

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY

THE REV. R. G. BURY, LITT.D.

FORMERLY SCHOLAR OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

IN FOUR VOLUMES

I

OUTLINES OF PYRRHONISM



CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS

LONDON

WILLIAM HEINEMANN LTD

MCMLXXVI

American
ISBN 0-674-99301-2

British
ISBN 0 434 99273 9

First printed 1933
Reprinted 1939, 1955, 1961, 1967, 1976

Printed in Great Britain

CONTENTS OF VOLUME I

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION :	
I. The Earlier Dogmatic Philosophies	vii
II. The Later Dogmatists	xxi
III. Scepticism and the Sceptics	xxix
IV. Text and Editions	xliii
OUTLINES OF PYRRHONISM :	
Book I	2
Book II	150
Book III	324

INTRODUCTION

I. THE EARLIER DOGMATIC PHILOSOPHIES

THE writings of Sextus contain not only an exposition of Scepticism but also a critique of the doctrines of "the Dogmatists." The main task of the Sceptic is, in fact, to expose the folly of every form of positive doctrine; and consequently the bulk of these works of Sextus is controversial. Scattered through his pages there are references to almost every known name in the history of ancient Greek thought, and without some previous acquaintance with the main outlines of that history it is hardly possible to appreciate the points or estimate the value of his arguments. Accordingly I give here, for the convenience of the reader, a short summary of the history of Greek philosophy.

1. *The Ionian Physicists.*—Of the School of Miletus the founder was *Thales* (circa 600 B.C.). He declared that the fundamental substance of which the world was made is *water*. His successor, *Anaximander* (circa 570 B.C.), described that substance as "*the boundless*" (*τὸ ἄπειρον*), since out of it were formed "countless" (*ἄπειροι*) worlds. He regarded this primitive stuff as being in itself indeterminate, or of no one definite quality, and evolving into the forms of earth, fire, etc., by a process of "separation" of hot from cold, moist from dry, etc. Also he called his primal substance "divine." *Anaximenes* (circa 540 B.C.), like Thales, took one definite element as his primary

INTRODUCTION

matter, but chose *air*, or vapour, instead of water. He explained the passage of this into other forms of matter as due to a process of "condensation and rarefaction."

2. *Heracleiteans and Eleatics*.—In chronological order the first of the Eleatic School, *Xenophanes* of Colophon (*circa* 520 B.C.), comes before *Heracleitus*. He was less a philosopher than a religious reformer who declaimed against traditional mythology and preached a pantheism which identified the One Universe with God.

As against this Unity of the Eleatic doctrine, which precludes diversity, *Heracleitus* of Ephesus (*circa* 490 B.C.) declared that things are never one and the same but continually changing. Reverting to the view of the Milesians, he looked for one primary world-substance and found it in *fire*; this, as being also mind-stuff, he called "Reason" (*λόγος*) and God. By a kind of circular process ("the upward and downward way") the primal fire passes through the forms of air, water and earth, and returns to its own nature again. The World is "a harmony of opposites," since "War is father of all and king of all," and conflict lies at the heart of things. "All things are in flux" (*πάντα ῥεῖ*), and since things have no permanent identity the reports of our senses are delusive, and opposite statements about an object may be equally true or false. In fact, to the eyes of God, life and death, good and evil, and all opposites are identical—there is no dividing line, and they are for ever passing into one another. Thus, as a Dogmatist who dissolves all dogma, *Heracleitus* is acclaimed by the Sceptics as one of the pioneers of their tradition. (*Cf. Pyrr. Hyp.* i. 210 ff.)

INTRODUCTION

Parmenides of Elea (*circa* 470 B.C.) defended the unitary doctrine of *Xenophanes* as against the flux doctrine of *Heracleitus*. In his view "only Being is," and change, motion, and Becoming are illusions. The World is a single self-contained Sphere, uncreated and imperishable. In his great poem "On Nature" *Parmenides* calls this "the Way of Truth"; but he follows it up by an account of the World and its constituents on the lines of current physical Science (especially that of the Pythagoreans) which he calls "the Way of Opinion," without giving any explanation of how the one "Way" can be related to the other.

Zeno of Elea (*circa* 450 B.C.) supported the doctrine of the Unity of Being by attacking the notions of multiplicity and motion. These notions, he argued, are self-contradictory. As against the possibility of motion he is said to have evolved the arguments known as "The Achilles" (and the tortoise) and "The Flying Arrow." The kernel of his reasoning is that any *quantum* (as of space or time) must be regarded either as consisting of a plurality of indivisible units or as itself divisible *ad infinitum*; but in the latter case, how can the sum of infinite parts make up a finite whole? and in the former, the unitary parts of the *quantum* must themselves be *quanta* or magnitudes, and as such they cannot be indivisible.

Melissus, the Samian admiral (*circa* 440 B.C.), likewise taught that Being is One, infinite, uncreate and everlasting, motionless and without void.

Thus, in spite of their metaphysical dogmatism, the Eleatics were akin to the Sceptics in so far as they rejected the evidence of the senses and criticized the ordinary belief in the phenomenal world.

3. *Fifth-century Pluralists*.—Hitherto the Cosmologists had attempted to explain the World by assuming either the Unity of its primal substance or its Unity as a static Totality (the Eleatics). And a direct contradiction had arisen between the position of Heraclitus ("All is in motion") and that of Parmenides ("All is at rest"). We come next to a number of theorists who—though otherwise divergent—agree in adopting a *plurality* of primary substances or principles to explain the world. Also, in relation to the opposing views of Heraclitus and Parmenides, they take up a mediating position.

Empedocles of Agrigentum (circa 450 B.C.) assumed as primary indestructible substances "four Roots of all things," viz. the four elements, earth, air, fire and water. He explained all Becoming and change as due to the mixing and unmixing of these elements. As the motive forces effecting these opposite processes he assumed the two rival powers Love and Hate, or Harmony and Discord, which oust each other alternately from control of the World. When Love is in full control, all the "roots" are fused together in a compact mass forming the "Sphere," which he terms "a blessed god." When Hate is in full control, all the "roots" are completely separated, each massed apart by itself. But in the world as we know it both forces are in play, so that its constituents are neither wholly in union nor wholly in disunion. The nature of particular things depends upon the proportion of the "roots" of which they are composed. As regards knowledge, Empedocles declared that "like is known by like," fire and water in the eyes (for example) perceiving the fire and water in the objects of sight by means of effluences. He also regarded the blood

as the seat of intelligence, it being the best mixture of all the elements. And he shared the Pythagorean belief in the transmigration of souls, saying that he himself had in times past been "a bush and a bird and a mute sea-fish."

Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (circa 450 B.C.) lived mostly at Athens, where he was intimate with Pericles and Euripides, until he was condemned on a charge of atheism and escaped to Lampsacus. Like Empedocles, he held that becoming and change are due to composition and decomposition of primary indestructible substances: "Nothing becomes and nothing perishes." But the primary substances ("seeds of all things") are not merely four but numberless, all existing forms of matter (bone, hair, gold, etc.) being equally ultimate. Originally "all things were together," in a chaotic mass of all kinds of matter, then "Reason (*Nous*) came and set them in order." That is Anaxagoras's most important contribution to philosophy—the introduction of Reason or Intelligence as the Moving Cause and the principle of order and harmony in the world. He described *Nous* as alone "unmixed," and ordering the mixed mass of the world by setting up in it a vortex motion which disintegrates the mass and unites like "seeds" of matter with like.

Leucippus of Miletus (?), the first Atomist, was probably a contemporary of Empedocles and Anaxagoras, but we know little that is definite about him. His views were developed by *Democritus* of Abdera (circa 420 B.C.). He held that the World is made up of "the Full" and "the Empty," i.e. of solid, indivisible molecules of matter, the *atoms*, and empty space or *void*. The atoms differ only in size and shape, and

the forms and qualities of visible objects depend on their atomic structure. The atoms are supposed to rain down through space and collide with one another owing to the differences in the speed of their movement, their speed varying in proportion to their size. As against Anaxagoras's doctrine of *Nous*, the Atomists spoke of "Necessity" as the governing force of the World, allowing only mechanical causation. Sensation was explained as due to the reception through "pores" of "images" projected from the atoms of the object perceived; but the apparent qualities of objects have only "conventional" reality, the only true reals being the Atoms and the Void. No clear distinction is made between sense and thought, and we can make no assertion about the truth of sense-objects, since these depend on the state of the percipient and the arrangement of the atoms of which he is composed. Belief in gods is due to the "images" projected by certain anthropomorphic beings who dwell in the air. Knowledge is of two kinds, "genuine" and "bastard," the latter being that derived from the senses, the former that of the understanding which discerns the only real existents, the atoms and the void. Democritus appears also to have named "Well-being," or tranquil cheerfulness, as the ethical "end" or "good." The relation of Democriteanism to Scepticism is discussed by Sextus in *Pyrr. Hyp.* i. 213 ff.

The Pythagoreans.—*Pythagoras* (circa 530 B.C.) was a contemporary of Xenophanes, born at Samos, but mainly resident at Crotona in South Italy. There he founded a religious Order, and a Way of Life akin to that of the Orphics in its asceticism, its belief in re-incarnation, and its precepts for the salvation of the soul from its "body-tomb" ($\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha\text{-}\sigma\hat{\eta}\mu\alpha$). But

nothing is known of Pythagoras himself as scientist or philosopher, and as a philosophy Pythagoreanism seems to date from the fifth century, its chief exponent being *Philolaus* (circa 440 B.C.). Thus Pythagoreanism is, in the main, contemporary with the other "pluralist" systems mentioned above. The chief subjects cultivated by the Pythagoreans were mathematics, music, medicine and gymnastics. Their main tenet was "Things are numbers," or "The principles of things are the principles of numbers." And, as all numbers are either odd or even, the world is made up of opposites, which can be arranged in ten classes. Even numbers are always divisible by 2 and so are named "Unlimited"; and 1, being the primary odd number, may be called the "Limit." Regarded geometrically, 1 is the point, 2 the line, 3 the plane, 4 the solid. They called 10 (the *Decad*) the perfect number, as being the sum of the first four numbers ("the Tetractys") and thus containing all the elements of number. "Harmony" is the principle which unites opposites and resolves cosmical as well as musical discords. The Universe consists of ten bodies (the heaven of fixed stars, the five planets, moon, sun, earth, "counter-earth") revolving around the "central fire" or cosmic "hearth"; it is surrounded by air which it breathes in and out. Its life lasts for a "Great Year" (10,000 years), at the end of which it starts anew on the same course; and in every such period history repeats itself. Soul was defined as a harmony, and the virtues identified with special numbers.

4. *The Fifth-century Sophists.*—While the thinkers hitherto mentioned dealt mainly with the world of Nature, the group known as "Sophists" were chiefly

concerned with Humanity. It was "the Age of Enlightenment" in Greece, when old beliefs and customs were being challenged by a new spirit of doubt and inquiry. With the rise of democracy every citizen became a potential politician, and instruction to fit men for public life was in general demand. This demand the Sophists laid themselves out to supply. They were the professional Educators of the public, and what they taught was "Virtue," as they called it, *i.e.* civic excellence, and the arts which enable a man to succeed in life. And since, for a political career and to achieve success in the law-courts, debating power is of supreme importance, the art of Rhetoric is the most useful aid to "Virtue"; and we find that the Sophists cultivated it in particular. The earliest of the Sophists was *Protagoras* of Abdera (*circa* 440 B.C.) who resided for some time at Athens until he was convicted of impiety and had to flee.* He is chiefly noted for his dictum—"Man is the measure of all things; of what is, that it is; of what is not, that it is not" (*cf.* *Pyrr. Hyp.* i. 216 ff.). This means that the individual man is the criterion of truth, and denies that there is any universal standard or any absolute truth. The subjective impressions of each man are true for him, but not necessarily for anyone else. Hence, all opinions are equally true, and falsehood has no meaning, and contradictory statements are both equally credible. But to reject objective truth is also to reject the possibility of knowledge, and this consequence of Protagoreanism was further developed by the second great Sophist, *Gorgias* of Leontini

* So Sextus in *Ph.* i. 56, but the story is doubtful.

(*circa* 440 B.C.). His book "On the Non-ent or Nature" essayed to prove (1) that nothing exists; (2) that if anything exists it is incognizable; (3) that even if cognizable it is incommunicable (*cf.* *Pyrr. Hyp.* ii. 59, 64). In this we see the strongest possible expression of the agnostic tendency and a Scepticism more dogmatic than that of the professed Sceptics of a later age. Another important Sophist was *Hippias* of Elis, the "polymath," who boasted of his ability to give an extempore lecture on any subject, and (like other Sophists) contrasted "law" or convention with "nature" or instinctive impulse. Of *Prodicus* of Ceos we are told that he specialized in linguistics, the precise use of synonyms, and ethical discourses. Other Sophists of the eristic type, who helped to undermine religious belief and to promote intellectual anarchy, were *Euthydemus* and *Dionysodorus*, *Critias* the Athenian (one of "The Thirty"), and *Diagoras* of Melos.

5. *Socrates and the Minor Socratics.*—*Socrates* (469–399 B.C.) was the contemporary of the Sophists and so far akin to them that he held that "the proper study of mankind is man," and was a humanist rather than a physicist. But his aim was exactly the reverse of theirs—to establish morality on a sound basis, instead of proclaiming the futility of the moral law. By means of the *inductive* method and *definition* he sought to build up a system of *conceptual* knowledge which should possess objective truth, as contrasted with the merely subjective opinions derived from sense-perception. As an ethical teacher he preached "well-doing," or right conduct, as the aim of life, and urged self-knowledge and self-control as things more valuable than any external goods, his most

distinctive doctrine being that of the identity of knowledge and virtue, and of vice and ignorance; for "no man," he said, "is voluntarily wicked." But there is much uncertainty about the details of the teaching of Socrates, since the "Socrates" of the Platonic dialogues is by no means always "the historic Socrates," and the evidence of Xenophon (our other chief authority) does not appear to be altogether trustworthy.

Four "Minor Socratic" Schools were formed by the disciples of Socrates. *Euclides* of Megara founded the *Megaric* School in which, it would seem, Socratic tenets were combined with Eleatic doctrines, and the indirect method of proof was developed. Its interest was mainly in logic and dialectic; and to *Eubulides* (*Euclides*' successor) is ascribed the invention of many logical puzzles ("the Liar," Sorites, etc.). Curiously enough, although Sextus often refers to *Diodorus Cronos* (*circa* 300 B.C.), he hardly mentions the earlier Megarics, although many of the Sceptic arguments must have been borrowed from them. The *Elean* School was founded by *Phaedo* of Elis, whose teaching seems to have resembled that of *Euclides*. It, too, is not referred to by Sextus. *Antisthenes* founded the *Cynic* School. It subordinated logic and physics to ethics. Virtue, said Antisthenes, is the only good, all else is indifferent and of no account. Virtue is wisdom, self-control and self-sufficiency: the wise man cuts himself free from all earthly interests—pleasure, society, religion; he stands secure in himself, above all temptation. And, as in their Ethics, so in their Logic the Cynics stood for individuality and independence. Only identical judgements, they said, are possible; contradiction is

impossible, and therefore knowledge equally so. Thus they reverted to the Sceptical position of *Protagoras* and *Gorgias*. Other notable Cynics were *Diogenes* (*circa* 340 B.C.), famed for his blunt coarse speech and his contempt for civilized customs, and *Crates* (*cf. Pyrr. Hyp. i. 72, 153*).

The *Cyrenaic* School was founded by *Aristippus* of Cyrene, who was succeeded by his daughter *Arete*, and she by his grandson *Aristippus*. Later members of the School were *Theodorus* "the atheist," *Anniceris*, *Hegesias* ("the *suasor mortis*"). Like the Cynics, the Cyrenaics concentrated on Ethical theory. The *summum bonum*, they said, is *Pleasure*, and pleasure consists in "smooth motion," pain being "rough motion," and the neutral state "immobility." These are the three states of consciousness or psychic "affections" in which sensation consists and to which knowledge is confined. As the causes of these internal states are unknown, knowledge is wholly subjective, and each individual is his own standard of truth—the Protagorean position again. As the end of life is to gain from it the maximum of pleasurable sensations, the "Wise Man" of the Cyrenaics is he who best knows how to secure enjoyment from all possible sources, and to ward off discomfort and pain. Like the Cynics, the Cyrenaics stood for "nature" as against "convention," but they interpreted nature in a very different way (*cf. Pyrr. Hyp. i. 215, Adv. Log. i. 11*).

6. *Plato and the Old Academy*.—The philosophy of *Plato* (427–347 B.C.) defies a brief summary. Only a few outstanding points can be mentioned. As against the Sophists, he maintained the possibility of knowledge, and the existence of an objective standard of

truth; and by identifying the "natural" with the "rational" he suppressed the Sophistic appeal from "law," or convention, to "nature." His theory of knowledge and of Being may be said to be based on a reconciliation of the rival doctrines of Heraclitus and Parmenides. Heraclitus was right in regarding the sense-world as being in a state of continual flux and therefore not a subject of knowledge, but he was wrong in treating it as the only world. Parmenides, too, was right in holding that the world as known must be changeless and self-identical, but he was wrong in trying to force this conception on the phenomenal world. There are, in fact, two distinct worlds and two distinct kinds of apprehension to deal with them. Sensation tells us of the phenomenal and gives rise to "opinion"; Reason and thought deal with objects supersensible. For the content of his "intelligible" world Plato is indebted to Socrates' theory of concepts. The general (Aristotelian) view is that by "hypostatizing" these concepts he framed his "Ideas." He presents the Ideas as the ultimate Realities, the only objects of knowledge in the strict sense. The logical method which deals with the Ideas is "Dialectic," which combines induction with deduction. The supreme Idea is "the Good." In the physical theory of the *Timaeus*, the "Demiurge" (God, or Mind) frames the Universe with a view to the most Good, by means of harmony and proportion. Ethics is interwoven with psychology; the soul is a whole with three component parts or faculties (rational, spirited, appetitive), and is defined as "the self-moving"—the source of all motion. Virtue is the "goodness" of the soul both as a whole and in each of its parts—so that virtue is fourfold (wisdom,

courage, temperance, justice). Virtue in the State corresponds to that in the individual: each class must be efficient and loyal, and all together must be united in harmony. Thus Plato's Idealism contemplates the rule of Reason, acting for "the Best," in all three spheres—that of the Individual, of the State, and of the Universe. How far it contains a Sceptical element is discussed in *Pyrr. Hyp.* i. 221 ff.

Speusippus, the nephew of Plato, succeeded him as Head of the Academy (347–339 B.C.) and was in turn succeeded by *Xenocrates* (339–314 B.C.). Both seem to have amalgamated Idealism with the Pythagorean doctrine of Numbers. *Polemo* (314–270 B.C.) was the next Head of the School. Other noted members, or allies, of the Academy were *Heraclides* of Pontus, *Philip* of Opus, *Eudoxus* of Cnidus, the astronomer, and the Pythagorean mathematician *Archytas* of Tarentum. The general character of their teaching was, it seems, in the direction of lowering the standard of the Idealism of Plato and adapting it to the interests of inferior minds. The most gifted of Plato's disciples was undoubtedly Aristotle, the man who deserted the Academy to found a rival school of his own and to teach a revised Platonism.

7. *Aristotle and the Peripatetics* (cf. *Pyrr. Hyp.* iv. 31, 136, 218).—*Aristotle* of Stageira (384–322 B.C.) joined the Academy in 367 B.C., and after Plato's death, about 335 B.C., founded a School of his own in the *Lyceum* at Athens, lecturing as he walked about—whence the name "Peripatetic" ("walking round"). Aristotle was the great systematizer in all branches of philosophy and science. In his *Logical* treatises ("Organon") he formulates the "Categories," or ten heads of predicables; the rules for the conversion of

INTRODUCTION

propositions ; the doctrine of the Syllogism, as based on the Laws of Contradiction and Excluded Middle ; the meaning of Demonstration or Proof as concerned with necessary causes, and how First Principles, or axiomatic truths, are indemonstrable ; problematic or imperfect syllogisms ; the various kinds of eristic argument or fallacy. In his *Metaphysics* he argues, as against Plato, that the Universals, the objects of knowledge, are not separate from the sensibles but *in* them. The first principles of Being are *actuality* and *potency* ; and *Cause* is analysed into four kinds—material, formal, efficient and final. *Form* is the essence of things, and the object of cognition, and Form *plus* Matter compose the concrete substance. God is pure actuality, “thought thinking upon thought,” the *primum mobile*. In his *Physics* and *Psychology* he postulated *Ether* as a fifth element, and the Earth as stationary in the centre of the Cosmos. Life is the power of self-movement, of which Soul is the principle, it being the “form” or “entelechy”^a of the body. The faculties of Soul are five—nutritive, sensitive, appetitive, locomotive, rational. In sensation we receive “the form without the matter” of the percept ; and besides the five external senses, each with its proper object, there are three internal senses, memory, imagination, and the central *communis sensus*, with its seat in the heart, by which we note and compare the several reports of the special senses. As the senses deal with the concrete and individual, so the Intellect deals with the abstract and universal ; but though distinct from Sense it is dependent on it for its material,

^a *i.e.* actuality or realization of what is otherwise merely “potential.”

INTRODUCTION

being of itself a *tabula rasa*. The intellect is also described as twofold, active and passive. His *Ethics* is chiefly notable for his doctrine of Virtue as consisting in “the Mean” between two extremes, and for his preference of mental to moral virtues. Also, he included bodily goods (health, wealth, pleasure) as well as virtue in his description of the ethical “End” (“Happiness”). In his *Political Theory* he rejects Plato’s communism and abolition of private property, and regards the State as a means for the moral advancement of the citizens and as the guardian of justice. He also wrote treatises on biology and aesthetics and rhetoric.

Theophrastus was Head of the Peripatetic School from 322 to 287 B.C., when he was succeeded by *Strato*, and he in turn by *Lyco* (269–225 B.C.). They, and other leading Peripatetics—such as *Dicaearchus*, the historian, and *Aristoxenus*, the musician—cultivated the special sciences rather than the metaphysical and logical aspects of Aristotelianism, and empirical interests tended to outweigh theoretical in the later history of the School.

II. THE LATER DOGMATISTS

On its theoretical and constructive side the philosophical movement which culminated in the architectonic systems of Plato and Aristotle came to an abrupt end. The philosophic *Epigoni* of the post-Aristotelian age showed less breadth of vision and but little originality of mind : the glory had departed from Israel. This was, no doubt, partly due to the depressing social and political conditions which prevailed in the Greek-speaking world during the third and following cen-

turies. These conditions tended to make men concentrate their thoughts on purely human interests—the welfare, destiny, salvation of the individual—to the neglect of the other departments of philosophy and science. In so far as they were cultivated at all, those other departments came to be treated merely as the handmaids of Ethics, thus reviving the mainly humanistic attitude of the Sophists. Philosophy, in fact, became the substitute for an out-of-date and exploded Religion, and had for its aim, not the attainment of objective truth, but the provision of a subjective spiritual salvation from the manifold ills of life. Its task was no longer theoretical, but the very practical and urgent one of supplying distressed humanity with “arms against a sea of troubles,” with shield and buckler against “the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune.” Truth was now a matter for the heart rather than the head; philosophy, like faith, was to be judged by its “works”; it was bound to be pragmatical. To meet this situation two great Dogmatic systems were evolved, the Epicurean and the Stoic, and, to counter them, the system of the Sceptics. These three were contemporaneous, all dating from the end of the fourth century B.C.

1. *The Epicureans.*—*Epicurus* of Samos (341–270 B.C.) founded his School in his garden (hence “the Garden School”) at Athens in 306 B.C. Epicurus reverted to Democritus for his Physics, and to Aristippus for his Ethics, being both an Atomist and a Hedonist. In his physical theory he followed Democritus closely, except in explaining the collision of atoms as due to slight arbitrary deviations from the straight line in their downward course. The Soul, he said, is material, composed (as are the gods) of a

finer sort of atoms, and mortal. Sensation, with its immediate evidence (*εἰσάργεια*), is the only criterion of truth; it is effected by effluent images (*εἰδωλα, ἀπορροαί*) from the external objects impinging on the sense-organs. The aggregation of several sensations forms the notion or concept (*πρόληψις*), and from notions arise opinion (*δόξα*) and conviction (*ὑπόληψις*). This theory of knowledge constitutes “*Canonic*,” the Epicureans’ name for Logic. Physics and Logic were regarded as subordinate to Ethics, and in Ethics Epicurus, like Aristippus, held that the Good is Pleasure, but he defined pleasure rather differently—not as a satisfying “smooth motion” but as a state of rest, “painlessness,” or absence of all unsatisfied desire, or “unperturbedness” (*ἀταραξία*). Also he regarded freedom from mental distress, fear and prejudice, as even more important than bodily satisfaction; and it is the task of the “Wise Man” (*φρόνιμος*), by means of a kind of hedonistic calculus, to estimate the comparative value of the different kinds of pleasurable affections (*πάθη*) so as to win for himself the maximum of mental satisfaction and repose throughout his life. Virtue, and the special virtues, are of value only in so far as they contribute to this end. Right and wrong become matters of merely subjective feeling. Religion was abolished as the cause of intolerable mental “perturbation,” and the gods were banished to the *intermundia*. Lucretius’s great poem *De Rerum Natura* is our most complete exposition of Epicureanism.

2. *The Stoics.*—*Zeno* of Citium, in Cyprus (350–258 B.C.), started his School about 305 B.C. in the “Painted Porch” (*στοὰ ποικίλη*) at Athens—whence the name “Stoic.” He was succeeded by *Cleanthes*, author of

the famous "Hymn to Zeus," who, in turn, was followed by *Chrysippus* of Cilicia (280–206 B.C.), who systematized the doctrines of the School. With *Panaetius* of Rhodes (180–111 B.C.), *Poseidonius* of Apamea (130–46 B.C.), and the later Stoics, the system tended to become more eclectic, with infiltrations of Peripatetic and Academic doctrine. The main tenets of Stoicism were briefly these :—

In *Physics* they reverted to Heracleiteanism, and taught a materialistic monism. All that exists is corporeal: only body can act on body, therefore God is as much corporeal as the world, the soul as the body. The primal world-stuff is *Fire*, which by the "upward and downward way" transforms itself into the other elements and produces the Cosmos, until finally, at the end of the "Great World-Year," it returns to its original form in the World-Conflagration (*ἐκπύρωσις*); and this cyclical process of evolution goes on for ever. This primary matter has two aspects, active and passive: as "artistic fiery vapour" it is the Soul of the World, Reason (*λόγος*), Thought, Destiny, God. Hence the World, though wholly material, is rational: because governed and permeated by *Logos* (the divine "Word") it exhibits order, harmony and beauty, as the artistic products of creative design. But the *Logos* is also the Cosmic Law, which binds all things in the rigid nexus of cause and effect, the bonds of Destiny (*εἰμαρμένη*). Hence, too, there can be no freedom of the Will for the individual. The Divine *Logos* contains all the "seminal *Logoi*," which are the active reproductive principles in all living creatures. Of the four elements, fire and air were contrasted as "active" with earth and water as "passive," and the forms and qualities of things were explained as

due to the action of air or "aeriform tension" (*τόνος*). The unity of inorganic objects was ascribed to "condition" (*ἕξις*), of plants to "nature" (*φύσις*), of animals to "soul" (*ψυχή*). The souls of living creatures are parts of the Cosmic Soul, and consist of hot vapour or "spirit" (*πνεῦμα*). Human souls (or at least those of the Wise) persist after death until the *Epyrosis*. The Soul has eight parts or faculties, viz. the five senses, the vocal, the generative, and the *hegemonic* or ruling. To this "Regent Part" all the rest are attached, it being their source of motion, with its seat in the heart, whence the *pneuma* radiates to the various local organs. It is in the "Regent Part," too, that perception (presentations and impulses) takes place.

For their *Logic* the Stoics were mainly indebted to Aristotle. They subdivided Logic into Rhetoric and Dialectic. All knowledge comes through the senses, the mind being a *tabula rasa* upon which sense-impressions are made. The "presentation" (*φαντασία*) is defined as "an affection (*πάθος*) arising in the soul" or "an impression (*τύπωσις*) on the soul" (Zeno) or "an alteration in the soul" (Chrysippus). Of these presentations some come through the senses, others are mental. How are we to distinguish between trustworthy and untrustworthy presentations? What is the *Criterion* of truth? Here we come to the most distinctive feature of the Stoic doctrine. The *Criterion*, they said, is to be found in the subjective reaction of the percipient. If the presentation is true, proceeding from a real object, it wins the "assent" or approbation (*συγκατάθεσις*) of the percipient: such an "apprehensive presentation" (*καταληπτικὴ φαντασία*) constitutes the *Criterion*. In

the development of knowledge they distinguished four stages—sense-perception (*αἴσθησις*), memory (*μνήμη*) or retained presentation of an absent object, experience (*ἐμπειρία*) formed by a plurality of like memories, notions (*ἐννοιαί*). “Notions” may be either involuntary—termed “common notions” or “concepts” (*προλήψεις*)—or voluntary, due to the reflex action of the mind. The “concept” is defined as “the natural notion of universals.” The reasoning faculty (*λόγος*) deals with “notions,” and all notions, as substances, are corporeal. The concepts were classified under four heads, the Stoic *Categories*, viz. substance (*ὑποκείμενον*), essential quality (*τὸ ποιόν*), accidental quality (*πρὸς ἕχον*), relation (*πρὸς τί πως ἔχον*). These they called “highest universals” or *συνταγματα* (*τὰ γενικώτατα*), and of these the first is also termed Being. In order to include also Non-being, another, still higher, category was postulated—“Something” (*τό τι*). All qualities, as gaseous currents (*πνεύματα*), are corporeal; but essential or intrinsic qualities or “states” (*ἕξεις*) are distinguished from imported or accidental qualities or “conditions” (*σχέσεις*). Under “relation” are classed all attributes which imply a connexion between co-existing objects.

In their *Ethics* the Stoics followed the Cynics, declaring Virtue to be the only *Good*, and presenting the Ideal “Sage” as the embodiment of virtue. Like all the post-Aristotelian Schools they regarded Ethics as the crown of their philosophy to which Physics and Logic were merely adjuncts, since Ethics deals with the one thing needful—human happiness and the rules for its attainment. Happiness—the End (*τέλος*) or Good—they defined as “Living in conformity with Nature” (*ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει*),

or without contravening the Cosmic “Law” which is Right Reason (*λόγος*), which means obeying God or Necessity. This subjection to the Law of the Logos is ultimately unavoidable, since “volentem fata ducunt, nolentem trahunt.” Action in accordance with “Nature” is Virtue, which does not admit of increase or decrease and is termed a “disposition” (*διάθεσις*) rather than a “state” (*ἕξις*). The four virtues—wisdom, temperance, justice, courage—are defined as four forms of knowledge. Between the extremes of virtue and vice there is no middle state; but an important distinction was made between three classes of conduct—perfect moral actions (*κατορθώματα*), “becoming” actions or “duties” (*καθήκοντα*), “undutiful” or sinful actions (*παρὰ τὸ καθήκον*). The first kind is peculiar to the Stoic “Sage,” the second proper for those “progressing” towards wisdom (*προκόπτοντες*). As the only “goods” are the virtues and the only “evils” their opposite vices, there is a large class of things which come under neither of these heads: these “neutral” things—such as life, health, wealth, beauty, pleasure, and their opposites—are, strictly speaking, “indifferent” (*ἀδιάφορα*). But, even so, they differ in value and were divided into two classes, “the desirable and preferred” (*προηγμένα*), and “the undesirable and unpreferred” (*ἀποπροηγμένα*). Non-rational affections are the “passions” or emotions (*πάθη*), of which there are four kinds—one being of the body, viz. involuntary sensuous feeling, and the other of the soul, viz. the rational emotion of the Sage, natural and involuntary states which are harmless, and vicious or morbid emotions. In all such mental passions there is an element of intellect and will as well as of feeling.

INTRODUCTION

The primary passions are four—desire, fear, pain and pleasure; and one definition of passion is “an excessive impulse.” To give way to such an impulse is to “assent” to it, or approve of it by a perverted act of judgement, and hence “passions” were called “judgements” by Chrysippus. The root of evil passions is “intemperance,” “a defection of the whole mind from right Reason,” and their fruits are the diseases of the soul we call vices and sins. The Ideal Wise Man or Sage, being moved only by rational emotions, is said to be “passionless” (*ἀπαθής*). In him virtue and wisdom are personified. He only is happy and at peace with himself, unperturbed by fightings without or fears within, indifferent to externals, self-sufficient and self-controlled, master of his fate and captain of his soul. Their portrait of the Ideal Sage is one of the features of Stoicism which attracted world-wide attention, alike from critics and admirers of the School. Horace alludes to the *sapiens* more than once in his *Satires*, e.g. ii. 7. 83 ff. :

quisnam igitur liber ? sapiens sibi qui imperiosus,
quem neque pauperies neque mors neque vincula terrent,
responsare cupidinibus, contemnere honores
fortis, et in se ipso totus, teres atque rotundus.

Of “the Wise” it was said also that all were friends of all and that they had all things in common and that the whole world was their city and their home (whence the term “cosmopolitan”). They form one of the two classes into which mankind is divided—the “good” (*σπουδαῖοι*) and the “bad” (*φᾶνλοι*), the sheep and the goats. Here again we note the ingrained ethical dualism of the Stoic system. The “bad,” the poor in virtue, we have always with us,

INTRODUCTION

a multitude whom no man can number, but where shall wisdom be found and who exactly are the truly “wise”? Socrates, they said, and Antisthenes and Diogenes approximated to the Ideal, but the perfect Sage is nowhere discoverable upon the earth; either, then, he had his being in the far-off Golden Age or he remains for ever a “pattern laid up in the heavens.”

I have enlarged thus much upon the details of Stoic doctrine because it is the type of Dogmatism which the Sceptics criticized most frequently and most severely. We pass on now to the Sceptics themselves.

III. SCEPTICISM AND THE SCEPTICS

A “Sceptic,” in the original sense of the Greek term, is simply an “inquirer” or investigator. But inquiry often leads to an *impasse*, and ends in incredulity or despair of a solution, so that the “inquirer” becomes a “doubter” or a “disbeliever,” and Scepticism receives its usual connotation. All down the history of Greek philosophy we have found traces of sceptical thought in the repeated discrediting of sense-perception and the frequent insistence on the folly of vulgar opinion. But, with the exception of Sophists like Protagoras and Gorgias, all the philosophers agreed in assuming that truth existed and that knowledge of it was possible. When Scepticism was revived and reorganized under the name of “Pyrrhonism” its main task was to challenge this assumption and to maintain, if not the impossibility of knowledge, at least the impossibility of positively affirming its possibility. Its watchword was “Suspend judgement.”

The history of Scepticism, as a definite tradition or

“School,” may conveniently be divided into four periods or stages, viz. :

- (1) Practical Scepticism of *Pyrrho* of Elis (circa 360–275 B.C.), and his pupil *Timon* of Phlius (circa 315–225 B.C.).
- (2) Critical Scepticism and probabilism of the New Academy—*Arcesilas* of Pitane (circa 315–241 B.C.) and *Carneades* of Cyrene (circa 213–129 B.C.). This ended in the Eclecticism of *Philo* and *Antiochus* (ob. 69 B.C.).
- (3) Pyrrhonism revived, systematized and developed dialectically by *Aenesidemus* (circa 100–40 B.C.) and *Agrippa* (? first century A.D.).
- (4) Final development of Empiric Scepticism, culminating in *Sextus Empiricus* (circa 160–210 A.D.).

A brief account of each of these stages must here suffice.

1. *Pyrrho* of Elis—in spite of some later traditions about him—was probably not at all a full-blown Sceptic, but rather a moralist of an austere and ascetic type—as Cicero represents him (*Acad. Pr.* ii. 130, *De Fin.* iv. 43, 49)—who cultivated insensibility to externals and superiority to environment. Probably he derived from Democritus a deep distrust of the value of sense-perception, but otherwise he seems to have been imbued with dogmatism, though it was the dogmatism of the will rather than of the intellect. We may fairly assume that the causes which led to the Scepticism of *Pyrrho* and his immediate followers were twofold—firstly, the intellectual confusion which resulted from the number of conflicting doctrines and rival schools, and secondly, the political confusion

and social chaos which spread through the Hellenic world after Alexander's death, together with the new insight into strange habits and customs which was given by the opening up of the East. The natural result of the situation at the close of the fourth century was to shake men's belief in tradition and custom, to dissolve the old creeds and loyalties, and to produce the demand for a new way of salvation in the midst of a crumbling world. *Pyrrho*, it would seem, shared this attitude, and stood out as the apostle of disillusionment. He would not seek or promise “happiness,” in the usual sense of the word, but he sought and taught the negative satisfaction of freedom from care and worry by the cultivation of a neutral, non-committal attitude towards all the problems of life and thought. In self-defence he sought refuge within himself, there to achieve a self-centred “apathy” which his disciples were to acclaim, under the name of “ataraxy,” as the Chief End of Man. Probably, then, the main, if not the only, interest of *Pyrrho* was in the ethical and practical side of Scepticism as the speediest cure for the ills of life.

Timon of Phlius spent the latter part of his long life at Athens. In his earlier days he is said to have sat under *Stilpo* at Megara, as well as under *Pyrrho* at Elis. His admiration for the latter was unbounded, although it would seem that he did not copy his ascetic habits too closely. He was a voluminous writer of both prose and poetry—epics, tragedies, satires—but only a few fragments of two of his works have survived, viz. the “Images” or “Illusions” (*Ἰνδαλμοί*), and the “Silli” or “Lampoons” (*Σίλλοι*). The latter evidently became very popular because of its mordant wit. It consisted of three books, all deriding the

professors of philosophy, and written in hexameters in the Homeric style, beginning thus :

Come now, listen to me, ye polypragmatical Sophists.

The second and third books were in the form of a dialogue between Timon and Xenophanes, in which the latter expresses his contempt for nearly all the rival schools of thought. It appears, then, that the only philosophers for whom Timon entertained any respect were the Eleatics, Democritus and Protagoras—the most severe critics of knowledge in the form of sense-perception. This exposure of the futility of philosophizing served to support the indifferentist attitude of Pyrrho ; and Timon by his writings (for Pyrrho wrote nothing) popularized the Sceptical view that the way to make the best of life is to eschew dogma and to cultivate mental repose. It is probably a mistake of Sextus (*Adv. Math.* iii. 2, vi. 66) to ascribe to Timon formal argumentation concerning “ hypotheses ” and the “ divisibility of time,” considering his ridicule of dialectic and his avoidance of “ the strife of tongues ” ; and it is very doubtful whether he (or Pyrrho) invented or used any of the technical vocabulary of Scepticism (e.g. “ Suspension,” “ No more,” “ Equipollence ”) which is commonly ascribed to him or his master.

2. *Scepticism in the New Academy* (cf. *Pyrr. Hyp.* i. 220 ff.).—With *Arcesilas* Scepticism entered upon a new stage of development. It ceased to be purely practical, and became mainly theoretical. Arcesilas succeeded Crates as Head of the Academy about 270 B.C. He appears to have been influenced by the Megarics as well as by Pyrrho, and was eminent as a dialectician and controversialist. His delight was

to argue *in utramque partem* and balance argument against argument ; and he took up the position that to know we know is an impossibility, and to seek for absolute truth an absurdity. His polemic was chiefly directed against the Stoic epistemology and its doctrine of the “ apprehensive presentation ” as the “ Criterion.” He maintained that we can “ assent ” to no sense-impression as carrying conviction and indubitably true, and that the objective realities are consequently incognizable, and we can only “ suspend judgement ” about them, unless we content ourselves with fallible “ opinion ” instead of scientific “ knowledge.” But the Stoic “ Sage ” never “ opines ” ; neither can he “ know ” ; therefore he must suspend judgement and turn Sceptic. False and true presentations are indistinguishable : no valid criterion exists : we have no guide but opinion, and we can only think, believe, and act in accordance with what seems reasonable (εὐλογον) or probably right. Thus, while Pyrrho had renounced and Timon flouted the Dogmatics, Arcesilas started the practice of refuting them scientifically and systematically, and earned thereby the abuse of Timon for his lapse from pure Pyrrhonism.

Carneades of Cyrene, like Arcesilas and Pyrrho, left no writings, but his views were preserved by his disciple Cleitomachus (Hasdrubal). He was a brilliant teacher, a formidable dialectician, and perhaps the most talented philosopher of the post-Aristotelian period. His energies were mainly devoted to negative criticism of the theories of the Dogmatists, especially the Stoics. He resumed and developed the arguments with which Arcesilas had attacked the Stoic theory of knowledge, and which Chrysippus had, in the meanwhile, attempted to rebut. Neither the senses nor

the reason, he argued, can supply any infallible "criterion": there is no specific difference between false "presentations" and true: beside any true presentation you can set a false one which is in no wise different. The dreamer, the drunkard, the madman have illusions of the truth of which they are convinced: you see two eggs or two hairs and cannot tell the one from the other: you cannot distinguish the true impression from the false, or assert that the one rather than the other is produced by a real object. It is in vain, then, to look to the senses for certainty; and it is equally vain to look to the reason since it (as the Stoics held) is wholly dependent on the senses and based on experience. Logic, the product of the reasoning faculty, is discredited because of the number of insoluble fallacies for which it is responsible—such as "The Liar" ("The Cretan says 'I lie': is he a liar?"), "The *Cornutus*" ("Have you shed your horns—yes or no?"), "The *Sorites*" or Chain-argument ("How many grains make a heap? 'Take 10, 20, 30, etc., away, is it still a heap?"). Chrysippus when confronted with the *Sorites* in a dialectical discussion is said to have called a halt and refused to answer, thus giving in to the Sceptic by "suspending judgement." Reason is thus found to be as fallible as sensation, and certitude impossible.

Carneades also attacked the Ethical system of the Stoics, exposing their inconsistency in saying that Virtue is directed to choosing the prime objects of natural desire while denying to these objects the name of "good." He criticized also their Theology, their doctrines of the Divine Nature, of Providence, of Divination and Prophecy. The Stoics were fond of appealing to the *consensus gentium*, or the universal

belief in the existence of the gods: Carneades ridiculed that appeal. For how do we know that the belief is universal? And why appeal to the multitude who—the Stoics tell us—are all fools? why call in ignorance as judge? And as to divination and prognostication, they rest on no principles of science but are mere quackery and tricks of the trade. The God of the Stoics is an incredible Being because he is composed of contradictory attributes. If He is to be infinite, omniscient, all-good, and imperishable, He cannot be either composite or corporeal or animate or rational or virtuous—all such qualities belonging to objects which lie in the sphere of becoming and perishing. In support of their theory of Providence the Stoics brought forward evidences of design in Nature. Carneades retorted by quoting cases of snake-bites and wrecks at sea. Reason, said the Stoics, is a gift of Providence to man: why then, replied Carneades, did not Providence see to it that the majority were endowed with a "right reason" instead of one that only enables them to outdo the brutes in brutishness? Only a few possess right reason; so the Stoic God must be miserly in his gifts!

In all this the position of Carneades is purely agnostic. He does not wish to affirm a negative, but merely to show up the untenability of the Stoic dogmas, and to reassert as regards all departments of knowledge the impossibility of attaining absolute certitude. When the pretentious structure of the Stoics had been thus riddled by the arrows of Carneades, their Ideal Sage must have appeared but as a figment to many, and their anthropomorphic Deity as an incredible bundle of contradictions.

But there was a constructive as well as a destructive side to the teaching of Carneades. He took over, modified, and developed the theory of Arcesilas that, despite the impossibility of objective knowledge, a sufficient ground for practical choice and action might be found in the "reasonable" (εὐλογον) or subjectively satisfying. He granted to the Stoics that some sense-impressions or opinions *seem* to the percipient superior to others, and this apparent superiority provided a sufficient reason for preference and consequential action. Impressions being thus subjectively distinguishable, judgements may be graded in value as more or less "persuasive" or "probable" (πιθανοί). Carneades then classified presentations in this way: (1) the apparently false; (2) the apparently true, which are of three grades—(a) the probable in itself; (b) the probable and "uncontradicted" (i.e. by accompanying conditions—ἀπερίσπαστος); (c) the probable and uncontradicted and "closely scrutinized" or "tested" (διεξωδευμένη). These apparently true impressions produce varying degrees of "conviction" and deserve proportionate "assent" (συγκατάθεσις) of a relative kind—the only kind of assent possible for the Sceptic who denies that objective certitude is attainable. In connexion with this doctrine of "probabilism" Carneades defended human freedom, in "assent," choice and action, as against the determinism of the Stoics with their rigid theory of Destiny and Necessity; and he subjected their doctrine on this subject to a searching criticism which exposed its inherent inconsistency.

With Carneades the dialectical Scepticism of the New Academy came to an end. His successors, *Philo of Larissa* (ob. circa 80 B.C.) and *Antiochus of Ascalon*

(ob. 69 B.C.), surrendered his theory of nescience, and reverted to a more dogmatic position. Both were Eclectics—Antiochus so much so that he asserted the harmony, if not the practical identity, of the doctrines of the Academy with those of the Peripatetics and Stoics, and his teaching was a curious amalgam of them all. This tendency to doctrinal conflation continued to characterize the philosophers of the succeeding generations till the rise of Neoplatonism, excepting only those attached to the Epicurean School and the Later Sceptics.

3. The first of the "Later Sceptics," who revived the original "Pyrrhonism," was *Aenesidemus*, a younger contemporary of Antiochus. Cnossus in Crete may have been his birthplace, Alexandria was where he taught. Though originally an Academic, he denounced Arcesilas and Carneades as dogmatists in disguise rather than true Sceptics, since we cannot know that knowledge is impossible. His treatise *Pyrrhonian Discourses* consisted of eight books in which he explained his dissent from the New Academy, and criticized in detail the logic, ethics, and physics of Stoicism. In another work, *Introductory Outline of Pyrrhonism*, he set forth his famous "Ten Tropes," or "Modes" of procedure, for the refuting of Dogmatism in all its forms. Apparently the order in which they are drawn up was not fixed, since Sextus's order differs from that of Diogenes Laertius; nor does it seem to be governed by any logical principle. The Tropes themselves merely formulate arguments in favour of the relativity of knowledge, borrowed from earlier Sceptical teachers—Sophists, Megarics, Academics; and, as Lotze says,^a

^a *Logic*, III. i. § 310 (English translation).

"The ten tropes, or logical grounds of doubt, all come to this, that sensations by themselves cannot discover to us what is the nature of the object which excites them."

Besides these ten Tropes, Aenesidemus (in his *Pyrrhonian Discourses*, bk. 5) summarized the arguments against causality and current theories of "cause," in his "Eight (Aetiological) Tropes." These form a list of fallacious methods of reasoning about "cause." His objections rest mainly on the assumption that "cause" is a thing in itself, and causality a real objective quality inherent therein.

Similarly he attacked the Stoic and Epicurean doctrine of "Signs" (*σημεία*), or "effects" which point back to "causes," arguing that no phenomenon can safely be regarded as a "sign," because "doctors differ" in interpreting symptoms.

But, to judge by several remarks of Sextus, Aenesidemus was not consistent in his Scepticism. We are told that he regarded "the Sceptic system (*ἀγωγή*) as a road leading to the Heracleitean philosophy, on the ground that the (Sceptic) view that opposites *apparently* belong to the same object is prefatory to the (Heracleitean) view that they *really* so belong." We are told also that he held that the primary world-principle is *air*, which he identified with *time* and number; and that he explained the origin of the world in all its variety from this unitary substance by supposing it to be receptive of opposite qualities, and every whole self-identical in all its parts. He is also said to have reduced the six kinds of *motion* distinguished by Aristotle, and the ten of Plato, to two, viz. locomotion and alteration or transformation;

and a peculiar theory of *Soul*, or reason (*διάνοια*), is ascribed to him, according to which the reason exists outside the body and is somehow inspired so that it can act from within through the senses. With the theory of reason as external, and therefore not individualized but "common" (*κοινή*), like the "Logos" of Heracleitus, is connected the further theory, ascribed to Aenesidemus, that some phenomena appear alike to all men "in common," while others appear different to different percipients, and that the former class are "true," the latter "false"—universality of experience thus being the "Criterion" of truth.

How we are to reconcile this hybrid dogmatism with the undoubted Pyrrhonism of Aenesidemus is a puzzling question which has much exercised the historians of philosophy. It has been suggested that Sextus has misunderstood or misrepresented Aenesidemus; or that Aenesidemus did ultimately pass over from the Sceptical to the Dogmatic position; or that his apparent Dogmatism can be explained away as no real surrender of Scepticism but rather an unconscious yielding to the Eclectic influences of his intellectual environment. None of these suggestions seems wholly satisfactory; but perhaps the least difficult supposition is that Sextus is unintentionally misrepresenting Aenesidemus by a loose use of language when he ascribes the dogmas mentioned above to "Aenesidemus and his followers" (*οἱ περὶ τὸν Αἰνησίδημον*). If so, we may suppose that while Aenesidemus may have given a start to the dogmatizing tendency by enlarging on the points of similarity between Scepticism and Heracleiteanism and claiming Heracleitus as a forerunner, certain of his adherents

pushed that tendency to excess and indulged in an Eclectic dogmatism, after the fashion of Antiochus, which blended Scepticism with Heracleitean and Stoic doctrine.

Of the successors of Aenesidemus we know no more than the names until we come to *Agrippa*, about a century later. To him is attributed the presentation of Sceptical theory in "five Tropes," which are briefly these: (1) Based on the conflict among opinions (ὁ ἀπὸ τῆς διαφωνίας); (2) Every proof requires a fresh proof in endless regress (ὁ εἰς ἀπειρον ἐκβάλλον); (3) Based on the relativity of perceptions (ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρὸς τι τρόπος); (4) Proof must not presuppose unproved premisses (ὁ ὑποθετικός); (5) Reasoning involves a vicious circle (ὁ διάλληλος τρόπος). Of these (1) and (3) resume and sum up the former "ten Tropes," which exhibited the fallibility of the senses and the relativity of perceptual knowledge; while (2), (4) and (5) are directed against the Aristotelian theory of "immediate" axioms (ἄμεσα) and the possibility of logical demonstration.

Agrippa was followed by *Zeuxippus*, *Zeuxis*, and *Antiochus*, who remain mere names, though we may suppose that they adhered to the tradition of dialectical Scepticism.

4. The last stage in the history of Greek Scepticism is marked by its alliance with medical empiricism (cf. *Pyrr. Hyp.* i. 236 ff.). *Menodotus* of Nicomedia and *Theodas* appear to have been the first of these medical Sceptics, and we may date them about A.D. 150. *Galen* criticizes the views of both regarding medicine and natural science. *Herodotus* of Tarsus, who succeeded *Menodotus*, is thought to have belonged to the "pneumatic" rather than to the

"empiric" school of medicine; but in any case he was the teacher of *Sextus Empiricus*.

To one or other of the foregoing Sceptics we may probably attribute two further developments of doctrine, viz. a further reduction of the "Tropes" to two (arguing against the possibility of either immediate or mediate certitude), and a new distinction between "commemorative" (ὑπομνηστικά) and "indicative" (ἐνδεικτικά) "signs" (cf. *Pyrr. Hyp.* ii. 99).

Sextus Empiricus (circa A.D. 200) is our main authority for the history and doctrine of the Sceptic School. We know that he was a Greek physician and that he succeeded *Herodotus* as Head of the School, but we know little else about the details of his life. He seems to have resided for some time in Rome, and to have been acquainted with Athens and Alexandria. Although named "Empiricus" he seems to imply that he adhered rather to the "methodic" than to the "empiric" tradition in medicine. His surviving works are three—(1) "Outlines (ὑποτυπώσεις) of Pyrrhonism" in three books; (2) "Against the Dogmatists" in five books,^a—1 and 2 "Against the Logicians," 3 and 4 "Against the Physicists," 5 "Against the Ethicists"; (3) "Against the Professors" in six books—a book each against Grammarians, Rhetors, Geometers, Arithmeticians, Astrologers, Musicians, in this order. Other works ascribed to him are a treatise "On the Soul" and "Notes on Medicine."

Of the surviving works the *Hypotyposes*, or "Outlines," is a kind of summary of Scepticism, the first book stating and defending the Sceptic position, and

^a These five books are sometimes entitled *Adversus Mathematicos*, vii-xi. Cf. p. xlii.

the other two books attacking the Dogmatic position. The other two works are usually put together as a whole under the title *Adversus Mathematicos*—which we might construe “Against the Professors of all Arts and Sciences,”—and they resume and expand the critical and polemical arguments of books 2 and 3 of the “Outlines.”

Probably there is but little original matter in these works. Sextus was mainly a compiler: he drew freely on the writings of his predecessors, especially Aenesidemus, Cleitomachus (for Carneades), and Menodotus. He was evidently interested in the history of thought, and provides us with much valuable information about the earlier Schools, although he is not wholly reliable. He writes mostly in a plain, dry style, enlivened but rarely by touches of humour. As a controversialist he studies fairness by quoting the opponent's own views, often at great length; but he wearies the reader by his way of piling argument upon argument for the mere sake of multiplying words—bad argument and good heaped together indiscriminately. Obviously his books are not intended to be works of art, but rather immense arsenals stored with all the weapons of offence and defence of every conceivable pattern, old and new, that ever were forged on the anvil of Scepticism by the hammer blows of Eristic dialecticians. From these storehouses the Sceptic engaged in polemics may choose his weapon to suit his need; for (as Sextus naïvely observes) the Sceptic is a “philanthropic” person who spares his adversary by using against him only the minimum of force necessary to bowl him over, so that the weakest and most flimsy arguments have their uses as well as the weightiest. Or is Sextus here the veiled humorist?

IV. TEXT AND EDITIONS

The text of Sextus is derived from two main sources—the Greek Manuscripts and a Latin Translation. For the *Hypotyposes* the most important mss.—as described by the latest editor, Mutschmann—are:

- M = Monac. gr. 439, late fourteenth century, containing *Pyrr. Hyp.*
- L = Laur. 81. 11, dated A.D. 1465, containing all the works of Sextus.
- E = Parisinus 1964, late fifteenth century, containing all Sextus (plus *διυλέξεις*).
- A = Parisinus 1963, dated 1534, containing all Sextus (plus *διυλέξεις*).
- B = Berol. Phill. 1518, dated 1542, nearly a duplicate of A.

Of these, the last three seem to be closely akin, so that we have three main lines of ms. tradition, derived from the same Archetype, viz. M, L, and EAB.

T denotes (in Mutschmann's notation, which is here followed) the Latin Translation, which is preserved in the ms. known as Parisinus lat. 14700 (fol. 83-132). It contains the whole of Sextus except for two omissions, viz. p. 51, 11-26, and p. 145, 3-160, 20. As it was first brought to light by C. Jourdain in 1888, earlier editors were ignorant of its existence, and it is only in the latest Teubner edition that its readings are reported. The Teubner editor, H. Mutschmann, dates it in the thirteenth century, and regards it as equal in importance to any of the Greek mss., and derived from an independent Archetype.

There are three early editions of Sextus—by P.

INTRODUCTION

and J. Chouet (Geneva, 1621); by J. A. Fabricius (Leipzig, 1718), incorporating the Latin version by H. Stephens (Paris, 1562), as well as additional Notes; by I. Bekker (Berlin, 1842), giving the text and index only. The first volume of the Teubner edition (containing *Pyrr. Hyp.*) was published in 1912, the second volume in 1914.

A literal German version of the three books of *Pyrr. Hyp.*, with an Introduction and useful Notes, by E. Pappenheim, appeared in 1877 (Leipzig); and an English version of *Pyrr. Hyp.*, book i., is included in M. Patrick's volume *Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism* (Cambridge, 1899). The latest considerable contribution to the textual criticism of Sextus is Werner Heintz's *Studien zu Sextus Empiricus* (Halle, 1932).

The present four volumes include "Outlines of Pyrrhonism" (in Vol. I); "Against the Logicians" (Vol. II); "Against the Physicists" and "Against the Ethicists" (Vol. III); and "Against the Professors" (Vol. IV). "Against the Professors" vii-xi (*Adversus Mathematicos* vii-xi) is an alternative title for "Against the Logicians" i-v (*Adversus Dogmaticos* i-v).

The text in these volumes is based on that of Bekker. Bekker, it may be noted, omitted both the Tables of Contents prefixed to the several books in the mss. and the corresponding Chapter-headings, although the earlier editors had retained both. In these volumes the Chapter-headings are restored, for the convenience of the reader, while the Tables of Contents are, after Bekker, omitted, as a superfluous duplication.

In addition to the accounts of Greek Scepticism

INTRODUCTION

given in the standard Histories of Ancient Philosophy, attention may be drawn to the special treatment of the subject in *The Greek Sceptics* by N. MacColl (1869); *Les Sceptiques grecs* by V. Brochard (1887), copious and clear; *Die Geschichte des griechischen Skeptizismus* by A. Goedeckemeyer (1905), good for details; *Stoic and Epicurean* by R. D. Hicks (1910), chapters 8 and 10; *Stoics and Sceptics* by E. Bevan (1913), less detailed, but scholarly, suggestive and interesting, and thus probably the best introduction to the subject for the general reader.

The following abbreviations are used in the foot-notes on the text:

- L = ms. Laur. 85. 11.
- M = „ Monac. 439.
- E = „ Paris. 1964.
- A = „ Paris. 1963.
- B = „ Berol. Phill. 1518.
- G = consensus of foregoing mss.
- T = Latin Translation.

Fabr. = Fabricius.

Bekk. = Bekker.

Mutsch. = H. Mutschmann.

Papp. = Pappenheim.

OUTLINES OF
PYRRHONISM

ΠΥΡΡΩΝΕΙΩΝ ΥΠΟΤΤΠΩΣΕΩΝ

ΤΩΝ ΕΙΣ ΤΡΙΑ ΤΟ ΠΡΩΤΟΝ

Α'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΑΝΩΤΑΤΩ ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑΣ ΤΩΝ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΩΝ

1 Τοῖς ζητοῦσί τι πρᾶγμα ἢ εὔρεσιν ἐπακολουθεῖν
εἰκὸς ἢ ἄρνησιν εὔρέσεως καὶ ἀκαταληψίας ὁμολο-
2 γίαν ἢ ἐπιμονὴν ζητήσεως. διόπερ ἴσως καὶ
ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ζητουμένων οἱ μὲν εὐρη-
κένοι τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔφασαν, οἱ δ' ἀπεφάναντο μὴ
3 δυνατὸν εἶναι τοῦτο καταληφθῆναι, οἱ δὲ ἔτι
ζητοῦσιν. καὶ εὐρηκένοι μὲν δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἰδίως
καλούμενοι δογματικοί, οἷον οἱ περὶ Ἀριστοτέλην
καὶ Ἐπίκουρον καὶ τοὺς στωικοὺς καὶ ἄλλοι τινές,
ὡς δὲ περὶ ἀκαταλήπτων ἀπεφάναντο οἱ περὶ
Κλειτόμαχον καὶ Καρνεάδην καὶ ἄλλοι Ἀκαδη-
4 μαῖκοί, ζητοῦσι δὲ οἱ σκεπτικοί. ὅθεν εὐλόγως
δοκοῦσιν αἱ ἀνωτάτω φιλοσοφίαι τρεῖς εἶναι, δογ-
ματικὴ Ἀκαδημαϊκὴ σκεπτικὴ. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν
ἄλλων ἐτέροις ἀρμόσει λέγειν, περὶ δὲ τῆς σκεπ-
τικῆς ἀγωγῆς ὑποτυπωτικῶς ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος ἡμεῖς
ἐρούμεν, ἐκεῖνο προειπόντες ὅτι περὶ οὐδενὸς τῶν

^a See *Introd.* pp. xxxii ff.

^b "Doctrines," "School," "system" or "way" are other

OUTLINES OF PYRRHONISM

BOOK I

CHAPTER I.—OF THE MAIN DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PHILOSOPHIC SYSTEMS

THE natural result of any investigation is that the 1
investigators either discover the object of search or
deny that it is discoverable and confess it to be
inapprehensible or persist in their search. So, too, 2
with regard to the objects investigated by philosophy,
this is probably why some have claimed to have dis-
covered the truth, others have asserted that it cannot
be apprehended, while others again go on inquiring.
Those who believe they have discovered it are the 3
"Dogmatists," specially so called—Aristotle, for
example, and Epicurus and the Stoics and certain
others; Cleitomachus and Carneades and other
Academics^a treat it as inapprehensible: the Sceptics
keep on searching. Hence it seems reasonable to 4
hold that the main types of philosophy are three—
the Dogmatic, the Academic, and the Sceptic. Of
the other systems it will best become others to speak:
our task at present is to describe in outline the
Sceptic doctrine,^b first premising that of none of our
possible renderings of ἀγωγή. "Procedure," "way of
thought," "trend," or "line of argument," "leading" (ἀγων)
up to a definite goal, is rather what it connotes.

λεχθησομένων διαβεβαιούμεθα ὡς οὕτως ἔχοντος πάντως καθάπερ λέγομεν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ νῦν φαινόμενον ἡμῖν ἱστορικῶς ἀπαγγέλλομεν περὶ ἐκάστου.

B'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΛΟΓΩΝ ΤΗΣ ΣΚΕΨΕΩΣ

5 Τῆς σκεπτικῆς οὖν φιλοσοφίας ὁ μὲν λέγεται καθόλου λόγος ὁ δὲ εἰδικός, καὶ καθόλου μὲν ἐν ᾧ τὸν χαρακτῆρα τῆς σκέψεως ἐκτιθέμεθα, λέγοντες τίς ἔννοια αὐτῆς καὶ τίνες ἀρχαὶ καὶ τίνες λόγοι τί τε κριτήριον καὶ τί τέλος, καὶ τίνες οἱ τρόποι τῆς ἐποχῆς, καὶ πῶς παραλαμβάνομεν τὰς σκεπτικὰς ἀποφάσεις, καὶ τὴν διάκρισιν τῆς σκέψεως ἀπὸ τῶν παρακειμένων αὐτῇ φιλοσοφιῶν, 6 εἰδικὸς δὲ ἐν ᾧ πρὸς ἕκαστον μέρος τῆς καλουμένης φιλοσοφίας ἀντιλέγομεν. περὶ τοῦ καθόλου δὲ πρῶτον διαλάβωμεν λόγου, ἀρξάμενοι τῆς ὑφηγήσεως ἀπὸ τῶν τῆς σκεπτικῆς ἀγωγῆς ὀνομάτων.

Γ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΟΝΟΜΑΣΙΩΝ ΤΗΣ ΣΚΕΠΤΙΚΗΣ

7 Ἡ σκεπτικὴ τοίνυν ἀγωγή καλεῖται μὲν καὶ ζητητικὴ ἀπὸ ἐνεργείας τῆς κατὰ τὸ ζητεῖν καὶ σκέπτεσθαι, καὶ ἐφεκτικὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ μετὰ τὴν ζήτησιν περὶ τὸν σκεπτόμενον γινομένου πάθους, καὶ ἀπορητικὴ ἥτοι ἀπὸ τοῦ περὶ παντὸς ἀπορεῖν καὶ ζητεῖν, ὡς ἐνίοι φασιν, ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀμνηχανεῖν πρὸς συγκατάθεσιν ἢ ἀρνήσιν, καὶ Πυρρώνειος ἀπὸ τοῦ φαίνεσθαι ἡμῖν τὸν Πύρρωνα σωματικώτερον

^a Cf. *Introd.* p. xxxvii; §§ 36 f. *infra*.

^b Bks. II. and III. belong to the "special" part of the exposition.

future statements do we positively affirm that the fact is exactly as we state it, but we simply record each fact, like a chronicler, as it appears to us at the moment.

CHAPTER II.—OF THE ARGUMENTS OF SCEPTICISM

Of the Sceptic philosophy one argument (or branch 5 of exposition) is called "general," the other "special." In the general argument we set forth the distinctive features of Scepticism, stating its purport and principles, its logical methods, criterion, and end or aim; the "Tropes," also, or "Modes,"^a which lead to suspension of judgement, and in what sense we adopt the Sceptic formulae, and the distinction between Scepticism and the philosophies which stand next to it. In the special argument we state our objections 6 regarding the several divisions of so-called philosophy.^b Let us, then, deal first with the general argument, beginning our description with the names given to the Sceptic School.

CHAPTER III.—OF THE NOMENCLATURE OF SCEPTICISM

The Sceptic School, then, is also called "Zetetic" 7 from its activity in investigation and inquiry, and "Ephectic" or Suspensive from the state of mind produced in the inquirer after his search, and "Aoretic" or Dubitative either from its habit of doubting and seeking, as some say, or from its indecision as regards assent and denial, and "Pyrrhonian" from the fact that Pyrrho^c appears to us to

^c See *Introd.* pp. xxx f.

καὶ ἐπιφανέστερον τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ προσεληλυθέναι τῇ σκέψει.

Δ.—ΤΙ ΕΣΤΙ ΣΚΕΨΙΣ

- 8 "Ἐστὶ δὲ ἡ σκεπτικὴ δύναμις ἀντιθετικὴ φαινομένων τε καὶ νοουμένων καθ' οἰονδήποτε τρόπον, ἀφ' ἧς ἐρχόμεθα διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀντικειμένους πράγμασι καὶ λόγοις ἰσοσθένειαν τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἰς ἐποχὴν, τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο εἰς ἀταραξίαν.
- 9 δύναμιν μὲν οὖν αὐτὴν καλοῦμεν οὐ κατὰ τὸ περιεργον ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς κατὰ τὸ δύνασθαι φαινόμενα δὲ λαμβάνομεν νῦν τὰ αἰσθητά, διόπερ ἀντιδιαστέλλομεν αὐτοῖς τὰ νοητά. τὸ δὲ " καθ' οἰονδήποτε τρόπον " δύναται προσαρμύζεσθαι καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, ἵνα ἀπλῶς τὸ τῆς δυνάμεως ὄνομα, ὡς εἰρήκαμεν, παραλαμβάνωμεν, καὶ τῷ " ἀντιθετικῇ φαινομένων τε καὶ νοουμένων ". ἐπεὶ γὰρ ποικίλως ἀντιτίθεμεν ταῦτα, ἢ φαινόμενα φαινομένοις ἢ νοούμενα νοουμένοις ἢ ἐναλλάξ ἀντιτιθέντες, ἵνα πᾶσαι αἱ ἀντιθέσεις ἐμπεριέχωνται, λέγομεν " καθ' οἰονδήποτε τρόπον. " ἢ καθ' οἰονδήποτε τρόπον φαινομένων τε καὶ νοουμένων, ἵνα μὴ ζητῶμεν πῶς φαίνεται τὰ φαινόμενα ἢ πῶς νοεῖται τὰ νοούμενα,
- 10 ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς ταῦτα λαμβάνομεν. ἀντικειμένους δὲ λόγους παραλαμβάνομεν οὐχὶ πάντως ἀπόφασιν καὶ κατάφασιν, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς ἀντὶ τοῦ μαχομένου. ἰσοσθένειαν δὲ λέγομεν τὴν κατὰ πίστιν καὶ

^a *i.e.* "opposites" includes, for the Sceptics, "contraries" (*e.g.* "All are wise") ("None are wise"), as well as "contradictories" (*e.g.* "Some are wise") ("None are wise"), whereas the Stoics used it of the latter only.

have applied himself to Scepticism more thoroughly and more conspicuously than his predecessors.

CHAPTER IV.—WHAT SCEPTICISM IS

Scepticism is an ability, or mental attitude, which opposes appearances to judgements in any way whatsoever, with the result that, owing to the equipollence of the objects and reasons thus opposed, we are brought firstly to a state of mental suspense and next to a state of "unperturbedness" or quietude. Now we call it an "ability" not in any subtle sense, but simply in respect of its "being able." By "appearances" we now mean the objects of sense-perception, whence we contrast them with the objects of thought or "judgements." The phrase "in any way whatsoever" can be connected either with the word "ability," to make us take the word "ability," as we said, in its simple sense, or with the phrase "opposing appearances to judgements"; for inasmuch as we oppose these in a variety of ways—appearances to appearances, or judgements to judgements, or *alternando* appearances to judgements,—in order to ensure the inclusion of all these antitheses we employ the phrase "in any way whatsoever." Or, again, we join "in any way whatsoever" to "appearances and judgements" in order that we may not have to inquire how the appearances appear or how the thought-objects are judged, but may take these terms in the simple sense. The phrase "opposed judgements" we do not employ in the sense of negations and affirmations only but simply as equivalent to "conflicting judgements."^a "Equipollence" we use of equality in respect of probability and improbability

ἀπιστίαν ἰσότητα, ὡς μηδένα μηδενὸς προκείσθαι τῶν μαχομένων λόγων ὡς πιστότερον. ἐποχὴ δὲ ἐστὶ στάσις διανοίας δι' ἣν οὔτε αἴρομέν τι οὔτε τίθεμεν. ἀταραξία δὲ ἐστὶ ψυχῆς ἀοχλησία καὶ γαληνότης. πῶς δὲ τῇ ἐποχῇ συνεισέρχεται ἡ ἀταραξία, ἐν τοῖς περὶ τέλους ὑπομνήσομεν.

Ε'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΣΚΕΠΤΙΚΟΥ

- 11 Καὶ ὁ Πυρρώνειος δὲ φιλόσοφος δυνάμει τῇ τῆς σκεπτικῆς ἀγωγῆς ἐννοία συναποδέδοται· ἐστὶ γὰρ ὁ μετέχων ταύτης τῆς δυνάμεως.

Σ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΑΡΧΩΝ ΤΗΣ ΣΚΕΨΕΩΣ

- 12 Ἀρχὴν δὲ τῆς σκεπτικῆς αἰτιώδη μὲν φάμεν εἶναι τὴν ἐλπίδα τοῦ ἀταρακτῆσειν· οἱ γὰρ μεγαλοφυεῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ταρασσόμενοι διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι ἀνωμαλίαν, καὶ ἀποροῦντες τίσιν αὐτῶν χρή μᾶλλον συγκατατίθεσθαι, ἦλθον ἐπὶ τὸ ζητεῖν τί τε ἀληθές ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ τί ψεῦδος, ὡς ἐκ τῆς ἐπικρίσεως τούτων ἀταρακτῆσοντες. συστάσεως δὲ τῆς σκεπτικῆς ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ μάλιστα τὸ παντὶ λόγῳ λόγον ἴσον ἀντικείσθαι· ἀπὸ γὰρ τούτου καταλήγειν δοκοῦμεν εἰς τὸ μὴ δογματίζειν.

Ζ'.—ΕΙ ΔΟΓΜΑΤΙΖΕΙ Ο ΣΚΕΠΤΙΚΟΣ

- 13 Λέγομεν δὲ μὴ δογματίζειν τὸν σκεπτικὸν οὐ κατ' ἐκείνο τὸ σημαίνον του δόγματος καθ' ὃ καὶ δόγμα εἶναι φασὶ τινες κοινότερον τὸ εὐδοκεῖν τινὶ πράγματι (τοῖς γὰρ κατὰ φαντασίαν κατ-

bility, to indicate that no one of the conflicting judgements takes precedence of any other as being more probable. "Suspense" is a state of mental rest owing to which we neither deny nor affirm anything. "Quietude" is an untroubled and tranquil condition of soul. And how quietude enters the soul along with suspension of judgement we shall explain in our chapter (XII.) "Concerning the End."

CHAPTER V.—OF THE SCEPTIC

In the definition of the Sceptic system there is also 11 implicitly included that of the Pyrrhonian philosopher: he is the man who participates in this "ability."

CHAPTER VI.—OF THE PRINCIPLES OF SCEPTICISM

The originating cause of Scepticism is, we say, the 12 hope of attaining quietude. Men of talent, who were perturbed by the contradictions in things and in doubt as to which of the alternatives they ought to accept, were led on to inquire what is true in things and what false, hoping by the settlement of this question to attain quietude. The main basic principle of the Sceptic system is that of opposing to every proposition an equal proposition; for we believe that as a consequence of this we end by ceasing to dogmatize.

CHAPTER VII.—DOES THE SCEPTIC DOGMATIZE?

When we say that the Sceptic refrains from dogma- 13 tizing we do not use the term "dogma," as some do, in the broader sense of "approval of a thing" (for the Sceptic gives assent to the feelings which

ηναγκασμένοις πάθεισιν συγκατατίθεται ὁ σκεπτικός, οἷον οὐκ ἂν εἴποι θερμαινόμενος ἢ ψυχόμενος ὅτι δοκῶ μὴ θερμαίνεσθαι ἢ ψύχεσθαι), ἀλλὰ μὴ δογματίζειν λέγομεν καθ' ὃ δόγμα εἶναι φασί τινες τὴν τιμὴν πράγματι τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας ζητουμένων ἀδήλων συγκατάθεσιν· οὐδενὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀδήλων συγκατατίθεται ὁ Πυρρώνειος. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἐν τῷ προφέρεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων τὰς σκεπτικὰς φωνάς, οἷον τὴν "οὐδὲν μᾶλλον" ἢ τὴν "οὐδὲν ὀρίζω" ἢ τινὰ τῶν ἄλλων περὶ ὧν ὕστερον λέξομεν, δογματίζει. ὁ μὲν γὰρ δογματίζων ὡς ὑπάρχον τίθεται τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐκεῖνο ὃ λέγεται δογματίζειν, ὁ δὲ σκεπτικός τὰς φωνὰς τίθησι ταύτας οὐχ ὡς πάντως ὑπαρχούσας· ὑπολαμβάνει γὰρ ὅτι ὡσπερ ἢ "πάντα ἐστὶ ψευδῆ" φωνὴ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἑαυτὴν ψευδῆ εἶναι λέγει, καὶ ἢ "οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἀληθές" ὁμοίως, οὕτως καὶ ἢ "οὐδὲν μᾶλλον" μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἑαυτὴν φησὶ μὴ μᾶλλον εἶναι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοῖς ἄλλοις ἑαυτὴν συμπεριγράφει. τὸ δ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων σκεπτικῶν φωνῶν λέγομεν. πλὴν ἀλλ' εἰ ὁ δογματίζων τίθησιν ὡς ὑπάρχον τοῦτο ὃ δογματίζει, ὁ δὲ σκεπτικός τὰς φωνὰς αὐτοῦ προφέρεται ὡς δυνάμει ὑφ' ἑαυτῶν περιγράφεσθαι, οὐκ ἂν ἐν τῇ προφορᾷ τούτων δογματίζειν λεχθείη. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, ἐν τῇ προφορᾷ τῶν φωνῶν τούτων τὸ ἑαυτῷ φαινόμενον λέγει καὶ τὸ πάθος ἀπαγγέλλει τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἀδοξάστωσ, μηδὲν περὶ τῶν ἕξωθεν ὑποκειμένων διαβεβαιούμενος.

^a Cf. §§ 187 ff. As there explained, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον is elliptical for οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τὸδε ἢ τὸδε.

^b Lit. "underlying things," i.e. the essences or reals which

are the necessary results of sense-impressions, and he would not, for example, say when feeling hot or cold "I believe that I am not hot or cold"; but we say that "he does not dogmatize" using "dogma" in the sense, which some give it, of "assent to one of the non-evident objects of scientific inquiry"; for the Pyrrhonian philosopher assents to nothing that is non-evident. Moreover, even in the act of ¹⁴ enunciating the Sceptic formulae ^a concerning things non-evident—such as the formula "No more (one thing than another)," or the formula "I determine nothing," or any of the others which we shall presently mention,—he does not dogmatize. For whereas the dogmatizer posits the things about which he is said to be dogmatizing as really existent, the Sceptic does not posit these formulae in any absolute sense; for he conceives that, just as the formula "All things are false" asserts the falsity of itself as well as of everything else, as does the formula "Nothing is true," so also the formula "No more" asserts that itself, like all the rest, is "No more (this than that)," and thus cancels itself along with the rest. And of the other formulae we say the same. If then, ¹⁵ while the dogmatizer posits the matter of his dogma as substantial truth, the Sceptic enunciates his formulae so that they are virtually cancelled by themselves, he should not be said to dogmatize in his enunciation of them. And, most important of all, in his enunciation of these formulae he states what appears to himself and announces his own impression in an undogmatic way, without making any positive assertion regarding the external realities.^b

lie behind, and give rise to, sensations or "appearances": cf. p. 30 note a.

Η.—ΕΙ ΑΙΡΕΣΙΝ ΕΧΕΙ Ο ΣΚΕΠΤΙΚΟΣ

- 16 'Ομοίως δὲ φερόμεθα καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐρωτᾶσθαι εἰ ἔχει αἵρεσιν ὁ σκεπτικός. εἰ μὲν τις αἵρεσιν εἶναι λέγει πρόσκλισιν δόγμασι πολλοῖς ἀκολουθίαν ἔχουσι πρὸς ἄλληλά τε καὶ φαινόμενα, καὶ λέγει δόγμα τινὶ ἀδήλῳ συγκατάθεσιν, φήσομεν μὴ ἔχειν
- 17 αἵρεσιν. εἰ δέ τις αἵρεσιν εἶναι φάσκει τὴν λόγῳ τινὶ κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀκολουθοῦσαν ἀγωγὴν, ἐκείνου τοῦ λόγου ὡς ἔστιν ὀρθῶς δοκεῖν ζῆν ὑποδεικνύοντος (τοῦ ὀρθῶς μὴ μόνον κατ' ἀρετὴν λαμβανομένου ἀλλ' ἀφελέστερον) καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἐπέχειν δύνασθαι διατείνοντος, αἵρεσιν φάμεν ἔχειν ἀκολουθοῦμεν γάρ τινι λόγῳ κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ὑποδεικνύντι ἡμῖν τὸ ζῆν πρὸς τὰ πάτρια ἔθη καὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰς ἀγωγὰς καὶ τὰ οἰκεία πάθη.

Θ.—ΕΙ ΦΥΣΙΟΛΟΓΕΙ Ο ΣΚΕΠΤΙΚΟΣ

- 18 Παραπλήσια δὲ λέγομεν καὶ ἐν τῷ ζητεῖν εἰ φυσιολογητέον τῷ σκεπτικῷ· ἔνεκα μὲν γὰρ τοῦ μετὰ βεβαίον πείσματος ἀποφαίνεσθαι περὶ τινος τῶν κατὰ τὴν φυσιολογίαν δογματιζομένων οὐ φυσιολογοῦμεν, ἔνεκα δὲ τοῦ παντὶ λόγῳ λόγον ἴσον ἔχειν ἀντιτιθέναι καὶ τῆς ἀταραξίας ἀπτόμεθα τῆς φυσιολογίας. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ λογικὸν μέρος καὶ τὸ ἡθικὸν τῆς λεγομένης φιλοσοφίας ἐπερχόμεθα.

^a Lit. "more smoothly" or "simply"; hence "in a less restricted, more extensive, way."

CHAPTER VIII.—HAS THE SCEPTIC A DOCTRINAL RULE?

We follow the same lines in replying to the question 16 "Has the Sceptic a doctrinal rule?" For if one defines a "doctrinal rule" as "adherence to a number of dogmas which are dependent both on one another and on appearances," and defines "dogma" as "assent to a non-evident proposition," then we shall say that he has not a doctrinal rule. But if one 17 defines "doctrinal rule" as "procedure which, in accordance with appearance, follows a certain line of reasoning, that reasoning indicating how it is possible to seem to live rightly (the word 'rightly' being taken, not as referring to virtue only, but in a wider sense^a) and tending to enable one to suspend judgment," then we say that he has a doctrinal rule. For we follow a line of reasoning which, in accordance with appearances, points us to a life conformable to the customs of our country and its laws and institutions, and to our own instinctive feelings.

CHAPTER IX.—DOES THE SCEPTIC DEAL WITH PHYSICS?

We make a similar reply also to the question 18 "Should the Sceptic deal with physical problems?" For while, on the one hand, so far as regards making firm and positive assertions about any of the matters dogmatically treated in physical theory, we do not deal with physics; yet, on the other hand, in respect of our mode of opposing to every proposition an equal proposition and of our theory of quietude we do treat of physics. This, too, is the way in which we approach the logical and ethical branches of so-called "philosophy."

Γ.—ΕΙ ΑΝΑΙΡΟΥΣΙ ΤΑ ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΑ ΟΙ ΣΚΕΠΤΙΚΟΙ

19 Οἱ δὲ λέγοντες ὅτι ἀναιροῦσι τὰ φαινόμενα οἱ σκεπτικοὶ ἀνήκοοί μοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν λεγομένων· τὰ γὰρ κατὰ φαντασίαν παθητικῆν¹ ἀβουλήτως ἡμᾶς ἄγοντα εἰς συγκατάθεσιν οὐκ ἀνατρέπομεν, ὡς καὶ ἔμπροσθεν ἐλέγομεν· ταῦτα δὲ ἔστι τὰ φαινόμενα. ὅταν δὲ ζητῶμεν εἰ τοιοῦτον ἔστι τὸ ὑποκείμενον ὁποῖον φαίνεται, τὸ μὲν ὅτι φαίνεται δίδομεν, ζητοῦμεν δ' οὐ περὶ τοῦ φαινομένου ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐκείνου ὃ λέγεται περὶ τοῦ φαινομένου· τοῦτο δὲ διαφέρει τοῦ ζητεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ
20 τοῦ φαινομένου. οἷον φαίνεται ἡμῖν γλυκαζέειν τὸ μέλι. τοῦτο συγχωροῦμεν· γλυκαζόμεθα γὰρ αἰσθητικῶς. εἰ δὲ καὶ γλυκύ ἐστιν ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ, ζητοῦμεν· ὃ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ φαινόμενον ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ φαινομένου λεγόμενον. εἴαν δὲ καὶ ἀντικρυς κατὰ τῶν φαινομένων ἐρωτῶμεν λόγους, οὐκ ἀναιρεῖν βυλλόμενοι τὰ φαινόμενα τούτους ἐκτιθέμεθα, ἀλλ' ἐπιδεικνύντες τὴν τῶν δογματικῶν προπέτειαν· εἰ γὰρ τοιοῦτος ἀπατεῶν ἐστιν ὁ λόγος ὥστε καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα μόνον οὐχὶ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἡμῶν ὑφαρπάζειν, πῶς οὐ χρὴ ὑφορᾶσθαι αὐτὸν ἐν τοῖς ἀδήλοις, ὥστε μὴ κατακολουθοῦντας αὐτῷ προπετεῦσθαι;

¹ παθητικῆν LMT: παθητικὰ EAB, Bekk.

^a *i.e.* "impressions" or "presentations" which cause "affections" or "feelings" (πάθη), as described in § 13 *supra*.

^b *Cf.* § 213.

CHAPTER X.—DO THE SCEPTICS ABOLISH APPEARANCES?

Those who say that "the Sceptics abolish appearances," or phenomena, seem to me to be unacquainted with the statements of our School. For, as we said above, we do not overthrow the affective sense-impressions^a which induce our assent involuntarily; and these impressions are "the appearances." And when we question whether the underlying object is such as it appears, we grant the fact that it appears, and our doubt does not concern the appearance itself but the account given of that appearance,—and that is a different thing from questioning the appearance itself. For example, honey^b appears to us to be 20 sweet (and this we grant, for we perceive sweetness through the senses), but whether it is also sweet in its essence is for us a matter of doubt, since this is not an appearance but a judgement regarding the appearance. And even if we do actually argue against the appearances, we do not propound such arguments with the intention of abolishing appearances, but by way of pointing out the rashness of the Dogmatists; for if reason is such a trickster as to all but snatch away the appearances from under our very eyes, surely we should view it with suspicion in the case of things non-evident so as not to display rashness by following it.^c

^c *i.e.* the "reason," or logic, which serves to discredit phenomena may be used *a fortiori* to discredit ultra-sensible objects. Instead of "abolishing appearances" it really (as the Sceptics contend) abolishes itself.

I.A.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΚΡΙΤΗΡΙΟΥ ΤΗΣ ΣΚΕΠΤΙΚΗΣ

CHAPTER XI.—OF THE CRITERION OF SCEPTICISM

- 21 "Ὅτι δὲ τοῖς φαινομένοις προσέχομεν, δηλον ἀπὸ τῶν λεγομένων ἡμῖν περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου τῆς σκεπτικῆς ἀγωγῆς. κριτήριον δὲ λέγεται διχῶς, τό τε εἰς πίστιν ὑπάρξεως ἢ ἀνυπαρξίας λαμβανόμενον, περὶ οὗ ἐν τῷ ἀντιρρητικῷ λέξομεν λόγῳ, τό τε τοῦ πράσσειν, ᾧ προσέχοντες κατὰ τὸν βίον τὰ μὲν πράσσομεν τὰ δ' οὐ, περὶ οὗ νῦν λέγομεν.
- 22 κριτήριον τοίνυν φαμέν εἶναι τῆς σκεπτικῆς ἀγωγῆς τὸ φαινόμενον, δυνάμει τὴν φαντασίαν αὐτοῦ οὕτω καλοῦντες· ἐν πείσει γὰρ καὶ ἀβουλήτῳ πάθει κειμένη ἀζήτητός ἐστιν. διὸ περὶ μὲν τοῦ φαίνεσθαι τοῖον ἢ τοῖον τὸ ὑποκείμενον οὐδεὶς ἴσως ἀμφισβητεῖ, περὶ δὲ τοῦ εἶ τοιοῦτον ἐστὶν ὁποῖον φαίνεται ζητεῖται.
- 23 Τοῖς φαινομένοις οὖν προσέχοντες κατὰ τὴν βιωτικὴν τήρησιν ἀδοξάστως βιοῦμεν, ἐπεὶ μὴ δυνάμεθα ἀνερέργητοι παντάπασιν εἶναι. εἴκοι δὲ αὕτη ἢ βιωτικὴ τήρησις τετραμερῆς εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὲν τι ἔχειν ἐν ὑψηλῇ φύσει, τὸ δὲ ἐν ἀνάγκῃ παθῶν, τὸ δὲ ἐν παραδόσει νόμων τε καὶ ἔθῶν,
- 24 τὸ δὲ ἐν διδασκαλίᾳ τεχνῶν, ὑψηλῇ μὲν φυσικῇ καθ' ἣν φυσικῶς αἰσθητικοὶ καὶ νοητικοὶ ἐσμεν, παθῶν δὲ ἀνάγκῃ καθ' ἣν λιμὸς μὲν ἐπὶ τροφὴν ἡμᾶς ὀδηγεῖ δίψος δ' ἐπὶ πόμα, ἔθῶν δὲ καὶ νόμων παραδόσει καθ' ἣν τὸ μὲν εὐσεβεῖν παραλαμβάνομεν βιωτικῶς ὡς ἀγαθὸν τὸ δὲ ἀσεβεῖν ὡς φαῦλον, τεχνῶν δὲ διδασκαλίᾳ καθ' ἣν οὐκ ἀνερέργητοὶ ἐσμεν ἐν αἷς παραλαμβάνομεν τέχναις. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα φαμέν ἀδοξάστως.

That we adhere to appearances is plain from what 21 we say about the Criterion of the Sceptic School. The word "Criterion" is used in two senses: in the one it means "the standard regulating belief in reality or unreality," (and this we shall discuss in our refutation ^a); in the other it denotes the standard of action by conforming to which in the conduct of life we perform some actions and abstain from others; and it is of the latter that we are now speaking. The 22 criterion, then, of the Sceptic School is, we say, the appearance, giving this name to what is virtually the sense-presentation. For since this lies in feeling and involuntary affection, it is not open to question. Consequently, no one, I suppose, disputes that the underlying object has this or that appearance; the point in dispute is whether the object is in reality such as it appears to be.

Adhering, then, to appearances we live in accord- 23 ance with the normal rules of life, undogmatically, seeing that we cannot remain wholly inactive.^b And it would seem that this regulation of life is fourfold, and that one part of it lies in the guidance of Nature, another in the constraint of the passions, another in the tradition of laws and customs, another in the instruction of the arts. Nature's guidance is that by 24 which we are naturally capable of sensation and thought; constraint of the passions is that whereby hunger drives us to food and thirst to drink; tradition of customs and laws, that whereby we regard piety in the conduct of life as good, but impiety as evil; instruction of the arts, that whereby we are not inactive in such arts as we adopt. But we make all these statements undogmatically.

^a Cf. II. 14 ff.^b Cf. §§ 226, 237-238.

25 Τούτοις ἀκόλουθον ἂν εἶη καὶ περὶ τοῦ τέλους τῆς σκεπτικῆς ἀγωγῆς διελθεῖν. ἔστι μὲν οὖν τέλος τὸ οὐ χάριν πάντα πράττεται ἢ θεωρεῖται, αὐτὸ δὲ οὐδενὸς ἔνεκα, ἢ τὸ ἔσχατον τῶν ὀρεκτῶν. φάμεν δὲ ἄχρι νῦν τέλος εἶναι τοῦ σκεπτικοῦ τὴν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ δόξαν ἀταραξίαν καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατηνα-
26 κασμένοις μετριопάθειαν. ἀρξάμενος γὰρ φιλοσοφεῖν ὑπὲρ τοῦ τὰς φαντασίας ἐπικρῖναι καὶ καταλαβεῖν τίνες μὲν εἰσιν ἀληθεῖς τίνες δὲ ψευδεῖς, ὥστε ἀταρακτῆσαι, ἐπέπεσεν εἰς τὴν ἰσοσθενῆ διαφωνίαν, ἣν ἐπικρῖναι μὴ δυνάμενος ἐπέσχεον ἐπισχόντι δὲ αὐτῷ τυχικῶς παρηκολούθησεν ἢ ἐν
27 τοῖς δοξαστοῖς ἀταραξία. ὁ μὲν γὰρ δοξάζων τι καλὸν τῇ φύσει ἢ κακὸν εἶναι ταράσσεται διὰ παντός· καὶ ὅτε μὴ πάρεστιν αὐτῷ τὰ καλὰ εἶναι δοκοῦντα, ὑπὸ τε τῶν φύσει κακῶν νομίζει πονηλατεῖσθαι καὶ διώκει τὰ ἀγαθὰ, ὡς οἶεται ἄπερ κτησάμενος πλείοσι ταραχαῖς περιπίπτει διὰ τε τὸ παρὰ λόγον καὶ τὸ ἀμέτρως ἐπαίρεσθαι, καὶ φοβούμενος τὴν μεταβολὴν πάντα πράσσει ἵνα μὴ
28 ἀποβάλῃ τὰ ἀγαθὰ αὐτῷ δοκοῦντα εἶναι. ὁ δὲ ἀοριστῶν περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὴν φύσιν καλῶν ἢ κακῶν οὔτε φεύγει τι οὔτε διώκει συντόμως· διόπερ ἀταρακτεῖ.

Ἔπερ οὖν περὶ Ἀπελλοῦ τοῦ ζωγράφου λέγεται, τοῦτο ὑπῆρξε τῷ σκεπτικῷ. φασὶ γὰρ ὅτι ἐκεῖνος

^a Cf. Cic. *De fin.* i. 12. 42 "vel summum bonum vel ultimum vel extremum, quod Graeci τέλος nominant, quod ipsum nullam ad aliam rem, ad id autem res referuntur omnes." Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* i. 1. 1 καλῶς ἀπεφῆσαντο τὰγαθὸν οὐ πάντ' ἐφίεται; *ibid.* 5 τέλος ἐστὶ τῶν πρακτῶν δ' δι' αὐτὸ βουλόμεθα, τὰλλα δὲ διὰ τοῦτο.

Our next subject will be the End of the Sceptic 25 system. Now an "End" is "that for which all actions or reasonings are undertaken, while it exists for the sake of none"; or, otherwise, "the ultimate object of appetency."^a We assert still that the Sceptic's End is quietude in respect of matters of opinion and moderate feeling in respect of things unavoidable. For the Sceptic, having set out to 26 philosophize with the object of passing judgement on the sense-impressions and ascertaining which of them are true and which false, so as to attain quietude thereby, found himself involved in contradictions of equal weight, and being unable to decide between them suspended judgement; and as he was thus in suspense there followed, as it happened, the state of quietude in respect of matters of opinion. For 27 the man who opines that anything is by nature good or bad is for ever being disquieted: when he is without the things which he deems good he believes himself to be tormented by things naturally bad and he pursues after the things which are, as he thinks, good; which when he has obtained he keeps falling into still more perturbations because of his irrational and immoderate elation, and in his dread of a change of fortune he uses every endeavour to avoid losing the things which he deems good. On the other hand, 28 the man who determines nothing as to what is naturally good or bad neither shuns nor pursues anything eagerly; and, in consequence, he is unperturbed.

The Sceptic, in fact, had the same experience which is said to have befallen the painter Apelles.^b Once,

^b Court painter to Alexander the Great (*circa* 350-300 B.C.).

ἵππον γράφων καὶ τὸν ἀφρόν τοῦ ἵππου μιμήσασθαι τῇ γραφῇ βουλευθεὶς οὕτως ἀπετύγγανεν ὡς ἀπειπεῦν καὶ τὴν σπογγίαν εἰς ἣν ἀπέμασσε τὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ γραφείου χρώματα προσρῦσαι τῇ εἰκόνι· τὴν δὲ προσαιψαμένην ἵππου ἀφροῦ ποιῆσαι μίμημα. 29 καὶ οἱ σκεπτικοὶ οὖν ἠλπίζον μὲν τὴν ἀταραξίαν ἀναλήψεσθαι διὰ τοῦ τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν τῶν φαινομένων τε καὶ νοουμένων ἐπικρίναι, μὴ δυνηθέντες δὲ ποιῆσαι τοῦτο ἐπέσχον· ἐπισχούσι δὲ αὐτοῖς οἷον τυχικῶς ἢ ἀταραξία παρηκολούθησεν ὡς σκιά σώματι. οὐ μὴν ἀόχλητον πάντῃ τὸν σκεπτικὸν εἶναι νομίζομεν, ἀλλ' ὀχλεῖσθαι φαμεν ὑπὸ τῶν καταναγκασμένων· καὶ γὰρ ῥιγοῦν ποτὲ ὁμολογοῦμεν καὶ διψῆν καὶ τοιουτότροπά τινα πάσχειν. 30 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τούτοις οἱ μὲν ἰδιῶται δισσαῖς συνέχονται περιστάσεσιν, ὑπὸ τε τῶν παθῶν αὐτῶν καὶ οὐχ ἦττον ὑπὸ τοῦ τὰς περιστάσεις ταύτας κακὰς εἶναι φύσει δοκεῖν· ὁ δὲ σκεπτικὸς τὸ προσδοξάζειν ὅτι ἔστι κακὸν τούτων ἕκαστον ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν περιαιρῶν μετριώτερον καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἀπαλλάσσει. διὰ τοῦτο οὖν ἐν μὲν τοῖς δοξαστοῖς ἀταραξίαν τέλος εἶναι φαμεν τοῦ σκεπτικοῦ, ἐν δὲ τοῖς καταναγκασμένοις μετριοπάθειαν. τινὲς δὲ τῶν δοκίμων σκεπτικῶν προσέθηκάν τούτοις καὶ τὴν ἐν ταῖς ζητήσεσιν ἐποχῆν.

II'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΟΛΟΣΧΕΡΩΝ ΤΡΟΠΩΝ ΤΗΣ ΕΠΟΧΗΣ

31 Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν ἀταραξίαν ἀκολουθεῖν ἐφάσκομεν τῇ περὶ πάντων ἐποχῇ, ἀκόλουθον ἂν εἴη λέγειν

* Viz. Timon and Aenesidemus; cf. Diog. Laert. ix. 107.

they say, when he was painting a horse and wished to represent in the painting the horse's foam, he was so unsuccessful that he gave up the attempt and flung at the picture the sponge on which he used to wipe the paints off his brush, and the mark of the sponge produced the effect of a horse's foam. So, too, the 29 Sceptics were in hopes of gaining quietude by means of a decision regarding the disparity of the objects of sense and of thought, and being unable to effect this they suspended judgement; and they found that quietude, as if by chance, followed upon their suspense, even as a shadow follows its substance. We do not, however, suppose that the Sceptic is wholly untroubled; but we say that he is troubled by things unavoidable; for we grant that he is cold at times and thirsty, and suffers various affections of that kind. But even in these cases, whereas ordinary people are 30 afflicted by two circumstances,—namely, by the affections themselves and, in no less a degree, by the belief that these conditions are evil by nature,—the Sceptic, by his rejection of the added belief in the natural badness of all these conditions, escapes here too with less discomfort. Hence we say that, while in regard to matters of opinion the Sceptic's End is quietude, in regard to things unavoidable it is "moderate affection." But some notable Sceptics* have added the further definition "suspension of judgement in investigations."

CHAPTER XIII.—OF THE GENERAL MODES LEADING TO SUSPENSION OF JUDGEMENT

Now that we have been saying that tranquillity 31 follows on suspension of judgement, it will be our

ὅπως ἡμῶν ἡ ἐποχή περιγίνεται. γίνεται τοίνυν αὕτη, ὡς ἂν ὀλοσχερέστερον εἶποι τις, διὰ τῆς ἀντιθέσεως τῶν πραγμάτων. ἀντιτίθεμεν δὲ ἢ φαινόμενα φαινομένοις ἢ νοούμενα νοουμένοις ἢ 32 ἐναλλάξ, ὅλον φαινόμενα μὲν φαινομένοις, ὅταν λέγωμεν "ὁ αὐτὸς πύργος πόρρωθεν μὲν φαίνεται στρογγύλος ἐγγύθεν δὲ τετράγωνος," νοούμενα δὲ νοουμένοις, ὅταν πρὸς τὸν κατασκευάζοντα ὅτι 33 ἔστι πρόνοια ἐκ τῆς τάξεως τῶν οὐρανίων, ἀντιτιθῶμεν τὸ τοὺς μὲν ἀγαθοὺς δυσπραγεῖν πολλάκις τοὺς δὲ κακοὺς εὐπραγεῖν, καὶ διὰ τούτου συνάγω- 34 μεν τὸ μὴ εἶναι πρόνοιαν νοούμενα δὲ φαινομένοις, ὡς ὁ Ἀναξαγόρας τῷ λευκῇ εἶναι τὴν χιόνα ἀντετίθει ὅτι ἡ χιὼν ὕδωρ ἔστι πεπηγός, τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ ἔστι μέλαν, καὶ ἡ χιὼν ἄρα μέλαινα ἔστιν. καθ' ἑτέραν δὲ ἐπίνοιαν ἀντιτίθεμεν ὅτε μὲν παρόντα παροῦσιν, ὡς τὰ προειρημένα, ὅτε δὲ παρόντα παρεληλυθόσιν ἢ μέλλουσιν, ὅλον ὅταν τις 34 ἡμᾶς ἐρωτήσῃ λόγον ὃν λῦσαι οὐ δυνάμεθα, φάμεν πρὸς αὐτὸν ὅτι, ὥσπερ πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι τὸν εἰσηγησάμενον τὴν αἴρεσιν ἢν μετέρχη, οὐδέπω ὁ κατ' αὐτὴν λόγος ὑγιῆς ὢν ἐφαίνετο, ὑπέκειτο μέντοι ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν, οὕτως ἐνδέχεται καὶ τὸν ἀντικείμενον τῷ ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐρωτηθέντι νῦν λόγῳ ὑποκεῖσθαι μὲν ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν, μηδέπω δ' ἡμῶν φαίνεσθαι, ὥστε οὐδέπω χρῆ συγκατατίθεσθαι ἡμᾶς τῷ δοκοῦντι νῦν ἰσχυρῶ εἶναι λόγῳ. 35 Ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦ τὰς ἀντιθέσεις ταύτας ἀκριβέστερον ἡμῶν ὑποπσεῖν, καὶ τοὺς τρόπους ὑποθήσομαι δι' ὧν ἡ ἐποχή συνάγεται, οὔτε περὶ τοῦ πλήθους

* Cf. § 118.

* See *Introd.* p. xi; *cf.* ii. 244.

next task to explain how we arrive at this suspension. Speaking generally, one may say that it is the result of setting things in opposition. We oppose either appearances to appearances or objects of thought to objects of thought or *alternando*. For instance, we 32 oppose appearances to appearances when we say "The same tower^a appears round from a distance, but square from close at hand"; and thoughts to thoughts, when in answer to him who argues the existence of Providence from the order of the heavenly bodies we oppose the fact that often the good fare ill and the bad fare well, and draw from this the inference that Providence does not exist. And thoughts 33 we oppose to appearances, as when Anaxagoras^b countered the notion that snow is white with the argument, "Snow is frozen water, and water is black; therefore snow also is black." With a different idea we oppose things present sometimes to things present, as in the foregoing examples, and sometimes to things past or future, as, for instance, when someone propounds to us a theory which we are unable to refute, we say to him in reply, "Just 34 as, before the birth of the founder of the School to which you belong, the theory it holds was not as yet apparent as a sound theory, although it was really in existence, so likewise it is possible that the opposite theory to that which you now propound is already really existent, though not yet apparent to us, so that we ought not as yet to yield assent to this theory which at the moment seems to be valid."

But in order that we may have a more exact under- 35 standing of these antitheses I will describe the Modes by which suspension of judgement is brought about, but without making any positive assertion regarding

οὔτε περὶ τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτῶν διαβεβαιούμενος· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ αὐτοὺς καὶ σαθροὺς εἶναι καὶ πλείους τῶν λεχθησομένων.

ΙΑ'. ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΔΕΚΑ ΤΡΟΠΩΝ

36 Παραδίδονται τοῖνυν συνήθως παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχαιοτέροις σκεπτικοῖς τρόποι, δι' ὧν ἡ ἐποχή συνάγεσθαι δοκεῖ, δέκα τὸν ἀριθμὸν, οὓς καὶ λόγους καὶ τόπους συνωνύμως καλοῦσιν. εἰσὶ δὲ οὗτοι, πρῶτος ὁ παρὰ τὴν τῶν ζώων ἐξαλλαγὴν, δεύτερος ὁ παρὰ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφορὰν, τρίτος ὁ παρὰ τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν αἰσθητηρίων κατασκευάς, τέταρτος ὁ παρὰ τὰς περιστάσεις, πέμπτος ὁ παρὰ τὰς θέσεις καὶ τὰ διαστήματα καὶ τοὺς τόπους, 37 ἕκτος ὁ παρὰ τὰς ἐπιμιξίας, ἕβδομος ὁ παρὰ τὰς ποσότητας καὶ σκευασίας τῶν ὑποκειμένων, ὄγδοος ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρὸς τι, ἔνατος ὁ παρὰ τὰς συνεχεῖς ἢ σπανίους ἐγκυρήσεις, δέκατος ὁ παρὰ τὰς ἀγωγὰς καὶ τὰ ἔτη καὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰς μυθικὰς πίστεις 38 καὶ τὰς δογματικὰς ὑπολήψεις. χρώμεθα δὲ τῇ τάξει ταύτῃ θετικῶς.

Τούτων δὲ ἐπαναβεβηκότες εἰσὶ τρόποι τρεῖς, ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ κρίνοντος, ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ κρινομένου, ὁ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ κρίνοντος ὑποτάσσονται οἱ πρῶτοι τέσσαρες (τὸ γὰρ κρῖνον ἢ ζῶον ἐστὶν ἢ ἄνθρωπος ἢ αἰσθησις καὶ ἐν τινι περιστάσει), εἰς δὲ τὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ κρινομένου ἀνάγονται¹ ὁ ἕβδομος καὶ ὁ δέκατος, εἰς δὲ τὸν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν σύνθετον ὁ πέμπτος καὶ ὁ ἕκτος καὶ ὁ 39 ὄγδοος καὶ ὁ ἔνατος. πάλιν δὲ οἱ τρεῖς οὗτοι

¹ <ἀνάγονται> add. Papp.

either their number or their validity ; for it is possible that they may be unsound or there may be more of them than I shall enumerate.

CHAPTER XIV.—CONCERNING THE TEN MODES

The usual tradition amongst the older Sceptics is 36 that the "modes" by which "suspension" is supposed to be brought about are ten in number ; and they also give them the synonymous names of "arguments" and "positions." They are these : the first, based on the variety in animals ; the second, on the differences in human beings ; the third, on the different structures of the organs of sense ; the fourth, on the circumstantial conditions ; the fifth, on positions and intervals and locations ; the sixth, on intermixtures ; 37 the seventh, on the quantities and formations of the underlying objects ; the eighth, on the fact of relativity ; the ninth, on the frequency or rarity of occurrence ; the tenth, on the disciplines and customs and laws, the legendary beliefs and the dogmatic convictions. This order, however, we adopt without 38 prejudice.

As superordinate to these there stand three Modes —that based on the subject who judges, that on the object judged, and that based on both. The first four of the ten Modes are subordinate to the Mode based on the subject (for the subject which judges is either an animal or a man or a sense, and existent in some condition) : the seventh and tenth Modes are referred to that based on the object judged : the fifth, sixth, eighth and ninth are referred to the Mode based on both subject and object. Furthermore, 39

ἀνάγονται εἰς τὸν πρὸς τι, ὡς εἶναι γενικώτατον μὲν τὸν πρὸς τι, εἰδικούς δὲ τοὺς τρεῖς, ὑποβεθηκότας δὲ τοὺς δέκα. ταῦτα μὲν περὶ τῆς ποσότητος αὐτῶν κατὰ τὸ πιθανὸν λέγομεν· περὶ δὲ τῆς δυνάμεως τάδε.

- 40 Πρῶτον ἐλέγομεν εἶναι λόγον καθ' ὃν παρὰ τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ζώων οὐχ αἱ αὐταὶ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ὑποπίπτουσι φαντασίαι. τοῦτο δὲ ἐπιλογιζόμεθα ἔκ τε τῆς περὶ τὰς γενέσεις αὐτῶν διαφορᾶς καὶ ἔκ τῆς περὶ τὰς συστάσεις τῶν σωμάτων παρα-
- 41 λαγῆς. περὶ μὲν οὖν τὰς γενέσεις, ὅτι τῶν ζώων τὰ μὲν χωρὶς μίξεως γίνεται τὰ δ' ἔκ συμπλοκῆς. καὶ τῶν μὲν χωρὶς μίξεως γινομένων τὰ μὲν ἔκ πυρός γίνεται ὡς τὰ ἐν ταῖς καμίνοις φαινόμενα ζωῦφια, τὰ δ' ἔξ ὕδατος φθειρομένου ὡς κώνωπες, τὰ δ' ἔξ οἴνου τρεπομένου ὡς σκνῖπες, τὰ δ' ἔκ γῆς <ὡς τέττιγες>,¹ τὰ δ' ἔξ ἰλύος ὡς βάτραχοι, τὰ δ' ἔκ βορβόρου ὡς σκώληκες, τὰ δ' ἔξ ὄνων ὡς κάνθαροι, τὰ δ' ἔκ λαχάνων ὡς κάμπαι, τὰ δ' ἔκ καρπῶν ὡς οἱ ἔκ τῶν ἐρινεῶν ψῆγες, τὰ δ' ἔκ ζώων σηπομένων ὡς μέλισσαι ταύρων καὶ σφήκες ἵππων·
- 42 τῶν δ' ἔκ συμπλοκῆς τὰ μὲν ἔξ ὁμοιογενῶν ὡς τὰ πλείστα, τὰ δ' ἔξ ἀνομοιογενῶν ὡς ἡμίονοι. πάλιν κοινῇ τῶν ζώων τὰ μὲν ζωτοκεῖται ὡς ἄνθρωποι, τὰ δ' ὠστοκεῖται ὡς ὄρνιθες, τὰ δὲ σαρκοτοκεῖται
- 43 ὡς ἄρκτοι. εἰκὸς οὖν τὰς περὶ τὰς γενέσεις ἀνομοιότητος καὶ διαφορᾶς μεγάλας ποιεῖν ἀντιπαθείας, τὸ ἀσύγκρατον καὶ ἀσυνάρμοστον καὶ μαχόμενον ἐκείθεν φερομένης.
- 44 Ἄλλὰ καὶ ἡ διαφορὰ τῶν κυριωτάτων μερῶν τοῦ σώματος, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν πρὸς τὸ ἐπικρίνειν

¹ <ὡς τέττιγες> addidi: <ὡς μῦς> cj. Fabr.

these three Modes are also referred to that of relation, so that the Mode of relation stands as the highest *genus*, and the three as *species*, and the ten as subordinate *sub-species*. We give this as the probable account of their numbers; and as to their argumentative force what we say is this:

The *First* argument (or *Trope*), as we said, is that 40 which shows that the same impressions are not produced by the same objects owing to the differences in animals. This we infer both from the differences in their origins and from the variety of their bodily structures. Thus, as to origin, some animals are produced without sexual union, others by coition. 41 And of those produced without coition, some come from fire, like the animalcules which appear in furnaces, others from putrid water, like gnats; others from wine when it turns sour, like ants; others from earth, like grasshoppers; others from marsh, like frogs; others from mud, like worms; others from asses, like beetles; others from greens, like caterpillars; others from fruits, like the gall-insects in wild figs; others from rotting animals, as bees from bulls and wasps from horses. Of the animals generated by coition, 42 some—in fact the majority—come from homogeneous parents, others from heterogeneous parents, as do mules. Again, of animals in general, some are born alive, like men; others are born as eggs, like birds; and yet others as lumps of flesh, like bears. It is 43 natural, then, that these dissimilar and variant modes of birth should produce much contrariety of sense-affection, and that this is a source of its divergent, discordant and conflicting character.

Moreover, the differences found in the most important parts of the body, and especially in those of

καὶ πρὸς τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι πεφυκότων, μεγίστην δύναται ποιεῖν μάχην τῶν φαντασιῶν [παρὰ τῆν τῶν ζώων παραλλαγῆν].¹ οἱ γοῦν ἰκτεριῶντες ἄχρᾳ φασιν εἶναι τὰ ἡμῖν φαινόμενα λευκά, καὶ οἱ ὑπόσφαγμα ἔχοντες αἰμωπά. ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ τῶν ζώων τὰ μὲν ἄχρους ἔχει τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς τὰ δ' ὑφαίμους τὰ δὲ λευκανθίζοντας τὰ δ' ἄλλην χροίαν ἔχοντας, εἰκός, οἶμαι, διάφορον αὐτοῖς τῆν τῶν
 45 χρωμάτων ἀντίληψιν γίνεσθαι. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐνατενίσαντες ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον τῷ ἡλίῳ, εἶτα ἐγκύψαντες βιβλίῳ τὰ γράμματα χρυσοειδῆ δοκοῦμεν εἶναι καὶ περιφερόμενα. ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ τῶν ζώων τιὰ φύσει λαμπηδόνα ἐν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἔχει καὶ φῶς λεπτομέρες τε καὶ εὐκίνητον ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀποστέλλει, ὡς καὶ νυκτὸς ὄραν, δεόντως ἂν νομίζομεν ὅτι μὴ
 46 ὅμοια ἡμῖν τε κάκεινοις τὰ ἐκτὸς ὑποπίπτει. καὶ γε οἱ γόητες χρίοντες τὰς θρυαλλίδας ἰῶ χαλκοῦ καὶ θολῶ σηπίας ποιῶσιν ὅτε μὲν χαλκοῦς ὅτε δὲ μέλανας φαίνεσθαι τοὺς παρόντας διὰ τῆν βραχεῖαν τοῦ μιχθέντος παρασποράν. πολὺ δὲ ἡμῶν εὐλογώτερόν ἐστι, χυμῶν διαφόρων ἀνακεκραμένων τῇ ὁράσει τῶν ζώων, διαφόρους τῶν ὑποκειμένων
 47 φαντασίας αὐτοῖς γίνεσθαι. ὅταν τε παραθλίψωμεν τὸν ὀφθαλμόν, ἐπιμήκη καὶ στενὰ φαίνεται τὰ εἶδη καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ τὰ μεγέθη τῶν ὁρατῶν. εἰκός οὖν ὅτι ὅσα τῶν ζώων λοξῆν ἔχει τῆν κόρην καὶ προμήκη, καθάπερ αἶγες αἰλουροι καὶ τὰ εἰκότα, διάφορα φαντάζεται τὰ ὑποκείμενα εἶναι, καὶ οὐχ ὅσα τὰ περιφερῆ τῆν κόρην ἔχοντα ζῶα εἶναι αὐτὰ
 48 ὑπολαμβάνει. τὰ τε κάτοπτρα παρὰ τῆν διάφορον

¹ [παρὰ . . . παραλλαγῆν] secl. Mutsch

which the natural function is judging and perceiving, are capable of producing a vast deal of divergence in the sense-impressions [owing to the variety in the animals]. Thus, sufferers from jaundice declare that objects which seem to us white are yellow, while those whose eyes are bloodshot call them blood-red. Since, then, some animals also have eyes which are yellow, others bloodshot, others albino, others of other colours, they probably, I suppose, have different perceptions of colour. Moreover, if we bend down
 45 over a book after having gazed long and fixedly at the sun, the letters seem to us to be golden in colour and circling round. Since, then, some animals possess also a natural brilliance in their eyes, and emit from them a fine and mobile stream of light, so that they can even see by night,^a we seem bound to suppose that they are differently affected from us by external objects. Jugglers, too, by means of smearing lamp-
 46 wicks with the rust of copper or with the juice of the cuttle-fish make the bystanders appear now copper-coloured and now black—and that by just a small sprinkling of extra matter. Surely, then, we have much more reason to suppose that when different juices are intermingled in the vision of animals their impressions of the objects will become different. Again, when we press the eyeball at one side the
 47 forms, figures and sizes of the objects appear oblong and narrow. So it is probable that all animals which have the pupil of the eye slanting and elongated—such as goats, cats, and similar animals—have impressions of the objects which are different and unlike the notions formed of them by the animals which have round pupils. Mirrors, too, owing to differences in
 48

^a Cf. § 84.

κατασκευὴν ὅτε μὲν μικρότατα δείκνυσι τὰ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενα, ὡς τὰ κοῦλα, ὅτε δ' ἐπιμήκη καὶ στενά, ὡς τὰ κυρτά· τινὰ δὲ τὴν μὲν κεφαλὴν κάτω δείκνυσι τοῦ κατοπτριζομένου, τοὺς δὲ πόδας ἄνω.

40 ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν ὄψιν ἀγγείων τὰ μὲν ἐξόφθαλμα κομιδῇ πέπτωκεν ὑπὸ κυρτότητος, τὰ δὲ κοιλότερά ἐστι, τὰ δ' ἐν ὑπτίῳ πλάτει βέβηκεν, εἰκὸς καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀλλοιοῦσθαι τὰς φαντασίας, καὶ μήτε ἴσα τοῖς μεγέθεσι μήτε ὅμοια ταῖς μορφαῖς ὄραν τὰ αὐτὰ κύναις ἰχθύας λέοντας ἀνθρώπους πάρνοπας, ἀλλ' οἷαν ἐκάστου ποιεῖ τύπωσιν ἢ δεχομένη τὸ φαινόμενον ὄψις.

50 Ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων λόγος· πῶς γὰρ ἂν λεχθεῖ ὁμοίως κινεῖσθαι κατὰ τὴν ἀφήν τὰ τε ὀστρακόδεσμα καὶ τὰ σαρκοφανῆ καὶ τὰ ἠκανθωμένα καὶ τὰ ἐπτερωμένα ἢ λελεπιδωμένα; πῶς δὲ ὁμοίως ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ἀκοὴν τὰ τε στενωτάτου ἔχοντα τὸν πόρον τὸν ἀκουστικὸν καὶ τὰ εὐρυτάτω τούτῳ κεχρημένα, ἢ τὰ τετριχωμένα τὰ ὠτα καὶ τὰ ψιλὰ ταῦτα ἔχοντα; ὅπου γε καὶ ἡμεῖς ἄλλως μὲν κινούμεθα κατὰ τὴν ἀκοὴν παραβύσαντες τὰ ὠτα, ἄλλως δὲ

51 ἦν ἀπλῶς αὐτοῖς χρώμεθα. καὶ ἡ ὀσφρησις δὲ διαφέρει ἂν παρὰ τὴν τῶν ζώων ἐξαλλαγὴν· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἡμεῖς ἄλλως μὲν κινούμεθα ἐμφυγέτες καὶ τοῦ φλέγματος πλεονάσαντος ἐν ἡμῖν, ἄλλως δὲ ἦν τὰ περὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν ἡμῶν μέρη πλεονασμὸν αἵματος

their construction, represent the external objects^a at one time as very small—as when the mirror is concave,—at another time as elongated and narrow—as when the mirror is convex. Some mirrors, too, show the head of the figure reflected at the bottom and the feet at the top. Since, then, some organs of sight 49 actually protrude beyond the face owing to their convexity, while others are quite concave, and others again lie in a level plane, on this account also it is probable that their impressions differ, and that the same objects, as seen by dogs, fishes, lions, men and locusts, are neither equal in size nor similar in shape, but vary according to the image of each object created by the particular sight that receives the impression.

Of the other sense-organs also the same account 50 holds good. Thus, in respect of touch, how could one maintain that creatures covered with shells, with flesh, with prickles, with feathers, with scales, are all similarly affected? And as for the sense of hearing, how could we say that its perceptions are alike in animals with a very narrow auditory passage and those with a very wide one, or in animals with hairy ears and those with smooth ears? For, as regards this sense, even we ourselves find our hearing affected in one way when we have our ears plugged and in another way when we use them just as they are. Smell also will differ because of the variety in animals. 51 For if we ourselves are affected in one way when we have a cold and our internal phlegm is excessive, and in another way when the parts about our head are filled with an excess of blood, feeling an aversion to

the percipient. I render the term indifferently by "objects," "real objects" or "realities," and "underlying objects."

^a τὰ ὑποκείμενα (Lat. *sub-stantia*) is a favourite term with Sextus for the objective realities which "underlie," or lie behind, the subjective impressions of sense (phenomena): they are called ἐκτὸς as "outside" of and not dependent on

ὑποδέξεται, ἀποστρεφόμενοι τὰ εὐώδη τοῖς ἄλλοις
δοκοῦντα εἶναι καὶ ὡς περ πλήττεσθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν
νομίζοντες, ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν ζώων τὰ μὲν πλαδαρά τέ
ἐστὶ φύσει καὶ φλεγματώδη, τὰ δὲ πολυαῖμα
σφόδρα, τὰ δ' ἐπικρατοῦσαν καὶ πλεονάζουσαν
ἔχοντα τὴν ξανθὴν χολὴν ἢ τὴν μέλαιναν, εὐλογον
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο διάφορα ἐκάστοις αὐτῶν φαίνεσθαι
52 τὰ ὀσφρητά. καὶ τὰ γευστὰ ὁμοίως τῶν μὲν
τραχείαν καὶ ἄνικμον ἔχόντων τὴν γλώσσαν τῶν
δὲ ἔνυγρον σφόδρα, εἶγε καὶ ἡμεῖς¹ ξηροτέραν ἐν
πυρετοῖς τὴν γλῶτταν σχόντες γεώδη καὶ κακό-
χυμα ἢ πικρὰ τὰ προσφερόμενα εἶναι νομίζομεν,
τοῦτο δὲ πάσχομεν καὶ παρὰ τὴν διάφορον ἐπι-
κράτειαν τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν χυμῶν εἶναι λεγομένων.
ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ τὰ ζῶα διάφορον τὸ γευστικὸν αἰσθη-
τήριον ἔχει καὶ διαφόροις χυμοῖς πλεονάζον, δια-
φόρους ἂν καὶ κατὰ τὴν γεῦσιν φαντασίας τῶν
53 ὑποκειμένων λαμβάνοι. ὡς περ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ τροφή
ἀναδιδομένη ὅπου μὲν γίνεται φλέψ ὅπου δὲ
ἀρτηρία ὅπου δὲ ὀστέον ὅπου δὲ νεῦρον καὶ τῶν
ἄλλων ἕκαστον, παρὰ τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ὑποδεχο-
μένων αὐτὴν μερῶν διάφορον ἐπιδεικνυμένη δύνα-
μιν, καὶ ὡς περ τὸ ὕδωρ ἐν καὶ μονοειδὲς ἀναδιδό-
μενον εἰς τὰ δένδρα ὅπου μὲν γίνεται φλοιὸς ὅπου
δὲ κλάδος ὅπου δὲ καρπὸς καὶ ἤδη σῦκον καὶ ροῖα
54 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον, καὶ καθάπερ τὸ τοῦ μουσ-
ουργοῦ πνεῦμα ἐν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐμπνεόμενον τῷ
αὐλῷ ὅπου μὲν γίνεται ὀξύ ὅπου δὲ βαρὺ καὶ ἡ
αὐτὴ ἐπέρεσις τῆς χειρὸς ἐπὶ τῆς λύρας ὅπου μὲν
βαρὺν φθόγγον ποιεῖ ὅπου δὲ ὀξύ, οὕτως εἰκόσ
καὶ τὰ ἑκτὸς ὑποκείμενα διάφορα θεωρεῖσθαι

¹ εἶγε κ. ἡμεῖς MT: κ. ἡμεῖς εἶγε L, Bekk.

smells which seem sweet to everyone else and regard-
ing them as noxious, it is reasonable to suppose that
animals too—since some are flaccid by nature and
rich in phlegm, others rich in blood, others marked
by a predominant excess of yellow or of black gall—
are in each case impressed in different ways by the
objects of smell. So too with the objects of taste ; 52
for some animals have rough and dry tongues, others
extremely moist tongues. We ourselves, too, when
our tongues are very dry, in cases of fever, think the
food proffered us to be earthy and ill-flavoured or
bitter—an affection due to the variation in the
predominating juices which we are said to contain.
Since, then, animals also have organs of taste which
differ and which have different juices in excess,
in respect of taste also they will receive different
impressions of the real objects. For just as the same 53
food when digested becomes in one place a vein, in
another an artery, in another a bone, in another a
sinew, or some other piece of the body, displaying a
different potency according to the difference in the parts
which receive it;—and just as the same unblended 54
water, when it is absorbed by trees, becomes in one
place bark, in another branch, in another blossom,
and so finally fig and quince and each of the other
fruits;—and just as the single identical breath of a
musician breathed into a flute becomes here a shrill
note and there a deep note, and the same pressure
of his hand on the lyre produces here a deep note and
there a shrill note;—so likewise it is probable that the
external objects appear different owing to differences

παρὰ τὴν διάφορον κατασκευὴν τῶν τὰς φαντασίας ὑπομενόντων ζῶων.

55 Ἐναργέστερον δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἔστι μαθεῖν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰρετῶν τε καὶ φευκτῶν τοῖς ζῴοις. μύρον γοῦν ἀνθρώποις μὲν ἡδιστον φαίνεται, κανθάρους δὲ καὶ μελίσσαις δυσανάσχετον· καὶ τὸ ἔλαιον τοὺς μὲν ἀνθρώπους ὠφελεῖ, σφήκας δὲ καὶ μελίσσας ἀναρεῖ καταρραϊνόμενον· καὶ τὸ θαλάττιον ὕδωρ ἀνθρώποις μὲν ἀηδὲς ἔστι πινόμενον καὶ φαρμα-
 56 κῶδες, ἰχθύσι δὲ ἡδιστον καὶ πότιμον. σῦες δὲ ἡδίων βορβόρω λούονται δυσωδεστάτῳ ἢ ὕδατι διειδεῖ καὶ καθαρῷ. τῶν τε ζῶων τὰ μὲν ἔστι ποηφάγα τὰ δὲ θαμνοφάγα τὰ δὲ ὑληνόμα τὰ δὲ σπερμοφάγα τὰ δὲ σαρκοφάγα τὰ δὲ γαλακτοφάγα, καὶ τὰ μὲν σεσηπυῖα χαίρει τροφῇ τὰ δὲ νεαρᾶ, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὠμῆ τὰ δὲ μαγειρικῶς ἐσκευασμένη· καὶ κουνῶς τὰ ἄλλοις ἡδέα ἄλλοις ἔστιν ἀηδῆ καὶ
 57 φευκτὰ καὶ θανάσιμα. τὸ γοῦν κύνειον πιαίνει τοὺς ὄρνυγας καὶ ὁ ὑοσκύαμος τὰς ὕς, αἱ δὲ χαίρουσι καὶ σαλαμάνδρας ἐσθίουσαι, ὡσπεροῦν ἔλαφοι τὰ ἰοβόλα ζῶα καὶ αἱ χελιδόνες κανθαρίδας. οἱ τε μύρμηκες καὶ οἱ σκνίπες ἀνθρώποις μὲν ἀηδίας καὶ στρόφους ἐμποιοῦσι καταπινόμενοι· ἡ δὲ ἄρκτος ἦν ἀρρωστίᾳ τινὶ περιπέσει, τούτους κατα-
 58 λιχμωμένη βῶννυται. ἐχίδνα δὲ θιγόντος αὐτῆς μόνον φηγοῦ κλάδου καροῦται, καθάπερ καὶ νυκτερίς πλατάνου φύλλου. φεύγει δὲ κριὸν μὲν ἐλέφας, λέων δὲ ἀλεκτρυόνα, καὶ θραγγὸν κυάμων ἐρεικομένων τὰ θαλάττια κήτη, καὶ τίγρις ὑόφον τυμπάνου. καὶ ἄλλα δὲ πλείω τούτων ἐνεοσι λέγειν· ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος ἐνδιατρίβειν δοκῶμεν, εἰ τὰ αὐτὰ τοῖς μὲν ἔστιν ἀηδῆ τοῖς

in the structure of the animals which experience the sense-impressions.

But one may learn this more clearly from the 55 preferences and aversions of animals. Thus, sweet oil seems very agreeable to men, but intolerable to beetles and bees; and olive oil is beneficial to men, but when poured on wasps and bees it destroys them; and sea-water is a disagreeable and poisonous potion for men, but fish drink and enjoy it. Pigs, too, enjoy 56 wallowing in the most stinking mire rather than in clear and clean water. And whereas some animals eat grass, others eat shrubs, others feed in woods, others live on seeds or flesh or milk; some of them, too, prefer their food high, others like it fresh, and while some prefer it raw, others like it cooked. And so generally, the things which are agreeable to some are to others disagreeable, distasteful and deadly. Thus, quails are fattened by hemlock, and pigs by 57 henbane; and pigs also enjoy eating salamanders, just as deer enjoy poisonous creatures, and swallows gnats. So ants and wood-lice, when swallowed by men, cause distress and gripings, whereas the bear, whenever she falls sick, cures herself by licking them up. The mere touch of an oak-twig paralyses the 58 viper, and that of a plane-leaf the bat. The elephant flees from the ram, the lion from the cock, sea-monsters from the crackle of bursting beans, and the tiger from the sound of a drum. One might, indeed, cite many more examples, but—not to seem unduly prolix—if the same things are displeasing to some

δὲ ἡδέα, τὸ δὲ ἡδὺ καὶ ἀηδὲς ἐν φαντασίᾳ κείται, διάφοροι γίνονται τοῖς ζώοις ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων φαντασίαι.

59 Εἰ δὲ τὰ αὐτὰ πράγματα ἀνόμοια φαίνεται παρὰ τὴν τῶν ζώων ἐξαλλαγὴν, ὅποιον μὲν ἡμῖν θεωρεῖται τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἔξομεν λέγειν, ὅποιον δὲ ἔστι πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ἐφέξομεν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπικρίνειν αὐτοὶ δυνασόμεθα τὰς φαντασίας τὰς τε ἡμετέρας καὶ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων ζώων, μέρος καὶ αὐτοὶ τῆς διαφωνίας ὄντες καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοῦ ἐπικρινούντος
60 δεησόμενοι μᾶλλον ἢ αὐτοὶ κρίνειν δυνάμενοι. καὶ ἄλλως οὔτε ἀναποδείκτως δυνάμεθα προκρίνειν τὰς ἡμετέρας φαντασίας τῶν παρὰ τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώοις γινομένων οὔτε μετ' ἀποδείξεως. πρὸς γὰρ τῷ μὴ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν ἴσως, ὡς ὑπομνήσομεν, αὐτῇ ἢ λεγομένη ἀπόδειξις ἤτοι φαινομένη ἡμῖν ἔσται ἢ οὐ φαινομένη. καὶ εἰ μὲν μὴ φαινομένη, οὐδὲ μετὰ πεποιθήσεως αὐτὴν προσησόμεθα· εἰ δὲ φαινομένη ἡμῖν, ἐπειδὴ περὶ τῶν φαινομένων τοῖς ζώοις ζητεῖται καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις ἡμῖν φαίνεται ζώοις οὖσι, καὶ αὐτῇ ζητηθήσεται εἰ ἔστιν ἀληθὴς καθό
61 ἔστι φαινομένη. ἀτοπον δὲ τὸ ζητούμενον διὰ τοῦ ζητουμένου κατασκευάζειν ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἐπεὶ ἔσται τὸ αὐτὸ πιστὸν καὶ ἄπιστον, ὅπερ ἀμήχανον, πιστὸν μὲν ἢ βούλεται ἀποδεικνύειν, ἄπιστον δὲ

^a See ii. 134 ff. where it is argued that logical demonstration or "proof" is "non-existent." The argument here is that, even if we grant the existence of "proof" in the abstract we cannot prove anything in the particular case before us—the question as to the superiority of our impressions to those of animals. For all proof must be either "apparent" to us, or "non-apparent": the latter kind we reject as incompre-

but pleasing to others, and pleasure and displeasure depend upon sense-impression, then animals receive different impressions from the underlying objects.

But if the same things appear different owing to 59 the variety in animals, we shall, indeed, be able to state our own impressions of the real object, but as to its essential nature we shall suspend judgement. For we cannot ourselves judge between our own impressions and those of the other animals, since we ourselves are involved in the dispute and are, therefore, rather in need of a judge than competent to pass judgement ourselves. Besides, we are unable, 60 either with or without proof, to prefer our own impressions to those of the irrational animals. For in addition to the probability that proof is, as we shall show,^a a non-entity, the so-called proof itself will be either apparent to us or non-apparent. If, then, it is non-apparent, we shall not accept it with confidence; while if it is apparent to us, inasmuch as what is apparent to animals is the point in question and the proof is apparent to us who are animals, it follows that we shall have to question the proof itself as to whether it is as true as it is apparent. It is, indeed, 61 absurd to attempt to establish the matter in question by means of the matter in question,^b since in that case the same thing will be at once believed and disbelieved,—believed in so far as it purports to prove, but disbelieved in so far as it requires proof,—which

hensible; the former "apparent" proof is indecisive, its "apparency" being relative to us, who are a species of animal, and thus involved in the dispute. Further, as relative to us the "apparent proof" is not absolute, and therefore not necessarily "true."

^b This would be the fallacy of *petitio principii*, or "arguing in a circle": cf. §§ 117, 164.

ἢ ἀποδείκνυται. οὐχ ἔξομεν ἄρα ἀπόδειξιν δι' ἧς προκρινοῦμεν τὰς ἑαυτῶν φαντασίας τῶν παρὰ τοῖς ἀλόγοις καλουμένων ζώοις γνωμένων. εἰ οὖν διάφοροι γίνονται αἱ φαντασίαι παρὰ τὴν τῶν ζώων ἐξαλλαγὴν, ἃς ἐπικρῖναι ἀμήχανόν ἐστιν, ἐπέχει ἀνάγκη περὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων.

- 62 Ἐκ περιουσίας δὲ καὶ συγκρίνομεν τὰ ἄλογα καλούμενα ζῶα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις κατὰ φαντασίαν· καὶ γὰρ καταπαίξειν τῶν δογματικῶν τετυφωμένων καὶ περιαιτολογούντων οὐκ ἀποδοκιμάζομεν μετὰ τοὺς πρακτικούς τῶν λόγων. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἡμέτεροι τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων ἀπλῶς εἰώθασιν 63 συγκρίνειν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· ἐπεὶ δὲ εὐρεσιλογοῦντες οἱ δογματικοὶ ἄνισον εἶναι φασὶ τὴν σύγκρισιν, ἡμεῖς ἐκ πολλοῦ τοῦ περιόντος ἐπὶ πλέον παίξοντες ἐπὶ ἐνὸς ζώου στήσομεν τὸν λόγον, οἷον ἐπὶ κυνός, εἰ δοκεῖ, τοῦ εὐτελεστάτου δοκοῦντος εἶναι. εὐρήσομεν γὰρ καὶ οὕτω μὴ λειπόμενα ἡμῶν τὰ ζῶα, περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος, ὡς πρὸς τὴν πίστιν τῶν φαινομένων.
- 64 Ὅτι τοίνυν αἰσθήσει διαφέρει τοῦτο τὸ ζῶον ἡμῶν, οἱ δογματικοὶ συνομολογοῦσιν· καὶ γὰρ τῇ ὀσφρῆσει μᾶλλον ἡμῶν ἀντιλαμβάνεται, τὰ μὴ ὀρώμενα αὐτῷ θηρία διὰ ταύτης ἀνιχνεύων, καὶ τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς θάπτον ἡμῶν ταῦτα ὁρῶν καὶ τῇ 65 ἀκοῇ αἰσθανόμενος ὀξέως. οὐκοῦν ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον ἔλθωμεν. τούτου δὲ ὁ μὲν ἐστὶν ἐνδιάθετος ὁ δὲ προφορικός. ἴδωμεν οὖν πρότερον περὶ τοῦ ἐνδια-

^a *i.e.* as a further, superfluous or jocular, kind of argument, which serves to "cap" the serious treatment of the questions: cf. §§ 63, 78.

^b *Esp.* the Stoics.

^c The Stoic theory of *logos* thus distinguished between its

is impossible. Consequently we shall not possess a proof which enables us to give our own sense-impressions the preference over those of the so-called irrational animals. If, then, owing to the variety in animals their sense-impressions differ, and it is impossible to judge between them, we must necessarily suspend judgement regarding the external underlying objects.

By way of super-addition,^a too, we draw comparisons 62 between mankind and the so-called irrational animals in respect of their sense-impressions. For, after our solid arguments, we deem it quite proper to poke fun at those conceited braggarts, the Dogmatists.^b As a rule, our School compare the irrational animals in the mass with mankind; but since the Dogmatists 63 captiously assert that the comparison is unequal, we—super-adding yet more—will carry our ridicule further and base our argument on one animal only, the dog for instance if you like, which is held to be the most worthless of animals. For even in this case we shall find that the animals we are discussing are no wise inferior to ourselves in respect of the credibility of their impressions.

Now it is allowed by the Dogmatists that this 64 animal, the dog, excels us in point of sensation: as to smell it is more sensitive than we are, since by this sense it tracks beasts that it cannot see; and with its eyes it sees them more quickly than we do; and with its ears it is keen of perception. Next let 65 us proceed to the reasoning faculty. Of reason one kind is internal, implanted in the soul, the other externally expressed.^c Let us consider first the

two senses—internal *reason*, or conception, and the enunciation of thought in the uttered *word*.

θέτου. οὗτος τοίνυν κατὰ τοὺς μάλιστα ἡμῖν ἀντιδοξοῦντας νῦν δογματικούς, τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς, ἐν τούτοις ἔοικε σαλεύειν, τῇ αἰρέσει τῶν οἰκείων καὶ φυγῇ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, τῇ γνώσει τῶν εἰς τοῦτο συντενουσῶν τεχνῶν, τῇ ἀντιλήψει τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν ἀρετῶν <καὶ>¹ τῶν περὶ
 66 τὰ πάθη. ὁ τοίνυν κύων, ἐφ' οὗ τὸν λόγον ἔδοξε στήσαι παραδείγματος ἕνεκα, αἴρεσιν ποιεῖται τῶν οἰκείων καὶ φυγῇ τῶν βλαβερῶν, τὰ μὲν τρόφιμα διώκων, μᾶστιγος δὲ ἀναταθείσης ὑποχωρῶν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τέχνην ἔχει ποριστικὴν τῶν οἰκείων, τὴν
 67 θηρευτικὴν. ἐστὶ δὲ οὐδ' ἀρετῆς ἐκτός· τῆς γέ ται δικαιοσύνης οὔσης τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν ἀποδοτικῆς ἐκάστω, ὁ κύων τοὺς μὲν οἰκείους τε καὶ εὖ ποιοῦντας σαίνων καὶ φρουρῶν τοὺς δὲ ἀνοικείους καὶ ἀδικοῦντας ἀμυνόμενος οὐκ ἔξω ἂν εἴη τῆς
 68 δικαιοσύνης. εἰ δὲ ταύτην ἔχει, τῶν ἀρετῶν ἀντακολουθουσῶν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς ἔχει, ἃς οὗ φασιν ἔχειν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀνθρώπους οἱ σοφοί. καὶ ἄλκιμον δὲ αὐτὸν ὄντα ὁρῶμεν ἐν ταῖς ἀμύναις, καὶ συνετόν, ὡς καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐμαρτύρησεν, ποιήσας τὸν Ὀδυσσέα πᾶσι μὲν τοῖς οἰκείοις ἀνθρώποις ἀγνώτα ὄντα ὑπὸ μόνου δὲ τοῦ Ἄργου ἐπιγνωσθέντα, μήτε ὑπὸ τῆς ἀλλοιώσεως τῆς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα τάνδρὸς ἀπατηθέντος τοῦ κυνός, μήτε ἐκστάντος τῆς καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας, ἣν μᾶλλον
 69 τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔχων ἐφάνη. κατὰ δὲ τὸν Χρύσιππον τὸν μάλιστα ὀμιλοῦντα² τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώοις καὶ τῆς αἰοιδίμου διαλεκτικῆς μετέχει. φησὶ γοῦν

¹ <καὶ> add. T.

² ὀμιλοῦντα ego: πολεμοῦντα GT, Bekk. . προσέχοντα Diels.

internal reason. Now according to those Dogmatists who are, at present, our chief opponents—I mean the Stoics—internal reason is supposed to be occupied with the following matters: the choice of things congenial and the avoidance of things alien; the knowledge of the arts contributing thereto; the apprehension of the virtues pertaining to one's proper nature and of those relating to the passions. Now 66 the dog—the animal upon which, by way of example, we have decided to base our argument—exercises choice of the congenial and avoidance of the harmful, in that it hunts after food and slinks away from a raised whip. Moreover, it possesses an art which supplies what is congenial, namely hunting. Nor is 67 it devoid even of virtue; for certainly if justice consists in rendering to each his due,^a the dog, that welcomes and guards its friends and benefactors but drives off strangers and evil-doers, cannot be lacking in justice. But if he possesses this virtue, then, since 68 the virtues are interdependent, he possesses also all the other virtues; and these, say the philosophers,^b the majority of men do not possess. That the dog is also valiant we see by the way he repels attacks, and intelligent as well, as Homer too testified^c when he sang how Odysseus went unrecognized by all the people of his own household and was recognized only by the dog Argus, who neither was deceived by the bodily alterations of the hero nor had lost his original apprehensive impression, which indeed he evidently retained better than the men. And according to 69 Chrysippus, who shows special interest in irrational animals, the dog even shares in the far-famed “Dia-

^a Cf. [Plato], *Deff.* 411 E.

^b i.e. the Stoics.

^c See *Odys.* xvii. 300.

αὐτὸν ὁ προειρημένος ἀνὴρ ἐπιβάλλει τῷ πέμπτῳ
 διὰ πλειόνων ἀναποδείκτῳ,¹ ὅταν ἐπὶ τρίοδον
 ἔλθων καὶ τὰς δύο ὁδοὺς ἰχνεύσας δι' ὧν οὐ διήλθε
 τὸ θηρίον, τὴν τρίτην μὴδ' ἰχνεύσας εὐθέως ὀρμήσῃ
 δι' αὐτῆς. δυνάμει γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτὸν λογιζέσθαι
 φησιν ὁ ἀρχαῖος " ἦτοι τῆδε ἢ τῆδε ἢ τῆδε διήλθε
 τὸ θηρίον· οὔτε δὲ τῆδε οὔτε τῆδε· τῆδε ἄρα."
 70 ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ παθῶν ἀντιληπτικός τέ ἐστι
 καὶ παραμυθητικός· σκόλοπος γὰρ αὐτῷ κατα-
 παγέντος ἐπὶ τὴν ἄρσιν τοῦτου ὀρμῆ τῆ τοῦ ποδὸς
 πρὸς τὴν γῆν παρατρίψει καὶ διὰ τῶν ὀδόντων.
 ἔλκος τε εἰ ἔχει που, ἐπεὶ τὰ μὲν ῥυπαρὰ ἔλκη
 δυσαλθῆ ἐστὶ τὰ δὲ καθαρὰ ῥαδίως θεραπεύεται,
 71 πρῶτος ἀποψῆ τὸν γινόμενον ἰχώρα. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ
 Ἱπποκράτειον φυλάσσει μάλα καλῶς· ἐπεὶ γὰρ
 ποδὸς ἄκος ἀκνησία, εἴ ποτε τραῦμα ἐν ποδὶ
 σχοίη, μετεωρίζει τοῦτον καὶ ὡς οἶόν τε ἄσкулτον
 σθρεῖ. ὀχλούμενός τε ὑπὸ χυμῶν ἀνοικείων πῶαν
 ἐσθίει, μεθ' ἧς ἀποβλύζων τὸ ἀνοικεῖον ὑγιάζεται.
 72 εἰ τοίνυν ἐφάνη τὸ ζῶον, ἐφ' οὗ τὸν λόγον ἐστή-
 σαμεν παραδείγματος ἕνεκα, καὶ αἰρούμενον τὰ
 οἰκεία καὶ τὰ ὀχληρὰ φεῦγον, τέχνην τε ἔχον πορι-
 στικὴν τῶν οἰκείων, καὶ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ παθῶν ἀντι-
 ληπτικὸν καὶ παραμυθητικόν, καὶ οὐκ ἔξω ἀρετῆς,
 ἐν οἷς κείται ἡ τελειότης τοῦ ἐνδιαθέτου λόγου,
 τέλειος ἂν εἴη κατὰ τοῦτο ὁ κύων· ὅθεν μοι δοκοῦσιν

¹ ἀναποδείκτῳ T, Prantl: -δείκτων MSS., Bekk.

* *i.e.* the Stoic logic, cf. ii. 94.

^b The Stoics had five syllogisms which they termed *anapodeictic*, or "indemonstrable," since they required no proof themselves but served to prove others. The "com-

plex" syllogism was of the form: "Either A or B or C exists; but neither A nor B exists; therefore C exists."
^c The famous physician, of Cos (circa 460-400 B.C.).

τινες τῶν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἑαυτοὺς σεμνῶναι τῇ τοῦ ζώου τούτου προσηγορίᾳ.

- 73 Περὶ δὲ τοῦ προφορικοῦ λόγου τέως μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκαῖον ζητεῖν· τοῦτον γὰρ καὶ τῶν δογματικῶν ἔνιοι παρητήσαντο ὡς ἀντιπράττοντα τῇ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀναλήψει, διὸ καὶ περὶ τὸν τῆς μαθήσεως χρόνον ἤσκησαν σιωπὴν· καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ καθ' ὑπόθεσιν εἴη ἄνθρωπος ἐνεός, οὐδεὶς φήσει αὐτὸν εἶναι ἄλογον. ἵνα δὲ καὶ ταῦτα παραλίπωμεν, μάλιστα μὲν ὀρώμεν τὰ ζῶα, περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος, καὶ ἀνθρωπίνως προφερόμενα φωνάς, ὡς κίττας καὶ ἄλλα
74 τινά. ἵνα δὲ καὶ τοῦτο εἰσώσωμεν, εἰ καὶ μὴ συνίεμεν τὰς φωνὰς τῶν ἀλόγων καλουμένων ζώων, ὅλως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπεικὸς διαλέγεσθαι μὲν ταῦτα ἡμᾶς δὲ μὴ συνιέναι· καὶ γὰρ τῆς τῶν βαρβάρων φωνῆς ἀκούοντες οὐ συνίεμεν ἀλλὰ μονοειδή
75 ταύτην εἶναι δοκοῦμεν. καὶ ἀκούομεν δὲ τῶν κυνῶν ἄλλην μὲν φωνὴν προϊεμένων ὅταν ἀμύνωνται τινὰς, ἄλλην δὲ ὅταν ὠρύωνται, καὶ ἄλλην ὅταν τύπτονται, καὶ διάφορον ἑπὶ σαίνωσιν. καὶ ὅλως εἴ τις εἰς τοῦτο ἀτενίσειεν, εὖροι ἂν πολλὴν παραλλαγὴν τῆς φωνῆς παρὰ τούτῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις ἐν ταῖς διαφόροις περιστάσεσιν, ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα εἰκότως λέγοιτ' ἂν καὶ τοῦ προφορικοῦ μετέχειν λόγον τὰ καλούμενα ἄλογα ζῶα.
76 εἰ δὲ μήτε ἀκριβεῖα τῶν αἰσθήσεων λείπεται τῶν ἀνθρώπων ταῦτα μήτε τῷ ἐνδιαθέτῳ λόγῳ, ἐκ περιουσίας δὲ εἰπεῖν μηδὲ τῷ προφορικῷ, οὐκ ἂν

And that, I suppose, is why certain of the professors of philosophy have adorned themselves with the title of this animal.^a

Concerning external reason, or speech, it is unnecessary for the present to inquire; for it has been rejected even by some of the Dogmatists as being a hindrance to the acquisition of virtue, for which reason they used to practise silence^b during the period of instruction; and besides, supposing that a man is dumb, no one will therefore call him irrational. But to pass over these cases, we certainly see animals—the subject of our argument—uttering quite human cries,—jays, for instance, and others. And, leaving 74 this point also aside, even if we do not understand the utterances of the so-called irrational animals, still it is not improbable that they converse although we fail to understand them; for in fact when we listen to the talk of barbarians we do not understand it, and it seems to us a kind of uniform chatter. More- 75 over, we hear dogs uttering one sound when they are driving people off, another when they are howling, and one sound when beaten, and a quite different sound when fawning. And so in general, in the case of all other animals as well as the dog, whoever examines the matter carefully will find a great variety of utterance according to the different circumstances, so that, in consequence, the so-called irrational animals may justly be said to participate in external reason. But if they neither fall short of mankind in 76 the accuracy of their perceptions, nor in internal reason, nor yet (to go still further) in external reason, or speech, then they will deserve no less credence

^a A sarcastic allusion to the Cynics; cf. Diog. Laert. vi. 13, Introd. p. xvi.

^b For the Pythagorean rule of silence (*ἐχεμυθία*) cf. Diog. Laert. viii. 10.

77 ἀπιστότερα ἡμῶν εἶη κατὰ τὰς φαντασίας. καὶ ἐφ' ἐκάστου δὲ τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων ἴσως ἰσάντας τὸν λόγον ταῦτα ἀποδεικνύει δυνατὸν εἶσθαι. οἷον γοῦν τίς οὐκ ἂν εἶποι τοὺς ὄρνιθας ἀγχινοῖα τε διαφέρειν καὶ τῷ προφορικῶ κεκρησθαι λόγῳ; οἷ γε οὐ μόνον τὰ παρόντα ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐσόμενα ἐπίστανται καὶ ταῦτα τοῖς συνιέναι δυναμένοις προδηλοῦσιν, ἄλλως τε σημαίνοντες καὶ τῇ φωνῇ προαγορεύοντες.

78 Τὴν δὲ σύγκρισιν ἐποιησάμην, ὡς καὶ ἔμπροσθεν ἐπεσημηνάμην, ἐκ περιόντος, ἰκανῶς, ὡς οἶμαι, δείξας ἔμπροσθεν ὅτι μὴ δυνάμεθα προκρίνειν τὰς ἡμετέρας φαντασίας τῶν παρὰ τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώοις ἡνωμένων. πλὴν ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ ἐστὶν ἀπιστότερα τὰ ἄλογα ζῶα ἡμῶν πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν τῶν φαντασιῶν, καὶ διάφοροι γίνονται φαντασίαι παρὰ τὴν τῶν ζώων παραλλαγὴν, ὅποιον μὲν ἕκαστον τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἐμοὶ φαίνεται δυνήσομαι λέγειν, ὅποιον δὲ ἐστὶ τῇ φύσει διὰ τὰ προειρημένα ἐπέχειν ἀναγκασθήσομαι.

79 Καὶ ὁ μὲν πρῶτος τῆς ἐποχῆς τρόπος τοιοῦτός ἐστι, δεύτερον δὲ ἐλέγομεν εἶναι τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἵνα γὰρ καθ' ὑπόθεσιν καὶ συγχωρήσῃ τις πιστοτέρους εἶναι τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, εὐρήσομεν καὶ ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ διαφορᾷ τὴν ἐποχὴν εἰσαγομένην. δύο τοίνυν εἶναι λεγομένων ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται ὁ ἀνθρώπος, ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, κατ' ἄμφω ταῦτα διαφέρομεν ἀλλήλων, οἷον κατὰ σῶμα ταῖς τε 80 μορφαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἰδιοσυγκρισίαις. διαφέρει μὲν

* Our word "idiosyncrasy" comes from ἰδιοσυγκρασία, a later form for ἰδιοσυγκρῆσις. σύγκρισις (or σύμμιξις) is Anax-

than ourselves in respect of their sense-impressions. Probably, too, we may reach this conclusion by basing 77 our argument on each single class of irrational animals. Thus, for example, who would deny that birds excel in quickness of wit or that they employ external reason? For they understand not only present events but future events as well, and these they foreshow to such as are able to comprehend them by means of prophetic cries as well as by other signs.

I have drawn this comparison (as I previously 78 indicated) by way of super-addition, having already sufficiently proved, as I think, that we cannot prefer our own sense-impressions to those of the irrational animals. If, however, the irrational animals are not less worthy of credence than we in regard to the value of sense-impressions, and their impressions vary according to the variety of animal,—then, although I shall be able to say what the nature of each of the underlying objects appears to me to be, I shall be compelled, for the reasons stated above, to suspend judgement as to its real nature.

Such, then, is the First of the Modes which induce 79 suspense. The *Second Mode* is, as we said, that based on the differences in men; for even if we grant for the sake of argument that men are more worthy of credence than irrational animals, we shall find that even our own differences of themselves lead to suspense. For man, you know, is said to be compounded of two things, soul and body, and in both these we differ one from another.

Thus, as regards the *body*, we differ in our figures and "idiosyncrasies," or constitutional peculiarities.^a

agoras's term for the process of "composition" by which the world comes into being; cf. *Introd.* p. xi.

γὰρ κατὰ μορφήν σῶμα Σκύθου Ἰνδοῦ σώματος, τὴν δὲ παραλλαγὴν ποιεῖ, καθάπερ φασίν, ἢ διάφορος τῶν χυμῶν ἐπικράτεια. παρὰ δὲ τὴν διάφορον τῶν χυμῶν ἐπικράτειαν διάφοροι γίνονται καὶ αἱ φαντασίαι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ λόγῳ παρεστήσαμεν. ταῦτά τοι καὶ ἐν τῇ αἰρέσει καὶ φυγῇ τῶν ἐκτὸς διαφορά πολλή κατ' αὐτοὺς ἔστιν· ἄλλοις γὰρ χαίρουσιν Ἰνδοὶ καὶ ἄλλοις οἱ καθ' ἡμᾶς, τὸ δὲ διαφόροις χαίρειν τοῦ παρηλλαγμένας ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων φαντασίας λαμβάνειν ἔστι
 81 μνηστικόν. κατὰ δὲ ἰδιοσυγκρισίας διαφέρομεν ὡς ἐνίου κρέα βόεια πετραίων ἰχθυοῖν ῥᾶον πέττειν καὶ ὑπὸ Λεσβίου οἰναρίου εἰς χολέραν περιτρέπεται. ἦν δέ, φασίν, γραῦς Ἀττικὴ τριάκοντα ὀγκᾶς κωνείου ἀκινδύνως προσφερομένη, Αὔσις δὲ καὶ μηκωνείου τέσσαρας ὀγκᾶς ἀλύπως ἐλάμβανεν.
 82 καὶ Δημοφῶν μὲν ὁ Ἀλεξάνδρου τραπεζοποιοῦς ἐν ἡλίῳ γινόμενος ἦ ἐν βαλανείῳ ἐρρίγου, ἐν σκιᾷ δὲ ἐθάλπτο, Ἀθηναγόρας δὲ ὁ Ἀργεῖος ὑπὸ σκορπίων καὶ φαλαγγίων ἀλύπως ἐπλήσσετο, οἱ δὲ καλούμενοι Ψυλλαεῖς οὐδ' ὑπὸ ὄφειν ἢ ἀσπίδων
 83 δακνόμενοι βλάπτονται, οἱ δὲ Τεντυρίται τῶν Αἰγυπτίων οὐ βλάπτονται πρὸς [ἄνω κάτω]² τῶν κροκοδείλων. ἀλλὰ καὶ Αἰθιοπίων οἱ ἀντιπέραν τῆς Μερῆς παρὰ τὸν Ἀστάπουν³ ποταμὸν οἰκοῦντες σκορπίους καὶ ὄφεις καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια ἀκινδύνως ἐσθίουσιν. καὶ Ρουφίνος δὲ ὁ ἐν Χαλκίδι πίνων ἐλλέβορον οὔτε ἡμεῖς οὔτε ὄλως ἐκαθαίρετο, ἀλλ' ὡς τι τῶν συνήθων προσεφέρετο
 84 καὶ ἔπασσεν. Χρύσερμος δὲ ὁ Ἡροφίλειος εἶ ποτε

The body of an Indian differs in shape from that of 80 a Scythian; and it is said that what causes the variation is a difference in the predominant humours. Owing to this difference in the predominant humours the sense-impressions also come to differ, as we indicated in our First Argument.^a So too in respect of choice and avoidance of external objects men exhibit great differences: thus Indians enjoy some things, our people other things, and the enjoyment of different things is an indication that we receive varying impressions from the underlying objects. In respect 81 of our "idiosyncrasies," our differences are such that some of us digest the flesh of oxen more easily than rock-fish, or get diarrhoea from the weak wine of Lesbos. An old wife of Attica, they say, swallowed with impunity thirty drams of hemlock, and Lysis took four drams of poppy-juice without hurt. Demo- 82 phon, Alexander's butler, used to shiver when he was in the sun or in a hot bath, but felt warm in the shade: Athenagoras the Argive took no hurt from the stings of scorpions and poisonous spiders; and the Psyllaeans,^b as they are called, are not harmed by bites from snakes and asps, nor are the Tentyritae^c of Egypt 83 harmed by the crocodile. Further, those Ethiopians who live beyond Lake Meroë^d on the banks of the river Astapous eat with impunity scorpions, snakes, and the like. Rufinus of Chalcis when he drank hellebore neither vomited nor suffered at all from purging, but swallowed and digested it just like any ordinary drink. Chrysermus the Herophilean doctor 84

^a See § 52.

^b A tribe of N. Africa, cf. Hdt. iv. 173.

^c Tentyra was a town in Upper Egypt; cf. Juvenal xv.

35.

^d In S. Egypt. The "Astapous" is the Blue Nile.

¹ δὲ MT: om. Bekk. ² [ἄνω κάτω] om. T, Apelt.

³ Ἀστάπουν T, Hercher: Ἰδάσπην mss., Bekk.

πέπερι προσηνέγκατο, καρδιακῶς ἐκινδύνευεν. καὶ Σωτήριχος δὲ ὁ χειρουργὸς εἶ ποτε σιλούρων ἤσθετο κνίσσης, χολέρα ἤλίσκετο. Ἄνδρων δὲ ὁ Ἄργειος οὕτως ἀδιψος ἦν ὡς καὶ διὰ τῆς ἀνύδρου Λιβύης ὀδεύειν αὐτὸν μὴ ἐπιζητοῦντα ποτόν. Τιβέριος δὲ ὁ Καίσαρ ἐν σκότῳ ἑώρα. Ἄριστοτέλης δὲ ἱστορεῖ Θάσιόν τινα ὃς ἐδόκει ἀνθρώπου εἶδωλον προηγείσθαι αὐτοῦ διὰ παντός.

85 Τοσαύτης οὖν παραλλαγῆς οὔσης ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις κατὰ τὰ σώματα, ἵνα ὀλίγα ἀπὸ πολλῶν τῶν παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς κειμένων ἀρκεσθῶμεν εἰπόντες, εἰκός ἐστι καὶ κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν διαφέρειν ἀλλήλων τοὺς ἀνθρώπους· τύπος γάρ τίς ἐστι τὸ σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς καὶ ἡ φυσιογνωμονικὴ σοφία δείκνυσιν. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον δείγμα τῆς κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν τῶν ἀνθρώπων πολλῆς καὶ ἀπείρου διαφορᾶς ἢ διαφωνίας τῶν παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς λεγομένων περὶ τε τῶν ἄλλων καὶ περὶ τοῦ τίνα οὖν καὶ οἱ ποιητὰ περὶ τούτων ἀπεφήναντο· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Πίνδαρός φησιν

ἀελλοπόδων μὲν τιν' εὐφραίνουσιν ἵππων τιμαὶ
καὶ στέφανοι,
τοὺς δ' ἐν πολυχρύσοις θαλάμοις βιοτά·
τέρπεται δὲ καὶ τις ἐπ' οἶδμ' ἄλιον ναῖ θεᾶ [σῶς]¹
διαστείβων.

ὁ δὲ ποιητὴς λέγει

ἄλλος γάρ τ' ἄλλοισιν ἀνὴρ ἐπιτέρπεται ἔργοις.
ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ τραγωδία μεστή τῶν τοιούτων ἐστὶ
λέγει γοῦν

¹ [σῶς] om. L.M.T.

was liable to get a heart attack if ever he took pepper; and Soterichus the surgeon was seized with diarrhoea whenever he smelled fried sprats. Andron the Argive was so immune from thirst that he actually traversed the waterless country of Libya without needing a drink. Tiberius Caesar could see in the dark; and Aristotle^a tells of a Thasian who fancied that the image of a man was continually going in front of him.

Seeing, then, that men vary so much in body—to⁸⁵ content ourselves with but a few instances of the many collected by the Dogmatists,—men probably also differ from one another in respect of the *soul* itself; for the body is a kind of expression of the soul, as in fact is proved by the science of Physiognomy. But the greatest proof of the vast and endless differences in men's intelligence is the discrepancy in the statements of the Dogmatists concerning the right objects of choice and avoidance, as well as other things. Regarding this the poets, too, have expressed⁸⁶ themselves fittingly. Thus Pindar says^b:

The crowns and trophies of his storm-foot steeds
Give joy to one; yet others find it joy
To dwell in gorgeous chambers gold-bedeckt;
Some even take delight in voyaging
O'er ocean's billows in a speeding barque.

And the poet^c says: "One thing is pleasing to one man, another thing to another." Tragedy, too, is full of such sayings; for example:

^a See Aristot. *Meteorol.* iii. 4.

^b *Fragm.* 242 (Boeckh), Sandys' *Pindar*, in Loeb Library, p. 610, copied by Horace, *Odes*, i. 1. 3 ff.

^c See Homer, *Odyss.* xiv. 228. Cf. Virgil, *Ecl.* ii. 65 "trahit sua quemque voluntas"; and "quot homines, tot sententiae."

εἰ πᾶσι ταῦτόν καλὸν ἔφν σοφόν θ' ἄμα,
οὐκ ἦν ἂν ἀμφίλεκτος ἀνθρώποις ἔρις,

καὶ πάλιν

δεινὸν γε ταῦτόν τοῖς μὲν ἀνδάνειν βροτῶν
τοῖς δ' ἔχθος εἶναι.

- 87 ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ αἴρεσις καὶ ἡ φυγὴ ἐν ἡδονῇ καὶ ἀηδισμῷ ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ ἡδονὴ καὶ ὁ ἀηδισμὸς ἐν αἰσθήσει κείται καὶ φαντασίᾳ, ὅταν τὰ αὐτὰ οἱ μὲν αἰρῶνται οἱ δὲ φεύγωσιν, ἀκόλουθον ἡμᾶς ἐπιλογίζεσθαι ὅτι οὐδὲ ὁμοίως ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν κινουῦνται, ἐπεὶ ὁμοίως ἂν τὰ αὐτὰ ἤροῦντο ἢ ἐξέκλινον. εἰ δὲ τὰ αὐτὰ διαφόρως κινεῖ παρά τῃν διαφορὰν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, εἰσάγοιτ' ἂν εἰκότως καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἡ ἐποχὴ, ὃ τι μὲν ἕκαστον φαίνεται τῶν ὑποκειμένων ὡς πρὸς ἐκάστην διαφορὰν ἴσως λέγειν ἡμῶν δυναμένων, τί δὲ ἔστι [κατὰ δύναμιν]¹ ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν οὐχ οἶων τε ὄντων ἀποφύνασθαι.
- 88 ἦτοι γὰρ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πιστεύσομεν ἢ τισίν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν πᾶσιν, καὶ ἀδυνάτοις ἐπιχειρήσομεν καὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα παραδεξόμεθα. εἰ δὲ τισίν, εἰπάτωσαν ἡμῖν τίσι χρὴ συγκατατίθεσθαι. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Πλατωνικὸς λέξει ὅτι Πλάτωνι, ὁ Ἐπικουρείος δὲ Ἐπικούρῳ, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀναλόγως, καὶ οὕτως ἀνεπικρίτως στασιάζοντες αὐθις ἡμᾶς
- 89 εἰς τὴν ἐποχὴν περιστήσουσιν. ὁ δὲ λέγων ὅτι τοῖς πλείστοις δεῖ συγκατατίθεσθαι παιδαριῶδές τι προσίεται, οὐδενὸς δυναμένου πάντας τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐπελθεῖν καὶ διαλογίσασθαι τί τοῖς

¹ [κατὰ δύναμιν] secl. Mutsch., Papp.

Were fair and wise the same thing unto all,
There had been no contentious quarrelling.^a

And again :

'Tis strange that the same thing abhorr'd by some
Should give delight to others.^b

Seeing, then, that choice and avoidance depend on 87 pleasure and displeasure, while pleasure and displeasure depend on sensation and sense-impression, whenever some men choose the very things which are avoided by others, it is logical for us to conclude that they are also differently affected by the same things, since otherwise they would all alike have chosen or avoided the same things. But if the same objects affect men differently owing to the differences in the men, then, on this ground also, we shall reasonably be led to suspension of judgement. For while we are, no doubt, able to state what each of the underlying objects appears to be, relatively to each difference, we are incapable of explaining what it is in reality. For we shall have to believe either all 88 men or some. But if we believe all, we shall be attempting the impossible and accepting contradictions ; and if some, let us be told whose opinions we are to endorse. For the Platonist will say " Plato's " ; the Epicurean, " Epicurus's " ; and so on with the rest ; and thus by their unsettled disputations they will bring us round again to a state of suspense. Moreover, he who maintains that we ought to assent 89 to the majority is making a childish proposal, since no one is able to visit the whole of mankind and determine what pleases the majority of them ; for

^a From Eurip. *Phoen.* 499 ff.

^b See *Fragm. Trag. adesp.* 462 (Nauck) : perhaps from Eurip.

πλείστοις ἀρέσκει, ἐνδεχομένου τοῦ ἐν τισιν ἔθνεσιν, ἃ ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἴσμεν, τὰ μὲν παρ' ἡμῖν σπάνια τοῖς πλείοσι προσεῖναι τὰ δὲ ἡμῶν τοῖς πολλοῖς συμβαίνοντα σπάνια ὑπάρχειν, ὡς τοὺς πολλοὺς μὲν ὑπὸ φαλαγγίων δακνομένους μὴ ἀλγεῖν τινὰς δὲ σπανίως ἀλγεῖν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημένων ἰδιοσυγκρισίων τὸ ἀνάλογον. ἀναγκαῖον οὖν καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφορὰν εἰσάγεσθαι τὴν ἐποχὴν.

90 Ἐπεὶ δὲ φίλαυτοὶ τινες ὄντες οἱ δογματικοὶ φασὶ δεῖν τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων ἑαυτοὺς προκρίνειν ἐν τῇ κρίσει τῶν πραγμάτων, ἐπιστάμεθα μὲν ὅτι ἀτοπὸς ἐστὶν ἡ ἀξίωσις αὐτῶν (μέρος γὰρ εἶσι καὶ αὐτοὶ τῆς διαφωνίας· καὶ ἂν αὐτοὺς προκρίνοντες οὕτω κρίνωσι τὰ φαινόμενα, πρὶν ἄρξασθαι τῆς κρίσεως τὸ ζητούμενον¹ συναρπάξουσιν, 91 ἑαυτοῖς τὴν κρίσιν ἐπιτρέποντες), ὅμως δ' οὖν ἵνα καὶ ἐπὶ ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου τὸν λόγον ἰστάντες, ὅλον τοῦ παρ' αὐτοῖς ὄνειροπολουμένου σοφοῦ, ἐπὶ τὴν ἐποχὴν κατανῶμεν, τὸν τρίτον τῇ τάξει τρόπον ἐγχειριζόμεθα.

Τοῦτον δὲ λέγομεν τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῶν αἰσθήσεων. ὅτι δὲ διαφέρονται αἱ αἰσθήσεις πρὸς 92 ἀλλήλας, πρόδηλον. αἱ γοῦν γραφαὶ τῇ μὲν ὄψει δοκοῦσιν εἰσοχὰς καὶ ἐξοχὰς ἔχειν, οὐ μὴν καὶ τῇ ἀφῆ. καὶ τὸ μέλι τῇ μὲν γλώττῃ ἡδὺ φαίνεται ἐπὶ τινων, τοῖς δ' ὀφθαλμοῖς ἀηδές· ἀδύνατον οὖν ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν πότερον ἡδὺ ἐστὶν εἰλικρινῶς ἢ ἀηδές. καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μύρου ὁμοίως· τὴν μὲν γὰρ ὄσφρησιν 93 εὐφραίνει, τὴν δὲ γεῦσιν ἀηδίζει. τὸ τε εὐφόρβιον

there may possibly be races of whom we know nothing amongst whom conditions rare with us are common, and conditions common with us rare,—possibly, for instance, most of them feel no pain from the bites of spiders, though a few on rare occasions feel such pain; and so likewise with the rest of the “idiosyncrasies” mentioned above. Necessarily, therefore, the differences in men afford a further reason for bringing in suspension of judgement.

When the Dogmatists—a self-loving class of men— 90 assert that in judging things they ought to prefer themselves to other people, we know that their claim is absurd; for they themselves are a party to the controversy; and if, when judging appearances, they have already given the preference to themselves, then, by thus entrusting themselves with the judgement, they are begging the question before the judgement is begun. Nevertheless, in order that we may arrive 91 at suspension of judgement by basing our argument on one person—such as, for example, their visionary “Sage”^a—we adopt the Mode which comes Third in order.

This *Third Mode* is, we say, based on differences in the senses. That the senses differ from one another is obvious. Thus, to the eye paintings 92 seem to have recesses and projections, but not so to the touch. Honey, too, seems to some^b pleasant to the tongue but unpleasant to the eyes; so that it is impossible to say whether it is absolutely pleasant or unpleasant. The same is true of sweet oil, for it pleases the sense of smell but displeases the taste.

^a The ideal “Wise Man” of the Stoics; see *Introduct.* p. xxviii.

^b For exceptions see § 101.

¹ τὸ ζητούμενον T; τὰ φαινόμενα mss., Bekk.

ἐπεὶ τοῖς μὲν ὀφθαλμοῖς λυπηρόν ἐστι τῷ δὲ ἄλλῳ σώματι παντὶ ἄλυπον, οὐχ ἔξομεν εἰπεῖν πότερον ἄλυπὸν ἐστὶν εἰλικρινῶς τοῖς σώμασιν ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει ἢ λυπηρόν. τό τε ὄμβριον ὕδωρ ὀφθαλμοῖς μὲν ἐστὶν ὠφέλιμον, ἀρτηρίαν δὲ καὶ πνεύμονα τραχύνει, καθάπερ καὶ τὸ ἔλαιον, καίτοι τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν παρηγοροῦν. καὶ ἡ θαλαττία νάρκη τοῖς μὲν ἄκροις προστεθείσα ναρκαν ποιεῖ, τῷ δ' ἄλλῳ σώματι ἀλύπως παρατίθεται. διόπερ ὁποῖον μὲν ἐστὶ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ἕκαστον τούτων οὐχ ἔξομεν λέγειν, ὁποῖον δὲ φαίνεται ἐκάστοτε δυνατὸν εἰπεῖν.

- 94 Καὶ ἄλλα δὲ πλείω τούτων ἔνεστι λέγειν· ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ διατρίβωμεν διὰ τὴν πρόθεσιν [τοῦ τρόπου]¹ τῆς συγγραφῆς, ἐκείνο λεκτέον. ἕκαστον τῶν φαινομένων ἡμῖν αἰσθητῶν ποικίλον ὑποπίπτει δοκεῖ, οἷον τὸ μῆλον λεῖον εὐῶδες γλυκὺ ξανθόν. ἄδηλον οὖν πότερόν ποτε ταύτας μόνας ὄντως ἔχει τὰς ποιότητας, ἢ μονόποιον μὲν ἐστὶν παρὰ δὲ τὴν διάφορον κατασκευὴν τῶν αἰσθητηρίων διάφορον φαίνεται, ἢ καὶ πλείονας μὲν τῶν φαινομένων ἔχει ποιότητας, ἡμῖν δ' οὐχ ὑποπίπτουσί τινας αὐτῶν.
- 95 μονόποιον μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τοῦτο ἐνδέχεται λογίζεσθαι ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ἡμῖν εἰρημένων περὶ τῆς εἰς τὰ σώματα ἀναδιδομένης τροφῆς καὶ τοῦ ὕδατος τοῦ εἰς τὰ δένδρα ἀναδιδομένου καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ ἐν αὐλοῖς καὶ σύργξι καὶ τοῖς παραπλησίοις ὀργάνοις· δύναται γὰρ καὶ τὸ μῆλον μονοειδὲς μὲν εἶναι, διάφορον δὲ θεωρεῖσθαι παρὰ τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν αἰσθητηρίων περὶ ἃ γίνεται αὐτοῦ ἡ ἀντίληψις.
- 96 πλείονας δὲ τῶν φαινομένων ἡμῖν ποιότητων ἔχειν τὸ μῆλον ποιότητας δύνασθαι οὕτως ἐπιλογιζόμεθα.

So too with spurge^a: since it pains the eyes but 93 causes no pain to any other part of the body, we cannot say whether, in its real nature, it is absolutely painful or painless to bodies. Rain-water, too, is beneficial to the eyes but roughens the wind-pipe and the lungs; as also does olive-oil, though it mollifies the epidermis. The cramp-fish, also, when applied to the extremities produces cramp, but it can be applied to the rest of the body without hurt. Consequently we are unable to say what is the real nature of each of these things, although it is possible to say what each thing at the moment appears to be.

A longer list of examples might be given, but to 94 avoid prolixity, in view of the plan of our treatise, we will say just this. Each of the phenomena perceived by the senses seems to be a complex: the apple, for example, seems smooth, odorous, sweet and yellow. But it is non-evident whether it really possesses these qualities only; or whether it has but one quality but appears varied owing to the varying structure of the sense-organs; or whether, again, it has more qualities than are apparent, some of which elude our perception. That the apple has but one 95 quality might be argued from what we said above^b regarding the food absorbed by bodies, and the water sucked up by trees, and the breath in flutes and pipes and similar instruments; for the apple likewise may be all of one sort but appear different owing to differences in the sense-organs in which perception takes place. And that the apple may possibly possess 96 more qualities than those apparent to us we argue in

^a A species of plants with acrid, milky juice.

^b See § 53.

¹ [τοῦ τρόπου] secl. Mutsch.

ἐνοήσωμέν τινα ἐκ γενετῆς ἀφῆν μὲν ἔχοντα καὶ ὄσφρησιν καὶ γεῦσιν, μήτε δὲ ἀκούοντα μήτε ὀρώντα. οὗτος τοῖνυν ὑπολήψεται μήτε ὄρατόν τι εἶναι τὴν ἀρχὴν μήτε ἀκουστόν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐκεῖνα τὰ τρία γένη τῶν ποιότητων ὑπάρχειν ὧν ἀντι-
97 λαμβάνεσθαι δύνανται. καὶ ἡμᾶς οὖν ἐνδέχεται τὰς πέντε μόνως αἰσθήσεις ἔχοντας μόνον ἀντιλαμ-
βάνεσθαι, ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὸ μῆλον ποιότητων, ὧν ἐσμὲν ἀντιληπτικοί· ὑποκεῖσθαι δὲ ἄλλας οἷον τέ ἐστι ποιότητος, ὑποπιπτούσας ἐτέροις αἰσθητηρίοις, ὧν ἡμεῖς οὐ μετεσχῆκαμεν, διὸ οὐδὲ ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα τῶν κατ' αὐτὰς αἰσθητῶν.

98 Ἄλλ' ἡ φύσις συνεμετρήσατο, φήσει τις, τὰς αἰσθήσεις πρὸς τὰ αἰσθητά. ποία φύσις, διαφωνίας τοσαύτης ἀνεπικρίτου παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς οὕσης περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τῆς κατ' αὐτήν; ὁ γὰρ ἐπικρίνων αὐτὸ τοῦτο, εἰ ἔστι φύσις, εἰ μὲν ἰδιώτης εἶη, ἄπιστος ἔσται κατ' αὐτούς, φιλόσοφος δὲ ὧν μέρος ἔσται τῆς διαφωνίας καὶ κρινόμενος αὐτὸς
99 ἄλλ' οὐ κριτής. πλὴν ἄλλ' εἰ ἐγχωρεῖ¹ καὶ ταύτας μόνως ὑποκεῖσθαι παρὰ τῷ μῆλῳ τὰς ποιότητας ὧν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι δοκοῦμεν, καὶ πλείους τούτων ἢ πάλιν μηδὲ τὰς ἡμῖν ὑποπιπτούσας, ἄδηλον ἡμῖν ἔσται ὅποιον ἔστι τὸ μῆλον. ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν λόγος. τῶν αἰσθήσεων μέντοι μὴ καταλαμβανουσῶν τὰ ἐκτός, οὐδὲ ἡ διάνοια ταῦτα δύνανται καταλαμβάνειν, ὥστε καὶ διὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἢ περὶ τῶν ἐκτός ὑποκειμένων ἐποχῆ συνάγεσθαι δόξει.

100 Ἴνα δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ μιᾷ ἐκάστης αἰσθήσεως ἰστάντες

¹ εἰ ἐγχωρεῖ Heintz: ἐνεχώρει mss.: εἰ ἐνεχώρει T, Bekk.

this way. Let us imagine a man who possesses from birth the senses of touch, taste and smell, but can neither hear nor see. This man, then, will assume that nothing visible or audible has any existence, but only those three kinds of qualities which he is able to apprehend. Possibly, then, we also, having only 97 our five senses, perceive only such of the apple's qualities as we are capable of apprehending; and possibly it may possess other underlying qualities which affect other sense-organs, though we, not being endowed with those organs, fail to apprehend the sense-objects which come through them.

"But," it may be objected, "Nature made the 98 senses commensurate with the objects of sense." What kind of "Nature"? we ask, seeing that there exists so much unresolved controversy amongst the Dogmatists concerning the reality which belongs to Nature. For he who decides the question as to the existence of Nature will be discredited by them if he is an ordinary person, while if he is a philosopher he will be a party to the controversy and therefore himself subject to judgement and not a judge. If, 99 however, it is possible that only those qualities which we seem to perceive subsist in the apple, or that a greater number subsist, or, again, that not even the qualities which affect us subsist, then it will be non-evident to us what the nature of the apple really is. And the same argument applies to all the other objects of sense. But if the senses do not apprehend external objects, neither can the mind apprehend them; hence, because of this argument also, we shall be driven, it seems, to suspend judgement regarding the external underlying objects.

In order that we may finally reach suspension by 100

τὸν λόγον, ἢ καὶ ἀφιστάμενοι τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ἔχωμεν καταλήγειν εἰς τὴν ἐποχὴν, παραλαμβάνομεν καὶ τὸν τέταρτον τρόπον αὐτῆς. ἔστι δ' οὗτος ὁ παρὰ τὰς περιστάσεις καλούμενος, περιστάσεις λεγόντων ἡμῶν τὰς διαθέσεις. θεωρεῖσθαι δ' αὐτόν φαμεν ἐν τῷ κατὰ φύσιν ἢ παρὰ φύσιν <ἔχειν>,¹ ἐν τῷ ἐγρηγορέναι ἢ καθεύδειν, παρὰ τὰς ἡλικίας, παρὰ τὸ κινεῖσθαι ἢ ἡρεμεῖν, παρὰ τὸ μισεῖν ἢ φιλεῖν, παρὰ τὸ ἐνδεεῖς εἶναι ἢ κεκορεσμένους, παρὰ τὸ μεθύειν ἢ νήφειν, παρὰ τὰς προδιαθέσεις, παρὰ τὸ θαρρεῖν ἢ δεδιέναι, [ἦ] 101 παρὰ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἢ χαίρειν. οἷον παρὰ μὲν τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἢ παρὰ φύσιν ἔχειν ἀνόμοια ὑποπίπτει τὰ πράγματα, ἐπεὶ οἱ μὲν φρενιτίζοντες καὶ οἱ θεοφορούμενοι δαιμόνων ἀκούειν δοκοῦσιν, ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐ. ὁμοίως δὲ ἀποφορᾶς στύρακος ἢ λιβανωτοῦ ἢ τινος τοιοῦτου καὶ ἄλλων πλείονων ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι πολλάκις λέγουσιν, ἡμῶν μὴ αἰσθανομένων. καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὕδωρ φλεγμαίνουσι μὲν τόποις ἐπιχυθὲν ζεστόν εἶναι δοκεῖ, ἡμῖν δὲ χλιαρόν. καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἱμάτιον τοῖς μὲν ὑπόσφαγμα ἔχουσι φαίνεται κερρόν, ἐμοὶ δὲ οὐ. καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ μέλι ἐμοὶ μὲν φαίνεται γλυκὺ, τοῖς δὲ ἰκτερικοῖς πικρόν. 102 εἰ δέ τις λέγει ὅτι χυμῶν τινῶν παραπλοκὴ ἀνοικεῖους φαντασίας ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ποιεῖ τοῖς παρὰ φύσιν ἔχουσι, λεκτέον ὅτι ἐπεὶ καὶ οἱ ὑγιαίνοντες χυμοὺς ἔχουσιν ἀνακεκραμένους, δύνανται οὗτοι τὰ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενα, τοιαῦτα ὄντα φύσει ὅποια φαίνεται τοῖς παρὰ φύσιν ἔχον λεγομένοις, 103 ἕτεροῖα φαίνεσθαι ποιεῖν τοῖς ὑγιαίνουσιν. τὸ γὰρ ἐκείνοις μὲν τοῖς χυμοῖς μεταβλητικῆν τῶν ὑποκει-

¹ <ἔχειν> add. Mutsch.

basing our argument on each sense singly, or even by disregarding the senses, we further adopt the *Fourth Mode* of suspension. This is the Mode based, as we say, on the "circumstances," meaning by "circumstances" conditions or dispositions.^a And this Mode, we say, deals with states that are natural or unnatural, with waking or sleeping, with conditions due to age, motion or rest, hatred or love, emptiness or fullness, drunkenness or soberness, predispositions, confidence or fear, grief or joy. Thus, according as 101 the mental state is natural or unnatural, objects produce dissimilar impressions, as when men in a frenzy or in a state of ecstasy believe they hear daemons' voices, while we do not. Similarly they often say that they perceive an odour of storax or frankincense, or some such scent, and many other things, though we fail to perceive them. Also, the same water which feels very hot when poured on inflamed spots seems lukewarm to us. And the same coat which seems of a bright yellow colour to men with blood-shot eyes does not appear so to me. And the same honey seems to me sweet, but bitter to men with jaundice. Now 102 should anyone say that it is an intermixture of certain humours which produces in those who are in an unnatural state improper impressions from the underlying objects, we have to reply that, since healthy persons also have mixed humours, these humours too are capable of causing the external objects—which really are such as they appear to those who are said to be in an unnatural state—to appear other than they are to healthy persons. For to ascribe the power of 103

^a *i.e.* the mental or physical state of the subject at the moment of perception.

μένων διδόναι δύναμιν, τούτοις δὲ μὴ, πλασματικόν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ ὡσπερ οἱ ὑγιαίνοντες κατὰ φύσιν μὲν τὴν τῶν ὑγιαίνοντων ἔχουσι παρὰ φύσιν δὲ τὴν τῶν νοσοῦντων, οὕτω καὶ οἱ νοσοῦντες παρὰ φύσιν μὲν ἔχουσι τὴν τῶν ὑγιαίνοντων κατὰ φύσιν δὲ τὴν τῶν νοσοῦντων, ὥστε ἀκείνοις πρὸς τι κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσι πιστευτέον.

104 Παρὰ δὲ τὸ ὑπνοῦν ἢ ἐγρηγορέναι διάφοροι γίνονται φαντασίαι, ἐπεὶ ὡς καθ' ὑπνους φανταζόμεθα, οὐ φανταζόμεθα ἐγρηγορότες, οὐδὲ ὡς φανταζόμεθα ἐγρηγορότες, καὶ κατὰ τοὺς ὑπνους φανταζόμεθα, ὥστε <τὸ>¹ εἶναι αὐταῖς² ἢ μὴ εἶναι γίνεται οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρὸς τι· πρὸς γὰρ τὸ καθ' ὑπνους ἢ πρὸς ἐγρήγορσιν. εἰκότως οὖν καθ' ὑπνους ὁρῶμεν ταῦτα ἃ ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ἐγρηγορέναι ἀνύπαρκτα, οὐκ ἐν τῷ καθάπαξ ἀνύπαρκτα ὄντα· ἐστὶ γὰρ καθ' ὑπνους, ὡσπερ τὰ ὑπάρ ἐστὶν, καὶ μὴ ἢ καθ' ὑπνους.

105 Παρὰ δὲ τὰς ἡλικίας, ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς ἀπὸ τοῖς μὲν γέρονσι ψυχρὸς εἶναι δοκεῖ τοῖς δὲ ἀκμάζουσιν εὐκρατος, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ χρῶμα τοῖς μὲν πρεσβυτέροις ἀμαυρὸν φαίνεται τοῖς δὲ ἀκμάζουσιν κατακορές, καὶ φωνὴ ὁμοίως ἢ αὐτῇ τοῖς μὲν ἀμαυρὰ
106 δοκεῖ τυγχάνειν τοῖς δ' ἐξάκουστος. καὶ παρὰ τὰς αἰρέσεις δὲ καὶ φυγὰς ἀνομοίως κινεῖνται οἱ ταῖς ἡλικίαις διαφέροντες· πασι μὲν γάρ, εἰ τύχοι, σφαῖραι καὶ τροχοὶ διὰ σπουδῆς εἰσὶν, οἱ ἀκμάζοντες δὲ ἄλλα αἰροῦνται, καὶ ἄλλα οἱ γέροντες. ἐξ ὧν συνάγεται ὅτι διάφοροι γίνονται φαντασίαι ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ὑποκειμένων καὶ παρὰ τὰς διαφορὰς ἡλικίας.

¹ <τὸ> cj. Mutsch. ² αὐταῖς Apelt: αὐτοῖς mss., Bekk.

altering the underlying objects to those humours, and not to these, is purely fanciful; since just as healthy men are in a state that is natural for the healthy but unnatural for the sick, so also sick men are in a state that is unnatural for the healthy but natural for the sick, so that to these last also we must give credence as being, relatively speaking, in a natural state.^a

Sleeping and waking, too, give rise to different 104 impressions, since we do not imagine when awake what we imagine in sleep, nor when asleep what we imagine when awake; so that the existence or non-existence of our impressions is not absolute but relative, being in relation to our sleeping or waking condition. Probably, then, in dreams we see things which to our waking state are unreal,^b although not wholly unreal; for they exist in our dreams, just as waking realities exist although non-existent in dreams.

Age is another cause of difference.^c For the same 105 air seems chilly to the old but mild to those in their prime; and the same colour appears faint to older men but vivid to those in their prime; and similarly the same sound seems to the former faint, but to the latter clearly audible. Moreover, those who differ in 106 age are differently moved in respect of choice and avoidance. For whereas children—to take a case—are all eagerness for balls and hoops, men in their prime choose other things, and old men yet others. And from this we conclude that differences in age also cause different impressions to be produced by the same underlying objects.

^a This is aimed against the Stoic view that only the healthy, or normal, is "natural."

^b ἀνύπαρκτα (from ὑπάρχω, "subsist") is an Epicurean term for "non-existent."

^c For age as affecting character cf. Aristot. *Rhet.* ii. 12 ff.

107 Παρὰ δὲ τὸ κινεῖσθαι ἢ ἡρεμεῖν ἀνόμοια φαίνεται τὰ πράγματα, ἐπεὶ ἅπερ ἐστῶτες ὀρώμεν ἀτρεμοῦντα, ταῦτα παραπλέοντες κινεῖσθαι δοκοῦ-
108 μεν. παρὰ δὲ τὸ φιλεῖν ἢ μισεῖν, ὅτι κρέα ὕεια τινὲς μὲν ἀποστρέφονται καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τινὲς δὲ ἥδιστα προσφέρονται. ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Μένανδρος ἔφη

οἶος δὲ καὶ τὴν ὄψιν εἶναι φαίνεται;
ἀφ' οὗ τοιοῦτος γέγονεν; οἶον θηρίον.
τὸ μηδὲν ἀδικεῖν καὶ καλοὺς ἡμᾶς ποιεῖ.

πολλοὶ <δὲ>¹ καὶ ἐρωμένες αἰσχρὰς ἔχοντες ὠραιο-
109 τάτας αὐτὰς εἶναι δοκοῦσιν. παρὰ δὲ τὸ πεινῆν ἢ κεκορέσθαι, ὅτι τὸ αὐτὸ ἔδεσμα τοῖς μὲν πεινώσιν ἥδιστον εἶναι δοκεῖ τοῖς δὲ κεκορεσμένοις ἀηδές. παρὰ δὲ τὸ μεθύειν ἢ νήφειν, ὅτι ἅπερ νήφοντες αἰσχρὰ εἶναι δοκοῦμεν, ταῦτα ἡμῖν με-
110 θύουσιν οὐκ αἰσχρὰ φαίνεται. παρὰ δὲ τὰς προδιαθέσεις, ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς οἶνος τοῖς μὲν φοίνικας ἢ ἰσχάδας προφαγοῦσιν ὀξύωδης φαίνεται, τοῖς δὲ κάρνα ἢ ἐρεβίνθους προσενεγκαμένοις ἡδὺς εἶναι δοκεῖ, καὶ ἢ τοῦ βαλανείου παραστὰς τοὺς μὲν ἔξωθεν εἰσιόντας θερμαίνει, ψύχει δὲ τοὺς ἐξιόντας,
111 εἰ ἐν αὐτῇ διατρίβουεν. παρὰ δὲ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι ἢ θαρρεῖν, ὅτι τὸ αὐτὸ πρᾶγμα τῷ μὲν δειλῷ φοβερόν καὶ δεινὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ, τῷ θαρραλωτέρῳ δὲ οὐδαμῶς. παρὰ δὲ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἢ χαίρειν, ὅτι τὰ αὐτὰ πράγματα τοῖς μὲν λυπουμένοις ἐστὶν ἐπαχθῆ τοῖς δὲ χαίρουσιν ἡδέα.

¹ <δὲ> cj. Bekk.

* Cf. Lucret. iv. 388.

^b *Fragm.* 518 (Kock). It is supposed that these lines were spoken by a maiden of her lover who had fallen into evil ways.

Another cause why the real objects appear different 107 lies in motion and rest. For those objects which, when we are standing still, we see to be motionless, we imagine to be in motion when we are sailing past them.^a

Love and hatred are a cause, as when some have 108 an extreme aversion to pork while others greatly enjoy eating it. Hence, too, Menander said ^b:

Mark now his visage, what a change is there
Since he has come to this! How bestial!
^c'Tis actions fair that make the fairest face.

Many lovers, too, who have ugly mistresses think them most beautiful.^c

Hunger and satiety are a cause; for the same food 109 seems agreeable to the hungry but disagreeable to the sated.

Drunkenness and soberness are a cause; since actions which we think shameful when sober do not seem shameful to us when drunk.

Predispositions are a cause; for the same wine 110 which seems sour to those who have previously eaten dates or figs, seems sweet to those who have just consumed nuts or chick-peas; and the vestibule^d of the bath-house, which warms those entering from outside, chills those coming out of the bath-room if they stop long in it.

Fear and boldness are a cause; as what seems to 111 the coward fearful and formidable does not seem so in the least to the bold man.

Grief and joy are a cause; since the same affairs are burdensome to those in grief but delightful to those who rejoice.

^c Cf. Horace, *Sat.* i. 3. 38.

^d i.e. the *tepidarium*, of moderate temperature.

- 112 Τοσαύτης οὖν οὔσης ἀνωμαλίας καὶ παρὰ τὰς
 διαθέσεις, καὶ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως¹ ἐν ταῖς διαθέσεσι
 τῶν ἀνθρώπων γνωσμένων, ὅποιον μὲν ἕκαστον
 τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἐκάστω φαίνεται ῥάδιον ἴσως
 εἶπεῖν, ὅποιον δὲ ἔστιν οὐκέτι, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀνεπίκριτός
 ἔστιν ἡ ἀνωμαλία. ὁ γὰρ ἐπικρίνων ταύτην ἤτοι
 ἐν τισι τῶν προειρημένων διαθέσεων ἔστιν ἢ ἐν
 οὐδεμῇ τὸ παράπαν ἔστι διαθέσει. τὸ μὲν οὖν
 λέγειν ὅτι ἐν οὐδεμῇ διαθέσει τὸ σύνολόν ἐστιν,
 οἷον οὔτε ὑγιαίνει οὔτε νοσεῖ, οὔτε κινεῖται οὔτε
 ἡρεμεῖ, οὔτε ἐν τινι ἡλικίᾳ ἐστίν, ἀπήλλακται δὲ
 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων διαθέσεων, τελῶς ἀπεμφαίνεται.
 εἰ δὲ ἐν τινι διαθέσει ὦν κρινεῖ τὰς φαντασίας,
 113 μέρος ἔσται τῆς διαφωνίας, καὶ ἄλλως οὐκ εἰλι-
 κρινῆς τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων ἐστὶ κριτῆς διὰ τὸ
 τεθλωσθαι ταῖς διαθέσεσιν ἐν αἷς ἔστιν. οὔτε
 οὖν ὁ ἐγρηγορῶς δύναται συγκρίνειν τὰς τῶν
 καθευδόντων φαντασίας ταῖς τῶν ἐγρηγορότων,
 οὔτε ὁ ὑγιαίνων τὰς τῶν νοσοῦντων ταῖς² τῶν
 ὑγιαίνοντων· τοῖς γὰρ παροῦσι καὶ κινουσιν ἡμᾶς
 κατὰ τὸ παρὸν συγκατατιθέμεθα μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς
 μὴ παροῦσιν.
 114 Καὶ ἄλλως δὲ ἀνεπίκριτός ἐστιν ἡ τῶν τοιοῦτων
 φαντασιῶν ἀνωμαλία. ὁ γὰρ προκρίνων φαντασίαν
 φαντασίας καὶ περίστασιν περιστάσεως ἤτοι ἀκρι-
 τως καὶ ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως τοῦτο ποιεῖ ἢ κρίνων καὶ
 ἀποδεικνύς. ἀλλ' οὔτε ἄνευ τούτων, ἄπιστος γὰρ
 ἔσται, οὔτε σὺν τούτοις. εἰ γὰρ κρινεῖ τὰς φαν-
 115 τασίας, πάντως κριτηρίῳ κρινεῖ. τοῦτο οὖν τὸ

¹ ἄλλως MLT: ἄλλων Bekk.

² ταῖς T: καὶ τὰς mss., Bekk.

Seeing then that the dispositions also are the cause 112
 of so much disagreement, and that men are differently
 disposed at different times, although, no doubt, it is
 easy to say what nature each of the underlying objects
 appears to each man to possess, we cannot go on to
 say what its real nature is, since the disagreement
 admits in itself of no settlement. For the person who
 tries to settle it is either in one of the afore-mentioned
 dispositions or in no disposition whatsoever. But to
 declare that he is in no disposition at all—as, for
 instance, neither in health nor sickness, neither in
 motion nor at rest, of no definite age, and devoid of
 all the other dispositions as well—is the height of
 absurdity. And if he is to judge the sense-impressions
 while he is in some one disposition, he will be a
 party to the disagreement,^a and, moreover, he will 113
 not be an impartial judge of the external underlying
 objects owing to his being confused by the disposi-
 tions in which he is placed. The waking person, for
 instance, cannot compare the impressions of sleepers
 with those of men awake, nor the sound person those
 of the sick with those of the sound; for we assent
 more readily to things present, which affect us in the
 present, than to things not present.

In another way, too, the disagreement of such 114
 impressions is incapable of settlement. For he who
 prefers one impression to another, or one “circum-
 stance” to another, does so either uncritically and
 without proof or critically and with proof; but he
 can do this neither without these means (for then he
 would be discredited) nor with them. For if he is to
 pass judgement on the impressions he must certainly
 judge them by a criterion; this criterion, then, he 115

^a Cf. § 90.

κριτήριον ἤτοι ἀληθές εἶναι λέξει ἢ ψευδές. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ψευδές, ἄπιστος ἔσται. εἰ δὲ ἀληθές εἶναι τοῦτο φήσει, ἤτοι ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως λέξει ὅτι ἀληθές ἐστὶ τὸ κριτήριον, ἢ μετὰ ἀποδείξεως. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως, ἄπιστος ἔσται· εἰ δὲ μετὰ ἀποδείξεως, πάντως δεήσει καὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἀληθῆ εἶναι, ἐπεὶ ἄπιστος ἔσται. ἀληθῆ οὖν λέξει τὴν ἀπόδειξιν τὴν εἰς τὴν πίστωσιν τοῦ κριτηρίου λαμβανομένην πότερον κεκρικῶς αὐτὴν
 116 ἢ μὴ κεκρικῶς; εἰ μὲν γὰρ μὴ κρίνας, ἄπιστος ἔσται, εἰ δὲ κρίνας, δηλὸν ὅτι κριτηρίῳ φήσει κεκρικῆναι, οὐ κριτηρίου ζητήσομεν ἀπόδειξιν, κἀκείνης κριτήριον. χρῆζει γὰρ αἰεὶ καὶ ἢ ἀποδείξεις κριτηρίου, ἵνα βεβαιωθῆ, καὶ τὸ κριτήριον ἀποδείξεως, ἵνα ἀληθές εἶναι δειχθῆ· καὶ οὔτε ἀποδείξεις ὑγιῆς εἶναι δύναται μὴ προϋπάρχοντος κριτηρίου ἀληθοῦς, οὔτε κριτήριον ἀληθές μὴ προ-
 117 πεπιστωμένης τῆς ἀποδείξεως. καὶ οὕτως ἐμπίπτουσιν εἰς τὸν διάλληλον τρόπον τὸ τε κριτήριον καὶ ἢ ἀποδείξεις, ἐν ᾧ ἀμφοτέρωθεν εὐρίσκειται ἄπιστα· ἐκάτερον γὰρ τὴν θατέρον πίστιν περιμένον ὁμοίως τῷ λοιπῷ ἐστὶν ἄπιστον. εἰ οὖν μήτε ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως καὶ κριτηρίου μήτε σὺν τούτοις δύναται τις προκρίναι φαντασίαν φαντασίας, ἀνεπίκριτοι ἔσονται αἱ παρὰ τὰς διαφορὰς διαθέσεις διάφοροι γινόμεναι φαντασίαι, ὥστε εἰσάγεται ἢ περὶ τῆς φύσεως τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων ἐποχὴ καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ.
 118 Πέμπτος ἐστὶ λόγος ὁ παρὰ τὰς θέσεις καὶ τὰ διαστήματα καὶ τοὺς τόπους· καὶ γὰρ παρὰ τούτων ἕκαστον τὰ αὐτὰ πράγματα διάφορα φαίνεται, οἷον

will declare to be true, or else false. But if false, he will be discredited; whereas, if he shall declare it to be true, he will be stating that the criterion is true either without proof or with proof. But if without proof, he will be discredited; and if with proof, it will certainly be necessary for the proof also to be true, to avoid being discredited. Shall he, then, affirm the truth of the proof adopted to establish the criterion after having judged it or without judging it? If 116 without judging, he will be discredited; but if after judging, plainly he will say that he has judged it by a criterion; and of that criterion we shall ask for a proof, and of that proof again a criterion. For the proof always requires a criterion to confirm it, and the criterion also a proof to demonstrate its truth; and neither can a proof be sound without the previous existence of a true criterion nor can the criterion be true without the previous confirmation of the proof. So in this way both the criterion and the proof are 117 involved in the circular process of reasoning,^a and thereby both are found to be untrustworthy; for since each of them is dependent on the credibility of the other, the one is lacking in credibility just as much as the other. Consequently, if a man can prefer one impression to another neither without a proof and a criterion nor with them, then the different impressions due to the differing conditions will admit of no settlement; so that as a result of this Mode also we are brought to suspend judgement regarding the nature of external realities.

The *Fifth Argument* (or *Trope*) is that based on 118 positions, distances, and locations; for owing to each of these the same objects appear different; for

^a Cf. §§ 60, 122; ii. 34, 121, etc.

ἡ αὐτὴ στοὰ ἀπὸ μὲν τῆς ἐτέρας ἀρχῆς ὀρωμένη μύουρος φαίνεται ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ μέσου σύμμετρος πάντοθεν, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πλοῖον πόρρωθεν μὲν μικρὸν φαίνεται καὶ ἐστὼς ἐγγύθεν δὲ μέγα καὶ κινούμενον, καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς πύργος πόρρωθεν μὲν φαίνεται στρογγύλος ἐγγύθεν δὲ τετραγώνος.

119 Ταῦτα μὲν παρὰ τὰ διαστήματα, παρὰ δὲ τοὺς τόπους ὅτι τὸ λυχνιαῖον φῶς ἐν ἡλίῳ μὲν ἀμαυρὸν φαίνεται ἐν σκοτῶν δὲ λαμπρὸν, καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ κώπη ἕναλος μὲν κεκλασμένη ἕξαλος δὲ εὐθεῖα, καὶ τὸ ὦν ἐν μὲν τῇ ὄρνιθι ἀπαλὸν ἐν ἀέρι δὲ σκληρόν, καὶ τὸ λυγγούριον ἐν μὲν λυγγί ὑγρὸν ἐν ἀέρι δὲ σκληρόν, καὶ τὸ κοράλιον ἐν θαλάττῃ μὲν ἀπαλὸν ἐν ἀέρι δὲ σκληρόν, καὶ φωνὴ ἀλλοία μὲν φαίνεται ἐν σύριγγι γνωμένη, ἀλλοία δὲ ἐν αὐλῶ, ἀλλοία δὲ ἐν ἀέρι ἀπλῶς.

120 Παρὰ δὲ τὰς θέσεις ὅτι ἡ αὐτὴ εἰκὼν ἐξυπτιαζομένη μὲν λεία φαίνεται, ποσῶς δὲ ἐπινευομένη εἰσοχὰς καὶ ἐξοχὰς ἔχειν δοκεῖ. καὶ οἱ τράχηλοι δὲ τῶν περιστερῶν παρὰ τὰς διαφόρους ἐπικλίσεις διάφοροι φαίνονται κατὰ χρῶμα.

121 Ἐπεὶ οὖν πάντα τὰ φαινόμενα ἐν τινι θεωρεῖται καὶ ἀπὸ τινος διαστήματος ἢ κατὰ τινὰ θέσιν, ὧν ἕκαστον πολλὴν ποιεῖ παραλλαγὴν περὶ τὰς φαντασίας, ὡς ὑπεμνήσαμεν, ἀναγκασθησόμεθα καὶ διὰ τούτου τοῦ τρόπου καταστῆναι εἰς ἐποχὴν. καὶ γὰρ ὁ βουλόμενος τούτων τῶν φαντασιῶν προ-
122 κρίνειν τινὰς ἀδυνάτους ἐπιχειρήσει. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως ποιήσεται τὴν ἀπόφασιν,

^a Cf. Lucret. iv. 428 ff.

^b "Lyngurion," so called from the belief that the stone was made of the urine of the lynx frozen or crystallized.

example, the same porch ^a when viewed from one of its corners appears curtailed, but viewed from the middle symmetrical on all sides; and the same ship seems at a distance to be small and stationary, but from close at hand large and in motion; and the same tower from a distance appears round but from a near point quadrangular.

These effects are due to distances; among effects due to locations are the following: the light of a lamp appears dim in the sun but bright in the dark; and the same oar bent when in the water but straight when out of the water; and the egg soft when inside the fowl but hard when in the air; and the jacinth ^b fluid when in the lynx but hard when in the air; and the coral soft when in the sea but hard when in the air; and sound seems to differ in quality according as it is produced in a pipe, or in a flute, or simply in the air.

Effects due to positions are such as these: the same painting when laid flat appears smooth, but when inclined forward at a certain angle it seems to have recesses and prominences. The necks of doves, also, appear different in hue according to the differences in the angle of inclination.

Since, then, all apparent objects are viewed in a certain place, and from a certain distance, or in a certain position, and each of these conditions produces a great divergency in the sense-impressions, as we mentioned above, we shall be compelled by this Mode also to end up in suspension of judgement. For in fact anyone who purposes to give the preference to any of these impressions will be attempting the impossible. For if he shall deliver his judgement simply and without proof, he will be discredited; and

ἄπιστος ἔσται· εἰ δὲ ἀποδείξει βουλήσεται χρήσασθαι, εἰ μὲν ψευδῆ λέξει τὴν ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι, ἑαυτὸν περιτρέψει, ἀληθῆ δὲ λέγων εἶναι τὴν ἀπόδειξιν αἰτηθήσεται ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ ἀληθῆ αὐτὴν εἶναι, κακένης ἄλλην, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὴν ἀληθῆ εἶναι δεῖ, καὶ μέχρις ἀπείρου· ἀδύνατον δὲ ἔστιν ἀ-

123 πείρους ἀποδείξεις παραστήσαι· οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ μετὰ ἀποδείξεως δυνήσεται προκρίνειν φαντασίαν φαντασίας. εἰ δὲ μήτε ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως μήτε μετὰ ἀποδείξεως δυνατὸς ἔσται τις ἐπικρίνειν τὰς προειρημένας φαντασίας, συνάγεται ἢ ἐποχή, ὅποιον μὲν φαίνεται ἕκαστον κατὰ τήνδε τὴν θέσιν ἢ κατὰ τὸδε τὸ διάστημα ἢ ἐν τῷδε εἰπεῖν ἴσως δυναμένων ἡμῶν, ὅποιον δὲ ἔστιν ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ἀδυνατούντων ἀποφαίνεσθαι διὰ τὰ προειρημένα.

124 Ἐκτός ἐστὶ τρόπος ὁ παρὰ τὰς ἐπιμιγὰς, καθ' ὃν συνάγομεν ὅτι ἐπεὶ μηδὲν τῶν ὑποκειμένων καθ' ἑαυτὸ ἡμῖν αὐτὸ ὑποπίπτει ἀλλὰ σὺν τινι, ὅποιον μὲν ἔστι τὸ μίγμα ἕκ τε τοῦ ἐκτός καὶ τοῦ ᾧ συνθεωρεῖται τάχα δυνατόν εἰπεῖν, ὅποιον δὲ ἔστι τὸ ἐκτός ὑποκείμενον εἰλικρινῶς οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμεν λέγειν. ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲν τῶν ἐκτός καθ' ἑαυτὸ ὑποπίπτει ἀλλὰ πάντως σὺν τινι, καὶ ὅτι παρὰ τοῦτο ἄλλοιον θεω-

125 ρεῖται, πρόδηλον, οἶμαι. τὸ γοῦν ἡμέτερον χρώμα ἄλλοιον μὲν ὁράται ἐν ἀλεσιῶ ἀέρι ἄλλοιον δὲ ἐν τῷ ψυχρῷ, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμεν εἰπεῖν ὅποιον ἔστι τῇ φύσει τὸ χρώμα ἡμῶν, ἀλλ' ὅποιον σὺν

^a Cf. ii. 128.

^b i.e. the real ("external") object of perception (cf. p. 30 note a) plus the physical conditions which accompany the act of perception; these latter may be either external (e.g.

should he, on the other hand, desire to adduce proof, he will confute himself if he says that the proof is false, while if he asserts that the proof is true he will be asked for a proof of its truth, and again for a proof of this latter proof, since it also must be true, and so on *ad infinitum*.^a But to produce proofs to infinity is impossible; so that neither by the use of proofs will 123 he be able to prefer one sense-impression to another. If, then, one cannot hope to pass judgement on the afore-mentioned impressions either with or without proof, the conclusion we are driven to is suspension; for while we can, no doubt, state the nature which each object appears to possess as viewed in a certain position or at a certain distance or in a certain place, what its real nature is we are, for the foregoing reasons, unable to declare.

The *Sixth Mode* is that based on admixtures, by 124 which we conclude that, because none of the real objects affects our senses by itself but always in conjunction with something else, though we may possibly be able to state the nature of the resultant mixture^b formed by the external object and that along with which it is perceived, we shall not be able to say what is the exact nature of the external reality in itself. That none of the external objects affects our senses by itself but always in conjunction with something else, and that, in consequence, it assumes a different appearance, is, I imagine, quite obvious. Thus, our own complexion is of one hue 125 in warm air, of another in cold, and we should not be able to say what our complexion really is, but only what it looks like in conjunction with each of

atmospheric) or internal (e.g. peculiarities in the sense-organs of the percipient).

ἐκάστῳ τούτων θεωρεῖται. καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ φωνὴ ἄλλοια μὲν φαίνεται σὺν λεπτῷ ἀέρι ἄλλοια δὲ σὺν παχυμερεῖ, καὶ τὰ ἀρώματα ἐν βαλανείῳ καὶ ἥλιῳ πληκτικώτερα μᾶλλον ἔστιν ἢ ἐν ἀέρι καταψύχρῳ, καὶ τὸ σῶμα ὑπὸ ὕδατος μὲν περιεχόμενον κοῦφόν ἔστιν ὑπὸ δὲ ἀέρος βαρύ.

126 Ἴνα δὲ καὶ τῆς ἕξωθεν ἐπιμιξίας ἀποστῶμεν, οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ ἡμῶν ἔχουσιν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς καὶ χιτῶνας καὶ ὑγρά. τὰ οὖν ὄρατὰ ἐπεὶ μὴ ἀνευ τούτων θεωρεῖται, οὐ καταληφθήσεται πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν· τοῦ γὰρ μίγματος ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οἱ μὲν ἰκτερικοὶ πάντα ὠχρὰ ὀρώσιν, οἱ δ' ὑπόσφαγμα ἔχοντες ὑφαίμα. καὶ ἐπεὶ ἡ φωνὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἄλλοια μὲν φαίνεται ἐν ἀναπεπταμένοις τόποις ἄλλοια δὲ ἐν στενοῖς καὶ ἐλικοειδέσι, καὶ ἄλλοια μὲν ἐν καθαρῷ ἀέρι ἄλλοια δὲ ἐν τεθολωμένῳ, εἰκὸς ἔστι μὴ ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι ἡμᾶς εἰλικρινῶς τῆς φωνῆς· τὰ γὰρ ὠτα σκολιόπορά ἐστι καὶ στενόπορα καὶ ἀτμώδεσιν ἀποφορήσεσιν, αἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν περὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν φέρεσθαι λέγονται τόπων, τεθολωμένα.

127 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς μυξωτήρσι καὶ ἐν τοῖς τῆς γεύσεως τόποις ὑλῶν ὑποκειμένων, μετ' ἐκείνων ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα τῶν γενεσῶν καὶ τῶν ὀσφρητῶν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰλικρινῶς. ὥστε διὰ τὰς ἐπιμιξίας αἱ αἰσθήσεις οὐκ ἀντιλαμβάνονται ὅποια πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν τὰ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενα ἔστιν.

128 Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἡ διάνοια, μάλιστα μὲν ἐπεὶ αἱ ὀδηγοὶ αὐτῆς αἰσθήσεις σφάλονται· ἴσως δὲ καὶ αὐτὴ ἐπιμίξιν τινὰ ἰδίαν ποιεῖται πρὸς τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἀναγγελλόμενα· περὶ γὰρ ἕκαστον τῶν τόπων ἐν οἷς τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν εἶναι δοκοῦσιν οἱ

these conditions. And the same sound appears of one sort in conjunction with rare air and of another sort with dense air; and odours are more pungent in a hot bath-room or in the sun than in chilly air; and a body is light when immersed in water but heavy when surrounded by air.

But to pass on from the subject of external ad- 126 mixture,—our eyes contain within themselves both membranes and liquids. Since, then, the objects of vision are not perceived apart from these, they will not be apprehended with exactness; for what we perceive is the resultant mixture, and because of this the sufferers from jaundice see everything yellow, and those with blood-shot eyes reddish like blood.^a And since the same sound seems of one quality in open places, of another in narrow and winding places, and different in clear air and in murky air, it is probable that we do not apprehend the sound in its real purity; for the ears have crooked and narrow passages, which are also befogged by vaporous effluvia which are said to be emitted by the regions of the head. Moreover, since there reside substances in the 127 nostrils and in the organs of taste, we apprehend the objects of taste and of smell in conjunction with these and not in their real purity. So that, because of these admixtures, the senses do not apprehend the exact quality of the external real objects.

Nor yet does the mind apprehend it, since, in the 128 first place, its guides, which are the senses, go wrong; and probably, too, the mind itself adds a certain admixture of its own to the messages conveyed by the senses; for we observe that there are certain humours present in each of the regions which the Dogmatists

^a Cf. §§ 44, 101 *supra*.

δογματικοί, χυμούς τινας ὑποκειμένους θεωροῦμεν, εἴτε περὶ ἐγκέφαλον εἴτε περὶ καρδίαν εἴτε περὶ ὀτιδίηποτε οὖν μέρος τοῦ ζώου τοῦτο τίθεσθαι βούλοιτό τις. καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον οὖν τὸν τρόπον ὀράμεν ὅτι περὶ τῆς φύσεως τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν ἔχοντες ἐπέχειν ἀναγκαζόμεθα.

- 129 Ἐβδομον τρόπον ἐλέγομεν εἶναι τὸν παρὰ τὰς ποσότητας καὶ σκευασίας τῶν ὑποκειμένων, σκευασίας λέγοντες κοινῶς τὰς συνθέσεις. ὅτι δὲ καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἐπέχειν ἀναγκαζόμεθα περὶ τῆς φύσεως τῶν πραγμάτων, δῆλον. οἷον γοῦν τὰ ξέσματα τοῦ κέρατος τῆς αἰγὸς φαίνεται μὲν λευκὰ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἄνευ συνθέσεως θεωρούμενα, συντιθέμενα δὲ ἐν τῇ τοῦ κέρατος ὑπάρξει μέλανα θεωρεῖται. καὶ τοῦ ἀργύρου [τὰ μέρη]¹ τὰ ῥινήματα κατ' ἴδιαν μὲν ὄντα μέλανα φαίνεται, σὺν δὲ τῷ ὄλῳ ὡς λευκὰ ὑποπίπτει. καὶ τῆς Ταυναρείας λίθου τὰ μὲν μέρη λευκὰ ὀράται ὅταν λεανθῇ, σὺν δὲ τῇ ὀλοσχερεῖ ξανθὰ φαίνεται. καὶ αἱ ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ἐσκεδασμένοι ψάμμοι τραχεῖαι φαίνονται, ὡς σωρὸς δὲ συντεθεῖσαι ἀπαλῶς κινουσί τὴν αἰσθησιν. καὶ ὁ ἐλλέβορος λεπτὸς μὲν καὶ χροῴδης προσφερόμενος πνιγμὸν ἐπιφέρει, κριμνώδης δὲ ὡν οὐκ ἐπι. καὶ ὁ οἶνος σύμμετρος μὲν πινόμενος ῥώννυσιν ἡμᾶς, πλείων δὲ λαμβανόμενος παραλύει τὸ σῶμα. καὶ ἡ τροφή παραπλησίως παρὰ τὴν ποσότητα διάφορον ἐπιδείκνυται δύναμιν· πολλάκις γοῦν διὰ τὸ πολλὴν προσενεχθῆναι καθαιρεῖ τὸ σῶμα

¹ [τὰ μέρη] secl. Mutsch.

* For the Stoic ἡγεμονικόν see Introd. p. xxv; for the dispute as to its location cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 313.

regard as the seat of the "Ruling Principle" ^a— whether it be the brain or the heart, or in whatever part of the creature one chooses to locate it. Thus, according to this Mode also we see that, owing to our inability to make any statement about the real nature of external objects, we are compelled to suspend judgement.

The *Seventh Mode* is that based, as we said, on the quantity and constitution of the underlying objects, meaning generally by "constitution" the manner of composition. And it is evident that by this Mode also we are compelled to suspend judgement concerning the real nature of the objects. Thus, for example, the filings of a goat's horn appear white when viewed simply by themselves and without combination, but when combined in the substance of the horn they look black. And silver filings appear black when they are by themselves, but when united to the whole mass they are sensed as white. And chips of the marble of Taenarum ^b seem white when planed, but in combination with the whole block they appear yellow. And pebbles when scattered apart appear rough, but when combined in a heap they produce the sensation of softness. And hellebore if applied in a fine and powdery state produces suffocation, but not so when it is coarse. And wine strengthens us when drunk in moderate quantity, but when too much is taken it paralyses the body. So likewise food exhibits different effects according to the quantity consumed; for instance, it frequently upsets the body with indigestion and attacks of purging because

^b Taenarum was the most southerly promontory of Laconia; its marble was yellowish green in colour (like serpentinite).

- 132 *διὰ τε ἀπεισιῶν καὶ χολερικῶν παθῶν. ἔξομεν οὖν κἀνταῦθα λέγειν ὁποῖόν ἐστι τοῦ κέρατος τὸ λεπτόν καὶ ὁποῖον τὸ ἐκ πολλῶν λεπτομερῶν συγκείμενον, καὶ ὁποῖος μὲν ἐστὶν ὁ μικρομερῆς ἄργυρος ὁποῖος δὲ ὁ ἐκ πολλῶν μικρομερῶν συγκείμενος, καὶ ὁποῖα μὲν ἢ ἀκαριαία Ταυναρεία λίθος ὁποῖα δὲ ἢ ἐκ πολλῶν μικρῶν συγκειμένη, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ψάμμων καὶ τοῦ ἔλλεβόρου καὶ τοῦ οἴνου καὶ τῆς τροφῆς τὸ πρὸς τι, τὴν μέντοι φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων καθ' ἑαυτὴν οὐκέτι διὰ τὴν παρὰ τὰς συνθέσεις τῶν φαντασιῶν ἀνωμαλίαν.*
- 133 *Καθόλου γὰρ δοκεῖ καὶ τὰ ὠφέλιμα λυπηρὰ γίνεσθαι παρὰ τὴν κατὰ ποσότητα ἀμετρον αὐτῶν χρῆσιν, καὶ τὰ βλαβερὰ εἶναι δοκοῦντα ἐν τῷ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν παραλαμβάνεσθαι ἀκαριαῖα μὴ λυπεῖν. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ μάλιστα τὸ κατὰ τὰς ἰατρικὰς δυνάμεις θεωρούμενον, ἐν αἷς ἢ μὲν πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν μίξις τῶν ἀπλῶν φαρμάκων ὠφέλιμον ποιεῖ τὸ συντεθέν, ῥοπής δὲ βραχυτάτης ἐνίοτε παροραθείσης οὐ μόνον οὐκ ὠφέλιμον ἀλλὰ καὶ βλαβερώτατον*
- 134 *καὶ δηλητήριον πολλάκις. οὕτως ὁ κατὰ τὰς ποσότητος καὶ σκευασίας λόγος συγχεῖ τὴν τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων ὑπαρξίν. διόπερ εἰκότως ἂν καὶ οὗτος ὁ τρόπος εἰς ἐποχὴν ἡμᾶς περιάγοι μὴ δυναμένους εὐλικρινῶς ἀποφύνασθαι περὶ τῆς φύσεως τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων.*
- 135 *Ὁ γδοός ἐστι τρόπος ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρὸς τι, καθ' ὃν συνάγομεν ὅτι ἐπεὶ πάντα ἐστὶ πρὸς τι, περὶ τοῦ τίνα ἐστὶν ἀπολύτως καὶ ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ἐφέξομεν. ἐκείνο δὲ χρῆ γινώσκειν ὅτι ἐνταῦθα, ὡσπερ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις, τῷ ἐστὶ καταχρώμεθα ἀντὶ*

of the large quantity taken. Therefore in these cases, too, we shall be able to describe the quality of the shaving of the horn and of the compound made up of many shavings, and that of the particle of silver and of the compound of many particles, and that of the sliver of Taenarean marble and of the compound of many such small pieces, and the relative qualities of the pebbles, the hellebore, the wine and the food,—but when it comes to the independent and real nature of the objects, this we shall be unable to describe because of the divergency in the sense-impressions which is due to the combinations.

As a general rule, it seems that wholesome things 133 become harmful when used in immoderate quantities, and things that seem hurtful when taken to excess cause no harm when in minute quantities. What we observe in regard to the effects of medicines is the best evidence in support of our statement; for there the exact blending of the simple drugs makes the compound wholesome, but when the slightest oversight is made in the measuring, as sometimes happens, the compound is not only unwholesome but frequently even most harmful and deleterious. Thus the argu- 134 ment from quantities and compositions causes confusion as to the real nature of the external substances. Probably, therefore, this Mode also will bring us round to suspension of judgement, as we are unable to make any absolute statement concerning the real nature of external objects.

The *Eighth Mode* is that based on relativity; and 135 by it we conclude that, since all things are relative, we shall suspend judgement as to what things are absolutely and really existent. But this point we must notice—that here as elsewhere we use the term

- τοῦ φαίνεται, δυνάμει τοῦτο λέγοντες “πρὸς τι πάντα φαίνεται.” τοῦτο δὲ διχῶς λέγεται, ἅπαξ μὲν ὡς πρὸς τὸ κρίνον (τὸ γὰρ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον καὶ κρινόμενον πρὸς τὸ κρίνον φαίνεται), καθ’ ἕτερον δὲ τρόπον πρὸς τὰ συνθεωρούμενα, ὡς τὸ
- 136 δεξιὸν πρὸς τὸ ἀριστερόν. ὅτι δὲ πάντα ἐστὶ πρὸς τι, ἐπελογισάμεθα μὲν καὶ ἔμπροσθεν, οἷον κατὰ τὸ κρίνον ὅτι πρὸς τόδε τὸ ζῶον καὶ τόνδε τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ τήνδε τὴν αἴσθησιν ἕκαστον φαίνεται, καὶ πρὸς τοιάνδε περίστασιν, κατὰ δὲ τὰ συνθεωρούμενα ὅτι πρὸς τήνδε τὴν ἐπιμιξίαν καὶ τόνδε τὸν τρόπον καὶ τὴν σύνθεσιν τήνδε καὶ τὴν ποσότητα καὶ τὴν θέσιν ἕκαστον φαίνεται.
- 137 Καὶ ἰδίᾳ δὲ ἐνδέχεται συνάγειν ὅτι πάντα ἐστὶ πρὸς τι, τόνδε τὸν τρόπον. πότερον διαφέρει τῶν πρὸς τι τὰ κατὰ διαφορὰν ἢ οὐ; εἰ μὲν οὐ διαφέρει, καὶ αὐτὰ πρὸς τι ἐστίν· εἰ δὲ διαφέρει, ἐπεὶ πᾶν τὸ διαφέρον πρὸς τι ἐστίν (λέγεται γὰρ πρὸς ἐκείνο
- 138 ὃ διαφέρει), πρὸς τί ἐστὶ τὰ κατὰ διαφορὰν. τῶν τε ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀνωτάτω γένη κατὰ τοὺς δογματικούς, τὰ δ’ ἔσχατα εἶδη, τὰ δὲ γένη καὶ εἶδη· πάντα δὲ ταῦτά ἐστι πρὸς τι· πάντα ἄρα ἐστὶ

* The main point urged here is that no object can be apprehended in its purity. As perceived it is always conditioned by (1) the physical or mental state of the percipient (“the thing which judges”), and (2) by the “concomitant percepts” which accompany its emergence into the world of space and time. As thus conditioned, the object is no longer “absolute” but “relative.”

^b Cf. § 39 *supra*.

^c Or “have a distinct existence of their own,” as opposed to a merely relative existence. This is a technical term for

“are” for the term “appear,” and what we virtually mean is “all things appear relative.” And this statement is twofold, implying, firstly, relation to the thing which judges (for the external object which is judged appears in relation to that thing), and, in a second sense, relation to the accompanying percepts, for instance the right side in relation to the left. Indeed, we have already argued ^b that all things are 136 relative—for example, with respect to the thing which judges, it is in relation to some one particular animal or man or sense that each object appears, and in relation to such and such a circumstance; and with respect to the concomitant percepts, each object appears in relation to some one particular admixture or mode or combination or quantity or position.

There are also special arguments to prove the 137 relativity of all things, in this way: Do things which exist “differentially” ^c differ from relative things or not? If they do not differ, then they too are relative; but if they differ, then, since everything which differs is relative to something (for it has its name from its relation to that from which it differs), things which exist differentially are relative. Again,—of existing 138 things some, according to the Dogmatists,^d are *summa genera*, others *infimae species*, others both genera and species; and all these are relative; the class of objects which are “self-existent,” “absolute,” or “independent.”

^d Including the Peripatetics, as well as the Stoics. A *summmum genus* (e.g. “Being”) may be divided into *genera* (e.g. “Animals,” “Minerals”), and these sub-divided into *species* (e.g. “Men,” “Dogs,” etc.), down to the *infimae species* (e.g. “Negroes”) which cannot be further subdivided. The intermediate species (e.g. “Men”) are both *genera* (in relation to their sub-species) and *species* (in relation to higher genera).

- πρός τι. ἔτι τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ πρόδηλα τὰ δὲ ἄδηλα, ὡς αὐτοὶ φασιν, καὶ σημαίνοντα μὲν τὰ φαινόμενα, σημαίνόμενα δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν φαινομένων τὰ ἄδηλα· ὅψις γὰρ κατ' αὐτοὺς τῶν ἀδήλων τὰ φαινόμενα. τὸ δὲ σημαῖνον καὶ τὸ σημαίνόμενόν ἐστὶ πρὸς τι· πρὸς τι ἄρα ἐστὶ πάντα. πρὸς 139 τούτοις τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν ὅμοια τὰ δὲ ἀνόμοια καὶ τὰ μὲν ἴσα τὰ δὲ ἄνισα· ταῦτα δὲ ἐστὶ πρὸς τι· πάντα ἄρα ἐστὶ πρὸς τι. καὶ ὁ λέγων δὲ μὴ πάντα εἶναι πρὸς τι βεβαιοὶ τὸ πάντα εἶναι πρὸς τι· καὶ αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ <μὴ>¹ εἶναι πάντα πρὸς τι πρὸς ἡμᾶς εἶναι δείκνυσι, καὶ οὐ καθόλου, δι' ὧν ἡμῖν ἐναντιοῦται.
- 140 Πλήν ἄλλ' οὕτω παριστάντων ἡμῶν ὅτι πάντα ἐστὶ πρὸς τι, δηλὸν ἐστὶ λοιπὸν ὅτι ὅποιον ἔστιν ἕκαστον τῶν ὑποκειμένων κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν καὶ εἰλικρινῶς λέγειν οὐ δυνασόμεθα, ἀλλ' ὅποιον φαίνεται ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι. ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ περὶ τῆς φύσεως τῶν πραγμάτων δεῖν ἡμᾶς ἐπέχειν.
- 141 Περὶ δὲ τοῦ κατὰ τὰς συνεχεῖς ἢ σπανίους συγκυρήσεις τρόπου, ὃν ἔννατον εἶναι λέγομεν τῇ τάξει, τοιαῦτά τινα διεξίμεν. ὁ ἥλιος πολλῶν δήπου ἐκπληκτικώτερός ἐστιν ἀστέρος κομήτου· ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τὸν μὲν ἥλιον συνεχῶς ὀρῶμεν τὸν δὲ κομήτην ἀστέρα σπανίως, ἐπὶ μὲν τῷ ἀστέρι ἐκπλησσομέθα ὥστε καὶ διοσημεῖαν αὐτὸν εἶναι δοκεῖν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ ἡλίῳ οὐδαμῶς. εἰάν μέντοι γε ἐνοήσωμεν τὸν ἥλιον σπανίως μὲν φαινόμενον σπανίως δὲ

¹ <μὴ> add. Papp.

therefore all things are relative. Further, some existing things are "pre-evident,"^a as they say, others non-evident; and the apparent things are significant, but the non-evident signified by the apparent; for according to them "the things apparent are the vision of the non-evident." But the significant and the signified are relative; therefore all things are relative. Moreover, some existent things are similar, 139 others dissimilar, and some equal, others unequal; and these are relative; therefore all things are relative. And even he who asserts that not all things are relative confirms the relativity of all things, since by his arguments against us he shows that the very statement "not all things are relative" is relative to ourselves, and not universal.

When, however, we have thus established that all 140 things are relative, we are plainly left with the conclusion that we shall not be able to state what is the nature of each of the objects in its own real purity, but only what nature it appears to possess in its relative character. Hence it follows that we must suspend judgement concerning the real nature of the objects.

The *Mode* which, as we said, comes *Ninth* in order 141 is based on constancy or rarity of occurrence, and we shall explain it as follows. The sun is, of course, much more amazing than a comet; yet because we see the sun constantly but the comet rarely we are so amazed by the comet that we even regard it as a divine portent, while the sun causes no amazement at all. If, however, we were to conceive of the sun as appearing but rarely and setting

^a i.e. superlatively, or wholly, manifest. Cf. *Adv. Log.* ii. 141.

- δυνόμενον, καὶ πάντα μὲν ἀθρόως φωτίζοντα πάντα δὲ ἐξαίφνης ἐπισκιάζεσθαι ποιούντα, πολλὴν ἔκ-
 142 πληξὶν ἐν τῷ πράγματι θεωρήσομεν. καὶ ὁ σεισ-
 μὸς δὲ οὐχ ὁμοίως θορυβεῖ τοὺς τε πρῶτον αὐτοῦ
 πειρωμένους καὶ τοὺς ἐν ἔθει τοῦτου γεγενημένους.
 πόσῃν δὲ ἔκπληξιν ἀνθρώπῳ φέρει θάλασσα πρῶ-
 τον ὀφθεῖσα. ἀλλὰ καὶ κάλλος σώματος ἀνθρω-
 πίνου πρῶτον καὶ ἐξαίφνης θεωρούμενον συγκινεῖ
 143 μᾶλλον ἡμᾶς ἢ εἰ ἐν ἔθει τοῦ ὁράσθαι γένοιτο.
 καὶ τὰ μὲν σπάνια τίμια εἶναι δοκεῖ, τὰ δὲ
 σύντροφα ἡμῖν καὶ εὐπορα οὐδαμῶς. ἐὰν γοῦν
 ἐνοήσωμεν τὸ ὕδωρ σπανίζον, πόσῳ ἂν τῶν
 τιμιῶν εἶναι δοκούντων ἀπάντων τιμιώτερον ἡμῖν
 φανείη. ἢ ἐὰν ἐνθυμηθῶμεν τὸν χρυσὸν ἀπλῶς
 ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἐρριμμένον πολὺν παραπλησίως τοῖς
 λίθοις, τίνοι δόξομεν ἕσσεσθαι τοῦτον τίμιον ἢ κατὰ-
 κλειστον οὕτως;
- 144 Ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ αὐτὰ πράγματα παρὰ τὰς συνεχεῖς
 ἢ σπανίους περιπτώσεις ὅτε μὲν ἐκπληκτικὰ ἢ
 τίμια ὅτε δὲ οὐ τοιαῦτα εἶναι δοκεῖ, ἐπιλογιζόμεθα
 ὅτι ὁποῖον μὲν φαίνεται τούτων ἕκαστον μετὰ
 συνεχοῦς περιπτώσεως ἢ σπανίας ἴσως δυνησό-
 μεθα λέγειν, ψιλῶς δὲ ὁποῖον ἔστιν ἕκαστον τῶν
 ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων οὐκ ἔσμεν δυνατοὶ φάσκειν.
 καὶ διὰ τοῦτον οὖν τὸν τρόπον περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπ-
 ἔχομεν.
- 145 Δέκατος ἐστὶ τρόπος, ὃς καὶ μάλιστα συνέχει
 πρὸς τὰ ἠθικά, ὃ παρὰ τὰς ἀγωγὰς καὶ τὰ ἔθη
 καὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰς μυθικὰς πίστεις καὶ τὰς
 δογματικὰς ὑπολήψεις. ἀγωγή μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν
 αἴρεσις βίου ἢ τινος πράγματος περὶ ἓνα ἢ πολλοῦς

rarely, and illuminating everything all at once and throwing everything into shadow suddenly, then we should experience much amazement at the sight. An earthquake also does not cause the same alarm 142 in those who experience it for the first time and those who have grown accustomed to such things. How much amazement, also, does the sea excite in the man who sees it for the first time! And indeed the beauty of a human body thrills us more at the first sudden view than when it becomes a customary spectacle. Rare things too we count as precious, but not what is familiar to us and easily got. Thus, 143 if we should suppose water to be rare, how much more precious it would appear to us than all the things which are accounted precious! Or if we should imagine gold to be simply scattered in quantities over the earth like stones, to whom do we suppose it would then be precious and worth hoarding?

Since then, owing to the frequency or rarity of 144 their occurrence, the same things seem at one time to be amazing or precious and at another time nothing of the sort, we infer that though we shall be able perhaps to say what nature appears to belong to each of these things in virtue of its frequent or rare occurrence, we are not able to state what nature absolutely belongs to each of the external objects. So because of this Mode also we suspend judgement regarding them.

There is a *Tenth Mode*, which is mainly concerned 145 with Ethics, being based on rules of conduct, habits, laws, legendary beliefs, and dogmatic conceptions. A rule of conduct is a choice of a way of life, or of a particular action, adopted by one person

* Cf. Plato, *Euthyd.* 304 B.

γινομένη, οἷον περὶ Διογένην ἢ τοὺς Λάκωνας·
 146 νόμος δὲ ἐστὶν ἔγγραφος συνθήκη παρὰ τοῖς πο-
 λιτευομένοις, ἣν ὁ παραβαίνων κολάζεται, ἔθος δὲ
 ἢ συνήθεια (οὐ διαφέρει γάρ) πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων
 κοινὴ πράγματός τινος παραδοχῆ, ἣν ὁ παραβὰς
 οὐ πάντως κολάζεται, οἷον νόμος ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ
 μοιχεύειν, ἔθος δὲ ἡμῖν τὸ μὴ δημοσίᾳ γυναικί
 147 μίγνυσθαι. μυθικὴ δὲ πίστις ἐστὶ πραγμάτων
 ἀγενήτων τε καὶ πεπλασμένων παραδοχῆ, οἷα
 ἐστὶν ἄλλα τε καὶ τὰ περὶ τοῦ Κρόνου μυθεύμενα·
 ταῦτα γὰρ πολλοὺς εἰς πίστιν ἄγει. δογματικὴ δὲ
 ἐστὶν ὑπόληψις παραδοχῆ πράγματος δι' ἀναλογισ-
 μου ἢ τινος ἀποδείξεως κρατύνεσθαι δοκοῦσα, οἷον
 ὅτι ἄτομα ἐστὶ τῶν ὄντων στοιχεῖα ἢ ὁμοιομερῆ ἢ
 ἐλάχιστα ἢ τινα ἄλλα.
 148 Ἀντιτίθεμεν δὲ τούτων ἕκαστον ὅτε μὲν ἑαυτῷ
 ὅτε δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκάστω. οἷον ἔθος μὲν ἔθει
 οὕτως. τινὲς τῶν Αἰθιοπῶν στίζουσι τὰ βρέφη,
 ἡμεῖς δ' οὐ· καὶ Πέρσαι μὲν ἀνθοβαφεῖ ἐσθῆτι καὶ
 ποδήρει χρῆσθαι νομίζουσιν εὐπρεπὲς εἶναι, ἡμεῖς
 δὲ ἀπρεπὲς· καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἴνδοι ταῖς γυναιξὶ δημοσίᾳ
 μίγνυνται, οἱ δὲ πλείστοι τῶν ἄλλων αἰσχρὸν
 149 τοῦτο εἶναι ἡγούνται. νόμον δὲ νόμῳ οὕτως αντι-
 τίθεμεν. παρὰ μὲν τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ὁ τῆς πατρῶας
 ἀποστάς οὐσίας οὐκ ἀποδίδωσι τὰ τοῦ πατρὸς
 χρέα, παρὰ δὲ τοῖς Ῥοδίοις πάντως ἀποδίδωσιν·
 καὶ ἐν μὲν Ταύροις τῆς Σκυθίας νόμος ἦν τοὺς
 ξένους τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι καλλιερῆσθαι, παρὰ δὲ ἡμῖν
 150 ἀνθρωπον ἀπείρηται πρὸς ἱερῷ φονεύεσθαι. ἀγ-

^a The Cynic philosopher.

^b Democritus and Epicurus took the first view, Anaxagoras the second, Diodorus Cronos the third; *cf.* iii. 32.

or many—by Diogenes,^a for instance, or the
 Laconians. A law is a written contract amongst the 146
 members of a State, the transgressor of which is
 punished. A habit or custom (the terms are equi-
 valent) is the joint adoption of a certain kind of action
 by a number of men, the transgressor of which is not
 actually punished; for example, the law proscribes
 adultery, and custom with us forbids intercourse
 with a woman in public. Legendary belief is the 147
 acceptance of unhistorical and fictitious events, such
 as, amongst others, the legends about Cronos; for
 these stories win credence with many. Dogmatic
 conception is the acceptance of a fact which seems
 to be established by analogy or some form of demon-
 stration, as, for example, that atoms are the elements
 of existing things, or homoeomerics, or *minima*,^b or
 something else.

And each of these we oppose now to itself, and now 148
 to each of the others. For example, we oppose habit
 to habit in this way: some of the Ethiopians tattoo
 their children, but we do not; and while the Persians
 think it seemly to wear a brightly dyed dress reach-
 ing to the feet, we think it unseemly; and whereas
 the Indians have intercourse with their women in
 public, most other races regard this as shameful. And 149
 law we oppose to law in this way: among the Romans
 the man who renounces his father's property does
 not pay his father's debts, but among the Rhodians
 he always pays them; and among the Scythian
 Tauri^c it was a law that strangers should be sacrificed
 to Artemis, but with us it is forbidden to slay a
 human being at the altar. And we oppose rule of 150

^c *i.e.* inhabitants of the Crimea; *cf.* Hdt. iv. 103, and Eurip. *Iphigenia in Tauris*.

γὴν δὲ ἀγωγῆ, ὅταν τὴν Διογένους ἀγωγὴν ἀντι-
τιθῶμεν τῇ τοῦ Ἀριστίππου ἢ τὴν τῶν Λακώνων
τῇ τῶν Ἰταλῶν. μυθικὴν δὲ πίστιν πίστει μυ-
θικῆ, ὅταν ὅπου μὲν <λέγωμεν>¹ τὸν Δία μυθεύε-
σθαι πατέρα ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε ὅπου δὲ τὸν
᾿Ωκεανόν, λέγοντες

᾿Ωκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν.

151 δογματικὰς δὲ ὑπολήψεις ἀλλήλαις ἀντιτίθεμεν,
ὅταν λέγωμεν τοὺς μὲν ἐν εἶναι στοιχεῖον ἀπο-
φαίνεσθαι τοὺς δὲ ἀπειρα, καὶ τοὺς μὲν θνητὴν
τὴν ψυχὴν τοὺς δὲ ἀθάνατον, καὶ τοὺς μὲν προνοία
θεῶν διοικεῖσθαι τὰ καθ' ἡμᾶς τοὺς δὲ ἀπρονοήτως.

152 Τὸ ἔθος δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀντιτίθεμεν, οἷον νόμῳ
μὲν, ὅταν λέγωμεν παρὰ μὲν Πέρσαις ἔθος εἶναι
ἀρρενομιξίαις χρῆσθαι, παρὰ δὲ Ῥωμαίοις ἀπαγο-
ρεῦεσθαι νόμῳ τοῦτο πράττειν, καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν μὲν
τὸ μοιχεύειν ἀπειρῆσθαι, παρὰ δὲ Μασσαγέταις
ἀδιαφορίας ἔθει παραδεδόσθαι, ὡς Εὐδόξος ὁ
Κνίδιος ἱστορεῖ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῆς περιόδου, καὶ
παρ' ἡμῖν μὲν ἀπαγορεῦσθαι μητράσι μίγνυσθαι,
παρὰ δὲ τοῖς Πέρσαις ἔθος εἶναι μάλιστα οὕτω
γαμεῖν. καὶ παρ' Αἰγυπτίοις δὲ τὰς ἀδελφὰς
153 γαμοῦσιν, ὁ παρ' ἡμῖν ἀπειρῆται νόμῳ. ἀγωγῆ
δὲ ἔθος ἀντιτίθεται, ὅταν οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ ἀνθρωποὶ
ἀναχωροῦντες μιγνύωνται ταῖς ἑαυτῶν γυναῖξιν, ὁ
δὲ Κράτης τῇ Ἰππαρχίᾳ δημοσίᾳ· καὶ ὁ μὲν
Διογένης ἀπὸ ἐξωμίδος περιήει, ἡμεῖς δὲ ὡς

¹ <λέγωμεν> add. T.

^a Homer, *Il.* xiv. 201.

conduct to rule of conduct, as when we oppose the
rule of Diogenes to that of Aristippus or that of the
Laconians to that of the Italians. And we oppose
legendary belief to legendary belief when we say
that whereas in one story the father of men and gods
is alleged to be Zeus, in another he is Oceanos—
“Ocean sire of the gods, and Tethys the mother
that bare them.”^a And we oppose dogmatic con-
ceptions to one another when we say that some
declare that there is one element only, others an
infinite number; some that the soul is mortal, others
that it is immortal; and some that human affairs are
controlled by divine Providence, others without
Providence.

And we oppose habit to the other things, as for
instance to law when we say that amongst the
Persians it is the habit to indulge in intercourse with
males, but amongst the Romans it is forbidden by
law to do so; and that, whereas with us adultery is
forbidden, amongst the Massagetæ it is traditionally
regarded as an indifferent custom, as Eudoxus of
Cnidos^b relates in the first book of his *Travels*; and
that, whereas intercourse with a mother is forbidden
in our country, in Persia it is the general custom to
form such marriages; and also among the Egyptians
men marry their sisters, a thing forbidden by law
amongst us. And habit is opposed to rule of conduct
when, whereas most men have intercourse with their
own wives in retirement, Crates^c did it in public
with Hipparchia; and Diogenes went about with one
shoulder bare, whereas we dress in the customary

^b Flourished about 360 B.C., famed as astronomer, geo-
meter, legislator and physician.

^c A Cynic philosopher, circa 320 B.C.; cf. iii. 24.

- 154 εἰώθαμεν. μυθικῇ δὲ πίστει, ὡς ὅταν λέγωσιν οἱ μῦθοι ὅτι ὁ Κρόνος κατήσθιεν αὐτοῦ τὰ τέκνα, ἔθους ὄντος ἡμῖν προνοεῖσθαι παιδῶν· καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν μὲν συνήθεια ὡς ἀγαθοὺς καὶ ἀπαθείς κακῶν σέβειν τοὺς θεοὺς, τιτρωσκόμοιοι δὲ καὶ φθοιοῦντες
- 155 ἀλλήλοιοι ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν εἰσάγονται. δογματικῇ δὲ ὑπολήψει, ὅταν ἡμῖν μὲν ἔθος ἢ παρὰ θεῶν αἰτεῖν τὰ ἀγαθὰ, ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος λέγῃ μὴ ἐπιστρέφεισθαι ἡμῶν τὸ θεῖον, καὶ ὅταν ὁ μὲν Ἀρίστιππος ἀδιάφορον ἡγήται τὸ γυναικείαν ἀμφιένυσθαι στολήν, ἡμεῖς δὲ αἰσχρὸν τοῦτο ἡγώμεθα εἶναι.
- 156 Ἀγωγὴν δὲ ἀντιτίθεμεν νόμῳ μὲν, ὅταν νόμου ὄντος μὴ ἐξείναι τύπτειν ἄνδρα ἐλεύθερον καὶ εὐγενῆ οἱ παγκρατιασταὶ τύπτωσιν ἀλλήλοιοι διὰ τὴν ἀγωγὴν τοῦ κατ' αὐτοὺς βίου, καὶ ὅταν ἀπειρημένοιοι τοῦ ἀνδροφονεῖν οἱ μονομάχοι ἀναιρῶσιν ἀλλήλοιοι διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν. μυθικὴν δὲ πίστιν ἀγωγῇ ἀντιτίθεμεν, ἐπειδὴν λέγωμεν ὅτι οἱ μὲν μῦθοι παρὰ τῇ Ὀμφάλῃ τὸν Ἡρακλέα λέγουσιν

εἰρία τε ζαίνειν καὶ δουλοσύνης ἀνέχεσθαι

- καὶ ταῦτα ποιῆσαι ἄπερ οὐδ' ἂν μετρίως προηρημένος ἐποίησεν ἂν τις, ἢ δὲ ἀγωγῇ τοῦ βίου τοῦ
- 158 Ἡρακλέοιοι ἦν γενναῖα. δογματικῇ δὲ ὑπολήψει, ὅταν οἱ μὲν ἀθληταὶ ὡς ἀγαθοῦ τῆς δόξης ἀντιποιοῦμενοι ἐπίπονον ἀγωγὴν βίου δι' αὐτὴν ἐπαναιρῶνται, πολλοὶ δὲ τῶν φιλοσόφων φαῦλον εἶναι
- 159 τὴν δόξαν δογματίζωσιν. τὸν δὲ νόμον ἀντιτίθεμεν μυθικῇ μὲν πίστει, ὅταν οἱ μὲν ποιηταὶ εἰσάγωσιν τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ μοιχεύοντας καὶ ἀρρενομιξίαις

manner. It is opposed also to legendary belief, as 154 when the legends say that Cronos devoured his own children, though it is our habit to protect our children; and whereas it is customary with us to revere the gods as being good and immune from evil, they are presented by the poets as suffering wounds and envying one another. And habit is opposed to 155 dogmatic conception when, whereas it is our habit to pray to the gods for good things, Epicurus^a declares that the Divinity pays no heed to us; and when Aristippus^b considers the wearing of feminine attire a matter of indifference, though we consider it a disgraceful thing.

And we oppose rule of conduct to law when, 156 though there is a law which forbids the striking of a free or well-born man, the pancratiasts strike one another because of the rule of life they follow; and when, though homicide is forbidden, gladiators destroy one another for the same reason. And we 157 oppose legendary belief to rule of conduct when we say that the legends relate that Heracles in the house of Omphale "toiled at the spinning of wool, enduring slavery's burden,"^c and did things which no one would have chosen to do even in a moderate degree, whereas the rule of life of Heracles was a noble one. And we oppose rule of conduct to dogmatic concep- 158 tion when, whereas athletes covet glory as something good and for its sake undertake a toilsome rule of life, many of the philosophers dogmatically assert that glory is a worthless thing. And we oppose law 159 to legendary belief when the poets represent the gods as committing adultery and practising intercourse with

^a Cf. iii. 219.

^b Cf. iii. 204.

^c Homer, *Odyss.* x. 423.

χρωμένους, νόμος δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν κωλύη ταῦτα πράτ-
 160 τειν, δογματικῇ δὲ ὑπολήψει, ὅταν οἱ μὲν περὶ
 Χρυσίππου ἀδιάφορον εἶναι λέγωσι τὸ μητράσι
 ἢ ἀδελφαῖς μίγνυσθαι, ὃ δὲ νόμος ταῦτα κωλύη.
 161 μυθικὴν δὲ πίστιν δογματικῇ ὑπολήψει ἀντιτίθεμεν,
 ὅταν οἱ μὲν ποιηταὶ λέγωσι τὸν Δία κατελθόντα
 θνηταῖς γυναιξὶ μίγνυσθαι, παρὰ δὲ τοῖς δογματι-
 162 κοῖς ἀδύνατον τοῦτο εἶναι νομίζηται, καὶ ὃ μὲν
 ποιητῆς λέγει ὅτι Ζεὺς διὰ τὸ πένθος τὸ ἐπὶ Σαρ-
 πηδόνι αἱματοέσσας ψεκάδας κατέχευεν ἔραζε,
 δόγμα μέντοι φιλοσόφων ἀπαθές εἶναι τὸ θεῖον,
 καὶ ὅταν τὸν τῶν ἵπποκενταύρων μῦθον ἀναιρῶσιν,
 ἀνυπαρξίας παράδειγμα τὸν ἵπποκένταυρον ἡμῖν
 φέροντες.
 163 Πολλὰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλα ἐνὴν καθ' ἐκάστην τῶν
 προειρημένων ἀντιθέσεων λαμβάνειν παραδείγματα·
 ὡς ἐν συντόμῳ δὲ λόγῳ ταῦτα ἀρκέσει. πλὴν
 τοσαύτης ἀνωμαλίας πραγμάτων καὶ διὰ τούτου
 τοῦ τρόπου δεικνυμένης, ὅποιον μὲν ἔστι τὸ ὑποκεί-
 μενον κατὰ τὴν φύσιν οὐχ ἔξομεν λέγειν, ὅποιον
 δὲ φαίνεται πρὸς τήνδε τὴν ἀγωγὴν ἢ πρὸς τόνδε
 τὸν νόμον ἢ πρὸς τόδε τὸ ἔθος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
 ἕκαστον. καὶ διὰ τούτων οὖν περὶ τῆς φύσεως
 τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων πραγμάτων ἐπέχειν ἡμᾶς
 ἀνάγκη. οὕτω μὲν οὖν διὰ τῶν δέκα τρόπων
 καταλήγομεν εἰς τὴν ἐποχὴν.

males, whereas the law with us forbids such actions ;
 and we oppose it to dogmatic conception when 160
 Chrysippus^a says that intercourse with mothers or
 sisters is a thing indifferent, whereas the law forbids
 such things. And we oppose legendary belief to 161
 dogmatic conception when the poets say that Zeus
 came down and had intercourse with mortal women,
 but amongst the Dogmatists it is held that such a
 thing is impossible ; and again, when the poet relates^b 162
 that because of his grief for Sarpedon Zeus " let fall
 upon the earth great gouts of blood," whereas it is
 a dogma of the philosophers that the Deity is im-
 passive ; and when these same philosophers demolish
 the legend of the hippocentaurs, and offer us the
 hippocentaur as a type of unreality.^c

We might indeed have taken many other examples 163
 in connexion with each of the antitheses above
 mentioned ; but in a concise account like ours, these
 will be sufficient. Only, since by means of this Mode
 also so much divergency is shown to exist in objects,
 we shall not be able to state what character belongs
 to the object in respect of its real essence, but only
 what belongs to it in respect of this particular rule of
 conduct, or law, or habit, and so on with each of the
 rest. So because of this Mode also we are compelled
 to suspend judgement regarding the real nature of
 external objects. And thus by means of all the Ten
 Modes we are finally led to suspension of judgement.

^a See *Introd.* pp. xxvii-xxviii ; *cf.* iii. 205.

^b *Homer, Il.* xvi. 459.

^c *Cf.* our use of " chimera " (lion+goat+dragon) for what is fantastic.

164 Οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι σκεπτικοὶ παραδιδόασιν τρόπους
 τῆς ἐποχῆς πέντε τούσδε, πρῶτον τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς
 διαφωνίας, δεύτερον τὸν εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκβάλλοντα,
 τρίτον τὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ πρὸς τι, τέταρτον τὸν ὑπο-
 165 θετικόν, πέμπτον τὸν διάλληλον. καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀπὸ
 τῆς διαφωνίας ἐστὶ καθ' ὃν περὶ τοῦ προτεθέντος
 πράγματος ἀνεπίκριτον στάσιν παρά τε τῷ βίῳ
 καὶ παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις εὐρίσκομεν γεγεννημένην,
 δι' ἣν οὐ δυνάμενοι αἰρεῖσθαι τι ἢ ἀποδοκιμάζειν
 166 καταλήγομεν εἰς ἐποχὴν. ὁ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς εἰς
 ἄπειρον ἐκπτώσεως ἐστὶν ἐν ᾧ τὸ φερόμενον εἰς
 πίστιν τοῦ προτεθέντος πράγματος πίστει εἰτέρας
 χρήζειν λέγομεν, κακείνο ἄλλης, καὶ μέχρις ἀπείρου,
 ὡς μὴ ἐχόντων ἡμῶν πόθεν ἀρξόμεθα τῆς κατα-
 167 σκευῆς τὴν ἐποχὴν ἀκολουθεῖν. ὁ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ
 πρὸς τι, καθὼς προειρήκαμεν, ἐν ᾧ πρὸς μὲν τὸ
 κρίνον καὶ τὰ συνθεωρούμενα τοῖον ἢ τοῖον
 φαίνεται τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ὁποῖον δὲ ἐστὶ πρὸς τὴν
 168 φύσιν ἐπέχομεν. ὁ δὲ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἐστὶν ὅταν
 εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκβαλλόμενοι οἱ δογματικοὶ ἀπὸ τινος
 ἀρξῶνται ὃ οὐ κατασκευάζουσιν ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς καὶ
 ἀναποδείκτως κατὰ συγχώρησιν λαμβάνειν ἀξιοῦ-
 169 σιν. ὁ δὲ διάλληλος τρόπος συνίσταται ὅταν τὸ
 ὀφείλον τοῦ ζητουμένου πράγματος εἶναι βεβαιω-
 τικὸν χρεῖαν ἔχη τῆς ἐκ τοῦ ζητουμένου πίστεως·
 ἔνθα μηδέτερον δυνάμενοι λαβεῖν πρὸς κατασκευὴν
 θατέρου, περὶ ἀμφοτέρων ἐπέχομεν.

^a *i.e.* those posterior to Aenesidemus; but the reference here is specially to Agrippa (see *Introd.* p. xl); *cf.* *Diox. Laert.* ix. 88.

The later Sceptics ^a hand down Five Modes leading 164 to suspension, namely these: the first based on discrepancy, the second on regress *ad infinitum*, the third on relativity, the fourth on hypothesis, the fifth on circular reasoning. That based on discrepancy 165 leads us to find that with regard to the object presented there has arisen both amongst ordinary people and amongst the philosophers an interminable conflict because of which we are unable either to choose a thing or reject it, and so fall back on suspension. The Mode based upon regress *ad 166 infinitum* is that whereby we assert that the thing adduced as a proof of the matter proposed needs a further proof, and this again another, and so on *ad infinitum*, so that the consequence is suspension, as we possess no starting-point for our argument. The 167 Mode based upon relativity, as we have already said,^b is that whereby the object has such or such an appearance in relation to the subject judging and to the concomitant percepts, but as to its real nature we suspend judgement. We have the Mode based on 168 hypothesis when the Dogmatists, being forced to recede *ad infinitum*, take as their starting-point something which they do not establish by argument but claim to assume as granted simply and without demonstration. The Mode of circular reasoning is 169 the form used when the proof itself which ought to establish the matter of inquiry requires confirmation derived from that matter; in this case, being unable to assume either in order to establish the other, we suspend judgement about both.

^b See §§ 135 ff.

- Ἔτι δὲ πᾶν τὸ ζητούμενον εἰς τούτους ἀνάγειν τοὺς τρόπους ἐνδέχεται, διὰ βραχέων ὑποδείξομεν οὕτως. τὸ προτεθὲν ἤτοι αἰσθητὸν ἔστιν ἢ νοητὸν, 170 ὅποιον δ' ἂν ᾖ, διαπεφώνηται· οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰ αἰσθητὰ μόνα φασὶν εἶναι ἀληθῆ, οἱ δὲ μόνα τὰ νοητά, οἱ δὲ τινὰ μὲν αἰσθητὰ τινὰ δὲ νοητά. πότερον οὖν ἐπικριτὴν εἶναι φήσουσι τὴν διαφωρίαν ἢ ἀνεπικριτον; εἰ μὲν ἀνεπικριτον, ἔχομεν ὅτι δεῖ ἐπέχειν· περὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀνεπικρίτως διαφωρουμένων οὐχ οἷόν τε ἔστιν ἀποφαίνεσθαι. εἰ δὲ 171 ἐπικριτὴν, πόθεν ἐπικριθήσεται πυνθανόμεθα. οἷον τὸ αἰσθητὸν (ἐπὶ τούτου γὰρ προτέρου στήσομεν τὸν λόγον) πότερον ὑπὸ αἰσθητοῦ ἢ ὑπὸ νοητοῦ; εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ αἰσθητοῦ, ἐπεὶ περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ζητοῦμεν, καὶ ἐκεῖνο ἄλλου δεήσεται πρὸς πίστιν. εἰ δὲ κάκεινο αἰσθητὸν ἔσται, πάλιν καὶ αὐτὸ ἄλλου δεήσεται τοῦ πιστώσοντος, καὶ τοῦτο μέχρῃς 172 ἀπείρου. εἰ δὲ ὑπὸ νοητοῦ ἐπικρίνεσθαι δεήσει τὸ αἰσθητὸν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ νοητὰ διαπεφώνηται, δεήσεται καὶ τοῦτο νοητὸν ὃν κρίσεώς τε καὶ πίστεως. πόθεν οὖν πιστωθήσεται; εἰ μὲν ὑπὸ νοητοῦ, εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπεσεῖται ὁμοίως· εἰ δ' ὑπὸ αἰσθητοῦ, ἐπεὶ πρὸς μὲν τὴν πίστιν τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ παρελήφθη νοητὸν πρὸς δὲ τὴν τοῦ νοητοῦ πίστιν αἰσθητὸν, ὃ 173 εἰ δὲ ταῦτα φεύγων, ὁ προσδιαλεγόμενος ἡμῶν

* Of these views the first was maintained, e.g. by Protagoras and Epicurus, the second by Plato and Democritus, the third by Peripatetics and Stoics.

^b Lit. "the through-one-another mode" (of reasoning). This is the fallacy known as *circulus in probando*, by which

That every matter of inquiry admits of being brought under these Modes we shall show briefly in this way. The matter proposed is either a sense- 170 object or a thought-object, but whichever it is, it is an object of controversy; for some say that only sensibles are true, others only intelligibles, others that some sensible and some intelligible objects are true.^a Will they then assert that the controversy can or cannot be decided? If they say it cannot, we have it granted that we must suspend judgement; for concerning matters of dispute which admit of no decision it is impossible to make an assertion. But if they say that it can be decided, we ask by what is it to be 171 decided. For example, in the case of the sense-object (for we shall base our argument on it first), is it to be decided by a sense-object or a thought-object? For if they say by a sense-object, since we are inquiring about sensibles that object itself also will require another to confirm it; and if that too is to be a sense-object, it likewise will require another for its confirmation, and so on *ad infinitum*. And if the sense-object shall have to be decided by 172 a thought-object, then, since thought-objects also are controverted, this being an object of thought will need examination and confirmation. Whence then will it gain confirmation? If from an intelligible object, it will suffer a similar regress *ad infinitum*; and if from a sensible object, since an intelligible was adduced to establish the sensible and a sensible to establish the intelligible, the Mode of circular reasoning^b is brought in.

If, however, our disputant, by way of escape from 173

each of two propositions is used in turn to prove the truth of the other.

κατὰ συγχώρησιν καὶ ἀναποδείκτως ἀξιώσει λαμβάνειν τι πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν τῶν ἐξῆς, ὁ ὑποθετικὸς εἰσάγεται τρόπος, ἄπορος ὑπάρχων. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὁ ὑποτιθέμενος πιστός ἐστιν, ἡμεῖς αἰεὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον ὑποτιθέμενοι οὐκ ἐσόμεθα ἀπιστότεροι. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀληθές τι ὑποτίθεται ὁ ὑποτιθέμενος, ὑποπτον αὐτὸ ποιεῖ, καθ' ὑπόθεσιν αὐτὸ λαμβάνων ἀλλὰ μὴ μετὰ κατασκευῆς· εἰ δὲ ψεῦδος, σαθρὰ
 174 ἔσται ἢ ὑποβάθρα τῶν κατασκευαζομένων. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀνύει τι τὸ ὑποτίθεσθαι πρὸς πίστιν, αὐτὸ τὸ ζητούμενον ὑποτιθέσθω, καὶ μὴ ἕτερόν τι δι' οὗ δὴ κατασκευάσει τὸ πρᾶγμα περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος· εἰ δὲ ἄτοπόν ἐστι τὸ ὑποτίθεσθαι τὸ ζητούμενον, ἄτοπον ἔσται καὶ τὸ ὑποτίθεσθαι τὸ ἐπαναβεβηκός.
 175 Ὅτι δὲ καὶ πρὸς τί ἐστι πάντα τὰ αἰσθητά, δηλόν· ἔστι γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς αἰσθανομένους. φανερόν οὖν ὅτι ὅπερ ἂν ἡμῖν προτεθῆ πρᾶγμα αἰσθητόν, εἰς τοὺς πέντε τρόπους ἀνάγειν τοῦτο εὐμαρές ἐστιν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ ἐπιλογιζόμεθα. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀνεπικρίτως διαπεφωνῆσθαι λέγοιτο, δοθήσεται ἡμῖν τὸ δεῖν ἐπέχειν περὶ
 176 αὐτοῦ. εἰ δὲ ἐπικριθῆσεται ἢ διαφωνία, εἰ μὲν διὰ νοητοῦ, εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκβαλοῦμεν, εἰ δὲ ὑπὸ αἰσθητοῦ, εἰς τὸν διάλληλον· τὸ γὰρ αἰσθητόν πάλιν διαφωνοῦμενον, καὶ μὴ δυνάμενον δι' αὐτοῦ ἐπικρίνεσθαι διὰ τὴν εἰς ἄπειρον ἔκπτωσιν, τοῦ νοητοῦ δεήσεται ὡς περὶ καὶ τὸ νοητὸν τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ.

^a Lit. "without exit (or way of escape)"; i.e. it hopelessly entangles the opponent.

^b i.e. the super-ordinate, or more universal, proposition.

this conclusion, should claim to assume as granted and without demonstration some postulate for the demonstration of the next steps of his argument, then the Mode of hypothesis will be brought in, which allows no escape.^a For if the author of the hypothesis is worthy of credence, we shall be no less worthy of credence every time that we make the opposite hypothesis. Moreover, if the author of the hypothesis assumes what is true he causes it to be suspected by assuming it by hypothesis rather than after proof; while if it is false, the foundation of his argument will be rotten. Further,
 174 if hypothesis conduces at all to proof, let the subject of inquiry itself be assumed and not some other thing which is merely a means to establish the actual subject of the argument; but if it is absurd to assume the subject of inquiry, it will also be absurd to assume that upon which it depends.^b

It is also plain that all sensibles are relative; for
 175 they are relative to those who have the sensations. Therefore it is apparent that whatever sensible object is presented can easily be referred to one of the Five Modes. And concerning the intelligible object we argue similarly. For if it should be said that it is a matter of unsettled controversy, the necessity of our suspending judgement will be granted. And if, on
 176 the other hand, the controversy admits of decision, then if the decision rests on an intelligible object we shall be driven to the regress *ad infinitum*, and to circular reasoning if it rests on a sensible; for since the sensible again is controverted and cannot be decided by means of itself because of the regress *ad infinitum*, it will require the intelligible object, just as also the intelligible will require the sensible. For 177

177 διὰ ταῦτα δὲ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ὁ λαμβάνων τι πάλιν ἄτοπος ἔσται. ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τί ἐστὶ τὰ νοητά· πρὸς γὰρ τὸν νοοῦντα λέγεται, καὶ εἰ ἦν τῇ φύσει τοιοῦτον ὁποῖον λέγεται, οὐκ ἂν διεφωνήθη. ἀνήχθη οὖν καὶ τὸ νοητὸν εἰς τοὺς πέντε τρόπους, διόπερ ἀνάγκη περὶ τοῦ προτεθέντος πράγματος πάντως ἡμᾶς ἐπέχειν.

Τοιοῦτοι μὲν καὶ οἱ παρὰ τοῖς νεωτέροις παραδιδόμενοι πέντε τρόποι· οὓς ἐκτίθενται οὐκ ἐκβάλλοντες τοὺς δέκα τρόπους, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ ποικιλώτερον καὶ διὰ τούτων σὺν ἐκείνοις ἐλέγχειν τὴν τῶν δογματικῶν προπέτειαν.

15'.—TINEΣ ΟΙ ΔΥΟ ΤΡΟΠΟΙ

178 Παραδιδόασι δὲ καὶ δύο τρόπους ἐποχῆς ἐτέρους· ἐπεὶ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ καταλαμβανόμενον ἦτοι ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καταλαμβάνεσθαι δοκεῖ ἢ ἐξ ἐτέρου ὑπομνησκόντες ὅτι οὔτε ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ τι οὔτε ἐξ ἐτέρου¹ καταλαμβάνεται, τὴν περὶ πάντων ἀπορίαν εἰσάγειν δοκοῦσιν. καὶ ὅτι μὲν οὐδὲν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καταλαμβάνεται, φασί, δῆλον ἐκ τῆς γεγενημένης παρὰ τοῖς φυσικοῖς περὶ τε τῶν αἰσθητῶν καὶ τῶν νοητῶν ἀπάντων, οἶμαι, διαφωνίας, ἣ δὴ ἀνεπίκριτός ἐστι μὴ δυναμένων ἡμῶν μῆτε αἰσθητῶ μῆτε νοητῶ κριτηρίῳ χρῆσθαι διὰ τὸ πᾶν, ὅπερ
179 ἂν λάβωμεν, ἀπίστον εἶναι διαπεφωνημένον. διὰ

¹ Ἐπομ. . . . ἐτέρου) add. T.

* For this final reduction of the "Tropes" to two—arguing against the possibility of either (1) immediate or (2) mediate certitude—see *Introd.* p. xli.

^b "Physics," as a branch of philosophy, was treated of by all the Schools alluded to in § 170 *supra*, which are specially here in mind.

these reasons, again, he who assumes anything by hypothesis will be acting illogically. Moreover, objects of thought, or intelligibles, are relative; for they are so named on account of their relation to the person thinking, and if they had really possessed the nature they are said to possess, there would have been no controversy about them. Thus the intelligible also is referred to the Five Modes, so that in all cases we are compelled to suspend judgement concerning the object presented.

Such then are the Five Modes handed down amongst the later Sceptics; but they propound these not by way of superseding the Ten Modes but in order to expose the rashness of the Dogmatists with more variety and completeness by means of the Five in conjunction with the Ten.

CHAPTER XVI.—OF THE TWO MODES

They hand down also *Two* other *Modes* leading¹⁷⁸ to suspension of judgement.^a Since every object of apprehension seems to be apprehended either through itself or through another object, by showing that nothing is apprehended either through itself or through another thing, they introduce doubt, as they suppose, about everything. That nothing is apprehended through itself is plain, they say, from the controversy which exists amongst the physicists^b regarding, I imagine, all things, both sensibles and intelligibles; which controversy admits of no settlement because we can neither employ a sensible nor an intelligible criterion, since every criterion we may adopt is controverted and therefore discredited. And the reason why they do not allow¹⁷⁹

δὲ τοῦτο οὐδ' ἐξ ἑτέρου τι καταλαμβάνεσθαι συγ-
χωροῦσιν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἐξ οὗ τι καταλαμβάνεται
ἀεὶ ἐξ ἑτέρου καταλαμβάνεσθαι δεήσει, εἰς τὸν
διάλληλον ἢ τὸν ἄπειρον ἐμβάλλουσι τρόπον. εἰ
δὲ βούλοιτό τις λαβεῖν ὡς ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καταλαμ-
βανόμενόν τι ἐξ οὗ τι καταλαμβάνεται¹ ἕτερον,
ἀντιπίπτει τὸ μηδὲν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καταλαμβάνεσθαι
διὰ τὰ προειρημένα. τὸ δὲ μαχόμενον πῶς ἂν
δύναιτο καταληφθῆναι <ἦ>² ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἢ ἀφ'
ἑτέρου, ἀποροῦμεν, τοῦ κριτηρίου τῆς ἀληθείας ἢ
τῆς καταλήψεως μὴ φαινομένου, σημείων δὲ καὶ
δίχα ἀποδείξεως διατρεπομένων, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς
ἐξῆς εἰσόμεθα.

Τοσαῦτα μὲν οὖν καὶ περὶ τῶν τρόπων τῆς
ἐποχῆς ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος ἀρκέσει λελέχθαι.

ΙΖ'.—ΤΙΝΕΣ ΤΡΟΠΟΙ ΤΗΣ ΤΩΝ Αἴτιολογικῶν
ΑΝΑΤΡΟΠΗΣ

- 180 "Ὡσπερ δὲ τοὺς τρόπους τῆς ἐποχῆς παραδίδομεν,
οὕτω καὶ τρόπους ἐκτίθενται τινες καθ' οὓς ἐν ταῖς
κατὰ μέρος αἰτιολογίαις διαποροῦντες ἐφιστῶμεν
τοὺς δογματικούς διὰ τὸ μάλιστα ἐπὶ ταύταις
αὐτοὺς μέγα φρονεῖν. καὶ δὴ Αἰνησιδῆμος ὀκτῶ
τρόπους παραδίδωσι καθ' οὓς οἴεται πᾶσαν δογ-
ματικὴν αἰτιολογίαν ὡς μοχθηρὰν ἐλέγχων ἀποφή-
181 νασθαι, ὧν πρῶτον μὲν εἶναί φησι καθ' ὃν τρόπον
τὸ τῆς αἰτιολογίας γένος ἐν ἀφανέσιν ἀναστρεφό-
μενον οὐχ ὁμολογουμένην ἔχει τὴν ἐκ τῶν φαινο-

¹ καταλαμβάνεται TM: λαμβάνειν mss., Bekk.

² <ἦ> add. T.

* See ii. 96 ff.

that anything is apprehended through something
else is this: If that through which an object is
apprehended must always itself be apprehended
through some other thing, one is involved in a process
of circular reasoning or in regress *ad infinitum*.
And if, on the other hand, one should choose to
assume that the thing through which another object
is apprehended is itself apprehended through itself,
this is refuted by the fact that, for the reasons already
stated, nothing is apprehended through itself. But
as to how what conflicts with itself can possibly be
apprehended either through itself or through some
other thing we remain in doubt, so long as the criterion
of truth or of apprehension is not apparent, and signs,
even apart from demonstration, are rejected, as we
shall discover in our next Book.^a

For the present, however, it will suffice to have said
thus much concerning the Modes leading to suspen-
sion of judgement.

CHAPTER XVII.—OF THE MODES BY WHICH THE
AETIOLOGISTS ARE CONFUTED

Just as we teach the traditional Modes leading to¹⁸⁰
suspense of judgement, so likewise some Sceptics
propound Modes by which we express doubt about
the particular "aetiologies," or theories of causation,
and thus pull up the Dogmatists because of the special
pride they take in these theories. Thus Aenesidemus
furnishes us with *Eight Modes* by which, as he thinks,
he tests and exposes the unsoundness of every dog-
matic theory of causation. Of these the First, he¹⁸¹
says, is that which shows that, since aetiology as a
whole deals with the non-apparent, it is unconfirmed

μένων ἐπιμαρτύρησιν· δεύτερον δὲ καθ' ὃν πολλάκις
 εὐεπιφορίας οὔσης δαψιλοῦς ὥστε πολυτρόπως
 αἰτιολογήσαι τὸ ζητούμενον, καθ' ἓνα μόνον τρό-
 182 πον τοῦτό τινες αἰτιολογοῦσιν· τρίτον καθ' ὃν τῶν
 τεταγμένως γινομένων αἰτίας ἀποδιδόασιν οὐδεμίαν
 τάξιν ἐπιφαινούσας· τέταρτον καθ' ὃν τὰ φαινόμενα
 λαβόντες ὡς γίνεται, καὶ τὰ μὴ φαινόμενα νομί-
 ζουσιν ὡς γίνεται κατειληφέναι, τάχα μὲν ὁμοίως
 τοῖς φαινομένοις τῶν ἀφανῶν ἐπιτελουμένων, τάχα
 183 δ' οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀλλ' ἰδιαζόντως· πέμπτον καθ' ὃν
 πάντες ὡς ἔπος ἐπιείν κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας τῶν στοι-
 χείων ὑποθέσεις ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ τινὰς κοινὰς καὶ
 ὁμολογουμένας ἐφόδους αἰτιολογοῦσιν· ἕκτον καθ'
 ὃν πολλάκις τὰ μὲν φωρατὰ ταῖς ἰδίαις ὑποθέσεσι
 παραλαμβάνουσιν, τὰ δὲ ἀντιπίπτοντα καὶ τὴν
 184 ἴσῃν ἔχοντα πιθανότητα παραπέμπουσιν· ἕβδομον
 καθ' ὃν πολλάκις ἀποδιδόασιν αἰτίας οὐ μόνον τοῖς
 φαινομένοις ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῖς ἰδίαις ὑποθέσεσι μαχο-
 μένας· ὄγδοον καθ' ὃν πολλάκις ὄντων ἀπόρων
 ὁμοίως τῶν τε φαίνεσθαι δοκούντων καὶ τῶν ἐπι-
 ζητουμένων, ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίως ἀπόρων περὶ τῶν
 185 ὁμοίως ἀπόρων ποιοῦνται τὰς διδασκαλίας. οὐκ
 ἀδύνατον δέ φησι καὶ κατὰ τινὰς ἐπιμίκτους τρό-
 πους, ἡρτημένους ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων, διαπίπτειν
 ἐνίους ἐν ταῖς αἰτιολογίαις.

Τάχα δ' ἂν καὶ οἱ πέντε τρόποι τῆς ἐποχῆς ἀπαρ-
 κοῦσι πρὸς τὰς αἰτιολογίας. ἤτοι γὰρ σύμφωνον
 πάσαις ταῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν αἰρέσεσι καὶ τῇ

* See §§ 164 ff. *supra*.

by any agreed evidence derived from appearances. The Second Mode shows how often, when there is ample scope for ascribing the object of investigation to a variety of causes, some of them account for it in one way only. The Third shows how to orderly 182 events they assign causes which exhibit no order. The Fourth shows how, when they have grasped the way in which appearances occur, they assume that they have also apprehended how non-apparent things occur, whereas, though the non-apparent may possibly be realized in a similar way to the appearances, possibly they may not be realized in a similar way but in a peculiar way of their own. In the Fifth Mode it 183 is shown how practically all these theorists assign causes according to their own particular hypotheses about the elements, and not according to any commonly agreed methods. In the Sixth it is shown how they frequently admit only such facts as can be explained by their own theories, and dismiss facts which conflict therewith though possessing equal probability. The Seventh shows how they 184 often assign causes which conflict not only with appearances but also with their own hypotheses. The Eighth shows that often, when there is equal doubt about things seemingly apparent and things under investigation, they base their doctrine about things equally doubtful upon things equally doubtful. Nor is it impossible, he adds, that the overthrow of 185 some of their theories of causation should be referred to certain mixed Modes which are dependent on the foregoing.

Possibly, too, the Five Modes of suspension^a may suffice as against the aetiologies. For if a person propounds a cause, it will either be or not be in accord

σκέβει καὶ τοῖς φαινομένοις αἰτίαν ἐρεῖ τις ἢ οὐ.
καὶ σύμφωνον μὲν ἴσως οὐκ ἐνδέχεται· τὰ τε γὰρ
186 φαινόμενα καὶ τὰ ἄδηλα πάντα διαπεφώνηται. εἰ
δὲ διαφωνεῖ, ἀπαιτηθήσεται καὶ ταύτης τὴν αἰτίαν,
καὶ φαινομένην μὲν φαινομένης ἢ ἄδηλον ἀδήλου
λαμβάνων εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπεσεῖται, ἐναλλάξ δὲ
αἰτιολογῶν εἰς τὸν διάλληλον. ἰστάμενος δέ που,
ἢ ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς εἰρημένοις λέξει τὴν αἰτίαν συν-
εστάναι, καὶ εἰσάγει τὸ πρὸς τι, ἀναιρῶν τὸ πρὸς
τὴν φύσιν, ἢ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως τι λαμβάνων ἐπι-
σχεθήσεται. ἔστιν οὖν καὶ διὰ τούτων ἐλέγχειν
ἴσως τὴν τῶν δογματικῶν ἐν ταῖς αἰτιολογίαις
προπέτειαν.

III'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΣΚΕΠΤΙΚΩΝ ΦΩΝΩΝ

187 Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐκάστῳ χρώμενοι τούτων τε καὶ τῶν
τῆς ἐποχῆς τρόπων ἐπιφθεγγόμεθα φωνάς τινας
τῆς σκεπτικῆς διαθέσεως καὶ τοῦ περὶ ἡμᾶς
πάθους μνηστικῆς, οἷον λέγοντες “οὐ μᾶλλον”
“οὐδὲν ὀριστέον” καὶ ἄλλας τινάς, ἀκόλουθον ἂν
εἶη καὶ περὶ τούτων ἐξῆς διαλαβεῖν. ἀρξώμεθα
δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς “οὐ μᾶλλον.”

with all the philosophical systems and with Scepticism
and with appearances. Probably, however, it is im-
practicable to propound a cause in accord with all
these, since all things, whether apparent or non-
evident, are matters of controversy. But if, on the 186
other hand, the cause propounded be not in accord
therewith, the theorist will be asked in turn for the
cause of this cause, and if he assumes an apparent
cause for an apparent, or a non-evident for a non-
evident, he will be involved in the regress *ad infinitum*,
or reduced to arguing in a circle if he grounds each
cause in turn on another. And if at any point he
makes a stand, either he will state that the cause is
well-grounded so far as relates to the previous ad-
missions, thus introducing relativity and destroying
its claim to absolute reality, or he will make some
assumption *ex hypothesi* and will be stopped by us.
So by these Modes also it is, no doubt, possible to
expose the rashness of the Dogmatists in their
aetiologies.

CHAPTER XVIII.—OF THE SCEPTIC EXPRESSIONS
OR FORMULAE

And because when we make use of these Modes 187
and those which lead to suspension of judgement we
give utterance to certain expressions^a indicative of
our sceptical attitude and tone of mind—such as
“Not more,” “Nothing must be determined,” and
others of the kind—it will be our next task to discuss
these in order. So let us begin with the expression
“Not more.”

^a Cf. §§ 14, 15 *supra*.

188 Ταύτην τοίνυν ὅτε μὲν ὡς ἔφην προφερόμεθα, ὅτε δὲ οὕτως “οὐδὲν μᾶλλον”· οὐ γάρ, ὡς τινες ὑπολαμβάνουσι, τὴν μὲν “οὐ μᾶλλον” ἐν ταῖς εἰδικαῖς ζητήσεσι παραλαμβάνομεν, τὴν δὲ “οὐδὲν μᾶλλον” ἐν ταῖς γενικαῖς, ἀλλ’ ἀδιαφόρως τὴν τε “οὐ μᾶλλον” καὶ τὴν “οὐδὲν μᾶλλον” προφερόμεθα, καὶ νῦν ὡς περὶ μιᾶς διαλεξόμεθα. ἔστι μὲν οὖν αὕτη ἡ φωνὴ ἑλλιπής. ὡς γὰρ ὅταν λέγωμεν διπλῆ, δυνάμει φαμέν ἔστι διπλῆ, καὶ ὅταν λέγωμεν πλατεία, δυνάμει λέγομεν πλατεία ὁδός,¹ οὕτως ὅταν εἰπώμεν “οὐ μᾶλλον,” δυνάμει φαμέν

189 “οὐ μᾶλλον τόδε ἢ τόδε, ἀνω κάτω.” τινὲς μὲντοι τῶν σκεπτικῶν παραλαμβάνουσιν ἀντὶ [τοῦ πύσματος]² τοῦ οὗ τὸ τί μᾶλλον τόδε ἢ τόδε, τὸ τί παραλαμβάνοντες νῦν ἀντὶ αἰτίας, ἢ ἢ τὸ λεγόμενον “διὰ τί μᾶλλον τόδε ἢ τόδε;” σύνηθες δὲ ἔστι καὶ πύσμασιν ἀντὶ ἀξιωμαίων χρῆσθαι, οἶον

τίς τὸν Διὸς σύλλεκτρον οὐκ οἶδε βροτῶν;

καὶ ἀξιώμασιν ἀντὶ πυσμάτων, οἶον “ζητῶ ποῦ οἰκεῖ Δίων” καὶ “πυθάνομαι τίνος ἕνεκα χρῆ θαυμάζειν ἄνδρα ποιητῆν.” ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ τί ἀντὶ τοῦ διὰ τί παραλαμβάνεται παρὰ Μενάνδρω·

τί γὰρ ἐγὼ κατελειπόμην;

190 δηλοῖ δὲ τὸ “οὐ μᾶλλον τόδε ἢ τόδε” καὶ πάθος

¹ πλατεία . . . πλατεία ὁδός Diels: πλατεῖαν . . . πλατεῖαν ὁδόν mss., Bekk.

² [τοῦ πύσματος] del. ego.

^a i.e. (perhaps) a two-storied house (taking ἔστι as meaning οἰκία). Fabric. proposed ἐσθής, διπλῆ then being = διπλοῖς, “a double cloak.” πλατεία, “square,” lit. “broad, open, place.”

This expression, then, we sometimes enunciate 188 in the form I have stated but sometimes in the form “Nowise more.” For we do not, as some suppose, adopt the form “Not more” in specific inquiries and “Nowise more” in generic inquiries, but we enunciate both “Not more” and “Nowise more” indifferently, and we shall discuss them now as identical expressions. This expression, then, is elliptical. For just as when we say “a double” we are implicitly saying “a double hearth,”^a and when we say “a square” we are implicitly saying “a square roadway,”^b so when we say “Not more” we are implicitly saying “Not this more than that, up than down.” Some of the Sceptics, however, in place of the “Not” 189 adopt the form “(For) what this more than that,” taking the “what” to denote, in this case, cause, so that the meaning is “For what reason this more than that?”^c And it is a common practice to use questions instead of assertions, as for example—“The bride of Zeus, what mortal knows her not?”^d And also assertions in the place of questions; for instance—“I am inquiring where Dion lives,” and “I ask you what reason there is for showing surprise at a poet.” And further, the use of “What” instead of “For what reason” is found in Menander,^d “(For) what was I left behind?” And the expression “Not 190 more this than that” indicates also our feeling, where-

^b The *τι*, here substituted for *οὐ*, is capable of meaning either “what” (or “in what respect”) or “why,” “for what cause or reason” (= *διὰ τί*). Thus *τι* gives an interrogative form (*πύσμα*) to the formula, as distinct from the affirmative form (*ἀξιωμα*) with *οὐ*.

^c Eurip. *Herc. Fur.* 1.

^d *Fragm.* 900 (Kock).

ἡμέτερον, καθ' ὃ διὰ τὴν ἰσοσθένειαν τῶν ἀντικειμένων πραγμάτων εἰς ἀρρεψίαν καταλήγομεν, ἰσοσθένειαν¹ μὲν λεγόντων ἡμῶν τὴν ἰσότητά τὴν² κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἡμῖν πιθανόν, ἀντικείμενα δὲ κοινῶς τὰ μαχόμενα, ἀρρεψίαν δὲ τὴν πρὸς μηδέτερον συγκατάθεσιν.

- 191 Ἡ γοῦν "οὐδὲν μᾶλλον" φωνὴ κἄν ἐμφαίνῃ χαρακτῆρα συγκαταθέσεως ἢ ἀρνήσεως, ἡμεῖς οὐχ οὕτως αὐτῇ χρώμεθα, ἀλλ' ἀδιαφόρως αὐτὴν παραλαμβάνομεν καὶ καταχρηστικῶς, ἥτοι ἀντὶ πύσματος ἢ ἀντὶ τοῦ λέγειν "ἀγνοῶ τίς μὲν τούτων χρῆ συγκατατίθεσθαι τίς δὲ μὴ συγκατατίθεσθαι." πρόκειται ἡμῖν δηλῶσαι τὸ φαινόμενον ἡμῖν κατὰ δὲ τὴν φωνὴν δι' ἧς αὐτὸ δηλοῦμεν ἀδιαφοροῦμεν. κἀκεῖνο δὲ χρῆ γινώσκω ὅτι προφερόμεθα τὴν "οὐδὲν μᾶλλον" φωνὴν οὐ διαβεβαιούμενοι περὶ τοῦ πάντως ὑπάρχειν αὐτὴν ἀληθῆ καὶ βεβαίαν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἡμῖν καὶ περὶ αὐτῆς λέγοντες.

Κ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΑΦΑΣΙΑΣ

- 192 Περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀφασίας λέγομεν τάδε. φάσις καλεῖται διχῶς, κοινῶς τε καὶ ἰδίως, κοινῶς μὲν ἢ δηλοῦσα θέσιν ἢ ἄρσιν φωνῆ, οἷον "ἡμέρα ἔστιν, οὐχ ἡμέρα ἔστιν," ἰδίως δὲ ἢ δηλοῦσα θέσιν μόνον, καθ' ὃ σημαίνοντα τὰ ἀποφατικά οὐ καλοῦσι φάσεις. ἢ οὖν ἀφασία ἀπόστασις ἔστι τῆς κοινῶς λεγομένης φάσεως, ἢ ὑποτάσσεσθαι λέγομεν τὴν τε κατάφασιν καὶ τὴν ἀπόφασιν, ὡς εἶναι ἀφασίαν

¹ ἰσοσθένειαν Papp.: ἰσότητα mss., Bekk.

² <ἰσότητα τῆν> add. Papp.

by we come to end in equipoise because of the equipollence of the opposed objects; and by "equipollence" we mean equality in respect of what seems probable to us, and by "opposed" we mean in general conflicting, and by "equipoise" a refusal of assent to either alternative.

Then as to the formula "Nowise more," even though it exhibits the character of a form of assent or of denial, we do not employ it in this way, but we take it in a loose and inexact sense, either in place of a question or in place of the phrase "I know not to which of these things I ought to assent, and to which I ought not." For our aim is to indicate what appears to us; while as to the expression by which we indicate this we are indifferent. This point, too, should be noticed—that we utter the expression "Nowise more" not as positively affirming that it really is true and certain, but as stating in regard to it also what appears to us.

CHAPTER XX.—OF "APHASIA" OR NON-ASSERTION

Concerning non-assertion what we say is this. The term "assertion" has two senses, general and special; used in the general sense it indicates affirmation or negation, as for example "It is day," "It is not day"; in its special sense it indicates affirmation only, and in this sense negations are not termed assertions. Non-assertion, then, is avoidance of assertion in the general sense in which it is said to include both affirmation and negation, so that non-assertion

* This is the typical Sceptic's attitude of complete mental neutrality, or "state of even balance" (ἀρρεψία, Diog. Laert. ix. 74).

193 πάθος ἡμέτερον δι' ὃ οὔτε τιθέναι τι οὔτε ἀναιρεῖν φαμέν. ὅθεν δῆλόν ἐστιν ὅτι καὶ τὴν ἀφασίαν παραλαμβάνομεν οὐχ ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν τοιούτων ὄντων τῶν πραγμάτων ὥστε πάντως ἀφασίαν κινεῖν, ἀλλὰ δηλοῦντες ὅτι ἡμεῖς νῦν, ὅτε προφερόμεθα αὐτήν, ἐπὶ τῶνδε τῶν ζητουμένων τοῦτο πεπόνθαμεν. κάκεῖνο χρή μνημονεύειν ὅτι μηδὲν τιθέναι μηδὲ ἀναιρεῖν φαμέν τῶν κατὰ τὸ ἄδηλον δογματικῶς λεγομένων· τοῖς γὰρ κινουσίην ἡμᾶς παθητικῶς καὶ ἀναγκαστικῶς ἄγουσιν εἰς συγκατάθεσιν εἰκομεν.

KA'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥΤ "ΤΑΧΑ," ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥΤ "ἘΞΕΣΤΙ," ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥΤ "ἘΝΔΕΧΕΤΑΙ"

194 Τὸ δὲ "τάχα" καὶ "οὐ τάχα" καὶ "ἔξεστι" καὶ "οὐκ ἔξεστι" καὶ "ἐνδέχεται" καὶ "οὐκ ἐνδέχεται" παραλαμβάνομεν ἀντὶ τοῦ τάχα μὲν ἔστιν τάχα δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, καὶ ἔξεστι μὲν εἶναι ἔξεστι δὲ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ἐνδέχεται μὲν εἶναι ἐνδέχεται δὲ μὴ εἶναι, ὡς παραλαμβάνειν ἡμᾶς συντομίας χάριν τὸ μὴ ἐξεῖναι ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐξεῖναι μὴ εἶναι, καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐνδέχεσθαι μὴ εἶναι, καὶ τὸ οὐ τάχα ἀντὶ τοῦ τάχα μὴ εἶναι.
195 πάλιν δὲ ἐνταῦθα οὐ φωνομαχοῦμεν, οὐδὲ εἰ φύσει ταῦτα δηλοῦσιν αἱ φωναὶ ζητοῦμεν, ἀλλ' ἀδιαφόρως αὐτάς, ὡς εἴπω, παραλαμβάνομεν. ὅτι μέντοι αὐταὶ αἱ φωναὶ ἀφασίας εἰσὶ δηλωτικαί, πρόδηλον, οἶμαι. ὁ γοῦν λέγων "τάχα ἔστιν" δυνάμει τίθησι καὶ τὸ μάχεσθαι δοκοῦν αὐτῷ, τὸ

is a mental condition of ours because of which we refuse either to affirm or to deny anything. Hence 193 it is plain that we adopt non-assertion also not as though things are in reality of such a kind as wholly to induce non-assertion, but as indicating that we now, at the time of uttering it, are in this condition regarding the problems now before us. It must also be borne in mind that what, as we say, we neither posit nor deny, is some one of the dogmatic statements made about what is non-apparent; for we yield to those things which move us emotionally and drive us compulsorily to assent.

CHAPTER XXI.—OF THE EXPRESSIONS "PERHAPS," "POSSIBLY," AND "MAYBE"

The formulae "perhaps" and "perhaps not," and 194 "possibly" and "possibly not," and "maybe" and "maybe not," we adopt in place of "perhaps it is and perhaps it is not," and "possibly it is and possibly it is not," and "maybe it is and maybe it is not," so that for the sake of conciseness we adopt the phrase "possibly not" instead of "possibly it is not," and "maybe not" instead of "maybe it is not," and "perhaps not" instead of "perhaps it is not." But here again we do not fight 195 about phrases nor do we inquire whether the phrases indicate realities, but we adopt them, as I said,^a in a loose sense. Still it is evident, as I think, that these expressions are indicative of non-assertion. Certainly the person who says "perhaps it is" is implicitly affirming also the seemingly contradictory

^a Cf. §§ 13, 191 *supra*.

τάχα μὴ εἶναι, τῷ μὴ διαβεβαιοῦσθαι περὶ τοῦ εἶναι αὐτό. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἔχει.

ΚΒ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ "ΕΠΕΧΩ"

196 Τὸ δὲ "ἐπέχω" παραλαμβάνομεν ἀντὶ τοῦ οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν τίνι χρῆ τῶν προκειμένων πιστεῦσαι ἢ τινι ἀπιστῆσαι, δηλοῦντες ὅτι ἴσα ἡμῖν φαίνεται τὰ πράγματα πρὸς πίστιν καὶ ἀπιστίαν. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἴσα ἐστίν, οὐ διαβεβαιούμεθα· τὸ δὲ φαινόμενον ἡμῖν περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅτε ἡμῖν ὑποπίπτει, λέγομεν. καὶ ἡ ἐποχὴ δὲ εἴρηται ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐπέχεσθαι τὴν διάνοιαν ὡς μήτε τιθέναι τι μήτε ἀναιρεῖν διὰ τὴν ἰσοσθένειαν τῶν ζητουμένων.

ΚΓ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ "ΟΤΑΕΝ ΟΡΙΖΩ"

197 Περὶ δὲ τοῦ "οὐδὲν ὀρίζω" ταῦτα φημέν. ὀρίζειν εἶναι νομίζομεν οὐχὶ τὸ ἀπλῶς λέγειν τι, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἀδηλον προφέρεσθαι μετὰ συγκатаθέσεως. οὕτω γὰρ οὐδὲν ὀρίζων ὁ σκεπτικός τάχα εὔρεθήσεται, οὐδὲ αὐτὸ τὸ "οὐδὲν ὀρίζω". οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ δογματικὴ ὑπόληψις, τουτέστιν ἀδήλω συγκατάθεσις, ἀλλὰ φωνὴ πάθους ἡμετέρου δηλωτική. ὅταν οὖν εἴπη ὁ σκεπτικός "οὐδὲν ὀρίζω," τοῦτό φησιν "ἐγὼ οὕτω πέπονθα νῦν ὡς μηδὲν

* Cf. §§ 7, 10 *supra*.

phrase "perhaps it is not" by his refusal to make the positive assertion that "it is." And the same applies to all the other cases.

CHAPTER XXII.—OF THE EXPRESSION
"I SUSPEND JUDGEMENT"

The phrase "I suspend judgement" * we adopt in 196 place of "I am unable to say which of the objects presented I ought to believe and which I ought to disbelieve," indicating that the objects appear to us equal as regards credibility and incredibility. As to whether they are equal we make no positive assertion; but what we state is what appears to us in regard to them at the time of observation. And the term "suspension" is derived from the fact of the mind being held up or "suspended" so that it neither affirms nor denies anything owing to the equipollence of the matters in question.

CHAPTER XXIII.—OF THE EXPRESSION
"I DETERMINE NOTHING"

Regarding the phrase "I determine nothing" this 197 is what we say. We hold that "to determine" is not simply to state a thing but to put forward something non-evident combined with assent. For in this sense, no doubt, it will be found that the Sceptic determines nothing, not even the very proposition "I determine nothing"; for this is not a dogmatic assumption, that is to say assent to something non-evident, but an expression indicative of our own mental condition. So whenever the Sceptic says "I determine nothing," what he means is "I am now in such a state of mind as neither to affirm

τῶν ὑπὸ τὴν ζήτησιν τήνδε πεπτωκότων τιθέναί δογματικῶς ἢ ἀναίρειν." τοῦτο δέ φησι λέγων τὸ ἑαυτῷ φαινόμενον περὶ τῶν προκειμένων [οὐκ] ἀπαγγελτικῶς, <οὐ δογματικῶς>¹ μετὰ πεποιθίσεως ἀποφαινόμενος, ἀλλ' ὁ πάσχει διηγούμενος.

ΚΔ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥΤ' "ΠΑΝΤΑ ΕΣΤΙΝ ΑΩΡΙΣΤΑ"

- 198 Καὶ ἡ ἀοριστία δὲ πάθος διανοίας ἐστὶ, καθ' ὃ οὔτε αἰρομέν τι οὔτε τίθεμεν τῶν δογματικῶς ζητουμένων, τουτέστι τῶν ἀδήλων. ὅταν οὖν λέγῃ ὁ σκεπτικὸς "πάντα ἐστὶν ἀόριστα," τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ λαμβάνει ἀντὶ τοῦ φαίνεσθαι αὐτῷ, πάντα δὲ λέγει οὐ τὰ ὄντα ἀλλ' ἄπερ διεξήλθε τῶν παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς ζητουμένων ἀδήλων, ἀόριστα δὲ μὴ πρὸυχοντα τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἢ κοινῶς μαχομένων
- 199 κατὰ πίστιν ἢ ἀπιστίαν. καὶ ὡσπερ ὁ λέγων "περιπατῶ" δυνάμει φησὶν "ἐγὼ περιπατῶ," οὕτως ὁ λέγων "πάντα ἐστὶν ἀόριστα" συσσημαίνει καθ' ἡμᾶς τὸ ὡς πρὸς ἐμέ ἢ ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, ὡς εἶναι τὸ λεγόμενον τοιοῦτον "ὅσα ἐπῆλθον τῶν δογματικῶς ζητουμένων, τοιαῦτά μοι φαίνεται ὡς μηδὲν αὐτῶν τοῦ μαχομένου πρὸυχει μοι δοκεῖν κατὰ πίστιν ἢ ἀπιστίαν."

ΚΕ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥΤ' "ΠΑΝΤΑ ΕΣΤΙΝ ΑΚΑΤΑΛΗΠΤΑ"

- 200 Οὕτω δὲ φερόμεθα καὶ ὅταν λέγωμεν "πάντα ἐστὶν ἀκατάληπτα". καὶ γὰρ τὸ πάντα ὁμοίως

¹ [οὐκ] . . . <οὐ δογματικῶς> om. et add. T.

^a For "opposed" and "conflicting" see § 10 above.
^b i.e. the personal pronoun "I" is potentially, or implicitly, expressed in the ending of the Greek verb (first person singular).
^c Cf. § 1.

dogmatically nor deny any of the matters now in question." And this he says simply by way of announcing undogmatically what appears to himself regarding the matters presented, not making any confident declaration, but just explaining his own state of mind.

CHAPTER XXIV.—OF THE EXPRESSION
 "ALL THINGS ARE UNDETERMINED"

Indetermination is a state of mind in which we 198 neither deny nor affirm any of the matters which are subjects of dogmatic inquiry, that is to say, non-evident. So whenever the Sceptic says "All things are undetermined," he takes the word "are" in the sense of "appear to him," and by "all things" he means not existing things but such of the non-evident matters investigated by the Dogmatists as he has examined, and by "undetermined" he means not superior in point of credibility or incredibility to things opposed, or in any way conflicting.^a And just 199 as the man who says "(I) walk about"^b is potentially saying "I walk about," so he who says "All are undetermined" conveys also, as we hold, the meaning "so far as relates to me," or "as appears to me," so that the statement amounts to this—"All the matters of dogmatic inquiry which I have examined appear to me to be such that no one of them is preferable to the one in conflict with it in respect of credibility or incredibility."

CHAPTER XXV.—OF THE EXPRESSION
 "ALL THINGS ARE NON-APPREHENSIBLE"

We adopt a similar attitude when we say "All 200 things are non-apprehensible."^c For we give a

ἐξηγοῦμεθα καὶ τὸ ἐμοὶ συνεκδεχόμεθα, ὡς εἶναι τὸ λεγόμενον τοιοῦτον “ πάντα ὅσα ἐφώδευσα τῶν δογματικῶς ζητουμένων ἀδήλων φαίνεται μοὶ ἀκατάληπτα.” τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν οὐ διαβεβαιουμένου περὶ τοῦ τὰ παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς ζητούμενα φύσεως εἶναι τοιαύτης ὡς εἶναι ἀκατάληπτα, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ πάθος ἀπαγγέλλοντος, καθ’ ὃ, φησὶν, ὑπολαμβάνω ὅτι ἄχρι νῦν οὐδὲν κατέλαβον ἐκείνων ἐγὼ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἰσοσθένειαν· ὅθεν καὶ τὰ εἰς περιτροπὴν φερόμενα πάντα ἀπᾶδοντα εἶναι δοκεῖ μοι τῶν ὑφ’ ἡμῶν ἀπαγγελλομένων.

ΚΣ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ “ ΑΚΑΤΑΛΗΠΤΩ ” ΚΑΙ “ ΟΤ
ΚΑΤΑΛΑΜΒΑΝΩ ”

201 Καὶ ἡ “ ἀκαταληπτῶ ” δὲ καὶ ἡ “ οὐ καταλαμ-
βάνω ” φωνὴ πάθους οἰκείου ἐστὶ δηλωτικὴ, καθ’
ὃ ἀφίσταται ὁ σκεπτικὸς ὡς πρὸς τὸ παρὸν τοῦ
τιθέναι τι τῶν ζητουμένων ἀδήλων ἢ ἀναιρεῖν, ὡς
ἔστι δῆλον ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων ἡμῖν περὶ τῶν
ἄλλων φωνῶν.

ΚΖ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΠΑΝΤΙ ΛΟΓΩΙ ΛΟΓΟΝ ἼΣΟΝ
ΑΝΤΙΚΕΙΣΘΑΙ

202 “ Ὅταν δὲ λέγωμεν “ παντὶ λόγῳ λόγος ἴσος
ἀντίκειται, ” παντὶ μὲν λέγομεν τῷ ὑφ’ ἡμῶν διεξ-
ωδευμένῳ, λόγον δὲ φάμεν οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ τὸν
κατασκευάζοντά τι δογματικῶς, τουτέστι περὶ

similar explanation of the word “ all,” and we similarly supply the words “ to me,” so that the meaning conveyed is this—“ All the non-apparent matters of dogmatic inquiry which I have investigated appear to me non-apprehensible.” And this is the utterance not of one who is positively asserting that the matters investigated by the Dogmatists are really of such a nature as to be non-apprehensible, but of one who is announcing his own state of mind, “ wherein,” he says, “ I conceive that up till now I myself have apprehended nothing owing to the equipollence of the opposites; and therefore also nothing that is brought forward to overthrow our position seems to me to have any bearing on what we announce.”

CHAPTER XXVI.—OF THE EXPRESSIONS “ I AM
NON-APPREHENSIVE ” AND “ I APPREHEND NOT ”

Both the expressions “ I am non-apprehensive ” 201
and “ I apprehend not ” are indicative of a personal
state of mind, in which the Sceptic, for the time being,
avoids affirming or denying any non-evident matter
of inquiry, as is obvious from what we have said above
concerning the other expressions.

CHAPTER XXVII.—OF THE PHRASE “ TO EVERY
ARGUMENT AN EQUAL ARGUMENT IS OPPOSED ”

When we say “ To every argument an equal argu- 202
ment is opposed,” we mean “ to every argument ”
that has been investigated by us, and the word
“ argument ” we use not in its simple sense, but of
that which establishes a point dogmatically (that is to
say with reference to what is non-evident) and estab-

ἀδήλου, καὶ οὐ πάντως τὸν ἐκ λημμάτων καὶ ἐπιφορᾶς ἀλλὰ τὸν ὅπως οὖν κατασκευάζοντα. ἴσον δέ φαμεν κατὰ πίστιν ἢ ἀπιστίαν, τό τε ἀντίκειται λαμβάνομεν ἀντὶ τοῦ μάχεται κοινῶς, καὶ τὸ “ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται” συνεκδεχόμεθα.

203 ὅταν οὖν εἴπω “παντὶ λόγῳ λόγος ἴσος ἀντίκειται,” δυνάμει τοῦτό φημι “παντὶ τῷ ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ ἐξητασμένῳ¹ λόγῳ, ὃς κατασκευάζει τι δογματικῶς, ἕτερος λόγος κατασκευάζων τι δογματικῶς, ἴσος αὐτῷ κατὰ πίστιν καὶ ἀπιστίαν, ἀντικείμεθα φαίνεται μοι,” ὡς εἶναι τὴν τοῦ λόγου προφορὰν οὐ δογματικὴν ἀλλ’ ἀνθρωπιῶν πάθους ἀπαγγελίαν, ὃ ἐστὶ φαινόμενον τῷ πάσχοντι.

204 Προφέρονται δέ τινες καὶ οὕτω τὴν φωνήν “παντὶ λόγῳ λόγον ἀντικείμεθα τὸν ἴσον,” ἀξιοῦντες παραγγεσματικῶς τοῦτο “παντὶ λόγῳ δογματικῶς τι κατασκευάζοντι λόγον δογματικῶς ζήτουντα, ἴσον κατὰ πίστιν καὶ ἀπιστίαν, μαχόμενον αὐτῷ ἀντιτιθῶμεν,” ἵνα ὁ μὲν λόγος αὐτοῖς ἢ πρὸς τὸν σκεπτικόν, χρῶνται δὲ ἀπαρεμφάτω ἀντὶ προστακτικοῦ, τῷ ἀντικείμεθα ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀντιτιθῶμεν.

205 παραγγέλλουσι δὲ τοῦτο τῷ σκεπτικῷ, μὴ πως ὑπὸ τοῦ δογματικοῦ παρακρουσθεὶς ἀπέιπη τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦς² ζήτησιν, καὶ τῆς φαινομένης αὐτοῖς ἀταραξίας, ἣν νομίζουσι παρυσίστασθαι τῇ περὶ πάντων ἐποχῇ, καθὼς ἔμπροσθεν ὑπεμνήσαμεν, σφαλῆ προπετευσάμενος.

¹ ἐξητασμένῳ Heintz: ἐξητημένῳ ML: ζητουμένῳ Bekk.

² αὐτοῦς cj. Heintz: αὐτοῦ Bekk.: αὐτῆς EAB.

^a i.e. by the use of syllogisms.

^b As with Protagoras, who seems to have originated it.

lishes it by any method, and not necessarily by means of premisses and a conclusion.^a We say “equal” with reference to credibility or incredibility, and we employ the word “opposed” in the general sense of “conflicting”; and we supply therewith in thought the phrase “as appears to me.” So whenever I say 203 “To every argument an equal argument is opposed,” what I am virtually saying is “To every argument investigated by me which establishes a point dogmatically, it seems to me there is opposed another argument, establishing a point dogmatically, which is equal to the first in respect of credibility and incredibility”; so that the utterance of the phrase is not a piece of dogmatism,^b but the announcement of a human state of mind which is apparent to the person experiencing it.

But some also utter the expression in the form 204 “To every argument an equal argument is to be opposed,”^c intending to give the injunction “To every argument which establishes a point dogmatically let us oppose an argument which investigates dogmatically, equal to the former in respect of credibility and incredibility, and conflicting therewith”; for they mean their words to be addressed to the Sceptic, although they use the infinitive form “to be opposed” instead of the imperative “let us oppose.” And they 205 address this injunction to the Sceptic lest haply, through being misled by the Dogmatist, he may give up the Sceptic search, and through precipitancy miss the “quietude”^d approved by the Sceptics, which they—as we said above^e—believe to be dependent on universal suspension of judgement.

^c The infinite is here used in a jussive sense.

^d Cf. §§ 10, 25 ff.

^e Cf. § 29.

ΚΗ'.—ΠΑΡΑΠΗΓΜΑΤΑ ΤΗΠΕΡ ΤΩΝ ΣΚΕΠΤΙΚΩΝ ΦΩΝΩΝ

- 206 Περὶ τοσοῦτων ἀρκέσει τῶν φωνῶν ὡς ἐν ὑπο-
 τυπώσει διεξελεθῆναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπεὶ ἐκ τῶν
 νῦν ἡμῖν εἰρημένων δυνατόν ἐστὶ λέγειν καὶ περὶ
 τῶν παραλελειμμένων. περὶ πασῶν γὰρ τῶν σκεπ-
 τικῶν φωνῶν ἐκεῖνο χρῆ προειληφέναι ὅτι περὶ
 τοῦ ἀληθεῖς αὐτὰς εἶναι πάντως οὐ διαβεβαιού-
 μεθα, ὅπου γε καὶ ὑφ' ἑαυτῶν αὐτὰς ἀναρῆσθαι
 λέγομεν δύνασθαι, συμπεριγραφομένας ἐκείνοις
 περὶ ὧν λέγονται, καθάπερ τὰ καθαρτικὰ τῶν φαρ-
 μάκων οὐ μόνον τοὺς χυμοὺς ὑπεξαιρεῖ τοῦ σώ-
 ματος ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑαυτὰ τοῖς χυμοῖς συνεξάγει.
- 207 φαμέν δὲ καὶ ὡς οὐ κυρίως δηλοῦντες τὰ πράγ-
 ματα, ἐφ' ὧν παραλαμβάνονται, τίθεμεν αὐτάς,
 ἀλλ' ἀδιαφόρως καὶ εἰ βούλονται καταχρηστικῶς·
 οὔτε γὰρ πρέπει τῷ σκεπτικῷ φωνομαχεῖν, ἄλλως
 τε ἡμῖν συνεργεῖ τὸ μηδὲ ταύτας τὰς φωνὰς
 εἰλικρινῶς σημαίνειν λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τι καὶ
- 208 πρὸς τοὺς σκεπτικούς. πρὸς τούτοις κἀκεῖνον δεῖ
 μεμνήσθαι ὅτι οὐ περὶ πάντων τῶν πραγμάτων
 καθόλου φαμέν αὐτάς, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων καὶ
 τῶν δογματικῶς ζητουμένων, καὶ ὅτι τὸ φαινό-
 μενον ἡμῖν φαμέν καὶ οὐχὶ διαβεβαιωτικῶς περὶ
 τῆς φύσεως τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων ἀποφαινόμεθα·
 ἐκ γὰρ τούτων πᾶν σόφισμα πρὸς φωνὴν ἐνεχθὲν
 σκεπτικὴν οἴομαι δύνασθαι διατρέπεσθαι.
- 209 Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν ἔννοιαν καὶ τὰ μέρη καὶ τὸ κρι-
 τήριον καὶ τὸ τέλος, ἔτι δὲ τοὺς τρόπους τῆς
 ἐποχῆς ἐφοδεύσαντες, καὶ περὶ τῶν σκεπτικῶν

^a Cf. § 195 *supra*.^b Suggesting that such attacks must involve the fallacy
 of *ignoratio elenchi*.CHAPTER XXVIII.—SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES ON
 THE SCEPTIC EXPRESSIONS

In a preliminary outline it will be sufficient to have 206
 explained the expressions now set forth, especially
 since it is possible to explain the rest by deductions
 from the foregoing. For, in regard to all the Sceptic
 expressions, we must grasp first the fact that we make
 no positive assertion respecting their absolute truth,
 since we say that they may possibly be confuted by
 themselves, seeing that they themselves are included
 in the things to which their doubt applies, just as
 aperient drugs do not merely eliminate the humours
 from the body, but also expel themselves along with
 the humours. And we also say that we employ them 207
 not by way of authoritatively explaining the things
 with reference to which we adopt them, but without
 precision and, if you like, loosely; for it does not
 become the Sceptic to wrangle over expressions,^a and
 besides it is to our advantage that even to these ex-
 pressions no absolute significance should be ascribed,
 but one that is relative and relative to the Sceptics.
 Besides this we must also remember that we do not 208
 employ them universally about all things, but about
 those which are non-evident and are objects of dog-
 matic inquiry; and that we state what appears to us
 and do not make any positive declarations as to the
 real nature of external objects; for I think that, as
 a result of this, every sophism^b directed against a
 Sceptic expression can be refuted.

And now that we have reviewed the idea or purpose 209
 of Scepticism and its divisions, and the criterion and
 the end, and the modes, too, of suspension, and have
 discussed the Sceptic expressions, and have thus made

φωνῶν εἰπόντες, τὸν χαρακτῆρα τῆς σκέψεως ἐμπεφανίκαμεν, ἀκόλουθον ἡγούμεθα εἶναι καὶ τῶν παρακειμένων αὐτῇ φιλοσοφῶν τὴν πρὸς αὐτὴν διάκρισιν συντόμως ἐπελθεῖν, ἵνα σαφέστερον τὴν ἐφεκτικὴν ἀγωγὴν κατανοήσωμεν. ἀρξώμεθα δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἡρακλείτειου φιλοσοφίας.

ΚΘ'.—ΟΤΙ ΔΙΑΦΕΡΕΙ Ἡ ΣΚΕΠΤΙΚΗ ΔΙΩΓΗ ΤΗΣ
ΗΡΑΚΛΕΙΤΕΙΟΥ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑΣ

- 210 Ὅτι μὲν οὖν αὕτη διαφέρει τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀγωγῆς, πρόδηλον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἡράκλειτος περὶ πολλῶν ἀδήλων ἀποφαίνεται δογματικῶς, ἡμεῖς δ' οὐχί, καθάπερ εἴρηται. ἐπεὶ δὲ οἱ περὶ τὸν Αἰνησιδῆμον ἔλεγον ὁδὸν εἶναι τὴν σκεπτικὴν ἀγωγὴν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἡρακλείτειον φιλοσοφίαν, διότι προηγείται τοῦ τάναντία περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑπάρχειν τὸ τάναντία περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φαίνεσθαι, καὶ οἱ μὲν σκεπτικοὶ φαίνεσθαι λέγουσι τὰ ἐναντία περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ, οἱ δὲ Ἡρακλείτειοι ἀπὸ τούτου καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ὑπάρχειν αὐτὰ μετέρχονται, φάμεν πρὸς τούτους ὅτι τὸ τὰ ἐναντία περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φαίνεσθαι οὐ δόγμα ἐστὶ τῶν σκεπτικῶν ἀλλὰ πρᾶγμα οὐ μόνον τοῖς σκεπτικοῖς ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις φιλοσόφοις καὶ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις
211 ὑποπίπτουν· οὐδεὶς γοῦν τολμήσει ἂν εἰπεῖν ὅτι τὸ μέλι οὐ γλυκάζει τοὺς ὑγαιίνοντας ἢ ὅτι τοὺς

^a For Heraclitus see *Introd.* p. viii; *cf.* ii. 59, 63. For Aenesidemus see *Introd.* pp. xxxvii ff.

^b *i.e.* the Sceptic view that the same thing *apparently* possesses opposite attributes or qualities is regarded as a step on the road to the Heraclitean view that it *really* possesses such qualities. But, as Sextus proceeds to argue,

clear the character of Scepticism, our next task is, we suppose, to explain briefly the distinction which exists between it and the philosophic systems which lie next to it, in order that we may more clearly understand the "suspensive" Way of thought. Let us begin with the Heraclitean philosophy.

CHAPTER XXIX.—THAT THE SCEPTIC WAY OF
THOUGHT DIFFERS FROM THE HERACLEITEAN
PHILOSOPHY

Now that this latter differs from our Way of thought 210 is plain at once; for Heraclitus ^a makes dogmatic statements about many non-evident things, whereas we, as has been said, do not. It is true that Aenesidemus and his followers used to say that the Sceptic Way is a road leading up to the Heraclitean philosophy, since to hold that the same thing is the subject of opposite appearances is a preliminary to holding that it is the subject of opposite realities, and while the Sceptics say that the same thing is the subject of opposite appearances, the Heracliteans go on from this to assert their reality.^b But in reply to them we declare that the view about the same thing having opposite appearances is not a dogma of the Sceptics but a fact which is experienced not by the Sceptics alone but also by the rest of philosophers and by all mankind; for certainly no one would venture to 211 say that honey ^c does not taste sweet to people in sound health or that it does not taste bitter to those

the ascription of *apparently* contradictory attributes to a thing is not peculiar to the Sceptics but common to all men, so that all others might equally well be regarded as Heracliteans in the making. For the opposition of "appearances" *cf.* §§ 32, 91 ff., 101 ff. ^c *Cf.* § 101 *supra*.

ικτερικούς οὐ πικράζει, ὥστε ἀπὸ κοινῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων προλήψεως ἄρχονται οἱ Ἡρακλείτειοι, καθάπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς, ἴσως δὲ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι φιλοσοφίαι. διόπερ εἰ μὲν ἀπὸ τίνος τῶν σκεπτικῶς λεγομένων ἐλάμβανον τὸ τὰναντία περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑποκεῖσθαι, οἷον τοῦ “ πάντα ἐστὶν ἀκατάληπτα ” ἢ τοῦ “ οὐδὲν ὀρίζω ” ἢ τίνος τῶν παραπλησιῶν, ἴσως ἂν συνῆγον ὁ λέγουσιν· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀρχὰς ἔχουσιν οὐ μόνον ἡμῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις φιλοσόφοις καὶ τῷ βίῳ ὑποπιπτούσας, τί μᾶλλον τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀγωγὴν ἢ ἐκάστην τῶν ἄλλων φιλοσοφιῶν ἢ καὶ τὸν βίον ὁδὸν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἡρακλείτειον φιλοσοφίαν εἶναι λέγοι τις ἂν, ἐπειδὴ πάντες κοιναῖς ὕλας κεκρήμεθα;

212 Μήποτε δὲ οὐ μόνον οὐ συνεργεῖ πρὸς τὴν γνώσιν τῆς Ἡρακλειτείου φιλοσοφίας ἡ σκεπτικὴ ἀγωγή, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀποσυνεργεῖ, εἴγε ὁ σκεπτικὸς πάντα τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἡρακλείτου δογματιζόμενα ὡς προπετῶς λεγόμενα διαβάλλει, ἐναντιούμενος μὲν τῇ ἐκπυρώσει ἐναντιούμενος δὲ τῷ τὰ ἐναντία περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑπάρχειν, καὶ ἐπὶ παντὸς δόγματος τοῦ Ἡρακλείτου τὴν μὲν δογματικὴν προπέτειαν διασύρων, τὸ δὲ “ οὐ καταλαμβάνω ” καὶ τὸ “ οὐδὲν ὀρίζω ” ἐπιφθεγγόμενος, ὡς ἔφην ἔμπροσθεν· ὅπερ μάχεται τοῖς Ἡρακλειτείοις. ἄτοπον δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ τὴν μαχομένην ἀγωγὴν ὁδὸν εἶναι λέγειν τῆς αἰρέσεως ἐκείνης ἢ μάχεται· ἄτοπον ἄρα τὸ τὴν σκεπτικὴν ἀγωγὴν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἡρακλειτείου φιλοσοφίαν ὁδὸν εἶναι λέγειν.

^a i.e. general human experience and observation, derived from sense-impressions.

suffering from jaundice; so that the Heracliteans start from the general preconception of mankind, just as we also do and probably all the other philosophies. Consequently, if they had derived their theory that the same thing is the subject of opposite realities from one of the Sceptic formulae, such as “ All things are non-apprehensible,” or “ I determine nothing,” or some similar expression, probably they would have reached the conclusion they assert; but since their starting-points are impressions experienced not by us only but by all the other philosophers and by ordinary people, why should anyone declare that our Way of thought is a road to the Heraclitean philosophy any more than any of the other philosophies or even than the ordinary view, since we all make use of the same common material ^a?

Rather it is the case that the Sceptic Way so far 212 from being an aid to the knowledge of the Heraclitean philosophy is actually an obstacle thereto, seeing that the Sceptic decries all the dogmatic statements of Heraclitus as rash utterances, contradicting his “ Ecpyrosis,” ^b and contradicting his view that the same thing is the subject of opposite realities, and in respect of every dogma of Heraclitus scoffing at his dogmatic precipitancy, and constantly repeating, as I said before, his own “ I apprehend not ” and “ I determine nothing,” which are in conflict with the Heracliteans. Now it is absurd to say that a conflicting Way is a road to the system with which it is in conflict; therefore it is absurd to say that the Sceptic Way is a road leading to the Heraclitean philosophy.

^b i.e. “ world-conflagration,” by which all things are resolved into the primal Fire.

Α'.—ΤΙΝΙ ΔΙΑΦΕΡΕΙ Η ΣΚΕΠΤΙΚΗ ΑΓΩΓΗ ΤΗΣ
ΔΗΜΟΚΡΙΤΕΙΟΥ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑΣ

CHAPTER XXX.—WHEREIN THE SCEPTIC WAY
DIFFERS FROM THE DEMOCRITTEAN PHILOSOPHY

213 Ἄλλα καὶ ἡ Δημοκρίτειος φιλοσοφία λέγεται
κοινωνίαν ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν σκέψιν, ἐπεὶ δοκεῖ τῇ
αὐτῇ ὕλη ἡμῖν κεχρησθαι. ἀπὸ γὰρ τοῦ τοῖς μὲν
γλυκὺ φαίνεσθαι τὸ μέλι τοῖς δὲ πικρὸν τὸν Δημό-
κριτον ἐπιλογίζεσθαι φασὶ τὸ μήτε γλυκὺ αὐτὸ
εἶναι μήτε πικρὸν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐπιφθέγγεσθαι
τὴν “οὐ μᾶλλον” φωνὴν σκεπτικὴν οὖσαν. δια-
φόρως μέντοι χρῶνται τῇ “οὐ μᾶλλον” φωνῇ οἱ
τε σκεπτικοὶ καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ Δημοκρίτου· ἐκείνοι
μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ μηδέτερον εἶναι τάττουσι τὴν
φωνήν, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀγνοεῖν πότερον ἀμφοτέρα
214 ἢ οὐθέτερον τι ἔστι τῶν φαινομένων. ὥστε καὶ
κατὰ τοῦτο μὲν διαφέρομεν, προδηλοτάτη δὲ
γίνεται ἡ διάκρισις ὅταν ὁ Δημόκριτος λέγῃ “ἐτεῖ
δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν”. ἐτεῖ μὲν γὰρ λέγει ἀντὶ
τοῦ ἀληθείας· κατ’ ἀλήθειαν δὲ ὑφ’ ἐστάναι λέγων
τάς τε ἀτόμους καὶ τὸ κενὸν ὅτι διενήνοχεν ἡμῶν,
εἰ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνωμαλίας τῶν φαινομένων ἄρ-
χεται, περιττόν, οἶμαι, λέγειν.

But it is also said that the Democritean ^a philo- 213
sophy has something in common with Scepticism,
since it seems to use the same material as we; for
from the fact that honey appears sweet to some and
bitter to others, Democritus, as they say, infers that
it really is neither sweet nor bitter, and pronounces
in consequence the formula “Not more,” which is
a Sceptic formula. The Sceptics, however, and the
School of Democritus employ the expression “Not
more” in different ways; for while they use it to
express the unreality of either alternative, we express
by it our ignorance as to whether both or neither of
the appearances is real. So that in this respect 214
also we differ, and our difference becomes specially
evident when Democritus says “But in verity atoms
and void” (for he says “In verity” in place of “In
truth”); and that he differs from us when he says
that the atoms and the void are in truth subsistent,
although he starts out from the incongruity of appear-
ances, it is superfluous, I think, to state.

ΑΑ'.—ΤΙΝΙ ΔΙΑΦΕΡΕΙ ΤΗΣ ΚΥΡΗΝΑΙΚΗΣ Η ΣΚΕΨΙΣ

CHAPTER XXXI.—WHEREIN SCEPTICISM DIFFERS
FROM CYRENAICISM

215 Φασὶ δὲ τινες ὅτι ἡ Κυρηναϊκὴ ἀγωγή ἢ αὐτὴ ἔστι
τῇ σκέψει, ἐπειδὴ κάκεινῃ τὰ πάθη μόνα φησὶ κατα-
λαμβάνεσθαι.¹ διαφέρει δὲ αὐτῆς, ἐπειδὴ ἐκείνη
μὲν τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὴν λείαν τῆς σαρκὸς κίνησιν
τέλος εἶναι λέγει, ἡμεῖς δὲ τὴν ἀταραξίαν, ἣ ἐναν-
τιοῦται τὸ κατ’ ἐκείνους τέλος· καὶ γὰρ παρούσης

Some assert that the Cyrenaic ^b doctrine is identical 215
with Scepticism since it too affirms that only mental
states are apprehended. But it differs from Scepticism
inasmuch as it says that the End is pleasure and the
smooth motion of the flesh, whereas we say it is
“quietude,” which is the opposite of their End; for

¹ καταλαμβάνεσθαι. Pohlenz, Mutsch.: καταλαμβάνειν MSS.,
Bekk.

^a See Introd. pp. xi ff.

^b See Introd. p. xvii; cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 191 ff.

τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ μὴ παρούσης παραχὰς ὑπομένει ὁ διαβεβαιούμενος τέλος εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν, ὡς ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ τέλους ἐπελογισάμην. εἶτα ἡμεῖς μὲν ἐπέχομεν ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ περὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων, οἱ δὲ Κυρηναῖκοι ἀποφαίνονται φύσιν αὐτὰ ἔχειν ἀκατάληπτον.

ΔΒ'.—ΤΙΝΙ ΔΙΑΦΕΡΕΙ ΤΗΣ ΠΡΩΤΑΓΟΡΕΙΟΥ ΔΙΩΓΗΣ
Η ΣΚΕΨΙΣ

216 Καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας δὲ βούλεται πάντων χρημάτων εἶναι μέτρον τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστιν, τῶν δὲ οὐκ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, μέτρον μὲν λέγων τὸ κριτήριον, χρημάτων δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων, ὡς δυνάμει φάσκειν πάντων πραγμάτων κριτήριον εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστιν, τῶν δὲ οὐκ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τίθησι τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκάστω μόνον, καὶ οὕτως
217 εἰσάγει τὸ πρὸς τι. διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ κοινωνίαν ἔχειν πρὸς τοὺς Πυρρωνεῖους. διαφέρει δὲ αὐτῶν, καὶ εἰσόμεθα τὴν διαφορὰν, ἐξαπλῶσαντες συμμέτρως τὸ δοκοῦν τῷ Πρωταγόρα.

Φησὶν οὖν ὁ ἀνὴρ τὴν ὕλην ῥευστὴν εἶναι, ῥεούσης δὲ αὐτῆς συνεχῶς προσθέσεις ἀντὶ τῶν ἀποφορήσεων γίνεσθαι καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις μετακοσμεῖσθαι τε καὶ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι παρά τε ἡλικίας καὶ
218 παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας κατασκευὰς τῶν σωμάτων. λέγει δὲ καὶ τοὺς λόγους πάντων τῶν φαινομένων ὑποκεῖσθαι ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ, ὡς δύνασθαι τὴν ὕλην ὅσον ἐφ' ἑαυτῇ πάντα εἶναι ὅσα πᾶσι φαίνεται. τοὺς

^a §§ 25 ff. *supra*.

whether pleasure be present or not present the man who positively affirms pleasure to be the End undergoes perturbations, as I have argued in my chapter "Of the End."^a Further, whereas we suspend judgement, so far as regards the essence of external objects, the Cyrenaics declare that those objects possess a real nature which is inapprehensible.

CHAPTER XXXII.—WHEREIN SCEPTICISM DIFFERS
FROM THE PROTAGOREAN DOCTRINE

Protagoras^b also holds that "Man is the measure 216 of all things, of existing things that they exist, and of non-existing things that they exist not"; and by "measure" he means the criterion, and by "things" the objects, so that he is virtually asserting that "Man is the criterion of all objects, of those which exist that they exist, and of those which exist not that they exist not." And consequently he posits only what appears to each individual, and thus he introduces relativity. And for this reason he seems also 217 to have something in common with the Pyrrhoneans. Yet he differs from them, and we shall perceive the difference when we have adequately explained the views of Protagoras.

What he states then is this—that matter is in flux, and as it flows additions are made continuously in the place of the effluxions, and the senses are transformed and altered according to the times of life and to all the other conditions of the bodies. He says also 218 that the "reasons" of all the appearances subsist in matter, so that matter, so far as depends on itself, is capable of being all those things which appear to

^b See *Introd.* p. xiv. In his physical theory Protagoras follows Heracleitus

δὲ ἀνθρώπους ἄλλοτε ἄλλων ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι παρὰ τὰς διαφόρους αὐτῶν διαθέσεις· τὸν μὲν γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχοντα ἐκεῖνα τῶν ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ καταλαμβάνειν ἃ τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσι φαίνεσθαι δύναται, τοὺς
219 δὲ παρὰ φύσιν ἃ τοῖς παρὰ φύσιν. καὶ ἤδη παρὰ τὰς ἡλικίας καὶ κατὰ τὸ ὑπνοῦν ἢ ἐγρηγορέναι καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον εἶδος τῶν διαθέσεων ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος· γίνεται τοίνυν κατ' αὐτὸν τῶν ὄντων κριτήριον ὁ ἀνθρώπος· πάντα γὰρ τὰ φαινόμενα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἔστιν, τὰ δὲ μηδενὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φαινόμενα οὐδὲ ἔστιν.

Ὅρωμεν οὖν ὅτι καὶ περὶ τοῦ τὴν ὕλην ῥευστὴν εἶναι καὶ περὶ τοῦ τοὺς λόγους τῶν φαινομένων πάντων ἐν αὐτῇ ὑποκείσθαι δογματίζει, ἀδήλων ὄντων καὶ ἡμῖν ἐφεκτῶν.

ΔΓ'.—ΤΙΝΙ ΔΙΑΦΕΡΕΙ ΤΗΣ ΑΚΑΔΗΜΑΪΚΗΣ
ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑΣ Ἡ ΣΚΕΨΙΣ

220 Φασὶ μέντοι τινὲς ὅτι ἡ Ἀκαδημαϊκὴ φιλοσοφία ἢ αὐτὴ ἐστὶ τῇ σκέψει· διόπερ ἀκόλουθον ἂν εἴη καὶ περὶ τούτου διεξελεῖν.

Ἀκαδήμια δὲ γεγόνασιν, ὡς <οἱ μὲν πλείους> φασὶ, [πλείους μὲν ἢ]¹ τρεῖς, μία μὲν καὶ ἀρχαιοτάτη ἢ τῶν περὶ Πλάτωνα, δευτέρα δὲ καὶ μέση ἢ τῶν περὶ Ἀρκεσίλαον τὸν ἀκουστὴν Πολέμωνος, τρίτη δὲ καὶ νέα ἢ τῶν περὶ Καρνεάδην καὶ Κλειτόμαχον· ἐνιοὶ δὲ καὶ τετάρτην προστιθέασιν τῶν περὶ Φίλωνα καὶ Χαριμίδαν, τινὲς δὲ καὶ

¹ add. et om. e conj. Bekk.

^a i.e., in brief, all "appearances" (sensations, opinions, etc.) are due to inter-action between the matter of the

all.^a And men, he says, apprehend different things at different times owing to their differing dispositions; for he who is in a natural state apprehends those things subsisting in matter which are able to appear to those in a natural state, and those who are in a non-natural state the things which can appear to those in a non-natural state. Moreover, precisely the same
219 account applies to the variations due to age, and to the sleeping or waking state, and to each several kind of condition. Thus, according to him, Man becomes the criterion of real existences; for all things that appear to men also exist, and things that appear to no man have no existence either.

We see, then, that he dogmatizes about the fluidity of matter and also about the subsistence therein of the "reasons" of all appearances, these being non-evident matters about which we suspend judgement.

CHAPTER XXXIII.—WHEREIN SCEPTICISM DIFFERS
FROM THE ACADEMIC PHILOSOPHY

Some indeed say that the Academic philosophy^b is
220 identical with Scepticism; consequently it shall be our next task to discuss this statement.

According to most people there have been three Academies—the first and most ancient that of Plato and his School, the second or middle Academy that of Arcesilaus, the pupil of Polemo, and his School, the third or New Academy that of the School of Carneades and Cleitomachus. Some, however, add as a fourth that of the School of Philo and Charmidas; and some percipient subject and the matter of the objective world, both of which are in constant flux. Thus "matter" is potentially the "phenomenon."

^b See *Intro.* pp. xxxii f.

πέμπτην καταλέγουσι τὴν τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀντίοχον.
221 ἀρξάμενοι τοίνυν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχαίας ἴδωμεν τὴν
διαφορὰν τῶν εἰρημένων φιλοσοφῶν.

Τὸν Πλάτωνα οὖν οἱ μὲν δογματικὸν ἔφασαν
εἶναι, οἱ δὲ ἀπορητικόν, οἱ δὲ κατὰ μὲν τι ἀπο-
ρητικὸν κατὰ δέ τι δογματικόν· ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς
γυμναστικοῖς [φασὶ] λόγοις, ἔνθα ὁ Σωκράτης
εἰσάγεται ἤτοι παίζων πρὸς τινας ἢ ἀγωνιζόμενος
πρὸς σοφιστάς, γυμναστικόν τε καὶ ἀπορητικόν
φασιν ἔχειν αὐτὸν χαρακτῆρα, δογματικὸν δὲ
222 ἔνθα σπουδάζων ἀποφαίνεται ἤτοι διὰ Σωκράτους
ἢ Τιμαίου ἢ τινοσ τῶν τοιούτων. περὶ μὲν οὖν
τῶν δογματικὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι λεγόντων, ἢ κατὰ μὲν
τι δογματικὸν κατὰ δέ τι ἀπορητικόν, περισσὸν ἂν
εἶη λέγειν νῦν· αὐτοὶ γὰρ ὁμολογοῦσι τὴν πρὸς
ἡμᾶς διαφορὰν· περὶ δὲ τοῦ εἶ ἔστιν εἰλικρινῶς
σκεπτικὸς πλατύτερον μὲν ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασι
διαλαμβάνομεν, νῦν δὲ ὡς ἐν ὑποτυπώσει λέγομεν¹
κατὰ τῶν περὶ² Μηνόδοτον καὶ Αἰνησίδημον (οἱ τοὶ
γὰρ μάλιστα ταύτης προσέστησαν τῆς στάσεως) ὅτι
ὅταν ὁ Πλάτων ἀποφαινηται περὶ ἰδεῶν ἢ περὶ
τοῦ πρόνοιαν εἶναι ἢ περὶ τοῦ τὸν ἐνάρετον βίον
αἰρετώτερον εἶναι τοῦ μετὰ κακιῶν, εἴτε ὡς ὑπ-
άρχουσι τούτοις συγκατατίθεται, δογματίζει, εἴτε
ὡς πιθανωτέροις προστίθεται, ἐπεὶ προκρίνει τι
κατὰ πίστιν ἢ ἀπιστίαν, ἐκπέφευγε τὸν σκεπτικὸν
χαρακτῆρα· ὡς γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἔστιν ἀλλό-
τριον, ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημένων πρόδηλον.

¹ λέγομεν T, cj. Bekk.: διαλαμβάνομεν mss.

² τῶν περὶ M. Heintz: περιηδοτον mss.: κατὰ M. Fabr., Bekk.

^a i.e. those which aim at training the mind—subdivided

even count the School of Antiochus as a fifth. Be- 221
ginning, then, with the Old Academy let us consider
how the philosophies mentioned differ <from ours>.

Plato has been described by some as “dogmatic,” by
others as “dubitative,” and by others again as partly
dogmatic and partly dubitative. For in his exercita-
tory discourses,^a where Socrates is introduced either
as talking playfully with his auditors or as arguing
against sophists, he shows, they say, an exercitatory
and dubitative character; but a dogmatic character
when he is speaking seriously by the mouth either
of Socrates or of Timaeus or of some similar personage.
Now as regards those who describe him as a dogmatist, 222
or as partly dogmatic and partly dubitative, it would
be superfluous to say anything now; for they them-
selves acknowledge his difference from us. But the
question whether Plato is a genuine Sceptic is one
which we discuss more fully in our “Commentaries”^b;
but now, in opposition to Menodotus^c and Aenesi-
demus (these being the chief champions of this view),
we declare in brief that when Plato makes state-
ments about Ideas or about the reality of Providence
or about the virtuous life being preferable to the
vicious, he is dogmatizing if he is assenting to these as
actual truths, while if he is accepting them as more
probable than not, since thereby he gives a preference
to one thing over another in point of probability or
improbability, he throws off the character of a Sceptic;
for that such an attitude is foreign to us is quite plain
from what has been said above.

(in Diog. Laert. iii. 49 ff.) into “maeentic” (“akin to the
midwife’s art” or “mental obstetrics”) and “peirastic” (or
“tentative,” e.g. *Lysis, Laches, Euthyphro, Meno*).

^b i.e. the five books *Against the Dogmatists*; see *Introduct.*
p. xli.

^c See *Introduct.* p. xl.

223 Εἰ δέ τινα καὶ σκεπτικῶς προφέρεται, ὅταν, ὡς φασί, γυμνάζηται, οὐ παρὰ τοῦτο ἔσται σκεπτικός· ὁ γὰρ περὶ ἐνὸς δογματίζων, ἢ προκρίνων φαντασίαν φαντασίας ὅλως κατὰ πίστιν ἢ ἀπιστίαν <ἢ ἀποφαινόμενος>¹ περὶ τίνος τῶν ἀδήλων, τοῦ δογματικοῦ γίνεται χαρακτηῆρος, ὡς δηλοῖ καὶ ὁ Τίμων διὰ τῶν περὶ Ξενοφάνους αὐτῷ λεγομένων.
 224 ἐν πολλοῖς γὰρ αὐτὸν ἐπαίνεσας [τὸν Ξενοφάνην],² ὡς καὶ τοὺς σίλλους αὐτῷ ἀναθεῖναι, ἐποίησεν αὐτὸν ὀδυρόμενον καὶ λέγοντα

ὡς καὶ ἐγὼν ὄφελον πυκνικοῦ νόου ἀντιβολήσαι ἀμφοτερόβλεπτος· δολίη δ' ὁδῶ ἐξαπατήθην πρεσβυγενῆς ἔτ' ἐὼν καὶ ἀμενθήριστος³ ἀπάσης σκεπτοσύνης. ὄππη γὰρ ἐμὸν νόον εἰρύσαιμι, εἰς ἐν ταυτὸ τε πᾶν ἀνελύετο· πᾶν δ' ἐὼν αἰεὶ πάντη ἀνεκτόμενον μίαν εἰς φύσιν ἴσαθ' ὁμοίην.

διὰ τοῦτο γοῦν καὶ ὑπάτυφον αὐτὸν λέγει, καὶ οὐ τέλειον ἄτυφον, δι' ὧν φησὶ

Ξενοφάνης ὑπάτυφος, ὀμηραπάτης ἐπισκώπτης, ἐκτὸς ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων θεὸν ἐπλάσατ' ἴσον ἀπάντη, <ἀτρεμῆ>⁴ ἀσκηθῆ, νοερώτερον⁵ ἢ ἐ νόημα.

ὑπάτυφον μὲν γὰρ εἶπε τὸν κατὰ τι ἄτυφον, ὀμηραπάτης δὲ ἐπισκώπτην, ἐπεὶ τὴν παρ' Ὀμήρω
 225 ἀπάτην διέστυρεν. ἐδογματίζε δὲ ὁ Ξενοφάνης παρὰ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων προλήψεις ἐν εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, καὶ τὸν θεὸν συμφυῆ τοῖς πᾶσι, εἶναι δὲ σφαιροειδῆ καὶ ἀπαθῆ καὶ ἀμετάβλητον καὶ λογι-

¹ <ἢ ἀποφαινόμενος> add. Papp.

² [τὸν Ξ.] del. Kayser, Mutsch.

³ ἀμενθήριστος Bergk: ἀπερθ. mss., Bekk.

⁴ <ἀτρεμῆ> add. Diels.

⁵ νοερώτερον Diels: νοερωτὸν mss., Bekk.

And if Plato does really utter some statements in a 223 sceptical way when he is, as they say, “exercising,” that will not make him a Sceptic; for the man that dogmatizes about a single thing, or ever prefers one impression to another in point of credibility or incredibility, or makes any assertion about any non-evident object, assumes the dogmatic character, as Timon^a also shows by his remarks about Xenophanes. For 224 after praising him repeatedly, so that he even dedicated to him his *Satires*, he represented him as uttering this lamentation—

Would that I too had attained a mind compacted of wisdom, Both ways casting my eyes; but the treacherous pathway deceived me, Old that I was, and as yet unversed in the doubts of the Sceptic.

For in whatever direction I turned my mind in its questing All was resolved into One and the Same; All ever-existing Into one self-same nature returning shaped itself all ways.

So on this account he also calls him “semi-vain,” and not perfectly free from vanity, where he says—

Xenophanes semi-vain, derider of Homer's deceptions, Framed him a God far other than Man, self-equal in all ways, Safe from shaking or scathe, surpassing thought in his thinking.

He called him “semi-vain” as being in some degree free from vanity, and “derider of Homer's deceptions” because he censured the deceit mentioned in Homer.^b Xenophanes, contrary to the preconceptions 225 of all other men, asserted dogmatically that the All is one, and that God is consubstantial with all things, and is of spherical form and passionless and unchange-

^a See Introd. p. xxxi; and for Xenophanes, *ibid.*, p. viii.

^b e.g. Homer, *Il.* ii. 114 where Agamemnon says of Zeus
 νῦν δὲ κακὴν ἀπάτην βουλεύσατ'. Cf. Plato, *Rep.* 380 D ff.

κόν· ὄθεν καὶ ῥάδιον τὴν Ξενοφάνους πρὸς ἡμᾶς διαφορὰν ἐπιδεικνύουσι. πλὴν ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων πρόδηλον ὅτι καὶ περὶ τινῶν ἐπαπορή ὁ Πλάτων, ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ἐν τισὶ φαίνεται ἢ περὶ ὑπάρξεως ἀποφαινόμενος πραγμάτων ἀδήλων ἢ προκρίνων ἀδηλα κατὰ πίστιν, οὐκ ἂν εἶη σκεπτικός.

226 Οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς νέας Ἀκαδημίας, εἰ καὶ ἀκατάληπτα εἶναι πάντα φασί, διαφέρουσι τῶν σκεπτικῶν ἴσως μὲν καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ λέγειν πάντα εἶναι ἀκατάληπτα (διαβεβαιοῦνται γὰρ περὶ τούτου, ὁ δὲ σκεπτικός ἐνδέχεται καὶ καταληφθῆναι τινα προσδοκᾶ), διαφέρουσι δὲ ἡμῶν προδήλως ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν κακῶν κρίσει. ἀγαθὸν γὰρ τί φασιν εἶναι οἱ Ἀκαδημαῖκοι καὶ κακὸν οὐχ ὡς ἡμεῖς, ἀλλὰ μετὰ τοῦ πεπεῖσθαι ὅτι πιθανόν ἐστι μᾶλλον ὁ λέγουσιν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχειν ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ κακοῦ ὁμοίως, ἡμῶν ἀγαθόν τι ἢ κακὸν εἶναι λεγόντων οὐδὲν μετὰ τοῦ πιθανόν εἶναι νομίζω ὃ φάμεν, ἀλλ' ἀδοξάστως ἐπομένων

227 τῷ βίῳ, ἵνα μὴ ἀνερέγηται ὤμεν. τὰς τε φαντασίας ἡμεῖς μὲν ἴσας λέγομεν εἶναι κατὰ πίστιν ἢ ἀπιστίαν ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ, ἐκείνοι δὲ τὰς μὲν πιθανὰς εἶναι φασὶ τὰς δὲ ἀπιθάνους.

Καὶ τῶν πιθανῶν δὲ λέγουσι διαφορὰς· τὰς μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ μόνον πιθανὰς ὑπάρχειν ἡγοῦνται, τὰς δὲ πιθανὰς καὶ διεξωδευμένας, τὰς δὲ πιθανὰς καὶ

able and rational; and from this it is easy to show how Xenophanes differs from us. However, it is plain from what has been said that even if Plato evinces doubt about some matters, yet he cannot be a Sceptic inasmuch as he shows himself at times either making assertions about the reality of non-evident objects or preferring one non-evident thing to another in point of credibility.

The adherents of the New Academy, although they 226 affirm that all things are non-apprehensible, yet differ from the Sceptics even, as seems probable, in respect of this very statement that all things are non-apprehensible (for they affirm this positively, whereas the Sceptic regards it as possible that some things may be apprehended); but they differ from us quite plainly in their judgement of things good and evil. For the Academicians do not describe a thing as good or evil in the way we do; for they do so with the conviction that it is more probable^a that what they call good is really good rather than the opposite, and so too in the case of evil, whereas when we describe a thing as good or evil we do not add it as our opinion that what we assert is probable, but simply conform to life undogmatically that we may not be precluded from activity.^b And as regards 227 sense-impressions, we say^c that they are equal in respect of probability and improbability, so far as their essence is concerned, whereas they assert that some impressions are probable, others improbable.

And respecting the probable impressions they make distinctions: some they regard as just simply probable, others as probable and tested, others as

^a Carneades was the chief exponent of this "probabilism"; see *Introd.* pp. xxxiii-xxxiv.

^b *Cf.* §§ 15, 23 f.; ii. 13.

^c *Cf.* § 117.

περιωδευμένας καὶ ἀπερισπάστους. ὅσον ἐν οἴκῳ σκοτεινῷ ποσῶς κειμένου σχοινίου ἐσπειραμένου πιθανῆ ἀπλῶς φαντασία γίνεται ἀπὸ τούτου ὡς
 228 ἀπὸ ὄψεως τῷ ἀθρόως ἐπισελθόντι τῷ μέντοι περισκοπήσαντι ἀκριβῶς καὶ διεξοδεύσαντι τὰ περὶ αὐτό, ὅσον ὅτι οὐ κινεῖται, ὅτι τὸ χρῶμα τοῖόν ἐστι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον, φαίνεται σχοινίον κατὰ τὴν φαντασίαν τὴν πιθανὴν καὶ περιωδευμένην. ἡ δὲ καὶ ἀπερίσπαστος φαντασία τοιάδε ἐστίν. λέγεται ὁ Ἡρακλῆς ἀποθανοῦσαν τὴν Ἄλκηστιν αὖθις ἐξ ᾄδου ἀναγαγεῖν καὶ δεῖξαι τῷ Ἀδμήτῳ, ὃς¹ πιθανὴν ἐλάμβανε φαντασίαν τῆς Ἄλκηστιδος καὶ περιωδευμένην· ἐπεὶ μέντοι ἦδει ὅτι τέθηκεν, περιεσπάτο αὐτοῦ ἡ διάνοια ἀπὸ τῆς συγκαταθέσεως καὶ πρὸς ἀπιστίαν ἐκκλινεν.
 229 προκρίνουσιν οὖν οἱ ἐκ τῆς νέας Ἀκαδημίας τῆς μὲν πιθανῆς ἀπλῶς τὴν πιθανὴν καὶ περιωδευμένην φαντασίαν, ἀμφοτέρων δὲ τούτων τὴν πιθανὴν καὶ περιωδευμένην καὶ ἀπερίσπαστον.

Εἰ δὲ καὶ πείθεσθαι τισιν οἱ τε ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως λέγουσι, πρόδηλος καὶ ἡ κατὰ τοῦτο διαφορά τῶν φιλοσοφῶν.
 230 τὸ γὰρ πείθεσθαι λέγεται διαφόρως, τὸ τε μὴ ἀντιτείνειν ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς ἔπεισθαι ἄνευ σφοδρᾶς προσκλίσεως καὶ προσπαθείας, ὡς ὁ παῖς λέγεται πείθεσθαι τῷ παιδαγωγῷ· ἅπαξ δὲ τὸ μετὰ αἰρέσεως καὶ οἰονεῖ συμπαθείας κατὰ τὸ σφόδρα βούλεσθαι συγκατατίθεσθαι τινι, ὡς ὁ ἄσωτος

¹ ὃς T: καὶ mss., Bekk.

^a διεξοδευμένας and περιωδευμένας mean literally "gone all through" (or "all over"), hence "thoroughly inspected,"

probable, tested, and "irreversible."^a For example, when a rope is lying coiled up in a dark room, to one who enters hurriedly it presents the simply "probable" appearance of being a serpent; but to the
 228 man who has looked carefully round and has investigated the conditions—such as its immobility and its colour, and each of its other peculiarities—it appears as a rope, in accordance with an impression that is probable and tested. And the impression that is also "irreversible" or incontrovertible is of this kind. When Alcestis had died, Heracles, it is said, brought her up again from Hades and showed her to Admetus, who received an impression of Alcestis that was probable and tested; since, however, he knew that she was dead his mind recoiled from its assent and reverted to unbelief.^b So then the philosophers
 229 of the New Academy prefer the probable and tested impression to the simply probable, and to both of these the impression that is probable and tested and irreversible.

And although both the Academics and the Sceptics say that they believe some things, yet here too the difference between the two philosophies is quite plain. For the word "believe" has different meanings: it
 230 means not to resist but simply to follow without any strong impulse or inclination, as the boy is said to believe his tutor; but sometimes it means to assent to a thing of deliberate choice and with a kind of sympathy due to strong desire, as when the incontinent man believes him who approves of

"scrutinized": ἀπερισπάστους, "not able to be drawn round" (or "stripped off"), hence "indubitable."

^b This is a curious example of an "irreversible" impression. If the text is right, it looks as if Sextus was nodding.

πείθεται τῷ δαπανητικῶς βιοῦν ἀξιούντι. διόπερ ἐπειδὴ οἱ μὲν περὶ Καρνεάδην καὶ Κλειτόμαχον μετὰ προσκλίσεως σφοδρᾶς πείθεσθαι τε καὶ πιθανὸν εἶναι τι φασίν, ἡμεῖς δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς εἴκειν ἄνευ προσπαθείας, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἂν αὐτῶν διαφέρομεν.

- 231 Ἄλλα καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὸ τέλος διαφέρομεν τῆς νέας Ἀκαδημίας· οἱ μὲν γὰρ κατ' αὐτὴν κοσμεῖσθαι λέγοντες ἄνδρες τῷ πιθανῷ προσχρῶνται κατὰ τὸν βίον, ἡμεῖς δὲ τοῖς νόμοις καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσι καὶ τοῖς φυσικοῖς πάθεσι ἐπόμεινοι βιοῦμεν ἀδοξάστως. καὶ πλείω δ' ἂν εἴπομεν πρὸς τὴν διάκρισιν, εἰ μὴ τῆς συντομίας ἔστοχαζόμεθα.
- 232 Ὁ μέντοι Ἀρκεσίλαος, ὃν τῆς μέσης Ἀκαδημίας ἐλέγομεν εἶναι προστάτην καὶ ἀρχηγόν, πάνν μοι δοκεῖ τοῖς Πυρρωνεῖοις κοινωνεῖν λόγοις, ὡς μίαν εἶναι σχεδὸν τὴν κατ' αὐτὸν ἀγωγὴν καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ ὑπάρξεως ἢ ἀνυπαρξίας τινὸς ἀποφαινόμενος εὐρίσκειται, οὔτε κατὰ πίστιν ἢ ἀπιστίαν προκρίνει τι ἕτερον ἑτέρου, ἀλλὰ περὶ πάντων ἐπέχει. καὶ τέλος μὲν εἶναι τὴν ἐποχὴν, ἢ συνεισέρχεσθαι τὴν ἀταραξίαν ἡμεῖς
- 233 ἐφάσκομεν. λέγει δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὰ μὲν εἶναι τὰς κατὰ μέρος ἐποχάς, κακὰ δὲ τὰς κατὰ μέρος συγκαταθέσεις. [ἤτοι] πλὴν εἰ μὴ λέγοι τις ὅτι ἡμεῖς μὲν κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἡμῖν ταῦτα λέγομεν καὶ οὐ διαβεβαιωτικῶς, ἐκεῖνος δὲ ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν, ὥστε καὶ ἀγαθὸν μὲν εἶναι αὐτὴν λέγειν τὴν ἐποχὴν,
- 234 κακὸν δὲ τὴν συγκατάθεσιν. εἰ δὲ δεῖ καὶ τοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ λεγομένοις πιστεύειν, φασὶν ὅτι κατὰ

an extravagant mode of life. Since, therefore, Carneades and Cleitomachus declare that a strong inclination accompanies their credence and the credibility of the object, while we^a say that our belief is a matter of simple yielding without any consent, here too there must be a difference between us and them.

Furthermore, as regards the End (or aim of life)^b 231 we differ from the New Academy; for whereas the men who profess to conform to its doctrine^c use probability as the guide of life, we^d live in an undogmatic way by following the laws, customs, and natural affections. And we might say still more about this distinction had it not been that we are aiming at conciseness.

Arcesilaus, however, who was, as we said,^e the 232 president and founder of the Middle Academy, certainly seems to me to have shared the doctrines of Pyrrho, so that his Way of thought is almost identical with ours. For we do not find him making any assertion about the reality or unreality of anything, nor does he prefer any one thing to another in point of probability or improbability, but suspends judgement about all. He also says that the End is suspension—which is accompanied, as we have said, by "quietude." He declares, too, that suspension regarding particular 233 objects is good, but assent regarding particulars bad. Only one might say that whereas we make these statements not positively but in accordance with what appears to us, he makes them as statements of real facts, so that he asserts that suspension in itself really is good and assent bad. And if one ought to credit 234 also what is said about him, he appeared at the first

^a Cf. §§ 22, 27 ff. *supra*.

^c Cf. § 226.

^d Cf. §§ 23, 24.

^b See §§ 25 *supra*.

^e Cf. § 220 *supra*.

μὲν τὸ πρόχειρον Πυρρώνειος ἐφαίνετο εἶναι, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀλήθειαν δογματικὸς ἦν· καὶ ἐπεὶ τῶν ἐταίρων ἀπόπειραν ἐλάμβανε διὰ τῆς ἀπορητικῆς εἰ εὐφύως ἔχουσι πρὸς τὴν ἀνάληψιν τῶν Πλατωνικῶν δογμάτων, δόξαι αὐτὸν ἀπορητικὸν εἶναι, τοῖς μέντοι γε εὐφύεσι τῶν ἐταίρων τὰ Πλάτωνος παρεγχειρεῖν. ἔνθεν καὶ τὸν Ἀρίστωνα εἰπεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ

πρόσθε Πλάτων, ὅπιθεν Πύρρων, μέσσοις Διόδωρος,

διὰ τὸ προσχρησθαι τῇ διαλεκτικῇ τῇ κατὰ τὸν Διόδωρον, εἶναι δὲ ἀντικρὺς Πλατωνικόν.

235 Οἱ δὲ περὶ Φίλωνά φασιν ὅσον μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ στωικῷ κριτηρίῳ, τοῦτέστι τῇ καταληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ, ἀκατάληπτα εἶναι τὰ πράγματα, ὅσον δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῶν καταληπτά. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ Ἀντίοχος τὴν στοᾶν μετήγαγεν εἰς τὴν Ἀκαδημίαν, ὡς καὶ εἰρήσθαι ἐπ' αὐτῷ ὅτι ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ φιλοσοφεῖ τὰ στωικά· ἐπεδείκνυε γὰρ ὅτι παρὰ Πλάτωνι κείμενα τὰ τῶν στωικῶν δόγματα, ὡς πρόδηλον εἶναι τὴν τῆς σκεπτικῆς ἀγωγῆς διαφορὰν πρὸς τε τὴν τετάρτην καὶ τὴν πέμπτην καλουμένην Ἀκαδημίαν.

ΛΔ'.—Εἰ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἰατρικὴν ἐμπειρία ἡ αὐτὴ ἐστὶ τῆ σκεψῆς

236 Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τῇ ἐμπειρίᾳ τῇ κατὰ τὴν ἰατρικὴν αἰρέσει τὴν αὐτὴν λέγουσιν εἶναι τὴν σκεπ-

^a Ariston of Chios, a pupil of Zeno the Stoic.

^b The verse is a parody of Homer, *Il.* vi. 181 (*cf.* Hesiod,

glance, they say, to be a Pyrrhonian, but in reality he was a dogmatist; and because he used to test his companions by means of dubitation to see if they were fitted by nature for the reception of the Platonic dogmas, he was thought to be a dubitative philosopher, but he actually passed on to such of his companions as were naturally gifted the dogmas of Plato. And this was why Ariston^a described him as "Plato the head of him, Pyrrho the tail, in the midst Diodorus"^b; because he employed the dialectic of Diodorus, although he was actually a Platonist.

Philo^c asserts that objects are inapprehensible 235 so far as concerns the Stoic criterion, that is to say "apprehensive impression," but are apprehensible so far as concerns the real nature of the objects themselves. Moreover, Antiochus^c actually transferred the Stoa to the Academy, so that it was even said of him that "In the Academy he teaches the Stoic philosophy"; for he tried to show that the dogmas of the Stoics are already present in Plato. So that it is quite plain how the Sceptic "Way" differs from what is called the Fourth Academy and the Fifth.

CHAPTER XXXIV.—WHETHER MEDICAL EMPIRICISM IS THE SAME AS SCEPTICISM

Since some allege that the Sceptic philosophy 236 is identical with the Empiricism of the Medical

Theog. 323), who thus describes the Chimaera: πρόσθε λέων, ἐπιθεν δὲ δράκων, μέσση δὲ χίμαιρα ("Lion the head of her, Dragon the tail of her, trunk of a She-goat"). Diodorus Cronos was a Megaric philosopher (circa 300 B.C.).

^c See *Intro.* pp. xxxvi f.

τικὴν φιλοσοφίαν, γνωστότερον ὅτι εἴπερ ἡ ἐμπειρία ἐκείνη περὶ τῆς ἀκαταληψίας τῶν ἀδήλων διαβεβαιούται, οὔτε ἡ αὐτὴ ἐστὶ τῇ σκέψει οὔτε ἀρμόζοι ἂν τῷ σκεπτικῷ τὴν αἵρεσιν ἐκείνην ἀναλαμβάνειν. μᾶλλον δὲ τὴν καλουμένην μέθοδον, 237 ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, δύναται ἂν μετιέναι· αὐτὴ γὰρ μόνη τῶν κατὰ ἰατρικὴν αἰρέσεων περὶ μὲν τῶν ἀδήλων δοκεῖ μὴ προπετεῦσθαι, πότερον καταληπτὰ ἐστὶν ἢ ἀκατάληπτα λέγειν αὐθαδεαζομένη, τοῖς δὲ φαινομένοις ἐπομένη ἀπὸ τούτων λαμβάνει τὸ συμφέρειν δοκοῦν κατὰ τὴν τῶν σκεπτικῶν ἀκολουθίαν. καὶ ἐλέγομεν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν ὅτι ὁ βίος ὁ κοινός, ᾧ καὶ ὁ σκεπτικός χρῆται, τετραμερής ἐστίν, τὸ μὲν τι ἔχων ἐν ὑψηλῇ φύσει, τὸ δ' ἐν ἀνάγκῃ παθῶν, τὸ δ' ἐν παραδόσει νόμων 238 τε καὶ ἐθῶν, τὸ δ' ἐν διδασκαλίᾳ τεχνῶν. ὡσπερ οὖν κατὰ τὴν ἀνάγκην τῶν παθῶν ὁ σκεπτικός ὑπὸ μὲν δίψους ἐπὶ ποτόν ὀδηγεῖται ὑπὸ δὲ λιμοῦ ἐπὶ τροφήν, καὶ ἐπὶ τι τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως, οὕτω καὶ ὁ μεθοδικὸς ἰατρός ὑπὸ τῶν παθῶν ἐπὶ τὰ κατάλληλα ὀδηγεῖται, ὑπὸ μὲν στεγνώσεως ἐπὶ τὴν χαύνωσιν, ὡς καταφεύγει τις ἀπὸ τῆς διὰ ψυχῆς ἐπιτεταμένον πυκνώσεως ἐπὶ ἀλέαν, ὑπὸ δὲ ῥύσεως ἐπὶ τὴν ἐποχὴν αὐτῆς, ὡς καὶ οἱ ἐν βαλανείῳ ἰδρώτι πολλῷ περιρρέομενοι καὶ ἐκλυόμενοι ἐπὶ τὴν ἐποχὴν αὐτοῦ παραγίνονται καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐπὶ τὸν ψυχρὸν ἀέρα καταφεύγουσιν. ὅτι δὲ καὶ τὰ φύσει ἀλλότρια ἐπὶ τὴν λύσιν¹ αὐτῶν

¹ λύσιν ego: φύσιν mss., Bekk.: ἄρσιν Papp.

* The later schools of Medicine were three: (1) the Dogmatic or Logical, which theorized about the "non-

sect,^a it must be recognized that inasmuch as that Empiricism positively affirms the inapprehensibility of what is non-evident it is not identical with Scepticism nor would it be consistent in a Sceptic to embrace that doctrine. He could more easily, in my opinion, adopt the so-called "Method"; for it alone of the Medical 237 systems appears to avoid rash treatment of things non-evident by arbitrary assertions as to their apprehensibility or non-apprehensibility, and following appearances derives from them what seems beneficial, in accordance with the practice of the Sceptics. For we stated above ^b that the common life, in which the Sceptic also shares, is four-fold, one part depending on the directing force of Nature, another on the compulsion of the affections, another on the tradition of laws and customs, and another on the training of the arts. So then, just as the Sceptic, in virtue of the 238 compulsion of the affections, is guided by thirst to drink and by hunger to food, and in like manner to other such objects, in the same way the Methodical physician is guided by the pathological affections to the corresponding remedies—by contraction to dilatation, as when one seeks refuge in heat from the contraction due to the application of cold, or by fluxion to the stoppage of it, as when persons in a hot bath, dripping with perspiration and in a relaxed condition, seek to put a stop to it and for this reason rush off into the cool air. It is plain, too, that conditions which are naturally alien compel us to take measures for their evident" causes of health and disease; (2) the Empiric, which regarded such causes as undiscoverable and confined itself to observation of evident facts; (3) the Methodic, which adopted an intermediate position, refusing either to affirm or deny "non-evident" causes; cf. *Introd.* p. xl.

^b § 23.

ἵεναι καταναγκάζει, πρόδηλον, ὅπου γε καὶ ὁ κύων
 σκόλοπος αὐτῷ καταπαγέντος ἐπὶ τὴν ἄρσιν αὐτοῦ
 239 παραγίνεται. καὶ ἵνα μὴ καθ' ἕκαστον λέγων
 ἐκβαίνω τὸν ὑποτυπωτικὸν τρόπον τῆς συγγραφῆς,
 πάντα οἶμαι τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν μεθοδικῶν οὕτω λεγόμενα
 ὑποτάσσεσθαι δύνασθαι τῇ ἐκ τῶν παθῶν ἀνάγκῃ,
 τῶν τε κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν, πρὸς τῷ
 καὶ τὸ ἀδόξαστόν τε καὶ ἀδιάφορον τῆς χρήσεως
 240 τῶν ὀνομάτων κοινὸν εἶναι τῶν ἀγωγῶν. ὡς γὰρ ὁ
 σκεπτικὸς <ἀδοξάστως>¹ χρῆται τῇ "οὐδὲν ὀρίζω"
 φωνῇ καὶ τῇ "οὐδὲν καταλαμβάνω," καθάπερ εἰ-
 ρήκαμεν, οὕτω καὶ ὁ μεθοδικὸς κοινότητα λέγει καὶ
 διήκειν καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια ἀπεριέργως. οὕτω δὲ καὶ
 τὸ τῆς ἐνδείξεως ὄνομα ἀδοξάστως παραλαμβάνει
 ἀντὶ τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν φαινομένων παθῶν τῶν τε κατὰ
 φύσιν καὶ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν ὀδηγήσεως ἐπὶ τὰ κατ-
 ἄλληλα εἶναι δοκοῦντα, ὡς καὶ ἐπὶ δίψους καὶ ἐπὶ
 241 λιμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὑπεμίμνησκον. ὅθεν οἰκειό-
 τητά τινα ἔχειν τὴν ἀγωγὴν τὴν κατὰ ἰατρικὴν
 τῶν μεθοδικῶν πρὸς τὴν σκέψιν, μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων
 κατὰ ἰατρικὴν αἰρέσεων καὶ ὡς πρὸς σύγκρισιν
 ἐκείνων, οὐχ ἁπλῶς, ῥητέον ἐκ τούτων καὶ τῶν
 παραπλησίων τούτοις τεκμαιρομένοις.

Τοσαῦτα καὶ περὶ τῶν παρακείσθαι δοκούντων
 τῇ κατὰ τοὺς σκεπτικὸς ἀγωγῇ διεξεληθόντες, ἐν
 τούτοις ἀπαρτίζομεν τὸν τε καθόλου τῆς σκέψεως
 λόγον καὶ τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ὑποτυπώσεων σύνταγμα.

¹ <ἀδοξάστως> add. Mutsch. e T.

* Or "generic character." All diseases being referred to one or other of the two "general" morbid states, over-contraction or over-dilatation of the pores or passages of the

removal, seeing that even the dog when it is pricked
 by a thorn proceeds to remove it. And in short—to 239
 avoid exceeding the limits proper to an outline of this
 kind by a detailed enumeration—I suppose that all
 the facts described by the Methodic School can be
 classed as instances of the compulsion of the affections,
 whether natural or against nature.

Besides, the use of terms in an undogmatic and
 indeterminate sense is common to both systems. For 240
 just as the Sceptic uses the expressions "I determine
 nothing" and "I apprehend nothing," as we have
 said, in an undogmatic sense, even so the Methodic
 speaks of "generality" and "pervade" and the like
 in a non-committal way. So also he employs the
 term "indication" in an undogmatic sense to denote
 the guidance derived from the apparent affections, or
 symptoms, both natural and contra-natural, for the
 discovery of the seemingly appropriate remedies—
 as, in fact, I mentioned in regard to hunger and thirst
 and the other affections. Consequently, judging 241
 from these and similar indications, we should say that
 the Methodic School of Medicine has some affinity
 with Scepticism; and, when viewed not simply by
 itself, but in comparison with the other Medical
 Schools, it has more affinity than they.

And now that we have said thus much concerning
 the Schools which seem to stand nearest to that of
 the Sceptics, we here bring to a conclusion both our
 general account of Scepticism and the First Book of
 our "Outlines."

body, each of these "general" states was said to "pervade"
 all the cases which exhibited the symptoms of that state.
 The "genus" "pervades" (its characteristics run through)
 its "species" and "particulars."

Α'.—ΕΙ ΔΥΝΑΤΑΙ ΖΗΤΕΙΝ Ο ΣΚΕΠΤΙΚΟΣ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ
ΛΕΓΟΜΕΝΩΝ ΠΑΡΑ ΤΟΙΣ ΔΟΓΜΑΤΙΚΟΙΣ

- 1 Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν ζήτησιν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς δογματικοὺς μετήλθομεν, ἕκαστον τῶν μερῶν τῆς καλουμένης φιλοσοφίας συντόμως καὶ ὑποτυπωτικῶς ἐφοδύσωμεν, πρότερον ἀποκρινάμενοι πρὸς τοὺς αἰὶ θρυλοῦντας ὡς μήτε ζητεῖν μήτε νοεῖν ὄλως οἷός τέ ἐστιν ὁ σκεπτικός περὶ τῶν δογματιζομένων
2 παρ' αὐτοῖς. φασὶ γὰρ ὡς ἤτοι καταλαμβάνει ὁ σκεπτικός τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν λεγόμενα ἢ οὐ καταλαμβάνει· καὶ εἰ μὲν καταλαμβάνει, πῶς ἂν ἀποροίῃ περὶ ὧν κατελιγμένα λέγει; εἰ δ' οὐ καταλαμβάνει, ἄρα περὶ ὧν οὐ κατέλιγfen οὐδὲ
3 οἶδε λέγειν. ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ μὴ εἰδώς, εἰ τύχοι, τί ἐστὶ τὸ καθ' ὃ περιαιρουμένου ἢ τὸ διὰ δύο τροπικῶν θεώρημα, οὐδὲ εἰπεῖν τι δύναται περὶ αὐτῶν, οὕτως ὁ μὴ γινώσκων ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς οὐ δύναται ζητεῖν πρὸς

^a *i.e.* the "special" section of this Sceptical treatise, as distinguished from the "general" exposition contained in Bk. I.; *cf.* i. 5, 6, 21.

^b *i.e.* Stoics and Epicureans.

^c This argument is not elsewhere mentioned; possibly it refers to some form of the "Sorites"; *cf.* § 253. But T has

CHAPTER I.—CAN THE SCEPTIC INVESTIGATE THE
STATEMENTS OF THE DOGMATISTS?

SINCE we have undertaken this inquiry in criticism 1 of the Dogmatists,^a let us review briefly and in outline the several divisions of so-called philosophy, when we have first made reply to those who keep constantly repeating that the Sceptic is incapable of either investigating or in any way cognizing the objects about which they dogmatize. For they^b maintain 2 that the Sceptic either apprehends or does not apprehend the statements made by the Dogmatists; if, then, he apprehends, how can he be perplexed about things which he has, as he says, apprehended? Whereas if he apprehends not, then neither does he know how to discuss matters which he has not apprehended. For just as he who is ignorant, for instance, 3 of the arguments known as "How far reduced"^c or "By two hypotheses,"^d is unable also to say anything about them, so the man who does not know each of the statements made by the Dogmatists is unable to

"qui non novit . . . quid est omnis triangulus habet tres angulos equales duobus rectis."

^d The hypothetical syllogism "by two hypotheses" has its major premiss in double form; *e.g.* "If A is, B is, and if A is not, B is; but A either is or is not; therefore B is." *Cf.* §§ 131, 186 *infra*.

αὐτοὺς περὶ ὧν οὐκ οἶδεν. οὐδαμῶς ἄρα δύναται
 ζητεῖν ὁ σκεπτικὸς περὶ τῶν λεγομένων παρὰ τοῖς
 4 δογματικοῖς. οἱ δὴ ταῦτα λέγοντες ἀποκρινά-
 σθωσαν ἡμῖν πῶς λέγουσι νῦν τὸ καταλαμβάνειν,
 πότερον τὸ νοεῖν ἀπλῶς ἄνευ τοῦ καὶ ὑπὲρ τῆς
 ὑπάρξεως ἐκείνων περὶ ὧν ποιούμεθα τοὺς λόγους
 διαβεβαιούσθαι, ἢ μετὰ τοῦ [νοεῖν]¹ καὶ τὴν ὑπαρξίαν
 ἐκείνων τιθεῖναι περὶ ὧν διαλεγόμεθα. εἰ μὲν γὰρ
 καταλαμβάνειν εἶναι λέγουσιν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τὸ
 καταληπτικῆ φαντασίᾳ συγκατατίθεσθαι, τῆς κατα-
 ληπτικῆς φαντασίας οὔσης ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος, κατ'
 αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπομεμαγμένης καὶ ἐναπεσφρα-
 γισμένης, οἷα οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχον-
 τος, οὐδὲ αὐτοὶ βουλήσονται τάχα μὴ δύνασθαι
 ζητεῖν περὶ ἐκείνων ἃ μὴ κατελήφασιν οὕτως.
 5 οἷον γοῦν ὅταν ὁ στωικὸς πρὸς τὸν Ἐπικούρειον
 ζητῆ λέγοντα ὅτι διήρηται ἡ οὐσία ἢ ὡς ὁ θεὸς
 οὐ προνοεῖ τῶν ἐν κόσμῳ ἢ ὅτι ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν,
 πότερον κατεῖληφεν ἢ οὐ κατεῖληφεν; καὶ εἰ μὲν
 κατεῖληφεν, ὑπάρχει αὐτὰ λέγων ἄρδην ἀναιρεῖ
 τὴν στοάν· εἰ δ' οὐ κατεῖληφεν, οὐ δύναται τι πρὸς
 αὐτὰ λέγειν.
 6 Τὰ δὲ παραπλήσια καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων
 αἰρέσεων ἀναγομένους λεκτέον, ὅταν τι ζητεῖν περὶ
 τῶν δοκούντων τοῖς ἑτεροδόξοις αὐτῶν ἐθέλωσιν.

¹ [νοεῖν] del. Heintz.

* For this term in the Stoic epistemology see *Intro.* p. xxv. The argument is, in brief, that the Stoic cannot consistently criticize the Epicurean unless he allows that his "apprehensive impression" of their dogmas is an impression of things which have no basis in reality, and this contradicts the Stoic definition of "apprehensive impression."

^b It is uncertain to what "division" this refers—whether

criticize them concerning matters of which he has no knowledge. Thus the Sceptic is wholly incapable of investigating the statements made by the Dogmatists.

Now let those who speak thus make answer and ⁴ tell us in what sense they are now using the term "apprehend," whether simply of mental conception without the further affirmation of the reality of the objects under discussion, or with the further assumption of the reality of the objects discussed. For if they say that "to apprehend" means, in their argument, to assent to an "apprehensive impression,"^a the apprehensive impression being derived from a real object and being an imprint or stamp upon the mind corresponding to the actual object, such as would not result from what is unreal, then probably not even they themselves will wish to allow their inability to investigate things which, in this sense, they have not apprehended. Thus, for example, when the ⁵ Stoic criticizes the statement of the Epicurean that "Being is divided,"^b or that "God does not foreknow events in the Universe," or that "Pleasure is the Good," has he apprehended or has he not apprehended? If he has apprehended these dogmas, by asserting their real truth he entirely overthrows the Porch; while if he has not apprehended them, he is unable to say anything against them.

And we must use a like argument against those ⁶ who issue from any of the other Sects, whenever they desire to make any critical investigation of the tenets of those who differ from them in doctrine. Con- that of God from the world (Fabricius), of Body from Void (Zimmermann), of the "numberless worlds" from one another (Pappenheim), or (as seems simplest) of Body into numberless atomic fractions. For the *dicta* about "God" and "Pleasure" *cf.* iii. 219.

ὥστε οὐ δύνανται περί τινος ζητεῖν πρὸς ἀλλήλους. μάλλον δέ, εἰ χρή μὴ ληρεῖν, συγχυθήσεται μὲν αὐτῶν ἅπαντα ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἢ δογματική, συντόμως δὲ προσαχθήσεται ἢ σκεπτική φιλοσοφία, διδομένου τοῦ μὴ δύνασθαι ζητεῖν περὶ τοῦ μὴ 7 οὕτως κατεληγμένου. ὁ γὰρ περί τινος ἀδήλου πράγματος ἀποφαινόμενός τε καὶ δογματίζων ἤτοι κατεληφώς αὐτὸ ἀποφαίνεσθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ λέξει ἢ μὴ κατεληφώς. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν μὴ κατεληφώς, ἄπιστος ἔσται· εἰ δὲ κατεληφώς, ἤτοι αὐτόθεν καὶ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ κατ' ἐνάργειαν ὑποπεσὸν αὐτῷ τοῦτο λέξει κατεληγῆναι ἢ διὰ τινος ἐρεύνης καὶ 8 ζητήσεως. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ περιπτωτικῶς κατ' ἐνάργειαν λέγοιτο ὑποπεσεῖν αὐτῷ καὶ κατεληγῆναι τὸ ἄδηλον, οὕτως ἂν οὐδὲ ἄδηλον εἶη ἀλλὰ πᾶσι ἐπ' ἴσης φαινόμενον καὶ ὁμολογούμενον καὶ μὴ διαπεφωνημένον. περὶ ἐκάστου δὲ τῶν ἀδῆλων ἀνήνυτος γέγονε παρ' αὐτοῖς διαφωνία· οὐκ ἄρα ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ κατ' ἐνάργειαν ὑποπεσὸν αὐτῷ κατεληφώς ἂν εἶη τὸ ἄδηλον ὁ περὶ τῆς 9 ὑπάρξεως αὐτοῦ διαβεβαιούμενός τε καὶ ἀποφανόμενος δογματικός. εἰ δὲ διὰ τινος ἐρεύνης, πῶς οἶός τε ἦν ζητεῖν πρὸ τοῦ καταλαβεῖν ἀκριβῶς αὐτὸ κατὰ τὴν προκειμένην ὑπόθεσιν; τῆς μὲν γὰρ ζητήσεως χρηζούσης τοῦ πρότερον ἀκριβῶς κατεληγῆναι τὸ μέλλον ζητεῖσθαι καὶ οὕτω ζητεῖσθαι, τῆς δὲ καταλήψεως τοῦ ζητουμένου πράγ-

* For this distinction cf. i. 178 ff.

sequently they are debarred from indulging in any criticism of one another. Or rather—to avoid talking nonsense—practically the whole of Dogmatism will be confounded and the Sceptic philosophy will be firmly established once it is granted that it is impossible to inquire regarding an object which is not, in this sense, apprehended. For he who makes a 7 dogmatic statement about a non-evident object will declare that he is making it either after having apprehended or after having not apprehended it. But if he has not apprehended it he will not gain credence; while if he has apprehended it, he will say that he has apprehended the object directly and through itself and owing to the clear impression it has made on him, or else by means of some kind of search and inquiry.^a But if he shall say that the 9 non-evident object has impressed him and has been apprehended through itself, immediately and clearly, in this case the object would not be non-evident but apparent to all men equally, an acknowledged and uncontroverted fact. But about every single object that is non-evident there exists amongst them endless controversy; so that the Dogmatist who makes positive assertions about the reality of a non-evident object cannot have apprehended it because of its having made on him a direct and clear impression. If, on the other hand, his apprehension is a result of 9 search, how was he in a position to make inquiry before he had accurately apprehended the object, without violating our present assumption? For since the inquiry necessitates as a preliminary the existence of an accurate apprehension of that which is to be the subject of inquiry, while the apprehension of the subject of inquiry demands, in its turn, the previous

ματος δεομένης πάλιν αὐτῆς τοῦ προεξηγήθησθαι πάντως αὐτό, κατὰ τὸν διάλληλον τρόπον τῆς ἀπορίας ἀδύνατον αὐτοῖς γίνεσθαι καὶ τὸ ζητεῖν περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων καὶ τὸ δογματίζειν, ἦν τε ἀπὸ τῆς καταλήψεως ἄρχεσθαι βούλωνται τινες, μεταγόντων ἡμῶν αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖν αὐτὸ προεξηγηκέναι πρὸ τοῦ κατειληφέναι, ἦν τε ἀπὸ τῆς ζητήσεως, ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖν πρὸ τοῦ ζητεῖν κατειληφέναι τὸ μέλλον ζητεῖσθαι. ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα μῆτε καταλαμβάνειν αὐτοὺς δύνασθαι τι τῶν ἀδήλων μῆτε ἀποφαίνεσθαι διαβεβαιωτικῶς ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν. ἐξ ὧν ἀναιρεῖσθαι μὲν τὴν δογματικὴν εὐρεσιλογίαν αὐτόθεν, οἶμαι, συμβήσεται, τὴν ἐφεκτικὴν δὲ εἰσαγάσθαι φιλοσοφίαν.

- 10 Εἰ δὲ φήσουσι μὴ τοιαύτην λέγειν κατάληψιν ἡγεῖσθαι ζητήσεως προσήκειν, νόησιν δὲ ἀπλῶς, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδύνατον [ἐν] τοῖς ἐπέχουσι περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τῶν ἀδήλων ζητεῖν. νοήσεως γὰρ οὐκ ἀπείργεται ὁ σκεπτικός, οἶμαι, ἀπὸ τε τῶν παθηματικῶς ὑποπιπτόντων κατ' ἐνάργειαν φαινομένων αὐτῷ λόγῳ γινομένης καὶ μὴ πάντως εἰσαγωγύσης τὴν ὑπαρξίν τῶν νοουμένων· οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὰ ὑπάρχοντα νοοῦμεν, ὡς φασίν, ἀλλ' ἤδη καὶ τὰ ἀνύπαρκτα. ὅθεν καὶ ζητῶν καὶ νοῶν ἐν τῇ σκεπτικῇ διαθέσει μένει ὁ ἐφεκτικός· ὅτι γὰρ τοῖς κατὰ φαντασίαν παθητικὴν ὑποπίπτουσιν αὐτῷ, καθὼ φάνεται αὐτῷ, συγκατατίθεται, δεδηλωται.
- 11 Ὅρα δὲ μὴ καὶ νῦν οἱ δογματικοὶ ζητήσεως ἀπείργονται. οὐ γὰρ τοῖς ἀγνοεῖν τὰ πράγματα ὡς

existence of a complete inquiry into that subject, owing to this circular process of reasoning^a it becomes impossible for them either to inquire concerning things non-evident or to dogmatize; for if some of them wish to make apprehension their starting-point we force them to grant that the object must be investigated before it is apprehended, while if they start from inquiry we make them admit that before inquiring they must apprehend the object of the inquiry, so that for these reasons they can neither apprehend any non-evident object nor make positive statements about them. From this there will follow automatically, as I think, the demolition of the Dogmatic sophistry^b and the establishment of the Suspensive philosophy.

If, however, they say that it is not this kind of 10 apprehension that ought, in their view, to precede inquiry, but simply mental conception, then it is no longer impossible for those who suspend judgement to inquire about the reality of things non-evident. For the Sceptic is not, I suppose, prohibited from mental conception which arises through the reason itself as a result of passive impressions and clear appearances and does not at all involve the reality of the objects conceived; for we conceive, as they say, not only of real things but also of unreal. Hence both while inquiring and while conceiving the Suspensive person continues in the Sceptical state of mind. For, as has been shown, he assents to what he experiences by way of subjective impression, according as that impression appears to him. But consider whether, even in this case, the 11 Dogmatists are not precluded from inquiry. For to continue the investigation of problems is not

^a Cf. i. 61.^b Cf. i. 63, ii. 84.

ἔχει πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ὁμολογοῦσι τὸ ζητεῖν ἔτι περὶ αὐτῶν ἀνακόλουθον, τοῖς δ' ἐπ' ἀκριβῆς οἰομένους ταῦτα γινώσκειν· οἷς μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ πέρας ἤδη πάρεστιν ἢ ζήτησις, ὡς ὑπειλήφασιν, οἷς δὲ τὸ δι' ὃ πᾶσα συνίσταται ζήτησις ἀκμὴν ὑπάρχει, τὸ νομίζειν ὡς οὐχ εὐρήκασιν.

- 12 Οὐκοῦν ζητητέον ἡμῖν περὶ ἐκάστου μέρους τῆς καλουμένης φιλοσοφίας συντόμως ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος. καὶ ἐπεὶ πολλὴ γέγονε παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς διαφωνία περὶ τῶν μερῶν τῆς φιλοσοφίας, τῶν μὲν ἓν τῶν δὲ δύο τῶν δὲ τρία εἶναι λεγόντων, περὶ ἧς οὐκ ἂν εἴη προσήκον πλείω νῦν διεξιέναι, τὴν δόξαν τῶν δοκούντων τελειότερον ἀνεστράφθαι κατὰ τὸ ἴσον ἐκθέμενοι κατ' αὐτὴν προσάξομεν τὸν λόγον.

B'.—ΠΟΘΕΝ ΑΡΚΤΕΟΝ ΤΗΣ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΥΣ ΔΟΓΜΑΤΙΚΟΥΣ ΖΗΤΗΣΕΩΣ

- 13 Οἱ στωικοὶ τοίνυν καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς τρία μέρη τῆς φιλοσοφίας εἶναι λέγουσι, λογικὸν φυσικὸν ἠθικόν· καὶ ἄρχονται γε τῆς διδασκαλίας ἀπὸ τοῦ λογικοῦ, καίτοι πολλῆς καὶ περὶ τοῦ πόθεν ἄρχεσθαι δεῖ στάσεως γεγεννημένης. οἷς ἀκολουθήσαντες ἀδοξάστως, ἐπεὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς τρισὶ μέρεσι λεγόμενα κρίσεως χρῆζει καὶ κριτηρίου, ὃ δὲ περὶ κριτηρίου λόγος ἐμπεριέχεσθαι δοκεῖ τῷ λογικῷ μέρει, ἀρξώμεθα ἀπὸ τοῦ περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου λόγου καὶ τοῦ λογικοῦ μέρους.

^a Cf. *Adv. Log. i. ad init.*

^b The others mentioned in *Adv. Log. i. 16* are Plato, Xenocrates, and the Peripatetics; so too the Epicureans.

inconsistent in those who confess their ignorance of their real nature, but only in those who believe they have an exact knowledge of them; since for the latter the inquiry has already, as they suppose, reached its goal, whereas for the former the ground on which all inquiry is based—namely, the belief that they have not found the truth—still subsists.

Thus we have to inquire briefly, on the present 12 occasion, concerning each several division of philosophy so called. And since there exists much dispute amongst the Dogmatists regarding the divisions of philosophy^a—some saying there is one division, some two, some three—and it would not now be convenient to discuss the question at length, we will explain fairly and impartially the view of those who seem to have treated it most fully, and take their view as the subject of our discourse.

CHAPTER II.—THE STARTING-POINT FOR CRITICISM OF THE DOGMATISTS

The Stoics, then, and several others,^b say that there 13 are three divisions of philosophy, namely, Logic, Physics, and Ethics; and they begin their teaching with Logic,^c although the question of the right starting-point is also a matter of much controversy. So we shall follow them in an undogmatic way; and since the subject matter of all three divisions requires testing and a criterion, and the doctrine of the criterion seems to be included in the division of Logic, we shall begin with the doctrine of the criterion and the division of Logic.

^c So Chrysippus. Sextus treats of Logic in this Bk. ii., Physics in iii. 1-167, Ethics in iii. 167-278.

Γ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΚΡΙΤΗΡΙΟΥ

CHAPTER III.—OF THE CRITERION

- 14 Ἐκεῖνο προειπόντες ὅτι κριτήριον μὲν λέγεται τό τε ᾧ κρίνεσθαι φασι ὑπαρξίν καὶ ἀνπαρξίαν καὶ τὸ ᾧ προσέχοντες βιοῦμεν, πρόκειται δὲ ἡμῖν νῦν περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου τῆς ἀληθείας εἶναι λεγομένου διαλαβεῖν· περὶ γὰρ τοῦ κατὰ τὸ ἔτερον σημαινόμενον ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς σκέψεως λόγῳ διεξήλθομεν.
- 15 Τὸ κριτήριον τοίνυν περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος ἐστὶν λέγεται τριχῶς, κοινῶς ἰδίως ἰδιαιτάτα, κοινῶς μὲν πᾶν μέτρον καταλήψεως, καθ' ὃ σημαινόμενον καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ οὕτω προσαγορεύεται κριτήρια, ὡς ὄρασις, ἰδίως δὲ πᾶν μέτρον καταλήψεως τεχνικὸν ὡς κανῶν καὶ διαβήτης, ἰδιαιτάτα δὲ πᾶν μέτρον καταλήψεως τεχνικὸν ἀδήλου πράγματος, καθ' ὃ τὰ μὲν βιωτικὰ οὐ λέγεται κριτήρια, μόνα δὲ τὰ λογικὰ καὶ ἅπερ οἱ δογματικοὶ φέρουσι πρὸς τὴν
- 16 τῆς ἀληθείας κρίσιν. φαμέν οὖν προηγουμένως περὶ τοῦ λογικοῦ κριτηρίου διεξιέναι. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ λογικὸν κριτήριον λέγοιτ' ἂν τριχῶς, τὸ ὑφ' οὗ καὶ τὸ δι' οὗ καὶ τὸ καθ' ὃ, οἷον ὑφ' οὗ μὲν ἀνθρωπος, δι' οὗ δὲ ἦτοι αἰσθησις ἢ διάνοια, καθ' ὃ δὲ ἢ προσβολὴ τῆς φαντασίας, καθ' ἣν ὁ ἀνθρωπος ἐπιβάλλει κρίνειν διὰ τινος τῶν προειρημένων.
- 17 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀρμόζον ἦν ἴσως προειπεῖν, ἵνα ἐννοήσωμεν περὶ οὗ ἡμῖν ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος· λοιπὸν δὲ

^a See i. chap. xi.

^b i. e. standards of weight and measure (e.g. pound, pint, yard).

^c Cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 261.

^d Examples of these three criteria are—the carpenter, his rule, the “applying” of his rule; cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 35 f.

But first we must notice that the word “criterion”¹⁴ is used both of that by which, as they say, we judge of reality and non-reality, and of that which we use as the guide of life; and our present task is to discuss the so-called criterion of truth, since we have already dealt with the criterion in its other sense in our discourse “On Scepticism.”^a

The criterion, then, with which our argument is¹⁵ concerned, has three several meanings—the general, the special, and the most special. In the “general” sense it is used of every standard of apprehension, and in this sense we speak even of physical organs, such as sight, as criteria. In the “special” sense it includes every technical standard of apprehension, such as the rule and compass. In the “most special” sense it includes every technical standard of apprehension of a non-evident object; but in this application ordinary standards^b are not regarded as criteria but only logical standards and those which the Dogmatists employ for the judging of truth. We¹⁶ propose, therefore, in the first place to discuss the logical criterion. But the logical criterion also may be used in three senses^c—of the agent, or the instrument, or the “according to what”; the agent, for instance, may be a man, the instrument either sense-perception or intelligence, and the “according to what” the application of the impression “according to” which the man proceeds to judge by means of one of the aforesaid instruments.^d

It was appropriate, I consider, to make these preliminary observations so that we may realize what is the exact subject of our discourse; and it remains

ἐπὶ τὴν ἀντίρρησην χωρῶμεν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς λέγοντας προπετῶς κατεληφέναι τὸ κριτήριον τῆς ἀληθείας, ἀπὸ τῆς διαφωνίας¹ ἀρξάμενοι.

Δ'.—Εἰ ΤΙ ΠΑΡΧΕΙ ΤΙ ΚΡΙΤΗΡΙΟΝ ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑΣ

18 Τῶν διαλαβόντων τοίνυν περὶ κριτηρίου οἱ μὲν εἶναι τοῦτο ἀπεφήναντο, ὡς οἱ στωικοὶ καὶ ἄλλοι τινές, οἱ δὲ μὴ εἶναι, ὡς ἄλλοι τε καὶ ὁ Κορίνθιος Ξενοιάδης καὶ Ξενοφάνης ὁ Κολοφώνιος, λέγων

δόκος δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται·

ἡμεῖς δ' ἐπέσχομεν² πότερον ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν. 19 ταύτην οὖν τὴν διαφωνίαν ἦτοι ἐπικριτὴν εἶναι φήσουσιν ἢ ἀνεπίκριτον· καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀνεπίκριτον, αὐτόθεν εἶναι δώσουσι τὸ δεῖν ἐπέχειν, εἰ δὲ ἐπικρίνεται, τίμη κριθήσεται λεγέτωσαν, μήτε κριτήριον ὁμολογούμενον ἡμῶν ἐχόντων, μήθ' ὅλως εἰ 20 ἔστιν εἰδόντων ἀλλὰ ζητούντων. καὶ ἄλλως, ἵνα ἡ γενομένη περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου διαφωνία ἐπικριθῆ, δεῖ κριτήριον ἡμᾶς ἔχειν ὁμολογημένον, δι' οὗ δυνησόμεθα κρίνειν αὐτήν· καὶ ἵνα κριτήριον ὁμολογούμενον ἔχωμεν, δεῖ πρότερον ἐπικριθῆναι τὴν περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου διαφωνίαν. οὕτω δὲ εἰς τὸν διάλληλον ἐμπίπτοντος τρόπον τοῦ λόγου ἄπορος ἢ εὕρεσις τοῦ κριτηρίου γίνεται, μήτε ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἡμῶν ἐόντων αὐτοὺς κριτήριον λαμβάνειν, ἐάν τε κριτηρίῳ τὸ κριτήριον κρίνειν ἐθέλωσιν, εἰς ἀπει-

¹ διαφωνίας T: ἀληθείας MSS., Bekk.

² ἐπέσχομεν Kayser: ἐπίσχομεν MSS., Bekk.

^a Earlier than Democritus; cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 53, 388.

^b Cf. i. 224; *Adv. Log.* i. 48, 110.

^c Cf. i. 164 ff., 115 ff.

for us to proceed to our counter-statement aimed against those who rashly assert that they have apprehended the criterion of truth, and we will begin with the dispute which exists about this question.

CHAPTER IV.—DOES A CRITERION OF TRUTH REALLY EXIST ?

Of those, then, who have treated of the criterion 18 some have declared that a criterion exists—the Stoics, for example, and certain others—while by some its existence is denied, as by the Corinthian Xenias,^a amongst others, and by Xenophanes^b of Colophon, who says—“Over all things opinion bears sway”; while we have adopted suspension of judgement as to whether it does or does not exist. This dispute,^c 19 then, they will declare to be either capable or incapable of decision; and if they shall say it is incapable of decision they will be granting on the spot the propriety of suspension of judgement, while if they say it admits of decision, let them tell us whereby it is to be decided, since we have no accepted criterion, and do not even know, but are still inquiring, whether any criterion exists. Besides, in order to decide the 20 dispute which has arisen about the criterion, we must possess an accepted criterion by which we shall be able to judge the dispute; and in order to possess an accepted criterion, the dispute about the criterion must first be decided. And when the argument thus reduces itself to a form of circular reasoning the discovery of the criterion becomes impracticable, since we do not allow them to adopt a criterion by assumption, while if they offer to judge the criterion by a

ρίαν αὐτοὺς ἐκβαλλόντων. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπεὶ ἡ μὲν ἀπόδειξις δέεται κριτηρίου ἀποδεδειγμένου τὸ δὲ κριτήριον ἀποδείξεως κεκριμένης, εἰς τὸν διάλληλον ἐκβάλλονται τρόπον.

- 21 Οἰόμενοι οὖν ἰκανὰ καὶ ταῦτα εἶναι δεικνύουσι τὴν τῶν δογματικῶν προπέτειαν κατὰ τὸν περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου λόγον, ἵνα καὶ ποικίλως αὐτοὺς ἐλέγχωμεν ἔχωμεν, οὐκ ἄτοπον προσκαρτερῆσαι τῷ τόπῳ. οὐ μὴν ἐκάστη τῶν περὶ κριτηρίου δοξῶν ἀμιλληθῆναι προαιρούμεθα εἰδικῶς (ἀμύθητος γὰρ ἡ διαφωνία γέγονεν, καὶ οὕτως εἰς ἀμέθοδον καὶ ἡμᾶς λόγον ἐμπεσεῖν ἀναγκαῖον ἔσται), ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τὸ κριτήριον περὶ οὗ ζητοῦμεν τρισὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ, τὸ τε ὑφ' οὗ καὶ τὸ δι' οὗ καὶ τὸ καθ' ὃ, ἕκαστον τούτων ἐπελθόντες ἐν μέρει τὴν ἀκαταληψίαν αὐτοῦ παραστήσομεν· οὕτω γὰρ ἐμμέθοδος ἅμα καὶ τέλειος ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ἔσται. ἀρξώμεθα δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑφ' οὗ· δοκεῖ γάρ πως συναπορεῖσθαι τούτῳ καὶ τὰ λοιπά.

Ε'. ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥΤΟΥ ΤΟΥΤΟΥ

- 22 Ὁ ἄνθρωπος τοίνυν δοκεῖ μοι, ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν, οὐ μόνον ἀκατάληπτος ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνεπινώτος εἶναι. ἀκούομεν γοῦν τοῦ παρὰ Πλάτωνι Σωκράτους διαρρηθῆναι ὁμολογοῦντος μὴ εἰδέναι πότερον ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ἢ ἕτερόν τι. παριστάναί τε βουλόμενοι τὴν ἔννοιαν
- 164

criterion we force them to a regress *ad infinitum*. And furthermore, since demonstration requires a demonstrated criterion, while the criterion requires an approved demonstration, they are forced into circular reasoning.

We suppose, then, that this is sufficient to expose 21 the rashness of the Dogmatists in respect of their doctrine of the Criterion; but in order to enable us to confute them in detail, it will not be out of place to dwell at length upon this topic. We do not, however, desire to oppose their opinions about the criterion severally, one by one—for their controversy is endless, and to do so would necessarily involve us as well in a confused discussion,—but inasmuch as the criterion in question is three-fold (the agent, the instrument, and the “according to what”), we shall discuss each of these in turn and establish the non-apprehensibility of each, since in this way our exposition will be at once both methodical and complete. Let us begin with the agent; for the perplexity which attaches to this seems somehow to involve the rest as well.

CHAPTER V.—OF THE CRITERION “BY WHOM,”
OR AGENT

Now “Man” (if he is “the agent”) seems to me, 22 so far as regards the statements made by the Dogmatists, to be not only non-apprehensible but also inconceivable. At least we hear the Platonic Socrates^a expressly confessing that he does not know whether he is a man or something else. And when they wish to establish the concept of “Man” they disagree in

^a Cf. Plato, *Phaedr.* 229 E f., *Theaet.* 174 B.

αὐτοῦ πρώτον μὲν διαφωνοῦσιν, εἶτα καὶ ἀσύνετα λέγουσιν.

- 23 Ὁ μὲν γὰρ Δημόκριτός φησιν ὅτι ἀνθρωπὸς ἐστὶν ὃ πάντες ἴσμεν. ὅσον δ' ἐπὶ τούτῳ οὐ γνωσόμεθα τὸν ἀνθρωπον, ἐπεὶ καὶ κύνα ἴσμεν, καὶ παρὰ τούτο ἔσται καὶ ὁ κύων ἀνθρωπος. τινὰς τε ἀνθρώπους οὐκ ἴσμεν· διὸ οὐκ ἔσονται ἀνθρωποι. μᾶλλον δέ, ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ ἐννοίᾳ ταύτῃ, οὐδεὶς ἔσται ἀνθρωπος· εἰ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος μὲν φησὶ δεῖν ὑπὸ πάντων γνωσκεσθαι τὸν ἀνθρωπον, οὐδένα δὲ ἀνθρωπον ἴσασι πάντες ἀνθρωποι, οὐδεὶς ἔσται κατ' αὐτὸν
- 24 ἀνθρωπος. καὶ ὅτι ταῦτα οὐ σοφιζόμενοι λέγομεν, ἐκ τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀκολουθίας φαίνεται. μόνα γὰρ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ὑπάρχειν φησὶν ὁ ἀνὴρ τὰ ἄτομα καὶ τὸ κενόν, ἅπερ φησὶν οὐ μόνον τοῖς ζώοις ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς συγκρίμασιν ὑπάρχειν, ὥστε ὅσον μὲν ἐπὶ τούτοις οὐκ ἐπινοήσομεν τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ιδιότητα, ἐπειδὴ κοινὰ πάντων ἐστίν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι ὑπόκειται παρὰ ταῦτα· οὐκ ἄρα ἔξομεν δι' οὐ τὸν ἀνθρωπον διακρίναί τε ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων καὶ εἰλικρινῶς νοῆσαι δυνασόμεθα.
- 25 Ὁ δ' Ἐπίκουρός φησιν ἀνθρωπον εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτοῦ μόρφωμα μετὰ ἐμφυχίας. καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον δέ, ἐπεὶ ὁ ἀνθρωπος δείξει ἐμφανίζεται, ὁ μὴ δεικνύμενος οὐκ ἔσται ἀνθρωπος. καὶ εἰ μὲν γυναικα δείκνυσί τις, ὁ ἀνὴρ οὐκ ἔσται ἀνθρωπος, εἰ δὲ ἀνδρα, ἢ γυνῆ ἀνθρωπος οὐκ ἔσται. τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ ἐπιχειρήσομεν καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῶν

the first place, and in the second place they speak unintelligibly.

Thus Democritus ^a declares that "Man is that 23 which we all know." Then, so far as his opinion goes, we shall not know Man, since we also know a dog, and consequently Dog too will be Man. And some men we do not know, therefore they will not be men. Or rather, if we are to judge by this concept, no one will be a man; for since Democritus says that Man must be known by all, and all men know no one man, no one, according to him, will be a man. And it is 24 evident from the relevance of this criticism that we are not now arguing sophistically. For this thinker proceeds to say that "Only the atoms and the void truly exist," and these he says "form the substrate not only of animals but of all compound substances," so that, so far as depends on these, we shall not form a concept of the particular essence of "Man," seeing that they are common to all things. But besides these there is no existing substrate; so that we shall possess no means whereby we shall be able to distinguish Man from the other animals and form a precise conception of him.

Again, Epicurus says that Man is "This sort 25 of a shape combined with vitality."^b According to him, then, since Man is shown by pointing out, he that is not pointed out is not a man, and if anyone points out a female, the male will not be Man, while if he points out a male the female will not be Man. And we shall also draw the same inferences from the by sense-perception: the percept is the real "thing in itself"; hence we have no general concepts which can be logically "defined" but only particular phenomena which are "indicated" or pointed out as "such and such, look you" (τοιοῦτος); cf. *Introd.* p. xxiii.

^a Cf. i. 213 ff.; *Adv. Log.* i. 265.

^b Cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 267. Epicurus taught that truth is given

περιστάσεων ἃς ἴσμεν ἐκ τοῦ τετάρτου τρόπου τῆς ἐποχῆς.

- 26 "Ἄλλοι ἔφασκον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι ζῶον λογικὸν θνητόν, νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν. ἐπεὶ οὖν δείκνυται ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῆς ἐποχῆς τρόπῳ ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐστὶ ζῶον ἄλογον, ἀλλὰ καὶ νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικά ἐστί πάντα, ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς ὑπ' αὐτῶν λεγομένοις οὐ γνωσόμεθα τί ποτε λέγουσιν.
- 27 τὰ τε κείμενα ἐν τῷ ὄρῳ συμβεβηκότα ἤτοι κατ' ἐνέργειαν λέγουσιν ἢ δυνάμει. εἰ μὲν οὖν κατ' ἐνέργειαν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος ὁ μὴ ἐπιστήμην ἥδη τελείαν ἀπειληφώς καὶ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τέλειος ὢν καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἀποθνήσκειν καθεστώς· τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ ἐνεργεῖα θνητόν ἐστιν. εἰ δὲ δυνάμει, οὐκ ἔσται ἄνθρωπος οὔτε ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων τέλειον οὔτε ὁ νοῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ἀνειληφώς· [καὶ] τοῦτο δὲ τοῦ προτέρου ἐστὶν ἀτοπώτερον.

Καὶ ταύτη ἄρα ἀσύστατος πέφηνεν ἡ ἐπίνοια τοῦ
 28 ἀνθρώπου. ὁ γὰρ Πλάτων ὅταν ἀξιολογῇ τὸν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι ζῶον ἄπτερον δίπουν πλατυώνυχον, ἐπιστήμης πολιτικῆς δεκτικόν, οὐδὲ αὐτὸς ἀξιολογῇ διαβεβαιωτικῶς τοῦτο ἐκτίθεσθαι· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐν τί ἐστὶ τῶν κατ' αὐτὸν γινομένων μὲν ὄντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄντων, ἀδύνατον δὲ περὶ τῶν μηδέποτε ὄντων διαβεβαιωτικῶς ἀποφαίνεσθαι κατ' αὐτόν, οὐδὲ ὁ Πλάτων ἀξιώσει τὸν ὄρον

^a Cf. i. 100.

^b Stoics and Peripatetics, cf. § 211 *infra*.

^c See i. 40 ff.

difference in the circumstances which we learn from the Fourth Mode of Suspension.^a

Others ^b used to assert that "Man is a rational ²⁶ mortal animal, receptive of intelligence and science." Now since it is shown by the First Mode of Suspension ^c that no animal is irrational but all are receptive of intelligence and science, so far as their statements go, we shall be unable to perceive what they mean. And the attributes contained ²⁷ in this definition are used either in an "actual," or full, or in a potential sense ^d; if in a full sense, he that has not already acquired complete science and is not rationally perfect and in the very act of dying—for this is to be mortal in the full sense of the word—is not a man. And if the sense is to be potential, then he will not be a man who possesses reason in perfection or who has acquired intelligence and science; but this conclusion is even more absurd than the former.

In this way, then, the concept of Man is shown to be one which it is impossible to frame. For when Plato ^e ²⁸ declares that "Man is a featherless two-footed animal with broad nails, receptive of political science," not even he himself claims to affirm this positively; for if Man is one of the class of things which, as he puts it,^f come into being but never possess absolute being, and if it is impossible, in his view, to make a positive declaration about things which never really exist, then even Plato will not claim to be taken as

^d The familiar Aristotelian distinction between "actuality" and "potentiality" is here used by Sextus to confute the Peripatetics, cf. *Introd.* p. xx.

^e Cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 281; *Diog. Laert.* vi. 40; [Plato], *Deff.* 415 A.

^f Cf. *Theaet.* 152 D, *Tim.* 27 D.

ἐκτίθεσθαι δοκεῖν ὡς διαβεβαιούμενος, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἴωθεν κατὰ τὸ πιθανὸν λέγων.

- 29 Εἰ μέντοι καὶ δοίημεν κατὰ συγχώρησιν ὅτι ἐπινοεῖσθαι δύναται ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἀκατάληπτος εὔρεθήσεται. συνέστηκε μὲν γὰρ ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, οὔτε δὲ τὸ σῶμα καταλαμβάνεται τάχα
30 οὔτε ἡ ψυχὴ· οὐδὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἄρα. καὶ ὅτι μὲν τὸ σῶμα οὐ καταλαμβάνεται, δῆλον ἐντεῦθεν· τὰ συμβεβηκότα τινὶ ἑτέρα ἐστὶν ἐκείνου ᾧ συμβέβηκεν. ὅταν οὖν χρῶμα ἢ τι παραπλήσιον ἡμῖν ὑποπίπτῃ, τὰ συμβεβηκότα τῷ σώματι εἰκὸς ἡμῖν ὑποπίπτειν, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα. τό γέ τοι σῶμα τριχῆ διαστατὸν εἶναι λέγουσιν· ὀφείλομεν οὖν τὸ μῆκος καὶ τὸ πλάτος καὶ τὸ βάθος καταλαμβάνειν, ἵνα τὸ σῶμα καταλάβωμεν. εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο ἡμῖν ὑπέπιπτεν, ἐγινώσκομεν ἂν καὶ τὰ ὑπάργυρα χρυσία. οὐδὲ τὸ σῶμα ἄρα.
- 31 Ἴνα δὲ καὶ τὴν περὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀμφισβήτησιν παρῶμεν, πάλιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος εὐρίσκεται ἀκατάληπτος διὰ τὸ ἀκατάληπτον εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν. ὅτι δὲ ἀκατάληπτός ἐστιν αὕτη, δῆλον ἐντεῦθεν· τῶν περὶ ψυχῆς διαλαβόντων, ἵνα τὴν πολλὴν καὶ ἀνήνυτον μάχην παραλίπωμεν, οἱ μὲν μὴ εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ἔφασαν, ὡς οἱ περὶ τὸν Μεσσήμιον Δικαί-
32 αρχον, οἱ δὲ εἶναι, οἱ δὲ ἐπέσχον. ταύτην οὖν τὴν διαφωνίαν εἰ μὲν ἀνεπίκριτον εἶναι λέξουσιν οἱ

¹ τό γέ τοι: the particles seem out of place here; read perhaps αὐτό τε τὸ.

^a "Perchance," one of the Sceptic formulae, cf. i. 194.

^b i.e. a "substance" in the Aristotelian sense, as distinguished from its "attributes," "properties," or "accidents"; cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 283 ff.

putting forward this definition positively, but rather as making, in his usual way, a probable statement.

But even if we should grant, by way of concession, 29 that Man can be conceived, yet he will be found to be non-apprehensible. For he is compounded of soul and body, and neither body nor soul perchance ^a is apprehended; so that Man is not apprehended. Now that body is not apprehended is easily shown 30 thus: the attributes of an object ^b are different from the object whereof they are attributes. So when colour or any similar quality is perceived by us, what we perceive is probably the attributes of the body but not the body itself. Certainly the body, they say, exists in three dimensions; we ought therefore to apprehend its length and breadth and depth in order to apprehend the body. For if we perceived depth ^c we should also discern silver pieces under their coating of gold. Therefore we do not apprehend the body either.

But, not to dwell on the controversy about the 31 body, Man is also found to be non-apprehensible owing to the fact that his soul is non-apprehensible. That it is non-apprehensible is plain from this: of those who have treated of the soul—so that we may avoid dwelling on the long and endless controversy—some have asserted, as did Dicaearchus ^d the Messenian, that the soul has no existence, others that it has existence, and others have suspended judgement. If, then, the Dogmatists shall maintain 32

^a Lit. "this" (ταῦτο: Mutsch. suggests ταῦτα). The argument would be clearer if we inserted the words "But we do not apprehend depth" after "body"; the text as it stands is too obscure to be sound.

^d A pupil of Aristotle, cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 349; Cicero, *Tusc.* i. 10. 22.

δογματικοί, δώσουσιν αὐτόθεν τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀκαταληψίαν, εἰ δὲ ἐπικριτὴν, τίνι ἐπικρινούσῃ αὐτὴν εἰπάτωσαν. αἰσθήσει μὲν γὰρ οὐ δύνανται διὰ τὸ νοητὴν ὑπ' αὐτῶν εἶναι λέγεσθαι· εἰ δὲ λέξουσιν ὅτι διανοία, ἐροῦμεν ὅτι ἐπεὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ἀδηλότατόν ἐστιν ἢ διάνοια, ὡς δεικνύουσιν οἱ περὶ μὲν τῆς ὑπάρξεως τῆς ψυχῆς ὁμοφωνοῦντες 33 περὶ δὲ τῆς διανοίας διαφερόμενοι, εἰ τῇ διανοίᾳ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐθέλουσι καταλαμβάνειν καὶ τὴν περὶ αὐτῆς διαφωνίαν ἐπικρίνειν, τῷ μᾶλλον ζητούμενῳ τὸ ἦττον ζητούμενον ἐπικρίνειν τε καὶ βεβαιοῦν ἐθελήσουσιν, ὅπερ ἄτοπον. οὐδὲ τῇ διανοίᾳ τοῖσιν ἐπικριθήσεται ἢ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς διαφωνία. οὐδενὶ ἄρα. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ ἀκατάληπτος ἐστίν. ὅθεν οὐδὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καταλαμβάνοιτ' ἄν.

34 Ἴνα δὲ καὶ δῶμεν ὅτι καταλαμβάνεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος, μήποτε οὐκ ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο δεῖξαι ὅτι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ κρίνεσθαι δεῖ τὰ πράγματα. ὁ γὰρ λέγων ὅτι ὑπ' ἀνθρώπου δεῖ κρίνεσθαι τὰ πράγματα, ἦτοι ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως τοῦτο λέξει ἢ μετὰ ἀποδείξεως. οὔτε δὲ μετὰ ἀποδείξεως· δεῖ γὰρ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ κεκριμένην, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ὑπότινος κεκριμένην. ἐπεὶ οὖν οὐκ ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν ὁμολογουμένως ὑφ' οὗ κριθῆναι δυνήσεται αὐτῆ ἢ ἀπόδειξις (ζητούμεν γὰρ τὸ κριτήριον τὸ ὑφ' οὗ), οὐ δυνησόμεθα τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἐπικρίνειν, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ τὸ κριτήριον περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος ἀπο- 35 δεικνύται. εἰ δὲ ἀναποδείκτως λεχθήσεται ὅτι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου δεῖ κριθῆναι τὰ πράγματα, ἄπιστον

^a Cf. i. 115, 164 ff. Note that, in the context, the words "test," "judge," "decide," are various renderings of *κρίνω* (whence *κριτήριον*).

that this dispute is incapable of decision, they will be admitting thereby the non-apprehensibility of the soul, while if they say it is capable of decision, let them tell us by what means they will decide it. For they cannot say "by sense-perception," since the soul is said by them to be an object of intelligence; and if they shall say "by the intellect," we will say that inasmuch as the intellect is the least evident part of the soul—as is shown by those who agree about the real existence of the soul, though differing about the intellect,—if they propose to apprehend the soul and 33 to decide the dispute about it by means of the intellect, they will be proposing to decide and establish the less questionable matter by the more questionable, which is absurd. Thus, neither by the intellect will the dispute about the soul be decided; therefore there is no means to decide it. And this being so, it is non-apprehensible; and, in consequence, Man too will not be apprehended.

But even supposing we grant that Man is appre- 34 hended, it would not, probably, be possible to show that objects ought to be judged by him. For he who asserts that objects ought to be judged by Man will be asserting this either without proof or with proof.^a Not with proof; for the proof must be true and tested, and therefore tested by some standard. Since, then, we are unable to make an agreed statement as to the standard by which the proof itself can be tested (for we are still inquiring about the criterion "By whom"), we shall be unable to pronounce judgment on the proof, and therefore also to prove the criterion, which is the subject of discussion. And 35 if it shall be asserted without proof that objects ought to be judged by Man, the assertion will be

ἔσται, ὥστε οὐχ ἔξομεν διαβεβαιουῖσθαι ὅτι τὸ ὑφ' οὗ κριτήριον ἔστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος. ὑπὸ τίνος δὲ καὶ κριθήσεται ὅτι τὸ ὑφ' οὗ κριτήριον ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἔστιν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἀκρίτως τοῦτο λέγοντες πιστευθήσονται. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ὑπ' ἀνθρώπου, τὸ ζητού-
 36 μενον συναρπασθήσεται. εἰ δ' ὑπὸ ἑτέρου ζώου, πῶς ἐκείνο πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι τὸ κριτήριον παραλαμβάνεται; εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρίτως, οὐ πιστευθήσεται, εἰ δὲ μετὰ κρίσεως, πάλιν ἐκείνο ὑπό τινος ὀφείλει κριθῆναι. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ, μένει ἢ αὐτῇ ἀτοπία (τὸ ζητούμενον γὰρ διὰ τοῦ ζητουμένου κριθήσεται), εἰ δὲ ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπου, ὁ διάλληλος εἰσάγεται τρόπος· εἰ δὲ ὑπὸ τινος παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλου, πάλιν ἐκείνου τὸ κριτήριον ἀπαιτήσομεν τὸ ὑφ' οὗ, καὶ μέχρις ἀπείρου. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἄρα οὐχ ἔξομεν λέγειν ὡς ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπου δεῖ κρίνεσθαι τὰ πράγματα.

37 Ἔστω δὲ καὶ πεπιστώσθω τὸ δεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κρίνεσθαι τὰ πράγματα. οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶ πολλῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔστι διαφορά, πρότερον οἱ δογματικοὶ συμφωνησάτωσαν ὅτι τῷδε τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δεῖ προσέχειν, εἴθ' οὕτω καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτῷ θέσθαι κελευέτωσαν. εἰ δ'

ἔστ' ἂν ὕδωρ τε νάη καὶ δένδρα μακρὰ τεθήλη, τοῦτο δὴ τὸ τοῦ λόγου, περὶ αὐτοῦ διαφωνήσουσιν, πῶς ἡμᾶς ἐπέιγουσι προπετῶς τινὶ συγκατα-
 38 τίθεσθαι; ἦν γὰρ καὶ λέγωσιν ὅτι τῷ σοφῷ πιστευτέον, ἐρωτήσομεν αὐτοὺς ποῖω σοφῷ, πότερον τῷ κατὰ Ἐπίκουρον ἢ τῷ κατὰ τοὺς Στωικοὺς ἢ

disbelieved, so that we shall be unable to affirm positively that the criterion "By whom" (or Agent) is Man. Moreover, who is to be the judge that the criterion of the Agent is Man? For if they assert this without a judgement (or criterion) they will surely not be believed. Yet if they say that a man is to be the 36 judge, that will be assuming the point at issue^a; while if they make another animal the judge, in what way do they come to adopt that animal for the purpose of judging whether Man is the criterion? If they do so without a judgement, it will not be believed, and if with a judgement, it in turn needs to be judged by something. If, then, it is judged by itself, the same absurdity remains (for the object of inquiry will be judged by the object of inquiry); and if by Man, circular reasoning is introduced; and if by some judge other than these two, we shall once again in his case demand the criterion "By whom," and so on *ad infinitum*. Consequently we shall not be in a position to declare that objects ought to be judged by Man.

But let it be granted and established that objects 37 ought to be judged by Man. Then, since there exists great difference amongst men, let the Dogmatists first agree together that this is the particular man to whom we must attend, and then, and only then, let them bid us also to yield him our assent. But if they are going to dispute about this "long as the waters flow on and the tall trees cease not to burgeon" (to quote the familiar saying),^b how can they urge us to assent rashly to anyone? For if they declare that 38 we must believe the Sage, we shall ask them "What Sage?" Is it the Sage of Epicurus or of the Stoics,

^a From the inscription on the tomb of Midas quoted in Plato, *Phaedr.* 264 D; cf. Tibullus i. 4. 60.

^a The fallacy of *petitio principii*, cf. §§ 57, 60, 67 *infra*.

τῷ <Κυρηναϊκῷ ἢ τῷ>¹ Κυρικῷ· οὐχ ἕξουσι γὰρ συμφώνως εἰπεῖν.

- 39 Εἰ δὲ ἀξιώσει τις ἡμᾶς τῆς περὶ τοῦ σοφοῦ ζήτησεως ἀποστάντας ἀπλῶς τῷ συνετωτέρῳ τῶν ὄντων ἀπάντων πιστεύειν, πρῶτον μὲν καὶ περὶ τοῦ τίς συνετώτερός ἐστι τῶν ἄλλων διαφωνήσουσιν, εἶτα κἂν δοθῇ συμφώνως δύνασθαι ληφθῆναι τίς ἐστι τῶν τε ὄντων καὶ τῶν γεγονότων συνετώτερος, οὐδ' οὕτως ἔσται πίστεως οὗτος ἄξιος.
- 40 ἐπεὶ γὰρ πολλή καὶ σχεδὸν ἀπειρός ἐστιν ἐπίτασις τε καὶ ἀνεσις κατὰ σύνεσιν, φαμὲν ὅτι τούτου τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὃν λέγομεν εἶναι τῶν γεγονότων τε καὶ ὄντων συνετώτερον, ἕτερον συνετώτερον ἐνδέχεται γενέσθαι. ὥσπερ οὖν τῷ νῦν εἶναι λεγομένῳ φρονιμωτέρῳ τῶν τε ὄντων καὶ τῶν γεγονότων διὰ τὴν σύνεσιν αὐτοῦ πιστεύειν ἀξιούμεθα, οὕτω καὶ τῷ μετ' αὐτὸν ἐσομένῳ τούτου συνετωτέρῳ μᾶλλον τούτου χρὴ πιστεύειν. καὶ ἐκείνου γενομένου πάλιν ἄλλον ἐλπίζειν χρὴ συνετώτερον αὐτοῦ γενήσεσθαι, κακείνου ἄλλον, καὶ μέχρις ἀπείρου.
- 41 καὶ ἀδηλον πότερον ποτε συμφωνήσουσιν ἀλλήλοις οὗτοι ἢ διάφωνα λέξουσιν. διόπερ κἂν τῶν γεγονότων τε καὶ ὄντων συνετώτερος εἶναι ὁμολογηθῇ τις, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν διαβεβαιωτικῶς ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἐσται τούτου ἀγχινοῦστερος (ἀδηλον γάρ), ἀεὶ δεήσει τὴν τοῦ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐσομένου συνετωτέρου κρίσιν περιμένειν καὶ μηδέποτε συγκατατίθεσθαι τῷ κρείττονι.
- 42 Ἴνα δὲ καὶ κατὰ συγχώρησιν δῶμεν ὅτι οὐδεὶς τοῦ ὑποτιθεμένου συνετοῦ συνετώτερος οὔτε ἔστιν

¹ Κ. ἢ τῷ add. T.

the Cyrenaic Sage or the Cynic? For they will be unable to return a unanimous answer.

And if anyone shall demand that we should desist 39 from our inquiry about the Sage and simply believe the man who is more sagacious than all others, then, in the first place, they will dispute as to who is more sagacious than the rest, and in the next place, even if it be granted that it can be unanimously agreed who the man is who is more sagacious than those of the present and the past, even so this man will not deserve credence. For inasmuch as sagacity is liable 40 to a great, indeed almost incalculable, advance or decline in intensity, we assert that it is possible for another man to arise who is more sagacious than this man who, we say, is more sagacious than those of the past and present. So, then, just as we are requested to believe the man who is now said to be wiser than those of the present and the past because of his sagacity, so it is still more proper to believe his successor in the future who will be more sagacious than he. And when that successor has arisen, then it is right to expect that yet another will arise more sagacious than he, and so on *ad infinitum*. Nor is it 41 evident whether all these men will agree with one another or contradict one another. And consequently, even when one of them is acknowledged to be more sagacious than those of the past and present, seeing that we are unable to affirm positively that no man will be more clever than he (this being non-evident), we shall always have to wait for the judgement of the more sagacious man of the future, and never give our assent to this superior person.

And even should we grant, by way of concession, 42 that no one either is, was, or will be more sagacious

οὔτε ἐγένετο οὔτε ἔσται, οὐδὲ ὡς πιστεύειν αὐτῷ προσήκει. ἐπεὶ γὰρ μάλιστα οἱ συνετοὶ φιλοῦσιν ἐν τῇ τῶν πραγμάτων κατασκευῇ τοῖς σαθροῖς παριστάμενοι πράγμασιν ὑγιῆ και ἀληθῆ ταῦτα δοκεῖν εἶναι ποιεῖν, ὅταν τι λέγῃ οὗτος ὁ ἀγχινοῦς, οὐκ εἰσόμεθα πότερον ποτε, ὡς ἔχει τὸ πρᾶγμα φύσεως, οὕτω λέγει, ἢ ψεῦδος αὐτὸ ὑπάρχον ὡς ἀληθές παρίστησι και ἡμᾶς πείθει φρονεῖν ὡς περὶ ἀληθοῦς, ἅτε δὴ συνετώτερος τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπάντων ὑπάρχων και διὰ τοῦτο ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἐλέγχεσθαι μὴ δυνάμενος. οὐδὲ τούτῳ τοῖνυν συγκαταθησόμεθα ὡς ἀληθῶς τὰ πράγματα κρίνοντι, διὰ τὸ οἰεσθαι μὲν αὐτὸν ἀληθῆ <ἐνεῖναι>¹ λέγειν, οἰεσθαι δ' ὅτι δι' ὑπερβολὴν ἀγχινοίας τὰ ψευδῆ τῶν πραγμάτων ὡς ἀληθῆ βουλόμενος παριστᾶν ᾧ φησι λέγει. διὰ ταῦτα μὲν οὖν οὐδὲ τῷ τῶν ἀπάντων ἀγχινουστάτῳ δοκοῦντι ὑπάρχειν ἐν τῇ κρίσει τῶν πραγμάτων χρῆ πιστεύειν.

- 43 Εἰ δὲ φήσει τις ὅτι τῇ τῶν πολλῶν συμφωνίᾳ δεῖ προσέχειν, λέξομεν ὅτι τοῦτ' ἔστι μάταιον. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ σπάνιον ἴσως ἔστι τὸ ἀληθές, και διὰ τοῦτο ἐνδέχεται ἓνα τῶν πολλῶν φρονιμώτερον εἶναι. εἶτα και παντὶ κριτηρίῳ πλείους ἀντιδοξοῦσι τῶν κατ' αὐτὸ συμφωνούντων· οἱ γὰρ ὅποιοι οὖν ἀπολιπόντες κριτήριον ἕτερον τοῦ συμφωνεῖσθαι δοκοῦντος παρά τισιν ἀντιδοξοῦσὶ τε αὐτῷ και κατὰ πολὺ πλείους εἰσὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτοῦ συμφωνούντων.
- 44 χωρὶς δὲ τούτων, οἱ συμφωνούντες ἤτοι ἐν διαφοροῖς εἰσὶ διαθήσεσιν ἢ ἐν μιᾷ. ἐν διαφοροῖς μὲν οὖν οὐδαμῶς ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ λεγομένῳ· πῶς γὰρ ἂν

than our hypothetical Sage, not even so is it proper to believe him. For since it is the sagacious above all who, in the construction of their doctrines, love to champion unsound doctrines and to make them appear sound and true, whenever this sharp-witted person makes a statement we shall not know whether he is stating the matter as it really is, or whether he is defending as true what is really false and persuading us to think of it as something true, on the ground that he is more sagacious than all other men and therefore incapable of being refuted by us. So not even to this man will we assent, as one who judges matters truly, since, though we suppose it possible that he speaks the truth, we also suppose that owing to his excessive cleverness he makes his statements with the object of defending false propositions as true. Consequently, in the judgement of propositions we ought not to believe even the man who is thought to be the most clever of all.

And if anyone shall say that we ought to attend to 43 the consensus of the majority, we shall reply that this is idle.^a For, in the first place, truth is a rare thing, and on this account it is possible for one man to be wiser than the majority. And, next, the opponents of any criterion are more numerous than those who agree about it; for those who admit any kind of criterion different from that which seems to some to be generally agreed upon oppose this latter, and they are much more numerous than those who agree about it. And besides all this, those who agree are either 44 in diverse dispositions^b or in one and the same. Now they certainly are not in diverse dispositions so far as regards the matter under discussion; else how could

¹ <ἐνεῖναι> addidi: <εἶναι> add. EBA.

* Cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 327 ff.

^b Cf. i. 100; *Adv. Log.* i. 333.

τὰ αὐτὰ ἔλεγον περὶ αὐτοῦ; εἰ δὲ ἐν μιᾷ, ἐπεὶ
καὶ ὁ εἰς ὁ λέγων ἕτερόν τι μίαν ἔχει διάθεσιν καὶ
οἱ πάντες οἱ συμφωνοῦντες μίαν, ὅσον ἐπὶ ταῖς
διαθέσεσιν αἰς προσέχουσαν οὐδὲ κατὰ πλήθος
45 εὐρίσκεται διαφορὰ τις. διόπερ οὐ χρὴ τοῖς πολ-
λοῖς προσέχουσαν μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ ἐνί, πρὸς τῷ καὶ
ἀκατάληπτον εἶναι, καθάπερ ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ τρόπῳ
τῆς σκέψεως ὑπεμνήσαμεν, τὴν κατὰ πλήθος δια-
φορὰν τῶν κρίσεων, ἀπειρῶν τῶν κατὰ μέρος
ἀνθρώπων ὑπαρχόντων καὶ ἡμῶν μὴ δυναμένων
ἀπάντων αὐτῶν τὰς κρίσεις ἐπελθεῖν καὶ ἀποφή-
νασθαι τί μὲν οἱ πλείους τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπάντων
ἀποφαίνονται τί δὲ οἱ ἐλάττους. καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο
οὖν ἄτοπος ἢ κατὰ τὸ πλήθος πρόκρισις τῶν
κρινόντων.

46 Εἰ δ' οὐδὲ τῷ πλήθει προσέξομεν, οὐχ εὐρήσομεν
οὐδένα ὑφ' οὗ κριθήσεται τὰ πράγματα, καίτοι
τοσαῦτα κατὰ συγχώρησιν διδόντες. διόπερ ἐξ
ἀπάντων τούτων ἀκατάληπτον εὐρίσκεται τὸ κρι-
τήριον ὑφ' οὗ κριθήσεται τὰ πράγματα.

47 Συμπεριγραφομένων δὲ τούτῳ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
κριτηρίων, ἐπεὶ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἦτοι μέρος ἢ πάθος
ἢ ἐνέργημα ἔστι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἀκόλουθον μὲν ἦν
ἴσως ἐπὶ τι τῶν ἐξῆς ἰέναι τῷ λόγῳ ὡς καὶ περὶ
ἐκεῖνων ἱκανῶς εἰρημένον ἐν τούτοις· ἵνα δὲ μηδὲ
τὴν εἰδικὴν ὡς πρὸς ἕκαστον ἀντίρρησιν φεύγειν
δοκῶμεν, ὀλίγα καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐξ ἐπιμέτρου λέξο-

^a Cf. i. 100 ff. for the fourth trope; but the reference ought rather to be to the second, in i. 89.

^b ἐξ ἐπιμέτρου, lit. "as extra-measure" or "overplus"; "into the bargain."

they have made identical statements about it? And if they are in one disposition, inasmuch as both the one man who makes a different statement is in one disposition and all these who agree together are also in one, so far as regards the dispositions in which we find ourselves, no difference is found even on the ground of numbers. Consequently we ought not to pay heed to the many more than to the one; besides the 45 further fact that—as we pointed out in "The Fourth Mode of Scepticism"^a—the difference in judgements that is based on numbers is non-apprehensible, since individual men are innumerable and we are incapable of investigating and expounding the judgements of all of them—what it is the majority of all mankind affirm and what the minority. Thus, on this showing also, the preference given to men's judgements on the ground of their numbers is absurd.

But if we are not even to give heed to numbers, 46 we shall not find anyone by whom objects are to be judged, in spite of our having granted so much by way of concession. Therefore, on all these grounds, the criterion "By whom" objects are to be judged is found to be non-apprehensible.

And seeing that the other criteria are included in 47 this one, since each of them is either a part or an affection or an activity of Man, our next task might perhaps have been to proceed in our discussion to one of the subjects which follows next in order, supposing that those criteria also have been sufficiently dealt with in what we have now said; yet in order that we may not seem to be shirking the specific counter-statement proper to each case, we will exceed our brief^b and deal with them also shortly. And we shall

μεν. πρότερον δὲ περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου τοῦ δι' οὗ
καλουμένου διαλεξόμεθα.

5.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΔΙ' ΟΥ

48 Πολλή μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄπειρος σχεδὸν ἡ περὶ αὐτὸ
γέγονε διαφωνία παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς· ἡμεῖς
δὲ πάλιν τοῦ ἐμμεθόδου προνοούμενοι φημὲν ὅτι,
ἐπεὶ κατ' αὐτοὺς ἀνθρώπος ἐστὶ τὸ ὑφ' οὗ κρίνεται
τὰ πράγματα, οὐδὲν δὲ οὗτος ἔχει ἂν δι' οὗ κρίνεται
δυνήσεται, καθάπερ καὶ αὐτοὶ συνομολογοῦσιν, ἡ
αἰσθησὶν καὶ διάνοιαν, εἰὰν δεῖξωμεν ὅτι οὔτε δι'
αἰσθήσεως μόνης δύναται κρίναι οὔτε διὰ μόνης
τῆς διανοίας οὔτε δι' ἀμφοτέρων αὐτῶν, συντόμως
πρὸς ἀπάσας τὰς κατὰ μέρος δόξας εἰρήκαμεν· πᾶσαι
γὰρ δοκοῦσιν εἰς τὰς τρεῖς ταύτας ἀναφέρεσθαι
49 στάσεις. ἀρξώμεθα δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων.

Οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶ τινὲς μὲν κενοπαθεῖν τὰς αἰσθήσεις
φασίν (οὐδὲν γὰρ ὑποκεῖσθαι ὡς ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι
δοκοῦσιν), οἱ δὲ πάντα ὑποκεῖσθαι ὑφ' ὧν οἴονται
κινεῖσθαι λέγουσιν, οἱ δὲ τὰ μὲν ὑποκεῖσθαι τὰ δὲ
μὴ ὑποκεῖσθαι, τίνι συγκαταθησόμεθα οὐχ ἔξομεν·
οὔτε γὰρ τῇ αἰσθήσει τὴν διαφωνίαν ἐπικρινοῦμεν,
ἐπεὶ περὶ αὐτῆς ζητοῦμεν πότερον κενοπαθεῖ ἢ
ἀληθῶς καταλαμβάνει, οὔτε ἐτέρῳ τινί, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ
ἔστιν ἄλλο τι κριτήριον δι' οὗ χρὴ κρίναι κατὰ
50 τὴν προκειμένην ὑπόθεσιν. ἀνεπίκριτον ἄρα καὶ

^a Cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 343.

^b e.g. Heraclitus, Parmenides, Democritus; cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 126 ff.

^c Epicurus and Protagoras; cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 204, 369.

^d Peripatetics, Stoics, and Academics; cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 369, 388.

discuss first the criterion "By means of which" (or
Instrument) as it is called.

CHAPTER VI.—OF THE CRITERION "BY MEANS OF
WHICH" (OR INSTRUMENT)

Concerning this criterion ^a the controversy which 48
exists amongst the Dogmatists is fierce and, one may
say, unending. We, however,—with a view here also
to a systematic treatment,—maintain that inasmuch
as Man is, according to them, the criterion "By
whom" matters are judged, and Man (as they also
themselves agree) can have no other instrument
by means of which he will be able to judge except
sense and intellect, then if we shall show that he is
unable to judge by means of either sense alone or
intellect alone or both conjoined, we shall have given
a concise answer to all the individual opinions; for
they can all, as it seems, be referred to these three
rival theories. Let us begin with the senses. 49

Since, then, some ^b assert that the senses have
"empty" impressions (none of the objects they seem
to apprehend having any real existence), and others ^c
say that all the objects by which they suppose them
to be moved are really existent, and others again ^d
say that some of the objects are real, some unreal,
we shall not know whom we should assent to. For
we shall not decide the controversy by sense-percep-
tion, since it is regarding this that we are making
our inquiry whether it is illusory or apprehends truly,
nor yet by anything else, seeing that there does not
even exist any other criterion "by means of which"
one ought to judge, according to the present hypo-
thesis. So then the question whether the senses have 50

ἀκατάληπτον ἔσται πότερον κενοπαθεῖ ἢ αἰσθησις ἢ καταλαμβάνει τι· ᾧ συνεισέρχεται τὸ μὴ δεῖν ἡμᾶς τῇ αἰσθήσει μόνῃ προσέχειν ἐν τῇ κρίσει τῶν πραγμάτων, περὶ ἧς οὐκ ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν εἰ καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν καταλαμβάνει τι.

- 51 Ἄλλ' ἔστω κατὰ συγχώρησιν τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἀντιληπτικὰς εἶναι· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἦττον καὶ οὕτως ἀπιστοὶ εὐρεθήσονται πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων πραγμάτων. αἱ γοῦν αἰσθήσεις ὑπεναντίας κινοῦνται ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκτὸς, οἷον ἡ γεῦσις ὑπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μέλιτος ὅτε μὲν πικράζεται ὅτε δὲ γλυκάζεται, καὶ ἡ ὄρασις τὸ αὐτὸ χρῶμα ὅτε μὲν αἰμωπὸν ὅτε δὲ λευκὸν εἶναι <δοκεῖ>.¹ ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἡ ὄσφρησις ἑαυτῇ συμφωνεῖ· τὸ γοῦν μύρον ὃ μὲν κεφαλαλγικὸς ἀηδὲς εἶναι φησιν, ὃ δὲ μὴ οὕτως ἔχων ἡδύ. καὶ οἱ θεόληπτοι δὲ καὶ οἱ φρενιτίζοντες ἀκούειν δοκοῦσὶ τιῶν διαλεγομένων αὐτοῖς, ὧν ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἐπακούομεν. καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὕδωρ τοῖς μὲν φλεγμαίνουσιν ἀηδὲς εἶναι δοκεῖ δι' ὑπερβολὴν
- 53 θερμότητος, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις χλιαρὸν. πότερον οὖν πάσας τὰς φαντασίας ἀληθεῖς εἶναι φήσει τις, ἢ τάσδε μὲν ἀληθεῖς τάσδε δὲ ψευδεῖς, ἢ καὶ ψευδεῖς ἀπάσας, εἰπεῖν ἀμήχανον, μηδὲν ἡμῶν ἐχόντων κριτήριον ὠμολογημένον δι' οὐ κρινοῦμεν ὃ προκρίνειν μέλλομεν, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ ἀποδείξωμεν εὐπορούντων ἀληθοῦς τε καὶ κεκριμένης, διὰ τὸ μέχρι νῦν ζητεῖσθαι τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας κριτήριον, δι' οὐ καὶ τὴν ἀληθῆ ἀποδείξειν ἐπικρίνεσθαι προσήκει.
- 54 διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ὁ ἀξιῶν τοῖς μὲν κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσιν [ἐν τούτοις]² πιστεύειν, τοῖς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν διακειμένοις μηδαμῶς, ἄτοπος ἔσται· οὔτε γὰρ

¹ <δοκεῖ> add. T.

² ἐν τούτοις om. Stephanus.

illusory affections or apprehend some real object will be incapable of either decision or apprehension; and there follows the corollary, that we must not attend to sensation alone in our judgement of matters, since regarding it we cannot so much as affirm that it apprehends anything at all.

But let it be granted, by way of concession, that 51 the senses are apprehensive; yet, even so they will not be found any the less unreliable for judging the external real objects. For certainly the senses are affected in diverse ways by external objects—taste, for instance, perceives the same honey now as bitter and now as sweet; and vision pronounces the same colour now blood-red and now white.^a Nay, even 52 smell is not consistent with itself; for certainly the sufferer from headache declares myrrh to be unpleasant, while one who does not so suffer calls it pleasant. And those who are possessed or in a frenzy fancy they hear persons conversing with them whom we do not hear. And the same water seems to those in a fever to be unpleasant because of its excessive heat, but to all others tepid. Whether, then, one is to call 53 all the appearances true, or some true and some false, or all false, it is impossible to say since we possess no agreed criterion whereby we shall judge the question we are proposing to decide, nor are we even provided with a proof that is true and approved, because we are still in search of the criterion of truth “By means of which” the true proof itself ought to be tested. For these reasons he also who asks us to 54 believe those who are in a natural state, but not those whose disposition is non-natural, will be acting absurdly; for he will not gain credence if he says

^a Cf. i. 100 ff.

ἀναποδείκτως τούτο λέγων πιστευθήσεται, οὔτε ἀπόδειξιν ἀληθῆ καὶ κεκριμένην ἔξει διὰ τὰ προειρημένα.

- 55 Εἰ μέντοι καὶ συγχωρήσειέ τις τὰς μὲν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἐχόντων φαντασίας εἶναι πιστὰς τὰς δὲ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν διακειμένων ἀπίστους, καὶ οὕτως ἀδύνατος εὐρεθήσεται ἢ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων μόνων κρίσις τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων. ἢ ὄρασις γοῦν καὶ ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσα τὸν <αὐτὸν>¹ πύργον ὅτε μὲν στρογγύλον ὅτε δὲ τετράγωνον εἶναι λέγει, καὶ ἡ γεῦσις τὰ αὐτὰ σιτία ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν κεκορεσμένων ἀηδῆ ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πεινῶντων ἡδέα φησὶν εἶναι, καὶ ἡ ἀκοή παραπλησίως τῆς αὐτῆς φωνῆς νυκτὸς μὲν ὡς εὐμεγέθους ἀντιλαμβάνεται ἡμέρας
- 56 δὲ <ὡς>² ἀμαυρᾶς, καὶ ἡ ὄσφρησις ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν πολλῶν δυσώδη ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν βυρσοδεψῶν οὐδαμῶς τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι δοκεῖ, καὶ ἡ αὐτῆ ἀφή εἰσιόντων μὲν ἡμῶν εἰς τὸ βαλανεῖον θερμαίνεται ὑπὸ τῆς παραστάδος, ἐξιόντων δὲ ψύχεται. διόπερ ἐπεὶ καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσαι αἱ αἰσθήσεις ἑαυταῖς μάχονται, καὶ ἡ διαφωνία ἐστὶν ἀνεπίκριτος, ἐπεὶ μὴ ἔχομεν ὠμολογημένον <κριτήριον>³ δι' οὗ κρίνεσθαι δύναται, τὰς αὐτὰς ἀπορίας ἀκολουθεῖν ἀνάγκη. καὶ ἄλλα δὲ πλείω μεταφέρειν πρὸς τὴν τούτου κατασκευὴν ἐνδέχεται ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων ἡμῖν περὶ τῶν τῆς ἐποχῆς τρόπων. διόπερ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἀληθές ἴσως τὸ τὴν αἴσθησιν μόνην δύνασθαι κρίνειν τὰ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενα.
- 57 Οὐκοῦν ἐπὶ τὴν διάνοιαν μετέλθωμεν τῷ λόγῳ. οἱ τοίνυν ἀξιούντες τῇ διανοίᾳ μόνῃ προσέχων ἐν

this without proof, and, for the reasons given above, he will not possess a true and approved proof.

And even were one to concede that the sense-⁵⁵ impressions of those in a natural state are reliable, and those of men in a non-natural condition unreliable, even so the judgement of external real objects by means of the senses alone will be found to be impossible. For certainly the sense of sight, even when it is in a natural state, pronounces the same tower^a to be at one time round, at another square; and the sense of taste declares the same food to be unpleasant in the case of those full-fed, but pleasant in the case of those who are hungry; and the sense of hearing likewise perceives the same sound as loud by night but as faint by day; and the sense of smell⁵⁶ regards the same objects as malodorous in the case of most people, but not so in the case of tanners; and the same sense of touch feels warmth in the outer hall,^b when we enter the bath-rooms, but cold when we leave them. Therefore, since even when in a natural state the senses contradict themselves, and their dispute is incapable of decision, seeing that we possess no accepted criterion by means of which it can be judged, the same perplexities must necessarily follow. Moreover, for the establishment of this conclusion we may derive still further arguments from our previous discussion of the Modes of Suspension.^c Hence it would probably be untrue to say that sense-perception alone is able to judge real external objects.

Let us, then, proceed in our exposition to the intellect. Now those who claim^d that we should attend

¹ <αὐτὸν> add. Mutsch.

² <ὡς> add. cj. Bekk.

³ <κριτήριον> add. T.

^a Cf. i. 118.

^b Cf. i. 110.

^c See i. 36 ff.

^d Cf. Adv. Log. i. 89 ff.

τῇ κρίσει τῶν πραγμάτων πρῶτον μὲν ἐκεῖνο οὐχ ἔξουσιν δεικνύειν ὅτι καταληπτὸν ἔστι τὸ εἶναι διάνοιαν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ μὲν Γοργίας οὐδὲν εἶναι φάσκων οὐδὲ διάνοιαν εἶναι φησι, τινὲς δὲ ταύτην ἀποφαίνονται ὑπάρχειν, πῶς οὖν ἐπικρινοῦσι τὴν διαφωνίαν; οὔτε γὰρ διανοία, ἐπεὶ τὸ ζητούμενον συναρπάσουσιν, οὔτε ἄλλω τινί· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο εἶναι φασι κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τὴν νῦν ὑποκειμένην, δι' οὗ κρίνεται τὰ πράγματα. ἀνεπίκριτον ἄρα καὶ ἀκατάληπτον ἔσται πότερον ἔστι διάνοια ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν· ὧ συνεισέρχεται τὸ μὴ δεῖν μόνῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ προσέχειν ἐν τῇ τῶν πραγμάτων κρίσει, τῇ μηδέπω κατειλημμένῃ.

58 Ἀλλὰ κατειλήφθω ἡ διάνοια, καὶ ὁμολογήσθω τὸ εἶναι ταύτην καθ' ὑπόθεσιν λέγω ὅτι οὐ δύναται κρίνειν τὰ πράγματα. εἰ γὰρ μηδ' ἑαυτὴν ἀκριβῶς ὄρα, ἀλλὰ διαφωνεῖ περὶ τε τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς καὶ τοῦ τρόπου τῆς γενέσεως καὶ τοῦ τόπου ἐν ᾧ ἔστιν, πῶς ἂν δυνηθεῖη τῶν ἄλλων
59 τι ἀκριβῶς καταλαμβάνειν; διδομένου δὲ καὶ τοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν κριτικὴν εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, οὐχ εὐρήσομεν πῶς κατ' αὐτὴν κρινοῦμεν. πολλῆς γὰρ οὔσης τῆς κατὰ διάνοιαν διαφορᾶς, ἐπειδὴ ἑτέρα μὲν ἔστιν ἡ Γοργίου διάνοια, καθ' ἣν φησι μηδὲν εἶναι, ἑτέρα δὲ ἡ Ἡρακλείτου, καθ' ἣν λέγει πάντα εἶναι, ἑτέρα δὲ ἡ τῶν λεγόντων τάδε μὲν εἶναι τάδε δὲ μὴ εἶναι, πῶς ἐπικρινώμεν τὴν τῶν διανοιῶν διαφορὰν οὐχ ἔξομεν, οὐδὲ δυνησόμεθα εἰπεῖν ὅτι

^a See *Introd.* p. xv; *cf. Adv. Log.* i. 65.

^b *i.e.* whether in the head or breast or elsewhere; *cf. Adv. Log.* i. 313, 348.

to the intellect only in our judgement of things will, in the first place, be unable to show that the existence of intellect is apprehensible. For when Gorgias,^a in denying that anything exists, denies also the existence of intellect, while some declare that it has real existence, how will they decide this contradiction? Not by the intellect, for so they will be assuming the matter in question; nor yet by anything else, since, as they assert, according to our present assumption there exists nothing else by means of which objects are judged. So then the problem as to whether intellect does or does not exist will not admit of decision or apprehension; and from this it follows, as a corollary, that in the judgement of objects we ought not to attend to the intellect alone, which has not as yet been apprehended.

But let it be granted that the intellect has been 58 apprehended, and let us agree, by way of assumption, that it really exists; I still affirm that it cannot judge objects. For if it does not even discern itself accurately but contradicts itself about its own existence and the mode of its origin and the position in which it is placed,^b how can it be able to apprehend anything else accurately? And even if it be granted 59 that the intellect is capable of judging objects, we shall not discover how to judge according to it. For since there exists great divergence in respect of the intellect—for the intellect of Gorgias, according to which he states that nothing exists, is one kind, and another kind is that of Heraclitus, according to which he declares that all things exist, and another that of those who say that some things do and others do not exist—we shall have no means of deciding between these divergent intellects, nor shall we be able to

τῆ μὲν τοῦδε διανοίᾳ κατακολουθεῖν προσήκει τῆ
 60 τοῦδε δὲ οὐδαμῶς. ἦν τε γὰρ διανοίᾳ τιμὴ κρίνειν
 τολμῶμεν, τῆς διαφωνίας μέρει συγκατατιθέμενοι
 τὸ ζητούμενον συναρπάσομεν· ἦν τε ἑτέρῳ τιμῇ,
 ψευσόμεθα ὅτι μόνῃ τῆ διανοίᾳ δεῖ κρίνειν τὰ
 πράγματα.

61 Λοιπὸν ἐκ τῶν περὶ κριτηρίου τοῦ ὑφ' οὗ λεγο-
 μένου ῥηθέντων δεικνύται δυνησόμεθα ὅτι μήτε
 τὴν ἀγχινουστέραν τῶν ἄλλων διάνοιαν εὐρεῖν
 δυνάμεθα, ὅτι τε ἂν εὐρωμεν τῶν τε γεγενημένων
 καὶ οὐσῶν διανοιῶν ἀγχινουστέραν διάνοιαν, ἐπεὶ
 62 ἄδηλόν ἐστιν εἰ πάλιν ταύτης ἕτερα ἔσται ἀγχι-
 νουστέρα, οὐ δεῖ προσέχειν αὐτῇ, ὅτι τε κἂν ὑπο-
 θώμεθα διάνοιαν ἧς ἐντρεχεστέρα οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο,
 οὐ συγκαταθησόμεθα τῷ δι' αὐτῆς κρίνοντι, εὐλα-
 βούμενοι μὴ ψευδῆ τιὰ λόγον προφερόμενος διὰ
 τὸ δξυτάτης διανοίας μετεσχηκέναι δύναται ἡμᾶς
 πείθειν ὅτι ἀληθὴς ἐστιν. οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ τῆ διανοίᾳ
 μόνῃ δεῖ κρίνειν τὰ πράγματα.

63 Λέιπεται λέγειν ὅτι δι' ἀμφοτέρων. ὁ πάλιν ἐστὶν
 ἀδύνατον· οὐ μόνον γὰρ οὐχ ὀδηγοῦσιν αἱ αἰ-
 σθήσεις τὴν διάνοιαν πρὸς κατάληψιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ
 ἐναντιοῦνται αὐτῇ. ἀμέλει γοῦν ἐκ τοῦ τὸ μέλι
 τοῖσδε μὲν πικρὸν τοῖσδε δὲ γλυκὺ φαίνεσθαι ὁ
 μὲν Δημόκριτος ἔφη μήτε γλυκὺ αὐτὸ εἶναι μήτε
 πικρὸν, ὁ δὲ Ἡράκλειτος ἀμφότερα. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων τε καὶ αἰσθητῶν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος.
 οὕτως ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ὀρμωμένη ἡ διάνοια
 διάφορά τε καὶ μαχόμενα ἀποφαίνεσθαι ἀναγκά-
 190

assert that it is right to take this man's intellect as
 our guide but not that man's. For if we venture 60
 to judge by any one intellect, by thus agreeing to
 assent to one side in the dispute we shall be assuming
 the matter in question; while if we judge by any-
 thing else, we shall be falsifying the assertion that
 one ought to judge objects by the intellect alone.

Further, we shall be able to show, from the state- 61
 ments made concerning the criterion "By whom"
 (as it is called), that we are unable to discover the
 intellect that is cleverer than all others; and also
 that if we should discover the intellect that is cleverer
 than past and present intellects we ought not to 62
 attend to it, since it is not evident whether yet
 another intellect may not arise which is cleverer than
 it; and further, that even if we assume an intellect
 which none could possibly surpass, we shall not
 assent to the man who judges by means of it, dread-
 ing lest he may put forward some false statement
 and succeed in persuading us of its truth because
 he possesses the keenest intellect. Neither, then, by
 the intellect alone ought we to judge objects.

The only remaining alternative is judgement by 63
 means of both senses and intellect.^a But this again is
 impossible; for not only do the senses not guide the
 intellect to apprehension, but they even oppose it. For
 it is certain, at any rate, that from the fact that honey
 appears bitter to some and sweet to others, Demo-
 critus declared that it is neither sweet nor bitter,
 while Heracleitus said that it is both. And the same
 account may be given of all the other senses and
 sensibles. Thus, when it starts out from the senses,
 the intellect is compelled to make diverse and con-

* Cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 354 ff.

ζεται. τούτο δὲ ἀλλότριόν ἐστι κριτηρίου καταληπτικοῦ.

- 64 *Εἶτα κάκεινο λεκτέον· ἦτοι πάσαις ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι καὶ ταῖς πάντων διανοαῖς κρινοῦσι τὰ πράγματα ἢ τισίν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν πάσαις λέξει τις, ἀδύνατα ἀξιώσει τοσαύτης μάχης ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι καὶ ἐν ταῖς διανοαῖς ἐμφαινομένης, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπεὶ τῆς Γοργίου διανοίας ἀπόφασίς ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ δεῖν μῆτε αἰσθῆσαι μῆτε διανοία προσέχειν, περιτραπήσεται ὁ λόγος. εἰ δὲ τισίν, πῶς κρινοῦσιν ὅτι ταῖσδε μὲν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι καὶ <τῆδε>¹ τῆ διανοία προσέχειν δεῖ ταῖσδε δὲ οὐ, μὴ ἔχοντες κριτήριον ὠμολογημένον δι' οὗ τὰς διαφόρους αἰσθήσεις τε καὶ διανοίας ἐπικρινοῦσιν; ἦν δὲ λέγωσιν ὅτι τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰς διανοίας τῆ διανοία καὶ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι κρινοῦμεν, τὸ ζητούμενον συναρπάξουσιν· περὶ γὰρ τοῦ εἰ δύναται τις διὰ τούτων κρίνειν ζητοῦμεν.*
- 66 *Εἶτα κάκεινο ῥητέον ὅτι ἦτοι ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι τὰς τε αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰς διανοίας κρινεῖ τις,² ἢ ταῖς διανοαῖς τὰς τε αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰς διανοίας, ἢ ταῖς τε αἰσθήσεσι τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ ταῖς διανοαῖς τὰς διανοίας, ἢ ταῖς μὲν αἰσθήσεσι τὰς διανοίας τῆ δὲ διανοία τὰς αἰσθήσεις. εἰ μὲν οὖν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἢ τῆ διανοία ἀμφοτέρα κρίνειν ἐβελήσουσιν, οὐκέτι δι' αἰσθήσεως καὶ διανοίας κρινοῦσιν ἀλλὰ δι' ἐνὸς τούτων, ὅπερ ἂν ἔλωνται· καὶ παρακολουθήσουσιν αὐτοῖς αἱ ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημένα ἁπορίαί. εἰ δὲ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ*

¹ <τῆδε> add. cj. Bekk.

² κρινεῖ τις ego; κρίνεται L; κρίνετε MEAB, Bekk.: κρινοῦσιν T, Mutsch.

flicting statements; and this is alien to a criterion of apprehension.

