry.* 1660-1900. New York: Columbia University Press. 1940. 280 pp.

A panoramic survey of the course of poetry in the major European languages, French, German, English, and Italian, from 1660 to the close of the nineteenth century. A treatment of such scope, ignoring political boundaries, is extremely revealing for it presents European poetic literature as an interrelated and complex whole in its changes of theme and style. We are free, if that is not too strong a word, from the perspective on European literature which seeing it only through British eyes gives and the insular viewpoint is avoided. Dr. Neff's shows how poetic themes and styles swept over borders and the wide extent of the give and take between poets and 'schools' in different countries. He points out that the truly revolutionary and creative centers of poetry of the eighteenth and nineteenth century were in Germany and France and shows how the course of poetry was shaped by the sweeping social events of the

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Notes and News

The Philosophical Library of 15 East 40th Street, New York City, reports that considerable progress has been made in the organization and preparation of the forthcoming Dictionary of the Arts. The following have joined the project as associate editors:

MAX HORKHEIMER (Sociology of Art); IRIS BARRY (Motion Picture), RAY FAULKNER (Art Education); FELIX M. GATZ (Musicology); M. AGA-OGLU, (Islamic Art, Art of the Near East); JOHN D. FORBES, (Architecture); THOMAS MUNRO (Comparative Aesthetics); MARGARET N. H'DOUBLER, (Dance) De-WITT H. PARKER (Philosophy of Art); ANANDA K. COOMARASWAMY (Indian Art); LEO BALET (Painting and Sculpture); ALFRED NEUMEYER (Theory of Art); ALFRED SALMONY (Chinese and Japanese Arts); MAX SCHOEN (Psychology of Art.

Among the contributing editors are:
Lionello Venturi, T. W. Adorno, Walter R. Agard, Van Meter Ames, Arthur V. Berger, Emmanuel Chapman, James Chillman, Jr., Kenneth J. Conant, Donald N. Ferguson, Milton S. Fox, Helen Gardner, Katharina Everett Gilbert, T. M. Greene, Walter Gropius, Henry-Russell Hitchcock, Philip Hofer, Joseph Hudnut, Betty Lark-Horovitz, Lester D. Longman, J. Arthur Maclean, Everett Victor Meeks, Richard J. Neutra, Helen H. Parkhurst, Stephen C. Pepper, Caroll C. Pratt, Max Reiser, Andrew C. Ritchie, Edouard Roditi, W. S. Rusk, Carl Thurston, John R. Tuttle, Paul Zucker, Walter D. Teague, Ernest Krenek, Richard Krautheimer, E. U. Barnhart, Herbert Marcuse, H. P. Osborne, Allardyce Nicoll, L. C. Everard, William Longyear, Emmanuel Winternitz, Alois J. Schard, H. L. Butler, Richard Bernheimer, Richard Foster Howard, G. B. Ladner, George Boas.

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The Carnegie Corporation of New York has recently taken several steps, at the suggestion of Dr. Munro, to stimulate activity in aesthetics. Among these were three conferences of persons active in aesthetics and related fields, held in New York and California under the chairmanship of Dr. Munro.

The first was held on the 16th of last December at the Biltmore Hotel in New York. Subjects discussed were the need of a national organization and journal of aesthetics, to promote research and writing. The speakers were George Boas, Irwin Edman, Ray Faulkner, Louis W. Flaccus, Christian Gauss, Theodore M. Greene, Katherine Gilbert, H. S. Langfeld, Lester D. Longman, Ulrich Middledorf, J. L. Mursell, Arthur Pope, Lydia B. Powel, Max Schoen, H. Jeffrey Smith, Edwin Ziegfeld. A report of this conference was published by the Corporation, at 522 Fifth Avenue, New York, under the title "Informal Conference on the Arts."

On April 26th and May 3rd, two conferences along similar lines were held in California, one at the Huntington Library in Pasadena and the other at the University of California in Berkeley. A report of their proceedings is being prepared by Dr. Munro. The following participated in the California meetings: *Pasadena*: Walter Baermann, Louise Ballard, Carl Baumann, Maurice Block, Isabel Creed, Martha Deane, Knight Dunlap, Henry P. Eames, Kate Gordon, Robert S. Hilpert, Richard Hocking, Helmut Hungerland, William T. Jones, Abraham Kaplan, Maurice Mandelbaum, Amy W. McClelland, Frank W. Pitman, Robert O. Schad, Arnold Schoenberg, Carl Thurston, Kurt B. Von Weisslingen, Allen Workman. *Berkeley*: Howard Chapman Brown, Albert I. Elkus, Walter Horn, Stephen Kayser, Willi Krakenberger, Charles Lindstrom, J. Loewenberg, Douglas MacAgy, Donald S. Mackay, Spencer Macky, James McCray, Douglas N. Morgan, Grace McCann Morley, Eugene Neuhaus, Alfred Neumeyer, Stephen C. Pepper, Margaret C. Prall, Lee F. Randolph, Worth Ryder, Edward W. Strong, Aram Torossian, Glenn Wessels, Hope Wickersham.

The following topics were discussed:

1. In what ways can the study of aesthetics and related fields best be advanced at the present time, or in future if more favorable conditions permit?

2. How can more effective cooperation be secured between workers in such related fields as philosophical aesthetics, the psychology of art, cultural history, art education, and the theoretical study of particular arts?

3. How can theoretical, critical, and evaluative studies in the various arts be brought into closer coordination, thus producing a more general, synthetic approach?

4. How can philosophic aesthetics be developed so as to involve more concrete data from the arts and from actual human experiences in dealing with the arts?

5. What special problems or lines of research and investigation in these fields appear to be most deserving of study at present?

6. How can the methods for dealing with these problems be improved and developed?

7. What intermediate ground or combined approach, if any, can be worked out as between the philosophic, literary, and quantitative (experimental science) approaches to aesthetics?

8. What outcomes affecting practice and human experience, especially in the production and use of art, can be expected as a result of better understanding of these problems?

9. What practical expedients could aid in such study at the present time? For example: (a) the forming of a national society for the study of aesthetics, or the extending of the functions of present societies, so as to advance cooperation; (b) improved facilities for publication of articles and for exchange of ideas among workers in fields related to aesthetics; (c) improved educational practice, especially in universities, to help qualified students to secure a more adequate preparation for scholarly achievement in aesthetics and related fields?

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(*Compiled by Dr. E. N. Barnhart, Reed College*)

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