Then there is this also to be said: they will judge 64 objects either by all the senses and by all men's intellects or by some. But if a man shall say "by all," he will be claiming what is impossible in view of the immense discrepancy which obviously exists amongst the senses and the intellects; and moreover, by reason of the assertion of Gorgias's intellect that "we must not give heed either to sense or to intellect," the man's statement will be demolished. And if they shall say "by some," how will they decide that we ought to give heed to these senses and this intellect and not to those, seeing that they possess no accepted criterion by which to judge the differing senses and intellects? And if they shall say that we will judge 65 the senses and the intellects by the intellect and the senses, they are assuming the matter in question; for what we are questioning is the possibility of judging by means of these.

Another point we must make is this: either one 66 will judge both the senses and the intellects by the senses, or both the senses and the intellects by the intellects, or the senses by the senses and the intellect by the intellects, or the intellects by the senses and the senses by the intellect. If then they shall propose to judge both objects by the senses or by the intellect, they will no longer be judging by sense and intellect but by one of these two, whichever one they may choose, and thus they will be entangled in the perplexities previously mentioned. And if they shall 67 judge the senses by the senses and the intellects by

τῇ διανοίᾳ τὰς διανοίας ἐπικρινούσιν, ἐπειδὴ μάχονται καὶ αἰσθήσεις αἰσθήσεσι καὶ δianoίαις διανοίαις, ἥτινα ἂν λάβωσιν ἀπὸ τῶν μαχομένων αἰσθήσεων πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων, τὸ ζητούμενον συναρπάσουσιν· μέρος γὰρ τῆς διαφωνίας ὡς πιστὸν ἤδη λήφονται πρὸς τὴν τῶν
 68 ἐπ' ἴσης αὐτῷ ζητουμένων ἐπίκρισιν. ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν διανοιῶν λόγος. εἰ δὲ ταῖς μὲν αἰσθήσεσι τὰς διανοίας ἐπικρινούσι τῇ διανοίᾳ δὲ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, ὁ διάλληλος εὐρίσκεται τρόπος, καθ' ὃν ἵνα μὲν αἱ αἰσθήσεις ἐπικριθῶσι δεῖ προκεκρίσθαι τὰς διανοίας, ἵνα δὲ αἱ δianoίαι δοκιμα-
 69 σθῶσι, χρὴ προδιακρίνεσθαι τὰς αἰσθήσεις. ἐπεὶ οὖν μήτε ὑπὸ τῶν ὁμογενῶν τὰ ὁμογενῆ κριτήρια δύναται ἐπικρίνεσθαι μήτε ὑπὸ ἐνὸς γένους ἀμφοτέ-
 70 τερα τὰ γένη μήτε ὑπὸ τῶν ἑτερογενῶν ἐναλλάξ, οὐ δυνασόμεθα προκρίνειν δianoίαν διανοίας ἢ αἰσθησιν αἰσθήσεως. διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ ἔξομεν διὰ τίνος κρινόμεν· εἰ γὰρ μήτε πάσαις ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι καὶ ταῖς διανοίαις κρίνειν δυνασόμεθα, μήτε εἰσόμεθα ποίαις μὲν δεῖ κρίνειν ποίαις δὲ μή, οὐχ ἔξομεν δι' οὗ κρινόμεν τὰ πράγματα.
 Ὡστε καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἀνύπαρκτον ἂν εἴη τὸ κριτήριον τὸ δι' οὗ.

Z'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΚΑΘ' Ο

70 Ἴδωμεν οὖν ἐξῆς περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου καθ' ὃ κρίνεσθαι λέγουσι τὰ πράγματα. πρῶτον τοῖνυν ἐκεῖνο ἔστιν εἰπεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ ὅτι ἀνεπινόητός

* i.e. the Stoics, cf. § 16; *Adv. Log.* i. 35, 370. For the Stoic doctrine of "presentation" and the "Criterion" see *Intro.* p. xxv.

the intellect, then, since both senses conflict with senses and intellects with intellects, whichever of the conflicting senses they shall adopt for judging the rest of the senses, they will be assuming the matter in question; for they will be adopting one section of the series in dispute, as being already reliable, to decide about the others which, equally with it, are in question. And the same argument applies to the 68 intellects. And if they shall judge the intellects by the senses, and the senses by the intellect, this involves circular reasoning inasmuch as it is required that the intellects should be judged first in order that the senses may be judged, and the senses be first scrutinized in order that the intellects may be tested. Since, therefore, criteria of the one species cannot be 69 judged by those of a like species, nor those of both the species by those of one species, nor conversely by those of an unlike species, we shall not be able to prefer intellect to intellect or sense to sense. And because of this we shall have nothing by which to judge; for if we shall be unable to judge by all the senses and intellects, and shall not know either by which of them we ought and by which we ought not to judge, then we shall possess no means by which to judge objects.

Consequently, for these reasons also the criterion "By means of which" will have no real existence.

CHAPTER VII.—OF THE CRITERION "ACCORDING TO WHICH"

Let us consider next the Criterion "According to 70 which," as they^a say, objects are judged. In the first place, then, we may say this of it, that "presentation"

ἔστιν ἡ φαντασία. λέγουσι γὰρ φαντασίαν εἶναι τύπωσιν ἐν ἡγεμονικῷ. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν πνεῦμά ἐστιν ἢ λεπτομερέστερόν τι πνεύματος, ὡς φασίν, οὐ δυνήσεται τις τύπωσιν ἐπινοεῖν ἐν αὐτῷ οὔτε κατ' εἰσοχὴν καὶ ἐξοχὴν, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν σφραγίδων ὀρώμεν, οὔτε κατὰ τὴν τερατολογουμένην ἑτεροωτικήν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μνήμην τοσοῦτων ἀναδέξαιτο θεωρημάτων ὅσα συνίστησι τέχνην, ἐν ταῖς ἐπιγινομέναις ἑτεροώσεσι τῶν

71 προὔποκειμένων ἀπαλειφομένων. εἰ μέντοι καὶ ἐπινοηθῆναι δύναίτο ἡ φαντασία, ἀκατάληπτος ἔσται· ἐπεὶ γὰρ πάθος ἐστὶν ἡγεμονικοῦ, τὸ δὲ ἡγεμονικὸν οὐ καταλαμβάνεται, ὡς εἰδείξαμεν, οὐδὲ τὸ πάθος αὐτοῦ καταληψόμεθα.

72 Εἶτα εἰ καὶ δοίημεν ὅτι καταλαμβάνεται ἡ φαντασία, οὐ δύναται κρίνεσθαι [καὶ] κατ' αὐτὴν τὰ πράγματα· οὐ γὰρ δι' ἑαυτῆς ἐπιβάλλει τοῖς ἐκτὸς καὶ φαντασιοῦται ἢ διάνοια, ὡς φασίν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, αἱ δὲ αἰσθήσεις τὰ μὲν ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενα οὐ καταλαμβάνουσιν, μόνα δέ, εἰ ἄρα, τὰ ἑαυτῶν πάθη. καὶ ἡ φαντασία οὖν τοῦ πάθους τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἔσται, ὅπερ διαφέρει τοῦ ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένου· οὐ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστὶ τὸ μέλι τῷ γλυκάζεσθαι με καὶ τὸ ἀψίνθιον τῷ πικράζεσθαι,

73 ἀλλὰ διαφέρει. εἰ δὲ διαφέρει τοῦτο τὸ πάθος τοῦ ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένου, ἡ φαντασία ἔσται οὐχὶ τοῦ ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένου ἀλλ' ἑτέρου τινὸς διαφέροντος αὐτοῦ. εἰ οὖν κατὰ ταύτην κρίνει ἡ διάνοια,

is inconceivable. They declare that "presentation" is an impression on "the regent part."^a Since, then, the soul, and the regent part, is breath or something more subtle than breath,^b as they affirm, no one will be able to conceive of an impression upon it either by way of depression and eminence, as we see in the case of seals, or by way of the magical "alteration" they talk about^c; for the soul will not be able to conserve the remembrance of all the concepts that compose an art, since the pre-existing concepts are obliterated by the subsequent "alterations." Yet 71 even if "presentation" could be conceived, it would still be non-apprehensible; for since it is an affection of the regent part, and the regent part, as we have shown,^d is not apprehended, neither shall we apprehend its affection.

Further, even were we to grant that the "presenta- 72 tion" is apprehended, objects cannot be judged according to it; for the intellect, as they assert, does not make contact with external objects and receive presentations by means of itself but by means of the senses, and the senses do not apprehend external real objects but only, if at all, their own affections.^e So then the presentation will be that of the affection of the sense, which is different from the external reality; for honey is not the same as my feeling of sweetness nor gall the same as my feeling of bitterness, but a different thing. And if this affection differs 73 from the external real object, the presentation will not be that of the external reality but of something else which is different therefrom. If, therefore, the intellect judges according to this, it judges badly and

^a Or "ruling principle," *cf.* i. 128, *Adv. Log.* i. 380; *Introd.* p. xxv.

^b *Cf.* § 81 *infra*, iii. 188; *Introd.* p. xxv.

^c The first of these views is ascribed to Cleanthes, the second to Chrysippus, *cf.* *Adv. Log.* i. 228, 372; *Introd.* p. xxv.

^d See §§ 57 ff. *supra*.

^e *i.e.* sensations or feelings.

φαύλως κρίνει καὶ οὐ κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον. διόπερ ἄτοπόν ἐστι τὸ κατὰ τὴν φαντασίαν τὰ ἐκτὸς κρίνεσθαι λέγειν.

74 Ἄλλ' οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ καταλαμβάνει διὰ τῶν αἰσθητικῶν παθῶν τὰ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενα διὰ τὸ ὅμοια τὰ πάθη τῶν αἰσθήσεων εἶναι τοῖς ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένοις. πόθεν γὰρ εἴσεται ἡ διάνοια εἰ ὅμοιά ἐστι τὰ πάθη τῶν αἰσθήσεων τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς, μήτε αὐτῇ τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἐντυγχάνουσα, μήτε τῶν αἰσθήσεων αὐτῇ τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν δηλοῦσιν ἀλλὰ τὰ ἐαυτῶν πάθη, καθάπερ ἐκ τῶν

75 τρόπων τῆς ἐποχῆς ἐπελογοισάμην. ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ ἀγνοῶν μὲν Σωκράτην εἰκόνα δὲ τούτου θεασάμενος οὐκ οἶδεν εἰ ὅμοιά ἐστὶν ἢ εἰκὼν τῷ Σωκράτει, οὕτω καὶ ἡ διάνοια τὰ μὲν πάθη τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐποπτεύουσα τὰ δὲ ἐκτὸς μὴ θεωροῦσα οὐδὲ εἰ ὅμοιά ἐστι τὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πάθη τοῖς ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένοις εἴσεται. οὐδὲ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν ἄρα δυνήσεται ταῦτα κρίνειν κατὰ τὴν φαντασίαν.

78 Ἄλλὰ δώμεν κατὰ συγχώρησιν, πρὸς τῷ ἐπινοεῖσθαι τὴν φαντασίαν καὶ καταλαμβάνεσθαι, ἔτι καὶ ἐπιδεκτικὴν εἶναι τοῦ κρίνεσθαι κατ' αὐτὴν τὰ πράγματα, καίτοι τοῦ λόγου πᾶν τὸ ἐναντίον ὑπομνήσαντος. οὐκοῦν ἦτοι πάση φαντασίᾳ πιστεύομεν <καὶ κατ' αὐτὴν ἐπικρινοῦμεν, ἢ τιμὴν ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν πάση, δηλὸν ὅτι καὶ τῇ Ξενιάδου φαντασίᾳ πιστεύομεν>¹ καθ' ἣν ἔλεγε πάσας τὰς φαντασίας ἀπίστους εἶναι, καὶ περιτραπήσεται ὁ λόγος εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι πάσας τὰς φαντασίας ὥστε

¹ <καὶ . . . πιστεύομεν> add. T.

not according to reality. Consequently, it is absurd to say that external objects are judged according to the presentation.

Nor, again, is it possible to assert that the soul ⁷⁴ apprehends external realities by means of the affections of sense owing to the similarity of the affections of the senses to the external real objects. For how is the intellect to know whether the affections of the senses are similar to the objects of sense when it has not itself encountered the external objects, and the senses do not inform it about their real nature but only about their own affections, as I have argued from the Modes of Suspension?^a For just as the man ⁷⁵ who does not know Socrates but has seen a picture of him does not know whether the picture is like Socrates, so also the intellect when it gazes on the affections of the senses but does not behold the external objects will not so much as know whether the affections of the senses are similar to the external realities. So that not even on the ground of resemblance will he be able to judge these objects according to the presentation.

But let us grant by way of concession that in ⁷⁶ addition to being conceived and apprehended the presentation is also such that it admits of objects being judged according to it, although the argument points to an entirely opposite conclusion. In this case we shall either believe every presentation, or impression, and judge according thereto, or some one impression. But if we are to believe every impression, clearly we shall believe also that of Xenias ^b according to which he asserted that all impressions are untrustworthy, and our statement will be reversed and made to say that all impressions are not of such a sort

^a See i. 100 ff.

^b Cf. § 18 *supra*.

καὶ κατ' αὐτὰς κρίνεσθαι δύνασθαι τὰ πράγματα·
 77 εἰ δὲ τισὶν, πῶς ἐπικρινούμεν ὅτι ταῖσδε μὲν ταῖς
 φαντασίαις πιστεύειν προσήκει ταῖσδε δὲ ἀπιστεῖν;
 εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἄνευ φαντασίας, δώσουσιν ὅτι παρέλκει
 ἢ φαντασία πρὸς τὸ κρίνεω, εἶγε χωρὶς αὐτῆς
 κρίνεσθαι δύνασθαι τὰ πράγματά [τινα] λέξουσιν·
 εἰ δὲ μετὰ φαντασίας, πῶς λήψονται τὴν φαντα-
 78 σίαν ἢν παραλαμβάνουσι πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων φαν-
 τασίων κρίσιν; ἢ πάλιν αὐτοῖς ἄλλης φαντασίας
 δεήσει πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν [τῶν ἄλλων φαντασιῶν],¹
 καὶ εἰς τὴν ἐκείνης κρίσιν ἄλλης, καὶ εἰς ἄπειρον.
 ἀδύνατον δὲ ἄπειρα ἐπικρῖναι· ἀδύνατον ἄρα εὐρεῖν
 ποίαις μὲν φαντασίαις ὡς κριτηρίοις δεῖ χρῆσθαι
 ποίαις δὲ οὐδαμῶς. ἐπεὶ οὖν κἂν δῶμεν ὅτι κατὰ
 τὰς φαντασίας δεῖ κρίνεω τὰ πράγματα, ἐκατέ-
 ρωθεν περιτρέπεται ὁ λόγος, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πάσης
 πιστεύειν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τισὶ μὲν πιστεύειν ὡς κρι-
 τηρίοις τισὶ δὲ ἀπιστεῖν, συνάγεται τὸ μὴ δεῖν
 τὰς φαντασίας πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν τῶν πραγμάτων
 ὡς κριτήρια παραλαμβάνειν.

79 Ταῦτα μὲν ἄρκει νῦν εἰπεῖν ὡς ἐν ὑποτυπώσει
 καὶ πρὸς τὸ κριτήριον καθ' ὃ κρίνεσθαι τὰ πράγ-
 ματα ἐλέγετο. εἰδέναι δὲ χρῆ ὅτι οὐ πρόκειται
 ἡμῶν ἀποφῆνασθαι ὅτι ἀνύπαρκτόν ἐστι τὸ κρι-
 τήριον τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας (τοῦτο γὰρ δογματικόν)·
 ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οἱ δογματικοὶ πιθανῶς δοκοῦσι κατ-
 εσκευακέναι ὅτι ἐστὶ τι κριτήριον ἀληθείας, ἡμεῖς
 αὐτοῖς πιθανοὺς δοκοῦντας εἶναι λόγους ἀντεθή-
 καμεν, οὔτε ὅτι ἀληθεῖς εἰσὶ διαβεβαιούμενοι οὔτε
 ὅτι πιθανώτεροι τῶν ἐναντίων, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν φαινο-

¹ [τῶν δ. φ.] del. Papp.

^o Cf. § 103 *infra*, *Adv. Log.* i. 443.

that objects can be judged according to them. And 77
 if we are to believe some, how shall we decide that
 it is proper to believe these and disbelieve those?
 For if they say we are to do so without presentation,
 they will be granting that presentation is superfluous
 for judging, inasmuch as they will be stating that
 objects can be judged without it; while if they say
 "by the aid of presentation," how will they select
 the presentation which they are adopting for the
 purpose of judging all the other presentations? Once 78
 again they will need a second presentation to judge
 the first, and a third to judge the second, and so on
ad infinitum. But it is impossible to judge an infinite
 series; and therefore it is impossible to discover what
 sort of presentations we ought to employ as criteria,
 and what we ought not. Seeing, then, that, even
 should we grant that one ought to judge objects
 according to presentations, whether we adopt the
 alternative of trusting all as criteria or that of trusting
 some and distrusting others, in either case the argu-
 ment is overthrown, and we are forced to conclude
 that we ought not to adopt presentations as criteria
 for the judging of objects.

This is enough to say now, in our outline sketch, 79
 with reference to the criterion "According to which,"
 as it was said, objects are judged. But one should
 notice that we do not propose to assert that the
 criterion of truth is unreal^a (for that would be dog-
 matism); but since the Dogmatists appear to have
 established plausibly that there really is a criterion of
 truth, we have set up counter-arguments which appear
 to be plausible; and though we do not positively
 affirm either that they are true or that they are more
 plausible than their opposites, yet because of the

μένην ἴσην πιθανότητα τούτων τε τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς κειμένων τὴν ἐποχὴν συναγόντες.

H'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΑΛΗΘΟΥΣ ΚΑΙ ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑΣ

80 Εἰ μέντοι καὶ δοίημεν καθ' ὑπόθεσιν εἶναι τὴν ἀληθείαν κριτήριον, ἀχρηστον εὐρίσκεται καὶ μάταιον, εἰάν ὑπομνήσωμεν ὅτι, ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν, ἀνύπαρκτος μὲν
81 ἐστὶν ἡ ἀλήθεια ἀνυπόστατον δὲ τὸ ἀληθές. ὑπομνησκομεν δὲ οὕτως. λέγεται διαφέρειν τῆς ἀληθείας τὸ ἀληθές τριχῶς, οὐσία συστάσει δυνάμει· οὐσία μὲν ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ἀληθές ἀσώματόν ἐστιν (ἀξίωμα γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ λεκτόν), ἡ δὲ ἀλήθεια σῶμα (ἐστὶ γὰρ ἐπιστήμη πάντων ἀληθῶν ἀποφαντικῆ, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη πῶς ἔχον ἡγεμονικὸν ὡσπερ καὶ ἡ πῶς ἔχουσα χεὶρ πυγμῆ, τὸ δὲ ἡγεμονικὸν σῶμα
82 ἐστὶ γὰρ κατ' αὐτοὺς πνεῦμα), συστάσει δὲ ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ἀληθές ἀπλοῦν τί ἐστὶν, οἷον "ἐγὼ διαλέγομαι," ἡ δὲ ἀλήθεια ἀπὸ [τῆς] πολλῶν ἀληθῶν
83 γνώσεων¹ συνίσταται, δυνάμει δὲ ἐπεὶ ἡ μὲν ἀλήθεια ἐπιστήμης ἔχεται, τὸ δὲ ἀληθές οὐ πάντως. διόπερ τὴν μὲν ἀλήθειαν ἐν μόνῳ σπουδαίῳ φασὶν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀληθές καὶ ἐν φαύλῳ· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸν φαῦλον ἀληθές τι εἰπεῖν.

¹ γνώσεων T; γνώσεως MSS. (τῆς . . . γν. Bekk.).

^o Cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 38 ff. S. argues that, to go by the Stoics' own statement, neither "truth" (which is "corporeal") nor "the true" (particular "judgement," which is "incorporeal") has any real existence: he terms the former "unreal," or "non-existent" (ἀνύπαρκτος), the latter "non-substantial" (ἀνυπόστατον).

apparently equal plausibility of these arguments and of those propounded by the Dogmatists we deduce suspension of judgement.

CHAPTER VIII.—OF THE TRUE AND TRUTH

Even were we to grant, by way of hypothesis, that 80 a criterion of truth exists, it is found to be useless and vain if we recall that, so far as the statements of the Dogmatists go, truth is unreal and the true non-substantial.^a The passage we recall is this: "The 81 true is said to differ from truth in three ways—in essence, composition, potency. In essence, since the true is incorporeal (for it is judgement and "expression"^b), while truth is a body (for it is knowledge declaratory of all true things, and knowledge is a particular state of the regent part, just as the fist is a particular state of the hand, and the regent part is a body; for according to them it is breath). In com- 82 position, because the true is a simple thing, as for example 'I converse,' whereas truth is a compound of many true cognitions.^c In potency, since truth 83 depends on knowledge but the true does not altogether so depend. Consequently, as they say, truth exists only in the good man, but the true in the bad man as well; for it is possible for the bad man to utter something true."

^b Literally "the utterable" (*lekton*), or thought in its relation to speech; *i.e.* the meaning or significance of a word or name (the idea or mental picture evoked by it) as distinguished from (1) the name itself, as uttered (*φωνή*), and (2) the real object, existing outside the mind (*ἐκτός*), denoted by the name: these two last were said (by the Stoics) to be "corporeal."

^c Cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 41 ff.

84 Ταῦτα μὲν οἱ δογματικοί· ἡμεῖς δὲ πάλιν τῆς κατὰ τὴν συγγραφὴν προαιρέσεως στοχαζόμενοι πρὸς μόνον τὸ ἀληθὲς νῦν τοὺς λόγους ποιησόμεθα, ἐπεὶ συμπεριγράφεται τούτῳ καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια, σύστημα τῆς τῶν ἀληθῶν γνώσεως εἶναι λεγομένη. πάλιν δὲ ἐπεὶ τῶν λόγων οἱ μὲν εἰσι καθολικώτεροι, δι' ὧν αὐτὴν τὴν ὑπόστασιν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς κινούμεν, οἱ δὲ εἰδικοί, δι' ὧν δείκνυμεν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν φωνῇ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἢ ἐν λεκτῷ ἢ ἐν τῇ κινήσει τῆς διανοίας, τοὺς καθολικωτέρους ἐκθέσθαι μόνους ὡς πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ἀρκεῖν ἡγοούμεθα. ὥσπερ γὰρ τείχος θεμελίῳ κατενεχθέντι καὶ τὰ ὑπερκείμενα πάντα συγκαταφέρεται, οὕτω τῇ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ὑποστάσει διατρεπομένη καὶ αἱ κατὰ μέρος τῶν δογματικῶν εὑρεσιλογίαι συμπεριγράφονται.

Θ'.—ΕΙ ΕΣΤΙ ΤΙ ΦΥΣΕΙ ΑΛΗΘΕΣ

85 Διαφωνίας τοίνυν οὔσης περὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς, ἐπεὶ τινὲς μὲν φασιν εἶναι τι ἀληθὲς τινὲς δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι ἀληθές, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὴν διαφωνίαν ἐπικρῖναι, ἐπειδὴ ὁ λέγων εἶναι τι ἀληθὲς οὔτε ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως τοῦτο λέγων πιστευθήσεται διὰ τὴν διαφωνίαν· ἢν τε καὶ ἀπόδειξιν βούληται φέρειν, ἢν μὲν ψευδῆ ταύτην εἶναι συνμολογήσῃ, ἄπιστος ἔσται, ἀληθῆ δὲ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι λέγων εἰς τὸν διάλληλόν τε ἐμπίπτει λόγον καὶ ἀπόδειξιν αἰτηθήσεται τοῦ ἀληθῆ αὐτὴν ὑπάρχειν, καὶ ἐκείνης ἄλλην, καὶ μέχρις ἀπίρου. ἀδύνατον δὲ ἄπειρα ἀποδείξαι· ἀδύνατον ἄρα γνῶναι καὶ ὅτι ἔστι τι ἀληθές.

204

Such are the statements of the Dogmatists. But ⁸⁴ we,—having regard here again to the plan of our treatise,—shall confine our present discussion to the true, since its refutation entails that of truth as well, it being defined as the “system of the knowledge of things true.” Again, since some of our arguments, whereby we dispute the very existence of the true, are more general, others of a specific kind, whereby we prove that the true does not exist in utterance or in expression or in the movement of the intellect, we deem it sufficient for the present to set forth only those of the more general kind. For just as, when the foundation of a wall collapses, all the superstructure collapses along with it, so also, when the substantial existence of the true is refuted, all the particular inventions of the logic of the Dogmatists are included in the refutation.

CHAPTER IX.—DOES ANYTHING TRUE REALLY EXIST ?

Seeing, then, that there is a controversy amongst ⁸⁵ the Dogmatists regarding “the true,” since some assert that something true exists, others that nothing true exists, it is impossible to decide the controversy, because the man who says that something true exists will not be believed without proof, on account of the controversy ; and if he wishes to offer proof, he will be disbelieved if he acknowledges that his proof is false, whereas if he declares that his proof is true he becomes involved in circular reasoning and will be required to show proof of the real truth of his proof, and another proof of that proof, and so on *ad infinitum*. But it is impossible to prove an infinite series ; and so it is impossible also to get to know that something true exists.

205

- 86 Καὶ μὴν τό τι, ὅπερ φασὶν εἶναι πάντων γενικώ-
 τατον, ἤτοι ἀληθές ἢ ψεῦδος ἔστω ἢ οὔτε ἀληθές
 οὔτε ψεῦδος ἢ καὶ ψεῦδος καὶ ἀληθές. εἰ μὲν οὖν
 ψεῦδος αὐτὸ εἶναι φήσουσιν, ὁμολογήσουσιν ὅτι
 ἔστι πάντα ψευδῆ. ὡπερ γὰρ ἐπεὶ τὸ ζῶον
 ἔμφυχόν ἐστι, καὶ πάντα τὰ ζῶα τὰ κατὰ μέρος
 ἔμφυχά ἐστιν, οὕτως εἰ τὸ γενικώτατον πάντων
 τό τι ψεῦδος ἐστὶ, καὶ πάντα τὰ κατὰ μέρος ἔσται
 ψευδῆ καὶ οὐδὲν ἀληθές. ᾧ συνεισάγεται τὸ μηδὲν
 εἶναι ψεῦδος· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ τὸ "πάντα ἐστὶ ψευδῆ"
 καὶ τὸ "ἔστι τι ψεῦδος" τῶν πάντων καθεστῶς
 ψεῦδος ἔσται. εἰ δὲ ἀληθές ἐστὶ τό τι, πάντα ἔσται
 ἀληθῆ· ᾧ συνεισάγεται πάλιν τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι ἀληθές,
 εἶγε καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τι ὑπάρχον, λέγω δὲ τὸ μηδὲν
- 87 εἶναι ἀληθές, ἀληθές ἐστίν. εἰ δὲ καὶ ψεῦδος ἐστὶ
 καὶ ἀληθές τό τι, ἕκαστον τῶν κατὰ μέρος καὶ
 ψεῦδος ἔσται καὶ ἀληθές. ἐξ οὗ συνάγεται τὸ
 μηδὲν φύσει ἀληθές εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ φύσιν ἔχον
 τοιαύτην ὥστε εἶναι ἀληθές, πάντως οὐκ ἂν εἶη
 ψεῦδος. εἰ δ' οὔτε ψεῦδος ἐστὶν οὔτε ἀληθές τό
 τι, ὁμολογεῖται ὅτι καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐπὶ μέρους μήτε
 ψευδῆ μήτε ἀληθῆ εἶναι λεγόμενα οὐκ ἔσται ἀληθῆ·
 καὶ διὰ ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἄδηλον ἡμῖν ἔσται εἰ ἔστιν
 ἀληθές.
- 88 Πρὸς τούτοις ἤτοι φαινόμενά ἐστι μόνον τὰ
 ἀληθῆ, ἢ ἄδηλα μόνον, ἢ τῶν ἀληθῶν τὰ μὲν
 ἄδηλά ἐστι τὰ δὲ φαινόμενα· οὐδὲν δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν
 ἀληθές, ὡς δείξομεν· οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐστὶν ἀληθές. εἰ
 μὲν οὖν φαινόμενα μόνον ἐστὶ τὰ ἀληθῆ, ἤτοι
 πάντα τὰ φαινόμενα λέξουσιν εἶναι ἀληθῆ ἢ τινά.
 καὶ εἰ μὲν πάντα, περιτρέπεται ὁ λόγος· φαίνεται

^a Cf. *Adv. Log.* ii. 32 ff.; *Introd.* p. xxvi.

Moreover, the "something," which is, they declare, 86
 the highest genus of all,^a is either true or false
 or neither false nor true or both false and true.
 If, then, they shall assert that it is false they will
 be confessing that all things are false. For just as it
 follows because "animal" is animate that all parti-
 cular animals also are animate, so too if the highest
 genus of all ("something") is false all the particulars
 also will be false and nothing true. And this involves
 also the conclusion that nothing is false; for the very
 statements "all things are false," and "something
 false exists," being themselves included in the "all,"
 will be false. And if the "something" is true, all
 things will be true; and from this again it follows
 that nothing is true, since this statement itself (I
 mean that "nothing is true") being "something" is
 true. And if the "something" is both false and 87
 true, each of its particulars will be both false and true.
 From which we conclude that nothing is really true;
 for that which has its real nature such that it is true
 will certainly not be false. And if the "something"
 is neither false nor true, it is acknowledged that all
 the particulars also, being declared to be neither
 false nor true, will not be true. So for these reasons
 it will be non-evident to us whether the true exists.

Furthermore, the true things are either apparent 88
 only, or non-evident only, or in part non-evident and
 in part apparent; ^b but none of these alternatives is
 true, as we shall show; therefore nothing is true. If,
 however, the true things are apparent only, they will
 assert either that all or that some of the apparent are
 true. And if they say "all," the argument is over-

^b Cf. *Adv. Log.* ii. 17 ff. By "true things" are meant
 judgements or propositions which conform to fact.

- γάρ τισι τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι ἀληθές. εἰ δὲ τινά, ἀνεπικρίτως μὲν οὐ δύναται τις λέγειν ὅτι τάδε μὲν ἔστιν ἀληθῆ τάδε δὲ ψευδῆ, κριτηρίω δὲ χρώμενος ἦτοι φαινόμενον εἶναι λέξει τοῦτο τὸ κριτήριον ἢ ἀδῆλον. καὶ ἀδῆλον μὲν οὐδαμῶς· μόνα γὰρ 89 ὑπόκειται νῦν ἀληθῆ τὰ φαινόμενα. εἰ δὲ φαινόμενον, ἐπεὶ ζητεῖται τίνα μὲν φαινόμενά ἐστιν ἀληθῆ τίνα δὲ ψευδῆ, καὶ τὸ λαμβανόμενον φαινόμενον πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν τῶν φαινομένων πάλιν ἑτέρου δεήσεται κριτηρίου φαινομένου, κάκεινο ἄλλου, καὶ μέχρις ἀπείρου. ἀδύνατον δὲ ἄπειρα ἐπικρίνειν· ἀδύνατον ἄρα καταλαβεῖν εἰ φαινόμενά ἐστι μόνον τὰ ἀληθῆ.
- 90 Ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ ὁ λέγων τὰ ἀδῆλα μόνον εἶναι ἀληθῆ πάντα μὲν οὐ λέξει εἶναι ἀληθῆ (οὐ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἀρτίους εἶναι τοὺς ἀστέρας ἀληθές εἶναι λέξει καὶ τὸ περιττοὺς τούτους ὑπάρχειν)· εἰ δὲ τινά, τίνοι κρινοῦμεν ὅτι τάδε μὲν τὰ ἀδῆλά ἐστιν ἀληθῆ τάδε δὲ ψευδῆ; φαινομένω μὲν γὰρ οὐδαμῶς· εἰ δὲ ἀδῆλω, ἐπεὶ ζητοῦμεν² τίνα τῶν ἀδῆλων ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ καὶ τίνα ψευδῆ, δεήσεται καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἀδῆλον ἀδῆλου ἑτέρου τοῦ ἐπικρινοῦντος αὐτό, κάκεινο ἄλλου, καὶ μέχρις ἀπείρου. διόπερ οὐδὲ ἀδῆλα μόνον ἐστὶ τὰ ἀληθῆ.
- 91 Λείπεται λέγειν ὅτι τῶν ἀληθῶν τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ φαινόμενα τὰ δὲ ἀδῆλα· ἔστι δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἄτοπον. ἦτοι γὰρ πάντα τὰ τε φαινόμενα καὶ τὰ ἀδῆλα

¹ καὶ Heintz: ἢ mss., Bekk.

² ἐπεὶ ζητοῦμεν T: ἐπιζητοῦμεν mss., Bekk.

* This is incorrect; on the hypothesis, non-evidents may also be true.

thrown; for it is apparent to some that nothing is true. If, again, they say "some," no one can assert without testing that these phenomena are true, those false, while if he employs a test or criterion he will say either that this criterion is apparent or that it is non-evident. But it is certainly not non-evident; for it is now being assumed^a that the apparent objects only are true. And if it is apparent, since the matter 89 in question is what apparent things are true and what false, that apparent thing which is adopted for the purpose of judging the apparent objects will itself in turn require an apparent criterion, and this again another, and so on *ad infinitum*. But it is impossible to judge an infinite series; and hence it is impossible to apprehend whether the true things are apparent only.

Similarly also he who declares that the non-evident 90 only are true will not imply that they are all true (for he will not say that it is true that the stars^b are even in number and that they are also odd); while if some are true, whereby shall we decide that these non-evident things are true and those false? Certainly not by an apparent criterion; and if by a non-evident one, then since our problem is which of the non-evident things are true and which false, this non-evident criterion will itself also need another to judge it, and this again a third, and so on *ad infinitum*. Neither, then, are the true things non-evident only.

The remaining alternative is to say that of the true 91 some are apparent, some non-evident; but this too is absurd. For either all the apparent and all the non-evident are true, or some of the apparent and

^b A favourite example of the "non-evident," cf. § 97 *infra*, *Adv. Log.* ii. 147, etc.

ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, ἢ τινὰ φαινόμενα καὶ τινὰ ἄδηλα. εἰ μὲν οὖν πάντα, πάλιν περιτραπήσεται ὁ λόγος, ἀληθοῦς εἶναι δίδομένου καὶ τοῦ μηδὲν εἶναι ἀληθές, λεχθήσεται τε ἀληθές καὶ τὸ ἀπίους εἶναι τοὺς 92 ἀστέρας καὶ τὸ περιττοὺς τοῦτους ὑπάρχειν. εἰ δὲ τινὰ τῶν φαινομένων καὶ τινὰ τῶν ἀδήλων ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, πῶς ἐπικρινούμεν ὅτι τῶν φαινομένων τάδε μὲν ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ τάδε δὲ ψευδῆ; εἰ μὲν διὰ φαινομένου, εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκβάλλεται ὁ λόγος· εἰ δὲ δι' ἀδήλου, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ ἄδηλα δεῖται κρίσεως, πάλιν τοῦτο τὸ ἄδηλον διὰ τίνος κριθήσεται; εἰ μὲν διὰ φαινομένου, ὁ διάλληλος εὕρισκεται τρόπος, 93 εἰ δὲ δι' ἀδήλου, ὁ εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκβάλλων. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων λεκτέον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀδήλω τινὶ κρίνειν αὐτὰ ἐπιχειρῶν εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκβάλλεται, ὁ δὲ φαινομένῳ ἢ αἰεὶ φαινόμενον προσλαμβάνων εἰς ἄπειρον, ἢ ἐπὶ ἄδηλον μεταβαίνων εἰς τὸν διάλληλον. ψεῦδος ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ λέγειν τῶν ἀληθῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι φαινόμενα τὰ δὲ ἄδηλα.

94 Εἰ οὖν μήτε τὰ φαινόμενά ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ μήτε τὰ ἄδηλα μόνα, μήτε τινὰ μὲν φαινόμενα τινὰ δὲ ἄδηλα, οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἀληθές. εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἐστὶν ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ κριτήριον δοκεῖ πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς χρησιμεύειν, ἄχρηστον καὶ μάταιόν ἐστι τὸ κριτήριον, κἄν δώμεν αὐτὸ κατὰ συγχώρησιν ἔχειν τινὰ ὑπόστασιν. καὶ εἴγε ἐφεκτέον περὶ τοῦ εἰ ἔστι τι ἀληθές, ἀκόλουθόν ἐστι τοὺς λέγοντας ὡς διαλεκτικῆ ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη ψευδῶν καὶ ἀληθῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων προπετεύεσθαι.

* For this Stoic definition cf. §§ 229, 247; *Adv. Eth.* 187; it is ascribed to Poseidonius by Diog. Laert. vii. 62.

some of the non-evident. If, then, we say "all," the argument will again be overthrown, since the truth is granted of the statement "nothing is true," and the truth will be asserted of both the statements "the stars are even in number" and "they are odd." But if some of the apparent are true and some of the 92 non-evident, how shall we judge that of the apparent these are true but those false? For if we do so by means of an apparent thing, the argument is thrown back *ad infinitum*; and if by means of a thing non-evident, then, since the non-evidents also require to be judged, by what means is this non-evident thing to be judged? If by an apparent thing, we fall into circular reasoning; and if by a thing non-evident, into the regress *ad infinitum*. And about the non- 93 evident we must make a similar statement; for he who attempts to judge them by something non-evident is thrown back *ad infinitum*, while he who judges by a thing apparent or with the constant assistance of a thing apparent falls back *ad infinitum*, or, if he passes over to the apparent, is guilty of circular reasoning. It is false, therefore, to say that of the true some are apparent, some non-evident.

If, then, neither the apparent nor the non-evident 94 alone are true, nor yet some apparent and some non-evident things, nothing is true. But if nothing is true, and the criterion seems to require the true for the purpose of judging, the criterion is useless and vain, even if we grant, by way of concession, that it possesses some substantial reality. And if we have to suspend judgement as to whether anything true exists, it follows that those who declare that "dialectic is the science of things true and false and neither" ^a speak rashly.

95 Ἀπόρου δὲ τοῦ κριτηρίου τῆς ἀληθείας φανέντος, οὔτε περὶ τῶν ἐναργῶν εἶναι δοκούντων, ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν, ἔτι οἶόν τέ ἐστί διασχυρίζεσθαι, οὔτε περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναργῶν ταῦτα καταλαμβάνει οἱ δογματικοὶ νομίζουσιν, ἐὰν ἐπέχειν περὶ τῶν ἐναργῶν καλουμένων ἀναγκαζώμεθα, πῶς ἂν περὶ τῶν
96 ἀδήλων ἀποφαίνεσθαι τολμήσαιμεν; ἐκ πολλοῦ δὲ τοῦ περιόντος καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἀδηλα τῶν πραγμάτων ἰδίως ἐνστησόμεθα. καὶ ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα διὰ σημείου τε καὶ ἀποδείξεως καταλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ κρατύνεσθαι δοκεῖ, διὰ βραχέων ὑπομνήσομεν ὅτι καὶ περὶ τοῦ σημείου καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἐπέχειν προσήκει. ἀρξώμεθα δὲ ἀπὸ σημείου· καὶ γὰρ ἢ ἀπόδειξις τῷ γένει σημείου εἶναι δοκεῖ.

I.—ΠΕΡΙ ΣΗΜΕΙΟΥ

97 Τῶν πραγμάτων τοίνυν κατὰ τοὺς δογματικοὺς τὰ μὲν ἐστί πρόδηλα τὰ δὲ ἀδηλα, καὶ τῶν ἀδήλων τὰ μὲν καθάπαξ ἀδηλα τὰ δὲ πρὸς καιρὸν ἀδηλα τὰ δὲ φύσει ἀδηλα. καὶ πρόδηλα μὲν εἶναι φασὶ τὰ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν εἰς γνώσιν ἡμῖν ἐρχόμενα, οἶόν ἐστί τὸ ἡμέραν εἶναι, καθάπαξ δὲ ἀδηλα ἃ μὴ πέφυκεν εἰς τὴν ἡμετέραν πίπτειν κατάληψιν, ὡς τὸ ἀρτίους
98 εἶναι τοὺς ἀστέρας, πρὸς καιρὸν δὲ ἀδηλα ἅπερ τὴν φύσιν ἔχοντα ἐναργῆ παρὰ τινος ἕξωθεν περιστάσεις κατὰ καιρὸν ἡμῖν ἀδηλεῖται, ὡς ἐμοὶ νῦν ἢ

^a Cf. i. 62-63.

^b i.e. the Stoics. "Pre-evident" = evident of themselves, self-manifesting; cf. i. 138.

^c Cf. Adv. Log. ii. 141, 144, 316.

^d Cf. § 90 *supra*.

And since the criterion of truth has appeared to be 95 unattainable, it is no longer possible to make positive assertions either about those things which (if we may depend on the statements of the Dogmatists) seem to be evident or about those which are non-evident; for since the Dogmatists suppose they apprehend the latter from the things evident, if we are forced to suspend judgement about the evident, how shall we dare to make pronouncements about the non-evident? Yet, by way of super-addition,^a we shall 96 also raise separate objections against the non-evident class of objects. And since they seem to be apprehended and confirmed by means of sign and proof, we shall show briefly that it is proper to suspend judgement also about sign and proof. We will begin with sign; for indeed proof seems to be a kind of sign.

CHAPTER X.—CONCERNING SIGN

Of objects, then, some, according to the Dogma- 97 tists,^b are pre-evident, some non-evident; and of the non-evident, some are altogether non-evident, some occasionally non-evident, some naturally non-evident. Pre-evident are, as they assert, those which come to our knowledge of themselves,^c as for example the fact that it is day-time; altogether non-evident are those which are not of a nature to fall within our apprehension, as that the stars^d are even in number; occasionally non-evident are those which, though 98 patent in their nature, are occasionally rendered non-evident to us owing to certain external circumstances,^e

^e i.e. distance in space. From this we infer that Sextus was not then residing at Athens.

τῶν Ἀθηναίων πόλις, φύσει δὲ ἄδηλα τὰ μὴ ἔχοντα φύσιν ὑπὸ τὴν ἡμετέραν πίπτει ἐνάργεια, ὡς οἱ νοητοὶ πόροι· οὗτοι γὰρ οὐδέποτε ἐξ ἑαυτῶν φαίνονται, ἀλλ' εἰ ἄρα, ἐξ ἑτέρων καταλαμβάνεσθαι ἂν νομισθῆεν, οἷον τῶν ἰδρώτων ἢ τινος παρα-
 99 πλησιου. τὰ μὲν οὖν πρόδηλα μὴ δεῖσθαι σημείου φασίν· ἐξ ἑαυτῶν γὰρ αὐτὰ καταλαμβάνεσθαι. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὰ καθάπαξ ἄδηλα ἅτε δὴ μηδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν καταλαμβάνόμενα. τὰ δὲ πρὸς καιρὸν ἄδηλα καὶ τὰ φύσει ἄδηλα διὰ σημείων μὲν καταλαμβάνεσθαι, οὐ μὴν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πρὸς καιρὸν ἄδηλα διὰ τῶν ὑπομνηστικῶν, τὰ δὲ φύσει ἄδηλα διὰ τῶν ἐνδεικτικῶν.

100 Τῶν οὖν σημείων τὰ μὲν ἔστιν ὑπομνηστικά κατ' αὐτοὺς τὰ δ' ἐνδεικτικά. καὶ ὑπομνηστικὸν μὲν σημεῖον καλοῦσιν ὃ συμπαρατηρηθὲν τῷ σημειωτῷ δι' ἐναργείας ἅμα τῷ ὑποπεσεῖν, ἐκείνου ἀδηλουμένου, ἄγει ἡμᾶς εἰς ὑπόμνησιν τοῦ συμπαρατηρηθέντος αὐτῷ καὶ νῦν ἐναργῶς μὴ ὑποπίπτοντος, ὡς ἔχει ἐπὶ τοῦ καπνοῦ καὶ τοῦ πυρός.

101 ἐνδεικτικὸν δὲ ἔστιν σημεῖον, ὡς φασίν, ὃ μὴ συμπαρατηρηθὲν τῷ σημειωτῷ δι' ἐναργείας, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς ἰδίας φύσεως καὶ κατασκευῆς σημαίνει τὸ οὐδ' ἔστιν σημεῖον, ὡςπεροῦν αἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμα κινήσεις σημειᾶ εἰσι τῆς ψυχῆς. ὅθεν καὶ ὀρίζονται τοῦτο τὸ σημεῖον οὕτως· σημείον ἔστιν ἐνδεικτικὸν ἀξίωμα ἐν ὑγιεῖ συνημμένῳ προκαθηγούμενον,

^a Cf. §§ 146, 318. For the "pores" (or excretory "ducts," or "passages") as "intelligible" (νοητοί), or objects of thought as opposed to sense, cf. § 140, *Adv. Log.* ii. 306.

^b The Stoic doctrine. Cf. *Adv. Log.* ii. 151 ff., 156.

^c Cf. § 104 *infra*. As smoke "indicates" fire, so in the

as the city of Athens is now to me; naturally non-evident are those which are not of such a nature^a as to fall within our clear perception, like the intelligible pores; for these never appear of themselves but may be thought to be apprehended, if at all, owing to other things, such as perspirations or something of the sort. Now the pre-evident objects, they say, do
 99 not require a sign, for they are apprehended of themselves. And neither do the altogether non-evident, since of course they are not even apprehended at all. But such objects as are occasionally or naturally non-evident are apprehended by means of signs—not of course by the same signs, but by "suggestive" signs in the case of the occasionally non-evident and by "indicative" signs in the case of the naturally non-evident.

Of the signs, then, according to them, some are
 100 suggestive, some indicative.^b They term a sign "suggestive" when, being mentally associated with the thing signified, it by its clearness at the time of its perception, though the thing signified remains non-evident, suggests to us the thing associated with it, which is not clearly perceived at the moment—as for instance in the case of smoke and fire. An
 101 "indicative" sign, they say, is that which is not clearly associated with the thing signified, but signifies that whereof it is a sign by its own particular nature and constitution, just as, for instance, the bodily motions are signs of the soul. Hence, too, they define this sign as follows: "An indicative sign is an antecedent judgement, in a sound hypothetical syllogism,"^c

hypothetical syllogism—"If there is smoke, there is fire; but in fact there is smoke; therefore there is fire"—the "antecedent" (or "if"-clause) "reveals" (or is a "sign" of) the "consequent" judgement "there is fire."

102 ἐκκαλυπτικὸν τοῦ λήγοντος." διττῆς οὖν οὔσης τῶν σημείων διαφορᾶς, ὡς ἔφαμεν, οὐ πρὸς πᾶν σημεῖον ἀντιλέγομεν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μόνον τὸ ἐνδεικτικὸν ὡς ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν πεπλάσθαι δοκοῦν. τὸ γὰρ ὑπομνηστικὸν πεπίστευται ὑπὸ τοῦ βίου, ἐπεὶ καπνὸν ἰδὼν τις σημειοῦται πῦρ καὶ οὐλήν θεασάμενος τραῦμα γεγενῆσθαι λέγει. ὅθεν οὐ μόνον οὐ μαχόμεθα τῷ βίῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ συναγωνιζόμεθα, τῷ μὲν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ πεπιστευμένῳ ἀδοξάστως συγκατατιθέμενοι, τοῖς δὲ <ὑπὸ>¹ τῶν δογματικῶν ἰδίως ἀναπλαττομένοις ἀνθιστάμενοι.

103 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἤρμοζεν ἰσως προειπεῖν ὑπὲρ τῆς σαφηνείας τοῦ ζητουμένου· λοιπὸν δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀντίρρησην χωρῶμεν, οὐκ ἀνύπαρκτον δεῖξαι τὸ ἐνδεικτικὸν σημεῖον πάντως ἐσπουδακότες, ἀλλὰ τὴν φαινομένην ἰσοσθένειαν τῶν φερομένων λόγων πρὸς τε τὴν ὑπαρξιν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν ἀνυπαρξίαν ὑπομινύσκοντες.

IA'.—ΕΙ ΕΣΤΙ ΤΙ ΣΗΜΕΙΟΝ ΕΝΔΕΙΚΤΙΚΟΝ

104 Τὸ σημεῖον τοῖνυν, ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις περὶ αὐτοῦ παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς, ἀνεπιόητον ἐστίν. αὐτίκα γοῦν οἱ ἀκριβῶς περὶ αὐτοῦ διεληφέναι δοκοῦντες, οἱ στωικοί, βουλόμενοι παραστήσαι τὴν ἔννοιαν τοῦ σημείου, φασὶ σημεῖον εἶναι ἀξίωμα ἐν ὑγιεῖ συνημμένῳ προκαθηγούμενον, ἐκκαλυπτικὸν τοῦ λήγοντος. καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀξίωμα φασιν εἶναι λεκτὸν αὐτοτελὲς ἀποφαντὸν ὅσον ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ, ὑγιές δὲ συνημμένον τὸ μὴ ἀρχόμενον

¹ <ὑπὸ> add. T, cj. Bekk.

which serves to reveal the consequent." Seeing, 102 then, that there are, as we have said, two different kinds of sign, we do not argue against every sign but only against the indicative kind as it seems to be invented by the Dogmatists. For the suggestive sign is relied on by living experience, since when a man sees smoke fire is signified, and when he beholds a scar he says that there has been a wound. Hence, not only do we not fight against living experience, but we even lend it our support by assenting undogmatically to what it relies on, while opposing the private inventions of the Dogmatists.

These prefatory remarks it was, perhaps, fitting to 103 make for the sake of elucidating the object of our inquiry. It remains for us to proceed to our refutation, not in any anxiety to show that the indicative sign is wholly unreal, but reminding ourselves of the apparent equivalence of the arguments adduced for its reality and for its unreality.

CHAPTER XI.—DOES AN INDICATIVE SIGN EXIST?

Now the sign, judging by the statements of the 104 Dogmatists about it, is inconceivable. Thus, for instance, the Stoics, who seem to have defined it exactly, in attempting to establish the conception of the sign, state that "A sign is an antecedent judgement in a valid hypothetical syllogism, which serves to reveal the consequent"; and "judgement" they define as "A self-complete expression^a which is of itself declaratory"; and "valid hypothetical syllo-

^a An "expression," *lekton* (see p. 203 note b), may be either "deficient" (e.g. "writes") or "complete" (e.g. "he writes"); cf. § 81, *Adv. Log.* ii. 71.

- 105 ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς καὶ λήγον ἐπὶ ψεύδος. τὸ γὰρ συνημμένον ἤτοι ἄρχεται ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς καὶ λήγει ἐπὶ ἀληθές, οἷον "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν," ἢ ἄρχεται ἀπὸ ψεύδους καὶ λήγει ἐπὶ ψεύδος, οἷον "εἰ πέταται ἡ γῆ, πτερωτή ἔστιν ἡ γῆ," ἢ ἄρχεται ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς καὶ λήγει ἐπὶ ψεύδος, οἷον "εἰ ἔστιν ἡ γῆ, πέταται ἡ γῆ," ἢ ἄρχεται ἀπὸ ψεύδους καὶ λήγει ἐπὶ ἀληθές, οἷον "εἰ πέταται ἡ γῆ, ἔστιν ἡ γῆ." τούτων δὲ μόνον τὸ ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς ἀρχόμενον καὶ λήγον ἐπὶ ψεύδος μοχθηρὸν εἶναι φασι, τὰ
- 106 δ' ἄλλα ὑγιῆ. προκαθηγούμενον δὲ λέγουσι τὸ ἐν συνημμένῳ ἀρχομένῳ ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς καὶ λήγοντι ἐπὶ ἀληθές ἡγούμενον. ἐκκαλυπτικὸν δὲ ἔστι τοῦ λήγοντος, ἐπεὶ τὸ "γάλα ἔχει αὐτῆ" τοῦ "κεκύηκεν αὐτῆ" δηλωτικὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ συνημμένῳ "εἰ γάλα ἔχει αὐτῆ, κεκύηκεν αὐτῆ."
- 107 Ταῦτα μὲν οὗτοι, ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγομεν πρῶτον ὅτι ἄδηλόν ἔστιν εἰ ἔστι τι λεκτόν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ τῶν δογματικῶν οἱ μὲν Ἐπικούρειοί φασι μὴ εἶναι τι λεκτόν οἱ δὲ στωικοὶ εἶναι, ὅταν λέγωσιν οἱ στωικοὶ εἶναι τι λεκτόν, ἤτοι μόνῃ φάσει χρῶνται ἢ καὶ ἀποδείξει. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν φάσει, ἀντιθήσουσιν αὐτοῖς οἱ Ἐπικούρειοι φάσιν τὴν λέγουσαν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τι λεκτόν· εἰ δὲ ἀπόδειξιν παραλήψονται, ἐπεὶ ἐξ ἀξιωματῶν συνέστηκε λεκτῶν ἢ ἀπόδειξις, ἐκ τῶν λεκτῶν δὲ συνεστῶσα οὐ δυνήσεται πρὸς πίστιν τοῦ λεκτόν εἶναι παραλαμβάνεσθαι (ὃ γὰρ μὴ διδοῦς εἶναι λεκτόν πῶς συγχωρήσει σύστημα λεκτῶν

^a i.e. with a true antecedent, or "if" clause. Cf. generally *Adv. Log.* ii. 112, 245 ff., 449.

^b For this stock example cf. *Aristot. Anal. pr.* ii. 27, *Rhet.* i. 2. 18; Plato, *Menex.* 237 e.

gism" as one "which does not begin with truth^a and end with a false consequent." For either the 105 syllogism begins with the true and ends with the true (e.g. "If there is day, there is light"), or it begins with what is false and ends in falsehood (like "If the earth flies, the earth is winged"), or it begins with truth and ends in falsehood (like "If the earth exists, the earth flies"), or it begins with falsehood and ends in truth (like "If the earth flies, the earth exists"). And they say that of these only that which begins with truth and ends in falsehood is invalid, and the rest valid. "Antecedent," they say, is "the precedent 106 clause in a hypothetical syllogism which begins in truth and ends in truth." And it "serves to reveal the consequent," since in the syllogism "If this woman has milk, she has conceived," the clause "If this woman has milk" seems to be evidential of the clause "she has conceived."^b

Such is the Stoic doctrine. But we assert, firstly, 107 that it is non-evident whether any "expression" exists. For since some of the Dogmatists, the Epicureans, declare that expression does not exist, others, the Stoics, that it does exist, when the Stoics assert its existence they are employing either mere assertion or demonstration as well. If assertion, then the Epicureans will confute them with the assertion which states that no expression exists. But if they shall adduce demonstration, then since demonstration is composed of expressed judgements, and because it is composed of expressions will be unable to be adduced to confirm the existence of expression (for how will he who refuses to allow the existence of expression grant the reality of a system compounded

108 ὑπάρχειν;)—διὰ τοῦ ζητουμένου τοίνυν τὸ ζητούμενον πιστοῦσθαι βούλεται ὁ ἐκ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τοῦ συστήματος τῶν λεκτῶν εἶναι τι λεκτὸν πειρώμενος κατασκευάζειν. εἰ οὖν μήτε ἀπλῶς μήτε δι' ἀποδείξεως ἐνδέχεται παριστᾶν ὅτι ἔστι τι λεκτόν, ἀδηλόν ἐστιν ὅτι ἔστι τι λεκτόν.

Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ ἔστιν ἀξίωμα· λεκτὸν γάρ 109 ἔστι τὸ ἀξίωμα. μήποτε δὲ καὶ εἰ καθ' ὑπόθεσιν εἶναι τι λεκτόν δοθείη, τὸ ἀξίωμα ἀνύπαρκτον εὐρίσκειται, συνεστηκὸς ἐκ λεκτῶν μὴ συνυπαρχόντων ἀλλήλοις. οἷον γοῦν ἐπὶ τοῦ "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν," ὅτε λέγω τὸ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν," οὐδέπω ἔστι τὸ "φῶς ἔστιν," καὶ ὅτε λέγω τὸ "φῶς ἔστιν," οὐκέτι ἔστι τὸ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν." εἰ οὖν τὰ μὲν συγκείμενα ἐκ τινῶν ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν μὴ συνυπαρχόντων ἀλλήλοις τῶν μερῶν αὐτῶν, τὰ δὲ ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται τὸ ἀξίωμα οὐ συνυπάρχει ἀλλήλοις, οὐχ ὑπάρξει τὸ ἀξίωμα.

110 Ἴνα δὲ καὶ ταῦτα παραλίπωμεν, τὸ ὑγιὲς συνημμένον ἀκατάληπτον εὐρεθήσεται. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Φίλων φησὶν ὑγιὲς εἶναι συνημμένον τὸ μὴ ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς καὶ λήγον ἐπὶ ψεύδος, οἷον ἡμέρας οὔσης καὶ ἐμοῦ διαλεγόμενου τὸ "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστιν, ἐγὼ διαλέγομαι," ὁ δὲ Διόδωρος, ὁ μήτε ἐνεδέχετο μήτε ἐνδέχεται ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς λήγειν ἐπὶ ψεύδος· καθ' ὃν τὸ μὲν εἰρημένον συνημμένον ψεύδος εἶναι δοκεῖ, ἐπεὶ ἡμέρας μὲν οὔσης ἐμοῦ δὲ σιωπήσαντος ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς ἀρξάμενον ἐπὶ ψεύδος κατα-

of expressions?),—it follows that the man who 108 attempts to establish the existence of expression from the reality of the system of expressions is proposing to confirm the problematic by the problematic. If, then, it is impossible to establish either simply or by means of demonstration that any expression exists, it is non-evident that any expression exists.

So, too, with the question whether judgement exists; for the judgement is a form of expression. And very possibly, even should it be granted by 109 way of assumption that expression exists, judgement will be found to be non-existent, it being compounded of expressions not mutually co-existent.^a Thus, for example, in the case of "If day exists, light exists," when I say "day exists" the clause "light exists" is not yet in existence, and when I say "light exists" the clause "day exists" is no longer in existence. If then it is impossible for things compounded of certain parts to be really existent if those parts do not mutually co-exist, and if the parts whereof the judgement is composed do not mutually co-exist, then the judgement will have no real existence.

But passing over this objection, it will be found that 110 the valid hypothetical syllogism is non-apprehensible. For Philo^b says that a valid hypothetical syllogism is "that which does not begin with a truth and end with a falsehood," as for instance the syllogism "If it is day, I converse," when in fact it is day and I am conversing; but Diodorus^c defines it as "that which neither was nor is capable of beginning with a truth and ending with a falsehood"; so that according to him the syllogism now mentioned seems to be false, since if it is in fact day but I have remained silent it will begin with a truth but end with a falsehood,

^a Cf. *Adv. Log.* ii. 80 ff.

^b A Megaric philosopher (circa 300 B.C.), not the Academic mentioned in i. 235, and *Introd.* pp. xxxvi f.; cf. *Adv. Log.* ii. 113 ff.

^c Cf. i. 234, *Adv. Log.* ii. 115.

- 111 λήξει, ἐκείνο δὲ ἀληθές “ εἰ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀμερῆ τῶν ὄντων στοιχεῖα, ἔστιν ἀμερῆ τῶν ὄντων στοιχεῖα ”. αἰεὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ ψεύδους ἀρχόμενον τοῦ “ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀμερῆ τῶν ὄντων στοιχεῖα ” εἰς ἀληθές καταλήξει καθ’ αὐτὸν τὸ “ ἔστιν ἀμερῆ τῶν ὄντων στοιχεῖα.” οἱ δὲ τὴν συνάρτησιν εἰσάγοντες ὑγιᾶς εἶναι φασὶ συνημμένον ὅταν τὸ ἀντικείμενον τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ λήγοντι μάχηται τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡγουμένῳ καθ’ οὗς τὰ μὲν εἰρημμένα συνημμένα ἔσται μοχθηρά, ἐκείνο
 112 δὲ ἀληθές “ εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστιν, ἡμέρα ἔστιν.” οἱ δὲ τῇ ἐμφάσει κρίνοντές φασιν ὅτι ἀληθές ἐστὶ συνημμένον οὐ τὸ λήγον ἐν τῷ ἡγουμένῳ περιέχεται δυνάμει καθ’ οὗς τὸ “ εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστιν, ἡμέρα ἔστι ” καὶ πᾶν διαφορούμενον [ἀξίωμα] συνημμένον ἴσως ψεύδος ἔσται· αὐτὸ γὰρ τι ἐν ἑαυτῷ περιέχεσθαι ἀμήχανον.
 113 Ταύτην τοίνυν τὴν διαφωνίαν ἐπικριθῆναι ἀμήχανον ἴσως ἂν εἶναι δόξει. οὔτε γὰρ ἀναποδείκτως προκρίνοντές τινα τῶν στάσεων τῶν προειρημένων πιστοὶ ἐσόμεθα οὔτε μετὰ ἀποδείξεως. καὶ γὰρ ἢ ἀπόδειξις ὑγιᾶς εἶναι δοκεῖ ὅταν ἀκολουθῇ τῇ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων αὐτῆς συμπλοκῇ τὸ συμπέρασμα αὐτῆς ὡς λήγον ἡγουμένῳ, ὡς οὕτως “ εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστιν, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν. [εἴπερ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· καὶ
 114 ἡμέρα ἔστι καὶ φῶς ἔστιν.]”¹ ζητουμένου δὲ περὶ

¹ [εἴπερ . . . ἔστιν] secl. Papp.: T om. καὶ ἡμέρα . . . ἔστιν.

^a The opposite is “diartesis,” incoherence or incompatibility, §§ 146, 152, 238 *infra*, *Adv. Log.* ii. 430.

^b “Implication” (*emphasis*) is power of signifying more

whereas the syllogism “ If atomic elements of things 111 do not exist, atomic elements exist,” seems true, since it begins with the false clause “ atomic elements do not exist ” and will end, according to him, with the true clause “ atomic elements exist.” And those who introduce “ connexion,” or “ coherence,”^a assert that it is a valid hypothetical syllogism whenever the opposite of its consequent contradicts its antecedent clause ; so that, according to them, the above-mentioned syllogisms are invalid, whereas the syllogism “ If day exists, day exists ” is true. And those who judge by “ implication ”^b declare 112 that a hypothetical syllogism is true when its consequent is potentially included in its antecedent ; and according to them the syllogism “ If day exists, day exists,” and every such duplicated syllogism, will probably be false ; for it is not feasible that any object should itself be included in itself.

Probably, then, it will not seem feasible to get this 113 controversy resolved. For whether we prefer any one of the above-mentioned rival views without proof or by the aid of proof, in neither case shall we gain credence. For proof itself is held to be valid whenever its conclusion follows the combination of its premisses as the consequent follows the antecedent ; thus, for example—“ If it is day it is light ; but in fact it is day ; therefore it is light ” : [“ If it is day it is light,” “ it is day and also it is light.”]^c But when 114

than is explicitly expressed. An example of this “ potential inclusion ” is “ If a man exists, a beast exists.”

^c The words bracketed give an unintelligible form of syllogism, and the Greek text is evidently corrupt. Possibly we should read—“ It is day ; and if it is day it is light ; therefore it is light ”—thus merely transposing the premisses of the preceding syllogism (*cf.* § 137).

τοῦ πῶς κρινοῦμεν τὴν ἀκολουθίαν τοῦ λήγοντος
 πρὸς τὸ ἡγούμενον, ὃ διάλληλος εὐρίσκεται τρόπος.
 ἵνα μὲν γὰρ ἡ κρίσις τοῦ συνημμένου ἀποδειχθῆ,
 τὸ συμπέρασμα τοῖς λήμμασι τῆς ἀποδείξεως
 ἀκολουθεῖ, ὡς προειρήκαμεν· ἵνα δὲ πάλιν τοῦτο
 πιστευθῆ, δεῖ τὸ συνημμένον καὶ τὴν ἀκολουθίαν
 115 ἐπικεκρίσθαι. ὅπερ ἄτοπον. ἀκατάληπτον ἄρα τὸ
 ὑγιὲς συνημμένον.

Ἄλλὰ καὶ τὸ προκαθηγούμενον ἄπορον ἔστιν.
 τὸ μὲν γὰρ προκαθηγούμενον, ὡς φασίν, ἔστι τὸ
 ἡγούμενον ἐν τοιοῦτῳ συνημμένῳ, ὃ ἄρχεται ἀπὸ
 116 ἀληθοῦς καὶ λήγει ἐπὶ ἀληθές. εἰ δὲ ἐκκαλυπτικὸν
 ἔστι τοῦ λήγοντος τὸ σημείον, ἥτοι πρόδηλόν ἔστι
 τὸ λήγον ἢ ἄδηλον. εἰ μὲν οὖν πρόδηλον, οὐδὲ
 τοῦ ἐκκαλύψοντος δεῖσεται, ἀλλὰ συγκαταληφθή-
 σεται αὐτῷ, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ σημειωτόν,
 διόπερ οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνο τούτου σημείον. εἰ δὲ ἄδηλον,
 ἐπεὶ περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων διαπεφώνηται ἀνεπικρίτως
 ποῖα μὲν ἔστιν αὐτῶν ἀληθῆ ποῖα δὲ ψευδῆ, καὶ
 ὅλως εἰ ἔστι τι αὐτῶν ἀληθές, ἄδηλον ἔσται εἰ εἰς
 ἀληθές λήγει τὸ συνημμένον. ᾧ συνεισέρχεται
 καὶ τὸ ἄδηλον εἶναι εἰ προκαθηγείται τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ
 117 ἡγούμενον. ἵνα δὲ καὶ ταῦτα παραλίπωμεν, οὐ
 δύναται ἐκκαλυπτικὸν εἶναι τοῦ λήγοντος, εἴγε
 πρὸς τὸ σημείον ἔστι τὸ σημειωτόν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο
 συγκαταλαμβάνεται αὐτῷ. τὰ γὰρ πρὸς τι ἀλλή-
 λους συγκαταλαμβάνεται· καὶ ὡσπερ τὸ δεξιὸν πρὸ
 τοῦ ἀριστεροῦ ὡς δεξιὸν ἀριστεροῦ καταληφθῆναι

^a Cf. §§ 105 f. *supra*.

we inquire how we are to judge the logical sequence
 of the consequent in its relation to the antecedent,
 we are met with the argument in a circle. For in
 order to prove the judgement upon the hypothetical
 syllogism, the conclusion of the proof must follow
 logically from its premisses, as we said above; and,
 in turn, in order to establish this, the hypothetical
 syllogism and its logical sequence must be tested;
 and this is absurd. So then the valid hypothetical
 115 syllogism is non-apprehensible.

But the "antecedent" also is unintelligible. For
 the antecedent, as they assert, is "the leading clause
 in a hypothetical syllogism of the kind which begins
 with a truth and ends in a truth."^a But if the sign
 116 serves to reveal the consequent, the consequent is
 either pre-evident or non-evident. If, then, it is
 pre-evident, it will not so much as need the thing
 which is to reveal it but will be apprehended along
 with it and will not be the object signified thereby,
 and hence also the thing mentioned will not be a
 "sign" of the object. But if the consequent is non-
 evident, seeing that there exists an unsettled con-
 troversy about things non-evident, as to which of them
 are true, which false, and in general whether any of
 them is true, it will be non-evident whether the
 hypothetical syllogism ends in a true consequent.
 And this involves the further fact that it is non-
 evident whether the leading clause in the syllogism
 is the logical antecedent. But to pass over this
 117 objection also, the sign cannot serve to reveal the
 consequent, if the thing signified is relative to the
 sign and is, therefore, apprehended along with it. For
 relatives are apprehended along with each other;
 and just as "right" cannot be apprehended as "right

οὐ δύναται, οὐδὲ ἀνάπαλιν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν
 πρὸς τι παραπλησίως, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ σημεῖον πρὸ
 τοῦ σημειωτοῦ <ὡς σημειωτοῦ>¹ καταληφθῆναι
 118 δυνατὸν ἔσται. εἰ δ' οὐ προκαταλαμβάνεται τὸ
 σημεῖον τοῦ σημειωτοῦ, οὐδὲ ἐκκαλυπτικὸν αὐτοῦ
 δύναται ὑπάρχειν τοῦ ἅμα αὐτῷ καὶ μὴ μετ' αὐτὸ
 καταλαμβανομένου.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς κοινότερον λεγομένοις
 ὑπὸ τῶν ἑτεροδόξων ἀνεπινοήτων ἔστι τὸ σημεῖον.
 καὶ γὰρ πρὸς τι καὶ ἐκκαλυπτικὸν τοῦ σημειωτοῦ,
 πρὸς ᾧ φασὶν αὐτὸ εἶναι, τοῦτο εἶναι λέγουσιν.
 119 ὅθεν εἰ μὲν πρὸς τί ἐστι καὶ πρὸς τῷ σημειωτῷ,
 συγκαταλαμβάνεσθαι πάντως ὀφείλει τῷ σημειωτῷ,
 καθάπερ τὸ ἀριστερὸν τῷ δεξιῷ καὶ τὸ ἄνω τῷ
 κάτω καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πρὸς τι. εἰ δὲ ἐκκαλυπτικὸν ἔστι
 τοῦ σημειωτοῦ, προκαταλαμβάνεσθαι αὐτοῦ πάν-
 τως ὀφείλει, ἵνα προεπιγνωσθῆν εἰς ἔννοιαν ἡμᾶς
 ἀγάγη τοῦ ἐξ αὐτοῦ γνωσκομένου πράγματος.
 120 ἀδύνατον δὲ ἐννοῆσαι πρᾶγμα μὴ δυνάμενον πρὸ
 ἐκείνου γνωσθῆναι οὐ προκαταλαμβάνεσθαι ἀνάγκη
 ἔχει· ἀδύνατον ἄρα ἐπινοεῖν τι καὶ πρὸς τι ὄν καὶ
 ἐκκαλυπτικὸν ἐκείνου ὑπάρχον πρὸς ᾧ νοεῖται. τὸ
 δὲ σημεῖον καὶ πρὸς τί φασιν εἶναι καὶ ἐκκαλυπτικὸν
 τοῦ σημειωτοῦ· ἀδύνατον ἄρα ἐστὶν ἐπινοῆσαι τὸ
 σημεῖον.

121 Πρὸς τούτους κἀκεῖνο λεκτέον. διαφωνία γέγονε
 παρὰ τοῖς πρὸ ἡμῶν, τῶν μὲν λεγόντων εἶναι τι

¹ <ὡς σημειωτοῦ> add. T, ML corr.

of left " before " left," nor *vice versa*—and the same
 holds good of all other relative terms,—so neither will
 it be possible for the sign, as " sign of signified," to be
 apprehended before the thing signified.^a And if the 118
 sign is not apprehended before the thing signified,
 neither can it really serve to reveal the actual thing
 which is apprehended along with itself and not after
 itself.

Thus also, so far as we may judge by the usual
 statements of the dissenting philosophers (the
 Stoics), the sign is inconceivable. For they assert
 that it is both relative and serving to reveal the
 thing signified, in relation to which they say it was.
 Accordingly, if it is relative and in relation to the 119
 thing signified it certainly ought to be apprehended
 along with the thing signified, as is " left " with
 " right," " up " with " down," and the rest of the
 relative terms. Whereas, if it serves to reveal the
 thing signified, it certainly ought to be apprehended
 before it, in order that by being foreknown it may
 lead us to a conception of the object which comes to
 be known by means of it. But it is impossible to form 120
 a conception of an object which cannot be known
 before the thing before which it must necessarily be
 apprehended ; and so it is impossible to conceive of
 an object which is both relative and also really serves
 to reveal the thing in relation to which it is thought.
 But the sign is, as they affirm, both relative and
 serving to reveal the thing signified ; wherefore it is
 impossible to conceive of the sign.

Furthermore, there is this also to be said. Amongst 121
 our predecessors there existed a controversy, some

^a Cf. *Adv. Log.* ii. 163 ff.

- σημείον ἐνδεικτικόν, τῶν δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι σημείον ἐνδεικτικόν φασκόντων. ὁ λέγων οὖν εἶναι τι σημείον ἐνδεικτικόν ἤτοι ἀπλῶς ἐρεῖ καὶ ἀναποδείκτως, ψιλῆ φάσει χρώμενος, ἢ μετὰ ἀποδείξεως. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν φάσει μόνῃ χρήσεται, ἀπιστος ἔσται, εἰ δὲ ἀποδείξει βουλήσεται, τὸ ζητούμενον συν-
 122 αρπάσει. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀπόδειξις τῷ γένει σημείου εἶναι λέγεται, ἀμφισβητουμένου τοῦ πότερον ἔστι τι σημείον ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀμφισβήτησις ἔσται καὶ περὶ τοῦ πότερον ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις ἢ οὐδαμῶς, ὡσπερ καθ' ὑπόθεσιν ζητουμένου εἰ ἔστι ζῶον, ζητεῖται καὶ περὶ τοῦ εἰ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος· ζῶον γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος. ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ ζητούμενον διὰ τοῦ ἐπ' ἴσης ζητουμένου ἢ δι' ἑαυτοῦ ἀποδεικνύναι· οὐδὲ δι' ἀποδείξεως ἄρα δυνήσεται τις
 123 διαβεβαιούσθαι ὅτι ἔστι σημείον. εἰ δὲ μήτε ἀπλῶς μήτε μετὰ ἀποδείξεως οἶόν τέ ἐστι περὶ τοῦ σημείου διαβεβαιωτικῶς ἀποφαίνεσθαι, ἀδύνατόν ἐστι περὶ αὐτοῦ καταληπτικὴν ἀπόφασιν ποιήσασθαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ καταλαμβάνεται μετὰ ἀκριβείας τὸ σημείον, οὐδὲ σημαντικόν εἶναι λεχθήσεται· τινος ἅτε δὴ μηδὲ αὐτὸ ὁμολογούμενον· διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ σημείον ἔσται. ὅθεν καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν ἐπιλογισμὸν ἀνύπαρκτον ἔσται τὸ σημείον καὶ ἀνεπινώθητον.
- 124 Ἔτι μέντοι κἀκεῖνο ῥητέον. ἤτοι φαινόμενα μόνον ἐστὶ τὰ σημεία ἢ ἄδηλα μόνον, ἢ τῶν σημείων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ φαινόμενα τὰ δὲ ἄδηλα. οὐδὲν δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν ὑγιές· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι σημείον.

^a Cf. § 99: the "others" include some of the Academics and medical Empirics (cf. i. 236).

^b Cf. § 96; *Adv. Log.* ii. 178 ff.

declaring that an indicative sign exists, others maintaining that no indicative sign exists.^a He, then, who asserts the existence of an indicative sign will assert it either simply and without proof, making a bald assertion, or by the aid of proof. But if he shall employ mere assertion he will not gain credence; while if he shall propose to prove it he will be assuming the matter in question. For since proof is stated 122 to come under the genus sign,^b seeing that it is disputed whether or not a sign exists, there will also be a dispute as to whether proof does or does not at all exist—just as, when we make, let us suppose, the inquiry "Does animal exist?" we are inquiring also "Does man exist?" But it is absurd to try to prove the matter in question either by means of what is equally in question or by means of itself. So that neither will one be able by means of proof to affirm positively that sign exists. And if it is not possible 123 either simply or with the aid of proof to make a positive declaration about the sign, it is impossible to make an apprehensive affirmation^c concerning it; and if the sign is not apprehended with exactness, neither will it be said to be significant of anything, inasmuch as there is no agreement even about itself; and because of this it will not even be a sign. Hence, according to this line of reasoning also, the sign will be unreal and inconceivable.

But there is this further to be said. Either the signs 124 are apparent only or non-evident only, or some are apparent and some non-evident.^d But none of these alternatives is valid; therefore sign does not exist.

^c A curious expression, only used here by Sextus; it seems to mean "an affirmation which treats the thing as though it were apprehended."

^d Cf. § 88; *Adv. Log.* ii. 171 ff.

"Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἄδηλα οὐκ ἔστι πάντα τὰ σημεῖα, ἐντεῦθεν δείκνυται. τὸ ἄδηλον οὐκ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ φαίνεται, ὡς οἱ δογματικοὶ φασιν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἑτέρου ὑποπίπτει. καὶ τὸ σημεῖον οὖν, εἰ ἄδηλον εἴη, ἑτέρου δεήσεται σημείου ἀδήλου, ἐπεὶ μηδὲν φαινόμενόν ἐστι σημεῖον κατὰ τὴν προκειμένην ὑπόθεσιν, κἀκεῖνο ἄλλου, καὶ μέχρις ἀπείρου. ἀδύνατον δὲ ἅπειρα σημεῖα λαμβάνειν· ἀδύνατον ἄρα τὸ σημεῖον καταληφθῆναι ἄδηλον ὄν. διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἀνύπαρκτον ἔσται, μὴ δυνάμενον σημαίνειν τι καὶ σημεῖον εἶναι διὰ τὸ μὴ καταλαμβάνεσθαι.

125 Εἰ δὲ πάντα τὰ σημεῖα φαινόμενά ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ πρὸς τί ἐστι τὸ σημεῖον καὶ πρὸς τῷ σημειωτῷ, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τι συγκαταλαμβάνεται ἀλλήλους, τὰ σημειωτὰ εἶναι λεγόμενα σὺν τοῖς φαινόμενοις καταλαμβανόμενα φαινόμενα ἔσται· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἅμα ὑποπιπτόντων τοῦ τε δεξιοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀριστεροῦ οὐ μᾶλλον τὸ δεξιὸν τοῦ ἀριστεροῦ ἢ τὸ ἀριστερὸν τοῦ δεξιοῦ φαίνεσθαι λέγεται, οὕτω συγκαταλαμβανόμενων τοῦ τε σημείου καὶ τοῦ σημειωτοῦ οὐ μᾶλλον τὸ σημεῖον ἢ τὸ σημειωτὸν φαίνεσθαι

126 ῥητέον. εἰ δὲ φαινόμενόν ἐστι τὸ σημειωτόν, οὐδὲ σημειωτόν ἔσται μὴ δεόμενον τοῦ σημαίνοντος αὐτὸ καὶ ἐκκαλύψοντος. ὅθεν ὥσπερ ἀναιρουμένου δεξιοῦ οὐδὲ ἀριστερόν ἔστιν, οὕτως ἀναιρουμένου τοῦ σημειωτοῦ οὐδὲ σημεῖον εἶναι δύναται, ὥστε ἀνύπαρκτον εὐρίσκεται τὸ σημεῖον, εἴπερ φαινόμενα μόνα εἶναι λέγοι τις τὰ σημεῖα.

127 Λείπεται λέγειν ὅτι τῶν σημείων τὰ μὲν ἐστι φαινόμενα τὰ δὲ ἄδηλα· καὶ οὕτως δὲ αἱ ἀπορίαι

Now that all the signs are not non-evident is shown by the following argument. The non-evident does not become apparent of itself, as the Dogmatists assert, but is perceived by means of something else. The sign, therefore, if it were non-evident, would require another non-evident sign—since, according to the hypothesis assumed, there is no apparent sign—and this again a third, and so on *ad infinitum*. But it is impossible to grasp an infinite series of signs; and so it is impossible for the sign to be apprehended when it is non-evident. And for this reason it will also be unreal, as it is unable to signify anything and to be a sign owing to its not being apprehended.

And if all the signs are apparent, then, because 125 the sign is a relative thing and in relation to the thing signified, and relatives are apprehended conjointly,^a the things said to be signified, being apprehended along with what is apparent, will be apparent. For just as when the right and left are perceived together, the right is not said to appear more than the left nor the left than the right, so when the sign and the thing signified are apprehended together the sign should not be said to appear any more than the thing signified. And if the thing signified is apparent, 126 it will not even be signified, as it requires nothing to signify and reveal it. Hence, just as when "right" is abolished there exists no "left," so when the thing signified is abolished there can exist no sign, so that the sign is found to be unreal, if one should declare that the signs are apparent only.

It remains to declare that of the signs some are 127 apparent, others non-evident; but even so the diffi-

^a Cf. §§ 119, 169.

μένουσιν. τῶν τε γὰρ φαινομένων σημείων τὰ σημειωτὰ εἶναι λεγόμενα φαινόμενα ἔσται, καθὰ προειρήκαμεν, καὶ μὴ δεόμενα τοῦ σηματοῦντος οὐδὲ σημειωτὰ ὅλως ὑπάρξει, ὅθεν οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνα

128 σημεία ἔσται, μηδὲν σημαίνοντα· τὰ τε ἄδηλα σημεία χρῆζοντα τῶν ἐκκαλυφόντων αὐτά, ἐὰν μὲν ὑπὸ ἀδῆλων σημαίνεσθαι λέγηται, εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπίπτοντος τοῦ λόγου ἀκατάληπτα εὐρίσκεται καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀνύπαρκτα, ὡς προειρήκαμεν· ἐὰν δὲ ὑπὸ φαινομένων, φαινόμενα ἔσται σὺν τοῖς φαινομένοις αὐτῶν σημείοις καταλαμβανόμενα, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἀνύπαρκτα. ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι τι πρᾶγμα ὃ καὶ ἄδηλόν ἐστι φύσει καὶ φαίνεται, τὰ δὲ σημεία περὶ ὧν ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος, ἄδηλα ὑποτεθέντα, φαινόμενα εὐρέθη κατὰ τὴν περιτροπὴν τοῦ λόγου.

129 Εἰ οὖν μήτε πάντα τὰ σημεία φαινόμενά ἐστι μήτε πάντα ἄδηλα, μήτε τῶν σημείων τινὰ μὲν ἐστὶ φαινόμενα τινὰ δὲ ἄδηλα, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστιν, ὡς καὶ αὐτοὶ φασιν, ἀνύπαρκτα ἔσται τὰ λεγόμενα σημεία.

130 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὀλίγα ἀπὸ πολλῶν ἀρκέσει νῦν εἰρησθαι πρὸς ὑπόμνησιν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι σημείον ἐνδεικτικόν· ἐξῆς δὲ καὶ τὰς ὑπομνήσεις τοῦ εἶναι τι σημείον ἐκθυσόμεθα, ἵνα τὴν ἰσοσθένειαν τῶν ἀντικειμένων λόγων παραστήσωμεν.

* Ἦτοι οὖν σημαίνουσί τι αἰ κατὰ τοῦ σημείου

culties remain. For the things said to be signified by the apparent signs will, as we said before, be apparent and require nothing to signify them, and will not even be things signified at all, so that neither will the signs be signs, as not signifying anything. And as to the non-evident signs which need things 128 to reveal them, if we say that they are signified by things non-evident, the argument will be involved in a regress *ad infinitum*, rendering them non-apprehensible and therefore unreal, as we said before ^a; whereas, if they are to be signified by things apparent, they will be apparent, because apprehended along with their apparent signs, and therefore also unreal. For it is impossible for any object really to exist which is by nature both non-evident and apparent; but the signs which we are discussing though assumed to be non-evident have been found to be apparent owing to the reversal of the argument.^b

If, therefore, the signs are neither all apparent nor 129 all non-evident, nor yet some of the signs apparent and some non-evident, and besides these there is no other alternative, as they themselves affirm, then the so-called signs will be unreal.

So then these few arguments out of many will be 130 enough for the present to suggest to us the non-existence of an indicative sign. Next, we shall set forth those which go to suggest the existence of a sign, in order that we may exhibit the equipollence of the counter-balancing arguments.

Either, then, the phrases used in criticism of the

^a Cf. § 124 *supra*.

^b Cf. §§ 185, 187.

φωναί φερόμεναι ἢ οὐδὲν σημαίνουσιν. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἄσημοι εἰσιν, πῶς ἂν κινήσειαν τὴν ὑπαρξίν τοῦ
 131 σημείου; εἰ δὲ σημαίνουσί τι, ἔστι σημεῖον. ἔτι ἦτοι ἀποδεικτικοὶ εἰσιν οἱ λόγοι οἱ κατὰ τοῦ σημείου ἢ οὐκ ἀποδεικτικοί. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἀποδεικτικοί, οὐκ ἀποδεικνύουσι τὸ μὴ εἶναι σημεῖον· εἰ δὲ ἀποδεικτικοί, ἐπεὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις τῷ γένει σημείον ἐστίν, ἐκκαλυπτική οὖσα τοῦ συμπεράσματος, ἔσται σημεῖον. ὅθεν καὶ συνερωτᾶται λόγος τοιοῦτος. εἰ ἔστι τι σημεῖον, ἔστι σημεῖον, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἔστι σημεῖον, ἔστι σημεῖον· τὸ γὰρ μὴ εἶναι σημεῖον δι' ἀποδείξεως, ἢ δὴ ἔστι σημεῖον, δείκνυται. ἦτοι δὲ ἔστι σημεῖον ἢ οὐκ ἔστι σημεῖον·
 132 ἔστιν ἄρα σημεῖον. τούτῳ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ παράκειται τοιοῦτος λόγος· εἰ οὐκ ἔστι τι σημεῖον, οὐκ ἔστι σημεῖον· καὶ εἰ ἔστι σημεῖον ὃ φασιν οἱ δογματικοὶ σημεῖον εἶναι, οὐκ ἔστι σημεῖον· τὸ γὰρ σημεῖον περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος, κατὰ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν αὐτοῦ καὶ πρὸς τι εἶναι λεγόμενον καὶ ἐκκαλυπτικὸν τοῦ σημειωτοῦ, ἀνύπαρκτον εὐρίσκεται, ὡς
 133 παρεστήσαμεν. ἦτοι δὲ ἔστι σημεῖον ἢ οὐκ ἔστι σημεῖον· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι σημεῖον.

Καὶ περὶ τῶν φωνῶν δὲ τῶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ σημείου αὐτοὶ ἀποκρινάσθησαν οἱ δογματικοί, πότερον

^a Cf. *Adv. Log.* ii. 279. The meaning of these sections, 130-133, is briefly this: The Dogmatists argue (§§ 130-131) (1) that the Sceptics' objections to "sign" must signify either something or nothing; if nothing, they have no force against it, while if they signify something they are signs themselves and so prove sign's existence; (2) the arguments (λόγοι) against "sign" prove either something or nothing; if nothing, they fail to prove the non-existence of "sign," while if they prove something, they are "proofs," *i.e.* a species of "sign," and thus prove sign's existence. Hence,

sign signify something or they signify nothing.^a But if they are non-significant how could they affect the reality of the sign? While if they signify something, there exists a sign. Further, the arguments against 131 the sign are either probative or non-probative; but if they are non-probative they do not prove the non-existence of a sign; while if they are probative, since proof, as serving to reveal the conclusion, belongs to the genus sign, sign will exist. Whence this argument also is propounded: "If sign exists, sign exists; and if sign exists not, sign exists; for the non-existence of sign is shown by proof, which is a form of sign. But sign either exists or exists not; therefore sign exists." And this argument is counter- 132 balanced by the following argument: "If any sign does not exist, sign does not exist; and if sign is that which the Dogmatists declare sign to be, sign does not exist (for the sign under discussion, according to the conception of it and as stated to be both relative and serving to reveal the thing signified, is found to be unreal, as we have shown). But sign 133 either exists or exists not; therefore sign does not exist."

Regarding also the phrases used in support of the sign,^b let the Dogmatists themselves say in reply to our argument whether they signify something or signify whichever view we take—the Dogmatists' that "sign exists," or the Sceptics' that "sign exists not"—we arrive at the same conclusion that "sign exists." In § 132 we have the counter-argument of the Sceptics, "reversing" that of the Dogmatists.

^b In this § 133 the Sceptics are replying to the first argument of the Dogmatists (in § 130); the conclusion that "the existence of sign" proves its "non-existence" is based on the arguments in § 132, which "reverses" that of the Dogmatists.

σημαίνουσί τι ἢ οὐδὲν σημαίνουσιν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν σημαίνουσιν, οὐ πιστοῦνται τὸ εἶναι σημεῖον· εἰ δὲ σημαίνουσιν, ἀκολουθήσει αὐταῖς τὸ σημειωτόν. τούτο δὲ ἦν τὸ εἶναι τι σημεῖον ᾧ ἔπεται τὸ <μη>¹ εἶναι σημεῖον, ὡς ὑπεμνήσαμεν, κατὰ τὴν τοῦ λόγου περιτροπήν.

Πλήν ἀλλ' οὕτω πιθανῶν καὶ πρὸς τὸ εἶναι σημεῖον καὶ πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι λόγων φερομένων, οὐ μᾶλλον εἶναι σημεῖον ἢ μὴ εἶναι ῥητέον.

IB'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΑΠΟΔΕΙΞΕΩΣ

- 134 Φανερόν μὲν οὖν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι οὐδὲ ἡ ἀπόδειξις ὁμολογούμενόν τι πρᾶγμα ἐστίν· εἰ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ σημείου ἐπέχομεν, καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις δὲ σημείον τί ἐστί, καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἐπέχειν ἀνάγκη. καὶ γὰρ εὐρήσομεν τοὺς περὶ τοῦ σημείου λόγους ἠρωτημένους ἐφαρμοζέσθαι δυναμένους καὶ κατὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως, ἐπεὶ καὶ πρὸς τι εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ ἐκκαλυπτική τοῦ συμπεράσματος, οἷς ἠκολούθει τὰ πρὸς τὸ σημεῖον ἡμῖν εἰρημένα σχεδὸν ἅπαντα.
- 135 εἰ δὲ δεῖ καὶ ἰδίως περὶ ἀποδείξεως εἰπεῖν, συντόμως ἐπελεύσομαι τὸν περὶ αὐτῆς λόγον, πρότερον σαφηνίσαι πειραθεὶς διὰ βραχέων τί φασιν εἶναι τὴν ἀπόδειξιν.

"Ἔστιν οὖν, ὡς φασίν, ἡ ἀπόδειξις λόγος δι' ὁμολογούμενων λημμάτων κατὰ συναγωγὴν ἐπιφορὰν ἐκκαλύπτων ἄδηλον. σαφέστερον δὲ ὁ λέγουσιν ἔσται διὰ τούτων. λόγος ἐστὶ σύστημα ἐκ λημμά-

¹ <μη> add. Kayser, Papp.

^a For this Sceptic formula cf. i. 188.

nothing. For if they signify nothing, the existence of sign is not confirmed; whereas if they signify something, the thing signified will follow them; and it was "the existence of a sign." And from this follows, as we have shown, the non-existence of sign, because of the reversal of the argument.

In short, then, since such plausible arguments are adduced both for the existence and for the non-existence of sign, we must declare that sign is "no more"^a existent than non-existent.

CHAPTER XII.—OF PROOF

Now it is plain from this that neither is proof a 134 matter upon which there is agreement; for if we suspend judgement about the sign, and proof also is a sign,^b we must necessarily suspend judgement about proof likewise. And in fact we shall find that the arguments propounded concerning the sign can be adapted to apply to proof as well, since it seems to be both relative and serving to reveal the conclusion, and from these properties followed nearly all the results we mentioned in the case of the sign. If, 135 however, one ought to devote a separate discussion to proof, I shall proceed to treat of it concisely after endeavouring first to explain shortly the definition they give of proof.

Proof is, as they assert, "an argument which, by means of agreed premisses, reveals by way of deduction a non-evident inference." What their statement means will be made clearer by what follows. "An argument is a system composed of premisses and an

^b Cf. §§ 96, 122, 131 *supra*; and for the next ten sections cf. *Adv. Log.* ii. 299 ff.

- 136 των καὶ ἐπιφορᾶς· τούτου δὲ λήμματα μὲν εἶναι λέγεται τὰ πρὸς κατασκευὴν τοῦ συμπεράσματος συμφώνως λαμβανόμενα ἀξιώματα, ἐπιφορὰ δὲ [ἢ συμπεράσμα] τὸ ἐκ τῶν λημμάτων κατασκευαζόμενον ἀξίωμα. οἷον ἐν τούτῳ “ εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν ” τὸ μὲν “ φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν ” συμπεράσμα ἔστι, τὰ
- 137 δὲ λοιπὰ λήμματα. τῶν δὲ λόγων οἱ μὲν εἰσι συνακτικοὶ οἱ δὲ ἀσύνακτοι, συνακτικοὶ μὲν ὅταν τὸ συνημμένον τὸ ἀρχόμενον μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ διὰ τῶν τοῦ λόγου λημμάτων συμπεπλεγμένου, λήγον δὲ εἰς τὴν ἐπιφορὰν αὐτοῦ, ὑγιὲς ἢ, οἷον ὁ προειρημένος λόγος συνακτικός ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ τῇ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων αὐτοῦ συμπλοκῇ ταύτῃ “ ἡμέρα ἔστι, καὶ εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν ” ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ “ φῶς ἔστιν ” ἐν τούτῳ τῷ συνημμένῳ “ [εἰ]² ἡμέρα ἔστι, καὶ εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν < φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν >.”³ ἀσύνακτοι δὲ οἱ μὴ οὕτως ἔχοντες.
- 138 Τῶν δὲ συνακτικῶν οἱ μὲν εἰσιν ἀληθεῖς οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἀληθεῖς, ἀληθεῖς μὲν ὅταν μὴ μόνον τὸ συνημμένον ἐκ τῆς τῶν λημμάτων συμπλοκῆς καὶ τῆς ἐπιφορᾶς, ὡς προειρήκαμεν, ὑγιὲς ἢ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ συμπεράσμα καὶ τὸ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων αὐτοῦ συμπεπλεγμένον ἀληθὲς ὑπάρχη, ὃ ἔστιν ἡγούμενον ἐν τῷ συνημμένῳ. ἀληθὲς δὲ συμπεπλεγμένον ἔστι τὸ πάντα ἔχον ἀληθῆ, ὡς τὸ “ ἡμέρα ἔστι, καὶ εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν.” οὐκ ἀληθεῖς δὲ οἱ μὴ
- 139 οὕτως ἔχοντες. ὁ γὰρ τοιοῦτος λόγος ἡμέρας οὕσης “ εἰ νύξ ἔστι, σκότος ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν νύξ ἔστιν· σκότος ἄρα ἔστιν ” συνακτικός μὲν ἔστιν,

inference. The premisses of it are (it is said) the 136 judgements adopted by consent for the establishment of the inference, and the inference is the judgement established by the premisses.” For example, in the argument “ If it is day, it is light ; but it is in truth day ; therefore it is light,” the clause “ therefore it is light ” is a conclusion, and the rest are premisses. And of arguments some are conclusive, some inconclusive—conclusive when the hypothetical syllogism^a which begins with the combination made by the premisses of the argument and ends with its inference is valid ; thus, for example, the argument just stated is conclusive since the combination of its premisses—“ it is day ” and “ if it is day, it is light ”—is followed by “ it is light ” in the syllogism “ it is day, and if it is day it is light ; therefore it is light.” But arguments that are not like this are inconclusive.

And of the conclusive arguments some are true, 138 some not true—true when not only the syllogism formed by the combination of the premisses and the inference is valid,^b as we said above, but the conclusion also and the combination of the premisses, which is the antecedent in the syllogism, is really true. And a combination is true when it has all its parts true, as in the case of “ It is day, and if it is day, it is light ” ; but those of a different kind are not true. For an argument such as this—“ If it is 139 night, it is dark ; but in fact it is night ; therefore it is dark ”—is indeed conclusive, since the syllogism

^a τὸ συνημμένον, lit. “ the combination ” ; cf. p. 246 note a.

^b “ Valid ” refers only to logical form ; “ true ” to content ; cf. § 139 ; *Adv. Log.* ii. 413.

¹ ἢ om. MSS., συμπεράσμα om. T.

² [εἰ] secl. Rüstow.

³ < φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν > add. Papp.

ἐπεὶ τὸ συνημμένον τοῦτο ὑγιές ἐστιν “ [εἶ] νύξ ἐστι, καὶ εἰ νύξ ἐστι, <σκότος ἐστι,>² σκότος ἄρα ἐστιν,” οὐ μέντοι ἀληθής. τὸ γὰρ ἡγούμενον συμπεπλεγμένον ψευδὸς ἐστι, τὸ “ νύξ ἐστι, καὶ εἰ νύξ ἐστι, σκότος ἐστι,” ψευδὸς ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸ “ νύξ ἐστιν ”. ψευδὸς γὰρ ἐστι συμπεπλεγμένον τὸ ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ ψευδὸς. ἔνθεν καὶ ἀληθῆ λόγον εἶναι φασι τὸν δι’ ἀληθῶν λημμάτων ἀληθῆς συνάγοντα συμπέρασμα.

140 Πάλιν δὲ τῶν ἀληθῶν λόγων οἱ μὲν εἰσιν ἀποδεικτικοὶ οἱ δ’ οὐκ ἀποδεικτικοί, καὶ ἀποδεικτικοὶ μὲν οἱ διὰ προδήλων ἀδηλόν τι συνάγοντες, οὐκ ἀποδεικτικοὶ δὲ οἱ μὴ τοιοῦτοι. οἷον ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος λόγος “ εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστίν, φῶς ἐστίν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἐστίν· φῶς ἄρα ἐστίν ” οὐκ ἐστίν ἀποδεικτικός· τὸ γὰρ φῶς εἶναι, ὅπερ ἐστίν αὐτοῦ συμπέρασμα, πρόδηλόν ἐστιν. ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος “ εἰ ἰδρῶτες ῥέουσι διὰ τῆς ἐπιφανείας, εἰσὶ νοητοὶ πόροι· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἰδρῶτες ῥέουσι διὰ τῆς ἐπιφανείας· εἰσὶν ἄρα νοητοὶ πόροι ” ἀποδεικτικός ἐστίν, τὸ συμπέρασμα ἔχον ἀδηλόν, τὸ “ εἰσὶν ἄρα νοητοὶ πόροι.”

141 Τῶν δὲ ἀδηλόν τι συναγόντων οἱ μὲν ἐφοδευτικῶς μόνον ἄγουσιν ἡμᾶς διὰ τῶν λημμάτων ἐπὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα, οἱ δὲ ἐφοδευτικῶς ἅμα καὶ ἐκκαλυπτικῶς. οἷον ἐφοδευτικῶς μὲν οἱ ἐκ πίστεως καὶ μνήμης ἠρτήσθαι δοκοῦντες, οἷός ἐστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος “ εἰ τίς σοι θεῶν εἶπεν ὅτι πλουτήσῃ οὗτος, πλουτήσῃ οὗτος· οὗτοσι δὲ ὁ θεός ” (δεικνυμι δὲ καθ’ ὑπόθεσιν τὸν Δία) “ εἰπέ σοι ὅτι

¹ [εἶ] secl. Rüstow.

² <σκότος ἐστι> add. Rüstow.

“ it is night, and if it is night it is dark, therefore it is dark ” is a valid one, but, when it is day-time, it is not true. For the antecedent combination—“ it is night, and if it is night it is dark ”—is false since it contains the falsehood “ it is night ”; for the combination which contains a falsehood is false. Hence they also say that a true argument is that which deduces a true conclusion from true premisses.

Of true arguments, again, some are “ probative,”¹⁴⁰ some “ non-probative ”; and the probative are those which deduce something non-evident by means of pre-evident premisses, the non-probative those not of this sort.^a For example, an argument such as this—“ If it is day it is light; but in fact it is day; therefore it is light ” is not probative; for its conclusion, that “ it is light,” is pre-evident. But an argument like this—“ If sweat pours through the surface, there are insensible pores^b; but in fact sweat does pour through the surface; therefore there are insensible pores ”—is a probative one, as its conclusion (“ there are therefore insensible pores ”) is non-evident.

And of arguments which deduce something non-¹⁴¹ evident, some conduct us through the premisses to the conclusion by way of progression only, others both by way of progression and by way of discovery as well. By progression, for instance, are those which seem to depend on belief and memory, such as the argument “ If a god has said to you that this man will be rich, this man will be rich; but this god (assume that I point to Zeus) has said to you that

^a For this and the following sections cf. *Adv. Log.* ii. 305 ff.

^b Cf. § 98 *supra*.

- πλουτήσῃ οὗτος· πλουτήσῃ ἄρα οὗτος". συγκατατιθέμεθα γὰρ τῷ συμπεράσματι οὐχ οὕτως διὰ τὴν τῶν λημμάτων ἀνάγκην ὡς πιστεύοντες 142 τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀποφάσει. οἱ δὲ οὐ μόνον ἐφοδευτικῶς ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκκαλυπτικῶς ἄγουσιν ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα, ὡς ὁ τοιοῦτος " εἰ ῥέουσι διὰ τῆς ἐπιφανείας ἰδρώτες, εἰσὶ νοητοὶ πόροι· ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· τὸ δεύτερον ἄρα "· τὸ γὰρ ῥεῖν τοὺς ἰδρώτας ἐκκαλυπτικόν ἐστὶ τοῦ πόρου εἶναι, διὰ τὸ προειληφθῆαι ὅτι διὰ ναστοῦ σώματος ὑγρὸν οὐ δύναται φέρεσθαι.
- 143 Ἡ οὖν ἀπόδειξις καὶ λόγος εἶναι ὀφείλει καὶ συνακτικὸς καὶ ἀληθῆς καὶ ἄδηλον ἔχων συμπεέρασμα [καὶ]¹ ἐκκαλυπτόμενον ὑπὸ τῆς δυνάμεως τῶν λημμάτων, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἶναι λέγεται ἀπόδειξις λόγος δι' ὁμολογουμένων λημμάτων κατὰ συναγωγὴν ἐπιφορὰν ἐκκαλύπτων ἄδηλον.
- Διὰ τούτων μὲν οὖν σαφηνίζειν εἰώθασιν τὴν ἔννοιαν τῆς ἀποδείξεως.

ΠΓ'.—ΒΙ ΕΣΤΙΝ ΑΠΟΔΕΙΞΙΣ

- 144 "Ὅτι δὲ ἀνύπαρκτός ἐστιν ἡ ἀπόδειξις, ἀπ' αὐτῶν ὧν λέγουσιν ἐπιλογίζεσθαι δυνατόν, ἕκαστον τῶν περιεχομένων ἐν τῇ ἐννοίᾳ διατρέποντα. οἷον γοῦν ὁ λόγος σύγκειται ἐξ ἀξιωματίων, τὰ δὲ σύνθετα πράγματα οὐ δύναται ὑπάρχειν ἐὰν μὴ τὰ ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκεν ἀλλήλοισιν συνυπάρχη, ὡς πρόδηλον ἀπὸ κλίνης καὶ τῶν παραπλησίων, τὰ δὲ μέρη τοῦ
- ¹ [καὶ] om. T.

^o See the definition of "proof" in §§ 135-136. It is with "hypothetical syllogisms" that Sextus is here concerned. The

this man will be rich ; therefore he will be rich " ; for we assent to the conclusion not so much on account of the logical force of the premisses as because of our belief in the statement of the god. But some arguments 142 conduct us to the conclusion by way of discovery as well as of progression, like the following : " If sweat pours through the surface, there are insensible pores ; but the first is true, therefore also the second " ; for the pouring of the sweat makes discovery of the fact of the existence of pores, because of the prior assumption that moisture cannot pass through a solid body.

So, then, proof ought to be an argument which 143 is deductive and true and has a non-evident conclusion which is discovered by the potency of the premisses ; and because of this, proof is defined as " an argument which by means of agreed premisses discovers by way of deduction a non-evident inference." It is in these terms, then, that they are in the habit of explaining the conception of proof.

CHAPTER XIII.—DOES PROOF EXIST ?

That proof has no real existence may be inferred 144 from their own statements, by refuting each of the assumptions implied in its conception.^a Thus, for instance, the argument is compounded of judgements, but compound things cannot exist unless its component elements mutually co-exist, as is pre-evident from the case of a bed and similar objects ; but the parts

" component elements " of the syllogism (or " argument ") are the " judgements " (or propositions) which go to form its " premisses."

λόγου ἀλλήλοις οὐ συνυπάρχει. ὅτε γὰρ λέγομεν τὸ πρῶτον λήμμα, οὐδέπω ὑπάρχει οὔτε τὸ ἕτερον λήμμα οὔτε ἡ ἐπιφορά· ὅτε δὲ τὸ δεύτερόν φαμεν, τὸ μὲν πρότερον λήμμα οὐκέτι ὑπάρχει, ἡ δὲ ἐπιφορά οὐδέπω ἔστιν· ὅτε δὲ τὴν ἐπιφορὰν προφερόμεθα, τὰ λήμματα αὐτῆς οὐκέτι ὑφέστηκεν. οὐ συνυπάρχει ἄρα ἀλλήλοις τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου· ὅθεν οὐδὲ ὁ λόγος ὑπάρχειν δόξει.

- 145 Χωρὶς δὲ τούτων ὁ συνακτικὸς λόγος ἀκατάληπτός ἐστιν· εἰ γὰρ οὗτος κρίνεται ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ συνημμένου ἀκολουθίας, ἡ δὲ κατὰ τὸ συνημμένον ἀκολουθία ἀνεπικρίτως διαπεφώνηται καὶ ἔστιν ἴσως ἀκατάληπτος, ὡς ἐν τῷ περὶ σημείου λόγῳ ὑπεμνήσαμεν, καὶ ὁ συνακτικὸς λόγος ἀκατάληπτος
- 146 ἔσται. οἱ γὰρ μὴν διαλεκτικοὶ φασὶν ἀσύνακτον λόγον γίνεσθαι ἴητοι παρὰ διάρτησιν ἢ παρὰ ἔλλειψιν ἢ παρὰ τὸ κατὰ μοχθηρὸν ἠρωτηῖσθαι σχῆμα ἢ κατὰ παρολκήν. οἷον κατὰ διάρτησιν μὲν ὅταν μὴ ἔχη τὰ λήμματα ἀκολουθίαν πρὸς ἀλλήλα τε καὶ τὴν ἐπιφορὰν, ὡς ὁ τοιοῦτος “εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν πυροὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ
- 147 πωλοῦνται· Δίων ἄρα περιπατεῖ.” παρὰ δὲ παρολκήν ὅταν εὐρίσκηται λήμμα παρέλκον πρὸς τὴν τοῦ λόγου συναγωγὴν, οἷον “εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ Δίων περιπατεῖ· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν.” παρὰ δὲ τὸ ἐν μοχθηρῷ ἠρωτηῖσθαι σχήματι ὅταν μὴ ἡ τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ λόγου συνακτικόν, οἷον ὄντων συλλογισμῶν, ὡς φασί, τούτων “εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν,” “εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· οὐχὶ δὲ φῶς ἔστιν· οὐκ ἄρα ἡμέρα ἔστιν,”

^a i.e. the Stoics, cf. §§ 166, 235.

of an argument do not mutually co-exist. For when we are stating the first premiss, neither the second premiss nor the inference is as yet in existence; and when we are stating the second premiss, the first is no longer existent and the inference is not yet existent; and when we announce the inference, its premisses are no longer in being. Therefore the parts of the argument do not mutually co-exist; and hence the argument too will seem to be non-existent.

But apart from this, the conclusive argument is 145 non-apprehensible; for if it is judged by the coherence of the hypothetical premiss, and the coherence in that premiss is a matter of unsettled dispute and is probably non-apprehensible, as we suggested in our chapter (xi) “On the Sign,” then the conclusive argument also will be non-apprehensible. Now the 146 Dialecticians^a assert that an argument is inconclusive owing to inconsistency or to deficiency or to its being propounded in a bad form or to redundancy. An example of inconsistency is when the premisses are not logically coherent with each other and with the inference, as in the argument “If it is day, it is light; but in fact wheat is being sold in the market; therefore Dion is walking.” And it is a case of redundancy 147 when we find a premiss that is superfluous for the logic of the argument, as for instance “If it is day, it is light; but in fact it is day and Dion also is walking; therefore it is light.” And it is due to the bad form in which it is propounded when the form of the argument is not conclusive; for whereas the really syllogistic arguments are, they say, such as these: “If it is day, it is light; but in fact it is day; therefore it is light”; and “If it is day, it is light; but it is not light; therefore it is not day,”—the inconclusive

ὁ λόγος ἀσύνακτός ἐστιν οὗτος " εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἐστίν· ἀλλὰ μὴν φῶς ἔστιν· ἡμέρα ἄρα ἔστιν." 148 ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἐπαγγέλλεται τὸ συνημμένον ὄντος¹ τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡγουμένου εἶναι καὶ τὸ λῆγον, εἰκότως τοῦ ἡγουμένου προσλαμβανομένου ἐπάγεται καὶ τὸ λῆγον, καὶ τοῦ λήγοντος ἀναιρουμένου ἀναιρεῖται καὶ τὸ ἡγούμενον· εἰ γὰρ ἦν τὸ ἡγούμενον, ἦν ἂν καὶ τὸ λῆγον. τοῦ δὲ λήγοντος προσλαμβανομένου οὐ πάντως τίθεται καὶ τὸ ἡγούμενον· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὑπισχνεῖτο τὸ συνημμένον τῷ λήγοντι ἀκολουθεῖν τὸ ἡγούμενον, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἡγούμενῳ τὸ λῆγον μόνον. 149 διὰ τοῦτο οὖν ὁ μὲν ἐκ συνημμένου καὶ τοῦ ἡγουμένου τὸ λῆγον συνάγων συλλογιστικὸς εἶναι λέγεται, καὶ ὁ ἐκ συνημμένου καὶ τοῦ ἀντικείμενου τοῦ λήγοντος τὸ ἀντικείμενον τῷ ἡγούμενῳ συνάγων· ὁ δὲ ἐκ συνημμένου καὶ τοῦ λήγοντος τὸ ἡγούμενον συνάγων ἀσύνακτος, ὡς ὁ προειρημένος, παρὸ καὶ ἀληθῶν ὄντων τῶν λημάτων αὐτοῦ ψεῦδος συνάγει, ὅταν λυχνιαίου φωτὸς ὄντος νυκτὸς λέγηται. τὸ μὲν γὰρ " εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστι " συνημμένον ἀληθές ἐστιν, καὶ ἡ " ἀλλὰ μὴν φῶς ἔστι " πρόσληψις, ἡ δὲ " ἡμέρα ἄρα " ἐπιφορὰ 150 ψευδής. κατὰ παράλειψιν δὲ ἐστὶ μοχθηρὸς λόγος ἐν ᾧ παραλείπεται τι τῶν πρὸς τὴν συναγωγὴν τοῦ συμπεράσματος χρησιμεύοντων· οἷον ὑγιούς ὄντος, ὡς οἴονται, τοῦ λόγου τούτου " ἤτοι ἀγαθός ἐστιν ὁ πλοῦτος ἢ κακός ἢ ἀδιάφορος· οὔτε δὲ κακός ἐστιν οὔτε ἀδιάφορος· ἀγαθός ἄρα ἐστίν,"

¹ ὄντος Heintz: ἐνός mss. Bekk.

^a i.e. (in Stoic terminology) definitely valid and conclusive; cf. § 163 *infra*. Note that the term *συνημμένον* ("combination") mostly means the "hypothetical, or major,

argument runs thus: "If it is day, it is light; but in fact it is light; therefore it is day." For since the 148 major premiss announces that if its antecedent exists its consequent also exists, naturally when the antecedent is admitted the consequent also is inferred, and when the consequent is denied the antecedent also is denied; for if the antecedent had existed, the consequent also would have existed. But when the consequent is admitted, the antecedent is not necessarily admitted as well; for the major premiss did not promise that the antecedent should follow the consequent, but only the consequent the antecedent.

Hence, the argument which deduces the conse- 149 quent from the major premiss and the antecedent is said to be syllogistic,^a and also that which deduces the opposite of the antecedent from the major premiss and the opposite of the consequent; but the argument which, like that stated above, deduces the antecedent from the major premiss and the consequent is inconclusive, so that it makes a false deduction, even though its premisses are true, whenever it is uttered by lamplight at night. For though the major premiss "If it is day, it is light" is true, and also the minor premiss, "but in fact it is light," the inference "therefore it is day" is false. And the 150 argument is faulty by deficiency, when it suffers from the omission of some factor needed for the deducing of the conclusion: thus, for instance, while we have, as they think, a valid argument in "Wealth is either good or bad or indifferent; but it is neither bad nor indifferent; therefore it is good,"^b the following premiss of a hypothetical syllogism," but sometimes the whole syllogism. ^b Cf. iii. 177 ff.

- φαῦλός ἐστι παρὰ ἔλλειψιν οὗτος ὁ λόγος " ἤτοι ἀγαθός ἐστιν ὁ πλοῦτος ἢ κακός· οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κακός· 151 ἀγαθός ἄρα ἐστίν." εἴαν οὖν δείξω ὅτι οὐδεμία διαφορὰ τῶν ἀσυνάκτων διακρίνεσθαι δύναται κατ' αὐτοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν συνακτικῶν, ἔδειξα ὅτι ἀκατάληπτός ἐστιν ὁ συνακτικὸς λόγος, ὡς περιττὰς εἶναι τὰς κατὰ διαλεκτικὴν αὐτοῖς φερομένας ἀπειρολογίας. δείκνυμι δὲ οὕτως.
- 152 Ὁ κατὰ διάρτησιν ἀσύνακτος λόγος ἐλέγετο ἐγνωρίσθαι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἔχειν ἀκολουθίαν τὰ λήμματα αὐτοῦ πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ τὴν ἐπιφοράν. ἐπεὶ οὖν τῆς γνώσεως τῆς ἀκολουθίας ταύτης δεῖ προηγεῖσθαι τὴν κρίσιν τοῦ συνημμένου, ἀνεπίκριτον δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ συνημμένον, ὡς ἐπελογισάμην, ἀδιάκριτος ἔσται καὶ ὁ κατὰ διάρτησιν ἀσύνακτος 153 λόγος. καὶ γὰρ ὁ λέγων κατὰ διάρτησιν ἀσύνακτον εἶναι τινα λόγον, φάσιν μὲν προφερόμενος μόνην ἀντιτιθεμένην αὐτῷ φάσιν ἔξει τὴν ἀντικειμένην τῇ προειρημένῃ· ἀποδεικνύς δὲ διὰ λόγου ἀκούσεται ὅτι δεῖ τὸν λόγον τοῦτον πρότερον συνακτικὸν εἶναι, εἶθ' οὕτως ἀποδεικνύειν ὅτι ἀσυνάρτητα τὰ λήμματα τοῦ διηρηθῆσθαι λεγομένου λόγου. οὐ γνωσόμεθα δὲ εἰ ἔστιν ἀποδεικτικὸς, μὴ ἔχοντες συνημμένου σύμφωνον κρίσιν, ἢ κρινόμενοι εἰ ἀκολουθεῖ τῇ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων τοῦ λόγου συμπλοκῇ τὸ συμπέρασμα. καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο οὖν οὐχ ἔξομεν διακρίνειν τῶν συνακτικῶν τὸν κατὰ διάρτησιν μοχθηρὸν εἶναι λεγόμενον.

* Over 300 volumes, dealing with grammar and logic ("dialectic"), are ascribed to Chrysippus.

^b With §§ 152-156 *cf. Adv. Log.* ii. 435 ff.

^c *i.e.* the syllogism as a whole, which is a "combination"

is faulty by way of deficiency: "Wealth is either good or bad; but it is not bad; therefore it is good." If, then, I shall show that, according to them, it is 151 impossible to distinguish any difference between the inconclusive and the conclusive arguments, I shall have shown that the conclusive argument is non-apprehensible, so that their endless disquisitions on "dialectic"^a are superfluous. And I show it in this wise.

It was said that the argument which is inconclusive 152 owing to inconsistency is recognized by the want of coherence which marks its premisses in their relation both to each other and to the inference.^b Since, then, the recognition of this coherence ought to be preceded by the judgement on the hypothetical syllogism,^c and that syllogism, as I have argued, does not admit of judgement, the argument that is inconclusive through inconsistency will likewise be incapable of being distinguished. For he who declares that any particular 153 argument is inconclusive through inconsistency will, if he is merely uttering a statement, find himself opposed by a statement which contradicts his own; while if he tries to prove it by argument, he will be told that this argument of his must itself be conclusive before he can prove that the premisses of the argument said to be inconsistent are devoid of consistency. But we shall not know whether it is probative, since we have no agreed test of the syllogism whereby to judge whether the conclusion follows the logical connexion formed by the premisses. And thus, also, we shall be unable to distinguish the argument that is faulty through inconsistency from those that are conclusive.

of premisses and conclusion, *cf.* § 137; for another sense of the word *cf.* note on § 149.

- 154 Τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ ἐροῦμεν πρὸς τὸν λέγοντα μοχθηρὸν εἶναι λόγον τινὰ παρὰ τὸ ἐν φαύλῳ σχήματι ἤρω-
 τῆσθαι· ὁ γὰρ κατασκευάζων ὅτι μοχθηρὸν τι
 σχῆμά ἐστιν, οὐχ ἔξει ὁμολογούμενον συνακτικὸν
 155 λόγον δι' οὗ δυνήσεται συνάγειν ὁ φησιν. δυνάμει
 δὲ ἀντειρήκαμεν¹ διὰ τούτων² καὶ πρὸς τοὺς πει-
 ρωμένους παρ' ἑλλειψιν ἀσυνάκτους λόγους εἶναι
 δεικνύναι. εἰ γὰρ ὁ ἐντελής <καὶ>³ ἀπρητισμένος
 ἀδιάκριτός ἐστι, καὶ ὁ ἐν ἑλλείψει ἀδηλος ἔσται.
 καὶ ἐτι ὁ διὰ λόγου δεικνύναι τινὰ ἑλλιπῆ βουλό-
 μενος λόγον, μὴ ἔχων συνημμένον κρίσιν ὁμο-
 λογημένην, δι' ἧς κρίνεται δυνήσεται τὴν ἀκολουθίαν
 τοῦ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ λεγομένου λόγου, οὗ δυνήσεται
 κεκριμένως καὶ ὀρθῶς λέγειν ὅτι ἑλλιπής ἐστιν.
- 156 Ἄλλὰ καὶ ὁ κατὰ παρολκὴν λεγόμενος εἶναι
 μοχθηρὸς ἀδιάκριτός ἐστιν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀποδεικτικῶν.
 ὅσον γὰρ ἐπὶ τῇ παρολκῇ καὶ οἱ θρυλούμενοι παρὰ
 τοῖς στωικοῖς ἀναπόδεικτοι ἀσύνακτοι εὐρεθί-
 σονται, ὧν ἀναιρουμένων ἢ πᾶσα διαλεκτικὴ ἀνα-
 τρέπεται· οὗτοι γὰρ εἰσιν οὓς φασιν ἀποδείξεως
 μὲν μὴ δεῖσθαι πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτῶν σύστασιν, ἀπο-
 δεικτικούς δὲ ὑπάρχειν τοῦ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους συν-
 ἀγειν λόγους. ὅτι δὲ παρέλκουσιν, ἔσται σαφές
 ἐκθεμένων ἡμῶν τοὺς ἀναποδείκτους καὶ οὕτως ὁ
 φάμεν ἐπιλογιζομένω.
- 157 Πολλοὺς μὲν ἀναποδείκτους ὄνειροπολοῦσιν, πέντε
 δὲ τούτους μάλιστα ἐκτίθενται, εἰς οὓς οἱ λοιποὶ

¹ ἀντειρήκαμεν T: ἀντειρήσομεν EAB: ἀντειρήσθω L, Bekk.

² τούτων T, cj. Bekk.: τούτο mss. ³ <καὶ> add. T.

^a i.e. those which need no proof as being self-evident; cf. Aristotle's "perfect syllogisms," and i. 69; *Adv. Log.* ii. 223 ff.

And we will make the same reply to the man who 154
 says that an argument is unsound owing to its being
 propounded in a faulty form; for he who maintains
 that a form is unsound will have no argument agreed
 to be conclusive whereby he will be able to draw the
 conclusion he states. And hereby we have also 155
 potentially refuted those who try to show that there
 are arguments which are inconclusive through defi-
 ciency. For if the complete and finished argument
 is indistinguishable <from others>, the deficient also
 will be non-evident. And, further, he who proposes
 to prove by argument that a certain argument is
 deficient, seeing that he has no agreed test of a
 hypothetical syllogism whereby he can judge the
 coherence of the argument he is talking about, will
 be unable to make a tested and true pronouncement
 that it is deficient.

Moreover, the argument that is said to be faulty 156
 through redundancy is indistinguishable from those
 that are probative. For, so far as concerns redun-
 dancy, even the "non-demonstrable" arguments^a so
 much talked of by the Stoics will be found to be
 inconclusive, and if they are demolished the whole of
 dialectic is overturned; for they are the arguments
 which, they say, need no proof to establish them,
 and themselves serve as proofs of the conclusiveness
 of the other arguments. And that they are re-
 dundant will be clear when we have set forth these
 non-probative arguments and thus confirm our state-
 ment by reasoning.

Now there are, in their imaginings, many non- 157
 demonstrable arguments, but the five which they
 chiefly propound, and to which all the rest can, it

πάντες ἀναφέρεσθαι δοκοῦσιν, πρῶτον τὸν ἐκ συνημμένου καὶ τοῦ ἡγουμένου τὸ λήγον συ-
 άγοντα, οἷον "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν
 ἡμέρα ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν." δεῦτερον τὸν ἐκ
 συνημμένου καὶ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου τοῦ λήγοντος τὸ
 ἀντικείμενον τοῦ ἡγουμένου συνάγοντα, οἷον "εἰ
 ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· οὐκ ἔστι δὲ φῶς· οὐκ ἄρα
 158 ἡμέρα ἔστιν." τρίτον τὸν ἐξ ἀποφατικοῦ συμ-
 πλοκῆς καὶ ἐνὸς τῶν ἐκ τῆς συμπλοκῆς τὸ ἀντι-
 κείμενον τοῦ λοιποῦ συνάγοντα, οἷον "οὐχὶ ἡμέρα
 ἔστι καὶ νύξ ἔστιν· ἡμέρα δὲ ἔστιν· οὐκ ἄρα νύξ
 ἔστιν." τέταρτον τὸν ἐκ διεξευγμένου καὶ ἐνὸς
 τῶν ἐπέξευγμένων τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ λοιποῦ
 συνάγοντα, οἷον "ἤτοι ἡμέρα ἔστιν ἢ νύξ ἔστιν·
 ἡμέρα δὲ ἔστιν· οὐκ ἄρα νύξ ἔστιν." πέμπτον τὸν
 ἐκ διεξευγμένου καὶ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου ἐνὸς τῶν
 ἐπέξευγμένων τὸ λοιπὸν συνάγοντα, οἷον "ἤτοι
 ἡμέρα ἔστιν ἢ νύξ ἔστιν· οὐχὶ δὲ νύξ ἔστιν· ἡμέρα
 ἄρα ἔστιν."
 159 Οἷτοι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν οἱ θρυλούμενοι ἀναπόδεικτοι,
 πάντες δὲ μοι δοκοῦσιν ἀσύνακτοι εἶναι κατὰ παρολ-
 κήν. αὐτίκα γοῦν, ἵνα ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀρξώμεθα,
 ἤτοι ὁμολογεῖται ὅτι ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ "φῶς ἔστιν" τῷ
 "ἡμέρα ἔστιν" ἡγουμένῳ αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ "εἰ ἡμέρα
 ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν" συνημμένῳ, ἢ ἀδηλόν ἔστιν.
 ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἀδηλόν ἔστιν, οὐ δώσομεν τὸ συν-
 ημμένον ὡς ὁμολογούμενον· εἰ δὲ πρόδηλόν ἔστιν
 ὅτι ὄντος τοῦ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν" ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔστι καὶ

^a Literally, the "combination," which here (as in § 104) means the hypothetical major premiss, of which the "if," clause is the "antecedent," the other clause the "consequent."

seems, be referred, are these. The first is that which deduces the consequent from the major premiss^a and the antecedent, as for example "If it is day, it is light; but in fact it is day; therefore it is light." The second is that which deduces the opposite of the antecedent from the major premiss and the opposite of the consequent, as for example "If it is day, it is light; but it is not light; therefore it is not day." The third deduces from the negation of a coupled 158 premiss^b and <the affirmation of> one of its clauses the opposite of the other clause, as for example "It is not both night and day; but it is day; therefore it is not night." The fourth deduces from a disjunctive premiss and one of its alternative clauses the opposite of the other, as for example "Either it is day or it is night; but it is day; therefore it is not night." The fifth^c deduces from a disjunctive premiss and the opposite of one of its clauses the other clause, as for example "Either it is day or it is night; but it is not night; therefore it is day."

These, then, are the much talked of non-demon- 159 strable arguments, but they all seem to me to be inconclusive through redundancy. Thus for instance, to begin with the first, either it is agreed, or else it is non-evident, that in the major premiss "If it is day, it is light," the clause "it is light" follows from its antecedent "it is day." But if this is non-evident, we shall not grant the major premiss as agreed; if, however, it is pre-evident that if the clause "it is day" be true, the clause "it is light" will necessarily

^b i.e. a premiss consisting of two clauses "coupled" by "and" (or "both . . . and"); a "conjunctive" premiss (as opposed to a "disjunctive," coupled by "either . . . or").

^c Cf. i. 69.

τὸ "φῶς ἔστιν," εἰπόντων ἡμῶν ὅτι ἡμέρα ἔστιν, συνάγεται καὶ τὸ φῶς ἔστιν, ὡς ἀρκεῖν τὸν τοιοῦτον λόγον "ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν," καὶ παρέλκει τὸ "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν" συνημμένον.

160 Ὁμοίως δὲ φερόμεθα καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δευτέρου ἀναποδείκτου. ἦτοι γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τοῦ λήγοντος μὴ ὄντος εἶναι τὸ ἡγούμενον, ἢ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἐνδέχεται, οὐκ ἔσται ὑγιὲς τὸ συνημμένον· εἰ δὲ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ἅμα τῷ τεθῆναι τὸ "οὐχὶ τὸ λῆγον" τίθεται καὶ τὸ "οὐχὶ τὸ ἡγούμενον," καὶ παρέλκει πάλιν τὸ συνημμένον, τῆς συνερωτήσεως τοιαύτης γινομένης "οὐχὶ φῶς ἔστιν, οὐκ ἄρα ἡμέρα ἔστιν."

161 Ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ τρίτου ἀναποδείκτου. ἦτοι γὰρ πρόδηλόν ἐστιν ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὰ ἐν τῇ συμπλοκῇ συνυπάρξαι ἀλλήλοις, ἢ ἄδηλον. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἄδηλον, οὐ δώσομεν τὸ ἀποφατικὸν τῆς συμπλοκῆς· εἰ δὲ πρόδηλον, ἅμα τῷ τεθῆναι τὸ ἕτερον ἀναιρεῖται τὸ λοιπόν, καὶ παρέλκει τὸ ἀποφατικὸν τῆς συμπλοκῆς, οὕτως ἡμῶν ἐρωτώντων "ἡμέρα ἔστιν, οὐκ ἄρα νύξ ἔστιν."

162 Τὰ δὲ παραπλήσια λέγομεν καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ τετάρτου καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πέμπτου ἀναποδείκτου. ἦτοι γὰρ πρόδηλόν ἐστιν ὅτι ἐν τῷ διεξευγμένῳ μὲν ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος μετὰ μάχης τελείας, ὅπερ ἐπαγγέλλεται τὸ διεξευγμένον, ἢ ἄδηλον. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἄδηλον, οὐ δώσομεν τὸ διεξευγμένον· εἰ δὲ πρόδηλον, τεθέντος ἑνὸς ἀπ' αὐτῶν φανερόν ἐστιν ὅτι τὸ λοιπὸν οὐκ ἔστιν, καὶ ἀναιρεθέντος ἑνὸς

* An example of the *sylllogismus decurtatus*, which has but one premiss; cf. § 167.

be true also, then, once we have asserted that "it is day," the statement "it is light" is also inferred, so that an argument in the form "It is day, therefore it is light" is sufficient,^a and the major premiss "If it is day, it is light" is redundant.

And in the case of the second non-demonstrable 160 argument we make a similar objection. For it is either possible or impossible for the antecedent to be true when the consequent is not true. But if this is possible, the major premiss will not be valid; while if it is impossible, at the moment of positing "Not the consequent" we posit also "Not the antecedent," and the major premiss is redundant once again, the argument propounded being "It is not light, therefore it is not day."

The same reasoning applies also to the third non- 161 demonstrable argument. For either it is pre-evident that it is impossible for the clauses in the coupled premiss mutually to co-exist, or else it is non-evident. And if it is non-evident we shall not grant the negative of the coupled premiss; but if it is pre-evident, at the moment of positing the one clause the other is annulled, and the negative of the coupled premiss is redundant when we propound the argument in the form "It is day, therefore it is not night."

And we deal in like manner with the fourth non- 162 demonstrable argument and the fifth. For either it is pre-evident or it is non-evident that in the disjunctive premiss one clause is true, the other false, in complete contradiction, as the disjunctive proclaims. And if this is non-evident, we shall not grant the disjunctive; but if it is pre-evident, if one of its clauses be affirmed it is apparent that the other is not true, and if one is negated it is pre-evident that the other is true, so

πρόδηλον ὅτι τὸ λοιπὸν ἔστιν, ὡς ἀρκεῖν συνερωτῶν οὕτως “ ἡμέρα ἔστιν, οὐκ ἄρα νύξ ἔστιν,” “ οὐχὶ ἡμέρα ἔστιν, νύξ ἄρα ἔστιν,” καὶ παρέλκει τὸ διεξυγμένον.

- 163 Παραπλήσια δὲ λέγειν ἔνεστι καὶ περὶ τῶν κατηγορικῶν καλουμένων συλλογισμῶν, οἷς μάλιστα χροῦνται οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ περιπάτου. οἷον γοῦν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ “ τὸ δίκαιον καλόν, τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δίκαιον ἄρα ἀγαθόν ” ἤτοι ὁμολογεῖται καὶ πρόδηλόν ἐστιν ὅτι τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, ἢ ἀμφισβητεῖται καὶ ἔστιν ἄδηλον. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν ἄδηλόν ἐστιν, οὐ δοθήσεται κατὰ τὴν τοῦ λόγου συνερῶτησιν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐ συνάξει ὁ συλλογισμός· εἰ δὲ πρόδηλόν ἐστιν ὅτι πᾶν ὅπερ ἂν ἢ καλόν, τοῦτο πάντως καὶ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, ἅμα τῷ λεχθῆναι ὅτι τόδε τι καλόν ἐστὶ συνεισάγεται καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι, ὡς ἀρκεῖν τὴν τοιαύτην συνερῶτησιν “ τὸ δίκαιον καλόν, τὸ δίκαιον ἄρα ἀγαθόν,” καὶ παρέλκει τὸ ἔτερον λῆμμα ἐν ᾧ τὸ
- 164 καλὸν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι ἐλέγετο. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ λόγῳ “ Σωκράτης ἄνθρωπος, πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ζῶν, Σωκράτης ἄρα ζῶν,” εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἔστι πρόδηλον αὐτόθεν ὅτι πᾶν ὃ τι περ ἂν ἢ ἄνθρωπος, τοῦτο καὶ ζῶν ἐστιν, οὐχ ὁμολογεῖται ἢ καθόλου πρότασις, οὐδὲ δώσομεν αὐτὴν ἐν τῇ
- 165 συνερῶτησει. εἰ δὲ ἔπεται τῷ ἄνθρωπόν τινα εἶναι τὸ καὶ ζῶν αὐτὸν ὑπάρχειν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀληθὴς ἐστὶν ὁμολογουμένως ἢ “ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ζῶν ” πρότασις, ἅμα τῷ λεχθῆναι ὅτι Σωκράτης ἄνθρωπος συνεισάγεται καὶ τὸ ζῶν αὐτὸν εἶναι, ὡς ἀρκεῖν τὴν τοιαύτην συνερῶτησιν “ Σωκράτης ἄνθρωπος, Σωκράτης ἄρα ζῶν,” καὶ παρέλκειν

that it is sufficient to frame the argument thus—“ It is day, therefore it is not night,” or “ It is not day, therefore it is night ”; and the disjunctive premiss is redundant.

One may also make similar observations on the so-called “ categorical ” syllogisms, which are chiefly used by the Peripatetics.^a Thus, for example, in the argument—“ The just is fair, but the fair is good, therefore the just is good,”^b either it is agreed and pre-evident that “ the fair is good,” or it is disputed and is non-evident. But if it is non-evident, it will not be granted in the process of deduction, and consequently the syllogism will not be conclusive; while if it is pre-evident that whatsoever is fair is also without exception good, at the moment of stating that this particular thing is fair the fact that it is good is likewise implied, so that it is enough to put the argument in the form “ The just is fair, therefore the just is good,” and the other premiss, in which it was stated that “ the fair is good,” is redundant. So 164 too in an argument such as this—“ Socrates is a man; every man is an animal; therefore Socrates is an animal,”—if it is not at once pre-evident that whatsoever is man is always also animal, the universal premiss is not agreed, and neither will we admit it in the process of deduction. But if the fact that he is a 165 man is logically followed by the fact that he is also an animal, and in consequence the premiss “ Every man is an animal ” is by agreement true, at the moment of stating that “ Socrates is a man ” we admit therewith that he is also an animal, so that an argument in the form “ Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is an

^a Aristotle dealt only with this form of proof; later Peripatetics with the hypothetical and disjunctive forms as well.

^b Cf. Plato, *Alcib. I.* 116.

166 τὴν “ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ζῶν ” πρότασιν. παρα-
πλησίαις δὲ μεθόδοις καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων πρώτων
κατηγορικῶν λόγων χρῆσθαι δυνατόν ἐστιν, ἵνα μὴ
νῦν ἐνδιατρίβωμεν.

Πλὴν ἐπεὶ παρέλκουσιν οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι ἐν οἷς τὴν
ὑποβάθραν τῶν συλλογισμῶν οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ τίθεν-
ται, ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ παρολκῇ διατρέπεται πᾶσα ἡ
διαλεκτική, μὴ δυναμένων ἡμῶν διακρίναι τοὺς
παρέλκοντας καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀσυνάκτους λόγους ἀπὸ
167 τῶν συνακτικῶν καλούμενων συλλογισμῶν. εἰ δὲ
οὐκ ἀρέσκει τισὶ λόγους μονολημμάτων εἶναι, οὐκ
εἰσὶν ἀξιοπιστότεροι Ἀντιπάτρου, ὃς οὐδὲ τοὺς
τοιούτους λόγους ἀποδοκιμάζει.

Διὰ ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀνεπικρίτός ἐστιν ὁ παρὰ τοῖς
διαλεκτικοῖς συνακτικὸς καλούμενος λόγος. ἀλλὰ
καὶ ὁ ἀληθὴς λόγος ἀνεύρετός ἐστι διὰ τε τὰ
προειρημένα καὶ ἐπεὶ πάντως ὀφείλει εἰς ἀληθὲς
λήγειν. τὸ γὰρ συμπέρασμα τὸ ἀληθὲς εἶναι λεγό-
168 μενον ἤτοι φαινόμενον ἐστὶν ἢ ἀδηλον. καὶ φαινό-
μενον μὲν οὐδαμῶς· οὐ γὰρ ἂν δέοιτο τοῦ διὰ τῶν
λημμάτων ἐκκαλύπτεσθαι δι' ἑαυτοῦ προσπίπτον
καὶ οὐχ ἦττον τῶν λημμάτων αὐτοῦ φαινόμενον.
εἰ δὲ ἀδηλον, ἐπεὶ περὶ τῶν ἀδηλων ἀνεπικρίτως
διαπεφώνηται, καθάπερ ἔμπροσθεν ὑπεμνήσαμεν,
διόπερ καὶ ἀκατάληπτά ἐστίν, ἀκατάληπτον ἔσται
καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα τοῦ ἀληθοῦς εἶναι λεγομένον
λόγου. εἰ δὲ [καί] τοῦτο ἀκατάληπτόν ἐστιν, οὐ

^a *i.e.* of the First Figure: the previous examples are cases of
Barbara and *Darii*, so “the others” would belong to
Celarent and *Ferio*. But Heintz’s suggestion, “τρόπων τῶν
(for πρώτων), “the other figures,” may well be right.

^b *i.e.* Stoics and Peripatetics, *cf.* § 146 *supra*.

animal” is sufficient, and the premiss “Every man is
an animal” is redundant. And (not to dwell on the 166
matter now) in the case of the other primary ^a cate-
gorical arguments also it is possible to employ similar
methods of reasoning.

Since, however, these arguments which the Dialec-
ticians ^b lay down as the foundations of their syllo-
gisms are redundant, by reason of this redundancy
the whole of Dialectic is thus far overthrown, seeing
that we cannot distinguish the redundant, and conse-
quently inconclusive, arguments from what are called
the conclusive syllogisms. But if some persons dis- 167
approve of arguments being of a “one-premiss form,”
they deserve no more credence than does Antipater ^c
who does not reject such arguments.

For these reasons, then, the argument named by
the Dialecticians “conclusive” is not judged accept-
able. But further, the “true” ^d argument is indis-
coverable both for the foregoing reasons ^e and because
it ought in all cases to end in truth. For the con-
clusion which is said to be true is either apparent
or non-evident. And it is certainly not apparent; 168
for it would not need to be disclosed by means of the
premisses if it were perceptible of itself and no less
apparent than its premisses. But if it is non-evident,
then, since there is an unsettled dispute concerning
things non-evident, as we mentioned above,^f and they
are in consequence non-apprehensible, the conclusion
also of the argument said to be true will be non-
apprehensible. And if this is non-apprehensible,

^e A. of Tarsus was head of the Stoic School *circa* 150-30
B.C.; *cf. Adv. Log.* ii. 443 for Chrysippus on the “curtailed
syllogism.”

^d *Cf.* § 143.

^e See §§ 85-94 *supra*, and § 138.

^f *Cf.* § 116.

γνωσόμεθα πότερον ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ συναγόμενον ἢ ψεῦδος. ἀγνοήσομεν οὖν πότερον ἀληθής ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος ἢ ψευδής, καὶ ἀνεύρετος ἔσται ὁ ἀληθής λόγος.

169 Ἴνα δὲ καὶ ταῦτα παρῶμεν, ὁ διὰ προδήλων ἀδηλον συνάγων ἀνεύρετός ἐστιν. εἰ γὰρ ἔπεται τῇ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων αὐτοῦ συμπλοκῇ ἢ ἐπιφορά, τὸ δ' ἐπόμενον καὶ τὸ λήγον πρὸς τί ἐστι καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἡγούμενον, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τι συγκαταλαμβάνεται ἀλλήλοις, ὡς παρεστήσαμεν, εἰ μὲν ἀδηλόν ἐστι τὸ συμπέρασμα, ἀδηλα ἔσται καὶ τὰ λήμματα, εἰ δὲ πρόδηλά ἐστι τὰ λήμματα, πρόδηλον ἔσται καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἅτε συγκαταλαμβανόμενον αὐτοῖς προδήλοις οὖσιν, ὡς μηκέτι ἐκ προδήλων ἀδηλον
170 συνάγεσθαι. διὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲ ἐκκαλύπτεται ὑπὸ τῶν λημμάτων ἢ ἐπιφορά, ἥτοι ἀδηλος οὐσα καὶ μὴ καταλαμβανομένη, ἢ πρόδηλος καὶ μὴ δεομένη τοῦ ἐκκαλύψοντος. εἰ τοίνυν ἢ ἀπόδειξις λόγος εἶναι λέγεται κατὰ συναγωγῇ, τουτέστι συνακτικῶς, διὰ τινων ὁμολογουμένως ἀληθῶν ἐπιφορὰν ἐκκαλύπτων ἀδηλον, ὑπεμνήσαμεν δὲ ἡμεῖς ὅτι οὔτε λόγος τις ἔστιν οὔτε συνακτικὸς οὔτε ἀληθής οὔτε διὰ τινων προδήλων ἀδηλον συνάγων οὔτε ἐκκαλυπτικὸς τοῦ συμπεράσματος, φανερόν ἐστιν ὅτι ἀνυπόστατός ἐστιν ἢ ἀπόδειξις.

171 Καὶ κατ' ἐκείνην δὲ τὴν ἐπιβολὴν ἀνύπαρκτον ἢ καὶ ἀνεπινόητον εὐρήσομεν τὴν ἀπόδειξιν. ὁ γὰρ λέγων εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν ἥτοι γενικὴν τίθησιν ἀπόδειξιν ἢ εἰδικὴν τινα· ἀλλ' οὔτε τὴν γενικὴν οὔτε εἰδικὴν ἀπόδειξιν τιθένα δυνατόν, ὡς ὑπομνήσο-

^a Cf. §§ 117 ff., 125.

^b Cf. §§ 135, 143 ff. ^c Cf. *Adv. Log.* ii. 382 ff.

we shall not know whether the deduction is true or false. Thus we shall be in ignorance as to whether the argument is true or false, and the "true" argument will be undiscoverable.

But, to pass over these objections also, the argument which deduces what is non-evident by means of pre-evident premisses is undiscoverable. For if the inference follows from the combination of its premisses, and what follows and forms the consequent is relative and relative to the antecedent, and relatives are apprehended, as we have shown,^a simultaneously,—then, if the conclusion is non-evident, the premisses also will be non-evident, while if the premisses are pre-evident the conclusion also will be pre-evident, as being apprehended along with the pre-evident premisses, so that no longer is there a deduction of what is non-evident from pre-evident premisses. And ¹⁷⁰ for these reasons, neither is the inference revealed by the premisses, as it is either non-evident and not apprehended, or pre-evident and not in need of anything to reveal it. So that if proof is defined ^b as "an argument which by deduction, that is conclusively, reveals a non-evident inference by means of certain premisses agreed to be true," while we have shown that there exists no argument either conclusive or true or which deduces a non-evident conclusion by means of evident premisses or serves to reveal its conclusion,—then it is apparent that proof is without real existence.

That proof is unreal, or even inconceivable, we shall ¹⁷¹ discover also from the following line of attack.^c He who asserts the existence of proof posits either a general or a particular proof; but, as we shall suggest, it is not possible to posit either the general or the

- μεν· παρὰ δὲ ταύτας ἄλλο τι νοεῖν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται· οὐκ ἄρα δύναται τις ὡς ὑπάρχουσιν τιθέναί τὴν
- 172 ἀπόδειξιν. ἢ μὲν οὖν γενικὴ ἀπόδειξις ἀνυπόστατος ἐστὶ διὰ τὰδε. ἦτοι ἔχει λήμματά τινα καὶ τινα ἐπιφορὰν ἢ οὐκ ἔχει. καὶ εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἔχει, οὐδὲ ἀπόδειξις ἐστίν· εἰ δὲ λήμματά τινα ἔχει καὶ ἐπιφορὰν τινα, ἐπεὶ πᾶν τὸ ἀποδεικνύμενον οὕτω καὶ ἀποδεικνύον ἐπὶ μέρους ἐστίν, εἰδικὴ ἔσται ἀπόδειξις· οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶ τις γενικὴ ἀπόδειξις.
- 173 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ εἰδική. ἦτοι γὰρ τὸ ἐκ τῶν λημμάτων καὶ τῆς ἐπιφορᾶς σύστημα ἀπόδειξιν ἐροῦσιν, ἢ τὸ σύστημα τῶν λημμάτων μόνον· οὐθέτερον δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν ἀπόδειξις, ὡς παραστήσω· οὐκ ἄρα
- 174 ἔστιν εἰδικὴ ἀπόδειξις. τὸ μὲν οὖν σύστημα τὸ ἐκ τῶν λημμάτων καὶ τῆς ἐπιφορᾶς οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀπόδειξις πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι μέρος τι ἔχουσα ἄδηλον, τουτέστι τὴν ἐπιφορὰν, ἄδηλος ἐστὶν, ὅπερ ἄτοπον· εἰ γὰρ ἄδηλός ἐστιν ἢ ἀπόδειξις, αὐτὴ δεῖσεται τοῦ ἀποδείξοντος αὐτὴν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐτέρων ἔσται ἀποδεικτικὴ.
- 175 Εἶτα καὶ ἐπεὶ πρὸς τί φασιν εἶναι τὴν ἀπόδειξιν καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐπιφορὰν, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τι πρὸς ἐτέροις νοεῖται, ὡς αὐτοὶ φασιν, ἕτερον εἶναι δεῖ τὸ ἀποδεικνύμενον τῆς ἀποδείξεως· εἰ οὖν τὸ συμπέρασμα ἐστὶ τὸ ἀποδεικνύμενον, οὐ νοηθήσεται ἢ ἀπόδειξις σὺν τῷ συμπεράσματι. καὶ γὰρ ἦτοι συμβάλλεται τι πρὸς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἑαυτοῦ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἢ οὐδαμῶς· ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν συμβάλλεται, ἑαυτοῦ ἔσται ἐκκαλυπτικόν, εἰ δὲ οὐ συμβάλλεται ἀλλὰ παρέλκει, οὐδὲ μέρος τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἔσται,

particular proof; and besides these no other can be conceived; no one, therefore, can posit proof as really existing. Now the general proof is unreal for the 172 following reasons. It either has or has not certain premisses and a certain inference. And if it has them not, it is not even proof; while if it has premisses and an inference, then, since everything which proves or is proved in this way belongs to the class of "particulars,"^a proof will be particular; therefore no general proof exists. Nor yet any particular proof. For they 173 will describe as proof either the system made up of the premisses and the inference^b or only the system of the premisses; but neither of these is proof, as I shall show; therefore particular proof does not exist. Now the system composed of the premisses and the 174 inference is not proof because, firstly, it contains a non-evident part—that is to say, the inference—and so will be non-evident, which is absurd; for if the proof is non-evident, instead of serving to prove other things it will itself be in need of something to prove it.

Moreover, since they assert that proof is a relative 175 thing and relative to the inference, and relatives, as they themselves affirm, are conceived in relation to other things, the thing proved must be other than the proof; if, then, the thing proved is the conclusion, the proof will not be conceived along with the conclusion. For the conclusion either contributes something to its own proof or does not do so; but if it contributes, it will serve to reveal itself, while if it does not contribute but is redundant it will not be even a part of the proof, since we shall declare the

^a Cf. τὰ ἐπὶ μέρους, § 87 *supra*; "things of a *partial* character" as opposed to "wholes" or *genera*.

^b Cf. § 135 *supra*.

176 ἐπεὶ κάκεινῃν κατὰ παρολκὴν ἐροῦμεν εἶναι μοχ-
θηράν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ σύστημα τῶν λημμάτων
μόνων ἀποδείξεις ἂν εἴη· τίς γὰρ ἂν εἴποι τὸ οὕτω
λεγόμενον "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν
ἡμέρα ἔστιν" ἢ λόγον εἶναι ἢ διάνοιαν ὅλως
ἀπαρτίζειν; οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ τὸ σύστημα τῶν λημ-
μάτων μόνον ἀποδείξεις ἔστιν. οὐδὲ ἡ εἰδικὴ ἄρα
ἀποδείξεις ὑπόστασιν ἔχει. εἰ δὲ μήτε ἡ εἰδικὴ
ἀποδείξεις ὑφέστηκε μήτε ἡ γενικὴ, παρὰ δὲ ταύτας
οὐκ ἔστιν ἐννοεῖν ἀποδείξιν, ἀνυπόστατός ἐστιν ἡ
ἀποδείξεις.

177 Ἐπι ἐκ τούτων τὸ ἀνυπόστατον τῆς ἀποδείξεως
ἐνεστὶν ὑπομνήσκειν. εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀποδείξεις,
ἤτοι φαινομένη φαινομένου ἐστὶν ἐκκαλυπτικὴ ἢ
ἄδηλος ἀδήλου ἢ ἄδηλος φαινομένου ἢ φαινομένη
ἀδήλου· οὐδενὸς δὲ τούτων ἐκκαλυπτικὴ δύναται
178 ἐπινοεῖσθαι· ἀνεπινόητος ἄρα ἐστίν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ
φαινομένη φαινομένου ἐκκαλυπτικὴ ἐστὶν, ἔσται
τὸ ἐκκαλυπτόμενον ἅμα φαινόμενόν τε καὶ ἄδηλον,
φαινόμενον μὲν ἐπεὶ τοιοῦτον εἶναι ὑπετέθη, ἄδηλον
δὲ ἐπεὶ δέεται τοῦ ἐκκαλύφοντος καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ
ὑποπίπτει ἡμῖν σαφῶς. εἰ δὲ ἄδηλος ἀδήλου, αὐτὴ
δεήσειται τοῦ ἐκκαλύφοντος αὐτὴν καὶ οὐκ ἔσται
ἐκκαλυπτικὴ ἐτέρων, ὅπερ ἀφέστηκε τῆς ἐννοίας
179 τῆς ἀποδείξεως. διὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲ ἄδηλος προ-
δήλου δύναται εἶναι ἀποδείξεις. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πρό-
δηλος ἀδήλου· ἐπεὶ γὰρ πρὸς τι ἐστίν, τὰ δὲ πρὸς
τι ἀλλήλοις συγκαταλαμβάνεται, συγκαταλαμβανό-
μενον τῇ προδήλῳ ἀποδείξει τὸ ἀποδεικνυσθαι
λεγόμενον πρόδηλον ἔσται, ὡς περιτρέπεσθαι τὸν
λόγον καὶ μὴ εὐρίσκεσθαι πρόδηλον τὴν ἀδήλου ἀπο-

proof to be faulty by reason of redundancy. Nor yet 176
will the system composed of the premisses by itself
be proof; for who would maintain that a statement
in the form "If it is day, it is light; but in fact it is
day," either is an argument or completely expresses
a piece of reasoning? So then, neither does the
system of the premisses alone constitute proof. There-
fore the particular proof has no real existence either.
But if neither the particular nor the general proof has
real existence, and besides these one can conceive
no other proof, then proof is without real existence.

And it is possible to show the unreality of proof 177
from these further considerations. If proof exists,
either as apparent it serves to reveal what is apparent,
or as non-evident what is non-evident, or as non-
evident what is apparent, or as apparent what is
non-evident; but it cannot be conceived as serving
to reveal any of these; therefore it is inconceivable.
For if it as apparent serves to reveal the apparent, 178
the thing revealed will be at once both apparent and
non-evident—apparent because it was assumed to be
such, and non-evident because it needs a revealer
and is not clearly perceived by us of itself. And if
as non-evident it reveals the non-evident, it will itself
need something to reveal it and will not serve to
reveal other things, which is foreign to the conception
of proof. And for these reasons neither can there 179
be a non-evident proof of the pre-evident; nor yet
a pre-evident proof of the non-evident; for since
they are relatives, and relatives are apprehended
together, that which is said to be proved, being
apprehended together with its pre-evident proof, will
be pre-evident, so that the argument is reversed and
the proof probative of the non-evident is not found

δεικτικήν. εἰ οὖν μήτε φαινομένη φαινομένου ἐστὶν ἢ ἀπόδειξις μήτε ἀδηλος ἀδήλου μήτε ἀδηλος προδήλου μήτε πρόδηλος ἀδήλου, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν εἶναι λέγουσιν, λεκτέον μηδὲν εἶναι τὴν ἀπόδειξιν.

- 180 Πρὸς τούτοις κάκεινο λεκτέον. διαπεφώνηται περὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως· οἱ μὲν γὰρ μηδὲ εἶναι λέγουσιν αὐτήν, ὡς οἱ μηδὲν ὅλως εἶναι φάσκοντες, οἱ δὲ εἶναι, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν δογματικῶν· ἡμεῖς δὲ μὴ
- 181 μᾶλλον εἶναι αὐτήν ἢ μὴ εἶναι φαμέν. καὶ ἄλλως ἢ ἀποδείξεις δόγμα πάντως περιέχει, περὶ παντὸς δὲ δόγματος διαπεφώνηκασιν, ὥστε περὶ πάσης ἀποδείξεως ἀνάγκη εἶναι διαφωνίαν. εἰ γὰρ τῆς ἀποδείξεως τοῦ εἶναι κενὸν λόγου ἔνεκεν ὁμολογούμενης καὶ τὸ εἶναι κενὸν συνομολογεῖται, δῆλον ὅτι οἱ ἀμφισβητοῦντες περὶ τοῦ εἶναι κενὸν καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως αὐτοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦσιν· καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων δογμάτων, ὧν εἰσὶν αἱ ἀποδείξεις, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος. πᾶσα τοίνυν ἀπόδειξις ἀμφισβητεῖται καὶ ἐν διαφωνίᾳ ἐστίν.

- 182 Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἀδηλὸς ἐστὶν ἢ ἀπόδειξις διὰ τὴν διαφωνίαν τὴν περὶ αὐτῆς (τὰ γὰρ διάφωνα, καθὸ διαπεφώνηται, ἀδηλά ἐστιν), οὐκ ἔστιν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς προὔπτος ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀποδείξεως ὀφείλει ἡμῖν συνίστασθαι. ἢ οὖν ἀπόδειξις δι' ἧς κατασκευάζεται ἢ ἀπόδειξις, ὁμολογούμενη μὲν καὶ προὔπτος οὐκ ἔσται (ζητοῦμεν γὰρ νῦν εἰ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις ὅλως), διαφωνουμένη δὲ καὶ ἀδηλος οὕσα δεῖσεται ἀποδείξεως ἄλλης, κάκεινῃ ἄλλης, καὶ μέχρις ἀπειρου.

* *i.e.* is real, as opposed to phenomenal; so Xenophanes, Xenocrates, Gorgias, *cf.* § 18.

^b For this Sceptic formula *cf.* i. 188.

^c The Epicurean proof of Void ran thus: "If motion

to be pre-evident. If, therefore, proof is neither apparent of the apparent, nor non-evident of the non-evident, nor non-evident of the pre-evident, nor pre-evident of the non-evident, and besides these, as they say, there is no other alternative, then we must declare that proof is nothing.

Furthermore, there is this also to be said. Proof 180 is a matter of controversy; for some declare that it does not even exist, as do those who assert that nothing at all exists,^a but others, including the majority of the Dogmatists, that it does exist; and we affirm that it is "no more"^b existent than non-existent. And besides, proof always contains a 181 dogma, and they are in dispute about every dogma, so that there must necessarily be dispute about every proof. For if (for the sake of argument) when the proof for the existence of void is accepted the existence of void is likewise accepted,^c it is plain that those who dispute the existence of void dispute its proof also; and the same argument applies to all the other dogmas with which the proofs are concerned. Therefore every proof is questioned and is in dispute.

Since, then, proof is non-evident, owing to the 182 controversy which exists concerning it (for things controverted, in so far as controverted, are non-evident), its existence is not self-evident but needs to be established for us by proof. The proof, then, by which proof is established will not be evident and agreed (for we are now inquiring whether proof in general exists), and being thus in dispute and non-evident it will need another proof, and this again a third, and so on *ad infinitum*. But it is impossible to

exists, Void exists; but motion does exist; therefore Void exists." *Cf.* § 245, *Adv. Log.* ii. 329 ff.

ἀδύνατον δὲ ἄπειρα ἀποδείξει· ἀδύνατον ἄρα παρα-
στήσαι ὅτι ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις.

- 183 Ἄλλ' οὐδὲ διὰ σημείου δύναται ἐκκαλύπτεσθαι.
ζητουμένου γὰρ τοῦ εἶ ἔστι σημεῖον, καὶ ἀποδείξεως
τοῦ σημείου δεομένου πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ὑπαρξίν, ὃ
δι' ἀλλήλων εὐρίσκεται τρόπος, τῆς μὲν ἀποδείξεως
σημείου δεομένης, τοῦ δὲ σημείου πάλιν ἀπο-
δείξεως· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. διὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲ ἐπι-
κρίναι δυνατόν ἐστι τὴν περὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως
διαφωνίαν, ἐπεὶ χρήζει μὲν κριτηρίου ἢ ἐπίκρισις,
ζητήσεως δὲ οὔσης περὶ τοῦ εἶ ἔστι κριτήριον, ὡς
παρεστήσαμεν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀποδείξεως τοῦ
κριτηρίου δεομένου τῆς δεικνουσύνης ὅτι ἔστι τι
κριτήριον, ὃ διάλληλος τρόπος τῆς ἀπορίας εὐρί-
184 σκεται πάλιν. εἰ οὖν μήτε δι' ἀποδείξεως μήτε
διὰ σημείου μήτε διὰ κριτηρίου ἔστιν ὑπομνήσαι
ὅτι ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐξ ἑαυτῆς πρόδηλός
ἐστίν, ὡς παρεστήσαμεν, ἀκατάληπτον ἔσται εἶ
ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις. διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἀνύπαρκτος
ἔσται ἢ ἀπόδειξις· νενόηται μὲν γὰρ σὺν τῷ ἀπο-
δεικνύναι, ἀποδεικνύναι δὲ οὐκ ἂν δύναίτο μὴ
καταλαμβάνομένη. διόπερ οὐδὲ ἀπόδειξις ἔσται.
- 185 Ταῦτα μὲν ὡς ἐν ὑποτυπώσει καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀπό-
δειξιν ἀρκέσει λελέχθαι. οἱ δὲ δογματικοὶ τούναν-
τίον κατασκευάζοντες φασιν ὅτι ἦτοι ἀποδεικτικοὶ
εἰσιν οἱ κατὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἠρωτημένοι λόγοι ἢ
οὐκ ἀποδεικτικοί. καὶ εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἀποδεικτικοί,
οὐ δύνανται δεικνύναι ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ ἀπόδειξις· εἰ
δὲ ἀποδεικτικοὶ εἰσιν, αὐτοὶ οὗτοι τὴν ὑπόστασιν

prove an infinite series ; therefore it is impossible to
show that proof exists.

But neither can it be revealed by means of a sign. 183
For since it is a matter of inquiry whether sign
exists,^a and since the sign needs proof to ensure its
reality, we find ourselves involved in circular reason-
ing—the proof requiring a sign, and the sign in turn
a proof; which is absurd. And for these reasons
neither is it possible to decide the controversy re-
garding proof, seeing that the decision requires a
criterion, but—because it is a matter of inquiry, as
we have shown,^b whether a criterion exists, and con-
sequently the criterion needs a proof showing the
existence of a criterion—we are again involved in
the perplexity of circular reasoning. If, then, neither 184
by proof nor by sign nor by criterion it is possible to
show that proof exists, and it is not evident of itself
either, as we have shown,^c then it will be non-appre-
hensible whether proof exists. Consequently, proof
will also be unreal; for it is conceived together with
the act of proving, and were it not apprehended it
would be unable to prove.^d Wherefore proof will not
exist.

Thus much it will be enough to say by way of 185
outline and in criticism of proof. The Dogmatists,
however, maintaining the opposite view assert that
the arguments propounded against proof are either
probative or not probative; and if they are not
probative, they are incapable of showing that proof
does not exist; while if they are probative, they

^a i.e. if "proof" is non-apprehensible it must also be
unreal or non-existent, because non-apprehensible "proof"
is incapable of "proving" anything, and "proof" apart
from "proving" is inconceivable—the "conception" of the
one necessarily implying the other.

^b Cf. §§ 104 ff., 121.

^c Cf. §§ 48 ff. *supra*.

^d Cf. §§ 144 *supra*.

186 τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἐκ περιτροπῆς εἰσάγουσιν. ὄθεν καὶ τοιοῦτον συνερωτώσει λόγον· “εἰ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις· εἰ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις· ἦτοι δὲ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις· ἔστιν ἄρα ἀπόδειξις.” ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς αὐτῆς δυνάμεως καὶ τοῦτον ἐρωτῶσι τὸν λόγον· “τὸ τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις ἐπόμενον οὐ μόνον ἀληθές ἐστιν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον· ἀντίκειται δὲ ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις ‘ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις—οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις,’ ὧν ἕκαστέρῳ ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν· ἔστιν ἄρα ἀπόδειξις.”

187 “Ἐνεστί μὲν οὖν πρὸς ταῦτα ἀντιλέγειν, οἶον γοῦν, ἐπεὶ μὴ νομιζόμεν τινα λόγον εἶναι ἀποδεικτικόν, καὶ τοὺς κατὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως λόγους οὐ πάντως φάμεν ἀποδεικτικούς εἶναι ἀλλὰ φαίνεσθαι ἡμῖν πιθανούς· οἱ δὲ πιθανοὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἰσὶν ἀποδεικτικοί· εἰ δὲ ἄρα καὶ ἀποδεικτικοὶ εἰσιν, ὅπερ οὐ διαβεβαιούμεθα, πάντως καὶ ἀληθεῖς· ἀληθεῖς δὲ εἰσι λόγοι δι’ ἀληθῶν ἀληθῆς συνάγοντες· οὐκοῦν ἀληθῆς ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἡ ἐπιφορά· ἦν δέ γε αὕτη “οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα ἀπόδειξις”· ἀληθές ἄρα ἔστι
188 τὸ “οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις” ἐκ περιτροπῆς· δύνανται δὲ οἱ λόγοι καὶ καθάπερ τὰ καθαρτικὰ φάρμακα ταῖς ἐν τῷ σώματι ὑποκειμέναις ὕλαις ἐαυτὰ συνεξάγει, οὕτω καὶ αὐτοὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις λόγοις τοῖς ἀποδεικτικοῖς εἶναι λεγομένοις καὶ ἐαυτοὺς συμπεριγράφειν· τοῦτο γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπεμφαῖνον, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ φωνὴ αὕτη ἢ “οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἀληθές”

themselves involve the reality of proof by self-refutation.^a Hence also they propound an argument 186 in this form ^b: “If proof exists, proof exists; if proof exists not, proof exists; but proof either exists or exists not; therefore proof exists.” With the same intention they propound also this argument: “That which follows logically from contradictories is not only true but necessary; ‘proof exists’ and ‘proof exists not’ are contradictories, and the existence of proof follows from each of them; therefore proof exists.”

Now to this we may reply, for instance, that, because 187 we do not believe that any argument is probative, we do not assert either that the arguments against proof are absolutely probative but that they appear to us plausible; but those that are plausible are not necessarily probative. Yet if they actually are probative (which we do not positively affirm) they certainly are also true. And true arguments are those which deduce what is true by means of true premisses; wherefore their inference is true. Now the inference was this—“therefore proof does not exist”; therefore the statement “proof does not exist” is true by reversing the argument. And just 188 as purgative medicines expel themselves together with the substances already present in the body, so these arguments are capable of cancelling themselves along with the other arguments which are said to be probative.^c Nor is this preposterous, since in fact

^a Cf. § 131 for this hypothetical syllogism with double major premiss. Here, as there, the Dogmatists argue that the Sceptics’ proof that “proof exists not” refutes itself, the very proof they employ being itself an “existent” proof.

^c Cf. i. 206, *Adv. Log.* ii. 480.

^{*} Lit. “reversal” of the argument; cf. § 128, *Adv. Log.* ii. 463.

οὐ μόνον τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ἀναιρεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑαυτὴν ἐκείνοις συμπεριτρέπει.

“Ὁ τε λόγος οὗτος δύναται δείκνυσθαι ἀσύνακτος “εἰ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις· εἰ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις· ἤτοι δὲ ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν· ἔστιν ἄρα,” καὶ διὰ πλειόνων μὲν, ὡς δὲ πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ἀρκούντως διὰ τοῦδε τοῦ ἐπιχειρή-
 189 ματος. εἰ ὑγιὲς ἔστι τὸ συνημμένον τοῦτο “εἰ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις,” δεῖ τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ λήγοντος, τουτέστι τὸ “οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις,” μάχεσθαι τῷ “ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις”. τοῦτο γάρ ἔστι τοῦ συνημμένου τὸ ἡγούμενον. ἀδύνατον δὲ ἔστι κατ’ αὐτοὺς συνημμένον ὑγιὲς εἶναι ἐκ μαχομένων ἀξιωμαίων συνεστώσ. τὸ μὲν γὰρ συνημμένον ἐπαγγέλλεται ὄντος τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡγούμενου εἶναι καὶ τὸ λήγον, τὰ δὲ μαχόμενα τούναντίον, ὄντος τοῦ ἐτέρου αὐτῶν ὁποιοῦδήποτε ἀδύνατον εἶναι τὸ λοιπὸν ὑπάρχειν. ὄντος ἄρα ὑγιοῦς τοῦδε τοῦ συνημμένου “εἰ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις” οὐ δύναται ὑγιὲς εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ συνημμένον “εἰ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπό-
 190 δεξις.” πάλιν δ’ αὖ συγχωρούντων ἡμῶν καθ’ ὑπόθεσιν ὑγιὲς εἶναι τότε τὸ συνημμένον “εἰ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις,” δύναται συνυπάρχειν τὸ “εἰ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις” τῷ “οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις.” εἰ δὲ δύναται αὐτῷ συνυπάρχειν, οὐ μάχεται αὐτῷ. ἐν ἄρα τῷ “εἰ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις” συνημμένῳ οὐ μάχεται τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ λήγοντος τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡγούμενῳ, ὥστε οὐκ ἔσται ὑγιὲς πάλιν τοῦτο τὸ συνημμένον, ἐκείνου κατὰ συγχώρησιν ὡς ὑγιοῦς
 191 τιθεμένου. μὴ μαχομένου δὲ τοῦ “οὐκ ἔστιν

the saying “nothing is true” not only refutes every other saying but also nullifies itself as well.

And as regards this argument—“If proof exists, proof exists; if proof does not exist, proof exists; but it either exists or exists not; therefore it exists”—there are a number of ways by which it can be shown to be inconclusive, but for the moment the following method may suffice. If the hypothetical 188 premiss “If proof exists, proof exists” is valid, the contradictory of its consequent, namely “proof does not exist,” must conflict with “proof exists,” for this is the antecedent of the hypothetical premiss. But, according to them, it is impossible for a hypothetical premiss to be valid when composed of conflicting clauses. For the hypothetical premiss promises that when its antecedent is true its consequent is also true, whereas conflicting clauses contrariwise promise that if either one of them is true the other cannot possibly be true. If therefore the premiss “If proof exists, proof exists” is valid, the premiss “If proof exists not, proof exists” cannot be valid. And again, conversely, if we grant by way of 190 assumption that the premiss “If proof exists not, proof exists” is valid, then the clause “If proof exists” can co-exist with “proof exists not.” But if it can co-exist with it, it is not in conflict with it. Therefore, in the premiss “If proof exists, proof exists,” the contrary of its consequent is not in conflict with its antecedent, so that, conversely, this premiss will not be valid, as the former was posited, by agreement, as valid. And as the clause 191 “proof exists not” is not in conflict with “proof

ἀποδείξις" τῷ "ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις" οὐδὲ τὸ διεzeug-
 μένον ὑγιὲς ἔσται τὸ "ἤτοι ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις ἢ
 οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις". τὸ γὰρ ὑγιὲς διεzeugμένον
 ἐπαγγέλλεται ἐν τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ὑγιὲς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ
 λοιπὸν ἢ τὰ λοιπὰ ψεῦδος ἢ ψευδῆ μετὰ μάχης. ἢ
 εἴπερ ὑγιὲς ἔστι τὸ διεzeugμένον, πάλιν φαῦλον
 εὐρίσκεται τὸ "εἰ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν
 ἀπόδειξις" συνημμένον, ἐκ μαχομένων συνεστῶς.
 οὐκοῦν ἀσύμφωνά τέ ἐστι καὶ ἀλλήλων ἀνααιρετικά
 192 τὰ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ προειρημένῳ λήμματα· διόπερ
 οὐκ ἔστιν ὑγιὲς ὁ λόγος. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὅτι ἀκολουθεῖ
 τι τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις δύνανται δεικνύναι, μὴ ἔχοντες
 κριτήριον ἀκολουθίας, ὡς ἐπελογισάμεθα.

Ταῦτα δὲ ἐκ περιουσίας λέγομεν. εἰ γὰρ πιθανοὶ
 μὲν εἰσιν οἱ ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀποδείξεως λόγοι (ἔστωσαν
 γάρ), πιθανοὶ δὲ καὶ αἱ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν λεγό-
 μεναι ἐπιχειρήσεις, ἐπέχειν ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ τῆς
 ἀποδείξεως, μὴ μᾶλλον εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν ἢ μὴ εἶναι
 λέγοντας.

ΙΔ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΣΥΛΛΟΓΙΣΜΩΝ

193 Διὸ καὶ περὶ τῶν θρυλουμένων συλλογισμῶν ἴσως
 περιττὸν ἔστι διεξιέναι, τοῦτο μὲν συμπεριτρεπο-
 μένων αὐτῶν τῇ ὑπάρξει τῆς ἀποδείξεως (δῆλον
 γὰρ ὅτι ἐκείνης μὴ οὔσης οὐδὲ ἀποδεικτικὸς λόγος
 χώραν ἔχει), τοῦτο δὲ καὶ δυνάμει διὰ τῶν ἔμ-
 προσθεν ἡμῶν λελεγμένων ἀντειρηκότων ἡμῶν πρὸς
 αὐτοῦς, ὅτε περὶ τῆς παρολκῆς διαλεγόμενοι μέθ-
 οδὸν τινα ἐλέγομεν δι' ἧς ἐνδέχεται δεικνύναι ὅτι

* See §§ 145 ff.

† Cf. §§ 159-162 against the Stoics, and 163-166 against the Peripatetics.

exists," the disjunctive "Either proof exists or
 proof exists not" will not be valid; for the valid
 disjunctive promises that one of its clauses is valid,
 but the other or others false and contradictory.
 Or else, if the disjunctive be valid, the hypothetical
 premiss "If proof exists not, proof exists" is, in
 turn, found to be fallacious, as composed of conflicting
 clauses. So then the premisses in the foregoing
 argument are discordant and mutually destructive;
 wherefore the argument is not valid. And further, 192
 they are unable even to show that anything follows
 logically from the contradictories, since, as we have
 argued,^a they possess no criterion of logical con-
 sequence or deduction.

But this discussion is, in fact, superfluous. For if,
 on the one hand, the arguments in defence of proof
 are (let it be granted) plausible, while, on the other
 hand, the criticisms directed against proof are also
 plausible, then we must necessarily suspend judge-
 ment concerning proof also, and declare that proof is
 "no more" existent than non-existent.

CHAPTER XIV.—CONCERNING SYLLOGISMS

So then it is also superfluous, perhaps, to discuss 193
 in detail the much vaunted "syllogisms," since, for
 one thing, they are included in the refutation of the
 existence of "proof" (for it is plain that if this is
 non-existent there is no place either for probative
 argument), and for another, we have implicitly con-
 tradicted them in our previous statements, when
 in discussing redundancy^b we mentioned a certain
 method by which it is possible to show that all the

πάντες οἱ ἀποδεικτικοὶ λόγοι τῶν τε στωικῶν καὶ τῶν περιπατητικῶν ἀσύνακτοι τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες.

194 ἐξ ἐπιμέτρου δὲ οὐ χεῖρον ἕως καὶ ἴδια περὶ αὐτῶν διαλαβεῖν, ἐπεὶ μάλιστα ἐπ' αὐτοῖς μέγα φρονούσιν. πολλὰ μὲν οὖν ἔστι λέγειν τὸ ἀνυπόστατον αὐτῶν ὑπομνησκοντας· ὡς ἐν ὑποτυπώσει δὲ ἀρκεῖ τῆδε τῇ μεθόδῳ χρῆσθαι κατὰ αὐτῶν. λέξω δὲ καὶ νῦν περὶ τῶν ἀναποδείκτων· τούτων γὰρ ἀναιρουμένων καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ σύμπαντες λόγοι διατρέπονται, τὴν ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ συνάγειν ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἔχοντες.

195 Ἡ πρότασις τοίνυν αὕτη "πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ζῶον" ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐπαγωγικῶς βεβαιούται· ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ Σωκράτην ἄνθρωπον ὄντα καὶ ζῶον εἶναι, καὶ Πλάτωνα ὁμοίως καὶ Δίωνα καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν κατὰ μέρος, δυνατὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ διαβεβαιοῦσθαι καὶ ὅτι πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ζῶόν ἐστιν, ὡς εἰ κἂν ἔν τι τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐναντιούμενον φαίνοιτο τοῖς ἄλλοις, οὐκ ἔστιν ὑγιῆς ἢ καθόλου πρότασις, οἷον γοῦν, ἐπεὶ τὰ μὲν πλείστα τῶν ζῶων τὴν κάτω γένυν κινεῖ, μόνος δὲ ὁ κροκόδειλος τὴν ἄνω, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθῆς ἢ "πᾶν ζῶον τὴν κάτω γένυν κινεῖ"

196 πρότασις. ὅταν οὖν λέγωσι "πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ζῶον, Σωκράτης δ' ἄνθρωπος, Σωκράτης ἄρα ζῶον," ἐκ τῆς καθόλου προτάσεως τῆς "πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ζῶον" τὴν κατὰ μέρος πρότασιν συνάγειν βουλόμενοι, τὴν "Σωκράτης ἄρα ζῶον," ἢ δὴ βεβαιωτικὴ τῆς καθολικῆς προτάσεώς ἐστι κατὰ τὸν ἐπαγωγικὸν τρόπον, ὡς ὑπεμνήσαμεν, εἰς τὸν

* For the phrase ἐξ ἐπιμέτρου, "into the bargain," cf. § 47 *supra*.

probative arguments of the Stoics and the Peripatetics are really inconclusive. Yet perhaps it will not 194 be amiss to go further^a and deal with them separately, especially since these thinkers pride themselves upon them. Now there is much that one can say by way of suggesting their unreality, but in an outline sketch it is sufficient to treat of them by the method which follows. And I will deal at present with the axiomatic^b arguments; for if these are destroyed all the rest of the arguments are overthrown as well, since it is from these that they derive the proof of their deductions.

Well then, the premiss "Every man is an animal" 195 is established by induction from the particular instances; for from the fact that Socrates, who is a man, is also an animal, and Plato likewise, and Dion and each one of the particular instances,^c they think it possible to assert that every man is an animal; so that if even a single one of the particulars should apparently conflict with the rest the universal premiss is not valid; thus, for example, when most animals move the lower jaw, and only the crocodile the upper,^d the premiss "Every animal moves the lower jaw" is not true. So whenever they argue "Every man is an 196 animal, and Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is an animal," proposing to deduce from the universal proposition "Every man is an animal" the particular proposition "Socrates therefore is an animal," which in fact goes (as we have mentioned) to establish by way of induction the universal proposition, they fall into the

^b Or "non-demonstrable," including here categorical syllogisms as well as those mentioned in § 157 *supra*.

^c Cf. Aristot. *Anal. pr.* ii. 23 on logical "induction."

^d Cf. Hdt. ii. 68; Aristot. *Hist. An.* iii. 7.

διάλληλον ἐμπίπτουσι λόγον, τὴν μὲν καθολικὴν πρότασιν δι' ἐκάστης τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐπαγωγικῶς βεβαιούντες, τὴν δὲ κατὰ μέρος¹ ἐκ τῆς καθολικῆς συλλογιστικῶς. παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ τοιούτου λόγου "Σωκράτης ἄνθρωπος, οὐδεὶς δὲ ἄνθρωπος τετράπους, Σωκράτης ἄρα οὐκ ἔστι τετράπους" τὴν μὲν "οὐδεὶς ἄνθρωπος τετράπους" πρότασιν ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐπαγωγικῶς βουλόμενοι βεβαιούν, ἐκάστην δὲ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐκ τῆς "οὐδεὶς ἄνθρωπος τετράπους" συλλογίζεσθαι θέλοντες, τῇ κατὰ τὸν διάλληλον ἀπορίᾳ περιπίπτουσιν.

198 Ὁμοίως δὲ ἐφοδευτέον καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς τῶν παρὰ τοῖς περιπατητικοῖς λεγομένων ἀναποδείκτων. ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν." τό τε γὰρ "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστι" συνακτικόν ἔστιν, ὡς φασί, τοῦ "φῶς ἔστι," τό τε "φῶς ἔστι" μετὰ τοῦ "ἡμέρα ἔστι" βεβαιωτικόν ἔστι τοῦ "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν." οὐ γὰρ ἂν ὑγιᾶς ἐνομίσθη τὸ προειρημένον συνημμένον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ πρότερον τεθεώρητο συνυπάρχον αἰ
199 τὸ "φῶς ἔστι" τῷ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν." εἰ οὖν δεῖ προκατεληφέναι ὅτι ἡμέρας οὐσης πάντως ἔστι καὶ φῶς εἰς τὸ συνθεῖναι τὸ "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστι" συνημμένον, διὰ δὲ τοῦ συνημμένου τούτου συνάγεται τὸ [ὅτι] ἡμέρας οὐσης φῶς εἶναι, τὴν μὲν συνυπάρξιν τοῦ ἡμέραν εἶναι καὶ τοῦ φῶς εἶναι συνάγοντος τοῦ "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστι" συνημμένον ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ προκειμένῳ ἀναποδείκτω, τὸ δὲ συνημμένον τῆς συνυπάρξεως τῶν προειρημένων

¹ <ἐπαγωγικῶς βεβαιούντες, τὴν δὲ κατὰ μέρος> supplēvi: lacunam indic. Bekk.

error of circular reasoning, since they are establishing the universal proposition inductively by means of each of the particulars and deducing the particular proposition from the universal syllogistically. So likewise in 197 the case of such an argument as "Socrates is a man, but no man is four-footed, therefore Socrates is not four-footed," by proposing to establish the premiss "No man is four-footed" by induction from the particular instances while wishing to deduce each several particular from the premiss "No man is four-footed," they become involved in the perplexity of the circular fallacy.

And a similar criticism may be passed upon the 198 rest of the "axiomatic" arguments, as they are called by the Peripatetics; and also upon arguments in the form "If it is day, it is light." For the proposition "If it is day, it is light" is capable, they say, of proving that "it is light," and the clause "it is light" in conjunction with "it is day" serves to establish the proposition "If it is day, it is light." For the hypothetical premiss stated above would not have been considered valid unless the constant co-existence of "it is light" with "it is day" had already been observed. If, then, one has to apprehend 199 beforehand that when there is day there certainly is light also, in order to construct the hypothetical premiss "If it is day, it is light," while by means of this premiss we deduce that when it is day it is light, the co-existence of the being of day and of night being proved (so far as depends on the axiomatic argument before us) by the premiss "If it is day, it is light," and that premiss in turn being established by the co-existence of the facts aforesaid,

βεβαιούσης, κἀνταῦθα ὁ διάλληλος τρόπος τῆς ἀπορίας ἀνατρέπει τὴν ὑπόστασιν τοῦ λόγου.

200 Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ τοιούτου λόγου “ εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· οὐχὶ δὲ φῶς ἔστιν· οὐκ ἄρα ἡμέρα ἔστιν.” ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ μὴ ἄνευ φωτὸς ἡμέραν θεωρεῖσθαι ὑγιὲς ἂν εἶναι νομισθεῖται τὸ “ εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστι ” συνημμένον, ὡς εἶγε καθ’ ὑπόθεσιν ἡμέρα μὲν φανεῖη ποτὲ φῶς δὲ μὴ, ψεῦδος ἂν λεχθεῖται τὸ συνημμένον εἶναι· ὅσον δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ προειρημένῳ ἀναποδείκτω τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἡμέραν φωτὸς μὴ ὄντος διὰ τοῦ “ εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστι ” συνάγεται, ὥστε ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ βεβαίωσιν χρῆζειν τοῦ τὸ ἕτερον βεβαίως εἰληφθαι, ἵνα δι’ αὐτοῦ πιστὸν γένηται κατὰ

201 τὸν διάλληλον τρόπον. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ δύνασθαι ἀλλήλοις συνυπάρχειν τινά, οἷον ἡμέραν, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ νύκτα, τό τε ἀποφατικὸν τῆς συμπλοκῆς, τὸ “ οὐχ ἡμέρα ἔστι καὶ νύξ ἔστι,” καὶ τὸ διεzeugμένον, τὸ “ ἤτοι ἡμέρα ἔστιν ἢ νύξ ἔστιν,” ὑγιῆ νομίζοιτο ἂν εἶναι. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ συνυπάρχειν αὐτὰ βεβαιουῖσθαι νομίζουσι διὰ τε τοῦ ἀποφατικοῦ τῆς συμπλοκῆς καὶ τοῦ διεzeugμένου, λέγοντες “ οὐχὶ ἡμέρα ἔστι καὶ νύξ ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν νύξ ἔστιν· οὐκ ἄρα ἡμέρα ἔστιν.” “ ἤτοι ἡμέρα ἔστιν ἢ νύξ ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν νύξ ἔστιν· οὐκ ἄρα ἡμέρα ἔστιν,” ἢ “ οὐχὶ δὲ νύξ ἔστιν· ἡμέρα ἄρα ἔστιν.”

202 ὅθεν ἡμεῖς πάλιν ἐπιλογιζόμεθα ὅτι εἰ μὲν πρὸς τὴν βεβαίωσιν τοῦ διεzeugμένου καὶ τοῦ τῆς συμπλοκῆς ἀποφατικοῦ χρῆζομεν τοῦ προκατειληφέναι ὅτι τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς περιεχόμενα ἀξιιώματά ἐστιν ἀσυνύπαρκτα, τὸ δὲ ἀσυνύπαρκτα ταῦτα εἶναι συν-

—in this case also the fallacy of circular reasoning overthrows the substance of the argument.

So likewise with an argument in the form “ If it is 200 day, it is light ; but it is not light ; therefore it is not day.” For from the fact that we do not observe day without light the hypothetical premiss “ If it is day, it is light ” might be considered to be valid ; just as if, should day, let us suppose, at some time appear, without the appearance of light, the premiss would be said to be false ; but, so far as concerns the axiomatic argument aforesaid, the non-existence of day when light is non-existent is proved by the premiss “ If it is day, it is light,” so that each of these statements needs for its confirmation the secure grasp of the other in order thereby to become credible by means of circular reasoning. Moreover, from the fact that some things are 201 unable to co-exist—take, for instance, if you like, day and night—both the conjunctive “ negation “ Not day exists and night exists ” and the disjunctive “ Either day exists or night exists ” might be considered to be valid. But they consider that their non-co-existence is established both by the negative of the conjunctive and by the disjunctive, arguing “ Not day exists and night exists ; but in fact night exists ; day therefore exists not ” ; and “ Either it is day or it is night ; but in fact it is night ; therefore it is not day,” or “ it is not night, therefore it is day.” Whence we argue again 202 that if for establishing the disjunctive proposition and the negative of the conjunctive we require to apprehend beforehand the fact that the judgements they contain are incapable of co-existence, while they believe that they are deducing this incapacity for

* For the “conjunctive” or “coupled” premiss see § 158, note.

ἀγειν δοκοῦσι διὰ τε τοῦ διεξευγμένου καὶ τοῦ τῆς
 συμπλοκῆς ἀποφατικοῦ, ὃ δι' ἀλλήλων εἰσάγεται
 τρόπος, μὴ δυναμένων ἡμῶν μήτε τοῖς προειρη-
 μένοις τροπικοῖς πιστεύειν ἄνευ τοῦ τὸ ἀσυνύπα-
 ρκτον τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς περιεχομένων ἀξιωματίων
 καταλαβεῖν, μήτε τὸ ἀσυνύπαρκτον αὐτῶν δια-
 βεβαιοῦσθαι πρὸ τῆς τῶν συλλογισμῶν διὰ τῶν
 203 τροπικῶν συνερωτήσεως. διόπερ οὐκ ἔχοντες πόθεν
 ἀρξόμεθα τῆς πίστεως διὰ τὸ παλίνδρομον, λέξομεν
 μήτε τὸν τρίτον μήτε τὸν τέταρτον μήτε τὸν
 πέμπτον τῶν ἀναποδείκτων ὅσον ἐπὶ τούτοις
 ὑπόστασις ἔχειν.
 Τοσαῦτα μὲν καὶ περὶ συλλογισμῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ
 παρόντος ἀρκέσει λελέχθαι.

ΙΕ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΕΠΑΓΩΓΗΣ

204 Εὐπαραίτητον δὲ εἶναι νομίζω καὶ τὸν περὶ
 ἐπαγωγῆς τρόπον. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ μέρος
 πιστοῦσθαι βούλονται δι' αὐτῆς τὸ καθόλου, ἦτοι
 πάντα ἐπιόντες τὰ κατὰ μέρος τοῦτο ποιήσουσιν
 ἢ τινά. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν τινά, ἀβέβαιος ἔσται ἡ ἐπα-
 γωγή, ἐνδεχομένου τοῦ ἐναντιοῦσθαι τῷ καθόλου
 τινα τῶν παραλειπομένων κατὰ μέρος ἐν τῇ ἐπα-
 γωγῇ· εἰ δὲ πάντα, ἀδύνατα μοχθήσουσιν, ἀπείρων
 ὄντων τῶν κατὰ μέρος καὶ ἀπεριορίστων. ὥσθ'
 οὕτως ἐκατέρωθεν, οἶμαι, συμβαίνει σαλευέσθαι
 τὴν ἐπαγωγὴν.

co-existence by means of both the disjunctive and
 the negative conjunctive, we involve ourselves in
 circular reasoning, seeing that we are unable either
 to give credence to the aforesaid premisses without
 having apprehended the incapacity for co-existence
 of the judgements they contain, or to affirm
 positively that incapacity before concluding the
 syllogisms based on these premisses. Consequently, 203
 as we possess no principle on which to ground belief
 owing to the circular style of the argument, we shall
 declare that, so far as depends on these statements,
 neither the third nor the fourth nor the fifth of the
 "axiomatic" syllogisms^a possesses valid substance.
 For the present, then, it will suffice to have said
 thus much concerning syllogisms.

CHAPTER XV.—CONCERNING INDUCTION

It is also easy, I consider, to set aside the method 204
 of induction. For, when they propose to establish
 the universal from the particulars by means of induc-
 tion, they will effect this by a review either of all
 or of some of the particular instances. But if they
 review some, the induction will be insecure, since
 some of the particulars omitted in the induction may
 contravene the universal; while if they are to review
 all, they will be toiling at the impossible, since the
 particulars are infinite and indefinite. Thus on both
 grounds, as I think, the consequence is that induction
 is invalidated.

^a For the "five non-demonstrable (or axiomatic) syllogisms" see §§ 157-158 *supra*.

205 Ἄλλα καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ περὶ ὄρων δὴ τεχνολογίᾳ μέγα φρονούσιν οἱ δογματικοί, ἣν τῷ λογικῷ μέρει τῆς καλουμένης φιλοσοφίας ἐγκαταλέγουσιν. φέρε οὖν καὶ περὶ ὄρων ὀλίγα ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος εἰπωμεν.

Πρὸς πολλὰ τοῖνυν χρησιμεύειν τοὺς ὄρους τῶν δογματικῶν δοκούτων, δύο τὰ ἀνωτάτω κεφάλαια <α>¹ περιληπτικὰ πάσης [ἦς]² λέγουσιν ἀναγκαιότητος αὐτῶν ἴσως εὐρήσεις· ἢ γὰρ ὡς πρὸς κατάληψιν ἢ ὡς πρὸς διδασκαλίαν ἐν πᾶσι παραδεικνύουσι τοὺς ὄρους ἀναγκαίους. εἰάν οὖν ὑπομνήσωμεν ὅτι πρὸς οὐδέτερον τούτων χρησιμεύουσι, περιτρέψομεν, οἴμαι, πᾶσαν τὴν γεγεννημένην περὶ αὐτῶν παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς ματαιοποιίαν.

207 Εὐθέως οὖν, εἰ ὁ μὲν ἀγνοῶν τὸ ὀριστὸν οὐχ οἶός τε ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ γνωσκόμενον αὐτῷ ὀρίσασθαι, ὁ δὲ γνωσκων, εἴθ' ὀριζόμενος οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ ὄρου τὸ ὀριστὸν κατεῖληφεν ἀλλ' ἐπὶ προκατειλημμένῳ τούτῳ τὸν ὄρον ἐπισυντέθεικεν, πρὸς κατάληψιν τῶν πραγμάτων ὁ ὄρος οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκαῖος. καὶ γὰρ ἐπεὶ πάντα μὲν ὀρίζεσθαι θέλοντες καθάπαξ οὐδὲν ὀριζόμεθα διὰ τὴν εἰς ἄπειρον ἔκπτωσιν, τινὰ δὲ καταλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ δίχα τῶν ὄρων ὁμολογοῦντες οὐκ ἀναγκαίους πρὸς κατάληψιν τοὺς ὄρους ἀποφαίνομεν, καθ' ὃν τρόπον τὰ μὴ ὀρισθέντα κατελήφθη δυναμένων ἡμῶν πάντα χωρὶς τῶν ὄρων καταλαμβάνειν, ἢ καθάπαξ οὐδὲν ὀρισόμεθα [διὰ τὴν εἰς ἄπειρον ἔκπτωσιν] ἢ οὐκ ἀναγκαίους τοὺς ὄρους ἀποφανοῦμεν.

¹ <α> add. T.² [ἦς] om. mss.* Cf. § 4 *supra*.

Further, the Dogmatists take great pride in their 205 systematic treatment of definitions, which they include in the logical division of their Philosophical System, as they call it. So come and let us now make a few observations on definitions.

Now while the Dogmatists hold that definitions have many uses, you will probably find that these fall under two main heads which, as they say, include all their necessary uses; for, as they explain, definitions 206 are necessary in all cases either for apprehension ^a or for instruction. If, then, we shall show that they are of use for neither of these purposes, we shall, I think, bring to naught all the labour so vainly spent on them by the Dogmatists.

So then, without preliminary, if, on the one hand, 207 the man who knows not the object of definition is unable to define the object unknown to him, while, on the other hand, the man who knows and proceeds to define has not apprehended the object from its definition but has put together his definition to fit the object already apprehended, then the definition is not necessary for the apprehension of objects. And since, if we propose to define absolutely all things, we shall define nothing, because of the regress *ad infinitum*; while if we allow that some things are apprehended even without definitions, we are declaring that definitions are not necessary for apprehension, seeing that we are able to apprehend all things apart from definitions in the same way as the undefined objects were apprehended,—then we shall 208 either define absolutely nothing or we shall declare that definitions are not necessary.

Διὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲ πρὸς διδασκαλίαν αὐτοὺς
 εὔροισιν ἂν ἀναγκαίους· ὡς γὰρ ὁ πρῶτος τὸ
 πρᾶγμα γνούς ἔγνω τοῦτο χωρὶς ὄρου, κατὰ τὸ
 παραπλήσιον καὶ ὁ διδασκόμενος αὐτὸ δύναται
 209 χωρὶς ὄρου διδαχθῆναι. ἔτι ἀπὸ τῶν ὀριστῶν
 ἐπικρίνουσι τοὺς ὄρους, καὶ φασὶ μοχθηροὺς ὄρους
 εἶναι τοὺς περιέχοντάς τι τῶν μὴ προσόντων τοῖς
 ὀριστοῖς, ἥτοι πᾶσιν ἢ τισίν. διόπερ ὅταν εἴπῃ
 τις τὸν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι ζῶον λογικὸν ἀθάνατον ἢ
 ζῶον λογικὸν θνητὸν γραμματικόν, ὅπου μὲν μη-
 δενὸς ὄντος ἀνθρώπου ἀθανάτου, ὅπου δὲ τινῶν
 μὴ γραμματικῶν ὄντων, φασὶ μοχθηρὸν εἶναι τὸν
 210 ὄρον. τάχα μὲν καὶ ἀνεπικριτοὶ εἰσιν οἱ ὄροι διὰ
 τὴν ἀπειρίαν τῶν κατὰ μέρος, ἐξ ὧν ἐπικρίνεσθαι
 ὀφείλουσιν· εἶτα οὐκ ἂν καταληπτικοὶ τε καὶ δι-
 δακτικοὶ τούτων εἶεν ἐξ ὧν ἐπικρίνονται δηλονότι
 προεπεγνωσμένων, εἶγε ἄρα, καὶ προκατελημμέ-
 νων.

Πῶς δὲ οὐκ ἂν εἴη γελοῖον τὸ λέγειν ὡς οἱ ὄροι
 χρησιμεύουσι πρὸς κατάληψιν ἢ διδασκαλίαν ἢ
 σαφήνειαν ὅλως, ἀσάφειαν ἡμῖν ἐπεισκευκλῶντες
 211 τοσαύτην; οἷον γοῦν, ἵνα τι καὶ παίξωμεν, εἴ τις
 παρά του βουλόμενος πυθέσθαι εἰ ἀπήντηται αὐτῷ
 ἄνθρωπος ἐπὶ ἵππου ὀχούμενος καὶ κύνᾳ ἐφέλκώ-
 μενος, τὴν ἐρώτησιν οὕτω ποιήσῃτο "ὦ ζῶον
 λογικὸν θνητόν, νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν,
 ἀπήντητό σοι ζῶον γελαστικὸν πλατωνύνηχον,
 ἐπιστήμης πολιτικῆς δεκτικόν, ζῶον θνητῷ χρε-
 μειστικῷ τὰ σφαιρώματα ἐφηδρακός, ἐφ-
 ελκόμενον ζῶον τετράπουνον ὑλακτικόν;" πῶς οὐκ
 ἂν εἴη καταγέλαστος, εἰς ἀφασίαν οὕτω γνωρίμου

* Cf. §§ 26, 28 for this definition of Man.

And for these reasons they are not necessary for instruction either, as we shall discover. For just as the man who first perceived the object perceived it apart from definition, so likewise the man who receives instruction about it can be instructed without definition. Moreover, they judge the definitions by 209 the objects defined and declare those definitions to be faulty which include any attributes not belonging either to all or to some of the objects defined. Hence, whenever one states that man is "a rational immortal animal" or "a rational mortal literary animal," whereas no man is immortal, and some are not literary, such a definition they say is faulty. And it may be 210 also that the definitions do not admit of judgement owing to the infinity of the particulars by which they ought to be judged; and consequently they will not convey apprehension and instruction regarding the objects whereby they are judged, which evidently have been known beforehand, if at all, and apprehended beforehand.

And how could it be other than absurd to assert that definitions are of use for apprehension or instruction or elucidation of any kind, when they involve us in such a fog of uncertainty? Thus, for instance, to take 211 a ridiculous case, suppose that one wished to ask someone whether he had met a man riding a horse and leading a dog and put the question in this form—"O rational mortal animal, receptive of intelligence and science, have you met with an animal capable of laughter, with broad nails and receptive of political science,* with his (posterior) hemispheres seated on a mortal animal capable of neighing, and leading a four-footed animal capable of barking?"—how would one be otherwise than ridiculous, in thus reducing the

πράγματος ἐμβαλὼν τὸν ἄνθρωπον διὰ τοὺς ὄρους;

212 Οὐκοῦν ἄχρηστον εἶναι τὸν ὄρον ὅσον ἐπὶ τούτοις λεκτέον, εἴτ' οὖν λόγος εἶναι λέγοιτο διὰ βραχείας ὑπομνήσεως εἰς ἔννοιαν ἡμᾶς ἄγων τῶν ὑποτεταγμένων ταῖς φωναῖς πραγμάτων, ὡς δῆλόν γε (οὐ γάρ;) ἐκ τῶν μικρῶ πρόσθεν ἡμῶν εἰρημένων, εἴτε λόγος ὁ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι δηλῶν, εἴτε ὁ βούλεται τις. καὶ γὰρ τί ἐστὶν ὁ ὄρος βουλούμενοι παριστᾶν εἰς ἀνήνυτον ἐμπύπτουσι διαφωνίαν, ἣν διὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν τῆς γραφῆς παρήμι νῦν, εἰ καὶ δοκεῖ διατρέπειν τοὺς ὄρους.

Τοσαῦτα μὲν καὶ περὶ ὄρων ἀπόχρη μοι νῦν λελέχθαι.

IZ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΔΙΑΙΡΕΣΕΩΣ

213 Ἐπεὶ δέ τις τῶν δογματικῶν τὴν διαλεκτικὴν εἶναι φασὶν ἐπιστήμην συλλογιστικὴν ἐπαγωγικὴν ὀριστικὴν διαιρετικὴν, διελέχθημεν δὲ ἡμεῖς ἤδη μετὰ τοὺς περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου καὶ τοῦ σημείου καὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως λόγους περὶ τε συλλογισμῶν καὶ ἐπαγωγῆς καὶ περὶ ὄρων, οὐκ ἄτοπον ἡγοῦμεθα εἶναι καὶ περὶ διαιρέσεως βραχεὰ διαλαβεῖν. γίνεσθαι τοίνυν τὴν διαιρέσιν φασὶ τετραχῶς ἢ γὰρ ὄνομα εἰς σημαζόμενα διαιρεῖσθαι ἢ ὅλον εἰς μέρη ἢ γένος εἰς εἶδη ἢ εἶδος εἰς τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον.

* The Aristotelian definition of "Definition," the previous definition being probably Stoic.

† The definition of "Dialectic," and also the four kinds of "Division," here mentioned are given by Alcinous, a second-century (A.D.) Eclectic. As used by Plato and Aristotle, "Division" includes only the 3rd and 4th kinds (i.e. "logical" as distinguished from grammatical (§ 214) and

man to speechlessness concerning so familiar an object because of one's definitions?

So then we must declare that, so far as we may judge by this, the definition is useless, whether it be 212 described as "a statement which by a brief reminder brings us to a conception of the objects which underlie the terms,"—as is plain (is it not?) from what we have said just a moment ago,—or as "a statement declaratory of the essence,"^a or what you like. For in fact, in their desire to propound a definition of the definition they plunge into an endless controversy which I now pass over, because of the plan of my present treatise, although it seems to overthrow definitions.

So what I have said about definitions is enough for the present.

CHAPTER XVII.—CONCERNING DIVISION

Inasmuch as some of the Dogmatists^b affirm that 213 "Dialectic" is "a science dealing with syllogism, induction, definition and division," and, after our arguments concerning the criterion and the sign and proof, we have already discussed syllogisms and induction as well as definitions, we deem that it will not be amiss to treat shortly of "division" also. Division then, as they allege, is effected in four ways: either a name, or word, is divided into its significations, or a whole into parts, or a genus into species, or a

arithmetical (§§ 215-218) division). Logical "division" is the process of defining a class-name by splitting it up into its component parts—the "genus" into "species," the "species" into particulars. By it we enumerate the classes of objects denoted by the name or term which is "divided."

ὅτι δὲ οὐδενὸς τούτων ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη διαιρετική,
ῥάδιον ἴσως ἐπελθεῖν.

ΙΗ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΟΝΟΜΑΤΟΣ ΕΙΣ ΣΗΜΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΑ
ΔΙΑΙΡΕΣΕΩΣ

214 Εὐθέως οὖν τὰς ἐπιστήμας τῶν φύσει φασὶν
εἶναι, τῶν θέσει δὲ οὐδαμῶς. καὶ εἰκότως· ἡ μὲν
γὰρ ἐπιστήμη βέβαιόν τι καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον πρᾶγμα
εἶναι θέλει, τὰ δὲ θέσει ῥάδιον ἔχει καὶ εὐμετάπτω-
τον τὴν μεταβολήν, ταῖς ἐναλλαγαῖς τῶν θέσεων,
αἱ εἶσιν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ἑτεροιοῦμενα. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ ὀνό-
ματα θέσει σημαίνει καὶ οὐ φύσει (πάντες γὰρ ἂν
συνίεσαν πάντα τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν φωνῶν σημαίνόμενα,
ὁμοίως Ἑλληνῆς τε καὶ βάρβαροι, πρὸς τῷ καὶ
ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι τὰ σημαίνόμενα οἷς ἂν βουλώμεθα
ὀνόμασι ἑτέροις αἰεὶ δηλοῦν τε καὶ σημαίνειν),
πῶς ἂν δυνατόν εἴη διαιρετικὴν ὀνόματος εἰς
σημαίνόμενα ἐπιστήμην εἶναι; ἢ πῶς ἐπιστήμη
σημαίνοντων τε καὶ σημαινομένων, ὡς οἴονται
τινες, ἡ διαλεκτικὴ δύναιτ' ἂν ὑπάρχειν;

ΙΘ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΟΛΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΜΕΡΟΥΣ

215 Περὶ δὲ ὅλου καὶ μέρους διαλεξόμεθα μὲν καὶ
ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς δὴ λεγομένοις, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ παρόντος
περὶ τῆς λεγομένης διαίρεσεως τοῦ ὅλου εἰς τὰ
μέρη αὐτοῦ τὰδε λεκτέον. ὅταν λέγη τις διααιρεῖσθαι

^a That "names" exist "by nature" was held by Hera-
clitus, Cratylus, Stoics and Epicureans; Aristotle and the
Sceptics took the other view. θέσει, "by convention" (or
human ordinance), like the more usual νόμος, is opposed to

species into particulars. But it is probably easy to
show that, on the contrary, in respect of none of these
does a divisive science exist.

CHAPTER XVIII.—CONCERNING THE DIVISION OF A
NAME INTO THINGS SIGNIFIED

Now they at once assert that the sciences of natural 214
objects exist whereas those of conventional objects
have no existence, and that with reason. For science
claims to be a thing that is firm and invariable, but
the conventional objects are easily liable to change
and variation, because their character is altered by
the shifting of the conventions which depend upon
ourselves. Since, then, the significance of names is
based on convention and not on nature ^a (for otherwise
all men, barbarians as well as Greeks, would under-
stand all the things signified by the terms, besides
the fact that it is in our power at any time to point
out and signify the objects by any other names we
may choose), how would it be possible for a science
capable of dividing a name into its significations to
exist? Or how could Dialectic really be, as some
imagine, a "science of things which signify and are
signified"?

CHAPTER XIX.—CONCERNING WHOLE AND PART

Whole and part we shall discuss in what we call 215
our physical treatise,^b but at present we have to deal
with the so-called division of the whole into its parts.
When a man says that the decad is being divided into

φύσει, "by nature," much as we contrast the "artificial"
with the "natural."

^b Cf. iii. 82 ff.; *Adv. Phys.* i. 297 ff., 330 ff., ii. 304.

τὴν δεκάδα εἰς μονάδα¹ καὶ δύο καὶ τρία καὶ τέσσαρα, οὐ διαιρεῖται εἰς ταῦτα ἢ δεκάς. ἅμα γὰρ τῷ τὸ πρῶτον αὐτῆς ἀρθῆναι μέρος, ἵνα κατὰ συγχώρησιν νῦν τοῦτο δώμεν, οἷον τὴν μονάδα, οὐκέτι ὑπόκειται ἢ δεκάς, ἀλλ' ἐννέα καὶ ὄλως
 216 ἕτερόν τι παρὰ τὴν δεκάδα. ἢ οὖν τῶν λοιπῶν ἀφαίρεσίς τε καὶ διαίρεσις οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάδος γίνεται ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τινων ἄλλων, καθ' ἐκάστην ἀφαίρεσιν ἕτεροιομένων.

Τάχα οὖν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὸ ὅλον διαιρεῖν εἰς τὰ λεγόμενα εἶναι αὐτοῦ μέρη. καὶ γὰρ εἰ διαιρεῖται τὸ ὅλον εἰς μέρη, ὀφείλει² τὰ μέρη ἐμπεριέχεσθαι τῷ ὅλῳ πρὸ τῆς διαιρέσεως, οὐ περιέχεται δὲ ἴσως. οἷον γοῦν, ἵνα ἐπὶ τῆς δεκάδος στήσωμεν πάλιν τὸν λόγον, τῆς δεκάδος μέρος φασὶ πάντως εἶναι τὰ ἐννέα· διαιρεῖται γοῦν εἰς ἓν καὶ ἐννέα. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ὀκτὼ ὁμοίως· διαιρεῖται γὰρ εἰς ὀκτὼ καὶ δύο. καὶ τὰ ἑπτὰ ὁμοίως καὶ ἕξ καὶ πέντε καὶ τέσσαρα
 217 καὶ τρία καὶ δύο καὶ ἓν. εἰ οὖν ταῦτα πάντα ἐν τῇ δεκάδι περιέχεται καὶ συντιθέμενα μετ' αὐτῆς πεντεκαίπεντήκοντα γίνεται, ἐν τοῖς δέκα περιέχεται πεντεκαίπεντήκοντα· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. οὐκοῦν οὔτε περιέχεται ἐν τῇ δεκάδι τὰ λεγόμενα αὐτῆς εἶναι μέρη, οὔτε ἢ δεκάς εἰς ἐκεῖνα διαιρεῖσθαι δύναται ὡς ὅλον εἰς μέρη, ἃ μηδὲ ὄλως ἐν αὐτῇ θεωρεῖται.

218 Τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ ἀπαντήσεται καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μεγεθῶν, ὅταν τὸ δεκάπηχον μέγεθος, εἰ τύχοι, διαιρεῖν ἐθέλοι τις. οὐκ ἐνδέχεται οὖν ἴσως διαιρεῖν οὐδὲ ὅλον εἰς μέρη.

¹ μονάδα T, cj. Bekk. : μίαν mss.

² ὀφείλει Heintz : φιλεῖ mss., Bekk.

one and two and three and four, the decad is not being divided into these. For as soon as its first part, say one, is subtracted—granting for the moment that this can be done—there no longer subsists the decad but the number nine, something quite different from the decad. Hence the division and the subtraction 216 of the other parts is not made from the decad but from some other numbers, and these vary with each subtraction.

Probably then it is impracticable to divide the whole into what are called its parts. For, in fact, if the whole is divided into parts, the parts ought to be comprised in the whole before the act of division, but probably they are not so comprised. Thus for example—to base our argument once more on the decad—they say that nine is certainly a part of the decad, since it is divided into one plus nine. But so likewise is the number eight, since it is divided into eight plus two; and so also are the numbers seven, six, five, four, three, two and one. If then all these 217 numbers are included in the decad, and when added together with it make up fifty-five, then fifty-five is included in the number ten, which is absurd. Therefore neither are its so-called parts included in the decad nor can the decad be divided into them, as a whole into parts, since they are not even seen in it at all.

And the same objections will confront us in the case 218 of magnitudes^a also, supposing one should wish, for example, to divide the magnitude of ten cubits. Probably, then, it is not practicable to divide a whole into parts.

^a The subject of geometry, as numbers are of arithmetic.

Κ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΓΕΝΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΕΙΔΩΝ

CHAPTER XX.—OF GENERA AND SPECIES

219 Οὐκοῦν ὁ περὶ τῶν γενῶν καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν ὑπολείπεται λόγος, περὶ οὗ πλατύτερον μὲν ἐν ἄλλοις διαλεξόμεθα, ὡς ἐν συντόμῳ δὲ νῦν ταῦτα λέξομεν. εἰ μὲν ἐννοήματα εἶναι τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἶδη λέγουσιν, αἱ κατὰ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ καὶ τῆς φαντασίας ἐπιχειρήσεις αὐτοὺς διατρέπουσιν· εἰ δὲ ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν αὐτοῖς ἀπολείπουσιν, τί πρὸς τοῦτο 220 ἐροῦσιν; εἰ ἔστι τὰ γένη, ἦτοι τσαυτὰ ἔστιν ὅσα τὰ εἶδη, ἢ ἔν ἐστι κοινὸν πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν αὐτοῦ λεγομένων εἶναι γένος. εἰ μὲν οὖν τσαυτὰ ἔστι τὰ γένη ὅσα τὰ εἶδη αὐτῶν, οὐκετ' ἂν εἴη κοινὸν γένος, ὃ εἰς αὐτὰ διαιρεθῆσεται. εἰ δὲ ἐν εἶναι λέγοιτο ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς εἶδεσιν αὐτοῦ τὸ γένος, ἦτοι ὅλου αὐτοῦ ἕκαστον εἶδος αὐτοῦ μετέχει ἢ μέρους αὐτοῦ. ἀλλ' ὅλου μὲν οὐδαμῶς ἀμήχανον γὰρ ἔστιν ἐν τι ὑπάρχον ἄλλω καὶ ἄλλω κατὰ ταῦτὸ περιέχεσθαι οὕτως ὡς ὅλον ἐν ἐκάστῳ θεωρεῖσθαι τῶν ἐν οἷς εἶναι λέγεται. εἰ δὲ μέρους, πρῶτων μὲν οὐκ ἀκολουθήσει τῷ εἶδει τὸ γένος πᾶν, ὡς ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, οὐδὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἔσται ζῶον ἀλλὰ μέρος ζώου, οἶον οὐσία, οὔτε δὲ ἔμφυχος οὔτε 221 αἰσθητική. εἴτα μέντοι καὶ ἦτοι ταυτοῦ λέγοιτο ἂν μετεσχηκέναι πάντα τὰ εἶδη μέρους τοῦ γένους αὐτῶν, ἢ ἐτέρου καὶ ἐτέρου. ἀλλὰ ταυτοῦ μὲν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται διὰ τὰ προειρημένα. εἰ δὲ ἄλλου καὶ

There still remains, then, the subject of genera and 219 species, which we shall discuss more at large elsewhere,^a but here we shall deal with them concisely. If, on the one hand, they^b assert that genera and species are mental concepts, our criticisms of the "regent part" and of "presentation" refute them; whereas if they assign to them a substantiality of their own, how will they reply to this objection? If 220 the genera exist, either they are equal in number to the species or else there is one genus common to all the species which are said to belong to it. If, then, the genera are equal in number to their species, there will no longer be a common genus to be divided into the species; while if it shall be said that the genus exists as one in all its species, then each species partakes of either the whole or a part of it.^c But it certainly does not partake of the whole; for it is impossible that what is one real object should be equally included in separate things in such a way as to appear as a whole in each of those things in which it is said to exist. And if it partakes of a part, then, in the first place, all the genus will not, as they suppose, accompany the species, nor will "man" be "an animal" but a part of an animal—he will be substance, for example, but neither animate nor sensitive.^d Then, 221 in the next place, all the species will be said to partake either of the same part of their genus or of different parts; but to partake of the same part is impossible for the reasons stated above; while if they partake of "participation" by Aristotle and in the *Parmenides* of Plato.

^a *i.e.* a part of the Genus is taken as meaning a part of its definition; *cf.* § 224 for this definition of the genus "animal."

^a No such discussion is to be found in the extant works of Sextus.

^b *i.e.* the Stoics; *cf.* §§ 29 ff., 70 ff., *Adv. Log.* i. 370 ff. for the Sceptic criticisms.

^c This view is Plato's, the former Aristotle's. The following objections are like those brought against the Platonic theory

ἄλλου, οὔτε ὁμοία ἀλλήλοις ἔσται τὰ εἶδη κατὰ γένος, ὅπερ οὐ προσδέξονται, ἀπειρόν τε ἔσται γένος ἕκαστον εἰς ἀπειρα τεμνόμενον οὐ μόνον τὰ εἶδη ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον, ἐν οἷς καὶ αὐτοῖς μετὰ τῶν εἰδῶν αὐτοῦ θεωρεῖται· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἀλλὰ καὶ ζῶον ὁ Δίων εἶναι λέγεται. εἰ δὲ ταῦτα ἄτοπα, οὐδὲ κατὰ μέρος μετέσχηκε τὰ εἶδη τοῦ γένους αὐτῶν ἐνός ὄντος.

222 Εἰ δὲ μήτε ὅλου μετέσχηκεν ἕκαστον εἶδος τοῦ γένους μήτε μέρους αὐτοῦ, πῶς ἂν λέγοιτο ἐν εἶναι γένος ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς εἶδεσιν αὐτοῦ, ὥστε καὶ εἰς αὐτὰ διαιρεῖσθαι; τάχα οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι τις λέγειν μὴ οὐχὶ ἀναπλάσσαν τινὰς εἰδωλοποιήσεις, αἱ ταῖς ἐκείνων αὐτῶν ἀνεπικρίτοις διαφωνίαις κατὰ τὰς σκεπτικὰς ἐφόδους περιτραπήσονται.

223 Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κἀκεῖνο λεκτέον. τὰ εἶδη τοῖα ἢ τοῖα ἔστιν· τούτων τὰ γένη ἦτοι καὶ τοῖα καὶ τοῖα ἢ τοῖα μὲν τοῖα δὲ οὐ ἢ οὔτε τοῖα οὔτε τοῖα. οἷον ἐπεὶ τῶν τινῶν τὰ μὲν ἔστι σώματα τὰ δὲ ἀσώματα, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀληθῆ τὰ δὲ ψευδῆ, καὶ ἔνια μὲν λευκά, εἰ τύχοι, ἔνια δὲ μέλανα, καὶ ἔνια μὲν μέγιστα ἔνια δὲ σμικρότατα, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὁμοίως, τό τι λόγου ἔνεκεν, ὃ φασιν εἶναι τινες γενικώτατον,

224 ἢ πάντα ἔσται ἢ τὰ ἕτερα ἢ οὐδέν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν οὐδέν ἔστιν ὅλως τό τι, οὐδὲ τὸ γένος, πέρασ ἔχει

^a The stock name for a specimen of "Man," *cf.* i. 189, and §§ 227 ff.

^b *e.g.* the Platonic Ideas, *cf.* iii. 189.

^c The argument here is that it is impossible to conceive a number of opposite qualities, such as are possessed by the multitude of species and particulars included in the "genus," co-existing in the unity of the genus; while if they do not all co-exist in it, the "genus" ceases to be inclusive of all

of different parts, the species will be generically dissimilar one to another (which they will not admit), and each genus will be infinite because cut up into infinite sections (not into the species only but also into the particulars, since it is actually seen in these along with its species; for Dion^a is said to be an animal as well as a man). But if these consequences are absurd, then not even by way of parts do the species partake of their genus, it being a unity.

If, then, each several species partakes neither of 222 the whole genus nor of a part of it, how can it be said that the one genus exists in all its parts so as to be actually divided into them? No one, probably, could make such a statement unless by concocting some imaginary entities,^b which will be overturned, as the attacks of the Sceptics show, by the unsettled disputes of the Dogmatists themselves.

Furthermore, there is this to be said.^c The species 223 are of this kind or of that kind: the genera of these species either are of both this kind and that kind, or of this kind but not of that kind, or neither of this kind nor of that kind. When, for instance, of the "somethings" (or particulars) some are corporeal others incorporeal, and some true others false, and some (it may be) white others black, and some very large others very small, and so on with the rest, the genus "something" (to take it for the sake of argument), which some regard as the *summum genus*,^d will either be all these or some of them or none. But 224 if the "something," and the genus too, is absolutely

its proper species and particulars; and if it includes *none* of the opposites, it is wholly unrelated to its particulars, and has no claim to be termed a "genus."

^d The Stoic view, *cf.* §§ 86 f. *supra*.

ἢ ζήτησις. εἰ δὲ πάντα εἶναι ῥηθείη, πρὸς τῷ ἀδύνατον εἶναι τὸ λεγόμενον, ἕκαστον¹ τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον ἐν οἷς ἐστὶ δεήσει πάντα εἶναι. ὡς γάρ, ἐπεὶ τὸ ζῶον, ὡς φασίν, οὐσία ἐστὶν ἔμφυχος αἰσθητική, ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐσία εἶναι λέγεται καὶ ἔμφυχος καὶ αἰσθητική, οὕτως εἰ τὸ γένος καὶ σῶμά ἐστι καὶ ἀσώματον καὶ ψευδές καὶ ἀληθές καὶ μέλαν, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ λευκόν καὶ μικρότατον καὶ μέγιστον καὶ τὰλλα πάντα, ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον πάντα ἔσται· ὅπερ οὐ θεωρεῖται. ψεῦδος οὖν καὶ 225 τοῦτο. εἰ δὲ τὰ ἕτερα μόνα ἐστὶ, τούτων τὸ γένος τῶν λοιπῶν οὐκ ἔσται γένος, οἷον εἰ σῶμα τό τι, τῶν ἀσωμάτων, καὶ εἰ λογικόν τὸ ζῶον, τῶν ἀλόγων, ὡς μήτε ἀσώματον τί εἶναι μήτε ἀλογον ζῶον,² καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. οὐκοῦν οὔτε καὶ τοῖον καὶ τοῖον τὸ γένος, οὔτε τοῖον μὲν τοῖον δὲ οὔ, οὔτε μὴν οὔτε τοῖον οὔτε τοῖον δύναται εἶναι [γένος]· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐδὲ ἔστιν ὅλως τὸ γένος.

Εἰ δὲ λέγοι τις ὅτι δυνάμει πάντα ἐστὶ τὸ γένος, λέξομεν ὡς τὸ δυνάμει τι ὄν δεῖ τι καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ εἶναι, οἷον οὐ δύναται τις γραμματικὸς εἶναι εἰ μὴ καὶ³ ἐνεργείᾳ. καὶ τὸ γένος οὖν εἰ δυνάμει πάντα ἐστίν, ἐρωτῶμεν αὐτοὺς τί ἐστὶν ἐνεργείᾳ, καὶ

¹ ἕκαστον cj. Bekk.: καὶ mss.

² ζῶον post εἶναι mss., edd., transp. Papp.

³ εἰ μὴ καὶ T: μὴ τις mss., ὦν add. Bekk.

* Aristotle regarded the relation of Genus to Species as that of Potentiality to Actuality, i.e. of unrealized possibility

none of them, the inquiry comes to an end. And if we should say that it is all of them, then, besides the impossibility of such a statement, each of the species and of the particulars wherein it exists will have to be all. For just as when the genus "animal" is, as they assert, "an animate sensitive substance," each of its species is said to be substance and animate and sensitive, so likewise if the genus is both corporeal and incorporeal and false and true and black, it may be, and white and very small and very large, and all the rest, each of the species and of the particulars will be all these—which is contrary to observation. So this too is false. But if the genus is some of them 225 only, the genus of these will not be the genus of the rest; if, for instance, the genus "something" is corporeal it will not be that of the incorporeal, and if the genus "animal" is rational it will not be that of the irrational, so that there is neither an incorporeal "something" nor an irrational animal, and so likewise with all other cases; and this is absurd. Therefore the genus cannot be either of both this and that kind, or of this kind but not of that, or of neither this kind nor that; and if this be so, neither does the genus exist at all.

And if one should say that the genus is potentially all things,^a we shall reply that what is potentially something must also be actually something, as, for instance, no one can be potentially literary without being so actually. So too, if the genus is potentially all things, what, we ask them, is it actually? And to what is real and determinate, or of the germinal to the fully evolved. As the "actuality" of the oak is implicit in the "potency" of the acorn, so the plurality of "actual" particulars are implicit in the "potency" of the unitary "genus."

οὕτω μένουσιν αἱ αὐταὶ ἀπορίαι. τὰναντία μὲν
 226 γὰρ πάντα ἐνεργεῖα εἶναι οὐ δύναται. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ
 τὰ μὲν καὶ ἐνεργεῖα τὰ δὲ δυνάμει μόνον, οἷον σῶμα
 μὲν ἐνεργεῖα, δυνάμει δὲ ἀσώματον. δυνάμει γὰρ
 ἔστιν ὁ οἶόν τέ ἐστιν ἐνεργεῖα ὑποστηῆναι, τὸ δὲ
 σῶμα ἐνεργεῖα ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ἀσώματον γενέσθαι
 κατ' ἐνεργεῖαν, ὥστε εἰ <τό τι>¹ λόγου χάριν σῶμά
 ἐστιν ἐνεργεῖα, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀσώματον δυνάμει, καὶ
 τὸ ἀνάπαλιν. οὐκοῦν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὸ γένος τὰ
 μὲν ἐνεργεῖα εἶναι τὰ δὲ δυνάμει μόνον. εἰ δὲ
 οὐδὲν ὅλως ἐστὶν ἐνεργεῖα, οὐδὲ ὑφέστηκεν.
 οὐκοῦν οὐδὲν ἐστὶ τὸ γένος, ὃ διαιρεῖν εἰς τὰ εἶδη
 λέγουσιν.

227 Ἐπι καὶ τοῦτο θεάσασθαι ἄξιον. ὥσπερ γὰρ
 ἐπεὶ ὁ αὐτός ἐστιν Ἀλέξανδρος καὶ Πάρις, οὐκ
 ἐνδέχεται τὸ μὲν "Ἀλέξανδρος περιπατεῖ" ἀληθές
 εἶναι, τὸ δὲ "Πάρις περιπατεῖ" ψεῦδος, οὕτως
 εἰ τὸ αὐτό ἐστὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπων² εἶναι Θέωνος καὶ
 Δίωνος, εἰς σύνταξιν ἀξιώματος ἀγομένη ἢ ἀνθρω-
 πος προσηγορία ἢ ἀληθές ἢ ψεῦδος ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρων
 ποιήσει τὸ ἀξίωμα. οὐ θεωρεῖται δὲ τοῦτο· τοῦ
 μὲν γὰρ Δίωνος καθημένου Θέωνος δὲ περιπα-
 τοῦντος τὸ "ἄνθρωπος περιπατεῖ" ἐφ' οὗ μὲν
 λεγόμενον ἀληθές ἐστὶν ἐφ' οὗ δὲ ψεῦδος. οὐκ ἄρα
 κοινή ἐστὶν ἀμφοτέρων ἢ ἀνθρωπος προσηγορία,
 καὶ ἢ αὐτὴ ἀμφοῖν, ἀλλ' εἰ ἄρα, ἰδία ἑκατέρου.

¹ <τό τι> add. Heintz.

² τὸ ἀνθρώπων cj. R. Philippson: τὸ ἀνθρώπων T, cj. Papp.:
 τῷ ἀνθρώπων MSS., Bekk.

thus we find that the same difficulties remain. For
 it cannot actually be all the contraries; nor yet can 226
 it be some of them actually and some only potentially
 —corporeal, for instance, actually and incorporeal
 potentially. For it is potentially that which it is
 capable of really being actually, but that which is
 actually corporeal is incapable of becoming incor-
 poreal in actuality, so that if, for example, the genus
 "something" is actually corporeal it is not potenti-
 ally incorporeal, and *vice versa*. It is impossible,
 therefore, for the genus to be some things actually
 and some only potentially. But if it is absolutely
 nothing actually, it has no substantial existence.
 Hence the genus, which they say they divide into
 the species, is nothing.

And further, here is another point worthy of notice. 227
 Just as, because Alexander and Paris^a are identical,
 it is impossible that the statement "Alexander walks"
 should be true when "Paris walks" is false, so also if
 "manhood" is identical for both Theon and Dion,
 the term "man" when introduced as an element in
 a judgement will cause the judgement to be equally
 true or false in the case of both. But this is not what
 we find; for when Dion is sitting and Theon walking,
 the judgement "man walks" is true when used of
 the one, but false of the other. Therefore the term^b
 "man" is not common to them both and the same
 for both but, if applicable at all, it is peculiar to one
 of the two.

^a Two names of the son of Priam who carried off Helen
 to Troy.

^b "Term," i.e. (in Stoic usage) "common noun or
 appellative" (Diog. Laert. vii. 58).

ΚΑ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΚΟΙΝΩΝ ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΤΩΝ

228 Παραπλήσια δὲ λέγεται καὶ περὶ τῶν κοινῶν συμβεβηκότων. εἰ γὰρ ἐν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ συμβέβηκε Δίῳ τε καὶ Θέῳ τὸ ὄραν, ἔαν καθ' ὑπόθεσιν φθαρῆ μὲν Δίῳ, Θέῳ δὲ περὶ καὶ ὄρα, ἦτοι τὴν ὄρασιν τοῦ ἐφθαρμένου Δίῳνος ἄφθαρτον μένειν ἐροῦσιν, ὅπερ ἀπεμφαίνει, ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν ὄρασιν ἐφθάρθαι τε καὶ μὴ ἐφθάρθαι λέξουσιν, ὅπερ ἄτοπον· οὐκ ἄρα ἢ Θέῳνος ὄρασις ἢ αὐτὴ ἐστὶ τῇ Δίῳνος, ἀλλ' εἰ ἄρα, ἰδίᾳ ἑκατέρου. καὶ γὰρ εἰ ταῦτὸν συμβέβηκε Δίῳ τε καὶ Θέῳ τὸ ἀναπνεῖν, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὴν ἐν Θέῳ ἀναπνοὴν εἶναι, τὴν ἐν Δίῳ δὲ μὴ εἶναι· ἐνδέχεται δὲ τοῦ μὲν φθαρέντος τοῦ δὲ περιόντος· οὐκ ἄρα ἢ αὐτὴ ἐστὶν.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον νῦν ἀρκέσει συντόμως λελέχθαι.

ΚΒ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΣΟΦΙΣΜΑΤΩΝ

229 Οὐκ ἄτοπον δὲ ἴσως καὶ τῷ περὶ τῶν σοφισμάτων ἐπιστῆσαι λόγῳ διὰ βραχέων, ἐπεὶ καὶ εἰς τὴν τούτων διάλυσιν ἀναγκαίαν εἶναι λέγουσι τὴν διαλεκτικὴν οἱ σεμνύνοντες αὐτήν. εἰ γὰρ τῶν τε ἀληθῶν καὶ ψευδῶν λόγων, φασίν, ἐστὶν αὕτη διαγνωστικὴ, ψευδεῖς δὲ λόγοι καὶ τὰ σοφίσματα, καὶ τούτων ἂν εἴη διακριτικὴ λυμαινομένων τὴν ἀλήθειαν φαινομένην πιθανότησιν. ὅθεν ὡς βοηθοῦντες οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ σαλεύοντι τῷ βίῳ καὶ τὴν ἔνοιαν καὶ τὰς διαφορὰς καὶ τὰς ἐπιλύσεις διὰ τῶν

* The Stoics; cf. § 94 *supra* for the definition of Dialectic.

CHAPTER XXI.—CONCERNING COMMON PROPERTIES

Similar arguments apply also to the "common 228 properties." For if vision is one and the same property in Dion and in Theon, then, suppose that Dion should perish and Theon survive and retain his sight, either they will assert that the vision of the perished Dion remains unperished, which is incredible, or they will declare that the same vision has both perished and not perished, which is absurd; therefore the vision of Theon is not identical with Dion's but, if anything, the vision of each is peculiar to himself. And if breathing is an identical property in Dion and Theon, it is impossible that breathing should exist in Theon and not exist in Dion; but this is possible when the one has perished and the other survives; therefore it is not identical.

However, as regards this subject, this concise statement will be sufficient for the present.

CHAPTER XXII.—CONCERNING SOPHISMS

It will not, perhaps, be amiss to give our attention 229 for a moment to the subject of Sophisms, seeing that those who glorify Dialectic^a declare that it is indispensable for exposing sophisms. For, they say, if Dialectic is capable of distinguishing true and false arguments, and sophisms are false arguments, it will also be capable of discerning these, which distort the truth by apparent plausibilities. Hence the dialecticians, by way of assisting life^b when it totters, strive earnestly to teach us the conception of sophisms, their

^b *i.e.* the views and conduct of ordinary people, cf. i. 23, 165.

σοφισμάτων μετὰ σπουδῆς ἡμᾶς πειρῶνται διδάσκειν, λέγοντες σόφισμα εἶναι λόγον πιθανὸν καὶ δεδολιευμένον ὥστε προσδέξασθαι τὴν ἐπιφορὰν ἥτοι ψευδῆ ἢ ὠμοιωμένην ψευδεῖ ἢ ἀδηλον ἢ ἄλλως ἀπρόσδεκτον, οἷον ψευδῆ μὲν ὡς ἐπὶ τούτου
 230 τοῦ σοφίσματος ἔχει “οὐδεὶς δίδωσι κατηγορήμα πεινῶν· κατηγορήμα δέ ἐστι τὸ ἀψίνθιον πεινῶν· οὐδεὶς ἄρα δίδωσιν ἀψίνθιον πεινῶν,” ἔτι δὲ ὅμοιον ψευδεῖ ὡς ἐπὶ τούτου “ὁ μήτε ἐνεδέχεται μήτε ἐνδέχεται, τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν ἄτοπον· οὔτε δὲ ἐνδέχεται οὔτε ἐνδέχεται τὸ ὁ ἰατρός, καθὼ ἰατρός ἐστι, φονεῦει <οὐκ ἄρα ἄτοπὸν ἐστι τὸ ὁ ἰατρός, καθὼ
 231 ἰατρός ἐστι, φονεῦει>.” ἔτι δὲ ἀδηλον οὕτως “οὐχὶ καὶ ἠρώτηκά τί σε πρῶτον, καὶ οὐχὶ οἱ ἀστέρες ἄρτιοὶ εἰσιν· ἠρώτηκα δὲ τί σε πρῶτον· οἱ ἄρα ἀστέρες ἄρτιοὶ εἰσιν.” ἔτι δὲ ἀπρόσδεκτον ἄλλως, ὡς οἱ λεγόμενοι σολοικίζοντες λόγοι, οἷον “ὁ βλέπεις, ἔστιν· βλέπεις δὲ φρενιτικόν· ἔστιν ἄρα φρενιτικόν.” “ὁ ὄρας, ἔστιν· ὄρας δὲ φλεγμαίνοντα τόπον· ἔστιν ἄρα φλεγμαίνοντα τόπον.”
 232 Εἶτα μέντοι καὶ τὰς ἐπιλύσεις αὐτῶν [δῶρᾶν ἥτοι] παριστᾶν ἐπιχειροῦσι, λέγοντες ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ πρώτου σοφίσματος ὅτι ἄλλο διὰ τῶν λημμάτων συγκεχώρηται καὶ ἄλλο ἐπενήρεται. συγκεχώρηται γὰρ τὸ μὴ πίνεσθαι κατηγορήμα, καὶ εἶναι κατηγορήμα τὸ ἀψίνθιον πίνειν, οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ ἀψίνθιον. διὸ δέον ἐπιφέρειν “οὐδεὶς ἄρα πίνει τὸ ἀψίνθιον

¹ <οὐκ . . . φονεῦει> add. cj. Bekk.

^a Or “meaningless.” The Stoics held that every “judgment” or “proposition” (ἀξιωμα) was significant; so the

differences and their solutions. They declare that a sophism is “a plausible argument cunningly framed to induce acceptance of the inference, it being either false or resembling what is false or non-evident or otherwise unacceptable.” It is false, for example, 230 in the case of the sophism “Nobody offers one a predicate to drink; but ‘to drink absinth’ is a predicate; nobody therefore offers one absinth to drink.” Or again, it may resemble the false, as in this case—“What neither was nor is possible is not absurd^a; but it neither was nor is possible for a doctor, *qua* doctor, to murder; therefore it is not absurd that a doctor, *qua* doctor, should murder.” Or again, it 231 may be non-evident, as thus—“It is not true both that I have asked you a question first and that the stars are not even in number; but I have asked you a question first; therefore the stars are even.” Or again, it may be otherwise unacceptable, like the so-called solecistic^b arguments, such as—“That at which you look exists; but you have a frenzied look; therefore ‘frenzied’ exists”; or “What you gaze at exists; but you gaze at an inflamed spot; therefore ‘at an inflamed spot’ exists.”

Moreover, they attempt also to set forth solutions 232 of the sophisms, saying in the case of the first sophism that one thing is established by the premisses and another inferred in the conclusion. For it is established that a predicate is not drunk and that “to drink absinth” is a predicate, but not “absinth” by itself. Hence, whereas one ought to infer “Nobody proposition “this is not possible” is not ἄτοπον, in this sense of the word.

^b *i.e.* ungrammatical, involving the use of an adjective for a noun, the accusative for the nominative case (as here τόπον for τόπος), and the like. Cf. Aristot. *Soph. El.* cc. 14, 32.

πίνειν," ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀληθές, ἐπενήνεκται " οὐδεὶς
 233 ἄρα ἀψίνθιον πίνει," ὅπερ ἐστὶ ψεῦδος, οὐ συναγόμενον
 ἐκ τῶν συγκεχωρημένων λημμάτων. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ δευτέρου ὅτι δοκεῖ μὲν ἐπὶ ψεῦδος ἀπάγειν
 ὡς ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀνεπιστάτους ὀκνεῖν αὐτῷ συγκατατίθεσθαι, συνάγει δὲ ἀληθές, τὸ " οὐκ ἄρα
 ἄτοπὸν ἐστὶ τὸ ὁ ἰατρός, καθὸ ἰατρός ἐστὶ, φονεύει." οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀξίωμα ἄτοπὸν ἐστίν, ἀξίωμα
 δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ " ὁ ἰατρός, καθὸ ἰατρός ἐστὶ, φονεύει".
 234 διὸ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἄτοπον. ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄδηλον ἀπαγωγὴ
 φασιν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ γένους τῶν μεταπιπτόντων ἐστίν.
 μηδενὸς γὰρ προηρωτημένου κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τὸ
 ἀποφατικὸν τῆς συμπλοκῆς ἀληθές γίνεται, ψευδοῦς
 τῆς συμπλοκῆς οὔσης παρὰ τὸ ἐμπεπλέχθαι
 ψεῦδος τὸ " ἠρώτηκά τί σε πρῶτον" ἐν αὐτῇ.
 μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἐρωτηθῆναι τὸ ἀποφατικὸν τῆς
 συμπλοκῆς, τῆς προσλήψεως ἀληθοῦς γινόμενης,
 " ἠρώτηκα δέ τί σε πρῶτον," διὰ τὸ ἠρωτηθῆσθαι
 πρὸ τῆς προσλήψεως τὸ ἀποφατικὸν τῆς
 συμπλοκῆς ἢ τοῦ ἀποφατικοῦ τῆς συμπλοκῆς πρότασις
 γίνεται ψευδῆς τοῦ ἐν τῷ συμπεπλεγμένῳ ψεῦδους
 γενομένου ἀληθοῦς· ὡς μηδέποτε δύνασθαι συναχθῆναι
 τὸ συμπέρασμα μὴ συνυπάρχοντος τοῦ
 235 ἀποφατικοῦ τῆς συμπλοκῆς τῇ προσλήψει. τοὺς δὲ
 τελευταίους, φασὶν ἔνιοι,¹ τοὺς σολοικίζοντας λόγους
 ἀτόπως ἐπάγεσθαι² παρὰ τὴν συνήθειαν.

Τοιαῦτα μὲν οὖν τινὲς διαλεκτικοὶ φασὶ περὶ σοφισμάτων
 (καὶ γὰρ ἄλλοι ἄλλα λέγουσιν)· ταῦτα

¹ ἔνιοι MT: ἐνθα L, Bekk.

² ἐπάγεσθαι T: ἐπάγειν mss., Bekk.

^a i.e. meaningless—a Stoic dictum.

^b i.e. the third Sophism, in § 231.

therefore drinks the 'to drink absinth,' which is true, the inference drawn is "Nobody therefore drinks absinth," which is false, as not deduced from the established premisses. And as regards the 233 second sophism, they explain that while it seems to lead in a false direction, so that it makes the inattentive hesitate in assenting to it, its conclusion is true, namely "It is not therefore absurd that the doctor, *qua* doctor, should murder." For no judgement is absurd,^a and "the doctor, *qua* doctor, murders" is a judgement, so that neither is it absurd. And 234 the method of leading up to the non-evident^b deals, they say, with the class of things that are variable.^c For when, according to the assumption, no previous question has been asked, the negation of the conjunctive premiss is true, the conjunctive or major premiss being false because of its inclusion of the false clause "I have asked you a question first." But after the negation of the major has been asked, as the minor premiss "I have asked you a question first" has become true, owing to the fact that the negation of the major has been asked before the minor premiss, the first clause in the negation of the major becomes false while the false clause in the major has become true; so that it is never possible for the conclusion to be deduced if the negation of the major premiss does not co-exist with the minor premiss. And as 235 to the last class—the solecistic arguments—some declare that they are introduced absurdly, contrary to linguistic usage.

Such are the statements made by some of the Dialecticians concerning sophisms—though others

^c i.e. judgements which change from truth to falsehood; cf. Diog. Laert. vii. 76.

δὲ τὰς μὲν τῶν εἰκαιωτέρων ἀκοὰς ἴσως δύναται γαργαλίξειν, περιττὰ δὲ ἐστὶ καὶ μάτην αὐτοῖς πεπονημένα. καὶ τοῦτο δυνατόν μὲν ἴσως καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἡδὴ λελεγμένων ἡμῖν ὄραν· ὑπεμνήσαμεν γὰρ ὅτι μὴ δύναται τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος κατὰ τοὺς διαλεκτικούς καταλαμβάνεσθαι, ποικίλως τε ἄλλως καὶ τῷ τὰ μαρτύρια τῆς συλλογιστικῆς δυνάμεως αὐτῶν, τὴν ἀπόδειξιν καὶ τοὺς ἀναποδείκτους δια-
 236 τρέπεσθαι λόγους. εἰς δὲ τὸν προκείμενον τόπον ἰδίως καὶ ἄλλα μὲν πολλὰ λέγειν ἔνεστιν, ὡς δὲ ἐν συντόμῳ νῦν τόδε λεκτέον.

“Ὅσα μὲν σοφίσματα ἰδίως ἢ διαλεκτικῆ δύνασθαι δοκεῖ διελέγειν, τούτων ἢ διάλυσις ἀχρηστός ἐστίν· ὅσων δὲ ἢ διάλυσις χρησιμεύει, ταῦτα ὁ μὲν διαλεκτικός οὐκ ἂν διαλύσειεν, οἱ δὲ ἐν ἐκάστη τέχνῃ τὴν ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων παρακολούθησιν
 237 ἐσχηκότες. εὐθέως γοῦν, ἵνα ἐνὸς ἢ δευτέρου μνησθῶμεν παραδείγματος, ἐρωτηθέντος ἱατρῶ τοιοῦτου σοφίσματος “κατὰ τὰς νόσους ἐν ταῖς παρακμαῖς τὴν τε ποικίλην δίαιταν καὶ τὸν οἶνον δοκιμαστέον· ἐπὶ πάσης δὲ τυπώσεως νόσου πρὸ τῆς πρώτης διατρίτου πάντως γίνεται παρακμὴ ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα πρὸ τῆς πρώτης διατρίτου τὴν τε ποικίλην δίαιταν καὶ τὸν οἶνον ὡς τὸ πολὺ παραλαμβάνει” ὁ μὲν διαλεκτικός οὐδὲν ἂν εἰπεῖν ἔχει πρὸς διάλυσιν τοῦ λόγου, καίτοι χρησίμην οὔσαν,
 238 ὁ δὲ ἱατρός διαλύσεται τὸ σόφισμα, εἰδὼς ὅτι παρακμὴ λέγεται διχῶς ἢ τε τοῦ ὄλου νοσήματος καὶ ἢ ἐκάστης ἐπιτάσεως μερικῆς ἀπὸ τῆς ἀκμῆς

^a Cf. §§ 80 ff. *supra*.

^b Cf. §§ 144 ff., 156 ff.

^c The “Methodic” School of medicine held that the progress of a disease was marked by three-day periods of increas-

indeed make other statements; and what they say may be able, perhaps, to tickle the ears of the casual hearer, superfluous though it is and the result of vain labour on their part. Probably this can be seen from what we have said already ^a; for we have shown that truth and falsehood, according to the Dialecticians, cannot be apprehended, and that by a variety of arguments as well as by the refutation of their evidences for the validity of the syllogism, namely proof and axiomatic arguments.^b And there are 236 many other special objections bearing on the topic before us which we might mention, but now, for brevity's sake, we mention only this one.

As regards all the sophisms which dialectic seems peculiarly able to expose, their exposure is useless; whereas in all cases where the exposure is useful, it is not the dialectician who will expose them but the experts in each particular art who grasp the connexion of the facts. Thus, for instance, to mention 237 one or two examples, if a sophism such as this were propounded—“In diseases, at the stages of abatement, a varied diet and wine are to be approved; but in every type of disease an abatement inevitably occurs before the first third day^c; it is necessary, therefore, to take for the most part a varied diet and wine before the first third day,”—in this case the dialectician would be unable to assist in exposing the argument, useful though the exposure would be, but the doctor will expose the sophism, since he 238 knows that the term “abatement” is used in two senses, of the general “abatement” in the disease and of the tendency to betterment after the crisis in

ing (up to the crisis) or decreasing severity; for the former they prescribed a light diet.

ρόπή πρὸς τὸ κρείσσον, καὶ πρὸ μὲν τῆς πρώτης διατρίτου ὡς τὸ πολὺ γίνεται παρακμὴ ἢ τῆς ἐπιτάσεως τῆς μερικῆς, τὴν δὲ ποικίλην δίαιταν οὐκ ἐν ταύτῃ δοκιμάζομεν ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ παρακμῇ τοῦ ὄλου νοσήματος. ὅθεν καὶ διηρηθῆσθαι λέξει τὰ λήμματα τοῦ λόγου, ἐτέρας μὲν παρακμῆς ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ λήμματι λαμβανομένης, τουτέστι τῆς τοῦ ὄλου πάθους, ἐτέρας δὲ ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ, τουτέστι τῆς μερικῆς.

239 Πάλιν τε ἐπὶ τινος πυρέσσοντος κατὰ πύκνωσιν ἐπιτεταμένην ἐρωτηθέντος τοῦ τοιοῦτου λόγου “ τὰ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων ἰάματά ἐστιν ἐναντίον δὲ τῇ ὑποκειμένη πυρώσει τὸ ψυχρόν· κατάλληλον ἄρα τῇ ὑποκειμένη πυρώσει τὸ ψυχρόν ” ὁ μὲν
240 διαλεκτικὸς ἡσυχάσει, ὁ δὲ ἰατρὸς εἰδὼς τίνα μὲν ἐστὶν προηγουμένως προσεχῆ πάθη, τίνα δὲ συμπτώματα τούτων, ἐρεῖ μὴ ἐπὶ τῶν συμπτωμάτων προκόπτει τὸν λόγον (ἀμέλει γοῦν πρὸς τὴν ἐπίχυσιν τοῦ ψυχροῦ πλείονα γίνεσθαι συμβαίνειν τὴν πύρωσιν) ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῶν προσεχῶν παθῶν, καὶ τὴν μὲν στέγνωσιν εἶναι προσεχῆ, ἣτις οὐ τὴν πύκνωσιν ἀλλὰ τὸν χαλαστικὸν τρόπον τῆς ἐπιμελείας ἀπαιτεῖ, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἐπακολουθούσης θερμοσίας οὐ προηγουμένως προσεχές, ὅθεν μὴδὲ τὸ κατάλληλον εἶναι δοκοῦν αὐτῇ.

241 Καὶ οὕτως μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς σοφίσμασι τοῖς χρησίμως ἀπαιτοῦσι τὴν διάλυσιν οὐδὲν ἕξει λέγειν ὁ διαλεκ-

* Cf. Hippocrates, *De flat.* 2; for morbid “contraction” counteracted by “dilatation” or “relaxation” cf. i. 238.

the strained local conditions, and this improvement in the local strain generally occurs before the first third day, but it is not for this but for the general abatement in the disease that we recommend the varied diet. Consequently he will say that the premisses are discordant, since one kind of “abatement” is adopted in the first premiss, namely that of the general condition, and another—that of the local condition—in the second premiss.

Again, in the case of one who suffers from fever 239 due to aggravated “contraction” or obstruction, if an argument is propounded in the form—“Opposites are cures of opposites^a; cold is the opposite of the present feverish condition; therefore cold is the treatment which corresponds to the present feverish condition,”—here again the dialectician will keep silence, but the doctor, since he knows what morbid 240 states are fundamentally persistent and what are symptoms of such states, will declare that the argument does not apply to the symptoms (not to mention the fact that the result of the application of cold is to aggravate the feverish condition) but to the persistent morbid states, and that the constipation is persistent but requires an expansive method of treatment rather than contraction, whereas the resultant symptom of inflammation is not fundamentally persistent, nor (consequently) is the state of cold which seems to correspond thereto.

Thus, as regards sophisms the exposure of which 241 is useful, the dialectician will not have a word to say,

By “corresponding” is meant the appropriate “counteracting” remedy. The “persistent” or “deep-seated” (προσεχῆ) morbid states are distinguished from the superficial “symptoms” which the Methodic School disregarded as accidentals.

τικός, ἐρωτήσας δὲ ἡμῶν τοιούτους λόγους “ εἰ οὐχὶ καὶ καλὰ κέρατα ἔχεις καὶ κέρατα ἔχεις, κέρατα ἔχεις· οὐχὶ δὲ καλὰ κέρατα ἔχεις καὶ κέρατα 242 ἔχεις· κέρατα ἄρα ἔχεις.” “ εἰ κινεῖται τι, ἥτοι ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπω κινεῖται, ἢ ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἔστιν· οὔτε δὲ ἐν ᾧ ἔστιν, μένει γάρ, οὔτε ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν· πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἐνεργοίη τι ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἐν ᾧ μηδὲ τὴν 243 ἀρχὴν ἔστιν; οὐκ ἄρα κινεῖται τι.” “ ἥτοι τὸ ὄν γίνεται ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν. τὸ μὲν ὄν ὄν οὐ γίνεται, ἔστι γάρ· ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τὸ μὴ ὄν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ γινόμενον πάσχει τι, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν οὐ πάσχει. οὐδὲν 244 ἄρα γίνεται.” “ ἡ χιών ὕδωρ ἐστὶ πεπηγός· μέλαν δὲ τὸ ὕδωρ ἐστίν· μέλαινα ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ χιών.”

Καὶ τοιούτους τινὰς ἀθροίσας ὕθλους συνάγει τὰς ὀφρῦς, καὶ προχειρίζεται τὴν διαλεκτικὴν, καὶ πάνυ σεμνῶς ἐπιχειρεῖ κατασκευάζειν ἡμῶν δι’ ἀποδείξεων συλλογιστικῶν ὅτι γίνεται τι καὶ ὅτι κινεῖται τι καὶ ὅτι ἡ χιών ἐστὶ λευκὴ καὶ ὅτι κέρατα οὐκ ἔχομεν, καίτοι γε ἀρκούντος ἴσως τοῦ τὴν ἐνάργειαν αὐτοῖς ἀντιτιθέναι πρὸς τὸ θραύεσθαι τὴν διαβεβαιωτικὴν θέσιν αὐτῶν διὰ τῆς ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων ἰσοσθενούς αὐτῶν ἀντιμαρτυρήσεως. ταῦτά τοι καὶ ἐρωτηθεὶς φιλόσοφος τὸν κατὰ τῆς κινήσεως λόγον σιωπῶν περιπάτησεν, καὶ οἱ κατὰ τὸν βίον ἄνθρωποι πεζὰς τε καὶ διαποντίους στέλλονται πορείας κατασκευάζουσί τε ναῦς καὶ οἰκίας

° The *ceratinē* or “Horn-fallacy” (invented by the Megarics, cf. Diog. Laert. ii. 111, vi. 39) is generally put in a simpler form—“If you have not lost anything, you have it; you have not lost horns, therefore you have horns” (a joke aimed at cuckolds, thinks Fabricius). Sextus’s complex syllogism seems much more clumsy (if the text is right).

but he will propound for us arguments such as these “ —“ If it is not so that you both have fair horns and have horns, you have horns; but it is not so that you have fair horns and have horns; therefore you have horns.” “ If a thing moves, it moves either in 242 the spot where it is or where it is not; but it moves neither in the spot where it is (for it is at rest) nor in that where it is not (for how could a thing be active in a spot where it does not so much as exist?); therefore nothing moves.”^b “ Either the existent 243 becomes or the non-existent; now the existent does not become (for it exists); nor yet does the non-existent (for the becoming is passive but the non-existent is not passive); therefore nothing becomes.”^c “ Snow is frozen water; but water is black; there- 244 fore snow is black.”^d

And when he has made a collection of such trash he draws his eyebrows together, and expounds Dialectic and endeavours very solemnly to establish for us by syllogistic proofs that a thing becomes, a thing moves, snow is white, and we do not have horns, although it is probably sufficient to confront the trash with the plain fact in order to smash up their positive affirmation by means of the equipollent contradictory evidence derived from appearances. Thus, in fact, a certain philosopher,^e when the argument against motion was put to him, without a word started to walk about; and people who follow the usual way of life proceed on journeys by land and sea and

^b Cf. § 245, iii. 7, and *Adv. Gramm.* 311, where this argument is ascribed to Diodorus the Megaric.

^c In *Adv. Log.* i. 71 this argument is ascribed to Gorgias.

^d Anaxagoras held this notion about snow, cf. i. 33.

^e Diogenes the Cynic (Diog. Laert. vi. 39); see iii. 66. Cf. Boswell’s story of how Dr. Johnson refuted Berkeley.

καὶ παιδοποιοῦνται τῶν κατὰ τῆς κινήσεως καὶ
 245 γενέσεως ἀμελοῦντες λόγων. φέρεται δὲ καὶ
 Ἡροφίλου τοῦ ἱατροῦ χαρίεν ἀπομνημόνευμα·
 συνεχρόνισε γὰρ οὗτος Διοδώρῳ, ὃς ἐναπειροκαλῶν
 τῇ διαλεκτικῇ λόγους διεξῆει σοφιστικούς κατὰ
 τε ἄλλων πολλῶν καὶ τῆς κινήσεως. ὡς οὖν ἐκ-
 βαλὼν ποτε ὤμον ὁ Διδώωρος ἤκε θεραπευθισόμενος
 ὡς τὸν Ἡρόφιλον, ἐχαριεντίσατο ἐκεῖνος πρὸς
 αὐτὸν λέγων “ ἦτοι ἐν ᾧ ἦν τόπω ὁ ὤμος ἂν ἐκ-
 πέπτωκεν, ἢ ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἦν· οὔτε δὲ ἐν ᾧ ἦν οὔτε
 ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἦν· οὐκ ἄρα ἐκπέπτωκεν,” ὡς τὸν σοφι-
 στήν λιπαρεῖν ἔαν μὲν τοὺς τοιοῦτους λόγους, τὴν
 δὲ ἐξ ἱατρικῆς ἀρμόζουσαν αὐτῷ προσάγειν θερα-
 246 πείαν. ἀρκεῖ γάρ, οἶμαι, τὸ ἐμπείρως τε καὶ ἀδο-
 ξάστως κατὰ τὰς κοινὰς τηρήσεις τε καὶ προλήψεις
 βιοῦν, περὶ τῶν ἐκ δογματικῆς περιεργίας καὶ
 μάλιστα ἔξω τῆς βιωτικῆς χρείας λεγομένων
 ἐπέχοντας. εἰ οὖν ὅσα μὲν εὐχρήστως ἂν ἐπιλυθεῖη,
 ταῦτα οὐκ ἂν διαλύσαιτο ἢ διαλεκτικῇ, ὅσα δὲ
 ἐπιλύεσθαι δοίη τις ἂν ἴσως ὑπ’ αὐτῆς σοφίσματα,
 τούτων ἢ διάλυσις ἄχρηστος ἐστίν, ἄχρηστος ἐστὶ
 κατὰ τὴν ἐπίλυσιν τῶν σοφισμάτων ἢ διαλεκτικῇ.
 247 Καὶ ἀπ’ αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν παρὰ τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς
 λεγομένων ὀρμώμενός τις οὕτως ἂν συντόμως
 ὑπομνήσειε περιττὰ εἶναι τὰ περὶ τῶν σοφισμάτων
 παρ’ αὐτοῖς δὴ τεχνολογούμενα. ἐπὶ τὴν τέχνην
 τὴν διαλεκτικὴν φασὶν ὠρμηκέναι οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ
 οὐχ ἀπλῶς ὑπὲρ τοῦ γινῶναι τί ἐκ τίνος συνάγεται,

^a A famous anatomist of Cos, circa 300 B.C. For Diodorus Cronos cf. i. 234.

^b This refers back to the end of § 244, § 245 being parenthetical.

build ships and houses and beget children without pay-
 ing any attention to the arguments against motion
 and becoming. And we are told of an amusing retort 245
 made by the physician Herophilus^a: he was a con-
 temporary of Diodorus who, being given to juggling 245
 with dialectic, used to promulgate sophistical argu-
 ments against motion as well as many other things.
 So when Diodorus had dislocated his shoulder he
 came to Herophilus to get treated, and the latter
 jestingly said to him—“ Your shoulder has been put
 out either in the place where it was or where it was
 not; but it was put out neither where it was nor
 where it was not; therefore it has not been put
 out ”; so that the Sophist begged him to leave such
 arguments alone and apply the treatment prescribed
 by medical art as suitable to his case. For ^b it is, I 246
 think, sufficient to conduct one’s life empirically and
 undogmatically in accordance with the rules and
 beliefs that are commonly accepted, suspending judge-
 ment regarding the statements derived from dogmatic
 subtlety and furthest removed from the usage of
 life.^c If, then, dialectic would fail to expose any of
 the sophisms which might usefully be exposed, while
 the exposure of all the sophisms which we might
 perhaps grant it capable of exposing is useless,
 then in respect of the exposure of sophisms dialectic
 is useless.

Starting even from the actual statements made by 247
 the dialecticians one might show concisely in this wise
 that their technical arguments about sophisms are
 superfluous. The dialecticians assert that they have
 resorted to the art of dialectic not simply for the sake
 of ascertaining what is deduced from what but chiefly

^c The traditional Sceptic attitude, cf. i. 15, 23 ff., etc.

ἀλλὰ προηγουμένως ὑπὲρ τοῦ δι' ἀποδεικτικῶν λόγων τὰ ἀληθῆ καὶ τὰ ψευδῆ κρίνειν ἐπίστασθαι· λέγουσι γοῦν εἶναι τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀλη-
 248 θῶν καὶ ψευδῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν αὐτοὶ φασὶν ἀληθῆ λόγον εἶναι τὸν δι' ἀληθῶν λημμάτων ἀληθῆς συνάγοντα συμπέρασμα, ἅμα τῷ ἐρωτηθῆναι λόγον ψεῦδος ἔχοντα τὸ συμπέρασμα εἰσόμεθα ὅτι ψευδῆς ἐστὶν καὶ οὐ συγκαταθησόμεθα αὐτῷ. ἀνάγκη γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν λόγον ἦτοι μὴ εἶναι συνακτικὸν ἢ μηδὲ τὰ λήμματα ἔχειν ἀληθῆ.
 249 καὶ τοῦτο δῆλον ἐκ τῶνδε. ἦτοι ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ψευδὲς συμπέρασμα τῇ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων αὐτοῦ συμπλοκῇ ἢ οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ, οὐδὲ συνακτικὸς λόγος ἔσται· λέγουσι γὰρ συνακτικὸν γίνεσθαι λόγον ὅταν ἀκολουθῇ τῇ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων αὐτοῦ συμπλοκῇ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ συμπέρασμα. εἰ δὲ ἀκολουθεῖ, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν διὰ τῶν λημμάτων συμπλοκὴν εἶναι ψευδῆ κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ἐκείνων τεχνολογίας· φασὶ γὰρ ὅτι τὸ ψεῦδος ψεύδει μὲν ἀκολουθεῖ, ἀληθεῖ δὲ
 250 οὐδαμῶς. ὅτι δὲ ὁ μὴ συνακτικὸς ἢ μὴ ἀληθῆς λόγος κατὰ αὐτοὺς οὐδὲ ἀποδεικτικὸς ἐστίν, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημένων.

Εἰ τοίνυν ἐρωτηθέντος λόγου ἐν ᾧ ψευδὸς ἐστὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα, αὐτόθεν γινώσκωμεν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθῆς οὐδὲ συνακτικὸς ὁ λόγος, ἐκ τοῦ συμπέρασμα ἔχειν ψευδές, οὐ συγκαταθησόμεθα αὐτῷ, κἂν μὴ γινώσκωμεν παρὰ τί τὸ ἀπατηλὸν ἔχει. ὡσπερ γὰρ οὐδ' ὅτι ἀληθῆ ἐστὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ψηφοπαικτῶν γινόμενα συγκατατιθέμεθα, ἀλλ' ἴσμεν

for the sake of knowing how to discern the true and the false by means of probative arguments. Thus they declare that dialectic is "the science of what is true and false and neither." Since, then, they assert 248 that a true argument is one which draws a true conclusion by means of true premisses,^a when an argument is propounded which has a false conclusion we shall at once know that it is false and shall not yield it assent. For the argument itself must either be illogical or contain premisses that are not true. The 249 following considerations show this clearly: The false conclusion in the argument either follows from the combination formed by its premisses, or it does not so follow. But if it does not so follow, neither will the argument be logically sound; for an argument, they say, is logically sound when its conclusion follows from the combination formed by its premisses. If, again, it does so follow, then—according to their own technical treatises—the combination formed by its premisses must necessarily be false; for they say that the false follows from the false and nohow from the true.^b And from what we have already said^c it is plain that 250 according to them the argument which is not logically sound or not true is not probative either.

If, then, when an argument is propounded with a false conclusion we know at once that the argument is neither true nor logically sound, because of its false conclusion, we shall not assent to it, even if we fail to see wherein the fallacy lies. For just as we refuse our assent to the truth of the tricks performed by jugglers and know that they are deluding us, even

^a Cf. §§ 137 ff.

^b Cf. Aristot. *Anal. pr.* ii. 2; Diog. Laert. vii. 81.

^c Cf. § 139.

ὅτι ἀπατώσιν κἄν μὴ γινώσκωμεν ὅπως ἀπατώσιν, οὕτως οὐδὲ τοῖς ψευδέσι μὲν πιθανοῖς δὲ εἶναι δοκοῦσι λόγοις πειθόμεθα, κἄν μὴ γινώσκωμεν ὅπως παραλογίζονται.

251 Ἡ ἐπεὶ οὐ μόνον ἐπὶ ψεύδος ἀπάγειν τὸ σόφισμά φασι¹ ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ ἄλλας ἀτοπίας, κοινότερον οὕτω συνερωτητέον. ὁ ἐρωτώμενος λόγος ἤτοι ἐπὶ τι ἀπρόσδεκτον ἡμᾶς ἄγει ἢ ἐπὶ τι τοιοῦτον ὡς χρῆναι αὐτὸ προσδέχεσθαι. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν τὸ δεύτερον, οὐκ ἀτόπως αὐτῷ συγκαταθησόμεθα· εἰ δὲ ἐπὶ τι ἀπρόσδεκτον, οὐχ ἡμᾶς τῇ ἀτοπία δεήσει συγκατατίθεσθαι προπετῶς διὰ τὴν πιθανότητα, ἀλλ' ἐκείνους ἀφίστασθαι τοῦ λόγου τοῦ τοῖς ἀτόποις ἀναγκάζοντος συγκατατίθεσθαι, εἶγε μὴ ληρεῖν παιδαριωδῶς ἀλλὰ τάληθῆ ζητεῖν, ὡς
252 ὑπισχνούνται, προήρηται. ὥσπερ γὰρ εἰ ὁδὸς εἴη ἐπὶ τινα κρημνὸν φέρουσα, οὐκ ἄθουμέν αὐτοὺς εἰς τὸν κρημνὸν διὰ τὸ ὁδὸν τινα εἶναι φέρουσαν ἐπ' αὐτόν, ἀλλ' ἀφιστάμεθα τῆς ὁδοῦ διὰ τὸν κρημνόν, οὕτω καὶ εἰ λόγος εἴη ἐπὶ τι ὁμολογούμενως ἀτοπον ἡμᾶς ἀπάγων, οὐχὶ τῷ ἀτόπῳ συγκαταθησόμεθα διὰ τὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' ἀποστησόμεθα
253 τοῦ λόγου διὰ τὴν ἀτοπίαν. ὅταν οὖν οὕτως ἡμῖν συνερωτᾶται λόγος, καθ' ἐκάστην πρότασιν ἐφέξομεν, εἶτα τοῦ ὅλου συνερωτηθέντος λόγου τὰ δοκοῦντα ἐπάξομεν.

Καὶ εἶγε οἱ περὶ τὸν Χρυσίππον δογματικοὶ ἐν τῇ συνερωτήσει τοῦ σωρίτου προϊόντος τοῦ λόγου

¹ τὸ σόφισμά φασι T: τοῖς σοφίσμασι mss., Bekk.

^a The fallacy of the "Heap" (*acervalis*), so-called because commonly framed thus: "This is a heap of grain: take away one grain—two grains—three grains, and so on—is it still a

if we do not know how they do it, so likewise we refuse to believe arguments which, though seemingly plausible, are false, even when we do not know how they are fallacious.

Further, since the sophism leads, they say, not only 251 to falsehood but also to other absurdities, we must discuss it more at large. The argument propounded leads us either to an inadmissible conclusion or to one of such a sort that we must needs admit it. In the latter case we shall assent to it without absurdity; but if it leads to what is inadmissible, it is not we that ought to yield hasty assent to the absurdity because of its plausibility, but it is they that ought to abstain from the argument which constrains them to assent to absurdities, if they really choose to seek truth, as they profess, rather than driblet like children. Thus, 252 suppose there were a road leading up to a chasm, we do not push ourselves into the chasm just because there is a road leading to it but we avoid the road because of the chasm; so, in the same way, if there should be an argument which leads us to a confessedly absurd conclusion, we shall not assent to the absurdity just because of the argument but avoid the argument because of the absurdity. So whenever such an 253 argument is propounded to us we shall suspend judgement regarding each premiss, and when finally the whole argument is propounded we shall draw what conclusions we approve.

And if the Dogmatists of the School of Chrysippus declare that when the "Sorites"^a is being propounded heap?" Or "Does one grain make a heap? Or, if not, 2, 3, . . . *x* grains?" The essence of the fallacy is that "aliquid minutatim et gradatim additur aut demitur" (Cicero, *Lucull.* 16). In modern Logic "Sorites" denotes a chain of syllogisms in which all the conclusions save the last are suppressed.

φασί δεῖν ἴστασθαι καὶ ἐπέχειν, ἵνα μὴ ἐκπέσωσιν εἰς ἀτοπίαν, πολὺ δῆπου μᾶλλον ἢ ἡμῖν ἀρμόζον εἶη σκεπτικοῖς οὖσιν, ὑποπεύουσιν ἀτοπίαν, μὴ προπίπτειν κατὰ τὰς συνερωτήσεις τῶν λημμάτων, ἀλλ' ἐπέχειν καθ' ἕκαστον ἕως τῆς ὅλης συνερω-
 254 τήσεως τοῦ λόγου. καὶ ἡμεῖς μὲν ἀδοξάστως ἀπὸ τῆς βιωτικῆς τηρήσεως ὀρμώμενοι τοὺς ἀπατηλοὺς οὕτως ἐκκλίνομεν λόγους, οἱ δογματικοὶ δὲ ἀδυνάτως ἕξουσι διακρίναι τὸ σόφισμα ἀπὸ τοῦ δεόντως δοκοῦντος ἐρωτᾶσθαι λόγου, εἶγε χρὴ δογματικῶς αὐτοὺς ἐπικρίναι καὶ ὅτι συνακτικὸν ἔστι τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ λόγου καὶ ὅτι τὰ λήμματά ἐστιν
 255 ἀληθῆ ἢ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει. ὑπεμνήσαμεν γὰρ ἔμπροσθεν ὅτι οὔτε τοὺς συνακτικούς λόγους δύναται καταλαμβάνειν οὔτε ἀληθῆ εἶναι τι κρίνειν οἰοί τε εἰσι, μήτε κριτήριον μήτε ἀπόδειξιν ὁμολογουμένως ἔχοντες, ὡς ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἐκείνων ὑπεμνήσαμεν. παρέλκει οὖν ὅσον ἐπὶ τούτοις ἢ θρυλουμένη παρὰ τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς περὶ τῶν σοφισμάτων τεχνολογία.
 256 Παραπλήσια δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς διαστολῆς τῶν ἀμφιβολιῶν λέγομεν. εἰ γὰρ ἡ ἀμφιβολία λέξις ἔστι δύο καὶ πλείω σημαίνουσα καὶ αἱ λέξεις σημαίνουσι θέσει, ὅσας μὲν χρήσιμόν ἐστιν ἀμφιβολίας διαλύσθαι, τουτέστι τὰς ἐν τινι τῶν ἐμπειριῶν, ταύτας οἱ καθ' ἑκάστην τέχνην ἐγγεγυμνασμένοι διαλύσονται, τὴν ἐμπειρίαν ἔχοντες αὐτοὶ τῆς ὑπ' αὐτῶν πεποιημένης θετικῆς χρήσεως τῶν ὀνομάτων κατὰ τῶν σημαινομένων, ὁ δὲ διαλεκ-
 257 τικὸς οὐδαμῶς, οἷον ὡς ἐπὶ ταύτης τῆς ἀμφιβολίας

* Cf. § 214.

they ought to halt while the argument is still proceeding and suspend judgement, to avoid falling into absurdity, much more, surely, would it be fitting for us, who are Sceptics, when we suspect absurdity, to give no hasty approval of the premisses propounded but rather to suspend judgement about each until the completion of the whole series which forms the argument. And 254 whereas we, by starting undogmatically from the observation of practical life, thus avoid these fallacious arguments, the Dogmatists will not be in a position to distinguish the Sophism from the argument which seems to be correctly propounded, seeing that they have to pronounce dogmatically that the form of the argument is, or is not, logically sound and also that the premisses are, or are not, true. For we have 255 shown above that they are neither able to apprehend the logically valid arguments nor yet capable of deciding that a thing is true, since—as we have shown from their own statements—they possess neither a Criterion nor a Demonstration that commands general agreement. Thus far, then, the technical treatment of Sophisms so much talked of amongst the Dialecticians is otiose.

And we say much the same regarding the distin- 256 guishing of ambiguities. For if the Ambiguity is a word or phrase having two or more meanings, and it is by convention ^a that words have meaning, then all such ambiguities as can be usefully cleared up—such, that is, as occur in the course of some practical affair—will be cleared up, not certainly by the dialectician, but by the craftsmen trained in each several art, as they have personal experience of the conventional way adopted by themselves of using the terms to denote the objects signified—as, for example, in the 257

“ ἐν ταῖς παρακμαῖς τὴν ποικίλην δίαιταν καὶ τὸν οἶνον δοκιμαστέον.” ἤδη δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὸν βίον ἄχρι καὶ τοὺς παῖδας ὀρώμεν διαστελλομένους ἀμφιβολίας, ὧν ἡ διαστολή χρησιμεύει αὐτοῖς δοκεῖ. εἰ γοῦν τις ὁμωνύμους οἰκέτας ἔχων κελεύει παιδίον κληθῆναι αὐτῷ τὸν Μάνην, εἰ τύχοι, (τοῦτο γὰρ τοῦνομα τοῖς οἰκέταις ἔστω κοινόν) πεύσεται ὁ παῖς ποῖον. καὶ εἰ πλείονας καὶ διαφόρους τις οἶνους ἔχων λέγοι τῷ παιδίῳ “ ἔγχεόν μοι τοῦ οἴνου πιεῖν,” ὁμοίως ὁ παῖς πεύσεται ποῖον.
258 οὕτως ἢ ἐν ἐκάστοις ἐμπειρία τοῦ χρησίμου τὴν διαστολὴν εἰσάγει.

“ Ὅσαι μέντοι μὴ ἐν τινι τῶν βιωτικῶν ἐμπειριῶν εἰσὶν ἀμφιβολίαι, ἀλλ’ ἐν δογματικαῖς οἰήσεσι κεῖνται καὶ εἰσὶν ἴσως ἄχρηστοι πρὸς τὸ ἀδοξάστως βιοῦν, περὶ ταύτας ἰδίως ὁ διαλεκτικὸς ἔχων ἀναγκασθήσεται καὶ ἐν αὐταῖς ὁμοίως ἐπέχειν κατὰ τὰς σκεπτικὰς ἐφόδους, καθὼς πράγμασιν ἀδήλοισι καὶ ἀκαταλήπτοις ἢ καὶ ἀνυποστάτοις ἴσως εἰσὶ
259 συνεξευγμένα. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων καὶ εἰσαυθὶς διαλεξόμεθα· εἰ δὲ τις δογματικὸς πρὸς τι τούτων ἀντιλέγειν ἐπιχειροῖ, κρατυνεῖ τὸν σκεπτικὸν λόγον, ἐκ τῆς ἐκατέρωθεν ἐπιχειρήσεως καὶ τῆς ἀνεπικρίτου διαφανείας τὴν περὶ τῶν ζητουμένων ἐποχὴν καὶ αὐτὸς βεβαιῶν.

Τοσαῦτα καὶ περὶ ἀμφιβολιῶν εἰπόντες αὐτοῦ ποῦ περιγράφομεν καὶ τὸ δεύτερον τῶν ὑποτυπώσεων σύνταγμα.

^a Cf. § 237.

^b i.e. his special attitude, as a Dogmatist, towards ambiguities.

case of the ambiguity “ In periods of abatement one should sanction a varied diet and wine.”^a And in the ordinary affairs of life we see already how people—ay, and even the slave-boys—distinguish ambiguities when they think such distinction is of use. Certainly, if a master who had servants named alike were to bid a boy called, say, “ Manes ” (supposing this to be common name for a servant) to be summoned, the slave-boy will ask “ Which one ? ” And if a man who had several different wines were to say to his boy “ Pour me out a draught of wine,” then too the boy will ask “ Which one ? ” Thus it
258 is the experience of what is useful in each affair that brings about the distinguishing of ambiguities.

All such ambiguities, however, as are not involved in the practical experiences of life but in dogmatic opinions, and are no doubt useless for a life void of dogmatism,—concerning these the Dialectician, in his own peculiar position,^b will be similarly forced, in view of the Sceptic attacks, to suspend judgement, in so far as they are probably linked up with matters that are non-evident and non-apprehensible, or even non-substantial. This subject, however, we
259 shall discuss later on^c; and if any Dogmatist should attempt to refute any of our statements he will be strengthening the Sceptic argument by adding support to their suspension of judgement about the matters in question as a result of our mutual antagonism and interminable dissension.

Having said thus much concerning ambiguities we now conclude therewith our Second Book of Outlines.

^c No such discussion is to be found in the extant works of Sextus.

Γ

1 Περὶ μὲν τοῦ λογικοῦ μέρους τῆς λεγομένης φιλοσοφίας ὡς ἐν ὑποτυπώσει τοσαῦτα ἀρκούντως λέγοιτο ἄν.

Α'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΦΥΣΙΚΟΥ ΜΕΡΟΥΣ

Κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τῆς συγγραφῆς καὶ τὸ φυσικὸν μέρος αὐτῆς ἐπιόντες οὐ πρὸς ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων αὐτοῖς κατὰ τόπον ἀντεροῦμεν, ἀλλὰ τὰ καθολικώτερα κινεῖν ἐπιχειρήσομεν, οἷς συμπεριγράφεται καὶ τὰ λοιπά. ἀρξόμεθα δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ περὶ ἀρχῶν λόγου.

Β'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΑΡΧΩΝ ΔΡΑΣΤΙΚΩΝ

Καὶ ἐπειδὴ παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοις συμπεφώνηται τῶν ἀρχῶν τὰς μὲν ὕλικὰς εἶναι τὰς δὲ δραστικὰς, ἀπὸ τῶν δραστικῶν τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ λόγου ποιησόμεθα· ταύτας γὰρ καὶ κυριωτέρας τῶν ὕλικῶν φασὶν εἶναι.

Γ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΘΕΟΥ

2 Οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶ θεὸν εἶναι δραστικώτατον αἴτιον οἱ πλείους ἀπεφώνησαν, πρότερον περὶ θεοῦ σκοπή-

* For the Stoic division of "Philosophy" into three parts—logic, physics and ethics—see ii. 13.

† Cf. ii. 84.

BOOK III

CONCERNING the logical division of what is called 1 "Philosophy" ^a the foregoing account may suffice by way of outline.

CHAPTER I.—OF THE PHYSICAL DIVISION

Pursuing the same method of exposition in our investigation of the Physical division of Philosophy, we shall not refute each of their statements in order, but we shall endeavour to overthrow those of a more general character ^b wherein the rest also are included.

Let us begin with their doctrine of Principles. ^c

CHAPTER II.—OF EFFICIENT PRINCIPLES

Since it is agreed by most that of Principles some are material and some efficient, we shall make our argument start with the efficient; for these, as they assert, are superior to the material.

CHAPTER III.—CONCERNING GOD

Since, then, the majority have declared that God ² is a most efficient Cause, let us begin by inquiring

^a "Principles," or "origins" (ἀρχαί), which are assumed to explain existence: fundamental realities: here used practically as a synonym for "Causes" (αἰτία).

σκιμεν, ἐκεῖνο προειπόντες ὅτι τῷ μὲν βίῳ κατακολουθοῦντες ἀδοξάστως φαμέν εἶναι θεοὺς καὶ σέβομεν θεοὺς καὶ προνοεῖν αὐτοὺς φαμέν, πρὸς δὲ τὴν προπέτειαν τῶν δογματικῶν τάδε λέγομεν.

Τῶν ἐννοουμένων ἡμῖν πραγμάτων τὰς οὐσίας ἐπινοεῖν ὀφείλομεν, οἷον εἰ σώματά ἐστιν ἢ ἀσώματα. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ εἶδη· οὐ γὰρ ἂν τις ἵππου ἐννοῆσαι δύναιτο μὴ οὐχὶ πρότερον τὸ εἶδος τοῦ ἵππου μαθῶν. τό τε ἐννοούμενον ἐννοεῖσθαι πού ὀφείλει. ἐπεὶ οὖν τῶν δογματικῶν οἱ μὲν σώμα φασιν εἶναι τὸν θεόν οἱ δὲ ἀσώματον, καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀνθρωποειδῆ οἱ δὲ οὐ, καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐν τόπῳ οἱ δὲ οὐ, καὶ τῶν ἐν τόπῳ οἱ μὲν ἐντὸς κόσμου οἱ δὲ ἐκτός, πῶς δυνησόμεθα ἔννοιαν θεοῦ λαμβάνειν μῆτε οὐσίαν ἔχοντες αὐτοῦ ὁμολογουμένην μῆτε εἶδος μῆτε τόπον ἐν ᾧ εἶη; πρότερον γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ὁμολογησάτωσάν τε καὶ συμφωνησάτωσαν ὅτι τοῖσδε ἐστὶν ὁ θεός· εἶτα ἡμῖν αὐτὸν ὑποτυπώσασμενοι οὕτως ἀξιούτωσαν ἡμᾶς ἔννοιαν θεοῦ λαμβάνειν. ἐς ὅσον δὲ ἀνεπικρίτως διαφωνοῦσιν, τί νοήσομεν ἡμεῖς ὁμολογουμένως παρ' αὐτῶν οὐκ ἔχομεν.

Ἄλλ' ἀφθαρτόν τι, φασί, καὶ μακάριον ἐννοήσας, τὸν θεὸν εἶναι τοῦτο νόμιζε. τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν εὐηθές· ὡς γὰρ ὁ μὴ εἰδὼς τὸν Δίωνα οὐδὲ τὰ συμβεβηκότα αὐτῷ ὡς Δίῳ δύναται νοεῖν, οὕτως ἐπεὶ

^a Cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 13 ff. It is argued here (1) that God is not "conceived," §§ 2-5; nor (2) "apprehended," §§ 6-11. Cf. § 218 *infra*.

^b Literally "life"; cf. i. 23 f.

^c "Substances" in the logical sense, as opposed to "properties."

^d The Stoics held God to be "corporeal," not "of human

about God,^a first premising that although, following the ordinary view,^b we affirm undogmatically that Gods exist and reverence Gods and ascribe to them foreknowledge, yet as against the rashness of the Dogmatists we argue as follows.

When we conceive objects we ought to form conceptions of their substances^c as well, as, for instance, whether they are corporeal or incorporeal. And also of their forms; for no one could conceive "Horse" unless he had first learnt the horse's form. And of course the object conceived must be conceived <as existing> somewhere. Since, then, some of the³ Dogmatists assert that God is corporeal, others that he is incorporeal, and some that he has human form, others not, and some that he exists in space, others not; and of those who assert that he is in space some put him inside the world, others outside^d; how shall we be able to reach a conception of God when we have no agreement about his substance or his form or his place of abode? Let them first agree and consent together that God is of such and such a nature, and then, when they have sketched out for us that nature, let them require that we should form a conception of God. But so long as they disagree interminably, we cannot say what agreed notion we are to derive from them.

But, say they,^e when you have conceived of a Being⁴ imperishable and blessed, regard this as God. But this is foolish; for just as one who does not know Dion is unable also to conceive the properties which belong to him as Dion, so also when we do not know the form, "inside the world"; the Epicureans, "corporeal," "of human form," "outside the world"; Aristotle, "incorporeal" and "not in space." Cf. § 218 *infra*.

^e *i.e.* the Stoics and Epicurus, cf. § 219 *infra*.

οὐκ ἴσμεν τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ θεοῦ, οὐδὲ τὰ συμβεβη-
 κότα αὐτῷ μαθεῖν τε καὶ ἐνοῆσαι δυνησόμεθα.
 5 χωρὶς δὲ τούτων εἰπάτωσαν ἡμῖν τί ἐστι τὸ
 μακάριον, πότερον τὸ ἐνεργοῦν κατὰ ἀρετὴν καὶ
 προνοούμενον τῶν ὑφ' ἑαυτὸ τεταγμένων, ἢ τὸ
 ἀνεέργητον καὶ μήτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχον μήτε
 ἐτέρω παρέχον· καὶ γὰρ καὶ περὶ τούτου διαφωνή-
 σαντες ἀνεπικρίτως ἀνενόητον ἡμῖν πεποιήκασι τὸ
 μακάριον, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τὸν θεόν.

6 Ἴνα δὲ καὶ ἐπινοῆται ὁ θεός, ἐπέχειν ἀνάγκη
 περὶ τοῦ πότερον ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς
 δογματικοῖς. τὸ γὰρ εἶναι τὸν θεὸν πρόδηλον μὲν
 οὐκ ἔστιν. εἰ γὰρ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ προσέπιπτεν, συν-
 εφώνησαν ἂν οἱ δογματικοὶ τίς ἐστι καὶ ποδαπὸς
 καὶ ποῦ· ἢ ἀνεπικρίτος δὲ διαφωνία πεποιήκεν
 αὐτὸν ἀδηλον ἡμῖν εἶναι δοκεῖν καὶ ἀποδείξεως
 7 δεόμενον. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀποδεικνύων¹ ὅτι ἐστι θεός,
 ἤτοι διὰ προδήλου τοῦτο ἀποδείκνυσεν ἢ δι' ἀδήλου.
 διὰ προδήλου μὲν οὐδ' αὐδ' αὐδ'· εἰ γὰρ ἦν πρόδηλον
 τὸ ἀποδεικνύον ὅτι ἐστι θεός, ἐπεὶ τὸ ἀποδεικνύ-
 μενον πρὸς τῷ ἀποδεικνύντι νοεῖται, διὸ καὶ συγ-
 καταλαμβάνεται αὐτῷ, καθὼς καὶ παρεστήσαμεν,
 πρόδηλον ἔσται καὶ τὸ εἶναι θεόν, συγκαταλαμ-
 βανόμενον τῷ ἀποδεικνύντι αὐτὸ προδήλου ὄντι.
 οὐκ ἔστι δὲ πρόδηλον, ὡς ὑπεμνήσαμεν· οὐδὲ ἀπο-
 8 δεῖκνυται ἄρα διὰ προδήλου. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ δι' ἀδήλου.

¹ ἀποδεικνύων T: λέγων Steph., Bekk.: om. mss.

^a The Epicurean Deity as contrasted with the Platonic and Stoic. Cf. Lucretius ii. 646 ff.:

omnis enim per se divom natura necessest
 immortalī aevo summa cum pace fruatur
 semota ab nostris rebus seiunctaque longe.

substance of God we shall also be unable to learn and conceive his properties. And apart from this, let 5 them tell us what a "blessed" thing is—whether it is that which energizes according to virtue and fore-knows what is subject to itself, or that which is void of energy and neither performs any work itself nor provides work for another.^a For indeed about this also they disagree interminably and thus render "the blessed" something we cannot conceive, and therefore God also.

Further, in order to form a conception of God one 6 must necessarily—so far as depends on the Dogmatists—suspend judgement as to his existence or non-existence. For the existence of God is not pre-evident.^b For if God impressed us automatically, the Dogmatists would have agreed together regarding his essence, his character, and his place; whereas their interminable disagreement has made him seem to us non-evident and needing demonstration. Now 7 he that demonstrates the existence of God does so by means of what is either pre-evident or non-evident. Certainly not, then, by means of the pre-evident; for if what demonstrates God's existence were pre-evident, then—since the thing proved is conceived together with that which proves it, and therefore is apprehended along with it as well, as we have established^c—God's existence also will be pre-evident, it being apprehended along with the pre-evident fact which proves it. But, as we have shown, it is not pre-evident; therefore it is not proved, either, by a pre-evident fact. Nor yet by what is non-evident. For 8

^b i.e. plainly manifest, self-evident, cf. i. 178.

^c Cf. ii. 179, 128.

τὸ γὰρ ἄδηλον τὸ ἀποδεικτικὸν τοῦ εἶναι θεόν, ἀποδείξεως χρῆζον, εἰ μὲν διὰ προδήλου λέγοιτο ἀποδείκνυσθαι, οὐκέτι ἄδηλον ἔσται ἀλλὰ πρόδηλον [τὸ εἶναι θεόν].¹ οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ἀποδεικτικὸν αὐτοῦ ἄδηλον διὰ προδήλου ἀποδείκνυται. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ δι' ἀδήλου· εἰς ἄπειρον γὰρ ἐκπεσεῖται ὁ τοῦτο λέγων, αἰτούντων ἡμῶν αἰεὶ ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ φερομένου ἀδήλου πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ προκειμένου. οὐκ ἄρα
9 ἐξ ἑτέρου δύναται ἀποδείκνυσθαι τὸ εἶναι θεόν. εἰ δὲ μήτε ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ἔστι πρόδηλον μήτε ἐξ ἑτέρου ἀποδείκνυται, ἀκατάληπτον ἔσται εἰ ἔστι θεός.

Ἔτι καὶ τοῦτο λεκτέον. ὁ λέγων εἶναι θεόν ἤτοι προνοεῖν αὐτὸν τῶν ἐν κόσμῳ φησὶν ἢ οὐ προνοεῖν, καὶ εἰ μὲν προνοεῖν, ἤτοι πάντων ἢ τινῶν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν πάντων προνοεῖ, οὐκ ἦν ἂν οὔτε κακόν τι οὔτε κακία ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ· κακίας δὲ πάντα μεστὰ εἶναι λέγουσιν· οὐκ ἄρα πάντων προνοεῖν λεχθή-
10 σται ὁ θεός. εἰ δὲ τινῶν προνοεῖ, διὰ τί τῶνδε μὲν προνοεῖ τῶνδε δὲ οὐ; ἤτοι γὰρ καὶ βούλεται καὶ δύναται πάντων προνοεῖν, ἢ βούλεται μὲν οὐ δύναται δέ, ἢ δύναται μὲν οὐ βούλεται δέ, ἢ οὔτε βούλεται οὔτε δύναται. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν καὶ ἠβούλετο καὶ ἠδύνατο, πάντων ἂν προνοεῖ· οὐ προνοεῖ δὲ πάντων διὰ τὰ προειρημένα· οὐκ ἄρα καὶ βούλεται καὶ δύναται πάντων προνοεῖν. εἰ δὲ βούλεται μὲν οὐ δύναται δέ, ἀσθενέστερός ἔστι τῆς αἰτίας δι' ἣν
11 οὐ δύναται προνοεῖν ὧν οὐ προνοεῖ· ἔστι δὲ παρὰ

¹ [τὸ . . . θεόν] del. Papp.

if the non-evident fact which is capable of proving God's existence, needing proof as it does, shall be said to be proved by means of a pre-evident fact, it will no longer be non-evident but pre-evident. Therefore the non-evident fact which proves his existence is not proved by what is pre-evident. Nor yet by what is non-evident; for he who asserts this will be driven into circular reasoning when we keep demanding proof every time for the non-evident fact which he produces as proof of the one last propounded. Consequently, the existence of God cannot be proved from any other fact. But if God's existence is neither 9 automatically pre-evident nor proved from another fact, it will be inapprehensible.

There is this also to be said. He who affirms that God exists either declares that he has, or that he has not, forethought for the things in the universe, and in the former case that such forethought is for all things or for some things. But if he had forethought for all, there would have been nothing bad and no badness in the world; yet all things, they say, are full of badness; hence it shall not be said that God forethinks all things. If, again, he forethinks some, why 10 does he forethink these things and not those? For either he has both the will and the power to forethink all things, or else he has the will but not the power, or the power but not the will, or neither the will nor the power. But if he had had both the will and the power he would have had forethought for all things; but for the reasons stated above he does not forethink all; therefore he has not both the will and the power to forethink all. And if he has the will but not the power, he is less strong than the cause which renders him unable to forethink what he does not forethink:

τὴν θεοῦ ἐπίνοιαν τὸ ἀσθενέστερον εἶναι τιὼς αὐτόν. εἰ δὲ δύναται μὲν πάντων προνοεῖν, οὐ βούλεται δέ, βάσκανος ἂν εἶναι νομισθεῖη. εἰ δὲ οὔτε βούλεται οὔτε δύναται, καὶ βάσκανός ἐστι καὶ ἀσθενής, ὅπερ λέγειν περὶ θεοῦ ἀσεβούντων ἐστίν. οὐκ ἄρα προνοεῖ τῶν ἐν κόσμῳ ὁ θεός.

Εἰ δὲ οὐδενὸς πρόνοιαν ποιεῖται οὐδὲ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ ἔργον οὐδὲ ἀποτέλεσμα, οὐχ ἕξει τις εἰπεῖν πόθεν καταλαμβάνει ὅτι ἔστι θεός, εἴγε μήτε ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ φαίνεται μήτε δι' ἀποτελεσμάτων τινῶν καταλαμβάνεται. καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἄρα ἀκατάληπτόν ἐστιν εἰ
12 ἔστι θεός. ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἐπιλογιζόμεθα ὅτι ἴσως ἀσεβεῖν ἀναγκάζονται οἱ διαβεβαιωτικῶς λέγοντες εἶναι θεόν· πάντων μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν προνοεῖν λέγοντες κακῶν αἴτιον τὸν θεὸν εἶναι φήσουσιν, τινῶν δὲ ἢ καὶ μηδενὸς προνοεῖν αὐτὸν λέγοντες ἤτοι βάσκανον τὸν θεὸν ἢ ἀσθενῆ λέγειν ἀναγκασθήσονται, ταῦτα δὲ ἔστιν ἀσεβούντων προδήλως.

Δ'. — ΠΕΡΙ ΑΙΤΙΟΥ

13 Ἴνα δὲ μὴ καὶ ἡμᾶς βλασφημεῖν ἐπιχειρήσωσιν οἱ δογματικοὶ δι' ἀπορίαν τοῦ πραγματικῶς ἡμῖν ἀντιλέγειν, κοινότερον περὶ τοῦ ἐνεργητικοῦ αἰτίου διαπορήσομεν, πρότερον ἐπιστήσαι πειραθέντες τῇ τοῦ αἰτίου ἐπινοίᾳ. ὅσον μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν οὐδ' ἂν ἐννοησαί τις τὸ αἴτιον δύναιτο, εἴγε πρὸς τῷ διαφώνουσι καὶ ἄλλοκότους ἐννοίας τοῦ αἰτίου <ἀποδιδόναι>,¹ ἔτι καὶ τῇν ὑπόστασιν αὐτοῦ πεποιήκασιν ἀνεύρετον διὰ

¹ <ἀποδιδόναι> add. T, Bekk. cj.

* *i.e.* by charging us with atheism.

but it is contrary to our notion of God that he should 11 be weaker than anything. And if, again, he has the power but not the will to have forethought for all, he will be held to be malignant; while if he has neither the will nor the power, he is both malignant and weak—an impious thing to say about God. Therefore God has no forethought for the things in the universe.

But if he exercises no forethought for anything, and there exists no work nor product of his, no one will be able to name the source of the apprehension of God's existence, inasmuch as he neither appears of himself nor is apprehended by means of any of his products. So for these reasons we cannot apprehend whether God exists. And from this we further conclude that 12 those who positively affirm God's existence are probably compelled to be guilty of impiety; for if they say that he forethinks all things they will be declaring that God is the cause of what is evil, while if they say that he forethinks some things or nothing they will be forced to say that God is either malignant or weak, and obviously this is to use impious language.

CHAPTER IV.—CONCERNING CAUSE

To prevent the Dogmatists attempting also to 13 slander us,* because of their inability to refute us in a practical way, we shall discuss the question of the efficient Cause more at large when we have first tried to give attention to the conception of Cause. Now so far as the statements of the Dogmatists are concerned, it would be impossible for anyone even to conceive Cause, since, in addition to offering discrepant and contradictory conceptions of Cause, they have rendered its substance also indiscoverable by

14 τὴν περὶ αὐτὸ διαφωνίαν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ σῶμα οἱ δὲ ἀσώματον τὸ αἴτιον εἶναι φασίν. δόξαι δ' ἂν αἴτιον εἶναι κοινότερον κατ' αὐτοὺς δι' ὃ ἐνεργοῦν γίνεται τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα, οἷον ὡς ὁ ἥλιος ἢ ἡ τοῦ ἡλίου θερμότης τοῦ χεῖσθαι τὸν κηρὸν ἢ τῆς χύσεως τοῦ κηροῦ. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ διαπεφωνήκασι, οἱ μὲν προσηγοριῶν αἴτιον εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον φάσκοντες, οἷον τῆς χύσεως, οἱ δὲ κατηγορημάτων, οἷον τοῦ χεῖσθαι. διό, καθάπερ εἶπον, κοινότερον ἂν εἴη τὸ αἴτιον τοῦτο δι' ὃ ἐνεργοῦν γίνεται τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα.

15 Τούτων δὲ τῶν αἰτίων οἱ μὲν πλείους ἡγοῦνται τὰ μὲν συνεκτικὰ εἶναι τὰ δὲ συναίτια τὰ δὲ συνεργά, καὶ συνεκτικὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν ὧν παρόντων πάρεστι τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα καὶ αἰρομένων αἴρεται καὶ μισουμένων μειοῦται (οὕτω γὰρ τὴν περίθεσιν τῆς στραγγάλης αἴτιον εἶναι φασὶ τοῦ πνιγμοῦ), συναίτιον δὲ ὃ τὴν ἴσιν εἰσφέρεται δύναμιν ἐτέρῳ συναίτιῳ πρὸς τὸ εἶναι τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα (οὕτως ἕκαστον τῶν ἐλκόντων τὸ ἄροτρον βοῶν αἴτιον εἶναι φασὶ τῆς ὀλκῆς τοῦ ἀρότρου), συνεργὸν δὲ ὃ βραχεῖαν εἰσφέρεται δύναμιν καὶ πρὸς τὸ μετὰ βραστῶν ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα, οἷον ὅταν δυοῖν βάρους τι βασταζόντων μόλις τρίτος τις προσελθὼν συγκουφίσῃ τοῦτο.

16 Ἔνιοι μέντοι καὶ παρόντα μελλόντων αἴτια ἔφασαν εἶναι, ὡς τὰ προκαταρκτικά, οἷον τὴν ἐπιτεταμένην ἡλίωσιν πυρετοῦ. τινὲς δὲ ταῦτα παρητήσαντο, ἐπειδὴ τὸ αἴτιον πρὸς τι ὑπάρχον καὶ

^a e.g. Plato's "Ideas" and the Pythagorean "Numbers"; cf. § 32, *Adv. Phys.* i. 364.

^b Cf. Plato, *Cratyl.* 413 A, *Phileb.* 26 E; *Adv. Phys.* i. 228.

their disagreement about it. For some affirm Cause ¹⁴ to be corporeal, others incorporeal.^a In the broad sense, a Cause would seem to be, according to them, "That by whose energizing the effect comes about";^b as, for example, the sun or the sun's heat is the cause of the wax being melted or of the melting of the wax. For even on this point they are at variance, some declaring that Cause is causal of nouns, such as "the melting," others of predicates, such as "being melted." Hence, as I said, in the broad sense Cause will be "that by whose energizing the effect comes about."

The majority of them hold that of these Causes ¹⁵ some are immediate,^c some associate, some co-operant; and that causes are "immediate" when their presence involves the presence, and their removal the removal, and their decrease the decrease, of the effect (it is thus, they say, that the fixing on of the halter causes the strangling); and that an "associate" cause is one which contributes a force equal to that of its fellow-cause towards the production of the effect (it is thus, they say, that each of the oxen which draw the plough is a cause of the drawing of the plough); and that a "co-operant" cause is one which contributes a slight force towards the easy production of the effect, as in the case when two men are lifting a heavy load with difficulty the assistance of a third helps to lighten it.

Some of them, however, have asserted further that ¹⁶ things present are causes of things future, being "antecedents"; as when intense exposure to the sun causes fever. But this view is rejected by some, on the ground that, since the Cause is relative to

^c Cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 1, 243.

πρὸς τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα ὃν οὐ δύναται προηγεῖσθαι αὐτοῦ ὡς αἴτιον.

Ἐν δὲ τῇ περὶ αὐτῶν διαπορήσει τοιάδε λέγομεν.

Ε'.—ΕΙ ΕΣΤΙ ΤΙ ΤΙΝΟΣ ΑΙΤΙΟΝ

- 17 Πιθανόν ἐστὶν εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον· πῶς γὰρ ἂν αὐξήσεις γένοιτο, μείωσις, γένεσις, φθορά, καθόλου κινήσις, τῶν φυσικῶν τε καὶ ψυχικῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων ἕκαστον, ἢ τοῦ παντὸς κόσμου διοικήσις, τὰ ἄλλα πάντα, εἰ μὴ κατὰ τινα αἰτίαν; καὶ γὰρ εἰ μηδὲν τούτων ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ὑπάρχει, λέξομεν ὅτι διὰ τινα αἰτίαν πάντως φαίνεται ἡμῖν
18 τοιαῦτα ὅποια οὐκ ἔστιν. ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντα ἐκ πάντων καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν ἂν ἦν μὴ οὐσης αἰτίας. οἶον ἵπποι μὲν ἐκ μυῶν, εἰ τύχοι, γεννηθήσονται, ἐλέφαντες δὲ ἐκ μυρμηκῶν· καὶ ἐν μὲν ταῖς Αἰγυπτίαις Θήβαις ὄμβροι ποτὲ ἐξαίσιοι καὶ χιόνες ἂν ἐγίνοντο, τὰ δὲ νότια ὄμβρων οὐ μετείχεν, εἰ μὴ αἰτία τις ἦν, δι' ἣν τὰ μὲν νότια ἔστι δυσχείμερα,
19 αὐχμηρὰ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἕω. καὶ περιτρέπεται δὲ ὁ λέγων μηδὲν αἴτιον εἶναι· εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἀνευ τινὸς αἰτίας τοῦτό φησι λέγειν, ἄπιστος ἔσται, εἰ δὲ διὰ τινα αἰτίαν, βουλόμενος ἀναιρεῖν τὸ αἴτιον τίθησιν, ἀποδίδουσι¹ αἰτίαν δι' ἣν οὐκ ἔστιν αἴτιον.

¹ ἀποδίδουσι Kayser, Papp.: ἀποδίδουσθω mss., Bekk.

^a Cf. § 25 *infra*.

^b To mark the distinction between αἴτιον and αἰτία, I render the former by "Cause," the latter by "cause." The latter seems used mostly of the particular instance, the former of the general notion; or (as in §§ 19, 23, 24) the former of the cause of existence, the latter of the cause of cognition.

something existent and to a real effect, it cannot precede it as its cause.^a

As regards this controversy, our position is as follows :

CHAPTER V.—DOES ANYTHING CAUSE ANYTHING ?

That Cause exists is plausible; for how could 17 there come about increase, decrease, generation, corruption, motion in general, each of the physical and mental effects, the ordering of the whole universe, and everything else, except by reason of some cause^b? For even if none of these things has real existence,^c we shall affirm that it is due to some cause that they appear to us other than they really are. Moreover, if 18 cause were non-existent everything would have been produced by everything and at random. Horses, for instance, might be born, perchance, of flies, and elephants of ants; and there would have been severe rains and snow in Egyptian Thebes, while the southern districts would have had no rain, unless there had been a cause which makes the southern parts stormy, the eastern dry. Also, he who asserts 19 that there is no Cause is refuted; for if he says that he makes this assertion absolutely and without any cause, he will not win credence; but if he says that he makes it owing to some cause, he is positing Cause while wishing to abolish it, since he offers us a cause to prove the non-existence of Cause.

^c Cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 201. "These things," being "appearances" (or phenomena), may not really exist in the form in which they "appear" to us: the "real" may differ from the "phenomenal," but even so a "Cause" of that difference must be assumed.

Διὰ ταῦτα μὲν οὖν πιθανόν ἐστὶν εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον·
 20 ὅτι δὲ καὶ τὸ λέγειν μὴ εἶναι τινός τι αἴτιον
 πιθανόν ἐστὶ, φανερόν ἔσται λόγους ἡμῶν ἐκθε-
 μένων ὀλίγους ἀπὸ πολλῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος πρὸς
 τὴν τούτου ὑπόμνησιν. οἶον γοῦν ἀδύνατόν ἐστι
 τὸ αἴτιον ἐννοῆσαι πρὶν τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα τούτου
 καταλαβεῖν ὡς ἀποτέλεσμα αὐτοῦ· τότε γὰρ γνω-
 ρίζομεν ὅτι αἰτιόν ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος, ὅταν
 21 ἐκείνο ὡς ἀποτέλεσμα καταλαμβάνωμεν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ
 τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα τοῦ αἰτίου ὡς ἀποτέλεσμα αὐτοῦ
 καταλαβεῖν δυνάμεθα, εἰ μὴ καταλάβωμεν τὸ
 αἴτιον τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος ὡς αἴτιον αὐτοῦ· τότε
 γὰρ καὶ ὅτι ἀποτέλεσμά ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ γνώσκωμεν
 δοκοῦμεν, ὅταν τὸ αἴτιον αὐτοῦ ὡς αἴτιον αὐτοῦ
 22 καταλάβωμεν. εἰ οὖν ἵνα μὲν ἐννοήσωμεν τὸ
 αἴτιον, δεῖ προεπιγνώσκειν τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα, ἵνα δὲ
 τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα γνῶμεν, ὡς ἔφην, δεῖ προεπίστασθαι
 τὸ αἴτιον, ὃ διάλληλος τῆς ἀπορίας τρόπος ἄμφω
 δείκνυσιν ἀνεπινώτητα, μήτε τοῦ αἰτίου ὡς αἰτίου
 μήτε τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος ὡς ἀποτελέσματος ἐπι-
 νοεῖσθαι δυναμένου· ἐκατέρου γὰρ αὐτῶν δεομένου
 τῆς παρὰ θατέρου πίστεως, οὐχ ἔξομεν ἀπὸ τίνος
 αὐτῶν ἀρξόμεθα τῆς ἐννοίας. διόπερ οὐδὲ ἀπο-
 φαίνεσθαι δυνασόμεθα ὅτι ἔστι τί τινος αἴτιον.
 23 Ἴνα δὲ καὶ ἐννοεῖσθαι δύνασθαι τὸ αἴτιον συγ-
 χωρήσῃ τις, ἀκατάληπτον ἂν εἶναι νομισθεῖη διὰ
 τὴν διαφωνίαν. ὃς μὲν γὰρ φησὶν εἶναι τί τινος
 αἴτιον, ἥτοι ἀπλῶς καὶ ἀπὸ μηδεμιᾶς ὀρμώμενος
 αἰτίας εὐλόγου τοῦτό φησι λέγειν, ἢ διὰ τινος
 αἰτίας ἐπὶ τὴν συγκατάθεσιν ταύτην ἰέναι λέξει.
 καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀπλῶς, οὐκ ἔσται πιστότερος τοῦ λέγον-

For these reasons, then, the existence of Cause is
 plausible. But that it is also plausible to say that 20
 nothing is the Cause of anything will be evident when
 we have set forth, to suit the occasion, a few of the
 many arguments which go to prove this case. Thus
 it is, for example, impossible to conceive the Cause
 before apprehending its effect as *its* effect; for we only
 recognize that it is causative of the effect when we
 apprehend the latter as an effect. But we cannot 21
 either apprehend the effect of the Cause as *its* effect
 unless we apprehend the Cause of the effect as *its*
 Cause; for we think we know that it is its effect only
 when we have apprehended the Cause of it as its
 Cause. If, then, in order to conceive the Cause, we 22
 must first know the effect, while in order to know
 the effect we must, as I said, have previous knowledge
 of the Cause, the fallacy of this circular mode of
 reasoning proves both to be inconceivable, the Cause
 being incapable of being conceived as Cause, and the
 effect as effect. For since each of them needs the
 evidence of the other, we shall not be able to say
 which conception is to have the precedence. Hence
 we shall be unable to declare that anything is the
 Cause of anything.

And even were one to grant that Cause can be 23
 conceived, it might be held to be inapprehensible
 because of the divergency of opinion. For he who
 says that there is some Cause of something either
 asserts that he makes this statement absolutely and
 without basing it on any rational cause, or else he will
 declare that he has arrived at his conviction owing
 to certain causes.* If, then, he says that he states it
 "absolutely," he will be no more worthy of credence

* Cf., for the following arguments, i. 164.

τος ἀπλῶς μηδὲν εἶναι μηδενὸς αἴτιον· εἰ δὲ καὶ αἰτίας λέξει δι' ἃς εἶναι τί τινος αἴτιον νομίζει, τὸ ζητούμενον διὰ τοῦ ζητουμένου παριστᾶν ἐπιχειρήσει· ζητούντων γὰρ ἡμῶν εἰ ἔστι τί τινος αἴτιον, αὐτὸς ὡς αἰτίας οὔσης τοῦ εἶναι αἴτιον
 24 αἴτιον εἶναι φησίν. καὶ ἄλλως, ἐπεὶ περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τοῦ αἰτίου ζητούμεν, δεήσει πάντως αὐτὸν καὶ τῆς αἰτίας τοῦ εἶναι τι αἴτιον αἰτίαν παρασχέιν, κακείνης ἄλλην, καὶ μέχρις ἀπέιρου. ἀδύνατον δὲ ἀπέιρους αἰτίας παρασχέιν· ἀδύνατον ἄρα διαβεβαιωτικῶς ἀποφῆναι ὅτι ἔστι τί τινος αἴτιον.

25 Πρὸς τούτοις ἦτοι ὃν καὶ ὑφ' ἑστώσῃ ἤδη αἴτιον τὸ αἴτιον ποιεῖ τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα, ἢ μὴ ὃν αἴτιον. καὶ μὴ ὃν μὲν οὐδαμῶς· εἰ δὲ ὃν, δεῖ αὐτὸ πρότερον ὑποστῆναι καὶ προγενέσθαι αἴτιον, εἰθ' οὕτως ἐπάγειν τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα, ὅπερ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἀποτελεῖσθαι λέγεται ὄντος ἤδη αἰτίου. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ πρὸς τί ἔστι τὸ αἴτιον καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα, σαφές ὅτι μὴ δύναται τούτου ὡς αἴτιον προὑποστῆναι· οὐδὲ ὃν ἄρα αἴτιον τὸ αἴτιον ἀποτελεῖν δύναται τὸ
 26 οὐ ἔστιν αἴτιον. εἰ δὲ μήτε μὴ ὃν αἴτιον ἀποτελεῖ τι μήτε ὃν, οὐδὲ ἀποτελεῖ τι. διὸ οὐδὲ αἴτιον ἔσται· ἄνευ γὰρ τοῦ ἀποτελεῖν τι τὸ αἴτιον οὐ δύναται ὡς αἴτιον νοεῖσθαι.

Ὅθεν κακείνο λέγουσί τινες. τὸ αἴτιον ἦτοι συνυφίστασθαι δεῖ τῷ ἀποτελέσματι ἢ προὑφίστασθαι τούτου ἢ μετ' αὐτὸ γίνεσθαι. τὸ μὲν οὖν λέγω ὅτι τὸ αἴτιον εἰς ὑπόστασιν ἄγεται μετὰ

than the man who asserts "absolutely" that nothing is a cause of anything; whereas if he shall mention causes on account of which he holds that something causes something, he will be attempting to support the matter in question by means of that matter itself; for when we are examining the question whether anything is the Cause of anything, he asserts that Cause exists since there exists a cause for the existence of Cause. Besides, since we are inquiring about the 24 reality of Cause, it will certainly be necessary for him to produce a cause for the cause of the existence of Cause, and of that cause yet another, and so on *ad infinitum*. But it is impossible to produce causes infinite in number. It is impossible, therefore, to affirm positively that anything is Cause of anything.

Moreover, the Cause, when it produces the effect, 25 either is and subsists already as causal or is non-causal. Certainly it is not non-causal; while if it is causal, it must first have subsisted and become causal, and thereafter produces the effect which is said to be brought about by it as already existing Cause. But since the Cause is relative and relative to the effect, it is clear that it cannot be prior in existence to the latter; therefore not even as being causal can the Cause bring about that whereof it is Cause. And if it 26 does not bring about anything either as being or as not being causal, then it does not bring anything about; and hence it will not be a Cause; for apart from its effecting something the Cause cannot be conceived as Cause.

Hence some people argue thus: The Cause must either subsist along with its effect or before it or must come into being after it. Now to say that the Cause is brought into existence after the appearance of its

τὴν γένεσιν τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος αὐτοῦ μὴ καὶ γελοῖον ἦ. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ προϋφίστασθαι δύναται τοῦ-
 27 του· πρὸς αὐτὸ γὰρ νοεῖσθαι λέγεται, τὰ δὲ πρὸς
 τι φασὶν αὐτοί, καθὼς πρὸς τι ἐστίν, συνυπάρχειν
 καὶ συννοεῖσθαι ἀλλήλοις. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ συνυφίστα-
 σθαι· εἰ γὰρ ἀποτελεσματικὸν αὐτοῦ ἐστί, τὸ δὲ
 γινόμενον ὑπὸ ὄντος ἤδη γίνεσθαι χρή, πρότερον
 δεῖ τὸ αἷτιον γενέσθαι αἷτιον, εἴθ' οὕτως ποιεῖν τὸ
 ἀποτέλεσμα. εἰ οὖν τὸ αἷτιον μήτε προϋφίσταται
 τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος αὐτοῦ μήτε συνυφίσταται
 τούτῳ, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ <τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα>¹ πρὸ αὐτοῦ
 γίνεται, μήποτε οὐδὲ ὑποστάσεως ὅλως μετέχει.
 28 σαφὲς δὲ ἴσως ὅτι καὶ διὰ τούτων ἡ ἐπίνοια τοῦ
 αἷτιου πάλιν περιτρέπεται. εἰ γὰρ τὸ αἷτιον ὡς
 μὲν πρὸς τι οὐ δύναται τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος αὐτοῦ
 προεπινοηθῆναι, ἵνα δε ὡς αἷτιον τοῦ ἀποτελέσ-
 ματος αὐτοῦ νοηθῆ, δεῖ αὐτὸ προεπινοεῖσθαι τοῦ
 ἀποτελέσματος αὐτοῦ, ἀδύνατον δὲ προεπινοηθῆναί
 τι ἐκείνου οὐ προεπινοηθῆναι [τι] οὐ δύναται,
 ἀδύνατον ἄρα ἐστὶν ἐπινοηθῆναι τὸ αἷτιον.
 29 Ἐκ τούτων οὖν λοιπὸν ἐπιλογιζόμεθα ὅτι εἴ
 πιθανοὶ μὲν εἰσιν οἱ λόγοι καθ' οὓς ὑπεμνήσαμεν
 ὡς χρή λέγειν αἷτιον εἶναι, πιθανοὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ παρ-
 ιστάντες ὅτι μὴ προσήκει αἷτιον εἶναι τι ἀποφαί-
 νεσθαι, καὶ τούτων προκρίνειν τινὰς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται
 μήτε σημεῖον μήτε κριτήριον μήτε ἀπόδειξιν
 ὁμολογουμένως ἡμῶν ἐχόντων, ὡς ἔμπροσθεν
 παρεστήσαμεν, ἐπέχειν ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ τῆς ὑπο-
 στάσεως τοῦ αἷτιου, μὴ μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι

¹ <τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα> add. T, Kayser: μετ' αὐτὸ cj. Steph.

² εἰ T: ἐπεὶ Bekk.: om. mss.

effect would seem ridiculous. But neither can it subsist before the effect; for it is said to be conceived in relation thereto, and they affirm that relatives, in so far as 27 they are relative, co-exist with each other and are conceived together. Nor, again, can it subsist along with its effect; for if it is productive of the effect, and what comes into existence must so come by the agency of what exists already, the Cause must have become causal first, and this done, then produces its effect. If, then, the Cause neither subsists before its effect, nor subsists along with it, nor does the effect precede the Cause, it would seem that it has no substantial existence at all. And it is clear probably 28 that by these arguments the conception of Cause is overthrown again. For if Cause as a relative notion cannot be conceived before its effect, and yet, if it is to be conceived as causative of its effect, it must be conceived before its effect, while it is impossible for anything to be conceived before that which the conception of it cannot precede,—then it is impossible for the Cause to be conceived.

From all this we conclude finally that—if the 29 arguments by which it was shown ^a that we ought to affirm the existence of Cause are plausible, and if the arguments which go to prove that it is improper to declare that any Cause exists are likewise plausible, and if it is inadmissible to prefer any of these arguments to the others, since, as we have shown above,^b we confessedly possess neither sign nor criterion nor proof,—we are compelled to suspend judgement concerning the real existence of Cause, declaring that a Cause is “no more” existent than non-existent,

^a Cf. §§ 17 ff.

^b Cf. ii. 18, 104, 134 ff.

τι αἴτιον λέγοντας ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν.

5'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΑΙΚΩΝ ΑΡΧΩΝ

- 30 Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς δραστηκῆς τοσαῦτα νῦν ἀρκέσει λελέχθαι· συντόμως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ὑλικῶν καλουμένων ἀρχῶν λεκτέον. ὅτι τοίνυν αὐταὶ εἰσὶν ἀκατάληπτοι, ῥάδιον συνιδεῖν ἐκ τῆς περὶ αὐτῶν γεγενημένης διαφωνίας παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς. Φερεκύδης μὲν γὰρ ὁ Σύριος γῆν εἶπε τὴν πάντων εἶναι ἀρχήν, Θαλῆς δὲ ὁ Μιλήσιος ὕδωρ, Ἀναξίμανδρος δὲ ὁ ἄκουστης τούτου τὸ ἄπειρον, Ἀναξίμενης δὲ καὶ Διογένης ὁ Ἀπολλωνιάτης ἀέρα, Ἴππασος δὲ ὁ Μεταποντῖνος πῦρ, Ξενοφάνης δὲ ὁ Κολοφώνιος γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ, Οἰνοπίδης δὲ ὁ Χίος πῦρ καὶ ἀέρα, Ἴππων δὲ ὁ Ῥηγίνος πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ, Ὀνομάκριτος δὲ ἐν τοῖς 31 Ὀρφικοῖς πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα πρὸς τοῖς στωικοῖς πῦρ ἀέρα ὕδωρ γῆν—περὶ γὰρ τῆς τερατολογουμένης ἀποίου παρατισιῶν ὕλης, ἣν οὐδὲ αὐτοὶ καταλαμβάνειν διαβεβαιούνται, τί δεῖ καὶ λέγειν; οἱ δὲ περὶ Ἀριστοτέλη τὸν περιπατητικὸν πῦρ ἀέρα ὕδωρ γῆν, 32 τὸ κυκλοφορητικὸν σῶμα, Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ἀτόμους, Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ ὁ Κλαζομένων ὁμοιομερείας, Διδώρος δὲ ὁ ἐπικληθεῖς

* With the following sections cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 360 ff., ii. 310 ff.; and for the arguments employed, i. 164.

^b Pherecydes, circa 650 B.C., was a semi-scientific cosmogonist; Oenopides was an astronomer and mathematician of the fifth century B.C.; Onomacritus was an Athenian religious poet, said to be the author of some of the Orphic hymns. For the other names see *Intro.*

if we are to judge by the statements made by the Dogmatists.

CHAPTER VI.—CONCERNING MATERIAL PRINCIPLES

So far, then, as concerns the efficient Principle this 30 account will suffice for the present. But we must also give a brief account of what are called the Material Principles.^a Now that these are inapprehensible may easily be gathered from the disagreement which exists about them amongst the Dogmatists. For Pherecydes of Syros^b declared earth to be the Principle of all things; Thales of Miletus, water; Anaximander (his pupil), the Unlimited; Anaximenes and Diogenes of Apollonia, air; Hippasus of Metapontum, fire; Xenophanes of Colophon, earth and water; Oenopides of Chios, fire and air; Hippo of Rhegium, fire and water; Onomacritus, in his *Orphica*, fire and water and earth; the School of 31 Empedocles as well as the Stoics, fire, air, water and earth—for why should one even mention that mysterious “indeterminate matter” which some of them talk about,^c when not even they themselves are positive that they apprehend it? Aristotle the Peripatetic <takes as his Principles> fire, air, water, earth, and the “revolving body”^d; Democritus 32 and Epicurus, atoms; Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, and Epicurians; Diodorus, surnamed Cronos, minimal

^a For this “formless” or “unqualified” primary matter of the Stoics cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 11, ii. 312.

^b i.e. the *quinta essentia*, aether (*alθήρ* fr. *del θεῖν*, “ever-speeding,” Plato, *Cratyl.* 410 B, Aristot. *De Caelo* i. 3).

^c i.e. “things with like parts,” or “homogeneous substances,” is Aristotle’s name for Anaxagoras’s “seeds of things,” or material “elements”; cf. *Intro.* p. xi.

Κρόνος ἐλάχιστα καὶ ἀμερῆ σώματα, Ἡρακλείδης δὲ ὁ Ποντικός καὶ Ἀσκληπιάδης ὁ Βιθυνὸς ἀνάγκους ὄγκους, οἱ δὲ περὶ Πυθαγόραν τοὺς ἀριθμούς, οἱ δὲ μαθηματικοὶ τὰ πέρατα τῶν σωμάτων, Στράτων δὲ ὁ φυσικὸς τὰς ποιότητας.

- 33 Τοσαύτης τοίνυν καὶ ἔτι πλείονος διαφωνίας γεγεννημένης περὶ τῶν ὑλικῶν ἀρχῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς, ἥτοι πάσαις συγκαταθησόμεθα ταῖς κειμέναις στάσεσι καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἢ τισίν. ἀλλὰ πάσαις μὲν οὐ δυνατὸν οὐ γὰρ δήπου δυνησόμεθα καὶ τοῖς περὶ Ἀσκληπιάδην συγκατατίθεσθαι, θραυστὰ εἶναι τὰ στοιχεῖα λέγουσι καὶ ποιά, καὶ τοῖς περὶ Δημόκριτον, ἄτομα ταῦτα εἶναι φάσκουσι καὶ ἄποια, καὶ τοῖς περὶ Ἀναξαγόραν, πᾶσαν αἰσθητὴν ποιό-
34 τητα περὶ ταῖς ὁμοιομερείαις ἀπολείπουσιν. εἰ δὲ τινα στάσιν τῶν ἄλλων προκρινοῦμεν, ἥτοι ἁπλῶς καὶ ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως προκρινοῦμεν ἢ μετὰ ἀποδείξεως. ἄνευ μὲν οὖν ἀποδείξεως οὐ συνθησόμεθα· εἰ δὲ μετὰ ἀποδείξεως, ἀληθῆ δεῖ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι. ἀληθῆς δὲ οὐκ ἂν δοθεῖη μὴ οὐχὶ κεκριμένη κριτηρίῳ ἀληθεί, ἀληθὲς δὲ κριτήριον εἶναι δεῖ-
35 κνυται δι' ἀποδείξεως κεκριμένης. εἰ τοίνυν ἵνα μὲν ἢ ἀπόδειξις ἢ προκρινούσα τινα στάσιν ἀληθῆς εἶναι δειχθῆ, δεῖ τὸ κριτήριον αὐτῆς ἀποδείχθαι, ἵνα δὲ τὸ κριτήριον ἀποδείχθῆ, δεῖ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν αὐτοῦ προκεκρισθαι, ὃ διάλληλος εὐρίσκεται τρόπος, ὃς οὐκ ἑάσει προβαίνειν τὸν λόγον, τῆς μὲν ἀποδείξεως αἰεὶ κριτηρίου δεομένης ἀποδεδειγμένου,
36 τοῦ κριτηρίου δὲ ἀποδείξεως κεκριμένης. εἰ δὲ

and non-composite bodies; Heracleides Ponticus and Asclepiades the Bithynian,^a homogeneous masses; the School of Pythagoras, the numbers; the Mathematicians, the limits of bodies; Strato the Physicist, the qualities.

Since, then, there exists amongst them as much ³³ divergence as this, and even more, regarding the Material Principles, we shall give assent either to all the positions stated, and all others as well, or to some of them. But to assent to all is not possible; for we certainly shall not be able to assent both to Asclepiades, who says that the elements can be broken up and possess qualities, and to Democritus, who asserts that they are indivisible and void of quality, and to Anaxagoras, who leaves every sensible quality attached to the homoeomerics. Yet if we shall prefer any one standpoint. or view, ³⁴ to the rest, we shall be preferring it either absolutely and without proof or with proof.^b Now without proof we shall not yield assent; and if it is to be with proof, the proof must be true. But a true proof can only be given when approved by a true criterion, and a criterion is shown to be true by means of an approved proof. If, then, in order ³⁵ to show the truth of the proof which prefers any one view, its criterion must be proved, and to prove the criterion in turn its proof must be pre-established, the argument is found to be the circular one which will not allow the reasoning to go forward, since the proof keeps always requiring a proved criterion, and the criterion an approved proof. And ³⁶

these "molecules" break in pieces, and when re-united become objects of sense.

^b For this form of argument cf. ii. 183.

^a Asclepiades (first century B.C.), a physician at Rome, held a theory of non-sensible, frangible "molecules" (ὄγκοι) of matter always in motion; by collision with one another

ἀεὶ τὸ κριτήριον κριτηρίῳ κρίνειν καὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἀποδείξει¹ ἀποδεικνύναι βούλοισι τις, εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκβληθήσεται.² εἰ τοίνυν μήτε πάσαις ταῖς περὶ στοιχείων στάσεσι δυνάμεθα συγκατατίθεσθαι μήτε τῷ τούτων, ἐπέχειν προσήκει περὶ αὐτῶν.

37 Δυνατὸν μὲν οὖν ἴσως ἐστὶ καὶ διὰ τούτων μόνων ὑπομνήσκειν τὴν τῶν στοιχείων καὶ τῶν ὑλικῶν ἀρχῶν ἀκαταληψίαν· ἵνα δὲ καὶ ἀμφιλαφέστερον τοὺς δογματικούς ἐλέγχειν ἔχωμεν, ἐνδιατρίβομεν συμμέτρως τῷ τόπῳ. καὶ ἐπεὶ πολλαὶ καὶ σχεδὸν ἄπειροὶ τινές εἰσι αἱ περὶ στοιχείων δόξαι, καθὼς ὑπεμνήσαμεν, τὸ μὲν πρὸς ἐκάστην λέγειν εἰδικῶς νῦν παρατηρούμεθα διὰ τὸν χαρακτήρα τῆς συγγραφῆς, δυνάμει δὲ πρὸς πάσας ἀντερούμεν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἦν ἂν τις εἴπη περὶ στοιχείων στάσει, ἥτοι ἐπὶ σώματα κατενεχθήσεται ἢ ἐπὶ ἀσώματα, ἀρκεῖν ἡγούμεθα ὑπομνήσαι ὅτι ἀκατάληπτα μὲν ἐστὶ τὰ σώματα ἀκατάληπτα δὲ τὰ ἀσώματα· διὰ γὰρ τούτου σαφὲς ἔσται ὅτι καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖά ἐστιν ἀκατάληπτα.

Z'.—Εἰ ΚΑΤΑΛΗΠΤΑ ΤΑ ΣΩΜΑΤΑ

38 Σῶμα τοίνυν λέγουσιν εἶναι τινες ὁ οἶόν τε ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν. ὅσον δὲ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ ἀκατάληπτόν ἐστὶ τοῦτο. τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἴτιον ἀκατάληπτόν ἐστι, καθὼς ὑπεμνήσαμεν· μὴ ἔχοντες δὲ εἰπεῖν εἰ ἔστι τι αἴτιον, οὐδὲ εἰ ἔστι τι πάσχον εἰπεῖν δυνάμεθα· τὸ γὰρ πάσχον πάντως ὑπὸ

¹ ἀποδείξει MLT: δι' ἀποδείξεως Bekk.

² ἐκβληθήσεται T, Nauck: ἐμβλ. mss., Bekk.

* A favourite classification of the Stoics, cf. *Adv. Phys.* ii. 218.

should any one propose to approve the criterion by a criterion and to prove the proof by a proof, he will be driven to a regress *ad infinitum*. Accordingly, if we are unable to assent either to all the views held about the elements or to any one of them, it is proper to suspend judgement about them.

Now though it is, perhaps, possible to show by 37 these arguments alone the inapprehensibility of the elements and of the Material Principles, yet in order that we may be able to refute the Dogmatists in a more comprehensive manner we shall dwell on this topic at appropriate length. And since the opinions about the elements are, as we have shown, numerous and well-nigh infinite, we will excuse ourselves—because of the character of our present treatise—from discussing each opinion in detail, but will make answer to them all implicitly. For since the elements, whatever view one takes of them, must be finally regarded either as corporeal or incorporeal,⁶ we think it enough to show that corporeal things are inapprehensible and incorporeal things inapprehensible; for thus it will be clear that the elements also are inapprehensible.

CHAPTER VII.—ARE BODIES APPREHENSIBLE?

Some say that Body is that which is capable of 38 being active or passive.^b But so far as this conception goes it is inapprehensible. For, as we have shown, Cause is inapprehensible; and if we cannot say whether any Cause exists, neither can we say whether anything passive exists; for what is passive

^b This definition is ascribed to Pythagoras in *Adv. Phys.* i. 366.

αἰτίου πάσχει. ἀκατάληπτου δὲ ὄντος καὶ τοῦ
 αἰτίου καὶ τοῦ πάσχοντος, διὰ ταῦτα ἀκατάληπτον
 39 ἔσται καὶ τὸ σῶμα. τινὲς δὲ σῶμα εἶναι λέγουσι
 τὸ τριχῆ διαστατὸν μετὰ ἀντιτυπίας. σημεῖον μὲν
 γὰρ φασιν οὐ μέρος οὐθέν, γραμμὴν δὲ μήκος
 ἀπλατές, ἐπιφάνειαν δὲ μήκος μετὰ πλάτους· ὅταν
 δὲ αὕτη καὶ βάθος προσλάβῃ καὶ ἀντιτυπίαν,
 σῶμα εἶναι, περὶ οὐ νῦν ἐστὶν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος, συν-
 εστῶς ἕκ τε μήκους καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους καὶ
 40 ἀντιτυπίας. εὐμαρῆς μέντοι καὶ ὁ πρὸς τούτους
 λόγος. τὸ γὰρ σῶμα ἤτοι οὐδὲν παρὰ ταῦτα εἶναι
 λέξουσιν ἢ ἕτερόν τι παρὰ τὴν συνέλευσιν τῶν
 προειρημένων. καὶ ἕξωθεν μὲν τοῦ μήκους τε καὶ
 τοῦ πλάτους καὶ τοῦ βάθους καὶ τῆς ἀντιτυπίας
 οὐδὲν ἂν εἶη τὸ σῶμα· εἰ δὲ ταῦτά ἐστι τὸ σῶμα,
 ἕαν δείξῃ τις ὅτι ἀνύπαρκτά ἐστιν, ἀναιροῖ ἂν
 καὶ τὸ σῶμα· τὰ γὰρ ὅλα συναναιρεῖται τοῖς
 ἑαυτῶν πᾶσι μέρεσιν.

Ποικίλως μὲν οὖν ἔστι ταῦτα ἐλέγχειν· τὸ δὲ νῦν
 ἀρκέσει λέγειν ὅτι εἰ ἔστι τὰ πέρατα, ἤτοι γραμμαῖ
 41 εἰσω ἢ ἐπιφάνειαι ἢ σώματα. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐπι-
 φάνειάν τινα ἢ γραμμὴν εἶναι λέγοι τις, καὶ τῶν
 προειρημένων ἕκαστον ἤτοι κατὰ ἰδίαν ὑφεστάναι
 δύνασθαι λεχθήσεται ἢ μόνον περὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις
 σώμασι θεωρεῖσθαι. ἀλλὰ καθ' ἑαυτὴν μὲν ὑπ-
 ἀρχουσαν ἤτοι γραμμὴν ἢ ἐπιφάνειαν ὀνειροπολεῖν
 ἴσως εὔηθες. εἰ δὲ περὶ τοῖς σώμασι θεωρεῖσθαι
 λέγοιτο μόνον καὶ μὴ καθ' ἑαυτὸ ὑφεστάναι τούτων

* Cf. ii. 30, *Adv. Phys.* i. 367, ii. 12.

† In geometry "Limits" (or "boundaries") was used to

is certainly made passive by a Cause. And when both
 the Cause and the passive object are inapprehensible,
 the result will be that Body also is inapprehensible.
 But some define Body as what has three dimensions 39
 combined with resistance or solidity.^a For they de-
 scribe the point as that which has no parts, the line
 as length without breadth, the surface as length with
 breadth; and when this takes on both depth and
 resistance there is formed Body—the object of our
 present discussion—it being composed of length and
 breadth and depth and resistance. The answer, 40
 however, to these people is simple. For they will
 say either that Body is nothing more than these
 qualities, or that it is something else than the com-
 bination of the qualities already mentioned. Now
 apart from length and breadth and depth and solidity
 the Body would be nothing; but if these things are
 the Body, anyone who shall prove that they are un-
 real will likewise abolish the Body; for wholes are
 abolished along with the sum of their parts.

Now it is possible to disprove these dimensions in a
 variety of ways; but for the present it will be enough
 to say that if the Limits^b exist, they are either lines
 or surfaces or bodies. If, then, one should affirm the 41
 existence of a surface or a line, then it will be affirmed
 that each of the afore-mentioned objects either can
 subsist of itself or is cognized solely in connexion
 with so-called Bodies. But to imagine either a line
 or a surface as existing of itself is doubtless silly.
 While if it should be said that each of these objects
 is cognized solely in connexion with the Bodies and
 has no independent existence, it will thereby be

denote the lines or surfaces by which any magnitude is
 "bounded."

ἕκαστον, πρῶτον μὲν αὐτόθεν δοθήσεται τὸ μὴ ἐξ αὐτῶν γεγονέναι τὰ σώματα (ἐχρῆν γάρ, οἶμαι, ταῦτα πρότερον ὑπόστασιν καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἐσχηκέναι, καὶ οὕτω συνελθόντα πεποιηκέναι τὰ σώματα),
 42 εἶτα οὐδὲ ἐν τοῖς καλουμένοις σώμασιν ὑφέστηκεν.

Καὶ τοῦτο διὰ πλειονῶν μὲν ἔστιν ὑπομνησκειν, ἀρκέσει δὲ νῦν τὰ ἐκ τῆς ἀφῆς ἀπορούμενα λέγειν. εἰ γὰρ ἄπτεται ἀλλήλων τὰ παρατιθέμενα σώματα, τοῖς πέρασιν αὐτῶν, ὅλον ταῖς ἐπιφανείαις, ψαύει ἀλλήλων. αἱ οὖν ἐπιφάνειαι ὅλαι μὲν δι' ὅλων ἀλλήλαις οὐχ ἐνωθήσονται κατὰ τὴν ἀφήν, ἐπεὶ σύγχυσις ἔσται ἢ ἀφή καὶ ὁ χωρισμὸς τῶν ἀπτο-
 43 μένων διασπασμός· ὅπερ οὐ θεωρεῖται. εἰ δὲ ἄλλοις μὲν μέρεσιν ἢ ἐπιφάνεια ἄπτεται τῆς τοῦ παρατιθεμένου αὐτῇ σώματος ἐπιφανείας, ἄλλοις δὲ συνήνεται τῷ σώματι οὐ ἔστι πέρασ, * * *¹ οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ περὶ σώματι θεωρῆσαι δύναται τις μήκος καὶ πλάτος ἀβαθές, ὅθεν οὐδὲ ἐπιφάνειαν.

Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ δύο ἐπιφανειῶν καθ' ὑπόθεσιν παρατιθεμένων ἀλλήλαις κατὰ τὰ πέρατα αὐτῶν εἰς ἃ λήγουσι, κατὰ τὸ λεγόμενον αὐτῶν μήκος εἶναι, τουτέστι κατὰ γραμμάς, αἱ γραμμαὶ αὗται, δι' ὧν ἄπτεσθαι λέγονται ἀλλήλων αἱ ἐπιφάνειαι, οὐχ ἐνωθήσονται μὲν ἀλλήλαις (συγχυθεῖεν γὰρ αὖν)· εἰ δὲ ἐκάστη αὐτῶν ἄλλοις μὲν μέρεσι τοῖς

¹ The lacuna marked here is to denote that there is probably an omission in the mss. (and Bekk.) of something corresponding to the insertion of T—"terminus non erit sine profunditate differentibus eius partibus intellectis secundum profunditatem hac quidem cui opponitur tangenti hac autem secundum <quod> coniungitur corpori cuius est terminus." Mutsch. inserts a Greek version of this in his text, and I give an English version between brackets.

granted, in the first place, that the Bodies are not generated from them (for if so, I suppose, these objects ought to have had independent existence first, and then have combined to form the Bodies); and ⁴² further, they have no real existence even in the so-called Bodies.

This can be shown by several arguments, but for the present it will suffice to mention the difficulties which arise from <the fact of> touch.^a For if juxtaposed Bodies touch one another they are in contact with their Limits—for example, with their surfaces. The surfaces, then, will not be completely unified one with another as a result of touching, since otherwise touch would be fusion and the separation of things touching a rending apart; and this is not what we find. And if the surface touches the surface of the ⁴³ juxtaposed Body with some of its parts, and with other parts is united with the Body of which it is a limit, <it will not be without depth, since its parts are conceived as different in respect of depth, one part touching the juxtaposed Body, the other being that which effects its union with the Body whereof it is a limit>. Hence, even in connexion with Body one cannot imagine length and breadth without depth, nor, consequently, surface.

So likewise when two surfaces are, let us imagine, juxtaposed along the limits where they come to an end, by way of what is called their "length," that is to say by way of their "lines," then these lines, by means of which the surfaces are said to touch each other, will not be unified (else they would be fused together); yet if each of them touches the line which

^a For arguments based on "touch," or contact, cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 258 ff., *Adv. Geom.* 34 ff.

κατὰ πλάτος ἄπτεται τῆς παρατιθεμένης αὐτῇ γραμμῆς, ἄλλοις δὲ συνήνεται τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ ἧς ἐστὶ πέρασ, οὐκ ἔσται ἀπλατῆς, ὅθεν οὐδὲ γραμμῆ. εἰ δὲ μήτε γραμμῆ ἔστω ἐν σώματι μήτε ἐπιφάνεια, οὐδὲ μήκος ἢ πλάτος ἢ βάθος ἐστὶ ἐν σώματι.

44 Εἰ δέ τις σώματα εἶναι τὰ πέρατα λέγοι, σύντομος ἔσται ἢ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀποκρίσις. εἰ γὰρ τὸ μήκος σῶμα ἐστίν, δεήσει τοῦτο εἰς τὰς τρεῖς αὐτοῦ μερίζεσθαι διαστάσεις, ὧν ἐκάστη σῶμα οὐσα πάλιν αὐτῇ διαιρηθήσεται εἰς διαστάσεις ἄλλας τρεῖς, αἱ ἔσονται σώματα, καὶ ἐκεῖναι εἰς ἄλλας ὁμοίως, καὶ τοῦτο μέχρις ἀπείρου, ὡς ἀπειρομέγεθες γίνεσθαι τὸ σῶμα εἰς ἄπειρα μεριζόμενον· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. οὐδὲ σώματα ἄρα εἰσὶν αἱ προειρημένα διαστάσεις. εἰ δὲ μήτε σώματ' αἰσὶ μήτε γραμμαὶ ἢ ἐπιφάνειαι, οὐδὲ εἶναι νομισθήσονται.

45 Ἀκατάληπτος δὲ ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ ἀντιτυπία. αὕτη γὰρ εἴπερ καταλαμβάνεται, ἀφή καταλαμβάνοιτο ἄν. εἰάν οὖν δείξωμεν ὅτι ἀκατάληπτός ἐστὶν ἢ ἀφή, σαφές ἐστὶ ὅτι οὐχ οἶόν τέ ἐστὶ καταλαμβάνεσθαι τὴν ἀντιτυπίαν. ὅτι δὲ ἀκατάληπτός ἐστὶν ἢ ἀφή, διὰ τούτων ἐπιλογιζόμεθα. τὰ ἀπτόμενα ἀλλήλων ἦτοι μέρεσιν ἀλλήλων ἄπτεται ἢ ὅλα ὅλων. ὅλα μὲν οὖν ὅλων οὐδαμῶς ἐνωθήσεται γὰρ οὕτω καὶ οὐχ ἄμεται ἀλλήλων. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μέρεσι μερῶν· τὰ γὰρ μέρη αὐτῶν ὡς μὲν πρὸς τὰ ὅλα μέρη ἐστίν, ὡς δὲ πρὸς τὰ μέρη 46 ἐαυτῶν ὅλα. ταῦτα οὖν τὰ ὅλα, ἃ ἐστὶν ἐτέρω μέρη, ὅλα μὲν ὅλων οὐχ ἄμεται διὰ τὰ προειρη-

lies next to it breadth-wise with some of its parts and by others is united with the surface of which it is a limit, it will not be without breadth, and, consequently, it will not be a line. But if there exists in Body neither line nor surface, neither length nor breadth nor depth will exist in Body.

And should anyone assert that the Limits are 44 bodies, he can be answered very shortly. For if length is a body, it must needs be divided into its three dimensions, and each of these, in turn, being a body will be divided into three other dimensions, which will be bodies, and these likewise into others, and so on *ad infinitum*, so that the Body comes to be of infinite size, being divided into an infinity of parts: this result is absurd, and therefore the dimensions aforesaid are not bodies. But if they are neither bodies nor lines nor surfaces, they will be held to have no existence.

Solidity^a also is inapprehensible. For if it is 45 apprehended, it must be apprehended by touch. If, then, we shall prove that touch is inapprehensible, it will be clear that it is impossible for solidity to be apprehended. That touch is inapprehensible we argue as follows. Things which touch one another either touch with their parts or as wholes touching wholes. Now they certainly will not touch as wholes; for then they will be unified instead of being in contact with one another. Nor yet through parts touching parts; for their parts, though in relation to the wholes they are parts, are wholes in relation to their parts. So these wholes, which are parts of 46 other things, will not touch as wholes touching wholes,

^a Or "resistance," § 39; for this quality, as treated by Epicurus, cf. *Adv. Phys.* ii. 222.

μένα, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μέρεσι μερῶν· καὶ γὰρ τὰ τούτων μέρη ὡς πρὸς τὰ ἑαυτῶν μέρη ὅλα ὄντα οὔτε ὅλα ὅλων ἄψεται οὔτε μέρεσι μερῶν. εἰ δὲ μήτε κατὰ ὁλότητα μήτε κατὰ μέρη γινομένην ἀφήν καταλαμβάνομεν, ἀκατάληπτος ἔσται ἡ ἀφή. διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἡ ἀντιτυπία. ὅθεν καὶ τὸ σῶμα· εἰ γὰρ οὐδέν ἐστι τοῦτο παρὰ τὰς τρεῖς διαστάσεις καὶ τὴν ἀντιτυπίαν, ἐδείξαμεν δὲ ἀκατάληπτον τούτων ἕκαστον, καὶ τὸ σῶμα ἔσται ἀκατάληπτον.

Οὕτω μὲν οὖν, ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ ἐννοίᾳ τοῦ σώματος, 47 ἀκατάληπτόν ἐστιν εἰ ἔστι τι σῶμα· λεκτέον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο εἰς τὸ προκείμενον. τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν φασι εἶναι αἰσθητὰ τὰ δὲ νοητά, καὶ τὰ μὲν τῇ διανοίᾳ καταλαμβάνεσθαι τὰ δὲ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν, καὶ τὰς μὲν αἰσθήσεις ἀπλοπαθεῖς εἶναι, τὴν δὲ διάνοιαν ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν αἰσθητῶν καταλήψεως ἐπὶ τὴν κατάληψιν τῶν νοητῶν ἰέναι. εἰ οὖν ἔστι τι σῶμα, ἦτοι αἰσθητόν ἐστιν ἢ νοητόν. καὶ αἰσθητόν μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν· κατὰ γὰρ συναθροισμὸν μήκους καὶ βάρους καὶ πλάτους καὶ ἀντιτυπίας καὶ χρώματος καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν καταλαμβάνεσθαι δοκεῖ, σὺν οἷς θεωρεῖται· αἱ δὲ αἰσθήσεις ἀπλοπαθεῖς εἶναι λέγονται 48 παρ' αὐτοῖς. εἰ δὲ νοητόν εἶναι λέγεται τὸ σῶμα, δεῖ τι πάντως ὑπάρχειν ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων αἰσθητόν, ἀφ' οὗ ἡ τῶν σωμάτων νοητῶν ὄντων ἔσται νόησις. οὐδέν δὲ ἔστι παρὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὸ ἀσώματον, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἀσώματον αὐτόθεν νοητόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ σῶμα οὐκ αἰσθητόν, ὡς ὑπ-

* Cf. § 38.

^b This means that each sense is specialized, so that it is capable of receiving only one kind of impression (e.g. the sight is affected by colour, but not by sound or solidity); cf. § 108.

for the reasons aforesaid, nor yet through parts touching parts; for their parts, too, being wholes relatively to their own parts, will not be in contact either as wholes with wholes or as parts with parts. But if we apprehend the occurrence of touch neither by way of wholeness nor by way of parts, touch will be inapprehensible. And, consequently, solidity also; and, therefore, Body; for if this is nothing more than the three dimensions *plus* Solidity, and we have proved that each of these is inapprehensible, Body also will be inapprehensible.

Thus, then, if we are to judge by the conception ^a of Body, it is inapprehensible whether any body exists; and about this problem there is this also to be said. 47 Of existing things some, they say, are sensible, others intelligible, and the latter are apprehended by the reason, the former by the senses, and the senses are "simply-passive," ^b while the reason proceeds from the apprehension of sensibles to the apprehension of intelligibles. If then any body exists, it is either sensible or intelligible. Now it is not sensible; for it is supposed to be apprehended as a conglomeration of length and depth and breadth and solidity and colour and various other things, along with which it is experienced; whereas, according to their statements, the senses are "simply-passive." And if Body is said 48 to be intelligible, there must certainly be pre-existent in the nature of things some sensible object from which to derive the notion of bodies, they being intelligible. But nothing exists save Body and the Incorporeal, and of these the Incorporeal is essentially intelligible, ^c and Body, as we have shown, is not ^c *i.e.* in the view of the Stoics, but not of the Sceptics, for the inapprehensibility of the "Incorporeal" is proved in § 50 *ad fin.*

εμνήσαμεν. μὴ ὄντος οὖν ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων αἰσθητοῦ τινὸς ἀφ' οὗ ἡ νόησις ἔσται τοῦ σώματος, οὐδὲ νοητὸν ἔσται τὸ σῶμα. εἰ δὲ μήτε αἰσθητὸν ἔστι μήτε νοητὸν, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστι, λεκτέον ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ μηδὲ εἶναι τὸ 49 σῶμα. διὰ ταῦτα οὖν ἡμεῖς ἀντιτιθέντες τοὺς κατὰ τοῦ σώματος λόγους τῷ φαίνεσθαι [δοκεῖν]¹ ὑπάρχον τὸ σῶμα, συνάγομεν τὴν περὶ τοῦ σώματος ἐποχήν.

Τῇ δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἀκαταληψία συνεισάγεται καὶ τὸ ἀκατάληπτον εἶναι τὸ ἀσώματον. αἱ γὰρ στερήσεις τῶν ἕξεων νοοῦνται στερήσεις, οἷον ὄρασεως τυφλότης καὶ ἀκοῆς κωφότης καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων παραπλησίως. διόπερ ἴνα στέρησιν καταλάβωμεν, δεῖ τὴν ἕξιν ἡμᾶς προκατειληφέναι ἧς λέγεται στέρησις εἶναι ἢ στέρησις· ἀνευνόητος γὰρ τις ὦν τῆς ὄρασεως οὐκ ἂν δύναίτο λέγειν ὅτι ὄρασω ὅδε οὐκ ἔχει, ὅπερ ἔστι τὸ τυφλὸν εἶναι. 50 εἰ οὖν στέρησις σώματός ἐστι τὸ ἀσώματον, τῶν δὲ ἕξεων μὴ καταλαμβανομένων ἀδύνατον τὰς στερήσεις αὐτῶν καταλαμβάνεσθαι, καὶ δέδεικται ὅτι τὸ σῶμα ἀκατάληπτον ἔστιν, ἀκατάληπτον ἔσται καὶ τὸ ἀσώματον. καὶ γὰρ ἦτοι αἰσθητὸν ἔστιν ἢ νοητὸν. εἴτε δὲ αἰσθητὸν ἔστιν, ἀκατάληπτον ἔστι διὰ τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ζώων καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ τῶν περιστάσεων καὶ παρὰ τὰς ἐπιμιξίας καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν προειρημένων ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῶν δέκα τρόπων· εἴτε νοητὸν, μὴ διδομένης αὐτόθεν τῆς τῶν αἰσθητῶν καταλήψεως, ἀφ' ἧς ὀρμώμενοι τοῖς νοητοῖς ἐπιβάλλειν δοκοῦμεν, οὐδὲ ἡ τῶν νοητῶν αὐτόθεν

¹ [δοκεῖν] om. T.

sensible. Since, then, no sensible object exists in the nature of things from which we can derive the notion of Body, Body will not be intelligible either. And if it is neither sensible nor intelligible, and besides these nothing else exists, we must declare that, so far as this argument goes, Body has no existence. Accordingly 49 we, by thus opposing the arguments against Body to the apparent existence of Body, infer suspension of judgement concerning Body.

The inapprehensibility of Body involves also that of the Incorporeal. For privations are conceived as privations of states or faculties, as, for example, blindness of sight, deafness of hearing, and similarly with the rest. Hence, in order to apprehend a privation, we must first have apprehended the state of which the privation is said to be a privation; for if one had no conception of sight one would not be able to assert that this man does not possess sight, which is the meaning of being blind. If then Incorporeality is 50 the privation of Body, and when states are not apprehended it is impossible for the privations of them to be apprehended, and it has been proved that Body is inapprehensible, Incorporeality also will be inapprehensible. Moreover, it is either sensible or intelligible. And if it is sensible, it is inapprehensible because of the variance amongst animals and men, the senses and the circumstances, and owing to the admixtures and all the other things we have previously described in our exposition of the Ten Tropes.^a If, again, it is intelligible, since the apprehension of sensibles, which is supposed to form the starting-point from which we attain to the intelligibles,^b is not immediately given, neither will the apprehension of

^a Cf. i. 36 ff.

^b Cf. ii. 10.

κατάληψις δοθήσεται, διόπερ οὐδὲ ἡ τοῦ ἀσωμάτου.

51 "Ὁ τε φάσκων καταλαμβάνειν τὸ ἀσώματον ἤτοι αἰσθήσει τοῦτο παραστήσει καταλαμβάνειν ἢ διὰ λόγου. καὶ αἰσθήσει μὲν οὐδαμῶς, ἐπειδὴ αἱ μὲν αἰσθήσεις κατὰ ἐπέρευσιν καὶ νύξιν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι δοκοῦσι τῶν αἰσθητῶν, οἷον ἡ ὄρασις, ἐάν τε κατὰ ἔντασιν¹ γίνηται κώνου, ἐάν τε κατὰ εἰδώλων ἀποκρίσεις τε καὶ ἐπικρίσεις, ἐάν τε <κατ>² ἀκτίνων ἢ χρωμάτων ἀποχύσεις, καὶ ἡ ἀκοή δέ, ἦν τε ὁ πεπληγμένος ἀήρ ἦν τε τὰ μόρια τῆς φωνῆς φέρηται περὶ τὰ ὦτα καὶ πλήττη τὸ ἀκουστικὸν πνεῦμα ὥστε τὴν ἀντίληψιν τῆς φωνῆς ἀπεργάζεσθαι. ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ ὀδμαὶ τῇ ῥινὶ καὶ οἱ χυμοὶ αὐτῇ γλώττῃ προσπίπτουσιν, καὶ τὰ τὴν ἀφήν 52 κινούντα ὁμοίως τῇ ἀφῆ. τὰ δὲ ἀσώματα ἐπέρευσιν τοιαύτην ὑπομένειν οὐχ οἷά τε ἔστιν, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν δύναίτο τῇ αἰσθήσει καταλαμβάνεσθαι.

'Ἄλλ' οὐδὲ διὰ λόγου. εἰ μὲν γὰρ λεκτὸν ἔστιν ὁ λόγος καὶ ἀσώματος, ὡς οἱ στωικοὶ φασιν, ὁ λέγων διὰ λόγου καταλαμβάνεσθαι τὰ ἀσώματα τὸ ζητούμενον συναρπάξει. ζητούντων γὰρ ἡμῶν εἰ δύναται ἀσώματόν τι καταλαμβάνεσθαι, αὐτὸς ἀσώματόν τι λαβὼν ἀπλῶς διὰ τούτου τὴν κατάληψιν τῶν ἀσωμάτων ποιῆσθαι θέλει. καίτοι αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος, εἴπερ ἀσώματος ἔστι, τῆς τῶν 53 ζητουμένων ἐστὶ μοίρας. πῶς οὖν ἀποδείξει τις

¹ ἔντασιν Kayser: ἔντασιν mss., Bekk.

² <κατ> add. T, cj. Bekk.

^a The first of these theories of vision is that of Chrysippus (a cone of light connecting eye with object), the second that of Democritus and Epicurus, the third that of Empedocles, Pythagoreans, Plato (*Tim.* 45 v) and Aristotle.

the intelligibles be given immediately, nor, consequently, that of Incorporeality.

Also, he who asserts that he apprehends the In- 51 corporeal will maintain that he apprehends it either by sense or by means of reason. Certainly not by sense, since it is supposed that the senses perceive the sensibles by way of "impression" and "indentation,"—take sight, for instance, whether it occur by reason of the tension of a cone, or of the emissions and immissions of images, or by effusions of rays or colours^a; and hearing too, whether it be the smitten air^b or the parts of the sound that are carried round the ears and smite the acoustic breath so as to effect the perception of sound. Smells also impinge on the nose and flavours on the tongue, and likewise objects of touch on the sense of touch. But incorporeals are 52 incapable of submitting to impression of this kind, so that they could not be apprehended by sense.

Nor yet by means of reason. For if the reason is "verbally expressible"^c and incorporeal, as the Stoics assert, he who says that incorporeals are apprehended by means of reason is begging the question. For when our question is—"Can an incorporeal object be apprehended?" he assumes an incorporeal object and then, by means of it alone, claims to effect the apprehension of incorporeals. Yet reason itself, if it is incorporeal, belongs to the class of things which are in question. How, then, is one to 53

^b Cf. Plato, *Tim.* 67 v; Diog. Laert. vii. 158; "acoustic breath" is Stoic for the air within the ear, cf. ii. 70.

^c For the Stoic theory of "expression" (λεκτόν) cf. ii. 81, 104. *Logos* ("reason" or "word") is from the same stem as *Lekton* ("what can be put into words" or "meaning"), which—as contrasted with "uttered words"—was termed by the Stoics "incorporeal."

ὅτι πρότερον τοῦτο τὸ ἀσώματον καταλαμβάνεται, φημί δὲ τὸν λόγον; εἰ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἄλλου ἀσωμάτου, κἀκεῖνου ζητήσομεν τὴν ἀπόδειξιν τῆς καταλήψεως, καὶ τοῦτο μέχρις ἀπείρου· εἰ δὲ διὰ σώματος, ζητεῖται καὶ περὶ τῆς καταλήψεως τῶν σωμάτων· διὰ τίνος οὖν δείξομεν ὅτι καταλαμβάνεται τὸ σῶμα τὸ εἰς ἀπόδειξιν τῆς καταλήψεως τοῦ ἀσωμάτου λόγου λαμβανόμενον; εἰ μὲν διὰ σώματος, εἰς ἀπείρον ἐκβαλλόμεθα, εἰ δὲ δι' ἀσωμάτου, εἰς τὸν διάλληλον τρόπον ἐκπίπτομεν. μένοντος οὖν οὕτως ἀκαταλήπτου τοῦ λόγου, εἴπερ ἀσωμάτος ἐστίν, οὐκ ἂν δύναίτο τις λέγειν δι' αὐτοῦ καταλαμβάνεσθαι τὸ ἀσώματον.

54 Εἰ δὲ σώμα ἐστίν ὁ λόγος, ἐπεὶ καὶ περὶ τῶν σωμάτων διαπεφώνηται πρότερον καταλαμβάνεται ἢ οὐ, διὰ τὴν λεγομένην συνεχῆ ῥύσιν αὐτῶν, ὡς μὴδὲ τὴν τόδε¹ δεῖξιν ἐπιδέχεσθαι, μὴδὲ εἶναι νομιζέσθαι (παρὸ καὶ ὁ Πλάτων γινόμενα μὲν ὄντα δὲ οὐδέποτε καλεῖ τὰ σώματα), ἀπορῶ πῶς ἐπικριθῆσεται ἢ περὶ τοῦ σώματος διαφωνία, μήτε σώματι μήτε ἀσωμάτῳ ταύτην ὄρων ἐπικρίνεσθαι δυναμένην διὰ τὰς μικρῶ πρόσθεν εἰρημένας ἀτοπίας. οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ λόγῳ δυνατόν ἐστι κατα-
55 λαμβάνειν τὰ ἀσώματα. εἰ δὲ μήτε αἰσθήσει ὑποπίπτει μήτε διὰ λόγου καταλαμβάνεται, οὐδ' ἂν ὅλως καταλαμβάνοιτο.

Εἰ τοίνυν μήτε περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τοῦ σώματος μήτε περὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων οἶόν τέ ἐστι διαβεβαιώσασθαι, καὶ περὶ τῶν στοιχείων ἐστὶν ἐφεκτέον,

¹ τόδε Apelt: τότε MSS., Bekk.

prove that this particular incorporeal (I mean reason) is previously apprehended? For if it is by means of another incorporeal, we shall ask for the proof of its apprehension also, and so on *ad infinitum*; whereas, if it is by means of a body, the apprehension of bodies is also in question; by what means, then, are we to prove that the body which is assumed in order to prove the apprehension of the incorporeal reason is itself apprehended? If by means of a body, we are plunged into infinite regress; while if we do so by means of an incorporeal, we are wrecked on circular reasoning. Reason, then, since it is incorporeal, remaining thus inapprehensible, no one will be able to say that by means of it the incorporeal is apprehended.

But if reason is a body, inasmuch as about bodies 54 also there is much controversy as to whether or not they are apprehended, owing to what is called their "continual flux,"^a which gives rise to the view that they do not admit of the title "this" and are non-existent—just as Plato^b speaks of bodies as "becoming but never being,"—I am perplexed as to how this controversy about Body is to be settled, as I see that it cannot be settled, because of the difficulties stated a moment ago, either by a body or by an incorporeal. Neither, then, is it possible to apprehend the incorporeals by reason. And if they are 55 neither objects of sense nor apprehended by means of reason, they will not be apprehended at all.

If, then, it is impossible to be positive either about the existence of Body or about the Incorporeals, we must also suspend judgement concerning the Elements, and possibly about the things

^b Cf. ii. 28.

* The Heraclitean doctrine, cf. i. 217 ff.; §§ 82, 115 *infra*.

τάχα δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν μετὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα, εἶγε τούτων τὰ μὲν σώματα τὰ δὲ ἀσώματα, καὶ περὶ ἀμφοτέρων ἠπόρηται. πλὴν ἀλλὰ τῶν τε δραστηκῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ τῶν ὑλικῶν διὰ ταῦτα ἐφεκτῶν οὐσῶν ἀπορός ἐστὶν ὁ περὶ ἀρχῶν λόγος.

H'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΚΡΑΣΕΩΣ

56 Ἴνα δὲ καὶ ταῦτα παραλίπη τις, πῶς ἄρα καὶ γίνεσθαι φασι τὰ συγκρίματα ἐκ τῶν πρώτων στοιχείων, μήτε θίξεως καὶ ἀφῆς ὑπαρχούσης μήτε κράσεως ἢ μίξεως ὅλως; ὅτι μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀφή, καὶ μικρῶ πρόσθεν ὑπέμνησα, ὅτε περὶ τῆς ὑποστάσεως τοῦ σώματος διελεγόμην· ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ ὁ τρόπος τῆς κράσεως ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπ' αὐτῶν δυνατός ἐστι, διὰ βραχείων ἐπιστήσω. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ λέγεται περὶ κράσεως, καὶ σχεδὸν ἀνήνυτοι περὶ τοῦ προκειμένου σκέμματός εἰσι παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς στάσεις· ὅθεν εὐθέως ἅμα τῇ ἀνεπικρίτῳ διαφωνία καὶ τὸ ἀκατάληπτον τοῦ σκέμματος συνάγοιτ' ἄν. ἡμεῖς δὲ νῦν τὴν πρὸς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἀντίρρησιν παραιτησάμενοι διὰ τὴν πρόθεσιν τῆς συγγραφῆς, τὰδε λέξεν ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος ἀποχρώντως ὑπολαμβάνομεν.

57 Τὰ κιννάμενα ἐξ οὐσίας καὶ ποιότητων συγκεῖσθαι φασίν. ἤτοι οὖν τὰς μὲν οὐσίας αὐτῶν μί-

^a For the four (or five) "elements" cf. §§ 30, 31; for "the things behind" them (from the point of view of cognition), i.e. primary bodies or stuff, cf. § 32.

^b i.e. the primary bodies out of which, as "elements," the (four) so-called "elements" (earth, air, fire, water) were said by the Stoics to be compounded.

^c For "touch" cf. i. 50, 96, iii. 45-46. "Mixture" (of solids as well as fluids) is a wider term than "blending."

which lie behind the Elements^a as well, seeing that of these some are bodies, others incorporeals, and both of these are matters of doubt. In fact, when both the active and the material Principles, for these reasons, call for suspense of judgement, the doctrine of Principles is open to doubt.

CHAPTER VIII.—CONCERNING MIXTURE

But, to pass over these problems, how do they⁵⁶ explain the production of the compounds from the primary elements,^b when neither contact and touch nor mixture or blending^c has any existence at all? For that touch is nothing I showed a moment ago, when I was discussing the subsistence of Body; and that the method of Mixture is equally impossible on their own showing, I shall briefly demonstrate. For there is much argument about Mixture, and the rival views held by the Dogmatists^d on the problem propounded are well-nigh endless; and hence we might straightway infer, along with the indeterminable controversy, the inapprehensibility of the problem. And we shall for the moment, owing to the design of our treatise, excuse ourselves from answering all their views in detail, deeming that the following remarks will amply suffice for the present.

They declare that mixed things are composed of⁵⁷ substance and qualities. If so, one must declare

^d Especially Aristotle (*De gen. et corr.* i. 10) and the Stoics. The following argument is against the latter. As Aristotle says, "mixture" effects some change, but not a total change, in the things mixed, which must be such as are capable of mutually affecting one another, and capable also of being easily decomposed into their constituent particles: he defines "mixture" as "the union of mixables which have undergone alteration."

γνυσθαι φήσει τις τὰς δὲ ποιότητος μηδαμῶς, ἢ τὰς μὲν ποιότητος ἀναμίγνυσθαι μηκέτι δὲ τὰς οὐσίας, ἢ μηθέτερον ἀναμίγνυσθαι θατέρῳ, ἢ ἀμφότερα ἐνοῦσθαι ἀλλήλοις. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν οὔτε αἱ ποιότητες οὔτε αἱ οὐσῖαι ἀναμίγνυνται ἀλλήλοις, ἀνεπινώτος ἔσται ἡ κρᾶσις· πῶς γὰρ μία αἴσθησις ἀπὸ τῶν κίρναμένων γίνεσθαι συμβήσεται, εἴγε κατὰ μηδὲν τῶν προειρημένων μίγνυνται ἀλλήλοις τὰ κίρναμένα; εἰ δὲ αἱ μὲν ποιότητες ἀπλῶς παρακείσθαι λεχθεῖεν ἀλλήλαις αἱ δὲ οὐσῖαι μίγνυσθαι, καὶ οὕτως ἄτοπον ἂν εἴη τὸ λεγόμενον· οὐ γὰρ κεχωρισμένων τῶν ποιότητων τῶν ἐν ταῖς κρᾶσεσιν ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα, ἀλλ' ὡς μιᾶς ἀπὸ τῶν κίρναμένων ἀποτελουμένης αἰσθανόμεθα. εἰ δὲ τὰς μὲν ποιότητος μίγνυσθαι λέγοι τις τὰς δὲ οὐσίας μηδαμῶς, ἀδύνατα λέξει· ἢ γὰρ τῶν ποιότητων ὑπόστασις ἐν ταῖς οὐσίαις ἔστιν, διόπερ γελοῖον ἂν εἴη λέγειν ὡς αἱ μὲν ποιότητες χωρισθεῖσαι τῶν οὐσιῶν [καὶ]¹ ἰδίᾳ μίγνυνται πῶς ἀλλήλαις, ἄποιοι δὲ αἱ οὐσῖαι χωρὶς ὑπολείπονται.

59 Δεῖπεται λέγειν ὅτι καὶ αἱ ποιότητες τῶν κίρναμένων καὶ αἱ οὐσῖαι χωροῦσι δι' ἀλλήλων καὶ μίγνυνται τὴν κρᾶσιν ἀποτελοῦσιν. ὁ τῶν προειρημένων ἔστιν ἀτοπώτερον· ἀδύνατος γὰρ ἔστιν ἡ τοιαύτη κρᾶσις. ὅλον γοῦν ἕαν δέκα κοτύλαις ὕδατος κωνείου χυλοῦ κοτύλη μίχθῃ, παντὶ τῷ ὕδατι συνανακίρνασθαι ἂν λέγοιτο τὸ κώνειον· εἰ γοῦν καὶ τι βραχύτατον μέρος τοῦ μίγματος λάβοι

¹ [καὶ] om. T, Creuzer.

* Here "blend" is used merely as a synonym for "mix."
 † Chrysippus held that "mixture" is not effected by superficial "juxtaposition" but by the mutual "permeation"

either that their substances are blended^a but not their qualities, or their qualities blended but not their substances any longer, or neither blended with the other, or both unified with each other. But if neither the qualities nor the substances are blended with one another, Mixture will be inconceivable; for how will a single sensation result from the things mixed if the things mixed are blended with one another in none of the ways stated above? And if it should be said 58 that the qualities are simply juxtaposed and the substances blended, even so the statement would be absurd; for we do not perceive the qualities in the mixtures as separate objects but as a single sense-impression produced by the mixed things. And anyone who should assert that the qualities are blended, but the substances not, would be asserting the impossible; for the reality of the qualities resides in the substances, so that it would be ridiculous to assert that the qualities by themselves, in separation from the substances, are somehow blended with one another, while the substances are left apart void of quality.

It only remains to say that both the qualities and 59 the substances of the mixed things permeate one another^b and by their blending produce Mixture. But this is a more absurd view than any of the foregoing; for such a mixture is impossible. Thus, for example, if a cup of hemlock juice were blended with ten cups of water, it will be said that the hemlock is mixed in with all the water; for certainly if one were to take even the least portion of the mixture he would

or "interpenetration" of the constituents of the mixture: "qualities" as well as substances he regarded as corporeal and thus capable of being "penetrated."

τις, εὐρήσει πεπληρωμένον αὐτὸ τῆς τοῦ κωνείου
 60 δυνάμεως. εἰ δὲ ἐπιμίγνυται τὸ κώνειον παντὶ
 μέρει τοῦ ὕδατος καὶ παρεκτείνεται αὐτῷ ὅλον
 ὅλῳ κατὰ τε τὴν τῶν οὐσιῶν καὶ τῶν ποιότητων
 αὐτῶν δι' ἀλλήλων δίοδον, ἢ οὕτως ἢ κρᾶσις
 γένηται, τὰ δὲ παρεκτεινόμενα ἀλλήλοις καθ' ἅπαν
 μέρος τὸν ἴσον ἐπέχει τόπον, διὸ καὶ ἴσα ἀλλήλοις
 ἐστίν, ἴση ἔσται ἢ κοτύλη τοῦ κωνείου ταῖς δέκα
 κοτύλαις τοῦ ὕδατος, ὡς εἴκοσι κοτύλας ὀφείλειν
 εἶναι τὸ μίγμα ἢ δύο μόνας, ὅσον ἐπὶ τῆδε τῆ
 ὑποθέσει τοῦ τρόπου τῆς κρᾶσεως· καὶ κοτύλης
 πάλιν ὕδατος ταῖς εἴκοσι κοτύλαις ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ
 λόγῳ τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἐπεμβληθείσης τεσσαράκοντα
 κοτυλῶν ὀφείλει τὸ μέτρον εἶναι ἢ πάλιν δύο μόνων,
 ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὴν κοτύλην εἴκοσι κοτύλας ἐνδέχεται
 νοεῖν, ὅσαις παρεκτείνεται, καὶ τὰς εἴκοσι κοτύλας
 61 μίαν, ἢ συνεξισοῦνται. δυνατόν δὲ οὕτω κατὰ μίαν
 κοτύλην ἐπεμβάλλοντα καὶ ὁμοίως συλλογιζόμενον
 συνάγειν ὅτι αἱ εἴκοσι δρώμενοι τοῦ μίγματος
 κοτύλαι δισμύριαί ποῦ καὶ πρὸς ὀφείλουσιν εἶναι
 ὅσον ἐπὶ τῆ ὑποθέσει τοῦ τρόπου τῆς κρᾶσεως, αἱ
 δὲ αὐταὶ καὶ δύο μόνα· ὅπερ ἀπεμφάσεως ὑπερ-
 βολὴν οὐκ ἀπολέλοιπεν. οὐκοῦν ἀτοπὸς ἐστὶ καὶ
 62 αὕτη ἢ ὑπόθεσις τῆς κρᾶσεως. εἰ δὲ οὔτε τῶν
 οὐσιῶν μόνων μιγνυμένων ἀλλήλαις οὔτε τῶν
 ποιότητων μόνων οὔτε ἀμφοτέρων οὔτε οὐθετέρου
 δύναται γίνεσθαι κρᾶσις, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν
 ὁλον τέ ἐστὶν ἐπινοεῖν, ἀνεπινώθητος ὁ τρόπος τῆς
 τε κρᾶσεως καὶ ὅλως τῆς μίξεως ἐστίν. διόπερ
 εἰ μήτε κατὰ θίξιν παρατιθέμενα ἀλλήλοις τὰ
 καλούμενα στοιχεῖα μήτε ἀνακινώμενα ἢ μιγνύ-
 μενα ποιητικὰ τῶν συγκριμάτων εἶναι δύναται,

find it full of the potency of the hemlock. Yet if the 60
 hemlock is blended in with every particle of the water
 and is distributed as a whole over the whole volume
 of the water and through the mutual interpenetration
 of both their substances and their qualities, so that
 Mixture may in this way result; and if the things so
 distributed over each other in every particle occupy
 an equal space, so that they are equal to each other,—
 then the cup of hemlock will be equal to the ten cups
 of water, so that the blend must consist of twenty
 cups or of only two, according to the assumption now
 made as to the mode of Mixture. And if, again, a
 cup of water were poured into the twenty cups,
 then—according to the theory assumed—the quantity
 is bound to be forty cups or, again, only two, since it
 is admissible to conceive either the one cup as all
 the twenty over which it is distributed, or the twenty
 cups as the one with which they are equalized. And 61
 by thus pouring in a cup at a time and pursuing the
 same argument it is possible to infer that the twenty
 cups seen in the blend must be twenty thousand and
 more, according to the theory of Mixture assumed,
 and at the same time only two—a conclusion which
 reaches the very height of incongruity. Wherefore
 this theory of Mixture also is absurd.

But if Mixture cannot come about by the mutual 62
 blending either of the substances alone or of the
 qualities alone or of both or of neither, and it is
 impossible to conceive any other ways than these,
 then the process of Mixture and of blending in
 general is inconceivable. Hence, if the so-called
 Elements are unable to form the compounds either
 by way of contact through juxtaposition or by

ἀνεπινοήτος ἔστιν ἡ κατὰ τοὺς δογματικοὺς φυσιο-
λογία καὶ ὅσον ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ.

Θ.—ΠΕΡΙ ΚΙΝΗΣΕΩΣ

63 Πρὸς δὲ τοῖς προειρημένοις ἦν ἐπιστήσαι τῷ
περὶ τῶν κινήσεων λόγῳ, ὧ καὶ ἀδύνατος ἂν
εἶναι νομισθεῖν ἢ κατὰ τοὺς δογματικοὺς φυσιο-
λογία. πάντως γὰρ κατὰ τινα κίνησιν τῶν τε
στοιχείων καὶ τῆς δραστικῆς ἀρχῆς ὀφείλει γίνε-
σθαι τὰ συγκρίματα. εἰ δὲ οὖν ὑπομήσωμεν ὅτι
μηδὲν εἶδος κινήσεως ὁμολογεῖται, σαφές ἔσται ὅτι
καὶ διδομένων καθ' ὑπόθεσιν τῶν προειρημένων
ἀπάντων μάρτην ὁ καλούμενος φυσικὸς λόγος τοῖς
δογματικοῖς διεξώδεται.

Ι'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΜΕΤΑΒΑΤΙΚΗΣ ΚΙΝΗΣΕΩΣ

64 Φασὶ τοίνυν οἱ δοκοῦντες ἐντελέστερον περὶ
κινήσεως διεληφέναι ἐξ εἶδη ταύτης ὑπάρχειν,
τοπικὴν μετάβασιν, φυσικὴν μεταβολήν, αὐξήσιν,
μείωσιν, γένεσιν, φθοράν. ἡμεῖς οὖν ἐκάστῳ τῶν
προειρημένων εἰδῶν τῆς κινήσεως κατ' ἰδίαν ἐπι-
στήσομεν, ἀπὸ τῆς τοπικῆς μεταβάσεως ἀρξά-
μενοι. ἔστιν οὖν αὕτη κατὰ τοὺς δογματικοὺς καθ'
ἦν τόπον ἐκ τόπου περιέρχεται τὸ κινούμενον ἥτοι
καθ' ὁλότητα ἢ κατὰ μέρος, ὅλον μὲν ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν
περιπατούντων, κατὰ μέρος δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς περὶ
κέντρῳ κινουμένης σφαίρας. ὅλης γὰρ αὐτῆς
μενούσης ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ τὰ μέρη τοὺς τόπους
ἀμείβει.

¹ ᾧ καὶ ego : καὶ ὡς mss., Bekk. : καὶ om. Steph.

mixture or blending, then, so far as this argument
goes, the physical theory of the Dogmatists is in-
conceivable.

CHAPTER IX.—CONCERNING MOTION

In addition to the foregoing we might have dwelt 63
on the argument about the kinds of motion, since
this also might be held to render the physical theory
of the Dogmatists impossible. For the formation of
the compounds must certainly be due to some motion
both of the elements and of the efficient Principle.
If, then, we shall show that no one kind of motion is
generally agreed upon, it will be clear that, even if
all the assumptions mentioned above be granted, the
Dogmatists have elaborated their so-called " Physical
Doctrine " in vain.

CHAPTER X.—CONCERNING TRANSIENT MOTION

Now those who are reputed to have given the most 64
complete classification of Motion assert that six kinds
of it exist—local transition, physical change, increase,
decrease, becoming, perishing.* We, then, shall deal
with each of the aforesaid kinds of motion separately
beginning with local transition. According, then, to
the Dogmatists, this is the motion by which the moving
object passes on from place to place, either wholly
or partially—wholly as in the case of men walking,
partially as when a globe is moving round a central
axis, for while as a whole it remains in the same place,
its parts change their places.

* Cf. *Adv. Phys.* ii. 37 ff.; *Aristot. Phys.* vii. 2, *Categ.*
15 a 13; *Plato, Laws*, x. 894.

65 Τρεῖς δέ, οἶμαι, γεγόνασιν αἱ ἀνωτάτω περὶ κινήσεως στάσεις. ὁ μὲν γὰρ βίος¹ καὶ τινες τῶν φιλοσόφων εἶναι κίνησιν ὑπολαμβάνουσι, μὴ εἶναι δὲ Παρμενίδης τε καὶ Μελίσσος καὶ ἄλλοι τινές. μὴ μᾶλλον δὲ εἶναι ἢ μὴ κίνησιν ἔφασαν οἱ σκεπτικοί· ὅσον μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς φαινομένοις δοκεῖν εἶναι κίνησιν, ὅσον δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ λόγῳ μὴ ὑπάρχειν. ἡμεῖς οὖν ἐκθέμενοι τὴν ἀντίρρησιν τῶν τε εἶναι κίνησιν ὑπολαμβανόντων καὶ τῶν μηδὲν εἶναι κίνησιν ἀποφαινομένων, ἐὰν τὴν διαφωνίαν εὐρίσκωμεν ἰσοσθενῆ, μὴ μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι κίνησιν λέγειν ἀναγκασθησόμεθα ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς
66 λεγομένοις. ἀρξόμεθα δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπάρχειν αὐτὴν λεγόντων.

Οὗτοι δὲ τῇ ἐναργείᾳ μάλιστα ἐπερείδονται· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἔστι, φασί, κινήσις, πῶς μὲν ἀπὸ ἀνατολῶν ἐπὶ δυσμᾶς ὁ ἥλιος φέρεται, πῶς δὲ τὰς τοῦ ἔτους ὥρας ποιεῖ, παρὰ τοὺς πρὸς ἡμᾶς συνεγγισμοὺς αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰς ἀφ' ἡμῶν ἀποστάσεις γιγνομένας; ἢ πῶς νῆες ἀπὸ λιμένων ἀναχθεῖσαι καταΐρουσι ἐπὶ λιμένας ἄλλους πάμπολλυ τῶν προτέρων ἀφ-εστῶτας; τίνα δὲ τρόπον ὁ τὴν κίνησιν ἀναιρῶν πρόεισι τῆς οἰκίας καὶ αὐθις ἀναστρέφει; ταῦτα δὲ τελέως ἀναντίρρητα εἶναι. διὸ καὶ τῶν κυνικῶν τις ἐρωτηθεὶς κατὰ τῆς κινήσεως λόγον οὐδὲν ἀπεκρίνατο, ἀνέστη δὲ καὶ ἐβόησεν, ἔργῳ καὶ διὰ τῆς ἐναργείας παριστάς ὅτι ὑπαρκτὴ ἔστιν ἡ κινήσις.

¹ βίος T: βίος MSS., Bekk.

^a Lit. "by life," cf. i. 165, ii. 244.

^b Such as Zeno and Diodorus Cronos, cf. ii. 242.

The main views held about motion are, I imagine, 65 three. It is assumed by ordinary people ^a and by some philosophers that motion exists, but by Parmenides, Melissus and certain others ^b that it does not exist; while the Sceptics have declared that it is "no more" existent than non-existent; for so far as the evidence of phenomena goes it seems that motion exists, whereas to judge by the philosophic argument it would seem not to exist. So when we have exposed the contradiction which lies between those who believe in the existence of motion and those who maintain that motion is naught, if we shall find the counter-arguments of equal weight, ^c we shall be compelled to declare that, so far as these arguments go, motion is "no more" existent than non-existent. We shall begin with those who affirm its real 66 existence.

These base their view mainly on "evidence." ^d If, say they, motion does not exist, how does the sun move from east to west, and how does it produce the seasons of the year, which are brought about by its approximations to us and its recessions from us? Or how do ships put out from harbours and cast anchor in other harbours very far distant from the first? And in what fashion does the denier of motion proceed from his house and return to it again? These facts are perfectly incontestable. Consequently, when one of the Cynics ^e had an argument against motion put to him, he made no reply but stood up and began to walk, thus demonstrating by his action and by "evidence" that motion is capable of real existence.

^c Cf. i. 26 for "equipollence" as leading to Sceptic "suspension."

^d i.e. what is plainly obvious, cf. § 266.

^e Cf. ii. 244.

Οὗτοι μὲν οὖν οὕτω δυσωπεῖν ἐπιχειροῦσι τοὺς
 67 τῆς ἐναντίας αὐτοῖς στάσεως ὄντας· οἱ δὲ τὴν
 ὑπαρξίν τῆς κινήσεως ἀναιροῦντες λόγοις ἐπι-
 χειροῦσι τοιούτοις. εἰ κινεῖται τι, ἤτοι ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ
 κινεῖται ἢ ὑφ' ἑτέρου. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ὑφ' ἑτέρου, [τὸ
 γὰρ λεγόμενον ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ κινεῖσθαι] ἤτοι ἀναιτίως
 κινήθησεται ἢ κατὰ τινα αἰτίαν. ἀναιτίως μὲν
 οὐδὲν φασὶ γίνεσθαι· εἰ δὲ κατὰ τινα αἰτίαν κινεῖ-
 ται, ἢ αἰτία, καθ' ἣν κινεῖται, κινήτικη αὐτοῦ
 68 μικρῶ πρόσθεν εἰρημένῃ ἐπιβολῇ. ἄλλως τε καὶ
 εἰ τὸ κινεῖν ἐνεργεῖ, τὸ δὲ ἐνεργοῦν κινεῖται,
 κάκεινο δεήσειται κινεῖντος ἑτέρου, καὶ τὸ δεύτερον
 τρίτου, καὶ μέχρι ἀπείρου, ὡς ἀναρχον γίνεσθαι
 τὴν κίνησιν· ὅπερ ἄποπον. οὐκ ἄρα πᾶν τὸ κινου-
 μενον ὑφ' ἑτέρου κινεῖται. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ.
 ἐπεὶ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ κινεῖν ἤτοι προωθοῦν κινεῖ ἢ
 ἐπισπώμενον ἢ ἀνωθοῦν ἢ ἐνθλίβον, δεήσει τὸ
 69 ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν κατὰ τινα τῶν προειρημένων τρόπων
 ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν προωστικῶς ἑαυτὸ κινεῖ,
 ἔσται ἐξόπισθεν ἑαυτοῦ, εἰ δὲ ἐπισπαστικῶς, ἔμ-
 προσθεν, εἰ δὲ ἀνωστικῶς, ὑποκάτω, εἰ δὲ ἐν-
 θλιπτικῶς, ἐπάνω. ἀδύνατον δὲ αὐτὸ τι ἑαυτοῦ
 ἐπάνω εἶναι ἢ ἔμπροσθεν ἢ ὑποκάτω ἢ ὀπίσω·
 ἀδύνατον ἄρα ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ τι κινεῖσθαι. εἰ δὲ μήτε
 ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ τι κινεῖται μήτε ὑφ' ἑτέρου, οὐδὲ
 κινεῖται τι.

70 Εἰ δέ τις ἐπὶ τὴν ὀρμὴν καὶ τὴν προαίρεσιν κατα-
 φεύγοι, ὑπομνηστέον αὐτὸν τῆς περὶ τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῶν
 διαφωνίας, καὶ ὅτι ἀνεπίκριτος αὕτη καθέστηκεν,

* An Aristotelian phrase: freedom of choice was denied by fatalists, such as Democritus and the Stoics.

So these men attempt in this way to put to shame those who hold the contrary opinion; but those who 67 deny the existence of motion allege such arguments as these: If a thing is moved, it is moved either by itself or by another thing. But if it is moved by another, it will be moved either causelessly or owing to some cause. Nothing, they assert, is moved causelessly; but if it is moved owing to some cause, the cause owing to which it moves will be what makes it move, and thus we are involved in an infinite regress, according to the criticism stated a little while ago. Moreover, if the movent thing 68 is active, and what is active is moved, that movent thing will need another movent thing, and the second a third, and so on *ad infinitum*, so that the motion comes to have no beginning; which is absurd. Therefore the thing that moves is not always moved by another. Nor yet by itself. Since every movent causes motion either by pushing forward or by drawing after or by pushing up or by thrusting down, what is self-movent must move itself in one of the aforesaid ways. But if it moves itself propulsively, it will be 69 behind itself; and if by pulling after, it will be in front of itself; and if by pushing up, it will be below itself; and if by thrusting down, it will be above itself. But it is impossible for anything to be above or before or beneath or behind its own self; therefore it is impossible for anything to be moved by itself. But if nothing is moved either by itself or by another, then nothing is moved at all.

And if anyone should seek refuge in the notions 70 of "impulse" and "purpose" we must remind him of the controversy about "what is in our power,"^a and

κριτήριον ἡμῶν τῆς ἀληθείας ἄχρι νῦν οὐχ εὐρηκότων.

71 Ἐτι κακείνω λεκτέον. εἰ κινεῖται τι, ἦτοι ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπω κινεῖται ἢ ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἔστιν. οὔτε δὲ ἐν ᾧ ἔστιν μένει γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ, εἴπερ ἐν αὐτῷ ἔστιν· οὔτε ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν· ὅπου γὰρ τι μὴ ἔστιν, ἐκεῖ οὐδὲ δράσαι τι οὐδὲ παθεῖν δύναται. οὐκ ἄρα κινεῖται τι. οὗτος δὲ ὁ λόγος ἔστι μὲν Διοδώρου τοῦ Κρόνου, πολλῶν δὲ ἀντιρρήσεων τετύχηκεν, ὧν τὰς πληκτικωτέρας διὰ τὸν τρόπον τῆς συγγραφῆς ἐκθησόμεθα μετὰ τῆς φαινομένης ἡμῖν ἐπικρίσεως.

72 Φασὶν οὖν τινὲς ὅτι δύναται τι ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπω κινεῖσθαι· τὰς γοῦν περὶ τοῖς κέντροις περιδιδυμένας σφαίρας ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μενούσας τόπω κινεῖσθαι. πρὸς οὓς μεταφέρειν χρὴ τὸν λόγον ἐφ' ἕκαστον τῶν μερῶν τῆς σφαίρας, καὶ ὑπομνησκοντας ὅτι ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ μηδὲ κατὰ μέρη κινεῖται, συνάγειν ὅτι μηδὲ ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπω κινεῖται

73 τι. τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ ποιήσομεν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς λέγοντας ὅτι τὸ κινούμενον δυοῖν ἔχεται τόπων, τοῦ τε ἐν ᾧ ἔστι καὶ τοῦ εἰς ὃν φέρεται. πευσόμεθα γὰρ αὐτῶν πότε φέρεται τὸ κινούμενον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπου εἰς τὸν ἕτερον, ἄρα ὅτε ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τόπῳ ἔστιν ἢ ὅτε ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ. ἀλλ' ὅτε μὲν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τόπῳ ἔστιν, οὐ μετέρχεται εἰς τὸν δεύτερον· ἔτι γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ ἔστιν· ὅτε δὲ οὐκ

74 ἔστιν ἐν τούτῳ, οὐ μετέρχεται ἀπ' αὐτοῦ. πρὸς τῷ καὶ συναρπάζεσθαι τὸ ζητούμενον· ἐν ᾧ γὰρ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ ἐνεργεῖν ἐν αὐτῷ δύναται· οὐ γὰρ

^a Cf. ii. 18 ff.

^b Cf. ii. 245.

how it is still unsettled, since hitherto we have failed to find a criterion of truth.^a

Further, there is this also to be said. If a thing 71 moves, it moves either in the place where it is or in that where it is not. But it does not move in the place where it is, for if it is in it, it remains in it; nor yet does it move in the place where it is not; for where a thing is not, there it can neither effect nor suffer anything. Therefore nothing moves. This argument is, in fact, that of Diodorus Cronos,^b but it has been the subject of many attacks, of which we shall describe, owing to the character of our treatise, only the more formidable, together with a judgement of their value, as it seems to us.

Some, then, assert that a thing can move in 72 the place where it is; at any rate the globes which revolve round their axes move while remaining in the same place.^c Against these men we should transfer the argument which applies to each of the parts of the globe, and, reminding them that, to judge by this argument, it does not move even in respect of its parts, draw the conclusion that nothing moves in the place where it is. And we shall take the same course 73 in replying to those who declare that the moving thing occupies two places, that wherein it is and that whereto it shifts. For we shall ask them *when* the moving object shifts from the place wherein it is to the other place—whether while it is in the first place or while it is in the second. But when it is in the first place it does not pass over into the second, for it is still in the first; and when it is not in this, it is not passing from it. And besides, the question is being 74 begged; for where it is not, there it cannot be active.

^c Cf. *Adv. Phys.* ii. 93, 103.

δήπου φέρεσθαι εἰς τινα τόπον συγχωρήσει τις ἐκείνο ἀπλῶς ὃ μὴ δίδωσι κινεῖσθαι.

- 75 Τινὲς μέντοι καὶ ἐκείνο φασίν· τόπος λέγεται διχῶς, ὃ μὲν ἐν πλάτει, οἷον ὡς ἐμοῦ ἢ οἰκία, ὃ δὲ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν, ὡς λόγου χάριν ὃ περιτετυπωκῶς μου τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν τοῦ σώματος ἀήρ. λέγεται οὖν ἐν τόπῳ κινεῖσθαι τὸ κινούμενον οὐκ ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ κατὰ πλάτος. πρὸς οὓς ἔνεστιν, ὑποδιαιροῦντας τὸν ἐν πλάτει τόπον, λέγειν ὅτι τοῦτου ἐν ᾧ μὲν ἔστι κυρίως τὸ κινεῖσθαι λεγόμενον σῶμα, ὡς ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν αὐτοῦ τόπῳ, ἐν ᾧ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὡς ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς μέρεσι τοῦ κατὰ πλάτος τόπου· εἰτα συνάγοντας ὅτι μήτε ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπῳ κινεῖσθαι τι δύναται μήτε ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν, ἐπιλογίζεσθαι ὅτι μηδὲ ἐν τῷ κατὰ πλάτος καταχρηστικῶς λεγομένῳ τόπῳ κινεῖσθαι τι δύναται· συστατικὰ γὰρ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ τό τε ἐν ᾧ ἔστι πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν καὶ ἐν ᾧ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν οὐκ ἔστιν, ὧν ἐν οὐθετέρῳ κινεῖσθαι τι δύνασθαι δέδεικται.
- 76 Ἐρωτητέον δὲ καὶ ἐκείνον τὸν λόγον. εἰ κινεῖται τι, ἤτοι κατὰ τὸ πρότερον πρότερον κινεῖται ἢ κατὰ ἄθροον μεριστὸν διάστημα· οὔτε δὲ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον πρότερον δύναται τι κινεῖσθαι, οὔτε κατὰ τὸ ἄθροον μεριστὸν διάστημα, ὡς δείξομεν· οὐδὲ κινεῖται τι ἄρα.

* Cf. §§ 119, 131. "Place" in the "exact" or narrow sense means the precise portion of space occupied by an object, as distinguished from "place" in the "broad" or "extended" sense in which it includes surrounding portions of space. The latter sense of "place" was adopted in order to make "motion in place" feasible; but Sextus argues that it fails to do so.

¹ The following sections, 76-80, criticize two kinds of motion, (1) *successive* motion, by which the moving body occupies the first part of the intervening space first with its

For surely no one will allow that any object to which he does not grant motion at all can shift to any place.

Some, however, make this statement: Place is ⁷⁵ used in two senses, the broad sense, as for example "my house," and the exact sense,^a as for instance "the air which enfolds the surface of my body." So the moving object is said to move in place, "place" being used not in the exact sense but in the broad sense. To these we can reply by dividing up "place" in the broad sense, and saying that in one part of it the body said to be moved properly exists, this being its own "place" in the exact sense, and in the other part it does not exist, this being the remaining portions of "place" in the extended sense; next we shall argue that an object can move neither in the place where it is nor in that where it is not, and so conclude that nothing can move even in what is perversely termed "place" in the broad sense; for this is composed of the place wherein it is in the exact sense and the place wherein it is not, and it has been proved that a thing cannot move in either of these.

We should also propound the following argument.^b ⁷⁶ If a thing moves it moves either by way of orderly, or gradual, progression or by occupying the divisible interval all at once; but in neither of these ways can a thing move, as we shall prove; so that it does not move at all.

own first part, next with its second part, and so on till all its parts have passed through all the parts of the "interval." (Here it is assumed that both the moving body and the spatial distance, or "interval," are divisible; but, argues Sextus, whether they are infinitely divisible or divisible only into a limited number of indivisible parts, in either case motion is found to be impossible.) (2) *Momentaneous* motion (§§ 78-79), by which the moving body passes into the whole of the interval in a single moment of time.

"Οτι μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ πρότερον πρότερον οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τι κινεῖσθαι, αὐτόθεν δῆλον. εἰ μὲν γὰρ εἰς ἄπειρον τέμνονται τὰ σώματα καὶ οἱ τόποι καὶ οἱ χρόνοι οἷς κινεῖσθαι λέγεται τὰ σώματα, οὐ γενήσεται κίνησις, ἀδυνάτου ὄντος τοῦ πρώτον τι ἐν ἀπείροις εὔρεθῆναι, ἀφ' οὗ πρώτου κινήσεται τὸ 77 κινεῖσθαι λεγόμενον. εἰ δὲ εἰς ἄμερὲς καταλήγει τὰ προειρημένα, καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν κινουμένων ὁμοίως τὸ πρῶτον ἄμερὲς τοῦ τόπου τῷ πρώτῳ ἑαυτοῦ ἄμερεῖ μετέρχεται χρόνῳ, πάντα τὰ κινούμενα ἔστιν ἰσοταχῆ, οἷον ὁ ταχύτατος ἵππος καὶ ἡ χελώνη· ὅπερ τοῦ προτέρου ἔστιν ἀτοπώτερον. οὐκ ἄρα κατὰ τὸ πρότερον πρότερον γίνεται ἡ κίνησις.

Ἄλλ' οὐδὲ κατὰ τὸ ἄθρον μριστὸν διάστημα. 78 εἰ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν φαινομένων, ὡς φασί, μαρτυρεῖσθαι τὰ ἀδηλα χρή, ἐπεὶ, ἵνα τις ἀνύση σταδιαῖον διάστημα, δεῖ πρότερον αὐτὸν ἀνύσαι τὸ πρῶτον τοῦ σταδίου μέρος καὶ τὸ δεύτερον δεύτερον καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὁμοίως, οὕτω καὶ πᾶν τὸ κινούμενον κατὰ τὸ πρότερον πρότερον κινεῖσθαι προσήκει, ἐπεὶ τοί γε εἰ ἀθρόως διέναι τὸ κινούμενον λέγοιτο πάντα τὰ μέρη τοῦ τόπου ἐν ᾧ κινεῖσθαι λέγεται, ἐν πᾶσιν ἅμα ἔσται τοῖς μέρεσιν αὐτοῦ, καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν ψυχρὸν εἶη μέρος τὸ δὲ θερμὸν τοῦ δι' οὐ ποιεῖται τὴν κίνησιν, ἢ τὸ μὲν, εἰ τύχοι, μέλαν τὸ δὲ λευκὸν ὥστε καὶ χρώζειν τὰ ἐντυγχάνοντα δύνασθαι, τὸ κινούμενον ἔσται θερμὸν τε ἅμα καὶ 79 ψυχρὸν καὶ μέλαν καὶ λευκόν· ὅπερ ἀτοπον. εἶτα καὶ πόσον ἀθρόως διέξεισι τόπον τὸ κινούμενον

Now that a thing can not move in orderly progression is plain on the face of it. For if bodies, and also the places and the times in which the bodies are said to move, are divided to infinity, motion will not occur, it being impossible to discover amongst the infinite any first thing wherefrom the object said to move will derive its initial movement. And if the aforesaid 77 objects are reducible to atomic parts, and each of the moving things passes equally in an atomic period of time with its own first atom into the first atomic point of space, then all moving things are of equal velocity—the speediest horse, for instance, and the tortoise^a; which is a result even more absurd than the former. Therefore motion does not take place by way of orderly progression.

Nor yet by way of immediate occupation of the divisible interval. For if one ought, as they declare, 78 to take the apparent as evidence for the non-apparent, since, in order to complete the distance of a stade a man must first complete the first portion of the stade, and secondly the second portion, and so on with the rest, so likewise everything that moves ought to move by way of orderly progression; for surely if we should assert that the moving thing passes all at once through all the portions of the place wherein it is said to move, it will be in all the portions thereof at once, and if one portion of the place through which it has its motion should be cold, another hot, or, mayhap, one black, another white, so as to be able also to colour things in contact,—then the moving thing will be at once hot and cold and black and white, which is absurd. Next let them tell us how much space the 79

^a Cf. the Eleatic puzzle of "Achilles" (and the tortoise); cf. Aristot. *Phys.* vi. 9.

εἰπάτωσαν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀόριστον τοῦτον εἶναι φήσουσιν, προσδέξονται τι κινεῖσθαι διὰ πάσης τῆς γῆς ἀθρόως· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο φεύγουσιν, ὀρισάτωσαν ἡμῖν τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ τόπου. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν ἐπιχειρεῖν ὀρίζων τὸν τόπον οὐ πλέον διάστημα οὐδὲ κατὰ τὸ ἀκαριαῖον δυνήσεται διελθεῖν τὸ κινούμενον ἀθρόως, πρὸς τῷ ἀποκληρωτικῶν καὶ προπετές ἢ καὶ γελοῖον ἴσως εἶναι, εἰς τὴν ἀρχῆθεν ἀπορίαν ἐμπίπτει· πάντα γὰρ ἔσται ἰσοταχῆ, εἴγε ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ὁμοίως κατὰ περιωρισμένους τόπους τὰς μεταβάσεις τῶν κινήσεων ποιεῖται. εἰ δὲ φήσουσιν ὅτι μικρὸν μὲν, οὐ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν δὲ περιωρισμένον τόπον ἀθρόως κινεῖται τὸ κινούμενον, ἐνέσται ἡμῖν κατὰ τὴν σωριτικὴν ἀπορίαν αἰεὶ τῷ ὑποθεθέντι μεγέθει ἀκαριαῖον προστιθεῖναι μέγεθος τόπου. εἰ μὲν γὰρ στήσονται που τοιαύτην ποιουμένων ἡμῶν συνερῶτησιν, πάλιν εἰς τὸν ἀκριβῆ περιορισμὸν καὶ τὴν τερατείαν ἐκείνην ἐμπεσοῦνται· εἰ δὲ προσήσονται τὴν παραύξησιν, ἀναγκάσομεν αὐτοὺς σωγχωρεῖν ἀθρόως τι δύνασθαι κινηθῆναι διὰ τοῦ μεγέθους τῆς γῆς ἀπάσης. ὥστε οὐδὲ κατὰ ἄθρου μριστὸν διάστημα κινεῖται 81 τὰ κινεῖσθαι λεγόμενα. εἰ δὲ μήτε κατὰ ἄθρου μριστὸν τόπον μήτε κατὰ τὸ πρότερον πρότερον κινεῖται τι, οὐδὲ κινεῖται τι.

Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν καὶ ἔτι πλείω τούτων φασὶν οἱ τὴν μεταβατικὴν κίνησιν ἀναιροῦντες. ἡμεῖς δὲ

^a Cf. § 77. This is further explained in *Adv. Phys.* i. 154: "If all is indivisible (time, bodies, and space), all moving bodies will be of equal velocity (e.g. the sun and the tortoise), since an indivisible interval is completed by all alike in an indivisible moment of time." In this § 79 the difficulties as 382

moving thing passes through all at once. For if they shall assert that it is limitless, they will be granting that a thing moves through the whole of the earth all at once; while if they shirk this conclusion, let them define for us the extent of the space. But, on the one hand, the attempt to define precisely the space or interval beyond which the thing moving all at once will be unable to advance so much as a hair's-breadth is probably not merely presumptuous and rash or even ridiculous, but plunges us again into the original difficulty ^a; for all things will be of equal velocity, if each of them alike has its transitional movements over definite intervals of space. And if, on the other 80 hand, they shall assert that the moving thing moves all at once through a space that is small but not precisely determined, it will be open to us to adopt the *sorites* argument ^b and keep constantly adding a hair's-breadth of space to the breadth assumed. And if, then, they shall make a halt anywhere while we are pursuing this argument, they will be reverting to the monstrous theory of precise definition as before; while if they shall assent to the process of addition, we shall force them to grant that a thing can move all at once through the whole of the earth. Consequently, objects said to be in motion do not move by occupying a divisible interval all at once. But if 81 a thing moves neither thus instantaneously nor by way of gradual progression, it does not move at all.

These, and yet more than these, are the arguments used by those who reject transient motion. But we, regards the *quantity* of space passed through by the moving body on the *momentaneous* theory are exposed; it must be conceived either as (1) unlimited or (2) precisely limited, or (3) small, but not precisely limited; but all these views lead to absurdities. ^b Cf. ii. 253.

μήτε τοὺς λόγους τούτους μήτε τὸ φαινόμενον, ᾧ κατακολουθοῦντες εἰσάγουσι τὴν ὑπόστασιν τῆς κινήσεως, δυνάμενοι διατρέπειν, ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ ἀντιθέσει τῶν τε φαινομένων καὶ τῶν λόγων, ἐπέχομεν περὶ τοῦ πότερον ἔστι κίνησις ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν.

ΙΑ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΑΥΞΗΣΕΩΣ ΚΑΙ ΜΕΙΩΣΕΩΣ

- 82 Τῷ δὲ αὐτῷ χρώμενοι λογισμῷ καὶ περὶ αὐξήσεως τε καὶ περὶ μειώσεως ἐπέχομεν· ἡ γὰρ ἐν-ἀργεια δοκεῖ τὴν ὑπόστασιν αὐτῶν εἰσάγειν, ἣν οἱ λόγοι διατρέπειν δοκοῦσιν. ἡ θέασαι γοῦν· τὸ αὐξόμενον ὄν καὶ ὑφεστῶς εἰς μέγεθος ἐπιδιδόμην προσήκει, ὡς εἶγε ἐτέρῳ προσθέσεως γενομένης ἕτερον ἠύξηκέναι τις λέγοι, ψεύσεται. ἐπεὶ τοιούτων ἡ οὐσία οὐδέποτε ἔστηκεν ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ρεῖ τε καὶ ἕτερα ἀνθ' ἑτέρας ἐπεισκρίνεται, τὸ ἠύξηκέναι λεγόμενον οὐκ ἔχει τὴν προτέραν οὐσίαν καὶ μετὰ ταύτης ἄλλην τὴν προστεθείσαν ἀλλ' ὅλην ἕτεραν.
- 83 ὡσπερ οὖν εἰ, λόγου χάριν, ξύλου τριπήχεος ὄντος δεκάπηχου ἕτερον ἀγαγὼν τις ἠύξηκέναι τὸ τρίπηχου λέγοι, ψεύσεται διὰ τὸ ὅλον ἕτερον εἶναι τοῦτο ἐκείνου, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ παντὸς τοῦ αὐξομένου λεγομένου, τῆς προτέρας ὕλης ἀπορρεούσης καὶ ἑτέρας ἐπεισιούσης, εἰ προστίθεται τὸ προστίθεσθαι λεγόμενον, οὐκ ἂν αὐξήσιν τις εἴποι τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὄλου ἕτεροίωσιν.
- 84 Ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς καὶ περὶ τῆς μειώσεως λόγος· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὑφεστῶς ὅλως πῶς ἂν μεμειῶσθαι λέγοιτο;

^a Cf. § 66.

^b i.e. material substance, which Heraclitus and Plato said was "in flux," cf. i. 217 ff., ii. 28.

being unable to refute either these arguments or the apparent facts on which the view of the reality of motion is based, suspend our judgement—in view of the contradiction between appearances and arguments—regarding the question as to the existence or non-existence of motion.

CHAPTER XI.—CONCERNING INCREASE AND DECREASE

Employing the same reasoning we suspend judgement also concerning both increase and decrease. For the outward evidence^a seems to support their reality, which the arguments seem to refute. For just consider: That which increases must grow in size as a stable substance, so that it will be false for anyone to say that one thing increases when an addition is made to another. Since then substance^b is never stable but always in flux, one part supplanting another, the thing said to have increased does not retain its former substance together with the added substance but has its substance all different. Just 83 as if, for example, when there is a beam three cubits long a man should bring another of ten cubits and declare that the beam of three cubits had increased, he would be lying because the one is wholly different from the other; so too in the case of every object which is said to increase, as the former matter flows away and fresh matter enters in its place, if what is said to be added is added, one should not call such a condition increase but complete alteration.

The same argument applies also to decrease.^c For 84 how could that which has no stable existence be said

^c Cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 277 ff.

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, εἰ ἢ μὲν μείωσις γίνεται κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν ἢ δὲ αὐξησις κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, οὐδὲν δὲ ἔστιν οὔτε ἀφαιρέσεις οὔτε πρόσθεσις, οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ἢ μείωσις οὐδὲ ἢ αὐξησις ἔστι τι.

IV'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΑΦΑΙΡΕΣΕΩΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΡΟΣΘΕΣΕΩΣ

85 Ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἀφαιρέσεις, ἐντεῦθεν ἐπιλογίζονται. εἰ ἀφαιρείται τι ἀπὸ τινος, ἦτοι τὸ ἴσον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ἀφαιρείται ἢ τὸ μείζον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐλάσσονος ἢ τὸ ἐλάσσον ἀπὸ τοῦ μείζονος. κατὰ οὐδένα δὲ τῶν τρόπων τούτων ἀφαιρέσεις γίνεται, ὡς παραστήσομεν· ἀδύνατος ἄρα ἔστιν ἢ ἀφαιρέσεις.

Ὅτι δὲ κατ' οὐδένα τῶν προειρημένων τρόπων ἢ ἀφαιρέσεις γίνεται, δηλον ἐντεῦθεν. τὸ ἀφαιρούμενον ἀπὸ τινος ἐμπεριέχεσθαι χρή πρὸ τῆς

86 ἀφαιρέσεως τῷ ἀφ' οὗ ἀφαιρείται. οὔτε δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ περιέχεται, οἷον τὰ ἕξ ἐν τοῖς ἕξι· μείζον γὰρ εἶναι δεῖ τὸ περιέχον τοῦ περιεχομένου καὶ τὸ ἀφ' οὗ ἀφαιρείται τι τοῦ ἀφαιρουμένου, ἵνα μετὰ τὴν ἀφαίρεσιν ὑπολείπηται τι· τούτῳ¹ γὰρ διαφέρειν δοκεῖ τῆς παντελοῦς ἄρσεως ἢ ἀφαιρέσεις· οὔτε τὸ μείζον ἐν τῷ μικροτέρῳ, οἷον τὰ ἕξ ἐν τοῖς

87 πέντε· ἀπεμφαίνει γάρ. διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ τὸ ἐλάσσον ἐν τῷ μείζονι. εἰ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἕξι περιέχεται τὰ πέντε ὡς ἐν πλειοσιν ἐλάσσονα, καὶ ἐν τοῖς πέντε περισχεθῆσεται τὰ τέσσαρα καὶ ἐν τοῖς τέτταρσι τὰ τρία καὶ ἐν τοῖς τρισὶ τὰ δύο καὶ ἐν τούτοις τὸ ἕν. ἕξει οὖν τὰ ἕξ πέντε τέσσαρα τρία δύο ἕν, ὧν συντεθέντων γίνεται ὁ πεντεκαίδεκα ἀριθμός, ὃς ἐν τῷ ἕξι περιέχεσθαι συνάγεται διδο-

¹ τούτῳ Mutsch.: τοῦτο mss., Bekk.

to have decreased? Besides, if decrease takes place by way of subtraction, and increase by addition, and neither subtraction nor addition is anything, then neither decrease nor increase is anything.

CHAPTER XII.—CONCERNING SUBTRACTION AND ADDITION

That subtraction^a is nothing they argue thus: If 85 anything is subtracted from anything, either equal is subtracted from equal, or greater from less, or less from greater. But in none of these ways does subtraction take place, as we shall show; therefore subtraction is impossible.

That subtraction takes place in none of these ways is plain from what follows: What is subtracted from anything ought, before its subtraction, to be included in that from which it is subtracted. But the 86 equal is not included in the equal—six, for instance, in six; for what includes must be greater than what is included, and that from which the subtraction is made than what is subtracted, in order that there may be some remainder after the subtraction; for it is this which is held to distinguish subtraction from complete removal. Nor is the greater included in the less—six, for instance, in five; for that is irrational. And for this reason, neither is the less 87 included in the greater. For if five is included in six, as less in greater, four will be included in five, three in four, two in three, and one in two. Therefore six will contain five, four, three, two, and one, which when put together form the number fifteen, and this we conclude is included in six, if it be granted

^a Cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 297 ff.

μένον τοῦ τὸ ἔλασσον ἐν τῷ μείζονι περιέχεσθαι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ πεντεκαίδεκα τῷ ἐν τῷ ἕξ ἐμπεριεχομένῳ ὁ τριακοντακαιπέντε ἀριθμὸς περιέχεται καὶ κατὰ ὑπόβασιν ἄπειροι. ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ λέγειν ἀπείρους ἀριθμοὺς ἐμπεριέχεσθαι τῷ ἕξ ἀριθμῷ· ἄτοπον ἄρα καὶ τὸ λέγειν ὅτι ἐν τῷ μείζονι περιέχεται τὸ ἔλασσον. εἰ οὖν χρῆ τὸ ἀφαιρούμενον ἀπὸ τινος περιέχεσθαι ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἀφ' οὗ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι μέλλει, οὔτε δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ περιέχεται οὔτε τὸ μείζον ἐν τῷ μικροτέρῳ οὔτε τὸ μικρότερον ἐν τῷ μείζονι, οὐδὲ ἀφαιρεῖται τι ἀπὸ τινος.

Καὶ μὴν εἰ ἀφαιρεῖται τι ἀπὸ τινος, ἢ ὅλον ἀπὸ ὅλου ἀφαιρεῖται ἢ μέρος ἀπὸ μέρους ἢ ὅλον ἀπὸ μέρους ἢ μέρος ἀπὸ ὅλου. ὅλον μὲν οὖν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι λέγειν ἤτοι ἀπὸ ὅλου ἢ ἀπὸ μέρους ἀπ-εμφαίνει προδήλως, λείπεται δὲ λέγειν τὸ μέρος ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἤτοι ἀπὸ ὅλου ἢ ἀπὸ μέρους· ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄτοπον. οἶον γοῦν, ἵνα ἐπὶ ἀριθμῶν στήσωμεν τὸν λόγον τοῦ σαφοῦς ἕνεκα, ἔστω δεκάς, καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης ἀφαιρεῖσθαι λεγέσθω μονάς. αὕτη οὖν ἢ μονάς οὔτε ἀπὸ ὅλης τῆς δεκάδος ἀφαιρεῖσθαι δύναται οὔτε ἀπὸ τοῦ λειπομένου μέρους τῆς δεκάδος, τουτέστι τῆς ἐννεάδος, ὡς παραστήσω· οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ἀφαιρεῖται.

90 Εἰ γὰρ ἢ μονάς ἀπὸ ὅλης ἀφαιρεῖται τῆς δεκάδος, ἐπεὶ ἢ δεκάς οὔτε ἕτερόν τι ἐστὶ παρὰ τὰς δέκα μονάδας οὔτε τις τῶν μονάδων ἀλλ' ἢ συνέλευσις

^a The addition of the numbers 1 . . . 5 gives 15; of 1 . . . 4, 10; of 1 . . . 3, 6; of 1 and 2, 3; so we get the total 35 = 15 + 10 + 6 + 3 + 1; cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 304 ff. But perhaps we should read 105 for 35 (ἐκατὸν for τριάκοντα), as 1 . . . 14 = 105.

that the less is included in the greater. So likewise in the fifteen which is included in the six there is included the number thirty-five,^a and so on, step by step, to infinity. But it is absurd to say that infinite numbers are included in the number six; and so it is also absurd to say that less is included in greater. If, then, what is subtracted from a thing must be 88 included in that from which it is to be subtracted, and neither equal is included in equal, nor greater in less, nor less in greater, then nothing is subtracted from anything.

Again, if anything is subtracted from anything, it is either a whole subtracted from a whole, or a part from a part, or a whole from a part, or a part from a whole. But to say that a whole is subtracted 89 from either a whole or a part is plainly nonsense. It remains, then, to say that a part is subtracted either from a whole or from a part; which is absurd. Thus for example—basing our argument on numbers for the sake of clearness—let us take ten and suppose that from it one is subtracted. This one, then, cannot be subtracted either from the whole ten or from the remaining part of the ten, as I shall show; therefore it is not subtracted at all.^b

For if the one is subtracted from the whole ten, 90 since the ten is neither something other than the ten ones nor one of the ones, but the aggregate of

^b In what follows it is argued (§§ 90, 91) that 1 cannot be subtracted from a "whole 10," 10 being ten ones, so that the subtracted 1 must be subtracted from each of those ones, including itself, and thus 10 - 1 = 0. Further, as the number 1 (the "monad") is indivisible, it does not admit of subtraction: and the 1 to be subtracted must fall into 10 parts, and thus be itself a 10, if it is subtracted 10 separate times from the units of the 10.

πασῶν τῶν μονάδων, ἀπὸ ἐκάστης μονάδος ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ὀφείλει ἢ μονάς, ἵνα ἀπὸ ὅλης ἀφαιρηθῆται τῆς δεκάδος. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ μονάδος οὐδὲν δύναται ἀφαιρεῖσθαι· ἀδιαίρετοι γάρ εἰσιν αἱ μονάδες, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀφαιρηθήσεται ἢ

91 μονὰς ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάδος οὕτως. εἰ δὲ καὶ δοίη τις ἀπὸ ἐκάστης τῶν μονάδων ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὴν μονάδα, δέκα ἔξει μέρη ἢ μονάς, δέκα δὲ ἔχουσα μέρη δεκάς¹ ἔσται. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπεὶ δέκα ἕτερα μέρη ἀπολείπεται, ἀφ' ὧν ἀφήρηται τὰ τῆς μονάδος λεγομένης δέκα μέρη, ἔσται τὰ δέκα εἴκοσι. ἄτοπον δὲ λέγειν τὸ ἓν δέκα εἶναι καὶ τὰ δέκα εἴκοσι καὶ τὸ ἀδιαίρετον κατὰ αὐτοὺς διαιρεῖσθαι. ἄτοπον ἄρα τὸ λέγειν ἀπὸ ὅλης τῆς δεκάδος ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὴν μονάδα.

92 Ἄλλ' οὐδὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπολειπομένης ἐννεάδος ἀφαιρεῖται ἢ μονάς· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀφ' οὗ τι ἀφαιρεῖται οὐ μένει ὀλόκληρον, ἢ δὲ ἐννεὰς μετὰ τὴν ἀφαίρεσιν ἐκείνης τῆς μονάδος ὀλόκληρος μένει. καὶ ἄλλως, ἐπεὶ ἢ ἐννεὰς οὐδὲν ἐστὶ παρὰ τὰς ἐννεὰς μονάδας, εἰ μὲν ἀπὸ ὅλης αὐτῆς λέγοιτο ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἢ μονάς, ἐννεάδος ἀφαίρεσις ἔσται, εἰ δὲ ἀπὸ μέρους τῶν ἐννεὰς, εἰ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν ὀκτώ, τὰ αὐτὰ ἄτοπα ἀκολουθήσει, εἰ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐσχάτης μονάδος, διαιρετὴν εἶναι φήσουσι

93 τὴν μονάδα, ὅπερ ἄτοπον. οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐννεάδος ἀφαιρεῖται ἢ μονάς. εἰ δὲ μήτε ἀπὸ ὅλης τῆς δεκάδος ἀφαιρεῖται μήτε ἀπὸ μέρους

¹ δεκάς T: μονὰς MSS., Bekk.

^a *i.e.* the Dogmatists, who assumed the indivisibility of the "one." In the next sections (92-93) it is shown that "a

the ones, the one ought to be subtracted from each of the ones in order to be subtracted from the whole ten. Now from a one, above all, nothing can be subtracted; for the ones are indivisible, and on this account the one will not be subtracted from the ten in this way. And even were we to grant that the

91 one is subtracted from each of the ones, the one will contain ten parts, and as containing ten parts it will be a ten. And further, since ten other parts remain, after the subtraction of the ten parts of the so-called one, the ten will be twenty. But it is absurd to say that the one is ten and the ten twenty, and to divide what, according to them,^a is indivisible. Wherefore it is absurd to say that the one is subtracted from the whole ten.

Neither is the one subtracted from the remaining

92 nine; for that from which anything is subtracted does not remain entire, but the nine does remain entire after the subtraction of that one. Besides, since the nine is nothing more than the nine ones, if it should be said that the one is subtracted from the whole nine, the sum subtracted will be nine, or if from a part of it, then in case it be eight the same absurd results will follow, while if the subtraction is made from the last one, they will be affirming the divisibility of the one, which is absurd. So then,

93 neither from the nine is the one subtracted. But if it is neither subtracted from the whole ten nor from

part cannot be subtracted from a part," *i.e.*, in the case of the "Decad," you cannot subtract 1 from 9: for 10 - 1 still leaves an "entire" 9; and if 9 = 9 × 1, and 1 is subtracted from each of the 9 ones, the subtracted 1 will be 1 × 9; and the same applies to subtraction of 1 from other "parts" of the "Decad" (8, 7, 6, etc.), of which the last is 1, which, as indivisible, does not admit of subtraction.

αὐτῆς, οὐδὲ μέρος ἀπὸ ὅλου ἢ μέρους ἀφαιρεῖσθαι δύναται. εἰ οὖν μήτε ὅλον ἀπὸ ὅλου τι ἀφαιρεῖται μήτε μέρος ἀπὸ ὅλου μήτε ὅλον ἀπὸ μέρους μήτε μέρος ἀπὸ μέρους, οὐδὲ ἀφαιρεῖται τι ἀπὸ τινος.

- 94 Ἄλλα καὶ ἡ πρόσθεσις τῶν ἀδυνάτων εἶναι παρ' αὐτοῖς ὑπέληπται. τὸ γὰρ προστιθέμενον, φασίν, ἦτοι ἑαυτῷ προστίθεται ἢ τῷ προϋποκειμένῳ ἢ τῷ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν συνεστῶτι· τούτων δὲ οὐδέν ἐστιν ὑγιές· οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ προστίθεται τι τινί. οἷον γοῦν ἔστω τι τετρακοτυλιαῖον πλήθος, καὶ προστιθέσθω κοτύλη. ζητῶ τίνι προστίθεται· ἑαυτῇ μὲν γὰρ οὐ δύναται, ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν προστιθέμενον ἕτερόν ἐστι τοῦ ᾧ προστίθεται, οὐδὲν δὲ ἑαυτοῦ ἕτερόν ἐστιν.
- 95 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τῷ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, τοῦ τετρακοτυλιαίου καὶ τῆς κοτύλης· πῶς γὰρ ἂν προστεθείη τι τῷ μηδέπω ὄντι; καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ τῷ τετρακοτυλιαίῳ καὶ τῇ κοτύλῃ μίγνυται ἢ κοτύλη ἢ προστιθεμένη, ἐξακοτυλιαῖον ἐστὶν πλήθος ἀπὸ τοῦ τετρακοτυλιαίου καὶ τῆς κοτύλης καὶ τῆς προστιθεμένης κοτύλης.
- 96 εἰ δὲ μόνῳ τῷ τετρακοτυλιαίῳ προστίθεται ἢ κοτύλῃ, ἐπεὶ τὸ παρεκτεινόμενον τινι ἴσον ἐστὶν ἐκείνῳ ᾧ παρεκτείνεται, τῷ τετρακοτυλιαίῳ πλήθει ἢ κοτύλῃ παρεκτεινομένη διπλασιάσει τὸ τετρακοτυλιαῖον ὡς γίνεσθαι τὸ πᾶν πλήθος ὀκτώ κοτυλῶν· ὅπερ οὐ θεωρεῖται. εἰ οὖν μήτε ἑαυτῷ προστίθεται τὸ προστίθεσθαι λεγόμενον μήτε τῷ προϋποκειμένῳ μήτε τῷ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τούτων, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδέν ἐστιν, οὐδὲ προστίθεται οὐδέν.

a part of it, no part can be subtracted from either a whole or a part. If, then, nothing is subtracted either as whole from whole or as part from whole, nor as whole from part or as part from part, then nothing is subtracted from anything.

Moreover, addition is regarded by them ^a as one of ⁹⁴ the impossibles. For, they say, that which is added is added either to itself or to what pre-exists or to the compound of both; but none of these alternatives is sound; therefore nothing is added to anything. Suppose, for instance, a measure of four cups,^b and add to this a cup. To what, I ask, is it added? for it cannot be added to itself, since what is added must be other than that whereto it is added, but nothing is other than itself. Neither is it added to the com- ⁹⁵ pound of the four cups and the one cup; for how could anything be added to what does not yet exist? Besides, if the added cup is blended with the four cups and the one cup, six cups will be the measure resulting from the four cups and the one cup and the added cup. And if the cup is added to the four ⁹⁶ cups alone, since that which is extended over anything is equal to that over which it extends, the cup which extends over the measure of four cups will double the four cups so that the whole measure becomes eight cups—a result contrary to experience. If, then, what is said to be added is neither added to itself nor to what pre-exists nor to the compound of these, and besides these there are no other alternatives, then there is no addition of anything to anything.

^a i.e. the Sceptics.

^b Cf. § 59.

97 Τῇ δὲ τῆς προσθέσεως καὶ τῆς ἀφαιρέσεως καὶ τῆς τοπικῆς κινήσεως ὑποστάσει συμπεριγράφεται καὶ ἡ μετάθεσις· αὕτη γὰρ ἀπὸ τινὸς μὲν ἔστιν ἀφαίρεσις τινὶ δὲ πρόσθεσις μεταβατικῶς.

98 Καὶ τὸ ὅλον δὲ καὶ τὸ μέρος. κατὰ μὲν γὰρ συνέλευσιν καὶ πρόσθεσιν τῶν μερῶν τὸ ὅλον γίνεσθαι δοκεῖ, κατ' ἀφαιρέσιν δὲ τινὸς ἢ τινῶν παύεσθαι τοῦ ὅλου εἶναι. καὶ ἄλλως δέ, εἰ ἔστι τι ὅλον, ἥτοι ἕτερόν ἐστι παρὰ τὰ μέρη αὐτοῦ ἢ
99 αὐτὰ τὰ μέρη αὐτοῦ τὸ ὅλον ἐστίν. ἕτερον μὲν οὖν τῶν μερῶν οὐδὲν φαίνεται τὸ ὅλον εἶναι· ἀμέλει γοῦν ἀναιρουμένων τῶν μερῶν οὐδὲν ὑπολείπεται, ἵνα ἕτερόν τι παρὰ ταῦτα λογισώμεθα τὸ ὅλον. εἰ δὲ αὐτὰ τὰ μέρη τὸ ὅλον ἐστίν, ὄνομα ἔσται μόνον τὸ ὅλον καὶ προσηγορία κενή, ὑπόστασιν δὲ ἰδίαν οὐχ ἔξει, καθάπερ οὐδὲ διάστασις ἐστὶ τι παρὰ τὰ διεστῶτα οὐδὲ δόκωσις παρὰ τὰ δεδοκωμένα. οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τι ὅλον.
100 Ἄλλ' οὐδὲ μέρη. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι μέρη, ἥτοι τοῦ ὅλου ταῦτά ἐστι μέρη ἢ ἀλλήλων ἢ ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστον. οὔτε δὲ τοῦ ὅλου, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ ἔστι τι παρὰ τὰ μέρη (καὶ ἄλλως τὰ μέρη οὕτως ἔσται μέρη ἑαυτῶν, ἐπεὶ ἕκαστον τῶν μερῶν συμπληρωτικὸν εἶναι λέγεται τοῦ ὅλου), οὔτε ἀλλήλων, ἐπεὶ τὸ μέρος

^a Lit. "is cancelled," *cf.* i. 13.

^b *Cf.* ii. 215 ff., *Adv. Phys.* i. 330 ff.

Together with the existence of addition and subtraction and local motion transposition also is abolished,^a for this is subtraction from a thing and addition to a thing by way of transition.

So too with both whole and part.^b For the whole is held to come about by the combination and addition of the parts, and to cease from being a whole by the subtraction of one or more parts. Besides, if a whole exists, it is either other than its parts^c or its parts themselves form the whole. Now it is apparent that the whole is nothing other than its parts; for certainly when the parts are removed there is nothing left, so as to enable us to account the whole as something else besides its parts. But if the parts themselves form the whole, the whole will be merely a name and an empty title,^d and it will have no individual existence, just as separation^e also is nothing apart from the things separated, or laying beams apart from the beams laid. Therefore no whole exists.

Nor yet parts. For if parts exist, either they are parts of the whole, or of one another, or each one of itself. But they are not parts of the whole, since it is nothing else than its parts (and besides, the parts will on this assumption be parts of themselves, since each of the parts is said to be complementary to the whole); nor yet of one another, since the part is said

^a The view of Epicurus; the Stoics said that the whole is neither the same as its parts nor different.

^b *Cf.* ii. 214, 227.

^c *Cf. Adv. Phys.* i. 344 f., ii. 27.

- ἐμπεριέχεσθαι δοκεῖ ἐν ἐκείνῳ οὐ ἐστὶ μέρος, καὶ ἀποπὸν ἐστὶ λέγειν τὴν χεῖρα, εἰ τύχοι, ἐν τῷ ποδὶ
 101 περιέχεσθαι. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἕκαστον ἑαυτοῦ μέρος ἐσται· διὰ γὰρ τὴν περιοχὴν ἐσται τι ἑαυτοῦ μείζον καὶ ἕλαττον. εἰ οὖν μήτε τοῦ ὅλου μήτε ἑαυτῶν μήτε ἀλλήλων μέρη ἐστὶ τὰ λεγόμενα εἶναι μέρη, οὐδενός ἐστὶ μέρος. εἰ δὲ μηδενός ἐστὶ μέρος, οὐδὲ ἐστὶ μέρος· τὰ γὰρ πρὸς τι ἀλλήλοις συναναίρειται. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀπλῶς¹ εἰρήσθω κατὰ παρέκβασις, ἐπειδὴ ἀπαξ ὅλου καὶ μέρους ἐπεμνήσθημεν.

IE'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΦΥΣΙΚΗΣ ΜΕΤΑΒΟΛΗΣ

- 102 Ἀνυπόστατον δὲ εἶναι λέγουσὶ τινες καὶ τὴν καλουμένην φυσικὴν μεταβολήν, λόγοις ἐπιχειροῦντες τοιούτοις. εἰ μεταβάλλει τι, ἤτοι σῶμά ἐστὶ τὸ μεταβάλλον ἢ ἀσώματον· ἐκότερον δὲ τούτων ἠπόρηται· ἀπορος ἄρα ἐσται καὶ ὁ περὶ τῆς μεταβολῆς λόγος. εἰ μεταβάλλει τι, κατὰ τινὰς ἐνεργείας αἰτίου καὶ πάσχον μεταβάλλει. <ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς πάσχον μεταβάλλει>.² διατρέπεται γὰρ ἢ τοῦ αἰτίου ὑπόστασις, ᾧ τὸ πάσχον συμπεριτρέπεται
 103 μὴ ἔχον ὑπὸ ὄτου πάθη. οὐδὲ μεταβάλλει τι ἄρα. [δ'] εἰ μεταβάλλει τι, ἤτοι τὸ ὄν μεταβάλλει ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν. τὸ μὲν οὖν μὴ ὄν ἀνυπόστατόν ἐστὶ καὶ οὔτε πάσχειν τι οὔτε δρᾶν δύναται, ὥστε οὐδὲ

¹ ἀπλῶς ego: ἄλλως mss., Bekk.² <ἀλλ' . . . μεταβάλλει> addidi: <δ ἀδύνατον> add. Apelt.^a Cf. §§ 86 ff. *supra*. The notion of "part" involves that of a "whole" which "includes" it, and of which it is "part."^b "Part" and "whole" are "co-relative" notions, each implying the other, and relative things are "apprehended

to be included^a in that whereof it is part, and it is absurd to assert that, say, the hand is included in the foot. Neither will each be a part of itself; for, 101 because of the inclusion, it will be both greater and less than itself. If, then, the so-called parts are parts neither of the whole nor of themselves nor of one another, they are parts of nothing. But if they are parts of nothing, parts have no existence; for co-relatives are annulled together.^b

Let thus much be said, then, of a general character, by way of digression, seeing that once already we have dealt with the subject of whole and part.

CHAPTER XV.—CONCERNING PHYSICAL CHANGE

Some, too, maintain that what is called "physical 102 change" is non-real, and the arguments they employ are such as these^c: If a thing changes, what changes is either corporeal or incorporeal; but each of these is matter of dispute; therefore the theory of change will also be disputable. If a thing changes, it changes 103 through certain actions of a Cause^d and by being acted upon. But it does not change by being acted upon, for the reality of Cause is refuted, and therewith is refuted also the object which is acted upon, as it has no agent to act upon it. Therefore nothing 104 changes at all. If a thing changes, either what is changes or what is not.^e Now what is not is unreal and can neither act nor be acted upon at all, so that

together," the presence, or absence, of the one involving that of the other, cf. ii. 125, 175.

^c With this section cf. §§ 38 ff., 49 and 64 where "physical change" is distinguished from "local transition" and other kinds of "motion."

^d Cf. §§ 17 ff.

^e With §§ 104-105 cf. 109 ff.

- μεταβολὴν ἐπιδέχεται. εἰ δὲ τὸ ὄν μεταβάλλει, ἤτοι καθὸ ὄν ἐστὶ μεταβάλλει ἢ καθὸ μὴ ὄν ἐστὶν.
- 105 καθὸ μὲν ὄν μὴ ὄν ἐστὶν, οὐ μεταβάλλει· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐκ ὄν ἐστὶν· εἰ δὲ καθὸ ὄν ἐστὶ μεταβάλλει, ἕτερον ἔσται τοῦ ὄν εἶναι, τουτέστιν οὐκ ὄν ἔσται. ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ λέγειν τὸ ὄν οὐκ ὄν γίνεσθαι· οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν μεταβάλλει. εἰ δὲ μήτε τὸ ὄν μεταβάλλει μήτε τὸ μὴ ὄν, παρὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὐδὲν ἔστι, λείπεται λέγειν ὅτι οὐδὲν μεταβάλλει.
- 106 Ἔτι καὶ ταῦτά φασι τινες. τὸ μεταβάλλον ἐν τινι χρόνῳ μεταβάλλειν ὀφείλει· οὔτε δὲ ἐν τῷ παρωχηκότι χρόνῳ μεταβάλλει τι οὔτε ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐν τῷ ἐνεστῶτι, ὡς δείξομεν· οὐκ ἄρα μεταβάλλει τι. ἐν μὲν ὄν τῷ παρεληλυθότι ἢ μέλλοντι χρόνῳ οὐδὲν μεταβάλλει· τούτων γὰρ οὐθέτερος ἐνεστήκεν, ἀδύνατον δὲ ἐστὶ δρᾶν τι ἢ πάσχειν ἐν τῷ μὴ ὄντι καὶ ἐνεστηκότι χρόνῳ.
- 107 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἐν τῷ ἐνεστῶτι. ὁ γὰρ ἐνεστῶς χρόνος ἴσως μὲν καὶ ἀνύπαρκτός ἐστιν, ἵνα δὲ τοῦτο νῦν ὑπερθώμεθα, ἀμερής ἐστὶν· ἀδύνατον δὲ ἐστὶν ἐν ἀμερεῖ χρόνῳ νομίζειν τὸν σίδηρον, εἰ τύχοι, ἀπὸ τῆς σκληρότητος εἰς μαλακότητα μεταβάλλειν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων μεταβολῶν ἐκάστην γίνεσθαι· παρατάσεως γὰρ αὗται φαίνονται χρήζειν. εἰ ὄν μήτε ἐν τῷ παρεληλυθότι χρόνῳ μεταβάλλει τι μήτε ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι μήτε ἐν τῷ ἐνεστῶτι, οὐδὲ μεταβάλλειν τι ῥητέον.
- 108 Πρὸς τούτοις, εἰ ἔστι τις μεταβολή, ἣτοι <αἰσθητή ἐστὶν ἢ νοητή. καὶ αἰσθητή μὲν οὐκ ἐστὶν· αἰ μὲν γὰρ>³ αἰσθήσεις ἀπλοπαθεῖς εἰσὶν, ἣ

¹ οὐδὲ Pasquali: οὐ Bekk.

² <αἰσθητή . . . γὰρ> add. cj. Bekk.

it does not admit of change either. And if what is changes, it changes either in so far as it is in being or in so far as it is not in being. Now in so far as it is 105 not in being it does not change, for it is not even existent; while if it changes in so far as it is existent, it will be other than existent, which means that it will be non-existent. But it is absurd to say that the existent becomes non-existent; therefore the existent does not change either. And if neither the existent nor the non-existent changes, and besides these there is nothing else, it only remains to say that nothing changes.

Some also argue thus ^a: That which changes must 106 change in a certain time; but nothing changes either in the past or in the future, nor yet in the present, as we shall prove; nothing therefore changes. Nothing changes in the past or in the future, for neither of these times is present, and it is impossible to do or suffer anything in time that is not existent and present. Nor yet in time present. For the present 107 time is probably also unreal,^b and—even if we set aside this point—it is indivisible; and it is impossible to suppose that in an indivisible moment of time iron, say, changes from hard to soft, or any one of all the other changes takes place; for they appear to require extension in time. If, then, nothing changes either in the past or in the future or in the present, we must declare that nothing changes at all.

Further, if change exists at all <it is either sensible 108 or intelligible; but it is not sensible, since the senses> are specialized,^c whereas change is thought to possess

^a Cf. §§ 144 ff.; Aristot. *Phys.* vi. 6.

^b This is shown later, in §§ 144-145.

^c Lit. "simply passive," i.e. each sense perceives only one class of objects, cf. § 47 *supra*.

δὲ μεταβολὴ συμμημόνευσον ἔχειν δοκεῖ τοῦ τε ἐξ οὗ μεταβάλλει καὶ εἰς ὃ μεταβάλλειν λέγεται· εἰ δὲ νοητὴ ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τῶν νοητῶν ἀνεπίκριτος γέγονε παρὰ τοῖς παλαιοῖς διαφωνία, καθάπερ ἤδη πολλάκις ὑπεμνήσαμεν, οὐδὲν ἔξομεν λέγειν οὐδὲ περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τῆς μεταβολῆς.

15'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΓΕΝΕΣΕΩΣ ΚΑΙ ΦΘΟΡΑΣ

- 109 Συμπεριτρέπεται μὲν οὖν καὶ ἡ γένεσις καὶ ἡ φθορὰ τῇ προσθέσει καὶ τῇ ἀφαιρέσει καὶ τῇ φυσικῇ μεταβολῇ· χωρὶς γὰρ τούτων οὔτε γένοιτο ἂν τι οὔτε φθαρεῖν, οἷον γοῦν ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάδος φθειρομένης, ὡς φασίν, ἐννεάδα γίνεσθαι συμβαίνει κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν μονάδος, καὶ τὴν δεκάδα ἀπὸ τῆς ἐννεάδος φθειρομένης κατὰ πρόσθεσιν τῆς μονάδος, καὶ τὸν ἰὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ χαλκοῦ φθειρομένου κατὰ μεταβολήν. ὥστε ἀναιρουμένων τῶν προειρημένων κινήσεων ἀναρῆσθαι καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν φθορὰν ἴσως ἀνάγκη.
- 110 Οὐδὲν δὲ ἡττόν τινας κἀκεῖνα φασίν. εἰ ἐγεν-
νήθη Σωκράτης, ἦτοι ὅτε οὐκ ἦν Σωκράτης ἐγένετο
Σωκράτης, ἢ ὅτε ἦν ἤδη Σωκράτης. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν
ὅτε ἦν ἤδη γεγενῆσθαι λέγοιτο, δις ἂν εἴη γεγενη-
μένος· εἰ δὲ ὅτε οὐκ ἦν, ἅμα καὶ ἦν Σωκράτης
καὶ οὐκ ἦν. ἦν μὲν τῷ γεγονέναι, οὐκ ἦν δὲ κατὰ
111 τὴν ὑπόθεσιν. καὶ εἰ ἀπέθανε Σωκράτης, ἦτοι ὅτε
ἔζη ἀπέθανεν ἢ ὅτε ἀπέθανεν. καὶ ὅτε μὲν ἔζη,
οὐκ ἀπέθανεν, ἐπεὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἂν καὶ ἔζη καὶ ἔτε-

* A peculiar Stoic expression, cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 353 ff., ii. 64.

† Cf. ii. 57 ff., i. 170.

“ concurrent recollection ”^a both of that from which it changes and that into which it is said to change. And if it is intelligible, then, since (as we have frequently pointed out already^b) there exists among the ancients an unsettled controversy as to the reality of intelligibles, we shall also be unable to make any assertion about the reality of change.

CHAPTER XVI.—CONCERNING BECOMING AND PERISHING

Both becoming and perishing are included in the 109 refutation of addition and subtraction and physical change ; for apart from these nothing would become or perish. Thus, for instance, it is as a result of the perishing of the ten, as they say, that the nine becomes by the subtraction of one, and the ten from the perishing of the nine by the addition of one ; and rust becomes from the perishing of bronze by means of change. Hence, if the aforesaid motions are abolished it is likely that becoming and perishing are also necessarily abolished.

Yet none the less some argue also as follows^c : 110 If Socrates was born, Socrates became either when Socrates existed not or when Socrates already existed ; but if he shall be said to have become when he already existed, he will have become twice ; and if when he did not exist, Socrates was both existent and non-existent at the same time—existent through having become, non-existent by hypothesis. And if Socrates 111 died, he died either when he lived or when he died. Now he did not die when he lived, since he would

^c Cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 269, ii. 346 ff.

θνήκει· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὅτε ἀπέθανεν, ἐπεὶ δις ἂν εἴη τεθνηκώς. οὐκ ἄρα ἀπέθανε Σωκράτης. τοῦτον δὲ τὸν λόγον οἶόν τέ ἐστιν ἐφ' ἑκάστου τῶν γίνεσθαι ἢ φθείρεσθαι λεγομένων ἰσάντα ἀναυρεῖν τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν φθοράν.

- 112 Ἐνιοὶ δὲ καὶ οὕτως συνερωτῶσιν. εἰ γίνεται τι, ἦτοι τὸ ὄν γίνεται ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν. οὔτε δὲ τὸ μὴ ὄν γίνεται· τῷ γὰρ μὴ ὄντι οὐδὲν συμβεβηκέναι δύναται, ὥστε οὐδὲ τὸ γίνεσθαι. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν. εἰ γὰρ γίνεται τὸ ὄν, ἦτοι καθὸ ὄν ἐστὶ γίνεται ἢ καθὸ οὐκ ὄν ἐστίν. καθὸ μὲν ὄν οὐκ ὄν ἐστίν, οὐ γίνεται. εἰ δὲ καθὸ ὄν ἐστὶ γίνεται, ἐπεὶ τὸ γνωμόνον ἕτερον ἐξ ἑτέρου φασι γίνεσθαι, ἕτερον ἔσται τοῦ ὄντος τὸ γνωμόνον, ὅπερ ἐστὶν οὐκ ὄν. τὸ
- 113 ἄρα γνωμόνον οὐκ ὄν ἐσται, ὅπερ ἀπεμφαίνει. εἰ οὖν μήτε τὸ μὴ ὄν γίνεται μήτε τὸ ὄν, οὐδὲ γίνεται τι.

- Κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ οὐδὲ φθείρεται. εἰ γὰρ φθίρεται τι, ἦτοι τὸ ὄν φθίρεται ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν. τὸ μὲν ὄν οὐκ ὄν οὐ φθίρεται· πάσχειν γὰρ τι δεῖ τὸ φθειρόμενον. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν. ἦτοι γὰρ μένον ἐν τῷ ὄν εἶναι φθίρεται ἢ μὴ μένον. καὶ εἰ μὲν μένον ἐν τῷ ὄν εἶναι, ἔσται τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα καὶ ὄν
- 114 καὶ οὐκ ὄν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ οὐ φθίρεται καθὸ μὴ ὄν ἐστίν ἀλλὰ καθὸ ὄν ἐστίν, καθὸ μὲν ἐφθάρθαι λέγεται, ἕτερον ἔσται τοῦ ὄντος καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ὄν, καθὸ δὲ μένον ἐν τῷ εἶναι φθείρεσθαι λέγεται,

* Cf. *Adv. Phys.* ii. 326 ff.; *Aristot. Phys.* i. 8.

† i.e. it is ("other" or) different after it has "become" from what it was before it "became": "becoming" involves a change of nature or character in the thing which undergoes the process.

‡ Cf. *Adv. Phys.* ii. 344 f.

have been at once both alive and dead; nor yet when he died, since he would have been dead twice. Therefore Socrates did not die. And by applying this argument in turn to each of the things said to become or perish it is possible to abolish becoming and perishing.

Some also argue thus^a: If a thing becomes,¹¹² either the existent becomes or the non-existent. But the non-existent does not become; for to the non-existent nothing can occur; neither, therefore, can becoming occur. Nor does the existent become. For if the existent becomes, it becomes either in so far as it is existent or in so far as it is non-existent. Now in so far as it is non-existent it does not become. But if it becomes in so far as it is existent, then, since they assert that what becomes becomes other from other,^b what becomes will be other than the existent, and that is non-existent. Therefore what becomes will be non-existent, which is nonsense. If, then,¹¹³ neither the non-existent becomes nor the existent, nothing becomes at all.

For the same reasons, neither does anything perish.^c For if anything perishes, it is either the existent that perishes or the non-existent. Now the non-existent does not perish, for what perishes must be a subject of action. Nor yet does the existent perish. For it must perish either while continuing in existence or while not so continuing. And if it be while continuing in existence, it will be at one and the same time both existent and non-existent; for since¹¹⁴ it does not perish in so far as it is non-existent but in so far as it is existent, it will be other than the existent and therefore non-existent in so far as it is said to have perished, whereas in so far as it is said to

ὄν ἔσται. ἄποπον δὲ τὸ λέγειν τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι καὶ ὄν καὶ οὐκ ὄν· οὐκ ἄρα μένον ἐν τῷ εἶναι φθείρεται τὸ ὄν. εἰ δὲ οὐ μένον ἐν τῷ εἶναι τὸ ὄν φθείρεται, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι περιίσταται πρῶτον, εἴθ' οὕτως φθείρεται, οὐκέτι τὸ ὄν ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ ὄν φθείρεται· ὅπερ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ὑπεμνήσαμεν. εἰ οὖν μήτε τὸ ὄν φθείρεται μήτε τὸ μὴ ὄν, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστιν, οὐδὲ φθείρεται τι.

Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὡς ἐν ὑποτυπώσει καὶ περὶ τῶν κινήσεων ἀρκέσει λελέχθαι, οἷς ἔπεται τὸ ἀν-ὑπαρκτον εἶναι καὶ ἀνεπινώθητον τὴν κατὰ τοὺς δογματικούς φυσιολογίαν.

IZ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΜΟΝΗΣ

- 115 Ἐπομένως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν μονῆς ἠπόρησάν τινες, λέγοντες ὅτι τὸ κινούμενον οὐ μένει, πᾶν δὲ σῶμα διαρκῶς κινεῖται κατὰ τὰς τῶν δογματικῶν ὑπολήψεις, ρευστήν εἶναι λεγόντων τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ αἰεὶ διαφορήσεις τε καὶ προσθέσεις ποιουμένην, ὡς τὸν μὲν Πλάτωνα μηδὲ ὄντα λέγειν τὰ σώματα ἀλλὰ γινόμενα μᾶλλον καλεῖν, τὸν δὲ Ἡράκλειτον ὀξεῖα ποταμοῦ ῥύσει τὴν
- 116 εὐκνησίαν τῆς ἡμετέρας ὕλης ἀπεικάζειν. οὐδὲν ἄρα σῶμα μένει. τό γε μὴν λεγόμενον μένειν συνέχεσθαι δοκεῖ ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ αὐτό, τὸ δὲ συνεχόμενον πάσχει· οὐδὲν δὲ ἔστι πάσχον, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ αἴτιον, ὡς ὑπεμνήσαμεν· οὐδὲ μένει τι ἄρα.

^a Cf. § 64.

^b i.e. "rest" as the opposite of motion in general, not of locomotion only (as in the Stoic use of the term); cf. *Adv. Phys.* ii. 245 ff.

^c Cf. §§ 51, 54 *supra*.

^d i.e. "matter" (in the ordinary sense) of "our" physical

perish while continuing in existence it will be existent. But it is absurd to say that the same thing is both existent and non-existent; therefore the existent does not perish while continuing in existence. And if the existent does not perish while continuing in existence but passes first into non-existence and then in this way perishes, it is no longer the existent that perishes but the non-existent; and this we have shown to be impossible. If, then, neither the existent perishes nor the non-existent, and besides these there is nothing else, nothing perishes at all.

This account of the motions^a will suffice by way of outline, and therefrom it follows that the Physical Science of the Dogmatists is unreal and inconceivable.

CHAPTER XVII.—CONCERNING REST

In like manner some have doubted about physical rest,^b saying that what is in motion is not at rest, but every body is constantly in motion according to the views of the Dogmatists who assert that Being is in flux^c and always undergoing effluxes and additions—just as Plato does not even speak of bodies as "being" but rather calls them "becoming," and Heraclitus compares the mobility of our matter^d to the swift current of a river. Therefore no body is at rest. What is said to be at rest is, in fact, held to be embraced by the things which surround it, and what is embraced is acted upon; but nothing acted upon exists, since no causal activity exists, as we have shown^e; therefore nothing is at rest.

universe, as distinct from any logical or metaphysical use of the term.

^e Cf. §§ 13 ff., 103 *supra*.

- Ἐρωτῶσι δέ τινες καὶ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον. τὸ μένον πάσχει, τὸ δὲ πάσχον κινεῖται· τὸ ἄρα μένειν
 117 λεγόμενον κινεῖται· εἰ δὲ κινεῖται, οὐ μένει. ἐκ δὲ τούτων φανερόν ἐστιν ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸ ἀσώματον ἐνδέχεται μένειν. εἰ γὰρ τὸ μένον πάσχει, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν σωμάτων ἐστὶν ἴδιον, εἴπερ ἄρα, καὶ οὐχὶ ἀσωμάτων, οὐδὲν [δέ]¹ ἀσώματον οὔτε πάσχειν δύναται οὔτε μένειν· οὐδὲν ἄρα μένει.
- 118 Τοσαῦτα μὲν καὶ περὶ μονῆς εἰρήσθω. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἕκαστον τῶν προειρημένων οὐκ ἄνευ τόπου ἢ χρόνου ἐπινοεῖται, μετιτέον ἐπὶ τὴν περὶ τούτων σκέψιν· ἐάν γὰρ ταῦτα δείξῃ τις ἀνυπόστατα, ἀνυπόστατον ἔσται καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἐκείνων ἕκαστον. ἀρξώμεθα δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ τόπου.

IH'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΠΟΥ

- 119 Τόπος τοίνυν λέγεται διχῶς, κυρίως καὶ καταχρηστικῶς, καταχρηστικῶς μὲν [ὡς] ὁ ἐν πλάτει, ὡς ἐμοῦ ἢ πόλις, κυρίως δὲ ὁ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν κατέχων, ὑφ' οὗ περιεχόμεθα πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν. ζητοῦμεν οὖν περὶ τοῦ [τόπου] πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν. τοῦτον δὲ οἱ μὲν ἔθεσαν οἱ δὲ ἀνεῖλον, οἱ δὲ
 120 ἐπέσχον περὶ αὐτοῦ. ὧν οἱ μὲν ὑπάρχειν αὐτὸν φάσκοντες ἐπὶ τὴν ἐνάργειαν καταφεύγουσιν. τίς γὰρ ἂν, φασί, λέξει μὴ εἶναι τόπον ὁρῶν τὰ μέρη τοῦ τόπου, οἷον τὰ δεξιὰ τὰ ἀριστερά, τὰ ἄνω τὰ

¹ [δέ] secl. Heintz.

* Cf. § 75 *supra* for this distinction between the "broad" and narrow or "strict" senses of "place." In §§ 121-120 we have the popular arguments for space based on (1) observed facts as to "the parts of space," and the movement of bodies

Some, too, propound this argument: What is at rest is acted upon; but what is acted upon is in motion; therefore what is said to be at rest is in motion; but if it is in motion, it is not at rest. And
 117 from this it is evident that neither does the incorporeal admit of being at rest. For if what is at rest is acted upon, and being acted upon is a property, if anything, of bodies and not of incorporeals, no incorporeal can either be acted upon or be at rest; therefore nothing is at rest.

So much for the subject of rest. And since no one
 118 of the things we have mentioned is conceived apart from space or time, we must pass on to consider these; for if one should prove these to be unreal, then, because of them, each of the others also will be unreal. Let us begin with space.

CHAPTER XVIII.—CONCERNING SPACE

Space, or place, then, is used in two senses,^a the strict and the loose—loosely of place taken broadly
 119 (as "my city"), and strictly of exactly containing place whereby we are exactly enclosed. Our inquiry, then, is concerned with space of the strict kind. This some^b have affirmed, others denied; and others have
 120 suspended judgement about it. And of these, those who maintain its existence have recourse to the evidence of experience.^c Who, they argue, could assert that space does not exist when he sees the parts of space, such as right and left, up and down, before

in space; and (2) traditional language, which assumes the existence of space; (3) if body exists, space must also exist.

^b e.g. the Stoics and Peripatetics, cf. §§ 124, 131.^c Cf. Aristot. *Phys.* iv. 1.

- κάτω, ἔμπροσθεν ὀπίσω, καὶ ἄλλοτε ἄλλαχού
 γιγνώμενος, βλέπων τε ὅτι ἔνθα ὁ ὑφηγητῆς ὁ
 ἐμὸς διελέγετο, ἐνταῦθα ἐγὼ νῦν διαλέγομαι, τόπον
 τε διάφορον καταλαμβάνων τῶν κούφων φύσει καὶ
 121 τῶν φύσει βαρέων, ἔτι καὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἀκούων
 λεγόντων "ἦτοι μὲν γὰρ πρῶτα χάος ἐγένετο";
 εἶναι γάρ φασι χάος τὸν τόπον ἀπὸ τοῦ χωρητικὸν
 αὐτὸν εἶναι τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ γινομένων. εἶγε μὴν ἔστι
 τι σῶμα, φασίν, ἔσται καὶ ὁ τόπος· ἄνευ γὰρ
 τούτου οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ σῶμα. καὶ εἰ ἔστι τὸ ὑφ'
 οὐ καὶ τὸ ἐξ οὐ, ἔστι καὶ τὸ ἐν ᾧ, ὅπερ ἔστιν ὁ
 τόπος· τὸ δὲ πρῶτον ἐν ἑκατέρῳ· τὸ ἄρα δεῦτερον
 ἐν ἀμφοτέροις.
- 122 Οἱ δὲ ἀναιροῦντες τὸν τόπον οὔτε τὰ μέρη τοῦ
 τόπου διδῶσιν εἶναι· μηδὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸν τόπον
 παρὰ τὰ τούτου μέρη, καὶ τὸν συνάγειν πειρώμενον
 ὅτι ἔστιν ὁ τόπος ἐκ τοῦ τὰ μέρη αὐτοῦ ὡς ὄντα
 λαμβάνειν, τὸ ζητούμενον δι' ἑαυτοῦ κατασκευάζειν
 βούλεσθαι. ὁμοίως δὲ ληρεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἐν τινι τόπῳ
 γίνεσθαι τι ἢ γεγονέναι φάσκοντας, ὅλως μὴ διδο-
 μένου τοῦ τόπου. συναρπάζειν δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ τὴν
 τοῦ σώματος ὑπαρξίν μὴ διδομένην αὐτόθεν, καὶ
 τὸ ἐξ οὐ καὶ τὸ ὑφ' οὐ δείκνυσθαι ἀνύπαρκτα
 123 παραπλησίως τῷ τόπῳ. τὸν δὲ Ἡσιόδον μὴ ἀξιό-
 χρεων εἶναι κριτὴν τῶν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν. καὶ οὕτω

* Herodotus of Tarsus, *cf.* *Intro.* pp. xl f.

† Hesiod, *Theog.* 118.

‡ "Chaos" is here absurdly derived from *χώρα*, "room" (the Stoics connected it with *χεῖν*, "to pour"). It means, in fact, a "cavity" or abyss (from *χάσκειν*, "to yawn").

§ "By which" is the "efficient," "from which" the "material" cause: the Stoics regarded both these as "bodies," and so involving the existence of space.

and behind; and when he is now here, now there, and sees that where my teacher^a was talking there I am talking now; and when he observes that the place of things naturally light is different from that of things naturally heavy; and when, also, he hears the 121 ancients declaring that "Verily first of all came Chaos into existence"^b? For space, they say, is called Chaos from its capacity for containing^c what becomes within it. Then, too, if any body exists, space also exists; for without it body would not exist. And if "that-by-which" exists, and "that-from-which,"^d there exists; also "that-in-which," and this is space; but the first is in each of the two, therefore the second is in both.^e

But those who deny space do not admit the existence 122 of the parts of space; for space, they say, is nothing else than its parts, and he who tries to deduce the existence of space from the assumption that its parts exist is seeking to establish the matter in question by means of itself. Equally silly is the language of those who assert that a thing becomes or has become in some place, when space in general is not admitted.^f And they also presume the reality of body, which is not self-evident; and, in much the same way as space, both that-from-which and that-by-which are proved to be unreal. Hesiod, too, is no competent 123 judge of philosophical problems. And while thus

• For the Stoic use of "first" and "second" in hypothetical syllogisms *cf.* ii. 104, 142. In the next sections (122-123) the arguments of the previous sections (120-121) are rebutted: (1) the "parts of space" are identical with space and in asserting their existence we are merely "begging the question"; (2) the reality of "body," or solid matter, as well as of the "efficient" and "material" causes, is likewise pure assumption. In §§ 124-130 the special views of the Stoics are expounded and refuted; in §§ 13 ff. those of Aristotle and his School. ^f *Of.* §§ 38 ff. *supra.*

διακρουόμενοι τὰ εἰς κατασκευὴν φερόμενα τοῦ εἶναι τόπον, ἤδη καὶ ποικιλώτερον κατασκευάζουσιν ὅτι ἀνύπαρκτός ἐστι, ταῖς ἐμβριθεστάταις εἶναι δοκούσαις τῶν δογματικῶν στάσεσι περὶ τοῦ τόπου προσχρώμενοι, τῇ τε τῶν στωικῶν καὶ τῇ τῶν περιπατητικῶν, τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.

- 124 Οἱ στωικοὶ φασὶ κενὸν μὲν εἶναι τὸ οἶόν τε ὑπὸ ὄντος κατέχεσθαι μὴ κατεχόμενον δέ, ἢ διάστημα ἔρημον σώματος, ἢ διάστημα ἀκαθεκτούμενον ὑπὸ σώματος, τόπον δὲ διάστημα ὑπὸ ὄντος κατεχόμενον καὶ ἐξισαζόμενον τῷ κατέχοντι αὐτόν, νῦν ὃν καλοῦντες τὸ σῶμα, χώραν δὲ διάστημα κατὰ μὲν τι κατεχόμενον ὑπὸ σώματος κατὰ δέ τι ἀκαθεκτούμενον, ἐνίων χώραν εἰπόντων εἶναι τὸν τόπον τοῦ μεγάλου σώματος, ὡς ἐν μεγέθει τῇ διαφορᾷ εἶναι τοῦ τε τόπου καὶ τῆς χώρας.
- 125 λέγεται οὖν ὅτι ἐπειδὴ διάστημα ὑπὸ σώματος κατεχόμενόν φασιν εἶναι τὸν τόπον, πῶς καὶ λέγουσιν αὐτόν εἶναι διάστημα; πότερον τὸ μήκος τοῦ σώματος ἢ τὸ πλάτος ἢ τὸ βάθος μόνον ἢ τὰς τρεῖς διαστάσεις; εἰ μὲν γὰρ μίαν διάστασιν, οὐκ ἐξισιάζεται ὁ τόπος τῷ οὐ τόπος ἐστίν, πρὸς τῷ καὶ μέρος τοῦ περιεχομένου τὸ περιέχον εἶναι, ὃ
- 126 παντάπασιν ἀπεμφαίνει. εἰ δὲ αἱ τρεῖς διαστάσεις, ἐπεὶ οὔτε κενὸν ὑπόκειται ἐν τῷ λεγομένῳ τόπῳ οὔτε ἄλλο σῶμα διάστασιν ἔχον, μόνον¹ δὲ τὸ ἐν

¹ μόνον Papp., Apelt: μένον mss., Bekk.

* The argument is: "Interval" cannot mean one "dimension" only (such as "length") since (by definition) "Place" must be "equated" to the "body" which is in it and must therefore have all three dimensions; and further, the "in-

rebutting the arguments that tend to establish the existence of space, they also demonstrate its unreality more elaborately by making use of what are held to be the most weighty views of the Dogmatists about space, namely those of the Stoics and Peripatetics, in the following fashion.

The Stoics declare that Void is that which is capable 124 of being occupied by an existent but is not so occupied, or an interval empty of body, or an interval unoccupied by body; and that Place is an interval occupied by an existent and equated to that which occupies it ("existent" being here the name they give to "body"); and that Room is an interval partly occupied by body and partly unoccupied—though some of them say that Room is the Place of the large body, so that the difference between Place and Room depends on size. Their opponents then argue thus: 125 When the Stoics define Place as an "interval occupied by body," in what sense do they call it an "interval"? Do they mean the length of the body or its width or its depth only, or all three dimensions? For if they mean one dimension, the place is not equated with the object of which it is the place, and besides, that which includes is part of what is included, which is pure nonsense.^a And if by "interval" is meant the 126 three dimensions, then, since in the so-called place there subsists neither a void nor another body which has dimensions, but only the body said to exist in

cluding" place of one "dimension" would be less than the body of three dimensions which it "includes." Nor can it be all three dimensions, since the body which is "in" it is all these three dimensions and therefore identical with its "place"—the thing contained with the thing which contains it. Thus "interval" and "place" are not explicable in terms of "dimensions."

τόπω λεγόμενον εἶναι σῶμα δ¹ συνέστηκεν ἐκ τῶν διαστάσεων (ἔστι γὰρ τοῦτο μῆκος καὶ πλάτος καὶ βάθος καὶ ἀντιτυπία, ἣ δὴ συμβεβηκέναι λέγεται ταῖς διαστάσεσι ταῖς προειρημέναις), αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα ἔσται ἑαυτοῦ τόπος, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ περιέχον καὶ περιεχόμενον, ὅπερ ἄτοπον. οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τις
 127 διάστασις τόπου ὑποκειμένου. διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ ἔστι τι ὁ τόπος.

Ἐρωτᾶται δὲ καὶ οὗτος ὁ λόγος. ἐπεὶ διπλαῖ αἱ διαστάσεις οὐ θεωροῦνται καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν τόπω εἶναι λεγομένων, ἀλλ' ἐν μῆκος καὶ ἐν πλάτος καὶ ἐν βάθος, πότερον μόνου τοῦ σώματος εἰσιν αἱ διαστάσεις αὐταὶ ἢ μόνου τοῦ τόπου ἢ ἀμφοτέρων; ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν μόνου τοῦ τόπου, οὐχ ἔξει τὸ σῶμα ἴδιον μῆκος οὐδὲ πλάτος οὐδὲ βάθος οὐθέν,
 128 ὥστε οὐδὲ σῶμα ἔσται τὸ σῶμα, ὅπερ ἄτοπον. εἰ δὲ ἀμφοτέρων, ἐπεὶ τὸ κενὸν οὐδεμίαν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει παρὰ τὰς διαστάσεις, εἰ αἱ διαστάσεις αἱ τοῦ κενοῦ ὑπόκεινται ἐν τῷ σώματι συστατικαὶ οὐσαὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ σώματος, τὰ τοῦ κενοῦ συστατικὰ καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἔσται συστατικά. περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τῆς ἀντιτυπίας οὐκ ἔστι διαβεβαιώσασθαι, καθάπερ ἔμπροσθεν ὑπεμνήσαμεν μόνων δὲ τῶν διαστάσεων φαινομένων κατὰ τὸ λεγόμενον σῶμα, αἴπερ εἰσὶ τοῦ κενοῦ καὶ αἱ αὐταὶ τῷ κενῷ, κενὸν ἔσται τὸ σῶμα. ὅπερ ἄτοπον. εἰ δὲ μόνου τοῦ σώματος εἰσιν αἱ διαστάσεις, οὐδεμία ἔσται διάστασις τόπου, διόπερ οὐδὲ ὁ τόπος. εἰ τοίνυν

¹ δ Papp.: οὐ mss., Bekk.

^a Cf. § 39 *supra*.

place, and it is composed of the dimensions (for it is length and breadth and depth and solidity,^a this last being said to be a property of the foregoing dimensions), the body itself will be its own place and at once both container and contained, which is absurd. Therefore no dimension of a subsisting place exists. 127 And, consequently, place is nothing.

This argument also is propounded.^b Since the dimensions are not found to be twofold in the case of each of the objects said to exist in place, but there is one length, one breadth and one depth, do these dimensions belong to the body only, or to the place only, or to both? If they belong only to the place, the body will have no length or breadth or depth of its own, so that the body will not even be body, which is absurd. If they belong to both, then, since the 128 Void has no reality apart from the dimensions, if the dimensions of the Void subsist in the body and serve to compose the body itself, the components of the Void will also be components of the body—for about the reality of solidity it is impossible to say anything positive, as we have shown above.^c And since in the case of the so-called body only those dimensions appear which belong to the Void and are identical with the Void, the body will be Void, which is absurd. And if the dimensions belong to the body only, there will be no dimension of place, and therefore no place

^b This argument raises the question—since “body” and “place” coincide (spatially), to which of the two do the “dimensions” belong, as we cannot assume two sets of dimensions in the same place? To ascribe them to the “body” annuls “place” and *vice versa*.

^c Cf. §§ 45 f.; the “components” of “body” are the three “dimensions.”

κατ' οὐδένα τῶν προειρημένων τρόπων εὑρίσκεται
τόπου διάστασις, οὐδὲ ἔστιν ὁ τόπος.

- 129 Πρὸς τούτοις λέγεται ὅτι ὅτε ἔπεισι τῷ κενῷ τὸ
σῶμα καὶ γίνεται τόπος, ἤτοι ὑπομένει τὸ κενὸν
ἢ ὑποχωρεῖ ἢ φθείρεται. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ὑπομένει,
τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται καὶ πλήρες καὶ κενόν, εἰ δὲ ὑποχωρεῖ
κινούμενον μεταβατικῶς ἢ φθείρεται μεταβάλλον,
σῶμα ἔσται τὸ κενόν· σώματος γὰρ ἰδιά ἐστι ταῦτα
τὰ πάθη. ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ λέγειν κενὸν καὶ
πλήρες, ἢ ὅτι σῶμά ἐστι τὸ κενόν. ἄτοπον ἄρα
τὸ λέγειν οἶόν τε εἶναι τὸ κενὸν ὑπὸ σώματος κατα-
130 σχεθῆναι καὶ γενέσθαι τόπον. διὰ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ
τὸ κενὸν ἀνυπόστατον εὑρίσκεται, εἴγε μὴ δυνατόν
ἔστιν αὐτὸ κατασχεθῆναι ὑπὸ σώματος καὶ γε-
νέσθαι τόπον· ἐλέγετο γὰρ κενὸν εἶναι ὁ οἶόν τε
ὑπὸ σώματος κατασχεθῆναι. συμπεριτρέπεται δὲ
τούτοις καὶ ἡ χώρα· εἴτε γὰρ ὁ μέγας τόπος ἐστὶ
χώρα, συμπεριγράφεται τῷ τόπῳ, εἴτε ἡ κατὰ μὲν
τι ὑπὸ σώματος κατεχομένη κατὰ δέ τι κενὴ διά-
στασις, ἀμφοτέροις συναναίρεται.

- Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν καὶ ἔτι πλείω πρὸς τὴν στάσιν
131 τῶν στωικῶν περὶ τοῦ τόπου λέγεται· οἱ δὲ περι-
πατητικοὶ φασιν εἶναι τόπον τὸ πέρασ τοῦ περι-
έχοντος, καθὸ περιέχει, ὡς ἐμοῦ τόπον εἶναι τὴν
ἐπιφάνειαν τοῦ ἀέρος τὴν περιτετυπωμένην τῷ
ἐμῷ σώματι. ἀλλ' εἴπερ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὁ τόπος, τὸ
αὐτὸ καὶ ἔσται καὶ οὐκ ἔσται. ὅτε γὰρ μέλλει
ἐν τινι τόπῳ γίνεσθαι τὸ σῶμα, καθὸ μὲν οὐδὲν
δύναται γενέσθαι ἐν τῷ μὴ ὑπάρχοντι, δεῖ προ-
ὑπάρχειν τὸν τόπον, ἵνα οὕτως ἐν αὐτῷ γένηται τὸ
σῶμα, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἔσται ὁ τόπος πρὶν ἐν αὐτῷ

^a Cf. §§ 49 ff.; and for the "affections," §§ 38, 52, 117.

either. If, then, no dimension of place is found in
any of the ways described above, place does not exist.

Further, it is argued that when the body occupies 129
the Void and place comes about, the Void either
remains or withdraws or perishes. But if it remains,
the Plenum and the Void will be identical; and if it
withdraws by a movement of transition, or perishes
by change, the Void will be a body ^a; for these affec-
tions are peculiar to body. But it is absurd to say
either that Void and Plenum are identical or that the
Void is body. Therefore it is absurd to say that the
Void can be occupied by body and become place.
For these reasons also the Void is found to be unreal, 130
since it is impossible for it to be occupied by body and
to become place; for Void was defined ^b as "that
which is capable of being occupied by body." And,
in the refutation of these, Room also is involved; for
it is annulled along with place if "room is the large
place," while if it is "that which is partly occupied
by body and partly empty extension," its refutation
is included in that of these two.

These arguments, and others besides, are directed
against the views about place held by the Stoics.
The Peripatetics ^c assert that place is "the limit of 131
what encloses in so far as it encloses," so that my
place is the surface of the air that forms a mould
round my body. But if this is place, the same thing
will both be and not be. For when the body is about to
become in a certain place, then, inasmuch as nothing
can become in what is non-existent, the place must
be pre-existent in order that the body may in this
way become in it, and consequently the place will

^b Cf. § 124.

^c Cf. *Adv. Phys.* ii. 30 ff.; *Aristot. Phys.* iv. 4, *De cael.* iv. 3.

γενέσθαι τὸ ἐν τόπῳ σώμα. καθὸ δὲ περιτυπουμένης τῆς τοῦ περιέχοντος ἐπιφανείας τῷ περιεχομένῳ ἀποτελεῖται, οὐ δύναται ὑποστῆναι ὁ τόπος πρὸ τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ γενέσθαι τὸ σώμα, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔσται τότε. ἀποπον δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ λέγειν καὶ εἶναι τι καὶ μὴ εἶναι· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τόπος τὸ πέρασ τοῦ περιέχοντος, καθὸ περιέχει.

132 Πρὸς τούτους, εἰ ἔστι τι ὁ τόπος, ἦτοι γεννητός ἐστιν ἢ ἀγέννητος. ἀγέννητος μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν· περιτυπούμενος γάρ, φασίν, τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ σώματι ἀποτελεῖται. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ γεννητός· εἰ γὰρ ἔστι γεννητός, ἦτοι ὅτε ἐν τόπῳ ἐστὶ τὸ σώμα, τότε γίνεται ὁ τόπος ἐν ᾧ ἤδη λέγεται εἶναι τὸ ἐν τόπῳ,

133 ἢ ὅτε οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῷ. οὔτε δὲ ὅτε ἐν αὐτῷ ἔστιν (ἔστι γὰρ ἤδη τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ σώματος ὁ τόπος) οὔτε ὅτε οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῷ, εἶγε περιτυποῦται μὲν, ὡς φασίν, τῷ περιεχομένῳ τὸ περιέχον καὶ οὕτω γίνεται τόπος, τῷ δὲ μὴ ἐν αὐτῷ ὄντι οὐδὲν δύναται περιτυπωθῆναι. εἰ δὲ μήτε ὅτε ἐν τόπῳ ἐστὶ τὸ σώμα, μήτε ὅτε οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῷ, γίνεται ὁ τόπος, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἐπινοεῖν, οὐδὲ γεννητός ἐστιν ὁ τόπος. εἰ δὲ μήτε γεννητός ἐστι μήτε ἀγέννητος, οὐδὲ ἔστιν.

134 Κοινότερον δὲ καὶ ταῦτα δύναται λέγεσθαι. εἰ ἔστι τι ὁ τόπος, ἦτοι σώμά ἐστιν ἢ ἀσώματον· ἐκάτερον δὲ τούτων ἀπορεῖται, ὡς ὑπεμνήσαμεν· καὶ ὁ τόπος ἄρα ἐστὶν ἀπορος. ὁ τόπος πρὸς τῷ σώματι νοεῖται οὐ ἔστι τόπος· ἀπορος δὲ ἐστὶν ὁ περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τοῦ σώματος λόγος· καὶ ὁ περὶ τοῦ τόπου ἄρα. ὁ τόπος ἐκάστου αἰδίου μὲν οὐκ

exist before the-body-in-the-place becomes therein. But inasmuch as it consists in the moulding of the surface of what encloses round the thing enclosed, place cannot be already subsisting before the body becomes within it, and therefore it will not be in existence then. But it is absurd to say that the same thing both is and is not; therefore place is not "the limit of what encloses in so far as it encloses."

Furthermore, if place is anything, it is either created 132 or uncreate. Now it is not uncreate; for it is brought about, they say, by being moulded round the body within it. Nor yet is it created; for if it is created, it is either when the body is in place that the place, in which the body in place is already said to be, comes into existence, or when the body is not in it. But it does not come into existence either when the 133 body is in it (for the place of the body within it exists already), or when it is not in it, since, as they assert, the container is moulded round the contained and in this way place becomes, and nothing can be moulded round that which is not within it. But if place does not become either when the body is in place or when it is not therein, and no other alternatives are conceivable, then place is not created at all. And if it is neither created nor uncreate, it has no existence.

These objections may also be stated more generally.^a 134 If place is anything, it is either corporeal or incorporeal; but each of these alternatives is, as we have shown, disputed; therefore place is in dispute. Place is conceived in relation to the body whereof it is the place; but the doctrine of the reality of body is disputed, therefore that of place is likewise disputable.

^a The first objection is based on §§ 38-56, the second also on §§ 38 ff., the third on §§ 109 ff.

ἔστιν, γίνεσθαι δὲ λεγόμενος ἀνυπόστατος εὐρίσκειται γενέσεως μὴ ὑπαρχούσης.

- 135 "Ἐνεσθι δὲ καὶ ἄλλα πλείω λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ τὸν λόγον μηκύνωμεν, ἐκείνῳ ἐπακτέον ὅτι τοὺς σκεπτικούς ἐντρέπουσι μὲν οἱ λόγοι, δυσωπεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐνάργεια. διόπερ οὐθετέρῳ προστιθέμεθα ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν, ἀλλ' ἐπέχομεν περὶ τοῦ τόπου.

IG.—ΠΕΡΙ ΧΡΟΝΟΥ

- 136 Τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ πάσχομεν καὶ ἐν τῇ περὶ τοῦ χρόνου ζητήσει· ὅσον μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς φαινόμενοις δοκεῖ τι εἶναι ὁ χρόνος, ὅσον δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ λεγομένοις ἀνυπόστατος φαίνεται. χρόνον γὰρ εἶναι φασιν οἱ μὲν διάστημα τῆς τοῦ ὅλου κινήσεως (ὅλον δὲ λέγω τὸν κόσμον), οἱ δὲ αὐτὴν τὴν κίνησιν τοῦ κόσμου, Ἀριστοτέλης δέ, ἢ ὡς τινας Πλάτων, ἀριθμὸν τοῦ ἐν κινήσει προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου,
- 137 Στράτων δέ, ἢ ὡς τινας Ἀριστοτέλης, μέτρον κινήσεως καὶ μονῆς, Ἐπίκουρος δέ, καθὼς Δημήτριος ὁ Λάκων φησί, σύμπτωμα συμπτωμάτων, παρεπόμενον ἡμέραις τε καὶ νυξί καὶ ὥραις καὶ πάθεσι καὶ ἀπαθείαις καὶ κινήσει καὶ μοναῖς.

^a Cf. §§ 66, 81. The Sceptics are here said to be "put to shame," or "confusion" (*i.e.* caused to hesitate in their judgement as to the nature of space) owing to the "equivalence" of the arguments against space and those for it based on the obvious facts of experience.

^b The Stoics, *cf.* Diog. Laert. vii. 141. This definition is derived from the fact that Time is measured by the motions of the planets and stars which compose the Universe.

^c Aristot. *Phys.* iv. 10 mentions this (Platonic) definition, *cf.* Plato, *Tim.* 47 *n* ff. Aristotle says that our notion of time is derived from a sense of difference and of succession in our

The place of each thing is not eternal, but if we say that it becomes it is found to be unreal as becoming does not exist.

It is possible to adduce many other arguments. 135 But in order to avoid prolonging our exposition, we may conclude by saying that while the Sceptics are put to confusion by the arguments, they are also put to shame by the evidence ^a of experience. Consequently we attach ourselves to neither side, so far as concerns the doctrines of the Dogmatists, but suspend judgement regarding place.

CHAPTER XIX.—CONCERNING TIME

Our attitude is the same with respect to the inquiry 136 about time. For if we depend on appearances, time seems to be something, but if we depend on the arguments about it, it appears unreal. Some ^b define time as "the interval of the motion of the Whole" (meaning by "Whole" the Universe), others ^c as "the actual motion of the Universe"; Aristotle (or, as some say, Plato) as "the number of the prior and posterior in motion"; Strato (or, as some say, 137 Aristotle) as "the measure of motion and rest"; Epicurus (according to Demetrius the Laconian ^d) as "a concurrence of concurrences, concomitant with days and nights and seasons and affections and non-affections and motions and rests." And, in point of 138

thoughts and perceptions, which brings with it a distinction between "before" and "after"—between "past," "present," and "future." Thus "time" is a thing "numbered" or "measured" by the conscious mind, and Aristotle defines it as "a numeration of motion in respect of priority and posteriority" (*Phys.* iv. 11).

^d An Epicurean, *cf.* *Adv. Log.* ii. 318.

138 κατ' οὐσίαν τε οἱ μὲν σῶμα αὐτὸν ἔφασαν εἶναι, ὡς οἱ περὶ τὸν Αἰνησιδήμον, (μηδὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν διαφέρειν τοῦ ὄντος καὶ τοῦ πρώτου σώματος), οἱ δὲ ἀσώματον. ἤτοι οὖν πᾶσαι αἱ στάσεις αὐταὶ εἰσιν ἀληθεῖς, ἢ πᾶσαι ψευδεῖς, ἢ τινὲς μὲν ἀληθεῖς τινὲς δὲ ψευδεῖς· οὔτε δὲ πᾶσαι ἀληθεῖς ὑπάρχειν δύνανται (μάχονται γὰρ αἱ πλείους) οὔτε πᾶσαι ψευδεῖς εἶναι δοθήσονται ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν.

139 καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ δοθείη ψεῦδος μὲν εἶναι τὸ σῶμα εἶναι τὸν χρόνον, ψεῦδος δὲ καὶ τὸ ὅτι ἀσώματος ἔστιν, αὐτόθεν δοθήσεται ἢ τοῦ χρόνου ἀνυπαρξία· παρὰ γὰρ ταῦτα οὐδὲν εἶναι δύναται ἕτερον. οὔτε τινὲς μὲν εἰσιν ἀληθεῖς τινὲς δὲ ψευδεῖς δυνατὸν καταλαβεῖν διὰ τε τὴν ἰσοσθενῆ διαφωνίαν καὶ τὴν ἀπορίαν τὴν κατὰ <τὸ>¹ κριτήριόν τε καὶ τὴν

140 ἀποδείξιν. ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔξομεν περὶ χρόνου διαβεβαιώσασθαι.

Εἶτα, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἄνευ κινήσεως ἢ καὶ μονῆς ὁ χρόνος ὑφεστάναι δοκεῖ, τῆς κινήσεως ἀναιρουμένης, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῆς μονῆς, ἀναιρεῖται ὁ χρόνος. οὐδὲν δὲ ἦπτον καὶ τάδε φασὶ τινες κατὰ τοῦ χρόνου. εἰ ἔστι χρόνος, ἤτοι πεπέρασται ἢ

141 ἀπειρός ἔστιν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν πεπέρασται, ἀπὸ τινος χρόνου ἤρξατο καὶ εἰς τινα χρόνον λήξει· διὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἦν ποτὲ χρόνος ὅτε οὐκ ἦν χρόνος, πρὸ τοῦ ἄρξασθαι αὐτόν, καὶ ἔσται ποτὲ χρόνος ὅτε οὐκ ἔσται χρόνος, μετὰ τὸ λῆξαι αὐτόν, ὅπερ

142 ἀποπον. οὐ τοίνυν πεπέρασται ὁ χρόνος. εἰ δὲ ἀπειρός ἔστιν, ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν τι αὐτοῦ λέγεται παρωχηκὸς τὸ δὲ ἐνεστὼς τὸ δὲ μέλλον, ὁ μέλλον καὶ ὁ παρωχηκὸς ἤτοι εἰσὶν ἢ οὐκ εἰσὶν. ἀλλ' εἰ οὐκ

¹ <τὸ> add. Mutsch.

substance, some have affirmed that it is corporeal—for instance, Aenesidemus, arguing that it differs in nothing from Being and the prime body,—others,^a that it is incorporeal. Either, then, all these theories are true, or all false, or some true and some false; but they cannot all be true (most of them being in conflict), nor will it be granted by the Dogmatists that all are false. And besides, should it 139 be granted that the assertion of the corporeality of time is false, and that of its incorporeality likewise false, then, *ipso facto*, the unreality of time will be granted; for it cannot be anything but one or other of these. Nor yet can we apprehend which theories are true, which false, owing to the equal weight^b of the rival opinions as well as the perplexity regarding the criterion and proof.^c Hence for these 140 reasons we shall be unable to affirm anything positively about time.

Further, since time does not seem to subsist without motion or even rest, if motion is abolished, and likewise rest, time is abolished. None the less the following objections against time are made by some. If time exists, it is either limited or unlimited. But 141 if it is limited, it began at a certain time and will end at a certain time. Consequently, there was once a time when time was not (before it began), and there will once be a time when time will not be (after it has ended); which is absurd.^d So then time is not limited. But if it is unlimited, since part of it is said to be 142 past, part present, and part future, the future and past are either existent or non-existent. But if they

^a i.e. the Stoics.

^b Cf. i. 8.

^c Cf. ii. cc. 3-7, 12, 13.

^d Cf. Aristot. *Met.* xii. 6.

εἰσίν, μόνου τοῦ ἐνεστώτος ὑπολειπομένου, ὃς ἔστιν ἀκαριαῖος, πεπερασμένος ἔσται ὁ χρόνος καὶ ἀκολουθήσουσιν αἱ ἀρχῆθεν ἀπορίαι. εἰ δὲ ὁ παρωχηκῶς ἔστι καὶ ὁ μέλλων ἔστιν, ἐνεστώς ἔσται ἑκάτερος αὐτῶν. ἀποπον δὲ τὸ λέγειν ἐνεστώτα τὸν παρωχηκότα καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ἀπειρός ἔστιν ὁ χρόνος. εἰ δὲ μήτε ἀπειρος μήτε πεπερασμένος, οὐδὲ ἔστιν ὅλως χρόνος.

143 Πρὸς τούτους, εἰ ἔστιν ὁ χρόνος, ἦτοι μεριστός ἔστιν ἢ ἀμέριστος. ἀμέριστος μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν· διαιρεῖται γὰρ εἰς τε τὸν ἐνεστώτα καὶ εἰς τὸν παρωχηκότα καὶ εἰς τὸν μέλλοντα, ὡς αὐτοὶ φασιν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μεριστός. ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν μεριστῶν καταμετρεῖται ὑπὸ τινος ἑαυτοῦ μέρους, καθ' ἕκαστον μέρος τοῦ μετρούμενου γινόμενου τοῦ μετροῦντος, ὡς ὅταν δακτύλῳ πῆχυν μετρώμεν. ὁ δὲ χρόνος οὐ δύναται καταμετρεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τινος ἑαυτοῦ μέρους. εἰ γὰρ ὁ ἐνεστώς λόγου χάριν καταμετρῆι τὸν παρωχημένον, ἔσται κατὰ τὸν παρωχηκότα καὶ διὰ τοῦτο παρωχηκῶς, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ὁμοίως μέλλων. καὶ ὁ μέλλων εἰ καταμετροίη τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνεστώς ἔσται καὶ παρωχηκῶς, καὶ ὁ παρωχηκῶς παραπλησίως μέλλων ἔσται καὶ ἐνεστώς· ὅπερ ἀπεμφαίνει. οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ μεριστός ἔστιν. εἰ δὲ μήτε ἀμέριστος μήτε μεριστός, οὐδὲ ἔστιν.

144 Ὁ τε χρόνος λέγεται τριμερῆς εἶναι, καὶ τὸ μὲν παρωχηκῶς τὸ δὲ ἐνεστώς τὸ δὲ μέλλων. ὦν ὁ μὲν παρωχηκῶς καὶ ὁ μέλλων οὐκ εἰσίν· εἰ γὰρ εἰσὶ νῦν ὁ τε παρωχηκῶς καὶ ὁ μέλλων χρόνος, ἔσται ἐνεστώς ἑκάτερος αὐτῶν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὁ ἐνεστώς. εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν ὁ ἐνεστώς χρόνος, ἦτοι ἀ-

are non-existent, and there remains only the present, which is momentary, time will be limited and the original difficulties^a will follow. And if the past exists and the future exists, each of these will be present. But it is absurd to call past and future time present; neither, then, is time unlimited. But if it is neither unlimited nor limited, time does not exist at all.

Further, if time exists it is either divisible or 143 indivisible. Now it is not indivisible; for it is divided, as they themselves declare, into present, past, and future. Yet it is not divisible either. For each divisible thing is measured by some part of itself, the measure coinciding with each part of the measured, as when we measure a cubit by a finger. But time cannot be measured by any part of itself. If, for instance, the present measures the past, it will coincide with the past and will therefore be past, and similarly it will be future in the case of the future. And if the future should measure the rest, it will be present and past, and so likewise the past will be future and present; which is nonsense. Neither, then, is time divisible. But if it is neither indivisible nor divisible, it does not exist.

Time, too, is said to be tripartite, partly past, partly 144 present, and partly future. Of these the past and the future are non-existent; for if past and future time exist now, each of them will be present. Neither is the present existent; for if present time exists

^a e.g. that there was once a time when no time was.

μέριστός ἐστιν ἢ μεριστός. ἀμέριστος μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐστιν· ἐν γὰρ τῷ ἐνεστώτι χρόνῳ λέγεται τὰ μεταβάλλοντα μεταβάλλειν, οὐδὲν δὲ ἐν ἡμερεῖ χρόνῳ μεταβάλλει, οἷον ὁ σίδηρος εἰς μαλακότητα ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον. ὥστε οὐκ ἔστιν ἀμέριστος
 145 ὁ ἐνεστώσας χρόνος. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μεριστός· εἰς ἐνεστώσας μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἂν μερισθείη, ἐπεὶ διὰ τὴν ὀξείαν ῥύσιν τῶν ἐν κόσμῳ ἀνεπινοήτως¹ ὁ ἐνεστώσας εἰς παρωχηκότα μεταβάλλειν λέγεται· ἀλλ' οὐδ' εἰς παρωχηκότα καὶ μέλλοντα· ἔσται γὰρ οὕτως ἀνύπαρκτος, τὸ μὲν τι μηκέτι ὄν ἔχων μέρος ἑαυτοῦ,
 146 τὸ δὲ μηδέπω ὄν. ὅθεν οὐδὲ τέλος τοῦ παρωχημένου καὶ ἀρχὴ τοῦ μέλλοντος εἶναι δύναται ὁ ἐνεστώσας, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἔσται καὶ οὐκ ἔσται. ἔσται μὲν [οὖν] ὡς ἐνεστώσας, οὐκ ἔσται δὲ ἐπεὶ μὴ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ τὰ μέρη. οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ μεριστός ἐστιν. εἰ δὲ μήτε ἀμέριστός ἐστιν ὁ ἐνεστώσας μήτε μεριστός, οὐδὲ ἔστιν. μὴ ὄντος δὲ τοῦ ἐνεστώσας μὴδὲ τοῦ παρωχημένου μὴδὲ τοῦ μέλλοντος, οὐδὲ ἔστι τι χρόνος· τὸ γὰρ ἐξ ἀνυπαρκτῶν² συνεστώσας ἀνυπαρκτόν ἐστιν.
 147 Λέγεται κατὰ τοῦ χρόνου κάκεινος ὁ λόγος. εἰ ἔστι χρόνος, ἦτοι γενητός ἐστι καὶ φθαρτός ἢ ἀγένητος καὶ ἀφθαρτός. ἀγένητος μὲν οὖν καὶ ἀφθαρτός οὐκ ἔστιν, εἶγε αὐτοῦ τὸ μὲν παρωχηκέναί λέγεται καὶ μηκέτι εἶναι τὸ δὲ μέλλειν καὶ μηδέπω
 148 εἶναι. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ γενητός καὶ φθαρτός. τὰ γὰρ γινόμενα ἕκ τινος ὄντος γίνεσθαι δεῖ καὶ τὰ

¹ ἀνεπινοήτως Kayser: ἀπερινοήτως mss., Bekk.

² ἀνυπαρκτῶν Kayser: ἀνυπαρκτου mss., Bekk.

^a Cf. Aristot. *Phys.* vi. 6.

it is either indivisible or divisible. Now it is not indivisible; for what changes is said to change in the present time, but nothing changes in indivisible time^a—iron, for instance, into softness, and so on. Hence present time is not indivisible. Neither 145 is it divisible; for it could not be divided into a plurality of presents, since time present is said to change into time past imperceptibly owing to the rapid flux of the things in the Universe. Nor yet into past and future; for so it will be unreal, having one part of itself no longer existent and the other part not yet existent. Hence, too, the present cannot be 146 the end of the past and the beginning of the future, since then it will both be and not be existent; for it will exist as present, but will not exist because its parts are non-existent. Therefore it is not divisible either. But if the present is neither indivisible nor divisible, it does not exist. And when neither the present nor the past nor the future exists, time too is non-existent; for what is compounded of things unreal is unreal.

This argument, too, is alleged against time: If 147 time exists it is either generable and perishable or ingenerable and imperishable.^b Now it is not ingenerable and imperishable, since part of it is said to be past and no longer in existence, and part to be future and not yet in existence. Neither is it generable and perishable. For things generated must be 148 generated from something existent, and things which

^b Time "came into existence" (*γένεσθαι*), said Plato (*Tim.* 38 b): "No," said Aristotle (*Met.* xii. 6). In §§ 147-148 I render *γενητός* ("capable of coming into existence") by "generable," and *γίνεται* by "is generated"; but in § 149, and elsewhere, I usually render *γίνεται* by "becomes," *γινόμενα* by "becoming," etc.

φθειρόμενα εἰς τι ὄν φθείρεσθαι κατὰ τὰς τῶν δογματικῶν αὐτῶν ὑποθέσεις. εἰ οὖν εἰς τὸν παρωχημένον φθείρεται, εἰς οὐκ ὄν φθείρεται, καὶ εἰ ἐκ τοῦ μέλλοντος γίνεται, ἐξ οὐκ ὄντος γίνεται· οὐθέτερος γὰρ αὐτῶν ἔστιν. ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ λέγειν τι ἐξ οὐκ ὄντος γίνεσθαι ἢ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν φθείρεσθαι. οὐκ ἄρα γενητὸς καὶ φθαρτὸς ἔστιν ὁ χρόνος. εἰ δὲ μήτε ἀγένητος καὶ ἀφθαρτὸς ἔστι μήτε γενητὸς καὶ φθαρτὸς, οὐδὲ ὅλως ἔστιν.

149 Πρὸς τούτοις, ἐπεὶ πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον ἐν χρόνῳ γίνεσθαι δοκεῖ, εἰ γίνεται ὁ χρόνος, ἐν χρόνῳ γίνεται. ἦτοι οὖν αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ γίνεται ἢ ἕτερος ἐν ἑτέρῳ. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ, τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἔσται καὶ οὐκ ἔσται. ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ ἐν ᾧ τι γίνεσθαι τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ γιγνομένου ὀφείλει προϋπάρχειν, ὁ γιγνόμενος ἐν ἑαυτῷ χρόνος, ἢ μὲν γίνεται, οὐδέπω 150 ἔστιν, ἢ δὲ ἐν ἑαυτῷ γίνεται, ἤδη ἔστιν. ὥστε οὐδὲ γίνεται ἐν ἑαυτῷ. ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἕτερος. εἰ γὰρ ὁ ἐνεστῶς ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι γίνεσθαι, μέλλον ἔσται ὁ ἐνεστῶς, καὶ εἰ ἐν τῷ παρωχηκότι, παρωχηκῶς. τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ λεκτέον καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων χρόνων. ὥστε οὐδὲ ἕτερος χρόνος ἐν ἑτέρῳ γίνεται χρόνῳ. εἰ δὲ μήτε αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ γίνεται μήτε ἕτερος ἐν ἑτέρῳ, οὐδὲ γενητὸς ἔστιν ὁ χρόνος. ἐδείκνυτο δὲ ὅτι οὐδὲ ἀγένητός ἔστιν. μήτε οὖν γενητὸς ὢν μήτε ἀγένητος οὐδ' ὅλως ἔστιν· ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν ὄντων ἦτοι γενητὸν ἢ ἀγένητον εἶναι προσήκει.

¹ ἢ μὲν . . . ἢ δὲ Heintz: εἰ μὲν . . . εἰ δὲ mss., Bekk.

perish must perish into something existent, according to the postulates of the Dogmatists themselves.^a If, then, time perishes into the past, it perishes into a non-existent; and if it is generated out of the future, it is generated out of a non-existent; for neither of these is in existence. But it is absurd to say that anything is generated from a non-existent or perishes into the non-existent. Therefore time is not generable and perishable. But if it is neither ingenerable and imperishable nor generable and perishable, it does not exist at all.

Further, since everything which becomes seems to 149 become in time, time, if it becomes, becomes in time. Either, then, it becomes itself in itself or as one time in another. But if it becomes in itself, it will be at once both existent and non-existent. For since that within which a thing becomes must exist before the thing which becomes within it, the time which becomes in itself does not yet exist in so far as it becomes, but does already exist in so far as it becomes in itself.^b Consequently it does not become in itself. Nor yet 150 in another. For if the present becomes in the future, the present will be future, and if in the past, it will be past. And the same may be said of all the other times; so that one time does not become in another. But if time neither becomes in itself nor as one time in another it is not generable. And it has been shown that it is not ingenerable either. Being, then, neither generable nor ingenerable, it is wholly non-existent; for each existing thing is bound to be either generable or ingenerable.

^a e.g. Aristotle, Epicurus, Poseidonius; cf. Lucr. i. 151.

^b Cf. § 133 *supra*.

151 Ἐπει δὲ ὁ χρόνος δοκεῖ μὴ ἄνευ ἀριθμοῦ θεω-
ρεῖσθαι, οὐκ ἂν εἶη ἄτοπον καὶ περὶ ἀριθμοῦ
βραχέα διεξελθεῖν. ὅσον μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τῇ συνηθείᾳ
καὶ ἀδοξάστως ἀριθμεῖν τί φαμεν καὶ ἀριθμὸν εἶναι
τι ἀκούομεν· ἢ δὲ τῶν δογματικῶν περιεργία καὶ
152 τὸν κατὰ τούτου κεκίνηκε λόγον. αὐτίκα γοῦν οἱ
ἀπὸ τοῦ Πυθαγόρου καὶ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου τοὺς
ἀριθμοὺς εἶναι λέγουσιν. φασὶ γοῦν ὅτι τὰ φαινό-
μενα ἕκ τινος συνέστηκεν, ἀπλᾶ δὲ εἶναι δεῖ τὰ
στοιχεῖα· ἀδήλα ἄρα ἐστὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα. τῶν δὲ
ἀδήλων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ σώματα, ὡς αἱ ἄτομοι¹ καὶ
οἱ ὄγκοι, τὰ δὲ ἀσώματα, ὡς σχήματα καὶ ἰδέαι
καὶ ἀριθμοί. ὧν τὰ μὲν σώματά ἐστι σύνθετα,
συνεστῶτα ἕκ τε μήκους καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους
καὶ ἀντιτυπίας ἢ καὶ βάρους. οὐ μόνον ἄρα
153 ἀδήλα ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀσώματά ἐστὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα. ἀλλὰ
καὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων ἕκαστον ἐπιθεωρούμενον ἔχει
τὸν ἀριθμὸν· ἢ γὰρ ἓν ἐστὶν ἢ δύο ἢ πλείω. δι'
ἧν συνάγεται ὅτι τὰ στοιχεῖα τῶν ὄντων εἰσὶν οἱ
ἀήλοιοι καὶ ἀσώματοι καὶ πᾶσιν ἐπιθεωρούμενοι
ἀριθμοί. καὶ οὐχ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλ' ἢ τε μονὰς καὶ ἢ
κατὰ ἐπισύνθεσιν τῆς μονάδος γινομένη ἀόριστος
δυάς, ἥς κατὰ μετουσίαν αἱ κατὰ μέρος γίνονται

¹ αἱ ἄτομοι Papp.: οἱ ἄτομοι mss., Bekk.

* With this chapter cf. *Adv. Phys.* ii. 248-309. In §§ 152-156 the Pythagorean doctrine of numbers as the primary constituents, or "elements," of the Universe is expounded; in 428

Since time, it seems, is not found apart from 151 number, it will not be out of place to discuss number briefly.^a In the customary way we speak undogmatically^b of numbering a thing and hear number talked of as something which exists; but the extreme methods of the Dogmatists have provoked the attack upon number also. Thus, for example, the School of 152 Pythagoras declare that numbers are also elements of the Universe. They assert, in fact, that phenomena are constructed from something, and that the elements must be simple; therefore the elements are non-evident. But of things non-evident, some are corporeal, like atoms and masses, others incorporeal, like figures^c and forms and numbers. Of these the corporeal are composite, being constructed from length and breadth and depth and solidity, or even weight. The elements, therefore, are not only non-evident but also incorporeal. Moreover, each of the 153 incorporeals involves the perception of number, for it is either one or two or more. Thus it is inferred that the non-evident and incorporeal numbers which are involved in all perception are the elements of existing things. Yet not simply <these numbers>, but both the Monad also and the Indefinite Dyad which is generated by the expansion of the Monad, and by participation in which the particular dyads

§§ 156-157 the Pythagorean proof that numbers are distinct from things numbered ("numerables") is set forth; in §§ 158 ff. the Sceptical arguments against the Pythagorean doctrine of the real existence of numbers (as distinct from "numerables") are developed.

^b Cf. i. 15.

^c *i.e.* "the limits of bodies" of § 32 *supra*, cf. § 153.

154 *δυάδες δυάδες. ἐκ τούτων γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους γίνεσθαι ἀριθμούς, τοὺς ἐπιθεωρουμένους τοῖς ἀριθμητοῖς, καὶ τὸν κόσμον κατασκευάζεσθαι λέγουσιν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ σημεῖον τὸν τῆς μονάδος ἐπέχειν λόγον, τὴν δὲ γραμμὴν τὸν τῆς δυάδος (δύο γὰρ σημείων μεταξύ θεωρεῖσθαι ταύτην), τὴν δὲ ἐπιφάνειαν τὸν τῆς τριάδος (ρύσιν γὰρ εἶναι φασὶ τῆς γραμμῆς εἰς πλάτος ἐπ' ἄλλο σημεῖον ἐκ πλαγίου κείμενον), τὸ δὲ σῶμα τὸν τῆς τετράδος· ἐπανάστασιν γὰρ γίνεσθαι τῆς ἐπιφανείας ἐπὶ τι*
 155 *σημεῖον ὑπερκείμενον. καὶ οὕτω τὰ τε σώματα καὶ ὄλον τὸν κόσμον ἀνειδωλοποιοῦσιν, ὄντινα καὶ διοικεῖσθαι φασὶ κατὰ ἀρμονικοὺς λόγους, τὸν τε διὰ τεσσάρων, ὃς ἐστὶν ἐπίτριτος, ὡς ἔχει πρὸς τὰ ἕξ τὰ ὀκτώ, καὶ τὸν διὰ πέντε, ὃς ἐστὶν ἡμιόλιος, ὡς ἔχει πρὸς τὰ ἕξ τὰ ἑννέα, καὶ τὸν διὰ πασῶν, ὃς ἐστὶ διπλάσιος, ὡς ἔχει πρὸς τὰ ἕξ τὰ δώδεκα.*
 156 *Ταῦτά τε οὖν ὄνειροπολοῦσιν, καὶ ὅτι ἕτερόν τι ἐστὶν ὁ ἀριθμὸς παρὰ τὰ ἀριθμητὰ κατασκευάζουσι, λέγοντες ὅτι εἰ τὸ ζῶον κατὰ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ λόγον ἐστίν, εἰ τύχοι, ἔν, τὸ φυτόν, ἐπεὶ μὴ ἐστὶ ζῶον, οὐκ ἔσται ἔν· ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ <τὸ>¹ φυτὸν ἔν· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ζῶον, <καθὸ ζῶον>,² ἔν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τι ἕτερον ἐπιθεωρούμενον ἕξωθεν αὐτῷ, οὐ μετέχει*

¹ <τὸ> add. Rüstow.

² , <καθὸ ζῶον>, addidi: καθὸ ζῶον ἐστίν, ἔν cj. Bekk.: <ὡς ζῶον>, Mutsch.

^a The existence of the "elemental" numbers is said to be due to "participation" in either the principle of "Unity" ("the Monad") or the principle of Duality ("the indefinite Dyad")—odd numbers in the first, even in the second. These principles are the "genera" of which odd and even numbers are "particulars."

become dyads.^a For they say that it is from these 154 that the rest of the numbers are generated—those, that is, which are involved in the perception of numerables—and the Universe is arranged. For the point presents the relation, or character, of the Monad,^b and the line that of the Dyad (it being regarded as lying between two points), and the surface that of the Triad (for they describe it as a flowing of the line breadth-wise up to another point placed transversely), and the <solid> body that of the Tetrad; for Body is formed by an ascension of the surface up to a point placed above. It is in this way 155 that they image forth both the bodies and the whole Universe, which also they declare to be arranged according to harmonic ratios^c—namely, that of the "By-Fours," which is "epitrite," as is the ratio of 8 to 6; and that of the "By-Fives," which is one and a half times, as is the ratio of 9 to 6; and that of the "By-Alls," which is double, as is the ratio of 12 to 6.

These are the fictions they imagine; and they 156 also make out that number is something else apart from numerables, arguing that if "animal" according to its proper definition^d is (say) one, the plant, since it is not an animal, will not be one; but the plant is one; therefore the animal is not one <qua animal> but in virtue of some other attribute perceived outside itself, whereof each animal partakes and because

^a i.e. it is an indivisible unit, and begins the line as the One begins the number-series; cf. *Adv. Phys.* ii. 278.

^b The terms here used are those of the Pythagorean musical ("octave") system, and denote the ratios 4:3, 3:2, 2:1. Cf. Plato, *Tim.* 36 A; *Adv. Arithm.* 6-9, *Adv. Mus.* 46.

^c Or "in its own essence," apart from relation to anything else.

ἕκαστον καὶ γίνεται δι' αὐτὸ ἓν. καὶ εἰ τὰ ἀριθμητὰ ἔστιν ὁ ἀριθμὸς, ἐπειδὴ ἀνθρωποὶ εἰσιν οἱ ἀριθμητοὶ καὶ βόες, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ ἵπποι, ἀνθρωποὶ καὶ βόες καὶ ἵπποι ἔσται ὁ ἀριθμὸς, καὶ λευκὸς [ἀριθμὸς]¹ καὶ μέλας καὶ γενευήτης, εἰ τύχοιεν
 157 τοιοῦτοι τυγχάνοντες οἱ μετρούμενοι. ταῦτα δὲ ἔστιν ἄτοπα· οὐκ ἄρα τὰ ἀριθμητὰ ἔστιν ὁ ἀριθμὸς, ἀλλ' ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει παρὰ ταῦτα, καθ' ἣν καὶ ἐπιθεωρεῖται τοῖς ἀριθμητοῖς καὶ ἔστι στοιχείον.

Οὕτως οὖν ἐκείνων συναγαγόντων ὅτι ἀριθμὸς οὐκ ἔστι τὰ ἀριθμητὰ, παρεισήληθεν ἢ κατὰ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἀπορία. λέγεται γὰρ ὅτι εἰ ἔστιν ἀριθμὸς, ἦτοι αὐτὰ τὰ ἀριθμητὰ ἔστιν ὁ ἀριθμὸς ἢ ἕτερόν τι παρὰ ταῦτα ἕξωθεν· οὔτε δὲ αὐτὰ τὰ ἀριθμητὰ ἔστιν ὁ ἀριθμὸς, ὡς ἀπέδειξαν οἱ Πυθαγορικοί, οὔτε ἕτερόν τι παρὰ ταῦτα, ὡς ὑπομνήσομεν· οὐδὲν ἄρα ἔστιν ὁ ἀριθμὸς.

158 Ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲν ἕξωθεν ἔστι παρὰ τὰ ἀριθμητὰ ὁ ἀριθμὸς, παραστήσομεν ἐπὶ τῆς μονάδος τὸν λόγον στήσαντες εὐσήμου διδασκαλίας ἕνεκεν. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τι καθ' ἑαυτὴν ἢ μονάς, ἥς μετέχον ἕκαστον τῶν μετεχόντων αὐτῆς γίνεται ἓν, ἦτοι μία ἔσται αὕτη ἢ μονάς ἢ τοσαῦται ὅσα τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτῆς ἔστιν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν μία ἔστιν, πότερον ὅλης αὐτῆς μετέχει ἕκαστον τῶν μετέχων αὐτῆς λεγομένων ἢ μέρους αὐτῆς; εἰ μὲν γὰρ πᾶσαν ἔχει τὴν μονάδα, εἰ τύχοι, ὁ εἰς ἀνθρωπος, οὐκέτι ἔσται μονάς ἥς μετέξει ὁ εἰς ἵππος ἢ ὁ εἰς κύων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων
 159 ἕκαστον ὁ λέγομεν εἶναι ἓν, ὥσπερ καὶ πολλῶν

¹ [ἀριθμὸς] om. M (? ἀνθρωπος).

of which it becomes one. And if number is the numerables, since the numerables are men (say) and oxen and horses, number will be men and oxen and horses—and number will be white and black and bearded, if the objects counted should happen to be such. But these things are absurd; therefore number 157 is not the numerables, but it has a reality of its own apart from them whereby it is involved in the perception of the numerables and is an element.

So when they had thus concluded that number is not the numerables, there arose in consequence the difficulty about number. For it is argued that if number exists, number is either the actual numerables or something else apart from them; but number is neither the actual numerables, as the Pythagoreans have proved, nor something else apart from them, as we shall show; number, therefore, is nothing.

That number is nothing apart from the numerables 158 we shall demonstrate by basing our argument on the Monad, for the sake of lucidity of exposition.^a If the Monad, by partaking in which each of its participants becomes one, is in itself a real object, this Monad will be either one or as many as are its participants. But if it is one, does each of the things said to partake thereof partake of all of it or of a part of it? For if the one man (say) takes all the Monad, there will no longer exist a monad for the one horse to partake of, or the one dog or any one of all the other things which we declare to be one—just as, supposing there 159

^a The argument here is that "participation" of things in the Monad involves either (1) the division of the Monad into an infinite number of parts (§§ 158-159), or (2) the multiplication of the Monad into an infinite number of whole Monads (§§ 160-162), both which results violate the conception of the Monad as unique principle of Unity.

ὑποτεθέντων γυμνῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐνὸς δὲ ὄντος ἱματίου καὶ τοῦτο ἐνὸς ἀμφιασαμένου, γυμνοὶ μενοῦσιν¹ οἱ λοιποὶ καὶ χωρὶς ἱματίου. εἰ δὲ μέρος αὐτῆς μετέχει ἕκαστον, πρῶτον μὲν ἕξει τι μέρος ἢ μονάς, καὶ ἄπειρά γε ἕξει μέρη, εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται ὅπερ ἄτοπον. εἶτα ὡς τὸ μέρος τῆς δεκάδος, οἷον ἢ δυάς, οὐκ ἔστι δεκάς, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ μέρος τῆς μονάδος ἔσται μονάς, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ μεθέξει τι τῆς μονάδος. ὥστε οὐκ ἔστι μία ἢ μονάς ἣς μετέχειν λέγεται τὰ κατὰ μέρος.

160 Εἰ δὲ ἰσαριθμοὶ τοῖς ἀριθμητοῖς, ἐφ' ὧν λέγεται τὸ ἓν, αἱ μονάδες εἰσὶν ὧν κατὰ μετοχὴν ἕκαστον τῶν κατὰ μέρος λέγεται ἓν, ἄπειροί ἐσονται αἱ μετεχόμεναι μονάδες. καὶ αὗται ἦτοι μετέχουσιν ἐπαναβεβηκυίας μονάδος ἢ μονάδων ἰσαριθμῶν αὐταῖς, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἰσὶ μονάδες, ἣ οὐ μετέχουσιν ἀλλὰ χωρὶς τινος μετοχῆς μονάδες εἰσὶν.

161 εἰ μὲν οὖν² χωρὶς μετοχῆς μονάδες εἶναι δύνανται αὗται, δυνήσεται καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἕκαστον χωρὶς μονάδος μετοχῆς ἓν εἶναι, καὶ αὐτόθεν περιτρέπεται ἢ καθ' ἑαυτὴν θεωρεῖσθαι λεγομένη μονάς. εἰ δὲ ἀπὸ μετοχῆς κἀκεῖναι μονάδες εἰσὶν, ἦτοι μῖας μετέχουσι πᾶσαι ἢ μία ἐκάστη ἰδίας, καὶ εἰ μὲν πᾶσαι μῖας, ἦτοι κατὰ μέρος ἐκάστη ἢ ὅλης λεχθήσεται μετέχειν, καὶ μένουσιν αἱ ἀρχῆθεν

162 ἀτοπία· εἰ δὲ ἐκάστη ἰδίας, καὶ ἐκείνων τῶν μονάδων ἐκάστη μονάδα ἐπιθεωρεῖσθαι δεῖ, καὶ ταῖς ἐπιθεωρουμέναις ἐκείναις ἄλλας, καὶ μέχρις ἀπείρου. εἰ οὖν ἵνα καταλάβωμεν ὅτι εἰσὶ τινες

¹ μενοῦσιν Mutsch.: μένουσιν mss., Bekk.

² οὖν cj. Bekk.: γὰρ mss.

are a number of naked men, who possess only one garment amongst them, which one man had put on, all the rest will remain naked and without a garment. And if each thing partakes of a part of it, then, in the first place, the Monad will have a part. and parts, too, infinite in number into which it is divided; which is absurd. And further, just as the part of the Decad, such as the Dyad, is not a Decad, so neither will the part of the Monad be a Monad, and for this reason nothing will partake of the Monad. Hence the Monad whereof the particular objects are said to partake is not one.

But if the monads, by participation in which each 160 of the particular objects is called one, are equal in number to the numerables to which the term "one" is applied, the monads partaken of will be infinite in number. And these either partake of a superior^a monad or of monads equal in number to themselves, or else they do not so partake but are monads apart from any participation. Yet if these 161 can be monads without participation, each of the sensibles also will be able to be one without participation in a monad, and so at once the monad said to be perceived as real in itself is overthrown. Whereas, if those monads are monads by participation, either they all partake of one monad, or each partakes of a monad of its own. And if all partake of one, each will be said to partake either of a part or of the whole, and the original difficulties will still remain; but if each 162 partakes of its own monad, we must posit a new monad for each of those monads, and others again for the former, and so on *ad infinitum*. If then, in order to apprehend that there are certain self-sub-

^a i.e. "Unity" as a *sumum genus*, cf. i. 38.

καθ' ἑαυτὰς μονάδες, ὧν κατὰ μετοχὴν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἓν, δεῖ κατειληφέναι ἀπειράκις ἀπείρους νοητὰς μονάδας, ἀδύνατον δὲ καταλαβεῖν ἀπειράκις ἀπείρους μονάδας νοητὰς, ἀδύνατον ἄρα ἐστὶν ἀποφῆναι ὅτι εἰσὶ τινες νοηταὶ μονάδες καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἓν κατὰ μετοχὴν ἰδίας μονάδος γινόμενον ἓν.

163 Ἄτοπον ἄρα τὸ λέγειν ὅτι τοσαῦται εἰσιν αἱ μονάδες ὅσα τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτῶν. εἰ δὲ μήτε μία ἐστὶν ἢ καθ' ἑαυτὴν λεγομένη μονὰς μήτε τοσαῦται ὅσα τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτῆς ἐστίν, οὐδὲ ἔστιν ὅλως μονὰς καθ' ἑαυτήν. ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἀριθμῶν ἕκαστος καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἔσται· χρῆσθαι γὰρ ἔνεστιν ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν ἀριθμῶν τῷ λόγῳ, παραδειγματικῶς νῦν ἐπὶ τῆς μονάδος ἠρωτημένῳ. ἀλλ' εἰ μήτε καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἐστὶν ὁ ἀριθμὸς, ὡς ὑπεμνήσαμεν, μήτε αὐτὰ τὰ ἀριθμητὰ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ἐστίν, ὡς οἱ ἀπὸ Πυθαγόρου παρέστησαν, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστι, λεκτέον μηδὲ εἶναι ἀριθμὸν.

164 Πῶς δὲ καὶ γίνεσθαι φασιν ἐκ τῆς μονάδος τὴν δυάδα οἱ ἐξωθέν τι δοκοῦντες εἶναι τὸν ἀριθμὸν παρὰ τὰ ἀριθμητὰ; ὅτε γὰρ συντίθεμεν μονάδα ἑτέρα μονάδι, ἤτοι προστίθεται τι ταῖς μονάσιν ἐξωθεν, ἢ ἀφαιρεῖται τι ἀπ' αὐτῶν, ἢ οὔτε προστίθεται τι οὔτε ἀφαιρεῖται. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν οὔτε προστίθεται τι οὔτε ἀφαιρεῖται, οὐκ ἔσται δυάς. οὔτε γὰρ χωρὶς ἀλλήλων οὐσαι αἱ μονάδες εἶχον τὴν δυάδα¹ ἐπιθεωρουμένην αὐταῖς κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον αὐτῶν λόγον, οὔτε νῦν τι αὐταῖς ἐξωθεν προσγέγονεν, ὡσπερ οὐδὲ ἀφῆρηται, κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν.

¹ δυάδα Kayser, Papp.: μονάδα mss., Bekk.

sistent monads by participation in which each existing thing is one, it is necessary to apprehend an infinite infinity of intelligible monads, and to apprehend an infinite infinity of intelligible monads is a thing impossible, then it is impossible to show that there are certain intelligible monads and that each existing thing is one through becoming one by participation in its own monad.

It is absurd, therefore, to say that the monads are 163 as numerous as the things which partake of them. But if the so-called self-subsistent monad is neither one nor as many as its participants, a self-subsistent monad does not exist at all. So likewise none of the other numbers will be self-subsistent; for one may apply to all the numbers the argument which has now been employed in the typical case of the monad. But if number is neither self-subsistent, as we have shown, nor consists in the actual numerables, as the Pythagoreans have demonstrated, and beyond these there is no other alternative, then we must declare that number does not exist.

In what way, too, is the Dyad said to be generated 164 from the Monad by those who believe that number is something else apart from the numerables? For when we combine a monad with another monad either something external is added to the monads, or something is subtracted from them, or nothing is either added or subtracted. But if nothing is either added or subtracted, there will not be a Dyad. For neither did the monads, when existing apart from each other, contain the Dyad as involved in the perception of them, according to their own definition, nor has any addition now been made to them from without, just as, by hypothesis, nothing has been subtracted.

165 ὥστε οὐκ ἔσται δυὰς ἢ σύνθεσις τῆς μονάδος πρὸς τὴν μονάδα, μήτε ἀφαιρέσεως μήτε προσθέσεως ἕξωθεν τινος γινομένης. εἰ δὲ ἀφαιρέσεις γίνεται, οὐ μόνον οὐκ ἔσται δυὰς, ἀλλὰ καὶ μειωθήσονται αἱ μονάδες. εἰ δὲ προστίθεται αὐταῖς ἕξωθεν ἢ δυὰς, ἵνα ἐκ τῶν μονάδων γένηται δυὰς, τὰ δύο δοκοῦντα εἶναι τέσσαρα ἔσται· ὑπόκειται γὰρ μονὰς καὶ ἑτέρα μονὰς, αἷς προστιθεμένης ἕξωθεν δυάδος
 166 ἢ τέσσαρα ἀριθμὸς ἀποτελοῖτο ἄν. ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀριθμῶν τῶν κατὰ σύνθεσιν ἀποτελεῖσθαι λεγομένων.

Εἰ οὖν μήτε κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν μήτε κατὰ πρόσθεσιν μήτε ἄνευ ἀφαιρέσεως καὶ προσθέσεως γίνονται οἱ σύνθετοι λεγόμενοι εἶναι ἀριθμοὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐπαναβεβηκότων, ἀσύστατός ἐστιν ἡ γένεσις τοῦ κατ' ἰδίαν καὶ παρὰ τὰ ἀριθμητὰ εἶναι λεγομένου ἀριθμοῦ. ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ ἀγένητοι τυγχάνουσι ὄντες οἱ κατὰ σύνθεσιν ἀριθμοί, δηλοῦσιν αὐτοὶ συντίθεσθαί τε αὐτοὺς καὶ γίνεσθαι φάσκοντες ἐκ τῶν ἐπαναβεβηκότων, οἷον τῆς τε μονάδος καὶ
 167 δυάδος τῆς ἀορίστου. οὐκοῦν οὐχ ὑφέστηκε κατ' ἰδίαν ὁ ἀριθμὸς. εἰ δὲ μήτε κατ' ἰδίαν ὁ ἀριθμὸς θεωρεῖται μήτε ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμητοῖς ἔχει τὴν ὑπόστασιν, οὐδὲ ἔστι τι ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὅσον ἐπὶ ταῖς περιεργίαις ταῖς ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν εἰσηνηγεμέναις.

Τοσαῦτα μὲν καὶ περὶ τοῦ φυσικοῦ καλουμένου τῆς φιλοσοφίας μέρους ἀρκοῦντα ὡς ἐν ὑποτυπώσει λελέχθω.

Hence the combination of the monad with the monad 165 will not be a dyad, as no addition or subtraction from without takes place. But if subtraction does take place, not only will there not be a dyad but the monads will even be diminished. And if the dyad is added to them from without, so that a dyad may be generated from the monads, the things which appear to be two will be four; for there exists already a monad and a second monad, and when an outside dyad is added to these the result will be the number 166 four. And the same argument applies to all the other numbers which are said to be formed as a result of combination.

If, then, the numbers which are said to be compounded from the superior^a numbers are formed neither by subtraction nor by addition nor without subtraction and addition, the formation of the number which is said to be independent and apart from the numerables is non-composite. But they themselves make it clear that the numbers formed by combination are not ungenerated by asserting that they are compounded and generated from the superior numbers—from the monad, for example, and the Indefinite Dyad.^b So then number does not subsist of itself. 167 But if number neither is conceived as self-existent, nor subsists in the numerables, then, to judge from the subtleties introduced by the Dogmatists, number is nothing.

Let this, then, suffice as an account in outline of what is called the Physical section of philosophy.

^a Cf. § 160 *supra*.

^b Cf. § 153 *supra*.

KA'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΗΘΙΚΟΥ ΜΕΡΟΥΣ ΤΗΣ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑΣ

168 Λείπεται δὲ τὸ ἠθικόν, ὅπερ δοκεῖ περὶ τὴν διάκρισιν τῶν τε καλῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἀδιαφόρων καταγίγνεσθαι. ἵνα οὖν κεφαλαιωδῶς καὶ περὶ τούτου διαλάβωμεν, περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἀδιαφόρων ζητήσομεν, τὴν ἔννοιαν ἐκάστου προεκθέμενοι.

KB'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΑΓΑΘΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΚΑΚΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΑΔΙΑΦΟΡΩΝ

169 Φασὶν οὖν οἱ στωικοὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι ὠφέλειαν ἢ οὐχ ἕτερον ὠφελείας, ὠφέλειαν μὲν λέγοντες τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν σπουδαίαν πράξιν, οὐχ ἕτερον δὲ ὠφελείας τὸν σπουδαῖον ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὸν φίλον. ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ πως ἔχον ἡγεμονικὸν καθεστηκυῖα καὶ ἢ σπουδαία πράξεις ἐνέργειά τις οὕσα κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀντικρὺς ἐστὶν ὠφέλεια, ὃ δὲ σπουδαῖος
170 ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ φίλος οὐχ ἕτερος ὠφελείας. μέρος μὲν γὰρ τοῦ σπουδαίου ἐστὶν ὠφέλεια, τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν αὐτοῦ ὑπάρχουσα· τὰ δὲ ὅλα οὔτε τὰ αὐτὰ τοῖς μέρεσιν εἶναι λέγουσιν, οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος χεῖρ, οὔτε ἕτερα παρὰ τὰ μέρη, οὐκ ἄνευ γὰρ τῶν μερῶν ὑφέστηκεν. διὸπερ οὐχ ἕτερα τῶν μερῶν τὰ ὅλα λέγουσιν. ὅθεν τὸν σπουδαῖον ὅλον ὄντα ὡς πρὸς τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ἑαυτοῦ, ὅπερ ἔφασαν ὠφέλειαν, οὐχ ἕτερον ὠφελείας εἶναι λέγουσιν.

^a Lit. "fair" (*honestum*); the Stoics used *καλόν* as a synonym for *ἀγαθόν* "good" (*bonum*), and in this section the terms are used as synonymous.

^b Or "regent part," *i.e.* the mind, *cf.* i. 128, ii. 81; *Introductio*, p. xxv. The doctrine that "the good man" is "not other" than goodness (virtue or "utility") strikes one as curious. The Stoics, we must remember, regarded attributes or qualities as corporeal and parts of the "substance" (*οὐσία*)
440

CHAPTER XXI.—CONCERNING THE ETHICAL
DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY

There remains the Ethical division, which is supposed to deal with the distinguishing of things good,^a bad, and indifferent. In order, then, to treat of this branch also in a summary way, we shall inquire into the reality of things good, bad, and indifferent, explaining first the conception of each.

CHAPTER XXII.—CONCERNING THINGS GOOD, BAD,
AND INDIFFERENT

The Stoics, then, assert that good is "utility or not
169 other than utility," meaning by "utility" virtue and right action, and by "not other than utility" the good man and the friend. For "virtue," as consisting in a certain state of the ruling principle,^b and "right action," being an activity in accordance with virtue, are exactly "utility"; while the good man and the friend are "not other than utility." For
170 utility is a part of the good man, being his ruling principle. But the wholes, they say, are not the same as the parts (for the man is not a hand), nor are they other than the parts (for without the parts they do not subsist). Wherefore they assert that the wholes are not other than the parts. Hence, since the good man stands in the relation of a whole to his ruling principle, which they have identified with utility, they declare that he is not other than utility.

to which they belong—here the mind ("regent part") of "the good man." For the equation of "virtue" (or "goodness") with "utility" (or "benefit") as "the source (or agency) from which benefit results" see *Diogenes Laertius*, vii. 94. For Stoic Ethics *cf.* *Introductio*, pp. xxvi ff.

171 Ἐντεῦθεν καὶ τριχῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν φασι λέγεσθαι. καθ' ἓνα μὲν γὰρ τρόπον φασὶν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν τὸ ὑφ' οὗ ἔστιν ὠφελείσθαι, ὃ δὴ ἀρχικώτατόν ἐστι καὶ ἀρετῆ, καθ' ἕτερον δὲ καθ' ὃ συμβαίνει ὠφελείσθαι, ὡς ἡ ἀρετῆ καὶ αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις, κατὰ τρίτον δὲ τρόπον τὸ οἶόν τε ὠφελεῖν, τοῦτο δὲ καὶ ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ κατὰ ἀρετὴν πράξιν καὶ τὸν σπουδαῖον καὶ τὸν φίλον θεοῦς τε καὶ σπουδαίους δαίμονας, ὡς τὸ μὲν δεύτερον σημαίνοντον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐμπεριληπτικὸν εἶναι τοῦ πρώτου σημαίνοντον, τὸ δὲ τρίτον τοῦ δευτέρου καὶ τοῦ
172 πρώτου. τινὲς δὲ φασι ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸ δι' ἑαυτὸ αἰρετόν, ἄλλοι δὲ τὸ συλλαμβανόμενον¹ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ τὸ συμπληρωτικόν· εὐδαιμονία δὲ ἔστιν, ὡς οἱ στωικοὶ φασι, εὖροια βίου.

Τοιαῦτα μὲν τινα εἰς τὴν ἔννοιαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ
173 λέγεται. εἴτε δὲ τὸ ὠφελεῖν εἴτε τὸ δι' ἑαυτὸ αἰρετόν εἴτε τὸ συνεργεῖν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἀγαθὸν τις εἶναι λέγοι, οὐχὶ τί ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν παρίσθησιν, ἀλλὰ τι τῶν συμβεβηκότων αὐτῷ λέγει. ὅπερ ἐστὶ μάταιον. ἦτοι γὰρ μόνῳ τῷ ἀγαθῷ συμβέβηκε τὰ προειρημένα ἢ καὶ ἑτέροις. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν καὶ ἑτέροις, οὐκ ἔστι χαρακτηριστικὰ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ κοινοποιούμενα, εἰ δὲ μόνῳ τῷ ἀγαθῷ, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἡμᾶς
174 ἀπὸ τούτων νοεῖν τὸ ἀγαθόν· ὡς γὰρ ὁ ἀνευνόητος ἵππου οὔτε τὸ χρεμετίζειν τί ἐστὶν οἶδεν, οὔτε διὰ τούτου δύναται εἰς ἔννοιαν ἔλθειν ἵππου, εἰ μὴ

¹ συλλαμβανόμενον cj. Bekk.: συλλαβάνον mss.

^a i.e. "primary, fundamental, good"—the source of other goods. Good in the first sense is the central good, which

Hence also they assert that good has three mean- 171
ings. In one of its meanings, good, they say, is that by which utility may be gained, this being the most principal good^a and virtue; in another meaning, good is that of which utility is an accidental result, like virtue and virtuous actions; and thirdly, it is that which is capable of being useful; and such is virtue and virtuous action and the good man and the friend, and gods and good daemons; so that the second signification of good is inclusive of the first signification, and the third of both the second and the first. But 172
some define good as "what is to be chosen for its own sake"^b; and others as "that which contributes to happiness or is supplementary thereto"; and happiness, as the Stoics declare, is "the smooth current of life."

These, or such as these, are their statements with reference to the notion of the Good. But in describ- 173
ing as good what is useful or what is choiceworthy for its own sake or what is contributory to happiness, one is not exhibiting the essence of the good but stating one of its properties. And this is senseless. For the properties aforesaid belong either to the good only or to other things as well. But if they belong to other things as well, they are not, when thus extended, characteristic marks of the good; while if they belong only to the Good, it is not possible for us to derive from them a notion of the good. For just as the man 174
who has no notion of "horse" has no knowledge of what "neighing" is and cannot arrive thereby at a notion of "horse," unless he should first meet with a

expands into the second and third senses as into concentric circles—the third including the second, the second the first.

^b Cf. Aristot. *Rhet.* i. 6; the other definition is Stoic.

πρότερον ἵππῳ χρεμετίζοντι ἐντύχοι, οὕτως ὁ διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ζητῶν τί ἐστὶν ἀγαθόν, οὐ δύναται γινώσκειν τὸ ἰδίως αὐτῷ καὶ μόνῳ ὑπάρχον, ἵνα δι' αὐτοῦ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ νοῆσαι δυνηθῇ. πρότερον γὰρ δεῖ μαθεῖν τὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν, εἰθ' οὕτω συνείναι ὅτι ὠφελεῖ καὶ ὅτι δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετόν ἐστι καὶ ὅτι εὐδαιμονίας ποιητικόν.

175 ὅτι δὲ τὰ προειρημένα συμβεβηκότα οὐκ ἔστιν ἱκανὰ μνηῦσαι τὴν ἐπίνοιαν καὶ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, δηλοῦσιν ἔργῳ οἱ δογματικοί. ὡς μὲν γὰρ ὠφελεῖ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὅτι αἰρετόν ἐστι, παρὸ καὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶρηται τὸ οἰονεῖ ἀγαστόν, καὶ ὅτι εὐδαιμονίας ἐστὶ ποιητικόν, πάντες ἴσως συγχωροῦσιν ἔρωτῶμενοι δὲ τί ἐστὶν ᾧ ταῦτα συμβεβηκεν, εἰς ἄσπειστον ἐμπίπτουσι πόλεμον, οἱ μὲν ἀρετὴν λέγοντες, οἱ δὲ ἡδονήν, οἱ δὲ ἀλυπίαν, οἱ δὲ ἄλλο τι. καίτοι εἰ ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων ὄρων ἐδείκνυτο τί ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτό, οὐκ ἂν ἐστασίαζον ὡς ἀγνοουμένης τῆς τούτου φύσεως.

176 Οὕτω μὲν οὖν διαφέρονται περὶ τῆς ἐννοίας τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ οἱ δοκιμώτατοι δοκοῦντες εἶναι τῶν δογματικῶν ὁμοίως δὲ διηρέθησαν καὶ περὶ τοῦ κακοῦ, λέγοντες κακὸν εἶναι βλάβην ἢ οὐχ ἕτερον βλάβης, οἱ δὲ τὸ δι' ἑαυτὸ φευκτόν, οἱ δὲ τὸ κακοδαιμονίας ποιητικόν. δι' ὧν οὐχὶ τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ κακοῦ ἀλλὰ τινα τῶν συμβεβηκότων ἴσως αὐτῷ φάσκοντες εἰς τὴν προειρημένην ἐμπίπτουσι ἀπορίαν.

* Deriving ἀγαθόν from ἀγαστόν, cf. Plato, *Cratyl.* 412 c, 422 A and § 184 *infra*.

^b The Stoics said "virtue," Cyrenaics and Epicureans "pleasure," some Peripatetics "painlessness" (cf. *Aristot. Rhet.* i. 7).

neighing horse, so too one who is seeking the essence of the good, because he has no knowledge of the good, cannot perceive the attribute which is peculiar to it alone in order that he may be enabled thereby to gain a notion of the good itself. For he must first learn the nature of the good itself, and then pass on to apprehend that it is useful, and that it is choiceworthy for its own sake, and that it is productive of happiness. But that the aforesaid attributes are 175 not sufficient to indicate the concept and the real nature of the good is made plain by the practice of the Dogmatists. All, probably, agree that the good is useful and that it is choiceworthy (so that the good is said to be, as it were, "the delightful" ^a) and that it is productive of happiness; but when asked what the thing is to which these properties belong, they plunge into a truceless war, some saying it is virtue, others pleasure, others painlessness, ^b and others something else. And yet, if the essence of the good had been proved from the foregoing definitions, they would not have been at feud as though its nature were unknown.

Such, then, is the discord amongst those who are 176 reputed the most eminent of the Dogmatists regarding the notion of the Good; and they have differed likewise regarding Evil, some defining Evil as "damage or not other than damage," ^c others as "what is to be shunned for its own sake," others as "what is productive of unhappiness." But since they express by these phrases not the essence of evil but some of its possible attributes they are involved in the logical *impasse* mentioned above.

^c "Damage" or "harm" being the opposite of "utility" or "benefit"—the Stoic definition of "good."

177 Τὸ δὲ ἀδιάφορόν φασι λέγεσθαι μὲν τριχῶς, καθ' ἓνα μὲν τρόπον πρὸς ὃ μήτε ὄρμη μήτε ἀφορμὴ γίνεται, οἷον ἔστι τὸ ἀρτίους εἶναι τοὺς ἀστέρας ἢ τὰς ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς τρίχας, καθ' ἕτερον δὲ πρὸς ὃ ὄρμη μὲν ἢ ἀφορμὴ γίνεται, οὐ μᾶλλον δὲ πρὸς τὸδε ἢ τὸδε, οἷον ἐπὶ δυοῖν τετραδράχμων ἀπαρallaκτων, ὅταν δέη τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν αἰρεῖσθαι· ὄρμη μὲν γὰρ γίνεται πρὸς τὸ αἰρεῖσθαι τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν, οὐ μᾶλλον δὲ πρὸς τὸδε ἢ τὸδε. κατὰ τρίτον δὲ τρόπον φασὶν ἀδιάφορον εἶναι τὸ μήτε πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν μήτε πρὸς κακοδαιμονίαν συμβαλλόμενον, ὡς ὑγίειαν πλοῦτον· ᾧ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅτε μὲν εὖ ὅτε δὲ κακῶς χρήσασθαι, τοῦτο ἀδιάφορον εἶναι φασὶν. περὶ οὐ μάλιστα ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς 178 διαλαμβάνειν λέγουσιν. τίνα μέντοι καὶ περὶ ταύτης τῆς ἐννοίας δεῖ φρονεῖν, δῆλον καὶ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἡμῖν περὶ τε ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν.

Οὕτω μὲν οὖν σαφές ἐστιν ὅτι οὐκ ἐπέστησαν ἡμᾶς τῇ ἐννοίᾳ τῶν προειρημένων ἐκάστου· οὐδὲν δὲ ἀπεικὸς πεπόνθασιν ἐν ἀνυποστάτοις τάχα πράγμασι σφαλλόμενοι. ὅτι γὰρ οὐδὲν τῇ φύσει ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ ἀδιάφορον, ἐντεῦθεν τινας ἐπιλογίζονται.

ΚΓ'.—ΕΙ ΕΣΤΙ ΤΙ ΦΤΣΕΙ ΑΓΑΘΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΚΑΚΟΝ
ΚΑΙ ΑΔΙΑΦΟΡΟΝ

179 Τὸ πῦρ φύσει ἀλεαῖνον πᾶσι φαίνεται ἀλεαντικόν, καὶ ἡ χιών φύσει ψύχουσα πᾶσι φαίνεται ψυκτικὴ, καὶ πάντα τὰ φύσει κινεῖντα ὁμοίως πάντας κινεῖ τοὺς κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς φασὶν, ἔχοντας. οὐδὲν δὲ

* Cf. i. 27.

The term "indifferent," they say, is used in three 177 senses—in one sense, of that which is an object of neither inclination nor disinclination, as for instance the fact that the stars or the hairs of the head are even in number; in another sense, of that which is an object of inclination or disinclination, but not towards this particular object any more than towards that, as in the case of two indistinguishable tetradrachms, when one has to choose one of them; for there arises an inclination to choose one of them, but not this one more than that one; and a third sense of the term "indifferent" is, they say, "that which contributes neither to happiness nor to unhappiness," as health, or wealth; for what a man may use now well, now ill, that, they say, is indifferent, and they claim to discuss it specially in their Ethics. But what view we 178 ought to take regarding this conception is plain from what we have already said about things good and evil.

Thus, then, it is plain that they have not guided us to a clear conception of the several things above-mentioned; yet, in thus failing with regard to matters that, perhaps, have no real existence, their experience is by no means strange. For there are some who argue on the following grounds that nothing is by nature^a either good or evil or indifferent.

CHAPTER XXI.—IS ANYTHING BY NATURE GOOD,
BAD, OR INDIFFERENT?

Fire which heats by nature appears to all as heat- 179 ing, and snow which chills by nature appears to all as chilling, and all things which move by nature move equally all those who are, as they say, in a natural

τῶν λεγομένων ἀγαθῶν πάντας κινεῖ ὡς ἀγαθόν, ὡς ὑπομνήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι φύσει ἀγαθόν. ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲν τῶν λεγομένων ἀγαθῶν πάντας ὁμοίως
 180 κινεῖ, δηλον, φασίν. ἵνα γὰρ τοὺς ἰδιώτας παρῶμεν, ὧν οἱ μὲν εὐεξίαν σώματος ἀγαθὸν εἶναι νομίζουσιν, οἱ δὲ τὸ λαγνεύειν, οἱ δὲ τὸ ἀδηφαγεῖν, οἱ δὲ οἰνοφλυγίαν, οἱ δὲ τὸ χρῆσθαι κύβοις, οἱ δὲ πλεονεξίαν, οἱ δὲ καὶ χεῖρω τινὰ τούτων, αὐτῶν τῶν φιλοσόφων τινὲς μὲν τρία γένη φασίν εἶναι ἀγαθῶν, ὡς οἱ περιπατητικοί· τούτων γὰρ τὰ μὲν εἶναι περὶ ψυχὴν ὡς τὰς ἀρετάς, τὰ δὲ περὶ σῶμα ὡς ὑγίειαν καὶ τὰ εὐκότα, τὰ δὲ ἐκτός ὡς φίλους, πλοῦτον, τὰ
 181 παραπλήσια. οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς τριγένειαν μὲν καὶ αὐτοὶ φασιν εἶναι ἀγαθῶν· τούτων γὰρ τὰ μὲν εἶναι περὶ ψυχὴν ὡς τὰς ἀρετάς, τὰ δὲ ἐκτός ὡς τὸν σπουδαῖον καὶ φίλον, τὰ δὲ οὔτε περὶ ψυχὴν οὔτε ἐκτός, οἷον τὸν σπουδαῖον ὡς πρὸς ἑαυτόν· τὰ μέντοι περὶ σῶμα [ἢ ἐκτός],¹ ἃ φασιν οἱ ἐκ τοῦ περιπάτου ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, οὗ φασιν ἀγαθὰ. ἔτι οἱ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἡσπᾶσαντο ὡς ἀγαθόν, τινὲς δὲ κακὸν αὐτὴν ἀντικρυς εἶναι φασίν, ὥστε καὶ τινὰ τῶν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ἀναφθέγξασθαι “μανεῖην μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθεῖην.”

182 Εἰ τοίνυν τὰ μὲν φύσει κινουῦντα πάντας ὁμοίως κινεῖ, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς λεγομένοις ἀγαθοῖς οὐ πάντες ὁμοίως κινούμεθα, οὐδὲν ἔστι φύσει ἀγαθόν. καὶ γὰρ οὔτε πάσαις ταῖς προεκκειμέναις στάσεσι πιστεύειν ἐνδέχεται διὰ τὴν μάχην οὔτε τινί. ὁ

¹ [ἢ ἐκτός] del. Apelt.

* Cf. Plato, *Laws* iii. 697; Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* i. 8.

condition. But none of the so-called “goods,” as we shall show, moves all men as being good; therefore no natural good exists. And that none of the so-called goods moves all men alike is, they assert, an evident fact. For, not to mention ordinary folk—of whom 180 some regard right bodily condition as good, others chambering, others gluttony, others drunkenness, others gambling, others greed, and others still worse things,—some of the philosophers themselves (such as the Peripatetics) say that there are three kinds of goods^a; of these some concern the soul, like the virtues, others the body, like health and similar things, while others are external, such as friends, wealth and the like. The Stoics themselves, too, 181 assert that there is a trinity^b of goods; of these some have to do with the soul, like the virtues, others are external, like the good man and the friend, while others are neither of the soul nor external, as for instance the good man in relation to himself; but they deny that the bodily states, which the Peripatetics declare to be goods, are goods. And some have accepted pleasure as a good, whereas some affirm that it is a downright evil, so that one professor of philosophy^c actually exclaimed, “I would sooner be mad than merry.”

If, then, things which move by nature move all 182 men alike, while we are not all moved alike by the so-called goods, there is nothing good by nature. In fact it is impossible to believe either all the views now set forth, because of their conflicting character, or any one of them. For he who asserts that one

^b Apparently a unique sense of the rare word *τριγένεια* (from *τριγενής*, “thrice-born”).

^c Antisthenes, the Cynic.

γὰρ λέγων ὅτι τῆδε μὲν πιστευτέον τῇ στάσει τῆδε δὲ οὐδαμῶς, ἐναντιουμένους τοὺς παρὰ τῶν ἀντιδοξούντων λόγους αὐτῷ ἔχων, μέρος γίνεται <τῆς>¹ διαφωνίας, καὶ τοῦ κρινούντος αὐτὸς δεήσειται διὰ τοῦτο μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἑτέρους κρινεῖ. μήτε οὖν κριτηρίου ὄντος ὁμολογουμένου μήτε ἀποδείξεως, διὰ τὴν ἀνεπίκριτον καὶ περὶ τούτων διαφωνίαν εἰς τὴν ἐποχὴν καταστήσει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐχ ἔξει διαβεβαιουῦσθαι τί ἐστι τὸ φύσει ἀγαθόν.

183 Ἔτι κακίον λέγουσί τινες ὅτι ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ἦτοι τὸ αἰρεῖσθαι αὐτὸ ἢ ἐκείνο ὃ αἰρούμεθα. τὸ μὲν οὖν αἰρεῖσθαι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον λόγον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐσπύδομεν τυχεῖν ἐκείνου ὃ αἰρούμεθα, ἵνα μὴ ἐκπέσωμεν τοῦ ἐτι αὐτὸ αἰρεῖσθαι, οἷον εἰ ἀγαθόν ἦν τὸ ἀντιποιεῖσθαι ποτοῦ, οὐκ ἂν ἐσπύδομεν ποτοῦ τυχεῖν· ἀπολαύσαντες γὰρ τούτου τῆς ἀντιποιήσεως αὐτοῦ ἀπαλλαττόμεθα. καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πεινῆν ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐρᾶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων. οὐκ ἄρα τὸ αἰρεῖσθαι δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετόν ἐστιν, εἰ μὴ γε καὶ ὀχληρόν· καὶ γὰρ ὁ πεινῶν σπύδει μετασχεῖν τροφῆς, ὅπως ἀπαλλαγῇ τῆς ἐκ τοῦ πεινῆν ὀχλήσεως, καὶ ὁ ἐρῶν ὁμοίως καὶ ὁ ὀψῶν.

184 Ἄλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ αἰρετόν ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθόν. τοῦτο γὰρ ἦτοι ἐξωθέν ἐστιν ἡμῶν ἢ περὶ ἡμᾶς. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἐξωθεν ἡμῶν, ἦτοι ποιεῖ περὶ ἡμᾶς ἀστείαν κίνησιν καὶ ἀποδεκτὸν κατάστημα καὶ ἀγαστόν πάθος, ἢ οὐδαμῶς ἡμᾶς διατίθωσιν. καὶ εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἐστιν ἡμῖν ἀγαστόν, οὔτε ἀγαθόν ἔσται οὔτε

¹ <τῆς> add. cj. Bekk.

^a Cf. ii. 18 ff., 134 ff.

must believe this view, but not that, becomes a party to the controversy, since he has opposed to him the arguments of those who take the rival view, and therefore he himself, along with the rest, will need an adjudicator instead of pronouncing judgement on others. And as there does not exist any agreed criterion or proof ^a owing to the unsettled controversy about these matters, he will be reduced to suspending judgement, and consequently he will be unable to affirm positively what the good by nature is.

Further, it is asserted by some that Good is either ¹⁸³ the Choice ^b itself or that which we choose. Now Choice is not good according to its proper meaning; else we would not have been hurrying to obtain that which we choose, for fear of losing the power of continuing to choose it; for example, if the seeking to get drink were good, we would not have hurried to obtain drink; for when we have enjoyed it we are quit of seeking to get it. So, too, with hunger and love and the rest. Choice, then, is not choiceworthy in itself, even if it is not actually disagreeable; for in fact the hungry man hurries to partake of food in order to get quit of the discomfort due to his hunger; and so likewise the man in love and the thirsty man.

But neither is the good the choiceworthy. For this ¹⁸⁴ is either external to us or in connexion with us. But if it is external to us either it produces in us a soothing motion and a welcome condition and a delightful feeling, or it does not affect us at all. And if it is not a delight to us it will not be good,^c nor will it attract

^b Literally, "the (act of) choosing" or "trying to get for oneself." "Choice" (as the context shows) involves "desire" and the striving for satisfaction.

^c For the connexion of "good" (ἀγαθόν) with "delightful" (ἀγαστόν) cf. § 175.

ἐπάξεται ἡμᾶς πρὸς τὸ αἰρεῖσθαι αὐτὸ οὔτε ὄλως αἰρετὸν ἔσται. εἰ δὲ [ἐγ]γίνεται τι περὶ ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐκτὸς προσηγές κατάστημα καὶ ἄσμενιστὸν πάθος, οὐχὶ δι' ἑαυτὸ αἰρετὸν ἔσται τὸ ἐκτὸς, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν περὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπ' αὐτῷ γινομένην διάθεσιν·

185 ὥστε οὐ δύναται τὸ δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν ἐκτὸς εἶναι. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ ἡμᾶς. ἤτοι γὰρ περὶ σῶμα εἶναι λέγεται μόνον ἢ περὶ ψυχὴν μόνην ἢ περὶ ἀμφοτέρα. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν περὶ σῶμα μόνον, ἐκφεύζεται τὴν γνώσιν ἡμῶν· ψυχῆς γὰρ αἱ γνώσεις εἶναι λέγονται, τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἄλογον εἶναι φασιν ὅσον ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ. εἰ δὲ καὶ μέχρι τῆς ψυχῆς διατείνειν λέγοιτο, τῆ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀντιλήψει καὶ τῷ ταύτης ἀγαστῷ πάθει δοκοίη ἂν αἰρετὸν εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ κρινόμενον ὡς αἰρετὸν τῇ διανοίᾳ κρίνεται κατὰ αὐτοὺς καὶ οὐκ ἀλόγῳ σώματι.

186 Λεῖπεται λέγειν ὅτι περὶ ψυχὴν μόνην τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν. καὶ τοῦτο δὲ ἐξ ὧν οἱ δογματικοὶ λέγουσιν ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν. ἢ γὰρ ψυχὴ τάχα μὲν καὶ ἀνύπαρκτός ἐστιν· εἰ δὲ καὶ ὑπάρχει, ὅσον ἐφ' οἷς λέγουσιν οὐ καταλαμβάνεται, καθὼς ἐπελογοσάμην ἐν τῷ περὶ κριτηρίου λόγῳ. πῶς δ' ἂν θαρροίη τις ἐν ἐκείνῳ τι γίνεσθαι λέγειν ὃ μὴ καταλαμβάνει;

187 ἵνα δὲ καὶ ταῦτα παραλίπωμεν, πῶς ἄρα καὶ λέγουσιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ ἀγαθὸν γίνεσθαι; εἰ γοῦν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν ἡδονῇ τίθεται τὸ τέλος καὶ φησὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, ἐπεὶ καὶ πάντα, ἐξ ἀτόμων συνεστάναι, πῶς ἐν ἀτόμων σωρῷ δυνατὸν ἡδονὴν γίνεσθαι καὶ συγκατάθεσιν ἢ κρίσιν τοῦ τὸδε μὲν αἰρετὸν εἶναι καὶ ἀγαθὸν τὸδε δὲ φευκτὸν καὶ κακόν, ἀμήχανον εἰπεῖν.

* Cf. ii. 31 ff., which also deals with "the Criterion."

us to the choosing of it, nor will it be choiceworthy at all. And if there arises within us, from the external object, a congenial condition and an agreeable feeling, it is not for its own sake that the external object will be choiceworthy but for the sake of the internal condition which follows upon it; so that what is choiceworthy in itself cannot be external. Nor can it be personal to us. For it is said to belong either to the body alone or to the soul alone or to both. But if it belongs to the body alone, it will elude our perception; for our perceptions are said to be properties of the soul, and they assert that the body, viewed by itself, is irrational. And if it should be said to extend to the soul also, it would seem to be choiceworthy owing to its affecting the soul and to the agreeable feeling therein; for, according to them, what is judged to be choiceworthy is judged by the intellect and not by the irrational body.

There remains the alternative that the good is in the soul only. But this, too, is impossible if we go by the statements of the Dogmatists. For the soul is, perhaps, actually non-existent^a; and even if it exists, judging by what they say it is not apprehended, as I have argued in my chapter "On the Criterion." How then could one venture to affirm that something takes place in a thing which he does not apprehend? But, to pass over these objections, in what manner does the good, according to them, come about in the soul? For certainly, if Epicurus makes the End consist in pleasure and asserts that the soul, like all else, is composed of atoms, it is impossible to explain how in a heap of atoms there can come about pleasure and assent or judgement that this object is choiceworthy and good, that object to be avoided and evil.

ΚΑ΄.—ΤΙ ΕΣΤΙΝ Η ΛΕΓΟΜΕΝΗ ΤΕΧΝΗ ΠΕΡΙ ΒΙΟΝ

188 Πάλιν οἱ στωικοὶ περὶ ψυχὴν ἀγαθὰ φασὶν εἶναι
 τέχναις τινάς, τὰς ἀρετάς· τέχνην δὲ εἶναι φασὶ
 σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων συγγεγυμνασμένων, τὰς
 δὲ καταλήψεις γίνεσθαι περὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. πῶς
 οὖν ἐν τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ, πνεύματι κατ' αὐτοὺς ὑπ-
 ἀρχοντι, ἐναπόθεσις γίνεται καταλήψεων καὶ ἀ-
 θροισμὸς τοσοῦτων ὡς γενέσθαι τέχνην, οὐχ οἶόν τε
 ἐννοῆσαι, τῆς ἐπιγυωμένης τυπώσεως ἀεὶ τὴν πρὸ
 αὐτῆς ἀπαλειφούσης, ἐπεὶ χυτὸν τέ ἐστι τὸ πνεῦμα
 καὶ ἐξ ὅλου κινεῖσθαι λέγεται καθ' ἑκάστην τύπω-
 189 σιν. τὸ γὰρ τὴν Πλάτωνος ἀνειδωλοποίησιν λέγειν
 ἐπιδεκτικὴν εἶναι δύνασθαι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, φημί δὲ
 τὴν κρᾶσιν τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ μεριστῆς οὐσίας καὶ
 τῆς θατέρου φύσεως καὶ ταύτου, ἢ τοὺς ἀριθμούς,
 τέλειον ληρώδες ἐστίν. ὅθεν οὐδὲ περὶ ψυχὴν εἶναι
 190 δύναται τὸ ἀγαθόν. εἰ δὲ μήτε τὸ αἰρεῖσθαι αὐτὸ
 ἀγαθόν ἐστι, μήτε ἐκτὸς ὑπόκειται τὸ δι' αὐτὸ
 αἰρετόν, μήτε περὶ σῶμά ἐστι μήτε περὶ ψυχὴν,
 ὡς ἐπελογισάμην, οὐδ' ὅλως ἔστι τι φύσει ἀγαθόν.
 Διὰ δὲ τὰ προειρημένα οὐδὲ κακόν τι ἔστι φύσει·
 τὰ γὰρ ἑτέροις δοκοῦντα εἶναι κακά, ταῦτα ἕτεροι
 διώκουσιν ὡς ἀγαθὰ, οἷον ἀσέλγειαν ἀδικίαν φιλ-
 αργυρίαν ἀκρασίαν, τὰ εὐκότα. ὅθεν εἰ τὰ μὲν

^a It is a mistake (of the mss.) to make a new chapter here, as §§ 188 ff. carry on the argument of 185 ff. about the connexion of "good" with the soul. The "Art of Living" is first dealt with in § 239.

^b Cf. Cic. Acad. iv. 7. 22 "ars . . . ex multis animi perceptionibus constat." The virtues, said the Stoics, are "arts" because they are forms of knowledge and consist in the use or "exercise" of a large number of perceptions or "apprehensions" related to one another in a systematic way. These

CHAPTER XXIV.—WHAT IS THE SO-CALLED ART OF LIVING? ^a

Again, the Stoics declare that goods of the soul 188 are certain arts, namely the virtues. And an art, they say, is "a system composed of co-exercised apprehensions," ^b and the perceptions arise in the ruling principle. But how there takes place in the ruling principle, which according to them is breath, ^c a deposit of perceptions, and such an aggregation of them as to produce art, it is impossible to conceive, when each succeeding impression obliterates the previous one, seeing that breath is fluid and it is said to move as a whole at each impression. For it is perfect nonsense to say 189 that Plato's imaginary construction of the soul—I mean the mixture of the indivisible and the divisible essence and of the nature of the Other and of the Same, ^d or the Numbers—is capable of being receptive of the Good. Hence the good cannot belong to the soul either. But if the good is not choice itself, and 190 what is choiceworthy in itself neither exists externally nor belongs to either body or soul—as I have argued,—then there does not exist at all any natural good.

For the foregoing reasons also there exists no natural evil. For things which seem to some to be evil are pursued as goods by others—for instance, incontinence, injustice, avarice, intemperance, and the like. Hence, if it is the nature of things naturally "apprehensions" are "deposited" in the mind which is conceived as an elastic fluid *pneuma* of which the whole moves when any part of it is moved. Cf. §§ 241, 251 *infra*.

^c Cf. i. 128, ii. 70.
^d Cf. Plato, *Tim.* 35 ff. But "the Numbers" may refer to the Pythagorean theory.

φύσει πάντας ὁμοίως πέφυκε κινεῖν, τὰ δὲ λεγόμενα εἶναι κακὰ οὐ πάντας ὁμοίως κινεῖ, οὐδὲν ἔστι φύσει κακόν.

- 191 Ὅμοίως δὲ οὐδ' ἀδιάφορόν ἐστὶ τι φύσει διὰ τὴν περὶ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων διαφωνίαν. οἷον γοῦν οἱ μὲν στωικοὶ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων φασὶ τὰ μὲν προηγμένα εἶναι τὰ δὲ ἀποπροηγμένα τὰ δὲ οὔτε προηγμένα οὔτε ἀποπροηγμένα, προηγμένα μὲν τὰ ἰκανὴν ἀξίαν ἔχοντα ὡς ὑγίειαν πλοῦτον, ἀποπροηγμένα δὲ τὰ μὴ ἰκανὴν ἔχοντα ἀξίαν ὡς πενίαν νόσον, μήτε δὲ προηγμένα μήτε ἀποπροηγμένα ὡς τὸ
- 192 ἐκτεῖναι ἢ συγκαμψαί τὸν δάκτυλον. τινὲς δὲ οὐδὲν τῶν ἀδιαφόρων φύσει προηγμένον ἢ ἀποπροηγμένον εἶναι λέγουσιν· ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων παρὰ τὰς διαφόρους περιστάσεις ὅτε μὲν προηγμένον φαίνεται ὅτε δὲ ἀποπροηγμένον. εἰ γοῦν, φασίν, οἱ μὲν πλούσιοι ἐπιβουλεύοντο ὑπὸ τυράννου οἱ δὲ πένητες εἰρηνεύοντο, πᾶς ἂν ἔλοιτο εἶναι πένης μᾶλλον ἢ πλούσιος, ὡς
- 193 ἀποπροηγμένον γίνεσθαι τὸν πλοῦτον. ὥστε ἐπεὶ ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων ἀδιαφόρων οἱ μὲν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι φασιν οἱ δὲ κακόν, ἅπαντες δ' ἂν ὁμοίως ἀδιάφορον αὐτὸ ἐνόμιζον εἶναι εἴγε ἀδιάφορον ἦν φύσει, οὐδὲν ἔστι φύσει ἀδιάφορον.

Ὅτως καὶ εἴ τις φύσει αἰρετὴν εἶναι λέγοι τὴν ἀνδρίαν διὰ τὸ τοὺς λέοντας φυσικῶς τολμᾶν καὶ ἀνδρίζεσθαι δοκεῖν, καὶ ταύρους, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ ἀνθρώπους τινὰς καὶ ἀλεκτρούνας, λέγομεν ὅτι ὅσον ἐπὶ τούτῳ καὶ ἡ δειλία τῶν φύσει αἰρετῶν ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ ἔλαφοι καὶ λαγωοὶ καὶ ἄλλα πλείονα

existent to move all men alike, whereas the things said to be evil do not move all alike, nothing is naturally evil.

Similarly there is nothing naturally indifferent, 191 because of the divergence of opinion about things indifferent. The Stoics, for example, assert that of the indifferents some are preferred, some rejected, and others neither preferred nor rejected,^a—the preferred being such as have sufficient value, like health and wealth; the rejected such as have not sufficient value, like poverty and sickness; while extending the finger or bending it in are cases of the neither preferred nor rejected. Some, however, maintain 192 that none of the indifferents is by nature preferred or rejected; for, owing to the differences in the circumstances, each of the indifferents appears at one time preferred, at another rejected. For certainly, they argue, if the rich were being threatened with attack by a tyrant while the poor were being left in peace, everyone would prefer to be poor rather than rich, so that wealth would be a thing rejected. Consequently, 193 since of each of the so-called indifferents some say that it is good, others bad, whereas all alike would have counted it indifferent had it been naturally indifferent, there is nothing that is naturally indifferent.

So also, should anyone declare that courage is naturally choiceworthy because lions seem to be naturally bold and courageous, bulls too, it may be, and some men and cocks, we reply that, as for that, cowardice also is one of the things naturally choiceworthy, since deer and hares and many other animals

¹ τολμᾶν καὶ T: τολμᾶν ἐπὶ τὸ mss.: ὁρμᾶν ἐπὶ τὸ edd., Bekk.

^a Cf. *Introduct.* p. xxvii, Cic. *De fin.* iii. 15 f., iv. 9, 16.

ζῶα φυσικῶς ἐπ' αὐτὴν ὀρμᾶ. καὶ οἱ πλείστοι δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων δειλοὶ θεωροῦνται· σπανίως μὲν γὰρ τις ὑπὲρ πατρίδος ἑαυτὸν ἐπέδωκεν εἰς θάνατον [βλακευσάμενος]¹ ἢ ἄλλως θερμόν τι τυφωθείς ἔδοξέ τις διαπράττεσθαι, ὁ δὲ πλείστος ὁμιλος τῶν ἀνθρώπων πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐκκλίνει.

- 194 "Ὅθεν καὶ οἱ Ἐπικουρείοι δεικνύουσι νομίζουσι φύσει αἰρετὴν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν· τὰ γὰρ ζῶα φασιν ἅμα τῷ γενέσθαι, ἀδιάστροφα ὄντα, ὀρμᾶν μὲν
195 ἐπὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐκκλίνειν δὲ ἀλγηδόνας. καὶ πρὸς τούτους δὲ ἔστι λέγειν ὅτι τὸ ποιητικὸν κακοῦ οὐκ ἂν εἴη φύσει ἀγαθόν. ἢ δέ γε ἡδονὴ κακῶν ἔστι ποιητικὴ· πάσῃ γὰρ ἡδονῇ παραπέτῃγεν ἀλγηδῶν, ἢ ἔστι κατ' αὐτοὺς φύσει κακόν. οἶον γούν ἡδεταὶ ὁ μέθυσος ἐμφορούμενος οἴνου καὶ ὁ γαστρίμαργος τροφῆς, καὶ ὁ λάγνος ἀφροδισίοις ἀμέτροις χρώμενος· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα καὶ πενίας καὶ νόσων ἔστι ποιητικά, ἅπερ ἀλγεινά ἐστι κακά, ὡς φασίν. οὐκ ἄρα φύσει ἀγαθόν ἐστὶν ἡ ἡδονή.
196 παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἔστι φύσει κακόν, ἡδονὰς δὲ ἀποτελοῦσιν ἀλγηδόνες· καὶ γὰρ ἐπιστήμας ἀναλαμβάνομεν πονοῦντες, καὶ πλούτου καὶ ἐρωμένης οὕτως ἐγκρατῆς γίνεταί τις, καὶ ὑγίειαν περιποιοῦσιν αἱ ἀλγηδόνες. οὐκ ἄρα ὁ πόνος φύσει κακόν. καὶ γὰρ εἰ φύσει ἀγαθόν μὲν ἦν ἡ ἡδονὴ φαῦλον δὲ ὁ πόνος, πάντες ἂν ὁμοίως διέκειντο περὶ αὐτῶν, ὡς ἐλέγομεν· ὀρώμεν δὲ πολλοὺς τῶν φιλοσόφων τὸν μὲν πόνον καὶ τὴν καρτερίαν αἰρουμένους, τῆς ἡδονῆς δὲ καταφρονοῦντας.

¹ [βλακευσάμενος] delevi, post ἀνθρώπων transp. Apelt: <οὗ> βλακ. cj. R. Philippson.

are naturally impelled thereto. The majority of men, too, show themselves to be cowardly; for it is rare for a man to give himself up to death for the sake of his country,^a or to seem inspired to do any other daring deed, the great majority of mankind being averse to all such actions.

Hence, also, the Epicureans suppose themselves to 194 have proved that pleasure is naturally choiceworthy; for the animals, they say, as soon as they are born, when still unperverted, seek after pleasure and avoid pains. But to these we may reply that what is pro- 195 ductive of evil cannot be naturally good; but pleasure is productive of evils; for to every pleasure there is linked a pain, and pain, according to them, is a natural evil. Thus, for example, the drunkard feels pleasure when filling himself with wine, and the glutton with food, and the lecher in immoderate sexual intercourse, yet these things are productive of both poverty and sickness, which, as they say, are painful and evil. Pleasure, therefore, is not a natural good. Similarly, 196 too, what is productive of good is not naturally evil, and pains bring about pleasures; it is, in fact, by toil that we acquire knowledge, and it is thus also that a man becomes possessed both of wealth and of his lady-love, and pains preserve health. Toil, then, is not naturally evil. Indeed if pleasure were naturally good, and toil bad, all men, as we said, would have been similarly disposed towards them, whereas we see many of the philosophers choosing toil and hardship and despising pleasure.

^a The word bracketed in the Greek text (βλακευσάμενος) means "being lazy, or spiritless," and is obviously out of place here, though it would fit well enough in the next clause (as Apelt suggests).

- 197 Ὅμοίως δ' ἂν περιτρέποντο καὶ οἱ τὸν ἐνάρετον βίον φύσει ἀγαθὸν εἶναι λέγοντες ἐκ τοῦ τινὰς τῶν σοφῶν τὸν μεθ' ἡδονῆς αἰρεῖσθαι βίον, ὡς ἐκ τῆς παρ' αὐτοῖς ἐκείνοις διαφωνίας τὸ φύσει τι τοῖον ἢ τοῖον εἶναι διατρέπεσθαι.
- 198 Οὐκ ἀποπον δ' ἂν ἴσως εἶη πρὸς τούτοις καὶ εἰδικώτερον ἐπιστήσαι διὰ βραχέων ταῖς ὑπολήψεις ταῖς περὶ αἰσχροῦν καὶ οὐκ αἰσχροῦν ἀθέσμων τε καὶ οὐ τοιούτων καὶ νόμων καὶ ἔθῶν καὶ τῆς εἰς θεοῦς εὐσεβείας καὶ τῆς περὶ τοὺς κατοικομένους ὀσιότητος καὶ τῶν εὐκοτόων· καὶ γὰρ οὕτω περὶ τῶν πρακτέων ἢ μὴ πολλὴν εὐρήσομεν ἀνωμαλίαν.
- 199 Οἶον γοῦν παρ' ἡμῖν μὲν αἰσχρὸν, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ παράνομον νενομίσται τὸ τῆς ἀρρενομιξίας, παρὰ Γερμανοῖς δέ, ὡς φασίν, οὐκ αἰσχρὸν ἀλλ' ὡς ἐν τι τῶν συνήθων. λέγεται δὲ καὶ παρὰ Θηβαίους τὸ παλαιὸν οὐκ αἰσχρὸν τοῦτο εἶναι δόξαι, καὶ τὸν Μηριόνην τὸν Κρηῖτα οὕτω κεκλήσθαι φασι δι' ἔμφασιν τοῦ Κρητῶν ἔθους, καὶ τὴν Ἀχιλλέως πρὸς Πάτροκλον διάπυρον φιλίαν εἰς τοῦτο ἀν-
200 ἀγοῦσι τινές. καὶ τί θαυμαστόν, ὅπου γε καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς κυνικῆς φιλοσοφίας καὶ οἱ περὶ τὸν Κιτιέα Ζήνωνα καὶ Κλεάνθην καὶ Χρύσιππον ἀδιάφορον τοῦτο εἶναι φασίν; καὶ τὸ δημοσίᾳ γυναικὶ μίγ-

^a e.g. the Cyrenaics.

^b Cf. the examples in i. 145 ff. "Amongst us" here, and throughout this chapter (as in i. 145 ff.), means "amongst the Greeks" and refers in special to the laws or customs of Athens.

^c Prob. not "Germans," but a Persian tribe, cf. i. 152.

^d i.e. Μηριόνης is derived from μηρός ("thigh"); cf. § 245 *infra*.

^e Cf. Plato, *Symp.* 180 A.

^f Cf. §§ 205, 245; and i. 148, 153, 160 for what follows. The repellent features of Stoic ethical theory mentioned in

And so, too, those who assert that the virtuous life 197 is naturally good might be refuted by the fact that some of the sages choose the life which includes pleasure,^a so that the claim that a thing is by nature of this sort or that is contradicted by the divergence of opinion amongst the Dogmatists themselves.

And perhaps it may not be amiss, in addition to 198 what has been said, to dwell more in detail, though briefly, on the notions concerning things shameful and not shameful, unholy and not so, laws and customs, piety towards the gods, reverence for the departed, and the like. For thus we shall discover a great variety of belief concerning what ought or ought not to be done.

For example,^b amongst us sodomy is regarded as 199 shameful or rather illegal, but by the Germani,^c they say, it is not looked on as shameful but as a customary thing. It is said, too, that in Thebes long ago this practice was not held to be shameful, and they say that Meriones the Cretan was so called by way of indicating the Cretans' custom,^d and some refer to this the burning love of Achilles for Patroclus.^e And 200 what wonder, when both the adherents of the Cynic philosophy and the followers of Zeno of Citium, Cleanthes and Chrysippus, declare that this practice is indifferent?^f Having intercourse with a woman,

this chapter are passed over in most expositions of Stoicism, though confirmed by Plutarch (*De Stoic. repugn.*). We may ascribe them to the "Back to Nature" movement, which the early Stoics shared with the Cynics. The dictum "Live according to Nature" might be taken to mean "Disregard conventional morals," "Cease to repress your natural instincts." But, as Sextus says in § 249, they did not (like some of the Cynics) carry out in practice these shocking theories.

νυθαι, καίτοι παρ' ἡμῖν αἰσχρὸν εἶναι δοκοῦν,
 παρά τισι τῶν Ἰνδῶν οὐκ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι νομίζεται.
 μίγνυνται γοῦν ἀδιαφόρως δημοσίᾳ, καθάπερ καὶ
 201 περὶ τοῦ φιλοσόφου Κράτητος ἀκηκόαμεν. ἀλλὰ
 καὶ τὸ τὰς γυναικάς ἐταιρεῖν παρ' ἡμῖν μὲν αἰ-
 σχρὸν ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπονείδιστον, παρὰ δὲ πολλοῖς τῶν
 Αἰγυπτίων εὐκλεές· φασι γοῦν ὅτι αἱ πλείστοις
 συνιοῦσαι καὶ κόσμον ἔχουσι περισφύριον, σύνθημα
 τοῦ παρ' αὐταῖς σεμνολογήματος. παρ' ἐνίοις
 δὲ αὐτῶν αἱ κόραι πρὸ τῶν γάμων τὴν προῖκα ἐξ
 ἐταιρήσεως συνάγουσαι γαμοῦνται. καὶ τοὺς στωι-
 κούς δὲ ὀρώμεν οὐκ ἄτοπον εἶναι λέγοντας τὸ
 ἐταῖρα συνοικεῖν ἢ τὸ ἐξ ἐταίρας ἐργασίας διαζῆν.
 202 Ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐστίχθαι παρ' ἡμῖν μὲν αἰσχρὸν
 καὶ ἄτιμον εἶναι δοκεῖ, πολλοὶ δὲ Αἰγυπτίων καὶ
 203 Σαρματῶν στίζουσι τὰ γεννώμενα. τό τε ἐλλόβια
 ἔχειν τοὺς ἄρρενας παρ' ἡμῖν μὲν αἰσχρὸν ἐστὶ,
 παρ' ἐνίοις δὲ τῶν βαρβάρων, ὡσπερ καὶ Σύροις,
 εὐγενείας ἐστὶ σύνθημα. τινὲς δὲ ἐπιτείνοντες τὸ
 σύνθημα τῆς εὐγενείας, καὶ τὰς ῥίνας τῶν παιδῶν
 τετρῶσκοντες κρίκους ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀργυρέους ἢ
 χρυσοῦς ἀπαρτῶσιν, ὃ παρ' ἡμῖν οὐκ ἂν ποιήσείε
 204 τις, ὡσπερ οὐδὲ ἀνθοβαφή καὶ ποδήρη τις ἄρρηγ
 ἐνταῦθα ἂν ἀμφιέσαιτο ἐσθῆτα, καίτοι παρὰ
 Πέρσαις εὐπρεπεστάτου τοῦ παρ' ἡμῖν αἰσχροῦ
 τούτου δοκοῦντος εἶναι. καὶ παρὰ Διονυσίῳ δὲ
 τῷ τῆς Συκελίας τυράνῳ τοιαύτης ἐσθῆτος Πλά-
 τῶνι καὶ Ἀριστίπῳ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις προσενεχ-
 θείσης ὁ μὲν Πλάτων ἀπεπέμψατο, εἰπὼν

too, in public, although deemed by us to be shameful,
 is not thought to be shameful by some of the Indians ;
 at any rate they couple publicly with indifference, like
 the philosopher Crates, as the story goes. Moreover, 201
 prostitution is with us a shameful and disgraceful
 thing, but with many of the Egyptians it is highly
 esteemed ; at least, they say that those women who
 have the greatest number of lovers wear an orna-
 mental ankle-ring as a token of their proud posi-
 tion.^a And with some of them the girls marry after
 collecting a dowry before marriage by means of
 prostitution. We see the Stoics also declaring that
 it is not amiss to keep company with a prostitute or
 to live on the profits of prostitution.

Moreover, with us tattooing is held to be shameful 202
 and degrading, but many of the Egyptians and
 Sarmatians tattoo their offspring. Also, it is a 203
 shameful thing with us for men to wear earrings, but
 amongst some of the barbarians, like the Syrians, it is
 a token of nobility. And some, by way of marking
 their nobility still further, pierce the nostrils also of
 their children and suspend from them rings of silver
 or gold—a thing which nobody with us would do, just 204
 as no man here would dress himself in a flowered
 robe reaching to the feet, although this dress, which
 with us is thought shameful, is held to be highly
 respectable by the Persians. And when, at the Court
 of Dionysius the tyrant of Sicily, a dress of this
 description was offered to the philosophers Plato and
 Aristippus,^b Plato sent it away with the words—

^a Cf. Hdt. iv. 176.

^b Cf. Diog. Laert. ii. 78, and i. 155 *supra*. The verses
 are from Eurip. *Bacchae* 836 and 317.

οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην θῆλυν ἐνδύσαι στολήν
ἄρρην πεφυκώς,

ἢ δὲ Ἀριστιππος προσήκατο, φήσας

καὶ γὰρ ἐν βακχεύμασιν
οὖσ' ἢ γε σώφρων οὐ διαφθαρήσεται.

οὕτω καὶ τῶν σοφῶν ᾧ μὲν οὐκ αἰσχρὸν ᾧ δὲ
205 αἰσχρὸν ἐδόκει τοῦτο εἶναι. ἄθεσμον τέ ἐστι παρ'
ἡμῖν μητέρα ἢ ἀδελφὴν ἰδίαν γαμεῖν. Πέρσαι δέ,
καὶ μάλιστα αὐτῶν οἱ σοφίαν ἀσκεῖν δοκοῦντες,
οἱ Μάγοι, γαμοῦσι τὰς μητέρας, καὶ Αἰγύπτιοι
τὰς ἀδελφὰς ἄγονται πρὸς γάμον, καὶ ὡς ὁ
ποιητὴς φησιν,

Ζεὺς Ἥρην προσέειπε κασιγνήτην ἄλοχόν τε.

ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ Κιτιεὺς Ζήνων φησὶ μὴ ἄτοπον εἶναι
τὸ μόριον τῆς μητρὸς τῷ ἑαυτοῦ μορίῳ τρίψαι,
καθάπερ οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι μέρος τοῦ σώματος αὐτῆς
τῇ χειρὶ τρίψαι φαῦλον ἂν εἴποι τις εἶναι. καὶ ὁ
Χρυσίππος δὲ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ δογματίζει τὸν τε
πατέρα ἐκ τῆς θυγατρὸς παιδοποιεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν
μητέρα ἐκ τοῦ παιδὸς καὶ τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἐκ τῆς
ἀδελφῆς. Πλάτων δὲ καὶ καθολικώτερον κοινὰς
206 εἶναι τὰς γυναῖκας δεῖν ἀπεφήνατο. τό τε αἰ-
σχρουργεῖν ἐπάρατον ὃν παρ' ἡμῖν ὁ Ζήνων οὐκ
ἀποδοκιμάζει· καὶ ἄλλους δὲ ὡς ἀγαθῷ τινὶ τούτῳ
χρησθαι τῷ κακῷ πυνθανόμεθα.

207 Ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἀνθρωπείων γεύεσθαι σαρκῶν παρ'
ἡμῖν μὲν ἄθεσμον, παρ' ὀλοῖσι δὲ βαρβάρους ἔθνεσιν
ἀδιάφορον ἐστίν. καὶ τί δεῖ τοὺς βαρβάρους λέγειν,

^a Cf. i. 152.

^b Homer, *Il.* xviii. 356.

^c Cf. § 246, i. 160.

A man am I, and never could I don
A woman's garb;

but Aristippus accepted it, saying—

For e'en midst revel-routs
She that is chaste will keep her purity.

Thus, even in the case of these sages, while the one of
them deemed this practice shameful, the other did
not. And with us it is sinful to marry one's mother 205
or one's own sister; but the Persians, and especially
those of them who are reputed to practise wisdom—
namely, the Magi,—marry their mothers; and the
Egyptians^a take their sisters in marriage, even as the
poet says^b—

Thus spake Zeus unto Hera, his wedded wife and his
sister.

Moreover, Zeno of Citium says that it is not amiss for
a man to rub his mother's private part with his own
private part, just as no one would say it was bad for 205
him to rub any other part of her body with his hand.
Chrysippus,^c too, in his book *The State* approves of a
father getting children by his daughter, a mother by
her son, and a brother by his sister. And Plato,^d in
more general terms, has declared that wives ought
to be held in common. Masturbation, too, which we 206
count loathsome, is not disapproved by Zeno; and we
are informed that others, too, practise this evil as
though it were a good thing.

Moreover, the eating of human flesh is sinful with 207
us, but indifferent amongst whole tribes of bar-
barians.^e Yet why should one speak of "barbarians"

^a Cf. *Rep.* v. 457.

^c Cf. § 225 *infra*.

ὅπου καὶ ὁ Τυδεὺς τὸν ἐγκέφαλον τοῦ πολεμίου
 λέγεται φαγεῖν, καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς οὐκ ἄτοπον
 εἶναι φασι τὸ σάρκας τιὰ ἐσθίειν ἄλλων τε ἀν-
 208 θρώπων καὶ ἑαυτοῦ; τό τε ἀνθρωπιῶ μαιίνειν
 αἵματι βωμὸν θεοῦ παρ' ἡμῖν μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς
 ἄθεσμον, Λάκωνες δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ βωμοῦ τῆς Ὀρ-
 θωσίας Ἀρτέμιδος μαστίζονται πικρῶς ὑπὲρ τοῦ
 πολλὴν αἵματος ἐπὶ τοῦ βωμοῦ τῆς θεοῦ γενέσθαι
 ῥύσιν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ Κρόνῳ θύουσιν ἀνθρωπὸν
 τινες, καθάπερ καὶ Σκύθαι τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι τοὺς
 ξένους· ἡμεῖς δὲ χραίνεσθαι τὰ ἱερά δοκοῦμεν ἀν-
 209 θρώπου φόνῳ. τοὺς γε μὴν μοιχοὺς κολάζει παρ'
 ἡμῖν νόμος, παρὰ δὲ τισιν ἀδιάφορόν ἐστι ταῖς
 τῶν ἐτέρων γυναιξὶ μίγνυσθαι· καὶ φιλοσόφων δὲ
 τινές φασι ἀδιάφορον εἶναι τὸ ἀλλοτρίᾳ γυναικὶ
 μίγνυσθαι.
 210 Τοὺς πατέρας τε ὑπὸ τῶν παίδων ἐπιμελείας
 ἀξιούσθαι κελεύει παρ' ἡμῖν νόμος· οἱ Σκύθαι δὲ
 ὑπὲρ τὰ ἐξήκοντα ἔτη γενομένους αὐτοὺς ἀποσφάτ-
 τουσιν. καὶ τί θαυμαστόν, εἴγε ὁ μὲν Κρόνος τῇ
 ἄρπῃ τὰ αἰδοῖα ἐξέτεμε τοῦ πατρός, ὁ δὲ Ζεὺς
 τὸν Κρόνον κατεταρτάρωσεν, ἡ δὲ Ἀθηναῖα μετὰ
 Ἥρας καὶ Ποσειδῶνος τὸν πατέρα δεσμεύειν ἐπ-
 211 χειρήσεν; ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ παῖδας ὁ Κρόνος
 ἀναρεῖν ἔκρινεν, καὶ ὁ Σόλων Ἀθηναίοις τὸν περὶ
 τῶν ἀκρίτων νόμον ἔθετο, καθ' ὃν φονεύειν ἐκάστω
 τὸν ἑαυτοῦ παῖδα ἐπέτρεψεν. παρ' ἡμῖν δὲ τὸ
 τοὺς παῖδας φονεύειν ἀπαγορεύουσιν οἱ νόμοι. οἱ
 τε Ῥωμαίων νομοθῆται τοὺς παῖδας ὑποχειρίους

^a Tydeus, father of Diomedes; his "enemy" was Melanippus (*Il.* xiv. 114 ff.).

when even Tydeus^a is said to have devoured the
 brains of his enemy, and the Stoic School declare
 that it is not wrong for a man to eat either other
 men's flesh or his own? And with most of us it is 208
 sinful to defile an altar of a god with human blood,
 but the Laconians lash themselves fiercely over the
 altar of Artemis Orthosia^b in order that a great
 stream of blood may flow over the altar of the
 goddess. Moreover, some sacrifice a human victim
 to Cronos, just as the Scythians^c sacrifice strangers
 to Artemis; whereas we deem that holy places are
 defiled by the slaying of a man. Adulterers are, of 209
 course, punished by law with us, but amongst some
 peoples^d intercourse with other men's wives is a thing
 indifferent; and some philosophers,^e too, declare that
 intercourse with the wife of another is indifferent.

With us, also, the law enjoins that the fathers 210
 should receive due care from their children; but the
 Scythians cut their throats when they get to be
 over sixty years old. And what wonder, seeing that
 Cronos cut off his father's genitals with a sickle, and
 Zeus plunged Cronos down to Tartarus, and Athena
 with the help of Hera and Poseidon attempted to
 bind her father with fetters?^f Moreover, Cronos 211
 decided to destroy his own children, and Solon gave
 the Athenians the law "concerning things immune,"
 by which he allowed each man to slay his own child;
 but with us the laws forbid the slaying of children.
 The Roman lawgivers also ordain that the children

^b Boys were scourged at the altar of Artemis Orthia in Laconia.

^c Cf. i. 149.

^d Cf. *Hdt.* iv. 180; *Aristot. Pol.* ii. 3.

^e e.g. Diogenes the Cynic, cf. *Diog. Laert.* vi. 72.

^f Cf. *Hom. Il.* xiv. 204, i. 399.

καὶ δούλους τῶν πατέρων κελεύουσιν εἶναι, καὶ τῆς οὐσίας τῶν παίδων μὴ κυριεύειν τοὺς παῖδας ἀλλὰ τοὺς πατέρας, ἕως ἂν ἐλευθερίας οἱ παῖδες τύχῃσι κατὰ τοὺς ἀργυρωνήτους· παρ' ἑτέροις δὲ
 212 ὡς τυραννικὸν τοῦτο ἐκβέβληται. νόμος τέ ἐστι τοὺς ἀνδροφόλους κολάζεσθαι· οἱ μονομάχαι δὲ φονεύοντες πολλάκις καὶ τιμῆς τυγχάνουσιν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ τύπτειν ἐλευθέρους οἱ νόμοι κωλύουσιν· οἱ ἀθληταὶ δὲ τύπτοντες ἐλευθέρους ἄνδρας, πολ-
 213 λάκις καὶ ἀναιροῦντες, τιμῶν καὶ στεφάνων ἀξιοῦν-
 214 ται. νόμος τε παρ' ἡμῖν κελεύει μιᾷ συνοικεῖν ἕκαστον, Θρακῶν δὲ καὶ Γαιτούλων (Λιβύων δὲ ἔθνος τοῦτο) πολλαῖς ἕκαστος συνοικεῖ. τό τε ληστεύειν παρ' ἡμῖν μὲν παράνομον καὶ ἀδικόν ἐστι, παρὰ δὲ πολλοῖς τῶν βαρβάρων οὐκ ἄτοπον. φασὶ δὲ ὅτι καὶ εὐκλεῆς τοῦτο οἱ Κίλικες ἐνόμιζον εἶναι, ὡς καὶ τοὺς ἐν ληστείᾳ τελευτήσαντας τιμῆς ἀξίους εἶναι δοκεῖν. καὶ ὁ Νέστωρ δὲ παρὰ τῷ ποιητῇ, μετὰ τὸ φιλοφρονήσασθαι τοὺς περὶ τὸν Τηλέμαχον, φησὶ πρὸς αὐτοὺς

ἢ μασιδίως ἀλλάγηθε

οἶά τε ληιστῆρες;

καίτοι εἰ ἄτοπον ἦν τὸ ληστεύειν, οὐκ ἂν <ἦν>¹ οὕτως αὐτοὺς φιλοφρονησάμενος διὰ τὸ ὑποπτεύειν μὴ ἄρα τοιοῦτοί τινες εἴεν.

215 Ἄλλὰ καὶ κλέπτειν [μὲν] παρ' ἡμῖν μὲν ἀδικον καὶ παράνομόν ἐστιν· οἱ δὲ καὶ κλεπτίστατον εἶναι θεὸν λέγοντες τὸν Ἑρμῆν οὐκ ἀδικον τοῦτο νομίζεσθαι ποιῶσιν· πῶς γὰρ ἂν θεὸς εἴη κακός; φασὶ δὲ τινες ὅτι καὶ οἱ Λάκωνες τοὺς κλέπτας

¹ <ἦν> addidi: <ὠνειδίσει> post φιλοφρ. cj. Mutsch.

are subjects and slaves of their fathers, and that power over the children's property belongs to the fathers and not the children, until the children have obtained their freedom like bought slaves; but this custom is rejected by others as being despotic. It is the law, too, 212 that homicides should be punished; but gladiators when they kill often receive actual commendation. Moreover, the laws prevent the striking of free men; yet when athletes strike free men, and often even kill them, they are deemed worthy of rewards and crowns. With us, too, the law bids each man to 213 have one wife, but amongst the Thracians and Gaetulians (a Libyan tribe)^a each man has many wives. Piracy, too, is with us illegal and criminal, 214 but with many of the barbarians it is not disapproved. Indeed they say that the Cilicians used to regard it as a noble pursuit, so that they held those who died in the course of piracy to be worthy of honour. So too Nestor—in the poet's account^b—after welcoming Telemachus and his comrades, addresses them thus—

Say, are you roaming

Aimlessly, like sea-rovers?

Yet, if piracy had been an improper thing, he would not have welcomed them in this friendly way, because of his suspicion that they might be people of that kind.

Moreover, thieving is with us illegal and criminal; 215 yet those who declare that Hermes is a most thievish god cause this practice to be accounted not criminal—for how could a god be bad? And some say that the Laconians also punished those who thieved, not be-

^a Cf. Sallust, *Bell. Jug.* 21, 82.

^b Homer, *Od.* iii. 73. For early Greek piracy cf. Thucyd. i. 5.

ἐκόλαζον οὐ διὰ τὸ κεκλοφέναι ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ πεφω-
 216 ρᾶσθαι. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ δειλὸς καὶ ὁ ῥίψασπις ἀνήρ
 κολάζεται παρὰ πολλοῖς νόμῳ· διὸ καὶ ἡ τὴν ἀσπί-
 दा τῷ παιδί ἐπὶ πόλεμον ἐξιόντι διδοῦσα Λάκαινα
 “σὺ” ἔφη, “τέκνον, ἢ ταύταν ἢ ἐπὶ ταύταν.”
 Ἀρχιλόχος δέ, ὡσπερ σεμνυνόμενος ἡμῖν ἐπὶ τῷ
 τὴν ἀσπίδα ῥίψας φυγεῖν, ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασι περὶ
 ἑαυτοῦ φησὶν

ἀσπίδι μὲν Σαίων τις ἀγάλλεται, ἦν παρὰ θάμνῳ
 ἔντος ἀμώμητον κάλλιπον οὐκ ἐθέλων,
 αὐτὸς δ' ἐξέφυγον θανάτου τέλος.

217 αἱ δὲ Ἀμαζόνες καὶ ἐχώλεον τὰ ἄρρενα τῶν παρ'
 αὐταῖς γεννωμένων ὑπὲρ τοῦ μηδὲν ἀνδρείον αὐτὰ
 ποιῆσαι δύνασθαι, περὶ πόλεμον δὲ ἔσχον αὐταί,
 τοῦ ἐναντίου παρ' ἡμῖν καλῶς ἔχειν νεομισμένου.
 καὶ ἡ μήτηρ δὲ τῶν θεῶν προσίεται τοὺς θηλυδρίας,
 οὐκ ἂν οὕτω κρίνασα ἢ θεός, εἶγε φύσει φαῦλον
 218 ἦν τὸ μὴ ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι. οὕτω καὶ τὰ περὶ τῶν
 δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρίαν
 καλοῦ πολλὴν ἀνωμαλίαν ἔχει.

Καὶ τὰ περὶ εὐσεβείας δὲ καὶ θεῶν πεπλήρωται
 πολλῆς διαφωσίας. θεοὺς γὰρ οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ φασι
 εἶναι τινὲς δὲ οὐκ εἶναι, ὡσπερ οἱ περὶ Διαγόραν
 τὸν Μήλιον καὶ Θεόδωρον καὶ Κριτίαν τὸν Ἀθη-
 ναῖον. καὶ τῶν εἶναι θεοὺς ἀποφηναμένων οἱ μὲν
 τοὺς πατέρας νομίζουσι θεοὺς, οἱ δὲ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς

^a A. of Paros, famous for his iambic poems, *circa* 680 B.C.
 Alcæus, a later poet, also flung away his shield in battle;
 and Hor. *Od.* ii. 7 is based on one or other of these incidents.

^b Cf. *Hdt.* iv. 114.

^c Cybele, whose priests were eunuchs, cf. *Catullus* 63.

cause they had thieved, but because they had been
 found out. Moreover, the coward and the man 216
 who throws away his shield are in many places
 punished by law; and this is why the Laconian
 mother, when giving a shield to her son as he set
 out for the war, said, “Either with this, my child, or
 upon it.” Yet Archilochus,^a as though vaunting to
 us of his flight after flinging away his shield, speaks
 thus of himself in his poems—

Over my shield some Saian warrior gloats,—
 The shield I left, though loth, beside the bush—
 A flawless piece of armour; I myself
 Flew and escaped from death which endeth all.

And the Amazons^b used to maim the males amongst 217
 their offspring so as to make them incapable of any
 manly action, while they themselves attended to
 warfare; though with us the opposite practice is
 regarded as right. The Mother of the gods,^c also,
 approves of effeminates, and the goddess would not
 have decided thus if unmanliness were naturally a
 bad thing. So it is that, in regard to justice and 218
 injustice and the excellence of manliness, there is a
 great variety of opinion.

Around all matters of religion and theology
 also, there rages violent controversy.^d For while
 the majority declare that gods exist, some deny
 their existence, like Diagoras of Melos, and Theo-
 dorus, and Critias the Athenian.^e And of those
 who maintain the existence of gods, some believe in
 the ancestral gods, others in such as are constructed

^d Cf. for this subject *Adv. Phys.* i. 13 ff., 50 ff.

^e Diagoras, atomist and poet, *circa* 420 B.C.; Theodorus,
 a Cyrenaic, *circa* 310 B.C.; Critias, orator and poet, one of
 the “Thirty Tyrants” (404 B.C.) of Athens.

δογματικαῖς αἰρέσεσιν ἀναπλασσομένους, ὡς Ἄριστοτέλης μὲν ἀσώματον εἶπεν εἶναι τὸν θεὸν καὶ πέρασ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, στωικοὶ δὲ πνεῦμα διήκον καὶ διὰ τῶν εἰδεχθῶν, Ἐπίκουρος δὲ ἀνθρωπόμορφον,
 219 Ξενοφάνης δὲ σφαῖραν ἀπαθῆ. καὶ οἱ μὲν προνοεῖν τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς, οἱ δὲ μὴ προνοεῖν τὸ γὰρ μακάριον καὶ ἀφθαρτον ὁ Ἐπίκουρός φησι μήτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχειν μήτε ἑτέροις παρέχειν. ὅθεν καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον οἱ μὲν ἓνα φασὶν εἶναι θεόν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὺς καὶ διαφόρους ταῖς μορφαῖς, ὡς καὶ εἰς τὰς τῶν Αἰγυπτίων ὑπολήψεις ἐκπίπτειν, κυνοπροσώπους καὶ ἰερακομόρφους καὶ βόας καὶ κροκοδείλους καὶ τί γὰρ οὐχὶ νομιζόντων τοὺς θεοὺς.

220 Ὅθεν καὶ τὰ περὶ θυσιῶν καὶ τῆς περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς θρησκείας ὅλως πολλὴν ἀνωμαλίαν ἔχει· ἃ γὰρ ἐν τισιν ἱεροῖς ὄσια, ταῦτα ἐν ἑτέροις ἀνόσια. καίτοι εἰ φύσει τὸ ὄσιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον ἦν, οὐκ ἂν τοῦτο ἐνομίσθη. ὅσον γοῦν Σαράπιδι χοῖρον οὐκ ἂν θύσειέ τις, Ἡρακλεῖ δὲ καὶ Ἀσκληπιῶ θύουσιν πρόβατον Ἴσιδι θύειν ἄθεσμον, τῇ μητρὶ μέντοι λεγομένη τῶν θεῶν καὶ θεοῖς ἄλλοις καλλιερεῖται.

221 τῷ Κρόνῳ <οἱ Καρχηδόνοι>¹ θύουσιν ἄνθρωπον, ὃ τοῖς πλείστοις ἀσεβές εἶναι νομίζεται. αἰλουρον ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ τῷ Ὠρω θύουσι, καὶ Θέτιδι σίλφην· ὃ παρ' ἡμῶν οὐκ ἂν ποιήσειέ τις. ἵππον

¹ <οἱ Καρχηδόνοι> addidi: <τινὲς δὲ> ante τῷ cj. Mutsch.

* This definition of God is not in our Aristotle, but cf. *De caelo*, i. 9, 278 b 14: "We are wont to give the name of 'Heaven' especially to the outermost and highest (part of the Universe), in which all the Divinity, we say, is situated."

in the Dogmatic systems—as Aristotle asserted that God is incorporeal and "the limit of heaven,"^a the Stoics that he is a breath which permeates even through things foul, Epicurus that he is anthropomorphic,^b Xenophanes that he is an impassive sphere. Some, too, hold that he cares for human affairs, others that he does not so care; for Epicurus declares that "what is blessed and incorruptible neither feels trouble itself nor causes it to others." Hence ordinary people differ also, some saying that there is one god, others that there are many gods and of various shapes; in fact, they even come to share the notions of the Egyptians^c who believe in gods that are dog-faced, or hawk-shaped, or cows or crocodiles or anything else.

Hence, too, sacrificial usages, and the ritual of worship in general, exhibit great diversity. For things which are in some cults accounted holy are in others accounted unholy. But this would not have been so if the holy and the unholy existed by nature. Thus, for example, no one would sacrifice a pig to Sarapis, but they sacrifice it to Heracles and Asclepius. To sacrifice a sheep to Isis is forbidden, but it is offered up in honour of the so-called Mother of the gods and of other deities. To Cronos^d a human victim is sacrificed <at Carthage>, although this is regarded by most as an impious act. In Alexandria they offer a cat to Horus and a beetle to Thetis—a thing which no one here would do. To Poseidon they sacrifice a

It is this outermost circumference—the abode of Fire, the finest and most divine of elements—which is here termed "the limit" (*πέρας*).

^b Cf. Diog. Laert. vii. 138 f. (Stoics), x. 139 (Epicureans). For Xenophanes cf. i. 225.

^c Cf. Hdt. ii. 41, Juvenal xv. 2 ff.

^d Cf. § 208 *supra*.

τῷ Ποσειδῶνι καλλιερῶσιν. Ἀπόλλωνι δέ, ἐξ-
αιρέτως τῷ Διδυμαίῳ, τὸ ζῶον ἀπεχθές. αἶγας
'Αρτέμιδι θύειν εὐσεβές, ἀλλ' οὐκ Ἀσκληπιῶ.
222 καὶ ἄλλα δὲ τούτοις ὅμοια παμπληθῆ λέγειν ἔχων
ἔῶ, τῆς συντομίας [παρα]στοχαζόμενος. εἰ μέντοι
τι ἦν ὅσιον φύσει θῦμα καὶ ἀνόσιον, παρὰ πᾶσιν
ἂν ὁμοίως ἐνομίζετο.

Παραπλήσια δὲ τούτοις ἔστιν εὐρεῖν καὶ τὰ ἐν
τῇ κατὰ τὴν διαίταν τῶν ἀνθρώπων θρησκείᾳ περὶ
223 τοὺς θεοὺς. Ἰουδαῖος μὲν γὰρ ἢ ἱερεὺς Αἰγύπτιος
θᾶπτον ἂν ἀποθάνοι ἢ χοίρειον φάγοι, Αἴβυς δὲ
προβατείου γεύσασθαι κρέως τῶν ἀθεσμοτάτων
εἶναι δοκεῖ, Σύρων δὲ τιwes περιστερᾶς, ἄλλοι δὲ
ἱερείων. ἰχθύς τε ἐν τισὶ μὲν ἱεροῖς θέμις ἐσθίειν,
ἐν ἄλλοις δὲ ἀσεβές. Αἰγυπτίων δὲ τῶν σοφῶν
εἶναι νενομισμένων οἱ μὲν κεφαλὴν ζώου φαγεῖν
ἀνίερων εἶναι νομίζουσιν, οἱ δὲ ὠμοπλάτην, οἱ δὲ
224 πόδα, οἱ δὲ ἄλλο τι. κρόμμυον δὲ οὐκ ἂν τις
προσενέγκαιτο τῶν καθιερουμένων τῷ κατὰ Πηλού-
σιον Κασίῳ Δίῳ, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἱερεὺς τῆς κατὰ
Λιβύην Ἀφροδίτης σκοροδοῦ γεύσασθαι ἂν. ἀπ-
έχονται δὲ ἐν οἷς μὲν ἱεροῖς μίνθης, ἐν οἷς δὲ ἡδυ-
όσμου, ἐν οἷς δὲ σελίνου. ἔνιοι δὲ θᾶπτον ἂν τὰς
κεφαλὰς φαγεῖν φασὶ τῶν πατέρων ἢ κυάμους.
225 ἄλλα παρ' ἑτέροις ταῦτα ἀδιάφορα. κυνεῖων τε
γεύσασθαι δοκοῦμεν ἡμεῖς ἀνίερων εἶναι, Θρακῶν
δὲ ἔνιοι κυνοφαγεῖν ἰστοροῦνται. ἴσως δὲ καὶ παρ'
Ἑλλήσι τοῦτο ἦν σύνθηες· διόπερ καὶ Διοκλῆς ἀπὸ
τῶν κατὰ τοὺς Ἀσκληπιάδας ὀρμώμενος τισὶ τῶν

^a i.e. of Didymus, near Miletus.

^b Cf. Hdt. ii. 47.

^c Cf. Hdt. ii. 39.

^d Cf. Juv. xv. 9.

^e East of the Nile Delta.

horse; but to Apollo (especially the Didymæan^a Apollo) that animal is an abomination. It is an act of piety to offer goats to Artemis, but not to Asclepius. And I might add a host of similar instances, but I 222 forbear since my aim is to be brief. Yet surely, if a sacrifice had been holy by nature or unholy, it would have been deemed so by all men alike.

Examples similar to these may also be found in the religious observances with regard to human diet. For a Jew or an Egyptian priest^b would sooner die 223 than eat swine's flesh; by a Libyan it is regarded as a most impious thing to taste the meat of a sheep, by some of the Syrians to eat a dove, and by others to eat sacrificial victims. And in certain cults it is lawful, but in others impious, to eat fish. And amongst the Egyptians some of those who are reputed to be sages believe it is sinful to eat an animal's head,^c others the shoulder, others the foot, others some other part. And no one would bring an onion^d 224 as an offering to Zeus Casius of Pelusium,^e just as no priest of the Libyan Aphrodite would taste garlic. And in some cults they abstain from mint, in others from catmint, in others from parsley. And some declare that they would sooner eat their fathers' heads than beans.^f Yet, amongst others, these things 225 are indifferent. Eating dog's flesh, too, is thought by us to be sinful, but some of the Thracians are reported to be dog-eaters. Possibly this practice was customary also amongst the Greeks; and on this account Diocles, too, starting from the practices of the Asclepiadae,^g prescribes that hounds' flesh should

^f Cf. Emped. Frag. 141; probably a Pythagorean (or Orphic) "taboo"; cf. Hdt. ii. 37.

^g The earliest Greek medical guild; Diocles was a famous physician of the fourth century B.C.

πασχόντων σκυλάκεια δίδοσθαι κελεύει κρέα. τινὲς δὲ καὶ ἀνθρώπων σάρκας, ὡς ἔφην, ἀδιαφόρως ἐσθίουσιν, ὅπερ ἀνέρον παρ' ἡμῖν εἶναι νενόμισται. 226
καίτοι εἶγε ἦν φύσει τὰ τῆς θρησκείας καὶ τῶν ἀθέσμων, παρὰ πᾶσιν ἂν ὁμοίως ἐνομίζετο.

Παραπλήσια δὲ ἔστι λέγειν καὶ περὶ τῆς εἰς τοὺς κατοικομένους ὁσιότητος. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὀλοκλήρως περιστείλαντες τοὺς ἀποθανόντας γῆ καλύπτουσιν, ἀσεβές εἶναι νομίζοντες ἡλίω δεικνύειν αὐτούς. Αἰγύπτιοι δὲ τὰ ἔντερα ἐξελόντες ταριχεύουσιν αὐτοὺς καὶ σὺν ἑαυτοῖς ὑπὲρ γῆς ἔχουσιν. 227
Αἰθιοπῶν δὲ οἱ ἰχθυοφάγοι εἰς τὰς λίμνας ἐμβάλλουσιν αὐτούς, ὑπὸ τῶν ἰχθύων βρωθησομένους. Ὑρκανοὶ δὲ κυσὶν αὐτοὺς ἐκτίθενται βορὰν, Ἰνδῶν δὲ ἔνιοι γυψίν. Τρωγλοδύτας δὲ φασιν ἐπὶ τινα γεώλοφον ἄγειν τὸν ἀποθάνοντα, εἶτα δεσμεύσαντας αὐτοῦ τὴν κεφαλὴν πρὸς τοὺς πόδας λίθους βάλλειν μετὰ γέλωτος, εἶθ' ὅταν χύσωσιν αὐτὸν τοῖς βαλ- 228
λομένοις ἀπαλλάσσεσθαι. τινὲς δὲ βάρβαροι τοὺς μὲν ὑπὲρ ἐξήκοντα ἔτη γεγονότας θύσαντες ἐσθίουσιν, τοὺς δὲ ἐν νεότητι ἀποθάνοντας γῆ κρύπτουσιν. ἔνιοι δὲ καίουσι τοὺς τετελευτηκότας. ὧν οἱ μὲν ἀναλαβόντες αὐτῶν τὰ ὀστέα κηδεύουσιν, οἱ δὲ ἀφροντίστως καταλείπουσιν ἐρριμμένα. Πέρσας δὲ φασιν ἀνασκοπιζέειν τοὺς ἀποθάνοντας καὶ νίτρω ταριχεύειν, εἶθ' οὕτω τελαμῶσι συνελεῖν. ἄλλοι δὲ ὅσον πένθος ἐπὶ τοῖς τελευτήσασιν ὑπομένουσιν ὁρῶμεν.

^a § 207 *supra*.

be given to certain patients. And some, as I have said,^a even eat human flesh indifferently, a thing which with us is accounted sinful. Yet, if the rules 226 of ritual and of unlawful foods had existed by nature, they would have been observed by all men alike.

A similar account may be given of reverence towards the departed.^b Some wrap the dead up completely and then cover them with earth, thinking that it is impious to expose them to the sun; but the Egyptians take out their entrails and embalm them and keep them above ground with themselves. The fish-eating tribes of the Ethiopians cast them 227 into the lakes, there to be devoured by the fish; the Hyrcanians^c expose them as a prey to dogs, and some of the Indians to vultures. And they say that some of the Troglodytes^d take the corpse to a hill, and then after tying its head to its feet cast stones upon it amidst laughter, and when they have made a heap of stones over it they leave it there. And some 228 of the barbarians^e slay and eat those who are over sixty years old, but bury in the earth those who die young. Some burn the dead; and of these some recover and preserve their bones,^f while others show no care but leave them scattered about. And they say that the Persians^g impale their dead and embalm them with nitre, after which they wrap them round in bandages. How much grief others endure for the dead we see ourselves.

^b For this subject *cf.* Diog. Laert. ix. 84; Cic. *Tusc.* i. 45; Sir T. Browne, *Hydriotaphia*, chap. i.

^c South of the Caspian Sea.

^d *i.e.* "cave-dwellers" of west coast of the Red Sea.

^e *Cf.* § 210 *supra*.

^f *Cf.* Tibull. iii. 2. 17 for the practice of *ossilegium*.

^g *Cf.* Hdt. i. 140.

229 Καὶ τὸν θάνατον δὲ αὐτὸν οἱ μὲν δεινὸν καὶ
 φευκτὸν εἶναι νομίζουσιν, οἱ δὲ οὐ τοιοῦτον. ὁ
 γοῦν Εὐριπίδης φησὶν

τίς δ' οἶδεν εἰ τὸ ζῆν μὲν ἔστι καταθεῖν,
 τὸ καταθεῖν δὲ ζῆν κάτω νομίζεται;

καὶ ὁ Ἐπίκουρος δὲ φησὶν “ ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς
 ἡμᾶς· τὸ γὰρ διαλυθὲν ἀναισθητεῖ, τὸ δὲ ἀναισθη-
 τῶν οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς.” φασὶ δὲ καὶ ὡς εἴπερ
 συνεστήκαμεν ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, ὁ δὲ θάνατος
 διάλυσις ἔστι ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, ὅτε μὲν ἡμεῖς
 ἔσμεν, οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ θάνατος (οὐ γὰρ διαλυόμεθα),
 ὅτε δὲ ὁ θάνατος ἔστιν, οὐκ ἔσμεν ἡμεῖς· τῷ γὰρ
 μηκέτι τὴν σύστασιν εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ
 230 σώματος οὐδὲ ἡμεῖς ἔσμεν. ὁ δὲ Ἡράκλειτος
 φησὶν ὅτι καὶ τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ ἀποθεῖναι καὶ ἐν τῷ
 ζῆν ἡμᾶς ἔστι καὶ ἐν τῷ τεθνᾶναι· ὅτε μὲν γὰρ
 ἡμεῖς ζῶμεν, τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν τεθνᾶναι καὶ ἐν
 ἡμῖν τεθάφθαι, ὅτε δὲ ἡμεῖς ἀποθνήσκομεν, τὰς
 ψυχὰς ἀναβιοῦν καὶ ζῆν. ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ βέλτιον
 εἶναι τὸ ἀποθεῖναι τοῦ ζῆν ἡμᾶς ὑπολαμβάνουσιν.
 ὁ γοῦν Εὐριπίδης φησὶν

ἐχρῆν γὰρ ἡμᾶς σύλλογον ποιουμένους
 τὸν φύντα θρηγεῖν, εἰς ὅσ' ἔρχεται κακά,
 τὸν δ' αὖ θανόντα καὶ κακῶν πεπαυμένον
 χαίροντας εὐφημοῦντας ἐκπέμπειν δόμων.

231 ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς αὐτῆς ὑπολήψεως καὶ ταῦτα εἴρηται·

^a Eurip. *Frag.* 638 (Nauck).

^b Epic. p. 61. 6; 71. 6 (Usener); cf. Lucret. iii. 830.

Some, too, believe death itself to be dreadful and 229
 horrible, others do not. Thus Euripides says ^a:

Who knows if life be but the state of death,
 And death be counted life in realms below?

And Epicurus ^b declares: “ Death is nothing to us;
 for what is dissolved is senseless, and what is senseless
 is nothing to us.” They also declare that, inasmuch as
 we are compounded of soul and body, and death is a
 dissolution of soul and body, when we exist death
 does not exist (for we are not being dissolved), and
 when death exists we do not exist, for through the
 cessation of the compound of soul and body we too
 cease to exist. And Heraclitus ^c states that both life 230
 and death exist both in our state of life and in our
 state of death; for when we live our souls are dead
 and buried within us, and when we die our souls
 revive and live. And some even suppose that dying
 is better for us than living. Thus Euripides says ^d:

Rather should we assemble to bewail
 The babe new-born, such ills has he to face;
 Whereas the dead, who has surcease from woe,
 With joy and gladness we should bear from home.

These lines, too, spring from the same sentiment ^e: 231

^a Cf. Heracl. *Frag.* 67, 78 (B 88 Diels). Part of the
 “Upward and Downward Way” of H. (see *Introd.* p. viii)
 is the cycle of generation by which every creature is simul-
 taneously both living and dying. The soul, which consists
 of “fire,” is continually passing into the other elements,
 and the other elements into it. But the second clause (“for
 when we live” etc.) looks rather like a contamination of
 Heraclitus's doctrine with the *σῶμα—σῆμα* (“body a tomb”)
 theory of Pythagoreanism.

^b *Frag.* 449; cf. Cic. *Tusc.* i. 48, Lucr. v. 222 ff.

^c Theognis 425 ff.; cf. Soph. *Oed. Col.* 1227.

ἀρχὴν μὲν μὴ φῦναι ἐπιχθονίοισιν ἄριστον,
μηδ' εἰσιδεῖν αὐγὰς ὀξέος ἡελίου,
φύντα δ' ὅπως ὠκίστα πύλας Ἄϊδαο περῆσαι
καὶ κείσθαι πολλὴν γαίαν ἐφессάμενον.

- καὶ τὰ περὶ Κλέοβιν δὲ καὶ Βίτωνα ἴσμεν, ἃ φησὶν
ὁ Ἡρόδοτος ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς Ἀργείας ἱερείας λόγῳ.
232 ἰστοροῦνται δὲ καὶ Θρακῶν ἔνιοι περικαθεσθέντες
τὸν γεννηθέντα θρηγεῖν. οὐδὲ ὁ θάνατος οὖν τῶν
φύσει δεινῶν εἶναι νομίζοιτο ἂν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ ζῆν
τῶν φύσει καλῶν. οὐδὲ τῶν προειρημένων τί ἐστι
φύσει τοῖον ἢ τοῖον, νομιστὰ δὲ πάντα καὶ πρὸς τι.
233 Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον τῆς ἐπιχειρήσεως μετα-
φέρειν ἔστι καὶ ἐφ' ἕκαστον τῶν ἄλλων, ἃ μὴ
ἐξεθέμεθα νῦν διὰ τὴν συντομίαν τοῦ λόγου. εἰ
δὲ καὶ περὶ τινων μὴ ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν αὐτόθεν ἀνω-
μαλίαν, λεκτέον ὅτι ἐν τισιν ἔθνεσιν ἀγνωστοί
ἡμῖν ἐνδέχεται καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν εἶναι διαφωνίαν.
234 ὡς οὖν εἰ μὴ ἐγινώσκομεν, εἰ τύχοι, τὸ περὶ τοῦ
τὰς ἀδελφὰς γαμεῖν τῶν Αἰγυπτίων ἔθος, οὐκ ἂν
ὀρθῶς διεβεβαιοῦμεθα ὁμολογούμενον παρὰ πᾶσιν
εἶναι τὸ μὴ δεῖν ἀδελφὰς γαμεῖν, οὕτως οὐδὲ περὶ
τῶν πραγμάτων ἐκείνων ἐν οἷς οὐχ ὑποπίπτουσι
ἡμῖν ἀνωμαλίας διαβεβαιούσθαι προσήκει μὴ εἶναι
διαφωνίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἐνδεχομένου, καθάπερ ἔφη,
τοῦ παρὰ τισιν ἔθνεσι τῶν ἡμῖν μὴ γνωσκομένων
τὴν περὶ αὐτῶν εἶναι διαφωνίαν.

* Cf. Hdt. i. 31; Cic. *Tusc.* i. 47. Their mother Cydippe (the "Argive priestess" of Hera) prayed the goddess to grant her sons, C. and B., the best of boons for mortals: the same night both died in their sleep.

Not to have been begotten at all were the best thing for
mortals,
Nor to have looked upon fiery rays of the sun:
Or, if begotten, to hasten amain to the portals of Hades,
And to lie unmoved robed in masses of earth.

We know, too, the facts about Cleobis and Biton which Herodotus^a relates in his story of the Argive priestess. It is reported, also, that some of the 232 Thracians sit round the new-born babe and chant dirges.^b So, then, death should not be considered a thing naturally dreadful, just as life should not be considered a thing naturally good. Thus none of the things mentioned above is naturally of this character or of that, but all are matters of convention and relative.

The same method of treatment may be applied also 233 to each of the other customs, which we have not now described owing to the summary character of our exposition. And even if, in regard to some of them, we are unable to declare their discrepancy offhand, we ought to observe that disagreement concerning them may possibly exist amongst certain nations that are unknown to us.^c For just as, if we had been 234 ignorant, say, of the custom amongst the Egyptians of marrying sisters,^d we should have asserted wrongly that it was universally agreed that men ought not to marry sisters,—even so, in regard to those practices wherein we notice no discrepancy, it is not proper for us to affirm that there is no disagreement about them, since, as I said, disagreement about them may possibly exist amongst some of the nations which are unknown to us.

^b Cf. Hdt. v. 4.

^d Cf. § 205 *supra*.

^c Cf. ii. 40.

235 Ὁ τοίνυν σκεπτικὸς τὴν τοσαύτην ἀνωμαλίαν τῶν πραγμάτων ὁρῶν ἐπέχει μὲν περὶ τοῦ φύσει τὴν ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ ὅλως πρακτέον ἢ μὴ πρακτέον εἶναι, κὰν τούτῳ τῆς δογματικῆς ἀφιστάμενος προπετειάς, ἔπεται δὲ ἀδοξάστως τῇ βιωτικῇ τηρήσει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐν μὲν τοῖς δοξαστοῖς ἀπαθὴς μένει,

236 ἐν δὲ τοῖς κατηναγκασμένοις μετριοπαθεῖ· ὡς μὲν γὰρ ἄνθρωπος αἰσθητικῶς¹ πάσχει, μὴ προσδοξάζων δὲ ὅτι τοῦτο ὁ πάσχει κακὸν ἐστὶ φύσει, μετριοπαθεῖ. τὸ γὰρ προσδοξάζειν τι τοιοῦτο χειρόν ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πάσχειν, ὡς ἐνίοτε τοὺς μὲν τεμνομένους ἢ ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτο πάσχοντας φέρειν, τοὺς δὲ παρεστώτας διὰ τὴν περὶ τοῦ γινομένου

237 δόξαν ὡς φαύλου λειποψυχεῖν. ὁ μὲντοι γε ὑποθέμενος τὸ φύσει τι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ ὅλως πρακτέον ἢ μὴ πρακτέον εἶναι ταρασσεται ποικίλως. καὶ γὰρ παρόντων αὐτῷ τούτων ἂ νομίζει φύσει κακὰ εἶναι ποιηλατεῖσθαι δοκεῖ, καὶ τῶν φαινομένων ἀγαθῶν αὐτῷ γινόμενος ἐγκρατῆς ὑπὸ τε τοῦ τύφου καὶ τοῦ περὶ τὴν ἀποβολὴν αὐτῶν φόβου, καὶ εὐλαβοῦμενος μὴ πάλιν ἐν τοῖς φύσει κακοῖς νομιζομένοις παρ' αὐτῷ γένηται, ταραχαῖς οὐχὶ

238 ταῖς τυχοῦσαις περιπίπτει· τοὺς γὰρ ἀναπόβλητα εἶναι τὰ ἀγαθὰ λέγοντας ἐφέξομεν ἐκ τῆς ἀπορίας τῆς κατὰ τὴν διαφωνίαν. ὅθεν ἐπιλογιζόμεθα ὅτι εἰ τὸ κακοῦ ποιητικὸν κακὸν ἐστὶ καὶ φευκτόν, ἢ δὲ πεποιθήσις τοῦ τάδε μὲν εἶναι φύσει ἀγαθὰ

¹ αἰσθητικῶς Heintz: αἰσθητικὸς mss., Bekk.

• Cf. i. 13, 25 ff.

Accordingly, the Sceptic, seeing so great a diversity 235 of usages, suspends judgement as to the natural existence of anything good or bad or (in general) fit or unfit to be done, therein abstaining from the rashness of dogmatism^a; and he follows undogmatically the ordinary rules of life, and because of this he remains impassive in respect of matters of opinion, while in conditions that are necessitated his emotions are moderate; for though, as a human being, he 236 suffers emotion through his senses, yet because he does not also opine that what he suffers is evil by nature, the emotion he suffers is moderate. For the added opinion that a thing is of such a kind is worse than the actual suffering itself, just as sometimes the patients themselves bear a surgical operation, while the bystanders swoon away because of their opinion that it is a horrible experience. But, in fact, he who 237 assumes that there exists by nature something good or bad or, generally, fit or unfit to be done, is disquieted in various ways. For when he experiences what he regards as natural evils he deems himself to be pursued by Furies, and when he becomes possessed of what seems to him good things he falls into no ordinary state of disquiet both through arrogance and through fear of losing them, and through trying to guard against finding himself again amongst what he regards as natural evils; for those who assert that goods 238 are incapable of being lost^b we shall put to silence by means of the doubts raised by their dissension. Hence we conclude that if what is productive of evil is evil and to be shunned, and the persuasion that these things are good, those evil, by nature produces

^b So said the Cynics, and some Stoics; other Stoics gave up the doctrine; cf. Diog. Laert. vi. 105, vii. 127.

τάδε δὲ κακὰ παραχὰς ποιεῖ, κακὸν ἔστι καὶ φευκτὸν τὸ ὑποτίθεσθαι καὶ πεποιθῆναι φαῦλον τι ἢ ἀγαθὸν ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν εἶναι.

Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος ἀρκεῖ λελέχθαι περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἀδιαφόρων.

ΚΕ'.—Εἰ ἔστι τέχνη περὶ βίον

239 Δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων ὅτι οὐδὲ τέχνη τις ἂν εἴη περὶ τὸν βίον. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τοιαύτη τέχνη, περὶ τὴν θεωρίαν τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν κακῶν καὶ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων ἔχει· διὸ τούτων ἀνυπόρκτων ὄντων ἀνυπαρκτός ἔστι καὶ ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη. καὶ ἄλλως, ἐπεὶ μὴ ὁμοφώνως μίαν ἀπολείπουνσι πάντες οἱ δογματικοὶ τέχνην περὶ τὸν βίον, ἀλλ' ἄλλοι ἄλλην ὑποτίθενται, ὑποπίπτουσι τῇ διαφωνίᾳ καὶ τῷ ἀπὸ τῆς διαφωνίας λόγῳ, ὃν ἠρώτησα ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰγαθοῦ λελεγμένοις ἡμῖν.

240 εἰ μέντοι καὶ μίαν εἶναι πάντες λέγοιεν καθ' ὑπόθεσιν τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνην, οἷον τὴν αἰδιμὸν φρόνησιν, ἣτις ὄνειροπολεῖται μὲν παρὰ στωικοῖς, μᾶλλον δὲ πληκτικωτέρα τῶν ἄλλων εἶναι δοκεῖ, καὶ οὕτως οὐδὲν ἤττον ἀτοπία παρακολουθήσουσιν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ φρόνησις ἔστιν ἀρετὴ, τὴν δὲ ἀρετὴν μόνος εἶχεν ὁ σοφός, οἱ στωικοὶ μὴ ὄντες σοφοὶ

241 οὐχ ἔξουσιν τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνην. ὅλως τε, ἐπεὶ μὴ δύναται κατ' αὐτοὺς ὑποστήναι τέχνη, οὐδὲ περὶ τὸν βίον ἔσται τέχνη τις ὅσον ἐφ' οἷς λέγουσιν. Οἷον γοῦν τέχνην εἶναι φασι σύστημα ἐκ κατα-

^a Cf. *Adv. Eth.* 167 ff.; *Cic. De fin.* i. 13, v. 6 ff.

^b Cf. §§ 180, 238 *supra*.

^c For the sage as "indiscoverable" cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 133, *Introd.* p. xxix. "Prudence" (*φρόνησις*), or "practical

disquiet, then the assumption and persuasion that anything is, in its real nature, either bad or good is evil and to be shunned.

For the present, then, this account of things good, evil, and indifferent is sufficient.

CHAPTER XXIII.—DOES THERE EXIST AN ART OF LIVING?

It is plain from what has been said above that there 239 can be no art of living.^a For if such an art exists, it has to do with the consideration of things good, evil, and indifferent, so that these being non-existent the art of living also is non-existent. Further, since the Dogmatists do not all with one accord lay down one single art of living, but some propound one art, some another, they are guilty of discrepancy and open to the argument from discrepancy which I stated in our discussion of the Good.^b Yet, even if they were 240 all to agree in assuming that the art of living is one—such as, for example, the celebrated "prudence" whereof the Stoics dream, and which seems to be more convincing than all the rest,—even so equally absurd results will follow. For since "prudence" is a virtue, and the Sage alone was in possession of virtue, the Stoics, not being sages,^c will not be in possession of the art of living. And in general, since, according 241 to them, no art^d can have real existence, an art of living cannot exist, so far as their statements go.

Thus, for example, they declare that art is "a common wisdom," is distinguished from "wisdom" (*σοφία*). Note that in this argument "the art of living" is identified with "prudence."

^d Cf. §§ 188 ff.; ii. 53 ff.

λήψεων, κατάληψιν δὲ καταληπτικῆ φαντασίᾳ συγκατάθεσιν. ἀνεύρετος δὲ ἔστιν ἡ καταληπτικῆ φαντασία· οὔτε γὰρ πᾶσα φαντασία καταληπτικῆ ἔστιν, οὔτε ποία τις ἔστιν ἀπὸ τῶν φαντασιῶν ἡ καταληπτικῆ φαντασία ἐπιγνωσθῆναι δύναται, ἐπεὶ μήτε πάσῃ φαντασίᾳ δυνάμεθα κρίνειν ἀπλῶς τις μὲν ἔστι καταληπτικῆ τις δὲ οὐ τοιαύτη, χρήζοντες τε καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας εἰς τὴν ἐπίγνωσιν τοῦ ποία τις ἔστιν ἡ καταληπτικῆ φαντασία εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκβαλλόμεθα, εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν τῆς λαμβανομένης ὡς καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν

242 ἄλλην αἰτούμενοι. ταῦτά τοι καὶ οἱ στωικοὶ ἐν τῇ τῆς καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας ἐννοίας ἀποδόσει οὐχ ὑγιῶς φέρονται· καταληπτικὴν μὲν γὰρ φαντασίαν λέγοντες τὴν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος γινομένην, ὑπάρχον δὲ εἶναι λέγοντες ὃ οἶόν τε κινεῖν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν, εἰς τὸν διάλληλον ἐμπίπτουσι τῆς ἀπορίας τρόπον. εἰ τοίνυν, ἵνα μὲν περὶ τὸν βίον ἡ τις τέχνη, δεῖ πρότερον εἶναι τέχνην, ἵνα δὲ ὑποστῇ τέχνη, κατάληψιν προῦφεστάναί, ἵνα δὲ ὑποστῇ κατάληψις, καταληπτικῆ φαντασία συγκατάθεσιν κατελιθῆναι, ἀνεύρετος δὲ ἔστιν ἡ καταληπτικῆ φαντασία, ἀνεύρετός ἔστιν ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη.

243 Ἐτι κἀκεῖνο λέγεται. πᾶσα τέχνη ἐκ τῶν ἰδίως ὑπ' αὐτῆς ἀποδιδόμενων ἔργων καταλαμβάνεσθαι δοκεῖ, οὐδὲν δὲ ἔστιν ἴδιον ἔργον τῆς περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνης· ὃ γὰρ ἂν ἔργον εἶναι ταύτης λέγῃ τις, τοῦτο κοινὸν εὐρίσκειται καὶ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν, οἷον τὸ τιμᾶν γονεῖς, τὸ παραθῆκας ἀποδιδόναι, τᾶλλα πάντα. οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τις περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη. οὔτε γὰρ

posite of apprehensions," and apprehension is "assent to an apprehensive impression."^a But the apprehensive impression is indiscoverable; for every impression is not apprehensive, nor is it possible to decide which one of the impressions is the apprehensive impression, since we cannot simply decide by means of every impression which one is apprehensive and which not, while if we require an apprehensive impression in order to determine which is the apprehensive impression we are wrecked on the *ad infinitum* fallacy, since we are asking for another apprehensive impression so as to determine the impression taken to be apprehensive. And herein, too, the procedure of the Stoics, 242 in presenting the notion of the apprehensive impression, is logically unsound; for in stating, on the one hand, that an apprehensive impression is that which is derived from a real object,^b and, on the other hand, that a real object is that which is capable of giving rise to an apprehensive impression, they fall into the fallacy of circular reasoning. If, then, in order that an art of living may exist, there must first exist art, and in order that art may subsist apprehension must pre-exist, and in order that apprehension may subsist assent to an apprehensive impression must be apprehended, but the apprehensive impression is indiscoverable,—then the art of living is indiscoverable.

Another argument is this. Every art appears to 243 be apprehended by means of its own special products, but there is no special product of the art of living; for anything you might mention as its product—such as honouring parents, paying back deposits, and all the rest—is found to be common to ordinary folk as well. Therefore no art of living exists. For we

^a Cf. ii. 4, 53 ff., *Introduct.* p. xxv.

^b Cf. *Adv. Log.* ii. 88.

ἐκ τοῦ ἀπὸ φρονίμης διαθέσεως φαίνεσθαι λεγόμενόν τι ὑπὸ τοῦ φρονίμου ἢ ποιούμενον, ὡς φασί τινες, ἐπιγνωσόμεθα ὅτι τῆς φρονήσεως ἔργον 244 ἐστίν. αὐτὴ γὰρ ἡ φρονίμη διάθεσις ἀκατάληπτός ἐστι, μήτε ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀπλῶς καὶ αὐτόθεν φαινομένη μήτε ἐκ τῶν ἔργων αὐτῆς· κοινὰ γάρ ἐστι ταῦτα καὶ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν. τό τε λέγειν ὅτι τῷ διομαλισμῷ τῶν πράξεων καταλαμβάνομεν τὸν ἔχοντα τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνην, ὑπερφθεγγομένων ἐστὶ τὴν ἀνθρώπων φύσιν καὶ εὐχομένων μᾶλλον ἢ τάληθῆ γεγονόντων·

τοῖος γὰρ νόος ἐστὶν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων
οἷον ἐπ' ἡμᾶρ ἄγῃσι πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε.

245 Λεῖπεται λέγειν ὅτι ἐξ ἐκείνων τῶν ἔργων καταλαμβάνεται ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη ἄπερ ἀναγράφουσιν ἐν ταῖς βίβλοις· ὧν πολλῶν καὶ παραπλησίων ἀλλήλοις ὄντων ὀλίγα ἐκθήσομαι παραδείγματος χάριν. οἷον γοῦν ὁ αἰρεσιάρχης αὐτῶν Ζήνων ἐν ταῖς διατριβαῖς φησὶ περὶ παίδων ἀγωγῆς ἄλλα τε ὅμοια καὶ τὰδε “ διαμηρίζειν μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδὲ ἡσσον παιδικὰ ἢ μὴ παιδικά, μηδὲ θήλεα ἢ ἄρρενα· οὐ γὰρ [ἐστὶ] παιδικοῖς ἄλλα ἢ μὴ παιδικοῖς, οὐδὲ θηλείαις ἢ ἄρρεσιν, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα πρέπει τε καὶ πρέπει 246 ποῦτα ἐστίν.” περὶ δὲ τῆς εἰς τοὺς γονεῖς ὀσιότητος ὁ αὐτὸς ἀνὴρ φησιν εἰς τὰ περὶ τὴν Ἰοκάστην καὶ τὸν Οἰδίποδα ὅτι οὐκ ἦν δευδὸν τρίβειν τὴν μητέρα. “ καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀσθενοῦσαν ἕτερόν τι μέρος τοῦ σώματος τρίψας ταῖς χερσὶν ὠφέλει, οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν· εἰ δὲ ἕτερα μέρη τρίψας εὐφραίνειν, ὀδυνω-

shall not ascertain (as some assert) from the apparent derivation of some speech or operation of the prudent man from a state of prudence that it is a product of prudence. For the state of prudence itself is inapprehensible, not being directly apparent either of itself or from its products, these being common to ordinary folk as well. And to say that we apprehend the possessor of the art of living by the unvarying quality of his actions^a is the assertion of those who over-estimate human nature and are visionaries rather than truth-tellers :

As is the day which upon them is brought by the sire immortal,
So are the minds of mortal men.^b

There remains the assertion that the art of living 245 is apprehended by means of those effects which they describe in their books ; and these being numerous and much alike, I will extract a few of them by way of examples. Thus, for instance, Zeno, the Master of their sect, in his treatises, amongst many other statements regarding the rearing of children, says this : “ Have carnal knowledge no less and no more of a favourite than of a non-favourite child, nor of a female than of a male ; favourite or non-favourite, males or females, no different conduct, but the same, befits and is befitting to all alike.” And as concerns piety 246 towards parents, the same man states,^c in reference to the story of Jocasta and Oedipus, that there was nothing dreadful in his rubbing his mother : “ If she had been ailing in one part of her body and he had done her good by rubbing it with his hands, it had not been shameful ; was it, then, shameful for

^a i.e. always consistently good, impeccable.

^b Homer, *Od.* xviii. 136-137.

^c Cf. § 205.

μένην παύσας, καὶ παῖδας ἐκ τῆς μητρὸς γενναίους ἐποίησεν, αἰσχρόν;” τούτοις δὲ ὁμογνωμονεῖ καὶ ὁ Χρύσιππος· ἐν γοῦν τῇ πολιτείᾳ φησὶ “δοκεῖ δέ μοι ταῦτα οὕτω διεξάγειν καθάπερ καὶ νῦν οὐ κακῶς παρὰ πολλοῖς εἴθισται, ὥστε καὶ τὴν μητέρα ἐκ τοῦ υἱοῦ τεκνοποιεῖσθαι καὶ τὸν πατέρα ἐκ τῆς θυγατρὸς καὶ τὸν ὁμομήτριον ἐκ τῆς ὁμομητρίας.” καὶ ἀνθρωποφαγεῖν ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς συντάγμασιν ἡμῖν ἐπεισάγει· φησὶ γοῦν “καὶ ἐὰν τῶν ζώντων ἀποκοπῇ τι μέρος πρὸς τροφήν χρήσιμον, μήτε κατορύττειν αὐτὸ μήτε ἄλλως ρίπτειν, ἀναλίσκειν δὲ αὐτό, ὅπως ἐκ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἕτερον μέρος γένηται.” ἐν δὲ τοῖς περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος περὶ τῆς τῶν γονέων ταφῆς ῥητῶς φησὶν “ἀπονεομένων δὲ τῶν γονέων ταφαῖς χρηστέον ταῖς ἀπλουστάταις, ὡς ἂν τοῦ σώματος, καθάπερ ὀνύχων ἢ ὀδόντων ἢ τριχῶν, οὐδὲν ὄντος πρὸς ἡμᾶς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπιστροφῆς ἢ πολυωρίας προσδεομένων ἡμῶν τοιαύτης τινός. διὸ καὶ χρησίμων μὲν ὄντων τῶν κρεῶν τροφῇ χρῆσονται αὐτοῖς, καθάπερ καὶ τῶν ἰδίων μερῶν, οἷον ποδὸς ἀποκοπέντος, ἐπέβαλλε χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς παραπλησίοις· ἀχρείων δὲ ὄντων ἢ κατορύξαντες ἐάσουσιν, ἢ κατακαύσαντες τὴν τέφραν ἀφήσουσιν, ἢ μακρότερον ρίψαντες οὐδεμίαν αὐτῶν ἐπιστροφῆν ποιήσονται καθάπερ ὄνυχος ἢ τριχῶν.”

249 Τοιαῦτα μὲν πλείστα ὅσα λέγουσιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι· ἄπερ οὐκ ἂν τολμήσειαν διαπράττεσθαι, εἶγε μὴ παρὰ Κύκλωσιν ἢ Λαιστρυγόσι πολιτεύοιντο. εἰ δὲ τούτων μὲν ἀνερέργητοι παντάπασιν εἰσιν, ἃ δὲ πράττουσι, κοινὰ καὶ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν ἐστίν, οὐδὲν

^a Cf. § 199.

^b Cf. § 207.

him to stop her grief and give her joy by rubbing other parts, and to beget noble children by his mother?” And with this opinion Chrysippus also agrees. At least he says in his *State*: “I approve of carrying out those practices—which, quite rightly, are customary even nowadays amongst many peoples—according to which a mother has children by her son,^a the father by his daughter, the brother by his full sister.” And he proceeds, in the same 247 treatises, to introduce amongst us cannibalism,^b saying: “And if from a living body a part be cut off that is good for food, we should not bury it nor otherwise get rid of it, but consume it, so that from our parts a new part may arise.” And in his book 248 *On Duty* he says expressly, regarding the burial of parents: “When our parents de cease we should use the simplest forms of burial, as though the body—like the nails or teeth or hair—were nothing to us, and we need bestow no care or attention on a thing like it. Hence, also, men should make use of the flesh, when it is good, for food, just as also when one of their own parts, such as the foot, is cut off, it would be proper that it and the like parts should be so used; but when the flesh is not good, they should either bury it and leave it, or burn it up and let the ashes lie, or cast it far away and pay no more regard to it than to nails or hair.”

Of such a kind are most of the philosophers’ 249 theories; but they would not dare to put them into practice unless they lived under the laws of the Cyclopes or Laestrygones.^c But if they are totally incapable of acting thus, and their actual conduct is common to ordinary folk as well, there is no action

^c For C. and L., as savages of ancient Sicily, cf. Hom. *Od.* i. 69, x. 81; Thuc. vi. 21.

ἴδιον ἔργον ἐστὶ τῶν ἔχειν ὑποπτευομένων τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνην. εἰ οὖν αἱ μὲν τέχναι πάντως ὀφείλουσι ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων ἔργων καταλαμβάνεσθαι, οὐδὲν δὲ ἴδιον ἔργον ὁράται τῆς περὶ τὸν βίον λεγομένης τέχνης, οὐ καταλαμβάνεται αὕτη. διόπερ οὐδὲ διαβεβαιουῖσθαι περὶ αὐτῆς δύναται τις ὅτι ἔστιν ὑπαρκτή.

ΚΣ'.—ΕΙ ΓΙΝΕΤΑΙ ΕΝ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΙΣ Η ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΝ ΒΙΟΝ ΤΕΧΝΗ

250 Καὶ μὴν εἰ γίνεται ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη, ἥτοι φύσει ἐγγίνεται αὐτοῖς ἢ διὰ μαθήσεως καὶ διδασκαλίας. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν φύσει, ἥτοι καθὸ εἰσὶν ἀνθρωποὶ ἐγγίνονται ἂν αὐτοῖς ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη, ἢ καθὸ οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀνθρωποὶ. καθὸ μὲν οὖν οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀνθρωποὶ, οὐδαμῶς· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀνθρωποὶ. εἰ δὲ καθὸ εἰσὶν ἀνθρωποὶ, πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὑπῆρξεν ἂν ἡ φρόνησις, ὡς πάντας εἶναι φρονίμους τε καὶ ἐναρέτους καὶ σοφοὺς. φαύλους
251 δὲ τοὺς πλείστους λέγουσιν. οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ καθὸ εἰσὶν ἀνθρωποὶ ὑπῆρξεν ἂν αὐτοῖς ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη. οὐδὲ φύσει ἄρα. καὶ ἄλλως, ἐπειδὴ τὴν τέχνην σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων εἶναι βούλονται συγγεγυμνασμένων, διὰ πείρας τέ τινος καὶ μαθήσεως ἐμφαίνουσι μᾶλλον ἀναλαμβάνεσθαι τὰς τε ἄλλας τέχνας καὶ ταύτην περὶ ἧς ὁ λόγος.

ΚΖ'.—ΕΙ ΔΙΔΑΚΤΗ ΕΣΤΙΝ Η ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΝ ΒΙΟΝ ΤΕΧΝΗ

252 Ἄλλ' οὐδὲ διδασκαλία καὶ μαθήσει ἀναλαμβάνεται. ἵνα γὰρ ὑπόστασιν ἔχη ταῦτα, δεῖ τρία
492

peculiar to those who are suspected of possessing the art of living. So then, if the arts must certainly be apprehended by means of their peculiar effects, and no effect is observed that is peculiar to the so-called art of living, this art is not apprehended. Consequently, no one can positively affirm regarding it that it is really existent.

CHAPTER XXVI.—DOES THE ART OF LIVING
ARISE IN MANKIND ?

Moreover, if the art of living comes into existence 250 in men, it so comes either by nature or through learning and teaching. But if it is by nature, then the art of living will arise in them either in so far as they are men, or in so far as they are not men. Certainly not in so far as they are not men ; for it is not a fact that they are not men. But if it is in so far as they are men, then prudence^a would have belonged to all men, so that all would have been prudent and virtuous and wise. But they describe most men as bad. Neither, then, in so far as they are men will the art of 251 living belong to them. Therefore it does not accrue by nature. And again, since they insist that art is "a system of co-exercised apprehensions,"^b they make it evident that the art under discussion, as well as all other arts, is acquired rather by some sort of effort and learning.

CHAPTER XXVII.—IS THE ART OF LIVING
CAPABLE OF BEING TAUGHT ?

But neither is it acquired by teaching and learning. 252 For in order that these should subsist, three things

^a For "prudence," or practical "wisdom," cf. § 240.

^b Cf. §§ 188, 241, 261.

προωμολογήσθαι, τὸ διδασκόμενον πρᾶγμα, τὸν διδάσκοντα καὶ τὸν μανθάνοντα, τὸν τρόπον τῆς μαθήσεως. οὐδὲν δὲ τούτων ὑφέστηκεν· οὐδὲ ἡ διδασκαλία ἄρα.

ΚΗ'.—ΕΙ ΕΣΤΙ ΤΙ ΔΙΔΑΣΚΟΜΕΝΟΝ

- 253 Οἷον γοῦν τὸ διδασκόμενον ἦτοι ἀληθές ἐστιν ἢ ψεῦδος· καὶ εἰ μὲν ψεῦδος, οὐκ ἂν διδάσκειτο· ἀνύπαρκτον γὰρ φασιν εἶναι τὸ ψεῦδος, ἀνύπαρκτων δὲ οὐκ ἂν εἶη διδασκαλία. ἀλλ' οὐδ' εἰ ἀληθές ἐστὶ λέγοιτο· ὅτι γὰρ ἀνύπαρκτόν ἐστι τὸ ἀληθές, ὑπεμνήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς περὶ κριτηρίου. εἰ οὖν μήτε τὸ ψεῦδος μήτε τὸ ἀληθές διδάσκεται, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα διδακτὸν οὐδὲν ἐστὶν (οὐ γὰρ δὴ τούτων ἀδιδάκτων ὄντων τοὺς ἀπόρους μόνους διδάσκειν
254 ἐρεῖ τις), οὐδὲν διδάσκεται. τὸ τε διδασκόμενον πρᾶγμα ἦτοι φαινόμενόν ἐστιν ἢ ἄδηλον. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν φαινόμενόν ἐστιν, οὐκ ἔσται διδασκαλίας δεόμενον· τὰ γὰρ φαινόμενα πᾶσιν ὁμοίως φαίνεται. εἰ δὲ ἄδηλον, ἐπεὶ τὰ ἄδηλα διὰ τὴν ἀνεπίκριτον περὶ αὐτῶν διαφωνίαν ἀκατάληπτά ἐστιν, ὡς πολλάκις ὑπεμνήσαμεν, οὐκ ἔσται διδακτὸν· ὃ γὰρ μὴ καταλαμβάνει τις, πῶς ἂν τοῦτο διδάσκειν ἢ μανθάνειν δύναιτο; εἰ δὲ μήτε τὸ φαινόμενον μήτε τὸ ἄδηλον διδάσκεται, οὐδὲν διδάσκεται.
255 Ἐπι τὸ διδασκόμενον ἦτοι σώμᾶ ἐστὶν ἢ ἀσώματον, ἐκάτερον δὲ αὐτῶν ἦτοι φαινόμενον ἢ

must first be agreed upon—the matter which is being taught, the teacher and the learner, and the method of learning. But none of these subsists; neither, then, does teaching.

CHAPTER XXVIII.—DOES A MATTER OF INSTRUCTION EXIST?

Thus, for instance, the matter of instruction is 253 either true or false; if false it would not be taught; for they assert that falsehood is non-existent, and of non-existents there could be no teaching. Nor yet if it were said to be true; for we have shown in our chapter "On the Criterion"^a that truth is non-existent. If, then, neither the false nor the true is being taught, and besides these there is nothing capable of being taught (for no one, to be sure, will say that, though these are unteachable, he teaches only dubious lessons^b), then nothing is taught. And the matter taught is either apparent or non- 254 evident. But if it is apparent, it will not require teaching; for things apparent appear to all alike. And if it is non-evident, then, since things non-evident are, as we have often shown, inapprehensible owing to the undecided controversy about them, it will be incapable of being taught; for how could anyone teach or learn what he does not apprehend? But if neither the apparent is taught nor the non-evident, nothing is taught.

Again, what is taught is either corporeal or in- 255 corporeal, and each of these being either apparent or

down (*cf. Adv. Math.* i. 29) that "the dubious (*ἀπορον*) cannot be taught": it is intermediate between truth and falsehood

^a Cf. ii. 85 ff.

^b "Dubious lessons": if the text is right, we must supply *λόγους* (sayings, "lessons") with *τοὺς ἀπόρους*. It was laid

ἀδηλούμενον οὐ δύναται διδάσκεσθαι κατὰ τὸν μικρῶ πρόσθεν ἡμῖν εἰρημένον λόγον. οὐκ ἄρα διδάσκεται τι.

256 Πρὸς τούτοις ἦτοι τὸ ὄν διδάσκεται ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν. τὸ μὲν οὖν μὴ ὄν οὐ διδάσκεται· εἰ γὰρ διδάσκειται τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἐπεὶ τῶν ἀληθῶν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι αἱ διδασκαλῖαι, ἀληθὲς ἔσται τὸ μὴ ὄν. ἀληθὲς δὲ ὄν καὶ ὑπάρξει· ἀληθὲς γὰρ εἶναι φασιν ὃ ὑπάρχει καὶ ἀντίκειται τι. ἄτοπον δὲ ἐστὶ λέγειν ὑπάρχειν τὸ μὴ ὄν· οὐκ ἄρα διδάσκεται τὸ μὴ ὄν.

257 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν. εἰ γὰρ διδάσκεται τὸ ὄν, ἦτοι καθὸ ὄν ἐστὶ διδάσκειται ἢ κατ' ἄλλο τι. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν καθὸ ὄν ἐστὶ διδακτόν, τῶν ὄντων ἔσται, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ διδακτόν· τὰς γὰρ διδασκαλίας ἐκ τινῶν ὁμολογουμένων καὶ ἀδιδάκτων γίνεσθαι προσήκει. οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ὄν καθὸ ὄν ἐστὶ διδακτόν ἐστίν.

258 καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ κατ' ἄλλο τι. τὸ γὰρ ὄν οὐκ ἔχει ἄλλο τι συμβεβηκὸς αὐτῷ ὃ μὴ ὄν ἐστίν, ὥστε εἰ τὸ ὄν καθὸ ὄν ἐστίν οὐ διδάσκειται, οὐδὲ κατ' ἄλλο τι διδαχθήσεται· ἐκεῖνο γὰρ ὃ τι ποτέ ἐστὶ συμβεβηκὸς αὐτῷ, ὄν ἐστίν. καὶ ἄλλως, εἴτε φαινόμενον εἴη τὸ ὄν ὃ λέξουσι διδάσκεσθαι, εἴτε ἀδηλον, ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἀπορίαις ὑποπίπτον ἀδίδακτον ἔσται. εἰ δὲ μήτε τὸ ὄν διδάσκεται μήτε τὸ μὴ ὄν, οὐδὲν ἐστὶ τὸ διδασκόμενον.

^a For the Stoic doctrine of "the true" and "truth" cf. ii. 80 ff. What "the true" is "opposed to" is presumably "the false."

^b Cf. Aristot. *Anal. Post.* i. 1.

non-evident is incapable of being taught, according to the argument we have just now stated. Nothing, therefore, is taught.

Further, either the existent is taught or the non-existent. Now the non-existent is not taught; for if the non-existent is taught the non-existent will be true, since teaching is held to be of things true. And if it is true, it will also subsist; for they declare that "a true thing is what subsists and is opposed to something."^a But it is absurd to say that the non-existent subsists; therefore the non-existent is not taught. Yet neither is the existent. For if the existent is taught, it is taught either in so far as it is existent or in so far as it is something else. But if it is to be taught in so far as it is existent, it will be one of the existing things, and therefore a thing incapable of being taught; for teaching ought to proceed from certain acknowledged facts which require no teaching.^b Therefore the existent, in so far as it is existent, is not capable of being taught. Nor, in fact, in so far as it is something else. For the existent has not anything else which is non-existent attached to it, so that if the existent in so far as it is existent is not taught, neither will it be taught in so far as it is something else; for whatsoever thing is attached to it is existent. And further, whether the existent thing which, they will say, is taught be apparent or non-evident, as it is subject to the absurdities we have stated, it will be incapable of being taught. But if neither the existent nor the non-existent is taught, there is nothing that is taught.

ΚΘ'.—ΕΙ ΕΣΤΙΝ Ο ΔΙΔΑΣΚΩΝ ΚΑΙ Ο ΜΑΝΘΑΝΩΝ

CHAPTER XXIX.—DO THE TEACHER AND THE
LEARNER EXIST ?

259 Συμπεριτρέπεται μὲν οὖν τούτῳ ὃ τε διδάσκων
καὶ ὁ μανθάνων, οὐδὲν δὲ ἤττον καὶ κατὰ ἰδίαν
ἀποροῦνται. ἤτοι γὰρ ὁ τεχνίτης τὸν τεχνίτην
διδάσκει ἢ ὁ ἄτεχνος τὸν ἄτεχνον ἢ ὁ ἄτεχνος τὸν
τεχνίτην ἢ ὁ τεχνίτης τὸν ἄτεχνον. ὁ μὲν οὖν
τεχνίτης τὸν τεχνίτην οὐ διδάσκει· οὐθέτερος γὰρ
αὐτῶν, καθὼς ἐστὶ τεχνίτης, δεῖται μαθήσεως. ἀλλ'
οὐδὲ ὁ ἄτεχνος τὸν ἄτεχνον, ὡσπερ οὐδὲ τυφλὸν
ὀδηγεῖν δύναται τυφλός. οὐδὲ ἄτεχνος τὸν τεχνί-
260 τήν· γελοῖον γάρ. λείπεται λέγειν ὅτι ὁ τεχνίτης
τὸν ἄτεχνον· ὁ καὶ αὐτὸ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστίν.
ὅπως γὰρ ὑποστήναι τεχνίτην ἀδύνατον εἶναι
λέγεται, ἐπεὶ μήτε αὐτοφύως τις καὶ ἅμα τῷ
γενέσθαι τεχνίτης ὑφιστάμενος βλέπεται μήτε ἐξ
ἀτέχνου γίνεται τις τεχνίτης. ἤτοι γὰρ ἐν θεώρημα
καὶ μία κατάληψις δύναται ποιῆσαι τὸν ἄτεχνον
261 τεχνίτην ἢ οὐδαμῶς. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν κατάληψις μία
τὸν ἄτεχνον τεχνίτην ἀπεργάζεται, πρῶτον μὲν
ἐνέσται λέγειν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι σύστημα ἐκ κατα-
λήψεων ἢ τέχνη· ὁ γὰρ μηδὲν ὅπως εἰδώς, εἰ ἐν
θεώρημα διδαχθεὶς τέχνης, τεχνίτης ἂν οὕτω
λέγοιτο εἶναι. εἶτα καὶ ἕαν λέγη τις ὡς ὁ τινα
θεωρήματα τέχνης ἀνεληφώς καὶ προσδεόμενος
ἐνὸς ἔτι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὦν ἄτεχνος, ἂν τὸ ἐν ἐκείνῳ
προσλάβῃ, τεχνίτης ἐξ ἀτέχνου ἀποτελεῖται ἐκ

Now with the refutation of this is involved that of 259 both the teacher and the learner ; though they are just as much open to doubt on their own account. For either the expert artist teaches the expert, or the non-expert the non-expert, or the non-expert the expert, or the expert the non-expert. Now the expert does not teach the expert ; for neither of them, *qua* expert, needs teaching. Nor does the non-expert teach the non-expert, any more than the blind can lead the blind.^a Nor the non-expert the expert, for it would be ridiculous. The only thing left is to say 260 that the expert teaches the non-expert ; and this, too, is a thing impossible. For it is declared to be wholly impossible that an expert artist should exist, since neither do we see anyone existing spontaneously and from birth as an expert, nor does anyone turn into an expert from being a non-expert. For either one lesson and one apprehension can make an expert of the non-expert or they cannot do so at all.^b But if one apprehension makes the non-expert an 261 expert, it will be open to us to declare, firstly, that art is not a system of apprehensions^c ; for the man who knows nothing at all would be termed an expert if only he were taught a single lesson of art. And, secondly, should anyone assert that, as soon as a man who has acquired some principles of art and still needs one more, and because of this is non-expert, acquires also that one principle, he at once becomes an expert instead of a non-expert by means of one

^a For this saying *cf.* Matt. xv. 14 ; Hor. *Epist.* i. 17.

^b The argument here is that the non-expert cannot become an expert either (1) by a *single* lesson, §§ 261-262, or (2) by a course of lessons, which must follow each other *singlely*, § 263. "Apprehension" here means the grasp of a truth or principle of the art or craft which is being imparted, the

"art" itself being defined as a "system" of such pieces of knowledge.

^c *Cf.* § 251 *supra*.

- 262 καταλήψεως μιᾶς, ἀποκληρωτικὸν λέξει. ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν κατὰ μέρος οὐκ ἂν δύναίτο δεῖξαι τινα ἄτεχνον μὲν ἔτι, τεχνίτην δὲ ἐσόμενον ἂν ἔν τι θεώρημα προσλάβῃ· οὐ γὰρ δήπου τὴν ἐξαριθμῆσιν τῶν θεωρημάτων ἐκάστης τέχνης ἐπίσταται τις, ὥστε ἀπαριθμησάμενος τὰ ἐγνωσμένα θεωρήματα, πόσα λείπεται πρὸς τὸν πλήρη τῶν θεωρημάτων τῆς τέχνης ἀριθμὸν εἰπεῖν ἔχειν. οὐκοῦν ἐνὸς θεωρήματος γνῶσις οὐ ποιεῖ τὸν ἄτεχνον τεχνίτην. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἐστὶν ἀληθές, ἐπεὶ μὴ πάντα ἀθρόως τὰ θεωρήματα τῶν τεχνῶν ἀναλαμβάνει τις, ἀλλ' εἴπερ ἄρα, καθ' ἕν ἕκαστον, ἵνα τις καὶ τοῦτο καθ' ὑπόθεσιν διδῶ, ὁ κατὰ ἕν θεώρημα τῆς τέχνης ἀναλαμβάνει λεγόμενος οὐκ ἂν τεχνίτης γένοιτο· ὑπεμνηστικοί γὰρ ὅτι οὐ δύναται θεωρήματος ἐνὸς γνῶσις τὸν ἄτεχνον ποιῆσαι τεχνίτην. οὐδὲ ἐξ ἄτεχνου τοίνυν γίνεταί τις τεχνίτης. ὥστε καὶ διὰ ταῦτα φαίνεται ἀνυπόστατος εἶναι ὁ τεχνίτης. διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ὁ διδάσκων.
- 264 Ἄλλ' οὐδὲ ὁ μανθάνειν λεγόμενος, ἄτεχνος ὢν, δύναται τὰ τῆς τέχνης θεωρήματα, ἧς ἐστὶν ἄτεχνος, μανθάνειν τε καὶ καταλαμβάνειν. ὡς γὰρ ὁ ἐκ γενετῆς πηρός, εἰς ὅσον ἐστὶ πηρός, οὐκ ἂν λάβοι χρωμάτων ἀντίληψιν, οὐδὲ ὁ ἐκ γενετῆς κωφὸς ὁμοίως φωνῆς, οὕτως οὐδὲ ὁ ἄτεχνος καταλάβοι ἂν τὰ τῆς τέχνης θεωρήματα ἧς ἐστὶν ἄτεχνος. καὶ γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ὁ αὐτὸς εἴη τεχνίτης τε καὶ ἄτεχνος τῶν αὐτῶν, ἄτεχνος μὲν ἐπεὶ οὕτως ὑπόκειται, τεχνίτης δὲ ἐπεὶ κατάληψιν ἔχει τῶν

^a Cf. § 79 *supra*.

^b These comparisons are ascribed to Anacharsis, the

apprehension, he will be making a random assertion.^a 262 For in the case of individual men we could not point to one who, being still a non-expert, will become an expert by acquiring one additional principle; for no one, to be sure, has such a command of the numeration of the principles of each art as to be able to say, by numbering off the known principles, how many are still needed to make up the full number of the principles of the art. So then the learning of one principle does not make the non-expert an expert. But if this is true, seeing that no one acquires all the 263 principles of the arts at once, but each one singly, if at all—this point also being granted by way of assumption—the man who is said to acquire the principles of the art one by one will not be termed an expert; for we recall the conclusion that the learning of one principle cannot make an expert of the non-expert. No one, then, becomes an expert from being a non-expert. Hence, on these grounds too, the expert artist appears to be non-existent. And therefore the teacher also.

Neither can the so-called learner, if he is non- 264 expert, learn and apprehend the principles of the art wherein he is non-expert. For just as the man who is blind from birth, in so far as he is blind, will not acquire perception of colours, nor, similarly, he who is deaf from birth, of sound,^b so too the non-expert will not apprehend the principles of the art wherein he is non-expert. For should he do so the same man would be both expert and non-expert in the same things—non-expert since he is such by hypothesis, and expert since he has apprehension of the prin-

Scythian sage of Solon's time (circa 590 B.C.); cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 55.

τῆς τέχνης θεωρημάτων. ὥστε οὐδὲ ὁ τεχνίτης
 265 τὸν ἄτεχνον διδάσκει. εἰ δὲ μήτε ὁ τεχνίτης τὸν
 τεχνίτην διδάσκει μήτε ὁ ἄτεχνος τὸν ἄτεχνον μήτε
 ὁ ἄτεχνος τὸν τεχνίτην μήτε ὁ τεχνίτης τὸν
 ἄτεχνον, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστιν, οὔτε ὁ
 διδάσκων ἔστιν οὔτε ὁ διδασκόμενος.

A'.—ΕΙ ΕΣΤΙ ΤΙΣ ΜΑΘΗΣΕΩΣ ΤΡΟΠΟΣ

Μὴ ὄντος δὲ μήτε τοῦ μαθάνοντος μήτε τοῦ
 διδάσκοντος καὶ ὁ τρόπος τῆς διδασκαλίας παρ-
 266 ἔκει· οὐδὲν δὲ ἦττον καὶ διὰ τούτων ἀπορείται.
 ὁ γὰρ τρόπος τῆς διδασκαλίας ἦτοι ἐναργεῖα
 γίνεται ἢ λόγῳ· οὔτε δὲ ἐναργεῖα γίνεται οὔτε
 λόγῳ, καθάπερ παραστήσομεν· οὐδὲ ὁ τρόπος ἄρα
 τῆς μαθήσεώς ἐστιν εὔπορος.

Ἐναργεῖα μὲν οὖν οὐ γίνεται διδασκαλία, ἐπεὶ
 τῶν δεικνυμένων ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνάργεια. τὸ δὲ δεικνύ-
 μενον πᾶσιν ἐστὶ φαινόμενον· τὸ δὲ φαινόμενον, ἢ
 φαίνεται, πᾶσιν ἐστὶ ληπτόν· τὸ δὲ κοινῶς πᾶσι
 ληπτὸν ἀδίδακτον· οὐκ ἄρα τι ἐναργεῖα διδακτόν
 ἐστίν.

267 Καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ λόγῳ διδάσκεται τι. οὗτος γὰρ
 ἦτοι σημαίνει τι ἢ οὐδὲν σημαίνει. ἀλλὰ μηδὲν
 μὲν σημαίνων οὐδὲ ἔσται τινὸς διδασκαλικός. εἰ
 δὲ σημαίνει τι, ἦτοι φύσει σημαίνει τι ἢ θέσει.
 καὶ φύσει μὲν οὐ σημαίνει διὰ τὸ μὴ πάντας πάν-
 των ἀκούοντας συνιέναι, ὡς Ἕλληνας βαρβάρων

* Cf. i. 138, 178.

b Cf. ii. 214.

principles of the art. Hence, neither does the expert
 teach the non-expert. But if neither the expert 265
 teaches the expert, nor the non-expert the non-
 expert, nor the non-expert the expert, nor the expert
 the non-expert, and these are all the alternatives
 possible, then neither the teacher exists nor the
 taught.

CHAPTER XXX.—DOES THERE EXIST ANY METHOD
 OF LEARNING ?

And if neither the learner nor the teacher exists,
 the method of teaching also is abolished. And it is no 266
 less disputed on the following grounds. The method
 of teaching comes to exist either by ocular evidence
 or by speech^a; but it does not come to exist either
 by ocular evidence or by speech, as we shall show;
 therefore the method of learning also is not easy to
 discover.

Now teaching does not come by ocular evidence,
 since ocular evidence consists in things exhibited.
 But what is exhibited is apparent to all; and the
 apparent, *qua* apparent, is perceptible by all; and
 what is perceptible by all in common is incapable of
 being taught; therefore nothing is capable of being
 taught by ocular evidence.

Nor, in fact, is anything taught by speech. For 267
 speech either signifies something or signifies nothing.
 But if it signifies nothing, neither will it be capable
 of teaching anything. And if it signifies some-
 thing, it does so either by nature or by conven-
 tion. But it is not significant by nature^b because
 all men do not understand all when they hear
 them, as is the case with Greeks hearing barbarians

- 268 καὶ βαρβάρους Ἑλλήνων. θέσει δὲ εἰ σημαίνει, δηλον ὡς οἱ μὲν προκατειληφότες καθ' ὧν αἱ λέξεις εἰσὶ τεταγμένοι ἀντιλήφονται τούτων, οὐκ ἐξ αὐτῶν διδασκόμενοι ἄπερ ἠγνόουν, ἀλλὰ ἀναμνησκόμενοι καὶ ἀνανεούμενοι ταῦτα ἄπερ ᾗδεσαν, οἱ δὲ χρήζοντες τῆς τῶν ἀγνοουμένων μαθήσεως, καὶ μὴ εἰδότες καθ' ὧν εἰσὶν αἱ λέξεις τεταγ-
 269 μέναι, οὐδενὸς ἀντίληψιν ἔξουσιν. διόπερ οὐδὲ ὁ τρόπος τῆς μαθήσεως ὑποστήναι δύναίτο ἄν. καὶ γὰρ ὁ διδάσκων κατάληψιν τῶν θεωρημάτων τῆς διδασκομένης τέχνης ἐμποιεῖν ὀφείλει τῷ μαθητῶντι, ἵνα οὕτως ἐκεῖνος τὸ σύστημα τούτων καταλαβὼν τεχνίτης γένηται. οὐδὲν δὲ ἔστι κατάληψις, ὡς ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν ὑπεμνήσαμεν· οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ὁ τρόπος τῆς διδασκαλίας ὑφεστάναι δύναται. εἰ δὲ μήτε τὸ διδασκόμενον ἔστι μήτε ὁ διδάσκων καὶ ὁ μαθητῶν μήτε ὁ τρόπος τῆς μαθήσεως, οὔτε μάθησις ἔστιν οὔτε διδασκαλία.
- 270 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν κοινότερον ἐπικεχίρηται περὶ μαθήσεως καὶ διδασκαλίας· ἔνεστι δὲ ἀπορεῖν οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς λεγομένης περὶ τὸν βίον εἶναι τέχνης. οἷον γοῦν τὸ μὲν διδασκόμενον πρᾶγμα, τουτέστι τὴν φρόνησιν, ἀνυπόστατον ἐδείξαμεν ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν· ἀνυπόστατος δὲ ἔστι καὶ ὁ διδάσκων καὶ ὁ μαθητῶν. ἤτοι γὰρ ὁ φρόνιμος τὸν φρόνιμον διδάξει τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνην ἢ ὁ ἀφρων τὸν ἀφρονα ἢ ὁ ἀφρων τὸν φρόνιμον ἢ ὁ φρόνιμος τὸν ἀφρονα· οὐδεὶς δὲ τούτων οὐδένα διδάσκει· οὐκ ἄρα διδάσκεται ἢ περὶ τὸν βίον εἶναι λεγομένη
 271 τέχνη. καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ἴσως περιττὸν καὶ λέγειν· εἰ δὲ ὁ φρόνιμος τὸν ἀφρονα διδάσκει

talk or barbarians hearing Greeks. And if it 268 is significant by convention, evidently those who have grasped beforehand the objects to which the several words are assigned will perceive those objects, not through being taught by the words things of which they were ignorant, but by recollecting and recovering things which they knew; whereas those who require to learn what they do not know, and who are ignorant of the objects to which the words are assigned, will have no perception of anything. Consequently, the method of learning also will be 269 incapable of subsisting. For, in fact, the teacher ought to impart to the learner an apprehension of the principles of the art he is teaching, so that the latter by apprehending them as a system may thus become an expert artist. But, as we have shown above,^a apprehension is nothing; therefore also the method of teaching cannot subsist. But if neither the matter taught exists, nor the teacher and the learner, nor the method of learning, then neither learning exists nor teaching.

Such, then, are the objections put forward regard- 270 ing learning and teaching in general. And the same difficulties may also be alleged in the case of the so-called art of living. Thus, for instance, we have shown above^b that the matter taught, namely prudence, is non-existent; and both the teacher and the learner are non-existent. For either the prudent man will teach the prudent the art of living, or the imprudent the imprudent, or the imprudent the prudent, or the prudent the imprudent; but none of these teaches any other; therefore the so-called art of living is not taught. Probably it is superfluous 271 even to refer to the other cases; but if the prudent

^a Cf. § 214.

^b Cf. §§ 240 ff.

τὴν φρόνησιν, ἣ δὲ φρόνησις ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐθετέρων, ὁ ἄφρων μὴ ἔχων τὴν φρόνησιν ἄγνοιαν ἔχει τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐθετέρων, ἄγνοιαν δὲ τούτων ἔχων πάντως διδάσκοντος αὐτὸν τοῦ φρονίμου τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ καὶ οὐθέτερα ἀκούσεται μόνον τῶν λεγομένων, οὐ γνώσεται δὲ ταῦτα. εἰ γὰρ ἀντιλαμβάνοιτο αὐτῶν ἐν ἀφροσύνῃ καθεστῶς, ἔσται καὶ ἡ ἀφροσύνη τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐθετέρων θεωρητικὴ. οὐχὶ δέ γε τούτων κατὰ αὐτοὺς ἡ ἀφροσύνη θεωρητικὴ καθέστηκεν, ἐπεὶ ὁ ἄφρων ἐστὶ φρόνιμος. ὁ ἄρα ἄφρων οὐκ ἀντιλαμβάνεται τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ φρονίμου λεγομένων ἢ πραττομένων κατὰ τὸν τῆς φρονήσεως¹ λόγον. μὴ ἀντιλαμβανόμενος δὲ οὐκ ἂν διδάσκειτο ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπεὶ μήτε ἐναργεῖα μήτε διὰ λόγου δύναται διδάσκεσθαι, καθὰ προειρήκαμεν. πλὴν ἀλλ' εἰ μήτε διὰ μαθήσεως καὶ διδασκαλίας ἐγίνεται τινι ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον λεγομένη τέχνη μήτε φύσει, ἀνεύρετός ἐστιν ἢ παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις θρυλουμένη τέχνη περὶ τὸν βίον.

273 Εἰ μέντοι καὶ δοίη τις ἐκ πολλοῦ τοῦ περιόντος ἐγγίνεσθαι τινι τὴν ὄνειροπολουμένην τέχνην περὶ τὸν βίον, βλαβερὰ καὶ παραχῆς αἰτία φανήσεται μᾶλλον τοῖς ἔχουσιν αὐτὴν ἢ ὠφέλιμος.

ΛΑ'.—Εἰ ὠφελεῖ ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτὴν

Αὐτὰ γοῦν, ἵνα παραδείγματος ἕνεκεν ὀλίγα ἀπὸ πολλῶν εἴπωμεν, ὠφελεῖν ἂν δοκοίη τὸν σοφὸν

¹ τῆς φρονήσεως Mutsch.: τῆς μαθήσεως Bekk.: τήσεως mss.: τῆς ζητήσεως T.

man teaches prudence to the imprudent, and prudence is "knowledge^a of things good and evil and neither," the imprudent man, as he does not possess prudence, possesses ignorance of the things that are good and evil and neither; and since he possesses nothing but ignorance thereof, when the prudent man teaches him what things are good and evil and neither, he will merely hear what is said and will not get to know the things. For if he should grasp them while in a state of imprudence, then imprudence too will be capable of perceiving what things are good and evil and neither. But, according to them, im- 272 prudence is certainly not capable of perceiving these things, since, if it were, the imprudent man will be prudent. Therefore, according to the definition of prudence, the imprudent man does not grasp what is said or done by the prudent. And, as he fails to grasp, he will not be taught by him, especially since, as we have said above, he cannot be taught either by ocular evidence or by means of speech. But, in fine, if the so-called art of living is not imparted to anyone either by means of learning and teaching or by nature, then the art of living, so harped on by the philosophers, is indiscoverable.

Yet even were one to grant, as an act of bounty, 273 that this visionary art of living is imparted to someone, it will show itself to be hurtful to its possessors, and a cause of perturbation, rather than beneficial.

CHAPTER XXXI.—DOES THE ART OF LIVING
BENEFIT ITS POSSESSOR?

Thus, for instance—to take a few arguments out of many by way of example—the art of living might

* Cf. § 168.

ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη ἐγκράτειαν αὐτῷ παρεχο-
 μένη ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ὀρμαῖς καὶ ἐν ταῖς
 274 ἀπὸ τοῦ κακοῦ ἀφορμαῖς. ὁ οὖν λεγόμενος κατ'
 αὐτοὺς ἐγκρατὴς σοφὸς ἦτοι κατὰ τοῦτο λέγεται
 ἐγκρατὴς καθόσον ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ γίνεται ὀρμῇ τῇ
 πρὸς τὸ κακὸν καὶ ἀφορμῇ τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ,
 ἢ καθόσον εἶχε μὲν φαύλας ὀρμὰς καὶ ἀφορμὰς,
 275 περιεκράτει δὲ αὐτῶν τῷ λόγῳ. ἀλλὰ κατὰ μὲν
 τὸ μὴ γίνεσθαι ἐν φαύλαις κρίσεσιν οὐκ ἂν εἴη
 ἐγκρατὴς· οὐ γὰρ κρατήσῃ οὐ οὐκ ἔχει. καὶ ὡς
 οὐκ ἂν εἴποι τις τὸν εὐνοῦχον ἐγκρατὴ πρὸς ἀφρο-
 δίσια καὶ τὸν κακοστομαχοῦντα πρὸς ἐδεσμάτων
 ἀπόλαυσιν (οὐδ' ὄλως γὰρ ἐπιζήτησις αὐτοῖς γίνε-
 ται τῶν τοιούτων, ἵνα καὶ ἐγκρατῶς κατεξαναστῶσι
 τῆς ἐπιζήτησεως) τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ οὐδὲ τὸν σοφὸν
 ἐγκρατὴ ρητέον διὰ τὸ μὴ φύεσθαι ἐν αὐτῷ πάθος
 276 οὐ ἔσται ἐγκρατὴς. εἰ δὲ κατὰ τοῦτο ἀξιῶσουσιν
 αὐτὸν ὑπάρχειν ἐγκρατὴ καθόσον γίνεται μὲν ἐν
 φαύλαις κρίσεσιν περιγίνεται δὲ αὐτῶν τῷ λόγῳ,
 πρῶτον μὲν δώσουσιν ὅτι οὐδὲν ὠφέλησεν αὐτὸν ἢ
 φρόνησις, ἀκμὴν ἐν ταραχαῖς ὄντα καὶ βοηθείας
 δεόμενον, εἶτα καὶ κακοδαμονέστερος τῶν φαύλων
 λεγομένων εὐρίσκειται. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὀρμᾷ ἐπί τι,
 πάντως ταράσσεται, εἰ δὲ περικρατεῖ τῷ λόγῳ,
 συνέχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸ κακόν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μᾶλλον
 ταράσσεται τοῦ φαύλου ἐκείνου μηκέτι τοῦτο

* For the Stoic definition of this virtue cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 153. It denotes "self-mastery" by which the rational self (or "Logos") overcomes the irrational appetites and passions.

^b Cf. § 177 for the Stoic use of "inclination" and "aversion" as ethical terms. The Stoic ideal being complete

be thought to benefit the wise man by furnishing him with temperance ^a in his impulses towards good and repulsions from evil. He, then, who is termed by 274 them a temperate sage is called temperate either in virtue of his never feeling the impulse towards good or repulsion from evil,^b or in virtue of his possessing slight impulses in either direction and overcoming them by reason. But in respect of his freedom from 275 bad resolutions he will not be self-controlled; for he will not control what he does not possess. And just as one would not call a eunuch temperate in sex-indulgence, or a man with a poor stomach temperate in respect of the pleasures of the table (for they feel no attraction at all towards such things, so that they might rise superior to the attraction through temperance),—in the same way we ought not to term the sage temperate, because he possesses no natural feeling over which he may exercise control. And 276 if they shall claim that he is temperate in virtue of his forming bad resolutions but overcoming them by reason, then, firstly, they will be admitting that prudence was of no benefit to him just when he was in a state of perturbation and needed assistance, and, secondly, he is found to be even more unfortunate than those they term bad.^c For if he feels an impulse towards anything, he is certainly perturbed; while if he overcomes it by reason, he retains the evil, and because of this he is more perturbed than the bad man who no longer experiences this feeling;

absence of passion and emotion ("apathy"), the less "temperance" a man exercised the better he was. "The Sage," being a purely rational self, needs no "self-mastery." Cf. *Intro.* p. xxviii.

^c The "not-wise" of the Stoics, cf. § 251.

277 πάσχοντος· εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὄρμη, ταρασσεται, εἰ δὲ τυγχάνει τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, παύεται τῆς ταραχῆς.

Οὐ τοίνυν ἐγκρατὴς γίνεται ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ φρονήσει ὁ σοφός· ἢ εἴπερ γίνεται, πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ κακοδαιμονέστατος, ὥστε οὐκ ὠφέλειαν ἀλλὰ ταραχὴν αὐτῷ μεγίστην ἢ περὶ τὸν βίον παρέσχε τέχνη. ὅτι δὲ ὁ νομίζων ἔχειν τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνην καὶ δι' αὐτῆς ἐπεγνωκέναι τίνα τέ ἐστιν ἀγαθὰ ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν καὶ τίνα φαῦλα, ταρασσεται σφόδρα καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν αὐτῷ παρόντων καὶ τῶν κακῶν, ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ὑπεμνήσαμεν.

278 λεκτέον οὖν ὅτι εἰ μήτε ἢ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἀδιαφόρων ὑπόστασις ὁμολογεῖται, ἢ τε περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη τάχα μὲν καὶ ἀνυπόστατός ἐστιν, εἰ δὲ καὶ ὑφεστάναι δοθείη καθ' ὑπόθεσιν, οὐδεμίαν ὠφέλειαν τοῖς ἔχουσιν αὐτὴν παρέχει, τούναντίον δὲ ταραχὰς αὐτοῖς ἐμποιεῖ μεγίστας, μάτην ὠφρῶσθαι δοκοῖεν ἂν οἱ δογματικοὶ κὰν τῷ λεγομένῳ ἠθικῷ μέρει τῆς καλουμένης φιλοσοφίας.

279 Τοσαῦτα καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ τόπου συμμετρῶς ὡς ἐν ὑποτυπώσει διεξελθόντες, ἐνταῦθα περιγράφομεν καὶ τὸ τρίτον σύνταγμα καὶ τὸ πᾶν τῶν Πυρρωνείων ὑποτυπώσεων σπουδάσμα, ἐκείνο ἐπιπόντες.

ΛΒ'.—ΔΙΑ ΤΙ Ο ΣΚΕΠΤΙΚΟΣ ΕΝΙΟΤΕ ΑΜΤΑΡΟΤΣ
ΤΑΙΣ ΠΙΘΑΝΟΤΗΣΙΝ ΕΒΡΩΤΑΝ ΕΠΙΤΗΔΕΤΕΙ ΛΟΓΟΥΣ

280 Ὁ σκεπτικὸς διὰ τὸ φιλάνθρωπος εἶναι τὴν τῶν δογματικῶν οἴησίν τε καὶ προπέτειαν κατὰ δύναμιν ἰᾶσθαι λόγῳ βούλεται. καθάπερ οὖν οἱ τῶν σω-

^a Cf. §§ 236 f. *supra*, i. 27.

^b Cf. i. 20, 177; ii. 256, 258.

for the latter, though he is perturbed if he is feeling 277
an impulse, yet ceases from his perturbation if he
gains his desires.

So, then, the sage does not become temperate in
virtue of his prudence; or if he does become so, he
is of all men the most miserable, so that the art of
living has brought him no benefit but the uttermost
perturbation. And we have shown above ^a that the
man who believes that he possesses the art of living,
and that by means of it he discerns what things are
naturally good and what bad, is extremely perturbed
both when good things are his and when evil things.
We must, then, declare that, if there is no agreement 278
as to the existence of things good and bad and
indifferent, and the art of living is possibly non-
existent, or—if its existence is provisionally admitted
—brings no benefit to its possessors but, on the
contrary, causes them extreme perturbations, then
the Dogmatists would seem to be vainly puffed up in
respect of the so-called Ethical division of what they
term "philosophy."

Having now treated of the subject of Ethics also 279
at sufficient length for an account in outline, we con-
clude at this point our third book, and with it the
complete treatise on "Pyrrhonian Outlines," adding
only this final section:

CHAPTER XXXII.—WHY THE SCEPTIC SOMETIMES
PURPOSELY PROPOUNDS ARGUMENTS WHICH ARE
LACKING IN POWER OF PERSUASION

The Sceptic, being a lover of his kind, desires to 280
cure by speech, as best he can, the self-conceit
and rashness ^b of the Dogmatists. So, just as the

ματικῶν παθῶν ἰατροὶ διάφορα κατὰ μέγεθος ἔχουσι βοηθήματα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν σφοδρῶς πεπονθόσι τὰ σφοδρὰ τούτων προσάγουσι τοῖς δὲ κούφως τὰ κούφωτερα, καὶ ὁ σκεπτικὸς οὕτως διαφόρους
 281 ἐρωτᾷ [καὶ] κατὰ ἰσχὺν λόγους, καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐμβριθέσι καὶ εὐτόνως ἀνασκευάζειν δυναμένοις τὸ τῆς οἰήσεως τῶν δογματικῶν πάθος ἐπὶ τῶν σφόδρα τῇ προπετείᾳ κεκακωμένων χρῆται, τοῖς δὲ κούφοτέροις ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπιπόλαιον καὶ εὐίατον ἐχόντων τὸ τῆς οἰήσεως πάθος καὶ ὑπὸ κούφοτέρων πιθανότητων ἀνασκευάζεσθαι δυναμένων. διόπερ ὅτε μὲν ἐμβριθεῖς ταῖς πιθανότησιν ὅτε δὲ καὶ ἁμαυροτέρους φαινομένους οὐκ ὀκνεῖ λόγους συν-ερωτᾶν ὁ ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως ὀρμώμενος, ἐπίτηδες, ὡς ἀρκοῦντας αὐτῷ πολλάκις πρὸς τὸ ἀνύειν τὸ προκείμενον.

physicians who cure bodily ailments have remedies which differ in strength, and apply the severe ones to those whose ailments are severe and the milder to those mildly affected,—so too the Sceptic propounds arguments which differ in strength, and employs those 281 which are weighty and capable by their stringency of disposing of the Dogmatists' ailment, self-conceit, in cases where the mischief is due to a severe attack of rashness, while he employs the milder arguments in the case of those whose ailment of conceit is superficial and easy to cure, and whom it is possible to restore to health by milder methods of persuasion. Hence the adherent of Sceptic principles does not scruple to propound at one time arguments that are weighty in their persuasiveness, and at another time such as appear less impressive,—and he does so on purpose, as the latter are frequently sufficient to enable him to effect his object.

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY

THE REV. R. G. BURY, Litt.D.

FORMERLY SCHOLAR OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

IN FOUR VOLUMES

II

AGAINST THE LOGICIANS



LONDON

WILLIAM HEINEMANN LTD

CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS

MCMLXVII

First printed 1935
Reprinted 1957, 1961, 1967

Printed in Great Britain

CONTENTS OF VOLUME II

	PAGE
PREFATORY NOTE	vii
AGAINST THE LOGICIANS:	
Book I	2
Book II	240

PREFATORY NOTE

THE two books "Against the Logicians" contained in this volume form the first division of Sextus's treatise "Against the Dogmatists"; hence they are commonly cited as *Adversus Dogmaticos* i, ii, and also as *Adversus Mathematicos* vii, viii.

For the constitution of the text we still have the manuscripts L and E (see Vol. I. Introd. p. xliii), but neither M nor the Latin Translation (T) is any longer available. Instead, we have a new and important manuscript, designated N by the Teubner editor (after A. Nebe, the scholar who first investigated it), of which the central part, which contains the books *Adv. Log.*, is attributed to the thirteenth century. Among the modern scholars and critics who have contributed corrections of the text, quoted by the Teubner editor, are L. Kayser, R. Hirzel, V. Heintz, A. Kochalsky, A. Rüstow.

Here, as in Vol. I., the text is based on that of Bekker; and here, again, the chapter-headings, omitted by Bekker, are restored.

AGAINST THE LOGICIANS

ΠΡΟΣ ΛΟΓΙΚΟΥΣ

A

1 Ὁ μὲν καθόλου τῆς σκεπτικῆς δυνάμεως χαρακτηρ μετὰ τῆς προσηκούσης ἐξεργασίας ὑποδέδεικται, τὰ μὲν προηγουμένως τὰ δὲ καὶ κατὰ διορισμὸν τῶν παρακειμένων φιλοσοφιῶν ἐκτυπωθεῖς· ἀπολείπεται δὲ ἐξῆς καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ μέρος αὐτοῦ χρήσιν διδάσκειν εἰς τὸ μήτε ἰδίᾳ περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων σκεπτομένους μήτε τοῖς δογματικοῖς
2 ἀνταίροντας ῥαδίως προπίπτειν. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ποικίλον τι χρήμα φιλοσοφία, δεήσει πρὸς τὸ κατὰ τάξιν καὶ ὁδῷ ζητεῖν ἕκαστον ὀλίγα περὶ τῶν ταύτης μερῶν διαλαβεῖν.

Αὐτίκα γὰρ οἱ μὲν μονομερῆ δοκοῦσιν αὐτὴν ὑποτεθεῖσθαι οἱ δὲ διμερῆ τινὲς δὲ τριμερῆ, καὶ τῶν ἐν μέρος ὑποστησαμένων οἱ μὲν τὸ φυσικὸν οἱ δὲ τὸ ἠθικὸν ἄλλοι δὲ τὸ λογικὸν ὑπεστήσαντο,
3 καὶ ὡσαύτως τῶν κατὰ δυνάδα διαιρούντων οἱ μὲν εἰς τὸ φυσικὸν καὶ τὸ λογικὸν διεῖλον, οἱ δὲ εἰς τὸ φυσικὸν καὶ ἠθικόν, οἱ δὲ εἰς τὸ λογικὸν καὶ ἠθικόν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ εἰς τρία διαιροῦντες συμφώνως

AGAINST THE LOGICIANS

BOOK I

THE general character of Scepticism has now been 1 set forth by the appropriate method of description, as an Outline of it has been given partly by means of direct exposition and partly by distinguishing it from the philosophies which stand next to it.^a It remains for us, in the next place, to explain how we apply it to the particular divisions of philosophy, so that we may be less prone to rashness either in our own sceptical investigations of things or in our contradictions of the Dogmatists. Since, however, 2 Philosophy is a complex affair, for the sake of an orderly and methodical inquiry into all its parts, we must first discuss briefly the question what its parts are.

Some, then, hold that it has but one part, others that it has two, and others that it has three parts; and of those who have supposed it to consist of one part, some have supposed this to be physics, others ethics, others logic; and so likewise of those who divide it 3 into two, some have made the divisions physics and logic, others physics and ethics, others logic and ethics; while those who divide it into three parts are 4

^a The reference is to the "Outlines (*Hypotyposes*) of Pyrrhonism" contained in Vol. I. of this Translation.

εἰς τὸ φυσικὸν καὶ λογικὸν καὶ ἠθικὸν διηγήρασιν.
 5 φυσικὸν μὲν οὖν μόνον ὑπεστήσαντο μέρος Θαλῆς
 τε καὶ Ἀναξίμενης καὶ Ἀναξίμανδρος Ἐμπεδοκλῆς
 τε καὶ Παρμενίδης καὶ Ἡράκλειτος, ὧν Θαλῆς
 μὲν καὶ Ἀναξίμενης καὶ Ἀναξίμανδρος κατὰ
 πάντας καὶ ἀναμφιλέκτως, ὁ δὲ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς κατὰ
 Παρμενίδης ἔτι δὲ Ἡράκλειτος οὐ κατὰ πάντας.
 6 Ἐμπεδοκλέα μὲν γὰρ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης φησὶ πρῶτον
 ῥητορικὴν κεκωηκέναι, ἧς ἀντίστροφον εἶναι τὴν
 διαλεκτικὴν, τουτέστιν ἰσόστροφον, διὰ τὸ περὶ
 τὴν αὐτὴν ὕλην στρέφεσθαι, ὡς καὶ ἀντίθεον ὁ
 7 ποιητὴς ἔφη τὸν Ὀδυσσεῖα, ὅπερ ἦν ἰσόθεον. Παρ-
 μενίδης δὲ οὐκ ἂν δόξαι τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἀπείρους
 ἔχειν, ἐπεὶ περὶ πάλιν Ἀριστοτέλης τὸν γνώριμον
 αὐτοῦ Ζήνωνα διαλεκτικῆς ἀρχηγὸν ὑπέληφεν.
 8 ἐζητεῖτο δὲ καὶ περὶ Ἡρακλείτου, εἰ μὴ μόνον
 φυσικός ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἠθικός φιλόσοφος. πλὴν
 οἱ μὲν τοῦ φυσικοῦ μέρους προστάντες εἰσὶν οἶδε,
 τοῦ δὲ ἠθικοῦ μόνου ἐπεμελείτο Σωκράτης κατὰ
 γε τοὺς ἄλλους αὐτοῦ γνωρίμους, εἶγε καὶ ὁ
 Ξενοφῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀπομνημονεύμασι ῥητῶς φησὶν
 ἀπαρνεῖσθαι αὐτὸν τὸ φυσικὸν ὡς ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς καθ-
 εστηκός καὶ μόνον σχολάζειν τῷ ἠθικῷ ὡς πρὸς
 ἡμᾶς ὄντι. τοιοῦτον αὐτὸν οἶδε καὶ ὁ Τίμων, ἐν
 οἷς φησὶν

ἐκ δ' ἄρα τῶν ἀπέκλιε λαοξόδος ἐννομολέσχης,
 τουτέστιν ἀπὸ τῶν φυσικῶν ἐπὶ τὴν ἠθικὴν

all agreed on the division into physics, logic, and ethics.^a It has been supposed to consist of physics, 5 as its sole part, by Thales, Anaximenes, Anaximander, Empedocles, Parmenides, Heraclitus^b: and of these, as regards Thales, Anaximenes, and Anaximander, all agree and there is no dispute, but all do not agree about Empedocles and Parmenides, nor yet Heraclitus. Thus Aristotle says^c that “Em- 6 pedocles first cultivated the art of rhetoric, to which dialectic is *antistrophic* (or corresponding),” that is to say is *isostrophic* (or equivalent), inasmuch as it is *strophic* of (concerned with) the same subject matter—just as the Poet called Odysseus *antitheos* (god-like), which means *isotheos* (god-equal). And it would seem 7 that Parmenides was not unversed in dialectic since Aristotle, again, regarded his friend Zeno as “the pioneer of dialectic.” About Heraclitus, too, it was a question whether he was not merely a physicist but an ethical philosopher as well. But in any case 8 these are the leading exponents of the Physical division. The Ethical division alone was that which engaged Socrates, at least according to the rest of his friends^d; for Xenophon in his *Memorabilia*^e says expressly that “he rejected physics as a subject above our human powers and devoted himself solely to Ethics as the subject which concerns us men.” Timon also knows that this was his practice, for in one place he says—

But by the Stone-cutter,^f prater of laws, such things were abjured.

That is to say, Socrates turned aside from physics to

^a For this classification cf. *P.H.* ii. 12 ff.

^b For these names see Vol. I. *Introd.*

^c Cf. *Diog. Laert.* viii. 57.

^d *i.e.* all except Plato (cf. § 9).

^e *Xen. Mem.* i. 1. 11 ff.

^f Socrates is said to have been, in his youth, a stone-cutter or quarry-man, like his father.

θεωρίαν· διὸ καὶ ἐνομολόεσης προσέθηκεν, ἅτε τοῦ ἠθικοῦ μέρους ὄντος τοῦ περὶ νόμων διαλέγεσθαι. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Πλάτων παντὸς μέρους φιλοσοφίας αὐτῷ μεταδίδωσιν, τοῦ μὲν λογικοῦ παρόσον περὶ ὄρων καὶ διαιρέσεων καὶ ἐτυμολογίας παρεισηκται ζητῶν, ἅπερ ἐστὶ λογικά, τοῦ δὲ ἠθικοῦ ὅτι περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ πολιτείας καὶ νόμων διασκέπτεται, τοῦ δὲ φυσικοῦ ὅτι καὶ περὶ κόσμου τι καὶ περὶ ζωογονίας καὶ ψυχῆς πεφιλοσόφηκεν. ἔνθεν καὶ ὁ Τίμων αἰτιᾶται τὸν Πλάτωνα ἐπὶ τῷ οὕτω καλῶς πίζειν τὸν Σωκράτην πολλοῖς μαθήμασιν· ἢ γὰρ φησι τὸν οὐκ ἐθέλοντα μείναι ἠθολόγον.

11 Δοκοῦσι δὲ κατὰ τινὰς καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Κυρήνης μόνον ἀσπάζεσθαι τὸ ἠθικὸν μέρος, παραπέμπειν δὲ τὸ φυσικὸν καὶ τὸ λογικὸν ὡς μηδὲν πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμόνως βιοῦν συνεργοῦντα. καίτοι περιτρέπεσθαι τούτους ἔνοιον νομομίκασιν ἐξ ὧν τὸ ἠθικὸν διαιροῦσιν εἰς τε τὸν περὶ τῶν αἰρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν τόπον καὶ εἰς τὸν περὶ τῶν παθῶν καὶ ἔτι εἰς τὸν περὶ τῶν πράξεων καὶ ἤδη τὸν περὶ τῶν αἰτίων καὶ τελευταῖον εἰς τὸν περὶ τῶν πίστεων· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ὁ περὶ αἰτίων τόπος, φασίν, ἐκ τοῦ φυσικοῦ μέρους ἐτύγχανεν, ὁ δὲ περὶ πίστεων ἐκ τοῦ λογικοῦ. καὶ Ἀρίστων δὲ ὁ Χίος οὐ μόνον, ὡς φασί, παρητέτο τὴν τε φυσικὴν καὶ λογικὴν θεωρίαν διὰ τὸ ἀνωφελὲς καὶ πρὸς κακοῦ τοῖς φιλοσοφοῦσιν ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ τόπου τινὰς συμπεριέγραφεν, καθάπερ τὸν τε παραινετικὸν καὶ τὸν ὑποθετικὸν τόπον· τούτους γὰρ εἰς τίθησας καὶ παιδαγωγοὺς πίπτειν, ἀρκεῖν δὲ πρὸς

the study of Ethics; and on this account Timon gave him the name of "prater of laws," as the discussion of laws is a branch of Ethics. Plato, however, ascribes to him every division of philosophy,—Logic, in so far as he is introduced as an investigator of definitions and divisions and etymology, which are logical themes,—Ethics, because he discusses virtue and government and laws,—Physics, since he is made to philosophize about the Universe and animal creation and the Soul. Hence, too, Timon censures Plato for thus decking out Socrates with a host of sciences: for Plato, he says, "suffered him not to remain a simple teacher of Ethics."

The Cyrenaics,^a too, are thought by some to embrace the Ethical division only, and to dismiss Physics and Logic as contributing nothing to the happiness of life. Some, however, have supposed that this view is refuted by the fact that they divide Ethics into sections—one dealing with objects of choice and aversion, another treating of the affections, yet another treating of actions, then a further section concerned with causes, and finally one dealing with arguments; for of these, the section treating of causes, they say, belongs to the Physical division of Philosophy, and that treating of arguments to the Logical. Ariston of Chios,^b also, not only, they say, rejected the study of Physics and Logic on the ground that they are unprofitable and injurious to the philosophers who study them, but also proscribed some branches of Ethics, such as the hortatory and admonitory; for these, he held, are the business of nurses and pedagogues, whereas for securing happi-

^a Cf. § 191 *infra*; Vol. I. *Intro.* p. xvii.

^b A disciple of Zeno, the Stoic.

- τὸ μακαρίως βιώναι τὸν οἰκειοῦντα μὲν πρὸς ἀρετὴν λόγον, ἀπαλλοτριοῦντα δὲ κακίας, κατατρέχοντα δὲ τῶν μεταξύ τούτων, περὶ αἷ οἱ πολλοὶ
- 13 πτοηθέντες κακοδαιμονοῦσιν. περὶ δὲ τὸ λογικὸν κατηνέχθησαν μέρος οἱ περὶ Πανθοῖδην καὶ Ἀλεξίνον καὶ Εὐβουλίδην καὶ Βρύσωνα Διονυσόδωρόν τε καὶ Εὐθύδημον [Θούριοι, ὧν μέμνηται καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Εὐθυδήμῳ].
- 14 Τῶν δὲ διμερῆ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ὑποσησαμένων Ξενοφάνης μὲν ὁ Κολοφώνιος τὸ φυσικὸν ἅμα καὶ λογικόν, ὡς φασὶ τινες, μετήρχετο, Ἀρχέλαος δὲ ὁ Ἀθηναῖος τὸ φυσικὸν καὶ ἠθικόν· μεθ' οὗ τινὲς καὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον τάττουσιν ὡς καὶ τὴν λογικὴν
- 15 θεωρίαν ἐκβάλλοντα. ἄλλοι δὲ ἦσαν οἱ φασὶ μὴ κοινῶς αὐτὸν τὴν λογικὴν παρητήσθαι, μόνην δὲ τὴν τῶν στωικῶν, ὥστε δυνάμει τριμερῆ πάλιν ἀπολείπειν τὴν φιλοσοφίαν. ἀναφέρεται δὲ ὑπὸ τινῶν δόξα, καθὼ καὶ ὁ Σωτίων μεμαρτύρηκεν, εἰς τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς Κυρήνης ὡς λέγοντας ἠθικὸν τι καὶ λογικὸν φιλοσοφίας εἶναι μέρος.
- 16 Πλὴν οὗτοι μὲν ἔλλιπῶς ἀνεστράφθαι δοκοῦσιν, ἐντελέστερον δὲ παρὰ τούτους οἱ εἰπόντες τῆς φιλοσοφίας τὸ μὲν τι εἶναι φυσικὸν τὸ δὲ ἠθικὸν τὸ δὲ λογικόν· ὧν δυνάμει μὲν Πλάτων ἐστὶν ἀρχηγός, περὶ πολλῶν μὲν φυσικῶν [περὶ] πολλῶν δὲ ἠθικῶν οὐκ ὀλίγων δὲ λογικῶν διαλεχθεῖς· ῥητότατα δὲ οἱ περὶ τὸν Ξενοκράτην καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ περιπάτου ἔτι δὲ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἔχονται
- 17 τῆσδε τῆς διαιρέσεως. ἐνθένδε πιθανῶς¹ ὁμοιοῦσι

¹ πιθανῶς cj. Bekk.: ἀπιθάνως MSS.

ness in life that doctrine is sufficient which attracts men to virtue and alienates them from vice and runs down those intermediate things which excite the admiration of most men and ruin their lives. Logic, on the other hand, was the sole division which 13 was cultivated by Panthoides and Alexinus, and Eubulides and Bryson, and Dionysodorus and Euthydemus.^a

Of those who supposed Philosophy to consist of 14 two parts, Xenophanes of Colophon, as some say, pursued both Physics and Logic, but Archelaos of Athens Physics and Ethics; and some set Epicurus beside Archelaos as equally rejecting the study of Logic. But there have been others who say that 15 he did not set aside logic as a whole but merely that of the Stoics, so that he virtually allowed after all the three divisions of Philosophy. Some too—as Sotion^b has testified—ascribe to the Cyrenaics the expression of the opinion that both Ethics and Logic are parts of Philosophy.

These thinkers, however, seem to have handled 16 the question incompletely, and, in comparison with them, the view of those who divide Philosophy into Physics, Ethics, and Logic is more satisfactory. Of these Plato is, virtually, the pioneer, as he discussed many problems of physics and of ethics, and not a few of logic; but those who most expressly adopt this division are Xenocrates^c and the Peripatetics, and also the Stoics. Hence they plausibly liken philo- 17

^a Dionysodorus and his brother Euthydemus were fifth-century Sophists; Bryson and Eubulides, Logicians of the fourth century; Alexinus and Panthoides, Logicians or Eristics of the third century.

^b Sotion of Alexandria, a historian of philosophy (circa 220 B.C.). ^c A disciple of Plato, see Vol. I. Introd. p. xix.

τὴν φιλοσοφίαν παγκάρπῳ ἀλωῇ, ἵνα τῇ μὲν
 ὑψηλότῃ τῶν φυτῶν εἰκάζηται τὸ φυσικόν, τῷ
 δὲ νοστήμῳ τῶν καρπῶν τὸ ἠθικόν, τῇ δὲ ὀχυρό-
 18 τητι τῶν τειχῶν τὸ λογικόν. οἱ δὲ ὧψ φασὶν
 αὐτὴν εἶναι παραπλήσιον· ἐώκει γὰρ τῇ μὲν λεκίθῳ,
 ἣν τινες νεοττόν ὑπάρχειν λέγουσι, τὰ ἠθικά, τῷ
 δὲ λευκῷ, ὃ δὴ τροφή ἐστι τῆς λεκίθου, τὰ φυσικά,
 19 τῷ δὲ ἔξωθεν ὀστρακῶδει τὰ λογικά. ὁ δὲ Ποσει-
 δώνιος, ἐπεὶ τὰ μὲν μέρη τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀχώριστα
 ἐστὶν ἀλλήλων, τὰ δὲ φυτὰ τῶν καρπῶν ἕτερα
 θεωρεῖται καὶ τὰ τεῖχη τῶν φυτῶν κεχώριστα,
 ζῶα μᾶλλον εἰκάζειν ἡξίου τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, αἷματι
 μὲν καὶ σαρκὶ τὸ φυσικόν, ὀστέοις δὲ καὶ νεύροις
 τὸ λογικόν, ψυχῇ δὲ τὸ ἠθικόν.
 20 Ἄλλὰ γὰρ τριμεροῦς οὐσης τῆς φιλοσοφίας οἱ
 μὲν πρῶτον μέρος τάττουσι τὸ φυσικόν, ἐπεὶ καὶ
 χρόνῳ μὲν πρεσβυτάτη ἐστὶν ἡ περὶ τὴν φυσικὴν
 πραγματεία ὡς καὶ μέχρι νῦν τοὺς πρώτους
 φιλοσοφήσαντας φυσικοὺς καλεῖσθαι, τάξει δὲ, ὅτι
 πρῶτον ἀρμόττει περὶ τῶν ὅλων διαλαβεῖν καὶ
 τότε περὶ τῶν ἐπ' εἶδους καὶ τὰνθρώπου σκέ-
 21 πτεσθαι. οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ἠθικῶν κατήρξαντο ὡς
 ἀναγκαιοτέρων καὶ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἐπισπώντων,¹
 καθὸ καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης παρήγγελλε μηδὲν ἄλλο
 ζητεῖν εἰ μὴ

ὅτι τοι ἐν μεγάροισι κακόν τ' ἀγαθόν τε
 τέτυκται.

22 οἱ δὲ Ἐπικούρειοι ἀπὸ τῶν λογικῶν εἰσβάλλουσιν·
 τὰ γὰρ κανονικὰ πρῶτον ἐπιθεωροῦσιν, περὶ τε

¹ ἐπισπώντων Kayser: ἐπειγόντων Bekk.: ἐπιστώντων E;
 ἐπιστότων L.

sophy to a garden rich in fruits, comparing Physics
 to the height of the plants, Ethics to the richness of
 the fruits, Logic to the strength of the walls. And 18
 others say that Philosophy resembles an egg, Ethics
 being like the yolk, which some identify with the
 chick, Physics like the white, which is nutriment
 for the yolk, and Logic like the outside shell. But 19
 on the ground that the parts of Philosophy are in-
 separable one from another, whereas plants appear
 different from fruits and walls separated from plants,
 Poseidonius ^a preferred the comparison of Philosophy
 with an animal—Physics with the blood and flesh,
 Logic with the bones and sinews, Ethics with the
 soul.

Regarding Philosophy, then, as tripartite, some 20
 put Physics as its first division since it holds first
 place both in point of time—seeing that even up till
 now the earliest philosophers have been called
 “physicists”—and also in natural order, as it is
 fitting to begin by discussing the Whole before we
 go on to investigate the particulars and Man himself.
 Others have begun with Ethics, as a more necessary 21
 subject and one which invites to happiness; just as
 Socrates gave out that his only subject of inquiry
 was

Whatso of evil and good within these homes is enacted.^b

The Epicureans start off with Logic, for they expound 22
 “Canonic” first, treating of things evident and

^a An Eclectic of the first century B.C.

^b Homer, *Od.* iv. 392.

ἐναργῶν καὶ ἀδήλων καὶ τῶν τούτοις ἀκολουθῶν
 ποιοῦνται τὴν ὑφήγησιν. οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς
 καὶ αὐτοὶ ἄρχειν μὲν φασὶ τὰ λογικά, δευτερεύειν
 δὲ τὰ ἠθικά, τελευταία δὲ τετάχθαι τὰ φυσικά.
 23 πρῶτον γὰρ δεῖν καταρτισθῆναι τὸν νοῦν εἰς δυσ-
 ἔκκρουστον τῶν παραδιδόμενων φυλακὴν, ὄχρω-
 τικὸν δὲ εἶναι τῆς διανοίας τὸν διαλεκτικὸν τόπον·
 δεῦτερον δὲ ὑπογράφειν τὴν ἠθικὴν θεωρίαν πρὸς
 βελτίωσιν τῶν ἠθῶν· ἀκίνδυνος γὰρ ἡ παραδοχὴ
 ταύτης ἐπὶ προϋποκειμένη τῇ λογικῇ δυνάμει·
 τελευταίαν δὲ ἐπάγειν τὴν φυσικὴν θεωρίαν·
 θειοτέρα γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ βαθυτέρας δεῖται τῆς ἐπι-
 στάσεως.
 24 Ταῦτα μὲν καὶ οὗτοι· ἡμεῖς δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀκριβὲς
 ἐν τῷ πράγματι τὰ νῦν οὐ σκεπτόμεθα, ἐκεῖνο δὲ
 φάμεν ὡς εἴπερ ἐν παντὶ μέρει φιλοσοφίας ζητητέον
 ἐστὶ τάληθές, πρὸ παντός δεῖ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τοὺς
 τρόπους τῆς τούτου διαγνώσεως ἔχειν πιστούς.
 ὁ δὲ γε λογικὸς τόπος τὴν περὶ τῶν κριτηρίων
 καὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων θεωρίαν περιείχεν· ἀπὸ τούτου
 25 ἄρα ποιητέον ἐστὶν ἡμῖν τὴν ἀρχήν· καὶ ἵνα
 εὐέφοδος γένηται πρὸς τοὺς δογματικούς ἢ ζήτησις,
 ἐπεὶ τὰ μὲν ἐναργῆ διὰ κριτηρίου τινὸς αὐτόθεν
 γνωρίζεσθαι δοκεῖ, τὰ δὲ ἀδήλα διὰ σημείων καὶ
 ἀποδείξεων κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναργῶν μετάβασιν
 ἐξιχνεύεσθαι, τάξει σκεπτόμεθα πρῶτον μὲν περὶ
 τοῦ εἰ ἔστι τι κριτήριον τῶν αὐτόθεν κατ' αἴσθησιν
 ἢ διάνοιαν προσπιπτόντων, τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο περὶ
 τοῦ εἰ ἔστι σημειωτικὸς ἢ ἀποδεικτικὸς τῶν
 26 ἀδήλων τρόπος. οἴμαι γὰρ ὡς τούτων ἀναιρεθέν-
 των οὐδεμία ἔτι καταλειφθήσεται ζήτησις περὶ τοῦ
 δεῖν ἐπέχειν ἄτε μήτε ἐν τοῖς προφανέσι μήτε ἐν

non-evident and allied matters. The Stoics them-
 selves, too, say that Logic comes first, and Ethics
 second, while Physics occupies the last place. For 23
 the mind must first be fortified for the task of
 guarding its heritage impregnably, and what thus
 makes the intellect secure is the Dialectical section ;
 secondly we must subjoin Ethical doctrine for the
 bettering of morals ; for when this is laid upon
 an existing basis of logic, its reception is without
 danger ; and finally we must add Physical doctrine, it
 being a more divine subject and one which requires
 more profound attention.

Such, then, are the views of these thinkers. We, 24
 however, are not at present investigating this matter
 with exactness ; but this we do affirm—that if truth
 is to be sought in every division of Philosophy, we
 must, before all else, possess trustworthy principles
 and methods for the discernment of truth. Now
 the Logical branch is that which includes the theory of
 criteria and of proofs ; so it is with this that we ought
 to make our beginning. And in order to facilitate 25
 our inquiry, in its criticism of the Dogmatists, seeing
 that things evident are held to be directly cognized
 by means of a criterion, whereas the non-evident
 things are discovered by means of signs and proofs
 through inference from the evident, we shall take
 them in this order, inquiring first whether there
 exists a criterion of things directly perceived either
 by sense or by reason, and, in the next place, whether
 there exists a method capable of either signifying
 or proving things non-evident. For I suppose that 26
 if these shall be abolished there will no longer be any
 question as to the duty of suspending judgement,
 seeing that no truth is discovered either in things

τοῖς συνεσκιασμένοις εὐρισκομένον τινὸς ἀληθοῦς. ἀρχέτω οὖν ὁ περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου λόγος, ἐπεὶ καὶ πάντων τῶν τῆς καταλήψεως τρόπων περιεκτικὸς εἶναι δοκεῖ.

ΕΙ ΕΣΤΙ ΚΡΙΤΗΡΙΟΝ ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑΣ

27 Ἡ περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου ζήτησις οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ φύσει φιλάληθες ζῶον εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ <αὐτὸ>¹ τὰς γενικωτάτας τῆς φιλοσοφίας αἰρέσεις περὶ τῶν κυριωτάτων βραβεύειν, πᾶσιν ἐστὶ περιμάχητος. ἢ γὰρ τὸ μέγα καὶ σεμνὸν τῶν δογματικῶν αὔχημα ἀναιρεῖσθαι ἄρδην δεήσει, μηδενὸς εὐρισκομένου κανόνος τῆς κατ' ἀλήθειαν τῶν πραγμάτων ὑπάρξεως, ἢ ἀνάπαλιν ὡς προπετεῖς ἐλέγχεσθαι τοὺς σκεπτικούς καὶ τῆς κοινῆς πίστεως κατατολμήσαντας, ἐὰν φαίνηται τι τὸ δυνάμενον ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς ἀληθείας κατάληψιν ὀδηγεῖν. καὶ γὰρ σχέτλιον εἶ τὰ μὲν ἐκτὸς κριτήρια μετὰ πάσης σπουδῆς ἀναζητήσομεν, οἷον κανόνας καὶ διαβήτας σταθμῖα τε καὶ τρυτάνας, τὸ δὲ ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ τούτων αὐτῶν δοκιμαστικὸν
28 εἶναι δοκοῦν παρήσομεν. τάξει τοίνυν ὡς ἂν περὶ τῶν ὄλων οὔσης τῆς σκέψεως ἀναλαβόντες, ἐπεὶ δύο μέρη ἐμφέρεται τῇ προτάσει, τό τε κριτήριον καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια, ἐν μέρει τὸν περὶ ἑκατέρου τούτων λόγον ποιησόμεθα, καὶ ὅτε μὲν ἐξηγητικῶς ὑποδεικνύντες ποσαχῶς λέγεται τὸ κριτήριον καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια, καὶ τίνα ποτὲ κατὰ τοὺς δογματικούς εἶχε φύσιν, ὅτε δὲ καὶ ἀπορητικώτερον σκεπτόμενοι εἶ δύναται τι τούτων ὑπάρχειν.

¹ <αὐτὸ> addo.

plainly obvious or in things obscure. Let us begin, then, with the discussion of the criterion, since it is held to embrace all the modes of apprehension.

DOES A CRITERION OF TRUTH EXIST ?

The problem of this Criterion is everywhere a²⁷ subject of controversy, not only because Man is by nature a truth-loving animal, but also because it pronounces judgement upon the most generic systems of Philosophy regarding the weightiest matters. For either the great and sublime theme of the Dogmatists' boasts will necessarily be utterly abolished if no Canon of the veritable existence of things is discovered, or conversely, if something appears which is able to point us to the apprehension of the truth, the Sceptics will be convicted of rashness and of defiant disregard for the general belief. It would indeed be monstrous if, while spending the utmost pains in investigating the external criteria—such as rules and compasses, weights and scales—we should neglect the Criterion within us—itsself the accepted test of those very externals. As our²⁸ inquiry, then, has to do with the whole subject, we shall proceed in an orderly way, and since two terms are involved in the proposition^a—namely, “the Criterion” and “Truth”—we shall discuss each of these separately, our treatment consisting partly of an exposition of the various senses of the terms “Criterion” and “Truth” and of the kind of reality ascribed to them by the Dogmatists, and partly of a more critical inquiry as to the possibility of the real existence of any such things.

^a i.e. the question “Does a Criterion of Truth exist?”

29 Αὐτίκα τοῖνυν τὸ κριτήριον (ἀρκτέον γὰρ ἀπὸ τούτου) λέγεται πρῶτον μὲν διχῶς, καθ' ἓνα μὲν τρόπον ᾧ προσέχοντες τὰ μὲν ποιούμεν τὰ δὲ οὐδαμῶς, καθ' ἕτερον δὲ ᾧ προσέχοντες τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν φασὲν τὰ δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχειν καὶ ταυτὶ μὲν ἀληθῆ καθεστάναι ταυτὶ δὲ ψευδῆ. ὦν τὸ μὲν πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς σκεπτικῆς ἀγωγῆς ἐξεθέμεθα· κατ' ἀνάγκην γὰρ ἔδει τὸν ἀπορητικῶς φιλοσοφούντα, μὴ εἰς τὸ παντελὲς ἀνερέργητον ὄντα καὶ ἐν ταῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον πράξεσιν ἀπρακτον, ἔχειν τι κριτήριον αἰρέσεως ἅμα καὶ φυγῆς, τουτέστι τὸ φαινόμενον, καθὼς καὶ ὁ Τίμων μεμαρτύρηκεν εἰπὼν

ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον πάντη¹ σθένει, οὐπερ ἂν ἔλθῃ.

31 τὸ δ' ἕτερον, λέγω δὲ τὸ περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως καὶ περὶ οὐ τὰ νῦν σκεπτόμεθα, λέγεσθαι δοκεῖ τριχῶς, κοινῶς τε καὶ ἰδίως καὶ ἰδιαίτατα. κοινῶς μὲν γὰρ πᾶν μέτρον καταλήψεως, καθ' ὃ σημαίνόμενον καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ κριτήρια ταύτης ἠξίωται τῆς προσ-
32 ηγορίας, ὅσον ὄρασις ἀκοή γεύσις· ἰδίως δὲ πᾶν μέτρον καταλήψεως τεχνικόν, καθ' ὃ πῆχυν μὲν καὶ ζυγὸν καὶ κανόνα καὶ διαβήτην εἴποι τις ἂν κριτήρια, παρόσον ἐστὶ τεχνικά, τὴν δὲ ὄρασιν καὶ τὴν ἀκοὴν καὶ καθόλου τὰ λοιπὰ κοινὰ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων, φυσικὴν ἔχοντα τὴν κατασκευήν,
33 οὐδαμῶς· ἰδιαίτερον δὲ πᾶν μέτρον καταλήψεως

¹ πάντη *ej. Bekk.* : παντὶ *mss.*

^a See *P.H.* i. 21 ff. Cf. *P.H.* ii. 14.

^b For Timon, the Sceptic, see Vol. I. *Introd.* pp. xxx ff.

Well, then, the Criterion (for with it we must begin) 29 has, in the first place, two senses: in the one sense it is used of that in view of which we do these things and not those; in the other, it means the thing in view of which we assert that these things exist and those do not exist, and that these are true, those false. The former of these we have dealt with in our section "Concerning the Sceptic Way."^a For the 30 sceptical philosopher, if he is not to be entirely inert and without a share in the activities of daily life, was necessarily obliged to possess some Criterion both of choice and of aversion—that is to say, the Appearance; even as Timon^b also testified in his saying—

Yea, the Appearance is ev'rywhere strong, where'er it approacheth.

"Criterion," in the second of the two senses—that 31 of existence, I mean, which is the theme of our present inquiry—seems to be used with three meanings: the general, the special, and the most special.^c As general it is used of every measure or standard of apprehension, and in this sense the physical criteria also—such as sight, hearing, taste—are thought worthy of the title; as special it includes 32 every technical measure of apprehension, so that in this sense one would call the cubit, the balance, the rule and the compass "criteria" inasmuch as they are technical, but not sight nor hearing nor in general the rest of the common sense-organs, the construction of which is natural; in the more special sense the 33 Criterion is every measure of apprehension of a non-

^c With this passage *cf. P.H.* ii. 15, 16.

ἀδήλου πράγματος, καθ' ὃ τὰ μὲν βιωτικά οὐκέτι λέγεται κριτήρια, μόνα δὲ τὰ λογικά καὶ ἄπερ οἱ δογματικοὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων παρεισάγουσι πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἀληθείας εὔρεσιν.

- 34 Πολλαχῶς δὴ λεγομένου τοῦ κριτηρίου, πρόκειται πάλιν τὸ σκέπτεσθαι προηγουμένως μὲν περὶ τοῦ λογικοῦ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις θρυλουμένου, κατ' ἐπακολούθημα δὲ καὶ περὶ ἐκάστου
35 τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον. πάρεστι μέντοι καὶ τὸ λογικὸν τοῦτο ὑποδιαιεῖσθαι, λέγοντας τὸ μὲν τι εἶναι κριτήριον ὡς ὑφ' οὐ, τὸ δὲ ὡς δι' οὐ, τὸ δὲ ὡς προσβολῆ καὶ σχέσις. ὑφ' οὐ μὲν ὡς ἄνθρωπος, δι' οὐ δὲ ὡς αἰσθησις, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ὡς ἡ προσβολῆ
36 τῆς φαντασίας. ὃν γὰρ τρόπον ἐν τῇ τῶν βαρέων καὶ κούφων ἐξετάσει τρία ἐστὶ κριτήρια, ὃ τε ζυγοστάτης καὶ ὁ ζυγὸς καὶ ἡ τοῦ ζυγοῦ θέσις, τούτων δὲ ὁ μὲν ζυγοστάτης κριτήριον ἦν τὸ ὑφ' οὐ, ὁ δὲ ζυγὸς τὸ δι' οὐ, ἡ δὲ θέσις τοῦ ζυγοῦ ὡς σχέσις, καὶ πάλιν ὃν τρόπον πρὸς τὴν τῶν εὐθειῶν καὶ στρεβλῶν διάκρισιν τεχνίτου τε καὶ κανόνος καὶ τῆς τούτου προσβολῆς ἐστὶ χρεία, κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀληθῶν τε καὶ ψευδῶν διάγνωσιν δεόμεθα τῶν προειρημένων
37 ἡμῖν τριῶν κριτηρίων, καὶ ἔοικε τῷ μὲν ζυγοστάτῃ ἡ τέκτονι ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὑφ' οὐ γίνεται ἡ κρίσις, τῷ δὲ ζυγῷ καὶ κανόνι ἡ αἰσθησις καὶ ἡ διάνοια, δι' ἧς γίνεται τὰ τῆς κρίσεως, τῇ δὲ σχέσει τῶν προειρημένων ὀργάνων ἡ προσβολῆ τῆς φαντασίας, καθ' ἣν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐπιβάλλεται κρίνειν.
Ἄλλὰ περὶ μὲν κριτηρίου ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος προλαβεῖν.

evident object, and in this sense the ordinary standards are no longer called criteria but only logical standards and those which the dogmatic philosophers introduce as means for the discovery of truth.

The term "Criterion," then, being used in many 34 senses, we again propose to examine in the first place the logical criterion, which the philosophers harp on, and subsequently each of the criteria of ordinary life. One may, however, subdivide this logical criterion 35 as well, by calling one form of it that of the agent, another the instrument, and a third the application and use. The agent, for instance, may be a man, the instrument sense-perception, and the third form of criterion the application of the sense-impression. For just as in the process of examining heavy and 36 light objects there are three criteria, the man who weighs, the scales, and the act of weighing, and of these the weigher is the criterion of the agent, the scales that of the instrument, and the act of weighing that of the use; and again, just as for the determination of things straight and crooked there is need of a craftsman and a rule and the application of the rule; so, in the same way, in philosophy also, for the determination of things true and false, we require the three criteria we have mentioned above; and here 37 the man, who is the agent in the judgement, corresponds to the weigher or carpenter; sense-perception or intelligence, as the instrument by which the judgement is effected, corresponds to the scales and the rule; and the application of the sense-impression, according to which the man proceeds to judge, corresponds to the use of the aforesaid instruments.

It was, in fact, necessary for our present purpose to begin with this explanation of the criterion.

38 Τὴν δὲ ἀλήθειαν οἴονται τινες, καὶ μάλιστα οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς, διαφέρειν τᾶληθοῦς κατὰ τρεῖς τρόπους, οὐσία τε καὶ συστάσει καὶ δυνάμει, οὐσία μὲν παρόσον ἢ μὲν ἀλήθεια σῶμά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς ἀσώματον ὑπῆρχεν. καὶ εἰκότως, φασὶν· τουτὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀξίωμα ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἀξίωμα λεκτόν, τὸ δὲ λεκτόν ἀσώματον. ἀνάπαλιν δὲ ἡ ἀλήθεια σῶμά ἐστι παρόσον ἐπιστήμη πάντων ἀληθῶν
 39 ἀποφαντικῆ δοκεῖ τυγχάνειν, πᾶσα δὲ ἐπιστήμη πῶς ἔχον ἐστὶν ἡγεμονικόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ πῶς ἔχουσα χεῖρ πυγμῆ νοεῖται· τὸ δὲ ἡγεμονικόν σῶμα κατὰ τούτους ὑπῆρχεν· τοῖνυν καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια
 40 κατὰ γένος ἔσται σωματικῆ. συστάσει δὲ καθόσον τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς ὡς μονοειδὲς τι καὶ ἀπλοῦν τὴν φύσιν νενόηται, οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος τὸ “ἡμέρα ἐστίν” καὶ τὸ “ἐγὼ διαλέγομαι,” ἡ δὲ ἀλήθεια ὡς ἂν ἐπιστήμη καθεστηκυῖα τούναντίον συστηματικῆ τε καὶ πλειόνων ἄθροισμα τυγχάνειν ὑπ-
 41 εἰληπται. ᾧ οὖν λόγῳ ἕτερόν τί ἐστὶν ὁ δῆμος καὶ ἕτερον ὁ πολίτης, καὶ δῆμος μὲν τὸ ἐκ πολλῶν πολιτῶν ἄθροισμα πολίτης δὲ ὁ εἷς, τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ διενήνοχεν ἡ ἀλήθεια τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, καὶ ὁμοίωται ἢ μὲν ἀλήθεια τῷ δήμῳ τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς τῷ πολίτῃ, διὰ τὸ τὴν μὲν εἶναι συστηματικὴν τὸ
 42 δὲ ἀπλοῦν. δυνάμει δὲ ταῦτα ἀλλήλων κεχώρισται, ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς οὐ πάντως ἐπιστήμης εἶχετο (καὶ γὰρ ὁ φαῦλος καὶ ὁ νήπιος καὶ ὁ μεμνηνὸς λέγει μὲν ποτέ τι ἀληθές, οὐκ ἔχει δὲ ἐπιστήμην ἀληθοῦς), ἡ δὲ ἀλήθεια κατ’ ἐπιστήμην θεωρεῖται.

^a With §§ 38-42 cf. P.H. ii. 80-83.

It is supposed by some, and especially by the 38 Stoics, that “truth” differs from “the true” in three ways, in essence and composition and potency, —in essence in so far as truth is a body whereas the true is incorporeal.^a And naturally so, they say; for the latter is “judgement,” and the judgement is “expression,” and the expression is incorporeal. On the other hand, truth is a body in so far as it is held to be “knowledge declaratory of all true things,” and all knowledge is “a particular state of the regent 39 part,” just as the fist is conceived as a particular state of the hand, and, according to these thinkers, the regent part is a body, so that truth also will belong to the genus body. They differ in composition, 40 inasmuch as the true is conceived as uniform and simple in its nature,—as for instance, at the present moment, the propositions “It is day” and “I am conversing,”—whereas truth, as consisting in knowledge, is on the contrary conceived to be of composite nature and a collection of several elements. Thus, 41 just as “the people,” is one thing and “the citizen” another,—the collection composed of many citizens being “the people,” the one individual “the citizen,”—so, by the same reasoning, truth is distinguished from the true, and whereas truth corresponds to “the people,” the true corresponds to “the citizen,” because the former is composite but the latter simple. And they are distinct from one another in potency, 42 since the true is not altogether dependent on knowledge (for in fact the fool and the infant and the madman at times say something true, but they do not possess knowledge of the true), whereas truth is considered to involve knowledge. Hence, too, its

ὅθεν καὶ ὁ ἔχων ταύτην σοφός ἐστιν (ἐπιστήμην
 γὰρ εἶχεν ἀληθῶν) καὶ οὐποτε ψεύδεται, κἂν
 ψεύδος λέγῃ, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀπὸ κακῆς ἀλλ' ἀπὸ
 43 ἀστείας αὐτὸ διαθέσεως προφέρεσθαι. καθὰ γὰρ
 ὁ περὶ τῆς τοῦ κάμνοντος σωτηρίας ψεύδος τι
 λέγων ἰατρός, καὶ ἐπαγγελλόμενος τι δώσειν μὴ
 διδοῦς δέ, ψεύδος μὲν τι λέγει, οὐ ψεύδεται δέ
 (πρὸς γὰρ τὴν τοῦ ἐπιστατουμένου σωτηρίαν αὐτῷ
 τὸ τοιοῦτο λαμβάνει τὴν ἀναφοράν), καὶ ὡς οἱ
 ἄριστοι τῶν στρατηγῶν πρὸς εὐθυμίαν τῶν ὑπο-
 ταττομένων αὐτοῖς στρατιωτῶν πολλάκις ἐπιστολὰς
 ἀπὸ συμμαχίδων πόλεων πλασάμενοι¹ ψεύδος μὲν
 τι λέγουσιν, οὐ ψεύδονται δέ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀπὸ
 44 πονηρᾶς γνώμης τοῦτο ποιεῖν, καὶ ὃν τρόπον γραμ-
 ματικός σολοικισμοῦ τιθεὶς ὑπόδειγμα σολοικισμὸν
 μὲν προφέρεται, οὐ σολοικίζει δέ (οὐ γὰρ παρὰ
 ἀπειρίαν τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου τοῦτο πάσχει), ὧδε καὶ
 ὁ σοφός, τουτέστιν ὁ τὴν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἐπιστήμην
 ἔχων, ἐρεῖ μὲν ποτε ψεύδος, ψεύσεται δέ οὐδέποτε
 45 διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν τὴν γνώμην ψεύδει συγκατατιθε-
 μένην. ὅτι γὰρ, φασίν, ἀπὸ τῆς διαθέσεως καὶ
 οὐκ ἀπὸ ψιλῆς τῆς προφορᾶς κριτέον ἐστὶ τὸν
 ψευδόμενον, πάρεστι μαθεῖν ἐκ τῶν τεθησομένων
 ὑποδειγμάτων. τυμβωρύχος γὰρ λέγεται καὶ ὁ
 ἐπὶ τῷ σκυλεύειν τοὺς νεκροὺς τοῦτο πράττων
 καὶ ὁ τύμβους τοῖς νεκροῖς ὀρύττων· ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν
 πρῶτος κολάζεται ὡς ἀπὸ κακῆς διαθέσεως τοῦτο
 πράσσειν, ὁ δὲ δεύτερος καὶ μισθὸν λαμβάνει τῆς
 ὑπηρεσίας διὰ τὴν ἀντικειμένην αἰτίαν. προφανές
 τὸν ἐστὶν ὅτι καὶ τὸ ψεύδος λέγειν τοῦ ψεύ-

¹ πλασάμενοι LE: πλασάμενος N: παρασκευασάμενοι Bekk.

possessor is a Sage (for he possesses knowledge of
 things true), and he never speaks falsely, even if he
 says what is false, because he does not utter it from
 an evil but from a kindly disposition. For just as the 43
 doctor who says something false respecting the cure
 of his patient, and promises to give him something
 but does not give it, is not lying though he says
 something false (for in saying it he has regard to
 the cure of the person in his charge),—and just as
 the best commanders, when, as often, they concoct
 messages from allied States for the encouragement of
 the soldiers under their command, say what is false
 yet are not liars because they do not do this with a
 bad intention,—and just as the grammarian, although 44
 when giving an example of a solecism he utters a
 solecism, is not guilty of bad grammar (for it is not
 through ignorance of correct speech that he makes the
 mistake),—so also the Sage (I mean the man who
 possesses the knowledge of the true) will at times say
 something false but will never lie because his mental
 disposition is not assenting to what is false. For, as 45
 they assert, the fact that the liar must be judged by
 his disposition and not by his mere utterance may be
 learnt from the examples now to be adduced. Thus
 the name “grave-digger” is applied both to the
 man who so acts in order to plunder the dead and
 to the man who digs graves for the dead; but
 whereas the first is punished as doing this from an
 evil disposition, the second receives pay for his service
 for the opposite cause. So then it is quite plain that
 uttering a falsehood is vastly different from lying, in

δεσθαι κατὰ πολὺ διενήνοχεν, ἢ τὸ μὲν ἀπὸ ἀστείας γίνεται γνώμης, τὸ δὲ ψεύδεσθαι ἀπὸ ποιηρᾶς.

- 46 Ταῦτα καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας κατὰ τινὰς προαποδόντες, ἀκολούθως καὶ τὴν γενομένην τοῖς δογματικοῖς φιλοσόφοις διάστασιν περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου σκοπῶμεν· ἀνάγκη γάρ ἐστι ζητοῦντας περὶ τῆς τούτου ὑπάρξεως συνεπιθεωρεῖν καὶ ὃ τι ἔστιν.
- 47 Πολλὰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ποικίλαι διαιρέσεις φέρονται κατὰ τὸν τόπον¹. ἀλλ' ἡμῖν ἀπόχρη πρὸς τὸ παρὸν λέγειν ὅτι οἱ μὲν ἀνείλον τὸ κριτήριον οἱ δὲ ἀπέλιπον. καὶ τῶν ἀπολιπόντων τρεῖς αἱ ἀνωτάτω γεγόνασι στάσεις· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν λόγῳ τοῦτο ἀπέλιπον, οἱ δὲ ἐν ταῖς ἀλόγοις ἐναργεῖαις;² οἱ δὲ ἐν ἀμφοτέροις. καὶ δὴ ἀνείλον μὲν αὐτὸ Ξενοφάνης τε ὁ Κολοφώνιος καὶ Ξενοφάνης ὁ Κορίνθιος καὶ Ἀνάχαρις ὁ Σκύθης καὶ Πρωταγόρας καὶ Διονυσόδωρος, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις Γοργίας ὁ Λεοντίνος καὶ Μητρόδωρος ὁ Χίος καὶ Ἀνάξαρχος ὁ εὐδαιμονικὸς καὶ Μόνιμος ὁ κύων. [ἐν τούτοις δὲ 49 εἰσι καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως.]³ ὧν Ξενοφάνης μὲν κατὰ τινὰς εἰπὼν πάντα ἀκατάληπτα ἐπὶ ταύτης ἔστι τῆς φορᾶς, ἐν οἷς γράφει

καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφὲς οὐ τις ἀνὴρ ἴδεν, οὐδέ τις ἔσται
εἰδὼς ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἄσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων·
εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα τύχοι τετελεσμένον εἰπὼν,
αὐτὸς ὁμῶς οὐκ οἶδε, δόκος δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται.

¹ τόπον N, cj. Bekk. : τρόπον LE.

² ἐναργεῖαις Heintz : ἐνεργεῖαις mss., Bekk.

³ ἐν . . . σκέψεως] secl. Mutsch.

that the former proceeds from a kindly intention but lying from an evil intention.

Having thus stated the views held by some con- 46
cerning truth, let us next consider the divergent
opinions which have arisen among the dogmatic
philosophers concerning the criterion; for while we
are investigating its existence we must also consider
at the same time what, in its essence, it is. Now many 47
divergent opinions of all sorts are propounded re-
garding this subject, but for the present it is sufficient
for us to say that some have rejected, others retained
the criterion. Of those who have retained it the main
views are three: some have retained it in rational
discourse, some in non-rational self-evident facts,
some in both. Moreover, it has been rejected by 48
Xenophanes of Colophon and Xenias of Corinth
and Anaxarchus the Scythian and Protagoras and
Dionysodorus^a; and besides these, by Gorgias of
Leontini and Metrodorus of Chios and Anaxarchus
"the Eudaemonist" and Monimus the Cynic. [And
amongst these are also the Sceptics.] And of these 49
Xenophanes, according to some, took up this position
by declaring all things to be non-apprehensible, as in
this passage^b:

Yet, with respect to the gods and what I declare about
all things,
No man has seen what is clear nor ever will any man
know it.
Nay, for e'en should he chance to affirm what is really
existent,
He himself knoweth it not; for all is swayed by opining.

^a For the views of those here named see §§ 53 ff. *infra*,
13 *supra*; P.H. ii. 18.

^b Repeated in § 110 *infra*, and *Adv. Log.* ii. 326.

50 διὰ τούτων γὰρ σαφές μὲν ἔοικε λέγειν τάληθές
καὶ τὸ γνώριμον, καθὸ καὶ λέγεται

ἀπλοῦς ὁ μῦθος τῆς ἀληθείας ἔφν,

ἄνδρα δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τῷ εἰδικῶ καταχρώμενος
ἀντὶ τοῦ γένους· εἶδος γὰρ ἀνθρώπου καθέστηκεν
ὁ ἀνὴρ. σύνηθες δ' ἔστι τούτῳ χρῆσθαι τῷ τρόπῳ
τῆς φράσεως καὶ Ἰπποκράτει, ὅταν λέγῃ “γυνή
ἀμφιδέξιος οὐ γίνεται,” τούτεστι θήλεια ἐν τοῖς
δεξιούσι μέρεσι τῆς μήτρας οὐ συνίσταται. ἀμφὶ
θεῶν δὲ ὑποδειγματικῶς περὶ τινος τῶν ἀδήλων,
51 δόκον δὲ τὴν δόκησιν καὶ τὴν δόξαν. ὥστε τοιοῦ-
τον εἶναι κατὰ ἐξάπλωσιν τὸ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ λεγόμενον
“τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀληθές καὶ γνώριμον οὐθεὶς ἄνθρωπος
οἶδε, τό γε ἐν τοῖς ἀδήλοις πράγμασιν· κἂν γὰρ
ἐκ τύχης ἐπιβάλλῃ τούτῳ, ὅμως οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι
52 ἐπιβέβληκεν αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' οἶεται καὶ δοκεῖ.” ὥσπερ
γὰρ εἰ ἐν ζοφερῷ οἰκῆματι καὶ πολλὰ ἔχοντι
κειμήλια ὑποβοίμεθά τινας χρυσὸν ζητοῦντας, ὑπο-
πεσεῖται διότι ἕκαστος μὲν τούτων λαβόμενός τινος
τῶν ἐν τῷ οἰκῆματι κειμένων οἰήσεται τοῦ χρυσοῦ
δεδράχθαι, οὐδεὶς δὲ αὐτῶν ἔσται πεπεισμένος ὅτι
τῷ χρυσῷ περιέπεσε, κἂν μάλιστα τύχῃ τούτῳ
περιπεπτωκώς, ὧδε καὶ εἰς τουτοῖ τὸν κόσμον
ὥσπερ τινὰ μέγαν οἶκον παρήλαθε πλήθος φιλοσόφων
ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς ἀληθείας ζήτησιν, ἧς τὸν λαβόμενον
εἰκός ἐστιν ἀπιστεῖν ὅτι εὐστόχησεν.

Οὗτος μὲν δὴ οὐ φησιν εἶναι κριτήριον ἀληθείας

^a Eurip. *Phoen.* 469.

^b A curious use of ἀμφιδέξιος (usually “ambidextrous”).
That the “left” is the “female” side was an old Pythagorean idea. But the main point of the sentence is that

For here he seems to mean by “clear” what is true 50
and known, just as in the saying

By nature simple is the word of truth.^a

And by “man” he seems to mean “human being,”
using the special term instead of the general; for
man is a species of human being. The use of this
mode of speech is customary also in Hippocrates,
as when he says “A woman is not produced right-
handed,”—that is to say, “a female is not com-
pounded in the right-hand parts of the womb.”^b
The words “with respect to the gods” are used, by
way of example, for “concerning any non-evident
object”; and “opining” stands for surmise and
opinion. Consequently his statement, when sim- 51
plified, amounts to this—“Yet the true and known—
at least in respect of non-evident things—no human
being knows; for even if by chance he should hit
upon it, still he knows not that he has hit upon it but
imagines and opines.” For just as, if we were to 52
suppose that certain people are searching for gold in
a dark room containing many treasures, what happens
will be that each of them whenever he lays hold of
some one of the treasures in the room will imagine
that he has grasped the gold, though none of them
will be convinced that he has lighted on the gold,
even though, in fact, he has lighted upon it; so
also into this Universe, as into a great house, there
has entered a host of philosophers bent on the search
for truth, and it is quite likely that the one who has
laid hold of it disbelieves that he has achieved his
aim.

Thus Xenophanes denies that a criterion of truth

H. is here using the specific term γυνή (“woman”) in place
of the generic θήλεια (“female”).

διὰ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι καταληπτὸν ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν
 53 ζητουμένων. Ξενιάδης δὲ ὁ Κορίνθιος, οὐδὲ καὶ
 Δημόκριτος μέμνηται, πάντ' εἰπὼν ψευδῆ, καὶ
 πᾶσαν φαντασίαν καὶ δόξαν ψεύδεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ
 μη ὄντος πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον γίνεσθαι, καὶ εἰς τὸ
 54 μὴ ὄν πᾶν τὸ φθειρόμενον φθείρεσθαι, δυνάμει
 τῆς αὐτῆς ἔχεται τῷ Ξενοφάνει στάσεως. μὴ
 ὄντος γὰρ τινος ἀληθοῦς κατὰ διαφορὰν τοῦ ψεύ-
 δους, ἀλλὰ πάντων ψευδῶν ὄντων καὶ διὰ τοῦτο
 ἀκαταλήπτων, οὐδὲ διακριτικὸν τι τούτων ἔσται
 κριτήριον. τὸ δ' ὅτι πάντα ἐστὶ ψευδῆ καὶ διὰ
 τοῦτο ἀκατάληπτα, οὐδὲ διακριτικὸν τούτων ἔσται
 κριτήριον,¹ δείκνυται ἐκ τῆς τῶν αἰσθήσεων δια-
 βολῆς· εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἐπαναβεβηκὸς κριτήριον πάντων
 τῶν πραγμάτων ἐστὶ ψευδές, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ
 πάντα ἐστὶ ψευδῆ. τὸ δέ γε ἐπαναβεβηκὸς κριτή-
 ριον πάντων τῶν πραγμάτων εἰσὶν αἱ αἰσθήσεις,
 καὶ δείκνυνται ψευδεῖς· πάντα ἄρα τὰ πράγματα
 ἐστὶ ψευδῆ.
 55 Καὶ Ἀνάχαρσις, ὡς φασίν, ὁ Σκύθης πάσης
 τέχνης τὴν κριτικὴν κατάληψιν ἀναιρεῖ, σφόδρα τε
 ἐπιτιμᾷ τοῖς Ἕλλησι ταύτην ἀπολείπουσιν· τίς
 γὰρ ἐστὶ, φησίν, ὁ κρίνων τι τεχνικῶς; ἄρα γε
 ὁ ἰδιώτης ἢ ὁ τεχνίτης; ἀλλ' ἰδιώτην μὲν οὐκ
 ἂν εἴποιμεν πεπῆρωται γὰρ πρὸς τὴν γνώσιν τῶν
 τεχνικῶν ἰδιωμάτων, καὶ ὡς οὔτε τυφλὸς λαμ-
 βάνει τὰ τῆς ὀράσεως ἔργα οὔτε κωφὸς τὰ τῆς
 ἀκοῆς, οὕτως οὐδὲ ὁ ἀτεχνος ὀξυωπεῖ πρὸς τὴν
 κατάληψιν τοῦ τεχνικῶς ἀποτελεσθέντος, ἐπεὶ τοι
 ἐὰν καὶ τούτῳ μαρτυρῶμεν τὴν τινος πράγματος
 τεχνικοῦ κρίσιν, οὐ διοίσει τῆς τέχνης ἢ ἀτεχνία,

¹ [οὐδὲ . . . κριτήριον] om. NLE.

exists because there is nothing apprehensible existing
 in the nature of the objects of inquiry. And Xenias 53
 the Corinthian^a—who is mentioned by Democritus—
 inasmuch as he asserts that all things are false, and
 that every impression and opinion is false, and that all
 that becomes becomes out of the non-existent, and
 all that perishes perishes into the non-existent, virtu-
 ally adopts the same position as Xenophanes. For if 54
 nothing true, as opposed to false, exists, but all things
 are false and therefore inapprehensible, neither will
 there exist any criterion capable of judging between
 things. And the fact that all things are false and
 therefore inapprehensible is proved by disparagement
 of the senses; ^b for if the supreme criterion of all
 things is false, all things also are of necessity false.
 But the senses are the supreme criterion of all things,
 and they are proved to be false; therefore all things
 are false.

Anacharsis the Scythian also, as they say, destroys 55
 the apprehension which judges concerning every art,
 and strongly censures the Greeks for accepting it.
 "For who," says he, "is the man who judges a thing by
 rules of art? Is he the non-expert or the expert artist?"^c
 But surely we could not say that he is the non-expert;
 for he is lacking in knowledge of the special features of
 the art, and just as the blind man does not perceive
 the effects of vision, nor the deaf those of hearing, so
 neither is the non-expert keen of sight to apprehend
 the result produced by artistic methods; since in fact,
 were we to entrust to him the judgement of any pro-
 duct of art, there will be no difference between lack

^a See P.H. ii. 18; § 388 *infra*.

^b See P.H. i. 44 ff., ii. 49 ff.

^c Cf. P.H. iii. 259.

56 ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄτοπον· ὥστε οὐχ ὁ ἰδιώτης ἐστὶ
 κριτῆς τῶν τεχνικῶν ἰδιωμάτων. λείπεται ἄρα
 λέγειν τὸν τεχνίτην· ὁ πάλιν ἐστὶν ἀπίθανον. ἦτοι
 γὰρ ὁ ὁμόζηλος τὸν ὁμόζηλον ἢ ὁ ἀνομόζηλος τὸν
 ἑτερόζηλον κρίνει. ἀλλ' ὁ ἑτερόζηλος οὐχ οἶός τέ
 57 ἐστὶ κρίνειν τὸν ἑτερόζηλον· τῆς γὰρ ἰδίας τέχνης
 ἐστὶν ἐπιγνώμων, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀλλοτρίαν ἰδιώτης
 καθέστηκεν. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ὁ ὁμόζηλος τὸν ὁμό-
 ζηλον δύναται δοκιμάζειν· αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτο ἐζή-
 τοῦμεν, τίς ἐστὶν ὁ τούτους κρίνων ἐν μιᾷ δυνάμει
 τὸ ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ αὐτῇ τέχνῃ καθεστῶτας. ἄλλως
 τε, εἴπερ οὗτος ἐκείνον κρίνει, γενήσεται τὸ αὐτὸ
 κρίνόν τε καὶ κρινόμενον πιστόν τε καὶ ἄπιστον·
 58 ἢ μὲν γὰρ ὁμόζηλός ἐστὶν ὁ ἕτερος τῷ κρινομένῳ,
 κρινόμενος καὶ αὐτὸς ἄπιστος ἔσται, ἢ δὲ κρίνει,
 πιστός γενήσεται. οὐ δυνατὸν δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ
 κρίνον καὶ κρινόμενον καὶ πιστόν καὶ ἄπιστον
 59 ὑπάρχειν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τις ὁ κρίνων τεχνικῶς.
 διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ κριτήριον· τῶν γὰρ κριτηρίων
 τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ τεχνικὰ τὰ δὲ ἰδιωτικά, οὔτε δὲ τὰ
 ἰδιωτικά κρίνει, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ὁ ἰδιώτης, οὔτε τὰ
 τεχνικά, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ὁ τεχνίτης, διὰ τὰς ἔμ-
 προσθεν εἰρημένας αἰτίας. τοίνυν οὐδέν ἐστι
 κριτήριον.
 60 Καὶ Πρωταγόραν δὲ τὸν Ἀβδηρίτην ἐγκατέλεξάν
 τινες τῷ χορῷ τῶν ἀναιρουμένων τὸ κριτήριον
 φιλοσόφων, ἐπεὶ φησι πάσας τὰς φαντασίας καὶ
 τὰς δόξας ἀληθεῖς ὑπάρχειν καὶ τῶν πρὸς τι εἶναι
 τὴν ἀλήθειαν διὰ τὸ πᾶν τὸ φανὲν ἢ δόξαν τι

• Cf. P.H. i. 216; Vol. I. Introd. p. xiv.

of art and art, which is absurd. So that the non-expert
 is not the judge of the special features of art. It 56
 remains, then, to say that the expert artist is the
 judge; and this again is improbable. For either the
 fellow-craftsman judges the fellow-craftsman, or the
 man of one craft the man of another craft. But the
 man of one craft is incapable of judging the man of
 another craft; for he is learned in his own art, but 57
 in regard to another man's he is in the position of a
 non-expert. Nor in fact can the fellow-craftsman pass
 judgement on his fellow-craftsman; for precisely this
 was our question—Who is he that judges those who
 stand on the same level inasmuch as they are engaged
 in the same art? And besides, if this fellow-craftsman
 judges that one, the same thing will be both judging
 and judged, both trusted and distrusted; for in so 58
 far as the other man is a fellow-craftsman of the man
 who is being judged, he himself also will be subject
 to judgement and distrusted, whereas, in so far as he
 is giving judgement, he will be trusted. But it is not
 possible for the same thing to be both judging and
 judged, trusted and distrusted. Therefore there is
 none who judges by rules of art. And because of this 59
 there is no criterion either; for of criteria some are
 technical, others non-technical, but, for the reasons
 already stated, neither the non-technical criteria judge
 any more than the non-expert, nor the technical
 any more than the expert artist. So then no criterion
 exists."

Some, too, have counted Protagoras of Abdera^a 60
 among the company of those philosophers who
 abolish the criterion, since he asserts that all sense-
 impressions and opinions are true and that truth is
 a relative thing inasmuch as everything that has

εὐθέως πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ὑπάρχειν. ἐναρχόμενος γοῦν τῶν καταβαλλόντων ἀνεφώνησε “ πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς 61 ἔστιν, τῶν δὲ οὐκ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν.” καὶ μαρτυρεῖν φαίνεται τούτῳ ὁ ἀντικείμενος λόγος. εἰ γὰρ φήσει τις μὴ πάντων τῶν πραγμάτων κριτήριον εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, βεβαιώσει τὸ πάντων τῶν πραγμάτων κριτήριον εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον· αὐτὸς γὰρ ὁ τοῦτο λέγων ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, καὶ τὸ ὡς πρὸς αὐτὸν τιθεὶς φαινόμενον ὁμολογεῖ καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τῶν ὡς πρὸς αὐτὸν φαινομένων ὑπάρχειν. ὅθεν καὶ ὁ μεμνηνὸς τῶν ἐν μανίᾳ φαινομένων πιστόν ἐστι κριτήριον, καὶ ὁ κοιμώμενος τῶν ἐν ὕπνοις καὶ ὁ νήπιος τῶν ἐν νηπιότητι καὶ 62 ὁ γεγηρακὸς τῶν ἐν γήρᾳ προσπιπτόντων. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ οἰκείον ἀπὸ τῶν διαφορουσῶν περιστάσεων τὰς διαφόρους περιστάσεις ἀθετεῖν, τούτεστιν ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν ἐν τῷ σωφρονεῖν ὑποπιπτόντων τὰ ἐν τῷ μεμνηνέαι φαινόμενα, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν ὑπαρ τὰ κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνου, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν ἐν γήρᾳ τὰ ἐν νηπιότητι. ὡς γὰρ αὐτὰ ἐκείνοις οὐ φαίνεται, οὐτὼ καὶ ἀνάπαλιν τὰ τούτοις φαινόμενα ἐκείνοις οὐ προσ- 63 πίπτει. διόπερ εἰ ὅτι ὁ μεμνηνὸς ἢ ὁ κοιμώμενος ἐν ποιᾷ διαθέσει θεωρεῖται, οὐκ ἔστι βέβαιος τῶν φαινομένων αὐτῷ κριτής, ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ σωφρονῶν καὶ ὁ ἐγρηγορῶν ἐν ποιᾷ καθέστηκεν διαθέσει, πάλιν οὐκ ἔσται πιστὸς πρὸς τὴν διάγνωσιν τῶν ὑποπιπτόντων αὐτῷ. μηδενὸς οὖν χωρὶς περιστάσεως λαμβανομένου, ἐκάστῳ πιστευτέον (περὶ)¹

¹ <περὶ> addidi: <ἀποφαινομένῳ περὶ> cj. Mutsch.

appeared to someone or been opined by someone is at once real in relation to him. Certainly, at the opening of his book *The Down-Throwers* he has proclaimed that “ Of all things the measure is man, of existing things that they exist and of non-existing things that they exist not.” And to this statement 61 even the opposite statement appears to bear witness. For if anyone shall assert that man is not the criterion of all things he will be confirming the statement that man is the criterion of all things; since the very person who makes the assertion is himself a man, and in affirming what appears relatively to himself he confesses that this very assertion of his is one of the appearances relative to himself. Hence also the madman is a trustworthy criterion of the appearances which occur in madness, and the sleeper of those in sleep, and the infant of those in infancy, and the ancient of those in old age. Nor is it appropriate to 62 disallow one set of circumstances because of a different set of circumstances—that is to say, the appearances which occur in the state of madness because of the impressions received in the sane state of mind, and those of sleep because of those of the waking state, and those of infancy because of those of old age. For as the latter percepts do not appear to the former percipients, so also conversely the appearances perceived by these do not affect those. Consequently, 63 if the madman or the sleeper is not a reliable judge of the appearances he perceives because he is found to be in a certain state of mind, then since both the sane and the waking man are also in a certain state, they again will not be trustworthy for the determining of their percepts. Seeing, then, that no impression is received apart from circumstances, each man must

τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν περίστασιν λαμβανομένων.
 64 καὶ τοῦτον¹ δὴ κινεῖν τινὲς ὑπενόησαν τὸ κριτήριον,
 ἐπεὶ περ τοῦτι μὲν τῶν καθ' αὐτὰ ὑποκειμένων
 δοκιμαστικὸν εἶναι βούλεται, τοῦ τε ἀληθοῦς καὶ
 τοῦ ψεύδους διοριστικὸν ὑπάρχειν, ὃ δὲ προειρη-
 μένος ἀνὴρ οὔτε καθ' αὐτό τι ὑπάρχον οὔτε ψεῦδος
 ἀπολέλοιπεν. τοιοῦτοι δὲ γεγονέναι λέγονται καὶ
 οἱ περὶ τὸν Εὐθύδημον καὶ Διονυσόδωρον· τῶν γὰρ
 πρὸς τι καὶ οὗτοι τό τε ὄν καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἀπο-
 λελοίπασιν.

65 Γοργίας δὲ ὁ Λεοντίνος ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μὲν τάγ-
 ματος ὑπῆρχε τοῖς ἀηρηκόσι τὸ κριτήριον, οὗ
 κατὰ τὴν ὁμοίαν δὲ ἐπιβολὴν τοῖς περὶ τὸν Πρωτ-
 αγόραν. ἐν γὰρ τῷ ἐπιγραφομένῳ περὶ τοῦ μὴ
 ὄντος ἢ περὶ φύσεως τρία κατὰ τὸ ἐξῆς κεφάλαια
 κατασκευάζει, ἐν μὲν καὶ πρῶτον ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔστιν,
 δεύτερον ὅτι εἰ καὶ ἔστιν, ἀκατάληπτον ἀνθρώπῳ,
 τρίτον ὅτι εἰ καὶ καταληπτόν, ἀλλὰ τοί γε ἀνέξ-
 66 οιστον καὶ ἀνερμήνευτον τῷ πέλας. ὅτι μὲν οὐδὲν
 οὐδὲν ἔστιν, ἐπιλογίζεται τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον. εἰ
 γὰρ ἔστι τι, ἦτοι τὸ ὄν ἔστιν ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἢ καὶ
 τὸ ὄν ἔστι καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν. οὔτε δὲ τὸ ὄν ἔστιν, ὡς
 παραστήσει, οὔτε τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὡς παραμυθήσεται,
 οὔτε τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὡς καὶ τοῦτο διδάξει·
 67 οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τι. καὶ δὴ τὸ μὲν μὴ ὄν οὐκ ἔστιν.
 εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔστιν, ἔσται τι ἅμα καὶ οὐκ
 ἔσται· ἢ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ὄν νοεῖται, οὐκ ἔσται, ἢ δὲ
 ἔστι μὴ ὄν, πάλιν ἔσται. παντελῶς δὲ ἄτοπον τὸ
 εἶναι τι ἅμα καὶ μὴ εἶναι· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τὸ μὴ

¹ τοῦτον Heintz: τοῦτῳ mss., Bekk.

^a Viz. Protagoras.

be trusted regarding those received in his own
 circumstances. And this man,^a as some have sup- 64
 posed, rejects the criterion, seeing that it purports
 to be a test of absolute realities and to discriminate
 between the true and the false, whereas the man just
 mentioned does not admit the existence either of
 anything absolutely real or of falsehood. Euthy-
 demus and Dionysodorus also are said to have shared
 these views; for they too regarded both the existent
 and the true as relative things.

Gorgias of Leontini belonged to the same party as 65
 those who abolish the criterion, although he did not
 adopt the same line of attack as Protagoras. For
 in his book entitled *Concerning the Non-existent* or
Concerning Nature he tries to establish successively
 three main points—firstly, that nothing exists;
 secondly, that even if anything exists it is inappre-
 hensible by man; thirdly, that even if anything is
 apprehensible, yet of a surety it is inexpressible
 and incommunicable to one's neighbour. Now that 66
 nothing exists, he argues in the following fashion:
 If anything exists, either it is the existent that exists
 or the non-existent, or both the existent and the
 non-existent exist. But neither does the existent
 exist, as he will establish, nor the non-existent, as
 he will demonstrate, nor both the existent and the
 non-existent, as he will also make plain. Nothing,
 therefore, exists. Now the non-existent does not 67
 exist. For if the non-existent exists, it will at one
 and the same time exist and not exist; for in so far
 as it is conceived as non-existent it will not exist, but
 in so far as it is non-existent it will again exist. But
 it is wholly absurd that a thing should both exist
 and exist not at one and the same time. Therefore

ὄν. καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔστι, τὸ ὄν οὐκ ἔσται· ἐναντία γὰρ ἔστι ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις, καὶ εἰ τῷ μὴ ὄντι συμβέβηκε τὸ εἶναι, τῷ ὄντι συμβήσεται τὸ μὴ εἶναι. οὐχὶ δέ γε τὸ ὄν οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ <τοῖνυν>¹ τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔσται.

- 68 Καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν ἔστιν. εἰ γὰρ τὸ ὄν ἔστιν, ἦτοι αἰδιόν ἐστιν ἢ γενητόν ἢ αἰδιον ἅμα καὶ γενητόν· οὔτε δὲ αἰδιόν ἐστιν οὔτε γενητόν οὔτε ἀμφοτέρα, ὡς δείξομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τὸ ὄν. εἰ γὰρ αἰδιόν ἐστι τὸ ὄν (ἀρκτέον γὰρ ἐντεῦθεν), οὐκ ἔχει τινα ἀρχήν· τὸ γὰρ γινόμενον πᾶν ἔχει τιν' ἀρχήν, τὸ δὲ αἰδιον ἀγένητον καθεστὼς οὐκ εἴχον ἀρχήν. μὴ ἔχον δὲ ἀρχήν ἄπειρόν ἐστιν. εἰ δὲ ἄπειρόν ἐστιν, οὐδαμοῦ ἐστίν. εἰ γὰρ πού ἐστιν, ἕτερον αὐτοῦ ἐστὶν ἐκείνο τὸ [ὄν] ἐν ᾧ ἐστίν, καὶ οὕτως οὐκέτ' ἄπειρον ἔσται τὸ ὄν ἐμπεριεχόμενον τινι· μείζον γὰρ ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐμπεριεχομένου τὸ ἐμπεριέχον, τοῦ δὲ ἄπειρου οὐδέν ἐστι μείζον,
- 70 ὥστε οὐκ ἔστι που τὸ ἄπειρον. καὶ μὴν οὐδ' ἐν αὐτῷ περιέχεται. ταῦτόν γὰρ ἔσται τὸ ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ δύο γενήσεται τὸ ὄν, τόπος τε καὶ σῶμα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ᾧ τόπος ἐστίν, τὸ δ' ἐν αὐτῷ σῶμα. τοῦτο δέ γε ἄτοπον· τοῖνυν οὐδὲ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστὶ τὸ ὄν. ὥστ' εἰ αἰδιόν ἐστι τὸ ὄν, ἄπειρόν ἐστιν, εἰ δὲ ἄπειρόν ἐστιν, οὐδαμοῦ ἐστίν, εἰ δὲ μηδαμοῦ ἐστίν, οὐκ ἔστιν. τοῖνυν εἰ αἰδιόν ἐστι τὸ ὄν, οὐδὲ τὴν ἀρχήν ὄν ἐστιν.
- 71 Καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ γενητόν εἶναι δύναται τὸ ὄν. εἰ γὰρ γέγονεν, ἦτοι ἐξ ὄντος ἢ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος γέγονεν.

¹ οὐδὲ <τοῖνυν>: <τοῖνυν> οὐδὲ cj. Bekk., Mutsch.

the non-existent does not exist. Moreover, if the non-existent exists, the existent will not exist; for these are contrary the one to the other, and if existence is a property of the non-existent, non-existence will be a property of the existent. But it is not the fact that the existent does not exist; neither, then, will the non-existent exist.

Furthermore, the existent does not exist either. 68 For if the existent exists, it is either eternal or created or at once both eternal and created; but, as we shall prove, it is neither eternal nor created nor both; therefore the existent does not exist. For if the existent is eternal (the hypothesis we must take first), it has no beginning; for everything created 69 has some beginning, but the eternal being uncreated had no beginning. And having no beginning it is infinite. And if it is infinite, it is nowhere. For if it is anywhere, that wherein it is is different from it, and thus the existent, being encompassed by something, will no longer be infinite; for that which encompasses is larger than that which is encompassed, whereas nothing is larger than the infinite; so that the infinite is not anywhere. Nor, again, is it 70 encompassed by itself. For, if so, that wherein it is will be identical with that which is therein, and the existent will become two things, place and body (for that wherein it is is place, and that which is therein is body). But this is absurd; so that the existent is not in itself either. Consequently, if the existent is eternal it is infinite, and if it is infinite it is nowhere, and if it is nowhere it does not exist. So then, if the existent is eternal, it is not even existent at all.

Nor, again, can the existent be created. For if 71 it has been created, it has been created either out of

ἀλλ' οὔτε ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος γέγονεν· εἰ γὰρ ὄν ἐστιν, οὐ γέγονεν ἀλλ' ἐστιν ἤδη· οὔτε ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὄν οὐδὲ γεννησάι τι δύναται διὰ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὀφείλειν ὑπάρξεως μετέχειν τὸ γεννητικόν τινος. οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ γενητόν ἐστι τὸ ὄν.

72 Κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ συναμφότερον, ἀίδιον ἅμα καὶ γενητόν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἀνααιρετικά ἐστιν ἀλλήλων, καὶ εἰ ἀίδιον ἐστι τὸ ὄν, οὐ γέγονεν, καὶ εἰ γέγονεν, οὐκ ἐστιν ἀίδιον. τοῖνυν εἰ μήτε ἀίδιον ἐστι τὸ ὄν μήτε γενητόν μήτε τὸ συναμφότερον, οὐκ ἂν εἶη τὸ ὄν.

73 Καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ ἔστιν, ἦτοι ἔν ἐστιν ἢ πολλά· οὔτε δὲ ἔν ἐστιν οὔτε πολλά, ὡς παρασταθήσεται· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τὸ ὄν. εἰ γὰρ ἔν ἐστιν, ἦτοι ποσὸν ἐστιν ἢ συνεχές ἐστιν ἢ μέγεθός ἐστιν ἢ σῶμά ἐστιν. ὃ τι δὲ ἂν ἦ τούτων, οὐχ ἔν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ ποσὸν μὲν καθεστῶς διαιρεθήσεται, συνεχές δὲ ὄν τμηθήσεται. ὁμοίως δὲ μέγεθος νοούμενον οὐκ ἔσται ἀδιαίρετον. σῶμα δὲ τυγχάνον τριπλοῦν ἔσται· καὶ γὰρ μήκος καὶ πλάτος καὶ βάθος ἔξει. ἄτοπον δὲ γε τὸ μηδὲν τούτων εἶναι λέγειν τὸ ὄν·

74 οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν ἔν τὸ ὄν. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ πολλά ἐστιν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐστιν ἔν, οὐδὲ πολλά ἐστιν· σύνθεσις γὰρ τῶν καθ' ἔν ἐστι τὰ πολλά, διόπερ τοῦ ἐνός ἀναιρουμένου συναίρεται καὶ τὰ πολλά.

Ἄλλὰ γὰρ ὅτι μὲν οὔτε τὸ ὄν ἐστιν οὔτε τὸ μὴ ὄν ἐστιν, ἐκ τούτων συμφανές· ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ ἀμφότερα ἔστιν, τό τε ὄν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν, εὐεπιλόγιστον.

the existent or out of the non-existent. But it has not been created out of the existent; for if it is existent it has not been created but exists already; nor out of the non-existent; for the non-existent cannot create anything because what is creative of anything must of necessity partake of real existence. Neither, then, is the existent created.

In the same way, it is not both together—at once 72 eternal and created; for these are destructive the one of the other, and if the existent is eternal it has not been created, while if it has been created it is not eternal. So then, if the existent is neither eternal nor created nor both at once, the existent will not exist.

Moreover, if it exists, it is either one or many; but, 73 as we shall show, it is neither one nor many; therefore the existent does not exist. For if it is one, it is either a discrete quantity^a or a continuum or a magnitude or a body. But whichever of these it be, it is not one; but if it be a discrete quantity it will be divided, and if it be a continuum it will be cut in sections; and similarly, if it be conceived as a magnitude it will not be indivisible, while if it is a body it will be threefold, for it will possess length and breadth and depth. But it is absurd to say that the existent is none of these; therefore the existent is not one. Yet neither is it many. For if it is not 74 one, neither is it many; for the many is a sum of the ones, and hence if the one is destroyed the many also are destroyed with it.

Well, then, it is plain from this that neither does the existent exist nor the non-existent exist; and that 75 they do not both exist—both the existent and the non-existent—is easy to prove. For if the non-

^a i.e. a quantity, or number, which is divisible.

εἴπερ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔστι καὶ τὸ ὄν ἔστι, ταῦτόν
 ἔσται τῷ ὄντι τὸ μὴ ὄν ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ εἶναι· καὶ διὰ
 τοῦτο οὐδέτερον αὐτῶν ἔστιν. ὅτι γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὄν
 οὐκ ἔστιν, ὁμόλογον· δέδεικται δὲ ταῦτό τούτω
 76 καθεστῶς τὸ ὄν· καὶ αὐτὸ τοῖνυν οὐκ ἔσται. οὐ
 μὴν ἀλλ' εἴπερ ταῦτόν ἔστι τῷ μὴ ὄντι τὸ ὄν,
 οὐ δύναται ἀμφότερα εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ ἀμφότερα, οὐ
 ταῦτόν, καὶ εἰ ταῦτόν, οὐκ ἀμφότερα. οἷς ἔπεται
 τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ μήτε τὸ ὄν ἔστι μήτε τὸ
 μὴ ὄν μήτε ἀμφότερα, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν
 νοεῖται, οὐδὲν ἔστιν.

77 "Ὅτι δὲ κἂν ἦ τι, τοῦτο ἀγνωστόν τε καὶ ἀνεπι-
 νόητόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώπῳ, παρακειμένως ὑποδεικτέον.
 εἰ γὰρ τὰ φρονούμενα, φησὶν ὁ Γοργίας, οὐκ ἔστιν
 ὄντα, τὸ ὄν οὐ φρονεῖται. καὶ κατὰ λόγον· ὡσπερ
 γὰρ εἰ τοῖς φρονουμένοις συμβέβηκεν εἶναι λευκοῖς,
 κἂν συμβεβήκει τοῖς λευκοῖς φρονεῖσθαι, οὕτως εἰ
 τοῖς φρονουμένοις συμβεβήκει μὴ εἶναι οὐσι, κατ'
 ἀνάγκην συμβήσεται τοῖς οὐσι μὴ φρονεῖσθαι.

78 διόπερ ὑγιᾶς καὶ σώζον τὴν ἀκολουθίαν ἐστὶ τὸ
 "εἰ τὰ φρονούμενα οὐκ ἔστιν ὄντα, τὸ ὄν οὐ
 φρονεῖται." τὰ δὲ γε φρονούμενα (προληπτέον
 γάρ) οὐκ ἔστιν ὄντα, ὡς παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα
 τὸ ὄν φρονεῖται. καὶ ὅτι τὰ φρονούμενα οὐκ ἔστιν
 79 ὄντα, συμφανές· εἰ γὰρ τὰ φρονούμενά ἐστιν ὄντα,
 πάντα τὰ φρονούμενα ἔστιν, καὶ ὅπη ἂν τις αὐτὰ
 φρονήσῃ. ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀπεμφαίνον· [εἰ δὲ ἐστὶ,
 φαῦλον.] οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν φρονῇ τις ἀνθρωπον ἰπτά-
 μενον ἢ ἄρματα ἐν πελάγει τρέχοντα, εὐθέως

* Cf. P. H. ii. 64.

existent exists and the existent exists, the non-
 existent will be identical with the existent so far as
 regards existing; and for this reason neither of them
 exists. For it is admitted that the non-existent does
 not exist; and it has been proved that the existent
 is identical therewith; therefore it too will not exist.
 And what is more, if the existent is identical with the
 non-existent, both of them cannot exist; for if the
 pair of them both exist, there is no identity, and if
 there is identity, there is no longer a pair. From
 which it follows that nothing exists; for if neither
 the existent exists nor the non-existent nor both,
 and besides these no other alternative is conceived,
 nothing exists.

In the next place it must be shown that even if any-
 77 thing exists it is unknowable and inconceivable by man.
 If, says Gorgias, the things thought are not existent,
 the existent is not thought.* And this is logical; for
 just as, if it is a property of the things thought to be
 white it would be a property of white things to be
 thought—so, if it is a property of things thought not
 to be existent, it will necessarily be a property of
 things existent not to be thought. Consequently, 78
 this is a sound and consistent syllogism—"If the
 things thought are not existent, the existent is not
 thought." But the things thought (for we must
 take them first) are not existent, as we shall establish;
 therefore the existent is not thought. And, in fact,
 that the things thought are not existent is plain;
 for if the things thought are existent, all the things
 79 thought exist, and in the way, too, in which one has
 thought them. But this is contrary to sense. For
 if someone thinks of a man flying or of a chariot run-
 ning over the sea, it does not follow at once that a

ἄνθρωπος ἵπταται ἢ ἄρματα ἐν πελάγει τρέχει.
 80 ὥστε οὐ τὰ φρονούμενά ἐστιν ὄντα. πρὸς τοῦτοις
 εἰ τὰ φρονούμενά ἐστιν ὄντα, τὰ μὴ ὄντα οὐ
 φρονηθήσεται. τοῖς γὰρ ἐναντίοις τὰ ἐναντία συμ-
 βέβηκεν, ἐναντίον δέ ἐστι τῷ ὄντι τὸ μὴ ὄν· καὶ
 διὰ τοῦτο πάντως εἰ τῷ ὄντι συμβέβηκε τὸ
 φρονεῖσθαι, τῷ μὴ ὄντι συμβήσεται τὸ μὴ φρονεῖ-
 σθαι. ἄτοπον δ' ἐστὶ τοῦτο· καὶ γὰρ Σκύλλα καὶ
 Χίμαιρα καὶ πολλὰ τῶν μὴ ὄντων φρονεῖται. οὐκ
 81 ἄρα τὸ ὄν φρονεῖται. ὥσπερ τε τὰ ὀρώμενα διὰ
 τοῦτο ὀρατὰ λέγεται ὅτι ὀρᾶται, καὶ τὰ ἀκουστὰ
 διὰ τοῦτο ἀκουστὰ ὅτι ἀκούεται, καὶ οὐ τὰ μὲν
 ὀρατὰ ἐκβάλλομεν ὅτι οὐκ ἀκούεται, τὰ δὲ ἀκουστὰ
 παραπέμπομεν ὅτι οὐχ ὀρᾶται (ἐκαστον γὰρ ὑπὸ
 τῆς ἰδίας αἰσθήσεως ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑπ' ἄλλης ὀφείλει
 κρίνεσθαι), οὕτω καὶ τὰ φρονούμενα καὶ εἰ μὴ
 βλέποιο τῇ ὄψει μηδὲ ἀκούοιο τῇ ἀκοῇ ἔσται,
 82 ὅτι πρὸς τοῦ οἰκείου λαμβάνεται κριτηρίου. εἰ
 οὖν φρονεῖ τις ἐν πελάγει ἄρματα τρέχειν, καὶ εἰ
 μὴ βλέπει ταῦτα, ὀφείλει πιστεύειν ὅτι ἄρματα
 ἔστω ἐν πελάγει τρέχοντα. ἄτοπον δὲ τοῦτο· οὐκ
 ἄρα τὸ ὄν φρονεῖται καὶ καταλαμβάνεται.
 83 Καὶ εἰ καταλαμβάνοιο δέ, ἀνέξοιστον ἐτέρῳ.
 εἰ γὰρ τὰ ὄντα ὀρατὰ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀκουστὰ καὶ
 κοινῶς αἰσθητά, ἅπερ ἐκτὸς ὑπόκειται, τούτων τε
 τὰ μὲν ὀρατὰ ὀράσει καταληπτά ἐστὶ τὰ δὲ
 ἀκουστὰ ἀκοῇ καὶ οὐκ ἐναλλάξ, πῶς οὖν δύναται
 84 ταῦτα ἐτέρῳ μνηνεσθαι; ᾧ γὰρ μνηνόμεν ἔστι

man is flying or a chariot running over the sea. So
 that the things thought are not existent. Further-
 80 more, if the things thought are existent, the non-
 existent things will not be thought. For opposites
 are properties of opposites, and the non-existent is
 the opposite of the existent; and because of this, if
 "to be thought" is a property of the existent, "not
 to be thought" will most certainly be a property of
 the non-existent. But this is absurd; for Scylla and
 Chimaera and many non-existent things are thought.
 Therefore the existent is not thought. And just 81
 as the things seen are called visible because of the
 fact that they are seen, and the audible termed
 audible because of the fact that they are heard, and
 we do not reject the visible things because they are
 not heard, nor dismiss the audible things because they
 are not seen (for each object ought to be judged by
 its own special sense and not by another),—so also the
 things thought will exist, even if they should not be
 viewed by the sight nor heard by the hearing, because
 they are perceived by their own proper criterion. If, 82
 then, a man thinks that a chariot is running over the
 sea, even if he does not behold it he ought to believe
 that there exists a chariot running over the sea. But
 this is absurd; therefore the existent is not thought
 and apprehended.

And even if it should be apprehended, it is incom-
 83 municable to another person. For if the existent
 things are objects, externally existing, of vision
 and of hearing and of the senses in general, and of
 these the visible things are apprehensible by sight
 and the audible by hearing, and not conversely,—how,
 in this case, can these things be indicated to another
 person? For the means by which we indicate is 84

λόγος, λόγος δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τὰ ὑποκείμενα καὶ ὄντα· οὐκ ἄρα τὰ ὄντα μηνύομεν τοῖς πέλας ἀλλὰ λόγον, ὃς ἕτερός ἐστι τῶν ὑποκειμένων. καθάπερ οὖν τὸ ὄρατὸν οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀκουστὸν καὶ ἀνάπαλιν, οὕτως ἐπεὶ ὑπόκειται τὸ ὄν ἐκτός, οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο
85 λόγος ὁ ἡμέτερος· μὴ ὦν δὲ λόγος οὐκ ἂν δηλωθῆι ἐτέρῳ.

Ὁ γε μὴν λόγος, φησὶν, ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν προσπιπτόντων ἡμῖν πραγμάτων συνίσταται, τοῦ-
ἐστι τῶν αἰσθητῶν· ἐκ γὰρ τῆς τοῦ χυλοῦ ἐγκυρή-
σεως ἐγγίνεται ἡμῖν ὁ κατὰ ταύτης τῆς ποιότητος ἐκφερόμενος λόγος, καὶ ἐκ τῆς τοῦ χρώματος ὑποπτώσεως ὁ κατὰ τοῦ χρώματος. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐχ ὁ λόγος τοῦ ἐκτός παραστατικός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ
86 τὸ ἐκτός τοῦ λόγου μηνυτικὸν γίνεται. καὶ μὴ οὐδὲ ἐνεστι λέγειν ὅτι ὄν τρόπον τὰ ὄρατὰ καὶ ἀκουστὰ ὑπόκειται, οὕτως καὶ ὁ λόγος, ὥστε δύνασθαι ἐξ ὑποκειμένου αὐτοῦ καὶ ὄντος τὰ ὑποκείμενα καὶ ὄντα μηνύεσθαι. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ὑπόκειται, φησὶν, ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ διαφέρει τῶν λοιπῶν ὑποκειμένων, καὶ πλείστῳ διενήροχε τὰ ὄρατὰ σώματα τῶν λόγων· δι' ἑτέρου γὰρ ὄργάνου ληπτὸν ἐστι τὸ ὄρατὸν καὶ δι' ἄλλου ὁ λόγος. οὐκ ἄρα ἐνδείκνυται τὰ πολλὰ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ὁ λόγος, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνα τὴν ἀλλήλων διαδηλοῖ φύσιν.

87 Τοιούτων οὖν παρὰ τῷ Γοργία ἠπορημένων οἴχεται ὅσον ἐπ' αὐτοῖς τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας κριτήριον· τοῦ γὰρ μήτε ὄντος μήτε γνωρίζεσθαι δυναμένου μήτε ἄλλῳ παρασταθῆναι πεφυκότος οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη κριτήριον.

Οὐκ ὀλίγοι δὲ ἦσαν, ὡς προείπον, οἱ καὶ τοὺς

^a See § 48.

speech, and speech is not the real and existent things; therefore we do not indicate to our neighbours the existent things but speech, which is other than the existing realities. Thus, just as the visible thing will not become audible, and *vice versa*, so too, since the existent subsists externally, it will not become our speech; and not being speech it will not
85 be made clear to another person.

Speech moreover, as he asserts, is formed from the impressions caused by external objects, that is to say the sensibles; for from the occurrence of flavour there is produced in us the speech uttered respecting this quality, and by the incidence of colour speech respecting colour. And if this be so, it is not speech that serves to reveal the external object, but the external object that proves to be explanatory of speech. Moreover, it is not possible to assert that
86 speech subsists in the same fashion as the visible and audible things, so that the subsisting and existent things can be indicated by it as by a thing subsisting and existent. For, says he, even if speech subsists, yet it differs from the rest of subsisting things, and the visible bodies differ very greatly from spoken words; for the visible object is perceptible by one sense-organ and speech by another. Therefore speech does not manifest most of the subsisting things, just as they themselves do not make plain one another's nature.

Such, then, being the difficulties raised by Gorgias, 87 if we go by them the criterion of truth is swept away; for there can be no criterion of that which neither exists nor can be known nor is naturally capable of being explained to another person.

As I said above,^a there have been not a few who

περὶ Μητρόδωρον καὶ Ἀνάξαρχον ἔτι δὲ Μόνιμον
88 φήσαντες ἀνηρηκέναι τὸ κριτήριον, ἀλλὰ Μητρό-
δωρον μὲν ὅτι εἶπεν “ οὐδὲν ἴσμεν, οὐδ’ αὐτὸ
τοῦτο ἴσμεν ὅτι οὐδὲν ἴσμεν,” Ἀνάξαρχον δὲ καὶ
Μόνιμον ὅτι σκηνογραφία ἀπέικασαν τὰ ὄντα,
τοῖς τε κατὰ ὕπνου ἢ μανίαν προσπίπτουσι ταῦτα
ὠμοιωῶσθαι ὑπέλαβον.

89 Ἄλλ’ οὗτοι μὲν τοιαύτης μετεσχῆκασιν στάσεως,
πρῶτοι δ’ ἔδοξαν οἱ ἀπὸ Θάλεω φυσικοὶ τὴν περὶ
κριτηρίου σκέψιν εἰσηγήσασθαι. καταγνόντες γὰρ
τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἐν πολλοῖς ὡς ἀπίστου, τὸν λόγον
κριτῆν τῆς ἐν τοῖς οὐσιν ἀληθείας ἐπέστησαν ἀφ’
οὗ ὀρμώμενοι περὶ τε ἀρχῶν καὶ στοιχείων καὶ
τῶν ἄλλων διετάσσοντο, ὡν ἡ κατάληψις διὰ τῆς
90 τούτου δυνάμεως περιγίνεται. ἔνθεν ὁ μὲν φυσι-
κῶτατος Ἀναξαγόρας ὡς ἀσθενεῖς διαβάλλων τὰς
αἰσθήσεις “ ὑπὸ ἀφαιρότητος αὐτῶν ” φησὶν “ οὐ
δυνατοὶ ἔσμεν κρίνειν τάληθές.” τίθησί τε πίστιν
αὐτῶν τῆς ἀπιστίας τὴν παρὰ μικρὸν τῶν χρωμάτων
ἐξαλλαγὴν· εἰ γὰρ δύο λάβοιμεν χρώματα, μέλαν
καὶ λευκόν, εἶτα ἐκ θατέρου εἰς θάτερον κατὰ
σταγόνα παρεκχέοιμεν, οὐ δυνήσεται ἡ ὄψις δια-
κρίνειν τὰς παρὰ μικρὸν μεταβολάς, καίπερ πρὸς
91 τὴν φύσιν ὑποκειμένης. τούτῳ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ δυνάμει
καὶ ὁ Ἀσκληπιάδης εὐρίσκεται κατακεχρημένος ἐν
τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν περὶ οἴνου δόσεως, ἐνθα¹ ἐπὶ
ἄχρας καὶ μέλανος ἴσταται· “ μυχέντων γὰρ τού-
των ” φησὶν “ ἀδυνατεῖ διαγινώσκειν ἢ αἰσθησις
εἴτε ἐν ἔστι καὶ ἀπλοῦν χρῶμα τὸ ὑποκείμενον
εἴτε καὶ μή.”

Ἔστω δὲ μὲν Ἀναξαγόρας κοινῶς τὸν λόγον ἔφη

¹ ἐνθα cj. Bekk.: ἐνθεν mss.

have asserted that Metrodorus and Anaxarchus, and
also Monimus, abolished the criterion—Metrodorus 88
because he said “ We know nothing, nor do we even
know the very fact that we know nothing ”; and
Anaxarchus and Monimus because they likened exist-
ing things to a scene-painting and supposed them
to resemble the impressions experienced in sleep or
madness.

Such, then, was the view in which all these men 89
shared; but it is held that the Physicists, from Thales
down, were the first to introduce the inquiry regard-
ing the criterion. For when they had condemned
sensation as being in many cases untrustworthy, they
set up reason as the judge of the truth in existing
things, and starting out from this they arranged their
doctrines of principles and elements and the rest, the
apprehension of which is gained by means of the
faculty of reason. Hence the greatest of the Physi- 90
cists, Anaxagoras, in disparaging the senses on the
ground of their weakness, says, “Owing to their in-
firmity we are unable to judge what is true.” And as
an assurance of their lack of sureness he alleges the
gradual change in colours: for if we were to take two
colours, black and white, and pour some of the one
into the other drop by drop, our sense of sight will
be unable to distinguish the gradual alterations
although they subsist as actual facts. Asclepiades, 91
too, is found using virtually the same argument in
the First Book of his *Concerning Wine-giving*, where
he is dealing with the pale and the dark—“ For when
these,” he says, “ are mixed, the sense is unable to
discern whether what subsists is a single and simple
colour or not.”

Anaxagoras, accordingly, declared that reason in

92 κριτήριον εἶναι· οἱ δὲ Πυθαγορικοὶ τὸν λόγον μὲν φασιν, οὐ κοινῶς δέ, τὸν δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων περιγινόμενον, καθάπερ ἔλεγε καὶ ὁ Φιλόλαος, θεωρητικόν τε ὄντα τῆς τῶν ὄλων φύσεως ἔχειν τινὰ συγγένειαν πρὸς ταύτην, ἐπεὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου τὸ ὁμοιον καταλαμβάνεσθαι πέφυκεν·

γαίῃ μὲν γὰρ γαίαν ὀπώπαμεν, ὕδατι δ' ὕδωρ, αἰθέρι δ' αἰθέρα διόν, ἀτὰρ πυρὶ πῦρ αἰδηλον, στοργὴν δὲ στοργῇ, νεῖκος δέ γε νεϊκέϊ λυγρῶ.

93 καὶ ὡς τὸ μὲν φῶς, φησὶν ὁ Ποσειδώνιος τὸν Πλάτωνος Τίμαιον ἐξηγούμενος, ὑπὸ τῆς φωτοειδοῦς ὄψεως καταλαμβάνεται, ἢ δὲ φωνὴ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀεροειδοῦς ἀκοῆς, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τῶν ὄλων φύσις ὑπὸ συγγενοῦς ὀφείλει καταλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου. ἦν δὲ ἀρχὴ τῆς τῶν ὄλων ὑποστάσεως ἀριθμὸς· διὸ καὶ ὁ κριτῆς τῶν πάντων λόγος οὐκ ἀμέτοχος ὢν τῆς τούτου δυνάμεως καλοῖτο ἂν ἀριθμὸς.

94 καὶ τοῦτο ἐμφαίνοντες οἱ Πυθαγορικοὶ ποτὲ μὲν εἰώθασι λέγειν τὸ

ἀριθμῶ δέ τε πάντ' ἐπέοικεν,

ὅτε δὲ τὸν φυσικώτατον ὁμνῦναι ὄρκον οὕτωςί,

οὐ μὰ τὸν ἀμέτερά κεφαλᾶ παραδόντα τετρακτῦν, πηγῆν ἀενάου φύσεως ριζώματ' ἔχουσαν,

τὸν μὲν παραδόντα λέγοντες Πυθαγόραν (τοῦτον γὰρ ἔθεοποιούον), τετρακτῦν δὲ ἀριθμὸν τινα, ὃς ἐκ τεσσάρων τῶν πρώτων ἀριθμῶν συγκείμενος τὸν τελειότατον ἀπήρτιζεν, ὥσπερ τὸν δέκα· ἐν γὰρ
95 καὶ δύο καὶ τρία καὶ τέσσαρα δέκα γίνεται. ἔστι τε οὗτος ὁ ἀριθμὸς πρώτη τετρακτῦς, πηγὴ δὲ ἀενάου φύσεως λέλεκται παρόσον κατ' αὐτοὺς ὁ

general is the criterion. But the Pythagoreans de- 92
clare that it is not reason in general but the reason
which is attained from the sciences; even as Philolaus
said that "It, being conversant with the nature of
all things, possesses a certain kinship thereto, since
it is the nature of like to be apprehended by like":

Verily earth by earth we behold, and water by water,
Aether divine by aether, and fire the destructive by fire,
Love, moreover, by love, and hate by dolorous hatred.

And as Poseidonius says in his exposition of Plato's 93
Timaeus, "Just as light is apprehended by the luci-
form sense of sight, and sound by the aeriform sense
of hearing, so also the nature of all things ought to be
apprehended by its kindred reason." But the prin-
ciple of the structure of all things is number; where-
fore also the reason that is judge of all things may
be called "number," seeing that it is not devoid of
the potency thereof. And by way of indicating this 94
the Pythagoreans are wont at one time to declare
that "All things are like unto number," and at
another time to swear the most natural of oaths in
this form:

Nay, by the man I swear who bequeathed to our head the
Tetraktys,
Fount containing the roots of Nature ever-enduring.

By "the man who bequeathed" they mean Pythagoras
(for him they deified); and by "the Tetraktys" a cer-
tain number which, being composed of the four primary
numbers, makes up the most perfect number, namely
the Ten; for one plus two plus three plus four amount
to ten. And this number is the first Tetraktys, and 95
it is termed the "fount of Nature ever-enduring" in

σύμπας κόσμος κατὰ ἄρμονίαν διοικεῖται, ἣ δὲ ἄρμονία σύστημά ἐστι τριῶν συμφωνιῶν, τῆς τε διὰ τεσσάρων καὶ τῆς διὰ πέντε καὶ τῆς διὰ πασῶν, τούτων δὲ τῶν τριῶν συμφωνιῶν αἱ ἀναλογίαι ἐν τοῖς προειρημένοις τέτταρσιν ἀριθμοῖς εὐρίσκονται, ἐν τε τῷ ἐνὶ κᾶν τῷ δύο κᾶν τῷ τρία κᾶν τῷ
 96 τέσσαρα. ἦν γὰρ ἡ μὲν διὰ τεσσάρων συμφωνία ἐν ἐπιτρίτῳ λόγῳ κειμένη, ἣ δὲ διὰ πέντε ἐν ἡμιολίῳ, ἣ δὲ διὰ πασῶν ἐν διπλασίονι. ὅθεν ὁ μὲν τέσσαρα ἀριθμὸς τοῦ τρία ἐπιτρίτος ὢν, ἐπειπερ ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ τρίτου μέρους αὐτοῦ συνίσταται, περιέσχηκε τὴν διὰ τεσσάρων συμ-
 97 φωνίαν· ὁ δὲ τρία τοῦ δύο ἡμιόλιος ὢν, ἣ ἐκεῖνόν τε περιέσχηκε καὶ τὸ ἡμισυ αὐτοῦ, ἐμφαίνει τὴν διὰ πέντε συμφωνίαν· ὁ δὲ τέσσαρα τοῦ δύο καὶ ὁ δύο τῆς μονάδος διπλασίον καθεστῶς περιληπτι-
 98 κός ἐστι τῆς διὰ πασῶν. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ τετρακτὺς ἀναλογίαν τῶν λεχθειῶν συμφωνιῶν ὑποβάλλει, αἱ δὲ συμφωνίαι τῆς τελείου ἄρμονίας εἰσὶ συμπληρωτικάι, κατὰ δὲ τὴν τέλειον ἄρμονίαν πάντα διοικεῖται, τοῦδε χάριν πηγῆν ἀενάου φύσεως ριζώματ' ἔχουσαν εἰρήκασιν αὐτήν.
 99 Καὶ ἄλλως, ἐπεὶ κατὰ τοὺς λόγους τῶν τεσσάρων τούτων ἀριθμῶν τό τε σῶμα καὶ τὸ ἀσώματον νοεῖται, ἐξ ὧν τὰ πάντα. στιγμῆς γὰρ ρυείσης γραμμῆν φαντασιούμεθα, ἥτις ἐστὶ μῆκος ἀπλατές, γραμμῆς δὲ ρυείσης πλάτος ἐποιήσαμεν, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐπιφάνειά τις ἀβαθῆς, ἐπιφανείας δὲ ρυείσης
 100 στερεὸν ἐγένετο σῶμα. ἀλλ' ἦν γε ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς στιγμῆς ἡ μονὰς ἀδιαίρετος οὐσα, καθὼς καὶ ἡ

so far as the whole Universe, according to them, is arranged according to harmony, and harmony is a system composed of three symphonies—that of the “By-Fours,” and that of the “By-Fives,” and that of the “By-Alls”^a; and the proportions of these three symphonies are found in the four numbers just mentioned—in the one and in the two and in the three and in the four. For the “By-Fours” symphony consists 96 in the “epitrite” (4 : 3) ratio, the “By-Fives” in the ratio 3 : 2, and the “By-Alls” in the ratio 2 : 1. Hence the number four being “epitrite” in relation to three (since it is composed of three plus a third part of three) comprises the symphony “By-Fours”; and 97 the number three, being one and a half times two (in that it comprises both the two and the half of the two), discloses the “By-Fives” symphony; and the four which is double of two, and the two double of one, are fitted to comprise the “By-Alls.” Seeing, 98 then, that the Tetraktys supplies the proportion of the symphonies mentioned, and the symphonies serve to make up the perfect harmony, and according to the perfect harmony all things are arranged, on this account they have described it as “the fount containing the roots of Nature ever-enduring.”

Again, they argue that it is according to the ratios of 99 these four numbers that both body and the incorporeal, from which come all things, are conceived—for it is by the flow of a point that we form a notion of a line, which is length without breadth, and by the flow of a line we construct breadth, which is surface without depth, and by the flow of surface solid body is produced. But over the point stands the monad which 100

^a Cf. P.H. iii. 155, where a similar account is given of the “harmonic ratios” of the Pythagorean musical system.

στιγμή, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς γραμμῆς ὁ δύο ἀριθμός <, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἐπιφανείας ὁ τρία>¹. ποθέν γάρ <ποι>² πάρεστιν ἢ γραμμῆ, τουτέστιν ἀπὸ σημείου ἐπὶ σημείον καὶ πάλιν ἀπὸ τούτου ἐπὶ ἄλλο σημείον. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ στερεοῦ σώματος ὁ τέσσαρα· ἐὰν γὰρ τρισὶ σημείοις τέταρτον ἐπαιωρήσωμεν σημείον, πυραμὶς γίνεται, ὅπερ δὴ πρῶτόν ἐστι στερεοῦ σώματος σχῆμα. κατὰ λόγον οὖν ἢ τετρακτύς πηγὴ τῆς τῶν ὄλων φύσεως ἐστίν.

- 101 Καὶ ἄλλως, πᾶν τὸ καταλαμβανόμενον ἀνθρώπων, φασίν, ἤτοι σῶμά ἐστιν ἢ ἀσώματον· ἐάν τε δὲ σῶμα ἢ ἐάν τε καὶ ἀσώματον, οὐ χωρὶς τῆς τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἐννοίας καταλαμβάνεται, τὸ μὲν σῶμα, ἐπεὶ τριχῆ διαστατὸν καθεστῶς τὸν τρία ἀριθμὸν
 102 ὑπαγορεύει. ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν σωμάτων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἐκ συναπτομένων ὡς πλοῖα καὶ ἀλύσεις καὶ πυργίσκοι, τὰ δὲ ἐξ ἠνωμένων, ἅπερ ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἕξεως συνέχεται, ὡς φυτὰ καὶ ζῶα, τὰ δὲ ἐκ διεστώτων ὡς χοροὶ καὶ στρατιαὶ καὶ ποιῆμαι. ἄλλ' ἐάν τε ἐκ συναπτομένων ἢ ἐάν τε ἐξ ἠνωμένων ἐάν τε ἐκ διεστώτων, ἀριθμοὺς ἔχει παρόσον ἐκ πλειόνων
 103 συνέστηκεν. ἔτι τῶν σωμάτων τὰ μὲν ἐν ἀπλαῖς κείται ποιότησι τὰ δὲ ἐν ἀθρόαις, καθάπερ τὸ μῆλον· καὶ γὰρ ποιὸν³ ἔχει χρῶμα πρὸς ὄρασιν καὶ χυλὸν πρὸς γεύσιν καὶ ὀσμὴν πρὸς ὄσφρησιν καὶ λειότητα πρὸς ἀφήν· ἃ δὴ τῆς τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἐστὶ φύσεως.
 104 Ὁ δ' αὐτὸς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων ἐστὶ λόγος,

¹ <ἐπὶ . . . τρία> cj. Bekk.

² <ποι> addo: <που> cj. Bekk.

³ ποιὸν NE: ποικίλον Bekk.

is indivisible, as is also the point, and over the line the number two; <and over the surface stands the number three> (for the line has come from somewhere to somewhere), that is to say <the movement> from one point to another, and from this again to a third; and over the solid body stands the number four; for if upon the top of three points we place a fourth, there is formed a pyramid, which is in fact the first form of a solid body. Thus it is reasonable to hold that the Tetraktys is the fount of universal Nature.

Again, everything apprehended by man is, they 101 say, either body or incorporeal; but whether it be body or whether it be incorporeal, it is not apprehended apart from the conception of numbers, since, in the case of body, as it has three dimensions it involves the number three. Moreover, of bodies some are 102 composed of things joined together, like ships and cables and turrets, others of things unified, which are held together by a single mode of connexion, like plants and animals, others of separate units, like choruses and armies and herds.^a But whether they consist of things joined or of things unified or of things separate, they contain numbers in so far as they are composed of a plurality of things. And further, some bodies are substances with single 103 qualities, others with numerous qualities, as is the apple; for it possesses a certain quality of colour to the sight and of flavour to the taste and of odour to the smell and of smoothness to the touch; and these belong to the nature of numbers.

The same argument applies to the case of incor- 104

^a Cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 78 ff.

εἶγε καὶ χρόνος ἀσώματος τῷ ἀριθμῷ λαμβάνεται, ὡς ἔστι συμφανὲς ἀπὸ ἐνιαυτῶν τε καὶ μηνῶν καὶ ἡμερῶν καὶ ὥρων. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἡ στιγμαὴ καὶ γραμμὴ καὶ ἐπιφάνεια, καὶ τὰλλα περὶ ὧν καὶ μικρῷ πρόσθεν διελέχθημεν, συνάγοντες καὶ τὰς τούτων νοήσεις εἰς ἀριθμούς.

- 105 Συνάδειν δὲ τοῖς εἰρημένοις φασι καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὸν βίον, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὰς τέχνας πράγματα. ὁ τε γὰρ βίος ἕκαστον κρίνει κριτηρίοις ἅπερ ἔστιν ἀριθμοῦ μέτρα. εἴαν γοῦν ἀνέλωμεν τὸν ἀριθμόν, ἀναιρεθήσεται μὲν πῆχυς ἐκ δυοῖν ἡμιπηχείων καὶ παλαιστῶν ἕξ καὶ δακτύλων εἰκοσιτεσσάρων συγκείμενος, ἀναιρεθήσεται δὲ μέδιμος καὶ τάλαντον καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν κριτηρίων ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα ἐκ πλείονων συνεστῶτα εὐθὺς ἀριθμοῦ ἔστιν εἶδη. ὅθεν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τούτῳ συνέχεται, δάνεια μαρτυρίαι ψῆφοι συγγραφαὶ χρόνοι περίοδοι. καὶ καθόλου τῶν ἀμηχάνων ἔστιν εὐρεῖν τι κατὰ τὸν βίον ἀμοιροῦν τούτου.

- Πᾶσά γε μὴν τέχνη οὐ χωρὶς ἀναλογίας συνέστη, ἀναλογία δ' ἐν ἀριθμῷ κείται· πᾶσα ἄρα τέχνη δι' ἀριθμοῦ συνέστη. Ῥόδιοι γοῦν, ὡς φασίν, ἐπύθοντο Χάρητος τοῦ ἀρχιτέκτονος πόσον δαπανηθήσεται χρῆμα πρὸς κατασκευὴν τοῦ κολοσσού. ὀρίσαντος δὲ αὐτοῦ τι, πάλιν ἐπηρώτων πόσον δέ, εἰ θέλοιν διπλασίονα κατὰ μέγεθος αὐτὸν κατασκευάσαι. τοῦ δὲ τὸ διπλασίον αἰτήσαντος οἱ μὲν ἔδοσαν, ὁ δ' εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰ προκεντήματα δαπανήσας τὸ δοθὲν ἑαυτὸν ἀνεῖλεν. θανόντος δὲ αὐτοῦ συνείδον οἱ τεχνίται ὡς οὐ διπλασίον ἐχρῆν ἀλλ' ὀκταπλάσιον αἰτῆσαι· οὐ γὰρ μῆκος μόνον

* For this use of *βίος* cf. *P.H.* ii. 15.

poreals also, seeing that time, which is incorporeal, is perceived by number, as is plain from the years and months and days and hours. So likewise are the point and line and surface and the rest of the things we were discussing a moment ago, when we traced back the notions of them to numbers.

The practice of ordinary life^a too, they assert, is 105 in unison with the views thus stated, as is also the practice of the arts. For ordinary life judges each thing by criteria, and these are numerical standards. And certainly, if we abolish number, the cubit will be abolished, which consists of two half-cubits and six palms and twenty-four fingers, and the bushel will be abolished and the talent and the rest of the criteria; for all these, as composed of a plurality of elements, are at once species of number. Hence all the other 106 things, too, are bound up with number—loans, evidences, votes, contracts, times, periods. And in general, it is impossible to find anything in ordinary experience that does not participate in number.

And assuredly there is no art or craft that has been built up without proportion, and proportion is based on number; so that every art is built up by means of number. Thus the Rhodians, it is said, asked Chares 107 the architect how much money it would cost to construct the Colossus. And when he had named a figure, they asked again how much it would be if they wished to construct it twice that size. And when he asked double the sum, they gave it to him; but he, when he had spent the sum given on the first stages of the work and the preliminary expenses, slew himself. And when he was dead the craftsmen 108 became aware that he ought to have asked not double but eight times the sum, for he was bound to enlarge

ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσαν διάστασιν ὄφειλε μεγεθοποιεῖν
 τοῦ δημιουργήματος. ὥστε ἀναλογία τις ἔστιν ἐν
 πλαστικῇ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν ζωγραφίᾳ, δι' ἣν
 109 ὁμοιότης¹ κατ' ἀπαρραλλαξίαν κατορθοῦται. κοινῶ
 τε λόγῳ πᾶσα τέχνη ἐστὶ σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων,
 τὸ δὲ σύστημα ἀριθμός. τοῖνυν ὑγιὲς τὸ

ἀριθμῶ δέ τε πάντ' ἐπέοικεν,

τουτέστι τῶ κρίνοντι λόγῳ καὶ ὁμοιογενεῖ τοῖς τὰ
 πάντα συνιστακόσιν ἀριθμοῖς.

110 Ταῦτα μὲν οἱ Πυθαγορικοί· Ξενοφάνης δὲ κατὰ
 τοὺς ὡς ἐτέρως αὐτὸν ἐξηγουμένους, ὅταν λέγῃ

καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφὲς οὐ τις ἀνὴρ ἴδεν, οὐδέ τις
 ἔσται

εἰδὼς ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἄσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων·
 εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα τύχοι τετελεσμένον εἰπὼν,
 αὐτὸς ὁμῶς οὐκ οἶδε, δόκος δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται,

φαίνεται μὴ πᾶσαν κατάληψιν ἀναιρεῖν ἀλλὰ τὴν
 ἐπιστημονικὴν τε καὶ ἀδιάπτωτον, ἀπολείπειν δὲ
 τὴν δοξαστὴν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐμφαίνει τὸ “δόκος δ'
 ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται.” ὥστε κριτήριον γίνεσθαι
 κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν δοξαστὸν λόγον, τουτέστι τὸν
 τοῦ εἰκότος ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸν τοῦ παγίου ἐχόμενον.

111 Ὁ δὲ γνώριμος αὐτοῦ Παρμενίδης τοῦ μὲν
 δοξαστοῦ λόγου κατέγνω, φημί δὲ τοῦ ἀσθενεῖς
 ἔχοντος ὑπολήψεις, τὸν δ' ἐπιστημονικόν, τουτέστι
 τὸν ἀδιάπτωτον, ὑπέβητο κριτήριον, ἀποστὰς καὶ
 τῆς τῶν αἰσθήσεων πίστews. ἐναρχόμενος γοῦν
 τοῦ περὶ φύσεως γράφει τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.

¹ ὁμοιότης LE (-τητος N): ὁμοιότητα Bekk.

not only the length but also every other dimension
 of the structure. So that there exists in the plastic
 art, and likewise in painting, a certain proportion
 whereby unvarying resemblance is preserved. And, 109
 to speak generally, every art is a system composed
 of apprehensions, and system is number. Hence it
 is a sound saying that “all things are like unto
 number;”—that is, like unto the reason that judges
 and is akin to the numbers which compose all things.

Such is the doctrine of the Pythagoreans. But 110
 Xenophanes, according to those who interpret him
 differently,^a when he says—

Yet, with respect to the gods and what I declare about all
 things,

No man has seen what is clear nor ever will any man
 know it.

Nay, for e'en should he chance to affirm what is really
 existent,

He himself knoweth it not; for all is swayed by opining,—

does not appear to be abolishing every apprehension,
 but only that which is cognitive^b and inerrant, while
 admitting that which is opinionative; for this is what
 the sentence “all is swayed by opining” indicates.
 So that according to him the opinionative reason—
 that is to say, the reason which holds to the probable
 but not to the certain—is the criterion.

But his friend Parmenides rejected the opinionative 111
 reason—I mean that which has weak conceptions,—
 and assumed as criterion the cognitive—that is, the
 inerrant—reason, as he also gave up belief in the
 senses. Thus in the opening of his work *On Nature*
 he writes in this fashion:

^a *i.e.* who interpret X. otherwise than Sotion, as quoted in
 § 49 *supra*.

^b *i.e.* affording absolute knowledge of the truth.

ἵπποι ταί με φέρουσιν, ὅσον τ' ἐπὶ θυμὸς ἰκάνοι,
πέμπων, ἐπεὶ μ' ἐς ὁδὸν βῆσαν πολύφημον
ἀγουσαι

δαίμονος, ἣ κατὰ πάντα σαφῆ φέροι εἰδότα φῶτα.
τῇ φερόμην· τῇ γάρ με πολύφραστοι φέρον ἵπποι
ἄρμα τιταίνουσαι, κοῦραι δ' ὁδὸν ἡγεμόνευον.
ἄξων δ' ἐν χροίῃσιν ἰεὶ σύριγγος αὐτῆν
αἰθόμενος· δοιοῖς γὰρ ἐπέιγετο δινωτοῖσιν
κύκλοις ἀμφοτέρωθεν, ὅτε σπερχοῖατο πέμπειν
Ἑλιάδες κοῦραι, προλιποῦσαι δώματα νυκτός,
εἰς φάος, ὡσάμεναι κρατῶν ἄπο χερσὶ καλύπτρας,
ἔνθα πύλαι νυκτός τε καὶ ἡματός εἰσι κελεύθων,
καὶ σφας ὑπέρθυρον ἀμφὶς ἔχει καὶ λάινος οὐδός·
αὐταὶ δ' αἰθέριαι πληνται μεγάλοισι θυρέτροις.
τῶν δὲ Δίκη πολυπίουος ἔχει κληΐδας ἀμοιβούσας.
τὴν δὴ παρφάμεναι κοῦραι μαλακοῖσι λόγοισιν
πέισαν ἐπιφραδέως ὡς σφιν βαλανωτὸν ὄχη
ἀπτερέως ὡσειε πυλέων ἄπο. ταὶ δὲ θυρέτρων
χάσμ' ἀχανές ποίησαν ἀναπτάμεναι, πολυχάλ-
κους

ἄξονας ἐν σύριγγιν ἀμοιβαδὸν εἰλίξασαι,
γόμεφοις καὶ περόνησιν ἀρηρότε· τῇ³ ῥα δι' αὐτῶν
ἰθὺς ἔχον κοῦραι κατ' ἀμαξιτὸν ἄρμα καὶ ἵππους.
καὶ με θεὰ πρόφρων ὑπεδέξατο, χεῖρα δὲ χειρὶ
δεξιτερῆν ἔλεν, ὧδε δ' ἔπος φάτο καὶ με
προσηΐδα.

ὦ κοῦρ' ἀθανάτησι συνήγορος ἡνιόχοισιν
ἵπποις θ' αἶ σε φέρουσιν, ἰκάνων ἡμέτερον δῶ

¹ πάντα σαφῆ Brandis: πάντα τῇ EL, Bekk.: πάντ' ἄστη N.

² ἀρηρότε· τῇ Bergk: ἀρηρότα· τῇ MSS.: ἀρηρότας. ἡ Bekk.

Far as the soul can aspire have the steeds that hurry me
forward
Brought me, seeing that now on the far-famed road they
have set me,
Road of the Daemon which all-whither leadeth the truth-
witting mortal.
By that road was I drawn; for the fam'd steeds drew me
by that road
Pulling the chariot amain; and damsels guided my going.
Glowing within its nave the axle sang like a reed-pipe—
Furnish'd on either side with a pair of wheels well-rounded—
Whenas the Sun-born damsels in haste proceeded to bring
me
Into the sun-light, leaving behind them the chambers of
Darkness,
When with their hands they had stript from their heads
the mantles that veiled them.
There are the gates dividing the ways of Day-time and
Night-time,
Gates which are holden around by a lintel and threshold
of marble;
High in the air they stand and with doors immense are
they furnish'd;
Justice, dealer of dooms, doth keep the keys which unlock
them.
Her the damsels addressing with soft and flattering speeches
Artfully won her consent to push the bolted cross-bar
Back from the gates; and whenas the gates swung wide
in the door-way,
Vast was the chasm they caused as they set the hinges
revolving,
Each in its socket on either side,—of bronze were the hinges,
Fitted with bolts and with nails of bronze. So then through
the gate-way
Straight did the damsels drive their horses and car on the
high-road,
Graciously then did the goddess receive me, taking my right
hand
Clasp'd in her own, and this was the speech wherewith she
address'd me:
" Youth, who hast for thy fellows immortal chariot-drivers,
Now thou hast come to our halls, both thou and the horses
that speed thee,

χαῖρ', ἐπεὶ οὐτι σε μοῖρα κακὴ προύπεμπε
 νέεσθαι
 τήνδ' ὁδόν (ἢ γὰρ ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων ἐκτὸς πάτου
 ἐστίν)
 ἀλλὰ θέμις τε δίκη τε. χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα
 πυθέσθαι,
 ἡμὲν ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος ἀτρεμῆς ἤτορ
 ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἐν πίστις ἀληθῆς.
 ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ' ἀφ' ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα,
 μηδέ σ' ἔθος πολὺπειρον ὁδὸν κἀτα τήνδε
 βιάσθω
 νωμῶν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἠχῆεσαν ἀκουήν
 καὶ γλῶσσαν, κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ πολὺπειρον¹ ἔλεγχον
 ἐξ ἑμέθεν ῥηθέντα. μόνος δ' ἔτι θυμὸς ὁδοῖο
 λείπεται.

- 112 Ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ὁ Παρμενίδης ἵππους μὲν φησὶν
 αὐτὸν φέρειν τὰς ἀλόγους τῆς ψυχῆς ὁρμάς τε καὶ
 ὀρέξεις, κατὰ δὲ τὴν πολὺφήμον ὁδὸν τοῦ δαίμονος
 πορεύεσθαι τὴν κατὰ τὸν φιλόσοφον λόγον θεωρίαν,
 ὃς λόγος προπόμπου δαίμονος τρόπον ἐπὶ τὴν
 ἀπάντων ὁδηγεῖ γνῶσιν. κούρας δ' αὐτοῦ προάγειν
 τὰς αἰσθήσεις, ὧν τὰς μὲν ἀκοῆς αἰνίττεται ἐν τῷ
 λέγειν "δοιοῖς γὰρ ἐπέεγγο δινωτοῖσι κύκλοις,"
 τουτέστι τοῖς τῶν ὠτων, τὴν φωνὴν δὲ ὧν κατα-
 113 δέχονται, τὰς δὲ ὀράσεις Ἡλιάδας κούρας κέκληκε,
 δῶματα μὲν νυκτὸς ἀπολιπούσας, ἐς φῶος δὲ ὠσα-
 μένας διὰ τὸ μὴ χωρὶς φωτὸς γίνεσθαι τὴν χρῆσιν
 αὐτῶν. ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν πολὺποιον ἐλθεῖν δίκην καὶ
 ἔχουσιν κληῖδας ἀμοιβούς, τὴν διάνοιαν ἀσφαλεῖς
 114 ἔχουσιν τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων καταλήψεις. ἤτις

¹ πολὺπειρον MSS.: πολὺδην Bekk.

Hail! since the doom was no evil doom that prompted thy
 journey
 Hither (for far does it lie from the ways that are trodden
 of mortals),
 Nay, but justice and right. Thy task is now to discover
 Truth's unshakable heart, which fitly induces persuasion,
 Mortals' opinions, to boot, which are empty of true con-
 viction.
 Nay, but I bid thee restrain thy mind from this path of
 inquiry,
 Nor let habit oft-tried along this pathway impel thee,
 Eye unobservant to ply and tongue and echoing ear-drum,
 But use reason to judge the oft-tried proof which refutes
 them
 Utter'd by me. For the heart when alone still misseth the
 pathway."

In these verses Parmenides means that the steeds 112
 which take him along are the irrational impulses and
 appetites of the soul, and that "the far-famed road
 of the Daemon" they travel is that of investigation
 according to philosophical reason, which reason, like
 a Divine conductor, points the way to the knowledge
 of all things. And the damsels that lead him on are
 the senses, the reports of which he indicates in
 riddling wise by saying "It was furnish'd with a pair
 of well-rounded wheels," that is with those of the
 ears, by means of which they receive sound; and the 113
 acts of vision he calls "Sun-born damsels," which
 "leave the chambers of Darkness" and "thrust into
 the light" because it is impossible to make use of
 them without light. And the approach to "Justice,
 dealer of dooms," which holds "the keys which unlock
 them," is that to intelligence which holds safe the
 apprehensions of things. And she, after welcoming 114

αὐτὸν ὑποδεξαμένη ἐπαγγέλλεται δύο ταῦτα διδά-
 ξειν, ἡμὲν ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος ἀτρεμές ἦτορ, ὅπερ
 ἐστὶ τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἀμετακίνητον βῆμα, ἕτερον
 δὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἐν πίστις ἀληθῆς,
 τουτέστι τὸ ἐν δόξῃ κείμενον πᾶν, ὅτι ἦν ἀβέβαιοι.
 καὶ ἐπὶ τέλει προσδιασαφεῖ τὸ μὴ δεῖν ταῖς
 αἰσθήσεσι προσέχειν ἀλλὰ τῷ λόγῳ· μὴ γάρ σε,
 φησὶν, ἔθος πολῦπειρον ὁδὸν κἀτά τῆνδε βιάσθω
 νωμᾶν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἠχῆσσαν ἀκουὴν καὶ
 γλῶσσαν, κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ πολῦπειρον ἔλεγχον ἐξ
 ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα.

Ἄλλ' οὗτος μὲν καὶ αὐτός, ὡς ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων
 συμφανές, τὸν ἐπιστημονικὸν λόγον κανόνα τῆς ἐν
 τοῖς οὐσιν ἀληθείας ἀναγορεύσας ἀπέστη τῆς τῶν
 115 αἰσθήσεων ἐπιστάσεως· Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δὲ ὁ Ἄκρα-
 γαντίνος κατὰ μὲν τοὺς ἀπλούστερον δοκοῦντας
 αὐτὸν ἐξηγεῖσθαι ἐξ κριτήρια τῆς ἀληθείας παρα-
 δίδωσιν. δύο γὰρ δραστηρίους τῶν ὄλων ἀρχὰς
 ὑποθέμενος, φιλίαν καὶ νεῖκος, ἅμα τε τῶν τεσσά-
 ρων μνησθεὶς ὡς ὑλικῶν, γῆς τε καὶ ὕδατος καὶ
 ἀέρος καὶ πυρός, πάσας ταύτας ἔφη κριτήρια
 116 τυγχάνειν. παλαιὰ γάρ τις, ὡς προεῖπον, ἄνωθεν
 παρὰ τοῖς φυσικοῖς κυλίστα δόξα περὶ τοῦ τὰ
 ὅμοια τῶν ὁμοίων εἶναι γνωριστικά· καὶ ταύτης
 ἔδοξε μὲν καὶ Δημόκριτος κεκομικέναι τὰς παρα-
 μυθίας, ἔδοξε δὲ καὶ Πλάτων αὐτῆς ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ
 117 παρεψαυκέναι. ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν Δημόκριτος ἐπὶ τε τῶν
 ἐμψύχων καὶ ἀψύχων ἴσθησι τὸν λόγον. καὶ γὰρ
 ζῶα, φησὶν, ὁμογενεῖσι ζώοις συναγελάζεται, ὡς
 περισσότεραὶ περιστεραῖς καὶ γέρανοι γεράνοις, καὶ
 ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀλόγων· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν

him, promises to teach him two things—"Truth's
 unshakable heart which fitly induces persuasion,"
 which is the immovable seat of knowledge, and
 secondly "mortal men's opinions which are empty of
 true conviction," that is to say everything which
 consists in opinion because all such things are unsure.
 And at the end he again makes it clear that one
 must not pay attention to the senses but to the
 reason; for he says "Let not habit oft-tryed along
 this pathway impel thee, Eye unobservant to ply and
 tongue and echoing ear-drum, But use reason to
 judge the oft-tryed proof which refutes them Utter'd
 by me."

This man himself, then, as is plain from his state-
 ments, proclaimed the cognitive reason to be the
 standard of truth in things existing and gave up
 paying attention to the senses. But Empedocles of 115
 Acragas, according to those who seem to interpret
 him most simply, offers us six criteria of truth. For
 having laid down two efficient principles of all things,
 Love and Strife, and having at the same time
 designated as material principles the four—earth and
 water and air and fire,—he declared that all these
 are criteria. For, as I said before,^a there is an old 116
 opinion, dating from far back, which is prevalent
 among the Physicists to the effect that like things
 are cognitive of like; Democritus too seems to have
 brought a confirmation of this opinion, and Plato also
 seems to have introduced it in his *Timaeus*. But, on 117
 the one hand, Democritus bases his argument on both
 animate and inanimate things. "For animals," he
 says, "flock together with animals of a like species, as
 doves with doves and cranes with cranes, and so too
 all other irrational animals." And it is the same with

^a See § 92.

- ἀψύχων, καθάπερ ὄραν πάρεστω ἐπὶ τε τῶν κοσκινευομένων σπερμάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν παρὰ ταῖς κυματωγαῖς ψηφίδων· ὅπου μὲν γὰρ κατὰ τὸν τοῦ κοσκίνου δῖνον διακριτικῶς φακοὶ μετὰ φακῶν τάσσονται καὶ κριθαὶ μετὰ κριθῶν καὶ πυροὶ μετὰ 118 πυρῶν, ὅπου δὲ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ κύματος κίνησιν αἱ μὲν ἐπιμήκεις ψηφίδες εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον ταῖς ἐπιμήκεσιν ὠθοῦνται, αἱ δὲ περιφερεῖς ταῖς περιφερέσιν, ὡς ἂν συναγωγὸν τι ἐχούσης τῶν πραγμάτων τῆς ἐν τούτοις ὁμοιότητος.
- 119 Ἄλλ' ὁ μὲν Δημόκριτος οὕτως, Πλάτων δὲ ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ πρὸς παράστασιν τοῦ ἀσώματος εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει τῆς ἀποδείξεως κέχρηται. εἰ γὰρ ἢ μὲν ὄρασις, φησί, φωτὸς ἀντιλαμβανομένη εὐθύς ἐστὶ φωτοειδής, ἢ δὲ ἀκοή ἀέρα πεπληγμένον κρίνουσα, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὴν φωνήν, εὐθύς ἀεροειδής θεωρεῖται, ἢ δὲ ὄσφρησις ἀτμοὺς γνωρίζουσα πάντως ἐστὶν ἀτμοειδής καὶ ἢ γεῦσις χυλοὺς χυλοειδής, κατ' ἀνάγκην καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ τὰς ἀσωμάτων ιδέας λαμβάνουσα, καθάπερ τὰς ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς καὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς πέρασι τῶν σωμάτων, γίνεται τις ἀσώματος.
- 120 Τοιαύτης δ' οὔσης παρὰ τοῖς προγενεστέροις δόξης, ἔοικε καὶ ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ταύτῃ συμπεριφέρεισθαι, ἕξ τε οὐσῶν τῶν τὰ πάντα συνεστακυῖων ἀρχῶν λέγειν ἰσάριθμα ταύταις ὑπάρχειν τὰ κριτήρια, δι' ὧν γέγραφε
- 121 γαίῃ μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὀπάπαμεν, ὕδατι δ' ὕδωρ, αἰθέρι δ' αἰθέρα δῖον, ἀτὰρ πυρὶ πῦρ αἰδηλον, στοργῆν δὲ στοργῆν, νεῖκος δὲ τε νεϊκέϊ λυγρῷ, ἐμφαίνων ὡς γῆν μὲν καταλαμβάνομεθα μετουσίᾳ

things inanimate, as one may see in the case of seeds that are being winnowed and in the case of pebbles along the beaches; for in the one case, by the whirling of the sieve lentils are ranged separately with lentils, barley with barley, and wheat with wheat; and in the other case, owing to the motion of 118 the waves, the oblong pebbles are pushed into the same place as the oblong, and the round as the round, as though the similarity in things had a certain force of attraction for them.

So says Democritus. But Plato, on the other hand, 119 in his *Timaeus*,^a uses the same kind of proof to establish the fact that the soul is incorporeal. For if, says he, the sense of sight as perceiving light is thereby light-like, and hearing as discerning smitten air, which is sound, is thereby seen to be air-like, and smell as recognizing vapours is indisputably vapour-like, and taste as recognizing flavours flavour-like, then the soul also must of necessity be incorporeal as perceiving the incorporeal Ideas, those in numbers, for instance, and those in the limits of bodies.^b

Such, then, being the opinion held by the earlier 120 thinkers, Empedocles also seems to be carried away by it, and to assert that as the principles which compose the Universe are six, so the criteria are equal to them in number, inasmuch as he writes c—

Verily earth by earth we behold, and water by water, 121
Aether divine by aether, and fire the destructive by fire,
Love, moreover, by love, and hate by dolorous hatred.

For thereby he indicates that we apprehend earth

^a Cf. *Tim.* 45 b.

^b i.e. the lines or surfaces by which solid bodies are bounded; cf. *P.H.* iii. 40 ff.

^c Cf. § 92.

γῆς, ὕδωρ δὲ κατὰ μετοχὴν ὕδατος, ἀέρα δὲ
 μετουσία τοῦ ἀέρος, καὶ ἐπὶ πυρὸς τὸ ἀνάλογον.
 122 ἄλλοι δὲ ἦσαν οἱ λέγοντες κατὰ τὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα
 κριτήριον εἶναι τῆς ἀληθείας οὐ τὰς αἰσθήσεις
 ἀλλὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, τοῦ δὲ ὀρθοῦ λόγου τὸν
 μὲν τινα θεῖον ὑπάρχειν τὸν δὲ ἀνθρώπινον, ὦν
 τὸν μὲν θεῖον ἀνέξοιστον εἶναι τὸν δὲ ἀνθρώπινον
 123 ἐξοιστόν. λέγει δὲ περὶ μὲν τοῦ μὴ ἐν ταῖς
 αἰσθήσεσι τὴν κρίσιν ἀληθοῦς ὑπάρχειν οὕτως·

στεινωποὶ μὲν γὰρ παλάμαι κατὰ γυῖα κέχυνται,
 πολλὰ δὲ δεῖλ' ἔμψαια, τά τ' ἀμβλύνοσσι
 μερίμνας.

παῦρον δὲ ζωῆς ἀβίου μέρος ἀθρήσαντες,
 ὠκύμοροι καπνοῖο δίκην ἀρθέντες ἀπέπταν,
 αὐτὸ μόνον πεισθέντες ὅτω προσέκυρσεν ἕκαστος,
 πάντοσ' ἐλαυνόμενοι. τὸ δ' ὄλον (μάψ)¹ εὐχεται
 εὐρεῖν.

οὔτως οὔτ' ἐπιδερκτὰ τὰδ' ἀνδράσιν οὔτ' ἐπ-
 ακουστά
 οὔτε νόω περιληπτά.

124 περὶ δὲ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι εἰς τὸ παντελὲς ἀληπτον τὴν
 ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὅσον ἰκνέεται ὁ ἀνθρώπινος
 λόγος ληπτὴν ὑπάρχειν, διασαφεῖ τοῖς προκειμέ-
 νοις ἐπιφέρων

σὺ δ' οὖν ἐπεὶ ὄδ' ἐλάσθης,
 πεύσαι, οὐ πλείον γε βροτεῖη μῆτις ὄπωπεν.²

καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐξῆς ἐπιπλήξας τοῖς πλείον ἐπαγ-
 γελλομένοις γινώσκειν, παρίστησιν ὅτι τὸ δι'
 ἑκάστης αἰσθήσεως λαμβανόμενον πιστόν ἐστι,
 τοῦ λόγου τούτων ἐπιστατούντος, καίπερ πρό-

¹ <μάψ> Stein. ² ὄπωπεν Panzerbieter: ὄρωρεν mss., Bekk.

by participation in earth and water by partaking in
 water, and air by participation in air, and similarly
 in the case of fire. But there have been others who 122
 have asserted that according to Empedocles the
 criterion of truth is not the senses but right reason,
 and of right reason one sort is divine, the other
 human. And of these the divine sort is inexpressible,
 but the human sort expressible. As regards the fact 123
 that the judgement of truth does not reside in the
 senses he speaks thus :

Straiten'd in sooth are the powers which lie dispersed in
 our members,

Many the plagues which thwart them, and blunt the edge
 of our thinking.

Short is the span of unlivable life beholden by mortals,
 Swift is their doom, as, whirl'd like smoke, they are lifted
 and vanish,

Each persuaded only of what himself has encounter'd,
 Carried about all ways ; yet each keeps foolishly boasting
 How he has found the Whole. So far from human percep-
 tion

Lie these things, out of reach of the sense of vision or
 hearing,

And of the grasp of the mind.

And as regards the fact that truth is not altogether 124
 unattainable, but is really attainable so far as the
 reason of man can reach, he makes this clear when
 to the foregoing verses he adds this :

But since thou hast hither retreated,
 Thou shalt be told not more than mortal wit has discovered.

And in what follows, after rebuking those who pro-
 fess they know more, he tries to establish that the
 thing perceived by each sense is trustworthy, as the
 reason is in control of them, although he had previ-

τερον καταδραμῶν τῆς ἀπ' αὐτῶν πίστεως.
125 φησὶ γὰρ

ἀλλὰ θεοὶ τῶν μὲν μανίην ἀποτρέψατε γλώσσης,
ἐκ δ' ὀσίων στομάτων καθαρὴν ὄχετεύσατε
πηγῆν.

καὶ σέ, πολυμνήστη λευκώλενε παρθένε μούσα,
ἄντομαι, ὦν θέμις ἐστὶν ἐφημερίοισιν ἀκούειν,
πέμπε παρ' εὐσεβίης ἐλάουσα' εὐήνιον ἄρμα·
μηδὲ σέ γ' εὐδόξοιο βιήσεται ἄνθεα τιμῆς
πρὸς θνατῶν ἀνελέσθαι ἐφ' ᾧ θ' ὀσίης πλέον
εἰπεῖν

θάρσει καὶ τότε δὴ σοφίης ἐπ' ἄκροισι θαάζειν.
ἀλλ' ἄγ' ἄθρει πάση παλάμη πῆ δῆλον ἕκαστον,
μήτε τι' ὄψιν ἔχων πιστὴν πλέον ἢ κατ' ἀκουήν
ἢ ἀκοὴν ἐρίδουπον ὑπὲρ τρανώματα γλώσσης,
μήτε τι τῶν ἄλλων, ὁπόση πόρος ἐστὶ νοῆσαι,
γυῖων πιστῶν ἔρυκε, νόει δ' ἢ δῆλον ἕκαστον.

126 Τοιαῦτα μὲν καὶ ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς· ὁ δὲ Ἡρά-
κλειτος, ἐπεὶ πάλιν ἐδόκει δυσὶν ὀργανῶσθαι ὁ
ἄνθρωπος πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἀληθείας γνῶσιν, αἰσθήσει
τε καὶ λόγῳ, τούτων τὴν μὲν αἰσθησιν παρα-
πλησίως τοῖς προειρημένοις φυσικοῖς ἀπιστον εἶναι
νενομικεν, τὸν δὲ λόγον ὑποτίθεται κριτήριον.
ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν αἰσθησιν ἐλέγχει λέγων κατὰ λέξιν
"κακοὶ μάρτυρες ἀνθρώποισιν ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ ὠτα
βαρβάρους ψυχᾶς ἐχόντων," ὅπερ ἴσον ἦν τῷ βαρ-
βάρων ἐστὶ ψυχῶν ταῖς ἀλόγοις αἰσθήσεσι πισ-
127 τεύειν. τὸν δὲ λόγον κριτὴν τῆς ἀληθείας ἀπο-
φαίνεται οὐ τὸν ὁποιοῦνδήποτε ἀλλὰ τὸν κοινὸν καὶ
68

ously run down the evidence supplied by them. For 125
he says :

Nay, ye gods, avert from my tongue the madness of those
men,
And make flow pure rivers of speech from lips that are
holy.

Thee, too, now I beseech, O Muse white-armed and virgin,
Courtèd by many ; thy car well-reined from Piety's dwell-
ing

Drive, and bring to me all that is meet to be told unto
mortals ;

Nor shalt thou ever be forced to receive from hands that
are mortal

Flores of glorious honour for uttering more than is holy
Over-bold, and to gain thus a seat on the summits of
wisdom.

Come, then, with each of thy powers discern each manifest
object,

Putting no greater trust in the sight of the eye than in
hearing,

Nor in the echoing ear above the clear witness of tongue's
taste ;

Nor from the rest of the parts wherein are the channels
of knowledge

Hold thou back thy trust, but mark each manifestation.

Such, then, are the views of Empedocles. And 126
Heraclitus—since he again supposed that man is
furnished with two organs for gaining knowledge of
truth, namely sensation and reason—held, like the
Physicists mentioned above, that of these organs
sensation is untrustworthy, and assumes reason as
the criterion. Sensation he convicts by saying ex-
pressly, " Ill witnesses for men are eyes and ears
when they have barbarous souls," which is equivalent
to saying " To trust in the irrational senses is the part
of barbarous souls." And he declares reason to be 127
the judge of truth—not, however, any and every
kind of reason, but that which is " common " and

θεῖον. τίς δ' ἐστὶν οὗτος, συντόμως ὑποδεικτέον.
ἀρέσκει γὰρ τῷ φυσικῷ τὸ περιέχον ἡμᾶς λογικόν
128 τε ὃν καὶ φρενήρες. ἐμφαίνει δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτο πολὺ
πρόσθεν Ὅμηρος εἰπὼν

τοῖος γὰρ νόος ἐστὶν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων
οἶον ἐπ' ἡμᾶρ ἄγρησι πατῆρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε.

καὶ Ἀρχιλόχος δέ φησι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τοιαῦτα
φρονεῖν

ὁποίην Ζεὺς ἐφ' ἡμέρην ἄγει.

εἴρηται δὲ καὶ τῷ Εὐριπίδῃ τὸ αὐτό·

ὅστις ποτ' εἰ σὺ δυστόπατος εἰσιδεῖν
Ζεὺς, εἴτ' ἀνάγκη φύσεος εἴτε νοῦς βροτῶν,
ἐπευξάμην σε.

129 τοῦτον δὴ τὸν θεῖον λόγον καθ' Ἡράκλειτον δι'
ἀναπνοῆς σπάσαντες νοεροὶ γινόμεθα, καὶ ἐν μὲν
ὑπνοῖς ληθαῖοι, κατὰ δὲ ἔγερσιν πάλιν ἔμφρονες.
ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ὑπνοῖς μυσάντων τῶν αἰσθητικῶν
πόρων χωρίζεται τῆς πρὸς τὸ περιέχον συμφυΐας
ὁ ἐν ἡμῖν νοῦς, μόνῃς τῆς κατὰ ἀναπνοὴν προσ-
φύσεως σωζομένης οἰοεὶ τινας ῥίζης, χωρισθεῖς
τε ἀποβάλλει ἢν πρότερον εἶχε μνημονικὴν δύνα-
130 μιν· ἐν δὲ ἐγρηγορόσι πάλιν διὰ τῶν αἰσθητικῶν
πόρων ὡσπερ διὰ τινων θυρίδων προκύνφας καὶ τῷ
περιέχοντι συμβαλὼν λογικὴν ἐνδύεται δύναμιν.
ὄνπερ οὖν τρόπον οἱ ἄνθρακες πλησιάσαντες τῷ
πυρὶ κατ' ἀλλοίωσιν διάπυροι γίνονται, χωρισ-
θέντες δὲ σβέννυνται, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἐπιξενωθεῖσα
τοῖς ἡμετέροις σώμασιν ἀπὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος μοῦρα
70

divine. But what this is must be explained concisely.
It is a favourite tenet of the Physicist that "What
encompasses us is rational and intelligent." And, 128
long before, Homer had expressed this when he says^a:

As is the day which upon them is brought by the sire
immortal,
So are the minds of mortal men.

Archilochus, too, says that the thoughts men think
are "Such as the day which Zeus doth bring about."
And the same thing has also been said by Euripides^b:

To see and know thee, who thou art, O Zeus,
Doth baffle wit! Art thou Necessity
Of Nature? Or mankind's Intelligence?
Howbeit, I invoke thee.

It is then by drawing in by inspiration this divine 129
reason that, according to Heraclitus, we become in-
telligent, and while forgetful during sleep become
sensible again on waking. For during sleep, as the
passages of the senses are closed, the mind within us
is cut off from its natural union with the envelop-
ing substance—only the connexion by way of respira-
tion, like that of a root, being preserved—and being
thus parted it loses the power of memory which it
previously possessed; but on waking it stretches out 130
again through the passages of sense, as it were
through windows, and by junction with the envelop-
ing substance is invested with the power of reason.
Thus, just as cinders when put close to the fire are
altered and become ignited, but are extinguished
when put at a distance, in like manner the fraction
of the enveloping substance that stays as a stranger
in our bodies becomes well-nigh irrational owing to

^a Hom. *Odyss.* xviii. 136-137; cf. *P.H.* iii. 244.

^b Eur. *Troad.* 885.

κατὰ μὲν τὸν χωρισμὸν σχεδὸν ἄλογος γίνεται, κατὰ δὲ τὴν διὰ τῶν πλείστων πόρων σύμφυσι
 131 ὁμοιοειδῆς τῷ ὅλῳ καθίσταται. τοῦτον δὴ τὸν κοινὸν λόγον καὶ θεῖον, καὶ οὐ κατὰ μετοχὴν γινόμεθα λογικοί, κριτήριον ἀληθείας φησὶν ὁ Ἡράκλειτος. ὅθεν τὸ μὲν κοινῇ πᾶσι φαινόμενον, τοῦτ' εἶναι πιστόν (τῷ κοινῷ γὰρ καὶ θεῖῳ λόγῳ λαμβάνεται), τὸ δὲ τινι μόνῳ προσπίπτον ἄπιστον
 132 ὑπάρχειν διὰ τὴν ἐναντίαν αἰτίαν. ἐναρχόμενος οὖν τῶν περὶ φύσεως ὁ προειρημένος ἀνὴρ, καὶ τρόπον τινα δεικνύς τὸ περιέχον, φησὶ "λόγῳ τοῦδε ἐόντος ἀξύνετοι γίνονται ἄνθρωποι, καὶ πρόσθεν ἢ ἀκούσαι, καὶ ἀκούσαντες τὸ πρῶτον. γινόμενων γὰρ κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε ἄπειροι εἰσὶ καὶ πειρώμενοι ἐπέων καὶ ἔργων τοιούτων ὁκοίων ἐγὼ διηγεῦμαι, κατὰ φύσιν διαιρέων ἕκαστον καὶ φράζων ὅπως ἔχει. τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους λανθάνει ὁκόσα ἐγερθέντες ποιούσιν,
 133 ὅκωσπερ ὁκόσα εὐδοντες ἐπιλανθάνονται." διὰ τούτων γὰρ ῥητῶς παραστήσας ὅτι κατὰ μετοχὴν τοῦ θεῖου λόγου πάντα πράττομέν τε καὶ νοοῦμεν, ὀλίγα προσδιελθὼν ἐπιφέρει "διὸ δεῖ ἐπεσθαι τῷ <ξυνῷ>", τουτέστι τῷ¹ κοινῷ. ξυνὸς γὰρ ὁ κοινός. "τοῦ λόγου δὲ ἐόντος ξυνοῦ, ζώουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἰδίαν ἔχοντες φρόνησιν." ἢ δ' ἔστιν οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἀλλ' ἐξήγησις τοῦ τρόπου τῆς τοῦ παντός διοικήσεως. διὸ καθ' ὃ τι ἂν αὐτοῦ τῆς μνήμης κοινωνή-

¹ <ξυνῷ . . . τῷ> cj. Bekk.

* i.e. Heraclitus uses *ξυνός* for *κοινός* ("common"). As

the separation, but through its union by means of its numerous passages it is made like in kind to the Whole. Heraclitus, then, asserts that this common 131 and divine reason, by participation in which we become rational, is the criterion of truth. Hence, that which appears to all in common is trustworthy (for it is perceived by the common and divine reason), but that which affects one person alone is, for the opposite cause, untrustworthy. Thus the man above-mentioned 132 declares at the beginning of his work *On Nature*, pointing in a fashion to the enveloping substance—"Of this existent Reason men are without comprehension, both before they have heard of it and when they have heard of it for the first time; for they are like unto men without experience of the things which happen according to this reason when they experience such words and deeds as I relate, when I define each thing according to its nature and declare what its condition is. But as to the rest of mankind, all the things which they do when awake escape their notice, even as they forget all when asleep." For having in these words expressly argued 133 that we do and think everything through participation in the divine reason, after proceeding a little further, he adds, "Wherefore one must follow the comprehensive," that is the "common" (for "comprehensive" means "common")^a; "and though reason is comprehensive most people live as though they possessed a private intelligence of their own." And this is nothing else than an explanation of the mode of arrangement of the Whole. Therefore in so far as we share in the memory of that reason we say

H. evidently intends a play on the words *ἀξύνετοι* (in § 132) and *ξυνός*, I render the latter "comprehensive."

σωμεν, ἀληθεύομεν, ἃ δὲ ἂν ἰδιάσωμεν, ψευδόμεθα.
 134 νῦν γὰρ ῥητότατα καὶ ἐν τούτοις τὸν κοινὸν λόγον
 κριτήριον ἀποφαίνεται, καὶ τὰ μὲν κοινῇ φησὶ
 φαινόμενα πιστὰ ὡς ἂν τῷ κοινῷ κρινόμενα λόγῳ,
 τὰ δὲ κατ' ἰδίαν ἐκάστῳ ψευδῆ.
 135 Τοιοῦδε μὲν καὶ ὁ Ἡράκλειτος· Δημόκριτος δὲ
 ὄτε¹ μὲν ἀναιρεῖ τὰ φαινόμενα ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι, καὶ
 τούτων λέγει μηδὲν φαίνεσθαι κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἀλλὰ
 μόνον κατὰ δόξαν, ἀληθὲς δὲ ἐν τοῖς οὖσις ὑπ-
 ἄρχειν τὸ ἀτόμους εἶναι καὶ κενόν. “νόμῳ” γάρ
 φησὶ “γλυκὸν καὶ νόμῳ πικρὸν, νόμῳ θερμόν, νόμῳ
 ψυχρόν, νόμῳ χροινῆ· ἔτεῃ δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν.”
 ὅπερ ἔστι, νομίζεται μὲν εἶναι καὶ δοξάζεται τὰ
 αἰσθητά, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ
 136 τὰ ἄτομα μόνον καὶ τὸ κενόν. ἐν δὲ τοῖς Κρατυν-
 τηρίοις, καίπερ ὑπεσχημένος ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι τὸ
 κράτος τῆς πίστεως ἀναθεῖναι, οὐδὲν ἦττον εὐρίσ-
 κεται τούτων καταδικάζων. φησὶ γὰρ “ἡμεῖς δὲ
 τῷ μὲν ἐόντι οὐδὲν ἀτρεκές συνίεμεν, μεταπίπτον
 δὲ κατὰ τε σώματος διαθήκην καὶ τῶν ἐπ-
 εισιόντων καὶ τῶν ἀντιστηριζόντων.” καὶ πάλιν
 φησὶν “ἔτεῃ μὲν νῦν ὅτι οἶον ἕκαστον ἔστιν ἢ
 137 οὐκ ἔστιν οὐ συνίεμεν, πολλαχῇ δεδηλωται.” ἐν
 δὲ τῷ περὶ ἰδεῶν “γινώσκειω τε χρή” φησὶν
 “ἄνθρωπον τῷδε τῷ κανόνι ὅτι ἔτεῆς ἀπ-
 ἡλλακται,” καὶ πάλιν “δηλοῖ μὲν δὴ καὶ οὗτος
 ὁ λόγος ὅτι ἔτεῃ οὐδὲν ἴσμεν περὶ οὐδενός, ἀλλ'
 ἐπιρυσμῆ ἐκάστοισιν ἢ δόξεις,” καὶ ἔτι “καίτοι

¹ ὅτε Usener: ὅτι mss., Bekk.

what is true, but whenever we utter our own private
 thoughts, we lie. So here and in these words he 134
 most expressly declares that the common reason is
 the criterion, and that the things which appear in
 common are trustworthy as being judged by the
 common reason, whereas those which appear privately
 to each man are false.

Such, then, is the attitude of Heraclitus. And 135
 Democritus in some places abolishes the things that
 appear to the senses and asserts that none of them
 appears in truth but only in opinion, the true fact in
 things existent being the existence of atoms and
 void; for “By convention,” he says, “is sweet, by
 convention bitter, by convention hot, by convention
 cold, by convention colour; but by verity atoms
 and void.” (This means: Sensible objects are con-
 ventionally assumed and opined to exist, but they
 do not truly exist, but only the atoms and the
 void.) And in his *Confirmations*, although he had pro- 136
 mised to ascribe the confirmatory evidence to the
 senses, yet none the less he is found condemning
 them. For he says: “But we in reality comprehend
 nothing invariable, but what shifts about according
 to the disposition of the body and of the things which
 enter into it and the things which oppose it.” And
 again he says: “Now verily that we do not compre-
 hend what the nature of each thing is or is not, has
 been oft-times made plain.” And in his book *Con-* 137
cerning Forms he says, “Man must learn by this
 rule that he is divorced from verity”; and again,
 “This argument also makes plain that we know
 nothing verily about anything, but each man’s opinion
 is due to influx”; and yet again, “It will, however,

δῆλον ἔσται ὅτι ἐτεῆ οἶον ἕκαστον γινώσκειν ἐν ἀπόρῳ ἐστί.”

Καὶ δὴ ἐν μὲν τούτοις πᾶσαν σχεδὸν κινεῖ κατὰ-
ληψιν, εἰ καὶ μόνων ἐξαιρέτως καθάπτεται τῶν
138 αἰσθήσεων· ἐν δὲ τοῖς κανόσι δύο φησὶν εἶναι
γνώσεις, τὴν μὲν διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων τὴν δὲ διὰ
τῆς διανοίας, ὣν τὴν μὲν διὰ τῆς διανοίας γνησίην
καλεῖ, προσμαρτυρῶν αὐτῇ τὸ πιστὸν εἰς ἀληθείας
κρίσιν, τὴν δὲ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων σκοτίην ὀνομάζει,
ἀφαιρούμενος αὐτῆς τὸ πρὸς διάγνωσιν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς
139 ἀπλανές. λέγει δὲ κατὰ λέξιν “ γνώμης δὲ δύο
εἰσὶν ἰδέαι, ἡ μὲν γνησίη ἡ δὲ σκοτίη· καὶ σκοτίης
μὲν τάδε σύμπαντα, ὅψις ἀκοή ὀδμη γέυσις ψαύσις,
ἡ δὲ γνησίη, ἀποκεκριμένη δὲ ταύτης.” εἴτα
προκρίνων τῆς σκοτίης τὴν γνησίην ἐπιφέρει λέγων
“ ὅταν ἡ σκοτίη μηκέτι δύναται μήτε ὄρῃν ἐπ’
ἔλαττον μήτε ἀκούειν μήτε ὀδμάσθαι μήτε γεύεσθαι
μήτε ἐν τῇ ψαύσει αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ λεπτό-
τερον.”¹ οὐκοῦν καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον ὁ λόγος ἐστὶ
140 κριτήριον, ὃν γνησίην γνώμην καλεῖ. Διότιμος δὲ
τρία κατ’ αὐτὸν ἔλεγεν εἶναι κριτήρια, τῆς μὲν
τῶν ἀδήλων καταλήψεως τὰ φαινόμενα, (ὅψις γὰρ
τῶν ἀδήλων τὰ φαινόμενα,) ² ὡς φησὶν Ἀναξ-
αγόρας, ὃν ἐπὶ τούτῳ Δημόκριτος ἐπαινεῖ, ζητήσεως
δὲ τὴν ἔννοιαν (περὶ παντὸς γάρ, ὦ παῖ, μία ἀρχὴ
τὸ εἰδέναι περὶ ὅτου ἔστιν ἡ ζήτησις), αἰρέσεως δὲ
καὶ φυγῆς τὰ πάθη· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ᾧ προσοικειού-

¹ Mutsch. (after Diels) marks a lacuna after λεπτότερον. Otherwise we might read ἄλλο τι <ληπτέον> λεπτ., “some other finer (more delicate) <instrument> must be adopted.”

² <ὅψις . . . φαινόμενα> add. N: om. cet., Bekk.

be plain that it is impracticable to learn the veritable nature of each thing.”

Now in these passages he almost rejects apprehension altogether, although it is the senses only that he specially attacks. But in his “Canons” he says 138 that there are two kinds of knowledge, one by means of the senses, the other by means of the intelligence; and of these he calls that by means of the intelligence “genuine,” ascribing to it trustworthiness in the judgement of truth, but that by means of the senses he terms “bastard,” denying it inerrancy in the distinguishing of what is true. He expressly declares— 139 “Of knowledge there are two forms, the genuine and the bastard: and to the bastard belong all these—sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch; but the other form is distinct from this and genuine.” Then, while thus preferring the genuine to the bastard, he proceeds: “Whenever the bastard kind is unable any longer to see what has become too small, or to hear or smell or taste or perceive it by touch, (one must have recourse to) another and finer (instrument).” Thus, according to this man also, reason is the criterion, and he calls it “genuine knowledge.” But Diotimus used 140 to say that according to Democritus there are three criteria—namely, the criterion of the apprehension of things non-evident, which is the things apparent; for, as Anaxagoras says (and Democritus commends him for it), the things apparent are the vision of the things non-evident; and the criterion of investigation, which is the conception—“for in every case, my child, the one starting-point is to know what the subject of investigation is”^a; and the criterion of choice and aversion, which is the affections—for that

^a Quoted loosely from Plato, *Phaedr.* 237 B.

μεθα, τοῦτο αἰρετόν ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ ᾧ προσαλλοτριού-
μεθα, τοῦτο φευκτόν ἐστιν.

Ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν παλαιῶν περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου
141 τῆς ἀληθείας ἱστορία τοιαύτη τις ἦν· ἀπτόμεθα
δὲ ἐξῆς καὶ τῶν μετὰ τοὺς φυσικοὺς αἰρέσεων.

Πλάτων τοίνυν ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ διελόμενος τὰ
πράγματα εἰς τε τὰ νοητὰ καὶ αἰσθητά, καὶ εἰπὼν
περιληπτὰ μὲν λόγῳ εἶναι τὰ νοητὰ δοξαστὰ δὲ
τυγχάνειν τὰ αἰσθητά, προδήλως κριτήριον ὤρισε
τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων γνώσεως τὸν λόγον, συμ-
περιλαβὼν αὐτῷ καὶ τὴν διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἐν-
142 ἀργειαν. λέγει δὲ οὕτως· “τί τὸ ὄν αἰεί, γένεσιν
δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, καὶ τί τὸ γινόμενον μὲν, ὄν δὲ οὐδέ-
ποτε; τὸ μὲν δὴ νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτόν,

143 τὸ δὲ δόξῃ μετὰ αἰσθήσεως.” περιληπτικὸν δὲ
καλεῖσθαι φασὶ λόγον παρ’ αὐτῷ οἱ Πλατωνικοὶ
τὸν κοινὸν τῆς ἐναργείας καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας. δεῖ
γὰρ τὸν λόγον ἐν τῷ κρίνειν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀπὸ
τῆς ἐναργείας ὀρμᾶσθαι, εἴπερ δι’ ἐναργῶν ἡ
κρίσις γίνεται τῶν ἀληθῶν. ἀλλ’ ἢ τε ἐνάργεια
οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτάρκης πρὸς γνώσιν ἀληθοῦς· οὐ γὰρ
εἴ τι κατ’ ἐνάργειαν φαίνεται, τοῦτο καὶ κατ’
ἀλήθειαν ὑπάρχει· ἀλλὰ δεῖ παρεῖναι τὸ κρίνον τί
τε φαίνεται μόνον καὶ τί σὺν τῷ φαίεσθαι ἔτι
καὶ κατ’ ἀλήθειαν ὑπόκειται, τουτέστι τὸν λόγον.

144 ἀμφοτέρα τοίνυν συνελθεῖν δεήσει, τὴν τε ἐν-
ἀργειαν ὡς ἂν ἀφετήριον οὖσαν τῷ λόγῳ πρὸς τὴν
κρίσιν τῆς ἀληθείας, καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν λόγον πρὸς

which we feel is congenial to us is choiceworthy, but
that which we feel is alien is to be regarded with
aversion.

Such, then, was the account given by the old
philosophers concerning the criterion of truth.
Next let us treat of those who came after the 141
Physicists.

Plato, then, in his *Timaeus*, after dividing things
into intelligibles and sensibles and stating that the
intelligibles are apprehensible by reason whereas the
sensibles are objects of opinion, plainly specified
reason as the criterion of the knowledge of things,
though he included along with it the clear evidence
of sense. These are his words^a: “What is that 142
which is Existent always and has no Becoming?
And what is that which is Becoming always and
never is Existent? Now the one of these is appre-
hensible by thought with the aid of reasoning, but
the other by opinion with the aid of sensation.”
And the Platonists say that the reason which em- 143
braces both sensible evidence and truth is termed by
him “comprehensive reason.” For in the act of
judging truth the reason must set out from the
sensible evidence, if it be so that the judgement of
things true is effected by means of things evident.
But this evidence is not self-sufficient for knowledge
of the true; for if a thing appears evidently, it does
not therefore exist truly; but there must also be
present an instrument which judges what thing
merely appears and what, in addition to appearing,
also subsists in truth—that is to say, reason. Thus it 144
will be necessary for both to come together—both
the sensible evidence as forming the starting-point
for the reason in its judging of the truth, and the

^a See *Tim.* 27 D.

διάκρισιν τῆς ἐναργείας. εἰς μέντοι τὸ ἐπιβάλλειν τῇ ἐναργείᾳ καὶ τὸ ἐν ταύτῃ ἀληθὲς διακρίνειν πάλιν συνεργοῦ δεῖται ὁ λόγος τῆς αἰσθήσεως· διὰ ταύτης γὰρ τὴν φαντασίαν παραδεχόμενος ποιεῖται τὴν νόησιν καὶ τὴν ἐπιστήμην τᾶλθηθούς, ὥστε περιληπτικὸν αὐτὸν ὑπάρχειν τῆς τε ἐναργείας καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας, ὅπερ ἴσον ἐστὶ τῷ καταληπτικόν.

145 Ὡς δὲ καὶ Πλάτων· Σπεύσιππος δέ, ἐπεὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τὰ μὲν αἰσθητὰ τὰ δὲ νοητὰ, τῶν μὲν νοητῶν κριτήριον ἔλεξεν εἶναι τὸν ἐπιστημονικὸν λόγον, τῶν δὲ αἰσθητῶν τὴν ἐπιστημονικὴν αἴσθησιν. ἐπιστημονικὴν δὲ αἴσθησιν ὑπέιληφε καθεστάναι τὴν μεταλαμβάνουσαν τῆς κατὰ τὸν λόγον

146 ἀληθείας. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ τοῦ αὐλητοῦ ἢ ψάλτου δάκτυλοι τεχνικὴν μὲν εἶχον ἐνέργειαν, οὐκ ἐν αὐτοῖς δὲ προηγουμένως τελειομένην ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς πρὸς τὸν λογισμὸν συνασκήσεως ἀπαρτιζομένην, καὶ ὡς ἡ τοῦ μουσικοῦ αἴσθησις ἐνέργειαν μὲν εἶχεν ἀντιληπτικὴν τοῦ τε ἡρμωσμένου καὶ τοῦ ἀναρμόστου, ταύτην δὲ οὐκ αὐτοφνῆ ἀλλ' ἐκ λογισμοῦ περιγεγονυῖαν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἐπιστημονικὴ αἴσθησις φυσικῶς παρὰ τοῦ λόγου τῆς ἐπιστημονικῆς μεταλαμβάνει τριβῆς πρὸς ἀπλανῆ τῶν ὑποκειμένων διάγνωσιν.

147 Ξενοκράτης δὲ τρεῖς φησὶν οὐσίας εἶναι, τὴν μὲν αἰσθητὴν τὴν δὲ νοητὴν τὴν δὲ σύνθετον καὶ δοξαστὴν, ὧν αἰσθητὴν μὲν εἶναι τὴν ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ, νοητὴν δὲ <τὴν>¹ πάντων τῶν ἐκτὸς οὐρανοῦ, δοξαστὴν δὲ καὶ σύνθετον τὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ· ὁρατὴ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ τῇ αἰσθήσει, νοητὴ δὲ δι'

¹ <τὴν> cj. Bekk.

reason itself for estimating the evidence. Yet for getting in touch with the evidence and estimating the truth it contains, the reason in turn needs sensation as a colleague ; for it is through it that the reason receives the presentation and produces the thought and the knowledge of what is true, so that it really is "comprehensive" both of evidence and of truth, which is equivalent to being "apprehensive."

Such, then, was the view of Plato. But Speusippus 145 declared that, since some things are sensible, others intelligible, the cognitive reason is the criterion of things intelligible and the cognitive sense of things sensible. And cognitive sense he conceived as being that which shares in rational truth. For just as the 146 fingers of the flute-player or harper possess an artistic activity, which, however, is not primarily brought to perfection by the fingers themselves but is fully developed as a result of joint practice under the guidance of reasoning,—and just as the sense of the musician possesses an activity capable of grasping the harmonious and the non-harmonious, this activity, however, not being self-produced but an acquisition due to reasoning,—so also the cognitive sense naturally derives from the reason the cognitive experience in which it shares, and which leads to unerring discrimination of subsisting objects.

But Xenocrates says that there are three forms of 147 existence, the sensible, the intelligible, and the composite and opinable ; and of these the sensible is that which exists within the Heaven, and the intelligible that which belongs to all things outside the Heaven, and the opinable and composite that of the Heaven itself ; for it is visible by sense but intelligible by

- 148 *ἀστρολογίας. τούτων μέντοι τούτων ἐχόντων τὸν τρόπον, τῆς μὲν ἐκτὸς οὐρανοῦ καὶ νοητῆς οὐσίας κριτήριον ἀπεφαίνεται τὴν ἐπιστήμην, τῆς δὲ ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ καὶ αἰσθητῆς τὴν αἰσθησιν, τῆς δὲ μικτῆς τὴν δόξαν· καὶ τούτων κοινῶς τὸ μὲν διὰ τοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ λόγου κριτήριον βέβαιόν τε ὑπάρχειν καὶ ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀληθές μὲν, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ὡς τὸ διὰ τοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ λόγου, τὸ δὲ σύνθετον κοινὸν ἀληθοῦς τε καὶ ψευδοῦς ὑπάρχειν· τῆς γὰρ δόξης τὴν μὲν τινα*
- 149 *ἀληθῆ εἶναι τὴν δὲ ψευδῆ. ὅθεν καὶ τρεῖς μοίρας παραδεδοσθαι, Ἄτροπος μὲν τὴν τῶν νοητῶν, ἀμετάθετον οὖσαν, Κλωθὴ δὲ τὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν, Λάχεσις δὲ τὴν τῶν δοξαστῶν.*
- 150 *Οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἄρκεσίλαον προηγουμένως μὲν οὐδὲν ὥρισαν κριτήριον, οἱ δὲ καὶ ὠρικένοι δοκοῦντες τοῦτο κατὰ ἀντιπαρεξαγωγὴν τὴν ὡς πρὸς*
- 151 *τοὺς στωικοὺς ἀπέδοσαν. τρία γὰρ εἶναι φασιν ἐκείνοι τὰ συζυγούντα ἀλλήλοις, ἐπιστήμην καὶ δόξαν καὶ τὴν ἐν μεθωρίᾳ τούτων τεταγμένην κατάληψιν, ὣν ἐπιστήμην μὲν εἶναι τὴν ἀσφαλῆ καὶ βεβαίαν καὶ ἀμετάθετον ὑπὸ λόγου κατάληψιν, δόξαν δὲ τὴν ἀσθενῆ καὶ ψευδῆ συγκατὰ θεσιν, κατάληψιν δὲ τὴν μεταξὺ τούτων, ἣτις*
- 152 *ἐστὶ καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας συγκατάθεσις· καταληπτικῆ δὲ φαντασία κατὰ τούτους ἐτύγχανεν ἢ ἀληθῆς καὶ ταιαύτη οἷα οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ψευδῆς. ὣν τὴν μὲν ἐπιστήμην ἐν μόνοις ὑφίστασθαι λέγουσι τοῖς σοφοῖς, τὴν δὲ δόξαν ἐν μόνοις τοῖς φαύλοις, τὴν δὲ κατάληψιν κοινήν ἀμφοτέρων εἶναι, καὶ*
- 153 *ταύτην κριτήριον ἀληθείας καθεστάναι. ταῦτα δὲ λεγόντων τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ὁ Ἄρκεσίλαος ἀντι-*

means of astronomy. This, then, being the condition 148 of things, he declared that the criterion of the existence which is outside the Heaven and intelligible is knowledge; and the criterion of that which is within the Heaven and sensible is sense; and the criterion of the mixed kind is opinion. And of these generally the criterion afforded by the cognitive reason is both firm and true, and that by sense is true indeed but not so true as that by the cognitive reason, while the composite kind shares in both truth and falsehood; for opinion is partly true and partly false. Hence, 149 too, we have by tradition three Fates—Atropos, the Fate of things intelligible, she being unchangeable, and Clotho of things sensible, and Lachesis of things opinable.

Arcesilaus^a did not, to begin with, lay down any 150 definite criterion, and those who are thought to have laid one down produced it by way of counter-blast to that of the Stoics. For the latter assert that there 151 are three criteria—knowledge and opinion and, set midway between these two, apprehension; and of these knowledge is the unerring and firm apprehension which is unalterable by reason, and opinion is weak and false assent, and apprehension is intermediate between these, being assent to an apprehensive presentation; and an apprehensive presenta- 152 tion, according to them, is one which is true and of such a kind as to be incapable of becoming false. And they say that, of these, knowledge subsists only in the wise, and opinion only in the fools, but apprehension is shared alike by both, and it is the criterion of truth. It was these statements of the Stoics that 153

^a Cf. *P.H.* i. 232; Vol. I. *Introd.* p. xxxii.

καθίστατο, δεικνὺς ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐστὶ μεταξύ ἐπι-
 στήμης καὶ δόξης κριτήριον ἢ κατάληψις. αὕτη
 γὰρ ἦν φασὶ κατάληψιν καὶ καταληπτικῆ φαν-
 τασία συγκατάθεσιν, ἥτοι ἐν σοφῷ ἢ ἐν φαύλῳ
 γίνεται. ἀλλ' ἐάν τε ἐν σοφῷ γένηται, ἐπιστήμη
 ἐστίν, ἐάν τε ἐν φαύλῳ, δόξα, καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο παρὰ
 154 ταῦτα ἢ μόνον ὄνομα μετείληπται. εἴπερ τε ἢ
 κατάληψις καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας συγκατάθεσις
 ἐστίν, ἀνύπαρκτός ἐστι, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἢ συγ-
 κατάθεσις οὐ πρὸς φαντασίαν γίνεται ἀλλὰ πρὸς
 λόγον (τῶν γὰρ ἀξιωματίων εἰσὶν αἱ συγκατα-
 θέσεις), δεύτερον ὅτι οὐδεμία τοιαύτη ἀληθῆς φαν-
 τασία εὐρίσκεται οἷα οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ψευδῆς, ὡς
 155 διὰ πολλῶν καὶ ποικίλων παρίσταται. μὴ οὔσης
 δὲ καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας οὐδὲ κατάληψις γενή-
 σεται· ἦν γὰρ καταληπτικῆ φαντασία συγκατά-
 θεσις. μὴ οὔσης δὲ καταλήψεως πάντ' ἔσται
 ἀκατάληπτα. πάντων δὲ ὄντων ἀκαταλήπτων ἀκο-
 λουθήσει καὶ κατὰ τοὺς στωικοὺς ἐπέχειν τὸν σοφόν.
 156 σκοπῶμεν δὲ οὕτως. πάντων ὄντων ἀκαταλήπτων
 διὰ τὴν ἀνυπαρξίαν τοῦ στωικοῦ κριτηρίου, εἰ
 συγκαταθήσεται ὁ σοφός, δοξάσει ὁ σοφός· μηδενὸς
 γὰρ ὄντος καταληπτοῦ εἰ συγκατατίθεται τινι, τῷ
 ἀκαταλήπτῳ συγκαταθήσεται, ἢ δὲ τῷ ἀκατα-
 157 λήπτῳ συγκατάθεσις δόξα ἐστίν. ὥστε εἰ τῶν
 συγκατατιθεμένων ἐστὶν ὁ σοφός, τῶν δοξαστῶν
 ἔσται ὁ σοφός. οὐχὶ δὲ γε τῶν δοξαστῶν ἐστὶν ὁ
 σοφός (τοῦτο γὰρ ἀφροσύνης ἦν κατ' αὐτούς, καὶ
 τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων αἴτιον)· οὐκ ἄρα τῶν συγκατα-
 τιθεμένων ἐστὶν ὁ σοφός. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, περὶ πάν-

Arcesilaus controverted by proving that apprehension
 is not a criterion intermediate between knowledge
 and opinion. For that which they call "appre-
 hension" and "assent to an apprehensive presenta-
 tion" occurs either in a wise man or in a fool. But
 if it occurs in a wise man, it is knowledge, and if in
 a fool, opinion, and nothing else is acquired besides
 these two save a mere name. And if apprehension 154
 is in fact assent to an apprehensive presentation, it is
 non-existent—firstly, because assent is not relative to
 presentation but to reason (for assents are given to
 judgements), and secondly, because no true presenta-
 tion is found to be of such a kind as to be incapable
 of proving false, as is shown by many and various
 instances. But if the apprehensive presentation does 155
 not exist, neither will apprehension come into
 existence, for it was assent to an apprehensive
 presentation. And if apprehension does not exist,
 all things will be non-apprehensible. And if all
 things are non-apprehensible, it will follow, even
 according to the Stoics, that the wise man suspends
 judgement. Let us consider the matter thus :—Since 156
 all things are non-apprehensible owing to the non-
 existence of the Stoic criterion, if the wise man shall
 assent the wise man will opine ; for when nothing is
 apprehensible, if he assents to anything he will be
 assenting to what is non-apprehensible, and assent
 to the non-apprehensible is opinion. So that if the 157
 wise man is in the class of assenters, the wise man will
 be in the class of those who opine. But the wise man,
 to be sure, is not in the class of those who opine (for,
 according to them, opinion is a mark of folly and a
 cause of sins) ; therefore the wise man is not in the
 class of assenters. And if this be so, he will neces-

των αὐτὸν δεήσει ἀσυγκαταθετεῖν. τὸ δὲ ἀσυ-
καταθετεῖν οὐδὲν ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἢ τὸ ἐπέχειν· ἐφέξει
158 ἄρα περὶ πάντων ὁ σοφός. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ μετὰ τοῦτο
ἔδει καὶ περὶ τῆς τοῦ βίου διεξαγωγῆς ζητεῖν,
ἣτις οὐ χωρὶς κριτηρίου πέφυκεν ἀποδίδοσθαι, ἀφ'
οὐ καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία, τουτέστι τὸ τοῦ βίου τέλος,
ἡρτημένην ἔχει τὴν πίστιν, φησὶν ὁ Ἀρκεσίλαος
ὅτι ὁ¹ περὶ πάντων ἐπέχων κανονιεῖ τὰς αἰρέσεις
καὶ φυγὰς καὶ κοινῶς τὰς πράξεις τῷ εὐλόγῳ,
κατὰ τοῦτό τε προερχόμενος τὸ κριτήριον κατ-
ορθώσει· τὴν μὲν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν περιγίνεσθαι διὰ
τῆς φρονήσεως, τὴν δὲ φρόνησιν κείσθαι² ἐν τοῖς
κατορθώμασιν, τὸ δὲ κατορθώμα εἶναι ὅπερ πραχ-
θὲν εὐλογον ἔχει τὴν ἀπολογία. ὁ προσέχων οὖν
τῷ εὐλόγῳ κατορθώσει καὶ εὐδαιμονήσει.

159 Ταῦτα καὶ ὁ Ἀρκεσίλαος· ὁ δὲ Καρνεάδης οὐ
μόνον τοῖς στωικοῖς ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς πρὸ αὐτοῦ
ἀντιδιετᾶσσοτο περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου. καὶ δὴ πρῶτος
μὲν αὐτῷ καὶ κοινὸς πρὸς πάντας ἐστὶ λόγος καθ'
ὃν παρίσταται ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς ἀληθείας
κριτήριον, οὐ λόγος, οὐκ αἴσθησις, οὐ φαντασία,
οὐκ ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα συλ-
160 λήβδην διαψεύδεται ἡμᾶς. δεύτερον δὲ καθ' ὃ
δείκνυσιν ὅτι καὶ εἰ ἐστὶ τὸ κριτήριον τοῦτο, οὐ
χωρὶς τοῦ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐναργείας πάθους ὑφίσταται.
ἐπεὶ γὰρ αἰσθητικῇ δυνάμει διαφέρει τὸ ζῶον τῶν
ἀψύχων, πάντως διὰ ταύτης ἑαυτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν
ἐκτὸς ἀντιληπτικὸν γενήσεται. ἡ δὲ γε αἴσθησις
ἀκίνητος μὲν οὐσα καὶ ἀπαθής καὶ ἄτρεπτος οὔτε
161 αἴσθησις ἐστὶν οὔτε ἀντιληπτικὴ τινας, τραπέισα

¹ ὁ Hervetus: οὐ mss., Bekk.

² κείσθαι N: κινεῖσθαι cet., Bekk.

sarily refuse assent in all cases. But to refuse assent is nothing else than to suspend judgement; therefore the wise man will in all cases suspend judgement. But inasmuch as it was necessary, in the next place, 158 to investigate also the conduct of life, which cannot, naturally, be directed without a criterion, upon which happiness—that is, the end of life—depends for its assurance, Arcesilaus asserts that he who suspends judgement about everything will regulate his inclinations and aversions and his actions in general by the rule of “the reasonable,” and by proceeding in accordance with this criterion he will act rightly; for happiness is attained by means of wisdom, and wisdom consists in right actions, and the right action is that which, when performed, possesses a reasonable justification. He, therefore, who attends to “the reasonable” will act rightly and be happy.

Such was the doctrine of Arcesilaus. Carneades 159 arrayed his arguments concerning the criterion not only against the Stoics but against all his predecessors. In fact his first argument, aimed at all alike, is that by which he establishes that there is absolutely no criterion of truth—neither reason, nor sense, nor presentation, nor anything else that exists; for these things, one and all, play us false. Second comes the 160 argument by which he shows that even if a criterion exists, it does not subsist apart from the affection produced by the evidence of sense. For since the living creature differs from lifeless things by its faculty of sense, it will certainly become perceptive both of itself and of external things by means of this faculty. But when the sense is unmoved and unaffected and undisturbed, neither is it sense nor perceptive of anything; but when it is disturbed and 161

δὲ καὶ πως παθοῦσα κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἐναργῶν ὑπό-
 πτωσιν, τότε ἐνδείκνυται τὰ πράγματα. ἐν ἄρα τῷ
 ἀπὸ τῆς ἐναργείας πάθει τῆς ψυχῆς ζητητέον ἐστὶ
 τὸ κριτήριον. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ πάθος αὐτοῦ ἐνδεικτικὸν
 ὀφείλει τυγχάνειν καὶ τοῦ ἐμποιήσαντος αὐτὸ
 φαινομένου, ὅπερ πάθος ἐστὶν οὐχ ἕτερον τῆς
 162 φαντασίας. ὅθεν καὶ φαντασίαν ῥητέον εἶναι πάθος
 τι περὶ τὸ ζῶον ἑαυτοῦ τε καὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου παρα-
 στατικόν. οἷον προσβλέψαντές τι, φησὶν ὁ Ἄν-
 τίοχος, διατιθέμεθά πως τὴν ὄψιν, καὶ οὐχ οὕτως
 αὐτὴν διακειμένην ἴσχομεν ὡς πρὶν τοῦ βλέψαι
 διακειμένην εἶχομεν· κατὰ μέντοι τὴν τοιαύτην
 ἀλλοίωσιν δυοῖν ἀντιλαμβάνομεθα, ἐνὸς μὲν αὐτῆς
 τῆς ἀλλοιώσεως, τουτέστι τῆς φαντασίας, δευτέρου
 δὲ τοῦ τὴν ἀλλοίωσιν ἐμποιήσαντος, τουτέστι τοῦ
 ὄρατοῦ. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων τὸ παρα-
 163 πλήσιον. ὡσπερ οὖν τὸ φῶς ἑαυτὸ τε δείκνυσι καὶ
 πάντα τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ, οὕτω καὶ ἡ φαντασία, ἀρχηγὸς
 οὖσα τῆς περὶ τὸ ζῶον εἰδήσεως, φωτὸς δίκην
 ἑαυτὴν τε ἐμφανίζειν ὀφείλει καὶ τοῦ ποιήσαντος
 αὐτὴν ἐναργοῦς ἐνδεικτικὴ καθεστάναι. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ
 οὐ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν αἰεὶ ποτε ἐνδείκνυται, πολλάκις
 δὲ διαψεύδεται καὶ διαφωνεῖ τοῖς ἀναπέμψασιν
 αὐτὴν πράγμασιν ὡς οἱ μοχθηροὶ τῶν ἀγγέλων,
 κατ' ἀνάγκην ἠκολούθησε τὸ μὴ πᾶσαν φαντασίαν
 δύνασθαι κριτήριον ἀπολείπειν ἀληθείας, ἀλλὰ
 164 μόνην, εἰ καὶ ἄρα, τὴν ἀληθῆ. πάλιν οὖν ἐπεὶ
 οὐδεμία ἐστὶν ἀληθὴς τοιαύτη οἷα οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο
 ψευδῆς, ἀλλὰ πάση τῇ δοκούσῃ ἀληθεῖ καθεστάναι
 εὑρίσκεται τις ἀπαράλλακτος ψευδῆς, γενήσεται τὸ
 κριτήριον ἐν κοινῇ φαντασίᾳ τοῦ τε ἀληθοῦς καὶ
 ψεύδους. ἡ δὲ κοινὴ τούτων φαντασία οὐκ ἔστι
 88

somehow affected owing to the impact of things
 evident, then it indicates the objects. Therefore the
 criterion must be sought in the affection of the soul
 caused by the sensible evidence. And this affection
 must be indicative both of itself and of the appear-
 ance which caused it, which affection is nothing else
 than the presentation. Hence we must say that the 162
 presentation is an affection of the living creature
 capable of presenting both itself and the other object.
 Thus for example, says Antiochus,* when we have
 looked at an object we have our sense of sight in a
 certain condition, and not in the same condition as
 that in which we had it before we looked; and owing
 to such an alteration we perceive, in fact, two things,
 one the alteration itself, which is the presentation,
 and, secondly, that which produced the alteration,
 which is the visible object. And similarly in the case
 of the other senses. So then, just as light shows both 163
 itself and all things within it, so also presentation,
 which is the primary factor in the cognition of the
 living creature, must, like light, both reveal itself and
 be indicative of the evident object which produced
 it. But since it does not always indicate the true
 object, but often deceives and, like bad messengers,
 misreports those who dispatched it, it has necessarily
 resulted that we cannot admit every presentation as
 a criterion of truth, but—if any—only that which is
 true. So then, once more, since there is no true 164
 presentation of such a kind that it cannot be false,
 but a false presentation is found to exist exactly
 resembling every apparently true presentation, the
 criterion will consist of a presentation which contains
 the true and the false alike. But the presentation

* Cf. P. H. i. 235.

καταληπτική, μη οὔσα δὲ καταληπτική οὐδὲ κριτή-
 165 ριον ἔσται. μηδεμιᾶς δὲ οὔσης φαντασίας κριτικῆς
 οὐδὲ λόγος ἂν εἶη κριτήριον· ἀπὸ φαντασίας γὰρ
 οὗτος ἀνάγεται. καὶ εἰκότως· πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ δεῖ
 φανῆναι αὐτῷ τὸ κρινόμενον, φανῆναι δὲ οὐδὲν
 δύναται χωρὶς τῆς ἀλόγου αἰσθήσεως. οὔτε οὖν ἡ
 ἀλογος αἰσθησις οὔτε ὁ λόγος ἦν κριτήριον.
 166 Ταῦτα μὲν [γὰρ] ἀντιπαρεξάγων τοῖς ἄλλοις
 φιλοσόφοις ὁ Καρνεάδης εἰς τὴν ἀνυπαρξίαν τοῦ
 κριτηρίου διεξήρχειτο· ἀπαιτούμενος δὲ καὶ αὐτός
 τι κριτήριον πρὸς τὴν τοῦ βίου διεξαγωγὴν καὶ
 πρὸς τὴν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας περίκτησιν, δυνάμει
 ἐπαναγκάζεται καὶ καθ' αὐτὸν περὶ τούτου δια-
 τάττεσθαι, προσλαμβάνων τὴν τε πιθανὴν φαν-
 τασίαν καὶ τὴν πιθανὴν ἅμα καὶ ἀπερίσπαστον καὶ
 167 διεξωδευμένην. τίς δὲ ἔστιν ἡ τούτων διαφορά,
 συντόμως ὑποδεικτέον. ἡ τοίνυν φαντασία τινὸς
 φαντασία ἔστιν, οἷον τοῦ τε ἀφ' οὗ γίνεται καὶ τοῦ
 ἐν ᾧ γίνεται, καὶ ἀφ' οὗ μὲν γίνεται ὡς τοῦ ἐκτός
 ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ, τοῦ ἐν ᾧ δὲ γίνεται καθάπερ
 168 ἀνθρώπου. τοιαύτη δὲ οὔσα δύο ἂν ἔχοι σχέσεις,
 μίαν μὲν ὡς πρὸς τὸ φανταστόν, δευτέραν δὲ ὡς
 πρὸς τὸν φαντασιούμενον. κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὴν πρὸς
 τὸ φανταστόν σχέσιν ἡ ἀληθὴς γίνεται ἢ ψευδής,
 καὶ ἀληθὴς μὲν ὅταν σύμφωνος ἢ τῷ φανταστῷ,
 169 ψευδὴς δὲ ὅταν διάφωνος. κατὰ δὲ τὴν πρὸς τὸν
 φαντασιούμενον σχέσιν ἡ μὲν ἔστι φαινομένη
 ἀληθὴς ἢ δὲ οὐ φαινομένη ἀληθὴς, ὡν ἡ μὲν φαινο-

which contains them both is not apprehensive, and
 not being apprehensive, it will not be a criterion.
 And if no presentation capable of judging exists, 165
 neither will reason be a criterion; for it is derived
 from presentation. And naturally so; for that which
 is judged must first be presented, and nothing can
 be presented without sense which is irrational.
 Therefore neither irrational sense nor reason is the
 criterion.

These were the arguments which Carneades set 166
 forth in detail, in his controversy with the other
 philosophers, to prove the non-existence of the
 criterion; yet as he, too, himself requires a criterion
 for the conduct of life and for the attainment of
 happiness, he is practically compelled on his own
 account to frame a theory about it, and to adopt both
 the probable presentation and that which is at once
 probable and irreversible and tested.^a What the dis- 167
 tinction is between these must be briefly indicated.
 The presentation, then, is a presentation of something
 —of that, for instance, from which it comes and of
 that in which it occurs; that from which it comes
 being, say, the externally existent sensible object,
 and that in which it occurs, say, a man. And, such 168
 being its nature, it will have two aspects, one in its
 relation to the object presented, the second in its
 relation to the subject experiencing the presentation.
 Now in regard to its aspect in relation to the object
 presented it is either true or false—true when it is in
 accord with the object presented, but false when it is
 not in accord. But in regard to its aspect in relation 169
 to the subject experiencing the presentation, the
 one kind of presentation is apparently true, the other
 apparently false; and of these the apparently true

^a With §§ 166-189 cf. P.H. i. 226-231.

μένη ἀληθῆς ἔμφασις καλεῖται παρὰ τοῖς Ἀκαδημαϊκοῖς καὶ πιθανότης καὶ πιθανὴ φαντασία. ἡ δ' οὐ φαينوμένη ἀληθῆς ἀπέμφασις τε προσαγορεύεται καὶ ἀπειθῆς καὶ ἀπιθανὸς φαντασία· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ αὐτόθεν φαινόμενον ψευδὲς οὔτε τὸ ἀληθὲς μὲν, μὴ φαινόμενον δὲ ἡμῖν πείθειν ἡμᾶς πέφυκεν.
 170 τούτων δὲ τῶν φαντασιῶν ἡ μὲν φανερώς ψευδῆς καὶ μὴ φαينوμένη ἀληθῆς παραγράψιμος ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ κριτήριον, ἐάν τε (ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος γίνηται ἐάν τε)¹ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος μὲν, διαφώνως δὲ τῷ ὑπάρχοντι καὶ μὴ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον, ὅποια ἦν ἡ ἀπὸ Ἡλέκτρας προσπεσοῦσα τῷ Ὀρέστῃ, μίαν τῶν Ἐρινύων αὐτὴν δοξάζοντι καὶ κεκραγῶτι

μέθες μί' ὄσα τῶν ἐμῶν Ἐρινύων.

171 τῆς δὲ φαينوμένης ἀληθοῦς ἡ μὲν τίς ἐστὶν ἀμυδρά, ὡς ἡ ἐπὶ τῶν παρὰ μικρότητα τοῦ θεωρουμένου ἢ παρὰ ἰκανὸν διάστημα ἢ καὶ παρὰ ἀσθένειαν τῆς ὀψεως συγκεχυμένως καὶ οὐκ ἐκτύπως τι λαμβανόντων, ἢ δὲ τις ἦν σὺν τῷ φαίνεσθαι ἀληθῆς ἔτι καὶ σφοδρὸν ἔχουσα τὸ φαίνεσθαι αὐτὴν ἀληθῆ.
 172 ὧν πάλιν ἡ μὲν ἀμυδρά καὶ ἔκλυτος φαντασία οὐκ ἂν εἴη κριτήριον· τῷ γὰρ μήτε αὐτὴν μήτε τὸ ποιῆσαν αὐτὴν τρανῶς ἐνδείκνυσθαι οὐ πέφυκεν ἡμᾶς πείθειν οὐδ' εἰς συγκατάθεσιν ἐπισπάσθαι.
 173 ἡ δὲ φαينوμένη ἀληθῆς καὶ ἰκανῶς ἐμφαινομένη κριτήριόν ἐστὶ τῆς ἀληθείας κατὰ τοὺς περὶ τὸν

¹ <ἀπὸ . . . τε> cf. Bekk.

^a I retain, perforce, the Greek terms in the absence of any good English equivalents. "Emphasis" means, roughly, the "appearance" or "reflection" in the mind caused by an external object which seems to correspond to that object

is termed by the Academics "emphasis" and probability and probable presentation, while the not apparently true is denominated "ap-emphasis"^a and unconvincing and improbable presentation; for neither that which itself appears false, nor that which though true does not appear so to us, is naturally convincing to us. And of these presentations that which is 170 evidently false, or not apparently true, is to be ruled out and is not a criterion whether (it be derived from a non-existent object or) from an object which exists, but not in accord with that object and not representing the actual object—such as was the presentation derived from Electra which Orestes experienced, when he supposed her to be one of the Furies and cried out—

Avaunt! For of my Furies thou art one.^b

And of the apparently true kind of presentation, 171 one sort is obscure—the sort, for instance, that is found in the case of those who have a perception that is confused and not distinct owing to the smallness of the object viewed or owing to the extent of the interval or even owing to the weakness of the sense of sight,—while the other sort, in addition to being apparently true, possesses this appearance of truth to an intense degree. And of these, again, the pre- 172 sentation which is obscure and vague will not be a criterion; for because of its not indicating clearly either itself or that which caused it, it is not of such a nature as to persuade us or to induce us to assent. But that which appears true, and appears so vividly, 173 is the criterion of truth according to the School of and thus is "apparently true"; but an "ap-emphasis" is apparently false.

^b Eurip. *Orest.* 264; cf. § 249 *infra*.

Καρνεάδην. κριτήριον δὲ οὐσα πλάτος εἶχεν ἰκανόν, καὶ ἐπιτεινομένης αὐτῆς ἄλλη ἄλλης ἐν εἴδει πιθανωτέραν τε καὶ πληκτικωτέραν ἴσχει φαντασίαν. τὸ δὲ πιθανὸν ὡς πρὸς τὸ παρὸν λέγεται τριχῶς, καθ' ἓνα μὲν τρόπον τὸ ἀληθές τε ὄν καὶ φαινόμενον ἀληθές, καθ' ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ψευδές μὲν καθεστῶς φαινόμενον δὲ ἀληθές, κατὰ δὲ τρίτον τὸ [ἀληθές] κοινὸν ἀμφοτέρων. ὅθεν τὸ κριτήριον ἔσται μὲν ἢ φαινομένη ἀληθῆς φαντασία, ἢν καὶ πιθανὴν προσηγόρευον οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας, ἐμπίπτει δὲ ἔσθ' ὅτε καὶ ψευδῆς, ὥστε ἀνάγκην ἔχειν καὶ τῇ κοινῇ ποτὲ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ ψευδοῦς φαντασία χρῆσθαι. οὐ μέντοι διὰ τὴν σπάνιον ταύτης παρέμπτωσι, λέγω δὲ τῆς μιμουμένης τἀληθές, ἀπιστητέον ἔστι τῇ ὡς τὸ πολὺ ἀληθεύουσι· τῷ γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τὰς τε κρίσεις καὶ τὰς πράξεις κανονίζεσθαι συμβέβηκεν.

Τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον καὶ κοινὸν κριτήριον κατὰ τοὺς περὶ τὸν Καρνεάδην ἔστι τοιοῦτον· ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐδέποτε φαντασία μονοειδῆς ὑφίσταται ἀλλ' ἀλύσεως τρόπον ἄλλη ἐξ ἄλλης ἠρτηται, δεύτερον προσγενήσεται κριτήριον ἢ πιθανὴ ἅμα καὶ ἀπερίσπαστος φαντασία. οἷον ὁ ἀνθρώπου σπάν φαντασίαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν λαμβάνει φαντασίαν καὶ τῶν ἐκτός, τῶν μὲν περὶ αὐτὸν ὡς χροῶς μεγέθους σχήματος κινήσεως λαλιᾶς ἐσθῆτος ὑποδέσεως, τῶν δὲ ἐκτός ὡς ἀέρος φωτὸς ἡμέρας οὐρανοῦ γῆς φίλων, τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων. ὅταν οὖν μηδεμίαν τούτων τῶν φαντασιῶν περιέλκη ἡμᾶς τῷ φαίνεσθαι ψευδῆς, ἀλλὰ πᾶσαι συμφώνως φαίνων-

Carneades. And, being the criterion, it has a large extension,^a and when extended one presentation reveals itself as more probable and more vivid than another. Probability, in the present instance, is used in three senses—in the first, of that which both is and appears true; in the second, of that which is really false but appears true; in the third, of that which is at once both true and false. Hence the criterion will be the apparently true presentation, which the Academics called "probable"; but sometimes the impression it makes is actually false, so that we are compelled at times to make use of the presentation which is at once both true and false. But the rare occurrence of this kind—the kind I mean which imitates the truth—should not make us distrust the kind which "as a general rule" reports truly; for the fact is that both our judgements and our actions are regulated by the standard of "the general rule."

Such then is the first and general criterion according to Carneades. But since no presentation is ever simple in form but, like links in a chain, one hangs from another, we have to add, as a second criterion, the presentation which is at once both probable and "irreversible." For example, he who receives the presentation of a man necessarily receives the presentation both of his personal qualities and of the external conditions—of his personal qualities, such as colour, size, shape, motion, speech, dress, foot-gear; and of the external conditions, such as air, light, day, heaven, earth, friends, and all the rest. So whenever none of these presentations disturbs our faith by appearing false, but all with one accord appear

^a i.e. it is very comprehensive and includes many sub-species, or varieties, of presentations.

178 ται ἀληθείς, μᾶλλον πιστεύομεν. ὅτι γὰρ οὗτός
 ἐστὶ Σωκράτης, πιστεύομεν ἐκ τοῦ πάντα αὐτῷ
 προσεῖναι τὰ εἰωθότα, χρῶμα μέγεθος σχῆμα
 διάλεξι¹ τρίβωνα, τὸ ἐνθάδε εἶναι ὅπου οὐθείς ἐσ-
 179 τιν αὐτῷ ἀπαράλλακτος. καὶ ὄν τρόπον τινές τῶν
 ἰατρῶν τὸν κατ' ἀλήθειαν πυρέσσοντα οὐκ ἐξ ἐνὸς
 λαμβάνουσι συμπτώματος, καθάπερ σφυγμοῦ σφο-
 δρότητος ἢ δαψιλοῦς θερμασίας, ἀλλ' ἐκ συνδρομῆς,
 οἶον θερμασίας ἅμα καὶ σφυγμοῦ καὶ ἐλκώδους
 ἀφῆς καὶ ἐρυθρήματος καὶ δύψους καὶ τῶν ἀνάλογον,
 οὕτως καὶ ὁ Ἀκαδημαϊκὸς τῇ συνδρομῇ τῶν φαν-
 τασιῶν ποιεῖται τὴν κρίσιν τῆς ἀληθείας, μηδεμιᾶς
 τε τῶν ἐν τῇ συνδρομῇ φαντασιῶν περισπώσης
 αὐτὸν ὡς ψευδοῦς λέγει ἀληθές εἶναι τὸ προσ-
 180 πίπτον. καὶ ὅτι ἡ ἀπερίσπαστός ἐστι συνδρομὴ τοῦ
 πίστιν ἐμποιεῖν, φανερόν ἀπὸ Μενελάου καταλιπὼν
 γὰρ ἐν τῇ νηὶ τὸ εἶδωλον τῆς Ἑλένης, ὅπερ ἀπὸ
 Τροίας ἐπήγετο ὡς Ἑλένην, καὶ ἐπιβάς τῆς Φάρου
 νήσου ὄρᾳ τὴν ἀληθῆ Ἑλένην, σπῶν τε ἀπ' αὐτῆς
 ἀληθῆ φαντασίαν ὅμως οὐ πιστεύει τῇ τοιαύτῃ
 φαντασίᾳ διὰ τὸ ὑπ' ἄλλης περισπᾶσθαι, καθ' ἣν
 181 ἦδει ἀπολελοιπῶς ἐν τῇ νηὶ τὴν Ἑλένην. τοιαύτη
 γοῦν ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ ἀπερίσπαστος φαντασία. ἦτις καὶ
 αὐτῇ πλάτος ἔχειν ἔοικε διὰ τὸ ἄλλην ἄλλης μᾶλλον
 ἀπερίσπαστον εὐρίσκεισθαι.

Τῆς δὲ ἀπερισπᾶστου φαντασίας πιστοτέρα
 μᾶλλον ἐστὶ καὶ τελειοτάτην ποιούσα τὴν κρίσιν, ἣ
 σὺν τῷ ἀπερίσπαστος εἶναι ἐτι καὶ διεξωδευμένη
 182 καθέστηκεν. τίς δὲ ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ ταύτης χαρακτήρ,
 παρακειμένως ὑποδεικτέον. ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῆς ἀ-

¹ διάλεξι cj. Bekker : διάληψιν MSS.

true, our belief is the greater. For we believe that 178
 this man is Socrates from the fact that he possesses
 all his customary qualities—colour, size, shape, con-
 verse, coat, and his position in a place where there is
 no one exactly like him. And just as some doctors 179
 do not deduce that it is a true case of fever from one
 symptom only—such as too quick a pulse or a very high
 temperature—but from a concurrence, such as that
 of a high temperature with a rapid pulse and soreness
 to the touch and flushing and thirst and analogous
 symptoms ; so also the Academic forms his judgement
 of truth by the concurrence of presentations, and
 when none of the presentations in the concurrence
 provokes in him a suspicion of its falsity he asserts
 that the impression is true. And that the “ irrever- 180
 sible ” presentation is a concurrence capable of im-
 planting belief is plain from the case of Menelaus ;
 for when he had left behind him on the ship the wraith
 of Helen—which he had brought with him from Troy,
 thinking it to be the true Helen—and had landed on
 the island of Pharos, he beheld the true Helen, but
 though he received from her a true presentation,
 yet he did not believe that presentation owing to his
 mind being warped by that other impression from
 which he derived the knowledge that he had left
 Helen behind in the ship. Such then is the “ irrever- 181
 sible ” presentation ; and it too seems to possess
 extension inasmuch as one is found to be more irre-
 versible than another.

Still more trustworthy than the irreversible pre-
 sentation and supremely perfect is that which creates
 judgement ; for it, in addition to being irreversible, is
 also “ tested.” What the distinctive feature of this 182
 presentation is we must next explain. Now in the

περισπάστου ψιλὸν ζητεῖται τὸ μηδεμίαν τῶν ἐν τῇ συνδρομῇ φαντασιῶν ὡς ψευδῆ ἡμᾶς περισπᾶν, πάσας δὲ εἶναι ἀληθεῖς τε [καί]¹ φαινόμενα καὶ μὴ ἀπιθάνους· ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς κατὰ τὴν περιωδευμένην συνδρομῆς² ἐκάστην τῶν ἐν τῇ συνδρομῇ ἐπιστατικῶς δοκιμάζομεν, ὁποῖόν τι γίνεται καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις, ὅταν ὁ δῆμος ἕκαστον τῶν μελλόντων ἄρχειν ἢ δικάζειν ἐξετάζη εἰ ἀξιὸς ἐστὶ τοῦ πιστευ-

183 θῆναι τὴν ἀρχὴν ἢ τὴν κρίσιν. οἶον ὄντων κατὰ τὸν τῆς κρίσεως τόπον τοῦ τε κρίνοντος καὶ τοῦ κρινόμενου καὶ τοῦ δι' οὗ ἢ κρίσις, ἀποστήματός τε καὶ διαστήματος, τόπου χρόνου τρόπου διαθέσεως ἐνεργείας, ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων ὁποῖόν ἐστι φυλοκρινουῦμεν, τὸ μὲν κρίνον, μὴ ἢ ὄψις ἡμβλυται (τοιαύτη γὰρ οὕσα ἀθετός ἐστι πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν), τὸ δὲ κρινόμενον, μὴ μικρὸν ἄγαν καθέστηκε, τὸ δὲ δι' οὗ ἢ κρίσις, μὴ ὁ ἄηρ ζοφερός ὑπάρχει, τὸ δὲ ἀπόστημα, μὴ μέγα λίαν ὑπόκειται, τὸ δὲ διάστημα, μὴ συγκέχυται, τὸν δὲ τόπον, μὴ ἀχανὴς ἐστὶ, τὸν δὲ χρόνον, μὴ ταχύς ἐστι, τὴν δὲ διάθεσιν, μὴ μανιώδης θεωρεῖται, τὴν δὲ ἐνεργείαν, μὴ ἀπρόσδεκτός ἐστιν.

184 Ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα καθ' ἐν γίνεται κριτήριον, ἢ τε πιθανὴ φαντασία καὶ ἢ πιθανὴ ἄμα καὶ ἀπερίσπαστος, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἢ πιθανὴ ἄμα καὶ ἀπερίσπαστος καὶ διεξωδευμένη. παρ' ἣν αἰτίαν ὄν

¹ [καί] secl. Heintz.

² συνδρομῆς Heintz: συνδρομῆν mss., Bekk.

^a Literally, "poured together," "confused"; hence "shortened" or "telescoped."

case of the irreversible presentation it is merely required that none of the presentations in the concurrence should disturb us by a suspicion of its falsity but all should be apparently true and not improbable; but in the case of the concurrence which involves the "tested" presentation, we scrutinize attentively each of the presentations in the concurrence,—just as the practice is at assembly-meetings, when the People makes inquiry about each of those who desire to be magistrates or judges, to see whether he is worthy to be entrusted with the magistracy or the judgship. Thus, for example, as there are present 183 at the seat of judgement both the subject that judges and the object that is being judged and the medium through which judgement is effected, and distance and interval, place, time, mood, disposition, activity, we judge the distinctive character of each of these factors—as regards the subject judging, whether its vision be not dimmed (for vision of that kind is unfitted for judging); and as regards the object judged, whether it be not excessively small; and as regards the medium through which the judgement is effected, whether the atmosphere be not dark; and as to distance, whether it be not excessively great; and as to interval, whether it be not too short^a; and as to place, whether it be not immense; and as to time, whether it be not brief; and as to disposition, whether it is not found to be insane; and as to activity, whether it be not unacceptable.

For all these factors together form the criterion— 184 namely, the probable presentation, and that which is at once both probable and irreversible and besides these that which is at once probable and irreversible and tested. And it is because of this that, just as

τρόπον ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ὅταν μὲν περὶ μικροῦ πράγματος
ζητῶμεν, ἓνα μάρτυρα ἀνακρίνομεν, ὅταν δὲ περὶ
μείζονος, πλείονας, ὅταν δ' ἔτι μᾶλλον περὶ ἀναγ-
καιοτέρου, καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν μαρτυρούντων ἐξετά-
ζομεν ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθομολογήσεως, οὕτω,
φασὶν οἱ περὶ τὸν Καρνεάδην, ἐν μὲν τοῖς τυχοῦσι
πράγμασι τῇ πιθανῇ μόνον φαντασίᾳ κριτηρίῳ
χρῶμεθα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς διαφέρουσι τῇ ἀπερισπάστῳ,
ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν συντείνουσι τῇ περι-
185 ὠδευμένῃ. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὡσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν διαφερόντων
πραγμάτων τὴν διάφορόν φασι παραλαμβάνειν
φαντασίαν, οὕτω καὶ κατὰ τὰς διαφόρους περι-
στάσεις μὴ τῇ αὐτῇ κατακολουθεῖν. τῇ μὲν γὰρ
αὐτὸ μόνον πιθανῇ προσέχειν λέγουσιν ἐφ' ὧν οὐ
δίδωσιν ἡμῖν καιρὸν ἢ περίστασις πρὸς ἀκριβῆ τοῦ
186 πράγματος ἀναθεώρησιν. οἷον διώκεται τις ὑπὸ
πολεμίων, καὶ ἐλθὼν εἰς τάφρον τινὰ φαντασίαν
σπᾶ ὡς κἀνταῦθα πολεμίων αὐτὸν λοχώντων· εἶθ'
ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς φαντασίας ὡς πιθανῆς συναρ-
πασθεὶς ἐκκλίνεται καὶ φεύγει τὴν τάφρον, ἐπόμενος
τῇ περὶ τὴν φαντασίαν πιθανότητι, πρὶν ἀκριβῶς
ἐπιστῆσαι πρότερον εἰ τῷ ὄντι λόχος ἔστι πολεμίων
187 κατὰ τὸν τόπον ἢ οὐδαμῶς. τῇ δὲ πιθανῇ καὶ
περιωδευμένῃ ἔπονται ἐφ' ὧν χρόνος δίδεται εἰς τὸ
μετὰ ἐπιστάσεως καὶ διεξόδου χρῆσθαι τῇ κρίσει
τοῦ προσπίπτοντος πράγματος. οἷον ἐν ἀλαμπεῖ
οἰκήματι εἰλημα σχοινίου θεασάμενός τις παραυ-
τίκα μὲν ὄφιν ὑπολαβὼν τυγχάνειν ὑπερήλατο, τὸ
δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο ὑποστρέψας ἐξετάζει τάληθές, καὶ
εὐρῶν ἀκίνητον ἤδη μὲν εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι ὄφιν ῥοπήν
188 ἴσχει κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν, ὁμῶς δὲ λογιζόμενος ὅτι
καὶ ὄφεις ποτὲ ἀκίνητοῦσι χειμερινῶ κρύει παγέν-

in ordinary life when we are investigating a small
matter we question a single witness, but in a greater
matter several, and when the matter investigated is
still more important we cross-question each of the
witnesses on the testimony of the others,—so like-
wise, says Carneades, in trivial matters we employ as
criterion only the probable presentation, but in
greater matters the irreversible, and in matters which
contribute to happiness the tested presentation.
Moreover, just as they adopt, they say, a different 185
presentation to suit different cases, so also in different
circumstances they do not cling to the same presenta-
tion. For they declare that they attend to the
immediately probable in cases where the circum-
stances do not afford time for an accurate considera-
tion of the matter. A man, for example, is being 186
pursued by enemies, and coming to a ditch he receives
a presentation which suggests that there, too,
enemies are lying in wait for him; then being carried
away by this presentation, as a probability, he turns
aside and avoids the ditch, being led by the probability
of the presentation, before he has exactly ascertained
whether or not there really is an ambush of the enemy
at the spot. But they follow the probable and tested 187
presentation in cases where time is afforded for using
their judgement on the object presented with delibera-
tion and thorough examination. For example,^a on
seeing a coil of rope in an unlighted room a man
jumps over it, conceiving it for the moment to be a
snake, but turning back afterwards he inquires into
the truth, and on finding it motionless he is already
inclined to think that it is not a snake, but as he 188
reckons, all the same, that snakes too are motionless

^a Cf. P.H. i. 227.

τες, βακτηρία καθικνεῖται τοῦ σπειράματος, καὶ τότε οὕτως ἐκπεριδεύσας τὴν προσπίπτουσαν φαντασίαν συγκατατίθεται τῷ ψεῦδος εἶναι τὸ ὄφιν ὑπάρχειν τὸ φαντασθὲν αὐτῷ σῶμα. καὶ πάλιν, ὡς προείπον, ὀρώντες τι περιφανῶς συγκατατιθέμεθα ὅτι τοῦτο ἀληθές ἐστι, προδιεξοδεύσαντες ὅτι ἀρτίους μὲν ἔχομεν τὰς αἰσθήσεις, ὕπαρ δὲ καὶ οὐ καθ' ὕπνου βλέπομεν, συμπάρεστι δὲ καὶ διαυγῆς ἀήρ καὶ ἀπόστημα σύμμετρον καὶ ἀκίνησία
 189 τοῦ προσπίπτοντος, ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα πιστὴν εἶναι τὴν φαντασίαν, χρόνον ἡμῶν ἐσχηκότων αὐτάρκη πρὸς διέξοδον τῶν κατὰ τὸν τόπον αὐτῆς θεωρουμένων. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστὶ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀπερισπάστου· προσίενται γὰρ αὐτὴν ὅταν μηδὲν ἦ τὸ ἀντιπεριέλκειν δυνάμενον, ὡς ἐπὶ Μενελάου προείρηται.
 190 Ἄλλὰ καὶ τῆς Ἀκαδημαϊκῆς ἱστορίας ἄνωθεν ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος ἀποδοθείσης, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλότριόν που καὶ τὴν τῶν Κυρηναϊκῶν στάσιν ἐπελθεῖν· δοκεῖ γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τούτων ἡ αἵρεσις ἀπὸ τῆς Σωκράτους ἀνεσχηκέναι διατριβῆς, ἀφ' ἧσπερ
 191 ἀνέσχε καὶ ἡ περὶ τὸν Πλάτωνα διαδοχῆ· φασὶν οὖν οἱ Κυρηναῖκοι κριτήρια εἶναι τὰ πάθη καὶ μόνα καταλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ ἀδιάψευστα τυγχάνειν, τῶν δὲ πεποιηκότων τὰ πάθη μηδὲν εἶναι καταληπτὸν μηδὲ ἀδιάψευστον. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ λευκαινόμεθα, φασί, καὶ γλυκαζόμεθα, δυνατόν λέγειν ἀδιαψεύστως καὶ [βεβαίως] ἀνεξελέγκτως· ὅτι δὲ τὸ ἐμποητικὸν τοῦ πάθους λευκόν ἐστὶν ἢ γλυκύ ἐστιν, οὐχ
 192 οἶόν τ' ἀποφαίνεσθαι. εἰκὸς γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ ὑπὸ μὴ λευκοῦ τινα λευκαντικῶς διατεθῆναι καὶ ὑπὸ μὴ

at times when numbed by winter's frost, he prods at the coiled mass with a stick, and then, after thus testing the presentation received, he assents to the fact that it is false to suppose that the body presented to him is a snake. And once again, as I said before, when we see a thing very plainly we assent to its being true when we have previously proved by testing that we have our senses in good order, and that we see it when wide awake and not asleep, and that there exists at the same time a clear atmosphere and a moderate distance and immobility on the part of the object perceived, so that because of these conditions 189 the presentation is trustworthy, we having had sufficient time for the scrutiny of the facts observed at the seat of the presentation. The same account is to be given of the irreversible presentation as well ; for they accept it whenever there is nothing capable of controverting it, as was said above in the case of Menelaus.

But now that we have set forth the Academic 190 doctrine from Plato down, it is not, I fancy, out of place to deal also with the Cyrenaic position ; for the Cyrenaic School appears to have arisen from the teaching of Socrates, from which also arose the School of Plato and his successors. The Cyrenaics, then, 191 assert that the affections are the criteria, and that they alone are apprehended and are infallible, but of the things that have caused the affections none is apprehensible or infallible. For, say they, that we feel whiteness or sweetness is a thing we can state infallibly and incontrovertibly ; but that the object productive of the affection is white or is sweet it is impossible to affirm. For it is likely 192 that a man might be made to feel whiteness by what

γλυκέος γλυκανθήναι. καθὰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν σκοτωθεὶς
καὶ ἰκτεριῶν ὠχραντικῶς ὑπὸ πάντων κινεῖται, ὁ
δὲ ὀφθαλμῶν ἐρυθθαίνεται, ὁ δὲ παραπιέσας τὸν
ὀφθαλμὸν ὡς ὑπὸ δυοῖν κινεῖται, ὁ δὲ μεμηνῶς
193 δισσᾶς ὄρᾳ τὰς Θήβας καὶ δισσοὺν φαντάζεται τὸν
ἥλιον, ἐπὶ πάντων δὲ τούτων τὸ μὲν ὅτι τὸδε τὶ
πάσχουσιν, οἷον ὠχραίνονται ἢ ἐρυθθαίνονται ἢ
δυσάζονται, ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ ὅτι ὠχρόν ἐστι τὸ κινουῦν
αὐτοὺς ἢ ἐνερευθές ἢ διπλοῦν ψεῦδος εἶναι νενόμι-
σται, οὕτω καὶ ἡμᾶς εὐλογώτατόν ἐστι πλέον τῶν
οἰκείων παθῶν μηδὲν λαμβάνειν δύνασθαι. ὅθεν
ἤτοι τὰ πάθη φαινόμενα θετέον ἢ τὰ ποιητικὰ τῶν
194 παθῶν. καὶ εἰ μὲν τὰ πάθη φαιμέν εἶναι φαινόμενα,
πάντα τὰ φαινόμενα λεκτέον ἀληθῆ καὶ καταληπτά·
εἰ δὲ τὰ ποιητικὰ τῶν παθῶν προσαγορευόμενα
φαινόμενα, πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ φαινόμενα ψευδῆ καὶ
πάντα ἀκατάληπτα. τὸ γὰρ περὶ ἡμᾶς συμβαῖνον
πάθος ἑαυτοῦ πλέον οὐδὲν ἡμῖν ἐνδείκνυται. ἔνθεν
καὶ, εἰ χρῆ τᾶληθές λέγειν, μόνον τὸ πάθος ἡμῖν
ἐστὶ φαινόμενον· τὸ δ' ἐκτὸς καὶ τοῦ πάθους ποιη-
τικὸν τάχα μὲν ἐστὶν ὄν, οὐ φαινόμενον δὲ ἡμῖν.
195 καὶ ταύτη περὶ μὲν τὰ πάθη τὰ γε οἰκεία πάντες
ἐσμὲν ἀπλανεῖς, περὶ δὲ τὸ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον
πάντες πλανώμεθα· κακείνα μὲν ἐστὶ καταληπτά,
τοῦτο δὲ ἀκατάληπτον, τῆς ψυχῆς πάνυ ἀσθενοῦς
καθεστῶσης πρὸς διάγνωσιν αὐτοῦ παρὰ τοὺς
τόπους, παρὰ τὰ διαστήματα, παρὰ τὰς κινήσεις,

* Cf. P.H. i. 101, 126.

† Eurip. Bacch. 918:

καὶ μὴν ὄραν μοι δύο μὲν ἡλίους δοκῶ
δισσᾶς δὲ Θήβας.

“The madman” is Pentheus.

is not white and sweetness by what is not sweet. For
just as the sufferer from vertigo or jaundice ^a receives
a yellowish impression from everything, and the
sufferer from ophthalmia sees things red, and he who
pushes his eye sideways gets as it were a double
impression, and the madman beholds a “doubled
Thebes,” and sees the image of a doubled sun,^b and in
193 all these cases, while it is true that they have this
particular affection (have, for instance, a feeling of
yellowness or of flushing or of doubleness), yet it is
supposed to be false to say that the object which
impresses them is yellow or reddish or double,—so
also it is most reasonable to hold that we are not able
to perceive anything more than our own immediate
affections. Hence we must posit as apparent either
the affections or the things productive of the affections.
And if we assert that the affections are apparent, we
194 must declare that all apparent things are true and
apprehensible; but if we term the things productive
of the affections apparent, all the apparent things are
false and all non-apprehensible.^c For the affection
which takes place in us reveals to us nothing more
than itself. Hence too (if one must speak the truth)
our affection alone is apparent to us, and the external
object which is productive of the affection, though it
is perhaps existent, is not apparent to us. And in
195 this way, whereas we are all unerring about our own
affections, as regards the external real object we all
err; and whereas the former are apprehensible, the
latter is non-apprehensible, the soul being far too
weak to discern it, owing to the positions, the

^c i.e. on the Cyrenaic assumption (§ 191) that affections
are apprehensible and true, their causes not so.

παρὰ τὰς μεταβολάς, παρὰ ἄλλας παμπληθεῖς
 αἰτίας. ἔνθεν οὐδὲ κριτήριόν φασιν εἶναι κοινὸν
 ἀνθρώπων, ὀνόματα δὲ κοινὰ τίθεσθαι τοῖς χρή-
 196 μασιν.¹ λευκὸν μὲν γάρ τι καὶ γλυκὺ καλοῦσι
 κοινῶς πάντες, κοινὸν δὲ τι λευκὸν ἢ γλυκὺ οὐκ
 ἔχουσι. ἕκαστος γὰρ τοῦ ἰδίου πάθους ἀντιλαμ-
 βάνεται, τὸ δὲ εἰ τοῦτο τὸ πάθος ἀπὸ λευκοῦ ἐγ-
 γίνεται αὐτῷ καὶ τῷ πέλας, οὐτ' αὐτὸς δύναται
 λέγειν μὴ ἀναδεχόμενος τὸ τοῦ πέλας πάθος, οὔτε
 197 ὁ πέλας μὴ ἀναδεχόμενος τὸ ἐκείνου. μηδενὸς δὲ
 κοινοῦ πάθους περὶ ἡμᾶς γινομένου προπετές ἐστι
 τὸ λέγειν ὅτι τὸ ἐμοὶ τοῖον φαινόμενον τοῖον καὶ
 τοῦ παρεστῶτι φαίνεται. τάχα γὰρ ἐγὼ μὲν οὕτω
 συγκρίμμαι ὡς λευκαίνεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔξωθεν
 προσπίπτοντος, ἕτερος δὲ οὕτω κατεσκευασμένην
 ἔχει τὴν αἴσθησιν ὥστε ἐτέρως διατεθῆναι. οὐ
 198 πάντως οὖν κοινὸν ἐστι τὸ φαινόμενον ἡμῖν. καὶ
 ὅτι τῷ ὄντι παρὰ τὰς διαφόρους τῆς αἰσθήσεως
 κατασκευὰς οὐχ ὡσαύτως κινούμεθα, πρόδηλον ἐπί-
 τε τῶν ἰκτεριῶντων καὶ ὀφθαλμιῶντων καὶ τῶν
 κατὰ φύσιν διακειμένων· ὡς γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ οἰ-
 μὲν ὠκρατικῶς οἱ δὲ φοινικτικῶς οἱ δὲ λευκαν-
 τικῶς πάσχουσι, οὕτως εἰκὸς ἐστι καὶ τοὺς κατὰ
 φύσιν διακειμένους παρὰ τὴν διάφορον τῶν αἰ-
 σθήσεων κατασκευὴν μὴ ὡσαύτως ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν
 κινεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐτέρως μὲν τὸν λευκόν, ἐτέρως δὲ
 τὸν χαροπὸν, μὴ ὡσαύτως δὲ τὸν μελανόφθαλμον.
 ὥστε κοινὰ μὲν ἡμᾶς ὀνόματα τίθεναι τοῖς πράγ-
 μασιν, πάθη δὲ γε ἔχειν ἴδια.

199 Ἐνάλογα δὲ εἶναι δοκεῖ τοῖς περὶ κριτηρίων

¹ χρήμασιν Natorp: κρίμασιν mss., Bekk.

intervals, the motions, the changes, and a host of
 other causes. Hence they assert that there exists
 no criterion common to mankind, but common names
 are given to the objects. For all in common use the
 terms "white" or "sweet," but they do not possess
 in common anything white or sweet. For each man
 perceives his own particular affection, but as to
 whether this affection is produced by a white object
 both in himself and in his neighbour, neither the
 man himself can affirm without experiencing his
 neighbour's affection, nor can the neighbour without
 experiencing that of the man. But since there is no
 affection which is common to us all, it is rash to assert
 that the thing which appears of this kind to me
 appears to be of this kind to the man next me as well.
 For possibly while I am so constituted as to get a
 feeling of whiteness from that which impresses me
 from without, the other man has his sense so con-
 structed as to be otherwise affected. So what appears
 to us is not always common to all. And that we do
 not, in fact, receive identical impressions, owing to the
 different constructions of our senses, is obvious in the
 case of sufferers from jaundice and ophthalmia and
 of those who are in a normal condition. For just as
 some have an affection of yellow, others of crimson,
 others of white, caused by the same object, so also
 it is likely that those who are in a normal condition
 will not receive identical impressions from the same
 objects owing to the differing construction of their
 senses, but the grey-eyed one kind, the blue-eyed
 another, and the black-eyed a different kind. So that
 we give to things names that are common, but the
 affections we have are peculiar to each of us.

Corresponding to the statements made by these 199

λεγομένοις κατὰ τούτους τοὺς ἄνδρας καὶ τὰ περὶ
 τελῶν λεγόμενα. διήκει γὰρ τὰ πάθη καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ
 τέλη. τῶν γὰρ παθῶν τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἡδέα τὰ δὲ
 ἀλγεινὰ τὰ δὲ μεταξύ, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀλγεινὰ κακὰ
 φασὶν εἶναι, ὡν τέλος ἀλγηδῶν, τὰ δὲ ἡδέα ἀγαθὰ,
 ὡν τέλος ἐστὶν ἀδιάρηστον ἡδονή, τὰ δὲ μεταξύ
 οὔτε ἀγαθὰ οὔτε κακὰ, ὡν τέλος τὸ οὔτε ἀγαθὸν
 οὔτε κακόν, ὅπερ πάθος ἐστὶ μεταξύ ἡδονῆς καὶ
 200 ἀλγηδόνος. πάντων οὖν τῶν ὄντων τὰ πάθη
 κριτήριά ἐστι καὶ τέλη, ζῶμέν τε, φασίν, ἐπόμενοι
 ταῦτοις, ἐναργεῖα τε καὶ εὐδοκήσει προσέχοντες,
 ἐναργεῖα μὲν κατὰ τὰ ἄλλα πάθη, εὐδοκήσει δὲ
 κατὰ τὴν ἡδονήν.

Τοιαῦτα μὲν καὶ οἱ Κυρηναῖκοί, συστέλλοντες
 μᾶλλον τὸ κριτήριον παρὰ τοὺς περὶ τὸν Πλάτωνα·
 ἐκείνοι μὲν γὰρ σύνθετον αὐτὸ ἐποίουν ἔκ τε ἐναρ-
 γείας καὶ τοῦ λόγου, οὗτοι δὲ ἐν μόναις αὐτὸ ταῖς
 ἐναργείαις καὶ τοῖς πάθεσιν δρίζουσιν.

201 Οὐκ ἄποθεν δὲ τῆς τούτων δόξης εὐκασιῶν εἶναι
 καὶ οἱ ἀποφαινόμενοι κριτήριον ὑπάρχειν τῆς ἀλη-
 θείας τὰς αἰσθήσεις. ὅτι γὰρ ἐγένοντό τινες τὸ
 τοιοῦτο ἀξιούντες, προὔπτον πεποίηκεν Ἀντίοχος
 ὁ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας, ἐν δευτέρῳ τῶν Κανονικῶν
 ῥητῶς γράψας ταῦτα “ ἄλλος δὲ τις, ἐν ἰατρικῇ μὲν
 οὐδενὸς δεύτερος, ἀπτόμενος δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφίας,
 ἐπέθετο τὰς μὲν αἰσθήσεις ὄντως καὶ ἀληθῶς
 ἀντιλήψεις εἶναι, λόγῳ δὲ μηδὲν ὅλως ἡμᾶς κατα-
 202 λαμβάνειν.” εἰκε γὰρ διὰ τούτων ὁ Ἀντίοχος τὴν
 προειρημένην τιθέναι στάσιν καὶ Ἀσκληπιάδην τὸν

men regarding criteria are, as it seems, their state-
 ments regarding Ends. For the affections reach even
 as far as the Ends.^a For of the affections some are
 pleasant, some painful, some intermediate; and the
 painful, they say, are evils, whereof the End is pain,
 and the pleasant are goods, whereof the infallible
 End is pleasure, and the intermediate are neither
 goods nor evils, whereof the End is neither good nor
 evil, this being an affection intermediate between
 pleasure and pain. Of all things, therefore, that exist 200
 the affections are the criteria and Ends, and we live,
 they say, by following these, paying attention to
 evidence and to approval—to evidence in respect of
 the other affections, but to approval in respect of
 pleasure.

Such are the views of the Cyrenaics, who thus, as
 compared with the Platonists, restricted the nature
 of the criterion more closely; for whereas the latter
 made it to be a compound of both evidence and
 reason,^b the former confine it to evidences and affec-
 tions.

Not far removed, it would seem, from the opinion 201
 of the Cyrenaics are those who declare the senses to be
 the criterion of truth. For that there have been some
 who have maintained this view has been made clear
 by Antiochus^c the Academic, when in the Second
 Book of his *Canonicis* he writes thus: “But a certain
 other man, second to none in the art of medicine
 and a student also of philosophy, believed that the
 sensations are really and truly perceptions, and that
 we apprehend nothing at all by the reason.” For in 202
 these words Antiochus seems to be stating the view
 mentioned above and to be hinting at Asclepiades the

^a i.e. the ethical “ends” (good and evil); cf. *P.H.* i. 25.

^b See §§ 141 ff.

^c Cf. § 162 *supra*; *P.H.* i. 235.

ιατρὸν αἰνίττεσθαι, ἀναιροῦντα μὲν τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον αὐτῷ γενόμενον. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῆς τούτου φορᾶς ποικιλώτερον καὶ κατ' ἰδίαν ἐν τοῖς ἱατρικοῖς ὑπομνήμασι διεξήλθομεν, ὥστε μὴ ἔχειν ἀνάγκην παλινωδεῖν.

203 Ἐπίκουρος δὲ δυοῖν ὄντων τῶν συζυγούντων ἀλλήλοις πραγμάτων, φαντασίας καὶ τῆς δόξης, τούτων τὴν φαντασίαν, ἣν καὶ ἐνάργειαν καλεῖ, διὰ παντὸς ἀληθῆ φησὶν ὑπάρχειν. ὥς γὰρ τὰ πρῶτα πάθη, τουτέστιν ἡδονὴ καὶ πόνος, ἀπὸ ποιητικῶν τινῶν καὶ κατ' αὐτὰ τὰ ποιητικὰ συνίσταται, οἷον ἢ μὲν ἡδονὴ ἀπὸ τῶν ἡδέων ἢ δὲ ἀλγηδῶν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλγεινῶν, καὶ οὔτε τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς ποιητικὸν ἐνδέχεται ποτε μὴ εἶναι ἡδὺ οὔτε τὸ τῆς ἀλγηδόνος παρεκτικὸν μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀλγεινόν, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ἡδον ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ἀλγύνον ἀλγεινὸν τὴν φύσιν ὑποκείσθαι, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν φαντασιῶν, παθῶν περὶ ἡμᾶς οὐσῶν, τὸ ποιητικὸν ἐκάστου αὐτῶν πάντη τε καὶ πάντως φανταστὸν ἔστιν, ὃ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ὄν φανταστὸν, μὴ ὑπάρχον κατ' ἀλήθειαν τοιοῦτον οἷον φαίνεται, ποιητικὸν φαντασίας καθεστάναι.

204 Καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ μέρος τὸ παραπλήσιον χρῆ λογίζεσθαι. τὸ γὰρ ὄρατὸν οὐ μόνον φαίνεται ὄρατόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔστι τοιοῦτον ὅποιον φαίνεται· καὶ τὸ ἀκουστόν οὐ μόνον φαίνεται ἀκουστόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῖς ἀληθείαις τοιοῦτον ὑπῆρχεν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡσαύτως. γίνονται οὖν πᾶσαι
205 αἱ φαντασίαι ἀληθεῖς. καὶ κατὰ λόγον· εἰ γὰρ ἀληθῆς λέγεται¹ φαντασία, φασὶν οἱ Ἐπικούρειοι,

¹ λέγεται N: φαίνεται cet., Bekk.

physician, who abolished the "ruling principle,"^a and who lived at the same time as himself. But of this man's attitude we have given a more circumstantial and particular account in our *Medical Memoirs*,^b so that there is no need to repeat the story.

Epicurus^c asserts that there are two things 203 which are correlative—namely, presentation and opinion,—of which the presentation, which he also terms "evidence," is constantly true. For just as the primary affections—that is to say pleasure and pain—come about owing to certain agents and in accord with those agents (pleasure, for instance, from things pleasant and pain from things painful), and it is impossible for the agent productive of pleasure ever to be not pleasant, or that which is creative of pain to be not painful, but of necessity that which gives pleasure must in its real nature be pleasant and that which gives pain painful,—so also in the case of the presentations, which are affections of ours, the agent which is productive of each of them is always entirely presented, and, as being presented, it is incapable of being productive of the presentation without being in very truth such as it appears.

In the case, also, of the particular sensations one 204 must argue in like manner. Thus the visible object not only appears visible but actually is such as it appears; and the audible object not only appears audible but also really is so in truth; and so on with the rest. The presentations, then, which occur are all true. And reasonably so; for, say the Epicureans, 205

^a *i.e.* denied the existence of that part of the soul which the Stoics termed the "ruling principle" or "regent part"; cf. Vol. I. *Intro.* p. xxv.

^b This work of Sextus is no longer extant.

^c Cf. § 368.

ὅταν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντός τε καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον γίνηται, πᾶσα δὲ φαντασία ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος τοῦ φανταστοῦ καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ φανταστόν συνίσταται, πᾶσα κατ' ἀνάγκην φαντασία ἐστὶν ἀληθής.

206 ἐξαπατᾶ δὲ ἐνίους ἢ διαφορὰ τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, οἷον ὄρατοῦ, δοκουσῶν προσπίπτει φαντασιῶν, καθ' ἣν ἢ ἀλλοιόχρουν ἢ ἀλλοιόσχημον ἢ ἄλλως πως ἐξηλλαγμένον φαίνεται τὸ ὑποκείμενον. ὑπενόησαν γὰρ ὅτι τῶν οὕτω διαφερουσῶν καὶ μαχομένων φαντασιῶν δεῖ τὴν μὲν τινα ἀληθῆ εἶναι τὴν δ' ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ψευδῆ τυγχάνειν. ὅπερ ἐστὶν εὐθές, καὶ ἀνδρῶν μὴ συνορώντων τὴν

207 ἐν τοῖς οὐσι φύσιν. οὐ γὰρ ὄλον ὄραται τὸ στερεμνιον, ἵνα ἐπὶ τῶν ὄρατῶν ποιῶμεθα τὸν λόγον, ἀλλὰ τὸ χρῶμα τοῦ στερεμνίου. τοῦ δὲ χρώματος τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ στερεμνίου, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν σύνεγγυς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μετρίου διαστήματος βλεπομένων, τὸ δ' ἐκτὸς τοῦ στερεμνίου κἂν τοῖς ἐφεξῆς τόποις ὑποκείμενον, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐκ μακροῦ διαστήματος θεωρουμένων. τοῦτο δὲ ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ ἐξαλλαττόμενον, καὶ ἴδιον ἀναδεχόμενον σχῆμα, τοιαύτην ἀναδίδωσι φαντασίαν ὅποιον καὶ

208 αὐτὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ὑπόκειται. ὅπερ οὖν τρόπον οὔτε ἢ ἐν τῷ κρουομένῳ χαλκῷματι φωνῆ ἐξακουέται οὔτε ἢ ἐν τῷ στόματι τοῦ κεκραγῶτος, ἀλλ' ἢ προσπίπτουσα τῇ ἡμέτερα αἰσθήσει, καὶ ὡς οὐθείς φησι τὸν ἐξ ἀποστήματος μικρᾶς ἀκούοντα φωνῆς ψευδῶς ἀκούειν, ἐπεὶ περ σύνεγγυς ἐλθὼν ὡς μείζονος ταύτης ἀντιλαμβάνεται, οὕτως οὐκ ἂν εἴποιμι ψεύδεσθαι τὴν ὄψιν, ὅτι ἐκ μακροῦ μὲν διαστήματος

if a presentation is termed " true " whenever it arises from a real object and in accord with that real object, and every presentation arises from a real presented object and in accord with that object, then every presentation is necessarily true. But some are de- 206 ceived by the difference in the presentations which seem to be derived from the same object of sense—for instance a visible object—because of which the object appears of another colour or of another shape, or altered in some other way. For they have supposed that, of the presentations thus differing and conflicting, one kind must be true and the kind derived from an opposite source false. But this is silly, and the notion of men who do not fully consider the real nature of things. Thus—to base our 207 argument on objects of sight—it is not the whole of the solid body that is seen, but the colour of the solid body. And of the colour, one part is on the solid (as in the case of objects seen close at hand or at a moderate distance), and another part outside the solid and existent in the spaces adjacent (as in the case of things viewed at a great distance).^a And this being altered in the intervening space and receiving a special shape of its own gives rise to a presentation which is similar to its own real nature. For just as 208 neither the sound in the brass instrument that is struck, nor the sound in the mouth of the man who shouts, is heard but the sound which strikes on our own sense ; and just as no one says that he who hears a faint sound from a distance hears falsely because the same man, on coming close, perceives it as loud ;—just so I should decline to say that the eyesight is

ing that its colour is partly absorbed by the intervening space, and thus is " outside the solid " (body).

^a The Epicureans explained the fact that our impressions of a coloured object vary with its distance from us by assum-

209 μικρὸν ὄρα τὸν πύργον καὶ στρογγύλον ἐκ δὲ τοῦ
 σύνεγγυς μείζονα καὶ τετράγωνον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον
 ἀληθεύειν, ὅτι καὶ ὅτε φαίνεται μικρὸν αὐτῇ τὸ
 αἰσθητὸν καὶ τοιούτῳ σχημον, ὄντως ἐστὶ μικρὸν
 καὶ τοιούτῳ σχημον, τῇ διὰ τοῦ ἀέρος φορᾷ ἀπο-
 θραυομένων τῶν κατὰ τὰ εἶδωλα περάτων, καὶ ὅτε
 μέγα πάλιν καὶ ἀλλοιόσχημον, πάλιν ὁμοίως μέγα
 καὶ ἀλλοιόσχημον, ἤδη μέντοι οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀμφοτέρα
 καθεστώς. τοῦτο γὰρ τῆς διαστρόφου λοιπὸν ἐστὶ
 δόξης οἰεσθαι, ὅτι τὸ αὐτὸ ἦν τό τε ἐκ τοῦ σύνεγγυς
 210 καὶ τὸ πόρρωθεν θεωρούμενον φανταστόν. αἰ-
 σθήσεως δὲ ἴδιον ὑπῆρχε τοῦ παρόντος μόνον καὶ
 κινουόντος αὐτὴν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, οἷον χρώματος,
 οὐχὶ δὲ τὸ διακρίνειν ὅτι ἄλλο μὲν ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνθάδε
 ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ἐνθάδε ὑποκείμενον. διόπερ αἱ μὲν
 φαντασίαι διὰ ταῦτα πᾶσαι εἰσιν ἀληθεῖς, (αἱ δὲ
 δόξαι οὐ πᾶσαι ἦσαν ἀληθεῖς,)¹ ἀλλ' εἶχόν τινα
 διαφοράν. τούτων γὰρ αἱ μὲν ἦσαν ἀληθεῖς αἱ
 δὲ ψευδεῖς, ἐπεὶ κρίσεις καθεστᾶσιν ἡμῶν ἐπὶ
 ταῖς φαντασίαις, κρίνομεν δὲ τὰ μὲν ὀρθῶς τὰ
 δὲ μοχθηρῶς ἤτοι παρὰ τὸ προστιθέναί τι καὶ
 προσνέμειν ταῖς φαντασίαις ἢ παρὰ τὸ ἀφαιρεῖν
 τι τούτων καὶ κοινῶς καταψεύδεσθαι τῆς ἀλόγου
 211 αἰσθήσεως. οὐκοῦν τῶν δόξων κατὰ τὸν Ἐπί-
 κουρον αἱ μὲν ἀληθεῖς εἰσὶν αἱ δὲ ψευδεῖς, ἀληθεῖς
 μὲν αἱ τε ἐπιμαρτυρούμεναι καὶ οὐκ ἀντιμαρ-
 τυρούμεναι πρὸς τῆς ἐναργείας, ψευδεῖς δὲ αἱ τε
 ἀντιμαρτυρούμεναι καὶ οὐκ ἐπιμαρτυρούμεναι πρὸς
 212 τῆς ἐναργείας. ἐστὶ δὲ ἐπιμαρτύρησις μὲν κατὰ-
 ληψις δι' ἐναργείας τοῦ τὸ δοξαζόμενον τοιοῦτον

¹ <αἱ δὲ . . . ἀληθεῖς> add. Usener, Mutsch.: αἱ δὲ δόξαι
 εἶχόν (om. ἀλλ') Bekk.

false because at a long distance it sees the tower as
 small and round but from close at hand as large and
 square, but I should say rather that it reports truly 209
 because, when the object of sense appears to it small
 and of a certain shape, it really is small and of a cer-
 tain shape, as the limits belonging to the images^a are
 rubbed away by their passage through the air; and
 again when it appears large and of a different shape
 it is correspondingly large and of a different shape,
 since it is no longer the same object that is both at
 once. For it is left to the distorted opinion to imagine
 that the presented object seen from close at hand is
 the same as that seen from a distance. But it is the 210
 special function of sense to perceive only that which
 is present and affects it—colour, for instance—but
 not to discern that the object here is one thing and
 the object there another. Hence, for these reasons,
 presentations are all true, (but opinions are not all
 true) but possess certain distinctions. For some of
 them are true, others false, since they are judgements
 of ours concerning the presentations, and we judge
 sometimes rightly and sometimes wrongly either
 because of adding and attaching something to the
 presentations or because of subtracting something
 from them and, in either case, falsifying the irrational
 sensation. Of opinions, then, according to Epicurus, 211
 some are true, others false; the true being those
 which testify for, and not against, the evidence of
 sense, and the false those which testify against, and
 not for, that evidence. And confirmatory testimony 212
 is apprehension by means of evidence that the thing

^a Sensation, according to Epicurus, is caused by "images"
 or "effluences," which issue forth from the external objects and
 strike upon the organs of sense; cf. Vol. I. Introd. p. xxlii.

εἶναι ὁποῖόν ποτε ἐδοξάζετο, οἷον Πλάτωνος μα-
 κρόθεν προσιόντος εἰκάζω μὲν καὶ δοξάζω παρὰ τὸ
 διάστημα ὅτι Πλάτων ἐστί, προσπελάσαντος δὲ
 αὐτοῦ προσεμαρτυρήθη ὅτι ὁ Πλάτων ἐστί, συν-
 αιρεθέντος τοῦ διαστήματος, καὶ ἐπεμαρτυρήθη δι'
 213 αὐτῆς τῆς ἐναργείας. οὐκ ἀντιμαρτύρησις δὲ ἐστὶν
 ἀκολουθία τοῦ ὑποσταθέντος καὶ δοξασθέντος
 ἀδήλου τῷ φαινομένῳ, οἷον ὁ Ἐπίκουρος λέγων
 εἶναι κενόν, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀδηλον, πιστοῦται δι' ἐναρ-
 γοῦς πράγματος τοῦτο, τῆς κινήσεως· μὴ ὄντος
 γὰρ κενοῦ οὐδὲ κίνησις ὄφειλεν εἶναι, τόπον μὴ
 214 ἔχοντος τοῦ κινουμένου σώματος εἰς ὃν περιστή-
 σεται διὰ τὸ πάντα πλήρη εἶναι καὶ ναστά, ὥστε
 τῷ δοξασθέντι ἀδήλῳ μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρεῖν τὸ φαινό-
 μενον κινήσεως οὔσης. ἢ μέντοι ἀντιμαρτύρησις
 μαχόμενόν τί ἐστί τῇ οὐκ ἀντιμαρτυρήσει· ἦν γὰρ
 συνασκεινὴ τοῦ φαινομένου τῷ ὑποσταθέντι ἀ-
 δήλῳ, οἷον ὁ στωικὸς λέγει μὴ εἶναι κενόν, ἀδηλόν τι
 ἀξιῶν, τούτῳ δὲ οὕτως ὑποσταθέντι ὄφειλεν τὸ
 φαινόμενον συνασκεινάζεσθαι, φημί δ' ἢ κινήσις·
 μὴ ὄντος γὰρ κενοῦ κατ' ἀνάγκην οὐδὲ κινήσις
 215 γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὸν ἤδη προδοδηλωμένον ἡμῖν
 τρόπον. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἢ οὐκ ἐπιμαρτύρησις
 ἀντίξου ἐστὶ τῇ ἐπιμαρτυρήσει· ἦν γὰρ ὑπόπτωσις
 δι' ἐναργείας τοῦ τὸ δοξαζόμενον μὴ εἶναι τοιοῦτον
 ὁποῖόν περ ἐδοξάζετο, οἷον πόρρωθεν τινος προσ-
 ιόντος εἰκάζομεν παρὰ τὸ διάστημα Πλάτωνα εἶναι,
 ἀλλὰ συναιρεθέντος τοῦ διαστήματος ἐγνωμεν δι'
 ἐναργείας ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶ Πλάτων. καὶ γέγονε τὸ
 116

opined is of such a sort as it was opined to be—as
 when, for example, on the approach of Plato from
 afar I guess and opine, because of the distance, that
 it is Plato, and when he has drawn near the fact that
 he is Plato is further testified—the distance being
 reduced—and is confirmed by actual evidence of
 sense. And lack of contrary testimony is the con- 213
 gruity of the supposed and opined non-evident object
 with the apparent—as when Epicurus says that
 void exists, which is a thing non-evident, and this is
 supported by an obvious fact, namely motion ; for if
 void does not exist, neither ought motion to exist, the
 moving body having no place into which to pass over,
 owing to the fact that all things are full and close-
 packed ; so that, since motion exists, the apparent 214
 does not give testimony that contradicts the opined
 non-evident fact. But contrary testimony is some-
 thing which conflicts with lack of contrary testimony ;
 for it is the joint-refutation of the apparent fact and
 the supposed non-evident fact,—as when, for instance,
 the Stoic says that void does not exist, assert-
 ing something non-evident, and jointly with this
 supposed fact the apparent fact, by which I mean
 motion, is necessarily refuted ; for if void does not
 exist, of necessity motion does not exist either,
 according to the argument we have already set out.
 So likewise lack of confirmatory testimony is opposed 215
 to confirmatory testimony ; for it is the impression
 due to sense-evidence that the thing opined is not
 such as it was opined to be ; as, for instance, when
 someone is approaching from afar and we guess,
 because of the distance, that it is Plato, but when
 the distance is reduced we learn by evidence that
 it is not Plato. Such an occurrence is lack of con-

τοιοῦτον οὐκ ἐπιμαρτύρησις· οὐ γὰρ ἐπιμαρτυρήθη
 216 τῷ φαινομένῳ τὸ δοξαζόμενον. ὅθεν ἡ μὲν ἐπι-
 μαρτύρησις καὶ οὐκ ἀντιμαρτύρησις τοῦ ἀληθῆς
 εἶναι τι ἔστι κριτήριον, ἡ δὲ οὐκ ἐπιμαρτύρησις
 καὶ ἀντιμαρτύρησις τοῦ ψεύδους εἶναι. πάντων δὲ
 κρηπὶς καὶ θεμέλιος ἡ ἐνάργεια.
 217 Τοιοῦτο μὲν καὶ κατὰ τὸν Ἐπίκουρόν ἐστι κριτή-
 ριον· οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη καὶ Θεόφραστον
 καὶ κοινῶς οἱ περιπατητικοί, διττῆς οὔσης κατὰ τὸ
 ἀνωτάτω τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων φύσεως, ἐπεὶ τὰ μὲν,
 καθὼς προείπον, αἰσθητὰ ἐστί τὰ δὲ νοητά, διττὸν
 καὶ αὐτοὶ τὸ κριτήριον ἀπολείπουσιν, αἰσθησῶ μὲν
 218 τῶν αἰσθητῶν νόησιν δὲ τῶν νοητῶν, κοινὸν δὲ
 ἀμφοτέρων, ὡς ἔλεγεν ὁ Θεόφραστος, τὸ ἐναργές.
 τάξει μὲν οὖν πρῶτόν ἐστι τὸ ἄλογον καὶ ἀναπόδει-
 κτον κριτήριον, ἡ αἰσθησις, δυνάμει δὲ ὁ νοῦς, εἰ καὶ
 τῇ τάξει δευτερεύειν δοκεῖ παρὰ τὴν αἰσθησῶν.
 219 ἀπὸ μὲν γὰρ τῶν αἰσθητῶν κινεῖται ἡ αἰσθησις,
 ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς κατὰ ἐνάργειαν περὶ τὴν αἰσθησῶν
 κινήσεως ἐπιγίνεται τι κατὰ ψυχὴν κίνημα τοῖς
 κρείττοσι καὶ βελτίοσι καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν δυναμένοις
 κινεῖσθαι ζῶοις. ὅπερ μνήμη τε καὶ φαντασία
 καλεῖται παρ' αὐτοῖς, μνήμη μὲν τοῦ περὶ τὴν
 αἰσθησῶν πάθους, φαντασία δὲ τοῦ ἐμποιήσαντος
 220 τῇ αἰσθήσει τὸ πάθος αἰσθητοῦ. διόπερ ἔχκει τὸ
 τοιοῦτον ἀναλογεῖν κίνημα φασίν· καὶ ὃν τρόπον
 ἐκεῖνο, φημί δὲ τὸ ἔχκος, ὑπὸ τινός τε γίνεται καὶ
 ἀπὸ τινος, ὑπὸ τινος μὲν οἶον τῆς τοῦ ποδός ἐπ-
 ερείσεως, ἀπὸ τινος δὲ ὡσπερ τοῦ Δίωνος, οὕτω καὶ
 τὸ προειρημένον τῆς ψυχῆς κίνημα ὑφ' οὗ μὲν
 γίνεται ὡσπερ τοῦ περὶ τὴν αἰσθησῶν πάθους, ἀφ'

* Cf. § 228.

firmatory testimony; for the thing opined was not
 confirmed by the apparent fact. Hence confirmatory 216
 testimony and lack of contrary testimony form a
 criterion of the truth of a thing, but lack of con-
 firmatory testimony and contradictory testimony of
 its falsehood. And the base and foundation of all
 is the evidence of sense.

Such, then, is the criterion according to Epicurus. 217
 But Aristotle and Theophrastus and the Peripatetics
 in general, seeing that the nature of things falls
 into two main classes,—since, as I said before, some
 things are sensible, others intelligible,—themselves
 also admit a twofold criterion, sense of things sensible
 and intellect of things intelligible, while common to 218
 both, as Theophrastus said, is the plainly evident.
 First, then, in order comes the irrational and non-
 demonstrable criterion, sense, but first in potency
 intellect, although it appears to come second in order
 as compared with sense. For the sense is affected by 219
 things sensible, and as a result of the affection of the
 sense in an evident way there supervenes an affection
 of the soul in such creatures as are superior and better
 and able to move of themselves; and this is termed by
 them memory and presentation—memory of the affec-
 tion felt by the sense, and presentation of the sensible
 object which has produced the affection in the sense.
 Hence they say that an affection of this kind is com- 220
 parable to a foot-mark^a; and just as that (I mean
 the foot-mark) is made both by something and from
 something—by something as, for example, by the
 pressure of the foot, and from something, as, say, from
 Dion,—so also the affection of the soul mentioned
 above is generated by something, as, say, the affection
 of the sense, and from something, such as the sensible

οὐδὲ καθάπερ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, πρὸς ὃ καὶ ὁμοίωτητά
 221 τινα σώζει. τοῦτο δὲ πάλιν τὸ κίνημα, ὅπερ
 μνήμη τε καὶ φαντασία καλεῖται, εἶχεν ἐν ἑαυτῷ
 τρίτον ἐπιγινόμενον ἄλλο κίνημα τὸ τῆς λογικῆς
 φαντασίας, κατὰ κρίσιν λοιπὸν καὶ προαίρεσιν τὴν
 ἡμετέραν συμβαῖνον, ὅπερ κίνημα διάνοιά τε καὶ
 νοῦς προσαγορεύεται, οἷον ὅταν τις προσπεσόντος
 κατ' ἐνάργειαν Δίωνος πάθη πως τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ
 τραπήῃ, ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ περι τὴν αἴσθησιν πάθους ἐγ-
 γνήηται τις αὐτοῦ τῆ ψυχῆ φαντασία, ἣν καὶ μνήμη
 222 πρότερον ἐλέγομεν καὶ ἴχνει παραπλήσιον ὑπάρχειν,
 ἀπὸ δὲ ταύτης τῆς φαντασίας ἐκουσίως ἀνάζω-
 γραφῆ αὐτῷ καὶ ἀναπλάσσει φάντασμα, καθάπερ τὸν
 γενικὸν ἄνθρωπον. τὸ γὰρ δὴ τοιοῦτο κίνημα τῆς
 ψυχῆς κατὰ διαφόρους ἐπιβολὰς οἱ περιπατητικοὶ
 τῶν φιλοσόφων διάνοιάν τε καὶ νοῦν ὀνομάζουσι,
 κατὰ μὲν τὸ δύνασθαι διάνοιαν, κατὰ δὲ ἐνέργειαν
 223 νοῦν· ὅταν μὲν γὰρ δύνηται τοῦτον ποιεῖσθαι τὸν
 ἀναπλασμὸν ψυχῆ, τουτέστιν ὅταν πεφύκη, διάνοια
 καλεῖται, ὅταν δὲ ἐνεργητικῶς ἤδη ποιῆ, νοῦς ὀνο-
 μάζεται. ἀπὸ μέντοι τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς διανοήσεως
 συνίσταται ἢ τε ἔννοια καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ τέχνη.
 διανόσεις μὲν γὰρ γίνεται ὅτε μὲν τῶν κατὰ μέρος
 224 εἰδῶν ὅτε δὲ τῶν τε εἰδῶν καὶ τῶν γενῶν· ἀλλ' ὁ
 μὲν ἀθροισμὸς τῶν τοιούτων τοῦ νοῦ φαντασμάτων
 καὶ ἡ συγκεφαλαίωσις τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους εἰς τὸ
 καθόλου ἔννοια καλεῖται, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀθροισμῷ τούτῳ
 καὶ τῆ συγκεφαλαίωσει τελευταῖον ὑφίσταται ἢ τε
 ἐπιστήμη καὶ τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη μὲν τὸ ἀκριβὲς καὶ
 ἀδιάπτωτον ἔχουσα, τέχνη δὲ ἢ μὴ πάντως τοιαύτη.
 225 ὥσπερ δὲ ἢ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ τεχνῶν φύσις ἐστὶν
 ὑστερογενής, οὕτω καὶ ἢ καλουμένη δόξα· ὅταν γὰρ

object, to which also it preserves a certain similarity.
 And this affection, again, which is termed both 221
 memory and presentation, possesses within itself a
 third and separate supervenient affection—that of
 rational presentation, which is an after-result con-
 sequent on our judgement and preference; and this
 affection is called mind and thought; as, for example,
 when someone, on receiving an evident impression of
 Dion, suffers a certain affection of sense and a certain
 disturbance, and by the affection of his sense there is
 produced in his soul a presentation (which is also, as
 we said above, memory and similar to a foot-mark),
 and from this presentation there is voluntarily limned 222
 and represented by him an imagined object, such as
 generic Man. Now this kind of affection of the soul
 the Peripatetic philosophers call either mind or
 thought according to the different ways in which it
 occurs—mind in so far as it is a potency, thought in
 so far as it is an actuality; for whenever the soul is 223
 potentially able to form this representation—that is
 to say, whenever it is of a nature to do so—it is called
 mind, but whenever it is already actually doing so,
 it is termed thought. Moreover, from thought and
 the action of mind arise comprehension and science
 and art. For mental action deals at one time with
 particulars, at another with both particulars and
 genera; but the aggregation of such images of the 224
 thought and the summing-up of the particulars in
 the universal is termed comprehension, and in this
 process of aggregation and summing-up the last stage
 constitutes science and art—science being that which
 possesses accuracy and inerrancy, art that which
 does not always possess them. And as the sciences 225
 and arts are of later origin, so also is what is termed

εἴη ἡ ψυχὴ τῇ ἀπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἐγγενομένη
 226 φαντασίᾳ καὶ τῷ φανέντῳ πρόσθηται καὶ συγκατά-
 μένων πρῶτα κριτήρια τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων γνώ-
 σεως ἢ τε αἰσθήσεις καὶ ὁ νοῦς, ἢ μὲν ὄργανον
 τρόπον ἔχουσα ὁ δὲ τεχνίτου. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡμεῖς
 οὐ δυνάμεθα χωρὶς ζυγοῦ τὴν τῶν βαρέων καὶ
 κούφων ἐξέτασιν ποιέσθαι, οὐδὲ ἄτερ κανόνος τὴν
 τῶν εὐθέων καὶ στρεβλῶν διαφορὰν λαβεῖν, οὕτως
 οὐδὲ ὁ νοῦς χωρὶς αἰσθήσεως δοκιμάσαι πέφυκε τὰ
 πράγματα.

Τοιοῦτοι μὲν ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίοις εἰσι καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ
 227 τοῦ περιπάτου ἀπολειπομένης δ' ἔτι τῆς στωικῆς
 δόξης παρακειμένως καὶ περὶ ταύτης λέγωμεν.
 κριτήριον τοίνυν φασὶν ἀληθείας εἶναι οἱ ἄνδρες
 οὗτοι τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν. ταύτην δ'
 εἰσόμεθα, πρότερον γνόντες τί ποτέ ἐστι κατ' αὐτοὺς
 ἢ φαντασία καὶ τίνες ἐπ' εἶδους ταύτης διαφοραί.
 228 φαντασία οὖν ἐστὶ κατ' αὐτοὺς τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ.
 περὶ ἧς εὐθύς καὶ διέστησαν. Κλεάνθης μὲν γὰρ
 ἤκουσε τὴν τύπωσιν κατὰ εἰσοχὴν τε καὶ ἐξοχὴν,
 ὥσπερ καὶ (τὴν)¹ διὰ τῶν δακτυλίων γυνομένην
 229 τοῦ κηροῦ τύπωσιν, Χρύσιππος δὲ ἄτοπον ἡγείτο
 τὸ τοιοῦτο. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ φησι, τῆς διανοίας
 δεήσει ὑφ' ἐν ποτε τρίγωνόν τι καὶ τετράγωνον
 φαντασιουμένης τὸ αὐτὸ σῶμα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν
 χρόνον διαφέροντα ἔχειν περὶ αὐτῷ σχήματα ἅμα
 τε τρίγωνον καὶ τετράγωνον γίνεσθαι ἢ καὶ περι-
 φερές, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄτοπον· εἶτα πολλῶν ἅμα φαν-

¹ <τὴν> add. Zeller.

^o Cf. P.H. ii. 70.

^b i.e. the mind, or part of the soul which receives the

“opinion”; for whenever the soul yields to the
 presentation produced in it by sense and inclines and
 assents to the object which has appeared, this is
 called “opinion.” It appears, then, from what has 226
 been said that the primary criteria of the knowledge
 of things are sensation and thought, the former
 playing the part of the instrument, the latter that of
 the craftsman. For just as we are unable to carry out
 a test of things heavy and light without a balance,
 or to grasp the difference between things straight
 and crooked without a rule, so likewise thought is
 naturally incapable of estimating objects when
 divorced from sense.

Such, then, summarily stated, are the views of the
 Peripatetics; and as there still remains the Stoic 227
 doctrine, let us deal with it also in the next place.
 These men, then, assert that the criterion of truth
 is the apprehensive presentation. What this is we
 shall understand when we have first learnt what, in
 their view, presentation is and what are its specific
 differences. Presentation then, according to them, 228
 is an impression on the soul. But about this they at
 once began to quarrel; for whereas Cleanthes under-
 stood “impression” as involving eminence and
 depression,^a just as does the impression made in wax
 by signet-rings, Chrysippus regarded such a thing as 229
 absurd. For in the first place, he says, when the
 mind imagines at one and the same moment a tri-
 angular object and a quadrangular, the same body^b
 must needs be circumscribed by different forms at the
 same time and become simultaneously both triangular
 and quadrangular, or even circular, which is absurd;

^a “impression,”—the Stoics regarding the soul as just as truly
 “corporeal” as the body; cf. Vol. I. *Intro.* pp. xxiv f.

τασίων ὑφισταμένων ἐν ἡμῖν παμπληθεῖς καὶ τοὺς
 σχηματισμοὺς ἕξειν τὴν ψυχὴν, ὃ τοῦ προτέρου
 230 χείρόν ἐστιν. αὐτὸς οὖν τὴν τύπωσιν εἰρησθαι ὑπὸ
 τοῦ Ζήνωνος ὑπενόει ἀντὶ τῆς ἑτεροιώσεως, ὥστ'
 εἶναι τοιοῦτον τὸν λόγον "φαντασία ἐστὶν ἑτε-
 ροιώσις ψυχῆς," μηκέτι ἀτόπου ὄντος τοῦ τὸ αὐτὸ
 σῶμα ὑφ' ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον πολλῶν περὶ
 231 ἡμᾶς συνισταμένων φαντασιῶν παμπληθεῖς ἀνα-
 πύσσονται ἑτεροιώσεις· ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ ἀήρ, ὅταν ἅμα
 πολλοὶ φωνῶσιν, ἀμυθῆτους ὑπὸ ἓν καὶ διαφερούσας
 ἀναδεχόμενος πληγὰς εὐθύς πολλὰς ἴσχει καὶ τὰς
 ἑτεροιώσεις, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ποικίλως
 φαντασιούμενον ἀνάλογόν τι τούτῳ πείσεται.
 232 "Ἄλλοι δὲ οὐδὲ τὸν κατὰ διόρθωσιν ἐκείνου ἐξ-
 ενεχθέντα ὅρον ὀρθῶς ἔχειν φασίν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἔστι
 τις φαντασία, αὕτη τύπωσις καὶ ἑτεροιώσις τῆς
 ψυχῆς καθέστηκεν· εἰ δὲ τις ἐστὶ τύπωσις τῆς
 ψυχῆς, ἐκείνη οὐ πάντως ἐστὶ φαντασία. καὶ γὰρ
 προσπταίσματος γενομένου περὶ τὸν δάκτυλον ἢ
 κνησμοῦ περὶ τὴν χεῖρα συμβάντος τύπωσις μὲν
 καὶ ἑτεροιώσις τῆς ψυχῆς ἀποτελεῖται, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ
 φαντασία, ἐπεὶπερ οὐδὲ περὶ τῷ τυχόντι μέρει τῆς
 ψυχῆς γίνεσθαι ταύτην συμβέβηκεν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆ
 233 διανοίᾳ μόνον καὶ τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ. πρὸς οὗς
 ἀπαντῶντες οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς συνεμφαίνεσθαι φασὶ
 τῆ τυπώσεως τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ὡς ἂν ἐν ψυχῇ, ὥστε εἶναι
 τὸ πλήρες τοιοῦτον "φαντασία ἐστὶ τύπωσις ἐν
 ψυχῇ ὡς ἂν ἐν ψυχῇ." καθὰ γὰρ ἡ ἐφηλότης
 λέγεται λευκότης ἐν ὀφθαλμῷ συνεμφαινόντων
 ἡμῶν τὸ ὡς ἐν ὀφθαλμῷ, τουτέστι τὸ κατὰ ποιόν

* A disease of the eye, supposed to be derived from rays of the sun ("Helios").

and further, when many presentations occur in us
 simultaneously, the soul will also receive innumerable
 formations, which result is worse than the former.
 He himself, therefore, suspected that the term 230
 "impression" was used by Zeno in the sense of
 "alteration," so that the definition runs like this—
 "presentation is an alteration of the soul"; for it is
 no longer absurd that, when many presentations
 co-exist in us at the same moment, the same body
 should admit of innumerable alterations; for just 231
 as the air, when many people are speaking simul-
 taneously, receives in a single moment numberless
 and different impacts and at once undergoes many
 alterations also, so too when the regent part is the
 subject of a variety of images it will experience some-
 thing analogous to this.

But others assert that not even the definition 232
 thus put forth in accordance with the amendment
 of Chrysippus is correct. For if a presentation exists,
 it is an impression and alteration of the soul; but if
 an impression of the soul exists, it is not in all cases
 a presentation. For in fact when a knock happens to
 the finger, or a scratch occurs in the hand, there is
 produced indeed an impression and alteration of the
 soul, but not a presentation as well; seeing that this
 is a result which occurs not in any chance part of the
 soul but only in the mind and the regent part.—By 233
 way of meeting their objection the Stoics declare that
 in the phrase "impression of the soul" there is im-
 plied also the words "in so far as it is soul," so that
 the full statement is this—"presentation is an
 impression in the soul in so far as it is soul." For just
 as "ephelotes" ^a is defined as "whiteness in the eye,"
 wherewith we also imply that "in so far as it is eye"

μέρος τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ, τὴν λευκότητα εἶναι, ἵνα μὴ πάντες οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἐφηλότητα ἔχωμεν ὡς ἂν πάντες ἐκ φύσεως ἔχοντες λευκότητα ἐν ὀφθαλμῷ, οὕτως ὅταν λέγωμεν τὴν φαντασίαν τύπωσιν ἐν ψυχῇ, συνεμφαίνομεν καὶ τὸ περὶ ποιὸν μέρος γίνεσθαι τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν τύπωσιν, τούτεστι τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, ὥστε ἐξαπλούμενον γίνεσθαι τὸν ὄρον τοιοῦτον "φαντασία ἐστὶν ἑτεροίωσις ἐν ἡγεμο-
 234 νικῶν." ἄλλοι δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς ὀρμώμενοι δυνάμειωσ γλαφυρότερον ἀπελογήσαντο. φασὶ γὰρ ψυχὴν λέγεσθαι διχῶς, τό τε συνέχον τὴν ὅλην συγκρισιν καὶ κατ' ἰδίαν τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. ὅταν γὰρ εἴπωμεν συνεστάναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, ἢ τὸν θάνατον εἶναι χωρισμὸν ψυχῆς ἀπὸ
 235 σώματος, ἰδίως καλοῦμεν τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὅταν διαιρούμενοι φάσκωμεν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι περὶ ψυχὴν τὰ δὲ περὶ σῶμα τὰ δ' ἐκτός, οὐ τὴν ὅλην ψυχὴν ἐμφαίνομεν ἀλλὰ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν ταύτης μόριον· περὶ τοῦτω γὰρ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ
 236 ἀγαθὰ συνίσταται. διόπερ καὶ ὅταν λέγῃ ὁ Ζήνων φαντασίαν εἶναι τύπωσιν ἐν ψυχῇ, ἀκουστέον ψυχὴν οὐ τὴν ὅλην ἀλλὰ τὸ μόριον αὐτῆς, ἵνα ἢ τὸ λεγόμενον οὕτως ἔχον "φαντασία ἐστὶν ἑτεροίωσις περὶ
 237 τὸ ἡγεμονικόν." ἀλλὰ καὶ οὕτως ἔχῃ, φασὶ τινες, πάλιν ἡμάρτηται. καὶ γὰρ ἡ ὀρμὴ καὶ ἡ συγκατάθεσις καὶ ἡ κατάληψις ἑτεροίωσις μὲν εἴσι τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ, διαφέρουσι δὲ τῆς φαντασίας· ἡ μὲν γὰρ πείσις τις ἦν ἡμετέρα καὶ διάθεσις, αὐταὶ δὲ πολλὸ μᾶλλον [ἢ ὀρμαί] ἐνέργειαι τινες ἡμῶν ὑπῆρχον. μοχθηρὸς ἄρα ἐστὶν ὁ ὄρος πολλοῖς καὶ
 238 διαφόροις πράγμασιν ἐφαρμοζόμενος· καὶ ὃν τρόπον ὁ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὀρισάμενος, καὶ εἰπὼν ὅτι ἄνθρωπος

(that is to say, "in a certain portion of the eye") there exists whiteness, in order that all of us men may not have "ephelotes," seeing that we all naturally have whiteness in the eye,—so when we define presentation as "impression in the soul," we also imply therewith that it occurs in a certain part of the soul, to wit, the regent part, so that, stated explicitly, the definition is this—"presentation is alteration in the regent part."—Others, starting with the same 234 line of argument, have made a more subtle defence. For they say that soul is used in two senses, as denoting both that which holds together the whole framework and, in especial, the regent part. For when we say that man is composed of soul and body, or that death is a separation of soul from body, we are speaking specially of the regent part. So like- 235 wise, when we are classifying goods and say that some are goods of the soul, some of the body, and some external, we do not mean the whole soul but the regent part of it, for it is to this that the affections and the goods belong. Hence, when Zeno says that "pre- 236 sentation is an impression on the soul," we must understand by "soul" not the whole but that part of it, so that the statement may be in this form, "presentation is alteration of the regent part."—But even 237 when put in this form some say that it is wrong again. For, in fact, impulse and assent and apprehension are alterations of the regent part, but are different from presentation. For whereas this is a passivity of ours and a condition, the former are much rather activities. The definition, therefore, is a bad one, as it suits many different things; and just as he who defines "man" 238 and says that "man is a rational animal" ^a does not

^a Cf. P. II. ii. 26 ff.

ἐστι ζῶον λογικόν, οὐχ ὑγιῶς τὴν ἔννοιαν τοῦ
 ἀνθρώπου ὑπέγραψε διὰ τὸ καὶ τὸν θεὸν ζῶον εἶναι
 λογικόν, οὕτω καὶ ὁ τὴν φαντασίαν ἀποφηνάμενος
 ἐτεροίωσιν ἡγεμονικοῦ διέπεισεν· οὐ μᾶλλον γὰρ
 239 ταύτης ἢ ἐκάστης τῶν κατηριθμημένων κινήσεων
 ἐστὶν ἀπόδοσις. τοιαύτης δ' οὔσης καὶ τῆσδε
 τῆς ἐνοστάσεως πάλιν ἐπὶ τὰς συνεμφάσεις οἱ στωικοὶ
 ἀνατρέχουσι, λέγοντες τῷ ὄρω δεῖν τῆς φαντασίας
 συνακούειν τὸ κατὰ πείσιν· ὡς γὰρ ὁ λέγων τὸν
 ἔρωτα ἐπιβολὴν εἶναι φιλοποιίας συνεμφαίνει τὸ
 νέων ὠραίων, καὶ εἰ μὴ κατὰ τὸ ῥητὸν τοῦτο ἐκφέρῃ
 (οὐθεὶς γὰρ γερόντιον καὶ ἀκμῆς ὦραν μὴ ἐχόντων
 ἐρᾶ), οὕτως ὅταν λέγωμεν, φασί, τὴν φαντασίαν
 ἐτεροίωσιν ἡγεμονικοῦ, συνεμφαίνομεν τὸ κατὰ
 240 πείσιν ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸ κατὰ ἐνέργειαν γίνεσθαι τὴν
 ἐτεροίωσιν. δοκοῦσι δὲ μηδ' οὕτως ἐκπεφευ-
 γέναι τὸ ἔγκλημα· ὅτε γὰρ τρέφεται τὸ ἡγεμονικόν
 καὶ νῆ Δία γε αὖξεται, ἐτεροιοῦται μὲν κατὰ πείσιν,
 οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ἡ τοιαύτη ἐτεροίωσις αὐτοῦ, καίπερ κατὰ
 πείσιν οὐσα καὶ διάθεσις, φαντασία, ἐκτὸς εἰ μὴ τι
 πάλιν λέγοιεν ἰδίωμα πείσεως εἶναι τὴν φαντασίαν,
 241 ὅπερ διενήνοχε τῶν τοιούτων διαθέσεων, ἢ ἐκεῖνό
 γε, ἐπεὶ ἡ φαντασία γίνεσθαι ἦτοι τῶν ἐκτὸς ἢ τῶν
 ἐν ἡμῖν παθῶν, ὃ δὴ κυριώτερον διάκενος ἐλκυσμὸς
 παρ' αὐτοῖς καλεῖται, πάντως ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῆς
 φαντασίας συνεμφαίνεσθαι τὸ τὴν πείσιν γίνεσθαι
 ἦτοι κατὰ τὴν ἐκτὸς προσβολὴν ἢ κατὰ τὰ ἐν ἡμῖν
 πάθη· ὅπερ οὐκέτ' ἔστιν ἐπὶ τῆς κατὰ τὰς αὐξήσεις
 ἢ θρέψεως ἐτεροίωσεως συνεχαικούειν.

^a i.e. a "presentation" without any real "presented"
 object (and so purely subjective and illusory) which "attracts"
 the mind to a "phantasma," or imaginary object.

give a sound description of the notion of "man"
 because "god" also is a rational animal, so also he
 who declares presentation to be "an alteration of
 the regent part" is at fault, since this is no more an
 account of presentation than of any one of the motions
 enumerated.—Such being this further objection, the 239
 Stoics resort once again to their "implications," say-
 ing that we must understand, as implied in the defini-
 tion, the words "by way of passivity." For just as
 he who says that love is "an impulse to win affection"
 implies therewith "of youths in their bloom," even
 though he does not state this expressly (for no one
 loves old men and those who are not in their first
 bloom), so when we describe presentation as "altera-
 tion of the regent part," we imply therewith, they
 say, that the alteration occurs "by way of passivity"
 and not by way of activity.—But not even so do they 240
 seem to have escaped the charge; for when the
 regent part is being nourished and, in sooth, in-
 creased, it is altered by way of passivity, but this
 kind of alteration, although it is by way of passivity
 and condition, is not presentation—unless they should
 say once again that presentation is a special form of
 passivity which is distinct from the passive conditions,
 or else say this—that, since presentation is either of 241
 things external or of our own internal affections (this
 being more precisely termed by them "vacuous attrac-
 tion"), there is always implied in the definition of
 presentation that the "passivity" is either in respect
 of external impact or in respect of our internal affec-
 tions; but this additional implication is no longer
 possible in the case of alteration due to processes of
 increase or nutrition.

Ἄλλ' ἢ μὲν φαντασία κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς οὕτω δυσαπόδοτός ἐστι· τῶν δὲ φαντασιῶν πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλαι εἰσὶ διαφοραί, ἀπαρκέσουσι δὲ αἱ
 242 λεχθησόμεναι. τούτων γὰρ αἱ μὲν εἰσι πιθαναί, αἱ δὲ ἀπίθανοι, αἱ δὲ πιθαναὶ ἅμα καὶ ἀπίθανοι, αἱ δὲ οὔτε πιθαναὶ οὔτε ἀπίθανοι. πιθαναὶ μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αἱ λείον κίνημα περὶ ψυχὴν ἐργαζόμεναι, ὥσπερ νῦν τὸ ἡμέραν εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐμὲ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ πᾶν ὃ τῆς ὁμοίας ἔχεται περιφανείας, ἀπίθανοι δὲ αἱ μὴ τοιαῦται ἀλλ' ἀποστρέφουσαι ἡμᾶς τῆς συγκατα-
 243 θέσεως, οἷον "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστιν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἥλιος ὑπὲρ γῆς; εἰ σκότος ἔστιν, ἡμέρα ἔστιν." πιθαναὶ δὲ καὶ ἀπίθανοι καθεστᾶσιν αἱ κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τι σχέσιν ὅτε μὲν τοιαῖα γινόμεναι ὅτε δὲ τοιαῖα [γινό-
 μεναι], οἷον αἱ τῶν ἀπόρων λόγων, οὔτε δὲ πιθαναὶ οὔτε ἀπίθανοι καθάπερ αἱ τῶν τοιούτων πραγμάτων "ἄρτιοὶ εἰσιν οἱ ἀστέρες, περισσοὶ εἰσιν οἱ ἀστέρες." τῶν δὲ πιθανῶν [ἢ ἀπιθάνων]¹ φαντασιῶν αἱ μὲν
 244 εἰσιν ἀληθεῖς, αἱ δὲ ψευδεῖς, αἱ δὲ ἀληθεῖς καὶ ψευδεῖς, αἱ δὲ οὔτε ἀληθεῖς οὔτε ψευδεῖς. ἀληθεῖς μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν ὧν ἔστιν ἀληθῆ κατηγορίαν ποιήσα-
 σθαι, ὡς τοῦ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν" ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος ἢ τοῦ "φῶς ἔστι," ψευδεῖς δὲ ὧν ἔστι ψευδῆ κατ-
 ηγορίαν ποιήσασθαι, ὡς τοῦ κεκλάσθαι τὴν κατὰ βυθοῦ κώπην ἢ μύουρον εἶναι τὴν στοάν, ἀληθεῖς δὲ καὶ ψευδεῖς, ὅποια προσέπιπτεν Ὀρέστη κατὰ
 245 μανίαν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἥλέκτρας (καθὸ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντός τινος προσέπιπτεν, ἦν ἀληθής, ὑπῆρχε γὰρ Ἥλέκτρα, καθὸ δ' ὡς ἀπὸ Ἐρινύος, ψευδής,

¹ [ἢ ἀπιθάνων] secl. Arnim.

Thus presentation, in the doctrine of the Stoics, is hard to define. In presentations, also, there are many and various distinctions, of which it will be enough to record the following. Some of them are 242 probable, some improbable, some at once both probable and improbable, some neither probable nor improbable. "Probable," then, are those which produce a smooth motion in the soul—as, at the present moment, the impression that "it is day" and that "I am discoursing," and everyone which attains a similar degree of obviousness; "improbable" are those which do not do so but make us decline to assent, such as the judgement "if it is day, 243 the sun is not above the earth," "if it is dark, it is day." "Both probable and improbable" are those which, according to the relation in which they stand, are at one time of this kind and at another time of that kind, as for instance presentations of problematic statements. "Neither probable nor improbable" are such as are concerned with judgements of this sort—"the stars are even in number," "the stars are odd."^a And of the probable presentations some are true, some false, some both true and false, some neither true 244 nor false. True, then, are those about which it is possible to make a true affirmation, as, at the present moment, "it is day" or "it is light"; false are those about which it is possible to make a false affirmation, as that the oar under the water is bent or that the porch narrows to a point; an example of both true and false is the impression of Electra experienced by Orestes in his madness (for in so far as his impres- 245 sion was of an existing object it was true, for Electra existed, but in so far as it was that of a Fury it was

^a Cf. P.H. i. 97, ii. 90.

οὐκ ἦν γὰρ Ἐριώς), καὶ πάλιν εἴ τις ἀπὸ Δίωτος
ζῶντος κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους ὡς ἀπὸ παρεστῶτος
246 ὄνειροπολεῖται ψευδῆ καὶ διάκενον ἔλκυσμον. οὔτε
δὲ ἀληθεῖς οὔτε ψευδεῖς εἰσὶν αἱ γενικαί· ὦν γὰρ τὰ
εἶδη τοῖα ἢ τοῖα, τούτων τὰ γένη οὔτε τοῖα οὔτε
τοῖα, ὅσον τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μὲν εἰσὼ Ἕλληνες οἱ
δὲ βάρβαροι, ἀλλ' ὁ γενικὸς ἄνθρωπος οὔτε Ἕλλην
ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ πάντες ἂν οἱ ἐπ' εἶδους ἦσαν Ἕλληνες,
247 οὔτε βάρβαρος διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν. τῶν δὲ
ἀληθῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσὶ καταληπτικαὶ αἱ δὲ οὔ, οὐ
καταληπτικαὶ μὲν αἱ προσπίπτουσαι τισὶ κατὰ
πάθος· μυρῖοι γὰρ φρενιτίζοντες καὶ μελαγχολῶντες
ἀληθῆ μὲν ἔλκουσι φαντασίαν, οὐ καταληπτικὴν δὲ
ἀλλ' ἔξωθεν καὶ ἐκ τύχης οὕτω συμπεσοῦσαν, ὅθεν
οὐδὲ διαβεβαιοῦνται περὶ αὐτῆς πολλάκις, οὐδὲ
248 συγκατατίθενται αὐτῇ. καταληπτικὴ δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ
ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπο-
μεμαγμένη καὶ ἐναπεσφραγισμένη, ὅποια οὐκ ἂν
γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος· ἄκρως γὰρ ποιούμενοι
ἀντιληπτικὴν εἶναι τῶν ὑποκειμένων τήνδε τὴν
φαντασίαν, καὶ πάντα τεχνικῶς τὰ περὶ αὐτοῖς
ιδιώματα ἀναμεμαγμένην, ἕκαστον τούτων φασὶν
249 ἔχειν συμβεβηκός. ὦν πρῶτον μὲν τὸ ἀπὸ ὑπ-
άρχοντος γίνεσθαι· πολλαὶ γὰρ τῶν φαντασιῶν
προσπίπτουσιν ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος ὡσπερ ἐπὶ
τῶν μεμνηνόντων, αἰτίνας οὐκ ἂν εἴεν καταληπτικαί.
δεύτερον δὲ τὸ καὶ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος εἶναι καὶ κατ'
αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον· ἔναι γὰρ πάλιν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος
μὲν εἰσὼ, οὐκ αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἰσὸδάλονται,
ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ μεμνηνότος Ὀρέστου μικρῶ πρότερον

false, for there was no Fury); and again when a man
experiences a false and "vacuous attraction" in
his dreams, imagining that Dion is standing beside
him when Dion is alive. Neither true nor false 246
are the generic presentations; for the genera of
things of which the particulars are of this kind or
of that are neither of this kind nor of that kind; as,
for instance, whereas some men are Greeks, others
barbarians, the generic Man is neither a Greek (for
then all particular men would have been Greeks),
nor yet a barbarian (for the same reason).—And of 247
true presentations some are apprehensive, others not,
—not apprehensive being those which are experienced
by persons in a morbid condition; for countless
sufferers from frenzy and melancholia receive a
presentation which though true is not apprehensive
but occurs externally and fortuitously, so that often
they make no positive affirmation about it and do not
assent to it. An apprehensive presentation is one 248
caused by an existing object and imaged and stamped
in the subject in accordance with that existing object,
of such a kind as could not be derived from a non-
existent object. For as they deem that this presenta-
tion is eminently perceptive of real objects and repro-
duces with artistic precision all their characteristics,
they declare that it possesses each one of these as
an attribute. Of these the first is derivation from an 249
existing object; for many presentations occur from
what is non-existent, as in the case of madmen, and
these will not be apprehensive. Second is derivation
both from an existing object and according to that
existing object; for some again, though they are
derived from an existing object, do not resemble that
object, as we showed a little while ago in the case of

εδείκνυμεν. εἴλακε μὲν γὰρ φαντασίαν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος τῆς Ἡλέκτρας, οὐ κατ' αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ὑπάρχον· μίαν γὰρ τῶν Ἐρινύων ὑπελάμβανεν αὐτὴν εἶναι, καθὸ καὶ προσιοῦσαν καὶ τημελεῖν αὐτὸν σπουδάζουσαν ἀπωθεῖται λέγων

μέθες μὴ ὄσα τῶν ἐμῶν Ἐρινύων.

καὶ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος μὲν ἐκινεῖτο τῶν Θηβῶν, οὐ κατ' αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ὑπάρχον· καὶ γὰρ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον δεῖ γίνεσθαι τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναπομεμαγμένην καὶ ἐναπεσφραγισμένην τυγχάνειν, ἵνα πάντα τεχνικῶς τὰ ἰδιώματα τῶν φανταστῶν¹ ἀναμάττηται. ὡς γὰρ οἱ γλυφεῖς πᾶσι τοῖς μέρεσι συμβάλλουσι τῶν τελουμένων, καὶ ὃν τρόπον αἱ διὰ τῶν δακτυλίων σφραγίδες αἰεὶ πάντας ἐπ' ἀκριβῆς τοὺς χαρακτῆρας ἐναπομάττονται τῷ κηρῷ, οὕτω καὶ οἱ κατάληψιν ποιούμενοι τῶν ὑποκειμένων πᾶσιν ὀφείλουσι τοῖς ἰδιώμασιν αὐτῶν ἐπιβάλλειν. τὸ δὲ "οἷα οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος" προσέθεσαν, ἐπεὶ οὐχ ὡςπερ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἀδύνατον ὑπειλήφασι κατὰ πάντα ἀπαράλλακτόν τινα εὐρεθῆσεσθαι, οὕτω καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας. ἐκείνοι μὲν γὰρ φασιν ὅτι ὁ ἔχων τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν τεχνικῶς προσβάλλει τῇ ὑπόουση τῶν πραγμάτων διαφορᾷ, ἐπέειπερ καὶ εἶχε τι τοιοῦτον ἰδίωμα ἢ τοιαύτη φαντασία παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας φαντασίας καθάπερ οἱ κερᾶσται παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ὄφεις· οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας τούναντίον φασὶ δύνασθαι τῇ κατα-

¹ φανταστῶν Apelt: φαντασιῶν mss., Bekk.

^o Eurip. *Orest.* 264; cf. §§ 170, 245.

the mad Orestes. For though he derived a presentation from an existing object, Electra, it was not in conformity with that object; for he supposed that she was one of the Furies, and accordingly repulses her, as she approaches and eagerly seeks to tend him, with the words ^a—

Avaunt! For of my Furies thou art one.

Heracles, too, derived an impression of Thebes^b from an existing object, but not according to that object; for the apprehensive presentation must also be in accord with the object itself. Moreover, it must also be imaged and stamped in the subject, in order that all the characteristics of the presented objects may be reproduced with artistic exactitude. For just as carvers set their hands to all the parts of the works they are completing, and as the seals on rings always imprint all their markings exactly on the wax, so likewise those who experience apprehension of real objects ought to perceive all their characteristics. And they added the clause "of such a kind as could not be derived from a non-existent object" because the Academics did not, like the Stoics, suppose it to be impossible that a presentation exactly similar in all respects should be found. For the Stoics assert that he who has the apprehensive presentation discerns with artistic exactitude the difference subsisting in the objects, since a presentation of that kind as compared with all other presentations has a special characteristic of its own, like the horned serpents as compared with all other serpents; but the Academics assert on the contrary that a false

^b Cf. § 192 (Heracles seems to be put for Pentheus, by oversight).

ληπτικῆ φαντασίᾳ ἀπαράλλακτον εὐρεθήσεσθαι ψεύδος.

253 Ἄλλὰ γὰρ οἱ μὲν ἀρχαιότεροι τῶν στωικῶν κριτήριόν φασιν εἶναι τῆς ἀληθείας τὴν καταληπτικὴν ταύτην φαντασίαν, οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι κατα-
 254 ἐτίθεσαν καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχουσα ἔνσημα. ἔσθ' ὅτε γὰρ καταληπτικὴ μὲν προσπίπτει φαντασία, ἀπιστος δὲ διὰ τὴν ἕξωθεν περίστασιν. οἶον ὅτε Ἀδμήτω ὁ Ἡρακλῆς τὴν Ἀλκηστὴν γῆθεν ἀναγαγὼν παρέστῃσε, τότε ὁ Ἀδμητος ἔσπασε μὲν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀλκήστιδος,
 255 ἠπίσται δ' αὐτῇ· καὶ ὅτε ἀπὸ Τροίας ὁ Μενέλαος ἀνακομισθεὶς ἑώρα τὴν ἀληθῆ Ἑλένην παρὰ τῷ Πρωτεύῃ, [καὶ] καταλιπὼν ἐπὶ τῆς νεῶς τὸ ἐκείνης εἰδῶλον, περὶ οὗ δεκαετῆς συνέστη πόλεμος, ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος μὲν καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον καὶ ἐναπομεμαγμένην καὶ ἐναπεσφραγισμένην ἐλάμβανε
 256 φαντασίαν, οὐκ εἶκε δὲ αὐτῇ.¹ ὥσθ' ἡ μὲν καταληπτικὴ φαντασία κριτήριόν ἐστι μηδὲν ἔχουσα ἔνσημα, αὐταὶ δὲ καταληπτικαὶ μὲν ἦσαν, εἶχον δὲ ἐνότασεις· ὁ τε γὰρ Ἀδμητος ἐλογίζετο ὅτι τέθηκεν ἡ Ἀλκηστὴς καὶ ὅτι ὁ ἀποθανὼν οὐκέτι ἀνίσταται, ἀλλὰ δαιμονία τινὰ ποτε ἐπιφοιτᾷ· ὁ τε Μενέλαος συνέωρα ὅτι ἀπολέλοιπεν ἐν τῇ νηὶ φυλαττομένην τὴν Ἑλένην, καὶ οὐκ ἀπίθανον μὲν ἔστω Ἑλένην μὴ εἶναι τὴν ἐπὶ τῆς Φάρου εὐρε-
 257 θείσαν, φάντασμα δέ τι καὶ δαιμόνιον. ἐνθένδε οὐχ ἀπλῶς κριτήριον γίνεται τῆς ἀληθείας ἡ καταληπτικὴ φαντασία, ἀλλ' ὅταν μηδὲν ἔνσημα ἔχη· αὕτη γὰρ ἐναργῆς οὖσα καὶ πληκτικὴ μόνον οὐχὶ τῶν τριχῶν, φασί, λαμβάνεται, κατασπῶσα ἡμᾶς

¹ εἶκε δὲ αὐτῇ Lachelier: εἶχε δὲ αὐτὴν mss., Bekk.

one exactly similar to the apprehensive presentation can be found.

But whereas the older Stoics declare that this 253 apprehensive presentation is the criterion of truth, the later Stoics added the clause "provided that it has no obstacle." For there are times when an 254 apprehensive presentation occurs, yet is improbable because of the external circumstances. When, for instance, Heracles presented himself to Admetus bringing back Alcestis from the grave,^a Admetus then received from Alcestis an apprehensive presentation, but disbelieved it; and when Menelaus on 255 his return from Troy^b beheld the true Helen at the house of Proteus, after leaving on his ship that image of her for which the ten years' war was waged, though he received a presentation which was imaged and imprinted from an existing object and in accordance with that object, he did not accept it as valid. So 256 that, whereas the apprehensive presentation is the criterion when it has no obstacle, these presentations, although they were apprehensive, yet had obstacles. For Admetus argued that Alcestis was dead and that he who is dead does not rise again, but certain daemons do rove about at times; and Menelaus also reflected that he had left Helen under guard in his ship and that it was not improbable that she who was discovered in Pharos might not be Helen but a phantom and supernatural. Hence the apprehensive presentation 257 is not the criterion of truth unconditionally, but only when it has no obstacle. For in this latter case it, being plainly evident and striking, lays hold of us, almost by the very hair, as they say, and drags us

^a Cf. P.H. i. 228.

^b Cf. § 180.

εἰς συγκατάθεσιν, καὶ ἄλλου μηδενὸς δεομένη εἰς
 τὸ τοιαύτη προσπίπτει ἢ εἰς τὸ τὴν πρὸς τὰς
 258 ἄλλας διαφορὰν ὑποβάλλειν. διὸ δὴ καὶ πᾶς ἄν-
 θρωπος, ὅταν τι σπουδάζῃ μετὰ ἀκριβείας καταλαμ-
 βάνεσθαι, τὴν τοιαύτην φαντασίαν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ μετα-
 διώκειν φαίνεται, οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν ὄρατῶν, ὅταν
 ἀμυδρὰν λαμβάνῃ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου φαντασίαν.
 ἐντείνει γὰρ τὴν ὄψιν καὶ σύνεγγυς ἔρχεται τοῦ
 ὀραμένου ὡς τέλος μὴ πλανᾶσθαι, παρατρίβει γὰρ
 τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς, καὶ καθόλου πάντα ποιεῖ μέχρις
 ἂν τρανὴν καὶ πληκτικὴν σπάσῃ τοῦ κρινομένου
 φαντασίαν, ὡς ἐν ταύτῃ κειμένην θεωρῶν τὴν τῆς
 259 καταλήψεως πίστιν. καὶ γὰρ ἄλλως τοῦναντίον
 ἀδύνατόν ἐστι λέγειν, καὶ ἀνάγκη¹ τὸν ἀφιστάμενον
 τοῦ ἀξιουῦν ὅτι φαντασία κριτήριόν ἐστι, καθ' ἑτέρας
 φαντασίας ὑπόστασιν τοῦτο πάσχοντα βεβαιοῦν τὸ
 φαντασίαν εἶναι κριτήριον, τῆς φύσεως οἰονεὶ
 φέγγος ἡμῖν πρὸς ἐπίγνωσιν τῆς ἀληθείας τὴν
 αἰσθητικὴν δύναμιν ἀναδούσης καὶ τὴν δι' αὐτῆς
 260 γινομένην φαντασίαν. ἄτοπον οὖν ἐστὶ τοσαύτην
 δύναμιν ἀθετεῖν καὶ τὸ ὡσπερ φῶς αὐτῶν ἀφαιρεῖ-
 σθαι. ὃν γὰρ τρόπον ὁ χρώματα μὲν ἀπολείπων καὶ
 τὰς ἐν τούτοις διαφορὰς, τὴν δὲ ὄρασιν ἀναιρῶν ὡς
 ἀνυπαρκτον ἢ ἄπιστον, καὶ φωνὰς μὲν εἶναι λέγων,
 ἀκοὴν δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀξιῶν, σφόδρα ἐστὶν ἄτοπος
 (δι' ὧν γὰρ ἐνόησαμεν χρώματα καὶ φωνὰς, ἐκείνων
 ἀπόντων οὐδὲ χρῆσθαι δυνατοὶ χρώμασιν ἢ φωναῖς),
 οὕτω καὶ τὰ πράγματα μὲν ὁμολογῶν, τὴν δὲ
 φαντασίαν τῆς αἰσθήσεως, δι' ἧς τῶν πραγμάτων
 ἀντιλαμβάνεται, διαβάλλων τελέως ἐστὶν ἐμβρόντη-
 τος, καὶ τοῖς ἀψύχοις ἴσον αὐτὸν ποιῶν.

¹ καὶ ἀνάγκη Hirzel: κατ' ἀνάγκην mss., Bekk.

off to assent, needing nothing else to help it to be
 thus impressive or to suggest its superiority over all
 others. For this reason, too, every man, when he is 258
 anxious to apprehend any object exactly, appears of
 himself to pursue after a presentation of this kind—as,
 for instance, in the case of visible things, when he
 receives a dim presentation of the real object. For
 he intensifies his gaze and draws close to the object
 of sight so as not to go wholly astray, and rubs
 his eyes and in general uses every means until he
 can receive a clear and striking presentation of the
 thing under inspection, as though he considered that
 the credibility of the apprehension depended upon
 that. Moreover it is impossible to affirm the opposite, 259
 and he who abstains from asserting that presentation
 is the criterion, since he does so owing to the existence
 of another presentation, thereby of necessity confirms
 the fact that presentation is the criterion,—nature
 having kindled as it were a light for us, to aid in the
 discernment of truth, in the faculty of sense and the
 presentation which takes place by means thereof.
 It is absurd, then, to set aside so great a faculty and 260
 to rob ourselves as it were of our own daylight. For
 just as the man who allows colours and the differences
 in them but abolishes vision as unreal or improbable,
 and while affirming the existence of sounds asserts
 the non-existence of hearing, is utterly illogical (for
 if the organs by which we perceive colours and sounds
 were absent we should be unable to experience
 colours or sounds),—so also he who admits the exist-
 ence of objects, but inveighs against the presentation
 of sense by means of which he apprehends the objects,
 has completely lost his wits and puts himself on a level
 with things that have no soul.

- 261 Τοιοῦτο μὲν καὶ τὸ τῶν στωικῶν ἐστὶ δόγμα·
 πάσης δὲ σχεδὸν τῆς περὶ κριτηρίου διαφωνίας ὑπ'
 ὄψιν κειμένης, καιρὸς ἂν εἴη τῆς ἀντιρρήσεως
 ἐφάπτεσθαι καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ κριτήριον ἐπανάγειν. καθὼς
 οὖν προείπον, οἱ μὲν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οἱ δὲ ἐν ταῖς
 ἀλόγοις αἰσθήσεσιν οἱ δὲ ἐν ἀμφοτέροις τούτοις
 ἀπέλιπον, καὶ οἱ μὲν τὸ ὑφ' οὗ ὡς τὸν ἄνθρωπον,
 οἱ δὲ τὸ δι' οὗ ὡς τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ διάνοιαν,
 262 οἱ δὲ τὸ ὡς προσβολὴν καθάπερ τὴν φαντασίαν.
 πειρασόμεθα (οὖν)¹ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ἐκάστη τῶν
 τοιούτων στάσεων τὰς ἀπορίας ἐφαρμόττειν, ἵνα
 μὴ κατ' ἄνδρα πάντας τοὺς κατηγορημένους
 φιλοσόφους ἐπιόντες ταυτολογεῖν ἀναγκαζώμεθα.

ΠΕΡΙ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΥ

- 263 Τάξει τοίνυν πρῶτον σκοπῶμεν τὸ ὑφ' οὗ, τουτ-
 ἐστι τὸν ἄνθρωπον· οἶμαι γὰρ ὡς τούτου προαπορη-
 θέντος οὐδὲν ἔτι δεήσει περιττότερον περὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων κριτηρίων λέγειν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἢ μέρη ἐστὶν
 ἀνθρώπου ἢ ἐνεργήματα ἢ πάθη. εἶπερ οὖν κατα-
 ληπτὸν ἐστὶ τουτί τὸ κριτήριον, πολὺ πρότερον
 ὀφείλει ἐπινοεῖσθαι, παρόσον πάσης καταλήψεως
 ἐπινοία προηγείται. μέχρι δὲ τοῦ δεῦρο ἀνεπι-
 νόητον εἶναι συμβέβηκε τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὡς παρα-
 264 στήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα καταληπτὸς πάντως ἐστὶν ὁ
 ἄνθρωπος· ὃ ἔπεται τὴν τῆς ἀληθείας γνώσιν
 ἀνεύρετον ὑπάρχειν, τοῦ γνωρίζοντος αὐτὴν ἀκατα-
 λήπτου καθεστῶτος. εὐθέως γὰρ τῶν περὶ τῆς
 ἐπινοίας ζητησάντων Σωκράτης μὲν ἠπόρησε

¹ <οὖν> cj. Bekk.

Such, then, is the doctrine of the Stoics ; and now 261
 that practically all the controversy regarding the
 criterion lies before our view, it will be a fitting time
 to commence our counter-argument and to apply it
 to the criterion. This, as I said above,^a some have
 supposed to reside in reason, some in the irrational
 senses, some in both ; and some have named " Man "
 as the agent " by which " ^b ; some the sense and
 intellect as the instrument " by means of which " ;
 some the impact as, for instance, the presentation.
 We shall endeavour, then, so far as possible to state 262
 the difficulties appropriate to each of these rival
 views, that we may not be compelled to repeat our-
 selves by assailing one by one all the philosophers
 enumerated.

CONCERNING MAN

First in order, then, let us examine the criterion 263
 " by whom," or agent, that is to say Man ^c ; for I
 suppose that when we have cast doubt on this, to
 begin with, there will no longer be any need to pro-
 ceed to further discussion of the other criteria ; for
 these are either parts or actions or affections of Man.
 If, then, this criterion is to be apprehended, it must
 be conceived long before, inasmuch as conception in
 every case precedes apprehension. But up till now
 Man has proved to be inconceivable, as we shall
 establish ; therefore Man is certainly not appre- 264
 hensible ; and from this it follows that the knowledge
 of truth is undiscoverable, seeing that the subject who
 knows it is inapprehensible. Thus, for instance, of
 those who investigated the conception, Socrates was

^a See §§ 47 ff.^b Cf. P.H. ii. 21.^c Cf. P.H. ii. 47.

- μείνας ἐν τῇ σκέψει καὶ εἰπὼν αὐτὸν ἀγνοεῖν τί τ' ἔστι καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὸ σύμπαν· "ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐκ οἶδα" φησὶν "εἴτε ἀνθρωπὸς εἰμι εἴτε καὶ ἄλλο
 265 τι θηρίον Τυφῶνος πολυπλοκώτερον." Δημόκριτος δὲ ὁ τῇ Διὸς φωνῇ παρεικαζόμενος, καὶ λέγων τάδε περὶ τῶν ζυμπάντων, ἐπεχείρησε μὲν τὴν ἐπίνοιαν ἐκθέσθαι, πλείον δὲ ἰδιωτικῆς ἀποφάσεως οὐδὲν ἴσχυσε, εἰπὼν "ἀνθρωπὸς ἔστιν ὁ πάντες ἴδμεν."
 266 πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ καὶ κύνα πάντες ἴσμεν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ κύων ἀνθρωπὸς· καὶ ἵππον πάντες ἴσμεν καὶ φυτόν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν τούτων ἦν ἀνθρωπὸς. εἶτα καὶ τὸ ζητούμενον συνήρπασεν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἐκ προχείρου δώσει γινώσκεισθαι τὸν ἀνθρωπον ὁποῖός ἐστιν, εἶγε ὁ Πύθιος ὡς μέγιστον ζήτημα προύθηκεν αὐτῷ τὸ γνῶθι σεαυτόν. εἰ δὲ καὶ δοίη, οὐ πᾶσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀκριβεστάτοις τῶν φιλοσόφων ἐπιτρέψει μόνον
 267 τούτον ἐπίστασθαι. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον καὶ δεικτικῶς ᾤθησαν δύνασθαι τὴν ἐπίνοιαν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου παρίστασθαι, λέγοντες "ἀνθρωπὸς ἔστι τοιουτοῦνι μὲν ὄρωμα μετ' ἐμψυχίας." οὐκ ἔγνωσαν δ' ὅτι εἰ τὸ δεικνύμενόν ἐστιν ἀνθρωπὸς, τὸ μὴ δεικνύμενον οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνθρωπὸς. καὶ πάλιν ἢ τοιαυτῆ δεῖξις ἦτοι ἐπ' ἀνδρὸς ἐκφέρεται ἢ γυναικός, ἢ πρεσβύτου ἢ μειρακίου, σιμοῦ γρυποῦ,
 268 τετανότριχος οὐλοκόμου, τῶν ἄλλων διαφορῶν· καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐπ' ἀνδρὸς ἐκφέροιο, ἢ γυνῆ οὐκ ἔσται ἀνθρωπὸς, εἰ δ' ἐπὶ γυναικός, περιγραφήσεται τὸ ἄρρεν, καὶ εἰ ἐπὶ νέου, αἱ λοιπαὶ τῶν ἡλικιῶν ἐκπεσοῦνται τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος.
 269 Ἦσαν δὲ τινες τῶν φιλοσόφων οἱ τὸν γενικὸν

a doubter, remaining undecided and declaring himself ignorant both of what he himself is and in what relation he stands to the Universe—"for I do not know," he says, "whether I am a man or some other kind of beast more complex than Typhon."^a But 265 Democritus, who likened himself to the voice of Zeus, and spoke so about the sum of all things, attempted indeed to explain the conception, but was able to produce nothing more than a crude statement, in the words "Man is what we all ken." For, in the first 266 place, we all know Dog as well, but Dog is not Man. And Horse we all know and Plant, but none of these is Man. And further, he has begged the question; for no one will grant off-hand that the nature of Man is known, seeing that the Pythian propounded "Know thyself" as Man's chief problem. And even were one to grant this, one would not ascribe the knowledge of Man to all but only to the most exact philo- 267 sopher.—Epicurus and his followers supposed that the conception of Man could be conveyed by indication, saying that "Man is this sort of a shape combined with vitality." But they did not notice that if the thing indicated is Man, the thing not so indicated is not Man. And again, such an indication is made in the case of either a man or a woman, an elder or a youth, snub-nosed or hook-nosed, straight-haired or curly-haired, and all the other differences; and if it is made in the case of a man, a woman will 268 not be Man, and if in the case of a woman, the male will be ruled out, and if in the case of a youth, all the remaining ages will be debarred from Manhood.

Some philosophers there have been who have de- 269

^a Cf. Plato, *Phaedr.* 230 A. With §§ 264-282 cf. *P.H.* ii. 22-28.

ἄνθρωπον διὰ λόγου διδάσκοντες, κἀντεῦθεν οἰόμενοι τὴν ἐπίνοιαν δύνασθαι τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους ἀνθρώπων ἀνακλύσειν. τούτων δὲ οἱ μὲν οὕτως ἀπέδοσαν “ ἄνθρωπος ἐστὶ ζῶον λογικὸν θνητόν, νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν.” οἱ καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀλλὰ τὰ συμβεβηκότα τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ 270 παρέδοσαν. διαφέρει δὲ τὸ τινὶ συμβεβηκὸς ἐκείνου τοῦ ᾧ συμβέβηκεν, ἐπεὶ τοι εἰ μὴ διαφέρει, οὐκ ἂν ἦν συμβεβηκὸς ἀλλ’ αὐτὸ ἐκείνο. ἀμέλει γοῦν τῶν συμβεβηκότων τὰ μὲν ἀχώριστά ἐστι τῶν οἷς συμβέβηκεν, ὡς μήκος καὶ πλάτος καὶ βάθος σώμασι (δίχα γὰρ τῆς τούτων παρουσίας ἀμήχανόν 271 ἐστὶν ἐπινοῆσαι σῶμα), τὰ δὲ χωρίζεται τοῦ ᾧ συμβέβηκεν καὶ ἀπαλλασσομένων μένει ἐκείνο, ὅλον τρέχειν διαλέγεσθαι ἄπροῦν ἐργηγορέναι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα συμβέβηκε μὲν ἡμῖν, οὐ διὰ παντὸς δέ· καὶ γὰρ μὴ τρέχοντες μένομεν οἱ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἡσυχάζοντες, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡσαύτως. διττῆς οὖν οὔσης τῶν συμβεβηκότων διαφορᾶς οὐδετέραν εὐρήσομεν τὴν αὐτὴν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ πράγματι, ἀλλ’ αἰεὶ διαφέρουσιν. μάταιοι 272 τοῖνυν εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ζῶον λέγοντες λογικὸν θνητόν καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς· οὐ γὰρ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀπέδοσαν, ἀλλὰ τὰ συμβεβηκότα τούτῳ κατηρίθμισαν. ὦν τὸ μὲν ζῶον τῶν διὰ παντὸς αὐτῷ συμβεβηκότων ἐστίν· ἀδύνατον γὰρ μὴ ζῶον ὄντα ἄνθρωπον εἶναι· τὸ δὲ θνητόν οὐδὲ συμβεβηκὸς ἐστίν, ἀλλ’ ἐπιγινόμενόν τι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· ὅτε γὰρ 273 ἐσμὲν ἄνθρωποι, ζῶμεν καὶ οὐ τεθνήκαμεν. τὸ δὲ λογίζεσθαι καὶ ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν συμβέβηκε μὲν, οὐ διὰ παντὸς δέ· καὶ γὰρ μὴ λογιζόμενοί τινες

fined by logic the generic Man, imagining that from this the conception of particular men will also emerge. Of these philosophers some have given this definition —“ Man is a rational mortal animal, receptive of thought and knowledge.” So they too have presented to us not Man but the properties of Man. But the property of a thing is different from the thing 270 of which it is a property, since of course if it were not different it would not have been a property but the actual thing itself. And, to be sure, while some properties are inseparable from the things to which they belong—as are length, breadth and depth from bodies, for without their presence it is impossible to conceive Body,—others are separated from the thing 271 to which they belong, and it still remains when they are removed—as, for instance, in the case of Man, running, talking, sleeping, waking; for all these properties belong to us, but not continuously; for we remain the same when we are not running and when we are silent, and so likewise as regards the rest of these properties. As, then, there are two distinct kinds of properties, we shall find that neither of them is the same as the substantial thing but always distinct. So then those who define Man as “ a rational 272 mortal animal,” and so on, achieve nothing; for they have not given a definition of Man but merely enumerated his properties. And of these “ animal ” is one of his constant properties, for it is impossible to be Man without being animal. But “ mortal ” is not even a property but something supervenient which occurs to Man; for when we are men we are alive and not dead. “ Reasoning and possessing 273 knowledge ” is indeed a property of his, but not constantly; for in fact some who are not reasoning are

ἄνθρωποι εἰσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ νηδύμω κατασχεθέντες ὑπνῳ, καὶ (οἱ)᾽ ἐπιστήμην μὴ ἔχοντες οὐκ ἐκπεπτώ-
 κασι τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος, ὥσπερ οἱ μεμνηότες.
 ἕτερον οὖν ζητούντων ἡμῶν ἕτερον παρεστάκασιν.

274 "Ἐτι τὸ μὲν ζῶον οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, ἐπεὶ πᾶν
 ζῶον ἔσται ἄνθρωπος. τὸ δὲ λογικὸν εἰ μὲν ἀντὶ
 τοῦ λογιζέσθαι τάττοιτο, καὶ οἱ θεοὶ λογιζόμενοι
 ἄνθρωποι γενήσονται, τάχα δὲ καὶ τινα τῶν ἄλλων
 ζῶων· εἰ δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ σημαντικὰς προφέρεσθαι
 φωνάς, τοὺς κόρακας καὶ ψιττακοὺς καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα
 275 ἀνθρώπους εἶναι λέξομεν, ὅπερ ἄτοπον. καὶ μὴν εἰ
 τὸ θνητὸν φαίη τις ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, ἀκολουθήσει τὸ
 καὶ τὰ ἄλογα τῶν ζῶων θνητὰ ὄντα ἀνθρώπους
 ὑπάρχειν. τὸ δὲ ὁμοιον καὶ περὶ τοῦ νοῦ τε καὶ
 ἐπιστήμης δεκτικὸν εἶναι χρῆ φρονεῖν. πρῶτον μὲν
 γὰρ καὶ εἰς θεοὺς πίπτει τὰ τοιαῦτα· δεῦτερον δέ,
 εἴπερ ἐπίδεκτικὸν ἔστι τούτων ὁ ἄνθρωπος, οὐκ
 ἔστι ταῦτα ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνος τούτων ἐπι-
 δεκτικὸς οὗ τὴν φύσιν οὐ παρέστησαν.

276 Καίτοι τινὲς τῶν συνετῶν εἶναι δοκούντων κατὰ
 τὴν δογματικὴν αἴρεσιν πρὸς τοῦτο ὑπαντώντες φασὶν
 ὅτι ἕκαστον μὲν τῶν κατηγορημένων οὐκ ἔστιν
 ἄνθρωπος, πάντα δὲ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ συναχθέντα ποιεῖ
 τοῦτον, οἷόν τι καὶ ἐπὶ μερῶν καὶ ὅλου θεωροῦμεν
 277 γινόμενον· ὡς γὰρ χεὶρ κατ' ἰδίαν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄν-
 θρωπος, οὐδὲ κεφαλὴ, οὐδὲ πούς, οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι τῶν
 τοιούτων, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐξ αὐτῶν σύνθετον ὅλον νοεῖται,
 οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὔτε ζῶόν ἔστι ψιλὸς οὔτε
 λογικὸν κατ' ἰδίαν οὔτε θνητὸν κατὰ περιγραφὴν,
 ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐξ ἀπάντων ἄθροισμα, τουτέστι ζῶον ἅμα

¹ <ο> add. Heintz.

men, as for instance those that are "by slumber
 sweet o'ercome," and those who are not "possessing
 knowledge" have not lost manhood, as for instance
 madmen. Thus while we have been seeking one
 thing, they have offered us another.

Again, "Animal" is not "Man," since in that case 274
 every animal would be a man. And if "rational"
 is put in place of "exercising reason," then the gods,
 too, when they reason will become men, and possibly
 some of the other animals as well; while if "rational"
 stands for "uttering significant sounds," we shall be
 saying that crows and parrots and the like are men,
 which is absurd. Moreover, if one should say that 275
 "mortal" is Man, it will follow that the irrational
 animals also, being mortal, are men. And one must
 take a similar view of the words "receptive of thought
 and knowledge." For, firstly, this applies to gods as
 well; and secondly, if Man is receptive of these,
 Man is not these things but he who is receptive of
 these things, the real nature of whom they have not
 explained.

Some, however, of those who have a reputation for 276
 cleverness in the Dogmatic School say, by way of
 reply to this, that it is not each of the properties
 enumerated that is "Man," but all of them combined
 together compose "Man"—the sort of thing we see
 happening in the case of parts and a whole.^a For just 277
 as a hand by itself is not a man, nor is a head, nor a
 foot, nor any other such part, but the compound made
 up of them is conceived as a whole,—so also "Man"
 is not barely "animal," nor solely "rational," nor
 "mortal" alone, but the aggregate of all these—
 that is to say, at once animal and mortal and rational.

^a Cf. P.H. iii. 98 ff.

278 καὶ θνητὸν καὶ λογικόν. πρόχειρος δ' ἐστὶ καὶ πρὸς
τοῦτο ὑπάντησις. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ πῶς, εἰ κατ'
ἰδίαν ἕκαστον οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα ἄνθρωπος, δύναται
εἰς ταῦτὸ συναχθέντα ἄνθρωπον ποιεῖν, μήτε
πλεονάσαντα παρὸ ἔστι, μήτε ἐλλιπόντα παρὸ
ὑπόκειται, μήτε ἄλλως πως τραπέντα; εἴτ' οὐδὲ
τὴν ἀρχὴν δύναται εἰς ταῦτὸ πάντα συνδραμεῖν, ἵνα
279 καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀπάντων ἄνθρωπος γένηται. τὸ γοῦν
θνητὸν εὐθέως, ὅτ' ἐσμὲν ἄνθρωποι, οὐ συμβέβηκεν
ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμμημόνευσιν λαμβάνεται.
θεωροῦντες γὰρ Δίωνα καὶ Θέωνα καὶ Σωκράτη
καὶ κοινῶς τοὺς κατὰ μέρος ἡμῖν ὁμοίους τετε-
λευτηκέναι λογιζόμεθα ὅτι καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐσμὲν θνητοί,
καὶ μηδέπω τοῦ θανεῖν παρόντος ἡμῖν· ζῶμεν γὰρ
280 δῆπουθεν. καὶ μὴν τὸ λογίζεσθαι ὅτ' ἐμὲν πάρεστιν
ἡμῖν ὅτ' ἐμὲν οὐ πάρεστι, καὶ τὸ ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν
πάλιν οὐ τῶν διὰ παντὸς συμβεβηκότων τῷ ἄν-
θρώπῳ καθέστηκεν, ὡς ἤδη παρεστήσαμεν. λεκτέον
οὖν μηδὲ τὴν κοινὴν τούτων σύνοδον ἄνθρωπον
εἶναι.

281 Πλάτων δὲ χείρον παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ὀρίζει τὸν
ἄνθρωπον, λέγων "ἄνθρωπός ἐστι ζῶον ἄπτερον
δίπουν πλατυώνυχον, ἐπιστήμης πολιτικῆς δεκτι-
κόν". ὅθεν καὶ προὑπτὰ ἐστὶ τὰ ὀφείλοντα πρὸς
αὐτὸν λέγεσθαι. πάλιν γὰρ οὐ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐκτέθει-
ται, ἀλλὰ τὰ συμβεβηκότα καὶ ἀποσυμβεβηκότα
282 τούτῳ καθήριθμηται. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄπτερον ἀποσυμ-
βέβηκεν αὐτῷ, τὸ δὲ ζῶον καὶ τὸ δίπουν καὶ τὸ
πλατυώνυχον συμβέβηκεν, τὸ δὲ ἐπιστήμης πολιτι-
κῆς δεκτικὸν ποτὲ μὲν συμβέβηκε ποτὲ δὲ ἀποσυμ-
βέβηκεν. ὥστε ἡμῶν ἕτερόν τι μαθεῖν ζητούντων
αὐτὸς ἕτερόν τι παρέστησεν.

But to this also there is an answer ready to hand. 278
For, firstly, if each of these things separately is not
"Man," how can they make "Man" when combined
together so as neither to extend beyond what he is
nor to fall short of his real extent nor to diverge in
any other way? And, next, they cannot so much as
congregate all together so that the sum of them all
should form "Man." Thus "mortal," for instance, 279
is not a property of ours when we are men but is
derived from concurrent recollection. For from seeing
that Dion and Theon and Socrates, and in general
individuals similar to ourselves, have died we reason
that we also are mortal, even though death is not yet
present with us—for, to be sure, we are alive. More- 280
over, reasoning, too, is at one time present with us,
at another time not present; and "possessing know-
ledge" again, as we have already explained,^a is not
one of the constant properties of Man. It must
be said, then, that not even the union of all these
properties is "Man."

Plato gives a worse definition of Man than the 281
others when he states that "Man is a wingless
animal, with two feet and broad nails, receptive of
political science."^b Hence the objections which
should be brought against him are obvious. For, once
again, he has not explained Man but has enumerated
the positive and negative attributes of Man; for 282
"wingless" is a negative attribute of his, while
"animal" and "with two feet" and "with broad
nails" are positive attributes, and "receptive of
political science" is at one time a positive, at another
a negative attribute. So that while we are seeking to
learn one thing, he offers us another.

^a See § 273.^b Cf. P.H. ii. 28.

Ἄλλὰ γὰρ οὕτως ἀποδείξω τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι
 283 τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐκ προχείρου νοεῖν. παρακειμένως
 δὲ λεκτέον ὅτι καὶ ἡ κατάληψις αὐτοῦ τῶν ἀπόρων
 ἐστί, καὶ μάλιστα ὅτι ἀπὸ μέρους ἤδη τοῦτο
 συμβεβίβασται. τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐπινοούμενον οὐδὲ
 καταληφθῆναι πέφυκεν· ἀνεπινόητος δὲ γε ὁ ἄν-
 284 θρωπος δέδεικται τὸ ὅσον ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν δογματικῶν
 καὶ καθ' ἕτερον τρόπον ἐνέσται τὸ τοιοῦτο κατα-
 σκευάζειν. εἴπερ καταληπτὸν ἐστὶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος,
 ἤτοι ὅλος δι' ὅλου ἑαυτὸν ζητεῖ τε καὶ καταλαμ-
 βάνει, ἢ ὅλος ἐστὶ τὸ ζητούμενον καὶ ὑπὸ τὴν
 κατάληψιν πίπτει, (ἢ μέρει μὲν ἐστὶ τὸ ζητοῦν,
 μέρει δὲ τὸ ζητούμενον,) ὥσπερ εἰ καὶ τὴν ὄρασιν
 ὑπόβοιτό τις ἑαυτὴν ὀρώσων ἢ γὰρ ὅλη ἐστὶ ὀρώσα
 ἢ ὀρωμένη ἢ μέρει μὲν ἑαυτὴν ὀρώσα μέρει δὲ ὑφ'
 285 ἑαυτῆς ὀρωμένη. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ὅλος δι' ὅλου ὁ
 ἄνθρωπος ἑαυτὸν ζητοῖ καὶ σὺν τούτῳ νοοῖτο, σὺν
 τῷ ὅλῳ δι' ὅλου ἑαυτὸν νοεῖν, οὐδὲν ἔτι ἐστὶ τὸ
 καταλαμβάνομενον, ὅπερ ἄτοπον. εἰ δὲ ὅλος εἴη
 τὸ ζητούμενον καὶ σὺν τούτῳ νοοῖτο ὅλος, σὺν τῷ
 ζητεῖσθαι, πάλιν οὐδὲν ἀπολειφθήσεται τὸ ζητοῦν
 286 καὶ τὸ τὴν κατάληψιν ποιησόμενον. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ
 δυνατόν ἐστὶ παρὰ μέρος ὅτε μὲν ὅλον ὑποκείσθαι
 τὸ ζητοῦν ὅτε δὲ ὅλον τὸ ζητούμενον. ὅτε γὰρ
 ὅλος ὑπόκειται ζητῶν καὶ σὺν τούτῳ νοεῖται ὅλος,
 σὺν τῷ ζητεῖν ὅλος, οὐδὲν ἀπολειφθήσεται ὁ ζητη-

¹ <ἢ . . . ζητ.> sic ego lacunam explevi: similiter Bekk.

Well, then, let us grant that it is thus proved that
 it is not possible to form off-hand a conception of
 Man. In like manner one must declare that the 283
 apprehension of Man is a thing impracticable,
 especially since this has been partially established
 already (for what is not conceived is not capable of
 being apprehended; and it has been shown that Man,
 so far as the conceptions of the Dogmatists are
 concerned, is inconceivable, and therefore also non-
 apprehensible). All the same, it will be possible to 284
 establish this point by another line of argument as
 well. If Man is apprehensible either he as a whole
 wholly seeks and apprehends himself, or as a whole
 he is the object sought and coming under apprehen-
 sion, (or he is partly the subject, partly the object
 of apprehension,) just as if one were to imagine the
 sense of sight seeing itself; for either it will be
 wholly seeing or seen, or partly seeing itself and
 partly seen by itself. But if man as a whole should 285
 wholly seek himself and should be conceived there-
 with (that is, with the fact that he as a whole wholly
 conceives himself), there will no longer be any object
 that is apprehended, which is absurd. And if, on the
 other hand, he as a whole is the object sought and
 as a whole is conceived therewith (that is, with the
 fact that he is sought), then again we shall be left
 with no subject that seeks or is about to effect the
 apprehension. Moreover it is not possible to take 286
 him in parts so that at one time he should be wholly
 the subject seeking, and at another wholly the object
 sought. For when as a whole he is seeking and as a
 whole is conceived therewith (that is, with the fact
 that as a whole he is seeking), no object will be left
 for him to seek; and conversely, when as a whole

σει· και ἀνάπαλιν, ὅτε ὅλος δι' ὅλου ἐστὶ τὸ ζητούμενον, οὐκ ἔσται τὸ ζητοῦν.

- 287 Λείπεται ἄρα μὴ ὅλον αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ ἐπιβάλλειν, ἀλλὰ μέρει τινὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ κατάληψιν ποιεῖσθαι. ὁ πάλιν ἐστὶ τῶν ἀπόρων. ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος οὐδέν ἐστι παρὰ τὸν ὄγκον καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὴν
- 288 διάνοιαν, ὅθεν εἰ μέλλει τινὶ μέρει ἑαυτὸν καταλαμβάνεσθαι, ἤτοι τῷ σώματι τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν γνωριεῖ, ἢ ἐναλλάξ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ τὸ σῶμα καταλήψεται. τῷ μὲν οὖν σώματι οὐχ οἷον τέ ἐστὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν γνωρίζειν· ἄλογον γὰρ ἐστὶ τοῦτο καὶ κωφὸν καὶ ἀφύες πρὸς τὰς τοιουτοτρόπους ζητή-
- 289 σεις. ἄλλως τε, εἰ τὸ σῶμα τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ τῆς διανοίας ἀντιληπτικὸν ἐστίν, ὀφείλει τὸ ταύτας καταλαμβάνον ὁμοιοῦσθαι ταύταις, τουτέστιν ὁμοίως διατίθεσθαι καὶ αἰσθησίς τε καὶ διάνοια γίνεσθαι. ὁράσεως γὰρ ἀντιλαμβανόμενον, καθὸ ὄρα, ὄρασις ἐστίν, καὶ γεύσεως γενομένης καταληπτικὸν ὑπάρχον γεύσει γενήσεται, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τὸ
- 290 ἀνάλογον. καθὰ γὰρ τὸ θερμὸν ἀντιλαμβανόμενον ὡς θερμὸν θερμαινόμενον ἀντιλαμβάνεται, θερμαινόμενον δὲ εὐθύς ἐστὶ θερμόν, καὶ ὡς τὸ ψυχρὸν γνώσιν ποιούμενον ὡς ψυχρὸν ψυχόμενον εὐθέως ἐστὶ ψυχρόν, οὕτω καὶ ὁ σάρκινος ὄγκος εἰ ἀντιλαμβάνεται τῶν αἰσθήσεων ὡς αἰσθήσεων, αἰσθάνεται,
- 291 αἰσθανόμενος δὲ πάντως αἰσθησίς γενήσεται, καὶ ταύτη οὐκέτι ὑποκείμεται τὸ ζητοῦν, ἀλλ' ἔσται τὸ ζητούμενον, σὺν τῷ καὶ τελῶς καταγέλαστον εἶναι τὸ μὴ διαφέρειν τὸν ὄγκον τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ τῆς διανοίας, πάντων σχεδὸν τῶν δογματικῶς

he is wholly the object sought, the subject which seeks will not exist.

We are left, then, with the alternative that Man 287 does not as a whole perceive himself but forms the apprehension of himself by means of some part of himself. But this again is a thing impracticable. For Man is nothing more than his substance and senses and intellect, so that, if he is to apprehend himself 288 with one of his parts, either he will perceive his senses and intellect with his body, or conversely he will apprehend his body with his senses and intellect. It is, however, impossible for him to perceive his senses and intellect with his body; for it is irrational and senseless and unsuited for suchlike investigations. And besides, if the body is capable of perceiving 289 the senses and the intellect, as apprehending these it must be similar to them, that is, it must be in a similar condition and become both sense and intellect. For when it perceives the sense of sight, in so far as it sees it will be sight, and when it is apprehensive of taste in the act of tasting it will become taste, and similarly with the other senses. For just as that which per- 290 ceives a hot thing as hot perceives it by being heated, and being heated is at once hot, and as that which acquires knowledge of a cold thing as cold by feeling cold is at once cold, so also if the fleshly substance perceives the senses as senses it has sense-perception, and having sense-perception it certainly will become sense, and in this way the seeking subject will no 291 longer subsist but it will be the object sought,— besides the fact that it is perfectly ridiculous to suppose that the body's substance does not differ from the senses and the intellect, when practically

φιλοσοφησάντων τὴν ἐν τούτοις διαφορὰν εἰσηγησαμένων.

- 292 Ὁ δ' αὐτὸς καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς διανοίας ἐστὶ λόγος· εἰ γὰρ ἀντιλαμβάνεται ταύτης ὁ ὄγκος ὡς διανοίας, τουτέστι νοούσης, ἔσται διάνοια ὁ ὄγκος, διάνοια δὲ ὢν οὐκ ἔσται τὸ ζητοῦν ἀλλὰ τὸ ζητούμενον. οὐ τοίνυν τὸ σῶμα καταληπτικόν ἐστι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.
- 293 Καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ αἱ αἰσθήσεις. αὐταὶ γὰρ πάσχουσι μόνον καὶ κηροῦ τρόπον τυποῦνται, ἄλλο δ' ἴσασι οὐδὲ ἔν, ἐπεὶ τοι ἔαν ζήτησί᾽ τινος αὐταῖς νείμωμεν, οὐκέτ' ἄλογοι γενήσονται ἀλλὰ λογικαὶ καὶ διανοίας ἔχουσαι φύσιν. ὅπερ οὐχ οὕτως εἶχεν· εἰ γὰρ τὸ λευκαίνεσθαι καὶ μελαίνεσθαι καὶ γλυκάζεσθαι καὶ πικράζεσθαι καὶ εὐωδίζεσθαι καὶ κωιδῶς πάσχειν ἰδίον ἐστὶν αὐτῶν, τὸ ζητεῖν ἐνεργητικῶς οὐκ ἔσται
- 294 ἴδιον αὐτῶν. εἰτα πῶς οἷόν τέ ἐστι διὰ τούτων καταληφθῆναι τὸν ὄγκον οὐκ ἔχουσῶν σωματικὴν¹ φύσιν; οἷον εὐθέως ἢ ὄρασις σχήματος μὲν καὶ μεγέθους καὶ χροῶς ἐστὶν ἀντιληπτικὴ, οὔτε δὲ σχῆμα οὔτε μέγεθος οὔτε χρωμά ἐστὶν ὁ ὄγκος, ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ ἄρα, τὸ ᾧ ταῦτα συμβέβηκεν· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸν μὲν ὄγκον οὐ δύναται λαβεῖν ἢ ὄρασις, μόνον δὲ ὄρα τὰ συμβεβηκότα τῷ ὄγκῳ, οἷον τὸ
- 295 σχῆμα, τὸ μέγεθος, τὴν χροάν. ναί, φήσει τις, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐκ τούτων συνηραρισμένον ὁ ὄγκος ἐστίν. ὅπερ ἦν ληρώδες. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ εἰδείξαμεν ὅτι οὐδὲ ἡ κοινὴ σύννοδος τῶν τινὶ συμβεβηκότων
- 296 ἐκεῖνό ἐστι τὸ ᾧ τινὶ συμβέβηκεν· εἰτα κἂν τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχη, πάλιν τῶν ἀμηχάνων ἐστὶν ὑπὸ τῆς

¹ σωματικὴν: τὴν mss., Bekk.: τὴν <αὐτὴν> cj. Mutsch.

all the dogmatic philosophers have made mention of the difference between them.

The same argument applies also to the intellect; 292 for if the bodily substance perceives it as intellect—that is, as thinking—the substance will be intellect, and being intellect it will be not the seeker but the sought. So, then, the body is not capable of apprehending Man.

Nor indeed are the senses. For these are solely 293 passive and are stamped like wax, and not a single thing else do they know, since, to be sure, if we ascribe to them a seeking for anything they will become no longer irrational but rational and endowed with the nature of intellect. But this is not the case; for if feeling the white and the black and the sweet and the bitter and the odorous, and passive feeling in general, is a peculiar property of theirs, active seeking will not be a peculiar property of theirs.— Further, how is it possible for the bodily substance to 294 be apprehended by them when they do not possess a corporeal nature? Thus the sense of sight, for instance, is perceptive of form and size and colour, but the substance is neither form nor size nor colour but, if anything, that whereof these are properties; and because of this sight is not able to perceive the substance and only sees the properties of the substance, such as its form, size, colour. "Yes," 295 someone will say, "but the aggregate made up of these is the substance." But this is fatuous. For, in the first place, we have shown^a that not even the united combination of the properties of a thing is the thing of which they are properties. And further, 296 even were it so, it is again an impossibility for the

^a See § 278.

ὄψεως ληφθῆναι τὸ σῶμα. εἰ γὰρ μήτε μήκος
 ψιλόν ἐστι τὸ σῶμα μήτε σχῆμα κατ' ἰδίαν μήτε
 χρῶμα χωρὶς, τὸ δὲ ἐκ τούτων σύνθετον, δεήσει
 τὴν ὄρασιν τοῦ σώματος ἀντιλαμβανομένην συν-
 τιθέναι ταῦτα καθ' ἕκαστον παρ' ἑαυτῆς, καὶ οὕτω
 297 τὸν κοινὸν πάντων ἀθροισμὸν σῶμα λέγειν. ἀλλὰ
 τὸ συντιθέναι τι μετὰ τινος, καὶ τὸ τοιούδε μέγεθος
 μετὰ τοῦ τοιούδε σχήματος λαμβάνειν, λογικῆς
 ἐστὶ δυνάμεως. ἄλογος δὲ γέ ἐστιν ἡ ὄρασις·
 298 τοῖνον οὐ ταύτης ἔργον καθέστηκε τὸ ἀντιλαμ-
 βάνεσθαι τοῦ σώματος. καίτοι οὐ μόνον τὴν
 κοινὴν σύνθετον ὡς σῶμα νοεῖν ἐστὶν ἀφύνης, ἀλλὰ
 καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἑκάστου τῶν τούτῳ συμβεβηκότων
 κατάληψιν πεπῆρωται. οἷον εὐθέως μήκους· καθ'
 ὑπέρθεσιν γὰρ μερῶν τοῦτο λαμβάνεσθαι πέφυκεν,
 ἀπὸ τινος ἀρχομένων ἡμῶν καὶ διὰ τινος καὶ ἐπὶ τι
 καταληγόντων, ὅπερ ποιεῖν ἄλογος φύσις οὐ δύνα-
 299 ται. εἴτα καὶ βάθους· περὶ αὐτὴν γὰρ πλάζεται
 τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν ἡ ὄρασις, εἰς βάθος δ' οὐκ ἐνδύνει.
 λανθάνει γοῦν αὐτὴν καὶ τὰ περιχρῦσα τῶν χαλκῶν.
 εἶρητο δὲ ὅτι καὶ πρὸς χρωμάτων γνώσιν ἦν ἀν-
 επιτηδῆεις, ὅτε τὴν Κυρηναϊκὴν στάσιν ἀνήροῦμεν.
 300 διόπερ εἰ μηδὲ τῶν συμβεβηκότων τῷ σώματι ἡ
 ὄρασις ἐστὶν ἀντιληπτικὴ, πολὺ πλέον οὐδ' αὐτοῦ
 τοῦ σώματος ἔσται θεωρητικὴ. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ
 ἀκοῆς ἐστὶν ἔργον τὸ τοιούτον ἢ ὀσφρήσεως ἢ γεύ-
 σεως ἢ ἀφῆς· ἑκάστη γὰρ τούτων τὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν
 μόνον αἰσθητὸν ἐπίσταται, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ὁ
 ὄγκος. ἡ γὰρ ἀκοὴ φωνῆς μόνον ἐστὶν ἀντιληπτι-
 κή, φωνῆ δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶν ὁ ὄγκος. καὶ ἡ ὀσφρησις
 εὐώδους μόνον ἢ δυσώδους ἐστὶ κριτήριον· ἀλλ'

body to be perceived by the sense of sight. For if
 neither bare length, nor form by itself, nor colour in
 isolation, is the body, but the compound made up of
 them, it will be necessary for the sight which apprehends
 the body to put these together one by one in
 itself, and thus to call the general aggregate of them
 all "body." But the act of putting together one 297
 thing with another, and of perceiving such and such
 a size together with such and such a form, belongs
 to the rational faculty. And the sense of sight is
 irrational, so that it is not its task to perceive the
 body.—Moreover, it is not only unsuited by nature 298
 to conceive the general aggregate as body, but it is
 also disabled for the apprehension of each of the
 body's properties. That of length, for instance; for
 this is naturally perceived by passing over its parts,
 as we commence at a point and proceed through a
 point and end up at a point, which an irrational nature
 cannot do. Again, take the property of depth; for 299
 sight roams over the actual surface and does not
 penetrate to the depth. Thus it fails to discover the
 copper in coins that are gilded over. And when we
 overthrew the Cyrenaic theory^a it was stated that
 sight is also unfitted for the discerning of colour.
 Consequently, if the sense of sight is not even 300
 perceptive of the properties of the body, much less
 will it be capable of discerning the body itself. Nor,
 indeed, is this a task for hearing or smell or taste
 or touch; for each of these senses is only aware of
 the percept proper to itself, and this will not be the
 bodily substance. For hearing is perceptive of sound
 only, and sound is not the substance. And smell is
 a judge only of the odorous or mal-odorous; but no

^a See §§ 190 ff.

οὐθεις οὕτως ἐστὶν ἄφρων ὡς τὴν ὑπόστασιν τοῦ περὶ ἡμᾶς σώματος ἐν τοῖς εὐώδεσιν ἢ δυσώδεσιν ἀπολείπειν. τὰ δ' αὐτὰ λεκτέον καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων, ἵνα μὴ μακρολογώμεν. ὥστε αὐται μὲν τὸν ὄγκον οὐ καταλαμβάνονται.

- 301 Καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ἑαυτάς. τίς γὰρ ὁράσει τὴν ὄρασιν εἶδεν; ἢ τίς ἀκοῇ τῆς ἀκοῆς ἀκήκοεν; τίς δὲ γεύσει ποτὲ τῆς γεύσεως ἐγεύσατο, ἢ ὀσφρήσει ὀσφρήσεως ὀσφρήσατο, ἢ ἀφῆς ἔθιγεν ἀφή; ταῦτα γὰρ διανοητὰ ἦν. τοίνυν μηδ' ἑαυτῶν ἀντιληπτικὰς λεκτέον εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις. οὕτωςι δὲ οὐδὲ ἀλλήλων. ὄρασις γὰρ ἀκούουσαν ἀκοῆν οὐ δύναται ὄραν, καὶ ἀνάπαλιν ἀκοὴ ὀρώσης ὀράσεως οὐ πέφυκεν ἀκούειν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ αὐτὸς τῆς ἐγχειρήσεως τρόπος, ἐπεὶ τοι κἂν λέγωμεν ὁράσει ληπτὴν εἶναι τὴν ἀκοῆν ὡς ἀκοῆν, τουτέστιν [ὡς] ἀκούουσαν, δώσομεν τὸ ὁμοιοπαθεῖν τὴν ὄρασιν ἐκείνη, ὥστε μηκέτι αὐτὴν ὄρασιν εἶναι ἀλλ' ἀκοῆν.
- 302 πῶς γὰρ δύναται κρίναι ἀκούουσαν ἀκοῆν αὐτὴ μὴ ἔχουσα φύσιν ἀκουστικὴν; καὶ ἀναστροφῶς, ἵνα καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ ὡς ὀρώσης ἀντιλάβηται τῆς ὄψεως, δεῖ πολὺ πρότερον ὄρασιν αὐτὴν γενέσθαι. τοῦτο δὲ οὐδεμίαν ὑπερβολὴν ἔοικεν ἀτοπίας ἀπολείπειν. λεκτέον ἄρα μηδὲ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἢ τοῦ σώματος ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι ἢ αὐτῶν ἢ ἀλλήλων.
- 303 Naί, φασὶν οἱ δογματικοί, ἀλλ' ἡ διάνοια καὶ τὸν ὄγκον καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ ἑαυτὴν γνωρίζει. ὅπερ καὶ αὐτὸ τῶν ἀπόρων ἐστίν. ὅταν γὰρ ἀξιώσῃ τὴν διάνοιαν ἀντιληπτικὴν γίνεσθαι τοῦ τε ὅλου σώματος καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ, πευσόμεθα πότερον ὑφ' ἐν ὅλῳ ἐπιπεσοῦσα τῷ ὄγκῳ τὴν κατάληψιν ποιεί-

one is so witless as to class the substance of our body amongst things odorous or mal-odorous. And—not to make a long story of it—the same may be said regarding the rest of the senses. So that the senses do not apprehend the bodily substance.

Nor indeed do they apprehend themselves. For 301 who has beheld sight by sight? Or who has heard hearing by hearing? And who ever tasted taste by taste, or smelt smell by smell, or touched touch by touch? For these are objects for the intellect. Hence it must be declared that the senses are not even perceptive of themselves; nor, in consequence, of one another. For sight cannot see hearing as it hears, and conversely hearing is incapable of hearing sight as it sees,—and the same method of criticism applies to the other senses,—since, of course, if we assert that hearing as hearing (that is, as in act of hearing) is perceptible by sight, we shall be admitting that sight is like to the former in quality, so that it is no longer sight but hearing; for how can it discern hearing 302 in act of hearing unless it possesses itself a nature capable of hearing? And conversely, in order that hearing may perceive sight as in act of seeing it must itself have become vision long before. But this, it would seem, reaches the very height of absurdity. One must, therefore, declare that the senses do not perceive either the body or themselves or one another.

“Yes,” say the Dogmatists, “but the intellect 303 discerns both the bodily substance and the senses and itself.” But this, too, is a thing impracticable. For when they claim that the intellect is perceptive both of the whole body and of its contents, we shall inquire whether it apprehends by making contact all

304 ται, ἢ τοῖς μέρεσιν αὐτοῦ, καὶ ταῦτα συντιθεῖσα τὸ
 ὅλον καταλαμβάνεται. καὶ τῷ μὲν ὅλῳ οὐκ ἂν
 θελήσαιεν, ὡς ἔσται συμφανές ἐκ τῶν ἐπιφερο-
 μένων· τὰ δὲ μέρη εἰ λέγοιεν αὐτὴν συντιθένα
 κἀντεῦθεν τὸ ὅλον γνωρίζειν, μείζονι συνειληθήσου-
 νται ἀπορία. τῶν γὰρ τοῦ ὅλου μερῶν τινὰ ἔστιν
 ἄλογα, τὰ δὲ ἄλογα ἀλόγως ἡμᾶς κινεῖ. τοῖνυν ἡ
 διάνοια πρὸς τούτων ἀλόγως κινουμένη ἄλογος
 γενήσεται, ἄλογος δὲ οὐσα οὐκ ἔσται διάνοια.
 305 ὥστε οὐ καταλήψεται τὸν ὄγκον ἢ διάνοια. καὶ
 μὴν οὐδὲ τὰς αἰσθήσεις δύναται κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν
 τρόπον διαγινώσκειν. ὡς γὰρ τὸ σῶμα οὐ δύναται
 [περι]λαβεῖν τῷ αὐτῇ μὲν λογικῆς μετέχειν δυνά-
 μειος ἐκείνο δὲ ἄλογον εἶναι, οὕτω πάλιν ἀδυνατήσει
 τὰς αἰσθήσεις καταλαμβάνεσθαι, ἐπεὶ περ ἄλογοί
 εἰσιν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀλόγως τὸ καταλαμβανόμενον
 αὐτὰς ἐκίνουν. εἶτα τὰς αἰσθήσεις λαμβάνουσα
 πάντως αὐτῇ αἰσθησις ἔσται. ἵνα γὰρ τὰς αἰσθή-
 σεις ὡς αἰσθήσεις λάβῃ, τουτέστιν αἰσθανομένης,
 καὶ αὐτῇ γενήσεται ὁμοιοειδῆς ἐκείναις· τὴν γὰρ
 ὄρασιν ὄρωσαν καταλαμβανομένη πολὺ πρότερον
 ὄρασις γενήσεται, καὶ τὴν ἀκοὴν ἀκούουσαν κρι-
 νουσα οὐχ ἕτερα γενήσεται τῆς ἀκοῆς. ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς
 καὶ ἐπὶ ὀσφρήσεως καὶ γεύσεως καὶ ἀφῆς ἔστι
 306 λόγος. ἀλλ' εἴπερ ἡ γνωρίζουσα τὰς αἰσθήσεις
 διάνοια εὐρίσκειται εἰς τὴν ἐκείνων μεταβεβηκυῖα
 φύσιν, οὐδὲν ἔσται ἔτι ὑποκείμενον τὸ ζητοῦν τὰς
 αἰσθήσεις· ὁ γὰρ ὑπεθέμεθα ζητεῖν, τοῦτο ἀναπέ-
 φηγε τὸ αὐτὸ ταῖς ζητουμέναις, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ
 307 χρῆζον τοῦ καταληψομένου. ναί φασιν, ἀλλὰ ταῦ-

at once with the substance as a whole, or with its
 parts, and by combining these it apprehends the
 whole. That it is with the whole they will not agree, 304
 as will be evident from what follows; and if they
 should say that it combines the parts and therefrom
 discerns the whole, they will be plunged into diffi-
 culties. For of the parts of the substance some are
 irrational, and those that are irrational move us
 irrationally. The intellect, therefore, being irration-
 ally moved by these will become irrational, and being
 irrational it will not be intellect. So that the intellect
 will not apprehend the substance.—Nor, in fact, can 305
 it distinguish the senses, according to the same argu-
 ment. For just as it is unable to apprehend the
 body owing to the fact that it has itself a share of
 rational power whereas the body is irrational, so also
 it will be unable to apprehend the senses since they
 are irrational and therefore move what apprehends
 them irrationally. Further, in perceiving the senses
 it will certainly be sense itself. For in order that it
 may perceive the senses as senses (that is, as exercis-
 ing sense-perception) it will itself become of like
 nature with them; for when it apprehends sight as
 in act of seeing it will, long before, become sight, and
 in discerning hearing in act of hearing it will become
 no different from hearing. The same argument
 applies to both smell and taste and touch.—But if 306
 the intellect that discerns the senses is found to have
 passed over into their nature, there will no longer
 exist any subject which seeks to know the senses;
 for that which we assumed to be seeking has turned
 out to be identical with the senses sought, and
 consequently in need of something to apprehend it.
 "Yes," they say, "but the same thing is both intellect 307

τόν ἐστι διάνοια καὶ αἴσθησις, οὐ κατὰ ταυτό δέ, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἄλλο μὲν διάνοια κατ' ἄλλο δὲ αἴσθησις· καὶ ὃν τρόπον τὸ αὐτὸ ποτήριον κοῖλόν τε καὶ περίκυρτον λέγεται, οὐ κατὰ ταυτό δέ, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἄλλο μὲν κοῖλον, οἷον τὸ ἐντὸς μέρος, κατ' ἄλλο δὲ περίκυρτον, καθάπερ τὸ ἐκτὸς, καὶ ὡς ἡ αὐτὴ ὁδὸς ἀνάτης τε καὶ κατάντης νοεῖται, ἀνάτης μὲν τοῖς ἀνιούσι δι' αὐτῆς κατάντης δὲ τοῖς κατιούσιν, οὕτως ἡ αὐτὴ δύναμις κατ' ἄλλο μὲν ἐστι νοῦς κατ' ἄλλο δὲ αἴσθησις, καὶ οὐκ εἴργεται ἡ αὐτὴ οὕσα τῆς

308 προειρημένης τῶν αἰσθήσεων καταλήψεως. πάνυ δ' εἰσὶν εὐήθεις, καὶ κενῶς μόνον πρὸς τὰς ἐκκειμένας ἀπορίας ἀντηχοῦσιν. φαμέν γάρ, εἰ καὶ συγχωρηθῶσιν αἱ διάφοροι αὗται δυνάμεις περὶ τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν ὑποκείσθαι, πάλιν μένει τὸ μικρῶ

309 πρόσθεν ὑπὸ ἡμῶν κινήθην ἄπορον. ζητῶ γάρ, τοῦτο τὸ κατ' ἄλλο μὲν νοῦς εἶναι λεγόμενον κατ' ἄλλο δὲ αἴσθησις πῶς δύναται τῷ καθ' ὃ νοῦς ἐστὶν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ καθ' ὃ αἴσθησις ἐστίν; λογικὸν γάρ ὃν καὶ ἀλόγου ποιούμενον κατάληψιν ἀλόγως κινήσεται, ἀλόγως δὲ κινούμενον ἀλογόν ἐστι, τοιοῦτον δὲ ὃν οὐκ ἔσται καταλαμβάνον ἀλλὰ καταλαμβανόμενον. ὅπερ πάλιν ἦν ἄπορον.

310 Διὰ τούτων μὲν δὴ παρεστάθω ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὔτε διὰ τοῦ σώματος τὰς αἰσθήσεις δύναται λαβεῖν οὔτε ἀνάπαλιν διὰ τούτων τὸ σῶμα, <εἶγε> μηδὲ <αὐταὶ>¹ αὐτὰς ἢ ἀλλήλας. ἐξῆς δὲ ὑποδεικτέον ὅτι οὐδ' ἑαυτῆς ἐπιγνώμων ἐστὶν ἡ διάνοια, καθάπερ ἀξιοῦσιν οἱ δογματικοὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων. εἴπερ γάρ ὁ νοῦς ἑαυτὸν καταλαμβάνεται, ἥτοι ὅλος ἑαυτὸν καταλήψεται, ἢ ὅλος μὲν οὐδαμῶς

¹ <εἶγε> μ. <αὐταὶ> cj. Bekk.

and sense, but not in the same aspect, it being in one aspect intellect but in another sense; and just as the same drinking-cup is said to be both concave and convex, though not in the same aspect, but in one aspect concave, as is the inside part, and in another convex, as is the outside,—and as the same road is conceived as being both an incline and a decline, an incline for those ascending by it but a decline for those descending,—so likewise the same faculty is in one aspect thought but in another sense, and being the same it is not precluded from the aforementioned apprehension of the senses.” But they are utterly 308 simple-minded, and only make empty replies to the difficulties propounded. For we assert that, even if it be granted that these different faculties really belong to the same substance, there still remains the difficulty raised by us a little while ago. For I ask, 309 as regards this thing which is said to be thought in one aspect and sense in another, how by its aspect as thought can it perceive its aspect as sense? For it being rational and apprehending an irrational thing will be moved irrationally, and being moved irrationally it will be irrational, and being this it will not be apprehending but apprehended. And this again is absurd.

Let it be established, then, by these arguments that 310 Man is unable to perceive either the senses by means of the body or, conversely, the body by means of the senses, seeing that these cannot perceive either themselves or one another. Next we have to show that the intellect is not cognizant of itself, as the Dogmatic philosophers claim. For if the mind apprehends itself, either it as a whole will apprehend itself, or it will do so not as a whole but employing for the purpose

- 311 μέρει δέ τι ἐαυτοῦ πρὸς τοῦτο χρώμενος. καὶ ὅλος μὲν ἐαυτὸν καταλαμβάνεσθαι οὐκ ἂν δυνηθεῖη. εἰ γὰρ ὅλος ἐαυτὸν καταλαμβάνεται, ὅλος ἔσται κατάληψις καὶ καταλαμβάνων, ὅλου δ' ὄντος τοῦ καταλαμβάνοντος οὐδὲν ἔτι ἔσται τὸ καταλαμβάνόμενον· τῶν δὲ ἀλογωτάτων ἐστὶ τὸ εἶναι μὲν τὸν καταλαμβάνοντα, μὴ εἶναι δὲ τὸ οὐ ἔστιν ἢ
- 312 κατάληψις. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ μέρει τινὶ δύναται πρὸς τοῦτο χρῆσθαι ὁ νοῦς. αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ μέρος πῶς¹ ἐαυτὸ καταλαμβάνει; εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὅλον, οὐδὲν ἔσται τὸ ζητούμενον· εἰ δὲ μέρει τινί, ἐκείνο πάλιν πῶς ἐαυτὸ γνώσεται; καὶ οὕτως εἰς ἄπειρον. ὥστε ἀναρχον εἶναι τὴν κατάληψιν, ἥτοι μηδενὸς εὐρισκομένου πρώτου τοῦ τὴν κατάληψιν ποιησομένου ἢ μηδενὸς ὄντος τοῦ καταληφθησομένου.²
- 313 ἐπεὶ τὰ³ εἰ ἐαυτὸν καταλαμβάνει ὁ νοῦς, καὶ τὸν τόπον ἐν ᾧ ἔστι συγκαταλήφεται· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ καταλαμβανόμενον⁴ σὺν τινὶ τόπῳ καταλαμβάνεται. εἰ δὲ καὶ τὸν τόπον ὁ νοῦς τὸν ἐν ᾧ ἔστι συγκαταλαμβάνει ἐαυτῷ, ἐχρῆν μὴ διαφωνεῖσθαι τοῦτον παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις, τῶν μὲν κεφαλὴν λεγόντων εἶναι τῶν δὲ θώρακα, καὶ ἐπ' εἶδους τῶν μὲν ἐγκέφαλον τῶν δὲ μήνιγγα, τινῶν δὲ καρδίαν, ἄλλων δὲ ἥπατος πύλας ἢ τι τοιοῦτο μέρος τοῦ σώματος. διαφωνοῦσι δὲ γε περὶ τούτου οἱ δογματικοὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων· οὐκ ἄρα καταλαμβάνει ἐαυτὸν ὁ νοῦς.
- 314 Καὶ δὴ οὕτω κουνότερον ἐπὶ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου

¹ πῶς Kayser: ὅπως mss.: αὐ πῶς cj. Bekk.

² καταληφθησομένου cj. Bekk.: καταληφσομένου mss.

³ ἐπεὶ τὰ cj. Bekk.: ἐπεὶ τὰ πῶς N: ἐπεὶ περ cet., Bekk.

⁴ καταλαμβανόμενον cj. Bekk.: καταλαμβάνον mss., Bekk.

a part of itself. Now it will not be able as a whole to 311 apprehend itself. For if as a whole it apprehends itself, it will be as a whole apprehension and apprehending, and, the apprehending subject being the whole, the apprehended object will no longer be anything; but it is a thing most irrational that the apprehending subject should exist while the object of the apprehension does not exist. Nor, in fact, can the 312 mind employ for this purpose a part of itself. For how does the part itself apprehend itself? If as a whole, the object sought will be nothing; while if with a part, how will that part in turn discern itself? And so on to infinity. So that apprehension is a thing without beginning, as either no first subject is found to apprehend or no object exists to be apprehended.—Further, if the mind apprehends itself it 313 will also apprehend therewith the place in which it exists; for everything that is apprehended is apprehended together with some place. And if the mind apprehends together with itself the place also wherein it exists, this ought not to have been a matter of dispute among the philosophers,^a some of them declaring it to be the head, others the breast, and, in particular, some the brain, others the *pia mater*, some the heart, others the portals of the liver or some such part of the body. Regarding this the Dogmatic philosophers do actually dispute among themselves; therefore the mind does not apprehend itself.

Let this, then, stand as a statement of the diffi- 314

^a Cf. *P.H.* i. 118.

διανορήσθω ἡ περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου ζήτησις. ἐπειδὴ δὲ φιλαύτως οἱ δογματικοὶ ἄλλοις μὲν οὐ παραχωροῦσι τὴν τῆς ἀληθείας κρίσιν, μόνους δ' ἑαυτοὺς ταύτην εὐρηκέναι λέγουσιν, φέρε ἐπ' αὐτῶν στήσαντες τὸν λόγον διδάσκωμεν ὅτι οὐδὲ οὕτως εὐρεθῆναι τι δυνατόν ἐστιν ἀληθείας κρι-
 315 τήριον. ἕκαστος τοίνυν τῶν ἀξιούντων τάλληθές εὐρηκέναι ἦτοι φάσει μόνον τοῦτο ἀποφαίνεται ἢ ἀπόδειξιν παραλαμβάνει. ἀλλὰ φάσει μὲν οὐκ ἐρεί- τῶν γὰρ ἀντικαθεζομένων αὐτῷ τις τὴν τούναντίον ἀξιούσαν προοίσαται φάσιν, καὶ οὕτως οὐ μᾶλλον ἐκείνος ἢ οὗτος ἔσται πιστός· ψιλῇ γὰρ φάσει ἴσον
 316 φέρεται ψιλῇ φάσει. εἰ δὲ μετ' ἀποδείξεως κρι- τήριον αὐτὸν ἀποφαίνηται, πάντως ὑγιούς. ἀλλ' ἵνα μάθωμεν ὅτι ὑγιῆς ἢ ἀπόδειξις ἐστὶν ἢ προσ- χρώμενος κριτήριον ἑαυτὸν ἀποφαίνεται, ὀφείλομεν ἔχειν κριτήριον, καὶ τοῦτο προωμολογημένον· οὐκ ἔχομεν δὲ γε σύμφωνον κριτήριον, ζητεῖται δέ·
 317 οὐκ ἄρα δυνατόν ἐστὶν εὐρεῖν κριτήριον. πάλιν ἐπεὶ οἱ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς κριτήρια λέγοντες τῆς ἀληθείας ἀπὸ διαφώνων αἰρέσεων ἀνάγονται καὶ παρ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο διαφωνοῦσιν ἀλλήλοις, δεῖ παρεῖναι τι ἡμῖν κριτήριον ᾧ προσχρώμενοι κρινοῦμεν τὴν διαφωνίαν εἰς τὸ τισὶ μὲν συγκατατίθεσθαι τισὶ δὲ μηδαμῶς.
 318 τοῦτο οὖν τὸ κριτήριον ἦτοι πᾶσι διάφωνόν ἐστι τοῖς διαφωνοῦσιν ἢ ἐνὶ μόνον σύμφωνον. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν πᾶσι διάφωνον, μοῖρα καὶ αὐτὸ γενήσεται τῆς διαφωνίας, μοῖρα δ' ὃν ταύτης οὐκ ἂν εἴη κρι- τήριον ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ παραπλησίως τῇ ὄλη δια-

^a With §§ 314-316 cf. *P.H.* ii. 34-36.

culties which beset the inquiry about the criterion, in its larger aspect as Man in general.^a But inas- much as the Dogmatists, in their self-conceit, do not pass over to others the judgement of truth but assert that they themselves alone have discovered it, come and let us base our argument upon them and demon- strate that not even so is it possible for any criterion of truth to be discovered. Now each of those who
 315 claim to have discovered the truth either makes this declaration by merely asserting it or adduces a proof. But he will not utter it by assertion; for one of those who belong to the opposite side will utter an assertion claiming the opposite, and in this case the former will be no more trustworthy than the latter; for a bare assertion counterbalances a bare assertion. But if
 316 his declaration of himself as criterion is accompanied by proof, it must be sound proof. But in order to ascertain that the proof which he employs in declaring himself as criterion is sound, we must possess a criterion, and one that is already agreed upon; but we do not possess an undisputed criterion, it being the object of inquiry; therefore it is not possible to discover a criterion.—Again, since those who call
 317 themselves criteria of truth derive from discordant Schools of thought, and just because of this disagree with one another, we need to possess a criterion which we can employ to pronounce upon their dis- agreement so as to give assent to the one party and not to the other. This criterion, then, is either in
 318 disagreement with all those who disagree or in agree- ment with only one. But if it disagrees with all, it will itself also be a party in the disagreement, and being a party in this it will not be a criterion but itself also, like the whole of the disagreement, in need of

φωνία κρίσεως δεόμενον· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ δοκιμάζων
 319 ἅμα καὶ δοκιμάζεσθαι τῶν ἀμηχάνων. εἰ δὲ μὴ
 πᾶσι διαπεφώνηκεν ἀλλ' ἐνὶ συμφωνεῖ, (ὁ εἰς οὗτος
 ᾧ συμφωνεῖ)¹ ἐκ τῆς διαφωνίας ὧν χρεῖαν ἔχει τοῦ
 δοκιμάσοντος. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸ σύμφωνον αὐτῷ
 κριτήριον μὴ ἕτερον ὄν παρ' ἐκείνου δεήσεται κρί-
 σεως, δεόμενον δὲ κρίσεως οὐκ ἔσται κριτήριον.
 320 τὸ δὲ πάντων κυριώτατον, εἶπερ τινὰ τῶν δογ-
 ματικῶν λέγομεν εἶναι κριτὴν τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ παρ'
 αὐτῷ μόνω ταύτην ὑπάρχειν, ἥτοι τῇ ἡλικίᾳ αὐτοῦ
 ἐνατενίζοντες τοῦτο ἐροῦμεν, ἢ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ μὲν οὐ-
 δαμῶς τῷ πόνῳ δέ, ἢ οὐδὲ τούτῳ ἀλλὰ τῇ συνέσει
 καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ, ἢ συνέσει μὲν οὐδαμῶς μαρτυρία δὲ
 τῇ τῶν πολλῶν. οὔτε δὲ ἡλικία οὔτε φιλοπονία
 οὔτ' ἄλλω τινὶ τῶν εἰρημένων προσέχειν οἰκειὸν
 ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ περὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ζητήσει, ὡς παρα-
 στήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα τινὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων ῥητέον
 321 κριτήριον εἶναι τῆς ἀληθείας. καὶ δὴ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ
 μὲν οὐ προσεκτέον, ἐπεὶπερ οἱ πλείους τῶν δογ-
 ματικῶν ὁμήλικες σχεδὸν ἦσαν ὅτε αὐτοὺς ἔλεγον
 κριτήρια τῆς ἀληθείας· πάντες γὰρ πρεσβῦται
 γερόμενοι, οἷον Πλάτων, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ Δημόκριτος
 καὶ Ἐπίκουρος καὶ Ζήνων, ἑαυτοῖς τὴν εὕρεσιν
 322 τῆς ἀληθείας προσμαρτύρησαν. εἰτ' οὐκ ἀπέουκεν,
 ὡς ἐν τῷ βίῳ καὶ τῇ κοινῇ συνηθείᾳ θεωροῦμεν
 ὅτι συνετώτεροι πολλάκις τῶν πρεσβυτέρων εἰσὶ
 νέοι, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ φιλοσοφία εὐεπηβολω-
 τέρους γεγενέσθαι παρὰ τοὺς πρεσβύτας τοὺς νέους.
 323 ἐνιοὶ μὲν γάρ, ὧν ἐστὶ καὶ Ἀσκληπιάδης ὁ ἰατρός,
 διαρρήδην ἔλεξαν πολλῶν λείπεσθαι τῆς περὶ τοὺς
 νέους συνέσεως καὶ ἀγχινοίας τοὺς πρεσβύτας,

¹ <ὁ . . . συμφωνεῖ> cj. Bekk.

a judgement; for that the same thing should be at
 once both examining and examined is a thing im-
 practicable. And if it does not disagree with all but 319
 agrees with one, the one with whom it agrees, as
 being involved in the disagreement, requires an
 examiner. And on this account the criterion which
 agrees with that one, being no different from it, will
 need judgement, and needing judgement it will not
 be a criterion.—But the most important argument of 320
 all is this:—if we say that some one particular Dog-
 matist is the judge of truth, and that this attribute
 belongs to him alone, we shall make this statement
 after looking intently either at his age, or not at his
 age but at his labours, or not at these but at his
 sagacity and intellect, or not at his sagacity but at the
 testimony of the multitude. But in our inquiry into
 the truth it is not appropriate, as we shall show, to
 give attention either to age or to industry or to any
 other of the points mentioned above; therefore it
 should not be asserted that any one of the philo-
 sophers is the criterion of truth. Now one should not 321
 attend to age, seeing that most of the Dogmatists
 were pretty much of the same age when they de-
 clared themselves to be criteria of truth; for it was
 when they had all become old—take Plato, for
 instance, and Democritus and Epicurus and Zeno—
 that they testified to their own discovery of truth.
 Further, it is not unlikely that, just as in ordinary life 322
 and common intercourse the young are often found
 to be more intelligent than the old, so likewise in
 philosophy the young may be more keen-witted than
 the old. For some people, including Asclepiades the 323
 physician, have asserted expressly that the old fall
 far short of the young in intelligence and mental

παρὰ δὲ τὴν τῶν πολλῶν καὶ εἰκαιτέρων ψευδο-
δοξίαν ἐναντίως ἔχειν ὑπελήφθη τὸ πρᾶγμα. διὰ γὰρ
τὸ πολυπειρον τῶν πρεσβυτῶν ἔδοξαν οἱ νεώτεροι
λείπεσθαι κατὰ σύνεσιν, τοῦ πράγματος ἐναντίως
ἔχοντος· πολυπειρότεροι μὲν γάρ, ὡς ἔφη, εἰσὶν
οἱ γεγηρακότες, οὐ συνετώτεροι δὲ παρὰ τοὺς
νεούς. οὐκοῦν διὰ μὲν ἡλικίαν οὐ λεκτέον κρι-
324 τήριον εἶναι τινα τῶν δογματικῶν. καὶ μὴν
οὐδὲ διὰ φιλοπονίαν. πάντες γὰρ ἐπ' ἴσης εἰσὶ φιλό-
πονοι, καὶ οὐδεὶς ἔστιν ὃς εἰς τὸν τῆς ἀληθείας
ἀγῶνα κατελθὼν καὶ ταύτην εὐρηκέναι φήσας
ῥαθύμως ἀνέστραπται. πάντων δὲ κατὰ τοῦτο
ἰσότητα μαρτυρουμένων, τὸ ἐνὶ μόνῳ προσκλιθῆναι
325 τῶν ἀδίκων ἔστιν. ὡσαύτως δὲ οὐκ ἂν τις
ἄλλον ἄλλου προκρίναι ἔνεκα συνέσεως. πρῶτον μὲν
γὰρ συνετοὶ πάντες ὑπῆρχον, καὶ οὐχ οἱ μὲν νωθεῖς οἱ
δὲ οὐ τοιοῦτοι. εἴτα πολλάκις οἱ συνετοὶ δοκοῦντες
ὑπάρχειν οὐ τῆς ἀληθείας τοῦ δὲ ψεύδους εἰσὶ
συνήγοροι. τῶν γοῦν ῥητόρων τοὺς μὲν τῷ ψεύδει
γενναίως¹ συλλαμβανομένους καὶ εἰς ἴσην αὐτὸ
πίστιν ἀνάγοντας τῷ ἀληθεῖ δυνατούς τε καὶ
νοερούς εἶναι φασί, τοὺς δὲ μὴ τοιοῦτους ἀνά-
326 παλιν βραδεῖς τε καὶ ἀσυνέτους. τάχα τοίνυν κἂν
φιλοσοφία οἱ μὲν περινούστατοι τῶν ζητησάντων
τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῷ εὐφρεῖς εἶναι πιθανοὶ καθεστάναι
δοκοῦσι, κἂν τῷ ψεύδει συνηγορῶσιν, οἱ δὲ ἀφρεῖς
ἀπίθανοι, κἂν τῷ ἀληθεῖ συμμαχῶσιν. οὔτε οὖν
διὰ ἡλικίαν οὔτε διὰ φιλοπονίαν οὔτε διὰ σύνεσιν
οἰκειὸν ἔστι τινα τινὸς προκρίνειν καὶ τόνδε μὲν
λέγειν εὐρηκέναι τὰληθῆς τόνδε δὲ μῆδαμῶς.

¹ ψεύδει γενναίως Kalbfleisch: ψευδεῖς εἶναι ὡς mss.: ψεύδει
πιθανῶς Bekk.

acumen, although the opposite was supposed to be
the fact owing to the false opinion held by most
thoughtless people. For the young are believed to
fall short in intelligence because of the great experi-
ence of the old, though the opposite is the fact; for
while the aged are, as I said, more experienced, they
are not more intelligent than the young. So, then,
one must not say that, on the ground of age, any of
the Dogmatists is the criterion.—Nor yet, surely, on 324
the ground of industry. For they are all equally
industrious, and there is none who, after competing
in the race for truth and asserting that he has found
it, conducts himself indolently. And when all give
evidence of equality in this respect, it is a thing unjust
to give the preference to one only.—So likewise no 325
one could prefer one as superior to another on the
ground of intelligence. For, in the first place, they
are all intelligent, nor are some obtuse and others not
so. Further, those who are reputed to be intelligent
are frequently advocates not of truth but of falsehood.
Thus we call those orators who ably support what is
false, and raise it to equal the true in credibility, com-
petent and brainy, and those who are not of this class
we call, on the contrary, slow of wit and unintelligent.
Possibly, then, in philosophy also the most sharp- 326
witted of the seekers after truth seem to be convin-
cing, even if they advocate what is false, owing to their
natural ability, whereas those lacking this ability are
unconvincing even when they contend for what is
true. So, then, neither on the ground of age nor of
industry, nor of intelligence, is it proper to prefer any-
one to another and to say that this man has discovered
the truth and that man has not.—It remains, then, 327

327 καταλείπεται τοῖνυν τῷ πλήθει τῶν συμφωνούντων
 προσέχειν· τάχα γὰρ (ἀν)¹ τις τοῦτον ἄριστον
 κριτὴν εἶναι τῆς ἀληθείας φήσειε τὸν ᾧ συμφώνως
 οἱ πλείους μαρτυροῦσιν. ὅπερ ἐστὶ ληρώδες καὶ
 τῶν προδιαβεβλημένων ἡμῖν κριτηρίων χείρον.
 ἵνα γὰρ τὰλλα παρῶμεν, ἴσοι εἰσὶ τοῖς περὶ τινῶν
 συμφωνοῦσιν οἱ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀντιφωνοῦντες, οἷον
 τοῖς Ἀριστοτελικοῖς οἱ Ἐπικούρειοι καὶ τοῖς Ἐπι-
 328 κουρείοις οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων
 ὡσαύτως. εἰ οὖν ἄριστός ἐστιν ὁ συνεωρακῶς
 τάληθές ἐπεὶ ταῦτὸ ἀξιούσι πάντες οἱ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ
 ὀρμώμενοι, τί μᾶλλον τόνδε ἢ τόνδε ἄριστον εἶναι
 φήσομεν καὶ κριτήριον ἀληθείας; οἷον εἰ Ἐπί-
 329 κουρον διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς εἶναι τοὺς περὶ αὐτοῦ συμ-
 φωνοῦντας ὅτι εὔρε τάληθές, τί μᾶλλον Ἐπίκουρον
 ἢ Ἀριστοτέλην[; ἦ]² ὅτι οὐκ ἐλάσσους εἰσὶν οἱ καὶ
 329 τούτῳ συνασπίζονται; οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὡς πάλιν ἐν
 τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον πράγμασιν οὐκ ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν
 ἓνα συνετὸν ἀμείνονα εἶναι πολλῶν ἀσυνέτων, οὕτω
 καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ οὐκ ἀπέοικεν ἓνα φρόνιμον εἶναι
 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πιστόν, πολλοὺς δὲ χηνώδεις καὶ
 διὰ τοῦτο ἀπίστους, κἄν συμφώνως τινὶ προσμαρ-
 330 τυρῶσιν· σπάνιος μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὁ συνετός, πολὺς δὲ
 330 ὁ εἰκαῖος. εἶτα κἄν τῇ συμφωνίᾳ καὶ τῇ τῶν
 πλείονων μαρτυρίᾳ προσέχωμεν, πάλιν εἰς τὸναν-
 τίον τῇ προθέσει περιαιγόμεθα· κατ' ἀνάγκην γὰρ
 τῶν περὶ τίνος συμφωνούντων πλείους εἰσὶν οἱ
 περὶ αὐτοῦ διαφωνοῦντες. ὁ δὲ λέγω, σαφέστερον
 γενήσεται οἰκείου τεθέντος ἡμῖν παραδείγματος.

¹ <ἀ> cj. Bekk.

² [; ἦ] secl. Heintz.

• With §§ 327-334 cf. P. H. ii. 43-44.

that we should attend to the majority of those in agreement; for possibly someone will assert that he is the best judge of truth with whom the testimony of the majority is in agreement.^a But this is nonsensical and worse than the criteria which we have already rejected. For, to pass over all other points, those who disagree about any facts are equal in number to those who agree about the same facts—the Epicureans, for example, are equal to the Aristotelians, and the Stoics to the Epicureans, and so on with the rest. If, then, he that has discerned the 328 truth is the best because all those who derive from him maintain the same view, why should we say that this man rather than that man is the best and the criterion of truth? If, for instance, we name Epicurus because those who agree about him that he has found the truth are many in number, why Epicurus rather than Aristotle, since those who side with the latter are no less numerous? But, notwith- 329 standing, just as in the ordinary affairs of life it is not impossible that one intelligent person should be better than many unintelligent persons, so, once again, in philosophy it is not unlikely that one man should be sensible and on that account trustworthy, and many be like geese and on that account untrustworthy, even though they testify with one voice in someone's favour; for the intelligent man is rare, the thoughtless common.—Moreover, even if we attend to general agreement and the testimony of the 330 majority, we are brought round again to a position which contradicts our assumption; for of necessity those who disagree about a thing are more numerous than those who agree about it. What I mean will become clearer if we take a familiar example. Let 331

331 ἔστω γάρ, ὑποθέσεως χάριν, τῶν καθ' ἑκάστην αἵρεσιν φιλοσοφούντων πλείους εἶναι τοὺς κατὰ τὴν στωικὴν αἵρεσιν φιλοσοφούντας, λεγέτωσάν τε οὗτοι συμφώνως Ζήνωννα μόνον εὐρηκέναι τἀληθές, ἕτερον δὲ μηδένα. οὐκοῦν ἀντιφθέγγονται αὐτοῖς οἱ ἀπὸ Ἐπικούρου, ψευδεσθαι δὲ αὐτοὺς ἐροῦσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ περιπάτου, ἀντεροῦσι δὲ καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας καὶ καθόλου πάντες οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν
 332 αἱρέσεων, ὥστε πάλιν τούτους τοὺς συμφώνως Ζήνωννα προκεκρικότας, συγκρινομένους τοῖς συμφώνως λέγουσι μὴ εἶναι Ζήνωννα κριτήριον, κατὰ πολὺ ἐλάσσους εὐρίσκεσθαι. καὶ παρ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἰ τοῖς συμφώνως περὶ τινος ἀποφαινομένοις χρῆ γνωματεύειν ὅταν ὦσι πολλοί, οὐδένα ῥητέον τἀληθές εὐρηκέναι· παντὶ γὰρ τῷ ὑπὸ τινων ἐπινοουμένῳ πολὺς ἔστω ὁ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων αἱρέσεων
 333 ἀντιφθεγγόμενος. τὸ δὲ πάντων συνεκτικώτατον, οἱ περὶ τινος ὡς εὐρηκότος τἀληθές συμφωνοῦντες ἤτοι διάφορον ἔχουσι διάθεσιν καθ' ἣν συμφωνοῦσιν, ἢ διάφορον μὲν οὐδαμῶς μίαν δὲ καὶ τὴν αὐτήν· ἀλλὰ διάφορον μὲν οὐδαμῶς ἂν ἔχοιεν, ἐπεὶ πάντως αὐτοὺς δεήσει διαφωνεῖν· μίαν δὲ ἔχοντες εἰς ἰσότητα περιίστανται τῷ τούναντίον ἀποφαινομένῳ. ὡς γὰρ ἐκεῖνος μίαν ἔχει διάθεσιν καθ' ἣν ἀντι-
 334 πέπτωκεν αὐτοῖς, οὕτω καὶ οὗτοι τὴν ἴσην ἔχουσιν ἐκείνῳ, παρέλκοντος λοιπὸν τοῦ πλήθους αὐτῶν πρὸς πίστιν· καὶ γὰρ εἰ καθ' ὑπόθεσιν εἰς ἣν

us suppose, for the sake of argument, that those who belong to the Stoic School of philosophy are more numerous than those who belong to each of the other Schools, and that the former agree in saying that Zeno alone has discovered the truth and no one else. Then the Epicureans will contradict them, and the Peripatetics will declare that they are liars, and the Academics will gainsay them, as will also all the members generally of the other Schools, so that once 332 again those who have unanimously given the preference to Zeno, when compared with those who unanimously declare that Zeno is not the criterion, are found to be far fewer in number. Here, too, is another reason: If one ought to vote for those who make an unanimous statement about any matter when they are numerous, it must be asserted that no one has found the truth; for everyone who is commended by a certain number has a multitude from the other Schools who cry out against him. But the most con- 333 vincing argument of all is this: Those who agree together about a certain person that he has found the truth are in a condition with respect to their agreement which is either different or not different at all but one and the same. But they will by no means be in a different condition since then they must certainly disagree; while if they are in one condition they are brought round into a state of equality with him who states the opposite.^a For just as the latter is in one condition in respect of which he has opposed them, so also the former are in a condition equal 334 to his, their large numbers being henceforward redundant for ensuring belief; for, in fact, if it had been but one of them who was supposed to have made this

^a i.e. all who agree about the matter are in the same "condition," or state of mind, respecting it. Thus, like their single opponent, they are in *one* state of mind, and their numbers go for nothing, so that his testimony is as weighty as theirs.

ἐξ αὐτῶν ὁ τοῦτο λέγων, ἴσον ἂν ἐδύνατο τοῖς πᾶσι.

335 Ἄλλ' εἶπερ ὁ τὴν ἀλήθειαν εὐρηκῶς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἢ διὰ ἡλικίαν ἢ διὰ φιλοπονίαν ἢ διὰ σύνεσιν ἢ τῷ πολλοῦς ἔχειν τοὺς μαρτυροῦντας εὐστοχηκέναι λέγεται, παρεστήσαμεν δὲ ἡμεῖς ὅτι δι' οὐδὲν τούτων ῥητέον κριτήριον αὐτὸν ὑπάρχειν ἀληθείας, φαίνεται ὡς ἀνεύρετόν ἐστι τὸ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ κριτήριον.

336 Ἔτι ὁ λέγων αὐτὸν ἀληθείας εἶναι κριτήριον τὸ φαινόμενον αὐτῷ λέγει, καὶ οὐδὲν πλεῖον. τοῖνυν ἐπεὶ καὶ ἕκαστος τῶν ἄλλων φιλοσόφων τὸ φαινόμενον αὐτῷ λέγει καὶ ἐναντίον τῷ προενεχθέντι, δηλὸν ὡς ἴσου πᾶσιν ὄντος τοῦ τοιοῦτου οὐ δυνασόμεθα ὠρισμένως τινὰ κριτήριον εἶναι λέγειν. εἰ γὰρ οὗτος πιστὸς ὅτι φαίνεται αὐτῷ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν κριτήριον, πιστὸς ἔσται καὶ ὁ δεύτερος ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτῷ φαίνεται κριτήριον εἶναι αὐτόν, καὶ οὕτως ὁ τρίτος καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ ᾧ συνεισάγεται τὸ μηδένα ὠρισμένως κριτήριον ἀληθείας ὑπάρχειν. πρὸς

τούτοις ἢ φάσει τις ἑαυτὸν κριτήριον εἶναι λέγει ἢ κριτηρίῳ προσχρῶμενος. ἀλλὰ φάσει μὲν φάσει ἐπισκεθῆσεται, κριτηρίῳ δὲ προσχρῶμενος περιτραπησεται. ἦτοι γὰρ διάφωνόν ἐστιν αὐτῷ τὸ κριτήριον τοῦτο ἢ σύμφωνον. καὶ εἰ μὲν διάφωνον, ἄπιστον, ἐπεὶπερ διαπεφώνηκε τῷ οἰομένῳ

338 αὐτὸν κριτήριον ὑπάρχειν· εἰ δὲ σύμφωνον, χρεῖαν ἔξει τοῦ κρίνοντος. ὥσπερ γὰρ οὗτος ὁ κριτήριον αὐτὸν ἀποφανόμενος ἄπιστος ἦν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ

statement, he would have had as much weight as all of them.

But if he that has discovered the truth in philosophy 335 is said to have succeeded either because of his age or his industry or his intelligence, or through having many to testify for him, whereas we have established that for none of these reasons ought it to be said that he is really the criterion of truth, then it is evident that the criterion in philosophy is undiscoverable.

Further, he who declares himself to be the criterion 336 of truth says what appears to himself and nothing more. So then, since each of the other philosophers also says what appears to himself and is contrary to the previous statement, it is plain that, as each of them is on a level with all the others, we shall be unable to state definitely that any one of them is a criterion. For if the first man is trustworthy because it appears to him that he is the criterion, the second man too will be trustworthy, since to him also it appears that he himself is the criterion, and so likewise with the third, and the rest; wherefrom it follows that no one is definitely the criterion of truth. —Furthermore, a man says he is the criterion either 337 by mere assertion or by employing a criterion. But if it be by assertion, he will be checked by assertion, while if it be by employing a criterion, he will be overthrown. For this criterion is either in disagreement with him or in agreement. And if it be in disagreement it is untrustworthy, since it is in disagreement with him who believes himself to be the criterion; and if it be in agreement, it will stand in need of a 338 judge. For just as the man who declares himself to be the criterion is not to be trusted, so also the criterion

σύμφωνον αὐτῷ κριτήριον, ἐπεὶ τρόπῳ τινὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔσχηκεν ἐκείνῳ δύναμιν, δεήσεται ἑτέρου τινὸς κριτηρίου. καὶ εἰ τοῦτο, οὐ λεκτέον ἕκαστον τῶν φιλοσόφων εἶναι κριτήριον· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ κρίσεως 339 δέομενον ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐστὶν ἄπιστον. πάλιν ὁ λέγων ἑαυτὸν κριτήριον ἤτοι φάσει τοῦτο ἀξιοῖ ἢ ἀποδείξει. καὶ φάσει μὲν οὐ δύναται δι' ἃς προείπον αἰτίας· εἰ δὲ ἀποδείξει, πάντως ὑγιεῖ· τὸ δὲ ὅτι¹ ἐστὶν ὑγιῆς ἢ τοιαύτη ἀπόδειξις, ἤτοι φάσει λέγεται ἢ ἀποδείξει, καὶ ταῦτ' εἰς ἄπειρον. τοίνυν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο λεκτέον ἀνεύρετον εἶναι τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας κριτήριον.

340 Ἐρωτᾶται δὲ καὶ οὕτως. οἱ κρίνειν τάληθές ἐπαγγελλόμενοι κριτήριον ἔχειν ὀφείλουσι τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. τοῦτο οὖν τὸ κριτήριον ἤτοι ἀνεπίκριτόν ἐστιν ἢ ἐπικέκριται. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀνεπίκριτόν ἐστι, πόθεν ὅτι πιστόν; οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων χωρὶς κρίσεώς ἐστι πιστόν. εἰ δὲ ἐπικέκριται, πάλιν τὸ κρίναν αὐτὸ ἤτοι ἀνεπίκριτόν ἐστιν ἢ ἐπικέκριται. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀνεπίκριτον, ἄπιστον· εἰ δὲ ἐπικέκριται, πάλιν τὸ ἐπικρίναν αὐτὸ ἤτοι ἐπικέκριται ἢ οὐκ ἐπικέκριται, καὶ 341 οὕτως εἰς ἄπειρον. πάλιν τὸ κριτήριον ἀμφισβητούμενον καθεστῶς δεῖται τινος ἀποδείξεως. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων αἱ μὲν εἰσιν ἀληθεῖς αἱ δὲ ψευδεῖς, ὀφείλει καὶ ἡ εἰς πίστιν τοῦ κριτηρίου παραλαμβανομένη ἀπόδειξις διὰ τινος κριτηρίου βεβαιοῦσθαι, ὥστε εἰς τὸν δι' ἀλλήλων ἐμπίπτειν τρόπον, τοῦ μὲν κριτηρίου τὴν διὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως πίστιν περιμένοντος, τῆς δὲ ἀποδείξεως τὴν ἀπὸ 342 τοῦ κριτηρίου βεβαίωσιν ἀναμενούσης, μηδετέρου

¹ ὑγιεῖ· τὸ δὲ ὅτι Mutsch.: ἐπεὶ ὑπὲρ τὸ δέον mss., Bekk.

in agreement with him, since it possesses in a fashion the same quality as he, will require some second criterion. And if this be so, one must not assert that each of the philosophers is the criterion; for everything which requires judging is of itself untrustworthy.—Once again, he who declares himself to 339 be the criterion makes this claim either by assertion or by demonstration. Yet, for the reasons I have already given, he cannot do so by assertion; and if he does so by demonstration, it must by all means be a valid one. But the fact that such a demonstration is valid is stated either by assertion or by demonstration, and so on *ad infinitum*. So, then, on this ground also it must be declared that the criterion of truth is undiscoverable.

This argument also is propounded:—Those who 340 claim for themselves to judge the truth are bound to possess a criterion of truth. This criterion, then, either is without a judge's approval or has been approved. But if it is without approval, whence comes it that it is trustworthy? For no matter of dispute is to be trusted without judging. And if it has been approved, that which approves it, in turn, either has been approved or has not been approved, and so on *ad infinitum*.—Again, the criterion being a matter 341 of dispute requires a proof. But since some proofs are true, some false, the proof which is adduced to confirm the criterion must needs be supported by a criterion; so that we are plunged into circular reasoning, the criterion on the one hand awaiting confirmation by the proof, and, on the other hand, the proof waiting for the support of the criterion, and neither 342

δὲ αὐτῶν διὰ θατέρου πεπιστῶσθαι δυναμένου. καὶ ἄλλως γίνεται τὸ αὐτὸ πιστόν τε καὶ ἄπιστον. πιστόν μὲν τὸ κριτήριον, ὅτι κρίνει τὴν ἀπόδειξιν, καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις, ὅτι ἀποδείκνυσι τὸ κριτήριον· ἄπιστον δὲ τὸ μὲν κριτήριον, ὅτι ἀποδείκνυται πρὸς τῆς ἀποδείξεως, ἡ δὲ ἀπόδειξις, ὅτι κρίνεται πρὸς τοῦ κριτηρίου.

- 343 Ἄλλ' ἡ μὲν τοῦ πρώτου κριτηρίου ἀγνωσία, τοῦτο ἐστὶ τοῦ ὑφ' οὗ, διὰ τοσούτων παρὰ τοῖς σκεπτικοῖς ἀπορεῖται· εὐαπόδοτος δὲ ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ περὶ τοῦ δευτέρου λόγος, φημὶ δὲ τοῦ δι' οὗ. εἰ γὰρ εὐρίσκει τὰληθές ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἤτοι ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι μόνον προσχρῶμενος τοῦτο εὐρίσκει ἢ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἢ τῷ συναμφοτέρῳ, ταῖς τε αἰσθήσεσι καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ· οὔτε δὲ μόνον ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι προσχρῶμενος δύναται τὰληθές εὐρεῖν οὔτε καθ' αὐτὴν τῇ διανοίᾳ οὔτε κοινῶς ταῖς τε αἰσθήσεσι καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ, ὡς παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα εὐρίσκειν τὰληθές ὁ ἄνθρωπος πέφυκεν. αἰσθήσεσι μὲν οὖν μόναις λαβεῖν τὰληθές οὐ δύναται, καθὼς ἔμπροσθεν ἐπεδείξαμεν, καὶ νῦν δὲ ἐπ' ὀλίγον παραμυθησόμεθα. φύσει γὰρ εἰσιν ἄλογοι, καὶ πλεον τοῦ τυποῦσθαι πρὸς τῶν φανταστῶν μὴ δυνάμεναι παντελῶς ἄθετοι καθεστᾶσι πρὸς εὔρεσιν τὰληθοῦς. οὐ γὰρ μόνον λευκαντικῶς ἢ γλυκαντικῶς δεῖ κινεῖσθαι τὸ ληψόμενον τὰληθές ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς φαντασίαν ἀχθῆναι τοῦ τοιούτου πράγματος " τοῦτο λευκόν ἐστὶ " καὶ " τοῦτο γλυκὺ ἐστίν." 344 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τὸ παραπλήσιον. τῷ δὲ τοιούτῳ πράγματι οὐκέτι τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἔργον ἐστὶν ἐπι- 180

of them being able to be confirmed by the other. And besides, the same thing becomes both trustworthy and untrustworthy—the criterion trustworthy because it judges the proof, and the proof trustworthy because it proves the criterion; but the criterion untrustworthy because it is proved by the proof, and the proof because it is judged by the criterion.

Well, then, it is by all these arguments that the 343 obscurity of the first criterion—that of the agent "By which"—is criticized amongst the Sceptics; and the argument regarding the second—I mean that "By means of which" or Instrument—is easy to set forth.^a For if Man discovers the truth, he discovers it by employing either the senses only or the intellect or the combination of both the senses and the intellect; but, as we shall establish, he cannot discover the truth by employing either the senses only or the intellect by itself or both the senses and the intellect conjointly; therefore Man is not capable of discovering the truth. Now he is not able to grasp the 344 truth by the senses alone, as we have shown above,^b and shall now briefly rehearse. For they are by nature irrational, and having no further capacity beyond that of being impressed by the objects imaged, they are wholly disqualified for discovering the truth. For that which is to perceive what is true in the real objects must not only be moved by a whitish or sweetish feeling but also must be brought to have an impression regarding such an object that "this thing is white" and "this thing is sweet." And similarly with the rest of the senses. But to perceive an object of 345 that kind is no longer the task of sense; for sense is

^a With §§ 343-346 cf. *P.H.* ii. 48-50.

^b Cf. §§ 293 ff.

βάλλειν· χρώμα γὰρ μόνον καὶ χυμὸν καὶ φωνὴν λαμβάνειν πέφυκε, τὸ δὲ “ τοῦτο λευκὸν ἐστὶν ” ἢ “ τοῦτο γλυκύ ἐστὶν ” οὔτε χρώμα οὔτε χυμὸς τυγχάνον ἀνυπόπτωτόν ἐστιν αἰσθήσει. ψεύδονται τε ἐν πολλοῖς αἰ αἰσθήσεις καὶ διαφωνοῦσιν ἀλλήλαις, καθάπερ ἐδείξαμεν τοὺς παρὰ τῷ Αἰνησιδήμῳ δέκα τρόπους ἐπιόντες. τὸ δὲ διάφωνον 346 καὶ ἑστασιασμένον οὐκ ἔστι κριτήριον ἀλλὰ τοῦ κρίνοντος αὐτὸ δεόμενον. τοῖνον οὐ δύναται καθ’ αὐτὰς αἰ αἰσθήσεις κρίνειν τάληθές. συνθέσεώς¹ τε δεῖ καὶ μνήμης πρὸς ἀντίληψιν τῶν ὑποκειμένων, ὅσον ἀνθρώπου, φυτοῦ, τῶν εὐκοκτῶν. χρώματος γὰρ μετὰ μεγέθους καὶ σχήματος καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν ἰδιωμάτων σύνθεσις ἐστὶν ὁ ἀν- 347 θρωπος, συνθεῖναι δέ τι μνημονικῶς οὐ δύναται ἢ αἰσθησις διὰ τὸ μήτε χρώμα μήτε χυμὸν μήτε φωνὴν εἶναι τὴν ἐπισύνθεσιν,² ὧν μόνον ἀντιληπτική ἐστὶν ἢ αἰσθησις.

348 Καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ἡ διάνοια. εἴπερ γὰρ ἐπιγνώμων ἐστὶ τάληθοῦς ἢ διάνοια, πρότερον ὤφειλεν ἑαυτὴν ἐπιγνώσκειν· καὶ ὡς ὁ ἀρχιτέκτων κρίνει τὸ τε εὐθὺ καὶ στρεβλὸν οὐ³ χωρὶς τοῦ ἐπιβάλλειν τῇ κατασκευῇ τῶν κριτηρίων, ὅσον τῇ τοῦ κανόνος καὶ τῇ τοῦ διαβήτου, οὕτως ἔχρην καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, εἴπερ διακριτική ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ τοῦ ψεύδους, πολλῶ πρότερον τῇ ἑαυτῆς φύσει συνεπιβάλλειν, ὅσον⁴ οὐσία τῇ ἐξ ἧς ἐστὶ, τόπω τῷ ἐν 349 ᾧ πέφυκε, τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν. οὐ πάνυ δέ γε τὰ τοιαῦτα συννοῶν δύναται, εἴγε οἱ μὲν μηδὲν φασιν

¹ συνθέσεώς Kochalsky: συνέσεώς MSS., Bekk.

² ἐπισύνθεσιν N: ἐπίθεσιν cet., Bekk.: σύνθεσιν cj. Bekk.

³ οὐ Heintz: καὶ MSS., Bekk.

⁴ ὅσον Heintz: δι’ ἣν Bekk.: διον MSS.

of a nature to grasp only colour and flavour and sound, whereas the recognition that “ this is white ” or “ this is sweet,” being neither colour nor flavour, is incapable of being experienced by sense.^a The senses, too, in many cases give false reports and disagree with one another, as we have shown when expounding the Ten Modes of Aenesidemus.^b But that which is in 346 disagreement and at variance is not a criterion, but is itself in need of a judge. So then the senses are not able by themselves to judge the truth.—There is need, too, of combination and of memory for the perception of real objects such as man, plant, and the like. For man is a combination of colour and size and form and certain other peculiarities, whereas sense is 347 unable to combine anything by aid of memory owing to the fact that the combination is neither colour nor flavour nor sound, which things alone sense is capable of perceiving.

Nor, indeed, is the intellect.^c For if the intellect is 348 cognizant of the truth, it ought previously to have been cognizant of itself; and just as the architect does not judge of the straight and the crooked without giving attention to the structure of his criteria—such as that of the rule and of the compasses,—so too the intellect, if it is capable of distinguishing falsehood and truth, should have been aware much earlier of its own nature—the substance, for instance, whereof it is composed, the place wherein it exists, and all the rest. But it cannot altogether comprehend such 349 things, seeing that some, like Dicaearchus, say that it

^a Cf. P.H. ii. 51-56.

^b See P.H. i. 91 ff.

^c With §§ 348-352 cf. P.H. ii. 57-60.

εἶναι αὐτὴν παρὰ τὸ πῶς ἔχον σῶμα, καθάπερ ὁ
 Δικαίαρχος, οἱ δὲ εἶναι μὲν ἔλεγον, οὐκ ἐν τῷ
 αὐτῷ δὲ τόπῳ περιέχεσθαι, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἐκτὸς τοῦ
 σώματος, ὡς Αἰνῆσιδημος κατὰ Ἡράκλειτον, οἱ
 δὲ ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ σώματι, καθάπερ τινὲς κατὰ Δημό-
 κριτον, οἱ δὲ ἐν μέρει τοῦ σώματος, ὡν πάλιν
 350 πολυσχιδεῖς εἰσὶν αἱ γινώμαι. καὶ οἱ μὲν διαφέρουν
 αὐτὴν τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ὡς οἱ πλείους, οἱ δὲ αὐ-
 τὴν εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις, καθάπερ διὰ τινων ὁπῶν
 τῶν αἰσθητηρίων προκύπτουσιν, ἧς στάσεως ἤρξε
 Στράτων τε ὁ φυσικὸς καὶ Αἰνῆσιδημος. οὐκ ἄρα
 351 κριτήριόν ἐστιν ἡ διάνοια. πλείους τέ εἰσιν
 αἱ διάνοιαι, πλείους δὲ οὐσαὶ διάφωνοι καθεστῶσιν,
 διαφωνοῦσαι δὲ χρειαὶ ἔχουσι τοῦ ἐπικρινόντος
 αὐτάς. τοῦτ' οὖν ἤτοι διάνοια πάλιν ἐστὶν ἡ
 ἕτερόν τι παρ' αὐτὴν. καὶ διάνοια μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη·
 μέρος γὰρ τῆς διαφωνίας γενόμενον κρίσεως δεῖ-
 σεται καὶ οὐκέτι κριτήριον γενήσεται· ἕτερον δὲ
 παρ' αὐτὴν ὑπάρχον τὸ μὴ εἶναι διάνοιαν κριτήριον
 352 παρίστησι. ἐξέσται δὲ καὶ τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν
 εἰρημένους ἐπιλογισμοῖς τὰ νῦν χρῆσθαι· ἡμῖν γὰρ
 οὐκ ἀνάγκη ταυτολογεῖν. πρὸς τούτοις ἐπεὶ
 οὐ μόνον ἐστὶν ἐν ἡμῖν διανοητικὸν κατὰ τοὺς
 πλείστους τῶν φιλοσόφων, ἀλλὰ σὺν τούτῳ καὶ
 αἰσθητικόν, ὅπερ πρόκειται τοῦ διανοητικοῦ, ἐξ
 ἀνάγκης τοῦτο αὐτοῦ¹ προκείμενον οὐκ ἑάσει τὴν

¹ αὐτοῦ Heintz: αὐτὸ mss., Bekk.

^a Cf. P.H. i. 210 f.; Vol. I. Introd. p. xxxviii.

^b Cf. § 313.

^c This sentence is obscure and the text probably corrupt. Heintz proposed τοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν . . . χρῆσθαι ἡμῖν· οὐ γὰρ ἀν. ταυτ. I suggest τοῖς αὐτῶν τῶν ἀνδρῶν . . . χρῆσθαι

is nothing more than a certain condition of body, while others have said that it exists, but have not all agreed that it is contained in the same place—some, like Aenesidemus “according to Heraclitus,”^a placing it outside the body, others in the whole of the body (like some “according to Democritus”), and others in a part of the body, and the views of these last, again, are very diverse.^b Also, while some 350 assert, as do the majority, that it is distinct from the senses, others say that it is the senses,—it peering out through the sense-organs as though through peep-holes,—which theory was first held by Strato the physicist and Aenesidemus. Therefore the intellect is not the criterion.—Intellects, too, are many in 351 number, and being many they are in disagreement, and as disagreeing they have need of one to pronounce judgement upon them. This, then, is either intellect again or something different from it. Now it will not be intellect; for if so, as being a party to the disagreement it will require judging and will no longer be a criterion; and if it be something different from intellect, it supports the view that the intellect is not the criterion. It would also be possible now to make 352 use of the conclusions stated by the Dogmatists; for there is no necessity for us to repeat ourselves.^c—Furthermore, since there exists in us, according to most of the philosophers, not only an intellectual part but along with this also a sensitive part which is set in front of the intellectual, this, being set in front of the other, will of necessity prevent the intellect from ἡμῖν· πάλιν γὰρ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ταυτολογεῖν, the sense being “we can employ (as an argument for distrusting the intellect) the divergent views of the Dogmatists themselves; but there is no need to repeat them again, as they have been described already.”

- 353 διάνοιαν τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ μεταξύ τῆς ὄψεως καὶ τοῦ ὄρατου πεπτωκὸς σῶμα οὐκ ἐᾷ τὴν ὄψιν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ ὄρατου, οὕτως εἰ μεταξύ τῆς διανοίας καὶ τοῦ ἐκτὸς ὄρατου κείται ἡ ὄρασις ἀλογος οὕσα, οὐκ ἐάσει τὴν διάνοιαν ἢ ὄρασις τοῦ ἐκτὸς ὄρατου ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, καὶ εἰ μεταξύ τῆς διανοίας καὶ τοῦ ἐκτὸς ἀκουστοῦ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀκοή, οὐ συγχωρήσει τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ ἀκουστοῦ¹ ἐπιγνώμονα γίνεσθαι, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων τὸ παραπλήσιον. ἐνδον οὖν ἀποκεκλεισμένη ἡ διάνοια, καὶ ταῖς αἰσθήσεω ἐπισκοτουμένη, οὐδενὸς ἔσται τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀντιληπτική. οὐδὲ ταύτην τοίνυν ῥητέον καθ' αὐτὴν εἶναι κριτήριον.
- 354 Λείπεται ἄρα λέγειν ἀμφοτέρα, τουτέστι τὴν διάνοιαν ὡς ὑπουργῶ χρωμένην τῇ αἰσθήσει λαμβάνειν τὰ ἐκτὸς. ὃ πάλιν ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον· ἡ γὰρ αἰσθησις οὐ τὰ ἐκτὸς παρίστησι τῇ διανοίᾳ, τὸ δὲ ἴδιον ἀγγέλλει πάθος, οἷον ἡ ἀφή ἀπὸ πυρὸς θαλπομένη οὐ τὸ ἐκτὸς καὶ καίον πῦρ ἀναδίδωσι τῇ διανοίᾳ, τὴν δὲ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ θάλψιν, τουτέστι τὸ ἴδιον αὐτῆς πάθος. καίτοι οὐδὲ τοῦτο. εἰ γὰρ λήψεται ἡ νόησις τὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως πάθος, αἰσθησις ἔσται. τὸ γὰρ ὄρατικοῦ πάθους ἀναδεκτικὸν ὄρατικῶς κινεῖται, τὸ δὲ ὄρατικῶς κινούμενον ὄρασις ἐστὶν· καὶ τὸ ἀκουστικοῦ πάθους ἀναδεκτικὸν ἀκουστικῶς κινεῖται, ὃ δὲ ἀκουστικῶς κινεῖται, ἀκοή ἐστὶν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων τὸ
- 356 παραπλήσιον. διόπερ καὶ ἡ διάνοια, εἰ τὸ ἐκάστης αἰσθήσεως ἀναλαμβάνει πάθος, αἰσθητικῶς κινεῖται,

¹ ἐστὶν . . . ἀκουστοῦ N; om. cet., Bekk.

perceiving the external objects. For just as the body 353 which lies between the sight and the object of sight prevents the sight from perceiving the object of sight, so if the irrational sense of sight intervenes between the intellect and the external object of sight, the sight will prevent the intellect from perceiving the external object of sight, and if the hearing intervenes between the intellect and the external object of hearing, it will not permit the intellect to become cognizant of the object of hearing; and similarly with the rest of the senses. The intellect, then, being locked away inside, and being kept in the dark by the senses, will not be capable of perceiving any of the external objects. Neither, then, can it be said that it, taken by itself, is the criterion.

It remains, therefore, to say "both of them,"— 354 meaning that the intellect, by employing sense as assistant, grasps external objects.^a But this again is impossible. For sense does not furnish the intellect with the external objects, but each sense reports its own peculiar affection—touch, for instance, when warmed by fire, does not supply to the intellect the external and burning fire but the warmth therefrom, that is to say, its own peculiar affection. And yet 355 not even this. For if thought shall receive the affection of sense, it will be sense. For that which is receptive of visual affection is visually moved, and that which is visually moved is vision^b; that also which is receptive of acoustic affection is acoustically moved, and that which is acoustically moved is the sense of hearing; and similarly with the other senses. Wherefore the intellect also, if it receives the affection 356 of each sense, is sensitively moved, and being sensi-

^a With §§ 354-358 cf. P.H. ii. 72-75.

^b Cf. § 305.

αἰσθητικῶς δὲ κινουμένη αἴσθησις ἐστίν, αἴσθησις δὲ οὐσα ἄλογός ἐστιν, ἄλογος δὲ γενομένη ἐκπεσεῖται τοῦ ἐπι νόησις ὑπάρχειν, μὴ οὐσα δὲ νόησις οὐ λήψεται τὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως πάθος ὡς νόησις.

357 κὰν λάβῃ δὲ τὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πάθος, οὐκ εἴσεται τὰ ἐκτός. ἀνόμοια γὰρ ἐστὶ τὰ ἐκτός τοῖς περι ἡμᾶς πάθεισιν, καὶ μακρῶ διαφέρει ἢ φαντασία τοῦ φανταστοῦ, ὅλον ἢ ἀπὸ πυρός φαντασία τοῦ πυρός· τὸ μὲν γὰρ καίει, ἢ δ' οὐκ ἐστὶ καυστικῆ. ἄλλως τε, κὰν ὅμοια δῶμεν εἶναι τοῖς περι ἡμᾶς πάθεισιν τὰ ἐκτός, οὐ πάντως τὰ περι ἡμᾶς πάθη λαμβάνουσα ἢ διάνοια καταλήψεται τὰ ἐκτός. τὰ γὰρ ὁμοιά τισιν ἕτερα ἐστὶν ἐκείνων τῶν οἷς ὁμοιά 358 ἐστίν. διόπερ εἰ τὰ ὁμοιά τοῖς ἐκτός ἢ διάνοια γνωρίζει, οὐ τὰ ἐκτός γνωρίζει ἀλλὰ τὰ ὁμοιά ἐκείνοις. καὶ ὃν τρόπον ὁ τὸν Σωκράτην ἀγνοῶν τὴν δὲ Σωκράτους εἰκόνα βλέπων οὐκ οἶδεν εἰ ὁμοίός ἐστι τῇ φαινομένη εἰκόνι ὁ Σωκράτης, οὕτως ἢ διάνοια τοῖς πάθεισιν ἐπιβάλλουσα, τὰ ἐκτός μὴ θεασαμένη, οὔτε ὅποιά ἐστὶ ταῦτα εἴσεται, οὔθ' ὅτι ὁμοιά ἐστὶ τοῖς πάθεισιν. μὴ γινώσκουσα δὲ τὰ φαινόμενα οὐδὲ τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τούτων μετάβασιν ἀξιούμενα γνωρίζεσθαι ἀδηλα συνήσει, οὕτως δὲ οὐδὲ κριτήριον ἐστὶ τῆς ἀληθείας.

359 Ἄλλ' ἐνιοι τῶν δογματικῶν τὴν ἀνώτερον εἰρημένην ὑπότευξιν καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος θρυλοῦσι, λέγοντες μὴ κεχωρίσθαι ταῦτα τὰ διαφέροντα τῆς ψυχῆς μέρη, τουτέστι τὸ λογικὸν καὶ ἄλογον, ἀλλ' ὡς τὸ μέλι ὅλον δι' ὅλου ὑγρὸν ἅμα καὶ γλυκὺ

tively moved it is sense, and being sense it is irrational, and having become irrational it will cease from being any longer thought, and not being thought it will not receive as thought the affection of sense.—But even 357 if it receives the affection of the senses it will not know external objects. For external objects are unlike our affections, and the presentation is far different from the thing presented,—that of a fire, for instance, from the fire, for the latter burns whereas the former is not capable of burning. Besides, even if we grant that external objects are similar to our affections, it is not certain that by receiving our affections the intellect will apprehend external objects. For things similar to certain things are other than those things to which they are similar. Wherefore if the intellect is cognizant of 358 things similar to the external objects, it is not cognizant of the external objects but of things similar to them. And just as he who does not know Socrates but is looking at the likeness of Socrates does not know whether Socrates resembles the apparent likeness,^a so the intellect, when it perceives the affections without having discerned the external objects, will not know either the nature of these objects or whether they resemble the affections. And not knowing the apparent things, neither will it understand the non-evident things which are assumed to be known by transition therefrom; and, consequently, it will not be the criterion of truth.

But some of the Dogmatists keep repeating in this 359 case also the rejoinder which was mentioned above, saying that these different parts of the soul—that is, the rational and the irrational—are not separated, but just as honey is at once, through and through,

* Cf. P.H. ii. 75.

ἐστίν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ὅλη δι' ὅλου δύο ἔχει
 τὰς ἀντιπαρηκούσας ἀλλήλαις δυνάμεις, ὧν ἡ μὲν
 360 ἐστὶ λογικὴ ἢ δὲ ἄλογος· καὶ κινεῖσθαι τὴν μὲν
 λογικὴν ὑπὸ τῶν νοητῶν, τὴν δὲ ἄλογον ἀντι-
 ληπτικὴν γίνεσθαι τῶν αἰσθητῶν. ὅθεν καὶ μάταιον
 εἶναι τὸ λέγειν τὴν διάνοιαν ἢ κοινῶς τὴν ψυχὴν
 μὴ δύνασθαι τῆς ἐτέρας τούτων τῶν πραγμάτων
 διαφορᾶς ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι· διάφορον γὰρ ἔχουσα
 τὴν κατασκευὴν εὐθύς καὶ ἀμφοτέρων ἔσται ἀντι-
 361 ληπτικὴ. πάντων δὲ εἰσὶν εὐήθεις. αὗται γὰρ αἱ
 δυνάμεις, καὶ εἰ τὰ μάλιστα δοκοῦσι περὶ τὴν
 αὐτὴν οὐσίαν συνίστασθαι καὶ ἀντιπαρῆκειν ἀλλή-
 λαις καὶ δι' ὅλης πεφοιτηκέναι τῆς ψυχῆς, οὐδὲν
 ἥσσον ἑτερογενῶς διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων, καὶ ἄλλο
 μὲν τί ἐστὶν ἢδε ἄλλο δὲ ἦδε. καὶ τοῦτο πάρεστι
 μαθεῖν ἀπὸ τῶν προδηλοτέρων εἶναι δοκούντων·
 362 συχνὰ γὰρ ἦν ἂ περὶ μὲν τὴν αὐτὴν ὕλην θεωρεῖται,
 οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ εἶχε φύσιν. βάρος γοῦν καὶ
 χρῶμα περὶ μὲν τὸ αὐτὸ σῶμα ἀμφοτέρᾳ ἔστιν,
 διενήνοχε δὲ ἀλλήλων· καὶ πάλιν σχῆμα καὶ
 μέγεθος τῆς μὲν αὐτῆς οὐσίας ἐστὶ συμβεβηκότα,
 κεχωρισμένην δὲ εἶχε τὴν φύσιν, ἄλλου μὲν τοῦ
 μεγέθους ἄλλου δὲ τοῦ σχήματος νοουμένου. οὕτω
 τοῖνυν καὶ ἡ προειρημένη λογικὴ δύναμις, κἂν
 ἀναμιξ ὑποκείται τῇ ἄλόγῳ δυνάμει, πάλιν αὐτῆς
 363 διοίσει. ὧ λοιπὸν συνεισέρχεται τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι
 τὴν ἐτέραν ὡσαύτως τῇ ἐτέρα κινεῖσθαι καὶ ὁμοιο-
 παθεῖν διὰ τὰς προκατηριθμημένας αἰτίας, ἐπεὶ
 δεήσει μίαν ἀμφοτέρας γίνεσθαι, τὴν μὲν λογικὴν
 ἄλογον, ἐὰν ἀλόγως πάσῃ, τὴν δὲ ἄλογον λογικὴν,
 364 ἐὰν λογικῶς κινήθῃ. κἂν ὑποθώμεθα δὲ τὴν

¹ τῆ Heintz: τῷ mss., Bekk.

both liquid and sweet, so also the soul possesses
 through and through these two faculties, co-extensive
 with each other, of which the one is rational, the
 other irrational; and that the rational is affected by 360
 intelligible objects, while the irrational is perceptive
 of sensible objects. Hence, too, it is vain to say
 that the intellect, or the soul in general, is unable
 to apprehend the other distinct class of such objects;
 for as the apparatus it possesses is twofold, it will
 inevitably be capable of apprehending both sorts of
 object.—But they are extremely silly. For even if 361
 these faculties seem ever so much to be combined in
 the same substance and to be co-extensive with each
 other and to range throughout the whole soul, none
 the less they are generically different from each other,
 this being one thing and that quite another. This
 one can learn from facts which seem especially
 obvious; for there are frequent instances of things 362
 which are found attached to the same matter but
 which have not the same nature. Thus weight and
 colour are both attached to the same body but are
 different from each other; and again, shape and
 size are attributes of the same substance but have
 separate natures, size being conceived as one thing,
 shape as another. In this way, then, the afore-
 mentioned rational faculty, even though it subsist in
 fusion with the irrational faculty, yet will differ from
 it. And this involves the further consequence that 363
 the one faculty is not able to be moved like the other
 and to have similar affections, for the reasons
 enumerated above; since otherwise it would be
 necessary for both to become one, the rational
 irrational, if it has irrational affections, and the
 irrational rational, if it has rational motions.—And 364

διάνοιαν διὰ τῶν αἰσθητικῶν πόρων ὥσπερ τινῶν
 ὁπῶν προκίπτουσιν καὶ χωρὶς τῶν προκειμένων
 αὐτῆς αἰσθήσεων τοῖς ἐκτὸς πράγμασι προσ-
 βάλλουσιν, ἄπορος οὐδὲν ἦσσαν καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἢ
 ὑπόθεσις εὐρεθήσεται. δεῖ γὰρ τὴν οὕτω τῶν ὑπο-
 κειμένων ἀντιλαμβανομένην διάνοιαν ὡς ἐναργῶν
 τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, οὐδὲν δὲ ἐστὶν
 ἐναργές, ὡς παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα δυνατόν ἐστι
 τὸ ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις ἀληθὲς λαβεῖν. ἐναργές
 γὰρ ἀξιοῦται τυγχάνειν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων τὸ ἐξ
 365 εἰς παράστασιν. οὐδὲν δὲ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ πέφυκε λαμ-
 βανέσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐκ πάθους, ὅπερ ἕτερον ἢ
 τοῦ ποιούντος αὐτὸ φανταστοῦ· γλυκανθεὶς γὰρ
 μέλιτος προσαχθέντος στοχάζομαι ὅτι γλυκύ ἐστι
 τὸ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον μέλι, καὶ ἀλεανθεὶς πυρὸς
 προσαχθέντος σημειοῦμαι ἐκ τῆς περὶ ἐμέ δια-
 θέσεως ὅτι τὸ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον πῦρ ἀλεεινόν
 ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος.
 366 ἐπεὶ οὖν τὸ ἐξ ἑτέρου ληπτὸν συμφώνως κατὰ
 πάντα ἀδηλόν ἐστι, πάντα δὲ ἐκ παθῶν ἡμετέρων
 ἕτερα ὄντα τούτων λαμβάνεται, πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ
 ἐκτὸς ἀδηλα καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἄγνωστα· δεῖ γὰρ
 εἰς τὴν τῶν ἀφανῶν γνώσιν ἐναργές τι παρεῖναι,
 καὶ τούτου μὴ παρόντος οἴχεται καὶ ἡ ἐκείνων
 367 κατάληψις. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔνεστι λέγειν ὡς ἐκεῖνα μὲν
 ἐστὶν ὅσον ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἀδηλα, καταλαμβάνεται δὲ
 ὑφ' ἡμῶν διὰ τὸ βέβαιον εἶναι τὴν ἐκ τῶν παθῶν
 σημειώσιν. οὐ γὰρ εἰ γλυκαντικῶς διατίθεται

^a Cf. § 350.

^b i. e. not perceptible directly but only through the medium
 of an "affection" of sense, or "feeling."

even if we assume that the intellect peers through
 the sensitive passages as through peep-holes^a and
 makes contact with the external objects apart from
 the senses placed in front of it,—even on this
 assumption the theory will be found no less untenable.
 For the intellect which apprehends the real objects
 in this way must apprehend the real objects as self-
 evident; but, as we shall establish, nothing is self-
 evident; therefore it is not possible to grasp the
 truth of the real objects. For it is laid down by
 our opponents that the "self-evident" is "that which
 is perceived of itself and needs no second thing to
 establish it." But nothing is of a nature to be 365
 perceived of itself, but all things through affection,
 and this is other than the object of presentation which
 produces it; for when I feel sweetness through the
 application of honey I guess that the external sub-
 stance of honey is sweet, and when I feel warm
 through the approach of fire I take my own condition
 as a sign that the external substance of fire is warm,
 and the same may be said of the other objects
 of sense. Since, then, that which is perceptible 366
 through another^b is by universal agreement non-
 evident, and all things are perceived through our
 affections, than which they are other, all external
 objects are non-evident and on this account unknow-
 able by us; for to ensure knowledge of things non-
 apparent there must be some self-evident fact present,
 and if this is not present, the apprehension of those
 things likewise vanishes. Nor is it possible to say 367
 that, though those things are, so far as that goes,
 non-evident, yet they are apprehended by us owing
 to the fact that the indication derived from the
 affections is firm. For honey is not necessarily

μέλιτος τῇ γεύσει προσαχθέντος, γλυκὴ πάντως ἐστὶ τὸ μέλι, οὐδὲ εἰ πικραντικῶς ἀψίνθιον, πικρὸν ἐστὶ τὸ ἀψίνθιον, ὡς ἂν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τῶν περὶ ἡμᾶς συμβαινόντων παθῶν καὶ τοῖς ποιοῦσιν αὐτὰ αἰτίοις ὀφειλόντων συμβεβηκέναι. καθὰ γὰρ ἡ προσπεσοῦσα τῇ σαρκὶ μᾶστιξ ἀλγύνει μὲν τὴν σάρκα, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ ἀλγηδῶν ἐστίν, καὶ ὡς τὸ σιτίον ἢ τὸ ποτόν ἤδει μὲν τὸν φαγόντα ἢ πίνοντα, οὐκ ἐστὶ δὲ ἡδονή, οὕτω καὶ τὸ πῦρ θερμαίνει μὲν δύναται, οὐχὶ δέ γε καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης θερμὸν εἶναι, καὶ τὸ μέλι γλυκάζει μὲν, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ γλυκὴ τυγχάνει· καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος. ἀλλ' εἴπερ, ἵνα γνῶμεν τὰληθές, δεῖ τι εἶναι ἐναργές, δέδεικται δὲ πάντα ἄδηλα, ὁμολογητέον ἄγνωστον εἶναι τὰληθές.

369 Πῶς δὲ οὐχὶ καὶ ἡ περὶ τῶν ἀνωτάτω πραγμάτων διάστασις παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἀφαιρεῖται τὴν τῆς ἀληθείας γνώσιν; εἰ γὰρ τῶν φυσικῶν οἱ μὲν πάντα ἀνηγήκασιν τὰ φαινόμενα, ὡς οἱ περὶ Δημόκριτον, οἱ δὲ πάντα ἔθεσαν, ὡς οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον καὶ Πρωταγόραν, οἱ δὲ τινὰ μὲν ἀνεῖλον τινὰ δὲ ἔθεσαν, ὡς οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς καὶ τοῦ περιπάτου, πάντη τε καὶ πάντως, ἕαν τε τὴν διάνοιαν ἕαν τε τὴν αἴσθησιν ἕαν τε τὸ συναμφότερον ὑπόθηται τις κριτήριον, δεῖ πρῶτον εἰς τὴν τοῦτων κρίσιν ἤτοι φαινόμενόν τι παραληφθῆναι ἢ ἄδηλον. ἀλλὰ φαινόμενον μὲν οὐχ οἶδόν τε· ἐκ γὰρ τῆς ἀμφισβητουμένης ὕλης ὑπάρχον ἀμφισβητήσιμον ἐστὶ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐ κριτήριον. εἰ δὲ ἄδηλον, ἀνέστραπται τὰ πράγματα, εἰ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ γιγνωσκομένου βεβαιούται τὸ δοκοῦν γιγνώσκεισθαι· ὅπερ ἄτοπον.

^a Cf. P.H. ii. 72.

sweet if I have a feeling of sweetness when honey is applied to my sense of taste, nor is gall bitter if I have a bitter feeling on tasting it,^a as though the feelings which belong to us ought necessarily to belong also to the causes which produce them. For just as the 368 lash that falls upon the flesh gives pain to the flesh but is not also pain, and as the food or the drink gives pleasure to him that eats or drinks but is not pleasure, so also the fire is able to give warmth and yet not be necessarily warm, and the honey to sweeten and yet not be sweet; and the same argument applies to the other objects of sense. But if, in order that we may know the truth, there must be something self-evident in existence, and it has been proved that all things are non-evident, it must be acknowledged that truth is unknowable.

And can it be denied that the controversy amongst 369 the philosophers regarding the highest matters does away with the knowledge of truth? For if some of the physicists, like Democritus, have abolished all phenomena, and others, like Epicurus and Protagoras, have established all, while others again, like the Stoics and Peripatetics, have abolished some and established others,—then, whether one assumes as criterion the intellect or the sense or both together, in every case it is by all means necessary that either some apparent or some non-evident thing should be adopted to judge between these thinkers. But to adopt an apparent thing is impossible; for as it is derived from the controverted matter it will be controverted and on this account not a criterion. While if a non-evident thing be adopted, things are turned upside down, when that which seems to be known is confirmed by what is not known—which is absurd.

- 370 Πλὴν συγκεχωρήσθω γε ἡ τάνθρώπου καὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ τῆς διανοίας ὑπόστασις εἰς τὸ προβαίνειν τὴν τῶν δογματικῶν ἀξίωσιν. ἀλλ' ἵνα καὶ διὰ τούτων τι γνωσθῆ, δεῖ τὸ τρίτον ὁμολογήσαι κριτήριον, τουτέστι φαντασίαν· οὔτε γὰρ ἡ αἴσθησις οὔτε ὁ νοῦς δίχα τοῦ φανταστικῶς ἑτεροιοῦσθαι
- 371 δύνатаί τισιν ἐπιβάλλειν. καὶ τοῦτο δὲ τὸ κριτήριον πολλῆς ἀπορίας ἐστὶ πλήρες, ὡς πάρεστι σκοπεῖν τάξει τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν λόγων ἄνωθεν ποιησάμενοις. ἐπεὶ γὰρ τῶν τῆ φαντασίᾳ τὰ πράγματα κανονιζόντων οἱ μὲν τῆ καταληπτικῆ προσέσχον οἱ δὲ τῆ πιθανῆ, τὸ κοινὸν ἀμφοτέρων γένος ἡμεῖς ἐκλαβόντες, τουτέστιν αὐτὴν τὴν φαντασίαν, ἀν-
- 372 αἰρῶμεν· ταύτης γὰρ ἀναιρεθείσης αἴρονται καὶ αἱ αἰεῖ εἶδους διαφοραὶ τῶν φαντασιῶν, καὶ ὡς μὴ ὄντος ζώου οὐδὲ ἀνθρώπου ἔστω, οὔτω μὴ οὔσης φαντασίας οὐδὲ καταληπτικῆ ἢ πιθανῆ τις ὑφέστηκε φαντασία. εἰ γὰρ τύπωσίς ἐστιν ἐν ψυχῇ ἢ φαντασία, ἤτοι κατ' ἐξοχὴν καὶ εἰσοχὴν τύπωσίς ἐστιν, ὡς οἱ περὶ τὸν Κλεάνθην νομίζουσιν, ἢ κατὰ ψιλλὴν ἑτεροίωσιν γίνεται, καθάπερ οἱ περὶ τὸν
- 373 Χρυσίππον ἐδόξασαν. καὶ εἰ μὲν κατ' ἐξοχὴν καὶ εἰσοχὴν ὑφίσταται, ταῦτα ἀκολουθήσει τὰ ἀτοπα ἄπερ φασὶν οἱ περὶ τὸν Χρυσίππον. εἰ γὰρ κηροῦ τρόπον τυποῦται ἡ ψυχὴ φανταστικῶς πάσχουσα, αἰεὶ τὸ ἔσχατον κίνημα ἐπισκοπήσει τῆ προτέρα φαντασία, ὡσπερ καὶ ὁ τῆς δευτέρας σφραγίδος τύπος ἐξαλειπτικός ἐστὶ τοῦ προτέρου. ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο, ἀναιρεῖται μὲν μνήμη, θησαυρισμὸς οὐσα

^a Cf. § 344. With §§ 370-379 cf. P.H. ii. 70. "Presentative alteration" means the alteration produced in the percipient (sense or intellect) by the percept, which constitutes "presentation."

However, let the substantiality of Man and of the 370 senses and the intellect be granted, so that the thesis of the Dogmatists may go forward. Yet in order that anything should be known even by means of these, one must needs agree about the third criterion, that is, presentation; for neither sense nor thought can possibly be aware of things without presentative alteration.^a But this criterion too is beset by mani- 371 fold doubts, as we may see in detail when we have discussed it in a systematic way right from the beginning. For since some of those who make presentation the rule of things have had regard to the "apprehensive," others to the "probable" presentation,^b we shall select the generic form that is common to both kinds—namely, presentation itself—and abolish it; for when this is abolished, the particular differ- 372 ences of the presentations are also abolished; and just as when Animal is non-existent Man does not exist either, so if presentation is non-existent neither does any apprehensive or probable presentation subsist. For if the presentation is "an impression on the soul," it is an impression either "by way of depression and eminence," as Cleanthes supposes, or "by way of mere alteration," as Chrysippus thought.^c And if it subsists by way of depres- 373 sion and eminence, those absurd results will follow which are alleged by Chrysippus. If the soul when presentatively affected is impressed like wax, the last motion will always keep overshadowing the previous presentation, just as the impression of the second seal is such as to obliterate that of the first. But if this be so, memory is abolished, it being "a treasury of

^b The former view is that of the Stoics, the latter that of the Academics; cf. §§ 227 ff., 174 ff.

^c Cf. § 228.

φαντασιῶν, ἀναιρεῖται δὲ πᾶσα τέχνη· σύστημα γὰρ ἦν καὶ ἄθροισμα καταλήψεων, πλείονας δὲ φαντασίας καὶ διαφόρους οὐ δυνατὸν ὑποστῆναι περὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, ἄλλοτε ἄλλων νοουμένων τῶν περὶ αὐτὸ τύπων. οὐ τοίνυν ἡ κυρίως νοουμένη

374 τύπωσις ἐστὶ φαντασία. ἄλλως τε, εἰ ὅψις ἐστὶ τῶν ἀδήλων τὰ φαινόμενα, θεωροῦμεν δὲ τὰ πολὺ παχυμερέστερα τοῦ πνεύματος τῶν φαινομένων σώματα μηδ' ὄντινοῦν περὶ αὐτοῖς τύπον δυνάμενα τηρεῖν, εὐλογόν ἐστὶ μηδὲ τὸ πνεῦμα ἓνα μόνον τινὰ ἀπὸ φαντασίας τύπον φυλάττειν. καὶ μὴν τὸ ὕδωρ παχυμερέστερόν ἐστὶ πνεύματος· ἀλλ' οὐδέποτε δακτύλου ἐπεραιοθέντος αὐτῷ πέφηνε

375 τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπεραιοσεως τύπον φυλάττον. καίτοι τί λέγω τὸ ὕδωρ, ὅτε καὶ ὁ μαλακώτατος κηρός, στερρὸς ἤδη κατὰ σύγκρισιν ὑπάρχων, τυποῦται μὲν ὑπὸ τινος ἅμα νοήματι διὰ τὴν ὑγρότητα, οὐ συνέχει δὲ τὸν τύπον; εἰ οὖν αὐτὸ τὸ¹ κατὰ σύμβλησιν πεπηγὸς παρὰ τὸ ὕδωρ σῶμα καθεστῶς σφόδρα ἀδυνάτως ἔχει τύπους τινὰς περὶ αὐτῷ φυλάττειν, φανερόν δήπουθεν ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸ πνεῦμα φύσιν ἔχει πρὸς τοῦτο ἐπιτηδεῖον, λεπτομερέστερον καὶ εὐρον παρὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν σωμάτων ὑπάρχων.

376 Ναί, ἀλλ' οὐ κυρίως τύπωσις ἐστὶν ἡ φαντασία, ψιλλὴ δὲ ἑτεροίωσις τῆς διανοίας. ὁ πάλιν τοῦ προτέρου χεῖρον ἦν. τῶν γὰρ ἑτεροιώσεων ἡ μὲν τίς ἐστὶ κατὰ πάθος ἡ δὲ ὡς ἀλλαγὴ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, καὶ κατὰ πάθος μὲν οἶον εἰ ὁ αὐτὸς κατ'

¹ αὐτὸ τὸ cj. Bekk.: τὸ αὐτὸ MSS.

presentations," and every art is abolished; for art is "a system and aggregation of apprehensions"^a; but it is not possible for many and different presentations to subsist in the regent part, when its mental impressions vary from time to time. So then the impression foremost in the mind is not a presentation. —Again, if the things apparent are "a vision of the 374 things non-evident," and we find that the bodies of things apparent which are composed of far denser parts than is breath are unable to retain any impression at all that is made upon them, it is reasonable to infer that neither does breath^b conserve any one single impression derived from a presentation. Moreover, water is of denser parts than breath, but when a finger is pressed upon it it is never found to conserve the impression made by the pressure. Yet why do 375 I speak of water, when even very soft wax, which by comparison is already firm, although because of its elasticity it takes an impression instantaneously, yet does not retain the impression? If, then, such a body as this—which, as compared with water, is in a solid state—is quite incapable of conserving any impressions made upon it, it is surely apparent that neither is breath endowed with a nature suited for this purpose, it being of finer parts and fluid as compared with those other bodies.

"Yes, but the presentation is not precisely an im- 376 pression, but a mere alteration of the intellect." But this again is worse than the previous definition. For of alterations one sort is by way of affection, the other consists in a change in the substance; and it is by

^a Cf. P.H. iii. 241.

^b "Breath" being the substance of the "regent part," cf. P.H. ii. 70, 81.

οὐσίαν καὶ μορφήν ὑποκείμενος ἀνδριάς παρὰ μέρος
 ὅτε μὲν θερμαίνοιτο τοῦ ἡλίου προσλάμψαντος,
 ὅτε δὲ ψύχοιτο νυκτὸς δρόσου καταπιπτούσης, ὡς
 ἀλλαγὴ δὲ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου καθάπερ εἰ χωνευθεῖς
 377 οὗτος ὁ ἀνδριάς σφαῖρα χάλκειος γένοιτο. εἰ οὖν
 ἑτεροίωσις τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστὶν ἢ φαντασία, ἦτοι
 κατὰ πάθος ψιλῶς ἐστὶν ἑτεροίωσις ἢ κατὰ ἀλλαγὴν
 τοῦ ὑποκειμένου. καὶ εἰ μὲν κατὰ πάθος, ἐπεὶ
 κατὰ τὰς διαφόρους φαντασίας πάθος διάφορόν
 ἐστί, τὸ νέον πάθος ἀλλάσσει τὸ ἀρχαιότερον, καὶ
 οὕτως οὐκ ἔσται κατοχὴ τινοῦ πράγματος περὶ
 τὴν διάνοιαν, ὅπερ ἄποπον· εἰ δὲ ὡς¹ ἀλλαγὴ τοῦ
 ὑποκειμένου, ἅμα τῷ φαντασίαν τινὸς λαβεῖν ἢ
 ψυχὴν ἑτεροιομένην ἐκβήσεται τοῦ ψυχῆς τυγχάνειν
 καὶ φθαρῆσεται, καθάπερ καὶ ὁ εἰς σφαῖραν χωνευ-
 θεῖς ἀνδριάς ἐξέβαινε τότε τοῦ ἀνδριάς ὑπάρχειν.
 οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ ἑτεροίωσις ψυχῆς ἐστὶν ἢ φαντασία,
 378 σὺν τῷ καὶ τὴν περὶ μεταβολῆς ἀπορίαν αὐτοῦς
 θλίβειν. εἰ γὰρ μεταβάλλει τι καὶ ἑτεροιοῦται,
 ἦτοι τὸ μένον μεταβάλλει τε καὶ ἑτεροιοῦται ἢ τὸ
 μὴ μένον. οὔτε δὲ τὸ μένον ἑτεροιοῦται καὶ μετα-
 βάλλει, μένει γὰρ ἐν τῷ εἶναι οἶον ἦν, οὔτε τὸ μὴ
 μένον· ἐφθαρταὶ γὰρ καὶ μεταβέβληται, ἀλλ' οὐ
 μεταβάλλει. οἶον εἰ μεταβάλλει τὸ λευκόν, ἦτοι
 379 μένον λευκόν μεταβάλλει ἢ μὴ μένον. οὔτε δὲ
 μένον λευκόν μεταβάλλει, μένει γὰρ λευκόν, καὶ
 ἐφ' ὅσον ἐστὶ λευκόν, οὐ μεταβάλλει· οὔτε μὴ
 μένον, ἐφθαρταὶ γὰρ καὶ μεταβέβληται, ἀλλ' οὐ
 μεταβάλλει. οὐκ ἄρα μεταβάλλει τὸ λευκόν. διό

¹ ὡς om. LE, Bekk.

way of affection when, for instance, the statue that
 remains the same in respect of substance and shape
 is alternately heated at one time by the sun shining
 upon it, and at another time chilled by dew falling
 upon it at night; but it consists in change in the sub-
 stance, if, for example, this statue were to be melted
 and become a brazen sphere. If, then, the presenta- 377
 tion is an alteration of the soul, it is an alteration
 either merely by way of affection or by way of change
 in the substance. And if it be by way of affection,
 then since the affection is different according as the
 presentations are different, the new affection changes
 the older, and thus there will be no retention of any-
 thing in the intellect, which is absurd; while if it
 consists in change of substance, at the very moment
 of receiving a presentation the soul through being
 altered will cease from being soul and will be de-
 stroyed, just as also the statue that was melted into
 a sphere ceased at the same time from being a statue.
 Neither, then, is the presentation an alteration of
 the soul; and besides they are crushed by the diffi- 378
 culty about change. For if a thing changes and is
 altered either what remains changes and is altered
 or what does not remain. But neither what remains
 is altered and changes—for it remains by being such
 as it was,—nor what does not remain, for this has been
 destroyed and been changed but does not change.
 For example, if white changes it changes either while
 remaining or while not remaining white. But it does 379
 not change while remaining white, for it remains
 white, and inasmuch as it is white it does not change;
 nor while not remaining white, for it has been de-
 stroyed and been changed but does not change.
 Therefore white does not change. Wherefore also,

καὶ ἡ φαντασία εἰ μεταβολή τις ἐστὶ καὶ ἑτεροίωσις τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀνυπόστατός ἐστιν.

380 Διδομένης τε τῆς ἑτεροίωσης οὐκ εὐθὺς καὶ ἡ τῆς φαντασίας ὑπόστασις συγχωρηθήσεται. ἐλέγγο γὰρ τύπωσις εἶναι ἡγεμονικοῦ, τοῦτο δὲ εἰ ἐστὶ [τὸ ἡγεμονικόν],¹ καὶ ἐν τίνι τόπῳ ἐστίν, οὐχ ὠμολόγηται, ἄλλων μὲν οὐδ' ὅλως ὑπάρχειν τι λεγόντων ἡγεμονικόν, ὡς τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀσκληπιάδην, τινῶν δὲ εἶναι μὲν νομιζόντων, οὐ συμφωνούντων δὲ περὶ τοῦ περιέχοντος αὐτὸ τόπου. διόπερ ἐφ' ὅσον ἀνεπίκριτός ἐστιν ἡ τοιαύτη διαφωνία, μένειν ἐν ἐποχῇ δεῖ ὡς ἀσυγχώρητον τὸ τὴν φαντασίαν ἡγεμονικοῦ τύπωσιν εἶναι.

381 Δεδόσθω δὲ καὶ τὸ τύπωσιν ὑπάρχειν τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ταύτην· ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἄλλως ἀναγγέλλεται ἡ τοιαύτη τύπωσις τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ εἰ μὴ διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως, οἷον ὀράσεως ἀκοῆς ἢ ἄλλης τινὸς τοιαύτης δυνάμεως, ζητῶ πότερον οἷα ἐστὶν ἡ περὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἑτεροίωσις, τοιαύτη γίνεται καὶ ἡ περὶ τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ, ἢ διάφορος. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἡ αὐτή, ἐπεὶ ἐκάστη τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἄλογός ἐστι, καὶ αὐτὸ² ἑτεροιοῦμενον ἄλογον ἔσται καὶ οὐ

382 διαφέρον τῆς αἰσθήσεως· εἰ δὲ διάφορος, οὐ τοιοῦτον λήψεται τὸ φανταστικὸν ὅποιον ὑπόκειται, ἀλλ' ἕτερον μὲν ἔσται τὸ ὑποκείμενον, διαφέρουσα δὲ ἡ περὶ τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ συνισταμένη φαντασία. ὁ πάλιν ἐστὶν ἄτοπον. οὐδὲ ταύτη τοῖνυν τύπωσιν εἶναι ῥητέον ἡγεμονικοῦ καὶ ἑτεροίωσιν τὴν φαντασίαν.

383 Πρὸς τούτοις ἡ φαντασία ἀποτελεσματὸν ἐστὶ τοῦ

¹ [τὸ ἡγ.] secl. Heintz.

² αὐτὸ: τὸ mss., Bekk.: τὸ <ἡγεμονικόν> Heintz.

if presentation is a change and alteration of the soul, it is non-existent.

And even if alteration be granted, the real existence 380 of presentation will not be admitted right away. For it was declared to be an impression of the regent part, but it is not agreed whether this regent part exists or in what spot it exists, some saying (like Asclepiades) that no regent part has any existence at all, and others believing that it exists though not agreeing as to the place which contains it.^a Wherefore, in so far as this controversy is unresolved, one must remain in a state of suspension, on the ground that it is not agreed that presentation is an impression of the regent part.

But let it be granted also that presentation is an 381 impression of the regent part; yet since such an impression is not announced to the regent part otherwise than through the sense—through sight, for instance, or hearing, or any other such faculty,—I want to know whether the alteration that takes place in the regent part is of the same sort as that of the sense, or different. And if it is the same, since each of the senses is irrational, the regent part too, being altered, will be irrational and in no respect different from sense; while if the alteration is different, it will 382 not receive the presented object exactly as it exists, but the existent object will be one thing and the presentation formed in the regent part something different. And this again is absurd. Neither in this way, then, can it be said that presentation is an impression and alteration of the regent part.

Furthermore, the presentation is an effect of the 383

^a Cf. §§ 313 ff., 349.

φανταστοῦ, καὶ τὸ φανταστὸν αἰτιὸν ἐστὶ τῆς φαντασίας καὶ τυπωτικὸν καθιεστῆκε τῆς αἰσθητικῆς δυνάμεως, διενήνοχέ τε τὸ ἀποτελεσμα τοῦ ποιούντος αὐτὸ αἰτίου. ὅθεν ἐπεὶ ταῖς φαντασίαις ἐπιβάλλει ὁ νοῦς, λήψεται τὰ ἀποτελέσματα τῶν φαντασιῶν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ ἐκτὸς φανταστά. καὶ εἰ λέγοις 384 τας ἐκ τῶν περὶ αὐτῶ πείσεων καὶ παθῶν τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἐπιβάλλειν αὐτόν, τὰς ἀνώτερον εἰρημένας μετοίσομεν ἀπορίας. ἤτοι γὰρ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐστὶ ταῖς ἡμετέραις φαντασίαις τὰ ἐκτός, ἢ τὰ αὐτὰ μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη, ὅμοια δέ. <ἀλλὰ τὰ αὐτὰ μὲν οὐκ ἔσται>¹ πῶς γὰρ δύναται τὸ αὐτὸ αἰτιὸν τε 385 καὶ ἀποτελεσμα ἑαυτοῦ νοεῖσθαι; εἰ δ' ὅμοια, ἐπεὶ τό τινι ὅμοιον ἕτερον ἐστὶν ἐκείνου τοῦ ὧ ὅμοιον ἐστίν, ἢ διάνοια τὰ ὅμοια τοῖς φανταστοῖς ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ φανταστά εἴσεται, σὺν τῷ καὶ τοῦτο ἄπορον εἶναι. πῶς γὰρ εἴσεται ἢ διάνοια ὅτι ὅμοιά ἐστὶ ταῖς φαντασίαις τὰ φανταστά; ἤτοι γὰρ χωρὶς φαντασίας τοῦτο αὐτὸ γινώσεται ἢ φαντασία τινί. καὶ χωρὶς μὲν φαντασίας ἀμήχανον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἢ διάνοια μὴ φαντασιουμένη πέφυκε λαμβάνειν. εἰ δὲ φαντασία, 386 πάντως αὕτη ἢ φαντασία ἵνα γνωσθῇ εἰ ὅμοια ἐστὶ τῷ ποιούντι αὐτὴν φανταστῷ, ὀφείλει ἑαυτὴν λαβεῖν καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον φανταστὸν. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ὑποκείμενον φανταστὸν τάχα δυνήσεται λαβεῖν φαντασία οὔσα ἐκείνου· ἑαυτὴν δὲ πῶς λήψεται; ἵνα γὰρ τοῦτο γένηται, δεήσει ταῦτο καὶ φαντασίαν 387 καὶ φανταστὸν γίνεσθαι. καὶ ἐπεὶ ἔστω ἕτερον

¹ <ἀλλὰ . . . ἔσται> cj. Bekk.

^a i.e. in § 381.

object presented, and the object presented is the cause of the presentation and is capable of impressing the sensitive faculty, and the effect is different from the cause which produces it. Hence, since the mind apprehends the presentations, it will be receiving the effects of the presented objects but not the external objects themselves. And should anyone argue from 384 the feelings and affections it experiences that it apprehends the external objects, we shall adduce the difficulties previously stated.^a For either the external objects are the same as our presentations, or they will not be the same but similar. <But they are certainly not the same ;> for how can a cause and its effect be conceived as the same? And if they are 385 similar, since what is similar to a thing is other than that to which it is similar, the intellect will know things similar to the presented objects but not the presented objects; and besides, this too is beset with difficulties. For how will the intellect know that the presented objects are similar to the presentations? It will know this either without a presentation or by means of a presentation. But without a presentation it is impracticable, for the intellect is naturally incapable of receiving anything unless by experiencing presentation. And if it knows it by means of a 386 presentation, this presentation ought certainly to perceive both itself and the presented object in order to ascertain whether it is itself similar to the presented object which produced it. Now the presentation will possibly be able to perceive the presented object, it being a presentation thereof; but how will it perceive itself? For in order that this should happen it will be necessary for the same thing to become both presentation and presented object. And since the presented 387

μὲν τὸ φανταστὸν (αἴτιον γὰρ ἔστιν) ἕτερον δὲ ἔστιν ἢ φαντασία (ἀποτέλεσμα γὰρ ἦν), ἔσται τὸ αὐτὸ ἕτερον ἑαυτοῦ, αἰτιὸν τε ἅμα καὶ ἀποτέλεσμα· ὡν ἐκάτερόν ἐστιν ἄλογον.

- 388 Ἐπισημασμένων δὴ τούτων μεταβάτες, καὶ ἐπὶ συγχωρήσει τοῦ εἶναι τὴν φαντασίαν τοιαύτην ὁποῖαν ποτὲ θέλουσιν ὑπάρχειν οἱ δογματικοί, ἑτέρως ἀπορῶμεν. εἰ γὰρ κριτήριον ἀπολειπτέον τὴν φαντασίαν, ἦτοι πᾶσαν ἀληθῆ φαντασίαν λεκτέον εἶναι, καθὼς ἔλεγεν ὁ Πρωταγόρας, ἢ πᾶσαν ψευδῆ, ὡς ἔφασκε Ξενιάδης ὁ Κορίνθιος, ἢ τινὰ μὲν ἀληθῆ τινὰ δὲ ψευδῆ, ὡς οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς
- 389 καὶ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας, ἔτι δὲ τοῦ περιπάτου. οὔτε δὲ πᾶσαν ἀληθῆ λεκτέον εἶναι οὔτε ψευδῆ οὔτε τινὰ μὲν ἀληθῆ τινὰ δὲ ψευδῆ, ὡς παραστήσομεν οὐκ ἄρα κριτήριον εἶναι ῥητέον τὴν φαντασίαν. πᾶσαν μὲν οὖν φαντασίαν οὐκ ἂν εἴποι τις ἀληθῆ διὰ τὴν περιτροπὴν, καθὼς ὁ τε Δημόκριτος καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἀντιλέγοντες τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ ἐδίδασκον·
- 390 εἰ γὰρ πᾶσα φαντασία ἐστὶν ἀληθῆς, καὶ τὸ μὴ πᾶσαν φαντασίαν εἶναι ἀληθῆ, κατὰ φαντασίαν ὑφιστάμενον, ἔσται ἀληθές, καὶ οὕτω τὸ πᾶσαν φαντασίαν εἶναι ἀληθῆ γενήσεται ψεῦδος. καὶ χωρὶς δὲ τῆς τοιαύτης περιτροπῆς παρὰ τὰ φαινόμενά ἐστι καὶ τὴν ἐνάργειαν τὸ λέγειν πᾶσαν φαντασίαν εἶναι ἀληθῆ, πολλῶν πάνυ ψευδῶν οὐσῶν.
- 391 οὐχ ὡσαύτως γὰρ κινούμεθα πρὸς τὸ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν" ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος καὶ πρὸς τὸ "νῦν ἔστιν," τό τε ζῆν Σωκράτη καὶ τεθνάναι, οὐδὲ τὴν ἴσην ποτὲ ταῦτα προσβάλλει ἐνάργειαν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἡμέραν νῦν εἶναι καὶ τὸ Σωκράτη τεθνάναι πιστόν

^a Cf. §§ 60, 48, 53; P.H. ii. 18, 76, 86.

object is one thing (for it is cause) and the presentation another thing (for it is effect), the same thing will be other than itself (both cause and effect simultaneously); and both these conclusions are illogical.

From the difficulties now stated let us pass on 388 and mention other difficulties which occur even after conceding that presentation is of that nature, whatsoever it be, which the Dogmatists desire. If presentation is accepted as the criterion, we must assert either that every presentation is true, as Protagoras asserted, or that every one is false, as Xenias the Corinthian declared, or that some are true, some false, as the Stoics and Academicians said, and the Peripatetics as well.^a But (as we shall 389 show) we ought not to assert either that every one is true or every one false or some true and some false; therefore we must not declare that presentation is the criterion. One cannot say that every presentation is true, because this refutes itself, as Democritus and Plato^b taught in opposing Protagoras; for if 390 every presentation is true, the judgement that not every presentation is true, being based on a presentation, will also be true, and thus the judgement that every presentation is true will become false.—And even apart from self-refutation of this kind, it is contrary to apparent facts and to plain evidence to assert that every presentation is true, when very many are false. For our feelings do not respond in the 391 same way, at the present moment, to the judgement "it is day" and to the judgement "it is night," or to "Socrates is alive" and "Socrates is dead," nor do these judgements bring with them equally clear evidence, but "it is now day" and "Socrates is

^b See Plato, *Theat.* 171 A, *Euthyd.* 286 B, C.

ἔοικεν ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ νύκτα εἶναι καὶ τὸ ζῆν
 Σωκράτη οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐστὶ πιστὸν ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀν-
 392 υπάρκτων φαίνεται. καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐπὶ τῆς
 ἐν τισι πράγμασι ἀκολουθίας τε καὶ μάχης
 [ἀληθῆς τε καὶ ψευδῆς ἐστι].¹ τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἡμέραν
 εἶναι τὸ φῶς εἶναι καὶ τῷ περιπατεῖν σε τὸ κινεῖ-
 σθαί σε ἐμφανῶς ἀκολουθεῖ, τῷ δὲ ἡμέραν εἶναι τὸ
 νύκτα εἶναι καὶ τῷ περιπατεῖν σε τὸ μὴ κινεῖσθαι
 σε προδήλως ἐμάχεται, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἑτέρου θέσις
 ἄριστος ἦν τοῦ λοιποῦ, [εἰ συνακολουθεῖ τί τι καὶ
 μάχεται πάντως ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ].² εἰ δὲ ἐστὶ τί τι
 μαχόμενον, οὐ πᾶσα φαντασία ἐστὶν ἀληθῆς· τὸ
 γὰρ τι μαχόμενον ὡς ἀληθὲς ψεύδει ἢ ὡς ψεῦδος
 393 ἀληθεῖ μάχεται. εἴπερ τε πάσας συμβέβηκε
 τὰς φαντασίας εἶναι ἀληθεῖς, οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἡμῖν
 ἄδηλον. ἀληθοῦς γὰρ τινος ὄντος καὶ ψεύδους,
 εἴτ' ἀγνοουμένου τί τούτων ἐστὶν ἀληθὲς καὶ τί
 ψεῦδος, τὸ ἀδηλούμενον ἡμῖν συνίσταται, καὶ ὁ
 λέγων "ἀδηλὸν ἐστὶ μοι τὸ ἀρτίους ἢ περισσοῦς
 εἶναι τοὺς ἀστέρας" δυνάμει λέγει μὴ ἐπίστασθαι
 πότερον ἀληθὲς ἐστὶ καὶ πότερον ψεῦδος, τὸ ἀρτίους
 εἶναι τοὺς ἀστέρας ἢ περισσοῦς. ὥστε εἰ πάντα
 ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ καὶ πᾶσαι φαντασίαι εἰσὶν ἀληθεῖς,
 οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἡμῖν ἄδηλον. εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἐστὶν ἡμῖν
 ἄδηλον, πάντ' ἔσται πρόδηλα. εἰ δὲ πάντ' ἔσται
 πρόδηλα, οὐδὲν ἔσται τὸ ζητεῖν καὶ ἀπορεῖν περὶ
 τινος· ζητεῖ γὰρ τις καὶ ἀπορεῖ περὶ τοῦ ἀ-
 δηλουμένου αὐτῷ πράγματος, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ περὶ τοῦ
 φανεροῦ. ἀποπον δὲ γέ ἐστι τὸ ζήτησιν καὶ

¹ [ἀληθῆς . . . ἐστὶ] secl. Kochalsky.

² [εἰ . . . ἐτέρῳ] secl. Heintz.

^a Cf. § 243.

dead " seem to be credible, whereas " it is night " and
 " Socrates is alive " are not equally credible but
 appear not to be actual facts.—The same argument 392
 also applies to the sequence and conflict belonging
 to certain things. For the existence of light is
 plainly consequent on the existence of day, and the
 fact of your motion on that of your walking, whereas
 the existence of night obviously conflicts with the
 existence of day, and the fact of your not moving with
 that of your walking, and the affirmation of the one
 is the negation of the other[, if one thing is con-
 sequent on another thing, certainly also one thing
 is in conflict with another thing]. But if anything
 conflicts with anything, not every presentation
 is true ; for that which conflicts with a thing con-
 flicts as truth with falsehood or as falsehood with
 truth.—Also, if it is the fact that all presentations are 393
 true, nothing is non-evident to us. For it is when
 one is true and another false, and we do not know
 which of them is true and which false, that we have
 a case of the non-evident, and the man who says " it
 is non-evident to me whether the stars are even in
 number or odd " ^a is virtually saying that he does not
 know whether it is true or whether it is false that
 the stars are even or that they are odd. So that if
 everything is true and all presentations are true,
 nothing is non-evident to us. And if nothing is
 non-evident, all things are quite evident. And if all
 things are quite evident, there will be no such thing
 as inquiring and doubting about anything ; for a
 man inquires and doubts about a matter which is to
 him non-evident, but not about what is apparent.
 But it is absurd to abolish inquiry and doubt ; not

ἀπορίαν ἀναιρεῖν· οὐκ ἄρα πᾶσα φαντασία ἐστὶν ἀληθής, οὐδὲ πάντα ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ.

394 Καὶ μὴν εἰ πᾶσα φαντασία ἐστὶν ἀληθής καὶ πάντα ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, οὔτε ἀλήθευσις τις ἔστιν οὔτε ἀπλανησία, οὐ διδασκαλία, [οὐ πλάνησις,]¹ οὐ τέχνη, οὐκ ἀπόδειξις, οὐκ ἀρετή, οὐκ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων. σκοπῶμεν δὲ τὸ λεγόμενον. εἰ γὰρ πᾶσα φαντασία ἐστὶν ἀληθής, οὐδὲν ἐστὶ ψεῦδος, μηδενὸς δὲ ὄντος ψεύδους οὔτε τὸ ψεῦδεσθαι ἔσται οὔτε τὸ πλανᾶσθαι οὔτε τὸ ἀτεχνον εἶναι οὔτε τὸ φαῦλον ὑπάρχειν· ἕκαστον γὰρ τούτων τοῦ ψεύδους ἔχεται

395 καὶ περὶ τοῦτο τὴν ὑπόστασιν λαμβάνει. μηδενὸς δὲ ψευδομένου οὐδ' ἀληθεύων τις ἔσται, καὶ μηδενὸς πλανωμένου οὐδ' ἀπλανῆς καταστήσεται τις. ὡσαύτως δὲ μὴ ὄντος ἀτεχνοῦ συναναίρεται καὶ ὁ τεχνίτης καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος φαύλου ὁ σοφός· ταῦτα γὰρ κατὰ σύμβλησιν νοεῖται, καὶ ὃν τρόπον μὴ ὄντος δεξιοῦ τινὸς οὐδὲ ἀριστερόν ἔστι μηδὲ ὄντος τοῦ κάτω οὐδὲ τὸ ἄνω ἔστιν, οὕτω μὴ ὄντος τοῦ ἐτέρου τῶν ἀντικειμένων οὐδὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ὑποστήσεται. οἰχθήσεται δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις καὶ

396 τὸ σημεῖον. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἀληθῆς εἶναι ἀλλὰ μὴ ψεῦδος ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις· μηδενὸς γὰρ ὄντος ψεύδους οὐ χρεῖα τοῦ διδάξοντος ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι ψεῦδος· τὸ δὲ σημεῖον καὶ τὸ τεκμήριον ἐπηγγέλλετο ἐκκαλυπτικὸν εἶναι τοῦ ἀδηλουμένου, πάντων δὲ ἀληθῶν ὄντων καὶ δι' αὐτῶν προφανῶν οὐ χρήζομεν τοῦ μηνύοντος τὸ μὴ γνωσκόμενον, εἴτε ἀληθῆς ἔστιν εἴτε καὶ ψεῦδος.

397 Καίτοι τί περὶ τούτων διεξιμεν, ὅτε οὔτε ζῶων οὔτε κοινῶς κόσμος ὑποκείσεται συγχωρηθέντος

¹ [οὐ πλάνησις,] secl. Kayser.

every presentation, therefore, is true, nor are all things true.

Moreover, if every presentation is true and all 394 things are true, there is no veracity or inerrancy, no instruction, no art, no proof, no virtue, nor any other thing of the kind. Let us consider this statement. If every presentation is true, nothing is false, and nothing being false lying will not exist nor error nor lack of art nor vice; for each of these things is connected with falsehood and derives its existence therefrom. And if no one lies neither will anyone be telling 395 the truth, and if no one is in error neither will anyone be found to be inerrant. In the same way, if there is no one inartistic the artist likewise is abolished, and the sage if no vicious man exists. For these things are conceived by way of correlation, and just as, if there is no right hand neither is there a left, and if there is no below neither is there an above, so, if one of two contraries does not exist, neither will the other subsist. Proof also and sign will vanish. For the 396 former is proof that the true exists but not the false; but if no falsehood exists, there is no need for anything to instruct us that falsehood does not exist. As to the sign and token, it was claimed that they serve to reveal what is non-evident, but if all things are true and self-apparent we do not need anything to indicate either the truth or falsity of a thing not known.

Yet why do we dilate on these details when neither 397 animal nor universe in general^a will exist if it be agreed

^a Or "at large," "universe" being a more comprehensive notion than "animal."

τοῦ πάσας τὰς φαντασίας ἀληθείς ὑπάρχειν; εἰ γὰρ πάντα ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, πάντα ἡμῖν γενήσεται πρόδηλα, καὶ εἰ τοῦτο, ἔσται ὑγιές τε καὶ ἀληθές καὶ τὸ πάντα ἡμῖν εἶναι ἄδηλα, ἐν ἐκ τῶν πάντων καθεστώς· ἀληθοῦς δὲ ὄντος τοῦ πάντα ἄδηλα τυγχάνειν, οὔτε ζῶον οὔτε φυτὸν οὔτε κόσμον προσδεξόμεθα φαίνεσθαι ἡμῖν· ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄτοπον.

398 λεκτέον ἄρα διὰ ταῦτα πάντα μὴ πάσας τὰς φαντασίας εἶναι ἀληθείς καὶ πιστάς, καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ πάσας ψευδεῖς διὰ τὰς ἀναλόγους αἰτίας· ἰσοδυναμεῖ γὰρ τῷ πάσας εἶναι ἀληθείς καὶ τὸ πάσας εἶναι ψευδεῖς. διὸ καὶ πάντα σχεδὸν τὰ προειρημένα ἡμῖν ἔσται καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν τοιαύτην μεταφέρειν στάσιν.

399 εἰ γὰρ πάσαι αἱ φαντασίαι εἰσὶ ψευδεῖς καὶ οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἀληθές, ἀληθές ἐστὶ τὸ “οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἀληθές.” εἰ ἄρα μηδὲν ἐστὶν ἀληθές, ἔστιν ἀληθές· καὶ οὕτως εἰς τούναντίον τῆ προθέσει περιήχθησαν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ξενιάδην, λέγοντες πάσας τὰς φαντασίας εἶναι ψευδεῖς καὶ μηδὲν ὅλως ἐν τοῖς οὐσιν ὑπάρχειν ἀληθές. καθόλου γὰρ ἀμήχανόν ἐστὶ τὸν ἐπὶ μέρους τι λέγοντα ψεύδος μὴ οὐχὶ καὶ ἀληθές ὀρίζειν. οἷον ὅτε λέγομεν ψεύδος εἶναι τὸ *A*, τοῦ μέν *A* τὸ ψεύδος αὐτὸ ὑπάρχειν κατηγοροῦμεν, τὸ δὲ “ψεύδος ἐστὶ τὸ *A*” τίθεμεν, ὥστε δυνάμει τοιοῦτόν τι ἀποφαίνεσθαι “ἀληθές ἐστὶ τὸ ψεύδος εἶναι τὸ *A*.” ἅμα οὖν τῷ ψεύδος τι λέγειν

400 καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἀληθές ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὀρίζομεν. ἔνεστι δὲ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἐνταυθοῖ διδάσκειν ὅτι ἐναργεῖς σχεδὸν εἰσι τῶν φαντασιῶν αἱ διαφοραί, καθ’ ὅς αἱ μὲν ἐπισπῶνται ἡμῶν τὴν συγκατάθεσιν αἱ δ’ ἀποκροῦνται καὶ οὔτε ἅσασαι ἐπισπῶνται κοινῶς οὔτε ἅσασαι συλλήβδην ἀπο-

that all presentations are true? For if all things are true, all things will be quite evident to us, and if so, it will also be valid and true that all things are non-evident to us, this being one of the “all things”; and if it be true that all things are non-evident we shall not admit that either animal or plant or universe appears to us; which is absurd. For all these 398 reasons, therefore, one must declare that not all presentations are true and credible, and indeed, for analogous reasons, that not all are false. For the statement “all are false” is equipollent with “all are true.” Wherefore also it will be possible for us to adduce against a position of this kind nearly all the objections previously stated. For if all the presenta- 399 tions are false and nothing is true, it is true that “nothing is true.” If, therefore, nothing is true, a truth exists; and in this way Xenias^a was driven round to the opposite of his original position, when he said that all presentations are false and that absolutely nothing true exists in the world. For, as a universal rule, it is impossible to assert that any particular thing is false without also affirming a truth. For example, when we assert that *A* is false, we are predicating the existence of that very falsity of *A*, and we are affirming that “*A* is false,” so that what we virtually declare is this—“It is true that *A* is false.” Simultaneously, then, with asserting a thing to be false we necessarily affirm the existence of truth. And in the same fashion one may here show that the 400 differences in presentations are well-nigh self-evident, owing to which some attract our assent while others repel it, and neither all alike attract nor all without

^a Cf. § 388.

κρούονται, ἐπεὶ τοὶ μηδεμιᾶς οὐσίας τῆς διαφορᾶς, ἀλλὰ πασῶν ἐπ' ἰσῆς ἀπίστων οὐσῶν ἢ πιστῶν, οὔτε τέχνη ποτ' ἂν οὔτε ἀτεχνία καθεισθῆκει, οὐκ ἔπαινος, οὐκ ἐπιτίμησις, οὐκ ἀπάτη· ἐνοεῖτο γὰρ ἢ μὲν τέχνη καὶ ἀποδοχὴ καὶ τὸ ἀνεξαπάτητον κατὰ τὰς ἀληθεῖς φαντασίας, ἢ δὲ ἀπάτη καὶ ἐπιτίμησις κατὰ τὰς ψευδεῖς. οὔτε οὖν πάσας ἀληθεῖς εἶναι ῥητέον καὶ πιστὰς οὔτε πάσας ψευδεῖς καὶ ἀπίστους.

401 Λεῖπεται ἄρα τὰς μὲν πιστὰς τὰς δὲ ἀπίστους ἀξιοῦν, ὅπερ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας ἔλεγον, οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς τὰς καταληπτικὰς φαντασίας ἀποδεχόμενοι, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας τὰς πιθανὰς εἶναι δοκούσας. τοῦτο δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ ἰσχυροῦς ἡμῖν ἀκριβῶς
402 εὐχῆ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἢ ἀληθείᾳ. ἦν γὰρ καταληπτικὴ φαντασία, ἵνα τις ἀπὸ ταύτης ἄρχηται, ἢ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπομεμαγμένη καὶ ἐναπεσφραγισμένη, ὅποια οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος. τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Καρνεάδην συγχωρήσειν τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς, τὸ δὲ "οἷα οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος" ἀσυγχώρητον εἶναι. γίνονται γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπαρχόντων φαντασίαι ὡς ἀπὸ
403 ὑπαρχόντων. καὶ τεκμήριον τῆς ἀπαραλλαξίας τὸ ἐπ' ἰσῆς ταύτας ἐναργεῖς καὶ πληκτικὰς εὐρίσκεισθαι, τοῦ δὲ ἐπ' ἰσῆς πληκτικὰς καὶ ἐναργεῖς εἶναι τὸ τὰς ἀκολούθους πράξεις ἐπιζεύγνυσθαι. ὡσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὑπαρ ὁ μὲν διψῶν ἀρνούμενος ποτὸν ἤδεται, ὁ δὲ θηρίον ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν δευμαλέων φεύγων βοᾷ καὶ κέκραγεν, οὕτω καὶ κατὰ τοὺς

¹ αὐτὸ cj. Bekk.: αὐτοὺς MSS.

exception repel, since, to be sure, if no difference existed but all were equally untrustworthy or trustworthy, there would exist no art nor lack of art, no praise, no blame, no deceit; for art and approval and lack of deceit are conceived through true presentations, but deceit and blame through false ones. One ought not, then, to assert either that all are true and trustworthy or that all are false and untrustworthy.

It remains, therefore, to affirm that some presenta- 401 tions are trustworthy, others untrustworthy, as the Stoics and the Academics have said, the Stoics approving the "apprehensive" presentations, and the Academics those which appear to be "probable." ^a But, on examining it closely, this view also seems to us more like a pious aspiration than the truth. For 402 an "apprehensive" presentation—to take this first—is one which is "imprinted and impressed by a real object and in accordance with that object itself, and such as could not be produced by anything not real." ^b As to the rest of this account Carneades ^c says that he will concede it to the Stoics, but the clause "Such as could not be produced by what is not real" should not be conceded. For presentations are produced by non-real objects just as by real ones. And the fact 403 that they are found equally self-evident and striking is a token of their indistinguishability, while the fact that corresponding actions are linked to them is a token of their being equally striking and self-evident. For as in waking life the thirsty man feels pleasure in indulging in drink, and the man who flees from a wild beast or any other object of terror shouts and cries aloud, so also in dreams delight is felt by the thirsty

^a Cf. §§ 227 ff., 174 ff.

^b Cf. §§ 248, 252.

^c Cf. § 164.

ἕπνου ἢ μὲν διάχυσις ἐστὶ τοῖς διψῶσι καὶ ἀπὸ
404 κρήνης πίνειν δοκοῦσιν, ἀνάλογον δὲ φόβος τοῖς
δειματουμένοις·

ταφῶν γὰρ ἀνόρουσεν Ἀχιλλεὺς
χεροῖ τε συμπλατάγησεν, ἔπος τ' ὀλοφυδνόν
ἔειπεν.

καὶ ὃν τρόπον ἐν καταστάσει τοῖς τρανότατα φαινο-
μένοις πιστεύομεν καὶ συγκατατιθέμεθα, ὅσον Δίῳ
μὲν ὡς Δίῳ Θεῶν δὲ ὡς Θεῶν προσφερόμενοι,
οὕτω καὶ ἐν μανίᾳ τὸ παραπλήσιον πάσχουσι τινές.
405 ὁ γοῦν Ἡρακλῆς μανεῖς, καὶ λαβῶν φαντασίαν
ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων παιδῶν ὡς Εὐρυσθέως, τὴν ἀκό-
λουθον πράξιν ταύτῃ τῇ φαντασίᾳ συνῆψεν. ἀκό-
λουθον δὲ ἦν τὸ τοὺς τοῦ ἐχθροῦ παῖδας ἀνελεῖν,
ὅπερ καὶ ἐποίησεν. εἰ οὖν καταληπτικαὶ τινές
εἰσι φαντασίαι παρόσον ἐπάγονται ἡμᾶς εἰς συγ-
κατάθεσιν καὶ εἰς τὸ τὴν ἀκόλουθον αὐταῖς πράξιν
συνάπτειν, ἐπεὶ καὶ ψευδεῖς τοιαῦται πεφήνασι,
λεκτέον ἀπαραλλάκτους εἶναι ταῖς καταληπτικαῖς
406 φαντασίαις τὰς ἀκαταλήπτους. καὶ μὴν ὃν τρόπον
ἀπὸ τῶν τόξων (ὡς τόξων)¹ ἐλάμβανε φαντασίαν
ὁ ἦρωρ, οὕτω καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων παιδῶν ὅτι
Εὐρυσθέως εἰσὶ παῖδες. μία γὰρ καὶ ἡ αὐτῇ
προὔπέκειτο καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντι φαντασία. ἀλλ'
ἦν ἢ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν τόξων ἀληθής, ἢ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν
407 παιδῶν ψευδής. ἐπ' ἴσης οὖν κινουσῶν² ἀμφο-
τέρων ὁμολογητέον ἀπαραλλάκτον εἶναι τὴν ἐτέ-
ραν τῇ ἐτέρᾳ· καὶ εἰ ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν τόξων λέγεται
καταληπτική, ὅτι ἀκόλουθος αὐτῇ πράξις ἐπέ-

¹ <ὡς τόξων> Heintz.

² κινουσῶν N: κλιουσῶν cet., Bekk.

when they think they are drinking from a spring, and 404
similarly fear is felt by those in terror :

Achilles up-leapt in amazement,
Smiting together his hands, and a doleful word did he utter.*

And just as in a normal state we believe and assent to very lucid appearances, behaving, for instance, towards Dion as Dion, and towards Theon as Theon, so also in a state of madness some are similarly affected. Thus Heracles, when he was mad and had 405
received a presentation of his own children as though they were those of Eurystheus,^b followed up this presentation with corresponding action. And the corresponding action was to destroy his enemy's children, which he did. If, then, presentations are apprehensive in so far as they attract us to assent and to the following of them up with corresponding action, then, since false ones also are seen to be of this kind, we must declare that the non-apprehensive presentations are indistinguishable from the apprehensive. Moreover, just as the hero received a presentation 406
of the bow and arrows, so also he received a presentation of his own children as being the children of Eurystheus. For the pre-existent presentation was one and the same and received by a man in the same condition ; yet while that of the bow and arrows was true, that of the children was false. So, since both 407
affected him equally, one must admit that the one was indistinguishable from the other ; and if that of the bow is termed " apprehensive," because it was

* Homer, *Iliad*, xxiii. 101.

^b Heracles, in a fit of madness, slew his own children in mistake for those of his enemy, King Eurystheus, who had imposed upon him his " Twelve Labours." Cf. Eurip. *Here.* Fur. 969 ; *Adv. Log.* ii. 67.

ζεύχθη τοῖς τόξοις αὐτοῦ ὡς τόξοις χρησαμένον, λεγέσθω καὶ ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν παίδων μὴ διαφέρειν ταύτης, παρόσον καὶ ταύτη τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐπε-
 ζεύχθη ἔργον, τουτέστι τὸ τοὺς τοῦ ἐχθροῦ παῖδας
 408 δεῖν ἀναερεῖν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ αὕτη μὲν ἡ ἀπαραλλαξία τῶν τε καταληπτικῶν καὶ τῶν ἀκαταλήπτων φαν-
 τασιῶν κατὰ τὸ ἐναργές καὶ ἔντονον ἰδίωμα παρ-
 ἰσταται· οὐδὲν δὲ ἦττον δείκνυται τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς
 Ἀκαδημίας καὶ ἡ κατὰ χαρακτῆρα καὶ [ἡ] κατὰ
 τύπον. καλοῦσι δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ φαινόμενα τοὺς στωικούς.
 409 ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν ὁμοίων μὲν κατὰ μορφήν διαφερόν-
 των δὲ κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἀμήχανόν ἐστι διορί-
 ζειν τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν ἀπὸ τῆς ψευδοῦς
 καὶ ἀκαταλήπτου· οἷον δυοῖν ὤων ἄκρως ἀλλήλοις
 ὁμοίων (εἰ) ἐναλλάξ τῷ στωικῷ δίδωμι πρὸς
 διάκρισιν, [εἰ] ἐπιβαλὼν ὁ σοφὸς (οὐκ)¹ ἰσχύσει
 λέγειν ἀδιαπτῶτως πότερον ἓν ἐστὶ τὸ δεικνύμενον
 410 ὄν ἢ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστὶ καὶ
 ἐπὶ διδύμων· λήψεται γὰρ ψευδῆ φαντασίαν ὁ
 σπουδαῖος καὶ [ὡς]² ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος καὶ κατ'
 αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπομεμαγμένην καὶ ἐναπεσφρα-
 γισμένην ἔχων τὴν φαντασίαν, ἐὰν ἀπὸ Κάστο-
 ρος ὡς ἀπὸ Πολυδεύκου φαντασιωθῇ. ἐντεῦθεν
 γοῦν καὶ ὁ ἐγκεκαλυμμένος συνέστη λόγος· ἐὰν
 γὰρ προκύψαντος δράκοντος θέλωμεν τῷ ὑποκει-
 μένῳ ἐπιστῆναι, εἰς πολλὴν ἀπορίαν ἐμπεσοῦμεθα,
 καὶ οὐχ ἔξομεν λέγειν πότερον ὁ αὐτὸς ἐστὶ
 δράκων τῷ πρότερον προκύψαντι ἢ ἕτερος, πολλῶν

¹ <εἰ> . . . [εἰ] . . . <οὐκ> Heintz.

² [ὡς] secl. Kayser: καίπερ cj. Bekk.

* The statement of § 403 that false presentations may be as "self-evident and striking" as true ones, and therefore 218

followed by the corresponding action when he used the bow as a bow, let it be said that the presentation of the children does not differ therefrom, inasmuch as it too was followed up by the corresponding action, —namely, the duty of slaying the enemy's children. Well then, this form of indistinguishability, in respect 408 of the characteristic of self-evidence and intensity, is established.^a And that in respect of stamp and impression is proved no less surely by the Academics. They summon the Stoics to face apparent facts. For 409 in the case of things similar in shape but differing in substance it is impossible to distinguish the apprehensive presentation from the false and non-apprehensive. If, for example, of two eggs that are exactly alike I offer each one in turn to the Stoic for him to distinguish between them, will the Sage be able on inspection to declare indubitably whether the egg exhibited is this one or that other one? And the 410 same argument also holds good in the case of twins. For the Good Man will receive a false presentation, though he has that presentation "imprinted and impressed both by a real object and according to that very object," if the presentation he gets be one of Castor as though it were of Polydeuces. It was this, too, that led to the framing of "the Veiled" argument; when a snake has thrust out its head, if we wish to examine the real object we shall be plunged into great perplexity and shall not be able to say whether it is the same snake that thrust its head out before or another one, as there are many snakes

"indistinguishable," has now been proved. The next sentence introduces the proof (in §§ 409-410) that an unreal percept may produce in the percipient an "impression" indistinguishable from that caused by a real one.

411 ἐνεσπειραμένων τῷ αὐτῷ φωλεῷ δρακόντων. οὐ τοῖνυν ἔχει τι ἰδίωμα ἢ καταληπτικὴ φαντασία ᾧ διαφέρει τῶν ψευδῶν τε καὶ ἀκαταληπτῶν φαντασιῶν.

Πρὸς τοῦτοις, εἴ τι ἄλλο καταληπτικόν τινός ἐστι, καὶ ὄρασις. οὐχὶ δέ γ' αὕτη καταληπτικὴ τινός ἐστιν, ὡς παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τι
 412 καταληπτικόν τινος. ἢ γὰρ ὄρασις λαμβάνειν μὲν δοκεῖ χρώματα καὶ μεγέθη καὶ σχήματα καὶ κινήσεις, τούτων δὲ οὐδὲν λαμβάνει, καθάπερ εὐθύς ἀπὸ τῶν χρωμάτων ἀρξαμένοις ἡμῖν φανεῖται. εἴπερ οὖν ἢ ὄρασις καταλαμβάνεται τι χῶμα, φαῖν οἱ ἐξ Ἀκαδημίας, καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καταλήψεται· οὐ καταλαμβάνεται δὲ τοῦτο· οὐδ'
 413 ἄλλο τοῖνυν καταλήψεται χῶμα. καὶ ὅτι οὐ καταλαμβάνεται, πρόδηλον· μεταβάλλει γὰρ κατὰ ὥρας ἐνεργείας φύσεις ἡλικίας περιστάσεις νόσους ὑγίαν ὑπνον ἐγρήγορσιν, ὥστε τὸ μὲν οὕτως αὐτὸ ποικίλλεσθαι γινώσκειν ἡμᾶς, τὸ δὲ τί ἐστι τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἀγνοεῖν. ταύτη τε εἰ τοῦτο μὴ ἔστι καταληπτόν, οὐδ' ἄλλο τι γενήσεται γινώριμον.
 414 καὶ μὴν καὶ ἐπὶ σχήματος τὸ αὐτὸ γένος τῆς ἀπορίας εὐρήσομεν· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ λεῖον καὶ τραχὺ ὑποπίπτει ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν γραφῶν, στρογγύλον τε καὶ τετράγωνον ὡς ἐπὶ πύργων, εὐθύ τε καὶ κεκλασμένον ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς ἐξάλου τε καὶ ἐνάλου κώπης, καὶ ἐπὶ κινήσεως κινούμενον καὶ ἡρεμοῦν, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν νηὶ καθεζομένων ἢ ἐπὶ τοῖς αἰγιαλοῖς ἐσώτων.
 415 Ἄλλως τε, εἴπερ προσαρμόζεται τῇ καταληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ ἢ ἀκατάληπτος φαντασία, οὐκ ἂν εἶη κριτήριον ἀληθείας ἢ καταληπτικὴ φαντασία.

coiled up in the same hole. So then the apprehensive 411 presentation possesses no characteristic whereby it differs from the false and non-apprehensive presentations.

Furthermore, if anything else is apprehensive of anything, the sense of sight is so. But in fact, as we shall establish, sight is not apprehensive of anything ; therefore nothing is apprehensive of anything. For 412 sight is thought to perceive colours and sizes and forms and motions, but it perceives none of these things, as will be apparent to us at once if we commence with colours. If then, as the Academics say, sight apprehends any colour it will also apprehend that of man ; but it does not apprehend this ; neither then will it apprehend another colour. And that 413 it does not apprehend this is quite evident ; for this changes according to the seasons, occupations, natures, ages, circumstances, diseases, health, sleeping, waking, so that while we know that it is thus varied we are ignorant of what in truth it is. And thus, if this colour is not apprehensible neither will any other become known. Moreover, we shall find 414 the same kind of difficulty in the case of form. For the same thing is perceived as both smooth and rough, as in the case of pictures ; and as both round and square, as in the case of towers ; and as both straight and bent, as in the case of the oar when out of and in the water ; and, as regards motion, both in motion and at rest, as in the case of persons seated in a ship or standing on the beach.^a

Again, if the non-apprehensive presentation coincides with the apprehensive presentation, the apprehensive presentation will not be the criterion of truth.

^a For these examples cf. *P.H.* i. 92, 118, 119, 102.

ὡςπερ γὰρ τὸ προσαρμοττόμενον στρεβλῶ οὐκ ἂν εἶη κριτήριον εὐθέος, οὕτως εἰ προσαρμόττεται ψευδέσι καὶ ἀκαταλήπτους φαντασίαις ἢ καταληπτικῆ φαντασία, οὐκ ἂν εἶη κριτήριον. προσαρμόττεται δέ γε ἀκαταλήπτους καὶ ψευδέσι πράγμασιν ἢ καταληπτικῆ φαντασία, καθὼς παραστήσομεν· οὐ τοίνυν κριτήριόν ἐστι τῶν τε ἀληθῶν
 416 καὶ τῶν ψευδῶν ἢ καταληπτικῆ φαντασία. ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῦ σωρίτου τῆς ἐσχάτης καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας τῇ πρώτῃ ἀκαταλήπτῳ παρακειμένης καὶ δυσδιορίστου σχεδὸν ὑπαρχούσης, φασὶν οἱ περὶ τὸν Χρύσιππον ὅτι ἐφ' ὧν μὲν φαντασιῶν ὀλίγη τις οὕτως ἔστι διαφορὰ, στήσεται ὁ σοφὸς καὶ ἡσυχάσει, ἐφ' ὧν δὲ πλείων προσπίπτει, ἐπὶ τούτων
 417 συγκαταθήσεται τῇ ἑτέρα ὡς ἀληθεῖ. ἐὰν οὖν παραστήσωμεν ἡμεῖς πολλὰ ψευδῆ καὶ ἀκατάληπτα τῇ καταληπτικῆ φαντασίᾳ παρακείμενα, δῆλον ὡς ἐσόμεθα κατεσκευακότες τὸ μὴ δεῖν συγκατατίθεσθαι τῇ καταληπτικῆ φαντασίᾳ, ἵνα μὴ ταύτῃ συναιδέσαντες προπέσωμεν διὰ τὴν γειννίασιν καὶ εἰς τὴν τῶν ἀκαταλήπτων καὶ ψευδῶν συγκατάθεσιν, κἂν ὅτι μάλιστα πολλὴ περὶ
 418 τὰς φαντασίας προσπίπτει δοκῆ διαφορὰ. τὸ δὲ λεγόμενον σαφές ἐσται ἐπὶ παραδείγματος. ὑποκείσθω γὰρ καταληπτικῆ μὲν φαντασία ἢ "τὰ πεντήκοντα ὀλίγα ἐστίν," ἥτις καὶ κατὰ πολὺ φαίνεται κεχωρισμένη τῆς "τὰ μύρια ὀλίγα ἐστίν" ἑτέρας. οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶ πλείστον ἀπέχει τῆς "τὰ πεντήκοντα ὀλίγα ἐστίν" καταληπτικῆς ἢ "τὰ μύρια ὀλίγα ἐστίν" ἀκατάληπτος, οὐκ ἐφέξει ὁ σπουδαῖος μεγάλης προσπιπτούσης διαφορᾶς, ἀλλὰ

For just as that which coincides with the crooked will not be the criterion of the straight, so the apprehensive presentation will not be the criterion if it coincides with false and non-apprehensive presentations. But the apprehensive presentation does coincide with non-apprehensive and false things, as we shall establish; so then the apprehensive presentation is not the criterion of the true and the false. For in the case of the 416 Sorites, when the last apprehensive presentation lies beside the first non-apprehensive one and almost defies distinction therefrom, Chrysippus declares that, in the case of presentations where the difference is so small, the Sage will pause and keep silence,^a but in cases where it appears greater he will assent to the former one as true. If, then, we shall establish that many false 417 and non-apprehensive things lie beside the apprehensive presentation, it is plain that we shall have shown that one ought not to assent to the apprehensive presentation, lest by approving of it we are driven on, because of their proximity, to give assent also to those which are non-apprehensive and false, even though the greatest possible difference may seem to exist between the presentations. What I mean will be clear 418 by an example. Let us assume as an apprehensive presentation "Fifty is few," which seems far apart from this other, "Ten thousand is few." Then, since the non-apprehensive presentation "Ten thousand is few" is very far removed from the apprehensive "Fifty is few," the Good Man will not suspend judgement on perceiving this great difference but

^a Cf. P.H. ii. 253 for the "Sorites" puzzle, and the Stoic rule of withholding assent and suspending judgement when a point is reached in the series where the difference between a true and a doubtful presentation, or judgement, becomes infinitesimal.

συγκαταθήσεται μὲν τῇ "τὰ πενήκοντα ὀλίγα ἐστὶ" καταληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ, οὐ συγκαταθήσεται δὲ τῇ "τὰ μύρια ὀλίγα ἐστίν" ἀκαταλήπτῳ.
 419 ἀλλ' εἰ τῇ "τὰ μύρια ὀλίγα ἐστίν" οὐ συγκαταθήσεται ὁ σοφός, παρόσον πολλῶ κεχώρισται τῆς "τὰ πενήκοντα ὀλίγα ἐστίν," φανερόν δήπουθεν ὅτι συγκαταθήσεται τῇ "τὰ πενήκοντα καὶ ἓν ὀλίγα ἐστίν". οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ μεταξὺ ταύτης καὶ τῆς "τὰ πενήκοντα ὀλίγα ἐστίν." ἦν δέ γε ἡ "τὰ πενήκοντα καὶ ἓν ὀλίγα ἐστὶ" καταληπτικῆς ἐσχάτως ὑποκειμένης τῆς "τὰ πενήκοντα ὀλίγα ἐστὶ" πρώτη ἀκατάληπτος. συγκαταθήσεται ἄρα ὁ σπουδαῖος ἀκατάληπτῳ φαντασίᾳ τῇ "τὰ πενήκοντα καὶ ἓν ὀλίγα ἐστίν" καὶ εἰ ταύτη συγκαταθήσεται, μηδεμίαν ἐχούση διαφορὰν πρὸς τὴν "τὰ πενήκοντα ὀλίγα ἐστὶ," συγκαταθήσεται καὶ τῇ
 420 "τὰ μύρια ὀλίγα ἐστίν" ἀκατάληπτῳ. πᾶσα γὰρ ἀκατάληπτος φαντασία (πάσῃ)¹ ἀκατάληπτῳ φαντασίᾳ ἐστὶν ἴση. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ μὲν "τὰ μύρια ὀλίγα ἐστίν" ἀκατάληπτος ἴση ἐστὶ τῇ "τὰ πενήκοντα καὶ ἓν ὀλίγα ἐστίν," οὐδενὶ δὲ (ἦδε)² διέφερε καὶ ἐκεχώριστο τῆς "τὰ πενήκοντα ὀλίγα ἐστὶ" καταληπτικῆς, ἴση γενήσεται τῇ "τὰ μύρια ὀλίγα ἐστίν" ἀκατάληπτῳ φαντασίᾳ ἢ "τὰ πενήκοντα
 421 ὀλίγα ἐστὶ" καταληπτικῇ. καὶ οὕτω συνεξέρχεται τῇ ψευδεὶ καὶ ἀκατάληπτῳ φαντασίᾳ διὰ τὴν ἀπαραλλαξίαν ἢ καταληπτικῇ.

Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔνεστι λέγειν μὴ πᾶσαν ἀκατάληπτον φαντασίαν ἴσην πάσῃ ἀκατάληπτῳ τυγχάνειν φαντασίᾳ, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν μάλλον εἶναι ἀκατάληπτον
 422 τὴν δὲ ἦσον, ἐπεὶ πρῶτον μὲν μαχέσονται ἑαυτοῖς

¹ <πάσῃ> Heintz.

will assent to the apprehensive presentation "Fifty is few" and will not assent to the non-apprehensive "Ten thousand is few." But if the Sage will not
 419 assent to the "Ten thousand is few" inasmuch as it is far apart from the "Fifty is few," it is plain, I presume, that he will assent to "Fifty-one is few"; for there is nothing between this presentation and that of "Fifty is few." But as "Fifty is few" was the apprehensive presentation placed last in order, "Fifty-one is few" is the first non-apprehensive one. The Good Man, therefore, will assent to the non-apprehensive presentation "Fifty-one is few." And if he will assent to this as being in no wise different from "Fifty is few," he will assent also to the non-apprehensive "Ten thousand is few"; for every
 420 non-apprehensive presentation is equal to every other non-apprehensive presentation. Since, then, the non-apprehensive "Ten thousand is few" is equal to the "Fifty-one is few," and this was not at all different nor remote from the apprehensive "Fifty is few," the apprehensive "Fifty is few" will become equal to the non-apprehensive presentation "Ten thousand is few." And thus the apprehensive presentation,
 421 because of its indistinguishability, passes out along with the false and non-apprehensive.

Nor indeed is it possible to argue that not every non-apprehensive presentation is equal to every non-apprehensive presentation, but this one is more, that one less non-apprehensive, since, in the first place, the
 422 Stoics will be in conflict both with themselves and

² <ἦδε> addidi: διέφερον αὐτῇ ἢ ἐκ. Fabr.

καὶ τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων οἱ στωικοί. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπου, καθὸ ἀνθρώπος ἐστίν, οὐ διαφέρει, οὐδὲ λίθος λίθου, οὕτως οὔτε ἀκατάληπτος φαντασία ἀκατάληπτου φαντασίας διενήνοχεν, ἢ ἀκατάληπτός ἐστιν, οὔτε¹ ψευδῆς ψευδοῦς, ἢ ψευδῆς ἐστίν. κἀντεῦθεν ὀρμώμενοι οἱ περὶ τὸν Ζήνωνα ἐδίδασκον ὅτι ἴσα ἐστὶ τὰ ἀμαρ-

423 τήματα. εἶτα ἔστω τὴν μὲν μᾶλλον εἶναι ἀκατάληπτον τὴν δὲ ἥσσον. τί τοῦτο αὐτοῖς βοηθεῖν δύναται; ἀκολουθήσει γὰρ τῇ μὲν μᾶλλον ἀκατάληπτῳ μὴ συγκατατίθεσθαι τὸν σοφόν, τῇ δὲ ἥσσον συγκατατίθεσθαι, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄτοπον. ἀπλανές γὰρ εἶχε κριτήριον κατ' αὐτοὺς ὁ σοφός, καὶ κατὰ πάντα ἐθεοποιεῖτο διὰ τὸ μὴ δοξάζειν, τουτέστι ψεύδει συγκατατίθεσθαι, ἐν ᾧ ἔκειτο ἡ ἄκρα κακοδαιμονία καὶ ἡ τῶν φαύλων διάπτωσις.

424 Ἴνα γε μὴν αἰσθητικὴ γένηται φαντασία κατ' αὐτοὺς, οἷον ὀρατικὴ, δεῖ πέντε συνδραμεῖν, τό τε αἰσθητήριον καὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν καὶ τὸν τόπον καὶ τὸ πῶς καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, ὡς ἐὰν τῶν ἄλλων παρόντων ἐν μόνον ἀπῆ, καθάπερ διάνοια παρὰ φύσιν ἔχουσα, οὐ σωθήσεται, φασίν, ἢ ἀντιληψίς. ἐνθεν καὶ τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν ἔλεγον τινες μὴ κοινῶς κριτήριον, ἀλλ' ὅταν μηδὲν ἔχη

425 κατὰ τὸν τρόπον ἐνστήμα. τοῦτο μέντοι τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστίν· καὶ γὰρ παρὰ τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν πόρων καὶ παρὰ τὰς τοῦ ἐκτὸς περιστάσεις καὶ παρ' ἄλλους πλείους τρόπους οὔτε τὰ αὐτὰ οὔτε ὡσαύτως ἰνδάλλεται ἡμῖν τὰ πράγματα, καθάπερ ἄνωτερον ἐπελογοσάμεθα, ὥστε εἰ μὲν φαίνεται πρὸς τῆδε τῇ αἰσθήσει καὶ τῆδε τῇ περιστάσει

¹ οὔτε cj. Bekk.: οὐδὲ mss.

with the nature of things. For just as man, *qua* man, differs not from man, nor stone from stone, so neither does non-apprehensive presentation, *qua* non-apprehensive, differ from non-apprehensive presentation, nor false, *qua* false, from false. Zeno, too, setting out from this standpoint, taught that "Sins are equal."—Further, let it be granted that this presentation is 423 more and that less non-apprehensive. How can this assist them? For it will follow that the Sage will not assent to the more non-apprehensive, but will assent to the less, which is absurd; for, according to them, the Sage possesses an infallible criterion, and is counted in all respects divine because he never opines,^a that is to say, assents to what is false, for therein consists the height of ill-fortune and the ruin of the foolish.

Moreover, in order that a sense-presentation, such 424 as that of sight, should take place, it is necessary, according to them, that five things should concur—the organ of sense, the object of sense, the place, the manner, the intellect—since if one only be absent though all the rest be present (if, for instance, the intellect is in an abnormal state), the perception, they say, will not be safely effected. Hence, too, some have said that the apprehensive presentation is not a criterion universally, but only when it has no obstacle present.^b This, however, is a thing impossible; for 425 because of differences in the (sensory) passages and because of external circumstances and because of many other conditions things do not appear to us either the same or in the same way, as we argued above^c; so that while we can say that a thing appears by this particular sense and in this particular

^a Cf. P.H. ii. 83.

^b Cf. §§ 254 ff.

^c Cf. § 414.

δύνασθαι λέγειν, τὸ δ' εἰ ταῖς ἀληθείαις τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν οἷον καὶ φαίνεται, ἢ ἄλλοιον μὲν ἐστιν ἄλλοιον δὲ φαίνεται, μὴ ἔχειν ἡμᾶς διαυθεντεῖν, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο μηδεμίαν εἶναι φαντασίαν χωρὶς ἐνοστήματος.

426 Πῶς δ' οὐχὶ καὶ εἰς τὸν δι' ἀλλήλων ἐπίπτουσι τρόπον; ζητούντων γὰρ ἡμῶν τίς ἐστιν ἡ καταληπτικὴ φαντασία, ὀριζόμενοι φασιν " ἢ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπομεμαγμένη καὶ ἐναπεσφραγισμένη, ὅποια οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος." εἶτα πάλιν, ἐπεὶ πᾶν τὸ ὀρικῶς διδασκόμενον ἐκ γινωσκομένων διδάσκεται, προσανακρινόντων ἡμῶν τί ποτ' ἔστι καὶ τὸ ὑπάρχον, ἀναστρέψαντές φασιν ὅτι ὑπάρχον ἐστὶν ὁ κινεῖ καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν. ὥστε ἵνα μὲν μάθωμεν τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν, προειληφέναι ὀφείλομεν τὸ ὑπάρχον, ἵνα δὲ τοῦτο, ἐπὶ τὴν καταληπτικὴν βαδίζωμεν φαντασίαν· καὶ οὕτω μηδέτερον γίνεσθαι σαφές, περιμένον τὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἑτέρου

427 πίστιν. ὥσπερ τε ἐπεὶ τῶν φαντασιῶν τὰ μὲν φαίνεται καὶ ὑπάρχει, τὰ δὲ φαίνεται μὲν οὐχὶ δέ γε καὶ ὑπάρχει, χρήζομεν τινος κριτηρίου τοῦ παραστήσοντος τίνα ἐστὶ τὰ φαινόμενα ἅμα καὶ ὑπάρχοντα καὶ τίνα τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχοντα,¹ οὕτως ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν φαντασιῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσι καταληπτικαὶ αἱ δὲ οὐ, δεόμεθα κριτηρίου τοῦ διατάξοντος τίνες εἰσι τοιαῦται καὶ τίνες ἀκατά-

428 ληπτοὶ τε καὶ ψευδεῖς. τοῦτο οὖν τὸ κριτήριον ἦτοι καταληπτικὴ γενήσεται φαντασία ἢ οὐ καταληπτικὴ. καὶ εἰ μὲν οὐ καταληπτικὴ, ἀκολουθήσει καὶ πάντων ἀπαξιαπλῶς μὴ καταληπτικὴν φαν-

¹ καὶ τίνα . . . ὑπάρχοντα N: om. cet., Bekk.

circumstance, we cannot be quite sure whether it is in very truth such as it appears, or is of one sort and appears to be of another; and on this account no presentation exists without an obstacle.

And of course they fall into the fallacy of circular reasoning.^a For when we inquire what the apprehensive presentation is, they define it as "That which is imprinted and impressed by a real object and according to that object itself, of such a kind as would not be produced by a non-real object." Then again, since everything that is definitely explained is explained by things known, when we inquire further what the "real object" is, they turn round and say that "A real object is that which excites an apprehensive presentation." So that, in order that we may understand the apprehensive presentation, we must first have grasped the real object, while in order to do this we must have recourse to the apprehensive presentation; and thus neither of them becomes clear as each awaits confirmation from the other.—And just as—since some objects of presentation both appear and are real, while others appear but are not also real—we need a criterion that will establish for us which are both apparent and real and which are apparent but unreal, so, since some presentations too are apprehensive and some not, we require a criterion which will discriminate which are of the former kind and which are non-apprehensive and false. This criterion, then, will be a presentation that is either apprehensive or not apprehensive. And if it is not apprehensive, it will follow that the not apprehensive presentation is the criterion once for

^a Cf. § 341.

τασίαν κριτήριον εἶναι, ἧς ἔργον ἐστὶ τὸ καὶ τὴν
 καταληπτικὴν ἐξετάζειν, ὅπερ οὐ θελήσουσιν· εἰ
 δὲ καταληπτικὴ, πρῶτον μὲν εὐήθης (αὐτὴν γὰρ
 ταύτην ἐζητοῦμεν κρίνειν πότε ἐστὶ καταληπτικὴ),
 429 δευτέρον δέ, εἰ πρὸς τὸ διαγνῶναι τὰς καταληπτι-
 κάς καὶ ἀκαταλήπτους φαντασίας κριτήριον παρα-
 λαμβάνομεν τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν, δεήσει
 καὶ τὸ ὅτι ἡ κρίνουσα αὐτὰς τῶ ὄντι καταληπτικὴ
 ἐστὶ φαντασία δοκιμάζεσθαι διὰ καταληπτικῆς φαν-
 τασίας, κάκειν γὰρ πάλιν δι' ἄλλης, καὶ τοῦτο μέχρι
 ἀπείρου.
 430 Ἄλλ' ἴσως τις ἐρεῖ τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν
 καὶ τοῦ φανταστοῦ, ὅτι κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ὑπόκειται,
 καὶ ἑαυτῆς, ὅτι καταληπτικὴ ἐστὶ, κριτήριον ὑπάρ-
 χειν. ὅπερ οὐ διήνεγκε τοῦ φάναι κατὰ ἀναστροφὴν
 καὶ τὸ φανταστόν ἑαυτοῦ τε καὶ τῆς φαντασίας
 εἶναι δοκίμιον. ὡς γὰρ τῶν φαινομένων ἐν δια-
 φωνία καθεστώτων ζητεῖται τίνι κρινοῦμεν τὸ
 ὑπάρχον καὶ τὸ μὴ ὑπάρχον, οὕτω τῶν φαντασιῶν
 ἀσυμφώνων οὐσῶν σκεπτόμεθα τὸ τίνι κρινοῦμεν
 431 τὴν τε καταληπτικὴν καὶ τὴν μὴ τοιαύτην. διόπερ
 ὁμοίων ὄντων τῶν πραγμάτων, εἰ ἑαυτῆς κριτήριον
 εἶναι δύναται ἡ φαντασία καίπερ ἀσύμφωνος οὕσα,
 ἔσται καὶ τὸ φανταστόν ἐξ αὐτοῦ πιστόν, κἂν ὅτι
 432 μάλιστα διαφωνήται· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. ἡ εἴπερ τοῦτο
 παρόσον ἐστὶ διάφωνον δεῖται τοῦ κρινοῦντος αὐτό,
 δεήσει καὶ ἡ φαντασία τοῦ δοκιμάσοντος αὐτὴν
 καὶ παραστήσοντος εἰ τῶ ὄντι καταληπτικὴ ἐστίν.
 Ἄλλως τε, εἰ πάσα φαῦλου κατ' αὐτοὺς ὑπόληψις
 ἄγνοιά ἐστὶ καὶ μόνος ὁ σοφὸς ἀληθεύει καὶ ἐπι-
 στήμην ἔχει τἀληθοῦς βεβαίαν, ἀκολουθεῖ μέχρι

all of everything, its function being to examine also
 the apprehensive, a result they will not admit; and
 if it is apprehensive, in the first place it is silly to say
 so (for the object of our inquiry was to judge when
 this particular presentation is apprehensive); and 429
 secondly, if we adopt the apprehensive presentation
 as the criterion for distinguishing the apprehensive
 and non-apprehensive presentations, it will be neces-
 sary also that the fact that the presentation which
 judges them is really apprehensive should be tested
 by means of an apprehensive presentation, and this
 again by means of another, and so on *ad infinitum*.

But perhaps someone will say that the apprehensive 430
 presentation is the criterion both of the presented
 object, that it truly subsists, and of itself, that it is
 apprehensive. But this is in nowise different from the
 converse assertion that the presented object is the
 test both of itself and of the presentation. For just
 as, when apparent things are contradictory, the
 question is by what shall we judge what is real and
 what not real, so also, when presentations are not in
 accord, we inquire by what we shall judge which of
 them is apprehensive and which not so. Wherefore, 431
 as the things are similar, if the presentation, although
 not in accord, can be its own criterion, the presented
 object also, be it ever so contradictory, will be of itself
 trustworthy, which is absurd. Or if this latter, in so 432
 far as it is contradictory, requires something to judge
 it, the presentation also will require something to
 test it, and to certify whether it is really apprehensive.

Again, if every conception of the fool is, according
 to them, ignorance and only the Sage speaks the
 truth and possesses firm knowledge of the true,^a it

^a Cf. *P.H.* ii. 83.

δεῦρο ἀνευρέτου καθεστῶτος τοῦ σοφοῦ κατ' ἀνάγκην καὶ τάληθές ἀνευρέτον εἶναι, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ πάντα ἀκατάληπτα τυγχάνειν, ἐπεὶ περ φαῦλοι πάντες ὄντες οὐκ ἔχουσι βεβαίαν τῶν ὄντων κατάληψιν. 433 τούτου δὲ οὕτως ἔχοντος ἀπολείπεται τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν στωικῶν πρὸς τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως λεγόμενα παρὰ μέρος καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν σκεπτικῶν πρὸς ἐκείνους λέγεσθαι. ἐπεὶ γὰρ τοῖς φαῦλοις κατ' αὐτοὺς ἐγκαταριθμοῦνται Ζήνων τε καὶ Κλεάνθης καὶ Χρυσίππος καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς αἰρέσεως, πᾶς δὲ φαῦλος ἀγνοία κρατεῖται, πάντως ἡγνόει Ζήνων πότερον ἐν κόσμῳ περιέχεται ἢ αὐτὸς τὸν κόσμον περιέσχηκεν καὶ πότερον ἀνὴρ ἔστω ἢ γυνή, καὶ οὐκ ἡπίστατος Κλεάνθης εἴτε ἀνθρώπος ἔστω εἴτε τι θηρίον Τυφῶνος πολυπλοκώτερον. 434 καὶ μὴν ἢ ἐγίνωσκε τὸ δόγμα τοῦτο Χρυσίππος στωικὸν ὄν, φημί δὴ τὸ "πάντα ἀγνοεῖ ὁ φαῦλος," ἢ οὐδὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἡπίστατο. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἡπίστατο, ψεῦδος τὸ πάντα ἀγνοεῖν τὸν φαῦλον· αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτο φαῦλος ὢν ἐγίνωσκεν ὁ Χρυσίππος, τὸ πάντα ἀγνοεῖν τὸν φαῦλον. εἰ δ' οὐδ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἦδει τὸ ὅτι πάντα ἀγνοεῖ, πῶς περὶ πολλῶν δογματίζει, τιθεὶς τὸ ἓνα εἶναι κόσμον καὶ προνοία τοῦτον διοικεῖσθαι καὶ διόλου τρεπτήν εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ ἄλλα παμπληθῆ; 435 παρέστι δέ, εἴ τι φιλον ἐστί, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀπορίας τὸν ἀντερωτῶντα, ὡς ἔθος ἔχουσιν αὐτοῖς τοῖς σκεπτικοῖς, προσάγειν· δεδηλωμένον μέντοι τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν χαρακτηρισμοῦ οὐκ ἀνάγκη μακρηγορεῖν.

¹ αὐτοὶ Kayser: αὐτοῖς mss., Bekk. (ἀπορίας <κομίσει> . . . ἀσ ἔθος . . . οἱ σκεπτικὸι πρ. cj. Bekk.).

^a Alluding to the saying of Socrates; cf. § 264.

follows that, since up till now the Sage has proved undiscoverable, the true also is necessarily undiscoverable; and because of this, all things are non-apprehensible, seeing that we all, being fools, do not possess a firm apprehension of existent things. And 433 this being so, it is open to the Sceptics to repeat in turn against the Stoics the objections made by the Stoics against the Sceptics. For since, according to themselves, Zeno and Cleanthes and Chrysippus and the rest of their School are numbered amongst the fools, and every fool is enslaved to ignorance, Zeno certainly was ignorant whether he was contained in the universe or himself contained the universe, and whether he was a man or a woman; and Cleanthes did not know whether he was a man or a beast more full of wiles than Typhon.^a Moreover, Chrysippus either 434 knew this dogma, which is a Stoic one (I mean, that "The fool is ignorant of all things"), or he did not know even this. And if he knew it, it is false that the fool is ignorant of all things; for Chrysippus, who was a fool, perceived this very fact that the fool is ignorant of all things. But if he did not even know this very dogma that he is ignorant of all things, how does he dogmatize about many things, laying down that there is one universe, and that this is ordered by providence, and that its substance is to be wholly changed,^b and a multitude of other things? And it is possible, should anyone so desire, for the 435 opponent to bring against them all the other difficulties which they themselves are accustomed to bring forward against the Sceptics; but now that the character of the argumentation has been made clear, there is no need for a lengthy exposition.

^b i.e. resolved into Fire, the primal world-substance; see Vol. I. *Introductio*. p. xxiv.

Πρὸς δὲ τοὺς τὰς πιθανὰς ἀποδεχομένους φαν-
 τασίας σύντομος ὁ λόγος. ταυτὶ γὰρ τὰ κριτήρια,
 δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ ὡς πρὸς τὴν τοῦ βίου διεξαγωγὴν
 χρήσιμα αὐτοῖς ὑπέληπται ἢ ὡς πρὸς τὴν εὔρεσιν
 436 τῆς ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἀληθείας. καὶ εἰ μὲν τὸ πρῶτον
 λέγοιεν, ἄτοποι γενήσονται· οὐδεμία γὰρ τούτων
 τῶν φαντασιῶν δύναται κατ' ἰδίαν χρειοῦν πρὸς
 τὰς τοῦ βίου διεξαγωγὰς, ἀλλὰ χρεία ἐστὶν ἐκάστη
 καὶ τῆς τηρήσεως, καθ' ἣν ἦδε μὲν διὰ τὸδε ἐστὶ
 πιθανή, ἦδε δὲ διὰ τὸδε διεξωδευμένη καὶ ἀπερί-
 437 σπαστος. εἰ δὲ ὡς πρὸς τὴν τάληθοῦς εὔρεσιν,
 διαπεσοῦνται. οὔτε γὰρ ἡ πιθανὴ μόνον κριτήριον
 τάληθοῦς· δεῖ γάρ, ἵνα τοῦτο εὔρεθῆ, πολὺ πρότερον
 αὐτὴν περιωδευμένην (εἶναι),¹ διὰ τὸ πάντως ἡμᾶς
 ἐν τῷ διοδοῦειν ἕκαστον τῶν κατὰ τὸν τόπον²
 αὐτῆς θεωρουμένων [μὴ] εἰς ὑπόνοιαν ἀνάγεσθαι,
 μήποτε (τι)³ παραλείπεται τῶν ὀφειλόντων κατὰ
 τὸν τόπον ἐξετάζεσθαι, εἶγε περισπασμοῦ περὶ
 τὴν διάνοιαν συμβαίνοντος αἴρεται ἢ τῆς ἀληθείας
 438 γινῶσις. τὸ δὲ ὅλον μήποτε τοῖς αὐτῶν ἐλέγχους
 κρατοῦνται. ὡς γὰρ διαβάλλοντες τὴν κατα-
 ληπτικὴν φαντασίαν ἔφασκον μὴ εἶναι κριτήριον
 ταύτην τῆς ἀληθείας τῷ καὶ ἄλλας ἀπαρράλλακτους
 παρακείσθαι αὐτῇ ψευδεῖς, οὕτως οὐκ ἀπέοικε
 καὶ τοῖς διεξωδευμένοις πράγμασιν ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ
 διαθεωρεῖν τὴν πιθανὴν φαντασίαν ἄλλα τινα
 ψευδῆ παρακείσθαι, ὥστε λόγου ἕνεκεν δοκεῖν μὲν
 ἡμᾶς ἔχειν ἀρτίαν τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα, μὴ
 οὕτως δὲ ἔχειν, ἢ ὡς ἐκ συμμέτρον μὲν διαστή-

¹ <εἶναι> cj. Bekk.

² τὸν τόπον N: τρόπον cet., Bekk.

³ <τι> Kayser (μὴ τι cj. Bekk.).

^o Especially the Academics, cf. §§ 174 ff., 371, 401.

Against those who accept the "probable" presenta-
 tions^a the argument is brief. For of these criteria
 one or other of two things must be true: they are
 adopted by them as useful either for the conduct
 of life or for the discovery of the truth of existing
 things. And if the first is what they say, they will
 436 be absurd; for none of these presentations is able of
 itself to suffice for the conduct of life, but each of
 them requires also that observation which certifies
 that this one is for this reason "probable," and that
 one for that reason "scrutinized and irreversible."^b
 But if they should pronounce them useful for the dis-
 437 covery of truth, they will come to grief. For the
 probable presentation alone is not the criterion of
 truth; for it is necessary, for the discovery of truth,
 that it should be scrutinized long before, owing to
 the fact that in our scrutiny of each of the things ob-
 served in connexion with it we are certainly brought to
 suspect that possibly some one of the things that ought
 to be tested in that connexion has been overlooked,
 because, if a reversal occurs in the intellect, know-
 ledge of the truth is done away. And in general, it
 438 seems that they are defeated by their own criticisms.
 For just as, in their disparagement of the appre-
 hensive presentation, they kept saying that this is
 not the criterion of truth since other indistinguishable
 presentations lie beside it which are false, so it is not
 unlikely that, during our examination of the probable
 presentation, certain false things lie beside those
 which have been scrutinized, so that it appears (let
 us say) that we are in a fit condition of soul but we
 are not really so, or it appears that the presented

^b For these technical terms and the distinction between them cf. §§ 184 ff., P.H. i. 227 ff., Vol. I. *Introd.* p. xxxvi.

ματος δοκεῖν βλέπεσθαι τὸ φανταστόν, ἄλλως δὲ
 439 ἔχειν. πλὴν τὸ γε κεφάλαιον, εἰ μήτε πᾶσαι αἱ
 φαντασίαι εἰσὶ πισταὶ μήτε πᾶσαι ἄπιστοι, μήτε
 τινὲς μὲν πισταὶ τινὲς δὲ ἄπιστοι, οὐκ ἂν εἴη
 κριτήριον τῆς ἀληθείας ἢ φαντασία. ᾧ ἀκόλουθον
 τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι κριτήριον διὰ τὸ μήτε τὸ ὑφ' οὗ
 μήτε τὸ δι' οὗ μήτε τὸ καθ' ὃ βεβαίαν ἔχειν τὴν
 γνώσιν.

440 Ἄλλ' εἰώθασιν ἀνθυποφέροντες οἱ δογματικοὶ
 ζητεῖν πῶς ποτὲ καὶ ὁ σκεπτικὸς τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι
 κριτήριον ἀποφαίνεται. ἦτοι γὰρ ἀκρίτως τοῦτο
 λέγει ἢ μετὰ κριτηρίου· καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀκρίτως,
 ἄπιστος γενήσεται, εἰ δὲ μετὰ κριτηρίου, περι-
 τραπήσεται καὶ λέγων μηδὲν εἶναι κριτήριον ὁμο-
 λογήσει εἰς τὴν τούτου παράστασιν κριτήριον

441 παραλαμβάνειν. πάλιν τε ἡμῶν συνερωτώντων
 “ εἰ ἔστι κριτήριον, ἦτοι κέκριται ἢ ἀκριτόν ἐστι,”
 καὶ δυοῖν θάτερον συναγόντων, ἦτοι τὴν εἰς ἄπειρον
 ἔκπτωσιν ἢ τὸ ἀτόπως ἑαυτοῦ τι κριτήριον εἶναι
 λέγεσθαι, ἀντιπαρεξάγοντές φασι μὴ ἄτοπον ὑπ-

442 ἀρχειν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ τι κριτήριον ἀπολείπειν· καὶ γὰρ
 ἑαυτοῦ τὸ εὐθὺ καὶ ἄλλων ἰσότητος καὶ τῆς ἰδίας
 σταθμητικὸς ὑπῆρχεν, καὶ τὸ φῶς οὐ μόνον τῶν
 ἄλλων ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἐκκαλυπτικὸν φαίνεται,
 διόπερ καὶ τὸ κριτήριον δύναται καὶ ἄλλων καὶ

443 ἑαυτοῦ κριτήριον καθεστάναι. ῥητέον δὲ πρὸς μὲν
 τὸ πρῶτον ὅτι σκεπτικὸν ἐστὶν ἔθος τὸ τοῖς πε-
 πιστευμένοις μὴ συνηγορεῖν, ἀρκεῖσθαι δ' ἐπ'
 αὐτῶν ὡς αὐτάρκει κατασκευῇ τῇ κοινῇ προλήψει,

object is seen from a measurable distance, whereas
 the fact is otherwise. However, to sum up, if 439
 neither all presentations are trustworthy, nor all
 untrustworthy, nor some trustworthy, others untrust-
 worthy, the presentation will not be the criterion of
 truth. Whereupon it follows that no criterion exists
 because neither that of the agent, nor that of the
 means, nor that “according to which,” provides
 knowledge that is secure.

But the Dogmatists are accustomed to retort by 440
 inquiring “How ever does the Sceptic show that
 there is no criterion? For he asserts this either with-
 out judging or with the help of a criterion; but if it is
 without judging, he will not be trusted, while if it is
 with a criterion, he will be self-refuted, and while
 asserting that there is no criterion he will agree to
 adopt a criterion in order to confirm that assertion.”
 Again, when we pose the argument “If a criterion 441
 exists it is either judged or unjudged,” and draw
 one or other of two conclusions—either the regress
ad infinitum or the absurdity of the statement that a
 thing is its own criterion,—they, in hostile array,
 declare that it is not absurd to admit that a thing is
 its own criterion; for that which is straight is capable 442
 of testing both itself and other things, and the balance
 is capable of weighing both its own equality and that
 of other things, and light appears capable of revealing
 not only other things but itself as well, and conse-
 quently the criterion can stand as a criterion both
 of other things and of itself. But in reply to the 443
 first point it should be stated that it is the Sceptic
 practice not to advocate things that are believed, but
 in their case to be satisfied with the general pre-
 sumption as a sufficient ground in itself, but, on the

τοὺς δὲ ἀπίστοις εἶναι δοκοῦσι συναγορεύειν καὶ εἰς ἰσοσθένειαν αὐτῶν ἕκαστον ἀνάγειν τῇ περὶ τὰ παραδοχῆς ἡξιωμένα πίστει. τοίνυν καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος οὐκ ἀναιροῦντες τὸ κριτήριον τοὺς κατὰ τοῦτου χειρίζομεν λόγους, ἀλλὰ βουλόμενοι δεῖξαι ὅτι οὐ πάντως πιστόν ἐστι τὸ εἶναι κριτήριον, διδομένων εἰς τοῦναντίον καὶ τῶν ἴσων ἀφορμῶν.

444 εἶτα κἂν τῷ ὄντι συναναιρεῖν δοκῶμεν τὸ κριτήριον, δυνάμεθα εἰς τοῦτο οὐχ ὡς κριτηρίῳ χρῆσθαι τῇ προχειρῶ φαντασίᾳ, καθ' ἣν τοὺς προσπίπτοντας ἡμῖν πιθανοὺς λόγους τιθέντες εἰς τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι κριτήριον ἐκτιθέμεθα μὲν, οὐ μετὰ συγκαταθέσεως δὲ τοῦτο ποιούμεν διὰ τὸ καὶ τοὺς ἀντικειμένους

445 λόγους ἐπ' ἴσης εἶναι πιθανοὺς. νῆ Δία, ἀλλὰ δύναται τι καὶ ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι κριτήριον, ὡς ἐπὶ τε κανόνος καὶ ζυγοῦ ἐγίνετο. ὅπερ ἐστὶ μειρακιῶδες. τούτων μὲν γὰρ ἐκάστου ἔστι τι ὑπεραναβεβηκὸς κριτήριον, ὡς αἰσθησις καὶ νοῦς, διὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν κατασκευὴν αὐτῶν ἐρχόμεθα· τοῦ δὲ νῦν ὑπὸ τὴν ζήτησιν πεπτωκότος κριτήριον οὐδὲν θέλουσιν ὑπεράνω τυγχάνειν. τοίνυν ἀπιστόν ἐστι περὶ αὐτοῦ τι λέγον καὶ μὴ ἔχον τὸ προσμαρτυροῦν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

446 Τοσαῦτα μὲν περὶ κριτηρίου· μέτρον δὲ ἔχοντος αὐταρκές τοῦ ὑπομνήματος, ἀπὸ ἄλλης ἀρχῆς πειρασόμεθα καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ κατὰ ἀποτομὴν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς διαπορεῖν.

other hand, to advocate the things which seem to be unworthy of belief and to bring each of these into a position of equipollence with the trust accorded to those which are deemed worthy of acceptance. So then, in the present case also, we do not employ the arguments against the criterion by way of abolishing it but with the object of showing that the existence of a criterion is not altogether to be trusted, equal grounds being presented for the opposite view. In 444 the next place, even if we seem to be really helping to abolish the criterion, we are able to use the presentation ready to hand, though not as a criterion; for when we state, in accordance with it, the probable arguments for the non-existence of the criterion that occur to us, we do indeed state them, but when we do this we do not add our assent, owing to the fact that the contrary arguments are equally probable. "But in sooth," say they, "a thing can also be its 445 own criterion, as was found in the case of the rule and the balance." But this is childish. For above each of these there stands a superior criterion, such as sense and mind, because of which we proceed to the task of constructing them; but the Stoics do not allow that anything stands above the criterion which is now under discussion. So then, when it makes any statement about itself and has no evidence for its truthfulness, it is untrustworthy.

Thus much, then, concerning the criterion; and 446 as this treatise is now sufficiently long, we shall make a fresh start and endeavour to discuss separately the subject of Truth itself.

B

1 "Όσα μὲν ἀπορητικῶς εἴωθε λέγεσθαι παρὰ τοῖς σκεπτικοῖς εἰς ἀναίρεσιν τοῦ κριτηρίου τῆς ἀληθείας, διὰ τοῦ προανυσθέντος ἡμῖν ὑπομνήματος ἐπεληλύθαμεν· συναποδόντες δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν ἄνωθεν ἀπὸ τῶν φυσικῶν μέχρι τῶν νεωτέρων καταγομένην ἱστορίαν, τούτι πάσιν ὑπεσχόμεθα καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ κατ' ἰδίαν ἐρεῖν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. ὅθεν νῦν τὴν ὑπόσχεσιν πληροῦντες ἐν πρώτοις σκεπτώμεθα εἰ ἔστι τι ἀληθές.

A.—ΕΙ ΕΣΤΙ ΤΙ ΑΛΗΘΕΣ

2 "Ότι μὲν μηδενὸς ὄντος σαφοῦς κριτηρίου κατ' ἀνάγκην συναδηλεῖται καὶ τὸ ἀληθές, πάσιν ἤδη φανερόν ἐστιν· ὅμως δὲ καὶ ἐξ ἐπιμέτρου παρέσται διδάσκειν ὅτι κἂν μηδὲν ἀντικρυς πρὸς τὸ κριτήριον λέγωμεν, ἢ περὶ αὐτοῦ τἀληθοῦς διάστασις ἰκανή
3 ἐστὶν εἰς ἐποχὴν ἡμᾶς καταστήσασθαι, καὶ ὄν τρόπον μηδενὸς ὄντος ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων εὐθέως καὶ στρεβλοῦ οὐδὲ κανῶν ἔστι δοκιμαστικὸς τούτων, καὶ μηδενὸς ὄντος βαρέως καὶ κούφου σώματος συναναιρεῖται ἢ τοῦ ζυγοῦ κατασκευή, οὕτω μηδενὸς ὄντος ἀληθοῦς οἴχεται καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας κριτήριον. τὸ δ' ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἀληθές ἢ ψεῦδος

BOOK II

THE difficulties that are usually stated by the Sceptics 1 in order to abolish the criterion of truth have now been reviewed by us in the treatise already completed ; and after giving their account of the investigation from the time of the early physicists down to the later philosophers, we promised, in addition to all this, to discuss separately the subject of Truth itself. So now in fulfilling our promise let us consider first of all whether anything true exists.

I.—DOES ANYTHING TRUE EXIST ?

That, if no clear criterion exists, Truth likewise is 2 rendered non-evident is at once apparent to everyone ; none the less it will be possible for us to show also—by way of further confirmation—that, even if we assert nothing directly against the criterion, the dissension which exists about Truth itself is enough to drive us to a position of suspended judgement ; and just as, if nothing straight nor crooked exists in 3 the nature of things, neither does there exist a rule capable of testing them ; and if no heavy or light body exists, the construction of the balance likewise is abolished ; so too, if nothing true exists, the criterion of truth also disappears. And the fact that there is nothing true or false—if we are to judge by

ὅσοι ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν δογματικῶν λόγοις, μάθοιμεν ἂν
 τὴν γεγυῖαν αὐτοῖς περὶ τούτου διάστασιν προ-
 4 τάξαντες. τῶν γὰρ σκεψαμένων περὶ ἀληθοῦς
 οἱ μὲν οὐδὲν εἶναι φασιν ἀληθές οἱ δὲ εἶναι, καὶ τῶν
 εἶναι φαιμένων οἱ μὲν μόνον ἔλεξαν ἀληθῆ εἶναι τὰ
 νοητά, οἱ δὲ μόνον τὰ αἰσθητά, οἱ δὲ κοινῶς τὰ
 5 αἰσθητά τε καὶ νοητά. Ξενιάδης μὲν οὖν ὁ Κορίν-
 θιος, ὡς ἀνώτερον ὑπεδείκνυμεν, μηθὲν εἶναι φησὶν
 ἀληθές· τάχα δὲ καὶ Μόνιμος ὁ κύων, τυφὸν εἰπὼν
 τὰ πάντα, ὅπερ οἴησιν ἐστὶ τῶν οὐκ ὄντων ὡς
 6 ὄντων. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Πλάτωνα καὶ Δημόκριτον
 μόνον τὰ νοητά ὑπενόησαν ἀληθῆ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν
 Δημόκριτος διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ὑποκεῖσθαι φύσει αἰσθη-
 τόν, τῶν τὰ πάντα συγκρινουσῶν ἀτόμων πάσης
 7 αἰσθητῆς ποιότητος ἔρημον ἔχουσῶν φύσιν, ὁ δὲ
 Πλάτων διὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι μὲν αἰεὶ τὰ αἰσθητά
 μηδέποτε δὲ εἶναι, ποταμοῦ δίκην ῥεούσης τῆς
 οὐσίας, ὥστε ταῦτ' οὐ μὴ δύο τοὺς ἐλαχίστους χρό-
 νους ὑπομένειν, μηδὲ ἐπιδέχεσθαι, καθάπερ ἔλεγε
 καὶ ὁ Ἀσκληπιάδης, δύο ἐπιδείξειν διὰ τὴν ὀξύτητα
 8 τῆς ῥοῆς. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Αἰνησίδημον καθ' Ἡρά-
 κλειτον καὶ τὸν Ἐπικουρον ἐπὶ τὰ αἰσθητά κοινῶς
 κατενεχθέντες ἐν εἶδει διέστησαν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ περὶ
 τὸν Αἰνησίδημον λέγουσιν τινα τῶν φαινομένων
 διαφορὰν, καὶ φασὶν τούτων τὰ μὲν κοινῶς πᾶσι
 φαίνεσθαι τὰ δὲ ἰδίως τινί, ὧν ἀληθῆ μὲν εἶναι τὰ
 κοινῶς πᾶσι φαινόμενα ψευδῆ δὲ τὰ μὴ τοιαῦτα·
 ὅθεν καὶ ἀληθές φερωνύμως εἰρησθαι τὸ μὴ λήθον

¹ περὶ N, cj. Bekk.: om. cet., Bekk.

^a Cf. i. 53, 388.

the statements of the Dogmatists—we shall learn
 when we have first set out the controversy which
 has arisen amongst them on this subject.—Of those 4
 who have inquired concerning Truth, some say that
 there is not, others that there is, something true ;
 and of the latter, some have said that only intelligibles
 are true, others that only sensibles, and others that
 both sensibles and intelligibles alike are true. Thus 5
 Xenocrates the Corinthian,^a as we indicated above,
 declares that nothing is true ; and so also, perhaps,
 Monimus the Cynic when he said that “ All things
 are vanity ”^b (that is to say, a vain fancy that non-
 existents are existent). Plato and Democritus sup- 6
 posed that only intelligibles are true ; but whereas
 Democritus did so because nothing sensible exists
 by nature,—since the atoms which compose all things
 possess a nature which is void of every sensible
 quality,—Plato did so because sensibles are always 7
 becoming and never being, as their substance keeps
 flowing like a river, so that it does not remain the
 same for two moments together, and (as Asclepiades
 said) does not admit of being pointed out twice owing
 to the speed with which it flows. Aenesidemus 8
 “ according to Heraclitus ”^c and Epicurus both alike
 fell back on sensibles but differed as to details. For
 Aenesidemus says that there is a difference in things
 apparent, and asserts that some of them appear to all
 men in common, others to one person separately, and
 of these such as appear to all in common are true,
 and the other sort false ; whence also that which does
 not escape the common knowledge is by derivation

^b “ Vanity ” (τῦφος), or “ folly ” (empty surmise) ; liter-
 ally “ smoke.”

^c Cf. i. 349, P.H. i. 210 ff.

- 9 τὴν κοινὴν γνώμην. ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος τὰ μὲν αἰσθητὰ πάντα ἔλεγεν ἀληθῆ καὶ ὄντα. οὐ διήνεγκε γὰρ ἀληθὲς εἶναι τι λέγειν ἢ ὑπάρχον· ἔνθεν καὶ ὑπογράφων τὰληθὲς καὶ ψεῦδος “ἔστι” φησὶν “ἀληθὲς τὸ οὕτως ἔχον ὡς λέγεται ἔχειν,” καὶ “ψεῦδος ἔστι” φησὶ “τὸ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχον ὡς λέγεται ἔχειν.” τὴν τε αἰσθησὶν ἀντιληπτικὴν οὖσαν τῶν ὑποπιπτόντων αὐτῇ, καὶ μήτε ἀφαιροῦσάν τι μήτε προστιθεῖσάν μήτε μετατιθεῖσάν τῷ ἄλογον εἶναι, διὰ παντός τε ἀληθεύειν καὶ οὕτω τὸ ὄν λαμβάνειν ὡς εἶχε φύσεως αὐτὸ ἐκείνο. πάντων δὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀληθῶν ὄντων, τὰ δοξαστὰ διαφέρειν καὶ τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν εἶναι ἀληθῆ τὰ δὲ ψευδῆ, καθὼς
- 10 πρότερον ἐδείξαμεν. οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς λέγουσι μὲν τῶν τε αἰσθητῶν τινὰ καὶ τῶν νοητῶν ἀληθῆ, οὐκ ἐξ εὐθείας δὲ τὰ αἰσθητὰ, ἀλλὰ κατ’ ἀναφορὰν τὴν ὡς ἐπὶ τὰ παρακείμενα τούτοις νοητὰ. ἀληθὲς γὰρ ἔστι κατ’ αὐτοῦ τὸ ὑπάρχον καὶ ἀντικείμενόν τι, καὶ ψεῦδος τὸ μὴ ὑπάρχον καὶ [μὴ] ἀντικείμενόν τι· ὅπερ ἀσώματον ἀξίωμα καθεστῶς νοητὸν εἶναι.
- 11 Ἄλλ’ ἢ μὲν πρώτη περὶ τὰληθοῦς διαφωνία τοιαύτη τις ὑπῆρχεν· ἦν δὲ καὶ ἄλλη τις παρὰ τούτοις διάστασις, καθ’ ἣν οἱ μὲν περὶ τῷ σημαίνοντι τὸ ἀληθὲς τε καὶ ψεῦδος ὑπεστήσαντο, οἱ δὲ περὶ τῆ φωνῆ, οἱ δὲ περὶ τῆ κινήσει τῆς διανοίας. καὶ δὴ τῆς μὲν πρώτης δόξης προεστήκασιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς, τρία φάμενοι συζυγεῖν ἀλλήλοις, τό τε σημαίνονμενον καὶ τὸ σημαῖνον καὶ τὸ τυγχάνον,
- 12 ὧν σημαῖνον μὲν εἶναι τὴν φωνήν, ὡς τὴν Δίω, σημαίνονμενον δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ ὑπ’ αὐτῆς

^a i.e. ἀ-ληθές = μὴ λήθον (“not escaping notice”).

termed “true.”^a But Epicurus asserts that all 9 sensibles are true and existent.^b For there is no difference between saying that a thing is “true” and saying that it is “subsisting.” Hence too, in describing truth and falsity, he says “That is true which is in the state in which it is said to be,” and “False is that which is not in the state in which it is said to be.” And he says that sense, being perceptive of the objects presented to it and neither subtracting nor adding nor transposing ought through being irrational, constantly reports truly and grasps the existent object as it really is by nature. And whereas all the sensibles are true, the opinables differ, and some of them are true, others false, as we showed before.^c But the 10 Stoics assert that some sensibles and some intelligibles are true, the sensibles, however, not directly so but by reference to the intelligibles associated with them. For according to them the True is “that which subsists and is opposed to something,” and the False “that which is not subsistent and is opposed to something”^d; and this being an incorporeal judgement is an intelligible.

Such, then, was the first disagreement about Truth; 11 but there was also another controversy, and in this some placed truth and falsity in the thing signified, others in the sound, others in the motion of the intellect. The champions of the first opinion were the Stoics who said that “Three things are linked together, the thing signified and the thing signifying and the thing existing”; and of these the thing signifying is the sound (“Dion,” for instance); and the thing signified is the actual thing indicated thereby,

^b Cf. i. 203 ff., 368; *infra*, 363 ff.

^c Cf. i. 210.

^d For a discussion of these definitions see §§ 85, 88 ff.

- οὐκ ἀληθεῖ μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἶπειν· ἄπιστον γάρ ἐστι τὸ τοιοῦτον. εἰ δὲ ἀληθεῖ, πόθεν ὅτι ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ ἀποδεικνύον τὸ εἶναι τι ἀληθές; εἰ μὲν αὐτόθεν, 16 ἔσται καὶ αὐτόθεν αὐτὸ λέγειν μὴ εἶναι ἀληθές· εἰ δὲ ἐξ ἀποδείξεως, ζητηθήσεται πάλιν πῶς ὅτι καὶ τοῦτο ἀληθές ἐστι, καὶ οὕτως εἰς ἄπειρον. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἵνα μάθωμεν ὅτι ἔστι τι ἀληθές, δεῖ ἄπειρα προληφθῆναι, ἀδύνατον δ' ἔστιν ἄπειρα ληφθῆναι, ἀδύνατον γίνεσθαι τὸ βεβαίως γνῶναι ὅτι ἔστι τι ἀληθές.
- 17 Καὶ μὴν εἰ ἔστι τι ἀληθές, ἤτοι φαινόμενον ἐστὶν ἢ ἀδηλον ἢ κατὰ μὲν τι φαινόμενον κατὰ δὲ τι ἀδηλον. οὔτε δὲ φαινόμενον ἐστὶν, ὡς παραστήσομεν, οὔτε ἀδηλον, ὡς δείξομεν, οὔτε κατὰ μὲν τι φαινόμενον κατὰ δὲ τι ἀδηλον, ὡς παραμυθησόμεθα.
- 18 οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τι ἀληθές. εἰ γὰρ φαινόμενον ἐστὶν, ἤτοι πᾶν φαινόμενον ἀληθές ἐστὶν ἢ τι φαινόμενον ἀληθές ἐστὶν. ἀλλὰ πᾶν μὲν φαινόμενον οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθές· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ καθ' ὑπνοῦς ἢ τὸ κατὰ μανίαν προσπίπτόν ἐστὶν ἀληθές· ἐπεὶ δεήσει τῶν φαινομένων πολλὴν ἐχόντων μάχην ὁμολογεῖν τὰ μαχόμενα συνυπάρχειν καὶ ἐπ' ἴσης ἀληθῆ καθεστάναι· ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄτοπον. τοίνυν οὐ πᾶν φαινόμενον 19 ἐστὶν ἀληθές. εἰ δὲ τί μὲν ἀληθές φαινόμενον ἐστὶν τὶ δὲ ψεῦδος, ὀφείλομεν ἔχειν κριτήριον εἰς διάγνωσιν τοῦ τί ἐστὶν ἀληθές φαινόμενον καὶ τί ψεῦδος. τοῦτ' οὖν τὸ κριτήριον ἤτοι πᾶσι φαινόμενον ἐστὶν ἢ ἀδηλον. καὶ εἰ μὲν φαινόμενον ἐστὶν, ἐπεὶ οὐ πᾶν φαινόμενον ἀληθές ἐστὶ, δεήσει καὶ τοῦτο φαινόμενον καθεστῶς ἐξ ἄλλου φαινομένου δοκιμάζεσθαι, κακείνῳ ἐκ διαφέροντος, καὶ οὕτως εἰς ἄπειρον

true, for such a proof is not to be trusted. And if it is by a true proof, whence comes it that the proof which proves that something is true is itself true? If it is true of itself, it will be possible also to state as true of itself that truth does not exist; while if it is derived from 16 proof, the question will again be asked "How is it that this proof is true?" and so on *ad infinitum*. Since, then, in order to learn that there is something true, an infinite series must first be grasped, and it is not possible for an infinite series to be grasped, it is not possible to know for a surety that something true exists.

Moreover, if anything true exists it is either 17 apparent or non-evident or partly apparent and partly non-evident.^a But it is neither apparent, as we shall establish, nor non-evident, as we shall prove, nor partly apparent and partly non-evident, as we shall demonstrate; therefore, there does not exist anything true. For if it is apparent, either every- 18 thing apparent is true or something apparent is true. But everything apparent is not true (for what is experienced in sleep or in madness is not true); since otherwise, as things apparent are frequently conflicting, we should have to allow that conflicting things are alike real and are equally true, which is absurd. So, then, not every apparent thing is true. And if something apparent is true and something 19 false, we ought to have a criterion for discerning which apparent thing is true and which false. This criterion, then, is either apparent to all or non-evident. But if it is apparent, since not every apparent thing is true, this too, being an apparent thing, will need to be tested by another apparent thing, and that again by a different one, and so we go on *ad infinitum*. And if 20

^a With §§ 17-31 cf. *P.H.* ii. 88-93.

20 ἐκπίπτομεν. εἰ δὲ ἄδηλον, οὐκ ἔσται μόνα τὰ φαινόμενα ἀληθῆ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἄδηλα. εἰ γὰρ τὸ εἰς τὴν τοῦ φαινομένου πίστιν παραλαμβανόμενον ἄδηλον λαμβάνομεν, τί ἄδηλον ὀφείλει ἀληθές εἶναι·
 21 οὐ γὰρ δὴ γε ψεύδει κρίνεται τὰληθές. εἰ δὲ ἐστὶ τι ἄδηλον ἀληθές, οὐ μόνον τὸ φαινόμενόν ἐστιν ἀληθές, ὡς ἀρχῆθεν ὑπέκειτο. εἶτα πόθεν ὅτι καὶ τὸ ἄδηλον τοῦτο ἀληθές ἐστιν; εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτόθεν, ἔσται καὶ πάντα τὰ ἄδηλα τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτόθεν ἀληθῆ. εἰ δ' ὡς ἀποδειχθέν, πάντως ἢ ἐξ ἀδήλου ἢ ἐκ φαινομένου ἀποδειχθέν ἔσται ἀληθές. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐξ ἀδήλου, ἐκείνο πάλιν ἐξ ἄλλου τινός δεῖσει κεκρίσθαι, καὶ τὸ τρίτον ἐκ τετάρτου, καὶ οὕτως εἰς
 22 ἄπειρον· εἰ δὲ ἐκ φαινομένου, εἰς τὸν δι' ἀλλήλων ἐκπεσούμεθα τρόπον, τὸ μὲν φαινόμενον ἐξ ἀδήλου πιστούμενοι, τὸ δὲ ἄδηλον ἀναστρόφως πάλιν ἐκ
 23 τοῦ φαινομένου βεβαιούμεντες. ἀλλ' εἰ μήτε πᾶν φαινόμενόν ἐστιν ἀληθές μήτε τι φαινόμενον, οὐδὲν φαινόμενόν ἐστιν ἀληθές. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ [τὸ]¹
 24 ἄδηλον. πάλιν γὰρ εἰ ἄδηλόν ἐστι τὰληθές, ἦτοι πᾶν ἄδηλόν ἐστιν ἀληθές ἢ οὐ πᾶν· οὔτε δὲ πᾶν ἄδηλόν ἐστιν ἀληθές οὔτε τι ἄδηλον, ὡς παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ ἄδηλόν ἐστι τὰληθές.² εἰ γὰρ πᾶν ἄδηλον ἐστιν ἀληθές, πρῶτον μὲν ἐχρήν μὴ στασιάζειν τοὺς δογματικούς, οἷον τοὺς μὲν ἐν εἶναι λέγοντας στοιχείων τοὺς δὲ δύο καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀριθμητὰ τοὺς δὲ ἄπειρα, οὐδὲ τὰς ἀλλήλων ψευδο-

¹ [τὸ] om. MSS.² τὰληθές Kochalsky: τι ἀληθές MSS., Bekk.

it be non-evident, it is not the apparent things alone that will be true but the non-evident things as well. For if we accept the non-evident thing which is adopted for confirming the apparent thing, something non-evident must be true; for assuredly the true is not judged by the false. But if something non-
 21 evident is true, not the apparent only is true, as was originally assumed. Further, how comes it that this non-evident thing is true? For if it is so of itself, then all things which are non-evident will be true of themselves. But if it is so because of proof, it will certainly be either by means of a non-evident or by means of an apparent proof that it is proved to be true. And if it is by means of a non-evident proof, that in turn will need to be judged by means of some other proof, and the third by a fourth, and so on
ad infinitum. But if it is by means of an apparent
 22 proof, we shall be wrecked on the fallacy of circular reasoning, when we confirm the apparent by the non-evident, and again conversely establish the non-evident by means of the apparent. But if
 23 neither every apparent thing is true nor something apparent, then nothing apparent is true.—Nor, indeed, is (the true) non-evident. For, again, if
 24 the true is non-evident, either everything non-evident is true, or not everything; but neither is everything non-evident true nor something non-evident, as we shall establish; therefore the true is not non-evident. For if everything non-evident is true, then, in the first place, the Dogmatists ought not to have quarrelled—some of them, for example, saying that there is one element, others two, some a definite number, others an infinite number,—nor ought they to have given the lie to one another's

25 ποιεῖν δόξας. παντός τε ἀδήλου ἀληθοῦς ὄντος
 ἔσται τὰ μαχόμενα ἀληθῆ, καθάπερ τὸ ἀρτίους
 εἶναι τοὺς ἀστέρας καὶ τὸ περισσοῦς· ἐπ' ἴσης γάρ
 ἔστιν ἄδηλα, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἀδηλά ἐστιν ἀληθῆ.
 οὐχὶ δέ γε τὰ μαχόμενα δύναται εἶναι ἀληθῆ· οὐκ
 26 ἄρα πάντα τὰ ἀδηλά ἐστιν ἀληθῆ. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ
 τινὰ τῶν ἀδηλῶν ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ. τὸ γὰρ τουτὶ μὲν
 τὸ ἀδηλον ἀληθές εἶναι τουτὶ δὲ ψεῦδος ἦτοι αὐτό-
 θεν λέγεται καὶ χωρὶς κριτηρίου ἢ σὺν κριτηρίῳ.
 καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐξ ἑτοίμου λέγεται, οὐδὲν ἔξομεν λέγειν
 27 πρὸς τὸν τοῦναντίον ἀληθές ἀποφαινόμενον. εἰ δὲ
 σὺν κριτηρίῳ, πάντως τοῦτο τὸ κριτήριον ἢ φαινό-
 μενόν ἐστιν ἢ ἀδηλον. καὶ εἰ μὲν φαινόμενόν ἐστι,
 ψεῦδος ἔσται τὸ ἀρχῆθεν ὑποκείμενον, τὸ μόνον
 28 ἀληθές εἶναι τὸ ἀδηλον. εἶτα καὶ τὸ ὧ κρίνομεν τὸ
 φαινόμενον, πόθεν ὅτι ἀληθές ἐστιν; εἰ μὲν αὐτό-
 θεν, καὶ τὸ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθές αὐτόθεν λεγόμενον
 ἔσται πιστόν· εἰ δὲ ἐκ φαινομένου, κάκεινο τὸ
 φαινόμενον ἐξ ἄλλου ληφθήσεται φαινομένου, καὶ
 29 μέχρῃς ἀπείρου· εἰ δὲ ἐξ ἀδήλου, ὁ δι' ἀλλήλων
 συστήσεται τρόπος, μήτε τὸ φαινόμενον δυναμένων
 ἡμῶν ἔχειν πιστὸν δίχα τοῦ ἀδήλου μήτε τὸ ἀδηλον
 βέβαιον χωρὶς τοῦ φαινομένου. τοῖνυν οὐδὲ τὸ
 ἀδηλον δύναται εἶναι ἀληθές.
 30 Λεῖπεται ἄρα λέγειν τὸ κατὰ μὲν τι φαινόμενον
 κατὰ δέ τι ἀδηλον ἀληθές (< ὅπερ εὐήθες >).¹ εἰ γὰρ τὸ
 φαινόμενον, καθὸ φαινόμενόν ἐστι, τοῦτο ὑποτιθέ-
 μεθα ἀληθές, ἦτοι καθὸ πᾶν φαινόμενόν ἐστιν ἀληθές

¹ < ὅπερ εὐήθες > Kochalsky: < ὅπερ ἀδύνατον > cj. Bekk.

opinions. And if everything non-evident is true, 25
 things which conflict will be true—for instance the
 statement that the stars are even in number and
 that they are odd; for they are equally non-evident,
 and all non-evident things are true. But of course
 conflicting things cannot be true; therefore not all
 non-evident things are true.—Nor, again, are some 26
 non-evident things true. For the statement that
 this non-evident thing is true and that false is made
 either of itself and without a criterion or with a
 criterion. And if it is so stated off-hand, we shall
 have no answer to make to him who declares that
 the opposite is true. But if it is stated with a 27
 criterion, certainly this criterion is either apparent or
 non-evident. And if it is apparent the original
 assumption that only the non-evident is true will be
 false. Furthermore, whence comes it that the cri- 28
 terion itself whereby we judge the apparent thing is
 true? If it is so of itself, then the (opponent's) state-
 ment that it is not true will also of itself be trust-
 worthy; and if it is so because of an apparent thing,
 then that apparent thing too will be derived from
 another apparent thing, and so on *ad infinitum*; and if 29
 it is so because of a non-evident thing, the argument
 will take the form of circular reasoning, as we are
 neither able to count the apparent thing trustworthy
 apart from the non-evident nor the non-evident
 well-founded without the apparent. So, then, the
 non-evident cannot be true either.

It remains, therefore, to say that what is partly 30
 apparent and partly non-evident is true (< but this
 is silly >). For if we assume that this apparent thing,
 in so far as it is apparent, is true, we assume it to be
 true either in so far as every apparent thing, or in so

ὑποτιθέμεθα αὐτὸ ἀληθές, ἢ καθὸ οὐ πᾶν· καὶ εἰ τὸ
 ἄδηλον, καθὸ ἄδηλόν ἐστιν, ὑπόκειται ἀληθές, ἥτοι
 καθὸ πᾶν ἄδηλον ἀληθές ἐστὶν ὑπόκειται ἀληθές,
 ἢ καθὸ οὐ πᾶν. καὶ λοιπὸν τὰς αὐτὰς ἀπορίας
 31 ἐπισυνθήσομεν. ὅθεν εἰ μήτε τὸ φαινόμενόν ἐστιν
 ἀληθές μήτε τὸ ἄδηλον μήτε τὸ κατὰ μὲν τι φαινό-
 μενον κατὰ δέ τι ἄδηλον, ἄλλο δὲ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲν
 ἐστὶν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἀληθές.
 32 Τινὲς δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ γενικωτάτου[τοῦ ὄντος,]¹
 ἐπάγουσιν ἀπορίαν. τουτί γὰρ πάντων μὲν ἐστὶν
 ἐπαναβεβηκὸς γένος, αὐτὸ δὲ οὐδενὶ ἐτέρῳ ὑπέσταλ-
 κεν. ἥτοι οὖν ἀληθές ἐστὶ τοῦτο ἢ ψεῦδος ἢ ἀληθές
 33 ἅμα καὶ ψεῦδος ἢ οὔτε ἀληθές οὔτε ψεῦδος. καὶ εἰ
 μὲν ἀληθές ἐστὶ, πάντα γενήσεται ἀληθῆ, παρόσον
 ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ εἶδη· καὶ ὃν τρόπον ἐπεὶ τὸ γένος τῶν
 ἀνθρώπων ἀνθρωπὸς ἐστὶ, καὶ οἱ ἐπ' εἶδους εἰσὶν
 ἀνθρωποι, καὶ ἐπεὶ λογικός, πάντες οἱ ἐπὶ μέρους
 εἰσὶ λογικοί, καὶ ἐπεὶ θνητός, ὡσαύτως θνητοί,
 οὕτως εἰ τὸ τῶν πάντων γένος ἐστὶν ἀληθές, ἀνάγκη
 34 καὶ πάντα τὰ ὄντα εἶναι ἀληθῆ. πάντων δὲ ὄντων
 ἀληθῶν οὐδὲν ἔσται ψεῦδος, ψεύδους δὲ μὴ ὄντος
 οὐδὲ ἀληθές τι γενήσεται, ὡς πρότερον ὑπεμνήσα-
 μεν, δεικνύντες ἑκάτερον τούτων κατὰ τὴν ὡς πρὸς
 θάτερον σύμβλησιν νοούμενον. καὶ ἄλλως, πάντων
 ὄντων ἀληθῶν θήσομεν τὰ μαχόμενα ἀληθῆ, τοῦτο
 δὲ ἐστὶν ἄτοπον. οὐ τοίουν ἀληθές ἐστὶ τὸ γενικώ-
 35 τατον. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ψεῦδος διὰ τὰς ὁμοίας
 ἀπορίας. εἰ γὰρ ψεῦδός ἐστι, πάντα ἔσται τὰ μετ-
 ἔχοντα αὐτοῦ ψευδῆ· πάντα δὲ αὐτοῦ μετέχει τὰ

¹ [τοῦ ὄντος,] secl. Heintz.

^a For this all-inclusive class, or highest category, of the Stoic logic (τὸ τι, "Something") see Vol. I. Introd. p. xxvi. With §§ 32-36 cf. *P.H.* ii. 86-87.

far as not every such thing, is true; and if the non-evident thing, in so far as it is non-evident, is assumed to be true, it is assumed to be true either in so far as every non-evident thing, or in so far as not every such thing, is true. And, for the rest, we shall continue to raise the same difficulties. Hence 31 if neither the apparent thing is true nor the non-evident, nor that which is partly apparent and partly non-evident, and besides these no other alternative exists, then of necessity nothing is true.

Some people also bring up the difficulty about the 32 *summum genus*.^a For this is a genus which stands above all others and is itself subordinate to no other. This, then, is either true or false or at once both true and false or neither true nor false. And if it is true, 33 all things will be true, inasmuch as they are particular specimens of it; and just as, because the genus of men is Man, the particulars are men, and because it is Rational, all the individuals are rational, and because it is Mortal, they likewise are mortal;—so too, if the all-inclusive genus is True, all existing things will necessarily be true also. And if all things 34 are true, nothing will be false, and if there exists nothing false neither will there be anything true, as we pointed out above ^b when we showed that each of these opposites is conceived as in correlation with the other. Besides, if all things are true we shall be affirming that conflicting things are true, and this is absurd. So then the *summum genus* is not true.— 35 Nor indeed is it false, because of the like difficulties. For if it is false, all things that partake of it will be false; but all things, both corporeal and incorporeal,

^b Cf. i. 395.

τε σώματα καὶ τὰ ἀσώματα· πάντα ἄρα γενήσεται
 ψευδῆ. τῷ δὲ πάντα εἶναι ψευδῆ αἰ ἀνάλογον
 36 ἀπορίας ἀκολουθήσουσιν. λείπεται οὖν ἀληθές
 ἅμα καὶ ψεῦδος λέγειν αὐτὸ εἶναι, ἢ οὔτε ἀληθές οὔτε
 ψεῦδος. ὁ χεῖρόν ἐστι τῶν πρότερον ὑποδεδειγ-
 μένων διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθεῖν τούτῳ τὸ πάντα τὰ ἐπὶ
 μέρους ἀληθῆ ἅμα καὶ ψευδῆ ἢ οὔτε ἀληθῆ οὔτε
 ψευδῆ γίνεσθαι· ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀτοπον. οὐ τοῦνν ἐστι
 τι ἀληθές.

37 Καὶ μὴν τὸ ἀληθές ἦτοι τῶν κατὰ διαφορὰν καὶ
 φύσει ἐστὶν ἢ τῶν πρὸς τι· οὐδὲν δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν,
 ὡς παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶ τὰληθές. κατὰ
 διαφορὰν μὲν οὖν καὶ φύσει οὐκ ἐστὶ τὰληθές
 παρόσον τὸ κατὰ διαφορὰν καὶ φύσει ὑποκειμένον
 ὡσαύτως τοὺς ὁμοίως διακειμένους κινεῖ, οἷον τὸ
 θερμὸν οὐ πρὸς ἄλλον μὲν ἐστὶ θερμὸν πρὸς ἄλλον
 δὲ ψυχρόν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς πάντας τοὺς ὡσαύτως διακει-
 38 μένους θερμὸν. τὸ δὲ ἀληθές οὐχ ὁμοίως πάντας
 κινεῖ, ἀλλὰ ταυτὸν ὡς μὲν πρὸς τόνδε ἀληθές εἶναι
 φαίνεται, ὡς δὲ πρὸς ἕτερον ψεῦδος. οὐκ ἄρα τῶν
 κατὰ διαφορὰν καὶ φύσει ὑποκειμένων ἐστὶ τὰληθές.

εἰ δὲ τῶν πρὸς τι ἐστὶν, ἐπεὶ τὰ πρὸς τι νοεῖται
 μόνον, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ ὑπάρχει, πάντως καὶ τὰληθές
 39 ἐπινοητὸν ἐστὶ μόνον, οὐχ ὑπάρξει δέ. καὶ ἄλλως,
 εἰ τῶν πρὸς τι ἐστὶ τὸ ἀληθές, ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτὸ
 ἀληθές ἅμα καὶ ψεῦδος· ὡς γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ δεξιὸν τε
 καὶ ἀριστερόν ἐστι, πρὸς τῷδε μὲν δεξιὸν πρὸς
 τῷδε δὲ ἀριστερόν, καὶ ὃν τρόπον τὸ αὐτὸ ἄνω καὶ
 κάτω λέγεται, ἄνω μὲν ὡς πρὸς τὸ ὑποκειμένον
 κάτω δὲ ὡς πρὸς τὸ ὑπερκειμένον, οὕτω ταυτὸ

partake of it; all things, therefore, will be false
 And analogous difficulties will follow on the statement
 that all things are false.—It remains, then, to say 36
 that it is at once both true and false or that it is
 neither true nor false. But this is worse than the
 alternatives already stated, because it results from
 this that all the particulars are at once both true
 and false, or neither true nor false, which is absurd.
 There does not, then, exist anything true.

Again, the true is either an absolute ^a and natural 37
 thing or a relative thing; but it is neither of these,
 as we shall establish; therefore the true does not
 exist. The true does not exist absolutely and by
 nature inasmuch as what subsists absolutely and by
 nature moves those who are in a like condition in the
 same way—the hot, for instance, is not hot to one
 man and cold to another but hot to all who are in the
 same condition. But the true does not move all alike, 38
 but the same thing in relation to this man seems
 to be true, but in relation to that other man false.
 Therefore the true does not belong to the class of
 things which subsist absolutely and by nature.—And
 if it belongs to the class of things relative, then, since
 relatives are only conceived and have no real exist-
 ence, the true also will certainly be only a concept
 and will not really exist. Besides, if the true is a 39
 relative thing, the same thing will be at once both
 true and false; for just as the same thing is both right
 and left—right relatively to this object, left relatively
 to that,—and just as the same thing is said to be both
 above and beneath—above relatively to what lies
 below it, and beneath relatively to what lies above

^a Literally, "(existing) differentially," having a distinct
 and independent existence; cf. *P.H.* i. 37; §§ 161 ff. *infra*.

τε σώματα καὶ τὰ ἀσώματα· πάντα ἄρα γενήσεται
 ψευδῆ. τῷ δὲ πάντα εἶναι ψευδῆ αἰ ἀνάλογον
 36 ἀπορίας ἀκολουθήσουσιν. λείπεται οὖν ἀληθές
 ἅμα καὶ ψεῦδος λέγειν αὐτὸ εἶναι, ἢ οὔτε ἀληθές οὔτε
 ψεῦδος. ὃ χεῖρόν ἐστι τῶν πρότερον ὑποδεδειγ-
 μένων διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθεῖν τούτῳ τὸ πάντα τὰ ἐπὶ
 μέρους ἀληθῆ ἅμα καὶ ψευδῆ ἢ οὔτε ἀληθῆ οὔτε
 ψευδῆ γίνεσθαι· ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀποπον. οὐ τοῖνυν ἐστι
 τι ἀληθές.

37 Καὶ μὴν τὸ ἀληθές ἦτοι τῶν κατὰ διαφορὰν καὶ
 φύσει ἐστὶν ἢ τῶν πρὸς τι· οὐδὲν δὲ τούτων ἐστίν,
 ὡς παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τὰληθές. κατὰ
 διαφορὰν μὲν οὖν καὶ φύσει οὐκ ἔστι τὰληθές
 παρόσον τὸ κατὰ διαφορὰν καὶ φύσει ὑποκείμενον
 ὡσαύτως τοὺς ὁμοίως διακειμένους κινεῖ, οἶον τὸ
 θερμόν οὐ πρὸς ἄλλον μὲν ἐστὶ θερμόν πρὸς ἄλλον
 δὲ ψυχρόν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς πάντας τοὺς ὡσαύτως διακει-
 38 μένους θερμόν. τὸ δὲ ἀληθές οὐχ ὁμοίως πάντας
 κινεῖ, ἀλλὰ ταῦτόν ὡς μὲν πρὸς τόνδε ἀληθές εἶναι
 φαίνεται, ὡς δὲ πρὸς ἕτερον ψεῦδος. οὐκ ἄρα τῶν
 κατὰ διαφορὰν καὶ φύσει ὑποκειμένων ἐστὶ τὰληθές.

εἰ δὲ τῶν πρὸς τι ἔστω, ἐπεὶ τὰ πρὸς τι νοεῖται
 μόνον, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ ὑπάρχει, πάντως καὶ τὰληθές
 39 ἐπινοητὸν ἔσται μόνον, οὐχ ὑπάρξει δέ. καὶ ἄλλως,
 εἰ τῶν πρὸς τι ἔστι τὸ ἀληθές, ἔσται τὸ αὐτὸ
 ἀληθές ἅμα καὶ ψεῦδος· ὡς γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ δεξιὸν τε
 καὶ ἀριστερόν ἐστι, πρὸς τῷδε μὲν δεξιὸν πρὸς
 τῷδε δὲ ἀριστερόν, καὶ ὄν τρόπον τὸ αὐτὸ ἄνω καὶ
 κάτω λέγεται, ἄνω μὲν ὡς πρὸς τὸ ὑποκείμενον
 κάτω δὲ ὡς πρὸς τὸ ὑπερκείμενον, οὕτω ταῦτό
 256

partake of it; all things, therefore, will be false
 And analogous difficulties will follow on the statement
 that all things are false.—It remains, then, to say 36
 that it is at once both true and false or that it is
 neither true nor false. But this is worse than the
 alternatives already stated, because it results from
 this that all the particulars are at once both true
 and false, or neither true nor false, which is absurd.
 There does not, then, exist anything true.

Again, the true is either an absolute ^a and natural 37
 thing or a relative thing; but it is neither of these,
 as we shall establish; therefore the true does not
 exist. The true does not exist absolutely and by
 nature inasmuch as what subsists absolutely and by
 nature moves those who are in a like condition in the
 same way—the hot, for instance, is not hot to one
 man and cold to another but hot to all who are in the
 same condition. But the true does not move all alike, 38
 but the same thing in relation to this man seems
 to be true, but in relation to that other man false.
 Therefore the true does not belong to the class of
 things which subsist absolutely and by nature.—And
 if it belongs to the class of things relative, then, since
 relatives are only conceived and have no real exist-
 ence, the true also will certainly be only a concept
 and will not really exist. Besides, if the true is a 39
 relative thing, the same thing will be at once both
 true and false; for just as the same thing is both right
 and left—right relatively to this object, left relatively
 to that,—and just as the same thing is said to be both
 above and beneath—above relatively to what lies
 below it, and beneath relatively to what lies above

^a Literally, "(existing) differentially," having a distinct
 and independent existence; cf. P.H. i. 37; §§ 161 ff. *infra*.

ἀληθὲς ἄμα καὶ ψεῦδος ἐροῦμεν. καὶ εἰ τοῦτο, οὐ
 μᾶλλον ἀληθὲς γενήσεται ἢ ψεῦδος, οὐ μὴν ἀληθὲς.
 40 Δυνάμει δὲ καὶ ὁ Αἰνησιδῆμος τὰς ὁμοιοτρόπους
 κατὰ τὸν τόπον ἀπορίας τίθησιν. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τι
 ἀληθές, ἤτοι αἰσθητόν ἐστιν ἢ νοητόν ἐστιν, ἢ καὶ
 νοητόν ἐστι καὶ αἰσθητόν ἐστιν. [ἦ] οὔτε δὲ¹ αἰσθητόν
 ἐστιν οὔτε νοητόν ἐστιν, οὔτε τὸ συναμφοτέρον, ὡς
 41 παρασταθῆσεται· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τι ἀληθές. ὅτι μὲν
 οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν αἰσθητόν, οὕτως ἐπιλογιούμεθα. τῶν
 αἰσθητῶν τὰ μὲν ἐστι γένη τὰ δὲ εἶδη, καὶ γένη
 μὲν αἰ ἐνδιήκουσαι ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος κοινότητες,
 ὡς ἄνθρωπος ὁ διὰ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀνθρώπων
 πεφοιτηκῶς καὶ ἵππος ὁ διὰ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἵππων,
 εἶδη δὲ αἰ καθ' ἕκαστον ιδιότητες, ὡς Δίωνος,
 42 Θέωνος, τῶν ἄλλων. εἴπερ οὖν αἰσθητόν ἐστι τὸ
 ἀληθές, καὶ τοῦτο πάντως κοινόν (<ὄν>² πλειόνων ἢ
 ἐν ιδιότητι κείμενον ἔσται [αἰσθητόν τὸ ἀληθές].³
 οὔτε δὲ κοινόν ἐστιν οὔτε ἐν ιδιότητι κείμενον· οὐκ
 43 ἄρα αἰσθητόν ἐστι τὸ ἀληθές. ἔτι δὲν τρόπον τὸ
 μὲν ὄρατόν ὄρασει ληπτόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἀκουστόν
 ἀκοῇ γνῶριμόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ὀσφρητόν ὀσφρήσει,
 οὕτω καὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν κοινῶς αἰσθήσει γνωρίζεται.
 οὐ γνωρίζεται δὲ κοινῶς αἰσθήσει· ἢ γὰρ αἰσθησις
 ἀλογός ἐστιν, καὶ τὸ ἀληθές οὐκ ἀλόγως γνωρί-
 44 ζεται. οὐκ ἄρα αἰσθητόν τὸ ἀληθές. καὶ μὴν
 οὐδὲ νοητόν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν ἔσται τῶν αἰσθητῶν
 ἀληθές· ὁ πάλιν ἄποπον. ἤτοι γὰρ πᾶσι κοινῶς
 ἔσται νοητόν ἢ τισὶν ιδίως. οὔτε δὲ πᾶσι κοινῶς
 45 οἶόν τε εἶναι νοητόν τὸ ἀληθές οὔτε τισὶν ιδίως· τὸ

¹ δὲ N: om. cet., Bekk.: [ἦ] secl. Kochalsky.

² <ὄν> cj. Bekk. (et <ἦτοι> ante κοινόν).

³ [αἰσθ. . . ἀληθές] secl. Kochalsky (τὸ ἀληθές secl. Bekk.).

it,—so we shall call the same thing both true and false. And if so, it will be no more^a true than false, and certainly not true.

Aenesidemus, too, virtually states difficulties of a 40 similar kind regarding this topic. If anything true exists it is either sensible or intelligible or both intelligible and sensible. But it is neither sensible nor intelligible nor both at once, as shall be established; therefore there does not exist anything true. Now 41 that it is not sensible, we shall argue in this way:—Of things sensible some are genera, some particulars, and genera are the common qualities which pervade the particulars—as Man is that which ranges through the particular men, and Horse through the particular horses,—whereas particulars are the separate individual qualities—of Dion, Theon, and the rest. If, 42 then, the true is sensible, it too will either be the common property of many or it will constitute an individual quality; but it is neither a common nor an individual property; therefore the true is not sensible.—Again, just as the visible object is per- 43 ceptible by vision, and the audible is known by hearing, and the odorable by smell, so too what is sensible is known by sense in general. But the true is not known by sense in general, for sense is irrational and the true is not known irrationally. Therefore the true is not sensible.—Nor, indeed, is it intelligible, 44 for if so none of the sensibles will be true; and this again is absurd. For either it will be intelligible to all in common or to some separately. But the true is not capable of being intelligible either to all in common or to some separately; for it is impossible 45

^a For the Sceptic formula “No more” see *P.H.* i. 188 ff.

τε γὰρ κοινῶς πᾶσι νοεῖσθαι ἀδύνατον, τό τε ἰδίως
 τινὲ ἢ τισὶν ἄπιστον καὶ μάχιμον. οὐδὲ νοητὸν ἄρα
 ἐστὶ τὸ ἀληθές. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ αἰσθητὸν ἄμα
 καὶ νοητόν. ἤτοι γὰρ πᾶν αἰσθητὸν καὶ πᾶν νοητὸν
 46 ἀληθές ἐστὶν ἢ τὶ αἰσθητὸν καὶ τὶ νοητόν. ἀλλὰ τὸ
 μὲν φάσκειν πᾶν αἰσθητὸν καὶ πᾶν νοητὸν ἀληθές
 εἶναι τῶν ἀμηχάνων· μάχεται γὰρ τὰ αἰσθητὰ τοῖς
 αἰσθητοῖς καὶ τὰ νοητὰ τοῖς νοητοῖς καὶ ἐναλλάξ
 τὰ αἰσθητὰ τοῖς νοητοῖς [καὶ τὰ νοητὰ τοῖς αἰσθη-
 τοῖς], καὶ δεήσει πάντων ἀληθῶν ὄντων τὸ αὐτὸ
 εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, ἀληθές τε ὑπάρχειν καὶ ψεῦδος.
 τί δὲ αἰσθητὸν ἀληθές καὶ τὶ νοητὸν ἀληθές ἀξιοῦν
 47 πάλιν τῶν ἀπόρων· ζητεῖται γὰρ τί τοῦτο. καὶ
 ἄλλως ἀκόλουθόν ἐστὶν ἢ πάντα λέγειν ἀληθῆ ἢ
 πάντα λέγειν ψευδῆ τὰ αἰσθητὰ· ἐπ' ἴσης γὰρ ἐστὶν
 αἰσθητὰ, καὶ οὐ τὸ μὲν μᾶλλον τὸ δὲ ἥττον, καὶ
 τὰ νοητὰ πάλιν ἐπ' ἴσης ἐστὶ νοητὰ, καὶ οὐ τὸ μὲν
 μᾶλλον τὸ δὲ ἕλαττον. οὐ πάντα δὲ τὰ αἰσθητὰ
 λέγεται ἀληθῆ, οὐδὲ πάντα ψευδῆ· οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶ
 τι ἀληθές.
 48 Ναί, ἀλλ' οὐ καθὸ φαίνεται ἢ ἀλήθεια, κατ'
 ἄλλην δὲ αἰτίαν λαμβάνεται. τίς οὖν ἐστὶν αὕτη
 ἢ αἰτία; θέτωσαν εἰς τὸ μέσον οἱ δογματικοί, ἵνα
 ἢ εἰς συγκατάθεσιν ἡμᾶς ἐπισπάσῃται ἢ εἰς φυγὴν
 49 ἀποτρέψῃται. εἶτα ταύτην αὐτὴν τὴν αἰτίαν πῶς
 λαμβάνουσιν; ὡς φαινομένην αὐτοῖς ἢ ὡς μὴ
 φαινομένην; εἰ μὲν ὡς φαινομένην, ψεύδονται
 λέγοντες τὴν ἀλήθειαν μὴ ὑπάρχειν καθὸ φαίνεται·
 εἰ δ' ὡς μὴ φαινομένην, πῶς τὸ μὴ φαινόμενον
 50 αὐτοῖς εἰλήφασιν; ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἢ δι' ἄλλου; καὶ ἐξ
 αὐτοῦ μὲν ἀδύνατον· οὐδὲν γὰρ μὴ φαινόμενον ἐξ

for it to be thought by all in common, and it becomes
 untrustworthy and debatable if thought by one or
 more persons separately. Therefore the true is not
 intelligible either.—Nor yet is it at once both sensible
 and intelligible. For either everything sensible and
 everything intelligible is true or something sensible
 and something intelligible. But to assert that every- 46
 thing sensible and everything intelligible is true is
 a thing impracticable; for sensibles conflict with
 sensibles and intelligibles with intelligibles, and con-
 versely sensibles with intelligibles; and, if all things
 are true, it will necessarily follow that the same thing
 both is and is not existent, and that it is both true and
 false. Nor again is it feasible to hold that something
 sensible is true and something intelligible true; for 47
 this is the point at issue. And besides it is logically
 consistent either to say that all sensibles are true or to
 say that all are false; for sensibles are on an equality,
 not one more and one less sensible, and intelligibles
 again are equally intelligible and not one more and
 one less intelligible. But not all sensibles are termed
 true, nor all false; therefore there is not anything true.

“Yes, but the truth is perceived not in so far as it 48
 appears but owing to another cause.” What, then,
 is this cause? Let the Dogmatists state it openly
 so that it may either attract us to assent or repel us
 to avoidance. Further, how do they perceive this 49
 cause itself? As appearing to them or as not appear-
 ing? If as appearing, they lie when they say that
 truth does not exist in so far as it appears; but if as
 not appearing, how have they perceived what is not
 appearing to them? Through itself or by means of
 another? To perceive it through itself is impossible, 50
 for nothing which does not appear is perceptible

αὐτοῦ ληπτὸν ἔστιν· εἰ δὲ δι' ἄλλου, ἐκείνο πάλιν πότερον φαινόμενόν ἐστιν ἢ μὴ φαινόμενον; καὶ οὕτως εἰς ἄπειρον οἰχομένης τῆς ζητήσεως ἀνεύρετον γίνεται τὸ ἀληθές.

- 51 Τί οὖν; τὸ πείθον ἡμᾶς, τὸ πιθανὸν ῥητέον ἀληθές, ὅποιαν ποτὲ ἂν ἔχη οὐσίαν, εἴτε αἰσθητὴν εἴτε νοητὴν εἴτε τὸ συναμφοτέρου, αἰσθητὴν ἅμα
- 52 καὶ νοητὴν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο τῶν ἀπόρων. εἰ γὰρ τὸ πιθανὸν ἀληθές ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ πάντας πείθει οὐδὲ διὰ παντός τοὺς αὐτούς, δώσομεν τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὑπάρχειν καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀληθές ἅμα εἶναι καὶ ψεῦδος· ἢ μὲν γὰρ πείθει τινάς, ἀληθές ἐστὶ καὶ ὑπάρχον, ἢ δὲ ἑτέρους οὐ πείθει, ψεῦδος καὶ ἀνυπαρκτόν. ἀδύνατον δὲ γε τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, ἀληθές τε ὑπάρχειν καὶ
- 53 ψεῦδος· τοίνυν οὐδὲ τὸ πιθανόν ἐστὶν ἀληθές. ἐκτός ἐστι μὴ τι τὸ πολλοὺς πείθον, τοῦτ' ἐροῦμεν ἀληθές· τὸ γοῦν μέλι πολλοὺς μὲν πείθον ὑγιαίνοντας ὡς γλυκύ, καὶ ἕνα μὴ πείθον ἰκτερικόν, ἀληθῶς λέγομεν γλυκύ. ὅπερ ἦν ληρώδες. ὅταν γὰρ περὶ ἀληθείας σκεπτώμεθα, τότε οὐκ εἰς τὸ πλῆθος τῶν συμφωνούντων δεῖ ἀποβλέπειν ἀλλ' εἰς τὰς διαθέσεις. μιᾷ δὲ διαθέσει κέχρηται ὁ νοσῶν καὶ μιᾷ
- 54 κατασκευῇ πάντες οἱ ὑγιαίνοντες. οὐ μᾶλλον οὖν τῆδε τῇ διαθέσει ἢ τῆδε πιστευτέον ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ ἀναστροφῶς ὑποτεθέντος τοῦ πολλοὺς μὲν πικράζεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ μέλιτος οἶον πυρέσσοντας, ἕνα δὲ γλυκάζεσθαι τὸν ὑγιαίνοντα, πάντως ἀκολουθήσει μικρὸν λέγειν τὸ μέλι· ὅπερ ἀτοπον. τοίνυν ὡς

* For this Academic term cf. i. 174 ff.

^b Cf. P.H. i. 101.

• Cf. i. 333; P.H. ii. 44.

through itself; while if it is by means of another, is this in turn appearing or not appearing? And as the inquisition thus proceeds *ad infinitum*, the true becomes undiscoverable.

What then? Is that which persuades us, "the probable,"^a to be termed "true" whatever be the nature it possesses, whether sensible or intelligible or a combination of both sensible and intelligible at once? But neither is this feasible. For if the probable is 52 true, then because the same thing does not convince all men nor the same men always, we shall be granting that the same thing both does and does not exist, and that the same thing is at once both true and false; for in so far as it convinces some it will be true and existent, but in so far as it does not convince others it will be false and non-existent. But it is impossible that the same thing should both exist and not exist, and be both true and false; so, then, the 53 probable is not true either. That is, unless we shall declare that what convinces many is true; thus, honey,^b which convinces many healthy people of its sweetness but does not convince one man who suffers from jaundice, we truly describe as sweet. But this is nonsensical. For when we are investigating truth we ought not to pay regard to the numbers of those who are in agreement but to their conditions. And the diseased person is in one condition, and all the healthy persons in one bodily state.^c One ought not, 54 then, to trust the one condition more than the other, since if we assume, conversely, that many get a bitter taste from the honey (feverish people, for instance), while one man who is healthy gets a sweet taste, it will certainly follow that we must call the honey bitter, which is absurd. As, then, in this case we set

ἐνθάδε παρέντες τὴν κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος μαρτυρίαν οὐδὲν ἤσσαν γλυκὺ φάμεν τὸ μέλι, οὕτω καὶ ὅταν πολλοὶ γλυκάζωνται εἰς δὲ πικράζηται, παρέντες τὸ διὰ πλῆθος τῶν οὕτω πασχόντων γλυκὺ καλεῖν τὸ μέλι, ἄλλως τάληθές ἐξετάζωμεν.

55 Αἱ μὲν καθόλου ἀπορίαι περὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς τοιαῦται τινές εἰσιν· ἀκολουθῶν δὲ ἔλθωμεν καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς κατὰ μέρος. καὶ δὴ τοὺς μὲν πάντα λέγοντας ψευδῆ ἐδείξαμεν πρόσθεν περιτρεπομένους. εἰ γὰρ πάντ' ἐστὶ ψευδῆ, ψεύδος ἔσται καὶ τὸ "πάντ' ἐστὶ ψευδῆ," ἐκ πάντων ὑπάρχον. ψεύδους δὲ ὄντος τοῦ "πάντ' ἐστὶ ψευδῆ," τὸ ἀντικείμενον αὐτῷ ἀληθές ἔσται, τὸ "οὐ πάντ' ἐστὶ ψευδῆ." εἰ ἄρα 56 πάντ' ἐστὶ ψευδῆ, οὐ πάντ' ἐστὶ ψευδῆ. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Δημόκριτον καὶ Πλάτωνα ἀθετοῦντες μὲν τὰς αἰσθήσεις, ἀναιροῦντες δὲ τὰ αἰσθητά, μόνους δ' ἐπόμενοι τοῖς νοητοῖς, συγχέουσι τὰ πράγματα, καὶ οὐ μόνον τὴν τῶν ὄντων ἀλήθειαν σαλεύουσιν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν αὐτῶν. πᾶσα γὰρ νόησις ἀπὸ αἰσθήσεως γίνεται ἢ οὐ χωρὶς αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ἢ 57 ἀπὸ περιπτώσεως ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ περιπτώσεως. ὅθεν οὐδὲ τὰς λεγομένας ψευδεῖς φαντασίας, οἷον τὰς καθ' ὕπνου ἢ τὰς κατὰ μανίαν, εὐρήσομεν ἀπηρητημένας τῶν διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως κατὰ περίπτωσιν ἡμῖν ἐγνωσμένων. καὶ γὰρ ὁ κατὰ μανίαν Ἐρινύας αὐτῷ ἀναπλάσσαν.

τὰς αἱματώδεις καὶ δρακοντώδεις κόρας

ἐκ τῶν πεφνησῶν αὐτῷ σύνθετον μορφήν νοεῖ· ὡσαύτως δὲ ὁ πτηνὸν ἄνθρωπον καθ' ὕπνου

aside the evidence of the multitude and none the less declare honey to be sweet, so also when many taste it sweet and one tastes it bitter, let us give up calling honey sweet because of the numbers of those who experience it as such, and let us investigate the truth in another way.

Of some such kind are the general difficulties 55 raised about "the true": let us pass on next to the particular difficulties. Now as to those who assert that all things are false, we proved above ^a that they are confuted. For if all things are false, the statement "All things are false," being one of the "all things," will be false. And if the statement "All things are false" is false, its contradictory, "Not all things are false," will be true. Therefore, if all things are false, not all things are false. And Democritus and 56 Plato,^b by rejecting the senses and abolishing sensibles and following intelligibles only, throw things into confusion and shake to pieces not only the truth of existing things but even the conception of them. For every thought occurs either owing to sensation or not apart from sensation, and either owing to experience or not without experience. Hence we shall find that not even the so-called false 57 presentations—such as those in dreams or madness—are detached from things known to us by experience through sense. And in fact when the hero in his madness imagines as his Furies

Maids shaped like dragons and all blood-besprent,^c he is conceiving a shape compounded of things that have appeared to his senses. And in the same way he who in his sleep dreams of a winged man does not

^a Cf. i. 390, 398.

^b Cf. §§ 6 ff.

^c Eurip. *Orest.* 256.

58 *ὄνειροπολούμενος οὐ δίχα τοῦ πτηνόν τι ἑωρακέναι
καὶ ἄνθρωπον ὄνειροπολεῖται. καὶ καθόλου οὐδὲν
ἔστιν εὐρεῖν κατ' ἐπινοίαν ὃ μὴ ἔχει τις αὐτῷ κατὰ
περίπτωσιν ἐγνωσμένον. τοῦτο γὰρ ἢ κατὰ ὁμοιό-
τητα τῶν ἐν περιπτώσει πεφηνότων ληφθήσεται ἢ
κατὰ παραύξησιν ἢ κατὰ μείωσιν ἢ κατ' ἐπισύν-
59 θεσιν. καθ' ὁμοιότητα μὲν οὖν οἶον ὅταν ἀπὸ τῆς
θεωρηθείσης Σωκράτους εἰκόνας τὸν μὴ ἑωραμένον
Σωκράτην ἐπινοῶμεν, κατὰ παραύξησιν δὲ ὅταν
ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀνθρώπου κινούμενοι νοῶμεν οἶον
ὅς οὐκ ἐώκει*

*ἀνδρὶ γε σιτοφάγῳ ἀλλὰ ρίψι ὑλήεντι
ὑψηλῶν ὄρέων,*

60 *κατὰ μείωσιν δὲ ἐπειδὴν συνελόντες πάλιν τὸ
μέγεθος τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀνθρώπου νόησιν λαμβάνωμεν
πυγμαίου, κατ' ἐπισύνθεσιν δὲ ὅταν ἀπὸ ἀνθρώπου
καὶ ἵππου τὸν μηδέποτε ὑποπεπτωκότα ἡμῖν
Ἴπποκένταυρον νοῶμεν. πάσης οὖν ἐπινοίας προ-
ηγείσθαι δεῖ τὴν διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως περίπτωσιν, καὶ
διὰ τοῦτ' ἀναιρουμένα τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης
61 συναναίρεται πᾶσα νόησις. ὃ τε λέγων πάντ'
εἶναι τὰ φαινόμενα ψευδῆ καὶ ἐτεῆ μόνα ὑπάρχειν
τὰ νοητά, τοῦτ' ἔστι κατ' ἀλήθειαν, ἥτοι φάσει
μόνον χρώμενος τοῦτ' ἐρεῖ ἢ καὶ ἀποδεικνύς. ἀλλὰ
φάσει μὲν λέγων φάσει ἐπισχεθήσεται, ἀπόδειξιν
62 δὲ παραλαμβάνειν πειρώμενος περιτραπήσεται. ἢ
γὰρ φαινομένῳ τινὶ διδάξει τὸ ἐτεῆ μόνα εἶναι τὰ
νοητά ἢ ἀδήλω. οὔτε δὲ φαινομένῳ τοῦτο διδάξει,*

* Homer, *Od.* ix. 191, describing the Cyclops.

dream so without having seen some winged thing and a man. And in general it is impossible to find in 58 conception anything which one does not possess as known by experience. For such a thing will be grasped either by way of resemblance to things which have been presented in experience, or by way of enlargement thereof, or of diminution, or of composition. Thus, by way of resemblance, as when because of the 59 likeness of Socrates which has been seen we conceive Socrates who has not been seen; and by way of enlargement, when starting from the common man we move on to a conception of one of such a kind that he was

*Less like a corn-eating man than a forest-clad peak of the
mountains
Towering high;**

and by way of diminution. when, on the contrary, we 61 decrease the size of the common man and grasp a conception of the pygmy; and by way of composition, when from man and horse we derive the conception of a thing we have never perceived—the Hippocentaur. Every conception, then, must be preceded by experience through sense, and on this account if 62 sensibles are abolished all conceptual thought is necessarily abolished at the same time.—Further, he 61 who declares that all apparent things are false and that only intelligibles exist “in sooth”—that is, in truth—will, in saying so, either use mere assertion or will prove it. But if he is stating it by assertion he will be checked by assertion, and if he tries to adduce proof he will be overthrown. For he will show that 62 only intelligibles exist “in sooth” by means of either an apparent thing or a non-evident. But he will show this neither by an apparent thing, for such

οὐ γὰρ ὑπάρχει, οὔτε ἀδήλω, ἐκ φαινομένου γὰρ ὀφείλει προπεπιστώσθαι τὸ ἀδηλον. οὐ τοίνυν ὑγιής ἐστιν ἡ στάσις τῶν περὶ Δημόκριτόν τε καὶ Πλάτωνα.

63 Ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος ἔλεγε μὲν πάντα τὰ αἰσθητὰ εἶναι ἀληθῆ, καὶ πᾶσαν φαντασίαν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος εἶναι, καὶ τοιαύτην ὁποῖόν ἐστι τὸ κινεῖν τὴν αἴσθησιν, πλανᾶσθαι δὲ τοὺς τινὰς μὲν τῶν φαντασιῶν λέγοντας ἀληθεῖς τινὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς παρὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι χωρίζειν δόξαν ἀπὸ ἐναργείας. ἐπὶ γούν τοῦ Ὁρέστου, ὅτε ἐδόκει βλέπειν τὰς Ἐρινύας, ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις ὑπ' εἰδώλων κινουμένη ἀληθῆς ἦν (ὑπέκειτο γὰρ τὰ εἶδωλα), ὁ δὲ νοῦς οἰόμενος ὅτι
64 στερεμνιοὶ εἶσιν Ἐρινύες ἐψευδοδόξει. καὶ ἄλλως, φησὶν, οἱ προειρημένοι τῶν φαντασιῶν διαφορὰν εἰσάγοντες οὐκ ἰσχύουσι πιστώσασθαι τὸ τινὰς μὲν αὐτῶν ἀληθεῖς ὑπάρχειν τινὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς· οὔτε γὰρ φαινομένῳ διδάξουσι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ζητεῖται γὰρ τὰ φαινόμενα, οὔτε ἀδήλω, διὰ φαινομένου γὰρ ὀφείλει
65 τὸ ἀδηλον ἀποδείκνυσθαι. τοιαῦτα δὴ λέγων ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἄκων εἰς τὴν ὁμοίαν ἐκπέπτωκεν ἀπορίαν. εἰ γὰρ ὁμολογεῖ τῶν φαντασιῶν τὰς μὲν ἀπὸ στερεμνίων γίνεσθαι σωμάτων τὰς δὲ ἀπὸ εἰδώλων, καὶ δίδωσι τὸ μὲν τι εἶναι ἐνάργειαν τὸ δὲ δόξαν, ζητῶ πῶς κρίνει τὰς ἀπὸ στερεμνίου σώματος φαντασίας καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ εἰδώλου προσπιπτούσας; οὔτε γὰρ ἐνάργεια, ζητεῖται γὰρ, οὔτε δόξη, δι' ἐναργείας γὰρ ὀφείλει πεπιστώσθαι.
66 ἄλλως τε καὶ ἄτοπός ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν μᾶλλον ζητούμενων τὰ ἥττον ζητούμενα δεικνύναι πειρώμενος·

* *i.e.* according to his own original assumption.

^b Cf. Eurip. *Orest.* 255.

does not exist,^a nor by a non-evident, for the non-evident must be confirmed beforehand by an apparent. So, then, the view of Democritus and Plato is not logically sound.

Epicurus asserted that "All sensibles are true and every presentation is of a real object and is of the same kind as is the object which excites the sensation, and those who say that some presentations are true, others false, are led astray owing to their inability to separate opinion from clear evidence. Thus in the case of Orestes, when he fancied he saw the Furies,^b his sense excited by images^c was true (for the images really existed), but his mind, in thinking that the Furies were solid, formed a false opinion. And
64 besides," he says, "the persons mentioned above, when introducing a difference in the presentations, are not capable of confirming the view that some of them are true, others false. For neither by means of an apparent thing will they prove such a statement, since it is apparent things that are in question, nor yet by a non-evident, since the non-evident must needs be proved by means of an apparent." In
65 saying this Epicurus has unwittingly fallen into a similar difficulty. For if he allows that some presentations come from solid bodies and others from images, and grants that clear evidence is one thing, opinion another, how, I ask, does he distinguish the presentations which occur from a solid body and those from an image? For he can do so neither by evidence, this being in question, nor by opinion, for this must be confirmed by means of evidence. Besides, it is absurd of him to try to prove the less
66 questionable things by the more questionable. For

* Cf. i. 209 n.; Vol. I. *Introductio*. p. xxiii; Lucret. iv. 34 ff.

ἡμῶν γὰρ σκεπτομένων περὶ τῆς τῶν φαινομένων πίστεως, αὐτὸς τὴν περὶ τῶν εἰδώλων τερατολογουμένην καὶ μυθώδη δόξαν ἐπεισάγει.

67 Καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῖς στωικοῖς εὐδοεῖ ὁ λόγος· θέλουσι μὲν γὰρ τῶν τε αἰσθητῶν καὶ νοητῶν εἶναι διαφορὰν, καθ' ἣν τὰ μὲν ἔστιν ἀληθῆ τὰ δὲ ψευδῆ, οὐκ ἰσχύουσι δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον συνάγειν. διακένους γὰρ εἶναι τινὰς φαντασίας ὠμολογήκασιν, ὅποια προσέπιπτον τῷ Ἐρινύων, καὶ ἄλλας παρατυπωτικὰς τὰς ἀπὸ ὑποκειμένων μὲν, οὐ κατ' αὐτὰ δὲ τὰ ὑποκείμενα, ὅποια ἦν ἡ κατὰ μανίαν τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων παιδῶν ὡς Εὐρυσθέως ὑποπεσοῦσα. ἀπὸ ὑποκειμένων γὰρ ἐγένετο τῶν παιδῶν, οὐ κατ' αὐτὰ δὲ τὰ ὑποκείμενα· οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἰδίου ἐβλεπε παῖδας, ἀλλὰ φησὶν

εἰς μὲν νεοσσὸς ὄδε θανῶν Εὐρυσθέως
ἔχθραν πατρῶων ἐκτίνων πέπτωκέ μοι.

68 τοῦτου δὲ οὕτως ἔχοντος ἀδιάκριτοι γίνονται αἱ φαντασίαι, καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσι λέγειν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς τίνες τε ταῖς ἀληθείαις καταληπτικαὶ εἴσι καὶ ἀπὸ ὑποκειμένων καὶ κατ' αὐτὰ τὰ ὑποκείμενα γίνονται, καὶ τίνες οὐκ εἴσι τοιαῦται, καθάπερ διὰ πλείονων ἔμπροσθεν ἐδείξαμεν.

69 Οἷος δὲ ἔστιν ὁ περὶ ταύτης τῆς στάσεως λόγος, τοιοῦτος γένοιτ' ἂν ἡμῶν καὶ ὁ περὶ τῆς λειπομένης, καθ' ἣν οἱ μὲν ἐν τῷ σηματομένῳ, τουτέστιν ἀσωμάτῳ λεκτῷ, τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος ὑπο-

^a Cf. i. 209 n.; Vol. I. *Intro.* p. xxiii; *Lucret.* iv. 34 ff.

^b Cf. i. 241. ^c *Eurip. Herc. Fur.* 982; cf. i. 405 ff.

^d Cf. i. 402 ff.

^e For *lekton*, "meaning" or "expression," cf. *P.H.* ii. 81.

when we are inquiring about the trustworthiness of things apparent, he introduces that marvellous and mythical doctrine of his about the images.^a

Nor, indeed, is the Stoic theory free from difficulty. 67 For while they urge that a difference exists in both sensibles and intelligibles, by which some of them are true, others false, they are unable to deduce this by logic. For they have allowed that some presentations are "vacuous"—such as those which Orestes received from the Furies,^b—and that others are "distorted," being derived from real objects but not in conformity with those objects themselves,—as was that which came to Heracles in his madness from his own children as though from those of Eurystheus; for it came from the children who really existed, but not in conformity with the actual real objects; for he did not see the children as his own, but declares^c—

This nestling of Eurystheus slain by me
Pays for his father's enmity by death.

And this being so, the presentations are indistinguish- 68 able and the Stoics are unable to say which are in truth apprehensive and are derived from real objects and in conformity with those objects themselves, and which are not of this kind, as we have already shown more at length.^d

What we have said regarding this view is very 69 much the same as what we have to say about the remaining view, according to which some assume truth and falsity to lie in the thing signified—that is to say in the incorporeal "expression,"^e

Regarding language and thought as both corporeal, the Stoics interpolated between them an incorporeal something, termed *lekton*, which is the subject matter of Logic; and thus they treated propositions, syllogisms, etc., as incorporeal.

τίθενται, οἱ δ' ἐν τῇ φωνῇ, οἱ δ' ἐν τῷ κινήματι τῆς
 70 διανοίας. αὐτίκα γάρ, ἵνα ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης ἀρξήται
 τις, ἡξίουν οἱ στωικοὶ κοινῶς ἐν λεκτῷ τὸ ἀληθές
 εἶναι καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος. λεκτὸν δὲ ὑπάρχειν φασι τὸ
 κατὰ λογικὴν φαντασίαν ὑφιστάμενον, λογικὴν δὲ
 εἶναι φαντασίαν καθ' ἣν τὸ φαντασθὲν ἔστι λόγῳ
 παραστήσαι. τῶν δὲ λεκτῶν τὰ μὲν ἑλλιπῆ καλοῦσι
 τὰ δὲ αὐτοτελή· ὧν τὰ μὲν ἑλλιπῆ παρεῖσθαι νῦν,
 τῶν δὲ αὐτοτελῶν πλείους εἶναι φασι (διαφοράς)¹.
 71 καὶ γὰρ προστακτικὰ καλοῦσί τινα, ἅπερ προσ-
 τάσσοντες λέγομεν, οἶον

δεῦρ' ἴθι, νύμφα φίλη,

καὶ ἀποφαντικά, ἅπερ ἀποφαινόμενοί φαμεν, οἶον
 "ὁ Δίων περιπατεῖ," καὶ πύσματα, ἅπερ λέγοντες
 72 πυνθανόμεθα, οἶον "ποῦ οἰκεῖ Δίων;" ὀνομά-
 ζεται δὲ τινα παρ' αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀρατικά, ἅπερ
 λέγοντες ἀρώμεθα,

ὦδέ σφ' ἐγκέφαλος χαμάδις ῥέοι ὡς ὄδε οἶνος,
 καὶ εὐκτικά, ἅπερ λέγοντες εὐχόμεθα,

Ζεῦ πάτερ, Ἰδηθεν μεδέων, κύνιδιτε μέγιστε,
 δὸς νίκην Αἴαντι καὶ ἀγλαὸν εὐχος ἀρέσθαι.

73 προσαγορεύουσι δὲ τινα τῶν αὐτοτελῶν καὶ ἀξιώ-
 ματα, ἅπερ λέγοντες ἤτοι ἀληθεύομεν ἢ ψευδόμεθα.
 ἔστι δὲ τινα καὶ πλείονα ἢ ἀξιώματα, οἶον τὸ μὲν
 τοιοῦτο

Πριαμίδησιν ἐμφερῆς ὁ βουκόλος

¹ <διαφοράς> cf. Bekk.

^a Homer, *Il.* iii. 130.

^b Homer, *Il.* iii. 300.

^c Homer, *Il.* vii. 202.

—others in the sound, others in the motion of
 the intellect. Thus, for instance, to start with the 70
 first view, the Stoics maintained that truth and
 falsity exist in the "expression." And they say that
 "expression" is "that which subsists in conformity
 with a rational presentation," and that a rational
 presentation is one in which it is possible to establish
 by reason the presented object. And of expressions
 they term some "defective," others "self-complete";
 the defective we may now pass over, but of the self-
 complete there are, as they assert, several varieties;
 for in fact they call some "jussive," such as we utter 71
 in giving an injunction, as for example—

Come thou hither, O lady dear; ^a

others "declaratory," such as we utter when making
 a statement, as for example—"Dion is walking
 about"; and others "interrogations," which we utter
 when asking a question, as for instance—"Where
 does Dion dwell?" And some, too, are named by 72
 them "imprecatory," which we utter when we curse—

E'en as this wine is spilt, so may their brains be spilt
 earthwards; ^b

also "precatory," which we utter in prayer, of which
 this is an example—

Zeus, my Father, who rulest from Ida, majestic and mighty,
 Victory grant unto Ajax and crown him with glory and
 honour. ^c

And they also term some of the self-complete ex- 73
 pressions "propositions," in uttering which we either
 speak the truth or lie. Some, too, are more than
 propositions. The following, for instance, is a pro-
 position—

The cowherd doth resemble Priam's sons;

ἀξιώμα ἐστιν· ἢ γὰρ ἀληθεύομεν λέγοντες αὐτὸ ἢ
ψευδόμεθα· τὸ δὲ οὕτως ἔχον

ὡς Πριαμίδαισιν ἐμφορῆς ὁ βουκόλος

74 πλέον τι ἀξιώματός ἐστι καὶ οὐκ ἀξίωμα. πλὴν
ικανῆς οὔσης ἐν τοῖς λεκτοῖς διαφορᾶς, ἵνα τι,
φασίν, ἀληθές ἢ ἢ ψεῦδος, δεῖ αὐτὸ πρὸ παντὸς
λεκτὸν εἶναι, εἶτα καὶ αὐτοτελές, καὶ οὐ κοινὸς
ὅποιονδήποτε οὖν ἀλλ' ἀξίωμα· μόνον γὰρ τοῦτο,
καθὼς προεῖπον, λέγοντες ἦτοι ἀληθεύομεν ἢ
75 ψευδόμεθα. οὐκοῦν φασίν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως, τὸ
εἶναι τι λεκτὸν ἀσώματον, ὃ κεχώρισται τῆς τε
σημαινούσης φωνῆς, οἷον τῆς Δίων, καὶ [τῆς] τοῦ
τυγχάνοντος, καθάπερ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Δίωνος, πότεν
ἔχομεν παραστήσει; ἢ γὰρ αὐτόθεν ἐρούσι τοῦθ'
ὑπάρχειν οἱ στωικοί, ἢ δι' ἀποδείξεως τὴν ὑπαρξίν
76 αὐτοῦ πιστώσονται. καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτόθεν λέγοιεν
τὸ ἀσώματον τοῦτο λεκτὸν ὑπάρχειν, καὶ ἡμῖν
ἐξέσται λέγειν αὐτόθεν ὅτι οὐκ ἐστίν· ὡς γὰρ
ἐκεῖνοι χωρὶς ἀποδείξεώς εἰσι πιστοί, οὕτω καὶ οἱ
ἀπορητικοὶ τούναντίον διὰ ψιλῆς προφερόμενοι
φάσεως γενήσονται πιστοί, ἢ εἴπερ ἀπιστοῦνται,
καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ὁμοίως ἀπιστοὶ γενήσονται.
77 εἰ δὲ δι' ἀποδείξεως τὸ τοιοῦτον πιστώσονται,
χείρον αὐτοῖς ἀπορον ἐπακολουθήσει. ἢ γὰρ ἀπό-
δείξις λόγος ἐστίν, ὃ δὲ λόγος ἐκ λεκτῶν συν-
έστηκεν. τοῖς λεκτοῖς οὖν παραστήσουσι τὸ εἶναι
τι λεκτὸν οἱ στωικοί, ὅπερ ἀπεμφαῖνον, ἐπεὶ περ ὃ
μὴ διδοῦς εἶναι τι λεκτὸν οὐδὲ πολλὰ δώσει λεκτὰ
78 εἶναι. ζητουμένων τε καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ἀποδείξει

for in uttering it we are either telling the truth or
lying; but a phrase like this—

How like to Priam's sons the cowherd is,^a

is somewhat more than a proposition and is not
a proposition. As, however, there is considerable 74
difference in the expressions in order that a thing
may be true or false it must first of all, they say, be
an expression, and next self-complete, and that, too,
not of any and every kind but a proposition; for, as
I said before, it is only when we utter this that
we speak a truth or a falsehood. How then, say the 75
Sceptics, can they establish that there exists any
incorporeal expression which is separate both from
the signifying sound, such as "Dion," and from the
actual object, such as Dion himself? For the Stoics
will either declare offhand that this subsists or they 76
will demonstrate its existence by proof. And if they
shall declare offhand that this incorporeal expression
subsists, it will be possible for us also to declare off-
hand that it does not exist; for just as they are to
be trusted without proof, so likewise the Doubters are
to be trusted when by means of bare assertion they
maintain the opposite, or, if they are distrusted, the
Stoics also will become similarly distrusted. And 77
if they shall support the statement by proof, they
will find themselves faced in consequence with a
worse difficulty. For proof is speech, and speech is
composed of expressions. The Stoics, then, will be
establishing by expressions the existence of an
expression, which is nonsensical, since the man who
does not grant that any expression exists will not
grant either that many expressions exist. Also, when 78
the existence of the expressions of the proof is in

^a *Frag. Trag. adesp.* 286 (Nauck).

λεκτῶν εἰ ἔστιν, εἰ μὲν ἐξ ἐτοίμου λαμβάνωσι τὸ εἶναι ταῦτα, ἐξ ἐτοίμου καὶ οἱ ἀπορητικοὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι λήψονται, τῆς αὐτῆς ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρων ὑποπιπτούσης πίστεως ἢ ἀπιστίας, εἰ δὲ ἐξ ἀποδείξεως, εἰς ἀπειρον ἐκπεσοῦνται· ἀπόδειξιν γὰρ ἀπαιτηθῆσονται τῶν ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ ἀποδείξει ἐμπεριεχομένων λεκτῶν, καὶ τρίτην κομίσαντες τῶν ἐν τῇ τρίτῃ, καὶ τετάρτην τῶν ἐν τῇ τετάρτῃ, ὥστε ἀναρχον αὐτοῖς εἶναι τὴν ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ εἶναι λεκτόν.

79 Καὶ ἄλλα δὲ πλείω ἔστιν εἰς τὸν τόπον λέγειν, περὶ ὧν εὐκαιρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ ἀποδείξεως διεξελευσόμεθα. τὰ νῦν δὲ ἐκείνο ρητέον ὅτι τὸ αὐτοτελὲς ἀξίωμα σύνθετον εἶναι θέλουσιν, οἷον τὸ "ἡμέρα ἔστι" σύγκειται ἐκ τε τοῦ ἡμέρα καὶ τοῦ ἔστιν. ἀσώματον δὲ οὐδὲν οὔτε συντεθῆναι οὔτε μερισθῆναι δύναται· ἴδια γὰρ σωμάτων ἐστὶ ταῦτα. τοῖνυν οὐδὲν ἔστιν αὐτοτελὲς [πρᾶγμα οὐδὲ] ἀξίωμα.

80 πᾶν τε λεκτὸν λέγεσθαι δεῖ, ὅθεν καὶ ταύτης ἔτυχε τῆς προσηγορίας· οὐδὲν δὲ λεκτὸν λέγεται, ὡς παριστᾶσιν οἱ ἀπορητικοί· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τι λεκτόν. ᾧ ἔπεται μηδὲ ἀξίωμα εἶναι μηδὲν ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος. λέγειν γὰρ ἔστι, καθὼς αὐτοὶ φασιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς, τὸ τὴν τοῦ νοουμένου πράγματος σημαντικὴν προφέρεσθαι φωνήν, οἷον τοῦδε τοῦ στίχου,

μῆνιν ἄειδε θεὰ Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος.

81 ἀλλὰ τούτου γε τὴν σημαντικὴν φωνὴν ἀμύχανόν ἐστι προφέρεσθαι διὰ τὸ οὐ τὰ μέρη μὴ συνπάρχει, μηδὲ αὐτὸ ἐκείνο ὑπάρχειν, τούτου δὲ τοῦ πράγ-

¹ [πρᾶγμα οὐδὲ] secl. Kayser.

question, if they shall perceive their existence directly, the Doubters also will perceive their non-existence directly, and if they perceive it as a result of proof, they will fall into the fallacy of regress *ad infinitum*; for they will be asked for a proof of the expressions contained in the second proof, and of those in the third when they bring forward a third, and of those in the fourth when they bring forward a fourth, so that their proof of the existence of expression is without a starting-point.

Many other arguments regarding this topic might 79 be adduced, but it will be more opportune to go through them in our chapter "Concerning Proof." For the present, let this one be stated: They hold that the self-complete proposition is a compound—"day exists," for example, is compounded of both "day" and "exists." But no incorporeal thing can be either compounded or divided; for these are things peculiar to bodies. So, then, there is no self-complete [object or] proposition.—Further, every 80 expression must be expressed, since from this it has got its name; but no expression is expressed, as the Doubters establish; therefore no expression exists. Whereupon it follows that no proposition, true or false, exists. For "to express" is, as the Stoics themselves declare, "to utter the sound capable of signifying the object conceived"—this verse, for instance,

Sing, O goddess, the fury of Peleus' offspring Achilles.*

But it is not feasible to utter the sound capable of 81 signifying this, because that object whose parts do not co-exist does not exist itself, and the parts of this

* Homer, *Il.* i.

ματος τὰ μέρη μὴ συνυπάρχειν, ὥστε μὴδ' αὐτὸ ὑπαρκτὸν εἶναι. τὸ δ' ὅτι ἀσυνυπαρκτὰ ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ τὰ μέρη, αὐτόθεν δείκνυται. ὅτε γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον ἡμιστίχιον προφερόμεθα, οὕτω ἐστὶ τὸ δεύτερον, καὶ ὅτε τὸ δεύτερον προφερόμεθα, οὐκέτ' ἐστὶ τὸ πρῶτον, ὥστε τὸν μὲν ὅλον στίχον οὐ προ-
 82 φερόμεθα. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ ἡμιστίχιον· ὅταν γὰρ πάλιν τὸ πρῶτον τοῦ ἡμιστίχιου μέρος λέγωμεν, τότε οὕτω τὸ δεύτερον αὐτοῦ μέρος προφερόμεθα, καὶ ὅτε τὸ δεύτερον προφερόμεθα, οὐκέτι λέγομεν τὸ πρῶτον, ὥστε οὐδὲ τὸ ἡμιστίχιον ὑπάρχει. κἂν δὲ σκοπῶμεν, οὐδὲ μία λέξις, ὅλον ἢ "μῆνιν"¹. ὅτε γὰρ τὴν "μη" συλλαβὴν λέγομεν, οὐδέπω τὴν "νιν" προφερόμεθα, καὶ ὅτε τὴν "νιν"
 83 προφερόμεθα, οὐκέτι τὴν "μη." εἰ οὖν ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ὑπάρχειν τι οὐ τὰ μέρη ἀσυνυπαρκτὰ ἐστὶ, δέδεικται δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ μιᾶς λέξεως ἀσυνυπαρκτα τὰ μέρη, ῥητέον μηδεμίαν ὑπάρχειν λέξιν. διὰ τοῦτο δὲ οὐδὲ ἀξίωμα, ὃ φασι σύνθετον εἶναι, οἷον τὸ τοιοῦτο "Σωκράτης ἐστίν." ὅτε γὰρ λέγεται "Σωκράτης," οὕτω ἐστὶ τὸ "ἐστίν," καὶ ὅτε τὸ "ἐστίν" λέγεται, τὸ "Σωκράτης" οὐ λέγεται. οὐδέποτε ἄρα ὅλον ὑπάρχει τὸ ἀξίωμα, ἀλλὰ μέρη τοῦ ὅλου· τὰ δὲ μέρη τούτου οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀξιώματα.
 84 οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶ τι ἀξίωμα. καίτοι τί περὶ ὅλου τοῦ ἀξιώματος διέξιμεν τοῦ "Σωκράτης ἐστίν," ὅτε καὶ αὐτὸ κατ' ἴδιαν τὸ πτωτικόν τὸ Σωκράτης οὐ δύναται ἐν ὑπάρξει νοεῖσθαι διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν; φημί δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ συνυπάρχειν τὰ συστατικὰ αὐτοῦ μόρια.

¹ μῆνιν Rüstow: μῆνις mss., Bekk.

² τὸ Heintz: ὁ mss., Bekk.

object do not co-exist, so that neither is it capable of existing itself. And the fact that its parts are not capable of co-existing is proved directly. For when we utter the first half-verse, the second is not yet in existence; and when we utter the second, the first is no longer in existence; so that we do not utter the whole verse. Nor, indeed, even the half-verse. 82 For when, once more, we are saying the first part of the half-verse, we are not then uttering as yet the second part of it; and when we utter the second, we are no longer saying the first; so that the half-verse does not exist either. Nor, if we consider it, does even a single expression, such as "fury," exist; for when we are saying the syllable "fu" we are not as yet uttering the "ry," and when we utter the "ry" we are no longer saying the "fu." If, then, 83 it is impossible for anything to exist if its parts are incapable of co-existence, and it has been proved in the case of one locution that its parts are incapable of co-existence, we must declare that no locution exists. And for the same reason, also, no proposition exists either; for they assert it to be a compound, as for instance "Socrates exists." For when "Socrates" is being said, "exists" does not yet exist; and when "exists" is being said, "Socrates" is not being said. Therefore the whole proposition never exists, but parts of the whole; and its parts are not propositions. Therefore no proposition exists. Yet why should 84 we discuss the whole proposition "Socrates exists," when even its nominative case, "Socrates," taken by itself cannot be conceived as in existence for the same reason—I mean, for the reason that its component parts do not co-exist?

- 85 Διδομένου τε τούτου,¹ ἀξίωμα εἶναι τι ἀληθές καὶ τι ψεῦδος οὐ συγχωρήσουσι οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως διὰ τὸ μὴ εὐαπόδοτον αὐτὸ καθεστάναι τοῖς πρὸς οὓς ἔστιν ὁ λόγος. φασὶ γὰρ ἀληθές μὲν εἶναι ἀξίωμα ὃ ὑπάρχει τε καὶ ἀντίκειται τινι, ψεῦδος δὲ ὃ οὐχ ὑπάρχει μὲν ἀντίκειται δέ τινι. ἐρωτώμενοι δὲ τί ἐστὶ τὸ ὑπάρχον, λέγουσι τὸ
- 86 καταληπτικὴν κινουὺν φαντασίαν· εἶτα περὶ τῆς καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας ἐξεταζόμενοι πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ὑπάρχον, ἐπ' ἴσης ὄν ἄγνωστον, ἀνατρέχουσι, λέγοντες “καταληπτικὴ ἐστὶ φαντασία ἢ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον.” ὅπερ ἦν ἴσον τῷ δι' ἀγνοουμένου τὸ ἀγνοουμένον διδάσκουσι καὶ εἰς τὸν δι' ἀλλήλων ἐμπύπτειν τρόπον. ἵνα γὰρ τὸ ὑπάρχον μάθωμεν, ἐπὶ τὴν καταληπτικὴν ἡμῶς φαντασίαν ἀποστέλλουσι, λέγοντες ὑπάρχον εἶναι τὸ κινουὺν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν· ἵνα δὲ τὴν καταληπτικὴν γνῶμεν φαντασίαν, ἐπὶ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἀναποστέλλουσι. μήτε οὖν ἐκεῖνο μήτε ταύτην γινώσκοντες οὐδὲ τὸ ἀπ' αὐτῶν διδάσκόμενον ἀληθές καὶ ψεῦδος ἀξίωμα συνήσομεν.
- 87 Ἐὰν ταύτης δὲ τῆς ἀπορίας ἀφίστηται τις, μείζων ἄλλη παρ' αὐτὴν ἀνακίψει τοῖς τὴν στωικὴν τεχνολογίαν ἀποδεχομένοις. ὥσπερ γὰρ εἰ βουλοίμεθα μαθεῖν τί ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, πρότερον ὀφείλομεν ἐγνωκέναι τί τὸ ζῶον καὶ τί τὸ λογικὸν καὶ τί τὸ θνητόν (ἐκ τούτων γὰρ συνέστηκεν ἢ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου νόησις), καὶ ὄν τρόπον εἰ προαιρούμεθα γινώσκειν τί ἐστὶ κύων, προκατεληφέναι δεήσει

¹ τούτου: τοῦ mss., Bekk. (lacunam ante ἀληθές indic. Kochalsky).

But if it be granted that a proposition exists, the 85 Sceptics will not admit that a true or a false proposition exists, because this is not easy of explanation for those with whom they are arguing. For these assert that a true proposition is that which subsists and is opposed to something, and a false one that which is not subsisting but is opposed to something. And when asked “What is that which subsists?”^a they reply “That which excites an apprehensive presentation” ; next, when examined concerning the apprehensive 86 presentation they have recourse again to “the subsistent,” which is equally unknown, saying “An apprehensive presentation is that derived from a subsisting object in conformity with that object itself.” And this is equivalent to teaching the unknown thing by means of an unknown thing and falling into the fallacy of circular reasoning. For in order that we may learn the subsistent they send us off to the apprehensive presentation, saying that the subsistent is that which excites an apprehensive presentation ; and in order that we may get to know the apprehensive presentation they send us back to the subsistent. As we know, then, neither the latter nor the former, neither shall we understand the true or false proposition which is explained through them.

And even if one sets aside this difficulty, another 87 will pop up, greater than this, for those who accept the logical system of Stoicism. For just as, if we wish to learn what Man is, we ought to know first what Animal is, and what Rational is, and what Mortal is (for the concept of Man is compounded of these),—and just as, if we desire to know what Dog is, it will first be necessary for us to have grasped

^a Cf. P.H. iii. 242.

πάλιν τὸ ζῶον καὶ τὸ ὑλακτικόν (ἐκ τούτων γὰρ
 88 ἐνοεῖτο ὁ κύων), οὕτως εἰ ἀληθές ἐστι κατὰ τοὺς
 στωικοὺς ὃ ὑπάρχει τε καὶ ἀντίκειται τινι καὶ
 ψεῦδος ὃ μὴ ὑπάρχει μὲν ἀντίκειται δὲ τινι, κατ'
 ἀνάγκην ὀφείλομεν γινώσκειν εἰς τὴν τούτων
 νόησιν τί ἐστὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον. οὐ πάνυ δὲ γε
 δύνανται παραστήσαι τὸ ἀντικείμενον ἡμῖν οἱ
 στωικοί· τοίνυν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀληθές ἢ ψεῦδος ἔσται
 89 γινώριμα. φασὶ γὰρ “ἀντικείμενά ἐστιν ὧν τὸ
 ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου ἀποφάσει πλεονάζει,” οἷον
 “ἡμέρα ἔστιν—οὐχ ἡμέρα ἔστιν.” τοῦ γὰρ
 “ἡμέρα ἔστιν” ἀξιώματος τὸ “οὐχ ἡμέρα ἔστιν”
 ἀποφάσει πλεονάζει τῇ οὐχί, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἀντι-
 κείμενόν ἐστὶν ἐκείνω. ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἀντι-
 κείμενον, ἔσται καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀντικείμενα, τὸ τε
 “ἡμέρα ἔστι (καὶ φῶς ἔστιν)” καὶ τὸ “ἡμέρα
 ἔστιν” καὶ “οὐχί φῶς ἔστιν.” τοῦ γὰρ “ἡμέρα
 ἔστιν (καὶ φῶς ἔστιν)” ἀξιώματος ἀποφάσει
 πλεονάζει τὸ “(ἡμέρα ἔστιν καὶ) οὐχί φῶς ἔστιν.”
 οὐχὶ δὲ γε κατ' αὐτοὺς ταῦτα ἀντικείμενά ἐστιν·
 οὐκ ἄρα ἀντικείμενά ἐστι (τῶ)² τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ
 90 ἑτέρου ἀποφάσει πλεονάζειν. ναὶ φασιν, ἀλλὰ σὺν
 τούτῳ ἀντικείμενά ἐστι, σὺν τῷ τὴν ἀπόφασιν
 προτετάχθαι τοῦ ἑτέρου· τότε γὰρ καὶ κυριεύει
 τοῦ ὅλου ἀξιώματος, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ “ἡμέρα ἔστιν
 καὶ οὐχί φῶς ἔστιν,” μέρος οὐσα τοῦ παντός, οὐ
 κυριεύει πρὸς τὸ ἀποφατικὸν ποιῆσαι τὸ πᾶν.
 ἐχρῆν οὖν, ἐροῦμεν, προσκεῖσθαι τῇ ἐννοίᾳ τῶν
 ἀντικειμένων ὅτι τότε ἀντικείμενά ἐστιν, ὅταν μὴ
 ψιλῶς τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου ἀποφάσει πλεονάζει,

¹ <καὶ . . . ἔστιν> . . . <καὶ φῶς ἔστιν> . . . <ἡμέρα . . . καὶ>
 Arnim.

² <τῶ> Hervet.

again what Animal is, and what “Capable of bark-
 ing” is (for out of these was formed the concept of
 Dog),—so likewise if the True is, according to the 88
 Stoics, that which subsists and is opposed to some-
 thing, and the false that which is not subsistent but is
 opposed to something, in order to conceive these things
 we must necessarily know what the “opposed” thing
 is. But the Stoics are certainly not able to explain
 to us the “opposed”; neither, then, will the true
 or the false become known. For they say that 89
 “Opposed things are those of which the one exceeds
 the other by a negative,”—for instance “It is day—
 it is not day.” For the proposition “It is not day”
 exceeds the proposition “It is day” by the negative
 “not,” and because of this it is opposed thereto.
 But if this is “opposed,” such propositions as the
 following will also be opposed—“It is day and it is
 light” and “It is day and it is not light”; for the
 proposition “It is day and it is not light” exceeds
 “It is day and it is light” by the negative. But in
 fact, according to them, these are not “opposed”;
 therefore things are not “opposed” through the one
 exceeding the other by the negative. “Yes,” they 90
 reply, “but they are opposed with this (added condi-
 tion) that the negative is prefixed to one of the
 propositions; for then it controls the whole proposi-
 tion, whereas in the case of “It is day and it is not
 light,” the negative, being a part of the whole, does
 not control the whole so as to render it negative.
 In that case, we will reply, to the concept of “things
 opposed” it should have been added that they are
 opposed not when the one simply exceeds the other

ἀλλ' ὅταν ἡ ἀπόφασις προάττηται τοῦ ἀξιώ-
ματος.

91 Ἄλλος δέ τις καὶ τὸν Πλάτωνος παραλήψεται
λόγον, ὃ κέχρηται ἐν τῷ περὶ ψυχῆς, καὶ διδάξει
ὡς οὐχ οἷόν τέ ἐστι μετουσίᾳ τῆς ἀποφάσεως
πλεονάζειν τὸ ἀξίωμα παρὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχον τὴν ἀπό-
φασιν. ὡς γὰρ οὐδὲν μετουσίᾳ θερμοῦ γίνεται
ψυχρόν, οὕτως οὐδὲν μετουσίᾳ μικροῦ γίνεται μέγα
ἀλλὰ μικρόν· καὶ ὡς μετοχῇ τοῦ μείζονος γίνεται
τι μέγα, οὕτω καὶ μετοχῇ τοῦ μικροῦ ἔσται τι
μικρόν. διὸ καὶ τὴν ἐννεάδα κατὰ τὴν τῆς μονάδος
πρόσληψιν μὴ γίνεσθαι μείζονα. τὸ γὰρ ἐν ἡττόν
92 ἐστὶ τῶν ἐννέα· τοῦτ' οὖν προσλαβοῦσα ἡ ἐννεὰς
οὐ γενήσεται πλείων τῶν ἐννέα, ἐλάττων δὲ μᾶλλον.
[τῇ γὰρ προσλήψει ταύτης οὐ γενήσεται ἡ ἐννεὰς
τῆς ἐννεάδος μείζων, ἀλλὰ ἐλάσσων μᾶλλον.]
ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ ἡ οὐχὶ ἀπόφασις μικρότερόν τι ἐστὶ
τοῦ ἀξιώματος, οὐ ποιήσει τὸ ἀξίωμα μείζον, διὰ
τό, ὡς μεγέθους τινὸς μετουσίᾳ γίνεται τι μείζον,
οὕτω καὶ ἐλάττωνος μετουσίᾳ ἕλαττον ἀποτελεῖται.

93 Ὁ μὲν οὖν Πλάτωνος λόγος οὕτως εἰς τὸν τόπον
ὑπὸ τινων μεταχθήσεται· ἐπισυνάπτοντες δὲ ἡμεῖς
τοῖς προκειμένοις κάκεινο λέγωμεν ὡς εἶπερ τὸ
ἀληθὲς ἀξίωμά ἐστι, πάντως ἢ ἀπλοῦν ἐστὶν
ἀξίωμα ἢ οὐχ ἀπλοῦν ἢ καὶ ἀπλοῦν καὶ οὐχ
ἀπλοῦν. τῶν γὰρ ἀξιωμάτων πρώτην σχεδὸν καὶ
κυριωτάτην ἐκφέρουσι διαφορὰν οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ
καθ' ἣν τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἀπλᾶ τὰ δ' οὐχ
ἀπλᾶ. καὶ ἀπλᾶ μὲν ὅσα μῆτ' ἐξ ἐνὸς ἀξιώματος
δὶς λαμβανομένου συνέστηκεν, μῆτ' ἐξ ἀξιωμάτων

¹ τῇ N: εἰ cet., Bekk.—[τῇ . . . μᾶλλον] secl. Kochalsky.

by the negative, but when the negative is prefixed
to the proposition.

Some other man, too, will adopt the argument of 91
Plato, which he uses in his book *On the Soul*,^a and
will show that it is not possible for the proposition by
participation in the negative to exceed that which
has no negative. For as nothing becomes cold by
participation in the hot, so nothing becomes great,
but small, by participation in the small; and as a
thing becomes great by participation in the greater,
so also a thing will be small by participation in the
small. And because of this, too, the nine does not
become greater through the addition of the monad.
For the one is less than the nine; so by the addition 92
of it the nine will not become more than nine, but
rather less. Since, then, the negative "not" is a
smaller thing than the proposition, it will not make
the proposition greater, seeing that, just as a thing
becomes greater by participation in a magnitude, so
also it is rendered smaller by participation in a smaller
thing.

By some, then, the argument of Plato will be trans-
ferred in this wise to our topic; but let us supplement the 93
arguments already put forward by stating this further
argument: If the true is a proposition, it certainly
is either a simple proposition or a not simple or both
a simple and a not simple. For the Dialecticians pro-
claim that almost the first and most important dis-
tinction in propositions is that by which some of them
are simple, others not simple. And simple are all
those which are neither compounded of one proposi-
tion twice repeated,^b nor of different propositions, by

^a See Plato, *Phaedo* 103 c.

^b For the "duplicated" proposition cf. *P.H.* ii. 112.

διαφερόντων διὰ τινὸς ἢ τινῶν συνδέσμων, οἷον
 "ἡμέρα ἔστιν, νύξ ἔστιν, Σωκράτης διαλέγεται,"
 94 πᾶν ὁ τῆς ὁμοίας ἐστὶν ιδέας. ὡσπερ γὰρ τὸν
 στήμονα ἀπλοῦν λέγομεν καίπερ ἐκ τριχῶν συν-
 εστῶτα, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἐκ στήμόνων, οὔτινές εἰσιν ὁμο-
 γενεῖς,πέπλεκται, οὕτως ἀπλᾶ λέγεται ἀξιώματα,
 ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἀξιωμάτων συνέστηκεν ἀλλ' ἐξ ἄλλων
 τινῶν. οἷον τὸ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν" ἀπλοῦν ἐστὶ
 παρόσον οὔτε ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐστὶν ἀξιώματος δις
 λαμβανομένου οὔτε ἐκ διαφερόντων συνέστηκεν,
 ἐξ ἄλλων δὲ τινῶν συγκέκριται, οἷον τοῦ ἡμέρα
 καὶ τοῦ ἔστιν. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ σύνδεσμός ἐστιν ἐν
 95 αὐτῷ. οὐχ ἀπλᾶ δὲ ἐτύγγχανε τὰ οἷον διπλᾶ, καὶ
 ὅσα δ' ἐξ ἀξιώματος δις λαμβανομένου ἢ ἐξ ἀξιω-
 μάτων διαφερόντων συνέστηκεν διὰ συνδέσμου τε ἢ
 συνδέσμων, οἷον "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστιν, ἡμέρα ἔστιν· εἰ
 νύξ ἔστι, σκότος ἔστιν· καὶ ἡμέρα ἔστι καὶ φῶς
 ἔστιν· ἦτοι ἡμέρα ἔστιν ἢ νύξ ἔστιν."
 96 τῶν δὲ ἀπλῶν τινὰ μὲν ὠρισμένα ἐστὶν τινὰ δὲ
 ἀόριστα τινὰ δὲ μέσα, ὠρισμένα μὲν τὰ κατὰ
 δεῖξιν ἐκφερόμενα, οἷον "οὗτος περιπατεῖ, οὗτος
 κάθηται". δείκνυμι γάρ τινα τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους
 97 ἀνθρώπων. ἀόριστα δὲ ἐστὶ κατ' αὐτοὺς ἐν οἷς
 ἀόριστόν τι κυριεύει μόριον, οἷον "τις κάθηται,"
 μέσα δὲ τὰ οὕτως ἔχοντα "ἄνθρωπος κάθηται"
 ἢ "Σωκράτης περιπατεῖ." τὸ μὲν οὖν "τις περι-
 πατεῖ" ἀόριστόν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἀφώρικέ τινα
 τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους περιπατούντων· κοινῶς γὰρ ἐφ'
 ἐκάστου αὐτῶν ἐκφέρεσθαι δύναται· τὸ δὲ "οὗτος
 κάθηται" ὠρισμένον ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ περ ἀφώρικε τὸ
 δεικνύμενον πρόσωπον. τὸ δὲ "Σωκράτης κάθ-

means of some one or more conjunctions; as for
 example "It is day," "It is night," "Socrates is con-
 versing," and every proposition of similar form. For 94
 just as we call the web "simple," although it is com-
 posed of threads, since it is not woven of webs, which
 are homogeneous with itself, so propositions are
 called "simple" since they are not compounded of
 propositions but of certain other things. For ex-
 ample, "It is day" is a simple proposition inas-
 much as it is neither formed from the same proposi-
 tion twice repeated nor compounded of different
 propositions, but is constructed of certain other
 elements, namely "day" and "it is." Moreover, 95
 there is no conjunction in it either. And "not
 simple" are those which are, so to say, double, and
 all such as are compounded of a proposition twice
 repeated, or of different propositions, by means of
 one or more conjunctions, as for example—"If it
 is day, it is day"; "If it is night, it is dark";
 "Both day exists and light exists"; "Either day
 exists or night exists."—And of the simple some are 96
 "definite," some "indefinite," some "intermediate";
 the definite are those uttered indicatively, for ex-
 ample "This man is walking," "This man is sitting"
 (for I am indicating some particular person). "In- 97
 definite," according to them, are those in which some
 indefinite part is dominant, as for example "Someone
 is sitting"; and "intermediate" those like this, "A
 man is sitting" or "Socrates is walking." Now
 "Someone is walking" is indefinite since it does not
 define any one of the individuals who are walking;
 for it can be applied in common to each one of them;
 but "This man is sitting" is definite because it
 defines the person indicated. And "Socrates is is

ηται" μέσον ὑπῆρχεν, ἐπεὶ περ οὔτε ἀόριστόν ἐστιν, ἀφώρικε γὰρ τὸ εἶδος, οὔτε ὠρισμένον, οὐ γὰρ μετὰ δείξεως ἐκφέρεται, ἀλλ' ἔοικε μέσον ἀμφοτέρων ὑπάρχειν, τοῦ τε ἀόριστου καὶ τοῦ ὠρισμένου. 98 γίνεσθαι δέ φασι τὸ ἀόριστον ἀληθές, τὸ "τίς περιπατεῖ" ἢ "τίς κάθηται," ὅταν τὸ ὠρισμένον ἀληθές εὐρίσκηται, τὸ "οὗτος κάθηται" ἢ "οὗτος περιπατεῖ." μηδενὸς γὰρ τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους καθημένου οὐ δύναται ἀληθές εἶναι τὸ "τίς κάθηται" ἀόριστον.

99 Τοιαῦτα μὲν ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίοις τὰ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀπλῶν ἀξιωμαίων λεγόμενα τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς ὑπῆρχεν. οἱ δὲ ἀπορητικοὶ ζητοῦσι πρῶτον εἰ δύναται τὸ ὠρισμένον ἀληθές εἶναι· τούτου γὰρ ἀναιρεθέντος οὐδὲ τὸ ἀόριστον δύναται ὑπάρχειν ἀληθές, ἀναιρουμένου δὲ καὶ τοῦ ἀόριστου οὐδὲ τὸ μέσον τούτων ὑποστήσεται. ταῦτα δ' ἦν ὡς περ στοιχεῖα τῶν ἀπλῶν ἀξιωμαίων· τοίνυν ἀθετουμένων αὐτῶν οἰχθήσεται καὶ τὰ ἀπλᾶ ἀξιώματα, καὶ οὐκ ἐνέσται λέγειν τὰ ληθές ἐν τοῖς ἀπλοῖς ὑπάρχειν ἀξιώμασιν.

100 καὶ δὴ τὸ ὠρισμένον τοῦτο ἀξίωμα, τὸ "οὗτος κάθηται" ἢ "οὗτος περιπατεῖ," τότε φασὶν ἀληθές ὑπάρχειν ὅταν τῷ ὑπὸ τὴν δείξιν πίπτοντι συμβεβήκη τὸ κατηγορήμα, οἷον τὸ καθῆσθαι ἢ τὸ περιπατεῖν. ἀλλ' ἐν τε τῷ λέγειν "οὗτος περιπατεῖ" δεικνυμένου τινὸς τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους ἀνθρώπων, ἥτοι Σωκράτης ἐστὶ λόγου χάριν ὁ ὑπὸ τὴν δείξιν πίπτων ἢ μέρος τι τοῦ Σωκράτους· οὔτε δὲ Σωκράτης ἐστὶν ὁ ὑπὸ τὴν δείξιν πίπτων οὔτε μέρος τι Σωκράτους, ὡς παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα 101 δύναται ἀληθές εἶναι τὸ ὠρισμένον ἀξίωμα. καὶ Σωκράτης μὲν οὐχ ὑποπίπτει τῇ δείξει, παρόσον

sitting" is intermediate, because it is neither indefinite (for it defines the particular object), nor definite (for it is not uttered indicatively), but seems to be intermediate between these two, the indefinite and the definite. And they say that the indefinite— 98 "Someone is walking" or "Someone is sitting"—becomes true when the definite—"This man is sitting" or "This man is walking"—is found to be true; for if no one particular person is sitting the indefinite proposition "Someone is sitting" cannot be true.

Such then, to speak summarily, are the statements 99 made by the Dialecticians regarding the "simple" propositions. But the Doubters inquire, firstly, whether the "definite" can be true; for if this is abolished, the "indefinite" cannot be true either; and if the indefinite also is abolished, neither will the "intermediate" subsist. But these are elements, as it were, of the simple propositions; so that if they are rejected the simple propositions also will disappear, and it will not be possible to assert that the true exists in the simple propositions.—Now as to 100 this definite proposition "This man is sitting" or "This man is walking," they declare that it is true when the thing predicated, such as "sitting" or "walking," belongs to the object indicated. But when, in the statement "This man is walking," some one particular man is indicated, the person indicated is either (let us say) Socrates or a part of Socrates; but the person indicated is neither Socrates nor a part of Socrates, as we shall establish; therefore the definite proposition cannot be true. Now Socrates 101 is not the object indicated inasmuch as (he being

αὐτοῦ ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος συνεστῶτος οὐθ' ἢ ψυχῆ δεικνυται οὔτε τὸ σῶμα, ὥστε οὐδὲ τὸ ὅλον ὑπὸ τὴν δεῖξιν πίπτου ἔσται.¹ καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ μῦριον τι Σωκράτους ὑπέπιπτε τῇ δείξει· εἰ γὰρ τῷ ὑπὸ τὴν δεῖξιν πίπτουτι συμβεβηκέναι φασὶ τὸ κατηγορήματα τὸ περιπατεῖν ἢ τὸ καθῆσθαι, οὐδέποτε δὲ τῷ δεικνυμένῳ μορίῳ ὄντι ἐλαχίστῳ συμβεβηκε τὸ κατηγορήματα, οἷον τὸ περιπατεῖν ἢ τὸ καθῆσθαι, κατ' ἀνάγκην οὐδὲ τὸ μῦριον ἔσται πίπτου
 102 ὑπὸ τὴν δεῖξιν. ἀλλ' εἰ μήτε τοῦτο μήτε Σωκράτους, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστιν, οἴχεται τὸ κατὰ δεῖξιν ἐκφερόμενον ὠρισμένον ἀξίωμα, σὺν τῷ καὶ ἀόριστον αὐτὸ γίνεσθαι σχεδόν· εἰ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται μὲν τοῦτ' εἶναι τὸ δεικνύμενον τοῦ Σωκράτους μέρος, ἐνδέχεται δὲ μηδὲ τοῦτο ἀλλ' ἕτερον, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀόριστον γίνεται τὸ ὅλον. μὴ ὄντος οὖν τοῦ ὠρισμένου ἀξιωματος οὐδὲ τὸ ἀόριστον ἔσται. διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ τὸ μέσον ὑποστήσεται.

103 Πρὸς τούτοις ὅταν λέγωσι τὸ μὲν "ἡμέρα ἔστιν" ἀξίωμα ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος εἶναι ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ "νῦξ ἔστι" ψεῦδος, καὶ τὸ μὲν "οὐχὶ ἡμέρα ἔστι" ψεῦδος, τὸ δὲ "οὐχὶ νῦξ ἔστιν" ἀληθές, ἐπιστήσῃ τις πῶς μία οὐσα καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀπόφασις τοῖς μὲν ἀληθέσι προσελθοῦσα ψευδῆ ταῦτα ποιεῖ, τοῖς δὲ ψευδέσιν ἀληθῆ. ὁμοιον γὰρ ἔστι τοῦτο τῷ κατὰ τὸ Αἰσώπειον αἰνίγμα Σειληνῶ, ὃς ὀρών τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνθρωπον χειμῶνος ὥρα καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ ψύχεσθαι τὰς χεῖρας [ἐμφυσῶντα] καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ καίεσθαι ἐμφυσῶντα τῷ στόματι, ἔφη μὴ ἂν ὑπομεῖναι τοιοῦτῳ θηρίῳ συζῆν ἐξ οὗ

¹ ὥστε οὐδὲ . . . πίπτου ἔσται: οὔτε . . . πίπτουτα MSS., Bekk. (εἴθ' ἢ ψ. δ. εἶτε τὸ σ., οὐχὶ καὶ . . . πίπτει c). Mutsch.).

compounded of soul and body) neither his soul nor his body is indicated, so that he will not be indicated as a whole either. Nor yet is a part of Socrates the object indicated; for if they assert that the thing predicated (walking or sitting) belongs to the object indicated, while the thing predicated, such as walking or sitting, never belongs to the part indicated, it being very small, it necessarily follows that the part will not be the object indicated. But if neither this nor
 102 Socrates (is indicated), and besides these there is no other alternative, then the definite proposition as indicatively stated disappears—in addition to the fact that it also becomes practically indefinite. For if the thing indicated admits of being this part of Socrates, and admits also of being not this part but another, then the whole necessarily becomes indefinite. If, then, the definite proposition is non-existent, neither will the indefinite exist. And because of this the intermediate will not subsist either.

Furthermore, when they say that the proposition
 103 "It is day" is at present true but "It is night" false, and "It is not day" false but "It is not night" true, one will ponder how a negative, which is one and the same, when attached to things true makes them false, and attached to things false makes them true. For this is like the Silenus in the riddle of Aesop who, on seeing the same man in the winter season blowing with his mouth both to save his hands from being cold, and to save himself from being burnt, declared that he could not endure to live with a beast of a kind such that out of him proceed

104 τὰ ἐναντιώτατα προέρχεται. ὧδε γὰρ καὶ αὐτὴ ἢ ἀπόφασις τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχοντα ἀνύπαρκτα ποιοῦσα, τὰ δὲ ἀνύπαρκτα ὑπαρκτά, τεραστίου φύσεως μετέλιπεν. ἢ γὰρ ὑπάρχειν αὐτὴν θέλουσιν ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἢ (μήτε ὑπάρχειν μήτε μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἢ)¹ ὑπάρχειν ἅμα καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν. καὶ εἰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν, πῶς ὑπάρχοντι προσελοῦσα ἀνύπαρκτον τὸ ὅλον ποιεῖ καὶ οὐ μᾶλλον ὑπάρχον; ὑπάρχον γὰρ ὑπάρχοντι προσγενόμενον βεβαιοὶ μᾶλλον τὴν ὑπάρχοντι προσελοῦσα ὑπαρκτὸν αὐτὸ ποιεῖ καὶ οὐ μᾶλλον ἀνύπαρκτον; ἀνύπαρκτῳ γὰρ ἀνύπαρκτον προστεθὲν οὐχ ὑπαρξῖν ἀλλ' ἀνυπαρξίαν ἀπεργάζεται. ἢ πῶς ἀνύπαρκτος οὐσα μετατίθησι τὸ ὑπαρκτὸν εἰς ἀνυπαρξίαν, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ μὲν τι ὑπαρκτὸν κατὰ δέ τι ἀνύπαρκτον αὐτὸ ποιεῖ; ὡς γὰρ λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν συντεθέντα οὐ μέλαν ἢ λευκὸν ποιεῖ ἀλλὰ κατὰ μὲν τι λευκὸν κατὰ δέ τι μέλαν, οὕτω καὶ ἀνύπαρκτον ὑπαρκτῷ συνελθὼν τὸ ὅλον ποιήσει κατὰ μὲν τι ὑπαρκτὸν κατὰ δέ τι ἀνύπαρκτον. ἄλλως τε τὸ ἀνύπαρκτὸν τι ποιοῦν ποιεῖ τι, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν ἔστι καὶ ὑπάρχει· ἢ ἄρα ἀπόφασις μὴ ὑπάρχουσα οὐδὲ ποιήσει τι ἀνύπαρκτον.² λείπεται ἄρα λέγειν μήτε ὑπάρχειν αὐτὴν μήτε μὴ ὑπάρχειν. ἀλλ' εἰ τοιαύτη ἔστι, πῶς πάλιν μήτε ὑπάρχουσα μήτε μὴ ὑπάρχουσα τῷ μὲν ὑπάρχοντι προσελοῦσα ἀνυπαρξίαν ποιεῖ, τῷ δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχοντι ὑπαρξῖν; ὡς γὰρ τὸ μήτε θερμὸν μήτε ψυχρὸν τῷ θερμῷ προσελθὼν οὐ δύναται ποιῆσαι ψυχρὸν, οὐδὲ τῷ ψυχρῷ θερμὸν, οὕτως

¹ <μήτε . . . ἢ> Heintz.

² ἀνύπαρκτον Kalbfleisch: ὑπαρκτὸν mss., Bekk.

things most opposite. Thus, too, the negative itself, 104 by making existing things non-existent and non-existents existent, partakes of the miraculous. For they claim that it either exists or exists not, or (neither exists nor exists not, or) both exists and exists not. And if it exists, how, by its attachment to an existing thing, does it make the whole non-existent and not, rather, existent? For an existing thing attached to an existing thing further strengthens its existence. But if it is non-existent, for what reason when 105 attached to what does not exist does it make it existent and not, rather, non-existent? For a non-existent attached to a non-existent produces, not existence, but non-existence. Or how when it is non-existent does it transform the existent into non-existence, instead of making it partly existent and partly non-existent? For just as white and black, when put together, do not make black or white but what is partly white and partly black, so also the non-existent combined with the existent will make the whole partly existent and partly non-existent. Besides, that which makes something non-existent 106 makes something, and that which makes is and exists; the negative, therefore, as not existing, will not make anything non-existent. It remains, therefore, to say that it neither exists nor exists not. But if such is its nature, how, once more, when it neither exists nor exists not, does it cause non-existence when attached to what exists and existence when attached to what does not exist? For just as that which 107 is neither hot nor cold when attached to what is hot cannot make it cold, nor the cold hot, so it is

ἀλογόν¹ ἔστι τὸ μήτε ὑπάρχον μήτε μὴ ὑπάρχον τῷ μὲν ὑπάρχοντι προσελθόν ἀνυπαρξίαν ποιεῖν, τῷ δὲ ἀνυπαρκτῷ ὑπαρξίω. τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ ἐνέσται ἀπορεῖν καὶ εἶν κατὰ τὸ μὲν ὑπάρχειν λέγωσι τὴν ἀπόφασιν, κατὰ δὲ τι ἀνυπαρκτον εἶναι.

- 108 Νῦν δὲ ἐπὶ ποσὸν ψηλαφηθείσης τῆς ἐπὶ τῶν ἀπλῶν ἀξιωματῶν παρὰ τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς νομοθεσίας, μετῴωμεν καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν οὐχ ἀπλῶν. καὶ δὴ οὐχ ἀπλᾶ μὲν ἔστιν ἀξιώματα τὰ ἀνώτερον προειρημένα, ἅπερ ἐξ ἀξιώματος διαφορουμένου ἢ ἀξιωματῶν διαφερόντων συνέστηκε καὶ ἐν οἷς
- 109 σύνδεσμος ἢ σύνδεσμοι ἐπικρατοῦσιν. λαμβανέσθω δὲ ἐκ τούτων ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος τὸ καλούμενον συνημμένον. τοῦτο τοῖνυν συνέστηκεν ἐξ ἀξιώματος διαφορουμένου ἢ ἐξ ἀξιωματῶν διαφερόντων διὰ τοῦ "εἰ" ἢ "εἴπερ" συνδέσμου, οἷον ἐκ διαφορουμένου μὲν ἀξιώματος καὶ τοῦ "εἰ" συνδέσμου συνέστηκε τὸ τοιοῦτον συνημμένον "εἰ
- 110 ἡμέρα ἔστιν, ἡμέρα ἔστιν," ἐκ διαφερόντων δὲ ἀξιωματῶν καὶ διὰ τοῦ "εἴπερ" συνδέσμου τὸ οὕτως ἔχον "εἴπερ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν." τῶν δὲ ἐν τῷ συνημμένῳ ἀξιωματῶν τὸ μετὰ τὸν εἰ ἢ τὸν εἴπερ σύνδεσμον τεταγμένον ἡγούμενον τε καὶ πρῶτον καλεῖται, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν λῆγόν τε καὶ δεύτερον, καὶ εἰν ἀναστροφῶς ἐκφέρεται τὸ ὅλον συνημμένον, οἷον οὕτως "φῶς ἔστιν εἴπερ ἡμέρα ἔστιν." καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ λῆγον μὲν καλεῖται τὸ "φῶς ἔστιν" καίπερ πρῶτον ἐξενεχθέν, ἡγούμενον δὲ τὸ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν" καίπερ δεύτερον λεγόμενον, διὰ τὸ μετὰ τὸν εἴπερ σύνδεσμον τετάχθαι.
- 111 ἢ μὲν οὖν σύστασις τοῦ συνημμένου, ὡς ἐν συν-

¹ ἀλογον Kalbfleisch: ἀνάλογον mss., Bekk.

contrary to reason that what is neither existent nor non-existent when attached to the existent should produce non-existence, and when attached to the non-existent, existence. And it will also be open to us to raise the same difficulties if they should declare that the negative is partly existent and partly non-existent.

And now that we have in some degree handled 108 the legislation of the Dialecticians regarding simple propositions, let us proceed also to that which concerns the non-simple. Now non-simple propositions are those already mentioned above, being such as are composed of a duplicated proposition or of differing propositions, and are controlled by a conjunction or conjunctions. Of these let us take for the present 109 the hypothetical proposition so-called. This, then, is composed of a duplicated proposition or of differing propositions, by means of the conjunction "if" or "if in fact"; thus, for example, from a duplicated proposition and the conjunction "if" there is composed such a hypothetical proposition as this—"If it is day, it is day"; and from differing propositions, and by 110 means of the conjunction "if in fact," one in this form—"If in fact it is day, it is light." And of the propositions contained in the hypothetical proposition that which is placed after the conjunction "if" or "if in fact" is called both "antecedent" and "first," and the other one both "consequent" and "second," even if the whole proposition is reversed in order of expression, as thus—"It is light, if in fact it is day"; for in this, too, the proposition "it is light" is called "consequent" although it is uttered first, and "it is day" antecedent, although it is spoken second, owing to the fact that it is placed after the conjunction "if in fact." Such then—to put it briefly—is the con- 111

τόμω εἰπεῖν, ἐστὶ τοιαύτη, ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι δὲ δοκεῖ
 τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀξίωμα ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ πρώτῳ
 τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ δεύτερον καὶ ὄντος τοῦ ἡγουμένου
 ἔσεσθαι τὸ λήγον. ὅθεν σωζομένης μὲν τῆς
 τοιαύτης ἐπαγγελίας καὶ ἀκολουθοῦντος τῷ ἡγου-
 μένῳ τοῦ λήγοντος ἀληθὲς γίνεται καὶ τὸ συν-
 112 ημιμένον, μὴ σωζομένης δὲ ψεύδος. διόπερ ἀπὸ
 τούτου εὐθὺς ἀρξάμενοι σκοπῶμεν εἰ δύνатаι
 ἀληθὲς τι συνημμένον καὶ σῶζον τὴν εἰρημένην
 ἐπαγγελίαν εὐρεθῆναι.

Κοινῶς μὲν γάρ φασιν ἅπαντες οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ
 ὑγιὲς εἶναι συνημμένον ὅταν ἀκολουθῆ τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ
 ἡγουμένῳ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ λήγον· περὶ δὲ τοῦ πότε
 ἀκολουθεῖ καὶ πῶς στασιάζουσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους,
 καὶ μαχόμενα τῆς ἀκολουθίας ἐκτίθενται κριτήρια.
 113 οἷον ὁ μὲν Φίλων ἔλεγεν ἀληθὲς γίνεσθαι τὸ συν-
 ημιμένον ὅταν μὴ ἀρχῆται ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς καὶ λήγη
 ἐπὶ ψεύδος, ὥστε τριχῶς μὲν γίνεσθαι κατ' αὐτὸν
 ἀληθὲς συνημμένον, καθ' ἓνα δὲ τρόπον ψεύδος.
 καὶ γὰρ ὅταν ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς ἀρχόμενον ἐπ' ἀληθὲς
 λήγη, ἀληθὲς ἐστίν, ὡς τὸ "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς
 ἔστιν". καὶ ὅταν ἀπὸ ψεύδους ἀρχόμενον ἐπὶ
 ψεύδος λήγη, πάλιν ἀληθὲς, οἷον τὸ "εἰ πέταται
 114 ἡ γῆ, πτέρυγας ἔχει ἡ γῆ," ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ
 ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ ψεύδους ἐπ' ἀληθὲς δὲ λήγον ἐστὶν
 ἀληθὲς, ὡς τὸ "εἰ πέταται ἡ γῆ, ἔστιν ἡ γῆ."
 μόνως δὲ γίνεται ψεύδος ὅταν ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ
 ἀληθοῦς λήγη ἐπὶ ψεύδος, ὁποῖόν ἐστι τὸ "εἰ
 ἡμέρα ἔστι, νύξ ἔστιν". ἡμέρας γὰρ οὐσης τὸ μὲν
 "ἡμέρα ἔστιν" ἀληθὲς ἐστίν, ὅπερ ἦν ἡγούμενον,
 τὸ δὲ "νύξ ἔστι" ψεύδος ἐστίν, ὅπερ ἦν λήγον.

struction of the hypothetical proposition, and a
 proposition of this kind seems to promise that its
 second logically follows its first, and that if the
 antecedent exists the consequent will exist. Hence,
 if this sort of promise is fulfilled and the consequent
 follows the antecedent, the hypothetical proposition
 is true; but if it is not fulfilled, it is false. Accord- 112
 112 ings, let us begin at once with this problem, and
 consider whether any hypothetical proposition can
 be found which is true and which fulfils the promise
 described.

Now all the Dialecticians agree in asserting that a
 hypothetical proposition is valid when its consequent
 follows (logically) its antecedent; but as to when and
 how it so follows they disagree with one another and
 propound conflicting criteria of this "following."
 Thus Philo^a declared that "the hypothetical is true 113
 whenever it does not begin with what is true and end
 with what is false"; so that, according to him, the
 hypothetical is true in three ways and false in one
 way. For whenever it begins with truth and ends in
 truth it is true, as thus—"If it is day, it is light."
 And whenever it begins with what is false and ends
 in what is false, once more it is true, as for instance
 "If the earth flies, the earth has wings." Likewise 114
 114 also that which begins with what is false and ends
 with what is true is true, as thus—"If the earth flies,
 the earth exists." And it is false only in this one way,
 when it begins with truth and ends in what is false,
 as in a proposition of this kind—"If it is day, it is
 night"; for when it is day the clause "It is day"
 is true, and this was the antecedent, but the clause
 "It is night," which was the consequent, is false.

* Cf. P.H. ii. 110; Vol. I. Introd. p. xxxvi.

- 115 Διόδωρος δὲ ἀληθὲς εἶναι φησι συνημμένον ὅπερ μήτε ἐνεδέχετο μήτε ἐνδέχεται ἀρχόμενον ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς λήγειν ἐπὶ ψεύδος. ὅπερ μάχεται τῇ Φίλωνος θέσει. τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον συνημμένον "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστιν, ἐγὼ διαλέγομαι" ἡμέρας οὐσης ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος κάμου διαλεγομένου κατὰ μὲν τὸν Φίλωνα ἀληθὲς ἔστιν, ἐπεὶ περ ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς ἀρχόμενον τοῦ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν" εἰς ἀληθὲς λήγει τὸ "ἐγὼ διαλέγομαι," κατὰ δὲ τὸν Διόδωρον ψεύδος. ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς ποτὲ ἀρξάμενον τοῦ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν" ἐπὶ ψεύδος λήγειν τὸ "ἐγὼ διαλέγομαι," ἡσυχάσαντος ἐμοῦ. καὶ ἐνδέχεται ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς ἀρχόμενον ἐπὶ ψεύδος λήγειν τὸ "ἐγὼ διαλέγομαι"· πρὶν γὰρ ἀρξάσθαι διαλέγεσθαι, ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς μὲν ἤρχετο τοῦ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν," ἐπὶ ψεύδος δὲ ἔληγε τὸ "ἐγὼ διαλέγομαι." πάλιν τὸ οὕτως ἔχον "εἰ νύξ ἔστιν, ἐγὼ διαλέγομαι," ἡμέρας οὐσης καὶ σιωπῶντος ἐμοῦ κατὰ μὲν Φίλωνα ὡσαύτως ἀληθὲς, ἀπὸ γὰρ ψεύδους ἀρχόμενον ἐπὶ ψεύδος λήγει, κατὰ δὲ τὸν Διόδωρον ψεύδος· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ αὐτὸ ἀρξάμενον ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς λῆξαι εἰς ψεύδος νυκτὸς ἐπελθούσης, καὶ πάλιν ἐμοῦ μὴ διαλεγομένου ἀλλ' ἡσυχάζοντος. ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ τὸ
- 117 "εἰ νύξ ἔστιν, ἡμέρα ἔστιν" ἡμέρας οὐσης κατὰ μὲν Φίλωνα διὰ τοῦτ' ἀληθὲς ὅτι ἀπὸ ψεύδους ἀρχόμενον τοῦ "νύξ ἔστιν" εἰς ἀληθὲς λήγει τὸ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν," κατὰ δὲ Διόδωρον διὰ τοῦτο ψεύδος ὅτι ἐνδέχεται νυκτὸς ἐπισχούσης, ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς ἀρχόμενον αὐτὸ τοῦ "νύξ ἔστιν," ἐπὶ ψεύδος λήγειν τὸ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν."
- 118 Τοιαύτης οὖν οὐσης ὡς ἐν παραδείγματος μέρει τῆς ἐν τοῖς κριτηρίοις τοῦ συνημμένου ἀξιώματος

—But Diodorus^a asserts that "the hypothetical proposition is true which neither admitted nor admits of beginning with truth and ending in falsehood." And this is in conflict with the statement of Philo. For a hypothetical of this kind—"If it is day, I am conversing," when at the present moment it is day and I am conversing, is true according to Philo since it begins with the true clause "It is day" and ends with the true "I am conversing"; but according to Diodorus it is false, for it admits of beginning with a clause that is, at one time, true and ending in the false clause "I am conversing," when I have ceased speaking; also it admitted of beginning with truth and ending with the falsehood "I am conversing," for before I began to converse it began with the truth "It is day" and ended in the falsehood "I am conversing." Again, a proposition in this form—"If it is night, I am conversing," when it is day and I am silent, is likewise true according to Philo, for it begins with what is false and ends in what is false; but according to Diodorus it is false, for it admits of beginning with truth and ending in falsehood, after night has come on, and when I, again, am not conversing but keeping silence. Moreover, the proposition "If it is night, it is day," when it is day, is true according to Philo for the reason that it begins with the false "It is night" and ends in the true "It is day"; but according to Diodorus it is false for the reason that it admits of beginning, when night comes on, with the truth "It is night" and ending in the falsehood "It is day."

Such, then, being the contradictory character (as these examples show) of the criteria of the hypo-

^a For Diodorus Cronos cf. *P.H.* ii. 110.

ὑπεναντιώσεως, μήποτε ἄπορος γίνεται ἢ τοῦ ὑγιούς συνημμένου διάγνωσις· ἵνα γὰρ μάθωμεν τοῦτο, πρὸ παντὸς δεῖ ἐπικριθῆναι τὴν περὶ τῆς ὑγιότητος αὐτοῦ τῶν διαλεκτικῶν διάστασιν. ἐφ' ὅσον δὲ ἀνεπίκριτός ἐστι, μένεω ἀνάγκη καὶ αὐτὸ
 119 ἐν ἐποχῇ· καὶ εἰκότως. ἦτοι γὰρ πᾶσι τοῖς κριτηρίοις τῶν διαλεκτικῶν προσέξομεν ἢ τινι τούτων. ἀλλὰ πᾶσι μὲν οὐχ οἶόν τέ ἐστι προσέχειν· μάχεται γάρ, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν προειρημένων δυοῖν ὑπέδειξα, τὰ δὲ μαχόμενα οὐ δύναται ἐπ' ἴσης εἶναι πιστά. εἰ δὲ τινι τούτων, ἦτοι αὐτόθεν καὶ ἀκρίτως προσέξομέν τινι, ἢ μετὰ λόγου τοῦ δεικνύντος ὅτι ὑγιές
 120 ἐστι τὸ τοιοῦτον κριτήριον. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀκρίτως καὶ αὐτόθεν συγκαταθησόμεθ' αὐτὸ κριτηρίω, τί μᾶλλον τῷδε ἢ τῷδε συγκαταθησόμεθα; ὅπερ ἴσον ἦν τῷ μηδενὶ συγκατατίθεσθαι διὰ τὴν μάχην. εἰ δὲ μετὰ λόγου τοῦ δεικνύντος ὅτι ὑγιές ἐστι τὸ παραλαμβανόμενον ὑφ' ἡμῶν τοῦ συνημμένου κριτηρίου, ἦτοι οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἀσύνακτός ἐστι καὶ
 121 ἀπέραντος ἢ συνακτικός καὶ περαίνων. ἀλλ' ἀσύνακτος μὲν καθεστὼς καὶ ἀπέραντος ἄπιστός ἐστι καὶ μοχθηρὸς ἐν τῷ προκρίνειν τι τοῦ συνημμένου κριτηρίου. εἰ δὲ συνακτικός ὑπάρχει, πάντως διὰ τοῦτο συνακτικός τυγχάνει ὅτι ἀκολουθεῖ αὐτοῦ τοῖς λήμμασιν ἢ ἐπιφορά, ὥστε δι' ἀκολουθίας
 122 τινὸς αὐτὸν δοκιμάζεσθαι. τὴν δὲ ἀκολουθίαν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ζητουμένην ἐπὶ τοῦ συνημμένου λόγου¹ ἔδει δοκιμάζεσθαι. τοίνυν ἴσον ἦν τὸ τοιοῦτον τῷ εἰς τὸν δι' ἀλλήλων τρόπον ἐμπίπτειν· ἵνα γὰρ τὸ

¹ λόγῳ Heintz : λόγου mss., Bekk.

^a i.e. Philo and Diodorus, §§ 113-117.

thetical proposition, it is to be feared that the task of distinguishing the valid hypothetical is impracticable ; for in order that we may perceive this, there must first of all be a decision of the controversy of the Dialecticians regarding its validity. And so long as this remains undecided, the valid proposition itself must also of necessity remain in suspense. And naturally 119 so. For we shall either give heed to all the criteria of the Dialecticians, or to some one of them. But it is not possible to give heed to them all ; for—as I have pointed out in the case of the two mentioned above^a—they are conflicting, and things which conflict cannot be equally trustworthy. And if we give heed to some one of them, we shall give heed to it either at once and uncritically, or with the support of reasoning which proves that a criterion of this kind is valid. And if we shall assent to any one criterion 120 uncritically and at once, why shall we assent to this one rather than to that one? And this is equivalent to giving one's assent to none, because of the conflict. But if we assent with the support of reasoning which proves that the criterion of the hypothetical adopted by us is valid, then this reasoning is either inconclusive and indecisive or conclusive and decisive. But if it is inconclusive and indecisive it is un- 121 trustworthy and unsound when preferring a certain criterion of the hypothetical. And if it is conclusive, certainly it is conclusive for the reason that its conclusion follows its premisses, so that it is approved because of a certain consistency. But the consist- 122 ency sought in the case of the hypothetical ought to have been approved by reasoning. So, then, a result of this kind is equivalent to falling into the fallacy of circular reasoning ; for in order to perceive the

συνημμένον ἐξ ἀκολουθίας ὀφείλον δοκιμάζεσθαι μάθωμεν, ἐπὶ λόγον τινα δεῖ δραμεῖν, καὶ ἵνα οὗτος ὁ λόγος ὑγιής ᾖ, τὴν ἀκολουθίαν δεῖ προπεπι-
 123 τῶσθαι, ἀφ' ἧς ὅτι ἔστιν ὑγιής κρίνεται. μὴ ἔχοντες οὖν τὸ ὑγιές συνημμένον ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἀπορίᾳ, οὐδὲ συνακτικὸν ἔξομεν λόγον. τοῦτον δὲ μὴ ἔχοντες οὐδὲ ἀπόδειξιν ἔξομεν λόγος γάρ ἐστι συνακτικὸς ἢ ἀπόδειξις. ἀποδείξεως δὲ μὴ παρουσίας ἀναιρείται ἢ δογματικὴ φαντασία.
 124 Ἐνέσται δὲ ἀπὸ τούτων καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ συμπεπλεγμένα καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ διεzeugμένα κοινῶς ἐπὶ τε τὰ λοιπὰ εἶδη τῶν οὐχ ἀπλῶν ἀξιωματῶν διαβαίνειν. τὸ γὰρ συμπεπλεγμένον ἐξ ἀπλῶν ὀφείλει ἢ οὐκ ἐξ ἀπλῶν ἢ ἐκ μικτῶν συνεστάναι, πάντα δὲ
 125 ταῦτα ἠπόρηται τῶν ἀπλῶν προσηπορημένων. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅταν λέγωσιν ὑγιές εἶναι συμπεπλεγμένον τὸ πάντ' ἔχον ἐν αὐτῷ ἀληθῆ, οἷον τὸ "ἡμέρα ἔστι καὶ φῶς ἔστιν," ψεῦδος δὲ τὸ (ἐν)¹ ἔχον ψεῦδος, πάλιν νομοθετοῦσιν αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς. ἀκόλουθον γὰρ ἦν, εἰ ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ ἐκ πάντων ἀληθῶν σύνθετον εὐθύς ἀληθές εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐκ πάντων ψευδῶν συγκείμενον ψεῦδος, τὸ δὲ ἐκ ψευδῶν ἅμα καὶ ἀληθῶν μὴ μᾶλλον ἀληθές εἶναι
 126 ἢ ψεῦδος. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἔξεσθιν αὐτοῖς ἃ θέλουσι νομοθετεῖν καὶ ὡς προαιροῦνται περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων διατάττεσθαι, ἐπιτρεπτέον μὲν τὸ ἐν ἔχον ψεῦδος συμπεπλεγμένον λέγεσθαι παρ' αὐτοῖς ψεῦδος, ἐξέσται δὲ καὶ ἄλλοις ἀντιδιατάττεσθαι καὶ λέγειν τὸ ἐκ πλειόνων ἀληθῶν ἐνὸς δὲ ψεῦδους

¹ <ἐν> Heintz.

^a "Parade," or "outward show," seems the only possible
 302

hypothetical which requires to be approved by its consistency, we are obliged to have recourse to a form of reasoning, and in order that this reasoning may be valid, the consistency by which its validity is judged must be confirmed beforehand. If then, judging by
 123 this *impasse*, we do not possess the valid hypothetical, neither shall we possess conclusive reasoning; and not possessing this, we shall not possess proof either; for proof is conclusive reasoning. And if proof is absent, the parade^a of Dogmatism is destroyed.

From these we may pass over both to the conjunctive and to the disjunctive, and generally to all the remaining forms of non-simple propositions. For the conjunctive must be composed either of simple or of non-simple or of mixed propositions, and all these are subject to doubt when the simple sort are already doubted. Moreover, when they declare that the
 124 conjunctive which has all its parts true is valid—as, for instance, "It is day and it is light,"—and that that which has a false part is false, they are again laying down the law for themselves. For it should have followed at once that, if the compound with all its parts true is true, the compound with all its parts false is false, but that which has some parts false and at the same time some true is no more true than false.
 125 For if it is open to them to lay down what laws they please and to make rules about these matters just as they choose, we must allow their assertion that the conjunctive which contains one false clause is false; but it will be open also to others to make a contrary rule and assert that the conjunctive with several true
 126

sense of *φαντασία* here. Very probably the text is corrupt, but Heintz's *φιλοσοφία*, adopted by Mutschmann, is not convincing. One might suggest *παντά<πρα>σιν*.

- 127 συμπεπλεγμένον ἀληθὲς ὑπάρχειν. εἰ δὲ τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων προσεκτέον ἐστίν, ἀκόλουθον δῆπουθεν τὸ τι μὲν ψεῦδος ἔχον τι δὲ ἀληθὲς συμπεπλεγμένον μὴ μᾶλλον ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος εἶναι λέγειν· ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ ἐκ λευκοῦ καὶ ἐκ μέλανος μειγμένον οὐ μᾶλλον λευκὸν ἐστὶν ἢ μέλαν (τὸ μὲν γὰρ λευκὸν λευκὸν ἦν καὶ τὸ μέλαν μέλαν ὑπῆρχεν), οὕτω τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς μόνον ἀληθὲς εἶναι συμβέβηκεν, τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος μόνον ψεῦδος ὑπάρχει, τὸ δὲ σύνθετον ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων οὐ μᾶλλον ἀληθὲς ἢ
- 128 ψεῦδος προσαγορευτέον. ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ βίῳ, φασί, τὸ κατὰ μὲν τὰ πλεῖστα μέρη ὑγιὲς ἰμάτιον κατ' ὀλίγον δὲ διερρωγὸς οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν πλείστων καὶ ὑγιῶν μερῶν ὑγιὲς εἶναι λέγομεν ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀλίγου καὶ διερρωγότητος διερρωγός, οὕτω καὶ τὸ συμπεπλεγμένον, κἂν ἐν μόνον ἔχη ψεῦδος πλείονα δὲ ἀληθῆ, λεχθήσεται τὸ ὅλον ἀπὸ τοῦ
- 129 ἐνὸς ψεῦδος. ὅπερ ἐστὶν εὐθὴς. τῷ μὲν γὰρ βίῳ συγχωρητέον καταχρηστικοῖς ὀνόμασι χρῆσθαι, μὴ πάντως τὸ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ἀληθὲς ζητοῦντι ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς τὴν δόξαν. φρέαρ γοῦν ὀρύσσειν φαιμέν καὶ χλαμύδα ὑφαίνειν καὶ οἰκίαν οἰκοδομεῖν, οὐ κυρίως· εἰ γὰρ φρέαρ ἐστίν, οὐκ ὀρύσσεται ἀλλ' ὀρύρκεται, καὶ εἰ χλαμύς ἐστίν, οὐχ ὑφαίνεται ἀλλ' ὑφανταί. ὥστε ἐν μὲν τῷ βίῳ καὶ τῇ κοινῇ συνηθείᾳ τόπον εἶχεν ἢ κατάχρησις· ὅταν δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ζητῶμεν πράγματα, τότε ἔχουσι δεῖ τῆς ἀκριβείας.
- 130 Ἄλλ' ὅτι μὲν ἀπορός ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος καὶ πολλὴν ἔχων τὴν ταραχὴν τοῖς ἐν ἀσωμάτῳ τινὶ λεκτῷ τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ ψεῦδος ἀπολείπουσιν, ἐκ τούτων αὐτάρκως ὑποδέδεικται· ὅτι δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐν φωνῇ

clauses and one false is true. But if we ought to give heed to the real nature of these things, it is surely logical to say that the conjunctive which has one part true and one part false is no more true than false; for just as what is compounded of white and black is no more white than black (for the white was white and the black was black), so also the true is in fact only true and the false is only false, and the compound of the two must be described as no more true than false.—But, they say, just as in ordinary speech^a we do not say that the garment which is in most parts sound, but in a small part torn, is sound because of its more numerous and sound parts, but we call it torn because of its small part which is torn, so also with the conjunctive,—if it has only one part false and several true, the whole will be named after the one false part. But this is silly. For we must allow ordinary speech to make use of inexact terms, as it does not seek after what is really true but what is supposed to be true. Thus we speak of digging a well and weaving a cloak and building a house, but not with exactness; for if there is a well, it is not being dug but it has been dug; and if there is a cloak, it is not being woven but it has been woven. So that in ordinary life and common conversation inexact speech is in place, but when we are inquiring into real facts, then we must stick to accuracy.

By all this it has been made sufficiently clear that the argument of those who make truth and falsehood to lie in incorporeal “expression” is hopeless and full of confusion; and it is easy also to see that

^a Lit. “in life.”

- ταῦθ' ὑποσησαμένοις οὐκ ἔστιν εὐπορος, ῥάδιον
 131 μαθεῖν. πᾶσα γὰρ φωνή, εἴ ἔστιν, ἤτοι γινομένη
 ἔστιν ἢ σιωπωμένη· οὔτε δὲ ἡ γινομένη ἔστι τῷ
 μὴ ὑφ'εστάναι οὔτε ἡ σιωπωμένη τῷ μήπω γίνε-
 σθαι· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν ἡ φωνή. ἡ μὲν οὖν γινομένη
 οὐκ ἔστιν, καθάπερ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων δείκνυται· οὔτε
 γὰρ οἰκία γινομένη οἰκία ἔστιν, οὐ ναῦς, οὐκ ἄλλο
 τι τῶν τοιούτων, ὥστ' οὐδὲ φωνή. ὅτι δ' οὐδ' ἡ
 σιωπωμένη ὑφέστηκεν, ὁμόλογον. εἴπερ οὖν ἡ
 γίνεται φωνή ἢ σιωπάται, κατ' οὐδέτερον δὲ
 τούτων τῶν χρόνων ἔστιν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη φωνή.
- 132 Καὶ ἄλλως, εἴ ἐν φωνῇ ἔστι τὸ ἀληθές, ἤτοι ἐν
 ἐλαχίστῃ ἔστι φωνῇ ἢ ἐν μακρᾷ· οὔτε δὲ ἐν ἐλα-
 χίστῃ, ἀμερές γάρ ἔστι τὸ ἐλάχιστον, καὶ τὸ ἀληθές
 οὐκ ἀμερές· οὔτε ἐν μακρᾷ, ἀνυπόστατος γάρ ἔστιν
 αὕτη διὰ τὸ, ὅτε μὲν τὸ πρῶτον αὐτῆς προφέρεται
 μέρος, μήπω εἶναι τὸ δεύτερον, ὅτε δὲ τὸ δεύτερον,
 μηκέτι εἶναι τὸ πρῶτον. οὐ τοίνυν ἐν φωνῇ ἔστι
 133 τὸ ἀληθές. πρὸς τούτοις, εἴ ἐν φωνῇ ἔστιν,
 ἤτοι ἐν σημαίνουσῃ ἢ μὴ ἐν σημαίνουσῃ. ἀλλ'
 ἐν μὲν τῇ μὴ σημαίνουσῃ τι, ὅλον τῇ βλίτυρι καὶ
 τῇ σκιδαπός, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τι· πῶς γὰρ τοῦ μὴ
 σημαινομένου πράγματος οἶόν τέ ἔστιν ὡς ἀληθοῦς
 134 ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι; λείπεται ἄρα λέγειν ἐν τῇ σημα-
 νούσῃ. ὃ δὴ πάλιν ἔστιν ἀδύνατον· οὐδεμία γὰρ
 φωνή ὡς φωνή σημαντικὴ ἔστιν, ἐπεὶ ἐχρῆν πάν-
 τας τοὺς ἀντιλαμβανομένους φωνῆς Ἑλληνας καὶ
 βαρβάρους ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ τοῦ σημαινομένου
 ὑπ' αὐτῆς. ὥστε οὐδὲ κατὰ τοῦτο ἐν φωνῇ θετέον
 135 τὰ ληθές. τῶν τε φωνῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσὶν ἀπλαῖ

the argument of those who place them in speech is not satisfactory. For every speech, if it exists, is 131 either coming to be or silenced; but neither does that which is coming to be exist, owing to its non-subsistence, nor that which is silenced, owing to its not as yet coming to be. Speech, therefore, does not exist. Now that which is coming to be does not exist, as is shown by parallel instances; for a house when coming to be is not a house, nor is a ship, nor anything else of the sort; nor, consequently, speech. And that silent speech has no existence either is admitted. If, then, speech is either becoming or silenced, and at neither of these periods exists, speech will not exist.

Another objection,—if the true resides in speech, 132 it is either in a minimal or in a long speech; but it is not in a minimal, for the minimal object is indivisible and the true is not indivisible; nor is it in a long speech, for this is not really existent because, when the first part of it is being uttered, the second does not as yet exist, and when the second is being uttered the first no longer exists. So, then, the true does not reside in speech.—Furthermore, if it resides in speech, 133 it is either in significant or in non-significant speech. But it will not exist in that which has no significance, such as the words "Blituri" and "Skindapso"; for how is it possible to accept as true a thing which is not significant? It only remains, therefore, to say 134 that it resides in significant speech. But this again is impossible; for no speech as speech is significant, for, were it so, all the Greeks and barbarians on perceiving speech ought also to have perceived what is signified by it. So that on this ground, too, the true must not be located in speech.—Also, some forms of 135

- αἱ δὲ σύνθετοι, ἀπλαῖ μὲν οἶον ἢ Δίῳ, σύνθετοι δὲ ὡσπερ ἢ “ Δίῳ περιπατεῖ.” εἰ οὖν ἐν φωνῇ ἔστι τάληθές, ἤτοι ἐν ἀπλῇ ἔστιν ἢ ἐν συνθέτῳ. ἀλλ’ ἐν μὲν ἀπλῇ καὶ ἀσυνθέτῳ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀξίωμα γὰρ εἶναι δεῖ τάληθές, καὶ οὐδὲν ἀξίωμα ἀσύνθετον.
- 136 ἐν συνθέτῳ δὲ οὐκ ἂν εἴη διὰ τὸ μηδεμίαν σύνθετον ὑφεστάναι λέξιν, οἶον τὴν “ Δίῳ ἔστιν.” ὅτε γὰρ λέγομεν τὴν Δίῳ, οὕτω λέγομεν τὴν ἔστιν, καὶ ὅτε ταύτην προφερόμεθα, οὐκέτ’ ἐκείνην λέγομεν. ὡστ’ οὐδ’ ἐν φωνῇ τάληθές.
- 137 Καὶ μὴν οὐδ’ ἐν τῷ κινήματι τῆς διανοίας, ὡς ὑπενόησαν τινες. εἰ γὰρ ἐν τῷ κινήματι τῆς διανοίας ἔστι τάληθές, οὐδὲν ἔσται τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀληθές· τὸ γὰρ κίνημα τῆς διανοίας ἔστιν ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ οὐκ ἐκτὸς. ἄτοπον δέ γε τὸ λέγειν μηδὲν εἶναι τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀληθές· ἄτοπον ἄρα καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ κινήματι τῆς διανοίας ἀπολείπειν τάληθές.
- 138 Τῶν τε κινήματων τῆς διανοίας ἰδίων ὄντων ἐκάστου οὐδὲν ἔσται κοινὸν ἀληθές, μηδενὸς δὲ ὄντος κοινοῦ τινὸς ἀληθοῦς πάντ’ ἔσται ἀσαφὴ καὶ διάφωνα· ὁ γὰρ ἔχει οὗτος ἀληθές, τουτέστι τὸ κίνημα τῆς διανοίας, τοῦθ’ ἕτερος οὐκ ἔχει, καὶ ἀναστροφῶς, ὁ ἐκείνος ἔχει, τοῦθ’ οὗτος οὐκ εἴληφεν. ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι λέγειν συμφώνως ἀληθές· τοίουν καὶ τὸ ἀξιοῦν ἐν τῷ κινήματι τῆς διανοίας ὑποκεῖσθαι τάληθές ἀτοπὸν ἔστι καὶ οὐχ ὑγιές.
- Ἀκολουθὸν τέ ἐστι τοῖς ἐν τῷ κινήματι τῆς διανοίας ἀπολείπουσι τάληθές πάνθ’ ὁμολογεῖν ἀληθῆ εἶναι, οἶον τὸ κίνημα τῆς Ἐπικούρου διανοίας καὶ Ζήνωνος καὶ Δημοκρίτου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων· πᾶσι

speech are simple, others composite—simple as, for instance, “ Dion ” ; and composite, as “ Dion walks.” If, then, the true exists in speech, it exists either in simple or in composite speech ; but it does not exist in the simple and non-composite ; for the true must be a proposition, and no proposition is non-composite. And it will not exist in composite speech because no composite expression (such as “ Dion exists ”) subsists ; for when we are saying “ Dion ” we are not as yet saying “ exists,” and when we are uttering the latter we are no longer saying the former. So that the true is not in speech.

Nor yet is it in the motion of the intellect, as some have surmised. For if the true is in the motion of the intellect, none of the external things will be true ; for the motion of the intellect is within us and not external. But it is absurd to say that none of the external things is true ; therefore it is also absurd to locate the true in the motion of the intellect.

Also, as the motions of the intellect are peculiar to each individual, there will be nothing generally true, and when there is nothing that is true for all in common everything will be doubtful and discordant ; for what this man holds as true (that is the motion of his intellect), that another man does not hold ; and conversely, what that man holds, this man has not experienced. But it is absurd to say that there is nothing which by common consent is true ; hence also it is absurd and unsound to assert that the true resides in the motion of the intellect.

It follows, also, that those who locate the true in the motion of the intellect must agree that all such motions are true—the motion, for instance, of the intellects of Epicurus and of Zeno and of Democritus

γὰρ αὐτοῖς συμβέβηκεν ἐπ' ἴσης κινήμασιν εἶναι τῆς διανοίας ἀδύνατον δέ γέ ἐστι τὸ πάντα εἶναι ἀληθῆ, ὡς καὶ τὸ πάντα ψευδῆ· τοίνυν οὐδὲ τὸ κίνημα τῆς διανοίας τάληθές ἐστιν.

- 140 Ἄλλὰ γὰρ διὰ τοσοῦτων περὶ τε κριτηρίου καὶ περὶ ἀληθοῦς ἀπορήσαντες, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο σκεπτώμεθα καὶ περὶ τῶν συντιθεμένων ἐφόδων ἀπὸ τοῦ κριτηρίου πρὸς κατάληψιν τοῦ μὴ αὐτόθεν ὑποπίπτοντος ἀληθοῦς, τουτέστι τοῦ τε σημείου καὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως. καὶ τάξει γε πρῶτον περὶ σημείου λέγωμεν· μετουσία γὰρ τούτου ἢ ἀπόδειξις ἐκκαλυπτική γίνεται τοῦ συμπεράσματος.

B.—EI ESTI TI SHMEION

- 141 Ἐπεὶ τῶν πραγμάτων διττὴ τις ἔστι κατὰ τὸ ἀνωτάτω διαφορά, καθ' ἣν τὰ μὲν ἐστι πρόδηλα τὰ δὲ ἄδηλα, καὶ πρόδηλα μὲν τὰ αὐτόθεν ὑποπίπτοντα ταῖς τε αἰσθήσεσι καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἄδηλα δὲ τὰ μὴ ἐξ αὐτῶν ληπτὰ, μεθοδικώτερον [δὲ] εἰς μὲν τὴν τῶν ἐναργῶν ἀπορίαν ὁ περὶ κριτηρίου λόγος 142 ἡμῖν ἀποδέδοται· τούτου γὰρ ἀβεβαίου δειχθέντος ἀδύνατον γίνεται καὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν φαινομένων δυσχυρίζεσθαι ὅτι τοιαῦτά ἐστι πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ὁποῖα φαίνεται. λειπομένης δὲ ἔτι τῆς τῶν ἀδήλων διαφορᾶς, καλῶς ἔχων ἡγοῦμεθα καὶ πρὸς τὴν ταύτης ἀθέτησιν συντόμῳ τινὶ χρῆσασθαι ἐφόδῳ, τῇ τὸ τε σημεῖον καὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἀναιρούσῃ· τούτων γὰρ πάλιν ἀναιρουμένων ἀβέβαιοι

• Cf. P.H. i. 138.

and of the rest; for it happens that all alike are motions of the intellect. But it is impossible that they should all be true, as likewise that they should all be false; neither, then, is the true the motion of the intellect.

And now that we have presented all these 140 difficulties concerning the criterion and concerning the true, let us consider in the next place the methods, based on the criterion, which are devised for the apprehension of the true that is not immediately presented—that is to say, Sign and Proof. And first in order let us speak of Sign; for it is by participation in it that Proof becomes capable of revealing the conclusion.

II.—DOES A SIGN EXIST?

Since there is a certain twofold distinction of a most 141 general kind in things by which some are pre-evident,^a others non-evident—those being pre-evident which are immediately and of themselves presented to the senses and the intellect, and those non-evident which are not apprehensible of themselves,—our discussion of the criterion has been given its due place,^b as serving to show the doubtfulness of things evident; for if the criterion is proved to be 142 precarious, it also becomes impossible to affirm, regarding things apparent, that they are in reality such as they appear. And as the distinct class of things non-evident is still left, we deem it well, for the purpose of refuting it also, to employ a concise method of attack which destroys both sign and proof; for when these in turn are abolished, the apprehension of the

^b *i.e.* the criterion has been discussed first (lit. "more methodically," *i.e.* observing the proper order of treatment).

γίνεται καὶ ἡ δι' αὐτῶν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς κατάληψις. βραχεία δ' ἴσως οἰκείον ἐστι πρὸ τῶν κατὰ μέρος διελθεῖν περὶ τῆς τοῦ σημείου φύσεως.

- 143 Λέγεται τοίνυν τὸ σημεῖον διχῶς, κοινῶς τε καὶ ἰδίως, κοινῶς μὲν τὸ δοκοῦν τι δηλοῦν, καθὸ καὶ τὸ πρὸς ἀνανέωσιν τοῦ συμπαρατηρηθέντος αὐτῷ πράγματος χρησιμεῖον εἰώθαμεν καλεῖν σημεῖον, ἰδίως δὲ τὸ ἐνδεικτικὸν τοῦ ἀδηλουμένου πράγματος, περὶ οὗ καὶ πρόκειται ζητεῖν ἐπὶ τοῦ
- 144 παρόντος. εἰ δέ τις τρανότερον ἐπιβάλλει αὐτοῦ τῇ φύσει, πάλιν προληπτέον ὅτι, ὡς ἀνώτερον ἐλέγομεν, τῶν πραγμάτων πρόδηλα μὲν ἐστὶ τὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν εἰς γνώσιν ἡμῖν ἐρχόμενα, οἷον ἦν ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος τὸ ἡμέραν εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐμὲ διαλέγεσθαι, ἄδηλα δὲ τὰ μὴ οὕτως ἔχοντα.

Γ.—ΠΟΣΑΙ ΤΩΝ ΑΔΗΛΩΝ ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑΙ

- 145 Τῶν δὲ ἀδῆλων τὰ μὲν τινα ἦν καθάπαξ ἄδηλα, τὰ δὲ φύσει ἄδηλα, τὰ δὲ πρὸς καιρὸν ἄδηλα. ὧν πρὸς καιρὸν μὲν ἄδηλα καλεῖται ἅπερ τὴν φύσιν [μὲν] ἔχοντα ἐναργῆ παρὰ τινος ἔξωθεν περιστάσεις κατὰ καιροῦς ἡμῖν ἀδηλεῖται, οἷον νῦν ἡ τῶν Ἀθηναίων πόλις ἡμῖν φύσει μὲν γὰρ ἐναργής ἐστὶ καὶ πρόδηλος, παρὰ δὲ τὸ μεταξὺ διάστημα
- 146 ἀδηλεῖται. φύσει δὲ ἦν ἄδηλα τὰ δι' αἰῶνος ἀποκεκρυμμένα καὶ μὴ δυνάμενα ὑπὸ τὴν ἡμετέραν

^a Cf. P.H. ii. 100.

^b Cf. P.H. ii. 98.

true by means of them likewise becomes precarious. But it is, perhaps, fitting, before going into particulars, to discuss briefly the nature of sign.

The term "sign," then, has two senses, the general 143 and the particular.^a In the general sense it is that which seems to make something evident—in which sense we are accustomed to call that a sign which serves to effect the renewal of the object observed in conjunction with it,—and in the particular sense it means that which is indicative of a non-evident object; and it is this latter which we propose at present to investigate. But if one is to understand its nature 144 clearly, one must, again, grasp first the fact that, as we said above, those things are pre-evident which come to our knowledge of themselves—such as, at the present moment, the fact that "it is day" and that "I am conversing,"—and those things are non-evident which are not of this character.

III.—HOW MANY ARE THE DISTINCT CLASSES OF THINGS NON-EVIDENT ?

Of things non-evident some are absolutely non- 145 evident, some naturally non-evident, and some temporarily non-evident. And of these, those are called "temporarily" non-evident which are in their nature manifest but are at certain times rendered non-evident to us owing to certain external circumstances—as for instance the city of Athens is to us at the present moment ^b; for though it is naturally manifest and pre-evident, owing to the intervening distance it is rendered non-evident. "Naturally" 146 non-evident are the things which are everlastingly hidden away and are not capable of presenting

πεσεῖν ἐνάργειαν, καθάπερ οἱ νοητοὶ πόροι καὶ τὸ
 ἀξιούμενον ἐκτὸς εἶναι τοῦ κόσμου τισὶ φυσικοῖς
 147 ἄπειρον κενόν. καθάπαξ δὲ ἄδηλα λέγεται τυγ-
 χάνειν τὰ μηδέποτε ὑπ' ἀνθρωπίνην κατάληψιν
 πεφυκότεα πίπτειν, οἷον ἔστι τὸ ἀρτίους εἶναι τοὺς
 ἀστέρας ἢ περισσοὺς καὶ τὸ τοσσάδε ὑπάρχειν ἐν
 148 Λιβύῃ ψάμμους. τεσσάρων οὖν οὐσῶν ἐν τοῖς
 πράγμασι διαφορῶν, μιᾶς μὲν τῆς τῶν ἐναργῶν,
 δευτέρας δὲ τῆς τῶν καθάπαξ ἀδήλων, τρίτης δὲ
 τῆς τῶν φύσει ἀδήλων, τετάρτης τῆς τῶν πρὸς
 καιρὸν, οὐ πᾶσάν φαμεν διαφορὰν σημείου δεῖσθαι
 149 ἀλλὰ τινά. εὐθέως γὰρ οὔτε τὰ καθάπαξ ἄδηλα
 ἐπιδέχεται τι σημεῖον οὔτε τὰ ἐναργῆ, ἀλλὰ τὰ
 μὲν ἐναργῆ ὅτι ἐξ αὐτῶν προσπίπτει καὶ οὐδενὸς
 ἑτέρου δεῖται πρὸς μῆνυσιν, τὰ δὲ καθάπαξ ἄδηλα
 ὅτι κοινῶς πᾶσαν ἐκπεφυγότεα κατάληψιν οὐδὲ
 150 τὴν διὰ σημείου ἐπιδέχεται. τὰ δὲ φύσει ἄδηλα
 καὶ τὰ πρὸς καιρὸν χρεῖαν ἔχει τῆς ἐκ τοῦ σημείου
 παρατηρήσεως, τὰ μὲν πρὸς καιρὸν ἄδηλα ὅτι
 κατὰ τινὰς περιστάσεις αἰρεται ἐκ τῆς πρὸς ἡμᾶς
 ἐναργείας, τὰ δὲ φύσει ἄδηλα ὅτι διὰ παντός ἔστιν
 151 ἀφανῆ. διττῆς οὖν οὐσης διαφορᾶς τῶν σημείου
 δεομένων πραγμάτων διττὸν ἀνεφάνη καὶ τὸ ση-
 μείον, τὸ μὲν τι ὑπομνηστικόν, ὅπερ μάλιστα ἐπὶ
 τῶν πρὸς καιρὸν ἀδήλων φαίνεται χρησιμεῖον, τὸ
 δὲ ἐνδεικτικόν, ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν φύσει ἀδήλων ἀξιοῦται
 152 παραλαμβάνεσθαι. καὶ δὴ τὸ μὲν ὑπομνηστικόν
 συμπαρηρηθὲν τῷ σημειωτῷ δι' ἐναργείας, ἅμα

* *i.e.* excretory ducts, called "intelligible" because not perceptible by sense but only by an intellectual act of inference; *cf.* *P.H.* ii. 98, 140.

^b *Cf.* i. 243.

themselves clearly to our perception, such as the intelligible pores ^a and the existence (maintained by certain physicists) of an infinite Void outside the universe. And "absolutely" non-evident are said to be 147 those things whose nature it is never to be presented to human apprehension, as is the fact that the stars are even in number or odd,^b and that the grains of sand in Libya are of a certain definite number. Since, 148 then, there are four distinct classes of objects—one being that of things manifest, the second of things absolutely non-evident, the third of things naturally non-evident, the fourth of things temporarily so, we assert that not every distinct class, but some of them, require a sign. For obviously neither the absolutely 149 non-evident nor the manifest things admit of a sign—the manifest because they strike on the senses of themselves and require no other thing to announce them, and the absolutely non-evident because they elude every kind of apprehension without exception and thus do not admit of apprehension by means of sign. But things naturally non-evident, and things 150 temporarily so, have need of the kind of observation effected by sign—the temporarily non-evident because, in certain circumstances, they are removed from our clear perception, and the naturally non-evident because they are for ever non-apparent. As, 151 then, there are two distinct classes of things which require sign, Sign also has revealed itself as twofold—the "commemorative," which appears to be chiefly of use in the case of things temporarily non-evident, and the "indicative," which is deemed proper for adoption in the case of things naturally non-evident.—Thus the commemorative sign, when observed 152 in conjunction with the thing signified in a clear

- τῷ ὑποπεσεῖν ἐκεῖνου ἀδηλουμένου, ἄγει ἡμᾶς εἰς ὑπόμνησιν τοῦ συμπαρατηρηθέντος αὐτῷ, νῦν δὲ ἐναργῶς μὴ προσπίπτοντος, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ καπνοῦ καὶ τοῦ πυρός· ταῦτα γὰρ πολλάκις ἀλλήλοις συνεξευγμένα παρατηρήσαντες ἅμα τῷ τὸ ἕτερον ἰδεῖν, τούτέστι τὸν καπνόν, ἀνανεούμεθα τὸ λοιπόν,
- 153 τούτέστι τὸ μὴ βλεπόμενον πῦρ. ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς τῷ ἔλκει ἐπιγινόμενης οὐλῆς καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ θανάτου προηγουμένης καρδίας τρώσεως· οὐλήν τε γὰρ ἰδόντες προηγησάμενον ἔλκος ἀνανεούμεθα, καρδίας τε τρώσιν θεασάμενοι μέλλοντα θάνατον προγινώσκομεν. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ὑπομνη-
- 154 στικὸν σημεῖον τοιαύτην εἶχε τὴν ιδιότητα, τὸ δὲ ἐνδεικτικὸν διέφερε τούτου. οὐκέτι γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸ συμπαρατήρησιν τῷ σημειωτῷ ἐπιδέχεται (ἀρχῆθην γὰρ ἀνυπόπτωτόν ἐστι τὸ φύσει ἀδηλον πρᾶγμα, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐ δύναται τινι τῶν φαινομένων συμπαρατηρηθῆναι), ἀλλ' ἀντικρυς ἐκ τῆς ἰδίας φύσεως καὶ κατασκευῆς μόνον οὐχὶ φωνῆν ἀφιέν
- 155 λέγεται σημαίνειν τὸ οὐ ἐστὶν ἐνδεικτικόν. οἷον ἢ ψυχῇ τῶν φύσει ἀδήλων ἐστὶ πραγμάτων· οὐδέποτε γὰρ ὑπὸ τὴν ἡμετέραν πέφυκε πίπτειν ἐν ἄργειαν. τοιαύτη δὲ οὖσα ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα κινήσεων ἐνδεικτικῶς μνησεται· λογιζόμεθα γὰρ ὅτι δυνάμεις τις ἐνδεδυκυῖα τῷ σώματι τοιαύτας αὐτῷ κινήσεις ἐνδίδωσιν.
- 156 Ἄλλὰ γὰρ δυσὶν ὄντων σημείων, τοῦ τε ὑπομνηστικοῦ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πρὸς καιρὸν ἀδήλων τὰ πολλὰ χρησιμεύειν δοκοῦντος, καὶ τοῦ ἐνδεικτικοῦ, ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν φύσει ἀδήλων ἐγκρίνεται, μελλήσομεν πᾶσαν ποιείσθαι ζήτησιν καὶ ἀπορίαν οὐ

perception, brings us, as soon as it is presented and when the thing signified has become non-evident, to a recollection of the thing observed along with it and now no longer clearly perceived—as in the case of smoke and fire; for as we have often observed these to be connected with each other, as soon as we see the one—that is to say, smoke—we recall the other—that is to say, the unseen fire. The same 153 account applies to the scar which follows on the wound, and to the puncture of the heart which precedes death; for on seeing the scar we recall the wound which preceded it, and on viewing the puncture of the heart we foretell the imminence of death.—Such, then, is the special character of the “commemorative” sign; but the “indicative” is of a 154 different kind. For it does not, like the former, admit of being observed in conjunction with the thing signified (for the naturally non-evident object is, from the start, imperceptible and therefore cannot be observed along with any of the things apparent), but entirely of its own nature and constitution, all but uttering its voice aloud, it is said to signify that whereof it is indicative. The soul, for instance, 155 is one of the things naturally non-evident; for such is its nature that it never presents itself to our clear perception; and being such, it is announced “indicatively” by the bodily motions; for we argue that it is a certain power residing within the body which inwardly excites in it such motions.

So then, as there are two signs—that which is 156 “commemorative” and held to be mainly of use in the case of things temporarily non-evident, and the “indicative” which is employed in the case of things naturally non-evident—we propose to devote all our

περὶ τοῦ ὑπομνηστικοῦ, τοῦτο γὰρ παρὰ πᾶσι κοινῶς τοῖς ἐκ τοῦ βίου πεπίστευται χρησιμεύειν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἐνδεικτικοῦ· τοῦτο γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν φιλοσόφων καὶ τῶν λογικῶν ἰατρῶν, ὡς δυνάμενον τὴν ἀναγκαιοτάτην αὐτοῖς παρέχειν
 157 χρεῖαν, πέπλασται. ὅθεν οὐδὲ μαχόμεθα ταῖς κοιναῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων προλήψεσιν, οὐδὲ συγγέομεν τὸν βίον, λέγοντες μὴθὲν εἶναι σημεῖον, καθάπερ τινὲς ἡμᾶς συκοφαντοῦσιν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ πᾶν ἀνηροῦμεν σημεῖον, τάχ' ἴσως ἂν καὶ τῷ βίῳ καὶ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἐμαχόμεθα· νυνὶ δὲ οὕτω καὶ αὐτοὶ ἔγνωμεν, ἐκ μὲν καπνοῦ πῦρ, ἐκ δὲ οὐλῆς προηγησάμενον ἔλκος, ἐκ δὲ προηγουμένης καρδίας τρώσεως θάνατον, ἐκ δὲ προκειμένης ταινίας
 158 ἄλειμμα λαμβάνοντας. νῦν οὖν ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ὑπομνηστικὸν σημεῖον τίθεμεν, ᾧ χρῆται ὁ βίος, τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν ψευδῶς δοξασθέν ἀναιροῦμεν, μήποτε πρὸς τῷ μὴ μάχεσθαι τῷ βίῳ ἔτι καὶ συναγορεύομεν αὐτῷ, ἐπεὶ περ τοὺς κατέξαστάντας τῆς κοινῆς προλήψεως δογματικούς καὶ τὰ φύσει ἀδηλα γινώσκειν λέγοντας σημειωτικῶς ἐκ φυσιολογίας ἐλέγχομεν.
 159 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίοις περὶ τοῦ ὑπὸ τὴν ζήτησιν πίπτοντος σημείου λελέχθω· χρῆ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος διὰ μνήμης ἔχειν τὸ σκεπτικὸν ἔθος. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ μετὰ πείσματος καὶ συγκαταθέσεως ἐκτίθεσθαι τοὺς κατὰ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τοῦ σημείου λόγους (ἴσον γὰρ ἦν τὸ τοιοῦτο ποιεῖν τῷ ἀξιοῦν εἶναι τι σημεῖον παραπλησιῶς τοῖς δογματίζουσιν), ἀλλ' ὥστε εἰς ἰσοσθένειαν τὴν ζήτησιν

* The "Logical," or "Dogmatic," was one of the chief Schools of Medicine in the Hellenistic age. Cf. *P.H.* i. 236 n. 318

investigation and criticism not to the commemorative sign (for this is generally believed by all ordinary folk to be useful) but to the indicative ; for this has been devised by the Dogmatic philosophers and by the Logical physicians,^a as capable of affording them most necessary assistance. Hence we are not attacking 157 the common preconceptions of mankind, nor are we turning life upside down by asserting that no sign exists, as some slanderously affirm of us. For if we were abolishing every sign we might, perhaps, have been attacking ordinary life and all mankind ; but as it is, we ourselves also are of the same mind and infer fire from smoke, and a previous wound from a scar, and death from a previous puncture of the heart, and oil from a previous fillet.^b As it is, then, 158 seeing that we affirm the commemorative sign which ordinary folk employ, but abolish the sign falsely imagined by the Dogmatists, one should rather say that not only do we not attack ordinary life but we even act as its advocates, inasmuch as we refute by means of natural science the Dogmatists who have risen up against the common judgement and declared that they discern by means of signs things naturally non-evident.

Let this, then, serve as a summary account of the 159 sign now under investigation ; and at this point it is right to keep in mind the practice of the Sceptics.^c This is to set out the arguments against the existence of the sign, but not with conviction or assent (for to do it with assent would be on a par with maintaining, like the Dogmatists, that a sign exists), but so as to

^a Alluding to the custom of athletes to wear fillets and anoint themselves.

^c Cf. *P.H.* ii. 79, 103.

ἀγειν, καὶ δεικνύναι ὅτι ἐπ' ἴσης ἐστὶ πιστὸν τῷ εἶναι τι σημεῖον τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἢ ἀνάπαλιν ἐπ' ἴσης ἄπιστον τῷ μηδὲν ὑπάρχειν τὸ ὑπάρχειν τι σημεῖον· ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ ἢ ἀρρεψία καὶ ἢ ἐποχὴ γίνεται τῇ
 160 *διανοίᾳ*. ἀμέλει γοῦν διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὁ δοκῶν ἡμῖν ἀντιλέγειν φάσκουσι μηδὲν εἶναι ἐνδεικτικὸν σημεῖον βοηθός ἐστιν, καὶ τὸ ὀφείλον κατασκευάζεσθαι μέρος σκεπτικῶς, τοῦτ' αὐτὸς προλαβὼν κατασκευάζει· εἰ γὰρ οἱ μὲν κατὰ τοῦ σημείου κομιζόμενοι παρὰ τοῖς ἀπορητικοῖς λόγοι σφόδρ' εἰσι σθεναροὶ καὶ σχεδὸν ἀναντίρρητοι, τούτων δὲ οὐ λείπονται καὶ οἱ παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς τὴν ὑπαρξίν αὐτοῦ κατασκευάζοντες, αὐτόθεν ἐφεκτέον ἐστὶ περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως καὶ μὴ ἀδίκως τῷ ἑτέρῳ μέρει
 161 προσθετέον. πλὴν καὶ τοῦ σκεπτικοῦ ἔθους παρασταθέντος, χωρῶμεν λοιπὸν καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ προκειμένου κατασκευήν.

Τῶν οὖν ὄντων, φασὶν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως, τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ κατὰ διαφορὰν τὰ δὲ πρὸς τι πῶς ἔχοντα. καὶ κατὰ διαφορὰν μὲν ὅποσα κατ' ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν καὶ ἀπολύτως νοεῖται, οἷον λευκὸν μέλαν, γλυκὺ πικρὸν, πᾶν τὸ τούτοις παραπλήσιον· ψιλοῖς γὰρ αὐτοῖς καὶ κατὰ περιγραφὴν ἐπιβάλλομεν καὶ δίχα
 162 τοῦ ἑτερόν τι συνεπινοεῖν. πρὸς τι δὲ ἐστὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν ὡς πρὸς ἕτερον σχέσιν νοούμενα καὶ οὐκέτι ἀπολελυμένως λαμβανόμενα, τούτέστι κατ' ἰδίαν, οἷον τὸ λευκότερον καὶ μελάντερον καὶ γλυκύτερον καὶ πικρότερον, καὶ πᾶν εἴ τι τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστὶν ιδέας. οὐ γὰρ ὄν τρόπον τὸ λευκὸν ἢ τὸ μέλαν κατ' ἰδίαν ἐνοεῖτο περιγραφὴν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ λευκότερον ἢ

^a Cf. P.H. ii. 130.

^b Cf. P.H. i. 190.

^c Cf. P.H. i. 135, 137.

bring the inquiry to a position of equipollence,^a and prove that the non-existence of a sign is equally credible with its existence, or, conversely, that the existence of a sign is equally incredible with its non-existence; for thereby there is produced in the intellect neutrality and suspension of judgement.^b Moreover, on this account even the man who appears
 160 to contradict us, when we assert that no indicative sign exists, is actually supporting us, and by already adopting it himself he establishes the view that ought to be established sceptically; for if the arguments brought against the sign by the Doubters are exceedingly strong and almost incontrovertible, and those of the Dogmatists establishing its existence are not less weighty, we must at once suspend judgement regarding its existence and must not attach ourselves unjustly to either side. And now
 161 that the practice of the Sceptics has been set forth, let us next proceed to develop the theme before us.

Of existing things, then, some, as the Sceptics assert, have an absolute, others a relative, existence. Absolutely existing are all such things as are perceived with a subsistence of their own and absolutely,^c as for instance white, black, sweet, bitter, and everything of a similar kind; for we apprehend these by themselves alone and separately and without the accompaniment of any other percept. But those things are relative which are perceived as standing in some relation to another thing and no longer apprehended absolutely (that is, separately by themselves); as, for example, the whiter and blacker and sweeter and bitterer, and whatever else is of the same character. For the whiter or blacker is not perceived separately in the same way as the white or black; but in order

μελάντερον· ἀλλ' ἵνα τοῦτο νοήσωμεν, συνεπιβάλλειν δεῖ καὶ ἐκείνῳ τῷ οὐ λευκότερον ἔστιν ἢ τῷ οὐ μελάντερον ἔστιν. καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ γλυκυτέρου καὶ 163 πικροτέρου ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος. ἐπεὶ οὖν δύο εἰσὶ τῶν πραγμάτων διαφοραὶ, μία μὲν ἢ τῶν κατὰ διαφορὰν δευτέρα δὲ ἢ τῶν πρὸς τι πῶς ἐχόντων, δεήσει καὶ τὸ σημεῖον τό γε ἐνδεικτικὸν ἦτοι τῶν κατὰ διαφορὰν ἢ τῶν πρὸς τι ὑπάρχειν· τρίτη γὰρ μεταξὺ τούτων ἰδέα τῶν πραγμάτων οὐκ ἔστιν. ἀλλὰ τῶν 164 κατὰ διαφορὰν μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἶη, ὡς αὐτόθεν συγκεχώρηται καὶ πρὸς τῶν ἑτεροδόξων. τοίνυν τῶν πρὸς τι γενήσεται. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ σημειωτὸν κατὰ τὴν ὡς πρὸς τὸ σημεῖον σχέσιν νοούμενον τῶν πρὸς τι ἔστίν (οὕτω καὶ τὸ σημεῖον τῶν πρὸς τι ἔστίν)¹· τινὸς γὰρ ἔστι σημεῖον, καθάπερ τοῦ σημειωτοῦ. εἰ γοῦν τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν καθ' ὑπόθεσιν ἀνέλωμεν, καὶ τὸ λειπόμενον συνααιρεθήσεται, οἷόν τι καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δεξιῦ καὶ ἀριστεροῦ φαίνεται γιγνόμενον· μηδενὸς γὰρ ὄντος δεξιῦ οὐδὲ ἀριστερόν τι ἔσται διὰ τὸ τῶν πρὸς τι εἶναι τούτων ἑκάτερον, καὶ 165 μηδενὸς ὄντος ἀριστεροῦ συμπεριγράφεται καὶ ἡ τοῦ δεξιῦ ἐπίνοια. ἀλλὰ δὴ τὰ πρὸς τι συγκαταλαμβάνεται ἀλλήλοις· οὔτε γὰρ λευκότερόν τι, ὡς ἔφην, δυνατόν ἐστι γνωρίζειν μὴ συνυποπίπτοντος τοῦ οὐ λευκότερόν ἔστιν, οὐδὲ μελάντερόν (μὴ συνεπινοουμένου τοῦ οὐ μελάντερόν)² ἔστιν. τοίνυν ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ σημεῖον τῶν πρὸς τι ἔστιν, ὡς παρεμυθησάμεθα, συγκαταληφθήσεται τῷ σημείῳ τὸ οὐ ἔστί σημεῖον. τὸ συγκαταλαμβανόμενον δὲ αὐτῷ οὐκ ἔσται σημεῖον αὐτοῦ. τὸ γὰρ ὑπονοεῖν ὅτι

¹ <οὕτω . . . ἔστίν> cj. Bekk.

<μὴ . . . μελάντερον> add. N: similiter cj. Bekk.

to perceive the former, one must also apprehend along with it the object than which it is whiter, or than which it is blacker. And the same account applies to the sweeter and the bitterer. Since, then, there 163 are two distinct classes of things, one being that of things absolute, the second that of things relative, the indicative sign must belong either to the class of absolutes or to that of relatives; for there is no third class of things between these two. But it will not belong to the absolutes, as is at once agreed even by those of the other persuasion. So, then, it will belong 164 to the relative class. For just as the thing signified, because it is perceived as standing in relation to the sign, is a relative thing, (so too the sign is a relative thing,) for it is a sign of something, namely, of the thing signified. Certainly, if we take away, let us suppose, one of the two, the remaining one also will be taken away along with it, a thing which plainly happens also in the case of right and left; for if there is no right, neither will there be a left, owing to the fact that each of these is a relative; and if there is no left, the notion of right also is cancelled at the same time. —Further, relatives are apprehended together; for, 165 as I said, it is impossible to be aware of a whiter thing without a joint perception of that than which it is whiter, or of a blacker thing (without a joint apprehension of that than which it is blacker). So then, since the sign is, as we showed,^a a relative thing, that whereof it is a sign will be apprehended along with the sign. But the thing apprehended along with it will not be a sign of it. For to imagine that what is

^a Cf. *P.H.* ii. 118 ff.

δύναται τό τινι συγκαταλαμβανόμενον σημεῖον ἐκείνου γίνεσθαι τελέως ἀπερρωγός· ἀμφοτέρων γὰρ ὑπὸ μίαν προθεσμίαν λαμβανομένων οὔτε τόδε τοῦδε ἐκκαλυπτικόν ἐστίν οὔτε τόδε τοῦδε μηνυτικόν, ἐκάτερον δὲ δι' αὐτοῦ προσπίπτον ἀποδεί τῆς 166 τοιαύτης δυνάμεως. συνθείη δ' ἂν τις ἀνά-παιν λόγον τοιοῦτον. τὸ σημεῖον εἴπερ καταλη-πτόν ἐστιν, ἤτοι προκαταλαμβάνεται τοῦ σημειωτοῦ ἢ συγκαταλαμβάνεται αὐτῷ ἢ ἐπικαταλαμβάνεται αὐτῷ· οὔτε δὲ προκαταλαμβάνεται οὔτε συγκατα-λαμβάνεται οὔτε ἐπικαταλαμβάνεται, ὡς παραστή- 167 σομεν· οὐκ ἄρα καταληπτόν ἐστι τὸ σημεῖον. καὶ δὴ τὸ μὲν λέγειν ὅτι ἐπικαταλαμβάνεται τῷ σημει-ωτῷ τὸ σημεῖον, αὐτόθεν φαίνεται ἄτοπον· πῶς γὰρ ἔτι δύναται ἐκκαλυπτικόν εἶναι τὸ σημεῖον, ὅτε οὐ ἐκκαλυπτικόν ἐστι, τὸ σημειωτόν, προκαταλαμ-βάνεται αὐτοῦ; ἄλλως τε καὶ μαχόμενόν τι προσ-δέξονται οἱ δογματικοὶ τῷ συνήθως ὑπ' αὐτῶν δογματιζομένῳ, ἐὰν τοῦτο λέγωσιν. φασὶ γὰρ τὸ σημειωτόν ἀδηλον εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἐξ αὐτοῦ κατα-ληπτόν· εἰ δέ γε μετὰ τὴν τούτου κατάληψιν ἐπικαταλαμβάνεται τὸ σημεῖον, οὐκ ἔσται τοῦτ' ἀδηλον ὃ γε πρὸ τῆς τοῦ μηνύοντος αὐτὸ παρουσίας πεφύραται. ὥστε οὐκ ἐπικαταλαμβάνεται τῷ ση- 168 μειωτῷ τὸ σημεῖον. καὶ μὴ οὐδὲ συγκατα-λαμβάνεται διὰ τὴν μικρῷ πρόσθεν εἰρημένην αἰτίαν· τὰ γὰρ συγκαταλαμβανόμενα ἀλλήλοις οὐ δέεται τῆς ἐξ ἀλλήλων μηνύσεως ἀλλ' ὑφ' ἐν ἐξ αὐτῶν προσπίπτει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε τὸ σημεῖον λέγοιτ' ἂν εἶναι σημεῖον οὔτε τὸ σημειωτόν ἔτι ὑπάρχειν 169 σημειωτόν. καταλείπεται οὖν λέγειν ὅτι προκαταλαμβάνεται τὸ σημεῖον τοῦ σημειωτοῦ. ὃ

apprehended along with a thing can be a sign of that thing is perfectly absurd; for when both are pre-ceived at one and the same moment, neither does this serve to reveal that nor that serve to indicate this; and each, when it is presented by itself, lacks any such efficacy.—Again, one might construct an 166 argument of this sort: The sign, if it is apprehensible, is either apprehended before the thing signified, or apprehended along with it, or apprehended after it; but, as we shall establish, it is not apprehended either before, or along with, or after it; therefore the sign is not apprehensible. Now to state that the sign is 167 apprehended after the thing signified is seen at once to be absurd; for how can the sign still be capable of revealing when that which it serves to reveal—the thing signified—is apprehended before it? And, besides, if they make this statement, the Dogmatists will be accepting something which is in conflict with one of their usual dogmas. For they assert that the thing signified is non-evident and not apprehensible of itself; but if, after the apprehension of this, the sign is apprehended subsequently, this thing, which was detected before the presence of that which announces it, will not be non-evident. So that the sign is not apprehended after the thing signified.—Nor yet, indeed, is it apprehended along with it, 168 for the reason stated a little while ago^a; for things apprehended along with one another do not require announcement by one another but are presented of themselves simultaneously; and because of this, neither will the sign be said to be a sign, nor the thing signified to be any longer signified.—It only remains, 169 then, to declare that the sign is apprehended before

^a Cf. § 165.

πάλιν εἰς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐλέγχους κυλίεται. πρότερον γὰρ ὀφείλουσιν οἱ δογματικοὶ δεῖξαι ὅτι οὐ τῶν πρὸς τι ἔστι τὸ σημεῖον ἢ ὅτι οὐ συγκαταλαμβάνεται ἀλλήλοις τὰ πρὸς τι, εἶτα τότε καὶ παρ' ἡμῶν λαμβάνειν τὸ δύνασθαι τοῦ σημειωτοῦ προκατα-
 170 λαμβάνεσθαι τὸ σημεῖον. ἀμετακινήτων δὲ ὄντων τῶν πρώτων οὐχ οἷόν τε ἔστι τὴν προκατάληψιν τῷ σημείῳ μαρτυρεῖν ἐκ τοῦ γένους ὄντι τῶν πρὸς τι καὶ ὀφείλονται συγκαταλαμβάνεσθαι τῷ οὐ ἔστι σημεῖον. ἀλλ' εἴπερ, ἵνα καταληφθῆ τὸ σημεῖον, δεῖ ἢ προκαταλαμβάνεσθαι αὐτὸ τοῦ σημειωτοῦ ἢ συγκαταλαμβάνεσθαι τούτῳ ἢ ἐπικαταλαμβάνεσθαι, δέδεικται δὲ μηδὲν τούτων δυνατὸν. ῥητέον ἦν¹ ἀκατάληπτον εἶναι τὸ σημεῖον.

171 "Ἐτι ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς δυνάμεως ἄλλον λόγον συνερρωτώσι τινας τοὺς δογματικούς, οὕτως ἔχοντα. εἴπερ ἔστι τι ἐνδεικτικὸν τινος σημείου, ἧτοι φαινόμενον φαινομένου σημείον ἔστιν ἢ ἀφανὲς ἀφανοῦς ἢ φαινόμενον ἀφανοῦς ἢ ἀφανὲς φαινομένου· οὔτε δὲ φαινόμενον φαινομένου σημείον ἔστιν οὔτε ἀφανοῦς ἀφανὲς οὔτε φαινόμενον ἀφανοῦς οὔτε [δὲ]
 172 ἐναλλάξ· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τι σημεῖον. καὶ ὁ μὲν λόγος τοιοῦτος, πρόδηλος δὲ καὶ ἡ τούτου κατασκευὴ ἔστιν. καὶ προδηλοτέρα μᾶλλον γενήσεται ὑποδειξάντων ἡμῶν τὴν κομιζομένην πρὸς αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν ἐνστασιν. φασὶ γὰρ μόνον τὰς δύο συγχωρεῖσθαι συζυγίας, περὶ δὲ τῶν λειπομένων
 173 δυοῖν διίστασθαι πρὸς ἡμᾶς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ φαινόμενον φαινομένου καὶ ἀφανοῦς φαινομένου γίνγε-

¹ ἦν : οὖν mss., Bekk. (secl. Mutsch.).

* Cf. P.H. ii. 124 ff.

the thing signified. And this, again, lies open to the same criticisms. For the Dogmatists ought first to prove that the sign is not a relative thing, or that relatives are not apprehended along with each other, and then in the next place get us to admit that the sign can be apprehended before the thing signified. But as our primary assumptions remain unaltered, 170 it is impossible to get evidence for the anterior apprehension of the sign, owing to the fact of its belonging to the class of relatives and having necessarily to be apprehended along with that whereof it is a sign.— But if it be so that the sign, in order to be apprehended, must either be apprehended before the thing signified, or apprehended along with this, or apprehended after it, and it has been proved that none of these alternatives is possible, one must declare that the sign is non-apprehensible.

Further, some confront the Dogmatists with 171 another argument, to the same effect, in this form: If there exists an indicative sign, either it is an apparent sign of an apparent thing, or a non-apparent of a non-apparent, or an apparent of a non-apparent, or a non-apparent of an apparent^a; but it is neither an apparent sign of an apparent thing, nor a non-apparent of a non-apparent, nor an apparent of a non-apparent, nor the converse; therefore no sign exists. Such is the argument, and its demonstrative 172 force is quite evident. And it will become yet more evident when we have indicated the objection brought against it by the Dogmatists. For they declare that they allow only two of these combinations, and as regards the remaining two they are at variance with us. For, (say they,) whereas it is true 173 that the apparent is a sign of the apparent and the

σθαι σημεῖον ἀληθές ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ μὴ φαινόμενον φαινόμενον ἢ μὴ φαινόμενον ἀφανοῦς ὑπάρχειν δηλωτικὸν ψεύδος ἦν.¹ αὐτίκα γὰρ φαινόμενον μὲν φαινόμενον σημεῖον ἐστίν, <οἶον>² ἢ σκιά τοῦ σώματος· αὐτὴ τε γὰρ σημεῖον οὕσα φαινόμενον ἐστίν, τὸ τε σώμα σημειωτὸν καθεστὼς ἐναργές ὑπάρχει. φαινόμενον δὲ ἀφανοῦς δηλωτικὸν καθ-
 174 ευστήκει, καθάπερ τὸ ἔρευθος τῆς αἰδοῦς· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐναργές καὶ αὐτοφώρατον ἦν, ἡ δὲ αἰδῶς ἀ-
 φαντος. τελέως δὲ εἰσιν εὐήθεις οἱ ταῦτα λέγοντες. ὁμολογηθέντος γὰρ τοῦ πρὸς τι εἶναι τὸ σημεῖον καὶ τοῦ κατ' ἀνάγκην συγκαταλαμβάνεσθαι ἀλλή-
 175 λους τὰ πρὸς τι, οὐ δύναται τῶν ἐπ' ἴσης συνυποπι-
 πτόντων ἀλλήλοις τὸ μὲν σημεῖον εἶναι τὸ δὲ σημει-
 ωτόν, ἀλλὰ πάντη τε καὶ πάντως διὰ τὴν ἐναργῆ ἀμφοτέρων συνυπόπτωσιν μήτε σημεῖον τι ἐξ αὐ-
 τῶν ὑπάρχειν μήτε σημειωτόν, τοῦ μὲν μὴ ἔχον-
 176 τος ὃ ἐκκαλύπτει, τοῦ δὲ μὴ χρῆζοντος τοῦ ἐκκαλύ-
 πτοντος. τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ λεκτέον καὶ περὶ τῆς λειπο-
 μένης συζυγίας, καθ' ἣν ἡξίουν τὸ φαινόμενον τοῦ ἀφανοῦς εἶναι σημεῖον· δεῖ γὰρ, εἰ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, προκαταλαμβάνεσθαι τὸ σημεῖον τοῦ σημειωτοῦ καὶ ἐπικαταλαμβάνεσθαι τὸ σημειωτὸν τῷ σημείῳ, ὅπερ ἦν ἀδύνατον διὰ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ γένους εἶναι τῶν πρὸς τι καὶ ὀφείλειν ἀλλήλοις συγκαταλαμβάνεσθαι.
 176 Τῶν γε μὴν καταλαμβανομένων ἀνθρώπῳ πραγ-
 μάτων τὰ μὲν δι' αἰσθήσεως καταλαμβάνεσθαι δοκεῖ τὰ δὲ διανοία, καὶ δι' αἰσθήσεως μὲν ὡς λευκὸν μέλαν, γλυκὺ πικρὸν, διανοία δὲ καλὸν αἰσχρόν, νόμιμον παράνομον, εὐσεβὲς ἀσεβές. καὶ τὸ σημεῖον οὖν εἴπερ καταληπτὸν ἐστίν, ἦτοι τῶν

¹ ἦν cf. Bekk.: εἶναι mss.² <οἶον> Heintz.

apparent of the non-apparent, it is false that the non-apparent is indicative of the apparent or the non-apparent of the non-apparent. Thus, for example, an apparent thing is a sign of an apparent thing, as the shadow of the body; for it, being a sign, is an apparent one, and the body, being a thing signified, is an evident thing. And an apparent thing may really be indicative of a non-apparent, as blushing of shame; for the former is obvious and self-detected, but shame is invisible. But those who speak thus are perfectly
 174 stupid. For if it be agreed that the sign is a relative thing and that relatives must necessarily be apprehended together, then, of the things thus simultane-
 175 ously presented, it is not possible that one should be the sign, the other the thing signified; but always and in every case, because of the evident joint-pre-
 176 sentation of the two together, neither one of them can be either sign or thing signified, as the one has nothing to reveal, and the other requires nothing to reveal it. And the same may also be said about the
 175 remaining combination, in which they claim that the apparent is a sign of the non-apparent; for, if this is so, the sign must be apprehended before the thing signified and the thing signified apprehended after the sign, which is impossible because they belong to the class of relatives and must be apprehended along with each other.

Now, of the objects apprehended by man, some
 176 appear to be apprehended by means of sense, others by the intellect,—by means of sense, as white, black, sweet, bitter; and by intellect, fair, foul, lawful, lawless, pious, impious. So the sign also, if it is apprehensible, is one of the sensible or of the intelligible

αἰσθητῶν ἐστὶ πραγμάτων ἢ τῶν νοητῶν, ὡς ἐὰν
 μὴ ἐκ τοῦ ἐτέρου γένους τούτων ὑπάρχη, οὐδ' ὄλως
 177 ἔσται τὴν ἀρχὴν ὑπάρχον. ἀμέλει γέ τοι τοῦτ'
 εὐθὺς τεκμήριόν ἐστι τοῦ ἀληθοῦς αὐτὸ τυγχάνειν,
 φημί δὲ τὸ μέχρι δεῦρο διέλκεσθαι τὴν φύσιν αὐτοῦ,
 τῶν μὲν αἰσθητῶν ὑπολαμβάνοντων τοῦτο εἶναι τῶν
 δὲ νοητῶν. Ἐπικουρος μὲν γὰρ καὶ οἱ προεστῶτες
 αὐτοῦ τῆς αἰρέσεως ἔλεξαν αἰσθητὸν εἶναι τὸ
 σημεῖον, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς νοητὸν. μένει δ' ἡ
 τοιαύτη διάστασις σχεδὸν ἀνεπίκριτος δι' αἰῶνος,
 καὶ μενούσης αὐτῆς ἀνεπικρίτου πᾶσα ἀνάγκη καὶ
 τὸ σημεῖον ἐν ἐποχῇ φυλάσσεσθαι, ὀφείλον ἢ
 178 αἰσθητὸν ἢ νοητὸν ὑπάρχειν. καὶ τὸ πάντων δεινότατον
 ὅτι μεταπέπτωκεν ἡ ὑπόσχεσις αὐτοῦ, εἴγε
 ὑπισχνεῖται μὲν ἐκκαλυπτικὸν ἔσεσθαι τινος ἐτέρου,
 ἀνάπαλι δὲ αὐτὸ νῦν εὐρηται χρῆζον ἐτέρου τοῦ
 ἐκκαλύφοντος· εἰ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ διάφωνον ἄδηλόν ἐστι,
 τὸ δὲ ἄδηλον ἐκ σημείου ληπτόν, πάντως καὶ τὸ
 σημεῖον διαφωνούμενον δεήσεται τινος σημείου
 179 πρὸς παράστασιν ὡς ἄδηλον. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ
 δύνανται λέγειν ὅτι τὸ διαφωνούμενον αὐτοῖς¹
 ἐνεστιν ἀποδείξει καταστήσασθαι καὶ πιστὸν ἔχειν.
 πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ὅταν ἀποδείξωσιν, τότε ὡς πιστὸν
 αὐτὸ λαμβανέτωσαν· ἐφ' ὅσον δὲ ψιλὴ μόνον αὐτοῖς
 ἐστὶν ὑπόσχεσις ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀπόδειξις, ἔστηκε καὶ τὰ
 180 τῆς ἐποχῆς. εἴτα καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις τῶν ἀμφι-
 σβητουμένων ἐστίν, διαφωνουμένη δὲ καὶ αὐτῇ
 χρεῖαν ἔχει τοῦ τὴν πίστιν περιθήσοντος· διὰ δὲ
 ζητουμένου τὸ ζητούμενον δεικνύναι θέλειν τελῶς
 ἐστὶν ἄτοπον. ἄλλως τε καὶ τῷ γένει σημείου
 ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπόδειξις· ἐκκαλυπτικὴ γὰρ ἦν τοῦ συμ-

¹ αὐτοῖς : αὐτὸ mss., Bekk.

objects, so that if it does not belong to either of these
 classes it will have absolutely no existence at all.
 And, what is more, we have here at once a direct 177
 evidence that it is non-apprehensible,—I mean in
 the fact that hitherto its nature has been rent in
 twain, some supposing it to be sensible, others in-
 telligible. Thus Epicurus and the leaders of his
 School have stated that the sign is sensible, but the
 Stoics that it is intelligible. And this controversy
 remains, as one may say, eternally undecided, and
 while it remains undecided there is every necessity
 to keep the sign in suspense, since it is bound to be
 either sensible or intelligible. Most serious of all 178
 is the fact that the promise it makes has become void,
 inasmuch as it promises that it will serve to reveal
 some other thing, but is itself now found, conversely,
 to require that other thing to reveal it ; for if every-
 thing which is controverted is non-evident, and the
 non-evident is apprehensible through a sign, then
 certainly the sign too, being controverted, will re-
 quire a sign to make it manifest, as it is non-evident.
 —Moreover, they cannot assert that it is possible for 179
 them to establish it, when controverted, by proof and
 hold it trustworthy.⁶ For when they have first
 proved it, then let them accept it as trustworthy ; but
 so long as they have only a mere promise and not
 proof, the case for suspension stands. Further, proof 180
 also is a debatable thing, and being controverted it
 has need itself of something to lend it cogency ; but
 to try to prove the thing in question by a thing in
 question is perfectly absurd. And, moreover, proof is,
 generically, a sign ; for it serves to reveal its conclusion.

⁶ Cf. i. 293 ff.

- 181 περάσματος. ἵνα οὖν τὸ σημεῖον βεβαιωθῆ, δεῖ πιστὴν εἶναι τὴν ἀπόδειξιν, ἵνα δὲ ἡ ἀπόδειξις πιστὴ γένηται, δεῖ προβεβαιωθῆναι τὸ σημεῖον, ὥστε ἑκάτερον τὴν ἐκ θατέρου πίστιν περιμένον
- 182 ἐπ' ἴσης τῷ λοιπῷ ἐστὶν ἄπιστον. πρὸς τοῦτοις τὸ ἐν ἀποδείξεως μέρει λαμβανόμενον εἰς τὴν τοῦ σημείου βεβαίωσιν ἦτοι αἰσθητὸν ἐστὶν ἢ νοητὸν. καὶ εἰ μὲν αἰσθητὸν, πάλιν ἢ ἀρχῆθεν μένει ζήτησις τῷ τὰ αἰσθητὰ κοινῶς διαπεφωνῆσθαι· εἰ δὲ νοητὸν, ὁμοίως ἄπιστον καθέστηκεν· οὐ χωρὶς γὰρ τῶν αἰσθητῶν δύναται τοῦτο ληπτὸν ὑπάρχειν.
- 183 Πλὴν συγκεχωρήσθω τε καὶ ἐκ περιουσίας δεδόσθω τὸ ἦτοι αἰσθητὸν ἢ νοητὸν εἶναι τὸ σημεῖον. ἀλλὰ καὶ οὕτως ἀδύνατον τὴν ὑπόστασιν αὐτοῦ πιστὴν ὑπάρχειν. λεκτέον δὲ ἐν μέρει περὶ ἑκατέρου, καὶ εὐθέως γε περὶ τοῦ [μῆ]¹ αἰσθητὸν αὐτὸ τυγχάνειν. ἵνα τοίνυν τοῦθ' ὁμολογῶν ἢ, δεῖ προσυμφωνῆσθαι τὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν ὑπαρξίν καὶ ὁμολογῶν εἶναι παρὰ πᾶσι τοῖς φυσικοῖς, ἵνα² ὡς ἀπὸ ὁμολόγου ταύτης ἢ περὶ τοῦ σημείου ἀνάγκηται
- 184 σκέψις. οὐ συμφεφώνηται δέ, ἀλλ'

ἔστ' ἂν ὕδωρ τε ῥέῃ καὶ δένδρεα μακρὰ τεθήλῃ

οὔποτε πεπαύσονται περὶ αὐτῆς οἱ φυσικοὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους πολεμοῦντες, ἐπεὶπερ ὁ μὲν Δημόκριτος μηδὲν ὑποκείσθαι φησι τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἀλλὰ κενοπαθείας τινὰς αἰσθήσεων εἶναι τὰς ἀντιλήψεις αὐτῶν, καὶ οὔτε γλυκὺ τι περὶ τοῖς ἐκτὸς ὑπάρχειν, οὐ πικρὸν ἢ θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρὸν ἢ λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν, οὐκ

¹ [μῆ] secl. Kochalsky.

² ἵνα cj. Bekk.: καὶ mss.

• With §§ 179-181 cf. *P.H.* ii. 121, 122.

In order, then, that the sign may be established, the 181 proof must be trustworthy; and in order that the proof may be trustworthy, the sign must be pre-established; so that each one of the two, as awaiting its confirmation from the other, is just as untrustworthy as the other. Besides this, that which is 182 taken as a proof for the establishment of sign is either sensible or intelligible. And if it is sensible, the original inquiry remains once more, by reason of the general disagreement about sensibles^a; while if it is intelligible, it is equally untrustworthy, for this latter cannot be apprehended apart from things sensible.

However, let it be agreed and granted, into the 183 bargain, that the sign is either sensible or intelligible. Yet, even so, it is impossible that its real existence should be worthy of confidence. We must discuss in turn each of these alternatives, and, first and at once, the view that it is sensible. In order, then, that this may be admitted, the real existence of sensibles must first be unanimously allowed and be admitted by all the Physicists, so that the investigation of the sign may proceed from this as admitted. This, however, is 184 not unanimously allowed, but

Long as the waters flow and the tall trees cease not to burgeon,^b

the Physicists will never stop warring with one another about it; for Democritus^c asserts that none of the sensibles really exists, but our perceptions of them are certain empty affections of the senses, and in things external there exists nothing sweet or bitter or hot or cold or white or black or any other of the

^b Cf. *P.H.* ii. 37.

^c Cf. i. 135 ff.; *P.H.* i. 213 ff.

ἄλλο τι τῶν πᾶσι φαινομένων· παθῶν γὰρ ἡμετέρων
 185 ἦν ὀνόματα ταῦτα. ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος πάντα ἔλεγε
 τὰ αἰσθητὰ τοιαῦτα ὑποκείσθαι ὅποια φαίνεται καὶ
 κατ' αἴσθησιν προσπίπτει, μηδέποτε ψευδομένης
 τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ἀλλ' ἡμῶν¹ ψεῦδεσθαι ταύτην
 δοκούντων. οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς καὶ τοῦ περιπάτου
 μέσῃν ὁδῶν τέμνοντες ἕνια μὲν ὑποκείσθαι τῶν
 αἰσθητῶν ἔλεξαν ὡς ἀληθῆ ἕνια δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχειν,
 186 ψευδομένης περὶ αὐτῶν τῆς αἰσθήσεως. ἀλλὰ τό
 γε κεφάλαιον, εἴπερ αἰσθητὸν εἶναι θέλομεν τὸ
 σημεῖον, πρὸ παντὸς ὁμολογηθῆναι δεῖ καὶ βεβαίως
 παραστῆναι τὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν ὑπόστασιν, ἵνα καὶ
 τοῦτο δοθῆ παγίως καταληπτὸν εἶναι· ἢ εἴπερ ἐκέ-
 νην δι' αἰῶνος ἔστασιάζεσθαι συμβέβηκεν, ὁμολογεῖν
 δεήσει καὶ τοῦτο τῆς αὐτῆς ἀσυμφωνίας ἔχουσαν.
 187 ὡς περ γὰρ τὸ λευκὸν χρῶμα οὐ δύναται ἀπτότως
 καταληφθῆναι μὴ ὁμολογηθείσης τῆς τῶν αἰσθη-
 τῶν ὑποστάσεως, διὰ τὸ καὶ αὐτὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν
 ὑπάρχειν, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ σημεῖον, εἴπερ κατὰ γένος
 αἰσθητὸν, λεχθήσεται πάγιον καθεστάναι μενούσης
 τῆς περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν μάχης. ἔστω δὴ καὶ συμ-
 πεφωνῆσθαι τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ μηδ' ἠντινοῦν γεγρονέναι
 περὶ αὐτῶν διάστασιν. ζητῶ πῶς δύναται οἱ
 ἑτερόδοξοι ἡμᾶς διδάσκειν ὅτι τῷ ὄντι αἰσθητὸν
 ἐστὶ τὸ σημεῖον; πᾶν γὰρ αἰσθητὸν πᾶσι τοῖς
 ὡσαύτως ἔχουσιν <ὁμοίως>² ὑποπίπτειν πέφυκε καὶ
 ἐπ' ἴσης λαμβάνεσθαι. οἷον τοῦ λευκοῦ χρώματος
 οὐκ ἄλλως μὲν οἱ Ἕλληνας ἀντιλαμβάνονται ἄλλως
 δὲ οἱ βάρβαροι, καὶ διαφερόντως μὲν οἱ τεχνῖται ἐξ-
 ηλλαγμένως δὲ οἱ ἰδιῶται, ἀλλ' ὡσαύτως πάντες οἱ
 188 γε ἀπαραποδίστους ἔχοντες τὰς αἰσθήσεις. τοῦ τε

things apparent to all; for these are names for our
 affections. But Epicurus declared that all sensibles 185
 really exist such as they appear and present them-
 selves in sensation, as sense never lies, though we
 think that it lies. And the Stoics and Peripatetics,
 pursuing a middle course, have said that some
 sensibles really exist, as being true, and some do not
 exist, as sensation lies about them. But now, to sum 186
 up: If we claim that the sign is sensible, it must
 first of all be agreed and firmly established that
 sensibles have substantial existence, in order that it
 may be granted that the sign also is definitely appre-
 hensible; or else, if it is the case that their existence
 has been quarrelled over eternally, we shall have to
 admit that the sign also partakes of the same contro-
 versial character. For just as white colour cannot 187
 be apprehended securely if the substantial existence
 of sensibles be not admitted, because it is itself one
 of the sensibles, so neither can the sign—if it belongs
 to the class of sensibles—be said to have stable
 existence so long as the conflict regarding sensibles
 continues. Let us suppose now that there is unanim-
 ity about sensibles and that there exists no dispute
 whatsoever regarding them. How, I ask, can our
 opponents show us that the sign is in reality sensible?
 For every sensible thing ought naturally to present
 itself alike to all who are in a like condition and
 be similarly apprehended. Take white colour, for
 instance: it is not apprehended in one way by Greeks,
 in another by barbarians; or in a special way by
 craftsmen and differently by ordinary folk; but
 in one and the same way by all those who have their
 senses unimpeded. Bitter and sweet, again, are not 188

¹ ἀλλ' ἡμῶν Heintz: ἄλλων mss., Bekk.

² <ὁμοίως> add. Heintz.

πικροῦ πάλιν ἢ γλυκεῖος οὐκ ἄλλως μὲν ὄδε γεύεται καθ' ἕτερον δὲ γρόπον ὄδε, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ὁμοίον ἕκαστος τῶν ὁμοίως διακειμένων. τὸ δέ γε σημείον ὡς σημείον οὐχ ὡσαύτως πάντας τοὺς ὁμοίως διακειμένους φαίνεται κινεῖν, ἀλλ' οἷς μὲν οὐδ' ὄλως ἐστὶ σημεῖόν τινος, καίπερ δι' ἐναργείας αὐτοῖς προσπίπτον, τισὶ δὲ σημεῖον μὲν ἐστίν, οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ δὲ πράγματος ἀλλὰ διαφέροντος· τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ φαινόμενα λόγου χάριν ἐν ἰατρικῇ ἄλλου μὲν ἐστὶ σημεῖα τῶδε, καθάπερ Ἐρασιστράτῳ, ἄλλου δὲ τῶδε, καθάπερ Ἡροφίλῳ, ἄλλου δὲ τῶδε, καθάπερ Ἀσκληπιάδῃ. οὐ τοίνυν λεκτέον αἰσθητὸν εἶναι τὸ σημεῖον· εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὲν αἰσθητὸν πάντας ὁμοίως κινεῖ, τὸ δὲ σημεῖον οὐ πάντας ὁμοίως
189 κινεῖ, οὐκ ἂν εἶη αἰσθητὸν τὸ σημεῖον. πάλιν εἴπερ αἰσθητὸν ἐστὶ τὸ σημεῖον, ἐχρῆν, ὥσπερ τὸ πῦρ αἰσθητὸν ὄν πάντας τοὺς καίεσθαι δυναμένους καίει καὶ ἡ χιών αἰσθητὴ καθεστηκυῖα πάντας τοὺς ψύχεσθαι δυναμένους ψύχει, ὥδε καὶ αὐτὸ εἴπερ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐστὶ, πάντας ὀφείλειν ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἄγειν σημειωτόν. οὐκ ἄγει δέ γε· οὐκ ἄρα αἰσθη-
190 τὸν ἐστίν. πρὸς τούτοις εἴπερ αἰσθητὸν ἐστὶ τὸ σημεῖον, ἥτοι καταληπτὰ ἐστὶν ἡμῖν τὰ ἀδηλα ἢ ἀκατάληπτα. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἀκατάληπτα ἡμῖν ἐστίν, οἴχεται τὸ σημεῖον· δυοῖν γὰρ ὄντων πραγμάτων, τῶν μὲν ἐναργῶν τῶν δὲ ἀδηλῶν, εἰ μήτε τὸ ἐναργές ἔχει σημεῖον διὰ τὸ αὐτοφώρατον εἶναι μήτε τὰ ἀδηλα διὰ τὸ ἀκατάληπτα τυγχάνειν, οὐδὲν ἐστὶ
191 σημεῖον. εἰ δὲ καταληπτὰ, πάλιν ἐχρῆν, ἐπεὶ αἰσθητὸν ἐστὶ τὸ σημεῖον, τὸ δὲ αἰσθητὸν ἐπ' ἴσης πάντας κινεῖ, πᾶσι τὰ ἀδηλα καταλαμβάνεσθαι.

tasted in this way by this man and in a different way by that man, but similarly by each of those who are in a similar condition. But the sign, as sign, does not seem to affect in the same way all those who are in a similar condition; but to some it is not a sign of anything at all, although it presents itself to them plainly, while to some it is a sign, yet not of the same thing but of something different; thus in medicine, for instance, the same appearances are signs of one thing to this man (such as Erasistratus), but of another to that man (say, Herophilus), and of another to a third (such as Asclepiades).⁶ We must not, then, say that the sign is sensible; for if the sensible affects all similarly, but the sign does not affect all similarly, the sign will not be sensible.—Again, if
189 the sign is sensible, it ought to follow that, just as fire, which is sensible, burns all those capable of being burnt, and snow, being sensible, chills all those capable of being chilled, so also the sign, if it belongs to the sensibles, leads all to the same signified thing. But, in fact, it does not so lead them; therefore it is not sensible.—Furthermore, if the sign is sensible, the
190 things non-evident are either apprehensible by us or non-apprehensible. If, then, they are non-apprehensible by us, the sign disappears; for things being of two kinds, some evident, others non-evident, if neither the evident thing possesses a sign owing to its being self-revealed, nor the non-evident things because they are non-apprehensible, there is no sign. But if the non-evident things are apprehensible, it
191 ought to follow again that, since the sign is sensible and the sensible affects all men alike, the things

⁶ These three were physicians of the Dogmatic (or "Logical") School of Medicine, cf. § 156 *supra*; P.H. i. 236 n.

ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν φασιν αὐτὰ μὴ καταλαμβάνεσθαι, ὡσπερ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἰατροὶ καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως φιλόσοφοι, οἱ δὲ καταλαμβάνεσθαι μὲν, οὐχ ὁμοίως δέ. οὐκ ἄρα αἰσθητὸν ἔστι τὸ σημεῖον.

192 *Ναὶ φασιν, ἀλλ' ὡς τὸ πῦρ αἰσθητὸν καθεστὼς παρὰ τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν ὑποκειμένων ὑλῶν διαφερούσας ὑποφαίνει δυνάμεις, καὶ πρὸς μὲν κηρῷ τῆκει πρὸς δὲ πηλῷ πήσσει πρὸς δὲ ξύλῳ καίει, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον εἰκὸς ἔστι καὶ τὸ σημεῖον αἰσθητὸν ὑπάρχον παρὰ τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν ἀντιλαμβανομένων*

193 *αὐτοῦ διαφορῶν εἶναι πραγμάτων μηνυτικόν. καὶ οὐ παράδοξον, ὅτε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὑπομνηστικῶν σημείων θεωρεῖται οὕτω γιγνόμενον· ὁ γὰρ ἀνατεινόμενος πυρὸς τισὶ μὲν πολεμίων ἔφοδον σημαίνει τισὶ δὲ φίλων ἄφιξιν δηλοῦ, καὶ ὁ τοῦ κώδωνος ψόφος οἷς μὲν <σημεῖον>¹ ὄψου πράσεως ἔστιν οἷς δὲ τοῦ δεῖν ραίνειν τὰς ὁδοὺς. καὶ τὸ ἐνδεικτικὸν ἄρα σημεῖον δυνήσεται φύσει αἰσθητὴν ἔχον ἄλλων*

194 *καὶ ἄλλων εἶναι μηνυτικόν. ἀξιώσειε δ' ἂν τις καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοὺς μὲν τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς μεταβάσει χρωμένους τοῦτο [δὲ] δεικνύναι γινόμενον ἐπὶ τοῦ σημείου ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πυρὸς γίνεσθαι συμβέβηκεν. τουτὶ μὲν γὰρ ὁμολόγους ἔχει τὰς προειρημένας δυνάμεις, καὶ οὐδεὶς ἔστιν ὃς διαφέρεται περὶ <τοῦ ὑπ'>² αὐτοῦ τὸν μὲν κηρὸν τῆκεσθαι τὸν*

195 *δὲ πηλὸν πήσσεσθαι τὸ δὲ ξύλον καίεσθαι. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ἐνδεικτικοῦ σημείου ἔαν τὸ ἀνάλογον προσδεχόμεθα γίνεσθαι, εἰς τὴν μεγίστην ἀπέμφασιν περιστησόμεθα, λέγοντες ἕκαστον τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἐνδεικνυμένων ὑπάρχειν, ὥστε εἰ οὕτω τύχοι, καὶ πλήθος νοσοποιεῖν καὶ δριμύτητα καὶ σωματικὴν*

¹ <σημεῖον> post ἔστιν add. Mutsch.

² <τοῦ ὑπ'> cj. Bekk.

non-evident are apprehended by all. But some—like the Empirical doctors and the Sceptic philosophers^a—assert that they are not apprehended, and others that they are apprehended but not equally. The sign, therefore, is not sensible.

"Yes," they reply, "but just as fire, being sensible, 192 exhibits different potencies owing to differences in the material subjected to it, and when applied to wax melts it, to clay hardens it, to wood burns it; so likewise it is probable that the sign also, being sensible, should serve to indicate different things according to the differences in those who apprehend it. Nor is this paradoxical, since this is also 193 seen to happen even in the case of commemorative signs; for the raising high of a torch signifies to some the approach of enemies, but to others indicates the arrival of friends; and the sound of a bell is to some a sign of the selling of meat, but to others of the need for watering the roads. Therefore the indicative sign also, having a sensible nature, will be capable of revealing things of different sorts."—But here, too, one 194 might require those who make use of the inference from fire to prove that what happens to take place in the case of fire takes place also in the case of the sign. For the former possesses potencies, as stated above, which are undisputed, and there is nobody who differs about the fact that wax is melted by it, clay hardened, and wood burned. But in the case of the 195 indicative sign, if we allow that a similar result takes place we shall find ourselves in the most absurd position—that of asserting that each of the things indicated by it exists, so that, let us say, plethora and acrid humours and bodily constitution

^a Cf. § 156.

196 κατασκευήν. ὅπερ ἄτοπον· τὰς γὰρ οὕτω μαχο-
 μένας καὶ ἀνασκευαστικὰς ἀλλήλων αἰτίας οὐχ
 οἶδόν τε συνυπάρχειν. ἢ τοῦτο οὖν ὁμολογεῖταισαν,
 καίπερ ὄν ἀδύνατον, οἱ δογματικῶς φιλοσοφούντες,
 ἢ ὅτι τὸ σημεῖον αἰσθητὸν ὄν οὐδενὸς τὸ ὅσον ἐφ'
 197 ἑαυτῷ ἐνδεικτικὸν ἔστιν, ἡμεῖς δὲ διαφόρους ἔχον-
 τες διαθέσεις οὐχ ὡσαύτως ἐπ' αὐτῷ κινούμεθα.
 ὅπερ οὐκ ἂν ὑπομείναιεν ὁμολογεῖν, πρὸς τῷ καὶ
 τὰς τοιαύτας τοῦ πυρὸς δυνάμεις μὴ εἶναι συμ-
 198 φώνους ἀλλ' ἠπορήσθαι. εἰ γὰρ καυστικὴν ἔχει φύσιν
 τὸ πῦρ, ὄφειλε πάντα καίειν καὶ μὴ τινὰ μὲν καίειν
 τινὰ δὲ μηδαμῶς· καὶ εἰ τηκτικὴν εἶχε δύναμιν, πᾶν
 199 ὄφειλε διαλύειν καὶ μὴ τινὰ μὲν τινὰ δ' οὐ. νῦν δὲ
 ταῦτα ἔοικε ποιεῖν οὐ παρά τὴν ἰδίαν φύσιν ἀλλὰ
 παρά τὰς προσομιλούσας αὐτῷ τῶν ὑποκειμένων
 ὕλας, οἷον τὸ ξύλον καίει οὐχ ὅτι αὐτὸ καυστικὸν
 ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ὅτι τὸ ξύλον ἐπιτηδείως ἔχει συνεργοῦ
 λαβόμενον ἐκείνου καῆναι, καὶ τήκει τὸν κηρὸν οὐχ
 ὅτι τηκτικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, ἀλλ' ὅτι ὁ κηρὸς ἐπιτη-
 δειότητα ἐκέκτητο πρὸς τὸ συνεργοῦ λαβόμενος¹
 ἐκείνου τήκεσθαι. ἀκριβέστερον δὲ περὶ τούτων δι-
 δάξομεν, ὅταν περὶ τῆς τῶν τοιούτων ὑπάρξεως
 200 σκεψώμεθα. τὰ νῦν δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς μετιόντας
 ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑπομνηστικοῦ σημείου καὶ τὸν πυρσὸν
 παραλαμβάνοντας, ἔτι δὲ τὸν τοῦ κώδωνος ψόφον,
 λεκτέον ἔστιν ἡμῖν ὅτι οὐ παράδοξον εἰ τὰ τοιαῦτα

¹ λαβόμενος N, cj. Bekk. ; λαβόμενον E; λαμβανόμενον L, Bekk.

* The text here is doubtful: read perhaps *συνυπάρχειν. ὥστε, . . . πλήθος νοσοποιῶν <μηνύειν> κτλ.* ("the sign indicates morbid plethora" etc.). Fabr. gives *πλ. νόσων ποιεῖν*, "(quo fiet ut . . . ignis) multitudinem morborum faciat"; Her- vetus, "multitudinem unum faciant" (= ἐνοσοποιεῖν); Kayser, *πλ. νόσων μηνύειν*.

are all causes of disease.^a But this is absurd; for it is 196
 not possible for causes so conflicting and mutually
 destructive to co-exist. Let the dogmatizing philo-
 sophers, then, agree either to this, impossible though
 it be, or that the sign, being sensible, is indicative of
 nothing, so far as its own power goes, but that we with 197
 our differing dispositions are not all affected alike by
 it. But this they would not endure to agree to; and
 besides, these potencies of fire are not unanimously
 allowed but are matters of doubt. For if fire was of a 198
 nature capable of burning, it ought to burn every-
 thing and not burn some things and not others; and if
 it had a power of melting, it ought to dissolve every-
 thing instead of dissolving some and not others. But 199
 as it is, it seems to do these things not on account of
 its own nature but on account of the materials of the
 substances with which it is brought into contact; for
 instance, it burns wood, not because it is itself capable
 of burning, but because wood is in a fit state to be
 burnt when it receives the co-operation of fire; and it
 melts wax, not because it has a power of melting,
 but because wax possesses a fitness for being melted
 when it receives the co-operation of fire. But this we
 shall explain more exactly when we come to consider
 the existence of such substances.^b For the present, 200
 in reply to those who draw inferences from the com-
 memorative sign and quote the case of the torch, and
 also of the sound of the bell, we must declare that
 it is not paradoxical for such signs to be capable

The argument seems to be that if the same sign (or symptom) indicates a number of different things (such as diseases, the "causes" of the symptoms) these things must co-exist; but the diseases mentioned cannot co-exist; therefore a sign cannot indicate different things.

^b See *Adv. Phys.* i. 237 ff.

τῶν σημείων πλείονων ἐστὶ δηλωτικά· θεμένων γὰρ νόμους, ὡς φασίν, ὀρίσαι¹ καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν κείται, ἕαν τε ἐν θέλωμεν αὐτὰ μηνύειν ἕαν τε καὶ πλείονων
 201 ὑπάρχειν δηλωτικά. τὸ δὲ ἐνδεικτικὸν σημεῖον ἐκ φύσεως ὑπαγορευτικὸν εἶναι δοκοῦν τοῦ σημειωτοῦ κατ' ἀνάγκην ἐνὸς δεῖ πράγματος ἐνδεικτικὸν εἶναι, καὶ τούτου πάντως μονοειδοῦς, ἐπεὶ τοι ἕαν κοινὸν πολλῶν ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἔσται σημεῖον. ἀμήχανον γὰρ ἐν βεβαίως διὰ τινος λαμβάνεσθαι, πολλῶν ὄντων τῶν δηλουμένων. οἷον τὸ ἐκ πλουσίου πένητα γενέσθαι κοινὸν ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ ἡσωτεῦσθαι καὶ τοῦ κατὰ θάλατταν ἐπταικεῖναι καὶ τοῦ φίλοις μεταδεωκέναι, πολλῶν δὲ κοινὸν ὑπάρχον οὐκέτι τινὸς αὐτῶν ἐξαιρέτως μηνυτικὸν εἶναι δύναται· εἰ γὰρ
 202 τούτου, τί μᾶλλον τούτου ἢ ἐκείνου; καὶ εἰ ἐκείνου, τί μᾶλλον ἐκείνου ἢ τούτου; καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ πάντων· ἀσυνύπαρκτα γὰρ ἐστὶ τὰ πάντα. διαφέρει τοίνυν τοῦ ὑπομνηστικοῦ σημείου τὸ ἐνδεικτικόν, καὶ οὐ μεταβατέον ἐστὶν ἀπ' ἐκείνου ἐπὶ τούτου, παρόσον τὸ μὲν ἐνὸς μόνου δεῖ μηνυτικὸν ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ πλείονων δύναται εἶναι παραστατικόν καὶ ὡς ἂν ἡμεῖς θεματίσωμεν σημαίνειν.
 203 Ἔτι πᾶν αἰσθητὸν ὡς αἰσθητὸν ἀδιδάκτον ἐστίν. οὔτε γὰρ τὸ λευκὸν χρῶμα διδάσκεται τις ὄραν οὔτε τοῦ γλυκέος μαθάνει γεύεσθαι, οὐ θερμοῦ ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, οὐκ ἄλλου τινὸς τοιούτου· ἀλλ' ἐκ φύσεως καὶ ἀδιδάκτως πάντων αὐτῶν πάρεστιν ἡμῖν ἢ γνώσις. τὸ δὲ σημεῖον ὡς σημεῖον μετὰ πολλῶν, ὡς φασί, μόχθων διδάσκεται, οἷον τὸ κατὰ

¹ ὀρίσαι Fabr.: ὀρίσται mss., Bekk.

of announcing more things than one. For they are determined, as they say, by the lawgivers and lie in our power, whether we wish them to indicate one thing or to be capable of announcing several things. But as the indicative sign is supposed to be essentially 201 suggestive of the thing signified, it must necessarily be indicative of one thing; and this must certainly be a thing of single form, since of course, if it is common to many things, it will not be a sign. For it is impossible for one object to be firmly apprehended by means of anything when the things indicated thereby are many. For example, a man's fall from wealth to poverty is a sign alike of a life of dissipation, and of disaster by sea, and of contributions to friends; and being thus common to many things, it can no longer be indicative of any one of them in special; for if it is indicative of this one, why of this one rather than of that one? And if of that one, why of that one rather than of this one? Nor, indeed, can it be indi- 202 cative of all; for they are not all capable of co-existing. So, then, the indicative sign differs from the commemorative, and one must not draw inferences about the former from the latter, inasmuch as the one ought to serve to indicate one object alone, whereas the other can serve to manifest several objects, and to possess such significations as we ourselves may determine.

Further, every sensible thing, *qua* sensible, is 203 incapable of being taught. For a man is not taught to see a white colour, nor does he learn to taste sweetness, nor to feel heat, nor anything else of the kind; but it is from nature and without teaching that the knowledge of all these things comes to us. But the sign, *qua* sign, is taught, as they say, with much

- κυβερνητικῆν, ὅτι ἀνέμων ἐστὶ δηλωτικὸν καὶ
 204 χειμῶνων ἢ εὐδίας. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς τὰ
 οὐράνια πραγματευσαμένοις, καθάπερ Ἀράτω καὶ
 Ἀλεξάνδρῳ τῷ Αἰτωλῷ. κατὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ τοῖς
 ἐμπειρικῶς ἰατροῦσιν, οἷον τὸ ἔρευθος καὶ ἡ
 κυρτότης τῶν ἀγγείων¹ καὶ τὸ δίψος καὶ τὰ ἄλλα,
 ὧν ὁ μὴ διδαχθεὶς οὐκ ἀντιλαμβάνεται ὡς σημείων.
 205 οὐκ ἄρα αἰσθητὸν ἐστὶ τὸ σημεῖον· εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὲν
 αἰσθητὸν ἀδίδακτον, τὸ δὲ σημεῖον ὡς σημείον ἐστὶ
 διδακτὸν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ σημεῖον αἰσθητὸν.
 206 Τὸ τε αἰσθητὸν, ἢ αἰσθητὸν ἐστὶ, κατὰ διαφορὰν
 νοεῖται, οἷον τὸ λευκόν, τὸ μέλαν, γλυκὺ πικρὸν,
 πᾶν τὸ τοιουτῶδες. τὸ δὲ σημεῖον, ἢ σημείον ἐστὶ,
 τῶν πρὸς τι καθέστηκεν· κατὰ γὰρ τὴν ὡς πρὸς
 τὸ σημειωτὸν σχέσιν ἐθεωρεῖτο. οὐκ ἄρα τῶν
 αἰσθητῶν ἐστὶ τὸ σημεῖον.
 207 Καὶ μὴν πᾶν αἰσθητὸν, ὡς ἡ κλῆσις παρίστησιν,
 αἰσθήσει ληπτὸν ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ σημεῖον ὡς σημεῖον
 οὐκ αἰσθήσει λαμβάνεται ἀλλὰ διανοίᾳ. λέγομεν
 γοῦν ἀληθὲς εἶναι σημεῖον καὶ ψεῦδος, τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς
 καὶ ψεῦδος οὐκ ἔστιν αἰσθητὸν· ἀξίωμα γὰρ ἐκά-
 τερον, τὸ δὲ ἀξίωμα οὐ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀλλὰ τῶν
 νοητῶν ὑπῆρχεν. λεκτέον ἄρα μὴ εἶναι τῶν
 αἰσθητῶν τὸ σημεῖον.
 208 Ἐπιχειρητέον δὲ καὶ οὕτως. εἶπερ αἰσθητὸν
 ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνδεικτικὸν σημεῖον, πολὺ πρότερον ὀφείλει
 τὸ αἰσθητὸν τινος ἐνδεικτικὸν ὑπάρχειν· ὅπερ οὐχ
 οὕτως εἶχεν. εἰ γὰρ ἐνδείκνυται τι τὸ αἰσθητὸν,
 ἦτοι τὸ ὁμογενὲς τοῦ ὁμογενοῦς ἔσται ἐνδεικτικὸν
 ἢ τὸ ἀνομογενὲς τοῦ ἀνομογενοῦς· οὔτε δὲ τὸ

¹ ἀγγείων Kalbfleisch: αἰτῶν LE, Bekk.: ὠτίων N.

labour—that, for example, in navigation, which serves to indicate winds and storms or fine weather. So 204 likewise the signs dealt with by those who treat of things in the heavens, like Aratus and Alexander the Aetolian^a; and similarly those of the Empiric physicians, such as blushing and swelling of the vessels and thirst and so on, which the uninstructed person does not apprehend as signs. The sign, there- 205 fore, is not sensible; for if the sensible is incapable of being taught, but the sign, *qua* sign, is capable of being taught, the sign will not be sensible.

The sensible, too, *qua* sensible, is conceived as 206 absolute^b—white, for instance, and black, sweet and bitter, and everything of that sort. But the sign, *qua* sign, is a relative thing; for it is viewed in regard to its relation to the thing signified. Therefore the sign does not belong to the class of sensibles.

Moreover, every sensible—as the term shows—is 207 apprehensible by sense, but the sign, *qua* sign, is apprehended not by sense but by intellect. Thus we say that a sign is true or false, but the true and the false are not sensible; for each of them is a judgement, and the judgement belongs not to the sensibles but to the intelligibles. We must declare, therefore, that the sign does not belong to the class of sensibles.

We may also use this argument: If the indicative 208 sign is sensible, the sensible ought, long before, to be indicative of something; but this is not the case. For if the sensible indicates anything, either the homogeneous will be indicative of the homogeneous or the heterogeneous of the heterogeneous; but neither

^a Greek poets of 3rd century B.C., who wrote on astronomical themes.

^b Cf. § 163.

ὁμογενές τοῦ ὁμογενοῦς οὔτε τὸ ἀνομογενές τοῦ
 ἀνομογενοῦς· οὐκ ἄρα ἐνδεικτικόν τινός ἐστι τὸ
 209 αἰσθητόν. οἷον ἔστω μηδέποτε ἡμᾶς καθ' ὑπό-
 θεοῖν λευκῶ περιπεπτωκέναι χρώματι, μηδὲ μέλανι,
 πρώτως δὲ ὄραν τὸ λευκόν. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν ἰσχύσαι-
 210 λαμβάνεσθαι χρώμα· ἔννοϊαν μὲν γὰρ ἔχειν τοῦ
 ἕτερον εἶναι χρώμα τὸ μέλαν, καὶ μὴ τοιοῦτο οἶόν
 ἐστι τὸ λευκόν, τάχα δυνατόν ἐστι, κατάληψιν δὲ
 ποιῆσθαι τοῦ μέλανος χρώματος ἐκ τῆς τοῦ λευκοῦ
 παρουσίας τῶν ἀμηχάνων. καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φωνῆς ὁ
 αὐτός ἐστι λόγος, καὶ κοινῶς ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰ-
 σθητῶν. οὐκοῦν τὸ ὁμογενές αἰσθητόν οὐκ ἂν εἴη
 τοῦ ὁμογενοῦς ἐνδεικτικόν, τοὔτεστι τὸ ὄρατόν τοῦ
 ὄρατοῦ ἢ τὸ ἀκουστόν τοῦ ἀκουστοῦ ἢ τὸ γευστόν
 211 τοῦ γευστοῦ. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀνομογενές
 τοῦ ἀνομογενοῦς, οἷον τὸ ὄρατόν τοῦ ἀκουστοῦ
 ἢ τὸ ἀκουστόν τοῦ γευστοῦ ἢ ὀσφραντοῦ· οὐ γὰρ
 ἂν ὀσφραίνηται τις εὐώδους τινός, εἰς κατάληψιν
 ἔρχεται τοῦ λευκοῦ χρώματος, οὐδὲ φωνῆς ἀντι-
 λαμβανόμενος γλυκαίνεται τὴν γεῦσιν.
 212 Καίτοι μακρόν ἐστι ζητεῖν εἰ δύναται τὸ
 ὁμογενές τοῦ ὁμογενοῦς καὶ τὸ ἀνομογενές τοῦ
 ἀνομογενοῦς εἶναι σημεῖον, ὅτε καὶ τὸ τοῦτου
 ἔγγιον ἀπελπίσειεν ἂν τις νοῦν ἔχων, φημί δὲ
 τὸ μηδὲ ἑαυτοῦ δύνασθαι ἐνδεικτικόν εἶναι τὸ
 213 αἰσθητόν. τῶν γὰρ περὶ τοῦτου σκεψαμένων, ὡς
 πολλάκις ἐδείξαμεν, οἱ μὲν φασι αὐτὸ μὴ τοιοῦτο
 λαμβάνεσθαι ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως οἷον ἐστὶ φύσει·
 οὔτε γὰρ λευκόν οὔτε μέλαν, οὔτε θερμόν, οὐ ψυ-
 χρόν, οὐ γλυκύ, οὐ πικρόν, οὐκ ἄλλην τοιαύτην ἔχον

^a Cf. i. 135, 293; P.H. i. 49, 213 ff.

is the homogeneous indicative of the homogeneous
 nor the heterogeneous of the heterogeneous;
 therefore the sensible is not indicative of anything.
 Suppose, for instance, that we had never experienced
 209 white colour or black, and were to see white for
 the first time. Then, from our apprehension of the
 white we would not be able to apprehend black; for
 210 though it is, perhaps, possible to form a notion that
 black is another colour, and not of the same sort as
 white, yet to arrive at an apprehension of black
 colour through the presence of white is a thing
 impossible. And the same account may be given
 of voice, and in general of all the other sensibles.
 So, then, the homogeneous sensible will not be indica-
 tive of the homogeneous—that is to say, the visible of
 the visible, or the audible of the audible, or the gust-
 able of the gustable.—Nor, again, is the heterogeneous
 211 indicative of the heterogeneous—as, for example, the
 visible of the audible, or the audible of the gustable
 or odorable; for one does not by smelling a sweet
 scent arrive at an apprehension of white colour, nor
 get a sweet taste by perceiving a voice.

However, it is far-fetched to inquire whether the
 212 homogeneous can be a sign of the homogeneous, or
 the heterogeneous of the heterogeneous, when any
 man of sense would despair of a thing much nearer to
 hand—I mean the fact that the sensible is not even
 able to be indicative of its own self. For, as we have
 213 often pointed out,^a of those who have investigated
 the sensible, some ^b assert that, as apprehended
 by sense, it is not the same as it is by nature; for it is
 not white or black, hot or cold, sweet or bitter, or
 possessed of any other such quality, but appears to

^b e.g. Democritus, cf. § 184.

ποιότητα αὐτὸ καθεστάναι, κenoπαθούσης δὲ καὶ
 ψευδομένης ἡμῶν τῆς αἰσθήσεως τοιοῦτο δοκεῖν
 ὑποκείσθαι· οἱ δὲ τινὰ μὲν τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἔδοξαν
 κατ' ἀλήθειαν ὑποκείσθαι τινὰ δὲ μηδαμῶς, ἄλλοι
 δὲ πᾶσι τὴν ὑπαρξίν ἐπ' ἴσης προσεμαρτύρησαν.
 214 τοσαύτης οὖν καὶ ἀδιακρίτου στάσεως οὐσης περὶ
 τῆς τῶν αἰσθητῶν ὑποστάσεως, πῶς οἷόν τε λέγειν
 αὐτοῦ παραστατικὸν εἶναι τὸ αἰσθητόν; ὅτε οὐδέ-
 πω γινώσκειται τίς ἐστὶν ἡ ἀληθὴς τῶν οὕτως
 διαφωνούντων στάσις. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνό γε κρατεῖν χρῆ,
 ὡς εἴπερ οὔτε τὸ ὁμογενὲς αἰσθητόν τοῦ ὁμογενοῦς
 αἰσθητοῦ οὔτε τὸ ἀνομογενὲς τοῦ ἀνομογενοῦς οὐτ'
 αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐνδεικτικόν ἐστίν, ἀδύνατον ἄρα λέγειν
 αἰσθητόν εἶναι τὸ σημεῖον.
 215 Ὁ δὲ Αἰνησίδημος ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ τῶν Πυρ-
 ρονείων λόγων εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπόθεσιν καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς
 αὐτῆς σχεδὸν δυνάμειος λόγον ἐρωτᾷ τοιοῦτον. εἰ
 τὰ φαινόμενα πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παρα-
 πλησίως φαίνεται καὶ τὰ σημεῖα ἐστὶ φαινόμενα, τὰ
 σημεῖα πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως
 φαίνεται. οὐχὶ δὲ γε τὰ σημεῖα πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως
 διακειμένοις παραπλησίως φαίνεται· τὰ δὲ φαινό-
 216 μενα πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως
 φαίνεται· οὐκ ἄρα φαινόμενά ἐστὶ τὰ σημεῖα. καὶ
 δὴ τοῖνυν φαινόμενα μὲν εἶκοι καλεῖν ὁ Αἰνησίδημος
 τὰ αἰσθητά, λόγον δὲ ἐρωτᾷ καθ' ὃν δευτερος
 ἀναπόδεικτος ἐπιβάλλει τρίτῳ, οὗ τὸ σχῆμά ἐστὶ
 τοιοῦτο "εἰ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ δεύτερον, τὸ τρίτον·
 οὐχὶ δὲ τὸ τρίτον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ
 217 δεύτερον." καὶ ὅτι τῷ ὄντι οὕτως ἔχει, μικρὸν
 ὑστερον διδάξομεν· νῦν δ' ὡς ὑγιῆ ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ τὰ

be really such when our sense has empty affections
 and gives false reports; but others^a have thought
 that some sensibles are truly existent and some not;
 while others, again, have attributed existence to all
 equally. Since, then, there exists an unsettled dispute
 214 of this magnitude regarding the real existence of
 sensibles, how is it possible to assert that the sensible
 is capable of manifesting itself, when it is not known as
 yet which of the discordant views is the true one? But
 this fact, at least, ought to stand fast—that if neither
 the homogeneous sensible is indicative of the homo-
 geneous sensible, nor the heterogeneous of the hetero-
 geneous, nor the sensible itself of itself, it is, conse-
 quently, impossible to declare that the sign is sensible.

Aenesidemus, in the Fourth Book of his *Pyrrhon-*
ean Discourses, propounds an argument on the same
 subject and to much the same effect in the following
 form: "If apparent things appear alike to all those
 in a similar condition, and signs are apparent things,
 signs appear alike to all those in a similar condition.
 But signs do not appear alike to all those in a similar
 condition; and apparent things appear alike to all
 those in a similar condition; therefore signs are not
 apparent things." Now Aenesidemus seems here to
 216 be terming sensibles "apparent things," and he pro-
 pounds an argument in which a second non-
 demonstrable^b is superadded to a third, the scheme
 of it being this: "If the first and the second, then
 the third; not the third, but the first; therefore not
 the second." That this is really so we shall show a
 217 little later on^c; at the moment we shall prove more

^a i.e. Aristotle and the Stoics; the third view is that of
 Epicurus; cf. §§ 9, 10, 185.

^b Cf. *P.H.* ii. 157 ff.

^c See §§ 234 ff.

λήμματα καὶ ἔπεται τούτοις ἡ ἐπιφορά, ἀπλούστερον ἀποδείξομεν. αὐτίκα τοίνυν τὸ συνημμένον ἀληθές ἐστιν. ἔπεται γὰρ τῷ κατ' αὐτὸ συμπεπλεγμένῳ τὸ λήγον, τουτέστι τῷ "τὰ φαινόμενα πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως φαίνεται καὶ τὰ σημεῖα ἐστὶ φαινόμενα" τὸ τὰ σημεῖα πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως φαίνονται. εἰ γὰρ τοῦ λευκοῦ χρώματος πάντες οἱ ἀπαραποδίστους ἔχοντες τὰς ὄψεις ὁμοίως ἀντιλαμβάνονται ἀλλ' οὐ διαφόρως, καὶ εἰ τοῦ γλυκέος πάντες οἱ κατὰ φύσιν τὴν γεῦσιν ἔχοντες γλυκαντικῶς ἀντιλαμβάνονται, κατ' ἀνάγκην ὀφείλουσι καὶ τοῦ σημείου, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν καθάπερ τὸ λευκὸν ἢ γλυκὺ, πάντες οἱ κατὰ τὴν ὁμοίαν ὄντες 218 διάθεσιν ὁμοίως ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι. ὥστε τὸ μὲν συνημμένον ὑγιές ἐστίν· ἀληθές δέ γε καὶ τὸ δεύτερον λήμμα, τὸ "οὐχὶ δέ γε τὰ σημεῖα πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως φαίνεται." τὸ γοῦν ἐπὶ τῶν πυρεσσόντων ἔρευθος καὶ ἡ τῶν ἀγγείων¹ προπάθεια καὶ ὁ ἔνικμος χρῶς καὶ ἡ πλείων θερμασία καὶ ἡ σφοδρότης τῶν σφυγμῶν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ σημεῖα τοῖς ὁμοίως κατὰ τε τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὴν ἄλλην σύγκρισιν διακειμένοις οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ προσπίπτει σημεῖα, οὐδ' 220 ὡσαύτως πᾶσι φαίνεται, ἀλλ' Ἡροφίλῳ μὲν λόγον χάριν ὡς ἀντικρυς χρηστοῦ² αἵματος σημεῖα, Ἐρασιστράτῳ δὲ ὡς μεταπτώσεως τῆς ἐκ φλεβῶν εἰς ἀρτηρίας, Ἀσκληπιάδῃ δὲ ὡς ἐνστάσεως νοητῶν ὄγκων ἐν νοητοῖς ἀραιώμασιν. τοίνυν καὶ τὸ δεύτερον 221 λήμμα ὑγιές ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ τὸ τρίτον, τὸ τὰ φαινόμενα πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως

¹ ἀγγείων Kalbfleisch: αἰτίων LE, Bekk.: ὤτιων N.

² An ἀχρήστου?

simply that the premisses of the argument are sound and that the conclusion follows from them. Thus, to start with, the major premiss is true; for the consequent follows from the conjunctive clause—that is, from "Apparent things appear alike to all those in a similar condition, and signs are apparent things," there follows "Signs appear alike to all those in a similar condition." For if all those who have 218 unimpeded sight perceive white colour similarly and not differently; and if all whose taste is in a natural state apprehend what is sweet as sweet; then all who are in a similar condition ought of necessity to apprehend the sign similarly, if it is a sensible thing like the white and the sweet. So that the major 219 premiss is sound. And the second premiss is also true, namely "But signs do not appear alike to all those in a similar condition." Thus, in the case of fever patients, flushing and prominence of the vessels and a moist skin and increased temperature and quickening of the pulses and all the other signs do not manifest themselves as signs of the same thing to those who are in a similar condition as regards their senses and the rest of their bodily constitution, nor do they appear alike to all; but to Herophilus, 220 for instance, they seem to be definite signs of good blood, and to Erasistratus of the transference of the blood from the veins to the arteries, and to Asclepiades of the lodgement of intelligible molecules^a in intelligible interstices. So, then, the second premiss also is sound. But so is the third as well, namely 221 "Apparent things appear alike to all those in a

^a i.e. non-sensible (invisible) molecules of matter in non-sensible passages of the body. Cf. P.H. iii. 32.

φαίνεσθαι. τὸ γὰρ λευκόν, εἰ τύχοι, χρῶμα τῷ μὲν ἰκτεριῶντι καὶ τῷ ὑφαίμους ἔχοντι τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ τῷ κατὰ φύσιν διακειμένῳ οὐχ ὡσαύτως προσπίπτει (ἀνομοίως γὰρ διέκειντο, παρ' ἣν αἰτίαν τῷ μὲν φαίνεται ὠχρὸν τῷ δὲ ἐνερευθῆς τῷ δὲ λευκόν), τοῖς μέντοι κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν διάθεσιν οὖσι, τούτέστι τοῖς ὑγιαίνουσι, λευκόν μόνον φαίνεται. τοῖνυν ἀληθέσιν οὖσι τοῖς λήμμασι συνεισαχθήσεται καὶ ἡ ἐπιφορὰ ἢ "οὐκ ἄρα φαινόμενόν ἐστι τὸ σημεῖον."

222 Αὐτόθεν μὲν οὖν ἐφοδεύσασι ἡμῖν ἀληθῆς ὁ λόγος ὑποδέδεικται· ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἀναπόδεικτός ἐστι καὶ συλλογιστικός, ἀναλύσασιν αὐτὸν φανήσεται. εὐθέως γάρ, ἵνα μικρὸν ἄνωθεν προλάβωμεν, ἀναπόδεικτοι λέγονται διχῶς, οἱ τε μὴ ἀποδεδειγμένοι καὶ οἱ μὴ χρεῖαν ἔχοντες ἀποδείξεως τῷ αὐτόθεν εἶναι περιφανῆς ἐπ' αὐτῶν τὸ ὅτι συνάγουσιν. ἐπεδείξαμεν δὲ πολλάκις ὡς κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον σημαινόμενον ταύτης ἠξίωνται τῆς προσηγορίας εἰ κατ' ἀρχὴν τῆς πρώτης περὶ συλλογισμῶν εἰσαγωγῆς 224 γὰρ παρὰ τῷ Χρυσίππῳ τεταγμένοι. νυνὶ δὲ ἐφ' ὁμολόγῳ τούτῳ γνωστέον ὅτι πρῶτος μὲν ἐστὶν ἀναπόδεικτος ὁ ἐκ συνημμένου καὶ τοῦ ἡγουμένου, τὸ λῆγον ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ συνημμένῳ ἔχων συμπέρασμα. τούτέστιν, ὅταν λόγος δύο ἔχη λήμματα, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἕτερόν ἐστι συνημμένον τὸ δὲ ἕτερον ἡγούμενον ἐν τῷ συνημμένῳ, ἔχη δὲ καὶ ἐπιφορὰν τὸ λῆγον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ συνημμένῳ, τότε ὁ τοιοῦτος λόγος πρῶτος ἀναπόδεικτος καλεῖται, οἷον ὁ οὕτως

similar condition." Thus, for example, white colour does not present itself in the same way to the man with jaundice, and to one who has blood-shot eyes,^a and to him who is in a natural condition (for their conditions are dissimilar, and because of this it appears yellow to the first, reddish to the second, and white to the third); yet to those who are in the same condition, that is to say in sound health, it appears white only. So from 222 these true premisses there will be drawn the conclusion "Therefore the sign is not an apparent thing."

This argument, then, has been shown by our examination of it to be true; and that it is both non- 223 demonstrable and syllogistic^b will appear when we have analysed it. For—to go back to first principles—the term "non-demonstrable," to start with, has two senses, being used both of arguments which are not demonstrated, and of those which have no need of demonstration owing to its being at once obvious in their case that they are conclusive. And we have often pointed^c out that the arguments set out by Chrysippus, at the beginning of his first *Introduction to Syllogisms*, are given this title in the second sense. So now, this being assumed, one must understand 224 that the first non-demonstrable argument is that composed of a hypothetical major premiss and its antecedent, having as its conclusion the consequent in the major.^d That is to say, when an argument has two premisses, of which the one is a hypothetical major and the other the antecedent in the major, and also has as its conclusion the consequent in the same major, then such an argument is called a "first non-demonstrable," for example one in this form—"If it is day,

^a Cf. P.H. i. 44.

^b Cf. P.H. ii. 149 n., 146 ff.

^c Cf. P.H. ii. 156.

^d With §§ 224-226 cf. P.H. ii. 157, 158.

ἔχων "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν." οὗτος γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἕτερον τῶν λημμάτων ἔχει συνημμένον, τὸ "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστι," τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν τὸ ἡγούμενον ἐν τῷ συνημμένῳ "ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν," τὸ δὲ "φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν" τρίτον τὴν ἐπιφορὰν, τὸ λήγον τοῦ
 225 συνημμένου. δεύτερος δ' ἔστιν ἀναπόδεικτος ὁ ἐκ συνημμένου καὶ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου τῷ λήγοντι ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ συνημμένῳ, τὸ ἀντικείμενον τῷ ἡγούμενῳ ἔχων συμπέρασμα. τουτέστιν, ὅταν λόγος πάλιν ἐκ δυοῖν (<ῆ>¹) συνεστῶς λημμάτων, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἕτερον ἔστι συνημμένον τὸ δὲ ἕτερον ἀντικείμενον τῷ λήγοντι ἐν τῷ συνημμένῳ, ἔχη δὲ καὶ ἐπιφορὰν τὸ ἀντικείμενον τῷ ἡγούμενῳ, τότε ὁ τοιοῦτος γίνεται δεύτερος ἀναπόδεικτος, ὡς τὸ "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· οὐχὶ δὲ γε φῶς ἔστιν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν ἡμέρα." τὸ τε γὰρ "εἰ ἔστιν ἡμέρα, φῶς ἔστιν," τὸ ἕτερον λῆμμα τοῦ λόγου, συνημμένον ἐστί, τὸ τε "οὐχὶ δὲ γε φῶς ἔστιν," λοιπὸν λῆμμα τοῦ λόγου καθεστῶς, ἀντικείμενον ἔστι τῷ λήγοντι ἐν τῷ συνημμένῳ· ἢ τε ἐπιφορὰ ἢ "οὐκ ἄρα ἡμέρα ἔστιν" τὸ ἀντικείμενον ἦν τοῦ ἡγούμενου.
 226 τρίτος δὲ ἔστι λόγος ἀναπόδεικτος ὁ ἐξ ἀποφατικῆς συμπλοκῆς καὶ ἐνὸς τῶν ἐν τῇ συμπλοκῇ, τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ λοιποῦ τῶν ἐν τῇ συμπλοκῇ ἔχων συμπέρασμα, οἷον "οὐχὶ καὶ ἡμέρα ἔστι καὶ νύξ ἔστιν· ἡμέρα δὲ ἔστιν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι νύξ." τὸ μὲν γὰρ "οὐχὶ καὶ ἡμέρα ἔστι καὶ νύξ ἔστιν" ἀποφατικὸν ἦν συμπεπλεγμένου τοῦ "καὶ ἡμέρα ἔστι καὶ νύξ ἔστιν," τὸ δὲ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν" τὸ ἕτερον ἐτύγχανε τῶν ἐν τῇ συμπλοκῇ, τὸ δὲ "οὐκ ἄρα

¹ <ῆ> cj. Bekk.

it is light ; but in fact it is day ; therefore it is light." For this has a hypothetical major as one of its premisses, namely, "If it is day, it is light" ; and as the second, the antecedent of the major, "But in fact it is day" ; and thirdly, as its conclusion, the consequent of the major, "Therefore it is light."—The second non-demonstrable is that composed of a 225 hypothetical major premiss and the contradictory of the consequent in that major, and having as its conclusion the contradictory of the antecedent. That is to say, when an argument, composed once more of two premisses, of which the one is a hypothetical major and the other the contradictory of the consequent in that major, has also as its conclusion the contradictory of the antecedent, then such an argument is a "second non-demonstrable"—as for example "If it is day, it is light ; but it is not light ; therefore it is not day." For the one premiss of the argument—namely, "If it is day, it is light"—is a hypothetical major ; and "But it is not light," which is the other premiss of the argument, is the contradictory of the consequent in the major ; and the conclusion, "Therefore it is not day," is the contradictory of the antecedent.—The third non-demonstrable argument is 226 that composed of a negative conjunctive premiss and one of the clauses of that conjunctive, and having as its conclusion the contradictory of the other clause in the conjunctive premiss ; for example, "It is not both day and night ; but it is day ; therefore it is not night." For the premiss "It is not both day and night" is the negative of the conjunctive, "It is both day and night," and "It is day" is one of the clauses in the conjunctive, and "Therefore it is not night"

ἔστι νύξ" τὸ ἀντικείμενον ἦν τῷ λοιπῷ τῶν ἐν τῇ συμπλοκῇ.

227 Οἱ μὲν οὖν λόγοι τοιοῦτοί τινές εἰσι, τρόποι δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ ὡσπερὶ σχήματα ἐν οἷς ἠρώτηται οἱ οὕτως ἔχοντες, τοῦ μὲν πρώτου ἀναποδείκτου " εἰ τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ δεύτερον· τὸ δέ γε πρῶτον· τὸ ἄρα δεύτερον," τοῦ δὲ δευτέρου " εἰ τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ δεύτερον· οὐχὶ δέ γε τὸ δεύτερον· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ πρῶτον," τοῦ δὲ τρίτου " οὐχὶ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ δεύτερον· τὸ δέ γε πρῶτον· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ δεύτερον."

228 Ἔτι χρή γινώσκειν ὅτι τῶν ἀναποδείκτων οἱ μὲν εἰσιν ἀπλοὶ οἱ δὲ οὐχ ἀπλοὶ. ὧν ἀπλοὶ μὲν εἰσιν οἱ αὐτόθεν σαφῆς ἔχοντες τὸ ὅτι συνάγουσιν, τουτέστι τὸ ὅτι συνεισάγεται αὐτῶν τοῖς λήμμασιν ἢ ἐπιφορά. ὁποῖοι εἰσιν οἱ ἐκκείμενοι· εἴαν γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ πρώτου εὐθὺς δῶμεν ἀληθές εἶναι τὸ " εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστι," λέγω δὲ τὸ ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ ἡμέραν εἶναι τὸ φῶς εἶναι, ὑποθώμεθα δὲ ἀληθές τὸ πρῶτον τὸ ἡμέραν εἶναι, ὅπερ ἦν ἡγούμενον ἐν τῷ συνημμένῳ, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀκολουθήσει καὶ τὸ φῶς εἶναι, ὅπερ ἦν συμπέρασμα τοῦ λόγου.

229 οὐχ ἀπλοὶ δὲ εἰσιν οἱ ἐκ τῶν ἀπλῶν πεπλεγμένοι καὶ ἔτι χρεῖαν ἔχοντες τῆς εἰς ἐκείνους ἀναλύσεως, ἵνα γνωσθῶσιν ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ συνάγουσιν. τούτων δὲ τῶν οὐχ ἀπλῶν οἱ μὲν ἐξ ὁμογενῶν εἰσὶν συν-εστῶτες οἱ δὲ ἐξ ἀνομογενῶν, καὶ ἐξ ὁμογενῶν μὲν ὡσπερ οἱ ἐκ δυῶν πρώτων ἀναποδείκτων πε-
230 πλεγμένοι ἢ ἐκ δυῶν δευτέρων, ἐξ ἀνομογενῶν δὲ ὡσπερ οἱ ἐκ πρώτου <καὶ τρίτου>¹ ἀναποδείκτου

is the contradictory of the other clause in the conjunctive.

Such, then, are these arguments; and the "moods" 227 or "schemes," so to say, in which the arguments of this kind are propounded are as follows: Of the first non-demonstrable—"If the first, then the second (is true); but the first (is true); therefore the second (is true)." Of the second—"If the first, then the second (is true); but the second is not (true); therefore the first is not (true)." Of the third—"The first and the second are not both (true); but the first is (true); therefore the second is not (true)."

Further, one should observe that some of the non- 228 demonstrables are simple, others not simple. Simple ones are those which at once clearly declare that they draw a conclusion—that is to say, that the inference is introduced together with the premisses themselves. The arguments stated above are of this kind; for, in the case of the first, if we grant it to be true that "If it is day, it is light,"—true, I mean, that the existence of light follows on that of day,—and if we assume as true the first clause, that "it is day," which is the antecedent in the major premiss, it will necessarily follow that it is also light, which is the conclusion of the argument. Not simple are those which are 229 woven together out of simple ones, and which require to be broken up first into simple ones before it can be known that they, too, draw conclusions. And of these not simple arguments, some are composed of homogeneous parts, others of heterogeneous—of homogeneous, as in the case of those woven out of two first non-demonstrables, or of two second; and of 230 heterogeneous, as in the case of those compounded of a first non-demonstrable (and a third), or of a

¹ <καὶ τρίτου> Kochalsky.

- συνεστῶτες ἢ ἐκ δευτέρου καὶ τρίτου, καὶ κοινῶς οἱ τούτοις παραπλήσιοι. ἐξ ὁμογενῶν μὲν οὖν συνέστηκεν οἶον ὁ τοιοῦτος “εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν.” πέπλεκται γὰρ ἐκ πρώτων δυοῖν ἀναποδείκτων, ὡς ἀναλύσαντες αὐτὸν εἰσόμεθα. γνωστότερον γὰρ 231 ὅτι θεώρημα διαλεκτικὸν ἔστιν εἰς τὰς τῶν συλλογισμῶν ἀναλύσεις παραδιδόμενον τοιοῦτον “ὅταν τὰ τινος συμπεράσματος συνακτικὰ λήμματα ἔχωμεν, δυνάμει κἀκείνου ἐν τούτοις ἔχομεν τὸ συμπέρασμα, κἂν κατ’ ἐκφορὰν μὴ λέγηται.”
- 232 ἐπεὶ οὖν δύο ἔχομεν λήμματα, τὸ τε συνημμένον τὸ “εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστιν, φῶς ἔστιν,” ὅπερ ἀρχεται μὲν ἀπὸ ἀπλοῦ ἀξιώματος τοῦ “ἡμέρα ἔστιν,” λήγει δὲ εἰς οὐχ ἀπλοῦν συνημμένον τὸ “εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστιν, φῶς ἔστιν,” καὶ ἔτι τὸ ἡγούμενον ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ “ἡμέρα ἔστιν,” ἐκ τούτων συναχθήσεται ἡμῖν πρῶτῳ ἀναποδείκτῳ τὸ λήγον ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ συνημμένῳ τὸ “εἰ ἄρα ἡμέρα ἔστιν, φῶς ἔστιν.” τοῦτ’ οὖν δυνάμει μὲν ἔχομεν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ συναγόμενον, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἐκφορὰν παραλελειμμένον τάξαντες μετὰ τῆς τοῦ ἐκκειμένου λόγου προσλήψεως¹ τῆς “ἡμέρα ἔστιν,” ἔξομεν συναγόμενον τὸ “φῶς ἔστιν” πρῶτῳ ἀναποδείκτῳ, ὅπερ ἦν ἐπιφορὰ τοῦ ἐκκειμένου λόγου. ὥστε δύο γίνεσθαι πρώτους ἀναποδείκτους, ἓνα μὲν τοιοῦτον “εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν,” ἕτερον δὲ τὸν τοιοῦτον “εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν.”
- 234 Τοιοῦδε μὲν οὖν ἔστιν ὁ χαρακτήρ τῶν ἐξ ὁμογενῶν τὴν πλοκὴν ἐχόντων λόγων· ἐξ ἀνομογενῶν

¹ προσλήψεως Heintz: πολλήψεως MSS., Bekk.

second and a third, and in general such as are similar to these. Thus an argument such as the following is composed of homogeneous parts—“If it is day, it is light; but in fact it is day; therefore it is light.” For it is woven out of two first non-demonstrables, as we shall learn when we analyse it. For one should 231 observe that there is a dialectical rule handed down for the analysis of syllogisms, namely this—“When we know the premisses which imply a certain conclusion, we know also potentially the conclusion involved in them, even though it be not explicitly stated.” Since, then, we have two premisses,—232 the major “If it is day, it is light,” which begins with the simple proposition “it is day” but ends with the not-simple major “if it is day, it is light,” and also its antecedent “it is day,”—from these we shall infer, by the first non-demonstrable, the consequent of that major, namely “Therefore if it is day, it is light.” Potentially, then, we have this 233 inference drawn in the argument, but as it is omitted in the explicit statement, when we have put it beside the minor premiss of the expressed argument “it is day” we shall have the clause “it is light” deduced by the first non-demonstrable, which clause is the conclusion of the expressed argument. So that two first indemonstrables are formed, the one being of this sort—“If it is day, it is light,” and the other of this—“If it is day, it is light; but in fact it is day; therefore it is light.”

Such then is the type of the arguments which are 234 woven out of homogeneous parts. Next come those

δὲ λοιπὸν ἔστι καθάπερ ὁ παρὰ τῷ Αἰνσιδήμῳ
περὶ τοῦ σημείου ἐρωτηθεῖς, ἔχων δὲ οὕτως "εἰ
τὰ φαινόμενα ἅπασιν τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις
παραπλησίως φαίνεται καὶ τὰ σημεία ἔστι φαινό-
μενα, τὰ σημεία πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις
παραπλησίως φαίνεται· τὰ δὲ φαινόμενα πᾶσι τοῖς
ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως φαίνεται· τὰ
δέ γε σημεία οὐ πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις
παραπλησίως φαίνεται· οὐκ ἄρα φαινόμενά ἐστι
235 τὰ σημεία." συνέστηκε γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος λόγος ἐκ
δευτέρου τε ἀναποδείκτου καὶ τρίτου, καθὼς
πάρεστι μαθεῖν ἐκ τῆς ἀναλύσεως, ἥτις σαφεστέρα
μᾶλλον γενήσεται ἐπὶ τοῦ τρόπου ποιησαμένων
ἡμῶν τὴν διδασκαλίαν, ἔχοντος οὕτως "εἰ τὸ
πρῶτον καὶ τὸ δεύτερον, τὸ τρίτον· οὐχὶ δὲ γε τὸ
τρίτον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ δεύτερον."
236 ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἔχομεν συνημμένον ἐν ᾧ ἡγείται συμ-
πελεγμένον τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ δεύτερον, λήγει δὲ
τὸ τρίτον, ἔχομεν δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ
λήγοντος τὸ "οὐ τὸ τρίτον," συναχθήσεται ἡμῖν
καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ ἡγουμένου, τὸ "οὐκ ἄρα
τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ δεύτερον," δευτέρῳ ἀναπο-
δείκτω. ἀλλὰ δὴ τοῦτο αὐτὸ κατὰ μὲν τὴν
δύναμιν ἔγκειται τῷ λόγῳ, ἐπεὶ ἔχομεν τὰ συν-
εκτικὰ αὐτοῦ λήμματα, κατὰ δὲ τὴν προφορὰν
παρέχεται. ἅπερ τάξαντες μετὰ τοῦ λειπομένου
λήμματος τοῦ πρώτου ἔξομεν συναγόμενον τὸ
συμπέρασμα τὸ "οὐκ ἄρα τὸ δεύτερον" τρίτῳ
ἀναποδείκτω. ὥστε δύο εἶναι ἀναποδείκτους, ἕνα
μὲν τοιοῦτον "εἰ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ δεύτερον, τὸ
τρίτον· οὐχὶ δὲ γε τὸ τρίτον· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ πρῶτον

with heterogeneous parts, such as that concerning the
Sign propounded by Aenesidemus,^a which runs thus :
" If the things apparent appear in like manner to all
those in a similar condition, and the signs are things
apparent, the signs appear in like manner to all those in
a similar condition; and the things apparent appear in
like manner to all those in a similar condition; but the
signs do not appear in like manner to all those in a
similar condition; therefore the signs are not things
apparent." For an argument like this is compounded 235
of the second non-demonstrable and the third, as one
may learn from its analysis; and this will become
clearer when we have given instruction as to its
" scheme," which goes thus: " If the first and the
second, the third (is true); but the third is not (true),
whereas the first is; therefore the second is not (true)."
For when we have a major premiss in which the ante- 236
cedent consists of the first and second conjoined, while
the third is the consequent, and have also the clause
" the third is not (true)" as the contradictory of the
consequent, we shall also get for our conclusion the
contradictory of the antecedent, namely " therefore
the first and the second are not (true)," by the second
non-demonstrable. But, in fact, this very conclusion is
potentially contained in the argument, since we possess
the premisses which go to prove it, but in the explicit
statement it is omitted. And when we have placed
these alongside of the remaining premiss, the first,
we shall have deduced the conclusion, " therefore the
second is not (true)," by the third non-demonstrable.
So that there are two non-demonstrables, one in the
form " If the first and the second, the third (is
true); but the third is not (true); therefore the

^a Cf. § 215.

καὶ τὸ δεύτερον," ὅς ἐστι δεύτερος ἀναπόδεικτος, ἕτερον δὲ τρίτον τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα "οὐχὶ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ δεύτερον· ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ δεύτερον."

237 Ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ τρόπου ἢ ἀνάλυσις ἐστὶ τοιαύτη, ἀναλογεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ λόγου· παραλείπεται γὰρ τὸ τρίτον τὸ "οὐχὶ τὰ φαινόμενα πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως φαίνεται καὶ τὰ σημεῖα ἐστὶ φαινόμενα," ὃ μετὰ τοῦ τὰ φαινόμενα ἅπασιν τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως φαίνεσθαι συνάγει τὸ τοῦ ἐκκειμένου τρίτῳ ἀναποδείκτω. ὥστε δεύτερον μὲν γίνεσθαι ἀναπόδεικτον τοιοῦτον "εἰ τὰ φαινόμενα πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως φαίνεται καὶ τὰ σημεῖα ἐστὶ φαινόμενα, τὰ σημεῖα πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως φαίνεται· οὐχὶ δὲ γε τὰ σημεῖα πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως φαίνεται· τὰ σημεῖα ἄρα οὐκ
238 ἐστὶ φαινόμενα," τρίτον δὲ τὸν τοιοῦτον "οὐχὶ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως φαίνεται καὶ τὰ σημεῖα ἐστὶ φαινόμενα· ἀλλὰ μὴν τὰ φαινόμενα πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως φαίνεται· οὐκ ἄρα τὰ σημεῖα ἐστὶ φαινόμενα."

239 Κατὰ δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν τῆς συναγωγῆς καὶ τοιοῦτός τις προταθήσεται λόγος "εἰ τὰ φαινόμενα πᾶσιν ἐπ' ἴσης φαίνεται καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα τῶν ἀδήλων ἐστὶ σημεῖα, τὰ ἀδήλα πᾶσιν ἐπ' ἴσης φαίνεται· οὐχὶ δὲ γε τὰ ἀδήλα πᾶσιν ἐπ' ἴσης
362

first and the second are not (true)," which is a second non-demonstrable^a; and the other, which is a third non-demonstrable, in the form "The first and the second are not (true); but in fact the first is (true); therefore the second is not (true)."

Such, then, is the analysis in the case of the 237 "scheme," and in the case of the argument it is analogous; for the third premiss is missing, namely, "It is not (true) both that apparent things appear in like manner to all those in a similar condition, and that the signs are apparent," which, taken in conjunction with the premiss that "apparent things appear in like manner to all those in a similar condition," proves the (conclusion) of the expressed (argument) by the third non-demonstrable. Hence there is brought about a second non-demonstrable in this form: "If apparent things appear in like manner to all those in a similar condition, and the signs are apparent, then the signs appear in like manner to all those in a similar condition; but the signs do not appear in like manner to all those in a similar condition; therefore the signs are not apparent"; and a third in this form: "It is not 238 (true both that) apparent things appear in like manner to all those in a similar condition and that the signs are apparent; but in fact apparent things appear in like manner to all those in a similar condition; therefore the signs are not apparent."

The same method of deduction will be employed 239 in propounding such an argument as this: "If apparent things appear equally to all, and things apparent are signs of things non-evident then things non-evident appear equally to all; but things

^a Cf. §§ 225-227.

φαίνεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα πᾶσιν ἐπ' ἴσης φαίνεται· οὐκ ἄρα τὰ φαινόμενα τῶν ἀδήλων ἐστὶ σημεῖα." τούτου δὴ τοῦ λόγου ἡ μὲν ἀνάλυσις ἐστὶν ὁμοία, [καθ' ἣν δεῦτερος ἀναπόδεικτος ἐπιβάλλει τρίτῳ,]¹ ἡ δὲ παραμυθία τῶν λημμάτων προϋπτος. ὅτι γὰρ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐπ' ἴσης φαίνεται τοῖς ἀπαρποδίστους ἔχουσι τὰς αἰσθήσεις, συμφανές· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλοις ἄλλως τὸ λευκὸν φαίνεται, οὐδὲ ἄλλοις ἄλλως τὸ μέλαν, οὐδὲ διαφερόντως τὸ γλυκύ, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως πάντα κινεῖ. εἰ δὴ ταῦτα ἐπ' ἴσης πᾶσι φαίνεται καὶ ἐνδεικτικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν τῶν ἀδήλων, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ ἀδηλα ἐπ' ἴσης πᾶσι προσπίπτειν ὡς ἂν καὶ τῶν αἰτίων τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντων καὶ τῆς ὕλης ὁμοίας ὑποκειμένης. οὐχὶ δέ γε τοῦτο· οὐ γὰρ πάντες ὡσαύτως τὰ ἀδηλα γινώσκουσι, καίπερ κατ' ἴσον τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἐγκυροῦντες, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν οὐδ' εἰς ἔννοιαν αὐτῶν ἔρχονται, οἱ δὲ ἔρχονται μὲν, εἰς ποικιλίαν δὲ καὶ πολυτρόπους καὶ μαχομένας ὑποσύρονται ἀποφάσεις. ἀκόλουθον ἄρα μὴ αἰσθητὰ λέγειν τὰ σημεῖα, ἵνα μὴ τοῦθ' ἡμῖν τὸ ἄτοπον ἔπηται.

242 Ἐνέσται δὲ καὶ βραχέως τὰ προειρημένα περιλαμβάνοντας τοιουτουσί τινας προτείνειν λόγους. εἰ τὰ φαινόμενα πᾶσι φαίνεται, τὰ δὲ σημεῖα οὐ πᾶσι φαίνεται, οὐκ ἔστι τὰ φαινόμενα σημεῖα.

243 ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· τὸ ἄρα δεῦτερον. καὶ πάλιν, εἰ τὰ φαινόμενα, καθόσον ἐστὶ φαινόμενα, διδασκαλίας οὐκ ἔχει χρεῖαν, τὰ δὲ σημεῖα, παρόσον ἐστὶ σημεῖα, διδασκαλίας ἔχει χρεῖαν, τὰ σημεῖα οὐκ ἔστι φαινόμενα. ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· τὸ ἄρα δεῦτερον.

¹ [καθ' ἣν . . . τρίτῳ] secl. Heintz.

non-evident do not appear equally to all, though things apparent do appear equally to all; therefore things apparent are not signs of things non-evident." Now the analysis of this argument is similar, [for in 240 it a second non-demonstrable is superimposed on a third,] and the logical force of the premisses is obvious. For it is plain at once that apparent things appear equally to all who have their senses unimpeded; for white does not appear differently to different people, nor black differently to different people, nor sweet in distinct ways, but they affect all similarly. So if 241 these things appear equally to all and possess the power of indicating things non-evident, then the non-evident things also must necessarily be perceived equally by all, as the causes are the same and the material substrate is similar. But this is not so; for all do not cognize non-evident things alike, although they experience sense-objects equally; some, indeed, do not even arrive at a conception of them, while others do so arrive, but are swept off into a variety of complex and conflicting pronouncements. Therefore, in order that we may avoid this absurd consequence, it follows that the signs are not sensible.

It will also be possible by compressing the foregoing 242 to propound concise arguments such as these: "If apparent things appear to all, but the signs do not appear to all, the apparent things are not signs. But in fact the first (is true); therefore the second (is true)." And again: "If apparent things, in so 243 far as they are apparent, do not require explanation, but the signs, in so far as they are signs, require explanation, the signs are not apparent. But in fact the first (is true), therefore the second (is true)."

Πρὸς μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἀξιούοντας αἰσθητὸν εἶναι τὸ
 244 σημεῖον τοσαῦτα ἠπορήσθω· σκοπῶμεν δὲ καὶ
 τὴν ἀντικειμένην τούτοις στάσιν, φημὶ δὲ τῶν
 νοητὸν αὐτὸ προειληφόντων καθεστάναι. βραχεία
 δὲ ἴσως δεήσει καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀρέσκοντος αὐτοῖς
 245 προλαβεῖν, καθ' ὃ ἀξίωμα θέλουσιν εἶναι τὸ
 σημεῖον, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο νοητόν. ὑπογράφοντες
 τοῖνυν φασὶ σημεῖον εἶναι ἀξίωμα ἐν ὑγιεὶ συν-
 ημμένῳ κατηγοούμενον, ἐκκαλυπτικὸν τοῦ λήγοντος.
 κρίσεις δὲ τοῦ ὑγιούς συνημμένου πολλὰς μὲν καὶ
 ἄλλας εἶναι φασιν, μίαν δ' ἐξ ἀπασῶν ὑπάρχειν,
 καὶ ταύτην οὐχ ὁμόλογον, τὴν ἀποδοθησομένην.
 πᾶν γὰρ συνημμένον ἢ ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς ἀρχόμενον εἰς
 ἀληθὲς λήγει, ἢ ἀπὸ ψεύδους ἀρχόμενον ἐπὶ ψεύδος
 λήγει, ἢ ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς ἐπὶ ψεύδος, ἢ ἀπὸ ψεύδους
 246 ἐπ' ἀληθές. ἀπὸ μὲν οὖν ἀληθοῦς ἀρχόμενον ἐπ'
 ἀληθὲς λήγει τὸ "εἰ εἰσὶ θεοί, προνοία θεῶν
 διοικεῖται ὁ κόσμος," ἀπὸ ψεύδους δὲ ἐπὶ ψεύ-
 δος τὸ "εἰ πέταται ἡ γῆ, πτέρυγας ἔχει ἡ γῆ,"
 ἀπὸ ψεύδους δὲ ἐπ' ἀληθές τὸ "εἰ πέταται ἡ
 γῆ, ἔστιν ἡ γῆ," ἀπὸ δὲ ἀληθοῦς ἐπὶ ψεύδος τὸ
 "εἰ κινεῖται οὗτος, περιπατεῖ οὗτος," μὴ περι-
 247 πατοῦντος μὲν αὐτοῦ, κινουμένου δέ. τεσσάρων
 οὖν οὐσῶν τοῦ συνημμένου συζυγιῶν, ὅταν ἀπ'
 ἀληθοῦς τε ἄρχηται καὶ εἰς ἀληθὲς λήγη, ἢ ὅταν
 ἀπὸ ψεύδους, ἐπὶ ψεύδος, ἢ ὅταν ἀπὸ ψεύδους
 ἐπ' ἀληθές ἢ ἀναστρόφως ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς ἐπὶ ψεύδος,
 κατὰ μὲν τοὺς πρώτους τρεῖς τρόπους φασὶν ἀλη-
 θές τοῦτο γίνεσθαι (εἴαν τε γὰρ ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς ἀρ-
 χόμενον ἐπ' ἀληθές λήγη, ἔστιν ἀληθές, εἴαν τε
 ἀπὸ ψεύδους ἐπὶ ψεύδος, πάλιν ἀληθές· ὡσαύτως
 δὲ κἂν ἀπὸ ψεύδους ἐπ' ἀληθές), καθ' ἓνα δὲ

In reply, then, to those who maintain that the sign
 is sensible let thus much be said by way of objection ;
 but let us also examine the view opposed to theirs— 244
 I mean that of those who conceive it to be intelligible.
 But perhaps it will be proper for us first to deal
 shortly with the view they accept, according to which
 the sign is, they maintain, a proposition, and on this
 account an intelligible. Thus, in describing it, they 245
 say that " The Sign is an antecedent proposition in
 a valid hypothetical major premiss, which serves to
 reveal the consequent." ^a And while there are, they
 say, many other tests of such a valid major, there is
 one above all—and even it not agreed upon—which
 shall be described. Every hypothetical major either
 begins with truth and ends in truth, or begins with
 falsehood and ends in falsehood, or (proceeds) from
 truth to falsehood or from falsehood to truth. The 246
 premiss " If there are gods, the world is ordered by
 the gods' providence " begins with truth and ends in
 truth ; and " If the earth flies, the earth has wings "
 (proceeds) from falsehood to falsehood ; and " If the
 earth flies, the earth exists " from falsehood to truth ;
 and " If this man moves, this man walks " from truth
 to falsehood, when he is not walking but is moving.
 As, then, there are four combinations of the major 247
 premiss—when it begins with truth and ends in truth,
 or when (it proceeds) from falsehood to falsehood, or
 when (it proceeds) from falsehood to truth, or con-
 versely from truth to falsehood,—in the first three
 modes the premiss, they say, is true (for if it begins
 with truth and ends in truth it is true, and if it begins
 with falsehood and ends in falsehood it is again true,
 and so likewise when (it passes) from falsehood to

^a With §§ 245-253 cf. P. H. ii. 104-106.

μόνον γίνεσθαι ψεύδος, ὅταν ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς ἀρχόμενον
 248 λήγη ἐπὶ ψεύδος. τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων ἀνα-
 ζητητέον, φασί, τὸ σημεῖον οὐκ ἐν τῷ μοχθηρῷ
 τούτῳ συνημμένῳ ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ ὑγιεῖ· εἴρηται γὰρ
 ἀξίωμα τὸ ἐν ὑγιεῖ συνημμένῳ καθηγούμενον.
 ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἐν ἡν ὑγιές συνημμένον, τρία δέ,
 καθάπερ τὸ ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς ἀρχόμενον καὶ ἐπ' ἀληθές
 λήγον καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ ψεύδους ἐπὶ ψεύδος καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ
 ψεύδους ἐπ' ἀληθές, σκεπτέον πότερον ποτε ἐν
 249 ἡ ἐν τισὶν ἢ ἐν τινί. οὐκοῦν εἰ τὸ σημεῖον ἀληθές
 εἶναι δεῖ καὶ ἀληθοῦς παραστατικόν, οὔτε ἐν τῷ
 ἀπὸ ψεύδους ἀρχομένῳ καὶ ἐπὶ ψεύδος λήγοντι
 οὔτε ἐν τῷ ἀπὸ ψεύδους ἐπ' ἀληθές ὑποκείμεται.
 λείπεται οὖν ἐν ἐκείνῳ μόνον αὐτὸ τυγχάνειν τῷ
 ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς τε ἀρχομένῳ καὶ ἐπ' ἀληθές
 λήγοντι, ὡς ἂν καὶ αὐτοῦ ὑπάρχοντος καὶ τοῦ
 250 σημειωτοῦ συνυπάρχειν ὀφείλοντος αὐτῷ. τοίνυν
 ὅταν λέγεται τὸ σημεῖον ἀξίωμα εἶναι ἐν ὑγιεῖ
 συνημμένῳ καθηγούμενον, δεήσει ἐν μόνῳ ἀκούειν
 αὐτὸ καθηγούμενον συνημμένῳ τῷ ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς τε
 ἀρχομένῳ καὶ ἐπ' ἀληθές λήγοντι. καὶ μὴν οὐκ
 εἴ τι ἡγείται ἀξίωμα ἐν ὑγιεῖ συνημμένῳ ἀπ'
 ἀληθοῦς τε ἀρχομένῳ καὶ ἐπ' ἀληθές λήγοντι,¹
 251 τοῦτό ἐστι σημεῖον. αὐτίκα γέ τοι τὸ τοιοῦτο
 συνημμένον "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν" ἀπ'
 ἀληθοῦς μὲν ἀρχεται τοῦ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν" καὶ ἐπ'
 ἀληθές λήγει τὸ "φῶς ἔστιν," οὐκ εἶχε δέ τι ἐν
 αὐτῷ ἡγούμενον ἀξίωμα σημεῖον τοῦ λήγοντος· οὐδὲ
 γὰρ ἐκκαλυπτικόν ἐστι τοῦ "φῶς ἔστιν" τὸ

¹ ἀρχομένῳ . . . λήγοντι Arnim: ἀρχόμενον . . . λήγον
 mss., Bekk.

truth); and in one mode only is it false, namely, when
 it begins with truth and ends in falsehood. And this 248
 being so, one should not look, they say, for the sign in
 this unsound major premiss but in the sound one; for
 it is called "a proposition which is the antecedent in
 a valid major premiss." But since there is not one
 valid major but three—namely, that which begins
 with truth and ends with truth, and that which (pro-
 ceeds) from falsehood to falsehood, and that which
 (proceeds) from falsehood to truth—one has to
 inquire whether possibly the sign should be sought
 in all the valid premisses, or in some, or in one. So 249
 then, if the sign must be true and indicative of truth,
 it will not reside either in that which begins with
 falsehood and ends in falsehood or in that which
 (passes) from falsehood to truth. Thus it only re-
 mains for it to exist in that which both begins with
 truth and ends in truth, since it really exists itself and
 the thing signified also must co-exist with it. So then, 250
 when the sign is said to be "a proposition which is the
 antecedent in a valid major premiss," one shall have
 to understand that it is an antecedent in that valid
 major only which begins with truth and ends in truth.
 Moreover, not every proposition which is an ante-
 cedent in a valid major beginning with truth and
 ending in truth is a sign. Such a major premiss as 251
 this, for instance—"If it is day, it is light,"—begins
 with the truth "it is day" and ends in the truth "it
 is light," but it does not contain any antecedent pro-
 position which is a sign of the consequent; for "it
 is day" does not serve to reveal that "it is light";

“ ἡμέρα ἔστιν,” ἀλλ’ ὡς αὐτὸ δι’ αὐτοῦ προσ-
 ἐπιπτεῖ, οὕτω καὶ τὸ “ φῶς ἔστιν ” ἐκ τῆς ἰδίας
 252 ἐλαμβάνετο περιφανείας. δεῖ ἄρα τὸ σημεῖον οὐ
 μόνον ἐν ὑγιεῖ εἶναι συνημμένῳ ἡγούμενον, τουτ-
 ἔστι τῷ ἀπ’ ἀληθοῦς ἀρχομένῳ καὶ ἐπ’ ἀληθὲς
 λήγοντι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκκαλυπτικὴν ἔχει φύσιν τοῦ
 λήγοντος, οἷον ἔστι τὸ ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις συνημμέ-
 νους “ εἰ γάλα ἔχει ἐν μαστοῖς ἦδε, κεκύηκεν ἦδε ”
 καὶ “ εἰ βρογχεῖον ἔπτυκεν οὗτος, ἔλκος ἔχει ἐν
 253 πνεύμονι οὗτος.” τουτὶ γὰρ τὸ συνημμένον ὑγιές
 ἔστιν, ἀρχόμενον μὲν ἀπ’ ἀληθοῦς τοῦ “ βρογχεῖον
 ἔπτυκεν οὗτος,” λήγον δὲ ἐπ’ ἀληθὲς τὸ “ ἔλκος
 ἔχει οὗτος ἐν πνεύμονι,” μετὰ τοῦ ἐκκαλυπτικόν
 εἶναι τὸ πρῶτον τοῦ δευτέρου· ἐκείνῳ γὰρ προσ-
 βάλλοντες κατάληψιν τούτου ποιούμεθα.
 254 “ Ἐτι, φασί, τὸ σημεῖον παρὸν παρόντος εἶναι δεῖ
 σημεῖον. ἔνιοι γὰρ ἐξαπατώμενοι καὶ παρὸν παρ-
 ωχημένον θέλουσιν εἶναι σημεῖον, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ “ εἰ
 οὐλὴν ἔχει οὗτος, ἔλκος ἔσχηκεν οὗτος.” εἰ μὲν
 γὰρ οὐλὴν ἔχει, παρὸν ἔστι, φαίνεται γάρ, τὸ δὲ
 ἔλκος ἔσχηκεῖναι παρωχημένον, οὐκέτι γὰρ ἔστιν
 ἔλκος· καὶ παρὸν μέλλοντος, ὡς τὸ περιεχόμενον
 τῷ τοιούτῳ συνημμένῳ “ εἰ καρδίαν τέτρωται
 οὗτος, ἀποθανεῖται οὗτος.” τὸ μὲν γὰρ τραῦμα
 255 τῆς καρδίας εἶναι φασιν ἤδη, τὸν δὲ θάνατον μέλ-
 λειν. ἀγνοοῦσι δὴ οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγοντες ὅτι
 ἀλλ’ ἔστι τὰ παρωχημένα καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα, τὸ
 μέντοι σημεῖον [καὶ σημειωτὸν]¹ κὰν τούτοις παρὸν
 παρόντος ἐστίν. ἐν τε γὰρ τῷ προτέρῳ τῷ “ εἰ
 οὐλὴν ἔχει οὗτος, ἔλκος ἔσχηκεν οὗτος ” τὸ μὲν
 ἔλκος γέγονεν ἤδη καὶ παρώχηκεν, τὸ δὲ ἔλκος

for just as the latter truth was perceived by means
 of itself, so also “ it is light ” was comprehended
 owing to its own obviousness. The sign, therefore, 252
 must not only be the antecedent in a valid major
 premiss—that is, in one that begins with truth and
 ends in truth—but must also possess a character which
 serves to reveal the consequent ; as, for example, the
 antecedent in premisses such as these—“ If this
 woman has milk in her breasts, she has conceived ” ;
 and “ If this man has had a viscid bronchial discharge,
 he has a wound in his lungs.” For this premiss is 253
 valid, as it begins with the truth “ This man has had a
 viscid bronchial discharge,” and ends in the truth
 “ he has a wound in his lungs ” ; and, besides, the first
 serves to reveal the second ; for by observing the
 former we come to an apprehension of the latter.

Further, they say, the sign must be a present sign 254
 of a present thing. For some people erroneously
 claim that a present thing may also be a sign of a past
 thing, as in the case of “ If this man has a scar, he has
 had a wound ” (for if he has a scar it is present, for
 it is apparent, but his having had a wound is past, for
 there is no longer a wound), and that a present thing
 (may be the sign) of a future thing, as for instance
 that included in such a premiss as this—“ If this man
 is wounded in the heart, he will die,” for they say
 that the wound in the heart exists already, but death
 is in the future. But those who make such state- 255
 ments are ignorant of the fact that though things
 past and things future are different, yet even in these
 cases the sign is a present (sign) of a present thing.
 For in the former (premiss)—“ If this man has a
 scar, he has had a wound ”—the wound has existed
 already and is past, but the (statement) that this

¹ [καὶ σημειωτὸν] secl. Heintz (et add. σημεῖον post ἐστίν).

ἔσχηκέναι τοῦτον ἀξίωμα καθεστηκὸς ἐνέστηκεν, περὶ γεγονότος τινὸς λεγόμενον· ἐν τε τῷ "εἰ καρδίαν τέτρωται οὗτος, ἀποθανεῖται οὗτος" ὁ μὲν θάνατος μέλλει, τὸ δὲ ἀποθανεῖσθαι τοῦτον ἀξίωμα ἐνέστηκεν, περὶ μέλλοντος λεγόμενον, 256 παρὸ καὶ νῦν ἐστὶν ἀληθές. ὥστε καὶ ἀξίωμα ἐστὶ τὸ σημεῖον, καὶ ἐν ὑγιεὶ συνημμένῳ καθηγείται τῷ ἀρχομένῳ ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς καὶ λήγοντι ἐπὶ ἀληθές, ἐκκαλυπτικὸν τέ ἐστὶ τοῦ λήγοντος, καὶ διὰ παντὸς παρὸν παρόντος ἐστὶ σημεῖον.

257 Τούτων δ' ὑποδεδειγμένων κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ἐκείνων τεχνολογίας πρῶτον μὲν ἄξιόν ἐστὶ τὸ τοσοῦτον εἰπεῖν πρὸς αὐτούς. εἰ καθ' οὗς μὲν αἰσθητὸν ἐστὶ τὸ σημεῖον καθ' οὗς δὲ νοητὸν, καὶ ἢ περὶ τούτου διαφωνία μέχρι τοῦ νῦν ἀνεπίκριτός ἐστιν, ἄδηλον εἶναι ῥητέον ἀκμὴν τὸ σημεῖον, ἄδηλον δὲ ὄν χρήζει τῶν ἐκκαλυψόντων, ἀλλ' οὐκ 258 αὐτὸ ἐτέρων δεῖ ὑπάρχειν ἐκκαλυπτικόν. καὶ μὴν εἰ τὸ σημεῖον κατ' αὐτούς ἐν λεκτῷ τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει, τὰ δὲ λεκτὰ εἰ ἐστὶ ζητεῖται, ἄποπον, πρὶν ὁμολογηθῆναι τὸ γένος, ὡς βέβαιον λαμβάνειν τὸ εἶδος. ὀρώμεν δὲ ὡς εἰσὶ τινες οἱ ἀνηρηκότες τὴν ὑπαρξίν τῶν λεκτῶν, καὶ οὐχ οἱ ἐτερόδοξοι μόνον, οἷον οἱ Ἐπικούρειοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ στωικοί, ὡς οἱ περὶ τὸν Βασιλεῖδην, οἷς ἔδοξε μηδὲν εἶναι ἀσώματον. τοίνυν ἐν ἐποχῇ φυλα- 259 κτέον ἐστὶ τὸ σημεῖον. ἀλλ' ἀποδείξαντες, φασί, πρότερον τὴν τῶν λεκτῶν ὑπαρξίν ἔξομεν βεβαίαν

^a Cf. §§ 177 ff., 244.

^b Cf. §§ 12, 76, 77; P.H. ii. 107, 108.

man has had a wound, which is a proposition, is present, being stated about a thing which has existed. And in the premiss "If this man is wounded in the heart, he will die," his death is in the future, but the proposition "he will die" is present, though a statement about the future, inasmuch as it is true even now. So that the sign is a proposition, and also it is the 256 antecedent in a valid major premiss which begins with truth and ends in truth, and it serves to reveal the consequent, and always it is a present sign of a present thing.

Now that these things have been explained accord- 257 ing to their own rules of logic, it is proper to reply to them, first, in this wise: If the sign is sensible according to some, but intelligible according to others,^a and the dispute on this point is undecided up till now, we must declare that the sign is as yet non-evident. And being non-evident, it needs things to reveal it and ought not to be capable itself of revealing other things.—Moreover, if the sign is, according 258 to them, classed, as to its "substance," under the head of "expression," and if the existence of "expressions" is a matter of inquiry,^b it is absurd to take the particular as securely fixed before the genus is agreed upon. And we see that there are some who have denied the real existence of "expressions," and these not only men of other Schools, such as the Epicureans, but even Stoics like Basileides^c who held that nothing incorporeal exists. So, then, we must preserve suspension of judgement regarding Sign. But, say they, when we have first proved the real 259 existence of "expressions" we shall have the reality

^c A Stoic of this name is said to have given instruction to Marcus Antoninus.

καὶ τὴν τοῦ σημείου φύσιν. οὐκοῦν ὅταν ἀπο-
δείξητε, ἔρει τις, τότε καὶ τὸ πιστὴν εἶναι τὴν
τοῦ σημείου ὑπαρξίν λαμβάνετε· ἄχρι δὲ ἐπὶ ψιλῆς
μένετε τῆς ὑποσχέσεως, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐν ἐποχῇ
260 μένειν. εἶτα καὶ πῶς οἷόν τέ ἐστιν ἀποδεικνύναι
τὴν τῶν λεκτῶν ὑπαρξίν; ἢ γὰρ διὰ σημείου
δεήσει τοῦτο ποιεῖν ἢ δι' ἀποδείξεως. ἀλλ' οὔτε
διὰ σημείου τινός οὔτε δι' ἀποδείξεως δυνατὸν
τοῦτο ποιεῖν· ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ αὐτὰ λεκτὰ ὄντα
261 παραπλησίως τοῖς ἄλλοις λεκτοῖς ἐζήτῃται, καὶ
τοσοῦτον ἀπέχει τοῦ δύνασθαι βεβαίως τι παριστᾶν
ὡς καὶ ἀνάπαλιν αὐτὰ χρῆζειν τοῦ παραστήσοντος.
λελήθασί τε αὐτοὺς οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς εἰς τὸν δι'
ἀλλήλων ἐμπύπτοντες τρόπον. ἵνα γὰρ τὰ λεκτὰ
ὁμολογηθῇ, ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι δεῖ καὶ σημείον· ἵνα
δὲ ἡ ἀπόδειξις καὶ τὸ σημείον προῦφεστήκη, προ-
πεπιστώσθαι ἀνάγκη τὴν τῶν λεκτῶν φύσιν. εἰς
ἄλληλα οὖν συννεύοντα καὶ τὴν ἐξ ἀλλήλων περι-
μένοντα πίστιν ἐπ' ἴσης ἐστὶν ἄπιστα.

262 Ἄλλ' ἔστω γε καὶ ἐκ περιουσίας συγκεχωρησθῶ,
ἐνεκα τοῦ προβαίνειν τὴν ζήτησιν, ἐν ὑπάρξει τυγ-
χάνειν τὰ λεκτὰ, καίπερ ἀνηνύτου καθεστώσης τῆς
περὶ αὐτῶν μάχης. οὐκοῦν εἰ ταῦτα ἐστίν, ἦτοι
σώματα ἢ ἀσώματα λέξουσιν εἶναι. καὶ σώματα
μὲν οὐκ ἂν φαίεν· εἰ δὲ ἀσώματα, ἦτοι ποιεῖ τι
κατ' αὐτοὺς ἢ οὐδὲν ποιεῖ. καὶ ποιεῖν μὲν οὐκ
263 ἂν ἀξιώσιαν· τὸ γὰρ ἀσώματος κατ' αὐτοὺς οὔτε
ποιεῖν τι πέφυκεν οὔτε πάσχειν. μηδὲν δὲ ποιοῦντα
οὐδὲ οὐ ἐστὶ σημεία ἐνδείξεται τε¹ καὶ δηλώσει·

¹ τε N: τι cet., Bekk. (ἐτι cj. Bekk.).

of the sign also securely established. "Yes," one will
reply, "when you have proved it, then assume also
that the existence of the sign is to be believed; but
so long as you remain merely promising, we too must
necessarily remain in an attitude of suspension." And 260
further, how is it possible to prove the existence of
"expressions"? For one will have to do this either
by means of a sign or by proof. But neither by means
of a sign nor by proof is it possible to do this; for
these, being themselves "expressions," are matters
of inquiry like the other "expressions," and are so 261
far from being capable of establishing anything
firmly that, on the contrary, they themselves require
something to establish them. The Stoics, too, have
unwittingly fallen into the fallacy of circular reason-
ing. For in order that "expressions" may be agreed
to, proof and sign must exist; and in order that proof
and sign may really pre-exist, the reality of "expres-
sions" must be previously confirmed. As these lean,
then, on one another and await confirmation from
one another, they are equally untrustworthy.

But let it be supposed and gratuitously con- 262
ceded, for the sake of advancing our inquiry, that
"expressions" are in existence, although the battle
regarding them remains unending. If, then, they
exist, the Stoics will declare that they are either
corporeal or incorporeal. Now they will not say that
they are corporeal; and if they are incorporeal,
either—according to them—they effect something,
or they effect nothing. Now they will not claim that
they effect anything; for, according to them, the 263
incorporeal is not of a nature either to effect anything
or to be affected. And since they effect nothing, they
will not even indicate and make evident the thing of

τὸ γὰρ ἐνδείκνυσθαι τι καὶ δηλοῦν ἔστι ποιεῖν τι.
264 ἄτοπον δέ γε τὸ σημεῖον μήτε ἐνδείκνυσθαι τι
μήτε δηλοῦν· οὐκ ἄρα νοητόν ἐστιν, οὐδὲ ἀξίωμα,
τὸ σημεῖον.

Ἄλλως τε, καθὼς ἐν πολλοῖς πολλάκις ὑπεδεί-
ξαμεν, ἃ μὲν σημαίνει ἃ δὲ σημαίνεται. σημαίνουσι
μὲν αἱ φωναί, σημαίνεται δὲ τὰ λεκτά, ἐν οἷς ἐστὶ
καὶ τὰ ἀξιώματα. πάντων δὲ τῶν ἀξιωματίων
σημαινομένων ἀλλὰ μὴ σημαινόντων οὐκ ἂν εἴη
τὸ σημεῖον ἀξίωμα.

265 Πάλιν παρακεχωρήσθω τὰ λεκτὰ φύσιν ἔχειν
ἀσώματον. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τὸ σημεῖον ἐν ὑγιεῖ συν-
ημμένῳ καθηγεῖσθαι φασι, δεήσει προσηκεκρίσθαι
τὸ ὑγιές συνημμένον καὶ προσεξήτάσθαι, εἴτε τὸ
κατὰ Φίλωνά ἐστι τὸ τοιοῦτον εἴτε κατὰ Διόδωρον
ἢ τὴν συνάρτησιν ἢ ἄλλως πως κρινόμενον· πολλῶν
γὰρ καὶ περὶ τούτου διαστάσεων οὐσῶν οὐκ ἔνεστι
λαβεῖν βεβαίως τὸ σημεῖον ἀνεπικρίτου τυγα-
νούσης τῆς διαφωνίας.

266 Ἐτι πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις, κἂν δῶμεν σύμφωνον
εἶναι τὸ ὑγιές κριτήριον, καὶ ὁποῖόν ποτ' ἂν
ἐκεῖνοι θέλωσι, τοιοῦτο ἀμάχως ὑπάρχειν, οὐδὲν
ἦν τὸ περιεκτικὸν τοῦ σημείου ἀνεπίκριτον
ὁμολογεῖν ἐστὶν ἀνάγκη. τὸ γὰρ σημειωτὸν ἦτοι

287 πρόδηλον θέλουσιν εἶναι ἢ ἄδηλον. καὶ εἰ μὲν
πρόδηλον, οὐκ ἔσται σημειωτόν, οὐδὲ σημαθήσε-
ται ὑπό τιως, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ δι' αὐτοῦ προσπεσείται·
εἰ δὲ ἄδηλον, πάντως ἄγνωστον ἔσται τοῦτο εἴτε
ἀληθές ἐστιν εἴτε ψευδές, ἐπεὶ γνωσκόμενον ὃ τι
268 ποτὲ τούτων ἐστί, γενήσεται πρόδηλον. τὸ οὖν

* Cf. § 12.

† With § 265 cf. §§ 70 ff. *supra*; P.H. II. 110-112.

which they are signs; for to indicate anything and
make it evident is to effect something. But it is 264
absurd that the sign should neither indicate nor make
evident anything; therefore the sign is not an in-
telligible thing, nor yet a proposition.

Moreover, as we have frequently shown in many
places,^a some things signify, others are signified.
Vocal sounds signify, but "expressions" are signified,
and they include also propositions. And as proposi-
tions are signified, but not signifying, the sign will not
be a proposition.

Again, let it be conceded that "expressions" are 265
of an incorporeal nature.^b Yet, since they assert that
the sign is the antecedent in a valid major premiss,
the valid major will have to be tested and scrutinized
beforehand, whether it be what is valid according to
Philo, or according to Diodorus,^c or through con-
gruence, or judged by some other criterion; for since
on this point also there are many rival views it is
impossible to have a firm grasp of the sign so long as
the dispute remains unsettled.

Further, in addition to the foregoing arguments, 266
even if we grant that the valid criterion is agreed upon
and that it is incontestably of the kind the Stoics
claim, none the less they must necessarily agree that
the premiss containing the sign is uncertain. For they
hold that the thing signified is either pre-evident or
non-evident. And if it is pre-evident, it will not 267
admit of being signified, nor will it be signified by
anything but will be perceived of itself; while if it is
non-evident, it certainly cannot be known whether it is
true or false, since when it is known which of these it is
it will become pre-evident. The premiss, then, which 268

* Cf. § 115.

περιεκτικὸν τοῦ τε σημείου καὶ τοῦ σημειωτοῦ
 συνημμένον, λήγον ἐπὶ ἄδηλον. ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔστιν
 ἀνεπίκριτον. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς ἀρχεται,
 γνωρίμῳ ἐστι, λήγει δὲ εἰς ἄγνωστον. δεῖ δὲ
 πρὸ παντὸς ἡμᾶς εἰς τὴν ἐπίκρισιν αὐτοῦ γινώσκειν
 τὸ εἰς τί λήγει, ἵνα εἰάν μὲν εἰς ἀληθές λήγη,
 θώμεθα τοῦτ' ἀληθές διὰ τὸ ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς τε ἀρ-
 χεσθαι καὶ εἰς ἀληθές λήγειν, εἰάν δὲ εἰς ψεῦδος,
 ἀνάπαλιν λέγωμεν ψεῦδος διὰ τὸ ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς ἀρ-
 χεσθαι καὶ ἐπὶ ψεῦδος λήγειν. οὐ τοίνυν ἀξίωμα
 ῥητέον εἶναι τὸ σημείον, οὐδὲ ἐν ὑγίει συνημμένῳ
 καθηγούμενον.

- 269 Προσθετόν δὲ τούτοις ὅτι καὶ ταῖς ἐναργείαις
 μάχονται οἱ ταύτης προσετώτες τῆς δόξης. εἰ
 γὰρ ἀξίωμα ἐστὶ τὸ σημείον καὶ ἐν ὑγίει συ-
 ημμένῳ καθηγείται, ἔχρη τὸς μηδ' ἀρχὴν ἔχοντας
 ἔννοιαν ἀξιώματος μηδὲ τὰς διαλεκτικὰς τέχνας
 ἐπεληλυθότας ἐκτὸς εἶναι πάσης σημειώσεως.
- 270 οὐχὶ δὲ γε τοῦτο· καὶ γὰρ ἀγράμματοι πολλάκις
 κυβερνῆται καὶ ἄπειροι [πολλάκις] τῶν διαλεκτικῶν
 θεωρημάτων γεωργοὶ ἄκρως σημειοῦνται, οἱ μὲν
 τὰ κατὰ θάλασσαν, ἀνέμους τε καὶ νηνεμίας χει-
 μῶνάς τε καὶ γαλήνας, οἱ δὲ κατὰ γεωργίαν,
 ὥσπερ εὐκαρπίαν καὶ ἀκαρπίαν αὐχμούς τε καὶ
 ἐπομβρίας. καίτοι τί περὶ ἀνθρώπων λέγομεν,
 ὅτε καὶ τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώοις τινὲς αὐτῶν μετα-
- 271 δεδώκασιν τῆς τοῦ σημείου νοήσεως; καὶ γὰρ ὁ
 κύων ὅτε ἐκ τοῦ ἵχνους στιβεύει τὸ θηρίον σημειοῦ-
 ται· ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τοῦτο ἀξιώματος ἔλκει φαντασίαν
 τοῦ "εἴπερ ἵχνος ἐστὶ τοῦτο, θηρίον ἔστιν ἐνθάδε."
 καὶ ὁ ἵππος κατὰ τὴν τοῦ μύωπος προσβολὴν ἢ
 τὴν τῆς μᾶστιγος ἐπανάτασιν ἐξάλλεται μὲν καὶ
 378

contains the sign and the thing signified, as it ends
 in what is non-evident, is of necessity uncertain. For
 that it begins with truth is known, but it ends in the
 unknown. But in order to pass judgement upon it we
 must first of all learn wherein it ends, so that if it
 ends in truth we may pronounce it true because it
 begins with truth and ends in truth, but if it ends
 in falsehood, we may, contrariwise, declare it to be
 false because it begins with truth and ends in false-
 hood. So then, the sign should not be said to be a
 proposition, or an antecedent in a sound premiss.

To these (objections) it should be added that those 269
 who champion this opinion are in conflict with evident
 facts. For if the sign is a judgement and an antecedent
 in a valid major premiss, those who have no concep-
 tion at all of a judgement, and have made no study of
 logical technicalities, ought to have been wholly in-
 capable of interpreting by signs. But this is not the 270
 case; for often illiterate pilots, and [often] farmers
 unskilled in logical theorems, interpret by signs
 excellently—the former on the sea (prognosticating)
 squalls and calms, stormy weather and fair, and the
 latter on the farm (foretelling) good crops and bad
 crops, droughts and rainfalls. Yet why do we talk of
 men, when some of the Stoics have endowed even
 irrational animals with understanding of the sign?
 For, in fact, the dog,^a when he tracks a beast by 271
 its footprints, is interpreting by signs; but he does
 not therefore derive an impression of the judgement
 "if this is a footprint, a beast is here." The horse,
 too, at the prod of a goad or the crack of a whip

^a Cf. P.H. i. 63 ff.

δροῦει πρὸς δρόμον, οὐκ ἐπικρίνει δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον συνημμένον διαλεκτικῶς "εἰ μάστιξ ἐπανατέταται, δραμητέον ἐστὶ μοι." οὐκ ἄρα ἀξίωμα ἐστὶ τὸ σημεῖον ἐν ὑγιεῖ συνημμένῳ καθηγουμένον.

272 Ταῦτα μὲν ἰδιαιτέρον πρὸς τοὺς νοητὸν ἀξιούοντας εἶναι τὸ σημεῖον εἰρήσθω· κοινότερον δὲ ἐνέσται πρὸς αὐτοὺς λέγειν καὶ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς αἰσθητὸν αὐτὸ φάσκοντας εἶναι εἰρημένα. εἴπερ γὰρ ἀξίωμα ἐστὶ τὸ σημεῖον ἐν ὑγιεῖ συνημμένῳ καθηγουμένον, καὶ ἐν παντὶ συνημμένῳ ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ λήγον τῷ ἡγουμένῳ, αἷ τε ἀκολουθία παρόντων εἰσὶ πραγμάτων, ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ σημεῖον καὶ τὸ σημειωτὸν ὑφ' ἑνα καιρὸν παρόντα συνυπάρξει ἀλλήλοις, καὶ οὐδέτερον οὐδετέρου γενήσεται μηνυτικόν, ἀλλ' ἀμφοτέρα ἐξ αὐτῶν γνώριμα καταστήσεται.

273 Ἐπι τὸ σημεῖον ἐκκαλυπτικόν ἐστὶ τοῦ [λήγοντος] σημειωτοῦ, τὸ δὲ σημειωτὸν ἐκκαλύπτεται πρὸς τοῦ σημείου. ταῦτα δὲ οὐ τῶν ἀπολύτων ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ τῶν πρὸς τι· πρὸς γὰρ τῷ ἐκκαλύπτοντι νοεῖται τὸ ἐκκαλυπτόμενον, καὶ πρὸς τῷ ἐκκαλυπτομένῳ νοεῖται τὸ ἐκκαλύπτον. εἰ δὲ ἀμφοτέρα πρὸς τι ὄντα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν πάρεστι χρόνον, ἀμφοτέρα συνυφέστηκεν ἀλλήλοις· εἰ δὲ συνυφέστηκεν, ἐκάτερον ἐξ αὐτοῦ καταληπτὸν ἐστὶ

274 καὶ οὐδέτερον ἐκ θατέρου. λεκτέον δὲ κακείνο ὅτι ὁποῖόν ποτ' ἂν ᾖ τὸ σημεῖον, ἤτοι αὐτὸ φύσιν ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ἐνδείκνυσθαι καὶ μηνύειν τὸ ἀδηλον, ἢ ἡμεῖς ἐσμέν μηνυμονικοὶ τῶν συναναγνυμωθέντων αὐτῷ. οὐχὶ δὲ ἐκείνο φύσιν ἔχει ἐνδεικτικῆν τῶν ἀδηλῶν, ἐπεὶ ὄφειλε πᾶσιν ἐπ' ἴσης ἐνδείκνυσθαι τὰ ἀδηλα. ἡμεῖς ἄρα ὡς ἂν ἔχωμεν

* Cf. § 174.

leaps forward and starts to run, but he does not frame a judgement logically in a premiss such as this—"If a whip has cracked, I must run." Therefore the sign is not a judgement, which is the antecedent in a valid major premiss.

Let these special arguments be stated against those 272 who hold that the sign is intelligible; but it will be possible also to use against them the general arguments we have brought against those who assert that it is sensible.^a For if the sign is an antecedent proposition in a valid major premiss, and in every major the consequent follows the antecedent, and these connexions are between things present, then the sign and the thing signified, both being present at one and the same time, will necessarily co-exist and neither of them will serve to disclose the other, but both will be known of themselves.

Further, the sign serves to reveal the thing 273 signified, and the thing signified is revealed by the sign. And these are not absolute things but relative; for the thing revealed is conceived in relation to that which reveals, and that which reveals is conceived in relation to that which is revealed. But if both, being relative things, are present at the same time, both co-exist; and if they co-exist, each of them is apprehensible of itself and neither of them through the other.—This, too, may be said: Whatever be 274 the character of the sign, either it is itself of such a nature as to indicate and disclose the non-evident, or we are capable of remembering the things laid bare together with it. But it does not possess a nature capable of indicating non-evident things, since, (if so), it ought to indicate non-evident things to all men equally. Therefore it depends upon the state

μνήμης, οὕτω περὶ τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων ὑποστά-
σεως φερόμεθα.

- 275 Ἄλλ' εἶπερ οὔτε αἰσθητὸν ἔστι τὸ σημεῖον, ὡς
ἔδειξαμεν, οὔτε νοητὸν, ὡς κατεστησάμεθα, παρὰ
δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστι τρίτον, λεκτέον τι μὴ εἶναι
σημεῖον. οἱ δὲ δογματικοὶ πρὸς ἕκαστον μὲν τῶν
οὕτως ἐπικειρημένων πεφίμωται, τούναντίον δὲ
κατασκευάζοντες φασὶν ὅτι ἄνθρωπος οὐχὶ τῷ
προφορικῷ λόγῳ διαφέρει τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων (καὶ
γὰρ κόρακες καὶ ψιττακοὶ καὶ κίτται ἐνάρθρους
276 προφέρονται φωνάς) ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐνδιαθέτῳ, οὐδὲ τῇ
ἀπλῇ μόνον φαντασίᾳ (ἐφαντασιούτο γὰρ ἀκείναι)
ἀλλὰ τῇ μεταβατικῇ καὶ συνθετικῇ. διόπερ ἀκο-
λουθίας ἔνοιαν ἔχων εὐθὺς καὶ σημείου νόησιν
λαμβάνει διὰ τὴν ἀκολουθίαν· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ τὸ
σημεῖον ἔστι τοιοῦτον "εἰ τόδε, τόδε." ἔπεται ἄρα
τῇ φύσει καὶ κατασκευῇ τᾶνθρώπου τὸ καὶ σημεῖον
277 ὑπάρχειν. ἀνωμολόγηται τε ἡ ἀποδείξεις τῷ
γένει σημεῖον εἶναι. δηλωτικὴ γάρ ἐστι τοῦ συμ-
περάσματος, καὶ ἔσται ἢ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων αὐτῆς
συμπλοκῆ σημεῖον τοῦ ὑπάρχειν τὸ συμπέρασμα.
οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς τοιαύτης "εἰ ἔστι κίνησις, ἔστι κενόν·
ἔστι δὲ κίνησις· ἔστιν ἄρα κενόν" τὸ τοιοῦτον
συμπεπλεγμένον ("ἔστι κίνησις, καὶ" εἰ ἔστι κίνη-
σις, ἔστι κενόν," [διὰ τῶν λημμάτων συμπεπλεγ-
μένων,]¹ εὐθὺς καὶ σημείον ἔστι τοῦ συμπεράσματος
278 τοῦ "ἔστι κενόν." ἦτοι οὖν ἀποδεικτικοὶ εἰσι
λόγοι, φασίν, οἱ κατὰ τοῦ σημείου κομισθέντες
ὑπὸ τῶν ἀπορητικῶν ἢ οὐκ ἀποδεικτικοί. καὶ εἰ
μὲν οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀποδεικτικοί, ἄπιστοι καθεστᾶσιν,

¹ συμπεπλεγμένον MSS.: συνημμένον Bekk.: <ἔστι . . . καὶ> add. Heintz. ² [διὰ . . . συμπ.] secl. Heintz.

of our memory what view we take about the real nature of things.

But if the sign is neither sensible, as we have shown, 275 nor intelligible, as we have established, and besides these there is no third (possibility), one must declare that no sign exists. But the Dogmatists remain muzzled as regards each of these objections, and by way of establishing the opposite they assert that Man does not differ in respect of uttered reason from the irrational animals (for crows and parrots and jays utter articulate sounds), but in respect of internal reason; nor (does he differ) in respect of the merely 276 simple impression (for the animals, too, receive impressions), but in respect of the transitive and constructive impression.^a Hence, since he has a conception of logical sequence, he immediately grasps also the notion of sign because of the sequence; for in fact the sign in itself is of this form—"If this, then this." Therefore the existence of sign follows from the nature and structure of Man.—Also, it is generally agreed 277 that proof is of the genus sign.^b For it serves to make evident the conclusion, and the combination formed by its premisses will be a sign of the existence of the conclusion. For example, in the case of this proof—"If motion exists, void exists; but motion exists; therefore void exists,"^c this combination "Motion exists, and if motion exists, void exists" is at once also a sign of the conclusion "void exists." The 278 arguments, then, brought against the sign by the Doubters are, they say, either probative or non-probative. And if they are non-probative they are

^a i.e. a compound impression (or presentation) which involves mental "transition" from one "presented" idea to another (cf. "association of ideas").

^b Cf. P.H. ii. 122.

^c Cf. i. 213.

ὅπου γε καὶ ἀποδεικτικοὶ τυγχάνοντες μόλις ἂν
 ἐπιστεύθησαν· εἰ δὲ ἀποδεικτικοί, δηλὸν ὅτι ἔστι
 τι σημεῖον· ἢ γὰρ ἀποδειξίς σημεῖον ἦν κατὰ τὸ
 279 γένος. εἴπερ δὲ οὐδὲν οὐδενός ἐστι σημεῖον,
 ἥτοι σημαίνουσί τι αἰ κατὰ τοῦ σημεῖου ἐκφερό-
 μεναι φωναὶ ἢ οὐδὲν σημαίνουσιν. καὶ εἰ μὲν
 οὐδέν, οὐδὲ τὴν τοῦ σημεῖου ὑπαρξίν ἀνελοῦσιν·
 πῶς γὰρ οἷόν τε τὰς μηδὲν σημαίνουσας πιστεύε-
 σθαι περὶ τοῦ μηδὲν εἶναι σημεῖον; εἰ δὲ σημαί-
 νουσι, μάταιοι καθεστᾶσι οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως,
 λόγῳ μὲν ἐκβάλλοντες τὸ σημεῖον, ἔργῳ δὲ τοῦτο
 280 παραλαμβάνοντες. καὶ μὴν εἰ μηδὲν ἔστι
 θεώρημα τέχνης ἴδιον, οὐ διοίσει τῆς ἀτεχνίας ἢ
 τέχνη. εἰ δ' ἔστι θεώρημα τέχνης ἴδιον, ἥτοι
 φαινόμενόν ἐστιν ἢ ἄδηλον. ἀλλὰ φαινόμενον μὲν
 οὐκ ἂν εἴη· τὰ γὰρ φαινόμενα πᾶσι ὁμοίως καὶ
 ἀδιδάκτως φαίνεται. εἰ δὲ ἄδηλον τυγχάνει, διὰ
 σημεῖου θεωρηθήσεται. εἰ δὲ ἔστι τι διὰ σημεῖου
 θεωρούμενον, ἔσται τι καὶ σημεῖον.
 281 Τινὲς δὲ καὶ οὕτω συνερωτώσιν· “εἰ ἔστι τι
 σημεῖον, ἔστι σημεῖον· εἰ μὴ ἔστι σημεῖον, ἔστι
 σημεῖον. ἥτοι δ' οὐδὲν ἔστι σημεῖον ἢ ἔστιν·
 ἔστιν ἄρα.” ὁ μὲν λόγος τοιοῦτος, τούτου δὲ τὸ
 μὲν πρῶτον λήμμα ὑγιὲς εἶναι φασίν· ἦν γὰρ δια-
 φορούμενον, καὶ τῷ εἶναι σημεῖον ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ
 εἶναι σημεῖον, παρόσον εἰ ἔστι τὸ πρῶτον, ἔσται
 καὶ τὸ δεύτερον, μηδενὶ διαφέρον τοῦ πρώτου τὸ
 δεύτερον. καὶ τὸ “εἰ μὴ ἔστι σημεῖον, ἔστι
 σημεῖον” καὶ αὐτὸ ἦν ὑγιὲς. τῷ γὰρ λέγοντι μὴ
 εἶναι σημεῖον, ἀκολουθεῖ λέγειν εἶναι τι σημεῖον.
 εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν ἔστι σημεῖον, αὐτοῦ τοῦ μηδὲν εἶναι

untrustworthy, seeing that they would hardly have
 been trusted, even had they been probative; while if
 they are probative it is plain that a sign exists, for
 proof is, as regards its genus, a form of sign.—And if 279
 nothing is a sign of anything, the words uttered
 against the sign either signify something or signify
 nothing.^a And if nothing, neither will they destroy
 the existence of sign; for how can words that signify
 nothing possibly be trusted regarding the non-
 existence of a sign? And if they signify (something),
 the Sceptics are fools in that they verbally reject the
 sign while actually accepting it.—Moreover, if there 280
 exists no special rule of art, art will not differ from
 lack of art. And if a special rule of art exists, it is
 either apparent or non-evident. But it will not be
 apparent, for things apparent appear to all similarly
 and without teaching. And if it is non-evident, it
 will be discerned by means of a sign. But if there
 exists anything discerned by means of a sign, there
 will also exist a sign.

Some also argue thus^b: “If a sign exists, a sign 281
 exists; if a sign does not exist, a sign exists. But a
 sign either exists not or exists; therefore it exists.”
 Such is the argument, and they declare that its first
 premiss is valid; for it is duplicated, and “a sign
 exists” follows from “a sign exists” inasmuch as the
 second also will be (true) if the first is (true), since
 it differs in no respect from the first. And the premiss
 “If a sign does not exist, a sign exists” is also valid in
 itself; for he who states that a sign does not exist is
 stating, consequently, that a sign does exist. For if
 no sign exists, there will be some sign that no sign

^a Cf. *P.H.* ii. 130.

^b With §§ 281-284 cf. §§ 466-469, and *P.H.* ii. 131, 188.

σημείον ἔσται τι σημείον. καὶ εἰκότως. ὁ γὰρ λέγων μὴ εἶναι τι σημείον ἤτοι φάσει μόνον τοῦτ' ἀξιῶν ἢ ἀποδείξει. καὶ φάσει μὲν ἀξιῶν φάσιν
 282 ἔξει τὴν ἀντιτιθεμένην· ἀποδεικνύς δὲ ὡς ἀληθὲς τὸ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ λεγόμενον, διὰ τοῦ δεικνύντος λόγου τὸ μὴ εἶναι τι σημείον, σημειώσεται τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι σημείον, τοῦτο δὲ ποιῶν ὁμολογήσει τὸ εἶναι τι σημείον. ἀληθῆ οὖν τὰ πρῶτα δύο λήμματα, φασίν. ἀληθὲς δὲ καὶ τὸ τρίτον. διεzeug- μένον γὰρ ἔστιν ἐξ ἀντικειμένων τοῦ τε εἶναι ση- μείον καὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι. ἐπεὶ οὖν¹ σύμπαν διεzeug- μένον τότε ἔστιν ἀληθὲς ὅταν τὸ ἐν ἔχῃ ἀληθές, θεωρεῖται δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων τὸ ἕτερον ἀληθές, ῥητέον τὸ τοιοῦτον συνεστῶς εὐθύς ὑπ- ἀρχεῖν ἀληθές. ὥστε καὶ ἐπὶ ὁμολογουμένοις τοῖς λήμμασι συνεισάγεσθαι καὶ τὴν ἐπιφορὰν τὴν
 "ἔστιν ἄρα σημείον."

283 Ἔσται δέ, φασί, καὶ οὕτως ἐφοδεύειν. δύο γὰρ ἔστιν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ συνημμένα καὶ ἐν διεzeugμένον· τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν συνημμένα ὑπισχνεῖται τοῖς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἢ οὐμ' οἷς ἀκολουθεῖν τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς λήγοντα, τὸ δὲ διεzeugμένον ἐν ἔχει τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἀληθές, ὡς εἰάν ἀμφότερα ἢ ἀληθῆ ἢ ἀμφότερα ψευδῆ,
 284 ψεῦδος ἔσται τὸ ὅλον. τοιαύτης δ' οὕσης τῆς ἐν τοῖς λήμμασι δυνάμεως, ὑποθέμενοι τὸ ἕτερον τῶν ἐν τῷ διεzeugμένῳ ἀληθές ἴδωμεν πῶς συναγεται τὰ τῆς ἐπιφορᾶς. καὶ δὴ πρῶτον ὑποκείσθω ἀληθὲς τὸ "ἔστι τι σημείον." οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶ τοῦθ' ἡγούμενον ἔστιν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ συνημμένῳ, ἔξει τὸ ἀκόλουθον αὐτῷ τὸ λήγον ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ συ- νημμένῳ. ἔληγε δὲ τὸ εἶναι σημείον, ὅπερ ταυτόν ἔστι τῆ ἐπιφορᾶ. συναχθήσεται ἄρα ἡ ἐπιφορᾶ,
 386

exists. And reasonably so; for he who states that no sign exists affirms this either by mere assertion or by proof. And if he affirms it by assertion he will have (against him) the contrary assertion; while if 282 he tries to prove the truth of his statement, then by his argument proving the non-existence of a sign he will be signifying the non-existence of a sign, and in doing so he will be acknowledging the existence of a sign. So the first two premisses are, they say, true. And the third also is true; for it is a disjunctive, composed of contradictories (the existence and non-existence of sign). Since, then, if every disjunctive is true when it has one clause true, and of contradictories one clause is regarded as true, one must declare that a premiss thus constructed is indisputably true. So that the conclusion, "sign therefore exists," is in- ferred along with the agreed premisses.

It will also be possible, they say, to argue thus: In 283 the argument there are two hypothetical premisses and one disjunctive; and of these, the hypothetical promise that their consequents follow from their antecedents, while the disjunctive has one of its clauses true, since if both be true or both false the whole will be false. Such then being the quality of 284 the premisses, let us assume that one of the clauses of the disjunctive is true and see how the con- clusion is deduced. And let it be assumed first that "a sign exists" is true: then, since this is the antecedent in the first hypothetical premiss, it will have as following from it the consequent in that premiss. And that consequent was "a sign exists," which is the same as the conclusion. The conclusion,

¹ οὖν cj. Bekk.: *ei* mss.

ὑποθεέντος ἀληθοῦς εἶναι ἐν τῷ διεζευγμένῳ τοῦ εἶναι τι σημεῖον. καὶ μὴν ἀνάπαυιν ὑποκείσθω τὸ ἕτερον ἀληθές τὸ μὴ εἶναι σημεῖον. τοῖνυν ἐπεὶ τοῦτο ἡγούμενόν ἐστιν ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ συνημμένῳ, ἔξει ἀκολουθοῦν αὐτῷ τὸ λῆγον ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ συνημμένῳ. ἡκολούθει δέ γε αὐτῷ τὸ εἶναι τι σημεῖον, ὃ καὶ ἐπιφορά ἐστιν. καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἄρα συνάγεται ἡ ἐπιφορά.

285 Ταῦτα μὲν οἱ δογματικοί· τάξει δὲ ῥητέον πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον εὐθύς, καθ' ὃ ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατασκευῆς συνήγον τὸ εἶναι τι σημεῖον, ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ μᾶλλον ζητουμένου τὸ ἦττον ζητούμενον ἐθέλουσι διδάσκειν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι σημεῖον, καὶ εἰ πρὸς τινων ἀντειρήται, καθάπερ τῶν σκεπτικῶν, ἀλλὰ τοί γε παρὰ πᾶσι τοῖς δογματικοῖς σύμφωνόν ἐστιν· τὸ δὲ προνοητικῶς κατασκευάσθαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον παρ' οὐκ ὀλίγοις αὐτῶν διαπεφώνηται. σφόδρα δ' ἦν βίαιον τὸ ἐκ τῶν μᾶλλον ἀσυγχωρήτων θέλειν τὰ μὴ οὕτως ἔχοντα διδάσκειν. καὶ μὴν ῥητῶς ὁ Ἡράκλειτός φησι τὸ μὴ εἶναι λογικὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, μόνον δ' ὑπάρχειν φρενήρες τὸ περιέχον. ὃ δὲ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἔτι παραδοξότερον πάντα ἡξίου λογικὰ τυγχάνειν, καὶ οὐ ζῶα μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ φυτά, ῥητῶς γράφων

πάντα γὰρ ἴσθι φρόνησιν ἔχειν καὶ νύματος αἴσαν.

287 μετὰ τοῦ καὶ πιθανὸν εἶναι λόγον εἰς τὸ μὴ ἄφρονα τυγχάνειν τὰ ἄλογα τῶν ζώων. εἰ γὰρ πάρεστιν αὐτοῖς ὁ προφορικὸς λόγος, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸν ἐνδιάθετον αὐτοῖς παρεῖναι· δίχα γὰρ τούτου ἀνυπό-

therefore, will be deduced if it be assumed that the clause "a sign exists," in the disjunctive, is true. Again, let it be assumed, conversely, that the other clause, "a sign does not exist," is true. Then, since this is the antecedent in the second hypothetical premiss, it will have as following from it the consequent in the second hypothetical. And what followed from it was "a sign exists," which is also the conclusion. Therefore in this way also the conclusion is deduced.

Such are the contentions of the Dogmatists; and 285 to the first of them, (taking them) in order, in which they inferred the existence of a sign from the structure of Man, one must straightway reply that they try to explain the less questionable by the more questionable. For the existence of a sign, even if it is controverted by some, such as the Sceptics, is nevertheless generally accepted by all the Dogmatists; but that 286 Man is providentially constructed is disputed by not a few of them. And it is extremely violent to try to explain by what is more generally controverted what is less so. Moreover, Heraclitus expressly affirms that "Man is not rational, and only the circumambient is intelligent." But Empedocles, still more paradoxically, held that all things are rational, and not animals only but plants as well, as he writes expressly—

Wisdom and power of thought, know thou, are shared in by all things.

Besides, there is a plausible argument to show that 287 the irrational animals are not unwise.^b For if they possess "uttered reason," they must necessarily possess also "internal reason"; for apart from this

^a Cf. i. 127, 349: "the circumambient" is the fiery world-substance ("Logos") of H., see Vol. I. Intro. p. viii.

^b Cf. P.H. i. 62 ff.

288 στατός ἐστὶν ὁ προφορικός. κἄν δῶμεν δὲ δια-
 φέρειν τῶν ἄλλων ζώων τὸν ἄνθρωπον λόγῳ τε
 καὶ μεταβατικῇ φαντασίᾳ καὶ ἐννοίᾳ ἀκολουθίας,¹
 ἀλλ' οὐ τοί γε καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀδήλοισι καὶ ἀνεπι-
 κρίτως διαπεφωνημένοις συγχωρήσομεν αὐτὸν
 εἶναι τοιοῦτον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς φαινομένοις τηρητικῇ
 τινα ἔχειν ἀκολουθίαν, καθ' ἣν μνημονεύων τίνα
 μετὰ τίνων τεθεώρηται καὶ τίνα πρὸ τίνων καὶ
 τίνα μετὰ τίνα, ἐκ τῆς τῶν προτέρων ὑποπτώσεως
 289 ἀνανεοῦται τὰ λοιπά. ἀλλὰ συνομολογηθέν-
 τος, φασίν, ὅτι ἡ ἀπόδειξις κατὰ γένος ἐστὶ
 σημεῖον, εἰ μὲν οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀποδείξεις οἱ κατὰ τοῦ
 σημείου κομισθέντες λόγοι, ἄπιστοι καθεστῶσιν,
 εἰ δὲ ἀποδείξεις εἰσὶν, ἔστι τι σημεῖον. ἡμεῖς δὲ
 προειρηκότες ὅτι οὐ τῷ ὑπομνηστικῷ ἐνιστάμεθα
 σημεῖω ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐνδεικτικῷ, δυνάμεθα τοὺς κατὰ
 τοῦ σημείου κομισθέντας λόγους παραχωρεῖν τι
 σημαίνειν, ἤδη δὲ οὐκ ἐνδεικτικῶς ἀλλ' ὑπο-
 μνηστικῶς· ἡμεῖς γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς κινούμεθα καὶ
 ἀναλαμβάνομεν τῇ μνήμῃ τὰ δυνάμενα λέγεσθαι
 290 πρὸς τὸ ἐνδεικτικὸν σημεῖον. τὰ δ' αὐτὰ καὶ
 περὶ τῆς ἀκολουθίου ῥητέον ὑπομνήσεως, καθ' ἣν
 ἐπυνθάνοντο πότερον σημαίνουσί τι αἱ κατὰ τοῦ
 σημείου προφερόμεναι φωναὶ ἢ οὐδὲν σημαίνουσιν.
 εἰ μὲν γὰρ πᾶν σημεῖον ἀνηροῦμεν, ἔδει κατ'
 ἀνάγκην ἢ μηδὲν σημαίνειν τὰς κατὰ τοῦ σημείου
 προφερομένας φωνὰς καθ' ἡμᾶς, ἢ σημαίνουσῶν
 αὐτῶν δίδοσθαι τὸ εἶναι τι σημεῖον. νῦν δὲ τῇ
 διαιρέσει χρώμενοι τὶ μὲν ἀναιροῦμεν σημεῖον τὶ
 δὲ τίθεμεν, οὐδ' ἐν τῷ σημαίνειν τι τὰς κατὰ τοῦ
 ἐνδεικτικοῦ σημείου προφερομένας φωνὰς παρακε-

¹ ἐννοία ἀκολουθίας Kayser: ἐν τῇ ἀκολουθίᾳ mss., Bekk.

latter the uttered reason is non-existent. And 288
 even if we grant that Man differs from the other
 animals in reason and transitive impression and
 conception of logical sequence, yet certainly we shall
 not agree that he is as described as regards things
 non-evident and matters of unsettled controversy,
 whereas in respect of things apparent he possesses a
 retentive sense of sequence, by which he remembers
 what things he has observed together with what, and
 what before what, and what after what, and from his
 experience of previous things revives the rest.—But, 289
 they say, when it is agreed that proof is, in respect
 of its genus, a sign, if the arguments brought against
 the sign are not proofs they are untrustworthy, while
 if they are proofs a sign exists. But as we have
 previously stated that we do not object to the
 commemorative sign but to the indicative, we are
 able to admit that the arguments brought against
 the sign signify something, but not as yet in an
 indicative but in a commemorative way; for we are
 affected by them and we recall in memory the things
 that can be said against the indicative sign.—And the 290
 same may be said regarding their next contention,
 in which they inquired whether the words uttered
 against the sign signify something or signify nothing.
 For if we abolished every sign it would necessarily
 result either that the words uttered by us against the
 sign signify nothing, or, if they are significant, that
 the existence of a sign is conceded. But as it is,
 since we make use of the distinction, and abolish one
 kind of sign but affirm the other, by (our allowing
 that) the words spoken against the indicative sign

- χώρηται τὸ ὑπάρχειν ἐνδεικτικὸν τι σημεῖον.
 291 ἐπι ἐλέγετο ὡς εἶπερ ἴδιον τέχνης ἐστὶ θεώρημα,
 δεήσει τοῦτο μὴ πρόδηλον ὑπάρχειν ἀλλ' ἀδηλον
 καὶ διὰ σημείου ληπτὸν, ἀγνοοῦντες ὅτι τῆς
 μὲν τῶν ἄλλων θεωρητικῆς τέχνης οὐδὲν ἐστὶ
 θεώρημα, καθάπερ ὕστερον διδάξομεν, τῆς δὲ
 ἐν τοῖς φαινομένοις στρεφομένης ἔστιν ἴδιόν τι
 θεώρημα. διὰ γὰρ τῶν πολλάκις τετηρημένων ἢ
 ἱστορημένων ποιεῖται τὰς τῶν θεωρημάτων συ-
 στάσεις· τὰ δὲ πολλάκις τηρηθέντα καὶ ἱστορηθέντα
 ἴδια καθειστήκει τῶν πλειστάκις τηρησάντων, ἀλλ'
 οὐ κοινὰ πάντων.
 292 Ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τέλει συνερωτηθεῖς αὐτοῖς λόγος
 ἐν τρόπῳ τοιούτῳ "εἰ τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ πρῶτον· εἰ
 οὐ τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ πρῶτον· ἤτοι τὸ πρῶτον ἢ οὐ
 τὸ πρῶτον· τὸ πρῶτον ἄρα" τάχα μὲν καὶ κατὰ
 παρολκῆν τὴν ἐν τοῖς λήμμασι μοχθηρὸς ἐστίν,
 ἀναμφιλέκτως δὲ καὶ αὐτοὺς φαίνεται θλίβειν.
 293 ῥητέον δὲ τάξει περὶ τοῦ πρώτου, τουτέστι τῆς
 παρολκῆς. εἰ γὰρ ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ
 διεξευγμένον, ἐν ἔχειν ἀληθές ὀφείλει, καθὼς καὶ
 αὐτοὶ πρότερον ἔλεγον. ἐν δὲ ἔχον ἀληθές τὸ
 ἕτερον τῶν συνημμένων ὡς παρέλκον διελέγχει.
 294 εἴαν τε γὰρ ἀληθές ὑποκείται τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ
 "ἔστι τι σημεῖον," ἀναγκαῖον γίνεται πρὸς τὴν
 τούτου συναγωγὴν τὸ διαφορούμενον συνημμένον
 τὸ "εἰ ἔστι τι σημεῖον, ἔστι σημεῖον," παρέλκον
 δὲ τὸ λοιπὸν τὸ "εἰ μὴ ἔστι τι σημεῖον, ἔστι τι
 σημεῖον"· εἴαν τε τὸ μὴ εἶναι τι σημεῖον ὑποκείται
 τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἀληθές, τὸ μὲν διαφορούμενον παρ-

are significant it is not admitted that an indicative sign exists.—Further, it was argued that if there is a 291 special rule of art, this ought not to be pre-evident but non-evident and apprehensible by means of a sign. But this is to ignore the fact that (as we shall show later) while there is no rule of the art concerned with other cases, of the art which deals with things apparent there is a special rule; for (this art) effects the framing of its rules by means of things frequently observed or investigated; and the things frequently observed and investigated are peculiar to those who have made the most frequent observations, and are not the common property of all.

Then, as to the final argument propounded by them 292 in this form ^a—"If the first, the first; if not the first, the first; either the first or not the first; therefore the first"—it is, perhaps, unsound also because of the redundancy ^b in its premisses, and it indisputably appears to cause worry even to them. First one should 293 speak of what comes first in order, that is to say, the redundancy. If the disjunctive premiss in the argument is true, it is bound to have one clause true, just as they themselves previously stated.^c And having one clause true it convicts one of the hypothetical premisses of redundancy. For, on the one hand, if 294 one of its clauses, namely "a sign exists," be assumed as true, then for its deduction the duplicated ^d hypothetical premiss, "if a sign exists, a sign exists," becomes necessary, but the remaining premiss, "if a sign does not exist, a sign exists," becomes redundant. And, on the other hand, if its clause "a sign does not exist" is assumed to be true, the duplicated premiss is redundant for the purpose

^a Cf. § 281.^b Cf. P.H. ii. 147.^c Cf. § 282.^d Cf. §§ 109, 181.

ἔλκει πρὸς τὴν τούτου κατασκευὴν, τὸ δὲ “ εἰ μὴ
 ἔστι τι σημεῖον, ἔστι σημεῖον ” ἀναγκαῖον γίνεσθαι.
 295 μοχθηρὸς οὖν κατὰ παρολκὴν ὁ λόγος. ἀλλ’
 ἵνα μὴ νῦν εἰς τὰ κατὰ λεπτὸν συμβαίνωμεν τοῖς
 ἐναντίοις, πάρεστιν ἕτερον συνερωτᾶν λόγον ἔχοντα
 τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. εἴπερ περιτρέπεται ὁ λέγων
 μὴ εἶναι τι σημεῖον εἰς τὸ λέγειν εἶναι τι σημεῖον,
 περιτρέπεται καὶ ὁ λέγων εἶναι τι σημεῖον εἰς τὸ
 λέγειν μὴ εἶναι τι σημεῖον. ὁ δὲ λέγων μὴ εἶναι
 τι σημεῖον σκεπτικῶς περιτρέπετο κατ’ αὐτοὺς
 εἰς τὸ λέγειν εἶναι τι σημεῖον· καὶ ὁ λέγων ἄρα
 δογματικῶς εἶναι τι σημεῖον περιτραπήσεται εἰς
 τὸ λέγειν μὴ εἶναι τι σημεῖον, ὡς παραστήσομεν.
 296 αὐτίκα γὰρ [εἰς] τὸν λέγοντα εἶναι τι σημεῖον
 σημείω δεῖ τὴν ἀπόφανσιν πιστώσασθαι, ἀσυγ-
 χωρήτου δὲ ὄντος τοῦ εἶναι τι σημεῖον, πῶς ἂν
 οὗτος χρήσεται τῷ σημείῳ πρὸς πίστιν τοῦ εἶναι
 τι σημεῖον; μὴ δυνάμενος δὲ ἀποδείξει σημεῖω
 τὸ εἶναι τι σημεῖον, περιτραπήσεται εἰς τὸ ὁμο-
 λογεῖν μηδὲν εἶναι σημεῖον. ἔστω δὲ καὶ ἐκ περι-
 ουσίας¹ τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ μόνον ὁμολογεῖσθω² σημεῖον, τὸ
 τοῦ [μὴ]³ εἶναι σημεῖον μηνυτικόν· τί τοῦτ’ ὄφελος
 αὐτοῖς μηδὲν ἔχουσι τῶν ἰδίων εἰπεῖν δογμάτων
 297 σημεῖον; ὥστε τοῦτο μὲν ἀνόνητον αὐτοῖς, φημί
 δὲ τὸ κοινῶς ὁμολογεῖσθαι εἶναι τι σημεῖον· ἐκέينو
 δ’ ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον, τὸ ὑποτάξαι τῷ “ ἔστι τι
 σημεῖον ” ἀορίστω τὸ “ τοῦτο δ’ ἔστι σημεῖον ”
 ὀρισμένως ἐκφερόμενον. ὅπερ οὐκ ἔνεστιν αὐτοῖς
 ποιεῖν. πᾶν γὰρ σημεῖον ἐπ’ ἴσης τῷ σημειωτῷ
 δοξαστόν ἐστι καὶ ἀνεπικρίτως διαφωνούμενον.
 ὡς οὖν τὸ “ τίς διὰ πέτρας πλεῖ ” ψεῦδός ἐστιν,

¹ περιουσίας Heintz: περιτροπῆς mss., Bekk.

of establishing this, whereas the premiss “ if a sign
 does not exist, a sign exists ” becomes necessary.
 The argument, therefore, is unsound because of
 redundancy.—But, not to follow our adversaries into 295
 minute points, one may propound another argument
 of the following kind: If he who states that a sign
 does not exist is converted to stating that a sign
 exists, he also who states that a sign exists is con-
 verted to stating that a sign does not exist. But he
 who stated, sceptically, that a sign does not exist was
 converted, according to them, to stating that a sign
 exists; therefore he who states, dogmatically, that
 a sign exists will be converted to saying, as we shall
 show, that a sign does not exist. For instance, it is 296
 necessary that he who states that a sign exists should
 confirm his assertion by a sign, but as it is not agreed
 that a sign exists, how can he use the sign for confirm-
 ing the existence of a sign? And if he cannot prove
 by a sign that a sign exists he will be converted to
 agreeing that no sign exists.—But let it be granted
 and agreed, into the bargain, that only this particular
 sign exists which serves to inform us that a sign
 exists: of what advantage to them is this, when they
 are unable to mention any sign of their own special
 doctrines? So that this does not profit them at all— 297
 the general agreement, I mean, that a sign exists; it is
 probably necessary for them to subjoin to the indefinite
 statement “ a sign exists ” the definitely expressed
 “ this sign exists.” And this it is not possible for them
 to do. For every sign, equally with the thing signified,
 is a matter of opinion and of unsettled controversy.
 Thus, just as the clause “ Someone is sailing through

² ὁμολογεῖσθω Heintz: ὁμολογεῖσθαι mss., Bekk.

³ [μὴ] secl. Kochalsky.

ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται αὐτῷ ὠρισμένον ὑποτάττειν ἀληθές τὸ " οὗτος διὰ πέτρας πλεῖ," οὕτως ἐπεὶ τῷ " ἔστι τι σημεῖον " ἀορίστῳ οὐδὲν ἔχομεν ὠρισμένον ἀληθές ὑποτάττειν " τοῦτο δὲ ἔστι σημεῖον," ψεῦδος ἄρα γίνεταί τὸ " ἔστι τι σημεῖον," καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον αὐτῷ ἀληθές, τὸ " οὐδὲν ἔστι σημεῖον."

- 298 Πλήν ἔστω γε καὶ τούτους τοὺς ὑπ' αὐτῶν κομισθέντας λόγους εἶναι σθεναροῦς, μεμενηκέναι δὲ καὶ τοὺς τῶν σκεπτικῶν ἀναντιρρήτους· τί ἀπολείπεται τῆς καθ' ἑκάτερον μέρος προσπιπτούσης ἰσοσθενείας εἰ μὴ τὸ ἐπέχειν καὶ ἀοριστεῖν περὶ τοῦ ζητουμένου πράγματος, οὔτε τὸ εἶναι τι σημεῖον λέγοντας οὔτε τὸ μὴ εἶναι, τὸ δὲ οὐ μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι μετὰ ἀσφαλείας προφερομένους;
- 299 Ἄλλ' ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις δοκεῖ κατὰ γένος εἶναι σημεῖον καὶ διὰ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων λημμάτων ἐκκαλύπτει τὸ ἀδηλούμενον συμπέρασμα, μὴ τι οἰκείον ἔστι τῇ περὶ σημεῖου σκέψει καὶ τὴν περὶ αὐτῆς ζήτησιν συνάπτειν.

Δ.—ΠΕΡΙ ΑΠΟΔΕΙΞΕΩΣ

- 300 Τίνος μὲν ἕνεκεν περὶ ἀποδείξεως ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος ζητοῦμεν πρότερον ὑποδέδεικται, ὅτε περὶ τε τοῦ κριτηρίου καὶ τοῦ σημείου ἐσκεπτόμεθα· πρὸς δὲ τὸ μὴ ἀμεθόδως γίνεσθαι τὴν ὑφήγησιν, ἀλλ' ἀσφαλέστερον καὶ τὴν ἐποχὴν καὶ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς δογματικούς ἀντίρρησιν προβαίνειν, ὑποδεικτέον τὴν ἐπίνοιαν αὐτῆς. ἡ τοίνυν ἀπόδειξις κατὰ μὲν 301 τὸ γένος ἐστὶ λόγος· οὐ γὰρ δὴ γε αἰσθητὸν ἦν πρᾶγμα, ἀλλὰ διανοίας τις κίνησις καὶ συγκατά-

* Cf. P.H. i. 8.

* Cf. P.H. i. 188.

a rock" is false, since it is impossible to subjoin to it as a definite truth " This man is sailing through a rock," so also, since we are unable to subjoin to the indefinite " a sign exists " a definite and true " this sign exists," the clause " a sign exists " becomes false and its contradictory, " no sign exists," true.

Let it be granted, however, both that the argu- 298 ments brought forward by the Stoics are strong and that those of the Sceptics remain uncontroverted: what remains for us, with this equipollence^a of the two parties, except to suspend judgement and avoid definition regarding the matter in question, not affirming either that a sign exists or that it does not exist, but cautiously pronouncing that it is " no more " ^b existent than non-existent?

But since proof seems to come under the genus 299 sign^c and to reveal the non-evident conclusion by means of the agreed premisses, it is perhaps fitting to attach our inquiry about proof to our examination of sign.

IV.—CONCERNING PROOF

The reason why we are at present inquiring about 300 proof has been shown before,^d when we were investigating the Sign and the Criterion; but in order that our treatment may not be unmethodical and that our suspension^e and our controversy with the Dogmatists may go forward, we must indicate the meaning of proof. Proof, then, in point of genus is an argument; 301 for it is not, of course, a sensible thing, but a certain

* With § 299 cf. P.H. i. 60, ii. 134, 135.

* Cf. i. 27.

* i.e. the Sceptics' doctrine of " suspension of judgement "; f. P.H. i. 8 ff.

θεσεις, ἄπερ ἦν λογικά· λόγος δέ ἐστιν, ὡς ἀπλού-
 στερον εἰπεῖν, τὸ συνεστηκὸς ἐκ λημμάτων καὶ
 302 ἐπιφορᾶς. λήμματα δὲ καλοῦμεν οὐ θέματα τινα,
 ἃ συναρπάζομεν, ἀλλ' ἄπερ ὁ προσδιαλεγόμενος τῷ
 ἐμφανῇ εἶναι δίδωσι καὶ παραχωρεῖ. ἐπιφορὰ δὲ
 ἐτύγχανε τὸ ἐκ τούτων τῶν λημμάτων κατασκευα-
 ζόμενον. οἶον λόγος μὲν ἐστὶ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο σύ-
 στημα "εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστὶ, φῶς ἔστιν" ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα
 ἐστὶν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν," λήμματα δὲ αὐτοῦ καθέστηκε
 τό τε "εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστὶ, φῶς ἔστιν" καὶ τὸ "ἀλλὰ
 μὴν ἡμέρα ἐστὶν," ἐπιφορὰ δὲ τὸ "φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν."
 303 τῶν δὲ λόγων οἱ μὲν εἰσι συνακτικοὶ οἱ δὲ οὐ,
 καὶ συνακτικοὶ μὲν ἐφ' ὧν συγχωρηθέντων ὑπάρχειν
 τῶν λημμάτων παρὰ τὴν τούτων συγχώρησιν
 ἀκολουθεῖν φαίνεται καὶ ἡ ἐπιφορὰ, ὡς εἶχεν ἐπὶ
 τοῦ μικρῷ πρόσθεν ἐκτεθέντος. ἐπεὶ γὰρ συν-
 ἔστηκεν ἐκ συνημμένου τοῦ "εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστὶ, φῶς
 ἔστιν," ὅπερ ὑπισχνεῖτο ὄντος τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ πρώτου
 ἀληθοῦς ἔσεσθαι καὶ τὸ δεύτερον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ
 304 ἀληθές, καὶ ἔτι ἐκ τοῦ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν," ὅπερ ἦν
 ἠγούμενον ἐν τῷ συνημμένῳ, φημί ὅτι δοθέντος μὲν
 ἀληθοῦς εἶναι τοῦ συνημμένου, ὥστε ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ
 ἐν αὐτῷ ἠγούμενῳ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ λήγον, δοθέντος δὲ
 ὑπάρχειν καὶ τοῦ πρώτου τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ τοῦ "ἡμέρα
 ἔστιν," κατ' ἀνάγκην συνεισαχθήσεται διὰ τὴν
 τούτων ὑπαρξίν καὶ τὸ δεύτερον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ, τουτ-
 305 ἐστὶ τὸ "φῶς ἔστιν," ὅπερ ἦν ἐπιφορὰ. καὶ δὴ
 οἱ μὲν συνακτικοὶ λόγοι τοιοῦτοί τινές εἰσι κατὰ
 τὸν χαρακτήρα, ἀσύνακτοι δὲ ὑπάρχουσιν οἱ μὴ
 οὕτως ἔχουσιν. τῶν δὲ συνακτικῶν οἱ μὲν πρό-
 398

motion and assent of the mind, and these are rational.^a
 And an argument is, speaking in general terms, what
 is constructed of premisses and a conclusion. We give 302
 the name of "premisses," not to certain assumptions
 which we take by force, but to those which, because
 they are obvious, the interlocutor grants and con-
 cedes. A conclusion is that which is established from
 the premisses. For example, this whole structure is
 an argument: "If it is day, it is light; but in fact
 it is day; therefore it is light"; and its premisses
 are "If it is day, it is light," and "but in fact it is
 day"; while its conclusion is "therefore it is light."
 —And of arguments some are conclusive, some not; 303
 and conclusive are those in which, when it is agreed
 that the premisses are true, owing to this agreement
 the conclusion also appears to follow, as was the case
 with that set out a moment ago. For since it is com-
 posed of the hypothetical major premiss "If it is day,
 it is light," which promises that, if its first clause
 is true, the second also of its clauses will be true; and 304
 also of the premiss "it is day," which is the ante-
 cedent in the major; I assert that if it is granted that
 the major premiss is true, so that its consequent
 follows from its antecedent, and granted also that
 the first of its clauses, "it is day," is a fact,—then,
 because of the actuality of these, the second also of
 its clauses, namely "it is light," will be deduced, and
 this is the conclusion. Such, then, in respect of their 305
 type, are the conclusive arguments, and those which
 are not of this kind are inconclusive.^b—Of the con-
 clusive arguments some deduce something pre-

^a With §§ 301-304 cf. *P.H.* ii. 135-138. "Argument"
 (λόγος) = Syllogism.

^b With §§ 305-310 cf. *P.H.* ii. 140-143.

δηλόν τι συνάγουσιν οἱ δὲ ἄδηλον, καὶ πρόδηλον μὲν καθάπερ ὁ ἐκκείμενος καὶ οὕτως ἔχων "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν." τὸ γὰρ "φῶς ἔστιν" ἐπ' ἴσης φαινόμενον τῷ "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστιν." καὶ πάλιν ὁ τοιοῦτος "εἰ περιπατεῖ Δίων, κινεῖται Δίων· περιπατεῖ δὲ Δίων· κινεῖται ἄρα Δίων." τὸ γὰρ "κινεῖται Δίων," ὅπερ ἔστι συμπέρασμα, τῶν αὐτοφωράτων ὑπῆρχεν.

308 ἄδηλον δὲ συνάγει οἶον ὁ τοιοῦτος "εἰ ἰδρώτες ῥέουσι διὰ τῆς ἐπιφανείας, εἰσὶ νοητοὶ τῆς σαρκὸς πόροι· ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· τὸ ἄρα δεύτερον." τὸ γὰρ νοητοὺς εἶναι τῆς σαρκὸς πόρους τῶν ἀδήλων ὑπῆρχεν. καὶ πάλιν "οὐ ἐκκριθέντος ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τελευτῶσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ψυχὴ ἔστιν ἐκείνο· αἵματος δὲ ἐκκριθέντος ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τελευτῶσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι· ψυχὴ ἄρα ἔστι τὸ αἷμα." τὸ γὰρ ἐν αἵματι κείσθαι τὴν ὑπόστασιν τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἐν-
307 αργές. τούτων δὲ τῶν ἀδηλόν τι συναγόντων οἱ μὲν ἐφοδευτικῶς μόνον ἐπάγουσιν ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τῶν λημμάτων ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα, οἱ δὲ ἐφοδευτικῶς
308 ἅμα καὶ ἐκκαλυπτικῶς. ὧν ἐφοδευτικῶς μὲν μόνον ἐπάγουσιν οἱ ἐκ πιστεως καὶ μνήμης ἠρτήσθαι δοκοῦντες, οἷός ἐστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος "εἰ τίς σοι θεῶν εἶπεν ὅτι πλουτήσῃ οὗτος, πλουτήσῃ οὗτος· οὗτος δὲ ὁ θεός" (δείκνυμι δὲ γε τὸν Δία καθ' ὑπόθεσιν) "εἶπέ σοι ὅτι πλουτήσῃ οὗτος· πλουτήσῃ ἄρα οὗτος." ἐνθάδε γὰρ παραδεχόμεθα τὸ συμπέρασμα, τὸ πλουτήσῃ τούτου, οὐκ ἐκ τῆς τοῦ προταθέντος λόγου δυνάμεως κατασκευασθέν, ἀλλὰ τῷ πιστεύειν
309 τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀποφάνσει. ἐφοδευτικῶς δὲ ἅμα καὶ ἐκκαλυπτικῶς ἐπήγειν ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τῶν λημμάτων

evident, others something non-evident,—pre-evident, as in the case of the argument set forth in this form: "If it is day, it is light; but in fact it is day; therefore it is light"; for "it is light" is just as apparent as "it is day." And again one like this: "If Dion walks, Dion moves; but Dion walks; therefore Dion moves"; for "Dion moves," which is the conclusion, is a thing patent of itself. But an argument such as 306 this deduces what is non-evident: "If sweat pours through the surface, intelligible pores^a of the flesh exist; but in fact the first (is true); therefore the second (is true)"; for the existence of intelligible pores of the flesh is a thing non-evident. And again: "That by the separation of which from the body men die is the soul; but it is by the separation of blood from the body that men die; therefore the blood is soul." For it is not manifest that the substance of the soul consists in blood. And of these arguments 307 which deduce something non-evident some lead us on from the premisses to the conclusion by way of progression only, others both by way of progression and by way of discovery as well. And of these such as 308 seem to depend on belief and memory lead us on by way of progression only, as, for example, "If a god has said to you that this man will be rich, this man will be rich; but this god (assume that I point to Zeus) has said to you that this man will be rich; therefore he will be rich." For here we accept the conclusion, that this man will be rich, not as established by the power of the argument set forth, but owing to our belief in the statement of the god. But 309 an argument such as that propounded regarding the intelligible pores leads us from the premisses to the

^a i. e. invisible excretory ducts; cf. P.H. ii. 90.

ἐπὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα καθάπερ ὁ ἐπὶ τῶν νοητῶν πόρων συνερωτηθείς. τὸ γὰρ "εἰ ρέουσι διὰ τῆς ἐπιφανείας ἰδρώτες, εἰσὶ νοητοὶ τῆς σαρκὸς πόροι" καὶ τὸ ρεῖν διὰ τῆς ἐπιφανείας ἰδρώτας, ἐκ τῆς αὐτῶν φύσεως κατασκευάσαι ἐδίδασκεν ἡμᾶς τὸ ὅτι εἰσὶ νοητοὶ τῆς σαρκὸς πόροι, κατὰ τινα τοιαύτην ἔφοδον "διὰ ναστοῦ καὶ ἀποροποιήτου σώματος ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ὑγρὸν ρεῖν· ρεῖ δέ γε διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἰδρώς· τούτων οὐκ ἂν εἴη ναστὸν τὸ σῶμα ἀλλὰ πεποροποιημένον."

310 Τούτων δὴ οὕτως ἐχόντων ἡ ἀπόδειξις πρὸ παντὸς ὀφείλει λόγος εἶναι, δεύτερον συνακτικὸς, τρίτον καὶ ἀληθῆς, τέταρτον καὶ ἄδηλον ἔχων συμπέρασμα, πέμπτον καὶ ἐκκαλυπτόμενον τοῦτο

311 ἐκ τῆς δυνάμεως τῶν λημμάτων. ὁ γοῦν τοιοῦτος λόγος ἡμέρας οὕσης "εἰ νῦξ ἔστι, σκότος ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν νῦξ ἔστιν· σκότος ἄρα ἔστιν" συνακτικὸς μὲν καθειστική, δοθέντων γὰρ αὐτοῦ τῶν λημμάτων ὑπάρχειν συνάγεται καὶ ἡ ἐπιφορά, οὐκ ἀληθῆς δέ γε ἦν, εἶχε γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ λῆμμα ψεῦδος τὸ "νῦξ ἔστιν". διόπερ οὐδὲ ἀποδεικτικὸς ἔστιν.

312 πάλιν ὁ τοιοῦτος "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἡμέρα δ' ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν" πρὸς τῷ συνακτικῷ ἔτι καὶ ἀληθῆς ἔστιν, ἐπιφέρει δοθέντων αὐτοῦ τῶν λημμάτων δίδοται καὶ ἡ ἐπιφορά, καὶ δι' ἀληθῶν ἀληθῆς τι δείκνυσιν. τοιοῦτος δὲ ὢν ἅλιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις τῷ πρόδηλον ἔχειν τὸ συμπέρασμα

313 τὸ "φῶς ἔστιν," ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄδηλον. κατὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ὁ οὕτως ἔχων "εἰ τίς σοι θεῶν εἶπεν ὅτι πλουτήσῃ οὗτος, πλουτήσῃ οὗτος· οὕτωσὶ δὲ ὁ θεὸς εἶπέ σοι ὅτι πλουτήσῃ οὗτος· πλουτήσῃ ἄρα οὗτος" ἄδηλον μὲν ἔχει συμπέρασμα τὸ πλου-

conclusion both by way of progression and by way of discovery. For the premisses "If sweat flows through the surface, intelligible pores of the flesh exist," and "Sweat flows through the surface," teach us to conclude from their own nature that intelligible pores of the flesh exist, in virtue of a progression such as this—"Through a solid body of non-porous formation it is impossible for a liquid to flow; but sweat flows through the body; so the body will not be solid but of porous formation."

This being so, proof must first of all be an argument; 310 secondly, conclusive; thirdly, also true; fourthly, having also a non-evident conclusion; fifthly, having also this conclusion discovered through the power of the premisses. Thus an argument such as this,^a 311 when it is day,— "If it is night, it is dark; but in fact it is night; therefore it is dark"—is conclusive in form (for its premisses being granted its conclusion also is inferred to exist), but it certainly is not true (for it contains the false premiss "it is night"); and on this account it is not probative. Again, such an 312 argument as this—"If it is day it is light; but it is day; therefore it is light,"—besides being conclusive is also true, since, its premisses being granted, its conclusion also is granted, and by means of true premisses it proves something true. But though it does so, still it is not a proof owing to its having as its conclusion what is pre-evident and not non-evident. In the same way one like this^b—"If a god said to 313 you that this man will be rich, this man will be rich; but this particular god said to you that this man will be rich; therefore he will be rich"—has a non-evident conclusion, that "this man will be rich," but is not

^a Cf. P.H. ii. 139.

^b Cf. P.H. ii. 141.

τήσειν τούτον, οὐκ ἔστι δ' ἀποδεικτικὸς¹ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐκ τῆς τῶν λημμάτων δυνάμεως ἐκκαλύπτεσθαι ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ πίστεως παραδοχῆς τυγχά-
 314 νειν. συνδραμόντων οὖν πάντων τούτων, τοῦ τε συνακτικὸν εἶναι τὸν λόγον καὶ ἀληθῆ καὶ ἀδήλου παραστατικόν, ὑφίσταται ἢ ἀπόδειξις. ἔνθεν καὶ οὕτως αὐτὴν ὑπογράφουσιν "ἀπόδειξις ἔστι λόγος δι' ὁμολογουμένων λημμάτων κατὰ συναγωγὴν ἐπιφορὰν ἐκκαλύπτων ἀδήλον," οἷον ὁ τοιοῦτος "εἰ ἔστι κίνησις, ἔστι κενόν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔστι κίνησις· ἔστιν ἄρα κενόν." τὸ γὰρ εἶναι κενὸν ἀδήλον τ' ἔστι, καὶ δι' ἀληθῶν δοκεῖ, τοῦ τε "εἰ ἔστι κίνησις, ἔστι κενόν" καὶ τοῦ "ἔστι δὲ κίνησις," κατὰ συναγωγὴν ἐκκαλύπτεσθαι.

315 "Ἄ μὲν οὖν οἰκείον ἦν προλαβεῖν περὶ τῆς τοῦ ζητουμένου πράγματος ἐπινοίας, ἔστι τοιαῦτα· τάξει δὲ ὑποδεικτέον καὶ τὸ ἐκ τίνος ὕλης ἔστίν.

E.—EK TINOΣ TAΗΣ ΕΣΤΙΝ Η ΑΠΟΔΕΙΞΙΣ

316 Τῶν πραγμάτων, ὡς πολλάκις προείπομεν, τὰ μὲν πεπίστευται ἐναργῆ εἶναι τὰ δὲ ἀδηλα, καὶ ἐναργῆ μὲν τὰ ἐκ φαντασίας ἀβουλήτως καὶ ἐκ πάθους λαμβανόμενα, οἷον ἔστι νῦν τὸ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν," τό τε² "τοῦτ' ἀνθρωπὸς ἔστιν," ἕκαστον
 317 τῶν τοιούτων, ἀδηλα δὲ τὰ μὴ οὕτως ἔχοντα. καὶ τῶν ἀδήλων, ὡς τινες διαιρούμενοί φασιν, τὰ μὲν ἔστι φύσει ἀδηλα, τὰ δ' ὁμώνυμως λεγόμενα τῷ γένει ἀδηλα. καὶ φύσει μὲν ἔστιν ἀδηλα τὰ μήτε

¹ ἀποδεικτικὸς Heintz: ἀποδεικτικὸν mss. (οὐκέτι δ' ἀποδεικτικὸν Bekk.).

² τό τε: ὅτι mss., Bekk.: τὸ Mutsch.

probative because it is not discovered by the power of the premisses but meets with acceptance through trust in the god. When, then, all these things concur 314—that the argument is at once conclusive and true and making manifest a non-evident—then proof really exists. Hence also they describe it thus: "A proof is an argument which by means of agreed premisses reveals by way of deduction a non-evident conclusion";—for example, this: "If motion exists, void exists; but in fact motion exists; therefore void exists." ^a For the existence of void is non-evident, and also it appears to be revealed by way of deduction by means of the true premisses "If motion exists, void exists" and "but motion exists."

Such, then, are the points regarding the notion 315 of the object of our inquiry which it was fitting to deal with first; and, next in order, we must explain its subject matter.

V.—THE SUBJECT MATTER OF PROOF

Some things—as we frequently said before ^b—are 316 believed to be manifest, others non-evident; and manifest are those which are perceived involuntarily through presentation and through affection, such as, at the present moment, "It is day," "This is a man," and everything of the kind; but non-evident are those which are not of this sort. And of things 317 non-evident—according to the distinction which some people make—some are naturally non-evident, but others are given the same name, "non-evident," as their genus. And naturally non-evident are the things

^a Cf. § 277; i. 213.

^b Cf. § 141. With §§ 316-320 cf. §§ 145-160; P.H. II. 97-103.

πρότερον καταληφθέντα μήτε νῦν καταλαμβάνόμενα μήτε αὐθις καταληφθησόμενα, αἰώνιον δὲ ἔχοντα τὴν ἀγνωσίαν, οἷόν ἐστι τὸ ἀπίους εἶναι
 318 τοὺς ἀστέρας ἢ περισσοῦς. διὸ καὶ φύσει ἀδηλα λέγεται, οὐχ ὅτι αὐτὰ φύσιν ἔχει ἀδηλον ὡς πρὸς ἑαυτὰ, ἐπεὶ μαχόμενόν τι ἐροῦμεν, τουτέστιν ἅμα καὶ ἀγνοεῖν αὐτὰ φάσκοντες καὶ τίνα ἔχει φύσιν ὁμολογοῦντες, ἀλλ' ὅτι τῇ ἡμῶν φύσει ἀδηλείται.
 319 ὁμωνύμως δὲ τῷ γένει ἀδηλα προσαγορεύεται ἅπερ κατὰ μὲν τὴν οικείαν φύσιν ἀποκρύπται, διὰ δὲ σημείων ἢ ἀποδείξεων ἀξιοῦται γνωρίζεσθαι, οἷον τὸ ἄτομα εἶναι στοιχεῖα ἐν ἀπείρῳ φερόμενα κενῷ.
 320 πλὴν τοιαύτης οὔσης ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι διαφορᾶς φαμὲν τὴν ἀπόδειξιν οὔτε πρόδηλον εἶναι (οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἑαυτῆς καὶ κατηναγκασμένου πάθους ἐγνωρίζετο) οὔτε φύσει ἀδηλον (οὐ γὰρ ἀπήλπισται ἢ κατάληψις αὐτῆς) ἀλλὰ τῆς λειπομένης τῶν ἀδηλῶν εἶναι διαφορᾶς, ἅπερ δεδουκυῖαν μὲν καὶ συνεσκιασμένην ἡμῖν ἔχει τὴν φύσιν, τῷ δ' ἐκ
 321 φιλοσοφίας λόγῳ δοκεῖ καταλαμβάνεσθαι. τοῦτο δὲ οὐ βεβαίως λέγομεν, ἐπεὶ γελοῖον παραχωρήσαντας τὴν ὑπαρξίν ἔτι ἐπιζητεῖν περὶ αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' ὅτι κατ' ἐπίνοιαν τοιαύτη τυγχάνει· οὕτω γὰρ ἐκ τῆς τοιαύτης ἐπινόιας καὶ προλήψεως ἀνακύνει ὁ
 322 περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως λόγος. ὅτι τοῖνυν τῶν ἀδηλῶν κατὰ τὴν ἐπινόιαν ἔστιν ἢ ἀπόδειξις καὶ οὐ δύναται δι' αὐτῆς γνωρίζεσθαι, ἐπιλογιστέον οὕτως.

Τὸ μὲν πρόδηλον καὶ ἐναργὲς πάντῃ πρόδηλόν ἐστι καὶ ἐναργὲς, συμπεφώνηται τε παρὰ πᾶσι, καὶ

which neither have been previously apprehended, nor are now being apprehended, nor will hereafter be apprehended, but are eternally unknowable, as for instance that the stars are even in number or odd. Hence they are termed naturally non-evident, not 318 because they possess in relation to themselves a non-evident nature, since this would be to state a contradiction (by saying, that is, that we do not know them and at the same time agreeing as to what nature they possess), but because they are non-evident to our nature. Termed after their genus non-evident 319 are the things which in their own proper nature are hidden but are made known, it is claimed, by means of signs and proofs, as for instance that there exist indivisible elements which move in infinite void.—If, 320 however, such a difference in the things exists, we assert that proof is neither pre-evident (for it is not made known of itself and by a necessitated affection), nor naturally non-evident (for the apprehension of it is not despaired of), but belongs to the remaining species of things non-evident, which have their nature submerged and obscured for us, but are thought to be apprehended by philosophic argument. This, how- 321 ever, we do not positively affirm, since it would be ridiculous to keep on inquiring about proof after conceding its real existence, but only that, in regard to its notion, it is of the kind described; for in this way, from this notion and preconception, the argument about its existence will emerge. So, then, that proof 322 is, in its notion, one of the non-evident things and cannot be made known through itself must be argued as follows.

What is pre-evident and manifest is in all ways pre-evident and manifest and is agreed by all and

οὐδεμίαν διολκὴν ἐπιδέχεται· τὸ δὲ ἄδηλον δια-
 323 πεφύνηται τε καὶ εἰς διολκὴν πίπτειν πέφυκεν. καὶ
 εἰκότως. πᾶς γὰρ λόγος κρίνεται ὅτι ἀληθὴς ἔστιν
 ἢ ψευδής, κατὰ τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ περὶ οὐ κεκό-
 μισται ἀναφοράν· ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ εὐρίσκηται σύμ-
 φωνος τῷ πράγματι τῷ περὶ οὐ κεκόμισται, ἀληθὴς
 εἶναι δοκεῖ, ἐὰν δὲ διάφωνος, ψευδής. οἷον ἀπο-
 φαίνεται τις ὅτι ἡμέρα ἔστιν· οὐκοῦν ἀναπέμφαντες
 τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα, καὶ γνόντες τὴν
 324 τούτου ὑπαρξίν συνεπιμαρτυροῦσαν τῷ λόγῳ,
 φαμέν ἀληθὲς εἶναι τὸ λεγόμενον. διόπερ ὅταν
 μὲν ἐναργὲς ἢ καὶ πρόδηλον τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ περὶ
 οὐ ὁ λόγος κομίζεται, ῥᾶδιον ἀναπέμφαντας ἐπὶ
 αὐτὸ τὸ λεγόμενον, τόθ' οὕτως ἢ ἀληθῆ λέγειν
 εἶναι τὸν λόγον ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον τῷ πράγματι ἢ
 ψευδῆ ἀντιμαρτυρούμενον. ὅταν δὲ ἄδηλον καθ-
 εστήκη τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ ἀποκεκρυμμένον ἡμῖν,
 τότε μηκέτι δυναμένης ἐπὶ τοῦτο βεβαίως γίνεσθαι
 τῆς τοῦ λόγου ἀναπομπῆς λείπεται τὸ καταπιθα-
 νεύεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων ἐπισπᾶσθαι τὴν διά-
 νοιαν εἰς συγκατάθεσιν. ἄλλου δὲ ἄλλως εἰκά-
 ζοντος καὶ διαπιθανεομένου φύεται ἢ διαφωνία,
 μήτε τοῦ ἀποτυχόντος εἰδότες ὅτι ἀπέτυχεν, μήτε
 325 τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος εἰδότες ὅτι ἐπέτυχεν. ταῦτά
 γέ τοι καὶ σφόδρα χαριέντως ἀπεικάζουσιν οἱ σκε-
 πτικοὶ τοὺς περὶ ἀδήλων ζητοῦντας τοῖς ἐν σκότῳ
 ἐπὶ τινα σκοπὸν τοξεύουσιν· ὥσπερ γὰρ τούτων
 εἰκός ἐστι τινὰ μὲν τυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ τινὰ δ'
 ἀποτυχεῖν, τὸ δὲ τίς ἐπέτυχεν ἢ ἀπέτυχεν ἀγνω-
 στον, οὕτως ἐν βαθεῖ σχεδὸν σκότῳ τῆς ἀληθείας
 ἀποκεκρυμμένης ἀφίενται μὲν ἐπὶ ταύτην πολλοὶ
 λόγοι, τὸ δὲ τίς ἐξ αὐτῶν σύμφωνός ἐστιν αὐτῇ καὶ

admits of no dispute; but the non-evident is dis-
 agreed about and naturally tends to fall into dis-
 pute. And reasonably so; for every argument is 323
 judged to be either true or false according to its
 reference to the thing concerning which it is
 brought forward; for if it is found to be in accord
 with the thing concerning which it is brought forward,
 it is held to be true, but if at variance, false. For
 example, someone declares that it is day. Then
 by referring the statement to the fact and learning
 that the fact's existence is confirmatory of the state-
 ment, we say that the statement is true. Conse- 324
 quently, when the fact concerning which the argument
 is brought forward is manifest and pre-evident, it is
 easy to refer the statement to it and then, in this
 way, to declare either that the argument is true as
 confirmatory of the fact, or false if contradictory. But
 when the fact is non-evident and hidden from us, then,
 as there can no longer be any secure reference of the
 argument to it, it only remains for the mind to be
 persuaded and drawn into assent by probabilities.
 But when one man guesses and tries to persuade in
 one way, another in another, disputation springs up,
 since neither he who has missed the mark knows that
 he has missed it, nor he who has hit it knows that he
 has hit it.—Accordingly, the Sceptics very neatly 325
 compare those who inquire about things non-evident
 to men shooting at a mark in the dark; for just as it
 is probable that one of these hits the mark and another
 misses, but which has hit or missed is unknowable, so,
 with the truth hidden almost in the depths of darkness,
 many arguments are shot at it, but which of them is
 in accord with it, and which at variance, it is impossible

326 τίς διάφωνος οὐχ οἶόν τε γινώσκειν, ἀρθέντος ἐκ τῆς ἐναργείας τοῦ ζητουμένου. καὶ τοῦτο πρῶτον εἶπε Ξενοφάνης,

καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφές οὗ τις ἀνὴρ ἴδεν, οὐδέ τις ἔσται

εἰδώς ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἄσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων· εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα τύχοι τετελεσμένον εἰπών, αὐτὸς ὁμως οὐκ οἶδε, δόκος δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται.

327 ὥστε εἰ μὲν τὸ πρόδηλον διὰ τὴν προειρημένην αἰτίαν ἔστι σύμφωνον, τὸ δὲ ἄδηλον διαπεφώνηται, δεήσει καὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν διαφωνομένην ἄδηλον εἶναι. ὅτι δὲ τῷ ὄντι διαπεφώνηται, οὐ πολλῶν ἡμῖν λόγων δεῖ, βραχείας δὲ τινος καὶ προχείρου ὑπομνήσεως, εἰ γε οἱ μὲν δογματικοὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων καὶ οἱ λογικοὶ τῶν ἰατρῶν τιθέασιν αὐτήν, οἱ δὲ ἐμπειρικοὶ ἀναιροῦσιν, τάχα δὲ καὶ Δημόκριτος (ἰσχυρῶς γὰρ αὐτῇ διὰ τῶν κανόνων ἀντι-
328 εἶρηκεν), οἱ δὲ σκεπτικοὶ ἐν ἐποχῇ ταύτῃ ἐφύλαξαν, τῇ “μὴ μᾶλλον” ἀποφάνσει χρώμενοι. τῶν τε τιθέντων αὐτήν πάλιν ἰκανή τις ἔστι διαφωνία, καθὼς προβαίνοντος τοῦ λόγου διδάσκομεν. τοῖνυν ἄδηλόν τί ἐστὶν ἢ ἀπόδειξις.

329 Καὶ μὴν εἰ πᾶσα ἀπόδειξις δόγμα ἐν τοῖς λήμμασιν αὐτῆς περιέχουσα εὐθύς ἐστι δόγμα, πᾶν δὲ δόγμα διαπεφώνηται, κατ' ἀνάγκην πᾶσα ἀπόδειξις διαπεφώνηται καὶ τῶν ζητουμένων ἐστὶ πραγμάτων. οἶον Ἐπίκουρος δοκεῖ ἰσχυροτάτην τεθεικέναι ἀπόδειξιν εἰς τὸ εἶναι κενὸν τοιαύτην “ εἰ

to learn, as the object of inquiry is removed from (the sphere of) the manifest. And this was first stated by 326 Xenophanes^a :

Yet, with respect to the gods and what I declare about all things,

No man has seen and no man will know the truth in its clearness.

Nay, for e'en should he chance to affirm what is really existent,

He himself knoweth it not; but opinion holds sway over all things.

So that if the pre-evident is, for the reason already 327 stated, agreed, whereas the non-evident is in dispute, it must be that proof also, being in dispute, is non-evident.^b And that it really is a matter of dispute it does not need many arguments to show us but only a short reminder, which lies ready to hand, seeing that the dogmatic philosophers and the logical doctors affirm it, but the Empirics^c deny it, and perhaps Democritus also (for he has spoken against it strongly in his *Canons*), while the Sceptics have 328 cautiously suspended judgement about it, making use of the formula “not more.”^d And amongst those who affirm it, again, there is no little dissension, as we shall explain as our discourse proceeds. So, then, proof is a thing non-evident.

Furthermore, if every proof which contains an 329 opinion in the premisses is indisputably an opinion, and every opinion is disputed, necessarily every proof is disputed and is one of the objects of inquiry. Epicurus, for instance, opines that he has put forward a very strong argument for the existence of void,

^a Cf. i. 49, 110; *P.H.* ii. 18.

^b With §§ 327-334 cf. *P.H.* ii. 180, 181.

^c Cf. § 191. For Democritus cf. i. 138.

^d Cf. *P.H.* i. 188, 213.

ἔστι κίνησις, ἔστι κενόν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔστι κίνησις·
 330 ἔστιν ἄρα κενόν." ταύτης δὲ τῆς ἀποδείξεως τὰ
 λήμματα εἰ μὲν συνεχωρεῖτο πρὸς πάντων, ἐξ
 ἀνάγκης ἂν καὶ τὴν ἐπιφορὰν εἶχεν ἀκολουθοῦσαν
 331 αὐτοῖς καὶ ὑπὸ πάντων παραχωρουμένην. νῦν δ'
 ἐνέστησάν τινες τούτῳ, φημί δὲ τῷ [μῆ]¹ συν-
 ἀγεσθαι τοῖς λήμμασι τὴν ἐπιφορὰν, οὐ διὰ τὸ μὴ
 ἀκολουθεῖν αὐτὴν ἐκείνοις, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ἐκεῖνα
 332 εἶναι ψευδῆ καὶ ἀνομόλογα. ἵνα γὰρ μὴ πολλὰς
 ἐπιτρέχωμεν συνημμένους κρίσεις, λέγωμεν δ' αὐτό-
 θεν ἕγιες εἶναι συνημμένον τὸ μὴ ἀρχόμενον ἀπ'
 ἀληθοῦς καὶ λῆγον ἐπὶ ψεύδος, τὸ [δ'] " εἰ ἔστι
 κίνησις, ἔστι κενόν " κατὰ μὲν Ἐπίκουρον ἀρχό-
 μενον ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς τοῦ "[εἰ] ἔστι κίνησις " καὶ
 λῆγον ἐπ' ἀληθές ἔσται ἀληθές, κατὰ δὲ τοὺς
 περιπατητικοὺς ἀρχόμενον ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς τοῦ "[εἰ]
 ἔστι κίνησις " καὶ λῆγον ἐπὶ ψεύδος τὸ " ἔστι
 333 κενόν " ἔσται ψεύδος, κατὰ δὲ Διόδωρον ἀρχόμενον
 ἀπὸ ψεύδους τοῦ " ἔστι κίνησις " καὶ λῆγον ἐπὶ
 ψεύδος τὸ " ἔστι κενόν " αὐτὸ μὲν ἔσται ἀληθές,
 τὴν δὲ πρόσληψιν τὴν " ἔστι δέ γε κίνησις " ὡς
 334 ψευδῆ διελέγχει, κατὰ μέντοι τοὺς σκεπτικοὺς
 λῆγον ἐπ' ἀδηλον ἔσται ἀδηλον· τὸ γὰρ " ἔστι
 κενόν " κατ' αὐτοὺς τῶν ἀγνώστων ἐτύγχανεν. φα-
 νερόν οὖν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι διαπεφώνηται τὰ λήμματα
 τῆς ἀποδείξεως. διάφωνα δὲ ὄντα² ἀδηλά ἐστιν,
 ὥστε καὶ ἡ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀπόδειξις πάντως ἀδηλος.

335 Καὶ μὴν τῶν πρὸς τὸ ἔστιν ἢ ἀπόδειξις· οὐ γὰρ
 καθ' ἑαυτὴν φαίνεται, πρὸς δὲ τῷ ἀποδεικνυμένῳ
 θεωρεῖται. τὰ δὲ πρὸς τι εἰ ἔστιν ἐξήγηται, καὶ

¹ [μῆ] secl. Kochalsky (τῶν N).

² ὄντα: καὶ τὰ MSS., Bekk. (ὄντα καὶ Kochalsky).

namely this—"If motion exists, void exists; but in
 fact motion exists; therefore void exists." But if the 330
 premisses of this proof had been agreed to by all, it
 would necessarily have had a conclusion also following
 from them and admitted by all. But as it is, some 331
 have objected to it—I mean, to the deduction of the
 conclusion from the premisses—not because it does
 not follow from them, but because they are false and
 not admitted. For—not to run over a great number 332
 of judgements about it, but to state at once (the view)
 that a valid hypothetical premiss^a is one that does
 not begin with truth and end in falsehood,—then,
 according to Epicurus, the premiss "If motion exists,
 void exists," as it begins with the truth "motion
 exists" and ends in truth, will be true; but according
 to the Peripatetics, as it begins with the truth
 "motion exists" and ends in the falsehood "void
 exists," it will be false; and according to Diodorus,^b 333
 as it begins with the falsehood "motion exists" and
 ends in the falsehood "void exists," it will in itself
 be true, but the minor premiss, "But motion in fact
 exists," he criticizes as false; according to the 334
 Sceptics, however, as it ends in a non-evident, it will
 be non-evident; for according to them "void
 exists" is one of the things unknowable. From this,
 then, it is plain that the premisses of the proof are
 matters of dispute. And matters of dispute are also
 non-evident, so that proof based on them is also
 wholly non-evident.

Moreover, proof is a relative thing, for it does not 335
 appear by itself but is seen in relation to the thing
 proved. And the existence of relatives is a matter

^a For this Stoic definition cf. §§ 114, 268.

^b Cf. P.H. ii. 245.

πολὺς ἦν ὁ λέγων μὴ εἶναι αὐτά. τὸ δὲ διολκῆν
 ἔχον ἔστιν ἄδηλον. καὶ ταύτη τοίνυν ἄδηλός ἐστιν
 336 ἢ ἀπόδειξις. πρὸς τούτοις ἦτοι ἐκ φωνῆς
 συνέστηκεν ἢ ἀπόδειξις, ὡς τοῖς Ἐπικουρείοις
 εἴρηται, ἢ ἐξ ἀσωμάτων λεκτῶν, ὡς τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς
 στοᾶς. ἐξ ὁποτέρων δ' ἂν συνεστήκη, πολλὴν
 ἐπιδέχεται ζήτησιν· τὰ τε γὰρ λεκτὰ εἰ ὑφέστηκε
 ζητεῖται, καὶ πολὺς ὁ περὶ τούτου λόγος, αἶ τε
 φωναὶ εἰ σημαίνουσι τι διηπόρηται. εἰ δὲ ἐξ
 ὁποτέρας ἂν ὕλης ὑπάρχη ἢ ἀπόδειξις ζητεῖται, τὸ
 δὲ ζητούμενόν ἐστιν ἄδηλον, πάντως ἢ ἀπόδειξις
 ἐστιν ἄδηλος.

Τοῦτο μὲν ὄν ὥσπερ τι στοιχεῖον τῆς μελλούσης
 ἀντιρρήσεως ὑποκείσθω· μετελθόντες δὲ ἐξῆς
 σκοπῶμεν καὶ περὶ τοῦ εἰ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις.

5.—ΕΙ ΕΣΤΙΝ ΑΠΟΔΕΙΞΙΣ

337 Παρεστακότες καὶ τὸ ἐκ τίνος ὕλης ἐστὶν ἢ
 ἀπόδειξις, ἀκολουθῶν πειρασόμεθα καὶ τοὺς σα-
 λεύοντας αὐτὴν λόγους προχειρίσασθαι, σκεπτόμενοι
 πότερον ἀκολουθεῖ τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ καὶ προλήψει ταύτης
 ἢ ὑπαρξίς ἢ οὐδαμῶς. καίτοι τινὲς εἰώθασιν ἡμῶν,
 καὶ μάλιστα οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἐπικούρου αἰρέσεως,
 ἀγροικότερον ἐνίστασθαι, λέγοντες “ ἦτοι νοεῖτε τί
 ἐστὶν ἢ ἀπόδειξις, ἢ οὐ νοεῖτε. καὶ εἰ μὲν νοεῖτε
 καὶ ἔχετε ἔννοιαν αὐτῆς, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις· εἰ δὲ
 οὐ νοεῖτε, πῶς ζητεῖτε τὸ μὴδ' ἀρχὴν νοούμενον
 331 α ὑμῖν; ” ταῦτα γὰρ λέγοντες ὑφ' ἑαυτῶν σχεδὸν περι-
 τρέπονται, ἐπεὶ περὶ τὸ μὲν παντὸς τοῦ ζητουμένου

* Cf. §§ 453 ff.
 ° Cf. P.H. ii. 107.

° Cf. §§ 12, 13, 404.
 ° Cf. P.H. ii. 214.

of inquiry,^a and there are many who say that they do
 not exist. And what is subject to dispute is non-
 evident. So in this way also proof is non-evident.—
 Besides this, proof is composed either of sound, as is 336
 said by the Epicureans, or of incorporeal expressions,
 as is said by the Stoics.^b But, whichever of these it
 is composed of, it is open to serious question. For it
 is a question whether “ expressions ” really exist,^c and
 there is much argument on the point; and whether
 sounds have any significance is also a matter of doubt.^d
 But if it is a question what subject matter is the basis
 of proof, and what is questioned is non-evident, cer-
 tainly proof is non-evident.

Let this, then, be laid down as the basis of our
 counter-argument; and let us pass on to consider
 next the question of the existence of proof.

VI.—DOES PROOF EXIST ?

Now that we have explained what is the matter of 337
 which proof consists, we shall in the next place attempt
 to deal with the arguments which render it precarious,
 and consider whether its real existence follows from
 its notion and preconception or not.^e Some people,
 to be sure,—and especially those of the Epicurean
 School—are wont to withstand us rather rudely and
 say—“ Either you understand what proof is, or you
 do not understand; and if you understand and have
 a notion of it, proof exists; but if you do not under-
 stand, how do you inquire into a thing of which you
 have no understanding at all? ” For in saying this 331 a
 they are pretty well overthrown by their own selves,
 since it is agreed that a preconception and notion

* With §§ 337 ff. cf. P.H. ii. 1 ff.

πρόληψιν καὶ ἔννοιαν δεῖν προηγείσθαι δμολογόν
 ἔστιν. πῶς γάρ τις καὶ ζητῆσαι δύναται μηδεμίαν
 ἔννοιαν ἔχων τοῦ ζητουμένου πράγματος; οὔτε
 γὰρ ἐπιτυχῶν εἴσεται ὅτι ἐπέτυχεν οὔτε ἀστοχίας
 332 a ὅτι ἡστόχησεν. ὥστε τοῦτο μὲν δίδομεν, καὶ
 τοσοῦτόν γε ἀπέχομεν τοῦ λέγειν ἔννοιαν μὴ ἔχειν
 παντὸς τοῦ ζητουμένου πράγματος, ὡς καὶ ἀνά-
 παλιν πολλάς γ' ἔννοιᾶς αὐτοῦ καὶ προλήψεις ἔχειν
 ἀξιούσιν, καὶ χάριν τοῦ μὴ δύνασθαι ταύτας δια-
 κρίνειν καὶ τὴν ἐξ αὐτῶν κυριωτάτην ἀνευρεῖν εἰς
 333 a ἐποχὴν καὶ ἀρρεψίαν περιίστασθαι. εἰ μὲν γὰρ μίαν
 εἴχομεν τοῦ ζητουμένου πράγματος πρόληψιν, κἂν
 ταύτῃ συνεξακολουθήσαντες τοιοῦτ' ἐπιστεύομεν
 ὑπάρχειν ὁποῖον κατὰ μίαν προσέπιπτεν ἔννοιαν·
 νῦν δ' ἐπεὶ πολλάς ἔχομεν τοῦ ἐνὸς ἔννοιᾶς καὶ
 πολυτρόπους μαχομένους καὶ ἐπ' ἴσης πιστὰς διά-
 τε τὴν ἐν αὐταῖς πιθανότητα καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν
 προῖσταμένων ἀνδρῶν ἀξιοπιστίαν, μήτε πάσαις
 πιστεῦσαι δυνάμενοι διὰ τὴν μάχην, μήτε πάσαις
 ἀπιστῆσαι τῷ μηδεμίαν ἄλλην ἔχειν αὐτῶν πιστο-
 τέραν, μήτε τινὶ μὲν πιστεῦσαι τινὶ δὲ ἀπιστεῖν διὰ
 τὴν ἰσότητα, κατ' ἀνάγκην ἤλθομεν εἰς τὸ ἐπέχειν.
 334 a ἀλλὰ γὰρ προλήψεις ἔχομεν τῶν πραγμάτων κατὰ
 τὸν ὑποδεικνυμένον τρόπον. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, εἰ μὲν
 ἢ πρόληψις κατάληψις ὑπήρχεν, ἴσως ἂν ἐν τῷ
 διδόναι τὸ πρόληψιν ἔχειν τοῦ πράγματος καὶ τὴν
 κατάληψιν τούτου συνωμολογοῦμεν· νῦν δ' ἐπεὶ ἢ
 πρόληψις καὶ ἢ ἔννοια τοῦ πράγματος οὐχ ὑπαρξίς
 ἔστιν, ἐπινοεῖν μὲν αὐτὸ φαμεν, καταλαμβάνεσθαι
 335 a δὲ μηδαμῶς διὰ τὰς προεκκειμένας αἰτίας, ἐπεὶ τοὶ
 εἰ αἰ πρόληψεις εἰσι κατάληψεις, παρὰ μέρους καὶ

* Cf. P.H. i. 190.

must precede every object of inquiry. For how can
 anyone even begin to inquire if he has no notion of
 the object of inquiry? For neither if he has hit the
 mark will he know that he has hit it, nor if he has
 missed it, that he has missed it. Consequently we grant 332 a
 this point, and in fact so far are we from saying that
 we have not a notion of the whole object of inquiry
 that, on the contrary, we claim to have many notions
 and preconceptions of it, and that it is because of our
 inability to decide between them and to discover
 the most cogent amongst them that we revert to
 suspension and indecision.* For if we had possessed 333 a
 but one preconception of the object of inquiry, then,
 by following this closely, we would have believed that
 the object was such as we felt it to be owing to that
 one notion; but now, since we have many notions
 of the one object, and these manifold and conflicting
 and equally trustworthy both because of their in-
 herent probability and because of the trustworthiness
 of the men who champion them,—as we are unable
 either to believe them all because of the conflict; or
 to disbelieve all, as we do not possess any other notion
 more trustworthy than they; or to believe one and
 disbelieve another, owing to their equality,—we are
 necessarily reduced to suspending judgement. But 334 a
 we do, in fact, possess preconceptions in the way
 that has been indicated. And because of this, if
 preconception was apprehension, in granting that
 we have a preconception of the thing we should prob-
 ably have been admitting also apprehension of it;
 but as it is, since the preconception and notion of the
 thing is not its existence, we say that we have a notion
 of it but do not apprehend it for the reasons already
 set forth; for, to be sure, if preconceptions are appre- 335 a

ἡμεῖς πευσόμεθα αὐτῶν πότερον ἔχει πρόληψιν καὶ
 ἐπίνοιαν Ἐπίκουρος τῶν τεττάρων στοιχείων ἢ οὐκ
 ἔχει, καὶ εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἔχει, πῶς ἀντιλήψεται τοῦ
 ζητουμένου πράγματος, καὶ τοῦτο ζητήσει οὐ μηδὲ
 336 a τέσσαρα εἶναι στοιχεῖα; ἀλλ' οἶμαι ὅτι ἀπολογου-
 μενοι φήσουσιν ὡς ἐπινοεῖ μὲν Ἐπίκουρος τὰ
 τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα, οὐ κατείληφε δὲ πάντως· ψιλὸν
 γὰρ κίνημά ἐστι τῆς διανοίας ἢ ἐπίνοια, ἧς ἐχό-
 μενος ἀντιλέγει τῷ εἶναι τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα. τοῖνυν
 καὶ ἡμεῖς ἔχομεν ἐπίνοιαν τῆς ἀποδείξεως, καὶ ἀπὸ
 ταύτης ἐξετάσομεν εἴτε ἔστιν εἴτε καὶ μή, ταύτην
 δὲ ἔχοντες οὐχὶ καὶ τὴν κατάληψιν ὁμολογήσομεν.
 337 a Ἄλλὰ πρὸς μὲν τούτους καὶ αὐθὶς ποτε λεχθή-
 σεται· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐμμεθόδους προσήκει ποιεῖσθαι τὰς
 ἀντιρρήσεις, ζητητέον τίμη μάλιστα δεῖ ἀποδείξει
 ἐνίστασθαι. καὶ δὴ ἐὰν μὲν ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρους καὶ
 καθ' ἐκάστην τέχνην ἀποδείξεσιν ἐνίστασθαι θέλω-
 μεν, ἀμέθοδον ποιησόμεθα τὴν ἔνστασιν, ἀπειρῶν
 338 οὐσῶν τῶν τοιούτων ἀποδείξεων· ἐὰν δὲ τὴν γενικὴν
 ἀπόδειξιν ἀνέλωμεν, ἥτις δοκεῖ πασῶν τῶν ἐπ'
 εἶδους εἶναι περιεκτικὴ, δῆλον ὅτι ἐν ταύτῃ πάσας
 ἔχομεν ἀνηρημένας. ὡσπερ γὰρ ζώου μὴ ὄντος
 οὐδὲ ἀνθρώπου ἔστι καὶ ἀνθρώπου μὴ ὑπάρχοντος
 οὐδὲ Σωκράτους ὑφέστηκεν, συναναρουμένων τοῖς
 γένεσι τῶν εἰδῶν, οὕτω μὴ οὐσης γενικῆς ἀπο-
 δείξεως οἴχεται καὶ ἀπαντα ἢ ἐπ' εἶδους ἀποδείξει·
 339 τῷ μὲν γὰρ εἶδει οὐ πάντως συναναρεῖται τὸ γένος,
 καθάπερ τῷ Σωκράτει ὁ ἀνθρώπος, τῷ γένει δ',
 ὡσπερ εἶπον, συμπεριγράφεται τὸ εἶδος. ἀναγ-
 καῖον οὖν ἔστι καὶ τοῖς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν σαλεύουσι μὴ

hensions, we too in our turn will ask them whether
 Epicurus has or has not a preconception and notion
 of the four elements; and if he has not, how will he
 apprehend the object of inquiry and inquire into a
 thing of which he has not even a notion? While if
 he has, how is it that he did not apprehend the fact
 that there are four elements? But they will, I sup- 336 a
 pose, say in defence that Epicurus has a notion of the
 four elements, but has not, certainly, apprehended
 them; for a notion is a bare movement of the mind,
 holding to which he denies that there are four ele-
 ments. So then we, too, possess a notion of proof,
 and starting from it we shall inquire whether it exists
 or not; but though we possess the notion we shall
 not also admit the apprehension.

To these people, however, a reply will be made at 337 a
 some later time; but since it behoves us to produce
 our counter-arguments in a methodical way, we must
 inquire which proof one should object to most. Now
 if we propose to object to the special proofs and those
 belonging to each art, we shall be making our objec-
 tion in an unmethodical way, as such proofs are end-
 less; whereas, if we abolish generic proof, which is 338
 held to be inclusive of all the particular proofs, it is
 evident that thereby we shall have all included therein
 abolished. For just as if Animal exists not, neither
 does Man exist, and if Man subsists not, neither does
 Socrates subsist,—the particulars being abolished
 along with the genera,—so if generic proof does not
 exist, particular proof wholly disappears as well. For 339
 although the genus is not wholly abolished along with
 the particular,—Man with Socrates, for example,—
 yet, as I said, the particular is cancelled along with
 the genus. It is necessary, then, for those who throw

ἄλλην τινὰ κινεῖν ὅτι μὴ τὴν γενικὴν, ἢ καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς ἀκολουθεῖν συμβέβηκεν.

- 340 Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ἀδηλόν ἐστιν ἡ ἀπόδειξις, ὡς ἐπελογισάμεθα, ὀφείλει ἀποδεδείχθαι πᾶν γὰρ ἀδηλον ἀναποδείκτως λαμβανόμενον ἐστιν ἀπιστον. ἦτοι οὖν ὑπὸ γενικῆς ἀποδείξεως καταστήσεται τὸ εἶναι
 341 τι ἀπόδειξιν ἢ ὑπὸ εἰδικῆς. ἀλλ' ὑπὸ μὲν εἰδικῆς οὐδαμῶς· οὐπω γὰρ οὐδεμία καθίσταται εἰδικῆ ἀπόδειξις διὰ τὸ μῆπω ὠμολογηθῆναι τὴν γενικὴν. ὡς γὰρ μηδέπω σαφοῦς ὄντος τοῦ ὅτι ἐστι ζῶον, οὐδέ ὅτι ἵππος ἐστι γνώριμον καθέστηκεν, οὕτω μηδέπω συνομολογηθέντος τοῦ ὅτι ἐστι γενικῆ ἀπόδειξις, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τις τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους ἀπο-
 342 δείξεων πιστῆ, μετὰ τοῦ καὶ εἰς τὸν δι' ἀλλήλων τρόπον ἡμᾶς ἐμπίπτειν· ἵνα μὲν γὰρ ἡ γενικῆ ἀπόδειξις βεβαιωθῆ, τὴν εἰδικὴν ἡμᾶς ἔχειν δεῖ πιστὴν, ἵνα δὲ ἡ εἰδικὴ ὁμολογηθῆ, τὴν γενικὴν ἔχειν βέβαιον, ὥστε μήτε ἐκείνην πρὸ ταύτης ἔχειν δύνασθαι μήτε ταύτην πρὸ ἐκείνης. οὐκοῦν ὑπὸ μὲν εἰδικῆς ἀποδείξεως ἀμήχανον τὴν γενικὴν
 343 ἀποδειχθῆναι. καὶ μὴν οὐδ' ὑπὸ γενικῆς· αὕτη γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ ζητουμένη, ἀδηλος δὲ οὐσα καὶ ζητουμένη οὐκ ἂν εἴη κατασκευαστικὴ ἐαυτῆς, ἢ γε καὶ τῶν ἐκκαλυπτόντων αὐτὴν ἔχρηζεν. ἐκτὸς εἰ μὴ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ληφθεῖσα λέγεται τινος εἶναι κατασκευαστικῆ. εἰ δὲ ἀπαξ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως λαμβάνεται τενα καὶ ἐστι πιστὰ, τίς ἔτι χρεία ἀποδεικνύει αὐτά, αὐτόθεν δυναμένων ἡμῶν λαμβάνειν ταῦτα καὶ ἀναποδείκτως διὰ γε τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἔχειν πιστά;
 344 πρὸς τούτοις, εἰ ἡ γενικῆ ἀπόδειξις παραστατικὴ ἐστὶ τῆς γενικῆς ἀποδείξεως, ἔσται ἡ αὕτη

^a Cf. §§ 322 ff.

^b Cf. P.H. i. 173.

doubt on proof to impugn no other proof save only the generic, since actually all the rest follow it.

Since, then, proof is, as we have argued,^a a thing 340 non-evident, it ought to have been proved; for every non-evident thing, if it is received without proof, is untrustworthy. Therefore the fact that proof is something will be established either by a generic or by a particular proof. But certainly not by a par- 341 ticular proof; for as yet particular proof does not even exist, because generic proof is not admitted as yet. For just as, if it is not yet clear that Animal exists, neither is it known that Horse exists, so when it is not yet agreed that generic proof exists, none of the particular proofs will be trustworthy; and, in 342 addition, we shall be involved in circular reasoning; for in order to establish the generic proof we must have the particular trustworthy, and in order that the particular may be admitted we must have the generic established, so that we can neither have the former before the latter, nor the latter before the former. So, then, it is not possible for the generic proof to be proved by the particular proof.—Nor yet by the 343 generic proof; for this is the object of inquiry, and being non-evident and an object of inquiry it will not be capable of establishing itself, seeing that it itself needs things which reveal it. Unless, indeed, when accepted by assumption, it is said to be capable of establishing something. But if once things are accepted by assumption^b and are trustworthy, what further need is there to prove them, since we are able to accept them on the spot and consider them trustworthy without proof because of the assumption?—Furthermore, if the generic proof is capable 344 of establishing the generic proof, the same proof will

περιφανής ἅμα καὶ ἄδηλος, καὶ ἥ μὲν ἀποδείκνυσι, περιφανής, ἥ δὲ ἀποδείκνυται, ἄδηλος. ἔσται θ' ὁμοίως πιστὴ τε καὶ ἄπιστος, πιστὴ μὲν ὅτι ἐκκαλυπτικὴ τινός ἐστιν, ἄπιστος δὲ ὅτι ἐκκαλύπτεται. πάνυ δὲ ἄτοπον ταυτὸ λέγειν πρόδηλον ἅμα καὶ ἄδηλον, πιστόν τε καὶ ἄπιστον. τοῖνυν καὶ τὸ ἀξιούν τὴν γενικὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἑαυτῆς εἶναι παραστατικὴν ἐστὶν ἄτοπον.

345 Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον οὐχ οἶον ἀπόδειξιν ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἕτερόν τι τῶν ὄντων διὰ γενικῆς ἀποδείξεως δυνατόν ἐστι παρασταθῆναι. ἦτοι γὰρ τάδε τινα ἔχει λήμματα καὶ τήνδε τινα ἐπιφορὰν ἢ γενικὴ ἀπόδειξις (ἢ οὐκ ἔχει).¹ τάδε γὰρ τινα ἔχουσα λήμματα καὶ τήνδε τινα ἐπιφορὰν μία γέγονε τῶν ἐπ' εἶδους. εἰ δ' οὐκ ἔχει λήμματα καὶ ἐπιφορὰν, ἐπεὶ οὐ χωρὶς λημμάτων καὶ ἐπιφορᾶς συνάγει ἢ ἀπόδειξις, οὐδὲν συνάξει ἢ γενικὴ ἀπόδειξις, μηδὲν δὲ συνάγουσα οὐδὲ τὸ ἑαυτὴν εἶναι

346 συνάξει. εἰ οὖν τὸ μὲν ὅτι δεῖ ἀποδειχθῆναι τὴν πρώτην ἀπόδειξιν ὠμολόγηται, αὕτη δὲ οὔτε ἐκ γενικῆς οὔτε ἐξ εἰδικῆς ἀποδείξεως δύναται ἀποδειχθῆναι, δῆλον ὡς ἄλλου μηδενὸς εὐρισκομένου παρὰ ταύτας ἐν ἐποχῇ φυλάττειν ὀφείλομεν τὴν περὶ

347 τῆς ἀποδείξεως ζήτησιν. καὶ μὴν εἴπερ ἢ πρώτη ἀπόδειξις ἀποδείκνυται, ἦτοι ὑπὸ ζητουμένης ἀποδείξεως ἀποδείκνυται ἢ ὑπὸ ἀζητήτου. οὔτε δὲ ὑπὸ ἀζητήτου· πᾶσα γὰρ ἀπόδειξις τῆς πρώτης ὑπ' ἀμφισβήτησιν πεπωκυίας ζητεῖται· οὔτε ὑπὸ ζητουμένης· πάλιν γὰρ ἐκεῖνη εἰ ζητεῖται, ὑπ' ἄλλης ἀποδείξεως ὀφείλει κατασταθῆναι, καὶ ἢ τρίτη ὑπὸ

¹ <ἢ οὐκ ἔχει> Mutsch.

^o Cf. P.H. ii. 172.

be at once quite apparent and non-evident—quite apparent in so far as it proves, but non-evident in so far as it is proved. And it will be equally trustworthy and untrustworthy—trustworthy because it serves to reveal something, but untrustworthy because it is revealed. But it is extremely absurd to term the same thing at once both pre-evident and non-evident, both trustworthy and untrustworthy. Therefore also the claim that the generic proof is capable of establishing itself is absurd.

Moreover, there is also another way of showing 345 that neither proof nor any other existing thing can be established by means of generic proof. For generic proof either possesses (or does not possess) these particular premisses and this particular conclusion.^o If, then, it possesses these particular premisses and this particular conclusion, it is a particular proof. But if it does not possess premisses and a conclusion, since proof does not deduce without premisses and a conclusion, generic proof will deduce nothing, and deducing nothing it will not even deduce its own existence. —If, then, it is agreed that the first proof ought to be 346 proved, and it cannot be proved either by generic or by particular proof, it is plain that, as nothing else beside these (proofs) is discovered, we ought to suspend judgement about the problem of proof. Moreover, if the 347 first proof is being proved, it is being proved either by a questioned proof or by an unquestioned proof. But not by an unquestioned, for when the first has come to be disputed, every proof is questioned; nor by a questioned proof, for, again, that proof, if questioned, must be established by another proof, and the third by a fourth, and

τετάρτης, καὶ ἡ τετάρτη ὑπὸ πέμπτης, καὶ τοῦτ' εἰς
 ἀπειρον. τοίνυν οὐκ ἔστι βεβαίως ἔχειν τὴν ἀπόδειξιν.
 343 Δημήτριος δὲ ὁ Λάκων, τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἐπι-
 κούρειον αἵρεσιν ἐπιφανῶν, εὐαπόλυτον ἔλεγεν εἶναι
 τὴν τοιαύτην ἔνστασιν. μίαν γάρ, φησί, τῶν ἐπ'
 εἶδους ἀποδείξεων (οἷον τὴν¹ συνάγουσαν ὅτι ἄτομα
 ἔστι στοιχεῖα ἢ ὅτι κενόν ἔστι), καταστησάμενοι καὶ
 βεβαίαν δείξαντες αὐτόθεν ἔξομεν ἐν ταύτῃ καὶ τὴν
 γενικὴν ἀπόδειξιν πιστὴν· ὅπου γὰρ ἔστι τό τινος
 γένους εἶδος, ἐκεῖ πάντως εὐρίσκεται καὶ γένος
 οὐ ἔστι τὸ εἶδος, καθάπερ ἀνώτερον ὑπεμνήσαμεν.
 349 τοῦτο δὲ δοκεῖ μὲν εἶναι πιθανόν, ἔστι δ' ἀδύνατον.
 πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἕασει τὸν Λάκωνα τὴν
 εἰδικὴν ἀπόδειξιν καταστήσασθαι τῆς γενικῆς μὴ
 προὔφεστώσης· καὶ ὡς αὐτὸς ἀξιοῖ ἔχων τὴν εἰδικὴν
 ἀπόδειξιν εὐθέως ἔχειν καὶ τὴν γενικὴν, οὕτω καὶ
 οἱ σκεπτικοὶ ἀξιώσουσι προαποδειχθῆναι τὸ γένος
 350 αὐτῆς, ἵνα πιστευθῇ τὸ εἶδος. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κἂν
 ἐκεῖνοι ἐπιτρέψωσιν αὐτῷ τὸ τοιοῦτο, λέγω δὲ εἰ-
 δικὴν τινα καταστήσασθαι ἀπόδειξιν εἰς βεβαίωσιν
 τῆς γενικῆς, οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμογενῶν αἰρέσεων οὐχ
 ἡσυχάσουσιν ἀλλ' ὅποιαν ἂν προχειρίσῃται ὡς πιστὴν
 ἀπόδειξιν, ταύτην ἀνατρέψουσι, πολὺ τε πλῆθος ἔξει
 τῶν οὐκ ἐώντων ταύτην τεθῆναι. οἷον εἰ τὴν περὶ
 ἀτόμων λαμβάνοι, ἀμύθητοι ἀντιφθέγγονται αὐτῷ·
 εἰ τὴν περὶ κενοῦ, παμπληθεῖς ἐνστήσονται· εἰ τὴν
 351 περὶ εἰδώλων, ὠσαύτως. κἂν τὰ μάλιστα οὖν συν-
 τρέχωσιν αὐτοῦ τῇ προαιρέσει οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως,
 οὐ δυνήσεται μίαν τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους ἀποδείξεων
 πιστώσασθαι διὰ τὴν τῶν δογματικῶν μάχην.

¹ οἷον τὴν cj. Bekk.: τινα mss.

^a Cf. P.H. iii. 137.

^b Cf. § 338.

^c Cf. § 65.

the fourth by a fifth, and so on *ad infinitum*. So, then,
 it is not possible for proof to be firmly established.

But Demetrius the Laconian,^a one of the notables 348
 of the Epicurean School, used to declare that this
 sort of objection is easy to dispose of, "for," says he,
 "when we have established one of the particular
 proofs (for example, that which deduces that in-
 divisible elements exist, or that void exists) and shown
 that it is sure, we shall at once have secured, as
 included in this, the trustworthiness of generic proof;
 for where there exists the particular of a genus, there
 we certainly find also the genus of which it is the
 particular," as we mentioned above.^b But this, 349
 though it seems to be plausible, is in fact impossible.
 For, in the first place, no one will allow the Laconian
 to establish his particular proof when his generic
 proof does not pre-exist; and just as he himself
 claims that, if he possesses the particular proof, he at
 once possesses also the generic, so too the Sceptics
 will claim that, to gain credence for the particular, its
 genus must first be proved. And, what is more, even 350
 if they allow him to do this (I mean, to establish a
 certain particular proof in order to confirm the
 generic), some of the kindred Schools will not stay
 quiet, but will overturn whatever proof he produces
 as trustworthy, and he will have a large host of men
 who refuse to allow its acceptance. For instance,
 if he takes the proof concerning atoms, a countless
 number will contradict him; if that concerning void,
 a vast crowd will object; and so likewise with the
 proof concerning images.^c And even though the 351
 Sceptics may concur ever so much with his choice, he
 will be unable to establish a single one of his proofs
 owing to the conflict of the Dogmatists.

Ἄλλως τε τίνα ποτὲ καὶ λέγει βεβαίαν ἕξειν
 εἰδικὴν ἀπόδειξιν; ἤτοι γὰρ τὴν αὐτόθεν ἐξ
 ἀπασῶν ἀρεσκομένην αὐτῷ ἢ τὴν ὁποιαυδηπο-
 τοῦν ἢ τὴν ἀποδεικνυμένην. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τὴν
 ἐξ ἀπασῶν ἀρεσκομένην αὐτῷ λαμβάνειν αὐθαδῆς
 352 καὶ ἀποκληρώσει μᾶλλον εὐκόσ ἐστίν· εἰ δὲ τὴν
 ὁποιαοῦν, πάσας θήσει τὰς ἀποδείξεις, τοῦτο
 μὲν τὰς τῶν Ἐπικουρείων τοῦτο δὲ τὰς τῶν
 στωικῶν καὶ ἤδη περιπατητικῶν ὅπερ ἄτοπον. εἰ
 δὲ τὴν ἀποδεικνυμένην, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις· εἰ γὰρ
 ἀποδείκνυται ζητεῖται, καὶ ζητουμένη οὐκ ἂν εἴη
 πιστὴ ἀλλὰ τῶν βεβαιωσόντων δεομένη. οὐκ ἄρα
 δυνατὸν ἐστὶ μίαν τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους ἀποδείξεων ἔχειν
 353 πιστήν. καὶ μὴν τὰ λήμματα ἧς λέγει ἀπο-
 δείξεως ὁ Λάκων ἤτοι ἀμφισβητεῖται καὶ ἀπιστά
 ἐστὶν ἢ ἀναμφισβήτητά ἐστὶ καὶ πιστά. ἀλλ' εἰ
 μὲν ἀμφισβητεῖται καὶ ἀπιστά ἐστίν, πάντως καὶ
 ἢ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀπόδειξις ἀπιστος γενήσεται πρὸς τὴν
 τινος κατασκευήν. τὸ δὲ πιστά αὐτὰ εἶναι καὶ
 354 ἀναμφισβήτητα εὐχὴ μᾶλλον ἐστὶν ἢ ἀλήθεια. εἰ
 γὰρ πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἤτοι αἰσθητά ἐστὶν ἢ νοητά,
 ὀφείλει καὶ τὰ λήμματα τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἤτοι
 αἰσθητά εἶναι ἢ νοητά. ἐάν τε δὲ αἰσθητά ἐάν τε
 νοητά ἢ, ἐζήτῃται. τὰ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητά ἢ ὑπό-
 κείται τοιαῦτα ὅποια φαίνεται, ἢ κενοπαθήματα
 ἐστὶ καὶ ἀναπλάσματα τῆς διανοίας, ἢ τινὰ μὲν
 αὐτῶν σὺν τῷ φαίνεσθαι καὶ ἔστι, τινὰ δὲ φαίνεται
 μόνον, οὐκέτι δὲ γε καὶ ὑπόκειται. καὶ πάρεστιν
 ἐπισήμους ἰδεῖν ἀνδρας, τοὺς ἐκάστης στάσεως προ-
 355 ἐστώτας, (διαφωνοῦντας)¹ εἶγε Δημόκριτος μὲν
 πᾶσαν αἰσθητὴν ὑπαρξὴν κεκίνηκεν, Ἐπίκουρος δὲ

¹ <διαφωνοῦντας> cf. Kayser.

Besides, what sort of firm particular proof does he
 say that he will possess? It will be either that one
 of them all which pleases him of itself, or any one
 whatsoever, or the one which is being proved. But
 to take that one out of them all which pleases him is
 self-willed and choosing at random; and if he takes
 352 any one whatsoever, he will be adopting all the proofs,
 on the one hand those of the Epicureans, and on the
 other those of the Stoics, and of the Peripatetics as
 well; which is absurd. And if he takes the one
 which is being proved, it is not a proof; for if it is
 being proved, it is in question, and being in question
 it will not be trustworthy but needing things to
 confirm it. Therefore it is not possible to hold as
 trustworthy one of the particular proofs.—Moreover, 353
 the premisses of the proof which the Laconian men-
 tions are either controverted and untrustworthy or
 are uncontroverted and trustworthy. But if they
 are controverted and untrustworthy, the proof also
 which they compose will certainly be untrustworthy
 for establishing anything. And that they are trust-
 worthy and uncontroverted is a vain hope rather than
 the truth. For if all existing things are either sensible
 354 or intelligible, the premisses also of the proof must be
 either sensible or intelligible. And whether they be
 sensible or intelligible, they are subjects of inquiry.
 For sensible things either really exist such as they
 appear; or they are empty affections^a and con-
 ceptions of the mind; or some of them not only
 appear but also exist, while others only appear and
 do not really exist as well. And one may see notable
 men, the leaders of every School, (disagreeing,) since 355
 Democritus threw over all sensible reality, but

^a Cf. § 213.

πᾶν αἰσθητὸν ἔλεξε βέβαιον εἶναι, ὁ δὲ στωικὸς
 Ζήνων διαίρει εἰς ἐχρήσατο, ὥστ' ἐὰν ᾗ αἰσθητὰ τὰ
 λήμματα, διάφωνα ἐστίν. ὡσαύτως δὲ κἄν
 νοητὰ τυγχάνη· καὶ γὰρ περὶ τούτων, τοῦτο μὲν ἐν
 τῷ βίῳ τοῦτο δὲ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, πλείστην πάρεστιν
 356 ἰδεῖν μάχην, ἄλλοις ἄλλων ἀρεσκομένων. εἶτα πρὸς
 τοῖς λεχθεῖσιν, εἰ πᾶν νοητὸν τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχει καὶ
 πηγὴν τῆς βεβαιώσεως ἐξ αἰσθήσεως, τὰ δὲ δι'
 αἰσθήσεως γνωρίζόμενα, ὡς ἐπελογισάμεθα, διά-
 φωνά ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ νοητὰ τοιαῦτα τυγχάνειν,
 ὥστε καὶ τὰ λήμματα τῆς ἀποδείξεως, ἐξ ὁποτέρας
 ἂν ᾗ μοίρας, ἄπιστά ἐστι καὶ ἀβέβαια. διὰ δὲ
 τοῦτο καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις οὐ πιστή.
 357 Καὶ ἵνα καθολικώτερον εἴπωμεν, τὰ λήμματα
 φαινόμενά ἐστι, τὰ δὲ φαινόμενα ἐζήτῃται εἰ
 ὑπόκειται, τὰ δὲ ζητούμενα οὐκ αὐτόθεν ἐστὶ
 λήμματα, ἀλλὰ ὀφείλει διὰ τίνος βεβαιωθῆναι. τὸ
 οὖν φαινόμενον ὅτι ὅποιον φαίνεται καὶ ὑπόκειται,
 358 διὰ τίνος ἔχομεν παραστήσαι; ἢ γὰρ δι' ἀδήλου
 πράγματος πάντως ἢ διὰ φαινομένου. ἀλλὰ τὸ
 μὲν δι' ἀδήλου ἄτοπον· τοσοῦτον γὰρ ἀπέχει τὸ
 ἄδηλον τοῦ δύνασθαι τι ἐκκαλύπτειν ὡς καὶ ἀνά-
 359 παλιν αὐτὸ δεῖσθαι τοῦ παραστήσοντος. διὰ φαινο-
 μένου δὲ πολλῶ ἄτοπώτερον· αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτό ἐστι
 τὸ ζητούμενον, καὶ οὐδὲν τῶν ζητουμένων ἑαυτοῦ
 βεβαιωτικόν. ἀμήχανον ἄρα τὰ φαινόμενα κατα-
 στήσασθαι, ἵνα καὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν οὕτως ἔχωμεν
 360 πιστήν. ἀλλὰ τὰ φαινόμενα, φασὶν οἱ δογ-
 ματικοί, πάντως δεῖ τιθέναι, πρῶτον ὅτι οὐδὲν

* *i.e.* he regarded some sensibles as real, but rejected others, *cf.* § 10 *supra*. For Democritus *cf.* § 6; for Epicurus, §§ 8 f.

^b *Cf.* § 58.

Epicurus declared that every sensible thing has stable existence, while Zeno the Stoic employed a distinction^a; so that if the premisses are sensible, they are matters of dispute.—So likewise if they are intelligible; for concerning these also one may see a vast deal of conflict amongst ordinary folk on the one hand, and amongst philosophers on the other, as men's tastes differ. And further, in addition to what has been said, 356 if every intelligible thing derives its origin and source of confirmation from sensation,^b and the things made known through sense are, as we have argued, disputable, the intelligibles also will necessarily be of the same sort; so that the premisses, too, of the proof, to whichever class they belong, are untrustworthy and unsure. And because of this, proof also is not trust-
 worthy.

To speak more generally, premisses are things 357 apparent, and it is a question whether things apparent really exist; and things questioned are not at once (accepted) premisses but must be confirmed by something. By what means, then, can we establish that the apparent thing is really such as it appears? Either, certainly, by means of a non-evident fact or by 358 means of an apparent one. But to do so by means of a non-evident fact is absurd; for the non-evident is so far from being able to reveal anything that, on the contrary, it is itself in need of something to establish it. And to do so by means of an apparent fact is 359 much more absurd; for it is itself the thing in question, and nothing that is in question is capable of confirming itself. It is not feasible, therefore, to establish things apparent, in order, by this means, to have proof made trustworthy.—“But,” say the Dogmatists, “one must 360 certainly posit things apparent, because, firstly, we

ἔχομεν πιστότερον αὐτῶν, εἴθ' ὅτι ὁ κινῶν αὐτὰ λόγος αὐτὸς ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ περιτρέπεται. ἤτοι γὰρ φάσει μόνον χρώμενος ταῦτα ἀναιρεῖ ἢ φαινόμενοις ἢ μὴ φαινόμενοις. ἀλλὰ φάσει μὲν χρώμενος ἀπιστός ἐστίν· ῥᾶδιον γὰρ τὴν ἀντικειμένην ἐκ-
 361 θέσθαι φάσιν. εἰ δὲ μὴ φαινόμενοις, πάλιν ἀπιστος θέλων διὰ μὴ φαινόμενων τὰ φαινόμενα περιτρέπειν. εἰ δὲ φαινόμενοις κινεῖ τὰ φαινόμενα, πάντως πιστοῖς, καὶ οὕτως αὐτόθεν ἔσται τὰ φαινόμενα πιστά. ὥστε ὁ λόγος καὶ κατ' αὐτῶν χωρεῖ.¹
 362 ἡμεῖς δὲ ὅτι μὲν τὰ φαινόμενα, εἴτε αἰσθητὰ εἴη εἴτε νοητά, πλείστης γέμει μάχης τῆς τε παρὰ φιλοσόφους καὶ τῆς παρὰ τῷ βίῳ, πρότερον ἐπελογοσάμεθα· τὸ δὲ νῦν ἔχον πρὸς τὴν ἐκκειμένην διαστολὴν ἐκείνο ῥητέον ὅτι οὔτε φάσει χρώμενοι κινούμεν τὰ φαινόμενα οὔτε μὴ φαινόμενοις, συγκρίνοντες δὲ αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς. εἰ μὲν γὰρ σύμφωνα εὐρίσκετο τὰ αἰσθητὰ τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς καὶ τὰ νοητὰ τοῖς νοητοῖς καὶ ἐναλλάξ, ἴσως ἂν παρεχωροῦμεν
 363 αὐτὰ τοιαῦτα τυγχάνειν ὅποια φαίνεται· νῦν δὲ ἐν τῇ συγκρίσει ἀνεπίκριτον εὐρίσκοντες μάχην, καθ' ἣν τὰ ἕτερα ὑπὸ τῶν ἐτέρων ἐκβάλλεται, τῷ μήτε πάντα θείναι δύνασθαι διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην μάχην μήτε τινὰ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἰσοσθένειαν, μήτε πόντ' ἐκβαλεῖν διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν τοῦ φαίνεσθαι
 364 πιστότερον, ἐπὶ τὸ ἐπέχειν κατηντήσαμεν. ἀλλ' ὁ λόγος ἐκ τῶν φαινόμενων τὴν πίστιν λαμβάνων ἐν τῷ ταῦτα κινεῖν καὶ ἑαυτὸν συνεκβάλλει. ὅπερ

¹ χωρεῖ N: χῥῆται cet., Bekk.

^a i.e. against the Sceptics (the "ourselves" of the next sentence).

^b Cf. §§ 354 ff.

have nothing more trustworthy than they, and, next, because the argument which attacks them is overthrown by itself. For it destroys them by employing either assertion only, or things apparent, or things not apparent. But if it employs assertion, it is untrustworthy; for it is easy to put forward the opposite assertion. And if it employs things not apparent, once again it is untrustworthy, since it attempts to overthrow apparent things by things not apparent. And if it attacks things apparent by things apparent, these must certainly be trustworthy, and in this way, too, the things apparent will at once be trustworthy. So that the argument goes against them.^a But as to our-
 362 selves—that the question whether things apparent are sensible or intelligible is one fraught with contention both amongst philosophers and amongst ordinary folk we have already argued.^b So, for the moment, in reply to the dilemma set forth, we must assert that we do not attack things apparent by employing either assertion or things not apparent, but by comparing them amongst themselves. For if sensibles had been found to be in accord with sensibles and intelligibles with intelligibles, and conversely, we might probably have conceded that they are such as they appear; but now, because on comparing them we find insoluble
 363 contradictions, through which some are expelled by others; and because we are unable either to posit all owing to this contradiction, or to posit some owing to the equipollence of the opposites, or to reject all owing to our having nothing more trustworthy than appearance; we have fallen back on suspension of judgement.—But, (say they,) the argument which de-
 364 rives its credibility from things apparent, in the act of attacking these wrecks itself as well. But this is

ἦν συναρπαζόντων τὸ ζητούμενον ἀνδρῶν. οὐ γὰρ
 ὁ λόγος ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων βεβαιούται, ἀλλὰ τὰ
 365 φαινόμενα ἐκ τοῦ λόγου κρατύνεται. καὶ εἰκότως·
 εἰ γὰρ διαφωνία ἔστι τινῶν μὲν λεγόντων αὐτὰ
 ὑποκείσθαι τινῶν δὲ μηδαμῶς, ἐκ τοῦ λόγου ὀφείλει
 κατασταθῆναι. τούτου τε μάρτυρές εἰσιν οὐκ ἄλλοι
 τινές ἢ οἱ ἑτερόδοξοι, λόγῳ [δ']¹ ἀποδείξαι θέλοντες
 ὅτι ἀληθὴ ἔστι τὰ φαινόμενα. καὶ ἄλλως, πόθεν ὅτι
 366 τοῖς φαινομένοις δεῖ πιστεῦναι; οὐκ ἄρα² τὰ φαινόμενα
 τοῦ λόγου ἄλλ' ὁ λόγος τῶν φαινομένων βεβαιότερός
 ἔστιν, ὃ γε καὶ ἑαυτὸν κάκεινα πιστούμενος.

Εἰ δὴ τὰ λήμματα τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἔστιν ἄδηλα,
 ἄδηλος δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐπιφορά, τὸ δὲ ἐξ ἀδηλῶν συνεστὼς
 πάλιν ἄδηλον, ἡ ἀπόδειξις ἔστιν ἀδηλος καὶ ἐπιζητεῖ
 τὸ παραστήσον αὐτῆς τὴν πίστιν, ὅπερ οὐκ ἔστιν
 ἀποδείξεως.

367 Ἄλλ' οὐ δεῖ, φασί, πάντων ἀποδείξιν αἰτεῖν, τινὰ
 δὲ καὶ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως λαμβάνειν, ἐπεὶ οὐ δυνήσεται
 προβαίνειν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος, ἐὰν μὴ δοθῇ τι πιστόν
 ἐξ αὐτοῦ τυγχάνειν. ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν καὶ ἡμεῖς
 ἐροῦμεν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκαῖον τὰς ἐκεῖνων
 δογματολογίας προβαίνειν, πλασματώδεις ὑπ-
 368 ἀρχούσας. εἶτα καὶ ποῖ προβήσονται; τῶν γὰρ
 φαινομένων αὐτὸ μόνον παριστάντων ὅτι φαίνεται,
 τὸ δ' ὅτι καὶ ὑπόκειται μηκέτι προσισχυόντων
 διδάσκειν, τιθέσθω καὶ τὰ λήμματα τῆς ἀποδείξεως
 ὅτι φαίνεται, καὶ ἡ ἐπιφορά ὁμοίως. ὦδε δὲ οὐ³
 συναχθήσεται τὸ ζητούμενον καὶ οὐ παραχθήσεται
 ἡ ἀλήθεια, μενόντων ἡμῶν ἐπὶ ψιλῆς φάσεως καὶ

¹ [δ'] secl. ego (ante λόγῳ lacunam notat Mutsch.).

² οὐκ ἄρα Heintz: οὐ γὰρ V, Bekk. (οὐ τὰ φ. γὰρ cet. mss.).

³ δὲ οὐ N: γὰρ cet., Bekk.

the plea of men who hastily assume the point at issue. For it is not the argument that is established by the things apparent, but the things apparent that are confirmed by the argument. And naturally so: for 365 if they are disputed (some saying that they really exist, some that they do not), they must be established by the argument. And those who bear witness to this are none other than those of the rival School who try to prove by argument that apparent things are true. And besides, on what grounds ought one to trust things apparent? Instead, therefore, of appar- 366 ent things being more certain than the argument, the argument is more certain than apparent things since it supports both itself and them.

Now if the premisses of the proof are non-evident and the conclusion also non-evident, and again if that which is composed of non-evident things is non-evident, then proof is non-evident and requires something else to support it, which is not the character of proof.

But, say they, one ought not to ask for proof of 367 everything, but accept some things by assumption, since the argument will not be able to go forward unless it be granted that there is something which is of itself trustworthy. But we shall reply, firstly, that there is no necessity for their dogmatic argumentations to go forward, fictitious as they are. And, 368 further, to what conclusion will they proceed? For as apparent things merely establish the fact that they appear, and are not capable also of showing that they subsist, let us assume also that the premisses of the proof appear, and the conclusion likewise. But even so the matter in question will not be deduced, nor will the truth be introduced, so long as we abide by our

τοῦ οἰκείου πάθους. τὸ δ' ὅτι οὐ μόνον φαίνεται ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπόκειται θέλει παριστᾶν ἀνδρῶν ἐστὶ μὴ τῷ ἀναγκαίῳ πρὸς τὴν χρείαν ἀρκουμένων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ δυνατόν συναρπάζειν ἐσπουδακῶτων.

369 Καθόλου τε ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἢ ἀπόδειξις μόνον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως προκόπτειν ἀξιούται τοῖς δογματικοῖς ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλη σχεδὸν φιλοσοφία, πειρασόμεθα κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν ὀλίγα διεξελεθῆναι πρὸς τοὺς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως

370 τινα λαμβάνοντας. ταῦτα γὰρ ἂ φασιν ἐξ ὑποθέσεως λαμβάνειν, εἰ μὲν πιστά ἐστι διὰ τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως εἰληφθαι, πιστὰ φανήσεται καὶ τὰναντία τούτοις ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ληφθέντα, καὶ ταύτη θήσομεν τὰ μαχόμενα· εἰ δὲ ἐπὶ τούτων, φημί δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων, πρὸς πίστιν ἢ ὑπόθεσιν ἀσθενῆς, ἀσθενῆς καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνων γενήσεται, ὥστε οὐδέτερα πάλιν

371 ὑποθησόμεθα. τοῦτό τε δὲ ὑποτίθεται τις, ἥτοι ἀληθές ἐστι καὶ τοιοῦτον οἶον αὐτὸ ὑποτίθεται, ἢ ψεῦδος. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀληθές, ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖ ὁ ὑποτιθέμενος τοῦτο, εἶγε δυνάμενος αὐτὸ μὴ αἰτεῖσθαι ἀλλ' αὐτόθεν λαμβάνειν ὡς ἀληθές εἰς πρᾶγμα συμφεύγει ὑποψίας πλήρες, εἰς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, αἰτούμενος τὸ αὐτόθεν ἀληθές. εἰ δὲ ψεῦδος ἐστίν, οὐκέτι αὐτὸν ἀλλὰ τὴν φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων ἀδικεῖ ὁ τῇ ὑποθέσει χρώμενος, τὸ μὴ ὄν ἀξίῶν αὐτῷ αὐτόθεν συγχωρηθῆναι ὡς ὄν, καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος

372 βιαζόμενος λαμβάνειν ὡς ἀληθές. καὶ μὴν εἴπερ πᾶν τὸ ἀκολουθοῦν τοῖς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ληφθεῖσιν ἀξιοῖ τις βέβαιον εἶναι, ὅλην συγχέει τὴν φιλόσοφον ζήτησιν. εὐθέως γὰρ ὑποθησόμεθα τὰ

bare assertion and our own affection. And the attempt to establish that apparent things not merely appear but also subsist is the act of men who are not satisfied with what is necessary for practical purposes but are eager also to assume hastily what is possible.

And in general—seeing that it is maintained by 369 the Dogmatists that not only proof but practically the whole of philosophy proceeds from assumption—we shall endeavour so far as possible to make answer briefly to those who accept a thing by assumption. If the things which they say they accept by assumption 370 are trustworthy because accepted by assumption, their opposites also will appear trustworthy when accepted by assumption, and thus we shall be positing things that conflict; but if in the case of the latter—the opposites, I mean—the assumption is too weak to support them, it will be too weak also in the case of the former; so that, once again, we shall assume 371 neither.—Further, that which a man assumes is either true and such as he assumes it to be, or it is false. And if it is true, he that assumes it is wronging himself, seeing that, when it was possible for him not to postulate it but to take it as true of itself, he has recourse to a thing that is gravely suspected—to assumption, that is—when he postulates what is true of itself. But if it is false, the man who employs assumption is no longer wronging himself, but the real nature of the things, when he claims that the non-existent should of itself be conceded to him as 372 existent, and compels one to accept what is false as true.—Again, if a man maintains that everything which follows from the things accepted by assumption is certain, he confounds the whole of philosophic inquiry. For we shall assume, for instance, that 3 is

τρια τέσσαρα εἶναι, καὶ συνάξομεν ὡς ἀκολουθοῦν
 τὸ τὰ ἐξ ὀκτώ ὑπάρχειν· ἔσται δὲ τοῦτο ἀληθές τὸ
 373 τὰ ἐξ ὀκτώ¹ ὑπάρχειν. εἰ δὲ λέγοιεν πρὸς ἡμᾶς
 ὅτι ἀτοπὸν ἔστι τὸ τοιοῦτο (δεῖ γὰρ βέβαιοι εἶναι
 τὸ ὑποτεθέν, ἵνα συνομολογηθῆ καὶ τὸ ἀκολουθοῦν
 τούτῳ), καὶ τὸ παρ' ἡμῶν ἀκούσονται, [τὸ] μηδὲν
 αὐτόθεν ἀξιούντων λαμβάνειν, πᾶν δὲ τὸ τιθέμενον
 374 μετ' ἀκριβείας τίθεσθαι. πρὸς τούτοις, εἰ τὸ
 ὑποτιθέμενον, ἢ ὑποτίθεται, βέβαιον ἔστι καὶ
 ἀσφαλές, μὴ ταῦτα ὑποτιθέσθωσαν οἱ δογματικῶς
 φιλοσοφούντες τὰ ἐξ ὧν συνάγουσι τὸ ἀδηλον, ἀλλ'
 αὐτὸ τὸ ἀδηλον, τουτέστι μὴ τὰ λήμματα τῆς
 ἀποδείξεως ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐπιφορὰν. ἀλλὰ κἂν μυριάκις
 τοῦθ' ὑποθῶνται, οὐκ ἔστι πιστὸν διὰ τὴν ἀδηλόγητα
 καὶ τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ ζήτησιν. φανερόν δὴ γίνουθεν ὅτι,
 οὐδὲ ἂν τὰ λήμματα τῆς ἀποδείξεως δίχα ἀπο-
 δείξεως αἰτήσωνται, ἀνύουσί τι πρὸς πίστιν διὰ τὸ
 καὶ ταῦτα τῶν ἀμφισβητησίμων ὑπάρχειν.
 375 Νῆ Δία, ἀλλ' εἰώθασιν ὑποτυγχάνοντες λέγειν
 ὅτι πίστις ἔστι τοῦ ἐρρῶσθαι τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τὸ
 ἀληθές εὐρίσκεισθαι ἐκεῖνο τὸ τοῖς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως
 ληφθεῖσιν ἐπιφερόμενον· εἰ γὰρ τὸ τούτοις ἀκολου-
 θοῦν ἔστιν ὑγιές, κἀκεῖνα οἷς ἀκολουθεῖ ἀληθῆ καὶ
 376 ἀναμφίλεκτα καθέστηκεν. καὶ πόθεν ἔχομεν, ἐρεῖ
 τις, δεῖξαι ὅτι τὸ ἀκολουθοῦν τῷ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως
 ληφθέντι ἀληθές ἐστιν; ἀρὰ γε ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἢ ἐκ τῶν
 λημμάτων οἷς ἀκολουθεῖ; ἀλλ' ἐξ αὐτοῦ μὲν οὐκ
 ἂν εἴη· ἀδηλον γὰρ ἔστιν. ἐκ δὲ τῶν λημμάτων;
 οὐδ' οὕτως· περὶ γὰρ τούτων ἔστιν ἡ μάχη, καὶ δεῖ
 377 αὐτὰ² πρότερον κατασταθῆναι. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἔστω

¹ τὸ . . . ὀκτώ MSS.: τῷ . . . δις τρία Fabr., Bekk.

² τούτων . . . αὐτὰ Heintz: τούτου . . . αὐτὸ MSS., Bekk.

4, and deduce as a consequence that 6 is 8; and this
 —that 6 is 8—will be true. And if they should say 373
 to us that such a case is absurd (for the thing assumed
 must be certain, in order that its consequence also
 may be admitted), they shall hear us, in reply, main-
 taining that nothing should be accepted of itself and
 everything affirmed should be affirmed with precision.
 —Furthermore, if the thing assumed, in that it is 374
 assumed, is certain and sure, let the dogmatic philo-
 sophers assume, not the things from which they de-
 duce the non-evident, but the non-evident itself—
 that is to say, not the premisses of the proof but the
 conclusion. But even were they to assume this ten
 thousand times, it is not trustworthy, owing to its
 being non-evident and the subject of inquiry. Thus
 it is, to be sure, apparent that if they postulate the
 premisses of the proof without proof, they effect
 nothing in support of it since the premisses them-
 selves are matters of dispute.

Yes, by Zeus; but they are wont to interrupt with 375
 the reply that a guarantee of the strength of the
 assumption is the fact that what is concluded by the
 premisses accepted by assumption is found to be true;
 for if what follows from the premisses is sound, the pre-
 misses from which they follow are true and indisput-
 able. But, someone will say, how can we show that 376
 what follows from the premiss accepted by assump-
 tion is true? By means of itself or by means of the
 premisses from which it follows? But it will not be by
 means of itself, for it is non-evident. Is it, then, by
 means of the premisses? Not in this way either; for
 it is about these that the conflict exists, and it is they
 that must first be established. Notwithstanding, 377

γε καὶ τὸ ἀκολουθοῦν τοῖς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ληφθεῖσιν ἀληθές· οὐ μὴν παρὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὰ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ληφθέντα γενήσεται ἀληθῆ. εἰ μὲν γὰρ μόνον κατ' αὐτοὺς τῷ ἀληθεὶ εἶπετο ἀληθές, προὔβαινε (ἀν)¹ ὁ λόγος, ὡς² τοῦ ἀκολουθοῦντος τῷ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ληφθέντι ὄντος ἀληθοῦς γίνεσθαι τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως
 378 ληφθὲν ἀληθές· νῦν δὲ ἐπεὶ καὶ ψεύδει ψεύδος, φασίν, ἀκολουθεῖ καὶ ψεύδει ἀληθές, οὐ κατ' ἀνάγκην, εἰ τὸ λήγόν ἐστιν ἀληθές, καὶ τὸ ἡγούμενον ἔσται ἀληθές, ἀλλ' ἐνδέχεται τοῦ λήγοντος ἀληθοῦς ὄντος τὸ ἡγούμενον ὑπάρχειν ψεύδος.

Ἄλλοθεν μὲν οὖν παρέργον, ὡς φασί, καὶ παρενθήκη³ τοσαῦτα εἰρήσθω περὶ τοῦ μὴ δεῖν ἐξ ὑποθέσεως κατάρχεσθαι τὴν ἀπόδειξιν· ἀκολουθῶν δ'
 379 ὑποδεικτέον ὅτι καὶ εἰς τὸν δι' ἀλλήλων τρόπον ἐμπέπτωκεν, ὃ ἐστὶν ἀπορώτερον. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἀδήλων ἐστὶν ἢ ἀπόδειξις προκατεστησάμεθα, πᾶν δὲ ἀδηλον ἐπικρίσεως δεῖται, τὸ δὲ ἐπικρίσεως δεόμενον κριτηρίου χρήζει τοῦ παραστήσοντος εἴτε ὑγιές ἐστὶν εἴτε μὴ τοιοῦτον· ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ μετρηθῆναι ὀφείλον οὐ χωρὶς μέτρου μετρεῖσθαι πέφυκε καὶ πᾶν τὸ κανονιζόμενον οὐ χωρὶς κανόνος κανονίζεται, οὕτω καὶ τὸ κρινόμενον οὐ χωρὶς κριτηρίου
 380 δοκιμάζεται. ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ τὸ εἰ ἔστι κριτήριον ἐζήτηται, τῶν μὲν μηδὲν εἶναι φαιμένων τῶν δὲ εἶναι, τῶν δὲ ἐν ἐποχῇ τοῦτο φυλαξάντων, πάλιν δεήσει τὸ ὅτι ἔστι κριτήριον ἀποδειχθῆναι διὰ τίνος ἀποδείξεως. ἀλλὰ δὴ ἵν' ἔχωμεν τὴν ἀπόδειξιν

¹ <ἀν> Kayser.

² ὡς Kochalsky: καὶ mss., Bekk.

³ παρενθήκη Kochalsky: παρενθήκης mss., Bekk.

let it be granted that what follows from the assumed premisses is true; all the same, the assumed premisses will not on this account become true. For if, according to them, the true had followed the true only, the argument would have gone forward, so that the assumed premiss would be true since the consequence of the premiss is true; but as it is, since they
 378 assert that both falsehood follows from falsehood and truth from falsehood,^a it is not necessary that if the consequent is true the antecedent also should be true, but it is possible for the antecedent to be false though the consequent is true.

Let thus much be said, then,—as “a bywork of our journey,” as they say,^b and an appendix—regarding the wrongfulness of founding proof on assumption. Next one must point out that it also
 379 involves itself in circular reasoning,^c which is still more hopeless. For we have already established that proof is a non-evident thing, and every non-evident thing requires scrutiny, and what requires scrutiny needs a criterion to determine whether it is valid or not; for just as a thing which needs to be measured cannot be measured without a measure, and nothing that is being ruled is ruled without a rule, so also what is being scrutinized is not tested without a criterion. Since, then, the existence of a criterion
 380 also is questioned,^d some declaring that none exists, others that it does exist, and others again suspending judgement about it, the fact that a criterion exists will, in turn, have to be proved by means of some proof. But in order to have the proof confirmed, we

^a Cf. §§ 113, 114.

^b Cf. Eurip. *Electra*, 509 ἦλθον γὰρ αὐτοῦ πρὸς τάφον παρέργ' ἄλλο.

^c Cf. *P.H.* ii. 183.

^d Cf. i. 47 ff.

πιστήν, ἀναστρέφειν ἐπὶ τὸ κριτήριον δεήσει, καὶ οὕτω μήτε ταύτην πρὸ ἐκείνου ἔχοντας πιστήν μήτε ἐκεῖνο πρὸ ταύτης βέβαιοι ὁμολογεῖν τὴν περὶ ἀμφοτέρων ἐποχὴν.

381 Ἐνέσται οὖν σὺν τοῖς εἰρημένοις καὶ τῆς ἐπινοίας κινεῖν τὴν ἀποδείξιν. καίτοι εἰ ἐπεισοῖτο, οὐ πάντως ἂν ὑπῆρχεν· πολλὰ γὰρ ἔστιν ἅπερ ἐπινοεῖται μὲν, ὡς ἔφην, οὐ μετέχει δέ τινος ὑπάρξεως. νῦν δὲ ὅταν καὶ ἡ ἐπίνοια εὐρίσκηται ἀδύνατος ἢ τῆς ἀποδείξεως, ἀναμφιλέκτως καὶ ἡ τῆς ὑπάρξεως
382 ἐλπίς ἀποκόπτεται. δυοῖν οὖν οὐσῶν ἀποδείξεων, τῆς τε γενικῆς καὶ τῆς εἰδικῆς, τὴν μὲν γενικὴν αὐτόθεν εὐρήσομεν ἀνεπινόητον· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἡμῶν οἶδε γενικὴν ἀπόδειξιν, οὐδὲ διὰ ταύτης πώποτε τι
383 δεδύνηται παραστήσαι. καὶ ἄλλως ἄξιον πυθέσθαι πότερον λήμματα ἔχει καὶ ἐπιφορὰν ἢ τοιαύτη ἀπόδειξις ἢ οὐκ ἔχει. καὶ εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἔχει, πῶς ἔτι δύναται νοηθῆναι ἀπόδειξις, εἴγε ἡ πάσης ἀποδείξεως νόησις οὐ χωρὶς τῶν αὐτῆς λημμάτων καὶ τῆς ἐπιφορᾶς συνίσταται; εἰ δὲ ἔχει ἐκάτερα, τουτέστι τὰ λήμματα καὶ τὴν ἐπιφορὰν, εἰδικὴ τίς ἐστίν
384 ἀπόδειξις· εἰ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ ἀποδεικνύμενον καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἀποδεικνύον τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους ἐστίν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν μίαν εἶναι τῶν εἰδικῶν. ἦν δὲ γε ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος οὐ περὶ τῆς εἰδικῆς ἀλλὰ τῆς γενικῆς·
385 οὐκ ἄρα ἐπινοεῖται ἡ γενικὴ ἀπόδειξις. καὶ μὴν οὐδέ γε ἡ εἰδική. ἐλέγετο γὰρ τοῖς δογματικοῖς ἡ ἀπόδειξις λόγος εἶναι κατὰ συναγωγὴν διὰ τινῶν φαινομένων ἐκκαλύπτων τι ἄδηλον. ἦτοι οὖν τὸ πᾶν σύστημα, τουτέστι τὸ ἐκ τῶν λημμάτων

* Cf. § 334. ^b With §§ 383-384 cf. § 345; P.H. ii. 172.

^c With §§ 385-390 cf. P.H. ii. 173-176.

shall have to turn back to the criterion, and thus, as we neither have the latter trustworthy before the former nor the former certain before the latter, we must agree to suspension of judgement about both.

In addition to what has been said, it will be possible 381 also to attack proof on the ground of its conception. Though even were it conceived, it would not necessarily be existent; for, as I said,^a there are many things which are conceived but have no share in real existence. But as it is, when even the conception of proof is found to be impossible, the hope also of its existence is cut off beyond dispute. As, then, there 382 are two kinds of proof, the generic and the particular, we shall find the generic to be of itself inconceivable; for none of us knows generic proof nor has ever yet been able to establish anything by means of it. Besides, one may well ask whether this kind of proof 383 has, or has not, premisses and a conclusion.^b And if it has not, how can it still be conceived as a proof, seeing that no conception of any proof is framed apart from its premisses and conclusion? And if it has both—that is to say, the premisses and the conclusion,—it is a particular proof; for if everything that is proved 384 and everything that proves belongs to the class of particulars, it is necessary that proof also should be one of the particulars. But our argument was not concerned with the particular but with the generic; therefore generic proof is not conceived.—Nor, in fact, 385 is particular proof.^c For proof was stated by the Dogmatists to be “an argument which reveals something non-evident through deduction by means of certain apparent things.”^d Either, then, the whole structure—that is, the thing conceived as a compound

^d Cf. §§ 301 ff.; P.H. ii. 135 ff.

καὶ τῆς ἐπιφορᾶς νοοῦμενον, ἀπόδειξις ἦν, ἢ τὰ μὲν
 λήμματα μόνον ἐστὶν ἀπόδειξις, ἢ δὲ ἐπιφορὰ τὸ
 ἀποδεικνύμενον. ὁπότερον δ' ἂν εἴπωσι τούτων,
 386 σαλεύεται ἢ τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἐπίνοια. εἰ μὲν γὰρ
 τὸ σύνθετον ἔκ τε τῶν λημμάτων καὶ τῆς ἐπιφορᾶς
 ἐστὶν ἀπόδειξις, ἀνάγκη ἀδηλὸν τι περιέχουσιν τὴν
 ἀπόδειξιν εὐθύς ἀδηλὸν εἶναι, τοιαύτην δὲ καθ-
 εστηκυῖαν δεῖσθαι τινος ἀποδείξεως, ὅπερ ἄτοπον.
 τοῖνυν οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἔκ τῶν λημμάτων καὶ τῆς
 ἐπιφορᾶς συνεστῶς ἀπόδειξις, εἴγε οὔτε ἀδηλὸν
 οὔτε ἀποδείξεως δεομένην νοοῦμεν τὴν ἀπόδειξιν.
 387 ἔτι ἢ ἀπόδειξις τῶν πρὸς τι ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ εἰς
 ἑαυτὴν νεύει, οὐδὲ κατὰ περιγραφὴν νενόηται, ἀλλ'
 ἔχει τι οὐ ἐστὶν ἀπόδειξις. εἰ οὖν ἢ ἐπιφορὰ ἐμ-
 περιέληται αὐτῇ, πᾶν δὲ τὸ πρὸς τι ἐκτός ἐστιν
 ἐκείνου τοῦ πρὸς ᾧ λέγεται πρὸς τι, πρὸς οὐδὲν
 ἐστὶν ἢ ἀπόδειξις νοουμένη, ἐπεὶπερ ἢ ἐπιφορὰ
 388 ἐμπεριείχεται αὐτῇ. ἀλλὰ κἂν ἑτέραν ὑποστησώ-
 μεθα ἐπιφορὰν ἐκτός, πρὸς ἣν ἢ ἀπόδειξις νοηθή-
 σεται, δύο γενήσονται ἐπιφοραὶ κατὰ τὸν τόπον,
 μία μὲν ἢ ἐν τῇ ἀποδείξει περιεχομένη, δευτέρα δὲ
 ἢ ἐκτός, πρὸς ἣν νοεῖται ἢ ἀπόδειξις. ἄτοπον δέ
 γε μίας ἀποδείξεως δύο λέγειν ἐπιφορᾶς· οὐκ ἄρα
 τὸ ἔκ λημμάτων καὶ ἐπιφορᾶς συνεστῶς ἐστὶν
 389 ἀπόδειξις. λείπεται τοῖνυν τὸ ἔκ τῶν λημμάτων
 λέγειν μόνον ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι. ὅπερ ἦν εὐθες·
 τοῦτο γὰρ οὐδὲ λόγος ἐστὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀλλὰ πρᾶγμα
 ἐλλιπὲς καὶ ἀδιανοήτον, εἴγε οὐθεὶς φησι τῶν νοῦν
 ἐχόντων τὸ τοιοῦτον κατ' ἰδίαν " εἰ ἐστὶ κίνησις,
 ἐστὶ κενόν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐστὶ κίνησις " ἢ λόγον εἶναι
 390 ἢ διανοίαν τινα σώζειν. εἰ οὖν μήτε τὸ ἔκ τῶν
 λημμάτων καὶ [τὸ ἔκ] τῆς ἐπιφορᾶς σύνθετον νοεῖ-

of the premisses and the conclusion—is proof, or the
 premisses only are proof, and the conclusion is what
 is proved. But whichever of these they declare for,
 the conception of proof is upset. For if, on the one 386
 hand, the compound of premisses and conclusion is
 proof, proof must at once, of necessity, be non-
 evident as containing something non-evident; and
 being such, it must need a proof, which is absurd.
 So then the compound of premisses and conclusion
 will not be proof, since we conceive of proof as neither
 non-evident nor needing proof.—Again, proof is a 387
 relative thing; for it does not refer to itself, nor is it
 conceived as isolated, but it has something whereof
 it is a proof. If, then, its conclusion is included
 within it, whereas every relative thing is outside of
 the thing whereto it is said to be in relation, then
 proof is conceived as relative to nothing, since its con-
 clusion is contained within it. If, however, we assume 388
 another conclusion outside, in relation to which the
 proof will be conceived, there will then be two con-
 clusions in the argument—first, the conclusion in-
 cluded in the proof, and secondly the outside one,
 as relative to which proof is conceived. But it is
 absurd to state two conclusions of one proof. Proof,
 therefore, is not the compound of premisses and con-
 clusion.—It only remains, then, to declare that proof 389
 is composed of the premisses only, which is silly.
 For then it is not even an argument at all, but a defective
 thing and meaningless, since no sensible man asserts
 that a combination such as this—" If motion exists,
 void exists; but in fact motion exists"—when taken
 by itself either is an argument or contains any mean-
 ing. If, therefore, proof is conceived neither as the 390

ται ἀπόδειξις μήτε τὸ ἐκ τῶν λημμάτων μόνον, ἀνεπινοήτος ἐστὶν ἢ ἀπόδειξις.

- 391 Ἔτι ἢ ἀποδεικνύουσα ἀπόδειξις ἦτοι πρόδηλος οὐσα προδήλου ἐστὶν ἀπόδειξις ἢ ἀδηλος ἀδήλου ἢ ἀδηλος προδήλου ἢ πρόδηλος ἀδήλου· οὐδὲν δὲ τούτων, ὡς παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τι ἀπόδειξις. καὶ δὴ πρόδηλος μὲν προδήλου οὐ δύναται ἀποδείξεως ἀλλ' ἐξ αὐτοῦ γνώριμον καθέστηκεν. ἀδηλος δὲ ἀδήλου πάλιν οὐκ ἂν εἶη ἀπόδειξις, παρόσον αὐτῇ χρεῖαν ἔξει τοῦ παριστάντος ἀδηλος οὐσα, καὶ οὐχ ἑτέρου τινὸς γενήσεται παραστατική.
- 393 ὡσαύτως δὲ οὐδὲ ἀδηλος προδήλου. ἀμφοτέρω γὰρ συνδραμεῖται ἄπορα· τό τε γὰρ ἀποδεικνύμενον οὐ δεήσειται τινος ἀποδείξεως πρόδηλον ὄν, ἢ τε ἀπόδειξις χρεῖαν ἔξει τοῦ καταστήσοντος αὐτὴν ἀδηλος οὐσα. ὥστε οὐδὲ ἀδηλος προδήλου γένοιτ' ἂν ποτε ἀπόδειξις. λείπεται λέγειν ὅτι πρόδηλος ἀδήλου, ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ τῶν ἀπόρων ἐτύγχανεν· εἰ γὰρ οὐ τῶν κατὰ περιγραφὴν καὶ ἀπολύτως νοουμένων ἐστὶν ἢ ἀπόδειξις ἀλλὰ τῶν πρὸς τι, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τι, ὡς ἐδείξαμεν ἐν τῇ περὶ σημείου ζητήσῃ, συγκαταλαμβάνεται ἀλλήλοις, τὰ δὲ συγκαταλαμβανόμενα οὐκ ἐξ ἀλλήλων ἐκκαλύπτεται ἀλλ' ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐστὶ πρόδηλα, οὐκ ἔσται ἢ ἀπόδειξις πρόδηλος ἀδήλου ἀπόδειξις διὰ τὸ κάκεινο συγκαταλαμβανόμενον
- 395 αὐτῇ δι' αὐτοῦ προσπίπτειν. εἰ οὖν μήτε ὡς φαινόμενον φαινόμενον ἐστὶν ἀπόδειξις μήτε ὡς ἀδηλον ἀδήλου μήτε ὡς ἀδηλον φαινόμενον μήτε

compound of premisses and conclusion, nor as that of the premisses only, proof is inconceivable.

Again,^a the proof that is proving is either a pre-evident proof of a pre-evident thing, or a non-evident of a non-evident, or a non-evident of a pre-evident, or a pre-evident of a non-evident; but it is none of these, as we shall establish; therefore, proof is not anything. Now a proof cannot be a pre-evident one of a pre-evident thing, since the pre-evident has no need of proof, but is known of itself. Nor, again, will a proof be a non-evident one of a non-evident thing, inasmuch as, being non-evident, it will itself have need of something that establishes it and will not be capable of establishing any other thing. And in the same way it will not be a non-evident one of a pre-evident thing; for here both difficulties will meet in one; for the thing proved will need no proof, as it is pre-evident, while the proof, being non-evident, will have need of something to establish it. So that a proof could never be a non-evident one of a pre-evident thing. All that is left is to say that it is a pre-evident one of a non-evident thing; and this, too, is doubtful. For if proof is not one of the things conceived as in isolation and absolute,^b but is one of the relatives, and relatives—as we showed in our inquiry regarding Sign^c—are apprehended together with one another, and things apprehended together are not revealed by one another but are of themselves pre-evident,—then proof will not be a pre-evident proof of a non-evident thing, owing to the fact that that thing, as apprehended together with the proof, is perceived by means of itself. If, then, proof is neither such a thing as an apparent of an apparent, nor a non-evident of a non-evident, nor a non-evident of an

^a With §§ 391-395 cf. P.H. ii. 177-179.

^b Cf. §§ 387, 273.

^c Cf. §§ 174 ff.

ὡς φαινόμενον ἀδήλου, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστι, λεκτέον μηδὲν εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν.

- 396 Ἀκολουθῶν δὲ τοῖς εἰρημένοις, ἐπεὶ καὶ οἱ στωικοὶ μάλιστα δοκοῦσιν ἐξηκριβωκέναι τοὺς ἀποδεικτικούς τρόπους, φέρε καὶ πρὸς τούτους ὀλίγα διεξέλθωμεν, παριστάντες ὅτι τὸ ὅσον ἐπὶ ταῖς ὑποθέσεσιν αὐτῶν τάχα μὲν πάντα ἐστὶν
- 397 ἀκατάληπτα, ἰδιαίτερον δὲ ἢ ἀπόδειξις. ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἢ κατάληψις,¹ ὡς ἔστι παρ' αὐτῶν ἀκούειν, καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας συγκατάθεσις, ἣτις διπλοῦν ἔοικεν εἶναι πρᾶγμα, καὶ τὸ μὲν τι ἔχει ἀκούσιον τὸ δὲ ἐκούσιον καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ ἡμετέρα κρίσει κείμενον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ φαντασιωθῆναι ἀβούλητον ἦν, καὶ οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ πάσχοντι ἔκειτο ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῷ φαντασιοῦντι τὸ οὕτωςι διατεθῆναι, οἷον λευκαντικῶς λευκοῦ ὑποπεσόντος χρώματος ἢ γλυκαντικῶς γλυκέος τῇ γεύσει προσαχθέντος· τὸ δὲ συγκαταθέσθαι τούτῳ τῷ κινήματι ἔκειτο ἐπὶ τῷ
- 398 παραδεχομένῳ τὴν φαντασίαν. ὥστε ἢ κατάληψις προηγουμένην ἔχει τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν, ἣς ἐστὶ συγκατάθεσις. ἢ δὲ καταληπτικὴ φαντασία προάγουσαν εἶχε τὴν φαντασίαν, ἣς ἐστὶν εἶδος. φαντασίας γὰρ μὴ οὔσης οὐδὲ καταληπτικῆς ἔστι φαντασία, παρόσον τοῦ γένους μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲ τὸ εἶδος ἔστιν· καὶ καταληπτικῆς μὴ οὔσης φαντασίας οὐδὲ συγκατάθεσις ἔστιν αὐτῆς. τῆς δὲ καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας τῆς συγκαταθέσεως αἰρομένης αἴρεται καὶ ἢ κατάληψις. ἔνθεν, ἂν ἐπιδειχθῇ [διὰ] τῆς ἀποδείξεως ὅτι οὐ δύναται φαντασία γενέσθαι κατὰ τοὺς στωικούς, δῆλον ἔσται ὡς οὐδὲ

¹ κατάληψις Hirzel: ἀπόδειξις mss., Bekk.

^a Cf. i. 227.

apparent, nor an apparent of a non-evident, and besides these there is no other possibility, one must declare that proof is nothing.

As a sequel to what has been said, seeing that the 396 Stoics seem to have elaborated most precisely the modes of proof, come and let us argue the matter briefly in reply to them, and show that, so far as depends on their assumptions, all things probably are non-apprehensible, and more particularly proof. Now apprehension, as one may learn from them, is 397 "assent to the apprehensive presentation"^a; and this seems to be a twofold thing, and to be partly involuntary, and partly voluntary and dependent on our judgement. For the experience of a presentation is involuntary, and it does not depend on the person affected, but on the cause of the presentation, that he is affected in this particular way—as, for instance, with a sense of whiteness when a white colour presents itself, or with a sense of sweetness when something sweet is offered to his taste; but the act of assenting to this affection lies in the power of the person who receives the presentation. So that apprehension has 398 as its antecedent the apprehensive presentation, to which it is the assent. And the apprehensive presentation has as antecedent the presentation, of which it is a species. For if presentation does not exist, neither does apprehensive presentation exist, inasmuch as when the genus does not exist, the species does not exist either; and if apprehensive presentation does not exist, neither does assent thereto exist. And when assent to the apprehensive presentation is taken away, apprehension also is taken away. Hence, 399 if it be shown that, according to the Stoics, a presentation of proof cannot come into existence, it will be

καταληπτικὴ φαντασία τις ὑποστήσεται τῆς ἀποδείξεως, ταύτης δὲ μὴ οὔσης οὐδ' ἢ συγκατάθεσις αὐτῆς, ὅπερ ἦν ἡ κατάληψις.

400 Ὅτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀποδείξεως φαντασία κατὰ τοὺς στωικούς, δέικνυται πρῶτον μὲν ἐκ τοῦ κοινότερον παρ' αὐτοῖς διαπεφωνήσθαι τὸ τί ποτ' ἔστιν ἡ φαντασία· μέχρι γὰρ τοῦ τύπωσιν αὐτὴν λέγειν ἐν ἡγεμονικῷ συμφωνήσαντες περὶ αὐτῆς διαφέρονται τῆς τυπώσεως, Κλεάνθους μὲν κυρίως ἀκούοντος τὴν μετὰ εἰσοχῆς καὶ ἐξοχῆς νοουμένην, Χρυσίππου δὲ καταχρηστικώτερον ἀντὶ τῆς ἀλ-
401 λουώσεως. εἰ δὴ καὶ κατ' ἐκείνους αὐτοὺς ἡ τύπωσις μέχρι τοῦ νῦν οὐχ ὁμολογεῖται, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν φαντασίαν ἄχρι δεῦρο διαφωνουμένην ἐν ἐποχῇ φυλάσσεσθαι καὶ τὴν ἐξηρητημένην αὐτῆς
402 ἀπόδειξιν. εἶτα δεδόσθω καὶ εἶναι τὴν φαντασίαν ὁποῖαν ποτὲ θέλουσιν, εἴτε κυρίως τύπωσιν τὴν μετὰ εἰσοχῆς καὶ ἐξοχῆς εἴτε ἑτεροίωσιν· ἀλλὰ τὸ πῶς αὕτη γίνεται τῆς ἀποδείξεως τῶν ἀπορωτάτων. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τὸ μὲν φανταστὸν ὀφείλει ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ φαντασιούμενον ἡγεμονικὸν πάσχειν, ἐκείνο μὲν ἵνα τυπώσῃ, τοῦτο δ' ἵνα τυπωθῇ·
403 ἄλλως γὰρ οὐκ εἰκὸς συμβαίνειν φαντασίαν. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἡγεμονικὸν τάχα συγχωρήσει τις δύνασθαι πάσχειν, καίπερ ἀσυγχώρητον οὖν τὴν δὲ ἀπόδειξιν πῶς εἰκὸς ἐστι ποιεῖν; ἦτοι γὰρ σῶμα κατ'
404 αὐτοῦς ἔστιν ἡ ἀσώματον. σῶμα μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐξ ἀσωμάτων γὰρ λεκτῶν συνέστηκεν· εἰ δὲ ἀσώματον, ἐπεὶ τὰ ἀσώματα κατ' αὐτοὺς οὔτε ποιεῖν τι πέφυκεν οὔτε πάσχειν, καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις

evident that no apprehensive presentation of proof will subsist, and, this being non-existent, assent to it will not exist either, and this is apprehension.

That a presentation of proof, according to the 400 Stoics, does not exist is shown, firstly, by the general dissension amongst them as to what presentation is ; for when they have agreed so far as to say that it is "an impression on the regent part," they are at variance about "impression" itself, Cleanthes understanding it to mean literally "that conceived as involving depression and eminence," but Chrysippus more loosely as a synonym for "alteration."^a If, 401 then, even amongst themselves there is no agreement up till now about "impression," presentation too, as being in dispute up till the present, must necessarily be treated with suspension, and also the proof which depends thereon. Next, let it be granted that 402 presentation exists, be it of whatsoever sort they wish, whether literal "impression" with depression and eminence or alteration ; yet how this (impression) comes about is a most doubtful question. For evidently the presented object ought to be the active agent, and the regent part, as receiving the presentation, the passive subject, so that the former may impress and the latter be impressed ; for it is not likely that presentation occurs in any other way. Now, that the regent part can be passive someone, 403 perhaps, will admit, although it is inadmissible ; but how is proof likely to be the agent ? For, according to them, it is either corporeal or incorporeal. Now, it is not corporeal, for it is composed 404 of incorporeal "expressions"^b ; while if it is incorporeal, then, since incorporeals, according to them, can neither affect anything nor be affected,

^a Cf. i. 228, 372 ; P.H. ii. 70.

^b Cf. §§ 262, 336.

ἀσώματος οὐσα οὐδὲν δυνήσεται ποιεῖν, μηδὲν δὲ
 ποιούσα οὐδὲ τυπώσει τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, μὴ τυπούσα
 δὲ αὐτὸ οὐδὲ φαντασίαν αὐτῆς ποιήσει περὶ αὐτῶ,
 405 εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐδὲ καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν. μὴ
 οὕσης δὲ αὐτῆς περὶ τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ καταληπτικῆς
 406 φαντασίας, οὐδὲ κατάληψις αὐτῆς γενήσεται. κατὰ
 τὰς τῶν στωικῶν ἄρα τεχνολογίας ἀκατάληπτός
 ἔστω ἢ ἀπόδειξις.

Καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ἔνεστι λέγειν ὅτι τὰ ἀσώματα οὐ
 ποιεῖ τι οὐδὲ φαντασιοὶ ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς ἐσμέν οἱ
 ἐπ' ἐκείνοις φαντασιούμενοι. εἰ γὰρ ὁμολογεῖται
 ὅτι πᾶν ἀποτέλεσμα οὐ χωρὶς γε τοῦ δρῶντος καὶ
 τοῦ πάσχοντος συνίσταται, ὀφείλει καὶ ἡ φαντασία
 τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἀποτέλεσμα καθεστηκυῖα μὴ χωρὶς
 407 τοῦ δρῶντός τε καὶ πάσχοντος νοεῖσθαι. τὸ μὲν
 οὖν πάσχον ὅτι τὸ ἡγεμονικόν ἐστι, δεδώκασιν οἱ
 ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς φιλόσοφοι· τὸ δὲ τυποῦν καὶ ποιοῦν
 τί ἂν εἴη κατ' αὐτούς, ἄξιον μαθεῖν. ἤτοι γὰρ
 ἀπόδειξις ἔστω ἢ τυπούσα τὸ ἡγεμονικόν καὶ κινού-
 σα τὴν ἑαυτῆς φαντασίαν, ἢ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν αὐτὸ
 τυποῖ καὶ φαντασιοὶ. ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν ἀπόδειξις οὐκ ἂν
 εἴη τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ τυπωτικῆ· ἀσώματος γὰρ ἐστι,
 τὸ δὲ ἀσώματον κατ' αὐτούς οὔτε ποιεῖ τι οὔτε
 408 πάσχει. εἰ δὲ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν ἑαυτὸ τυποῖ, ἤτοι
 οἷός ἐστιν ὁ τύπος τοιοῦτο καὶ τὸ τυποῦν, ἢ ἄλλοιον
 μὲν τι ὁ τύπος ἀνόμοιον δέ τι τούτου τὸ τυποῦν.
 καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀνόμοιον, ἄλλων ὑποκειμένων ἄλλων
 γενήσονται αἱ φαντασίαι· ὅπερ πάλιν εἰς τὴν περὶ
 ἀπάντων ἀκατάληψιαν συγκλείει τοὺς στωικούς.
 εἰ δὲ ὁμοίός ἐστιν ὁ τύπος τῷ τυποῦντι, ἐπεὶ τὸ

proof also, being incorporeal, will not be able to affect
 anything; and, as affecting nothing, it will not im-
 press the regent part; and, as not impressing this,
 neither will it produce therein a presentation of itself,
 nor, if this is so, an apprehensive presentation. But
 405 if there exists no apprehensive presentation of it in
 the regent part, neither will there be an apprehension
 of it. Therefore, according to the technical rules of
 406 the Stoics' logic, proof is non-apprehensible.

Moreover, it is not allowable to say that incorporeals
 do not affect anything nor produce in us presentations,
 but it is we who form presentations from them. For
 if it is agreed that no effect is brought about without
 an agent and a passive subject, then the presentation
 of proof also, being an effect, should not be conceived
 without both agent and patient. That the patient,
 407 then, is the regent part has been granted by the
 Stoics; but what the agent is which, according to
 them, makes the impression is worth considering.
 For either it is proof which impresses the regent part
 and excites its own presentation, or it is the regent
 part which impresses itself and causes presentation.
 But proof will not be capable of impressing the regent
 part; for it is incorporeal, and the incorporeal,
 according to them, neither effects nor suffers anything.
 And if the regent part impresses itself, either what
 408 impresses is the same sort of thing as the impression,
 or else the impression is one sort of thing and what
 impresses something dissimilar. And if it is dis-
 similar, as the underlying objects are different, the
 presentations will be of different things; and this
 again forces the Stoic to admit the non-apprehensi-
 bility of all things. But if the impression is similar to
 what impresses, since the regent part impresses itself,

- ἡγεμονικὸν ἑαυτὸ τυποῖ, λήψεται φαντασίαν οὐ τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἀλλὰ ἑαυτοῦ· ὁ πάλιν ἐστὶν ἄτοπον.
- 409 Οἱ δὲ καὶ δι' ὑποδειγμάτων πειρῶνται τὸ ἀξιούμενον παραμυθεῖσθαι. ὥσπερ γάρ, φασίν, ὁ παιδοτρίβης καὶ ὁ ὄπλομάχος ἔσθ' ὅτε μὲν λαβόμενος τῶν χειρῶν τοῦ παιδὸς ῥυθμίζει καὶ διδάσκει τινὰς κινήσθαι κινήσεις, ἔσθ' ὅτε δὲ ἄπωθεν ἐστῶς καὶ πῶς κινούμενος ἐν ῥυθμῷ παρέχει ἑαυτὸν ἐκείνῳ πρὸς μίμησιν, οὕτω καὶ τῶν φανταστῶν ἔνια μὲν οἰοεὶ ψάλλοντα καὶ θιγγάνοντα τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ποιεῖται τὴν ἐν τούτῳ τύπωσιν, ὁποῖόν ἐστι τὸ λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν καὶ κοινῶς τὸ σῶμα, ἔνια δὲ (οὐ)¹ τοιαύτην ἔχει φύσιν, τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς φαντασιουμένου καὶ οὐχ ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ὅποιά
- 410 ἐστὶ τὰ ἀσώματα λεκτά. οἱ δὲ τοῦτο λέγοντες πιθανῶ μὲν χρῶνται παραδείγματι, οὐ συνάγουσι δὲ τὸ προκειμένον. ὁ μὲν γὰρ παιδοτρίβης καὶ ὁ ὄπλομάχος εἰσὶ σῶμα, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἐδύναντο φαντασίαν ἐμποιεῖν τῷ παιδί· ἢ δὲ ἀπόδειξις ἀσώματος καθειστήκει, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἐζητέτο εἰ δύναται φανταστικῶς τυποῦν τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. ὥστε μὴ ἀποδεδείχθαι αὐτοῖς τὸ ἀρχήθεν ζητούμενον.
- 411 Ὅθεν τούτων ὑποδεδειγμένων² σκοπῶμεν μεταελθόντες εἰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν θεωρίαν δύναται ἢ τῆς ἀποδείξεως αὐτοῖς ὑπόσχεσις σώζεσθαι. οἴονται τοίνυν τρεῖς τινὰς ἀλλήλοις συζυγεῖν λόγους, τὸν τε συνακτικὸν καὶ τὸν ἀληθῆ καὶ τὸν
- 412 ἀποδεικτικόν, ὧν τὸν μὲν ἀποδεικτικὸν πάντως ἀληθῆ τε καὶ συνακτικόν, τὸν δὲ ἀληθῆ πάντως συνακτικὸν μὲν ὑπάρχειν, οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης δὲ καὶ

¹ <οὐ> ego (lacunam post φύσιν stat. Kochalsky).

² ὑποδεδειγμένων Fabr.: ἀποδεδειγμένων mss., Bekk.

it will receive a presentation not of the proof but of itself; which again is absurd.

But they endeavour also to render their view 409 plausible by means of illustrations. For, say they, just as the trainer or sergeant sometimes takes hold of the boy's hands when he is teaching him rhythm and how to make certain motions, and at other times stands at a distance and offers himself as a pattern for the boy's imitation by making certain rhythmical motions, so also some of the objects presented produce the impression in the regent part as it were by touching and contact with it—such as white and black and body generally,—whereas others are not of this nature, since the regent part receives the presentation as a result of them but not by their agency, as is the case with incorporeal expressions. But those who argue thus, though they use a plausible 410 illustration, do not prove the matter in question. For the trainer or sergeant is corporeal, and because of this he was able to produce a presentation in the boy; but proof is incorporeal, and because of this it was questioned whether it is able to impress, as a presentation, the regent part. So that the original point in question has not been proved by them.

These arguments, therefore, having been indicated, 411 let us pass on to consider whether the promise they ascribe to proof can be made good by their logical theory. Now they suppose that there are three forms of argument connected with one another^a—the conclusive and the true and the probative, and of these 412 the probative is always both true and conclusive, and the true is always conclusive but not necessarily

^a Cf. P.H. ii. 137-143.

ἀποδεικτικόν, τὸν δὲ συνακτικὸν οὔτε πάντως
 413 ἀληθῆ οὔτε πάντως ἀποδεικτικόν. καὶ ὁ μὲν
 τοιοῦτος ἡμέρας οὔσης “ εἰ νύξ ἔστι, σκότος ἔστιν·
 ἀλλὰ μὴν νύξ ἔστιν· σκότος ἄρα ἔστιν ” συνάγει
 μὲν διὰ τὸ ἐν ὑγιεὶ ἠρωτησθαι σχήματι, οὐκ ἔστι
 δὲ ἀληθές, τὸ δεύτερον λήμμα ἔχων ψεῦδος, τὴν
 414 πρόσληψιν, τὸ “ ἀλλὰ μὴν νύξ ἔστιν. ” ὁ δὲ οὕτως
 ἔχων ἡμέρας οὔσης “ εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν·
 ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν ” συνακτικὸς
 ἅμα ἦν καὶ ἀληθῆς τῷ καὶ ἐν ὑγιεὶ ἠρωτησθαι
 415 σχήματι καὶ δι’ ἀληθῶν ἀληθές συνάγειν. κρίνε-
 σθαι δὲ φασι τὸν συνακτικὸν λόγον ὅτι συνακτικὸς
 ἔστιν, ὅταν τῇ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων αὐτοῦ συμπλοκῇ
 ἔπηται τὸ συμπέρασμα, οἷον τὸν τοιοῦτον λόγον
 ἡμέρας οὔσης “ εἰ νύξ ἔστι, σκότος ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν
 νύξ ἔστιν· σκότος ἄρα ἔστιν, ” καίπερ μὴ ὄντα
 ἀληθῆ διὰ τὸ ἐπὶ ψεῦδος ἄγειν, συνακτικὸν εἶναι
 416 φαμέν. συμπλέξαντες γὰρ οὕτω τὰ λήμματα,
 “ νύξ ἔστι, καὶ εἰ νύξ ἔστι, σκότος ἔστι, ” ποιούμεν
 συνημμένον [συλλογισμόν],¹ ἀρχόμενον μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς
 τοιαύτης συμπλοκῆς, λήγον² δὲ εἰς τὸ συμπέρασμα
 τοιοῦτον, “ [νύξ ἔστι, καὶ εἰ νύξ ἔστι,]³ σκότος
 ἔστι. ” τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ συνημμένον ἀληθές ἔστι διὰ
 τὸ μηδέποτε ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς λήγειν ἐπὶ
 ψεῦδος. ἡμέρας μὲν γὰρ οὔσης ἀρχεται ἀπὸ
 ψεῦδους τοῦ “ νύξ ἔστι, καὶ εἰ νύξ ἔστι, σκότος
 ἔστι, ” καὶ λήξει ἐπὶ ψεῦδος, “ σκότος ἔστι, ” καὶ
 οὕτως ἔσται ἀληθές· νυκτὸς δὲ ἀρξεται τε ἀπ’
 ἀληθοῦς καὶ λήξει ἐπ’ ἀληθές, καὶ ἔσται παρ’ αὐτὸ
 417 τοῦτο ἀληθές. οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν συνακτικὸς τότε ἔστιν
 ὑγιής, ὅταν συμπλεξάντων ἡμῶν τὰ λήμματα καὶ

¹ [συλλογισμόν] secl. Arnim.

probative as well, while the conclusive is not always true nor always probative. Thus an argument such 413 as this, when it is day—“ If it is night, it is dark ; but in fact it is night ; therefore it is dark ”—draws a conclusion because it is propounded in a valid form, but is not true as it has a false second premiss, the minor “ but in fact it is night. ” But one of this kind, 414 when it is day—“ If it is day, it is light ; but in fact it is day ; therefore it is light ”—is at once both conclusive and true, as being not only propounded in a valid form but also drawing a true conclusion by means of true premisses. And they say that the 415 conclusive argument is judged to be conclusive when the conclusion follows from the combination of the premisses ; for example, an argument such as this, when it is day—“ If it is night, it is dark ; but in fact it is night ; therefore it is dark ”—we declare to be conclusive, although it is not true because it leads us to a falsehood. For when we have combined the 416 premisses thus, “ It is night, and if it is night it is dark, ” we frame a hypothetical syllogism which begins with this form of combination and ends in this form of conclusion “ it is dark. ” For this hypothetical syllogism is true, as it never begins with truth and ends in falsehood.^a For when it is day, it will begin with the falsehood “ It is night, and if it is night, it is dark, ” and will end in the falsehood “ it is dark, ” and thus will be true ; and in the night, it will both begin with truth and end in truth, and for this very reason it will be true. So, then, the conclusive argument is 417 sound when, after we have combined the premisses

• Cf. §§ 114, 268, 331.

² λήγον Arnim : λήγοντα mss., Bekk.

³ [νύξ . . . ἔστι] secl. Kochalsky.

συνημμένον ποιησάντων τὸ ἀρχόμενον μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς
 διὰ τῶν λημμάτων συμπλοκῆς λήγον δ' εἰς τὸ
 συμπέρασμα, εὐρίσκηται τοῦτο αὐτὸ συνημμένον
 418 ἀληθές. ὁ δ' ἀληθῆς λόγος κρίνεται ὅτι ἔστιν
 ἀληθῆς οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ μόνου τὸ συνημμένον τὸ ἀρχό-
 μενον ἀπὸ τῆς διὰ τῶν λημμάτων συμπλοκῆς καὶ
 λήγον εἰς τὸ συμπέρασμα εἶναι ἀληθές, ἀλλὰ καὶ
 ἐκ τοῦ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων τὸ συμπεπλεγμένον ὑπ-
 ἀρχειν ὑγιές· ὡς ἂν τὸ ἕτερον τούτων εὐρίσκηται
 ψεῦδος, καὶ τὸν λόγον ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίνεσθαι ψευδῆ,
 ὡς τὸν τοιοῦτον νυκτὸς οὐσης "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστιν,
 φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν"
 419 διὰ τὸ λήμμα ἔχειν ψεῦδος τὸ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν,"
 ψεῦδος ἔστιν. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν συμπεπλεγμένον διὰ
 τῶν λημμάτων, ἐν ἔχον τῶν λημμάτων ψεῦδος τὸ
 "ἡμέρα ἔστιν," ψεῦδος ἔστιν· τὸ δὲ συνημμένον
 τὸ ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ τῆς διὰ τῶν λημμάτων συμ-
 πλοκῆς καὶ λήγον εἰς τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀληθές ἔσται.
 οὐδέποτε γὰρ ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς λήγει ἐπὶ
 ψεῦδος, ἀλλὰ νυκτὸς μὲν ἀπὸ ψεύδους ἀρχεται τῆς
 συμπλοκῆς, ἡμέρας δέ, ὡς περ ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς ἀρχεται,
 420 οὕτω καὶ εἰς ἀληθές λήγει. καὶ πάλιν ὁ τοιοῦτος
 "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· φῶς δέ γε ἔστιν· ἡμέρα
 ἄρα ἔστιν" ψευδῆς ἔστιν, δυνάμενος ἡμᾶς δι'
 421 ἀληθῶν λημμάτων ἄγειν ἐπὶ ψεῦδος. ἀλλὰ δὴ ἂν
 ἐξετάζωμεν, δύναται τὸ μὲν διὰ τῶν λημμάτων
 συμπεπλεγμένον ἀληθές εἶναι ἡμέρας οὐσης, οἶον
 τὸ τοιοῦτο "φῶς ἔστιν, καὶ εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς
 ἔστιν," τὸ δὲ συνημμένον τὸ ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ τῆς
 διὰ τῶν λημμάτων συμπλοκῆς καὶ λήγον ἐπὶ τὸ
 συμπέρασμα ψεῦδος, οἶον τὸ τοιοῦτον "εἰ φῶς ἔστι
 καὶ εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἡμέρα ἄρα ἔστιν."¹

and framed a hypothetical syllogism which begins
 with the combination formed by the premisses and
 ends in the conclusion, this syllogism itself is found
 to be true. And the true argument is judged to be 418
 true not solely from the fact that the hypothetical
 syllogism which begins with the combination formed
 by the premisses and ends with the conclusion is true,
 but also from the fact that the combination formed
 by the premisses is valid; since, if either of these
 is found to be false, the argument also necessarily
 becomes false; just as the following, when it is night,
 "If it is day, it is light; but in fact it is day;
 therefore it is light," is false because it contains the
 false premiss "it is day." And the combination 419
 formed by the premisses is false, as it has one of its
 premisses—"it is day"—false; but the hypothetical
 syllogism, which begins with the combination formed
 by the premisses and ends in the conclusion, will be
 true. For never when beginning with truth does it
 end in falsehood, but, in the night, it begins the
 combination with falsehood, and, in the day, as it
 begins with truth so also it ends in truth. And again, 420
 an argument such as this is false—"If it is day, it is
 light; but it is light; therefore it is day," as it can
 lead us by means of true premisses to falsehood. But 421
 in fact, if we examine it, the combination formed by
 the premisses can be true when it is day—as for
 instance "It is light, and if it is day, it is light,"—
 but the hypothetical syllogism, which begins with the
 combination formed by the premisses and ends in the
 conclusion, may be false, as for instance this—"If it is
 light and if it is day, it is light (< therefore it is day >)."

¹ <ἡμέρα ἄρα ἔστιν> add. Kochalsky.

δύναται γὰρ τὸ συνημμένον τοῦτο νυκτὸς οὔσης ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς ἄρχεσθαι τῆς συμπλοκῆς, λήγειν ἐπὶ ψεύδος τὸ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν," καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἶναι ψεύδος. ὥστε γίνεται ἀληθῆς ὁ λόγος οὔτε ὅταν τὸ συμπεπλεγμένον μόνον ᾗ ἀληθές οὔτε ὅταν τὸ συνημμένον, 422 ἀλλ' ὅταν ἀμφοτέρα ἀληθῆ. ὁ δὲ ἀποδεικτικὸς τοῦ ἀληθοῦς διαφέρει, ὅτι ὁ μὲν ἀληθῆς δύναται ἐναργῆ ἔχειν πάντα, φημί δὲ τὰ τε λήμματα καὶ τὴν ἐπιφορὰν, ὁ δὲ ἀποδεικτικὸς πλέον τι ἔχειν βούλεται, λέγω δὲ τὸ τὴν ἐπιφορὰν ἄδηλον οὔσαν ἐκκαλύ- 423 πτεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν λημμάτων. ὅθεν ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν" ἐναργῆ ἔχειν τὰ λήμματα καὶ τὴν ἐπιφορὰν ἀληθῆς ἔστι καὶ οὐκ ἀποδεικτικὸς, ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος "εἰ γάλα ἔχει ἐν μαστοῖς ἦδε, κεκύηκεν ἦδε· ἀλλὰ μὴν γάλα ἔχει ἐν μαστοῖς ἦδε· κεκύηκεν ἄρα ἦδε" σὺν τῷ ἀληθῆς εἶναι ἔτι καὶ ἀποδεικτικὸς ἔστιν· ἄδηλον γὰρ ἔχων τὸ συμπέρασμα τὸ "κεκύηκεν ἄρα ἦδε," τοῦτο διὰ τῶν λημμάτων ἐκκαλύπτει.

424 Τριῶν οὖν ὄντων λόγων, τοῦ τε συνακτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ τοῦ ἀποδεικτικοῦ, εἰ μὲν τίς ἔστιν ἀποδεικτικὸς, οὗτος πολὺ πρότερόν ἐστιν ἀληθῆς καὶ συνακτικὸς· εἰ δὲ τις ἀληθῆς, οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀποδεικτικὸς, πάντως δὲ συνακτικὸς· εἰ δὲ τις συνακτικὸς, οὐ πάντως ἀληθῆς ὡς οὐδὲ πάντως 425 ἀποδεικτικὸς. κοινῶς οὖν ὀφείλοντος πᾶσιν αὐτοῖς συμβεβηκέναι τοῦ συνακτικοῦ ιδιώματος, ἐὰν παραστήσωμεν ὅτι ἀνεύρετός ἐστι τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ὁ συνακτικὸς λόγος, ἐσόμεθα παρεστακότες ὅτι οὐδὲ 426 ἀληθῆς οὐδὲ ἀποδεικτικὸς δύναται εὐρεθῆναι. ὅτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστι συνακτικὸς λόγος τις, ῥάδιον γυνῶναι.

458

For this syllogism can, when it is night, begin with its combination which is true and end in the falsehood "it is day," and on this account be false. So that the argument becomes true neither when the combination only, nor when the syllogism only, is true but when both are true.—But the probative argument ^a differs from 422 the true because, while the true can have all its parts manifest (both the premisses, I mean, and the conclusion), the probative purports to have something more—namely, the discovery of the conclusion, which is non-evident, by means of the premisses. Hence, an 423 argument like this—"If it is day, it is light; but in fact it is day; therefore it is light," which has both premisses and conclusion manifest, is true and not probative; but one such as this ^b—"If she has milk in her breasts, she has conceived; but in fact she has milk in her breasts; therefore she has conceived," besides being true is also probative, for it has a non-evident conclusion, "therefore she has conceived," and discovers this by means of its premisses.

As there are, then, three kinds of argument, the 424 conclusive and the true and the probative, if an argument is probative it must previously be true and conclusive; but one that is true is not necessarily probative, but it certainly is conclusive; and one that is conclusive is not always true, just as it is not always probative. Since, then, the conclusive character 425 must appertain to them all in common, if we shall establish that the conclusive argument is undiscoverable by the Stoics, we shall have established that the true and the probative cannot be discovered either. And that there does not exist any conclusive argument 426

^a Cf. §§ 312, 452; P.H. ii. 140 ff.

^b Cf. § 252.

εἰ γὰρ συνακτικὸν εἶναι λέγουσι λόγον, ὅταν ἀληθές ἢ συνημμένον τὸ ἀρχόμενον μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν λημάτων αὐτοῦ συμπλοκῆς λήγον δὲ εἰς τὴν ἐπιφορὰν, δεήσει προεπικεκρίσθαι τὸ ἀληθές συνημμένον καὶ τότε βεβαίως λαμβάνεσθαι τὸν ἐκ τούτου ἡρτησθαι
 427 δοκοῦντα συνακτικὸν λόγον. ἀνεπίκριτον δὲ γέ ἐστι μέχρι τοῦ νῦν τὸ ὑγιές συνημμένον· τοῖνυν οὐδὲ ὁ συνακτικὸς λόγος δύναται γνώριμος ὑπάρχειν. ὥσπερ γὰρ μέτρου μὴ ἐστῶτος ἀλλ' ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως μεταβαλλομένου οὐδὲ τὸ μετρούμενον ἔστηκεν, οὕτως ἐπεὶ οἰονεὶ μέτρον ἐστὶ τοῦ συνάγειν τὸν λόγον τὸ ὑγιές συνημμένον, ἀκολουθήσει τούτου ἀνεπικρίτου καθεστῶτος μηδὲ ἐκεῖνον εἶναι σαφῆ.
 428 ὅτι δ' ἀνεπίκριτόν ἐστι τὸ ὑγιές συνημμένον, αἰ εἰσαγωγαὶ τῶν στωικῶν διδάσκουσιν, ἐν αἷς πολλὰς καὶ διαφάνους καὶ μέχρι τοῦ νῦν ἀνεπικρίτους ἐκτίθενται τούτου κρίσεις. ὅθεν τοῦ συνακτικοῦ τοιοῦτου τυγχάνοντος πάντως καὶ ὁ ἀληθής, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ὁ ἀποδεικτικός, ὀφείλει ἐν ἐποχῇ φυλάττεσθαι.

Κἂν ἀποστάντες δὲ ταύτης τῆς ἐνστάσεως ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν περαιόντων καὶ ἀπεράντων χωρῶμεν τεχνολογίαν, ἀδύνατος εὑρεθήσεται ἢ τοῦ ἀποδεικτικοῦ λόγου σύστασις. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν περαιόντων πολλῆς καὶ ἀκριβοῦς οὔσης ζητήσεως οὐκ ἀνάγκη νῦν διεξελθεῖν, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀπεράντων λόγων ἐπὶ ποσὸν ὑποδεικτέον. τοῖνυν φασι τετραχῶς γίνεσθαι τὸν ἀπέραντον λόγον, ἧτοι κατὰ διάρτησιν ἢ κατὰ παρολκῆν ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἐν μοχθηρῷ

^a Cf. §§ 223, 443.

is easy to perceive. For if they assert that a conclusive argument exists whenever there exists a true hypothetical syllogism, beginning with the combination formed by its premisses and ending in its conclusion, the truth of the syllogism will have to be judged beforehand, and after that the conclusive argument which seems to depend on it must be accepted with certainty. But the valid syllogism has
 427 not been determined up till now; neither, then, can the conclusive argument be ascertained. For just as, when a standard measure does not remain constant but varies from time to time, the thing measured also is not constant, so likewise, since the valid syllogism is, as it were, the standard for deducing the argument, when the former is undetermined it will follow that the latter too is not clear. And that the
 428 valid syllogism is undetermined is taught us by the "Introductions" of the Stoics,^a in which they propose many determinations of it, which are contradictory and up till now undetermined. Hence, as the conclusive argument is of this sort, certainly the true also, and therefore also the probative, ought to be regarded with suspension.

But even if we leave this objection and proceed to the logical rules about "definite" and "indefinite" arguments, the construction of the probative argument will be found impossible. Now concerning the
 429 definite arguments there is much close investigation, and there is no necessity to discuss them now, but we must give some account of the indefinite.^b They say, then, that the indefinite argument comes about in four ways—either through inconsistency, or through redundancy, or through being propounded in a bad

^b With §§ 429-434 cf. P.H. ii. 146-150.

430 ἠρωτηῖσθαι σχήματι ἢ κατὰ ἔλλειψιν. ἀλλὰ κατὰ
 διάρτησιν μὲν ὅταν μηδεμίαν ἔχη κοινωνίαν καὶ
 συνάρτησιν τὰ λήμματα πρὸς ἀλλήλα τε καὶ πρὸς
 τὴν ἐπιφορὰν, οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ τοιούτου λόγου "εἰ
 ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν πυροὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ
 πωλοῦνται· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν." ὀρώμεν γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ
 τούτου οὔτε τὸ "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστιν" ἔχει τινὰ σύμ-
 πνοιαν καὶ συμπλοκὴν πρὸς τὸ "πυροὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ
 πωλοῦνται," οὔτε ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν πρὸς τὸ "φῶς
 ἄρα ἔστιν," ἀλλ' ἑκάστον ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων διήρτη-
 431 ται. κατὰ δὲ παρολκὴν ἀπέραντος γίνεται ὁ λόγος
 ὅταν ἐξωθέν τι καὶ περισσῶς παραλαμβάνηται τοῖς
 λήμμασι, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ οὕτως ἔχοντος "εἰ
 ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν,
 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ὠφελεῖ· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν." τὸ γὰρ
 τὴν ἀρετὴν ὠφελεῖν περισσῶς συμπαρείληπται τοῖς
 ἄλλοις λήμμασι, εἶγε δυνατόν ἔστιν ἐξαιρεθέντος
 αὐτοῦ διὰ τῶν περιλειπομένων, τοῦ τε "εἰ ἡμέρα
 ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν" καὶ τοῦ "ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν,"
 συνάγεσθαι τὴν ἐπιφορὰν τὸ "φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν."
 432 διὰ δὲ τὸ ἐν μοχθηρῷ ἠρωτηῖσθαι σχήματι ἀ-
 πέραντος γίνεται λόγος ὅταν ἐν τινι τῶν παρὰ τὰ
 ὑγῆ σχήματα θεωρουμένων ἐρωτηθῆ σχήματι
 οἷον ὄντος ὑγιούς σχήματος τοῦ τοιούτου "εἰ τὸ
 πρῶτον, τὸ δεύτερον, τὸ δὲ γε πρῶτον, τὸ ἄρα
 433 δεύτερον," ὄντος δὲ καὶ τοῦ "εἰ τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ
 δεύτερον, οὐχὶ δὲ γε τὸ δεύτερον, οὐκ ἄρα τὸ πρῶ-
 τον,"¹ φάμεν τὸν ἐν τοιούτῳ σχήματι ἐρωτηθέντα
 "εἰ τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ δεύτερον, οὐχὶ δὲ γε τὸ πρῶτον,
 οὐκ ἄρα τὸ δεύτερον" ἀπέραντον εἶναι, οὐχ ὅτι

¹ δεύτερον, οὐκ . . . πρῶτον Mutsch. : πρῶτον, οὐκ . . . δεύτερον
 mss., Bekk.

form, or through deficiency. Thus it is through 430
 inconsistency when the premisses have no connexion
 and consistency with each other and with the con-
 conclusion, as in an argument such as this—" If it is day,
 it is light ; but in fact wheat is being sold in the
 market ; therefore it is light." For we see that in
 this instance neither the clause " if it is day " has any
 relevance and connexion with the clause " wheat is
 being sold in the market," nor either of these with the
 clause " therefore it is light," but each of them is
 inconsistent with the others. And the argument is 431
 indefinite through redundancy when something is
 included, extrinsically and superfluously, along with
 the premisses, as is the case with one like this—" If it
 is day, it is light ; but in fact it is day, and also virtue
 benefits ; therefore it is light " ; for the fact that
 virtue benefits is superfluously introduced along with
 the other premisses, seeing that, when it is excluded,
 it is possible for the conclusion, " therefore it is light,"
 to be deduced by means of the remaining premisses,
 " if it is day, it is light " and " but in fact it is day."
 And the argument becomes indefinite owing to being 432
 propounded in a bad form whenever it is propounded
 in any form that differs from the valid forms ; for
 example, when a form such as this is valid—" If the
 first, the second ; but in fact the first ; therefore the
 second " ; and also this—" If the first, the second ; 433
 but not the second ; not, therefore, the first,"—we
 say that the argument propounded in this form—" If
 the first, the second ; but not the first ; not, therefore,
 the second," is indefinite, not because it is impossible

ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ σχήματι λόγον
 συνερωτᾶσθαι δι' ἀληθῶν ἀληθῆς συνάγοντα (δύ-
 ναται γάρ, οἷον ὁ τοιοῦτος "εἰ τὰ τρία τέσσαρά
 ἐστίν, τὰ ἕξ ὀκτώ ἐστίν· οὐχὶ δέ γε τὰ τρία τέσ-
 σαρὰ ἐστίν, οὐκ ἄρα τὰ ἕξ ὀκτώ ἐστίν"), τῷ δὲ
 δύνασθαι τινὰς λόγους ἐν αὐτῷ τάττεσθαι μοχ-
 θηρούς, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον "εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστι,
 φῶς ἐστίν· ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐκ ἐστίν ἡμέρα· οὐκ ἄρα
 434 ἐστὶ φῶς." κατ' ἔλλειψιν δὲ ἀπέραντος ἐγένετο ὁ
 λόγος ὅταν ἐλλείπη τι τῶν συνακτικῶν λημμάτων.
 οἷον "ἤτοι κακόν ἐστίν ὁ πλοῦτος ἢ ἀγαθόν ἐστίν
 ὁ πλοῦτος· οὐχὶ δέ γε κακόν ἐστίν ὁ πλοῦτος·
 ἀγαθόν ἄρα ἐστὶν ὁ πλοῦτος." ἐλλείπει γὰρ ἐν
 τῷ διεξευγμένῳ τὸ ἀδιάφορον εἶναι τὸν πλοῦτον,
 ὥστε τὴν ὑγιῆ συνερώτησιν τοιαύτην μᾶλλον
 ὑπάρχειν "ἤτοι ἀγαθόν ἐστίν ὁ πλοῦτος ἢ κακόν
 ἐστίν ἢ ἀδιάφορον· οὔτε δέ γ' ἀγαθόν ἐστίν ὁ
 πλοῦτος οὔτε κακόν· ἀδιάφορον ἄρα ἐστίν."

435 Τοιαύτης δὴ παρὰ τοῖς στωικοῖς κειμένης τεχνο-
 λογίας μήποτε τὸ ὅσον ἐπ' αὐτῇ οὐ δύναται ἀ-
 πέραντος ἐπικριθῆναι λόγος, καὶ γε εὐθέως ὁ κατὰ
 διάρτησιν καὶ οὕτως ἔχων "εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστίν, φῶς
 ἐστίν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐν ἀγορᾷ πυροὶ πωλοῦνται· φῶς
 ἄρα ἐστίν." τὸ γὰρ διηρηθῆσθαι τὰ λήμματα, καὶ
 μήτε πρὸς ἄλληλα μήτε πρὸς τὴν ἐπιφορὰν ἔχειν
 τινὰ κοινῶν, ἤτοι ψιλῆ λέγουσι φάσει ἢ διὰ
 τινος τεχνικῆς καὶ διδασκαλικῆς ἐφόδου τὸ τοιοῦτο
 436 παριστάντες. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἀναποδείκτω χρώμενοι
 φάσει, ῥάδιον φάσιν αὐτοῖς ἀντιθεῖναι, πάντα τὸν
 λεγόμενον κατὰ διάρτησιν ἀπέραντον λόγον φάσκον-

for an argument which deduces what is true by means
 of true premisses to be propounded in this form (for
 this is possible, as for instance "If 3 is 4, 6 is 8; but
 3 is not 4; therefore 6 is not 8"), but because it is
 possible for some bad arguments to be arranged in
 this form, such as this, for example—"If it is day
 it is light; but in fact it is not day; therefore it is
 not light." And the argument becomes indefinite 434
 through deficiency when one of its deductive pre-
 misses is deficient. For example, "Either wealth is
 an evil or wealth is a good; but wealth is not an evil;
 therefore wealth is a good"; for in the disjunctive
 premiss there is an omission of "wealth is indifferent,"
 so that the valid statement ought rather to run thus—
 "Wealth is either a good or an evil or indifferent; but
 wealth is neither a good nor an evil; therefore it is
 indifferent."

Such, then, being the logical theory laid down by 435
 the Stoics, one suspects that, if we go by it, an
 argument cannot be judged to be indefinite,^a—for
 example, that through inconsistency which takes the
 form—"If it is day it is light; but in fact wheat
 is being sold in the market; therefore it is light."
 For the fact that the premisses are inconsistent and
 possess no connexion either with each other or with
 the conclusion is stated by them either by bare asser-
 tion or by establishing the fact by means of some
 technical and doctrinal method. But if they are 436
 employing bare assertion, it is easy to reply with an
 opposite assertion, which asserts that every argument
 termed indefinite through inconsistency is definite;

^a With §§ 435-437 cf. *P.H.* ii. 146 ff., 152-153, where, for
 indefinite (ἀπέραντος), the term "inconclusive" (ἀσύνακτος) is
 used.

τας περαίνειν· εἰ γὰρ ἐκ ψιλῆς φάσεως ἐκείνοι
 δύνανται πιστεύεσθαι, δυνήσονται καὶ οἱ τοῦναν-
 τίον λέγοντες εἶναι πιστοί· τὴν ἰσοσθενῆ γὰρ προ-
 φέρονται φάσιν. εἰ δὲ μεθόδῳ τοῦτο διδάσκοντες,
 ἐπιζητήσομεν τίς ποτέ ἐστὶν ἡ τοιαύτη μέθοδος.
 437 καὶ λέγωσιν ὅτι τοῦ κατὰ διάρτησιν ἀπεράντου
 λόγου τεκμήριόν ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ πάντως ἀκολουθεῖν
 αὐτοῦ τῇ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων συμπλοκῇ τὸ συμ-
 πέρασμα, μηδὲ ὑγιῆς εἶναι συνημμένον τὸ ἀρχό-
 μενον ἀπὸ τῆς διὰ τῶν λημμάτων συμπλοκῆς καὶ
 λήγον εἰς τὸ συμπέρασμα, πάλιν εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν
 φήσομεν αὐτοὺς ἀπορίαν ἐμπίπτειν· εἰ γὰρ ἴνα
 τὸν κατὰ διάρτησιν ἀπεράντον λόγον μάθωμεν, δεῖ
 ἔχειν ἐπικεκριμένον τὸ ὑγιῆς συνημμένον, τοῦτο
 δ' οὐκ ἔχομεν μέχρι τοῦ νῦν ἐπικεκριμένον, πάντως
 οὐδὲ τὸν κατὰ διάρτησιν ἀπεράντον λόγον δυνά-
 438 μεθα γινώσκειν. ἀλλὰ καὶ δεύτερος ἦν
 τρόπος ἀπεράντων ὁ κατὰ παρολκῆν, ὅταν ἔξω-
 θεν παραλαμβάνηται τι τοῖς λήμμασι παρέλκον ὡς
 πρὸς τὴν τοῦ συμπεράσματος κατασκευήν. ὅσον
 δ' ἐπὶ τούτῳ δεήσει τὸν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ [καὶ τῷ
 δευτέρῳ]¹ τρόπῳ συνερωτώμενον λόγον κατὰ παρ-
 ολκῆν εἶναι ἀπεράντον, ἐπεὶ παρέλκει ἐν αὐτῷ
 τροπικόν. καὶ τοῦτ' εἰσόμεθα παρατεθέντων ἡμῶν
 439 τῶν λόγων. τὸν² γὰρ δὴ τοιοῦτόν φασιν ἀπεράν-
 τον “ εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστὶ, φῶς ἐστίν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα
 ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ὠφελεῖ· φῶς ἄρα ἐστίν.”
 παρέλκει γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τὸ “ ἡ ἀρετὴ ὠφελεῖ ”
 πρὸς τὴν κατασκευήν τοῦ συμπεράσματος, διὰ

¹ [καὶ τῷ δευτέρῳ] secl. Mutsch.

² τὸν Kochalsky: τὸ mss., Bekk.

for if these men can be trusted on a bare assertion, those too who say the opposite will be able to be trusted; for they utter an equipollent assertion. And if they are expounding this by method, we shall inquire further what this method can possibly be. And if they allege that the sign of the argument 437 indefinite through inconsistency is the fact that the conclusion does not always follow from the combination of its premisses, and that the syllogism which begins with the combination formed by the premisses and ending in the conclusion is not valid, we shall assert that they are falling again into the original difficulty; for if, in order to discern the argument which is indefinite through inconsistency, we must have the valid syllogism determined, and up till now we have not got this determined, we certainly cannot ascertain the argument which is indefinite through inconsistency.—But there exists also a second 438 type of indefinite arguments—that through redundancy,—in which something from without is introduced into the premisses which is redundant for establishing the conclusion.^a But, to judge by this, an argument propounded according to the first type will have to be indefinite through redundancy, since in it the hypothetical premiss is redundant. This we shall learn when we have compared the arguments. For they assert that an argument such as this is 439 indefinite—“ If it is day, it is light; but in fact it is day, and also virtue benefits; therefore it is light.” For in this case “ virtue benefits ” is redundant for the deduction of the conclusion, because when this

^a With §§ 438-443 cf. *P.H.* ii. 156; and for the (five) Stoic “ modes ” or “ types ” of non-demonstrable arguments cf. §§ 224 ff. *supra*.

τὸ ἀρθέντος αὐτοῦ δύνασθαι ἐκ τῶν περι-
 λειπομένων δυοῖν λημμάτων ἀνελλιπῶς συνάγεσθαι
 410 τὴν ἐπιφοράν. τοῖνυν ὑποτιγχάνοντες οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς
 σκέψεως ἐροῦσιν ὡς εἴπερ ἀπέραντός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος
 κατὰ παρολκὴν ἐφ' οὗ ἀρθέντος τινὸς λήμματος ἐκ
 τῶν περιλειπομένων συνάγεται ἢ ἐπιφορά, ῥητέον
 ἀπέραντον εἶναι καὶ τὸν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τρόπῳ
 ἐρωτώμενον, ἔχοντα δὲ οὕτως "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι,
 φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν."
 παρέλκει γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ συμπερά-
 σματος κατασκευὴν τὸ τροπικὸν τὸ "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι,
 (φῶς ἔστι)"¹ καὶ δύναται ἐκ τοῦ "ἡμέρα ἔστι"
 441 μόνου συνάγεσθαι τὸ "φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν." τοῦτο δὲ
 πρόδηλον μὲν ἦν καὶ αὐτόθεν, ἔστι δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ ἐκ
 τῆς ὡς πρὸς ἐκεῖνο² ἀκολουθίας παραμυθεῖσθαι.
 ἥτοι γὰρ ἀκολουθεῖν φήσουσι τῷ ἡμέραν εἶναι τὸ
 φῶς εἶναι, ἢ μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀκολουθεῖ,
 αὐτόθεν ὁμολογηθέντος ἀληθοῦς εἶναι τοῦ "ἡμέρα
 ἔστι" συνάγεται καὶ τὸ "φῶς ἔστι," κατ' ἀνάγ-
 442 κην ἐπόμενον αὐτῷ· ὅπερ ἦν συμπέρασμα. εἰ δὲ
 οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ, οὐδ' ἐπὶ τοῦ συνημμένου ἀκολου-
 θήσει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἔσται ψεῦδος τὸ συνημμένον,
 μὴ ἀκολουθοῦντος ἐν αὐτῷ τοῦ λήγοντος τῷ ἡγου-
 μένῳ. ὥστε δυοῖν θάτερον ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ προ-
 ειρημένη τεχνολογίᾳ, ἢ ἀπέραντον εὐρίσκεσθαι τὸν
 ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τρόπῳ ἠρωτημένον παρέλκοντος ἐν
 αὐτῷ τοῦ τροπικοῦ, ἢ ψευδῆ πάντως διὰ τὸ ψεῦδος
 443 ἐν αὐτῷ εἶναι τὸ τροπικόν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ λέγειν
 μὴ ἀρέσκειν τῷ Χρυσίππῳ μονολημμάτων εἶναι
 λόγους, ὃ τάχα τινὲς ἐροῦσι πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην

¹ <φῶς ἔστι> Kochalsky.

² ἐκεῖνο Heintz: ἐκείνους mss., Bekk.

clause is removed the conclusion can be deduced,
 with no deficiency from the two remaining premisses.
 The Sceptics, then, will say in reply that if that 440
 argument is indefinite through redundancy in which,
 when one premiss is removed, the conclusion is de-
 duced from the remaining premisses, then we must
 declare that the argument propounded in the first
 mode is also indefinite,^a namely this—"If it is day,
 it is light; but in fact it is day; therefore it is light."
 For in this the hypothetical premiss "If it is day,
 (it is light)" is redundant for the establishing of the
 conclusion, and "therefore it is light" can be de-
 duced from the clause "it is day" by itself. And this 441
 is pre-evident even of itself, but it is also possible to
 argue it from its logical relation to the latter clause.
 For they will say that "it is light" either follows or
 does not follow from "it is day." And if it follows,
 when the clause "it is day" is allowed of itself to
 be true, the clause "it is light" is also deduced, as
 necessarily following it; and this is the conclusion.
 But if it does not follow, neither will it follow in the 442
 case of the hypothetical premiss, and because of this
 the hypothetical premiss will be false, as the conse-
 quent in it does not follow the antecedent. So that,
 to judge by the logical theory stated above, one of
 two things must result—either that the argument
 propounded in the first mode is found to be indefinite,
 as its hypothetical premiss is redundant, or that it is
 wholly false because its hypothetical premiss is false.
 For to say that Chrysippus does not approve of argu- 443
 ments having but one premiss—which some, perhaps,
 will say in reply to this objection—is utterly non-

^a Cf. P. II. ii. 159.

ἔνστασιν, τελῶς ληρῶδες. οὔτε γὰρ ταῖς Χρυσίππου φωναῖς ὡς πυθοχρήστοις παραγγέλμασιν ἀνάγκη πείθεσθαι, οὔτε μαρτυρία προσέχειν ἀνδρῶν ἐστὶν ἴεις οἰκείαν ἀπόρρησιν¹ ἐκ μάρτυρος τοῦ τὸ ἐναντίον λέγοντος. Ἀντίπατρος γάρ, τῶν ἐν τῇ στωικῇ αἰρέσει ἐπιφανεστάτων ἀνδρῶν, ἔφη δύνασθαι καὶ μονολημμάτους λόγους συνίστασθαι.

444 Ἔτι κατὰ τρίτον τρόπον ἀπέραντος ἐλέγετο λόγος παρὰ τὸ ἐν μοχθηρῷ ἠρωτηῆσθαι σχήματι. πάλιν οὖν ἢ φάσει μόνον ἀρκούμενοι λέξουσιν ἐν μοχθηρῷ τιτὶ σχήματι λόγον συνηρωτηῆσθαι, ἢ ὑπόμνησιν εἰς τοῦτο παραλήφονται. καὶ εἰ μὲν φάσει ἀρκοῦνται, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀντιθήσομεν φάσιν τὴν λέγουσαν ὅτι οὐκ ἐν μοχθηρῷ ἠρώτηται σχήματι.
445 εἰ δὲ λόγον παραλαμβάνουσι, πάντως ἀληθῆ. τὸ δ' ὅτι ἔστιν ἀληθῆς οὗτος ὁ λόγος, φημι δὲ ὁ δεικνὺς τὸ ἐν μοχθηρῷ σχήματι ἠρωτηῆσθαι τινα λόγον, πόθεν δείκνυται; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐν ὑγιεὶ ἠρωτηῆσθαι σχήματι; οὐκοῦν ἵνα μὲν ὁ ἐν μοχθηρῷ ἐρωτηθεὶς σχήματι λόγος γνωσθῆ ὅτι ἐν μοχθηρῷ ἠρώτηται σχήματι, δεῖ λόγον ὑγιῆ παραλήφθῆναι. ἵνα δὲ οὗτος ὑγιῆς ἦ, ἔδει αὐτὸν ἐν ὑγιεὶ ἠρωτηῆσθαι σχήματι. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μήτε τοῦ ὑγιοῦς λόγου πρὶν τοῦ σχήματος πιστωθῆναι δυναμένου ὅτι ἔστιν ὑγιῆς, μήτε τοῦ σχήματος, ὅτι ἔστιν ὑγιῆς σχῆμα, πρὶν τοῦ ἐπικρίναντος αὐτὸ λόγου, συνίσταται ὁ δι' ἀλλήλων τρόπος, ὅς ἐστιν ἀπορώματος.

¹ ἴεις οἰκ. ἀπόρρησιν† dubia videntur: ἀπόρρησιν LE: ἀπορρησιν N: ? οἰς οἰκέα (vel οἰκοί) ἦν ἀπόρρησις.

sensical.^a For it is neither necessary to believe in the utterances of Chrysippus as though they were pronouncements of the Delphic oracle, nor to pay attention to the witness of men (who are contradicted)^b by a witness (of their own) who says the opposite; for Antipater, one of the most eminent men in the Stoic school, asserted that arguments with a single premiss can be constructed.

Again, in the third mode an argument is said to be indefinite owing to its being propounded in a bad form.^c So, once again, they will either state that an argument is propounded in a bad form by contenting themselves with assertion only or they will bring in also an argument to support it. But if they content themselves with assertion, we too will make the opposite assertion which declares that it has not been put in a bad form. And if they bring in an argument, 445 it must certainly be a true one. But how is it proved that this argument is true (I mean, that which proves that an argument has been propounded in a bad form)?^b Evidently by the fact that it is propounded in a valid form. So, then, in order that it may be known that the argument propounded in a bad form has been propounded in a bad form, a valid argument must be brought in; and in order that this may be valid, it must be propounded in a valid form. And for this reason, since neither the valid argument can be confirmed as being valid before the form, nor the form, as being a valid form, before the argument which determines it, the mode of circular reasoning, which allows no escape, is brought about.

^a Cf. P.H. ii. 167.

^b I give the apparent sense, as the Greek of mss. and Bekk. is (as Mutsch. says) hardly intelligible.

^c Cf. P.H. ii. 154.

446 Καὶ πρὸς τὴν λειπομένην δὲ διαφορὰν τῶν ἀπεράντων λόγων, τουτέστι τὴν παρ' ἑλλειψιν, ἥδη [μέν] σχεδὸν ἀντειρηκάμεν. εἰ γὰρ ἀνεύρετός ἐστιν ὁ ἀπηρητισμένος λόγος, ὡς ἀνώτερον ὑπεδείξαμεν, ἄγνωστος ὀφείλει τυγχάνειν καὶ ὁ ἑλλιπής· ἀνεύρετος δὲ γέ ἐστιν ὁ ἀπηρητισμένος, ὡς παρεστήσαμεν· τοίνυν καὶ ὁ ἑλλιπής ἄγνωστος γενήσεται.

447 Εἰ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς στωικοὺς τεσσάρων ὄντων τρόπων καθ' οὓς ἀπέραντος γίγνεται λόγος, ἐδείξαμεν καθ' ἕκαστον αὐτῶν μὴ γνωσκομένους τοὺς ἀπεράντους λόγους, ἀκολουθήσει καὶ τὸν περαίνοντα ἄγνωστον εἶναι. τούτου δὲ μὴ γνωσκομένου καὶ ὁ ἀποδεικτικὸς ἔσται λόγος τῶν ἀνευρέτων.

448 Πρὸς τούτοις ἐπὶ παντὸς ἀληθοῦς λόγου δεῖ ἐπικεκρίσθαι τὰ λήμματα (τούτων γὰρ συγχωρομένων δίδοται ἢ ἐπιφορὰ ἀκολουθῶς αὐτοῖς), ἐπὶ δὲ γε τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἀνεπικριτά ἐστὶ τὰ λήμματα, καθὼς παρεστήσαμεν· οὐκ ἄρα δυνήσεται ἀληθῆς

449 λόγος εἶναι ἢ ἀπόδειξις. τὸ γὰρ συνημμένον, ὡς ἔμπροσθεν ἐδείκνυμεν, ὑγιὲς ἀξιοῦσι τυγχάνειν ὅταν ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς ἀρχόμενον (ἐπ' ἀληθές ἢ ἀπὸ ψεύδους)¹ ἐπὶ ψεύδος λήγη ἢ ἀπὸ ψεύδους ἐπ' ἀληθές, καὶ καθ' ἓνα τρόπον ψεύδος, ὅταν ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς ἀρχόμενον ἐπὶ ψεύδος λήγη. τούτων δ' οὕτως ἐχόντων εὔρεθῆσεται ἐπὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἀνεπικριτον. ὡς ἐπίπαν γὰρ ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ τῆς προσλήψεως λήγει εἰς τὴν ἐπιφορὰν, ὡς ἔχει ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων λόγων "εἰ ἔστι κίνησις, ἔστι κενόν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔστι κίνησις· ἔστιν ἄρα κενόν." ἐνταῦθα γὰρ

¹ <ἐπ' . . . ψεύδους> add. Fabr., Bekk.: om. mss.

^a Cf. §§ 435 ff., 411 ff.

^b Cf. § 429.

The species of indefinite arguments which still 446 remains—namely, that through deficiency—we have pretty well criticized already. For if the fully completed argument is undiscoverable, as we have shown above,^a the deficient also must be unknowable; but the fully completed is undiscoverable, as we have established; so then the deficient also will be unknowable.

But if there are, according to the Stoics, four 447 modes^b in which an argument is indefinite, and we have proved that in each of them the indefinite arguments are not known, it will follow that the definite argument also is unknowable. And if this is not known, the probative argument also will be undiscoverable.

Furthermore, in the case of every true argument 448 the premisses must be approved (for when these are agreed, the conclusion is granted as following from them), but in the case of proof the premisses are not approved, as we have established^c; therefore proof will not be able to be a true argument. For, as we 449 showed above,^d they maintain that the hypothetical premiss is valid whenever it begins with truth (and ends in truth, or begins with falsehood) and ends in falsehood, or begins with falsehood and ends in truth; and is false in one mode—namely, when it begins with truth and ends in falsehood^e; and this being so, it will be found to be undetermined in the case of proof. For in all cases it begins with the 450 minor premiss and ends in the conclusion, as is the case with arguments such as this—"If motion exists, void exists; but in fact motion exists; therefore void

^a Cf. §§ 267 ff., 331 ff.

^a Cf. §§ 112 ff., 247.

^c Cf. §§ 114, 268, 331, 416.

τὸ συνημμένον ἄρχεται τε ἀπὸ τῆς προσλήψεως
 τῆς "ἔστι κίνησις," καὶ λήγει εἰς τὴν ἐπιφορὰν
 451 τὴν "ἔστι κενόν." ἤτοι οὖν πρόδηλόν ἐστι πρᾶγμα
 ἢ ἐπιφορὰ καὶ γνωσκόμενον ἡμῖν ἢ ἀδηλον καὶ
 ἄγνωστον. καὶ εἰ μὲν πρόδηλον καὶ γνωστόν,
 οὐκέτι ἀποδεικτικὸς γίνεται ὁ λόγος, ἐκ πάντων
 προδήλων συνεστῶς, τοῦτο μὲν τῶν λημμάτων
 τοῦτο δὲ τῆς ἐπιφορᾶς. εἰ δὲ ἀδηλον, ἐξ ἀνάγκης
 452 ἀνεπίκριτον γίνεται τὸ συνημμένον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ
 ἀπὸ τίνος ἄρχεται γνώριμόν ἐστιν ἡμῖν (πρόδηλον
 γάρ), τὸ δὲ εἰς τί λήγει ἀγνωεῖται διὰ τὴν ἀδηλό-
 τητα. μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι δὲ πότερον ἀληθές ἢ
 ψεῦδός ἐστι τὸ τοιοῦτον, οὐδ' ἐπικρίνειν δυνη-
 σόμεθα τὸ συνημμένον. ἀνεπικρίτου δὲ ὄντος
 αὐτοῦ καὶ ὁ λόγος γίνεται μοχθηρός.
 453 Ἐπι τῶν πρὸς τί ἐστὶν ἢ ἀπόδειξις, τὰ δὲ πρὸς
 τι ἐπινοεῖται μόνον, οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ ὑπάρχει· τοῖνυν
 καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις ἐν ἐπινοίᾳ μόνον ἐστὶ καὶ οὐκ ἐν
 ὑπάρξει. καὶ ὅτι τῷ ὄντι ἐπινοία μόνον σώζεται
 τὰ πρὸς τί πως ἔχοντα, ὑπαρξίς δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶν
 αὐτοῖς, πάρεστι διδάσκειν ἐκ τῆς τῶν δογματικῶν
 454 ἀνθομολογήσεως. ὑπογράφοντες γὰρ τὸ πρὸς τι
 συμφώνως φασὶ "πρὸς τί ἐστὶ τὸ πρὸς ἑτέρω
 νοούμενον." εἰ δὲ γε ὑπάρξεως μετείχεν, οὐκ ἂν
 οὕτως αὐτὸ ἀπεδίδοσαν, ἀλλ' ἐκείνως μᾶλλον
 "πρὸς τί ἐστὶ τὸ πρὸς ἑτέρω ὑπάρχον." οὐκ
 455 ἄρα ὑπόκειται τι ἐν τοῖς οὐσι τὸ πρὸς τι. καὶ
 ἄλλως, πᾶν τὸ ὑπάρχον οὐ δύναται ἀλλαγὴν τινα
 καὶ ἑτεροίωσιν ἀναδέξασθαι χωρὶς πάθους, οἷον
 τὸ λευκὸν χρῶμα οὐ δύναται μέλαν γενέσθαι μὴ
 τραπέν καὶ μεταβαλόν, καὶ τὸ μέλαν οὐ δύναται

* With §§ 451-452 cf. P.H. ii. 167-168.

exists." For there the hypothetical major both
 begins with the minor premiss "motion exists," and
 ends in the conclusion "void exists." Either, then, 451
 the conclusion is a fact that is pre-evident and known
 by us, or it is non-evident and unknowable.^a And
 if it is pre-evident and knowable, the argument is no
 longer probative, being composed of parts that are all
 pre-evident, the premisses on the one side, and the
 conclusion on the other. But if it is non-evident,
 the major premiss is necessarily undetermined. For 452
 what it begins with is known to us (for it is pre-
 evident), but what it ends in is not known owing to
 its being non-evident. But when we do not under-
 stand whether this is true or false, we shall also be
 unable to pass judgement on the major premiss. And
 when it is undetermined the argument, too, is bad.

Again, proof is a relative thing, and relatives are 453
 conceived only and do not really exist as well; so,
 then, proof too exists only in conception and not in
 reality. And that relative things are, in truth, only
 preserved by conception, and that they have no real
 existence, one may show by the admission of the
 Dogmatists. For in describing the relative they say 454
 with one accord: "Relative is that which is con-
 ceived in relation to another;" whereas if it had
 participated in real existence they would not have
 given that account of it but rather this: "Relative
 is that which exists in relation to another." There-
 fore the relative is not among the things that are really
 existent.—Moreover, nothing which really exists can 455
 admit of any modification and alteration without
 being affected—just as white colour cannot become
 black unless it has been converted and changed, and
 black cannot change to another colour while it re-

εἰς ἕτερον μεταβαλεῖν χρώμα μένον μέλαν, καὶ
 ὡσαύτως τὸ γλυκὺ οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο πικρὸν ἀπαθὲς
 456 καὶ ἀνετεροίωτον ὑποκείμενον. ὥστε πᾶν τὸ ὑπ-
 ἄρχον οὐ χωρὶς πάθους τινὸς τὴν εἰς ἕτερον ἀνα-
 δέχεται μεταβολήν. τὸ δὲ πρὸς τι ἀλλάσσεται
 χωρὶς πάθους καὶ μηδεμιᾶς περὶ αὐτὸ γινομένης
 ἑτεροιώσεως. οἷον τὸ πηχυαῖον ξύλον πηχυαίου
 μὲν αὐτῷ ἀντιπαρατεθέντος λέγεται ἴσον ἐκείνῳ
 τυγχάνειν, διπήχους δὲ οὐκέτι ἴσον ἀλλ' ἄνισον,
 μηδεμιᾶς περὶ αὐτὸ γενομένης τροπῆς καὶ ἄλ-
 λωιώσεως. καὶ εἰ νοήσαιεν τινα ἐξ ἄγγους ὕδωρ
 προχέοντα, ὁ τοιοῦτος ὑποτεθέντος μὲν τινος ἑτέρου
 ἄγγους λεχθήσεται ἐγγέειν, μὴ ὑποτεθέντος δὲ
 ἐκχέειν, καίπερ μηδεμίαν αὐτὸς τροπήν καὶ
 457 ἀλλοίωσιν ἀναδεξάμενος. ὥστε εἰ τῷ μὲν ὑπ-
 ἄρχοντι συμβέβηκε τὸ μὴ χωρὶς πάθους ἀλλαγὴν
 ὑπομένειν, τῷ δὲ πρὸς τι τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν συμ-
 458 βέβηκεν, ῥητέον μὴ ὑπάρχειν τὸ πρὸς τι. σὺν
 τούτοις τοῦ χωρὶς ἔστι τὸ πρὸς τι· τοῦ γὰρ ἄνω
 459 τὸ κάτω χωρὶς ἔστιν. εἴπερ δ' ὑπάρχει τὸ πρὸς
 τι καὶ μὴ ψιλὴν ἔχει ἐπίνοιαν, ἔσται τὸ ἐν τάναντία.
 ἄτοπον δὲ γέ ἔστι λέγειν τὸ ἐν τάναντία· οὐκ ἄρα
 ὑπάρχει τὸ πρὸς τι, ἀλλ' ἐπινοεῖται μόνον. πάλιν
 γὰρ τὸ πηχυαῖον σῶμα κατὰ μὲν τὴν τοῦ ἡμι-
 πηχυαίου παράθεσιν λέγεται μείζον κατὰ δὲ τὴν δι-
 πηχυαίου μικρότερον. τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν
 χρόνον καὶ μείζον καὶ μικρότερον ὑπάρχειν, τουτ-
 ἔστι τάναντία, τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐπινοεῖσθαι μὲν
 γὰρ τάχ' ἴσως δυνήσεται κατὰ τὴν ὡς πρὸς ἄλλο
 (καὶ ἄλλο)¹ σύμβλησιν, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ὑπάρχειν
 οὐχ οἷόν τε. οὐκ ἄρα ὑπάρχει τὰ πρὸς τι.

¹ <καὶ ἄλλο> Heintz.

mains black, and in the same way what is sweet will
 not become bitter while it subsists unaffected and
 unaltered. So that no real existent admits of change 456
 into something else without some affection. But the
 relative is modified without affection and when no
 alteration takes place in it. For example, when the
 stick of a cubit's length is compared with one of a
 cubit's length, it is said to be equal to it, but as com-
 pared with one of two cubits it is no longer equal but
 unequal, although no conversion or alteration has
 happened to it. And were we to conceive of a man
 pouring forth water out of a jug, if another jug is
 placed underneath this man will be said to pour in,
 but if there is no jug underneath, to pour out, although
 the man himself has undergone no conversion or
 alteration. So that, if it is an attribute of the really 457
 existent not to submit to modification without being
 affected, and the relative has no such attribute, one
 must declare that the relative does not really exist.—
 Besides this, the relative is relative to what is apart 458
 from it; for "above" is apart from "below." But if 459
 the relative has real existence and not mere conception,
 the one thing will be both opposites. But it is absurd
 to call the one the opposites; therefore the relative
 does not really exist but is only conceived. For, once
 again, the body of a cubit's length is called greater
 in comparison with one of half a cubit, but smaller
 as compared to one of two cubits. But that the same
 thing at the same time should really be both greater
 and smaller—that is, two opposites—is a thing im-
 possible. For it may possibly, perhaps, be conceived
 as such on account of the reference being to different
 objects, but it cannot be such in reality. Therefore
 relatives do not really exist.

- 460 Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' εἴπερ ἔστι τὰ πρὸς τι, ἔστι τι ταῦτο ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ· οὐχὶ δέ γε τοῦτο· τοῖνυν οὐδὲ ταύτη ρητέον ὑπάρχειν τὸ πρὸς τι. ἔτι εἰ ὑπάρχει τὸ πρὸς τι, ἔσται τι ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίον· οὐκ εὐλογον δέ γέ ἐστιν εἶναι τι αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίον· τοῖνυν οὐδὲ τὸ πρὸς τι ὑπάρχειν εὐλογόν ἐστιν.
- 461 τὸ γὰρ ἄνω τῷ κάτω ἐστὶν ἐναντίον, τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ ὡς μὲν πρὸς τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἄνω ἐστίν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ὑπερκείμενον κάτω. εἰ δ' ἔσται τρία, ἄνω καὶ κάτω καὶ μέσον τοῦ ἄνω καὶ τοῦ κάτω, τὸ μέσον ἔσται πρὸς μὲν τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἄνω πρὸς δὲ τὸ ὑπερκείμενον κάτω, καὶ ἔσται τὸ αὐτὸ ἄνω καὶ κάτω· ὅπερ ἀδύνατον. οὐκ ἄρα ὑπάρχει τὸ πρὸς τι. εἰ δ' ἄρα τὸ πρὸς τι ὑπάρχει, τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται ἄνω καὶ κάτω. διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ εἰ ἔστι, λέγεται τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ τὴν ὡς πρὸς ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο σχέσιν ἄνω καὶ κάτω. τὸ αὐτὸ ἄρα χωρὶς ἑαυτοῦ γενήσεται, ὃ πάντων ἀτοπώτατον.
- 462 Ἄλλ' εἴπερ τὰ πρὸς τι ἀνύπαρκτά ἐστι, πάντως καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις τῶν πρὸς τι οὔσα ἀνύπαρκτος γενήσεται· τὰ δέ γε πρὸς τι δέδεικται ἀνύπαρκτα· καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις ἄρα τῶν ἀνυπαρκτῶν γενήσεται.
- 463 Τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν τοιαυτὰ τινα καθέστηκεν· σκοπῶμεν δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀντικείμενον λόγον. οἴονται γὰρ οἱ δογματικοὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων λόγον τὸν ἀξιούντα μὴ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν αὐτὸν ὑφ' αὐτοῦ περιτρέπεσθαι, καὶ δι' ὧν ἀναირεῖ ταύτην, διὰ τούτων αὐτὴν ὀρίζουν. ὄθεν

^a i.e. "above" and "below" are things "apart from" each other; but they are also identical ("the same thing") since both are "relatives."

Nevertheless, if the relative does exist, there exists 460 an identical thing which is opposite to itself; but there is not such a thing; so neither in this way can we say that the relative really exists.—Again, if the relative really exists, there will be something opposite to itself; but it is not reasonable that there should be anything opposite to itself; neither, then, is it reasonable that the relative should really exist. For 461 "above" is opposite to "below," and the same thing is "above" relatively to what lies beneath it, and "below" relatively to what lies above it. And if there are to be three things, "above" and "below" and "midway" between "above" and "below," "midway" will be "above" relatively to what lies beneath it, and "below" relatively to what lies above it, and the same thing will be above and below; which is impossible. Therefore the relative does not really exist.—But if, after all, the relative does exist, the same thing will be above and below. And for this reason, even if it exists, the same thing is called "above" and "below" in respect of its relation to different things. The same thing, therefore, will come to be apart from itself,^a which is the greatest absurdity of all.

But if relatives are, in fact, non-existent, proof also, 462 being a relative thing, will certainly be non-existent; but relatives have been proved to be non-existent; proof, therefore, will also be a non-existent thing.

Such, then, are the arguments for the non-existence 463 of proof. Let us also examine the argument brought against them. The Dogmatic philosophers imagine that the argument which maintains the non-existence of proof is overthrown by itself, and that it affirms proof by the very means by which it abolishes it.

καὶ ἀντικαθιστάμενοι τοῖς σκεπτικοῖς φασίν, ὁ λέγων μηδὲν εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν ἤτοι ψιλῆ καὶ ἀναποδείκτω χρώμενος φάσει λέγει μηδὲν ὑπάρχειν ἀπόδειξιν, ἢ λόγῳ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀποδεικνύς. καὶ εἰ μὲν ψιλῆ φάσει προσχρώμενος, οὐθεὶς αὐτῷ πιστεύσει τῶν τὴν ἀπόδειξιν παραδεχομένων, ψιλῆ φάσει χρωμένῳ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῆς ἀντικειμένης ἐπισηθήσεται φάσεως, εἰπόντος τινὸς εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν. εἰ δὲ ἀποδεικνύς τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν (τοῦτο γὰρ φασιν), αὐτόθεν ὠμολόγησε τὸ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν· ὁ γὰρ δεικνύς λόγος τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις τοῦ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν. καὶ καθόλου ὁ κατὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως λόγος ἤτοι ἀπόδειξις ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις· καὶ εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἀπιστός ἐστιν, εἰ δὲ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἀπόδειξις ἔστιν. ἐνιοὶ δὲ καὶ οὕτω συνερωτῶσιν. εἰ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἀπόδειξις ἔστιν· εἰ μὴ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἀπόδειξις ἔστιν. ἤτοι δὲ ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις· ἀπόδειξις ἄρα ἔστιν. καὶ δὴ ἢ μὲν τῶν λημμάτων τοῦ λόγου τούτου παραμυθία προὔπτω ἔστιν. τό τε γὰρ πρῶτον συνημμένον τὸ “εἰ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις” διαφορούμενον καθεστῶς ἀληθές ἐστιν· ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ πρώτῳ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ δεύτερον, μὴ ἕτερον ὄν ἐκείνου. τό τε δεύτερον συνημμένον τὸ “εἰ μὴ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις” πάλιν ὑγιές ἐστιν· τῷ γὰρ μὴ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν, ἡγουμένῳ ὄντι, ἔπεται τὸ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν· αὐτὸς γὰρ ὁ δεικνύς λόγος τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν ἀποδεικτικὸς ὢν βεβαιοῖ τὸ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν. τό τε διεξευγμένον τὸ “ἤτοι δὲ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις,” ἔξ ἀντικειμένων διεξευγ-

480

Hence in withstanding the Sceptics they say: “He who states that proof is nothing states that proof is nothing either by using a bare and unproved assertion or by proving his statement by argument.^a And 464 if it is by using bare assertion, none of those who are receiving the proof will trust him when using bare assertion, but he will be checked by the opposite assertion, when someone declares that proof exists. But if it is by proving the non-existence of proof (for this is what they say), he has thereby confessed that proof exists; for the argument which proves the non-existence of proof is a proof of the existence of proof. And, in general, the argument against proof either 465 is proof or is not proof; and if it is not proof, it is untrustworthy, but if it is proof, proof exists.”—And some, too, argue thus ^b: “If proof exists, proof 466 exists; if proof exists not, proof exists; but proof either exists or exists not; therefore proof exists.” And indeed the convincing character of the premisses of this argument is manifest. For the first hypothetical premiss, “If proof exists, proof exists,” being duplicated, is true; for its second clause follows from its first as it does not differ from it. And the second hypothetical premiss—“if proof exists not, proof exists”—is also valid; for the existence of proof follows from the non-existence of proof, which is its antecedent; for the very argument which proves the 467 non-existence of proof, being probative, certifies the existence of proof. And the disjunctive, “either proof exists or proof exists not,” being a disjunctive

^a Cf. §§ 282 ff.

^b Cf. *P.H.* ii. 3, 186; also § 281 *supra*. The second premiss (“if proof exists not, proof exists”) sounds absurd, but it really stands for “if proof is proved not to exist, proof exists” as is implied in § 467.

μένον τοῦ τε εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν καὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι, ἐν
 ὀφείλει ἔχειν ἀληθές καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἶναι ἀληθές
 ὥστε ἀληθῶν ὄντων τῶν λημμάτων συνεισάγεται
 468 καὶ ἡ ἐπιφορά. πάρεστι δὲ καὶ ἐτέρως διδά-
 σκειν θι ἀκολουθεῖ αὐτοῖς. εἰ γὰρ τὸ διεzeug-
 μένον ἀληθές ἐστιν ἐν ἑχον ἐν αὐτῷ ἀληθές,
 ὁπότερον ἂν ἐκ τούτων [ἂν] ὑποθώμεθα ἀληθές,
 συνεισαχθήσεται καὶ ἡ ἐπιφορά. ὑποκείσθω δὲ
 πρῶτον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἀληθές τὸ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν
 οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶ τοῦτο ἡγούμενον ἐστιν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ
 συνημμένῳ, ἀκολουθήσει αὐτῷ τὸ λῆγον ἐν τῷ
 πρώτῳ συνημμένῳ· ἔληγε δὲ τὸ “ἐστὶν ἀπό-
 δεῖξις,” ὅπερ ἦν καὶ ἐπιφορά. δοθέντος ἄρα τοῦ
 εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν ἀληθοῦς ἐν τῷ διεzeugμένῳ, ἀκο-
 469 λουθήσει ἡ τοῦ λόγου ἐπιφορά. ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς τῆς
 παραμυθίας τρόπος καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ λειπομένου ἀξιώ-
 ματος τοῦ μὴ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν· ἡγείτο γὰρ καὶ
 τοῦτο¹ ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ συνημμένῳ (καὶ)² εἶχεν ἀκο-
 λουθοῦσαν τὴν τοῦ λόγου ἐπιφορὰν.
 470 Τοιαύτης δὲ οὐσης τῆς τῶν δογματικῶν ἐν-
 στάσεως σύντομός ἐστι καὶ ἡ πρὸς ταύτην τῶν
 σκεπτικῶν ἀπάντησις. λέξουσιν γὰρ, εἰ μὲν οὐκ
 ἐνδέχεται ἀποκρίνασθαι πρὸς τὴν πεῦσιν καθ’
 ἣν ἐπελήθουσι πότερον ἀπόδειξις ἐστὶν ὁ κατὰ τῆς
 ἀποδείξεως λόγος ἢ οὐκ ἀπόδειξις, ὀφείλουσι συγ-
 γνωμονεῖν εἰ μὴ ἔχουσι πρὸς ἄπορον οὕτω πεῦσιν
 471 ἀποκρίνασθαι. εἰ δὲ εὐχερές ἐστιν αὐτοῖς ὁ προσ-
 τὰπτουσι τοῖς σκεπτικοῖς, ὡς εὐχερές ὄν ποιεί-
 τωσαν, ἀποκρινόμενοι πότερον ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι
 λέγουσι τὸν κατὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως λόγον ἢ οὐκ

τοῦτο Kochalsky: τοῦτου ὁ mss., Bekk.

² <καὶ> Kochalsky.

formed of the contradictories “proof exists” and
 “exists not,” must have one clause true and must
 therefore be true. So that, as the premisses are true,
 the conclusion also is deduced therewith.—And in 468
 another way, also, one can show that the conclusion
 follows from the premisses. For if the disjunctive
 premiss is true when it has one of its clauses true,
 then whichever one of them we assume to be true the
 conclusion also will be deduced therewith. Let it
 be assumed that the first of its clauses—“proof
 exists”—is true. Then, since this is the antecedent
 in the first hypothetical premiss, the consequent in
 that first premiss will follow from it; but the conse-
 quent was “proof exists,” which is also the con-
 clusion. Therefore, if it be granted that the clause
 “proof exists” is true in the disjunctive premiss, the
 conclusion of the argument will follow. And the 469
 same method of argumentation applies also to the
 remaining proposition—“proof exists not”; for this
 was the antecedent in the second hypothetical pre-
 miss and, following from it, it had the conclusion of
 the argument.

Such being the objection of the Dogmatists, the 470
 Sceptics’ way of meeting it is short. For they will
 reply that if the Stoics are unable to answer the
 question in which they inquired whether the argu-
 ment against proof is a proof or is not a proof, they
 ought to be indulgent towards the Sceptics if they
 are not prepared to answer so difficult a question.
 But if what they demand of the Sceptics is easy for 471
 themselves, let them do what is easy and tell us in
 answer whether they assert that the argument
 against proof is proof or is not proof. For if it is not

ἀπόδειξιν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, οὐκ ἐνέσται ἐξ αὐτοῦ διδάσκειν ὅτι [οὐκ]¹ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, οὐδὲ λέγειν ὅτι οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος ἀπόδειξις ὅτι [οὐκ]¹ ἔσται ἡ ἀπόδειξις· ὠμολογήκασι γὰρ αὐτοὶ τὸ
 472 μὴ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν. εἰ δὲ ἀπόδειξις ἐστὶ, πάντως ἀληθῆ ἔχει τὰ λήμματα καὶ τὴν ἐπιφορὰν· σὺν γὰρ τῇ τούτων ἀληθότητι νοεῖται ἡ ἀπόδειξις. ἦν δὲ γε ἐπιφορὰ αὐτοῦ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν· ἀληθὲς ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν, καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον τούτῳ ψεῦδος, τὸ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν. οὕτω γὰρ ἀποδεικτικὸν θέλοντες ἀποδείξει τὸν κατὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως λόγον, οὐ μᾶλλον αὐτὴν τιθέασιν
 473 ἢ ἀναιροῦσιν. ὅμως δὲ καὶ τοὺς σκεπτικοὺς ἂν δέη ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἀσφαλῶς ἀποκρινοῦνται. φήσουσι γὰρ τὸν κατὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως λόγον πιθανὸν εἶναι μόνον καὶ πρὸς τὸ παρὸν πείθειν αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐπάγεσθαι συγκατάθεσιν, ἀγνοεῖν δὲ εἰ καὶ αὐθις ἔσται τοιοῦτος διὰ τὸ πολύτροπον τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης διανοίας. οὕτω γὰρ γενομένης τῆς ἀποκρίσεως οὐδὲν ἔτι δυνήσεται λέγειν ὁ δογματικός. ἡ γὰρ τοῦτο διδάξει ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθὴς ὁ κατὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως κομισθεὶς λόγος, ἡ τοῦτο παραστήσει ὅτι οὐ πείθει
 474 τὸν σκεπτικόν. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον δευκνὺς οὐ τῷ σκεπτικῷ μάχεται διὰ τὸ μηδὲ ἐκεῖνον διαβεβαιοῦσθαι περὶ τούτου τοῦ λόγου ὡς ἀληθοῦς,
 475 μόνον δὲ λέγειν ὅτι πιθανὸς ἐστίν. τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ποιῶν προπετῆς γενήσεται, ἀλλότριον πάθος θέλων λόγῳ καταπαλαῖσαι· καθὰ γὰρ τὸν χαίροντα οὐθεὶς δύναται λόγῳ πείσαι ὅτι οὐ χαίρει καὶ τὸν λυπούμενον ὅτι οὐ λυπείται, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸν πειθόμενον

¹ [οὐκ] secl. Heintz.

proof, it will not be possible to show by it that proof exists, nor to affirm that, because this argument is proof, proof must exist; for they have agreed that it is not proof. But if it is proof, it certainly has its pre- 472 misses and its conclusion true; for proof is conceived as involving the truth of these. But its conclusion was "proof exists not"; therefore it is true that proof exists not, and the contradictory of this, that proof exists, is false. For by trying in this way to prove that the argument against proof is probative they no more affirm than deny proof. Yet if the 473 Sceptics are obliged to answer on their own behalf, they will give a safe answer. For they will say that the argument against proof is merely probable^a and that at the moment it convinces them and draws them on to assent, but that they do not know whether it will still do so later on owing to the variableness of the human mind. For when our answer is framed thus, the Dogmatist will no longer be able to say anything. For either he will make it clear that the argument brought against proof is not true, or else he will establish the fact that he does not convince the Sceptic. But if he proves the first, he is not in 474 conflict with the Sceptic, since neither does the latter positively assert the truth of this argument, but merely says that it is probable. And if he does the 475 second he will show himself rash, by trying to upset another man's mental impression by argument; for just as nobody can by argument convince the joyful man that he is not joyful, or the man in pain that he is not in pain, so nobody can convince the man who

^a With §§ 473-478 cf. P .ii. 187.

476 ὅτι οὐ πείθεται. πρὸς τούτοις, εἰ μὲν δισχυρίζοντο οἱ σκεπτικοὶ μετὰ συγκαταθέσεως περὶ τοῦ μηδὲν εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν, τάχα ἂν διετρέποντο ὑπὸ τοῦ διδάσκοντος ὅτι ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις· νῦν δὲ ἐπεὶ ψιλὴν θέσιν λόγων ποιοῦνται τῶν κατὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως χωρὶς τοῦ συγκατατίθεσθαι τούτοις, τοσοῦτον ἀπέχουσι τοῦ βλάπτεσθαι πρὸς τῶν τούναντίον

477 κατασκευαζόντων ὡς ὠφελείσθαι μᾶλλον. εἰ γὰρ οἱ μὲν κατὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως κομισθέντες λόγοι μεμενήκασιν ἀναντίρρητοι, οἱ δὲ εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν παραληφθέντες λόγοι πάλιν εἰσὶν ἰσχυροί, μήτε ἐκείνοις μήτε τούτοις προσθήμενοι τὴν ἐποχὴν

478 ὁμολογῶμεν. κἂν συγχωρηθῆ δὲ ἀποδεικτικὸς εἶναι ὁ κατὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως λόγος, οὐ διὰ τοῦτο ὠφελοῦνται τι εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν οἱ δογματικοί, καθὼς ἤδη ὑπεμνήσαμεν· συνάγει γὰρ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν, καὶ τούτου ἀληθοῦς ὄντος ψεῦδος γίνεται

479 τὸ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν. ναὶ φασιν, ἀλλ' ὁ συνάγων τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν ἀποδεικτικὸς ὢν ἑαυτὸν ἐκβάλλει. πρὸς δὲ ῥητέον ὅτι οὐ πάντως ἑαυτὸν ἐκβάλλει. πολλὰ γὰρ καθ' ὑπεξαίρεσιν λέγεται, καὶ ὡς τὸν Δία φαρμέν θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων εἶναι πατέρα καθ' ὑπεξαίρεσιν αὐτοῦ τούτου (οὐ γὰρ δή γε καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ ἦν πατήρ), οὕτω καὶ ὅταν λέγωμεν μηδεμίαν εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν, καθ' ὑπεξαίρεσιν λέγομεν τοῦ δεικνύντος λόγου ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις· μόνος γὰρ οὗτός ἐστιν ἀπόδειξις.

480 κἂν αὐτὸν δὲ ἐκβάλλῃ, οὐ διὰ τοῦτο κυροῦται τὸ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν. πολλὰ γὰρ ἔστιν ἅπερ ὁ ἄλλα ποιεῖ, τοῦτο καὶ ἑαυτὰ διατίθησιν. οἷον ὡς τὸ πῦρ δαπανῆσαν τὴν ὕλην καὶ ἑαυτὸ συμφθίρει,

is convinced that he is not convinced.—Furthermore, 476 if the Sceptics had asseverated, together with assent, that proof is nothing, they might, perhaps, have been confuted by him who shows that proof exists; but as it is, seeing that they only make a bare statement of the arguments against proof without assenting to them, so far from being injured by those who establish the opposite, they are benefited rather. For if the 477 arguments brought against proof have remained uncontradicted, and the arguments adopted in favour of proof's existence are likewise strong, let us adhere neither to the former nor to the latter but agree to suspend judgement. And if it be conceded that the 478 argument against proof is probative, the Dogmatists will not gain any help thereby towards the existence of proof, as we have already shown; for it deduces the non-existence of proof, and if this is true the existence of truth becomes false.—Yes, say they, but 479 the argument which deduces that proof does not exist, being probative itself, banishes itself. To which it must be replied that it does not entirely banish itself. For many things are said which imply an exception; and just as we declare that Zeus is "the Father of both gods and men," implying the exception of this god himself (for, to be sure, he is not his own father), so also when we say that no proof exists we imply in our statement the exception of the argument which proves that proof does not exist; for this alone is proof. And even if it does banish itself, 480 the existence of proof is not thereby confirmed.* For there are many things which produce the same effect on themselves as they produce on other things. Just as, for example, fire after consuming the fuel destroys

* Cf. P.H. ii. 188.

καὶ ὄν τρόπον τὰ καθαρτικά, ἐξελάσαντα τῶν
σωμάτων τὰ ὑγρά, καὶ αὐτὰ συνεκτίθησιν, οὕτω
δύναται καὶ ὁ κατὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως λόγος μετὰ
τὸ πᾶσαν ἀπόδειξιν ἀνελεῖν καὶ ἑαυτὸν συμπερι-
481 γράφειν. καὶ πάλιν ὡς οὐκ ἀδύνατόν ἐστι τὸν διὰ
τινος κλίμακος ἐφ' ὑψηλὸν ἀναβάντα τόπον μετὰ
τὴν ἀνάβασιν ἀνατρέψαι τῷ ποδὶ τὴν κλίμακα,
οὕτως οὐκ ἀπέοικε τὸν σκεπτικόν, ὡς διὰ τινος
ἐπιβάθρας τοῦ δεικνύοντος λόγου τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀπό-
δειξιν χωρήσαντα ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ προκειμένου κατα-
σκευήν, τότε καὶ αὐτὸν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἀνελεῖν.
Ἄλλὰ γὰρ τσαῦτα καὶ περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν
λογικὸν τόπον ἐφόδων ἀπορήσαντες τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο
καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς φυσικοὺς ζήτησιν χωρή-
σομεν.

also itself, and like as purgatives ^a after driving the
fluids out of the bodies expel themselves as well,
so too the argument against proof, after abolishing
every proof, can cancel itself also. And again, just 481
as it is not impossible for the man who has ascended to
a high place by a ladder to overturn the ladder with
his foot after his ascent, so also it is not unlikely that
the Sceptic after he has arrived at the demonstration
of his thesis by means of the argument proving the
non-existence of proof, as it were by a step-ladder,
should then abolish this very argument.

Well, then, now that we have raised all these diffi-
culties regarding the doctrines which belong to the
division of Logic, we will proceed next to our criticism
of the Physicists.

^a Cf. P.H. i. 206, ii. 188.

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY

THE REV. R. G. BURY, Litt.D.

FORMERLY SCHOLAR OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

IN FOUR VOLUMES

III

AGAINST THE PHYSICISTS

AGAINST THE ETHICISTS



CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS

LONDON

WILLIAM HEINEMANN LTD

MCMLXVIII

First printed 1936
Reprinted 1953, 1960, 1968

Printed in Great Britain

CONTENTS OF VOLUME III

	PAGE
PREFATORY NOTE	vii
AGAINST THE PHYSICISTS:	
BOOK I	2
BOOK II	210
AGAINST THE ETHICISTS:	
TEXT AND TRANSLATION	384
GLOSSARY	511
I. INDEX OF NAMES	541
II. INDEX OF SUBJECTS	547

PREFATORY NOTE

THIS volume contains the two books "Against the Physicists" (commonly cited as *Adversus Dogmaticos* iii., iv., or *Adversus Mathematicos* ix., x.) and the single book "Against the Ethicists" (cited as *Adv. Dogm.* v., or *Adv. Math.* xi.). The authorities for the text are the same as those for "Against the Logicians," viz. the manuscripts L, E, and N (see Vol. I. Introd. p. xliii, and Vol. II. Prefatory Note).

The Glossary is designed to include Greek words, phrases, and usages which are technical or rare or otherwise noteworthy.

In this, as in the previous volumes, the text is based on that of Bekker, the chief deviations being indicated in the footnotes.

AGAINST THE PHYSICISTS

ΠΡΟΣ ΦΥΣΙΚΟΥΣ

A

- 1 Τὴν μὲν αἰτίαν δι' ἣν μετὰ τὸ λογικὸν τῆς φιλοσοφίας μέρος εἰς ἐπίσκεψιν ἡμῶν ἄγεται τὸ φυσικόν, καίπερ χρόνῳ τῶν ἄλλων προήκειν δοκοῦν, ἀνώτερον ὑπεμνήσαμεν· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον τῆς ζητήσεως πάλιν ἐνταῦθα συστησόμεθα, οὐκ ἐμβραδύνοντες τοῖς κατὰ μέρος, ὅποιόν τι πεποιήκασιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Κλειτόμαχον καὶ ὁ λοιπὸς τῶν Ἀκαδημαϊκῶν χορὸς (εἰς ἄλλοτριαν γὰρ ὕλην ἐμβάντες καὶ ἐπὶ συγχωρήσει τῶν ἑτεροίως δογματιζομένων ποιούμενοι τοὺς λόγους ἀμέτρως ἐμήκυναν τὴν ἀντίρρησην), ἀλλὰ τὰ κυριώτατα καὶ συνεκτικώτατα κινουῦντες, ἐν οἷς ἠπορημένα ἔσομεν καὶ τὰ λοιπά.
- 2 καθάπερ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πολιορκίαις οἱ τὸν θεμέλιον τοῦ τείχους ὑπορύξαντες τούτῳ συγκαταφερομένου ἔχουσι τοὺς πύργους, οὕτως οἱ ἐν ταῖς φιλοσόφοις σκέψαι τὰς πρώτας τῶν πραγμάτων ὑποθέσεις χειρωσάμενοι δυνάμει τὴν παντὸς πράγματος κατάληψιν ἠθετήκασιν. οὐκ ἀπιθάνως γοῦν τινὲς ἀπεικάζουσι τοὺς μὲν εἰς τὰς κατὰ μέρος ζητήσεις συγκαταβαίνοντας τοῖς ἐκ ποδὸς τὸ

* See *Adv. Log.* i. 20 ff.

AGAINST THE PHYSICISTS

BOOK I

WE have explained above^a the reason why the physical division of philosophy is being examined by us after the logical, although in point of time it seems to precede all the other divisions; and with regard to it we shall pursue again the same method of inquiry, and not delay long on particular points as Cleitomachus^b has done and the rest of the Academic troupe (for by plunging into alien subject matter and framing their arguments on the basis of assent to dogmatic assumptions not their own they have unduly prolonged their counter-statement); instead of this, we shall attack the most important and most comprehensive dogmas, as in the doubts cast on these we shall find the rest also included. For just as, in a siege, those who have undermined the foundation of a wall find that the towers tumble down along with it,^c so too in philosophical investigations those who have routed the primary assumptions on which the theories are based have potentially abolished the apprehension of every particular theory. Thus it is not without plausibility that some people compare those who join in plunging into inquiries into par-

^a The disciple of Carneades, *cf.* Vol. I. *Introd.* p. xxxiii.

^b *Cf. P.H.* ii. 84.

θηρίον διώκουσι κυνηγοῖς ἢ ἀπὸ ὀρμῆς ἀλείνουσιν ἢ ἰξῶ καὶ καλάμῳ τοὺς ὄρνιθας θηρεύουσιν, τοὺς δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν συνεκτικωτάτων πάντα τὰ ἐπὶ μέρους σαλεύοντας τοῖς λῖνα καὶ στάλικας καὶ σαγήνας περιβαλλομένοις. ὄθεν ὡς πολλῶ τεχνικώτερόν ἐστι τοῦ καθ' ἕκαστον θήραμα πονεῖσθαι τὸ διὰ μιᾶς ἐφόδου πολλὰ δύνασθαι ἀγρεύειν, οὕτω πολλῶ χαριέστερον τὸ κοινῇ κατὰ πάντων κομίζειν ἀντίρρησιν τοῦ προσελεύεσθαι τοῖς κατὰ μέρος.

- 4 Ἐπεὶ οὖν οἱ δοκοῦντες ἀκριβέστερον κατὰ τὸν φυσικὸν τόπον περὶ τῶν τοῦ παντός ἀρχῶν διατετάχθαι τὰς μὲν τινὰς αὐτῶν δραστηρίους εἶναι λέγουσιν τὰς δὲ ὑλικὰς (ὧν τῆς δόξης ἀρχηγὸς ἀξιοῦται τυγχάνειν ὁ ποιητὴς Ὅμηρος καὶ μετὰ τοῦτόν γε Ἀναξαγόρας ὁ Κλαζομένιος καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ὁ Ἀκραγαντίνος καὶ ἄλλοι παμπληθεῖς,—
- 5 ὁ μὲν γὰρ ποιητὴς περὶ τούτων ἀποδιδούς φησιν ἐν οἷς περὶ Πρωτέως καὶ Εἰδοθεᾶς ἀλληγορεῖ, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχικώτατον αἴτιον Πρωτέα καλῶν, τὴν δὲ εἰς εἶδη τρεπομένην οὐσίαν Εἰδοθεᾶν.
- 6 ὁ δὲ Ἀναξαγόρας φησὶν ἦν πάντα ὁμοῦ χρήματα, νοῦς δὲ ἔλθων αὐτὰ διεκόσμησεν, τὸν μὲν νοῦν, ὃς ἐστι κατ' αὐτὸν θεός, δραστήριον ὑποτιθέμενος ἀρχὴν, τὴν δὲ τῶν ὁμοιομερειῶν πολυμυγίαν
- 7 ὑλικήν. ὁ δὲ Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ Ἐρμότιμόν φησι τὸν Κλαζομένιον καὶ Παρμενίδην τὸν Ἐλεάτην καὶ πολὺ πρότερον τὸν Ἡσίοδον ταῦτα φρονεῖν κατασκευάζοντες γὰρ τὴν τῶν ὄλων γένεσιν ἔρωτα

* Cf. P.H. iii. 1.

^b See Homer, *Odys.* iv. 365 ff. The allegorizing (absurdly ascribed to Homer) is based on etymology (Πρωτεύς from πρῶτος, and εἰδοθεᾶ from εἶδη, "particulars").

ticals to hunters who pursue the quarry on foot or men who fish with a line or catch birds with bird-lime on a cane; whereas those who call in question all the particulars by starting with the most comprehensive postulates, they compare to men who surround (their prey) with lines and stakes and drag-nets. Hence, as it shows much more art to be able to catch a great number with a single onset than to hunt after the game laboriously one by one, so too it is much more artistic to bring one's counter-argument against all in common rather than to develop it against the particular tenets.

Seeing, then, that those who, in the department of 4 Physics, seem to have classified most precisely the principles of the Universe declare that some of these are efficient, others material,^a—and it is claimed that the originators of their opinion was the poet Homer, who was followed by Anaxagoras of Clazomenae and Empedocles of Acragas and a vast number of others. For the poet makes a statement about these prin- 5 ciples where he speaks allegorically about Proteus and Eidothea,^b calling the first and most original cause "Proteus," and the substance which turns into particulars "Eidothea." And Anaxagoras says— 6 "All things were together, and Mind came and set them in order," assuming that Mind, which according to him is God, is the efficient principle, and the mixture of homoeomerics^c the material principle. And Aristotle^d says that Hermotimus of Clazomenae 7 and Parmenides of Elea and, much earlier, Hesiod held this view; for in picturing the birth of all things

^a i.e. "things with like parts"—Aristotle's name for the material "elements" of Anaxagoras. Cf. P.H. iii. 32.

^d See Aristot. *Metaph.* I. 3, 984 b 18 ff. Hermotimus was an early Ionian physicist (date uncertain).

συμπαρέλαβον, τουτέστι τὴν κινητικὴν καὶ συν-
8 αγωγὸν τῶν ὄντων αἰτίαν, ὃ μὲν Ἡσίοδος λέγων

ἦτοι μὲν πρῶτιστα χάος γένετ', αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα
γαί' εὐρύστερνος, πάντων ἔδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰεὶ,
ἦδ' ἔρος, ὃς κάλλιστος ἐν ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσιν,

9 ὃ δὲ Παρμενίδης ῥητῶς ἀποφηνάμενος

πρῶτιστον μὲν ἔρωτα θεῶν μῆτίσατο πάντων.

10 δόξαι δ' ἄν, ὡς προείπον, καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τοιοῦτος
εἶναι· σὺν γὰρ τοῖς τέσσαρσι στοιχείοις τὸ νεῖκος
καὶ τὴν φιλίαν καταριθμεῖται, τὴν μὲν φιλίαν ὡς
συναγωγὸν αἰτίαν, τὸ δὲ νεῖκος ὡς διαλυτικὴν·

“ πῦρ ” γάρ φησι “ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γαῖα καὶ ἠέρος
ἦπιον ὕψος,
νεῖκός τ' οὐλόμενον δίχα τῶν, ἀτάλαντον ἀπάντη,
καὶ φιλότης μετὰ τοῖσιν, ἴση μῆκός τε πλάτος τε.

11 οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς δύο λέγοντες
ἀρχάς, θεὸν καὶ ἄπειον ὕλην, τὸν μὲν θεὸν ποιεῖν
ὑπειλήφασιν, τὴν δὲ ὕλην πάσχειν τε καὶ τρέπεσθαι).

12 ἐπεὶ οὖν τοιαύτη τις ἔστι παρὰ τοῖς ἀρίστοις τῶν
φυσικῶν διάταξις, φέρε περὶ τῶν ποιητικῶν ἀρ-
χῶν διαπορῶμεν πρῶτον, σκεπτόμενοι ὅτε μὲν οἷον
δογματικῶς περὶ θεοῦ, ὅτε δὲ ἀπορητικώτερον
περὶ τοῦ μηδὲν εἶναι τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον. ἀλλ'
ἐπεὶ κατὰ πᾶσαν ζήτησιν προτάσσεται ἡ τοῦ ζητου-
μένου πράγματος νόησις, ἴδωμεν πῶς εὐθύς ἔννοιαν
ἐλάβομεν θεοῦ.

they joined in introducing Love (that is to say, the
moving and unifying cause of existents); as when 8
Hesiod says ^a—

Verily first created of all was Chaos, thereafter
Earth broad-bosom'd, unshakable seat of all things for
^{ever,}
Aye and Love, who of all the immortal gods is the
fairest—

and Parmenides, when he expressly declares that 9

Love was the first of the gods whom she in her wisdom
created.

And, as I said before, Empedocles would seem to hold 10
a like view; for he enumerates Strife and Love along
with his four elements (Love as a unifying, Strife as a
disintegrating cause), saying—

Fire and water and earth, and soft air reaching to heaven,
Strife pernicious, divided from these, and evenly balanc'd,^b
Love, together with these, in length and in breadth ever
equal.

Moreover, the Stoics also, when they declare that 11
there are two principles, God and unqualified matter,
suppose that God acts and that matter is passive and
altered:—seeing then that some such classification is 12
made by the best of the Physicists, come and let us
first express our doubts about the efficient principles,
arguing on the one hand dogmatically concerning
God, and on the other hand more sceptically concern-
ing the non-existence of anything active or passive.
But since, in regard to every inquiry, the conception
of the subject of inquiry must come first, let us con-
sider how exactly we acquired the notion of God.

^a See Hesiod, *Theog.* 116 ff.

^b Lit. “equal in weight every way,” “in perfect equi-
poise,” i.e. symmetrical (like “Love” in the next line).

13 Ὁ περὶ θεῶν λόγος πάνυ ἀναγκαιότατος εἶναι δοκεῖ τοῖς δογματικῶς φιλοσοφοῦσιν. ἐντεῦθεν τὴν φιλοσοφίαν φασὶν ἐπιτήδευσιν εἶναι σοφίας, τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ἐπιστήμην θείων τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων. ὅθεν ἐὰν παραστήσωμεν ἡμεῖς ἡγορημένην τὴν περὶ τῶν θεῶν ζήτησιν, δυνάμει ἐσόμεθα κατεσκευακότες τὸ μῆτε τὴν σοφίαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι θείων καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων μῆτε τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιτήδευσιν σοφίας.

14 Ἐνιοὶ τοίνυν ἔφασαν τοὺς πρώτους τῶν ἀνθρώπων προστάνας καὶ τὸ συμφέρον τῷ βίῳ σκεψαμένους, πάνυ συνετοὺς ὄντας, ἀναπλάσαι τὴν περὶ τῶν θεῶν ὑπόνοιαν καὶ τὴν περὶ τῶν
15 ἐν ἄδῳ μυθεομένων δόξαν. θηριώδους γὰρ καὶ ἀτάκτου γεγονότος τοῦ πάλαι βίου (ἦν γὰρ χρόνος, ὡς φησὶν ὁ Ὀρφεύς,

ἦνίκα φῶτες ἀπ' ἀλλήλων βίον εἶχον
σαρκοδακῆ, κρείττων δὲ τὸν ἥττονα φῶτ' ἐδάιζεν)

ἐπισχεῖν βουλόμενοι τοὺς ἀδικούντας πρῶτον μὲν νόμους ἔθεντο πρὸς τὸ τοὺς φανερώς ἀδικούντας
16 κολάζεσθαι, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ θεοὺς ἀνέπλασαν ἐπόπτας πάντων τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἀμαρτημάτων τε καὶ κατορθωμάτων, ἵνα μηδὲ κρύφα τολμῶσί τι καὶ ἀδικεῖν, πεπεισμένοι ὅτι οἱ θεοὶ

ἡέρα ἐσόσάμενοι πάντη φοιτῶσιν ἐπ' αἶαν,
ἀνθρώπων ὕβρεις τε καὶ εὐνομίας ἐφορῶντες.

17 Εὐδήμερος δὲ ὁ ἐπικληθεὶς ἄθεος φησὶν "ὅτ' ἦν

The doctrine concerning Gods certainly seems to 13 the Dogmatic philosophers to be most necessary. Hence they assert that "philosophy is the practice of wisdom, and wisdom is the knowledge of things divine and human." Accordingly, if we shall establish the doubtfulness of the inquiry concerning Gods, we shall virtually have demonstrated that neither is wisdom the knowledge of divine and human things, nor philosophy the practice of wisdom.

Some, then, have asserted that those who first led 14 mankind and considered what is of profit for life, being men of great intelligence, invented both the fancy about the Gods and the belief in the mythical events in Hades. For, since life in old times was brutish and 15 disorderly (for, as Orpheus says,—

There was a time when ev'ry man liv'd by devouring his fellow

Cannibal-wise, and the stronger man did feast on the weaker),—purposing to check the wrongdoers they laid down laws, in the first place, for the punishing of such as were manifestly doing wrong, and after this they also 16 invented Gods as watchers of all the sinful and righteous acts of men, so that none should dare to do wrong even in secret, believing that the Gods

Cloaked in garments of mist all over the earth go roaming, Watching the violent doings of men and their lawful behaviour.^a

And Euhemerus, nick-named "the Atheist,"^b says— 17

^a Cf. for the 1st verse Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 255; for the 2nd, Homer, *Odys.* xvii. 487.

^b Euhemerus was probably a Sicilian, and lived at the court of Cassander, king of Macedonia (circa 315 B.C.). He was chiefly noted as the rationalizer of myths.

ἄτακτος ἀνθρώπων βίος, οἱ περιγεγόμενοι τῶν ἄλλων ἰσχύι τε καὶ συνέσει ὥστε πρὸς τὰ ὑπ' αὐτῶν κελεύόμενα πάντας βιοῦν, σπουδάζοντες μείζονος θαυμασμοῦ καὶ σεμνότητος τυχεῖν, ἀνέπλασαν περὶ αὐτοὺς ὑπερβάλλουσάν τινα καὶ θείαν δύναμιν, ἔνθεν καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἐνομισθησαν θεοί." Πρόδικος δὲ ὁ Κεῖος "ἤλιον," φησί, "καὶ σελήνην καὶ ποταμοὺς καὶ κρήνας καὶ καθόλου πάντα τὰ ὠφελούντα τὸν βίον ἡμῶν οἱ παλαιοὶ θεοὺς ἐνόμισαν διὰ τὴν ἀπ' αὐτῶν ὠφέλειαν, καθάπερ Αἰγύπτιοι τὸν Νεῖλον." καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸν μὲν ἄρτον Δῆμητραν νομισθῆναι, τὸν δὲ οἶνον Διόνυσον, τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ Ποσειδῶνα, τὸ δὲ πῦρ Ἥφαιστον καὶ ἤδη τῶν εὐχρηστούντων ἕκαστον.

19 Δημόκριτος δὲ εἰδωλά τινα φησὶν ἐμπελάζειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν εἶναι ἀγαθοποιὰ τὰ δὲ κακοποιὰ (ἔνθεν καὶ εὐχετο¹ εὐλόγῳ² τυχεῖν εἰδῶλων), εἶναι δὲ ταῦτα μεγάλα τε καὶ ὑπερφυῆ, καὶ δύσφθαρτα μὲν, οὐκ ἄφθαρτα δέ, προσημαίνειν τε τὰ μέλλοντα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, θεωρούμενα καὶ φωνᾶς ἀφιέντα. ὅθεν τούτων αὐτῶν φαντασίαν λαβόντες οἱ παλαιοὶ ὑπενόησαν εἶναι θεόν, μηδενὸς ἄλλου παρὰ ταῦτα ὄντος θεοῦ

20 [τοῦ]³ ἄφθαρτον φύσιν ἔχοντος. Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ ἀπὸ δυοῖν ἀρχῶν ἐννοίαν θεῶν ἔλεγε γεγονέναι ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀπὸ τε τῶν περὶ ψυχῆν συμβαινόντων καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν μετεώρων. ἀλλ' ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχῆν συμβαινόντων διὰ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις γινόμενους ταύτης ἐνθουσιασμοὺς καὶ τὰς

"When the life of mankind was without order, those who so far excelled the rest in strength and intelligence that all men lived subservient to their commands, being intent to gain for themselves more admiration and veneration, invented for themselves a kind of superhuman and divine authority, and in consequence were by the populace accounted Gods." And Prodicus of Ceos^a says—"The ancients ac- 18 counted as Gods the sun and moon and rivers and springs and in general all the things that are of benefit for our life, because of the benefit derived from them, even as the Egyptians deify the Nile." And he says that it was for this reason that bread was worshipped as Demeter, and wine as Dionysus, and water as Poseidon, and fire as Hephaestus, and so on with each of the things that are good for use. And 19 Democritus says that certain images impinge on men, and of these some are beneficent, others maleficent (whence also he prayed that he might have "propitious images"), and these images are great and gigantic, and are hard to destroy although not indestructible, and they signify the future to men beforehand, as they are visible and utter sounds. Hence the ancients, on receiving a presentation of these images, supposed that God exists, God being none other than these images, and possessed of an indestructible nature. And Aristotle^b said that the 20 conception of Gods arose amongst mankind from two originating causes, namely from events which concern the soul and from celestial phenomena. It arose from events which concern the soul because of the inspired states of the soul which occur in sleep and

¹ εὐχετο NLE: εὐχεται Bekk.

² εὐλόγῳ NLE: εὐλόγων Bekk.

³ [τοῦ] secl. Kayser.

^a Cf. Vol. I. Introd. p. xv; § 52 *infra*.

^b Aristot. *Prag.* 10 (Rose).

- 21 *μαντείας*. ὅταν γάρ, φησίν, ἐν τῷ ὑπνοῦν καθ' ἑαυτὴν γένηται ἡ ψυχὴ, τότε τὴν ἴδιον ἀπολαβοῦσα φύσιν προμαντεύεται τε καὶ προαγορεύει τὰ μέλλοντα. τοιαύτη δὲ ἐστὶ καὶ ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὸν θάνατον χωρίζεσθαι τῶν σωματίων. ἀποδέχεται γοῦν καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν Ὅμηρον ὡς τοῦτο παρατηρήσαντα· πεποίηκε γὰρ τὸν μὲν Πάτροκλον ἐν τῷ ἀναιρεῖσθαι προαγορεύοντα περὶ τῆς Ἑκτορος ἀναιρέσεως, τὸν δ' Ἑκτορα περὶ τῆς Ἀχιλλέως τελευτῆς. ἐκ τούτων οὖν, φησίν, ὑπενόησαν οἱ ἄνθρωποι εἶναι τι θεῖον,¹ τὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸ εὐκὸς τῇ
- 22 *ψυχῇ* καὶ πάντων ἐπιστημονικώτατον. ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν μετεώρων θεασάμενοι γὰρ μεθ' ἡμέραν μὲν ἥλιον περιπολοῦντα, νύκτωρ δὲ τὴν εὐτακτον τῶν ἄλλων ἀστέρων κίνησιν, ἐνόμισαν εἶναι τινα θεὸν τὸν τῆς τοιαύτης κινήσεως καὶ εὐταξίας αἴτιον.
- 23 Τοιοῦτος μὲν καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης· ἄλλοι δὲ εἰσιν οἱ φάσκοντες ὅτι ὁ νοῦς ὄξυς ὢν καὶ εὐκίνητος ἐν τῷ ἐπιβάλλειν τῇ αὐτοῦ φύσει ἦλθε καὶ εἰς ἔμφασιν τοῦ παντός, καὶ ὑπενόησέ τινα ὑπερβαλλόντως δύναμιν νοητικὴν, καὶ ἀναλογοῦσαν μὲν
- 24 *αὐτῷ* θεῖαν δὲ τὴν φύσιν. εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν γινόμενων κατὰ τὸν κόσμον παραδόξων ὑπονοήσαντες εἰς ἔννοιαν ἡμᾶς ἐληλυθέναι θεῶν, ἀφ' ἧς φαίνεται εἶναι δόξης καὶ ὁ Δημόκριτος· ὁρῶντες γάρ, φησί, τὰ ἐν τοῖς μετέωροις παθήματα οἱ παλαιοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καθάπερ βροντὰς καὶ ἀστραπὰς κερανοῦς τε καὶ ἀστρων συνόδους ἡλίου τε καὶ σελήνης ἐκλείψει, ἔδειματοῦντο, θεοὺς οἰόμενοι τούτων
- 25 *αἰτίους* εἶναι. Ἐπίκουρος δὲ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τοὺς

¹ θεῖον N: θεόν cet., Bekk.

because of prophecies. For, says he, when the soul 21 is by itself in sleep, then it takes on its own proper nature and prophesies and predicts the future. And it is in this state also when it is being separated from bodies at death. He certainly agrees that the poet Homer observed this fact; for Homer told of how Patroclus at the time of his death predicted the slaying of Hector, and Hector the end of Achilles.^a Owing, then, to these reasons (he says) men conceived the existence of some divinity, in itself like unto the soul and of all things the most intelligent. Moreover (they derived this conception) from celestial 22 phenomena also; for when they beheld the sun circling round in the day-time, and by night the orderly motion of the other stars, they supposed some God to be the cause of such motion and orderliness.^b

Such, then, was the view of Aristotle; but there 23 are others who assert that the mind, which is keen and mobile, while inspecting its own nature proceeded also to reflection on the Universe and conceived a Power superlatively cognitive, and analogous to itself but of a divine nature. And there are some 24 who have supposed that we have arrived at the conception of Gods from those events in the world which are marvellous; which opinion seems to have been held by Democritus, who says—"For when the men of old time beheld the disasters in the heavens, such as thunderings and lightnings, and thunderbolts and collisions between stars, and eclipses of sun and moon, they were affrighted, imagining the Gods to be the causes of these things." But Epicurus thinks that 25

^a See Homer, *Il.* xvi. 850 ff., xxii. 358 ff.^b Cf. Lucret. v. 1183 ff.

ὑπνους φαντασιῶν οἶται τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἔννοιαν ἔσπακέναι θεοῦ· μεγάλων γὰρ εἰδώλων, φησί, καὶ ἀνθρωπομόρφων κατὰ τοὺς ὑπνους προσπιπτόντων ὑπέλαβον καὶ ταῖς ἀληθείαις ὑπάρχειν τινὰς τοιού-
 26 τοὺς θεοὺς ἀνθρωπομόρφους. ἔννοιαι δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀπαράβατον καὶ εὐτακτον τῶν οὐρανίων κίνησιν παραγινόμενοι φασι τὴν ἀρχὴν ταῖς τῶν θεῶν ἐπινοίαις ἀπὸ ταύτης γεγονέναι πρῶτον· ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴ τις ἐπὶ τῆς Τρωικῆς καθεζόμενος Ἰδῆς εὔρα τὴν τῶν Ἑλλήνων στρατείαν μετὰ πολλοῦ κόσμου καὶ τάξεως τοῖς πεδίοις προσιούσαν,

ἰππήσας μὲν πρῶτα σὺν ἵπποισιν καὶ ὄχεσφιν,
 πεζοὺς δ' ἐξόπιθεν,

πάντως ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος εἰς ἔννοιαν ἦλθε τοῦ ὅτι ἔστι τις ὁ διατάσσων τὴν τοιαύτην τάξιν καὶ ἐγκελευόμενος τοῖς ὑπ' αὐτόν [ἐγ]κοσμουμένοις στρατιώταις, οἷον Νέστωρ ἢ ἄλλος τις τῶν ἡρώων, ὃς ἦδει

κοσμηῆσαι ἵππους τε καὶ ἀνέρας ἀσπιδιώτας,

27 καὶ ὃν τρόπον ὁ ἔμπειρος νεῶς, ἅμα τῷ θεάσασθαι πόρρωθεν ναῦν οὐρίῳ διωκομένην πνεύματι καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἰστίοις εὐτρεπιζομένην, συνήσιν ὅτι ἔστι τις ὁ κατευθύνων ταύτην καὶ εἰς τοὺς προκειμένους λιμένας κατὰγων,¹ οὕτως οἱ πρῶτον εἰς οὐρανὸν ἀναβλέψαντες καὶ θεασάμενοι ἥλιον μὲν τοὺς ἀπὸ ἀνατολῆς μέχρι δύσεως δρόμους σταδιεύοντα, ἀστέρων δὲ εὐτάκτους τινὰς χορείας, ἐπεζήτουν τὸν δημιουργὸν τῆς περικαλλοῦς ταύτης διακοσμῆσεως, οὐκ ἐκ αὐτομάτου στοχαζόμενοι

¹ κατάγων N (cj. Bekk.): κατανῶν cet., Bekk.

men derived the conception of God from the presentations received in sleep; "for," says he, "when great images of human shape impressed them during sleep, they supposed that some such Gods of human shape really existed."^a And some have recourse to the 26 unalterable and orderly motion of the heavenly bodies, and say that the first beginning of conceptions about the Gods arose from this; for just as, if a man seated on Trojan Ida had been gazing at the host of the Greeks marching along the plain in splendid order and array—

Riding first, in the van, were the knights with their chariots and horses

Next came the men on foot; ^b—

such a man would certainly have arrived at the idea that there exists someone who orders this array and gives commands to the soldiers marshalled under him, such as Nestor (or some other hero) who understood how

Rightly to marshal the steeds and the warriors armed with bucklers.^c

And just as the man who is familiar with ships, as 27 soon as he sees in the distance a ship with a favouring wind behind it and with all its sails well set, concludes that there is somebody who directs its course and brings it into its appointed havens,—so too those who first looked up to heaven and beheld the sun running its courses from east to west and the orderly processions of the stars sought for the Artificer of this most beautiful array, conjecturing that it had not come

^a Cf. Lucret. v. 1168 ff.

^b See Homer, *Il.* iv. 297.

^c Homer, *Il.* ii. 554.

συμβαίνειν αὐτὴν ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τινος κρείττονος καὶ
 28 ἀφθάρτου φύσεως, ἥτις ἦν θεός. τῶν δὲ νεωτέρων
 στωικῶν φασὶ τινες τοὺς πρώτους καὶ γηγενεῖς
 τῶν ἀνθρώπων κατὰ πολὺ τῶν νῦν συνέσει δια-
 φέροντας γεγονέαι, ὡς πάρεστι μαθεῖν ἐκ τῆς ἡμῶν
 πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχαιοτέρους (συμβλήσεως),¹ καὶ ἥρωας
 ἐκείνους ὡσπερ τι περιττὸν αἰσθητήριον σχόντας
 τὴν ὀξύτητα τῆς διανοίας ἐπιβεβληκέναι τῇ θείᾳ
 φύσει καὶ νοησαί τινας δυνάμεις θεῶν.

29 Τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς
 φιλοσόφοις περὶ τῆς τῶν θεῶν ἐνοίας ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα,
 οὐκ οἴομεθα δὲ αὐτὰ χρεῖαν ἔχειν ἀντιρρήσεως·
 τὸ γὰρ πολύτροπον τῆς ἀποφάσεως τὴν ἀγνωσίαν
 τοῦ [παντός]² ἀληθοῦς ἐπισφραγίζεται, πολλῶν μὲν
 δυναμένων εἶναι τρόπων τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ νοήσεως,
 τοῦ δὲ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀληθοῦς μὴ καταλαμβανομένου.
 ὁμως δὲ κἂν ἐπὶ τὰς κατὰ μέρος ὑπομνήσεις
 χωρῶμεν, οὐδὲν εὐρεθήσεται τῶν εἰρημένων βέ-
 30 βαιον. αὐτίκα γὰρ οἱ μὲν νομοθέτας τινὰς οἴομενοι
 καὶ συνετοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐμπεποιηκέναι τοῖς ἄλλοις
 τὴν περὶ θεῶν δόξαν οὐ πᾶν τι φαίνονται τῷ
 ζητουμένῳ προσβάλλειν. ἐζητεῖτο γὰρ ἀπὸ τίνος
 ἀρχῆς ὀρμηθέντες ἀνθρωποὶ ἦλθον ἐπὶ τὸ θεοῦς
 31 νομίζειν· οἱ δὲ διαμφοδοῦντές φασιν ὅτι νομοθέται
 τινὲς ἐνεποίησαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὴν περὶ θεῶν
 δόξαν, μὴ εἰδότες ὅτι τὸ ἀρχῆθεν ἄπορον³ αὐτοῦς
 περιμένει, ζήτησαντος ἂν τινος, πόθεν δὲ οἱ νομο-

¹ <συμβλήσεως> add. Hervetus ("sed plura exciderunt," Bekk.).

² [παντός] seclusi: πάντως cj. Rüstow.

³ ἄπορον Helntz: ἄτροπον mss., Bekk.

about spontaneously but by the agency of some superior and imperishable nature, which is God. And some of the later Stoics^a declare that the first 28 men, the sons of Earth, greatly surpassed the men of to-day in intelligence (as one may learn from a comparison of ourselves with the men of the past), and that those ancient heroes possessed, as it were, in the keenness of their intellect, an extra organ of sense and apprehended the divine nature and discerned certain powers of the Gods.

Such, then, are the statements of the Dogmatic 29 philosophers regarding the conception of the Gods; but we do not suppose that they call for refutation; for the variety of the modes of conception which they assume stamps them with ignorance of the truth; for while there can be many modes of conceiving God, that one of them which is true is not apprehended. Yet even were we to deal with the particular suggestions, none of the statements will be found to be well-grounded. Thus, for instance, those 30 who think that certain lawgivers and clever men implanted in the rest the belief in Gods do not appear at all to attack the problem. For the problem was—"from what starting-point did men set out when they arrived at a belief in Gods?"; whereas those 31 men make the irrelevant statement that certain lawgivers implanted in men this opinion about Gods, not seeing that they have the original difficulty still remaining, when someone may inquire "But how did

^a e.g. Seneca, *Epist.* 90 "sed primi mortalium quique ex his geniti naturam incorrupti sequebantur . . . non tamen negaverim fuisse alti spiritus viros et, ut ita dicam, a dis recentes"; cf. Juvenal, *Sat.* xv. 69—

nam genus hoc vivo iam decrescebat Homero,
 terra malos homines nunc educat atque pusillos.

θέται, μηδενὸς πρότερον παραδόντος αὐτοῖς θεοῦς,
 32 ἦλλον εἰς ἐπίνοιαν θεῶν; εἴτα πάντες μὲν
 ἄνθρωποι τούτων ἔχουσιν ἔννοιαν, οὐχ ὡσαύτως
 δέ, ἀλλὰ Πέρσαι μὲν, εἰ οὕτω τύχοι, τὸ πῦρ θεο-
 φοροῦσιν, Αἰγύπτιοι δὲ τὸ ὕδωρ, ἄλλοι δὲ ἄλλο
 τι τῶν τοιούτων. ἀπίθανόν τε ἦν πάντας ἀνθρώ-
 πους ὑπὸ τῶν νομοθετῶν εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ συναχθέντας
 ἀκοῦσαι τι περὶ θεῶν· ἀνεπίμικτα γὰρ ἦν τὰ τῶν
 ἀνθρώπων φύλα καὶ ἄγνωστά γε, κατὰ τὴν ναυ-
 τιλίαν δὲ τὴν Ἀργῶ πρωτόπλου τι σκάφος διὰ
 33 τῆς ἱστορίας παρειλήφμεν. ναί, ἀλλ' ἴσως τις
 πρὸ τούτων πάντων φήσει ὅτι οἱ παρ' ἐκάστοις
 νομοθεταὶ καὶ ἡγεμόνες ἀνέπλασαν τὴν τοιαύτην
 νόησιν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἄλλοι ἄλλους θεοὺς ὑπάρχειν
 ὑπέλαβον. ὅπερ ἐστὶν εὐθές· κοινὴν γὰρ πάντων
 πρόληψιν ἔχουσι πάντες ἄνθρωποι περὶ θεοῦ, καθ'
 ἦν μακάριόν τι ἐστὶ ζῶον καὶ ἄφθαρτον καὶ τέλειον
 ἐν εὐδαιμονίᾳ καὶ παντὸς κακοῦ ἀνεπίδεκτον,
 τελέως δὲ ἐστὶν ἄλογον τὸ κατὰ τύχην πάντας τοῖς
 αὐτοῖς ἐπιβάλλειν ἰδιώμασιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ φυσικῶς
 οὕτως ἐκκινεῖσθαι. οὐ τοίνυν θέσει οὐδὲ κατὰ τινα
 νομοθεσίαν παρεδέξαντο οἱ παλαιοὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπῶν
 εἶναι θεοῦς.

34 Οἱ δὲ λέγοντες τοὺς πρώτους τῶν ἀνθρώπων
 ἡγεμονεύσαντας καὶ διοικητὰς τῶν κοινῶν πραγ-
 μάτων γενομένους, πλείονα δύναμιν αὐτοῖς περι-
 θέντας καὶ τιμὴν πρὸς τὸ ὑπακοῦειν τὰ πλήθη,
 τούτους χρόνῳ τελευτήσαντας θεοὺς ὑποληφθῆναι,
 πάλιν οὐ συνιᾶσι τὸ ζητούμενον. αὐτοὶ γὰρ οἱ εἰς
 θεοὺς ἀνάγοντες αὐτοὺς πῶς ἔννοιαν ἔλαβον θεῶν
 εἰς ἣν αὐτοὺς ἐνέταξαν; τοῦτο γὰρ δεόμενον ἀπο-

the lawgivers arrive at the conception of Gods, when nobody before had given them any tradition about Gods?"—Further, all men possess a conception of 32 Gods, but not in the same way; thus the Persians, for example, deify fire, the Egyptians water, and others other things of that sort. It is improbable, too, that all men should have been assembled together by the lawgivers to hear something about the Gods; for the tribes of mankind were not mixed together but unknown to one another, and it has been handed down to us by history that, as regards voyaging, the Argo was the first bark to sail the seas. Yes, but before 33 all this, someone perhaps will say, the lawgivers and leaders of each tribe invented this conception, and on this account different peoples conceived the existence of different Gods. But this is silly; for, on the contrary, all men have one common preconception about God, according to which he is a blessed creature and imperishable and perfect in happiness and receptive of nothing evil, and it is quite contrary to reason that all men should apprehend the same characteristics by chance instead of gaining these impressions naturally. Hence, the men of old times did not accept the existence of Gods by convention or owing to legislation.

And those who say that the men who first led man- 34 kind and were the controllers of their public affairs, decked themselves with greater power and honour in order to secure the obedience of the multitude, and afterwards, when they died, were regarded as Gods,—they again fail to understand the problem. For how did the men who raised themselves to the position of Gods obtain that conception of the gods under which they ranked themselves? For this point,

35 δείξεως παρείται. ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀπίθανόν ἐστι τὸ
 ἀξιούμενον. τὰ γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν ἡγεμόνων γινόμενα,
 καὶ μάλιστα γὰρ τὰ ψευδῆ, ζῶσι μόνον συμπαρα-
 μένει τοῖς ἡγουμένοις, τελευτησάντων δὲ ἀναιρεῖται,
 καὶ πάρεστι πολλοὺς ἐπελθεῖν τοὺς παρὰ μὲν τὸν
 τῆς ζωῆς χρόνον ἐκθειασθέντας μετὰ δὲ τὴν
 τελευτὴν καταφρονηθέντας, εἰ μὴ τινὰς προση-
 γορίας θεῶν ὑποστέλλοιεν, ὥσπερ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς ὁ
 36 ἐξ Ἀλκμήνης καὶ Διός. ἦν μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὡς
 φασίν, Ἀλκαῖος τοῦνομα, ὑπέδραμε δὲ τὴν Ἡρα-
 κλέους προσηγορίαν νομιζομένου παρὰ τοῖς τότε
 θεοῦ. ὅθεν καὶ ἐν ταῖς Θήβαις λόγος ἔχει πάλαι
 ποτὲ ἀνδριάντα ἴδιον Ἡρακλέους εὐρήσθαι ἐπι-
 γραφὴν ἔχοντα "Ἀλκαῖος Ἀμφιτρύωνος Ἡρακλεῖ
 37 χαριστήριον." καὶ τοὺς Τυνδαρίδας δὲ φασὶ τὴν
 τῶν Διοσκούρων δόξαν ὑπελθεῖν πάλιν νομιζομένων
 εἶναι θεῶν· τὰ γὰρ δύο ἡμισφαίρια, τό τε ὑπὲρ γῆν
 καὶ τὸ ὑπὸ γῆν, Διοσκόρους οἱ σοφοὶ τῶν τότε
 ἀνθρώπων ἔλεγον. διὸ καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς τοῦτο
 αἰνιττόμενός φησιν ἐπ' αὐτῶν

ἄλλοτε μὲν ζώουσ' ἑτερήμεροι, ἄλλοτε δ' αὐτὲ
 τεθνᾶσι, τιμὴν δὲ λελόγχασι ἴσα θεοῖσι.

πίλους τ' ἐπιτιθέασιν αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτοις
 ἀστέρας, αἰνισσόμενοι τὴν τῶν ἡμισφαιρίων κατα-
 38 σκευήν. οἱ μὲν δὴ οὕτως ὑποδραμόντες τὴν τῶν
 θεῶν τιμὴν ἐκράτησάν πως τῆς προθέσεως, οἱ δὲ
 αὐτόθεν αὐτοὺς ἀναγορεύσαντες θεοὺς κατεφρο-
 νήθησαν μᾶλλον.

^a i.e. Castor and Pollux, sons of Tyndareus by Leda. Note
 that the Greek words here rendered by "assume" imply
 sheltering oneself or hiding one's identity (under a divine

which needs explanation, is passed over. More- 35
 over, the view thus maintained is improbable. For
 the things done by leaders,—and especially such
 things as are false,—remain unaltered only during
 the life-time of the leaders, and at their death are
 done away, and one may meet with many who
 were counted as Gods during their life-time but
 were despised after their death, unless they had
 assumed some divine appellation, like Heracles the
 son of Zeus and Alcmena. For originally, as they say, 36
 his name was Alcaeus, but he assumed the appella-
 tion of Heracles, who was regarded as a God by the
 men of that age. Hence, too, there is a story that at
 Thebes long ago a private statue of Heracles was
 discovered bearing the inscription "Alcaeus, son of
 Amphitryon, as a thank-offering to Heracles." And 37
 they say that the sons of Tyndareus ^a assumed the
 title of "Dioscuri," who likewise were reputed to be
 Gods; for the wise men of that time called the two
 hemispheres, that above the earth and that below the
 earth, "Dioscuri." Wherefore also the poet, in
 riddling allusion to this, says about them ^b—

Living on one day, dying the next, in alternate succession—
 So they exist, and honour is theirs no less than the Godhead's.

And they set caps of felt ^c upon them, and upon these
 stars, symbolizing the construction of the hemi-
 spheres. Those, then, who thus assumed the rank of 38
 these Gods somehow secured that pre-eminence, but
 those who openly proclaimed themselves Gods in
 their own right were, instead, despised.

title already recognized, as contrasted with claiming divinity
 in one's own name, see § 38).

^b See Homer, *Odys.* xi. 303 f.

^c Cf. Catullus xxxvii. 2, where C. and P. are called "pil-
 leati fratres."

39 Καὶ μὴν οἱ λέγοντες ὅτι πάντα τὰ τὸν βίον ὠφελοῦντα ὑπενόησαν οἱ παλαιοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων θεοὺς ὑπάρχειν, ὡς ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην ποταμούς τε καὶ λίμνας καὶ τὰ ὅμοια, σὺν τῷ ἀπιθάνου προΐστασθαι δόξης ἔτι καὶ τὴν ἀνωτάτω εὐήθειαν καταψηφίζονται τῶν ἀρχαίων. οὐ γὰρ οὕτως εἰκὸς ἐκείνους ἀφρονάς εἶναι ὥστε τὰ ὀφθαλμοφανῶς φθειρόμενα ὑπολαβεῖν εἶναι θεοὺς ἢ τοῖς πρὸς αὐτῶν κατεσθιομένοις καὶ διαλυομένοις θείαν προσμαρτυρεῖν δύναμιν. τινὰ μὲν γὰρ λόγου ἴσως ἔχεται, καθάπερ 40 τὸ τὴν γῆν θεὸν νομίζω, οὐ τὴν ἀλλακοτομουμένην ἢ ἀνασκαπτομένην οὐσίαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν διήκουσαν ἐν αὐτῇ δύναμιν καὶ καρποφόρον φύσιν καὶ ὄντως δαιμονιωτάτην. τὸ δὲ λίμνας καὶ ποταμούς, καὶ εἴ τινα ἄλλα συνωφελεῖν ἡμᾶς πέφυκεν, ἠγείσθαι θεοὺς οὐδεμίαν ὑπερβολὴν ἐμβροντησίας ἀπο- 41 λέλοιπεν. οὕτω γὰρ ἐχρῆν καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας ἠγείσθαι θεοὺς, συνωφελοῦσι γὰρ ἡμῶν τὸν βίον, τῶν τε ἀλόγων ζώων τὰ πολλά, συνεργοποιεῖ γὰρ ἡμῖν, τὰ τε κατ' οἰκίας [ζῶα] σκευὴ τε καὶ πᾶν εἴ τι τούτων ἐστὶ ταπεινότερον. ἀλλὰ ταῦτά γε σφόδρα ἐστὶ γελοία· τοῖνυν οὐδὲ τὴν ἐκκειμένην δόξαν ῥητέον ἰγὴ τυγχάνειν.

42 Ὁ δὲ Δημόκριτος τὸ ἦττον ἄπορον διὰ τοῦ μείζονος ἀπόρου διδάσκων ἀπιστος ἐστίν. εἰς μὲν γὰρ τὸ πῶς νόησιν θεῶν ἔσχον ἀνθρωποὶ πολλὰς καὶ ποικίλας ἢ φύσιν δίδωσιν ἀφορμὰς· τὸ δὲ εἰδῶλα εἶναι ἐν τῷ περιέχοντι ὑπερφυτῆ καὶ ἀνθρωποειδεῖς ἔχοντα μορφὰς καὶ καθόλου τοιαῦτα

Again, those who say ^a that the ancients supposed 39 that all the things which benefit life are Gods,—such as the sun and moon, rivers and lakes, and the like,—are not only defending an improbable view but also convicting the ancients of the utmost stupidity. For it is not likely that they were so foolish as to imagine that things they saw perishing before their eyes are Gods, or that they attributed divine power to things which were being devoured by themselves and dissolved. For some things, perhaps, are reasonable, 40 such as believing the Earth to be divine,—not that substance which is plowed into furrows or dug up, but the power which pervades it and its fruitful, and really most divine, nature. But to suppose that lakes and rivers, and whatsoever else is of a nature to be useful to us, are Gods surpasses the height of lunacy. For, on this showing, one ought also to believe that 41 men, and especially philosophers, are Gods (for they help to benefit our life), and most of the irrational animals (for they co-operate with us), and our domestic furniture and whatsoever else there is of a still more humble kind. But all this is extremely ludicrous; so that one must declare that the view set forth is not sound.

Nor is Democritus ^b to be credited in that he 42 explains the less doubtful by the more doubtful. For nature supplies a great number and variety of facts which go to explain how men acquired the conception of Gods; but the notion that “there exist in the circumambient gigantic images of human shape,”

^a *e.g.* Prodicus, see § 18 *supra*.

^b *Cf.* § 19 *supra*; Vol. I. *Introduct.* p. xii. “The circumambient” is the air around us.

ὅποια βούλεται αὐτῷ ἀναπλάττειν Δημόκριτος, παντελῶς ἐστὶ δυσπαράδεκτον.

43 Τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸν Ἐπίκουρον ἔνεστι λέγειν, οἰόμενον ὅτι κατὰ τὰς ἐνυπνιδίους φαντασίας τῶν ἀνθρωπομόρφων εἰδώλων ἐνοήθησαν θεοί· τί γὰρ μᾶλλον ἀπὸ τούτων νόησις ἐγίγνετο
44 θεῶν ἢ ὑπερφυῶν ἀνθρώπων; καὶ καθόλου καὶ πρὸς πάσας τὰς ἐκκειμένας δόξας ἐνέσται λέγειν ὅτι οὐ κατὰ ψιλὸν μέγεθος ἀνθρωποειδοῦς ζῶον νόησι θεοῦ λαμβάνουσι ἀνθρωποι, ἀλλὰ σὺν τῷ μακάριον εἶναι καὶ ἄφθαρτον καὶ πλείστην δύναμιν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προφερόμενον. ἄπερ οὐ διδάσκουσι, ἀπὸ τίνος ἀρχῆς ἢ πῶς ἐπενοήθη παρὰ τοῖς πρῶτον ἔννοιαν σπάσσαι θεοῦ, οἱ τὰς ἐνυπνιδίους αἰτιώμενοι φαντασίας καὶ τὴν τῶν οὐρανίων εὐταξίαν.

45 Οἱ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο φασιν ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἀρχὴ τῆς νοήσεως τοῦ εἶναι θεὸν γέγονεν ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνου ἰνδαλλομένων ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ τὸν κόσμον θεωρουμένων, τὸ δὲ αἰδιον εἶναι τὸν θεὸν καὶ ἄφθαρτον καὶ τέλειον ἐν εὐδαιμονίᾳ παρήλθε κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων μετάβασιν. ὡς γὰρ τὸν κοινὸν ἀνθρωπον αὐξήσαντες τῇ φαντασίᾳ νόησιν ἔσχομεν Κύκλωπος, ὃς οὐκ ἐψέκει

ἀνδρὶ γε σιτοφάγῳ ἀλλὰ ρίψῳ ὑλήεντι

ὑψηλῶν ὀρέων, ὅτε φαίνεται οἶον ἀπ' ἄλλων,

οὕτως ἀνθρωπον εὐδαιμόνα νοήσαντες καὶ μακάριον καὶ συμπεπληρωμένον πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, εἶτα ταῦτα ἐπιτείναντες τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐκείνοις ἄκρον

46 ἐνοήσαμεν θεόν. καὶ πάλιν πολυχρόνιον τινα φαντασιωθέντες ἀνθρωπον οἱ παλαιοὶ ἐπηύξησαν

* Cf. § 25 *supra*.

^b Cf. § 21 *supra*.

^c Homer, *Odys.* ix. 191 f.

and, in general, all such fictions as Democritus is pleased to invent for himself, is wholly inadmissible.

Against Epicurus,^a too, one may make the same 43 objections; as he imagines that Gods were conceived "in accordance with the presentations during sleep of images of human shape"; for why did there spring from these the conception of Gods rather than of gigantic men? And one may object generally, 44 against all the views set forth, that men do not form a notion of God by means of merely magnifying a creature of human shape, but by including also the fact that he is blessed and imperishable and exhibiting very great power in the Universe. But how, or from what starting-point, these qualities came to be conceived by those who first derived the conception of God, is not explained by those who attribute it to presentations during sleep or to the orderly array of the heavenly bodies.

But to this they reply that, while the notion of God 45 originated in the images presented during sleep ^b or in the phenomena of the Universe, the idea that God is eternal and imperishable and perfect in happiness was introduced by way of transference from mankind. For just as by magnifying in fantasy the ordinary man we have obtained the conception of Cyclops, who was not—

Like to a corn-eating man, but rather a peak well-wooded
High on the mountain-tops, when it loometh apart from its fellows.^c

so when we have formed a notion of a man who is happy and blessed and fulfilled with all things good, then by intensifying these qualities we form a notion of God as he who excels in them all. And again, 46 when the ancients had imagined a long-lived man

- τὸν χρόνον εἰς ἄπειρον, προσσυνάβαντες τῷ ἐνεστώτι καὶ τὸν παρωχημένον καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα· εἶτα ἐντεῦθεν εἰς ἔννοιαν αἰδίου¹ παραγενόμενοι
- 47 ἔφασαν καὶ αἰδίου εἶναι τὸν θεόν. οἱ δὲ τοιαῦτα λέγοντες πιθανῆς μὲν προΐστανται δόξης, ἡρέμα δὲ εἰς τὸν δι' ἀλλήλων ἐπίπτουσι τρόπον, ὅς ἐστιν ἀπορώτατος. ἵνα γὰρ πρῶτον εὐδαίμονα νοήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου κατὰ μετάβασιν τὸν θεόν, ὀφείλομεν νοῆσαι τί ποτέ ἐστιν εὐδαιμονία, ἥς κατὰ μετοχὴν νοεῖται ὁ εὐδαίμων. ἀλλ' ἦν γε εὐδαιμονία κατ' αὐτοὺς δαιμονία τις καὶ θεία φύσις, καὶ εὐδαίμων ἐκαλεῖτο ὁ εὖ τὸν δαίμονα διακείμενον ἔχων. ὥσθ' ἵνα μὲν λάβωμεν τὴν περὶ ἄνθρωπον εὐδαιμονίαν, πρότερον ἔχειν ὀφείλομεν νόησιν θεοῦ καὶ δαίμονος, ἵνα δὲ τὸν θεόν νοήσωμεν, πρότερον ἔχειν ὀφείλομεν ἔννοιαν εὐδαίμονος ἀνθρώπου. τοίνυν ἐκότερον περιμένον τὴν ἐκ θατέρου νόησιν ἀνεπινόητον γίνεται ἡμῖν.
- 48 Καὶ δὴ ταῦτα μὲν εἰρήσθω πρὸς τοὺς ζητοῦντας πῶς οἱ πρότερον νόησιν θεῶν ἔσχον ἄνθρωποι· ἀκολούθως δὲ ζητῶμεν καὶ περὶ τοῦ εἰ εἰσὶ θεοί.

Εἰ εἰσὶ θεοί

- 49 Ἐπεὶ οὐ πᾶν τὸ ἐπινοούμενον καὶ ὑπάρξεως μετέληφεν, ἀλλὰ δύναται τι ἐπινοεῖσθαι μὲν, μὴ ὑπάρχειν δέ, καθάπερ Ἴπποκένταυρος καὶ Σκύλλα, δεήσει μετὰ τὴν περὶ τῆς ἐπινοίας τῶν θεῶν ζήτησιν καὶ περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τούτων σκέπτεσθαι. τάχα γὰρ ἀσφαλέστερος παρὰ τοὺς ὡς ἑτέρως φιλο-

¹ αἰδίου Mutsch. (sec. Hervetum): αἰδίων MSS., Bekk.

they extended his life-time to infinity, by linking together with the present both the past and the future; and having thus arrived at the conception of eternity they went on to say that God is eternal. Those that argue thus maintain, indeed, a plausible ⁴⁷ view, but they slide gently into circular reasoning, which is the most hopeless kind. For in order to conceive first the happy man, and from him to pass on to a conception of God, we ought to have conceived what happiness is, through participation in which the happy man is conceived. But, according to them, "happiness is a certain daemonic and divine nature," and "he who has his daemon well disposed" is said to be "happy."^a So that, in order to grasp human happiness we must previously have a notion of "God" and "daemon," and in order that we may conceive God we must have a previous conception of the happy man. So then, as each of these waits for its conception to be derived from the other, it becomes for us inconceivable.

Let this, then, serve as our criticism of those who ⁴⁸ inquire how the men of a past age acquired the notion of Gods; and let us inquire in the next place if there are Gods.

Do Gods Exist?

Since not everything which is conceived partakes ⁴⁹ also in existence, but it is possible for a thing to be conceived and not exist—like a Hippocentaur and Scylla,—after our inquiry about the conception of Gods we shall have to examine also the question of their existence. For perchance the Sceptic, as compared with philosophers of other views, will be found

^a The point of this is lost in the English, as it lies in the etymology (εὐδαίμων = εὖ δαίμων).

σοφούντας εύρεθήσεται ὁ σκεπτικός, κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάτρια ἔθη καὶ τοὺς νόμους λέγων εἶναι θεοὺς καὶ πᾶν τὸ εἰς τὴν τούτων θρησκείαν καὶ εὐσέβειαν συντεῖνον ποιῶν, τὸ δ' ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ φιλοσόφῳ ζητήσῃ μηδὲν προπετευόμενος.

50 Τῶν οὖν περὶ ὑπάρξεως θεοῦ σκεψαμένων οἱ μὲν εἶναι φασὶ θεόν, οἱ δὲ μὴ εἶναι, οἱ δὲ μὴ μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι. καὶ εἶναι μὲν οἱ πλείους τῶν 51 δογματικῶν καὶ ἡ κοινὴ τοῦ βίου πρόληψις, μὴ εἶναι δὲ οἱ ἐπικληθέντες ἄθεοι, καθάπερ Εὐήμερος,

γέρων ἀλαζών, ἄδικα βιβλία ψήχων,

καὶ Διαγόρας ὁ Μήλιος καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κείος καὶ Θεόδωρος καὶ ἄλλοι παμπληθείς· ὧν Εὐήμερος μὲν ἔλεγε τοὺς νομιζομένους θεοὺς δυνατοὺς τινὰς γεγενημένους ἀνθρώπους καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων 52 θεοποιηθέντας δόξαι θεοὺς, Πρόδικος δὲ τὸ ὠφελοῦν τὸν βίον ὑπειλῆφθαι θεόν, ὡς ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ ποταμοὺς (καὶ λίμνας)¹ καὶ λειμῶνας 53 καὶ καρποὺς καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιουτῶδες. Διαγόρας δὲ ὁ Μήλιος, διθυραμβοποιός, ὡς φασί, τὸ πρῶτον γενόμενος ὡς εἶ τις καὶ ἄλλος δεισιδαίμων· ὅς γε καὶ τῆς ποιήσεως ἑαυτοῦ κατήρξατο τὸν τρόπον τούτον “κατὰ δαίμονα καὶ τύχην πάντα τελεῖται”· ἀδικηθεὶς δὲ ὑπὸ τινος ἐπιορκήσαντος καὶ μηδὲν 54 ἕνεκα τούτου παθόντος μετρημόσατο εἰς τὸ λέγειν

¹ <καὶ λίμνας> add. N, Mutsch.

* Cf. P. H. iii. 2.

in a safer position, since in conformity with his ancestral customs and the laws, he declares that the Gods exist,^a and performs everything which contributes to their worship and veneration, but, so far as regards philosophic investigation, declines to commit himself rashly.

Of those, then, who have inquired as to the 50 existence of God some say that God exists, some that he does not exist, some that he has existence “no more” than non-existence. That he exists is the view of most of the Dogmatists and the general pre-conception of ordinary folk; that he does not exist 51 is the view of those who are designated “atheists,” such as Euhemerus^b—

A hoary braggart, penning wicked books,

and Diagoras of Melos,^c and Prodicus of Ceos, and Theodorus, and a host of others. Of these, Euhemerus declared that those counted as Gods were certain men of power, because of which they were deified by the rest and reputed to be Gods; but Prodicus said 52 that what benefits life is God, such as the sun and moon and rivers and lakes and meadows and crops and everything of that kind. And Diagoras of Melos, 53 the dithyrambic poet, was at first, they say, god-fearing above all others; for he began his poem in this fashion—“By Heaven’s will and Fortune all things are accomplished”; but when he had been wronged by a man who had sworn falsely and suffered no punishment for it, he changed round and asserted that God does not exist. And Critias, one of the 54

^b Cf. § 17 *supra*; the quotation is from Callimachus (*Frag.* 86).

^c D. was a disciple of Democritus (*circa* 420 B.C.). Theodorus was a Cyrenaic (*circa* 310 B.C.), cf. Vol. I. *Intro.* p. xvii.

τυραννησάντων δοκεῖ ἐκ τοῦ τάγματος τῶν ἀθέων
 ὑπάρχειν, φάμενος ὅτι οἱ παλαιοὶ νομοθέται ἐπι-
 σκοπὸν τινα τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κατορθωμάτων καὶ
 ἀμαρτημάτων ἐπλασαν τὸν θεὸν ὑπὲρ τοῦ μηδένα
 λάθρα τὸν πλησίον ἀδικεῖν, εὐλαβούμενον τὴν ὑπὸ
 τῶν θεῶν τιμωρίαν. ἔχει δὲ παρ' αὐτῷ τὸ ῥητὸν
 οὕτως.

ἦν χρόνος ὅτ' ἦν ἄτακτος ἀνθρώπων βίος
 καὶ θηριώδης ἰσχύος θ' ὑπηρετής,
 ὅτ' οὐδὲν ἄθλον οὔτε τοῖς ἐσθλοῖσιν ἦν
 οὔτ' αὖ κόλασμα τοῖς κακοῖς ἐγγίγνετο.
 κἄπειτά μοι δοκοῦσιν ἀνθρωποὶ νόμους
 θέσθαι κολαστάς, ἵνα δίκη τύραννος ἦ
 (γένους βροτείου)¹ τὴν θ' ὕβριν δούλην ἔχη·
 ἐξημιούτο δ' εἰ τις ἐξαμαρτάνοι.
 ἔπειτ' ἐπειδὴ τὰ μφανῆ μὲν οἱ νόμοι
 ἀπείργον αὐτοὺς ἔργα μὴ πράσσειν βία,
 λάθρα δ' ἔπρασσον, τηρικαῦτά μοι δοκεῖ
 (πρώτον) πυκνὸς τις καὶ σοφὸς γνώμην ἀνὴρ
 θεῶν δέος θνητοῖσιν ἐξευρεῖν ὅπως
 εἴη τι δαίμα τοῖς κακοῖσι κἄν λάθρα
 πράσσωσιν ἢ λέγωσιν ἢ φρονώσι τι.
 ἐντεῦθεν οὖν τὸ θεῖον εἰσηγήσατο,
 ὡς ἔστι δαίμων ἀφθίτῳ θάλλων βίῳ,
 νόῳ τ' ἀκούων καὶ βλέπων, φρονῶν τε καὶ
 προσέχων τε ταῦτα, καὶ φύσει θεῖαν φορῶν,
 ὃς πᾶν τὸ λεχθὲν ἐν βροτοῖς ἀκούσεται,
 τὸ δρώμενον δὲ πᾶν ἰδεῖν δυνήσεται.
 ἐὰν δὲ σὺν σιγῇ τι βουλευῆς κακόν,
 τοῦτ' οὐχὶ λήσει τοὺς θεοὺς· τὸ γὰρ φρονοῦν
 (αὐτοῖς)² ἔνεστι. τούσδε τοὺς λόγους λέγων

Tyrants at Athens,^a seems to belong to the company
 of the atheists when he says that the ancient law-
 givers invented God as a kind of overseer of the right
 and wrong actions of men, in order to make sure that
 nobody injured his neighbours privily through fear of
 vengeance at the hands of the Gods ; and his state-
 ment runs thus ^b :—

A time there was when anarchy did rule
 The lives of men, which then were like the beasts',
 Enslaved to force ; nor was there then reward
 For good men, nor for wicked punishment.
 Next, as I deem, did men establish laws
 For punishment, that Justice might be lord
 Of all mankind, and Insolence enchain'd ;
 And whosoe'er did sin was penalized.
 Next, as the laws did hold men back from deeds
 Of open violence, but still such deeds
 Were done in secret,—then, as I maintain,
 Some shrewd man first, a man in counsel wise,
 Discovered unto men the fear of Gods,
 Thereby to frighten sinners should they sin
 E'en secretly in deed, or word, or thought.
 Hence was it that he brought in Deity,
 Telling how God enjoys an endless life,
 Hears with his mind and sees, and taketh thought
 And heeds things, and his nature is divine,
 So that he hearkens to men's every word
 And has the power to see men's every act.
 E'en if you plan in silence some ill deed,
 The Gods will surely mark it ; for in them
 Wisdom resides. So, speaking words like these,

^a i.e. one of " the Thirty " Tyrants of 404 B.C.

^b For this poem Sextus is our only authority and in several
 places the text is dubious. I follow for the most part that of
 Diels (*Frag. d. Vorsokr.* p. 571).

¹ <γένους βροτείου> add. Grotius : <ὁμῶς ἀπάντων> Diels.

² <αὐτοῖς> add. Mutsch. : <ἀγαν> Diels.

διδαγμάτων κέρδιστον¹ εισηγήσατο,
 ψευδεὶ καλύψας τὴν ἀλήθειαν λόγῳ.
 ναίειν δ' ἔφασκε τοὺς θεοὺς ἐνταῦθ' ἵνα
 μάλιστ' ἂν ἐξέπληξεν ἀνθρώπους λέγων,
 ὅθεν περ ἔγνω τοὺς φόβους ὄντας βροτοῖς
 καὶ τὰς δνῆσεις τῷ ταλαιπώρῳ βίῳ,
 ἐκ τῆς ὑπερθε περιφορᾶς, ἢ ἀστραπὰς
 κατείδεν οὐσας, δεινὰ δὲ κτυπήματα
 βροντῆς, τό τ' ἀστερωπὸν οὐρανοῦ δέμας,
 χρόνου καλὸν ποικίλμα, τέκτονος σοφοῦ,
 ὅθεν τε λαμπρὸς ἀστέρος στείχει μύδρος,
 ὃ θ' ὑγρὸς εἰς γῆν ὄμβρος ἐκπορεύεται.
 τοίους περίξ ἔστησεν ἀνθρώποις φόβου
 στοίχους, καλῶς τε τῷ λόγῳ κατώκισεν
 τὸν δαίμον' οἰκεῖν ἐν πρέποντι χωρίῳ,
 τὴν ἀνομίαν τε τοῖς νόμοις κατέσβεσεν.

καὶ ὀλίγα προσδιελθὼν ἐπιφέρει

οὕτω δὲ πρῶτον οἶομαι πείσαι τινα
 θνητοὺς νομίζειν δαιμόνων εἶναι γένος.

55 Συμφέρεται δὲ τούτοις τοῖς ἀνδράσι καὶ Θεό-
 δωρος ὁ ἄθεος καὶ κατὰ τινος Πρωταγόρας ὁ
 Ἀβδηρίτης, ὁ μὲν διὰ τοῦ περὶ θεῶν συντάγματος
 τὰ παρὰ τοῖς Ἑλλήσι θεολογούμενα ποικίλως
 56 ἀνασκευάσας, ὁ δὲ Πρωταγόρας ῥητῶς πῶς
 γράψας “περὶ δὲ θεῶν οὔτε εἰ εἰσὶν οὔθ' ὁποῖοί
 τινές εἰσι δύναμαι λέγειν· πολλὰ γάρ ἐστι τὰ
 κωλύοντά με.” παρ' ἣν αἰτίαν θάνατον αὐτοῦ
 57 κατὰ θάλατταν πταίσας ἀπέθανεν. μέμνηται δὲ

¹ κέρδιστον Nauck : ἥδιστον mss., Diels.

Most cunning doctrine did he introduce,
 The truth concealing under speech untrue.
 The place he spoke of as the God's abode
 Was that whereby he could affright men most,—
 The place from which, he knew, both terrors came
 And easements unto men of toilsome life—
 To wit the vault above, wherein do dwell
 The lightnings, he beheld, and awesome claps
 Of thunder, and the starry face of heaven,
 Fair-spangled by that cunning craftsman Time,—
 Whence, too, the meteor's glowing mass doth speed
 And liquid rain descends upon the earth.
 Such were the fears wherewith he hedged men round,
 And so to God he gave a fitting home,
 By this his speech, and in a fitting place,
 And thus extinguished lawlessness by laws.

And, after proceeding a little farther, he adds—

Thus first did some man, as I deem, persuade
 Men to suppose a race of Gods exists.

Theodorus “the Atheist,” too, is of the same mind 55
 as these men, and (according to some) Protagoras of
 Abdera ; the former, seeing that he demolished the
 theological beliefs of the Greeks by a variety of
 arguments in his treatise *Concerning Gods* ; and 56
 Protagoras, where in one place he wrote expressly—
 “Concerning Gods I am not able to say either whether
 they exist or of what sort they are ; for the things
 which prevent me are many.” And when, because
 of this, the Athenians had condemned him to death
 he escaped, and died by shipwreck at sea. Mention 57

ταύτης τῆς ἱστορίας καὶ Τίμων ὁ Φλιάσιος ἐν τῷ
 δευτέρῳ τῶν σίλλων ταῦτα διεξερχόμενος,

〈πάντων πρωτίστῳ τό〉 τε¹ καὶ μετέπειτα σο-
 φιστῶν

οὔτ' ἀλιγγλώσσω οὔτ' ἀσκόπων οὔτ' ἀκυλίστων
 Πρωταγόρῃ· ἔθελον δὲ τέφρην συγγράμματα
 θείναι,

ὅττι θεοὺς κατέγραψ' οὔτ' εἰδέναι οὔτε δύνασθαι
 ὁποῖοί τινες εἰσι καὶ οἱ τινες ἀθρήσασθαι,
 πᾶσαν ἔχων φυλακὴν ἐπιεικείης. τὰ μὲν οὖ οἱ
 χραίσμησ', ἀλλὰ φνυγῆς ἐπεμαίετο, ὄφρα μὴ οὔτως
 Σακρατικὸν πίνων ψυχρὸν πότον αἶδα δύη.

58 καὶ Ἐπίκουρος δὲ κατ' ἐνίουσ ὡς μὲν πρὸς τοὺς
 πολλοὺς ἀπολείπει θεόν, ὡς δὲ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν τῶν
 59 πραγμάτων οὐδαμῶς. οὐ μᾶλλον δὲ εἶναι ἢ μὴ
 εἶναι θεοὺς διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀντικειμένων λόγων ἰσο-
 σθένειαν ἔλεξαν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως. καὶ τοῦτο
 εἰσόμεθα ἑκατέρωθεν τὰ ἐπιχειρούμενα συντόμως
 ἐπιδραμόντες.

60 Οἱ τοίνυν θεοὺς ἀξιούντες εἶναι πειρῶνται τὸ
 προκείμενον κατασκευάζειν ἐκ τεσσάρων τρόπων,
 ἐνὸς μὲν τῆς παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις συμφωνίας,
 δευτέρου δὲ τῆς κοσμικῆς διατάξεως, τρίτου δὲ
 τῶν ἀκολουθούντων ἀτόπων τοῖς ἀναιροῦσι τὸ
 θεῖον, τετάρτου δὲ καὶ τελευταίου τῆς τῶν ἀντι-
 61 πιπτόντων λόγων ὑπεξαίρεσεως. ἀλλ' ἀπὸ μὲν
 τῆς κοινῆς ἐννοίας λέγοντες ὡς ἅπαντες ἀνθρωποὶ
 σχεδὸν Ἕλληνές τε καὶ βάρβαροι νομίζουσιν εἶναι

¹ 〈πάντων . . . τό〉 τε Diels; ὡς Bekk.; ἔσθη Ν; ὡστε cet.

is made of this story by Timon of Phlius, in the second
 book of his *Silli*,—

First of the Sophists existing then or that shall be hereafter,
 Neither in speech unclear nor dull of sight or of action,
 Protagoras; and they wished to reduce his writings to ashes,
 For that he wrote of the Gods that he knew not and could not
 discover

Who, if any, they truly are, and what is their nature,
 Giving all heed to candour. But that did profit him nothing;
 Wherefore he hastened to flee, that he might not descend into
 Hades,

Doomed to drink of that potion cold which Socrates swal-
 lowed.*

And, according to some, Epicurus in his popular 58
 exposition allows the existence of God, but in ex-
 pounding the real nature of things he does not allow
 it. And the Sceptics have declared that, owing to 59
 the equipollence of the opposed arguments, the Gods
 are existent "no more" than non-existent. This
 we shall learn when we have briefly run through the
 arguments urged on either side.

Those, then, who maintain that Gods exist try to 60
 establish their thesis by four modes, arguing, firstly,
 from the universal agreement of mankind; secondly,
 from the orderly arrangement of the Universe;
 thirdly, from the absurd consequences of the denial
 of the existence of deity; fourthly and lastly, by under-
 mining the opposing arguments.^b Arguing from the 61
 universal conception, they say that practically all men,
 both Greeks and barbarians,^c believe in the existence

* P. was condemned to death (by hemlock) at Athens on
 a charge of impiety (§ 56 *supra*). For Timon and his writings
 see Vol. I. *Intro.* p. xxxi.

^b S. deals with these four arguments as follows—(1) in
 §§ 61-74; (2) in §§ 75-122; (3) in §§ 123-126; (4) in §§ 127-136.

^c Cf. *Adv. Log.* ii. 187.

τὸ θεῖον, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο συμφώνως μὲν θύουσί τε καὶ εὐχονται καὶ τεμένη θεῶν ἀνιστάσιν, ἄλλοι δὲ ἄλλως ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν, ὡς ἂν κατὰ μὲν τὸ κοινὸν πεπιστευκότες τὸ εἶναι τι θεῖον, μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ἔχοντες περὶ τῆς φύσεως αὐτοῦ πρόληψιν. εἰ δέ γε ψευδῆς ὑπῆρχεν ἡ τοιαύτη πρόληψις, οὐκ ἂν οὕτως πάντες συνεφώνουν. εἰσὶν ἄρα θεοί. καὶ γὰρ ἄλλως αἱ ψευδεῖς δόξαι καὶ πρόσκαιροι φάσεις οὐκ ἐπὶ πλείον παρεκτείνουσιν, ἀλλὰ συντελευτώσιν ἐκείνοις ὧν χάριν ἐφυλάττοντο. οἷον τιμῶσι βασιλεῖς ἀνθρώποι θυσίαις τε καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις θρησκείαις, αἷς [ὡς]¹ θεοὺς προστρέπονται· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μέχρις ἐκείνων αὐτῶν διατηροῦσιν, τελευτησάντων δὲ ὡς ἄθεσμά τινα καὶ ἀσεβῆ καταλείπουσιν. ἡ δέ γε τῶν θεῶν ἔννοια καὶ ἐξ αἰῶνος ἦν καὶ εἰς αἰῶνα διαμένει, ἐξ αὐτῶν, ὡς εἰκός, τῶν γιγνομένων μαρτυρουμένη. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ τὴν ιδιωτικὴν ὑπόνοιαν δεῖ παραλείπειν, τοῖς δὲ συνετοῖς καὶ μεγαλοφρονοῦσιν τῶν ἀνδρῶν πείθεσθαι, πάρεστι μὲν τὴν ποιητικὴν ὄραν μηδὲν μέγα μηδὲ λαμπρὸν ἐκφέρουσιν ἐν ᾧ μὴ θεὸς ἔστιν ὁ τὴν ἐξουσίαν καὶ τὸ κράτος τῶν γιγνομένων πραγμάτων ἐνημμένος, ὡσπερ καὶ τῷ ποιητῇ Ὀμήρῳ κατὰ τὸν ἀναγραφέντα τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων πόλεμον. πάρεστι δὲ καὶ τὴν τῶν φυσικῶν πληθὺν ἰδεῖν σύμφωνον τῇ ποιητικῇ· καὶ γὰρ Πυθαγόρας καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἰωνίας Σωκράτης τε καὶ Πλάτων καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς, τάχα δὲ οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν κήπων, ὡς αἱ ῥηταὶ τοῦ Ἐπικούρου λέξεις μαρ-

of the Divine, and because of this they agree in sacrificing and in praying and in setting up shrines for the Gods; and some do this in one way, some in another, as though all of them in common believed in the existence of some Divinity, but did not possess the same preconception regarding its nature. But if this preconception had been false, they would not all have agreed in this way; therefore Gods exist. And besides, false opinions and temporary appearances do not survive longer but come to an end together with the persons for whose sakes they were retained. For example, men honour kings with sacrifices and with all the other religious rites with which they worship the Gods; but they observe these practices only so long as the kings themselves are there, and when they are dead they give them up as being illegal and impious. But the conception of the Gods has existed from eternity and persists unto eternity, as it probably derives its evidence from the very facts of existence. —Moreover, even if one ought to pass over the belief of the ordinary man and put one's trust in men who are clever and most highly gifted, one may see how poetry produces no great or brilliant work in which God is not the person invested with authority and power over the events which take place,—even as he was by the poet Homer in the war he described between the Greeks and barbarians. And one may also see the host of the Physicists in accord with poetry; for Pythagoras and Empedocles and the Ionians and Socrates and Plato and Aristotle and the Stoics, and perhaps "the Garden philosophers"^a too (as the express statements of Epicurus testify), allow

¹ [ὡς] om. Hervetus (καὶ cj. Bekk.).

^a i.e. the Epicureans, so called from the garden at Athens in which Epicurus established his school of philosophy.

65 τυροῦσι, θεὸν ἀπολείπουσιν. ὥσπερ οὖν εἰ περὶ τινος τῶν ὑπὸ τὴν ὄρασιν πιπτόντων ἐζητοῦμεν, εὐλόγως ἂν τοῖς ὀξυωπεστάτοις ἐπιστεύομεν, καὶ εἰ περὶ τινος τῶν ἀκουσῶν, τοῖς ὀξυηκουστάτοις, οὕτω σκεπτόμενοι περὶ τῶν λόγῳ θεωρουμένων οὐκ ἄλλοις τισὶ πιστεύειν ὀφείλομεν ἢ τοῖς τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὸν λόγον ὀξυωποῦσιν, ὁποῖοί τινες ἦσαν οἱ φιλόσοφοι.

66 Ἄλλ' εἰώθασιν ἀνθυποφέροντες πρὸς τοῦτο λέγειν οἱ ἐξ ἐναντίας ὅτι καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν ἄδου μυθεομένων κοινὴν ἔννοιαν ἔχουσιν ἅπαντες ἀνθρώποι καὶ συμφώνους ἔχουσιν τοὺς ποιητάς, καὶ μᾶλλον γε περὶ τούτων ἢ περὶ τῶν θεῶν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν εἴπομεν ταῖς ἀληθείαις ὑπάρχειν τὰ καθ' ἄδου μυθεύμενα, μὴ συνιέντες πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι οὐ μόνον τὰ καθ' ἄδου πλαττόμενα ἀλλὰ καὶ κοινῶς πάντα μῦθον μάχην περιεσχηκέναι συμβέβηκε καὶ ἀδύνατον εἶναι. οἶον ἦν

καὶ Τιτυὸν εἶδον, Γαίης ἐρικυδέος υἱόν,
κείμενον ἐν δαπέδῳ· ὁ δ' ἐπ' ἐννέα κείτο πέλεθρα,
γῦπε δέ μιν ἐκάτερθε παρημένω ἦπαρ ἔκειρον,
δέρτρων ἔσω δύνοντες· ὁ δ' οὐκ ἀπαμύνετο χερσίν·
Λητῶ γὰρ ἦσχυνε Διὸς κυδρὴν παράκοιτιν.

68 εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἄψυχος ἦν ὁ Τιτυός, πῶς οὐδεμίαν συναίσθησιν ἔχων ὑπὸ τιμωρίαν ἐπιπτεν; εἰ δὲ 69 εἶχε ψυχὴν, πῶς τετελευτήκει; καὶ πάλιν ὅταν λέγηται

καὶ μὴν Τάνταλον εἰσείδον κρατέρ' ἄλγε' ἔχοντα,
ἔσταότ' ἐν λίμνῃ· ἢ δὲ προσέκλυζε γενεῖω.

¹ περὶ N, Mutsch.: ὅτι Bekk.

God's existence. Therefore, just as, if we had been 65 inquiring about something which is perceived by sight, it would have been reasonable for us to have trusted those who have the sharpest sight, and if it had been about something audible, those of the sharpest hearing,—so also, when we are examining one of the things observed by reason we ought to trust none except those who are sharp of sight in mind and reason, such as were the philosophers.

But in reply to this those of the opposite side are 66 accustomed to argue that all men have a common conception about the legendary doings in Hades as well, and have the poets in agreement with them; and even more so about these things than about the Gods; yet we would not assert that the legendary doings in Hades are real facts, through failing to 67 understand, in the first place, that not only the fictions about Hades but, in general, every legend is such as to contain conflicting elements and to be impossible; as, for instance—

Tityus, too, I beheld, the glorious Earth-mother's offspring,
Lying flat on the ground; nine roods did he cover extended;
Vultures twain sat on either side and tore at his liver,
Plunged in his inward parts; with his hands he could not
repel them:
Seeing he shamed the consort of Zeus, illustrious Leto.*

For if Tityus was lifeless, how was he under punish- 68 ment when he possessed no consciousness? And if he possessed life, how was he dead? And again, 69 when it is related b—

Tantalus, too, I beheld with mine eyes in agonies grievous
Standing within a lake; and up to his chin came the water;

* Homer, *Odys.* xi. 576 ff.; cf. Lucret. iii. 996 ff.

b Homer, *Odys.* xi. 582 ff.

στυπτό τε διψάων, πείειν δ' οὐκ εἶχεν ἐλέσθαι·
 ὄσασακι γὰρ κύψει' ὁ γέρων πείειν μενεαίνων,
 τοσσάχ' ὕδωρ ἀπολέσκειτ' ἀναβροχέν, ἀμφὶ δὲ
 ποσσὶν
 γαῖα μέλαινα φάνεσκε, καταζήνασκε δὲ δαίμων.

70 εἰ γὰρ μήποτε ὑγροῦ καὶ τροφῆς ἐγεύετο, πῶς
 διέμενεν ἀλλ' οὐ σπάνει τῶν ἀναγκαίων διεφθείρετο;
 εἰ δὲ ἀθάνατος ἦν, πῶς τοιοῦτος ἐστίν; μάχεται
 γὰρ ἀθάνατος φύσις ἀληθῶσι καὶ βασιάνοις,
 71 ἐπέπερ πᾶν τὸ ἀλγοῦν θηητόν ἐστιν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ
 ὁ μὲν μῦθος οὕτως ἐν αὐτῷ τὸν ἔλεγχον περιείχεν,
 ἡ δὲ περὶ θεῶν ὑπόληψις οὐ τοιαύτη τις ἐστίν,
 οὐδὲ μάχην ὑπέβαλλεν, ἀλλὰ σύμφωνος τοῖς γιγνο-
 μένοις ἐφαίνετο. καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ τὰς ψυχὰς ἐνεστιν
 ὑπονοῆσαι κάτω φερομένας· λεπτομερεῖς γὰρ
 οὔσαι καὶ οὐχ ἦττον πυρώδεις ἢ πνευματώδεις εἰς
 72 τοὺς ἄνω μᾶλλον τόπους κουφοφοροῦσιν. καὶ καθ'
 αὐτὰς δὲ διαμένουσι καὶ οὐχ, ὡς ἔλεγεν ὁ Ἐπί-
 κουρος, ἀπολυθεῖσαι τῶν σωματικῶν καπνοῦ δίκην
 σκίδναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ πρότερον τὸ σῶμα διακρατη-
 τικὸν ἦν αὐτῶν, ἀλλ' αὐταὶ τῷ σώματι συμμονῆς
 73 ἦσαν αἰτιαί, πολὺ δὲ πρότερον καὶ ἑαυταῖς. ἔκ-
 σκηνοὶ γοῦν ἡλίου γενόμεναι τὸν ὑπὸ σελήνην
 οἰκοῦσι τόπον, ἐνθάδε τε διὰ τὴν εἰλικρίνειαν τοῦ
 ἀέρος πλείονα πρὸς διαμονὴν λαμβάνουσι χρόνον,
 τροφῇ τε χρῶνται οἰκεία τῇ ἀπὸ γῆς ἀναθυμιάσει
 ὡς καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἄστρα, τὸ διαλύσόν τε αὐτὰς ἐν
 74 ἐκείνοις τοῖς τόποις οὐκ ἔχουσιν. εἰ οὖν δια-
 μένουσιν αἱ ψυχαί, δαίμοσιν αἱ αὐταὶ γίνονται· εἰ

Thirsty he stood, nor could he attain to reach it and drink it;
 Nay, for as oft as the old man stoop'd desirous of drinking
 Just so oft did the wave surge back; and close to his foot-
 prints
 Black did the earth appear, so parch'd was it made by the
 Daemon.

For if he never tasted drink or food how did he 70
 survive and not perish through lack of necessary
 sustenance? And if he was immortal, how is he
 in the state described? For an immortal nature
 is inconsistent with pains and torments, since every-
 thing that suffers pain is mortal. But, (retort the 71
 Stoics,) whereas the myth does thus contain within
 itself its own refutation, the conception of Gods
 is not of this kind, nor does it introduce inconsis-
 tency, but is evidently in accord with facts. Nor,
 indeed, is it possible to suppose that souls move
 downwards; for since they are of fine particles, and
 no less of a fiery than of a vaporous nature, they
 rather soar lightly to the upper regions. Also, they 72
 persist as they are in themselves, and are not (as
 Epicurus said) "dispersed like smoke when released
 from their bodies."^a For before that it was not the
 body that was in control of them, but it was they that
 were the causes of the body's conjoined existence
 and, much more, of their own. For having quitted 73
 the sphere of the sun^b they inhabit the region below
 the moon, and there because of the pureness of the
 air they continue to remain for a long time, and for
 their sustenance they use the steam which rises from
 the earth, as do the rest of the stars,^b and in those
 regions they have nothing to dissolve them. If, 74
 then, souls persist, they are the same as daemons;

^a Cf. Lucret. iii. 437 f., 457 f.

^b This was a Stoic theory, cf. Cicero, *Nat. D.* ii. 15.

δὲ δαίμονες εἰσι, ρήτέον καὶ θεοὺς ὑπάρχειν, μηδὲν αὐτῶν τὴν ὑπαρξίν βλαπτούσης τῆς περὶ τῶν ἐν αἴθρι μυθευομένων προλήψεως.

75 Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ τῆς κοινῆς καὶ συμφώνου οἰήσεως τοῦ θεοῦ λόγος ἐστὶ τοιοῦτος· σκοπῶμεν δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ περιέχοντος διακοσμήσεως. ἡ τοῖνυν τῶν ὄντων οὐσία, φασίν, ἀκίνητος οὐσα ἐξ αὐτῆς καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος ὑπὸ τινος αἰτίας ὀφείλει κινεῖσθαι τε καὶ σχηματίζεσθαι· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, ὡς χαλκούργημα περικαλλῆς θεασάμενοι ποθοῦμεν μαθεῖν τὸν τεχνίτην ἅτε καθ' αὐτὴν τῆς ὕλης ἀκινήτου καθεστῶσης, οὕτω καὶ τὴν τῶν ὄλων ὕλην θεωροῦντες κινουμένην καὶ ἐν μορφῇ τε καὶ διακοσμήσει τυγχάνουσαν εὐλόγως ἂν σκεπτοίμεθα τὸ κινεῖν αὐτὴν καὶ πολυειδῶς μορφοῦν αἴτιον.

76 τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἄλλο τι πιθανόν ἐστὶν εἶναι ἢ δυνάμιν τινα δι' αὐτῆς πεφοίτηκυῖαν, καθάπερ ἡμῖν ψυχῇ πεφοίτηκεν. αὕτη οὖν ἡ δύναμις ἥτοι αὐτοκίνητος ἐστὶν ἢ ὑπὸ ἄλλης κινεῖται δυνάμεως. καὶ εἰ μὲν ὑφ' ἑτέρας κινεῖται, τὴν ἑτέραν ἀδύνατον ἐσται¹ κινεῖσθαι μὴ ὑπ' ἄλλης κινουμένην, ὅπερ ἄτοπον. ἔστι τις ἄρα καθ' ἑαυτὴν αὐτοκίνητος δύναμις, ἥτις ἂν εἴη θεία καὶ αἰδιος. ἢ γὰρ ἐξ αἰῶνος κινήσεται ἢ ἀπὸ τινος χρόνου. ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τινος χρόνου μὲν οὐ κινήσεται· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται τις αἰτία τοῦ ἀπὸ τινος αὐτὴν χρόνου κινεῖσθαι. αἰδιος τοῖνυν ἐστὶν ἢ κινουσα τὴν ὕλην δύναμις καὶ τεταγμένως αὐτὴν εἰς γενέσεις καὶ μεταβολὰς ἄγουσα. ὥστε θεὸς ἂν

77 εἴη αὕτη. καὶ ἔτι τὸ γεννητικὸν λογικοῦ καὶ φρονίμου πάντως καὶ αὐτὸ λογικόν ἐστὶ καὶ

¹ ἔσται N, Mutsch.: εἶναι Bekk.

and if daemons exist, one must declare also that Gods exist, their existence being in no wise hindered by the preconception about the legendary doings in Hades.

Such, then, is the argument from the general and unanimous opinion about God; and let us also consider that which is based on the orderly arrangement of the Universe. The substance of existing things being of itself, they say, motionless and shapeless must be put in motion and shape by some cause; and on account of this just as, when we behold some very beautiful piece of bronze-work, we are anxious to know who the craftsman is, since the material is of itself motionless, so also when we behold the matter of the Universe moving and existing in definite shape and orderly arrangement we shall naturally look for the cause which moves it and shapes it into various forms. And it is probable that this is nothing else than some power which pervades it, even as our soul pervades ourselves. This power, then, is either self-moving or moved by some other power. And if it is moved by another power, it will not be possible for that other to be moved unless it is moved by a further power; which is absurd. There exists, therefore, a power which is of itself self-moving, and this will be divine and eternal. For either it will be in motion from eternity or from some definite point of time. But it will not be in motion from a point of time; for there will exist no cause of its motion from a given point of time. So then, the power which moves matter and subjects it to ordered forms of generation and change is eternal. Consequently this power will be God.—Moreover, that which generates what is rational and wise is certainly itself both rational and wise;

φρόνιμον· ἡ δὲ γε προειρημένη δύναμις ἀνθρώπους
πέφυκε κατασκευάζειν· λογικὴ τοίνυν καὶ φρονίμη
γενήσεται, ὅπερ ἦν θείας φύσεως. εἰσὶν ἄρα θεοί.
78 τῶν τε σωματίων τὰ μὲν ἔστιν ἡνωμένα τὰ δὲ
ἐκ συναπτομένων τὰ δὲ ἐκ διεστώτων. ἡνωμένα
μὲν οὖν ἔστι τὰ ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἕξεως κρατούμενα
καθάπερ φυτὰ καὶ ζῶα, ἐκ συναπτομένων δὲ τὰ
ἐκ τε παρακειμένων καὶ πρὸς ἓν τι κεφάλαιον
νεύοντων συνεστώτα ὡς ἀλύσεις καὶ πυργίσκοι καὶ
νῆες, ἐκ διεστώτων δὲ τὰ ἐκ διεζευγμένων καὶ [ἐκ]
79 κειμένων ὡς στρατιαὶ καὶ ποιμναὶ καὶ χοροί. ἐπεὶ
οὖν καὶ ὁ κόσμος σῶμά ἐστιν, ἦτοι ἡνωμένον ἔστι
σῶμα ἢ ἐκ συναπτομένων ἢ ἐκ διεστώτων. οὔτε
δὲ ἐκ συναπτομένων οὔτε ἐκ διεστώτων, ὡς
δείκνυμεν ἐκ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν συμπαθειῶν. κατὰ
γὰρ τὰς τῆς σελήνης ἀυξήσεις καὶ φθίσεις πολλὰ
τῶν τε ἐπιγείων ζώων καὶ θαλασσίων φθίνει τε
καὶ αὐξεται, ἀμπώτεις τε καὶ πλημμυρίδες περὶ
τινα μέρη τῆς θαλάσσης γίνονται. ὡσαύτως δὲ
καὶ κατὰ τινὰς τῶν ἀστέρων ἐπιτολὰς καὶ δύσεις
μεταβολαὶ τοῦ περιέχοντος καὶ παμποίκιοι περὶ
τὸν ἀέρα τροπαὶ συμβαίνουσιν, ὅτε μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ
κρεῖττον ὅτε δὲ λοιμικῶς. ἐξ ὧν συμφανὲς ὅτι
80 ἡνωμένον τι σῶμα καθέστηκεν ὁ κόσμος. ἐπὶ μὲν
γὰρ τῶν ἐκ συναπτομένων ἢ διεστώτων οὐ συμ-
πάσχει τὰ μέρη ἀλλήλοις, εἴγε ἐν στρατιᾷ πάντων,
εἰ τύχοι, διαφθαρέντων τῶν στρατιωτῶν οὐδὲν
κατὰ διάδοσιν πάσχειν φαίνεται ὁ περιωθειῶν· ἐπὶ

but the aforementioned power is of such a nature as to construct men; therefore it will be rational and wise, and this is the mark of a divine nature. Gods, therefore, exist.—Of bodies, too, some are unified, some 78 formed of things conjoined, some of separate things. Unified^a bodies are such as are controlled by a single “attraction,”^b such as plants and animals; those formed of conjoined parts are such as are composed of adjacent elements which tend to combine into one main structure, like cables and turrets and ships; those formed of separate things are such as are compounded of things which are disjoined and isolated and existing by themselves, like armies and flocks and choruses. Seeing, then, that the Universe also is a body, it is 79 either unified or of conjoined or separate parts. But it is neither of conjoined nor of separate parts, as we prove from the “sympathies” it exhibits. For in accordance with the waxings and wanings of the moon many sea and land animals wane and wax, and ebb-tides and flood-tides occur in some parts of the sea. And in the same way, too, in accordance with certain risings and settings of the stars alterations in the surrounding atmosphere and all varieties of change in the air take place, sometimes for the better, but sometimes fraught with pestilence. And from these facts it is obvious that the Universe is a unified body. For in the case of bodies formed from 80 conjoined or separate elements the parts do not “sympathize” with one another, since if all the soldiers, say, in an army have perished (save one) the one who survives is not seen to suffer at all through transmission; but in the case of unified

* Cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 102.

^b For the Stoic use of *ἕξις*, “attraction” (lit. “holding”);

to denote the principle of cohesion and unity in things inorganic see §§ 81 ff. *infra*; cf. Vol. I. *Intro.* p. xxv.

δὲ τῶν ἠνωμένων συμπάθειά τις ἔστιν, εἶγε δα-
 κτύλου τεμνομένου τὸ ὄλον συνδιατίθεται σῶμα.
 ἠνωμένον τοίνυν ἐστὶ σῶμα καὶ ὁ κόσμος.
 81 ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τῶν ἠνωμένων σωμάτων τὰ μὲν ὑπὸ
 ψιλῆς ἕξεως συνέχεται τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ φύσεως τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ
 ψυχῆς, καὶ ἕξεως μὲν ὡς λίθοι καὶ ξύλα, φύσεως
 δὲ καθάπερ τὰ φυτὰ, ψυχῆς δὲ τὰ ζῶα, πάντως δὴ
 82 καὶ ὁ κόσμος ὑπὸ τίνος τούτων διακρατεῖται. καὶ
 ὑπὸ μὲν ψιλῆς ἕξεως οὐκ ἂν συνέχοιτο. τὰ γὰρ
 ὑπὸ ἕξεως κρατούμενα οὐδεμίαν ἀξιόλογον μετα-
 βολὴν τε καὶ τροπὴν ἀναδέχεται, καθάπερ ξύλα
 καὶ λίθοι, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐξ αὐτῶν πάσχει τὴν κατὰ
 83 ἄνεσιν καὶ τὴν κατὰ συμπίεσμον διάθεσιν. ὁ δὲ
 κόσμος ἀξιολόγους ἀναδέχεται μεταβολάς, ὅτε μὲν
 κρυμαλέου τοῦ περιέχοντος γιγνομένου ὅτε δὲ
 ἄλειου, καὶ ὅτε μὲν αὐχμῶδους ὅτε δὲ νοτεροῦ,
 ὅτε δὲ ἄλλως πως κατὰ τὰς τῶν οὐρανίων κινήσεις
 ἕτεροιομένου. οὐ τοίνυν ὑπὸ ψιλῆς ἕξεως ὁ
 84 κόσμος συνέχεται. εἰ δὲ μὴ ὑπὸ ταύτης, πάντως
 ὑπὸ φύσεως· καὶ γὰρ τὰ ὑπὸ ψυχῆς διακρατούμενα
 πολὺ πρότερον ὑπὸ φύσεως συνείχετο. ἀνάγκη
 ἄρα ὑπὸ τῆς ἀρίστης αὐτὸν φύσεως συνέχεσθαι,
 ἐπεὶ καὶ περιέχει τὰς πάντων φύσεις. ἡ δὲ γε τὰς
 πάντων περιέχουσα φύσις καὶ τὰς λογικὰς περι-
 85 ἔσχηκεν. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ τὰς λογικὰς περιέχουσα
 φύσις πάντως ἐστὶ λογική· οὐ γὰρ οἷον τε τὸ ὄλον
 τοῦ μέρους χεῖρον εἶναι. ἀλλ' εἰ ἀρίστη ἐστὶ
 φύσις ἡ τὸν κόσμον διοικοῦσα, νοερά τε ἔσται
 καὶ σπουδαία καὶ ἀθάνατος. τοιαύτη δὲ τυγ-
 86 χάνουσα θεὸς ἐστίν. εἰσὶν ἄρα θεοί. εἶπερ
 ἐν γῆ καὶ θαλάσῃ πολλῆς οὔσης παχυμερείας
 ποικίλα συνίσταται ζῶα ψυχικῆς τε καὶ αἰσθητικῆς

bodies there exists a certain "sympathy," since,
 when the finger is cut, the whole body shares in
 its condition. So then, the Universe also is a
 unified body.—But since of unified bodies some 81
 are held together by mere "attraction," others by
 organic structure, others by soul,—by attraction,
 like stones and sticks; by organic structure, like
 plants; and animals by soul,—the Universe also is
 certainly controlled by one of these. Now it will not 82
 be held together by mere attraction. For the things
 controlled by attraction (such as sticks and stones) do
 not admit of any considerable alteration or change,
 but merely suffer the conditions produced by expansion
 or compression. But the Universe admits of con- 83
 siderable alterations, as the atmosphere becomes at
 one time frosty, at another torrid, and at one time
 dry, at another damp, and at other times modified in
 other ways according to the motions of the heavenly
 bodies. So then, the Universe is not held together
 by mere attraction. But if not by this, then certainly 84
 by organic structure; for even the bodies which are
 controlled by soul were first of all held together by
 organic structure. Necessarily, then, it must be held
 together by the best structure, since it contains the
 structures of all things. But that which contains the 85
 structures of all things contains also such as are
 rational; and, moreover, that which contains the
 rational organic structures is certainly rational; for
 it is not possible for the whole to be inferior to the
 part. But if that structure which governs the Uni-
 verse is the best, it will be intelligent and virtuous
 and immortal. And being such, it is God. There-
 fore Gods exist.—Also, if there exist on the earth and 86
 in the sea, which have very dense parts, a variety of

μετέχοντα δυνάμεως, πολλῶ πιθανώτερόν ἐστιν ἐν τῷ ἀέρι, πολὺ τὸ καθαρὸν καὶ εἰλικρινές ἔχοντι παρὰ τὴν γῆν καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ, ἔμφυχά τινα καὶ νοερά συνίστασθαι ζῶα. καὶ τούτῳ συμφωνεῖ τὸ τοὺς Διοσκούρους ἀγαθοὺς τινὰς εἶναι δαίμονας, σωτήρας ἐυσέλμων νεῶν, καὶ τὸ

τρὶς γὰρ μύριοι εἰσιν ἐπὶ χθονὶ πουλυβοτείρῃ
ἀθάνατοι Ζητὸς φύλακες μερόπων ἀνθρώπων.

87 ἀλλ' εἰ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι πιθανὸν ὑπάρχειν ζῶα, πάντως εὐλογον καὶ ἐν τῷ αἰθέρι ζῶων εἶναι φύσιν, ὅθεν καὶ ἄνθρωποι νοεράς μετέχουσι δυνάμεως, κάκειθεν αὐτὴν σπάσαντες. ὄντων δὲ αἰθερίων ζῶων, καὶ κατὰ πολὺ τῶν ἐπιγείων ὑπερφέρειν δοκούντων τῷ ἄφθαρτα εἶναι καὶ ἀγέννητα, δοθήσεται καὶ θεοὺς ὑπάρχειν, τούτων μὴ διαφέροντας.

88 Ὁ δὲ Κλεάνθης οὕτως συνηρώτα. εἰ φύσις φύσεώς ἐστι κρείττων, εἴη ἂν τις ἀρίστη φύσις· εἰ ψυχὴ ψυχῆς ἐστὶ κρείττων, εἴη ἂν τις ἀρίστη ψυχὴ· καὶ εἰ ζῶον τοῖνον κρείττον ἐστὶ ζῶου, εἴη ἂν τι κράτιστον ζῶον· οὐ γὰρ εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπίπτειν πέφυκε τὰ τοιαῦτα. ὡσπεροῦν οὔτε ἡ φύσις ἐδύνατο ἐπ' ἄπειρον αὔξασθαι κατὰ τὸ κρείττον οὔθ' ἡ ψυχὴ 89 <οὕτως> οὐδὲ τὸ ζῶον. ἀλλὰ μὴν ζῶον ζῶου κρείττον ἐστίν, ὡς ἵππος χελώνης, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ ταῦρος ὄνου καὶ λέων ταύρου. πάντων δὲ σχεδὸν τῶν ἐπιγείων ζῶων καὶ σωματικῇ καὶ ψυχικῇ διαθέσει προέχει τε καὶ κρατιστεύει ὁ ἄνθρωπος· τοῖνον κράτιστον 90 ἂν εἴη ζῶον καὶ ἀριστον. καὶ οὐ πάντι ὁ ἄν-

¹ <οὕτως> οὐδὲ Heintz: οὔτε MSS., Bekk.

^a Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 252 f.

animals which share in the faculties of soul and of sense, it is much more probable that there exist in the air (which, as compared with earth and water, is very clear and pure) some animals endowed with soul and intelligence. And in accord with this is the saying that the Dioscuri are good daemons, "saviours of well-benched ships," and that

Zeus over mortal men, upon Earth the sustainer of many,
Thrice ten thousand guardians has set, <divine and>
immortal.^a

But if it is probable that animals exist in the air, it is 87 certainly reasonable that animal organisms should also exist in the aether, from which men too derive their share of intellectual power, having drawn it from thence. And as ethereal animals exist, and are deemed to be far superior to terrestrial animals through being imperishable and unbegotten, it will be granted that Gods, which are no wise different from these, exist as well.

And Cleanthes argued thus: "If one nature is 88 better than another, there will be some best nature; if one soul is better than another, there will be some best soul: if, then, one animal is better than another, there will be some best animal; for such things are not of a kind to proceed *ad infinitum*. So then, as nature is not capable of increasing to infinity in goodness, nor soul, neither is the animal capable. One animal, however, is better than another, as (say) 89 the horse than the tortoise, and the bull than the ass, and the lion than the bull. And of all the terrestrial animals Man is the highest and best in respect of the disposition of both body and soul; therefore a certain best and most excellent animal will exist. Yet Man cannot be absolutely the best 90

θρωπος κρτίστον είναι δύναται ζών, ολον εϋθέως
 οτι δια κακίας πορεύεται τον πάντα χρόνον, ει δε
 μή γε, τον πλείστον (και γάρ ει ποτε περιγένοιτο
 ἀρετῆς, ὁψέ και πρὸς ταῖς του βίου δυσμαῖς περι-
 γίνεταί), ἐπικηρόν τ' ἐστὶ και ἀσθενές και μυριων
 δεόμενον βοηθημάτων, καθάπερ τροφῆς και σκεπα-
 σμάτων και τῆς ἄλλης του σώματος ἐπιμελείας,
 μικροῦ τινὸς τυράννου τρόπον ἐφεστῶτος ἡμῖν και
 τον πρὸς ἡμέραν δασμόν ἀπαιτοῦντος, και ει μή
 παρέχομεν ὡστε λούειν αὐτὸ και ἀλείφειν και
 περιβάλλειν και τρέφειν, νόσους και θάνατον
 ἀπειλοῦντος. ὡστε οὐ τέλειον ζῶον ὁ ἄνθρωπος,
 91 ἀτελές δε και πολὺ κεχωρισμένον του τελείου. τὸ
 δε τέλειον και ἄριστον κρεῖττον μὲν ἂν ὑπάρχοι
 ἀνθρώπου και πάσαις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς συμπληρω-
 μένον και παντὸς κακοῦ ἀνεπίδεκτον, τουτο δε
 οὐ διοίσει θεοῦ. ἔστιν ἄρα θεός.
 92 Ἄλλ' ὁ μὲν Κλεάνθης ἐστὶ τοιοῦτος· ἠρώτησε δε
 και Ξενοφῶν ὁ Σωκρατικός λόγον εἰς τὸ εἶναι θεούς,
 Σωκράτει περιθεῖς τὴν ἀποδείξιν πρὸς τον Ἀριστό-
 δημον ζητοῦντι, δι' ὧν κατὰ λέξιν φησὶν "εἰπέ
 μοι ὦ Ἀριστόδημε, εἰσὶν οὓς τινας ἐπὶ σοφία
 τεθαύμακας; ἔγωγε, ἔφη. τίνες οὖν εἰσὶν οὗτοι;
 ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν ποιητικῇ ἔγωγε Ὅμηρον τεθαύμακα,
 ἐπὶ δε ἀνδριαντοποιίᾳ Πολύκλειτον, ζωγραφίας γε
 93 μὴν χάριν Ζεῦξιν. τουτους οὖν ἀποδέχη οὐ δια
 τὸ τὰ ὑπ' αὐτῶν κατεσκευασμένα περισσῶς δε-
 δημιουργῆσθαι; ἔγωγε, ἔφη. εἰ οὖν ὁ Πολυ-
 κλείτου ἀνδριάς και ἐμψυχίαν προσλάβη, οὐ πολὺ
 μάλλον ἀποδέξη τον τεχνίτην; και μάλα. ἄρ'
 οὖν ἀνδριάντα μὲν ὄρων ἔφησ ὑπὸ τινος τεχνίτου
 δεδημιουργῆσθαι, ἄνθρωπον δε ὄρων κατὰ τε

animal, because, for instance, he walks in wickedness
 all his life, or, if not, at least for the greater part of
 it (for if ever he attains virtue, he attains it late and
 at the setting of life's sun), and he is the victim of
 fate and feeble and in need of countless aids—such
 as food and coverings, and all the other requirements
 of the body, which stands over us like a rigorous
 tyrant and demands its daily tribute, and threatens
 us with disease and death unless we provide for its
 washing and anointing and clothing and feeding. So
 that Man is not a perfect animal, but imperfect and
 far removed from the perfect. But that which is
 perfect and best will be better than Man and fulfilled
 with all the virtues and not receptive of any evil; and
 this animal will not differ from God. God, therefore,
 exists."

Such, then, is the view of Cleanthes. Xenophon,
 too, the Socratic, propounded an argument for the
 existence of Gods, ascribing the proof to Socrates,
 when in his interrogation of Aristodemus, he expresses
 himself in the following terms: "Tell me, Aristo-
 demus, are there any persons whom you have admired
 for their wisdom? Yes, said he. Who then are
 they? I have admired Homer for his poetry, Poly-
 cleitus for his statuary, Zeuxis of course for his
 painting.^b Then is it not because of the superlative
 93 craftsmanship of their productions that you approve
 of them? Yes, said he. If, then, the statue of
 Polycleitus should also become alive, would you not
 approve of the artist far more? Most certainly.
 Now, if when you saw a statue you said that it had
 been wrought by some artist, when you see a man

^a See Xen. *Mem.* i. 4. 2.

^b P. and Z. were famous Greek artists (circa 440-400 B.C.).

ψυχὴν εὖ κινούμενον καὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα εὖ κεκοσμη-
 μένον οὐκ οἶει ὑπὸ τιος νοῦ περιττοῦ δεδημιουρ-
 94 γῆσθαι; εἶτα δὲ ὁρῶν θέσιν τε καὶ χρῆσιν μερῶν,
 πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι διανέστησε τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὁμματα
 γὰρ μὴν ἔδωκεν ὥστε ὁρᾶν τὰ ὁρατά, ἀκοὴν δὲ ὥστε
 ἀκούειν τὰ ἀκουστά. ὁσμῆς γὰρ μὴν τί ἂν ἦν
 ὄφελος, εἰ μὴ ῥίνας προσέθηκεν, χυμῶν τε μὴν
 ὁμοίως, εἰ μὴ γλῶσσα ἢ τούτων ἐπιγνώμων ἐν-
 ειργάσθη; καὶ ταῦτα" φησὶν "εἰδὼς ὅτι γῆς τε
 μέρος μικρὸν ἔχεις ἐν τῷ σώματι πολλῆς οὐσης,
 ὑγροῦ τε μὴν βραχὺ πολλοῦ ὄντος, πυρὸς ἀέρος τε
 ὁμοίως· νοῦν δὲ ἄρα μόνον οὐδαμοῦ ὄντα εὐτυχῶς
 πόθεν δοκεῖς συναρπάσαι;"

95 Τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ τοῦ Ξενοφῶντος ἐστὶ λόγος,
 δυνάμιν γὰρ ἐπαγωγικὴν ἔχων καὶ τοιαύτην. γῆς
 πολλῆς οὐσης ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ μικρὸν μέρος ἔχεις, καὶ
 ὑγροῦ πολλοῦ ὄντος ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ μικρὸν μέρος
 ἔχεις· καὶ νοῦ ἄρα πολλοῦ ὄντος ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ
 μικρὸν μέρος ἔχεις. νοερὸς ἄρα ὁ κόσμος ἐστίν,
 96 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο θεός. παραβάλλουσι δὲ τινες τῷ
 λόγῳ τὰ λήμματα μεταποιοῦντες αὐτοῦ, καὶ φασι
 "γῆς πολλῆς οὐσης ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ μικρὸν μέρος
 ἔχεις· ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑγροῦ πολλοῦ ὄντος ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ
 μικρὸν μέρος ἔχεις, καὶ ἤδη ἀέρος καὶ πυρὸς· καὶ
 πολλῆς ἄρα χολῆς οὐσης ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ μικρὸν τι
 μέρος ἔχεις, καὶ φλέγματος καὶ αἵματος." ἀκο-

well disposed in soul and well equipped in body,
 do you not think that he has been wrought by
 some superexcellent mind? And when you observe 94
 further the arrangement and function of his parts ;
 and, in the first place, that he has made man upright,
 and has given him eyes that he may see what is
 visible and ears that he may hear what is audible.
 And of what use would smell have been if he had
 not also supplied him with nostrils, or flavours either
 if he had not had a tongue constructed within him
 which discerns them? And when you know also that
 you have in your body a small portion of the earth,
 of which so much exists, and a little of the water of
 which so much exists, and so likewise of fire and of
 air ; from what source do you think that you have by
 good luck derived your mind, if it alone is nowhere
 existent? "

Such, then, is the argument of Xenophon ; and the 95
 inductive value which it has is this :—" Of the great
 quantity of earth which exists in the Universe you
 possess a small portion, and of the great quantity of
 water which exists in the Universe you possess a small
 portion ; therefore, you also possess a small portion
 of the mind which exists in the Universe in large
 quantity. Therefore the Universe is intelligent, and
 consequently is God." But some meet this with a 96
 parallel argument, by altering its premisses, and say
 —" Of the great quantity of earth which exists in the
 Universe you possess a small portion ; but also of the
 great quantity of water existing in the Universe you
 possess a small portion, and also of air and fire ;
 therefore you possess also a small portion of the great
 quantity of gall existing in the Universe, and phlegm
 and blood. It will follow, therefore, that the Universe

λουθήσει καὶ χολοποῖόν καὶ αἵματος γεννητικὸν
 97 εἶναι τὸν κόσμον· ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄτοπον. οἱ δὲ ἀπο-
 λογούμενοί φασιν ἀνόμοιον εἶναι τὴν παραβολὴν τῷ
 Ξενοφάντος λόγῳ. ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀπλῶν
 καὶ πρώτων σωμάτων ποιεῖται τὴν ζήτησιν, ὡς περ
 γῆς καὶ ὕδατος ἀέρος τε καὶ πυρός, οἱ δὲ τῇ παρα-
 βολῇ χρώμενοι μετεπήδησαν ὡς ἐπὶ τὰ συγκρίματα·
 χολῆ γὰρ καὶ αἷμα καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἐν τοῖς σώμασι
 ὑγρὸν οὐκ ἔστι πρῶτον καὶ ἀπλοῦν ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν
 πρώτων καὶ στοιχειωδῶν σωμάτων συγκείμενον.

98 "Ἐνεστι δὲ καὶ οὕτως τὸν αὐτὸν συνερωτᾶν λόγον.
 εἰ μὴ ἦν τι γεῶδες ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, οὐδὲ ἐν σοὶ τι ἂν
 ἦν γεῶδες, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἦν τι ὑγρὸν ἐν κόσμῳ, οὐδ'
 ἂν ἐν σοὶ ἦν τι ὑγρὸν, καὶ ὁμοίως ἐπὶ ἀέρος καὶ
 πυρός. τοίνυν καὶ εἰ μὴ ἦν τις ἐν κόσμῳ νοῦς,
 οὐδ' ἂν ἐν σοὶ τις ἦν νοῦς· ἔστι δὲ γε ἐν σοὶ τις
 νοῦς· ἔστιν ἄρα καὶ ἐν κόσμῳ. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο
 νοερός ἐστιν ὁ κόσμος. νοερός δὲ ὦν καὶ θεὸς
 99 καθέστηκεν. τῆς δὲ αὐτῆς δυνάμεως ἐστὶ καὶ
 ὁ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἔχων λόγος. ἄρα γε ἀγαλμα
 εἰδὲ δημιουργημένον θεασάμενος διστάσειας ἂν εἰ
 τεχνίτης νοῦς τοῦτο ἐποίησεν; ἢ οὐ τοσοῦτον¹ ἂν
 ἀπόσχοις τοῦ ὑπονοεῖν τι τοιοῦτον ὡς καὶ θαυμάζειν
 τὴν περιττότητα τῆς δημιουργίας καὶ τὴν τέχνην;

100 ἀρ' οὖν ἐπὶ μὲν τούτων τὸν ἔξωθεν θεωρῶν τύπον
 προσμαρτυρεῖς τῷ κατεσκευακότητι καὶ φῆς εἶναι
 τινα τὸν δημιουργόν· τὸν δὲ ἐν σοὶ ὁρῶν νοῦν,
 τοσαύτη ποικιλία διαφέροντα παντὸς ἀγάλματος
 καὶ πάσης γραφῆς, γεννητὸν ὄντα νομίζεις ἀπὸ
 τύχης γεγονέναι, οὐχὶ δὲ ὑπὸ τίνος δημιουργοῦ

¹ οὐ τοσοῦτον] οὐτ' Bekk.: οὕτως N, Mutsch.: τοσοῦτον
 cj. Bekk.

is gall-making and productive of blood; which is absurd." But others allege in defence that this 97 parallel argument is not similar to the argument of Xenophon. For whereas he bases his inquiry on the simple and primary bodies,—such as earth and water and air and fire,—those who employ the parallel argument jump aside to compounds; for neither gall nor blood nor any bodily fluid is primary and simple, but a compound of the primary and elemental bodies.

It is also possible to propound the same argument 98 in this form: "If there had not been something earthy in the Universe, there would not have been anything earthy in you; and if there had not been something fluid in the Universe, there would not have been anything fluid in you; and so likewise with air and fire. Hence, too, if there had not been some mind in the Universe, there would not have been any mind in you; but there is mind in you. And because of this the Universe is rational; and being rational, it is also God."—To the same effect is the argument which is 99 put in this form:—"If you saw a statue which was well wrought would you be in doubt as to whether an artistic intelligence had made it? Or would you not be so far from having any such suspicions that you would actually admire the excellence of its workmanship and its artistic quality? If then, in such cases, 100 when you behold the external form you take it as evidence of a constructor and assert that there exists a craftsman who made it,—when you see the mind within yourself, which is so far superior in its intricacy to any statue or any painting, do you suppose that it came into being as the creation of chance and not by

δύναμιν καὶ σύνεσιν ὑπερβάλλουσαν ἔχοντας; ὅσπερ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλοθί που διατρίβοι ἢ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, διοικῶν αὐτὸν καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ γενῶν τε καὶ αὔξων. οὗτος δὲ ἐστὶ θεός· εἰσὶν ἄρα θεοί.

- 101 Ζήνων δὲ ὁ Κιτιεὺς ἀπὸ Ξενοφῶντος τὴν ἀφορμὴν λαβὼν οὕτως συνερωτᾷ. τὸ προϊέμενον σπέρμα λογικοῦ καὶ αὐτὸ λογικόν ἐστιν· ὁ δὲ κόσμος προίεται σπέρμα λογικοῦ· λογικὸν ἄρα ἐστὶν ὁ κόσμος. ᾧ συνεισάγεται καὶ ἡ τούτου
- 102 ὑπαρξίς. καὶ ἐστὶν ἡ τῆς συνερωτήσεως πιθανότης προὔπιτος. πάσης γὰρ φύσεως καὶ ψυχῆς ἡ καταρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως γίνεσθαι δοκεῖ ἀπὸ ἡγεμονικοῦ, καὶ πᾶσαι αἱ ἐπὶ τὰ μέρη τοῦ ὅλου ἐξαποστελλόμεναι δυνάμεις ὡς ἀπὸ τινος πηγῆς τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ἐξαποστέλλονται, ὥστε πᾶσαν δύναμιν τὴν περὶ τὸ μέρος οὔσαν καὶ περὶ τὸ ὅλον εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡγεμονικοῦ διαδίδοσθαι. ὅθεν οἶόν ἐστι τὸ μέρος τῇ δυνάμει,
- 103 τοιοῦτον πολὺ πρότερόν ἐστι τὸ ὅλον. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἰ προίεται λογικοῦ ζώου σπέρμα ὁ κόσμος, οὐχ ὡς τὸν ἀνθρωπὸν κατὰ ἀποβρασμόν, ἀλλὰ καθὸ περιέχει σπέρματα λογικῶν ζώων· περιέχει <δὲ>¹ [τὸ πᾶν], οὐχ ὡς ἂν εἴπομεν τὴν ἄμπελον γιγάρτων εἶναι περιεκτικὴν, τουτέστι κατὰ περιγραφὴν, ἀλλ' ὅτι λόγοι σπερματικοὶ λογικῶν ζώων ἐν αὐτῷ περιέχονται. ὥστε εἶναι τοιοῦτο τὸ λεγόμενον "ὁ δὲ γε κόσμος περιέχει σπερματικούς² λόγους λογικῶν ζώων· λογικὸς ἄρα ἐστὶν ὁ κόσμος."

¹ <δὲ> add. cj. Bekk., [τὸ πᾶν] secl. cj. Heintz.

² σπερματικούς cj. Bekk.: σπέρματος mss., Bekk.

³ For this Stoic term see Vol. I. *Introductio*, p. xxv.

some craftsman possessed of power and intelligence to a superlative degree? And he can dwell nowhere else save in the Universe, governing it and generating and increasing the things that are therein. And this person is a God; therefore Gods exist."

And Zeno of Citium, taking Xenophon as his starting-point, argues thus:—"That which projects the seed of the rational is itself rational; but the Universe projects the seed of the rational; therefore the Universe is rational. And thereby the existence thereof is also concluded." The plausibility of this 102 argument is obvious. For the origin of motion in every nature and soul seems to come from "the regent part,"^a and all the powers that are sent forth into the parts of the whole are sent forth from the regent part as from a fount, so that every power which exists in the part exists also in the whole owing to its being distributed from its regent part. Hence, what the part is in point of power, that the whole must certainly be first. Consequently, if the Uni- 103 verse projects the seed of a rational animal, it does not do so, like man, by frothy emission, but as containing the seeds of rational animals; but it does not contain them in the same way as we might speak of the vine "containing" its grapes,—that is, by way of inclusion,—but because the "seminal reasons"^b of rational animals are contained in it. So that the argument is this—"The Universe contains the seminal reasons of rational animals; therefore the Universe is rational."

^b According to Stoic doctrine the Universal Reason (Logos) is present in particular things as their vital formative principle, and these pluralizations of Reason are termed "seminal reasons"; cf. Vol. I. *Introductio*, p. xxiv.

- 104 Καὶ πάλιν ὁ Ζήνων φησίν, "[εἶ] τὸ λογικὸν τοῦ μὴ λογικοῦ κρεῖττον ἐστίν· οὐδὲν δέ γε κόσμου κρεῖττον ἐστίν· λογικὸν ἄρα ὁ κόσμος. καὶ ὡσαύτως ἐπὶ τοῦ νοεροῦ καὶ ἔμψυχίας μετέχοντος. τὸ γὰρ νοερόν τοῦ μὴ νοεροῦ καὶ τὸ ἔμψυχον τοῦ μὴ ἔμψυχου κρεῖττον ἐστίν· οὐδὲν δέ γε κόσμου κρεῖττον· νοερός ἄρα καὶ ἔμψυχός ἐστιν ὁ κόσμος."
- 105 Κεῖται δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῷ Πλάτωνι τῇ δυνάμει τοιοῦτος λόγος, κατὰ λέξιν αὐτοῦ γράφοντος "λέγωμεν δὴ δι' ἣν αἰτίαν γένεσιν καὶ πᾶν τὸδε ὁ συνιστὰς συνέστησεν. ἀγαθὸς ἦν, ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδὲ εἰς περὶ οὐδενὸς ἐγγίνεται φθόνος. τούτου δὴ ἐκτὸς ὧν πάντα ὅσα μάλιστα ἐβουλήθη γίγνεσθαι παραπλήσια ἑαυτῷ. ταύτην δὲ γενέσεως καὶ κόσμου μάλιστα ἂν τις ἀρχὴν κυριωτάτην παρὰ ἀνδρῶν φρονίμων ἀποδεχόμενος ὀρθότατα ἀποδέχοιτο ἂν." εἶτ' ὀλίγα διεληθὼν ἐπιφέρει λέγων
- 106 "διὰ δὴ τὸν λογισμὸν τόνδε νοῦν μὲν ἐν ψυχῇ ψυχῇ δὲ ἐν τῷ σώματι συνιστὰς τὸ πᾶν συνετεκταίνεται, <ὅπως>¹ ὅ τι κάλλιστον ἂν εἴη κατὰ φύσιν ἄριστον τε² ἔργον ἀπειργασμένος. οὕτως οὖν δὴ κατὰ λόγον τὸν εἰκότα δεῖ λέγειν τόνδε τὸν κόσμον ζῶων ἔμψυχον ἔνουν τε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ διὰ τὸ τῇ θεοῦ
- 107 γενέσθαι προνοία." δυνάμει δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν τῷ Ζήνωνι λόγον ἐξέθετο· καὶ γὰρ οὗτος τὸ πᾶν κάλλιστον εἶναι φησι, κατὰ φύσιν ἀπειργασμένον ἔργον καὶ κατὰ τὸν εἰκότα λόγον ζῶων ἔμψυχον νοερόν τε καὶ λογικόν.

¹ <ὅπως> add. e Plat. Mutsch.

² τε sec. Plat., Heintz: τὸ mss., Bekk.

* Plato, *Timaeus* 29 D ff.

And Zeno says again: "The rational is better than 104 the non-rational; but nothing is better than the Universe; therefore the Universe is rational. And so likewise with the intelligent and that which partakes of animation; for the intelligent is better than the non-intelligent and the animate than the non-animate; but nothing is better than the Universe; therefore the Universe is intelligent and animate."

A similar argument is stated by Plato, where he 105 writes in these terms^a:—"Let us declare the cause whereof he that constructed constructed Becoming and this All. He was good and in him that is good there is no envy concerning anything. And being devoid of envy, he desired that all things should be, so far as possible, like unto himself. This principle, then, we shall be wholly right in accepting from men of wisdom as being above all the supreme originating principle of Becoming and the Cosmos." Then, after 106 a few further remarks, he goes on to say—"So because of this reflection he constructed reason within soul and soul within body as he fashioned the All, that so the work he was executing might be of its nature most fair and most good. Thus, then, in accordance with the likely account, we must declare that this Cosmos is verily a living creature endowed with soul and reason because it has come into existence through the providence of God." Thus Plato has set out 107 virtually the same argument as Zeno; for the former also asserts that "the All is most fair, being a work executed according to nature and according to the likely account a living creature endowed with soul, both intelligent and rational."

- 108 Ἄλλ' ὁ γὰρ Ἀλεξίνος τῷ Ζήνωνι παρέβαλε τρόπον
τῷδε. τὸ ποιητικὸν τοῦ μὴ ποιητικοῦ καὶ τὸ
γραμματικὸν τοῦ μὴ γραμματικοῦ κρείττον ἐστί,
καὶ τὸ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας θεωρούμενον κρείτ-
τόν ἐστι τοῦ μὴ τοιοῦτου· οὐδὲ ἐν δὲ κόσμου
κρείττον ἐστίν· ποιητικὸν ἄρα καὶ γραμματικόν
109 ἐστὶν ὁ κόσμος. πρὸς ἣν ἀπαντῶντες παραβολὴν
οἱ στωικοὶ φασὶν ὅτι Ζήνων τὸ καθάπαξ κρείττον
εἴληφεν, τουτέστι τὸ λογικὸν τοῦ μὴ λογικοῦ καὶ
τὸ νοερὸν τοῦ μὴ νοεροῦ καὶ τὸ ἐμψυχον τοῦ μὴ
110 ἐμψύχου, ὃ δὲ Ἀλεξίνος οὐκ ἐτί· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ
καθάπαξ τὸ ποιητικὸν τοῦ μὴ ποιητικοῦ καὶ τὸ
γραμματικὸν τοῦ μὴ γραμματικοῦ κρείττον. ὥστε
μεγάλην ἐν τοῖς λόγοις θεωρεῖσθαι διαφορὰν· ἰδὸν
γὰρ Ἀρχίλοχος ποιητικὸς ὢν οὐκ ἐστὶ Σωκράτους
τοῦ μὴ ποιητικοῦ κρείττων, καὶ Ἀρίσταρχος
γραμματικὸς ὢν οὐκ ἐστὶ Πλάτωνος τοῦ μὴ
γραμματικοῦ κρείττων.
- 111 Πρὸς τούτοις καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κινήσεως
ἐπιχειροῦσι κατασκευάζειν τὴν τῶν θεῶν ὑπαρξίν
οἱ τε ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς καὶ οἱ τούτοις συμπνέοντες.
ὅτι γὰρ κινεῖται ὁ κόσμος πᾶς ἂν τις ὁμολογήσειεν
112 ὑπὸ πολλῶν εἰς τοῦτο ἐναγόμενος. ἦτοι οὖν ὑπὸ
φύσεως κινεῖται ἢ ὑπὸ προαιρέσεως ἢ ὑπὸ δίνης
καὶ κατ' ἀνάγκην. ἀλλ' ὑπὸ μὲν δίνης καὶ κατ'
ἀνάγκην οὐκ εὐλογον. ἦτοι γὰρ ἄτακτός ἐστιν ἢ
διατεταγμένη ἢ δίνη. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἄτακτος, οὐκ ἂν
δυνηθεῖη τεταγμένως τι κινεῖν· εἰ δὲ μετὰ τάξεώς

* A. was a disciple of Eubulides, the Megaric philosopher, and a contemporary of Zeno the Stoic (circa 300 B.C.); cf. Vol. I. *Intro.* p. xvi.

But Alexinus^a opposed Zeno with a parallel argu- 108
ment in this form:—"The poetic is better than the
non-poetical and the grammatical than the non-
grammatical, and the artistic product of the other arts
than the inartistic; but nothing is better than the
Universe; therefore the Universe is poetical and
grammatical." But in answer to this counter-argu- 109
ment the Stoics say that, whereas Zeno has chosen
what is absolutely better—that is, the rational than
the non-rational, and the intelligent than the non-
intelligent and the animate than the non-animate,—
Alexinus has not done so; for the poetic is not 110
absolutely better than the non-poetic or the gram-
matical than the non-grammatical. So that we
observe a great difference between the two argu-
ments; for notice how Archilochus who is poetical
is not better than the non-poetical Socrates, and
Aristarchus^b who is grammatical is not better than
the non-grammatical Plato.

Furthermore, the Stoics and their supporters try to 111
demonstrate the existence of the Gods from the
motion of the Universe. For that the Universe is in
motion everyone will admit, being driven thereto by
many things. It is moved, then, either by nature or 112
by will or by vortex^c and of necessity. But that (it is
moved) by vortex and of necessity is not probable.
For the vortex is either disorderly or orderly. And
if it is disorderly, it will not be able to move anything
in an orderly way; but if it moves anything in a way

^b Archilochus of Paros was an iambic poet circa 700 B.C. Aristarchus was a famous grammarian and literary critic at Alexandria, circa 150 B.C. In these §§ 108-110 "grammatical" means "possessed of the grammarian's art."

^c In the doctrine of Democritus "vortex" (δίνη) was the name for the whirling force giving spiral motion to the atoms.

τι κινεῖ καὶ συμφωνίας, θεία τις ἔσται καὶ δαιμόνιος·
 113 οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε τεταγμένως καὶ σωτηρίως τὸ ὅλον
 ἐκίνηι μὴ νοερά καὶ θεία καθεστῶσα. τοιαύτη δὲ
 οὐσα οὐκέτι ἂν εἴη ἀτακτον γάρ ἐστιν αὐτῆ
 καὶ ὀλιγοχρόνιον. ὥστε κατ' ἀνάγκην μὲν καὶ
 ὑπὸ δίνης, ὡς ἔλεγον οἱ περὶ τὸν Δημόκριτον, οὐκ
 114 ἂν κινεῖτο ὁ κόσμος. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ φύσει ἀφαν-
 τάστω, παρόσον ἢ νοερά φύσις ἀμείνων ἐστὶ ταύτης.
 ὁράνται δὲ τοιαῦται φύσεις ἐν κόσμῳ περιεχόμεναι·
 ἀνάγκη ἄρα καὶ αὐτὸν νοεράν ἔχειν φύσιν ὑφ' ἧς
 τεταγμένως κινεῖται, ἥτις εὐθέως ἐστὶ θεός.
 115 Τὰ γε μὴν αὐτομάτως κινούμενα τῶν κατα-
 σκευασμάτων θαυμαστότερα ἐστὶ τῶν μὴ τοιούτων.
 τὴν γοῦν Ἀρχιμήδειον σφαῖραν σφόδρα θεωροῦντες
 ἐκπληττόμεθα, ἐν ἣ ἡλίος τε καὶ σελήνη κινεῖται
 καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν ἀστέρων, οὐ μὰ Δία ἐπὶ τοῖς
 ξύλοις οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῇ κινήσει τούτων τεθηπότες, ἀλλ'
 ἐπὶ τῷ τεχνίτῃ καὶ ταῖς κινούσαις αἰτίαις. ὅθεν
 ὄσῳ θαυμασιώτερα ἐστὶ τὰ αἰσθανόμενα τῶν
 αἰσθητῶν, τοσοῦτῳ θαυμασιώτεραί εἰσιν αἱ ταῦτα
 116 κινούσαι αἰταί. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ ἵππος θαυμασιώτερος
 τοῦ φυτοῦ, καὶ ἡ κινητικὴ τοῦ ἵππου αἰτία θαυμα-
 σιωτέρα τῆς τοῦ φυτοῦ αἰτίας· καὶ ἐπεὶ ὁ ἐλέφας
 θαυμασιώτερος ἵππου, καὶ ἡ κινητικὴ τοῦ ἐλέφαντος
 αἰτία, τηλικούτον γε ὄγκον διαβαστάζουσα, θαυμα-
 117 σιωτέρα τῆς τοῦ ἵππου. τούτων δὲ γε πασῶν κατὰ
 τὸν ἀνωτάτω λόγον καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης
 καὶ ἀστέρων, καὶ πρὸ τούτων ἢ τοῦ κόσμου φύσις,
 ἥτις καὶ τούτων ἐστὶν αἰτία. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ μέρους

that is orderly and harmonious, it will be divine and
 supernatural; for it would never have moved the 113
 whole in an orderly and conserving way had it not
 been intelligent and divine. And if it is such, it will
 no longer be vortex; for this is disorderly and of short
 duration. So that the Universe will not be moved of
 necessity and by vortex, as Democritus said. Nor yet 114
 by a non-perceptive nature, inasmuch as the intelli-
 gent nature is superior to this; and such natures are
 seen to be contained in the Universe; of necessity,
 therefore, it must itself possess an intelligent nature
 by which it is moved in an orderly way, and this
 indubitably is God.

Moreover, constructions which move of their own 115
 accord are more marvellous than other kinds. Thus
 when we behold an Archimedean sphere ^a in which
 the sun and moon and all the other stars are in motion,
 we are immensely struck by it—not, to be sure,
 because we are amazed at the woodwork or at the
 motion of these bodies, but at the artificer and the
 causes of the motion. Hence in the degree that per-
 ceipients are more marvellous than things perceived,
 in the same degree the causes which move the former
 are the more marvellous. For since the horse is more 116
 marvellous than the plant, the moving cause of the
 horse is more marvellous than that of the plant; and
 since the elephant is more marvellous than the horse,
 the moving cause of the elephant, which transports so
 huge a bulk, is more marvellous than that of the
 horse; and—to rise to the highest kinds—(more 117
 marvellous) than all the foregoing are the moving
 causes of the sun and moon and stars, and still more
 than these that which is their cause, the nature of the
 Universe. For the cause of the part does not extend

^a A kind of orrery, representing the movements of the stars, invented by Archimedes (circa 230 B.C.).

αἰτία οὐ διατείνει ἐπὶ τὸ ὅλον, οὐδ' ἔστι τούτου αἰτία, ἢ δὲ τοῦ ὅλου διατέτακεν εἰς τὰ μέρη· διὸ καὶ θαυμασιωτέρα ἐστὶ τῆς τοῦ μέρους αἰτίας.

118 ὥστε ἐπεὶ ἢ τοῦ κόσμου φύσις ἐστὶν αἰτία τῆς τοῦ ὅλου κόσμου διακοσμῆσεως, εἴη ἂν αἰτία καὶ τῶν μερῶν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, κρατίστη ἐστίν. εἰ δὲ κρατίστη ἐστὶ, λογικὴ τέ ἐστι καὶ νοερά, προσέτι δὲ αἰδιος ἂν εἴη. ἢ δὲ τοιαύτη φύσις ἢ αὐτὴ ἐστὶ θεῶ. ἔστι τοίνυν τι θεός.

119 Καὶ μὴν ἐν παντὶ πολυμερεῖ σώματι καὶ κατὰ φύσιν διοικουμένῳ ἐστι τι τὸ κυριεῦον, καθὼ καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῶν μὲν ἢ ἐν καρδίᾳ τοῦτο τυγχάνειν ἀξιούται ἢ ἐν ἐγκεφάλῳ ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ μέρει τοῦ σώματος, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν φυτῶν οὐ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὧν μὲν κατὰ τὰς ρίζας ἐφ' ὧν δὲ κατὰ τὴν

120 κόμην ἐφ' ὧν δὲ κατὰ τὸν ἐγκάρδιον. ὥστε ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ κόσμος ὑπὸ φύσεως διοικεῖται πολυμερῆς καθεστώς, εἴη ἂν τι ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ κυριεῦον καὶ τὸ προκαταρχόμενον τῶν κινήσεων. οὐδὲν δὲ δυνατόν εἶναι τοιοῦτον ἢ τὴν τῶν ὄντων φύσιν, ἣτις θεός ἐστιν. ἔστιν ἄρα θεός.

121 Ἄλλ' ἴσως τινὲς ἐροῦσιν ὅτι τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ ἡγεμονικωτάτην εἶναι συμβέβηκε καὶ κυριωτάτην ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τὴν γῆν καὶ <ἔτι>¹ ἡγεμονικώτερον καὶ κυριώτερον τὸν ἀέρα· ἀνευ γὰρ τούτων οὐχ οἶόν τέ ἐστὶ συστήναι κόσμον. ὥστε καὶ τὴν γῆν

122 καὶ τὸν ἀέρα φήσομεν εἶναι θεόν. ὅπερ ἐστὶν εὐήθες, καὶ ὅμοιον τῷ λέγειν κυριώτατον ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ καὶ ἡγεμονικώτατον εἶναι τὸν τοίχον· ἀνευ

¹ <ἔτι> add. cj. Bekk.

to the whole, nor is it the cause thereof, but that of the whole extends to the parts; wherefore also it is more marvellous than the cause of the part. So that 118 since the nature of the Universe is the cause of the ordering of the whole Universe, it will also be the cause of the parts. And if so, it is most excellent. And if it is most excellent, it is both rational and intelligent, and besides it will be eternal. But such a nature is identical with God. Therefore God is something existent.

Further, in every multipartite body which is 119 regulated by nature^a there exists some ruling element, even as in our case this is said to exist either in the heart or in the brain or in some other part of the body^b; and in the case of plants in a different way,— in some cases in the roots, in others in the leaves, in others again in the central core. Consequently, 120 since the Universe also is multipartite and regulated by nature, there will exist in it an element which rules and originates its motions. And this can be nothing else than the nature of existing things, which is God. God therefore exists.

But perhaps some will say that the result of this 121 argument is that the earth is a most dominant and ruling force in the Universe, and even more dominant and ruling is the air; for without these it is not possible for the Universe to subsist; so that we shall assert that both the earth and the air are God. But 122 this is silly, and much like saying that the wall is the most dominant and ruling thing in the house; for

^a i. e. "nature" (φύσις), or "organic structure," as distinct from "attraction" (ἐξίς); cf. § 81 *supra*. The "multipartite body" is an "organism."

^b Cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 313.

γὰρ τούτου μὴ δύνασθαι τὴν οἰκίαν συστήναι. καθάπερ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα ταῖς μὲν ἀληθείαις ἀδύνατον ἔστιν ἀνευ τοίχου συστήναι τὴν οἰκίαν, οὐ μὴν ὑπερφέρει καὶ κρεῖττόν ἐστι τοῦ οἰκοδεσπότου ὁ τοίχος, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ κόσμου ἀδύνατον μὲν χωρὶς γῆς καὶ ἀέρος τὴν τοῦ παντός σύστασιν γενέσθαι, οὐ μὴν ταῦτα ὑπερφέρει τῆς διοικουσύσης τὸν κόσμον φύσεως, ἥτις οὐ διενήνοχε θεοῦ. ἔστιν ἄρα θεός.

Τὸ μὲν οὖν γένος τῶν τοιούτων λόγων ἔστι τοιούτον· σκοπῶμεν δὲ ἐξῆς καὶ τὸν τρόπον τῶν ἀκολουθούντων ἀτόπων τοῖς ἀναιρουσὶ τὸ θεῖον. εἰ γὰρ μὴ εἰσὶ θεοί, οὐκ ἔστιν εὐσέβεια [μόνον τῶν αἰρετῶν]¹ ὑπάρχουσα. ἔστι γὰρ εὐσέβεια ἐπιστήμη θεῶν θεραπείας, τῶν δ' ἀνυπάρκτων οὐ δύναται τις εἶναι θεραπεία, ὅθεν οὐδὲ ἐπιστήμη τις περὶ ταύτην γενήσεται· καὶ ὡς οὐχ οἶδόν τε περὶ τῶν ἵπποκενταύρων θεραπείαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι ἀνυπάρκτων ὄντων, οὕτως οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν θεῶν θεραπείαν, εἴπερ εἰσὶν ἀνυπαρκτοί, ἔσται τις ἐπιστήμη. ὥστε εἰ μὴ εἰσὶ θεοί, ἀνυπαρκτός ἐστιν ἢ εὐσέβεια. ὑπάρχει δὲ εὐσέβεια· τοίνυν ρητέον εἶναι θεούς.

124 καὶ πάλιν, εἰ μὴ εἰσὶ θεοί, ἀνυπαρκτός ἐστιν ἢ ὁσιότης, δικαιοσύνη τις οὐσα πρὸς θεούς· ἔστι δὲ γε κατὰ τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας καὶ προλήψεις πάντων ἀνθρώπων ὁσιότης, καθό τι καὶ ὁσίον ἐστίν· καὶ τὸ θεῖον ἄρα ἔστιν.

125 εἴγε μὴν μὴ εἰσὶ θεοί, ἀναιρεῖται σοφία, ἐπιστήμη οὐσα θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων· καὶ ὃν τρόπον οὐδεμία ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη ἀνθρωπείων τε καὶ ἵπποκενταυρείων πραγμάτων διὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπους μὲν ὑπάρχειν ἵπποκενταύρους δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, οὕτως οὐδὲ ἐπιστήμη τις ἔσται θεῶν

without it the house cannot subsist. For just as, in this case, although the house cannot in fact subsist without the wall, yet the wall does not overrule and is not better than the master of the house,—so also in the case of the Universe, although it is impossible for the structure of the Whole to exist without earth and air, yet these do not overrule the nature which regulates the Universe; and this does not differ from God. God, therefore, exists.

Such, then, is the general character of these arguments. Next let us consider the nature of the absurd 123 consequences of abolishing Divinity. If Gods do not exist, piety is not existent. For piety is "the science of service to the Gods," and there cannot be any service of things non-existent, nor, consequently, will any science thereof exist; and just as there cannot be any science of service to Hippocentaurs, they being non-existent, so there will not be any science of service to the Gods if they are non-existent. So that, if Gods do not exist, piety is non-existent. But piety exists; so we must declare that Gods exist.—Again, if Gods do not exist, holiness is non-existent, 124 it being "a kind of God-ward justice"; but according to the common notions and preconceptions of all men holiness exists, and because of this a holy thing also exists; and therefore the Divine exists.—If, 125 however, Gods do not exist, wisdom is abolished, it being "the science of things both divine and human"; and just as there is no science of things both human and Hippocentaurean owing to the fact that men exist but Hippocentaurs do not exist, so too there will

¹ [μόνον τῶν αἰρ.] secl. ego: μία τῶν ἀρετῶν cj. Bekk.: [μόνον . . . ὑπάρχ.] secl. Kayser.

καὶ ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων, ἀνθρώπων μὲν ὑπαρχόντων θεῶν δὲ μὴ ὑφεστώτων. ἄτοπον δὲ γε λέγειν μὴ εἶναι σοφίαν· ἄτοπον ἄρα καὶ τὸ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀξιοῦν ἀνυπάρκτους.

- 126 Καὶ μὴν εἴπερ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη κατὰ τὴν ἐπι-
πλοκὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρὸς τε ἀλλήλους καὶ πρὸς
θεοὺς εἰσῆκται, εἰ μὴ εἰσι θεοί, οὐδὲ δικαιοσύνη
127 συστήσεται· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. οἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν
Πυθαγόραν καὶ τὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα καὶ τῶν Ἰταλῶν
πλήθος φασι μὴ μόνον ἡμῖν πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ πρὸς
τοὺς θεοὺς εἶναι τινα κοινωνίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰ
ἄλογα τῶν ζώων. ἐν γὰρ ὑπάρχειν πνεῦμα τὸ διὰ
παντὸς τοῦ κόσμου διήκον ψυχῆς τρόπον, τὸ καὶ
128 ἐνοῦν ἡμᾶς πρὸς ἐκεῖνα. διόπερ καὶ κτείνοντες
αὐτὰ καὶ ταῖς σαρκῖν αὐτῶν τρεφόμενοι ἀδικήσομεν
τε καὶ ἀσεβήσομεν ὡς συγγενεῖς ἀναιροῦντες. ἔθθεν
καὶ παρήνουν οὗτοι οἱ φιλόσοφοι ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν
ἐμφύχων, καὶ ἀσεβεῖν ἔφασκον τοὺς ἀνθρώπους

βωμὸν ἐρεύθοντας μακάρων θερμοῖσι φόνοισιν.

- 129 καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς πού φησιν

οὐ παύσεσθε φόνοιο δυσσηχέος; οὐκ ἐσορᾶτε
ἀλλήλους δάπτοντες ἀκηδέησι νόοιο;

καὶ

μορφὴν δ' ἀλλάξαντα πατὴρ φίλον υἱὸν αἰείρας,
σφάζει ἐπευχόμενος μέγα νήπιος· οἱ δ'
ἀπορεύνται¹

λισσόμενοι θύοντος. ὁ δ' αὖ² νήκουστος ὁμο-
κλέων

¹ ἀπορεύνται Diels: ἐπορεύνται Bekk.: οἱ δὲ (οἶδα N) πο-
ρεύνται mss.

² δ' αὖ Diels: δὲ Bekk.

be no science of things divine and human if men exist but Gods subsist not. But it is absurd to assert that wisdom does not exist; therefore it is also absurd to maintain that the Gods are non-existent.

Furthermore, if justice too has been introduced 126 because of the connexion of men with one another and with the Gods, if Gods exist not, neither will justice subsist; which is absurd. Now Pythagoras and Em- 127 pedocles and the rest of the Italian company declare that we have some fellowship not only with one another and with the Gods but also with the irrational animals. For there is one spirit which pervades, like a soul, the whole Universe, and which also makes us one with them. Wherefore if we slay them and 128 feed on their flesh we shall be doing what is unjust and impious, as destroying our kindred. Hence, too, these philosophers advised abstinence from animal food, and declared that those men were impious who

Redden'd the Blessed Ones' altars with warm blood pouring from victims.

And Empedocles somewhere says—

129

Will ye not cease from the harrowing sound of slaughter?
Nor see ye
How in your reckless frenzy of mind ye devour one another?

And—

Raising his dear one on high—his son with visage how alter'd!—
Witless the sire doth slay him, with prayer: and the rest are
astonied
Begging him e'en as he slays; but he, ever deaf to their outcries,

σφάξας ἐν μεγάροισι κακὴν ἀλεγύνατο δαῖτα.
ὡς δ' αὖτως πατέρ' υἱὸς ἑλὼν καὶ μητέρα παῖδες
θυμὸν ἀπορραΐσαντε φίλας κατὰ σάρκας ἔδουσιν.

- 130 ταῦτα δὴ παρήνουν οἱ περὶ τὸν Πυθαγόραν πταί-
οντες. οὐ γὰρ εἰ ἔστι τι διῆκον δι' ἡμῶν τε καὶ
ἐκείνων πνεῦμα, εὐθὺς ἔστι τις ἡμῖν δικαιοσύνη
πρὸς τὰ ἄλογα τῶν ζώων. ἰδοὺ γὰρ καὶ διὰ τῶν
λίθων καὶ διὰ τῶν φυτῶν πεφοίτηκέ τι πνεῦμα,
ὥστε ἡμᾶς αὐτοῖς συνενουσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἔστιν
ἡμῖν δίκαιον πρὸς τὰ φυτὰ καὶ λίθους, οὐδὲ μὴν
τέμνοντες καὶ πρίζοντες τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν σωματίων
131 ἀδικοῦμεν. τί οὖν φασὶν οἱ στωικοὶ δικαιοσύνην
τινὰ καὶ ἐπιπλοκὴν ἔχειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους πρὸς
ἀλλήλους καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς; οὐ καθόσον ἔστι τὸ
ἐλληλακὸς διὰ πάντων πνεῦμα, ἐπεὶ ἂν καὶ πρὸς τὰ
ἄλογα τῶν ζώων ἐσώζετό τι δίκαιον ἡμῖν, ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ
λόγον ἔχομεν τὸν ἐπ' ἀλλήλους τε καὶ θεοὺς δια-
τείνοντα, οὐ τὰ ἄλογα τῶν ζώων μὴ μετέχοντα οὐκ
ἂν ἔχοι τι πρὸς ἡμᾶς δίκαιον. ὥστε εἰ ἡ δικαιοσύνη
κατὰ τινα κοινωνίαν ἀνθρώπων πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ
ἀνθρώπων πρὸς θεοὺς νενόηται, δεήσει μὴ ὄντων
θεῶν μηδὲ δικαιοσύνην ὑπαρκτὴν εἶναι. ὑπαρκτὴ
δέ ἔστιν ἡ δικαιοσύνη· ῥητέον ἄρα καὶ θεοὺς
ὑπάρχειν.
- 132 Πρὸς τούτοις εἰ μὴ εἰσὶ θεοί, οὐδὲ μαντικὴ
ὑπάρχει, ἐπιστήμη οὐσα θεωρητικὴ καὶ ἐξηγητικὴ
τῶν ὑπὸ θεῶν ἀνθρώποις διδομένων σημείων, οὐδὲ
μὴν θεοληπτικὴ καὶ ἀστρομαντικὴ, οὐ θυτικὴ,¹ οὐχ
ἢ δι' ὀνείρων πρόρρησις. ἄτοπον δέ γε τοσοῦτο

¹ θυτικὴ Fabr.: λογικὴ mss., Bekk.

Still in his halls doth slay and his horrible banquet prepareth.
Likewise the son doth capture the sire, the children the
mother,
Reave them of life, and greedily feed on the flesh of their
kinsfolk.

This, then, was the advice of Pythagoras, but mis- 130
taken; for it does not at once follow that, if there
exists a spirit which pervades both us and them, there
exists some form of justice as between us and the
irrational animals. For, look you, the spirit also
ranges through stones and through plants, so that we
are united with them, but we have no relation of
justice with plants and stones, nor to be sure do we
act unjustly in cutting and sawing bodies of that
kind.—Why then do the Stoics assert that men have a 131
certain just relation and connexion with one another
and with the Gods? Not on account of the existence
of the spirit which runs through all things,—since
then there would also remain for us a duty towards
the irrational animals,—but because we possess that
reason which reaches out to one another and the
Gods, whereas the irrational animals, having no share
in this, will have no relation of justice towards us.
So that, if justice is conceived because of a certain
fellowship between men and men and between
men and Gods, if Gods do not exist, it must follow
that justice also is non-existent. But justice is
existent; we must declare, therefore, that Gods also
exist.

In addition,—if Gods exist not, neither does 132
prophecy exist, it being “the science which observes
and interprets the signs given by Gods to men”; nor
yet inspiration and astrology, nor divination, nor
prediction by means of dreams. But it is absurd

πλήθος πραγμάτων ἀναιρεῖν πεπιστευμένων ἤδη
παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις. εἰσὶν ἄρα θεοί.

- 133 Ζήνων δὲ καὶ τοιοῦτον ἠρώτα λόγον. τοὺς θεοὺς
εὐλόγως ἂν τις τιμῶ· τοὺς δὲ μὴ ὄντας οὐκ ἂν
τις εὐλόγως τιμῶ· εἰσὶν ἄρα θεοί ᾧ λόγῳ τινὲς
παραβάλλοντές φασι “ τοὺς σοφοὺς ἂν τις εὐλόγως
τιμῶ· τοὺς δὲ μὴ ὄντας οὐκ ἂν τις εὐλόγως τιμῶ·
εἰσὶν ἄρα σοφοί.” ὅπερ οὐκ ἤρεσκε τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς
στοᾶς, μέχρι τοῦ νῦν ἀνευρέτου ὄντος τοῦ κατ’
134 αὐτοὺς σοφοῦ. ἀπαντῶν δὲ πρὸς τὴν παραβολὴν
Διογένης ὁ Βαβυλώνιος τὸ δευτέρον φησι λῆμμα
τοῦ Ζήνωνος λόγου τοιοῦτον εἶναι τῇ δυνάμει
“ τοὺς δὲ μὴ πεφυκότας εἶναι οὐκ ἂν τις εὐλόγως
τιμῶη.” τοιούτου γὰρ λαμβανομένου δηλὸν ὡς
135 πεφύκασιν εἶναι θεοί. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ εἰσὶν ἤδη.
εἰ γὰρ ἅπαξ ποτὲ ἦσαν, καὶ νῦν εἰσὶν, ὥσπερ εἰ
ἄτομοι ἦσαν, καὶ νῦν εἰσὶν· ἄφθαρτα γὰρ καὶ
ἀγένητα τὰ τοιαῦτά ἐστι κατὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν τῶν
σωμάτων. διὸ καὶ κατὰ ἀκόλουθον ἐπιφορὰν
συνάξει ὁ λόγος. οἱ δὲ γε σοφοὶ οὐκ ἐπεὶ πεφύ-
136 κασιν εἶναι, ἤδη καὶ εἰσὶν. ἄλλοι δὲ φασι τὸ
πρῶτον λῆμμα τοῦ Ζήνωνος, τὸ “ τοὺς θεοὺς
εὐλόγως ἂν τις τιμῶη,” ἀμφίβολον εἶναι· ἐν μὲν
γὰρ σημαίνειν “ τοὺς θεοὺς εὐλόγως ἂν τις τιμῶη,”
ἕτερον δὲ “ τιμητικῶς ἔχει.” λαμβάνεσθαι δὲ τὸ
πρῶτον, ὅπερ ψεῦδος ἔσται ἐπὶ τῶν σοφῶν.
137 Οἱ μὲν οὖν κομιζόμενοι λόγοι παρά τε τοῖς
στομακοῖς καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων αἰρέσεων

to abolish such a multitude of things which are
already believed in by all men. Therefore, Gods
exist.

Zeno propounded this argument also :—“ One may 133
reasonably honour the Gods ; but those who are non-
existent one may not reasonably honour ; therefore
Gods exist.” But some oppose to this argument a
parallel one—“ The wise one may reasonably honour ;
but one may not reasonably honour the non-existent ;
therefore wise men exist.” Which conclusion was
unpleasing to the Stoics, as their “ Wise man ” has
remained undiscoverable up till now. In reply to the 134
counter-argument Diogenes the Babylonian “ asserts
that the second premiss in Zeno’s argument is virtually
this—“ But those who are not of such a nature as to
exist one may not reasonably honour ” ; for when
this premiss is accepted it is evident that the Gods
are of such a nature as to exist. But if so, they do 135
actually exist. For if they had once existed at any
time, they also exist now, just as, if atoms had existed,
they also exist now ; for according to the conception
of such bodies, they are imperishable and uncreate.
Hence the argument will deduce a consequent
conclusion. But it is not true of the wise that they
actually exist because they are of such a nature as to
exist. But others say that Zeno’s first premiss—136
“ One may reasonably honour the Gods ”—is am-
biguous ; for one of its significations is “ one may
reasonably pay honour to the Gods,” the other “ one
may hold them in honour.”^b But the first is taken as
the premiss, and in the case of the wise this will be
false.

Such, then, in their character are the arguments 137
brought forward by the Stoics, and by those of the

* A Stoic philosopher, disciple of Chrysippus (circa 160 B.C.)

^b By “ pay honour to ” is meant “ worship ” (with offer-
ings, etc.), whereas “ hold in honour ” implies merely the
respect paid to any “ honourable man.”

εἰς τὸ ὑπάρχειν θεοὺς τοιοῦτοί τινές εἰσι κατὰ τὸν
 χαρακτήρα· ὅτι δὲ οὐ λείπονται τούτων ἕνεκα τῆς
 138 περὶ τὸ πείθειν ἰσοσθενείας καὶ οἱ τὸ μὴ εἶναι θεοὺς
 διδάσκοντες παρακειμένως ὑποδεικτέον. εἴπερ τοί-
 νυν εἰσι θεοί, ζῶα εἰσίν· καὶ ὧ λόγῳ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς
 στοᾶς ἐδίδασκον ὅτι ζῶόν ἐστιν ὁ κόσμος, τῷ αὐτῷ
 χρησάμενος ἂν τις κατασκευάζοι ὅτι καὶ ὁ θεός
 ἐστὶ ζῶον. τὸ γὰρ ζῶον τοῦ μὴ ζώου κρείττον
 ἐστίν, οὐδὲν δὲ κρείττον ἐστὶ θεοῦ· ζῶον ἄρα ἐστὶν
 ὁ θεός, συμπαραλαμβανομένης τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ
 τῆς κοινῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐννοίας, εἶγε καὶ ὁ βίος
 καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ ἡ τῶν ἀρίστων φιλοσόφων
 πληθὺς μαρτυρεῖ τῷ ζῶον εἶναι τὸν θεόν. ὥστε
 139 σώζεσθαι τὰ τῆς ἀκολουθίας. εἰ γὰρ εἰσι θεοί,
 ζῶα εἰσίν. εἰ δὲ ζῶα εἰσίν, αἰσθάνονται· πᾶν
 γὰρ ζῶον αἰσθήσεως μετοχῇ νοεῖται ζῶον. εἰ δὲ
 αἰσθάνονται, καὶ πικράζονται καὶ γλυκάζονται· οὐ
 γὰρ δι' ἄλλης μὲν τινος αἰσθήσεως ἀντιλαμβάνονται
 τῶν αἰσθητῶν, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ διὰ τῆς γεύσεως. ὅθεν
 καὶ τὸ περικόπτειν ταύτην ἢ τινα αἰσθησιν ἄλλην
 140 ἀπλῶς τοῦ θεοῦ παντελῶς ἐστὶν ἀπίθανον· περι-
 τοτέρας γὰρ αἰσθήσεις ἔχων [ὁ ἄνθρωπος] ἀμείνων
 αὐτοῦ γενήσεται, δέον μᾶλλον, ὡς ἔλεγεν ὁ
 Καρνεάδης, σὺν ταῖς πᾶσιν ὑπαρχούσαις πέντε
 ταύταις αἰσθήσεσι καὶ ἄλλας αὐτῷ περισσοτέρας
 προσμαρτυρεῖν, ἢ ἔχη πλειόνων ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι
 πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ μὴ τῶν πέντε ἀφαιρεῖν. ῥήτέον
 οὐδὲν τινὰ γεῦσιν ἔχειν τὸν θεόν, καὶ διὰ ταύτης

* Cf. P.H. iii. 2 ff.

other Schools, in favour of the existence of Gods ; and
 in similar fashion we must show that those which
 maintain the non-existence of Gods do not fall short
 of the former in respect of their equipollence as
 regards persuasion.^a If, then, Gods exist, they are 138
 animals^b; and, employing the same argument as that
 by which the Stoics maintained^c that the Universe is
 an animal, one may demonstrate that God, too, is an
 animal. For "the animal is better than the non-
 animal; but nothing is better than God; therefore
 God is an animal"; and in support of this argument
 is adduced also the common conception of mankind,
 since ordinary folk and the poets, too, and the majority
 of the best philosophers testify to the fact that God is
 an animal. So that the steps of the logical sequence
 are secured. For if Gods exist, they are animals. 139
 But if they are animals, they have sensation; for
 every animal is conceived as an animal by its parti-
 cipation in sensation. And if they have sensation,
 they also feel bitterness and sweetness; for they do
 not perceive sense-objects through some other sense,
 and not through taste as well; hence it is wholly
 improbable that God should be entirely deprived of
 this or of any other sense; for the more numerous 140
 the senses he has, the better he will be, since it is
 preferable—as Carneades said—that, in addition to
 the five senses which belong to all men, yet others
 should supply him with evidence, in order that he
 may be able to apprehend a greater number of things,
 rather than that he should be robbed of the five. We
 must assert, then, that God possesses taste, and by it

^b i.e. "animals" in the sense of "living creatures" (cf. § 107)—not as opposed to "men."

^c Cf. § 107 *supra*.

141 ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τῶν γευστῶν. ἀλλ' εἰ διὰ γεύσεως ἀντιλαμβάνεται, γλυκάζεται καὶ πικράζεται. γλυκαζόμενος δὲ καὶ πικραζόμενος εὐαρεστήσει τισὶ καὶ δυσαρεστήσει. δυσαρεστῶν δὲ τισὶ καὶ ὀχλήσεως ἔσται δεκτικὸς καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον μεταβολῆς. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, φθαρτὸς ἔστω. ὥστε εἶπερ εἰσὶ θεοί, φθαρτοὶ εἰσιν. οὐκ ἄρα θεοὶ εἰσίν.

142 Εἴγε μὴν ἔστι θεός, ζῶων ἐστίν. εἰ ζῶων ἐστὶ, καὶ αἰσθάνεται· τὸ γὰρ ζῶων τοῦ μὴ ζῶου οὐκ ἄλλω τινὶ διαφέρει ἢ τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι. εἰ δὲ αἰσθάνεται, καὶ ἀκούει καὶ ὄρα καὶ ὀσφραίνεται καὶ ἄπτεται.

143 εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔστι τινὰ τὰ καθ' ἐκάστην αἰσθησιν οἰκειοῦντα αὐτὸν καὶ ἀλλοτριοῦντα, οἷον κατὰ μὲν ὄρασιν τὰ συμμετρῶς ἔχοντα καὶ οὐχ ἐτέρως, κατὰ δὲ ἀκοὴν αἰ ἐμμελεῖς φωναὶ καὶ οὐχ αἰ μὴ οὕτως ἔχουσαι, κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔστι τινὰ τῷ θεῷ ὀχληρά· καὶ εἰ ἔστι τινὰ θεῷ ὀχληρά, γίνεται ἐν τῇ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον μεταβολῇ θεός, ὥστε καὶ ἐν φθορᾷ. φθαρτὸς ἄρα ὁ θεός. τοῦτο δὲ παρὰ τὴν κοινὴν ἔννοιαν ὑπῆρχεν αὐτοῦ· τοῖνυν οὐκ ἔστι τὸ θεῖον.

144 Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ μιᾶς αἰσθήσεως ἐπεξεργαστικώτερον τιθέναι τὸν λόγον, οἷον τῆς ὀράσεως. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τὸ θεῖον, ζῶων ἐστίν. εἰ ζῶων ἐστίν, ὄρα [ὄλος]¹.

οὖλος γὰρ ὄρα, οὖλος δὲ νοεῖ, οὖλος δὲ τ' ἀκούει.

145 εἰ δὲ ὄρα, καὶ λευκὰ ὄρα καὶ μέλανα. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ λευκὸν μὲν ἔστι τὸ διακριτικὸν ὄψεως μέλαν δὲ τὸ

perceives things gustable. But if he perceives by 141 means of taste, he feels sweetness and bitterness; and feeling sweetness and bitterness, he will be pleased by some things and displeased by others; and being displeased by some things, he will be receptive of vexation and of change for the worse. But if so, he is perishable. So that if Gods exist, they are perishable. Therefore Gods do not exist.

If, however, God exists, he is an animal. If he is 142 an animal, he has sensation; for the animal differs from the not-animal by nothing else than by sensation. But if he has sensation, he hears and sees and smells and touches. And if so, there are certain 143 things in connexion with each sense which are congenial or repellent to him,—for instance, in respect of sight, things which are symmetrical and not the reverse; and in respect of hearing, sounds which are musical and not those of a different kind; and similarly with the rest of the senses. But if so, there are certain things which are vexatious to God; and if there are certain things vexatious to God, God is subject to change for the worse, and thus also to decay. Therefore God is perishable. But this is contrary to the general conception of him. Therefore the Divine does not exist.

And it is also possible to base the argument still 144 more effectively on a single sense,—for instance, vision. For if the Divine exists, it is an animal. And if it is an animal, it sees, for—

He with the whole of his being beholdeth and marketh and heareth.^a

And if he sees, he sees both white things and black. But since white is what is divisive of sight, and black 145

¹ [ὄλος] secl. Heintz.

^a Xenophanes, *Frag.* 2.

συγχυτικὸν ὄψεως, διακρίνεται τὴν ὄψιν καὶ συγ-
χέται ὁ θεός. εἰ δὲ διακρίσεως καὶ συγχύσεως
ἔστι δεκτικός, καὶ φθορᾶς ἔστι δεκτικός. τοῖνυν
εἰ ἔστι τὸ θεῖον, φθαρτὸν ἔστω. οὐχὶ δὲ γε φθαρτὸν
ἔστω· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστω.

- 146 Καὶ μὴν ἢ αἰσθησις ἑτεροίωσις τις ἐστίν· ἀμή-
χανον γὰρ τὸ δι' αἰσθήσεως τινος ἀντιλαμβανόμενον
μὴ ἑτεροιοῦσθαι ἀλλὰ οὕτω διακεῖσθαι ὡς πρὸ τῆς
ἀντιλήψεως διέκειτο. εἰ οὖν αἰσθάνεται ὁ θεός,
καὶ ἑτεροιοῦται· εἰ δὲ ἑτεροιοῦται, ἑτεροιώσεως
147 δεκτικός ἐστὶ καὶ μεταβολῆς· δεκτικὸς δὲ ὢν
μεταβολῆς πάντως καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον μεταβολῆς
ἔσται δεκτικός. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ φθαρτός ἐστίν.
ἄτοπον δὲ γε τὸ λέγειν τὸν θεὸν φθαρτὸν ὑπάρχειν·
ἄτοπον ἄρα καὶ τὸ ἀξιοῦν εἶναι τοῦτον.
- 148 Πρὸς τοῦτοις, εἰ ἔστι τι θεῖον, ἦτοι πεπερα-
σμένον ἐστὶν ἢ ἄπειρον. καὶ ἄπειρον μὲν οὐκ ἂν
εἶη, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀκίνητον ἂν εἶη καὶ ἄψυχον. εἰ γὰρ
κινεῖται τὸ ἄπειρον, τόπον ἐκ τόπου μετέρχεται·
τόπον δὲ ἐκ τόπου μετερχόμενον ἐν τόπῳ ἐστίν, ἐν
τόπῳ δὲ ὃν πεπέρασται. εἰ ἄρα ἐστὶ τι ἄπειρον,
ἀκίνητόν ἐστίν· ἢ εἴπερ κινεῖται, οὐκ ἔστω ἄπειρον.
- 149 ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἄψυχόν ἐστίν. εἰ γὰρ ὑπὸ ψυχῆς
συνέχεται, πάντως ἀπὸ τῶν μέσων ἐπὶ τὰ πέρατα
καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν περάτων ἐπὶ τὰ μέσα φερόμενον συν-
έχεται. ἐν δὲ ἀπείρῳ οὐδὲν ἐστὶ μέσον οὐδὲ πέρας·
ὥστε οὐδὲ ἔμψυχόν ἐστὶ τὸ ἄπειρον. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο
εἰ ἄπειρόν ἐστι τὸ θεῖον, οὔτε κινεῖται οὔτε ἔμψυχόν

what is compressive of sight,^a God has his sight divided and compressed. And if he is receptive of division and compression, he is receptive also of decay. So then, if the Divine exists, it is perishable. But it is not perishable; therefore it does not exist.

Again, sensation is a kind of alteration; for it is 146 impossible for that which apprehends by means of a sense not to be altered, but to remain in the same condition in which it was before the act of apprehension. If God, then, has sensation, he is altered; and if he is altered, he is receptive of alteration and change; and being receptive of change, he will cer- 147 tainly be receptive of change for the worse. And if so, he is also perishable. But it is absurd to say that God is perishable; therefore it is absurd also to claim that he exists.

Furthermore, if any Divinity exists, it is either 148 limited or unlimited. And it will not be unlimited, since then it would be both motionless and inanimate. For if the unlimited moves, it passes from place to place; and if it passes from place to place, it is in space, and being in space it is limited. Therefore, if any unlimited exists, it is motionless; or if it moves, it is not unlimited. So likewise it is inanimate; for 149 if it is held together by soul, it is certainly held together by movement from the centres to the limits and from the limits to the centres.^b But in the unlimited there is no centre nor limit; so that the unlimited is not animate either. And on account of this, if the Divine is unlimited it neither moves nor is

^a Alluding to the theory of Plato, *Timaeus* 67 E, that the stream of particles which issues from a white object "divides" the visual current which proceeds from the eyes, while that from a black object "compresses" it.

^b Alluding to the Stoic view that sensation is effected by means of breath-currents passing between the central sense-organ (the heart) and the peripheral sense-organs (eye, ear, etc.).

- ἐστιν. κινεῖται δὲ τὸ θεῖον καὶ ἐμψυχίας ἀξιούται
 150 μετέχειν· οὐκ ἄρα ἄπειρόν ἐστι τὸ θεῖον. καὶ
 μὴν οὐδὲ πεπερασμένον. ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ πεπερα-
 σμένον τοῦ ἀπείρου μέρος ἐστί, τὸ δὲ ὅλον τοῦ
 μέρους κρείττον ἐστί, δηλον ὡς τὸ ἄπειρον τοῦ
 θεῖου κρείττον ἔσται καὶ κρατήσῃ τῆς θείας
 φύσεως. ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ λέγειν θεοῦ τι κρείττον, καὶ
 κρατεῖν τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ φύσεως· τοίνυν οὐδὲ πεπερα-
 σμένον ἐστί τὸ θεῖον. ἀλλ' εἰ μήτε ἄπειρόν ἐστι
 μήτε πεπερασμένον, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστι
 τρίτον νοεῖν, οὐδὲν ἔσται τὸ θεῖον.
- 151 Καὶ μὴν εἰ ἔστι τι τὸ θεῖον, ἤτοι σῶμά ἐστιν ἢ
 ἀσώματον· οὔτε δὲ ἀσώματόν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ ἀψυχόν
 ἐστί καὶ ἀναίσθητον καὶ οὐδὲν δυνάμενον ἐνεργεῖν
 τὸ ἀσώματον, οὔτε σῶμα, ἐπεὶ πᾶν σῶμα μετα-
 βλητόν τέ ἐστι καὶ φθαρτόν, ἀφθαρτόν δὲ τὸ θεῖον·
 οὐ τοίνυν ὑπάρχει τὸ θεῖον.
- 152 Εἴγε μὴν ἔστι τὸ θεῖον, πάντως καὶ ζῶον ἐστίν.
 εἰ δὲ ζῶον ἐστίν, πάντως καὶ πανάρετόν ἐστι καὶ
 εὐδαιμόν· εὐδαιμονία δὲ χωρὶς ἀρετῆς οὐ δύναται
 ὑποστήναι· εἰ δὲ πανάρετός ἐστι, καὶ πάσας ἔχει
 τὰς ἀρετάς. ἀλλ' οὐ πάσας μὲν ἔχει τὰς ἀρετάς,
 οὐχὶ δέ γε καὶ ἐγκράτειαν ἔχει καὶ καρτερίαν. οὐχὶ
 δέ γε ταύτας μὲν ἔχει τὰς ἀρετάς, οὐχὶ δέ γε ἔστι
 τινὰ δυσάποσχετα καὶ δυσεγκαρτέρητα τῷ θεῷ.
- 153 ἐγκράτεια γάρ ἐστι διάθεσις ἀνυπέρβατος τῶν κατ'
 ὀρθὸν λόγον γιγνομένων, ἢ ἀρετὴ ὑπεράνω ποιούσα
 ἡμᾶς τῶν δοκούντων εἶναι δυσάποσχετών· ἐγ-
 κρατεύεται γάρ, φασίν, οὐχ ὁ θανατιώσης γραῶς

animate. But the Divine moves and participates, as is claimed, in animation ; therefore the Divine is not unlimited.—Nor yet is it limited. For since the 150 limited is a part of the unlimited, and the whole is superior to the part, it is plain that the unlimited will be superior to the Divine and will master the Divine nature. But it is absurd to say that anything is superior to God and master over the nature of God ; so then, the Divine is not limited either. But if it is neither unlimited nor limited, and besides these one can conceive no third possibility, the Divine will be nothing.

Again, if the Divine is anything, it is either a body 151 or incorporeal ; but it is not incorporeal, since the incorporeal is inanimate and insensitive and incapable of any action ; nor is it a body, since every body is both subject to change and perishable, whereas the Divine is imperishable ; so then, the Divine does not exist.

If, however, the Divine exists, it is certainly 152 an animal. And if it is an animal, it is certainly both all-virtuous and happy (and without virtue happiness cannot subsist). And if it is all-virtuous, it possesses all the virtues. But it does not possess all the virtues unless it possesses both continence and fortitude. And it does not possess these virtues unless there are certain things which are hard for God to abstain from and hard to endure. For continence is “ a state of mind in- 153 capable of transgressing the rules of right reason, or a virtue which makes us superior to the things which seem hard to abstain from.” For a man, they say, is continent not when he abstains from an old woman with one foot in the grave, but when he

ἀπεχόμενος, ἀλλ' ὁ Λαΐδος καὶ Φρύνης ἢ τινος
 τοιαύτης δυνάμενος ἀπολαῦσαι, εἶτα ἀπεχόμενος.
 154 καρτερία δέ ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη ὑπομενετέων καὶ οὐχ
 ὑπομενετέων, ἢ ἀρετὴ ὑπεράνω ποιούσα ἡμᾶς τῶν
 δοκούντων εἶναι δυσσομενήτων· χρῆται γὰρ καρ-
 155 τερίᾳ ὁ τεμνόμενος καὶ καιόμενος, εἶτα [δὲ] δια-
 καρτερῶν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ οἰνόμελι πίνων. ἔσται οὖν
 τινὰ τῷ θεῷ δυσσομένητα καὶ δυσσπόμενα. εἰ
 γὰρ μὴ ἔσται, οὐχὶ ταύτας ἔξει τὰς ἀρετάς, τοῦτ-
 156 ἐστι τὴν ἐγκράτειαν καὶ τὴν καρτερίαν. εἰ δὲ
 ταύτας οὐκ ἔχει τὰς ἀρετάς, ἐπεὶ μεταξύ ἀρετῆς
 καὶ κακίας οὐδὲν ἔστι, τὰς ἀντιθέτους ταῖσδε ταῖς
 ἀρεταῖς ἔξει κακίας ὡσπερ τὴν μαλακίαν καὶ τὴν
 ἀκρασίαν· καθάπερ γὰρ ὁ μὴ ἔχων τὴν ὑγίαν
 νόσον ἔχει, οὕτως ὁ μὴ ἔχων ἐγκράτειαν καὶ
 157 καρτερίαν ἐν ταῖς ἀντικειμέναις ἐστὶ κακίας, ὅπερ
 ἀτοπον ἐπὶ θεοῦ λέγεσθαι. εἰ δὲ ἔστι τινὰ δυσσπόμε-
 να καὶ δυσσομένητα τῷ θεῷ, ἔστι τινὰ καὶ τὰ
 ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον αὐτοῦ μεταβλητικὰ καὶ ὀχλήσεως
 ποιητικὰ. ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο, δεκτικός ἐστιν ὀχλήσεως
 ὁ θεὸς καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον μεταβολῆς, διὸ καὶ
 φθορᾶς. ὥστε εἶπερ ἔστιν ὁ θεός, φθαρτός ἐστιν·
 οὐχὶ δὲ τὸ δεύτερον, οὐκ ἄρα τὸ πρῶτον.
 158 Ἔτι δὲ σὺν τοῖς προκειμένοις, εἰ πανάρτερόν ἐστι
 τὸ θεῖον, καὶ ἀνδρίαν ἔχει· εἰ δὲ ἀνδρίαν ἔχει, ἐπι-
 159 στήμην ἔχει δεινῶν καὶ οὐ δεινῶν καὶ τῶν μεταξύ,
 καὶ εἰ τοῦτο, ἔστι τι θεῷ δεινόν. οὐ γὰρ δή γε ὁ
 ἀνδρείος διὰ ταῦτά ἐστιν ἀνδρείος ὅτι ἐπιστήμην ἔχει

has the power of enjoying Laïs^a or Phryne^a or some
 such charmer and then abstains. And fortitude is 154
 “the science of things endurable and not endurable,
 or a virtue which makes us superior to the things
 which seem hard to endure.” For it is the man who
 holds firm when he is being cut and burned that shows
 fortitude, and not the man who is drinking sweet
 wine. There will, then, exist certain things which 155
 are hard for God to endure and hard to abstain from.
 For if these do not exist, he will not possess these
 virtues,—namely, continence and fortitude. And if 156
 he does not possess these virtues, since there is no
 mean state between virtue and vice, he will possess
 the vices which are contrary to these virtues, such as
 effeminacy and incontinence; for just as he who has
 not health has disease, so he who has not continence
 and fortitude is subject to the opposite vices, which
 is an absurd thing to say about God. And if there are 157
 some things which are hard for God to abstain from
 and hard to endure, there are some things which are
 able to change him for the worse and to cause him
 vexation. But if so, God is receptive of vexation and
 of change for the worse, and hence of decay also. So
 that if God exists, he is perishable; but the second
 is not (true); therefore the first is not (true).

Further, in addition to the foregoing arguments,— 158
 if God is all-virtuous he possesses courage; and if he
 possesses courage he possesses “knowledge of things
 fearful and not fearful and of things intermediate”;
 and if so, there is something which is fearful to God.
 For, to be sure, the courageous man is not courageous 159
 because he possesses knowledge of the sort of things

^a Two Greek courtesans famed for their beauty; P. sat
 as a “model” to Praxiteles and Apelles (circa 330 a.c.).

τοῦ ποιά ἐστὶ τὰ δευὰ τῷ γείτονι, ἀλλὰ τὰ αὐτῷ ἄπερ οὐκ¹ ἀπαράλλακτά ἐστὶ τοῖς τοῦ πλησίον δεινοῖς. ὥστε ἐπεὶ ἀνδρείος ἐστὶν ὁ θεός, ἐστὶ 160 τι αὐτῷ δεινόν. εἰ ἐστὶ τι θεῷ δεινόν, ἐστὶ τι τῷ θεῷ ὀχλήσεως ποιητικόν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἐπι- δεκτικός ἐστὶν ὀχλήσεως, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ φθορᾶς. ὅθεν εἰ ἐστὶ τὸ θείον, φθαρτόν ἐστὶν. οὐχὶ δὲ φθαρτόν ἐστὶν· οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν.

161 Καὶ μὴν εἰ πανάρετόν ἐστὶ τὸ θείον, καὶ τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν ἔχει. εἰ δὲ μεγαλοψυχίαν ἔχει, ἐπιστήμην ἔχει ποιούσαν ὑπεραίρειν τῶν συμβαι- νόντων. εἰ τοῦτο, ἐστὶ τινὰ τὰ συμβαινόντα αὐτῷ ὦν ὑπεράνω γίνεται. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἐστὶ τινὰ καὶ ὀχληρὰ τὰ συμβαινόντα αὐτῷ, καὶ οὕτω φθαρτὸς ἐστὶν. οὐχὶ δὲ γε τοῦτο· τοῖνον οὐδὲ τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς.

162 Πρὸς τούτοις, εἴπερ πάσας ἔχει τὰς ἀρετὰς ὁ θεός, καὶ φρόνησιν ἔχει. εἰ φρόνησιν ἔχει, ἔχει καὶ ἐπιστήμην ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἀδιαφόρων. εἰ δὲ ἐπιστήμην ἔχει τούτων, οἶδε ποιά ἐστὶ τὰ 163 ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ καὶ ἀδιάφορα. ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ ὁ πόνος τῶν ἀδιαφόρων ἐστίν, οἶδε καὶ τὸν πόνον [καὶ] ποῖός τις ὑπάρχει τὴν φύσιν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ περιπέπτωκεν αὐτῷ· μὴ περιπεσῶν γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ἔσχε νόησιν αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' ὄν τρόπον ὁ μὴ περι- πεπτωκὸς λευκῷ χρώματι καὶ μέλανι διὰ τὸ ἐκ γενετῆς εἶναι πηρὸς οὐ δύναται νόησιν ἔχειν χρώ- ματος, οὕτως οὐδὲ θεὸς μὴ περιπεπτωκὸς πόνῳ 164 δύναται νόησιν ἔχειν τούτου. ὅποτε γὰρ ἡμεῖς οἱ περιπεσόντες πολλάκις τούτῳ τὴν ιδιότητα τῆς

¹ οὐκ NLE: om. cet., Bekk.

which are fearful to his neighbour, but of those which are fearful to himself; and these are not to be identified with those which are fearful to his neighbour. Consequently, since God is courageous, there is something which is fearful to him. If there is some- 160 thing fearful to God, there is something which causes vexation to God. And if so, he is receptive of vexation, and therefore of decay. Hence, if the Divine exists, it is perishable. But it is not perishable; therefore, it does not exist.

Moreover, if the Divine is all-virtuous, it also 161 possesses greatness of soul. And if it possesses greatness of soul, it possesses "knowledge which makes it rise superior to circumstances." If so, there exist certain circumstances above which it rises superior. And if so, there exist certain circumstances which are vexatious to it, and thus it will be perishable. But this is not (true); neither, then, is the original supposition.

Furthermore: if God possesses all the virtues, 162 he possesses wisdom. If he possesses wisdom, he possesses "knowledge of things good and evil and indifferent." And if he possesses knowledge of these, he knows what the good things are and the evil and the indifferent. Since, then, suffering is one of the 163 indifferent things, he knows both suffering and what its real nature is. And if so, he has experienced it; for without experience he would not have formed a notion of it, but, just as the man who has not experienced white colour and black, owing to his being blind from birth, cannot possess a notion of colour, so too God cannot have a notion of suffering if he has not experienced it. For when we, who have often 164 experienced it, are unable to discern distinctly the

περὶ τοὺς ποδαλγικοὺς ἀλγηδόνας οὐ δυνάμεθα
 τρανώς γνωρίζειν, οὐδὲ διηγουμένων ἡμῖν τινῶν
 συμβαλεῖν, οὐδὲ παρ' αὐτῶν τῶν πεπονητότων
 συμφώνως ἀκοῦσαι διὰ τὸ ἀλλοῦς ἄλλως ταύτην
 ἐρμηνεύειν καὶ τοὺς μὲν στροφήν τοὺς δὲ κλάσει
 τοὺς δὲ νύξει λέγειν ὅμοιον αὐτοῖς παρακολουθεῖν,
 ἢ πού γε θεὸς μῆδ' ὄλως πόνῳ περιπεπωκῶς
 165 <οὐ>¹ δύναται πόνου νόησιν ἔχειν. νῆ Δί', ἀλλὰ
 πόνῳ μὲν, φασίν, οὐ περιπέπτωκεν, ἡδονῇ δέ, κακ
 ταύτης ἐκείνον νενόηκεν. ὅπερ ἦν εὐθες. πρῶτον
 μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν ἀμήχανον μὴ πειραθέντα πόνου νόη-
 σιν ἡδονῆς λαβεῖν· κατὰ γὰρ τὴν παντός τοῦ ἀλγύ-
 166 νοντος ὑπεξαίρεσιν συνίστασθαι πέφυκεν. εἴτα καὶ
 τούτου συγχωρηθέντος πάλιν ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ φθαρτὸν
 εἶναι τὸν θεόν. εἰ γὰρ τῆς τοιαύτης διαχύσεως
 δεκτικός ἐστι, καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον μεταβολῆς
 ἔσται δεκτικός ὁ θεὸς καὶ φθαρτός ἐστιν. οὐχὶ δέ
 γε τοῦτο, ὥστε οὐδὲ τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς.
 167 Εἴπερ τε πανάρετόν ἐστι τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὴν φρόνη-
 σιν ἔχει, ἔχει καὶ τὴν εὐβουλίαν, παρόσον ἢ εὐ-
 βουλία φρόνησις ἐστὶ πρὸς τὰ βουλευτά. εἰ δὲ τὴν
 168 εὐβουλίαν ἔχει, καὶ βουλεύεται. εἰ δὲ βουλεύεται,
 ἔστι τι ἀδηλον αὐτῷ· εἰ γὰρ μῆδέν ἐστιν ἀδηλον
 αὐτῷ, οὐ βουλεύεται οὐδὲ τὴν εὐβουλίαν ἔχει τῷ
 τὴν βουλήν ἀδηλου τινὸς ἔχεισθαι, ζήτησιν οὖσαν
 περὶ τοῦ πῶς ἐν τοῖς παρούσιν ὀρθῶς διεξάγομεν.
 ἄτοπον δὲ γέ ἐστι τὸ μὴ βουλεύεσθαι μῆδὲ εὐ-
 βουλίαν ἔχειν τὸν θεόν. τοῖνον ἔχει ταύτην, καὶ
 169 ἐστὶ τι ἀδηλον αὐτῷ. εἰ δὲ ἐστὶ τι ἀδηλον θεῷ, οὐκ

¹ <οὐ> N, Mutsch.

special quality of the pain suffered by gouty patients, or to guess it from descriptions, or to get consistent accounts from the actual sufferers, since they explain it in different ways, and some say that they find it to resemble twisting, others bending, others stabbing,—surely, if God has had no experience at all of suffering, he cannot possess a notion of suffering. Truly, they 165 reply, he has not experienced suffering, but pleasure, and from this he has formed a notion of the other. But this is silly. For, in the first place, it is impossible to acquire a notion of pleasure without having experienced suffering; for it is owing to the withdrawal of everything that gives pain that pleasure really subsists. And, in the next place, if this be 166 granted, it follows once more that God is perishable. For if he is receptive of such a collapse, God will be receptive of change for the worse, and is perishable. But this is not (true), nor, in consequence, is the original supposition (true).

Also, if the Divine is all-virtuous and possesses 167 wisdom, it possesses sound-deliberation, inasmuch as sound-deliberation is "wisdom regarding things requiring deliberation." And if it possesses sound-deliberation, it deliberates. And if it deliberates, 168 there is something which is non-evident to it; for if there is nothing non-evident to it, it does not deliberate nor does it possess sound-deliberation, since deliberation is attached to what is non-evident, being "a search for the way of conducting ourselves rightly under present circumstances." But it is absurd that God should not deliberate nor possess sound-deliberation. So then, he does possess this, and there is something which is non-evident to him. And if there is something non-evident to God, it is 169

- ἄλλο μὲν τι ἔστιν ἄδηλον θεῶ, οὐχὶ δέ γε καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον οἶον εἰ ἔστι τινα αὐτοῦ ἐν τῇ ἀπειρίᾳ φθαρτικά. ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτό ἐστιν ἄδηλον αὐτῷ, πάντως κατὰ τὴν προσδοκίαν τῶν φθαρτικῶν αὐτοῦ τούτων, ἐξ ὧν ἐν συνθροήσῃ τινὶ καὶ κινήματι 170 γενήσεται, κἂν φοβοίτο. εἰ δὲ ἐν [συγκινήματι τοιοῦτω γίνεται, καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον μεταβολῆς ἔσται δεκτικός, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ φθαρτός. ὧ ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ μηδ' ὅλως αὐτὸν ὑπάρχειν.
- 171 Καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ μηδὲν ἄδηλόν ἐστι θεῶ ἀλλ' αὐτόθεν ἐκ φύσεως πάντων καταληπτικός καθ- ἔστηκεν, οὐκ ἔχει τέχνην, ἀλλ' ὃν τρόπον οὐκ ἂν εἴπαμεν περὶ τὸν βάτραχον ἢ τὸν δελφίνα, φύσει νηκτικούς ὄντας, τέχνην εἶναι νηκτικὴν, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον οὐδὲ περὶ τὸν θεὸν ἐκ φύσεως πάντα κατα- λαμβανόμενον εἴπαμεν ἂν εἶναι τέχνην τῷ ἀδήλου τινός καὶ [τοῦ]¹ αὐτόθεν μὴ καταλαμβανομένου 172 ἐφάπτεσθαι τὴν τέχνην. ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ ἔστι περὶ τὸν θεὸν τέχνη, οὐδ' ἢ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη ἔσται περὶ αὐτόν, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐδὲ ἢ ἀρετῆ. μὴ ἔχων δὲ θεὸς ἀρετὴν ἀνύπαρκτός ἐστιν. καὶ ἄλλως, λογικός ὧν ὁ θεός, εἰ μὴ ἔχει τὴν ἀρετὴν, πάντως τὴν 173 ἀντίθετον ἔχει κακίαν· οὐχὶ δέ γε τὴν ἀντίθετον ἔχει κακίαν· ἔχει ἄρα τέχνην ὁ θεός, καὶ ἔστι τι ἄδηλον τῷ θεῶ. ὧ ἔπεται τὸ φθαρτὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι, καθὼς πρῶτον ἐπελογοσάμεθα. οὐδὲ γε φθαρτός ἐστιν οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν.
- 174 Εἴπερ τε μὴ ἔχει φρόνησιν, ὡς ὑπεμνήσαμεν, οὐδὲ σωφροσύνην ἔχει· ἔστι γὰρ ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐξίς ἐν αἰρέσει καὶ φυγαῖς σώζουσα τὰ τῆς φρονήσεως

¹ [τοῦ] secl. Heintz.

impossible that this—if anything else—should not be non-evident to God, namely, whether there exist in the infinite any things destructive of himself. But if this is non-evident to him, he will certainly be afraid, owing to the expectation of these destructive things which will put him in a state of alarm and commotion. And if he comes to be in a commotion of this sort, 170 he will be receptive also of change for the worse, and therefore he will be perishable. From which it follows that he does not exist at all.

Here, too, is another argument: If nothing is non- 171 evident to God, but he of his own nature is capable of apprehending all things, he does not possess art, but just as we should not say that there exists in the frog or the dolphin, which swim by nature, an art of swimming, in the same way we should not say of God, who of his own nature apprehends all things, that he has art, since art has to do with a thing that is non-evident and not apprehended of itself. But if God 172 has not art, he will not have the art of living; and if so, neither will he have virtue. But if God has not virtue, he is non-existent.—And again: God being rational, if he does not possess virtue, he certainly 173 possesses its opposite, vice; but he does not possess its opposite, vice; therefore God possesses art, and there is something non-evident to God. From which it follows that he is perishable, as we argued before.^a But he is not perishable; therefore, he does not exist.

Also, if (as we have shown ^b) he does not possess 174 wisdom, neither does he possess temperance; for temperance is “a state which preserves, in preferences and aversions, the decisions of wisdom.”

^a Cf. § 169.^b Cf. §§ 162, 167 ff.

- 175 κρίματα. καὶ ἄλλως δέ, εἰ μὴδὲν ἔστιν ὁ τὰς τοῦ θεοῦ ὀρέξεις κινήσει, μὴδὲ ἔστι τι ὁ ἐπισπάσεται τὸν θεόν, πῶς ἐροῦμεν αὐτὸν εἶναι σώφρονα, τῆς σωφροσύνης κατὰ τοιοῦτόν τινα λόγον ἡμῖν νενοημένης; καθὰ γὰρ οὐκ ἂν εἴποιμεν τὸν κίονα σωφρονεῖν, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον οὐδὲ τὸν θεὸν δεόντως φήσομεν σώφρονα τυγχάνειν. περιαιρούμενων δὲ αὐτοῦ τούτων τῶν ἀρετῶν περιαιρεῖται καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ αἱ λοιπαί. ἀλλ' εἰ μηδεμίαν ἀρετὴν ἔχει ὁ θεός, ἀνύπαρκτός ἐστιν. τὸ δὲ ἠγούμενον· τὸ ἄρα λήγον.
- 176 Πάλιν εἰ ἔστι τὸ θεῖον, ἥτοι ἔχει ἀρετὴν ἢ οὐκ ἔχει. καὶ εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἔχει, φαῖλον ἔστι τὸ θεῖον καὶ κακοδαιμονικόν, ὅπερ ἄτοπον. εἰ δὲ ἔχει, ἔσται τι τοῦ θεοῦ κρείττον· ὃν γὰρ τρόπον ἢ τοῦ ἵππου ἀρετὴ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἵππου ἐστὶ κρείττων καὶ ἢ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετὴ τοῦ ἔχοντος ἐστὶ κρείττων, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἢ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀρετὴ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ
- 177 ἔσται κρείττων. εἰ δὲ ἔστι κρείττων τοῦ θεοῦ, δῆλον ὡς ἐλλιπῶς ἔχων φαύλως ἔξει καὶ φθαρτὸς γενήσεται. ἀλλ' εἰ μεταξὺ μὲν τῶν ἀντικειμένων οὐδὲν ἔστιν, εἰς οὐδέτερον δὲ ὁρᾶται τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἐμπύπτων ὁ θεός, ῥητέον μὴ εἶναι θεόν.
- 178 Καὶ ἔτι, εἰ ἔστιν, ἥτοι φωνᾶν ἔστιν ἢ ἄφωνον. τὸ μὲν οὖν λέγειν ἄφωνον τὸν θεὸν τελείως ἄτοπον καὶ ταῖς κοιναῖς ἐννοίαις μαχόμενον. εἰ δὲ φωνᾶν ἔστί, φωνῇ χρῆται καὶ ἔχει φωνητικὰ ὄργανα, καθάπερ πνεῦμονα καὶ τραχείαν ἀρτηρίαν γλώσσαν τε καὶ στόμα. τοῦτο δὲ ἄτοπον καὶ ἐγγὺς τῆς Ἐπικούρου μυθολογίας. τοίνυν ῥητέον μὴ ὑπάρχειν
- 179 τὸν θεόν. καὶ γὰρ δὴ εἰ φωνῇ χρῆται, ὁμιλεῖ. εἰ δὲ ὁμιλεῖ, πάντως κατὰ τινα διάλεκτον ὁμιλεῖ. εἰ
- 90

And besides, if there is nothing which will excite the 175 desires of God, and nothing which will attract God, how shall we say that he is temperate, when temperance is conceived by us in accordance with this kind of definition? For just as we should not say that the pillar is temperate, so also we are bound to deny that God is temperate. And if he is stripped of these virtues, he is stripped of justice also and the rest. But if God possesses no virtue, he is non-existent; and the antecedent (is true), therefore the consequent (is true).

Again, if the Divine exists, it either has or has not 176 virtue. And if it has it not, the Divine is base and unhappy, which is absurd. But if it has it, there will exist something which is better than God; for just as the virtue of the horse is better than the horse itself and the virtue of the man better than he who has it, so also the virtue of God will be better than God himself. But if it is better than God, plainly he, as 177 deficient, will be in a bad state and will be perishable. But if there is nothing intermediate between the opposites, and it is seen that God falls under neither of the opposites, one must declare that God does not exist.

Further, if he exists, he is either gifted with speech 178 or speechless. But to say that God is speechless is perfectly absurd and in conflict with our general conceptions. But if he is gifted with speech, he employs speech and has organs of speech, such as lungs and windpipe, tongue and mouth. But this is absurd and borders on the fairy-tales of Epicurus. So then, one must assert that God does not exist. Moreover, if he 179 employs speech, he converses. And if he converses, he certainly converses in some dialect. But if so,

δὲ τοῦτο, τί μᾶλλον τῇ Ἑλληνίδι ἢ τῇ βαρβάρῳ
 χρῆται γλώσσῃ; καὶ εἰ τῇ Ἑλληνίδι, τί μᾶλλον
 τῇ Ἰάδι ἢ τῇ Αἰολίδι ἢ τινι τῶν ἄλλων; καὶ μὴν
 οὐδὲ πάσαις οὐδεμιᾷ τοίνυν. καὶ γὰρ εἰ τῇ Ἑλ-
 ληνίδι χρῆται, πῶς τῇ βαρβάρῳ χρήσεται, εἰ μὴ
 ἐδίδαξέ τις αὐτόν; <πῶς δὲ διδάξει τις αὐτόν>,¹
 εἰ μὴ ἑρμηνεὺς ἔχει παραπλησίους τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν
 δυναμένοις ἑρμηνεύειν; ρητέον τοίνυν μὴ χρῆσθαι
 φωνῇ τὸ θεῖον, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἀνύπαρκτον
 εἶναι.

180 Πάλιν εἰ ἔστι τὸ θεῖον, ἥτοι σῶμά ἐστιν ἢ ἀ-
 σώματον. ἀλλ' ἀσώματον μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη διὰ
 τὰς ἐμπροσθεν ἡμῖν εἰρημένους αἰτίας. εἰ δὲ σῶμα
 ἐστίν, ἥτοι σύγκριμά ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν ἀπλῶν στοιχείων
 ἢ ἀπλοῦν ἐστὶ καὶ στοιχειῶδες σῶμα. καὶ εἰ μὲν
 σύγκριμά ἐστι, φθαρτόν ἐστιν· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ κατὰ
 σύννοδόν τινων ἀποτελεσθὲν ἀνάγκη διαλυόμενον
 181 φθείρεσθαι. εἰ δὲ ἀπλοῦν ἐστὶ σῶμα, ἥτοι πῦρ
 ἐστίν ἢ ἀήρ ἢ ὕδωρ ἢ γῆ. ὅποῖον δ' ἂν ἦ τούτων,
 ἀψυχόν ἐστὶ καὶ ἄλογον· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. εἰ οὖν
 μήτε σύγκριμά ἐστιν ὁ θεὸς μήτε ἀπλοῦν σῶμα,
 παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστι, ρητέον μηδὲν εἶναι
 τὸν θεόν.

182 Τοιοῦτον μὲν δὴ καὶ τὸ τῶν λόγων τούτων εἶδος
 ἐστίν· ἠρώτηνται δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ Καρνεάδου καὶ
 σωριτικῶς τινές, οὓς ὁ γνώριμος αὐτοῦ Κλειτό-
 μαχος ὡς σπουδαιότατους καὶ ἀνυτικωτάτους
 ἀνέγραψεν, ἔχοντας τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον. εἰ Ζεὺς
 θεός ἐστι, καὶ ὁ Ποσειδῶν θεός ἐστιν·

¹ <πῶς . . . αὐτόν> add. cj. Bekk.

why does he employ the Greek tongue rather than
 the barbarian? And if the Greek, why the Ionian
 rather than the Aeolic or any of the others? And, of
 course, he does not employ them all; and so he
 employs none. For if he employs the Greek, how
 will he employ the barbarian, unless someone has
 taught him? <But how will anyone teach him,>
 unless he has interpreters similar to those amongst us
 who are able to interpret? We must say, then, that
 the Divine does not employ speech, and on this
 account it is non-existent.

Again, if the Divine exists, it is either a body or 180
 incorporeal. But it will not be incorporeal for the
 reasons we have already stated.^a And if it is a body,
 it is either a compound of the simple elements or a
 simple and elemental body. And if it is a compound,
 it is perishable; for everything which is constructed
 by the union of things must necessarily dissolve and
 perish. And if it is a simple body, it is either fire 181
 or air or water or earth. But whichever of these it is,
 it is without soul or reason, which is absurd. If, then,
 God is neither a compound nor a simple body, and
 besides these there is no other alternative, one must
 declare that God is nothing.

Such, then, is the character of these arguments. 182
 And some have been propounded, in the form of a
 "sorites,"^b by Carneades, which his friend Cleito-
 machus recorded as being most excellent and con-
 vincing; and this is the form they take:—If Zeus is
 a God, Poseidon also is a God:—

^a Cf. § 151.

^b For the "sorites" or chain-argument cf. *P.H.* ii. 253 n.

τρεις γάρ τ' ἐκ Κρόνου ἡμεν ἀδελφοί, οὓς τέκετο
 Ῥέα,
 Ζεὺς καὶ ἐγώ, τρίτατος δ' Ἀΐδης ἐνέροιον
 ἀνάσσειν.
 τριχθὰ δὲ πάντα δέδασται, ἕκαστος δ' ἔμμορε
 τιμῆς.

ὥστε εἰ ὁ Ζεὺς θεὸς ἐστὶ, καὶ ὁ Ποσειδῶν ἀδελφός
 183 ὧν τούτου θεὸς γενήσεται. εἰ δὲ ὁ Ποσειδῶν θεὸς
 ἐστὶ, καὶ ὁ Ἀχελῷος ἔσται θεός· εἰ δὲ ὁ Ἀχελῷος,
 καὶ ὁ Νεῖλος· εἰ ὁ Νεῖλος, καὶ πᾶς ποταμός· εἰ πᾶς
 ποταμός, καὶ οἱ ῥύακες ἂν εἴεν θεοί, καὶ εἰ οἱ
 ῥύακες, καὶ αἱ χαράδραι. οὐχὶ δὲ οἱ ῥύακες· οὐδὲ
 ὁ Ζεὺς ἄρα θεός ἐστιν. εἰ δὲ γε ἦσαν θεοί, καὶ ὁ
 184 Ζεὺς ἦν ἂν θεός. οὐκ ἄρα θεοὶ εἰσὶν. καὶ μὴν
 εἰ ὁ ἥλιος θεός ἐστίν, καὶ ἡ ἡμέρα ἂν εἴη θεός· οὐ
 γὰρ ἄλλο τι ἦν ἡ ἡμέρα ἢ ἥλιος ὑπὲρ γῆς. εἰ δ'
 ἡ ἡμέρα ἐστὶ θεός, καὶ ὁ μὴν ἔσται θεός· σύστημα
 γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐξ ἡμερῶν. εἰ δὲ ὁ μὴν θεός ἐστὶ, καὶ
 ὁ ἐνιαυτός ἂν εἴη θεός· σύστημα γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐκ
 μηνῶν ὁ ἐνιαυτός. οὐχὶ δὲ γε τοῦτο· τοίνυν οὐδὲ
 τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς. σὺν τῷ ἀποπον εἶναι, φασί, τὴν
 μὲν ἡμέραν θεὸν εἶναι λέγειν, τὴν δὲ ἔω καὶ τὴν
 185 μεσημβρίαν καὶ τὴν δειλὴν μηκέτι. εἶγε μὴν ἡ
 Ἄρτεμις θεός ἐστίν, καὶ ἡ Ἐνοδία τις ἂν εἴη θεός·
 ἐπ' ἴσης γὰρ ἐκένη καὶ αὕτη δεδόξασται εἶναι θεὰ
 (< εἰ δὲ θεὰ) ἢ Ἐνοδία, καὶ ἡ Προθυριδία καὶ
 Ἐπιμύλιος καὶ Ἐπικλιβάνιος. οὐχὶ δὲ γε τοῦτο·
 186 οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς. εἶγε μὴν τὴν Ἀφροδίτην
 θεὰν λέγομεν εἶναι, ἔσται καὶ ὁ Ἔρως υἱὸς ὧν
 187 Ἀφροδίτης θεός. ἀλλ' εἰ ὁ Ἔρως θεός ἐστὶ, καὶ ὁ

¹ < εἰ δὲ θεὰ > add. Heintz.

Brethren three were we, all children of Cronos and Rhea, Zeus and myself and Hades, the third, with the Shades for his kingdom.

All things were parted in three, and each hath his share of the glory.^a

So that if Zeus is a God, Poseidon also, being his brother, will be a God. And if Poseidon is a God, 183 Achelous,^b too, will be a God; and if Achelous, Neilos; and if Neilos, every river as well; and if every river, the streams also will be Gods; and if the streams, the torrents; but the streams are not Gods; neither, then, is Zeus a God. But if there had been Gods, Zeus would have been a God. Therefore, there are no Gods.—Further, if the sun is a God, day will 184 also be a God; for day is nothing else than sun above the earth. And if day is God, the month too will be God; for it is a composite made up of days. And if the month is God, the year too will be God; for the year is a composite made up of months. But this is not (true); neither then is the original supposition. And besides, they say, it is absurd to declare that the day is God, but not the dawn and midday and the evening.—Again, if Artemis is a Goddess, Enodia^c too will be 185 a Goddess; for the latter has been accounted a Goddess equally with the former; (and if) Enodia (is a Deity), so also is Prothyridia and Epimylius and Epiclibanius.^d But this is not (true); neither is the original supposition.—Again, if we declare that 186 Aphrodite is a Goddess, Eros, being the son of Aphrodite, will be a God; but if Eros is a God, Eleos 187

^a Homer, *Il.* xv. 187 ff. (Poseidon being the speaker).

^b A river of Aetolia, as Neilos (the Nile) of Egypt.

^c i.e. "Our Lady of the Wayside" (Lat. *Trivia*).

^d These epithets (treated as proper names) signify respectively "Our Lady of the Porch,"—"of the Mill," and—"of the Oven."

"Ελεος ἔσται θεός· ἀμφοτέρα γάρ ἐστι ψυχή ἀπάθη, καὶ ὁμοίως ἀφωσιώται τῷ Ἐρωτι καὶ ὁ "Ελεος· παρὰ Ἀθηναίοις γοῦν Ἐλεόν βωμοὶ τινες
188 εἰσίν. εἰ δὲ ὁ "Ελεος θεός ἐστι, καὶ ὁ Φόβος·

ἀμορφότατος [γὰρ] τὴν ὄψιν, εἰμὶ γὰρ φόβος, πάντων ἐλάχιστον τοῦ καλοῦ μετέχων θεός.

εἰ δὲ ὁ φόβος, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη. οὐχὶ δέ γε ταῦτα· οὐδὲ ἡ Ἀφροδίτη ἄρα θεός ἐστιν. εἰ δέ γε ἦσαν θεοί, κἂν Ἀφροδίτη θεὸς ὑπῆρχεν· οὐκ
189 ἄρα εἰσὶ θεοί. καὶ μὴν εἰ ἡ Δημήτηρ θεός ἐστι, καὶ ἡ Γῆ θεός ἐστιν· ἡ γὰρ Δημήτηρ, φασίν, οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἢ Γῆ μήτηρ. εἰ ἡ Γῆ θεός ἐστι, καὶ τὰ ὄρη καὶ αἱ ἀκρωτηρία καὶ πᾶς λίθος ἔσται θεός. οὐχὶ δέ γε τοῦτο· τοίνυν οὐδὲ τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς.
190 καὶ ἄλλους δὴ τοιοῦτους σωρίτας ἐρωτῶσιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Καρνεάδην εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι θεούς· ὧν τὸ γένος ἀπὸ τῶν προεκκευμένων ἀντάρκως γέγονε πρόδηλον.

Ἄλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἀντεπιχειρούμενα παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς φιλοσόφοις εἰς τὸ εἶναι θεούς καὶ εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι τοιαυτὰ τινα καθέστηκεν. ἐφ' οἷς ἡ τῶν σκεπτικῶν ἐποχὴ συνεισάγεται, καὶ μάλιστα προσγενομένης αὐτοῖς καὶ τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ βίου
192 περὶ θεῶν ἀνωμαλίας. ἄλλοι γὰρ ἄλλας καὶ ἀ συμφώνους ἔχουσι περὶ τούτων ὑπολήψεις, ὥστε μήτε πᾶσας εἶναι πιστὰς διὰ τὴν μάχην μήτε τινας διὰ τὴν ἰσοσθένειαν, προσεπισφραγίζομένης τὸ τοιοῦτο καὶ τῆς παρὰ τοῖς θεολόγοις καὶ ποιηταῖς

^a i.e. "Pity"; and "Phobos," in the next sentence, is "Fear."

too will be a God; for both are psychic affections, and Eleos^a has been worshipped like Eros; at any rate, amongst the Athenians there are some altars to Eleos. And if Eleos is a God, so also is Phobos—

188

Fear am I, most unshapely to behold,
The god who shares in beauty least of all.^b

And if Phobos, then all the rest of the soul's affections. But these are not Gods; neither, then, is Aphrodite a Goddess. But if they had been Gods, Aphrodite too would have been a Goddess. Therefore Gods do not exist.—Again, if Demeter is a Goddess, Gê too is
189 a Goddess; for Demeter, they say, is nothing else than Gê-meter.^c If Gê is a Goddess, the mountains and the cliffs and every stone will be a God. But this is not (true); neither, then, is the original supposition.—And Carneades propounds other sorites-argu-
190 ments of this kind to show that Gods do not exist, the general character of which is sufficiently plain from the examples already set forth.

Well then, such are the opposing arguments alleged 191 by the Dogmatic philosophers in favour of the existence and of the non-existence of Gods. As a result of these the Sceptics' suspension of judgement is introduced, especially since they are supplemented by the divergency of the views of ordinary folk about the Gods. For different people have different and dis-
192 cordant notions about them, so that neither are all of these notions to be trusted because of their inconsistency, nor some of them because of their equipollence; and this is further confirmed by the mythologizing of the theologians and the poets; for

^b *Frag. Com. adesp.* 154 (Kock).
^c i.e. "Earth-Mother."

193 μυθοποιήσεως· πάσης γὰρ ἀσεβείας ἐστὶ πλήρης.
 193 ἔνθεν καὶ ὁ Ξενοφάνης διελέγχων τοὺς περὶ Ὅμηρον
 καὶ Ἡσίοδον φησὶ

πάντα θεοῖς ἀνέθηκαν Ὅμηρός θ' Ἡσίοδος τε
 ὅσσα παρ' ἀνθρώποισιν ὀνειδέα καὶ ψόγος ἐστίν,
 κλέπτειν μοιχεύειν τε καὶ ἀλλήλους ἀπατεύειν.

194 Πλὴν ἐκ τούτων παραστήσαντες ὅτι ἀκολουθεῖ
 τοῖς περὶ τῶν δραστηρίων ἀρχῶν δογματικῶς
 εἰρημένους ἢ ἐποχή, μετὰ τούτ' ἤδη καὶ σκεπτικώ-
 τερον διδάσκωμεν ὅτι κοινῶς ἀπορός ἐστὶ τῷ¹ περὶ
 τοῦ ποιούντος αἰτίου καὶ ὁ περὶ τῆς πασχούσης
 ὕλης λόγος.

ΠΕΡΙ ΑΙΤΙΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΠΑΣΧΟΝΤΟΣ

195 Περὶ μὲν τῆς τοῦ αἰτίου νοήσεως ἐν ἄλλοις
 ἀκριβέστερον διελέχθημεν· νῦν δὲ ἀρκούμενοι τῇ
 ὀλοσχερεῖ τούτου ἐπινοήσει, λέγομεν ὅτι τῶν σκε-
 ψαμένων περὶ αὐτοῦ οἱ μὲν ἔφασαν εἶναι τί τινος
 αἴτιον, οἱ δὲ μὴ εἶναι, οἱ δὲ μὴ μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ μὴ
 εἶναι. καὶ εἶναι μὲν οἱ πλείστοι τῶν δογματικῶν
 ἢ πάντες σχεδόν, μὴ εἶναι δὲ οἱ τὴν μεταβλητικὴν
 καὶ μεταβατικὴν κίνησιν ἀνελόντες σοφισταί· οὐ
 χωρὶς γὰρ ταύτης ὑφίστατα, τὸ ποιοῦν. μὴ μᾶλ-
 λον δὲ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι τὸ αἰτίον φασιν οἱ ἀπὸ
 τῆς σκέψεως. καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἀσκόπως, ἐκ τῶν εἰς
 196 ἑκάτερον ἐπιχειρουμένων πάρεστι μαθεῖν. ἀρχὴ δὲ
 γινέσθω πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀξιούντων εἶναι τί τινος
 αἴτιον.

Εἴπερ τοίνυν, φασίν, ἔστι σπέρμα, ἔστι καὶ αἴτιον,

¹ ἀπορός . . . τῷ N, Mutsch.: ἀπορόν . . . τὸ cet., Bekk.

it is full of all kinds of impiety. Hence, too, Xeno- 193
 phanes, in his criticism of Homer and Hesiod, says—

Unto the gods are ascrib'd by Hesiod, like as by Homer,
 All of the acts which are counted by men disgraceful and
 shameful,
 Thieving and wenching and dealing deceitfully one with
 another.

Now, however, that we have established on these 194
 grounds that suspension follows from the dogmatic
 arguments concerning the efficient principles, let us
 next show, by a more sceptical discussion, that the
 account given of passive matter is no less open to
 doubt than that of the active cause.

CONCERNING CAUSE AND THE PASSIVE

We have elsewhere^a discussed more exactly the 195
 notion of Cause ; and now, contenting ourselves with
 the general conception of it, we affirm that, of those
 who have examined it, some have asserted that a
 cause of things exists, others that it does not exist,
 others that it is "no more" existent than non-
 existent. Most, or almost all, of the Dogmatists
 assert its existence ; the Sophists who deny change
 and transient motion assert its non-existence, as
 without such motion the agent does not subsist.
 And the Sceptics assert that cause is "no more"
 existent than non-existent. And that they do not do
 this inconsiderately one may learn from the argu-
 ments adduced on either side. Let us begin first 196
 with those who maintain that a cause of things
 exists.

If, say they, seed exists, cause also exists since the

^a Cf. §§ 4-12 *supra*, P.H. iii. 13 ff. ; also *Adv. Phys.* ii. 70 ff.

ἐπεὶ τὸ σπέρμα αἰτιὸν ἐστὶ τῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ φυομένων τε καὶ γεννωμένων· ἐστὶ δέ γε σπέρμα, ὡς ἐκ τῶν σπειρομένων καὶ ζωογονουμένων δείκνυται·
 197 ἔστιν ἄρα αἰτιον. καὶ πάλιν, εἰ ἔστι τι φύσις, ἔστι τι αἰτιον· τῶν γὰρ φυομένων ἢ ἐκπεφυκότων αἰτιὸν ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις. ὑπάρχει δὲ αὕτη, ὡς ἀπὸ τῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων συμφανές· καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπον, φασίν, εἰς ἀνδριαντοποιοῦ μὲν ἡμᾶς ἐργαστήριον παρελθόντας καὶ θεασαμένους τῶν ἀνδριάντων τοὺς μὲν τελείους καὶ ἀπηρτισμένους τοὺς δὲ ἡμιτελεῖς, ἄλλους δὲ ἀρχὴν ἔχοντας τυπώσεως, πιστεύειν ὅτι ἔστι τις τούτων τεχνίτης καὶ δημιουργός, εἰς δὲ τοῦτον τὸν κόσμον εἰσελθόντας καὶ γῆν μὲν ἐν μέσῳ θεωροῦντας ὕδωρ δὲ μετὰ ταύτην, καὶ τρίτην ἀνάτασιν ἀέρος, οὐρανὸν τε καὶ ἀστέρας λίμνας τε καὶ ποταμοὺς καὶ ζῶων παντοδαπῶν γένη καὶ φυτῶν ποικιλίας, μὴ ὑπολαμβάνειν εἶναι τινα καὶ τῆς τούτων δημιουργίας αἰτιον. τοῖνυν εἰ ἔστι φύσις, ἔστι τι αἰτιον. ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· ἄρα τὸ
 198 δεύτερον. καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ ἔστι τι ψυχὴ, ἔστιν αἰτιον· αὕτη γὰρ καὶ τοῦ ζῆν καὶ τοῦ θνήσκειν αἰτία γίνεται, τοῦ μὲν ζῆν παρούσα, τοῦ δὲ θνήσκειν χωριζομένη τῶν σωμάτων. ἔστι δέ γε ψυχὴ, φασίν, εἴγε καὶ ὁ λέγων μὴ εἶναι ψυχὴν αὕτῃ προσχρόμενος τοῦτο ἀποφαίνεται· ἔστιν ἄρα αἰτιον.
 199 πρὸς τούτοις, εἰ ἔστι θεός, ἔστιν αἰτιον· οὗτος γὰρ ἦν ὁ τὰ ὅλα διοικῶν. ἔστι δέ γε κατὰ τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας τῶν ἀνθρώπων θεός· ἔστιν ἄρα αἰτιον. καίτοι κἂν μὴ θεὸς ὑπάρχη, ἔστιν αἰτιον· τὸ γὰρ μὴ εἶναι θεοὺς διὰ τινα αἰτίαν γίνεται. καὶ

* Cf. §§ 99 f. *supra*.

seed is the cause of the things which grow and are generated; but seed exists, as is proved by the plants sown and the animals generated; cause, therefore, exists.—And again: If nature exists at all, a 197 cause exists; for nature is the cause of the things which grow or have grown up naturally. But nature exists, as is plain from its effects. For it is in fact absurd, they say, that when we have visited a sculptor's workshop and have seen some of his statues complete and finished off, and some half-completed, and others in the first stage of their shaping, we should believe that there exists some craftsman and artificer of these things,^a but when we enter into this Universe and behold the earth in its centre, and next to this water, and thirdly the extent of air above, and the heaven and its stars, and the lakes and rivers, and the tribes of animals of every kind, and the varieties of plants, we should not suppose that there exists someone who is the cause of the construction of these things. So then, if nature exists, a cause exists. But in fact the first (is true); therefore the second (is true).—Further: If a soul exists at all, it is a 198 cause; for it is the cause of both living and dying, —of living when it is present, and of dying when it is being separated from its bodies. But the soul, they assert, exists, seeing that even he who says that the soul does not exist makes this statement by employing it. Therefore cause exists. —Moreover, if God exists, cause exists; for he is 199 the governor of all things. But according to the general notions of mankind God exists; cause, therefore, exists. Yet even if God does not exist, cause exists; for the non-existence of Gods is due to some cause. And thus both from the existence

τῷ οὖν ὑπάρχειν θεὸν καὶ τῷ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἐπ'
 200 ἴσῃς ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ εἶναι τι αἴτιον. πολλῶν γε
 μὴν γεννωμένων καὶ φθειρομένων αὐξομένων τε καὶ
 μειουμένων κινουμένων τε καὶ ἀκινήτων, ἐξ
 ἀνάγκης ὁμολογεῖν δεῖ τὸ εἶναι τινα τούτων αἴτια,
 τὰ μὲν γενέσεως τὰ δὲ φθορᾶς, καὶ τὰ μὲν αὐξήσεως
 τὰ δὲ μειώσεως καὶ ἤδη κινήσεως ἢ ἀκινήσιας.
 201 σὺν τῷ κἂν μὴ ὑπάρχη ταῦτα τὰ ἀποτελέσματα,
 φαίνεται δὲ μόνον, πάλιν εἰσαγεσθαι τὴν ὑπαρξίν
 τῶν αἰτίων· τοῦ γὰρ φαίνεσθαι μὲν ἡμῖν αὐτὰ ὡς
 ὑποκείμενα, μὴ ὑποκείσθαι δέ, αἰτιόν τι καθέστηκεν.
 202 καὶ μὴν εἰ μηδὲν ἔστιν αἴτιον, πάντα
 ἐκ παντὸς δεήσει γίνεσθαι καὶ ἐν παντὶ τόπῳ,
 ἔτι καὶ κατὰ πάντα καιρόν. ὅπερ ἄτοπον· εὐθέως
 γὰρ εἰ μηδὲν ἔστιν αἴτιον, οὐδὲν τὸ κωλύον ἐξ ἀν-
 203 θρώπου ἵππον συνίστασθαι. [αἴτιον ἄρα τι ἔσται.]
 μηδενὸς δὲ ὄντος τοῦ κωλύοντος συστήσεται ποτε
 ἐξ ἀνθρώπου ἵππος, καὶ οὕτως, εἰ τύχοι, ἐξ ἵππου
 φυτόν. κατὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὐκ ἀδύνατον ἔσται χιόνα
 μὲν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ πῆγνυσθαι, ἄβροχίαν δὲ ἐν Πόντῳ
 συμβαίνειν, καὶ τὰ μὲν τοῦ θέρους ἐν χειμῶνι
 γίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ τοῦ χειμῶνος ἐν θέρει συνίστα-
 σθαι. ὅθεν εἴπερ ᾧ ἔπεται τι ἀδύνατον,¹ καὶ αὐτὸ
 ἔσται ἀδύνατον,¹ τῷ δὲ μὴ εἶναι αἴτιον ἔπεται πολλὰ
 204 ἀδυνάτων ὑπάρχειν. ὁ τε λέγων μὴ εἶναι
 αἴτιον ἤτοι χωρὶς αἰτίας τοῦτο λέγει ἢ μετὰ τινας
 αἰτίας. καὶ εἰ μὲν χωρὶς τινας αἰτίας, ἀπιστός
 ἔστιν, μετὰ τοῦ ἀκολουθεῖν αὐτῷ τὸ μὴ μᾶλλον
 τοῦτο ἀξιοῦν ἢ τὸ ἀντικείμενον τούτῳ, αἰτίας

¹ ἀδύνατον (bis) Arnim: δυνατόν mss., Bekk.

of God and from his non-existence there follows
 equally the existence of a cause.—And further, 200
 since many things become and perish, increase and
 decrease, move and cease from movement, one must
 necessarily allow that there exist some causes of these
 things—some of becoming, others of perishing; some
 of increase, others of decrease; and also of motion
 or want of motion.^a Moreover, even if these effects 201
 do not really exist but merely appear, the existence of
 their causes is introduced once more; for there exists
 some cause of their appearing to us as really existing
 things and not being such.—Again, if there is no 202
 cause all things will have to come from everything
 and in every place, and also at every time. But this
 is absurd; for indisputably, if nothing is a cause,
 there is nothing to prevent a horse being formed from
 a man. And if there is nothing to prevent this, a 203
 horse will some time be formed from a man, and like-
 wise, perchance, a plant from a horse. And for the
 same reason it will not be impossible for snow to
 congeal in Egypt and drought to occur in Pontus, and
 things proper to summer to happen in winter and
 things proper to winter to take place in summer.
 Hence, if what has for its consequence something
 impossible is itself also impossible, and many im-
 possible consequences follow from the non-existence
 of cause, one must declare that the non-existence of
 cause also is a thing impossible.—Also, he who says 204
 that cause does not exist says so either without a
 cause or with some cause. And if he does so without
 any cause, he is untrustworthy, besides the con-
 sequence he incurs of not maintaining this position
 any more than its opposite, as there pre-exists no

^a With §§ 200-204 cf. P.H. iii. 17-19.

εὐλόγου μὴ προὔποκειμένης, δι' ἣν φησιν ἀνύπαρκτον εἶναι τὸ αἷτιον. εἰ δὲ μετὰ τινος αἰτίας, περιτρέπεται, κὰν τῷ λέγειν μὴ εἶναι τι αἷτιον
 205 τίθησι τὸ εἶναι τι αἷτιον. ὅθεν καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς δυνάμειος ἐρωτῶν ἔξεστι καὶ τὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ σημείου καὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως διὰ τῶν ἐμπροσθεν ἀποδοθέντα λόγον, ὃς ἔξει τὴν σύνταξιν τοιαύτην. "εἰ ἔστι τι αἷτιον, ἔστιν αἷτιον· ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ μὴ ἔστι τι αἷτιον, ἔστιν αἷτιον· ἦτοι δὲ ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν· ἔστιν ἄρα." τῷ τε γὰρ εἶναι αἷτιον ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ εἶναι τι αἷτιον, μὴ διαφέροντος παρὰ τὸ ἡγούμενον τοῦ λήγοντος,
 206 τῷ τε μηδὲν εἶναι αἷτιον ἀκολουθεῖ πάλιν τὸ εἶναι τι αἷτιον, ἐπεὶπερ ὁ λέγων μηδὲν εἶναι αἷτιον ὑπὸ τινος αἰτίας κινηθεὶς λέγει μηδὲν εἶναι αἷτιον. ὥστε καὶ τὸ διεξευγμένον πρὸς τοῖς δυσὶ συνημμένοις ἀληθὲς γίνεσθαι ἐξ ἀντικειμένων διεξευγμένον, καὶ τὴν ἐπιφορὰν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις λήμμασι συνεισάγεσθαι, καθὼς ἀνώτερον παρεμυθησάμεθα.

Καὶ δὴ ταῦτα μὲν, ὡς κεφαλαιωδέστερον εἰπεῖν, εἰς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος εἴωθε λέγεσθαι παρὰ τοῖς
 207 δογματικοῖς· σκοπῶμεν δὲ ἀκολουθῶν καὶ τοὺς τῶν ἀπορητικῶν λόγους· φανήσονται γὰρ καὶ οὗτοι τοῖς ἐκκειμένοις ἰσοσθενεῖς καὶ ἔνεκα πειθοῦς μὴ διαφέροντες αὐτῶν. τὸ αἷτιον τοῖνυν, φασί, τῶν πρὸς τι ἔστιν· τινὸς γὰρ ἔστιν αἷτιον καὶ τινί, οἷον τὸ σμιλλίον τινὸς μὲν ἔστιν αἷτιον καθάπερ τῆς τομῆς,
 208 τινὶ δὲ καθάπερ τῆ σαρκί. τὰ δὲ γε πρὸς τι ἐπινοεῖται μόνον ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑπάρχει, καθὼς ἐν τοῖς περὶ ἀποδείξεως παρεστήσαμεν· καὶ τὸ αἷτιον ἄρα

^a This is an argument "by two hypotheses," consisting of a double hypothetical major premiss ("If A is, B is; and if A is not, B is") and a disjunctive minor ("A either is or is

reasonable cause which makes him say that cause is non-existent. But if he says so with some cause, he is self-refuted, and in the act of saying that no cause exists he is affirming the existence of some cause. Hence also it is possible to propound to the same effect
 205 the argument stated above, relating to the sign and proof, which will take the following shape ^a:—"If a cause exists, cause exists; but also if a cause does not exist, cause exists; but either it does or does not exist; therefore it exists." For the existence of a cause follows from the existence of cause, as the antecedent does not differ from the consequent; and
 206 the existence of a cause follows again from the existence of no cause, since he who says that no cause exists is moved by some cause when he says that no cause exists. So that the disjunctive in addition to the two hypothetical premisses is true, being composed of contradictories, and the conclusion is inferred from these premisses, as we have shown above.^b

Such then, summarily stated, are the arguments customarily adduced on this side by the Dogmatists. Let us consider next the arguments of the Doubters;
 207 for these will give expression to arguments just as forcible as those set forth and nowise different from them in point of persuasiveness. Cause then, they say, is a relative thing; for it is a cause of something and to something, as, for instance, the lancet is a cause of something, namely cutting, and to something, namely flesh. But relatives are only conceived
 208 and do not exist, as we have established in our chapter "Concerning proof"^c; therefore cause, too, will

not"), with the conclusion "therefore B is"; cf. *P.H.* ii. 3 n. and § 199 *supra*. ^b Cf. *Adv. Log.* ii. 281 f., 466 f.

^c See *Adv. Log.* ii. 453-461.

209 ἐπινοηθήσεται μόνον, οὐχ ὑπάρξει δέ. εἴπερ τε αἰτιόν ἐστιν, ὀφείλει ἔχειν τὸ οὐ λέγεται αἴτιον, ἐπεὶ (εἰ μὴ ἔχει)¹ οὐκ ἔσται αἴτιον, ἀλλ' ὃν τρόπον τὸ δεξιὸν μὴ παρόντος τοῦ πρὸς ὃ λέγεται δεξιὸν οὐκ ἔστιν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ αἴτιον μὴ παρόντος τοῦ πρὸς ὃ νοεῖται οὐκ ἔσται αἴτιον. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐκ ἔχει τὸ αἴτιον οὐδ' ἔστιν αἴτιον, διὰ τὸ μήτε γένεσιν μήτε φθορὰν μήτε πείσιν μήτε κοινῶς κίνησιν ὑπάρχειν, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν οἰκείων γνωσμένοι τόπων διδάξομεν. οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν αἴτιον.

210 Καὶ μὴν εἰ ἔστιν αἴτιον, ἦτοι σῶμα σώματος ἔστιν αἴτιον ἢ ἀσώματον ἀσωμάτου ἢ σῶμα ἀσωμάτου ἢ ἀσώματον σώματος· οὔτε δὲ σῶμα σώματος, ὡς παραστήσομεν, οὔτε ἀσώματον ἀσωμάτου οὔτε σῶμα ἀσωμάτου οὔτε ἐναλλάξ ἀ-

211 σώματον σώματος· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν αἴτιον. ἀμέλει καὶ αἱ γιγνώμεναι τῶν δογματικῶν στάσεις συμφωνοῦσι τῇ ἐκκεκμηῆναι διαιρέσει, εἶγε στωικοὶ μὲν πᾶν αἴτιον σῶμά φασι σώματι ἀσωμάτου τινὸς αἴτιον γίνεσθαι, οἷον σῶμα μὲν τὸ σμιλίον, σώματι δὲ τῇ σαρκί, ἀσωμάτου δὲ τοῦ τέμνεσθαι κατηγορήματος, καὶ πάλιν σῶμα μὲν τὸ πῦρ, σώματι δὲ τῷ ξύλῳ,

212 ἀσωμάτου δὲ τοῦ καίεσθαι κατηγορήματος. οἱ δὲ ἀσώματον ὑποθέμενοι τὸν κοσμοποιόν² καὶ τὸν πάντα διοικοῦντα θεὸν τούναντίον ἀσώματον σώματος λέγουσιν ὑπάρχειν τὸ αἴτιον. ὁ δ' Ἐπίκουρος καὶ σώματα σωμάτων καὶ ἀσώματα ἀσωμάτων

¹ <εἰ μὴ ἔχει> addo: <μὴ ἔχον> add. cj. Bekk.

² κοσμοποιόν] κόσμον, οἷον MSS., Bekk. (τὸν κόσμον del. cj. Heintz). (? secl. τὸν post καί.)

* See §§ 218-231, 267 ff.; *Adv. Phys.* ii. 45 ff., 310 ff.

^b For "expression" (λεκτόν) as incorporeal cf. *Adv. Log.*

only be conceived and will not exist.—Also, if cause 209 exists, it must have the thing whereof it is said to be the cause, as (without this) it will not be a cause, but just as right is not right in the absence of that to which it is said to be relative, so also cause will not be cause in the absence of that to which it is conceived as relative. But, in fact, cause has not that whereof it is cause, owing to the non-existence of becoming and perishing and affection and motion in general, as we shall show in their proper places when we come to them.^a Therefore cause does not exist.

Further, if cause exists, either body is cause of 210 body, or the incorporeal of the incorporeal, or body of the incorporeal, or the incorporeal of body; but, as we shall establish, body is not cause of body, nor the incorporeal of the incorporeal, nor body of the incorporeal, nor conversely the incorporeal of body; therefore cause does not exist. Moreover, the exist- 211 ing sects of the Dogmatists agree about the distinctions set forth, since the Stoics declare that "every cause is a body which is the cause to a body of something incorporeal"; for example, the lancet is a body, and "the flesh" is a body, and the expression "being cut" is incorporeal^b; and again, fire is a body, and "the wood" is a body, and the expression "being burnt" is incorporeal. But 212 those who assume that the God who is the World-maker and governs all things is incorporeal assert, on the contrary, that the incorporeal is the cause of body. And Epicurus says that both bodies are the causes of bodies and incorporeals of incorporeals,—

ii. 12. Notice that the cases (dat. and gen.) in the Greek are due to the grammatical form of the full sentences—"the lancet is the cause to the flesh of being cut"—"the fire is the cause to the wood of being burnt."

φησὶν αἴτια τυγχάνειν, καὶ σώματα μὲν σωμάτων
 ὡς τὰ στοιχεῖα τῶν συγκριμάτων, ἀσώματα δὲ
 ἀσωμάτων ὡς τὰ τοῖς πρώτοις σώμασι συμβεβη-
 213 κότα ἀσώματα τῶν τοῖς συγκρίμασι συμβεβηκότων
 ἀσωμάτων. ὥστε ἐὰν δείξωμεν ὅτι οὔτε τὸ σῶμα
 τοῦ σώματος οὔτε τὸ ἀσώματος τοῦ ἀσωμάτου
 οὔτε τὸ ἀσώματος τοῦ σώματος οὔτ' ἐναλλάξ
 δύναται τυγχάνειν αἴτιον, αὐτόθεν ἐσόμεθα κατ-
 214 σεων κατωρθῶσθαι. σῶμα μὲν οὖν σώματος
 οὐκ ἂν εἴη ποτὲ αἴτιον, ἐπεὶ περ ἀμφότερα τὴν
 αὐτὴν ἔχει φύσιν· καὶ εἰ τὸ ἕτερον αἴτιον λέγεται
 παρόσον ἐστὶ σῶμα, πάντως καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν
 σῶμα καθεστῶς αἴτιον γενήσεται. κοινῶς δὲ ἀμ-
 φοτέρων αἰτίων ὄντων οὐδὲν ἐστὶ τὸ πάσχον, μηδενὸς
 δὲ πάσχοντος οὐδὲ τὸ ποιῶν γενήσεται. εἰ ἄρα
 215 σῶμα σώματος ἐστὶν αἴτιον, οὐδὲν ἐστὶν αἴτιον.
 καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀσώματος ἀσωμάτου λέγοιτ' ἂν
 εἶναι ποιητικὸν διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν· εἰ γὰρ ἀμφό-
 τερα τῆς αὐτῆς μετέσχε φύσεως, τί μᾶλλον τόδε
 216 τοῦδε ῥητέον αἴτιον ἢ τόδε τοῦδε; λείπεται
 οὖν ἢ σῶμα ἀσωμάτου λέγειν αἴτιον ἢ ἀνάπαλι
 ἀσωμάτου σώματος. ὅπερ πάλιν τῶν ἀδυνάτων·
 τό τε γὰρ ποιῶν θιγεῖν ὀφείλει τῆς πασχούσης
 ὕλης, ἵνα ποιήσῃ, ἢ τε πάσχουσα ὕλη θιχθῆναι
 ὀφείλει, ἵνα πάθῃ, τὸ δὲ ἀσώματος οὔτε θιγεῖν οὔτε
 217 θιχθῆναι πέφυκεν. τοίνυν οὐδὲ σῶμα ἀσωμάτου ἢ
 ἀσώματος σώματος ἐστὶν αἴτιον. ᾧ ἔπεται τὸ
 μηδὲν ὑπάρχειν αἴτιον· εἰ γὰρ μήτε σῶμα σώματος
 ἐστὶν αἴτιον μήτε ἀσώματος ἀσωμάτου μήτε σῶμα

bodies of bodies as the elements are of the com-
 pounds, and incorporeals of incorporeals as the in-
 corporeal attributes of the primary bodies are of the
 incorporeal attributes of the compounds. So that if 213
 we shall show that body cannot be a cause of body,
 nor the incorporeal of the incorporeal, nor the in-
 corporeal of body, nor the converse, we shall thereby
 have established that none of the views mentioned is
 correct.—Now body will never be the cause of body 214
 since both have the same nature; and if the one is
 said to be a cause inasmuch as it is body, the other
 also, as being a body, will certainly be a cause. And
 as both equally are causes, there is no passive effect,
 and when nothing is passive there will be no efficient
 agency. Therefore, if body is the cause of body,
 there is no cause.—Moreover, the incorporeal cannot 215
 be said to be productive of the incorporeal, for the
 same reason; for if both partook of the same
 nature, why should this one be called the cause
 of that one rather than that one of this one? 216
 It remains for us, then, to say either that body
 is the cause of the incorporeal, or conversely that
 the incorporeal is the cause of body. But this
 again is impossible; for that which acts must
 touch the passive matter in order to act, and the
 passive matter must be touched, in order to be
 acted on, but the incorporeal is not of such a
 nature as either to touch or be touched.* So then 217
 neither is body the cause of the incorporeal nor the
 incorporeal of body. From which it follows that no
 cause exists; for if body is not a cause of body, nor
 the incorporeal of the incorporeal, nor body of the

* Cf. §§ 223, 281; Lucr. i. 304 "tangere et tangi nisi corpus nulla potest res."

ἀσωμάτου μήτε ἐναλλάξ, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστι, κατ' ἀνάγκη οὐδὲν ἔστιν αἴτιον.

- 218 Ἀφελέστερον μὲν οὖν οὕτω τινὲς παραμυθοῦνται τὰ τοῦ ἐκκειμένου λόγου λήμματα· ὁ δὲ Αἰνησίδημος διαφορώτερον ἐπ' αὐτῶν ἐχρήτο ταῖς περὶ 219 τῆς γενέσεως ἀπορίας. τὸ γὰρ σῶμα τοῦ σώματος οὐκ ἂν εἴη αἴτιον, ἐπεὶ περ ἢ ἀγέννητόν ἐστι τὸ τοιοῦτον σῶμα καθάπερ ἢ κατ' Ἐπίκουρον ἄτομος, ἢ γενητὸν ὡς ἄνθρωπος,¹ καὶ ἢ φανερόν ὡς σίδηρος καὶ πῦρ, ἢ ἀφανὲς ὡς ἄτομος. ὅ τι δ' ἂν ἦ τούτων, 220 οὐδὲν δύναται ποιεῖν. ἦτοι γὰρ καθ' ἑαυτὸ μένον ἕτερόν τι ποιεῖ ἢ ἑτέρῳ συνελθόν. ἀλλὰ μένον μὲν καθ' ἑαυτὸ πλείον αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς οἰκείας φύσεως οὐκ ἂν δύναίτο τι ποιεῖν· συνελθόν δὲ ἑτέρῳ τρίτον οὐκ ἂν δύναίτο ἀποτελεῖν, ὃ μὴ πρότερον ἐν τῷ εἶναι ὑπῆρχεν. οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἐν γενέσθαι δύο δυνα- 221 τόν ἐστιν, οὔτε τὰ δύο τρίτον ἀποτελεῖ. εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἐν δύο γενέσθαι δυνατὸν ἦν, καὶ ἐκάτερον τῶν γενομένων ἐν ὄν δύο ἀποτελέσει, καὶ τῶν τεσσάρων ἕκαστον ἐν ὄν δύο ποιήσει, καὶ ὁμοίως τῶν ὀκτῶ ἕκαστον, καὶ οὕτως εἰς ἄπειρον. παντελῶς δὲ γε ἄτοπόν ἐστι τὸ ἐξ ἑνὸς ἄπειρα λέγειν γίνεσθαι· ἄτοπον ἄρα καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐνὸς λέγειν τι πλείον 222 γεννάσθαι. τὰ δ' αὐτὰ καὶ ἀξιῶ τις ἐκ τῶν ἡσσόνων κατὰ σύνοδον πλείονα ἀποτελεῖσθαι· εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἐν τῷ ἐνὶ συνελθόν τρίτον ποιεῖ, καὶ τὸ τρίτον προσγενόμενον τοῖς δυοῖς τέταρτον ἀποτελέσει, καὶ τὸ τέταρτον προσγενόμενον τοῖς τρισὶ πέμπτον ἀποτελέσει, καὶ οὕτω πάλιν εἰς ἄπειρον. οὐκοῦν σῶμα μὲν σώματος οὐκ ἔστιν αἴτιον.

¹ ἄνθρωπος Hirzel: ἔθος mss., Bekk. (ἔρος Fabr.: ? ἔρος).

incorporeal, nor the converse, and besides these there is no other possibility, of necessity nothing is a cause.

It is thus, then, that some state in more simple form 218 the premisses in the arguments now set forth; but Aenesidemus^a has, in his treatment of them, made a more elaborate use of the difficulties concerning becoming. Body will not be the cause of body, since 219 such a body is either ungenerated, like the atom of Epicurus, or generated, as is man, and either visible like iron and fire, or invisible like the atom. And whichever of these it is, it cannot effect anything. For it acts on another thing either while continuing 220 by itself or after uniting with the other. But while it remains by itself it would not be able to effect anything more than itself and its own nature; and when united with another it would not be able to produce a third thing which was not previously in existence. For neither is the one thing able to become two, nor do the two produce a third thing. For if one 221 is able to become two, each of the units which have so become, being one, will produce two, and each of the four, being one, will make two, and similarly each unit of the eight, and so on *ad infinitum*; but it is wholly absurd to say that an infinite number proceeds from one; therefore it is also absurd to say that anything more is generated from the one.—The same (objection holds good) 222 should anyone maintain that more is produced from less by addition; for if the one added to the one makes a third, the third added to the two will produce a fourth, and the fourth added to the three will produce a fifth, and so on, again, *ad infinitum*. Body, then is not the cause of body.—Moreover, for the 223

^a For Aenesidemus, see Vol. I. Introd. p. xxxvii.

- 223 καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀσώματον ἀσωμάτου διὰ τὰς αὐτὰς αἰτίας· οὔτε γὰρ ἐξ ἑνὸς οὔτε ἐκ πλειόνων ἢ ἑνὸς γένοιτ' ἂν τι πλεῖον. καὶ ἄλλως ἀναφῆς φύσις καθεστῶς τὸ ἀσώματον οὔτε ποιεῖν οὔτε πάσχειν
 224 δύναται. ὥστε οὐδὲ ἀσώματον ἀσωμάτου ποιητικὸν ἔστιν· οὕτως δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ ἐναλλάξ, τουτέστι σῶμα ἀσωμάτου ἢ ἀσώματον σώματος. τό τε γὰρ σῶμα οὐκ ἔχει ἐν αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ ἀσωμάτου φύσιν, τό τε ἀσώματον οὐκ ἐμπεριεῖχε τὴν τοῦ σώματος φύσιν. διόπερ οὐδέτερον ἐξ οὐδετέρου συστήναι
 225 δυνατὸν ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐκ πλατάνου οὐ γίνεται ἵππος διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἐν τῇ πλατάνῳ τὴν τοῦ ἵππου φύσιν, οὐδὲ ἐξ ἵππου συνίσταται ἀνθρώπος διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἐν ἵππῳ τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσιν, οὕτως οὐδὲ ἐκ σώματος ἔσται ποτ' ἂν τὸ ἀσώματον διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἐν τῷ σώματι τὴν τοῦ ἀσωμάτου φύσιν,
 226 οὐδὲ ἀνάπαλιν ἐκ τοῦ ἀσωμάτου τὸ σῶμα. καίτοι κἂν ἢ τὸ ἕτερον ἐν τῷ ἐτέρῳ, πάλιν οὐ γενήσεται τὸ ἕτερον ἐκ τοῦ ἐτέρου. εἰ γὰρ ὄν ἔστιν ἐκάτερον, ἐκ τοῦ ἐτέρου οὐ γίνεται, ἀλλ' ἤδη ἔστιν ἐν τῷ εἶναι, ἤδη δὲ ὄν ἐν τῷ εἶναι οὐ γίνεται διὰ τὸ τὴν γενέσειν ὁδὸν ὑπάρχειν εἰς τὸ εἶναι. οὐδὲ σῶμα οὖν ἀσωμάτου ἢ ἀσώματον σώματός ἔστιν αἴτιον· ᾧ ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι αἴτιον.
 227 Καὶ πάλιν, εἰ ἔστι τί τινος αἴτιον, ἦτοι τὸ μένον τοῦ μένοντος αἴτιόν ἔστιν ἢ τὸ κινούμενον τοῦ κινουμένου ἢ τὸ κινούμενον τοῦ μένοντος ἢ τὸ μένον τοῦ κινουμένου· οὔτε δὲ τὸ μένον τῷ μένοντι γένοιτ' ἂν μονῆς αἴτιον, οὔτε τὸ κινούμενον τῷ κινουμένῳ κινήσεως, οὔτε τὸ μένον τῷ κινουμένῳ

same reasons, the incorporeal is not the cause of the incorporeal; for nothing more can become either from one or from more than one. And besides, the incorporeal being an intangible nature cannot be either active or passive. So that neither is the in- 224 corporeal capable of creating the incorporeal. And thus the converse is not possible either,—that is to say, body creating the incorporeal or the incorporeal, body. For body does not contain within itself the nature of the incorporeal, and the incorporeal does not include the nature of body. Hence neither of them can be produced from the other, but just as a 225 horse does not spring from a plane-tree because the nature of the horse does not exist in the plane-tree, nor is a man produced from a horse because the nature of the man does not exist in the horse, so the incorporeal will never come into existence from body because the nature of the incorporeal does not exist in body; nor, conversely, will body come from the incorporeal. Yet 226 if the one does exist in the other, even so the one will not spring from the other. For if either of them is existent, it does not come into existence from the other, but it is already in existence and being already in existence it does not become, since becoming is the process towards existence. Neither, then, is body the cause of the incorporeal nor the incorporeal of body; from which it follows that nothing is a cause.

And again: If there exists any cause of anything, 227 either the unmoved is the cause of the unmoved, or the moved of the moved, or the moved of the unmoved, or the unmoved of the moved: but the motionless will not be the cause to the motionless of its want of motion, nor the moved to the moved of its motion, nor the motionless to the moved of want of

228 *μονῆς, οὔτε ἐναλλάξ, ὡς παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τι αἴτιον. τὸ μὲν οὖν μένον τῷ μένοντι μονῆς καὶ τὸ κινούμενον τῷ κινουμένῳ κινήσεως οὐκ ἂν ὑπάρχοι αἴτιον δι' ἀπαρραλαξίαν. ἀμφοτέρων γὰρ ἐπ' ἴσης μερόντων ἢ ἀμφοτέρων κατ' ἴσον κινουμένων οὐ μᾶλλον τόδε τῷδε ἐροῦμεν εἶναι αἴτιον μονῆς καὶ κινήσεως ἢ τόδε τῷδε. εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἕτερον, ὅτι κινεῖται, τῷ ἑτέρῳ τῆς κινήσεως αἴτιον ὑπάρχει, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἕτερον ὡσαύτως κινεῖται, λεχθήσεται τῷ λοιπῷ κινήσεως εἶναι παρεκτικόν. οἷον κινεῖται μὲν ὁ τροχός, κινεῖται δὲ καὶ ὁ τροχηλάτης· τί οὖν μᾶλλον διὰ τὸν τροχόν [καὶ] ὁ τροχηλάτης κινεῖται ἢ ἀνάπαλιω διὰ τὸν τροχηλάτην ὁ τροχός; εἴ γέ τοι τὸ ἕτερον μὴ κινεῖτο, οὐδὲ τὸ λειπόμενον κινήσεται. ὅθεν εἰ αἰτίον ἔστιν οὐ παρόντος γίνεται τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα, ἐπεὶ ἀμφοτέρων παρόντων γίνεται τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα καὶ οὔτε τοῦ τροχοῦ ἀπόντος τελειοῦται οὔτε τοῦ τροχηλάτου, ῥητέον μὴ μᾶλλον τὸν τροχηλάτην αἴτιον εἶναι τῆς κινήσεως τῷ τροχῷ
 229 ἢ τὸν τροχόν τῷ τροχηλάτῃ. καὶ πάλιν μένει μὲν ὁ στῦλος, μένει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐπιστύλιον. ἀλλ' οὐ μᾶλλον διὰ τὸν στῦλον ῥητέον μένει τὸ ἐπιστύλιον ἢ διὰ τὸ ἐπιστύλιον τὸν στῦλον· τοῦ ἑτέρου γοῦν ἀρθέντος καὶ τὸ ἕτερον καταφέρεται. ὥστε τὸ μὲν μένον τῷ μένοντι μονῆς καὶ τὸ κινούμενον τῷ κινουμένῳ κινήσεως διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἂν εἴπομεν
 230 αἴτιον. ὡσαύτως δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ μένον τῷ κινουμένῳ κινήσεως ἢ τὸ κινούμενον τῷ μένοντι μονῆς δι' ἐναντιότητα φύσεως· καθὰ γὰρ τὸ ψυχρὸν οὐκ ἔχον τὸν τοῦ θερμοῦ λόγον οὐδέποτε δύναται θερ-*

motion, nor the converse, as we shall establish. Therefore, no cause exists. Now the motionless will 228 not be the cause to the motionless of its want of motion, nor the moved to the moved of its motion, because of their being indistinguishable. For when both are equally motionless, or both equally in motion, we shall no more say that this is the cause to that of its want of motion or its motion than that to this. For if the one, because it moves, is the cause of motion to the other, since the other also moves in like manner it will be said to be supplying motion to the first. For example, the hoop moves and the hoop-trundler also moves; why, then, should the hoop-trundler move because of the hoop rather than, conversely, the hoop because of the hoop-trundler? Certainly if the one does not move, neither will the other move. Hence if cause is "that by the presence of which the effect takes place," since the effect takes place with both present, and it is effected when neither the hoop is absent nor the hoop-trundler, one must declare that the hoop-trundler is no more the cause of motion to the hoop than the hoop to the hoop-trundler. And again, the pillar is motionless, 229 and the lintel also is motionless. But one should not say that the lintel is motionless because of the pillar any more than the pillar because of the lintel; for when the one is removed the other tumbles down. So that for this reason we will not say that the motionless is the cause to the motionless of its want of motion or the moving to the moving of its motion.— So likewise the motionless is not the cause of motion 230 to the moving, nor the moving to the motionless of its want of motion, because of their opposite natures; for just as the cold can never heat, since it does not

μαίνειν, καὶ ὡς τὸ θερμὸν μὴ ἔχον τὸν τοῦ ψυχροῦ λόγον οὐδέποτε δύναται ψύχειν, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ κινούμενον, μὴ ἔχον τὸν τοῦ μένοντος λόγον, οὐδέποτε δύναται μονῆς εἶναι ποιητικόν, ἢ τὸ ἀνά-
 231 παλιν. ἀλλ' εἴπερ οὔτε τὸ μένον τῷ μένοντι μονῆς ἐστὶν αἴτιον οὔτε τὸ κινουμένον τῷ κινουμένῳ κινήσεως οὔτε τὸ μένον τῷ κινουμένῳ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι οὔτε τὸ κινούμενον τῷ μένοντι τοῦ μένειν, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἄλλο τι προσεπινοεῖν, λεκτέον μὴδὲν ὑπάρχειν αἴτιον.

232 Πρὸς τούτοις, εἰ ἔστι τί τινος αἴτιον, ἦτοι τὸ ἅμα ὄν τοῦ ἅμα ὄντος ἐστὶν αἴτιον ἢ τὸ πρότερον τοῦ ὕστερον ἢ τὸ ὕστερον τοῦ πρότερον· οὔτε δὲ τὸ ἅμα ὄν τοῦ ἅμα ὄντος αἰτιόν ἐστιν οὔτε τὸ πρότερον τοῦ ὕστερον οὔτε τὸ ὕστερον τοῦ πρότερον, ὡς
 233 παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τι αἴτιον. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἅμα ὄν τοῦ ἅμα ὄντος οὐ δύναται τυγχάνειν αἴτιον διὰ τὸ συνυπάρχειν ἀμφοτέρα καὶ μὴ μᾶλλον τότε τοῦδε γεννητικὸν ὑπάρχειν ἢ τότε τοῦδε, ἐκατέρου
 234 τὴν ἴσην ὑπαρξίαν ἔχοντος. οὐδὲ τὸ πρότερον δὲ ἔσται τοῦ ὕστερον γενομένου ποιητικόν. εἰ γὰρ ὅτε ἔστι τὸ αἴτιον, οὕτω ἔστι τὸ οὐ ἐστὶν αἴτιον, οὔτε ἐκεῖνο ἔτι αἰτιόν ἐστι, μὴ ἔχον τὸ οὐ αἰτιόν ἐστιν, οὔτε τοῦτο ἔτι ἀποτέλεσμα, μὴ συμπαρόντος αὐτῷ τοῦ οὐ ἀποτέλεσμά ἐστι· τῶν γὰρ πρὸς τι ἐκατέρον ἐστὶ τούτων, καὶ τὰ πρὸς τι κατ' ἀνάγκην δεῖ συνυπάρχειν ἀλλήλοις καὶ οὐ τὸ μὲν προηγεῖσθαι τὸ
 235 δὲ ὕστερον. λείπεται οὖν τὸ ὕστερον λέγειν τοῦ

possess the quality of the hot, and as the hot can never chill, since it does not possess the quality of the cold, so too the moving can never be productive of want of motion, since it does not possess the quality of the motionless, nor can the converse take place.— But if neither the motionless is the cause to the 231 motionless of its want of motion, nor the moving to the moving of its motion, nor the motionless to the moving of its motion, nor the moving to the motionless of its want of motion, and besides these there is no other possibility conceivable, we must assert that nothing is a cause.

Furthermore, if anything is the cause of anything, 232 either the simultaneous is the cause of the simultaneous, or the prior of the posterior, or the posterior of the prior^a; but the simultaneous is not the cause of the simultaneous, nor the prior of the posterior, nor the posterior of the prior, as we shall establish. Therefore there does not exist any cause. Now the simul- 233 taneous cannot be the cause of the simultaneous owing to the co-existence of both and the fact that this one is no more capable of generating that one than is that one of this one, since both are equal in point of existence. Nor will the prior be capable of 234 producing that which comes into being later; for if, when the cause exists, that whereof it is cause is not yet existent, neither is the former any longer a cause, as it has not that whereof it is the cause, nor is the latter any longer an effect, since that whereof it is the effect does not co-exist with it. For each of these is a relative thing, and relatives must necessarily co-exist with each other, instead of one preceding and the other following. It only remains for us, then, to 235

* Cf. P.H. iii. 25 ff.

προτέρου αἴτιον γίνεσθαι. ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀποπώτατον
καὶ ἀνδρῶν τὰ πράγματα ἀναστρεφόντων· δεήσει
γὰρ τὸ ἀποτελεσμα πρᾶσβύτερον λέγειν τοῦ ποιούν-
τος αὐτό, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο μὴδ' ὅλως ἀποτελεσμα
τυγχάνειν ὡς ἂν μὴ ἔχον τὸ οὐ ἐστὶν ἀποτελεσμα.
ὄνπερ οὖν τρόπον ἡλίθιον ἐστὶ τὸ λέγειν υἱὸν μὲν
πατρὸς εἶναι πρᾶσβύτερον, ἄμητον δὲ σπόρου προ-
ήκειν τοῖς χρόνοις, οὕτως εὔηθες τὸ ἀξιοῦν [τι]¹
236 αἴτιον εἶναι τοῦ ἤδη ὄντος τὸ μῆπω ὄν. ἀλλ' εἰ
μῆτε τὸ ἅμα ὄν τοῦ ἅμα ὄντος μῆτε τὸ πρότερον τοῦ
ὑστερου μῆτε τὸ ὑστερον τοῦ προτέρου ἐστὶν αἴτιον,
παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἐστίν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τι αἴτιον.

Καὶ μὴν εἰ ἐστὶ τι αἴτιον, ἤτοι αὐτοτελῶς καὶ
237 ἰδία μόνον προσχρῶμενον δυνάμει τινός ἐστιν αἴτιον,
ἢ συνεργού πρὸς τοῦτο δεῖται τῆς πασχούσης ὕλης,
ὥστε τὸ ἀποτελεσμα κατὰ κοινὴν ἀμφοτέρων νοεῖ-
σθαι σύνοδον. καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτοτελῶς καὶ ἰδία
238 προσχρῶμενον δυνάμει ποιεῖν τι πέφυκεν, ὠφείλει
διὰ παντός ἑαυτὸ ἔχον καὶ τὴν ἰδίαν δυνάμιν πάν-
τοτε ποιεῖν τὸ ἀποτελεσμα καὶ μὴ ἐφ' ὧν μὲν
ποιεῖν ἐφ' ὧν δὲ ἀπρακτεῖν. εἰ δέ, ὡς φασὶ τινες
239 τῶν δογματικῶν, οὐ τῶν ἀπολελυμένων καὶ ἀφ-
εστηκότων ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ τῶν πρὸς τι διὰ τὸ καὶ αὐτὸ
πρὸς τῷ πάσχοντι θεωρεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ πάσχον πρὸς
αὐτῷ, χεῖρόν τι ἀνακύψει. εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἕτερον πρὸς
240 τῷ ἑτέρῳ νοεῖται, ὧν² τὸ μὲν ποιοῦν τὸ δὲ πάσχον,
ἔσται μία μὲν ἔννοια, δυοῖν δ' ὀνομάτων τεύξεται,
τοῦ τε ποιούντος καὶ τοῦ πάσχοντος· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο
οὐ μᾶλλον ἐν αὐτῷ ἢ ἐν τῷ λεγομένῳ πάσχειν
ἐγκλείσεται ἢ δραστήριος δυνάμις. ὡς γὰρ αὐτὸ

¹ [τι] secl. Mutsch.² ὧν Herv., Mutsch.: οὐ ἄσ., Bekk.

say that the posterior is the cause of the prior ; but
this is a most absurd notion, worthy of men who turn
things topsy-turvy ; for we shall have to say that the
effect is older than what produced it, and consequently
is not an effect at all since it is without that whereof
it is the effect. So just as it is foolish to say that the
son is older than his father, or that the harvest is
earlier in date than the sowing, so it is silly to main-
tain that what is as yet non-existent is the cause of
what already exists.—But if the simultaneous is not 236
the cause of the simultaneous, nor the prior of the
posterior, nor the posterior of the prior, and besides
these there is no other possibility, no cause will
exist.

Moreover, if a cause exists it is the cause of some- 237
thing either wholly of itself and using only its own
power, or else it needs for the purpose the assistance
of the passive matter, so that the effect is conceived
as due to the combination of both jointly. And if it 238
is its nature to effect something of itself and by using
its own power, since it is constantly in possession of
itself and its own power it ought always to be pro-
ducing its effect, and not be at one time active and
at another inactive. But if, as some of the Dogmatists 239
say, cause is not an absolute and independent thing
but a relative thing, since it is viewed in relation
to the thing affected and the thing affected also in
relation to it, a worse consequence will emerge. For 240
if the one is conceived as relative to the other, and of
these the one is active, the other passive, they will
be one in conception but will be called by two names,
the active and the passive ; and because of this the
efficient power will not reside in the cause any more
than in that which is said to be passive. For just as

οὐδὲν δύναται ποιεῖν χωρὶς τοῦ λεγομένου πάσχειν,
οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ λεγόμενον πάσχειν δύναται χωρὶς
241 τῆς ἐκείνου παρουσίας πάσχειν. ὥσθ' ἔπεται τὸ
μὴ μᾶλλον ἐν αὐτῷ ἢ ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι ὑποκεῖσθαι
τὴν δραστήριον τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος δύναμιν. οἶον
(ἔσται γὰρ σαφὲς τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπὶ ὑποδείγματος)
εἴπερ τὸ πῦρ καύσεώς ἐστιν αἴτιον, ἤτοι αὐτοτελῶς
καὶ τῇ ἰδίᾳ μόνον προσχρῶμενον δυνάμει καύσεώς
242 καιομένης ὕλης. καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτοτελῶς καὶ τῇ ἰδίᾳ
φύσει ἀρκοῦμενον ποιεῖ τὴν καύσιν, ἐχρῆν καὶ
πάντοτε ἔχον αὐτὸ τὴν ἰδίαν φύσιν διὰ παντὸς
καίειν. οὐχὶ δὲ πάντοτε καίει, ἀλλὰ τινὰ μὲν καίει
τινὰ δὲ οὐ καίει· οὐκ ἄρα αὐτοτελῶς καὶ τῇ ἰδίᾳ
243 φύσει προσχρῶμενον καίει. εἰ δὲ σὺν τῇ ἐπιτη-
δειότητι τῶν καιομένων ξύλων, πόθεν ἔχομεν
λέγειν ὅτι αὐτὸ ἐστὶ τῆς καύσεως αἴτιον, ἀλλ' οὐχ
ἢ ἐπιτηδειότητος τῶν ξύλων; ὃν γὰρ τρόπον μὴ
ὄντος αὐτοῦ οὐ γίνεται καύσις, οὕτω καὶ τῆς ἐπι-
τηδειότητος τῶν ξύλων ἀπούσης οὐ γίνεται καύσις.
ταύτη τε, εἰ αὐτὸ ἐστὶν αἴτιον ὅτι παρόντος αὐτοῦ
γίνεται τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα καὶ ἀπόντος οὐ γίνεται,
ἔσται καὶ ἢ ἐπιτηδειότητος δι' ἑκάτερον τούτων
244 αἴτιον. ὥσπερ οὖν τῆς δι συλλαβῆς ἕκ τε τοῦ δ καὶ
ι συνεστώσης ἀτοπός ἐστιν ὁ λέγων αἴτιον μὲν τοῦ
ἀποτελεῖσθαι τὴν τοιαύτην συλλαβὴν τὸ δ, οὐκ αἴτιον
δὲ τὸ ι, οὕτω συλλαβῇ μὲν εὐκότος τοῦ καίεσθαι,
στοιχείῳ δὲ τοῦ πυρός καὶ τῶν ξύλων, ἀτοπώτατος
ἐστὶν ὁ τὸ μὲν πῦρ αἴτιον λέγων τοῦ καίεσθαι, τὰ
δὲ ξύλα μηδαμῶς. οὔτε γὰρ δίχα τοῦ πυρός οὔτε
χωρὶς τῶν ξύλων γίνεται τὸ καίεσθαι, καθάπερ οὐδὲ

¹ εἰ αὐτὸ <καί> cj Mutsch.: ? κατὰ.

the cause cannot act without what is called the passive
thing, so also the so-called passive thing cannot be
passive without the presence of the cause. So it 241
follows that the power productive of the effect does
not reside in the cause any more than in the passive
thing. Thus (for our meaning will be made clear
by an example) if fire is the cause of burning, either
it is productive of burning by itself and using only its
own power, or it needs for this purpose the co-ope-
ration of the burning material. And if it produces the 242
burning by itself, being sufficient of its own nature,
then, since it always possesses its own nature, it ought
to have been continually burning. But it does not
burn always, but burns some things and does not
burn others; therefore it does not burn by itself and
by using its own nature. But if it does so in con- 243
junction with the suitability of the burning wood,
how can we assert that it, rather than the suitability
of the wood, is the cause of the burning? For just
as no burning takes place if the fire is non-existent, so
also no burning takes place if the suitability of the
wood is absent. Thus also, if it is the cause because
the effect occurs when it is present and does not occur
when it is absent, the suitability too will be the cause
for both these reasons. So just as, in the case of the 244
syllable "di," which consists of the letters d and i, it
is absurd of a man to say that the cause of the con-
struction of this syllable is the d, and that the i is not
the cause, so if we compare the act of burning to a
syllable and the fire and the wood to letters, it is
most absurd of a man to say that the fire is the cause
of the burning and the wood not the cause. For
the burning neither takes place without the fire nor
without the wood, just as the syllable does not exist

245 ἡ συλλαβὴ χωρὶς τοῦ δ ἢ τοῦ ι. ὅθεν πάλιν εἰ μῆτε αὐτοτελῶς ποιητικόν τινός ἐστι τὸ αἴτιον μῆτε σὺν ἐπιτηδειότητι τοῦ πάσχοντος, οὐδενὸς ποιητικόν ἐστι τὸ αἴτιον.

246 Ἐπι εἰ ἐστι τὸ αἴτιον, ἤτοι μίαν ἔχει τὴν δραστη-
ριον δύναμιν ἢ πολλὰς· οὔτε δὲ μίαν ἔχειν δύναται,
ὡς παραστήσομεν, οὔτε πολλὰς, ὡς διδάξομεν· οὐκ
247 ἄρα τι ἐστὶν αἴτιον. μίαν μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει δύναμιν,
ἐπεὶ περ εἰ μίαν εἶχεν, ὄφειλε πάντα ὁμοίως δια-
τιθέναι καὶ μὴ διαφερόντως. οἶον ὁ ἥλιος καίει
μὲν τὰ περὶ τὴν Αἰθιοπίαν μέρη, θάλπει δὲ τὰ πρὸς
ἡμᾶς, καταναγάζει δὲ μόνον τοὺς Ὑπερβορέους, καὶ
πήττει μὲν τὸν πηλόν, τῆκει δὲ τὸν κηρόν, καὶ
λευκαίνει μὲν τὰ ἐσθῆματα, μελαίνει δὲ τὴν ἡμετέ-
ραν ἐπιφάνειαν, ἐρυθαίνει δὲ καρπούς τινάς, καὶ
ἡμῶν μὲν τοῦ ὄραν αἴτιος γίνεται, τοῖς νυκτινόμοις
δὲ τῶν ὀρνίθων, οἶον γλαυξὶ καὶ νυκτερίσι, τοῦ μὴ
ὄραν· ὥστε εἰ μίαν εἶχε δύναμιν, ὄφειλε ταῦτόν
ἐπὶ πάντων ποιεῖν· οὐχὶ δὲ ταῦτόν ἐπὶ πάντων
248 ποιεῖν· οὐκ ἄρα μίαν ἔχει δύναμιν. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ
πολλὰς, ἐπεὶ ἐχρῆν πάσας ἐπὶ πάντων ἐνεργεῖν, οἶον
πάντα φλέγειν ἢ πάντα χεῖν ἢ πάντα πηγνύναι. εἰ
δὲ μῆτε μίαν ἔχει δύναμιν μῆτε πολλὰς, οὐκ ἂν εἴη
τινὸς αἴτιον.

249 Ναί, ἀλλ' εἰώθασι πρὸς τοῦτο ὑποτυγχάνειν οἱ
δογματικοί, λέγοντες ὅτι παρὰ τὰ πάσχοντα καὶ τὰ
διαστήματα πέφυκεν ἐξαλλάσσεσθαι τὰ γινόμενα
ὑπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ αἰτίου ἀποτελέσματα, καθάπερ τοῦ
ἡλίου. συνέγγυς μὲν γὰρ ὢν τοῖς Αἰθίοψιν ἔοικε
καίειν, μετρίως δὲ ἡμῶν ἀφεστηκῶς θάλπει, πολὺ
δὲ τῶν Ὑπερβορέων κεχωρισμένος θάλπει μὲν οὐ-
250 δαμῶς, καταναγάζει δὲ μόνον· καὶ πήττει μὲν τὸν
122

without the *d* or without the *i*. Hence, once more, 245
if the cause is not productive of anything either by
itself or in conjunction with the suitability of the
passive subject, the cause is productive of nothing.

Further, if the cause exists, it either has one 246
efficient power or many; but it cannot have one, as
we shall establish, nor yet many, as we shall explain;
therefore no cause exists. It has not one power, 247
since if it had one power it ought to affect all things
alike and not in different ways. The sun, for instance,
burns the regions about Æthiopia, but warms our
regions, and only illumines the Hyperboreans^a; and
it dries mud,^b but melts wax; and it whitens clothes,
but blackens our complexion, and reddens certain
fruits; and it is the cause of seeing to us, but of not
seeing to the birds which feed by night, such as owls
and bats. So that, if it had one power, it ought to
produce the same effect in all cases; but it does not
produce the same effect in all cases; therefore it has
not one power. Nor yet has it many, since then it 248
ought to operate with them all in every case—burn
everything, for example, or fuse everything, or con-
geal everything. But if it neither has one power nor
many, it will not be the cause of anything.

Yes, but the Dogmatists usually reply to this by 249
saying that the effects produced by the same cause
naturally vary owing to the materials affected and
the distances, as in the case of the sun. For being
close to the Ethiopians it naturally burns them, and
being at a moderate distance from us it warms us,
and being far removed from the Hyperboreans it does
not warm them at all but merely illumines them; and 250

^a Dwellers in the extreme North, "Laplanders."

^b Cf. *Adv. Log.* ii. 194.

πηλὸν τὸ ὕδατῶδες τοῦ γεώδους ἐξατμίζων, τήκει
 δὲ τὸν κηρὸν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν τὴν τοῦ πηλοῦ
 251 ἰδιότητα. οἱ δὲ χρώμενοι τῇ τοιαύτῃ ὑποτεύξει
 σχεδὸν ἀμάχως ἡμῖν συγχωροῦσι τὸ μὴ ἕτερον
 εἶναι τοῦ πάσχοντος τὸ ποιοῦν. εἰ γὰρ οὐ διὰ
 τὸν ἥλιον γίνεται ἡ τήξις τοῦ κηροῦ ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν
 ἰδιότητα τῆς περὶ τὸν κηρὸν φύσεως, φανερὸν ὡς
 οὐδὲ τὸ ἕτερον αἰτιὸν ἐστὶ τῆς τήξεως τῷ κηρῷ, ἢ
 δὲ ἀμφοτέρων συνέλευσις, τοῦ τε ἡλίου καὶ τοῦ
 κηροῦ. τῆς δὲ ἀμφοτέρων συνόδου ποιούσης τὸ
 ἀποτέλεσμα, τουτέστι τὴν τήξιν, οὐ μᾶλλον διὰ τὸν
 ἥλιον ὁ κηρὸς τήκεται ἢ διὰ τὸν κηρὸν ὁ ἥλιος
 τήκει. οὕτω τε ἀποπον τὸ ἐκ συνόδου δυοῖν γινόμε-
 νον ἀποτέλεσμα μὴ τοῖς δυοῖν ἀναπιθέσθαι, τῷ δὲ
 252 ἐτέρῳ μόνῳ προσμαρτυρεῖν.
 Καὶ μὴν εἰ ἐστὶ τίς τινος αἰτιον, ἦτοι κεχώρισται
 τῆς πασχούσης ὕλης ἢ σύνεστιν αὐτῇ· οὔτε δὲ
 κεχωρισμένον αὐτῆς δύναται τυγχάνειν αἰτιον τοῦ
 πάσχειν αὐτὴν οὔτε συνὸν αὐτῇ, καθὼς παρα-
 253 στήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶ τίς τινος αἰτιον. καὶ δὲ
 κεχωρισμένον μὲν αὐτῆς αὐτόθεν οὔτε αὐτὸ αἰτιὸν
 ἐστὶ, μὴ παρούσης τῆς πρὸς ἣν λέγεται αἰτιον, οὔτε
 254 ἐκεῖν ἄλλο, μὴ συμπαρόντος τοῦ ποιοῦντος. εἰ
 δὲ συνδυάζοι τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἐτέρῳ, ἦτοι αὐτὸ μόνον
 ποιεῖ τὸ λεγόμενον αἰτιον ὑπάρχειν, οὐχὶ δὲ πάσχει,
 ἢ ποιεῖ ἅμα καὶ πάσχει. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἅμα ποιεῖ καὶ
 πάσχει, ἐκάτερον ἐστὶ ποιοῦν τε καὶ πάσχον· ἢ
 μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ, ἐστὶ πάσχουσα ἢ ὕλη, ἢ δὲ ἡ
 ὕλη ποιεῖ, ἐστὶ ἐκεῖνο τὸ πάσχον. καὶ οὕτως οὐ
 μᾶλλον τὸ ποιοῦν γενήσεται ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον, καὶ

it dries mud by making the watery part steam out
 of the earthy part, but melts wax because it has not
 the peculiar quality of mud. Now those who make 251
 this reply grant us, almost without dispute, that what
 acts is not different from what is acted upon. For if
 the melting of the wax occurs not because of the sun
 but because of the property of the substance of the
 wax, it is plain that neither of them is the cause of
 the melting of the wax but the combination of both
 of them, the sun and the wax. And as it is the
 conjunction of both which produces the effect,—
 namely, the melting,—the wax is not melted because
 of the sun any more than the sun melts because of the
 wax. And thus it is absurd not to ascribe the effect
 produced by the conjunction of two things to those
 two, but to attribute it to one of them only.

Moreover, if there exists any cause of anything, 252
 either it is separate from the matter affected or it
 co-exists with it; but neither when separate from it
 nor when co-existing with it can it be the cause of
 its being affected, as we shall establish; therefore no
 cause of anything exists. Now when separated from 253
 its matter, obviously it is not a cause, since the matter
 with respect to which it is termed a cause is not
 present, nor is the matter affected, since that which
 affects it is not present with it. But if the one is 254
 coupled with the other, that one which is said to be
 the cause either acts only and is not acted upon, or
 both acts and is acted upon at once. And if it both
 acts and is acted upon, each of them will be both
 active and passive; for in so far as the cause acts the
 matter will be passive, but in so far as the matter acts
 the cause will be the passive thing. And thus that
 which acts will be no more active than passive, and

τὸ πάσχον οὐ μᾶλλον ἔσται πάσχον ἢ ποιούν· ὅπερ
 256 ἄτοπον. εἰ δὲ ποιεῖ μὲν, οὐκ ἀντιπάσχει δέ,
 ἤτοι κατὰ ψιλὴν ψαύου, τουτέστι τὴν κατ' ἐπι-
 φάνειαν, ποιεῖ, ἢ κατὰ διάδοσιν. καὶ ἔξωθεν μὲν
 προσπίπτον καὶ κατὰ ψιλὴν τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν παρα-
 βαλλόμενον τῇ πασχούσῃ ὕλη οὐ δυνήσεται τι
 ποιεῖν· ἢ γὰρ ἐπιφάνεια ἀσώματος ἔστιν, τὸ δ'
 257 ἀσώματον οὔτε ποιεῖν οὔτε πάσχειν πέφυκεν. οὐκ
 ἄρα κατὰ ψιλὴν παραβαλλόμενον τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν τὸ
 αἴτιον τῇ ὕλῃ τι ποιεῖν δύνатаι. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ
 κατὰ διάδοσιν οἷον τέ ἔστιν αὐτὸ δρᾶν. ἤτοι γὰρ
 διὰ στερεῶν σωμάτων διζέται ἢ διὰ νοητῶν τινῶν
 καὶ ἀναισθητῶν πόρων. ἀλλὰ διὰ μὲν στερεῶν
 σωμάτων οὐκ ἂν φέροιτο· σῶμα γὰρ διὰ σώματος
 257 οὐ δύναται χωρεῖν. εἰ δὲ διὰ πόρων τινῶν, ὀφείλει
 ταῖς περιγραφούσαις τοὺς πόρους ἐπιφανείαις
 προσπίπτον ποιεῖν. ἀλλ' αἶ γε ἐπιφανείαι εἰσιν ἀ-
 σώματοι, καὶ τὸ ἀσώματον οὔτε ποιεῖν οὔτε πάσχειν
 εὐλόγον ἔστιν. τοῖνυν οὐδὲ κατὰ διάδοσιν ποιεῖ τὸ
 αἴτιον. ὧ ἔπεται τὸ μηδ' ὅλως αἴτιον αὐτὸ τυγα-
 χάνειν.

258 *Ἐνεστι δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀφῆς κωϊότερον τῷ τε
 ποιούντι καὶ τῷ πάσχοντι ἐπαπορεῖν. ἵνα γὰρ τι
 ποιήσῃ ἢ πάθῃ, ὀφείλει θιγεῖν ἢ θιχθῆναι· οὐδὲν δὲ
 οὔτε θιγεῖν οὔτε θιχθῆναι δύναται, καθὼς παρα-
 στήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν ἢ τὸ ποιούν ἢ τὸ πάσχον.
 259 εἰ γὰρ ἄπτεται τί τινος καὶ θιγγάνει, ἤτοι ὅλον ὅλου
 ἄπτεται ἢ μέρος μέρους ἢ ὅλον μέρους ἢ μέρος

^a Cf. P.H. iii. 39.

that which is acted upon will be no more passive than
 active; which is absurd.—But if it acts and is not 255
 acted upon, it acts either by mere contact—that is
 to say, superficial contact—or by permeation. And
 if it imposes itself externally and is applied to the
 passive matter on the surface only, it will not be able
 to effect anything; for surface is incorporeal,^a and
 the incorporeal is not of a nature either to act or to
 256 be acted upon. Therefore the cause is not able to
 act at all upon the matter when applied on the surface
 only. Nor yet is it possible for it to act by permea-
 tion. For it will penetrate either through solid
 bodies or through certain intelligible and impercept-
 ible pores.^b But it will not move through solid
 bodies; for body cannot pass through body. And if 257
 it passes through certain pores, it ought to act while
 in contact with the surfaces which enclose the pores.
 But the surfaces are incorporeal, and it is contrary to
 reason that the incorporeal should either act or be
 acted upon. Neither, then, does the cause act by
 permeation. And from this it follows that it is not
 a cause at all.

Regarding that which acts and that which is 258
 acted upon it is also possible to raise difficulties of
 a more general kind, based upon contact. For in
 order that a thing may act or be acted upon, it
 must touch or be touched; but, as we shall establish,
 nothing can either touch or be touched; therefore
 neither that which acts nor that which is acted
 upon exists. For if one thing is in contact with 259
 another and touches it, it is in contact either as
 a whole with the whole, or as a part with a part,
 or as a whole with a part or as a part with the

^b Cf. Adv. Log. ii. 306, 309; P.H. ii. 98, 140.

ὅλον· οὔτε δὲ μέρος μέρους οὔτε ὅλον ὅλου οὔτε
 ὅλον μέρους οὔτε ἐναλλάξ ἄπτεται, καθὼς διδά-
 ξομεν· οὐκ ἄρα τί τιως ἄπτεται. καὶ εἰ μὴδὲν
 μὴδενὸς ἄπτεται, οὔτε τὸ πάσχον ἔστιν οὔτε τὸ
 260 ποιοῦν. ὅλον μὲν οὖν ὅλου οὐχ ἄπτεται κατὰ λόγον·
 εἰ γὰρ ὅλον ὅλου ἄπτεται, οὐ θίξις ἔσται ἀλλὰ
 ἐνωσις ἀμφοτέρων, καὶ τὰ δύο σώματα ἐν ἔσται
 σῶμα, διὰ τὸ καὶ τοῖς κατὰ βάθος ὀφείλειν τὸ
 ἕτερον τοῦ ἐτέρου θιγγάνειν διὰ τὸ καὶ ταῦτα τοῦ
 261 ὅλου καθεστάναι μέρος. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ μέρος
 μέρους θιγγάνειν δυνατόν ἔστω. τὸ γὰρ μέρος κατὰ
 μὲν τὴν πρὸς τὸ ὅλον σχέσιν νοεῖται μέρος, κατὰ δὲ
 τὴν ἴδιον περιγραφὴν ἔστιν ὅλον, πάλιν τε διὰ
 ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ἦτοι τὸ ὅλον μέρος τοῦ ὅλου
 μέρους ἄψεται ἢ μέρος μέρους. καὶ εἰ μὲν
 ὅλον ὅλου, ἐνωθήσεται, καὶ ἀμφοτέρα ἐν γενήσεται
 σῶμα· εἰ δὲ μέρει μέρους,¹ ἐκείνο πάλιν τὸ μέρος
 κατ' ἴδιαν περιγραφὴν ὅλον νοούμενον ἦτοι ὅλον
 ὅλου τοῦ μέρους ἄψεται ἢ μέρει τινὶ τιως μέρους,
 καὶ οὕτως εἰς ἄπειρον. οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ μέρος
 μέρους ἄπτεται. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ὅλον μέρους.
 262 εἰ γὰρ τὸ ὅλον τοῦ μέρους ἄψεται, ἔσται καὶ τὸ
 ὅλον συνυποστελλόμενον τῷ μέρει μέρος καὶ τὸ
 μέρος ἀντιπαρεκτεινόμενον τῷ ὅλῳ ὅλον· τὸ γὰρ
 ἴσον τῷ μέρει τὴν τοῦ μέρους εἶχεν ἀναλογίαν, καὶ
 τὸ ἴσον τῷ ὅλῳ τὴν τοῦ ὅλου. τελέως δὲ ἀπ-
 ερρωγός ἔστιν ἢ τὸ ὅλον ποιεῖν μέρος ἢ τὸ μέρος
 ἴσον ἀξιοῦν εἶναι τῷ ὅλῳ. τοίνυν οὐδὲ τὸ ὅλον τοῦ
 263 μέρους ἄπτεται. καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ τὸ ὅλον τοῦ
 μέρους ἄπτεται, ἔσται ἑαυτοῦ μικρότερον καὶ πάλιν

¹ μέρους Heintz : μέρος mss., Bekk.

whole ; but, as we shall show, it is not in contact
 either as part with part, or as whole with whole,
 or as whole with part, or the converse ; therefore
 nothing touches anything.* And if nothing touches
 anything, neither what is acted upon exists nor
 what acts. Now it is according to reason that a 260
 whole does not touch a whole ; for if whole touches
 whole, there will not be contact but the union of both,
 and the two bodies will be one body, because the one
 must touch the other with its depths, since these too
 are parts of the whole.—Nor, again, is it possible for 261
 part to touch part. For the part is conceived as a
 part in respect of its relation to the whole, but in
 respect of its own limited extent it is a whole, and
 for this reason again either the whole part will touch
 the whole part, or a part of it a part. And if the
 whole touches the whole, they will be unified and both
 will become one body ; while if with a part it touches
 a part, that part again, being conceived as a whole in
 respect of its own limited extent, will either touch as
 a whole the whole part, or touch a part of it with a
 part—and so on *ad infinitum*. Neither then does a
 part touch a part.—Nor, again, does a whole touch
 a part. For if the whole shall touch the part, the 262
 whole, being contracted so as to equal the part, will
 be a part, and the part, being extended so as to
 match the whole, will be a whole ; for what is equal
 to the part has the proportion of the part, and what
 is equal to the whole that of the whole. But it is
 perfectly absurd either to make the whole into a part
 or to claim that the part is equal to the whole. Neither
 then does the whole touch the part.—Moreover, if 263
 the whole touches the part it will be smaller than

* With §§ 259-261 cf. *P.H.* iii. 45 f.

ἑαυτοῦ μείζον· ὅπερ ἐστὶ τοῦ προτέρου χείρον. τό τε γὰρ ὅλον εἰ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπιλαμβάνει τόπον τῶ μέρει, ἴσον ἔσται τῶ μέρει, ἴσον δὲ τούτῳ γενόμενον μικρότερον ἑαυτοῦ ἔσται· καὶ ἀνάπαλιν τὸ μέρος εἰ ἀντιπαρεκτείνεται τῶ ὅλῳ, τὸν αὐτὸν ἐφέξει τούτῳ τόπον, τῶ δὲ ὅλῳ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπ-
 264 εσσηκὸς τόπον ἔσται μείζον ἑαυτοῦ. ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀναστροφῆς ἐστὶ λόγος· εἰ γὰρ μὴ δύναται τὸ ὅλον τοῦ μέρους ἄπτεσθαι διὰ τὰς μικρῶ πρόσθεν ἐπιλογισθείσας αἰτίας, οὐδὲ τὸ μέρος δυνησεται τοῦ ὅλου ἄπτεσθαι. ὅθεν εἰ μήτε τὸ ὅλον τοῦ ὅλου ἄπτεται μήτε τὸ μέρος τοῦ μέρους μήτε τὸ ὅλον τοῦ μέρους μήτε ἐναλλάξ, οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς ἄπτεται. διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ αἰτιῶν τί τινος ὑπάρξει, οὐδὲ πάσχον τι ὑπὸ τινος.

265 Πρὸς τούτοις τε, εἰ ἄπτεται τί τινος, ἦτοι μεσο-
 λαβούμενον ὑπὸ τινος, οἷον πόρου ἢ γραμμῆς, ἄψεται τινος, ἢ ὑπ' οὐδενὸς μεσολαβούμενον. καὶ εἰ μὲν ὑπὸ τινος μεσολαβοῖτο, οὐχ ἄψεται οὐ λέ-
 γεται ἄπτεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τοῦ μεταξύ ἀμφοτέρων· εἰ δὲ μηδενὸς ἀπαξᾶπλῶς μεταξύ ἀμφοτέρων ὄντος τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου ἄψεται, ἔνωσις ἔσται ἀμφοτέρων
 266 ἀλλ' οὐ θίξις. τοίνυν οὐδὲ ταύτῃ τί τινος ἄπτεται. ὅθεν εἴπερ, ἵνα νοηθῇ τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον, δεῖ προωμολογησθαι τὸ ὅτι <τί>¹ τινος ἄπτεται, δέ-
 δεικται δὲ μηδὲν μηδενὸς ἀπτόμενον, λεκτέον μήτε τὸ ποιοῦν μήτε τὸ πάσχον ὑπάρχειν.

Τὸ μὲν οὖν ποιοῦν αἰτιον οὕτω καὶ κατ' ἰδίαν καὶ
 267 κωιῆ μετὰ τοῦ πάσχοντος ἀπορεῖται· ἀπορος δὲ ἐστὶ κατ' ἰδίαν καὶ ὁ περὶ τοῦ πάσχοντος λόγος. εἰ

itself, and again larger than itself; which is a worse consequence than the previous one. For if the whole occupies the same space as the part, it will be equal to the part, and being equal thereto it will be smaller than itself; and conversely, if the part is extended so as to match the whole, it will take up the same space as it, and as occupying the same space as the whole it will be larger than itself.—And to the converse 264 case the same argument applies; for if the whole cannot touch the part, for the reasons set forth a little while ago, neither will the part be able to touch the whole. Hence, if the whole does not touch the whole, nor the part the part, nor the whole the part, nor the converse, nothing touches anything. And for this reason nothing will be the cause of anything, nor will anything be affected by anything.

Furthermore, if one thing touches another, it will 265 touch it either when intercepted by something—such as a pore or a line—or when intercepted by nothing. And if it is intercepted by something, it will not be touching what it is said to touch but the thing which lies between them both; but if the one shall touch the other with absolutely nothing intervening between them, there will be a union of the two and not contact. Neither, then, in this way does anything 266 touch anything. Hence, if the conception of activity and passivity requires the previous agreement that one thing touches another, and it has been proved that nothing touches anything, we must declare that neither the active nor the passive exists.

Thus the active cause is a matter of doubt both separately in itself and when taken along with the thing affected by it. And the account given of the 267 thing affected is also doubtful in itself. For if a thing

¹ <τί> add. Heintz.

γὰρ πάσχει τι, ἤτοι τὸ ὄν πάσχει τι ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν·
 οὔτε δὲ τὸ ὄν πάσχει τι, ὡς παραστήσομεν, οὔτε τὸ
 268 μὴ ὄν, ὡς ὑπομνήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα πάσχει τι. τὸ
 μὲν οὖν ὄν οὐ πάσχει· ἐφ' ὅσον γὰρ ὄν ἐστι καὶ
 τὴν ἰδίαν φύσιν ἔχει, οὐ πάσχει· τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν τῷ
 μηδ' ὅλως ὑπάρχειν οὐκ ἂν πάθει. παρὰ δὲ τὸ
 εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι οὐδὲν ἔστιν· οὐκ ἄρα πάσχει τι.
 269 οἶον ὁ Σωκράτης ἤτοι ὡν θνήσκει ἢ μὴ ὡν. δύο
 γὰρ οὗτοι χρόνοι, εἰς μὲν ὁ καθ' ὄν ἐστι καὶ ζῆ,
 ἕτερος δὲ καθ' ὄν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλ' ἐφθάρται· διόπερ
 ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὀφείλει κατὰ τὸν ἕτερον τούτων θνή-
 σκειν. ὅτε μὲν οὖν ἐστι καὶ ζῆ, οὐ θνήσκει· ζῆ
 γὰρ δήπουθεν· θανάων δὲ πάλιν οὐ θνήσκει, ἐπεὶ
 270 δὲς ἔσται θνήσκων, ὅπερ ἄτοπον. οὐ τοίνυν θνή-
 σκει Σωκράτης. οἶος δ' ἔστιν ἐπὶ τούτου λόγος,
 τοιοῦτος καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχοντος. οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ὄν
 δύναται πάσχειν ἐφ' ὅσον ὄν ἐστι καὶ κατὰ τὴν
 ἀρχῆθεν ὑπόστασιν νοεῖται, οὔτε τὸ μὴ ὄν· ἀρχῆν
 271 γὰρ οὐχ ὑφέστηκεν· οὐκ ἄρα πάσχει τι. καὶ ἔτι
 τρανότερον, εἴπερ γε τὸ ὄν, ὅτε ὄν ἐστι, πάσχει,
 ἔσται τάναντία ὑφ' ἑν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ· οὐχὶ δέ γε
 τάναντία ὑφ' ἑν περὶ τῷ αὐτῷ συνίσταται· οὐκ ἄρα
 πάσχει τὸ ὄν, ὅτε ὄν ἐστιν. οἶον ἔστω τὸ ὄν τῆ
 φύσει σκληρὸν εἶναι καὶ πάσχειν μαλακυνόμενον,
 καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ σιδήρου θεωροῦμεν. οὐκοῦν ὅτε
 μὲν σκληρὸν ἐστι καὶ ὄν, οὐ δύναται μαλακύνεσθαι,
 272 ἐπεὶ εἰ μαλακύνεται ὅτε σκληρὸν ἐστιν, ἔσται τὰ-
 ναντία περὶ τῷ αὐτῷ ὑφ' ἑν, καὶ ἡ μὲν καθέστηκεν

is affected, either what exists is affected or what
 exists not; but neither what exists is affected, as we
 shall establish, nor what exists not, as we shall show;
 therefore nothing is affected.^a Now the existent is 268
 not affected, for in so far as it is existent and has its
 own nature it is not affected; and the non-existent
 will not be affected owing to the fact that it does not
 subsist at all. But besides existence and non-existence
 nothing exists; therefore nothing is affected.
 For example, Socrates dies either when existing or 269
 when not existing.^b For these are two periods—the
 one that in which he exists and is alive, the other that
 in which he exists not but has perished; wherefore
 he must necessarily die in one or other of these
 periods. Now he does not die when he exists and is
 alive; for, to be sure, he is alive; nor, again, does he
 die when he has died, since then he will be dying
 twice over, which is absurd. So then, Socrates does
 not die. And the argument used in this case may 270
 similarly be applied to the case of the thing affected.
 For the existent cannot be affected in so far as it is
 existent and is conceived according to its original
 substance; nor can the non-existent, for it does not
 subsist at all; nothing, therefore, is affected.—And 271
 still more clearly, if the existent, when it is existent,
 is affected, opposites will exist in the same thing at
 the same time; but opposites do not exist in the same
 thing at the same time; therefore the existent, when
 it is existent, is not affected.^c For example, let it be
 granted that the existent is hard in its nature and is
 affected by softening, as we see in the case of iron.
 While, then, it is hard and existent it cannot become
 soft, since, if it becomes soft when it is hard, opposites 272
 will exist in the same thing at the same time, and in

^a With §§ 267-268 *cf.* *P.H.* iii. 104 f.

^b With § 269 *cf.* *P.H.* iii. 111, *Adv. Phys.* ii. 346.

^c With §§ 271 ff. *cf.* *P.H.* iii. 107.

ὄν, ἔσται σκληρόν, ἢ δὲ πάσχει ὄν ὑπάρχον, ἔσται
μαλακόν. οὐ δύναται δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑφ' ἐν καὶ σκληρόν
καὶ μαλακὸν νοεῖσθαι· οὐ δύναται ἄρα τὸ ὄν, ὅτε
273 ὄν ἐστί, πάσχειν. ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ λευκοῦ
καὶ μέλανος χρώματος. ἔστω γὰρ τὸ ὄν, ἢ ὄν ἐστί,
καὶ λευκὸν εἶναι, καὶ πάσχειν αὐτὸ μέλαν γινόμενον.
οὐκοῦν εἰ τὸ ὄν [ἐστί] καὶ λευκὸν τότε ἀξιοῦται
πάσχειν ὅτε λευκὸν ἐστί μέλαν (γινόμενον)¹ ἔσται
συμβεβηκότα ἔχον τὰ ἐναντία· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. οὐ
τοῖνυν τὸ ὄν, ἐφ' ὅσον ὄν ἐστί, πάσχειν πέφυκεν.
274 πρὸς τούτοις, εἰ λέγοιμεν τὸ ὄν, ὅτε ὄν ἐστί,
πάσχειν, ἔσται τι πρὶν γεγονέαι γεγονός· <οὐδὲν δέ
ἐστί πρὶν γεγονέαι γεγονός·>² οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ὄν, ὅτε
275 ὄν ἐστί, πάσχει. εἰ γὰρ σκληρόν ἐστί τὸ ὄν, ἐφ'
ὅσον ὄν ἐστί, σκληρόν ἐστί καὶ οὐ μαλακόν· εἰ δὲ
μαλακόν, πρὸ τοῦ γεγονέαι μαλακὸν ἔσται μα-
λακόν. ἢ μὲν γὰρ ὄν ἐστί, σκληρόν ἐστί καὶ οὕτω
μαλακόν· ἢ δὲ ὅτε ὄν ἐστί τότε ἀξιοῦται πάσχειν,
πρὶν γεγονέαι μαλακὸν γενήσεται μαλακόν. ἄτοπον
δέ γε τὸ τοιοῦτον· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ὄν, ἐφ' ὅσον ὄν ἐστί,
276 πάσχειν ῥητέον. ὡσαύτως δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ μὴ ὄν,
ὅτε μὴ ὄν ἐστί. τῷ γὰρ μὴ ὄντι οὐδὲν συμβέβηκεν,
ὧ δὲ μὴδὲν συμβέβηκεν, οὐδὲ τὸ πάσχειν συμ-
βέβηκεν· τοῖνυν οὐδὲ τὸ μὴ ὄν πάσχει τι. εἰ δὲ
μήτε τὸ ὄν μήτε τὸ μὴ ὄν πάσχει τι καὶ παρὰ
ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἐστί, οὐδὲν ἐστί τὸ πάσχον.
277 Καὶ μὴν εἰ ἐστί τι τὸ πάσχον, ἦτοι κατὰ πρόσ-

¹ <γινόμενον> addo.

² <οὐδὲν . . . γεγονός.> add. N, Mutsch.

so far as it is existent it will be hard, but in so far as
it is affected while existent it will be soft. But the
same thing cannot be conceived as at once both hard
and soft; therefore, the existent, when it is existent,
cannot be affected. And the same argument holds 273
good also in the case of white colour and black. For
let it be granted that the existent, in so far as it is
existent, is white and that it is affected by becoming
black. If then the existent and white is held to be
affected by becoming black at the time when it is white,
it will have opposite properties; which is absurd.
So then the existent, in so far as it is existent, is not
of a nature to be affected.—Further, if we say that 274
the existent, when it is existent, is affected, there will
exist something become before it has become; <but
there is nothing become before it has become;>
therefore the existent, when it is existent, is not
affected. For if the existent is hard, in so far as it is 275
existent, it is hard and not soft; and if it <becomes>
soft, it will be soft before it has become soft; for in
so far as it is existent it is hard and not yet soft; but
in so far as it is held to be affected at the time when
it is existent, it will become soft before it has become
soft. But such a result is absurd; one must, there-
fore, declare that the existent, in so far as it is
existent, is not affected.—And in the same way, the 276
non-existent is not affected when it is non-existent.
For the non-existent has no property, and being
affected is not a property of that which has no
property; neither, then, is the non-existent affected
at all. But if neither the existent nor the non-
existent is affected at all, and besides these there is
no other alternative, there is nothing which is affected.

Moreover, if there is something which is affected, it 277

θεσιν πάσχει ἢ κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν ἢ κατὰ ἑτεροίωσιν
καὶ μεταβολήν· οὔτε δὲ πρόσθεσις τις ἔστιν οὔτε
ἀφαίρεσις οὔτε μεταβολή καὶ ἑτεροίωσις, ὡς ὑπο-
278 δείξομεν· οὐκ ἄρα πάσχει τι. καθὰ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν
ὀνομάτων κατὰ τούτους τοὺς τρεῖς τρόπους γί-
νονται τινες μεταπτώσεις, καὶ τοῦ μὲν κωβίους
ὀνόματος ἀφαιρεθείσης τῆς πρώτης συλλαβῆς γί-
νεται ἕτερον ὄνομα βίος, καὶ τούτῳ προστεθείσης
τῆς αὐτῆς συλλαβῆς συνίσταται τὸ πρότερον ὄνομα,
καὶ παρὰ ἐναλλαγὴν στοιχείων, ὡς τὸ ἄρχων ὄνομα
γίνεται Χάρων, οὕτω καὶ τὰ σώματα λεχθεῖη ἂν
πάσχειν τριχῶς, ἥτοι κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν ἢ κατὰ πρόσ-
279 θεσιν ἢ κατὰ ἑτεροίωσιν, κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν μὲν οἶον
τὰ φθίνοντα, κατὰ πρόσθεσιν δὲ οἶον τὰ αὐξήμενα,
κατὰ τροπὴν δὲ ὡς τὰ ἐξ ὑγείας εἰς νόσον μετα-
πίπτοντα. εἰάν οὖν δειχθῆ ὅτι οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς
ἀφαιρεῖται καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν οὐδενὶ προστίθεται καὶ
ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀπ' οὐδενὸς μετατίθεται, αὐτόθεν ἔσται
κατεσκευασμένον τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι τὸ πάσχον.
280 λέγωμεν δὲ ἐν πρώτοις περὶ τοῦ κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν
τρόπου.

Εἰ γὰρ ἀφαιρεῖται τι ἀπὸ τινος, ἥτοι σῶμα ἀπὸ
σώματος ἀφαιρεῖται ἢ ἀσώματον ἀπὸ ἀσωμάτου ἢ
σῶμα ἀπὸ ἀσωμάτου ἢ ἀσώματον ἀπὸ σώματος·
οὔτε δὲ σῶμα ἀπὸ σώματος ἀφαιρεῖται, ὡς δει-
ξομεν, οὔτε ἀσώματον ἀπὸ ἀσωμάτου, καθὼς
παραστήσομεν, οὔτε σῶμα ἀπὸ ἀσωμάτου ἢ ἀ-
281 σώματον ἀπὸ σώματος, ὡς καταστησόμεθα· οὐκ
ἄρα ἀφαιρεῖται τι τινός. ἀσώματον μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ ἀ-
σωμάτου ἀφαιρεθῆναι τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἔστιν· τὸ γὰρ
ἀφαιρούμενον ἀπὸ τινος οὐκ ἔστιν ἀθιγές, τὸ δὲ

^a κωβίους, "gudgeon"; βίος, "life."

is affected either through addition or through sub-
traction or through alteration and change. But no
addition nor subtraction nor change and alteration
exists, as we shall demonstrate; nothing therefore is
affected. For just as, in the case of nouns, modifi- 278
cations take place in these three ways, and when
the first syllable is subtracted from the noun *kōbios*^a
there is formed another noun *bios*, and when the same
syllable is added to this the former noun is con-
structed; and by interchange of letters, as when the
noun *archon* becomes *Charon*;—so, too, bodies may
be said to be affected in three ways, either through
addition or through subtraction or through altera-
tion—through subtraction like decreasing things; 279
through addition, like increasing things; through
conversion, like things that pass over from health to
sickness. If, then, it shall be shown that nothing is
subtracted from anything and that nothing is added
to anything and that nothing is transposed from any-
thing, it will thereby be established that there is
nothing which is affected. And let us discuss in the 280
first place the mode of subtraction.^b

If one thing is subtracted from another, either body
is subtracted from body, or the incorporeal from the
incorporeal, or body from the incorporeal, or the
incorporeal from body; but neither body is sub-
tracted from body, as we shall prove, nor the incor-
poreal from the incorporeal, as we shall demonstrate,
nor body from the incorporeal nor the incorporeal from
body, as we shall establish; therefore nothing is sub- 281
tracted from anything. Now, that the incorporeal
should be subtracted from the incorporeal is a thing
impossible; for what is subtracted from a thing is not

^b With this discussion of "subtraction" cf. *P.H.* iii. 85 ff.

ἀσώματον ἀθιγές ὄν οὐ παρέχει αὐτὸ πρὸς ἀφ-
 282 αἶρεσιν καὶ χωρισμόν. ἔνθεν καὶ ματαιάζουσιν
 οἱ μαθηματικοί, ὅταν λέγουσι τὴν δοθείσαν εὐθείαν
 δίχα τεμεῖν. ἡ γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἄβρακος δεικνυμένη
 εὐθεία αἰσθητὸν ἔχει μῆκος καὶ πλάτος, ἡ δὲ ὑπ'
 αὐτῶν νοουμένη εὐθεία γραμμὴ μῆκός ἐστιν ἀ-
 πλατές. καὶ ἡ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἄβρακος δεικνυμένη οὐκ ἂν
 εἴη γραμμὴ, καὶ οἱ ἐπιβαλλόμενοι ταύτην τέμνουσιν οὐ
 τὴν οὖσαν γραμμὴν ἀλλὰ τὴν μὴ οὖσαν τέμνουσιν.

283 ἡ καὶ ἄλλως, ἐπεὶ κατ' αὐτοὺς ἡ γραμμὴ
 ἐκ στιγμῶν συνεστῶσα νοεῖται, ἔστω τις εὐθεία
 γραμμὴ, ἣν λέγουσιν εἰς ἴσα τέμνειν, ἐκ περισσῶν
 συνεστῶσα στιγμῶν, οἷον ἑνέα. ἀλλὰ ταύτην γε
 τέμνοντες ἢ τὴν πέμπτην διελοῦσι στιγμῆν, φημί
 δὲ τὴν μεταξὺ τῶν τεσσάρων καὶ τῶν τεσσάρων
 νοουμένην, ἢ τῶν τμημάτων τὸ μὲν τεττάρων ποιή-
 σουσι στιγμῶν τὸ δὲ πέντε. τὴν μὲν οὖν πέμπτην
 στιγμῆν οὐκ ἂν φαῖεν τέμνειν· ἀμερῆς γὰρ ἐστὶ κατ'
 αὐτοὺς, καὶ τὸ ἀμερῆς ἀδύνατον νοεῖν εἰς μέρη
 διαιρούμενον.λείπεται ἄρα τῶν τῆς γραμμῆς
 τμημάτων τὸ μὲν τεσσάρων ποιεῖν στιγμῶν τὸ δὲ
 πέντε, ὃ πάλιν ἐστὶν ἀτοπον καὶ παρὰ τὴν πρό-
 θεσιν αὐτῶν ὑπισχνούται μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστημονικῶς
 τὴν δοθείσαν εὐθείαν γραμμὴν εἰς ἴσα διαιρεῖν

284 τμήματα, διαιροῦσι δὲ αὐτὴν εἰς ἄνισα. ὃ δὲ
 αὐτὸς καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ κύκλου λόγος νοεῖσθω. φασὶ γὰρ
 κύκλον εἶναι σχῆμα ἐπίπεδον ὑπὸ μιᾶς γραμμῆς
 περιεχόμενον, [ἀφ']¹ οὐ πᾶσαι αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ κέντρου
 πρὸς τὴν περιφέρειαν ἐκβαλλόμεναι εὐθεῖαι ἴσαι
 ἀλλήλαις εἰσίν. εἴτα ἐπὶ τούτοις πρόβλημά ἐστι
 τὸν κύκλον δίχα τεμεῖν· ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον. τὸ

¹ [ἀφ'] secl. Mutsch.: ἐφ' Bekk.

intangible, but the incorporeal, being intangible, does
 not submit to subtraction and separation. Hence, 282
 too, the mathematicians talk idly when they say that
 they will bisect a given straight line. For the straight
 line shown to us on the board has length and breadth,
 whereas the straight line conceived by them is
 "length without breadth." And the line shown on
 the board will not be a line, and those who attempt
 to cut it are cutting not the real line but the unreal.—
 Or again, since, according to them, the line is con- 283
 ceived as composed of points, let us assume a certain
 straight line, which they say they cut into equal
 parts, composed of an odd number of points, such as
 nine. But in cutting this, either they will divide the
 fifth point (I mean the point conceived as lying
 between the first four and the last four), or else they
 will make one of the sections consist of four points
 and the other of five. Now they will not say that
 they cut the fifth point; for, according to them, the
 point is without parts, and it is impossible to conceive
 what is without parts as divided into parts. It only
 remains, therefore, to make the one section of the
 line consist of four points and the other of five, which
 again is absurd and at variance with their undertak-
 ing; for they promise to divide the given straight line
 scientifically into equal sections, but they divide it
 into unequal ones.—And the same argument may be 284
 applied in the case of the circle. For they say that
 the circle is "a plane form enclosed by one line, of
 which all the straight lines extending from the centre
 to the circumference are equal to one another." Then,
 on these conditions, the problem is to bisect the
 circle; and this is impossible. For the centre, which

γὰρ κέντρον, ὅπερ παντὸς τοῦ κύκλου μεσαίτατόν
 ἔστιν, ἥτοι δίχα τέμνεται κατὰ τὴν τοῦ κύκλου
 διχοτόμησιν ἢ τῷ ἑτέρῳ προσμερίζεται τμήματι.
 285 ἀλλὰ δίχα μὲν τμηθῆναι τῶν ἀδυνάτων· πῶς γὰρ
 οἶόν τε τὸ ἀμερές ἐπινοεῖν μεριζόμενον; εἰ δὲ τῷ
 ἑτέρῳ προσμερίζεται τμήματι, ἄνισα γίνεται τὰ
 τμήματα καὶ ὁ κύκλος οὐ μέσος διαιρεῖται.
 286 τὸ τε τέμνον τὴν γραμμὴν ἢ τὸν κύκλον ἥτοι σώμα
 ἔστιν ἢ ἀσώματον. ἀλλὰ σῶμα μὲν πῶς ἂν ἐπι-
 νοηθῆι; ἀθιγὲς γὰρ καὶ ἀσώματον καὶ ἀνυπό-
 πτωτον ἡμῖν τὸ τεμνόμενον, τοῦτέστιν ἢ γραμμὴ καὶ
 ὁ κύκλος. τοιοῦτο δὲ ὄν οὐκ ἂν τμηθῆι ὑπὸ
 σώματος· τὸ γὰρ ὑπὸ σώματος τεμνόμενον παθεῖν
 δεῖ καὶ θιχθῆναι, τὸ δὲ ἀσώματον οὔτε θιγεῖν οὔτε
 θιχθῆναι πέφυκεν. ὥστε οὐκ ἔνεστι [νοῆσαι] ὑπὸ
 σώματος τεμνομένην τὴν γραμμὴν καὶ διαιρούμενον
 287 τὸν κύκλον ἐπινοῆσαι. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ὑπὸ
 ἀσωμάτου τινός. εἰ γὰρ ἀσώματόν ἐστι τὸ διαιροῦν
 τὴν γραμμὴν ἢ τὸν κύκλον, ἥτοι στιγμὴ στιγμὴν
 τέμνει ἢ γραμμὴ γραμμὴν. οὔτε δὲ στιγμὴ τὴν
 στιγμὴν οὔτε γραμμὴ τὴν γραμμὴν οἷα τέ ἐστι
 288 τέμνειν, ἀλλὰ στιγμὴ μὲν τὴν στιγμὴν οὐκ ἂν τέμνοι,
 ἐπεὶ ἑκάτερα ἔστιν ἀμερέης, καὶ οὔτε ἢ τέμνουσα
 ἔχει οἷς τεμεῖ οὔτε ἢ τεμνομένη τὰ εἰς ἃ τμη-
 289 θήσεται. γραμμὴ δὲ τὴν γραμμὴν πάλιν οὐκ ἂν
 διαιροῖ. εἴαν τε γὰρ πλαγίως ἐπιζευχθῆι εἴαν τε
 ὀρθίως ἢ τέμνουσα τῇ τεμνομένῃ, κατ' ἀνάγκην
 ὀφείλει στιγμὴ ἑαυτῆς ἐπιζευγνυσθαι τῇ κατὰ τὴν
 διαιρουμένην γραμμὴν στιγμῇ. ἀμεροῦς μὲν οὖν
 οὔσης καὶ τῆς ἐπιζευγνυμένης, ἀμεροῦς δὲ καὶ τῆς
 ἐν τῇ τεμνομένῃ, οὐ γενήσεται τις διαίρεσις διὰ τὸ
 μῆτι τὴν τέμνουσαν εὐφύως ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ τέμνειν,
 140

is in the very middle of the whole circle, either is
 bisected in the bisection of the circle, or is added on
 to one or other of the sections. But it is impossible 285
 for it to be bisected; for how is it possible to conceive
 what is without parts as partitioned? And if it is
 added on to either of the sections, the sections become
 unequal and the circle is not divided in the middle.—
 Also, that which cuts the line or the circle is either a 286
 body or incorporeal. But how can it be conceived as
 a body? For the thing cut—namely, the line or the
 circle—is intangible and incorporeal and impercept-
 ible by us. And being such, it will not be cut by a
 body; for what is cut by a body must be acted upon
 and be touched, but the incorporeal is not of a nature
 either to touch or be touched. So that it is not
 possible to conceive of the line being cut or the circle
 divided by a body.—Nor yet by anything incorporeal. 287
 For if what divides the line or the circle is incorporeal,
 it is either a point that cuts a point or a line a line.
 But neither can a point cut the point nor a line the
 line. For a point will not cut the point since each of 288
 them is without parts, and the one which cuts has no
 parts wherewith to cut, nor has the one which is being
 cut any parts into which it may be cut. Nor, again, 289
 will the line divide the line. For whether the cutting
 line is joined to the line that is being cut at an acute
 or at a right angle, it must necessarily be joined at a
 point in itself to a point in the divided line. As,
 however, the point of the joined line is without parts,
 and the point in the cut line is also without parts, no
 division will take place, since neither the cutting line
 is suited by nature for cutting, being without parts,

οἶσαν ἀμερῆ, μήτε τὴν τεμνομένην πρὸς τὸ τέμνε-
 290 σθαι τῷ παντὸς ἐστερηῆσθαι μέρους. καὶ μὴν
 οὐδ' ἔνεστι λέγειν ὅτι τὸ τέμνον τὴν γραμμὴν
 μεταξύ δυοῦν στιγμῶν τῶν ἐν τῇ τεμνομένη γραμμῇ
 πίπτον τέμνει τὴν γραμμὴν. τοῦτο γὰρ τῶν προ-
 ειρημένων ἐστὶν ἀτοπώτερον. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ
 ἐν συνεχείᾳ γραμμῆς ἀδύνατόν ἐστι μέσον πεσεῖν
 πέρασ, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη κατὰ στιγμῆς φερόμενον νοεῖν
 291 τὸ τέμνον. εἶτα κἂν συγχωρηθῇ μεταξύ δυοῦν
 στιγμῶν τῶν ἐν τῇ τεμνομένη γραμμῇ φερόμενον
 τὸ τέμνον τέμνει τὴν γραμμὴν, χεῖρόν τι ἀνα-
 δύσεται τοῖς γεωμέτραις. αἱ γὰρ συνθετικαὶ τῆς
 γραμμῆς στιγμαὶ ἤτοι οὕτως εἰσὶ συνεχεῖς ὡς μὴ
 παραδέχεσθαι μεταξύ ἀλλήλων ἕξωθέν τινα στιγ-
 μῆν, ἢ οὐκ ἔσται ἢ ἕξ αὐτῶν σύνθετος συνεχῆς καὶ
 292 μία γραμμῆ. εἰ δ' οὕτως εἰσὶ συνεχεῖς ὡς ἀν-
 επινώητον ἔχειν μεταξύ ἀλλήλων τόπον στιγμῆς, ἵνα
 τὸ τέμνον διχάζῃ τὴν γραμμὴν, δυοῦν θάτερον, ἢ τὴν
 στιγμὴν δεῖ τὴν καθ' ἧς φέρεται νοεῖν διχαζομένην,
 ἢ τούτου ἀδυνάτου καθεστῶτος τὰς ὑποκειμένας
 στιγμαὶς τῆς γραμμῆς νοεῖν ὑπαναχωρούσας καὶ
 τόπον καὶ διάστασιν παρεχομένας, τοτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ
 τόδε τὸ μέρος συστελλομένων τοτὲ δὲ ἐπὶ τόδε, ὧν
 293 ἐκάτερόν ἐστιν ἄτοπον· οὔτε γὰρ στιγμῆ, καθὼς
 προπαρεμυθησάμεθα, τέμνεσθαι δύναται τῷ ἀμερῆς
 ὑπάρχειν, οὔτε αἱ ἐν τῇ τεμνομένη γραμμῇ στιγμαὶ
 ὑπαναχωρεῖν πεφύκασιν· ἀκίνητοι γὰρ εἰσιν. τοῖνυν
 καὶ τὸ ἀσώματον οὔτε ἀφαιρεῖται ἀπὸ τινος ἀ-
 294 σωμάτου οὔτε ἐπιδέχεται τὴν ἀφαίρεσιν. κἂν ἐπὶ
 τῶν αἰσθητῶν δὲ γραμμῶν καὶ κύκλων, τουτέστι

nor the cut line for being cut, owing to its wholly
 lacking parts.—Moreover, it is not possible to say 290
 that what cuts the line cuts the line by falling between
 two points in the line that is being cut. For this is
 still more absurd than the foregoing. For, in the
 first place, it is impossible that an intermediate limit^a
 should be set within the continuity of a line, and one
 must necessarily conceive the thing which cuts as
 striking at a point. And, secondly, even if it be con- 291
 ceded that the sector cuts the line between two of
 the points in the line which is being cut, a worse result
 for the geometers will emerge. For the points which
 compose the line either are so continuous as not to
 admit of any point from outside coming between them,
 or else the line composed of them will not be a single
 and continuous line. But if they are so continuous 292
 that there is no conceivable space between them for
 a point, so as to enable the sector to bisect the line,
 then one or other of two results must follow—either
 we must conceive the point on which it strikes as
 being divided, or, if this is impossible, we must con-
 ceive the existing points of the line as receding and
 affording it space and an interval, by crowding to-
 gether now towards this side, and now towards that ;
 and each of these suppositions is absurd ; for, as we 293
 have pointed out above, the point cannot be cut,
 owing to its being without parts, nor are the points in
 the line that is being cut of such a nature as to recede,
 for they are immobile. So then, the incorporeal
 neither is subtracted from an incorporeal nor admits
 of subtraction.—And even if the geometers propose 294

^a i.e. a point (of the sector) which acts as a "limit" (or ends the line) in the middle of the line by breaking its continuity.

τῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἄβακος βλεπομένων, θέλωσι στήσαντες τὸν λόγον οἱ γεωμέτραι διδάσκειν τί τινος ἀφαιρούμενον, οὐ δυνήσονται· οὔτε γὰρ ἀφ' ὅλης τῆς γραμμῆς ἢ ἀφ' ὅλου τοῦ κύκλου δύναται τις ἀφαιρέσις γενομένη νοεῖσθαι οὔτε ἀπὸ μέρους, ὡς μικρὸν ὑστερον προβάτος τοῦ λόγου διδάξομεν, ὅταν εἰς τὴν περὶ τῶν τεμνομένων σωμάτων ζήτησιν συγκαταβαίνωμεν.

- 295 Νῦν δὲ συντόμως δειχθέντος ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀσώματον οὐδενὸς ἀσωμάτου ἀφαιρεῖσθαι δύναται, λείπεται λέγειν ἢ σῶμα ἀπὸ σώματος χωρίζεσθαι ἢ ἀσώματον ἀπὸ σώματος ἢ σῶμα ἀπὸ ἀσωμάτου. ἀλλὰ σῶμα μὲν ἀπὸ ἀσωμάτου ἀφαιρεῖσθαι αὐτό-
- 296 θενέστιν ἀδιανόητον, ἀσώματον δὲ ἀπὸ σώματος χωρίζεσθαι τῶν ἀδυνάτων· θιγεῖν γὰρ δεῖ τοῦ ἀφαιρουμένου τὸ ἀφαιροῦν, ἀθιγὲς δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀσώματον καὶ ἀδύνατος δέδεικται ἢ θίξις· ὥστε οὐδὲ ἀσώματον σώματος χωρισθεῖ ποτ' ἂν. καὶ ἄλλως τὸ χωριζόμενόν τινος οἶονεῖ μέρος ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀφ' οὗ χωρίζεται, τὸ δὲ ἀσώματον τοῦ σώματος
- 297 οὐκ ἂν εἴη μέρος. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ σῶμα σώματος δύναται ἀφαιρεῖσθαι. εἰ γὰρ σῶμα ἀπὸ σώματος ἀφαιρεῖται, ἦτοι τὸ ἴσον ἀπὸ ἴσου ἀφαιρεῖται ἢ τὸ ἄνισον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄνισου· ἀλλ' οὔτε τὸ ἴσον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ἀφαιρεῖσθαι δύναται, ὡς διδάξομεν, οὔτε τὸ ἄνισον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄνισου, ὡς ὑπομνήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα
- 298 σῶμα ἀπὸ σώματος ἀφαιρεῖται. ἴσον μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ ἴσου οὐκ ἂν ἀφαιρεθεῖη, καθάπερ ἀπὸ πήχεως πῆχυς, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔσται τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀφαιρέσις
- 299 ἀλλὰ παντελῆς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἀναίρεσις. καὶ

* Cf. § 282.

• Cf. §§ 297 ff., 331 ff.

to show how one thing is subtracted from another by basing their argument on sensible lines and circles—that is, on those seen on the board,^a—they will not be able; for no subtraction can be conceived as taking place from the whole line or the whole circle, or from a part of them, as we shall show a little farther on in our exposition,^b when we come to deal with the investigation of bodies which are divided.

And now that it has been shown concisely that no 295 incorporeal can be subtracted from any incorporeal, it remains for us to say either that body is separated from body, or the incorporeal from body, or body from the incorporeal. But the subtraction of body 296 from the incorporeal is of itself inconceivable, and the separation of the incorporeal from body is a thing impossible; for what subtracts must touch what is subtracted, but the incorporeal is intangible and touch has been proved to be impossible^c; so that neither will the incorporeal ever be separated from body. And besides: what is separated from anything is, as it were, a part of that from which it is separated, but the incorporeal will not be a part of the body.—Nor, 297 again, can body be subtracted from body.^d For if body is subtracted from body, either the equal is subtracted from the equal, or the unequal from the unequal; but the equal cannot be subtracted from the equal, as we shall show, nor the unequal from the unequal, as we shall explain; therefore body is not subtracted from body. Now the equal will not be 298 subtracted from the equal,—the cubit, for instance, from the cubit,—since such a thing is not subtraction but the complete removal of the object. And besides 299

• Cf. §§ 258 ff.

^d With §§ 297-307 cf. P. H. iii. 85-88.

ἔτι ἦτοι ἀπὸ μένοντος τοῦ πήχεως ποιησόμεθα τὴν
 ἀφαίρεσιν ἢ ἀπὸ μὴ μένοντος. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀπὸ
 μένοντος, διπλασιάσομεν τὸν πήχυν ἀλλ' οὐκ
 ἐλαττώσομεν· πῶς γὰρ ἔτι πήχυς ὑποκείται ὁ
 πήχυς πήχεως ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀφαιρεθέντος; εἰ δὲ ἀπὸ
 μὴ μένοντος, οὐδὲν ἀπολείπομεν τὸ τὴν ἀφαίρεσιν
 ἐπιδεξόμενον· ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν μὴ ὄντων ἀμήχανόν τι
 ἀφαιρεθῆναι. ὥστε <τὸ>¹ ἴσον μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου οὐκ
 300 ἀφαιρείται. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ ἄνισον ἀπὸ τοῦ
 ἄνισου. εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο, ἦτοι τὸ μείζον ἀπὸ τοῦ
 ἥττονος ἀφαιρείται, ὥσπερ ἀπὸ παλαιστοῦ πήχυς,
 ἢ ἀπὸ μείζονος τὸ ἥττον, ὡς τὸ παλαιστιαῖον ἀπὸ
 301 τοῦ πηχυαίου. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν μείζον ἀπὸ τοῦ
 ἥττονος οὐκ ἂν ἀφαιρεθῆι· δεῖ γὰρ τὸ ἀπὸ τινος
 ἀφαιρούμενον περιέχεσθαι ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ ἐξ οὗ ἢ
 ἀφαιρέσει, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἥττονι οὐ περιέχεται τὸ μείζον.
 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπὸ τῶν πέντε
 ἀφαιρεῖν τὰ ἐξ (οὐ γὰρ ἐμπεριέχεται τοῖς πέντε τὰ
 ἐξ), οὕτως οὐδὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἥττονος δυνατὸν ἔστιν
 ἀφαιρεῖν τὸ μείζον· οὐ γὰρ ἐμπεριέχεται τῷ ἥττονι
 τὸ μείζον. τοίνυν οὐκ ἀφαιρείται ἀπὸ τοῦ ἥττονος
 302 τὸ μείζον. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ μείζονος
 τὸ ἥττον. ὡς γὰρ ἐλέγομεν, δεῖ τὸ ἀπὸ τινος
 ἀφαιρούμενον ἐμπεριέχεσθαι τῷ ἐξ οὗ ἢ ἀφαιρέσει.
 οὐχὶ δὲ γε τὸ ἔλαττον ἐμπεριέχεται τῷ πλείονι·
 ἀκολουθήσει γὰρ καὶ τὸ μείζον καὶ τὸ πλείον ἐμ-
 περιέχεσθαι τῷ ἥττονι, ἀδύνατον δὲ τοῦτο εἰδέναι.
 ὥστε οὐδὲ τὸ ἥττον ἐμπερισχεθῆσεται τῷ μείζονι,
 303 οὕτως δ' οὐδ' ἀφαιρεθῆσεται. καὶ ὅτι τῷ ὄντι
 σώζεται τὰ τῆς ἀκολουθίας, σκοπῶμεν ἐπὶ τῶν

¹ <τὸ> addo.

we will make the subtraction from the cubit either
 while it remains or while it does not remain. And if
 we do so while it remains, we shall be doubling the
 cubit instead of diminishing it; for how will the cubit
 still be really a cubit after a cubit has been sub-
 tracted from it? And if (the subtraction be made)
 while it does not remain, we are leaving nothing
 behind to submit to the subtraction; for it is impos-
 sible for anything to be subtracted from non-existents.
 So that the equal is not subtracted from the equal.—
 Nor, again, is the unequal subtracted from the un- 300
 equal. For if so, either the greater is subtracted
 from the less, as a cubit from a palm; or the less from
 the greater, as that which is a palm in length from
 that which is a cubit in length. But the greater will 301
 not be subtracted from the less; for that which is
 subtracted from anything must be included in the
 thing from which the subtraction takes place, but the
 greater is not included in the less. And because of
 this, just as it is not possible to subtract six from five
 (for five does not include six), so too it is not possible
 to subtract the greater from the less; for the greater
 is not included in the less. So then, the greater is
 not subtracted from the less.—Nor, again, is the less 302
 subtracted from the greater. For, as we have said,
 that which is subtracted from anything must be
 included in that from which the subtraction takes
 place. But the less is not included in the more; for
 if so, it will follow that both the greater and the
 more are included in the less, and this was shown to
 be impossible. So that the less will not be included
 in the greater, and thus it will not be subtracted
 either. And that the rules of logical consistency are 303
 observed we may see from the examples given by

τιθεμένων τοῖς ἀπορητικοῖς ὑποδειγμάτων. εἰ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἕξ ἐμπεριέχεται τὰ πέντε ὡς ἐν πλείονι ἐλάττονα, ἀνάγκη κὰν τοῖς πέντε περιέχεσθαι τὰ τέσσαρα ὡς ἐν πλείονι ἐλάττονα, κὰν τοῖς τέσσαρσι τὰ τρία, κὰν τοῖς τρισὶ τὰ δύο, κὰν τοῖς δυσι τὸ ἕν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐν τῷ ἕξ ἀριθμῷ περιέχεσθαι τὰ πέντε καὶ τὰ τέσσαρα καὶ τρία καὶ δύο καὶ ἕν, 304 ἄπερ ἐστὶ πεντεκαίδεκα. ἀλλ' εἰ ἐν τῷ ἕξ κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον αὐτοῦ λόγον ἐμπεριέχεται τὰ πεντεκαίδεκα κατ' ἀνάγκην τῷ πέντε περισχέθῃσεται τὰ τέσσαρα καὶ τρία καὶ δύο καὶ ἕν, ἄπερ ἐστὶ δέκα. καὶ δι' τρόπον ἐν τοῖς πέντε περισχῆται τὰ δέκα, οὕτω κὰν τοῖς τέσσαρσι ἔσται τὰ τρία καὶ δύο καὶ ἕν, τουτέστι τὰ ἕξ, καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον ἐν τοῖς τρισὶ τὰ δύο καὶ τὸ ἕν, ἄπερ ἐστὶν ἄλλα τρία, κὰν τοῖς 305 λειπομένοις δυσι τὸ ἕν. ταύτη συντιθεμένων τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἕξ ἀριθμῶν, φημὶ δὲ τοῦ πεντεκαίδεκα καὶ τοῦ δέκα καὶ τοῦ ἕξ καὶ τοῦ τρία, ἔτι καὶ τοῦ ἑνός, ἔσται ὁ ἕξ ἀριθμὸς περιεσχῆκώς τὸν τριάκοντα 306 πέντε ἀριθμὸν. τούτου τ' ἔτι συγχωρηθέντος ἀπειράκις ἀπείρων ἀριθμῶν περιληπτικός ἐσται ὁ ἕξ· πάλιν γὰρ ὁ τριάκοντα πέντε τῶν ὑποβεβηκότων ἀριθμῶν ἔσται περιληπτικός, ὅλον τοῦ τριάκοντα τέσσαρα, καὶ οὗτος τοῦ τριάκοντα τρία, καὶ οὗτος τοῦ τριάκοντα δύο, καὶ οὕτω καθ' ὑπόθεσιν 307 μέχρις ἀπείρου. ἀλλ' εἴπερ ἵνα τί τινος ἀφαιρεθῆ, δεῖ ἐμπεριέχεσθαι τὸ ἀφαιρούμενον τῷ ἕξ οὐ ἢ ἀφαιρέσεις, δέδεικται δὲ οὔτε ἐν τῷ ἡττονι τὸ μείζον περιεχόμενον οὔτε ἐν τῷ μείζονι τὸ ἐλάττον, καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ τὸ ἴσον (δεῖ γὰρ τὸ περιέχον μείζον εἶναι τοῦ περιεχομένου, τὸ δὲ τινι ἴσον οὔτε ἐλαττόν ἐστιν ἐκείνου οὔτε 148

the Doubters. Thus, if 5 is included in 6 as the less in the more, 4 also must necessarily be included in 5, as the less in the more, and 3 in 4, and 2 in 3, and 1 in 2; and because of this there are included in the number 6, 5 and 4 and 3 and 2 and 1, which make 15. But if in 6, according to its own proper 304 definition, 15 is included, there will necessarily be contained in 5, 4 and 3 and 2 and 1, which make 10. And just as 10 is included in 5, so also 3 and 2 and 1, which make 6, will inhere in 4; and, by analogy, 2 and 1, which make another 3, in 3; and in the 2 that is still left, 1. Thus when the contents of the 305 6 numbers are added together—I mean the 15 and 10 and 6 and 3, and also the 1, the number 6 will be found to include the number 35. And if this also 306 is granted, the 6 will be capable of including numbers that are infinite times infinite; for the 35, again, will be inclusive of the subordinate numbers, such as 34, and this of 33, and this of 32, and so downwards *ad infinitum*.—But if it is required, in order that 307 one thing may be subtracted from another, that the thing subtracted should be included in that from which the subtraction is made, and it has been proved that neither is the greater included in the less nor the less in the greater, nor yet the equal in the equal (for what includes must be greater than what is included, but what is equal to a thing is neither less nor greater than the thing to which it is equal), then

μείζον τοῦ ὧ ἴσον ἐστί), ῥητέον μηδὲν μηδενὸς ἀφαιρεῖσθαι.

- 308 Καὶ μὴν εἰ ἀφαιρεῖται τι τινός, ἦτοι ὅλον ἀπὸ ὅλου ἀφαιρεῖται ἢ μέρος ἀπὸ μέρους ἢ μέρος ἀπὸ ὅλου ἢ ὅλον ἀπὸ μέρους· οὔτε δὲ ὅλον ἀπὸ ὅλου ἀφαιρεῖται οὔτε μέρος ἀπὸ μέρους οὔτε ὅλον ἀπὸ μέρους ἢ μέρος ἀπὸ ὅλου, ὡς παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἀφαιρεῖται τι τινός. τὸ μὲν οὖν ὅλον ἀπὸ τοῦ ὅλου ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τελέως ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἀπὸ πῆχους ἀφαιρεῖ πῆχυν, οὐδὲ ἀπὸ κοτύλης κοτύλην, ἐπεὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον οὐκ ἔσται τινός ἀφαιρέσεις ἀλλὰ ὀλοσχερῆς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἀναίρεσις.
- 310 ἀδιανόητον δὲ ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ ὅλον λέγειν ἀπὸ τοῦ μέρους ἀφαιρεῖσθαι. τὸ γὰρ μέρος ἡττόν ἐστὶ τοῦ ὅλου, καὶ τὸ ὅλον πλείον ἐστὶ τοῦ μέρους· ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἡττονος λέγειν τὸ πλεόν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι σφόδρα ἐστὶν ἀπίθανον. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὑπέκειτο ἐν τῷ μέρει τὸ ὅλον, ἵνα ἀπ' αὐτοῦ λάβῃ τὴν ἀφαίρεσιν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ τὸ μέρος. λείπεται οὖν τὸ πιθανώτερον εἶναι δοκοῦν, ἢ τὸ μέρος ἀπὸ τοῦ ὅλου ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἢ τὸ μέρος ἀπὸ τοῦ μέρους. ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο τῶν ἀπόρων ἐτύγχανεν. σκοπῶμεν δὲ τὸ λεγόμενον, ὡς ἔθος τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως, ἐπὶ ἀριθμοῦ. ὑποκείσθω γὰρ δεκάς, καὶ ἀφαιρεῖσθω ἀπὸ ταύτης μονάς. οὐκοῦν ἡ ἀφαιρουμένη μονάς ἦτοι ἀπὸ τῆς ὑποκειμένης δεκάδος ἀφαιρεῖται ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς μετὰ τὴν ἄρσιν ὑπολειπομένης ἐννεάδος· οὔτε ἀπὸ τῆς ἐννεάδος δὲ οὔτε ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάδος ἀφαιρεῖται, ὡς δείξομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἀφαιρεῖται τῆς δεκάδος μονάς, ὧ ἐπεται τὸ μηδὲν μηδενὸς ἀφαιρεῖσθαι. εἰ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάδος ἀφαιρεῖται ἡ

one must declare that nothing is subtracted from anything.

Moreover, if one thing is subtracted from another, 308 either it is a whole that is subtracted from a whole, or a part from a part, or a part from a whole, or a whole from a part^a; but neither is a whole subtracted from a whole, nor a part from a part, nor a whole from a part, nor a part from a whole, as we shall establish; 309 therefore one thing is not subtracted from another. Now that a whole should be subtracted from the whole is perfectly impossible; for no one subtracts a cubit from a cubit, nor a pint from a pint, since such an action will not be subtraction but the complete removal of the existing object. And it is also an 310 inconceivable assertion that the whole is subtracted from the part; for the part is less than the whole, and the whole is more than the part; and to say that the more is subtracted from the less is extremely incredible. For the whole did not exist in the part, so as to enable it to undergo subtraction therefrom, but rather the part in the whole.—We are left, then, with 311 what seems the more probable alternative, that either the part is subtracted from the whole or the part from the part. But this, too, is a thing not feasible. Let us consider the statement, as is the practice of the Sceptics, in the case of number. Thus, let a decad 312 be assumed, and from it let a monad be subtracted. Then this subtracted monad is subtracted either from the existing decad or from the nine which remains after the subtraction; but it is not subtracted either from the nine or from the decad, as we shall show; therefore the monad is not subtracted from the decad; and from this follows that nothing is subtracted from anything. For if the monad is sub- 313

^a With §§ 308-317 cf. P.H. iii. 88-93.

μονάς, ἤτοι ἕτερόν τι ἐστὶν ἢ δεκάς παρὰ τὰς κατὰ μέρος μονάδας, ἢ ἀθροισμὸς τῶν κατὰ μέρους μονάδων ἐστὶν ἢ δεκάς. ἀλλ' ἐτέραν μὲν τῶν κατὰ μέρος μονάδων οὐκ εἰκὸς εἶναι τὴν δεκάδα· καὶ γὰρ ἀναιρεθεισῶν αὐτῶν συναναίρεται καὶ ὑποκει-
 314 μένων πάρεστιν. εἰ δὲ ἐν αὐταῖς ἐστὶ ταῖς μονάσιν ἢ δεκάς, πάντως ἐὰν λέγωμεν ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάδος ἀφαιρῆσθαι τὴν μονάδα, ἐπεὶ ἡ δεκάς οὐδὲν ἐστὶ παρὰ τὰς μονάδας, ὁμολογήσομεν τὴν μονάδα ἀφ' ἐκάστης μονάδος ἀφαιρῆσθαι· ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀφ' ἑαυτῆς
 315 διὰ τὸ σὺν ταύτῃ νοεῖσθαι τὴν δεκάδα. ἀπὸ πάσης δὲ μονάδος ἀφαιρουμένης καὶ ἀφ' ἑαυτῆς τῆς μῆς μονάδος ἐστὶ ἢ τῆς μῆς μονάδος ἄριστος δεκάδος ἄριστος. ἄτοπον δὲ ἐστὶ τὴν τῆς μονάδος ἄρσιν δεκάδος λέγειν ἄρσιν ὑπάρχειν. ἄτοπον ἄρα καὶ ἀπὸ δεκάδος ἀξιοῦν ἀφαιρῆσθαι μονάδα. καὶ μὴν ἀπὸ τῆς περιλειπομένης ἐννεάδος οὐκ ἂν εἴπομεν ταύτην ἀφαιρῆσθαι. εἰ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐννεάδος ἀφαιρῆται ἡ μονάς, οὐκ ὤφειλε μετὰ τὴν ἄρσιν αὐτῆς ὀλόκληρος θεωρεῖσθαι ἢ ἐννεάς· τὸ γὰρ ἀφ' οὗ τι ἀφαιρῆται, οὐ μένει ὀλόκληρον μετὰ τὴν ἀφαίρεσιν, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἐστὶ γεγονυῖα τις ἀπ'
 316 αὐτοῦ ἀφαίρεσις. καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ ἀπὸ τῆς περιλειπομένης ἐννεάδος ἀφαιρῆται ἡ μονάς, ἤτοι ἀπὸ ὅλης τῆς ἐννεάδος ἀφαιρῆται ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐσχάτης μονάδος. οὔτε δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ὅλης ἐννεάδος ἀφαιρῆται, ἐπεὶ ἐστὶ, μὴ ἐτέρας οὔσης παρὰ τὰς κατὰ μέρος μονάδας τῆς ἐννεάδος, ἢ μονάδος ἄριστος ἐννεάδος
 317 ἄριστος, ὅπερ ἦν ἄτοπον· οὔτε ἀπὸ τῆς ἐσχάτης μονάδος, ἐπεὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἀμερῆς καὶ ἀδιαίρετός ἐστὶν ἡ μονάς, ἔπειτα πῶς ὀλόκληρος ἀπολείπεται ἢ

tracted from the decad, either the decad is something other than the individual monads, or the decad is the sum total of the individual monads. But it is not likely that the decad is other than the individual monads; for it disappears when they disappear, and when they exist it too is present. And if 314 the decad consists of the monads themselves, if we say that the monad is subtracted from the decad, we shall certainly agree that the monad is subtracted from each monad, since the decad is nothing else than its monads; and also that it is subtracted from itself, because the decad is conceived as including this monad. But if the single monad 315 is subtracted from each monad and from itself, the removal of the single monad is the removal of the decad. But it is absurd to say that the removal of the monad is the removal of the decad. Therefore it is also absurd to maintain that the monad is subtracted from the decad.—Nor yet shall we say that the monad is subtracted from the remaining nine. For if the monad is subtracted from the nine, after its removal the nine ought not to be found complete; for that from which something is subtracted does not remain complete after the subtraction, since otherwise no subtraction will have been made from it. And 316 besides—if the monad is subtracted from the remaining nine, it is subtracted either from the whole nine or from its last monad. But it is not subtracted from the whole nine, since then—as the nine is nothing else than its individual monads—the removal of the monad is the removal of the nine, which is absurd; nor is it subtracted from the last monad since, firstly, 317 the monad is without parts and indivisible; and, further, how is the nine left complete and not

έννεάς, ἀλλ' οὐ <μειοῦται>¹ παρὰ μονάδα; εἰ δὲ μήτε ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάδος αἶρεται μονὰς μήτε ἀπὸ τῆς περιλειπομένης έννεάδος, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστι τρίτον ἐπινοεῖσθαι, λεκτέον μὴ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι
 318 τῆς δεκάδος μονάδα. πρὸς τούτοις, εἰ ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάδος αἶρεται μονὰς, ἦτοι ἀπὸ μενούσης ἔτι τῆς δεκάδος αἶρεται ἢ μονὰς ἢ ἀπὸ μὴ μενούσης· οὔτε δὲ ἀπὸ μὴ μενούσης αἶρεται ποτε μονὰς οὔτε ἀπὸ μενούσης· παρὰ δὲ τὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι οὐδὲν ἔστιν· οὐκ ἄρα ἀφαιρεῖται ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάδος μονὰς.
 319 ἀπὸ μὲν οὖν μενούσης τῆς δεκάδος αὐτόθεν φαίνεται μὴ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἢ μονὰς· ἐφ' ὅσον γὰρ μένει δεκάς, οὐδὲν ἀφαιρεῖται ἀπ' αὐτῆς. ἀπὸ δὲ μὴ μενούσης πάλιν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἄτοπον· ἀπὸ γὰρ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲ ἀφαιρεθῆναι τι δύναται. οὐκ ἄρα ἀφαιρεῖται
 320 τι τινός. ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐπι² τῶν μετρητῶν ἀφαιρέσεως, ὅλον τῆς ἀπὸ χοέως ἀφαιρουμένης κοτύλης ἢ τοῦ ἀπὸ πήχεως ἀφαιρουμένου παλαιστοῦ. ἢ γὰρ ἀπὸ ὄλου τοῦ χοέως ῥητέον γίνεσθαι τὴν ἀφαίρεσιν ἢ ἀπὸ μέρους, καὶ ἦτοι ἀπὸ μένοντος ἢ μὴ μένοντος· ἀπ' οὐδενός δὲ τούτων, ὡς παρεστήσαμεν· τοῖνυν οὐδὲ ταύτη ἀφαιρεῖται τι τινός.
 321 Ἄλλ' ὅτι μὲν οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἀφαίρεσις, ἐκ τούτων συμφανές· ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ προστίθεται τι τινί, παρακειμένως διδάσκωμεν. ὑποκειμένου τοῖνυν πηχυαίου σώματος καὶ προστιθεμένου τούτῳ παλαι-

¹ <μειοῦται> add. Rüstow.

² ἐπί Heintz: ἀπὸ mss., Bekk.

* The κοτύλη ("cup") was a liquid measure, about $\frac{1}{2}$ pint;

(diminished) by one? But if the one is taken neither from the ten nor from the remaining nine, and besides these no third possibility can be conceived, one must declare that the one is not subtracted from the ten.—Furthermore, if the one is taken from the ten, the one 318 is taken away either while the ten is still remaining or while it is not remaining; but the one is never taken away from it either while it remains or while it does not remain; but there is no other alternative besides existence or non-existence; therefore the one is not subtracted from the ten. Now that the one is not 319 subtracted from the ten whilst it remains is at once apparent; for in so far as the ten remains, nothing is subtracted from it. And that it should be subtracted from it whilst it does not remain is also absurd. For nothing can be subtracted from the non-existent. Therefore, one thing is not subtracted from another.—And the same argument applies also 320 to subtraction in the case of things measured,—for example, the subtraction of a cup from a gallon,^a or the subtraction of a palm from a cubit. For we must say that the subtraction is made either from the whole pint or from a part of it, and either whilst it remains or whilst it does not remain; but it is made from none of these, as we have shown; neither, then, in this way is one thing taken from another.

So then, it is quite evident from these arguments 321 that subtraction is nothing; and in the next place let us demonstrate that neither is one thing added to another.^b Let us suppose, then, a body of a cubit's length, and added to this one of a palm's length, so

the χοῦς ("gallon") was 12 κοτύλαι, about $\frac{1}{2}$ gallon. A "cubit" contained 6 "palms" of about 3 inches each.

^b With §§ 321-327 cf. P.H. iii. 94-96.

σταιίου ὥστε ἑπταπάλαιστον γίνεσθαι τὸ ἐκ τοῦ
 ὑποκειμένου καὶ τῆς προσθέσεως ἀποτελεσθέν,
 ζητῶ [ἐν]¹ τίνι ποτὲ γέγονεν ἢ τοῦ παλαιστοῦ
 322 πρόσθεσις; ἦτοι γὰρ αὐτῷ προστίθεται ὁ παλαι-
 στήσ ἢ τῷ προὑποκειμένῳ πήχει ἢ τῷ ἐξ ἀμφο-
 τέρων ἀποτελεσθέντι ἑπταπαλαιστῷ μεγέθει· οὔτε
 δὲ αὐτῷ προστίθεται ὁ παλαιστήσ οὔτε τῷ προὑπο-
 κειμένῳ πήχει οὔτε τῷ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ἀποτελε-
 σθέντι μεγέθει, φημί δὲ ἕκ τε τοῦ προὑποκειμένου
 πήχεως καὶ τῆς προσθέσεως· οὐκ ἄρα προστίθεται
 323 τι τινί. ἑαυτῷ μὲν οὐδ' ἂν προστεθείη ὁ
 παλαιστήσ· μὴ ἂν γὰρ ἕτερος ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ μὴ
 διπλασιάζων ἑαυτὸν κατὰ τὴν πρόσθεσιν, οὐκ ἂν
 ἑαυτῷ προστεθείη. εἰ δὲ τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ πήχει
 προστίθεται, πῶς παντὶ προστιθέμενος οὐ παρ-
 ισάζεται αὐτῷ καὶ δύο ποιεῖ πήχεις, ὥστε τὸ μὲν
 μείζον ἦττον γίνεσθαι τὸ δὲ ἦττον μείζον; εἰ
 γὰρ ἐξισοῦται τῇ προσθέσει ὁ παλαιστήσ τῷ
 πήχει καὶ ὁ πῆχυς τῷ παλαιστῇ, ὁ μὲν πῆχυς
 ἦττον ἰσαζόμενος μείζων καθεστῶς ἦττων γενή-
 σεται, ὁ δὲ παλαιστήσ μικρὸς ἂν καὶ τῷ πήχει
 324 ἰσαζόμενος μείζων καταστήσεται. ἀλλ' εἰ μὴθ'
 ἑαυτῷ προστίθεται ὁ παλαιστήσ μήτε τῷ προ-
 ὑποκειμένῳ πήχει, λείπεται λέγειν αὐτὸν τῷ ἐξ
 ἀμφοτέρων ἀποτελουμένῳ ἑπταπαλαιστῷ μεγέθει
 προστίθεσθαι. ὁ πάλιν ἐστὶν ἀλογώτατον· τὸ γὰρ
 πρόσθεσιν ἐπιδεχόμενον προὑποκεῖσθαι δεῖ τῆς
 προσθέσεως, οὐχὶ δὲ τὸ γνωόμενον ἐξ αὐτῶν προ-
 ὑπόκειται αὐτῶν. οὐκ ἄρα τῷ γινομένῳ ἕκ τε τῆς
 προσθέσεως καὶ ἐκ τοῦ προόντος προστίθεται τὸ
 325 προστιθέμενον. διαφέρει γε μὴν ἢ πρόσθεσις τοῦ
 γινομένου ἐξ αὐτῆσ, καὶ διαφωνεῖ τοῖσ χρόνοισ

that the body formed of the original body and the
 addition is of seven palms' length—to what, I ask, is
 the addition of the palm made? For the palm is 322
 added either to itself or to the originally existing
 cubit or to the magnitude of seven palms composed
 of both; but the palm is not added either to itself
 or to the original cubit or to the magnitude composed
 of both,—I mean, of both the pre-existing cubit and
 the addition. Therefore one thing is not added to
 another. Now the palm will not be added to itself; 323
 for as it is not other than itself, and does not double
 itself owing to the addition, it will not be added to
 itself. And if it is added to the original cubit, how
 is it that, when it is added to all of it, it does not equal
 it and make two cubits, so that the greater becomes
 less and the less greater? For if by the addition the
 palm is made equal to the cubit and the cubit to the
 palm, the cubit, which is the greater, by being made
 equal to the less will become less, whereas the palm,
 which is small, by being made equal to the cubit will
 come to be larger. But if the palm is not added to 324
 itself nor to the pre-existing cubit, it is only left to
 us to say that it is added to the magnitude of seven
 palms composed of both. But this, again, is most
 irrational; for that which receives the addition must
 be in existence before the addition, but that which
 comes into existence from them is not in existence
 before them. Therefore, what is added is not added
 to what comes into existence from both the addition
 and what previously existed. Moreover, the addition 325
 differs from that which results from it and does not

¹ [ἐν] secl. Heintz.

ἐκείνω· ὅτε μὲν γὰρ γίνεται ἡ πρόσθεσις, οὐπῶ
τὸ γινόμενον ἔστιν ἐξ αὐτῶν, ὅτε δὲ ἔστι τὸ
γεγονὸς ἐξ αὐτῶν, οὐκέτι ἔσται πρόσθεσις. ὥστε
οὐδὲ τῷ γινομένῳ ἐκ τῆς προσθέσεως καὶ τοῦ
προϋποκειμένου πῆχews προστίθεται ὁ παλαι-
στής. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τὸ προστιθέμενον πάλιν οὔτε αὐτὸ
ἑαυτῷ προστίθεται οὔτε τῷ προϋποκειμένῳ οὔτε
τῷ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων, οὐδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν προστίθεται
τινι.

326 Ἐνεστί δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀριθμῶν τὴν αὐτὴν κινεῖν
ἀπορίαν. ὑποκειμένης γὰρ τετράδος καὶ προσ-
τιθεμένης ταύτῃ μονάδος σκεπτέον τίη γίνεται
ἡ πρόσθεσις. ἢ γὰρ ἑαυτῇ προστίθεται ἡ μονὰς
ἢ τῇ τετράδι ἢ τῇ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ἀποτελουμένη
πεντάδι. οὔτε δὲ ἑαυτῇ προστίθεται διὰ τὸ τὸ
μὲν προστιθέμενόν τι ἕτερον εἶναι ἐκείνου τοῦ ᾧ
προστίθεται, τὴν δὲ μονάδα μὴ ἕτερον εἶναι ἑαυτῆς,
καὶ διὰ τὸ μηδὲ ἑαυτὴν διπλασιάζειν, δυνάδα γινο-
327 μένην, οὔτε τῇ τετράδι διὰ τὸ μὴ ἰσάζεσθαι αὐτῇ
μηδὲ διπλασιάζειν αὐτὴν· τὸ γὰρ ὅλην τετράδι
προστιθέμενον, μὴ ἕτερα οὔση τῶν κατὰ μέρος
τεσσάρων μονάδων, τετράς ἐστιν. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ
τῇ ἐξ αὐτῆς καὶ τῆς τετράδος ἀποτελουμένη πεν-
τάδι διὰ τὸ μὴ προϋποκείσθαι τῆς προσθέσεως τὴν
πεντάδα καὶ αἰεὶ ποτε ὀφείλει τὸ προστιθέμενον
προϋποκειμένῳ τινὶ προστίθεσθαι. οὐκ ἄρα προσ-
τίθεται τι τινι.

328 Ἄλλ' εἰ μήτε ἀφαιρεῖται τι τινός, ὡς ὑποδέδει-
κται, μήτε προστίθεται τι τινι, ὡς παρεμυθησάμεθα,
φανερὸν ὡς οὐδὲ μετατίθεται τι ἀπό τινος· ἦν γὰρ
329 ἡ μετάθεσις τοῦ μὲν ἀρσις τοῦ δὲ πρόσθεσις. μὴ
ὄντων δὲ τούτων οὐδὲ τὸ πάσχον ὀφείλει εἶναι
158

coincide with it in time; for when the addition is
being made, what results from them is not as yet
existent, and when what has resulted from them
exists, the addition will exist no longer. So that the
palm is not added to what results from the addition
and the pre-existing cubit. But since, once more,
what is added is not added either to itself or to the
pre-existing object or to the sum of them both, it is
not added to anything at all.

With regard to numbers also it is possible to raise 326
the same difficulty. For if four be set down and one
be added to it, to what, we may inquire, is the addition
made? For the one is added either to itself, or to
the four, or to the five which is made up of the sum
of both. But it is not added to itself, because what
is added to anything is other than the thing whereto
it is added, but the one is not other than itself; and
also because it does not double itself by becoming two.
Nor is it added to the four, because of its not equalling 327
it or doubling it; for what is added to the whole four,
which does not differ from its four individual ones, is
a four. Nor, again, is it added to the five which is
made up of itself and the four, because the five is not
in existence before the addition, and what is added
must always be added to something which pre-exists.
Therefore, nothing is added to anything.

But if nothing is subtracted from anything, as has 328
been demonstrated, nor anything added to anything,
as we have shown, it is also evident that nothing is
transposed from anything^a; for transposition con-
sists in the subtraction of one thing and the addition
of another. And if these are non-existent, what is 329
affected must also be non-existent, inasmuch as

^a With §§ 328-329 cf. *P.H.* iii. 97.

εἴπερ ἦν κατὰ τινα τούτων τῶν τρόπων τὸ πάσχειν· ἄλλως γὰρ οὐκ ἂν τις ἐπινοήσῃε δυνάμενόν τι πάσχειν εἰ μὴ κατὰ τούτους τοὺς τρόπους.

- 330 Συνήπται δὲ πῶς τῇ περὶ τούτου ἀπορία καὶ ἡ περὶ τοῦ ὅλου ἐπι δὲ τοῦ μέρους ζήτησις, ἐπεὶ περ καὶ ἡ ἀφαίρεσις μέρους τινὸς ἀπὸ ὅλου δοκεῖ ἀφαίρεσις εἶναι καὶ ἡ πρόσθεσις ὅλου πάλιν ὑπάρχει πρόσθεσις. ὅθεν εἰ δειχθεῖται ὅτι ἀπορός ἐστὶν ὁ περὶ τοῦ ὅλου καὶ τοῦ μέρους λόγος, ἐπιδειχθήσεται μᾶλλον τὰ περὶ τῆς προσθέσεως καὶ ἀφαιρέσεως πάσχοντός τε καὶ δρώντος προηπορημένα. τὸ δ' ὅτι οὐκ εὐχερές ἐστι λέγειν τί τὸ ὅλον ἐστὶ καὶ τί τὸ μέρος, ἀκολούθως διδάσκωμεν.

ΠΕΡΙ ΟΛΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΜΕΡΟΥΣ

- 331 Ἡ περὶ τοῦ ὅλου σκέψις ἀναγκαία ἐστὶ τοῖς μὲν φυσικοῖς, ἐπεὶ ἀτοπον καθέστηκε τούτους περὶ τοῦ ὅλου καὶ τοῦ παντός ἐπαγγελλομένους τὸ ἀληθὲς εἶρεῖν μὴ εἰδέναι τί ποτέ ἐστι τὸ ὅλον καὶ τίνα τὰ μέρη, τοῖς δὲ σκεπτικοῖς πρὸς ἔλεγχον τῆς τῶν
332 δογματικῶν προπετείας. καὶ δὴ οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς φιλόσοφοι διαφέρουν ὑπολαμβάνουσι τὸ ὅλον καὶ τὸ πᾶν ὅλον μὲν γὰρ εἶναι λέγουσι τὸν κόσμον, πᾶν δὲ τὸ σὺν τῷ κόσμῳ ἔξωθεν κενόν, καὶ διὰ τούτου τὸ μὲν ὅλον πεπερασμένον εἶναι, πεπερασταὶ γὰρ ὁ κόσμος, τὸ δὲ πᾶν ἀπειρον, τοιούτου γὰρ τὸ
333 ἐκτός τοῦ κόσμου κενόν. ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος ἀδιαφόρως τὴν τε τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τὴν τοῦ κενοῦ φύσιν ὅλον τε καὶ πᾶν προσαγορεύει εἰωθεν· ὅτε μὲν γὰρ φησὶν ὅτι ἡ τῶν ὄλων φύσις σώματά ἐστι

¹ τὸ Mutsch.: τε mss., Bekk.

affection occurs in some one of these ways.^a For no one could conceive of any affection possibly taking place otherwise than in one of these ways.

Connected with the difficulty concerning this 330 matter is that concerning the Whole, and also the problem of the Part, since subtraction seems to be the subtraction of a part from a whole, and addition, again, is the addition of a whole. Hence, if it should be proved that the account given of the whole and the part is doubtful, the difficulties previously raised regarding addition and subtraction, and the passive and the active, will be brought out still more clearly. And that it is not easy to define the whole and the part it will be our next task to demonstrate.

CONCERNING WHOLE AND PART

The investigation of the Whole is necessary for the 331 Physicists, since it is absurd that they, while professing to tell the truth about the Whole and the All, should not know how to define what the Whole is and what the parts are; and also for the Sceptics, as a means of convicting the Dogmatists of rashness. Now the philosophers of the Stoic school suppose that 332 "the Whole" differs from "the All"; for they say that the Whole is the Cosmos, whereas the All is the external void together with the Cosmos, and on this account the Whole is limited (for the Cosmos is limited) but the All unlimited (for the void outside the Cosmos is so). But Epicurus usually gives the 333 name of both Whole and All indifferently both to the nature of bodies and to that of void; for at one time he says that "the nature of the Whole of things

^a For further discussion of "affection," or "the passive," see §§ 267 ff., P.H. iii. 38.

καὶ κενόν, ὅτε δὲ ὅτι τὸ πᾶν κατ' ἀμφοτέρα
 ἀπειρόν ἐστι, κατὰ τε σώματα καὶ τὸ κενόν, τουτ-
 ἐστι κατὰ τε τὸ πλῆθος τῶν σωμάτων καὶ κατὰ
 τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ κενοῦ, ἀντιπαρηκουσῶν ἀλλήλαις
 334 τῶν καθ' ἑκάτερον ἀπειριῶν. οἱ δὲ φάμενοι μηδ'
 ὅλως εἶναι κενόν, ὡς οἱ ἐκ τοῦ περιπάτου, τὸ ὅλον
 καὶ τὸ πᾶν τῶν σωμάτων μόνον, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ τοῦ
 335 κενοῦ ἐπικατηγοροῦσιν. γέγονε δὲ τις διά-
 στασις βραχεῖα καὶ περὶ τοῦ μέρους. Ἐπίκουρος
 μὲν γὰρ ἕτερον ἡξίου τυγχάνειν τὸ μέρος τοῦ ὅλου,
 καθάπερ τὴν ἄτομον τοῦ συγκρίματος, εἶγε ἐκείνη
 μὲν ἄποιός ἐστι, τὸ δὲ σύγκριμα πεποιώται, ἥτοι
 336 λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν ἢ κοινῶς κεχρωσμένον καὶ ἥτοι
 θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρὸν ἢ ἄλλην τιὰ ἔχον ποιότητα. οἱ
 δὲ στωικοὶ οὔτε ἕτερον τοῦ ὅλου τὸ μέρος οὔτε τὸ
 αὐτὸ φασιν ὑπάρχειν· ἡ γὰρ χεὶρ οὔτε ἡ αὐτὴ τῷ
 ἀνθρώπῳ ἐστίν, οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, οὔτε
 337 ἕτερα παρὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, σὺν αὐτῇ γὰρ ὁ ἄν-
 θρωπος νοεῖται ἄνθρωπος. ὁ δὲ Αἰνησίδημος κατὰ
 Ἡράκλειτον καὶ ἕτερόν φησι τὸ μέρος τοῦ ὅλου
 καὶ ταῦτόν· ἡ γὰρ οὐσία καὶ ὅλη ἐστὶ καὶ μέρος,
 ὅλη μὲν κατὰ τὸν κόσμον, μέρος δὲ κατὰ τὴν τοῦδε
 τοῦ ζώου φύσιν. τὸ δὲ μόριον καὶ αὐτὸ λέγεται
 διχῶς, καὶ ὅτε μὲν ὡς διαφέρον τοῦ ἰδίως νοου-
 μένου μέρους, καθά φασιν αὐτὸ μέρος μέρους εἶναι,
 καθάπερ δάκτυλον μὲν τῆς χειρὸς οὐς δὲ τῆς κεφα-
 λῆς, ὅτε δ' ὡς μὴ διαφέρον ἀλλὰ μέρος ὄν τοῦ ὅλου,
 καθὼς τινὲς φασὶ κοινῶς μόριον εἶναι τὸ συμπληρω-
 338 τικὸν τοῦ ὅλου. προδιηρθρωμένων δὲ τούτων [καὶ
 τοῦ ὅλου κατὰ τὴν τῶν μερῶν συμπλήρωσιν νοου-
 μένου],¹ χωρῶμεν λοιπὸν ἐπὶ τὴν σκέψιν.

¹ [καὶ . . . νοουμένου] secl. Heintz.

is bodies and void," and at another time that "the All is unlimited in both respects, in respect of both bodies and void,—that is, both in respect of the number of the bodies and in respect of the extent of the void, the infinity of the one matching that of the other." And those who totally deny the existence 334 of void, such as the Peripatetics, predicate Whole and All only of the bodies and not of the void.—There 335 exists also some small dispute about the Part. For Epicurus maintained that the part is other than the Whole, as the atom is other than the compound, since the former is devoid of quality whereas the compound has qualities, being either white or black or, generally, coloured, and either hot or cold or possessed of some other quality. But the Stoics assert that the part is 336 neither other than the Whole nor the same; for the hand is neither the same as the man (for it is not a man) nor other than the man (for it is included in the conception of the man as man). And Aenesidemus, 337 "according to Heraclitus,"^a says that the part is both other than the whole and the same; for substance is both whole and part, whole in the Universe, but part in the nature of this particular animal. And "particle" itself is used in two senses, at one time as different from the separately conceived part—in which sense they speak of it as a part of a part, as the finger of the hand and the ear of the head—and at another time as not different, but as being a part of the whole, in which sense some say generally that "a particle is that which helps to fill up the whole." And 338 now that these distinctions have been drawn [and the whole conceived as a result of the filling up by the parts], let us next proceed to our investigation.

^a Cf. *P.H.* i. 210; *Introd.* Vol. I. pp. xxxviii f.

Εἶπερ οὖν ἔστι τι ὅλον, οἷον ἀνθρώπος ἵππος
φυτὸν ναῦς (ταῦτα γὰρ ὀλων ὀνόματα), ἧτοι ἕτερόν
ἔστι τῶν μερῶν αὐτοῦ καὶ κατ' ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν
καὶ οὐσίαν νοεῖται, ἢ τὸ ἀθροισμα τῶν μερῶν
339 λέγεται τυγχάνειν ὀλον. ἀλλ' ἕτερον μὲν τῶν
μερῶν οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ ὅλον, οὔτε κατ' ἐνάργειαν
οὔτε κατὰ νόησιν. καὶ κατ' ἐνάργειαν μὲν, ἐπεὶ
εἶπερ ἕτερον ἦν καὶ κεχωρισμένον τῶν μερῶν τὸ
ὅλον, ἐχρῆν ἀναιρουμένων τῶν μερῶν ὑπομένον
θεωρεῖσθαι τὸ ὅλον· τοσοῦτον δὲ ἀπέχει τοῦ
πάντων τῶν μερῶν ἀναιρουμένων, οἷον τοῦ ἀν-
δριάντος, μένειν τὸ ὅλον, ὡς κὰν ἐν μόνον μέρος
ἀναιρεθῆ, μηκέτι θεωρεῖσθαι τὸ ὅλον ὑποκείμενον
340 ὡς ὅλον. κατὰ δὲ νόησιν, ὅτι ὅλον νοεῖται οὐ
οὐδὲν ἄπεστι μέρος. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, εἰ ἕτερόν ἔστι
τῶν μερῶν τὸ ὅλον, πάντ' ἔσται ἀπόντα τὰ μέρη
τοῦ ὀλου, καὶ οὕτως οὐκέτι ἔσται τὸ ὅλον.
ἄλλως τε τὸ ὅλον τῶν πρὸς τι ἔστιν· ὡς γὰρ πρὸς
τὰ μέρη νοεῖται ὅλον, καὶ ὅν τρόπον τὸ μέρος τινὸς
ἔστι μέρος, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἕκ τινων μερῶν
ἔστιν ὅλον. τὰ δὲ πρὸς τι συνυπάρχειν ἀλλήλοις
δεῖ καὶ ἀχώριστα τυγχάνειν ἀλλήλων. οὐκ ἄρα
ἕτερόν ἔστι τῶν μερῶν τὸ ὅλον, οὐδὲ κεχώριστα
341 αὐτῶν. λείπεται ἄρα λέγειν τὰ μέρη εἶναι τὸ
ὅλον. ἀλλ' εἰ τὰ μέρη ἔστιν ὅλον, ἧτοι πάντα τὰ
μέρη ἔστιν ὅλον ἢ τινὰ τῶν μερῶν ἢ τὶ τούτων.
καὶ τὶ μὲν τῶν μερῶν οὐκ ἂν εἴη ὅλον· οὐ γὰρ δὴ γε
ἢ κεφαλὴ τάνθρώπου ὅλος ἔστιν ἀνθρώπου, οὐδὲ
342 ὁ τράχηλος ἢ ἡ χεὶρ ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων. καὶ
μὴν οὐδὲ τινὰ τῶν μερῶν ἔσται τὸ ὅλον. πρῶτον
μὲν γὰρ εἴ τινα τῶν μερῶν ὅλον ἐστί, τὰ λειπόμενα

* With §§ 338-349 cf. P.H. iii. 98-101.

If, then, there exists any whole,—such as man, horse, plant, ship (for these are names of wholes),—either it is other than its parts and is conceived according to its own separate reality and substance, or the sum of the parts is said to be the whole.^a But 339 the whole will not be other than its parts, either in its sensible appearance or in its conception. Not in appearance, since, if the whole were other than its parts and separate, when the parts are removed the whole ought to be found still remaining; but so far is it from true that when all the parts (say, of a statue) are removed the whole remains that even when but one part only is removed the whole is no longer found to subsist as a whole. Nor yet in its 340 conception, because the whole is conceived as that from which no part is missing. And because of this, if the whole is other than its parts, all the parts will be missing from the whole, and thus the whole will no longer exist.—And again,—the whole is a relative thing, for it is in relation to its parts that it is conceived as a whole, and just as the part is a part of something, so also the whole is a whole made up of certain parts. But relatives must co-exist with each other and be inseparable from each other. The whole, therefore, is not other than its parts nor separate therefrom.—It only remains for us, then, to say that 341 the parts are the whole. But if the parts are the whole, either all the parts are the whole, or a certain number of the parts, or some one of them. Now some one of the parts will not be the whole; for, assuredly, the head of the man is not the whole man, nor yet his neck or his hand or any other such member. Nor, 342 again, will the whole be a certain number of the parts. For, firstly, if certain of the parts are the

οὐκ ἔσται τοῦ ὅλου μέρος, ὅπερ ἄτοπον. εἶτα καὶ περιτραπήσεται ἢ νόησις τοῦ ὅλου. εἰ γὰρ τινα τῶν μερῶν ὅλον ἐστὶ, ψεῦδός ἐστι τὸ ὅτι ὅλον ἐστὶν οὐ μὴδὲν ἄπεστι τῶν μερῶν· τινα γὰρ ἄπεστιν.
 343 ὥστε οὔτε τι μέρος ὅλον ἐστὶν οὔτε τινα μέρος. εἰ δὲ πάντα τὰ μέρη τὸ ὅλον ἐστίν, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐστὶ τὸ ὅλον εἰ μὴ τὸ ἄθροισμα τῶν μερῶν, οὔτε ἔσται ὅλον οὔτε τὰ μέρη γενήσεται μέρος. ὥς γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐστὶ διάστημα παρὰ τὰ διεστηκότα, οὐδὲ δόκωσις παρὰ τὰς πῶς διακειμένας δοκούς, οὐδὲ πυγμὴ παρὰ τὴν πῶς ἐσχηματισμένην χεῖρα, οὕτως <εἰ>¹ οὐδὲν ἔσται ὅλον παρὰ τὸ ἄθροισμα τῶν μερῶν,
 344 οὐδὲ τὰ μέρη γενήσεται μέρος. καὶ πάλιν, ὃν τρόπον δεξιῶν μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲ ἀριστερὸν ἔστι καὶ τοῦ ἄνω μὴ νοουμένου οὐδὲ τὸ κάτω νοεῖται, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον εἰ μὴ ἔστι τὸ ὅλον, οὔτε τὰ μέρη νοεῖται
 345 μέρη οὔτε μέρη τινα ὑπάρξει. ἔστω δὲ καὶ πάντα τὰ μέρη ὅλον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ζητητέον τε τίνος ἔσται ταῦτα συμπληρωτικά, ὅλου <ἢ>³ ἀλλήλων ἢ ἑαυτῶν; οὔτε δὲ τοῦ ὅλου ἐστὶ μέρη οὔτε ἀλλήλων οὔτε ἑαυτῶν, ὥς παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα τινός ἐστὶ μέρος. ὅλου μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἂν εἶη μέρος· τὸ γὰρ ὅλον οὐδὲν ἐστὶ παρὰ ταῦτα, ἀλλ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα
 346 λέγεται εἶναι ὅλον. οὐδὲ μὴν ἀλλήλων γενήσεται μέρος. τὰ γὰρ τίνος μέρη ἐμπεριέχεται τοῖς ὧν ἐστὶ μέρη, ὅλον ἀνθρώπων μὲν ἢ χεῖρ χειρὶ δὲ ὁ δάκτυλος, τὰ δὲ μέρη τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατ' ἰδίαν ὑφέστηκε καὶ οὐκ ἐμπεριέχεται ἀλλήλοις· οὔτε γὰρ ἡ ἀριστερὰ χεῖρ τὴν δεξιᾶν συμπληροῦ οὔτε ἡ δεξιὰ

¹ <εἰ> add. N, Mutsch.

³ οὐδὲ Mutsch.: οὔτε MSS. (οὔτε . . . μέρος om. Bekk.).
² <ἢ> addo.

whole, the rest will not be parts of the whole, which is absurd. And, secondly, the conception of the whole will be overthrown. For if certain of the parts are the whole, it is false to say that the whole is that from which none of the parts are missing; for some are missing. So that neither some one part nor certain of the parts are the whole. And if all the 343 parts are the whole, and the whole is nothing else than the sum of the parts, neither will it be a whole nor will the parts be parts. For just as separation is nothing apart from the things separated, or rafting apart from the rafters arranged in a certain way, or the fist apart from the hand held in a certain position, so too if the whole is nothing more than the sum of the parts, the parts will not be parts. And again, 344 just as, when "right" does not exist, "left" also is non-existent, and when "above" is not conceived neither is "below" conceived, in the same way, if the whole does not exist, the parts are not conceived nor will any parts exist.—But let it be granted that 345 all the parts are the whole, still we must inquire what it is that these are to complete—is it the whole, or one another, or themselves? But they are not parts either of the whole or of one another or of themselves, as we shall establish; therefore, they are not parts of anything. Now they will not be parts of the whole; for the whole is nothing more than the parts, and they themselves are said to be the whole. Nor yet will they 346 be parts of one another. For the parts of anything are included in the things whereof they are parts,—as, for instance, the hand in the man and the finger in the hand,—but the parts of the man subsist separately and are not included in one another; for the left hand does not complete the right, nor the right the left, nor

τὴν ἀριστεράν, οὐχ ὁ ἀντίχειρ τὸν λιγανόν, οὐχ αἱ
 χεῖρες τὴν κεφαλὴν, ἀλλ' ἴδιον τόπον ἕκαστον τοῦ-
 347 τῶν ἀπέληφεν. οὐδὲ ἀλλήλων οὖν μέρη ἐστὶ τὰ
 μέρη. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ἑαυτῶν· ἀμήχανον γὰρ ἑαυτοῦ
 τι μέρος ὑπάρχει. εἰ οὖν μήτε ἕτερόν ἐστι τῶν
 μερῶν τὸ ὅλον μήτε αὐτὰ τὰ μέρη ἐστὶν ὅλον,
 348 οὐδὲν ἐστὶ τὸ ὅλον. καὶ πάλιν τὸ μέρος, οἷον
 ἡ κεφαλὴ, λέγεται τὸν ὅλον ἄνθρωπον συμπληροῦν
 καὶ ἀνθρώπου μέρος εἶναι· θεωρεῖται δέ γε ὁ
 ἄνθρωπος σὺν τῇ κεφαλῇ ἄνθρωπος· καὶ ἑαυτὴν
 ἄρα συμπληροῖ ἡ κεφαλὴ, καὶ ἑαυτῆς γίνεται
 μέρος. διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ μείζων ἐστὶν ἑαυτῆς καὶ
 ἐλάσσων· ἢ μὲν γὰρ συμπεπληρωμένη νοεῖται ὑφ'
 ἑαυτῆς, μείζων ἐστὶν αὐτῆς, ἢ δὲ συμπληροῦσα,
 349 ἐλάττων. ἡ δὲ αὐτῆ ἀπορία καὶ ἐπὶ φυτοῦ καὶ
 ἐπὶ πήχεως καὶ κοινῶς τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ὧν
 ἐπικατηγορεῖται τὸ ὅλον· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ παλαιστής
 μέρος πήχεως νοεῖται (σὺν γὰρ τῷ παλαιστῇ καὶ ὁ
 πήχυς νοεῖται πήχυς), καὶ ἑαυτοῦ συμπληρωτικός
 ἐστὶν ὁ παλαιστής καὶ μέρος ἑαυτοῦ. ὅπερ ἄτοπον
 καὶ σχεδὸν παρὰ τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας.
 350 Ἄπεται δὲ ἡ ἀπορία καὶ τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν.
 ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῦ τοιοῦτου στίχου,

μῆνιν ἄειδε θεὰ Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος,

ζητητέον τὸ μῆνιν καὶ τὸ ἄειδε καὶ τὸ θεὰ καὶ τὸ
 Πηληϊάδεω καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τὸ Ἀχιλῆος, τίνος
 ἐστὶ μέρος. ἦτοι γὰρ ὅλος ὁ στίχος ἄλλο τί ἐστὶ
 τῶν μερῶν τούτων, ἢ τὸ ἄθροισμα αὐτῶν ὁ στίχος
 ἐστίν. καὶ ἐπακτέον τὰς κειμένας ἀπορίας. τὸ
 μῆνιν εἰ μὲν τοῦ ὅλου στίχου μέρος ἐστί, καὶ

the thumb the forefinger, nor the hands the head, but
 each of these has its own separate place. So then the 347
 parts are not parts of one another. Nor yet of them-
 selves; for it is impossible for anything to be a part
 of itself. If, then, the whole is not other than the
 parts, and the parts themselves are not the whole,
 the whole is nothing.—And again, the part (such as 348
 the head) is said to complete the whole man and be a
 part of the man: and the man is certainly viewed as
 a man with head included; and therefore the head
 completes itself and is a part of itself. And because
 of this it is both greater and less than itself; for in
 so far as it is conceived as completed by itself it is
 greater than itself, but in so far as it completes, less.
 And there is the same difficulty in the case of the 349
 plant and the cubit and, in general, of all the other
 things of which the term "whole" is predicated; for
 since the palm^a is conceived as part of the cubit (for
 it is with the inclusion of the palm that the cubit is
 conceived as a cubit), the palm both serves to com-
 plete itself and is a part of itself. But this is absurd
 and contrary, one may say, to our common notions.

This difficulty applies also to the parts of speech. 350
 For in a line like this—

Sing, O goddess, the wrath of the son of Peleus, Achilles,^b—
 one must inquire about the words "wrath" and
 "sing" and "goddess" and "son of Peleus" and
 also "Achilles," of what are they parts? For either
 the whole line is something other than these parts, or
 the sum of them is the line. But here one must bring
 up the difficulties already stated. If the word
 "wrath" is a part of the whole line, it will also be

^a Cf. § 321.

^b Homer, *Il.* i. 1.

351 *ἑαυτοῦ γενήσεται μέρος· σὺν αὐτῷ γὰρ ἐνοεῖτο καὶ ὅλος ὁ στίχος· εἰ δὲ τοῦ λοιποῦ τοῦ “ἄειδε θεὰ Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος,” πῶς οὐ μείζων ἀνακῦψει ἀπορία; τὸ γὰρ τινος μέρος ἐμπεριέχεται τῷ οὐ ἐστὶ μέρος, τὸ δὲ μῆνιν οὐκ ἐμπεριέχεται τῷ “ἄειδε θεὰ Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος”· οὐκ ἄρα μέρος ἐστὶ τὸ μῆνιν τοῦ ὅλου στίχου.*
 352 *Τοιούτων δὲ ἠπορημένων κατὰ τὸν τόπον εἰώθασιν οἱ δογματικοί, μικρὰν ἀναπνοὴν πορίζοντες αὐτοῖς, λέγειν ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον καὶ αἰσθητὸν οὔτε ὅλον ἐστὶν οὔτε μέρος, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐσμεν οἱ ἐκείνου τό τε ὅλον καὶ τὸ μέρος ἐπι-
 353 κατηγοροῦντες. ἦν γὰρ τὸ ὅλον τῶν πρὸς τι· ὡς γὰρ πρὸς τὰ μέρη ἐνοεῖτο τὸ ὅλον. καὶ πάλιν τὰ μέρη τῶν πρὸς τι· ὡς γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον νοεῖται τὰ μέρη. τὰ δὲ πρὸς τι ἐν συμμημονεύσει ἐστὶν ἡμετέρα, ἢ δὲ ἡμετέρα συμμημονεύσεις ἐστὶν ἐν ἡμῖν· τὸ οὖν ὅλον καὶ τὸ μέρος ἐστὶν ἐν ἡμῖν. τὸ δὲ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον αἰσθητὸν οὔτε ὅλον ἐστὶν οὔτε μέρος, ἀλλὰ πρᾶγμα οὐ ἡμεῖς ἐπικατηγοροῦμεν
 354 τὴν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν συμμημονέουσιν. ῥητέον δὲ πρὸς αὐτοὺς πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἀτοπὸν ἐστὶ τὸ λέγειν τὸν τράχηλον ἢ τὴν κεφαλὴν μὴ τοῦ ἐκτὸς ἀνθρώπου συμπληρωτικὰ εἶναι μέρη ἀλλὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας συμμημονεύσεως. εἰ δὲ ἡ κεφαλὴ καὶ ὁ τράχηλος συμπληρωτικὰ ἐστί τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ ὁ τράχηλος ἐστὶν ἐν ἡμῖν, δεήσει τὸν ἀνθρώπον εἶναι ἐν ἡμῖν. ὅπερ ἀτοπὸν. οὐ τοῖνυν ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ συμμη-
 355 μονεύσει τό τε ὅλον καὶ τὰ μέρη κεῖται. ναί, φήσει τις, ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν ὅλος ἀνθρωπὸς ἐστὶν ἐν ἡμῖν κατὰ συμμημόνευσιν, συμπληροῦται δὲ οὐχ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐκτὸς τραχήλου καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς κεφαλῆς, ἀλλὰ*

a part of itself; for the whole line was conceived as including it; and if it is a part of the rest of the line 351 (“Sing, O goddess, of the son of Peleus, Achilles”), surely a greater difficulty will emerge. For the part of anything is included in that of which it is a part, but “the wrath” is not included in “Sing, O goddess, of the son of Peleus, Achilles”; therefore “the wrath” is not a part of the whole line.

Such being the difficulties raised about this topic, 352 the Dogmatists—by way of providing themselves with a little breathing-space—are accustomed to argue that the external real and sensible object is neither whole nor part, but it is we who apply to it the terms “whole” and “part.” For “whole” is a 353 relative term, since a whole is conceived in relation to its parts. And again, “parts” are relative, for the parts are conceived in relation to the whole. And relatives are in our consciousness,^a and our consciousness is in us; so the whole and the part are in us. And the external real and sensible object is neither a whole nor a part but a thing of which we predicate our own consciousness. In reply to them one must 354 say, firstly, that it is absurd to argue that the neck and the head are not complementary parts of the external man but of our consciousness. But if the head and the neck are complements of the man and the neck is in us, the man will have to be in us. Which is absurd. So then, the whole and the parts do not reside in our consciousness.—Yes, someone will say, 355 but the whole man is in us, through consciousness, and has its complement not in the external neck and

^a Literally, “concurrent recollection.”

- πάλιν ἐκ τῶν κατὰ ταῦτα τὰ μέρη ἐννοῶν· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ ὅλος ἄνθρωπος ἐννόημά ἐστιν ἡμῶν.
 356 ὁ δὲ τοῦτο λέγων οὐκ ἐκφεύγει τὴν ἀπορίαν. πάλιν γὰρ οὗτος ὁ ἐν ἡμῖν ἄνθρωπος, εἴτε ἐννόημά ἐστιν εἴτε καὶ ἡμετέρα συμμνημόνευσις, ἤτοι ἕτερος νοεῖται παρὰ τὰ μέρη ἢ τὰ μέρη νοεῖται ὁ ἄνθρωπος. οὐδέτερον δὲ τούτων δύναται ὑπάρχειν, ὡς παρεστήσαμεν. καὶ αὐτὴ οὖν ἡ νόησις
 357 ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτὴν πέπτωκεν ἀπορίαν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ῥητέον μηδὲν εἶναι ὅλον. ὧ ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ μηδὲ μέρος ὑπάρχειν· τῶν γὰρ πρὸς τι ἐκάτερόν ἐστι, καὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου τῶν πρὸς τι ἀναιρεθέντος συναναίρεται καὶ τὸ λοιπόν.
 358 Ὡδε μὲν περὶ τούτων ἠπορήσθω· συνεζητηκότες δὲ ἀπτόρως ἤδη τοῖς δογματικοῖς περὶ τῶν δραστηρίων τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχῶν, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο κοινότερον περὶ τε τούτων καὶ τῶν ὑλικῶν διαπορώμεν.

ΠΕΡΙ ΣΩΜΑΤΟΣ

- 359 Περὶ τῶν ἀνωτάτω καὶ ἀρχικωτάτων στοιχείων δύο μὲν αἱ πρῶται γεγόνασι στάσεις, πλείους δὲ κατ' εἶδος. οἱ μὲν γὰρ σώματα ἔλεξαν εἶναι τὰ
 360 τῶν ὄντων στοιχεῖα, οἱ δὲ ἀσώματα. καὶ τῶν σώματα φαμένων Φερεκύδης μὲν ὁ Σύριος γῆν ἔλεξε πάντων εἶναι ἀρχὴν καὶ στοιχείον, Θαλῆς δὲ ὁ Μιλήσιος ὕδωρ, Ἀναξίμανδρος δὲ ὁ ἀκουστής τοῦτου τὸ ἀπειρον, Ἀναξίμενης δὲ καὶ Ἰδαῖος ὁ Ἱμεραῖος καὶ Διογένης ὁ Ἀπολλωνιάτης καὶ Ἀρχέλαος ὁ Ἀθηναῖος, Σωκράτους δὲ καθηγητῆς, καὶ κατ' ἐπίου Ἡράκλειτος ἀέρα, Ἰππασος δὲ ὁ

* With §§ 359-364 cf. *P.H.* iii. 30-32.

the external head but, once more, in the conceptions which correspond to these parts. For in fact the whole man is itself a concept of ours. But he who 356 argues thus does not escape from the difficulty. For, once again, either this man who is within us, whether he be a concept or our consciousness, is conceived as other than his parts, or else the man is conceived as his parts. But neither of these can be true, as we have established. Thus, too, the very conception itself is overthrown by the same difficulty. And if so, 357 we must declare that no whole exists. From which it follows that no part, either, exists. For each of these is a relative, and when one of a pair of relatives is abolished, the other also is abolished with it.

Let this, then, stand as the statement of our doubts 358 about these matters; and as we have now disputed sufficiently with the Dogmatists regarding the efficient principles of the Universe, let us now state in more general terms the difficulties regarding both these and the material principles.

CONCERNING BODY

Concerning the primary and most fundamental 359 elements there are two leading views, with several sub-divisions; for some have affirmed that the elements of existing things are bodies, others that they are incorporeal.^a And of those who have de- 360 clared them to be bodies, Pherecydes of Syros said that the principle and element of all things is earth; and Thales of Miletus, water; and his disciple, Anaximander, the unlimited; and Anaximenes and Idaeus of Himeria and Diogenes of Apollonia and Archelaus of Athens (Socrates' teacher) and (according to some) Heraclitus, air; and Hippasus of Meta-

361 *Μεταποντίνος καὶ κατ' ἐνίου Ἡράκλειτος πῦρ, Ξενοφάνης δὲ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν*

(πάντες γὰρ γαίης τε καὶ ὕδατος ἐκγενόμεσθα),

**Ἴππων δὲ ὁ Ῥηγίνος πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ, Οἰνοπίδης δὲ ὁ Χίος πῦρ καὶ ἀέρα, Ὀνομάκριτος δὲ ἐν τοῖς Ὀρφικοῖς πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν*

362 *Ἐμπεδοκλέα καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀέρα καὶ πῦρ*

(τέσσαρα γὰρ πάντων ριζώματα πρῶτον ἄκουε· Ζεὺς ἀργῆς Ἥρη τε φερέσβιος ἦδ' Ἄιδωνεὺς Νῆστις θ', ἣ δακρύοις τέγγει κρούνομα βρό-
τειον),

363 *Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ἀτόμους, εἰ μὴ τι ἀρχαιοτέραν ταύτην θετέον τὴν δόξαν, καὶ ὡς ἔλεγεν ὁ στωικός Ποσειδώνιος, ἀπὸ Μώχου τινὸς ἀνδρὸς Φοίνικος καταγομένην, Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ ὁ Κλαζομένιος ὁμοιομερείας, Διόδωρος δὲ ὁ ἐπικληθεὶς Κρόνος ἐλάχιστα καὶ ἀμερῆ σώματα, Ἀσκληπιάδης δὲ ὁ Βιθυνὸς ἀνάρμους ὄγκους.*

364 *τῶν δὲ ἀσώματα δογματιζόντων οἱ μὲν περὶ Πυθαγόραν τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἔλεξαν πάντων ἀρχεῖν, οἱ δὲ μαθηματικοὶ τὰ πέρατα τῶν σωματίων, οἱ*

365 *δὲ περὶ τὸν Πλάτωνα τὰς ἰδέας. τοιαύτης δὲ οὐσης τῆς κατὰ γένος καὶ κατ' εἶδος τῶν φυσικῶν διαστάσεως, ἐνέσται πρὸς πάντας κοινῶς ἀντερεῖν, ἐν μέρει περὶ τε τῶν σωματίων καὶ τῶν ἀσωματίων διαπορήσαντας· ὧδε γὰρ ἕκαστος τῶν κατηγορη-*

* Zeus probably stands for the element "air," Herē for

pontum and (according to some) Heracleitus, fire; 361 and Xenophanes, water and earth—

(Verily all we men are sprung from earth and from water); and Hippo of Rhegium, fire and water; and Oenopides of Chios, fire and air; and Onomacritus in his *Orphica*, fire and water and earth; and Empedocles and the 362 Stoics, earth and water and air and fire—

Four are the roots of all things, and list thou first to their titles:

Shining Zeus, and Herē the life-bringer, and Aidoneus,* Nestis, too, who wetteth with tears the fountain of mortals;—

and Democritus and Epicurus, atoms, unless one 363 should regard this opinion as more ancient and— as the Stoic Poseidonius asserted—derived from a certain Phoenician called Mochus; and Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, homoeomeries^b; and Diodorus, sur-named Cronos, minimal and indivisible bodies; and Asclepiades the Bithynian, homogeneous molecules. And of those who have dogmatically asserted that 364 they are incorporeal, the Pythagoreans have said that the numbers are the principles of all things; and the Mathematicians, the limits of bodies; and Plato, the ideas.—Such, then, being the divergence of opinion, 365 both in general and in particular, amongst the Physicists, it will be possible to give one general answer to them all when we have discussed in turn the difficulties about bodies and those about incorporeals^c; for in this way each of the persons

"earth," Aidoneus for "fire"; Nestis certainly for "water." "The fountain" (or physical source) is the semen.

^b i.e. "things with like parts"—Aristotle's name for the material "elements" of Anaxagoras.

^c "Bodies" are discussed in §§ 366 ff., "incorporeals" in *Adv. Phys.* ii. With § 365 cf. *P.H.* iii. 37.

μημένων σωματικὰς μὲν ἀπολείπων τὰς πάντων ἀρχὰς ταῖς κατὰ τοῦ σώματος κομιζομέναις ἀπορίας ὑποπεσεῖται, ἀσωμάτους δὲ δογματίζων
366 ταῖς κατὰ τῶν ἀσωμάτων. ἡγήσθω δὲ ὁ περὶ τοῦ σώματος λόγος, τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς σκέψεως λαμβάνων ἀπὸ τῆς ἐννοίας.

Εὐθέως τοίνυν κατὰ μὲν τοὺς σώμα νοούντας τὸ οἶόν τε παθεῖν ἢ διαθεῖναι, ὧν ἀρχηγὸς ἱστορεῖται Πυθαγόρας, ἤδη σχεδὸν ἀνηγήκαμεν τὸ σῶμα, καὶ οὐ δεόμεθα πρὸς τοῦτο καινοτέρων λόγων· εἰ γὰρ σῶμά ἐστι τὸ οἶόν τε παθεῖν ἢ ποιῆσαι, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον δέδεικται ἡμῖν, οὐδὲν ἂν εἶη τὸ
367 ἐπινοούμενον σῶμα. κατὰ δὲ τὰς τῶν μαθηματικῶν ἐννοίας νῦν συνακτέον¹ τὸ προκείμενον. φασὶ γὰρ σῶμα εἶναι τὸ τρεῖς ἔχον διαστάσεις, μῆκος βάθος πλάτος, ὧν μῆκος μὲν ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἄνωθεν κάτω, πλάτος δὲ τὸ ἀπὸ ἀριστερῶν ἐπὶ τὰ δεξιὰ, τρίτην δὲ διάστασιν ὑπάρχειν, τουτέστι τὸ βάθος, τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν εἰς τοῦπίσω. ὅθεν καὶ παρατάσεις εἶναι ἕξ, δύο καθ' ἐκάστην διάστασιν, ἄνω κάτω,
368 δεξιὰ ἀριστερά, πρόσω ὀπίσω. ταύτη μὲν τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ πολὺ τι πληθὸς ἀποριῶν ἐξακολουθεῖν φαίνεται. ἤτοι γὰρ χωριστὸν ἐστὶ τούτων τῶν τριῶν διαστάσεων τὸ σῶμα κατὰ τὴν ἐπινοίαν, ὥστε ἄλλο μὲν εἶναι σῶμα ἄλλο δὲ τὸ μῆκος καὶ βάθος καὶ πλάτος τοῦ σώματος, ἢ ἄθροισμα τούτων
369 τῶν διαστάσεων ἐστὶ τὸ σῶμα. ἀλλὰ χωριζόμενον μὲν τούτων τῶν διαστάσεων τὸ σῶμα οὐκ

¹ συνακτέον cj. Mutsch.: συντακτέον mss., Bekk.

• Cf. P.H. iii. 38.

enumerated who admits that the principles of all things are corporeal will be brought face to face with the difficulties raised about body, and every one who asserts their incorporeality with those raised about incorporeals. And let our discussion of body come
366 first, commencing with an examination of the conception of "body."

To begin with, then, as against those who conceive body^a as "what is capable of being acted upon or of affecting" (and of these it is recorded that Pythagoras was the leader), we have already pretty well abolished body and do not need for this purpose other fresh arguments; for if body is what is capable of being acted upon or acting, since we have proved^b that there is nothing which acts or is acted upon, the body as so conceived will be nothing. But the subject before us must now be treated
367 systematically with reference to the conceptions of the Mathematicians.^c They say that body is "that which has three dimensions, length, depth, breadth"; and of these, length is extent from above to below, breadth from left to right, and the third dimension (namely, depth) is from front to back. Hence, there are six modes of extension, two for each dimension,—up and down, to right and to left, forward and backward. From this conception a vast number of diffi-
368 culties seem to follow. For either body, in respect of its conception, is separate from these three dimensions, so that the body is one thing and the length and depth and breadth of the body something different, or else the body is the sum of these dimensions. But it is not possible to conceive the body as
369

^a Cf. §§ 195 ff., 266 ff.

^b With §§ 367-370 cf. P.H. iii. 39-40.

ἔνεστω ἐπινοεῖν· ὅπου γὰρ μήτε μήκός ἐστι μήτε
 πλάτος μήτε βάθος, ἐκεῖ οὐδὲ σῶμα νοεῖν οἷόν τε
 ἐστίν. εἰ δὲ ὁ ἀθροισμὸς τούτων σῶμα καθέστη-
 κεν, ἐπεὶ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἀσώματόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἐξ
 ἀσωμάτων συγκείμενον πάντως ἐστὶν ἀσώματον,
 δεήσει καὶ τὴν κοινήν αὐτῶν σύνοδον μὴ σῶμα
 370 ἀλλ' ἀσώματον ὑπάρχειν· ὡς γὰρ ἡ συνέλευσις τῶν
 γραμμῶν ἀσωμάτων οὐσῶν καὶ ὁ ἀθροισμὸς τῶν
 στιγμῶν οὐδέποτε πέφυκε στερεὸν ποιεῖν σῶμα
 καὶ ἀντίτυπον, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τοῦ μήκους καὶ τοῦ
 βάθους καὶ τοῦ πλάτους σύνοδος, ἀσωμάτων οὐσα
 σύνοδος, οὐκ ἀποτελεῖ σῶμα. εἰ δὲ μήτε τούτων
 χωρὶς ἐστὶ τι σῶμα μήτε ταῦτά ἐστι σῶμα, οὐδέν
 371 ἐστὶ σῶμα. καὶ ἄλλως, ἐπεὶ περ ἡ σύνοδος
 τοῦ μήκους καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους ποιεῖ σῶμα,
 ἦτοι πρὶν τῆς συνόδου τούτων ἕκαστον ἰδίᾳ
 περιεῖχε τὴν σωματότητα καὶ τοὺς ὡσπερ λόγους
 τοῦ σώματος, ἢ μετὰ τὴν συνέλευσιν αὐτῶν ἐπι-
 συνέβη τὸ σῶμα. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἕκαστον πρὶν τῆς
 συνόδου περιεῖχε τὴν σωματότητα, ἔσται ἕκαστον
 372 σῶμα· ἐστ' ἐπεὶ τὸ σῶμα οὐ μήκος μόνον ἐστὶν
 οὐδὲ πλάτος οὐδὲ βάθος ἀλλὰ καὶ μήκος καὶ βάθος
 καὶ πλάτος, ἕκαστον τούτων ἔχον τὴν σωμα-
 τότητα τρία γενήσεται, καὶ οὕτω τὸ μήκος οὐ
 μόνον μήκος ἔσται ἀλλὰ καὶ πλάτος καὶ βάθος,
 καὶ τὸ πλάτος οὐχ ἀπλῶς πλάτος ἀλλὰ καὶ μήκος
 καὶ βάθος, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἡ λειπομένη διάστασις.
 373 εἰ δὲ συνελθόντων τούτων τότε ἐπισυνέβη τὸ σῶμα,
 ἦτοι συνελθόντων αὐτῶν μένει ἡ ἀρχῆθεν φύσις ἢ
 μεταβάλλει εἰς τὴν σωματότητα. καὶ εἰ μὲν μένει
 ἡ ἀρχῆθεν φύσις, ἐπεὶ ἀσώματά ἐστι καὶ ἀσώματα

separate from these dimensions ; for where there is
 neither length nor breadth nor depth, there it is not
 possible to conceive body. And if the sum of these
 is body, since each of them is incorporeal and what is
 compounded of incorporeals is certainly incorporeal,
 the combination of all these together will have to be,
 not body but, incorporeal. For just as the conjunc- 370
 tion of lines, which are incorporeal, and the sum of
 points are never of a nature to make a solid and
 resistant body, so also the combination of length,
 depth, and breadth, being a combination of incor-
 poreals, will not produce a body. But if there is no
 body apart from these, and these, too, are not body,
 nothing is body.—And again, since the combination 371
 of length and breadth and depth makes body, either
 each of these separately, before combining, con-
 tained corporeality and the rational germs,^a as it were,
 of body, or body supervened after their conjunction.
 And if each of them, before combining, contained 372
 corporeality, each will be a body ; and further, since
 body is not length only, nor breadth, nor depth, but
 length and depth and breadth, each of these as
 possessing corporeality will become three, and thus
 length will not only be length but also breadth and
 depth, and depth not simply breadth but also length
 and breadth, and so likewise with the remaining
 dimension. And if it is after these are conjoined 373
 that body supervenes, either their original nature
 remains after their conjunction or it changes to cor-
 poreality. And if their original nature remains,
 since they are incorporeal and remain incorporeal,

^a Or "seminal reasons," i.e. the creative principles derived
 from the Cosmic Reason ("Logos") according to Stoic
 doctrine; cf. *Introd.* Vol. I. p. xxiv.

374 μένει, οὐ ποιήσει διάφορον σῶμα· εἰ δὲ μεταβάλλει εἰς τὸ σῶμα, ἐπεὶ τὸ ἐπιδεχόμενον μεταβολὴν ἔστι σῶμα, ἕκαστον τούτων καὶ πρὶν τῆς συνελύσεως σῶμα ὄν, πρὶν σώματος ἀποτελέσει σῶμα. ὡσπερ τε τὸ μεταβάλλον σῶμα ἄλλην μὲν ἀντ' ἄλλης παραδέχεται ποιότητα, μένει δὲ σῶμα, οἷον τὸ λευκόν, ἵνα γένηται μέλαν, καὶ τὸ γλυκύ, ἵνα γένηται πικρόν, ἣν μὲν ἀποβάλλει ποιότητα ἣν δὲ ἀναδέχεται, μὴ ἐκβαῖνον τοῦ σῶμα εἶναι, οὕτω καὶ ταῦτα, εἴπερ μεταβάλλει εἰς σῶμα, ἄλλην ἀντ' ἄλλης δέξεται ποιότητα· τοῦτο δὲ πάσχιοντα ἔσται σῶματα. εἰ οὖν οὔτε πρὸ τῆς συνελύσεως τούτων ἔστι τὸ νοούμενον σῶμα οὔτε μετὰ τὴν συνελουσιν αὐτῶν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπινοῆσαι τὸ σῶμα.

Πρὸς τούτοις εἰ μηδὲν ἔστι μήκος μηδὲ πλάτος μηδὲ βάθος, οὐδὲ τὸ κατὰ μετουσίαν τούτων νοούμενον σῶμα γενήσεται· οὐδὲν δὲ ἔστι μήκος καὶ 376 πλάτος καὶ βάθος, ὡς παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι σῶμα. μήκος μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπεὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἦν τοῦτο τοῦ σώματος διάστημα ὅπερ λέγεται παρὰ τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς γραμμῆ, ἣ δὲ γραμμὴ ἦν στιγμὴ ἔρρηκτιὰ, καὶ ἡ στιγμὴ σημεῖον ἀμερές καὶ ἀδιάστατον. (ὅθεν εἰ μηδὲν ἔστι σημεῖον ἀμερές καὶ ἀδιάστατον),¹ οὐδὲ γραμμὴ γενήσεται, μὴ οὔσης δὲ γραμμῆς οὐδὲ μήκος ἔσται, μήκος δὲ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲ σῶμα ὑποστήσεται· σὺν μήκει 377 γὰρ σῶμα νοεῖται. ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲν ἔστι σημεῖον ἀμερές καὶ ἀδιάστατον, ἐντεῦθεν μάθωμεν. εἰ γάρ

¹ <ὅθεν . . . ἀδιάστατον> add. N, Mutsch. (ὥστε . . . ἀδ. add. c). Bekk.).

^a Or (as compared with "breadth" and "depth") the

they will not produce a different body; but if it 374 changes to body, then, since what admits of change is body, each of the dimensions, even before their conjunction, will be body and will produce body before there is body.—Also, just as the body which changes receives one quality instead of another but remains a body,—the white, for instance, in becoming black, and the sweet in becoming bitter, casts off one quality and receives another, while not ceasing to be a body,—so also these dimensions, if they change into body, will exchange one quality for another; and if they are thus affected they will be 375 bodies. If, then, the body as conceived exists neither before their conjunction nor after their conjunction, it is not possible to conceive body.

Furthermore, if there is no length or breadth or depth, neither will the body which is conceived as partaking of these exist; but there is no length and breadth and depth, as we shall establish; therefore 376 body does not exist. For length does not exist, since this, which is termed "line" by the Mathematicians, is the greatest dimension of body,^a and the line is "a point which has flowed," and the point is "a sign which is without parts and without dimensions." (Hence, if no sign^b without parts or dimensions exists,) neither will a line exist, and if the line does not exist neither will length exist, and if length does not exist neither will body subsist; for body, as conceived, includes length. And that there exists no sign with- 377 out parts or dimensions we may learn from what

primary dimension; cf. Nicomachus, *Instit. Arithm.* ii. 6 πρῶτον δὲ διάστημα γραμμὴ λέγεται· γραμμὴ γὰρ ἔστι τὸ ἐφ' ἐν διαστατόν.

^b "Sign" is used in the sequel in the sense of "point."

ἔστι τοιοῦτόν τι, ἥτοι σώμά ἐστιν ἢ ἀσώματον.
 καὶ σώμα μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπεὶ διαστατόν ἂν ὑπῆρχε,
 τοῦ σώματος τὰς τρεῖς ἔχοντος διαστάσεις. καὶ
 378 μὴν οὐδὲ ἀσώματον. εἰ γὰρ ἀσώματόν ἐστιν,
 οὐδὲν γενήσεται ἐξ αὐτοῦ· τὸ γὰρ γενῶν κατὰ
 θίξιν γενεᾶ, θίξις δὲ οὐδεμία γενέσθαι δύναται ἐπὶ
 ἀσωμάτου φύσεως. τοῖνυν οὐδὲ ἀσώματόν ἐστι
 τὸ σημεῖον. εἰ δὲ μήτε σώμα μήτε ἀσώματον,
 379 ἀνεπισημῶν ἐστι τὸ σημεῖον. εἰ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι
 σημεῖον, οὐδὲ γραμμὴ ἔσται. μὴ οὐσης δὲ τῆς
 γραμμῆς οὐδὲ μήκος ἔσται, ᾧ ἔπεται καὶ ἡ τοῦ
 σώματος ἀνπαρξία.
 380 Ἐπι κἂν δοθῇ τὸ σημεῖον εἶναι, οὐκ ἔσται μήκος.
 ἦν γὰρ τὸ μήκος γραμμῆ, ἡ δὲ γραμμὴ ρύσις
 σημείου. ἥτοι οὖν ἔν ἐστι σημεῖον ἐκτεταμένον ἢ
 γραμμῆ, ἢ πολλὰ σημεία νοεῖται στοιχηδὸν κεί-
 381 μενα. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἔν ἐκτεταμένον σημείον ἐστιν,
 οὐκ ἂν εἴη γραμμῆ. ἥτοι γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπέχει
 τόπον τοῦτο τὸ σημεῖον, ἢ τόπον ἐκ τόπου μετα-
 τίθεται. καὶ εἰ μὲν τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπέχει τόπον τοῦτο
 τὸ σημεῖον, οὐκ ἔσται γραμμῆ ἀλλὰ στιγμῆ· ῥυέν
 382 γὰρ ἐνοεῖτο γραμμῆ. εἰ δὲ τόπον ἐκ τόπου μέτ-
 εῖσι, ἥτοι ὃν μὲν ἀπολείπον τόπον οὐ δὲ ἐπιλαμ-
 βανόμενον μέτεισι, ἢ οὐ μὲν ἐχόμενον τόπου εἰς
 383 ὃν δὲ ἐκτεινόμενον. οὔτε δὲ ὃν μὲν ἀπολείπον
 τόπον οὐ δὲ ἐπιλαμβανόμενον ποιήσει γραμμῆν·
 μενεῖ γὰρ ἢ¹ ἀρχῆθεν στιγμῆ, καὶ ᾧ λόγῳ τὸν
 πρῶτον ἐπεσχηκὸς τόπον ἐλέγετο στιγμῆ καὶ οὐ
 γραμμῆ, τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ τὸν δεύτερον ἐπειληφὸς καὶ
 τὸν τρίτον καὶ τοὺς ἐξῆς οὐκ ἔσται γραμμῆ ἀλλὰ
 384 πάλιν στιγμῆ. εἰ δὲ οὐ μὲν ἐχόμενον τόπου εἰς ὃν

¹ ἢ ego: ἢ mss., Bekk.

follows: if there is any such thing it is either a body
 or incorporeal. Now it is not a body, since then it
 would have had dimensions, as body has three dimen-
 sions. Nor yet is it incorporeal. For if it is incor- 378
 poreal, nothing will proceed from it; for that which
 generates generates by contact, but there can be no
 contact in the case of an incorporeal nature. So then,
 the sign is not incorporeal either. But if the sign is
 neither a body nor incorporeal it is inconceivable.
 And if the sign does not exist, neither will the line 379
 exist. And if the line does not exist, neither will
 length exist; and from this follows also the non-
 existence of body.

Moreover, even if it be granted that the sign exists, 380
 length will not exist. For length is line, and the line
 the flux of a sign. The line then is either one sign
 extended, or it is conceived as many signs placed in
 a row. But if it is one sign extended, it will not be 381
 a line, for this sign either occupies the same place
 or changes from place to place. And if this sign
 occupies the same place, it will not be a line but a
 point; for the line is conceived as a thing which has
 flowed. And if it moves on from place to place it 382
 moves either by leaving one place and taking up
 another, or by occupying one place and extending
 into another. But it will not make a line by leaving 383
 one place and taking up another; for it will remain,
 as at first, a point, and just as when it occupied its
 first place it was called a point and not a line, so, by
 the same reasoning, when it occupies its second place
 and its third, and all the rest, it will not be a line but,
 as before, a point. And if it makes the line by 384

δὲ ἐκτεινόμενον ποιεῖ τὴν γραμμὴν, ἥτοι μεριστῶ
 ἀντιπαρεκτείνεται τόπῳ ἢ ἀμερίστῳ. καὶ εἰ μὲν
 ἀμερίστῳ, μένει στιγμὴ καὶ οὐ γίνεται γραμμὴ·
 385 μεριστὸν γὰρ τί ἐστὶν ἢ γραμμὴ· εἰ δὲ μεριστῶ
 ἀντιπαρεκτείνεται τόπῳ, ἐπεὶ τὸ μεριστῶ ἀντι-
 παρεκτεινόμενον τόπῳ μεριστὸν ἐστὶ καὶ ἔχει μέρη,
 τὸ δὲ ἔχον μέρη σώμᾶ ἐστὶν, ἔσται τὸ σημεῖον
 μεριστὸν τε καὶ σώμα, ὅπερ οὐ βούλονται. τοῖνυν
 386 οὐχ ἓν ἐστὶ σημεῖον ἢ γραμμὴ. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ
 πολλὰ στοιχηδὸν κείμενα. ταῦτα γὰρ τὰ σημεῖα
 ἥτοι ψαύει ἀλλήλων κατὰ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν, ἢ οὐχ
 ἀπτεται ἀλλήλων, μεσολαβούμενα δὲ τόποις τισὶ
 διορίζεται. εἰ δὲ τόποις μεσολαβεῖται, οὐκέτι μίαν
 ποιήσει γραμμὴν. εἰ δὲ ἀπτεται ἀλλήλων, ἥτοι ὅλα
 387 ὅλων ἀπτεται ἢ μέρεσι μερῶν. καὶ εἰ μὲν μέρεσι
 μερῶν, οὐκέτι ἔσται ἀμερῆ· τὸ γὰρ μέσον, εἰ τύχοι,
 σημεῖον δυοῖν ἄλλων σημείων πλείονα ἔξει μέρη,
 ἐν μὲν ᾧ ἀπτεται τοῦ ἔμπροσθεν σημείου, ἕτερον δὲ
 ᾧ θιγγάνει τοῦ ὀπισθεν, τρίτον ᾧ τῆς ἐπιπέδου,
 τέταρτον ᾧ τοῦ ὑπερκειμένου μέρους, ὥστε μηκέτι
 388 αὐτὸ ἀμερὲς ὑπάρχειν ἀλλὰ πολυμερὲς. εἰ δὲ ὅλα
 ὅλων ἀπτεται, σημεῖα ἐν σημείοις περισχεθῆσεται
 καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐφέξει τόπον. εἰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐφέξει
 τόπον, οὐκέτι ἔσται στοιχὸς αὐτῶν, ἵνα γένηται
 389 γραμμὴ, ἀλλὰ πάντα μία ἐστὶ στιγμὴ. εἴπερ οὖν
 ἵνα μὲν ἐπινοηθῇ τὸ σώμα, δεῖ ἐπινοηθῆναι τὸ
 μῆκος, ἵνα δὲ τὸ μῆκος, τὴν γραμμὴν, καὶ ἵνα αὕτη,
 τὸ σημεῖον, ἐπεὶ δέδεικται ἢ γραμμὴ μῆτε σημείον

* i.e. that of the board (or paper) on which the point is
 marked. "The part which lies above" is that which is

occupying one place and extending into another, it
 extends over a place that is either divisible or indi-
 visible. And if it is indivisible, it remains a point
 and does not become a line; for the line is a divisible
 thing; and if it extends over a divisible place, then, 385
 since what extends over a divisible place is divisible
 and has parts, and what has parts is a body, the sign
 will be both divisible and a body; and this they do
 not want to admit. So then the line is not one single
 sign.—Nor yet is it many signs set in a row. For 386
 these signs, as conceived, either are in contact with
 one another or do not touch one another but are
 separated by intercepting spaces. But if they are
 intercepted by spaces they will no longer make one
 line. And if they touch one another they either
 touch wholes as wholes or parts with parts. And if 387
 they touch parts with parts they will no longer be
 without parts; for, to take an example, the sign
 which stands midway between two other signs will
 have several parts,—one by which it touches the sign
 in front of it, another by which it makes contact with
 that behind it, a third by which it touches the sur-
 face,^a a fourth by which it touches the part which
 lies above; so that it is no longer without parts but
 with many parts. And if they touch wholes as wholes, 388
 signs will be contained in signs and will occupy the
 same place. And if they shall occupy the same place
 there will no longer be a row of them, so as to form a
 line, but they will all be one point. If, then, in order 389
 to form a conception of body, one must first conceive
 length, and conceive line, again, before length, and
 sign before line, then—since the line has been shown

visible to the eye (on a higher level) of the observer, and
 beneath which is "the part which touches the surface."

ὑπάρχουσα μήτε ἐκ σημείων σύνθετος, οὐδέν ἐστι γραμμῆ. εἰ δὲ μή ἐστι γραμμῆ, οὐδὲ μήκος· ὧ ἀκολοθεῖ τὸ μηδὲ σώμα τι ὑπάρχειν.

390 Καὶ ἄρτι μὲν ἐπεδείξαμεν ἀνεπινώθητον τὴν γραμμὴν ἐχόμενοι τοῦ σημείου· ἔνεστι δὲ καὶ προηγουμένως αὐτὴν ἀναρῶν ἐχόμενους τῆς κατ' αὐτὴν ἐπινοίας. φασι γὰρ οἱ γεωμέτραι ὅτι γραμμῆ
391 ἐστι μήκος ἀπλατές, ἡμεῖς δὲ σκεπτόμενοι οὔτε ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς οὔτε ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς δυνάμεθα λαβεῖν μήκος ἀπλατές· ὁ τι γὰρ ἂν λάβωμεν μήκος αἰσθητόν, τοῦτο σὺν ποσῷ πλάτει λαμβάνομεν. ὥστ' ἐν μὲν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς οὐκ ἐστὶ τι ἀπλατές [σῶμα].¹
392 καὶ μὴν οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς ἔνεστι <τι>² τοιοῦτο φαντασιωθῆναι μήκος. ἕτερον μὲν γὰρ ἐτέρου στενώτερον μήκος δυνάμεθα νοεῖν· ὅταν δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ φυλάττοντες μήκος ἐκ τούτου κατ' ὀλίγον σχίζωμεν ταῖς ἐπινοίαις τὸ πλάτος καὶ τοῦτο ἄχρι τινὸς ποιῶμεν, ἔλαττον μὲν αἰεὶ καὶ μᾶλλον τὸ πλάτος γινόμενον νοοῦμεν, ὅταν δὲ φθάσωμεν ἅπαξ στερεῖν τοῦ πλάτους τὸ μήκος, οὐκέτι οὐδὲ τὸ μήκος νοοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ σὺν τῇ ἄρσει τοῦ πλάτους αἱρεται καὶ ἡ τοῦ μήκους ἐπινοία.

393 Καθόλου τε τὸ ἐπινοούμενον πᾶν ἦτοι κατ' ἐμπέλασιν τῶν ἐναργῶν νοεῖται ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναργῶν μετάβασιν, καὶ τοῦτο ποικίλως, ὅτε μὲν κατὰ ὁμοιότητα ὅτε δὲ κατὰ ἐπισύνθεσιν ὅτε δὲ κατὰ ἀναλογίαν, καὶ ταύτην δὲ ἦτοι ἀξήτηκὴν ἢ
394 μειωτικὴν. κατ' ἐμπέλασιν μὲν οὖν τῶν ἐναργῶν νοεῖται ὡς λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν καὶ γλυκὴ καὶ πικρὸν·

¹ [σῶμα] secl. ego: μήκος cj. Heintz.

² <τι> add. LN, Mutsch.

to be neither a sign nor a compound of signs,—the line is nothing. And if the line does not exist, neither does length; and from this it follows that no body exists either.

We pointed out just now, by examining the sign, 390 that the line is inconceivable; but it is also possible to abolish it directly by examining its own conception. For the Geometers state that "the line is length without breadth"; but we in our inquiry are unable to 391 perceive length without breadth either in sensibles or in intelligibles; for whatever sensible length we perceive we perceive as including a certain breadth. So that there does not exist among sensibles any [body] without breadth. Nor yet is it possible to 392 imagine amongst intelligibles any length of this kind. For although we are able to think of one length as narrower than another, yet when we keep the same length and, in our thoughts, gradually pare off its breadth and keep on doing this up to a certain point, then we conceive the breadth becoming ever less and less, but when we have gone so far as to deprive the length of its breadth altogether, we no longer conceive even the length, but along with the removal of the breadth the conception of the length also is removed.

In general, too, everything which is conceived is 393 conceived either through the presentation of things manifest to the senses or through transition from things manifest,^a and this again in various ways—at one time through resemblance, at another through composition, at another by analogy, and this again by way either of increase or of decrease. Thus it is 394 through the presentation of things manifest that things like white and black and sweet and bitter are

^a With §§ 393-395 cf. *Adv. Log.* ii. 58-60.

ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ εἰ αἰσθητά ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἦττον νοεῖται. κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναργῶν μετάβασιν ὁμοιωτικῶς μὲν νοεῖται οἷον ἀπὸ [μὲν] τῆς Σω-
 395 κράτους εἰκόνος ὁ μὴ παρῶν Σωκράτης, συν-
 θετικῶς δὲ οἷον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἵππου
 ὁ μῆτε ἄνθρωπος ὢν μῆτε ἵππος, σύνθετος δὲ ἐξ
 ἀμφοτέρων ἵπποκένταυρος, κατὰ δὲ ἀναλογίαν αὐ-
 ξητικὴν ἢ μειωτικὴν οἷον ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄραν τὸν κοινὸν
 κατὰ μέγεθος ἀνθρώπων καὶ ὑποπίπτοντα αὐξή-
 σαντες μὲν ταῖς φαντασίαις ἐνοήσαμεν τὸν Κύ-
 κλωπα, ὃς οὐκ ἐώκει

ἀνδρὶ γε σιτοφάγῳ ἀλλὰ ρίψῳ ὑλήεντι,

μειώσαντες δὲ ἐσπάσαμεν ἔννοιαν τοῦ πυγμαίου
 396 ἀνθρώπου. τοσοῦτων δὴ τρόπων νοήσεως ὄντων,
 εἰ ἐπινοεῖται τι μῆκος ἀπλατές [ἢ γραμμῆ],¹ κατὰ
 τινα τούτων τῶν τρόπων ὀφείλει νοεῖσθαι· κατ'
 οὐδένα δὲ αὐτῶν δύναται νοηθῆναι, ὡς παραστή-
 397 σομεν, ὥστε ἀνεπιώητον ἐστίν. κατὰ μὲν οὖν
 ἐμπέλασιν τῶν ἐναργῶν οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο νόησις μή-
 κους τινὸς ἀπλατοῦς· οὐδενὶ γὰρ περιεπέσομεν
 μήκει χωρὶς πλάτους ἐν τοῖς φαινομένοις καὶ
 398 ἐναργέσι πράγμασιν. κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν
 ἐναργῶν μετάβασιν πάλιν τῶν ἀμηχάνων ἐστὶ
 φαντασιωθῆναι μῆκος ἀπλατές, οὔτε κατὰ ὁμοιό-
 τητα· οὐδὲν² γὰρ ἔχομεν ἐν τοῖς ἐναργέσι μῆκος
 χωρὶς πλάτους, ἵνα νοήσωμέν τι ὅμοιον τούτῳ
 ἀπλατές μῆκος. τὸ γὰρ τινι ὅμοιον γνωσσομένῳ
 καὶ ἐωραμένῳ ὀφείλει ὅμοιον ὑπάρχειν· ἐπεὶ οὖν
 οὐδὲν ἔχομεν ἐναργές ὑποπίπτον μῆκος χωρὶς

¹ [ἢ γραμμῆ] secl. Heintz.

² οὐδὲν Mutsch.: οὐδὲ mss., Bekk.

conceived; for these things, though they are sensible, are none the less conceived. And things are conceived through transition from things manifest either by way of resemblance (as, for instance, the absent Socrates from a likeness of Socrates); or by way of 395 composition (as, for instance, from man and horse but compounded of both); or by analogy, which may either magnify or diminish the object,—as when from seeing the man of average size, as presented to our senses, by magnifying him in imagination we conceive the Cyclops who was

Less like a corn-eating man than a forest-clad peak of the mountains,*

and by diminishing him we derive a conception of the pygmy. Seeing, then, that there are so 396 many modes of conception, if a length without breadth is conceived, it must be conceived after one of these modes; but it cannot be conceived after any of them, as we shall establish, so that it is inconceivable.—Now the conception of a length without 397 breadth will not be formed through the presentation of things manifest; for we have never met with length without breadth amongst objects that are apparent and manifest to the senses. And it is like- 398 wise impossible for length without breadth to be imagined through transition from things manifest, or through resemblance; for amongst things manifest we have not got any length without breadth, so as to enable us to conceive a length without breadth resembling it. For what resembles anything ought to bear resemblance to what is known and seen; since then we have no length without breadth that is

* Homer, *Odys.* ix. 191.

πλάτους, οὐδ' ὁμοίον τι αὐτοῦ συνεῖναι δινησόμεθα
 399 εἶναι μήκος ἀπλατές. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ κατ' ἐπισύν-
 θεσιν ληπτὸν ἐστὶ τοῦτο· εἰπάτωσαν γὰρ ἡμῖν, τίνα
 τῶν ἐκ περιπτώσεως ἐναργῶν [καὶ]¹ γιγνομένων
 μετὰ τίνων συντιθέντες ἐνόησαν μήκος ἀπλατές;
 400 ὅπερ εἰπεῖν οὐ δύνησονται. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ κατὰ
 ἀναλογίαν παρήλθεν ἡ τοῦ ἀπλατοῦς μήκους νόησις.
 τὰ γὰρ κατὰ ἀναλογίαν νοούμενα ἔχει τι κοινὸν
 πρὸς τὰ ἀφ' ὧν νοεῖται, ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ με-
 γέθους τὰνθρώπου κατὰ παραύξησιν ἐνόησαμεν τὸν
 Κύκλωπα καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πάλιν κατὰ μείωσιν
 401 τὸν πυγμαῖον· ὥστ' εἰ ἐστὶ τι κοινὸν τοῖς κατὰ
 ἀναλογίαν νοουμένοις πρὸς τὰ ἀφ' ὧν νοεῖται,
 οὐδὲν δὲ ἔχομεν κοινὸν τοῦ τε ἀπλατοῦς καὶ τοῦ
 σὺν πλάτει μήκους, ἵνα ἀπ' ἐκείνου ὀρμηθέντες
 νοήσωμεν τὸ ἀπλατές μήκος, οὐδὲ κατὰ ἀναλογίαν
 402 οὐδὲν νοεῖται τὸ τοιοῦτον. ὅθεν εἰ ἕκαστον τῶν
 νοουμένων κατὰ τίνα τῶν ἐκκειμένων τρόπων
 ὀφείλει νοεῖσθαι, ἐδείξαμεν δὲ ἡμεῖς κατὰ μηδένα
 τρόπον νοεῖσθαι δυνάμενον τὸ ἀπλατές μήκος,
 λεκτέον ἀνεπινώητον εἶναι τὸ ἀπλατές μήκος.
 403 Ἄλλ' ἴσως τις ἐρεῖ ὅτι λαβόντες τι μήκος σὺν
 ποσῷ πλάτει κατ' ἐπίτασιν νοοῦμεν τὸ ἀπλατές
 μήκος· εἰ γὰρ ἐκ τούτου κατ' ὀλίγον ἐλασσούται τὸ
 πλάτος, ἐλεύσεται ποτε καὶ εἰς τὸ ἀπλατές, ὥστε
 καταλήγειν τὴν μείωσιν εἰς τὸ χωρὶς πλάτους
 404 μήκος. ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν ἐδείξαμεν ὅτι ἡ παντελής
 τοῦ πλάτους ἄρισ καὶ τοῦ μήκους ἐστὶν ἀναίρεσις.

¹ [καὶ] om. N (ἐναργῶς γιγνοσκομένων Mutsch.).

^a i.e. of "intensifying," or gradually increasing, the narrowness of the line (cf. § 405 *infra*), which is equivalent to decreasing its breadth.

manifestly perceived, we shall not be able to discern the existence of any length without breadth which resembles it. Nor, again, is it perceptible through 399 composition; for let them tell us what objects made manifest by sense they compounded with what in order to form the notion of length without breadth, —and that they will not be able to tell us. Nor yet 400 was the notion of length without breadth suggested by analogy. For things conceived by way of analogy possess something in common with the things from which their conception is derived; for example, from the common feature of man's size, by enlargement, we conceive the Cyclops, and conversely, by diminution of the same object, the pygmy. Consequently, 401 if things conceived by analogy have some feature in common with those from which the conception is derived, but we find nothing that is common both to length without breadth and to length with breadth, to enable us by starting from the latter to arrive at the conception of length without breadth,—then this conception is not formed by analogy either. Hence, 402 if everything which is conceived must be conceived in one of the ways mentioned, and we have shown that length without breadth cannot be conceived in any way, we must declare that length without breadth is inconceivable.

But someone, perhaps, will say that we conceive 403 length without breadth by a process of "intension" ^a when we have taken a certain length with a certain breadth; for if, starting with this, the breadth is gradually diminished, it will come in time to being without breadth, so that the decrease ends in length without breadth. But, firstly, we have shown that 404 the complete removal of breadth is also the abolition

ἔπειτα τὸ κατ' ἐπίτασιν νοούμενον οὐχ ἕτερόν ἐστι
 τοῦ προνοηθέντος, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο ἐπιτεταμένον.
 405 ἐπεὶ οὖν ἀπὸ τοῦ ποσὸν ἔχοντος πλάτος κατ' ἐπί-
 τασιν στενότητος νοῆσαι τι θέλομεν, πάντως τὸ μὲν
 ἀπλατὲς μῆκος οὐκ ἐπινοήσομεν (ἕτερογενὲς γάρ
 406 ἔστω), ἀεὶ δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον στενώτερον ληψόμεθα
 πλάτος, ὥστε τὴν κατάληξιν τῆς νοήσεως ἐν ἐλα-
 χιστοτάτῳ γίνεσθαι πλάτει, μετὰ τοῦτο δὲ τὴν εἰς
 τὸ ἕτερογενὲς μετάβασιν συμβαίνειν, τουτέστι τοῦ
 407 συναιρουμένου τῷ πλάτει μῆκος. καθόλου
 τε, εἰ κατὰ στέρησιν πλάτους νοῆσαι δυνάμεθα
 μῆκος ἀπλατὲς, ἐπεὶ πάντα τὰ στερητικὰ οὐκ ἔστιν
 ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, οὐδὲ τὸ ἀπλατὲς μῆκος· διὸ οὐδὲ
 γραμμῆ. ἵππος μὲν γάρ τι ἔστιν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ,
 οὐχ ἵππος δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, καὶ ἄνθρωπος μὲν ἔστιν,
 οὐκ ἄνθρωπος δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν. τοίνυν εἰ ἔχομέν τι
 πλάτος ἢ τι μῆκος, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἔσται· ἀπλατὲς
 408 δ' οὐχ ὑπάρξει. ὅνπερ οὖν τρόπον οἱ λέγοντες
 ὅτι ἕτερον ἕτερου μέγεθος ὑπερτιθέντες νόησιν
 λαμβάνουσι τοῦ ἀπείρου μεγέθους ὡς σώματος
 πλανῶνται, καὶ μέγιστον μὲν τι καθ' ὑπέρθεσιν
 πολλῶν μεγεθῶν λαμβάνουσι, οὐκ ἀπειρον δὲ τοῦτο
 ἀλλὰ πεπερασμένον (ὃ γὰρ ἔσχατον νενοήκασι, τῇ
 409 διανοίᾳ περιληπτὸν ἔστιν, ὃ δὲ περιληπτὸν ἔστι
 διανοίᾳ, πεπερασταί, ἐπεὶ περ τοι τὸ λοιπὸν οὐπω
 περιληφθὲν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἐλέγχει τὸ περιληφθὲν ὡς
 μὴ ὄν ἀπειρον), οὕτω τοίνυν κἀνθάδε ἢ συναίρεισι
 τοῦ πλάτους, εἰς ἐλάχιστον πλάτος καταλγούσης
 τῆς διανοίας, πλάτος ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ μῆκος ἀπλατὲς.

* "Privation," "privative," are (Aristotelian) terms for "negation," "negative."

of length. And next, what is conceived through
 intension is not other than what was previously con-
 ceived but that very same thing after undergoing
 intension. Since, then, we propose to conceive some- 405
 thing from that which has a certain breadth, through
 intension of narrowness, we certainly shall not con-
 ceive length without breadth (for this is a hetero-
 geneous thing), but we shall apprehend a breadth that 406
 is ever getting more and more narrow, so that our con-
 ception ends in the least possible breadth, and after this
 there follows a transition to what is heterogeneous,
 that is to say, when the length is abolished along
 with the breadth.—Also, in general, if we can conceive 407
 length without breadth through privation of breadth,
 since all privatives* are non-existent in reality, neither
 does length without breadth exist; nor, in conse-
 quence, the line. Thus, horse is a thing which exists
 in reality, but "not horse" does not exist; and man
 exists, but "not man" does not exist. So then, if
 we perceive a breadth or a length, it will exist in
 reality; but "without breadth" will not exist. As, 408
 then, those men who assert that they form a notion
 of an infinite magnitude as body by superimposing
 one magnitude on another are in error, and while they
 grasp a maximum through the superimposition of many
 magnitudes, yet this is not infinite but limited (for
 what they conceived last is capable of being contained
 by the intellect, and what is capable of being con- 409
 tained by the intellect is limited, since otherwise, of
 course, what remains as yet uncontained by the
 intellect convicts what is contained of not being
 infinite),—so too in this case, the contraction of
 the breadth, when the intellect ends with a mini-
 mal breadth, is a breadth and not a length without

- 410 ἄλλως τε, εἰ δυνατόν ἐστι νοήσαντάς τι μῆκος
 σὺν ποσῷ πλάτει στερεῆσαι αὐτὸ τοῦ πλάτους καὶ
 τὸ μῆκος ἀπλατῆς ἐπινοεῖν, ἐνέσται καὶ σάρκα
 ἐπινοήσαντας σὺν τρωτῷ ιδιώματι στερεῆσαι τοῦ
 411 τρωτοῦ ιδιώματος νοῆσαι ἄτρωτον σάρκα, καὶ ἐν-
 δέξεται μετὰ ἀντιτύπου ιδιώματος σῶμα νοήσαντας
 στερεῆσαι τοῦ ἀντιτύπου ιδιώματος λαβεῖν ἀναντί-
 τυπον σῶμα. ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον· τὸ γὰρ ἄτρωτον
 νοούμενον οὐκ ἔστι σάρξ, σὺν τρωτῷ γὰρ ιδιώματι
 ἐνοεῖτο ἢ σάρξ, καὶ ἀναντίτυπον οὐκ ἔστι σῶμα,
 σὺν γὰρ τῷ ἀντιτύπῳ ιδιώματι ἐνοεῖτο τὸ σῶμα.
 τοῖνυν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον χωρὶς πλάτους μῆκος
 οὐκ ἔστι μῆκος· σὺν ποσῷ γὰρ πλάτει νοεῖται τὸ
 μῆκος.
- 412 Ἄλλ' ὃ γε Ἀριστοτέλης οὐκ ἀδιανόητον ἔλεγε
 εἶναι τὸ παρὰ τοῖς γεωμέτραις ἀπλατῆς μῆκος (τὸ
 γέ τοι τοῦ τοίχου μῆκος λαμβάνομεν χωρὶς τοῦ
 ἐπιβάλλειν τῷ πλάτει τοῦ τοίχου) πλανώμενος.
 ὅταν γὰρ τὸ τοῦ τοίχου μῆκος λαμβάνωμεν χωρὶς
 πλάτους, οὐ χωρὶς παντὸς πλάτους τοῦτο λαμβά-
 νομεν ἀλλὰ χωρὶς τοῦ περὶ τῷ τοίχῳ πλάτους.
 ἐνδέχεται γὰρ συγκαταπλέξαντας τὸ τοῦ τοίχου
 μῆκός τινι πλάτει καὶ οἰωδῆποτε οὖν νόησιν αὐτοῦ
 ποιεῖσθαι, ὥστε μῆκος λαμβάνεσθαι οὐ χωρὶς
 413 πλάτους ἀλλὰ χωρὶς τοῦδὲ τινος πλάτους. πρού-
 κειτο δὲ τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει παραστῆσαι οὐχ ὅτι τὸ
 τινὸς πλάτους ἄμοιρον μῆκος ἐνδέχεται νοεῖν, ἀλλ'
 ὅτι τὸ παντὸς πλάτους· ὅπερ οὐ παρέστηκεν.
- 414 Πρὸς τούτους, εἶπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι οὐ μόνον ἀπλατῆς

• Aristot. *Frag.* 29 (Rose).

breadth.—And further : if it is possible for those who 410
 have conceived a length with a certain breadth to
 deprive it of its breadth and thus to conceive length
 without breadth, it will also be possible for them,
 when they have conceived flesh which possesses the
 property of vulnerability, by privation of the property
 of vulnerability to conceive invulnerable flesh ; and 411
 after conceiving a body with the property of solidity,
 it will be feasible for them, by privation of the pro-
 perty of solidity, to conceive a non-solid body. But
 this is impossible ; for what is conceived as invulner-
 able is not flesh (for flesh was conceived as including
 the property of vulnerability), and the non-solid is
 not body (for body was conceived as including the
 property of solidity). So too the length conceived as
 without breadth is not length (for length is conceived
 as including a certain breadth).

Aristotle,^a however, declared that the length with- 412
 out breadth of the Geometers is not inconceivable
 (" for in fact we apprehend the length of a wall
 without having a perception of the wall's breadth ") ;
 but he is in error. For when we apprehend the
 length of a wall without its breadth, we do not
 apprehend it as without any breadth but without the
 breadth which belongs to the wall. For it is possible
 by connecting the length of the wall with some
 breadth (whatever it be) to form a notion of it, so
 that its length is not apprehended without breadth
 but without this particular breadth. But the task 413
 before Aristotle was to establish that it is possible to
 conceive, not the length which is devoid of a certain
 breadth, but that which is devoid of any breadth
 at all ; and this he did not establish.

Furthermore, since the Geometers assert that the 414

μηκός φασι τὴν γραμμὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ πέρασ ἐπι-
 φανείας, [ὁ μῆκός καὶ πλάτος ἐστὶν ἀβαθές,]¹
 ἐνέσται κοινότερον περὶ τε γραμμῆς καὶ ἐπιφανείας
 διαπορεῖν. εἰ γὰρ ἡ γραμμὴ πέρασ ἐστὶν ἐπι-
 φανείας, [ὁ ἐστὶ,] μῆκος ἀπλατὲς καθεστηκυῖα,
 πάντως ἐπιφανείας ἐπιφανεία παρατεθείσης ἢ
 παράλληλοι δύο γίνονται γραμμαὶ ἢ μία ἐξ ἀμφο-
 415 τέρων. καὶ εἰ μὲν μία αἱ παράλληλοι δύο γραμμαὶ
 γίνονται, ἐπεὶ ἡ γραμμὴ πέρασ ἐστὶν ἐπιφανείας, ἢ
 δὲ ἐπιφάνεια πέρασ σώματος, τῶν δυοῖν γραμμῶν
 μιᾶς γινομένων² καὶ αἱ δύο ἐπιφάνειαι μία γενή-
 σονται. οὕτως δὲ καὶ τὰ δύο σώματα ἐν ἔσται
 αἶμα, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ παράθεσις οὐκέτι γενήσεται
 παράθεσις ἀλλὰ ἔνωσις. ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον· ἐπι-
 τῶν μὲν γὰρ παρατιθεμένων ἀλλήλοις σωμάτων
 ἔνωσις γίνεσθαι πέφυκεν, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ὑγρῶν, ἐπι-
 τῶν δὲ οὐκέτι λίθος γὰρ λίθω καὶ ἀδάμας ἀδά-
 416 μαντι κατὰ τὴν παράθεσιν οὐχ ἐνοῦται. ὥστε δύο
 γραμμαὶ οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο μία. καὶ ἄλλως, ἐὰν
 δῶμεν μίαν γενέσθαι, καὶ ἔνωσιν διὰ τοῦτο τῶν
 σωμάτων, δεήσει τὸν χωρισμὸν αὐτῶν μὴ κατὰ τὰ
 αὐτὰ πέρατα γίνεσθαι ἀλλὰ κατ' ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα
 μέρη, βιαίως ἀποσπωμένων αὐτῶν. οὐχὶ δὲ τοῦτο·
 τῶν γὰρ περάτων καὶ πρὶν τῆς παραθέσεως καὶ
 μετὰ τὸν χωρισμὸν αὐτῶν ἢ αὐτῇ σῶζεται φύσις.
 οὐκ ἄρα αἱ δύο παράλληλοι γραμμαὶ μία γίνονται.³
 σὺν τούτοις, εἴπερ αἱ δύο γραμμαὶ μία γί-
 νονται, τὰ παρατιθέμενα ἀλλήλοις σώματα ἐνὶ ἄκρω

¹ [ὁ . . . ἀβαθές] secl. ego: δ . . . ἀβαθές N, Mutsch.:
 ὁ μ. κ. π. ἐστὶν ἀπλατὲς cet. (secl. Bekk.).

² γινομένων N: γινομένης cet., Bekk.

³ γίνονται cj. Bekk.: γίνονται mss.: γένοιτο edd.

line is not only "length without breadth" but also
 "the limit of a surface," [this being length and
 breadth without depth,] it will be possible for us to
 discuss more generally the difficulties involved both
 in line and in surface.^a For if the line is the limit of a
 surface, and is length without breadth, then certainly,
 when surface is set beside surface either there are two
 parallel lines or one compounded of both. And if the 415
 two parallel lines become one, since the line is the limit
 of the surface and the surface the limit of the body,
 when the two lines become one the two surfaces also
 will become one. And thus the two bodies also will be
 one body, and because of this the juxtaposition will
 no longer be juxtaposition but unification. But this
 is impossible; for though in some cases when bodies
 are juxtaposed unification is the natural result (as in
 the case of liquids), yet in other cases it is not so;
 for stone is not made one with stone, nor adamant
 with adamant, by juxtaposition. So that two lines
 will not become one.—And again, if we grant that 416
 they do become one, and that owing to this there is
 unification of the bodies, their separation will have to
 take place not at the same limits but in various other
 parts, as they are forcibly pulled apart. But this is
 not so; for the nature of the limits remains the same
 both before the juxtaposition and after their separa-
 tion. Therefore the two parallel lines do not become
 one.—Moreover, if the two lines become one the
 juxtaposed bodies will be smaller by one extreme

^a For "limits" and "surfaces," in geometry, cf. P.H.
 iii. 39 ff.

ἔσται ἐλάσσονα· γεγόνασι γὰρ αἱ δύο γραμμαὶ μία, καὶ ἡ μία κατ' ἀνάγκην ἔν ἔχειν ἄκρον ὀφείλει. οὐχὶ δέ γε τὰ παρατιθέμενα ἀλλήλοις σώματα ἐνὶ ἄκρῳ γίνεται ἐλάσσονα, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴεν αἱ δύο
 417 γραμμαὶ μία. εἰ δὲ παράλληλοι δύο μένουσιν αἱ γραμμαί, τὸ ἐκ τῶν δυοῖν μείζον ἔσται τῆς μιᾶς. εἰ δὲ τὸ ἐκ τῶν δυοῖν γινόμενον μείζον ἔσται τῆς μιᾶς γραμμῆς, ἔξει ἐκάτερα αὐτῶν πλάτος, ὃ μετὰ τῆς ἐτέρας ταττόμενον μείζον ποιεῖ διάστημα. καὶ οὕτως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπλατὲς μήκος ἢ γραμμῆ· ἢ εἴπερ ἔστι, σαλεύεσθαι δεήσει τὴν ἐνάργειαν, ὡς παρεστήσαμεν.

418 Προηγουμένως μὲν οὖν ταῦτα ῥητέον πρὸς τὴν παρὰ τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς περὶ σωμάτων τε καὶ
 419 περάτων διάταξιν· μεταβάντες δὲ ἀκολουθῶς σκοπῶμεν εἰ καὶ κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ἐκείνων ὑποθέσεις δύναται προκόπτειν ὁ λόγος. ἀρέσκει τοίνυν τοῖς γεωμέτραις τὴν εὐθεῖαν γραμμὴν στρεφομένην πᾶσιν αὐτῆς τοῖς μέρεσι κύκλους γράφειν. τούτῳ δὲ εὐθύς αὐτῶν τῷ θεωρήματι μάχεται τὸ μήκος
 420 ἀπλατὲς εἶναι τὴν γραμμὴν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ πᾶν μέρος γραμμῆς, ὡς φασί, σημεῖον ἔχει, τὸ δὲ σημεῖον στρεφόμενον κύκλον γράφει, ὅταν εὐθεῖα γραμμῆ στρεφομένη καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἐαυτῆς μέρεσι κυκλογραφοῦσα καταμετρή τὸ διάστημα τῆς ἐπιπέδου τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ κέντρου μέχρι τῆς ἐξωτάτω περιφερείας, τότε ἦτοι συνεχεῖς εἰσὶν οἱ παράλληλοι κύκλοι ἢ
 421 διεστᾶσιν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων. ὁπότερον δ' ἂν λέγωσι τούτων οἱ γεωμέτραι, εἰς ἄλυτον σχεδὸν ἀπορίαν ἐμπεσοῦνται. εἰ μὲν γὰρ διεστᾶσιν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων,

edge; for the two lines have become one, and this one must necessarily have one edge. But juxtaposed bodies do not become smaller by one edge, so that the two lines will not be one.—And if the two 417 parallel lines remain two, the sum of the two will be greater than the one. And if the sum of the two shall be greater than the one line, each of them will possess breadth, which when ranged along with the other produces a larger dimension. And thus the line will not be “length without breadth”; or if it is, the result must be that the evidence of sense is rendered shaky, as we have shown.

Let this, then, serve as our direct reply to the 418 Mathematicians' formal account of bodies and limits; and let us pass on next to consider whether, even 419 on their own assumptions, their account is admissible. The Geometers, then, are of opinion that the straight line by revolving describes circles with all its parts.^a But the fact that the line is length without breadth conflicts at once with this theorem of theirs. For since every part of the line, as they 420 assert, contains a sign, and the sign by revolving describes a circle, when the straight line, by revolving and describing a circle with all its parts, has measured out the distance of the surface which extends from the centre to the outermost circumference, then the parallel circles are either continuous or separate from one another. But whichever of 421 these alternatives the Geometers may adopt, they will involve themselves in an almost insuperable difficulty. For if these circles are separate from one

* *i.e.* if the straight line AB is made to revolve round the (fixed) point A, with this as centre it will describe as many concentric circles as it contains points.

ἔσται τι μέρος τῆς ἐπιπέδου τὸ μὴ κυκλογραφοῦ-
 μενον καὶ τῆς γραμμῆς τὸ μὴ κυκλογραφοῦν, ὅπερ
 κατὰ τοῦτο τέτακται τὸ διάστημα τῆς ἐπιπέδου.
 422 τοῦτο δὲ ἦν ἄτοπον· καὶ γὰρ ἔχει σημεῖον ἢ γραμμὴ
 πάντως κατὰ τόδε τὸ μέρος, καὶ τὸ σημεῖον κατὰ
 τοῦτο στρεφόμενον κυκλογραφεῖ· τὸ γὰρ ἢ τὴν
 γραμμὴν μὴ ἔχειν κατὰ τι μέρος αὐτῆς σημεῖον, ἢ
 τὸ σημεῖον στρεφόμενον μὴ γράφειν κύκλον, παρὰ
 423 τὸν γεωμετρικὸν ἐστὶ λόγον. εἰ δὲ συνεχεῖς εἰσὶν
 οἱ κύκλοι, ἤτοι οὕτω συνεχεῖς εἰσὶν ὡς κατὰ τὸν
 αὐτὸν τετάχθαι τόπον, ἢ ὥστε ἄλλον παρ' ἄλλον
 νοεῖσθαι μεταξὺ μὴ δυναμένου τινὸς παρεμπεσεῖν
 σημείου· παρεμπύπτου γὰρ ὀφείλει κύκλον γράφειν.
 καὶ εἰ μὲν τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπέχουσι τόπον, εἰς γενή-
 σονται πάντες, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὁ μέγιστος κύκλος οὗ
 424 διόισει τοῦ ἐλαχίστου· εἰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν ἐνδοτάτω
 κύκλος καὶ πρὸς τῷ κέντρῳ ἐστὶν ἐλάχιστος, ὁ δὲ
 ἐξωτάτω καὶ πρὸς τῇ περιφερείᾳ μέγιστος καθ-
 ἔστηκεν, πάντες δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν κατέχουσι τόπον,
 ἔσται ἴσος τῷ μεγίστῳ κύκλῳ ὁ ἐλάχιστος κύκλος·
 ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀπεμφαῖνον. οὐ τοίνυν οὕτως συνεχεῖς
 εἰσὶν οἱ κύκλοι ὡς τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπειληφέναι τόπον.
 425 εἰ δὲ παράκεινται ἀλλήλοις ὡς μὴ παρεμπύπτου
 μεταξὺ τι σημεῖον, συμπληροῦσι τὸ τῆς ἐπιπέδου
 πλάτος τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ κέντρου μέχρι τῆς ἐσχάτης
 περιφερείας. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὸ συμπληρωτικὸν πλάτους
 ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔχει πλάτος, οἱ κύκλοι συμπληροῦντες
 τὸ τῆς ἐπιπέδου πλάτος ἔξουσι πλάτος. ἦσαν δὲ
 γραμμαὶ οἱ κύκλοι· τοίνυν αἱ γραμμαὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν
 ἀπλατεῖς.
 426 Ἔνεστι δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς δυνάμεως ὁμοιότροπον
 συνθεῖναι ἀπόδειξιν. φασὶ γὰρ οἱ γεωμέτραι τὴν
 200

another there will be a certain part of the surface
 which is not formed into a circle, and of the line which
 does not form a circle, namely that which is situated
 at this interval of the surface. But this is absurd ; 422
 for the line certainly contains at this part a sign, and
 the sign by revolving at this part describes a circle ;
 for that the line at any part of it should not contain
 a sign, or that the sign should not by revolving de-
 scribe a circle, is contrary to the Geometers' doctrine.
 And if the circles are continuous, either they are 423
 continuous in such a way as to be situated in the same
 place or so that they are conceived as lying side by
 side in such a way that no sign can be inserted between
 them ; for if one is inserted, it is bound to describe a
 circle. And if they occupy the same place they will
 all become one, and because of this the greatest circle
 will not differ from the least ; for if the innermost 424
 circle, which is next the centre, is the least, and the
 outermost circle, next to the circumference, is the
 greatest, and all occupy the same place, the least
 circle will be equal to the greatest circle ; which is
 contrary to sense. So then, the circles are not con-
 tinuous in such a way as to occupy the same place.
 And if they are so juxtaposed that no sign is inserted 425
 between them, they fill up the breadth of the surface
 from the centre up to the outermost circumference.
 Since, then, what fills up a breadth necessarily
 possesses breadth, the circles, as filling up the breadth
 of the surface, will possess breadth. But the circles
 are lines ; and so the lines are not without breadth.

And it is possible to construct a proof of a similar 426
 character to the same effect. The Geometers assert

κυκλογραφουσαν εὐθείαν δι' αὐτῆς στρεφομένην κυκλογραφεῖν. διόπερ συνερωτῶντες αὐτοὺς φήσομεν "εἰ ἡ κυκλογραφουσα εὐθεῖα δι' αὐτῆς τὸν κύκλον γράφει, οὐκ ἔστι μῆκος ἀπλατὲς ἢ γραμμὴ· ἡ δὲ κυκλογραφουσα εὐθεῖα κατ' αὐτοὺς δι' αὐτῆς τὸν κύκλον γράφει· οὐκ ἄρα μῆκος ἀπλατὲς ἔστιν ἡ γραμμὴ." ὅταν γὰρ ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ κέντρου εὐθεῖα ἀγομένη στρέφεται καὶ δι' αὐτῆς γράφῃ τὸν κύκλον, ἦτοι κατὰ πάντων τῶν μερῶν τοῦ ἐντὸς τῆς περιφερείας πλάτους φέρεται ἢ εὐθεῖα γραμμὴ, ἢ κατὰ τινῶν μὲν φέρεται κατὰ τινῶν δὲ οὐδαμῶς. ἀλλ' εἰ κατὰ τινῶν μὲν φέρεται κατὰ τινῶν δὲ μὴ, πάντως οὐ γράφει κύκλον, καθ' ὧν μὲν φερομένη μερῶν τῆς ἐπιπέδου καθ' ὧν δὲ μὴ φερομένη. εἰ δὲ κατὰ πάντων φέρεται, ὅλον τὸ ἐντὸς τῆς περιφερείας πλάτος καταμετρήσει, πλάτος δὲ καταμετροῦν ἔξει πλάτος· τὸ γὰρ πλάτους καταμετρη-
 427 τικὸν ἔχει πλάτος ᾧ καταμετρεῖ. τοίνυν οὐδὲ διὰ τοῦτο ῥητέον μῆκος ἀπλατὲς εἶναι τὴν γραμμὴν.

Τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ σαφέστερον γίνεται καὶ ὅταν λέγωσιν οἱ γεωμέτραι τὴν πλάγιον τοῦ τετραγώνου πλευρὰν καταγομένην δι' αὐτῆς τὸ παραλληλόγραμμον ἐπίπεδον καταμετρεῖν. εἰ γὰρ μῆκος ἀπλατὲς ἔστιν ἢ γραμμὴ, πάντως καὶ ἡ πλευρὰ τοῦ τετραγώνου ἀπλατῆς οὕσα γραμμὴ οὐ καταμετρήσει τὸ παραλληλόγραμμον ἐπίπεδον πλάτος ἔχον· ἢ καταμετροῦσα τοῦτο ἔξει καὶ αὐτὴ πλάτος ᾧ καταμετρεῖ. ὥστε ἢ τὸ θεώρημα αὐτοῖς γίνεται ψευδές, ἢ ὅτι ἢ γραμμὴ μῆκος ἔστιν ἀπλατὲς.

429 Τὸν τε κύλινδρον κατ' εὐθείαν φασὶ γραμμὴν

that the straight line which describes a circle describes it of itself by revolving; and therefore we will propound to them this syllogism—"If the straight line which describes a circle describes the circle of itself, the line is not a length without breadth; but the straight line which describes a circle does, according to them, describe the circle of itself; therefore the line is not a length without breadth." For when the
 427 straight line drawn from the centre revolves and of itself describes the circle, either the straight line moves through all the parts of the surface within the circumference, or it moves through some parts and not through others. But if it moves through some parts and not through others, it certainly does not describe a circle, as it moves through some parts of the surface but does not move through others. And if it moves through them all, it will measure out the whole of the breadth within the circumference, and as measuring out the breadth it will possess breadth; for what is capable of measuring out breadth possesses breadth whereby it measures. So for this reason also
 428 one must deny that the line is length without breadth.

The same thing becomes more evident when the Geometers state that the line drawn as side of the square measures of itself the surface bounded by parallel lines. For if the line is length without breadth, certainly the side of the square, being a line without breadth, will not measure out the surface bounded by parallel lines which has breadth; or, if it measures this, it will itself also have breadth whereby it measures. So that either their theorem proves false, or else the definition of the line as length without breadth.

Also, they say that the cylinder touches the sur- 429

ἄπτεσθαι τῆς ἐπιπέδου, ἐκκυλιόμενον τε τῇ ἀνά μέρος ἄλλων καὶ ἄλλων εὐθειῶν θέσει καταμετρεῖν τὴν ἐπίπεδον. εἰ δὴ καὶ κατ' εὐθείαν ἄπτεται τῆς ἐπιπέδου ὁ κύλινδρος καὶ κυλιόμενος τῇ ἀνά μέρος ἄλλων καὶ ἄλλων εὐθειῶν θέσει καταμετρεῖ τὴν ἐπίπεδον, πάντως καὶ ἡ ἐπίπεδος ἐξ εὐθειῶν συνέστηκε γραμμῶν καὶ ἡ ἐπιφάνεια τοῦ κυλίνδρου πάλιν ἐξ εὐθειῶν ἐστίν. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ ἐπίπεδος πλάτος ἔχει, ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἡ τοῦ κυλίνδρου ἐπιφάνεια, τὸ δὲ πλάτους συμπληρωτικὸν οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀπλατές, αἱ γραμμαὶ πλάτος συμπληροῦσαι οὐ γενήσονται ἀπλατεῖς.

- 430 Ἐτι κἂν δῶμεν τὴν γραμμὴν μῆκος ἀπλατές ὑπάρχειν, οὐδὲν ἦττον ἀπορος εὐρεθήσεται τοῖς γεωμέτραις ὁ περὶ τοῦ σώματος λόγος. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ σημεῖον ῥυέν ποιεῖ γραμμὴν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ γραμμὴ ῥυεῖσα ποιεῖ ἐπιφάνειαν, ἣτις ἐστὶ πέρασ σώματος
- 431 δύο ἔχον διαστάσεις, μῆκός τε καὶ πλάτος. ἐπεὶ περ οὖν ἡ ἐπιφάνεια πέρασ ἐστὶ σώματος, πάντως τὸ σῶμα πεπερασμένον ἐστίν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ὅτε παρατίθεται σῶμα σώματι, τότε ἦτοι τὰ πέρατα τῶν περάτων ἄπτεται, ἢ τὰ πεπερατωμένα τῶν πεπερατωμένων, ἢ καὶ τὰ πεπερατωμένα τῶν πεπερατωμένων καὶ τὰ πέρατα τῶν περάτων, οἷον (ἔσται γὰρ σαφὲς τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπὶ ὑποδείγματος) εἰ νοῆσαιμεν πέρασ μὲν τὸ ἐξῶθεν τοῦ ἀμφορέως ὄστρακον, πεπερατωμένον δὲ τὸν ἐν τῷ ἀμφορέῳ οἶνον, δυοῖν ἀμφορέων παρατιθεμένων ἀλλήλοις ἦτοι τὸ ὄστρακον τοῦ ὄστράκου ἄψεται ἢ ὁ οἶνος τοῦ οἴνου ἢ καὶ τὸ ὄστρακον τοῦ ὄστράκου καὶ ὁ
- 432 οἶνος τοῦ οἴνου. καὶ εἰ μὲν τὰ πέρατα τῶν περάτων ἄπτεται, τὰ πεπερατωμένα οὐχ ἄψεται ἀλλήλων,

face along a straight line and when rolling forward, by the placing of straight lines in turn, one after another, it measures out the surface. If, then, the cylinder touches the surface along a straight line and when rolling measures out the surface by placing its straight lines in turn, one after another, the surface certainly consists of straight lines, and the superficies of the cylinder likewise is made of straight lines. Since, then, the surface possesses breadth and the superficies of the cylinder also possesses it, and what fills up breadth is not without breadth, the lines as they fill up breadth will not be without breadth.

Moreover, even if we grant that the line is length 430 without breadth, none the less the Geometers will find that their account of body is hopeless. For just as the sign when it has flowed makes the line, so also the line by flowing makes the surface, which is "a limit of body possessing two dimensions, length and breadth." Since, then, the surface is a limit of body, 431 body is certainly limited. And if so, when body is set beside body, then either the limits touch the limits, or the things limited touch the things limited, or the things limited touch the things limited and the limits also touch the limits. Thus (for our meaning will be made clear by an example) if we were to conceive the external earthenware of the jar as the limit and the wine within the jar as the thing limited, then when two jars are set side by side either the ware will touch the ware, or the wine the wine, or both the ware the ware and the wine the wine. And if the limits touch 432 the limits, the things limited (that is, the bodies) will

τούτέστι τὰ σώματα ὅπερ ἦν ἄτοπον. εἰ δὲ τὰ πεπερατωμένα τῶν πεπερατωμένων ἄπτεται, τού-
 433 πέρων ἐκτὸς γίνεσθαι· ὁ πάλιν ἄτοπον. εἰ δὲ καὶ
 τὰ πέρατα τῶν περάτων ἄπτεται καὶ τὰ πεπερατω-
 μένα τῶν πεπερατωμένων, συνδραμοῦνται αἱ ἀπο-
 ρίαι· ἢ μὲν γὰρ τὰ πέρατα ἀλλήλων ἄπτεται, τὰ
 πεπερατωμένα ἀλλήλων οὐχ ἄψεται, ἢ δὲ ταῦτα
 434 ἀλλήλων θιγγάνει, ἐκτὸς ἔσται τῶν οἰκείων πε-
 435 ράτων. καὶ μὴν εἴπερ πέρασ ἔστιν ἡ ἐπιφάνεια,
 πεπερατωμένον δὲ τὸ σῶμα, ἥτοι σῶμά ἐστιν ἡ
 ἐπιφάνεια ἢ ἀσώματον. καὶ εἰ μὲν σῶμά ἐστι,
 ψεύδος τὸ ἀβαθὴ εἶναι τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν· πᾶν γὰρ
 σῶμα βάθους μετεῖχεν. εἶτα οὐδὲ ἄψεται τινος τὸ
 πέρασ, ἀλλὰ πᾶν σῶμα γενήσεται ἀπειρομέγεθες·
 435 εἰ γὰρ σῶμά ἐστιν ἡ ἐπιφάνεια, ἐπεὶ πᾶν σῶμα
 πέρασ ἔχει, κάκεινο τὸ πέρασ πάλιν σῶμα ὃν ἔξει
 πέρασ, κάκεινο τρίτον, καὶ τὸ τρίτον τέταρτον, καὶ
 οὕτως εἰς ἀπειρον. εἰ δὲ ἀσώματός ἐστιν ἡ ἐπι-
 φάνεια, ἐπεὶ τὸ ἀσώματον οὐδενὸς δύναται θιγγεῖν
 οὐδὲ ὑπὸ τινος θιχθῆναι, τὰ πέρατα οὐχ ἄψεται
 ἀλλήλων, τούτων δὲ μὴ ἀπτομένων οὐδὲ τὰ πεπε-
 436 ρατωμένα ἄψεται. ὥστε κἂν τῆς γραμμῆς ἀπο-
 στῶμεν, ὃ γε περὶ τῆς ἐπιφανείας λόγος ἀπορος ὢν
 εἰς ἐποχὴν ἡμᾶς καθίστησιν.

Νῦν μὲν οὖν πεποιήμεθα τὰς ζητήσεις ἐχόμενοι
 τῶν ἐνοιῶν τῶν τοῦ σώματος καὶ τῶν περάτων, ἔτι
 437 δὲ καὶ τῶν γεωμετρικῶν θεωρημάτων· ἐνεσσι δὲ
 κάκεινον τὸν λόγον ἀναλαμβάνειν,¹ σθεναρῶς συν-
 ἀγοντα τὸ προκείμενον. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τι σῶμα, ἥτοι

not touch each other ; which is absurd. And if the things limited touch the things limited—that is, bodies touch bodies,—they will have to be outside their own limits ; which again is absurd. And if the 433 limits touch the limits and the things limited also the things limited, the difficulties will be combined ; for in so far as the limits touch one another the things limited will not touch one another ; and in so far as the latter are in contact with one another they will be outside their own limits.—Furthermore, if the 434 surface is a limit and the body a thing limited, the surface is either a body or incorporeal.^a And if it is a body, it is false that the surface is without depth ; for every body partakes of depth. Moreover, the limit will not touch anything, but every body will be of unlimited size ; for if the surface is body, since 435 every body has a limit, that limit again, being a body, will have a limit, and this again a third, and the third a fourth, and so on *ad infinitum*. And if the surface is incorporeal, since the incorporeal cannot touch anything or be touched by anything, the limits will not be in contact with one another, and if these are not in contact neither will the things limited be in contact. So that even if we disregard the line, the hope- 436 lessness of the account given of surface reduces us to a state of suspension.

So, then, we have now carried out our investigations, while confining ourselves to the notions of body and limits, and also to the Geometers' theorems. But it is possible, also, to repeat our former argu- 437 ment which deduces our thesis in a convincing way^b: If a body exists, it is either sensible or

¹ ἀναλαμβάνειν] παραλαμβάνειν NLE: λαμβάνειν cet., Bekk.

^a With § 434 cf. P.H. iii. 41-44.

^b With §§ 437-439 cf. P.H. iii. 47-48.

αἰσθητόν ἐστὶν ἢ νοητόν. καὶ αἰσθητόν μὲν οὐκ
 ἔστιν. ἀθρόα γὰρ ἦν ποιότης κατ' ἐπισύνθεσιν
 σχήματος καὶ μεγέθους καὶ ἀντιτυπίας λαμβανο-
 μένη· ποιότης δὲ κατ' ἐπισύνθεσιν τινῶν λαμβανο-
 μένη οὐκ ἔστιν αἰσθητή· καὶ τὸ σῶμα ἄρα, ὡς
 438 σῶμα νοούμενον, οὐκ ἔστιν αἰσθητόν. καὶ μὴν
 οὐδὲ νοητόν. ἵνα γὰρ γένηται νόησις σώματος,
 ὀφείλει ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων ὑποκείσθαι τι
 αἰσθητόν, ἀφ' οὗ γενήσεται ἡ τοῦ σώματος νόησις.
 οὐδὲν δὲ ἔστιν ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων παρὰ
 τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἀσώματον, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἀσώματον
 αὐτόθεν ἐστὶ νοητόν τὸ δὲ σῶμα οὐκ αἰσθητόν, ὡς
 439 δέδεικται ἡμῖν. μὴ ὄντος οὖν ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν
 πραγμάτων αἰσθητοῦ τινός ἀφ' οὗ νόησις ἔσται τοῦ
 σώματος, οὐδὲ νοητόν ἔσται τὸ σῶμα. εἰ δὲ μήτε
 αἰσθητόν ἐστὶ μήτε νοητόν, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν
 ἔστι, ῥητέον μηδὲν εἶναι τὸ σῶμα.

440 Ἄλλ' ἐπεὶ ἐν τούτοις ὁ περὶ τῶν σωμάτων λόγος
 πέφηνεν ἄπορος, ἀπ' ἄλλης ἀρχῆς πειρασόμεθα
 διδάσκειν ὅτι καὶ ὁ περὶ τῶν λειπομένων ἀσωμάτων
 ὁμοίος ἐστὶ τούτῳ.

intelligible. And it is not sensible; for it is "a
 complex quality perceived through the combination
 of form, size, and solidity"^a; and a quality perceived
 through a combination of things is not sensible;
 therefore the body also, conceived as body, is not
 sensible. Nor yet is it intelligible. For in order that 438
 there may be a conception of body, there must already
 exist in the nature of things some sensible object
 from which the conception of body may be formed.
 But nothing exists in the nature of things besides
 body and the incorporeal, and of these the incor-
 poreal is of itself intelligible, and body, as we have
 proved, is not sensible. Since, then, there does not 439
 exist in the nature of things any sensible object from
 which the notion of body may be formed, body will
 not be intelligible either. But if it is neither sensible
 nor intelligible, and besides these there is no other
 alternative, one must declare that body is nothing.

But now that the account given of bodies has been 440
 shown by these arguments to be hopeless, we shall
 start afresh^b and try to demonstrate that the account
 given of the other things, the incorporeals, is equally
 so.

^a This is an Epicurean definition.

^b Cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 446.

B

1 Τοῖς περὶ τοῦ σώματος καὶ τῶν περάτων προ-
 ηπορημένοις ἡμῖ νπρὸς τε τοὺς φυσικοὺς καὶ τοὺς
 γεωμέτρας ἀκόλουθος εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ ἡ περὶ τοῦ
 τόπου ζήτησις· ἅπασι γὰρ συμφώνως ἀξιούται τὸ
 σῶμα ἢτοι ἐν τόπῳ περιέχεσθαι ἢ κατὰ τόπου
 2 φέρεσθαι. διὸ προληπτέον ὅτι κατὰ τὸν Ἐπι-
 κουρον τῆς ἀναφοῦς καλουμένης φύσεως τὸ μὲν
 τι ὀνομάζεται κενὸν τὸ δὲ τόπος τὸ δὲ χώρα,
 μεταλαμβανομένων κατὰ διαφόρους ἐπιβολὰς τῶν
 ὀνομάτων, ἐπεὶπερ ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις ἔρημος μὲν καθ-
 εστηκῦια παντὸς σώματος κενὸν προσαγορεύεται,
 καταλαμβανομένη δὲ ὑπὸ σώματος τόπος καλεῖται,
 χωρούντων δὲ δι' αὐτῆς σωμάτων χώρα γίνεται.
 κοινῶς μὲντοι φύσις ἀναφῆς εἴρηται παρὰ τῶν
 Ἐπικούρω διὰ τὸ ἐστερηθῆαι τῆς κατὰ ἀντίβασιν
 3 ἀφῆς. καὶ οἱ στωικοὶ δὲ κενὸν μὲν εἶναι φασι τὸ
 οἶόν τε ὑπὸ ὄντος κατέχεσθαι, μὴ κατεχόμενον δέ,
 ἢ διάστημα ἔρημον σώματος, ἢ διάστημα ἀκαθ-
 εκτούμενον ὑπὸ σώματος, τόπον δὲ τὸν ὑπὸ ὄντος
 κατεχόμενον καὶ ἐξισιζόμενον τῷ κατέχοντι αὐτόν,
 νῦν ὃν καλοῦντες τὸ σῶμα, καθὼς καὶ ἐκ τῆς
 μεταλήψεως τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐστὶ συμφανές· χώραν
 δὲ φασι εἶναι διάστημα κατὰ μὲν τι κατεχόμενον
 4 ὑπὸ σώματος κατὰ δὲ τι ἀκαθεκτούμενον. ἐνιοὶ δὲ

BOOK II

AFTER the foregoing discussion of body and limits, 1
 criticizing both the Physicists and the Geometers, the
 investigation of "Place" seems to follow next; for
 it is maintained by them all with one accord that
 body either is contained in place or moves in place.
 Hence we must notice first that, according to Epi- 2
 curus, "of the intangible nature one part is named
 'void,' another 'place,' another 'room,'" the names
 being varied according to the different applications,
 since the same nature is termed "void" when desti-
 tute of any body, and is called "place" when occupied
 by a body, and becomes "room" when bodies pass
 through it. But the general designation "intangible
 nature" is given to it by Epicurus owing to its lack
 of resistant touch. And the Stoics assert^a that 3
 "void is that which is capable of being occupied by
 an existent but is not so occupied, or an interval
 empty of body, or an interval unoccupied by body;
 and place is that which is occupied by an existent and
 made equal to that which occupies it" (calling body
 now "an existent," as is plain from the interchange
 of the names); and "room," they say, is "an interval
 partly occupied by body and partly unoccupied."

^a With §§ 3-4 cf. P.H. iii. 124.

χώραν ἔλεξαν ὑπάρχειν τὸν τοῦ μείζονος σώματος τόπον, ὡς ταύτη διαφέρειν τοῦ τόπου τὴν χώραν, τῷ ἐκείνῳ μὲν μὴ ἐμφαίνειν μέγεθος τοῦ ἐμπεριεχομένου σώματος (κἂν γὰρ ἐλάχιστον περιέχῃ σῶμα, οὐδὲν ἦττον τόπος προσαγορεύεται), τὴν δ' ἀξίολογον ἐμφαίνειν μέγεθος τοῦ ἐν αὐτῇ σώματος.

6 περὶ μὲν οὖν κενοῦ ποικίλως ἐν τοῖς περὶ στοιχείων ἐζητήσαμεν, καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον τὰ νῦν τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον παλινωδεῖν· περὶ δὲ τοῦ τόπου καὶ τῆς συζυγούσης τούτῳ χώρας, ἥτις καὶ αὐτῇ κατὰ τὸ γένος ἐστὶ τόπος, ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος σκεψόμεθα. προδηλοτέροις γὰρ οὐσι τούτοις καὶ παρὰ πᾶσι σχεδὸν ὁμολογουμένοις συναπορηθήσεται καὶ ἡ περὶ τοῦ κενοῦ σκέψις, ὅσῳ καὶ περὶ ἀδηλοτέρου πράγματος προκόπτει.

A.—ΕΙ ΕΣΤΙ ΤΟΠΟΣ

6 Τῆς τοῦ τόπου νοήσεως δεδηλωμένης καὶ τῶν συζυγούντων αὐτῷ πραγμάτων ὑποδεδειγμένων ἀπολείπεται, ὡς ἔστιν ἔθος τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως, τοὺς εἰς ἑκάτερον κινήσαι λόγους καὶ τὴν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς

7 συναγομένην ἐποχὴν κρατύνεσθαι. εἴπερ οὖν ἔστιν ἄνω καὶ κάτω καὶ εἰς τὰ δεξιὰ καὶ τὰ ἀριστερὰ καὶ πρόσω καὶ ὀπίσω, ἔστι τις τόπος· μέρη γὰρ εἰσὶν αἱ ἕξ αὐταὶ παρατάσεις τοῦ τόπου, καὶ ἀδύνατόν ἐστὶ τινος τῶν μερῶν ὑπαρχόντων μὴ οὐχὶ κάκεινο ὑπάρχειν οὐδ' ἐστὶ τὰ μέρη. ἔστι δέ γε ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων ἄνω καὶ κάτω καὶ εἰς δεξιὰ καὶ ἀριστερὰ καὶ πρόσω καὶ ὀπίσω· ἔστιν ἄρα τόπος.

* Cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 333 ff.

† Thus the arguments for the existence of "place" (or

But some have said that room is "the place of the 4 larger body," so that room differs from place in the fact that the latter does not imply magnitude of the contained body (for even if it contains a minimal body it is none the less termed "place"), whereas the former implies considerable magnitude in the body it contains. Now "void" we have already discussed 5 in various ways in our sections "Concerning Elements,"^a and there is no need now to repeat the same account; on the present occasion we shall examine "place" and the allied subject of "room," which itself also comes under the head of place. For along with these, which are more evident and subjects of almost universal agreement, the inquiry about void also will be shown to involve doubt, in so far as it deals with a less evident matter.

CHAPTER I.—DOES PLACE EXIST?

Now that the conception of place has been ex- 6 plained and the things allied therewith indicated, it remains for us—in accordance with the Sceptics' custom—to expound the arguments on both sides^b and to justify the suspension of judgement deduced therefrom. If, then, there exist upwards and down- 7 wards, and rightwards and leftwards, and forwards and backwards, some place exists; for these six directions are parts of place, and it is impossible that, if the parts of a thing exist, the thing of which they are parts should not exist. But upwards and downwards, and rightwards and leftwards, and forwards and backwards, do exist in the nature of things;

"space") are given in §§ 7-12 (cf. *P.H.* iii. 120-121)—those against in §§ 13-19 (cf. *P.H.* iii. 122-123); and further arguments in criticism of "place" are added in §§ 20-36.

8 οὐ μὴν ἄλλ' εἰ ὅπου ἦν Σωκράτης, νῦν ἔστιν ἄλλος, ὡς Πλάτων ἀποθανόντος Σωκράτους, ἔστιν ἄρα τόπος. ὡς γὰρ τοῦ ἐν τῷ ἀμφορεί ὕγρου ἐκκενωθέντος καὶ ἄλλου ἐπεχυθέντος λέγομεν ὑπάρχειν τὸν ἀμφορέα τόπον ὄντα καὶ τοῦ προτέρου καὶ τοῦ ὕστερου ἐπεμβληθέντος ὕγρου, οὕτως εἰ ὅν τόπον κατεῖχε Σωκράτης ὅτ' ἔζη, τοῦτον ἕτερος νῦν
9 κατέχει, ἔστι τις τόπος. καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ ἔστι τι σῶμα, καὶ τόπος ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· τὸ ἄρα δεύτερον. πρὸς τούτοις εἰ ὅπου τὸ κοῦφον φύσει φέρεται, ἐκεῖ τὸ βαρὺ φύσει οὐ φέρεται, ἔστιν ἴδιος τοῦ κοῦφου καὶ τοῦ βαρέος τόπος· ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· τὸ ἄρα δεύτερον. τό γέ τοι πῦρ φύσει κοῦφον καθεστῶς ἀνώφορον ἐστί, καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ φύσει βαρὺ τυγχάνον κάτω βρῖθει, καὶ οὔτε τὸ πῦρ κάτω φέρεται οὔτε τὸ ὕδωρ ἄνω ἄττει. ἔστιν ἄρα ἴδιος καὶ τοῦ φύσει κοῦφου καὶ τοῦ φύσει
10 βαρέος τόπος. ὥσπερ τε εἰ τὸ ἐξ οὐ τι γίνε-
νται ἔστι, καὶ τὸ ὑφ' οὐ τι γίνεταί καὶ τὸ δι' ὃ, οὕτως ὑπάρχοι ἂν καὶ τὸ ἐν ᾧ τι γίνεταί. ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἐξ οὐ τι γίνεταί, ὡς ὕλη, καὶ τὸ ὑφ' οὐ, ὡς αἶτιον, καὶ τὸ δι' ὃ, καθάπερ τὸ τέλος· ἔστιν ἄρα καὶ τὸ ἐν ᾧ τι γίνεταί, τούτέστιν ὁ
11 τόπος. οἳ τε παλαιοὶ καὶ τὰ ὅλα δια-
κοσμήσαντες ἀρχὴν τῶν πάντων ὑπέθεντο τόπον, κἀντεῦθεν ὀρμηθεῖς ὁ Ἡσίοδος ἀνεφώνησεν

ἦτοι μὲν πρῶτιστα χάος γένητ', αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα
γαῖ' εὐρύστερνος, πάντων ἕδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰεὶ,

^a Cf. Aristot. *De caelo* iv. 3.

^b Hesiod, *Theog.* 116 f. (cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 8).

therefore place exists.—Moreover, if where Socrates 8 was another man (such as Plato) now is, Socrates being dead, then place exists. For just as, when the liquid in the pitcher has been emptied out and other liquid poured in, we declare that the pitcher, which is the place both of the former liquid and of that poured in later, exists, so likewise, if another man now occupies the place which Socrates occupied when he was alive, some place exists.—Again, if a body 9 exists, place also exists; but in fact the first (is true); therefore the second (is true).—Further, if where what is light naturally moves there what is heavy naturally does not move, there exists a separate place for the light and for the heavy ^a; but in fact the first (is true); therefore the second (is true). For certainly fire, which is naturally light, tends to ascend, and water, which is naturally heavy, presses down- 10 wards, and neither does fire move downwards nor water shoot upwards. There exists, therefore, a separate place both for the naturally light and for the naturally heavy.—Also, just as if there exists 10 that from which a thing becomes, and that by which a thing becomes, and that on account of which a thing becomes, so too there will exist that in which a thing becomes. But that from which a thing becomes (namely, its matter) exists, and that by which (namely, its cause), and that on account of which (that is, its end); therefore, that in which a thing becomes (that is, its place) exists also.—The 11 ancients also in planning the order of the Universe laid down place as the first principle of all things, and starting out from it Hesiod proclaimed ^b how—

Verily first created of all was Chaos; thereafter
Earth broad-bosom'd, unshakable seat of all things for ever—

χάος λέγων τὸν χωρητικὸν τῶν ὄλων τόπον· μὴ ὑποκειμένου γὰρ τούτου οὔτε γῆ οὔτε ὕδωρ οὔτε τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν στοιχείων, οὐχ ὁ σύμπας κόσμος 12 ἐδύνατο συστήναι. κὰν κατ' ἐπίνοιαν δὲ ἅπαντα ἀνέλωμεν, ὁ τόπος οὐκ ἀναιρεθήσεται ἐν ᾧ ἦν τὰ πάντα, ἀλλ' ὑπομένει, τὰς τρεῖς ἔχων διαστάσεις, μήκος βάθος πλάτος, χωρὶς ἀντιτυπίας· τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον ἦν σώματος.

Καὶ ἄλλα δὲ εἰώθασι τοιαῦτα οἱ δογματικοὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων διεξέρχεσθαι πρὸς τὸ καταστήσαι τὴν 13 ὑπαρξίν τοῦ τόπου. πάντα δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦτο δύνανται ποιεῖν. τό τε γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν μερῶν τοῦ τόπου θέλει ἐπιλογίζεσθαι τὸ καὶ τὸν τόπον ὑπάρχειν τελέως ἐστὶ μειρακιῶδες· ὁ γὰρ μὴ διδοὺς αὐτοῖς εἶναι τὸ ὄλον, οὗτος οὐδὲ τὰ μέρη συγ-χωρήσει τοῦ ὄλου. καὶ ἄλλως, ἐπεὶ τὰ τινὸς μέρη αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν οὐ τὰ μέρη καθέστηκεν, δυνάμει ὁ λέγων “εἰ ἔστι τὰ μέρη τοῦ τόπου, ἔστιν ὁ τόπος” τοῦτό φησι “εἰ ἔστιν ὁ τόπος, ἔστιν ὁ τόπος.” ὅπερ ἦν ἄτοπον· αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ ζητούμενον 14 εἰς τὴν αὐτοῦ πίστιν ὡς ἀζήτητον παρείληπται. τὸ δ' αὐτὸ ῥητέον καὶ ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἦν Σωκράτης νῦν εἶναι Πλάτωνα συνάγωσι τὴν ὑπαρξίν τοῦ τόπου. ἡμῶν γὰρ ζητούντων εἰ ἔστι τι ὁ τόπος ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τὸ σῶμα, διαφέρων αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ λεγομένου περιέχεσθαι σώματος, ἐκεῖνοι ὡς ὁμόλογον ἡμῖν ἀντιφωνοῦσι τὸ ἐν τόπῳ γεγονέναι Σωκράτην καὶ τὸ ἐν τούτῳ νῦν περιέχεσθαι 15 Πλάτωνα. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ λέγομεν ἀφελῶς ἐν Ἀλεξ-ανδρείᾳ εἶναι τινα καὶ ἐν γυμνασίῳ καὶ ἐν τῇ

meaning by “Chaos” the place which serves to contain all things ; for if this had not subsisted neither earth nor water nor the rest of the elements, nor the Universe as a whole, could have been constructed. And even if, in imagination, we abolish all things, 12 the place wherein all things were will not be abolished, but remains possessing its three dimensions—length, depth, breadth,—but without solidity ; for this is an attribute peculiar to body.^a

There are also other reasons of this kind which the Dogmatic philosophers are wont to enumerate for the purpose of establishing the real existence of place. But they are able to effect anything rather than this. 13 For to try to argue from the parts of place that place itself also exists is perfectly childish ; for he who does not grant them that the whole exists will not concede that the parts of the whole exist. And besides, since the parts of a thing are that very thing whereof they are the parts, he who argues—“If the parts of place exist, place exists”—is virtually saying “If place exists, place exists.” But this is absurd ; for the thing in question is brought in for the purpose of confirming itself as though it were not in question. And 14 the same may be said when they deduce the existence of place from the fact that Plato now exists in the place where Socrates existed. For while we are inquiring whether the place in which the body exists, as distinct from the body itself which is said to be contained therein, is an existent thing they reply to us—as though it were agreed—that Socrates was in a place and that Plato is now contained in that place. Now it is agreed that, speaking loosely, we say that a 15 man is in Alexandria^b or in the gymnasium or in the

^a Cf. P.H. iii. 39.

^b Cf. § 95, P.H. iii. 221.

σχολῆ, ὁμολογόν· ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἡμῶν ἡ σκέψις οὐ περὶ τοῦ κατὰ πλάτος ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ κατὰ περιγραφὴν τόπου, πότερον ἔστιν ἢ ἐπινοεῖται μόνον, καὶ εἰ ἔστι, ποταπὸν τὴν φύσιν, ἀρὰ γε σωματικὸν ἢ ἀσώματον καὶ ἐν τόπῳ περιεχόμενον ἢ οὐδαμῶς. ὧν οὐδὲν ἴσχυσαν παραστήσαι οἱ ταῖς προειρη-
 16 μέναις ὑπομήσεσι χρώμενοι. κοῦφόν τε φύσει οὐ δίδοται εἶναι τὸ σῶμα, ἵνα καὶ εἰς ἴδιον φέρηται τόπον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ δοκοῦν εἶναι τοιοῦτον ὑπ' ἄλλης τινὸς αἰτίας καὶ καταναγκασμένως¹ εἰς τινὰ ἀνωθεῖται τόπου. εἴτα κὰν δοθῆ ἢ φύσει τυγχάνεναι κοῦφον καὶ φύσει βαρῦ, πάλιν οὐδὲν ἦττον ἀπορήσεται τὸ εἰς τί φέρεται, ἀρα εἰς γε σῶμά τι ἢ κενὸν ἢ πέρας ἢ ἄλλο τι διαφερούσης μετεσχηκῶς
 17 φύσεως. ναί, ἀλλ' εἰ ἔστι τὸ ἐξ οὗ καὶ τὸ ὑφ' οὗ καὶ τὸ δι' ὃ, εἴη ἂν καὶ τὸ ἐν ᾧ. οὐ πάντως φήσομεν. εἰ γὰρ ἀπορεῖται τὸ ἐξ οὗ τι γίνεται, τοὔτέστι τὸ πάσχον, καὶ τὸ ὑφ' οὗ, καθάπερ τὸ αἴτιον, καὶ καθόλου τὸ γίνεσθαι καὶ τὸ φθείρεσθαι ἢ κοινότερον κινεῖσθαι, ἀνάγκη συνηπορῆσθαι καὶ τὸ ἐν ᾧ. τὸ δ' ὅτι ταῦτ' ἠπόρηται, καὶ πρότερον ἐδειξάμεν περὶ τοῦ ποιούντος καὶ πάσχοντος δι-
 18 σκεπτόμενοι. ὁ μὲν γὰρ εἰπὼν

ἦτοι μὲν πρῶτιστα χάος γένετ', αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα γαί' εὐρύστερνος, πάντων ἕδος,

¹ καταναγκασμένως Heintz: καταναγκασμένης mss., Bekk.

* For this distinction see § 95 *infra*, and *P.H.* iii. 75.

^b *Cf. Adv. Phys.* i. 195 ff., 207 ff., 267 ff.

^c *Cf.* §§ 310 ff. *infra*.

school; but our investigation is not concerned with place in the broad sense but with that in the circumscribed sense,^a as to whether this exists or is merely imagined; and if it exists, of what sort it is in its nature, whether corporeal or incorporeal, and whether contained in place or not. And none of these points have those who employ the foregoing arguments been able to establish.—Nor is it granted that there is any 16 body which is naturally light, so that it moves into a separate place of its own, but even that which seems to be such is driven up into certain places by some cause and through compulsion. And further, even if it be granted that a naturally light and a naturally heavy exist, none the less it will again be a matter of doubt into what it moves, whether into some body or into a void or a limit or something else possessed of a distinct nature. “Yes,” (they reply), “but if the 17 ‘from which’ and the ‘by which’ and the ‘on account of which’ exist, the ‘in which’ will also exist.” Not necessarily, we shall say. For if there is doubt about that “from which” a thing becomes (that is, the passive element), and about the “by which” (namely, the cause), and in general about becoming and perishing, or motion generally, then the “in which” also will necessarily be involved in the same doubt. And that these things are matters of doubt we have shown before in our discussion of agent and patient,^b and we shall point it out again when considering becoming and perishing,^c and also, at an earlier stage, motion.^d For he who said e—

Verily first created of all was Chaos; thereafter Earth broad-bosom'd, of all things the seat—

^a *Cf.* §§ 37 ff. *infra*.

^b *Cf.* § 11 *supra*.

ἐξ αὐτοῦ περιτρέπεται· ἐρομένου γάρ τινος αὐτὸν ἐκ τίνος γέγονε τὸ χάος, οὐχ ἕξει λέγειν. καὶ τοῦτό φασιν ἔνιοι αἰτίον γεγενῆαι Ἐπικούρῳ τῆς 19 ἐπὶ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν ὀρμῆς. κομιδῇ γὰρ μειρακίσκος ὢν ἤρητο τὸν ἐπαναγωγώσκοντα αὐτῷ γραμματιστῆν "ἦτοι μὲν πρῶτιστα χάος γένετ'," ἐκ τίνος τὸ χάος ἐγένετο, εἴπερ πρῶτον ἐγένετο. τούτου δὲ εἰπόντος μὴ αὐτοῦ ἔργον εἶναι τὰ τοιαῦτα διδάσκειν ἀλλὰ τῶν καλουμένων φιλοσόφων, τοίνυν, ἔφησεν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος, ἐπ' ἐκείνους μοι βαδιστέον ἐστίν, εἴπερ αὐτοὶ τῆν τῶν ὄντων ἀλήθειαν ἴσασι.

Ἄλλ' ὅτι μὲν οὐδὲν ἰκνούμενον λέγεται εἰς τὸ 20 ὑπάρχειν τι τὸν τόπον, ἐκ τούτων ἤδη γνώριμον. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τις ὑποδεκτικὸς τοῦ σώματος τόπος, ἦτοι σῶμά ἐστιν οὗτος ἢ κενόν. καὶ σῶμα μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ ὑποδεκτικὸς τοῦ σώματος τόπος· εἰ γὰρ πᾶν σῶμα ὀφείλει ἐν τόπῳ εἶναι, ὁ δὲ τόπος ἐστὶ σῶμα, ἔσται ὁ τόπος ἐν τόπῳ, κακείνος πάλιν ἐν τρίτῳ, καὶ ὁ τρίτος ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ, καὶ οὕτως εἰς ἄπειρον. 21 οὐ τοίνυν σῶμά ἐστιν ὁ ὑποδεκτικὸς τοῦ σώματος τόπος. εἰ δὲ κενόν ἐστὶν ὁ ὑποδεκτικὸς τοῦ σώματος τόπος, ἦτοι μένει τοῦτο τὸ κενόν ἐπιόντος αὐτῷ τοῦ σώματος ἢ μεθίσταται ἢ φθείρεται. καὶ εἰ μὲν μένει ἐπιόντος αὐτῷ τοῦ σώματος, ἔσται κενόν ἅμα καὶ πλήρες, ἢ μὲν μένει, κενόν, ἢ δὲ ἐπιδέχεται τὸ σῶμα, πλήρες. ἀδιανόητον δὲ γε τὸ αὐτὸ κενὸν τε καὶ πλήρες λέγειν· τοίνυν οὐ μένει τὸ 22 κενόν ἐπιόντος αὐτῷ τοῦ σώματος. εἰ δὲ μεθίσταται τὸ κενόν, ἔσται σῶμα τὸ κενόν· τὸ γὰρ μεθιστάμενον τόπον ἐκ τόπου σῶμά ἐστιν. οὐχὶ

is refuted by himself; for if someone asks him "from what did Chaos come into being?," he will have no answer. And this, as some say, was the reason why Epicurus took to philosophizing. For when still quite 19 a youth^a he asked his schoolmaster, who was reading out the line "Verily first created of all was Chaos," what Chaos was created from, if it was created first. And when he replied that it was not his business, but that of the men called philosophers, to teach things of that sort, "Well then," said Epicurus, "I must go off to them, if it is they who know the truth of things."

So from this it is already evident that nothing pertinent is said to show that place is a real thing; and to this we must further add the Sceptics' argu- 20 ments:—If there exists any place receptive of body, it is either body or void. But the place receptive of body is not body; for if every body must be in a place, and place is a body, place will be in a place, and this again in a third, and the third in a fourth, and so on *ad infinitum*. So then the place receptive of body is not a body. And if the place receptive of body is a void, this void either remains when the body comes upon it, or moves away, or perishes.^b And if it remains when the body comes upon it, it will be at once both void and full,—void in so far as it remains, but full in so far as it admits the body. But it is irrational to say that the same thing is both void and full; the void, then, does not remain when the body comes upon it. And if the void moves away, 22 the void will be body, for that which moves away from place to place is a body. But the void is not a

^a At the age of 14, according to Diog. Laert. x. 2.

^b With §§ 21-23 cf. P.H. iii. 129.

δέ γε σῶμά ἐστι τὸ κενόν, ὥστε οὐδὲ μεθίσταται ἐπιόντος αὐτῷ τοῦ σώματος. καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ μεθίσταται τοῦ σώματος ἐπιόντος, οὐκέτι δέξεται τὸ
 23 σῶμα· ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ τῶν ἀτόπων. λείπεται ἄρα λέγειν φθειρεσθαι τὸ κενόν· ὃ πάλιν ἀδύνατον. εἰ γὰρ φθείρεται, ἐν μεταβολῇ καὶ κινήσει γίνεται [καὶ εἰ φθείρεται, γενητόν ἐστι]· τὸ δ' ἐν μεταβολῇ καὶ κινήσει γνωόμενον [γενητόν τε καὶ φθαρτόν]· σῶμα καθέστηκεν· ὥστε οὐδὲ φθείρεται τὸ κενόν. καὶ οὕτως, εἰ μήτε σῶμά ἐστιν ὁ τόπος, ὡς παρεστήσαμεν, μήτε κενόν, ὡς ὑπεμνήσαμεν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τις τόπος.

24 Πρὸς τούτοις ἔτι, εἰ ὁ τόπος περιεκτικὸς νοεῖται τοῦ σώματος, τὸ δὲ περιέχον ἐκτός ἐστι τοῦ περιεχομένου, κατ' ἀνάγκην, εἰ ἔστιν ὁ τόπος, ὀφείλει τι τούτων τυγχάνειν ὧν τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ὕλη, τὸ δὲ εἶδος, τὸ δὲ μεταξὺ διάστημα τῶν ἐσχάτων τοῦ
 25 σώματος περάτων, τὸ δὲ πέρατα ἔσχατα. ὕλη μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἂν εἴη ὁ τόπος κατὰ πολλοὺς τρόπους, οἷον ἐπεὶ αὕτη μὲν σεσωμάτῳται, ὁ δὲ τόπος οὐ σεσωμάτῳται, καὶ ἡ μὲν ὕλη μέτεισι ἀπὸ τόπου εἰς τόπον, ὁ δὲ τόπος οὐ μετέρχεται ἀπὸ τόπου εἰς τόπον. καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς ὕλης λέγομεν ὅτι πρότερον μὲν ἦν ἀήρ, νῦν δὲ πυκνωθεῖσα γέγονεν ὕδωρ, ἡ ἀνάπαλι πρότερον μὲν ὕδωρ ἦν, νῦν δὲ λεπτυνθεῖσα γέγονεν ἀήρ· ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ τόπου οὐ λέγομεν τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ὅτι πάλαι μὲν ἐν αὐτῷ ἦν ἀήρ, νῦν δ' ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῷ ὕδωρ. οὐ τοίνυν δύναται ὕλη ὁ τόπος
 26 νοεῖσθαι. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ εἶδος. τὸ γὰρ εἶδος ἀχώριστόν ἐστι τῆς ὕλης, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀνδριάντος ἀχώριστόν ἐστι τοῦ ὑποκειμένου χαλκοῦ, ὃ δὲ τόπος χωρίζεται τοῦ σώματος· μεταβαίνει γὰρ

body, so that it does not move away either when the body comes upon it. And besides, if it moves away when the body comes upon it, it will no longer receive the body; and this too is itself an absurd notion. It
 23 remains, therefore, to declare that the void perishes; which again is impossible. For if it perishes, it becomes in a state of change and motion [and if it perishes it is generable]; but that which becomes in a state of change and motion is a body [both generable and perishable]; so that the void does not perish. And so, if place is neither a body, as we have established, nor void, as we have shown, no place will exist.

And furthermore, if place is conceived as containing
 24 body, and that which contains is outside of that which is contained, necessarily, if place exists, it must be some one of those things of which one is matter, another form, another the interval between the extreme limits of the body, another the extreme limits. Now place will not be matter for many
 25 reasons,—because, for instance, the latter is corporealized but place is not corporealized, and matter passes over from place to place, but place does not pass over from place to place. And as regards matter we say that formerly it was air but now after condensation it has become water, or conversely that formerly it was water but now after rarefaction it has become air; but we do not speak thus in the case of place, but we say that formerly there was air in it but now there is water in it. So then place cannot be conceived as matter.—Nor, in fact, as form. For
 26 form is inseparable from matter,—as in the case of the statue it is inseparable from the underlying bronze,—but place is separate from body; for the

¹ [καὶ . . . ἐστι] et [γενητόν . . . φθαρτόν] secl. ego.

ἐκεῖνο καὶ εἰς ἕτερον μεθίσταται τόπον μὴ συμ-
 μεταβαίνοντος αὐτῷ τοῦ ἐν ᾧ περιείχεται τόπου.
 ὥστε εἰ τὸ μὲν εἶδος ἀχώριστόν ἐστι τῆς ὕλης, ὁ
 δὲ τόπος χωρίζεται ταύτης, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ εἶδος ὁ
 τόπος. καὶ πάλιν τὸ μὲν εἶδος συμμεταβαίνει τῇ
 ὕλῃ, ὁ δὲ τόπος, ὡς προείπον, οὐ συμμεταβαίνει
 τῷ σώματι· τοίνυν οὐδὲ εἶδος ἐστὶν ὁ τόπος.

27 ὡσαύτως δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ μεταξὺ τῶν περάτων διάστημα·
 τοῦτο γὰρ περιέχεται πρὸς τῶν περάτων, ὁ δὲ
 τόπος οὐ βούλεται περιέχεσθαι ὑπὸ τινος ἀλλ'
 ἑτέρου εἶναι περιεκτικός. εἴτα πέρασ ἐστὶ τοῦ
 σώματος ἢ ἐπιφάνεια, τὸ δὲ μετὰ τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν
 διάστημα οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ πεπερατωμένον
 σῶμα. εἰ οὖν φαμέν τὸ μεταξὺ [τῶν πεπερατω-
 μένων σωμάτων]¹ τόπον εἶναι, ἔσται σῶμα ὁ τόπος·

28 ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀπεμφαίνον. λείπεται οὖν λέγειν
 ὅτι τὰ ἔσχατα τοῦ σώματος πέρατά ἐστι τόπος·
 ὁ καὶ αὐτὸ τῶν ἀδυνάτων, ἐπεὶ τὰ μὲν ἔσχατα
 τοῦ σώματος συνεχῆ ἐστὶ τῷ σώματι καὶ μέρη
 αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀχώριστα, ὁ δὲ τόπος οὔτε συνεχῆς ἐστὶ
 τῷ σώματι οὔτε μέρος αὐτοῦ οὔτε ἀχώριστος τοῦ
 σώματος. οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ τὰ ἔσχατα τῶν σωμάτων
 29 ἐστὶν ὁ τόπος. εἰ δὲ μήτε ὕλη ὁ τόπος ἐστὶ μήτε
 τὸ εἶδος μήτε τὸ μεταξὺ διάστημα τῶν περάτων μήτ'
 αὐτὰ ἔσχατα τοῦ σώματος, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν
 ἔστιν ἄλλο ἐπινοεῖν, ῥητέον μηδὲν ὑπάρχειν τόπον.

30 Ναὶ φασιν οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ περιπάτου φιλόσοφοι,
 ἀλλὰ τόπος ἐστὶ τὸ πέρασ τοῦ περιέχοντος σώ-
 ματος. τῆς γὰρ γῆς ὕδατι περιεχομένης καὶ τοῦ
 ὕδατος ἀέρι περιεχομένου καὶ τοῦ ἀέρος πυρὶ καὶ

¹ [τῶν . . . σωμάτων] secl. ego: τῶν περάτων τῶν σ. Fabr.
 in vers.

latter changes its position and moves on to another
 place, while the place wherein it was contained does
 not change position along with it. So that if form is
 inseparable from matter, whereas place is separate
 from it, place will not be form. And again,—the
 form changes its position along with the matter, but
 place, as I said before, does not change its position
 along with body; so then place is not form.—So 27
 likewise it is not the interval between the limits; for
 this is enclosed by the limits, whereas place refuses
 to be enclosed by anything, but itself serves to enclose
 other things. Moreover, surface is a limit of body,
 and the interval after the surface is nothing else than
 the limited body. If, then, we assert that what is
 between [the limited bodies]^a is place, place will be
 a body; which is contrary to sense.—It remains, 28
 then, to declare that the extreme limits of the body
 are place; but this itself, too, is a thing impossible,
 since the extremities of the body are continuous with
 the body and parts thereof and inseparable, whereas
 place is neither continuous with the body nor a part
 of it nor inseparable from the body. Neither, then,
 is place the extremities of the bodies. But if place 29
 is neither matter nor form nor the interval between
 the limits nor the extremities of the body, and besides
 these one can conceive no other possibility, we must
 declare that place is nothing.

“Yes,” say the Peripatetic philosophers, “but 30
 place is the limit of the containing body.”^b For
 since earth is contained in water, and water contained
 in air, and air in fire, and fire in Heaven,—just as

^a The words bracketed would imply an interval between
 different bodies, whereas it seems clear that the reference is
 to the internal space of a single body.

^b With § 30 cf. P.H. iii. 131.

τοῦ πυρός οὐρανῶ, ὃν τρόπον τὸ τοῦ ἀγγείου πέρασ
 τόπος ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐν τῷ ἀγγεῖῳ σώματος, οὕτω καὶ
 τὸ τοῦ ὕδατος πέρασ ἐστὶ τόπος τῆς γῆς, καὶ τὸ
 τοῦ ἀέρος πέρασ ἐστὶ τόπος τοῦ ὕδατος, καὶ τὸ τοῦ
 πυρός πέρασ τόπος ἔσται τοῦ ἀέρος, καὶ τὸ τοῦ
 31 οὐρανοῦ πέρασ τόπος ἔσται τοῦ πυρός. αὐτὸς
 μέντοι ὁ οὐρανὸς κατὰ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη οὐκέτ'
 ἐστὶν ἐν τόπῳ ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ τῇ οἰκείᾳ
 ἰδιότητι· ἐπεὶ γὰρ τόπος ἐστὶ τὸ ἔσχατον τοῦ περι-
 ἔχοντος σώματος πέρασ, ἐκτὸς δὲ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ
 κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν φιλόσοφον οὐδὲν ἔστιν, ἵνα καὶ
 τὸ τούτου πέρασ γένηται τόπος οὐρανοῦ, ἀνάγκη
 καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ὑπὸ μηδεὸς περιεχόμενον ἐν
 ἑαυτῷ εἶναι καὶ τοῖς οἰκείοις περιέχεσθαι πέρασιν,
 32 ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐν τόπῳ τυγχάνειν. ὅθεν οὐδέ που ὃν
 ἐστὶν ὁ οὐρανός· τὸ γὰρ που ὃν αὐτὸ τε ἔστιν
 ἐκεῖνο καὶ ἕτερον τὸ ὅπου ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ οὐρανὸς
 οὐδὲν ἔχει ἕτερον παρ' αὐτὸν ἕξωθεν, διόπερ αὐτὸς
 33 ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὢν οὐδέ που γενήσεται. ὅσον δὲ ἐπὶ
 τοῖς οὕτω λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τῶν περιπατητικῶν,
 κινδυνεύει ὁ πρῶτος θεὸς τόπος εἶναι πάντων.
 κατὰ γὰρ Ἀριστοτέλη ὁ πρῶτος θεὸς ἦν τὸ
 πέρασ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ. ἦτοι οὖν ὁ θεὸς ἕτερόν ἐστι
 παρὰ τὸ οὐράνιον πέρασ, ἢ αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο ὁ θεὸς
 ἐστίν. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἕτερόν ἐστι παρὰ τὸ οὐράνιον
 πέρασ, ἔσται τι ἕτερον ἐκτὸς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, καὶ τὸ
 τούτου πέρασ τόπος γενήσεται οὐρανοῦ, καὶ ταύτη
 δώσουσιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη ἐν τόπῳ περι-
 ἔχεσθαι τὸν οὐρανόν· ὅπερ οὐχ ὑπομενοῦσιν, ἀνθ-
 εστώτες ἑκατέρῳ τούτων, τῷ τε εἶναι τι ἐκτὸς
 οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῷ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἐν τόπῳ περιέχεσθαι.

the limit of the vessel is the place of the body in the vessel, so also the limit of water is the place of earth, and the limit of air is the place of water, and the limit of fire will be the place of air, and the limit of Heaven will be the place of fire. When we come to 31 the Heaven itself, however, according to Aristotle,^a it is not in place but abides within itself and in its own proper selfhood; for since place is the extreme limit of the containing body, and according to this philosopher nothing exists outside Heaven so that its limit should be the place of Heaven, it is necessary that Heaven, being contained by nothing, should exist in itself and be contained within its own limits, and not exist in place. Hence Heaven is not existent 32 anywhere; for that which exists anywhere both exists itself and its "where" is other than it, but Heaven has no other thing besides and outside of itself; and on this account, as existing itself within itself, it will not be anywhere.—And so far as regards 33 these statements of the Peripatetics, it seems likely that the First God is the place of all things. For according to Aristotle^b the First God is the limit of Heaven. Either, then, God is something other than the Heaven's limit, or God is just that limit. And if He is other than Heaven's limit, something else will exist outside Heaven, and its limit will be the place of Heaven, and thus the Aristotelians will be granting that Heaven is contained in place; but this they will not tolerate, as they are opposed to both these notions,—both that anything exists outside of Heaven and that Heaven is contained in place. And if God

^a Cf. Aristot. *Phys.* iv. 5.

^b Cf. Aristot. *De caelo* i. 3 270 b 6, πάντες τὸν ἀνωτάτω τῷ θεῷ τόπον ἀποδιδοῦσαι . . . (b 22) αἰθέρα προσωνομάσαν τὸν ἀνωτάτω τόπον.

εἰ δὲ ταῦτόν ἐστι τῷ οὐρανῷ πέρατι ὁ θεός, ἐπεὶ τὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ πέρασ τόπος ἐστὶ πάντων τῶν ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ, ἔσται κατὰ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην ὁ θεός πάντων τόπος, ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ τῶν ἀπεμφαινόντων.

34 καθόλου τε, εἴπερ τὸ τοῦ ἐμπεριέχοντος σώματος πέρασ τόπος ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐμπεριεχομένου, τοῦτο τὸ πέρασ ἤτοι σώμᾶ ἐστὶν ἢ ἀσώματον. καὶ εἰ μὲν σώμᾶ ἐστὶν, ἐπεὶ πᾶν σώμα ὀφείλει ἐν τόπῳ εἶναι, ἔσται ὁ τόπος ἐν τόπῳ καὶ οὐκέτι τόπος· εἰ δὲ ἀσώματόν ἐστι τὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος σώματος πέρασ, ἐπεὶ παντός σώματος τὸ πέρασ ἐστὶν ἢ ἐπιφάνεια, ἔσται ἐκάστου σώματος τόπος ἐπι-

35 φάνεια, ὅπερ ἄτοπον. καθόλου τε πῶς οὐ καταγέλαστόν ἐστι λέγειν τὸν οὐρανὸν αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ τόπον εἶναι; οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν τε καὶ δύο, σώμᾶ τε καὶ ἀσώματον. ἢ μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστὶν, ἐν ἔσται, ἢ δὲ περιέχον καὶ ἐμπεριεχόμενον, δύο γενήσεται, καὶ ἢ μὲν περιεχόμενον, σώμα, ἢ δὲ

36 περιέχον, ἀσώματον· τόπος γὰρ ἦν. οὐ δύναται δὲ ἐπινοεῖσθαι τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα καὶ ἐν καὶ δύο καὶ σώμα καὶ ἀσώματον· τοίνυν οὐδὲ κατὰ τὴν τοιαύτην νόησιν εὐδρομεῖ ἢ τοῦ τόπου κατάληψις.

Ἄλλ' ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτον ἀηρήκαμεν, ἴδωμεν ἐξῆς εἰ δύναται τι τῶν ὄντων κατὰ τόπον κινεῖσθαι.

B'.—Εἰ ἔστι κίνησις

37 Ὁ μὲν Ἀριστοτέλης ἐξ εἶδη τῆς κινήσεως ἔλεγεν ὑπάρχειν, ὡν τὸ μὲν τι εἶναι τοπικὴν μεταβάσιν, τὸ δὲ μεταβολὴν, τὸ δὲ γένεσιν, τὸ δὲ

38 φθοράν, τὸ δὲ αὐξήσιν, τὸ δὲ μείωσιν· οἱ δὲ πλείους,

228

is identical with Heaven's limit, since Heaven's limit is the place of all things within Heaven, God—according to Aristotle—will be the place of all things; and this, too, is itself a thing contrary to sense.—Also, in 34 general, if the limit of the enclosing body is the place of the enclosed, this limit is either a body or incorporeal. And if it is a body, since every body must be in a place, place will be in a place and will no longer be place; but if the limit of the containing body is incorporeal, since the limit of every body is a surface, the place of each body will be a surface, which is absurd.—Also, in general, how is it other 35 than ridiculous to say that Heaven is itself its own place? For in this case the same thing will be both the container and the contained, and the same thing both one and two, both body and incorporeal. For in so far as it is the same thing it will be one, but in so far as it is both container and contained it will be two; and in so far as it is contained it will be body, but in so far as it is container, incorporeal; for it is place. But the same thing cannot be conceived as at 36 once both one and two, both body and incorporeal; so then, neither with this conception of it does the apprehension of place have an easy course.

And now that we have abolished this also, let us next consider whether any of the existing things can move in space.

CHAPTER II.—DOES MOTION EXIST?

Aristotle said ^a that there are six kinds of motion, 37 and of these one is local transition, another change, another becoming, another perishing, another increase, another decrease; but the majority—amongst 38

^a Cf. Aristot. *Categ.* 15 a 13. With §§ 37-41 cf. *P.H.* iii. 64.

ἐν οἷς εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀνησιδῆμον, διττὴν τινα
 κατὰ τὸ ἄνωγάτω κίνησιν ἀπολείπουσι, μίαν μὲν
 39 τὴν μεταβλητικὴν, δευτέραν δὲ τὴν μεταβατικὴν,
 ὧν μεταβλητικὴ μὲν ἐστὶ κίνησις καθ' ἣν τὸ σῶμα
 ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ μένον οὐσίᾳ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλην ἀναδέχεται
 ποιότητες καὶ ἣν μὲν ἀπολείπει ἣν δὲ ἐπιλαμβάνει,
 ὁποῖόν τι γίνεται ἐπὶ τοῦ εἰς ὄξος μεταβάλλοντος
 οἴνου καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐξ ὄμφακος εἰς γλυκὺν χυμὸν
 μεταβαλλούσης σταφυλῆς ἢ τοῦ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως
 40 ποικιλλομένου τὰς χροᾶς χαμαιλέοντος ἢ πολύ-
 ποδος. ὅθεν καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν φθορὰν καὶ
 τὴν αὔξησιν ἔτι δὲ μείωσιν εἰδικὰς ῥητέον εἶναι
 μεταβολὰς· ὡς φασι καὶ τῇ μεταβλητικῇ κινήσει
 ὑποστέλλειν, εἰ μὴ τι τὴν αὔξησιν φήσει τις
 ἔχουσι τῆς μεταβατικῆς κινήσεως, ὡς πρόβασι
 41 οὖσαν¹ σωμάτων εἷς τε μήκος καὶ εὖρος. μετα-
 βατικὴ δὲ ἐστὶ κίνησις καθ' ἣν τὸν ὅλον ἢ κατὰ μέρος,
 ὅλον μὲν ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν τροχαζόντων καὶ περιπατούν-
 των θεωροῦμεν, κατὰ μέρος δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς ἐκ-
 τεινομένης καὶ συστελλομένης χειρὸς ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν
 τῆς περὶ κέντρω² δινομένης σφαίρας μερῶν. ὅλης
 γὰρ αὐτῆς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μενούσης τόπῳ τὰ μέρη
 ἀμείβει τοὺς τόπους· τὸ γὰρ κάτω ὄν πρότερον ἄνω
 γίνεται καὶ τὸ ἄνω κάτω καὶ τὸ πρόσω ὀπίσω.
 42 καίτοι τινὲς τῶν φυσικῶν, ἐξ ὧν ἐστὶ καὶ
 ὁ Ἐπίκουρος, τὴν μεταβλητικὴν κίνησιν εἶδος
 ἔλεξαν εἶναι τῆς μεταβατικῆς· τὸ γὰρ μεταβάλλον
 κατὰ ποιότητες σύγκριμα πάντως κατὰ τὴν τῶν

¹ <ὡς> πρόβασι οὖσαν Heintz: προβαίνουσαν mss., Bekk.
² κέντρω Mutsch.: κέντροις mss., Bekk.

whom Aenesidemus is included—allow that motion,
 in its main kinds, is twofold, one sort being that of
 change, the second that of transition; and of these 39
 the motion of change is that by which the body, while
 remaining identical in substance, receives different
 qualities at different times, putting off one quality
 and putting on another,—the sort of thing which takes
 place in the case of wine changing into vinegar and in
 the case of the grape when it changes from a state of
 acidity to a sweet flavour, or when the chameleon or
 polypod takes on a variety of different colours at
 different times. Hence, too, it must be affirmed that 40
 becoming and perishing and increase, and decrease as
 well, are particular forms of change; and they assert
 that these come under the head of the motion of
 change, unless perhaps someone should assert that
 increase belongs to transitional motion, as it is the
 progress of bodies towards length and breadth. And 41
 transitional motion is that by which the moving object
 passes from place to place, either wholly or partially,
 —wholly as we see in the case of runners and walkers,
 and partially as in the case of a hand which is ex-
 tended and clenched, or in the case of the parts of a
 sphere which is spinning round its centre. For while
 this as a whole remains in the same place, its parts
 change their places; for the part which was formerly
 below becomes above, and the above below, and the
 before behind.—Some of the physicists, however,— 42
 and amongst them Epicurus—have declared that the
 motion of change is a particular form of transitional
 motion; for the composite object which changes in

συγκεκρικότων αὐτὸ λόγω θεωρητῶν σωμάτων
τοπικὴν τε καὶ μεταβατικὴν κίνησιω μεταβάλλει.
43 οἷον ἵνα τι ἐκ γλυκέος γένηται πικρὸν ἢ ἐκ λευκοῦ
μέλαν, δεῖ τοὺς συνιστακότας αὐτὸ ὄγκους μετα-
κοσμηθῆναι καὶ ἄλλην ἀντὶ ἄλλης τάξιν ἀνα-
δέξασθαι· τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως συμβαίη, ἐὰν μὴ
μεταβατικῶς κινηθῶσιν οἱ ὄγκοι. καὶ πάλιν ἵνα
τι ἐκ σκληροῦ μαλακὸν γένηται ἢ ἐκ μαλακοῦ
σκληρόν, δεῖ τὰ ἐξ ὧν ἔστι μόρια κατὰ τὸν τόπον
44 κινηθῆναι· διατάσει μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν μαλακύνεται,
συνελεύσει δὲ καὶ πυκνώσει σκληρύνεται. παρ' ὃ
ἢ μεταβλητικὴ κίνησις οὐχ ἕτερα κατὰ γένος ἔστι
τῆς μεταβατικῆς κινήσεως. διόπερ ἡμεῖς πρὸς
ταύτην μάλιστα κομιοῦμεν τὰς ἀπορίας, ἐπεὶπερ
αἰρομένης αὐτῆς οἰχῆσεται καὶ ἢ μεταβλητικὴ
κίνησις.

45 Πρὶν δὲ τῶν ἀποριῶν γνωστότεον ὅτι τρεῖς γε-
γόνασι στάσεις κατὰ τὸ ἀνωτάτω περὶ κινήσεως.
οἱ μὲν γὰρ φασι κίνησιν εἶναι, οἱ δὲ μὴ εἶναι, οἱ δὲ
οὐ μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι. καὶ εἶναι μὲν ὃ τε
βίος,¹ τοῖς φαινομένοις προσέχων, καὶ οἱ πλείους
τῶν φυσικῶν, ὥσπερ οἱ περὶ Πυθαγόραν καὶ
'Εμπεδοκλέα καὶ 'Αναξαγόραν Δημόκριτόν τε καὶ
'Επίκουρον, οἷς καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ περιπάτου ἐπι δὲ
καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς συναπεγράψαντο καὶ ἄλλοι
46 παμπληθεῖς· μὴ εἶναι δὲ οἱ περὶ Παρμενίδην καὶ
Μέλισσον, οὓς ὁ 'Αριστοτέλης στασιώτας τε <τῆς
φύσεως>² καὶ ἀφυσικούς κέκληκεν, στασιώτας μὲν

¹ βίος NL: Bías cet., Bekk.

² <τῆς φύσεως> add. NLE.

quality changes owing to the local and transitional
motion of the rationally perceived bodies which com-
pose it. Thus, in order that a thing may become 43
bitter from sweet, or black from white, the molecules
which compose it must be arranged in a new order
and take up different positions; and this could not
be brought about otherwise than by the transitional
motion of the molecules. And again,—in order that
a thing may become soft from hard or hard from soft,
the parts whereof it is composed must move in place ;
for it is made soft by their expansion, but made hard 44
by their coalescence and condensation. And owing
to this the motion of change is, generically, nothing
else than transitional motion. Consequently, we
shall bring our criticisms to bear chiefly on this last,
since if it is abolished the motion of change will also
disappear.

But before we begin our criticisms we must observe 45
that there have been three main views regarding
motion.^a Some say that motion exists, others that
it does not exist, and others that it is “no more”
existent than non-existent. That it exists is affirmed
both by ordinary folk, who pay attention to appear-
ances, and by the majority of physicists, such as
Pythagoras and Empedocles and Anaxagoras and
Democritus and Epicurus, to whose view also the
Peripatetics have subscribed, and the Stoics as well,
and a host of others. But its non-existence is affirmed 46
by Parmenides and Melissus, whom Aristotle has
described as “Nature’s stationers”^b and “anti-
naturalists”—“stationers” from “standing still,”

where the Eleatics are called τοῦ ὅλου στασιῶται (“partisans
of the Whole”), with a play on στασ. (as if from στάσις,
“rest”).

^a With §§ 45-49 cf. P.H. iii. 65.

^b This phrase is derived (by A.) from Plato, *Theaet.* 181 A,

ἀπὸ τῆς στάσεως, ἀφυσικούς δὲ ὅτι ἀρχὴ κινήσεώς
 ἔστιν ἡ φύσις, ἣν ἀνείλον φάμενοι μηδὲν κινεῖσθαι.
 47 τὸ γὰρ κινούμενον ὀφείλει ἀνένειν τι διάστημα, πᾶν
 δὲ διάστημα διὰ τὸ τὴν εἰς ἄπειρον δέχεσθαι
 48 τομὴν ἀνήνυτον ἔστιν, ὥστ' οὐδὲ κινούμενον τι
 ἔσται. συμφέρεται δὲ τούτοις τοῖς ἀνδράσι καὶ
 Διόδωρος ὁ Κρόνος, εἰ μὴ τι ῥητέον κατὰ τούτον
 κενεῖσθαι μὲν τι κινεῖσθαι δὲ μηδὲ ἔν, ὡς προ-
 βαίνοντος τοῦ λόγου διδάξομεν, ὅταν αὐτοῦ τὴν
 στάσιν ἀκριβέστερον ἐπισκεπτώμεθα· τὰ νῦν δὲ
 ἀπόρηται τούτο γνώσκων, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπὶ τῆς
 αὐτῆς ἔστι δόξης τοῖς τὴν κίνησιν ἀνηρηκόσιν.
 49 μὴ μᾶλλον δὲ εἶναι κίνησιν ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἔλεξαν οἱ
 ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως· ὅσον μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς φαινο-
 μένοις εἶναι τι κίνησιν, ὅσον δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ
 λόγῳ μὴ ὑπάρχειν.

50 Τοιαύτη μὲν καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὸν τόπον στάσις· μεθ'
 ἦν εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι κίνησιν ἐπιχειροῦντες πρῶτας
 κομιοῦμεν ἐνστάσεις, ἐχόμενοι τῆς κατὰ τὴν
 κίνησιν ἐννοίας. ἔνιοι τοίνυν ὀριζόμενοι τὴν κίνησιν
 φασὶ "κίνησις ἔστι μετάβασις ἀπὸ τόπου εἰς
 51 τόπον." πρὸς οὓς λέγεται ὅτι τὴν μὲν εὐθικὴν
 κίνησιν ἀπέδοσαν, τουτέστι τὴν ἄνω ἢ κάτω ἢ
 πρόσω ἢ ὀπίσω ἢ εἰς δεξιὰ ἢ εἰς ἀριστερά, τὴν
 δὲ κυκλοφορητικὴν παρέλιπον, οἷον καθ' ἣν ὁ
 κεραμεικὸς τροχὸς στρέφεται καὶ ἡ σφαῖρα τοῖς
 κνώδαξι περιδινεῖται, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ οἱ ἄξονες
 καὶ τὰ τύμματα· ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν οὕτω κινου-
 μένων σωμάτων οὐ μετέρχεται ἀπὸ τόπου εἰς
 τόπον ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μένον τόπῳ κινεῖται.

52 ὅθεν τινὲς τὴν τοιαύτην φεύγοντες ἐνστάσιν δι-

and "anti-naturalists" because Nature is the first
 principle of motion, and it they abolished by declaring
 that nothing moves. For what moves must complete 47
 a certain interval, but every interval is incapable of
 being completed because it admits of division *ad*
infinitum, so that no moving thing will exist. And 48
 with these men Diodorus Cronos^a also is in agree-
 ment, unless it should be said that according to him
 something has moved but not a single thing is moving
 —as we shall explain later in the course of our argu-
 ment, when we come to examine his view more
 closely.^b For the present it is enough to notice this
 point, that he too is of the same opinion as those
 who have abolished motion. And that motion is "no 49
 more" existent than non-existent has been stated
 by the Sceptics; for motion is an existent thing if
 we are to judge by appearances, but judging by
 philosophical argument it is non-existent.

Such, then, is the dissension with regard to this 50
 subject; and after this, in our endeavour to show the
 non-existence of motion, we shall bring forward our
 first objections by concentrating on the conception
 of motion. Some, then, in defining motion assert
 that "Motion is transition from place to place." And 51
 to these it is replied that while they have described
 straight-line motion—that is, up or down, forwards or
 backwards, to right or to left,—they have passed over
 circular motion, such as that by which the potter's
 wheel revolves and the sphere spins round its pivots,
 and likewise axles and drums; for each of the bodies
 which move in this way does not pass on from place
 to place but moves whilst remaining in the same
 place.—Hence, by way of escaping this objection, 52

^a Of the later Megaric School, cf. P.H. ii. 245.

^b See §§ 85 ff., 120.

ορθοῦνται τὸν ἐκκείμενον ὄρον, καὶ φασιν ὅτι κίνησίς ἐστι μετάβασις ἀπὸ τόπου εἰς τόπον ἥτοι ὅλου τοῦ σώματος ἢ τῶν τοῦ ὅλου μερῶν. ὁ τε γὰρ ἐν τῷ περιπατεῖν κινούμενος κατὰ ὁλόγητα ἀπὸ τόπου εἰς τόπον μετέρχεται, ἢ τε τοῖς κνώδαξι περιδινουμένη σφαῖρα ὅλη μὲν οὐ μεταβαίνει τόπον ἐκ τόπου, κατὰ μέρη δὲ ἀμείβει τοὺς τόπους, καὶ στρεφομένης αὐτῆς τὸ μὲν ἄνω μέρος ἐπιλαμβάνει τὸν κάτω τόπον, τὸ δὲ κάτω μετέρχεται εἰς τὸν ἄνω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν τὸ ἐναλλάξ. διόπερ τὴν κίνησιν ῥητέον, φασί, μετάβασις εἶναι ἀπὸ τῶνος τόπου εἰς τόπον ἥτοι ὅλου τοῦ κινουμένου σώματος 53 ἢ τῶν τοῦ ὅλου μερῶν. θελήσαντες δὲ οὗτοι τὴν εἰρημένην φυγεῖν ἀπορίαν εἰς ἑτέραν ἐπέπεσαν. οὐ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ κινούμενον μεταβατικῶς μέτεισιν ἀπὸ τόπου εἰς τόπον ἥτοι κατὰ ὁλοσχέρειαν ἢ κατὰ μέρη, ἀλλ' ἔστι τινὰ τῶν μεταβατικῶς κινουμένων σωμάτων ἅπερ τισὶ μὲν μέρεσιν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μένοντα τόπῳ κινεῖται τισὶ δὲ οὐκ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μένοντα ἀλλ' ἄλλον καὶ ἄλλον ἐπιλαμβάνοντα, ὁποῖόν τι ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ἐπὶ τοῦ κυκλογραφοῦντος 54 καρκίνου καὶ τῆς ἀνοιγομένης καὶ κλειομένης θύρας. ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ καρκίνου φαίνεται ἢ τῷ κέντρῳ ἐνηρησμένη κεραία κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν στρεφομένη τόπον καὶ ἢ ἔξωθεν περιαιομένη τε καὶ κυκλογραφοῦσα ἀπ' ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλον μετιοῦσα τόπον· ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς κλειομένης ἢ ἀνοιγομένης θύρας ὁ μὲν κατὰ τοῦ ὀλμίσκου βεβηκῶς στροφεὺς τῷ αὐτῷ ἐνστρέφεται τόπῳ, τὸ δ' ἀντικείμενον αὐτῷ τῆς θύρας μέρος διαφέροντας ἐπέρχεται τόπους καὶ ὃν μὲν ἀπολείπει ὃν δὲ ἐπιλαμβάνει. 55 αὐτὰ μὲν οὖν αἱ κινήσεις ἐκπεπτώκασι τῆς

some rectify the definition put forward and say that "Motion is transition from place to place either of the whole body or of the parts of the whole." For he who moves while walking passes as a whole from place to place, but the sphere which spins round on its pivots does not as a whole pass from place to place but changes its place part by part, and as it turns round the upper part comes to occupy the lower place and the lower part passes into the upper place; and the remaining parts likewise alternate. Hence, they say, we must declare that motion is a transition from place to place either of the whole moving body or of the parts of the whole.—But these men in trying to escape 53 the difficulty mentioned have fallen into another. For not everything which moves by way of transition passes from place to place either in its wholeness or part by part, but there are some of the bodies moving by transition which move with some of their parts while remaining in the same place, but move with others while not remaining in the same place but occupying one place after another, as we can see in the case of compasses when they are describing a circle and of a door that is being opened or shut. For in the case 54 of the compasses the leg that rests on the centre is evidently turning in the same place while that which revolves outside it and describes the circle passes from one place to another; and in the case of the door which is being shut or opened the pivot which is set in the socket turns there in the same place but the part of the door opposite thereto passes on to different places and leaves one and occupies another. —These motions, then, are omitted from their de- 55

ἀποδόσεως, ἣν δέ τις καὶ ἄλλη παραδοξότερα κίνησις μεταβατική, καθ' ἣν τὸ κινούμενον οὔτε καθ' ὅλον οὔτε κατὰ μέρος νοεῖται ἐκβαίνειν τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπου· ἦτις καὶ αὐτὴ ἐκπέπτωκε τοῦ ὄρου, καθὼς αὐτόθεν συμφανές. καὶ ἔσται τὸ ἰδίωμα ταύτης προηλότερον ἐπὶ ὑποδείγματος 56 ποιησαμένων ἡμῶν τὴν δεῖξιν.¹ εἰ γὰρ τις οὐριωδρομούσης νηὸς ὑποκείντο ἐκ τῆς πρώρας εἰς πρύμναν ὄρθιον δοκίδα μεταφέρων καὶ ἰσοταχῶς κινούμενος τῇ νηί, ὥστε καθ' ὃν χρόνον αὐτὴ εἰς τοῦμπροσθεν ἀνύει πηχυαῖον διάστημα, κατὰ τὸν ἴσον καὶ τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ κινούμενον εἰς τοῦπίσω μεταβαίνειν πηχυαῖον διάστημα, πάντως κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ὑπόθεσιν γενήσεται μὲν μεταβατικὴ κίνησις, οὔτε δὲ ὅλον τὸ κινούμενον ἐκβήσεται τοῦ ἐν ᾧ 57 ἔστι τόπου οὔτε κατὰ μέρος· ὁ γὰρ ἐν τῇ νηί κινούμενος κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν κάθετον τοῦ τε ἀέρος καὶ τοῦ ὕδατος μένει διὰ τό, ὅποσον ἂν δοκῇ εἰς τοῦπίσω προκόπτειν, τοσοῦτον σύρσθαι εἰς τὸ ἔμπροσθεν. δύναται οὖν τι κινεῖσθαι μεταβατικῶς ὁ οὔτε καθ' ὁλόγητα οὔτε κατὰ μέρος ἐκβαίνειν τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπου.² ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἔοικεν εἶναι 58 τοιαῦτα, πάρεστι δὲ καὶ ἐτέρως ἀπορεῖν τοὺς οὕτω τὴν ἐπίνοιαν τῆς μεταβατικῆς κινήσεως ἀποδιδόντας. εἴαν γὰρ νοήσωμέν τι ἀμερὲς καὶ ἐλάχιστον σῶμα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ στρεφόμενον τόπῳ, τουτέστι κυκλοφορητικῶς, ἔσται μὲν τις μεταβατικὴ κίνησις, οὔτε δὲ κατὰ ὁλόγητα ἐκβήσεται τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπου (τὸ)³ κινούμενον οὔτε κατὰ μέρος, καὶ κατὰ

¹ δεῖξιν cj. Bekk., Mutsch.: δόξαν mss., Bekk.

² τοῦ . . . τόπου Mutsch.: τὸν . . . τόπον mss., Bekk.

³ <τὸ> add. Heintz.

scription; but there is also another more surprising kind of transitional motion, in which the moving object is conceived as not going out from the place wherein it is either as a whole or part by part; and this too is omitted from their definition, as is obvious at once. And the peculiar character of this motion will be more evident when we have explained it by an example. For if we should suppose that, when a 56 ship is running before the wind, a man is carrying an upright rod from the prow to the stern and moving at the same speed as the ship, so that in the time in which the latter completes the distance of a cubit in a forward direction, in an equal time the man who is moving in the ship passes over the distance of a cubit in a backward direction, then, in the case thus supposed there will certainly be transitional motion, but the moving object will not go out from the place wherein it is either wholly or in part; for the man who is 57 moving in the ship remains in the same perpendicular both of air and of water owing to the fact that he is borne just as far forward as he seems to proceed backward. It is, then, possible for a thing which does not quit the place wherein it is either wholly or in part to move transitionally.—Such then, as it seems, are cases of this sort; and there are other difficulties 58 which may be encountered by those who thus define the notion of transitional motion. For if we conceive an indivisible and minimal body revolving in the same place,—that is, with a circular motion,—a transitional motion will exist, but the moving body will not quit the place wherein it is either wholly or in part—not

δλότητα μὲν ἐπεὶ ὑπόκειται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ
κυκλοφορητικῶς στρεφόμενον, κατὰ μέρος δὲ ἐπεὶ
59 ἀμερῆς ἔστιν. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος κἂν συνθώμέν
τινα εὐθείαν γραμμὴν ἐξ ἀμερῶν σωμάτων στοιχη-
δὸν τεταγμένων, καὶ ταύτην νοήσωμεν στρεφόμε-
νην ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ, ὥσπερ τοὺς ἄξονας· πάλιν
γὰρ ἔσται μὲν μεταβατικὴ κίνησις, οὔτε δὲ ὄλη
ἢ¹ εὐθεία ἐκβήσεται τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπου, κυκλο-
φορητικὴν γὰρ μόνον ἐποιεῖτο τὴν κίνησιν, οὔτε
κατὰ μέρη, τῶν γὰρ ἀμερῶν σωμάτων οὐκ ἔστι μέρη.
60 Ἄλλὰ ταύτας μὲν τὰς ἐνοστάσεις διακρούσονται
οἱ μὴ συναρεσκόμενοι τῷ [μῆ] εἶναι τινα ἀμερῆ,
κίνησις τε μέχρις ἐπινοίας προκόπτει τὴν τοιαύτην
κίνησιν, δεῖν δὲ αὐτὴν ἐπὶ ὑποστατῶν ἐξετάζεσθαι
61 σωμάτων. ὥσθ' οὗτοι μὲν οὕτως ὑπαντήσονται·
οἱ δ' ἀξιούντες ἀμερῆ εἶναι σώματα καὶ τὴν
κατάληξιν τῆς τῶν σωμάτων τομῆς εἰς ἐλάχιστον
γίνεσθαι οὐδὲν ἰσχύσουσι λέγειν πρὸς τὰς τοιοῦτο-
τρόπους ἀπορίας. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν μετα-
σῶμεν τούτων, εὔρεθήσεται ἰσοσθενῆς ὁ τε κατα-
σκευάζων τὸ μῆ εἶναι κίνησιν λόγος καὶ ὁ δεικνύς
62 ταύτην ὑπάρχειν. τῷ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι κίνησιν
συναγορεύει ἢ ἐνάργεια, περὶ δὲ ταύτης ἔστι
ζήτησις, παρόσον οἱ μὲν αἰσθήσει λαμβάνεσθαι
φασὶ τὴν κίνησιν, οἱ δὲ αἰσθήσει μὲν οὐδαμῶς, δι'
63 αἰσθήσεως δὲ τῇ διανοίᾳ. καὶ οἱ μὲν αἰσθητὸν
εἶναι λέγοντες πρᾶγμα τὴν κίνησιν πιστοῦνται τὸ
τοιούτο ἐκ τοῦ μῆ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐγγίνεσθαι πάθος τῆ
αἰσθήσει, ὅλον τῆ ὄψει, ἀπὸ τε τοῦ κινουμένου
σώματος, ὅτε κινεῖται, καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡρεμοῦντος,
ὅτε ἡρεμεῖ, ἀλλὰ διάφορον μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀκινήτι-

¹ ὄλη ἢ Heintz: ἢ ὄλη mss., Bekk.

wholly, since it is assumed to be revolving with
circular motion in the same spot, nor in part, since it
is without parts. And the same argument applies, 59
if we should construct a straight line out of in-
divisible bodies placed in a row, and conceive this as
revolving in the same place, as do axles; for here
again there will be transitional motion but the
straight line will not quit the place wherein it is
either as a whole (for the motion it has is circular
only) or in part (for in indivisible bodies there are
no parts).

But those who do not admit the existence of any 60
indivisibles will evade these objections, and they will
say that it is only in conception that this sort of
motion proceeds, and it must be examined in the case
of existing bodies. Consequently, these men will 61
answer thus; but those who maintain that indivisible
bodies exist, and that at the minimal point there is a
termination to the division of bodies, will not be able
to say anything in reply to criticisms of this kind.
Nevertheless, even if we refrain from pursuing these,
the argument which establishes the non-existence of
motion and that which proves its existence will be
found to be equipollent. For the evidence of sense 62
advocates the existence of motion, although about
this there is disputation, inasmuch as some assert that
motion is perceived by sense, but others that it is not
perceived at all by sense but by the intellect through
sensation. And those who declare that motion is an 63
object of sense support this view by the fact that the
same affection is not produced in the sense—in sight,
for example—by a moving object when it moves and
by a stationary object when it remains stationary,
but the motionless object produces one sort of affec-

ζοντος ἄλλοιον δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ κινουμένου, ὥστε κατὰ
 64 τοῦτο αἰσθήσει ληπτὴν εἶναι τὴν κίνησιν. οἱ δὲ
 ἀξιοῦντες μὴ αἰσθήσει ταύτην λαμβάνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ
 δι' αἰσθήσεως μὲν διανοία δέ, φασὶν ὅτι πᾶσα
 κίνησις κατὰ συμμημονέουσιν γίνεται· ἀναφέροντες
 γὰρ ὡς τότε τὸ σῶμα πάλαι μὲν ἐν τῷδε τῷ τόπῳ
 ἐτύγγανε νῦν δὲ ἔστιν ἐν τῷδε, ἔννοιαν λαμβάνομεν
 τῆς κινήσεως καὶ τοῦ κεκινήσθαι. αὐτὸ δὲ τό γε
 μνημονεύειν οὐκ ἀλόγου τινὸς αἰσθήσεως, λογικῆς
 δὲ δυνάμεώς ἐστιν ἔργον. οὐκ ἄρα τῇ αἰσθήσει,
 διανοία δὲ λαμβάνεσθαι συμβέβηκε τὴν κίνησιν.
 65 ἄλλως τε πᾶσα κίνησις κατὰ ἀπόλειψιν καὶ ἐπί-
 ληψιν τόπου νοεῖται. ἢ δὲ αἰσθησις οὔτε τόπον
 δύναται λαμβάνειν, οὐθεὶς γὰρ τόπος αἰσθητός
 ἐστίν, οὔτε ἐπίληψιν καὶ ἀπόλειψιν· μνημονικῶς
 γὰρ ταῦτα θεωρεῖται, ἢ δὲ αἰσθησις ἄλογος οὐσα
 ἐστὶν ἀμνήμων. οὐκ ἄρα αἰσθητόν τι ἐστὶν ἢ
 κίνησις.
 66 Πλὴν εἴαν τε αἰσθήσει προηγουμένως λαμβάνηται
 εἴαν τε διανοία, ἀδιάφορον· ἐκείνο γὰρ συμφανές
 ἐστίν, ὅτι συνάδειν δοκεῖ τῷ εἶναι κίνησιν ἢ
 ἐνάργεια. παρ' ἣν αἰτίαν καὶ οἱ δογματικοὶ
 φιλόσοφοι οὐκ ἄλλοθεν εἰώθασι δυσωπεῦν τοὺς
 67 ἀπορητικούς ἢ ἀπὸ ταύτης. πῶς γάρ, φασίν,
 εἴπερ μὴ ἔστι κίνησις, ἥλιος ἀπὸ ἀνατολῆς μέχρι
 δύσεως τοὺς ἰδίους σταδιεῖν δρόμους; ἢ πῶς
 ὥρων γίνονται μεταβολαί, ἔαρος καὶ θέρου καὶ
 μετοπώρου καὶ χειμῶνος; παρὰ γὰρ τὰς τοῦ
 ἡλίου κινήσεις συνεγγισμούς τε καὶ ἀποστάσεις
 68 αἰσθάνονται. πῶς δὲ καὶ νῆες ἀναχθεῖσαι
 ἐκ λιμένων εἰς ἑτέρουσιν κατάγονται λιμένας; τίνα
 δὲ τρόπον ὁ ἀναιρῶν τὴν κίνησιν ἀπορητικός

tion and the moving object a different sort, so that in
 this way motion is perceptible by sense. But those 64
 who maintain that it is not perceived by sense, but
 by the intellect through sensation, assert that every
 motion comes about through concurrent recollection;
 for by recalling that this particular body was formerly
 in that particular place but now is in this we acquire
 the conception of motion and of being moved. But
 recollection itself is the work not of any irrational
 sense but of the reasoning faculty. It results, there-
 fore, that motion is not perceived by sense but by
 intellect. And further, all motion is conceived as 65
 involving departure from and occupation of place;
 but sense cannot perceive either place (for no place
 is sensible), or occupation and departure (for these
 things are observed through memory, but sense being
 irrational is without memory). Therefore motion is
 not a sensible object.

However, it is a matter of indifference whether 66
 motion is apprehended chiefly by sense or by intel-
 lect; for it is plain that the evidence of facts seems
 to bear out the view that motion exists. And for
 this reason the Dogmatic philosophers are in the
 habit of using no other means than this to put the
 Doubters to shame. For, say they, if motion does 67
 not exist how does the sun run its own special course
 from its rising to its setting? * Or how do the
 changes of the seasons—spring, summer, autumn and
 winter—take place? For it is owing to the sun's
 motions, its advances and recessions, that these occur.
 And how do ships, after putting out to sea from har- 68
 bours, put in to land in other harbours? And how is
 it that the Doubter who abolishes motion goes forth

* With §§ 67-68 cf. P.H. iii. 66.

ἔωθεν προελθὼν τῆς οἰκίας καί τινα τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον πραγματευσάμενος πάλιν ὑποστρέφει; πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα ἀναντίρρητά ἐστι τῆς κινήσεως τεκμήρια. ὅθεν καὶ τῶν παλαιῶν τις κυνικῶν τοὺς κατὰ τῆς κινήσεως ἐρωτώμενος λόγους ἀπεκρίνατο μὲν οὐδὲ ἔν, ἀναστὰς δὲ περιπάτει, δι' αὐτῆς τῆς ἐναργείας 69 τὴν ἀνοιαν¹ τοῦ σοφιστοῦ ὀνειδίζων. καὶ ἄλλα δὲ παμπληθῆ τοιαῦτ' εἰώθασιν οἱ ἐξ ἐναντίας λέγειν ὑπὲρ τοῦ κίνησιν εἶναι. οἷς καὶ ἡμεῖς ὡς ἀποχρώσει συνηγορίᾳ πρὸς κατασκευὴν τοῦδε τοῦ μέρους ἀρκεσθέντες εἰς τούναντιον ἐπιχειρήσομεν. ἐάν γὰρ ἴσον δειχθῆ κατὰ τε πίστιν καὶ ἀπιστίαν τῷ εἶναι κίνησιν τὸ μὴ εἶναι κίνησιν, πάντως ἀκολουθήσει τὸ μηθετέρῳ μὲν συναίνειν, ἐπέχειν δὲ περὶ ἀμφοτέρων.

70 Εἴπερ οὖν κινεῖται τι πρώτως, οἷον στοιχείον, ἥτοι ὑφ' αὐτοῦ κινεῖται ἢ ὑπ' ἄλλου· οὔτε δὲ ὑφ' αὐτοῦ, ὡς δείξομεν, οὔθ' ὑπ' ἄλλου, καθὼς παραμυθησόμεθα· οὐκ ἄρα κινεῖται. ἀντίκα γὰρ εἰ πᾶν τὸ κινούμενον ὑπὸ ἑτέρου κινεῖται, ἦτοι συνακολουθοῦντος αὐτῷ τοῦ κινούντος κινεῖται ἢ μὴ συνακολουθοῦντος· οὔτε δὲ συνακολουθοῦντος οὔτε ἀφισταμένου κινεῖται, ὡς δείξομεν· οὐκ ἄρα 71 τὸ κινούμενον ὑπ' ἄλλου κινεῖται. εἰ γὰρ τὸ κινούμενον συνακολουθοῦντος αὐτῷ τοῦ κινούντος κινεῖται, δεήσει τῷ ὀπωιδηποτοῦν κινουμένῳ ἐνὶ πάντα συνακολουθεῖν. εἰ γὰρ λόγου χάριν ἕκαστον τῶν εἴκοσι τεσσάρων στοιχείων ὑπὸ ἑτέρου κινεῖται, ἀναγκαῖον τῷ ἄλφα κινουμένῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ βῆτα

¹ ἀνοιαν N, Mutsch. : διάνοιαν cet., Bekk.

^a Diogenes, cf. P.H. ii. 244.

^b With §§ 70-76 cf. P.H. iii. 67.

from his house in the morning and, after transacting some ordinary business, returns to it again? For all these are irrefutable signs of motion. Hence also one of the ancient Cynics,^a when the arguments against motion were propounded to him, made no reply at all but stood up and walked about, thus flouting the folly of the sophist by the evidence of actual fact. And 69 there are hosts of similar arguments which those of the opposite side are wont to adduce in support of the existence of motion. And as we, too, are content with these as affording sufficient support for the establishment of this view, we shall now turn to argue for the opposite view. For if it be shown that the non-existence of motion is equal to the existence of motion in respect of probability and improbability, there will certainly follow assent to neither but suspension of judgement regarding both.

If, then, anything has a primary motion (an ele- 70 ment, for instance), it is moved either by itself or by another; but (it is moved) neither by itself, as we shall show, nor by another, as we shall explain; therefore it is not moved.^b Thus, for example, if everything which is moved is moved by another it is moved either while that which moves it accompanies it or while it does not accompany it; but, as we shall show, it is not moved either while it accompanies or while it recedes from it; therefore, what is moved is not moved by another. For if what is moved is moved 71 while its mover accompanies it, all things will have to accompany that one thing, whatsoever it be, which is being moved. Thus if, for the sake of argument, each one of the twenty-four letters is moved by another, it is necessary that all the rest should accompany Alpha when it is moved by Beta, since, just as

συνακολουθεῖν τὰ λοιπά, ἐπεὶπερ ὡς ἔπεται τῷ
 ἄλφα τὸ βῆτα, κινοῦν τὸ ἄλφα, οὕτω καὶ τῷ βῆτα
 ἀκολουθήσει τὸ γάμμα, κωητικὸν ὄν αὐτοῦ, καὶ τῷ
 72 γάμμα τὸ δέλτα, καὶ μέχρι τοῦ ω. τοῖνυν καὶ ἐπὶ
 τῶν κατὰ τὸν κόσμον πραγμάτων, εἰ ἕκαστον τῶν
 κινουμένων ἀκολουθοῦν ἔχειν ὀφείλει τὸ κινοῦν,
 ἐνὶ κινουμένῳ πάντα συνακολουθήσει. ἄτοπον
 δέ γε ἐνὸς κινουμένου πάντα λέγειν κινεῖσθαι.
 οὐκ ἄρα ἔπεται τῷ κινουμένῳ τὸ κινοῦν.
 73 εἰ δὲ χωρίζεται αὐτοῦ, καθάπερ ἡ χεὶρ ἀφ-
 ἰσταται τῆς ἀποπαλλομένης σφαίρας, ἀνάγκη
 παθὸν πως καὶ διατεθὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ κινουόντος τὸ
 κινούμενον ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ φορᾶν. ἐπεὶ
 οὖν τὸ πάσχον οὐκ ἄλλως πέφυκε πάσχειν εἰ μὴ
 κατὰ πρόσθεσιν ἢ ἀφαίρεσιν ἢ μεταβολήν, δεήσει
 καὶ τὸ κινούμενον τι τούτων παθὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ κινουόν-
 τος κινεῖσθαι, ὡς ἂν μηδὲν αὐτῶν πάθη χωρι-
 74 σθέντος τοῦ κινουόντος στήσεται. εἰδείξαμεν δέ γε
 ἄπορον τὸν περὶ τῆς ἀφαιρέσεως καὶ προσθέσεως
 καὶ μεταβολῆς λόγον, ὥστε οὐδ' ἀφισταμένου τοῦ
 75 κινουόντος κινήσεται τὸ κινούμενον. καὶ ἄλλως,
 εἰ παθὸν κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν ἢ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν ἢ κατὰ
 μεταβολήν κινεῖται τὸ κινούμενον, αἱ ἄτομοι οὐ
 κινήθησονται διὰ τὸ μήτε πρόσθεσιν μήτε ἀφαίρεσιν
 μήτε μεταβολήν ἐπιδέχεσθαι. τοῖνυν οὐδὲ ὑπὸ
 ἑτέρου κινεῖται τὸ κινούμενον. εἰ γὰρ ἵνα ὑπὸ
 ἑτέρου κινήθῃ, δεῖ συνακολουθοῦντος αὐτῷ ἐκείνου
 κινεῖσθαι ἢ μὴ συνακολουθοῦντος, δέδεικται δὲ
 ἐκάτερον ἀδύνατον, λεκτέον μὴ ὑπὸ ἑτέρου κινεῖσθαι.
 76 καὶ μὴν εἰ πᾶν τὸ κινούμενον ὑπ' ἄλλου τινός

Beta in moving Alpha follows Alpha, so also Gamma
 will accompany Beta as being its mover, and Delta
 Gamma and so on up to Omega. So, too, with objects 72
 in the Universe, if each moving object must have its
 mover following it, all things will follow after a single
 moving object. But it is absurd to say that if one
 thing moves all things move; therefore the mover
 does not follow the thing moved.—And if it is 73
 separated from it, as the hand is parted from the ball
 when it is being flung away, the movements away
 from it must necessarily cause the thing moved to
 be somehow affected and disposed by that which
 moves it. Since, then, what is affected cannot be
 affected otherwise than by way of addition or of sub-
 traction or of change, what is moved will have to
 undergo one of these modes of affection at the hands
 of its mover when being moved, since, if it is not
 affected in any of these ways, it will stand still when
 its mover is separated from it. But we have shown ^a 74
 that the account given of subtraction and addition
 and change is open to doubt, so that neither when
 the mover is parted from it will what is moved be
 in motion.—And besides, if what is moved moves 75
 through being affected either by way of subtraction
 or of addition or of change, the atoms will not move
 because they do not admit of addition or subtraction
 or change. Neither, then, is what moves moved by
 another. For if, in order that it should be moved
 by another, it must be moved either while that
 other follows with it or while it does not so follow,
 and each of these alternatives has been proved to
 be impossible, we must declare that it is not moved
 by another.—Moreover, if everything which moves 76

^a Cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 277 ff.

κινείται, ἤτοι τὸ κινεῖται αὐτὸ κινεῖται ἢ ἀκινήτεϊ.
καὶ ἀκινήτιζεν μὲν ἀδύνατον· τὸ γὰρ κινεῖται ἐν-
εργεῖ τι, τὸ δὲ ἐνεργοῦν κινεῖται, τὸ ἄρα κινεῖται
κινεῖται. εἰ δὲ κινεῖται, ἐπεὶ πᾶν τὸ κινούμενον
ὑπ' ἄλλου τινὸς κινεῖται, δεήσει καὶ αὐτὸ¹ κινού-
μενον ὑπὸ τρίτου τινὸς κινεῖσθαι, καὶ τὸ τρίτον
ὑπὸ τοῦ τετάρτου, καὶ τὸ τέταρτον ὑπὸ τοῦ πέμ-
πτου, καὶ οὕτως εἰς ἄπειρον, ὥστε ἀναρχον γίνε-
σθαι τὴν κίνησιν. τοῦτο δὲ ἦν ἀποπον· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ
κινούμενον ὑπ' ἄλλου κινεῖται.

77 Καὶ μὴ οὐδ' αὐτὸ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ κινήσεται. εἰ
γὰρ αὐτοκίνητόν ἐστιν, ἤτοι πάντῃ κινήτην ἔχει
τὴν φύσιν ἢ εἰς τινα διάστασιν, ὅλον ἐπὶ τῶν
πρώτων καὶ στοιχειωδῶν σωμάτων, ἐπεὶ καὶ πρὸς
τοὺς φυσικούς ἐστιν ὁ λόγος. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν πάντῃ
78 κινήτην ἔχει τὴν φύσιν, οὐ κινήσεται· οὔτε γὰρ
ἄνω ἐνεχθήσεται διὰ τὸ καὶ εἰς τὸ κάτω κινήτην
ἔχει τὴν φύσιν, οὔτε κάτω διὰ τὸ καὶ εἰς τὸ ἄνω,
οὔτε πρὸσω διὰ τὸ καὶ εἰς τὸ ὀπίσω, οὔτ' ὀπίσω
διὰ τὸ καὶ εἰς τοῦμπροσθεν. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λεπτο-
79 μένων δυοῖν διαστάσεων ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος. εἰ δὲ εἰς
τινα διάστασιν κινήτην ἔχει τὴν φύσιν, εἰ μὲν εἰς
τὴν ἄνω ὡσπερ τὸ πῦρ καὶ ὁ ἀήρ, πάντ' ἄνω
κινήσεται, εἰ δὲ εἰς τὴν κάτω μόνον ὡς γῆ καὶ
ὔδωρ, πάντα εἰς τὸ κάτω. εἰ δὲ τινα μὲν εἰς τὴν
ἄνω διάστασιν κινήτην ἔχει τὴν φύσιν τινὰ δὲ εἰς
τὴν κάτω, οὐ γενήσεται ἐκ κινουμένων σωμάτων
80 σύγκριμα. εἴτε γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου νοοῖτο κινού-
μενα τὰ στοιχειώδη σώματα ὡς ἐπὶ τὰ πέρατα,

¹ αὐτὸ Heintz; τὸ mss., Bekk. (τὸ κινεῖται cj. Papp.).

is moved by some other thing, that which moves it
either is in motion itself or is motionless. But it is
impossible for it to be motionless; for what causes
motion is active, and what is active is in motion,
therefore what causes motion is in motion. And if
it is in motion, since everything in motion is moved
by something else, it too, being in motion, will have
to be moved by some third thing, and the third by
a fourth, and the fourth by a fifth, and so on *ad*
infinitum; so that motion comes to have no beginning.
But this is absurd; therefore what is in motion is
not moved by another.

Nor yet will a thing be moved by itself. For if it
is self-moved it is of a nature which is movable
either in all directions or in some one direction, as in
the case of the primary and elemental bodies, since
our argument is against the Physicists. But if it has
a nature which is movable in all directions, it will not
move; for it will not be borne upwards since it is also
78 of a nature which is movable downwards, nor down-
wards as being movable upwards, nor forwards as
movable backwards, nor backwards as movable for-
wards. And the same argument applies to the two
other directions.^a And if it possesses a nature capable
79 of being moved in some one direction, if this be
upwards (like fire and air), all things will move up-
wards, while if it be downwards only (like earth and
water) all things will move downwards. And if it is
of a nature which is partly movable in the upward
direction and partly in the downward, no combina-
tion will take place between the moving bodies; for
80 if the elemental bodies are conceived as moving from
the centre towards the limits, the whole will be dis-

^a *i.e.* to the right and to the left.

λυθήσεται τὸ πᾶν· ἐκάτερον γὰρ ἀπὸ θατέρου χωρισθὲν ὡς ἐπὶ τὴν ἴδιον δραμεῖται κίνησι, τὸ μὲν ἀνωφερὲς ἐπὶ τὴν ἄνω, τὸ δὲ κατωφερὲς ἐπὶ τὴν κάτω. εἴτ' ἀπὸ τῶν περάτων ὑποκέοιτο ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον συνωθούμενα, πάντως ἢ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν κάθετον ἐνεχθήσεται ἢ οὐ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν. καὶ εἰ μὲν κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν φέροιτο, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ἀντιπυσεῖται ἀλλήλοις, καὶ οὕτως ἢ ἰσοκρατοῦντα στησεται μηθετέρου νικῶντος, μήτε τοῦ κάτω βιαζομένου μήτε τοῦ ἄνω (ἄτοπον δὲ λέγειν στάσι 81 γίνεσθαι ἐν τοῖς φύσει κινουμένοις), ἢ τούναντίον ἀνισοκρατοῦντα εἰς ἓνα μόνον ἐνεχθήσεται τόπον, ἥτοι τὸν ἄνω ἐπικρατησάντων τῶν ἀνωφερῶν, ἢ εἰς τὸν κάτω ὑπερτερούντων τῶν κατωφερῶν. εἰ δὲ μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν κάθετον φέροιτο, οὐ συμβάλλει ἀλλήλοις, μὴ συμβάλλοντα δὲ οὐδὲ συγκρίματος ἔσται τινὸς ἀποτελεσματικά. τοῦτο δὲ ἄτοπον. τοίνυν οὐδὲ αὐτοκίνητόν ἐστι τὸ κινούμενον.

83 πάλιν εἰ αὐτοκίνητόν ἐστι τὸ κινούμενον, ἐπεὶ πᾶν τὸ κινοῦν ἥτοι προωθοῦν κινεῖ ἢ ἐπισπώμενον ἢ ἀνοχλοῦν καὶ θλίβον, δέησει καὶ τὸ αὐτοκίνητον ἑαυτοῦ κινητικὸν ὃν ἥτοι προωστικῶς κινεῖν ἢ ἐπι- 84 σπαστικῶς ἢ ἀνοχλητικῶς καὶ θλιπτικῶς. εἴτε δὲ προωστικῶς κινεῖ, ἔσται ἐξόπισθεν ἑαυτοῦ (τὸ γὰρ προωθοῦν ἐξόπισθὲν ἐστι τοῦ προωθουμένου), εἴτε ἐπισπαστικῶς, ἔσται ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ, εἴτε ἀνοχλητικῶς καὶ θλιπτικῶς, ὑποκάτωθεν αὐτοῦ. ἀδύνατον δὲ γε νοεῖν τι¹ αὐτὸ ἥτοι ὀπισθεν ἑαυτοῦ ἢ ἔμπροσθεν ἢ ὑποκάτω· οὐκ ἄρα αὐτοκίνητόν ἐστι τὸ

¹ τ. Heintz: τὸ mss., Bekk.

solved; for each being separated from each will run on its own special course, the ascending upwards and the descending downwards. And if they are supposed to be driven together towards the centre from the limits, they will certainly be transported either along the same or not along the same vertical line. And if they are borne along the same line, they will necessarily collide with one another, and thus they will either be of equal force and come to rest, neither side being victorious, and neither the upward nor the downward body yielding to force (though it is absurd to say that rest occurs in things which are by nature in motion), or if, on the contrary, they are of unequal 82 force they will be borne into one place only, either into that above if the ascending bodies have gained the mastery, or into that below if the descending bodies are the more powerful. But if they do not move along the same vertical line, they do not meet with one another, and not meeting they will not be capable of effecting any combination. But this is absurd. So then, that which is in motion is not self-moved.—Again, if what is moved is self-moved,⁶ since 83 everything which causes motion does so either by propelling or by dragging or by heaving up and pressing down, the self-moved too, being the cause of its own motion will have to cause motion either by propelling or by dragging or by heaving up and pressing down. But if it moves by propelling it will 84 be behind itself (for what propels is behind what is propelled), and if by dragging it will be in front of itself, and if by heaving and pressing, beneath itself. But it is impossible to conceive of a thing being either behind or before or beneath itself; therefore

⁶ With §§ 83-84 cf. P.H. iii. 68-69.

κινούμενον. εἰ δὲ μήτε ὑπ' ἄλλου κινεῖται τὸ κινούμενον μήτε ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστι, ῥητέον μὴ κινεῖσθαι τὸ κινούμενον.

- 85 Κομίζεται δὲ καὶ ἄλλη τις ἐμβριθῆς ὑπόμνησις εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι κίνησιν ὑπὸ Διοδώρου τοῦ Κρόνου, δι' ἧς παρίστησιν ὅτι κινεῖται μὲν οὐδὲ ἔν, κελί-
νεται δέ. καὶ μὴ κινεῖσθαι μὲν, τοῦτο ἀκόλουθόν
86 ἔστι ταῖς κατ' αὐτὸν τῶν ἀμερῶν ὑποθέσεσιν. τὸ γὰρ ἀμερὲς σῶμα ὀφείλει ἐν ἀμερεῖ τόπῳ περι-
έχεσθαι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μήτε ἐν αὐτῷ κινεῖσθαι (ἐκπεπλήρωκε γὰρ αὐτόν, δεῖ δὲ τόπον ἔχειν
μεῖζονα τὸ κινησόμενον) μήτε ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν· οὕτω
γὰρ ἔστιν ἐν ἐκείνῳ, ἵνα καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ κινήθῃ.
ὥστε οὐδὲ κινεῖται. κελίηται δὲ κατὰ λόγον· τὸ
γὰρ πρότερον ἐν τῷδε τῷ τόπῳ θεωρούμενον,
τοῦτο ἐν ἑτέρῳ νῦν θεωρεῖται τόπῳ· ὅπερ οὐκ
ἂν ἐγεγόνει μὴ κινήθέντος αὐτοῦ. οὗτος μὲν οὖν
ὁ ἀνὴρ ἐπαρήγειν θελήσας τῷ οἰκείῳ δόγματι
ἄτοπὸν τι προσήκατο· πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἄτοπον τὸ
μηδενὸς κινουμένου λέγειν τι κελίησθαι; οἱ δὲ
ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως ἐπ' ἴσης καὶ περὶ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι
καὶ περὶ τοῦ κελίησθαι ἀποροῦντες οὐδὲν ἄτοπον
προσδέξονται, καθάπερ Διδώρος προσήκατο.
87 πλὴν οὗτος γε τὸν περιφορητικὸν συνερωτᾷ λόγον
εἰς τὸ μὴ κινεῖσθαι τι, λέγων "εἰ κινεῖται τι, ἦτοι
ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπῳ κινεῖται, ἢ ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν· οὔτε δὲ
ἐν ᾧ ἔστι, μένει γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ, οὔτε ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν,
88 οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῷ· οὐκ ἄρα κινεῖται τι." καὶ
ὁ μὲν λόγος τοιοῦτος, ἢ δὲ παραμυθία τῶν λημ-
μάτων αὐτοῦ προφανής. δυοῖν γὰρ ὄντων τόπων,

what is moved is not self-moved. But if what is moved is moved neither by another nor by itself, and besides these there is no other alternative, one must declare that what is moved is not in motion.

And another weighty argument for the non-⁸⁵ existence of motion is adduced by Diodorus Cronos,^a by means of which he establishes that not a single thing *is* in motion, but *has been* in motion. And the fact that nothing is in motion follows from his assumptions of indivisibles. For the indivisible body must⁸⁶ be contained in an indivisible place and therefore must not move either in it (for it fills it up, but a thing which is to move must have a larger place) or in the place in which it is not; for as yet it is not in this place so as to be moved therein; consequently it *is* not in motion. But, according to reason, it *has been* in motion; for that which was formerly observed in this place is now observed in another place, which would not have occurred if it had not been moved. Thus this man, in trying to support his own dogma, has admitted what is an absurdity; for how is it other than absurd to say that while nothing moves something has moved? But the Sceptics, being equally in doubt about being in motion and having been in motion, will not assent to any absurdity, such as Diodorus has admitted.—This man, however, pro-⁸⁷ pounds the familiar argument^b to show that nothing moves, when he says—"If a thing moves, it moves either in the place where it is or in that where it is not; but it moves neither in the place where it is (for it remains therein) nor in that where it is not (for it does not exist therein); therefore nothing moves." Such then is his argument, and the method of proving⁸⁸ its premisses is obvious. For as there are two

^a Cf. § 48.

^b Cf. P.H. ii. 242, 245; iii. 71.

ἐνός μὲν τοῦ ἐν ᾧ τι ἔστιν, δευτέρου δὲ τοῦ ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν, καὶ τρίτου παρὰ τούτους μηδ' ἐπινοεῖσθαι δυναμένου, δεῖ τὸ κινούμενον, εἰ ὄντως κινεῖται, ἐν τῷ ἐτέρῳ τούτων κινεῖσθαι· ἐν γὰρ τῷ ἀν-
 89 ἐπινοήτῳ οὐκ ἂν κινώτο. ἐν ᾧ μὲν οὖν ἔστι τόπων οὐ κινεῖται· ἐκπεπλήρωκε γὰρ αὐτόν· καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῷ, μένει· μένον δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ οὐ κινεῖται. ἐν ᾧ δὲ μὴ ἔστι, πάλιν ἀδύνατον αὐτὸ κινεῖσθαι· ὅπου γὰρ τι μὴ ἔστιν, ἐκεῖ οὔτε δρᾶσαι τι οὔτε παθεῖν δύναται, κατὰ ταῦτά δὲ οὐδὲ κινεῖσθαι, καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἂν τις λέγοι τὸν ἐν Ῥόδῳ ὄντα ἐν Ἀθήναις κινεῖσθαι, οὕτως οὐδὲ κοινῶς πᾶν σῶμα ἐρεῖ ἐν ἐκείνῳ κινεῖσθαι τῷ τόπῳ ἔνθα
 90 μὴ ἔστιν. ὅθεν εἰ δύο εἰσὶ τόποι, ὃ τε ἐν ᾧ ἔστι καὶ ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστι, δέδεικται δ' ἐν μηδετέρῳ τούτων δυναμένου κινεῖσθαι τὸ κινούμενον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ κινούμενον.

Τοιαύτη μὲν καὶ ἡ τοῦ λόγου παραμυθία, ποικίλως δὲ καὶ ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἀντείρηται, ὧν τὰς
 91 ἐνστάσεις παρακειμένως ἐκθησόμεθα. καὶ δὴ ἔνιοι μὲν ἀδύνατον εἶναι φασὶ τῶν συντελεστικῶν ἀληθῶν ὄντων ψευδῆ εἶναι τὰ παρατακτικὰ τούτων, ἀλλ' ἀληθῆ καθεστάναι, καὶ ψευδῶν ὄντων ἀναλόγως ψευδῆ. οὐ γὰρ ἔστι τι πέρασ, ἔστι κάκεινο, καὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος οὐκ ἂν εἴη τι πέρασ. εἰ δὲ πέρασ ὑπήρχε τοῦ παρατακτικοῦ τὸ συντελεστικόν, ἀνάγκη ἄρα τοῦ συντελεστικοῦ ὄντος, ὃ δὴ πέρασ ἐστίν, εἶναι καὶ τὸ παρατακτικόν οὐ τοῦτο πέρασ ἐστίν.
 92 καὶ ὡς οὐδέν ἐστι τὸ γεγενῆσθαι συντελεστικόν

* This (as Heintz points out) must be the meaning, though not clearly expressed in the Greek. (The insertion of τούτων ἐκεῖνα after ψ. ὄντων would help.)

places,—one being that wherein a thing is and the second that wherein it is not, and it being impossible to conceive a third place in addition to these two,—the thing in motion, if it really moves, must move in one or other of these places; for it will not move in an inconceivable place. Now it does not move in the place wherein it is, for it fills it up; and, so long as it exists therein, it remains; and remaining therein it does not move. And it is likewise impossible for it 89 to move in the place wherein it is not; for where a thing does not exist, there it cannot either effect anything or be affected, and in the same way it cannot move; and just as no one could say that he who is in Rhodes is moving in Athens, so too in general one will not say of any body that it moves in that place where it does not exist. Hence, if there are two 90 places, that wherein it exists and that wherein it exists not, and it has been proved that the moving object cannot move in either of them, the moving object will not exist.

Such, then, is the method of proving his argument; but it is opposed by many in various ways, and we shall in the next place expound their objections. Thus some assert that if preterites are true it is 91 impossible that their presents should be false, and they must be true; and similarly the preterites must be false when the presents are false.^a For that thing whereof a limit exists, exists also itself, and of a thing non-existent no limit will exist. And if the preterite is a limit of the present, it is therefore necessary that when the preterite, which is a limit, exists the present also, whereof it is the limit, should exist. And just 92 as the preterite "to have become" is nothing if the

μη ὄντος ἀληθοῦς τοῦ γίνεσθαι παρατατικοῦ, καὶ ὄν τὸν τρόπον οὐδέν ἐστι τὸ ἐφθάρθαι συντελεστικὸν μη προϋπάρξαντος τοῦ φθείρεσθαι παρατατικοῦ, ὡδε ἀδύνατόν ἐστι, μη ὄντος ἀληθοῦς τοῦ κινεῖσθαι παρατατικοῦ, ἀληθὲς εἶναι τὸ κενωῆσθαι συντελεστικόν.

93 "Ἄλλοι δέ φασιν δύνασθαι τι ἐν ᾧ περιέχεται τόπῳ κινεῖσθαι· αἱ γὰρ περὶ τοῖς κνώδαξιν εἰλούμεναι σφαῖραι καὶ οἱ περιδινούμενοι ἄξονες καὶ ἥδη τὰ τύμπανα καὶ οἱ κεραμευτικοὶ τροχοὶ καὶ ἄλλα παμπληθῆ τούτοις εὐκότα σώματα κινεῖται μὲν, ἐν ᾧ δὲ ἔστι τόπῳ κινεῖται, ὥστε ψεῦδος εἶναι ἐν τι τοῦ λόγου λῆμμα, τὸ μὴ κινεῖσθαι τι ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπῳ. ἄλλοι δὲ παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν τῆς κινήσεως ἠρωτησθαι φασὶ τὸν λόγον. τὸ γὰρ κινούμενον νοεῖται σὺν τόπῳ τῷ ἀφ' οὗ κινεῖται καὶ τῷ εἰς ὃν κινεῖται· διόπερ ὅταν λέγῃ ὁ Διόδωρος "εἰ κινεῖται τι, ἤτοι ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπῳ κινεῖται ἢ ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν," μοχθηρόν τι καὶ παρὰ τὴν τῆς κινήσεως νόησιν λέγει, παρόσον τὸ κινούμενον οὔτε ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπῳ κινεῖται οὔτε ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἀμφοτέρων, τοῦ τε ἀφ' οὗ κινεῖται καὶ τοῦ εἰς ὃν. ἦσαν δὲ οἱ καὶ ἀμφιβολίαν διεστέλλοντο. τὸ γὰρ ἐν τόπῳ περιέχεσθαι δύο σημαίνειν φασίν, ἐν μὲν ἐν τόπῳ τῷ κατὰ πλάτος, ὡς ὅταν λέγωμέν τινα ἐν Ἀλεξανδρεία εἶναι, ἕτερον δὲ ἐν τόπῳ τῷ κατ' ἀκρίβειαν, καθὸ κάμου λέγουσι* ἂν εἶναι τόπος ὁ περιτετυκῶς τὴν ἐπιφάνειάν μου τοῦ σώματος ἀήρ, καὶ ἀμφοτέρους τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ περιεχομένου προσαγορεύεται τόπος. διχῶς δὲ καλουμένου νῦν τοῦ τόπου, φασὶ

present "to become" is not true, and just as the preterite "to have perished" is nothing if the present "to perish" has not pre-existed, so too it is impossible that the preterite "to have moved" should be true if the present "to move" is not true.

Others assert^a that a thing can move in the place 93 wherein it is contained; for the balls which spin round their pivots, and revolving axles, and drums,^b too, and potters' wheels, and hosts of other bodies similar to these, move but move in the place wherein they are, so that one premiss of the argument—that nothing moves in the place where it is—is false.—And 94 others assert that the argument is propounded contrary to the conception of motion. For the moving object is conceived in conjunction with the place wherefrom it moves and that whereto it moves; consequently, when Diodorus says "If a thing moves, it moves either in the place wherein it is or in that wherein it is not" he says what is unsound and contrary to the conception of motion, inasmuch as the moving object does not move either in the place wherein it, or in that wherein it is not, but through both places—both that wherefrom and that whereto it moves.—And there have been some who have dis- 95 cerned an ambiguity. For "being contained in a place," they say, has two meanings,—in the one "in a place" is used in the broad sense, as when we say of a man that he is "in Alexandria,"^c and in the other it is used of place in the exact sense, as the air which is moulded round the surface of my body might be said to be my place, and the jar is called the place of what is contained in it. So as "place" is now applied in two ways, they assert that the

* With §§ 93-95 cf. P.H. iii. 72-75.

^b Cf. §§ 51, 103.

^c Cf. § 15.

δύνασθαι τὸ κινούμενον ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπω κινεῖσθαι, τῷ κατὰ πλάτος, ἔχοντι διάστημα καθ' ὃ γενήσεται
 96 τὰ τῆς κινήσεως. τινὲς δὲ καὶ ἀπέραντον εἶναι ᾧθήθησαν τὸν τοῦ Διοδώρου λόγον, ἐπεὶ περ ἄρχεται μὲν ἀπὸ διεzeugμένου, ψευδοποιεῖ δὲ τοῦτο διὰ τῶν ἔξης, ἐκότερον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ δεικνύς ψεῦδος, τὸ τε ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστι τι τόπω κινεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ ἐν ᾧ ἔστιν.

97 Τοιαῦται μὲν αἱ πρὸς τὸν λόγον ἐνστάσεις, δοκεῖ δὲ Διόδωρος πρὸς τὴν πρώτην εὐθὺς ὑπηνητηκέναι διδάσκων ὅτι ἐνδέχεται τῶν συντελεστικῶν ἀληθῶν ὄντων τὰ τούτων παρατατικὰ ψευδῆ τυγχάνειν. ἔστω γάρ τινα πρὸ ἐνιαυτοῦ γεγαμηκέναι καὶ ἕτερον μετ' ἐνιαυτόν. οὐκοῦν ἐπὶ τούτων τὸ μὲν "οὗτοι ἔγημαν" ἀξίωμα συντελεστικὸν ὄν ἀληθές ἐστιν, τὸ δ' "οὗτοι γαμοῦσι" παρατατικὸν καθεστῶς ψεῦδος ἐστίν· ὅτε γὰρ οὗτος ἐγάμει, οὐπω οὗτος ἐγάμει, καὶ ὅτε οὗτος ἐγάμει, οὐκέτι οὗτος ἐγάμει. τότε δ' ἂν ἦν ἀληθές ἐπ' αὐτῶν τὸ οὗτοι¹ γαμοῦσιν, εἰ ὁμοσε ἐγάμου. δύναται οὖν τοῦ συντελεστικοῦ ἀληθοῦς
 98 ὄντος ψεῦδος εἶναι τὸ τούτου παρατατικόν. τοιοῦτο δὲ ἔστι καὶ τὸ "Ἑλένη τρεῖς ἔσχεν ἄνδρας"· οὕτε γὰρ ὅτε Μενέλαον εἶχεν ἐν Σπάρτῃ ἄνδρα οὐθ' ὅτε Πάριον ἐν Ἰλίῳ, οὐθ' ὅτε θανόντος τούτου Δημόφωβον ἐγαμήθη, ἀληθές ἐστὶ τὸ παρατατικόν τὸ "τρεῖς ἔχει ἄνδρας," ἀληθοῦς ὄντος τοῦ συν-
 99 τελεστικοῦ τοῦ "τρεῖς ἔσχεν ἄνδρας." σοφίζεται δὲ ἐν τούτοις ὁ Διόδωρος, καὶ παρ' ἀμφιβολίαν βούλεται ἡμᾶς πλανᾶν. τὸ γὰρ "οὗτοι ἔγημαν"

¹ οὗτοι NLE: οἱ cet., Bekk.

^a i.e. the object in "broad" place does not occupy all that place but has a margin of room wherein to move.

moving object can move in the place wherein it is—place in the broad sense,—as this possesses extension through which the processes of motion may take place.^a—And some have thought that the argument 96 of Diodorus is inconclusive, since it begins with a disjunctive premiss, and falsifies this by means of the succeeding statements, in that it proves that both its clauses are false,—both that a thing moves in the place where it is not and (that it does so) where it is.

Such are the objections against the argument; but 97 Diodorus seems to have answered the first one^b at once by explaining that when preterites are true their presents admit of being false. For suppose that a certain man married a year before and another a year after. Then, in the case of these men, the proposition "these men married," which is a preterite, is true, but "these men are marrying," which is a present, is false; for when this man was marrying that man was not yet marrying, and when that man was marrying this man was no longer marrying. And in their case the proposition "these men are marrying" would have been true of them only if they had been marrying simultaneously. It is possible, then, for the present to be false when the preterite is true. Of the same 98 sort, too, is the proposition "Helen had three husbands," for neither when she had Menelaus as her husband in Sparta, nor when she had Paris in Ilium, nor when, after his death, she married Deiphobus,^c is the present—"she has three husbands"—true, though the preterite—"she had three husbands"—is true. But here Diodorus is using sophistry and 99 wishes to deceive us by ambiguity. For the proposi-

^b See §§ 91 ff.

^c A brother of Paris (son of Priam, king of Troy).

δύο σημαίνει, ἐν μὲν πληθυντικὸν καὶ ἴσον τῷ
 “οὗτοι συνέγημαν,” ὅπερ ἐστὶ ψεῦδος, ἕτερον δὲ
 τὸ κατὰ περίληψιν ἐνικοῦ πράγματος ἐγκεκλιμένον
 ἀπὸ τοῦ “οὗτος ἔγημεν” καὶ ἑτέρου ἐνικοῦ τοῦ
 “οὗτος ἔγημεν,” ὧν πάλιν ἐνικῶν τὰ παρατατικά
 ἐστὼν ἀληθῆ, τὸ “οὗτος γαμει” καὶ τὸ “οὗτος
 γαμει” ἐπ’ ἀμφοτέρων γὰρ ἀληθῆ γέγονε ταῦτα.
 100 ἀμήχανον οὖν ἐστὶ τῶν παρατατικῶν ψευδῶν
 ὄντων ἀληθῆ εὐρίσκεισθαι τὰ τούτων συντελεστικά,
 ἀλλ’ ἀνάγκη συναναρῆσθαι ἢ συνυπάρχειν τὰ ἕτερα
 τοῖς ἑτέροις.

Νῆ Δι’, ἀλλ’ εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπόθεσιν καὶ ἑτέραν
 ὁ Διόδωρος κομίζεται παραμυθίαν, σαφεστέρω
 101 χρώμενος ὑποδείγματι. βαλλέσθω γάρ, φησί,
 σφαῖρα εἰς τὸν ὑπερκείμενον ὄροφον. οὐκοῦν ἐν
 τῷ μεταξὺ τῆς βολῆς χρόνῳ τὸ μὲν παρατατικὸν
 ἀξίωμα “ἄπτεται ἡ σφαῖρα τῆς ὀροφῆς” ψευδὸς
 ἐστὶν· ἔτι γὰρ ἐπιφέρεται. ὅταν δὲ ἄψηται τῆς
 ὀροφῆς, γίνεται ἀληθὲς τὸ συντελεστικόν, τὸ
 “ἤψατο ἡ σφαῖρα τῆς ὀροφῆς.” ἐνδέχεται ἄρα
 ψεῦδους ὄντος τοῦ παρατατικοῦ ἀληθὲς ὑπάρχειν
 τὸ συντελεστικόν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μὴ κινεῖσθαι μὲν
 τι παρατατικῶς κεινησθαι δὲ συντελεστικῶς.

102 μήποτε δὲ κἀνταῦθα πλανᾶται. τὸ γὰρ παρα-
 τατικὸν τὸ “ἄπτεται ἡ σφαῖρα τῆς ὀροφῆς”
 γίνεται ἀληθὲς οὐχ ὅτε φέρεται ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ ἀέρι
 ἡ σφαῖρα, ἀλλ’ ὅτε ἄρχεται ἄπτεσθαι τῆς ὀροφῆς.
 ὅταν δὲ τερματίσασα τὴν ψαῦσιν ὑπονοστήσῃ, τότε
 καὶ τὸ συντελεστικὸν γίνεται ἀληθές, τὸ “ἤψατο
 ἡ σφαῖρα τῆς ὀροφῆς.” ἄποπος οὖν ἐστὶν ὁ
 Διόδωρος τοῦ μὲν κεινησθαι περιεχόμενος ὡς
 ἀληθοῦς, τοῦ δὲ κινεῖσθαι ἀφιστάμενος ὡς ψεῦδους,
 260

tion “these men married” has two senses, of which
 the one is plural and equivalent to “these men
 married together,” which is false, but the other is
 formed by the combination of one singular proposition
 “this man married,” and another singular proposition
 “that man married,” and of these singulars, again,
 the presents are true, namely, “this man is marrying”
 and “that man is marrying”; for these statements
 are true in both cases. It is, then, impossible, if the 100
 presents are false, that their preterites should be
 found to be true; and of necessity both of them
 must either be abolished together or co-exist along
 with each other.

Nevertheless, Diodorus brings forward another
 argument against the same assumption, in which
 he employs a clearer example. Let a ball, he 101
 says, be thrown on to an overhanging roof. Then,
 at the point of time that is midway in the throw, the
 proposition “the ball touches the roof” is false; for
 it is still on its way. But when it has touched the
 roof, the preterite “the ball has touched the roof”
 becomes true; therefore it is possible for the preterite
 to be true when the present is false, and therefore
 possible for a thing not “to be moving” in the present
 but “to have moved” in the preterite. But I suspect 102
 that here too he goes astray. For the present—“the
 ball touches the roof”—is true not when the ball is
 travelling in mid air but when it begins to touch the
 roof. But when it comes down again, after ending its
 contact, then the preterite becomes true—“the ball
 touched the roof.” Therefore it is absurd of Diodorus
 to accept “to have moved” as true and to reject “to

δέον ἢ ἀμφοτέροις συγκατατίθεσθαι ἢ ἀμφοτέρων ἀφίστασθαι.

- 103 Οἱ δὲ φάσκοντες δύνασθαι τι κινεῖσθαι ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπων, καὶ τοῦτο μὲν τὰς σφαίρας τοῦτο δὲ τοὺς ἄξονας καὶ τὰ τύμπανα παρατιθέμενοι, οὐ λύουσι τὴν ἀπορίαν ἀλλ' ὁμοίως ἐγκυλίωνται αὐτῇ. ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων σωμάτων, καθὼς καὶ ἀνώτερον ὑπεδείκνυμεν, καθ' ὁλόγητα μὲν μένει ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ, κατὰ μέρη δὲ ἀλλάττει τοὺς τόπους, τοῦ μὲν ἄνω ἀντιλαμβάνοντος τὸν τοῦ κάτω τόπον, 104 τοῦ δὲ κάτω τὸν τοῦ ἄνω. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, μένει τὰ τῆς ἀπορίας. ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων σωμάτων μέρος ἦτοι ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπῳ κινεῖται ἢ ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν· οὔτε δὲ ἐν ᾧ ἔστιν, ὡς παρεστήσαμεν, οὔτε ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν, ὡς εἰδείξαμεν· οὐκ ἄρα κινεῖται.
- 105 Ἄλλ' ἀκολουθῶς¹ ἔφασκόν τινες παρὰ τὴν ἔνοιαν τοῦ κινουμένου κεκομίσθαι τὸν λόγον· νοεῖσθαι γὰρ τὸ κινούμενον ὡς δυοῖν ἐχόμενον τόπων, τοῦ τ' ἐξ οὗ κινεῖται τοῦ τ' εἰς ὃν μετέρχεται. ῥᾶδιον δὲ ἔστι καὶ πρὸς τούτους ὑπαντῶντας λέγειν ὅτι κἂν τοιαύτην εἶναι συμβεβήκη τὴν τοῦ κινουμένου νόησιν, οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον διὰ τὸ μὴ περὶ τῆς νοήσεως τοῦ κινεῖσθαι νῦν εἶναι τὴν ζήτησιν τοῖς ἀπορητικοῖς προηγουμένως, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως, ὑπὲρ ἧς οὐδὲν εἰρήκασιν οἱ τῇ τοιαύτῃ
- 106 χρῆσάμενοι ἐνοστάσει. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κἂν τὸν λόγον ἀνατρέψωμεν, οὐδὲν ἔξουσιν εἰπεῖν πρὸς ἡμᾶς. ὅταν γὰρ φάσκωσι τὸ κινούμενον δυοῖν ἔχεσθαι τόπων, τοῦ τε ἐν ᾧ ἔστι καὶ τοῦ εἰς ὃν φέρεται, πεισομέθ'

¹ ἀκολουθῶς most mss.: ἀνακολουθῶς al., Bekk.

move" as false, when he ought either to assent to both or to reject both.

And those who declare that a thing can move in the 103 place where it is,^a by alleging the examples now of balls and now of axles and drums, fail to solve the difficulty and are equally entangled in it. For, as we have shown previously,^b each of these bodies remains in the same place as a whole but in respect of its parts it changes places, the part above occupying instead the place below and the part below the place above. And if so, the difficulty remains. For each 104 part of these bodies moves either in the place where it is or in that where it is not; but it moves neither in the place where it is, as we have established, nor in that where it is not, as we have proved; therefore it does not move.

But, in the next place, some have asserted^c that 105 the argument thus brought forward is contrary to the conception of a moving object; for a moving object is conceived as occupying two places, both that wherefrom it moves and that into which it passes. But in answer to these, too, it is easy to say that, even if it is the fact that the notion of the moving object is of this kind, it has no bearing on our problem because the question now before the Doubters is chiefly concerned not with the conception of motion but with its real existence, and about this those who make that sort of objection have said nothing. And, moreover, 106 even if we overthrow the argument they will have nothing to say against us. For when they assert that the moving object occupies two places, both that wherein it is and that whereinto it moves, we shall ask

^a With §§ 103-110 cf. *P.H.* iii. 72-75; and see § 93 *supra*.

^b See § 52 *supra*.

^c See § 94 *supra*.

- αὐτῶν πότε μέτεισι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπου τὸ κινούμενον εἰς τὸν ἕτερον; ἀρὰ γε ὅτε ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ ἔστιν ἢ ὅτε ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ; ἀλλ' ὅτε μὲν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τόπῳ ἔστιν, οὐ μετέρχεται εἰς ἕτερον·
- 107 ἔτι γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ ἔστιν. ὅτε δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τούτῳ ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ, πάλιν οὐ μετέρχεται ἀλλὰ μετελήλυθεν ἤδη· τῶν γὰρ ἀμηχάνων ἔστι καὶ τῶν ἀνεπινοήτων τὸ μετελθεῖν τι ἐξ ἐκείνου τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν. ὥστε κἂν τοιαύτην ἔχωμεν τοῦ κινουμένου νόησιν, μένει οὐδὲν ἥττον ἢ ἀρχῆθεν ἀπορία.
- 108 Καὶ μὴν οἱ λέγοντες διχῶς καλεῖσθαι τὸν τόπον, ἐν πλάτει τε καὶ κατ' ἀκρίβειαν, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τὴν κίνησιν ἐν τῷ κατὰ πλάτος νοουμένῳ τόπῳ δύνασθαι συμβαίνει, οὐ πρὸς νοῦν ὑπαντῶσιν. προηγείται γὰρ τοῦ κατὰ πλάτος νοουμένου τόπου ὁ κατ' ἀκρίβειαν, καὶ ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ἐν τῷ κατὰ πλάτος τόπῳ κινήσθαι τι μὴ προκινήθην ἐν τῷ
- 109 κατ' ἀκρίβειαν· ὡς γὰρ οὗτος περιεκτικός ἐστι τοῦ κινουμένου σώματος, οὕτως ὁ κατὰ πλάτος τόπος σὺν τῷ κινουμένῳ σώματι καὶ τὸν κατ' ἀκρίβειαν τόπον περιέσχηκεν. καθάπερ οὖν οὐδεὶς δύναται ἐν σταδιαίῳ κινεῖσθαι διαστήματι μὴ προκινήθεις ἐν τῷ πηχυαίῳ διαστήματι, ὡδε τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἔστιν ἐν τῷ κατὰ πλάτος τόπῳ κινεῖσθαι μὴ κινού-
- 110 μενον ἐν τῷ κατ' ἀκρίβειαν. ἠρώτηκε δὲ ὁ Διόδωρος τὸν ἐκκείμενον λόγον κατὰ τῆς κινήσεως τοῦ κατ' ἀκρίβειαν ἐχόμενος τόπου· τοίνυν ἀναιρουμένης ἐπὶ τούτου τῆς κινήσεως οὐθεὶς ἀπολείπεται λόγος ἐπὶ τοῦ κατὰ πλάτος τόπου.

Τὸ μὲν γὰρ μοχθηρὸν εἶναι τὸν λόγον φάσκειν διὰ

them—"When does the moving object pass over from the place wherein it is to the other place? Is it when it is in the first place or when it is in the second?" But when it is in the first place it does not pass over into the other; for it is still in the first. And when 107 it is not in this but in the second, once again it is not passing over but has already passed over; for it is a thing impossible and inconceivable that anything should pass over from that place wherein it does not exist. So that, even if we have this sort of conception of the moving object, the original difficulty remains none the less.

Further, those who say that the term "place" has 108 two senses, the "broad" sense and the "exact," and that therefore motion can occur in place when conceived as "broad," are giving an answer that is not to the purpose. For place conceived as exact precedes place conceived as broad, and it is impossible for anything to move in broad place if it has not moved before in exact place; for as the latter serves 109 to contain the moving body, so the broad place contains, along with the moving body, the exact place as well. As, then, no one can move over a distance of a stade^b without first having moved over a distance of a cubit, so it is impossible to move over broad place without moving over exact place. And when Dio- 110 dorus propounded the argument against motion which has been set forth he was keeping to the exact sense of place; so if in its case motion is abolished, there is no argument left in the case of place in the broad sense.

Now it is perfectly foolish to say that the argument

^a See § 95 *supra*.

^b About 200 yards, or nearly a furlong. A cubit = $\frac{1}{3}$ yard.

- τὸ ἀπὸ διεzeugμένου ἀρχεσθαι καὶ τοῦτο ψευδοποιεῖν
 111 τὸ διεzeugμένον τελῶς ἐστὶ ληρώδες. κατ' ἀκο-
 λουθίαν γὰρ γέγονε τὰ τῆς ἐρωτήσεως, καὶ δύναμιν
 ἔχει τοιαύτην " εἰ κινεῖται τι, κατὰ τὸν ἕτερον τῶν
 προειρημένων τρόπων ὀφείλει κινεῖσθαι· οὐχὶ δέ γε
 τὸ δεύτερον· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ πρῶτον." εἰ γὰρ ὄντος
 τοῦ πρῶτου ἐστὶ τὸ δεύτερον, τοῦ δευτέρου μὴ
 ὄντος οὐδὲ τὸ πρῶτον ἐσται. ὅπερ καὶ κατὰ τὰς
 αὐτῶν τῶν διαλεκτικῶν ὑποθέσεις ὑγιές ἐστίν.
- 112 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν πρὸς τὰ ἀντιλεγόμενα τῷ ὑπὸ
 Διοδώρου κομισθέντι λόγῳ ἀναγκαῖον ἦν εἰπεῖν.
 κομίζει δὲ καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς λόγους οὐχ οὕτως
 ἐμβριθεῖς ἀλλὰ σοφιστικωτέρους, ὧν τὴν ἐκθεσιν
 ποιησόμεθα εἰς τὸ δύνασθαι κατὰ τὰς ζητήσεις
 ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐκκλίνειν. εὐθέως γὰρ φησι τὸ
 κινούμενον ἐν τόπῳ ἔστιν, τὸ δὲ ἐν τόπῳ ὄν οὐ
- 113 κινεῖται· τὸ ἄρα κινούμενον οὐ κινεῖται. διττῆς δὲ
 οὔσης κινήσεως, μιᾶς μὲν τῆς κατ' ἐπικράτειαν
 δευτέρας δὲ τῆς κατ' εἰλικρίνειαν, καὶ κατ' ἐπι-
 κράτειαν μὲν ὑπαρχούσης ἐφ' ἧς τῶν πλειόνων
 κινουμένων μερῶν τοῦ σώματος ὀλίγα ἡρεμεῖ, κατ'
 εἰλικρίνειαν δὲ ἐφ' ἧς πάντα κινεῖται τὰ τοῦ σώ-
 ματος μέρη, δοκεῖ τούτων τῶν δυοῖν κινήσεων ἢ
 κατ' ἐπικράτειαν προηγέσθαι τῆς κατ' εἰλικρίνειαν.
- 114 ἵνα γάρ τι εἰλικρινῶς κινήθῃ, τουτέστιν ὅλον δι'
 ὅλον, πρότερον ὀφείλει νοεῖσθαι κατ' ἐπικράτειαν
 κινούμενον, ὃν τρόπον ἵνα τις κατ' εἰλικρίνειαν γέ-
 νηται πολίος, ὀφείλει κατ' ἐπικράτειαν προπεπο-
 λιῶσθαι, καὶ ἵνα τις κατ' εἰλικρίνειαν ληφθῇ σωρός,
 ὀφείλει κατ' ἐπικράτειαν γεγονέναι σωρός· κατὰ

is unsound ^a because of its beginning with a disjunctive premiss and asserting the falsity of this premiss. For the steps in the argument are in logical sequence 111 and the force they have is this,—“ If a thing moves, it must move in one or other of the ways stated above ; but the second (clause) is not (true) ; therefore the first is not (true).” For if the second is true when the first is true, when the second is not true the first will not be true either. And this is sound according to the assumptions of the Dialecticians themselves.

These observations, then, it was necessary to make 112 in answer to the objections made against the argument brought forward by Diodorus. And he also brings forward other arguments which are not so weighty but more sophistical, and of these we shall give an exposition so as to be able to avoid each of them in our investigations. For instance, he says, the moving object is in a place, and that which is in a place does not move ; therefore the moving object does not move. And motion being twofold,—the 113 one sort that of the major portion, the second sort absolute,—and that of the major portion being the sort in which while most parts of the body are in motion a few are at rest, and the absolute sort that in which all the parts of the body are in motion,—it seems that of these two motions that of the major portion precedes the absolute kind. For in order 114 that a thing should move absolutely,—that is, as a whole wholly,—it must first be conceived as moving in respect of its major portion ; just as, in order that a man may become completely grey-headed he must first become grey as to the major part, and in order that a complete heap may be obtained, the major part of a heap must first be formed ; in much the

^a See § 96 *supra*, and § 87 *supra*.

- τὸν ὁμοιον τρόπον ἡγεῖσθαι δεῖ τῆς κατ' εἰλικρίνειαν κινήσεως τὴν κατ' ἐπικράτειαν ἐπίτασις γὰρ τῆς κατ' ἐπικράτειαν ἐστὶν ἢ κατ' εἰλικρίνειαν.
- 115 οὐχὶ δέ γε ἐστὶ τις κατ' ἐπικράτειαν κίνησις, ὡς παραστήσομεν· τοίνυν οὐδ' ἢ κατ' εἰλικρίνειαν γενήσεται. ὑποκείσθω γὰρ ἐκ τριῶν ἀμερῶν συνεστὼς σῶμα, δυοῖν μὲν κινουμένων ἐνὸς δὲ ἀκινήτου· τοῦτο γὰρ ἢ κατ' ἐπικράτειαν ἀπ-
- 116 αἰτεῖ κίνησις. οὐκοῦν εἰ προσθήημεν τέταρτον ἀμερὲς ἀκινήτου τούτῳ τῷ σώματι, πάλιν γενήσεται κίνησις. εἴπερ γὰρ τὸ ἐκ τριῶν ἀμερῶν συγκείμενον σῶμα, δυοῖν μὲν κινουμένων ἐνὸς δὲ ἀκινήτου, κινεῖται, καὶ τετάρτου προσθέντος ἀμεροῦς κινήσεται· ἰσχυρότερα γὰρ τὰ τριῖ ἀμερῶν μεθ' ὧν πρότερον ἐκινεῖτο, τοῦ προσθέντος ἐνὸς ἀμεροῦς. ἀλλ' εἴπερ τὸ ἐκ τεσσάρων ἀμερῶν συγκείμενον σῶμα κινεῖται, κινήσεται καὶ τὸ ἐκ πέντε· ἰσχυρότερα γὰρ ἐστὶ τὰ τέσσαρ' ἀμερῶν μεθ' ὧν πρότερον ἐκινεῖτο, τοῦ προσθέντος ἀμεροῦς.
- 117 καὶ εἰ τὸ ἐκ τῶν πέντε συγκείμενον κινεῖται, πάντως καὶ ἕκτου προσελθόντος ἀμεροῦς κινήσεται, ἰσχυροτέρων ὄντων τῶν πέντε παρὰ τὸ ἓν. καὶ οὕτω μέχρι μυρίων ἀμερῶν προέρχεται ὁ Διόδωρος, δεικνύς ὅτι ἀνυπόστατός ἐστιν ἢ κατ' ἐπικράτειαν κίνησις· ἄτοπον γὰρ, φησί, τὸ λέγειν κατ' ἐπικράτειαν κινεῖσθαι σῶμα ἐφ' οὗ ἑνακισχίλια ἐνακόσια ἐνεθήκοντα ὀκτὼ ἀκινήτου κινεῖται καὶ δύο μόνον κινεῖται. ὥστε οὐδὲν κατ' ἐπικράτειαν κινεῖται. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐδὲ κατ' εἰλικρίνειαν, ᾧ ἔπεται τὸ μηδὲν κινεῖσθαι.
- 118 Ἄλλὰ γὰρ ἢ μὲν ἐπιχείρησις τοιαύτη πῶς ἐστίν, ¹ τριῖ ἀμερῶν NE: τρία μέρη cet., Bekk.

same way motion as to the major part must precede absolute motion ; for absolute motion is an intensification of that of the major part. But there does not 115 exist any motion of the major part, as we shall establish ; neither, then, will absolute motion exist.—For let us assume the existence of a body composed of three indivisible parts, two being in motion and one motionless ; for this is what motion of the major part demands. If, then, we were to add to this body a 116 fourth indivisible which is motionless, there will again be motion. For if the body composed of three indivisibles, two in motion and one motionless, moves, it will also move when a fourth indivisible is added ; for the three indivisibles, with which it was moving before, are stronger than the one indivisible which is added. But if the body composed of four indivisibles moves, that composed of five will also move ; for the four indivisibles, with which it was moving before, are stronger than the added indivisible. And if that 117 which is composed of five moves, it will certainly move also when a sixth indivisible is added, the five being stronger than the one. And in this way Diodorus proceeds up to ten thousand indivisibles, by way of proving that motion of the major part is non-existent ; for it is absurd, he says, to assert that a body moves as to its major part when it has 9998 of its indivisibles motionless and two only in motion. So that nothing moves as to its major part. And if so, neither does anything move absolutely ; from which it follows that nothing moves.

Well then, such is the argumentation, but it seems 118

φαίνεται δὲ καὶ σοφιστικῆ καὶ παρακείμενον ἔχουσα τὸν ἔλεγχον· ἅμα γὰρ τῇ τοῦ πρώτου ἀμεροῦς προσθέσει οἶχεται ἢ κατ' ἐπικράτειαν κινήσεις, δυοῖν κινουμένων ἀμερῶν δυοῖν δὲ ἀκινήτιζόντων. ὅθεν τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας ἐπιχειρήσεις παραιτητέον, ἐκείνοις δὲ μάλιστα χρηστέον τοῖς
 119 λόγοις. εἰ κινεῖται τι, νῦν κινεῖται· εἰ νῦν κινεῖται, ἐν τῷ ἐνεστώτι χρόνῳ κινεῖται· εἰ δὲ ἐν τῷ ἐνεστώτι χρόνῳ κινεῖται, ἐν ἀμερεῖ χρόνῳ ἄρα κινεῖται. εἰ γὰρ μερίζεται ὁ ἐνεστώσ χρόνος, πάντως εἰς τὸν παρωχηκότα καὶ μέλλοντα μερισθῆσεται,
 120 καὶ οὕτως οὐκέτ' ἔσται ἐνεστώσ. εἰ δ' ἐν ἀμερεῖ χρόνῳ τι κινεῖται, ἀμερίστους τόπους διέρχεται. εἰ δὲ ἀμερίστους τόπους διέρχεται, οὐ κινεῖται. ὅτε γὰρ ἔστω ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ ἀμερεῖ τόπῳ, οὐ κινεῖται· ἔτι γὰρ ἔστω ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ ἀμερεῖ τόπῳ. ὅτε δὲ ἔστω ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ ἀμερεῖ τόπῳ, πάλιν οὐ κινεῖται ἀλλὰ κεκίνηται. οὐκ ἄρα κινεῖται τι.

121 Πρὸς τοῦτοις πᾶσα κίνησις τριῶν τινῶν ἔχεται, καθάπερ σωμάτων τε καὶ τόπων καὶ χρόνων, σωμάτων μὲν τῶν κινουμένων, τόπων δὲ τῶν ἐν οἷς ἢ κινήσις γίνεται, χρόνων δὲ τῶν καθ' οὓς ἢ
 122 κινήσις γίνεται. ἦτοι οὖν πάντων τούτων εἰς ἀπείρους τεμνομένων τόπους καὶ χρόνους καὶ εἰς ἄπειρα σώματα γίνεται ἢ κινήσις, ἢ πάντων εἰς ἀμερές καὶ ἐλάχιστον καταληγόντων, ἢ τινῶν μὲν εἰς ἄπειρον τεμνομένων τινῶν δὲ εἰς ἀμερές καὶ ἐλάχιστον καταληγόντων. ἐάν τε δὲ πάντα εἰς ἄπειρα τέμνηται ἐάν τε πάντα εἰς ἀμερές καταλήγη,¹ ἄπορος ὁ περὶ τῆς κινήσεως εὐρεθῆσεται λόγος.

¹ καταλήγη, <ἐάν τε τινὰ μὲν εἰς ἀπειρον τέμνηται, τινὰ δὲ εἰς ἀμερές καταλήγη.> cj. Bekk.

sophistical and its refutation lies ready to hand ; for motion as to the major part disappears simultaneously with the addition of the first indivisible, when there are two indivisibles in motion and two motionless. Hence, one must set aside arguments of that sort, and use chiefly arguments such as these :—“ If a thing
 119 moves, it moves now ; if it moves now, it moves in the present time ; and if it moves in the present time, it moves, therefore, in an indivisible time. For if the present time is divided, it will certainly be divided into the past and future, and thus it will no longer be present. And if a thing moves in an indivisible time,
 120 it passes through indivisible places. And if it passes through indivisible places, it does not move. For when it is in the first indivisible place it does not move ; for it is still in the first indivisible place. And when it is in the second indivisible place, again it does not move but it has moved.^a Therefore nothing moves.

Furthermore, every motion involves three things,^b
 121 namely bodies and places and times,—bodies which are in motion, places wherein the motion occurs, times during which the motion occurs. Either then
 122 the motion occurs while all these are being divided into an infinite number of places and times and into an infinite number of bodies, or while all come to end in what is indivisible and minimal, or while some of them are being divided *ad infinitum* and some coming to end in what is indivisible and minimal. But whether all are divided *ad infinitum* or all end in what is indivisible, the account given of motion will be found doubtful.

^a Cf. §§ 48, 85, 143.

^b Cf. §§ 139, 142, 154, 169.

- 123 Τάξει δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης στάσεως ποιούμεθα τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν, καθ' ἣν πάντα εἰς ἄπειρον τέμνεται. καὶ δὴ οἱ προσεστῶτες αὐτῆς φασὶ τὸ κινούμενον σῶμα ὑφ' ἑνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ἄθρουν μεριστὸν ἀνύειν διάστημα, καὶ οὐ τὸ πρῶτον τοῦ διαστήματος (μέρος)¹ πρῶτον ἐπιλαμβάνει τῷ πρῶτῳ αὐτοῦ μέρει καὶ τὸ δεύτερον τῇ τάξει δεύτερον, ἀλλ' ὑφ' ἑν τὸ ὅλον μεριστὸν διάστημα καὶ ἁθρόως διέρχεται. ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄτοπον καὶ
- 124 ποικίλως τοῖς φαινομένοις μαχόμενον. εἰ γοῦν ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τούτων σωμάτων νοήσωμέν τινα κατὰ σταδίου τροχάζοντα διαστήματος, πάντως ὑποπέσειται ὅτι ὀφείλει ὁ τοιοῦτος τὸ πρῶτον ἡμιστάδιον ἀνύειν πρῶτον καὶ τὸ δεύτερον τῇ τάξει δεύτερον· τὸ γὰρ ὑφ' ἑν ἀξιοῦν τὸ ὅλον ἀνύειν τοῦ
- 125 σταδίου διάστημα τελείως ἄτοπον. καὶ εἰ τέμοιμεν τὸ ἕτερον ἡμιστάδιον εἰς δύο τεταρτημόρια, πάντως πρῶτον διελεύσεται τὸ πρῶτον τεταρτημόριον· καὶ εἰ εἰς πλείονα τέμοιμεν, ὡσαύτως. κἂν κατὰ πεφωτισμένου δὲ τροχάζου τοῦ σταδίου, φαίνεται ὡς οὐχ ὑφ' ἑν σκιάσει τὸ στάδιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τι
- 126 πρῶτον μέρος τὸ δὲ δεύτερον τὸ δὲ τρίτον. καὶ εἰ παραθείοι δὲ τῷ τοίχῳ μεμιλτωμένη τῇ χειρὶ τούτου ἐφαπτόμενος, οὐχ ὑφ' ἑνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον τὸν ὅλον τοῦ σταδίου τοῖχον μιλιτῶσει ἀλλὰ κατὰ τάξιν, καὶ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον πρότερον. ὅπερ οὖν ὁ λόγος ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἔδειξε πραγμάτων, τουτὶ καὶ
- 127 ἐπὶ τῶν νοητῶν προσδεκτέον ἐστὶν ἡμῖν. καὶ ἄλλως δὲ ἐνεστί ταύτην ἀνελεῖν τὴν δόξαν, πολλαῖς καὶ ποικίλαις εἰς τοῦτο χρωμένους ὑποθέσεσιν. ὑπο-

¹ <μέρος> add. NLE.

Taking them in order, let us commence our argument with the first view, according to which all are divided *ad infinitum*. Now the champions of this view^a assert that the moving body at one and the same time completes the whole of a divisible interval, and does not occupy first the first part of the interval with the first part of itself, and secondly in order the second part, but passes through the whole divisible interval all at once and completely. But this is absurd and conflicts with apparent facts in a variety of ways. Thus, if, in the case of our sensible bodies, we conceive of a man running over a distance of a stade, it will certainly be obvious that such a man must first complete the first half-stade and secondly in order the second; for to claim that he completes all at once the whole distance of a stade is perfectly absurd. And if we were to divide one of the half-stades into two quarters, he will certainly pass over the first quarter first, and so likewise if we divide it into further parts. And if he runs over the stade when it is lighted up, it is evident that he will not cast a shadow over the stade all at once, but now over the first part, now over the second and now over the third. And if he should run alongside the wall and keep touching it with his hand painted red, he will not mark the whole of the wall of the race-course with red paint at one and the same time, but the successive parts of it successively. What, then, the argument has proved in the case of things sensible, this we must also accept in the case of things intelligible.—And besides, it is possible to overthrow this opinion by employing for the purpose a great number of diverse hypothetical cases. For let us suppose a

^a *i.e.* the Stoics. With §§ 123-126 *cf.* P.H. iii. 76-78.

κείσθω γὰρ πηχναῖον διάστημα, καὶ διωρίσθω κατὰ τὴν μεσότητα εἰς δύο ἡμιπήχεα. διωρίσθω δὲ καὶ τὰ παλαισσιαῖα διαστήματα αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἔστω τὰ διορίζοντα στερεὰ πρὸς τὸ ἀντικόπτειν καὶ ἰστᾶν δύνασθαι τὸ κινούμενον. (εἰ οὖν τὸ κινούμενον) ὑφ'¹ ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ἄθρον ἀνέει μεριστὸν διάστημα, καὶ οὐ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον πρότερον ἢ κίνησις, καὶ τὸ κατὰ τοῦ προειρημένου διαστήματος κινούμενον σώμα ὑφ' ἓνα χρόνον ὑπὸ τοῦ² τὰ δύο ἡμιπηχναῖα διορίζοντος ἀντικοπήσεται

128 σώματος καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ τὰ παλαισσιαῖα. ἀλλ' εἰ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ ὑπὸ τούτων ἀντικοπήσεται, ἔσται τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα καὶ κεκινημένον καὶ μὴ κεκινημένον· ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἀντέκοψεν αὐτῷ τὸ διοριστικὸν τῶν ἡμιπηχναίων διαστημάτων, κεκίνηται τὸ ἡμιπηχναῖον διάστημα, ἢ δὲ καὶ τὸ διοριστικὸν τοῦ παλαισσιαίου ἀντέκοψεν, πάλιν οὐ κεκίνηται τὸ αὐτὸ διάστημα. ἄτοπον δέ γε τὸ αὐτὸ λέγειν ἅμα κεκινήσθαι καὶ μὴ κεκινήσθαι. ἄτοπον ἄρα καὶ τὸ ἀξιῶν τὸ κινούμενον ἄθρον ὑφ' ἓν μεριστὸν ἀνέειν διάστημα καὶ μὴ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον πρότερον κινεῖσθαι.

129 πάλιν ὑποκείσθω πηχναῖον διάστημα, καὶ φερέσθω τινὰ σώματα ἀφ' ἑκατέρου τῶν ἄκρων ἰσοταχῶς ὡς αἱ κατ' Ἐπίκουρον ἄτομοι. οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶ ὑπόκειται ταῦτα τὰ σώματα ἰσοταχῶς κινούμενα, πάντως κατὰ τὴν μεσότητα τοῦ πηχναίου διαστήματος προσκρούσαντα ἀλλήλοις ἢ στήσεται ἢ ἐπὶ τὸν

130 ὄθεν ἦλθε τόπον³ ἀντικρουσθήσεται. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἴσταται, πρόδηλόν ἐστιν ὅτι ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν ἐν

¹ <εἰ οὖν τὸ κινούμενον> ὑφ' N, cj. Bekk. : ἐφ' cet., Bekk.

² ὑπὸ τοῦ N : ὑφ' οὐ cet., Bekk. (ὑπὸ τε τοῦ cj. Bekk.).

³ ἐπὶ τὸν . . . τόπον Mutsch. : ἐκ τοῦ . . . τόπου mss., Bekk.

distance of a cubit, and let it be divided at the middle into two half-cubits. And let its distances of a palm's breadth be also divided, and let the divisors be solid so as to be able to resist and bring to rest the moving object. If, then, the moving object completes the whole of a divisible distance in one and the same time, and the motion is not one of orderly succession, the body which moves over the distance mentioned above will be resisted simultaneously both by the body which divides the two half-cubits and by that dividing the palm's breadths. But if it shall be 128 resisted by these at the same time, the same thing will be at once both having moved and not having moved; for in so far as the divisor of the half-cubit distances has resisted it, it has moved over the half-cubit distance, but in so far as the divisor of the palm's breadth distance has resisted it, it has not, on the contrary, moved over the same distance. But it is absurd to say that the same thing has at once both moved and not moved. Therefore it is also absurd to maintain that the moving object completes a divisible distance at once and as a whole and does not move by gradations.—Again, let us suppose a distance of a 129 cubit, and let certain bodies move at equal speeds, like the atoms of Epicurus, from each of its extremities. Then, since these bodies are assumed to be moving with equal speeds, they will certainly collide with one another in the middle of the distance of the cubit, and will either come to rest or be driven back towards the place from which they came. And if 130 they come to rest, it is quite evident that each of

ἄλλω μὲν χρόνῳ ἐκινεῖτο τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄκρου διάστημα ἄχρι τῆς μεσότητος, ἐν ἄλλῳ δὲ ἐμελλεν ἀνύειν τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς μεσότητος ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον. εἰ δὲ ἀνταναβάλλεται ὡς ἐπὶ τὰ τοῦ ὅλου διαστήματος ἄκρα, πάλιν προὔπτον ὡς ἐν ἄλλῳ μὲν χρόνῳ διῆλθε τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄκρων διαστήματα¹ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον, ἐν ἄλλῳ δὲ ἀντικρουσθέντα ὑπέστρεψεν ὡς ἐπὶ τὰ ἄκρα. καὶ οὕτως οὐδὲν ἐστὶ τὸ κινούμενον ὑφ' ἐν ἄθρουν μεριστὸν διάστημα.

- 131 Ἔτι καὶ οὕτως ἐλεγκτέον ἐστὶ τοὺς πάντα μὲν εἰς ἄπειρον τέμνεσθαι λέγοντας, κινεῖσθαι δὲ τὸ κινούμενον ὑφ' ἐν ἄθρουν μεριστὸν διάστημα προειληφότας. δυοῖν γὰρ ἰσοταχῶς κινουμένων σωμάτων ὅσον πηχυαῖον διάστημα, ἀκολουθήσει λέγειν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ διάστημα ἐκάτερον ἀνύειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πλείον τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον.
- 132 ὅπερ ἐστὶ παρὰ τὴν ἐνάργειαν. διωρίσθω γὰρ τὸ πηχυαῖον διάστημα τοῦ ἑτέρου σώματος κατὰ τὴν μεσότητα, καὶ τὸ διορίζον ἀντικοπτέτω παντὶ προσπίπτουσι. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐν ἴσῳ χρόνῳ ἀξιοῦσιν ἐκάτερον κινεῖσθαι κὰν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀνύειν τὸ τε πηχυαῖον διάστημα καὶ τὰ μέρη τούτου καὶ οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ μὲν τὰ μέρη ἐν ἄλλῳ δὲ τὸ ὅλον, πάντως ἐν ᾧ χρόνῳ κινεῖται τὸ ἕτερον τούτων τῶν σωμάτων τὸ ὅλον πηχυαῖον διάστημα, ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ καὶ τὸ λειπόμενον σῶμα κινήσεται τὸ ἡμίπηχυ διάστημα καὶ
- 133 ἀντικοπὲν στήσεται. ἀλλ' ὑπέκειτό γε ἰσοταχῶς ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν κινούμενον. τὰ ἄρα ἰσοταχῶς κινούμενα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ ἄνισον κινεῖται διά-

¹ διῆλθε τὰ ἀπὸ τ. ἄκρων διαστήματα Rüstow: διῆλθεν ἄ. τ. ἄλλων διαστημάτων MSS., Bekk. (ἄκρων cj. Bekk.).

them was moving over the distance from the extremity to the centre at one time, and at another time was about to complete the distance from the centre towards the other extremity. But if they are repelled back towards the extremities of the whole distance, it is obvious again that they passed over the distances from the extremities to the centre at one time, and at another were driven back and retreated towards the extremities. And thus there is nothing which moves all at once and as a whole over a divisible distance.

Moreover, in this way one can also refute those who 131 assert that all things are divided *ad infinitum*, and yet assume that a moving object moves at once and as a whole over a divisible distance. If two bodies are moving with equal speeds over the distance of a cubit, it will follow that they must say that they do not both complete the same distance in the same time, but the one a greater the other a less; which is contrary to evidence. For let the cubit's distance 132 of one of the bodies be divided at the centre, and let the divisor repel everything which collides with it. Since, then, they maintain that both bodies move during an equal time, and during the same time complete both the cubit's distance and the parts thereof, and not the parts in one time and the whole in another, then certainly during the time in which the one of these bodies is moving over the whole distance of the cubit, the remaining body during an equal time will move over the distance of the half-cubit and being repelled will come to rest. But each of them was 133 assumed to be moving at an equal speed. Therefore things which move at equal speeds move over an unequal distance in the same time; which is contrary

στημα· ὅπερ παρὰ τὴν ἐνάργειάν ἐστιν. τοῖνυν οὐ κινεῖται τὸ κινούμενον ὑφ' ἐν ἄθρουν μεριστὸν διάστημα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον πρότερον ἢ κίνησις ὀφείλει γίνεσθαι.

- 134 *Ἐπι πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις τὸ ἐν ἴσῳ χρόνῳ κινούμενον πλέον διάστημα τοῦ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ ἔλαττον διάστημα κινουμένου ταχύτερόν ἐστιν· οἶον ἔαν ἐν ὠριαίῳ διαστήματι καθ' ὑπόθεσιν τῶν κινουμένων τὸ μὲν εἴκοσι σταδίου ἀνύη τὸ δὲ δέκα μόνον, λεχθήσεται συμφώνως κατὰ πάντας¹ ταχύτερον μὲν εἶναι τὸ τοὺς εἴκοσι σταδίου ἀνύον, 135 βραδύτερον δὲ τὸ τοὺς δέκα. ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γε τὸ φαινόμενον καὶ ἐναργές εἶναι δοκοῦν ἀναφύεται ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ ἐκκειμένῃ ὑποθέσει καὶ γίνεται ψεῦδος. ἔσται γὰρ <τὸ>² ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ κινούμενον καὶ ταχύτερον καὶ βραδύτερον· ὅπερ ἦν ἀπεμφαίνον. εἰ γὰρ οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ μὲν χρόνῳ τὸ ὅλον κινεῖται πηχυαῖον διάστημα ἐν ἄλλῳ δὲ τὰ τοῦ πηχυαίου διαστήματος μέρη, ἀλλ' ἐν ἐνὶ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ τὸ τε ὅλον διάστημα διέρχεται καὶ τὰ τοῦ ὅλου μέρη, ἔσται τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν 136 τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ καὶ βραδύτερον καὶ ταχύτερον· ἢ μὲν γὰρ πηχυαῖον ἐν τούτῳ διάστημα ἀνύει, ἔσται ταχύτερον, ἢ δ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἡμιπηχυαῖον, ἔσται βραδύτερον. τελέως δέ ἐστιν ἄτοπον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ λέγειν τι καὶ ταχύτερον εἶναι καὶ βραδύτερον. τοῖνυν οὐκ ἄθρουν μεριστὸν διάστημα κινεῖται τὸ κινούμενον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον πρότερον.

- 137 Ἰκανῶς δ' ἂν ἐλέγχοντο οἱ ταύτης προεσιώτες τῆς δόξης καὶ διὰ τῆς λεχθησομένης ὑποθέσεως. ἔστω γὰρ τι δακτυλίου διάστημα, διηρήσθω δὲ

¹ πάντας cj. Bekk. : πάντα mss., Bekk.

² <τὸ> add. NE.

to evidence. So then the moving object does not move over a divisible distance at once and as a whole, but motion must take place by gradations.

Moreover, in addition to what has been said, the 134 object which moves over a greater distance in an equal time is speedier than that which moves over a less distance in the same time. For example, if of two bodies assumed to be in motion the one completes twenty stades in the space of an hour, the other only ten, it will be asserted unanimously and on all hands that the one which completes the twenty stades is the speedier, and that of the ten stades the slower. But 135 this fact which seems to be apparent and evident is destroyed—if we are to go by the hypothesis put forward—and becomes false. For that which moves in the same time will be both speedier and slower; which is nonsensical. For if it is not the case that the whole moves over a cubit's distance in one time and over the parts of the cubit's distance in another, but passes through both the whole distance and the parts of that whole in one and the same time, then the same thing will be both slower and speedier in the same time; for in so far as it completes in this 136 time the cubit's distance it will be speedier, but in so far as it completes that of half-a-cubit in the same time it will be slower. But it is perfectly absurd to say that a thing is, in the same time, both speedier and slower. So, then, the moving object does not move over a divisible interval all at once but by gradations.

But the champions of this opinion^a may be 137 sufficiently confuted by the hypothetical case now to be stated. Let us suppose the distance of a finger-

^a Cf. § 123.

τοῦτο κατὰ τὴν μεσότητα εἰς δύο ἡμιδακτυλιαῖα διαστήματα, καὶ ἔστω τὸ διορίζον φύσιν ἔχον ἀντικοπτικὴν καὶ ἀποβάλλειν δυναμένην τὸ προσπίπτον, κινείσθω τε σῶμά τι κατὰ τοῦ τοιούτου διάστηματος· φημὶ δὴ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, ἐπεὶ τὸ κινούμενον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ τό τε ὅλον ἀνύει διάστημα καὶ τὰ τοῦ ὅλου μέρη, δεήσει τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ ἔλθειν τε καὶ ἀπελθεῖν·
 138 ὃ ἔστι τῶν ἀδυνάτων. εἰ γὰρ ἐν ἐνὶ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ ἀνύει τό τε ὅλον δακτυλιαῖον διάστημα καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτοῦ, δακτυλιαῖον δ' ἔστι διάστημα τό τε ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄκρου μέχρι τῆς μεσότητος καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ ταύτης μέχρι τοῦ ἄκρου, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ καὶ ἀνελεύσεται¹ τὸ κινούμενον καὶ προσκρούσαν τῷ διορίζοντι κατελεύσεται. παρὰ τὴν ἐνάργειαν δέ ἔστι τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ ἔλθειν τε καὶ ἀπελθεῖν· παρὰ τὴν ἐνάργειαν ἄρα καὶ τὸ οὕτω γίνεσθαι τὴν κίνησιν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ λέγειν καὶ ἐκτείνεσθαι τὴν χεῖρα καὶ συστέλλεσθαι καὶ οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ μὲν ἐκτείνεσθαι ἐν ἄλλῳ δὲ συστέλλεσθαι.
 139 Ὡστε τὸ μὲν κατ' ἄθρον διάστημα γίνεσθαι τὴν κίνησιν οὕτως ἔστιν ἄπορον τοῖς προειρημένοις ἀνδράσιν· πολλῶν δὲ τούτου ἀπορώτερον τὸ μὴ κατ' ἄθρον γίνεσθαι μεριστὸν διάστημα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον πρότερον καὶ κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον δεύτερον. εἰ γὰρ οὕτω γίνεται ἡ κίνησις, πάντων εἰς ἄπειρον τεμνομένων τῶν τε σωμάτων καὶ τόπων καὶ χρόνων,
 140 οὐκ ἔσται τις ἀρχὴ κινήσεως. ἵνα γὰρ τι κινηθῆῃ πηχυαῖον διάστημα, ὀφείλει τὸ πρῶτον ἡμίπηχου

¹ ἀνελεύσεται ego: ἀπελεύσεται mss., Bekk. (ἐλεύσεται cf. Bekk.).

length, and let this be divided at the centre into two distances of half a finger, and let the divisor be of a nature capable of repelling and able to hurl back the colliding object, and let there be a body moving over this distance; now I assert that, in the case thus assumed, since the moving object completes in the same time both the whole distance and the parts of that whole, the same thing must both approach and retreat in the same time; which is a thing impossible. For if it completes in one and the same time both the whole distance of a finger and the parts thereof, and the distance of the finger is both that from the extremity to the centre and that from this to the extremity, then the moving object will in the same time both go forward and, after colliding with the divisor, return backwards. But it is contrary to evidence that it should both approach and retreat in the same time; therefore it is also contrary to evidence that motion should take place in this way, just as it is to say that the hand is in the same time both extended and clenched, and not extended in one time and clenched in another.

Consequently, the men mentioned above^a are in 139 a hopeless position in making motion complete a distance all at once; and much more hopeless is it to suppose that it completes a divisible distance not all at once but gradually—the first stage first, and secondly the second. For if motion takes place in this way, when all the bodies and places and times^b are divided to infinity, there will be no beginning of motion. For in order that a thing may have moved 140 over a cubit's distance, it must first pass through the

^a Viz. the Stoics. With §§ 139-141 cf. *P.H.* iii. 76.

^b The three requisites for motion, cf. § 121.

διέρχεσθαι πρῶτον καὶ τὸ δεύτερον τῇ τάξει δευ-
 τερον. ἀλλ' ἵνα καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἀνύση ἡμίτηχου
 διάστημα, ὀφείλει τὸ πρῶτον τεταρτημόριον τοῦ
 πηχαιίου διαστήματος διελθεῖν, εἶτα τότε τὸ δεύ-
 τερον. ἀλλὰ κἄν εἰς πέντε διαιρεθῇ (τὸ πρῶτον
 πεμπτημόριον),¹ κἄν εἰς ἕξ, τὸ πρῶτον ἕκτημόριον.
 141 παντὸς οὖν τοῦ πρῶτου μέρους ἄλλο πρῶτον ἔχοντος
 μέρος διὰ τὴν εἰς ἄπειρον τομῆν, ἀνάγκη μηδέποτε
 ἀρχὴν γίνεσθαι κινήσεως διὰ τὸ ἀνέκλειπτα εἶναι τὰ
 μέρη τοῦ διαστήματος καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώματος, καὶ πᾶν
 τὸ ἐκ τούτων λαμβανόμενον ἔχει ἄλλα μέρη.
 142 Πρὸς μὲν οὖν τοὺς εἰς ἄπειρον τέμνεσθαι λέ-
 γοντας τὰ τε σώματα καὶ τοὺς τόπους καὶ τοὺς
 χρόνους (οὗτοι δὲ εἰσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς) ταυθ'
 ἤρμοξε λέγειν· οἱ δὲ πάντα εἰς ἀμερῆ καταλήγειν
 ὑπειληφότες, ὡς οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον, νεανικω-
 τέραις μᾶλλον ἐνέχονται ταῖς ἀπορίαις, καὶ πρῶτον
 143 ὅτι οὐκ ἔσται κίνησις, ὡς ὁ Διόδωρος ἐδίδασκε τῶν
 ἀμερῶν ἐχόμενος τόπων καὶ σωμάτων. τὸ γὰρ ἐν
 τῷ πρώτῳ ἀμερεῖ τόπῳ περιεχόμενον ἀμερὲς σῶμα
 οὐ κινεῖται· περιείχεται γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἀμερεῖ τόπῳ καὶ
 ἐκπεπληρώκει τούτον. καὶ πάλιν, τὸ ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ
 ὑποκείμενον οὐ κινεῖται· κενεῖται γὰρ ἤδη. εἰ δὲ
 μήτε ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τὸ κινούμενον κινεῖται ἐφ' ὅσον
 ἔστιν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ, μήτ' ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ, παρὰ δὲ
 144 ταῦτα τρίτος οὐκ ἐπινοεῖται τόπος, οὐ κινεῖται τὸ
 λεγόμενον κινεῖσθαι. πάρεστι δὲ καὶ χωρὶς
 τῆς τοιαύτης ἀπορίας ἐξ ὑποθέσεως διαβάλλειν τὴν
 στάσιν τῶν κατ' Ἐπίκουρον. ἔστω γὰρ διάστημα
 ἐξ ἐννέα [τε] συγκείμενον ἀμερῶν τόπων στοιχηδόν

¹ <τὸ πρῶτον πεμπτημόριον> add. cj. Bekk.

first half-cubit and secondly the second in order. But
 in order that it may have completed the distance of
 the first half-cubit, it must first have passed through
 the first quarter of the cubit's distance, and in the
 next place the second quarter; so also (the first fifth
 part), if it be divided into five, and if into six the first
 sixth part. Since, then, every first part has another 141
 first part, because of the division to infinity, of neces-
 sity there can never be any beginning of motion,
 owing to the fact that the parts of the distance and
 those of the body are endless, and every one of them
 which is taken contains other parts.

Such, then, are the arguments which it was proper 142
 to bring against those who say that bodies and places
 and times are divided to infinity (and these men
 are the Stoics); but those who, like Epicurus, have
 assumed that all things are reducible to indivisibles
 involve themselves in more formidable difficulties,—
 such as, firstly, the fact that motion will not exist, as 143
 Diodorus^a showed when treating of indivisible places
 and bodies. For the indivisible body contained in the
 first indivisible place does not move; for it is con-
 tained in the indivisible place and fills it up. And
 again: the body situated in the second place does
 not move, for it has moved already. But if the
 moving object neither moves in the first place—
 inasmuch as it exists in the first—nor yet in the
 second, and besides these no third place is conceived,
 then that which is said to move does not move.—And 144
 even apart from this sort of difficulty, it is possible to
 attack the position of the Epicureans by means of a
 hypothetical case. For suppose a distance made up
 of nine indivisible places arranged in a row, and let

^a Cf. § 86 *supra*.

τεταγμένων, καὶ κινείσθω κατὰ τούτου¹ δὴ τοῦ
 διαστήματος δύο ἀμερῆ σώματα ἀφ' ἑκατέρου τῶν
 145 ἄκρων, κινείσθω δὲ ἰσοταχῶς. οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶ ἡ
 κίνησις ἐστὶν ἰσοταχής, δεήσει ἑκάτερον τῶν
 τοιούτων σωμάτων ἀνὰ τέσσαρας ἀμερεῖς διέρχε-
 σθαι τόπους. φθάσαντα δὲ ἐπὶ τὸν πέμπτον τόπον,
 ὃς ἐστὶ μέσος τῶν τεσσάρων καὶ τῶν τεσσάρων, ἢ
 στήσεται ἢ τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν προκαταταχῆσει, ὥστε
 τοῦτο μὲν πέντε διελθεῖν ἀμερεῖς τόπους τὸ δὲ
 λειπόμενον τέσσαρας μόνον, ἢ οὔτε στήσεται οὔτε
 τὸ ἕτερον προκαταταχῆσει, συνδραμόντα δὲ ὑφ'
 ἐν ἀμφοτέρα ἐξ ἡμισείας διακαθέξει τὸν πέμπτον
 146 ἀμερῆ τόπον. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀμφοτέρα στήναι πάνυ
 ἐστὶν ἀπίθανον· τόπου γὰρ [οὐχ]² ὑποκειμένου καὶ
 μηδενὸς πρὸς τὴν κίνησιν ἀντικείμενος οὐ στή-
 σεται. τὸ δὲ προκαταταχεῖν τοῦ ἑτέρου τὸ ἕτερον
 παρὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὑπέκειτο γὰρ ἰσοταχῶς ἐκά-
 147 τερον αὐτῶν κινούμενον. λείπεται ἄρα λέγειν ὅτι
 εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ συνδραμόντα ἀμφοτέρα ἐφέξει τὰς
 ἡμισείας τοῦ λειπομένου τόπου. εἰ δὲ ἐπέχει
 τοῦτο μὲν τὴν καθ' αὐτὸ ἡμίσειαν ἐκεῖνο δὲ τὴν
 καθ' αὐτό, οὐκ ἔσται ἀμερῆς ὁ τόπος ἀλλ' εἰς δύο
 ἡμισείας μεριστός. οὕτως δὲ καὶ τὰ σώματα·
 μέρει γὰρ αὐτῶν τὸ τοῦ τόπου μέρος ἐπιλαμβά-
 148 νοντα οὐκ ἔσται ἀμερῆ. εἰ δὲ καὶ οἱ τόποι
 μεριστοὶ καὶ τὰ σώματα οὐκ ἀμερῆ, ἀνάγκη καὶ
 τὸν χρόνον μὴ εἶναι ἀμερῆ καὶ ἐλάχιστον. οὐ γὰρ
 ἐν ἴσῳ χρόνῳ διέρχεται τὸν ἀμερῆ τόπον τὸ ἀμερὲς
 σῶμα καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἀμεροῦς τόπου μέρος, ἀλλ' ἐν
 ἄλλῳ μὲν τὸν ὅλον ἀμερῆ τόπον, ἐν ἐλαχίστῳ δὲ τὸ

¹ κατὰ τούτου Heintz: κατ' αὐτοῦ mss., Bekk.

² [οὐχ] om. N, Heintz.

two indivisible bodies be moving over this distance
 from each of its extremities, and let them move at
 equal speeds. Then, since their motions are equal in 145
 speed, each of these bodies will necessarily pass over
 four indivisible places. And on arriving at the fifth
 place, which is midway between the one set of four
 and the other, they will either come to a halt or one
 of them will get there first,—so that this one has
 passed through five indivisible places, the other only
 four,—or they will not come to a halt nor will one of
 them get there first but they will both meet together
 in their course and each occupy a half of the fifth
 indivisible place. Now that both should come to a 146
 halt is extremely improbable; for when there is a
 place existing and nothing repelling their motion
 they will not halt. And that the one should get there
 before the other is contrary to the assumption; for
 it was assumed that both move at equal speeds. It 147
 remains, then, to declare that both will meet together
 in their course and occupy the two halves of the
 vacant place. But if this one occupies the half on its
 side, and that one the half on its side, the place will
 not be indivisible but divisible into two halves. And
 so too the bodies; for as occupying a part of the place
 with a part of themselves they will not be indivisible.
 —But if the places are divisible and the bodies also 148
 not indivisible, time too, of necessity, is not indivisible
 and minimal. For the indivisible body does not pass
 through an indivisible place and a part of that in-
 divisible place in an equal time, but the whole indivis-
 ible place in one time and the part of it in a minimal

149 τούτου μέρος. πάλιν ἔστω τι κανόνιον κέν-
 τρους κατὰ τὸ ἕτερον μέρος διειλημμένον, καὶ τοῦτο
 περιαγέσθω ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑτέρου τῶν ἄκρων κατὰ τινος
 ἐπιπέδου ἐν ἐνὶ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ. καὶ δὴ
 τοῦ ἄκρου περιαγομένου κύκλοι καταγραφῆσονται
 μεγέθει διαφέροντες ἀλλήλων, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἕξωτάτω
 καὶ πάντων περιληπτικὸς μέγιστος, ὁ δ' ἐνδοτάτω
 βραχύτατος, καὶ οἱ μεταξὺ τούτων ἀνάλογοι, ἥτοι
 μείζους καὶ μείζους ἀπὸ τοῦ κέντρου ἐπιόντων
 ἡμῶν ἢ ἐλάσσους καὶ ἐλάσσους ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκτὸς
 150 περιφερείας ὑποβαιώντων. ἐπεὶ οὖν εἰς ἐστὶν ὁ
 τῆς περιαγωγῆς χρόνος (ἔστω δὲ ἡμερῆς οὗτος),
 ζητῶ πῶς ἐνός καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ χρόνου καθεστῶτος
 καθ' ὃν γέγονε τὰ τῆς καταγραφῆς, μιᾶς δὲ οὐσῆς
 καὶ τῆς κινήσεως, διαφέροντες γεγόνασιν ἀλλήλων
 οἱ κύκλοι, καὶ οἱ μὲν μεγάλοι οἱ δὲ μικρὰν ἔχοντες
 151 τὴν περίμετρον. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔνεστι λέγειν ὅτι τῶν
 ἡμερῶν χρόνων διαφορά τις ἐστι παρὰ τὸ μέγεθος
 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τῶν κύκλων οἱ μὲν ἐν μείζουσι ἡ-
 μερέσι καταγραφέντες χρόνοι εἰσὶ μείζους, οἱ δὲ ἐν
 ἐλάσσοσι μικρότεροι. εἰ γὰρ ἕτερος ἑτέρου μείζων
 ἐστὶν ἡμερῆς χρόνος, οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμερῆς ὁ χρόνος
 οὐδὲ ἐλάχιστος, καὶ τὸ κινούμενον οὐ πάντως ἐν
 152 ἡμερῇ χρόνῳ κινεῖται. πρὸς τούτοις οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνο
 ἔστι φάναι, ὅτι εἰς μὲν ἐστὶν ἡμερῆς χρόνος καθ'
 ὃν ἅπαντες καταγράφονται οἱ κύκλοι, τὰ δὲ μέρη
 τοῦ περιαγομένου κανόνος οὐκ ἔστιν ἰσοταχῆ ἀλλὰ
 τὰ μὲν ταχύτερον περιάγεται τὰ δὲ βραδύτερον, καὶ
 ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν ταχύτερον περιαγομένων οἱ μείζους
 συνίστανται κύκλοι ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν βραδύτερον οἱ
 153 μικρότεροι. εἰ δὲ τῷ ὄντι τὰ μὲν θάπτον κινεῖται
 μέρη τὰ δὲ βράδιον, ἐχρήν ἢ διασπᾶσθαι τὸ κα-
 286

time.—Again, suppose there is a certain small ruler 149
 which on one side is provided at intervals with points,
 and let this be made to revolve, starting from one of
 its extremities, over a certain plane surface in one
 and the same time. Now as the extremity revolves,
 circles will be described which differ from one another
 in magnitude, the outermost which surrounds them
 all being the greatest and the innermost the smallest,
 and the intermediate ones in proportion, becoming
 either greater and greater as we advance from the
 centre or less and less as we recede from the outer
 circumference. Since, then, the time of the revolu- 150
 tion is one (and let this be indivisible), I ask how it is
 that, when the time in which the process of describing
 took place is one and the same and the motion also
 is one, the circles have come to be different from one
 another, some being great and some having a small
 circumference. For it is not possible to say that there is
 a difference in the indivisible times in respect of magni- 151
 tude, and because of this those of the circles which were
 described in greater indivisible times are greater, and
 those in less smaller. For if one indivisible time is
 greater than another, the time is not indivisible nor
 minimal, and the moving object does not move wholly
 in an indivisible time. And furthermore, it is not 152
 possible either to assert that, while it is one indivisible
 time in which all the circles are described, the parts
 of the revolving ruler are not of equal speeds but some
 revolve more quickly, others more slowly, and by
 those which revolve more quickly the greater circles
 are constructed, but by those revolving more slowly
 the smaller. But if in reality some parts move more 153
 quickly, others more slowly, the ruler ought to have

νόμιον ἐν τῇ περιαγωγῇ ἢ κάμπτεσθαι γε πάντως, τινῶν μὲν αὐτοῦ μερῶν προκαταταχούντων τινῶν δὲ ὑστερούντων. οὔτε δὲ διασπᾶται οὔτε κάμπτεται· τοῖνυν ἄπορός ἐστιν ἡ κίνησις τοῖς πάντα λέγουσιν
 154 εἰς ἄμερῃ καταλήγειν. καθόλου τε, εἰ πάντα ἀμερῇ ἐστίν, ὃ τε χρόνος ἐν ᾧ γίνεται ἡ κίνησις, καὶ τὸ σῶμα ὅπερ κινεῖται, ὃ τε τόπος ἐν ᾧ τὰ τῆς κινήσεως συντελεῖται, πάντα κατ' ἀνάγκην τὰ κινούμενα ἰσοταχῶς κινήσεται, ὥστε τὸν ἥλιον τῇ χελώνῃ γίνεσθαι ἰσοταχῇ· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς καὶ αὐτῇ ἐν ἄμερῃ χρόνῳ ἄμερές ἀντίε διάστημα. ἄτοπον δέ γε πάντα τὰ κινούμενα ἰσοταχῶς λέγειν κινεῖσθαι ἢ τὴν χελώνην τῷ ἥλιῳ τυγχάνειν ἰσοταχῇ· ἄτοπον ἄρα τὸ πάντων εἰς ἄμερές καταληγόντων ἀξιοῦν γίνεσθαι τὴν κίνησιν.

155 Λείπεται τοῖνυν σκοπεῖν εἰ δύναται κινεῖσθαι τι τινῶν μὲν εἰς ἄπειρον τεμνομένων τινῶν δὲ εἰς ἄμερές καταληγόντων. καὶ δὴ οὕτως ἠνέχθησαν οἱ περὶ τὸν Στράτωνα τὸν φυσικόν· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ χρόνους εἰς ἄμερές ὑπέλαβον καταλήγειν, τὰ δὲ σώματα καὶ τοὺς τόπους εἰς ἄπειρον τέμνεσθαι, κινεῖσθαι τε τὸ κινούμενον ἐν ἄμερῃ χρόνῳ ὅλον ἄθρουν μεριστὸν διάστημα καὶ οὐ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον
 156 πρότερον. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὴν τούτων στάσιν (εἶναι) ἀδύνατον¹ ἔσται διδάσκειν πάντως² προδηλοτέρων ἐχομένους ὑποδειγμάτων. ὑποκείσθω γὰρ τετραδακτυλῆιον διάστημα, καὶ ἀντέτω τοῦτο τὸ κινούμενον σῶμα ἐν δυσὶν ἄμερέσι χρόνοις, ὥστε τὸ ἕτερον διδακτυλῆιον ἐν ἐνὶ ἄμερῃ χρόνῳ διέρχεσθαι καὶ τὸ λειπόμενον πάλιν ἐν ἐνί. τοιαύτης δὲ

been pulled to pieces during its revolution or certainly bent, as some of its parts rush ahead while others lag behind. But it is neither pulled to pieces nor bent; so then motion is inexplicable for those who assert that all things are reducible to indivisibles.—Also, 154 in general, if they are all indivisible^a—not only the time in which the motion occurs, but also the body which moves and the place in which the effects of the motion are completed,—then all the moving bodies will of necessity move at equal speeds, so that the sun is equal in speed to the tortoise; for both the former and the latter complete an indivisible distance in an indivisible time. But it is absurd to say that all moving objects move at equal speeds or that the tortoise is equal in speed to the sun; therefore it is absurd to maintain that, if all things are reducible to indivisibles, motion exists.

It remains, then, to consider whether anything can 155 move if some things are divided *ad infinitum* and others are reducible to indivisibles. And Strato the physicist,^b in fact, took this view; for he supposed that times are reducible to indivisibles, but bodies and places are divided *ad infinitum*, and that the moving object moves over the whole of a divisible distance in an indivisible time all at once and not by gradations. That this view also is impossible one can 156 certainly show by employing quite plain examples. For let us assume a distance of four fingers, and let the moving body complete this in two indivisible times, so that it passes over the one two-fingers' distance in one indivisible time and the other likewise in one. And such being our assumption, from the

^a With § 154 *cf.* P.H. iii. 77.

^b Head of the Peripatetic School, 287-269 B.C.

¹ <εἶναι> ἀδύνατον] ἀδύνατον N, cj. Bekk.: δυνατόν cet., Bekk.

² πάντως Fabr.: πάντων mss., Bekk.

οὔσης ὑποθέσεως ἀφαιρείσθω τοῦ τοσοῦτου διαστή-
 ματος δακτυλιαῖον διάστημα, ὥστε τὸ περιλειπό-
 157 μενον διάστημα τριδακτυλιαῖον γίνεσθαι. ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ
 ὅλον τετραδακτυλιαῖον διάστημα ἐν δυοῖν ἀμερέσι
 χρόνοις τὸ κινούμενον σῶμα διήρχετο, πάντως
 τὸ τριδακτυλιαῖον ἀνύσει ἐν ἐνὶ ἀμερεὶ χρόνῳ καὶ
 ἡμίσει, ἐν ἐνὶ μὲν τὸ διδακτυλιαῖον διάστημα, ἐν
 ἡμίσει δὲ τὸ λειπόμενον δακτυλιαῖον. καὶ οὕτως
 εἰ ἔστι τοῦ ἀμεροῦς χρόνου ἡμίσει λειπόμενος ἀμε-
 ρῆς χρόνος, οὐκ ἔστι τις ἀμερῆς χρόνος, ἀλλὰ καὶ
 158 οὗτος εἰς μέρη τέτμηται. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος εἰ
 πέμπτον δάκτυλον προσθῶμεν τῷ τετραδακτυλιαίῳ
 διαστήματι. πῶς γὰρ τοῦτο κινήσεται τὸ κινού-
 μενον; ἄρα γε ἐν ἀμερεὶ χρόνῳ; ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ
 διπλοῦν ἐν ἀμερεὶ χρόνῳ διήνυεν, ἔσται τὸ ἐν τῷ
 αὐτῷ χρόνῳ κινούμενον ταχύ τε ἅμα καὶ βραδύ,
 ἢ μὲν διδακτυλιαῖον ἐν ἀμερεὶ χρόνῳ ἀνύει, ταχύ,
 ἢ δ' ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ δακτυλιαῖον διέρχεται, βραδύ. εἰ
 δὲ ἐν ἐλάττονι ἀμεροῦς χρόνου ἀνύει τὸν πέμπτον
 δάκτυλον, μεριστός ἐστιν ὁ ἀμερῆς χρόνος· ὅπερ οὐ
 θέλουσιν.

159 Καὶ μὴν εἰ ἐν ἀμερεὶ χρόνῳ τὸ κινούμενον ὑφ'
 ἐν ἄθρονι μεριστὸν ἀνύει διάστημα, στήσεται τι
 ἀναιτίως, ὡς παραστήσομεν· οὐχὶ δέ γε ἴσταται τι
 ἀναιτίως· οὐκ ἄρα κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον γίνεται

160 ἡ κίνησις. ἔστω γὰρ ὀρθιὸν τι διάστημα, οἷον
 δεκάπηχυ, καὶ βαρὺ τι σῶμα, οἷον εἰς μολιβῆ σφαῖρα,
 ἐν ἐνὶ ἐλαχίστῳ χρόνῳ ἀνέτω ὅλον τοῦτο τὸ
 διάστημα ἀνωθεν κάτω. ἀλλὰ καὶ προστιθέσθω
 τούτῳ τῷ διαστήματι ἄλλο πηχυαῖον διάστημα,
 ὥστε ὅλον γίνεσθαι ἐνδεκάπηχυ, ἀφιεῖσθω τε πάλιν

161 ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄκρου ἢ σφαῖρα. οὐκοῦν φθάσασα ἐπὶ τὸ

distance stated let the distance of a finger be sub-
 tracted, so that the distance still left is one of three
 fingers. But if the moving body passes over the 157
 whole distance of four fingers in two indivisible times
 it certainly will complete that of three fingers in one
 indivisible time and a half,—the distance of two
 fingers in one, and the remaining distance of a finger
 in a half. And thus, if an indivisible time is less by
 half than an indivisible time, no indivisible time exists
 but this too is divided into parts. And the same 158
 argument applies if we add on a fifth finger to the
 distance of four fingers. For how will the moving
 object move over this? Will it be in an indivisible
 time? But if so, since it also completed double that
 distance in an indivisible time, the object which
 moves over it in the same time will be both fast and
 slow simultaneously,—fast inasmuch as it completes
 the distance of two fingers in an indivisible time, but
 slow inasmuch as it completes but one finger's distance
 in an equal time. But if it completes the fifth finger
 in less than an indivisible time, the indivisible time is
 divisible; which they refuse to admit.

Moreover, if the moving object completes all at 159
 once a divisible distance in an indivisible time, some-
 thing will be coming to a halt causelessly, as we shall
 establish; but nothing comes to a halt causelessly;
 therefore motion does not take place in this way. For 160
 suppose a certain vertical distance, say of ten cubits,
 and let a certain heavy body, such as a leaden ball,
 complete the whole of this distance from the top to
 the bottom in one minimal time. But to this distance
 let there be also added another distance of a cubit, so
 that the total becomes eleven cubits, and let the ball
 be started again from the top. Then, when it has 161

πέρας μὲν τοῦ δεκάτου πήχεως ἀρχὴν δὲ τοῦ ἐνδεκάτου ἢ στήσεται ἢ καὶ τοῦτον διελύσεται, φημί δὲ τὸν ἐνδέκατον πήχυν. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν στήναι ἄτοπον· βαρὺ γὰρ οὕτω σῶμα καὶ δι' ἀέρος φερόμενον καὶ μηδενὸς ἀντικόπτοντος, εἰ στήσεται, 162 πάντως ἀναίτιως στήσεται, ὅπερ ἦν ἄτοπον. εἰ δὲ κινήσεται, ἐπεὶ τὸ ὅλον δεκάπηχυν διάστημα ἐν ἐνὶ ἡμερῇ διέρχεται χρόνῳ, τὸ λειπόμενον πηχυαῖον διάστημα τῆς αὐτῆς οὔσης κινήσεως ἐν δεκάτῳ μέρει τοῦ ἡμεροῦς χρόνου διελύσεται, ὥστε τὸν ἡμερῆ χρόνον πρὸς τῷ μὴ εἶναι ἡμερῆ ἔτι καὶ εἰς δέκα μέρη τετμηθῆναι.

163 Καὶ μὴν εἰ τὸ κινούμενον ἐν ἐνὶ ἡμερῇ χρόνῳ ὅλον ἀνύει μεριστὸν διάστημα, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐν ἐνὶ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ ἐν πᾶσι γενήσεται τοῖς τοῦ διαστήματος μέρεσιν. εἰ δὲ ἐν ἐνὶ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ ἐν πᾶσι γενήσεται τοῖς τοῦ διαστήματος μέρεσιν, οὐκ ἔσται κεκωημένον τὸ διάστημα ἀλλὰ 164 ἐπεσχηκός· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. οὐ τοίνυν ἐν ἐνὶ καὶ ἡμερῇ χρόνῳ κινεῖται τὸ κινούμενον μεριστὸν διάστημα, ἐπεὶ ἔσται τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ θερμόν τε καὶ ψυχρόν πεφωτισμένον τε καὶ ἀφώτιστον. ὑποκείσθω γὰρ διπηχυαῖον διάστημα, καὶ τούτου ὁ μὲν ἕτερος πήχυσ πεपुरακτώσθω ὁ δ' ἕτερος ἐψύχθω. εἰ δὴ τὸ κινούμενον ἐν ἐνὶ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ ἡμερῇ χρόνῳ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο ἐπιλαμβάνει 165 διάστημα, ὅτε μὲν κατὰ τοῦ πεपुरακτωμένου πήχεως ἔστω, ἔσται πεपुरακτωμένον, ὅτε δὲ κατὰ τοῦ ἐψυγμένου, ἐψυγμένον. γίνεται δὲ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ἔν τε τῷ πεपुरακτωμένῳ καὶ τῷ ἐψυγμένῳ· τὸ αὐτὸ ἄρα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ἔσται ἅμα θερμόν τε καὶ ψυχρόν· ὃ τῶν ἀδυνάτων 292

reached the end of the tenth cubit and the beginning of the eleventh, it will either come to a halt or it will pass over the latter as well—I mean the eleventh cubit. But that it should come to a halt is absurd ; for if a body which is so heavy and moving through the air and having nothing to resist it shall come to a halt, it will certainly be halting causelessly, which is absurd. And if it shall keep moving, then, since it 162 passes over the whole distance of ten cubits in one indivisible time, as the motion is the same it will pass over the remaining distance of a cubit in the tenth part of the indivisible time, so that the indivisible time, in addition to being no longer indivisible, is also divided into ten parts.

Moreover, if the moving object completes the whole 163 of a divisible distance in one indivisible time, it will necessarily come to be in all the parts of the distance in one and the same time. But if it shall be in all the parts of the distance in one and the same time, it will not have moved over the distance but will have occupied it ; which is absurd. So then, the moving object does 164 not move over a divisible distance in one indivisible time, since (if it does so) the same object at the same time will be both hot and cold, both illuminated and not illuminated. For let us suppose a distance of two cubits, and of this let the one cubit be heated by fire and the other be chilled. Now if the moving body 165 occupies the whole of this distance in one and the same indivisible time, when it is in the heated cubit it will be heated, and when in the chilled one it will be chilled. But it is both in the heated one and in the chilled one at the same time ; therefore the same thing will be at once both hot and cold at the same time ; and this is a thing impossible. And not only 166

166 ὑπῆρχεν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔφοδον ἔσται διδάσκειν ὅτι ὑφ' ἐν ταυτὸ ἔσται καὶ πεφωτισμένον καὶ ἀφώτιστον· ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ παρὰ τὴν ἐνάργειαν.

Πρὸς τούτοις δεήσει ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ, ὅπηλικον ἂν τις ὑποθῆται διάστημα, κεινησθαι λέγειν 167 τὸ κινούμενον. ὅσον ἔστω τετραδακτυλιαῖον διάστημα, καὶ διηρήσθω εἰς ὀκτώ μέρη, εὐσήμου τε χάριν διδασκαλίας τὸ μὲν πρῶτον αὐτοῦ μέρος καλεῖσθω Α, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον Β, τὸ δὲ τρίτον Γ, καὶ κατὰ τὰ ἐξῆς ὁμοίως. εἰ δὴ τὸ κινούμενον ἐν ἐνὶ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ μεριστὸν ἀνύει διάστημα, ἐν ᾧ χρόνῳ κινεῖται τὸ ΑΒ διάστημα, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ δυνήσεται κινεῖσθαι τὸ ΒΓ διάστημα. ἀλλ' εἰ <τούτου>¹ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ κινήσεται καὶ τὸ ΓΔ, καὶ οὕτω μέχρις ἀπείρου, ὥστε ἐν ἐνὶ καὶ ἀμερεῖ χρόνῳ κινήσεται τὸ ὅλον τῆς γῆς διάστημα.

168 Εἰ οὖν μήτε εἰς ἀπειρον οὔσης τῆς τομῆς μήτε εἰς ἀμερές τῆς καταλήξεως, μήτε τινῶν μὲν εἰς ἀπειρον τεμνομένων τινῶν δὲ εἰς ἀμερές καταληγόντων, σώζεται ἢ κίνησις, ῥητέον μηδὲν εἶναι κίνησιν. οἷς ἔπεται ἢ ἐποχὴ διὰ τε τὴν τῆς ἐναργείας καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀντικειμένων αὐτῇ λόγων ἰσοσθένειαν.

Γ'.—ΕΙ ΕΣΤΙ ΧΡΟΝΟΣ

169 Τῆς κινήσεως τριῶν οὐσιῶν, ὡς προείπον, ἔχομένης, σώματός τε τοῦ κινουμένου καὶ τόπου τοῦ ἐν ᾧ κινεῖται καὶ χρόνου καθ' ὃν ἡ κίνησις συν-

¹ <τούτου> add. cj. Bekk.

^a The first view is that of the Stoics (§§ 123 ff.), the second that of Epicurus (§§ 142 ff.), the third Strato's (§§ 155 ff.)

so, but by the same method it will be possible to show also that the same thing will be at once both illuminated and not illuminated; and this too is contrary to the evidence of sense.

Furthermore, one will have to say that the moving object has moved over the distance, whatever the length one assumes this to have, in the same time. For example, suppose a distance of four fingers, and let it be divided into eight parts, and, for the sake of explaining the matter clearly, let the first part of it be called Α, the second Β, the third C, and so on with the rest. Now if the moving object completes a divisible distance in one and the same time, it will be able to move over the distance BC in the same time in which it moves over the distance AB. But if so, it will also move over CD in the same time, and so on *ad infinitum*, so that in a single and indivisible time it will move over the whole distance of the earth.

If, then, motion is secured neither when there is a division to infinity, nor when there is a reduction to indivisibles, nor when some things are divided to infinity but others reduced to indivisibles,^a then one must declare that motion is nothing. And from this there follows suspension of judgement because of the equipollence of the sense-evidence and of the arguments which contradict it.^b

CHAPTER III.—DOES TIME EXIST?

As motion involves, as I said before,^c three things—169 the moving body and the place wherein it moves and the time in which the movement is completed,—now

^b For "the evidence" of the senses in favour of motion see §§ 66 ff., the counter-arguments being those in §§ 70-168.

^c See §§ 121, 140, 142, 154.

τελείται, ἐπεὶ τό τε σῶμα καὶ τὸν τόπον ἠπορή-
 σαμεν, πειρασόμεθα καὶ περὶ χρόνου ζητεῖν· τάχα
 γὰρ καὶ περὶ τούτου ὁ λόγος ἄπορος φανεῖται τοῖς
 τε αἰώνιον ὑποτιθεμένοις εἶναι τὸν κόσμον φυσικοῖς
 καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ τινος χρόνου λέγουσιν αὐτὸν συνεστά-
 σθαι. καὶ δὴ τινές φασι χρόνον εἶναι “διάστημα
 τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κινήσεως,” οἱ δὲ αὐτὴν τὴν τοῦ
 κόσμου κίνησιν. οὔτε δὲ κατὰ τοὺς πρώτους οὔτε
 κατὰ τοὺς δευτέρους γίνεται τις χρόνος. εἴπερ γὰρ
 τὸ διάστημα τῆς κινήσεως καὶ ἡ κίνησις οὐδὲν
 ἔστι παρὰ τὸ κινούμενον, ὁ χρόνος τῆς κοσμικῆς
 κινήσεως διάστημα καθεστῶς ἢ ἰδιαίτερον κοσμικῆς
 κινήσεως οὐδὲν ἔσται παρὰ τὸν κινούμενον κόσμον,
 ἀλλὰ κόσμος πως ἔχων γενήσεται ὁ χρόνος· ὅπερ
 171 ἔστιν ἄτοπον. καὶ ἄλλως, τὴν μὲν κίνησιν τοῦ
 κόσμου ἐνδέχεται νοεῖν κατὰ τινα χρόνον μὴ οὔσαν,
 ὡστ’ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ τοῦ κόσμου κίνησις <ὁ>¹ χρόνος.
 172 καὶ ἄλλως, πᾶσα κίνησις ἐν χρόνῳ γίνεται,
 διὸ καὶ ἡ τοῦ κόσμου κίνησις ἐν χρόνῳ γενήσεται.
 ὁ δὲ χρόνος ἐν χρόνῳ οὐ γίνεται· ἤτοι γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ
 γενήσεται ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ ὡς ἄλλος,² οὔτε δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ
 γένοιτ’ ἂν (ἔσται γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ εἰς καὶ δύο) οὔτε
 ἕτερος ἐν ἑτέρῳ διὰ τὸ μήτε τινα τῶν ἐνεστώτων
 γίνεσθαι ἐν τῷ μὴ ἐνεστώτι μήτε τινα τῶν μὴ
 ἐνεστώτων ἐν τῷ ἐνεστώτι. τοίνυν οὐδὲ διὰ τοῦτο
 173 ῥητέον κόσμου κίνησιν εἶναι τὸν χρόνον. πάλιν
 ὡσπερ ἡ κίνησις ἐν χρόνῳ γίνεται, οὔτω καὶ ἡ
 μονή· ἀλλ’ ὃν τρόπον οὐδεὶς λέγει τὴν μονὴν εἶναι

that we have discussed the difficulties regarding body
 and place,^a we shall try also to investigate time ; for
 regarding it also the accounts given both by the
 Physicists who suppose that the Universe is eternal,
 and by those who assert that it was constructed at a
 given time, will, perhaps, appear to be hopeless. Now 170
 some declare that time is “the interval of the motion
 of the Universe,” and others that it is “the motion
 itself of the Universe.”^b But neither according to
 the view of the first nor according to that of the second
 does any time exist. For if interval of motion and
 motion are nothing apart from the moving object,
 time, since it is interval of cosmic motion or, more
 precisely, cosmic motion, will be nothing else than the
 moving Universe, and time will be the Universe in
 a certain state ; which is absurd.—And again : it is 171
 possible to conceive the motion of the Universe as
 non-existent at a certain time, so that time will not
 be the motion of the Universe.—And again : all 172
 motion takes place in time, therefore the motion of
 the Universe also will take place in time. But time
 does not take place in time ; for, if so, it will exist either
 in itself or as one <time> in another. But it will not
 exist in itself (for then the same time will be both
 one and two), nor as one time in another, because none
 of the things present exists in what is not present and
 none of those not present in what is present. So,
 then, on this account also one must not assert that
 time is the motion of the Universe.—Once more : just 173
 as motion takes place in time, so also does rest ; but
 just as no one says that rest is time, so neither is one

^a For “body” see *Adv. Phys.* i. 366 ff. ; for “place,” §§ 37 ff. *supra*.

^b The first of these definitions is Stoic, the second Platonic ; cf. *P.H.* iii. 136 f.

¹ <ὁ> add. Rüstow.

² ὡς ἄλλος] ἢ ἄλλοις mss., Bekk. (del. Kayser).

χρόνον, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὴν τοῦ κόσμου κίνησιν δεόντως
 χρόνον ἀποφαίνεται. ἢ τε τοῦ κόσμου κίνησις
 διὰ παντός ἐστιν ἢ αὐτῆ, ὁ δὲ χρόνος οὐ διὰ παντός
 ἐστιν ὁ αὐτός, ἀλλ' ὅτε μὲν ὁ αὐτός λέγεται ὅτε δὲ
 ἄλλος, καὶ ὅτε ἄλλος, ὅτε μὲν πλείων ὅτε δὲ
 ἐλάττων. ἕτερον ἄρα ἐστὶν ἢ τοῦ κόσμου κίνησις
 174 καὶ ἕτερον ὁ χρόνος. οἷ γε μὴν τὴν τοῦ κόσμου
 κίνησιν ἀνελόντες τὴν δὲ γῆν κινεῖσθαι δοξάσαντες,
 ὡς οἱ περὶ Ἀρίσταρχον τὸν μαθηματικόν, οὐ
 κωλύονται νοεῖν χρόνον. τοῖνον ἕτερον εἶναι λε-
 κτέον τὸν χρόνον καὶ οὐ ταῦτόν τῆ τοῦ κόσμου
 175 κινήσει. οἷ τε ἐν καταγείοις τισὶ καὶ ἀλαμπέσι
 σπηλαίοις βιοτεύοντες καὶ οἱ ἐκ γενετῆς πηροὶ τῆς
 μὲν τοῦ κόσμου κινήσεως ἔννοιαν οὐκ ἔχουσι,
 καθίσαντες δὲ καὶ ἀναστάντες καὶ περιπατήσαντες,
 ἔννοιαν χρόνου λαμβάνουσι τοῦ ἐν ᾧ τὰ τρία ταῦτα
 ἐνήργησαν, καὶ πλείονος μὲν τοῦ ἐν ᾧ τὰ τρία,
 ἐλάσσονος δὲ τοῦ ἐν ᾧ τὰ δύο, ἐλαχίστου δὲ τοῦ ἐν
 ᾧ τὸ ἐν. εἰ δὲ δυνατόν νοῆσαι χρόνον μὴ νοοῦντας
 τὴν οὐράνιον περιφορὰν, ἕτερόν ἐστιν αὕτη καὶ
 ἕτερον ὁ χρόνος.
 176 Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ χρόνον ἔφασκεν εἶναι ἀριθμὸν
 τοῦ ἐν κινήσει πρώτου καὶ ὑστέρου. εἰ δὲ τοῦτό
 ἐστὶν ὁ χρόνος, συμμημόνευσις τις τοῦ ἐν κινήσει
 πρώτου καὶ ὑστέρου, τὸ ἡρεμοῦν καὶ ἀκινήτιζον οὐκ
 ἔσται ἐν χρόνῳ. ἢ εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἐν χρόνῳ τὸ ἀκινή-
 τίζον, ὁ δὲ χρόνος ἐστὶν ἀριθμὸς τοῦ ἐν κινήσει
 πρώτου καὶ ὑστέρου, ἔσται τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ ἡρεμοῦν
 177 καὶ κινούμενον ὅπερ ἀδύνατον. διόπερ Στράτων ὁ

right in asserting that the motion of the Universe is
 time.—Also, the motion of the Universe is perpetually
 the same but time is not perpetually the same, but is
 now called the same and again unequal; and when
 unequal, now more and now less. Therefore the
 motion of the Universe is one thing and time another.
 And in fact those who, like Aristarchus the mathe- 174
 matician, have rejected the motion of the Universe,^a
 but have held that the earth moves, are not precluded
 from conceiving time. So, then, we must say that
 time is another thing and not the same as the motion
 of the Universe.—Also, those who live in subter- 175
 ranean and unlighted caverns and those who are
 blind from birth have no conception of the motion of
 the Universe, but after sitting and standing up and
 walking they get a conception of the time in which
 they performed these three actions, and of the time
 of the three as greater, that of two as less, and that
 of one as least. But if it is possible for them to
 conceive time without conceiving the revolution of
 the heavens, this latter is one thing and time another.

Aristotle declared that time is "the number of the 176
 prior and posterior in motion."^b But if time is this—
 a "joint recollection" of the prior and posterior in
 motion,—what is at rest and motionless will not exist
 in time. Or else, if what is motionless is in time, and
 time is the number of the prior and posterior in
 motion, then that which is in time will be both at rest
 and in motion; which is impossible. On this account 177

^a Cf. *P.H.* iii. 136; *Aristot. Phys.* iv. 11. When the mind distinguishes between past, present, and future, it is using time as the measure (or "number") of the course of events. For the Stoic term "joint recollection" cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 353 ff.

^b Here "the Universe" (*κόσμος*) means "the Heavens" (excluding the earth). Aristarchus of Samos was a famous astronomer at Alexandria (circa 270 B.C.).

φυσικὸς ἀποστὰς τῆσδε τῆς ἐννοίας ἔλεγε χρόνον
 ὑπάρχειν μέτρον πάσης κινήσεως καὶ μονῆς· παρ-
 ἦκει γὰρ πᾶσι τοῖς κινουμένοις, ὅτε κινεῖται, καὶ
 πᾶσι τοῖς ἀκινήτοις, ὅτε ἀκινήτιζοι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο
 178 πάντα τὰ γινόμενα ἐν χρόνῳ γίνεται. μήποτε δὲ
 πάμπολλά ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ τοῦτω μαχόμενα· αὐταρκες
 δὲ νῦν ἐκεῖνο λέγειν ὅτι τὸ μετροῦν τὴν κίνησιν ἢ
 τὴν μονὴν ἐν χρόνῳ γίνεται [καὶ οὐκ ἐστὶ χρόνος].¹
 εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ μετροῦν τὴν κίνησιν καὶ
 τὴν μονὴν <ὁ>² χρόνος· ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ οὐ γίνεται
 179 χρόνος. ἄλλως τε, εἰ διὰ τοῦτο μέτρον τῆς
 κινήσεως καὶ τῆς μονῆς ἐστὶν ὁ χρόνος, ἐπεὶ ἀντι-
 παρῆκει τῇ τε κινήσει ἐφ' ὅσον ἐστὶ κίνησις καὶ
 τῇ μονῇ ἐφ' ὅσον ἐστὶ μονή, ἐπεὶ πάλιν ἡ κίνησις
 καὶ ἡ μονὴ ἀντιπαρῆκει τῷ χρόνῳ, οὐ μᾶλλον ἐστὶ
 χρόνος μέτρον τῆς κινήσεως καὶ τῆς μονῆς ἢ ἡ
 180 κίνησις καὶ ἡ μονὴ μέτρον τοῦ χρόνου. καὶ τοῦτο
 τάχα βέλτιον ἢν εἰπεῖν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ χρόνος δυσθεώ-
 ρητόν τι ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ κίνησις καὶ ἡ μονὴ εὐσύνοπτον,
 ληφθεῖη δ' ἂν οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ δυσθεωρήτου τὸ εὐθεώ-
 ρητον ἀλλ' ἀνάπαλιν.
 181 Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ εἰς τοὺς περὶ Ἐπίκουρον καὶ
 Δημόκριτον φυσικοὺς τοιαύτη τις ἀναφέρεσθαι
 τοῦ χρόνου νόησις· “χρόνος ἐστὶν ἡμεροειδὲς καὶ
 νυκτοειδὲς φάντασμα,” καθ' ἣν πάλιν ἀπορός ἐστὶν
 ἡ [περὶ] τοῦ χρόνου φύσις. εἰ γὰρ ἀνυπόστατος
 δείκνυται ἡ ἡμέρα καὶ ἡ νύξ, ἀκολουθεῖ καὶ τὸ
 ἡμεροειδὲς φάντασμα [μὴ εἶναι χρόνον ἢ]³ ἀνυπό-
 182 στατον ὑπάρχειν. ἡμέρα γὰρ ἡ καὶ ἰδιαίτερον
 νοουμένη καὶ δωδεκάωρος, τουτέστιν ἡ ἀπὸ ἀνα-

Strato the Physicist ^a rejected this notion and said that time is “the measure of all motion and rest”; for it is co-extensive with all moving objects when they are moving and with all immobile objects when they are motionless, and for this reason all things which exist exist in time. But, very possibly, there is a vast 178 number of things which conflict with his view; though it is enough now to mention the fact that what measures the motion or the rest exists in time [and is not time]; and if so, time will not be that which measures motion and rest; for time does not exist in time.—And again: if time is the measure of motion 179 and rest for the reason that it is co-extensive both with motion in so far as it is motion and with rest in so far as it is rest, then since, conversely, motion and rest are co-extensive with time, time will not be the measure of motion and rest any more than motion and rest the measure of time. Perhaps, indeed, it would 180 have been better to have said the latter; for whereas time is hard to observe, motion and rest are easy to discern, and what is easy to observe is not to be perceived through what is hard, but rather the reverse.

It seems, too, that there is ascribed to the Physi- 181 cists Epicurus and Democritus ^b a conception of time such as this—“Time is a day-like and night-like phantasm” ^c; and according to this, again, the nature of time is dubious. For if day and night are shown to be unreal, it follows that the day-like phantasm also [is not time or] is unreal. For day, in 182 its narrower conception as consisting of twelve hours

^a Cf. P.H. iii. 137; § 228 *infra*.

^b Cf. § 219 *infra*; P.H. iii. 137.

^c *i.e.* image, or mental picture.

¹ [καὶ . . . χρόνος] secl. Heintz.

² <ὁ> add. N.

³ [μὴ . . . ἢ] secl. Heintz.

183 πολῆς μέχρι δύσεως, σκεψαμένους ἡμῶν ἀνυπόστατος φαίνεται. ὅτε γὰρ ἡ πρώτη ὑφέστηκεν ὥρα, οὕτω αἱ ἑνδεκα ὑφεστᾶσιν· τῶν δέ γε πλειόνων ὥρῶν μὴ οὐσῶν οὐκ ἂν εἶη ἡμέρα. καὶ πάλιν ὅτε ἡ δευτέρα ὑφέστηκεν ὥρα, ἡ μὲν πρώτη οὐκέτ' ἔστιν, αἱ δὲ λειπόμεναι δέκα οὕτω εἰσίν, διὸ τῶν πλειόνων μὴ οὐσῶν ὥρῶν οὐδ' οὕτως ἔσται ἡ ἡμέρα. πάντοτε οὖν μιᾶς ὥρας ὑφεστάσεως, τῆς δὲ ἡμέρας μιᾶς ὥρας μὴ οὐσης, οὐκ ἂν εἶη τις ἡμέρα. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ἡ μία ὥρα ὑφέστηκεν· κατὰ πλάτος γὰρ νοεῖται, ἐκ πλειόνων τε καὶ αὐτῆ συνέστηκε μοιρῶν, ὧν αἱ μὲν οὐδέπω εἰσὶν αἱ δὲ οὐκέτι, ὥστε καὶ τὸ σύνθετον ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀνυπόστατον γίνεσθαι. εἰ δὲ μήτε ὥρα τις ἐστὶ μήτε ἡμέρα μήτε κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον νύξ, οὐδὲ χρόνος ἔσται ἡμεροειδὲς ἢ νυκτερο-
 185 εἰδὲς φάντασμα. καὶ μὴν ἡμέρα λέγεται διχῶς, καθ' ἓνα μὲν τρόπον ἢ ἐκ τῶν δώδεκα ὥρῶν συνεστῶσα, καθ' ἕτερον δὲ ὁ πεφωτισμένος ἐξ ἡλίου ἀήρ. ἦτοι οὖν τῆς ἐκ τῶν ὥρῶν συνεστάσεως ἡμέρας φάντασμα εἶναι λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον τὸν χρόνον, ἢ τῆς ὡς πεφωτισ-
 186 μένου ἀέρος ἐξ ἡλίου. ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν ἐκ τῶν ὥρῶν συνεστάσεως ἡμέρας οὐκ ἂν εἴπαιεν φάντασμα εἶναι τὸν χρόνον· αὕτη γὰρ αὐτῆ ἡ ἡμέρα χρόνος ἐστὶ, φημί δὲ τὴν δωδεκάωρον, διόπερ εἰ τὸ φάντασμα ταύτης χρόνος εἶναι νοεῖται, ἔσται ὁ χρόνος τοῦ χρόνου φάντασμα· ὅπερ ἦν ἀπεμφαῖνον. τοῖνυν οὐ λεκτέον τὸ τῆς δωδεκάωρου ἡμέρας φάντασμα χρόνον ὑπάρχειν. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ τῆς ὡς πεφωτισμένου ἀέρος ἡμέρας φάντασμα· αὕτη γὰρ ἐν χρόνῳ γίνεται, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἰ χρόνος ἐστὶ τὸ ταύτης τῆς ἡμέρας ἡμέτερον φάντασμα, ἐν τῷ ἡμετέρῳ φαν-
 302

—that is to say, from sunrise to sunset,—appears when we examine it to be unreal. For when the first hour exists, the eleven do not as yet exist; and when most of the hours are non-existent, day will not exist. And again: when the second hour is present, the first no longer exists and the remaining ten are not yet in existence, so that in this case too, as most of the hours are non-existent, day will not exist. Always, then, if one hour exists but day is not one hour, no day will exist. Nor, in fact, does one hour exist; for it is conceived by way of extension and is itself also composed of a number of parts of which some are not as yet and others no longer existent, so that what is compounded of them is unreal. But if there exists neither an hour nor a day nor, by analogy, a night, then time will not be a day-like or night-like phantasm.—Moreover, the word “day” has two senses, being in the one sense that which is composed of the twelve hours, and in the other the air which is illuminated by the sun. Epicurus, then, asserts that time is a phantasm either of the day composed of the hours or of that which is air illuminated by the sun. But he would not say that time is a phantasm of the day composed of the hours; for this day itself—I mean the twelve-hour day—is time, and therefore, if the phantasm of this is conceived to be time, time will be the phantasm of time; which is nonsensical. So then one must not say that the phantasm of the twelve-hour day is time. Nor yet the phantasm of the day which is illuminated air; for this exists in time, and therefore, if time is our phantasm of this

τάσματι γενήσεται ἢ τοιαύτη ἡμέρα. ὁ πολλῶ τοῦ
 188 πρώτου χεῖρον ἐστίν. φθαρέντος τε τοῦ κόσμου
 κατὰ Ἐπικούρου οὔτε ἡμέρα ἐστίν οὔτε νύξ, διὰ δὲ
 τοῦτο οὔτε ἡμερήσιον οὔτε νυκτερήσιον φάντασμα.
 ἄτοπον δ' ἦν φθαρέντος τοῦ κόσμου λέγειν μὴ εἶναι
 χρόνον· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ποτέ¹ [καὶ τὸ] ἐφθάρθαι καὶ τὸ
 φθεῖρ θῆναι χρόνων ἐστίν ἐμφατικά. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο,
 ἕτερον μὲν ἐστίν ὁ χρόνος, διάφορον δὲ τὸ ἡμερήσιον
 ἢ νυκτερήσιον φάντασμα.

Ἐκ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἐπινοίας οὕτως ἢ τοῦ χρόνου
 189 ὑπαρξίς ἠπορήσθω· πάρεστι δὲ καὶ προηγουμένῳ
 λόγῳ τὸ προκείμενον κατασκευάζειν. εἴπερ γὰρ
 ἐστὶ χρόνος, ἦτοι πεπέρασται ἢ ἀπειρός ἐστίν· οὔτε
 δὲ πεπέρασται, ὡς παραστήσομεν, οὔτε ἀπειρός
 ἐστίν, ὡς διδάξομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶ τι χρόνος. εἰ
 γὰρ πεπέρασται ὁ χρόνος, ἦν ποτὲ χρόνος ὅτε ὁ
 χρόνος οὐκ ἦν, καὶ ἔσται ποτὲ χρόνος ὅτε οὐκ ἔσται
 χρόνος. ἄτοπον δέ γε ἢ τὸ γεγονέναι ποτὲ χρόνον
 ὅτε ὁ χρόνος οὐκ ἦν, ἢ τὸ ἔσεσθαι ποτὲ χρόνον ὅτε
 χρόνος οὐκ ἔσται· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ποτὲ γεγονέναι καὶ
 τὸ ἔσεσθαι, καθὼς προείπον, διαφερόντων χρόνων
 ἐστίν ἐμφατικά. οὐ τοίνυν πεπέρασται ὁ χρόνος.

190 καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀπειρός ἐστίν. ἐστὶ γὰρ [τι]
 αὐτοῦ τὸ μὲν τι παρῳχημένον τὸ δὲ μέλλον. ἦτοι
 οὖν ἐκάτερος τούτων τῶν χρόνων ἐστίν ἢ οὐκ ἔσται.
 καὶ εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἔσται, αὐτόθεν πεπέρασται ὁ χρόνος,
 καὶ εἰ πεπέρασται, μένει τὸ ἀρχῆθεν ἄπορον, τὸ
 γεγονέναι ποτὲ χρόνον ὅτε χρόνος οὐκ ἦν καὶ τὸ

¹ τὸ ποτέ (om. καὶ τὸ) Mutsch.: ὁπότε mss., Bekk. (τὸ ποτέ
 <φθαρῆναι> cf. Bekk.).

day, this day will exist in our phantasm. And this is
 a result far worse than the first.—Also, when the 188
 Universe is destroyed, according to Epicurus,^a there
 exists neither day nor night, and consequently neither
 a diurnal nor a nocturnal phantasm. But it is absurd
 to say that when the Universe is destroyed time does
 not exist; for the statements that it was destroyed
 once and that it is being destroyed are indicative of
 times. And if so, time is one thing and the diurnal
 or nocturnal phantasm a different thing.

Let this, then, serve as our account of the diffi-
 culties regarding the real existence of time which
 arise from the conception of it; but we can also 189
 establish our case by means of direct argument. For
 if time exists it is either limited or unlimited; but
 neither is it limited, as we shall establish, nor is
 it unlimited, as we shall show; therefore time is
 nothing.^b For if time is limited, there was once a
 time when time did not exist, and there will one day
 be a time when time will not exist. But it is absurd
 to say either that there was once a time when time
 did not exist, or that there will one day be a time
 when time will not exist, for the statements that
 “there once was” and that “there will be” are (as I
 said before ^c) indicative of different times. So, then,
 time is not limited.—Nor, in fact, is it unlimited. For 190
 one part of it is past, the other future. Each of these
 times, then, either exists or does not exist. And if
 it does not exist, time is at once limited, and if it
 is limited the original difficulty remains—that there
 was once a time when time did not exist and there

^a Cf. Lucret. v. 91 ff., 235 ff. for the “exitium caeli terrae-
 que futurum.”

^b With §§ 189-193 cf. P.H. iii. 141-142.

^c In § 188.

191 ἔσεσθαι ποτε χρόνον ὅτε χρόνος οὐκ ἔσται. εἰ δὲ
 ἔστω ἑκάτερος, φησὶ δὲ ὁ τε παρωχημένος καὶ
 ὁ μέλλων χρόνος, ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἔσται. ἐν τῷ
 παρόντι δὲ ὑπάρχων, ἐν τῷ ἐνεστώτι γενήσεται
 χρόνῳ ὃ τε παρωχημένος καὶ ὁ μέλλων. ἀποπον
 δὲ τὸν παρωχημένον καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα λέγειν κατὰ
 τὸν ἐνεστώτα χρόνον νοεῖσθαι. τοῖνυν οὐδ' ἀπειρός
 ἔστω ὁ χρόνος. εἰ δὲ μήτε πεπερασμένος νοεῖται
 192 μήτ' ἀπειρος, οὐδ' ὅλως ἔσται. τὸ τε μὴν ἐξ
 ἀνυπάρκτων συνεστῶς ἀνυπαρκτον ἔσται, ὃ δὲ γε
 χρόνος ἐξ ἀνυπάρκτων ἀξιοῦται συνεστάναι τοῦ
 παρωχημένου μηκέτ' ὄντος καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος
 μήπω ὄντος· ἀνυπαρκτος ἄρα ἐστὶν ὁ χρόνος.
 193 Πρὸς τοῦτοις, εἰ ἔστι τι χρόνος, ἦτοι ἀμεριστός
 ἔστω ἢ μεριστός· οὔτε δὲ ἀμεριστός εἶναι δύναται,
 καθὼς ὑπομνήσομεν, οὔτε μεριστός, ὡς καταστη-
 σόμεθα· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τις χρόνος. ἀμερῆς μὲν οὖν
 οὐ δύναται τυγχάνειν ὁ χρόνος, ἐπεὶ διαιρεῖται εἰς τε
 τὸν παρωχημένον καὶ τὸν ἐνεστώτα καὶ εἰς τὸν μέλ-
 194 λοντα. μεριστός δὲ οὐκ ἂν ὑπάρχοι διὰ τὸ πᾶν τὸ
 μεριστὸν ὑπὸ τινος αὐτοῦ μέρους καταμετρεῖσθαι·
 οἶον ὁ μὲν πήχυς ὑπὸ παλαιστοῦ καταμετρεῖται,
 καὶ ἔστι τοῦ πήχεως μέρος ὁ παλαιστής, ὑπὸ
 δὲ τοῦ δακτύλου ὁ παλαιστής, καὶ ἔστι μέρος τοῦ
 παλαιστοῦ ὁ δάκτυλος. τοῖνυν εἰ καὶ ὁ χρόνος
 μεριστός ἔστω, ὀφείλει πρὸς τινος αὐτοῦ μέρους
 195 καταμετρεῖσθαι. οὔτε δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐνεστώτος ἐν-
 δέχεται τοὺς ἄλλους χρόνους καταμετρεῖσθαι. εἰ γὰρ
 ὁ ἐνεστώτης χρόνος καταμετρεῖ τὸν παρωχημένον,
 ἔσται ὁ ἐνεστώτης χρόνος κατὰ τὸν παρωχημένον,
 γινόμενος δὲ κατὰ τὸν παρωχημένον οὐκέτι ἔσται
 ἐνεστώτης ἀλλὰ παρωχημένος. καὶ εἰ τὸν μέλλοντα

will one day be a time when time will not exist. But 191
 if each exists—I mean both past and future time,—
 each will be in the present. And as existing in the
 present, both past and future time will be in present
 time. But it is absurd to say that past and future
 are conceived as in present time. So, then, time is
 not unlimited either. But if it is neither conceived
 as limited nor as unlimited, it will not exist at all.—
 Also, what is composed of non-existents will be non- 192
 existent, and time is held to be composed of non-
 existents—of the past which exists no longer and of
 the future which does not as yet exist; time, there-
 fore, is non-existent.

Furthermore: if time is anything, it is either 193
 indivisible or divisible; but it cannot be either in-
 divisible, as we shall show, or divisible, as we shall
 establish; no time, therefore, exists.^a Now time
 cannot be indivisible, since it is divided into past,
 present, and future. And it will not be divisible 194
 because everything divisible is measured by a part of
 itself; the cubit, for instance, is measured by the
 palm, and the palm is a part of the cubit, and the palm
 is measured by the finger, and the finger is a part of
 the palm.^b So, then, if time too is divisible, it ought
 to be measured by some part of itself. But it is not 195
 possible for the other times to be measured by the
 present. For if the present time measures the past,
 the present time will be in the past, and being in the
 past it will no longer be present but past. And if

^a With §§ 193-196 cf. *P.H.* iii. 143.

^b 4 fingers = 1 palm; 6 palms = 1 cubit (= 18 inches).

καταμετρεῖ ὁ ἐνεστώς, κατ' αὐτὸν γινόμενος μέλλων ἔσται ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ἐνεστώς. ὅθεν οὐδὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις χρόνοις ἐνδέχεται καταμετρεῖν τὸν ἐνεστώτα· ἐκάτερος γὰρ αὐτῶν κατὰ τοῦτον γινόμενος ἐνεστώς ἔσται καὶ οὕτε παρωχημένος οὔτε μέλλων.

196 ἀλλ' εἰ πάντως μεριστὸν ἢ ἀμέριστον δεῖ νοεῖν τὸν χρόνον, ἐδείξαμεν δὲ ἡμεῖς ὅτι οὔτε μεριστός ἐστίν οὔτε ἀμέριστος, λεκτέον μηδὲν εἶναι τὸν χρόνον.

197 Σὺν τούτοις ὁ χρόνος τριμερής ἐστίν· τὸ μὲν γάρ τι ἦν αὐτοῦ παρωχημένον, τὸ δ' ἐνεστώς, τὸ δὲ μέλλον. τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν παρωχημένον οὐκέτ' ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ μέλλον οὕτω ἐστίν. λείπεται δὲ ἐν εἶναι μέρος ἐνεστηκός. ἦτοι οὖν ὁ ἐνεστηκὸς χρόνος ἀμερής ἐστίν ἢ μεριστός. οὔτε δὲ ἀμερής εἶναι δύναται· ἐν ἀμερεῖ γὰρ χρόνῳ οὐδὲν πέφυκε γίνεσθαι μεριστόν, ὡς φησὶ Τίμων, οἷον τὸ γίνεσθαι καὶ τὸ φθείρεσθαι καὶ πᾶν ὁ τούτοις ἔοικεν.

198 εἰ δ' ἀμερής ἐστίν, οὔτε ἀρχὴν ἔξει, ἢ συνάπτει τῷ παρωχημένῳ, οὔτε πέρασ, ᾧ συνάπτει τῷ μέλλοντι· τὸ γὰρ ἀρχὴν ἔχον καὶ πέρασ οὐκ ἀμεριστόν ἐστίν. εἰ δὲ μήτε ἀρχὴν ἔχει μήτε πέρασ, οὐδὲ μέσον ἔχει· κατὰ γὰρ τὴν ὡς <πρὸς>¹ ταῦτα σύμβλησιν νοεῖται τὸ μέσον. μήτε δὲ ἀρχὴν ἔχων² μήτε

199 πέρασ μήτε μέσον οὐδ' ὅλως ἔσται. εἰ δὲ μεριστός ἐστίν ὁ ἐνεστώς χρόνος, ἦτοι εἰς τοὺς ὄντας χρόνους μερίζεται ἢ εἰς τοὺς μὴ ὄντας. καὶ εἰ μὲν εἰς τοὺς μὴ ὄντας χρόνους μερίζοιτο, οὐκέτ' ἔσται χρόνος· τὸ γὰρ εἰς τοὺς μὴ ὄντας χρόνους μεριζόμενον οὐκ ἂν εἴη χρόνος. εἰ δὲ εἰς τοὺς ὄντας χρόνους μερί-

¹ <πρὸς> add. Heintz.

² ἔχων NLE: ἔχον cet., Bekk.

the present measures the future, being within this it will be future and not present. Hence, too, it is not possible to measure the present by the other times; for, as being within it, each of them will be present and not either past or future. But if one must ¹⁹⁶ certainly conceive time as either divisible or indivisible, and we have shown that it is neither divisible nor indivisible, it must be declared that time is nothing.

Furthermore: time is tripartite; for one part of ¹⁹⁷ it is past, one present, and one future.^a And of these the past no longer exists and the future does not yet exist. It remains to say that one part exists, the present. The present time, then, is either indivisible or divisible. But it cannot be indivisible, for "nothing divisible is of a nature to exist in indivisible time," as Timon says,—becoming, for example, and perishing, and everything of a similar kind. And if it is ¹⁹⁸ indivisible, it will neither have a beginning whereby it is joined on to the past, nor an end whereby it is joined on to the future; for that which has a beginning and an end is not indivisible. But if it has neither a beginning nor an end, it will not have a middle either; for the middle is conceived by way of comparison in its relation to the other two. And as having neither beginning nor middle nor end, it will not exist at all. And if present time is ¹⁹⁹ divisible, it is divided either into existent times or into non-existent. And if it should be divided into non-existent times, it will no longer be time; for that which is divided into non-existent times will not be time. And if it is divided into existent times, it will no longer, as a

^a With §§ 197-199 cf. P.H. iii. 144-145.

ζεται, οὐκέτι ἔσται ὅλος ἐνεστῶς, ἀλλὰ τὶ μὲν αὐτοῦ παρωχημένοι τὶ δὲ μέλλον. διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐκέτι ἔσται ὅλος [ἐνεστῶς καί]¹ ὑπάρχων, τοῦ μὲν 200 μηκέτι ὄντος αὐτοῦ τοῦ δὲ μήπω ὄντος. ἀλλ' εἰ τριῶν ὄντων, παρωχημένου καὶ μέλλοντος καὶ ἐνεστῶτος, δέδεικται τούτων μηδεὶς ὑπάρχων, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τις χρόνος.

Οἱ δὲ λέγοντες τὸν ἐνεστῶτα χρόνον πέρασ μὲν εἶναι τοῦ παρωχημένου ἀρχὴν δὲ τοῦ μέλλοντος, ἐκ δυοῖν ἀνυπάρκτων χρόνων ἕνα ποιοῦντες, οὐχ ἕνα μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντα χρόνον ἀνυπάρκτον ποιοῦσιν.

201 ἄλλως τε, εἰ πέρασ ἐστὶ τοῦ παρωχημένου ὁ ἐνεστῶς χρόνος, τὸ δὲ πέρασ τοῦ παρωχημένου συμπαρώχηκε τῷ οὐδ' ἐστὶ πέρασ, οὐκέτι ἔσται ὁ ἐνεστῶς χρόνος, εἴπερ πέρασ ἐστὶ τοῦ παρωχη- 202 μένου. καὶ πάλιν, εἰ ἀρχὴ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐστὶν ὁ ἐνεστῶς χρόνος, ἢ δὲ ἀρχὴ τοῦ μέλλοντος οὕτω ἔστιν, ὁ ἐνεστῶς χρόνος οὕτω ὑποστήσεται, καὶ οὕτω τὰ ἐναντιώτατα τούτῳ συμβήσεται· καθὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐνεστῶς ἐστὶν, ὑπάρξει, καθὸ δὲ συμπαρώχηκε τῷ παρωχημένῳ, οὐκέτι ἔσται, καθὸ δὲ τῷ μέλλοντι σύνεστιν, οὕτω ἔσται. ἀποπον δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον νοεῖν καὶ ὄντα καὶ μὴ ὄντα καὶ μηκέτ' ὄντα καὶ μήπω ὄντα. τοίνυν οὐδὲ ταύτη ῥήτεον εἶναι τῶα χρόνον.

203 Ἐπακτέον δὲ καὶ οὕτως. εἰ ἔστι τι ὁ χρόνος, ἦτοι ἀφθαρτός ἐστι καὶ ἀγέννητος ἢ φθαρτός καὶ γενητός· οὔτε δὲ ἀφθαρτός ἐστι καὶ ἀγέννητος, ὡς δειχθήσεται, οὔτε φθαρτός καὶ γενητός, ὡς καὶ τοῦτο παρασταθήσεται· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τι χρόνος. ἀφθαρτος μὲν οὖν καὶ ἀγέννητος οὐκ ἔστιν εἴ γε τὸ μὲν τι αὐτοῦ παρώχηκε τὸ δὲ ἐνέστηκε τὸ δὲ 810

whole, be present but one part of it will be past, another future. And for this reason it will no longer, as a whole, be [present and] existent, as part of it no longer exists and part is not as yet existing. But if 200 of the three times—past, future, and present—it has been proved that not one exists, no time will exist.

And those who assert that present time is the limit of the past and the beginning of the future,^a—thus making one out of two non-existent times,—make not only one but every time non-existent.—And further : 201 if present time is the limit of past, and the limit of the past has passed away together with that whereof it is the limit, present time will no longer exist, if it really is the limit of the past.—And again : if present 202 time is the beginning of the future, and the beginning of the future does not yet exist, present time will not yet exist, and thus it will have most opposite properties ; for inasmuch as it is present it will exist, but inasmuch as it has passed away together with the past it will exist no longer, and inasmuch as it accompanies the future it will not as yet exist. But it is absurd to conceive the same time as both existing and not existing, and no longer existing and not yet existing. So, then, in this way too one must deny that any time exists.

One may also argue thus : if time is anything, it is 203 either imperishable and ingenerable or perishable and generable ; but it is neither imperishable and ingenerable, as shall be proved, nor perishable and generable, as this also shall be established ; time, therefore, is not anything. Now it is not imperishable and ingenerable, seeing that part of it is past, part present,

^a With §§ 200-205 cf. P.H. iii. 146-148.

¹ [ἐνεστῶς καί] secl. Heintz.

204 μέλλει. καὶ γὰρ ἡμέρα ἢ μὲν χθὲς οὐκέτι ἔστιν, ἢ
 δὲ σήμερον ἔστιν, ἢ δὲ αὔριον οὐπω γέγονεν. ὅθεν
 καὶ τοῦ χρόνου τὸ μὲν οὐκέτ' ἔστιν,¹ ὥσπερ τὸ
 παρωχημένον, τὸ δὲ ἔστιν, ὡς τὸ ἐνεστηκός, τὸ δὲ
 οὐπω ἔστιν, καθάπερ τὸ μέλλον. διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὔτε
 ἀγένητος οὔτε ἀφθαρτος γενήσεται ὁ χρόνος.

205 εἰ δὲ φθαρτός ἐστι καὶ γενητός, ἀπορον τὸ εἰς τί
 φθαρῆσεται καὶ ἐκ τίνος ἔσται. οὔτε γὰρ ὁ μέλλων
 ἔστιν ἤδη, οὔτε ὁ παρωχημένος ἔτι ἔστιν. ἐκ δὲ
 τῶν μὴ ὄντων πῶς δύναται τι γίνεσθαι, ἢ εἰς τὰ μὴ
 ὄντα πῶς δύναται τι² φθείρεσθαι; οὐδὲν οὖν ἐστὶ
 χρόνος.

206 Ἐπιχειρητέον δὲ καὶ οὕτως. εἰ ἔστι τι χρόνος,
 ἤτοι γενητός ἐστὶν ἢ ἀγένητος ἢ τις μὲν γενητός τις
 δὲ ἀγένητος· οὔτε δὲ γενητός δύναται εἶναι ὁ
 χρόνος οὔτε ἀγένητος οὔτε τις μὲν γενητός τις δὲ

207 ἀγένητος· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τι³ χρόνος. εἰ μὲν γὰρ
 γενητός εἶη, ἐπεὶ πᾶν τὸ γεννώμενον ἐν χρόνῳ γί-
 νεται, καὶ ὁ χρόνος γεννώμενος ἐν χρόνῳ ἔσται
 γεννώμενος. ἤτοι οὖν [ὁ]⁴ αὐτός ἐσται ἐν αὐτῷ γεν-
 νώμενος ἢ ἕτερος ἐν ἑτέρῳ. καὶ εἰ μὲν [ὁ]⁴ αὐτός
 ἐν ἑαυτῷ γεννᾶται, ἔσται τι γεγονὸς πρὶν γεγονέναι·

208 ὅπερ ἀτοπον. ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ ἐν ᾧ τι γίνεται ὀφείλει
 προϋπάρχειν τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ γεννωμένου, δεήσει καὶ
 τὸν χρόνον ἐν ἑαυτῷ γεννώμενον ἑαυτοῦ προ-
 γεγενῆσθαι· οἷον ἐν ἐργαστηρίῳ δημιουργεῖται
 ἀνδριάς, ἀλλὰ προϋπόκειται τοῦ ἀνδριάντος τὸ

¹ οὐκέτ' ἔστιν Heintz: οὐκ ἔσται mss., Bekk. (οὐκέτ' cj. Bekk.).

² γίνεσθαι . . . τι add. Mutsch. (<γίν. . . . πῶς> add. cj. Bekk.).

³ τι NLE: τις cet., Bekk.

⁴ [ὁ] secl. Kayser.

and part future. For the day of yesterday exists no 204
 longer, that of to-day exists, and that of to-morrow
 has not yet come into existence. Hence one part
 of time (namely, the past) no longer exists, another
 (namely, the present) exists, and another (namely,
 the future) does not yet exist. And for this reason
 time will be neither ingenerable nor imperishable.—
 But if it is perishable and generable, it is hard to say 205
 what it will perish into and from what it will come
 to exist. For neither does the future exist already,
 nor the past exist any longer. But how can a thing
 <come into existence> from non-existents, (or how can
 a thing) perish <into non-existents>? Time, then, is
 nothing.

One may attack it also in this way^a: if time is 206
 anything, it is either generable or ingenerable, or
 partly generable and partly ingenerable. But time
 cannot be either generable or ingenerable or partly
 generable and partly ingenerable; therefore time is
 not anything. For if it were generable, since every- 207
 thing which is generated becomes in time, time too
 being generated will be generated in time. Either,
 then, it will be generated as itself in itself or as one
 time in another. And if it is generated as itself in
 itself, it will be a thing which has come to exist before
 it has come to exist; which is absurd. For since that 208
 in which a thing becomes must exist before that
 which is generated in it, time also, as generated in
 itself, must have come into existence before itself;
 just as a statue is wrought in a workshop, but the
 workshop existed before the statue, and a ship is con-

^a With §§ 206-211 cf. *P.H.* iii. 149-150.

ἐργαστήριον, καὶ ἐν τόπῳ τινὶ συνίσταται ναῦς, ἀλλὰ καὶ προῦφέστηκε τῆς νεῦς ὁ τόπος. τοίνυν εἰ καὶ ὁ χρόνος ἐν ἑαυτῷ γίνεται, προῦπάρξει ἑαυτοῦ· καὶ οὕτως ἢ¹ μὲν γίνεται, οὕτω ἔσται, ἐπεὶ πάν τὸ γινόμενον, ὅτε γίνεται, οὕτω ἔστιν, ἢ¹ δὲ ἐν 209 ἑαυτῷ γίνεται, ὀφείλει προῦπάρχειν. ἔσται οὖν ἅμα χρόνος καὶ οὐκ ἔσται. ἢ μὲν γίνεται, οὐκ ἔσται, ἢ δὲ ἐν ἑαυτῷ γίνεται, ἔσται. ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπιβολὴν εἶναί τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι· ἄτοπον ἄρα καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ λέγειν γίνεσθαι τὸν 210 χρόνον. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ἕτερος ἐν ἑτέρῳ γίνεται χρόνος, οἷον ὁ μέλλον ἐν τῷ ἐνεστώτῳ καὶ ὁ ἐνεστώς ἐν τῷ παρωχημένῳ. εἰ γὰρ ἕτερος ἐν ἑτέρῳ γίνεται χρόνος, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἕκαστος τῶν χρόνων ἀπολείπων τὴν ἰδίαν θέσιν τὴν ἑτέρου ἐπιλήψεται τάξιν. οἷον εἰ² ὁ μέλλον χρόνος γίνεται ἐν τῷ ἐνεστώτῳ χρόνῳ, ὁ μέλλον κατὰ τὸν ἐνεστώτα γινόμενος ἔσται ἐνεστώς ἀλλ' οὐ μέλλον· καὶ εἰ ὁ ἐνεστώς ἐν τῷ παρωχημένῳ γίνεται, πάντως κατὰ τὸν παρωχημένον γινόμενος οὐκ ἔσται ἐνεστώς 211 ἀλλὰ παρωχημένος. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος κἂν ἀναστρέψωμεν, τὸν μὲν παρωχημένον ποιούντες ἐν τῷ ἐνεστώτῳ γινόμενον, τὸν δὲ ἐνεστώτα ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι· αἱ γὰρ αὐταὶ πάλιν ἀκολουθοῦσιν ἀπορίαι. εἰ οὖν οὔτε ἐν αὐτῷ γίνεται χρόνος οὐθ' ὡς ἕτερος ἐν ἑτέρῳ, οὐκ ἔστι γεννητὸς ὁ χρόνος. εἰ δὲ μήτε ἀγέννητός ἐστι μήτε γεννητός, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα 212 τρίτον ἐπινοεῖν ἀμήχανον, λεκτέον μηδὲν ὑπάρχειν τὸν χρόνον. ὅτι γὰρ καὶ ἀγέννητος οὐ δύναται εἶναι, σφόδρα εὐπαραμύθητον. εἰ γὰρ ἀγέννητός

¹ ἢ Heintz: ἢ N: εἰ cet., Bekk.

² εἰ Heintz: ἐπεὶ mss., Bekk.

constructed in a certain place, but the place was existing before the ship. So, then, if time too becomes in itself, it will exist before itself; and thus, inasmuch as it becomes, it will not yet exist, since everything which becomes, while it is becoming, does not exist as yet; but inasmuch as it becomes in itself, it must exist beforehand. Time, then, will be at once both 209 existent and non-existent. Inasmuch as it becomes it will not exist, but inasmuch as it becomes in itself it will exist. But it is absurd that the same thing at the same instant should both exist and not exist; therefore it is also absurd to say that time becomes in itself.—Nor yet does it become as one time in 210 another,—the future, for instance, in the present, and the present in the past. For if one time becomes in another, each of the times will necessarily quit its own position and occupy the post of the other. If, for example, the future time becomes in the present time, the future as becoming during the present will be present and not future; and if the present becomes in the past, as becoming during the past it will certainly not be present but past. And the same 211 argument applies if we reverse their order, making the past becoming in the present and the present in the future; for here again the same difficulties follow.—If, then, time does not become either in itself or as one time in another, time is not generable. But if it is neither ingenerable nor generable, and besides these one can conceive no third possibility, one must declare that time is nothing.—Now the fact 212 that it cannot be ingenerable is extremely easy to demonstrate. For if it is ingenerable and neither has

- ἔστι καὶ οὔτε γέγονεν οὔτε γενήσεται, εἰς ἔσται
μόνος ὁ ἐνεστῶς χρόνος, καὶ οὔτε ὁ μέλλων ἔτι
μέλλων, οὐδὲ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ πράγματα, οὔτε ὁ παρ-
ρωχηκῶς ἔτι παρωχηκῶς, οὐδὲ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ πρατ-
τώμενα. οὐχὶ δέ γε τοῦτο· τοῖσιν οὐδὲ ἀγένητός
213 ἔστιν ὁ χρόνος. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τις μὲν γενητός
τις δὲ ἀγένητος, ἐπεὶ ἐπισυντεθήσονται αἱ ἀπορίαι.
ὁ τε γὰρ γενητός ἢ ἐν ἑαυτῷ γίνεσθαι ὀφείλει ἢ ἐν
ἐτέρῳ· ἀλλ' ἐὰν μὲν ἐν ἑαυτῷ γένηται, προϋπάρξει
ἑαυτοῦ, ἐὰν δὲ ἐν ἐτέρῳ, οὐκέτι ἐκεῖνος ὁ χρόνος
ἔσται, ἀλλὰ καθ' ὃν γίνεται ἀπολείπων τὴν ἰδίαν
214 τάξιν. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀγενήτου·
εἰ γὰρ ἀγένητός ἐστιν, οὔτε ὁ μέλλων ποτὲ ἔσται
χρόνος οὔτε ὁ παρωχηκῶς, ἀλλ' εἰς μόνος ὁ ἐν-
εστηκῶς. ἄποπα δὲ ταῦτα. λείπεται ἄρα λέγειν,
μήτε γενητοῦ ὄντος τοῦ χρόνου μήτε ἀγενήτου μήτε
τινὸς μὲν γενητοῦ τινὸς δὲ ἀγενήτου, μὴ εἶναι
χρόνον.
- 215 Ἐνέσται δὲ τοῦτο ἀπορεῖν καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς οὐσίας,
ὡς καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐνοίας προσηπόρηται. αὐτίκα γὰρ
τῶν δογματικῶν φιλοσόφων φασὶν οἱ μὲν σῶμα
εἶναι τὸν χρόνον οἱ δὲ ἀσώματον, καὶ τῶν ἀσώματων
φαμένων οἱ μὲν ὡς καθ' αὐτό τι νοούμενον πρᾶγμα
216 οἱ δ' ὡς συμβεβηκὸς ἐτέρῳ. σῶμα μὲν οὖν ἔλεξεν
εἶναι τὸν χρόνον Αἰνησιδῆμος κατὰ τὸν Ἡρά-
κλειτον· μὴ διαφέρειν γὰρ αὐτὸν τοῦ ὄντος καὶ τοῦ
πρώτου σώματος. ὅθεν καὶ διὰ τῆς πρώτης εἰσ-
αγωγῆς κατὰ ἕξ πραγμάτων τετάχθαι λέγων τὰς
ἀπλᾶς λέξεις, αἵτινες μέρη τοῦ λόγου τυγχάνουσι,
τὴν μὲν χρόνος προσηγορίαν καὶ τὴν μονὰς ἐπὶ τῆς

become nor will become, one time alone, the present, will exist, and neither will the future, and the things therein, be any longer future, nor will the past, and the things done therein, be any longer past. But this is not so; nor, consequently, is time ingenerable.— Nor yet is it partly generable and partly ingenerable, 213 since, if so, the difficulties will be combined. For the generable must become either in itself or in another; but if it becomes in itself it will exist before itself, and if in another it will no longer be that time but, quitting its own post, it will be the time during which it becomes. And the same argument applies also to 214 the ingenerable; for if it is ingenerable, neither will the future time ever exist nor the past, but one time only, the present. But these results are absurd. It only remains, then, to say that as time is neither generable nor ingenerable, nor partly generable and partly ingenerable, time does not exist.

And it will be possible to doubt about this matter 215 in respect of its substance, just as we have previously shown its doubtfulness in regard to its conception. Thus, for instance, some of the Dogmatic philosophers assert that time is a body, others that it is incorporeal; and of those who assert it to be incorporeal some regard it as a thing conceived as self-existent, others as a property of something else. Thus Aenesidemus 216 "according to Heracleitus" * stated that time is a body; for it does not differ from the existent and the first body. Hence, too, when he mentions in his *First Introduction* that the simple appellations, which are the parts of speech, apply to six things, he asserts that the names "time" and "unit" are

* Cf. P.H. iii. 138; *Adv. Phys.* i. 337. By "the existent and the first body" is meant "air"; see §§ 232 f. *infra*.

- 217 οὐσίας τετάχθαι φησίν, ἥτις ἐστὶ σωματική, τὰ δὲ
μεγέθη τῶν χρόνων καὶ τὰ κεφάλαια τῶν ἀριθμῶν
ἐπὶ πολλαπλασιασμοῦ μάλιστα ἐκφέρεσθαι. τὸ μὲν
γὰρ νῦν, ὃ δὴ χρόνου μῆνυμά ἐστιν, ἐτι δὲ τὴν
μονάδα οὐκ ἄλλο τι εἶναι ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν, τὴν δὲ
ἡμέραν καὶ τὸν μῆνα καὶ τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν πολλαπλα-
σιασμὸν ὑπάρχειν τοῦ νῦν, φημί δὲ τοῦ χρόνου, τὰ
δὲ δύο καὶ τρία καὶ δέκα καὶ ἑκατὸν πολυπλα-
σιασμὸν εἶναι τῆς μονάδος. ὥσθ' οὗτοι μὲν σῶμα
218 ποιοῦσι τὸν χρόνον, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς φιλόσοφοι
ἀσώματον αὐτὸν ᾤθησαν ὑπάρχειν· τῶν γὰρ τινῶν
φασὶ τὰ μὲν εἶναι σώματα τὰ δὲ ἀσώματα, τῶν δὲ
ἀσωμάτων τέσσαρα εἶδη καταριθμοῦνται ὡς λεκτὸν
καὶ κενὸν καὶ τόπον καὶ χρόνον. ἐξ οὗ δῆλον
γίνεται ὅτι πρὸς τῷ ἀσώματον ὑπολαμβάνειν τὸν
χρόνον, ἐτι καὶ καθ' αὐτό τι νοούμενον πρᾶγμα
δοξάζουσι τοῦτον.
- 219 Ἐπίκουρος δέ, ὡς αὐτὸν Δημήτριος ὁ Λάκων
ἐξηγεῖται, τὸν χρόνον σύμπτωμα συμπτωμάτων
εἶναι λέγει, παρεπόμενον ἡμέραις τε καὶ νυξὶ καὶ
ὥραις καὶ πάθεισι καὶ ἀπαθείαις καὶ κινήσεσι καὶ
μοναῖς. πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα συμπτώματά ἐστι
τισὶ συμβεβηκότα, καὶ ὁ χρόνος πᾶσι τούτοις
συμπαραπόμενος εἰκότως ἂν λεχθεῖν σύμπτωμα
220 συμπτωμάτων. καθόλου γάρ, ἵνα μικρὸν ἀνωθεν
προλάβωμεν εἰς τὴν τοῦ λεγομένου παρακολου-
θησιν, τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν τινα καθ' ἑαυτὰ ὑφέστηκεν,
τὰ δὲ περὶ τοῖς καθ' ἑαυτὰ ὑφεστῶσι θεωρεῖται.
καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὰ μὲν ὑφέστηκε πράγματα οἷον αἱ
οὐσίαι, ὡς τὸ σῶμα καὶ κενόν, περὶ δὲ τοῖς καθ'

applied to the substance, which is corporeal, whereas 217
the extents of the times and the sums of the numbers
are chiefly expressed by multiples of these. For
“now,” which is an indication of time, and also
“unit” are nothing else than the substance; while
“day” and “month” and “year” are multiples of
“now” (I mean, of time), and “two” and “three”
and “ten” and “a hundred” are multiples of
“unit.” So that these people make time a body;
but the Stoic philosophers supposed it to be incor- 218
poreal; for they assert that of the “Somethings”^a
some are bodies, others incorporeal, and they enu-
merate four kinds of the incorporeals, namely, “expres-
sion” and void and place and time. And from this
it is evident that, in addition to supposing time to be
incorporeal, they also regard it as a thing conceived
as self-existent.

Epicurus, as Demetrius the Laconian interprets 219
him, declares that time is “a symptom of symptoms,^b
accompanying days and nights and hours and affec-
tions and non-affections and motions and rests.” For
all these are symptoms attached to things, and as
accompanying all these time may naturally be called
“a symptom of symptoms.” For in general—to go 220
back a little, for the reader following of our expo-
sition—some existent things are self-existent, while
others are viewed as attached to such as are self-
existent. And such things as substances (like body
and void) are self-existent; and such as are viewed

^a In the Stoic logic “Something” (τό τι) was the highest
universal (*summmum genus*); see *Intro.* Vol. I. p. xxvi. For
“expression” (i.e. “meaning” of a term, or the subjective
idea which it excites) cf. *P.H.* ii. 81, *Adv. Log.* ii. 12.

^b Cf. § 81 *supra*; *P.H.* iii. 137. “Symptom” (or “con-
currence”) nearly = “attribute” or “property”, cf. § 221.

221 *ἑαυτὰ ὑφ' ἑστώσι θεωρεῖται τὰ καλούμενα παρ' αὐτοῖς συμβεβηκότα. τούτων δὲ τῶν συμβεβηκότων τὰ μὲν ἔστιν ἀχώριστα τῶν οἷς συμβεβηκεν, τὰ δὲ χωρίζεσθαι τούτων πέφυκεν. ἀχώριστα μὲν οὖν ἔστι τῶν οἷς συμβεβηκεν ὥσπερ ἡ ἀντιτυπία*
 222 *μὲν τοῦ σώματος, εἷξις δὲ τοῦ κενοῦ· οὔτε γὰρ σῶμα δυνατὸν ἔστι ποτε νοῆσαι χωρὶς τῆς ἀντιτυπίας οὔτε τὸ κενὸν χωρὶς εἷξεως, ἀλλ' αἰδιον ἑκατέρου συμβεβηκὸς τοῦ μὲν τὸ ἀντιτυπεῖν τοῦ δὲ τὸ εἶκειν. οὐκ ἀχώριστα δὲ ἔστι τῶν οἷς συμβεβηκε*
 223 *καθάπερ ἡ κίνησις καὶ ἡ μονή. τὰ γὰρ συνακριτικὰ τῶν σωμάτων οὔτε κινεῖται διὰ παντὸς ἀνηρηκίτως οὔτ' ἀκινήτίζει διὰ παντός, ἀλλὰ ποτὲ μὲν συμβεβηκυῖαν ἔχει τὴν κίνησιν ποτὲ δὲ τὴν μονήν, καίπερ τῆς ἀτόμου, ὅτε καθ' ἑαυτὴν ἔστιν, ἀεικινήτου καθεστῶσης. ἡ γὰρ κενῶ πελάζειν ὀφείλει ἢ σώματι· εἴτε δὲ κενῶ πελάζοι, διὰ τὴν εἷξιν φέρεται δι' αὐτοῦ, εἴτε σώματι, διὰ τὴν ἀντιτυπίαν ἀποπαλτικῶς ποιεῖται τὴν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ κίνησιν.*
 224 *συμπτώματα οὖν ταῦτ' ἔστιν οἷς χρόνος παρέπεται, φημι δὲ τὴν τε ἡμέραν καὶ νύκτα καὶ ὥραν καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς ἀπαθείας κινήσεις τε καὶ μονάς. ἡ τε γὰρ ἡμέρα καὶ νύξ τοῦ περιέχοντος ἀέρος εἰσὶ συμπτώματα, ὧν ἡ μὲν ἡμέρα κατὰ τὸν ἐξ ἡλίου φωτισμὸν συμβαίνει, ἡ δὲ νύξ κατὰ φωτισμοῦ*
 225 *στέρησιν τοῦ ἐξ ἡλίου ἐπιγίνεται. ἡ δὲ ὥρα ἥτοι τῆς ἡμέρας ἢ τῆς νυκτὸς μέρος καθεστηκυῖα πάλιν σύμπτωμα γίνεται τοῦ ἀέρος, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ ἡμέρα καὶ ἡ νύξ. ἀντιπαρεκτείνεται δὲ πάση ἡμέρᾳ καὶ πάσῃ νυκτὶ καὶ ὥρᾳ ὁ χρόνος· παρ' ἣν αἰτίαν μακρὰ τις ἢ βραχεῖα λέγεται ἡμέρα καὶ νύξ, φερομένων*

as attached to the self-existents are what they call "properties." And of these properties some are 221 inseparable from the objects whereto they belong, while others are naturally separated from them.^a Inseparable, for instance, from the things whereto they belong are the resistance ^b of body and the non-resistance of void; for body can never be conceived 222 as without resistance, or void without non-resistance; but each has a property that is eternal, the one resistance, the other non-resistance. But not inseparable from the things whereto they belong are such properties as motion and rest. For such bodies 223 as are composite are neither in restless motion continually nor continually motionless, but have at one time the property of motion, at another that of rest, although the atom, when it is by itself, is in perpetual motion. For it must collide either with a void or with a body; and if it collides with a void, it passes through this because of its non-resistance; but if with a body, it moves back from this by way of rebound, because of its resistance.—Thus these things 224 are "symptoms" which time accompanies—I mean day and night and hour and affections and non-affections and motions and rests. For day and night are symptoms of the surrounding air, of which day is a property due to the illumination from the sun, while night results from the privation of the illumination from the sun. And hour again, being a part either 225 of day or of night, is a symptom of the air, like day and night. And time extends parallel to every day and every night and hour; and for this reason a day or a night is called long or short, as we pass over the

^a Such "properties" are (in logical phrase) "accidents."

^b Or "solidity," *cf.* § 239; *P.H.* iii. 39.

ἡμῶν ἐπὶ τὸν ταύτη συμβεβηκότα χρόνον. τὰ τε
 πάθη καὶ αἱ ἀπάθειαι ἦτοι ἀλγηδόνες ἢ ἡδοναὶ
 ἐτύγγαλον, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐκ οὐσίαι τινὲς καθειστή-
 κεισαν ἀλλὰ συμπτώματα τῶν πασχόντων ἦτοι
 ἡστικῶς ἢ ἀλγεινῶς, καὶ συμπτώματα οὐκ ἄχρονα.
 226 πρὸς τούτοις καὶ ἡ κίνησις, ἔτι δὲ ἡ μονή, ὡς ἤδη
 παρεστήσαμεν, τῶν σωμάτων ἐστὶ συμπτώματα
 καὶ οὐ χωρὶς χρόνου· τὴν γοῦν ὀξύτητα καὶ βρα-
 δυτήτα τῆς κινήσεως, ἔτι δὲ τὴν πλείονα καὶ
 227 ἐλάττονα μονὴν χρόνω καταμετροῦμεν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ
 ἐκ τούτων φανερόν ἐστι ὅτι Ἐπίκουρος ἀσώματον
 οἶεται τὸν χρόνον ὑπάρχειν, οὐ παραπλησίως δὲ
 τοῖς στωικοῖς· ἐκείνοι μὲν γάρ, ὡς λέλεκται,
 ἀσώματόν τι καθ' αὐτὸ νοοῦμενον ὑπεστήσαντο
 τὸν χρόνον, Ἐπίκουρος δὲ συμβεβηκός τισιν.
 228 Ὡδε μὲν οὗτοι, Πλάτων δὲ ἔλεγεν, ὡς δὲ τινες
 Ἀριστοτέλης, χρόνον εἶναι ἀριθμὸν τοῦ ἐν κινήσει
 προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου, Στράτων δὲ ὁ φυσικός, ὡς
 δ' ἄλλοι Ἀριστοτέλης, μέτρον κινήσεως καὶ μονῆς.
 229 Ὅθεν τοιαύτης οὔσης καὶ περὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸν
 χρόνον οὐσίας διαστάσεως, πάρεστι μὲν ἤδη συμ-
 βαλεῖν ἐκ τῶν προσηπορημένων ὅτι οὐδ' ἐκ ταύτης
 οἶον τέ ἐστι βεβαίως τι μαθεῖν, ὅμως δὲ καὶ τὰ νῦν
 λεκτέον πρὸς μὲν Πλάτωνα καὶ Ἀριστοτέλην καὶ
 Στράτωνα τὸν φυσικὸν τὰ ἐν ἀρχαῖς ἀντειρημένα,
 ὅτε ἐκ τῆς ἐννοίας τοῦ χρόνου συνήγομεν τὸ μηδὲν
 230 εἶναι τὸν χρόνον, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς σωματικὴν ἀξιοῦντας
 εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ χρόνου, φημί δὲ τοὺς Ἡρα-
 κλειτεῖους, ἐκείνο τὸ¹ προχειρότατον ὅτι εἰ χρόνος
 σῶμά ἐστι, πᾶν δὲ σῶμα ἢ μένον ἢ κινούμενον

¹ ἐκείνο τὸ cj. Bekk.: κινούτο MSS., Bekk.

time which is a property thereof. The affections, too, and non-affections are either pains or pleasures, and on this account are not substances but symptoms of those who are affected either pleasurably or painfully, and not timeless symptoms. And besides these, 226 motion and also rest are, as we have already established,^a symptoms of bodies and not without time; for certainly we measure by time the quickness and slowness of motion, and the greater or less amount of rest. Well then, from this it is plain that Epicurus 227 thinks that time is incorporeal, but not in the same sort of way as do the Stoics; for whereas they, as has been said, supposed that time is an incorporeal thing conceived as self-existent, Epicurus supposed it to be a property of certain things.

Such were the views of these men; but Plato— 228 and, as some say, Aristotle^b—declared that “time is the number of the prior and posterior in motion”; and Strato the physicist—and, as others say, Aristotle—that it is “the measure of motion and rest.”

Hence, as there also exists such a divergence of 229 opinion regarding the substance of time, one can already infer from the difficulties stated above that from it too it is impossible to learn anything for certain; but still we ought now to bring against Plato and Aristotle and Strato the physicist the objections we made at the beginning^c when we deduced from the conception of time that time is nothing, and against 230 those who maintain that the substance of time is corporeal—I mean the Heracliteans^d—we should bring the argument most ready to hand that if time is a body, and every body is conceived as either at rest

^a Cf. §§ 176-177.

^b Cf. § 176; P.H. iii. 137.

^c See §§ 170 ff.

^d Cf. § 216.

- νοείται, τὸ δὲ μένον ἢ κινούμενον ἐν χρόνῳ μένον ἢ κινούμενον νοείται, <ἐν σώματι τὸ σῶμα μένον ἢ κινούμενον νοείται.>¹ οὐχὶ δὲ γε ἐν σώματι τὸ σῶμα μένον ἢ κινούμενον νοείται, οὐκ ἄρα σῶμά ἐστιν ὁ
- 231 χρόνος. τὸ τε ὄν κατὰ τοὺς Ἡρακλειτεῖους, ὁ δὴ σῶμά ἐστιν, ἐν χρόνῳ ἐστίν· οὐχὶ δὲ γε ὁ χρόνος ἐν χρόνῳ ἐστίν· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ σῶμα χρόνος ἐστίν. τὸ τε ζῶον ἐν χρόνῳ ζῆ, ὡς καὶ τὸ τεθνηκὸς ἐν χρόνῳ τέθνηκεν· διὸ οὐκ ἐστὶ ζῶον ἢ σῶμα ὁ
- 232 χρόνος. καὶ μὴν οἱ λέγοντες μὴ ὑπάρχειν τὸ πρῶτον σῶμα κατὰ τὸν Ἡράκλειτον οὐ κωλύονται χρόνον νοεῖν· εἰ δὲ γε χρόνος ἦν τὸ πρῶτον κατὰ τὸν Ἡράκλειτον σῶμα, κἂν ἐκωλύοντο τὸν χρόνον νοεῖν· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ὄν κατὰ τὸν Ἡράκλειτον ἐστὶ
- 233 χρόνος. τὸ τε ὄν κατὰ τὸν Ἡράκλειτον ἀήρ ἐστίν, ὡς φησὶν ὁ Αἰνησιδημος, μακρῷ δὲ ἀέρος διέφερεν ὁ χρόνος, καὶ ὧ λόγῳ οὐθεὶς τὸ πῦρ ἢ τὸ ὕδωρ ἢ τὴν γῆν χρόνον λέγει εἶναι, τῷ αὐτῷ οὐδὲ τὸν ἀέρα φήσει· οὐ τοῖνυν τὸ ὄν ἐστὶ χρόνος.
- 234 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὡς ἐν συντόμοις πρὸς ταύτην εἰρήσθω τὴν στάσιν, βραχὺς δ' ἐστὶ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς στοαῆς λόγος, φάσκοντας τῶν τιῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι σώματα τὰ δὲ ἀσώματα, καὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων εἶδος τι καθ' αὐτὸ νοούμενον οἰομένους τὸν χρόνον. τὸ γὰρ τί γενικώτατον τῷ μήτε σῶμά τι δύνασθαι εἶναι μήτε ἀσώματον μήτε σῶμα ἅμα καὶ ἀσώματον
- 235 οὐκ ἂν εἶη. εἰ γὰρ σῶμά ἐστι, δεήσει πάντα αὐτοῦ τὰ εἶδη σώματα τυγχάνειν καὶ μηδὲν ἀσώματον· καὶ ὄν τρόπον πάντα τὰ τοῦ ζώου εἶδη ζῴα ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδὲν ἀψυχον καὶ τὰ τοῦ φυτοῦ φυτὰ καὶ οὐδὲν
- ¹ <ἐν . . . νοείται> add. Heintz (lac. in N).

^a Cf. § 218. With §§ 234-236 cf. P.H. ii. 223-225.

or in motion. and what is at rest or in motion is conceived as at rest or in motion in time, <then the body is conceived as being at rest or in motion in a body>; but the body is not conceived as at rest or in motion in a body; therefore time is not a body.—Also, 231 according to the Heracliteans, “the existent,” which is body, is in time; but time is not in time; therefore the existent and body is not time. Also, the living creature lives in time, as also the dead is dead in time; wherefore time is not a living creature or a body.—Moreover, those who assert that “the first 232 body” of Heraclitus does not exist are not precluded from conceiving time; but if time had been the first body of Heraclitus, they would have been precluded; therefore “the existent” of Heraclitus is not time. Also, the existent of Heraclitus, as Aenesidemus says, 233 is air; but time is vastly different from air, and just as nobody says that fire or water or earth is time, so for the same reason nobody will say that air is time; so, then, the existent is not time.

Let this, then, serve as a concise statement of the 234 objections to this view; and brief, too, is our argument against the Stoics, who declare that of the “Somethings” some are bodies, others incorporeals,^a and suppose that time is a particular species of the incorporeals which is conceived as self-existent. For the “Something,” the highest genus, will not exist owing to its being unable to be either a body or an incorporeal or at once both body and incorporeal. For 235 if it is a body, all its particulars will have to be bodies and none incorporeal; and just as all the particulars of Animal are animals and none inanimate, and those

ἐμφυχον, οὕτως ἀκολουθήσει καὶ τὰ τοῦ τινὸς εἶδη
 σώματος ὄντος σώματα τυγχάνειν καὶ μηδὲν αὐτῶν
 ἀσώματον. εἰ δὲ ἀσώματόν ἐστιν, ἔσται πάντα
 236 αὐτοῦ τὰ εἶδη ἀσώματα καὶ οὐδὲν σῶμα. ὡσαύτως
 δὲ κἂν σῶμα ᾄμα καὶ ἀσώματον ὑπάρχη, πάντα τὰ
 ἐπὶ μέρους ἔσται σώματα ᾄμα καὶ ἀσώματα, καὶ
 οὐδὲν κατ' ἰδίαν ἢ σῶμα μόνον ἢ ἀσώματον. ὥστε
 εἰ μὴ σῶμά ἐστι τὸ τί μηδὲ ἀσώματον ἢ σῶμα ᾄμα
 καὶ ἀσώματον, οὐδὲν ἐστὶ τὸ τί. τούτου δ' ἄν-
 237 ἁιρουμένου συναναίρεται καὶ τὰ ἐπ' εἶδους πάντα·
 ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀποπον. καὶ μὴν καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν
 συναποδοθέντων τῷ χρόνῳ ἀσωμάτων ἠπόρηται
 τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως, οἷον τὸ λεκτὸν καὶ τὸ κενόν
 καὶ ὁ τόπος· ἐκάστου δὲ τούτων ἠπορημένου καὶ ὁ
 χρόνος οὐ συγχωρηθήσεται ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους
 εἶναι τούτοις.
 238 Πρὸς δὲ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον σύμπτωμα συμπτω-
 μάτων ἀξιοῦντα τυγχάνειν τὸν χρόνον, πολλῶν καὶ
 ἄλλων λέγεσθαι δυναμένων, ἐκεῖνο πρὸς τὸ παρὸν
 ἀπαρκέσει λέγειν, ὅτι αἱ μὲν πως ἔχουσαι οὐσίαι
 τάχα θεωροῦνται καὶ εἰσὶ τῶν ὑποκειμένων πραγ-
 μάτων, τὰ δὲ λεγόμενα συμβεβηκέναι ταῖς οὐσίαις,
 οὐχ ἕτερα ὄντα τῶν οὐσιῶν, ἀνυπόστατά ἐστιν·
 239 οὔτε γὰρ ἀντιτυπία τις ἔστι παρὰ τὸ ἀντίτυπον
 σῶμα οὔτε εἰζὶς ὑπόκειται παρὰ τὸ εἶκον καὶ κενόν,
 οὐ κίνησις παρὰ τὸ κινούμενον σῶμα, οὐ μονὴ παρὰ
 τὸ ἡρεμοῦν, ἀλλ' ὡς οὐδὲν ἐστὶ στρατηγία παρὰ
 τὸν στρατηγούντα οὐδὲ γυμνασιαρχία παρὰ τὸν
 γυμνασιαρχούντα, οὕτως οὐδὲ ἕκαστον τούτων τῶν
 240 συμβεβηκότων ἐστὶ παρὰ τὸ ᾧ συμβέβηκεν. ὅθεν

^a Cf. § 218.

^b Cf. §§ 219, 227.

^c Or "solidity," a property of "body," cf. § 12.

of Vegetable vegetables and none animate, so too
 it will follow that, as "Something" is a body, its
 particulars are bodies and none of them incorporeal.
 But if it is incorporeal, its particulars will all be
 incorporeal and none will be a body. And in the 236
 same way, if it is at once both body and incorporeal
 all its particulars will be at once both bodies and
 incorporeals and none will be by itself either a body
 only or an incorporeal. So that if the "Something"
 is not a body nor incorporeal, nor at once both body
 and incorporeal, the "Something" is nothing. And
 if this is destroyed, there are also destroyed along
 with it all its particulars; which is absurd.—Further- 237
 more, each of the incorporeals assumed together
 with time^a—such as "expression" and void and
 place—have been doubted by the Sceptics; and as
 each of these has been doubted, it will not be granted
 that time is of the same genus as they.

And as against Epicurus, who maintains that time 238
 is a "symptom of symptoms,"^b although many other
 arguments can be brought, it will suffice for the
 present to state this one—that whereas substances
 in a certain condition are perhaps observed and belong
 to the class of things really existent, what are called
 the properties of substances, being not other than
 the substances, are non-existent; for there exists no 239
 "resistance"^c apart from the resistant body, nor
 does any non-resistance subsist apart from the non-
 resistant and void, nor motion apart from the moving
 body, nor rest apart from the stationary; but just as
 generalship is nothing apart from the acting general,
 nor headship of a training-school apart from the
 acting head, so too each of these properties is non-
 existent apart from that whereof it is a property.

καὶ ἐπειδὴν λέγει ὁ Ἐπίκουρος τὸ σῶμα νοεῖν κατ' ἐπισύνθεσιν μεγέθους καὶ σχήματος καὶ ἀντιτυπίας καὶ βάρους, ἐκ μὴ ὄντων [σωμάτων]¹ βιάζεται τὸ ὄν σῶμα νοεῖν· εἰ γὰρ μήτε μέγεθός τι ὑπόκειται παρὰ τὸ μεμεγεθωμένον μήτε σχῆμα παρὰ τὸ ἐσχηματισμένον μήτε ἀντιτυπία παρὰ τὸ ἀντιτυποῦν, πῶς ἐκ τῶν μὴ ὑποκειμένων οἶόν τε τὸ ὑποκείμενον
 241 νοεῖν σῶμα; ὥσθ' ἵνα ἡ χρόνος, συμπτώματα εἶναι δεῖ, ἵνα δὲ τὰ συμπτώματα ὑπάρχει, συμβεβηκός τι ὑποκείμενον· οὐδὲν δέ ἐστι συμβεβηκός ὑποκείμενον· τοῖνυν οὐδὲ χρόνος δύναται ὑπάρχειν.
 242 ἐὼ λέγειν ὅτι καὶ τὰ οἷς λέγεται συμβεβηκέναι ὁ χρόνος, καὶ τὰ ὧν λέγεται σύμπτωμα τρυγᾶναι, ἀνεύρετά ἐστιν, οἷον ἡ ἡμέρα ἢ νύξ, ὥρα, κίνησις μονή, πάθος ἀπάθεια. ἡ γοῦν ἡμέρα δωδεκάωρος λεγομένη εἶναι, καθὼς πρότερον ὑπέδειξαμεν, οὐχ ὑφέστηκε κατὰ τὰς δώδεκα ὥρας ἀλλὰ κατὰ μίαν μόνην τὴν ἐνεστῶσαν, ἣτις οὐκ
 243 ἔστιν ἡμέρα. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς νυκτός. ἡ τε ὥρα ἐν πλάτει νοουμένη καὶ οἷον τριμερῆς πάλω σκεψαμένοις ἡμῖν ἀνυπόστατος φαίνεται. οὔτε γὰρ ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον αὐτῆς μέρος ἔστιν ὑφέστηκεν, οὔπω γὰρ τὰ λοιπὰ ἔστιν, οὔτε ὅτε τὸ δεύτερον· τότε γὰρ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον οὐκέτι ἔστιν τὸ δὲ
 244 τρίτον οὔπω ἔστιν. τῶν δὲ πλειόνων αὐτῆς μερῶν κατά τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον μὴ ὑπαρχόντων οὐδ' αὐτὴ δύναται ὑπάρχειν. ἀλλ' ἔστω γε ἡμέραν εἶναι καὶ νύκτα ὑπάρχειν καὶ ὥρας. οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶ ταῦτά ἐστι χρόνος, ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος σύμπτωμά φησιν αὐτῶν εἶναι τὸν χρόνον, ἔσται κατὰ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον ὁ

¹ [σωμάτων] secl. Heintz.

Hence when Epicurus asserts that we conceive body 240 by means of a combination of size and shape and resistance and weight, he is forcing us to form a conception of existent body out of non-existents; for if no size exists apart from that which is endowed with size, nor shape apart from what is shaped, nor resistance apart from what resists, how is it possible from things non-existent to form a conception of an existent body? So that, in order that time may 241 exist, symptoms must exist, and in order that symptoms may exist there must be a really existent property; but there is no really existent property; so then, time cannot exist.—I pass over the argument 242 that the things of which time is said to be a property and also the things of which it is said to be a symptom are undiscoverable,—such as day, night, hour, motion, rest, affection, non-affection. Thus “day,” which is said to be of twelve hours—as we pointed out above ^a—does not exist during the twelve hours but during only one, the present, which is not a day. And the same 243 account holds good of “night.” And “hour” again, being conceived as extended and, as it were, tripartite,^a appears to us when we examine it to be non-existent. For neither does it exist when the first part of it exists (for the other parts do not as yet exist), nor when the second; for then the first part exists no longer and the third does not as yet exist. But since, 244 in this way, most of its parts are non-existent, it cannot exist itself. But let it be granted that day exists and that night and hours exist; then, since these are time, and Epicurus asserts that time is a symptom of them, time itself, according to Epicurus, will be a

^a See § 182 *supra*. “Hour” may be regarded as “tripartite” as being divisible into past, present, and future.

245 χρόνος αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ σύμπτωμα. καὶ μὴν καὶ ὁ περὶ τῆς κινήσεως λόγος ποικίλως ἄπορος δέ-
δεικται διὰ τὸ μήτε ἐν ᾧ τι ἔστι τόπω δύνασθαι
κινεῖσθαι μήτε ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστι. συναλήρηται δὲ καὶ
τὸ περὶ τῆς μονῆς· κινήσεως γὰρ μὴ οὔσης οὐδὲ
μονῆ γένοιτ' ἂν. κατὰ γὰρ ἀντιπαραβολὴν τοῦ
κινουμένου νοεῖται τὸ ἀκίνητον καὶ τοῦ ἀκινήτι-
ζοντος τὸ κινούμενον· ὅθεν ὡς δεξιῶ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲ
ἀριστερόν ἔστιν, οὕτως τοῦ ἐτέρου τούτων μὴ ὑπ-
246 ἄρχοντος οὐδὲ τὸ λοιπὸν δύναται νοεῖσθαι. καὶ
ἄλλως, φασὶν οἱ ἀπορητικοί, τὸ μένον ὑπὸ τινος
αἰτίας ἀναγκάζεται μένεω, τὸ δὲ ἀναγκαζόμενον
πάσχει, τὸ δὲ πάσχον κινεῖται· τὸ ἄρα μένον κινεῖται.
ἀλλ' εἰ περὶ τὰ συμπτώματά φησιν εἶναι τὸν χρόνον
ὁ Ἐπίκουρος, δέδεικται δὲ ἠπορημένα, δεήσει ὁμο-
λογεῖν καὶ τὸν συμβεβηκότα τούτοις χρόνον ἠπορη-
247 σθαι. πρὸς τούτοις ἀσώματόν τι ἔστιν ἡ
κίνησις καὶ τὸ πάθος καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν κατηγορη-
μένων, ἀσώματον δὲ καὶ ὁ χρόνος. ἐπεὶ οὖν οὐ
πιθανὸν τοῖς ἀσωμάτοις ἀσώματα συμβεβηκέναι,
λέγωμεν μηδὲ τὸν χρόνον σύμπτωμα εἶναι τῶν
ἐκκειμένων συμπτωμάτων.
Ἄλλὰ γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς οὐσίας τὸν χρόνον ἀπορή-
σαντες τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ζητῶμεν καὶ περὶ ἀριθμοῦ.

Δ'. ΠΕΡΙ ΑΡΙΘΜΟΥ

248 Ἐπεὶ ἔτι τῶν συζυγούντων τῷ χρόνῳ πραγ-
μάτων ἔστι καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς διὰ τὸ μὴ χωρὶς ἐξαρ-
θμήσεως τῆν τοῦ χρόνου γίνεσθαι καταμέτρησης,
καθάπερ ὥρων καὶ ἡμερῶν καὶ μηνῶν ἔτι δὲ

¹ ἀσώματόν τι NLE: ἀσώματός cet., Bekk.

symptom of itself.—Furthermore, the account given 245
of motion ^a has been shown to be in many respects
dubious owing to the impossibility of a thing moving
either in the place where it is or in that where it is
not. And along with this the doctrine of rest is also
destroyed; for if motion does not exist, neither will
rest exist. For it is by contrast with the moving
object that the motionless is conceived, and by con-
trast with the motionless the moving; hence as left
does not exist if right is non-existent, so if either of
these does not exist, the other cannot be conceived.
And besides, say the Doubters, that which is at rest 246
is compelled to be at rest by some cause ^b; but that
which is compelled is affected, and what is affected
moves; therefore that which is at rest moves. But
if Epicurus asserts that time is related to the symp-
toms, and they have been shown to be doubtful, he
will have to confess that their property, time, is also
doubtful.—And further: motion is an incorporeal, 247
and also affection, and each of the things mentioned,^c
and time too is an incorporeal. Since, then, it is not
probable that incorporeals are properties of incor-
poreals, let us declare that time is not a symptom of
the symptoms mentioned.

So now that we have shown the difficulties about
time in respect of its substance, let us inquire next
about number.

CHAPTER IV.—CONCERNING NUMBER

Since number also is one of the things linked closely 248
with time—seeing that the measurement of time (as,
for instance, of hours and days and months, and years

^a See §§ 87 ff.

^b With § 246 cf. *P.H.* iii. 116.

^c Cf. § 242.

ἐναντιῶν, καλῶς ἔχειν ἡγοῦμεθα μετὰ τὴν προ-
 ανυθεῖσαν ἡμῖν περὶ ἐκείνου ζήτησιν καὶ τὸν περὶ
 τούτου διαθέσθαι λόγον, καὶ μάλισθ' ὅτι οἱ ἐπιστη-
 μονέστατοι τῶν φυσικῶν οὕτω μεγάλην δύναμιν
 τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς ἀπένευμαν ὥστε ἀρχὰς καὶ στοιχεῖα
 τῶν ὄλων τούτους νομίζω. οὗτοι δὲ εἰσιν οἱ περὶ
 249 τὸν Σάμιον Πυθαγόραν. εἰκέναι γὰρ λέγουσι τοὺς
 φιλοσοφοῦντας γησιῶς τοῖς περὶ λόγον πονου-
 μένοις. ὡς γὰρ οὗτοι πρῶτον τὰς λέξεις ἐξετά-
 ζουσιν (ἐκ λέξεων γὰρ ὁ λόγος), καὶ ἐπεὶ ἐκ
 συλλαβῶν αἱ λέξεις, πρῶτον σκέπτονται τὰς συλ-
 λαβάς· τῶν δὲ συλλαβῶν (εἰς)¹ τὰ στοιχεῖα τῆς
 ἐγγραμμάτου φωνῆς ἀναλυομένων, περὶ ἐκείνων
 250 πρῶτον ἐρευνῶσιν· οὕτω δεῖν φασὶν οἱ περὶ Πυθα-
 γόραν τοὺς ὄντως φυσικούς, τὰ περὶ τοῦ παντός
 ἐρευνῶντας, ἐν πρώτοις ἐξετάζω εἰς τίνα τὸ πᾶν
 λαμβάνει τὴν ἀνάλυσιν. τὸ μὲν οὖν φαινομένην
 εἶναι λέγειν τὴν τῶν ὄλων ἀρχὴν ἀφύσικόν πως
 ἐστίν· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ φαινόμενον ἐξ ἀφανῶν ὀφείλει
 συνίστασθαι, τὸ δ' ἐκ τινων συνεστῶς οὐκ ἔστιν
 251 ἀρχή, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐκείνου αὐτοῦ συστατικόν. ὅθεν καὶ
 τὰ φαινόμενα οὐ ῥητέον ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὄλων, ἀλλὰ
 τὰ συστατικὰ τῶν φαινομένων, ἅπερ οὐκέτι ἦν
 φαινόμενα. τοίνυν ἀδήλους καὶ ἀφανεῖς ὑπ-
 252 ἔθεντο τὰς τῶν ὄντων ἀρχάς, καὶ οὐ κοινῶς. οἱ γὰρ
 ἀτόμους εἰπόντες ἢ ὁμοιομερείας ἢ ὄγκους ἢ κοινῶς
 νοητὰ σώματα πάντων τῶν ὄντων ἀρχεῖν πῆ μὲν

¹ τῶν δὲ σ. <εἰς>] καὶ ἐπεὶ ἐκ σ. N Mutsch.: ἐκ γὰρ σ. cet.,
 Bekk. ("cumque syllabae resolvantur ex litteris" Herv.).

as well) does not take place without numeration,—
 after the investigation of the latter which we have
 now completed we consider that it is well for us to give
 an orderly discussion of the former; and that the
 more so because the most learned of the Physicists^a
 have attributed so great a potency to numbers as to
 deem them the principles and elements of all things.
 These men are Pythagoras of Samos and his school.
 For they say that those who are genuinely philo- 249
 sophizing are like those who work at language. Now
 the latter first examine the words (for language is
 composed of words); and since words are formed
 from the syllables, they scrutinize the syllables first;
 and as syllables are resolved into the elements of
 written speech, they investigate these first; so like- 250
 wise the true physicists, as the Pythagoreans say,
 when investigating the Universe, ought in the first
 place to inquire what are the elements into which
 the Universe can be resolved.—Now to assert that
 the principle of all things is apparent is contrary to
 physical science; for every apparent thing must be
 composed of non-apparents, and what is composed of
 things is not a principle, but rather the component
 of that compound (is a principle). Hence one ought 251
 not to say that the apparent things are principles
 of all things, but the components of the apparent
 things, and these are no longer apparent.—Thus they
 assumed the principles of existing things to be non-
 evident and non-apparent, yet they did not do so
 with one consent. For those who declared that 252
 atoms or homoeomerics or molecules^b or, in general,
 intelligible bodies are the principles of all existing

^a i.e. the Pythagoreans; cf. P.H. iii. 152.

^b Cf. Adv. Phys. i. 363.

κατώρθωσαν πῆ δὲ διέπεσον. ἥ μὲν γὰρ ἀδήλους νομίζουσιν εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς, δεόντως ἀναστρέφονται, ἥ δὲ σωματικὰς ὑποτίθενται ταύτας, διαπίπτουσιν.
 253 ὡς γὰρ τῶν αἰσθητῶν σωμάτων προηγείται τὰ νοητὰ καὶ ἀδηλα σώματα, οὕτω καὶ τῶν νοητῶν σωμάτων ἄρχειν δεῖ τὰ ἀσώματα. καὶ κατὰ λόγον· ὡς γὰρ τὰ τῆς λέξεως στοιχεῖα οὐκ εἰσὶ λέξεις, οὕτω καὶ τὰ τῶν σωμάτων στοιχεῖα οὐκ ἔστι σώματα· ἦτοι δὲ σώματα ὀφείλει τυγχάνειν ἢ
 254 ἀσώματα· διὸ πάντως ἔστιν ἀσώματα. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ἔνεστι φάναι ὅτι αἰώνιους συμβέβηκεν εἶναι τὰς ἀτόμους, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δύνασθαι σωματικὰς οὐσας τῶν ὄλων ἄρχειν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ καὶ οἱ τὰς ὁμοιομερείας καὶ οἱ τοὺς ὄγκους καὶ οἱ τὰ ἐλάχιστα καὶ ἀμερῆ λέγοντες εἶναι στοιχεῖα αἰώνιον ἀπολείπουνσι τούτων τὴν ὑπόστασιν, ὥστε μὴ μάλ-
 255 λον τὰς ἀτόμους ἢ ταῦτ' εἶναι στοιχεῖα. εἴτα καὶ δεδόσθω ταῖς ἀληθείαις αἰώνιους εἶναι τὰς ἀτόμους· ἀλλ' ὃν τρόπον οἱ ἀγένητον καὶ αἰώνιον ἀπολείποντες τὸν κόσμον οὐδὲν ἤττον πρὸς ἐπίνοιαν ζητοῦσι τὰς πρῶτον συστημαμένας αὐτὸν ἀρχάς, οὕτω καὶ ἡμεῖς, φασὶν οἱ Πυθαγορικοὶ τῶν φυσικῶν φιλοσόφων, κατ' ἐπίνοιαν σκεπτόμεθα τὸ ἐκ τίνων τὰ αἰώνια ταῦτα καὶ λόγῳ θεωρητὰ συνέστηκε
 256 σώματα. ἦτοι οὖν σώματά ἐστι τὰ συστατικὰ αὐτῶν ἢ ἀσώματα. καὶ σώματα μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴπαμεν, ἐπεὶ δεήσει κακείνων σώματα λέγειν εἶναι συστατικὰ καὶ οὕτως εἰς ἀπειρον προβαίνουσης τῆς
 257 ἐπινοίας ἀναρχον γίνεσθαι τὸ πᾶν.λείπεται ἄρα λέγειν ἐξ ἀσωμάτων εἶναι τὴν σύστασιν τῶν νοητῶν σωμάτων· ὅπερ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ὡμολόγησε, φήσας

* Cf. § 240.

things proved partly right, but partly went wrong. For in so far as they consider the principles to be non-evident, their procedure is correct, but in so far as they assume them to be corporeal they go wrong. For just as the intelligible and non-evident bodies 253 precede the sensible bodies, so the incorporeals ought to be the principles of the intelligible bodies. And logically so: for just as the elements of a word are not words, so also the elements of bodies are not bodies; but they must be either bodies or incorporeals; certainly, then, they are incorporeals.— Moreover, it is not admissible to say that it is a 254 property of atoms to be eternal, and that on this account they can be the principles of all things although they are corporeal. For, in the first place, those who assert that homoeomerics or molecules or minimal and indivisibles are elements assign to them an eternal existence, so that the atoms are no more elements than they. Next, let it be granted 255 that the atoms are in very truth eternal; yet, just as those who allow that the Universe is ingenerable and eternal seek none the less, in theory, for the principles which first composed it, so also we—as those Physical philosophers, the Pythagoreans, say—examine theoretically the problem as to what are the components of these eternal bodies perceptible by the reason. Their components, then, are either 256 bodies or incorporeals. And we will not say that they are bodies, since then we should have to say that the components of these also are bodies, and, as the conception thus proceeds *ad infinitum*, that the Whole is without beginning. It only remains, therefore, to 257 declare that the intelligible bodies are composed of incorporeals; and this, too, Epicurus^a acknowledged,

κατὰ ἀθροισμὸν σχήματός τε καὶ μεγέθους καὶ ἀντιτυπίας καὶ βάρους τὸ σῶμα νενοῆσθαι.

Ἄλλ' ὅτι ἀσώματους εἶναι δεῖ τὰς ἀρχὰς τῶν λόγῳ θεωρητῶν σωμάτων, ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων
 258 συμφανές. ἤδη δὲ οὐκ εἴ τινα προῦφέστηκε τῶν σωμάτων ἀσώματα, ταῦτ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης στοιχεῖά ἐστι τῶν ὄντων καὶ πρῶταί τις ἀρχαί. ἰδοὺ γὰρ καὶ αἱ ἰδέαι ἀσώματοι οὖσαι κατὰ τὸν Πλάτωνα προῦφεστώσιν τῶν σωμάτων, καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν γινομένων πρὸς αὐτὰς γίνεται· ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰσὶ τῶν ὄντων ἀρχαί, ἐπεὶπερ ἕκάστη ἰδέα κατ' ἰδίαν μὲν λαμβανομένη ἐν εἶναι λέγεται, κατὰ σύλληψιν δὲ ἐτέρας ἢ ἄλλων δύο καὶ τρεῖς καὶ τέσσαρες, ὥστε εἶναι τι ἐπαναβεβηκὸς αὐτῶν τῆς ὑποστάσεως, τὸν ἀριθμὸν, οὐ κατὰ μετοχὴν τὸ ἐν ἢ τὰ δύο ἢ τὰ τρία ἢ τὰ
 259 τούτων ἔτι πλείονα ἐπικατηγορεῖται αὐτῶν. καὶ τὰ στερεὰ σχήματα προεπινοεῖται τῶν σωμάτων, ἀσώματον ἔχοντα τὴν φύσιν· ἀλλ' ἀνάπαλι οὐκ ἀρχει τῶν πάντων· προάγει γὰρ καὶ τούτων κατὰ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν τὰ ἐπίπεδα σχήματα διὰ τὸ ἐξ ἐκείνων
 260 τὰ στερεὰ συνίστασθαι. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τὰ ἐπίπεδα σχήματα θείη τις ἂν τῶν ὄντων στοιχεῖα· ἕκαστον γὰρ αὐτῶν πάλιν ἐκ προαγόντων συντίθεται, τῶν γραμμῶν, καὶ αἱ γραμμαὶ προεπινοούμενους ἔχουσι τοὺς ἀριθμούς, παρόσον τὸ μὲν ἐκ τριῶν γραμμῶν τρίγωνον καλεῖται καὶ τὸ ἐκ τεσσάρων τετράγωνον. καὶ ἐπεὶ ἡ ἀπλή γραμμὴ οὐ χωρὶς ἀριθμοῦ νενοῆται, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ σημείου ἐπὶ σημείον ἀγομένη ἔχεται τῶν δυοῖν, οἳ τε ἀριθμοὶ πάντες καὶ αὐτοὶ ὑπὸ τὸ ἐν πεπτῶκασιν (καὶ γὰρ ἡ δυὰς μία τις ἐστὶ δυάς, καὶ

when he said that "body is conceived by means of a combination of form and magnitude and resistance and weight."

Well then, it is plain from what has been said that the principles of the bodies perceptible by reason must be incorporeal. But if certain incorporeals 258 exist before the bodies, these are not already of necessity elements of existing things and primary principles. For see how the Ideas, which are incorporeal,^a exist before the bodies, according to Plato, and everything which becomes becomes because of its relation to them; yet they are not principles of existing things since each Idea taken separately is said to be a unit, but two or three or four when taken in conjunction with one or more others, so that there is something which transcends their substance, namely number, by participation in which the terms one or two or three or a still higher number than these is predicated of them. The solid 259 forms also, which are of an incorporeal nature, are conceived before bodies; but they, again, are not principles of all things, for the plane forms precede them in conception, since out of these the solid are composed. Yet, indeed, one should not 260 posit the plane forms either as elements of existing things, for each of these likewise is composed of prior things—namely lines—and lines have numbers already pre-conceived, inasmuch as the compound of three lines is called a triangle and that of four a quadrangle. And since the simple line is not conceived apart from number but, as drawn from a point to a point, involves the number two, and all the numbers themselves fall under the One (for the two is a single two, and the three is one particular thing,

^a Cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 364.

ἡ τριάς ἐν τι ἐστί, τριάς, καὶ ἡ δεκάς ἐν ἀριθμοῦ
 261 κεφάλαιον), ἔνθεν κινηθεὶς ὁ Πυθαγόρας ἀρχὴν
 ἔφησεν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων τὴν μονάδα, ἧς κατὰ
 μετοχὴν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ἐν λέγεται· καὶ ταύ-
 την κατ' αὐτότητα μὲν ἑαυτῆς νοουμένην μονάδα
 νοεῖσθαι, ἐπισυντεθείσαν δ' ἑαυτῇ καθ' ἑτερότητα
 ἀποτελεῖν τὴν καλουμένην ἀόριστον δυνάδα διὰ τὸ
 μηδεμίαν τῶν ἀριθμητῶν καὶ ὠρισμένων δυνάδων
 εἶναι [τὴν]¹ αὐτὴν, πάσας δὲ κατὰ μετοχὴν αὐτῆς
 262 δυνάδας νοεῖσθαι, καθὼς καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς μονάδος
 ἐλέγχουσιν. δύο οὖν τῶν ὄντων αἱ ἀρχαί, ἡ τε
 πρώτη μονάς, ἧς κατὰ μετοχὴν πᾶσαι αἱ ἀριθμηταὶ
 μονάδες νοοῦνται μονάδες, καὶ ἡ ἀόριστος δυνάς, ἧς
 κατὰ μετοχὴν αἱ ὠρισμέναι δυνάδες εἰσὶ δυνάδες.

Καὶ ὅτι ταῖς ἀληθείαις αὐταὶ εἰσι τῶν ὅλων
 263 ἀρχαί, ποικίλως οἱ Πυθαγορικοὶ διδάσκουσιν. τῶν
 γὰρ ὄντων, φασί, τὰ μὲν κατὰ διαφορὰν νοεῖται,
 τὰ δὲ κατ' ἐναντίωσιν, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τι. κατὰ δια-
 φορὰν μὲν οὖν εἶναι τὰ καθ' ἑαυτὰ καὶ κατ' ἰδίαν
 περιγραφὴν ὑποκείμενα, οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἵππος
 φυτὸν γῆ ὕδωρ ἀῆρ πῦρ· τούτων γὰρ ἕκαστον
 ἀπολύτως θεωρεῖται καὶ οὐχ ὡς κατὰ τὴν πρὸς
 264 ἕτερον σχέσιν κατ' ἐναντίωσιν δὲ ὑπάρχειν ὅσα
 ἐξ ἐναντιώσεως ἑτέρου πρὸς ἕτερον θεωρεῖται, οἷον
 ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν, δίκαιον ἄδικον, συμφέρον
 ἀσύμφορον, ὅσιον ἀνόσιον, εὐσεβὲς ἀσεβές, κινού-
 μενον ἡρεμοῦν, τὰ ἄλλα ὅσα τούτοις ἐμφερῆ.
 265 πρὸς τι δὲ τυγχάνειν τὰ κατὰ τὴν ὡς πρὸς ἕτερον

¹ [τὴν] secl. Heintz.

* The Pythagoreans regarded "the ten" (Decad) as the "perfect" number as being the sum of the first four numbers

a three, and the ten is one sum of number^a), Pyth- 261
 agoras, moved by these considerations, declared that
 the One is the principle of existing things, by partici-
 pation in which each of the existing things is termed
 one; and this when conceived in its self-identity is
 conceived as One, but when, in its otherness, it is
 added to itself it creates the "Indefinite Dyad,"^b
 so-called because it is not itself any one of the
 numbered and definite dyads but they all are con-
 ceived as dyads through their participation in it, even
 as they try to prove in the case of the monad. There 262
 are, then, two principles of existing things, the First
 One, by participation in which all the numbered ones
 are conceived as ones, and also the Indefinite Dyad,
 by participation in which the definite dyads are dyads.

And that these are in very truth the principles of
 all things the Pythagoreans teach in a variety of
 ways.^c Of existing things some, they say, are con- 263
 ceived absolutely, some by way of contrariety, some
 relatively. Absolute, then, are those which subsist
 of themselves and in complete independence, such
 as man, horse, plant, earth, water, air, fire; for each
 of these is regarded absolutely and not in respect of
 its relation to something else. And contraries are all 264
 those which are regarded in respect of their contra-
 riety one to another, such as good and evil, just and
 unjust, advantageous and disadvantageous, holy and
 unholy, pious and impious, in motion and at rest,
 and all other things similar to these. And relatives 265
 are the things conceived as standing in a relation to

(1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 10); cf. Aristot. *Metaph.* i. 5, 986^a 8 τέλειον ἡ δεκάς εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ πᾶσαν περιεληφέναι τὴν τῶν ἀριθμῶν φύσιν.

^b Cf. *P.H.* iii. 155. The "Indefinite Dyad" is the generic Two, or principle of Duality.

* With §§ 263-265 cf. *Adv. Log.* ii. 161-162; *P.H.* i. 137.

σχέσιν νοούμενα, ὅσον δεξιὸν ἀριστερόν, ἄνω κάτω, διπλάσιον ἡμισυ· τό τε γὰρ δεξιὸν νοεῖται κατὰ τὴν ὡς πρὸς τὸ ἀριστερόν σχέσιν καὶ τὸ ἀριστερόν κατὰ τὴν ὡς πρὸς τὸ δεξιόν, τό τε κάτω κατὰ τὴν ὡς πρὸς τὸ ἄνω καὶ τὸ ἄνω κατὰ τὴν ὡς πρὸς τὸ κάτω· καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τὸ παραπλήσιον.

286 διαφέρειν δέ φασι τὰ κατὰ ἐναντίωσιν νοούμενα τῶν πρὸς τι. ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ τοῦ ἑτέρου φθορὰ γένεσις ἔστι τοῦ ἑτέρου, ὅσον ἐπὶ ὑγείας καὶ νόσου κινήσεώς τε καὶ ἡρεμίας· νόσου τε γὰρ γένεσις ἀρσῆς ἔστι ὑγείας, ὑγείας τε γένεσις ἀρσῆς ἔστι νόσου, καὶ κινήσεως μὲν ὑπόστασις φθορὰ στάσεως, γένεσις δὲ στάσεως ἀρσῆς κινήσεως. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ λύπης καὶ ἀλυπίας ἀγαθοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ καὶ κοινῶς τῶν

267 ἐναντίαν φύσιν ἐχόντων. τὰ δὲ πρὸς τι συνύπαρξιν τε καὶ συναναίρεσιν ἀλλήλων περιεῖχεν· οὐδὲν γὰρ δεξιὸν ἔστιν, εἰ μὴ καὶ ἀριστερόν ὑπάρχη, οὐδὲ διπλάσιον, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὸ ἡμισυ προϋποκέηται οὗ

268 διπλάσιον ἔστιν. πρὸς τούτοις ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἐναντίων ὡς ἐπίπαν οὐδὲν θεωρεῖται μέσον, καθάπερ εὐθέως ἐπὶ ὑγείας καὶ νόσου ζωῆς τε καὶ θανάτου κινήσεώς τε καὶ μονῆς· μεταξύ γὰρ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ νοσεῖν οὐδὲν ἔστι, καὶ μεταξύ τοῦ ζῆν καὶ τεθνάναι καὶ ἔτι τοῦ κινεῖσθαι καὶ μένειν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πρὸς τί πως ἐχόντων ἔστι τι μέσον· τοῦ γὰρ μείζονος, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ τοῦ μικροτέρου τῶν πρὸς τί πως καθεστῶτων μεταξύ γένοιτ' ἂν τὸ ἴσον, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τοῦ πλείονος καὶ ἥττονος τὸ ἰκανόν, ὀξέος τε καὶ βαρέος τὸ

269 σύμφωνον. ἀλλὰ γὰρ τῶν τριῶν ὄντων γενῶν, τῶν τε καθ' ἑαυτὰ ὑφ' ἑστώτων καὶ τῶν κατ'

something else, such as right and left, above and below, double and half; for right is conceived as standing in relation to left, and left also as standing in relation to right, and below as related to above, and above as related to below; and similarly in the other cases.—And they say that things conceived as 266 contraries differ from relatives. For in the case of contraries the destruction of the one is the generation of the other, as in the case of health and disease, of motion and rest; for the generation of disease is the removal of health and the generation of health is the removal of disease, and the existence of motion is the destruction of rest and the generation of rest the removal of motion. And the same account holds good also in the case of pain and painlessness, of good and evil, and in general of all things that are of opposite natures. But relatives have the property 267 both of co-existence and of co-destruction one with the other; for there is no right unless a left also exists, nor a double unless the half also, whereof it is the double, pre-exists.—Furthermore, in the case of 268 opposites, as a universal rule, no intermediate state is conceived, as for instance in the cases of health and disease, life and death, motion and rest; for there is nothing between healthiness and illness, and between living and being dead, or again between moving and resting. But in the case of relatives there is a middle state; for the equal (let us say) will be between the greater and the smaller, these being relatives; and so likewise the adequate between the more and the less, and the harmonious between the high and the deep.—So then, as there are these three classes—the 269 self-existent things, those conceived as in opposition,

ἐναντιότητα καὶ ἔτι τῶν πρὸς τι νοουμένων, ὀφείλει κατ' ἀνάγκην καὶ τούτων αὐτῶν ἐπάνω τι γένος τετάχθαι, καὶ πρῶτον ὑπάρχειν διὰ τὸ καὶ πᾶν γένος προϋπάρχειν τῶν ὑφ' αὐτὸ τεταγμένων εἰδῶν. ἀναιρουμένου γοῦν αὐτοῦ πάντα τὰ εἶδη συνααιρεῖται, τοῦ δὲ εἶδους ἀναιρεθέντος οὐκέτ' ἀνασκευάζεται τὸ γένος· ἤρτηται γὰρ ἐξ 270 ἐκείνου τούτου, καὶ οὐκ ἀνάπαλιν. καὶ δὴ τῶν μὲν καθ' αὐτὰ νοουμένων γένος ὑπεστήσαντο Πυθαγορικῶν παῖδες, ὡς ἐπαναβεβηκός, τὸ ἔν· καθὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καθ' αὐτὸ ἔστιν, οὕτω καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν κατὰ διαφορὰν ἔν τε ἔστι καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὸ 271 θεωρεῖται. τῶν δὲ κατ' ἐναντίωσιν ἔλεξαν ἄρχειν, γένους τάξω ἐπέχον, τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ ἀνισόν· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἢ πάντων τῶν ἐναντιουμένων θεωρεῖται φύσις, οἷον μονῆς μὲν ἐν ἰσότητι, οὐ γὰρ ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥσσον, κινήσεως δὲ ἐν ἀνισότητι, 272 ἐπιδέχεται γὰρ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥσσον. ὡσαύτως δὲ τὸ μὲν κατὰ φύσιν ἐν ἰσότητι, ἀκρότης γὰρ ἦν ἀνεπίτατος, τὸ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν ἐν ἀνισότητι, ἐπεδέχετο γὰρ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥσσον. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ ὑγείας καὶ νόσου εὐθύτητός τε καὶ 273 στρεβλότητος. τὰ μέντοι γε πρὸς τι ὑφέστηκε γένει τῇ τε ὑπεροχῇ καὶ τῇ ἠλείψει· μέγα μὲν γὰρ καὶ μείζον πολὺ τε καὶ πλεῖον ὑψηλόν τε καὶ ὑψηλότερον καθ' ὑπεροχὴν νοεῖται, μικρόν δὲ καὶ μικρότερον ὀλίγον τε καὶ ὀλιγώτερον ταπεινόν τε 274 καὶ ταπεινότερον κατ' ἠλείψιν. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ καὶ τὰ κατ' ἐναντίωσιν καὶ τὰ πρὸς τι, γένη ὄντα, εὐρηται ἄλλοις γένεσιν ὑποταττόμενα, καθάπερ τῷ τε ἐνὶ καὶ τῇ ἰσότητι καὶ ἀνισότητι ὑπεροχῇ τε καὶ ἠλείψει, σκοπῶμεν εἰ καὶ ταῦτα

and also those conceived as relatives,—above all these there must stand of necessity a certain genus, and it must exist first for the reason that every genus must exist before the particulars classed under it. When it, then, is abolished all the particulars are abolished along with it, but when the particular is abolished the genus is not also done away with; for the former depends on the latter, and not conversely.—Thus the 270 disciples of the Pythagoreans postulated the One as the supreme genus of the things conceived as self-existent. For even as this is self-existent, so also each of the absolute things is one and is conceived by itself. But of the opposites the equal and the un- 271 equal are, they said, the principles and hold the rank of genus; for in them is seen the nature of all the opposites,—that of rest, for instance, in equality (for it does not admit of the more and the less), and that of motion in inequality (for it does admit of the more and the less). So too the natural in equality (for it 272 is an inextensible extreme),^a but the unnatural in inequality (for it admits of the more and less). The same account holds good also in the case of health and disease, and of straightness and crookedness. The relatives, however, are classed under the genus of 273 excess and defect; thus great and greater, much and more, high and higher are conceived by way of excess; but small and smaller, few and fewer, low and lower by way of defect.—But since self-existents and oppo- 274 sites and relatives, which are genera, are found to be subordinate to other genera—namely, the One, and equality and inequality, and excess and defect,—let

^a i. e. a fixed (and best) state which is "extreme" and "inextensible" as incapable of alteration for the better.

τὰ γένη δύναται ἐπ' ἄλλα λαμβάνειν τὴν ἀναπομπήν.
 275 οὐκοῦν ἢ μὲν ἰσότης τῷ ἐνὶ ὑπάγεται, τὸ γὰρ ἐν
 πρώτως αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ ἐστὶν ἴσον, ἢ δὲ ἀνισότης
 ἐν ὑπεροχῇ τε καὶ ἑλλείψει βλέπεται· ἀνισα γὰρ
 ἐστὼν ὧν τὸ μὲν ὑπερέχει τὸ δὲ ὑπερέχεται. ἀλλὰ
 καὶ ἡ ὑπεροχὴ καὶ ἡ ἑλλειψις κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἀορί-
 στου δυάδος λόγον τέτακται, ἐπειδήπερ ἡ πρώτη
 ὑπεροχὴ καὶ ἡ ἑλλειψις ἐν δυσὶν ἐστὶ, τῷ τε
 276 ὑπερέχοντι καὶ τῷ ὑπερεχομένῳ. ἀνέκυψαν ἄρα
 ἀρχαὶ πάντων κατὰ τὸ ἀνωτάτω ἢ τε πρώτη μονάς
 καὶ ἡ ἀόριστος δυάς· ἐξ ὧν γίνεσθαι φασι τό τ'
 ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς ἐν καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ τούτοις πάλιν
 δυάδα, ἀπὸ μὲν τῆς πρώτης μονάδος τὸ ἕν, ἀπὸ
 δὲ τῆς μονάδος καὶ τῆς ἀορίστου δυάδος τὰ δύο.
 δις γὰρ τὸ ἐν δύο, καὶ μήπω ὑποκειμένου ἐν
 τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς τοῦ δύο οὐδὲ τὸ δις ἦν ἐν τούτοις,
 ἀλλ' ἐλήφθη ἐκ τῆς ἀορίστου δυάδος, καὶ οὕτως
 ἐκ ταύτης τε καὶ τῆς μονάδος ἐγένετο ἡ ἐν τοῖς
 277 ἀριθμοῖς δυάς. κατὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ
 ἀριθμοὶ ἐκ τούτων ἀπετελέσθησαν, τοῦ μὲν ἑνὸς
 αἰεὶ περατοῦντος,¹ τῆς δὲ ἀορίστου δυάδος δύο
 γεννώσης καὶ εἰς ἄπειρον πλήθος τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς
 ἐκτεινούσης. ὅθεν φασὶν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ταύταις
 τὸν μὲν τοῦ δρώντος αἰτίου λόγον ἐπέχειν τὴν
 μονάδα, τὸν δὲ τῆς πασχούσης ὕλης τὴν δυάδα.
 καὶ ὃν τρόπον τοὺς ἐξ αὐτῶν ὑποστάντας ἀριθμοὺς
 ἀπετέλεσαν, οὕτω καὶ τὸν κόσμον καὶ πάντα τὰ
 278 ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ συνεστήσαντο. εὐθέως γὰρ τὸ
 σημεῖον κατὰ τὸν τῆς μονάδος λόγον τετάχθαι·
 ὡς γὰρ ἡ μονὰς ἀδιαίρετόν τι ἐστίν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ
 σημεῖον, καὶ ὃν τρόπον ἡ μονὰς ἀρχὴ τίς ἐστὶν ἐν
 ἀριθμοῖς, οὕτως καὶ τὸ σημεῖον ἀρχὴ τίς ἐστὶν

us consider whether these genera also can be referred
 back to others. Equality, then, is brought under the 275
 One (for the One first of all is equal to itself), but
 inequality is seen in excess and defect; for things
 of which the one exceeds and the other is exceeded
 are unequal. But both excess and defect are ranked
 under the head of the Indefinite Dyad, since in fact
 the primary excess and defect is in two things, that
 which exceeds and that which is exceeded. Thus as 276
 the highest principles of all things there have emerged
 the primary One and the Indefinite Dyad; and from
 these, they say, spring both the numerical one and
 the numerical two,—the one from the primary One,
 and the two from the One and the Indefinite Dyad.
 For the two is twice the one, and when the two did
 not as yet exist among the numbers neither did the
 twice exist amongst them, but it was taken from the
 Indefinite Dyad, and in this way the numerical two
 sprang from it and the One. And in the same way 277
 the rest of the numbers were constructed from these,
 the One always limiting and the Indefinite Dyad
 generating two and extending the numbers to an
 infinite amount.—Hence they say that, of these
 principles, the One holds the position of the efficient
 cause and the Dyad that of the passive matter; and
 just as they have constructed the numbers composed
 of these, so also they have built up the Universe and
 all things in the Universe. Thus the point, for ex- 278
 ample, is ranked under the head of the One; for as
 the One is an indivisible thing, so also is the point;
 and just as the One is a principle in numbers, so too

¹ περατοῦντος NLE: περιπατοῦντος cet., Bekk.

ἐν γραμμαῖς. ὥστε τὸ μὲν σημεῖον τὸν τῆς
 μονάδος εἶχε λόγον, ἢ δὲ γραμμὴ κατὰ τὴν τῆς
 279 δυάδος ἰδέαν ἐθεωρεῖτο· κατὰ μετάβασιν γὰρ καὶ
 ἡ δυὰς καὶ ἡ γραμμὴ νοεῖται. καὶ ἄλλως, τὸ
 μεταξύ δυοῖν σημείων νοούμενον ἀπλατὲς μῆκος
 ἔστι γραμμὴ. τοίνυν ἔσται κατὰ τὴν δυνάδα ἡ
 γραμμὴ, τὸ δὲ ἐπίπεδον κατὰ τὴν τριάδα, ὃ μὴ
 μόνον μῆκος αὐτὸ θεωρεῖται καθὸ ἦν ἡ δυὰς, ἀλλὰ
 καὶ τρίτην προσέληφε διάστασιν τὸ πλάτος.
 280 τιθεμένων δὲ τριῶν σημείων, δυοῖν μὲν ἐξ ἐναντίου
 διαστήματος, τρίτου δὲ κατὰ μέσον τῆς ἐκ τῶν
 δυοῖν ἀποτελεσθείσης γραμμῆς, πάλιν ἐξ ἄλλου
 διαστήματος, ἐπίπεδον ἀποτελεῖται. τὸ δὲ στερεὸν
 σχῆμα καὶ τὸ σῶμα, καθάπερ τὸ πυραμοειδές, κατὰ
 τὴν τετράδα τάττεται. τοῖς γὰρ τρισὶ σημείοις,
 ὡς προείπον, κειμένοις ἐπιτεθέντος ἄλλου τινὸς
 ἀνωθεν σημείου πυραμοειδὲς ἀποτελεῖται σχῆμα
 στερεοῦ σώματος· ἔχει γὰρ ἤδη τὰς τρεῖς δια-
 281 στάσεις, μῆκος πλάτος βάθος. τινὲς δ' ἀπὸ
 ἐνὸς σημείου τὸ σῶμά φασι συνίστασθαι· τουτὶ
 γὰρ τὸ σημεῖον ῥυέν γραμμὴν ἀποτελεῖν, τὴν δὲ
 γραμμὴν ῥυείσαν ἐπίπεδον ποιεῖν, τοῦτο δὲ εἰς
 βάθος κινήθην τὸ σῶμα γεννᾶν τριχῆ διαστατόν.
 282 διαφέρει δὲ ἡ τοιαύτη τῶν Πυθαγορικῶν στάσις
 τῆς τῶν προτέρων. ἐκείνοι μὲν γὰρ ἐκ δυοῖν ἀρχῶν,
 τῆς τε μονάδος καὶ τῆς ἀορίστου δυάδος, ἐποίησαν
 τοὺς ἀριθμούς, εἰτ' ἐκ τῶν ἀριθμῶν τὰ σημεία
 καὶ τὰς γραμμὰς τὰ τε ἐπίπεδα σχήματα καὶ τὰ
 στερεά· οὗτοι δὲ ἀπὸ ἐνὸς σημείου τὰ πάντα τεκταί-

the point is a principle in lines. So that the point
 comes under the head of the One, but the line is
 regarded as belonging to the class of the Dyad; for
 both the Dyad and the line are conceived by way of
 transition.—And again: the length without breadth 279
 conceived as lying between two points is a line. So
 then, the line will belong to the Dyad class, but the
 plane to the Triad since it is not merely regarded as
 length, as was the Dyad, but has also taken to itself
 a third dimension, breadth. Also when three points 280
 are set down, two at an interval opposite to each
 other, and a third midway in the line formed from the
 two, but at a different interval,^a a plane is constructed.
 And the solid form and the body, as also the pyramid,
 are classed under the Tetrad. For when the three
 points are placed, as I said before, and another point
 is placed upon them from above,^b there is constructed
 the pyramidal form of the solid body; for it now
 possesses the three dimensions length, breadth, and
 depth.—But some assert that the body is constructed 281
 from one point; for this point when it has flowed
 produces the line, and the line when it has flowed
 makes the plane, and this when it has moved towards
 depth generates the body which has three dimen-
 sions. But this view of the (later) Pythagoreans 282
 differs from that of the earlier ones. For these latter
 formed the numbers from two principles, the One and
 the Indefinite Dyad, and then, from the numbers, the
 points and the lines and both the plane and the solid
 forms; but the former build up all of them from a

^a Any triangle ABC will illustrate this.

^b Here the plane triangle ABC is assumed to be horizontal, and relatively to it the 4th point is in a vertical line ("from above"), thus forming a "pyramid," having "depth."

ουσιν. ἐξ αὐτοῦ μὲν (γὰρ)¹ γραμμὴ γίνεται, ἀπὸ
γραμμῆς δὲ ἐπιφάνεια, ἀπὸ δὲ ταύτης σῶμα.

283 Πλήν οὕτω μὲν ἀποτελεῖται τὰ στερεὰ σχήματα²
ἡγουμένων τῶν ἀριθμῶν· ἀφ' ὧν λοιπὸν καὶ τὰ
αἰσθητὰ³ συνίσταται, γῆ τε καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀήρ καὶ
πῦρ, καὶ καθόλου ὁ κόσμος, ὃν φασὶ καθ' ἁρμονίαν
διοικεῖσθαι πάλιν ἐχόμενοι τῶν ἀριθμῶν, ἐν οἷς οἱ
λόγοι εἰσὶ τῶν συστατικῶν τῆς τελείου ἁρμονίας
συμφωνιῶν, τῆς τε διὰ τεσσάρων καὶ τῆς διὰ πέντε
καὶ τῆς διὰ πασῶν, ὧν ἡ μὲν ἐν ἐπιτρίτῳ ἔκειτο
284 λόγῳ, ἡ δὲ ἐν ἡμιολίῳ, ἡ δὲ ἐν διπλασίονι. εἴρηται
δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀκριβέστερον κἀν τῇ περὶ κριτηρίου
σκέψει κἀν τοῖς περὶ ψυχῆς.

Νῦν δὲ ὑποδειχθέντος ὅτι μεγάλην δύναμιν
ἀπονέμουσι τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἰταλίας
φυσικοὶ μετελθόντες καὶ τὰς ἀκολουθοῦσας τῷ τόπῳ
285 κομίζωμεν ἀπορίας. ὅταν οὖν λέγωσι τῶν ἀρι-
θμητῶν, οἷον τῶν αἰσθητῶν καὶ ὑποπιπτόντων,
μηδὲν εἶναι ἔν, μετοχῇ δὲ τοῦ ἐνὸς τοῦ ὡσανεὶ
πρώτου καὶ στοιχείου ἐν τι καλεῖσθαι, εἰ οὖν τὸ
δεικνύμενον [καὶ τὸ μένον]⁴ ζῶον ἐν εἴῃ, τὸ μὴ
δεικνύμενον φυτὸν οὐκ ἔσται ἐν. οὐ γὰρ δεῖ
πολλὰ (ἐν)⁵ εἶναι, μετοχῇ δὲ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἕκαστον
286 νοεῖσθαι ἐν, οἷον ζῶον ξύλον φυτὸν. εἰ γὰρ τὸ

¹ <γὰρ> add. E, cj. Bekk.

² σχήματα] σώματα MSS., Bekk. (νοητὰ σώμ. Heintz).

³ αἰσθητὰ NE: στερεὰ cet., Bekk.

⁴ [καὶ τὸ μένον] secl. Kayser.

⁵ <ἐν> add. ego.

^a Cf. P.H. iii. 155; Adv. Log. i. 96. The terms are those of the Pythagorean musical theory and denote the "intervals" ("fourth" "fifth," and "octave") between the notes. With διὰ τεσσάρων—πέντε—πασῶν sc. χορδῶν.

single point. For from this the line is produced, and from the line the plane, and from this the body.

This, however, is the way in which the solid forms 283 are constructed, with the numbers leading; and, finally, from these (solids) the sensibles are composed, earth and water and air and fire, and the Universe at large; and it, they declare (holding fast once more to the numbers), is ordered according to harmony,^a since it is in numbers that the ratios reside of those symphonies which make up the perfect harmony,—namely, the "By-Fours" and the "By-Fives" and the "By-alls," of which the first lies in the ratio 4 : 3, the second in the ratio 3 : 2, the third in that of 2 : 1. But this subject has been discussed more exactly in 284 our inquiry regarding the criterion^b and in our treatise *On the Soul*.

And now that it has been shown that the Italian Physicists ascribe a great potency to numbers, let us pass on and bring forward the difficulties consequent on this position.^c Thus when they assert^d that none 285 of the numerables—such as things sensible and perceived—is one, but is called one through its participation in the One which is, as it were, primary and elemental, then if the animal pointed out is one, the plant which is not pointed out will not be one. For many things must not really be one, but each of them—such as an animal, a stick, a plant—must be conceived as one through participation in the One. For 286

^b i.e. Adv. Log. i. 96 ff. The treatise *On the Soul* is not extant.

^c With §§ 285-287 cf. P.H. iii. 156. The text here (from μετοχῇ . . . ἔσται ἐν §§ 285-286) is probably corrupt (a conflation of two versions).

^d From here to the end of § 287 we are given the Pythagorean doctrine; the criticism follows in §§ 288 ff.

δεικνύμενον ζῶων ἔν ἐστι, τὸ μὴ ὄν ζῶων, οἶον τὸ
 φυτόν, οὐκ ἔσται ἔν· καὶ εἰ τὸ φυτόν ἔν ἐστι, τὸ
 μὴ ὄν φυτόν, οἶον τὸ ζῶων, οὐκ ἔσται ἔν. ἀλλὰ
 λέγεται γε τὸ μὴ ὄν ζῶων ἔν, καθάπερ τὸ φυτόν,
 καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν φυτόν πάλιν ἔν, ὡς τὸ ζῶων. οὐκ
 ἄρα ἕκαστον τῶν ἀριθμητῶν ἔν ἐστιν. τὸ δὲ οὐ
 ἕκαστον μετοχῇ νενόηται ἔν, ἐκεῖνο ἔν τέ ἐστι καὶ
 287 πολλά, ἔν μὲν καθ' ἑαυτό, πολλά δὲ κατὰ περι-
 ληψιν. ὅπερ πλήθος πάλιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς
 ἀριθμητοῖς δεικνύμενον. εἰ γὰρ τὸ τῶν ζῶων
 πλήθος (πλήθος)¹ ἐστιν, τὸ τῶν φυτῶν οὐκ ἔσται
 πλήθος, καὶ εἰ τὸ τούτων, ἀνάπαλιν οὐκ ἔσται τὸ
 τῶν ζῶων. λέγεται δὲ γε καὶ ἐπὶ φυτῶν καὶ ἐπὶ
 ζῶων καὶ ἐπ' ἄλλων ἱκανῶν πλήθος· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ
 ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμητοῖς δεικνύμενον πλήθος τῶ ὄντι
 πλήθος ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ ἐκεῖνο τὸ οὐ μετοχῇ νενόηται
 288 τοῦτο πλήθος. ὅταν δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγωσιν
 οἱ Πυθαγορικοὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων, ὁμοίον τι λέγουσι
 τῶ μηδένα τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους ἀνθρώπων ἀνθρωπον
 εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸν οὐ μετοχῇ ἕκαστος εἰς τε ἀνθρωπος
 νενόηται καὶ πολλοὶ ἀνθρωποὶ καλοῦνται. νοεῖται
 γὰρ ὁ ἀνθρωπος ζῶων λογικὸν θνητόν, καὶ διὰ
 τοῦτο οὔτε Σωκράτης ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν οὔτε
 289 Πλάτων, οὐκ ἄλλος τις τῶν ἐπ' εἶδους. εἰ γὰρ
 Σωκράτης, καθὼ Σωκράτης ἐστίν, ἀνθρωπος καθ-
 ἔστηκεν, ὁ Πλάτων οὐκ ἔσται ἀνθρωπος, οὐδὲ Δίων
 ἢ Θέων· καὶ εἰ Πλάτων ἐστίν ἀνθρωπος, ὁ Σω-
 κράτης οὐκ ἔσται. λέγεται δὲ γε καὶ Σωκράτης
 ἀνθρωπος καὶ Πλάτων καὶ ἕκαστος τῶν ἄλλων·

¹ <πλήθος> add. Heintz.

* The otiose repetitions in this passage make the text doubtful.

if the animal pointed out is one, that which is not an animal,—a plant, for instance,—will not be one^a; and if the plant is one, that which is not a plant—for instance, an animal—will not be one. But, in fact, that which is not an animal—for instance, a plant—is termed one; and, again, that which is not a plant—for instance, an animal—is termed one. It is not true, therefore, that each of the numerables is one. But that by participation in which each thing is conceived as one is both one and many, one in respect of itself but many in respect of its comprehension. And this plurality, again, is not exhibited 287 in the case of the numerables. For if the plurality of animals is a plurality, that of plants will not be a plurality; and if that of the latter is a plurality, that of animals, conversely, will not be a plurality. But in fact plurality is predicated both of plants and of animals, and of many other things; therefore it is not the plurality exhibited in the case of numerables which is really plurality, but rather that plurality by participation in which this plurality was conceived. —Now when the Pythagorean philosophers make 288 such statements, what they say resembles the assertion that no particular man is Man, but only He^b by participation in whom each single person is conceived as a man and many are termed men. For Man is conceived as “a rational mortal animal,” and because of this neither Socrates is Man nor Plato nor any other particular man. And if Socrates, as Socrates, 289 is Man, Plato will not be Man, nor will Dion or Theon; and if Plato is Man, Socrates will not be Man. But in fact Socrates is termed man and Plato too and each of

^b i.e. the “generic Man,” or “Man” as a universal concept.

οὐκ ἄρα τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους ἀνθρώπων ἕκαστός ἐστιν
 ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲ μετοχήν ἕκαστος αὐτῶν νενόηται,
 290 ἄνθρωπος, ὃς οὐκ ἔστιν εἰς ἐξ αὐτῶν. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς
 λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ φυτοῦ καὶ πάντων τῶν λουπῶν.
 ἄτοπον δέ γέ ἐστι μηδένα τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους ἀνθρώπων
 λέγειν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, μηδὲ τῶν φυτῶν φυτόν.
 ἄτοπον ἄρα καὶ τὸ ἕκαστον τῶν ἀριθμητῶν κατὰ
 291 τὸν ἴδιον λόγον μὴ λέγειν ἓν. ἄλλως τε καὶ
 ἡ κοιμιζομένη κατὰ τοῦ γένους ἀπορία φθάνειν
 εἶκοι καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν τοιαύτην τῶν Πυθαγορικῶν
 δόξαν. ὡς γὰρ ὁ γενικός ἄνθρωπος οὔτε μετὰ τῶν
 ἐπ' εἰδους ἀνθρώπων θεωρεῖται, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὸς
 ἔσται εἰδικός, οὔτε κατ' ἰδίαν ὑφέστηκεν, ἐπεὶ οὐ
 γενήσονται οἱ κατὰ μέρος ἄνθρωποι μετοχήν αὐτοῦ
 ἄνθρωποι, οὔτ' ἐν αὐτοῖς τούτοις περιέχεται
 292 (ἀδιανόητον γὰρ τούτου μετοχήν ἀπείροις¹ εἶναι
 καὶ τούτο μὲν τεθνηκόσι τούτο δὲ ζῶσι περι-
 ἔχεσθαι),—ὡς οὖν οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἄπορος, οὔτω
 καὶ ὁ περὶ τοῦ ἐνὸς τούτου μᾶλλον ἐστὶν ἀπορώ-
 τερος τῷ μῆτε σὺν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος ἀριθμητοῖς²
 αὐτὸ θεωρεῖσθαι, μῆτε κατὰ παντὸς αὐτὸ δύνασθαι
 τετάχθαι, μῆτε μετοχήν αὐτοῦ τοῖς ἀπείροις ὑπ-
 293 ἄρχειν. ἢ γε μὴν τοῦ ἐνὸς ἰδέα, ἥς κατὰ
 μετοχήν ἕκαστον νοεῖται ἓν, ἥτοι μία ἐστὶν ἰδέα
 τοῦ ἐνὸς ἢ πλείους ἰδέαι τοῦ ἐνός. καὶ εἰ μὲν μία,
 ἥτοι ὅλης μετέχει ἕκαστον τῶν ἀριθμητῶν ἢ
 μέρους τινὸς αὐτῆς. καὶ εἰ μὲν ὅλης μετέσχηκεν,
 οὐκ ἔστι μία· εἰ γὰρ ὅλην ἔχει τὴν τοῦ ἐνός ἰδέαν
 λόγου χάριν τὸ Α, ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ Β, μὴ ἔχον οὐ

¹ μετοχήν ἀπείροις Heintz: μετοχήν ἀπείρους mss., Bekk.

² ἀριθμητοῖς Heintz: ἀριθμοῖς mss., Bekk.

the others; therefore it is not each of the particular
 men which is Man, but he by participation in whom
 each of them is conceived as a man, and he is not one
 of themselves. And the same argument applies also 290
 in the case of plants and all the rest. But it is absurd
 to say that none of the particular men is a man, nor of
 the plants a plant; therefore it is also absurd to deny
 that each of the numerables, in respect of its own
 definition, is one.—And again, the difficulty brought 291
 against genus^a seems to tell beforehand against this
 theory of the Pythagoreans. For as generic Man
 neither is perceived along with particular men (since
 then it will itself also be particular), nor subsists
 separately (since then the particular men will not
 become men by participation in it), nor is included
 amongst these men themselves (for it is inconceiv- 292
 able that an infinite number of them should have par-
 ticipation in it and that it should be included partly
 amongst the dead and partly amongst the living);—
 as then this account is doubtful, so also the account
 given of this One is still more doubtful, owing to the
 fact that it is neither perceived along with the par-
 ticular numerables, nor is capable of being ranked as
 a universal, and that the infinite (particulars) do not
 participate in it.—Moreover, the Idea of the One, by 293
 participation in which each thing is conceived as one,
 is either one Idea of the One or several Ideas of the
 One.^b And if it is one, each of the numerables par-
 takes either of the whole of it or of a part of it. And
 if it partakes of the whole, the Idea is not one; for if
 A (so to call it) has the whole of the Idea of the One,
 B, as it has nothing whereof to partake, will of neces-

^a Cf. P.H. ii. 219 ff.

^b With §§ 293-298 cf. P.H. iii. 158-162.

294 μετάσχη, οὐκ ἔσται ἓν ὅπερ ἄποπον. εἰ δὲ
 πολυμερὴς ἔστω ἡ τοῦ ἐνός ἰδέα καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν
 ἀριθμητῶν [ἐκάστου] μέρους αὐτῆς μετείληφεν,
 πρῶτον μὲν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων οὐ τῆς τοῦ ἐνός
 ἰδέας ἔσται μετείληφός ἀλλὰ μέρους αὐτῆς, καὶ
 διὰ τοῦτο οὐκέτι γενήσεται ἓν ὡς γὰρ τὸ μέρος
 ἀνθρώπου οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ μέρος τῆς
 λέξεως οὐκ ἔστι λέξις, οὕτω τὸ μέρος τῆς τοῦ ἐνός
 ἰδέας οὐκ ἔσται ἡ τοῦ ἐνός ἰδέα, ἵνα καὶ τὸ μετ-
 295 εσχῆκός αὐτῆς γένηται ἓν. εἴτα ἡ τοῦ ἐνός ἰδέα
 οὐκέτι γίνεται ἐνός ἰδέα, οὐδὲ μία ἀλλὰ πλείους.
 τὸ γὰρ ἓν, ἢ ἓν ἔστω, ἀδιαίρετον καθέστηκεν, καὶ
 ἢ μονάς, ἢ μονάς ἔστω, οὐ διχάζεται ἢ εἴπερ εἰς
 πολλὰ διαιρεῖται, ἀθροισμὸς πλειόνων μονάδων
 296 γενήσεται καὶ οὐκέτι μονάς. εἰ δὲ πλείους εἴεν
 ἰδέαι τοῦ ἐνός, ὡς ἕκαστον τῶν ἀριθμητῶν ἰδίας
 τινὸς μετέχειν ἰδέας καθ' ἣν ἓν νοεῖται, ἦτοι ἡ τοῦ
 A ἰδέα καὶ ἡ τοῦ B μετέχουσαν ἐνός τινος ἰδέας,
 καθ' ἣν ἐκότερον αὐτῶν προσαγορεύεται ἓν, ἢ οὐ
 297 μετέχουσαν. καὶ εἰ μὲν οὐ μετέχουσαν, ὃν τρόπον
 αὐταὶ δύνανται τῆς τοῦ ἐνός ἐπικατηγορίας
 ἀξιόσθαι μὴ μετέχουσαι τινος ἐπαναβεβηκυίας
 τοῦ ἐνός ἰδέας, οὕτω δύνανται καὶ πᾶν τὸ ὅπωσοῦν
 λεγόμενον ἓν μὴ κατὰ μετοχὴν τῆς τοῦ ἐνός ἰδέας
 298 προσαγορεύεσθαι ἓν. εἰ δὲ μετέχουσαν, ἢ ἀρχῆθεν
 μένει ἀπορία· πῶς γὰρ αἱ δύο ἰδέαι τῆς μιᾶς
 μετέχουσαν ἰδέας; ὅλης ἑκάτερα, ἢ μέρους αὐτῆς;
 ὁπότερον γὰρ ἂν λέγωσιν, ἐπαχθήσονται αἱ μικρῶ
 πρόσθεν ἀποδοθεῖσαι πρὸς ἡμῶν ἀπορίαι.
 299 Σὺν τούτοις ἐπεὶ πᾶν τὸ λαμβανόμενον ἀνθρώπῳ

sity not be one ; which is absurd. But if the Idea of 294
 One is multipartite and each of the numerables
 participates in some one part of it, then, in the first
 place, each of the existents will be participating not
 in the Idea of the One but in a part of it, and for this
 reason will no longer become one ; for just as the part
 of a man is not a man and the part of a word is not a
 word, so the part of the Idea of the One will not be
 the Idea of the One so that what partakes thereof may
 also become one. And secondly, the Idea of the One 295
 becomes no longer an Idea of one, nor itself one but
 several. For the One, in so far as it is one, is indivisible,
 and the monad, in so far as it is a monad, is not dissected ;
 or if it is divided into many parts, it will become an
 aggregation of several monads and no longer a monad.
 And if there are several Ideas of the One, then, since 296
 each of the numerables partakes of a separate Idea
 owing to which it is conceived as one, either the
 Idea of A and the Idea of B participate in some one
 Idea, owing to which each of them is termed one,
 or they do not participate. And if they do not partic- 297
 ipate, then, just as these can have the title " one "
 assigned to them although they do not participate
 in any supreme Idea of the One, so also everything
 which is in any way called one can be designated
 " one " without participation in the Idea of the One.
 But if they do participate, the original difficulty 298
 remains ; for how can the two Ideas partake of the
 one Idea ? Will each partake of the whole or of a
 part of it ? For whichever answer they give, those
 difficulties which we mentioned a short while ago *
 will be brought up against them.

And besides ; since everything perceived by man 299

¹ [ἐκάστου] secl. ego : ἑτέρου cj. Heintz (? ἐνός του).

* See § 293.

ἤτοι αἰσθήσει λαμβάνεται καὶ κατὰ ψιλλὴν ἐγκύρησιν ἢ διανοίᾳ, πάντως καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς,¹ εἴπερ ἀνθρώπων ληπτὸς ἔστιν, ἤτοι αἰσθήσει ἢ διανοίᾳ κατα-
 300 ληφθήσεται. ἀλλὰ αἰσθήσει μὲν καὶ ἀπλῆ ἐμφάσει οὐκ ἂν ληφθείη· πλανᾷ γὰρ ἐνίοις ἢ τῶν ἀριθμητῶν ὑπόστασις, ἐπεὶ βλέποντες ταῦτα λευκὰ ἢ μέλανα ἢ κωῶς αἰσθητὰ ὑπονοοῦσιν ὅτι καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς αἰσθητὸν τί ἐστι καὶ φαινόμενον πρᾶγμα, μὴ ἐχούσης οὕτω τῆς ἀληθείας. τὸ μὲν γὰρ λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν καί, εἰ οὕτω τύχοι, τὸ φυτὸν καὶ ὁ λίθος καὶ τὸ ξύλον καὶ τῶν ἀριθμητῶν ἕκαστον φαίνεται καὶ αἰσθήσει ληπτὸν ἔστιν, ὁ δ' ἀριθμὸς ὡς ἀριθμὸς οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῖν αἰσθητὸς οὐδὲ φαίνεται.
 301 σκοπῶμεν δὲ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον. τὰ αἰσθητὰ ὡς αἰσθητὰ ἀδιδάκτως ἡμῖν λαμβάνεται· οὐθεὶς γὰρ τὸ λευκὸν ἢ τὸ μέλαν ὄραν διδάσκεται, οὐδὲ τραχέος ἢ λείου ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι. ὁ δὲ ἀριθμὸς ὡς ἀριθμὸς οὐκ ἀδιδάκτως ἡμῖν λαμβάνεται· ὅτι γὰρ τὰ δις δύο τέσσαρά ἐστι καὶ τὰ τρις δύο ἕξ ἐστι καὶ τὰ δεκάκις δέκα ἑκατόν, ἐκ μαθήσεως ἔγνωμεν. οὐκ ἄρα αἰσθητὸν τί ἐστιν ὁ ἀριθμὸς.
 302 εἰ δὲ μνήμη κατ' ἐπισύνθεσιν τινων ἔγνωσται, ἀπορήσει τις τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀποστάς, καθὼς καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἠπόρει ἐν τῷ περὶ ψυχῆς πῶς τὰ δύο κατ' ἰδίαν μὲν ὄντα οὐ νοεῖται δύο, συνελθόντα δὲ
 303 εἰς ταῦτ' ἔγινετο δύο. εἰ γὰρ τοιαῦτά ἐστι μετὰ τὴν σύνθεσιν ὅποια ἦν πρὶν τῆς συνόδου, ἦν δ' ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν πρὶν τῆς συνόδου ἓν, ἔσται καὶ

¹ ἀριθμὸς Heintz: ἀθροισμὸς mss., Bekk.

* i.e. as a sense-impression, cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 85.

^b See Plato, *Phaedo* 96 E ff.; § 306 *infra*; *Adv. Log.*

is perceived either by sense and through mere occurrence^a or by intellect, number also, if it is perceptible by man, will certainly be apprehended either by sense or by intellect. But it will not be 300 perceived by sense and simple impression; for the nature of the numerables leads some people astray, since, when they see these to be white or black, or, in general, objects of sense, they suppose that number too is an object of sense and an apparent thing, whereas the truth is otherwise. For the white thing and the black, and (shall we say?) the plant and the stone and the stick and each of the numerables is apparent and is perceptible by sense, but number, as number, is not an object of sense for us nor is it apparent.—But 301 let us consider it in this way:—The sensibles, as sensibles, are perceived by us without teaching; for no one is taught to see the white or the black, or to perceive the rough or the smooth. But number, as number, is not perceived by us without teaching; for it is by learning that we get to know that twice two is four, and that three times two is six, and ten times ten a hundred. Therefore number is not an object of sense.—And if number becomes known by 302 memory through the combination of certain things, when one has left the sensibles one will be perplexed, even as Plato was perplexed in his book *On the Soul*,^b as to how the two when existing separately are not conceived as two but become two when they are combined together. For if they are of the same 303 sort after the combination as they were before the combination, and before the combination each of them was one, then each of them will also be one

μετὰ τὴν σύνοδον ἑκάτερον ἔν, ἐπεὶ ἂν δῶμεν προσγίνεσθαι τι αὐτοῖς περισσότερον μετὰ τὴν σύνοδον παρ' ὃ ἦν, ὡς τὴν δυάδα, ἔσται ἡ τῶν
 304 δυοῖν συνέλευσις τετράς. εἰ γὰρ τῷ συνελθόντι ἐνὶ καὶ ἐνὶ πλείον τι προσγίνεται ἡ δυάς, ἐπεὶ ἐν ταύτῃ μονὰς καὶ μονὰς νοεῖται, κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ ἐνὸς συνέλευσιν τετράς γενήσεται, δυοῖν μὲν νοουμένων τῶν συνιόντων, διττῆς δὲ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν οὔσης τῆς προσγινόμενης αὐτοῖς δυάδος.
 καὶ πάλιν εἰ τοῖς κατὰ σύνοδον ποιούσι τὴν δεκάδα πλείον τι προσγίνεται ἡ δεκάς, ἐπεὶ ἐν τῇ δεκάδι νοεῖται τὰ ἐννέα καὶ τὰ ὀκτὼ καὶ τὰ ἑπτὰ καὶ κατ' ὑπόθεσιν οἱ λοιποὶ ἀριθμοί, ἀπειράκις ἀπειρῶν ἔσται πλήθος τὰ δέκα, ὡς ἀνώτερον δεδείχαμεν.

305 Ὅ δὲ Πλάτων καὶ ἄλλως ἐπιχειρεῖν βούλεται. εἴπερ γὰρ τὸ ἔν, φησὶν, ὅτε διαιρεῖται καὶ χωρίζεται, δύο νοεῖται, πάντως καὶ ἡ ἑκάτερον τῶν ἀνὰ ἔν εἰς ταῦτὸ σύνοδος οὐ νοηθήσεται δύο· ἐναντίον γὰρ ἔστι τῷ πρώτῳ αἰτίῳ τὸ δεύτερον αἴτιον, καὶ εἰ τὰ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ χωριζόμενα δύο ἔστί, τὰ εἰς ταῦτὸ συναγόμενα καὶ ἀλλήλοις παραθεμιμένα οὐκ ἂν εἶη δύο. ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὸ ῥητὸν παρ' αὐτῷ τὸν
 306 τρόπον τοῦτον· “θαυμάζω γὰρ εἰ ὅτε μὲν ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν ἦν χωρὶς ἀλλήλων, ἐν ἦν ἑκάτερον καὶ οὐκ ἦσθην τότε δύο, πλησιάσαντα δ' ἀλλήλοις, αὕτη ἄρα αὐτῶν αἰτία ἐγένετο δυοῖν γενέσθαι, σύνοδος τοῦ πλησίον ἀλλήλων τεθῆναι. οὐδέ γε ὡς ἕαν τις ἐν διασχίσει, δύναμαι ἔτι πεισθῆναι ὅτι ὡσαύτως αἰτία γέγονεν ἡ σχίσις τοῦ δύο γεγονέαι. ἐναντία γὰρ γέγονεν ἢ τότε αἰτία τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι· τότε

¹ ἢ Mutsch. (sec. Platonis text.): ἡ MSS., Bekk.

^a See *Adv. Phys.* i. 303 ff. ^b See Plato, *Phaedo* 97 A.

after the combination ; since if we admit that after the combination some further new attribute was bestowed on them, such as duality, the combination of the two will make four. For if to the one and one which
 304 were combined the Dyad is attached as something further, then, since a monad and a monad are conceived as existing therein, a four will be formed by the combination of the one and the one,—the things combined being conceived as two, and the Dyad attached to them being of its own nature twofold.— And again, if to the numbers which by combination make up the Decad the Decad is attached in addition, since the nine is conceived as included in the Decad, and the eight and the seven and the rest of the numbers in descending order, the ten will be infinity times infinity in number, as we have previously pointed out.^a

And Plato attempts also to argue in another way.
 305 If the one, he says, when it is divided and separated is conceived as two, the combination of each of these single ones taken together will certainly not be conceived as two ; for the second cause is opposed to the first, and if the separated parts of the same thing are two, those which are brought together and set side by side will not be two. His statement^b is put in this form : “ For I am surprised that, whereas
 306 when each of them was apart from the other each of them was one and they were not then two, yet when they came close to each other this coming together in mutual juxtaposition actually proved the cause of their becoming two. Nor can I yet come to believe that if a man bisects a one the act of bisection likewise is the cause of its having become two ; for this cause of its becoming two is the opposite of the former

μὲν ὅτι συνήγετο πλησίον ἀλλήλων καὶ προσετίθετο
 ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ, νῦν δ' ὅτι ἀπάγεται καὶ χωρίζεται
 307 ἕτερον ἀφ' ἑτέρου." ῥητῶς γὰρ διὰ τούτων φησὶν
 ὡς εἴπερ ἢ ψιλὴ σύνοδος τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ἑνὸς καὶ ἢ
 αὐτὸ μόνον παράθεσις αἰτιῶν ἐστὶ τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι
 τὰ πρότερον μὴ ὄντα δύο, πῶς ἔτι πεισθῆναι
 δύναμαι ὅτι τὸ ἕν, ὅτε χωρίζεται καὶ διασπᾶται,
 δύο γίνεται; ἐναντία γὰρ τῇ συνόδῳ ἢ σχίσιν
 ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ χωρισμός.
 308 Τοιοῦτος μὲν καὶ ὁ Πλάτων· ἔνεστι δὲ καὶ ὠδε
 συνερωτᾶν. εἰ ἔστι τι ἀριθμός, ὅτε παρατίθεται
 τι ἑτέρῳ, ὅλον τῇ μονάδι ἢ μονάδι, τότε ἢ προσ-
 γίνεταί τι ταῖς συνελθούσαις μονάσιν ἢ ἀπογίνεταί
 τῶν συνελθουσῶν ἢ οὔτε προσγίνεταί τι αὐταῖς
 οὔτε ἀπογίνεταί. ἀλλ' εἰ μήτε προσγίνεταί τι
 αὐταῖς μήτε ἀπογίνεταί αὐτῶν, οὐκ ἔσται δυὰς
 κατὰ τὴν παράθεσιν τῆς ἑτέρας τῇ ἑτέρᾳ, ὡς οὐδὲ
 309 πρὶν τῆς συνόδου ἐτύγγανεν. εἰ δὲ ἀπογίνεταί τι
 κατὰ τὴν παράθεσιν αὐτῶν, ἐλάσσωσις ἔσται τῆς
 μιᾶς μονάδος καὶ οὐκέτι δυὰς γενήσεται. εἰ δὲ
 προσγίνεταί τι αὐταῖς, ὅλον ἢ δυὰς, τὰ ὀφείλοντα
 δύο εἶναι τέσσαρα γενήσονται. δυὰς γὰρ ἢ ἐπι-
 γενομένη μονὰς ἦν καὶ μονάδι· προσελθούσα οὖν
 μονάδι καὶ μονάδι, ταῖς συνερχομέναις, τὸν
 τέσσαρα ποιήσει ἀριθμόν· ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄτοπον.
 τοῖνυν οὐκ ἔστι τι ἀριθμός.

Ε'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΓΕΝΕΣΕΩΣ ΚΑΙ ΦΘΟΡΑΣ

310 Ἡ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς ζήτησις συνίσταται
 τοῖς σκεπτικοῖς πρὸς τοὺς φυσικοὺς σχεδὸν τι περὶ
 360

cause ; for then it was because the ones were brought
 close to each other and added to each other, but
 now it is because they are taken apart and separated
 the one from the other." In these words he says 307
 expressly that if the mere combination of one and
 one and their simple juxtaposition is the cause of
 those which formerly were not two becoming two,
 how can I still believe that the one when it is separated
 and pulled apart becomes two ? For bisection and
 separation is the opposite of combination.

Such, then, is Plato's view. But it is also possible 308
 to argue thus ^a: "If number is anything, when
 something is set beside another, say the monad beside
 the monad, then either something is added to the
 combined monads or subtracted from them, or nothing
 is either added to them or subtracted. But if
 nothing is either added to them or subtracted from
 them, there will not be a dyad because of the setting
 of the one beside the other, just as none existed before
 the combination. And if something is subtracted 309
 because of their being set side by side, there will be a
 decrease of one monad and no longer will a dyad come
 into existence. And if something is added to them,
 say the dyad, those which ought to be two will become
 four ^b; for the added dyad was a monad *plus* a monad ;
 when, then, this is added to the monad and monad
 which are being combined, it will make the number
 four ; which is absurd. So then, number is nothing.

CHAPTER V.—CONCERNING BECOMING AND PERISHING

The inquiry concerning becoming and perishing, 310
 as undertaken by the Sceptics against the Physicists,

^a With §§ 308-309 *cf.* P.H. iii. 164-165.

^b *Cf.* §§ 303, 304.

τῶν ὄλων, εἶγε τῶν σκεψαμένων περὶ τῆς τοῦ
 παντός συστάσεως οἱ μὲν ἐξ ἑνὸς ἐγέννησαν τὰ
 πάντα οἱ δ' ἐκ πλείονων, καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἑνὸς οἱ μὲν
 311 ἐξ ἀποίου οἱ δὲ ἐκ ποιοῦ, καὶ τῶν ἐκ ποιοῦ οἱ μὲν
 ἐξ ἀέρος οἱ δ' ἐξ ὕδατος οἱ δ' ἐκ πυρός, ἄλλοι ἐκ
 γῆς, καὶ τῶν ἐκ πλείονων οἱ μὲν ἐξ ἀριθμητῶν οἱ
 δ' ἐξ ἀπείρων, καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀριθμητῶν οἱ μὲν ἐκ δύο
 οἱ δ' ἐκ τεσσάρων οἱ δ' ἐκ πέντε οἱ δ' ἐξ ἕξ, καὶ
 τῶν ἐξ ἀπείρων οἱ μὲν ἐξ ὁμοίων τοῖς γεννωμένοις
 οἱ δὲ ἐξ ἀνομοίων, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν ἐξ ἀπαθῶν
 312 οἱ δ' ἐκ παθητῶν. ἐξ ἀποίου μὲν οὖν καὶ ἑνὸς
 σώματος τὴν τῶν ὄλων ὑπεστήσαντο γένεσιν οἱ
 στωικοί· ἀρχὴ γὰρ τῶν ὄντων κατ' αὐτοὺς ἐστὶν
 ἡ ἀποιος ὕλη καὶ δι' ὄλων τρεπτῆ, μεταβαλλούσης
 τε ταύτης γίνεται τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα, πῦρ καὶ
 313 ἀήρ, ὕδωρ καὶ γῆ. ἐξ ἑνὸς δὲ καὶ ποιοῦ γεγενῆσθαι
 τὰ πάντα θέλουσιν οἱ τε περὶ τὸν Ἴππασον καὶ
 Ἀναξίμενη καὶ Θαλῆ, ὧν Ἴππασος μὲν καὶ κατὰ
 τινὰς Ἡράκλειτος ὁ Ἐφέσιος ἐκ πυρός ἀπέλιπον
 τὴν γένεσιν, Ἀναξίμενης δὲ ἐξ ἀέρος, Θαλῆς δὲ
 ἐξ ὕδατος, Ξενοφάνης δὲ κατ' ἐνίου ἐκ γῆς·

ἐκ γαίης γὰρ πάντα, καὶ εἰς γῆν πάντα τελευτᾷ.

314 ἐκ πλείονων δὲ καὶ ἀριθμητῶν, δυοῖν μὲν, γῆς τε
 καὶ ὕδατος, ὁ ποιητῆς Ὅμηρος, ὅτε μὲν λέγων

is practically concerned with the Whole of things, seeing that of those who have investigated the structure of the Universe some have generated all things from one, others from several things^a; and of those who have generated them from one, some have done so from an unqualified and others from a qualified thing; and of those who have done so from 311 a qualified thing, some make this air, others water, others fire, others earth; and of those who have generated all from several things, some have done so from numerable things, others from things infinite in number; and of those who adopt numerables, some make them two, others four, others five, others six; and of those who adopt things infinite in number, some make these like to the things generated, others unlike; and some of these last make them impassive, others passive things. Thus the Stoics supposed 312 the becoming of all things to be derived from one unqualified body; for the principle of existing things, according to them, is the unqualified and wholly convertible matter, and by its changes the four elements come into being,—fire and air, water and earth. But Hippasus and Anaximenes and 313 Thales hold that all things have become from one thing which is qualified; and of these Hippasus—and, according to some, Heraclitus of Ephesus—derived the becoming from fire, but Anaximenes from air, and Thales from water, and Xenophanes (according to some) from earth,—

All things spring from the earth, and all in the earth have their ending.

And of those who derive all from things several and 314 numerable, the poet Homer makes them two, earth and water, as he says in one place^b—

^a Cf. P.H. iii. 30; Adv. Phys. i. 379 ff.
^b Homer, Il. xiv. 201.

᾽Ωκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν,
 ὅτε δὲ
 ἀλλ' ὑμεῖς μὲν πάντες ὕδωρ καὶ γαῖα γένοισθε.
 συμφέρεσθαι δ' αὐτῷ δοκεῖ κατ' ἐπίουσι καὶ ὁ
 Κολοφώνιος Ξενοφάνης· φησὶ γὰρ
 πάντες γὰρ γαίης τε καὶ ὕδατος ἐκγενόμεσθα.
 315 ἐκ γῆς δὲ καὶ αἰθέρος Εὐριπίδης, ὡς πάρεστιν
 ἐκδέξασθαι ἐκ τοῦ λέγειν αὐτὸν
 αἰθέρα καὶ γαίαν πάντων γενέτειραν αἰίδω.
 ἐκ τεσσάρων δὲ ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς·

τέσσαρα γὰρ πάντων ριζώματα πρῶτον ἄκουε·
 Ζεὺς ἀργῆς Ἥρη τε φερέσβιος ἠδ' Ἄιδωνεύς
 Νῆστίς θ', ἧ δακρυοῖς τέγγει κρούνωμα βρότειον.

316 ἐκ πέντε δὲ Ὀκελλος ὁ Λευκανὸς καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης·
 συμπαρέλαβον γὰρ τοῖς τέσσαρα στοιχείοις τὸ
 πέμπτον καὶ κυκλοφορητικὸν σῶμα, ἐξ οὗ λέγουσιν
 317 εἶναι τὰ οὐράνια. ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἑξ τῆν πάντων ὑπ-
 ἔθεντο γένεσιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα. ἐν οἷς
 μὲν γὰρ λέγει τέσσαρα τῶν πάντων ριζώματα, ἐκ
 τεσσάρων ποιεῖ τῆν γένεσιν· ὅταν δὲ προσθῆ

νεῖκος τ' οὐλόμενον δίχα τῶν, ἀτάλαντον ἀπάντη,
 καὶ φιλή μετὰ τοῖσιν, ἴση μῆκος τε πλάτος τε,
 ἕξ παραδίδωσι τὰς τῶν ὄντων ἀρχάς, τέσσαρας μὲν
 τὰς ὑλικάς, γῆν ὕδωρ ἀέρα πῦρ, δύο δὲ τὰς δραστη-

^a Homer, *Il.* vii. 99.

^b Eurip. *Frag.* 1023 (Nauck).

^c Cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 362, with note *ad loc.*

^d i.e. the aether, cf. *P.H.* iii. 31.

Ocean, sire of the gods, and Tethys the mother that bare
 them;

and again,^a

Nay, but I would that ye all might be turnèd to earth and
 to water.

And with him Xenophanes of Colophon is thought by
 some to agree; for he says—

All we men from earth and from water have our beginning.

And Euripides (derives all things) from earth and 315
 aether, as one may gather from his saying ^b—

Aether I hymn and Earth, the goddess-mother of all things.

And Empedocles from four things ^c—

Four are the roots of all things, and list thou first to their
 titles:—

Shining Zeus, and Herè the life-bringer, and Aïdoneus,
 Nestis too, who wetteth with tears the fountain of mortals.

And from five things Ocellus the Lucanian and Aris- 316
 totle; for along with the four elements they also
 adopted the fifth body which revolves in a circle,^d and
 from which they say that the celestial objects are
 derived. And Empedocles assumed that the genera- 317
 tion of all things is from the six. For in the verses
 where he speaks of "the four roots" of all things he
 makes their generation to be from four; but when
 he adds ^e—

Strife pernicious, divided from these and evenly balanc'd,
 Love, together with these, in length and breadth perfectly
 equal,—

he is handing down six as the principles of existing
 things, four material (earth, water, air, fire), and

^e Cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 10; and with § 318 cf. *P.H.* iii. 32;
Adv. Phys. i. 363.

318 *ρίους, φιλίαν καὶ νείκος. ἐξ ἀπείρων δ' ἐδόξασαν τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων γένεσιν οἱ περὶ Ἀναξαγόραν τὸν Κλαζομένιον καὶ Δημόκριτον καὶ Ἐπίκουρον καὶ ἄλλοι παμπληθεῖς, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν Ἀναξαγόρας ἐξ ὁμοίων τοῖς γεννωμένοις, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Δημόκριτον καὶ Ἐπίκουρον ἐξ ἀνομοίων τε καὶ ἀπαθῶν, τούτεστι τῶν ἀτόμων, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ποντικὸν Ἡρακλείδην καὶ Ἀσκληπιάδην ἐξ ἀνομοίων μὲν παθητῶν δέ, καθάπερ τῶν ἀνάρμων ὄγκων.*

319 *Προεληφότες οὖν ὅτι πᾶσι τούτοις ἄπορος δεικνυταὶ ὁ τῆς φυσιολογίας τρόπος ἀναιρεθείσης τῆς γενέσεως καὶ τῆς φθορᾶς, προθυμότερον ἀπτώμεθα τῶν λόγων. καίτοι γε ἐὰν ἐξετάζωμεν, διὰ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν αὐτάρκως ἤδη συμβεβίβασται*
 320 *τὸ κεφάλαιον. τὸ γὰρ γινόμενον καὶ φθειρόμενον ἐν χρόνῳ γίνεται καὶ φθίρεται, χρόνος δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὡς ἀνώτερον παρεστήσαμεν, ὥστε οὐδὲ τὸ*
 321 *γινόμενον καὶ φθειρόμενον ἔσται. πᾶσά τε γένεσις καὶ φθορὰ μεταβλητικαὶ τινές εἰσι κινήσεις, οὐδὲν δ' ἐστὶ κίνησις, ὡς προκατεστησάμεθα·*
 322 *τοῖνυν οὐδὲ γένεσις καὶ φθορὰ γενήσεται. καὶ πᾶν τὸ γεννώμενον ἢ φθειρόμενον οὐ χωρὶς τοῦ δρώντος καὶ πάσχοντος γεννᾶται ἢ φθίρεται, οὔτε δὲ δρᾶτι οὔτε πάσχει, ὥστ' οὐδὲ γεννᾶται τι οὐδὲ*
 323 *φθίρεται. καὶ μὴν εἰ γίνεται τι καὶ φθίρεται, ὀφείλει τίτιν προστίθεσθαι καὶ τί τινος ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἢ τι ἐκ τινος μεταβάλλειν· γένεσις γὰρ καὶ φθορὰ κατὰ τῶν τριῶν τούτων τρόπων ὀφείλει συνίστασθαι, ὅλον ἐπὶ τῆς δεκάδος κατ' ἀφαιρέσειν*

two efficient (Love and Strife). But Anaxagoras of Clazomenae and Democritus and Epicurus and a host of others held that the generation of things is from innumerables; yet whereas Anaxagoras said that these are like to the things generated, Democritus and Epicurus said that they are unlike and impassive (namely, the atoms), while Heraclides of Pontus and Asclepiades said that they are unlike but passive (namely, the irregular molecules).

Having, then, first grasped the fact that the physical theory of all these men is shown to be hopeless if becoming and perishing are abolished, let us deal with their arguments all the more confidently. Yet, if we examine them, the main point has been sufficiently established already by our previous arguments. For what becomes and perishes becomes and perishes in time; but, as we showed above,^a time does not exist, so that what becomes and perishes will not exist either.—Also, becoming and perishing are always change-causing motions; but, as we have previously shown,^b motion is nothing; neither, then, will becoming and perishing exist. Nothing, too, which is generated or perishes is generated or perishes without an agent and a patient,^c but nothing is agent or patient, so that nothing is generated or perishes.—Moreover, if anything becomes and perishes, something must be added to something and something be subtracted from something or something changed from something. For becoming and perishing must come about in some one of these three ways,^d—as, for instance, in the case of the ten, the nine becomes

^a See §§ 170 ff.

^b See §§ 37 ff.

^c Cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 195 ff.

^d Cf. *P.H.* iii. 109; *Adv. Phys.* i. 277 ff.

τῆς μονάδος γίνεται μὲν ἡ ἑννεὰς φθίρεται δὲ ἡ δεκάς, καὶ πάλιν ἐπὶ τῆς ἑννεάδος κατὰ πρόσθεσιν μονάδος γίνεται μὲν ἡ δεκάς φθίρεται δὲ ἡ ἑννεὰς. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ τροπὴν φθειρομένων ἢ γεννωμένων ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος· οὕτω γὰρ φθίρεται μὲν ὁ
 324 οἶνος γίνεται δὲ ὄξος. εἰ δὴ τοίνυν πᾶν τὸ γεννώμενον καὶ φθειρόμενον ἦτοι κατὰ πρόσθεσιν ἢ κατ' ἀφαιρέσιν ἢ κατὰ μεταβολὴν γίνεται καὶ φθίρεται, ἐπεὶ παρεστήσαμεν μῆτε πρόσθεσιν οὖσαν μῆτε ἀφαιρέσιν μῆτε μεταβολὴν, δυνάμει προκατεστησάμεθα τὸ μηδὲ γένεσιν ἢ φθορὰν
 325 ὑπάρχειν. πρὸς τούτοις τὸ γεννώμενον ἢ φθειρόμενον ψαύειν ὀφείλει ἐκείνου τοῦ ἐξ οὗ φθίρεται καὶ τοῦ εἰς ὃ μεταβάλλει, οὐδὲν δὲ ψαύσις ἔστιν, ὡς παρέσταται· τοίνυν οὐδὲ γένεσις ἢ φθορὰ συστήναι δύναται.
 326 Πάρεστι δὲ καὶ προηγουμένως ἀποροῦντας λέγειν ὡς εἴπερ τι γίνεται, ἦτοι τὸ ὄν γίνεται ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν. οὔτε δὲ τὸ μὴ ὄν γίνεται· τῷ γὰρ μὴ ὄντι οὐδὲν συμβέβηκεν, ᾧ δὲ μηδὲν συμβέβηκεν,
 327 οὐδὲ τὸ γίνεσθαι συμβέβηκεν. καὶ ἄλλως, τὸ γινόμενον πάσχει, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν οὐδὲν δύναται πάσχειν· ὄντος γὰρ τὸ πάσχειν οὐκ ἄρα τὸ μὴ ὄν γίνεται. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν· ἔστι γὰρ ἤδη τὸ ὄν, καὶ οὐκ ἔχει χρεῖαν γενέσεως· οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν γεννᾶται. ἀλλ' εἰ μῆτε τὸ ὄν μῆτε τὸ μὴ ὄν γίνεται, παρὰ ταῦτα δ' οὐδὲν ἔστι τρίτον ἐπινοεῖν,
 328 οὐδὲν γεννᾶται. ἄλλως τε, ἐν τοῖς φαινομένοις

^a Cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 277 ff.; *P.H.* iii. 85, 102; *Adv. Log.* i. 378 ff.

through the subtraction of the one but the ten perishes; and again, in the case of the nine, through the addition of the one the ten becomes but the nine perishes. And the same account holds of the things which perish or are generated through conversion; for in this way wine perishes and vinegar becomes. If, then, everything which is becoming and perishing
 324 becomes and perishes either through addition or through subtraction or through change, then, since we have established^a that neither addition exists nor subtraction nor change, we have already virtually established that neither does becoming or perishing exist.—And further, that which is being generated or
 325 is perishing must be touching that wherefrom it perishes and that whereinto it changes; but, as has been shown,^b touch is nothing; so then, becoming or perishing cannot subsist either.

It is also possible for us, as doubters, to argue
 326 directly that if a thing becomes, either the existent becomes or the non-existent.^c But the non-existent does not become; for the non-existent has no property, and of that which has no property neither is becoming a property. And again: what becomes
 327 is affected, but the non-existent cannot be affected at all; for affection belongs to the existent; therefore the non-existent does not become. Nor yet does the existent; for the existent exists already and has no need of becoming; neither, therefore, is the existent generated. But if neither the existent becomes nor the non-existent, and besides these no third thing can be conceived, nothing is generated.—And again,
 328

^b Cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 258 ff.; *P.H.* iii. 45 ff.
^c With §§ 326-327 cf. *P.H.* iii. 112.

θεωρεῖται τὰ μὲν ἐξ ἑνὸς γεννώμενα κατὰ μετα-
 329 βολήν, τὰ δ' ἐκ πλειόνων κατὰ σύνθεσιν· καὶ ἐξ
 ἑνὸς μὲν κατὰ μεταβολήν ὅποσα τῆς αὐτῆς οὐσίας
 μενούσης ἑτέραν ἐξ ἑτέρας μεταλαμβάνει ποιότητα,
 οἷον ὅταν τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὑγροῦ μένοντος ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ
 πλήθει τὸ μὲν γλευκος ἀφανισθῆ ὄλνος δὲ γένηται,
 ἢ ὁ ὄλνος μὲν ἀφανισθῆ ὄξος δὲ ὑποστῆ, ἢ τοῦ
 κηροῦ μένοντος ἢ μὲν σκληρότης ἀφανίζεται ἢ δὲ
 330 μαλακότης γένηται, ἢ ἀνάπαλιν· ἐκ πλειόνων δὲ
 κατ' ἐπισύνθεσιν ὡς ἄλλυσις μὲν κατ' ἐπισύνδεσιν
 κρίκων, οἰκία δὲ κατὰ σύνοδον λίθων, ἐσθῆς δὲ
 331 κατὰ κρόκης καὶ στημόνων συμπλοκήν. εἰ δὲ
 κὰν τοῖς νοητοῖς γίνεται τι, ἤτοι ἐξ ὄντος γίνεται
 τι ἢ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος. καὶ ἐκ μὲν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲν
 δύναται γίνεσθαι· δεῖ γὰρ τὸ γεννητικόν τινος
 οὐσίαν ἔχειν καὶ ποῖαν ἀναδέχεσθαι κίνησιν, ὥστ'
 οὐκ ἂν εἴη τι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος γεννώμενον. καὶ
 332 μὴν οὐδ' ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος. εἰ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος
 γίνεται τι, ἤτοι ἐξ ἑνὸς γίνεται ἢ ἐκ πλειόνων.
 καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη γεννώμενον. εἰ γὰρ ἐξ
 ἑνὸς γίνεται, ἤτοι αὐξανόμενου ἢ μειουμένου ἢ
 333 ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μένοντος γίνεται. ἀλλ' αὐξάνεσθαι
 μὲν καὶ μειοῦσθαι οὐχ οἷον τε ταυτό, καὶ οὐκ ἂν
 δυναθεῖν ἑαυτοῦ τι μείζον ἢ ἑαυτοῦ τι ἔλαττον
 ἀποτελεῖσθαι ταυτόν. ἐάν τε γὰρ αὐτοῦ πλείον
 γένοιτο, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν ἔχει πλείον παρ' ἑαυτοῦ, ἐξ οὐκ
 ὄντος ἔξει τὴν πρόσθεσιν· ἐάν τε ἔλαττον ἑαυτοῦ,
 πάλιν, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν ἔχει παρ' ἑαυτοῦ, ἀπολλύμενον
 αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν ἀπολείται. οὐδὲν ἄρα δύναται

¹ < τὸ > add. Rüstow.

amongst things apparent some are observed to be gener-
 ated from one thing through change, others from several
 things by combination; and from one thing through 329
 change come all those which take on one quality in
 place of another while the same substance remains,
 —as for example when, while the same fluid remains
 in the same quantity, the must disappears and wine
 becomes, or the wine disappears and vinegar is formed;
 or, while the wax remains, its hardness disappears and
 softness becomes, or the converse. But (others are 330
 formed) from several things by combination, such as
 the chain formed by the joining together of the links
 and the house by the combination of stones, and the
 robe by the weaving together of woof and warp.—And 331
 if amongst the intelligibles also something becomes,
 something becomes either from an existent thing
 or from a non-existent. But from the non-existent
 nothing can become; for that which is generative of
 anything must possess existence and admit of qualified
 motion, so that nothing will be generated from the
 non-existent. Nor yet from the existent. For if 332
 anything becomes from the existent, it becomes either
 from one thing or from several. And it will not be
 generated from one. For if it becomes from one, it
 becomes through this being increased or decreased or
 remaining in the same state. But it is not possible 333
 for the same thing to increase and decrease, and the
 same thing will not be able to be made into something
 greater than itself or less than itself. For if it should
 become more than itself, it will get the addition from
 a non-existent, since it has nothing more beyond
 itself; and again, if it becomes less than itself, what
 vanishes from it will vanish into the non-existent,
 since it has nothing except itself. Nothing, there-

334 ἐκ τοῦ αὐξομένου ἢ μειουμένου γίνεσθαι. καὶ μὴν
οὐδ' ἐκ τοῦ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μένοντος ἔσται τὸ γεννώ-
μενον. εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο, ἦτοι ἀτρέπτου καὶ ἀμετα-
βλήτου μένοντος αὐτοῦ γεννᾶται τι ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ἢ ἐκ
τρεπομένου καὶ μεταβάλλοντος. ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀτρέπτου
335 τι ἑτεροίωσις γὰρ τίς ἐστὼν ἢ γένεσις. εἰ δὲ ἐκ
τρεπομένου καὶ μεταβάλλοντος, ἦτοι εἰς ἑαυτὸ
μεταβάλλοντος γίνεται τὸ γεννώμενον ἢ εἰς ἕτερον.
καὶ εἰ μὲν εἰς ἑαυτὸ μεταβάλῃ τὸ γεννητικόν τινος,
πάλιν μένει τὸ αὐτό, καὶ μένον τὸ αὐτὸ οὐδενὸς
ἔσται περισσοτέρου γεννητικόν. εἰ δὲ εἰς ἕτερον
τρέπεται, ἦτοι ἐκβαίνει τῆς ἰδίας ὑποστάσεως ὅτε
τρέπεται καὶ γεννᾶται, ἢ μένει μὲν ἐν τῇ οἰκείᾳ
ὑποστάσει, ἄλλο δὲ εἶδος ἀντ' ἄλλου εἶδους μετα-
λαμβάνον γεννᾶται, ὡς ὁ μετασχηματιζόμενος
κηρὸς καὶ ἄλλοτε ἄλλην μορφήν ἀναδεχόμενος.
336 ἀλλ' ἐκβαίνον μὲν τῆς ἰδίας ὑποστάσεως εἰς τὸ μὴ
ὄν φθαρήσεται, καὶ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν φθειρόμενον
γενήσεται οὐδέν. εἰ δὲ μένον ἐν τῇ ἰδίᾳ ὑποστάσει
καὶ ἄλλην ἀντ' ἄλλης ποιότητα ἀναδεχόμενον
337 γεννᾶται, κρατεῖται τῇ αὐτῇ ἀπορίᾳ. ἦτοι γὰρ
μένοντος τοῦ πρώτου εἶδους καὶ τῆς προτέρας
ποιότητος περὶ αὐτῷ γίνεται τὸ δεύτερον εἶδος
καὶ ἢ δευτέρα ποιότης, ἢ μὴ μένοντος. οὔτε δὲ
μένοντος τοῦ πρώτου εἶδους γίνεται τὸ δεύτερον
οὔτε μὴ μένοντος, ὡς ἔμπροσθεν παρεστήσαμεν,
ὅτε περὶ τοῦ πάσχοντος ἐσκεπτόμεθα. τοῖνυν οὐδ'

• Cf. *P.H.* iii. 112 ff.

• Cf. *Adv. Phys.* ii. 266 ff. "The patient" means "what

fore, can become from what increases or decreases. Nor yet will that which is generated be from that 334 which remains in the same state. For if so, something is generated from it either while it remains unconverted and unchanged or while it is being converted and changed.^a But while it is unconverted and remaining constantly as it was nothing will be generated from it; for becoming is a form of alteration. And 335 if it is being converted and changed, that which is being generated from it becomes while it is changing either into itself or into another. And if that which is generative of something changes into itself, it remains again the same, and remaining the same it will not be generative of anything further. And if it is converted into another thing, either it passes out from its own substance when it is converted and generated, or it remains in its proper substance and is generated by assuming one form instead of another, just like the wax which changes its shape and receives various forms at various times. But if it passes out from 336 its own substance it will perish into the non-existent, and perishing into the non-existent it will generate nothing. And if it is generated while remaining in its own substance and assuming one quality in place of another, it is defeated by the same difficulty. For the 337 second form and the second quality become either while the first form and the first quality remain in it or while they do not remain. But, as we showed before^b when we were investigating "the patient," the second form does not become either while the first form remains or while it does not remain. So then, what is generated does not become from one

is affected," or "acted upon," as opposed to "the agent" (or "efficient cause").

- 338 ἐξ ἐνὸς γίνεται τὸ γεννώμενον. καὶ μὴν οὐδ'
ἐκ πλειόνων. δυοῖν γὰρ συνελθόντων τρίτον οὐκ
ἂν γένοιτο, μενόντων τῶν δυοῖν, καὶ πάλιν τριῶν
όντων τέταρτον οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, μενόντων τῶν
τριῶν. εἴρηται δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀκριβέστερον, ὅτε
περὶ τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὑποστάσεως ἐζητοῦμεν,
παριστάντες ὅτι οὔτε σῶμά ἐστιν ὁ ἀνθρώπος οὔτε
339 ψυχὴ οὔτε τὸ σύνθετον. διόπερ εἰ μήτε ἐξ ἐνὸς
ἐστὶ τὸ γεννώμενον μήτε ἐκ πλειόνων, παρὰ δὲ
ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστιν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων
γεννάται.
- 340 Ταῦτα μὲν οἱ ἀπορητικοὶ περὶ γενέσεως διεξ-
ίασιν· οἱ δὲ δογματικοὶ μὴ πρὸς νοῦν ἀπαντῶντες
πάλιν ἐπὶ τὰ ἐξ ἐναργείας ὑποδείγματα συμφε-
ρουσιν. τὸ γὰρ ὕδωρ θερμὸν ὄν, μὴ ὄν δὲ ψυχρὸν,
γίνεται ψυχρὸν· καὶ ὁ ὑπάρχων χαλκός, μὴ ὄν
ἀνδριάς, γίνεται ἀνδριάς· καὶ τὸ ὄν κατὰ δύναμιν
μὲν ἐστὶ νεοσσός, κατ' ἐντελέχειαν δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν,
[ἀλλὰ λέγεται κατὰ δύναμιν εἶναι νεοσσός εἰς τὸ
κατ' ἐντελέχειαν ὑπάρχειν].¹ καὶ τὸ ὄν τοίνυν
δύναται γίνεσθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν. εἶτα καὶ ὀρώμεν
βρέφος μὲν γεννώμενον ἐξ ἀνθρώπου, χυλὸν δ' ἐκ
πόας. ὥστε πάντα τὸν τῶν ἀπορητικῶν² λόγον
341 παρὰ τὴν ἐνάργειαν χωρεῖν. πλανῶνται δ' οἱ
ταῦτα λέγοντες, καὶ οὐ πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον
ἀπαντῶσιν. τὸ γὰρ θερμὸν (ὄν)³ ὕδωρ καὶ οὐκ ὄν
ψυχρὸν οὔτε θερμὸν γίνεται τῷ εἶναι οὔτε ψυχρὸν
τῷ μὴ εἶναι· παρὰ δὲ τὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι οὐδὲν
ἔστιν· οὐκ ἄρα οὐδ' ἐπὶ τοῦ ὕδατος ἔστι τις γένεσις.

¹ [ἀλλὰ . . . ὑπάρχειν] secl. ego (? ἀλλ' ἀγεται <ἐκ τοῦ> κ. δ.).

² ἀπορητικῶν Heintz; δογματικῶν mss., Bekk.

³ <ὄν> addo.

thing.—Nor yet does it become from several things. 338
For when two things are combined a third will not
become while the two remain; and again, if there are
three, a fourth will not become while the three re-
main. But we made a more precise statement about
these matters when we were investigating the sub-
stance of Man^a and showed that Man is neither body
nor soul nor the compound of both. Wherefore, if the 339
thing generated is neither from one thing nor from
several, and besides these there is no further possi-
bility, then of necessity no existent thing is generated.

Such are the arguments concerning Becoming 340
which the Doubters rehearse in detail; but the
Dogmatists, without resorting to reason, take refuge
once more in examples drawn from the evidence
of sense. Thus water being warm, and not being
cold, becomes cold; and the bronze, which is not a
statue, becomes a statue; and the egg is potentially
a chick but is not so actually [but is said to be a chick
potentially until it is one actually].^b Both the
existent, then, and the non-existent can become.
Moreover, we also see a baby generated from a
human being, and juice from grass. So that all the
argumentation of the Sceptics runs contrary to the
evidence of sense.—But those who say this are in 341
error, and are not facing the problem before them.
For the water which is hot and is not cold neither
becomes hot by being so nor cold by not being so;
but besides being and not being nothing exists; not
even, therefore, in the case of water is there any

^a Cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 263 ff., 288 ff.

^b As this clause seems futile, one may suspect (with
Heintz) that the text is incomplete, the original being to the
effect that "it is said <to become a chick in that it changes
from being> a chick potentially to being one actually."

καὶ πάλιν, οὔτε ὁ χαλκὸς γίνεται τῷ εἶναι χαλκὸς
 342 οὔτε [ὁ]¹ ἀνδρίας τῷ μὴ εἶναι. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
 κατὰ δύναμιν καὶ ἐντελέχειαν ὁ αὐτὸς ἐστὶ λόγος.

ἄλλως τε ἤτοι πλείον τί ἐστὼν ἐν τῷ κατ'
 ἐντελέχειαν παρὰ τὸ ἐν δυνάμει ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν· καὶ
 εἰ μὲν οὐδὲν πλείον ἐστὼν, αὐτόθεν οὐδὲν γίνεται
 τῷ κατὰ δύναμιν εἶναι, εἰ δὲ ἔστι τι πλεόν, ἐκ τοῦ
 343 μὴ ὄντος τοῦτο γίνεται, ὅπερ ἄτοπον. ναί, ἀλλὰ
 καὶ βρέφος ἐκ τῆς ἐγκύμονος γεννᾶται καὶ χυλὸς
 ἐκ τῆς πόας συνίσταται. καὶ τοῦτο τί πρὸς τὸ
 ζητούμενον; ἐροῦμεν. οὔτε γὰρ τὸ βρέφος γίνεται
 τικτόμενον, εἰς τοῦμφανές δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἀφανοῦς
 ἄγεται, οὔτε ὁ χυλὸς· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ πόα προῦπ-
 ἦρχεν, καὶ ἐκτὸς τῆς πόας γινόμενος τόπον μόνον
 ἤλλαξεν. ὥσπερ οὖν τὸν ἐκ τοῦ ζόφου εἰς τὸ φῶς
 προελθόντα οὐ λέγομεν γίνεσθαι, τόπον δ' ἐκ τόπου
 μεταβεβηκέναι, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον οὐδὲ τὸ
 βρέφος ἐροῦμεν γίνεσθαι ἀλλ' ἐξ ἑτέρου τινὸς
 τόπου εἰς ἕτερον μεταβαίνειν τόπον. οὐδὲν οὖν
 γεννᾶται.

344 Κατὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὐδὲ φθείρεται. εἰ γὰρ φθείρεται
 τι, ἤτοι τὸ ὄν φθείρεται ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν. οὔτε δὲ τὸ
 μὴ ὄν φθείρεται· τὸ γὰρ φθειρόμενον εἰς τὸ μὴ
 εἶναι χωρεῖ, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν [τι] ἤδη ἐν τῷ μὴ εἶναι
 ὄν οὐ δεῖται τῆς εἰς τοῦτο μεταβάσεως. τοῖνυν
 345 οὐ φθείρεται τὸ μὴ ὄν. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν. ἤτοι
 γὰρ μένον ἐν τῷ εἶναι φθείρεται ἢ μὴ μένον. καὶ
 εἰ μὲν μένον, ἔσται ἄμα καὶ οὐκ ἔσται, ἐφθαρμένον

¹ [ὁ] secl. Heintz.

* With §§ 344-345 cf. *P.H.* iii. 113-114.

becoming. And again: neither does the bronze be-
 come bronze by being so nor a statue by not being so.
 And the same may be said of the cases of potentiality 342
 and actuality.—And further, there either is or is not
 something more in the actual than in the potential;
 and if there is nothing more, it follows that nothing
 becomes by existing potentially; but if there is some-
 thing more, this becomes from the non-existent, 343
 which is absurd. Yes, (they reply,) but the babe is
 generated from the mother, and juice is formed from
 the grass. And how, we shall ask, does this affect
 the question? For neither does the babe become by
 being born (being merely brought from obscurity into
 sight), nor does the juice become (for it was pre-
 existing in the grass, and in becoming outside the
 grass it has merely changed its place). As, then, we
 do not say that the man who has advanced out of the
 darkness into the light is becoming, but that he has
 passed on from place to place, so in the same way we
 shall not say that the babe becomes, but that it
 passes on from one place to another place. Nothing,
 then, is generated.

Nor, for the same reasons, does anything perish.* 344
 For if anything perishes, either the existent perishes
 or the non-existent. But the non-existent does not
 perish; for what perishes passes into a state of non-
 existence, but the non-existent, as it is already in
 the state of non-existence, does not require trans-
 ference into this state. So then, the non-existent
 does not perish. Nor yet does the existent. For 345
 it perishes either while remaining in existence or
 while not remaining. And if it does so while re-
 maining, it will be at once existent and non-existent,
 perished and not perished; but if it does so while not

καὶ μὴ ἐφθαρμένον· εἰ δὲ μὴ μένον, ἀπόλλυται,
καὶ οὐκέτι τὸ ὄν ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ ὄν φθείρεται. ὥστε
346 εἰ μήτε τὸ ὄν μήτε τὸ μὴ ὄν φθείρεται, παρὰ δὲ
ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστω, οὐδὲν φθείρεται.

Τινὲς δὲ καὶ τῶν χρόνων ἐχόμενοι τῆς τε
γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς οὕτω συνερωτῶσιν. εἰ
ἀπέθανε Σωκράτης, ἦτοι ὅτε ἔζη ἀπέθανεν ἢ ὅτε
ἔτελεύτα. καὶ ζῶν μὲν οὐκ ἀπέθανεν· ἔζη γὰρ
347 δῆπουθεν καὶ ζῶν οὐκ ἐτεθνήκει. οὔτε δ' ὅτε
ἀπέθανεν· δις γὰρ ἔσται τεθνηκώς. οὐκ ἄρα
ἀπέθανε Σωκράτης. ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς αὐτῆς δυνά-
μεως, ἐπὶ διαφέροντος δὲ ὑποδείγματος, λόγον
συνηρώτηκε καὶ ὁ Κρόνος τοιοῦτον. εἰ φθείρεται
τὸ τειχίον, ἦτοι ὅτε ἄπτονται ἀλλήλων οἱ λίθοι
καὶ εἰσὶν ἡρμοσμένοι φθείρεται τὸ τειχίον, ἢ
ὅτε διεστᾶσιν· οὔτε δὲ ὅτε ἄπτονται ἀλλήλων
348 καὶ εἰσὶν ἡρμοσμένοι φθείρεται τὸ τειχίον, οὔτε
ὅτε διεστᾶσιν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων· οὐκ ἄρα φθείρεται τὸ
τειχίον. καὶ ὁ μὲν λόγος τοιοῦτος, ἡ δὲ δύναμις
αὐτοῦ προφανής. δύο γὰρ εἰσι χρόνοι κατ' ἐπί-
νοιαν, ἐν ᾧ ἄπτονται ἀλλήλων οἱ λίθοι καὶ εἰσὶν
ἡρμοσμένοι, καὶ ἐν ᾧ διεστᾶσιν· παρὰ δὲ τούτους
349 οὐδ' ἐπινοηθῆναι τρίτος τις δύναται χρόνος. εἰ
οὖν φθείρεται τὸ τειχίον, ἐν τῷ ἑτέρῳ τούτων
ὀφείλει φθειρεσθαι. ἀλλ' ἐν μὲν ᾧ ἄπτονται ἀλ-
λήλων οἱ λίθοι καὶ εἰσὶν ἡρμοσμένοι, οὐ δύναται
φθειρεσθαι· ἔστι γὰρ ἔτι τειχίον, καὶ εἰ ἔστω, οὐ
φθείρεται. οὔτε δὲ ἐν ᾧ διεστᾶσιν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων·
οὐκέτι γὰρ ἔστω τειχίον, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν οὐ δύναται
350 φθειρεσθαι. εἰ οὖν μήτε ὅτε ἄπτονται ἀλλήλων
οἱ λίθοι φθείρεται τὸ τειχίον, μήτε ὅτε διεστᾶσιν

remaining, it is destroyed, and it is no longer the
existent but the non-existent which perishes. So that
if neither the existent nor the non-existent perishes,
and besides these there is nothing, nothing perishes.

Some also, fastening on the times of becoming and 346
perishing, argue thus: If Socrates died, he died
either when he was living or when he was dead.^a But
he did not die while living; for assuredly he was
living, and as living he had not died. Nor when he
died; for then he would be twice dead. Therefore
Socrates did not die.—And to the same effect, 347
although using a different example, Cronos^b pro-
pounded an argument of this kind: If the wall
perishes, the wall perishes either while the stones are
touching one another and are fitted together or when
they are disparted. But neither when they touch
one another and are fitted together nor when they are
disparted does the wall perish; therefore the wall
does not perish. Such is the argument, and the force 348
of it is quite plain. There are two times conceived,
that in which the stones touch one another and are
fitted together and that in which they are disparted;
and besides these no third time can be conceived. If,
then, the wall perishes, it must perish in one or other
of these times. But it cannot perish in the time when 349
the stones are touching one another and are fitted
together; for it still exists as a wall, and if it exists it
does not perish. Nor in the time when they are dis-
parted from one another; for then it no longer exists
as a wall, and the non-existent cannot perish. If,
then, the wall does not perish either when the stones
are touching one another or when they are disparted

^a Cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 269; *P.H.* iii. 111.

^b i.e. Diodorus Cronos (*cf.* § 85).

350 ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, οὐ φθείρεται τὸ τειχίον. καὶ
 οὕτω δὲ δυνατὸν συνερωτᾶν. εἰ γίνεται τι καὶ
 φθείρεται, ἤτοι ἐν ᾧ ἔστι χρόνῳ γίνεται καὶ
 φθείρεται, ἢ ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν. καὶ ἐν ᾧ μὲν ἔστιν,
 οὔτε γίνεται οὔτε φθείρεται· ἐφ' ὅσον γὰρ ἔστι
 τοῦτο, οὔτε γίνεται οὔτε φθείρεται. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ
 ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστι πάθοι ἂν τι τούτων· ἐν ᾧ γάρ τι μὴ
 ἔστιν, οὔτε παθεῖν τι οὔτε ποιεῖν δύναται. εἰ δὲ
 τοῦτο, οὐδὲν οὔτε γίνεται οὔτε φθείρεται.

351 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν πρὸς τοὺς φυσικοὺς τῶν φιλο-
 σόφων εἰρήσθω· καιρὸς δ' ἂν εἴη μετελθεῖν καὶ ἐπὶ
 τοὺς τὸ ἠθικὸν μέρος τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀσπασα-
 μένους.

from one another, the wall does not perish.—And 350
 it is also possible to argue thus: If a thing both
 becomes and perishes, it becomes and perishes either
 in the time in which it exists or in that in which it does
 not exist. But in that in which it exists it neither be-
 comes nor perishes; for inasmuch as it exists as this
 thing it neither becomes nor perishes. Nor yet will
 it undergo any of these affections in the time in which
 it does not exist; for in the time in which a thing does
 not exist it can neither affect nor be affected at all.
 And if so, nothing either becomes or perishes.

Let these, then, be our answers to those of the 351
 philosophers who are Physicists; but now it will be
 time for us to pass on to those who have embraced
 the Ethical division of philosophy.

AGAINST THE ETHICISTS

VOL. III

N 2

ΠΡΟΣ ΗΘΙΚΟΥΣ

1 Τὰς μὲν κομιζομένας ὑπὸ τῶν σκεπτικῶν ἀπορίας εἰς τε τὸ λογικὸν καὶ φυσικὸν τῆς φιλοσοφίας μέρος πρότερον ἐπεληλύθαμεν, ὑπόλοιπον δέ ἐστι καὶ τὰς εἰς τὸ ἠθικὸν φέρεσθαι δυναμένας προσυποτάπτειν· οὕτω γὰρ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν τὴν τελείαν καὶ σκεπτικὴν ἀπολαβὴν διάθεσιν κατὰ τὸν Τίμωνα βιώσεται

ῥῆστα μεθ' ἡσυχίης
αἰεὶ ἀφροντίστως καὶ ἀκινήτως κατὰ ταῦτά,
μὴ προσέχων αἰνοῖς¹ ἠδυλόγου σοφίης.

2 ἄλλ' ἐπεὶ τὴν ἠθικὴν θεωρίαν συμφώνως σχεδὸν ἅπαντες ὑπελήφασιν περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν διάκρισιν γίνεσθαι, καθὸ καὶ ὁ πρῶτος αὐτὴν δόξας κεκωκέναι Σωκράτης παρήγγειλεν ὡς ἀναγκαϊότατον ζητεῖν

ὄττι τοι ἐν μεγάροισι κακὸν τ' ἀγαθὸν τε τέτυκται,

δεήσει καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐν ἀρχαῖς εὐθύς περὶ τῆς ἐν τούτοις διαφορᾶς σκοπεῖν.

¹ αἰνοῖς: δειλοῖς mss., Bekk.: δίνους Nauck (λήροις cj. Bekk.).

AGAINST THE ETHICISTS

WE have already discussed the difficulties brought forward by the Sceptics with regard to the Logical and Physical divisions of philosophy, and now it remains for us to subjoin further those which can be brought against the Ethical division; for in this way, by acquiring the perfect and sceptical frame of mind, each of us will (in the words of Timon^a) pass his life—

In great comfort and calm,
Ever devoid of care, uniformly free from distraction,
Quite regardless of all Sweet-voiced Science's tales.

But since almost all have with one accord supposed that the study of Ethics is concerned with the distinction between things good and evil,^b—even as Socrates, who is thought to be the first who introduced it, proclaimed as the most necessary subject of inquiry—

Whatso of evil and good within these homes is enacted,^c

we too shall have to begin at once by considering the difference which exists between them.

^a Cf. Vol. I. Introd. p. xxxi.

^b With §§ 2, 3 cf. *P.H.* iii. 168.

^c Homer, *Odys.* iv. 392; cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 21.

A'.—ΤΙΣ ΕΣΤΙΝ Η ΟΛΟΣΧΕΡΗΣ ΤΩΝ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΟΝ ΒΙΟΝ
ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΩΝ ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ

- 3 Πάντες μὲν οἱ κατὰ [τὸν] τρόπον στοιχειοῦν
δοκοῦντες τῶν φιλοσόφων, καὶ ἐπιφανέστατα παρὰ
πάντας οἱ τε ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχαίας Ἀκαδημίας καὶ οἱ
ἀπὸ τοῦ περιπάτου ἔτι δὲ τῆς στοᾶς, εἰώθασι
διαιρούμενοι λέγειν τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν εἶναι ἀγαθὰ
τὰ δὲ κακὰ τὰ δὲ μεταξύ τούτων, ἅπερ καὶ ἀδιά-
4 φορα λέγουσιν· ἰδιαίτερον δὲ παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ὁ
Ξενοκράτης καὶ ταῖς ἐνικαῖς πτώσεσι χρώμενος
ἔφασκε “ πᾶν τὸ ὄν ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν ἢ κακὸν ἔστιν
5 ἢ οὔτε ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν οὔτε κακὸν ἔστιν.” καὶ τῶν
λοιπῶν φιλοσόφων χωρὶς ἀποδείξεως τὴν τοιαύτην
διαίρεσιν προσιεμένων αὐτὸς ἐδόκει καὶ ἀποδείξειν
συμπαραλαμβάνειν. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τι κεχωρισμένον
πρᾶγμα τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ τῶν μῆτε
ἀγαθῶν μῆτε κακῶν, ἐκεῖνο ἦτοι ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν ἢ
οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν, ἐν τῶν
τριῶν γενήσεται· εἰ δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν, ἦτοι κακὸν
ἔστιν ἢ οὔτε κακὸν ἔστιν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν· εἴτε
δὲ κακὸν ἔστιν, ἐν τῶν τριῶν ὑπάρξει, εἴτε οὔτε
ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν οὔτε κακὸν ἔστι, πάλιν ἐν τῶν τριῶν
καταστήσεται. πᾶν ἄρα τὸ ὄν ἦτοι ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν ἢ
κακὸν ἔστιν ἢ οὔτε ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν οὔτε κακὸν ἔστιν.
6 δυνάμει δὲ καὶ οὗτος χωρὶς ἀποδείξεως προσήκατο
τὴν διαίρεσιν, ἐπεὶ περὶ ὁ εἰς κατασκευὴν αὐτῆς
παραληφθεὶς λόγος οὐχ ἕτερός ἐστιν αὐτῆς· ὅθεν εἰ
ἐν αὐτῇ περιέσχηκε τὴν πίστιν ἢ ἀποδείξεις, ἔσται
καὶ ἡ διαίρεσις ἐξ αὐτῆς πιστὴ μὴ διαφέρουσα τῆς
ἀποδείξεως.
7 Ἄλλ’ ὁμως, καίπερ συμφώνου δοκοῦντος ὑπάρ-
χειν κατὰ πάντας τοῦ ὅτι τρισσὴ ἔστιν ἡ τῶν ὄντων
386

CHAPTER I.—WHAT IS THE MAIN DIFFERENCE IN
THE THINGS WHICH CONCERN LIFE?

All the philosophers who seem to teach systematic- 3
ally the principles (of Ethics), and, most notably of
all, those of the Old Academy and the Peripatetics,
and the Stoics also, are accustomed to make a dis-
tinction by saying that “ of existing things some are
good, some evil, some between these two,” and these
last they term “ indifferent ”; but Xenocrates,⁶ in 4
phrases peculiar to himself and using the singular
case, declared that “ Everything which exists either
is good or is evil or neither is good nor is evil.” And 5
whereas the rest of the philosophers adopted this
division without a proof, he thought it right to
introduce a proof as well. “ If,” he argued, “ any-
thing exists which is apart from things good and evil
and things neither good nor evil, that thing either is
good or is not good. And if it is good, it will be one
of the three; but if it is not good, it is either evil or
neither evil nor good; and if it is evil, it will be one
of the three, and if it is neither evil nor good, again
it will be one of the three. Therefore everything
which exists either is good or is evil or neither is good
nor is evil.” But he, too, virtually accepted the 6
division without proof, since the argument adopted to
establish it is nothing else than the division itself;
hence, if the proof contains in itself the confirmation,
the division, too, will be its own confirmation as it
does not differ from the proof.

But yet, although it seems to be agreed by all that 7
the distinction between existing things is threefold,

⁶ Head of the Platonic “ Academy,” 339-314 B.C.

διαφορά, τινές οὐδὲν ἤττον εὐρεσιλογουῶσιν, ὁμο-
λογοῦντες μὲν τὴν ἐν τοῖς οὐσι διαφορὰν ὅτι τοιαύτη
τίς ἐστι, σοφιστικῶς δὲ προσειλούμενοι τῇ ἔκτε-
θείσῃ διαιρέσει. καὶ τοῦτο εἰσόμεθα μικρὸν ἄνωθεν
προλαβόντες.

- 8 Τὸν γὰρ ὄρον φασὶν οἱ τεχνογράφοι ψιλῇ τῇ
συντάξει διαφέρειν τοῦ καθολικοῦ, δυνάμει τὸν
αὐτὸν ὄντα. καὶ εἰκότως· ὁ γὰρ εἰπὼν “ ἄνθρωπός
ἐστὶ ζῶον λογικὸν θνητόν ” τῷ εἰπόντι “ εἴ τί ἐστὶν
ἄνθρωπος, ἐκεῖνο ζῶον ἐστὶ λογικὸν θνητόν ” τῇ
μὲν δυνάμει τὸ αὐτὸ λέγει τῇ δὲ φωνῇ διάφορον.
- 9 καὶ ὅτι τοῦτο, συμφανὲς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ μόνον τὸ καθ-
ολικὸν τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους εἶναι περιληπτικόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ
τὸν ὄρον ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ εἶδη τοῦ ἀποδιδόμενου
πράγματος διήκειν, ὅσον τὸν μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐπὶ
πάντας τοὺς κατ’ εἶδος ἀνθρώπους, τὸν δὲ τοῦ
ἵππου ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς ἵππους. ἐνός τε ὑποταχ-
θέντος ψεύδους ἐκάτερον γίνεται μοχθηρόν, τό τε
- 10 καθολικὸν καὶ ὁ ὄρος. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὡς ταῦτα φωναῖς
ἐξηλλαγμένα κατὰ δυνάμιν ἐστὶ τὰ αὐτά, ὡς καὶ
ἡ τέλειός φασι διαίρεσις, δύνάμιν ἔχουσα καθολικὴν,
συντάξει τοῦ καθολικοῦ διενήνοχεν. ὁ γὰρ τρόπῳ
τῷδε διαιρούμενος “ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μὲν εἰσὶν
Ἕλληνες οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι ” ἴσον τι λέγει τῷ “ εἴ
τινές εἰσιν ἄνθρωποι, ἐκεῖνοι ἢ Ἕλληνές εἰσιν ἢ
βάρβαροι.” εἴαν γὰρ τις ἄνθρωπος εὐρίσκῃται μήτε
Ἕλληνα μήτε βάρβαρον, ἀνάγκη μοχθηρὰν μὲν εἶναι
τὴν διαίρεσιν, ψεῦδος δὲ γίνεσθαι τὸ καθολικόν.
- 11 διόπερ καὶ τὸ οὕτω λεγόμενον “ τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν

none the less some people invent captious objections,
and while allowing that the distinction between things
is of this kind, yet attack the division as set forth in
sophistical fashion. And this we shall learn when we
have first gone back a little.

The professional Logicians assert that the definition 8
differs merely in its verbal construction from the uni-
versal, being identical in meaning. And rightly; for
he who says “ Man is a rational, mortal animal ” says
what is identical in meaning, though different in word-
ing from him who says “ Whatever thing is man, that
thing is a rational, mortal animal.” And that this is 9
so is plain from the fact that not only is the universal
inclusive of the particulars but the definition also
extends to all the particular instances of the thing in
question,—that of Man, for example, to all the partic-
ular men, and that of Horse to all the horses. Also,
if one false instance is classed under it each of them is
vitiating, both the universal and the definition. Well 10
then, just as these, which vary in wording, are identi-
cal in meaning, so also, they declare, the perfect
division, which has a universal meaning, differs from
the universal in verbal construction.^a For he who
divides in this fashion—“ Of men some are Greeks,
others barbarians ”—says what is equivalent to
“ Whosoever are men, they are either Greeks or
barbarians.” For if any man is found who is neither
a Greek nor a barbarian, the division must necessarily
be vicious and the universal false. Hence, too, a 11
statement in the form “ Of existing things some are

Greeks); as thus inclusive of all possible instances (*i.e.*
“ exhaustive ”) it is “ universal in meaning ” and differs only
in form from a regular “ universal proposition ” (*e.g.* “ All
men are either Greeks or non-Greeks ”).

^a In a “ perfect division ” the two *species* into which the
genus is divided are contradictories (*e.g.* Men = Greeks + non-

ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ τὰ δὲ κακὰ τὰ δὲ τούτων μεταξύ”
 δυνάμει κατὰ τὸν Χρύσιππον τοιοῦτόν ἐστι καθολικόν “εἰ τινὴ ἐστὶν ὄντα, ἐκεῖνα ἤτοι ἀγαθὰ ἐστὶν ἢ κακὰ ἐστὶν ἢ ἀδιάφορα.” τὸ μέντοι γε τοιοῦτον καθολικὸν ψεῦδος ἐστὶν ὑποτασσομένου τινὸς αὐτῶ
 12 ψεύδους. δυοῖν γάρ φασιν ὑποκειμένων πραγμάτων, τοῦ μὲν ἀγαθοῦ τοῦ δὲ κακοῦ, ἢ τοῦ μὲν ἀγαθοῦ τοῦ δὲ ἀδιαφόρου, ἢ κακοῦ καὶ ἀδιαφόρου, τὸ μὲν “τοῦτ’ ἐστὶ τῶν ὄντων ἀγαθόν” ἀληθές ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ “ταῦτ’ ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ” ψεῦδος· οὐ γάρ ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθόν τὸ δὲ κακόν.
 13 καὶ τὸ “ταῦτ’ ἐστὶ κακὰ” πάλιν ψεῦδος· οὐ γάρ ἐστὶ κακὰ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων· ψεῦδος γάρ τὸ “ταῦτ’ ἐστὶν ἀδιάφορα,” ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ “ταῦτ’ ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ.” ἢ μὲν οὖν ἔνστασις τοιαύτη πως καθέστη-
 14 κεν, φαίνεται δὲ μὴ καθάπτεσθαι τοῦ Ξενοκράτους διὰ τὸ μὴ ταῖς πληθυντικαῖς πτώσεσι κεχρησθαι, ὥστ’ ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν ἑτερογενῶν δείξεως ψευδοποιηθῆναι τὴν διαίρεσιν.
 15 Ἄλλοι δὲ κάκεινως ἐνέστησαν. πᾶσα γάρ, φασίν, ὑγιῆς διαίρεσις γένους ἐστὶ τομὴ εἰς τὰ προσεχῆ εἶδη, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μοχθηρὰ καθέστηκεν ἢ τοιαύτη διαίρεσις “τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μὲν εἰσιν Ἕλληνες οἱ δὲ Αἰγύπτιοι οἱ δὲ Πέρσαι οἱ δὲ Ἰνδοί.” τῷ γὰρ ἑτέρῳ τῶν προσεχῶν εἰδῶν οὐ τὸ συζυγοῦν καὶ προσεχές εἶδος ἀντιδιέζευκται, ἀλλὰ τὰ τούτου εἶδη, δέον οὕτως εἰπεῖν “τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μὲν εἰσιν Ἕλληνες οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι,” καὶ καθ’ ὑποδιαίρεσιν λοιπὸν “τῶν βαρβάρων οἱ μὲν εἰσιν Αἰγύπτιοι οἱ δὲ Πέρσαι οἱ δὲ Ἰνδοί.” ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν ὄντων διαίρέσεως, ἐπεὶ ὅσα μὲν ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ

good, others evil, others between these two,” is virtually, according to Chrysippus, a universal such as this—“Whatsoever things are existent, they either are good or are evil or indifferent.” Such a universal, however, is false if a false instance is classed under it. For, they say, when two things subsist, the one good¹² and the other evil, or the one good and the other indifferent, or an evil and an indifferent, the statement “This one of existing things is good” is true, but “These things are good” false; for they are not (both) good, but the one is good and the other evil. And again the statement “These things are evil” is¹³ false; for they are not (both) evil but only the one of them. And so likewise in the case of the things indifferent; for “These things are indifferent” is false, just as is “These things are good, or evil.” Something like this, then, is the objection, but it¹⁴ appears not to affect Xenocrates because he does not employ plural cases, which would result in the falsification of his division when things of different kinds are to be indicated.

And others have raised the following objection:¹⁵ Every sound division, they say, is the cutting up of a genus into its proximate species, and for this reason a division such as this is unsound—“Of men some are Greeks, others Egyptians, others Persians, others Indians.” For the first proximate species has matched against it not its correlative proximate species but the sub-species of this, the correct statement being, “Of men some are Greeks, others barbarians,” and next, by subdivision, “And of barbarians some are Egyptians, others Persians, others Indians.” And this applies also to the¹⁶ division of existing things, since all such as are good

καὶ κακά, διαφέροντά ἐστιν ἡμῖν, ὅσα δὲ μεταξὺ τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἡμῖν ἀδιάφορα. ἐχρῆν οὖν μὴ οὕτως ἔχειν τὴν διαίρεσιν ὡς ἔχει, μᾶλλον δ' ἐκείνως " τῶν ὄντων ἃ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀδιάφορα ἃ δὲ διαφέροντα, τῶν δὲ διαφερόντων ἃ
 17 μὲν ἀγαθὰ ἃ δὲ κακά." ἐώκει γὰρ ἡ μὲν τοιαύτη διαίρεσις τῇ λεγούσῃ " τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μὲν εἰσιν Ἕλληνες οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι, τῶν δὲ βαρβάρων οἱ μὲν Αἰγύπτιοι οἱ δὲ Πέρσαι οἱ δὲ Ἰνδοί." ἡ δὲ ἐκκειμένη ὁμοίωτο τῇ τοιουτοτρόπῃ " τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μὲν εἰσιν Ἕλληνες οἱ δὲ Αἰγύπτιοι οἱ δὲ Πέρσαι οἱ δὲ Ἰνδοί."

Ἄλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων τῶν ἐνοστάσεων οὐκ
 18 ἀνάγκη νῦν μηκύνειν, ἐκείνο δ' ἴσως ἀρμόσει προδιαρθρῶσαι ὅτι τὸ ἐστὶ δύο σημαίνει, καὶ ἐν μὲν τὸ οἶον ὑπάρχει, καθὸ φαμεν ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος τὸ ὅτι ἡμέρα ἐστὶν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἡμέρα ὑπάρχει, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ οἶον φαίνεται, καθὸ τινες τῶν μαθηματικῶν εἰώθασιν λέγειν πολλάκις ὅτι τὸ μεταξὺ δυοῖν τινῶν ἀστέρων διάστημα πηχυαῖόν ἐστιν, ἐν ἴσῳ λέγοντες τῷ φαίνεται καὶ οὐ πάντως ὑπάρχει· τάχα γὰρ ὑπάρχει μὲν σταδίων ἑκατόν, φαίνεται δὲ πηχυαῖον παρὰ τὸ ὕψος καὶ παρὰ τὴν τῆς ὀψεως ἀπόστασιν.
 19 διττοῦ δὲ τυγχάνοντος τοῦ ἐστὶ μορίου, ὅταν λέγωμεν σκεπτικῶς " τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ τὰ δὲ κακά τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ τούτων," τὸ ἐστὶν ἐντάττομεν οὐχ ὡς ὑπάρξεως ἀλλ' ὡς τοῦ φαίνεσθαι δηλωτικόν. περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῆς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ὑποστάσεως τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων ἱκανοὶ πῶς εἰσὶν ἡμῖν ἀγῶνες πρὸς τοὺς

and evil are "different"^a to us, but all that lie between the good things and the evil are "indifferent" to us. The division, then, ought not to have been stated in its present form but rather in this form—"Of existing things some are indifferent, others different; and of the different some are good, others evil." For this form of division resembles that which 17 runs—"Of men some are Greeks, others barbarians; and of the barbarians some are Egyptians, others Persians, others Indians"; but the division put forward resembled one of this type—"Of men some are Greeks, others Egyptians, others Persians, others Indians."

However, there is no necessity now to speak at length about these objections; but it will, perhaps, 18 be fitting to explain first that the word "is" has two meanings, one of these being "really exists" (as, at the present moment, we say "it is day" for "day really exists"); and the other "appears"^b (as some of the mathematicians are frequently in the habit of saying that the distance between two stars "is" a cubit's length, this being equivalent to "appears to be but is not really"; for perhaps it is really "one hundred stades" but appears to be a cubit owing to its height and owing to the distance from the eye). When, then, as Sceptics, we say that 19 "Of existing things some are good, others evil, others between these two," as the element "are" is twofold in meaning, we insert the "are" as indicative not of real existence but of appearance. For concerning the real and substantial existence of things good and evil and neither we have contests enough with the

^a i. e. such as to "make a difference" to us, important.

^b Cf. P.H. i. 135, 198.

20 δογματικούς· κατὰ δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον τούτων ἕκα-
στον ἔχομεν ἔθος ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ ἀδιάφορον
προσαγορεύειν, καθάπερ καὶ ὁ Τίμων ἐν τοῖς
ἰνδαλμοῖς ἔοικε δηλοῦν, ὅταν φῆ

ἦ γὰρ ἐγὼν ἐρέω ὥς μοι καταφαίνεται εἶναι,
μῦθον ἀληθείης ὀρθὸν ἔχων κανόνα,
ὡς ζῆ¹ τοῦ θείου τε φύσις καὶ τἀγαθοῦ αἰεὶ,
ἐξ ὧν ἰσότητος γίνεται ἀνδρὶ βίος.

Κεμένης οὖν κατὰ τὸν ὑποδεδειγμένον τρόπον
τῆς προειρημένης διαιρέσεως, ἴδωμεν ἂν χρῆ φρονεῖν
περὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ, τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν λόγων ἀπὸ τῆς
ἐννοίας ποιησάμενοι.

Β'.—ΤΙ ΕΣΤΙ ΤΟ ΑΓΑΘΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΚΑΚΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΑΔΙΑΦΟΡΟΝ

21 Τῆς κατὰ τὸν τόπον χειριζομένης ἡμῖν πρὸς τοὺς
δογματικούς ἀντιρρήσεως τὸ κυριώτατον μέρος
ἐχούσης ἐν τῇ διαγνώσει τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν,
πρὸ παντὸς ἀρμόσει τὴν ἐπίνοιαν τούτων στήσαι·
κατὰ γὰρ τὸν σοφὸν Ἐπίκουρον οὔτε ζητεῖν ἔστιν
22 οὔτε ἀπορεῖν ἀνευ προλήψεως. οἱ μὲν οὖν στωικοὶ
τῶν κοινῶν ὡς εἰπεῖν ἐννοιῶν ἐχόμενοι ὀρίζονται
τἀγαθὸν τῷ τρόπῳ τῷδε “ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν ὠφέλεια ἢ οὐχ
ἕτερον ὠφελείας,” ὠφέλειαν μὲν λέγοντες τὴν
ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν σπουδαίαν πράξιν, οὐχ ἕτερον δὲ
ὠφελείας τὸν σπουδαῖον ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὸν φίλον.
23 ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ πως ἔχον ἡγεμονικὸν καθεστηκυῖα,
καὶ ἡ σπουδαία πράξις ἐνέργειά τις οὕσα κατ'
ἀρετὴν, ἀντικρὺς ἔστιν ὠφέλεια· ὁ δὲ σπουδαῖος
ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ φίλος, πάλιν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ὄντες καὶ

¹ ζῆ: ἡ mss., Bekk.

Dogmatists; but as regards the appearance of each 20
of these things we are in the habit of designating it
good or evil or indifferent, even as Timon seems to
make plain in his “Images,” when he says—

Verily I will relate each fact as to me it appeareth,
Standard exact of truth having in this my speech,
How that the nature of God and of Goodness abideth for
ever,
Whence proceedeth for man Life that is equal and just.

So then, the division mentioned above having been
laid down in the form described, let us see what view
we should take of the terms contained in it, beginning
our discussion with the conception (implied by those
terms).

CHAPTER II.—THE ESSENCE OF GOOD AND EVIL AND INDIFFERENT

Since the controversy which we wage on this 21
subject with the Dogmatists has for its most important
point the differentiation of things good and evil, it
will be fitting first of all to formulate a conception of
these; for, according to the sapient Epicurus, “It
is not possible either to seek or to doubt without a
preconception.” Now the Stoics, holding fast to the 22
common notions (so to call them), define the good in
this way^a—“Good is utility or not other than
utility,” meaning by “utility” virtue and right
action, and by “not other than utility” the good
man and the friend. For virtue, being a certain state 23
of the regent part, and right action, being an activity
in accordance with virtue, are exactly utility; and
the good man, again, and the friend, belonging also
themselves to the class of “good things,” cannot be

^a With §§ 22-27 cf. P.H. iii. 169-171.

αὐτοί, οὔτε ὠφέλεια λεχθῆεν ἂν ὑπάρχειν οὔθ' 24 ἕτεροι ὠφελείας δι' αἰτίαν τοιαύτην. τὰ γὰρ μέρη, στωικῶν φασὶ παῖδες, οὔτε τὰ αὐτὰ τοῖς ὅλοις ἐστὶν οὔτε ἕτεροῖα τῶν ὅλων, ὡς ἡ χεὶρ οὔτε ἡ αὐτὴ ἐστὶν ὅλῳ ἀνθρώπῳ, οὐ γὰρ ὅλος ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν ἡ χεὶρ, οὔτε ἕτερα τοῦ ὅλου, σὺν γὰρ τῇ [ὄλῃ]¹ χεὶρὶ ὅλος ὁ ἀνθρώπος νοεῖται ἀνθρώπος. ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου ἀνθρώπου καὶ τοῦ φίλου μέρος ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή, τὰ δὲ μέρη οὔτε ταῦτα τοῖς ὅλοις ἐστὶν οὔτε ἕτερα τῶν ὅλων, εἴρηται ὁ σπουδαῖος ἀνθρώπος καὶ ὁ φίλος οὐχ ἕτερος ὠφελείας. ὥστε πᾶν ἀγαθὸν τῷ ὄρω ἐμπεριεληφθαι, εἴαν τε ἐξ εὐθείας ὠφέλεια τυγχάνῃ εἴαν τε μὴ ἢ ἕτερον ὠφε- 25 λείας. ἔνθεν καὶ κατὰ ἀκολουθίαν τριχῶς εἰπόντες ἀγαθὸν προσαγορεύεσθαι, ἕκαστον τῶν σηματο- μένων κατ' ἰδίαν πάλιν ἐπιβολὴν ὑπογράφουσιν. λέγεται γὰρ ἀγαθόν, φασί, καθ' ἓνα μὲν τρόπον τὸ ὑφ' οὗ ἢ ἀφ' οὗ ἐστὶν ὠφελείσθαι, ὃ δὴ ἀρχι- κώτατον ὑπῆρχε καὶ ἀρετὴ ἀπὸ γὰρ ταύτης ὡς περ 26 τινὸς πηγῆς πᾶσα πέφυκεν ἀνίσχειν ὠφέλεια. καθ' ἕτερον δὲ τὸ καθ' ὃ συμβαίνει ὠφελείσθαι· οὕτως οὐ μόνον αἱ ἀρεταὶ λεχθήσονται ἀγαθὰ ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ κατ' αὐτὰς πράξεις, εἴπερ καὶ κατὰ ταύτας συμ- 27 βαίνει ὠφελείσθαι. κατὰ δὲ τὸν τρίτον καὶ τελευ- ταῖον τρόπον λέγεται ἀγαθὸν τὸ οἶόν τε ὠφελεῖν, ἐμπεριλαμβανούσης τῆς ἀποδόσεως ταύτης τὰς τε ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς ἐναρέτους πράξεις καὶ τοὺς φίλους καὶ τοὺς σπουδαίους ἀνθρώπους, θεοὺς τε καὶ 28 σπουδαίους δαίμονας. παρ' ἣν αἰτίαν οὐκ ἐν ἴσῳ λέγεται παρὰ τε τοῖς περὶ τὸν Πλάτωνα καὶ Ξενοκράτη πολλὰ ὀνομάζεσθαι τὰ ἀγαθὸν καὶ παρὰ τοῖς στωικοῖς. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ ὅταν φῶσιν

said either to be utility or to be other than utility, for the following reason: The parts, say the sons of the 24 Stoics, are neither the same as their wholes nor of a different kind from their wholes, even as the hand (for instance) is neither the same as the whole man (for the hand is not the whole man), nor other than the whole (for the whole man is conceived as man when including the hand). Since, then, virtue is a part both of the good man and of the friend, and the parts are neither the same as their wholes nor other than their wholes, the good man and the friend are called "not other than utility." So that every good thing is comprehended in the definition, whether it be directly "utility" or whether it be "not other than utility." Next, and by way of corollary, they 25 state that "good" has three senses, and in each of its significations, again, they portray it by a separate description. In one sense "good," they say, means that by which or from which "utility" may be gained, this being the most principal good and virtue; for from virtue, as from a fountain, all utility naturally springs. And in another sense, good is that of which 26 utility is an accidental result; thus not only will the virtues be called "good," but also the actions in accordance therewith, inasmuch as utility results also from them. And in the third and last sense, "that 27 which is capable of being useful" is termed "good," this description comprehending the virtues and the virtuous actions and the friends and the good men, and both gods and good daemons.—And because of 28 this Plato and Xenocrates do not mean the same as the Stoics when they say that "good" has several senses. For when the former declare that the Idea

¹ [ὄλῃ] secl. Arnim.

29 *ἐτέρως λέγεσθαι ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἰδέαν καὶ ἐτέρως τὸ μετέχον τῆς ἰδέας, σημαίνόμενα ἐκτίθενται καὶ κατὰ πολλὰ ἀλλήλων διεστῶτα καὶ μηδεμίαν ἔχοντα κοινωνίαν, οἷόν τι καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς κύων φωνῆς θεω-*
ροῦμεν. ὡς γὰρ ἐκ ταύτης σημαίνεται μὲν πῶσις ὑφ' ἣν τὸ ὑλακτικὸν πέπτωκε ζῶον, καὶ ἔτι ὑφ' ἣν τὸ ἔνυγρον, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτοις ὑφ' ἣν ὁ φιλόσοφος, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑφ' ἣν τὸ ἄστρον, οὐδὲν δὲ κοινὸν ἔχουσιν αἱ τοιαῦται πτώσεις, οὐδ' ἐμπεριέχεται τῇ δευτέρᾳ ἢ πρώτῃ καὶ τῇ τρίτῃ ἢ δευτέρᾳ, οὕτω κὰν τῶ φάναι ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἰδέαν καὶ τὸ μετέχον τῆς ἰδέας ἔκθεσις μὲν ἐστὶ σημαινομένων, κεχωρισμένων δὲ καὶ οὐδεμίαν περίληψιν ἐμφαυόντων.
 30 *ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἀρχαιότεροι, ὡς προείπον, τοιοῦτοί τινας ἦσαν· οἱ δ' ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς θέλουσι ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ προσηγορίας τὸ δεύτερον σημαίνόμενον ἐμπεριληπτικὸν εἶναι τοῦ πρώτου καὶ τὸ τρίτον περιληπτικὸν τῶν δυοῖν. ἦσαν δὲ οἱ φάσκοντες ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχειν τὸ δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετόν. οἱ δ' οὕτως "ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶ τὸ συλλαμβανόμενον πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν," τινὲς δὲ "τὸ συμπληρωτικὸν εὐδαιμονίας." εὐδαιμονία δὲ ἐστίν, ὡς οἱ τε περὶ τὸν Ζήνωνα καὶ Κλεάνθην καὶ Χρυσίππον ἀπέδωσαν, εὐροία βίου.*

31 *Πλὴν τὸ μὲν γένος τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀποδόσεώς ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον· εἰώθασι δ' ἔννοι, τριχῶς λεγομένου τὰγαθοῦ, πρὸς τὸν τοῦ πρώτου σημαινομένου ὄρον εὐθὺς ἐπιζητεῖν, [καθὸ λέγει "τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶ τὸ ὑφ' οὗ ἢ ἀφ' οὗ ἐστὶν ὠφελείσθαι,"]¹ ὡς εἰ ταῖς*

¹ [καθὸ . . . ὠφελείσθαι] secl. Heintz (? λέγεται pro λέγει).

is termed "good" in one sense and that which partakes of the Idea in another sense, they propose significations which differ greatly from one another and have no connexion, as we see in the case of the word "dog." For just as by this is signified a meaning^a under which falls the barking animal, and also the marine animal, and besides them the philosopher, and moreover the star as well; but these meanings have nothing in common, and the first is not included in the second nor the second in the third,—so also in the statement that the Idea is good, and also that which partakes of the Idea, we have a declaration of significations, but of such as are separate and display no mutual connexion. Such then, as I 30 said before, were the views of the earlier thinkers; but the Stoics hold that, in the case of the term "good," the second signification should be inclusive of the first and the third inclusive of the other two. And there have been some who have asserted that "good" is "that which is desirable for its own sake."^b And others put it thus: "Good is that which contributes to happiness"; and some—"that which helps to fulfil happiness." And happiness, as Zeno and Cleanthes and Chrysippus have defined it, is "an equable flow of life."^c

Such, in fine, is the general form of the definition of "the good." But as "the good" is used in three^d senses, with regard to the definition of the first signification [which says "The good is that by which or from which utility can result"] some are wont to

^a Literally, "case" (falling), as a grammatical term "Dog" is variously applied to "dogs," "dog-fish," "Dog-men" (Cynics), "Dog-star."

^b Cf. P.H. iii. 172; Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* i. 1.

^c Cf. § 110 *infra*.

^d See § 25 *supra*.

ἀληθείαις ἀγαθὸν ἔστι τὸ ἀφ' οὗ ἔστιν ὠφελείσθαι, μόνην ῥητέον τὴν γενικὴν ἀρετὴν ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχειν (ἀπὸ μόνης γὰρ ταύτης συμβαίνει τὸ ὠφελείσθαι), ἐκπίπτειν δὲ τοῦ ὄρου ἐκάστην τῶν εἰδικῶν, ὡς τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς.
 32 ἀπ' οὐδεμιᾶς γὰρ αὐτῶν συμβαίνει [τὸ]¹ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὠφελείν, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ μὲν τῆς φρονήσεως τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ οὐ κοινότερον τὸ ὠφελείν (εἰ γὰρ αὐτὸ τοῦτο συμβαίνοι, τὸ ὠφελείν, οὐκ ἔσται ὠρισμένως φρόνησις, γενικὴ δ' ἀρετὴ), καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς σωφροσύνης τὸ κατ' αὐτὴν κατηγορήμα, σωφρονεῖν, οὐ τὸ κοινόν,
 33 ὠφελείν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν τὸ ἀνάλογον. οἱ δ' ἀντικαθιστάμενοι πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ ἔγκλημα τοῦτό φασιν· ὅταν λέγωμεν "ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν ἀφ' οὗ συμβαίνει τὸ ὠφελείσθαι," ἐν ἴσῳ τοῦτο λέγομεν τῷ "ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν ἀφ' οὗ συμβαίνει τι τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὠφελείσθαι." οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἐκάστη τῶν ἐπ' εἶδους ἀρετῶν ἀγαθὸν γενήσεται, κοινῶς μὲν τὸ ὠφελείν μὴ ἐπιφέρουσα, τί δὲ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὠφελείσθαι παρεχομένη, ὡς ἢ μὲν φρονεῖν, καθάπερ ἢ φρόνησις, ἢ δὲ [τὸ] σωφρονεῖν, ὡς ἢ σωφροσύνη.
 34 θελήσαντες δὲ οὗτοι ὡς ἀπολογούμενοι τὸ πρότερον ἔγκλημα φυγεῖν, εἰς ἕτερον ἀπεκυλίσθησαν. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τὸ λεγόμενον τοιοῦτο "ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν ἀφ' οὗ συμβαίνει τι τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὠφελείσθαι," ἢ γενικὴ ἀρετὴ ἀγαθὸν οὕσα οὐχ ὑποπέσειται τῷ ὄρω· οὐ γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῆς συμβαίνει τι τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὠφελείσθαι, ἐπεὶ μία τῶν ἐπ' εἶδους γενήσεται, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς τὸ ὠφελείσθαι.
 35 Καὶ ἕτερα δὲ εἴωθε λέγεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς τοιοῦτους ὄρους, δογματικῆς ἐχόμενα περιεργίας. ἡμῖν δὲ

¹ [τὸ] secl. Mutsch.

argue further that if in very truth good is "that from which utility can result," we must declare that generic virtue alone is good (for it is from this alone that utility results), and that each of the particulars—such as wisdom, temperance, and the rest—fall outside the definition. For the precise fact of being useful does ³² not result from any of these, but from wisdom "being wise" results and not "being useful" more generally, (for if just this—namely, being useful—were its result it would not be wisdom in particular but generic virtue), and from temperance results what is named after it (namely, "being temperate") and not the general result (namely, "being useful"), and similarly with the rest.—But those who resist this ³³ indictment say this: When we state that "good is that from which utility results," this is equivalent to saying "good is that from which results one of the things useful in life." For thus each of the particular virtues also will be a good, not as procuring utility in general but as providing some one of the things useful in life—one of them (namely, wisdom) providing the state of being wise, and another (namely, temperance) the temperate state. But these men, in attempting ³⁴ by this defence to escape the previous charge, have involved themselves in another one. For if the statement is this—"Good is that from which results one of the things useful in life," then generic virtue, which is a good, will not fall under the definition; for none of the things useful in life results from it (since otherwise it will become one of the particulars), but simply utility.

* And other objections, which partake of Dogmatic ³⁵ over-subtlety, are customarily made against these

* With §§ 35-39 cf. P.H. iii. 173-174.

ἀπόρη ἀποδείξει ὅτι ὁ λέγων ἀγαθὸν τὸ ὠφελοῦν ἢ τὸ δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν ἢ τὸ συνεργοῦν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν, ἢ οὕτω πως ἀποδιδούς, οὐχ ὁ ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν διδάσκει, ἀλλὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς αὐτῷ παρίστησιν. ὁ δὲ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς τάγαθῷ παριστάς οὐκ αὐτὸ δεικνυσι τάγαθόν. εὐθέως γοῦν τὸ μὲν ὅτι ὠφελεί τάγαθόν καὶ τὸ ὅτι αἰρετὸν ἔστι, παρὸ ἀγαθὸν εἴρηται τὸ οἶον ἀγαστόν, ὅτι τε εὐδαιμονίας ἔστι ποιητικόν, πάντες συγχωροῦσιν· ἀλλ' εἰὰν προσεξετάζηται τί ποτε ἔστι τοῦτο τὸ ὠφελοῦν καὶ δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν καὶ εὐδαιμονίας ποιητικόν, οὐκέτι ὁμοφρονήσουσι, καίπερ συμφώνως πρότερον αὐτὸ λέγοντες τὸ ὠφελοῦν καὶ τὸ αἰρετὸν, ἀλλ' εἰς ἀσπειστον ἐξενεχθήσονται πόλεμον, τοῦ μὲν ἀρετὴν λέγοντος τοῦ δ' ἡδονὴν τοῦ δ' ἀλυπίαν τοῦ δ' ἄλλο 37
 37 τι τῶν διαφερόντων. εἰ δέ γε ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων ὄρων ἐδείκνυτο ὁ ἔστι τὸ ἀγαθόν, οὐκ ἂν ἐπεστασίαζον ὡς ἀγνοουμένης τῆς τάγαθοῦ φύσεως. τοῖνυν οὐχ ὁ ἔστι τὸ ἀγαθόν οἱ ἐκκείμενοι ὄροι διδάσκουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς τάγαθῷ. διόπερ οὐδὲ κατὰ τοῦτο μόνον εἰσι μοχθηροί, ἀλλὰ καὶ 38
 38 καθόσον ἀδυνάτου τινὸς ἐφίενται πράγματος· ὁ γὰρ ἀγνοῶν τι τῶν ὄντων, οὗτος οὐδὲ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἐκείνῳ γινώσκει δύναιται. οἶον ὁ πρὸς τὸν ἀγνοοῦντα τί ἔστιν ἵππος λέγων "ἵππος ἔστι ζῶον χρεμετιστικόν" οὐ διδάσκει ὁ ἔστιν ἵππος· τῷ γὰρ μὴ γινώσκοντι τὸν ἵππον καὶ τὸ χρεμετίζειν ἀγνοεῖται, ὅπερ ἦν τοῦ ἵππου συμβεβηκός. καὶ ὁ πρὸς τὸν μὴ κατειληφῶτα τί ἔστι βοῦς προφερό-

* Deriving ἀγαθόν from ἀγαστόν, cf. § 85 *infra*; P.H. iii. 175; Plato, *Cratyl.* 412 c.

definitions. But for us it is sufficient to show that he who asserts that the good is "the useful," or "what is choiceworthy for its own sake," or "that which contributes to happiness," or gives some such description of it, does not teach us what good is but states its accidental property. But he who states the property of the good does not show us the good itself. For certainly all agree that the good is useful and that it is choiceworthy (and for this reason it is called "good" as being "delightful" *), and that it is productive of happiness; but 36
 36 if one inquires further what this thing is which is useful and choiceworthy for its own sake and productive of happiness, they will no longer be of one mind, although they previously agreed in calling it the useful and the choiceworthy, but will be swept away into a truceless war, one man calling it virtue, another pleasure, another painlessness, another something else quite different. But if it had in fact been 37
 37 shown by the definitions mentioned above what the good is, they would not have been at strife as though the real nature of the good were unknown. So then, the definitions set forth do not teach us what the good is but the accidental property of the good. Consequently, they are unsound not only in this respect but also inasmuch as they aim at something which is impossible; for he who is ignorant of an existing object 38
 38 cannot get to know the property of that object either. For example, the man who says to one who is ignorant of what a horse is, "A horse is an animal capable of neighing," does not teach him what a horse is; for "neighing," too, is unknown to the person who does not know the horse, as it is a property of the horse. And he who to the man who has not grasped

μενος "βοῦς ἐστὶ ζῶον μυκητικόν" οὐ παρίστησι
 τὸν βόυν· τῷ γὰρ μὴ γινώσκοντι τοῦτον συνακα-
 ταληπτέεται καὶ τὸ μυκάσθαι, συμβεβηκὸς ὑπάρχον
 39 τοῦ βοός. οὐκοῦν καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀνενόητον ὄντα
 τὰγαθοῦ μάτην καὶ ἀνωφελῶς λέγεται ὅτι ἀγαθὸν
 ἐστὶ τὸ αἰρετόν ἢ τὸ ὠφελοῦν. πρῶτον γὰρ δεῖ
 μαθεῖν τὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν, εἶτα τότε
 συνιέναι ὅτι ὠφελεί καὶ ὅτι αἰρετόν ἐστὶ καὶ εὐδαι-
 μονίας ποιητικόν. ἐπ' ἀγνοουμένη δὲ ταύτη καὶ οἱ
 τοιοῦτοι τῶν ὄρων οὐ διδάσκουσι τὸ ζητούμενον.
 40 Δείγματος μὲν οὖν χάριν ἀπαρκέσει ταῦτ' εἰρη-
 σθαι περὶ τῆς τὰγαθοῦ νοήσεως. ἐξ ὧν, ὡς οἶμαι,
 σαφῆ τυγχάνει καὶ τὰ περὶ τοῦ κακοῦ τεχνολογού-
 μενα παρὰ τοῖς ἑτεροδόξοις. κακὸν γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ
 ἐναντίον τῷ ἀγαθῷ ὅπερ βλάβη ἐστὶν ἢ οὐχ ἕτερον
 βλάβης, καὶ βλάβη μὲν ὡςπερ κακία καὶ ἡ φαῦλη
 πράξις, οὐχ ἕτερον δὲ βλάβης καθάπερ ὁ φαῦλος
 41 ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ ἐχθρός. μεταξὺ δὲ τούτων, φημι
 δὲ τοῦ τε ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ, ὅπερ καὶ ἀδιάφορον
 ὠνομάζετο, ἐστὶ τὸ οὐδετέρως ἔχον. τίς δ' ἦν ἢ
 τῶν ὄρων τούτων δύναμις καὶ τίνα ῥητέον πρὸς τοὺς
 ὄρους, ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰγαθοῦ λεγομένων πάρεστι
 μαθεῖν. νῦν δ' ἐπὶ προκατασταθεῖσι τούτοις μετ-
 ελθόντες σκεψώμεθα εἰ ὡςπερ ἐπινοεῖται τι ἀγαθὸν
 καὶ κακόν, οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ὑπαρκτόν
 ἐστίν.

Γ'.—ΕΙ ΕΣΤΙ ΦΥΣΕΙ ΑΓΑΘΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΚΑΚΟΝ

42 "Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐ κεκρατημένως ὑπέγραψαν οἱ
 δογματικοὶ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν τοῦ τε ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ,

* With § 40 *cf.* P.H. iii. 176.

^b *Cf.* §§ 21-39 *supra*.

what an ox is propounds the definition, "An ox is an
 animal capable of bellowing," does not explain the
 ox, for "bellowing" too is equally uncomprehended
 by the man who does not know the ox, it being a
 property of the ox. Therefore also it is vain and 39
 useless to say to the man who is devoid of a concep-
 tion of the good that the good is the choice-
 worthy or the useful. For one ought first to learn
 the real nature of the good itself, and then, in the
 next place, perceive that it is useful and that it is
 choiceworthy and productive of happiness. But if
 this is unknown such definitions as these do not
 inform us of what we seek.

It will be enough, then, to have said thus much, by 40
 way of illustration, regarding the conception of the
 Good. And from this the logical subtleties which
 the Dogmatists devise regarding Evil will also be
 plain.^a For the evil is the contrary of the good; and
 it is harm or not other than harm; and it is "harm"
 as in the case of badness and wicked action, but "not
 other than 'harm'" as in the case of the wicked man
 and the enemy. And between these (I mean, between 41
 the good and the evil, and termed the "indifferent")
 is that which is in neither state. And what the signi-
 ficance of these definitions is, and what is to be said
 against the definitions, one may learn from our dis-
 cussion of the good.^b But now, on the assumption
 that these are already established, let us pass on and
 consider whether good and evil are really existent in
 the way in which they are conceived.

CHAPTER III.—DO GOOD AND EVIL REALLY EXIST?

Now that the Dogmatists have not described the 42
 conception of Good and Evil convincingly we have

πρότερον ἐπελογισάμεθα· πρὸς δὲ τὸ εὐχρέστερον
 συμπεριφέρεσθαι τοῖς περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως αὐτοῦ
 λόγους αὐταρκές ἐστιν εἰπεῖν ὡς ἄρα πάντες ἀν-
 θρωποι, καθάπερ ἔλεγε καὶ ὁ Αἰνησίδημος, ἀγαθὸν
 ἡγούμενοι τὸ αἰροῦν αὐτούς, ὅποιον ἂν ποτ' ᾗ,
 43 καὶ ὃν τρόπον συμφωνοῦντες, εἰ τύχοι, περὶ τοῦ
 εἶναι τινα σωματικὴν εὐμορφίαν περὶ τῆς εὐμόρφου
 καὶ καλῆς γυναικὸς στασιάζουσιν, τοῦ μὲν Αἰθίο-
 πος τὴν σιμοτάτην καὶ μελαντάτην προκρίνοντας,
 τοῦ δὲ Πέρσου τὴν γρυποτάτην καὶ λευκοτάτην
 ἀποδεχομένου, ἄλλου δὲ τὴν μέσην κατὰ τὸν
 χαρακτήρα καὶ κατὰ τὴν χροῖαν πασῶν καλλίονα
 44 λέγοντος, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ κατὰ κοινὴν πρό-
 ληψιν δοξάζοντες εἶναι τι ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν οἱ τε
 ἰδιῶται καὶ οἱ φιλόσοφοι, ἀγαθὸν μὲν τὸ αἰροῦν
 αὐτούς καὶ ὠφελοῦν, κακὸν δὲ τὸ ἐναντίως ἔχον,
 κατ' εἶδος πρὸς ἀλλήλους πολεμοῦσιν·

ἄλλος γάρ τ' ἄλλοισιν ἀνὴρ ἐπιτέρπεται ἔργοις,
 καὶ κατ' Ἀρχίλοχον

ἄλλος ἄλλω ἐπ' ἔργω καρδίην ἰαίνεται,
 εἶγε ὁ μὲν δόξαν ἀσπάζεται ὁ δὲ πλοῦτον, ἄλλος
 εὐεξίαν, τίς δὲ ἡδονήν. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων ὁ
 45 αὐτὸς λόγος. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας καὶ
 τοῦ περιπάτου τρία γένη φασὶν εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν,
 καὶ ἃ μὲν περὶ ψυχὴν ὑπάρχειν ἃ δὲ περὶ σῶμα ἃ δὲ
 ἐκτὸς ψυχῆς τε καὶ σώματος, περὶ μὲν οὖν ψυχὴν
 τὰς ἀρετὰς, περὶ δὲ τὸ σῶμα ὑγίειαν καὶ εὐεξίαν

* With §§ 42-44 cf. *P.H.* iii. 175.

† Homer, *Odys.* xiv. 228 ; cf. *P.H.* i. 86.

already argued * ; but in order to become more easily
 familiar with the arguments about its existence it is
 quite sufficient to say that, after all (as Aenesidemus
 used to assert), whereas all men consider that the good
 is what attracts them, whatever that may be, the
 particular views they hold about it are conflicting.
 And just as, although men agree (shall we say ?) 43
 that comeliness of body exists yet they are at variance
 about the comely and beautiful woman,—the Ethio-
 pian preferring the blackest and most snub-nosed,
 and the Persian approving the whitest and most
 hook-nosed, and someone else declaring that she
 who is intermediate both in feature and in colouring
 is the most beautiful of all,—so in the same way both 44
 laymen and philosophers share the same pre-concep-
 tion and believe that good and evil exist,—good being
 that which attracts them and is useful, and evil that
 which is of the opposite nature,—but as to particular
 instances they are at war with one another :—

One thing is pleasing to one man, another thing to another.*
 and, in the words of Archilochus,°—

Men differ as to what things cheer their hearts,
 seeing that this man welcomes glory, that man wealth,
 another well-being, and another pleasure. And the
 same account applies to the philosophers. ° For the 45
 Academics and the Peripatetics ° assert that there are
 three classes of goods, and that some belong to the
 soul, some to the body, and others are external to
 both soul and body,—the virtues belonging to the
 soul, and to the body health and well-being and keen-

* *Frag.* 36 (Bergk).

° With §§ 45-47 cf. *P.H.* iii. 180-181.

° Cf. *Aristot. Eth. Nic.* i. 8.

- καὶ εὐαισθησίαν καὶ κάλλος καὶ πᾶν ὃ τῆς ὁμοίας
 ἐστὶν ἰδέας, ἐκτὸς δὲ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος πλοῦτον
 46 πατρίδα γονεῖς τέκνα φίλους, τὰ παραπλήσια. οἱ
 δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς τρία μὲν γένη τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ
 αὐτοὶ τυγχάνειν ἔλεξαν, οὐχ ὡσαύτως δέ· τούτων
 γὰρ τὰ μὲν περὶ ψυχῆν τὰ δ' ἐκτὸς τὰ δὲ οὔτε περὶ
 ψυχῆν οὔτε ἐκτὸς, ἔξαιροῦντες τὸ γένος τῶν περὶ τὸ
 σῶμα ἀγαθῶν ὡς μὴ ἀγαθῶν. καὶ δὴ περὶ μὲν
 ψυχῆν εἶναί φασι τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς σπουδαίας
 πράξεις, ἐκτὸς δὲ εἶναι τὸν τε φίλον καὶ τὸν σπου-
 δαῖον ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὰ σπουδαῖα τέκνα καὶ γονεῖς
 καὶ τὰ ὅμοια, οὔτε δὲ περὶ ψυχῆν οὔτε ἐκτὸς αὐτὸν
 τὸν σπουδαῖον ἄνθρωπον ὡς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν. οὔτε γὰρ
 ἐκτὸς ἑαυτοῦ δυνατὸν εἶναι αὐτὸν οὔτε περὶ ψυχῆν.
 47 Ἐκ γὰρ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος συνέστηκεν. εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ
 τοσοῦτον ἀπέχοντες τοῦ ἐξαιρεῖν τὸ γένος τῶν περὶ
 σώματι ἀγαθῶν ὡς καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ ἀρχικώτατον
 ἀπολιπεῖν ἀγαθόν· ὅποιοι εἰσω οἱ τὴν κατὰ σάρκα
 ἡδονὴν ἀσπαζόμενοι. καὶ ἵνα μὴ δοκῶμεν νῦν ἐπὶ
 πλείον ἐκτείνειν τὸν λόγον, παριστάντες ὅτι ἀσύμ-
 φωνός ἐστι καὶ μαχομένη ἡ περὶ ἀγαθοῦ τε καὶ
 κακοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων κρίσις, ἐπὶ ἐνὸς ὑποδείγματος¹
 ποιησόμεθα τὴν ὑφήγησιν, καθάπερ τῆς ὑγείας,
 ἐπεὶ καὶ συνηθέστερός ἐστιν ἡμῖν ὁ περὶ αὐτῆς
 λόγος.
 48 Οὐκοῦν τὴν ὑγείαν οἱ μὲν νομίζουσιν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι
 οἱ δ' οὐκ ἀγαθόν, καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ὑπολαμβάνόντων
 οἱ μὲν μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ταύτην ἔλεξαν οἱ δ' οὐ
 μέγιστον, καὶ τῶν οὐκ ἀγαθῶν εἰπόντων οἱ μὲν
 ἀδιάφορον προηγούμενον, οἱ δὲ ἀδιάφορον μὲν, οὐ

ness of sense and beauty and everything which is of a similar character, and external to soul and body being wealth, country, parents, children, friends, and the like. But the Stoics, though they too declared that 46 there are three classes of good things, yet classed them differently, saying that some of them belong to the soul, that some are external, and that some are neither psychical nor external, and eliminating the class of bodily goods as not being goods. Thus those belonging to the soul are, they say, the virtues and the right actions; and external are the friend and the good man and good children and parents and the like; and neither psychical nor external is the good man in his relation to himself, for it is impossible for him to be either external to himself or psychical; for he is composed of soul and body. And there are some who 47 are so far from eliminating the class of bodily goods that they even assign to them the most principal good; and of this sort are they who approve of carnal pleasure. But lest we may seem now to be unduly prolonging our argument in showing that the judgement of men regarding Good and Evil is discordant and conflicting, we shall base our exposition on one example only—namely health, since the discussion of this is specially familiar to us.^a

Health, then, is by some considered to be a good, by 48 others not a good; and of those who suppose it to be a good some have declared it to be the greatest good, others not the greatest; and of those who have said that it is not a good, some have counted it "a preferred indifferent," others an indifferent but not

¹ ὑποδείγματος Heintz: ὑποδειγματικῶς mss., Bekk.

^a Since Sextus himself was a physician.

49 προηγούμενον δέ. ἀγαθὸν μὲν οὖν, καὶ τοῦτο
πρῶτον, εἰρήκασι τὴν ὑγίαν οὐκ ὀλίγοι τῶν τε
ποιητῶν καὶ τῶν συγγραφέων καὶ καθόλου πάντες
οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ βίου. Σιμωνίδης μὲν γὰρ ὁ μελοποιὸς
φησι μηδὲ καλᾶς σοφίας εἶναι χάρις, εἰ μὴ τις ἔχει
σεμνὴν ὑγίαν· Λικύμνιος δὲ προειπὼν ταῦτα

λιπαρόμματε, μάτερ ὑψίστα,¹ θρόνων
σεμνῶν Ἀπόλλωνος βασιλεία ποθεινά,
πραῦτελως ὑγεία,

ποῖον ὑψηλὸν ἐπιφέρει·

τίς γὰρ πλοῦτου χάρις ἢ τοκῆων
ἢ τᾶς ἰσοδαίμονος ἀνθρώπου βασιλιῆδος ἀρχᾶς;
σέθεν δὲ χωρὶς οὐ τις εὐδαίμων ἔφθ.

50 Ἡρόφιλος δὲ ἐν τῷ διαιτητικῷ καὶ σοφίαν φησὶν
ἀνεπίδεικτον καὶ τέχνην ἄδηλον καὶ ἰσχὺν ἀν-
αγώνιστον καὶ πλοῦτον ἀχρεῖον καὶ λόγον ἀδύνατον

51 ὑγείας ἀπούσης. ἀλλ' οὗτοι μὲν οὕτως ἀγαθὸν
δ' εἶπαν αὐτὴν ὑπάρχειν, οὐ μὴν καὶ πρῶτον, οἳ τε
ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ περιπάτου.
δεῖν γὰρ ὑπέλαβον ἐκάστῳ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὴν οἰκείαν
τάξιν τε καὶ ἀξίαν ἀπονέμειν. ἔνθεν καὶ ὁ Κράντωρ
εἰς ἔμφασιν τοῦ λεγομένου βουλόμενος ἡμᾶς ἄγειν
52 πάνυ χαρίεντι συνεχρήσατο παραδείγματι. εἰ γὰρ
νοήσοιμεν, φησί, κοινόν τι τῶν Πανελλήνων θέα-
τρον, εἰς τοῦτό τε ἕκαστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν παρίον καὶ
τῶν πρωτείων ἀντιποιοῦμενον ἦκειν, εὐθὺς καὶ εἰς
ἐννοίαν ἀναχθησόμεθα τῆς ἐν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς δια-

¹ ὑψίστα Wilamowitz: ὑψίστων MSS., Bekk.

* For the two subdivisions of the "indifferent"—"pre-ferred" and "rejected"—cf. §§ 59 ff. *infra*; P.H. iii. 191 f.; Vol. I. *Introductio*. p. xxvii.

"preferred." ^a Now that health is a good, and the 49
prime good, has been asserted by not a few of the
poets and writers and generally by all ordinary folk.
Thus Simonides the lyric poet declares ^b that "Even
fair Wisdom lacks grace unless a man possesses
august Health." And Licymnius, after first uttering
this prelude ^c—

Mother sublime, with eyes bright-shining,
Lov'd queen of the holy throne of Apollo,
Gently-smiling Lady of Health—

adds this lofty strain—

Where is the joy of wealth or of kindred,
Or of kingly dominion that maketh man god-like?
Nay, parted from thee can no one be blessed.

And Herophilus ^d in his *Dietetics* affirms that wisdom 50
cannot display itself and art is non-evident and
strength unexerted and wealth useless and speech
powerless in the absence of health.—Such then are 51
the views of these men. But the Academics and
Peripatetics ^e said that health is indeed a good, but
not the prime good. For they held that one ought
to assign to each of the goods its own proper rank
and value. Hence Crantor,^f wishing to bring us to
have a clear image of the object under discussion,
made use of a very delightful illustration. If we were 52
to imagine, he says, a general theatre, common to all
the Greeks, and that each of the goods were to come
and present itself in this and challenge for the first
prize, we should be brought at once to a realization of
the difference between the goods. For in the first 53

^b *Frag.* 70 (Bergk).

^c *Frag.* 4 (Bergk).

^d A physician of Cos, *circa* 300 B.C.; cf. P.H. ii. 245.

^e Cf. § 77 *infra*.

^f An Academic, disciple of Xenocrates, *circa* 300 B.C.

53 φορᾶς. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ὁ πλοῦτος παραπηδήσας ἔρει " ἐγώ, ὦ ἄνδρες Πανέλληνες, κόσμον παρέχων πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις καὶ τὰς ἐσθήτας καὶ τὰς ὑποδέσεις καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀπόλαυσιν χρεώδης εἰμι νοσοῦσι καὶ ὑγιαίνουσι, καὶ ἐν μὲν εἰρήνῃ παρέχω τὰ τερπνά,
54 ἐν δὲ πολέμοις νεύρα τῶν πράξεων γίνομαι." τούτων γὰρ δὴ τῶν λόγων ἀκούσαντες οἱ Πανέλληνες ὁμοθυμαδὸν κελύσουσιν ἀποδοῦναι τὰ πρωτεῖα τῷ πλούτῳ. ἀλλ' ἐὰν τούτου ἤδη ἀνακηρυττομένου ἐπιστάσα ἢ ἡδονή,

τῇ ἐνὶ μὲν φιλότῃ, ἐνὶ δ' ἱμερῳ, ἐν δ' ὀαριστύς,
πάρφασις, ἢ τ' ἔκλεψε νόον τύκα περ φρονούντων,

55 λέγῃ δὲ εἰς μέσον καταστᾶσα ὅτι αὐτὴν δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἀναγορεύειν

(ὁ γὰρ ὄλβος οὐ βέβαιος, ἀλλ' ἐφήμερος
ἐξίπτατ' οἴκων, μικρὸν ἀνθήσας χρόνον,

διώκεται τε πρὸς τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὐ δι' ἑαυτὸν ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ περιγινομένην ἀπόλαυσιν καὶ ἡδονήν), πάντως οἱ Πανέλληνες, οὐκ ἄλλως ἔχειν τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ οὕτως ὑπολαβόντες, κεκράζονται δεῖν τὴν ἡδονήν
56 στεφανοῦν. ἀλλὰ καὶ ταύτης τὸ βραβεῖον φέρεσθαι μελλούσης, ἐπὶν εἰσβάλλῃ ἢ ὑγεία μετὰ τῶν συν- ἔδρων αὐτῇ θεῶν, καὶ διδάσκῃ ὡς οὔτε ἡδονῆς οὔτε πλοῦτου ὄφελός τί ἐστιν ἀπούσης αὐτῆς

(τί γὰρ με πλοῦτος ὠφελεῖ νοσοῦντά γε;¹
μικρ' ἂν θέλωμι καὶ καθ' ἡμέραν ἔχων
ἄλυπον οἰκεῖν βίον ἢ πλουτῶν νοσεῖν),

57 ἀκούσαντες πάλιν οἱ Πανέλληνες καὶ καταλαβόντες

¹ νοσοῦντά γε Fabr., Bekk.: νόσον MSS. (? μεστόν ὠφελεῖ νόσον).

place Wealth, springing to the front, will say—" I, O all ye Greeks, by providing adornment to all men and garments and shoes and all other comforts am indispensable both to the sick and to the whole, and while I furnish delights in peace, in war I become the sinews of action." Then all the Greeks, on hearing 54 these words, will with one consent give orders that the first prize be bestowed on Wealth. But if, whilst he is already being proclaimed the victor, Pleasure should present herself—

In whom love doth abide and longing and amorous converse, Speech seductive which stealeth the wits, yea e'en of the wisest,^a—

and taking her stand in the middle should declare 55 that it is right to proclaim her victor—

For unsure is Wealth: it lasteth but a day,
Then, after briefest flow'ring, takes to flight,^b

also it is pursued by men not for its own sake but for the enjoyment and pleasure which accrue because of it,—then certainly all the Greeks, conceiving that this is in fact the case, will cry aloud that they must crown Pleasure. But when she, too, is about to carry 56 off the palm, as soon as Health makes her entry in company with her fellow-deities,^c and explains that in her absence there is no profit either in pleasure or in wealth—

What doth wealth profit me when I am sick?
Better a little portion day by day
With painless life than riches with disease^d—

then, once again, when they have heard her and have 57

^a Homer, *Il.* xiv. 216.

^b Cf. Eurip. *Phoen.* 558, *Electra* 944.

^c Such as Asclepius, Panacea, Athenê (an altar to Athenê Hygieia was set up in Athens by Pericles).

^d From Eurip. *Telephus* (*Frag.* 714 Nauck).

ὡς οὐκ ἔνεστι κλινοπετῆ καὶ νοσοῦσαν ὑποστῆναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, φήσουσι νικᾶν τὴν ὑγίαν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ὑγείας ἤδη νικώσης, ἐπὶ εἰσέλθῃ ἡ ἀνδρία πολὺ στίφος ἀριστέων καὶ ἡρώων ἔχουσα περὶ 58 ἑαυτὴν, καταστᾶσά τε λέγῃ "ἐμοῦ μὴ παρούσης, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἕλληνες, ἀλλοτρία γίνεται ἡ κτήσις τῶν παρ' ὑμῖν ἀγαθῶν, εὐξαινό τ' ἂν οἱ πολέμιοι περιουσιάζειν ὑμᾶς πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὡς μελλήσοντες ὑμῶν κρατεῖν," καὶ τούτων οὐκ ἀκούσαντες οἱ Ἕλληνες τὰ μὲν πρωτεία τῆ ἀρετῆ ἀποδώσουσι, τὰ δὲ δευτερεία τῆ ὑγείας, τὰ δὲ τρίτα τῆ ἡδονῆς, τελευταῖον δὲ τάξουσι τὸν πλοῦτον.

59 Καὶ δὴ ὁ μὲν Κράντωρ τὴν ὑγίαν ἐν δευτέρᾳ μοίρᾳ ἐτίθετο, στοιχῶν τοῖς προειρημένοις φιλοσόφοις· οὐκ ἀγαθὸν δ' οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἔλεξαν αὐτὴν ἀλλ' ἀδιάφορον. τὸ ἀδιάφορον δ' οἴονται λέγεσθαι τριχῶς, καθ' ἓνα μὲν τρόπον πρὸς ὃ μήτε ὄρμη μήτε ἀφορμὴ γίνεται, οἷον ἔστι τὸ περιττοῦς ἢ ἀρτίους εἶναι τοὺς ἀστέρας ἢ τὰς ἐπὶ τῆ κεφαλῇ 60 τρίχας, καθ' ἕτερον δὲ πρὸς ὃ ὄρμη μὲν καὶ ἀφορμὴ γίνεται, οὐ μᾶλλον δὲ πρὸς τὸδε ἢ τὸδε, οἷον ἐπὶ δυοῖν δραχμῶν ἀπαραλλάκτων τῷ τε χαρακτήρι καὶ τῆ λαμπρότητι, ὅταν δέη τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν αἰρεῖσθαι· ὄρμη μὲν γὰρ γίνεται πρὸς τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν 61 [αἰρεῖσθαι], οὐ μᾶλλον δὲ πρὸς τὸδε ἢ τὸδε. κατὰ δὲ τρίτον καὶ τελευταῖον τρόπον φασὶν ἀδιάφορον τὸ μήτε πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν μήτε πρὸς κακοδαιμονίαν συλλαμβανόμενον, καθ' ὃ σημιανόμενόν φασὶ τὴν τε ὑγίαν καὶ νόσον καὶ πάντα τὰ σωματικὰ καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀδιάφορα τυγχάνειν διὰ τὸ μήτε

come to realize that happiness cannot exist when bed-ridden and diseased, all the Greeks will declare that Health is the victor. But even while Health is already claiming the victory, as soon as Courage enters, surrounded by a great press of nobles and heroes, and taking her stand speaks thus—"If I am 58 not present, O ye Greeks, the ownership of your goods falls into other hands, and your enemies would pray that you might abound in all things good since they intend to conquer you"; then, on hearing this, the Greeks will assign the first prize to valour, and the second to health, and the third to pleasure, and they will rank wealth last.

Thus Crantor put health in the second place, 59 adopting the order of the philosophers previously mentioned; but the Stoics affirmed that it is not a "good" but an "indifferent."^a They suppose that the term "indifferent" has three senses: in one sense it is applied to that for which there exists neither inclination nor disinclination,—such as the fact that the stars or the hairs of the head are odd in number or even; in another sense it applies to that 60 for which there exists inclination and disinclination but not more for this thing than for that—as in the case of two drachmae indistinguishable both in markings and in brightness, when one is required to choose one of them, for there exists an inclination for one of them but no more for this one than for that. And in the third and last sense the indifferent, they 61 say, is that which contributes neither to happiness nor to unhappiness; and indifferent in this signification, they say, are health and disease and all things of the body and most external things because they

^a With §§ 59-61 cf. *P.H.* iii. 177.

πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν μήτε πρὸς κακοδαιμονίαν συν-
 τείνειν. ὧ γὰρ ἔστιν εὖ καὶ κακῶς χρῆσθαι, τοῦτ'²
 ἂν εἶη ἀδιάφορον διὰ παντός δ' ἀρετῇ μὲν καλῶς,
 κακία δὲ κακῶς, ὑγεία δὲ καὶ τοῖς περὶ σώματι
 62 ἂν εἶη ἀδιάφορα. ἤδη δὲ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων φασὶ
 τὰ μὲν εἶναι προηγμένα τὰ δ' ἀποπροηγμένα τὰ
 δὲ μήτε προηγμένα μήτε ἀποπροηγμένα, καὶ προ-
 ηγγμένα μὲν εἶναι τὰ ἰκανῆν ἀξίαν ἔχοντα, ἀπο-
 προηγμένα δὲ τὰ ἰκανῆν ἀπαξίαν ἔχοντα, μήτε δὲ
 προῆχθαι μήτε ἀποπροῆχθαι οἷον τὸ ἐκτείνειν ἢ
 63 συγκάμψαι τὸν δάκτυλον καὶ πᾶν ὃ τούτῳ παρα-
 μένοις τήν τε ὑγείαν καὶ τήν ἰσχύν καὶ τὸ κάλλος
 πλοῦτόν τε καὶ δόξαν καὶ τὰ εὐκότα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς
 ἀποπροηγμένοις νόσον καὶ πεινίαν καὶ ἀλγηδόνα καὶ
 τὰ ἀνάλογα. ὦδε μὲν καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς·
 64 μὴ εἶναι δὲ προηγμένον ἀδιάφορον τὴν ὑγείαν καὶ
 πᾶν τὸ κατ' αὐτὴν παραπλήσιον ἔφησεν Ἀρίστων ὁ
 Χίος. ἴσον γάρ ἐστι τὸ προηγμένον αὐτὴν λέγειν
 ἀδιάφορον τῷ ἀγαθὸν ἀξιοῦν, καὶ σχεδὸν ὀνόματι
 65 μόνον διαφέρειν. καθόλου γὰρ τὰ μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς
 καὶ κακίας ἀδιάφορα μὴ ἔχειν μηδεμίαν παρ-
 αλλαγὴν, μηδὲ τιὰ μὲν εἶναι φύσει προηγμένα τιὰ
 δὲ ἀποπροηγμένα, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὰς διαφοροὺς τῶν
 καιρῶν περιστάσεις, (ὡς)¹ μήτε τὰ λεγόμενα προ-
 ῆχθαι πάντως γίνεσθαι προηγμένα μήτε τὰ λεγόμενα
 66 μένα. εἰάν γοῦν δέη τοὺς μὲν ὑγαιίνοντας ὑπηρετεῖν
 τῷ τυράννῳ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀναρῆσθαι, τοὺς δὲ

¹ <ὡς> add. cj. Heintz.

tend neither towards happiness nor towards un-
 happiness. For that which it is possible to use either
 well or ill will be indifferent; and whereas one
 always uses virtue well and vice ill, one can use
 health and the things of the body at one time well
 and at another ill, and consequently they will be
 indifferent.—And they say too that of things 62
 indifferent some are “preferred,” others “re-
 jected,” others neither preferred nor rejected,^a and
 that the preferred are those which have consider-
 able “worth,” and the rejected those which have
 considerable “unworthiness,” and that extending the
 finger, for example, or contracting it, and everything
 like that, is neither preferred nor rejected. And 63
 amongst the things preferred are ranked health and
 strength and beauty, wealth and glory and the like;
 but amongst the things rejected, sickness and poverty
 and pain and suchlike.—So say the Stoics; but 64
 Ariston of Chios^b affirmed that health, and everything
 of a similar kind, is not a “preferred indifferent”;
 for to call it a “preferred indifferent” is equivalent
 to claiming it to be a “good,” and practically differs
 only in name. For, without exception, amongst the 65
 indifferent things which lie between virtue and vice
 there is no distinction; nor are some of them pre-
 ferred, others rejected naturally, but owing to the
 different circumstances of the various occasions; (so
 that) neither are those said to be preferred inevitably
 preferred, nor those said to be rejected necessarily
 rejected. Were it, for instance, obligatory that men 66
 in sound health should serve under the tyrant and on
 this account be destroyed, but that the sick should

^a Cf. § 48 *supra*. With §§ 62-66 cf. *P.H.* iii. 191-192.

^b A Stoic, with Cynic tendencies, *circa* 260 B.C.

νοσοῦντας ἀπολυομένους τῆς ὑπηρεσίας συναπο-
 λύεσθαι καὶ τῆς ἀναιρέσεως, ἔλοιτ' ἂν μᾶλλον ὁ
 σοφὸς τὸ νοσεῖν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν καιρὸν ἢ [ὄτι]¹ τὸ
 ὑγιαίνειν. καὶ ταύτη οὔτε ἡ ὑγεία προηγμένον ἐστὶ
 67 πάντως οὔτε ἡ νόσος ἀποπροηγμένον. ὥσπερ οὖν
 ἐν ταῖς ὀνοματογραφίαις ἄλλοτ' ἄλλα προτάττομεν
 στοιχεῖα, πρὸς τὰς διαφόρους περιστάσεις ἀρτιζό-
 μενοι, καὶ τὸ μὲν δέλτα ὅτε τὸ τοῦ Δίωνος ὄνομα
 γράφομεν, τὸ δὲ ἰῶτα ὅτε τὸ τοῦ Ἰωνος, τὸ δὲ ὦ
 ὅτε τὸ τοῦ Ὠρίωνος, οὐ τῇ φύσει ἐτέρων παρὰ τὰ
 ἕτερα γράμματα προκρινόμενων, τῶν δὲ καιρῶν
 τοῦτο ποιεῖν ἀναγκαζόντων, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς μεταξὺ
 ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας πράγμασι οὐ φυσικῆ τις γίνεται
 ἐτέρων παρ' ἕτερα πρόκρισις, κατὰ περίστασι δὲ
 μᾶλλον.

68 Ἄλλὰ γὰρ ἐκ τούτων ἀσυμφώνου δειχθείσης καὶ
 ὑποδειγματικώτερον τῆς περὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ
 κακῶν ἔτι δὲ ἀδιαφόρων προλήψεως, δεήσει λοιπὸν
 καὶ τῶν παρὰ τοῖς σκεπτικοῖς εἰς τὸ προκείμενον
 69 λεγομένων ἐφάπτεσθαι. εἰ τοίνυν ἐστὶ τι φύσει
 ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐστὶ τι φύσει κακόν, τοῦτο ὀφείλει
 κοινὸν εἶναι πάντων καὶ πᾶσι ὑπάρχειν ἀγαθὸν ἢ
 κακόν. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ πῦρ φύσει ἀλεαντικὸν καθ-
 εστῶς πάντας ἀλεαίνει καὶ οὐχ οὓς μὲν ἀλεαίνει
 οὓς δὲ ψύχει, καὶ ὃν τρόπον ἡ χιών (φύσει)² ψύ-
 χουσα οὐχὶ τοὺς μὲν ψύχει τοὺς δὲ ἀλεαίνει, πάντας
 δ' ὁμοίως ψύχει, οὕτω τὸ φύσει ἀγαθὸν πᾶσι
 70 τοῖς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθόν. παρὸ καὶ ὁ Πλάτων συνιστᾷς
 ὅτι φύσει ἀγαθόν ἐστὶν ὁ θεός, ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων
 ἐπικεχειρήκεν. ὡς γὰρ θερμοῦ, φησὶν, ἰδίον ἐστὶ

be set free from that service and freed likewise from
 destruction, on such an occasion the wise man would
 choose sickness rather than health. And thus neither
 is health inevitably preferred nor sickness rejected.
 As, then, in the writing of names we place different 67
 letters first at different times, adapting them to the
 varying circumstances,—Delta when we are writing
 the name of Dion, Iota when it is Ion, Omega when
 it is Orion,—no one letter being preferable to the
 others by nature, but the occasions compelling us to
 act thus,—so also in the things which lie between
 virtue and vice there exists no natural precedence of
 some before others, but rather a precedence due to
 circumstance.

But now that we have thus shown, mainly by means 68
 of examples, that there is no agreement about the
 preconception regarding things good and evil, and
 the indifferent as well, it will be our next task to deal
 with the arguments of the Sceptics about the problem
 before us. If, then, there exists anything good by 69
 nature or anything evil by nature, this thing ought to
 be common to all men and be good or evil for all.^a
 For just as fire which is warmth-giving by nature
 warms all men, and does not warm some but chill
 others,—and like as snow which chills (by nature)
 does not chill some and warm others, but chills all
 alike,—so what is good by nature ought to be good
 for all, and not good for some but not good for others.
 Wherefore also Plato,^b in establishing that God is 70
 good by nature, argued on similar lines. For, he
 says, as it is the special property of heat to make hot

^a With § 69 cf. *P.H.* iii. 179.

^b Cf. Plato. *Rep.* ii. 379 A ff., and 335 D.

¹ [ὄτι] secl. Arnim (? οὕτως). ² <φύσει> add. cj. Mutsch.

τὸ θερμαίνειν καὶ ψυχροῦ ἰδιὸν ἐστὶ τὸ ψύχειν, οὕτω καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδιὸν ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθοποιεῖν· τὰ-
 γαθὸν δέ γε ὁ θεός· ἰδιὸν ἄρα ἐστὶ θεοῦ τὸ ἀγαθο-
 71 ποιεῖν. ὥστε εἰ ἐστὶ τι φύσει ἀγαθόν, τοῦτο πρὸς
 ἅπαντάς ἐστιν ἀγαθόν, καὶ εἰ ἐστὶ τι φύσει κακόν,
 τοῦτο πρὸς ἅπαντάς ἐστὶ κακόν. οὐδὲν δὲ κοινὸν
 πάντων ἐστὶν ἀγαθόν ἢ κακόν, ὡς παραστήσομεν·
 72 οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶ τι φύσει ἀγαθόν ἢ κακόν. ἦτοι γὰρ
 πᾶν τὸ ὑπὸ τιος δοξαζόμενον ἀγαθὸν ῥητέον ταῖς
 ἀληθείαις ἀγαθόν, ἢ οὐ πᾶν. καὶ πᾶν μὲν οὐ ῥη-
 τέον· εἰ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ ὑπὸ τιος δοξαζόμενον ἀγαθὸν
 λέγομεν ἀγαθόν, ἐπεὶ ταῦτόν ὑπὸ ἑτέρου δοξάζεται
 [δοξάζεται] ἀδιάφορον, δώσομεν τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα καὶ
 73 κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀδιάφορον ὑπάρχειν. οἶον
 τὴν ἡδονὴν ὁ μὲν Ἐπικουρὸς ἀγαθὸν εἶναι φησιν,
 ὁ δὲ εἰπὼν “μανεῖην μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθεῖην” κακόν, οἱ
 δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἀδιάφορον καὶ οὐ προηγμένον,
 ἀλλὰ Κλεάνθης μὲν μήτε κατὰ φύσιν αὐτὴν εἶναι
 μήτε ἀξίαν ἔχειν [αὐτὴν] ἐν τῷ βίῳ, καθάπερ δὲ τὸ
 κάλλυντρον κατὰ φύσιν μὴ εἶναι, ὁ δὲ Ἀρχέδημος
 κατὰ φύσιν μὲν εἶναι ὡς τὰς ἐν μασχάλῃ τρίχας,
 οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ ἀξίαν ἔχειν, Παναίτιος δὲ τινὰ μὲν
 74 κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχειν τινὰ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν. εἰ δὲ
 τοῖνυν πᾶν τό τι φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν, τοῦτο πάντως
 ἔστιν ἀγαθόν, ἐπεὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ τῷ μὲν Ἐπικουρῷ
 φαίνεται ἀγαθόν τινὶ δὲ τῶν κυνικῶν κακόν τῷ δ’
 ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἀδιάφορον, ἔσται ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν

and the property of cold to chill, so also it is the special property of good to do good ; but the Good is God ; therefore it is the property of God to do good. So 71 that if there exists anything good by nature, this is good in relation to all men, and if there exists anything evil by nature, that is evil in relation to all. But there is nothing good or evil which is common to all, as we shall establish ; therefore there does not exist anything good or evil by nature. For we must 72 declare either that everything which is supposed by anyone to be good is in very truth good, or not everything. But we must not declare that everything is so ; for if we should call good everything which is supposed by anyone to be good, then, since the same thing is supposed by one man to be evil, and by another good, and by yet another [is held to be] indifferent, we shall be granting that the same thing is at once both evil and good and indifferent. Epicurus, for example, asserts that pleasure is a good, 73 but he who said “ I would rather be mad than enjoy pleasure ”^a counted it an evil, while the Stoics say it is indifferent and not preferred ; but Cleanthes says that neither is it natural nor does it possess value for life, but, like a cosmetic, has no natural existence, whereas Archedemus^b says that it has a natural existence, like the hairs in the armpit, but possesses no value, and Panaetius that it exists partly by nature and partly contrary to nature.—If, then, everything 74 that seems good to anyone is altogether good, then, since pleasure seems good to Epicurus, and evil to one of the Cynics, and indifferent to the Stoic,

^a Antisthenes, the Cynic : with this § 73 cf. *P.H.* iii. 180-181.

^b A Stoic, like Cleanthes and Panaetius.

ἄμα καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀδιάφορον. οὐχὶ δὲ γε δύναται τῇ φύσει τὸ αὐτὸ τὰ ἐναντία τυγχάνειν, ἀγαθὸν ἄμα καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀδιάφορον· οὐκ ἄρα πᾶν τό τι φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, τοῦτο ῥητέον εἶναι
 75 ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν. εἰ δὲ <οὐ πᾶν>¹ τό τι φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν καὶ πάντῃ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν, ὀφείλομεν καταληπτικοὶ εἶναι καὶ διακρίνειν δύνασθαι τὴν ἐν τοῖς δοξαζομένοις ἀγαθοῖς διαφορὰν, ὥστε λέγειν τὸ μὲν τῷδε δοξαζόμενον ἀγαθὸν ταῖς ἀληθείαις εἶναι ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ τῷδε δοξαζόμενον μὲν
 76 ἀγαθόν, οὐκέτι δὲ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθόν. ἤτοι οὖν δι' ἐναργείας ταύτην τὴν διαφορὰν λαμβάνεσθαι συμβέβηκεν ἢ διὰ λόγου τινός. ἀλλὰ δι' ἐναργείας ἀμήχανον. πᾶν γὰρ τὸ δι' ἐναργείας προσπίπτον κοινῶς τε καὶ συμφώνως λαμβάνεσθαι πέφυκεν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀπαραποδίστους ἐχόντων τὰς ἀντιλήψεις, ὡς παρὸν ἰδεῖν ἐπὶ πάντων σχεδὸν τῶν φαινομένων. οὐχὶ δὲ γε συμφώνως τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσι ἀγαθὸν εἶναι λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν ἀρετὴ καὶ τὸ μετέχον ἀρετῆς, τοῖς δὲ ἡδονή, τοῖς δὲ ἀλυπία, τισὶ δ' ἄλλο τι. οὐκ ἄρα ἐναργῶς προσπίπτει πᾶσι τὸ ὄντως ἀγαθόν.
 77 εἰ δὲ λόγῳ λαμβάνεται, ἐπεὶ ἕκαστος πάντων τῶν κατὰ διαφοροὺς αἰρέσεις κοσμουμένων ἴδιον ἔχει λόγον, καὶ ἄλλον μὲν Ζήνων, δι' οὗ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι δεδόξακεν, ἄλλον δ' Ἐπίκουρος, δι' οὗ τὴν ἡδονήν, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ Ἀριστοτέλης, δι' οὗ τὴν ὑγείαν, ἴδιον πάλιν ἕκαστος εἰσηγήσεται ἀγαθόν, ὅπερ οὐκ ἦν τῇ φύσει ἀγαθόν, οὐδὲ κοινὸν
 78 πάντων. τοῖσιν οὐδὲν ἔστι φύσει ἀγαθόν. εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἴδιον ἐκάστου οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν πάντων οὐδὲ

¹ <οὐ πᾶν> add. Heintz.

^a Cf. § 36 *supra*.

pleasure will be at once good and evil and indifferent ; but it is impossible for the same thing to be by nature opposite things,—at once good and evil and indifferent therefore we must not declare that everything which seems good or evil to anyone is good or evil.—But 75 if what seems good to anyone is not in all cases altogether good, we ought to be gifted with discernment and able to distinguish the difference between the supposed goods so as to declare that this thing which is supposed by this man to be good is in very truth good, whereas that thing which is supposed by that man to be good is not also good by nature. This difference, 76 then, comes to be perceived either through sensible evidence or through a process of reasoning.—But it cannot be through sensible evidence. For everything which causes an impression through sensible experience is of such a nature as to be perceived with one accord by all in common who have their perceptions undistorted, as one may see in the case of nearly all appearances. But the same thing is not accounted good by all with one accord, but by some virtue and what partakes of virtue, by others pleasure, by others painlessness,^a by others something else. Therefore the really good does not impress all men through sense-evidence.—And if it is perceived by reasoning, 77 then, since each of those persons who are held in honour in the different sects has his own peculiar reason—Zeno one by which he opined that virtue is the good, Epicurus another by which he chose pleasure, Aristotle a different one by which he chose health,—each of them likewise will introduce his own peculiar good, which is not a good by nature nor common to all. So then nothing is good by nature. 78 For if the private good of each is not the good of all

φύσει, παρὰ δὲ τὸ ἴδιον ἐκάστου ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲν ἔστι
 συμφώνως ἀγαθόν, οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἀγαθόν.

- 79 Καὶ μὴν εἴ ἔστι τι ἀγαθόν, τοῦτο κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον
 λόγον αἰρετὸν ὀφείλει τυγχάνειν, ἐπεὶ πᾶς ἀνθρώπος
 αἰρεῖται τούτου τυγχάνειν ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ κακὸν
 φυγεῖν. οὐδὲν δὲ γε αἰρετὸν ἔστι κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον
 λόγον [ὡς αἰρετὸν],¹ καθάπερ δείξομεν· οὐκ ἄρα
 80 τι ἔστιν ἀγαθόν. εἰ γὰρ ἐστὶ τι κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον
 λόγον αἰρετὸν, ἦτοι αὐτὸ τὸ αἰρεῖσθαι αἰρετὸν
 ἔστιν ἢ ἕτερόν τι παρὰ τοῦτο, οἷον ἦτοι τὸ αἰρεῖ-
 σθαι τὸν πλοῦτον αἰρετὸν ἔστιν ἢ αὐτὸς ὁ πλοῦτος
 81 αἰρετός ἔστιν. καὶ αὐτὸ μὲν τὸ αἰρεῖσθαι οὐκ ἂν
 εἴη αἰρετὸν. εἰ γὰρ αἰρετὸν ἔστι κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον
 λόγον τὸ αἰρεῖσθαι, οὐκ ὀφείλομεν σπουδάζειν
 τυχεῖν οὐπερ αἰρούμεθα, ἵνα μὴ ἐκπέσωμεν τοῦ
 ἔτι αἰρεῖσθαι. ὥσπερ γὰρ <φευκτέον>² τὸ πίνειν
 ἢ ἐσθίειν, ἵνα μὴ πίνοντες ἢ φαγόντες ἐκπέσωμεν
 τοῦ ἔτι θέλειν τὸ πίνειν ἢ ἐσθίειν, οὕτως εἰ τὸ
 αἰρεῖσθαι πλοῦτον ἢ ὑγίαν αἰρετὸν ἔστιν, οὐκ
 ἐχρήν ἡμᾶς διώκειν τὸν πλοῦτον ἢ τὴν ὑγίαν, ἵνα
 μὴ τυχόντες αὐτῶν ἐκπέσωμεν τοῦ ἔτι αἰρεῖσθαι.
 82 διώκομεν δὲ γε τὴν τευξίν αὐτῶν· οὐκ ἄρα αἰρετὸν
 ἔστι τὸ αἰρεῖσθαι, φευκτὸν δὲ μᾶλλον. καὶ ὃν
 τρόπον ὁ ἐρών σπεύδει τυχεῖν τῆς ἐρωμένης, ἵνα
 φύγη τὴν ἐν τῷ ἐρᾶν ὄχλησιν, καὶ ὡς ὁ διψῶν
 ἐπείγεται πιεῖν, ἵνα φύγη τὴν ἐν τῷ διψῆν βάσανον,
 ὧδε καὶ ὁ ἐν τῷ αἰρεῖσθαι πλοῦτον ὀχλούμενος
 [κατὰ τὸ αἰρεῖσθαι]³ ἐπείγεται τυχεῖν πλούτου, ἵνα
 83 ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ ἔτι αἰρεῖσθαι. εἰ δ' ἕτερόν τι

nor by nature, and besides the private good of each
 there exists no good upon which all are agreed, no
 good exists.

Moreover, if good exists, it ought to be desirable 79
 on its own account, since every man desires to obtain
 it even as he desires to escape evil.^a But, as we shall
 show, nothing is desirable on its own account; there-
 fore there does not exist any good. For if there is 80
 anything desirable on its own account, either the
 desire itself is desirable or something other than
 this,—for example, either the desire for wealth is
 desirable or wealth itself is desirable. But the desire 81
 itself will not be desirable. For if the desire is desir-
 able on its own account, we ought not to be eager to
 obtain that which we desire lest we should cease from
 desiring any longer. For just as <we ought to avoid> ^b
 drinking or eating lest by having eaten or drunk we
 should cease to wish any longer to drink or eat, so, if
 the desire for wealth or health is desirable, we ought
 not to pursue after wealth or health, lest by acquiring
 them we cease to desire them any longer. But we 82
 do desire the acquisition of them; therefore the
 desire is not desirable but rather to be avoided. And
 just as the lover is eager to obtain his beloved that
 he may escape from the distress which love entails,
 and as the thirsty man hurries to drink that he may
 escape the torment of thirst, so also he who is dis-
 tressed through his desire for wealth hurries to obtain
 wealth that he may be relieved from further desire.—

^a With §§ 79-84 cf. *P.H.* iii. 183-184.

^b Probably more words have been lost from the Greek, as
 we should rather expect "we ought to have avoided drinking
 or eating if the desire for them is desirable," or the like.

¹ [ὡς αἰρετὸν] secl. Heintz.

² <φευκτέον> addo: <ἐμβραδύνομεν τῷ> cj. Bekk.

³ [κατὰ τὸ αἰρεῖσθαι] secl. Heintz.

ἐστὶ τὸ αἰρετὸν παρ' αὐτὸ τὸ αἰρεῖσθαι, ἥτοι τῶν
 κεχωρισμένων ἐστὶν ἡμῶν ἢ τῶν περὶ ἡμᾶς. καὶ
 εἰ μὲν κεχώρισται ἡμῶν καὶ ἐκτὸς ἐστίν, ἥτοι
 συμβαίνει τι περὶ ἡμᾶς ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἢ οὐδὲν συμβαίνει·
 οἷον ἀπὸ τοῦ φίλου ἢ τοῦ σπουδαίου ἀνθρώπου ἢ
 τέκνου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν ἐκτὸς εἶναι λεγομένων
 ἀγαθῶν ἢ συμβαίνει τι περὶ ἡμᾶς ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀστέιον
 κίνημα καὶ ἀποδεκτὸν κατάστημα καὶ ἀγαστὸν
 πάθος, ἢ οὐδὲν συμβαίνει τοιοῦτον οὐδέ ἐσμεν ἐν
 84 διαφόρῳ κινήματι, ὅτε αἰρετὸν ἡγοῦμεθα τὸν φίλον
 ἢ τὸ τέκνον. καὶ εἰ μὲν οὐδὲν ἀπαξιαπλῶς γίνεται
 τι τοιοῦτον περὶ ἡμᾶς, οὐδ' ὅλως ἔσται τὸ ἐκτὸς
 αἰρετὸν ἡμῖν. πῶς γὰρ πρὸς ὃ ἀκινήτως διακειμέθα,
 85 τούτου οἷον τε αἰρεσὶν ποιεῖσθαι ἡμᾶς; καὶ γὰρ
 ἄλλως, εἴπερ τὸ μὲν χαρτὸν νενόηται ἐκ τοῦ
 χαίρειν ἡμᾶς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, τὸ δὲ λυπηρὸν ἐκ τοῦ
 λυπεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἐκ τοῦ ἀγασθαι, ἀκολου-
 θήσει, ἐξ οὗ μῆτε χαρὰ τις ἡμῖν ἐγγίνεται μῆτε
 ἀγαστὴ διάθεσις μῆτε ἀσμενιστὸν τι κίνημα, ἐκ
 86 τούτου μὴδὲ αἰρεσὶν τινα ἐμφύεσθαι. εἰ δὲ γίνε-
 ται τι περὶ ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐκτὸς, οἷον τοῦ φίλου ἢ
 τοῦ τέκνου, προσηγὸς κατάστημα καὶ ἀσμενιστὸν
 πάθος, ἔσται οὐ δι' αὐτὸν αἰρετὸς ὁ φίλος ἢ τὸ
 τέκνον, διὰ δὲ τὸ προσηγὸς τοῦτο κατάστημα καὶ
 ἀσμενιστὸν πάθος. ἀλλ' ἦν γε τὸ τοιοῦτο κατά-
 στημα οὐκ ἐκτὸς ἀλλὰ περὶ ἡμᾶς. οὐδὲν ἄρα τῶν
 87 ἐκτὸς δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν ἐστίν ἢ ἀγαθόν. καὶ
 μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν περὶ ἡμᾶς ἐστὶ τὸ αἰρετὸν καὶ
 ἀγαθόν. ἥτοι γὰρ σωματικόν ἐστὶ τοῦτο μόνον
 ἢ ψυχικόν. ἀλλὰ σωματικόν μὲν μόνον οὐκ ἂν
 εἴη· εἰ γὰρ σωματικόν μόνον ὑποκέοιτο, οὐκέτι

But if the desirable is something other than the desire 83
 itself, it is either a thing separate from ourselves or a
 thing belonging to ourselves. And if it is separate
 from us and external, either some effect is produced
 in us by means of it, or no effect; as, for instance, by
 the friend or the good man or the child, or any other
 of the so-called external goods, either there is pro-
 duced in us a pleasing motion and a welcome state
 and a delightful affection, or no such result occurs
 and we do not experience any different motion when
 we regard the friend or the child as desirable. And 84
 if absolutely no such effect is produced in us, no
 external thing at all will be desirable in our eyes.
 For how can we possibly have a desire for a thing in
 regard to which we feel no emotion? And besides, 85
 if the enjoyable is so conceived because we get joy
 from it, and the painful because we get pain, and
 the good because we get delight,^a it will follow that
 no desire is implanted by that which produces in us
 no joy nor delightful feeling nor agreeable emotion.
 But if there is produced in us by an external object, 86
 such as the friend or the child, a welcome state and an
 agreeable affection, the friend or the child will not be
 desirable for his own sake but for the sake of this
 welcome state and agreeable affection. But such a
 state is not an external thing but is personal to our-
 selves. Therefore none of the external things is
 desirable for its own sake or good.—Nor yet is the 87
 desirable and good one of the things personal to our-
 selves.^b For it is either solely corporeal or psychical.
 But it will not be solely corporeal; for if it really were
 solely corporeal, and no longer a psychical affection,

^a For the derivation of ἀγαθόν from ἀγασθαι cf. § 35 supra.

^b With §§ 87-89 cf. P. II. iii. 185-186.

δὲ καὶ ψυχικὸν πάθος, ἐκφεύξεται τὴν γνώσιν
 ἡμῶν (ψυχῆς γὰρ ἔστι πᾶσα γνώσις) καὶ ἴσον ἔσται
 τοῖς ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένοις καὶ μηδεμίαν ἔχουσι πρὸς
 88 ἡμᾶς συμπάθειαν. εἰ δὲ διατείνουσιν ἔχει τὴν
 εὐαρέστησιν εἰς ψυχὴν, ἔσται κατ' αὐτὴν αἰρετὸν
 καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' οὐ καθὼς ψιλῶς σωματικόν ἔστι
 κίνημα. πᾶν γὰρ αἰρετὸν κατὰ αἴσθησιν ἢ νόησιν
 κρίνεται, οὐ κατ' ἄλογον σῶμα. ἀλλ' ἤγε τὸ
 αἰρετὸν λαμβάνουσα αἴσθησις ἢ διάνοια ψυχῆς
 ἔστι [κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον λόγον]¹· οὐδὲν ἄρα τῶν περὶ
 σῶμα συμβαινόντων δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν ἔστι καὶ
 89 ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' εἰ ἄρα, τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν, ὃ πάλιν εἰς
 τὴν ἀρχῆθην κυλλεῖται ἀπορίαν. τῆς γὰρ ἐκάστου
 διανοίας ἀσυμφώνους ἔχουσης τὰς κρίσεις πρὸς τὴν
 τοῦ πέλας, ἀνάγκη ἑκάστον τὸ φαινόμενον αὐτῷ
 ἀγαθὸν ἡγεῖσθαι. οὐκ ἦν δὲ τὸ ἐκάστῳ φαινόμενον
 ἀγαθὸν φύσει ἀγαθόν. οὐδὲ ταύτη τοῖνυν τί ἔστιν
 ἀγαθόν.
 90 Ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ κακοῦ. δυνάμει γὰρ
 συναποδέδοται² τῇ περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ζητήσῃ,
 πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι [ἐπεὶ]³ τοῦ ἐτέρου ἀναιρουμένου
 συναναίρεται καὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ἑκάτερον γὰρ κατὰ
 τὴν ὡς πρὸς τὸ ἕτερον σχέσιν νενόηται· εἴτα
 ἐπεὶ καὶ προηγουμένως ἔνεστι τὸ τοιοῦτον <ἡμῖν
 παριστᾶν, πειρασόμεθα>⁴ πάλιν ἐπὶ ἐνὸς ὑπο-
 δεύματος καταστήσασθαι τὸν λόγον, καθάπερ τῆς
 ἀφροσύνης, ἣν μόνην φασὶν εἶναι κακὸν οἱ ἀπὸ
 91 τῆς στοᾶς. εἰ γὰρ φύσει κακὸν ἔστιν ἡ ἀφρο-
 σύνη, δεήσει, ὃν τρόπον τὸ θερμὸν γνωρίζεται ὅτι

¹ [κατὰ . . . λόγον] secl. Heintz.

² συναποδέδοται Mutsch. : ἀποδέδοται mss., Bekk.

it would elude our perception (for all perception is a property of the soul) and it would be on a par with the things which exist externally and have no fellow-feeling with us. But if the pleasure it contains 88 extends to the soul, it will be desirable and good on account of this but not on account of its being a merely corporeal motion. For every desirable thing is judged to be so by means of a sensation or perception and not by means of an irrational body. But the sense or intelligence which apprehends the desirable is of the soul; therefore none of the things which happen to the body is desirable for its own sake and good, but, if any, those which happen to the soul; 89 and this involves us once again in the original difficulty.^a For since the intelligence of each man disagrees with that of his neighbour in respect of its judgements, each must necessarily regard as good that which appears so to himself. But what appears good to each man is not good by nature. So in this way, too, nothing is good.

And the same argument applies also to evil. For 90 it virtually results from our investigation of the good that, in the first place, when one of these is abolished the other also is abolished along with it (for each of them is conceived in its relation to the other); and next, since it is possible <for us to establish> this directly, <we shall attempt> once more to base our argument upon a single example, namely folly, which alone, say the Stoics, is evil. For if folly is evil by nature, then, 91 just as the hot is known to be hot by nature from

^a See § 77 *supra*.

³ [ἐπεὶ] secl. Mutsch.

⁴ <ἡμῖν . . . πειρασόμεθα> addo (sec. Mutsch.).

θερμόν ἐστι φύσει ἐκ τοῦ τοὺς προσπελάσαντας αὐτῷ θερμαίνεσθαι, καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν ἐκ τοῦ ψύχεσθαι, οὕτω καὶ τὴν ἀφροσύνην φύσει κακὸν ὑπάρχουσαν γνωρίζεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ κακοῦσθαι. ἤτοι οὖν οἱ λεγόμενοι ἄφρονες κακοῦνται ὑπὸ τῆς ἀφροσύνης ἢ οἱ φρόνιμοι. ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν φρόνιμοι οὐ κακοῦνται· ἐκτὸς γάρ εἰσι τῆς ἀφροσύνης, ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ μὴ παρόντος αὐτοῖς κακοῦ ἀλλὰ κεχωρισμένου οὐκ ἂν κακωθεῖεν. εἰ δὲ τοὺς ἄφρονας κακοῖ ἢ ἀφροσύνη, ἤτοι πρόδηλος αὐτοῖς οὐσα κακοῖ αὐτοὺς ἢ ἀδηλος. καὶ ἀδηλος μὲν οὐδαμῶς· εἰ γὰρ ἀδηλὸς ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς, οὐδὲ κακὸν οὐδὲ φευκτὸν ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ' ὡς τὴν μὴ φαινομένην λύπην καὶ ἀνεπαίσθητον ἀλγηδόνα οὔτε φεύγει τις οὔτε ταράσσεται, ὥδε καὶ τὴν ἀνυπόπτωτον ἀφροσύνην καὶ τὴν ἀδηλουμένην οὐδεὶς ὡς κακὸν περιστήσεται. εἰ δὲ πρόδηλως αὐτοῖς γινώσκεται καὶ ἔστι φύσει κακόν, ὧφειλον οἱ ἄφρονες φεύγειν αὐτὴν ὡς φύσει κακόν. οὐχὶ δὲ γε οἱ ἄφρονες τὸ λεγόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀφραίνων ὡς πρόδηλον κακὸν φεύγουσιν, ἀλλ' ἕκαστος τὴν μὲν ἰδίαν κρίσιν ἀποδέχεται τὴν δὲ τοῦ τὸ ἐναντίον δοξάζοντος κακίζει. ὥστ' οὐδὲ πρόδηλός ἐστι τοῖς ἀφροσιν ὡς φύσει κακὸν ἢ ἀφροσύνη. ὅθεν εἶπερ οὔτε οἱ φρόνιμοι κακοῦνται τι πρὸς τῆς ἀφροσύνης οὔτε τοῖς ἄφροσι φευκτὸν ἐστὶν ἢ ἀφροσύνη, ῥητέον μὴ εἶναι φύσει κακὸν τὴν ἀφροσύνην. εἰ δὲ μὴ ταύτην, οὐδ' ἄλλο τι τῶν λεγομένων κακῶν.

96 Ἄλλ' εἰώθασι τινες τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἐπικούρου αἰρέσεως, πρὸς τὰς τοιαύτας ἀπορίας ὑπαντώντες, λέγειν ὅτι φυσικῶς καὶ ἀδιδάκτως τὸ ζῶον φεύγει

the fact that those who approach it are made hot,^a and the cold from their being made cold, so also it will be necessary for folly to be known as being evil by nature from the fact that people are made evil. Either, then, it is those who are called fools that are made evil by folly, or the wise. But the wise are not made evil; for they are outside of folly, and they will not be made evil by an evil which is not present with them but separated. And if folly makes evil the fools, it makes them evil either when evident to them or when non-evident. But certainly not when non-evident; for if it is non-evident to them it is neither evil for them nor to be avoided, but just as a man neither avoids nor is perturbed by a non-apparent pain and a non-perceptible pang, so also no one will account as evil the folly which is unsuspected and non-evident. But if it is quite plainly perceived by them and is evil by nature, the fools ought to have avoided it as evil by nature. But the fools do not avoid as an evident evil that which is called by outsiders "foolishness," but each one accepts his own judgement and reckons that of the man who holds an opposite opinion to be evil. So that it is not evident to the fools that folly is evil by nature. Hence, if neither are the wise made evil at all by folly nor is folly a thing avoided by the fools, we must declare that folly is not a thing evil by nature. And if it is not, neither is any other of the so-called evils.

But some of those who belong to the sect of Epicurus, in answer to these objections, are wont to argue that the animal avoids pain and pursues pleasure naturally

^a Cf. § 69 *supra*.

μὲν τὴν ἀλγηδόνα διώκει δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν· γεννηθὲν
 γοῦν καὶ μηδέπω τοῖς κατὰ δόξαν δουλεύον ἅμα
 τῷ ῥαπισθῆναι ἀσυνήθει ἀέρος ψύξει ἔκλασέ τε
 καὶ ἐκώκυσεν. εἰ δὲ φυσικῶς ὄρμῃ μὲν πρὸς
 ἡδονὴν ἐκκλίνει δὲ τὸν πόνον, φύσει φευκτόν τε
 97 ἔστιν αὐτῷ ὁ πόνος καὶ αἰρετόν ἢ ἡδονή. οὐ
 συνείδον δὲ οἱ ταῦτα λέγοντες τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὅτι
 καὶ τοῖς ἀτιμοτάτοις ζώοις μεταδιδόασιν τὰγαθοῦ,
 πολλή γὰρ μετουσία κἀκεινοῖς ἐστὶν ἡδονῆς, εἰθ'
 ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸ καθάπαξ φευκτόν ἐστιν ὁ πόνος· καὶ
 γὰρ πόνῳ πραῦνεται πόνος, καὶ ὑγεία, ἔτι δὲ
 ῥώσις καὶ θρέψις, γίνεται σωμαίων διὰ πόνων,
 τέχνῃς τε καὶ ἐπιστήμας τὰς ἀκριβεστάτας
 ἀναλαμβάνουσιν ἄνδρες οὐ χωρὶς πόνου, ὥστ' οὐ
 98 πάντως φύσει φευκτόν ὁ πόνος. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ
 δοκοῦν ἡδὺ φύσει πάντως αἰρετόν· πολλάκις γοῦν
 τὰ κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἐμπέλασιν ἡστικῶς ἡμᾶς
 διατιθέντα, ταῦτα ἐκ δευτέρου, καίπερ ὄντα τὰ
 αὐτά, ἀηδῆ νομίζεται ὡς ἂν τοῦ ἡδέος οὐ φύσει
 ὄντος τοιούτου, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὰς διαφόρους περι-
 στάσεις ὅτε μὲν οὕτως ὅτε δ' ἐκείνως κινουήντος
 ἡμᾶς.
 99 Naί, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθὸν δοξάζον-
 τες δείκνυσθαι νομίζουσιν ὅτι φύσει τοῦτο αἰρετόν
 ἐστὶ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων. ὀρώμεν γάρ,
 φασίν, ὡς τινα γενναῖα ζῶα, καθάπερ ταῦροι καὶ
 ἀλεκτρυόνες, καίπερ¹ μηδεμίᾳς αὐτοῖς ὑποκειμένης
 τέρψεως καὶ ἡδονῆς διαγωνίζεται μέχρι θανάτου.
 100 καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων δὲ οἱ ὑπὲρ πατρίδος ἢ γονέων
 ἢ τέκνων εἰς ἀναίρεσιν ἑαυτοῦς ἐπιδιδόντες οὐκ
 ἂν ποτε τοῦτ' ἐποίουν, μηδεμίᾳς αὐτοῖς ἐλπ-
¹ καίπερ Apelt: ἀπερ mss., Bekk.

and without teaching; thus when it is born, and is
 not as yet a slave to opinions, it cries and screams as
 soon as it is smitten by the air's unwonted chill. But
 if it naturally has an inclination for pleasure and a
 disinclination for toil, toil is a thing naturally avoided
 by it and pleasure a thing desirable. But they who
 97 argue thus have failed to notice, in the first place,
 that they are giving a share in the good even to the
 basest animals (for they too have a large share in
 pleasure); and, next, that toil is not a thing to be
 absolutely avoided; for, in fact, pain is alleviated
 by toil, and health of body, as well as strength and
 growth, comes by means of toils, and men do not
 acquire the most exact arts and sciences without
 toil, so that toil is not a thing naturally to be avoided
 altogether. Moreover, what seems to be pleasant
 98 is not in all cases naturally desirable; thus it often
 happens that things which on their first occurrence
 affect us pleasantly, on the second occasion, although
 they are the same, are deemed unpleasant, just as
 though the pleasant were not so by nature, but affected
 us now this way and now that according to the differ-
 ing circumstances.

Yes, but even those who hold that only the fair is
 good think that it is proved by the irrational animals
 that this is desirable by nature.^a For we see, they
 say, how certain noble animals, such as bulls and
 cocks, contend unto the death even when they have
 no feeling of delight and pleasure. And those men
 100 who have given themselves over to destruction for the
 sake of country or parents or children would never
 have done so, when they had no hope of pleasure after

^a With §§ 99-100 cf. *P.H.* iii. 193.

ζομένης μετὰ θάνατον ἡδονῆς, εἰ μὴ φυσικῶς τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν τούτους τε καὶ πᾶν τὸ γενναῖον αἰεὶ ζῶον ἐπεσπάτο πρὸς τὴν αὐτοῦ αἵρεσιν.

101 λέληθε δὲ καὶ τούτους ὅτι τελέως ἐστὶν εὐήθες τὸ νομίζειν τὰ προειρημένα τῶν ζῶων ἐννοία τὰγαθοῦ μέχρι τῆς ὑστάτης ἀναπνοῆς διαγωνίζεσθαι. αὐτῶν γὰρ πάρεστιν ἀκούειν λεγόντων ὅτι ἡ φρονιμὴ διάθεσις μόνη βλέπει τὸ καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἡ δὲ ἀφροσύνη τυφλῶται περὶ τὴν τούτου διάγνωσιν, ὅθεν καὶ ὁ ἀλεκτρυὼν καὶ ὁ ταῦρος μὴ μετέχοντα τῆς φρονιμῆς διαθέσεως οὐκ ἂν βλέποι

102 τὸ καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν. ἄλλως τε, εἰ ἔστι τι περὶ οὗ διαγωνίζεται ταῦτα τὰ ζῶα μέχρι θανάτου, τοῦτο οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ νικᾶν καὶ τὸ ἡγείσθαι. ἔσθ' ὅτε δὲ τὸ νικᾶσθαι καὶ τὸ ὑποτάσσεσθαι κάλλιον ἐστὶν, ὅπου γε ἐκότερον ἐστὶν ἀδιάφορον. οὐ τοίνυν φύσει ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν ἀλλ' ἀδιάφορον τὸ

103 νικᾶν καὶ τὸ ἡγείσθαι. ἄλλως τε¹ εἰ φαίεν καὶ τὸν ἀλεκτρυόνα ἢ ταῦρον ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἀλκίμων ζῶων τοῦ καλοῦ ἐφίεσθαι, πόθεν ὅτι καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος τοῦ αὐτοῦ στοχάζεται; οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἐκείνα δείξει τούτου προνοούμενα καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος τοιοῦτος ὢν

104 δέδεικται, ἐπεὶ τοι εἰ ὅτι τινὰ τῶν ζῶων ἀλκιμὰ ἐστὶ καὶ καταφρονητικὰ μὲν τοῦ ἡδέος κατεξ-
 αναστατικά δὲ τῶν ἀλγηδόνων, λέγεται καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος προνοεῖσθαι τοῦ καλοῦ, ἐπεὶ τὰ πολλὰ λίχνα ἐστὶ καὶ γαστροὶς ἤττονα, τοῦμπαλιν ἐροῦμεν καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τοῦ ἡδέος μᾶλλον ἀντιποιεῖσθαι.

105 εἰ δὲ λέγοιεν εἶναι μὲν τινὰ ζῶα φιλήδονα, τὸν δ' ἄνθρωπον μὴ πάντως τοιοῦτον ὑπάρχειν, ἀναστρέψαντες καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐροῦμεν, οὐκ εἴ τινα τῶν

¹ ἄλλως τε Apelt: ὥστε mss., Bekk.

death, unless the fair and good had naturally drawn them, and every noble animal, to desire it. But these 101 people, too, fail to notice that it is perfectly silly to suppose that the animals just mentioned contend to their last breath owing to a conception of the good. For one may hear them declaring themselves that it is only the wise state of mind which beholds the fair and good, while folly blinds men for discerning it; and hence the cock and the bull, as they have no share in the wise state of mind, will not behold the fair and good. And besides, if there is anything 102 about which these animals contend unto the death, it is nothing else than victory and leadership. But sometimes it is a fairer thing to be vanquished and subdued, at least where either result is indifferent.^a Therefore victory and leadership is not good by nature but indifferent. And besides, if they should assert 103 that the cock or the bull or any other of the valiant animals strives after the fair, whence comes it that man also aims at the same thing? For in proving that those animals have a preconception of this, it is not proved that man is of a like kind, since, to be sure, 104 if man too is said to have a preconception of the fair because some animals are valiant and contemptuous of pleasure and capable of resisting pains, then, since most of them are greedy and the slaves of their bellies, we shall declare also, conversely, that man is still more eager for pleasure. And if they should argue that, 105 though some animals are pleasure-loving, man is not wholly so, we too shall turn round and say that it does

^a i. e. when neither victory nor defeat is (strictly speaking) either "good" or "evil" the latter may be "fairer" (i. e. more "good") than the former.

ζώων κατὰ φυσικὸν λόγον μεταδιώκει τὸ καλόν,
 εὐθέως καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος τοῦ αὐτοῦ στοχαζέται
 106 τέλους. ἄλλος δέ τις φήσει περιμάχτητον εἶναι
 τὸ νικᾶν καὶ τὸ ἡγεῖσθαι τοῖς ζώοις [δι' αὐτό,
 ἀνθρώπων δ']¹ οὐ δι' αὐτό, διὰ δὲ τὴν ἔπακολου-
 θούσαν αὐτῷ κατὰ ψυχὴν τέρψιν καὶ γῆθος, προσ-
 ηγές τι τυγχάνον κατὰστασμα. καὶ μᾶλλον γε
 τοῦτο ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων ἔστιν ὑπολαβεῖν, ἐφ' ὧν καὶ
 τιμὴ καὶ ἔπαινος καὶ δωρεαὶ καὶ δόξαι ἰκανά ἐστιν
 ἡδεῖν καὶ διαχεῖν τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ παρ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο
 κατεξαναστατικὴν αὐτῆν τῶν ὀχληρῶν παρέχειν.
 107 ὅθεν καὶ οἱ μέχρι τελευτῆς ἀριστεύοντες καὶ ὑπὲρ
 πατρίδος εἰς ἀναίρεσιν αὐτοὺς ἐπιιδόντες διὰ
 ταύτην ἴσως τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπ' ἀνδρῶν ἀγωνίζονται
 καὶ θνήσκουσιν· καὶ γὰρ εἰ τελευτῶσι καὶ τοῦ ζῆν
 μεθίστανται, ἀλλὰ τοῖ γε ὅτε ζῶσιν ἡδονταὶ καὶ
 108 γήθονται πρὸς τοὺς ἔπαινους. εἰκὸς δ' ἔστιν
 ἐνίοις αὐτῶν καὶ προσδοξάζοντας ὅτι μετὰ
 τελευτῆν ὁμοίως αὐτοὺς ἔπαινος περιμένει, προὔπ-
 τον αἰρεῖσθαι θάνατον. οὐκ ἀπίθανον δ' ἄλλους
 τοῦτο πάσχειν βλέποντας ὅτι δυσυπομένητα μᾶλλον
 αὐτοῖς ἔσται τὰ κατὰ τὴν ζωὴν, θεασαμένοις

υἱάς τ' ὀλλυμένους ἐλκυσθείσας τε θύγατρας
 καὶ θαλάμους κεραῖζομένους καὶ νήπια τέκνα
 βαλλόμενα ποτὶ γαίῃ ἐν αἰνῇ δηιοτήτι.

109 διὰ πολλοὺς οὖν τρόπους τὸν μετ' εὐκλείας τινῶν
 αἰροῦνται θάνατον, καὶ οὐ διὰ τὸ περισπούδαστον
 ἡγεῖσθαι τὸ παρά τισι τῶν δογματικῶν θρυλού-
 μενον καλόν. ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν περὶ τούτων ἐπὶ
 τοσοῦτον ἠπορήσθω.

¹ [δ' . . . δ'] secl. Heintz.

not at once follow that, if some animals for a natural
 reason pursue after the fair, man also aims at the
 same goal.—But some other man will assert that 106
 victory and leadership is a thing highly prized by the
 animals not for its own sake but for the sake of the
 delight and joy of soul which follow upon it, this being
 an agreeable state. And one may suppose that this
 is even more true of men, with whom reputation and
 praise and gifts and honours are sufficient to please
 and thrill the mind and because of this to render
 it capable of resisting hardships. Whence, too, it is 107
 probably owing to this cause that those who prove
 valiant to the end and devote themselves to destruction
 for their country's sake struggle manfully and die.
 For even if they die and depart from life, yet to be
 sure while they are alive they take pleasure and joy
 in the praise. And it is likely also that some of them 108
 believe further that similar praise awaits them after
 death, and thus they desire a conspicuous death. And
 it is not improbable that others endure death through
 seeing that the woes of life will be still harder for
 them to endure, when they behold—

Death overtaking their sons and ravishers seizing their
 daughters,
 Plunderers wrecking their chambers, and even their infant
 children
 Brutally dashed to the ground in the fearful fury of
 fighting.^a

It is for many reasons, then, that some desire death 109
 with glory, and not because they regard "the fair"
 (so harped upon by certain of the Dogmatists) as a
 thing to be greatly sought after. But let this serve
 to conclude our discussion of these problems.

^a Homer, *Il.* xxii. 62 ff.

Δ'.—ΕΙ ΤΗΠΟΤΕΘΕΤΩΝ ΦΥΣΕΙ ΑΓΑΘΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΚΑΚΩΝ
ΕΝΔΕΧΕΤΑΙ ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΩΣ ΒΙΩΤΗ

- 110 Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ μηδὲν εἶναι φύσει ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ κακὸν ἀντάρκως ἐσκεψάμεθα· νυνὶ δὲ ζητῶμεν καὶ εἰ συγχωρηθέντων αὐτῶν δυνατόν ἐστιν εὐρώως ἅμα καὶ εὐδαιμόνως βιοῦν. οἱ μὲν οὖν δογματικοὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων οὐδ' ἄλλως φασὶν ἢ οὕτως ἔχειν· ὁ γὰρ τυχὼν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ κατ' αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐκκλίνων τὸ κακόν, οὗτός ἐστιν εὐδαιμόν· παρὸ καὶ ἐπιστήμην τιὰ περὶ τὸν βίον εἶναι λέγουσι τὴν φρόνησιν, διακριτικὴν μὲν οὖσαν τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν 111 καὶ κακῶν, περιποιητικὴν δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας. οἱ δ' ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως μηδὲν εἰκῆ τιθέντες ἢ ἀναιροῦντες, ἅπανθ' ὑπὸ τὴν σκέψιν εἰσάγοντες, διδάσκουσιν ὡς τοῖς μὲν φύσει ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν ὑποστησάμενοις ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ κακοδαιμόνως βιοῦν, τοῖς δ' ἀοριστοῦσι καὶ ἐπέχουσι

ρήϊστη βιοτῆ πέλει ἀνθρώποισι.

- 112 καὶ τοῦτο μάθοιμεν ἂν μικρὸν ἄνωθεν προλαβόντες.
Πᾶσα τοίνυν κακοδαιμονία γίνεται διὰ τινα παραχῆν. ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσα παραχῆ παρέπεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἤτοι διὰ τὸ συντόνως τιὰ διώκειν 113 ἢ καὶ διὰ τὸ συντόνως τιὰ φεύγειν. διώκουσι δέ γε συντόνως πάντες ἄνθρωποι τὸ δοξαζόμενον αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὸν καὶ φεύγουσι τὸ ὑποσταθὲν κακόν. πᾶσα ἄρα κακοδαιμονία γίνεται παρὰ τὸ τάγαθὰ μὲν διώκειν ὡς ἀγαθὰ τὰ δὲ κακὰ φεύγειν ὡς κακά. ἐπεὶ οὖν ὁ δογματικὸς πεπίστευκεν ὅτι

* Alluding to the Stoic definition of happiness as the "equable flow of life"; cf. § 31 *supra*.

CHAPTER IV.—ASSUMING THAT THINGS GOOD AND EVIL
EXIST BY NATURE, IS IT POSSIBLE TO LIVE HAPPILY?

We have, then, sufficiently considered the question 110 of the non-existence of any thing good or evil by nature; and now let us inquire whether, if (the existence of) these be conceded, it is possible to live at once equably ^a and happily. Now the dogmatic philosophers assert that this, and nothing else, is actually the case; for according to them the man who acquires the good and avoids the evil is happy. Wherefore also they allege that wisdom is a science of life, it being capable of distinguishing things good and evil ^b and of securing happiness. But the Sceptics, 111 neither affirming nor denying anything rashly but subjecting all things to criticism, maintain that those who assume the existence of good and evil by nature have in consequence an unhappy life, whereas for those who refuse to define and suspend judgement—

Freest from care is the life they lead.*

And this we may learn if we first go back a little. 112

Now every unhappy state occurs because of some perturbation. But every perturbation in men is a consequence due either to an eager pursuit of certain things or to an eager avoidance of certain things. And all men eagerly pursue what is believed by them 113 to be good and avoid what is supposed to be evil. Therefore every case of unhappiness occurs owing to the pursuit of the good things as good, and the avoidance of the evil things as evil. Since, then, the Dog-

^b Cf. P.H. iii. 240.

* Homer, *Odys.* iv. 565.

τὸδε ἐστὶ φύσει ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸδε ἐστὶ φύσει κακόν,
 αἰεὶ τὸ μὲν διώκων τὸ δὲ φεύγων, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο
 114 ταραττόμενος, οὐδέποτε εὐδαιμονήσει. ἦτοι γὰρ
 πᾶν ὃ διώκει τις, τοῦτ' εὐθὺς καὶ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν
 ἐστὶ, καὶ πᾶν ὃ φεύγει τις ὡς φευκτόν, τοῦτο τῷ
 ὄντι τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ἢ τὶ τῶν διωκομένων ἐστὶν
 αἰρετόν, καὶ οὐ πᾶν, καὶ τὶ τῶν φευγομένων
 φευκτόν ἢ ἐν τῷ πρὸς τί πως ἔχειν ἐστὶ ταῦτα,
 καὶ ὡς μὲν πρὸς τόνδε τὸδ' ἐστὶν αἰρετόν ἢ φευκτόν,
 ὡς δὲ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων οὔτε
 αἰρετόν ἐστὶν οὔτε φευκτόν, ἀλλὰ νυνὶ μὲν αἰρετόν
 115 νυνὶ δὲ φευκτόν. εἰ μὲν οὖν πᾶν τὸ ὅπως οὖν
 ὑπὸ τινος διωκόμενον ὑπόβοιτό τις φύσει ἀγαθὸν
 καὶ τὸ φευγόμενον φύσει φευκτόν, ἀβίωτον ἔξει
 τὸν βίον, ἀναγκαζόμενος τὸ αὐτὸ διώκειν ἅμα καὶ
 φεύγειν, καὶ διώκειν μὲν ἢ πρὸς τινα αἰρετόν
 ὑπέληπται, φεύγειν δὲ παρόσον ἐτέροις φευκτόν
 116 δεδόξασται. εἰ δὲ πᾶν μὲν τὸ διωκόμενον ἢ
 φευγόμενον μὴ λέγοι αἰρετόν καὶ φευκτόν, τὶ δὲ
 αὐτῶν αἰρετόν καὶ τὶ φευκτόν, βιώσεται μὲν, οὐ
 χωρὶς δὲ ταραχῆς βιώσεται· διὰ παντὸς γὰρ τὸ
 δοξασθὲν αὐτῷ φύσει τυγχάνειν ἀγαθὸν διώκων
 καὶ τὸ ὑποληφθὲν κακὸν περισταμένος οὐδέποτε
 ἀπαλλαγῆσεται ταραχῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ μήπω δραξά-
 μενος τἀγαθοῦ διὰ τὴν τοῦ τυχεῖν ἐπιθυμίαν
 σφοδρῶς ταραχθήσεται, καὶ τυχῶν διὰ τὴν ὑπερ-

matist firmly believes that this thing is good by nature
 and that thing is evil by nature, as he is always
 pursuing the one and avoiding the other and being,
 consequently, perturbed, he will never be happy.
 For either everything which anyone pursues is at 114
 once and by nature good and everything which any-
 one avoids as a thing to be avoided is such in reality ;
 or else some one of the things pursued is desirable,
 but not every one, and some one of the things avoided
 is to be avoided ; or else these things belong to the
 relative class, and in relation to this man this thing is
 desirable or to be avoided, whereas in relation to the
 real nature of the things it is neither desirable nor
 to be avoided, but at one time desirable, at another
 to be avoided.—If, then, a man should assume that 115
 everything which is in any way pursued by anyone is
 good by nature and that everything which is avoided
 is by nature to be avoided, he will have a life that is
 unlivable, through being compelled both to pursue
 and to avoid at the same time the same thing,—to
 pursue it, inasmuch as it is conceived by some to be
 desirable, but to avoid it, in so far as it is deemed by
 others a thing to be avoided.—But if he were to say 116
 not that everything which is pursued or avoided is
 desirable and to be avoided, but that some one of
 them is desirable and some one to be avoided, he
 will have a life indeed, but not a life free from per-
 turbation ; for through continually pursuing what
 he believes to be good by nature and shunning what
 he supposes to be evil he will never be clear of
 perturbation, but both when he has failed as yet
 to grasp the good he will be extremely perturbed
 because of his desire to gain it, and when he has
 gained it he will never be at rest owing to the excess

βολὴν τῆς χαρᾶς ἢ διὰ τὴν φρουρὰν τοῦ κτηθέντος
 117 οὐδέποτε ἠρεμήσει. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ
 κακοῦ· οὔτε γὰρ ὁ ἐκτὸς ὧν αὐτοῦ ἀμέριμνός ἐστιν,
 ἱκανῶς ποιηλατούσης αὐτὸν τῆς τε κατὰ τὸ
 φεύγειν καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸ προφυλάττεσθαι ταραχῆς,
 οὔτε ὁ ἐν αὐτῷ καθεστῶς παύσαν ἔχει τῶν βασάνων,
 σκεπτόμενος " πῶς ἂν φύγοι αἰπὴν ὄλεθρον."

118 Εἰ δὲ μὴ μᾶλλον τις λέγοι τι φύσει αἰρετὸν ἢ
 φευκτὸν μηδὲ μᾶλλον φευκτὸν ἢ αἰρετὸν, ἐκάστου
 τῶν ὑποπιπτόντων πρὸς τί πως ἔχοντος καὶ κατὰ
 διαφέροντας καιροὺς καὶ περιστάσεις νυνὶ μὲν
 αἰρετοῦ καθεστῶτος νυνὶ δὲ φευκτοῦ, βιώσεται μὲν
 εὐδαιμόνως καὶ ἀταράχως, μήτε ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ ὡς
 ἀγαθῷ ἐπαιρόμενος μήτε ἐπὶ κακῷ ταπεινούμενος,
 τὸ μὲν κατ' ἀνάγκην συμβαῖνον γεννικῶς δεχόμενος,
 τοῦ δὲ κατὰ δόξαν ὀχληροῦ, καθ' ἣν κακὸν τι παρ-
 εῖναι ἢ ἀγαθὸν δοξάζεται, ἐλευθερούμενος. τοῦτο
 μὴν αὐτῷ παρέσται ἐκ τοῦ μηδὲν φύσει ἀγαθὸν
 ἢ κακὸν δοξάζειν. οὐκ ἄρα ἔνεστιν εὐδαιμόνως
 βιοῦν φύσει ἀγαθὰ τινα ἢ κακὰ ὑποστησάμενον.

119 Καὶ μὴν τό τινος κακοῦ ποιητικόν, τοῦτο πάντως
 ἐστὶ φευκτὸν ὡς καὶ <τὸ>¹ κακόν. οἷον εἰ ἢ
 ἀλγηδῶν ἐστὶ κακόν, πάντως καὶ τὸ ποιητικόν τῆς
 ἀλγηδόνος ἐπισυστήσεται τῇ ἀλγηδόνι φευκτὸν ὄν·
 καὶ εἰ ὁ θάνατος τῶν κακῶν ἐστίν, ἔσται καὶ τὸ
 θανατοῦν τῶν κακῶν ἅμα καὶ φευκτῶν. τοίνυν καὶ
 κωῶς, εἰ τὸ κακὸν φευκτὸν ἐστίν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ
 τὸ ποιητικὸν τοῦ κακοῦ φευκτὸν ἔσται καὶ κακόν.

120 τὰ δὲ λεγόμενά τισι φύσει ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακῶν
 ἐστὶ ποιητικά, ὡς διδάξομεν. δυνάμει ἄρα κακὰ

¹ <τὸ> add. cj. Bekk.

of his joy or on account of keeping watch over his
 acquisition. And the same argument applies also to 117
 evil; for neither he who is without it is care-free, as
 he is no little tormented by the perturbation caused
 both by avoiding it and by taking precautions; nor
 does he who is in an evil state have any cessation
 of his torments, through taking thought—

How to escape from the steep of destruction.*

But if a man should declare that nothing is by 118
 nature an object of desire any more than of avoid-
 ance, nor of avoidance more than of desire, each thing
 which occurs being relative, and, owing to differences
 of times and circumstances, being at one time desir-
 able, at another to be avoided, he will live happily
 and unperturbed, being neither exalted at good, as
 good, nor depressed at evil, manfully accepting what
 befalls him of necessity, and being liberated from the
 distress due to the belief that something evil or good
 is present. This, in fact, will accrue to him from his
 belief that nothing is good by nature or evil. There-
 fore it is not possible to live happily if one posits any
 things good or evil by nature.

Moreover, that which is productive of any evil is 119
 certainly to be avoided, just as is the evil. For
 instance, if pain is an evil, certainly also what is pro-
 ductive of the pain will take rank with the pain as a
 thing to be avoided; and if death is one of the evils,
 what causes death will also be at once both evil and a
 thing to be avoided. So then in general, if evil is to
 be avoided, what is productive of evil will of necessity
 be a thing to be avoided and an evil. But, as we shall 120
 show, things which are said by some to be good are
 also productive of evils. Therefore the things which

* Homer, *Il.* xiv. 507.

ἔστι τὰ ὑπὸ τινων λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο
κακοδαμονίας τυγχάνει αἷτια. διὰ γὰρ δὴ τὰ τοι-
αῦτα ἀγαθὰ πάντα ἔστι τὰ κακά, φιλαργυρία τε
καὶ φιλοδοξία καὶ φιλονεκία καὶ φιληδονία καὶ
121 τᾶλλα ὅποσα τούτοις ἐμφερῆ ἔστιν. ἕκαστος γὰρ
τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸ δοξασθῆν ὑπὸ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθὸν
τε καὶ αἰρετὸν συντόνως διώκων καὶ μετὰ σφοδροῦ
πέισματος ληληθότως εἰς τὴν ἀγχίθυρον κακίαν
ἐμπίπτει. οἶον (ἔσται γὰρ τὸ λεγόμενον σαφές
122 τῶν οἰκείων ἡμῖν τεθέντων ὑποδειγμάτων) ὁ μὲν
τὸν πλοῦτον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι προειληφώς ὀφείλει
πάντα ἐσπευσμένως ποιεῖν εἰς τὸ τυχεῖν τοῦ
πλούτου, καὶ ἑκάστοτε πρὸς ἑαυτὸν τὸ κωμικὸν
ἀναμελετᾶν παράγγελμα,

κέρδαι' ἔταίρε καὶ θέρους καὶ χειμῶνος,
καὶ τὸ τραγικὸν ἀποδέχεσθαι,

ὦ χρυσέ, δεξίωμα κάλλιστον βροτοῖς.

τὸ δέ γε πάντα ποιεῖν εἰς τὸ πλούτου τυχεῖν οὐκ
ἄλλο τί ἐστίν ἢ φιλαργυρεῖν. ὁ ἄρα τὸν πλοῦτον
μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ἰνδαλλόμενος ἐν τῷ σπεύδειν ἐπὶ
123 τοῦτον γίνεταί φιλάργυρος. πάλιν ὁ τὴν δόξαν
αἰρετὴν ὑποτιθέμενος συντόνως ἐφίεται τῆς δόξης,
τὸ δὲ συντόνως ἐφίεσθαι τῆς δόξης ἔστι φιλοδοξεῖν.
τὸ ἄρα τὴν δόξαν αἰρετὸν καὶ φύσει ἀγαθὸν ὑπο-
τίθεσθαι μεγάλου κακοῦ τινὸς γεννητικὸν ἔστι,
124 τῆς φιλοδοξίας. καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς δὲ ταῦτον
εὐρήσομεν τοῖς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὴν τεύξιν αὐτῆς σπεύ-
δουσιν ἀνάγκη <ἔξιν>¹ τινὰ μοχθηρὰν² συνεξακο-
λουθεῖν, τὴν φιληδονίαν. ὥστε εἰ τὸ ποιητικὸν

¹ <ἔξιν> addo: <ταραχήν> cj. Bekk.

² μοχθηρὰν cj. Bekk.: μοχθηρὰ mss.

are said by some to be good are potentially evil, and
on account of this are causes of unhappiness. For,
in fact, it is owing to such goods that all these evils
exist,—love of money and love of fame and love of
strife and love of pleasure and all the other things
which resemble these. For it is by pursuing earnestly 121
and with extreme persistence what he himself believes
to be good and desirable that each man unwittingly
falls into the evil lying next-door.^a Thus for instance
(for our meaning will be clear if we take examples
familiar to us), the man who has already assumed that 122
wealth is a good must make every effort for the obtain-
ing of wealth, and keep always rehearsing to himself
the injunction of the Comedy^b—

Winter and summer get thee gain, good sir ;
and he must accept what the Tragedy says^c—

Thou fairest of all boons to mortals, Gold !

But to make every effort for the gaining of wealth
is nothing else than to be a money-lover. Therefore
he who imagines wealth to be the greatest good, in
his zeal for this, becomes a money-lover. Again, the 123
man who supposes fame to be desirable earnestly
strives for fame, and the earnest striving for fame is
love of fame ; therefore the supposition that fame is
desirable and good by nature serves to generate a
great evil, love of fame. And in the case of pleasure 124
we shall find the same thing ; for to those who are
eager for its acquisition there results necessarily a
certain depraved condition, love of pleasure. So
that, if what is productive of evils is evil, and it has

^a Cf. Genesis iv. 7 " Sin lieth at the door."

^b *Frag. Com. adesp.* 1255 (Kock).

^c *Eurip. Frag.* 324 (Nauck).

τῶν κακῶν κακόν ἐστι, δέδεικται δὲ τὰ δοξασθέντα τισὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων ἀγαθὰ πάντων τῶν κακῶν ποιητικά, ῥητέον τὰ τισι δοξασθέντα ἀγαθὰ τῇ δυνάμει τυγχάνειν κακά.

- 125 Καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ἔνεστι λέγειν τοῖς ἐξ ἐναντίας ὡς κατὰ μὲν τὴν δίωξιν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν ἐπ' αὐτὰ ὄρμην πάρεστί τι τοῖς ὀρμῶσι καὶ διώκουσι κακόν, ὅλον τῷ μὲν τὸν πλοῦτον μεινόντι ἢ φιλαργυρία, τῷ δὲ τὴν δόξαν ἢ φιλοδοξία, τῷ δ' ἄλλο τι ἄλλοία τις ταραχὴ, κατὰ δὲ τὴν τεύξιν αὐτῶν ἀπαλλαγὴ γίνεται τῶν ταραχῶν καὶ ἀνάπαυλα τῆς πρότερον
- 126 ὀχλήσεως· ὁ γὰρ τυχῶν τοῦ πλοῦτου οὐκέτι συντόνως ἐπιζητεῖ τὸν πλοῦτον, καὶ ὁ λαβόμενος τῆς ἡδονῆς λύσει τὸ σύντονον τῆς περὶ αὐτὴν σπουδῆς. καθάπερ οὖν τὰ κρημνοβατοῦντα τῶν ζώων ὑπὲρ τοῦ πιεῖν δι' ἀλγηδόνοιο ἵεται ἐπὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ ἅμα τῷ κορεσθῆναι παύεται τῶν πρὶν μόχθων, οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐν μὲν τῷ ἐπιείγεσθαι πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὀχλεῖται, τυχῶν δὲ οὐ
- 127 ἐπόθει καὶ τῆς ὀχλήσεως ἀπαλλάττεται. οὐ δὴ δυνατόν ἐναί φασιν ταῦτα λέγειν, οὐδ' οὕτως ἔχει τὸ πρᾶγμα. κἂν γὰρ τύχῃσι τῶν νομιζομένων αὐτοῖς ἀγαθῶν, συνεχόνται καὶ ἐπιλυποῦνται μᾶλλον, ὅτι οὐ μόνοι ταῦτα ἔχουσιν· σὺν τούτῳ γὰρ τὰγαθὰ τίμια καὶ περιμάχητα νομίζουσι, σὺν τῷ μόνοι ταῦτα κεκτηῖσθαι, διὸ καὶ ζῆλος αὐτοῖς ἐμφύεται πρὸς τοὺς πέλας καὶ βασκανία καὶ φθόνος. ὥστε καὶ τὴν δίωξιν τῶν λεγομένων ὑπάρχειν ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἀταλαίπωρον

been shown that the things which are believed by some philosophers to be good are productive of all the evils, one must declare that the things believed by some to be good are potentially evil.

Moreover, it is not possible for our opponents to 125 argue that although, through their pursuit of them and their impulse towards them, there accrues some evil to the subjects of the impulse and the pursuit (love of money, for example, to the man who goes after wealth, and love of fame to him who goes after fame, and some other kind of perturbation to him who is after something else), yet as a result of their acquisition there comes about a relief from the perturbations and a cessation of the previous distress ; for he who has acquired the wealth no longer seeks 126 earnestly after wealth, and he who has got the pleasure will relax the intensity of his zeal for it. For just as the animals which haunt the crags are driven for the sake of drinking through pain to pleasure and as soon as they are satisfied cease from their previous distress, so also man is necessarily distressed during his efforts after the good, but when he has gained what he yearned for he is also relieved from his distress.—But we assert that it is not possible to 127 argue thus, nor is this the truth of the matter. For even if men obtain what they regard as goods, they are still more oppressed and vexed that they are not alone in possessing them ; for it is when accompanied with this—with their being alone in possessing them—that they regard the goods as precious and highly to be prized, and hence they are infected with jealousy towards their neighbours and ill-will and envy. So that while the pursuit of the things said to be goods is not devoid of misery, the

εἶναι, καὶ τὴν περίκτισιν πλειόνων κακῶν ὑπάρχειν
 128 ἐπισύστασιν. πάλιν τε καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν
 κακῶν ὁ αὐτὸς ἐστὶ λόγος. προειληφῶς γάρ τις
 εἶναι τινα φύσει κακά, καθάπερ ἀδοξίαν πενίαν
 πῆρωσιν ἀλγηδὸνα νόσον, κουνῶς ἀφροσύνην, οὐ
 μόνοις ὀχλεῖται τούτοις ἀλλὰ καὶ παμπληθέσιν
 129 ἄλλοις τοῖς δι' αὐτὰ κακοῖς. παρόντων μὲν γὰρ
 αὐτῶν χειμάζεται οὐχ ὑπ' αὐτῶν μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ
 τῆς περὶ αὐτῶν δόξης, καθ' ἣν πεπίστευκεν ὅτι
 κακὸν αὐτῷ πάρεστιν, καὶ ὡς ὑπὸ μείζονος κακοῦ
 πορθεῖται τῆς τοιαύτης προλήψεως. μὴ παρόντων
 δὲ ὁμοίως οὐκ ἀναπαύεται, ἀλλ' ἥτοι προφυλατ-
 τόμενος τὸ μέλλον ἢ δεδιὼς σύνοικον ἔχει τὴν
 130 μέρμυραν. λόγου δὲ παραστήσαντος ὅτι οὐδὲν
 τούτων φύσει ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν ἢ φύσει κακὸν, λύσις
 ἐστὶ τῆς παραχῆς καὶ εἰρηναῖος ἡμᾶς ἐκδέχεται
 βίος.

Ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὅτι μὲν διὰ τὰ δοξαζόμενά τισιν
 ἀγαθὰ πλήθος ἐπισυμβαίνει κακῶν καὶ διὰ τὰ κακὰ
 ἕτερα γίνεται κακά, ὡς χάριν αὐτῶν ἀνέφικτον
 γίνεσθαι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων
 131 συμφανές· ἀκολουθῶς δὲ ὑποδεικτέον ὅτι οὐδὲ
 βοηθείας ἐνδέχεται τυχεῖν διὰ τῆς δογματικῆς
 πορευομένου φιλοσοφίας. ὑποκειμένου γάρ τινος
 φύσει ἀγαθοῦ ἢ φύσει κακοῦ, ὁ παραμυθούμενος
 τὸν παρασσόμενον ἐπὶ τῷ συντόνως διώκειν
 τὰγαθὸν ὡς ἀγαθὸν ἢ σφοδρῶς φεύγειν τὸ κακὸν
 ὡς κακὸν καταστέλλει τὴν παραχῆν ἥτοι τοῦτο
 λέγων, ὅτι καθήκον ἐστὶ μῆτε τὰγαθὸν διώκειν
 132 μῆτε τὸ κακὸν φεύγειν, ἢ τοῦτο παριστὰς ὅτι τόδε
 μὲν τὸ διωκόμενον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἐλαχίστην ἔχει
 ἀξίαν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκτεῖον αὐτὸ διώκειν, τόδε δὲ

acquisition of them is the heaping up of more
 numerous evils.—And again, the same account holds 128
 good also of the evils themselves. For when a man
 has a preconception that certain things are by nature
 evil (such as ill-repute, poverty, lameness, pain, dis-
 ease, folly in general), he is not distressed by these
 alone but also by hosts of other evils due to them.
 For when they are present he is tempest-tost not only 129
 by them but also by his belief about them, through
 which he is convinced that evil is present with him ;
 and by such a preconception he is devastated as by
 a greater evil. And he is equally devoid of rest when
 they are not present, and, either through taking pre-
 cautions against the future or through fear, he has
 anxiety as his house-mate. But when reasoning has 130
 established that none of these things is good by
 nature or evil by nature, we shall have a release from
 perturbation and there will await us a peaceful life.

Well then, it is plain from what has been said that
 a multitude of evils occur as the result of the things
 believed by some to be goods, and as a result of the
 evils other evils come about, so that owing to these
 happiness becomes unattainable. And, in the next 131
 place, we must show that we cannot gain assistance
 either by taking the road of the dogmatic philosophy.
 For if anything good by nature or evil by nature is
 assumed to exist, he who is consoling the man who is
 perturbed owing to his strenuous pursuit of the good
 as good, or his excessive avoidance of the evil as evil,
 checks the perturbation either by declaring that it is
 a duty neither to pursue the good nor to avoid the
 evil, or by showing that the object which the man 132
 pursues possesses very little value and that it is not
 proper to pursue it, whereas this other object has

μείζονα, καὶ ἀρμόζει αὐτὸ μετέρχεσθαι, ὅσον ἐλάτ-
 τονα μὲν ἔχει ἀξίαν ὁ πλοῦτος μείζονα δὲ ἢ ἀρετῆ,
 καὶ οὐκ ἐκείνον ἀλλὰ ταύτην διωκτέον, ἢ ὅτι
 τοῦτο μὲν ὀλιγωφελὲς ὄν πολλὰς ἔχει τὰς ὀχλήσεις,
 τοῦτο δὲ πολυωφελὲς καθεστῶς ὀλίγας ἔχει τὰς
 133 ὀχλήσεις. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν λέγειν ὅτι οὔτε ἀγαθὸν
 οἰκεῖόν ἐστι συντόμως διώκειν οὔτε τὸ κακὸν
 φεύγειν, παρὰ τὴν τῶν δογματικῶν ἀξίωσιν ἐστίν,
 αἰεὶ ποτε τὴν ἐκλογὴν καὶ ἀπεκλογὴν τούτων τὰς
 134 τε αἰρέσεις καὶ φυγὰς θρυλούντων. τὸ δὲ φάναι
 τὸδε μὲν μὴ δεῖν διώκειν ὡς ταπεινόν, ἐπὶ τὸδε δ'
 ἐπείγεσθαι ὡς λαμπρότερον, ἀνδρῶν ἦν οὐκ ἀπο-
 λούντων τὴν ταραχὴν ἀλλὰ μεταγωγὴν ταύτης
 ποιουμένων· ὡς γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον διώκων τις
 ὀχλείτο, οὕτω καὶ τὸ δεύτερον διώκων τις ὀχλη-
 135 θήσεται, ὥστε νόσον ἀντὶ νόσου ποιεῖν τὸν τοῦ
 φιλοσόφου λόγον, ἐπεὶ περ τὸν ἐπὶ πλοῦτον ἢ δόξαν
 ἢ ὑγίαν ὡς ἀγαθὸν ὀρμῶντα ἀποστρέφων εἰς τὸ
 μὴ ταῦτα διώκειν ἀλλὰ τὸ καλόν, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ τὴν
 ἀρετὴν, οὐκ ἐλευθεροῖ τῆς διώξεως ἀλλ' ἐφ' ἑτέραν
 136 μετατίθησι διώξιν. ὡς οὖν ὁ ἰατρὸς ἀναιρῶν
 μὲν πλευρίτιν ποιῶν δὲ περιπνευμονίαν, ἢ ἀνα-
 σκευάζων μὲν φρενίτιν ἀντεισάγων δὲ λήθαργον,
 οὐκ ἀπαλλάττει τὸν κίνδυνον ἀλλ' ἐναλλάττει,
 οὕτω καὶ ὁ φιλόσοφος ἑτέραν ταραχὴν ἀνθ' ἑτέρας
 137 ἐισηγούμενος οὐ βοηθεῖ τῷ ταραττομένῳ. οὐ γὰρ
 ἔνεστι λέγειν ὅτι ἢ μὲν ἀντεισαγομένη ταραχὴ
 μέτριός ἐστιν ἢ δὲ ἀναιρουμένη σφοδροτέρα. οἷαν
 γὰρ εἶχε δόξαν ὁ ταραττόμενος περὶ τοῦ πρότερον
 450

greater value and to follow after it is a fitting thing
 (wealth, for example, possesses less and virtue more
 value, and one ought not to pursue the former but
 the latter); or (by showing) that this object is of
 little use and entails many annoyances, whereas that
 object is of great use and entails few annoyances.
 But to declare that it is not proper either to pursue 133
 the good or to avoid the evil strenuously is contrary
 to the view of the Dogmatists, who are always harp-
 ing on the selection or rejection of these things and
 on desires and avoidances. And to say that one 134
 ought not to pursue this object as being base, but to
 strive after that object as being more noble, is the
 action of men who are not getting rid of the per-
 turbation but effecting a change in its position; for
 just as the man who pursued the first object was
 distressed, so also he who pursues the second will be
 distressed, so that the philosopher's discourse creates 135
 a new disease in place of the old, since, by turning
 away the man who strives after wealth or fame or
 health, as being a good, towards the pursuit not of
 these things but of "the fair" (shall we say) and of
 virtue, he does not set him free from the pursuit
 but makes him change over to another pursuit.—As, 136
 then, the physician, if he does away with a pleurisy
 but creates inflammation of the lungs, or removes
 brain-fever but in its place introduces lethargy, does
 not get rid of the danger but shifts it over, so also
 the philosopher, who introduces one perturbation
 in place of another, gives no succour to the person
 perturbed. For it is not possible to argue that the 137
 perturbation introduced is a moderate one, whereas
 the one removed was more violent. For the per-
 turbed person has the same sort of belief about the

διωκομένου, τοιαύτην ἔχει καὶ περὶ τοῦ δευτέρου·
 ἐδόξαζε δὲ τό γε πρῶτον ὡς ἀγαθόν, καὶ διὰ
 138 τοῦτο ἔσπευδεν ἐπ' αὐτό· τοίνυν καὶ τὸ δεύτερον
 ἀγαθὸν εἶναι δοξάζων καὶ ἐπ' ἴσης ἐπ' αὐτὸ σπεύ-
 δων τὴν ἴσην ἔξει παραχῆν, τάχα δὲ καὶ σφοδρο-
 τέραν, ὅσω μεταπέπεισται εἰς τὸ μείζονος ἀξίας
 εἶναι τὸ νῦν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ διωκόμενον. οὐκοῦν εἰ
 ἕτερον ἀνθ' ἑτέρου ὁ φιλόσοφος παρασκευάζοι τὸν
 ὀχλούμενον διώκειν, οὐκ ἀπολύσει τῆς ὀχλήσεως.
 139 εἰ δ' ἀπλῶς διδάσκει ὅτι τουτὶ μὲν ὀλιγωφελές
 ἔστι, πλείονας δ' ἔχει τὰς ὀχλήσεις, <τουτὶ δὲ
 πολυωφελές καθεστῶς ὀλίγας ἔχει τὰς ὀχλήσεις,>¹
 σύγκρισιν ἔσται ποιῶν αἰρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς πρὸς
 ἕτέραν αἵρεσιν καὶ φυγῆν, καὶ οὐκ ἀναίρεσιν τῆς
 παραχῆς. ὅπερ ἄτοπον· ὁ γὰρ ὀχλούμενος οὐ
 βούλεται μαθεῖν τί μᾶλλον ὀχλεῖ καὶ τί ἦττον,
 140 ἀλλ' ἀπαλλαγῆναι τῆς ὀχλήσεως πεπόθηκεν. μόνως
 οὖν ἔσται φυγεῖν ταύτην, εἰ ὑποδείξαιμεν τῷ
 ταραττομένῳ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ κακοῦ φυγῆν ἢ κατὰ
 τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δίωξιν ὅτι οὔτε ἀγαθόν τι ἔστι
 φύσει οὔτε κακόν,

ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ταῦτα νόῳ κέκριται

κατὰ τὸν Τίμωνα. τὸ δὲ γε διδάσκειν τὸ τοιοῦτον
 ἴδιον τῆς σκέψεως. ταύτης ἄρα ἦν τὸ εὐδαίμονα
 βίον περιποιεῖν.

¹ <τουτὶ . . . ὀχλήσεις> add. cj. Bekk.

second object of pursuit as he had about the previous
 one ; but he believed that the first object was good
 and because of this he went after it eagerly ; so, as 138
 he also believes that the second is good and goes after
 it with equal eagerness, he will be equally perturbed,
 or perhaps even more violently in so far as he has
 been converted to the belief that his present object of
 pursuit is of greater value. If, then, the philosopher
 should cause the distressed person to pursue one
 object in place of another, he will not rid him of his
 distress. And if he simply teaches that this object is 139
 of little use but entails many annoyances, <while that
 object is of great use and entails few annoyances,> he
 will be making a comparison between one desire and
 avoidance and another desire and avoidance, and
 will not be removing the perturbation. But this is
 absurd ; for the person in distress does not wish to
 learn which thing is more distressing and which less,
 but yearns to be rid of his distress. It will only be 140
 possible, then, to avoid this by making it evident to
 the person who is in distress, owing to his avoidance
 of evil or his pursuit of good, that there does not exist
 anything which is either good or evil by nature,—

But by the judgement of men Sentence upon them is
 pass'd,

as Timon says. And to teach this is, in fact, the
 peculiar task of Scepticism ; therefore it belongs to
 it to secure a happy life.

Ε'.—ΕΙ Ο ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΤΩΝ ΑΓΑΘΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΚΑΚΩΝ ΦΥΣΕΩΣ
ΕΠΕΧΩΝ ΚΑΤΑ ΠΑΝΤΑ ΕΣΤΙΝ ΕΥΔΑΙΜΩΝ

141 Εὐδαιμῶν μὲν ἔστιν ὁ ἀταράχως διεξάγων καὶ
ὡς ἔλεγεν ὁ Τίμων, ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ καὶ γαληνότητι
καθεστώς·

πάντη γὰρ ἐπέειχε γαλήνην

καὶ

τὸν δ' ὡς οὖν ἐνόησ' ἐν νηνεμίῃσι γαλήνης.

τῶν δὲ λεγομένων ὑπάρχειν ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν
τὰ μὲν κατὰ δόξαν εἰσῆκται τὰ δὲ κατ' ἀνάγκην.

142 ἀλλὰ κατὰ μὲν [λογικὴν]¹ δόξαν εἰσῆκται ὅσα κατὰ
κρίσιν διώκουσιν ἄνθρωποι ἢ φεύγουσιν, ὅλον ἐν
μὲν τοῖς ἐκτὸς αἰρετὰ λέγεται καὶ ἀγαθὰ πλοῦτος
καὶ δόξα καὶ εὐγένεια καὶ φιλία καὶ πᾶν τὸ εὐικός,
ἐν δὲ τοῖς περὶ σῶμα κάλλος ἰσχύς εὐεξία, ἐν
δὲ τοῖς περὶ ψυχὴν ἀνδρία δικαιοσύνη φρόνησις,
κοινῶς ἀρετή, καὶ φευκτὰ τὰ ἐναντία τούτοις.

143 κατ' ἀνάγκην δὲ παρήλθεν ὅποσα κατ' ἄλογον
αἰσθήσεως πάθος συνίσταται περὶ ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὅσα
φυσικὴ τις ἀνάγκη παρέχει, "ἐκὼν δ' οὐκ ἂν τις
144 ἔλοιτο" ἢ φύγοι, ὡς ἀληθῶν καὶ ἡδονῆ. διόπερ
τοιαύτης οὔσης ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι διαφορᾶς, περὶ
μὲν τοῦ μόνον ἀταράχως διεξάγειν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ
δόξαν ἀγαθοῖς καὶ κακοῖς τὸν περὶ πάντων ἐπ-
έχοντα ἤδη παρεστήσαμεν καὶ πρότερον, ὅτε περὶ
τοῦ σκεπτικοῦ τέλους διελεγόμεθα, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ
παρόντος, ὅτε ἐδείκνυμεν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν εὐδαιμονεῖν

¹ [λογικὴν] secl. Heintz.

^a From Homer, *Il.* iii. 66.

^b Cf. *P.H.* i. 25 ff.

^c Cf. §§ 110 ff. *supra*.

CHAPTER V.—IS HE WHO SUSPENDS JUDGEMENT RE-
GARDING THE NATURE OF THINGS GOOD AND EVIL
IN ALL RESPECTS HAPPY?

He, then, is happy who lives to the end without 141
perturbation and, as Timon said, existing in a state
of quietness and calm—

For on all sides calm was prevailing,

and—

Him when thus I descried in a calm with no winds to disquiet.

And of the goods and evils which are said to exist
some are introduced by belief, others by necessity.
Thus by [rational] belief are introduced all those 142
which men pursue or avoid of their own judgement,—
as, for example, amongst things external, wealth and
fame and noble birth and friendship, and everything
of the kind, are called desirable and good; and,
amongst qualities of the body, beauty and strength
and sound condition; and, amongst qualities of the
soul, courage and justice and wisdom and virtue in
general; and the opposites of these are regarded as
things to be avoided. But by necessity are brought 143
about all such things as befall us because of an
irrational affection of sense, and all that some natural
necessity brings about, "but no one would willingly
choose them,"^a or avoid them,—such as pain and
pleasure. Hence, since there exists such a difference 144
as this in these things, the fact that it is only the man
who suspends judgement about all things who lives
to the end an unperturbed life in respect of the goods
and evils due to belief we have already established,
both in our previous discussion of the Sceptic "end,"^b
and also on the present occasion^c when we showed
that it is not possible to be happy if one assumes the

145 φύσει ἀγαθόν τι καὶ κακὸν ὑποστησάμενον. ὁ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο ποιῶν ἀνηνύτοις συμπεριεφέρετο ταραχαῖς, τὰ μὲν φεύγων τὰ δὲ διώκων, καὶ πολλὰ μὲν αὐτῷ ἐπισπώμενος κακὰ διὰ τὰγαθὰ, ἐν πολλαπλασίῳσι δὲ τριβόμενος κακοῖς διὰ τὴν περὶ τῶν
 146 κακῶν δόξαν. οἷον ὁ λέγων, εἰ τύχοι, ἀγαθὸν μὲν τὸν πλοῦτον κακὸν δὲ τὴν πενίαν, μὴ ἔχων μὲν τὸν πλοῦτον διχῶς ταραττεται, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὅτι πραγματεύεται τὴν περίκτησιν αὐτοῦ, κτησάμενος δ' αὐτὸν κατὰ τρεῖς τιμωρεῖται τρόπους, καὶ ὅτι πέραν τοῦ μετρίου γέγηθε, καὶ ὅτι πραγματεύεται εἰς τὸ παραμένειν αὐτῷ τὸν πλοῦτον, καὶ ὅτι ἀγωνιᾷ καὶ δέδιεν αὐτοῦ τὴν
 147 ἀποβολήν. ὁ δὲ μήτε ἐν τοῖς φύσει ἀγαθοῖς τάττων τὸν πλοῦτον μήτε ἐν τοῖς φύσει κακοῖς, τὴν δὲ "οὐ μᾶλλον" προφερόμενος φωνήν, οὔτε ἐπὶ τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ τούτου ταραττεται οὔτε ἐπὶ τῇ παρουσίᾳ γέγηθεν, μένει δὲ καθ' ἑκάτερον ἀτάραχος. ὥστ' ἐν μὲν τοῖς κατὰ δόξαν νομιζομένοις ἀγαθοῖς τε καὶ κακοῖς καὶ ἐν ταῖς τούτων αἰρέσεσι καὶ
 148 φυγαῖς τελέως ἐστὶν εὐδαίμων, ἐν δὲ τοῖς κατ' αἰσθησιν καὶ ἀλόγοις κινήμασι μετριάξει.¹ τὰ γὰρ μὴ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ λόγου διαστροφὴν συμβαίνοντα καὶ τὴν φαύλην δόξαν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ ἀκούσιον τῆς αἰσθήσεως πάθος, ἀμήχανόν ἐστιν ὑπὸ τοῦ
 149 κατὰ τὴν σκέψιν λόγου ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. τῷ γὰρ διὰ λιμὸν ἢ δίψος ὄχλουμένῳ οὐ δυνατὸν ἐμποιεῖν πείσμα διὰ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν σκέψιν λόγου ὅτι οὐκ ὀχλεῖται, καὶ τῷ ἐν ταῖς τούτων παρηγορίαις

¹ μετριάξει cj. Bekk.: εἰκάξει mss. (? ἀναχάξει).

existence of anything good and evil by nature. For 145 he who does this is tossed about with endless perturbations, through avoiding these things and pursuing those, and drawing upon himself many evils because of the goods, and being afflicted by many times more evils because of his belief about evils.— Thus the man who declares that wealth (shall we say?) 146 is a good and poverty an evil is perturbed in two ways if he has not wealth,—both because he has not the good and because he is toiling for the acquisition of it,—and when he has acquired it he is punished in three ways,—because he is immoderately overjoyed, and because he toils to ensure that his wealth stays with him, and because he is painfully anxious and dreads the loss of it. But he who ranks wealth neither amongst 147 the natural goods nor amongst the natural evils, but utters the formula "Not more,"^a is neither perturbed at its absence nor overjoyed at its presence, but in either case remains unperturbed. So that in respect of the things held, as a matter of belief, to be good and bad, and in respect of the desires and avoidances thereof, he is perfectly happy, while in respect of the 148 sensible and irrational affections he preserves a due mean. For the things which occur, not because of a distortion of the reason and foolish belief but, owing to an involuntary affection of the sense it is impossible to get rid of by means of the Sceptical argument^b; for in a man who is distressed because 149 of hunger or thirst, it is not feasible to implant, by means of the Sceptical argument, the conviction that he is not in distress, and in the man who is overjoyed

^a For this Sceptic formula (denoting suspense of judgement) see *P.H.* i. 187 ff.

^b *Cf. P.H.* i. 30, iii. 237.

διαχειομένῳ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται πειθῶ ἐμποιεῖν περὶ
 150 τοῦ ὅτι οὐ διαχέεται. τί οὖν, φασίν, ὄφελος
 ὑμῖν, οἱ δογματικοί, πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἐκ τῆς
 ἐποχῆς, εἰ ταραττεσθαι πάντως δεῖ καὶ ταραττο-
 μένους κακοδαιμονεῖν; μέγα, φήσομεν, ὄφελος.
 καὶ γὰρ εἰ ταραττεται ὁ περὶ πάντων ἐπέχων κατὰ
 τὴν τοῦ ἀλγύνοντος παρουσίαν, ἀλλ' εὐφωρότερον
 παρὰ τὸν ἀπὸ τῶν δογμάτων φέρει τὴν ὄχλησιν,
 151 πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἴσον ἀπειρα τῷ πλήθει
 τάγαθὰ διώκοντα καὶ περισταμένον τὰ κακὰ ὡς
 ὑπὸ Ἑρινύων ἐλαύνεσθαι τῶν κατὰ τὰς διώξεις
 καὶ φυγὰς ταραχῶν, ἢ τοῦτο μὲν μὴ πάσχειν, ἐν
 δὲ μόνον ἐξ ἀπάντων ἀποτεμνόμενον κακὸν τούτου
 152 τὴν ἔκκλισιν καὶ φυλακὴν πραγματεῦσθαι. δεύ-
 τερον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ὅπερ φεύγουσιν οἱ ἐφεκτικοὶ ὡς
 κακόν, οὐκ ἄγαν ἐστὶ ταρακτικόν. ἢ γὰρ μικρὸς
 τις ὁ πόνος ἐστὶ, καθάπερ ὁ καθ' ἐκάστην ἡμέραν
 ἐγγνώμενος ἡμῖν λιμὸς ἢ δίψος ἢ ψῦχος ἢ θάλπος
 153 ἢ τι τῶν παραπλησίων, ἢ τοῦναντίον σφοδρότατος
 καὶ ἀκρότατος, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνηκέστοις συνεχο-
 μένων βασάνοις, δι' ὧν πολλάκις οἱ ἰατροὶ ἀν-
 ωδύνους πορίζουσι δυνάμεις πρὸς τὸ βραχεῖαν τινα
 λαβεῖν ἀναστροφὴν εἰς βοήθειαν, ἢ μέσος καὶ
 154 παρατείνων, καθάπερ ὁ ἐν τισὶ νόσοις. τούτων
 δὲ ὁ μὲν καθ' ἐκάστην ἡμέραν συναντῶν ἐπορί-
 στούς ἔχων τὰς παρηγορίας, τροφὴν καὶ πόμα καὶ
 σκέπη, πρὸς ἐλάχιστον ταραττει· ὁ δὲ ἀκρότατος
 καὶ εἰς τὰ μάλιστα ταρακτικώτατος, ἀλλά τοι
 γε πρὸς ἀκαρὲς ἀστραπῆς τρόπον δειματώσας ἢ
 155 ἀναιρεῖ ἢ ἀναιρεῖται. ὁ δὲ μέσος καὶ παρατείνων
 οὔτε παρ' ὅλον ἐστὶ τὸν βίον οὔτε συνεχῆς τὴν

at getting relief from these sufferings it is not in its
 power to implant the belief that he is not overjoyed.
 —What help, then, towards happiness (ask the Dogma- 150
 tists) do we get from suspension of judgement if one
 has to be perturbed in any case and unhappy because
 perturbed? Great help, we shall reply. For even
 though he who suspends judgement about all things is
 perturbed owing to the presence of what causes pain,
 yet as compared with the Dogmatist he bears the
 distress more lightly, because, firstly, to pursue goods 151
 and to shun evils which are endless in number and thus
 to be harassed by the perturbations due to these pur-
 suits and avoidances as by Furies is much worse than
 not to suffer thus but merely to be engaged in avoiding
 and guarding against only one isolated form of evil.
 And, secondly, even the thing which the Ephectics^a 152
 avoid as evil, is not excessively perturbing. For the
 suffering is either small, such as that which befalls us
 every day,—hunger or thirst or cold or heat or some-
 thing similar;—or, on the contrary, it is very violent 153
 and intense, as in the case of those afflicted with
 incurable torments, during which the doctors often
 provide powerful anodynes to assist the patient in
 obtaining some relief; or else it is moderate and
 protracted, as in some diseases. And of these, that 154
 which faces us every day perturbs us least as the
 remedies for it (food and drink and shelter) are easy
 to provide; and that which is most intense and in the
 highest degree perturbing terrifies us, after all, but
 for a moment, like a lightning-flash, and then either
 destroys us or is destroyed. And the moderate and 155
 protracted kind neither remains all through life nor

^a *i.e.* the Sceptics (as “suspenders” of judgement), *cf.*
P.H. i. 7, 196.

φύσιν ἀλλὰ πολλὰς διαναπαύσεις ἔχων καὶ βραστά-
νας· διηλεκτῆς γὰρ ὢν οὐκ ἂν παρέτεινεν.

μέτριος οὖν ἐστὶ καὶ οὐχ οὕτω φοβερὰ ἢ περὶ τὸν
156 σκεπτικὸν συμβαίνοσα ταραχή. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ
μεγίστη τις ἦ, οὐχ ἡμᾶς αἰτιᾶσθαι δεῖ τοὺς
ἀκουσίως καὶ κατ' ἀνάγκην πάσχοντας, ἀλλὰ τὴν
φύσιν,

ἢ νόμων οὐδὲν μέλει,

καὶ τὸν δοξαστικῶς καὶ κατὰ κρίσιν ἐπισπώμενον
ἑαυτῷ τὸ κακόν. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸν πυρέττοντα οὐκ
αἰτιατέον ὅτι πυρέττει, ἀκουσίως γὰρ πυρέττει,
τὸν δὲ μὴ ἀπεχόμενον τῶν ἀσυμφόρων αἰτιατέον,
ἐπ' αὐτῷ γὰρ ἔκειτο τὸ ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἀσυμφόρων,
οὕτω τὸν μὲν ταραττόμενον ἐπὶ παροῦσι τοῖς
157 ἀλγενοῖς οὐκ αἰτιατέον· οὐ γὰρ παρ' αὐτὸν γίνεται
ἢ διὰ τὸν πόνον ταραχή ἀλλ', ἔάν τε θέλῃ ἔάν τε
καὶ μὴ, γίνεσθαι κατ' ἀνάγκην ὀφείλει· τὸν δὲ παρὰ
τὰς ἰδίας ὑπολήψεις ἀναπλάττοντα αὐτῷ αἰρετῶν
τε καὶ φευκτῶν πραγμάτων πλήθος αἰτιατέον·
ἑαυτῷ γὰρ ἐγείρει κακῶν πλήμμυραν. καὶ
ταῦτ' ἴσως ἀρεστὴν ἰδεῖν ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν λεγομένων
158 κακῶν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μηδὲν προσδοξάζων περὶ τοῦ
κακοῦ εἶναι τὸν πόνον ἔχειται τῷ καθηναγκασμένῳ
τοῦ πόνου κινήματι· ὁ δὲ γε προσαναπλάσσων ὅτι
μόνον ἀνοϊκειῶν ἐστὶν ὁ πόνος, ὅτι μόνον κακόν,
διπλασιάζει τῇ δόξῃ ταύτῃ τὸ κατὰ παρουσίαν
159 αὐτοῦ συμβαῖνον ὄχλημα. ἢ γὰρ οὐ θεωροῦμεν
ὡς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τεμνομένων πολλάκις αὐτὸς μὲν
ὁ πάσχων καὶ τεμνόμενος ἀνδρικῶς ὑπομένει τὴν
ἐκ τῆς τομῆς βίασαν, μήτε

¹ ταῦτ' Heintz: τοῦτο mss., Bekk.

is continuous in its nature but has many intervals of rest and periods of relief; for were it unceasing it would not have been protracted.—The perturbation, then, which befalls the Sceptic is moderate and not so very alarming. Notwithstanding, even if it be 156 very great, we ought not to blame those who suffer involuntarily and of necessity but Nature,

Who recks not aught of custom,^a

and the man who through his beliefs and owing to his own judgement draws upon himself the evil. For just as the man with a fever is not to be blamed because he has a fever (for he has the fever involuntarily), but the man who does not abstain from things inexpedient is to be blamed (for it lay in his own power to abstain from things inexpedient),—so the man who is perturbed at the presence of painful things is not to be blamed; for the perturbation caused by the pain is 157 not due to himself but is bound to occur of necessity whether he wishes it or not; but he who through his own imaginations invents for himself a host of things desirable and to be avoided is deserving of blame; for he stirs up for himself a flood of evils.^b—And one may see the same thing in the case of the so-called “ evils ” themselves. For he who has no additional belief 158 about pain being an evil is merely affected by the necessitated motion of the pain; but he who imagines in addition that the pain is objectionable only, that it is evil only, doubles by this belief the distress which results from its presence. For do we not observe 159 frequently how, in the case of those who are being cut, the patient who is being cut manfully endures the torture of the cutting—

^a Eurip. *Frag.* 920 (Nauck).

^b Cf. Hamlet's “ Take arms against a sea of troubles.”

ὠχρήσας χροῖα κάλλιμον μήτε παρεϊῶν
δάκρυ' ὁμορξάμενος,

διὰ τὸ μόνω τῷ κατὰ τὴν τομὴν ὑποπίπτει
κινήματι· ὁ δὲ παρεστῶς αὐτῷ, σῆμα τῷ βρα-
χεῖαν ἰδεῖν αἵματος ῥύσιν, ὠχρῖα τρέμει περιδροῖ
ἐκλύεται, τὸ τελευταῖον ἄφωνος καταπίπτει, οὐ
διὰ τὸν πόνον, οὐδὲ γὰρ πάρεστιν αὐτῷ, διὰ δὲ
160 τὴν περὶ τοῦ κακὸν εἶναι τὸν πόνον δόξαν; οὕτω
μείζων ἐστὶν ἐνίστε ἢ διὰ τὴν περὶ τινος κακοῦ ὡς
κακοῦ δόξαν ταραχὴ τῆς δι' αὐτὸ τὸ λεγόμενον
εἶναι κακὸν συμβαινούσης. οὐκοῦν ὁ περὶ
πάντων [μὲν] ἐπέχων τῶν κατὰ δόξαν τελειοτάτην
161 καρποῦται τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις
καὶ ἀλόγοις κινήμασι ταραττεται μὲν

(οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ δρυὸς ἐστὶ παλαιφάτου, οὐδ' ἀπὸ
πέτρης,
ἀλλ' ἀνδρῶν γένος ἦεν),

162 μετριοπαθῶς δὲ διατίθεται. ὅθεν καὶ καταφρονεῖν
ἀναγκαῖον τῶν εἰς ἀνεργησίαν αὐτὸν περι-
163 κλειέσθαι νομιζόντων ἢ εἰς ἀπέμφασιν, καὶ εἰς
ἀνεργησίαν μὲν ὅτι τοῦ βίου παντὸς ἐν αἰρέσει
καὶ φυγαῖς ὄντος ὁ μήτε αἰρούμενός τι μήτε
φεύγων δυνάμει τὸν βίον ἀρνέεται καὶ τινος φητοῦ
164 τρόπον ἐπέειχεν, εἰς ἀπέμφασιν δὲ ὅτι ὑπὸ τυράννῳ
ποτὲ γενόμενος καὶ τῶν ἀρρήτων τι ποιεῖν ἀναγκα-
ζόμενος ἢ οὐχ ὑπομενεῖ τὸ προσταττόμενον ἀλλ'
ἐκούσιον ἐλείπει θάνατον, ἢ φεύγων τὰς βασάνους
ποιήσει τὸ κελευόμενον, οὕτω τε οὐκέτι "ἀφυγῆς
καὶ ἀναίρετος ἔσται" κατὰ τὸν Τίμωννα, ἀλλὰ τὸ
μὲν ἐλείπει τοῦ δ' ἀποστῆσεται, ὅπερ ἦν τῶν μετὰ
462

His fair hue paling not, nor from his cheeks
Wiping the tears away,^a

because he is affected only by the motion due to the cutting; whereas the man who stands beside him, as soon as he sees a small flow of blood, at once grows pale, trembles, gets in a great sweat, feels faint, and finally falls down speechless, not because of the pain (for it is not present with him), but because of the belief he has about pain being an evil? Thus the 160 perturbation due to the belief about an evil as evil is sometimes greater than that which results from the so-called evil itself.—He, then, who suspends judgment about all things which depend on belief wins happiness most fully, and during involuntary and 161 irrational affections although he is perturbed—

Yea, for he is not sprung from a rock or an oak primeval
But of the race of men was he,^b

yet his state of feeling is moderate. Hence, too, one 162 must scorn those who fancy that he is confined to a state of inactivity or of inconsistency,—to inactivity, 163 because, as all life consists in desires and avoidances, he that neither desires nor avoids anything is virtually rejecting life and remaining like a vegetable; and to 164 inconsistency because, should he ever be subject to a tyrant and compelled to do something unspeakable, either he will not submit to the order given him but will choose a voluntary death, or else to avoid torture he will do what is commanded, and thus he will no longer be (in Timon's phrase) "unmov'd by choice and avoidance," but will choose the one and refuse the other, which is the action of those who confidently

^a Homer, *Odys.* xi. 529 f.

^b The first line is from Homer, *Odys.* xix. 163; the half-line is S.'s addition.

πέισματος κατειληφόντων τὸ φευκτόν τι εἶναι καὶ
 165 αἰρετόν. ταῦτα δὴ λέγοντες οὐ συνιᾶσιν ὅτι
 κατὰ μὲν τὸν φιλόσοφον λόγον οὐ βιοῖ ὁ σκεπτικός
 (ἀνεύρηγτος γὰρ ἔστιν ὅσον ἐπὶ τούτῳ), κατὰ δὲ
 τὴν ἀφιλόσοφον τήρησιν δύναται τὰ μὲν αἰρεῖσθαι
 166 τὰ δὲ φεύγειν. ἀναγκαζόμενός τε ὑπὸ τυράννου
 τι τῶν ἀπηγορευμένων πράττειν, τῇ κατὰ τοὺς
 πατρίους νόμους καὶ τὰ ἔθνη προλήψει τυχὸν τὸ
 μὲν ἐλείπεται τὸ δὲ φεύζεται· καὶ ῥᾶόν γε οἴσει τὸ
 σκληρὸν παρὰ τὸν ἀπὸ τῶν δογμάτων, ὅτι οὐδὲν
 ἔξωθεν τούτῳ προσδοξάζει καθάπερ ἐκεῖνος.
 167 εἰρητὰ δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀκριβέστερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ
 τοῦ σκεπτικοῦ τέλους σχολασθεῖσι, καὶ οὐκ ἀναγ-
 καῖον

αὐθις ἀριζήλως εἰρημένα μυθολογεῖν.

“Ὅθεν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν ἀποδόντες, ἀφ’ ὧν
 αἱ ἀπορίαι ἐπὶ πάντα σχεδὸν τὸν ἠθικὸν διατείνουσι
 τόπον, φέρε τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο σκοπῶμεν εἰ ἔστι τις
 περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη.

5'.—Εἰ ἔστι τις περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη

168 “Ὅτι μὲν ἔστι δυνατόν κατὰ τρόπον βιοῦν αἰρου-
 μένους τὴν περὶ πάντων ἐποχὴν, ἀποχρώντως ἡμῖν
 δέδεικται· οὐδὲν δὲ κωλύει ἐκ παραλλήλου δοκιμά-
 ζειν καὶ τὴν τῶν δογματικῶν στάσιν, καίπερ ἀπὸ
 μέρους ἤδη δοκιμασθεῖσαν. ἐπαγγέλλονται γὰρ
 169 τέχνην τινα περὶ τὸν βίον παραδώσειν, καὶ διὰ
 τοῦτο Ἐπίκουρος μὲν ἔλεγε τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἐνέρ-

* Cf. P.H. i. 23.

ᵇ See P.H. i. 25-30.

ᵇ Homer, *Odys.* xii. 453.

hold that something to be avoided and desirable
 exists.—Now in arguing thus they do not comprehend 165
 that the Sceptic does not conduct his life according to
 philosophical theory (for so far as regards this he is
 inactive), but as regards the non-philosophic regula-
 tion of life ^a he is capable of desiring some things and
 avoiding others. And when compelled by a tyrant to 166
 commit any forbidden act he will perchance choose
 the one course and avoid the other owing to the pre-
 conception due to his ancestral laws and customs ;
 and as compared with the Dogmatist he will certainly
 endure hardship more easily because he has not, like
 the other, any additional beliefs beyond the actual
 suffering.—But we have discussed these matters more 167
 exactly in our discourse “On the Sceptic End,”^b
 and there is no necessity

Once again to repeat an account most plainly deliver'd.^c

Hence, as we have completed our account of things
 good and evil, the difficulties raised by which extend
 over almost the whole sphere of Ethics, come and let
 us consider next whether there exists any art of
 life.^d

CHAPTER VI.—DOES THERE EXIST ANY ART OF LIFE?

We have proved sufficiently that it is possible to 168
 live a satisfactory life by adopting suspension of
 judgement about all things ; but nothing hinders us
 from examining also in a similar fashion the view
 of the Dogmatists, although it has been partially
 examined already. For they promise to present us
 with an “art of life,” and because of this Epicurus 169
 declared that “philosophy is an activity which

^d For the “art of living” cf. P.H. iii. 239 ff.

γειαυ εἶναι λόγοις καὶ διαλογισμοῖς τὸν εὐδαίμονα
 170 βίον περιποιούσαν, οἱ δὲ στωικοὶ καὶ ἄντικρύς φασὶ
 τὴν φρόνησιν, ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν
 καὶ οὐδετέρων, τέχνην ὑπάρχειν περὶ τὸν βίον, ἣν
 οἱ προσλαβόντες μόνοι γίνονται καλοί, μόνοι πλού-
 σιοι, σοφοὶ μόνοι. ὁ γὰρ πολλοῦ ἀξία κεκτημένος
 πλούσιός ἐστιν, ἣ δὲ ἀρετὴ πολλοῦ ἐστὶν ἀξία, καὶ
 μόνος ταύτην ὁ σοφὸς κέκτηται· μόνος ἄρα ὁ σοφὸς
 ἐστὶ πλούσιος. καὶ ὁ ἀξίεραστός ἐστι καλός, μόνος
 δὲ ὁ σοφὸς ἀξίεραστός· μόνος ἄρα ὁ σοφὸς ἐστὶ
 171 καλός. αἱ δὲ τοιαῦται ὑποσχέσεις θηρεύουσι μὲν
 τοὺς νέους ἐλπίσι ψυχραῖς, οὐκέτι δὲ εἰσὶν ἀληθεῖς.
 παρὸ καὶ ὁ Τίμων ὅτε μὲν τοὺς ἐπαγγελλομένους
 τὴν παράδοσιν αὐτῶν ἐπισκώπτει, λέγων

πολλῶν λακεδόνων λυμάντορες αἰπυδολωταί,¹

172 ὅτε δὲ τοὺς προσέχοντας αὐτοῖς μεταμελομένους ἐφ'
 οἷς μάτην ἐμόχθησαν παρειαγεί διὰ τούτων·

φῆ δέ τις αἰάζων, οἷα βροτοὶ αἰάζουσιν,
 οἷμοι ἐγὼ τί πάθω; τί νυ μοι σοφὸν ἔνθα
 γένηται;

πτωχὸς μὲν φρένας εἰμί, νόου δὲ μοι οὐκ ἔνι
 κόκκος.

ἦ με μάτην φεύξεσθαι οἴομαι αἰπὺν ὄλεθρον.
 τρις μάκαρες μέντοι καὶ τετράκις οἱ μὴ ἔχοντες

¹ αἰπυδολωταί Fabr., Bekk.: ἐπιδολωταί (or -οταί) mss.:
 ἐπιδοδῶται Usener (? ἀρχιδολωταί).

* For the Stoic "Wise Man," or "Sage," see Vol. I.
 Introd. p. xxviii. "Fair" (καλός, here, means "noble" or
 466

secures the happy life by arguments and discussions";
 while the Stoics assert outright that "wisdom, which 170
 is the science of things good and evil and neither, is
 an art of life, and only those who attain this become
 fair, only they rich, as only they are wise. For he
 who possesses things of great value is rich, and virtue
 is of great value, and it only the Wise man^a possesses;
 therefore the wise man only is rich. And the lover
 of the valuable is fair, but the wise man only is a lover
 of the valuable; therefore the wise man only is fair."
 Now promises such as these capture the young with 171
 fruitless expectations, but they are not also true.
 Wherefore also Timon in one place scoffs at those
 who promise us to provide us with these things, calling
 them—

Spoilers of many a doctrine and masters of knavish im-
 posture^b;

and in another place he brings in the people who have 172
 paid attention to them, repenting of the vain labours
 they have undergone, in these words—

One, then, lamenting did cry, as men are wont when lament-
 ing,

"Oh, what is to befall me! Where now shall I gain any
 wisdom?"

Beggar'd in soul I am, and of sense not a grain is within me.
 Vainly methinks shall I try to escape from sheerest destruc-
 tion.

Thrice, yea four times, blessed are those devoid of possessions,

"honourable" (*honestus*),—gifted with "the beauty of
 holiness."

^b For λακεδόνων ("doctrines"), which can scarcely be
 right, I suggest βλακεδόνων ("wastrels"), which accords
 better with the next quotation (Hervetus has *juvenum*); then
 λυμάντορες βλ. will mean "those who bring wastrels (or
 idlers) to ruin."

μήτε κατατρώξαντες ἐνὶ σχολῇ ὄσ' ἐπέπαντο.
 νῦν δέ με λευγαλέαις ἔρισιν εἵμαρτο δαμῆναι
 καὶ πενίη καὶ ὄσ' ἄλλα βροτοὺς κηφῆνας ἔλαστρεῖ.

- 173 διότι δὲ ταύθ' οὕτως ἔχει, μάθοιμεν ἂν ἐντεύθεν ἐπι-
 στήσαντες. ἡ γὰρ ἀξιουμένη περὶ τὸν βίον εἶναι
 τέχνη, καὶ καθ' ἣν εὐδαιμονεῖν ὑπειλήφασιν, οὐ μία
 τις ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ πολλαὶ καὶ διάφωνοι, οἷον ἡ μὲν
 κατὰ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον, ἡ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς στωικούς, τὶς
 δὲ τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ περιπάτου. ἤτοι οὖν πάσαις ὁμοίως
 174 ἀκολουθητέον ἢ μιᾷ μόνῃ ἢ οὐδεμιᾷ. καὶ πάσαις
 μὲν ἀκολουθεῖν τῶν ἀμηχάνων διὰ τὴν μάχην· ὁ γὰρ
 ἦδε προσάσσει ὡς αἰρετόν, τοῦτο ἦδε ἀπαγορεύει
 ὡς φευκτόν, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα καὶ
 175 διώκειν καὶ φεύγειν. εἰ δὲ μιᾷ κατακολουθητέον
 ἐστίν, ἤτοι τῇ ὁποιαδήποτε οὖν, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον.
 (τὸ μία) ἀκολουθεῖν¹ γὰρ ἴσον τῷ² πάσαις θέλειν
 ἔπεσθαι· εἰ γὰρ τῆδε προσεκτέον, τί μᾶλλον τῆδε ἢ
 τῆδε; καὶ ἀναστρόφως. λείπεται ἄρα τῇ προκρι-
 176 θείσῃ λέγειν δεῖν ἔπεσθαι. ἤτοι οὖν τῇ ὑπ' ἄλλης
 προκριθείσῃ κατακολουθήσομεν ἢ τῇ ὑφ' ἑαυτῆς.
 καὶ εἰ μὲν τῇ ὑφ' ἑαυτῆς, ἀπιστος ἐστὶν, ἡ δεήσει
 πάσας ἠγείσθαι πιστάς· εἰ γὰρ ἦδε καθόσον ὑφ'
 ἑαυτῆς κέκριται ἐστὶ πιστή, καὶ αἱ λοιπαὶ γενή-
 177 σονται πισταί· ἐκάστη γὰρ αὐτῶν ὑφ' ἑαυτῆς
 κέκριται. εἰ δὲ ὑπ' ἄλλης, δεήσει πάλιν καὶ οὕτως
 αὐτὴν ἀπιστεῖσθαι· ὡς γὰρ αὐτὴ παρόσον διαφωνεῖ
 ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐδεῖτο κρίσεως, οὕτω καὶ ἡ κρίνουσα
 αὐτὴν, ἢ διαφωνεῖ ταῖς λοιπαῖς ἀγωγαῖς, δεήσειται

¹ <τὸ μία> ἀκολουθεῖν] ἀκολουθεῖ mss., Bekk.: <τὸ ταύτη>
 ἀκολουθεῖν Heintz.

² τῷ N, Heintz: τὸ mss., Bekk. (ἴσως cj. Bekk.).

* With §§ 173-177 cf. P.H. iii. 239.

Those who never have wasted their goods in idle existence.
 But my fate it is now to be stricken by grievous contentions,
 Penury, too, and what else doth harry the drones amongst
 mortals."

And the reason why this is so we may learn if we 173
 attend to the following point.^a The art of life which,
 it is claimed, exists and owing to which they suppose
 that men are happy, is not one art but many and
 dissimilar—that, for instance, of Epicurus, and that
 of the Stoics, and another of the Peripatetics. Either,
 then, one must follow all alike or one only or none.
 But to follow them all is impracticable because of 174
 their conflicting character; for what this one enjoins
 as desirable that one forbids as a thing to be avoided,
 and it is not feasible both to pursue and avoid simultane-
 ously the same object. And if one ought closely 175
 to follow one art, either this is anyone whatsoever,
 which is impossible; for then, to follow one is equi-
 valent to being willing to follow them all; for if we
 should give heed to this one, why to this one rather
 than that other? and conversely. It only remains,
 then, to say that we ought to follow that one art
 which has been judged best. Either, then, we shall 176
 follow that which is judged best by another art or
 that which is judged best by itself. And if it is that
 judged best by itself, it will be distrusted or else we
 shall have to count them all trustworthy; for if this
 one is trustworthy inasmuch as it is judged by itself,
 the rest also will be trustworthy; for each of them
 is judged by itself. But if it is judged by another art, 177
 even in this case, again, it will have to be distrusted;
 for just as it, in so far as it differs from the rest,
 needed judgement, so also the art which judges it,
 in that it differs from the other doctrines, will need

τῆς κρινούσης καὶ παρ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔσται πιστὸν ἐκείνης κριτήριον. εἰ οὖν μήτε πάσαις ἐνδέχεται ταῖς περὶ τὸν βίον τέχναις ἀκολουθεῖν
 178 μήτε μιᾷ, λείπεται μηδεμιᾷ ἔπεσθαι. καὶ ἄλλως, ὡς προείπον, πολλῶν οὐσῶν περὶ τὸν βίον τεχνῶν κατ' ἀνάγκην δεῖ τὸν μιᾷ τούτων προσαναπαυσάμενον κακοδαιμονεῖν, οὐ μόνον διὰ τὰς προειρημένας αἰτίας ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ λόγου προϊόντος λεχθησομένην. ἕκαστος γὰρ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔχεται πάθει τινί· ἢ γὰρ φιλόπλουτός ἐστιν ἢ φιλήδονος ἢ φιλόδοξος. τοιοῦτος δὲ ὢν ὑπ' οὐδεμιᾶς τῶν δογματικῶν ἀγωγῶν δύναται κατα-
 179 στέλλεσθαι, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν φιλόπλουτος ἢ φιλόδοξος ἐκπυρσεύεται μᾶλλον τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ὑπὸ τῆς περιπατητικῆς φιλοσοφίας, καθ' ἣν ὁ πλοῦτος καὶ ἡ δόξα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ φιλήδονος προσεκκαίεται ὑπὸ τῆς κατὰ Ἐπίκουρον ἀγωγῆς (τέλος γὰρ εὐδαιμονίας ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀποδείκνυται κατ' αὐτόν), ὁ δὲ φιλόδοξος προσεκτραχηλίζεται εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος πρὸς τῶν στωικῶν λόγων, καθ' οὓς ἡ ἀρετὴ μόνον ἐστὶν ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ ἀπ' ἀρετῆς γινόμενον.
 180 πᾶσα οὖν ἡ λεγομένη περὶ τὸν βίον ἐπιστήμη τοῖς δογματικοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἐπιτείχιμα ἐστὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κακῶν ἀλλ' οὐ βοήθεια.

Καὶν μίαν δὲ δῶμεν εἶναι τέχνην περὶ τὸν βίον, καὶ ταύτην σύμφωνον, ὅλον τὴν στωικὴν, οὐδ' οὕτως προσησόμεθα διὰ τὸ πολλὰς καὶ ποικίλας
 181 αὐτῇ συνεισάγεσθαι κήρας. εἰ γὰρ ἡ μὲν περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη φρόνησις οὐσα ἔστιν ἀρετὴ, τὴν δὲ ἀρετὴν μόνος εἶχεν ὁ σοφός, οἱ στωικοὶ μὴ ὄντες σοφοὶ οὐχ ἔξουσι φρόνησιν οὐδὲ τέχνην τιὰ περὶ

one to judge it, and owing to this fact it will not be a trustworthy criterion of the other. If, then, it is not feasible to follow either all the arts of life or one, it only remains to follow none.—And again: since, as I 178 said above,^a there are many arts of life, he who abides by one of them must necessarily be unhappy, not only for the reasons previously stated^b but also for that which shall be stated as our argument proceeds. For each individual man is subject to a certain affection; for either he is a lover of wealth^c or a lover of pleasure or a lover of fame; and being such, he cannot be calmed down by any of the dogmatic doctrines; nay, the lover of wealth or the lover of 179 fame is further enkindled in his desire by the Peripatetic philosophy, according to which wealth and fame are among the goods^d; and the lover of pleasure is further inflamed by the doctrine of Epicurus (for on his showing pleasure is proved to be the perfection of happiness); and the lover of fame is also plunged headlong into this very affection by the Stoic arguments, according to which virtue alone is good and that which results from virtue. In every case, 180 then, what is called by the Dogmatic philosophers "the science of life" is a bulwark in defence of the evils of mankind rather than an aid against them.

And even if we grant that there is one art of life,^e and this an agreed one,—for instance, the Stoic,—not even so shall we accept it, since along with itself it brings many and diverse calamities. For if the art of 181 life, as consisting in wisdom, is a virtue, and only the Sage possesses virtue, the Stoics not being sages will not possess wisdom nor any art of life, and not possessing

^a Cf. § 120 *supra*.

^d Cf. §§ 51, 77 *supra*.

^e With §§ 180-183 *cf. P.H.* iii. 240-242.

^a See § 173 *supra*.

^b Cf. §§ 110 ff. *supra*.

- τὸν βίον, μὴ ἔχοντες δὲ ταύτην οὐδὲ ἄλλους διδά-
 ξουσι. εἴπερ τε κατ' αὐτοὺς οὐδεμία δύναται
 182 ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον τὸ ἄρα δεύτερον. τέχνη γάρ
 ἔστι σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων, καὶ καταλήψις ἔστι
 καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας συγκατάθεσις. οὐδεμία δ'
 ἦν καταληπτικὴ φαντασία διὰ τὸ μῆτε πᾶσαν ὑπ-
 ἄρχειν φαντασίαν καταληπτικὴν, μάχονται γάρ,
 μῆτε τινὰ διὰ τὴν ἀνεπικρισίαν. μὴ οὔσης δὲ
 καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας οὐδὲ συγκατάθεσις τις
 αὐτῆς γενήσεται, οὕτως δὲ οὐδὲ καταλήψις. μὴ
 οὔσης δὲ καταλήψεως οὐδὲ σύστημα ἐκ κατα-
 λήψεων γενήσεται, τουτέστι τέχνη. ᾧ ἀκολουθεῖ
 183 τὸ μηδὲ περὶ τὸν βίον εἶναι τινα τέχνην. πρὸς
 τούτοις ἡ καταληπτικὴ φαντασία κρίνεται κατὰ
 τοὺς στωικοὺς, ὅτι καταληπτικὴ ἔστι, τῷ ἀπὸ
 ὑπάρχοντος γενέσθαι καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον
 ἐναπομεμαγμένως καὶ ἐναπεσφραγισμένως· τὸ θ'
 ὑπάρχον δοκιμάζεται, ὅτι ὑπάρχον ἐστίν, ἐκ τοῦ
 καταληπτικῆν κινεῖν φαντασίαν. εἰ δὲ ἴνα μὲν ἡ
 καταληπτικὴ κρίνηται φαντασία, τὸ ὑπάρχον δεῖ
 ἐπεγνώσθαι, ἴνα δὲ τοῦτο καταληφθῆ, τὴν κατα-
 ληπτικὴν φαντασίαν βέβαιον εἶναι, ἐκάτερον δὲ διὰ
 θάτερον ἔστιν ἄπιστον, ἀγνωρίστου οὔσης τῆς
 καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας ἀναιρεῖται καὶ ἡ τέχνη,
 σύστημα οὐσα ἐκ καταλήψεων.
- 184 Εἴπερ τε ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον ἐπιστήμη, τουτέστιν ἡ
 φρόνησις, θεωρητικὴ τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ
 οὐδετέρων ἐστίν, ἥτοι ἕτερα καθέστηκε τῶν ἀγαθῶν

^a Cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 388 ff.

^b Cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 248, 402, ii. 86.

this neither will they teach it to others.—Also, if, on their showing, no art can be constructed, neither will the art of life be constructed; but in fact the first (is true); therefore the second (is true). For an art is 182 “a system constructed of apprehensions,” and apprehension is “assent to an apprehensive presentation.” But no apprehensive presentation exists^a because neither is every presentation apprehensive (owing to their conflicting character), nor yet any one of them (owing to their being unjudged). And if an apprehensive presentation does not exist, neither will there be any assent to it, and thus there will not be any apprehension either. And if there is no apprehension, neither will there be a system of apprehensions, that is to say, an art. Wherefrom it follows that there is no art of life either.—Further- 183 more, according to the Stoics the apprehensive presentation is judged to be apprehensive by the fact that it proceeds from an existing object and in such a way as to bear the impress and stamp of that existing object^b; and the existing object is approved as existent because of its exciting an apprehensive presentation. But if the existent must be ascertained in order that the apprehensive presentation may be judged, and if the apprehensive presentation must be established in order that the existent may be apprehended, and each of these is untrustworthy because of the other,—then, as the apprehensive presentation is unknowable, art also is abolished, it being a system of apprehensions.

Also, if the science of life,—that is, wisdom,—is 184 cognisant of things good and evil and neither,^c either it is other than the goods whereof it is said to be the

^c Cf. § 170 *supra*.

- ὦν λέγεται ἐπιστήμη τυγχάνειν, ἢ αὐτὴ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, καθὸ καὶ ὀριζόμενοι τιwes ἐξ αὐτῶν φασὶν
 185 "ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ ἢ τὸ μετέχον ἀρετῆς." καὶ εἰ μὲν ἑτέρα ἐστὶ παρὰ τὰγαθὰ ὦν λέγεται ἐπιστήμη, οὐδ' ὅλως ἐστὶ ἐπιστήμη· πᾶσα γὰρ ἐπιστήμη ὑπαρκτῶν τινῶν ἐστὶ γνώσις, τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ πρότερον ἐδείξαμεν ἀνύπαρκτα, ὥστ' οὐδ' ἐπιστήμη τις ἐστὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν.
 186 εἰ δ' αὐτὴ ἐστὶν ἀγαθόν καὶ ἀξιούται τῶν ἀγαθῶν εἶναι ἐπιστήμη, ἑαυτῆς ἐστὶ ἐπιστήμη. ὁ πάλιν ἀποπον· τὰ γὰρ ὦν ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, ταῦτα προ-επινοεῖται τῆς ἐπιστήμης. οἶον ἰατρικὴ λέγεται ἐπιστήμη ὑγιεινῶν καὶ νοσερῶν καὶ οὐθετέρων· ἀλλὰ προὔφεστηκε τῆς ἰατρικῆς καὶ προηγείται τὰ ὑγιεινὰ καὶ νοσερά· πάλιν τε ἡ μουσικὴ ἐμμελῶν ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκμελῶν ἐνρhythμων τε καὶ ἐκρhythμων ἐπι-
 187 στήμη· ἀλλ' οὐ πρὶν τούτων ἐστὶν ἡ μουσικὴ· καὶ αὐτοὶ δὲ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ἔφασαν ἐπιστήμην ἀληθῶν τε καὶ ψευδῶν καὶ οὐθετέρων· οὐκοῦν προ-ὔφεστηκε τῆς διαλεκτικῆς τάληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ καὶ οὐθέτερα· εἰ δὲ ἑαυτῆς ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη ἢ φρόνησις, ὀφείλει προὔφεσταναι ἑαυτῆς· οὐδὲν δὲ δύναται ἑαυτοῦ προὔφεσθηκέναι· οὐδὲ ταύτη τοίνυν ρητέον εἶναι τινα περὶ τὸν βίον ἐπιστήμην.
 188 Πᾶσά τε ὑπαρκτὴ τέχνη καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἐκ τῶν ἀποδιδόμενων ὑπὸ αὐτῆς τεχνικῶν τε καὶ ἐπιστη-μονικῶν ἔργων καταλαμβάνεται, οἶον ἰατρικὴ μὲν ἐκ τῶν ἰατρικῶς γινομένων, κιθαριστικὴ δὲ ἐκ τῶν κιθαριστικῶς καὶ ἤδη ζωγραφία καὶ ἀνδριαντοπλα-στικὴ καὶ πᾶσαι αἱ ἐμφερεῖς· ἢ δέ γε περὶ τὸν βίον

science, or it is itself the good, even as some of them assert in their definition—"Good is virtue or what partakes of virtue."^a And if it is other than the 185 goods whereof it is said to be the science, it will not be a science at all; for every science is the knowledge of certain existing things, but we have previously shown^b that goods and evils are non-existent, so that neither will there exist any science of goods and evils. But if it is itself the good and claims to be the 186 science of the goods, it will be the science of itself; and this again is absurd. For the things which form the object of a science are conceived before the science. Thus medicine is said to be the science of things healthy and morbid and neither; but the healthy and morbid things are in existence before medicine and precede it. And again: Music is the science of things in tune and out of tune, rhythmical and unrhythmical; but previous to these Music does not exist. The Stoics, too, have said that Dialectic^c 187 is "the science of things true and false and neither"; so, then, before Dialectic the true and false and neither pre-existed. If, then, wisdom is the science of itself, it must have existed before itself; but nothing can have existed before itself; so that neither in this way can it be asserted that any art of life exists.

Also, every existing art and science is apprehended 188 by means of the artistic and scientific effects which it produces,^d—medicine, for instance, by its medical results, and harp-playing by those of the harper, and painting and sculpture as well, and all arts of a like kind. But the art which is supposed to be conversant

^a Cf. § 22 *supra*.

^b Cf. §§ 42-10

^c Cf. *P.H.* ii. 94, 247.

^d With §§ 188-189 cf. *P.H.* iii. 243.

ἀξιουμένη στρέφεται τέχνη οὐδὲν ἔχει συμβεβηκὸς ἐνέργημα, ὡς παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τις περὶ
 189 τὸν βίον τέχνη. οἶον πολλῶν λεγομένων παρὰ τοῖς
 στωικοῖς περὶ τε τῆς τῶν παιδῶν ἀγωγῆς καὶ περὶ
 τῆς πρὸς τοὺς γονεῖς τιμῆς καὶ ἔτι τῆς πρὸς τοὺς
 κατοικομένους ὁσιότητος, ὀλίγα ἐξ ἑκάστου εἰδούς
 ἐπιλεξάμενοι δείγματος χάριν προοισόμεθα εἰς τὴν
 τῆς ἐπιχειρήσεως κατασκευήν.

190 Καὶ μὴν περὶ μὲν παιδῶν ἀγωγῆς ἐν ταῖς δια-
 τριβαῖς ὁ αἰρεσιάρχης Ζήνων τοιαῦτά τινα διέξεισιν.
 “ διαμηρίζειν δὲ μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδὲ ἦσον παιδικὰ
 ἢ μὴ παιδικὰ, μηδὲ θήλεα ἢ ἄρρενα· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλα
 παιδικοῖς ἢ μὴ παιδικοῖς, οὐδὲ θηλείαις ἢ ἄρρεσιν,
 ἀλλὰ τὰ αὐτὰ πρέπει τε καὶ πρόποντα ἐστίν.” καὶ
 πάλιν “ διαμεμήρικας τὸν ἐρώμενον; οὐκ ἔγωγε.
 πότερον οὐκ ἐπεθύμησας αὐτὸν διαμηρίσαι; καὶ
 μάλα. ἀλλὰ ἐπιθυμήσας¹ παρασχέειν σοι αὐτὸν [ἦ]²
 ἐφοβήθης κελεύσαι; μὰ Δί’. ἀλλ’ ἐκέλευσας; καὶ
 μάλα. εἴθ’ οὐχ ὑπέρητῆσέ σοι; οὐ γάρ.”

191 περὶ δὲ τῆς εἰς τοὺς γονεῖς τιμῆς παράθιτο ἂν τις
 τὰ τῆς μητρομξίας ὑπ’ αὐτῶν θρυλούμενα. καὶ γε
 ὁ μὲν Ζήνων τὰ περὶ τῆς Ἰοκάστης καὶ Οἰδίποδος
 θεῖς ἱστορούμενα φησὶν ὅτι οὐκ ἦν δεινὸν τριψαί τὴν
 μητέρα. “ καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀσθενοῦσαν τὸ σῶμα ταῖς
 χερσὶ τρίψας ὠφέλει, οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν· εἰ δ’ ἑτέρῳ
 μέρει τρίψας, εὐφραίνει* ὀδυνωμένην παύσας, καὶ
 παῖδας ἐκ τῆς μητρὸς γενναίους ποιήσας, τί ἦν
 192 αἰσχρόν;” ὁ δὲ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῇ πολιτεία κατὰ

¹ ἐπιθυμήσας cj. Bekk.: ἐπεθύμησας mss., Bekk.

² [ἦ] secl. Arnim (εἴτ’ cj. Bekk.).

* εὐφραίνει Arnim: ἐφ’ ᾧ εὐρέν mss., Bekk.

with life has no resultant effect, as we shall establish ; therefore, no art of life exists. Thus, since much is said 189 by the Stoics both about the education of children and about the honouring of parents, and also about piety towards the departed, we shall select a few points under each of these heads by way of illustration and bring them forward in support of our criticism.

Well then, as regards the education of children, 190 Zeno, the founder of the School, gives the following exposition in his discourses^a: “ Have carnal knowledge no less and no more of a favourite than of a non-favourite child, nor of a female than of a male ; favourite or non-favourite, males or females, no different conduct, but the same, befits and is befitting in respect of all alike.” And again,—“ Have you had intercourse with your beloved one ? I have not. Did you not desire to have intercourse with him ? Certainly. But, though desiring to win him for yourself, were you afraid of inviting him ? Not at all. But you invited him ? Certainly. Then he did not yield to you ? He did not.”—And with regard 191 to honouring one’s parents one might adduce the cases of incest which they harp upon. Thus Zeno, after stating the facts about Jocasta and Oedipus, asserts that there was nothing dreadful in his rubbing his mother. “ If she had been ailing and he had done her good by rubbing her body with his hands, it had not been shameful ; what shame was it, then, if he stopped her grief and gave her joy by rubbing her with another member, and begat noble children by his mother ?” And Chrysippus, in his *State* says 192

^a With §§ 190-196 cf. *P.H.* iii. 245-249. The Stoics seem to have derived these ugly tenets from the Cynics; cf. *P.H.* 200 n.

λέξιν φησὶν οὕτως· “δοκεῖ μοι καὶ ταῦτα οὕτως διεξάγειν¹ καθάπερ καὶ νῦν οὐ κακῶς παρὰ πολλοῖς εἶθισται, ὥστε καὶ <τὴν μητέρα ἐκ τοῦ υἱοῦ τεκνοποιεῖσθαι καὶ>² τὸν πατέρα ἐκ τῆς θυγατρὸς καὶ τὸν ὁμομήτριον ἐκ τῆς ὁμομητρίας.” δεῖγμα δὲ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς κατοικομένους αὐτῶν ὁσιότητος γένοιτ’ ἂν καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς ἀνθρωποφαγίας παραγγελλόμενα· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἀξιούσι τοὺς τετελευτηκότας ἐσθίειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς αὐτῶν σάρκας, εἴ ποτε
 193 τύχοι τι μέρος τοῦ σώματος ἀποκοπέν. λέγεται δ’ ἐν τῷ περὶ δικαιοσύνης ὑπὸ Χρυσίππου ταυτί· “καὶ ἂν τῶν μελῶν ἀποκοπῆ τι μέρος πρὸς τὴν τροφήν χρήσιμον, μήτε κατορύττειν αὐτὸ μήτε ἄλλως ρίπτειν, ἀναλίσκειν δὲ αὐτό, ὅπως <ἐκ>³ τῶν ἡμετέρων
 194 ἕτερον μέρος γένηται.” ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος περὶ τῆς τῶν γονέων ταφῆς διεξερχόμενος ῥητικῶς φησὶν “ἀπογενομένων δὲ τῶν γονέων ταφαῖς χρηστέον ταῖς ἀπλουστάταις, ὡς ἂν τοῦ σώματος καθάπερ ὄνυχος ἢ τριχῶν οὐδὲν ὄντος πρὸς ἡμᾶς, οὐδ’ ἐπιστροφῆς καὶ πολυωρίας προσδεομένων ἡμῶν τοιαύτης τινός. διὸ καὶ χρησίμων μὲν ὄντων τῶν κρεῶν τροφῆν χρήσονται αὐτοῖς, καθάπερ καὶ τῶν ἰδίων μερῶν, οἷον ποδὸς ἀποκοπέντος ἐπέβαλλε χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ, καὶ τοῖς παραπλησίους· ἀχρείων δὲ ὄντων αὐτῶν ἢ κατορύξαντες τὸ μνήμα ἐποίησουσιν, ἢ κατακαύσαντες τὴν τέφραν ἀφήσουσιν, ἢ μακρότερον ῥίψαντες οὐδεμίαν ἐπιστροφήν αὐτῶν ποιήσονται καθάπερ ὄνυχος ἢ τριχῶν.”
 195 Ὡδε μὲν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς, ἐπακτέον δ’ αὐτοῖς τὸ

¹ διεξάγειν Fabr.: ἐξαγαγεῖν mss., Bekk.

² <τὴν . . . καὶ> add. Fabr.

³ <ἐκ> add. Mutsch.

expressly: “I approve of carrying out those practices—which, quite rightly, are customary even nowadays amongst many peoples—according to which <the mother has children by her son, and> the father by his daughter, and the brother by his full sister.”—And their recommendations concerning cannibalism may serve as an example of their piety towards the departed; for they deem it right to eat not only the dead but even their own flesh, if ever any part of their body should happen to be cut off. This is what is stated by Chrysippus in his treatise *On Justice*:—“And if any part of the limbs be cut off that is good 193 for food, we should neither bury it nor otherwise get rid of it, but consume it, so that from our parts a new part may arise.” And in his book *On Duty*, when 194 discoursing about the burial of parents, he says expressly: “When our parents decease we should use the simplest forms of burial, as though the body—like nails or hair—were nothing to us, and we need bestow on it no care or attention of that kind. Hence, also, when their flesh is good for food, men shall make use of it, just as also of their own parts,—when, for instance, a foot is cut off it is proper for them to use it, and things like it; but when the flesh is not good, either they shall bury it and lay the mound upon it, or burn it up and scatter the ashes, or cast it far away and pay no more regard to it than to nails or hair.”

Such is the Stoics’ doctrine; but against them we 195

ἀκόλουθον τῆς ἐπιχειρήσεως. ἤτοι γὰρ οὕτω παραγγέλλουσι ταῦτα ποιεῖν ὡς μελλόντων αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι τῶν νέων ἢ ὡς μὴ χρησομένων. καὶ ὡς χρησομένων μὲν οὐδαμῶς· οἱ γὰρ νόμοι κωλύουσιν, εἰ μὴ τι παρὰ Λαιστρυγῶσι καὶ Κύκλωψι δεήσει βιοῦν, παρ' οἷς θεμιτόν ἐστιν

ἀνδρόμεα κρέ' ἔδειν καὶ ἐπ' ἄκρητον γάλα πίνειν.

- 196 εἰ δ' ὡς μὴ χρησομένων, παρέλκουσα γίνεται ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη, ἧς ἡ χρῆσις ἐστὶν ἀδύνατος· ὡς γὰρ ἐν τυφλῶν δῆμῳ ἄχρηστός ἐστι ζωγραφία, βλεπόντων γὰρ ἡ τέχνη, καὶ ὃν τρόπον ἐν πόλει κωφῶν ἀνόνητός ἐστι κιθαριστική, ἀκούοντας γὰρ τέρπει, οὕτω καὶ ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη πρὸς μηδέν ἐστι τοῖς μὴ δυναμένοις αὐτῇ χρῆσθαι.
- 197 Καὶ μὴν πᾶσα τέχνη, εἴαν τε θεωρητικὴ καθεστῆκη ὡς γεωμετρία καὶ ἀστρολογικὴ, εἴαν τε πρακτικὴ ὡς ὄπλομαχητικὴ, εἴαν τε ἀποτελεσματικὴ ὡς ζωγραφία καὶ ἀνδριαντοπλαστική, ἴδιον ἔχει ἔργον ᾧ διαφέρει τῶν ἄλλων διαθέσεων, (τῆς δὲ φρονήσεως οὐκ ἐστὶν ἴδιον ἔργον),¹ ὡς παραστήσω· οὐκ ἄρα τέχνη τις ἐστὶ περὶ τὸν βίον ἢ φρόνησις.
- 198 ὡς γὰρ τὸ κοινὸν μουσικοῦ καὶ ἀμούσου, τοῦτ' οὐκ ἐστὶ μουσικόν, καὶ τὸ κοινὸν γραμματικοῦ καὶ ἀγραμμάτου, τοῦτ' οὐκ ἐστὶ γραμματικόν, οὕτω καὶ συλλήβδην τὸ κοινὸν τοῦ τεχνίτου καὶ ἀτέχνου, τοῦτ' οὐκ ἐστὶ τεχνικόν. διόπερ καὶ τὸ τοῦ φρονίμου καὶ ἀφρονος κοινὸν οὐκ ἂν εἴη τῆς φρονήσεως
- 199 ἴδιον ἔργον. πᾶν δέ γε τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ φρονίμου γίνε-

¹ <τῆς . . . ἔργον> add. N.

must bring the next point in our criticism. Either they enjoin these actions with the idea that young people will perform them or with the idea that they will not perform them. But certainly not with the idea that they will perform them; for the laws forbid them, unless it shall be their lot to live amongst the Laestrygones and Cyclopes, where it is permissible—Human flesh to devour, and pure milk swallow thereafter.^a

And if they enjoin them with the idea that they will not perform them, the art of life becomes redundant, as the practice of it is impossible. For just as painting is useless in a country of the blind (for this art is for men who have sight), and just as harp-playing is valueless in a city of the deaf (for it is those who have hearing that it delights), so also the art of life is of no benefit to those who are unable to make use of it.

Moreover, every art,^b whether it be theoretical, like geometry and astronomy, or practical, like the military art, or creative, like painting and sculpture, possesses a special work of its own whereby it differs from the other states of mind, (whereas there is no special work which belongs to wisdom,) as I shall establish; therefore wisdom is not an art of life. For just as the work common to the musical man and the unmusical is not music, and the work common to the literary and the non-literary is not literature, so too, in general, the work common to the artistic and the non-artistic is not artistry. Hence also the work common to the wise man and the unwise will not be the special work of wisdom. But in fact every work which seems to be done by

^a Homer, *Odys.* ix. 297.

^b With §§ 197-199 cf. *P.H.* iii. 243.

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS

σθαι δοκοῦν ἔργον, τοῦτο κοινὸν εὐρίσκεται καὶ τοῦ μὴ φρονίμου ἔργον· οἷον ἐάν τε τιμᾶν γονεῖς θώμεθα τοῦ φρονίμου ἔργον, ἐάν τε τὸ παρακαταθήκη ἀποδιδόναί τοῖς πιστεύσασιν, ἐάν τ' ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ τοὺς μὴ σπουδαίους εὐρήσομεν τούτων τι ποιούντας. ὥστε μηδὲν ἴδιον εἶναι τοῦ σοφοῦ ἔργον, ᾧ διοίσει τῶν μὴ σοφῶν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐδὲ φρόνησις ἔσται τέχνη τις περὶ τὸν βίον, ἧς ἴδιον οὐδὲν τεχνικὸν ἔστιν ἔργον.

- 200 Ἄλλα πρὸς τοῦθ' ὑπαντώντες φασι πάντα μὲν κοινὰ εἶναι καὶ πάντων τὰ ἔργα, διορίζεσθαι δὲ τῷ ἀπὸ τεχνικῆς διαθέσεως ἢ ἀπὸ ἀτέχνου γίνεσθαι. οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι γονέων καὶ ἄλλως τιμᾶν γονεῖς τοῦ σπουδαίου ἔστιν ἔργον, ἀλλὰ σπουδαίου
- 201 τὸ ἀπὸ φρονήσεως τοῦτο ποιεῖν· καὶ ὡς τὸ μὲν ὑγιάζειν κοινὸν ἔστι τοῦ τε ἱατροῦ καὶ ἰδιώτου, τὸ δὲ ἱατρικῶς ὑγιάζειν τοῦ τεχνίτου ἴδιον, ὥδε καὶ τὸ μὲν τιμᾶν τοὺς γονεῖς κοινὸν τοῦ τε σπουδαίου καὶ μὴ σπουδαίου, τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ φρονήσεως τιμᾶν τοὺς γονεῖς ἴδιον τοῦ σοφοῦ, ὥστε καὶ τέχνην αὐτὸν ἔχειν περὶ τὸν βίον, ἧς ἴδιόν ἔστιν ἔργον τὸ ἕκαστον τῶν πραττομένων ἀπὸ ἀρίστης διαθέσεως πράττειν.
- 202 εἰκόμασι δ' οἱ ταύτη χρώμενοι τῇ ὑπαντήσει ἐθελοκωφεῖν καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τὸ ἐπιζητούμενόν τι λέγειν. ἡμῶν γὰρ ἀντικρυς δεικνύντων ὅτι οὐδὲν ἴδιόν ἔστι τοῦ φρονούντος ἔργον, ᾧ διαφέρει τῶν μὴ φρονίμων, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον ὑπὸ αὐτοῦ, τοῦτο καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν μὴ σπουδαίων γίνεσθαι, αὐτοὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἴσχυσαν ἀνελεῖν, ἔξωθεν δὲ φασιν ὅτι τὸ κοινὸν ἔργον ὅτε μὲν ἀπὸ φρονίμης

the wise man is found to be a work common also to the unwise ; if, for example, we count honouring parents as a work of the wise man, or rendering back a deposit to those who have entrusted it, or any other thing of the kind, we shall also find men who are not virtuous doing any one of these things. So that there is no work peculiar to the wise man whereby he shall differ from the not wise. And if this is so, neither will wisdom be an art of life, as it has no artistic work peculiar to itself.

But in reply to this they say that although all the 200 works are common to all men, yet they are distinguished by their proceeding either from an artistic or from a non-artistic disposition. For the work of the virtuous man is not that of caring for his parents and generally honouring his parents, but doing this because of wisdom is the act of the virtuous ; and just 201 as procuring health is common both to the medical man and to the layman, but to procure health medically is peculiar to the man of art, so also honouring one's parents is common both to the virtuous man and the non-virtuous, but the honouring of his parents because of wisdom is peculiar to the wise man, so that he possesses also an art of life, of which the special work is the performance of each of his actions from the best disposition.—But those who make this 202 reply would seem to be wilfully deaf, and doing anything rather than answer the question before them. For when we were definitely proving that there is no work peculiar to the wise man whereby he differs from the not wise, but everything which is done by him is done also by those who are not virtuous, the Stoics were unable to disprove this ; but they assert irrelevantly that the work common to both proceeds in

203 γίνεται διαθέσεως ὅτε δὲ ἀπὸ φαύλης. ὅπερ ἀπό-
 δείξεις μὲν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι κοινὸν ἔργον τῶν τε φρο-
 νίμων καὶ τῶν μὴ τοιούτων οὐκ ἔστιν, δείχεται δὲ
 (αὐτὸ)¹ ἀποδείξεως, ζητήσαντος ἂν τινος πόθεν γε
 διαγνωσόμεθα πότε γίνεται ταῦτα ἀπὸ φρονίμης
 διαθέσεως καὶ πότε οὐ γίνεται· αὐτὰ γὰρ τὰ κοινὰ
 ἔργα τοῦτ' οὐκ ἐμφαίνει, παρόσον ἐστὶ κοινά.
 204 ἐνθεν καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ ἰατρικῆς κομισθὲν ὑπόδειγμα
 κατ' αὐτῶν μᾶλλον εὐρίσκεται. ὅταν γὰρ φῶσι
 τὸ ὑγιάζειν κοινὸν ἰατροῦ τε καὶ οὐκ ἰατροῦ καθ-
 εστηκὸς ἐξαίρετον γίνεσθαι τοῦ τεχνίτου, ἐπειδὴν
 ἰατρικῶς ἀποτελεσθῆ, τότε ἦτοι ἴσασι τι διαφόρως
 γινόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἰατροῦ παρὰ τὸν ἰδιώτην, οἶον
 τὸ συντόμως καὶ ἀπόνως καὶ μετὰ τάξεως καὶ
 ποιότητος, ἢ οὐκ ἴσασι ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῦτα πάντα
 205 κοινὰ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν ὑπειλήφασιν. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἴσασι,
 αὐτόθεν ἰδίον τι τοῦ ἰατροῦ φαινόμενον ἔργον
 ὠμολογήκασιν ὑπάρχειν, καὶ ἀκόλουθον ἦν αὐτοῖς
 ἀπὸ τούτου μετελθοῦσι διδάσκειν καὶ τοῦ σοφοῦ τι
 ἴδιον ἔργον, ᾧ διοίσει τοῦ μὴ σοφοῦ. εἰ δὲ οὐκ
 ἴσασι ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἰατροῦ γινόμενον, τοῦτ'
 ἐροῦσι καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἰδιώτου γίνεσθαι, ἀφελοῦνται
 τοῦ ἰατροῦ τὸ ἴδιον ἔργον καὶ ἀπαραλλαξίας οὔσης
 κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἐν τοῖς γινόμενοις ἔργοις οὐ
 διαγνώσκονται τὸν τε τεχνίτην καὶ τὸν ἀτεχνον, οὐδὲ
 τὸ ἀπὸ τεχνικῆς διαθέσεως ἐνεργούμενον οὐδὲ τὸ
 ἀπὸ ἀτέχνου, διὰ τὸ μηδὲ τὴν καθ' ἕκαστον [ἀφανῆ]²
 διάθεσιν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς δύνασθαι γνωρίζεσθαι οὐσαν

¹ <αὐτὸ> addo.

² [ἀφανῆ] secl. Heintz.

^o Cf. § 201 *supra*.

the one case from a wise disposition and in the other
 from a foolish. But this is not a proof that there is no 203
 work common both to those who are wise and those
 who are not so, but itself needs proof, since one might
 inquire how we are to discern when these works pro-
 ceed, and when they do not proceed, from a wise
 disposition; for the common works themselves do
 not make this clear, inasmuch as they are common.—
 Hence, too, the example brought forward from the 204
 art of medicine ^a is found to tell rather against them.
 For when they assert that procuring health, which is
 a thing common both to the medical and the non-
 medical man, belongs specially to the man of art when
 it is effected medically, then either they know that
 there is some difference in what is done by the doctor
 as compared with the layman,—the work being, for
 instance, rapid and painless and done systematically
 and on a definite plan,—or else they do not know this,
 but conceive that all these things are also common
 to laymen. And if they know it, they are directly 205
 confessing that there is an apparent work which is
 peculiar to the doctor, and their next task is to pass
 on from this and to show that there is also a work
 peculiar to the wise man, wherein he will differ
 from the not wise. But if they do not know it, but
 shall declare that everything which is done by the
 doctor is also done by the layman, they will be
 robbing the doctor of his own peculiar work, and,
 —since there exists, apparently, exact similarity
 in the works executed,—they will not distinguish
 between the expert and the non-expert, nor between
 what is performed by an artistic disposition and by a
 non-artistic, because the disposition of the individual
 cannot be discerned of itself, as it is non-apparent.

208 ἀφανῆ. τοῖνυν οὐδὲν ὠφελεῖ αὐτοὺς τὸ ὁμολογεῖν
 μὲν κοινὰ εἶναι τὰ ὑπὸ τε τοῦ σοφοῦ γινόμενα
 ἔργα καὶ τὰ μὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ σοφοῦ, διαφέρειν δ' αὐτὰ
 <φάναι>¹ τῷ νυνὶ μὲν ἀπὸ φρονίμης γίνεσθαι δια-
 θέσεως νυνὶ δὲ ἀπὸ ἄφρονος.

"Ἄλλοι δὲ εἰσιν οἱ τῷ διομαλισμῷ καὶ τάξει ταῦτα
 207 διορίζεσθαι νομίζοντες. καθὰ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν μέσων
 τεχνῶν ἰδίον ἐστὶ τοῦ τεχνίτου τό τε τεταγμένως
 τι ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀποτελέσμασι διομαλίζειν
 (ποιήσαι γὰρ ἂν ποτε καὶ ἰδιώτης τὸ τεχνικὸν
 ἔργον, ἀλλὰ σπανίως καὶ οὐ πάντοτε, οὐδὲ κατὰ τὸ
 αὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως), ὥδε καὶ τοῦ μὲν φρονίμου
 φασὶν ἔργον εἶναι τὸ ἐν τοῖς κατορθώμασι διομαλί-
 208 ζειν, τοῦ δὲ ἄφρονος τοῦναντίον. φαίνονται δὲ καὶ
 οὗτοι οὐ κατὰ τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων φύσιν περὶ τῆς
 ἐν χερσὶ ζητήσεως διαταπτόμενοι. τὸ γὰρ εἶναι τινα
 βίου τάξιν κατὰ τεχνικὸν λόγον ὠρισμένως εἰρη-
 μένην εὐχῆ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν. πᾶς γὰρ ἄνθρωπος πρὸς
 τὰς τῶν ὑποπιπτόντων πραγμάτων διαφορὰς καὶ
 ποικιλίας ἀρτιζόμενος οὐδέποτε δύναται τὴν αὐτὴν
 τάξιν φυλάττειν, καὶ μάλιστα ὁ ἔμφρων τό τε
 ἄστατον τῆς τύχης καὶ τὸ ἀβεβαιοῦν τῶν πραγμάτων
 209 ἐννοούμενος. ἄλλως τε, εἴπερ μίαν καὶ ὠρισμένην
 εἶχε βίου τάξιν ὁ φρόνιμος, κἂν ἐκ ταύτης ἐναργῶς
 κατεῖληπτο τοῖς μὴ φρονίμοις· οὐχὶ δὲ γε κατα-
 λαμβάνεται τούτοις· τοῖνυν οὐδ' ἐκ τῆς τάξεως τῶν
 ἔργων ληπτὸς ἐστὶν ὁ φρόνιμος. ὅθεν εἰ πᾶσα μὲν
 τέχνη ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων ἔργων φαίνεται, τῆς δὲ φρονή-

¹ <φάναι> add. cj. Heintz.

So then, it does not profit them at all to agree that the 206
 works performed by the wise man and by the not
 wise are common to both, while alleging that they
 differ by being done in the one case from a wise
 disposition, in the other from an unwise.

But there are others who think that these works
 are distinguished by (the presence or absence of)
 unvarying quality and order. For just as in the 207
 case of the intermediate arts^a it is the peculiarity
 of the artist to produce a thing in an orderly way
 and to be unvarying in his products (for the layman,
 too, may at times produce an artistic work, but
 rarely and not at all times, nor consistently and in
 the same way),—so also they say that the work of
 the wise man is to be unvarying in his right actions,
 and that of the unwise the opposite. But these men, 208
 too, are evidently not dealing with the question in
 hand according to the real state of the facts. For
 that there exists some order of life definitely formu-
 lated by the artistic reason seems rather like an
 illusory hope. For no man, in preparing himself to
 meet the different and varied occurrences, is ever able
 to preserve the same order,^b and, least of all, the wise
 man who is aware both of the instability of fortune
 and the insecurity of events. And besides, if the 209
 wise man had a single definite order of life, he would
 also have been plainly recognized through this by the
 not wise; but in fact he is not recognized by them;
 so then, the wise man cannot be discerned through
 the order of his works. Hence, if every art is
 apparent through its own special works, whereas

^a With §§ 207-209 cf. *P.H.* iii. 243-244. By "intermediate" is meant "common" or "vulgar" arts (cf. *ἐς μέσον*, "in public").

^b i.e. rule of life, programme of conduct.

σεως οὐδέν ἐστιν ἴδιον ἔργον ἐξ οὗ φαίνεται, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τις τέχνη περὶ τὸν βίον ἢ φρόνησις.

210 Καὶ μὴν εἰ τέχνη τις ἐστὶ περὶ τὸν βίον ἢ φρόνησις, οὐκ ἄλλον ἂν τινα μᾶλλον ὠφέλησεν ἢ τὸν κεκτημένον αὐτὴν σοφόν, ἐγκράτειαν αὐτῷ παρασχομένη ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τὸ κακὸν¹ ὁρμαῖς καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ¹ ἀφορμαῖς. οὐχὶ δέ γε τὸν σοφὸν ὠφελεί ἢ φρόνησις, ὡς παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα

211 τέχνη τις ἐστὶ περὶ τὸν βίον. ὁ γὰρ λεγόμενος ἐγκρατὴς σοφὸς ἦτοι κατὰ τοῦτο λέγεται ἐγκρατὴς, καθόσον ἐν οὐδεμίᾳ γίνεται ὁρμῇ τῇ πρὸς τὸ κακὸν καὶ ἀφορμῇ τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἢ καθόσον ἔχει μὲν φαύλας ὁρμὰς περικρατεῖ δὲ τούτων τῷ λόγῳ. καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸ μὴ γίνεσθαι ἐν φαύλαις κρίσεσιν οὐκ ἂν λεχθεῖ ἐγκρατὴς εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ κρατήσῃ οὐδὲ οὐκ

212 ἔχει. καὶ ᾧ τρόπῳ οὐκ ἂν εἴποι τις τὸν εὐνοῦχον ἐγκρατῆ πρὸς ἀφροδισίων μίξιν καὶ τὸν κακοστομαχοῦντα πρὸς ἐδεσμάτων ἀπόλαυσιν (οὐδ' ὅλως γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐπιζήτησις τις γίνεται τούτων, ἵνα καὶ ἐγκρατῶς κατεξανααστῶσι τῆς ἐπιζήτησεως), τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ οὐδὲ τὸν σοφὸν ἐγκρατῆ ῥητέον διὰ τὸ

213 μὴ φύεσθαι ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ οὐ ἔσται ἐγκρατὴς. εἰ δὲ κατὰ τοῦτο ἀξιόσουσιν αὐτὸν ὑπάρχειν ἐγκρατῆ, καθόσον γίνεται μὲν ἐν φαύλαις κρίσεσι περιγίνεται δ' αὐτῶν τῷ λόγῳ, πρῶτον μὲν δώσουσι τὸ ὅτι οὐδὲν ὠφέλησεν αὐτὸν ἢ φρόνησιν ἀκμὴν ἐν παραχαῖς ὄντα καὶ βοηθείας δεόμενον, εἶτα καὶ κακοδαι-

214 μονέστερον τῶν φαύλων εὐρίσκεσθαι. ἢ μὲν γὰρ ὁρμᾶ ἐπὶ τι, πάντως ταράσσεται, ἢ δὲ περικρατεῖ

¹ κακὸν . . . ἀγαθοῦ Heintz: ἀγαθὸν . . . κακοῦ mss., Bekk.

of wisdom there is no special work through which it is apparent, then wisdom will not be an art of life.

Moreover, if wisdom is an art of life,^a it would have 210 benefited no one more than the wise man who possesses it, by furnishing him with self-control in his inclinations towards evil and in his disinclinations towards good. But wisdom does not in fact benefit the wise man, as we shall establish; therefore it is not an art of life. For the wise man who is termed 211 "self-controlled" is termed self-controlled either in respect of the fact that he has no inclination towards evil or disinclination towards good, or in respect of the fact that he has foolish inclinations but keeps them in control by his reason. But in respect of his not forming foolish judgements he will not be called self-controlled; for he will not control what he has not got. And just as one would not call the eunuch self- 212 controlled as regards sexual intercourse, nor the man with a bad stomach as regards the enjoyment of food (for they do not possess any appetite at all for these things, so that through self-control they might rise superior to the appetite),—in the same way one ought not to call the wise man self-controlled because the thing which he is to keep in control does not arise in him. And if they shall maintain that he is self- 213 controlled in respect of the fact that he forms foolish judgements but keeps them in control by his reason, they will be granting, firstly, that his wisdom has not benefited him at all, as he is still beset by perturbations and needing succour, and, secondly, that he is found to be even more unhappy than the foolish. For in that he has an inclination for something he 214 is certainly perturbed, and in that he controls it by

^a With §§ 210-215 cf. *P.H.* iii. 273-277.

τῷ λόγῳ, συνέχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸ κακόν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο
 μᾶλλον ταραττεται τοῦ φαύλου μηκέτι τοῦτο πά-
 σχοντος· ἢ μὲν γὰρ ὄρμῃ, ταραττεται, ἢ δὲ τυγ-
 χάνει τῶν ἐπιθυμουμένων, ὑπεκλυομένην ἴσχει τὴν
 215 ταραχήν. οὐ τοίνυν ἐγκρατῆς γίνεται ὅσον ἐπὶ
 τῇ φρονήσει ὁ σοφός· ἢ εἶπερ γίνεται, πάντων
 ἀνθρώπων κακοδαιμονέστερος γίνεται. ἀλλ' εἰ
 ἐκάστη τέχνη τὸν κεκτημένον αὐτὴν ὠφελεῖ μᾶλλον,
 δέδεικται δὲ ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον ἀξιουμένη τυγχάνειν
 τέχνη μηδὲ τὸν κεκτημένον ὠφελούσα, ῥητέον μὴ
 εἶναι τινα περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνην.

Ζ'.—ΕΙ ΔΙΔΑΚΤΗ ΕΣΤΙΝ Η ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΝ ΒΙΟΝ ΤΕΧΝΗ

216 Δυνάμει μὲν οὖν συναποδεδείκται τῷ μὴ εἶναι
 τινα περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνην τὸ μηδὲ διδακτὴν αὐτὴν
 καθεστάναι· τῶν γὰρ μὴ ὄντων οὐ γίνεται μάθησις·
 ὁμῶς δ' ἐκ περιπτοῦ συγχωρήσαντες αὐτῆς τὴν
 217 ὑπαρξὴν διδάσκωμεν ὡς ἔστιν ἀδίδακτος. πολὺς
 μὲν οὖν καὶ ποικίλος ἐστὶ παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ὁ
 περὶ τῆς μαθήσεως λόγος· ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς γε τὰ κυριώ-
 τατα ἐπιλεξάμενοι θήσομεν, ὧν τὰ μὲν κοινότερον
 ἐπιχειρεῖται παρὰ τοῖς σκεπτικοῖς εἰς τὸ μηδὲν
 εἶναι μάθησιν, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἰδιαίτερον λέγεται περὶ
 αὐτῆς τῆς φρονήσεως. τάξει δὲ πρώτας σκοπῶμεν
 τὰς κοινότερας ἐπιχειρήσεις.

218 Ἐπὶ πάσης τοίνυν μαθήσεως ὁμολογεῖσθαι δεῖ τὸ
 τε διδασκόμενον πρᾶγμα καὶ τὸν διδάσκοντα καὶ
 τὸν μανθάνοντα καὶ τὸν τρόπον τῆς μαθήσεως.
 οὐδὲν δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν ὁμολογον, ὡς δεῖξομεν· οὐκ
 ἄρα ἔστι τις μάθησις. καὶ ἐπεὶ πρῶτον ἐμνήσθημεν
 τοῦ διδασκομένου πράγματος, περὶ αὐτοῦ πρῶτον
 219 ἀπορητέον. εἰ γὰρ διδάσκεται τι πρᾶγμα, ἦτοι τὸ
 490

his reason he retains the evil within himself and is, on this account, more perturbed than the fool who is no longer affected in this way; for the latter is perturbed in that he feels inclination, but in that he obtains the things desired he has his perturbation gradually diminished. So then the wise man is not 215 self-controlled in virtue of his wisdom; or if he is so, he is of all men the most unhappy. But if every art especially benefits him who possesses it, and it has been shown that that which is, as they maintain, the art of life does not even benefit its possessor, one must declare that there does not exist any art of life.

CHAPTER VII.—CAN THE ART OF LIFE BE TAUGHT?

Now in the proof that no art of life exists there is 216 virtually involved the proof that it is incapable of being taught; for there is no learning of non-existent things. However, let us concede, gratuitously, that it exists, and let us teach that it cannot be taught. Now amongst the philosophers the arguments about 217 learning are many and varied; but we, for our part, shall select and state the most important points, of which some are the more general criticisms of the Sceptics which go to show that learning is nothing, and others the more special discussions of wisdom itself. And first in order let us consider the more general criticisms.

In every instance, then, of learning there ought to 218 be agreement regarding the subject taught and the teacher and the learner and the mode of learning; but, as we shall show, none of these things is agreed; therefore no learning exists. And since we have mentioned first the subject taught, we must raise questions about it first. Now if any subject is taught, 219

ὄν διδάσκεται ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν· οὔτε δὲ τὸ ὄν διδάσκεται, ὡς δείξομεν, οὔτε τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὡς παραμυθησόμεθα· οὐκ ἄρα διδάσκεταιί τι πρᾶγμα. καὶ δὴ τὸ μὴ ὄν οὐ διδάσκεται· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ συμβέβηκεν, ὥστ'
 220 οὐδὲ τὸ διδάσκεσθαι. καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ τὸ μὴ ὄν διδάσκεται, ἀληθὲς ἔσται τὸ μὴ ὄν· τῶν γὰρ ἀληθῶν ἔστιν ἡ μάθησις. εἰ δὲ ἀληθὲς ἔσται τὸ μὴ ὄν, εὐθύς καὶ ὑπαρκτὸν γενήσεται· ἀληθὲς γοῦν φασὶν οἱ στωικοὶ ὃ ὑπάρχει τε καὶ ἀντίκειται τι. ἄτοπον δέ γε τὸ μὴ ὄν ὑπάρχειν· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ μὴ ὄν διδά-
 σκεται. τό γε μὴν διδασκόμενον κινοῦν φαν-
 τασίαν διδάσκεται, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν οὐ δύναται κινεῖν
 221 φαντασίαν· οὐκ ἄρα διδακτὸν ἔστι τὸ μὴ ὄν. πρὸς τούτοις, εἰ τὸ μὴ ὄν διδάσκεται, οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς διδάσκεται· τῶν γὰρ ὄντων καὶ ὑπαρχόντων ἔστι τὰληθές. εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἀληθὲς διδάσκεται, πᾶν τὸ διδασκόμενον ἔστι ψεῦδος. ἄτοπον δέ γε πᾶν τὸ διδασκόμενον εἶναι ψεῦδος· οὐ τοίωον τὸ μὴ ὄν διδάσκεται. ἐπεὶ τοι εἴπερ τὸ μὴ ὄν διδάσκεται, ἦτοι καθὸ μὴ ὄν ἔστι διδάσκεται, ἢ κατ' ἄλλο τι. καθὰ μὲν ὄν μὴ ὄν ἔστιν, οὐ διδάσκεται· εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὄν καθὸ μὴ ὄν ἔστι διδάσκεται, οὐδὲν ὄν διδα-
 χθήσεται, ὅπερ ἄτοπον. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ κατ' ἄλλο τι· τὸ γὰρ ἄλλο τι ἔστι, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν οὐκ ἔστω, ὥστ'
 222 οὐκ ἂν διδαχθῆι τὸ μὴ ὄν. λείπεται οὖν λέγειν τὸ ὄν διδάσκεσθαι· ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ τῶν ἀδυνάτων δείξομεν. εἰ γὰρ τὸ ὄν διδάσκεται, ἦτοι καθὸ ὄν

either the existent is taught or the non-existent.^a But neither is the existent taught, as we shall show, nor the non-existent, as we shall argue; therefore no subject is taught. Now the non-existent is not taught; for it has no property, so that it has not that of being taught. And besides, if the non-existent is 220 taught, the non-existent will be true; for learning is of things true. And if the non-existent shall be true, it will straightway be real as well: for certainly the Stoics say that "the true is that which is real and is opposed to something."^b But it is absurd that the non-existent should be real. Therefore the non-existent is not taught. And, certainly, what is taught excites an impression when being taught, but the non-existent cannot excite an impression; therefore the non-existent is not capable of being taught. Furthermore, if the non-existent is taught, nothing 221 true is taught; for the true belongs to the class of things existent and real. And if nothing true is taught, everything which is taught is false. But it is, in fact, absurd that everything which is taught should be false; so then the non-existent is not taught. For, of course, if the non-existent is taught, it is taught either in virtue of its non-existence or in virtue of something else. Now it is not taught in virtue of its non-existence; for if the non-existent is taught in virtue of its non-existence, nothing existent will be taught; which is absurd. Nor yet in virtue of something else; for that "something else" exists, but the non-existent does not exist. So that the non-existent will not be taught.—It remains then to say that the existent is 222 taught; and this too we shall prove to be a thing impossible. For if the existent is taught, it is either

^a With §§ 219-223 cf. *P.H.* iii. 256-258.

^b *Cf. Adv. Log.* ii. 10.

ἐστιν ἢ κατ' ἄλλο τι. καὶ εἰ μὲν καθὸ ὄν ἐστι
 διδάσκεται, οὐδὲν ἔσται ἀδίδακτον· εἰ δὲ τῶν ὄντων
 οὐδὲν ἐστιν ἀδίδακτον, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔσται τὸ διδασκό-
 μενον· δεῖ γὰρ ἀδίδακτόν τι εἶναι, ἵνα ἐκ τούτου
 μάθησις γένηται. ὥστε καθὸ μὲν ὄν ἐστιν, οὐκ ἂν
 223 διδάχθῃ τὸ ὄν. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ κατ' ἄλλο τι· τὸ
 γὰρ ὄν οὐκ ἔχει ἄλλο τι)¹ συμβεβηκὸς αὐτῷ, ὅπερ
 μὴ ὄν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ συμβεβηκὸς αὐτῷ ὄν
 ἐστιν. ὥστ' εἰ τὸ ὄν καθὸ ὄν ἐστιν οὐ διδάσκεται,
 οὐδὲ κατ' ἄλλο τι διδάχθῆσεται· ἐκεῖνο γὰρ ὅτιποτέ
 ἐστιν ἄλλο συμβεβηκὸς αὐτῷ, ὄν ἐστιν. εἰ οὖν μήτε
 τὸ ὄν διδάσκεται μήτε τὸ μὴ ὄν, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα
 οὐδὲν ἐστιν, οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων διδάσκειται.

224 Καὶ ἄλλως, ἐπεὶ τῶν τιῶν τὰ μὲν ἐστί σώματα
 τὰ δὲ ἀσώματα, εἰ διδάσκειται τι, ἤτοι τὸ σῶμα
 διδάσκειται ἢ τὸ ἀσώματον· οὔτε δὲ τὸ σῶμα
 διδάσκειται οὔτε τὸ ἀσώματον· οὐκ ἄρα διδάσκειται
 τι. τὸ μὲν οὖν σῶμα οὐ διδάσκειται, καὶ μάλιστα
 κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς λεκτὰ γὰρ ἐστί τὰ
 225 διδασκόμενα, σῶμα δ' οὐκ ἔστι τὰ λεκτὰ. καὶ
 ἄλλως, εἰ τὸ σῶμα μήτε αἰσθητὸν ἐστί μήτε νοητὸν
 ἐστιν, οὐ διδάσκειται τὸ σῶμα. δεῖ γὰρ τὸ διδασκό-
 μενον ἢ αἰσθητὸν εἶναι ἢ νοητὸν, μητέτερον δὲ ὄν
 οὐ διδάσκειται. τὸ δ' ὅτι οὔτε αἰσθητὸν ἐστὶν οὔτε
 νοητὸν ἐστί τὸ σῶμα, παρεστάκαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρὸς
 226 τοὺς φυσικοὺς. εἴαν τε γὰρ ἄθροισμός τις ἦ τὸ
 σῶμα, ὡς φησὶν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος, μεγέθους καὶ σχή-

¹ < τὸ . . . τῷ add. Heintz.

• With §§ 224-231 cf. *P.H.* iii. 255. "Something" was the highest category of the Stoics, cf. Vol. I. *Intro.* p. xxvi.

in virtue of its existence or in virtue of something else. But if it is taught in virtue of its existence, nothing will be untaught; and if of existing things none is untaught, neither will there exist anything taught; for something untaught must exist in order that from it learning may come about. So that the existent will not be taught in virtue of its existence. Nor yet in virtue of something else; <for the existent 223 has no other> property belonging to it which is non-existent, but every property which belongs to it is existent. So that if the existent is not taught in virtue of its existence, neither will it be taught in virtue of something else; for that other property, whatsoever it be, which belongs to it is existent. If, then, neither the existent is taught nor the non-existent, and besides these there is no other alternative, no existing thing is taught.

And again^a: since of the "Somethings" some are 224 bodies, others incorporeal, if something is taught either it is a body that is taught or an incorporeal; but neither is the body taught nor the incorporeal; therefore nothing is taught. Now the body is not taught, according to the Stoics especially; for the things taught are "expressions," and expressions are not bodies.^b And besides, if the body is neither 225 sensible nor intelligible, the body is not taught. For what is taught must be either sensible or intelligible, and if it is neither it is not taught. And the fact that body is neither sensible nor intelligible we have established in our treatise *Against the Physicists*.^c For whether body is, as Epicurus asserts, a combina- 226

^b For the incorporeality of "expressions" (*λεκτὰ*) cf. *Adv. Log.* ii. 12; *P.H.* ii. 81.

^c See *Adv. Phys.* i. 437-439, 361 ff.; cf. *P.H.* ii. 47 ff.

ματος καὶ ἀντιτυπίας, ἐάν τε τὸ τὰς τρεῖς ἔχον
 διαστάσεις μετὰ ἀντιτυπίας, ἐπεὶ πᾶν τὸ κατὰ
 σύνοδον πλειόνων λαμβανόμενον οὐκ ἔστι τῆς
 227 ἀλόγου αἰσθήσεως λαβεῖν ἀλλὰ λογικῆς τιὸς δυνά-
 μως, οὐκ ἔσται τῶν αἰσθητῶν τὸ σῶμα. καὶ εἰ
 αἰσθητὸν δὲ ὑπάρχοι, πάλιν ἀδίδακτον γενήσεται·
 τῶν γὰρ αἰσθητῶν οὐδὲν διδάσκεται, οἷον οὐδεὶς
 λευκὸν δρᾶν μανθάνει, οὐδὲ γλυκέος γεύεσθαι, οὐχ
 ὑπὸ τιος εὐωδίζεσθαι ψύχεσθαι ἀλεινεσθαι, ἀλλ'
 ἀδιδάκτος ἔστιν ἢ πάντων τούτων ἀντίληψις. οὔτε
 228 τοῖνυν αἰσθητὸν ἔστι τὸ σῶμα, οὔτ' εἰ αἰσθητὸν
 ὑπάρχει, κατὰ τοῦτ' ἔσται διδακτόν. καὶ μὴν
 οὐδ' ὡς νοητὸν δύναται διδάσκεσθαι. εἰ γὰρ μήτε
 τὸ μήκος κατ' ἰδίαν ἔστι σῶμα μήτε τὸ πλάτος
 μήτε τὸ βάθος, τὸ δὲ ἐξ ἀπάντων τούτων σύνθετον,
 δεήσει πάντων ἀσωμάτων ὄντων καὶ τὸ ἐξ αὐτῶν
 229 αἴθροισμα ἐνοεῖν ἀσώματον καὶ οὐ σῶμα· διὰ δὲ
 τοῦτο καὶ ἀδίδακτον εἶναι τὸ σῶμα. τῶν τε σω-
 μάτων τὰ μὲν ἔστιν αἰσθητὰ τὰ δὲ νοητά. διόπερ
 εἰ διδάσκεται τὸ σῶμα, ἤτοι τὸ αἰσθητὸν διδάσκεται
 ἢ τὸ νοητὸν. οὔτε δὲ τὸ αἰσθητὸν διδάσκεται διὰ
 τὸ φαίνεσθαι καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ πᾶσι πρόδηλον ὑπάρχειν,
 οὔτε τὸ νοητὸν διὰ τὴν ἀδηλόγητα καὶ τὴν ἀνεπι-
 κριτον μέχρι τοῦ νῦν περὶ αὐτοῦ διαφωνίαν, τῶν μὲν
 ἀτομον αὐτὸ λεγόντων τῶν δὲ τμητόν, καὶ τῶν μὲν
 ἀμερές καὶ ἐλάχιστον, τῶν δὲ μεριστὸν καὶ εἰς
 230 ἄπειρον τέμνεσθαι δυνάμενον. οὐκ ἄρα διδακτόν
 ἔστι τὸ σῶμα. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀσώματον.
 ἢ γὰρ ἰδέα τίς ἐστι Πλατωνικὴ ἢ τὸ παρὰ τοῖς

^a With §§ 227-228 cf. P.H. iii. 254.

^b This last is the Stoic view, whereas the Epicureans be-
 lieved in indivisibles ("atoms").

tion of size and form and solidity, or whether it is that
 which has the three dimensions plus solidity, since it is
 not the part of the irrational sense but of some rational
 faculty to perceive everything which is perceived
 owing to the concurrence of several elements, body will
 not be an object of sense. And even if it should be 227
 sensible, it will, once again, be incapable of being
 taught.^a For no sensible thing is taught,—as, for
 instance, no one learns to see the white, or to taste
 the sweet, to derive a sweet smell from something,
 to feel cold or heat, but the perception of all these
 things is untaught. So, then, neither is body sensible
 nor, should it be sensible, will it on that account be
 capable of being taught.—Moreover, even supposing 228
 it to be intelligible it cannot be taught. For if
 neither length by itself is body, nor breadth nor
 depth, but the compound of them all, as they are all
 incorporeal we shall have to conceive of the combina-
 tion of them as being incorporeal and not body; and
 because of this body is also incapable of being taught.
 Also, some bodies are sensible, others intelligible. 229
 Hence, if body is taught, either the sensible is taught
 or the intelligible. But neither is the sensible
 taught (because it appears and is of itself quite
 evident to all), nor the intelligible (because of its
 obscurity and the hitherto undecided controversy
 about it, some saying that it is indivisible, others
 divisible, and some that it is without parts and
 minimal, others that it has parts and can be divided
ad infinitum^b). Body, therefore, is not capable of
 being taught.—Nor, indeed, is the incorporeal. For 230
 it is either a Platonic Idea, or the "expression" of

- στωικοῖς λεκτὸν ἢ κενὸν ἢ τόπος ἢ χρόνος ἢ ἄλλο
 τι τῶν τοιούτων. ὁ τι δ' ἂν ἦ τούτων, ἔτι ζητου-
 μένην καὶ ἀνεπικρίτως διαφωνουμένην ἔχει τὴν
 231 ὑπόστασιν· τὸ δὲ τὰ ἐπι ἀμφισβητούμενα ὡς ἀν-
 ἀμφίλεκτα λέγειν διδάσκεισθαι τελῶς ἐστὶν ἄπορον.
 ἀλλ' εἰ τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ σώματα τὰ δὲ
 ἀσώματα, δέδεικται δὲ μηθὲν τούτων διδασκόμενον,
 οὐθὲν ἐστὶ τὸ διδασκόμενον.
- 232 Καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ διδάσκεται τι, ἤτοι ἀληθές ἐστὶν ἢ
 ψεῦδος. καὶ ψεῦδος μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ὡς αὐτόθεν
 φαίνεται· ἀληθές δ' εἴπερ ἐστίν, ἄπορον ἐστὶν, ὡς
 ἐν τοῖς περὶ κριτηρίου ἐδείξαμεν, καὶ περὶ ἀπόρων
 οὐκ ἐστὶ μαθήσις· οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ διδασκόμενον.
- 233 πρὸς τούτοις τὸ διδασκόμενον ἢ τεχνικόν
 ἐστὶν ἢ ἄτεχνον. ἀλλ' ἄτεχνον μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπεὶ
 οὐδὲ δεῖσεται μαθήσεως. εἰ δὲ τεχνικόν ἐστὶν, ἤτοι
 αὐτόθεν φαίνεται ἢ ἀδηλόν ἐστὶν. καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτό-
 θεν φαίνεται, καὶ ἄτεχνόν ἐστὶ καὶ ἀδιδασκόν· εἰ δὲ
 ἀδηλόν ἐστὶν, οὐ γίνεται δι' αὐτὸ τὸ ἀδηλεῖσθαι
 διδασκόν.
- 234 Ἐκ τούτων μὲν οὖν ἄπορον παρίσταται τὸ δι-
 δασκόμενον πρᾶγμα· συναναιρείται δ' αὐτῷ ὁ τε
 διδάσκων διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ὁ διδάξει, ὁ τε μανθάνων
 διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ὁ μάθη. οὐθὲν δ' ἦττον ἔσται καὶ
 235 ἐπ' αὐτῶν τούτων τὰς ὁμοίας κινεῖν ἀπορίας. εἰ
 γὰρ ἐστὶ τις ὁ διδάσκων καὶ ἔστι τις ὁ μανθάνων,
 ἤτοι τεχνίτης τὸν τεχνίτην διδάξει ἢ ἄτεχνος τὸν
 ἄτεχνον ἢ ἐναλλάξ ὁ τεχνίτης τὸν ἄτεχνον ἢ ἄτεχνος
 τὸν τεχνίτην. οὐτε δὲ ὁ ἄτεχνος τὸν ἄτεχνον

* Cf. *Adv. Phys.* ii. 258 ; *Adv. Log.* ii. 12.

^b With §§ 232-233 cf. *P.H.* iii. 253.

the Stoics, or void or place or time or something else of the kind.^a But whichever of these it be, its real existence is still a matter of doubt and of unsettled controversy. But to say that things still in dispute 231 are taught as though they were uncontroverted is perfectly absurd. But if of things existent some are bodies, others incorporeal, and it has been shown that none of these is taught, then what is taught is nothing.

Yet again : if anything is taught, it is either true 232 or false.^b But it is not false, as is apparent at once ; and if it is true it is doubtful, as we have shown in our chapter "On the Criterion," and concerning things doubtful no learning exists. Therefore what is taught does not exist.—Furthermore, what is 233 taught is either technical or non-technical. But it is not non-technical, since then it would not require learning. And if it is technical, either it is apparent of itself or it is non-evident. But if it is apparent of itself, it is both non-technical and incapable of being taught ; while if it is non-evident, because of the very fact of its being non-evident it is not capable of being taught.

By these arguments it is established that the thing 234 taught is open to doubt^c ; and along with it both the teacher is abolished, because he will have nothing to teach, and the learner, because he will have nothing to learn. None the less, in their case also it will be possible to raise similar difficulties. For if a teacher 235 exists and a learner exists, either the expert will teach the expert, or the non-expert the non-expert, or conversely the expert the non-expert, or the non-expert the expert. But neither can the non-expert

^c With §§ 234-238 cf. *P.H.* iii. 259-260.

διδάσκει δύναται, ὡς οὐδὲ ὁ τυφλὸς τὸν τυφλὸν
 ὀδηγεῖν, οὐθ' ὁ τεχνίτης τὸν τεχνίτην· οὐ γὰρ
 ἔχει πάντως ὁ διδάξει. οὔτε μὴν ὁ ἄτεχνος τὸν
 τεχνίτην, ὡς οὐδὲ ὁ τυφλὸς ὀδηγεῖν ποτὲ δύναται
 τὸν βλέποντα· πεπήρωται γὰρ ὁ ἰδιώτης εἰς τὰ τῆς
 236 τῆς τέχνης θεωρήματα, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἀνεπιτήδειος πρὸς
 τὸ διδάσκειν. ἀπολείπεται οὖν λέγειν ὅτι ὁ
 τεχνίτης τὸν ἰδιώτην διδάσκει, ὃ πάλιν τῶν ἀμη-
 χάνων· καὶ γὰρ ὁ τεχνίτης συνηπόρηται ἡμῖν τοῖς
 237 τῆς τέχνης θεωρήμασι, καὶ ὁ ἄτεχνος εἰ διδάσκεται
 καὶ γίνεται τεχνίτης, ἥτοι ὅτε ἄτεχνός ἐστι γίνεται
 τεχνίτης ἢ ὅτε τεχνίτης ἐστίν, οὔτε δὲ ὅτε ἄτεχνός
 ἐστὶ δύναται γίνεσθαι τεχνίτης, οὔτε ὅτε τεχνίτης
 238 ἐστὶν ἔτι γίνεται τεχνίτης, ἀλλ' ἐστίν. καὶ κατὰ
 λόγον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄτεχνος ἔοικε τῷ ἐκ γενετῆς
 τυφλῷ ἢ κωφῷ, καὶ ὃν τρόπον οὔτε ὁ ἐκ γενετῆς
 τυφλὸς εἰς ἔννοιαν ἔρχεται χρωμάτων οὔτε ὁ ἐκ
 γενετῆς κωφὸς εἰς ἔννοιαν ἔρχεται φωνῶν, οὕτω καὶ
 ὁ ἄτεχνος, ἐφ' ὅσον ἐστὶν ἄτεχνος, πεπηρωμένος
 πρὸς τὴν τῶν τεχνικῶν θεωρημάτων ἀντίληψιν οὐ
 δύναται τούτων αὐτῶν ἔχειν τὴν γνώσιν. ὁ δὲ
 τεχνίτης οὐκέτι διδάσκεται ἀλλὰ δεδιδάκται.
 239 Καὶ μὴν ὡς ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἄπορα, οὕτω καὶ ὁ
 τρόπος τῆς μαθήσεώς ἐστὶν ἄπορος. ἢ γὰρ ἐναρ-
 γεία γίνεται ἢ λόγῳ· οὔτε δὲ ἐναργεία οὔτε λόγῳ
 γίνεται, ὡς παραστήσομεν, ὥστε οὐδὲ ὁ τρόπος τῆς
 240 μαθήσεώς ἐστὶν εὐπορος. ἐναργεία μὲν οὖν οὐ
 γίνεται μάθησις, ἐπεὶ τῶν δεικνυμένων ἐστὶν ἢ
 ἐναργεία, τὸ δὲ δεικτόν ἐστι φαινόμενον· τὸ δὲ

^a Cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 55.

^b Cf. *P.H.* iii. 264.

• With §§ 239-242 cf. *P.H.* iii. 266-268.

teach the non-expert (just as the blind cannot lead
 the blind ^a) nor the expert the expert, for certainly
 he has nothing to teach him. Nor yet the non-expert
 the expert, just as the blind man can never lead the
 man who sees; for the layman is incapacitated for
 grasping the theorems of the art, and on this account is
 unfitted for teaching.—It remains, then, to say that the 236
 expert teaches the layman, which again is a thing im-
 practicable; for together with the theorems of the
 art the expert was doubted by us; and the non-expert 237
 too, if he is taught and becomes an expert, becomes
 an expert either when he is non-expert or when he is
 expert; but he cannot become an expert when he
 is non-expert, and when he is expert he no longer
 becomes an expert but is one. And reasonably so; 238
 for the non-expert resembles the man who is blind or
 deaf from birth, and just as he who is blind from birth ^b
 does not attain to a conception of colours, nor does
 he who is deaf from birth attain to a conception of
 sounds, so also the non-expert, in so far as he is non-
 expert, seeing that he is incapacitated for grasping
 the technical theorems cannot possess knowledge of
 them. And the expert is no longer being taught but
 has been taught.

Moreover, just as these things are doubtful, so also 239
 is the method of learning doubtful.^c For learning
 takes place either by the evidence of the senses or by
 speech. But, as we shall establish, it takes place
 neither by evidence nor by speech, so that the method
 of learning is not free from doubt either. Now 240
 learning is not by means of evidence, since evidence
 is of things pointed out. But what can be pointed
 out is apparent; and the apparent, in so far as it is

φαινόμενον, ἢ φαίνεται, κοινῶς πᾶσι ληπτὸν ἔστι, τὸ δὲ κοινῶς πᾶσι ληπτὸν ἀδίδακτον. οὐκ ἄρα τὸ
 241 ἐναργεῖα δευκτὸν διδακτὸν ἔστιν. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ λόγῳ τι διδάσκεται. ἢ γὰρ σημαίνει τι ὁ λόγος ἢ οὐδὲ ἐν σημαίνει. ἀλλὰ μὴδὲ ἐν σημαίνων οὐδ' ἔστιαι τινὸς διδάσκαλος. εἰ δὲ σημαίνει τι, ἦτοι φύσει σημαίνει ἢ θέσει. καὶ φύσει μὲν οὐ σημαίνει διὰ τὸ μὴ πάντας πάντων ἀκούειν, <οἶον>¹ Ἕλληνας
 242 βαρβάρων καὶ βαρβάρους Ἑλλήνων, θέσει δ' εἶπερ σημαίνει, δῆλον ὡς οἱ μὲν προκατειληφότες καθ' ὧν αἱ λέξεις εἰσὶ τεταγμένοι ἀντιλήψονται τούτων, οὐκ ἐξ αὐτῶν διδασκόμενοι ἄπερ ἡγνόουν, ἀλλ' ἀναμνησκόμενοι καὶ ἀνανοούμενοι ταυθ' ἄπερ ἦδεσαν, οἱ δὲ χρῆζοντες τῆς τῶν ἀγνοουμένων μαθήσεως, καὶ ἀγνοοῦντες καθ' ὧν εἰσὶ τεταγμένοι
 243 αἱ λέξεις, οὐδενὸς ἀντιλήψιν ἔξουσιν. διόπερ εἰ μήτε τὸ διδασκόμενον ἔστι πρᾶγμα μήτε ὁ διδάσκων μήτε ὁ μαθάνων μήτε ὁ τρόπος τῆς μαθήσεως, οὐδὲν ἔστι μάθησις.

Κουώτερον μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἐπιχειρεῖται τοῖς σκεπτικοῖς εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι μάθησιν· ἐνέσται δὲ μεταφέρεω τὰς ἀπορίας καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν λεγομένην περὶ
 244 τὸν βίον τέχνην. ἦτοι γὰρ ὁ φρόνιμος τὸν φρόνιμον ταύτην διδάξει ἢ ὁ ἄφρων τὸν ἄφρονα ἢ ὁ ἄφρων τὸν φρόνιμον ἢ ὁ φρόνιμος τὸν ἄφρονα. οὔτε δὲ ὁ φρόνιμος τὸν φρόνιμον λέγοιτ' ἂν ταύτην διδάσκειν, ἀμφοτέροι γὰρ τέλειοι κατ' ἀρετὴν εἰσι καὶ οὐδέτερος αὐτῶν δέεται μαθήσεως, οὔτε ὁ ἄφρων τὸν ἄφρονα, ἀμφοτέροι γὰρ χρεῖαν ἔχουσι μαθήσεως

¹ <οἶον> add. cj. Heintz.

* Cf. P.H. ii. 214.

apparent, is perceptible by all alike, and what is perceptible by all alike is incapable of being taught. Therefore what is pointed out by evidence is not capable of being taught. Nor yet is anything taught by speech. For either the speech signifies something 241 or it signifies nothing. But if it signifies nothing it will not be a teacher of anything. And if it signifies something, it signifies either by nature or by convention. But it does not signify by nature,^a because all men do not hear all men,—Greeks, for instance, barbarians and barbarians Greeks. And if it signifies by convention, evidently those who have apprehended 242 beforehand the objects to which the terms are assigned will comprehend those terms, not because they are taught by them things of which they were ignorant but by recalling and being reminded of the things which they knew; while those who need to learn the unknown things, and are in ignorance of the things to which the terms are assigned, will have no comprehension of anything. Wherefore, if neither the thing taught exists nor the teacher nor the learner 243 nor the method of learning, learning is nothing.

These, then, are the objections of a more general character brought forward by the Sceptics to show the non-existence of learning^b; and it will be possible also to apply these difficulties in turn to the so-called art of life. For either the wise man will teach this to the wise, or the unwise to the unwise, or the unwise 244 to the wise, or the wise to the unwise. But neither would the wise man be said to teach it to the wise (for both are perfect in virtue and neither of them needs to learn), nor the unwise to the unwise (for both of them have need of learning and neither of

^b With §§ 243-246 cf. P.H. iii. 270-272.

καὶ οὐθέτερος αὐτῶν φρόνιμος (ἔστιν),¹ ἵνα τὸν
 245 ἕτερον διδάξῃ. καὶ μὴν οὐδ' ὁ ἄφρων διδάξει τὸν
 φρόνιμον· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ τυφλὸς μνηστικός γίνεται τῷ
 βλέποντι χρωμάτων. λείπεται ἄρα τὸν φρόνιμον
 διδακτικὸν εἶναι τοῦ ἄφρονος· ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ τῶν
 246 ἀπόρων. εἰ γὰρ ἡ φρόνησις ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη ἀγα-
 θῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐθετέρων, ὁ ἄφρων μὴ ἔχων
 τινὰ φρόνησιν, ἄγνοιαν δὲ ἔχων τούτων πάντων,
 διδάσκοντος τοῦ φρονίμου τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ καὶ
 οὐθέτερα ἀκούσεται μόνον τῶν λεγομένων, οὐ
 γνώσεται δ' αὐτά. εἰ γὰρ ἀντιλαμβάνοιτο αὐτῶν
 ἐν ἀφροσύνῃ καθεστώς, ἔσται ἡ ἀφροσύνη τῶν τε
 ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐθετέρων γνωριστική. οὐχὶ
 δὲ γε τούτων κατ' αὐτοὺς ἐστὶν ἡ ἀφροσύνη θεω-
 ρητική· ὁ ἄρα ἄφρων οὐκ ἀντιλήψεται τῶν ὑπὸ
 τοῦ φρονίμου λεγομένων ἢ πραττομένων κατὰ τὸν
 247 τῆς φρονήσεως λόγον. καὶ ὃν τρόπον ὁ ἐκ γενετῆς
 πηρὸς, μέχρις οὗ πηρὸς ἐστίν, οὐκ ἔχει ἔννοιαν
 χρωμάτων, καὶ ὁ ἐκ γενετῆς κωφός, μέχρις οὗ
 κωφός ἐστίν, οὐκ ἀντιλαμβάνεται φωνῶν, οὕτω καὶ
 ὁ ἄφρων, ἐφ' ὅσον ἄφρων ἐστίν, οὐκ ἀντιλαμβάνεται
 τῶν φρονίμως λεγομένων καὶ πραττομένων. οὐδ'
 ὁ φρόνιμος ἄρα δύναται τοῦ ἄφρονος ἐν τῇ περὶ τὸν
 248 βίον τέχνῃ καθηγεῖσθαι. καὶ μὴν εἰ ὁ φρόνιμος
 διδάσκει τὸν ἄφρονα, θεωρητικὴ ὀφείλει εἶναι ἡ
 φρόνησις τῆς ἀφροσύνης ὡσπερ καὶ ἡ τέχνη τῆς
 ἀτεχνίας· οὐχὶ δὲ γε ἡ φρόνησις δύναται εἶναι
 θεωρητικὴ τῆς ἀφροσύνης· οὐκ ἄρα ὁ φρόνιμος τοῦ
 ἄφρονος ἐστὶ διδακτικός. ὁ γὰρ γενόμενος φρό-
 νιμος ἐκ τινος συνασκήσεως καὶ τριβῆς (φύσει γὰρ

¹ <ἔστιν> addo (post αὐτῶν add. Mutsch.).

them is wise so as to teach the other). Nor yet will 245
 the unwise teach the wise; for neither is the blind
 man capable of instructing the man who sees about
 colours. It only remains, therefore, that the wise
 man is capable of teaching the unwise; and this too
 is a matter of doubt. For if wisdom is "the science 246
 of things good and evil and neither,"^a the unwise
 man, when the wise man is teaching him the things
 good and evil and neither, will merely hear the things
 spoken and will not know the things themselves,^b
 since he does not possess any wisdom but is in ignor-
 ance of all these things. For if he should comprehend
 them while he is in a state of unwisdom, unwisdom
 will be capable of knowing things good and evil and
 neither. But, according to them, unwisdom is not
 capable of perceiving these things; therefore the
 unwise man will not comprehend the things said or
 done by the wise man in pursuance of the rule of his
 wisdom. And just as he who is blind from birth,^c so 247
 long as he is blind, has no conception of colours, and
 he who is deaf from birth, so long as he is deaf, does
 not apprehend sounds, so also the unwise man, in so
 far as he is unwise, does not comprehend things
 wisely said and done. Neither, therefore, can the
 wise man guide the unwise in the art of life.—
 Moreover, if the wise man teaches the unwise, wisdom 248
 must be cognisant of unwisdom, even as art is of lack
 of art; but wisdom cannot be cognisant of unwisdom;
 therefore the wise man is not capable of teaching the
 unwise. For he who has become wise owing to some
 joint exercise^d and practice (for no one is such by

^a Cf. § 170 *supra*.

^b Cf. §§ 238, 242 *supra*.

^c Cf. *Adv. Phys.* ii. 175. With § 247 cf. *P.H.* iii. 264.

^d i.e. simultaneous training of several parts or faculties:
cf. Adv. Log. i. 146.

οὐδείς ἐστι τοιοῦτος) ἤτοι ὑποκειμένης ἐν αὐτῷ
 τῆς ἀφροσύνης προσεκτῆσατο τὴν φρόνησιν, ἢ κατὰ
 τὴν ἐκείνης ἀποβολὴν καὶ τὴν ταύτης κτῆσιν γέγονε
 249 φρόνιμος. καὶ εἰ μὲν ὑποκειμένης ἐν αὐτῷ τῆς
 ἀφροσύνης προσεκτῆσατο τὴν φρόνησιν, ἔσται ὁ
 αὐτὸς φρόνιμος ἅμα καὶ ἀφρων· ὃ ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον.
 εἰ δ' ἀποβολῇ ἐκείνης ἐκτῆσατο ταύτην, οὐ δυνή-
 σεται διὰ τῆς ὑστερογενοῦς διαθέσεως τὴν προ-
 οῦσαν διάθεσιν, νῦν δὲ μὴ παρούσαν γνωρίζειν.
 250 καὶ εἰκότως. παντὸς γοῦν πράγματος αἰσθητοῦ
 ἢ νοητοῦ γίνεται κατάληψις ἤτοι κατὰ ἐνάργειαν
 περιπτωτικῶς ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν περιπτωτικῶς
 πεφηνότων ἀναλογιστικὴν μετάβασιν, καὶ ταύτην
 251 ἤτοι ὁμοιωτικὴν, ὡς ὅταν ἀπὸ τῆς Σωκράτους
 εἰκόνος γνωρίζηται ὁ μὴ παρὼν Σωκράτης, ἢ
 συνθετικὴν, ὡς ὅταν ἀπ' ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἵππου κατ'
 ἐπισύνθεσιν νοῶμεν τὸν ἀνύπαρκτον ἵπποκένταυρον,
 ἢ κατὰ ἀναλογίαν, ὡς ὅταν ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀνθρώ-
 που παραυξητικῶς μὲν λαμβάνηται ὁ Κύκλωψ, ὃς
 οὐκ ἐψέκει

ἀνδρὶ γε σιτοφάγῳ ἀλλὰ ρίψι ὑλήεντι,

252 μειωτικῶς δὲ ὁ πυγμαῖος ἄνθρωπος. ὅθεν εἰ καὶ
 τῇ φρονήσει λαμβάνεται ἢ ἀφροσύνη καὶ τῷ φρο-
 νίμῳ ὁ ἀφρων, ἤτοι κατὰ περίπτωσιν θεωρεῖται ἢ
 κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς περιπτώσεως μετάβασιν. οὔτε
 δὲ κατὰ περίπτωσιν θεωρεῖται (οὐδείς γὰρ ὡς
 λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν καὶ γλυκὺ καὶ πικρὸν κατὰ
 περίπτωσιν ἔγνω, οὔτω καὶ ἀφροσύνην) οὔτε κατὰ

nature) either has acquired wisdom in addition while
 his unwisdom still subsists within him, or else has
 become wise through getting rid of the latter and
 acquiring the former. But if he has acquired wisdom 249
 in addition while his unwisdom still subsists within
 him, the same man will be at once both wise and un-
 wise, which is impossible. And if he has acquired the
 former by getting rid of the latter, he will not be able
 to know his pre-existing condition, which is not now
 present, by means of a condition of later origin. And 250
 naturally so^a; for certainly the apprehension of
 every object, whether sensible or intelligible, comes
 about either empirically by way of sense-evidence or
 by way of analogical inference from things which
 have appeared empirically, this latter being either
 through resemblance (as when Socrates, not being
 present, is recognized from the likeness of Socrates), 251
 or through composition (as when from a man and a
 horse we form by compounding them the conception
 of the non-existent hippocentaur), or by way of
 analogy (as when from the ordinary man there is
 conceived by magnification the Cyclops who was

Less like a corn-eating man than a forest-clad peak of
 the mountains,^b

and by diminution the pygmy). Hence, if unwisdom 252
 is perceived by wisdom and also the unwise man by
 the wise, the perception takes place either by experi-
 ence or by inference from experience. But the per-
 ception does not take place by experience (for no one
 gets to know wisdom in the same way as white and
 black and sweet and bitter), nor by inference from

^a With §§ 250-251 cf. *Adv. Log.* ii. 58-60; *Adv. Phys.*
 i. 393-395.

^b Homer, *Odys.* ix. 191; cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 45.

τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς περιπτώσεως μετάβασιν· οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν εἰκὸς ἀφροσύνη· [εἰ δ' ἀπὸ τούτου ποιεῖται τὴν μετάβασιν ὁ φρόνιμος, ἥτοι ὁμοιωτικὴν ἢ συνθετικὴν ἢ ἀναλογιστικὴν,]¹ ὥστε οὐ
 253 λήψεται ποτε τὴν ἀφροσύνην ἢ φρόνησιν. ναί, ἀλλ' ἴσως τις ἔρει ὅτι ὁ φρόνιμος τῇ ἐν αὐτῷ φρονήσει τὴν περὶ ἄλλον ἀφροσύνην δύναται κατανοεῖν· ὅπερ ἐστὶν εὐθες. ἡ γὰρ ἀφροσύνη διάθεσίς
 254 ἐστὶν ἔργων τῶν ἀποδοτικῆ. εἰ οὖν αὐτὴν ἐν ἄλλῳ θεωρεῖ καὶ καταλαμβάνεται ὁ φρόνιμος, ἥτοι αὐτὴν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς καταλήψεται τὴν διάθεσιν, ἢ τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτῆς ἐπιβάλλων ἀπὸ τούτων καὶ αὐτὴν
 255 γνωρεῖ, καθάπερ τὴν μὲν ἰατρικὴν διάθεσιν ἀπὸ τῶν ἰατρικῶς γινομένων ἔργων, τὴν δὲ ζωγραφικὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ζωγραφικῶς γινομένων. οὔτε δὲ αὐτὴν ἐξ αὐτῆς δύναται τὴν διάθεσιν λαβεῖν· ἀφανὴς γάρ ἐστι καὶ ἀθεώρητος, καὶ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἐστὶν αὐτὴν διὰ τῆς τοῦ σώματος μορφῆς περιαιρηθῆσαι· οὔτε ἐκ τῶν ὑπὸ αὐτῆς ἀποδιδόμενων ἔργων· πάντα γὰρ τὰ φαινόμενα ἔργα, καθάπερ καὶ πρότερον ἐδείκνυμεν, κοινὰ
 256 φρονήσεως καὶ ἀφροσύνης ἐστίν. ἀλλ' εἴπερ, ἵνα ὁ φρόνιμος τὸν ἀφρονα διδάξῃ τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνην, δεῖ θεωρητικὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι τῆς ἀφροσύνης καθάπερ καὶ τὸν τεχνίτην τῆς ἀτεχνίας, δέδεικται δ' ἀληπτος αὐτῷ ἢ ἀφροσύνη, οὐκ ἂν δύναίτο ὁ φρόνιμος τὸν ἀφρονα τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνην διδάσκειν.
 257 Καὶ δὴ τὰ συνεκτικώτατα τῶν κατὰ τὸν ἠθικὸν τόπον ζητουμένων ἠπορηκότες, ἐν τοσοῦτοις τὴν σύμπασαν τῆς σκεπτικῆς ἀγωγῆς διέξοδον ἀπαρτίζομεν.

¹ [εἰ δ' . . . ἀναλογιστικὴν] secl. ego (ἀλλ' L, ἰν' E, οὐδ' R, εἰ δ' cet., Bekk.: ? ἰν' . . . ποιῆται κτλ.).

experience (for no existing thing resembles un wisdom) [But if the wise man makes the inference from this, it is either through resemblance or through composition or through analogy]; so that wisdom will never perceive un wisdom.—Yes, but possibly someone will
 253 say that the wise man can discern the un wisdom of another by the wisdom within himself; but this is puerile. For un wisdom is a condition productive of certain works. If, then, the wise man sees and
 254 apprehends this in another, either he will apprehend the condition directly by means of itself, or by attention to its works he will also get to know the condition itself, just as one knows the condition of the medical
 255 man from works in accordance with the art of medicine, and that of the painter from works in accordance with the art of painting. But he cannot perceive the condition by means of itself; for it is obscure and invisible, and it is not possible to view it closely through the shape of the body; nor by means of the works which result from it; for all the apparent works are, as we showed above,^a common to wisdom and un wisdom alike. But if it is necessary
 256 that the wise man, in order that he may teach the art of life to the un wise, should himself be capable of perceiving un wisdom—even as the artist lack of art,—and it has been shown that un wisdom is to him imperceptible, then the wise man will not be able to teach the un wise the art of life.

So now that we have critically discussed the most
 257 essential of the problems which belong to the department of Ethics, we herewith bring to a close the whole of our exposition of the Sceptic Way.^b

^a See §§ 197-209 *supra*.

^b For this expression cf. *P.H.* i. 4 n.

GLOSSARY

[In the Glossary and Indexes the following abbreviations are used:

- I. = Introduction (in Vol. I.);
- P. = "Outlines of Pyrrhonism" (in Vol. I.);
- L. = "Against the Logicians" (in Vol. II.);
- Ph. = "Against the Physicists" (in Vol. III.);
- E. = "Against the Ethicists" (in Vol. III.).]

- ἀγωγή*, (doctrinal) procedure, method: *ἡ σκεπτικὴ ἀγ.*, "the Sceptic Way," P. i. 4, 7, etc.
- ἀδιάκριτος*, indistinguishable, P. ii. 152, 155 f.
- ἀδιάπτωτος* (*φαντασία*), unerring, infallible, L. i. 110, etc.
- ἀδιάστροφος*, unperverted, acting instinctively, P. iii. 194.
- ἀδιάφορα*, "indifferents," *i.e.* (in Stoic ethics) things which lie midway between "good" and "evil"; see P. iii. 177, Vol. I. Introd. p. xxvii.
- ἀδοξάστως* (oppd. to *δογματικῶς*), undogmatically, P. i. 15.
- ἀθετεῖν*, set aside, reject, L. i. 260; so *ἀθέτησις*, L. ii. 142;
- ἄθετος πρὸς* (*τι*), unfitted for, L. i. 183.
- ἀθιγής*, intangible, Ph. i. 281, etc.
- αἰρεσιάρχης*, leader or Head of a School or sect, P. iii. 245.
- αἶρεσις*, choice, approval, preference, P. i. 230; "doctrinal rule," P. i. 16; sect, School, L. i. 27, etc.
- αἶρετά*, preferred, choiceworthy (oppd. to *φευκτά*), P. i. 55, etc.
- ἀκαθεκτούμενον* (oppd. to *κατεχόμενον*), unoccupied (space), P. iii. 124, Ph. ii. 3.
- ἀκαρές*: *πρὸς ἀκ.*, for a moment, suddenly, E. 154.
- ἀκαριαῖος*, minute, momentary, P. i. 132, iii. 142: *κατὰ τὸ ἀκ.*, to the smallest extent, a hair's breadth, P. iii. 79.
- ἀκαταληπτεῖν*, be non-apprehensive, fail to grasp, P. i. 201; so *ἀκατάληπτος*, P. ii. 22: *ἀκαταληψία*, P. i. 1.
- ἀκμήν* (*adv. accus.*), still, just (while), P. ii. 11, iii. 276, L. ii. 257, E. 213.
- ἀκολουθία*, (logical) sequence, coherence, P. i. 16, ii. 114: pursued method, practice, P. i. 237.
- ἀκύλιστος* (Timon), lacking in versatility or energy, Ph. i. 57.

GLOSSARY

- ἀμνήριμος* (c. genit., Timon), untroubled by, heedless of, P. i. 224.
- ἀμφιβολία*, verbal ambiguity, P. ii. 256 (cf. Diog. L. vii. 62).
- ἀναιρεῖν*, abolish (logically), deny (oppd. to *τιθέναι*, posit, affirm), P. i. 19, iii. 119, etc.
- ἀναλογία*, proportion, L. i. 106.
- ἀναλογισμὸς*, (reasoning from) analogy, P. i. 147; so *ἀναλογιστικός*, E. 250.
- ἀνάλυσις* (*συλλογισμῶν*), analysis, resolution, L. ii. 231.
- ἀναμφίλεκτος* (oppd. to *ἀμφισβητούμενος*), undisputed, E. 231.
- ἀναντίτυπος* (oppd. to *ἀντίτυπος*), non-resistant, yielding, Ph. i. 411.
- ἀναπόδεικτοι* (*λόγοι*), indemonstrable (of syllogisms or principles assumed, as not requiring demonstration), P. i. 69 n., ii. 156 ff.; so *ἀναποδείκτως*, without demonstration, P. i. 60, etc.
- ἀνασκευαστικός*, (logically) destructive, contradictory (oppd. to *κατασκευαστικός*), L. ii. 196.
- ἀναστροφή*: *κατὰ ἄν.*, reversely, *vice versa*, L. i. 430; so *ἀναστροφῶς*, L. i. 302, etc.
- ἀνεπίκριτος* (*διαφάνεια*), incapable of decision, unsettled, P. i. 98, 112, etc.; so *ἀνεπικρισία*, E. 182.
- ἀνεπίνοητος*, inconceivable, P. ii. 22, etc.; so *-ήτως*, imperceptibly, P. iii. 145.
- ἀνεπίτατος*, inextensible, Ph. ii. 272 (cf. *ἐπίτασις*).
- ἀνετεροίωτος*, immutable, unaltered, L. ii. 455.
- ἀνέφικτος*, unattainable, E. 130.
- ἀνηρεμήτως*, unrestingly, Ph. ii. 223.
- ἀνυποφέρειν*, object, retort, L. i. 440.
- ἀνοχητικῶς*, by heaving up, Ph. ii. 83 f.
- ἀντακολουθεῖν*, mutually follow, involve, be interdependent, P. i. 68 (cf. Diog. L. vii. 125).
- ἀντίληψις*, perception, apprehension, P. i. 44, etc.; so *ἀντιληπτικός*, P. i. 70.
- ἀντιπαρατείνεσθαι*, be stretched out side by side with, be extended so as to equal, Ph. i. 262, etc.
- ἀντιπαραεξαγωγή*: *κατὰ ἀντ.*, by way of attacking, as a counterblast, L. i. 150.
- ἀντιπαρήκειν*, stretch parallel to, be co-extensive with, L. i. 361, etc.
- ἀντιπεριέλκειν*, draw round to the other side, convert to an opposite belief, L. i. 189.

GLOSSARY

- ἀντιπίπτειν*, conflict, tell against, refute, P. i. 179, etc.: (c. dat.) L. i. 333.
- ἀντιποίησης*, seeking possession of, pursuit of, P. iii. 183.
- ἀντιστηρίζειν* (Democr.), press against, resist, L. i. 136.
- ἀντιστροφος*, corresponding, equivalent, L. i. 6.
- ἀντιτυπία*, resistance, solidity, P. iii. 39, etc.
- ἀνυπαρξία* (oppd. to *ὑπαρξίς*), unreality, non-existence, P. i. 21, etc.; so *ἀνυπαρκτος*, P. i. 104, etc.
- ἀνυπόστατος*, non-substantial, unreal, P. ii. 80.
- ἀνυτικώτατος* (*λόγος*), most effective, Ph. i. 182.
- ἀνωτάτω* (as adj.), most generic (or inclusive), main types of, P. i. 4, iii. 65; so *κατὰ τὸ ἄν.*, Ph. ii. 38, 45.
- ἀξίωμα*, (logical) judgement, proposition, assertion, P. i. 189, ii. 81, etc.
- ἀοριστία*, (Sceptic) indeterminateness, refusal to define, P. i. 198; so *ἀοριστέω*, P. i. 28.
- ἀόριστος* (*δύαδ*, Pythagorean), indefinite (Dyad, *i.e.* the "two" as principle of plurality), P. iii. 154.
- ἀόχλησία* (Epicur. and Sceptic), unperturbedness, serenity, P. i. 10; so *ἀόχλητος*, P. i. 29.
- ἀπαξία* (oppd. to *ἀξία*, Stoic ethics), worthlessness, E. 62.
- ἀπαράλλακτος*, indistinguishable, P. iii. 177, etc.; so *ἀπαράλλαξία*, L. i. 108, 403, etc.
- ἀπαρροπίστος*, unimpeded, clear, L. ii. 187, E. 76.
- ἀπαρέμφατον*, infinitive (mood), P. i. 204.
- ἀπαρτίζειν*, complete, express fully, P. ii. 176, E. 257.
- ἀπειρομεγέθης*, infinitely large, P. iii. 44.
- ἀπειρον*: *εἰς ἄπ.*, (regress) *ad infinitum*, P. ii. 78, etc.; so *μέχρις ἀπείρου*, P. i. 122, etc.
- ἀπεκλογή* (oppd. to *ἐκλογή*, Stoic), rejection, E. 133.
- ἀπεμφαίνεω*, be incongruous, absurd, P. i. 112, ii. 188, etc.; so *ἀπέμφασις*, P. iii. 61 (= "improbable presentation," Carneades), L. i. 169.
- ἀπερίαντος* (*λόγος*), indefinite, inconclusive, L. ii. 429.
- ἀπεριέργως*, simply, not positively or dogmatically, P. 240.
- ἀπερίσπαστος* (*φαντασία*), irreversible, indubitable, P. i. 227, L. i. 166.
- ἀπλανής*, unerring, infallible, L. i. 138, 146, etc.; so *ἀπλανησία*, L. i. 394.
- ἀπλάτεις* (*μήκος*), (length) without breadth (def. of *γραμμῆς*), P. iii. 39, Ph. ii. 279, etc.

GLOSSARY

ἀποπαθεῖς (αἰσθήσεις), simply-passive, *i.e.* receptive of only one kind of impression, P. iii. 47, 108.
 ἀπό: οἱ ἀπὸ (τῆς Στοᾶς), members of (the Stoic School), P. iii. 181 etc.
 ἀποβρασμός, frothy emission (of a fluid), Ph. i. 103.
 ἀπόδοσις, account rendered, description, E. 30.
 ἀποδοτικός (c. genit.), productive of, E. 253.
 ἀποιος (ἄλη), devoid of quality, P. iii. 33, Ph. ii. 310, etc.
 ἀποκληρωτικός, acting at random, capricious, P. iii. 79.
 ἀπολείπειν (oppd. to ἀναίρειν), admit, allow (the existence or truth of a thing), P. ii. 43, 219, etc.
 ἀπόλυτα (oppd. to πρὸς τι), absolute, existing in their own right, L. ii. 273; so ἀπολύτως, P. i. 135, etc., and ἀπολελυμένως, L. ii. 162.
 ἀποπάλλειν, hurl away, Ph. ii. 73: ἀποπαλικῶς, by way of rebound, Ph. ii. 223.
 ἀποπροηγμένα (oppd. to προηγμένα), unpreferred, rejected, P. iii. 191, E. 62.
 ἀπορητικός, doubting, sceptical: οἱ ἀπ., Sceptics; ἡ ἀπ., Scepticism; P. i. 7, 221, etc.; so ἀπορητικῶς, L. i. 30, etc.
 ἀποροπόρητον (σῶμα), made without pores, impermeable, L. ii. 309.
 ἀποσυμβεβηκότα (oppd. to συμβεβηκότα), non-attributes, not properties, L. i. 281.
 ἀποσυνεργεῖν, thwart, counteract, P. i. 212.
 ἀποτελεσμα, completed result, product, P. iii. 11, 14, etc.; so ἀποτελεσματική, E. 197, ἀποτελεστικόν, P. iii. 27.
 ἀποτομή: κατ' ἀπ., separately, independently, L. i. 446.
 ἀπόφασις, declaration, formula, P. i. 5; affirmation (καταληπτική ἀπ.), P. ii. 123; so ἀποφαντόν, declaratory, P. ii. 104, ἀποφαντικόν, L. ii. 71.
 ἀπόφασις, negation, P. i. 192; ἀποφατικόν, negating, negative, P. i. 192, ii. 161, etc.
 ἀποφορά, effluvia, scent, P. i. 101; so ἀποφόρησις, P. i. 126.
 ἀπτερέως (Xenophanes), without wavering, firmly, L. i. 111.
 ἀππῶτως, firmly, securely, L. ii. 187.
 ἀραιώματα (νοητά), interstices, pores, L. ii. 220.
 ἀρρηψία (Sceptic), state of even balance, equipoise, mental neutrality, P. i. 190, L. ii. 159, etc.
 ἄρσις (oppd. to θέσις), removal, abolition, denial, P. i. 70, 192, iii. 86, etc.

GLOSSARY

ἀρχικώτατον (αἴτιον), most principal, original, supreme, Ph. i. 5, etc.
 ἄσημοι (φωναί), non-significant, without distinct meaning, P. ii. 130.
 ἀστεία (κίνησις), soothing, kindly, P. iii. 184, L. i. 42, 45.
 ἀσυγκαταθετεῖν, withhold assent (= ἐπέχεω), L. i. 157.
 ἀσύνακτος (λόγος), inconclusive (oppd. to συνακτικός), P. ii. 137, etc.
 ἀσυνάρτητα (λήμματα), inconsistent, without logical coherence, P. ii. 153 (*cf.* διάρρηξις).
 ἀσυνύπαρκτος, incapable of co-existence, P. ii. 202.
 ἀσύστατος (ἐπίνοια), without cohesion, impossible to construct, P. ii. 27.
 ἀταραξία (Sceptic), unperturbedness, quietude (of mind), P. i. 8, 25, etc.; so ἀταρακτεῖν, P. i. 12, etc., and ἀταραχῶς, E. 118, etc.
 αὐτόθεν, of itself, at once, *ipso facto*, P. ii. 164, *passim*.
 αὐτοτελής, self-complete, P. ii. 104; so αὐτοτελῶς, wholly of itself, independently, Ph. i. 237, etc.
 αὐτότης: κατ' αὐτότητα ἑάντης, in its self-identity, Ph. ii. 261.
 ἀφαίρεσις (oppd. to πρόσθεσις), subtraction, P. iii. 84, (distingd. fr. ἄρσις) P. iii. 86, (fr. ἀναίρεσις) Ph. i. 298.
 ἀφάνταστος (φύσις), devoid of apprehension, non-perceptive (oppd. to νοερά), Ph. i. 114.
 ἀφασία (oppd. to φάσις), non-assertion, (Sceptic) refusal to say "Yes" or "No" about anything, P. i. 192, ii. 211.
 ἀφορμή (oppd. to ὀρμή), disinclination, aversion (Stoic), P. iii. 177, 273-274, E. 210-211.

βίος, life, ordinary belief or conduct, P. i. 237; hence ὁ βίος and οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ β., ordinary folk (oppd. to philosophers), P. i. 165, etc., E. 49; so βιωτικός, P. i. 23; βιωτικά (κριτήρια), ordinary, taken from common life, P. ii. 15.

γενικώταται (αἰρέσεις), most comprehensive, leading (Schools), L. i. 27.
 γῆθος, joy, delight, E. 106.
 γλυκαντικῶς (κινεῖσθαι), (be affected by, or taste) sweetness, L. i. 344.
 γνησίη (oppd. to σκοτίη), genuine, true (γνώσις Democr.), L. i. 138-139.

GLOSSARY

γυμναστικοὶ (λόγοι), exercitatory, providing mental exercise (of the Socratic dialogues of Plato), P. i. 221.

- δεδολευμένος (λόγος), cunningly framed (sophism), P. ii. 229.
 δέγμα, indication, example, proof, P. i. 85; so δείγματος χάρην, by way of example, as specimens, E. 40.
 δείξis, pointing out, indicating, P. ii. 25, etc.; so δεικτικῶς, L. i. 267.
 διαγνωστική, capable of distinguishing, P. ii. 229; so διάγνωσις, ascertaining distinctly, discerning, L. i. 24.
 διάθεσις, condition, disposition, state (of mind or body), P. iii. 243, etc.
 διαθήκη (Democr.) = διάθεσις, L. i. 136.
 διαίρεσις, division (4 kinds of), P. ii. 213 ff.; τέλειος δ., E. 10; so διαιρητική, P. ii. 213.
 διάκενος (έλκυσμός), vacuous (attraction), of a purely subjective impression, L. i. 241, ii. 67.
 διαλεκτική, dialectic, logic (Stoic def., "Science of things false and true and neither"), P. ii. 94, 213, etc.; so of διαλεκτικοί, the Logicians, P. ii. 146, etc.
 διάλληλος (τρόπος), circular mode (of reasoning), arguing in a circle, P. i. 117, 164, etc.; so δ' δι' ἀλλήλων τρόπος, P. ii. 202, L. i. 426, etc.
 διά πασῶν (συμφωνία), the octave-scale (ratio of 2 : 1), P. iii. 155, L. i. 95; so διὰ τεσσάρων (= 4 : 3), and διὰ πέντε (= 3 : 2), *loc. cit.* (all terms of Pythagorean musical theory).
 διαπίπτειν, collapse, fail, go wrong, P. i. 185, (oppd. to κατορθοῦν) Ph. ii. 252.
 διάρηθις, inconsistency, lack of congruity (in the premisses of an argument), P. ii. 146, 152, L. ii. 429.
 διάστασις, dissension, dispute, L. ii. 11, 118, 177; (Spatial) dimension, P. iii. 44, 125, etc.; so (τριχῆ) διαστατόν, P. ii. 30, etc.
 διαφορά: τὰ κατὰ δ. (oppd. to τὰ πρὸς τ), things which have a distinct existence of their own, self-existent (= ἀπόλυτα, absolutes), P. i. 137, L. ii. 37, 161, Ph. ii. 263.
 διαφορούμενον (ἀξίωμα), duplicated, P. ii. 112, L. ii. 108, etc. (*cf.* Diog. L. vii. 69 : ? διαφορ., as Prantl).
 διεξωδευμένη (φαντασία), thoroughly scrutinized, tested, P. i. 227, L. i. 181, 438 (*cf.* περιωδευμένη).
 διήκειν (Methodic School), pervade, P. i. 240 n.; Ph. i. 40.
 διολκή, dissension, dispute, L. ii. 322.

GLOSSARY

- διομαλιμῶς, evenness, uniform quality, P. iii. 244, E. 206; so διομαλίζειν, not vary, E. 207.
 διοριστικός, capable of distinguishing, L. i. 64; serving to divide, marking off, Ph. ii. 128.
 διπλασίων (λόγος), duplicate (ratio), double, L. i. 97.
 διχάζειν, cut in two, divide, Ph. i. 292; so διχοτόμησις, bisection, Ph. i. 284.
 δογματολογίαί, expositions of dogmas, L. ii. 367.
 δοκιμαστικός, capable of scrutinizing, testing, L. i. 27, etc.
 δόκος (= δόξα, Xenophanes), opinion, P. ii. 18.
 δόκωσις, laying beams, rafting, P. iii. 99, Ph. i. 343.
 δοξαστής, one who opines, conjecturer, L. i. 157; so δοξαστικῶς, E. 156.
 δόξις (= δόξα, Democr.), opinion, L. i. 137.
 δραστήριος (ἀρχή), active, efficient, L. i. 115, etc.; so δραστική, P. iii. 1, δραστικώτατον (αἴτιον), P. iii. 2.
 δύναμις, ability, potency, P. i. 8, etc.; δυνάμει (oppd. to ἐνεργεία), potentially, virtually, implicitly, P. i. 11, ii. 225-226; ἰατρικαὶ δυνάμεις = medicines, P. i. 133, E. 153.
 ἐγγράμματος (φωνή), written (speech), Ph. ii. 249.
 ἐγκεκαλυμμένος (λόγος), "the Veiled" (classed, with the "Sorites," among the "insoluble" (ἀποροὶ) arguments by the Stoics, see Diog. L. vii. 82), L. i. 410.
 ἐβλοκωφείν, affect deafness, be wilfully obtuse, E. 202.
 εἰδησις, cognition, awareness, L. i. 163.
 εἶδος (oppd. to ὄλη), form, Ph. ii. 26; (distingd. fr. γένος) species, particular, L. ii. 41; so οἱ (τὰ) ἐπ' εἶδους (or κατ' εἶδος), particulars, individual cases, L. i. 20, E. 9, etc.
 εἰδωλοποιήσεις, image-formations, imaginary objects, P. ii. 222.
 εἰλικρίνεια, purity, Ph. i. 73; ἡ κατ' εἰλ. κίνησις, absolute (or complete) motion, Ph. ii. 113; so εἰλικρινῆς κριτής, impartial (perfect) judge, P. i. 113; εἰλικρινῶς, clearly, absolutely, P. i. 207, ii. 25, etc.
 εἰζίς (oppd. to ἀπιτυπία), yielding, non-resistance, Ph. ii. 221 ff.
 εἰσοχή (oppd. to ἐξοχή), concavity, depression, P. i. 92, ii. 70, etc.
 ἐκβάλλειν, throw over, reject, P. i. 177, etc.; ἐκβ. εἰς ἄπειρον, make regress *ad infinitum*, P. i. 164.
 ἐκκαλυπτικός, serving to reveal, disclosing, P. ii. 101, 116, etc.; so ἐκκαλυπτικῶς, by way of disclosure, P. ii. 141.

ἐκπεριθεύειν, (go right round,) inspect closely, scrutinize, L. i. 188 (*cf.* διεξοθεύειν).
 ἐκπίπτειν (c. genit.), be ousted from, lose, L. i. 268, etc.;
 ἐκπ. εἰς (ἀπειρον), be forced off into, be lost (wrecked) in, P. i. 186, ii. 253, etc.; so ἐκπτώσις, P. ii. 207, etc.
 ἐλαστρεῖν (= ἐλαύνειν, Timon), drive, worry, E. 172.
 ἐλκυσμός (διάκενος), (vacuous) attraction, or compulsion (of wholly subjective impressions), L. i. 241.
 ἐμμέθοδος (λόγος), orderly, systematic, P. ii. 21, 48.
 ἐμπειρία, practice, experience, P. ii. 256; (medical) empiricism, P. i. 236, L. ii. 191; so ἐμπειρικῶς (ιατρεύειν), L. ii. 204.
 ἐμπέλασις, approach, impact, Ph. i. 393; so ἐμπελάζειν (Democr.), Ph. i. 19.
 ἐμφασίς (reflection), probable subjective appearance (Carneades), L. i. 169; implication, P. ii. 112; indication, allusion, P. iii. 199.
 ἐναλλαγή (στοιχείων), interchange (of letters), Ph. i. 278.
 ἐναλλάξ, alternately, in turn, *alternando*, P. i. 9, 186, etc.
 ἐναπειροκαλεῖν, (deal tastelessly), fool with, P. ii. 245.
 ἐναπεισφραγισμένη (φαντασία), stamped (or imprinted) on (the mind), P. ii. 4; so ἐναπεισφραγισμένος, E. 183.
 ἐναπόθεσις (καταλήψεων), storing within, deposit, P. iii. 188.
 ἐναπομεμαγμένη (φαντασία), impressed upon (the mind), P. ii. 4 (*cf.* E. 183).
 ἐνάργεια (oppd. to λόγος), sensible evidence, P. iii. 266; sense-impression (= φαντασία, Epicur.), L. i. 203.
 ἐναρθροί (φωναί), articulate, L. ii. 275.
 ἐνδεικτικόν (σημείον), indicative (sign), P. ii. 99 ff., L. i. 161.
 ἐνδειξις, indication (techn. term of the Methodic School of Medicine), P. i. 240.
 ἐνδιάθετος (oppd. to προφορικὸς) λόγος, internal reason, mental discourse, P. i. 65, L. ii. 275.
 ἐνδιήκουσαι (κοινότητες), pervading (of a class qualifying all its particulars), L. ii. 41.
 ἔννοια (Peripatetic), comprehension, concept, L. i. 223 f.; κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι, common conceptions, general opinion, Ph. i. 178, 199.
 ἐνομολόγησις (Timon), prating about (discussing) laws or customs, moralizer, L. i. 8.
 ἔνστασις, objection, (logical) hindrance, L. i. 256; lodgement (of bodies, so as to block a passage,—medical term), L. ii. 220.

ἐνσσημα, objection, contradictory fact, L. i. 256.
 ἔντασις (κῶνον), tension (of coniform light, or visual stream), P. iii. 51.
 ἐντελέχεια (oppd. to δύναμις), actuality, Ph. ii. 340.
 ἐξάλλαγή, variety, differing nature, P. i. 36.
 ἐξάπλου, unfold, explain, P. i. 217; so κατὰ ἐξάπλωσιν, when stated simply, L. i. 51.
 ἔξις, state, condition, faculty (oppd. to στέρησις), P. iii. 49, 50; cohesion (distingd. from φύσις and ψυχή, as ground of inorganic unity), Ph. i. 81 (*cf.* Vol. I. Intro. p. xxv).
 ἐξοχή (oppd. to εἰσοχή), convexity, prominence, P. i. 92, 120; κατ' ἐξ., P. ii. 70, L. i. 372.
 ἐπαγωγή, induction (arguing from parts to whole), P. ii. 204; so ἐπαγωγικός (τρόπος), P. ii. 196; ἐπαγωγικῶς, P. ii. 195, 197.
 ἐπακολουθήμα: κατ' ἐπ. (oppd. to προηγουμένως), as a sequel, secondarily, L. i. 34.
 ἐπαραβεβηκῶς, super-ordinate, (logically) higher or more comprehensive, P. i. 38, 174, iii. 160, etc.
 ἐπεισκρίνεσθαι, enter in separately, P. iii. 82.
 ἐπεικυκλεῖν, roll in on, surround with, P. ii. 210.
 ἐπέχειν, come to a halt, withhold judgement, P. i. 26, 29, etc. (*cf.* ἐποχή).
 ἐπιβάλλειν (c. dat.), approach, perceive, attend to, deal with, P. i. 69, ii. 72, etc.; (c. infin.) undertake, proceed to, P. ii. 16, (mid.) L. i. 37.
 ἐπιβολή, objection, criticism, P. iii. 67, L. i. 65; aspect, occurrence, instant, L. i. 222, Ph. ii. 209, E. 25.
 ἐπιθεωρεῖν, theorize about, imagine, assume in addition, L. i. 22, P. iii. 162, 164.
 ἐπικράτεια, predominance, P. i. 80; so ἡ κατ' ἐπ. κίνησις (oppd. to κατ' εἰλικρίνειαν), majority-motion (when most parts move, but a few are at rest), Ph. ii. 113 f.
 ἐπικρίνειν, judge, distinguish, P. i. 26, etc.; decide, settle (a controversy), P. ii. 19, 113, etc.
 ἐπίκρισις, judging, deciding, P. i. 12; ἐπ. εἰδώλων (oppd. to ἀποκρίσεις), immissions, P. iii. 51.
 ἐπιλογισμός, reckoning, reasoning, P. ii. 123, L. i. 352.
 ἐπιμαρτύρησις, confirmatory evidence, P. i. 181, L. i. 212.
 ἐπίμετρον: ἐξ ἐπιμέτρον, by way of excess, into the bargain, P. ii. 47, 194, L. ii. 2.
 ἐπιμίξια, admixture, intermixture, P. i. 36, 126, 128; so ἐπιμύγη, P. i. 124; ἐπιμικτος, P. i. 185.

GLOSSARY

ἐπίνοια (oppd. to ὑπαρξίς), concept, notion, L. ii. 381; κατ' ἐπ., conceptually, Ph. ii. 348.
 ἐπιπέδος (ἡ), plane surface, plane, Ph. i. 387, 420, 428.
 ἐπιρρυμίη (δόξίς, Democr.), in-flowing, adventitious, L. i. 137.
 ἐπισπαστικῶς (oppd. to προωστικῶς), by pulling (after, oppd. to pushing), P. iii. 69, Ph. ii. 83.
 ἐπίστασις, attention, close observation, L. i. 23, 114; so ἐπιστατικῶς, attentively, L. i. 182.
 ἐπιστατεῖν, have charge of, control, L. i. 43, 124.
 ἐπιστημονικός (oppd. to δοξαστός λόγος), cognitive, scientific, L. i. 111, 114; (κατάληψις), L. i. 110; (αἴσθησις), L. i. 145; so ἐπιστημονικῶς, scientifically, Ph. i. 283.
 ἐπιστροφή, attention, regard, P. iii. 248, E. 194.
 ἐπισυνθεσις, composition, enlargement by addition, P. iii. 153, L. ii. 58, 60, Ph. ii. 302.
 ἐπίτασις (oppd. to ἀνεσις), intensification, increase, P. ii. 40; κατ' ἐπ., Ph. i. 403.
 ἐπιφορά, conclusion, Ph. i. 135, 206.
 ἐπιχειρεῖν, handle, attempt, argue against, object, P. iii. 13, 270, Ph. ii. 69, 305.
 ἐπιχείρημα, (hostile) argument, critique, P. ii. 188; so ἐπιχειρήσις, P. ii. 192, 219, E. 217.
 ἐποχή, checking, stopping, P. i. 238; (Sceptic) suspension of judgement, withholding assent, P. i. 5, 8, 11, etc.
 ἐρωτᾶν (λόγον), propound (an argument, regarded as in the form of question and answer, or "dialectic"), P. i. 20, 33, ii. 134, etc.
 ἔστω (c. accus. and infin.), let it be granted (that), P. ii. 51, L. i. 423, etc.
 ἐτεῖη (Democr.), verily, in sooth, P. i. 214, L. i. 135, 137, ii. 62.
 ἐτερογενῶς (διαφέρειν), by generic distinction, L. i. 361.
 ἐτεροδόξος (c. genit.), differing in opinion (from), P. ii. 6, 118, etc.
 ἐτεροίωσις, alteration, modification, P. ii. 70, L. i. 230, 372 (as def. of φαντασία, Chrysippus); so ἐτεροωτικός, P. ii. 70.
 εὐαπόδοτος (λόγος), easy to explain, or state, L. i. 343, ii. 85.
 εὐαρεστέν, be well-pleased, Ph. i. 141; so εὐαρέστησις, E. 88.
 εὐδόκησις (Cyrenaic), approval, satisfaction, L. i. 200.
 εὐδρομεῖν, run easily, prove satisfactory, Ph. ii. 36 (cf. εὐοδεῖν, L. ii. 67).
 εὐπηβολώτερος, more sharp-witted, more shrewd, L. i. 322.

GLOSSARY

εὐπελόγιος, easily inferred, L. i. 75.
 εὐθέως, at once, for instance, P. ii. 214, (with οἶον) L. i. 298, Ph. i. 114, E. 35.
 εὐθική (κίνησις), in a straight line, rectilinear, Ph. ii. 51.
 εὐλογία (εἰδωλα, Democr.), lucky, propitious, Ph. i. 19.
 εὐρευσιλογία, word-play, sophistry, P. ii. 9, 84; so εὐρευσιλογεῖν, P. i. 63, E. 7.
 εὐροια (βλου), smooth current, fair course (= εὐδαιμονία, Stoic), P. iii. 172, E. 30; so εὐρώως (βιοῦν), E. 110.
 εὐσμος (διδασκαλία), easily intelligible, plain, P. iii. 158, Ph. ii. 167.
 εὐχρηστῆν, be useful, Ph. i. 18.
 ἐφεκτική (ἀγωγή), suspensive (= Sceptic), P. i. 7, 209, ii. 9; (masc.) P. ii. 10, E. 152; so ἐφεκτός, P. i. 219, iii. 55; ἐφεκτέον, P. ii. 94, iii. 55, L. ii. 160.
 ἐφιστάναι (c. accus.), check, make pause, P. i. 180; (c. dat.) dwell on, attend to, P. ii. 229, iii. 13, 198, L. i. 410; (c. ὅτι) argue, make out, P. iii. 56.
 ἐφοδεύειν, inspect, examine, P. i. 200, 209, etc.
 ἐφοδευτικῶς (oppd. to ἐκκαλυπτικῶς), by (logical) advance, or progression, P. ii. 141-142, L. ii. 307-308.
 ἐφοδος, mode of approach or attack, counter-argument, method, P. i. 183, ii. 222, 258; L. ii. 140, 142.
 ζητητική (ἀγωγή), (way) of investigation (i.e. Scepticism), P. i. 7.
 ζωγραφικῶς, in accordance with the art of painting, artistically, E. 255.
 ζωύφια, animalcules, P. i. 41.
 ἡγεμονικόν (Stoic), ruling principle, regent part, P. i. 128, ii. 70; L. i. 233 f., etc. (cf. Vol. I. Introd. p. xxv).
 ἡγούμενον (oppd. to λήγον), antecedent (clause), P. ii. 111 f., 148, etc.
 ἡμίλιος (λόγος), ratio of 3 : 2, one and a half times, P. iii. 155.
 ἡστικῶς (oppd. to ἀλγεῖν), pleasantly, agreeably, Ph. ii. 225, E. 98.
 θεματίζω, propose, assume, L. ii. 202; so θέματα, assumptions (distingd. fr. λήματα), L. ii. 302.
 θεοφορεῖν, deify, Ph. i. 32; (pass.) be god-possessed, in a state of ecstasy, P. i. 101.

GLOSSARY

- θέσις, (local) position, P. i. 36, 118; (oppd. to φύσις) assumption, convention, P. ii. 214, 256.
- θετικός: θ. χρήσις, conventional, agreed use, P. ii. 256; so θετικῶς, as laid down, on trust, P. i. 38.
- θεωρεῖσθαι, be seen, observed, found as a fact (hence almost= εἶναι), P. ii. 198, 224; L. i. 183, 362, etc.
- θεώρημα, argument, principle, lesson, P. ii. 3, 70, iii. 261; L. ii. 291.
- θίξις, touching, contact, P. iii. 56, Ph. i. 260, 265 (cf. ἀφή).
- θλιπτικῶς, by pressure, Ph. ii. 83.
- ιδιάζειν (Heracleit.), be peculiar, act (or think) on one's own, L. i. 133.
- ιδιαιόντως, privately, in a peculiar way, P. i. 182.
- ἴδιος: κατ' ἴδιαν, privately, by (one)self, solely, P. iii. 259, L. i. 277 f., 296, etc.; ἰδιαιτερον, more particularly, specifically, L. ii. 272, 396; Ph. ii. 182.
- ἰδιοσυγκρισία, peculiar constitution (or temperament), idiosyncrasy, P. i. 79, 89.
- ἰδιότης, peculiar nature, individuality, L. ii. 41 f.
- ιδίωμα, peculiar property, characteristic, L. i. 55, ii. 425, Ph. i. 410 f.
- ιδιωτικὴ (ἀπόφασις), crude, common-place, L. i. 265, Ph. i. 63 (cf. ἰδιότης) (τεχνίτης, L. i. 55).
- ἰκτερικολί, jaundiced, P. i. 101, 126, etc.; so ἰκτεριῶν(τες), P. i. 44, L. i. 192, etc.
- ἰσοκρατεῖν, be of equal force, Ph. ii. 81.
- ἰσοσθένεια, equality of (logical) force, equipollence, P. i. 8, 190, 196, etc.; so ἰσοσθενής, P. i. 26, etc.
- ἰσotάναι (λόγον ἐπί τινας), base (an argument on), P. i. 66, 72, 77, etc.; ἰστασθαι, halt, pause, P. i. 186, ii. 253; ἔστηκε (ἔστως), stands still, remains constant, L. ii. 427.
- ἰστορία, inquiry, account, L. i. 140, ii. 1, 14; so ἰστορικῶς, as a chronicler, in detail, P. i. 4.
- καθάπαξ, once for all, wholly, absolutely, P. i. 104, ii. 97, 208, etc.
- καθίστασθαι (= γίνεσθαι), become, L. i. 130; so καθεστάναι (= εἶναι), be, L. i. 29, 50, etc.; καθεστῶς (= ὢν, ὄν), being, L. i. 69, 73, etc.
- καθολικός, general, universal, P. ii. 196, E. 8; so καθολικώτερος, P. ii. 84, iii. 205.

GLOSSARY

- κανονίζειν, measure (by a rule or standard), judge, L. i. 158, 175, etc. (so κανών, carpenter's rule, P. ii. 15, L. i. 27).
- κανονικά (Epicur.), rules (of thought), logic, L. i. 22.
- Καταβάλλοντες (οἱ), *The Down-Throwers* (wrestling term, title of a book of Protagoras, also called Ἀλήθεια), L. i. 60.
- κατάκλειστος, shut up, treasured, P. i. 143.
- καταλαμβάνειν, grasp, apprehend, perceive, P. i. 26, 99, 182, etc.; καταλαμβάνεσθαι (pass.), P. i. 178, ii. 8, etc.; (mid.) L. i. 300, 305, 310, ii. 209, etc.
- καταλήγειν (eis), fall back on, terminate in, P. i. 12, 163, 165, etc.; so κατάληξις, end, Ph. ii. 61.
- καταληπτικός, apprehensive, capable of perceiving, E. 75; κ. φαντασία (Stoic), P. i. 68, 235, iii. 241 f., etc. (cf. Vol. I. *Introd.* p. xxv); so καταληπτός, apprehensible, P. i. 235, etc.
- κατάληψις, apprehension, perception, P. i. 179, L. i. 151 f., etc.
- κατασκευάζειν, make out, argue, demonstrate, establish, P. i. 32, 61, 168, etc.; so κατασκευαστικός, L. ii. 343.
- κατασκευή, (physical) construction, constitution, P. i. 48, 54, 217, etc.; (logical) demonstration, P. i. 169, 173.
- κατάστημα, (physical) condition, P. iii. 184.
- κατάχρησις (oppd. to ἀκρίβεια), misuse (of words), loose language, L. ii. 129; so καταχρηστικά (δνόματα), L. ii. 129; καταχρηστικῶς, P. i. 191, 207; καταχρηστικώτερον (oppd. to κυρίως), L. ii. 400.
- κατεξαναστατικός (c. genit.), fit to resist, impervious to, E. 104, 106 (cf. κατεξαναστήναι, P. iii. 275, etc.).
- κατηγόρημα, predicate, asserted fact, P. ii. 230, 232, Ph. i. 211, E. 32.
- κατηγορικός (λόγος), affirmative, categorical (oppd. to hypothetical), P. ii. 163, 166.
- κατηνγκασμένος, necessitated, unavoidable, P. i. 13, 29, iii. 235, etc.
- κατόρθωμα (Stoic), right action, L. i. 158, Ph. i. 16 (cf. Vol. I. *Introd.* p. xxvii).
- κεκρατημένως, convincingly, E. 42.
- κενοπαθεῖν (Stoic), have empty affections (of illusory sensation), P. ii. 49, L. ii. 213; so κενόπαθεια (Democr.), L. ii. 184; κενόπαθημα, L. ii. 354.
- κεφαλαιωδέστερον, rather summarily, Ph. i. 206.
- κινεῖν, move, excite, affect, P. i. 193, etc.; remove, overthrow, dispute, P. ii. 84, iii. 1, L. i. 137, etc.; arouse, set agoing, L. i. 6.

GLOSSARY

- κωδότης (medical term), general (morbid) state, type, P. i. 240.
- κοσκινωόμενα (σπέρματα, Democr.), sifted, winnowed, L. i. 117.
- κουφοφορέω, rise lightly, soar, Ph. i. 71.
- κρατύνειν, confirm, establish, P. i. 147, ii. 96.
- Κρατυνήρια, *Confirmations* (title of a work by Democr.), L. i. 136.
- κρητήριον, standard (of belief or conduct), criterion, P. i. 21 f., P. ii. 13 ff., L. i. 26 ff. (*cf.* Vol. I. *Intro.* pp. xxv, xxxiii ff.).
- κυκλογραφείν, describe a circle, Ph. i. 420 ff., 426.
- κυκλοφορητικός, moving in a circle, revolving, P. iii. 31, Ph. ii. 51, 316 : -κώς, Ph. ii. 58.
- κυλλεσθαι, be bandied about, be current talk, L. i. 116 ; (είς), be brought up against, involved in, L. ii. 169, E. 89.
- κύων, dog, P. i. 63, etc. ; Cynic, L. i. 48, ii. 5 ; (various senses of) E. 28 f.
- κωβίος, kind of fish, gudgeon, Ph. i. 278.
- λακεδών (Timon), cry, utterance, E. 171 (dubious word).
- λαμβάνειν, take, accept, admit, P. i. 186, etc. ; grasp, discern, diagnose, P. ii. 39, L. i. 179.
- λαμπηδών, sparkle, lustre, P. i. 45.
- λειποθυγείν, lose consciousness, faint, P. iii. 236.
- λεκτόν (Stoic), expressible, expression (= meaning of a name, or mental image evoked by it), P. ii. 81, 104, 107 ff., L. ii. 12, 70, Ph. ii. 218, E. 224 (*cf.* note on P. ii. 81).
- λέξις, word, part of speech, Ph. ii. 216 ; κατά λ., word for word, expressly, Ph. i. 92.
- λεπτός : τὰ κατὰ λεπτόν, refinements, subtle points, minutiae, L. ii. 295.
- λευκαίνεσθαι, have a sensation of whiteness, sense white colour, L. i. 191, 197, 293.
- λευκανθίζοντες (ὄφθαλμοί), flecked with white, albino, P. i. 44.
- λευκαντικώς (διατεθῆναι, etc.), have a feeling, or sense, of whiteness, L. i. 192, 198, 344, ii. 397.
- λήγον (oppd. to ἡγούμενον), (logical) consequent, P. ii. 111 ff., etc.
- λήμματα, (logical) premisses, P. ii. 135, etc.
- ληπτός, within reach, attainable, L. i. 124.
- ματαιάζειν, speak foolishly, talk nonsense, Ph. i. 282.

GLOSSARY

- ματαιοποιία, useless labour, P. ii. 206.
- μάχεσθαι (c. dat.), conflict with, contradict, P. i. 184, etc. : so μάχμιον, disputed, L. ii. 45.
- μεγεθοποιεῖν, make great, enlarge, L. i. 108.
- μεγεθούν : μεμεγεθωμένον, magnified, enlarged, Ph. ii. 240.
- μέθοδος, "Method" (*i.e.* the doctrinal system of the Methodist School of Medicine), P. i. 236 ; so μεθοδικός (*ιατρός*), P. i. 239 ff. : μεθοδικώτερον, more systematically, in due order, L. ii. 141.
- μειωτικώς (oppd. to παραξητικώς), by diminution, E. 251.
- μέρος, part, parties to, P. i. 59, 90, etc. : ἀνά μ., in turn, Ph. i. 429 ; ἀπὸ μέρους, in part, L. i. 283 ; ἐν μέρει, in turn, L. i. 28, ii. 183 ; (c. genit.) by way of, L. ii. 118 ; τὰ ἐπὶ μέρους, (logical) particulars (oppd. to "genus," or "universal"), P. ii. 87, L. i. 399, etc. ; so (τὰ) κατὰ μέρος, P. ii. 84, 86, 195 f., etc. ; παρὰ μέρος, by turns, alternately, L. i. 286, 376, etc.
- μεσολαβεῖν, intercept, Ph. i. 265, 386.
- μεταβατική (φαντασία), transitive (impression, *i.e.* passing on so as to combine with others and form knowledge), L. ii. 276, 288 ; μ. κίνησις, (distingd. from μεταβλητική κ.) Ph. i. 195, ii. 38, 41. So μεταβατικώς, by transition, P. iii. 97, 129, Ph. ii. 43, 53.
- μεταβλητική (δύναμις), capable of changing, P. i. 103 ; μ. κίνησις, Ph. i. 195, ii. 42, 321.
- μετάθεσις, transposition, substitution, Ph. i. 328.
- μετακοσμίεσθαι, be rearranged, transformed, P. i. 217.
- μετουσία, sharing, participation, P. iii. 153, Ph. i. 375.
- μετριώπθεια (Sceptic), moderate feeling, P. i. 25, 30 ; so μετριώπθειν, P. iii. 235 f. ; -παθῶς, E. 161.
- μέγχις ἐκείων, so long as they live, during their lifetime, Ph. i. 62.
- μηρυτικός, capable of informing, indicative of, P. i. 187, L. i. 85, ii. 165, E. 245.
- μημονικός, capable of remembering, retentive, L. ii. 274 ; -ικώς, by way of memory, L. i. 347.
- μονολήμματος (λόγος), with one premiss only, P. ii. 167, L. ii. 443.
- μονομάχης, fighter in single combat, gladiator, P. i. 156, iii. 212.
- μονόποιος, of one quality only, P. i. 94 f.
- μουσουργός, music-maker, musician, P. i. 54.

GLOSSARY

μοχθῆρὸς (oppd. to ὑγιής, ἀληθής), unsound, invalid, P. ii. 105, 111, 146, 175, etc.

μυθοποιήσις, myth-making, invention of fables, Ph. i. 192.

μυζωτήρες, nostrils, P. i. 127.

μύουρος (στούα, oppd. to σύμμετρος), running to a point, curtailed, P. i. 118.

ναστόν (σῶμα), solid, impermeable, P. ii. 142, L. ii. 309; (plur.) i. 213.

νηκτικός, able to swim, Ph. i. 171.

νοητοὶ (πόροι), intelligible (i.e. not perceptible by sense), P. ii. 98, 140, L. ii. 146, 220, 306, Ph. i. 256.

νόστιμος: τὸ ν. τῶν καρπῶν, produce, yield, richness, L. i. 17.

νυκτερήσιον (φάντασμα), nocturnal, Ph. ii. 188; so νυκτεροειδὲς φ., Ph. ii. 184: νυκτοειδὲς φ. (Democr., Epicur.), Ph. ii. 181.

νυκτινόμος (ὄρνις), (feeding, or) flying by night, Ph. i. 247.

ξέσματα, filings, slivers, P. i. 129.

ξυνός (= κοινός, Heraclit.), common, universal, L. i. 133.

ὄγκος, mass, material body, molecule, L. i. 287, 290 f., P. iii. 152; (ἀναρμοί) P. iii. 32, Ph. i. 363, (νοητοί) L. ii. 220.

ὀδμάσθαι (Democr.), smell, L. i. 139.

ὀδός, way, avenue (to), P. i. 210 ff.; ὀδῶ (ζητεῖν), methodically, L. i. 2: ὀδοῦ πάρεργον, as a bye-work on the road, in passing, L. ii. 378.

οἷσις, conceit, (idle) fancy, P. ii. 258, iii. 280 f.; (c. genit.) belief in, opinion about, L. i. 5, Ph. i. 74.

ὀλμίσκος, socket of door-hinge, Ph. ii. 54.

ὀλοσχερής, whole, entire, P. i. 130; so ὀλοσχερέστερον (εἰπεῖν, adv.), in general terms, broadly, P. i. 31: κατὰ ὀλοσχερείαν (oppd. to κατὰ μέρη), as a whole, totally, Ph. ii. 53.

ὀλόγης: κατὰ ὀλόγητα (oppd. to κατὰ μέρη), as a whole, completely, P. iii. 46, 64, Ph. ii. 52, 57, 103.

ὀμοιομέρειαι (Anaxagoras), homoeomerics, substances composed of homogeneous parts, P. iii. 32 f., Ph. i. 6, ii. 252, 254.

ὀμοιοπαθεῖν (c. dat.), be similarly affected, share the sensation of, L. i. 301, 363.

ὀμοιωτικός: κατὰ ὀμοιωτικὴν μετάβασιν, by inference based on similarity, E. 250; so ὀμοιωτικῶς (νοεῖσθαι), Ph. i. 394.

ὀμολόγος, agreed, granted, L. i. 75, ii. 183, 194.

GLOSSARY

ὄνειροπολεῖν, dream of, imagine (vainly), P. ii. 157, iii. 41, 156; (mid.) L. ii. 57; (pass.) P. i. 91, etc.

ὄνοματογραφία, writing down names, E. 67.

ὄξη ακούσματος, with most acute hearing, Ph. i. 65.

ὄξυαπεῖν, have keen sight, be sharp, L. i. 55, Ph. i. 65; so ὄξυαπέστατος, Ph. i. 65.

ὄρατικῶς (κινεῖσθαι), (affected) by the sensation of sight, L. i. 355; so ὄρατικὸν πάθος, L. i. 355.

ὀρίζεσθαι (mid. = ὀρίζω), define, P. ii. 101, 207, etc.; so ὀριστόν, object of definition, P. ii. 207.

ὀρικῶς, by defining, through a definition, L. i. 426.

ὄρμη, impulse, instinct, P. iii. 70; (oppd. to ἀφορμή), inclination, desire, P. iii. 177, 273 f., E. 59 f.

ὄρος, (logical) definition, P. ii. 27, 205 ff., (distingd. fr. τὸ καθολικόν) E. 8.

οὐροδρομεῖν, run before the wind, Ph. ii. 56.

οὐσία, being, what exists, P. ii. 5; (material) substance (δεῖ βεῖ, βευστή), P. iii. 82, 115; τρεῖς οὐσῆαι (Xenocr.), L. i. 147, Ph. ii. 169.

ὀφθαλμοφανῶς, plainly before their eyes, Ph. i. 39.

ὀχυρωτικός (c. genit.), serving to fortify, L. i. 23.

πάγιος, firm, certain, (oppd. to εἰκός) L. i. 110, ii. 187; so παγίως, L. ii. 186.

παθηματικῶς (ὑποπίπτοντα), (things experienced) by way of passive affection, P. ii. 10.

παθητός (oppd. to ἀπαθής), subject to affection or change, passible, Ph. ii. 311.

πάθος, suffering, P. i. 70; affection, impression, feeling, P. i. 192, etc.: τὰ πρῶτα π. (Epicur.), L. i. 203.

παλαισιταῖος, of a palm's breadth (about 3 inches), Ph. i. 300, 321.

παραβάλλω (c. dat.), compare, set against, object to, Ph. i. 96, 108, 133; so παραβολή, analogous contradictory argument, objection, Ph. i. 97, 109, 134.

παραγγεματικῶς, by way of command, imperatively, P. i. 204.

παραγράψιμος (φαντασία), exceptionable, rejected, L. i. 170.

παραθλίβειν (ὀφθαλμῶν), press at the side, P. i. 47.

παρακειμένως, similarly, in the next place, L. i. 77, 182, 227, Ph. i. 321, etc.

παρακμή (medical), post-crisis stage, abatement (of disease), P. ii. 237 f., 257.

GLOSSARY

- παρακολούθησις*, connexion, comprehension, P. ii. 236, Ph. ii. 220.
πράλειψις (logical, = ἔλλειψις), omission, deficiency, P. ii. 150.
παραλογίζεσθαι, be fallacious, reason falsely, P. ii. 250.
παραμυθεῖσθαι (= διδάσκειν), show, argue, establish, L. i. 66, 344, ii. 17, etc.
παραμυθητικός, capable of relieving, P. i. 70, 72.
παραμυθία, proof, confirmatory evidence, L. i. 116, ii. 240, 469, etc.
παραπέμπειν (oppd. to *παραλαμβάνειν*), dismiss, reject, P. i. 183, L. i. 11, 81.
παραπέζω, press on the side, L. i. 192.
παραπλοκή (χυμῶν), blending, intermixture, P. i. 102.
παρασπορά, extra sprinkling, P. i. 46.
παραστάς (βαλανείου), vestibule, P. i. 110, ii. 56.
παραστάσις, establishing, proof, L. i. 119.
παραστατικός (= μνηντικός), able to establish, probative, L. i. 85, ii. 202, 214, etc.
παρατάσις, extension (in time), P. iii. 107; (in space) Ph. i. 367, ii. 7.
παρατακόν (oppd. to *συντελεστικόν*), imperfect (or present) time, Ph. ii. 91 f., 97, 101; so *-κῶς*, Ph. ii. 101.
παρατυπωτικός: π. (φαντασίαι), incorrectly impressed, fallacious, L. ii. 67.
παραύξησις, additional increase, enlargement, P. iii. 80, L. ii. 58 f.; so *παραύξητικῶς*, E. 251.
παραχειρεῖν, hand on to, transfer to, P. i. 234.
παρέκβασις: κατὰ παρέκβασιν, by way of digression, P. iii. 101.
παρέλκειν, be superfluous, redundant, P. ii. 77, 147, 156, 163, 175, L. i. 334.
παρέμπτωσις, occurrence, L. i. 175.
παρενθήκη, parenthesis, supplement, L. ii. 378.
παρηγορία, relief, assuagement, E. 149, 154.
παραστᾶν (-ιστάναι), set forth, make good, establish, prove, P. ii. 21 f., 108, etc.; (pass.) defend, P. ii. 42.
παραλοκή, (logical) redundancy, P. ii. 146, 156, 159, 166, 175, L. ii. 292, 429, etc.
παρόσον (= παρ' ὅσον), in so far as, inasmuch as, L. i. 405, 407, 419, etc.
παραντίστασθαι (c. dat.), be dependent on, result from, P. i. 205, L. ii. 12.

GLOSSARY

- παχυμέρεια*, thickness, density of parts, Ph. i. 86; so *παχυμερῆς* (ἄηρ), P. i. 125.
πείσις, feeling, passive affection, P. i. 22, L. i. 237, 239, 384, Ph. i. 209.
πέισμα, conviction, assurance, E. 149; μετὰ πείσματος, P. i. 18, L. ii. 159, E. 121, 164.
πεισθήσις, confidence, assurance, P. i. 60, 197, iii. 238.
περατοῦν: πεπερατωμένον, limited, (spatially) bounded, Ph. i. 431 ff., ii. 27.
περιαντολογεῖν, to laud oneself, brag, P. i. 62.
περιγράφεω, conclude, P. ii. 259, iii. 279; cancel, annul, P. i. 15, L. i. 268; encircle, enclose, Ph. i. 257.
περιγραφῆ: κατὰ π. (= κατ' ἴδιαν), separately, by itself, solely, L. i. 277, ii. 161 f., 394, Ph. i. 103, 261, ii. 263.
περιεργία, needless labour, over-elaboration, subtlety, P. ii. 246, iii. 151, (plur.) 167.
περιέργος: οὐ κατὰ τὸ π. (= ἀπεριέργος), not in a special, or technical, sense, P. i. 9.
περιέχειν: τὸ περιέχον (Heracleit.), that which encompasses, the environing (atmosphere), L. i. 127, 129, ii. 286, Ph. i. 75, 79.
περίκτησις, acquisition, L. i. 166, E. 127, 146.
περιληπτικός, inclusive, comprehensive, L. i. 143; so *περιληπτός*, comprehensible, L. i. 141 f.
περιουσίτατος, most keen-witted, cleverest, L. i. 326.
περίπτωσις, occurrence, P. i. 144; actual impression, experience, (κατὰ π.) L. ii. 56 f., E. 252; so *περιπτωτικῶς*, actually, experientially, P. ii. 8, E. 250.
περισπᾶν, draw away, cause to doubt, L. i. 179 (cf. ἀπερ-σπαστος).
περίστασις, circumstance, condition, P. i. 30, 100, L. i. 185.
περιτρέπειν, overthrow, confute, P. i. 122, ii. 64, 78, etc.; (εἰς) change over, convert (to), P. i. 81, ii. 76, L. ii. 295 f.; so *περιτροπή* (λόγου), reversal, refutation, P. i. 200, ii. 123, 185, 187.
περιτυποῦν, mould round, enfold, P. iii. 75, 131 ff.
περιφορητικός (λόγος), banded about, familiar, Ph. ii. 87.
περιωδευμένοι (φαντασίαι), scrutinized, fully tested, P. i. 227 ff., L. i. 182, 187, 437 (cf. διεξωδευμένοι).
περιών: ἐκ (τοῦ) περιόντος (lit. from our reserves, or extra resources), over and above, into the bargain, P. i. 63, 78, ii. 96, iii. 273; so ἐκ περιουσίας, P. i. 62, 76, ii. 192, L. ii. 183, 262, 296.

GLOSSARY

- πιθανότης*, credibility, probability, plausibility, P. ii. 79, 229, iii. 281.
πικραντικῶς (*διατίθεται*), am affected by (have a sensation of) bitterness, L. i. 367.
πλασματικός, fictitious, fanciful, P. i. 103; so *πλασματώδης*, L. ii. 367.
πλατύτερον (oppd. to *ἐν ὑποτιπώσει*, *λέγειν*), more fully, at length, P. i. 222.
πληκτικός, pungent, overpowering, P. i. 125; striking, convincing, P. iii. 71, 240; (*φαντασία*) L. i. 173, 257 f.
ποιότης, quality, P. i. 94 ff., iii. 32, 57.
πολυμυγία, multi-mixture, amalgam, Ph. i. 6.
πολυπλασιασμός, multiplication, Ph. ii. 217.
πολυσχιδεῖς (*γνώμαι*), much divided, various, L. i. 349.
πολυωρία (Zenon), attention, regard, P. iii. 248, E. 194.
ποριστικός: π. (*τέχνη*), capable of providing, P. i. 66, 72.
πόροι (*νοητοί*, *q. v.*), (bodily) passages, pores, P. ii. 140, etc.; (sing.) P. i. 50.
ποροποιεῖν: *πεποροποιημένον* (*σῶμα*, oppd. to *ναστόν*), provided with pores, permeable, L. ii. 309.
πραγματικῶς (*ἀντιλέγειν*), in a practical way, effectively, P. iii. 13.
πρακτικός (*λόγος*), systematic, direct, P. i. 62.
πρὶν (c. genit.), before, L. i. 162, ii. 445, etc.
προάγειν (c. genit.), precede, Ph. ii. 259: *προηγμένα* (Stoic), preferred, P. iii. 191 f., E. 62 ff.
προανυσθέν, accomplished before, already completed, L. ii. 1, Ph. ii. 248.
πρόδηλον, pre-evident, quite obvious, P. i. 91, 210, etc.; (oppd. to *ἄδηλον*) P. i. 138, ii. 97 ff.; so *προδηλοτάτη*, P. i. 214: *προδήλιος*, P. i. 226, L. i. 141.
προδιάθεσις, predisposition, antecedent condition, P. i. 100, 110.
προδιακρίνεσθαι, be distinguished first, P. ii. 68 (*-διευκρινεῖσθαι* c. Bekk.).
προδιαρθροῦν, enucleate (make clear) beforehand, Ph. i. 338, E. 18.
προδιεξοδεύειν, go through (make sure by scrutiny) beforehand, L. i. 188.
προηγούμενῳ λόγῳ, by direct argument, Ph. ii. 189; so *προηγούμενως*, firstly, principally, directly, P. ii. 16, 247. Ph. i. 390, etc.

GLOSSARY

- προθεσμία*, appointed day: *ὑπὸ μίαν προθεσμίαν*, at one and the same moment, L. ii. 165.
προκαθηγούμενον (oppd. to *λήγον*, logical), antecedent (proposition), P. ii. 101, 106, 115.
προκαταρτικὰ, antecedents, immediate causes, P. iii. 16.
προκαταταχεῖν, get the start of, outspeed, Ph. ii. 145 f., 153.
προκενήματα, preliminaries, first outgoings, L. i. 107.
προκόπτειν, advance, proceed (of arguments, etc.), P. ii. 240, L. ii. 369, etc.; (spatially) Ph. ii. 57, 60, etc.
προκρίνειν, prefer, P. i. 60 f., 78, 90, etc.; so *πρόκρισις*, preferring, P. ii. 45.
πρόληψις (*κοινή*), preconception, instinctive judgment, P. i. 211, L. i. 443, ii. 157, 337 ff., etc.
προνοητικῶς, providentially, by design, L. ii. 286.
προπάθεια (*ἀγγείων*), prominence, swollen state, L. ii. 219.
προπετεια, precipitancy, rashness, P. i. 20, 177, etc.; so *προπετής*, P. iii. 79, etc.: *προπετῶς*, P. i. 212, ii. 17, 37: *προπετεύεσθαι*, P. i. 20, 205, 237, etc.
πρὸς: τὰ πρὸς τι, things related to something else, (logical) relatives, P. ii. 125, 175, 179, L. ii. 38, etc.
προσαλλοτριβοῦσθαι (c. dat.), be averse from, L. i. 140.
προσαναπλάσσειν, invent besides, fancy in addition, E. 158.
προσβολή (*φαντασίας*), impact, application, occurrence, P. ii. 16, L. i. 36 f.; (*μύωπος*) stroke, L. ii. 271.
προδιασαφείν, explain further, L. i. 114.
προδοξάζειν, suppose besides, hold the additional opinion, P. i. 30, iii. 236, etc.
προσειλέσθαι (c. dat.), press against, oppose, Ph. i. 3, E. 7.
προσεχῆ (*πάθη*), persistent, chronic, P. ii. 240; (*εἶδη*) related, appropriate, E. 15.
προσηνές (*κατάστημα*), congenial, agreeable, P. iii. 184, E. 86, 106.
πρόσκεισις (c. dat.), adherence to, dependence on, P. i. 16; inclination, assent, P. i. 230.
πρόληψις (logical), minor premiss, P. ii. 149, 234, L. ii. 333, etc.
προσοικειοῦσθαι (c. dat.), be naturally attached to, find congenial, L. i. 140.
προσπάθεια, tendency towards, inclination, consent, P. i. 230.
προστακτικὰ (*λεκτά*, Stoic), imperative, L. ii. 71, P. i. 204.
προσφέρεισθαι (mid.), give oneself, consume, P. i. 81, 83, 108, 110; (pass.) P. i. 52, 130.

GLOSSARY

- πρότασις* (logical), premiss (esp. major premiss of a syllogism), P. ii. 164 f., 195 ff.
- προφέρεισθαι* (*φωνάς*, etc.), utter, emit, P. i. 14, 73, etc.; (pass.) L. ii. 132, 290; so *προφορά* (*φωνών*), utterance, P. i. 15, 203.
- προφορικός* (*λόγος*, oppd. to *ἐνδιάθετος*, Stoic), uttered (reason, i.e. speech), L. ii. 275, 287.
- προωστικῶς* (oppd. to *ἐπισπαστικῶς*), by pushing forward, propulsively, P. iii. 69, Ph. ii. 83 f.
- πτῶσις* (grammatical), inflexion, case, verbal usage (sense), E. 4, 29; so *τὸ πτωτικόν*, declinable form, noun, L. ii. 84.
- πυρακτοῦσθαι*, be heated, Ph. ii. 164 f.
- πύρωσις* (medical), feverish heat, inflammation, P. ii. 239.
- πύσμα*, interrogation, question, P. i. 189.
- ρεῖν*: *ρύνεσα* (*στιγμῆ*, etc.), flowing, moving continuously, L. i. 99, Ph. i. 376, 381, 430.
- ρευστή* (*ῥη*), in (constant) flux, P. i. 217, iii. 115.
- ῥητός*: *τὸ ῥητόν*, precise statement, Ph. i. 54, (*ῥ. λέξεις*) Ph. i. 64; so *ῥητῶς*, literally, expressly (in quoting), P. iii. 248, etc.; *ῥητότατα* (oppd. to *δυνάμει*), most explicitly, distinctly, L. i. 16, 134.
- ῥῖσις* (medical), flux, issue (e.g. sweat), P. i. 238; (*ῥησις*) P. iii. 54, 115; (*γραμμαῖς*) P. iii. 154, Ph. i. 380.
- ῥῶσις* (*σωμάτων*), strengthening, E. 97.
- σαλεύειν* (*ἐν*), be engaged in, deal with, P. i. 65; be storm-tossed, in distress, P. ii. 229; shake, upset, L. ii. 56, 337, 339, Ph. i. 3; (pass.) P. ii. 204, L. ii. 385, Ph. i. 417.
- σαρκοδακῆς* (*βίος*, Orpheus), flesh-eating, Ph. i. 15.
- σαρκοτοκεῖσθαι*, be flesh-born (i.e. as fleshy lumps), P. i. 42.
- σαρκοφανής*, fleshy-looking, coated with flesh, P. i. 50.
- σεμνολόγημα*, proud position, dignity, P. iii. 201.
- σημείον* (*ὑπομηθηστικόν*) (*ἐνδεικτικόν*): sign, P. ii. 96 ff., 99 ff., L. ii. 140 ff.; (geometr.= *στιγμῆ*), point, P. iii. 39, 154, Ph. ii. 278 ff.
- σημειώσις*, reading signs, interpreting, L. ii. 269; so *σημειωτικῶς*, by means of signs, by interpretation, L. ii. 158; *σημειωτόν*, thing signified, P. ii. 100 f., 116 ff., etc.
- σῆλλοι* (title of book by Timon), Satires, lampoons (fr. *σῆλλος*, squint-eyed), P. i. 224.
- σκεπτοσύνη* (Timon), speculation, scepticism, P. i. 224.

GLOSSARY

- σκέψις*, the Sceptic way of thought, scepticism, P. i. 185, 209, 213 ff., etc.
- σκηνογραφία*, scene-painting, illusion, L. i. 88.
- σκυδαλός*, (a meaningless word) "what d'ye call it," L. ii. 133.
- σκολιόπορα* (*ᾠτα*), with winding passages, P. i. 126.
- σκολιή* (oppd. to *γενεή*, *γνώσις*, Democr.), bastard, inferior, L. i. 138 f.
- σολοικίζοντες* (*λόγοι*), solecistic, ungrammatical, P. ii. 231, 235; so *σολοικισμός*, L. i. 44.
- σπᾶν*, draw in, derive (*λόγον*, *φαντασίαν*, etc.), L. i. 129, 176, 180, 186, etc.
- σπουδαῖος* (oppd. to *φαῦλος*), good, virtuous, P. ii. 83, L. i. 410, 418, etc.
- σταθμητικός* (*ζυγός*), able to weigh, or measure, L. i. 442.
- στάλιξ*, stake for nets, Ph. i. 3.
- στάσις*, rest, immobility, Ph. ii. 46, 81; (doctrinal) position, opinion, school of thought, L. i. 53, 89, 190, ii. 13, Ph. ii. 45, etc.; (= *διάστασις*) dissension, L. i. 214.
- στασιώτης* (partisan), stationer, arrester, Ph. ii. 46.
- στερέμιος*, substantial, solid, L. i. 207, ii. 63, 65.
- στερήσις* (logical), privation, negation, Ph. i. 407; so *στερητικά*, negatives, Ph. i. 407.
- στιγμῆ* (geometr.), point, L. i. 99, Ph. i. 376.
- στοά* (porch), the Stoic School, Stoicism, P. i. 235, ii. 5; *οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς*, Stoics, P. iii. 181, etc.
- στοιχεῖν* (c. dat.), range oneself with, side with, E. 59.
- στοιχείον*, (physical) element, P. ii. 111, iii. 37.
- στοιχειοῦν*, teach principles (elements), E. 3.
- στοιχηδόν* (*κέλιμενα*), in a row, side by side, Ph. i. 380, 386, ii. 59, 144.
- συγγεγυμνασμένοι* (*καταλήψεις*, Stoic), co-exercised, used in conjunction, P. iii. 188, 251.
- συγκατάθεσις* (oppd. to *ἄρησις*), assent, P. i. 7, 13, 16, 19, 233, etc.
- συγκαταλαμβάνειν*, apprehend together with, P. ii. 116 f., 119, etc.
- συγκουφίζειν*, help to make light, P. iii. 15.
- σύνκρμα* (Democr.), composite substance, compound, P. ii. 24, iii. 56, Ph. i. 97, etc.
- συζυγεῖν* (Stoic), be ranked together, be correlative, L. i. 151, ii. 11, Ph. ii. 5 f., etc.; so *συζυγία*, correlative pair, L. ii. 172, 175.

συλλογιστικός (λόγος, Stoic), conclusive, demonstrative, P. ii. 149.
 συμβεβηκός (logical), attribute, property, P. ii. 27, 228, L. i. 269 ff., Ph. ii. 220 ff., E. 37 f.
 συμβιβάζειν, conclude, demonstrate, (συμβεβίβασται) L. i. 283, Ph. ii. 319.
 σύμβλησις, comparison, reference, relation; κατά σ., L. i. 375, 395, ii. 34, 459, Ph. ii. 198.
 συμνημόνευσις (Stoic), simultaneous recollection, P. iii. 108, L. i. 279, Ph. i. 353 ff., ii. 64, 176.
 συμπάθεια, feeling for, emotional assent, inclination, P. i. 230; sympathy, sharing of affections, Ph. i. 79 f.
 συμπαράτηρέισθαι (c. dat.), be observed together with, P. ii. 100 f., L. ii. 143, 152; so συμπαράτηρησις, simultaneous observation, L. ii. 154.
 συμπερασμα (logical), conclusion (cf. ἐπιφορά), P. ii. 113 f., 134, 139 ff., L. ii. 140.
 συμπεργράφειν, cancel (annul) together with, P. i. 14, 206, ii. 47, etc.
 συμπλέκειν, intertwine, combine, (λήμματα) L. ii. 416 f.; συμπεπλεγμένον, (logical) combination, complex, P. ii. 137 f., L. ii. 125, 419, 421.
 συμπληρωτικός (Epicur.), serving to fill up, complementary, P. iii. 100, 172, L. i. 98, Ph. i. 337, etc.; so συμπλήρωσις, filling up, completion, Ph. i. 338.
 συμπλοκή, (carnal) conjunction, P. i. 41; (logical, cf. συμπλέκειν) combination, P. ii. 113, 137 ff., etc.; connexion (of meaning) L. ii. 430.
 σύμψοια (καὶ συμπλοκή), accordance, consistency, L. ii. 430; so συμψνεῖν, be in accord with, side with, Ph. i. 111.
 σύμπτωμα (medical), symptom; (Epicur.) σ. συμπτωμάτων (as def. of Time), concurrence, P. iii. 137, Ph. ii. 219.
 συμφυής, of one substance with, P. i. 225; so συμφύτια, L. i. 129, σύμφυσις, L. i. 130, substantial union, essential connexion.
 συνάγειν (logical), infer, conclude, P. i. 32, 35, etc.; so συναγωγή, inference, deduction, P. ii. 143, 170.
 συναγωγός (αἰτία), combining, unifying, Ph. i. 7, 10.
 συναδηλείσθαι, be non-evident therewith, be likewise obscure, L. ii. 2.
 συνακαταληπτεῖσθαι, be also uncomprehended, E. 38.
 συνακτικός (λόγος), drawing a conclusion, conclusive, P. ii. 137 ff., 151, L. ii. 120, etc.

σύναμα (= σύν ἄμα), together with, E. 159.
 συνανασκευή, joint refutation, L. i. 214; so συνανασκευάζεσθαι, L. i. 214.
 συναρπάζειν, (τὸ ζητούμενον) beg the question, P. i. 90, ii. 35, etc.; σ. (ὑπαρξῶν), assume, P. iii. 121; συναρπασθεῖς (ὑπὸ φαντασίας), being carried away, influenced, L. i. 186.
 συνάρτησις (oppd. to διάρτησις, logical), connexion, coherence, P. ii. 111, L. ii. 265, 430.
 συνεκτικός, conclusive: σ. αἰτία, direct, primary causes, P. iii. 15; συνεκτικώτατον, most comprehensive, conclusive, L. i. 333, Ph. i. 1, E. 257.
 συνεμφάνειν (Stoic), indicate therewith, imply also, L. i. 233; so συνέμφασις, added implication, L. i. 239.
 συνεξέρχεσθαι (= συνεκβάλλεσθαι), pass out with, be rejected along with, L. i. 421.
 συνεργανίζειν, contribute: τὸ συνεργανισμένον (ἐκ τούτων), the total made up of, L. i. 295.
 συνεργὰ (αἰτία), co-operant, accessory, P. iii. 15.
 συνεργογονεῖν (c. dat.), be fellow-workers with, help in the toil of, Ph. i. 41.
 συνεργωτᾶν, join in asking; σ. λόγον, propound an argument (by means of question and answer), P. ii. 131, 160, etc.; συνεργωτητέον, P. ii. 251; so συνεργώτησις, P. ii. 162, etc.
 συνέχειν, hold together, retain, L. i. 375; σ. πρὸς (τὰ ἠθικά), relate to, be concerned with, P. i. 145.
 συνημένον (λήμμα, logical), combination (of clauses or propositions), hypothetical major premiss or syllogism, P. ii. 101, 104, 111 f., 157 n., L. ii. 109, 112 f., 247, etc.
 συνηθρόσις, (mental) commotion, perturbation, Ph. i. 169.
 σύνταγμα, treatise, book, P. i. 241, iii. 247, 279.
 συντελεστικός (oppd. to παρατακτικός), perfect (tense), past (time), Ph. ii. 91 f.; so -κώς, Ph. ii. 101.
 συνύπαρξις, co-existence, P. ii. 199; so συνυπάρχειν, P. ii. 109, 144, etc.
 συνυπόπτωσις, joint occurrence, being sensed together, L. ii. 174; so συνυπόπτειν, L. ii. 165, 174.
 συστατικά (μέρια), component, P. iii. 128, L. ii. 84.
 συστηματικός, forming an organized whole, composite, L. i. 40 f.
 σχέσις, attitude, (active) relation, application, L. i. 35 ff., 168, 243, ii. 162.
 σχήμα (μοχθηρόν) (ὑγιές, logical), form (of statement of a syllogism), P. ii. 146, L. ii. 413, etc.

GLOSSARY

σχηματισμός, formation, configuration, L. i. 229; so σχηματίζεσθαι, Ph. i. 75.
 σχολάζειν (c. dat.), devote oneself to, L. i. 8: τὰ σχολασθέντα (περὶ), lectures on, discussion of, E. 167.
 σχολικῶς (πλάττεσθαι), after the style of the Schools (i.e. with perverse subtlety), L. ii. 13.
 σωματικός, corporeal, E. 61: σωματικώτερον, more solidly, thoroughly, P. i. 7.
 σωματότης, corporeality, Ph. i. 371 ff.; so σωματοῦν (σεσωμάτωται, is corporealized), Ph. ii. 25.
 σωρίτης (logical), the Sorites, (the fallacy known as "the Heap"), P. ii. 253, L. i. 416, Ph. i. 190.
 σωριτική (ἀπορία), of the Sorites-argument, P. iii. 80; so σωρικῶς, Ph. i. 182.

ταυτολογεῖν, repeat oneself, L. i. 262.
 τελαμιών, linen wrapper, swathing-band (for a mummy), P. iii. 228.
 τέλος (ethical), final purpose, objective, end, P. i. 25, L. i. 199 f.
 τεράστιος (φύσις), monstrous, incredible, L. ii. 104.
 τερατολογουμένη (τύπωσις), marvellous, mythical, P. ii. 70, (ἕλη) iii. 31, (δόξα) L. ii. 66.
 τερματίζειν, bring to an end, terminate, Ph. ii. 102.
 τετρακτύς (Pythag.), the Tetractys (i.e. Ten, as sum of first 4 numbers), L. i. 94.
 τεχνογράφος, writer on the art (of logic), E. 8.
 τεχνολογία, systematic treatment, logical theory (or rules), P. ii. 205, 249, 255, L. ii. 87, 257, 406; so τεχνολογούμενα, P. ii. 247, E. 40.
 τήρησις, observance, rule of conduct. (βιωτική) P. i. 23, ii. 254; (κοινά) ii. 246; (ἀφιλόσοφος) E. 165.
 τηρητική (ἀκολουθία), observant (sense of consequence or power of inference), L. ii. 288.
 τίς: τὸ τί (Stoic), "something" (the highest logical genus), P. ii. 86, 223 f.; (plur.) Ph. ii. 234, E. 224.
 τιμητικῶς ἔχειν, hold in honour, regard as honourable, Ph. i. 136.
 τοιούτουσχημον, of such a shape, L. i. 209.
 τοιοῦτώδης, suchlike, of like kind, L. ii. 206, Ph. i. 52.
 τρανὴ (φαντασία), clear, vivid, L. i. 258; so τρανῶς, L. i. 172,

GLOSSARY

Ph. i. 164; τρανότερον, L. ii. 144, Ph. i. 271; τρανότατα, L. i. 404.
 τρεπόμενος (οἶνος), turning sour, P. i. 41.
 τρεπτή (οὐσία), to be changed, alterable, L. i. 434.
 τριγένεια (ἀγαθῶν), a trinity, threefold class, P. iii. 181.
 τροπικόν (Stoic, = συνημμένον), hypothetical premiss, P. ii. 202, L. ii. 438, 440, 442.
 τρόπος (= λόγος), "trope," mode (of argument), P. i. 35 ff., 164; (λόγων) L. ii. 227, 235, 237, 292.
 τυγχάνειν (= εἶναι), to be, P. i. 105, L. i. 38, 40, etc.: εἰ τύχοι, *verbi gratia*, P. i. 106, ii. 201, 218, etc.
 ὑποδιαίρειν, subdivide, P. iii. 75; -ρεῖσθαι, L. i. 35; so ὑποδιαίρεισι, E. 15.
 ὑπόθεσις, supposition, assumption: καθ' ὑπ., P. i. 73, 79, etc.; ἐξ ὑπ., P. i. 168, ii. 20, etc.; so ὁ ὑποθετικὸς τρόπος, P. i. 164, 173.
 ὑποκείμενον (oppd. to φαινόμενον), substantial (or real object, which *underlies* the sensible appearance), P. i. 19, 22, 46, 59, etc.: ὑποκείται= ἐστὶ, L. i. 183, 278, etc.
 ὑπομνησκειν, suggest, show, teach, P. ii. 76, 80, 177, etc.; so ὑπόμνησις, P. ii. 130, L. ii. 327.
 ὑπομνηστικόν (oppd. to ἐνδεικτικόν σημεῖον), suggestive, commemorative, P. ii. 99 f., L. ii. 151; so -ικῶς, L. ii. 289.
 ὑποπίπτειν, occur, be noticed or perceived (*sub sensus cadere*), P. i. 35, 40, 94, etc.: ὑποπείθεται ἀπορίας, fall under, be faced by, Ph. i. 365.
 ὑπόπτωσις, occurrence, sense-experience, L. i. 85, 161, 215.
 ὑπόστασις, substantiality, real existence, P. ii. 94, 176, 199, etc.; so ὑπόστατος, Ph. ii. 60.
 ὑποστέλλειν (c. dat.), yield, be subordinate to, L. ii. 32, Ph. ii. 40: (c. accus.) cloak oneself in, adopt (as a disguise), Ph. i. 35 (= ὑποδραμεῖν, Ph. i. 36).
 ὑπότευξις, rejoinder, reply, L. i. 359, Ph. i. 251; so ὑποτυγχάνειν, L. ii. 375, 440, Ph. i. 249.
 ὑποτύπωσις, outline, sketch; (ὡς ἐν ὑ.) P. i. 206, 222, ii. 79, etc.; so ὑποτυπούσθαι, P. iii. 3; ὑποτυπωτικὸς (τρόπος) P. i. 239; -ικῶς, P. i. 4, ii. 1.
 ὑφ' ἑν, in one moment, together, simultaneously, L. i. 229, 231, 303, etc.
 ὑφήγησις, sketch, exposition, description, P. i. 6; guidance, P. i. 23 f., 237.

GLOSSARY

ὑφίστασθαι, lay down, suppose, L. i. 14, ii. 11, Ph. ii. 270, (derive) 312: *ὑποσταθέν=δοξαζόμενον*, E. 113.

φαλάγγιον, venomous spider, P. i. 82, 89.

φαντάζεσθαι, appear, P. i. 47; have a presentation, P. i. 104.

φαντασία, presentation, sense-impression (as *appearing* to the sentient subject), P. i. 22, 52, etc.; (Stoic def. of *φ.*) P. ii. 70, L. i. 228 ff.; *ἀπλή φ.*, L. ii. 276; *καταληπτική φ.*, P. ii. 4, iii. 241, etc.; *λογική φ.*, L. ii. 70; *αἰσθητική φ.*, L. i. 424.

φαντασοῦν, cause a presentation, produce a mental image in, L. ii. 406 f.; (pass.) receive an image, be impressed, P. ii. 72, L. i. 99, ii. 397, 402, etc.

φάντασμα, image, imaginary concept, L. i. 222, 224, Ph. ii. 181, 184 ff.; illusory appearance, phantasm, L. i. 256.

φανταστικῶς (*πάσχουσα*), (affected) as by a presentation, L. i. 373, ii. 410.

φανταστον, object presented to sense (the cause of sense-impressions), L. i. 203, 344, 357, etc.

φάσις, affirmation, assertion, P. i. 192, ii. 107, 121, 153, etc.

φάυλος, (oppd. to *σοφός*, Stoic), foolish, L. i. 153, 432; (*συνημμένον*) invalid, P. ii. 191.

φιλαύτως, self-conceitedly, L. i. 314.

φιλοποιία, making friends, affection, L. i. 239.

φιμοῦσθαι, be muzzled, silenced, without reply, L. ii. 275.

φουικτικῶς (*πάσχειν*), (have a sensation) of redness, L. i. 198.

φρενήρης (*τὸ περιέχον*, Heraclit.), intelligent, L. i. 127, ii. 286.

φρενιτίζειν, be delirious, rave, P. i. 101, ii. 52, L. i. 247; so *φρενιτικὸν βλέπειν*, look crazy, P. ii. 231.

φυλοκρινεῖν, select with care, scrutinize, L. i. 183.

φυσιογνωμονική (*σοφία*), physiognomy, art of judging character by features, P. i. 85.

φυσιολογία, study of nature, physical science, P. i. 18, iii. 62, etc.; so *φυσιολογεῖν*, P. i. 18.

φωνή, vocal utterance, speech, sound, L. i. 119, ii. 180 ff.; *φωναί* (*σκεπτικαί*), formulae, P. i. 14, 187 ff.

φωνομαχεῖν, fight about words or phrases, P. i. 195, 207.

φωρατός, discoverable, detected, explicable, P. i. 183; so *φωραῖσθαι*, P. iii. 215, L. ii. 167.

φωτειδής (*δύμις*), light-like, resembling light, L. i. 93, 119.

χαλαστικός (*τρόπος*, oppd. to *πύκνωσις*), loosening, laxative, P. ii. 240.

538

GLOSSARY

χαρακτήρ, distinctive nature, form, characteristic, P. i. 191, 209, iii. 37, etc.; (oppd. to *χρῶσα*) shape, features, E. 43; so *χαρακτηριστικά* (*τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*), distinguishing marks, peculiarities, P. iii. 173.

χαριέντως, aptly, wittily, L. ii. 325: *χαριεντίζεσθαι*, say wittily, jest, P. ii. 245.

χαροπός, blue-eyed, L. i. 198.

χαρόν (oppd. to *λυπηρόν*), joyful, delightful, E. 85.

χεῖν (= *τήκειν*), melt, Ph. i. 248; (pass.) P. iii. 14.

χειρίζω (*λόγους*, *ἀπορίας*, etc.), handle, apply, use (as instruments), L. i. 443, ii. 14, E. 21.

χηνώδης (oppd. to *φρόνιμος*), goose-like, silly, L. i. 329.

χιτών (*ὀφθαλμοῦ*), skin, membrane, P. i. 126.

χρωάδης (oppd. to *κρυμνώδης*), in a fine state, powdery, P. i. 130.

χολερικά (*πάθη*), like cholera, P. i. 131.

χολοποιός, bile-producing, Ph. i. 96.

χρειῖν (*πρὸς τι*), be helpful, suffice, L. i. 436.

χρῆμα (= *πράγμα*, Protag.), thing, object or event, P. i. 216; amount, sum of money, L. i. 107.

χρησιμεῖν (*πρὸς τι*), be of use, be needed, P. ii. 94, 150, 205 f., 236, L. ii. 143, etc.

χρώζειν: *κεχρωσμένον*, tinged, coloured, Ph. i. 335.

χυλοειδής, like juice, flavour-like, L. i. 119.

χύσις, melting, liquefying, P. iii. 14; so *χυτὸν* (*τὸ πνεῦμα*), fluid, mobile, P. iii. 188.

χωλεύειν, make lame, maim, P. iii. 217.

χώρα, place, space, (Stoic def.) P. iii. 124, 130, Ph. ii. 2 f.

ψαῦσις (Democr.), (sense of) touch, L. i. 139; contact, Ph. ii. 102. *ψευδοποιεῖν*, give the lie to, falsify, L. ii. 24, Ph. ii. 96, 110, E. 14.

ψηλαφᾶσθαι, be handled, examined, L. ii. 108.

ψηφοπαίκτης, player with pebbles, juggler, P. ii. 250.

ψιλός (*φάσις*, *ἐνοια*, etc.), bare, bald, mere (unconfirmed), P. ii. 121, L. i. 182, ii. 179, 459, etc.; so *ψιλῶς*, separately, taken by itself, P. i. 144, (= *κατ' ἴδιαν*) L. i. 277, ii. 15, E. 88.

ψυκτικός (*χιών*), making cold, chilling, P. iii. 179; so *ψυχοῦσθαι*, be made cold, Ph. ii. 164 f.

ὤμον ἐκβαλεῖν, put out (dislocate) the shoulder, P. ii. 245

(so *ὤμος ἐκπέπτωκεν* P. ii. 245).

GLOSSARY

ὀμοπλάτη, shoulder-blade, shoulder, P. iii. 223.
ψοτοκείσθαι, be born as eggs (like birds), P. i. 42.
ώρα (ἡ πρώτη, δευτέρα), hour (of the day), Ph. ii. 182 ff.; so
ὄριαιον διάστημα, interval of an hour, Ph. ii. 134.
ὠρισμένως, definitely, L. i. 336, ii. 297; in the limited sense,
 E. 32, 208.
ὥς . . . ὥδε, as . . . so, E. 10: οὐδὲ ὥς, not even so, P. ii. 42.
ὥσπερ (= *τουτέστι*), that is to say, namely, L. i. 94: *ὥσπεροῦν*,
 even as, as in fact, P. i. 57, ii. 101, Ph. i. 88.
ἄχρα (oppd. to *μέλαν*), pale, light-coloured (of wine), L. i.
 91; so *ἄχρὸν*, L. i. 193.
ὠχραίνεσθαι, be made (have a sense of) yellow, or pale colour,
 L. i. 193; so *ὠχραντικῶς κνεῖσθαι*, be affected by yellow,
 see (things) as yellow, L. i. 192, 198.

I. INDEX OF NAMES

Academics, P. i. 3, 220 ff.; L. i.
 169, 174, 179, 252 f., 334, 388, 408,
 412; Ph. i. 1, 182; E. 3, 45, 51
 Academy: ("Old A."), I. xvii ff.;
 P. i. 221 ff.; ("Middle A."), P. i.
 220, 232 ff.; ("New A."), I. xxii
 ff.; P. i. 220, 226 ff.; ("Fourth"
 and "Fifth A."), P. i. 220, 235
 Achelous, Ph. i. 183
 Achilles, P. iii. 199; L. ii. 80
 Admetus, P. i. 228; L. i. 254, 256
 Aenesidemus, I. xxxvii ff.; P. i.
 180, 210, 222; III. 138; L. i. 349
 f.; ii. 8, 40, 215, 285; Ph. i. 218,
 337; ii. 38, 216; E. 42
 Aesop, L. ii. 108
 Agrippa, I. xi
 Aidoneus, Ph. i. 362; ii. 315
 Ajax, L. ii. 72
 Aicæus, Ph. i. 86
 Alcestis, P. i. 228; L. i. 254, 256
 Alcmena, Ph. i. 85
 Alexander (the Astolian), L. ii.
 204; A. (= Paris), P. ii. 227
 Alexandria, P. iii. 221; Ph. ii. 15
 Alexinus, L. ii. 13; Ph. i. 108
 Amazons, P. iii. 217
 Amphitryon, Ph. i. 86
 Anacharsis (the Scythian), L. i.
 48, 55
 Anaxagoras, I. xi; P. i. 83; III.
 32; L. i. 90 f., 140; Ph. i. 4, 308,
 363; ii. 45, 818
 Anaxarchus, L. i. 48, 87 f.
 Anaximander, I. vii; P. III. 30;
 L. i. 6; Ph. i. 360; ii. 318
 Anaximenes, I. viii; P. iii. 30; L. i.
 5; Ph. i. 360
 Andron (the Argive), P. i. 84
 (Anonymous) Poet, P. i. 86; L. ii.
 73; Ph. i. 128, 138
 Antiochus, I. xxxvi; P. i. 220, 235;
 L. i. 162, 201
 Antipater, P. ii. 167; L. ii. 444
 Antisthenes, I. xvi; (alluded to)
 E. 73
 Apelles, P. i. 28
 Aphrodite, Ph. i. 186, 188; (Libyan
 A.) P. iii. 224
 Aratus, L. ii. 204
 Arcesilas (or Arcesilaus), I. xxxii
 f.; P. i. 220, 232 ff.; L. ii. 160,
 153, 158
 Archedemus, E. 73
 Archelaus (the Athenian), L. i.
 14; Ph. i. 360
 Archilochus, P. iii. 216; L. i. 128;
 Ph. i. 110; E. 44
 Archimedes, Ph. i. 115
 Archytas, I. xix
 Argo, Ph. i. 82
 Aristarchus (the grammarian),
 Ph. i. 110; (the mathematician)
 Ph. ii. 174
 Aristippus, I. xvii; P. i. 150, 155;
 iii. 204
 Aristodemus, Ph. i. 92
 Ariston, P. i. 234; L. i. 12; E. 64
 Aristotle, I. xix ff.; P. i. 8, 84;
 iii. 31, 186 f., 218; L. i. 6 f., 217,
 328; Ph. i. 7, 20, 64, 412 f.; ii.
 81, 83, 87, 46, 176, 228, 316; E. 77
 Artemis, P. i. 149; iii. 208; Ph. i.
 185
 Asclepiadae, P. iii. 225
 Asclepiades (the Bithynian), P. iii.
 32 f.; L. i. 91, 202, 323, 380; ii.
 7, 138, 220; Ph. i. 363; ii. 318
 Asclepius, P. iii. 220 f.
 Astapus (river of Ethiopia), P. i.
 83
 Athens, P. iii. 210

I. INDEX OF NAMES

Athenagoras, P. i. 82
 Athenians, P. iii. 211; Ph. i. 56
 Athens, P. ii. 98; Ph. ii. 89

Basileides (the Stoic), L. ii. 258
 Bias, P. iii. 65; Ph. ii. 45
 Biton, P. iii. 281
 Bryson, L. i. 8

Callimachus (alluded to), Ph. i. 51
Canonicis (title of work by Antiochus), L. i. 201
Canons (title of work by Democritus), L. i. 138; ii. 827
 Carneades, I. xxxiii ff.; P. i. 3, 220, 230; L. i. 159, 166, 178, 175, 184, 402; Ph. i. 140, 181, 190
 Carthage, P. iii. 221
 Castor, L. i. 410
 Chalcidamas, P. iii. 281
 Chaos, P. iii. 121; Ph. ii. 11, 18 f.
 Chares (the Architect), L. i. 107
 Charmidas, P. i. 220
 Chimaera, L. i. 80
 Chrysermus (of Erophile), P. i. 84
 Chrysipus (the Stoic), I. xxiv; P. i. 69, 160; ii. 253; iii. 199, 205, 246, 248; L. i. 228, 872 f., 416, 483 f.; ii. 223, 400, 443; E. ii. 80, 193 f.
 Cilicians, P. iii. 214
 Cleanthes (the Stoic), I. xxiii; P. iii. 199; L. i. 228, 372, 433; ii. 400; Ph. i. 88; E. 80, 78
 Cleitomachus, I. xxxiii; P. i. 3, 220, 230; Ph. i. 1, 11, 182
 Cleobius, P. iii. 231
Confirmations (title of work by Democritus), L. i. 186
 Crantor, E. 51, 59
 Crates (the Cynic), I. xvii; P. i. 153; iii. 200
 Crestana, P. iii. 199
 Critias, I. xv; P. iii. 218; Ph. i. 54
 Cronos (the god), P. i. 147, 164; iii. 208 f., 221; Ph. i. 182
 Cronos (= Diodorus C.), Ph. ii. 847
 Cyclopes, Cyclopes, P. iii. 249; Ph. i. 45, 395; E. 195
 Cynics, I. xvi; P. iii. 66, 198; Ph. ii. 68; E. 74
 Cyrenais, I. xvii; P. i. 215 ff.; L. i. 11, 190 f., 200, 299

Deiphobus, Ph. ii. 98
 Demetrius (the Laconian), P. iii. 137; L. ii. 348 f., 458; Ph. ii. 219
 Democritus, I. xi f.; P. i. 213 ff.; ii. 23, 63; iii. 32 f.; L. i. 58, 116 f., 135 ff., 140, 265, 321, 349, 868, 889; ii. 6, 56, 189, 184, 328, 355; Ph. i. 19, 24, 42, 118, 363; ii. 45, 181, 318
 Demophon (Alexander's butler), P. i. 82
 Diagoras (of Melos), I. xv; P. iii. 218; Ph. i. 51, 53
 Diacarchus, I. xxi; P. ii. 81; L. i. 349
Diastichis (title of work by Herophilus), E. 50
 Diocles, P. iii. 225
 Diodorus (Cronos), I. xvi; P. i. 284; ii. 110, 245 ff.; iii. 30, 71; L. ii. 115 ff.; Ph. i. 363; ii. 47, 85, 87, 94, 96 f., 99, 102, 110, 117, 143
 Diogenes (the Cynic), I. xvii; P. i. 145, 150, 153
 Diogenes (of Apollonia), P. iii. 80; Ph. i. 380
 Diogenes (of Babylon, Stoic), Ph. i. 134
 Dion (as a stock name), P. i. 189; ii. 146 f., 221, 227 f.; iii. 4; L. i. 245, 404; ii. 71, 75, 135 f.; Ph. ii. 289
 Dionysius (of Sicily), P. iii. 204
 Dionysodorus, I. xv; L. i. 18, 48, 64
 Dioscuri, Ph. i. 37
 Diotimus, L. i. 140
Down-Throaters, The (title of work by Protagoras), L. i. 60
 Duty: *On Duty* (title of work by Chrysipus), P. iii. 243

Egypt, Ph. i. 203
 Egyptians, P. iii. 202, 205; E. 15 ff.
 Eiectra, L. i. 170, 244 f., 249
 Eleos, Ph. i. 187
 Empedocles, I. x; P. iii. 81; L. i. 91, 115, 130 ff.; ii. 286; Ph. i. 4, 6, 10, 64, 127, 129, 362; ii. 45, 317
 Empirical Doctors, P. i. 336; L. ii. 191

Enodia, Ph. i. 185
 Epiclianius, Ph. i. 185
 Epicurus, Epicureans, I. xxii f.; P. i. 88, 88, 155; ii. 5, 25, 38, 107, 191; iii. 32, 187, 187, 218 f., 229; L. i. 14, 22, 208, 218, 267, 321, 328, 868; ii. 8 f., 13, 63, 189, 197, 185, 258, 329, 331, 335 f., 355; Ph. i. 25, 43, 58, 64, 72, 178, 212, 219, 333, 335, 363; ii. 2, 18 f., 42, 45, 129, 142 f., 181, 185, 188, 219, 227, 238, 240, 246, 257, 318; E. 78, 77, 169, 173, 179, 226

Epimylus, Ph. i. 185
 Erasistratus, L. ii. 188, 220
 Eros, Ph. i. 186 f.
 Ethiopians, P. i. 148; iii. 227; Ph. i. 247, 249; E. 43
 Eubulides, I. xvi; L. i. 18
 Eucleides, I. xvi
 Eudoxus (of Cnidus), I. xix; P. i. 152
 Euhemerus (the Atheist), Ph. i. 17, 51
 Euripides, P. iii. 229 f.; L. i. 128; E. 115; (alluded to) P. i. 86, 189; L. i. 170, 192, 249; ii. 67; E. 56, 122
 Eurytheus, L. i. 405 f.; ii. 67
 Euthydemus, I. xv; L. i. 18, 64
Euthydemus (of Plato), L. i. 13

Forms: *Concerning Forms* (title of work by Democritus), L. i. 137
 Furies, P. iii. 237; L. i. 170, 245, 249; ii. 63, 67

Gaetulians (of Libya), P. iii. 218
 Gê, Ph. i. 189
 Geometers, Ph. i. 291, 294, 890, 414
 Germani, P. iii. 199
 Gods: *Concerning Gods* (title of work by Theodorus), Ph. i. 55
 Gorgias, I. xiv f.; P. ii. 37, 59, 64; L. i. 48, 65, 77, 87
 Greeks, E. 15 ff., 52 f.

Hades, P. i. 228; Ph. i. 14, 66 f., 74, 182
 Helen, L. i. 180, 255 f.; Ph. ii. 98
 Hera, P. iii. 210; Ph. i. 362; ii. 815
 Heraclides (of Pontus), I. xix; P. iii. 32; Ph. ii. 318

Heraclitus, I. viii; P. i. 210 ff.; ii. 59, 63; iii. 115, 230; L. i. 5, 7, 126, 129, 131, 849; ii. 8, 182, 286; Ph. i. 837, 360; ii. 216, 230 ff., 313
 Heracles, P. i. 157; iii. 220; L. i. 249, 254, 405; ii. 87
 Hermes, P. iii. 215
 Hermetimus (of Clazomenae), Ph. i. 7
 Herodotus (the historian), P. iii. 281
 Herodotus (of Tarsus), I. xi
 Herophilus, P. ii. 245 f.; L. ii. 188, 220; E. 50
 Hesiod, P. iii. 121, 123; Ph. i. 7 f., 193; ii. 11, 18; (alluded to) Ph. i. 86
 Hipparchia, P. i. 153
 Hippasus (of Metapontum), P. iii. 30; Ph. i. 360; ii. 318
 Hippias, I. xv
 Hippo (of Rhegium), P. iii. 80; Ph. i. 861
 Hippocentaur, P. i. 162; Ph. i. 49, 123, 125
 Hippocrates, P. i. 71; L. i. 50
 Homer, P. i. 68, 86, 162; iii. 205, 214; L. i. 128; Ph. i. 4, 21, 37, 63, 193; ii. 814; (alluded to) P. i. 150; ii. 87; iii. 244; L. i. 404; ii. 59, 71 f., 80, 134; Ph. i. 49, 67 f., 181, 350, 395; E. 44, 54, 108, 112
 Horus, P. iii. 221
 Hyperboreans, Ph. i. 247, 249
 Hyrcanians, P. iii. 227

Ida (Mt.), L. ii. 72
 Idaeus (of Himera), Ph. i. 360
 Ilium, Ph. ii. 98
 Indians, P. i. 80, 148; E. 15 ff.
Introductions (title of Stoic works on logic), L. ii. 438
 Ionian philosophers, I. vii; Ph. i. 64
 Isis, P. iii. 220
 Italian philosophers, Ph. i. 127; ii. 284
 Italians, P. i. 150

Jew, P. iii. 223
 Jocasta, P. iii. 246; E. 101

I. INDEX OF NAMES

Justice: *On Justice* (title of work by Chrysaippus), E. 193

Laconians, P. i. 145, 150; iii. 215 f.
Laestrygonians, P. iii. 249; E. 195
Lais, Ph. i. 153
Lesbos (wine of), P. i. 81
Leucippus, I. xi
Libya, P. i. 84; L. ii. 147
Licymnius, E. 49
Logical physicians, L. ii. 156
Lyco, I. xxi
Lysis, P. i. 83

Magi (of Persia), P. iii. 205
Manes (stock name for a slave), P. ii. 267
Massagetae, P. i. 152
Mathematicians, P. iii. 32; Ph. i. 89, 304, 367; E. 18
Medical Memoirs (title of work by Sextus), L. i. 202
Melissus, I. ix; P. iii. 65; Ph. ii. 46
Memorabilia (of Xenophon, quoted), L. i. 8
Menander, P. i. 108, 189; (alluded to) E. 122
Menelaus, L. i. 180, 255 f.; Ph. ii. 98
Menodotus, I. xi; P. i. 222
Meriones (of Crete), P. iii. 199
Metrodorus (of Chios), L. i. 48, 87 f.
Mochus (the Phoenician), Ph. i. 363
Monimus (the Cynic), L. i. 48, 87 f.; ii. 5
Mother (of the Gods=Cybele), P. iii. 217, 220

Nature: *On Nature* (title of work by Parmenides), L. i. 111
Nellois, Ph. i. 183
Nestis (=water, Empedocles), Ph. i. 862; ii. 315
Nestor, P. iii. 214
Non-existent: *Concerning the Non-existent* (title of work by Gorgias), I. xv; L. i. 65

Oceanos, P. i. 150; Ph. ii. 314
Ocellus (of Lucania), Ph. ii. 316
Oedipus, P. iii. 246; E. 191

Oenopides (of Chios), P. iii. 80; Ph. i. 361
Omphale, P. i. 157
Onomacritus, P. iii. 30; Ph. i. 361
Orestes, L. i. 170, 244, 249; ii. 68, 67
Orpheus, Ph. i. 15
Orphica (of Onomacritus), Ph. i. 861

Panastius (of Rhodes), I. xxiv; E. 73
Panthoedes, L. ii. 13
Paris, P. ii. 227; Ph. ii. 98
Parmenides, I. xx; P. iii. 65; L. i. 5 f., 111 f.; Ph. i. 7, 9; ii. 46
Patroclus, P. iii. 199
Pelus, L. ii. 80

Peripatetic philosophers, I. xix ff.; P. ii. 198; iii. 131, 181; L. i. 217, 222, 391, 368, 398; ii. 185, 332; Ph. i. 334; ii. 33, 45; E. 3, 45, 51, 173
Persians, P. i. 148, 152; E. 15 ff., 83
Phaedo (of Ellis), I. xvi
Phaedo (of Plato), L. ii. 91; Ph. ii. 302

Pharos (Isle of), L. i. 180, 256
Pherecydes (of Syros), P. iii. 30; Ph. i. 360
Phillip (of Opus), I. xix
Philo (of Larissa), I. xxxvi; P. i. 220; ii. 110; L. ii. 143 ff.

Philolaus, I. xiii; L. i. 92
Phobos, Ph. i. 188
Phryne, Ph. i. 153
Pindar, P. i. 86
Plato, I. xvii ff.; P. i. 220 f., 223, 225; ii. 22, 28; iii. 54, 115, 136, 189, 204 f.; L. i. 9 f., 18, 16, 93, 116, 119, 141, 190, 200, 321, 339; ii. 6 f., 57, 62; Ph. i. 62, 105 ff., 364; ii. 8, 14, 228, 258, 289, 302, 305 f.; E. 28, 70, 230

Polemo, I. xix; P. i. 220
Polycleitus, Ph. i. 92 f.
Polydeuces, L. i. 140
Pontus, Ph. i. 203
Poseidon, P. iii. 210, 221; Ph. i. 182
Poseidonius (the Stoic), I. xxiv; L. i. 19, 93; Ph. i. 363
Priam, L. ii. 73
Prodicus (of Ceos), I. xv; Ph. i. 51 f.; (of Chios), Ph. i. 18

I. INDEX OF NAMES

Protagoras (of Abdera), I. xiv; P. i. 216; L. i. 48, 60, 65, 368, 388 f.; Ph. i. 55 f.
Proteus, L. i. 255
Pyrrho (of Elis), I. xxx f.; P. i. 2
Pyrrhonian Discourses (title of work by Aenesidemus), I. xxxvii; L. ii. 215
Pythagoras, Pythagoreans, I. xii f.; P. iii. 32, 152 ff.; L. i. 92, 94, 110; Ph. i. 64, 127, 130, 364, 366; ii. 45, 248 f., 255, 262, 270, 282, 288
Pythian (god), L. i. 266.

Rhea, Ph. i. 182
Rhodes, Ph. ii. 89
Rhodians, P. i. 149
Romans, P. i. 149, 152
Rufinus (of Chalcis), P. i. 83

Sarapis, P. iii. 220
Sarmatians, P. iii. 202
Sarpedon, P. i. 162
Sceptic philosophers, I. xxx ff.; P. i. 3, 7, *et passim*
Sceptic Way: Concerning the Sceptic Way (title of work by Sextus), L. i. 29

Scylla, L. i. 80; Ph. i. 49
Sextus Empiricus, I. xli f.
Silenus, L. ii. 103
Silli (title of work by Timon), I. xxxi; Ph. i. 57
Simonides (the poet), Ph. ii. 45
Socrates, I. xv; P. i. 221; iii. 110 f.; L. i. 8, 10, 21, 190, 264; Ph. i. 64, 269 f.; ii. 289; E. 2
Solon, P. iii. 211
Soterichus (the surgeon), P. i. 84
Sotion, L. i. 15
Sparta, Ph. ii. 98
Speusippus, I. xix; L. i. 145
State: *The State* (title of work by Chrysaippus), P. iii. 205, 246; E. 192

Stoic philosophers, I. xxiii ff.; P. i. 3, 65; ii. 5, 13, 18, 38, 104 ff., 156; iii. 51, 52, 124 ff., 169, 172, 181, 188, 191, 207, 218, 240, 242; L. i. 15 f., 22, 38, 151, 153, 155, 214, 227, 233, 239, 248, 252 f., 327, 368, 388, 402, 408, 422, 433 ff.; ii. 10 f., 68, 70, 76 ff., 80, 177,

185, 258, 261, 386, 396 ff., 406 ff., 428, 433, 448; Ph. i. 11, 28, 109 ff., 131, 137 f., 211, 332, 386, 362; ii. 3, 45, 142, 217, 234; E. 3, 22, 24, 28, 30, 46, 59, 73 f., 90, 170, 173, 179 ff., 180, 220, 224, 230
Strato (the physicist), I. xxi; P. iii. 93, 136; L. i. 350; ii. 18; Ph. ii. 155, 177, 228 f.
Syrians, P. iii. 203

Taenarum (in Laconia), P. i. 130
Tantalos, Ph. i. 69
Tauri (of Scythia), P. i. 149
Telemachus, P. iii. 214
Tentyritae (of Egypt), P. i. 82
Tethys, P. i. 150; Ph. ii. 814
Thales (of Miletus), I. vii; P. iii. 30; L. i. 5, 89; Ph. i. 360; ii. 313
Thebes, L. i. 192, 249; (T. in Egypt) P. iii. 18

Theodorus (the Atheist), P. iii. 218; Ph. i. 51
Theognis (alluded to), P. iii. 231
Theon (stock name for a man), P. ii. 227 f.; L. i. 404; Ph. ii. 289
Theophrastus, I. xxi; L. i. 217 f.
Thetis, P. iii. 221
Thracians, P. iii. 213
Tiberius Caesar, P. i. 84
Timaeus (of Locri, the Pythagorean), P. i. 221
Timaeus (of Plato), L. i. 98, 116, 119, 141; Ph. i. 105 ff.
Timon (of Phlius), I. xxxi; P. i. 223; L. i. 8, 10; Ph. i. 57; ii. 197; E. 1, 20, 140 f., 164, 171
Tityos, Ph. i. 67 f.

Travels (title of work by Eudoxus), P. i. 152
Trogodytes, P. iii. 227
Troy, L. i. 180, 255
Tydeus, P. iii. 207
Tyndareus, Ph. i. 37
Typhon, L. i. 264, 433

Wine-giving: *Concerning Wine-giving* (title of work by Asclepiades), L. i. 91

Xeniades (of Corinth), P. ii. 18; L. i. 48, 58, 398, 399; ii. 5
Xenocrates, I. xix; L. i. 16, 147; E. 4, 14, 28

I. INDEX OF NAMES

- Xenophanes, I. viii; P. i. 224 ff.;
 ii. 18; iii. 30, 218, 257, 289; L. i.
 14, 48 f., 53, 110; ii. 326; Ph. i.
 144, 198, 361; ii. 313
 Xenophon, L. i. 8; Ph. i. 92, 97
 Zeno (of Citium), I. xxiii; P. iii.
 199, 205 f., 245; L. i. 7 230, 236,
 331 f., 422, 433; ii. 139, 355; Ph. i.
 104, 108, 133 f.; E. 30, 77, 101,
 190
 Zeus, I. ix; P. i. 150, 161 f.; ii.
 141; L. i. 265; ii. 72, 308, 479,
 Ph. i. 182 f.; ("Z. Casius")
 P. iii. 224
 Zeuxis, Ph. i. 92

II. INDEX OF SUBJECTS

- Absolute (oppd. to "relative"), L.
 ii. 37, 161, 206, 394; Ph. ii. 263.
 Absolute Motion (oppd. to "M.
 of major portion"), Ph. ii. 118 ff.
 Academic Philosophy, I. xvii ff.,
 xxxii ff.; L. i. 150 ff.; (contrasted
 with Scepticism) P. i. 220 ff.
 Actuality (oppd. to "potenti-
 ality"), P. ii. 225 ff.; Ph. ii.
 340 ff.
 Addition, (discussion of) P. iii.
 94 ff.; Ph. i. 222, 321 ff.; ii. 308 f.,
 323 ff.
 Admixtures, (of sense-objects) P. i.
 124 f.; (of sense-organs) P. i.
 126 ff.; iii. 50
 Adultery, P. i. 152; iii. 209
 Aether, Ph. i. 87; ii. 315 (cf. P. iii.
 31)
 Aetiologies, I. xxxviii; P. i. 180 ff.
 Affections (of sense), I. xxv; L. i.
 191 ff., 219 ff., 376 ff.; ii. 455 f.;
 Ph. ii. 225; ("empty a.") L. ii.
 184, 218, 354
 Age, (as affecting impressions) P. i.
 105 f., 219; (as affecting criterion)
 L. i. 320 ff.
 Agent (oppd. to "patient"), L. ii.
 406 f.; (as criterion) P. ii. 21 ff.;
 L. i. 35 ff.
 Air, P. iii. 30 f.; Ph. i. 121 f., 360 f.
 All (distingd. fr. "Whole"), Ph. i.
 332 ff.
 Alteration (of the Soul, = "presen-
 tation," Stoic), I. xxv; L. i. 230 ff.,
 372 ff.; ii. 400 ff.; Ph. i. 146
 Ambiguity (logical), P. ii. 256 ff.
 Analogy, P. i. 147; E. 250 f.
 Analysis, L. ii. 231
 Animal, (philosophy compared to)
 L. i. 19; (intelligence of) L. ii.
 275 f., 287 ff.; ("generic A.")
 L. ii. 338 ff.; Ph. i. 86 ff., 107,
 138 f.; E. 96 ff.; (differences in
 a.) P. i. 50 ff.
 Antecedent (oppd. to "conse-
 quent," in Syllogisms), P. ii. 106,
 112 ff., 115 ff., 148 ff., 157, 189 f.;
 L. ii. 110 f., 224 ff., 245 ff., 283 ff.;
 (a. causes) P. iii. 16
 Antitrophic (= "isostrophic"),
 L. i. 6
 Ap-emphasis (= "not apparently
 true presentation," oppd. to
 "emphasis," Academic), L. i.
 169
 Aporetic (= Sceptic), P. i. 7
 Appearances (= "phenomena"),
 P. i. 8 ff., 19 f., 81 f.; L. i. 30
 Apprehension, P. ii. 4 ff., 206 ff.;
 ii. 241; L. i. 31 ff., 151 ff., 233 ff.;
 ii. 334 a ff., 397 ff.; E. 182 ff.
 Apprehensive Impression (Stoic),
 I. xxv, xxxiii; P. ii. 4; iii. 241 ff.;
 L. i. 152 ff., 247 ff., 401 ff.; ii.
 85 ff., 397 ff.; E. 182 ff.
 Archimedean Sphere, Ph. i. 115
 Argument, (= syllogism) L. ii.
 301 ff., 310 ff., 411 ff.; ("definite"
 oppd. to "indefinite" a.) L. ii.
 428 ff.
 Art (Stoic def. of), P. iii. 188,
 241, 251; L. i. 55, 106 ff., 224 ff.,
 373; ii. 280; Ph. i. 171 ff.;
 ("art of life") P. iii. 239 ff.; E.
 167 ff.
 Assent (to a "presentation"), I.
 xxv, xxxvi; L. ii. 397 ff., 476
 Assertion (oppd. to "proof"), L. i.
 315, 337 ff.; ii. 15, 61, 76, 860

II. INDEX OF SUBJECTS

Assumption (oppd. to "proof"), L. ii. 343, 367 ff.
 Atoms (of Democritus and Epicurus), I. xii; P. i. 147; iii. 32; L. i. 135 ff.; ii. 6, 350; Ph. i. 384, 363
 Attraction (= "cohesion," *ἄξις*, Stoic), I. xxv; Ph. i. 78, 81 ff.
 Avoidance (oppd. to "choice"), P. i. 80, 85 ff.; E. 112 ff., 139 ff.
 Axiomatic (= "non-demonstrable," arguments), I. xxi; P. ii. 194, 198 ff., 203
 Bastard (oppd. to "genuine," knowledge, Democritus), I. xii; L. i. 138 f.
 Bath-house, P. i. 110
 Becoming (oppd. to "perishing"), P. iii. 109 ff., 149 f.; Ph. i. 106; ii. 310 ff.; (oppd. to "existent") L. i. 142; ii. 7
 Belief, (two senses of the word) P. i. 230; L. i. 177 ff.; (b. in gods) Ph. i. 30 ff.
 Birds (reason in), P. i. 77
 Bisection, Ph. i. 292 ff.
 Blending (cf. "mixture"), P. iii. 56 ff.
 Blessedness (of God), P. iii. 4; Ph. i. 35
 "Blituri" (ex. of nonsense-word), L. ii. 133
 Body (oppd. to "incorporeal"), I. xxiv; P. iii. 38-35, 124 ff.; L. i. 99 ff.; Ph. i. 78 ff., 90, 180 ff., 210 ff., 278 ff., 359 ff.; ii. 20 ff., 215 ff.; E. 45 ff., 224 ff.
 Broad (oppd. to "exact") Place, P. iii. 75; Ph. ii. 95, 108 ff.
 Cannibalism, P. iii. 87, 207, 225, 228, 247; Ph. i. 15; E. 192
 Canonicus (= "logic," Epicurus), I. xxiii; L. i. 22
 Categorical (syllogisms, Peripatetic), P. ii. 163
 Cause, I. xx, xxiv, xxxviii; P. iii. 13-29, 38, 67, 103; L. ii. 48; Ph. i. 75 ff.; 195 ff.
 Chances (physical), P. iii. 102-108; L. i. 876 ff.; ii. 455 ff.; Ph. ii. 89 ff., 828 ff., 828 ff.

Children (duty of c. to parents), P. iii. 210 ff., 246; E. 180 ff.
 Choice (oppd. to "avoidance," "aversion"), P. i. 80, 85 ff.; iii. 183 ff.; L. i. 11, 140
 Choice-worthy (= "desirable"), P. iii. 184 ff., 193 ff.; E. 135 ff.
 Circle, Ph. i. 284 ff., 419 ff.; ii. 53 ff., 149 ff.
 Circular Motion, P. iii. 64, 72; Ph. ii. 58 ff., 316
 Circular Reasoning, I. xi; P. i. 60, 117, 122, etc.; ii. 36, 68, 199 f.; iii. 8, 22, etc.; L. i. 426; ii. 22, 29, etc.; Ph. i. 47
 Circumstances (use of the term in Trope IV.), P. i. 100; iii. 50; L. i. 62 f., 425
 Co-existence (of parts), L. ii. 81 ff.
 Coherence (= "congruence," logical), P. ii. 111, 152
 Colossus (of Rhodes), P. i. 107
 Colour (sensations of), P. i. 44 f.
 Combination (of premisses), P. ii. 138 ff.; L. ii. 277; Ph. ii. 328 ff.
 Common (oppd. to "private," reason, etc.), I. viii, xxxix; L. i. 127 ff.; ii. 8
 Compasses, Ph. i. 54
 Composition, E. 251
 Comprehension (Peripatetic), L. i. 228 f.
 Concept, P. ii. 219
 Concept (mental), P. ii. 10; L. i. 140, 263 ff.; ii. 56 ff., 381 ff.; Ph. i. 29 ff.; ii. 339 f., 355 ff.; E. 20 ff.
 Conclusive (arguments), P. ii. 137 ff., 145 ff., 167; L. ii. 803 ff., 310 ff., 411 ff.
 Concurrence (of Symptoms), L. i. 179 f., 424
 Concurrent Recollection, L. i. 279 (cf. "consciousness")
 Confirmatory (oppd. to "contrary" testimony, Epicurus), L. i. 212 ff.
 Congruence (= "coherence," logical), L. ii. 265
 Conjunctive (oppd. to "disjunctive," premiss), P. ii. 201 ff.; L. ii. 124 ff., 217, 226 (cf. "coupled")
 Consciousness, Ph. ii. 353 ff.
 Consensus (of opinion), P. ii. 43; L. i. 327 ff.

II. INDEX OF SUBJECTS

Constancy (oppd. to "rarity" of occurrence), P. i. 141
 Constitution (= mode of composition), P. i. 129 ff.
 Contact, P. iii. 56; L. ii. 409; Ph. i. 255, 258 ff.
 Continnence, Ph. i. 152 f.
 Contraries, Ph. ii. 264 ff.
 Convention (oppd. to "nature"), I. xv, xviii; P. ii. 214; iii. 267 f.; L. i. 185 ff.; Ph. i. 83; E. 241 ff.
 Cosmos, I. xx, xxiv; Ph. i. 332 (cf. "universe")
 Coupled (premiss), P. iii. 158, 161 (cf. "conjunctive")
 Courage, Ph. i. 158 ff.; E. 57
 Cowardice, P. iii. 216 ff.
 Creation, Created (oppd. to "eternal"), L. i. 68 ff.
 Cremation, P. iii. 228
 Criterion (of truth), I. xxv, xxxiii ff.; P. i. 21 ff., 114 ff., 179, 235; ii. 14 ff., 88 ff., 193 f.; iii. 34 ff.; L. i. 24-27, 139 ff., 445; ii. 119 ff., 830
 Cup (liquid measure), P. iii. 59 ff.; 94 ff.
 Custom (= "habit"), def. of, P. i. 146; (variety of customs) P. iii. 198 ff.; (laws and c.) P. i. 23 f.
 Cylinder (geometrical), Ph. i. 429
 Cyrenaisicism, I. xvii; (contrasted with Scepticism), P. i. 215
 Daemon, (= "reason," Parmenides) L. i. 111 f.; P. i. 101; Ph. i. 47, 69, 74, 86
 Day (= 12 hours), Ph. ii. 182 ff., 185, 242 ff.
 Dead (practices regarding the d.), P. iii. 226 ff.; E. 192 ff.
 Death (various views of), P. iii. 229 ff.
 Decad (= "ten"), I. xiii; P. ii. 215 ff.; iii. 159; Ph. i. 812 ff.; ii. 804
 Decrease (oppd. to "increase" as mode of "change"), P. iii. 82, 84
 Deduction, L. ii. 239, 314
 Deficiency (logical, invalidating the syllogism), P. ii. 160, 165; L. ii. 484

Definition (in Stoic logic), P. ii. 205-212; E. 8 ff., 31 ff.
 Deification, Ph. i. 82, 34 ff., 51
 Delightful (related to "good"), P. iii. 175
 Democritean philosophy, I. xi. f.; (contrasted with Scepticism), P. i. 215 f.
 Desire, Desirable, E. 79 ff., 114 ff., 142 ff. (cf. "choiceworthy")
 Dialectic (= logic), Dialectician, P. ii. 94, 166 f., 213 f., 229 ff., 247; L. ii. 93, 108; E. 187
 Diet (in ritual), P. iii. 222 ff.
 Differences, (of body) P. i. 79-84; (of soul) P. i. 85-89 (theme of Trope II.); (in the senses), P. i. 91-99 (theme of Trope III.)
 Differential (= "absolute," oppd. to "relative" existence), P. i. 137
 Dimensions (of "body"), P. iii. 89 ff., 44, 46, 125 ff.; Ph. i. 366 ff.; ii. 12
 Disease (and its treatment), P. ii. 237 ff.
 Disinclination, P. iii. 177; E. 59 f.
 Disjunctive (premiss), P. ii. 158, 162; L. ii. 282 ff., 467 f.; Ph. i. 206; ii. 96, 110
 Dispositions, P. i. 101, 112 f., 218
 Distance (as affecting sense-impressions), P. i. 118; L. i. 207 ff.
 Division (logical), P. ii. 213-227; Ph. ii. 193 ff.; E. 10; (d. *ad infinitum*) Ph. ii. 123 ff., 139 ff.
 Doctor, L. i. 43, 179; E. 158 (cf. "physician")
 Dog, (intelligence of) P. i. 63 ff.; L. ii. 271; (various senses of the word) E. 28 f.
 Dog-eaters, P. iii. 225
 Dogma, (defn. of) P. i. 18 ff., 16; ii. 181
 Dogmatic conception (or "assumption," defined), P. i. 147
 Dogmatic philosophy (Schools, etc.), Dogmatists, I. vii-xxix; P. i. 3 f.; ii. i f., 6 ff., 180, etc.
 Dreams (impressions in d.), P. i. 104
 Drunkenness (as affecting impressions), P. i. 109
 Duplicated (propositions, etc.), P. ii. 112; L. ii. 294, 466

II. INDEX OF SUBJECTS

Dyad, ("indefinite D." Pythagorean) P. iii. 158 ff.; Ph. ii. 261, 275 ff.

Earth, (as "principle" or "element") P. iii. 30 ff.; Ph. i. 40, 67, 121 ff., 360 ff.

Ectyrosis (of Heraclitus), I. xxv; P. i. 212

Ecstasy, P. i. 101

Education, E. 180 ff.

Efficient Cause (or "principle"), P. iii. 1 ff.; Ph. i. 4 (cf. "agent")

Egg (philosophy compared to an e.), L. i. 18

Elements (material), I. x, xxiv; P. iii. 33, 37, 55, 152 ff.; L. i. 89; Ph. i. 180, 359; ii. 77 ff., 249 ff.

Elliptical expressions, P. i. 188

Embalming (the dead), P. iii. 226, 228

Emphasis (= "apparently true presentation," Academic), L. i. 169

Empiricism (Medical), I. xl f.; (compared with Scepticism) P. i. 236 ff.

"Empty Impressions" (= purely subjective i.), P. ii. 49; L. ii. 184, 218, 354

End (ethical E., defined), P. i. 25, 215, 281 ff.; iii. 187; L. i. 199 ff.

Ephectic (= Sceptic), P. i. 7

Ephelotes (disease of the eye), L. i. 233

Equipoise ("arrepais" of Sceptics), P. i. 190

Equipollence (of opposing views), I. xxvii; P. i. 16, 190, 196; ii. 180, 244; iii. 66; L. ii. 159, 298, 368; Ph. i. 59, 137

Essence (oppd. to "properties"), P. iii. 173 ff.

Eternity, (of "atoms," etc.) Ph. ii. 254 ff.; (of God) Ph. i. 45 f.

Ethics, I. xv ff.; P. i. 145; iii. 168 ff., 183 ff., 235 ff., 274 ff.; L. i. 1 ff., 255; E. 1 ff.

Evidence (of sense), I. xxviii; P. iii. 66, 135, 266 f., 273; L. i. 141 ff., 208, 211 ff.; ii. 63 ff.; E. 76, 239 ff.

Evil (oppd. to "good"), I. xxvii; P. iii. 176, 190, 195 f., 235 ff., 274 ff.; E. 3 ff., 40 ff., 90 ff., 119 ff.

Experience (sense-experience, oppd. to "thought"), L. ii. 56 ff.

Expert (artist, oppd. to "non-expert" or "layman"), P. iii. 259 ff.; L. i. 55 ff.; E. 235 ff.

Expression (Stoic "lekton"), P. ii. 104 ff., 107 ff.; iii. 52; L. ii. 69 ff.; 258 ff., 336, 404; Ph. ii. 218; E. 224

Expressions (= "formulae" of Scepticism), P. i. 187-208

Eyes (variations in), P. i. 44 ff.

Fair (= "good," *honestum*, Stoic), E. 99 ff.

False, Falsity, P. ii. 86 f.; L. i. 168 ff., 243 ff., 394 ff.; ii. 8 ff., 245 ff., 323 ff., 878, 413 ff.

Fathers (duty of children to f.), P. iii. 210 ff.

Fear (as affecting impressions), P. i. 111

Fellowship, Ph. i. 127, 131.

Figures (= geometrical "limits"), P. iii. 152

Fire, (of Heraclitus) I. viii, xxiv; P. iii. 30 ff.; (effects of f.) L. ii. 192, 194, 197 ff.; Ph. i. 82, 360 f.

Fish-eaters, P. iii. 227

Flux (of matter, Heraclitus), I. viii; P. i. 217; iii. 54, 82, 115; L. ii. 7

Folly, E. 90 ff.

Fool (oppd. to "sage," Stoic), L. i. 482 ff.; E. 91 ff., 213 f.

Forethought (= "Providence," of God), P. iii. 9 ff.

Form (= "scheme," of a syllogism), L. ii. 429, 432 ff., 444 ff.; (oppd. to "matter") Ph. ii. 26

Formulae (of Scepticism), I. xxvii; P. i. 14 ff., 191, 194; L. ii. 828 (cf. "expressions")

Fortitude, Ph. i. 154 f.

Fortune, Ph. i. 58

Garden (philosophy compared to a g.), L. i. 17

Garden ("philosophers of the G."), Ph. i. 64

Generality (as technical term of the Methodic School), P. i. 240

Generation (= "Becoming," *g.v.*), P. iii. 147 ff.; Ph. ii. 103 ff., 840 ff.

Genus (distingd. fr. "species" or

II. INDEX OF SUBJECTS

"particulars"), P. ii. 219 ff.; L. i. 223; Ph. ii. 269 ff., 291; (*summa genera*) I. xxvi; P. i. 138; ii. 223

Globes (revolving g.), P. iii. 72

God, Gods, I. xviii, xxiv; P. i. 225; ii. 5; (nature and existence of G. discussed) P. iii. 2-12, 218 ff.; Ph. i. 11 ff., 199; ii. 83; E. 70

Good, ("the G." as ethical "end") I. xviii, xxi ff., xxvi f.; P. iii. 169 ff., 188 ff., 235 ff., 274 ff.; L. i. 235; E. 3 ff., 20 ff.

Good Man (= "Sage" of Stoics), L. i. 410, 418 ff.; E. 22 ff.

Greatness of Soul, Ph. i. 161

Grief (as affecting impressions), P. i. 111

Happiness, P. iii. 173 ff.; Ph. i. 47, 152; E. 110 ff., 140

Harmony, I. xviii; L. i. 95 ff.; Ph. i. 288

Health, E. 40 ff., 63 ff.; (as affecting impressions) P. i. 100 ff.

Hearing, (causes of h.) P. iii. 51; L. i. 855

Heaven, L. i. 147 f.; Ph. ii. 30 ff.

Heraclitean philosophy, (contrasted with Scepticism), P. i. 210 ff.

Heterogeneous (oppd. to "homogeneous" sensibles), L. ii. 208 ff., 229 ff.

Holiness, Holy (oppd. to "unholy" in ritual), P. iii. 220 ff.; Ph. i. 124

Homicides, P. iii. 212

Homocomerics (of Anaxagoras), P. i. 147; iii. 32 f.; Ph. i. 6, 368; ii. 252, 254

Homogeneous (oppd. to "heterogeneous" sensibles), L. ii. 208 ff., 229 ff.

Hoop (motion of), Ph. i. 228

Horse, (intelligence of the h.) L. ii. 271; (generic h.) L. ii. 841

Hour (as divisible time), Ph. ii. 242

Humours, (bodily h.) P. i. 80, 102 f., 128, 206

Hunger (as affecting impressions), P. i. 109

Hunters (critics cpd. to h.), Ph. i. 3

Hypothesis, (as used in a "Trope") P. i. 168, 173 f., 186 (cf. "assumption")

Hypothetical (premiss or syllogism), P. ii. 137, 145; L. ii. 224 ff.

Ideas (Platonic), I. xviii; P. i. 222; L. i. 119; Ph. i. 364; ii. 258, 293 ff.; E. 23 f.

Idiosyncrasies, P. i. 79

Impression (of Democr.), I. xii, xxiii; L. i. 209; ii. 63 ff., 350; Ph. i. 19, 42 f.

Imperative (mood), P. i. 204; L. ii. 71

Implication (of elliptical phrases), P. i. 188, 195; ii. 112, 163; L. i. 233, 239 ff.; ii. 233, 236, 479

Impression (of sense, = "presentation," Stoic), I. xxv, xxviii, xxxvi; L. i. 228 ff., 372 ff.; ii. 400 ff.

Impulse (= "inclination," oppd. to "repulsion"), P. iii. 273 f.

Incest, P. iii. 205, 246; E. 191

Inclination, P. iii. 177; E. 59 ff., 210 ff.

Inconsistency (logical, oppd. to "coherence"), P. ii. 146, 152 f.; L. ii. 429 ff., 435 ff.

Incorporeals (oppd. to "body," *q.v.*), P. i. 363

Increase (oppd. to "decrease" as form of "change"), P. iii. 82 ff.

Indefinite Dyad, P. iii. 154

Indentation (of sense), P. iii. 51

Indetermination (Sceptic, defn. of), P. i. 198

Indication, (as term of Methodic School) P. i. 240; (of Epicurus) L. i. 267; ii. 100 ff.

Indifferent (ethical term of Stoics), I. xxvii; P. iii. 177 f., 191 ff., 278; E. 3, 21 ff., 59 ff.

Individual (qualities), L. ii. 41 ff.

Indivisible (bodies, places, times), Ph. ii. 58 f., 115 ff., 120 ff., 142 ff., 193 ff.

Induction (logical), I. xv; P. ii. 194, 204

Inference (= "conclusion" of an argument), Ph. ii. 172 f., 175

Infinite, Infinity, L. i. 66 ff.

Infinite (mood), P. i. 204

Instantaneous (= "all at once," motion), P. iii. 76, 78 ff.

Instruction (oppd. to "apprehension"), P. ii. 206, 208 ff.; iii. 258

Instrument (of judging), P. ii. 48 ff.; L. i. 85 ff., 843 ff.

II. INDEX OF SUBJECTS

Intellect, P. ii. 82 f.; (as criterion) P. ii. 57 ff.; L. i. 803 ff., 348 ff.; ii. 187 f.; Ph. ii. 62 ff.
 Intelligence, L. i. 823 ff.
 Intelligible (= "non-sensible," pores, bodies), P. ii. 98; L. ii. 306; Ph. ii. 252 ff.
 Interval (of space), P. iii. 124 ff.; Ph. ii. 27
 Irreversibility (of "impressions," Academic), P. i. 227 ff.; L. i. 166 ff., 178 ff., 436
 "Is" (two senses of "is" and "are"), E. 18 ff.
 Jaundice (as affecting sight), P. i. 44, 101
 Judgement (logical), P. ii. 104, 108 f., 233; L. ii. 12, 269 ff.
 Jugglers, P. i. 46
 Justice, Ph. i. 126 ff.
 Juxtaposition (oppd. to "mixture"), P. ii. 58, 62
 Knowledge, L. xii, xvi ff., xxv, xxxiii ff.; (= "truth," Stoic) L. i. 89, 151 ff.
 Language, Ph. ii. 249 (cf. "speech")
 Law, I. xxiv, xxvii; (defined) P. i. 146; (variety of laws and customs) P. iii. 198 ff.
 Layman (oppd. to "expert"), E. 235 f.
 Learning (impossible), P. iii. 259 ff.; E. 216 ff.
 Letters (of alphabet), Ph. ii. 71
 Life (= ordinary converse), P. ii. 229; L. i. 105
 Light (oppd. to "heavy"), Ph. ii. 9, 16
 Limits (geometrical), I. xiii; P. iii. 40 ff.; Ph. i. 149, 864, 414 ff., 431 ff.; ii. 27 ff., 100 f.
 Line (geometr.), I. xiii; P. iii. 39 ff.; L. i. 99 ff.; Ph. i. 282, 876 ff.; ii. 280, 278 ff.
 Location (as affecting "impressions"), P. i. 119; (f. of "Regent Part") P. i. 128
 Logic, I. xvi, xix f., xxiii, xxv, xxxiv; L. i. 1 f. (cf. "dialectic")
 Logical physicians, L. ii. 158, 827
 Love (as "cause"), Ph. i. 7 ff.; ii. 817; (defn. of l.) L. i. 289

Madness (as affecting impressions), P. i. 101; L. i. 245, 247 ff.; ii. 87
 Magnitudes (geometr.), P. ii. 218
 Man, (defn. of) P. ii. 22 ff.; L. i. 27, 35 f., 50, 298; (generico M.) L. i. 222, 246, 269; ii. 87, 285 f., 538 ff.; (M. as "criterion") L. ii. 261, 263 ff.; Ph. i. 89 ff.; ii. 288 ff., 338; E. 8 ff.
 Material principles (or causes), P. iii. 1, 30 ff.; L. i. 105; Ph. i. 4 ff.
 Matter, Ph. ii. 24 ff.; ("indeterminate M.") P. i. 31; Ph. i. 11; ii. 812
 Measure: "Man the Measure" (Protagoras), I. xiv; P. i. 216 ff.; Ph. ii. 194 ff.
 Medicine, E. 186, 204, 255; (Schools of M.) P. i. 236 ff.
 Memory, I. xxv; L. i. 846 ff.; ii. 274, 308
 Method (system of medicine), P. i. 287; E. 238; (m. of teaching) P. iii. 265 ff.
 Methodic (school of medicine), P. i. 288 ff.
 Mind, L. i. 222 f., 810 ff.; Ph. i. 6, 23; (location of M.) L. i. 813 (cf. "Regent Part")
Minima ("elements" of Diodorus), P. i. 147; iii. 82; Ph. i. 364
 Mirrors (images in), P. i. 48
 Mixture (discussion of), P. iii. 56-62
 Mode (= "Trope" of Scepticism), P. i. 35; the Ten Modes, I. xxxvii, P. i. 86-163; the Five Modes, I. xl; P. i. 164-177, 185 f.; the Two Modes, I. xli; P. i. 178 f.; the Eight (Aetiological) Modes, I. xxxviii; P. i. 180-185; (= "scheme" of a syllogism) L. ii. 440 ff.; Four Modes (of proof, Stoic), Ph. i. 60
 Moderate Affection (= "metriopathy"), P. i. 25, 80; iii. 235; E. 155 ff.
 Molecule, L. ii. 220; Ph. i. 863; ii. 818
 Monad (= "One"), P. iii. 158 ff.; L. i. 100
 Mood (= "scheme" of a syllogism), L. ii. 227
 Motion, (6 kinds of m.) I. xxxviii; P. i. 107; iii. 63-114; Ph. i. 227 ff.; ii. 87 ff.

II. INDEX OF SUBJECTS

Moving Cause, Ph. i. 115 ff. (cf. "efficient cause")
 Multi-mixture (of "homoeomerics," Anaxagoras), Ph. i. 6
 Multiplication, Ph. ii. 217
 Music, E. 186
 Musician, P. i. 54
 Names (significance of), P. ii. 214
 Nature, I. xxvi; P. i. 98; Ph. i. 111 f., 119 f., 197, 224 ff.; E. 68 ff., 156, 241 f. (N. oppd. to "learning") P. iii. 250 f.; (N. oppd. to "convention") I. xv, xviii; P. iii. 287
 Necessity, Ph. i. 111 f.; E. 142 ff., 156 ff.
 Negative (propositions), L. ii. 89 ff. (cf. "privative")
 Non-assertion (= "aphasia" of Sceptics), P. i. 192
 Non-demonstrable (= "axiomatic" arguments), P. ii. 157 ff.; L. ii. 216, 223 ff.
 Non-evident, (kinds of n. objects) L. ii. 145 ff., 818 ff.; P. iii. 153
 "Not more" (Sceptic formula), P. i. 187 ff.; E. 147
 Notion, I. xxvi; L. ii. 821 f., 837 ff. (cf. "concept," "conception")
 Number, (Pythagorean theory of N.) I. xiii; P. iii. 151-167; L. i. 98-109; Ph. i. 864; ii. 248 ff.
 Numerables, P. iii. 154, 156 ff.; Ph. ii. 235 ff.
 One (Pythagorean), Ph. ii. 260 ff., 270, 274 ff. (cf. "monad")
 One (and Many), L. i. 69 ff.
 One-premiss (argument), P. ii. 167; L. ii. 443
 Opining, Opinion, I. xiv, xviii, xxxiii; L. i. 49 f., 110 ff., 141 f., 147 ff., 151 ff., 209 ff., 225 ff.
 Opposition (= "conflict" of arguments), P. i. 202 ff.; (as term of Stoic logic) L. ii. 88 ff.
 Organic Structure (*φύσις*), Ph. i. 81 f., 119 n.
 Pain, Ph. i. 164 f.
 Palm, Palm's-breadth, Ph. i. 800, 820 f., 840; ii. 177, 104
 Parents (duty to), E. 192 f., 200 f. (cf. "fathers")

Part(s) (oppd. to "whole"), P. ii. 213, 215 ff.; iii. 45 ff., 88 ff., 98 ff., 170; L. i. 276 f.; Ph. i. 259 ff., 308 ff., 830 ff.; ii. 13
 Participation (logical), P. ii. 220 ff.; iii. 153, 158 ff.; Ph. ii. 258, 285 ff., 291 ff.
 Particle (distingd. fr. "part,"), Ph. i. 337
 Particulars (oppd. to "genus" or "universal"), P. ii. 195 ff., 204; (p. proof) L. ii. 841 ff., 851 ff.
 Passive (matter), Ph. i. 194 ff., 237 ff.; ii. 17
 Perception, P. i. 44
 "Perhaps," "Perhaps Not" (Sceptic formulae), P. i. 194
 Perishing (oppd. to "becoming"), P. iii. 109, 118 ff., 147 f.; Ph. ii. 810 ff., 844 ff.
 Perturbation (oppd. to "quietude"), I. xxliii; P. iii. 276 ff.; E. 112 ff., 131 ff.
 Pervade (techn. term of Methodic School), P. i. 236 ff.
 Philosophy, (divisions of) P. ii. 12 f.; L. i. 2 ff.; Ph. i. 13; E. 169
 Physician, P. iii. 280; E. 186 (cf. "doctor")
 Physics, Physicist, I. xx, xxii, xxiv; P. i. 18; L. i. 1 ff.; Ph. i. 1 ff.; ii. 1 ff.
 Physiognomy (science of), P. i. 85
 Piety, Ph. i. 123; E. 189, 192 ff.
 Piracy, P. iii. 214
 Place, P. iii. 71 ff., 75, 119, 131; Ph. ii. 1 ff.
 Plane, Ph. ii. 279 ff. (cf. "surface")
 Pleasure, I. xvii, xxiii; P. i. 215; ii. 5; iii. 187, 194 ff.; L. i. 203; E. 54, 73 ff.
 Plenum (oppd. to "void"), P. iii. 129
 Point (geometr.), I. xlii; P. iii. 89; L. i. 99 ff.; Ph. i. 283 ff., 876 ff.; ii. 278
 Polygamy, P. iii. 213
 Porch (= "Stoics" or "Stoicism"), I. xliii; P. ii. 5
 Pores ("intelligible p."), P. ii. 98, 140; L. ii. 146, 806, 809; Ph. i. 256
 Position (in space as affecting impressions), P. i. 118, 120
 Potency, Potential (oppd. to

II. INDEX OF SUBJECTS

"actual"), I. xx; P. ii. 225 f.; L. i. 222 f.; Ph. ii. 340 ff.
 Preconception ("common p."), I. xxvi; L. ii. 157, 321, 337 ff.; Ph. i. 33, 61; E. 103 f., 128
 Predication (logical), L. ii. 100 ff.
 Predispositions (as affecting impressions), P. i. 110
 Pre-evident (oppd. to "non-evident"), P. i. 188; ii. 97 ff., 169 f.; iii. 6 ff.; L. ii. 145 ff., 266 f., 305, 391 ff.
 Preferred (class of "indifferents," Stoic), I. xxvii; P. iii. 191 ff.; E. 48 ff., 62 ff.
 Premiss (logical), P. ii. 136, 149 ff.; L. ii. 217 ff., 302 ff., 357, 375 ff., 383 ff.
 Present (time), L. ii. 254 ff.; Ph. ii. 91 f., 97 ff.
 Presentation (Stoic), I. xxv; P. ii. 70 ff.; L. i. 161 ff., 203 ff., 228 ff., 370 ff. (cf. "impression")
 Prerite (oppd. to "present"), Ph. ii. 91 f., 97 ff.
 Principles, I. xx; P. iii. 1 ff.; Ph. ii. 252 ff. (cf. "cause"); (p. of "art") P. iii. 261 ff.; L. i. 115
 Privation (logical), P. iii. 49 f.; Ph. i. 407
 Probability, Probable (the Academic "criterion"), I. xxxvi; P. i. 226 ff., 231; L. i. 166 ff., 173 ff., (Stoic) 242 ff., 435 ff.; ii. 51 ff., 473 ff.
 Probative (arguments), P. ii. 140, 185 ff.; L. ii. 278, 313, 411 ff., 422 ff.
 Progression (oppd. to "discovery"), L. ii. 307 ff.; (= gradual motion) P. iii. 76 f.
 Proof (logical), I. xx; P. i. 114 ff., 122 f.; ii. 113 ff., 122, 134-192; iii. 34 ff.; L. i. 24; ii. 300 ff.; ("generic" oppd. to "particular") P. ii. 340 ff., 381 ff.
 Property (logical): "common p.", P. ii. 228; iii. 4, 173; "separable p.", L. i. 160 ff., 293 ff.; L. ii. 41 ff.; Ph. ii. 220 ff.; E. 35 ff.
 Prophecy, Ph. i. 20 f., 132
 Proportion, L. i. 106
 Proposition (logical), L. ii. 73 ff., 79 ff., 93 ff.

Prostitution, P. iii. 201
 Protogoreanism, I. xiv; (contrasted with Scepticism) P. i. 216 f.
 Providence, I. xxxv; P. i. 32, 151, 222; Ph. i. 106 (cf. "forethought")
 Prudence, P. iii. 240, 243 f., 250, 270 ff., 276 f.
 Purpose, P. iii. 70
 Pygmy, L. ii. 60; E. 251
 Pyramid (geometr.), Ph. ii. 280
 Pyrrhonian (=Sceptic), I. xxix; P. i. 7
 Qualities (sensible), I. xxvi; P. i. 94 ff.; iii. 57 ff.
 Quietude (= "ataraxy," Sceptic), I. xxxi; P. i. 10, 12, 25 ff., 29 f., 205
 Rashness (of Dogmatists), P. i. 20, 177; ii. 256, 258; iii. 280; L. i. 15
 Ratios ("harmonic r."), P. iii. 151; L. i. 96 ff.; Ph. ii. 283
 Real (object), L. i. 426 ff.
 Reason ("internal" and "uttered"), P. i. 65; L. ii. 275, 287 f.; (inherent r.) P. i. 218 f.; (oppd. to "sense") L. i. 89 ff.
 Recollection ("concurrent r."), P. iii. 108; L. i. 279; Ph. i. 353
 Redundancy (logical), P. iii. 146 f., 156, 159 ff., 163 ff.; L. ii. 292 ff., 491, 438 ff.
 "Regent Part" (Stoic), I. xxv; P. ii. 70, 219; L. i. 39, 233 ff., 380 ff.; ii. 400 ff.; Ph. i. 102; E. 23 (cf. "Ruling Principle")
 Regress ad infn., I. xi; P. i. 164, 166, 171 f., 176, 179, 186; ii. 123, 207; iii. 36, 53, 67; L. i. 141; ii. 78, 347
 "Rejected" (oppd. to "preferred" class of "indifferents," Stoic), I. xxvii; P. iii. 191 ff.
 Relative (oppd. to "absolute"), L. ii. 37 ff., 161 ff., 453 ff.; Ph. i. 207 ff., 234, 353; ii. 264 ff., 340, 352
 Relativity (as ground for "suspension"), I. xxxvii, xl; P. i. 135 ff., 167, 166; ii. 118 ff., 125, 175, 179; L. i. 64; ii. 206, 535, 337 f., 394
 Religion, P. iii. 218 ff.
 Resemblance, E. 250
 Resistance (= "solidity" of "body") P. iii. 39; Ph. ii. 221 ff.; 239 ff.

II. INDEX OF SUBJECTS

Rest (physical, oppd. to "motion"), P. iii. 115 ff.; Ph. ii. 81
 Rhetoric, L. i. 6
 Ritual (diversity of), P. iii. 220
 Room (disting. fr. "place," Stoic), P. iii. 124, 130
 Rule, (carpenter's r.) P. ii. 15; ("R. of conduct") P. i. 145
 "Ruling Principle" (location of), I. xxv; P. i. 128; iii. 169, 188; L. i. 202; Ph. i. 115, 119 (cf. "Regent Part")
 Sacrifice (diversity of customs as to S.), P. iii. 220 ff.
 Sage (Stoic), I. xxvii ff., xxxiii; P. i. 91; ii. 88 ff.; iii. 240; L. i. 42, 44, 416, 419, 423, 432 ff.; Ph. i. 133; E. 181
 Scepticism, I. xxix ff.; (defined) P. i. 8 ff., 208 ff.
 Scheme (= "mood" of a syllogism), L. ii. 227, 235, 237
 Science (and Art), L. i. 223 ff.; E. 110 ff., 180, 184 ff.
 Scrutinized (= "tested" impressions, Academic), I. xxxv; L. i. 436 ff. (cf. "tested")
 Seed, Ph. i. 101 ff.
 Self-control, E. 210 ff.
 Self-evident, L. i. 364 ff., 408, 408
 Self-existents, Ph. ii. 220 ff., 269 ff.
 Self-motion, P. iii. 63 f.; Ph. ii. 77 ff.
 Seminal reason, Ph. i. 103
 Sensation, Sense, Sense - Organs, I. viii, xviii, xx, xxiii, xxv, xxiv; P. i. 87, 91, 94 ff.; ii. 43 ff., 74; L. i. 89 ff., 122 ff., 293 ff., 343 ff.; Ph. i. 139 ff.; ii. 62 ff., 259 ff.; ("cognitive sense," Spensippus) L. i. 145 f.
 Sense-object, Sensible, P. i. 170 ff., 175; L. i. 141 ff.; ii. 183 ff., 212 ff., 354 ff.
 Shameful (acts, exx. of), P. iii. 198 ff.
 Sight, (variations of) P. i. 44 f.; ii. 55; (causes of) P. iii. 51; L. i. 119, 162 f., 207 ff., 294 ff., 411 ff.
 Sign, L. xxxviii; P. ii. 96 ff.; L. ii. 140 ff., 149 ff.; ("indicative s.") P. ii. 99 ff., 116 ff., 121 ff., 183 f.; ("suggestive" or "commemorative s.") P. ii. 100, 102; L. ii. 193

Signified Thing, L. ii. 11 ff., 264, 272 ff.
 Simply-passive (senses), P. iii. 47 (cf. "specialized")
 Sisters (marriage with, in Egypt), P. i. 152; ii. 234
 "Skindapnos" (ex. of nonsense-word), L. ii. 133
 Sleep, ("Impressions" in S.), P. i. 104; Ph. i. 20, 25, 43 ff.
 Smell, P. i. 51, 64, 92, 96; ii. 52, 56
 Solecism, Solecistic (argument), P. ii. 231, 235; L. i. 44
 Solidity (of "body"), P. iii. 39, 46, 123 (cf. "resistance")
 "Something" (Stoic *sumum genus*), I. xxvi; P. ii. 86, 223 ff.; Ph. ii. 218, 234 ff.; E. 224
 Sophisms, P. ii. 229-255
 Sophistry, P. ii. 9, 112 ff.
 "Sorites" (= "Heap" fallacy), I. xxxiv; P. ii. 253; iii. 80; L. i. 416; Ph. i. 182, 190
 Soul, I. xviii, xx, xxii, xxv, xxxix; P. ii. 81; iii. 185 ff., 189; L. i. 10, 119, 234 ff., 359 ff.; L. ii. 155, 306; Ph. i. 20 ff., 71 ff., 81 ff., 193; E. 45 ff.
 Sound-deliberation, Ph. i. 167 f.
 Space, P. iii. 119-135 (cf. "place")
 Specialized Senses, P. iii. 108 (cf. "simply-passive")
 Species (oppd. to "genus"), P. ii. 219 ff.
 Speech, P. iii. 266 ff., 280; L. i. 83 f.; ii. 180 ff.; Ph. i. 178 ff.; ii. 350; E. 241 ff.
 Spirit, Ph. i. 127, 130 f.
 Stone-cutter (=Socrates, so called by Timon), L. i. 8
 Strife (oppd. to "Love," Empedocles), Ph. i. 10 (cf. I. x)
 Subject (taught), E. 218 ff. (cf. P. iii. 252 ff.)
 Substance (oppd. to "qualities"), P. iii. 2, 57 ff.; L. ii. 258; (physical s.) P. iii. 82; L. i. 103, 237 ff.; P. ii. 215 ff.
 Subtraction, P. ii. 215; iii. 85-98; Ph. i. 230 ff.; ii. 74 ff., 303 f., 323 ff.
 Suffering, Ph. i. 163 ff.
 "Sun-born Damsels" (= the senses, Parmenides), L. i. 111 ff.

II. INDEX OF SUBJECTS

- Surface (geometr.), I. xiii; P. iii. 39 ff.; L. i. 99 f.; Ph. i. 414 ff., 430 ff. (*cf.* "plane")
- Suspension (of judgement, Sceptic), I. xxix, xxxii; P. i. 8, 10, 31, 196; iii. 49; L. ii. 258, 298, 363, 380; Ph. i. 192, 194
- Syllable, Ph. i. 244; ii. 249
- Syllogism (hypothetical s.), P. ii. 104 ff., 110 ff. (*cf.* "argument")
- Syllogistic (= "conclusive" argument, Stoic), P. ii. 149, 198-203; L. ii. 223
- Sympathy (mutual s. of parts), Ph. i. 79 f.
- Symphonies, L. i. 95 ff.
- Symptom ("s. of symptoms," def. of "time," Epicurus), Ph. ii. 219 ff., 238 ff. (*cf.* P. iii. 137)
- Taste, P. i. 52; ii. 51, 55
- Tattooing, P. iii. 203
- Teaching (and Learning, oppd. to "nature"), P. iii. 250, 252 ff.; L. ii. 203; E. 218 ff.
- Temperance, P. iii. 272 ff.; Ph. i. 174 f.; E. 82 f. (*cf.* "self-control")
- Term (= "common noun," Stoic), P. ii. 227
- "Tested" (impressions, Academic), I. xxxvi; P. i. 227 ff.; L. i. 166 ff., 181 ff. (*cf.* "scrutinized.")
- "Tetraktys" (=no. Ten, Pythagorean), I. xiii; L. i. 94 f., 98, 100
- Thieving, P. iii. 215
- Thought (objects of t. oppd. to "existents"), L. i. 77 ff., 221 ff.
- Time (past, present, future), P. iii. 106 f., 136-150; L. i. 104; Ph. ii. 169 ff., 346 ff.
- Touch, P. i. 50, 96; iii. 42 ff., 56; L. ii. 409; Ph. i. 258 ff. (*cf.* "contact")
- Transient Motion, Transition, P. iii. 64-81; Ph. ii. 41 ff., 56 ff.
- Transposition, P. iii. 97; Ph. i. 328
- Trope (= "Mode," Sceptic), I. xxxvii ff.; P. i. 5; iii. 50 (*cf.* "mode")
- Truth (distingd. fr. "the True," Stoic), P. ii. 80 ff., 138 ff., 163 f., 187 f.; L. i. 24 ff., 88 ff., 248 ff., 392 ff.; ii. 2-40, 245 ff., 323 ff., 375 ff., 413 ff.; E. 220 ff.
- Tyrants ("the Thirty"), Ph. i. 54
- Universal (oppd. to "particular," logical), P. ii. 195 ff.; L. i. 224; E. 8 ff.
- Universe, P. iii. 186; L. i. 52; Ph. i. 4, 23, 44 f., 75 f., 95 ff.; ii. 11, 169 ff., 255 (*cf.* "cosmos")
- Utility (= "good," Stoic), P. iii. 169 ff.; E. 22 ff.
- Vacuous Attraction (=subjective impression, Stoic), L. i. 241, 245; ii. 67
- Validity (logical), P. i. 84 f.; ii. 138 ff., 189 ff.; L. ii. 118 ff., 245 ff., 265, 413 ff., 432
- Valour (of the Dog), P. i. 63; E. 103 ff. (*cf.* "courage")
- Vanity (=empty surmise), L. ii. 6
- Variety (in origin and structure of animals, theme of Trope I.), P. i. 40
- "Velled" (Argument), L. i. 410
- Vice, Ph. i. 156
- Virtue, I. xiv, xvi, xviii f., xxi, xxiii, xxvii; P. iii. 169 ff., 188; L. i. 12; Ph. i. 152 ff., 172; E. 22 ff.; (generic v.) E. 31 ff.
- Void (of Democritus), I. xii; P. i. 214; ii. 181; Ph. i. 332 ff.; ii. 2 ff., 20 ff.; (of Stoics) P. iii. 124 ff., 128 ff.; L. i. 213; ii. 146, 277, 314, 320 ff.
- Vortex (of Democritus), Ph. i. 111 f.
- Water (as "principle" or "element"), P. iii. 80 f.; Ph. i. 82, 360 f.
- Wax, Ph. i. 251
- Wealth, E. 50 ff., 122 ff.
- Whole (oppd. to "parts"), P. ii. 213, 215 ff.; iii. 45 ff., 89 ff., 98 ff., 120, 122, 170; L. i. 276 f.; Ph. i. 259 ff., 308 ff., 330 ff.; ii. 13, 256; (= "Universe") P. iii. 186; L. i. 20
- Wisdom, I. xviii, xxvii; Ph. i. 125, 162; E. 32 f., 110 ff., 170, 181 ff., 246 ff.
- Wise Man (ideal, of Cyrenaics), I. xvii; (of Stoics) Ph. i. 138; E. 170, 209 ff., 244 ff. (*cf.* "sage")
- Zetetic (=Sceptic), P. i. 7

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY

THE REV. R. G. BURY, Litt.D.

FORMERLY SCHOLAR OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

IN FOUR VOLUMES

IV

AGAINST THE PROFESSORS



LONDON

WILLIAM HEINEMANN LTD

CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS

MCMLXXI

American
ISBN 0-674-99420-5

British
ISBN 0 434 99882 4

First printed 1949
Reprinted 1961, 1971

Printed in Great Britain

CONTENTS OF VOLUME IV

	PAGE
PREFATORY NOTE	vii
AGAINST THE PROFESSORS:	
BOOK I	2
BOOK II	188
BOOK III	244
BOOK IV	304
BOOK V	322
BOOK VI	372
INDEX OF NAMES	407

PREFATORY NOTE

THIS volume contains the first six books of *Adversus Mathematicos*, viz. *Adv. Grammaticos*, *Adv. Rhetores*, *Adv. Geometras*, *Adv. Arithmeticos*, *Adv. Astrologos*, *Adv. Musicos*. As in the previous volumes the text is based on that of Bekker, the chief deviations being indicated in the footnotes. The remaining five books of *Adversus Mathematicos* are the works found in Vols. II and III of this edition. Books vii and viii are in Vol. II and the rest in Vol. III.

The Translator is indebted to the Editor, Dr. Rouse, for kindly help in explaining the passages (in *Adv. Gram.* 79 ff.) which deal with *προσφδία*. He is very grateful also to Prof. R. Hackforth for many valuable suggestions.

AGAINST THE PROFESSORS

ΠΡΟΣ ΜΑΘΗΜΑΤΙΚΟΥΣ

A

ΠΡΟΣ ΜΑΘΗΜΑΤΙΚΟΥΣ—ΠΡΟΣ ΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΙΚΟΥΣ

- 1 Τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων ἀντίρρησιν κοινότερον μὲν διατεθεῖσθαι δοκοῦσιν οἱ τε περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ Πύρρῳ, οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς δὲ διαθέσεως, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον ὡς τῶν μαθημάτων μηδὲν συνεργούντων πρὸς σοφίας τελείωσιν, ἢ ὡς τινες εἰκάζουσι, τοῦτο προκάλυμμα τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἀπαιδευσίας εἶναι νομίζοντες (ἐν πολλοῖς γὰρ ἀμαθῆς Ἐπίκουρος ἐλέγχεται, οὐδὲ ἐν ταῖς κοιναῖς ὁμιλίαις καθαρῶν),
2 τάχα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς περὶ Πλάτωνα καὶ Ἀριστοτέλη καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους δυσμένειαν πολυμαθεῖς γεγονότας. οὐκ ἀπέοικε δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν πρὸς Ναυσιφάνην τὸν Πύρρῳ ἀκουστὴν ἔχθραν πολλοὺς γὰρ τῶν νέων συνέιχε καὶ τῶν μαθημάτων σπουδαίως ἐπεμελεῖτο, μάλιστα δὲ ῥητορικῆς.
3 γενόμενος οὖν τούτου μαθητῆς ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ὑπὲρ τοῦ δοκεῖν αὐτοδίδακτος εἶναι καὶ αὐτοφυῆς φιλόσοφος ἠρνεῖτο ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου, τὴν τε περὶ

^a §§ 1-8 are Introductory.

AGAINST THE PROFESSORS

BOOK I

§§ 1-40—AGAINST THE PROFESSORS ; §§ 41- END—AGAINST THE GRAMMARIANS

^a THE case against the *Mathematici* (or Professors of Arts and Sciences) has been set forth in a general way, it would seem, both by Epicurus and by the School of Pyrrho, although the standpoints they adopt are different. Epicurus took the ground that the subjects taught are of no help in perfecting wisdom ; and he did this, as some conjecture, because he saw in it a way of covering up his own lack of culture (for in many matters Epicurus stands convicted of ignorance, and even in ordinary converse his speech was not correct). Another reason may have been his hostility² towards Plato and Aristotle and their like who were men of wide learning. It is not unlikely, too, that he was moved by his enmity against Nausiphanes, the disciple of Pyrrho, who kept his hold on many of the young men and devoted himself earnestly to the Arts and Sciences, especially Rhetoric. Epicurus, then,³ though he had been one of this man's disciples, did his best to deny the fact in order that he might be thought to be a self-taught and original philosopher, and tried hard to blot out the reputation of Nausi-

αὐτοῦ φήμην ἐξαλείφειν ἔσπευδε, πολὺς τε ἐγίνετο τῶν μαθημάτων κατήγορος, ἐν οἷς ἐκείνος ἐσεμνύ-
 4 νετο. φησὶ γοῦν ἐν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ φιλοσόφους ἐπιστολῇ "οἶμαι δὲ ἔγωγε τοὺς βαρυστόνους καὶ μαθητὴν με δόξειεν τοῦ πλεύμονος εἶναι, μετὰ μειρακίων τινῶν κραιπαλώντων ἀκούσαντα," νῦν πλεύμονα καλῶν τὸν Νουσιφάνην ὡς ἀναίσθητον. καὶ πάλιν προβάς πολλά τε κατειπῶν τάνδρὸς ὑπεμφαίνει τὴν ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασι αὐτοῦ προκοπὴν λέγων "καὶ γὰρ ποιηρὸς ἄνθρωπος ἦν καὶ ἐπιτετηδευκῶς τοιαῦτα ἐξ ὧν οὐ δυνατὸν εἰς
 5 σοφίαν ἔλθειν," αἰνισσόμενος τὰ μαθήματα. πλὴν ὁ μὲν Ἐπίκουρος, ὡς ἂν τις εἰκοβολῶν εἴποι, ἀπὸ τοιούτων τινῶν ἀφορμῶν πολεμεῖν τοῖς μαθήμασι ἤξίου, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ Πύρρωνος οὔτε διὰ τὸ μηδὲν συνεργεῖν αὐτὰ πρὸς σοφίαν, δογματικὸς γὰρ ὁ λόγος, οὔτε διὰ τὴν προσοῦσαν αὐτοῖς ἀπαιδευσίαν· σὺν γὰρ τῷ πεπαιδεῦσθαι καὶ πολυπειρότεροι¹ παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ὑπάρχειν φιλοσόφους ἔτι καὶ ἀδιαφόρως ἔχουσι πρὸς τὴν παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς
 6 δόξαν. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ δυσμενείας χάριν τῆς πρὸς τινος (μακρὰν γὰρ αὐτῶν τῆς πραότητός ἐστιν ἢ τοιαύτη κακία), ἀλλὰ τοιοῦτόν τι ἐπὶ τῶν μαθημάτων παθόντες ὅποσον ἐφ' ὅλης ἔπαθον τῆς φιλοσοφίας. καθὰ γὰρ ἐπὶ ταύτην ἦλθον πόθῳ τοῦ τυχεῖν τῆς ἀληθείας, ἰσοσθενεῖ δὲ μάχης² ἀνωμαλία τῶν πραγμάτων ὑπαντήσαντες ἐπέσχον, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μαθημάτων ὀρμήσαντες ἐπὶ τὴν ἀνάληψιν αὐτῶν, ζητοῦντες καὶ τὸ ἐνταῦθα μαθεῖν ἀληθές,

¹ πολυπειρότεροι cj. Bekk. : πολυπειροτέρους mss., Bekk.

² μάχης: fortasse μάχη καί.

phanes, and became a violent opponent of the Arts and Sciences wherein Nausiphanes prided himself. Thus, in his *Letter to the Philosophers*^a in *Mytilenē*,⁴ Epicurus says, "I quite suppose that 'the bellowers' will fancy that I am even a disciple of 'the Stockfish,' having sat under him in the company of some crapulous striplings"; where he calls Nausiphanes a "Stockfish," as being without sense. And again, after proceeding further and abusing the man at length, he hints at his proficiency in Arts and Sciences when he says—"In fact he was a sorry fellow and exercised himself on matters which cannot possibly lead to wisdom," alluding thereby to Arts and Sciences. Such,⁵ in fact,—as we may conjecture—were the sort of motives which decided Epicurus to make war on the Arts and Sciences. The School of Pyrrho, on the other hand, were not moved either by the view that these subjects are of no help to gaining wisdom (for that is a "dogmatic" assertion) or by any lack of culture attaching to themselves; for in addition to their culture and their superiority to all other philosophers in breadth of experience they are also indifferent to the opinion of the multitude. Nor is the reason to be
 6 found in ill-will towards any (for that sort of vice is wholly alien to their gentle character), but in the fact that in respect of the Arts and Sciences they have met with the same experience as they did in respect of philosophy as a whole. For just as they approached philosophy with the desire of attaining truth,^b but, when faced by the equipollent conflict and discord of things, suspended judgement,—so also in the case of the Arts and Sciences, when they had set about mastering them with a view to learning here also the

^a Cf. Diog. Laert. x. 8.

^b Cf. P.H. i. 12.

τὰς δὲ ἴσας εὐρόντες ἀπορίας, οὐκ ἀπεκρύψαντο.
 7 διόπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς τὴν αὐτὴν τούτοις ἀγωγὴν μετα-
 διώκοντες πειρασόμεθα χωρὶς φιλονεικίας τὰ
 πραγματικῶς λεγόμενα πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐπιλεξάμενοι
 θεῖναι.

Τὸ μὲν οὖν διδάσκειν ἀπὸ τίνος ἐγκύκλια προσ-
 ηγόρευται μαθήματα καὶ πόσα τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἔστι,
 περιττὸν ἡγοῦμαι, πρὸς ἱκανὴν ἤδη τὴν περὶ
 τούτων ἔχοντας κατήχησιν γινομένης ἡμῖν τῆς
 8 διδασκαλίας. ὃ δὲ ἔστιν ἀναγκαῖον ἐπὶ τοῦ παρ-
 όντος, ὑποδεικτέον ὅτι τῶν λεγομένων πρὸς τὰ
 μαθήματα τὰ μὲν καθολικῶς λέγεται πρὸς πάντα
 τὰ μαθήματα τὰ δ' ἰδίως¹ πρὸς ἕκαστα, καὶ
 καθολικώτερον μὲν τὸ περὶ τοῦ μηδὲν εἶναι μάθημα,
 ἰδιαιτέρον δὲ πρὸς μὲν γραμματικούς, εἰ τύχοι,
 περὶ τῶν τῆς λέξεως στοιχείων, πρὸς δὲ γεω-
 μέτρας περὶ τοῦ μὴ δεῖν ἐξ ὑποθέσεως λαμβάνειν
 τὰς ἀρχάς, πρὸς δὲ μουσικούς περὶ τοῦ μηδὲν
 εἶναι φωνὴν μηδὲ χρόνον. ἴδωμεν δὲ τάξει πρῶτον
 τὴν καθολικωτέραν ἀντίρρησιν.

A'.—Εἰ ἔστι μαθημα

9 Τὴν μὲν οὖν γενομένην παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις
 περὶ μαθήσεως διαφωνίαν πολλὴν καὶ ποικίλην
 οὐσαν οὐ τοῦ παρόντος ἔστι καιροῦ ἐπικρίνειν·
 ἀπόχρη δὲ παραστήσαι ὡς εἴπερ ἔστι τι μάθημα,
 καὶ τοῦτο ἀνυστὸν ἀνθρώπῳ, τέσσαρα δεῖ προμο-

¹ τὰ δ' ἰδίως scripsi : τὰ δὲ ὡς mss., Bekk.

^a i.e. the Subjects of general, pre-professional, education,

truth, they found difficulties no less serious, which they did not conceal. Accordingly, we too will pursue the same method as they and endeavour, in no spirit of controversy, to select and set forth the substantial arguments against the Professors of culture.

Now I deem it superfluous to explain why the "cyclical studies"^a are so called, and how many of them there are, when our exposition is addressed to those who are already sufficiently instructed in these matters. But it is necessary for our present purpose⁸ to indicate this point,—that of the arguments brought against the Arts and Sciences some are of a general character directed against all these subjects, while others are of a special character, being against the subjects taken separately; thus, the argument that no Art or Science exists is of a more "general" character, whereas more "special" is the argument against, say, the Grammarians concerning the elements of speech, and that against the Geometers denying the right to assume the principles, and that against the Musicians which questions the existence of tone and time. First, then, in point of order let us consider the more general refutation.

CHAPTER I.—DOES A SUBJECT OF LEARNING EXIST?

It is no part of our present task to pronounce upon⁹ the long and varied dispute regarding learning which has been carried on by the philosophers. It is sufficient to lay down that if any subject of learning exists, and if it is attainable by man, four things must including astronomy, geometry, music, grammar, and rhetoric.

λογήσασθαι, τὸ διδασκόμενον πρᾶγμα, τὸν διδάσκοντα, τὸν μαθάνοντα, τὸν τρόπον τῆς μαθήσεως. οὔτε δὲ τὸ διδασκόμενον ἔστιν οὔτε ὁ διδάσκων οὔτε ὁ μαθάνων οὔτε ὁ τρόπος τῆς μαθήσεως, καθάπερ ὑποδείξομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τι μάθημα.

B'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΔΑΣΚΟΜΕΝΟΥ

- 10 Καὶ δὴ περὶ τοῦ πρώτου λέγοντες πρώτον φάμεν ὡς εἴπερ διδάσκεται τι, ἤτοι τὸ ὄν τῷ εἶναι διδάσκεται ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν τῷ μὴ εἶναι. οὔτε δὲ τὸ ὄν τῷ εἶναι διδάσκεται οὔτε τὸ μὴ ὄν τῷ μὴ εἶναι, καθάπερ παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα διδάσκεται τι. καὶ δὴ τὸ μὴ ὄν τῷ μὴ εἶναι οὐκ ἂν διδάσκοιτο· εἰ γὰρ διδάσκεται, διδακτὸν ἔστι, διδακτὸν δὲ καθ-
- 11 ἐστὼς τῶν ὄντων γενήσεται, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἔστι μὴ ὄν τε καὶ ὄν. οὐχὶ δὲ γε δυνατόν ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὄν [τε] καὶ μὴ ὄν ὑπάρχειν· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ μὴ ὄν τῷ μὴ εἶναι διδάσκεται. τῷ τε μὴ ὄντι οὐδὲν συμβέβηκεν, ᾧ δὲ μηδὲν συμβέβηκεν, οὐδὲ τὸ διδάσκεσθαι συμβήσεται· ἐν γάρ τι ἦν τῶν συμβεβηκότων καὶ τὸ διδάσκεσθαι. τοίνυν οὐδὲ ταύτη
- 12 διδακτὸν ἔστι τὸ μὴ ὄν. καὶ μὴν τὸ διδασκόμενον φαντασίαν κινοῦν εἰς μάθησιν ἡμῖν ἔρχεται, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν ἀδυνατοῦν φαντασίαν κινεῖν οὐδὲ διδακτὸν ἔστιν. ἔτι δ' οὐδ' ὡς ἀληθές τὸ μὴ ὄν διδακτὸν ἔστιν· οὔτε γὰρ τῶν μὴ ὄντων ἔστι τἀληθές, οὔτε τι ἀληθές ὡς μὴ ὄν διδακτὸν ἔστιν. εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἀληθές ὡς μὴ ὄν διδακτὸν ἔστι (τῶν γὰρ ὄντων ἔστι τἀληθές), ἀδίδακτον ἄρα τὸ μὴ ὄν.

* Cf. P.H. iii. 252.

* Cf. P.H. iii. 256 ff.

first be agreed upon^a—the subject taught, the teacher, the learner, the method of learning. But, as we shall show, neither does the subject exist nor the teacher nor the learner nor the method of learning; therefore no subject of learning exists.

CHAPTER II.—CONCERNING THE SUBJECT TAUGHT

Now in dealing with the first point first we assert 10 that if anything is taught either the existent *qua* existent is taught or the non-existent *qua* non-existent.^b But, as we shall establish, neither is the existent *qua* existent taught nor the non-existent *qua* non-existent; therefore nothing is taught. Now the non-existent *qua* non-existent will not be taught; for if it is taught it is teachable, and being teachable it will become an existent, and because of this it 11 will be both non-existent and existent. But it is not possible for the same thing to be both existent and non-existent; therefore the non-existent *qua* non-existent is not taught.—Also, the non-existent has no property, and what has no property will not have the property of being taught; for being taught is one of the properties. Hence, on this ground, too, the non-existent is not capable of being taught.—More- 12 over, that which is taught comes to be learnt by us through exciting a presentation, but the non-existent being unable to excite a presentation is likewise incapable of being taught.—Further, the non-existent cannot be taught as being true; for neither is the true a non-existent, nor is anything true capable of being taught as a non-existent. But if nothing true can be taught as non-existent (since the true is an existent), then the non-existent is incapable of being

- 13 εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἀληθὲς διδάσκεται, πᾶν τὸ διδασκόμενον ψευδὸς ἔστιν· ὅπερ ἀλογώτατον ὑπάρχει. οὐ τοίνυν τὸ μὴ ὄν διδάσκεται. ἤτοι γὰρ τὸ διδασκόμενον ψευδὸς ἔστιν ἢ ἀληθές. ἀλλὰ ψεῦδος μὲν ἀλογώτατον, τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς ὄν ὑπῆρχεν. οὐκ
- 14 ἄρα τὸ μὴ ὄν διδακτόν. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν τῷ εἶναι διδακτόν ἔστιν, ἐπειδήπερ τῶν ὄντων πᾶσι φαινομένων ἐπ' ἴσης πάντα ἔσται ἀδίδακτα. ᾧ ἀκολουθήσει τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι διδακτόν· δεῖ γὰρ ὑποκεῖσθαι τι ἀδίδακτον, ἵνα ἐκ τοῦ γινωσκομένου γένηται ἢ τούτου μάθησις. τοίνυν οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν τῷ εἶναι διδάσκεται.
- 15 Ὁ δὲ ὅμοιος τῆς ἀπορίας γενήσεται τρόπος καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐροῦντας τὸ οὔτι ἢ τί διδάσκεσθαι. εἰ γὰρ τὸ οὔτι διδάσκοιτο, ἔσται ἢ διδάσκεται τί, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο <τὸ>¹ αὐτὸ τάναντία οὔτι καὶ τί ἔσται, ὅπερ ἦν τῶν ἀδυνάτων. τῷ τε οὔτινι οὐδὲν συμβέβηκεν, διὸ οὐδὲ τὸ διδάσκεσθαι· καὶ γὰρ
- 16 τοῦτο τῶν συμβεβηκότων ἔστιν. οὐ τοίνυν τὸ οὔτι διδάσκεται. κατὰ δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναλογίαν καὶ τὸ τί τῶν ἀδιδάκτων γενήσεται· εἰ γὰρ διὰ τοῦτο διδακτόν ἔσται ὅτι <τί>² ἔστιν, οὐδὲν ἀδίδακτον
- 17 ἔσται, ᾧ ἔπεται τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι διδακτόν. καὶ μὴν εἰ διδάσκειται τι, ἤτοι διὰ τῶν οὐτινῶν διδαχθήσεται ἢ διὰ τῶν τινῶν. ἀλλὰ διὰ μὲν τῶν οὐτινῶν οὐχ οἷόν τε διδαχθῆναι· ἀνπόστατα γὰρ ἔστι τῇ διανοίᾳ ταῦτα κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς. λείπεται

¹ <τὸ> add. cj. Bekk.² <τί> add. Heintz.

taught. And if nothing true is taught, everything 13 that is taught is false, which is most irrational. The non-existent, therefore, is not taught. For what is taught is either false or true. But to say it is false is most irrational, and what is true is existent. Therefore the non-existent is not capable of being taught.—Nor, 14 indeed, is the existent *qua* existent capable of being taught, for, since existents are equally evident to all men, they will all be incapable of being taught. Wherefrom it will follow that nothing is capable of being taught; for something untaught must be assumed in order that the learning of it may be derived from what is known. Neither, then, is the existent *qua* existent taught.

The same method of scepticism will be used also 15 against those who will say that either “nothing” is taught or “something.” For if “nothing” should be taught, it will be “something” inasmuch as it is taught, and because of this the same thing will be two opposite things, nothing and something, which is impossible.—Besides, “nothing” has no property, and therefore it has not that of being taught; for this is, in fact, one of the properties. So, then, 16 “nothing” is not taught.—And, by parity of reasoning, “something” also is one of the things which cannot be taught. For if it is to be capable of being taught because it is “something,” nothing will be untaught; wherefrom it follows that nothing is capable of being taught.—Moreover, if something is 17 taught it will be taught by means either of the “nothings” or of the “somethings”; but it is not possible for it to be taught by means of the “nothings,” for these have no reality for the mind according to the Stoics. It remains, then, that learning

ὄν διὰ τῶν τινῶν γίνεσθαι τὴν μάθησιν. ὁ πάλιν
 18 ἀπορόν ἐστιν· ὡς περ γὰρ αὐτὸ τὸ διδασκόμενον
 κατὰ τοῦτο διδάσκεται καθὸ τί ἐστιν, οὕτως ἐπεὶ
 καὶ τὰ ἐξ ὧν ἡ μάθησις τινὰ ἐστι, γενήσεται
 διδακτά. καὶ ταύτῃ μηδενὸς ὄντος ἀδιδάκτου¹
 ἀναιρεῖται ἡ μάθησις.

Γ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΣΩΜΑΤΟΣ

19 Ἄλλως τε, ἐπεὶ τῶν τινῶν τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ σώμα-
 τα τὰ δὲ ἀσώματα, δεήσει τὰ διδασκόμενα τινὰ
 ὄντα ἢ τοὶ σώματα εἶναι ἢ ἀσώματα· οὔτε δὲ
 σώματα δύναται ὑπάρχειν οὔτε ἀσώματα, ὡς
 παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶ τινὰ διδασκόμενα.
 20 τὸ μὲν οὖν σῶμα, καὶ μάλιστα κατὰ τοὺς στωικούς,
 οὐκ ἂν εἶη τῶν διδακτῶν· δεῖ γὰρ τὰ διδασκόμενα
 λεκτὰ τυγχάνειν, τὰ δὲ σώματα οὐκ ἐστὶ λεκτά,
 διόπερ οὐ διδάσκεται. εἴπερ δὲ τὰ σώματα μήτε
 αἰσθητά ἐστὶ μήτε νοητά, δῆλον ὡς οὐδὲ διδακτά
 γενήσεται. αἰσθητά μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐστὶν, ὡς ἐκ
 21 τῆς ἐνοίας αὐτῶν συμφανές. εἰ γὰρ σύνδοδος ἐστὶ
 κατὰ ἀθροισμὸν μεγέθους καὶ σχήματος καὶ
 ἀντιτυπίας τὸ σῶμα, ὡς φησὶν Ἐπίκουρος, ἢ τὸ
 τριχῆ διαστατόν, τουτέστι τὸ ἐκ μήκους καὶ
 πλάτους καὶ βάθους, καθάπερ οἱ μαθηματικοὶ
 λέγουσιν, ἢ τὸ τριχῆ διαστατόν μετὰ ἀντιτυπίας,
 ὡς πάλιν Ἐπίκουρος, ἵνα τούτῳ διορίζῃ τοῦ κενοῦ,²
 22 ἢ ὄγκος ἀντίτυπος, ὡς ἄλλοι,—ὅπως δ' ἂν ἐχῆ,
 ἐπεὶ κατὰ σύνοδον πολλῶν ιδιωμάτων νοεῖται, ἢ
 δὲ πλειόνων ἐπισύνθεσις οὐχ ἀπλῆς τίνος καὶ

¹ ἀδιδάκτου Heintz : διδακτοῦ mss., Bekk.

² τοῦ κενοῦ Heintz : τὸ κενόν mss., Bekk.

takes place by means of the "somethings," which too is dubious. For just as the thing taught is itself 18 taught *qua* "something," so also, since the things from which the learning is derived are "somethings," they too will be taught. And thus, since nothing is untaught, learning is abolished.

CHAPTER III.—CONCERNING THE CORPOREAL

Furthermore, since some of the "somethings" are 19 corporeal, others incorporeal, the things taught, being "somethings," will have to be either corporeal or incorporeal^a; but, as we shall establish, they cannot be either corporeal or incorporeal; therefore there are no "somethings" which are taught. Now the 20 corporeal—according to the Stoics in special—will not be capable of being taught; for things taught must be "meanings,"^b but corporeals are not "meanings" and, consequently, are not taught. And if corporeals are neither sensibles nor intelligibles it is plain that they will not be capable of being taught. Now they are not sensibles, as is manifest from our conception of them. For if the corporeal is, as Epi- 21 curus says, a combination of magnitude, shape and solidity massed together,—or, as the Mathematicians assert, that which is three-dimensional, that is to say compounded of length, breadth and depth,—or that which has three-dimensions *plus* solidity (another definition of Epicurus : in order to distinguish it thus from void),—or, as others say, a solid mass,—be this 22 as it may, inasmuch as the corporeal is conceived as a combination of a number of separate factors, and the combining of many is not the operation of a simple

^a Cf. *P.H.* iii. 255.

^b The Stoic *lekta*; see *P.H.* ii. 81 n.

ἀλόγου αἰσθήσεως ἐστὶν ἔργον ἀλλὰ λογικῆς
 διανοίας, [· εἰ δὲ λογικῆς διανοίας,]¹ οὐκ ἔσται τῶν
 23 αἰσθητῶν τὸ σῶμα. κὰν αἰσθητὸν δὲ [πάλιν] αὐτὸ
 ὑποθώμεθα, πάλιν ἐστὶν ἀδίδακτον. τὸ γὰρ
 αἰσθητὸν πάλιν, ἢ αἰσθητὸν ἐστίν, οὐ διδάσκεται·
 οὐδεὶς γὰρ λευκὸν ὄραν μανθάνει, οὐδὲ γλυκέος
 γεύεσθαι, οὐδὲ θερμοῦ ἀπτεσθαι, οὐκ εὐώδους
 ὀσφραίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐστὶ ταῦτα τῶν ἀδιδάκτων
 24 καὶ φυσικῶς ἡμῖν προσόντων. λείπεται οὖν
 νοητὸν τε λέγειν τὸ σῶμα καὶ ταύτῃ διδακτὸν.
 ὅπως δ' ἂν ἀληθὲς εἴη, σκοπῶμεν. εἰ γὰρ μήτε
 μῆκός ἐστι κατ' ἰδίαν τὸ σῶμα μήτε πλάτος ἢ
 βάθος, τὸ δὲ ἐξ ἀπάντων νοούμενον, ἀνάγκη
 πάντων ἀσωμάτων ὄντων καὶ τὸ ἐξ αὐτῶν
 συστὰν ἀσώματον νοεῖν καὶ οὐ σῶμα, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο
 25 καὶ ἀδίδακτον. πρὸς τῷ τὸν νοεῖν τὰ ἐκ τού-
 των συνεστῶς σῶμα πρότερον ὀφείλειν αὐτὰ ταῦτα
 νοεῖν, ἵνα κάκεινο δυνατὸς² ἢ νοεῖν. (ἀλλ' οὐ
 δύναται ταῦτα νοεῖν)³ ἢ γὰρ περιπτωτικῶς αὐτὰ
 νοήσει ἢ κατὰ μετάβασιν ἀπὸ περιπτώσεως. οὔτε
 δὲ περιπτωτικῶς ἀσώματα γὰρ ἐστὶ, καὶ τῶν
 ἀσωμάτων οὐκ ἀντιλαμβάνομεθα περιπτωτικῶς,
 αἰεὶ κατὰ θίξιν γινομένης τῆς περὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν
 ἀντιλήψεως. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ κατὰ μετάβασιν ἀπὸ
 περιπτώσεως, τῷ μηδὲν ἔχειν αἰσθητὸν ἀφ' οὗ
 μειῶν τις ποιήσεται τούτων ἐπίνοιαν. τοῖνυν
 οὐδὲ τὰ ἐξ ὧν τὸ σῶμα νοεῖν δυνάμενοι πάντως
 οὐδὲ διδάσκειν τοῦτο ἰσχύσομεν.
 26 Ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῆς τοῦ σώματος νοήσεώς τε

¹ [· εἰ . . . διανοίας,] del. Heintz.

² δυνατός cj. Bekk. : δυνατόν mss., Bekk.

³ (ἀλλ' οὐ δύναται ταῦτα νοεῖν) add. cj. Bekk.

and irrational sense but of a rational intellect, the corporeal will not be one of the sensibles. And even 23 if we assume that it is sensible, yet even so it is still incapable of being taught. For the sensible also, *qua* sensible, is not taught; for no one learns to see what is white, or to taste the sweet, or feel the hot, or smell the odorous, but these sensations are untaught and belong to us naturally.—It remains, then, to say that 24 the corporeal is intelligible and thus capable of being taught. But let us consider what is the truth of the matter. If the corporeal is neither length by itself nor breadth nor depth, but that which is conceived as compounded of them all, then, since these are all incorporeal, one must necessarily conceive the compound formed from them as being incorporeal and not corporeal, and therefore incapable of being taught. Besides, the man who conceives the body 25 compounded of these dimensions must first conceive the dimensions themselves, in order that he may also be able to conceive the body. (But these he cannot conceive;) for he will conceive them either by way of sense-experience or by way of transference from sense-experience. Not, however, by way of experience; for they are incorporeals, and we do not apprehend incorporeals by experience, since sensuous apprehension always takes place by way of contact. Nor yet by way of transference from experience, since one possesses no sense-object by transference from which one might form the conception of the dimensions. Thus, since we cannot even conceive the elements which go to form the corporeal, we certainly shall not be able to teach it.

But we have treated more exactly of the conception 26

καὶ ὑποστάσεως ἐν τοῖς σκεπτικοῖς ὑπεμνήσαμεν ἀκριβέστερον· νυνὶ δὲ ἀποστάντες τούτων τῶν λέγων ἐκεῖνο λέγωμεν ὅτι τῶν σωμάτων κατὰ τὸ ἀνωτάτω διττὴ τις ἐστὶ διαφορὰ· τὰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν αἰσθητὰ καθέστηκε τὰ δὲ νοητά· καὶ εἰ τὸ διδασκόμενόν ἐστὶ σῶμα, πάντως ἤτοι νοητόν 27 ἐστὶν ἢ αἰσθητόν· ἀλλ' οὔτε αἰσθητόν εἶναι δύναται διὰ τὸ πᾶσιν ἐπ' ἴσης ὀφείλειν φαίνεσθαι καὶ πρόδηλον ὑπάρχειν, οὔτε νοητόν διὰ τὸ ἀδηλεῖσθαι καὶ δι' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀνεπικρίτως διαφωλεῖσθαι παρὰ πᾶσι τοῖς φιλοσόφοις, τῶν μὲν ἄτομον τοῦτο λεγόντων ὑπάρχειν τῶν δὲ τμητόν, καὶ τῶν τμητόν φαιμένων εἶναι ἐνίων μὲν εἰς ἄπειρον τέμνεσθαι τοῦτο ἀξιούντων, ἐνίων δὲ εἰς ἐλάχιστον καὶ ἀμερὲς καταλήγειν. οὐκ ἄρα διδακτόν ἐστὶ τὸ σῶμα.

28 Καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀσώματον. πᾶν γὰρ καὶ ὅποιον ἂν τις ἀσώματον λέγη διδάσκεισθαι, εἴαν τε τὴν Πλατωνικὴν ἰδέαν, εἴαν τε τὸ παρὰ τοῖς στωικοῖς λεκτόν, εἴαν τε τόπον ἢ κενὸν ἢ χρόνον ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἵνα μὴδὲν προπετές περὶ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτῶν λέγωμεν, μὴδ' ἑτέρας σκέψεις ἐφ'¹ ἑτέραις διεξοδευόμεν παριστάντες τὸ ἀνυπόστατον ἐκάστου, [δ] προδήλως μὲν ἐπιζητεῖται καὶ

ἔς τ' ἂν ὕδωρ τε νάη καὶ δένδρεα μακρὰ τεθῆλη

ζητήσεται παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς, τῶν μὲν εἶναι ταῦτα διαβεβαιουμένων τῶν δὲ μὴ εἶναι, τῶν δὲ ἐπεχόντων· τὸ δὲ τὰ ἔτι ἐπίδικα καὶ ἐν μετεωροῖς

¹ ἐφ' scripsi: ἐν mss., Bekk.

and reality of the corporeal in our *Skeptika*^a; so now let us leave aside these criticisms and proceed to state that the most generic distinction amongst corporeals is twofold; some of them are sensibles, others intelligibles. And if the thing taught is corporeal it must certainly be either an intelligible or a sensible. But it cannot be a sensible, since then 27 it ought to be equally apparent to all men and be pre-evident; nor can it be an intelligible owing to the fact that it is non-evident, and for this very reason there is an unsettled controversy about it amongst all the philosophers, some of them saying that it is indivisible, others that it is divisible; while of those who assert its divisibility some claim that it is divided to infinity, others that the division stops at what is minimal and atomic. Therefore the corporeal is not capable of being taught.

Nor, indeed, is the incorporeal. For in every case, 28 whatever be the incorporeal which one declares to be taught,—whether it be the Platonic Idea, or the “lekton” of the Stoics, or place or void or time or anything else of the kind,—without making any rash assertion about the reality of these things, or pursuing divers inquiries one after another in order to prove the non-reality of each of them, we may say that it is manifest that the problem of their reality is a matter of discussion amongst the Dogmatists, and will be so

Long as the waters flow on and the tall trees cease not to burgeon,^b

since some of them stoutly assert that these things exist, others that they do not exist, while still others suspend judgement; thus it is absurd to say that

^a Cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 359 ff.; *P.H.* iii. 38 ff.

^b Cf. *P.H.* ii. 37 n.

ἀμφισβητήσσει κείμενα ὡς σύμφωνα καὶ ὁμόλογα διδάσκεισθαι λέγειν τῶν ἀτόπων ἐστίν.

29 Εἰ οὖν τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ σώματα τὰ δὲ ἀσώματα, δέδεικται δὲ οὐδέτερα τούτων διδασκόμενα, οὐδὲν διδάσκεται.

Ἐπιχειρητέον δὲ καὶ οὕτως. εἰ διδάσκεται τι, ἤτοι ἀληθές ἐστὶν ἢ ψεῦδος. οὔτε δὲ ψεῦδος διδακτόν ἐστιν, ὡς αὐτόθεν ὁμόλογον, οὔτε ἀληθές· τὸ γὰρ ἀληθές ἄπορον, ὡς ἐν τοῖς σκεπτικοῖς ὑπομνήμασι δέδεικται, καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων οὐκ ἐστὶ μάθησις. οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶ τι τὸ διδασκόμενον. καθόλου τε, εἰ διδάσκεται τι, ἤτοι τεχνικόν ἐστὶν ἢ ἄτεχνον. καὶ ἄτεχνον μὲν ὃν οὐκ ἐστὶ διδακτόν, τεχνικόν δὲ εἴπερ καθέστηκεν, αὐτόθεν μὲν φαινόμενον οὔτε τεχνικόν ἐστὶν οὔτε διδακτόν, ἄδηλον δὲ καθεστῶς διὰ τὸ ἀδηλεῖσθαι πάλιν ἐστὶν ἀδίδακτον.

*Ὅτι συναναιρεῖται καὶ ὁ διδάσκων διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ὁ διδάξει [ἢ ἀδηλόν ἐστιν], ὃ τε μανθάνων διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ὁ μάθη. ὅμως δ' οὖν καὶ περὶ ἐκατέρου τούτων κατ' ἰδίαν ἐπελθόντες ἀπορήσομεν.

Δ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΔΑΣΚΟΝΤΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΜΑΝΘΑΝΟΝΤΟΣ

31 Εἰ γὰρ ἐστὶ τις τούτων, ἤτοι ὁ ἄτεχνος τὸν ὁμοίως ἄτεχνον διδάξει ἢ ὁ τεχνίτης τὸν ὁμοίως τεχνίτην ἢ ὁ ἄτεχνος τὸν τεχνίτην ἢ ἀνάπαυιν. οὔτε δὲ ὁ ἄτεχνος τὸν ἄτεχνον δύναται διδάσκειν, ὡς οὐδὲ ὁ τυφλὸς τὸν τυφλὸν ὁδηγεῖν, οὔτε ὁ

things which are undecided and subjects of unsettled controversy are taught, as though they were unanimously agreed upon and undisputed.

If, then, of existents some are corporeal, others 29 incorporeal, and it has been shown that neither of these is taught, nothing is taught.

We may also argue thus: If a thing is taught it is either true or false.^a But neither is the false taught (as the very notion compels us to admit), nor yet the true; for the true is dubious, as has been shown in our *Treatise on Scepticism*, and of things dubious there is no learning. Therefore there is nothing 30 which is taught.—Also, in general, if a thing is taught it is either a matter of art or without art. And if it is without art it cannot be taught; while if it is a matter of art, either it is self-evident and consequently no matter of art nor capable of being taught, or else it is non-evident and thus, too, incapable of being taught because of its being non-evident.

This involves also the abolition of the teacher because he will have nothing to teach, and of the learner because he will have nothing to learn. Notwithstanding, we shall proceed to state the difficulties about each of these separately.

CHAPTER IV.—CONCERNING THE TEACHER AND THE LEARNER

For if anyone of these exists either the non-expert 31 will teach him who is similarly non-expert, or the expert him who is similarly expert, or the non-expert the expert, or *vice versa*.^b But the non-expert cannot teach the non-expert (just as the blind cannot lead

^a Cf. *P.H.* iii. 253.

^b Cf. *P.H.* iii. 259 ff.

τεχνίτης τὸν ὁμοίως¹ τεχνίτην· οὐδέτερος γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐδεῖτο μαθήσεως, καὶ οὐ μᾶλλον οὗτος ἐκείνου ἢ ἐκείνος τούτου χρεῖαν ἔχει πρὸς τὸ μαθάνειν, τοῖς ἴσοις περιουσιαζόμενοι. οὔτε ὁ
 32 ἀτεχνος τὸν τεχνίτην· ὅμοιον γὰρ ὡς εἴ τις λέγοι τὸν βλέποντα ὑπὸ τοῦ πεπηρωμένου ὀδηγεῖσθαι. καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἀτεχνος πρὸς τὰ τεχνικὰ τῶν θεωρημάτων πεπηρωμένος οὐκ ἂν δύναιτό τινα διδάσκειν ἃ μηδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν οἶδεν, καὶ ὁ τεχνίτης διαβλέπων ἐν τοῖς τεχνικοῖς θεωρήμασι καὶ γνώσιν αὐτῶν
 33 ἐσχηκῶς οὐ δεήσεται τοῦ διδάζοντος.λείπεται οὖν τὸν τεχνίτην τοῦ ἀτέχνου διδάσκαλον εἶναι λέγειν. ὁ τῶν προτέρων ἐστὶν ἀποπώτερον· ὁ τε γὰρ τεχνίτης συνηπὸρηται ἡμῖν τοῖς τῆς τέχνης θεωρήμασιν ἐν τῷ σκεπτικῷ τόπῳ, ὁ τε ἀτεχνος οὔτε ὅτε ἐστὶν ἀτεχνος δύναται γενέσθαι τεχνίτης, οὔτε ὅτε ἐστὶ τεχνίτης ἐτι γίνεται τεχνίτης ἀλλ'
 34 ἐστίν. ἀτεχνος μὲν γὰρ ὢν ὁμοίός ἐστι τῷ ἐκ γενετῆς τυφλῷ ἢ κωφῷ, καὶ ὄν τρόπον οὗτος οὐδέποτε ἢ εἰς χρωμάτων ἢ εἰς φωνῶν ἔννοιαν ἔλθειν πέφυκεν, οὕτως οὐδὲ ὁ ἀτεχνος, ἐφ' ὅσον ἐστὶν ἀτεχνος, τετυφλωμένος καὶ κεκωφωμένος πρὸς τὰ τεχνικὰ θεωρήματα οὔτε ἰδεῖν οὔτε ἀκοῦσαι τι τούτων οἷός τε ἐστίν· τεχνίτης δὲ γενόμενος οὐκέτι διδάσκεται ἀλλὰ δεδίδακται.
 35 Μετακτέον δὲ τὰς ἀπορίας ἐκ τῶν περὶ μεταβολῆς καὶ πάθους γενέσεως τε καὶ φθορᾶς προεγεχειρημένων ἡμῖν ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τοὺς φυσικοὺς ἀντιρρήσεσι. τὰ δὲ νῦν συγχωρήσαντες τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων εἶναι τι τὸ διδασκόμενον πρᾶγμα

¹ τὸν ὁμοίως scripsi: ὁμοίως τὸν mss., Bekk.

the blind), nor the expert the similarly expert; for neither of these requires to learn, and this one has no more need of learning than that one, nor that one than this one, both being equally full of knowledge. Nor can the non-expert teach the expert; for that 32 would be like saying that the man who has eyesight is led along by the man who has none. For in fact the non-expert is blind as regards the technical principles, and thus will be unable to teach things of which he knows nothing at all; while the expert, having clear vision of the technical principles and having gained knowledge of them, will not require a teacher.—It remains, then, to say that the expert 33 teaches the non-expert. But this is even more absurd than the former suppositions; for along with the principles of his art the existence of the expert himself has been shown in our Sceptic text-book to be open to doubt, and the non-expert neither can become an expert while he is non-expert, nor when he is an expert does he any longer become an expert, but is one. For if he is non-expert he is like a man blind 34 or deaf from birth, and just as such a man cannot ever form a notion of colours or of sounds, so the non-expert, in so far as he is non-expert, being blind and deaf to the technical principles is incapable of seeing or hearing any of them; and if he has become an expert he is no longer being taught but has been taught.

We may also borrow criticisms from those we have 35 already brought forward in our arguments against the Physicists concerning change and affection and becoming and perishing.^a For the present let us concede to the Professors that there exists a subject

^a Cf. P.H. iii. 102 ff., Adv. Phys. ii. 39 ff.

καὶ εἶναι τινα τὸν ὑφηγούμενον, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸν μαθάνοντα, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀπαιτῶμεν τὸν
 36 τρόπον τῆς μαθήσεως. ἢ γὰρ ἐναργεῖα γίνεται ἢ λόγῳ τὰ τῆς διδασκαλίας. ἀλλὰ τούτων ἢ μὲν ἐναργεῖα τῶν δεικτῶν ἐστί, τὸ δὲ δεικτὸν φαινόμενον, τὸ δὲ φαινόμενον, ἢ φαίνεται, κοινῶς πᾶσι ληπτόν, τὸ δὲ κοινῶς πᾶσι ληπτὸν ἀδίδακτον· οὐκ
 37 ἄρα τὸ ἐναργεῖα δεικτὸν διδακτὸν. ὁ δὲ λόγος ἥτοι σημαίνει τι ἢ οὐ σημαίνει. καὶ μηδὲν μὲν σημαίνων οὐδὲ διδάσκαλός τινός ἐστι, σημαίνων δὲ ἥτοι φύσει σημαίνει τι ἢ θέσει. καὶ φύσει μὲν οὐ σημαίνει διὰ τὸ μὴ πάντας πάντων ἀκούειν, Ἑλλήνας βαρβάρων καὶ βαρβάρους Ἑλλήνων ἢ
 38 Ἑλλήνας Ἑλλήνων ἢ βαρβάρους βαρβάρων· θέσει δὲ εἶπερ σημαίνει, δῆλον ὡς οἱ μὲν προκατειληφότες τὰ καθ' ὧν αἱ λέξεις κείνται καὶ ἀντιλήφονται τούτων, οὐ τὸ ἀγνοούμενον ἐξ αὐτῶν διδασκόμενοι, τὸ δ' ὅπερ ἤδεισαν ἀνανεούμενοι, οἱ δὲ χρήζοντες τῆς τῶν ἀγνοουμένων μαθήσεως οὐκέτι.

Εἰ οὖν οὔτε τὸ διδασκόμενον ἐστίν οὔτε ὁ διδάσκων οὔτε ὁ μαθάνων οὔτε ὁ τρόπος τῆς μαθήσεως, δῆλον ὡς οὐδὲ μάθημα, οὐδὲ ὁ μαθήματος προσ-
 39 εστῶς. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὐ καθολικὴν μόνον πρὸς πάντας τοὺς μαθηματικοὺς ὑπεσχόμεθα ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἀντίρρησιν ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰδικωτέραν πρὸς ἕκαστον, ὑποτιθέμενοι τὸ εἶναι τι μάθημα καὶ δυνατὴν ὑπάρχειν τὴν μάθησιν, σκοπῶμεν εἰ καὶ τὸ ἐκάστων

taught and that the instructor exists and likewise the learner, and let us next investigate the method of learning. Now teaching takes place either by means 36 of sense-evidence or by means of speech. But of these sense-evidence is concerned with ostensible things, and the ostensible is apparent, and the apparent, in so far as it appears, is perceptible by all alike, and what is perceptible by all alike is incapable of being taught; therefore what is shown by sense-evidence is not capable of being taught.—And speech 37 either signifies or does not signify something. Now if it signifies nothing, neither does it teach anything; while if it signifies, it signifies a thing either by nature or by convention. But it does not signify by nature since all men do not understand the speech of all,—Greeks that of barbarians and barbarians that of Greeks, or Greeks that of Greeks or barbarians that of barbarians.* And if it signifies by convention, it is 38 plain that those who have apprehended beforehand the objects to which the terms are conventionally applied will also understand those terms, not that they are taught by them what they did not know, but rather as reviving what they did know; but those who lack learning about the things not known will fail to do so.

If, then, the subject taught does not exist, nor the teacher, nor the learner, nor the method of learning, it is clear that neither does the subject learnt exist nor he who presides over that subject. But since we 39 undertook not only to construct a general argument against all the Professors but also a special one against each of them, let us assume that a subject of learning exists and that learning is possible, and consider whether the claims made regarding each subject are

* Cf. P.H. ii. 214.

μαθήματος ἐπάγγελμα δυνατόν ἐστι, λαμβάνοντες πρὸς τοὺς ἐλέγχους μὴ πάντα τὰ παρὰ τοῖς ἐλεγχομένοις λεγόμενα (τοῦτο γὰρ σὺν τῷ περισκελεῖ 40 καὶ ἀμέθοδον, ἐπεὶ τάχα καὶ ἀδύνατόν ἐστι) μήτε δ' ἐκ πάντων τὰ ὁποιοῦν (τοῦτο γὰρ ἴσως οὐδὲ καθικνεῖται αὐτῶν), ἀλλὰ τὰ ὧν ἀναιρουμένων συναναιρεῖται πάντα. καὶ ὃν τρόπον οἱ πόλιν λαβεῖν σπεύδοντες ἐκείνων μάλιστα ἐγκρατεῖς γίνεσθαι σπουδάζουσιν ὧν ἀλόγων καὶ ἢ πόλιν ἐάλωκεν, οἷον τεῖχη καθαιροῦντες ἢ στόλον ἐμπιπράντες ἢ τὰς εἰς τὸ ζῆν ἀφορμὰς ἀποκλείοντες οὕτω καὶ ἡμεῖς τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων διαγωνιζόμενοι ταῦτ' αὐτὰ¹ πειράζωμεν ἐξ ὧν αὐτοῖς σώζεται τὰ πάντα, οἷον ἢ ἀρχὰς ἢ τὰς ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν καθολικὰς μεθόδους ἢ τὰ τέλη· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἢ ἐκ τούτων συνίσταται πᾶν μάθημα.

Α'.—ΠΡΟΣ ΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΙΚΟΥΣ

41 Ἀρχέτω δὲ ἡμῖν εὐθύς ἢ πρὸς τοὺς γραμματικούς ζήτησις, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπεὶ ἀπὸ νηπιότητος σχεδὸν καὶ ἐκ πρώτων σπαργάνων γραμματικῆ παραδιδόμεθα, ἐστὶ τε αὕτη οἷον ἀφετήριόν τι πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων μάθησιν, εἶθ' ὅτι παρὰ πάσας θρασύνεται τὰς ἐπιστήμας, σχεδὸν τι τὴν τῶν 42 Σειρήνων ὑπόσχεσιν ὑπισχνουμένη. ἐκείναι μὲν γὰρ εἰδύϊαι ὅτι φύσει φιλοπευθῆς ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος καὶ πολὺς αὐτῷ κατὰ στέρνων τῆς ἀληθείας ἡμερος ἐντέτηκεν, οὐ μόνον θεσπεσίους μέλεσι κηλήσειν 24

also possible ; and let us take as the matter for our refutation not all the statements made by those whom we are refuting (for this would be unsystematic as well as inordinate, and probably impossible also), nor yet any random selection out of them all (for this 40 perhaps would fail to reach all of them), but those statements the destruction of which involves the destruction of all. And just as those who are striving to take a city are anxious most of all to make themselves masters of those things the capture of which ensures also their capture of the city—such as breaking down their walls or setting fire to their equipment or cutting off their food-supplies,—so let us, too, in our conflict with the Professors attack those very points upon which all their safety depends, such as their principles, or the general arguments which are derived from the principles, or their conclusions ; for by these or from these every art and science is formed.

CHAPTER I.—AGAINST THE GRAMMARIANS

Let us begin at once with our criticism of the 41 Professors of Letters (or Grammarians), firstly because we are handed over to the study of letters well-nigh from infancy and our first swaddling clothes, and this art is as it were the starting-point for our learning of all the others, and next because it puffs itself up above all the sciences, almost promising the Sirens' promise. For they, being aware that man is 42 inquisitive by nature and that there is implanted in his breast a great longing for the truth, promise not only to charm those who are sailing by with wondrous

¹ ταῦτ' αὐτὰ cj. Bekk. : τὸ αὐτὸ mss., Bekk.

τοὺς παραπλέοντας ὑπιοχνούνται ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ὄντα αὐτοὺς διδάξεν. φασὶ γὰρ

δεῦρ' ἄγ' ἰών, πολυαῖν' Ὀδυσσεῦ, μέγα κῦδος
Ἀχαιῶν,

νῆα κατάστησον, ἵνα νωιτέρην ὄπ' ἀκούσης.
οὐ γάρ πώ τις τῆδε παρέπλω νηὶ μελαίνῃ
πρὶν γ' ἡμέων μελίγηρυν ἀπὸ στομάτων ὄπ'
ἀκούσῃ,

ἀλλ' ὃ γε περιψάμενος νεύται καὶ πλείονα εἰδώς.
ἴδμεν γάρ τοι πάνθ' ὅσ' ἐνὶ Τροίῃ εὐρείῃ
Ἄργεῖοι Τρῶές τε θεῶν ἰότητι μόγησαν,
ἴδμεν δ' ὅσσα γένηται ἐπὶ χθονὶ πουλυβοτείρῃ.

43 ἡ δὲ γραμματικὴ, σὺν τῶν τὰ ἐκ τῶν μύθων τε καὶ ἱστοριῶν λόγῳ διορίζειν, καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰς διαλέκτους καὶ τεχνολογίας καὶ ἀναγνώσεις πραγματικὸν ἀύχουσα πολὺν ἑαυτῆς ἐργάζεται τοῖς ἀκούουσι πόθον. ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ παρὰ θύραν πλανᾶσθαι δοκῶμεν, ὑποδεικτέον πόσαι τέ εἰσι γραμματικαὶ καὶ περὶ τίνος αὐτῶν πρόκειται ζητεῖν.

B'.—ΠΟΣΑΧΩΣ ΛΕΓΕΤΑΙ ΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΙΚΗ

44 Γραμματικὴ τοῖνυν λέγεται κατὰ ὁμωνυμίαν κοινῶς τε καὶ ἰδίως, καὶ κοινῶς μὲν ἡ τῶν ὁποιωνδήποτεῦν γραμμάτων εἰδησις, εἴαν τε Ἑλληνικῶν εἴαν τε βαρβαρικῶν, ἣν συνήθως γραμματιστικὴν καλοῦμεν, ἰδιαιτερον δὲ ἡ ἐντελής καὶ τοῖς περὶ Κράττητα τὸν Μαλλώτην Ἀριστοφάνην τε καὶ
45 Ἀρίσταρχον ἐκπονηθεῖσα. δοκεῖ δὲ τούτων ἕκα-

* Homer, *Od.* xii. 184 ff.

music but also to teach them real happenings. Here is what they say ^a—

Come hither now, Odysseus, far-famed, great pride of Achaeans :

Stay thy ship on its course and hark to the words we utter. No man ever as yet has passed this point in his black ship Ere he has lent an ear to the honey-sweet sound of our singing ;

So he departs over-joy'd, and richer, to boot, in knowledge, Seeing that we know all that the Argive hosts and the Trojans

Suffered in broad Troy-land by the dispensation of Heaven ; Nothing, in sooth, is done on the bountiful Earth but we know it.

So the Art of Letters, by boasting of its dealing ⁴³ systematically with dialects and rules of style and recitations, as well as the logical treatment of the contents of myths and histories, excites in the listeners a great desire for itself. But lest we should seem to be wandering past the door, we must indicate how many Arts of Letters there are and which of them we propose to investigate.

CHAPTER II.—THE VARIOUS MEANINGS OF THE TERM “ART-OF-LETTERS”

The term “Art-of-letters” is used, by homonym, ⁴⁴ both in a general and in a special sense. In the general sense it means the knowledge of letters of any and every kind, either Greek or barbarian, which we customarily call “grammatic” ; in the special sense it is applied to the perfected art as elaborated by Crates of Mallus, Aristophanes and Aristarchus.^b

^b Aristarchus founded a School of Grammar at Alexandria (*circa* 150 B.C.) : he was a pupil of Aristophanes of Byzantium. Crates of Mallus, in Cilicia, founded the Pergamene School, in opposition to the Alexandrian.

τέρα καὶ ἀπὸ τινος ἐτύμου φερωνύμως προσηγο-
 ρεῦσθαι. ἡ μὲν γὰρ πρώτη ἀπὸ τῶν γραμμάτων
 οἷς σημειούμεθα τὰς ἐνάρθρους φωνάς, ἡ δὲ δευτέρα
 τάχα μὲν, ὡς τινες ἠξιώκασι, διατακτικώτερον ἀπὸ
 τῆς πρώτης· μοῖρα γάρ ἐστιν (αὕτη)¹ αὐτῆς, καὶ
 ὃν τρόπον ἰατρικὴ εἴρηται μὲν τὸ παλαιὸν ἀπὸ
 τῆς τῶν ἰῶν ἐξαιρέσεως, ἐπικατηγορεῖται δὲ νῦν
 καὶ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων παθῶν ἀνασκευῆς πολλῶ
 46 τεχνικώτερας οὔσης, καὶ ὡς γεωμετρία ἔσπακε
 μὲν τὴν κλήσιν ἀρχικῶς ἀπὸ τῆς κατὰ τὴν γῆν
 καταμετρήσεως, τάττεται δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος
 καὶ κατὰ τῆς τῶν φυσικωτέρων θεωρίας, οὕτω
 καὶ ἡ τέλειος γραμματικὴ ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν γραμμάτων
 εἰδήσεως κατ' ἀρχὰς ὀνομασθεῖσα διετάρθη καὶ
 ἐπὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ποικιλωτέροις αὐτῶν καὶ τεχνικω-
 47 τέροις θεωρήμασι γινώσιν. τάχα δέ, ὡς φασὶν
 οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀσκληπιάδην, καὶ αὕτη ἀπὸ μὲν
 γραμμάτων ὀνόμασται, οὐκ ἀπὸ τούτων δὲ ἀφ' ὧν
 καὶ ἡ γραμματιστικὴ, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη μὲν, ὡς ἔφην,
 ἀπὸ τῶν στοιχείων, αὕτη δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν συγγραμ-
 μάτων περὶ οἷς πονεῖται. γράμματα γὰρ καὶ
 ταῦτα προσηγορεύετο, καθὰ καὶ δημόσια καλοῦμεν
 γράμματα, καὶ πολλῶν τινὰ γραμμάτων ἐμπειρον
 ὑπάρχειν φασί, τοῦτέστιν οὐ τῶν στοιχείων ἀλλὰ
 48 τῶν συγγραμμάτων. καὶ Καλλίμαχος δέ, ποτὲ
 μὲν τὸ ποίημα καλῶν γράμμα ποτὲ δὲ τὸ κατα-
 λογάδην σύγγραμμα, φησὶ

Κρεωφύλου πόνος εἰμί, δόμῳ ποτὲ θεῖον αἰοιδὸν
 δεξαμένου, κλείω δ' Εὐρύτων ὄσσο' ἔπαθεν
 καὶ ξανθὴν Ἰόλειαν, Ὀμήρειον δὲ καλοῦμαι
 γράμμα. Κρεωφύλω, Ζεῦ φίλε, τοῦτο μέγα.

¹ (αὕτη) addidi.

In both cases the sense is evidently derived from the 45
 original meaning of the term " letters " ; for the first
 sense comes from the letters by which we represent
 the articulate sounds, and the second perhaps, as
 some have maintained, from the first by extension ;
 for the first is a part of it, and just as *iatrikḗ* (medical
 art) was so named in olden times from the extraction
 of *ioi* (poisons), but is now applied to the curative
 treatment of all other ailments as well, which is a
 much higher form of art,—and just as geometry 46
 derived its name originally from the mensuration of
gḗ (land), but is at present applied also to theory con-
 cerned with more fundamental entities,—so also the
 perfected Art of letters, after being named originally
 from the knowledge of letters, was extended so as to
 comprise acquaintance with the more complex and
 technical theories about them. But perhaps, as 47
 Asclepiades says, this art, too, was named from
 letters, though not from the same letters as " gram-
 matic " ; for while the latter takes its name, as I
 said, from the elements, the former takes its name
 from the compositions with which it deals. For these,
 too, were called " letters," just as we speak of
 " public letters," and say that a man is skilled in
 many letters, meaning not the elements but the
 compositions. Callimachus,^a too, calling the poem 48
 in one place, and in another the prose composition, a
 letter, says—

Work am I of Crēophylus who welcomed once to his
 homestead

Homer, the singer divine. Woeful the tale I relate
 How fared blond Ioleia and Eurytus. But they do call
 me

Homer's letter! By Jove! fame for the author is this!

^a Callim. *Epigr.* 7 and 25.

καὶ πάλιν

εἶπας " ἦλιε χαῖρε " Κλεόμβροτος Ἀμπρακιώτης
ἦλατ' ἀφ' ὑψηλοῦ τείχεος εἰς αἶθρα,
ἄξιον οὐδ' ἐν ἰδῶν θανάτου τέλος, ἀλλὰ Πλάτωνος
ἐν τῷ περὶ ψυχῆς γράμμ' ἀναλεξάμενος.

- 49 Πλὴν διττῆς οὔσης γραμματικῆς, τῆς μὲν τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ τὰς τούτων συμπλοκάς διδάξεν ἐπαγγελλομένης καὶ καθόλου τέχνης τινὸς οὔσης τοῦ γράφειν τε καὶ ἀναγινώσκειν, τῆς δὲ βαθυτέρας παρὰ ταύτην δυνάμεως, οὐκ ἐν ψιλῇ γραμμάτων γνώσει κειμένης ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ ἐξετάζειν τὴν εὔρεσιν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν φύσιν, ἔτι δὲ τὰ ἐκ τούτων συνεστῶτα λόγου μέρη καὶ εἴ τι τῆς αὐτῆς ιδέας θεωρεῖται, πρόκειται νῦν ἀντιλέγειν οὐ τῇ προτέρα· συμφώνως γὰρ κατὰ πάντας ἐστὶ χρειώδης. ἐν οἷς θετέον καὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον, εἰ καὶ δοκεῖ τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων διεχθραίνειν· ἐν γοῦν τῷ περὶ δώρων καὶ χάριτος ἰκανῶς πειρᾶται διδάσκειν ὅτι ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι τοῖς σοφοῖς μανθάνειν γράμματα.
- 50 καὶ ἄλλως, εἴπαιμεν ἂν ἡμεῖς, οὐ σοφοῖς μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις. ὅτι γὰρ πάσης τέχνης
- 51 τὸ τέλος εὐχρηστόν ἐστι τῷ βίῳ, φανερόν. τῶν δὲ τεχνῶν αἱ μὲν προηγουμένως ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν ὀχληρῶν ἐκκλίσεως παρήλθον, αἱ δὲ ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν ὠφελίμων εὑρέσεως. καὶ ἐστὶ τῆς μὲν πρώτης ιδέας ἰατρικῆ, παιωνίς οὔσα καὶ λυσίπνοος τέχνη, τῆς δὲ δευτέρας κυβερνητικῆ· τῆς γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐθνῶν χρείας μάλιστα δεόνται πάντες
- 52 ἄνθρωποι. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ γραμματιστικὴ διὰ τῆς τῶν γραμμάτων ἐπινοίας ἵαται μὲν ἀργότατον πάθος, τὴν λήθην, συνέχει δὲ ἀναγκαιοτάτην

And again—

Crying " Farewell, O Sun!" Cleombrotus, born in Ambracia,
Leapt from the lofty wall, down to the house of the dead;
Naught had befallen him worthy of death, 'twas his reading of Plato
Mov'd him so—Plato's letter " Concerning the Soul."

However, as the Art of Letters is twofold,—the 49 one promising to teach the elements and their combinations and being in general an art of writing and reading, and the other being in comparison a more profound faculty and not consisting merely in the bare knowledge of letters but also in the investigation of their discovery and their nature, and in addition the parts of speech composed of letters and all other matters of the same kind—it is not our purpose now to controvert the former; for that it is useful is agreed by all men. And amongst them we must place Epicurus, although he seems to be bitterly hostile to the Professors of Arts and Sciences; certainly in his book *On Gifts and Gratitude* he definitely tries to prove that it is necessary for the wise to learn letters. Necessary moreover, as we 50 should say, not for the wise only but for all men. For it is plain that the end aimed at by every art is very useful for life. Some arts have been introduced 51 mainly with the object of averting things hurtful, others with that of discovering things beneficial; medicine is an example of the first kind, being a curative and pain-relieving art, and navigation of the second, for all men are very much in need of the assistance of the other nations. Since then " gramma- 52 tistic " by its comprehension of letters cures a most inactive disease, forgetfulness, and contains a most

ἐνέργειαν, τὴν μνήμην, τὰ πάντα ἐπ' αὐτῇ κείται σχεδόν, καὶ οὔτε ἄλλους τι ἔνεστι τῶν ἀναγκαίων διδάσκειν, οὔτε παρ' ἄλλου μαθεῖν τι τῶν λυσιτελῶν χωρὶς αὐτῆς δυνατὸν ἔσται. οὐκοῦν τῶν χρησι-
 53 μωτάτων ἡ γραμματιστική. ἀμέλει γοῦν οὐδὲ θελήσαντες ταύτην δυνησόμεθα ἀπεριτρέπτως ἀνελεῖν· εἰ γὰρ αἱ ἄχρηστον διδάσκουσαι τὴν γραμματιστικὴν ἐπιχειρήσεις εἰσὶν εὐχρηστοί, οὔτε δὲ μνημονευθῆναι οὔτε τοῖς ἀθίσι παραδοθῆναι χωρὶς αὐτῆς δύναται, χρεώδης ἔστιν ἡ γραμματιστική. καίτοι δόξαι ἂν τισιν ἐπὶ τῆς ἐναντίας εἶναι προλήψεως ὁ προφήτης τῶν Πύρρωνος λόγων Τίμων ἐν οἷς φησὶ

γραμματικῆ, τῆς οὐ τις ἀνασκοπῆ οὐδ' ἀνάθρησις ἀνδρὶ διδασκομένῳ Φοινικικὰ σήματα Κάδμου.

54 οὐ μὴν οὕτως ἔχειν φαίνεται. τὸ γὰρ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ λεγόμενον οὐκ ἔστι τοιοῦτον κατ' αὐτῆς τῆς γραμματιστικῆς, καθ' ἣν διδάσκεται τὰ Φοινικικὰ σήματα Κάδμου, τὸ "οὐδεμίαν ἔστιν ἀνασκοπῆ οὐδ' ἀνάθρησις"· πῶς γάρ, εἰ διδάσκεται τις αὐτῆν, οὐδεμίαν ἔσχηκεν ἐπιστροφὴν αὐτῆς; ἀλλὰ μάλλον τοιοῦτό φησι "διδαχθέντι τὰ Φοινικικὰ σήματα Κάδμου οὐδεμιᾶς ἄλλης παρὰ τοῦτό ἐστι γραμματικῆς ἐπιστροφῆ," ὅπερ καταστρέφει οὐκ εἰς τὸ ἀχρηστεῖν ταύτην τὴν ἐν τοῖς στοιχείοις καὶ τῷ δι' αὐτῶν γράφειν τε καὶ ἀναγινώσκειν θεωρου-
 55 μένην, ἀλλὰ τὴν πέρπερον καὶ περιεργότεραν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τῶν στοιχείων χρῆσις ἤπειγεν εἰς τὴν τοῦ βίου διεξαγωγὴν, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀρκεῖσθαι τῇ ἐκ τῆς παρατηρήσεως τοῦτων παραδόσει, προσεπιδεικνύει δὲ ὡς τάδε μὲν ἔστι φωνάεντα τῇ

necessary activity, memory, almost everything depends upon it, and without it it is impossible to teach any necessary thing to others, and it will be impossible to learn anything profitable from another. Thus the "grammaticistic" is one of the most useful arts. And in any case even if we wished we should
 53 not be able to abolish it without upsetting ourselves; for if the arguments which show that "grammaticistic" is useless are themselves useful but can neither be remembered nor passed on to posterity without it, then "grammaticistic" is useful. Yet it might be thought by some that Timon, the expounder of Pyrrho's views, is of the contrary opinion when he says—

Grammar's an art that a man need neither heed nor consider When he is still being taught the Punic symbols of Cadmus.

This, however, does not appear to be the case. For the
 54 phrase he uses, "he need neither heed nor consider," is not aimed against the actual "grammaticistic" by which the Punic symbols of Cadmus are taught; for if a man is being taught it, how can he have paid no attention to it? What he means is rather this,— "when a man has been taught the Punic symbols of Cadmus he need pay no attention to any further art of letters"; and this does not refer to the uselessness of the art which is found to deal with the elements and with employing them in writing and reading, but of that which is boastful and needlessly inquisitive. For
 55 while the handling of the elements contributes to the conduct of life, not to be contented with what is given by the observation of the elements and attempting further to show that some of them are naturally

φύσει τάδε δὲ σύμφωνα, καὶ τῶν φωναέντων τὰ μὲν φύσει βραχέα τὰ δὲ μακρὰ τὰ δὲ δίχρονα καὶ κοινὰ μήκους τε καὶ συστολῆς, καὶ καθόλου τὰ λοιπὰ περὶ ὧν οἱ τετυφωμένοι τῶν γραμματικῶν
56 διδάσκουσιν (ἄχρηστόν ἐστιν.)¹ ὥστε τῇ μὲν γραμματιστικῇ πρὸς τῷ μηδὲν ἐγκαλεῖν ἔτι καὶ τὰς ἀνωτάτω χάριτας ὀφείλομεν, τῇ δὲ λειπομένη προσάπτομεν τοὺς ἐλέγχους. τὸ δὲ εἶπε ὑγιῶς εἶτε τοῦναντίον μάθοιμεν ἂν προσεξαπλώσαντες αὐτῆς τὸν χαρακτῆρα.

Γ'.—ΤΙ ΕΣΤΙ ΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΙΚΗ

57 Ἐπεὶ οὔτε ζητεῖν οὔτε ἀπορεῖν ἔστι κατὰ τὸν σοφὸν Ἐπίκουρον ἀνευ προλήψεως, εἴ ἂν ἔχοι πρὸ τῶν ὄλων σκέψασθαι τί τ' ἔστιν ἡ γραμματικὴ, καὶ εἰ κατὰ τὴν ἀποδιδιομένην ὑπὸ τῶν γραμματικῶν ἔννοιαν δύναται συστατὸν τι καὶ ὑπαρκτὸν νοεῖσθαι μάθημα. Διονύσιος μὲν οὖν ὁ Θραξ ἐν τοῖς παραγγέλμασί φησι "γραμματικὴ ἐστὶν ἐμπειρία ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον τῶν παρὰ ποιηταῖς τε καὶ συγγραφεῦσι λεγομένων," συγγραφεῖς καλῶν, ὡς ἔστιν ἐκ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς ποιητὰς ἀντεμφάσεως πρόδηλον, οὐκ ἄλλους τινὰς ἢ τοὺς καταλογάδην
58 πραγματευσαμένους. τὰ τε γὰρ παρὰ τοῖς ποιηταῖς ὁ γραμματικὸς ἐρμηνεύειν φαίνεται, καθάπερ Ὀμήρῳ τε καὶ Ἡσιόδῳ Πινδάρῳ τε καὶ Εὐριπίδῃ καὶ Μενάνδρῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, τὰ τε παρὰ τοῖς συγγραφεύσιν, οἷον Ἡροδότῳ καὶ Θουκυδίδῃ καὶ
59 Πλάτῳ, ὡς ἴδιον ἔργον μετέρχεται. παρὸ καὶ οἱ χαριέντες ἐξ αὐτῶν περὶ πολλῶν ἐπραγματεύ-

¹ (ἄχρηστόν ἐστιν.) addidi.

vowels, others consonants, and that of the vowels some are naturally short, others long, others doubtful and indifferently long or short, and in general all the other rules that are taught by the conceited Grammarians (are unprofitable proceedings). Hence, 56 while we not only have no fault to find with "Grammatic" but even owe it the warmest thanks, we bring our critical weapons to bear on the rest of the Art of Letters. Whether we do so rightly or wrongly, we shall learn when we have further explained its character.

CHAPTER III.—A DESCRIPTION OF "THE ART OF GRAMMAR"

Since, according to the sage Epicurus, it is not 57 possible either to inquire or to doubt without a preconception, it will be well first of all to consider what "Grammatic" (or the Art of Grammar) is and whether a systematic and real art or science can be conceived on the lines of the conception put forward by the Grammarians. Now Dionysius "the Thracian"^a says in his *Directions* that "Grammar" is mainly expertness regarding the language of poets and composers," meaning by "composers" (as is plain from its contrast with "poets") none others than the writers in prose. For the Grammarian 58 appears to interpret the writings of the poets, such as Homer and Hesiod, Pindar and Euripides and Menander and the rest; and he also investigates those of the composers, such as Herodotus and Thucydides and Plato, as being his proper task. Accordingly, 59 some of their notable figures have dealt with many of

^a Famous grammarian, who taught at Rome *circa* 80 B.C.

σαντο συγγραφέων, τοῦτο μὲν ἱστορικῶν τοῦτο δὲ ῥητορικῶν καὶ ἤδη φιλοσόφων, ζητοῦντες τίνα τε δεόντως καὶ ἀκολούθως ταῖς διαλέκτοις εἴρηται καὶ τίνα παρέφθαρται, τί τε σημαίνει παρὰ μὲν Θουκυδίδη λόγου χάριν τὸ ζάγκλον καὶ τὸρνεύοντες, παρὰ δὲ Δημοσθένει τὸ “ἐβόα ὡςπερ ἐξ ἀμάξης,” ἢ πῶς ἀναγνωστέον παρὰ Πλάτωνι τὴν ἥδος λέξιν, πότερον ψιλῶς ἐκφέροντα τὴν πρώτην συλλαβὴν ἢ δασέως, ἢ τὴν μὲν πρώτην ψιλῶς τὴν δὲ δευτέραν δασέως, ἢ ἀμφοτέρας ψιλῶς ἢ ἐν-
60 ἀλλάξ. διὰ γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἴρηται ἢ γραμματικῇ ἐμπειρία τῶν παρὰ ποιηταῖς τε καὶ συγγραφεύσι λεγομένων.

Οὗτος μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἐγκαλεῖ δὲ αὐτῷ Πτολεμαῖος ὁ περιπατητικὸς ὅτι οὐκ ἔχρησεν ἐμπειρίαν
61 εἰρηκέναι τὴν γραμματικὴν (αὐτῇ μὲν γὰρ ἢ ἐμπειρία τριβὴ τίς ἐστι καὶ ἐργάτις ἄτεχνός τε καὶ ἄλογος, ἐν ψιλῇ παρατηρήσει καὶ συγγυμνασίᾳ κειμένη, ἢ δὲ γραμματικῇ τέχνῃ καθέστηκεν), οὐκ
62 συνορῶν ὅτι τάττεται μὲν καὶ ἐπὶ τέχνῃς τούνομα, καθὼς ἐν τοῖς ἐμπειρικοῖς ὑπομνήμασιν ἐδιδάξαμεν, ἀδιαφόρως τοῦ βίου τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐμπείρους τε καὶ τεχνίτας καλοῦντος, ἀφ’ ἧσπερ ἐνοίας καὶ ὁ Μητροδώρος ἔφη μηδεμίαν ἄλλην πραγμάτων ἐμπειρίαν τὸ ἐαυτῆς τέλος συνορᾶν ἢ φιλοσοφίαν,
62 τουτέστι μηδεμίαν τέχνην, τάττεται δὲ ἐξόχως καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν καὶ ποικίλων πραγμάτων γνώσεως, καθὼς καὶ τοὺς πρεσβύτας πολλὰ μὲν

¹ (παρὰ Πλάτωνι) add. cj. Warmington.

^a “Zanklon” occurs in Thucyd. vi. 4; but “torneuontes” is not found in Thucydides.

^b Cf. Dem. de Corona 122. “From a waggon,” i.e. like

the prose-writers, whether historians or orators or even philosophers, seeking to discover which of their writings are correctly and idiomatically expressed and which are faulty, and what, for example, is the meaning in Thucydides^a of *zanklon* (“sickle”) and *torneuontes* (“rounding off”), and in Demosthenes^b of “he shouted as though from a waggon”; and how we should pronounce the word *ēdos*^c in Plato—whether we should utter the first syllable with or without the aspirate, or the first syllable without and the second with the aspirate, or both without the aspirate or both with it. It is because of such investi-
60 gations that Grammar has been called “expertness regarding the language of poets and composers.”

Such, then, is the view of Dionysius. But Ptolemy the Peripatetic raises the objection that he ought not to have described Grammar as “expertness” (for
61 expertness as such is a kind of practice and operation, void of art and reasoning, which consists in mere observation and joint-exercise, whereas Grammar is an art); but he fails to notice that the term is also applied to art (as we have shown in our *Empiric Treatise*^d), since ordinary folk call the same men “experts” and “artists” without distinction; and it was with this notion that Metrodorus^e said that “philosophy is the only expertness in affairs which perceives its own end,” meaning “the only art”;
62 and the term is applied especially to the knowledge of many and various matters, in the way that we speak of old men who have seen much and heard

women crying insults from the waggons in which they rode to the Eleusinian Mysteries.

^c i.e. ἡ δ’ ὄς, “said he.”

^d This work is no longer extant.

^e An Epicurean philosopher.

ιδόντας πολλά δὲ ἀκούσαντας ἐμπείρους τοῦ βίου
φαμέν, ὡς καὶ ὁ Εὐριπίδης

ὦ τέκνον, οὐχ ἅπαντα τῷ γήραι κακά,
Ἐτεόκλεες, πρόσσεσιν, ἀλλ' ἡμπειρία
ἔχει τι λέξαι τῶν νέων σοφώτερον.

63 ἐφ' ὅπερ ἴσως ὁ Θραξ φερόμενος σημαινόμενον,
ἐπεὶ πολυειδήμονά τινα καὶ πολυμαθῆ βούλεται
εἶναι τὸν γραμματικόν, ἔφη ἐμπειρίαν ὑπάρχειν
τὴν γραμματικὴν τῶν παρὰ ποιηταῖς τε καὶ
συγγραφεῦσι λεγομένων. ὥστε τοῦτο μὲν ὑπ-
έλαβρον, ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἴσως τις πραγματικωτέρας¹
64 ἐχόμενον ζητήσεως ἐρεῖ πρὸς αὐτόν· ἦτοι γὰρ
τῶν παρὰ ποιηταῖς τε καὶ συγγραφεῦσι λεγομένων
μόνον ἐμπειρίαν συμβέβηκεν εἶναι τὴν γραμ-
ματικὴν, ἢ καὶ τῶν μῆτε παρὰ ποιηταῖς μῆτε
παρὰ συγγραφεῦσι καθεστῶτων. ἀλλὰ μόνων μὲν
τῶν παρὰ ποιηταῖς καὶ συγγραφεῦσιν οὐκ ἂν εἴποιεν
ἐμπειρίαν αὐτὴν ὑπάρχειν διὰ τὸ ποτὲ καὶ ταῖς
ἀνὰ χεῖρα τῶν ιδιωτῶν καὶ ἀνεπιστημόνων ὀμι-
λίας² ἐφιστῶσαν (θεωρεῖσθαι),³ καὶ τὸ βάρβαρον
καὶ τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν τό τε σόλοικον καὶ τὸ μὴ τοιοῦ-
65 τον ἐξελέγχουσιν. εἰ δὲ καὶ τῶν μὴ παρὰ ποιηταῖς
μηδὲ συγγραφεῦσι μόνον λεγομένων ἐμπειρία καθ-
έστηκεν, οὐκ ἔδει αὐτὴν εἶναι λέγειν, <ὁ> ἀπὸ
μέρους ἔχει⁴ συμβεβηκός.

Ἀλλὰ παρέντες τὸ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων λεπτολο-
γεῖν σκοπῶμεν, ὡς ὑπεσχόμεθα, εἰ δύναται τέλος,
ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἐννοίᾳ, ὑποστήναι ἢ γραμ-
66 ματικῆ. ὅταν οὖν λέγωσιν αὐτὴν ἐμπειρίαν κατὰ
τὸ πλεῖστον τῶν παρὰ ποιηταῖς καὶ συγγραφεῦσι

¹ πραγματικωτέρας Heintz : γραμματικωτέρας mss., Bekk.

much as "experienced in life." So too Euripides a—

Not all is evil that besets old age,
My child Eteocles : experience
Can teach a wisdom which eludes the young.

And the Thracian ^b was probably brought to adopt ⁶³
this meaning of the term through wishing the Gram-
marian to be a man of wide knowledge and wide
learning, when he says that grammar is expertness
in the language of poets and composers. So that this
is rather a small point. But here is an argument more
suited to a serious inquiry which one might perhaps
bring against him : it belongs to grammar either to ⁶⁴
be expertness in the language of poets and composers
only, or also to be expertness in speech which is not
found in either poets or composers. But they will
not say that it is expertness in poets' and composers'
language only, since it is sometimes seen to preside
over the current conversation of ordinary and un-
learned people, and also to examine and declare
what is barbaric and what Hellenic, what is solecistic
and what not. And if it is not expertness in the ⁶⁵
speech of poets and composers only, they ought not
to have identified it with a part of its contents.

But without proceeding to split hairs about such
matters, let us consider, as we undertook to do,
whether, if we are to go by the proposed defini-
tion, the Art of Grammar can in the end exist. Now ⁶⁶
when they describe it as "expertness regarding most
of the speech of poets and composers," they mean

^a Eurip. *Phoen.* 528 ; cf. Ovid, *Met.* vi. 28.

^b i.e. Dionysius.

¹ ταῖς . . . ὀμιλίας cj. Bekk. : τὰς . . . ὀμιλίας mss., Bekk.

² (θεωρεῖσθαι) add. cj. Bekk.

⁴ <ὁ> . . . ἔχει cj. Bekk. : ἔχων mss., Bekk.

λεγομένων, φασὶ πάντων ἢ τινῶν. καὶ εἰ πάντων, πρῶτον μὲν οὐκέτι κατὰ τὸ πλείστον ἀλλὰ πάντων, καὶ εἰ πάντων, καὶ τῶν ἀπείρων· ἀπειρα γὰρ ἔστι ταῦτα. τῶν δὲ ἀπείρων οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμπειρία· διόπερ οὐδὲ γραμματικὴ τις γενήσεται. εἰ δὲ τινῶν, ἐπεὶ καὶ οἱ ἰδιῶται τινα τῶν παρὰ ποιηταῖς καὶ συγγραφεῦσι λεγομένων εἰδότες οὐκ ἔχουσι γραμματικὴν ἐμπειρίαν, οὐδὲ ταύτη¹ εἶναι λεκτέον
 67 γραμματικὴν. ἐκτός ἐι μὴ τι διὰ τοῦτο (τὸ)² “κατὰ τὸ πλείστον” εἰρησθαι φήσουσιν, ἵνα ἢ τε πρὸς τὴν πάντων (ἐμπειρίαν) ἐνιαχοῦ ἀπορία³ ἢ τε πρὸς τὸν ἰδιωτισμὸν διαφορὰ ὑποβάλληται. τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἰδιώτου διενήνοχεν ὁ γραμματικὸς παρῶσον οὐκ ὀλίγων, ὡς ἐκεῖνος, ἀλλὰ πλείστον τῶν παρὰ ποιηταῖς τε καὶ συγγραφεῦσι λεγομένων ἔμπειρός ἐστι· τῆς δὲ τῶν πάντων γνώσεως ἀδυνάτου τάχα καθεστῶσης κεχώρισται, ἐπεὶ οὐ πάντα τὰ δὲ πλείστα ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐπαγγέλλεται γινώσκειν.
 68 ταῦτα δὲ οὐκ ἀπολογουμένου ἦν, ἀλλὰ κακοῖς ἐπιπληροῦντος κακὰ καὶ μηκέτι μετρίως ἀλλ’ ἄρδην ἐπισπωμένου τὰς ἀπορίας. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ἀορίστα ἔστι καὶ τὴν σωρικὴν γεννᾶ ἀπορίαν, οὕτω καὶ τὰ πλείστα. ὅθεν ἢ περιγραμμάτωσαν ἡμῖν αὐτὰ, δείξαντες ἄχρι πόσων γνώσεως⁴ τῶν παρὰ ποιηταῖς τε καὶ συγγραφεῦσι λεγομένων ῥητέον· ἢ εἴπερ ἐπὶ ἀορίστου μένουσιν ὑποσχέσεως, τὰ πλείστα γινώσκειν λέγοντες,
 69 παραδεχέσθωσαν τὴν παρὰ μικρὸν ἐρώτησιν. ταῦ

¹ ταύτη scripsi : ταύτην mss., Bekk.

² (τὸ) add. cj. Bekk.

³ (ἐμπειρίαν) . . . ἀπορία cj. Bekk : ἀπορίαν mss., Bekk.

⁴ γνώσεως Heintz : γνώσεων mss., Bekk.

either all or some of it. And if they mean “all,” then, in the first place, it is no longer “regarding most of their speech” but all of it, and if all then endless (for their speech is endless): but of the endless there is no experience: hence no Art of Grammar will exist. But if they mean “some,” then, since even ordinary folk understand some of the speech of the poets and composers though they possess no grammatical expertness, neither in this case can one say that an Art of Grammar exists. Unless they shall say that the words “regarding 67 most” were expressly used for the purpose of suggesting their occasional lack of expertness regarding all their language and their difference from the ordinary man. For the Grammarian differs from the ordinary man in so far as he is expert not in regard to a little, like the other, but to most of the language of the poets and composers; and he is not committed to what is probably impossible, the knowledge of it all, since he does not pretend to know all but most of it. But this is not the conduct of a man making his 68 defence, but of one who piles evils on evils and draws upon himself difficulties to an extent that is no longer moderate but complete. Now in the first place, just as “many” is indefinite and gives rise to the puzzle of “the Heap,”^a so also is “most.” Either, then, let them define for us this “most,” showing how far we are to say that this knowledge of the speech of poets and composers extends; or if they abide by their indefinite claim and say that they know “most,” let them submit to being questioned “little by little.”

^a Cf. P.H. ii. 253 n.

γὰρ πλείστον ὀρισθέντος ἀριθμοῦ ὃ ἐνὶ ἐλάσσων
 πλείστος ἀκμήν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ τελέως ἄτοπον μονάδος
 προσθέσει τὸν μὲν πλείστον λέγειν τὸν δὲ μηδαμῶς.
 διόπερ αἰεὶ μονάδι πλεονεκτούμενος ὃ κατ' αὐτοὺς
 πλείστος ἀριθμὸς ἐλεύσεται πάντως εἰς τὸ μηκέτι
 ἀριθμὸς πλείστος ὑπάρχειν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μηδέ
 γραμματικῆ¹. ὅπερ ἦν τῆς σωρικῆς ἀπορίας συμ-
 70 πέρασμα. πῶς δ' οὐκ ὄντως γραμματικῆς παχύ-
 τητος τὸ ἐν ἀπείρῳ πλήθει λέγειν πλείστα; ὡς
 γὰρ τὸ ὀλιγώτερον πρὸς τί ἐστι καὶ κατὰ τὴν
 ὡς πρὸς τὸ πλείστον σχέσιν νοεῖται, οὕτω καὶ
 τὸ πλείστον κατὰ τὴν ὡς πρὸς τὸ ὀλίγον σχέ-
 σιν θεωρήσεται. εἰ οὖν τῶν πλείστων τῶν παρὰ
 ποιηταῖς καὶ συγγραφεῦσι λεγομένων ἐμπειρίαν
 ἔχουσιν οἱ γραμματικοί, ὀλίγων τῶν λοιπῶν οὐκ
 71 ἔχουσιν· εἰ δὲ καὶ τὸ ληφθὲν ἐστὶ πλείστον καὶ
 τὸ καταλειφθὲν ἔλασσον, οὐκέτι τὸ πᾶν γίνεται
 ἄπειρον. ὅμως δ' οὖν, ἵνα μηδὲν περὶ τούτων
 ἀκριβεζώμεθα, ψευδὸς ἐστὶ τὸ τὰ πλείστα τῶν
 παρὰ ποιηταῖς τε καὶ συγγραφεῦσι λεγομένων
 γνώσκειν τὸν γραμματικόν· ἐλάχιστα γὰρ ἦν,
 πολλαπλασιῶν ἀπολειπομένων ἃ οὐκ οἶδε, καθὼς
 72 προβαίνουσης τῆς ζητήσεως παραστήσω. τὰ νῦν
 δὲ ἄλλην ἀπόδοσιν θεωρητέον.

Ἀσκληπιάδης τοίνυν μέμφεται τὸν Θρᾶκα Διονύ-
 σιον ἐμπειρίαν λέγοντα τὴν γραμματικὴν, δι' ἣν
 αἰτίαν καὶ ὁ Πτολεμαῖος ἔφη, ἐγκαλεῖ δὲ αὐτῷ
 καὶ τὸ² κατὰ τὸ πλείστον ἐμπειρίαν αὐτὴν ἀπο-
 φαίνειν. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τῶν στοχαστικῶν καὶ

¹ γραμματικῆ Fabr. : γραμματικὴν Bekk.

² τὸ cj. Bekk. : τῷ mss., Bekk.

For when a "very large" number is fixed, the number 69
 that is less by one is still "very large," since it
 is perfectly absurd to call the one number, because of
 the addition of an unit, "very large" and the other
 not. Hence, if their "very large" number keeps on
 always being increased by one it will certainly come
 to being no longer a "very large" number, so that
 Grammar too is non-existent; and this is the con-
 clusion of the puzzle of "the Heap." And surely it is 70
 a piece of *grammatic* obtuseness to speak of "very
 many" in dealing with an infinite number; for just
 as "small" is a relative notion and is conceived as in
 relation to the condition "very large," so also the
 notion "very large" will be conceived as relative to
 the condition "small." If, then, the Grammarians are
 expert regarding "very much of the speech of poets
 and composers," they are not expert regarding the
 small quantity which remains over; and if what is in- 71
 cluded is "very much," and what is omitted is "rather
 small," the total no longer makes up an infinite quan-
 tity.—But in any case, not to argue these points too
 closely, it is false to say that the Grammarian knows
 "very much of the speech of poets and composers";
 for it is really "very little," since many times more of
 it remains which he does not know, as I shall prove
 in the course of our inquiry. But for the moment 72
 we must consider another account of the matter.

Asclepiades blames Dionysius "the Thracian" for
 calling the Art of Grammar "expertness," and that
 for the reason stated by Ptolemy, and he also finds fault
 with his description of it as "expertness for the most
 part." For this is a feature of arts which are conjectural

ὑπὸ τὴν τύχην πιπτοουσῶν ἐστὶ τεχνῶν, ὥσπερ κυβερνητικῆς καὶ ἰατρικῆς· γραμματικὴ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι στοχαστικὴ ἀλλὰ μουσικῆ τε καὶ φιλοσοφίας
 73 παραπλήσιος. εἰ μὴ τι δέδοικε, φησί, τὴν ὀλιγότητα τοῦ βίου ὡς οὐκ οὖσαν ἱκανὴν πρὸς τὸ πάντα περιλαβεῖν, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀτοπον, (ὡς)¹ γραμματικοῦ ἀλλ' οὐ γραμματικῆς ποιήσεται τὸν ὄρον, ἐπεὶ οὗτος μὲν τυχὸν ἴσως (ὀλίγων)² ἐπιστήμων ἐστὶ τῶν παρὰ ποιηταῖς τε καὶ συγγραφεῦσι λεγομένων, ὀλιγόβιον καθεστῶς ζῶον, ἢ δὲ γραμματικὴ
 74 πάντων εἰδήσις. ὅθεν τὸ μὲν ἀλλάζας τοῦ ὄρου τούτου τὸ δ' ἀνελών, οὕτως ἀποδίδωσι τῆς γραμματικῆς τὴν ἔννοιαν " γραμματικὴ ἐστὶ τέχνη τῶν παρὰ ποιηταῖς καὶ συγγραφεῦσι λεγομένων." οὐκ ἀνείλε δὲ ὁ ἀνὴρ τὰς ἀπορίας ἀλλ' ἐπέτευεν· καὶ ἐν οἷς θέλει τὴν γραμματικὴν αὔξειν, ἐν τούτοις αὐτῆς ἀφείλεν.³ ἔστω γὰρ πάντων εἰδήσις τῶν παρὰ ποιηταῖς καὶ συγγραφεῦσι λεγομένων. οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶ οὐδέν ἐστιν εἰδήσις παρὰ τὸν εἰδόμενον, οὐδὲ γραμματικὴ παρὰ τὸν [εἰδόμενον] γραμματικόν, ὡς οὐδὲ περιπάτησις παρὰ τὸν περιπατοῦντα καὶ στάσις παρὰ τὸν ἐστῶτα καὶ κατάκλισις παρὰ τὸν τῶν κατακείμενον. ὠμολόγηται δὲ ὁ γραμματικὸς
 75 μὴ ἔχειν πάντων εἰδήσιν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔτι ἐστὶν εἰδήσις πάντων τῶν παρὰ ποιηταῖς καὶ συγγραφεῦσι λεγομένων, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ γραμματικὴ. καὶ ἄλλως, εἴπερ τέχνη ἐστὶν ἢ γραμματικὴ, εἰδήσις οὐσα πάντων τῶν παρὰ ποιηταῖς τε καὶ συγγραφεῦσι λεγομένων, ἢ δὲ τέχνη σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων [τῶν περὶ τὸν γραμματικόν],⁴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης μηδενὸς ἔχοντος πάντων τῶν παρὰ ποιηταῖς καὶ

¹ (ὡς) add. cj. Bekk.² (ὀλίγων) add. cj. Bekk.

and subject to accidents such as navigation and medicine; but Grammar is not a conjectural art but akin to Music and Philosophy. "Unless," he says, "he has 73 some fear of the shortness of life as being insufficient for the comprehension of all, which is absurd; for in that case he will not be defining the Art of Grammar but the Grammarian, since he perchance, being a short-lived creature, is acquainted with a little of the speech of the poets and composers, whereas Grammar is knowledge of it all. Hence, by altering one part and 74 deleting another part of this definition, he presents the concept of Grammar in this form: "Grammar is the art dealing with the speech of poets and composers." But instead of removing the difficulties, our critic has increased them, and by the very means whereby he intends to magnify Grammar, he makes it less. For let it be granted that it is knowledge of all the speech of poets and composers: then, since knowledge is nothing apart from him who knows, neither is Grammar anything apart from the Grammarian, just as walking is nothing apart from the walker, or standing apart from him who stands, or lying apart from him who lies. But it has been agreed that the Grammarian 75 does not possess knowledge of all; therefore knowledge of all the speech of poets and composers no longer exists; neither, in consequence, does Grammar exist.—Again, if Grammar is an art, being knowledge of all the speech of poets and composers, and art is "a system composed of apprehensions,"^a then, since no one possesses an apprehension of all the speech of

^a For this Stoic definition cf. *P.H.* iii. 188.³ αὐτῆς ἀφείλεν scripsi: αὐτὴν ἀνείλεν mss., Bekk. (ἔλυσε cj. Bekk.).⁴ [τῶν . . . γραμματικόν] del. Heintz.

συγγραφεῦσι λεγομένων κατάληψιν ἀνύπαρκτος γίνεται ἢ γραμματική.

- 76 Χάρης δὲ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ γραμματικῆς τὴν τελείαν φησὶ γραμματικὴν ἕξιν εἶναι ἀπὸ τέχνης διαγνωστικὴν τῶν παρ' Ἑλλησι λεκτῶν καὶ νοητῶν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀκριβέστατον, πλὴν τῶν ὑπ' ἄλλαις τέχναις, τὸ τελευταῖον προσθεῖς οὐ παρέργως.
- 77 ἐπεὶ γὰρ τῶν παρ' Ἑλλησι λεκτῶν καὶ νοητῶν τὰ μὲν ἔστιν ὑπὸ τέχναις τὰ δ' οὐ, τῶν μὲν ὑπὸ τέχναις οὐκ οἶεται τέχνην εἶναι καὶ ἕξιν τὴν γραμματικὴν, οἷον ἐν μὲν μουσικῇ τῆς διὰ τεσσάρων συμφωνίας καὶ τῆς μεταβολῆς τῶν συστημάτων, ἐν δὲ μαθηματικῇ ἐκλείψεως ἢ τῆς τῶν κύκλων θέσεως. τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων νοητέον τεχνῶν· οὐδενὸς γὰρ τῶν ὑπ' αὐταῖς εἰδησις ἢ γραμματικῆ, ἀλλὰ μέθοδος τίς ἐστι τῶν
- 78 παρὰ ταύτας ἐτέρων λεκτῶν τε καὶ νοητῶν, νοητῶν μὲν ὡς ὅτι πίσυρες τέσσαρες καὶ βῆσσαι καὶ ἄγκεα οἱ βάσιμοι τόποι, λεκτῶν δὲ τῶν περὶ τὰς διαλέκτους, οἷον ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν εἴρηται Δωρικῶς τοῦτο δ' Αἰολικῶς, καὶ οὐχ ἤπερ οἱ στωικοὶ τὸ σημαινόμενον, ἀλλ' ἀνάπαλιν τὸ σημαῖνον· τὸ γὰρ νοητὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ σημαινομένου μόνου παρείληπται.
- 79 ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Κρατήτειόν τινα κινεῖν λόγον. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος ἔλεγε διαφέρειν τὸν κριτικὸν τοῦ γραμματικοῦ· καὶ τὸν μὲν κριτικὸν πάσης, φησὶ, δεῖ λογικῆς ἐπιστήμης ἔμπειρον εἶναι, τὸν δὲ γραμματικὸν ἀπλῶς γλωσσῶν ἐξηγητικὸν καὶ προσωδίας ἀποδοτικὸν καὶ τῶν τούτοις παρα-

poets and composers, Grammar is of necessity non-existent.

Chares in the first book of his treatise on the Art of 76 Grammar says that perfect Grammar is "a skill derived from art which distinguishes very precisely Greek language and thought, except in so far as these are dealt with by other arts,"—which last addition of his is not superfluous. For since part of the Greek 77 language and thought is dealt with by arts and part not, he holds that Grammar is not an art and skill concerned with what is treated by the arts,—as for instance in Music the *dia-tessaron* (or "Fourth") concord and the change of the "systems," and in Mathematic the eclipse or the position of the spheres. And the same applies, one must suppose, to the rest of the arts: Grammar is not knowledge of any of the subjects the other arts deal with, but it is a methodical treatment of language and meanings not touched 78 on by other arts,—of meanings, as that *pisures* means *tessares* (four), and that *bēssai* and *ankeā* mean accessible places; and of language in so far as it concerns dialects, as for example, that such a phrase is Doric and such other Aeolic, but it does not (like the Stoics) regard the signification of the phrase but conversely the signifying phrase itself; for the meaning is derived from the thing signified alone.—But Chares 79 seems to be disputing an argument of Crates.^a For he used to say that the "Critic" differs from the Grammarian; and, says he, the "Critic" must be expert in the whole range of linguistic science, but the Grammarian simply capable of expounding dialects and explaining prosodies and skilled in things

^a For Crates see p. 27 n.

πλησίον εἰδήμονα· παρὸ καὶ εἰκέναι ἐκεῖνον μὲν ἀρχιτέκτονι τὸν δὲ γραμματικὸν ὑπηρετῆν.

80 Ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν τῆς ἀποδόσεως τοιαῦτα, πῆ μὲν μετριώτερα τῶν Διονυσίου ἀτοπημάτων πῆ δὲ χείρονα. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ τῆς σωρικῆς ἀπορίας ἐξέλυσε τὴν γραμματικὴν καὶ τῶν ἀλλοτριῶν κωλύει θεωρημάτων, μουσικῆς τε καὶ μαθηματικῆς, ὡς μὴ προσηκόντων, αὐτόθεν συμφανές· τοῦ δὲ μὴ ἀνυπόστατον ὑπάρχειν οὐδαμῶς αὐτὴν ἐρρύσατο, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὸ εἶναι τοιαύτην μᾶλλον

81 σνηγωνίσασατο. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Διονύσιος κατὰ τι διώρισε τὸν τῆς γραμματικῆς ὄρον, ἐπὶ μόνων αὐτὴν ποιητῶν τε καὶ συγγραφέων στήσας· οὗτος δὲ περὶ πᾶσαν Ἑλληνικὴν φωνὴν καὶ περὶ πᾶν σημαίνοντα καταγίνεσθαι ταύτην θέλει. ὅπερ, εἰ θεμιτὸν εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲ θεοῖς ἀνυτόν ἐστιν. ὡς γὰρ καὶ πρότερον ἐλέγομεν, οὐδεμία μέθοδος συνίσταται περὶ τι ἄπειρον, ἀλλὰ καὶ μάλιστα αὕτη τοῦτο περατοῦ· τῶν γὰρ ἀορίστων ἡ ἐπιστήμη

82 δεσμός ἐστιν· τὰ δὲ σημαίνοντα καὶ σημαίνοντα τῶν πραγμάτων ἐστὶν ἄπειρα· οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ γραμματικὴ τέχνη περὶ τὰ σημαίνοντα καὶ σημαίνοντα. καὶ μὴν παντοῖαι γίνονται τῶν φωνῶν μεταβολαὶ καὶ πρὸ τοῦ γεγονάσι καὶ εἰσαυθις γενήσονται· φιλομετάβολον γὰρ τί ἐστὶν ὁ αἰὼν, οὐκ εἰς φυτὰ μόνον καὶ ζῶα ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς ῥήματα.

83 περὶ ἐστῶσαν δὲ ἀπειρίαν, οὐ τοί γε καὶ μεταβάλλουσαν, ἀμήχανόν ἐστι γνώσιν ἀνθρωπίνην εὔρειν. οὐδὲ ταύτη ἄρα ἡ γραμματικὴ συνστήσεται. ἄλλως τε ἤτοι τεχνικὴν οἴεται εἶναι τὴν ἕξιν ἢ ἄτεχνον. καὶ εἰ μὲν τεχνικὴν, πῶς οὐκ

of that sort; and accordingly the former may be compared to a head-craftsman, and the Grammarian to a subordinate.

Such, then, are the features of this definition, which 80 are in some ways more reasonable than the absurdities of Dionysius, but in others worse. For it is evident at once that he has freed Grammar from the "Heap" difficulty and has set it apart from the alien disciplines of Music and Mathematic, on the ground that they have no connexion with it; but he has by no means rescued it from the charge of being non-existent, but rather has helped to confirm that it is so. For whereas Dionysius in some degree limited the 81 scope of Grammar by confining it to the speech of poets and composers only, this man (Chares) proposes to make it cover all Greek language and every signification,—a thing which, if one may say so, is not feasible even for gods. For, as we have also said before, no scientific inquiry deals with anything unlimited, such inquiry itself being the chief agent of limitation; for science is what binds down the undefined: but things signifying and things signified 82 are unlimited; therefore the Art of Grammar is not concerned with things signifying and signified. Moreover, as to words, changes of all sorts occur and have occurred in the past and will occur in the future; for Time is a lover of change and that not only in regard to animals and plants but also to words.⁶ But concern- 83 ing a stationary infinite, not to speak of a changing one, no human knowledge can be found. Neither, then, in this way will Grammar subsist.—Further, either he supposes that the "skill" is artistic or that it is without art. And if it is artistic, why did he

⁶ Cf. Hor. A.P. 60 ff.

αὐτὴν εἶπε τέχνην ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀφ' οὗ ἔστιν; εἰ δὲ ἄτεχνον, ἐπεὶ οὐ δυνατόν διὰ τοῦ ἀτέχνου τὸ τεχνικὸν ὁρᾶσθαι, οὐδὲ συστήσεταιί τις γραμματικὴ ἕξις τεχνικῶς διαγιγνώσκουσα τὰ παρ' Ἑλληνισμῶν σημαίνοντά τε καὶ σημαινόμενα.

84 Δημήτριος δὲ ὁ ἐπικαλούμενος Χλωρός καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς τῶν γραμματικῶν οὕτως ὠρίσαντο “ γραμματικὴ ἐστὶ τέχνη τῶν παρὰ ποιηταῖς τε καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν συνήθειαν λέξεων εἰδησις.” μένουσι δὲ καὶ τοὺς αἰ αὐταὶ ἀπορίαι· οὔτε γὰρ πάντων τῶν παρὰ ποιηταῖς λεγομένων δύναται
85 εἶναι τέχνη γραμματικὴ οὔτε τινῶν. καὶ πάντων μὲν αὐτόθεν ἀδύνατον, εἶγε καὶ περὶ θεῶν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ ψυχῆς λέγεται παρὰ τοῖς ποιηταῖς, ὧν ἀπείρως ἔχουσιν οἱ γραμματικοί· τινῶν δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰς τοὺς γραμματικούς τὸ τοιοῦτον πίπτει μόνους ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλους τινάς, οἷον φιλοσόφους καὶ μουσικούς καὶ ἰατρούς· συνεῶρων γὰρ
86 καὶ οἷδε τινὰ τῶν παρὰ ποιηταῖς. πάλιν τε ἐν τῷ λέγειν καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν συνήθειαν λέξεων εἰδησις εἶναι τὴν γραμματικὴν εἰ μὲν τὸ καθολικὸν λαμβάνοιεν τὸ “ εἰ τινὲς εἰσι κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν συνήθειαν λέξεις, ἐκείνων ἐστὶν εἰδησις ἢ γραμματικὴ,” ἀμαρτάνουσιν· ἀπειροὶ γὰρ αἱ κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν συνήθειαν λέξεις, καὶ τῶν ἀπείρων οὐκ
87 ἔστιν εἰδησις. εἰ δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ ἐπὶ μέρους φέροντο, ὅπερ ἴσον ἐστὶ τῷ “ εἰσὶ τινες λέξεις κατὰ τὴν συνήθειαν τὴν κοινὴν ὧν εἰδησις ἐστὶν ἢ γραμματικὴ,” οὐδ' οὕτω ποιήσουσι τι τὴν γραμματικὴν· καὶ γὰρ ὁ Ἀθηναῖος εἰδησις ἔχει τῶν κατὰ τὴν
50

not term it “ art ” instead of that wherefrom it is derived? But if it is without art, then, since the artistic cannot be perceived by means of the non-artistic, neither will there be formed any “ grammatic skill ” which distinguishes by art what things are signifying and what signified in the speech of the Greeks.

Demetrius, surnamed Chlorus, and certain other 84 Grammarians have given this definition: “ The Art of Grammar is knowledge of the forms of speech in the poets and also those in common usage.” But for these, too, the same difficulties remain; the Art of Grammar cannot deal either with all the forms of speech in the poets or with some of them. That it 85 should deal with them all is sheerly impossible, since in the poets there is discourse concerning the gods and concerning virtue and the soul, things whereof the Grammarians have no expert knowledge. Nor can it deal with some of them, since a subject such as this falls within the scope not of Grammarians only but also of certain others, such as philosophers and musicians and physicians; for these too have inquired into some of the diction of the poets. Again, 86 in their statement that Grammar is “ knowledge of the forms of speech in common usage ” as well, if they are taking it as the universal proposition “ whatsoever forms of speech are in common usage, of these the Art of Grammar is knowledge,” then they are in error; for the forms of speech in common usage are infinite, and of infinites there is no knowledge. But if they should tend to state it as a particular 87 proposition, equivalent to “ there are certain forms of speech in common usage whereof Grammar is knowledge,” not even so will they make Grammar anything real; for the Athenian has knowledge of

Ἀτθίδα συνήθων λέξεων, καὶ ὁ Δωριεὺς τῶν κατὰ τὴν Δώριον, καὶ ὁ ῥήτωρ τῶν κατὰ τὴν ῥητορικὴν, 88 καὶ ὁ ἰατρός τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἰατρικὴν. εἰ δὲ λέγοιεν πασῶν τῶν κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν συνήθειαν αὐτὴν λέξεων εἶδησιν οὐχ ὡς τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ ἐν μέρει πασῶν (τοῦτο γὰρ ὄντως ἀδύνατον) ἀλλὰ τῶν καθόλου πασῶν καὶ ἀνωτάτω ἐν ταῖς διαλέκτοις, οἷον ὅτι Δωριέων μὲν ἐστὶ τοιοῦτω τόνῳ χρῆσθαι Ἰώνων δὲ ἄλλω, τάχα μὲν τι πιθανὸν ἐροῦσιν, οὐ 89 μὴν ἀληθές· οὔτε γὰρ ἐν ἔθος ἐστὶ καθ' ἑκάστην διάλεκτον (πολλαὶ γὰρ Δωριδὲς καὶ Ἀτθίδες), οὔτε οἱ κανόνες οὓς δοκοῦσι παραδιδόμηναι πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀποτείνονται λέξιν, ἀλλ' ἄχρι μὲν ποσῶν καὶ ὁμοτόνων, οἷον ὀξύτων ἢ βαρυτόνων, προκόπτουσι, πάσας δὲ περιλαβεῖν ἀδυνατοῦσιν.

90 Δείγματος μὲν οὖν χάριν ταῦτ' εἰρήσθω εἰς τὸ ἀνυπόστατον εἶναι τὴν γραμματικὴν ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ παρὰ τοῖς γραμματικοῖς αὐτῆς ἐπινοία· μετελθόντες δὲ ἀκολουθῶς καὶ τὰ κυριώτατα τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ θεωρημάτων, καὶ ἐξ ὧν μάλιστα λαμβάνει τὴν ὑπόστασιν, βασανίζωμεν.

Δ'.—ΤΙΝΑ ΜΕΡΗ ΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΙΚΗΣ

91 Πολλῆς οὔσης καὶ ἀνηνύτου παρὰ τοῖς γραμματικοῖς περὶ μερῶν γραμματικῆς διαστάσεως, ἵνα μήτε τὸ πάρεργον ἔργου χώραν ἐπέχειν ἡμῖν φαίνηται, μήτε εἰς ἄλλοτριάν καὶ ὡς πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ἀνωφελῆ ἐμβαίοντες ὑλὴν ἀπολειπόμεθα τῆς ἀναγκαιοτέρας ἀντιρρήσεως, ἀπαρκέσει λέγειν ἀσυ-

the forms of speech commonly used in Attica, and the Dorian of those in Dorian lands, and the orator of those used in rhetoric, and the physician of those in medicine. And if they should mean by this "knowledge of all the forms of speech in common usage," not that of all the forms taken separately and individually (for this is actually impossible), but knowledge of all those in the dialects which are universal and most widely used, as for instance that it is the practice of the Dorians to use one sort of pitch and the Ionians another, then perhaps what they say will be plausible, yet it will not be true; for neither is 89 there one customary practice in each dialect (for both the Dorian and the Attic dialects are numerous), nor do the rules which they suppose they are handing on extend to every form of speech but only go so far as to apply to a certain number and those with similar pitch, such as oxytones and barytones, and they are unable to include them all.

Let so much, then, be said by way of sample to 90 show the baselessness of the Art of Grammar, judging by the definition of it given by the Grammarians. Next let us investigate and test the most important of its theorems and those from which it mainly derives its constitution.

CHAPTER IV.—THE PARTS OF GRAMMAR

Since there exists amongst the Grammarians great 91 and endless dissension concerning the parts of the Art of Grammar, in order that we should not allow side-issues to seem to usurp the place of the main issue, nor be diverted from the more necessary mode of refutation by plunging into matter which is neither pertinent nor useful for our present purpose, it will

κοφανητότερον ὡς ἄρα τῆς γραμματικῆς τὸ μὲν ἔστιν ἱστορικὸν τὸ δὲ τεχνικὸν τὸ δὲ ἰδιαίτερον, δι' οὗ τὰ κατὰ τοὺς ποιητὰς καὶ συγγραφεῖς μεθ-
 92 οδεύεται. ὧν τεχνικὸν μὲν ἔστιν ἐν ᾧ περὶ τῶν στοιχείων καὶ τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν ὀρθογραφίας, τε καὶ ἑλληνισμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἀκολουθῶν διατάττονται, ἱστορικὸν δὲ ὅπου περὶ προσώπων οἰοῦναι θείων τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων καὶ ἡρωικῶν διδάσκουσιν, ἢ περὶ τόπων διηγοῦνται καθάπερ ὄρων ἢ ποταμῶν, ἢ περὶ πλασμάτων καὶ μύθων παραδιδόασιν ἢ εἴ τι
 93 τῆς αὐτῆς ἰδέας ἔστιν. ἰδιαίτερον δ' ἐν ᾧ τὰ¹ κατὰ τοὺς ποιητὰς καὶ συγγραφεῖς ἐπισκοποῦσι, καθ' ὃ τὰ ἀσαφῶς λεγόμενα ἐξηγοῦνται, τὰ τε ὑγιῆ καὶ τὰ μὴ τοιαῦτα κρίνουσι, τὰ τε γνήσια ἀπὸ τῶν νόθων διορίζουσιν. ἀλλ' ὡς μὲν τύπῳ καὶ ὀλοσχερέστερον περιλαβεῖν, ταῦτά ἐστι τὰ τῆς
 94 γραμματικῆς μέρη· νοητέον δὲ αὐτὰ οὐ κατ' εἰλικρίνειαν, οὐδ' ὡς ἂν τις εἰποι μέρη τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆν² καὶ σῶμα. ταυτὶ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἕτερα ὄντα ἀλλήλων νοεῖται, τὸ δὲ τεχνικὸν καὶ ἱστορικὸν καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰς ποιήσεις καὶ συγγραφὰς τῆς γραμματικῆς μέρη πολλὴν ἔχει συμπλοκὴν καὶ ἀνά-
 95 κρασιν πρὸς τὰ λοιπὰ· καὶ γὰρ ἡ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐπίσκεψις οὐ χωρὶς τοῦ τεχνικοῦ καὶ ἱστορικοῦ γίνεται μέρους, καὶ ἑκάτερον τούτων οὐ δίχα τῆς τῶν ἄλλων παραπλοκῆς συνέστηκεν. ὥσπερ οὖν οἱ λέγοντες τῆς ἰατρικῆς μέρη δίαιταν χειρουργίαν φαρμακείαν οὕτω λέγουσιν ὡς πολλῆς οὐσης ἐν

¹ δ' ἐν ᾧ τὰ scripsi: δὲ τὸ mss., Bekk. (δὲ ᾧ τὰ cj. Bekk.).

² ψυχῆν cj. Bekk.: ψυχῆ mss., Bekk.

be sufficient to state without sophistry that one part of Grammar is "historical," another "technical," a third "special,"^a in which last the writings of the poets and prose-writers are dealt with. Of these the 92 "technical" part is that in which they formulate the rules concerning the elements and the parts of speech and orthography and Greek idiom and consequential matters; and the "historical" is that wherein they give instruction regarding persons—divine persons, for example, and human, and heroic,—or else explain about places, such as mountains or rivers, or record fictions or legends, or anything else of that description. The "special" part is that in which they 93 examine the language of the poets and prose-writers, and in it they explain the obscurities in their language, and judge as to which of their expressions are sound and which unsound, and distinguish the genuine works from the spurious. Such then, to describe them in broad outline, are the parts of the Art of Grammar; but one should not conceive of them as 94 "parts" in the precise sense of that term, nor in the way that one speaks of the soul and body as "parts" of the man. For these latter are conceived as being distinct from each other, whereas the parts of Grammar,—the technical and historical and that which deals with poetry and prose,—are each closely interconnected and intermixed with the rest; for the 95 investigation of poetry is not separate from the "technical" and "historical" parts, nor is each of these devoid of mutual connexion with the other two. So, just as those who describe dieting, surgery and pharmacy as "parts" of the art of medicine, imply thereby that in their precepts there is much mutual

^a Also termed "exegetical."

τοῖς θεωρήμασιν ἀλληλουχίας (καὶ γὰρ ἡ διαίτα οὐ χωρὶς φαρμακείας καὶ χειρουργίας πρόεισι, καὶ ἡ φαρμακεία πάλιν περιείχεται καὶ τῇ τῶν ἄλλων δυνάμει), ὡς καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος οὐκ ἀπότακτόν τι ἔστιν ἕκαστον μέρος, οὐδ' εἰλικρινές
 96 ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιμιξίας. τοῦτο δὲ προδιηρθρώσαμεν οὐ παρέργως, ἀλλ' ἵνα εἰδῶμεν ὡς ἂν ἐν τι ἐξ αὐτῶν δειχθῆ ἄσύστατον, δυνάμει καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἀνήρηται, ὧν ἕκαστον οὐ χωρὶς τοῦ ἀναιρεθέντος ὑφίσταται. ὁμοίως δὲ οὐ ποιήσομεν τοῦτο καίπερ ὄν σύντομον, ἀλλὰ πειρασόμεθα πρὸς ἕκαστον ἀντιλέγειν, ὡς εἰ καὶ μὴ ἔχρηζε τῆς τῶν λοιπῶν παρουσίας. τάξει δὲ ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου.

Ε'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΤΕΧΝΙΚΟΥ ΤΗΣ ΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΙΚΗΣ
 ΜΕΡΟΥΣ

97 Διὰ πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα δίκαιόν ἐστι μετὰ σπουδῆς ἐξετάζειν τὴν γραμματικὴν τεχνολογίαν, μάλιστα δὲ ἀπάντων διὰ τὸ ἐπ' αὐτῇ κομᾶν καὶ μέγα φρονεῖν τοὺς γραμματικούς, αἰεὶ δὲ τῶν κατὰ τὰ λοιπὰ κοσμουμένων μαθήματα κατατρέχειν ὡς μηδὲ τὴν κοινὴν τῶν Ἑλλήνων συνήθειαν ἐπισταμένων, καὶ ἔτι διὰ τό, εἴ ποτε θλίβοντο ἐν ζητήσει, μὴ ἄλλην εὐρίσκειν πολλάκις ἀποφυγὴν εἰς τὸ περισπᾶν τοὺς συζητοῦντας αὐτοῖς ἢ τὸ ὅτι βάρβαρον ἢ σόλοικόν ἐστι τὸ ὑπ' αὐτῶν λεχθέν.
 98 οὐκ ὀλίγην δὲ ἂν ἔχοι μοῖραν εἰς προτροπὴν καὶ ὅταν βλέπωμεν τοὺς μηδὲ δύο σχεδὸν ῥήματα δεξιῶς εἶρειν δυναμένους γραμματικούς θέλοντας

borrowing from one another (for dieting does not progress apart from pharmacy and surgery, and pharmacy in turn is involved in the functioning of the other "parts"), so also in the present instance each part of Grammar is not something quite separate and free from admixture with the others. This description we have given beforehand in full detail, not as a side-issue, but so that we may understand that if any one of these parts is proved to have no consistence the others too are virtually destroyed, since neither of them subsists when apart from the one which has been destroyed. We shall not, however, adopt this method, concise though it is, but shall try to refute each part as though it had no need of the presence of the rest. And, keeping the order, we must begin with the first part.

CHAPTER V.—CONCERNING THE TECHNICAL PART OF
 GRAMMAR

While it is right for many other reasons to examine 97 with care the technology of Grammar, it is especially so because it is upon this that the Grammarians plume themselves and give themselves great airs, while they are always running down those who are highly reputed in other sciences as men who do not even understand the common usage of Greek speech; and also for the further reason that whenever they are hard pressed in disputation they frequently find no other resort for the purpose of distracting their opponents than asserting that what they have said is a barbarism or a solecism. And what has no small 98 share in urging us on is our observing the Grammarians, who can hardly even join two sentences together skilfully, wishing to convict of barbarisms

ἕκαστον τῶν μέγα δυναθέντων ἐν εὐφραδείᾳ καὶ ἑλληνισμῷ παλαιῶν, καθάπερ Θουκυδίδην Πλάτωνα Δημοσθένην, ὡς βάρβαρον ἐλέγχειν. μία γὰρ ἀντὶ πάντων ἄμυνα γενήσεται πρὸς αὐτοὺς, ἐὰν τὴν ψευδώνυμον αὐτῶν τεχνολογίαν ἀτεχνον ἀποδείξωμεν. τάξει δὲ λεκτέον ἡμῖν πρῶτον περὶ 99 τῶν στοιχείων, ἐξ ὧν τὰ πάντα κατ' αὐτοὺς συνέστηκεν καὶ ὧν ἀναιρεθέντων ἀγγραμμάτους ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι τοὺς γραμματικούς.

Καὶ δὴ τριχῶς λεγομένου τοῦ στοιχείου, τοῦ τε γραφομένου χαρακτήρος καὶ τύπου καὶ τῆς τούτου δυνάμεως καὶ ἔτι τοῦ ὀνόματος, προαγέτω νῦν ἢ ζήτησις μάλιστα περὶ τῆς δυνάμεως· αὕτη γὰρ καὶ κυρίως στοιχείον παρ' αὐτοῖς προσηγόρευται. εἰκοσιτεσσάρων τοίνυν στοιχείων 100 ὄντων τῆς ἐγγραμμάτου φωνῆς, τούτων διττὴν ὑποτίθενται κατὰ τὸ ἀνωτάτω τὴν φύσιν. τὰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν φωνάεντα προσαγορεύουσι, τὰ δὲ σύμφωνα, καὶ φωνάεντα μὲν ἑπτὰ, αεηιοω, σύμφωνα δὲ τὰ λοιπά. τῶν δὲ φωναέντων τρεῖς λέγουσι διαφοράς· δύο μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν φύσει μακρὰ λέγουσι τυγχάνειν, τὸ η καὶ τὸ ω, ἰσάριθμα δὲ βραχέα, τὸ ε καὶ τὸ ο, τρία δὲ κοινὰ μήκους τε καὶ βραχύτητος, α ι υ, ἅπερ δίχρονα καὶ ὑγρὰ καὶ ἀμφίβολα καὶ μεταβολικὰ καλοῦσιν· ἕκαστον γὰρ 101 αὐτῶν πέφυκεν ὅτε μὲν ἐκτείνεσθαι ὅτε δὲ συστέλλεσθαι, οἷον τὸ μὲν α ἐπὶ τοῦ

* Ἄρες Ἄρες βροτολογιγὲ μαιφόνε τειχεσιπλήτη,
τὸ δὲ ι

"Ἴλιον εἰς ἱεράν· τῇ δ' ἀντίος ὤρνυτ' Ἄπόλλων,

* Cf. Hom. Il. v. 81.

* Cf. Hom. Il. vii. 20.

every one of the ancients who were supreme masters of correct language and Greek idiom, such as Thucydides, Plato and Demosthenes. Against their attack one defence will stand for all,—the proof, namely, that their "technology" is non-technical. And first in order we must discuss the "elements," wherefrom 99 their whole system is constructed, and the abolition of which will necessarily bring it about that the Grammarians are ungrammatical.

The term "element" being used in three senses,—of the written character or form, and of its "function" (or sound), and also of the name,—let us proceed now in our inquiry to deal mainly with the function; for this is accounted by the Grammarians to be the "element" proper. As, then, there are twenty-four elements of the voice in written form, 100 they lay it down that the nature of these, in respect of their *summa genera*, is twofold. The one class they call vowels, the other consonants; and seven are vowels—*a e η ι ο υ ω*,—the rest being consonants. And of the vowels there are, they say, three distinct sorts: for they say that two of them are long, namely *η* and *ω*, an equal number short, namely *ε* and *ο*, and three indifferently long or short, namely *α ι υ*, which they term "dichronous" (or having two quantities), and "liquid" and "amphibolous" (or ambiguous) and "metabolic" (or changeable); for each of them is naturally capable of being at one time long, at 101 another short, as *α* in the example, Ἄρες Ἄρες—

Ἄρες, Ἄρες, fort-wrecker and murderous slayer of mortals, α—
and ι in Ἴλιον εἰς ἱεράν,—

(So fared she)

Even to Holy Troy, and Apollo hastened to meet her, α—

τὸ δὲ ν

θεσπέσιον νεφέων ἐκ Διὸς δὲν ὕδωρ.

- 102 τῶν δὲ συμφώνων τὰ μὲν ἡμίφωνα ἔστι κατ' αὐτῶν τὰ δὲ ἄφωνα, καὶ ἡμίφωνα μὲν ὅσα δι' αὐτῶν ροῖζον ἢ σιγμὸν ἢ μυγμὸν ἢ τινα παραπλήσιον ἤχον κατὰ τὴν ἐκφώνησιν ἀποτελεῖν πεφυκότα, καθάπερ τὸ ζ θ λ μ ν ξ ρ σ φ χ ψ, ἢ ὡς τινές, χωρὶς τοῦ θ καὶ φ καὶ χ τὰ λειπόμενα ὀκτώ· ἄφωνα δὲ ἔστι τὰ μήτε συλλαβὰς καθ' ἑαυτὰ ποιεῖν δυνάμενα μήτε ἤχων ιδιότητας, αὐτὸ δὲ μόνον μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων συνεκφωνούμενα, καθάπερ
- 103 β γ δ κ π τ, ἢ ὡς ἔνιοι, καὶ τὸ θ φ χ. καὶ μὴν κοινῶς τῶν συμφώνων πάλιν τὰ μὲν φύσει δασέα λέγουσι τὰ δὲ ψιλὰ, καὶ δασέα μὲν θ φ χ, ψιλὰ δὲ κ π τ· μόνον δὲ φασὶ τὸ ρ ἐπιδέχεσθαι ἐκάτερον, δασύτητα καὶ ψιλότητα. λέγουσι δὲ τινα τῶν συμφώνων καὶ διπλᾶ, καθάπερ τὸ ζ ξ ψ· συνεστηκέναι γάρ φασὶ τὸ μὲν ζ ἐκ τοῦ σ καὶ δ, τὸ δὲ ξ ἐκ τοῦ κ καὶ σ, τὸ δὲ ψ ἐκ τοῦ π καὶ σ.
- 104 Τούτων δὴ προεστοιχειωμένων, φημὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἀτόπως αὐτοῖς λέγεσθαι τῶν στοιχείων τινα εἶναι διπλᾶ. τὸ γὰρ διπλοῦν σύστημα ἔστιν ἐκ δυοῦν, τὸ δὲ στοιχεῖον οὐκ ἔστι σύστημα ἐκ τινῶν· ἀπλοῦν γὰρ ὀφείλει τυγχάνειν καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἐτέρων συστατῶν. οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι διπλοῦν στοιχεῖον. ἄλλως τε, εἰ τὰ συστατικά τοῦ διπλοῦ στοιχείου στοιχεῖά ἐστι, τὸ διπλοῦν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων συνεστῶς οὐκ ἔσται στοιχεῖον· ἀλλὰ μὴν τὰ συστατικά τοῦ διπλοῦ στοιχείου στοιχεῖα ἐστίν· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ διπλοῦν ἐστὶ στοιχεῖον.

* This pentameter comes, perhaps,—as Fabricius suggests—from a lost poem of Callimachus.

and the ν in δὲν ὕδωρ—

Out of the Sky-god's clouds poured a marvellous flood.*

Of the consonants some, according to them, are “semi- 102 vocal,” others “non-vocal” (or mute): “semi-vocal” are all those which of themselves naturally produce at their utterance the *r*-sound or the *s*-sound or the *m*-sound, or some similar sound, for example ζ θ λ μ ν ξ ρ σ φ χ ψ, or, as some say, the eight which remain after the omission of θ φ and χ. “Non-vocal” are those which are not able by themselves to form syllables or sounds of their own, they being uttered only along with others, such as β γ δ κ π τ, or, as some say, with the addition of θ φ χ. Moreover, of the con- 103 sonants again in general they say that some are naturally “rough” (or aspirated), others “smooth” (or without the aspirate), the “rough” being θ φ χ, and the “smooth” κ π τ; and ρ alone, they say, admits of either breathing, the “rough” or the “smooth.” They declare also that some of the consonants are “twofold,” such as ζ ξ ψ; for ζ, they say, is composed of σ and δ, ξ of κ and σ, ψ of π and σ.

These, then, being placed first as elements, I assert, 104 firstly, that it is absurd of them to state that some of the elements are “twofold,” for what is twofold is a compound of two things, but the element is not a compound of any things; for it must be simple and not compounded of other things. Therefore a twofold element does not exist. Again, if the components of the twofold element are elements, the twofold compound of those elements will not be an element; but in fact the components of the twofold element are elements; therefore the twofold (compound) is not an element.

105 Καὶ μὴν ὡς ταῦτα ἀναιρεῖται, οὕτω καὶ τὰ
 δίχρονα, κοινὴν φύσιν μήκουσ τε καὶ βραχύτητος
 ἀξιούμενα ἔχειν. εἶπερ γὰρ τοιαῦτα ἐστίν, ἦτοι
 αὐτὸ τὸ γράμμα κατ' ἰδίαν καὶ ὁ ψιλός, εἰ τύχοι,
 τοῦ α ἢ υ χαρακτήρ ἐμφανιστικός ἐστι τῆς διχρόνου
 φύσεως, καὶ νυνὶ μὲν συστέλλεσθαι νυνὶ δὲ ἐκτείνε-
 106 σθαι δυνάμενον, (ἢ σὺν¹) προσωδία. ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν
 χαρακτήρ κατ' ἰδίαν οὐκ ἐστὶ κοινού φύσει στοιχείου
 μηνυτικός. οὔτε γὰρ ὅτι μακρύνεται οὔθ' ὅτι βρα-
 χύνεται οὔθ' ὅτι τὸ συναμφότερον καὶ μακρύνεται
 καὶ βραχύνεται ἐμφαίνει· ἀλλ' ὃν τρόπον ἡ δι'
 αὐτοῦ συλλαβή, καθάπερ εἴρηται ἐπὶ τῆς Ἄρες λέ-
 ξεως, οὐ² χωρὶς τῆς προστιθεμένης προσωδίας οὔτ'
 εἰ μακρά ἐστὶν οὔτ' εἰ βραχεῖα γινώσκεται, οὕτω
 καὶ τὸ α ἢ υ κατ' ἰδίαν λαμβανόμενα οὐ κοινὰ
 107 ἑκατέρας ἔσται δυνάμεισ ἀλλ' οὐδετέρας. λείπεται
 οὖν σὺν προσωδία λέγειν αὐτὸ κοινὸν ὑπάρχειν.
 ὁ πάλιν ἐστὶν ἀμήχανον· προσλαμβάνον γὰρ
 ταύτην ἢ μακρὸν γίνεται, ὅτε ἐστὶ μακρά, ἢ βραχύ,
 ὅτε ἐστὶ βραχεῖα, κοινὸν δὲ οὐδέποτε. οὐκ ἄρα
 108 ἐστὶ φύσει δίχρονα στοιχεῖα. εἰ δὲ λέγοιεν κοινὰ
 φύσει ὑπάρχειν ταῦτα παρόσον ἐπιδεκτικά ἐστὶν
 ἑκατέρου, μήκουσ τε καὶ συστολήσ, λήσονται
 σχεδὸν εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν ἐγκυλισθέντες ἀπορίαν. τὸ
 γὰρ ἐπιδεκτικὸν τινοσ οὐκ ἐστὶ ἐκεῖνο τὸ οὐπερ
 ἐπιδεκτικὸν ἐστὶν· ὡσπερ γὰρ ὁ χαλκὸς ἐπιδεκτι-
 κὸς μὲν ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀνδριάσ γενέσθαι, οὐκ ἐστὶ δὲ
 ἀνδριάσ ἐφ' ὅσον ἐπιδεκτικός ἐστὶ, καὶ ὃν τρόπον
 τὰ ξύλα ἐπιτήδειον μὲν ἔχει φύσιν εἰς τὸ ναῦσ

¹ (ἢ σὺν) addidi: τῆ mss., Bekk. (προσωδία, ἢ σὺν προσωδία
 κοινὸν ὑπάρχει cj. Bekk.).

² οὐ cj. Bekk.: ἡ mss., Bekk.

Moreover, just as these are destroyed, so also are 105
 the "dichronous" elements which, as is claimed, are
 naturally "common" in respect of length and brevity.
 For if they are such, either the letter itself in itself
 and the mere character, of, say, the ε, ι, and υ, are
 indicative of their "dichronous" nature, and can be
 now shortened, now lengthened, or the "tension"^a
 must be added. But the character is not of itself indi- 106
 cative of an element naturally "common," for it does
 not show clearly that it is long or that it is short or that
 it is at once both long and short; but just as it is not
 known about the syllable formed by it,—as we said
 in the case of the word Ἄρες—whether it is long or
 short apart from the added tension, so also the letters
 α ἢ υ taken by themselves will not be "common"
 and having either quantity, but will have neither. It 107
 remains, then, to say that the letter is "common"
 when conjoined with tension. But this again is im-
 possible; for when the letter takes the tension it
 becomes either long, when the tension is long, or
 short when it is short, but never "common." Hence,
 elements "dichronous" by nature do not exist.—And 108
 if they should say that these elements are "common"
 by nature inasmuch as they are susceptible of either
 quantity, length or shortness, they will unwittingly
 be involving themselves in much the same difficulty.
 For what is susceptible of a thing will not be that
 thing whereof it is susceptible; for just as the bronze
 is susceptible of becoming the statue, but inasmuch
 as it is susceptible is not the statue, and just as the
 timber possesses a nature suitable for becoming a

^a See note on § 113.

γενέσθαι, οὕτω δὲ ἔστι ναῦς, οὕτω καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν στοιχείων ἐπιδεκτικὰ μὲν ἔστι μήκους τε καὶ συστολῆς, οὔτε δὲ μακρὰ ἔστιν οὔτε βραχεὰ οὔθ' ἑκάτερον πρὶν ἀπὸ προσωδίας ποιωθῆναι.
 109 πρὸς γε μὴν τοῖς λεχθεῖσιν ἐναντίον ἔστιν ἢ τε βραχύτης καὶ ἢ ἐπέκτασις, καὶ οὐ συννφίσταται· ἀναιρέσει γὰρ τῆς βραχύτητος ἢ ἐπέκτασις συνίσταται, καὶ ἀναιρουμένης μακρᾶς βραχεῖα γίνεται. παρ' ἣν αἰτίαν ἀδύνατον περισπωμένην βραχεῖαν γενέσθαι, διὰ τὸ τῷ περισπασμῷ κατ' ἀνάγκην
 110 συννφίστασθαι τῇ ἐπέκτασιν. διόπερ εἰ φύσει τι δίχρονόν ἐστι στοιχείον, ἦτοι ὑφ' ἐν περὶ αὐτὸ ἢ τε τῆς βραχύτητος καὶ ἢ τῆς ἐπέκτασεως ὑποστήσεται δύναμις ἢ παρὰ μέρος. ἀλλ' ὑφ' ἐν μὲν ἀμήχανον· περὶ γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐκφώνησιν κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀναιρετικαὶ ἀλλήλων δυνάμεις οὐκ ἂν ὑποσταίεν. λείπεται ἄρα παρὰ μέρος. ὁ πάλιν ἔστιν ἀπίθανον· ὅτε γὰρ ἔστι <βραχὺ καὶ ὅτε ἔστι> μακρόν, τότε οὐκ ἔστι κοινὸν στοιχείον βραχύτητος καὶ μήκους, ἀλλὰ βραχὺ μόνον <καὶ μακρόν μόνον>.¹
 111 Ὁ δ' αὐτὸς τῆς ἐπιχειρήσεως τρόπος γινέσθω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν φύσει ψιλῶν ἢ δασέων ἢ καθ' ἑκάτερον κοινῶν· ἡμῶν δὲ ἀπόχρη τὸ γένος τῆς ἐπιχειρήσεως ὑποδείξαι.

Καὶ μὴν ἐπεὶ ἀνήρηται τὰ κοινὰ καὶ δέδεικται τὸ ἐκτείνεσθαι μόνον αὐτὰ ἢ συστέλλεσθαι, ἀκολουθήσει καὶ τὸ δισσοῦν ὑπάρχειν ἕκαστον, τὸ
 112 μὲν φύσει μακρόν τὸ δ' αὖ φύσει βραχὺ. δισσοῦ οὖν ὄντος τοῦ α καὶ ι καὶ υ οὐκέτι ἑπτὰ γενήσεται μόνον στοιχεῖα φωνάεντα, ὧν δύο μὲν μακρὰ, τὸ

¹ <βραχὺ . . . ἔστι> et <καὶ μ. μόνον> addidi (Bekk. ej. <καὶ ὅτι βραχὺ> post μακρόν et <μακρόν μόνον καὶ> post ἀλλά).

ship, but is not as yet a ship, so also elements of this kind are susceptible of both length and shortness but are neither long nor short, nor either of the two, before they have been qualified by tension.—Moreover, in 109 addition to what has been said, shortness and length are contraries and do not exist together; for length exists by the abolition of shortness, and when a long is abolished a short comes into existence. And for this reason it is impossible for a circumflexed letter to be short, since the lengthening necessarily co-exists with the circumflex. Consequently, if an 110 element is “dichronous” by nature the quality of both shortness and length will subsist in it either both together or one at a time. But it is impossible for both qualities to subsist together, for qualities which are destructive of each other will not subsist in the same utterance simultaneously. It remains, then, to say that they subsist “one at a time.” But this too is incredible; for when the element is short, or when it is long, it is not, at that time, “common” as regards shortness and length, but is solely short or solely long.

Let the same method of attack be employed in the 111 case of the elements which are “smooth” or “rough,” or “common,” as taking either breathing. We content ourselves here with merely indicating the kind of the attack.

And now that the “common” elements have been destroyed and it has been proved that they are only either shortened or lengthened, it will follow that each of them is twofold, the one sort naturally long, the other naturally short. As then α ι and υ are each 112 twofold, there will no longer be only seven “vocal” elements (or vowels), of which two are long, namely

τε η και το ω, δύο δὲ βραχέα, τό τε ε και το ο, τρία δὲ δίχρονα, τό τε α και ι και υ, ἀλλὰ τὰ σύμπαντα δέκα, και τούτων τὰ πέντε μὲν μακρά, τό τε η και το ω και το μακρόν α και ι και υ, ισάριθμα δὲ τὰ βραχέα, το ο και το ε και το βραχύν α και ι και υ. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὐ δύο μόνον ὑπειλήφασιν

113 εἶναι προσωδίας γραμματικῶν παῖδες, τὴν τε μακρὰν και βραχεῖαν, ἀλλὰ και ὀξεῖαν βαρεῖαν περισπωμένην δασεῖαν ψιλήν, ἕκαστον τῶν ὑποδεδειγμένων φωναέντων ἔχον τινὰ τούτων καθ' ἰδίαν προσωδίαν γενήσεται στοιχείον· και ᾧ λόγῳ οὐδὲν ἦν κοινὸν μήκους τε και βραχύτητος στοιχείον, ἀλλ' ἢ μακρόν μόνον, ὅτ' εἶχε τὴν μακρὰν, ἢ βραχύν, ὅτ' εἶχε τὴν βραχεῖαν, τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ οὐδὲν ἔσται κοινὸν ὀξύτητος και βαρύτητος, ἀλλ' ἢ ὀξύ μόνον, ὅτε προσειλήφει τὴν ὀξεῖαν, ἢ βαρύν, ὅτε τὴν βαρεῖαν. και ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τὸ ἀνάλογον. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ μὲν βραχέα δύο ὄντα ἀνὰ πέντε ἐπιδέχεται προσωδίας, βραχεῖαν ὀξεῖαν βαρεῖαν δασεῖαν

114 ψιλήν, δέκα γενήσεται. τὰ δὲ μακρὰ πάλιν δύο ὄντα εἰ ἐκ περισσοῦ προσλαμβάνει και τὴν προσωδίαν τὴν περισπωμένην (μηκύνεται γὰρ ταῦτα και ὀξύνεται και βαρύνεται και δασύνεται και ψιλοῦται και ἰδιαίτερον περισπᾶσθαι πέφυκε), γενήσεται δώδεκα. τὰ δὲ κοινὰ τρία καθεστῶτα <εἰ>¹ τὰς ἑπτὰ προσωδίας καθ' ἕκαστον ἐπιδέχεται,

¹ <εἰ> add. cj. Bekk.

^a προσωδία (cf. § 119) "comprises accent, breathing, and quantity—all the elements in the spoken word which in the ancient mode of writing were left to be supplied by the reader" (Bywater, *Aristotle on Poetry*, p. 336). The symbols were invented to help foreigners. See Rhys Roberts, *Demetrius on Literary Composition*, glossary. The τόνος,

η and ω, and two short, namely ε and ο, and three "dichronous," namely α ι and υ, but the total will be ten; and of these five will be long, namely η and ω and the long α and ι and υ, and the short will be equal in number, namely ο and ε and the short α and ι and υ. But since the School of Grammarians have assumed 113 that there are not only two tensions,^a the long and the short, but also the acute, the grave,^b the circumflex, the rough and the smooth, each of the vowels indicated having some one of these tensions peculiar to itself will become an element; and just as we found that an element was never "common" in respect of length and brevity but was either long only, when it had the long tension added, or short when it had the short, so, by the same reasoning, an element will never be "common" in respect of acuteness and gravity, but will be acute only, when it has received the acute added, or grave, when it has received the grave. So also with the others. Since, then, the short elements, being two, admit of five tensions apiece,—the short, the acute, the grave, the rough and the smooth,—they will become ten. The 114 long ones, again, which are two, if they receive the further addition of the circumflex,—for these elements can naturally take the circumflex as their own special tension as well as the long, the acute, the grave, the rough and the smooth,—will become twelve. And if the "common," being three, each admit of the

which we call accent, is explained by Demetrius as a musical pitch of about a musical fifth, what we call the acute, all the rest is what we call grave accent. The circumflex is a drawl when a vowel with acute slides into one with an unaccented vowel (e.g. when ὄ-μας becomes οὐ-μαί).

^b The grave is, then, the general monotone of the speaker's voice.

καὶ ταῦτα γίνεται εἴκοσι καὶ ἔν· ὥστε πάντα τεσσαράκοντα καὶ τρία τυγχάνειν· οἷς τῶν δεκαεπτὰ συμφώνων προστιθεμένων ἐξήκοντα γίνεται¹ στοιχεῖα, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰκοσιτέσσαρα.

115 Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἕτερος λόγος καθ' ὃν ἀξιούται διαφόρως τὰ φωνάεντα πάλιν στοιχεῖα ἐλάσσονα εἶναι τῶν παρὰ τοῖς γραμματικοῖς θρυλουμένων ἐπτά. εἰ γὰρ τὸ α κατ' αὐτοὺς ἐκτεινόμενον καὶ συστελλόμενον οὐχ ἕτερόν ἐστι στοιχείον ἀλλ' ἐν κοινόν, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ ι καὶ τὸ υ, ἀκολουθήσει καὶ τὸ ε καὶ τὸ η ἐν εἶναι στοιχείον κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν κοινόν· ἢ γὰρ αὐτὴ δύναμις ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρων ἐστί, καὶ συσταλὲν μὲν τὸ η γίνεται ε, ἐκταθὲν δὲ τὸ ε γίνεται η. κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τὸ ο καὶ τὸ υ μία στοιχείον γενήσεται φύσις κοινή, ἐκτάσει καὶ συστολῇ διαφέρουσα, ἐπεὶ περ τὸ μὲν ω μακρόν ἐστίν ο, τὸ δὲ ο βραχὺ 116 ἐστίν ω. τυφλώττουσιν οὖν οἱ γραμματικοὶ καὶ τὸ ἀκόλουθον αὐτοῖς οὐ συνορώσι, λέγοντες ἐπτὰ φωνάεντα τυγχάνειν, πέντε μόνων ὄντων πρὸς τὴν φύσιν.

Καὶ ἀναστροφῶς ἔσεσθαι τινὰ φασιν ἔνιοι τῶν φιλοσόφων πλείονα στοιχεῖα, διάφορον ἔχοντα δύναμιν τῶν συνήθως παρατιδομένων, ὅλον καὶ τὸ α καὶ τὸ ου καὶ πάν ὁ τῆς ὁμοίας ἐστὶ φύσεως. τὸ γὰρ στοιχείον κριτέον μάλιστα, ὅτι στοιχείον ἐστίν, ἐκ τοῦ ἀσύνθετον καὶ μονόποιον ἔχει φθόγγον, οἷός ἐστιν ὁ τοῦ α καὶ ε καὶ ο καὶ τῶν 117 λοιπῶν. ἐπεὶ οὖν ὁ τοῦ αἰ καὶ εἰ φθόγγος ἀπλοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ μονοειδής, ἔσται καὶ ταῦτα στοιχεῖα. τεκμήριον δὲ τῆς ἀπλότητος καὶ μονοειδείας τὸ

¹ γίνεται cj. Bekk. : γίνεσθαι mss., Bekk.

seven tensions, they become twenty-one. Hence their total is forty-three; and when to these are added the seventeen consonants, the elements turn out to be sixty and not twenty-four.

There is, on the other hand, a different argument 115 by which it is made out that the vowels are fewer in number than the seven which are so much talked about by the Grammarians. For if the *a* when long and when short is not, according to them, a different element but one "common" element, and so likewise both the *i* and the *v*, then it will also follow that *ε* and *η* are one "common" element as having the same potency; for in the case of both there is the same potency, and *η* when shortened becomes *ε*, while *ε* when lengthened becomes *η*. In the same way *ο* and *ω* will also become one "common" element, differing in length and brevity, since *ω* is long *ο*, and *ο* is short *ω*. The Grammarians, then, are blind and fail to 116 perceive the consequence, when they assert that there are seven vowels, whereas in actual fact there are only five.

Contrariwise, some philosophers declare that there will be some more elements which possess a potency different from those which are usually handed down, —*αι*, for instance, *ου* and every one which is of similar nature. For the "element" must be judged to be an element mainly on the ground that it has a sound which is non-composite and of single quality, such as that of *α* and *ε* and *ο* and the rest. Since, then, 117 the sound of *αι* and of *ει* is simple and of one kind only, these, too, will be elements. And a proof of the simplicity of their sounds and that they are of one kind only is to be found in the following state-

λεχθησόμενον. ὁ μὲν γὰρ σύνθετος φθόγγος οὐχ οἶος ἀπ' ἀρχῆς προσπίπτει τῇ αἰσθήσει, τοιοῦτος ἄχρι τέλους παραμένειν πέφυκεν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ παράτασιν ἑτεροιοῦται, ὁ δὲ ἀπλοῦς καὶ ὄντως τοῦ στοιχείου λόγον ἔχων τούναντιον ἀπ' ἀρχῆς μέχρι τέλους ἀμετάβολός ἐστιν. οἶον τοῦ μὲν ρα φθόγγου ἐν παρατάσει προφερομένου, δῆλον ὡς οὐχ ὡσαύτως αὐτοῦ κατὰ τὴν πρώτην πρόσπτωσιν ἀντιλήφεται ἢ αἰσθησις καὶ κατὰ τὴν τελευταίαν, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ ρ ἐκφωνήσεως κινηθήσεται, μεταῦθις δὲ ἐξαφανισθείσης αὐτῆς εἰλικρινοῦς τῆς τοῦ α δυνάμεως ποιήσεται τὴν ἀντίληψιν. ὅθεν οὐκ ἂν εἴη στοιχεῖον τὸ ρα καὶ

118 πᾶν τὸ ἑοικὸς αὐτῷ. εἰ δὲ τὸν τοῦ αἰ φθόγγον λέγοιεν, οὐδὲν ἔσται τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ' οἶον ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἐξακούεται τῆς φωνῆς ἰδίωμα, τοιοῦτον καὶ ἐπὶ τέλει, ὥστε στοιχεῖον ἔσται τὸ αἰ. τούτου δὲ οὕτως ἔχοντος, ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ τοῦ εἰ φθόγγος καὶ ὁ τοῦ οἰ¹ μονοειδῆς καὶ ἀσύνθετος καὶ ἀμετάβολος ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἄχρι τέλους λαμβάνεται, ἔσται καὶ οὗτος στοιχεῖον.

119 Ἄλλὰ ἀφέμενοί γε ταύτης τῆς ζητήσεως ἐκεῖνο ἂν λέγοιμεν, ὃ μᾶλλον δύναται θλίβειν τοὺς γραμματικούς. εἰ γὰρ κοινὰ λέγεται στοιχεῖα τρία, α ἰ ν, διὰ τὸ ἐπιδεκτικὰ τυγχάνειν μήκους τε καὶ συστολῆς, ἀκολουθήσει πᾶν στοιχεῖον κοινὸν εἶναι λέγειν. ἐπιδεκτικὸν γὰρ ἐστὶ τῶν τεσσάρων προσωδιῶν, βαρύτητος ὀξύτητος ψιλότητος δασύτητος. ἢ εἴπερ οὐχ ὑπομένουσι πᾶν στοιχεῖον κοινὸν εἶναι λέγειν, μηδ' ἐκεῖνα λεγέτωσαν κοινὰ παρόσον ἐκτάσεως καὶ συστολῆς ἐστὶν ἐπιδεκτικά.

120 Ἦρκει μὲν οὖν ἠπορημένων τῶν στοιχείων τῆς

ment: the composite sound does not naturally remain to the end just the same in quality as when it first strikes the sense-organ, but is altered through its prolongation, whereas the simple sound, which really has the character of "element," is on the contrary unchanged from beginning to end. Thus, when the sound *pa* is prolonged in utterance, it is plain that the sense will not perceive it alike at the first impression and at the last, but will be stirred at first by the utterance of the *p* and afterwards, when this sound has vanished, it will gain the perception of the *a* sound in its purity. Hence, *pa* and all similar vocables will not be elements. But if they should 118 pronounce the sound *ai*, the result will not be at all similar, but its peculiar tone, as heard at the beginning, is just the same at the end, so that *ai* will be an element. And such being the case in respect of *ai*, since the sound *ei* and the sound *oi* are received from beginning to end as of single quality and non-composite and unaltered, these too will be elements.

But letting go this line of inquiry we may state 119 another which is capable of pressing the Grammarians still harder. If the three elements *a*, *i*, and *v* are termed "common" because they are receptive of length and brevity, it will follow that we must say that every element is common, for it is receptive of the four tensions, gravity, acuteness, smoothness, roughness. Else, if they cannot endure to say that every element is common, neither let them term those three common on the ground that they are receptive of length and brevity.

It would have been sufficient to have put an end to 120

¹ οἰ Coraes: ου MSS., Bekk.; <καὶ ὁ τοῦ αἰ> add. cj. War-mington.

γραμματικῆς πέρας ἐπιτεθεικέναι τῇ ζητήσει τίς γὰρ ἀπολείπεται λόγος περὶ τῶν μετὰ τὰς ἀρχὰς τοῖς τὰς ἀρχὰς οὐκ ἔχουσι γραμματικοῖς; ὁμῶς δ' οὖν ἐνδοτέρω προχωροῦντας οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλότριον κἀκείνων δείγματος χάριν ἀποπειραθῆναι. καὶ ἐπεὶ ἐκ στοιχείων αἱ συλλαβαὶ εἰσι, <τὰ>¹ περὶ τούτων ἐπισυνάπτωμεν.

ς'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΣΥΛΛΑΒΗΣ

- 121 Πᾶσα οὖν συλλαβὴ ἢ μακρὰ ἔστιν ἢ βραχεῖα. μακρὰ δὲ γίνεται, φασί, διχῶς, φύσει τε καὶ θέσει, φύσει μὲν τριχῶς, ἢ ὅταν ἔχη στοιχείον φύσει μακρὸν ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς ἠώς λέξεως, ἑκατέρα γὰρ τούτων τῶν συλλαβῶν ἔστι μακρὰ διὰ τὸ τὴν μὲν τὸ η τὴν δὲ τὸ ω φύσει ἔχειν μακρὸν, ἢ ὅταν ἐκ δυοῖν φωναέντων συνεστήκη ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς αἰεί λέξεως, αἱ γὰρ δύο συλλαβαὶ μακραὶ τῷ ἑκατέραν ἐκ δυοῖν φωναέντων ὑπάρχειν, ἢ ὅταν κοινὸν ἔχη τὸ στοιχείον μακροτόνως παρειλημμένον ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς Ἄρης· τὸ γὰρ α δίχρονον νῦν μακροτόνως ἐκ-
122 φέρεται. οὐκοῦν φύσει τριχῶς μηκύνεται συλλαβὴ, θέσει δὲ πενταχῶς, ἤτοι ὅταν εἰς σύμφωνα τῶν ἀπλῶν λήγη δύο, ἢ ὅταν ἢ μετ' αὐτὴν συλλαβὴ ἀπὸ συμφώνων δύο ἀρχῆται, ἢ ὅταν εἰς σύμφωνον λήγη καὶ ἀπὸ συμφώνου ἢ ἐξῆς ἀρχῆται, ἢ ὅταν εἰς διπλοῦν λήγη στοιχείον, ἢ ὅταν μετ' αὐτὴν
123 διπλοῦν ἐπιφέρηται. εἰ δὴ πᾶσα συλλαβὴ ἤτοι μακρὰ ἔστιν ἢ βραχεῖα κατὰ τοὺς ὑποδεδειγμένους τῆς τεχνολογίας τρόπους, εἰς παραστήσωμεν μηδετέραν οὐσαν αὐτῶν, δηλοῦν ὡς οὐδὲ λέξιν

¹ <τὰ> add. Heintz.

our investigation at this point, now that the "elements" of the Art of Grammar have been shown to be doubtful; for what is left for the Grammarians to say about what comes after their principles when they do not possess those principles? None the less, it is not irrelevant to penetrate further and, as a sample, to test also what follows the principles. And since the "syllables" are formed from the "elements," let us subjoin a discussion of these.

CHAPTER VI.—CONCERNING THE SYLLABLE

Every syllable is either long or short. It is long, 121 they say, in two ways, by nature and by position: by nature it is long in three cases, either when it has an element which is naturally long, as in the word ἠώς, for each of these syllables is long since the one contains η, the other ω, which are naturally long; or when it is composed of two vowels, as in the word αἰεί, for the two syllables are long since each is made up of two vowels; or when it has its element "common" and pronounced with a long tension, as in the case of Ἄρης; for the "dichronous" α is now uttered with a long tension. Thus the syllable is long by 122 nature in three ways, but by position in five ways, either when it ends with two of the simple consonants; or when the next syllable begins with two consonants; or when it ends with a consonant and the next begins with a consonant; or when it ends with a double element; or when a double element is inserted after it.—If every syllable is either long or short in the ways 123 indicated in their "technology," then if we shall establish that neither of these syllables exists, it is plain that the Grammarians will not have a "word"

ἔξουσιν οἱ γραμματικοί· καθὰ γὰρ τῶν στοιχείων ἀναιρουμένων συναιρουῦνται καὶ αἱ συλλαβαί, οὕτω καὶ τῶν συλλαβῶν μὴ οὐσῶν οὔτε αἱ λέξεις γενήσονται οὔτε κοινῶς τὰ τοῦ λόγου μέρη, διὰ δὲ τοῦτ' οὐδὲ λόγος.

- 124 Ἴν' οὖν ἢ τις βραχεῖα συλλαβή, δεῖ προωμολογήσθαι ὅτι ἐλάχιστος καὶ βραχὺς ἔστι χρόνος, ἐν ᾧ ὑφίσταται. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ἐλάχιστος χρόνος· πᾶς γὰρ εἰς ἄπειρον τέμνεται, ὡς ἐν τοῖς ὑστερον δείξομεν· εἰ δὲ εἰς ἄπειρον τέμνεται, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐλάχιστος. οὐκ ἄρα ἔσται βραχεῖα συλλαβὴ βραχὺν ἔχουσα χρόνον. εἰ δὲ λέγοιεν νῦν βραχεῖαν καλεῖν καὶ ἐλαχίστην συλλαβὴν οὐ τὴν πρὸς φύσιν ἐλαχίστην οὐσαν ἀλλὰ τὴν πρὸς αἴσθησιν, ἑαυτοῖς
125 προσαύξουσι τὴν ἀπορίαν. τὰς γὰρ λεγομένας παρ' αὐτοῖς βραχεῖας συλλαβὰς εὐρήσομεν ὡς πρὸς αἴσθησιν μεριστάς, ὅλον τὴν ἐρ. αἰσθητῶς γὰρ ἐπιβάλλομεν ἐπ' αὐτῆς ὅτι προεκφωνεῖται τῆς τοῦ ρ δυνάμεως ἢ τοῦ ε δύναμις. καὶ ἐναλλάξαντες εἰ λέγομεν ρε, πάλιν ἀντιληψόμεθα ὅτι πρώτη μὲν ἔστι κατὰ τὴν τάξιν ἢ τοῦ ρ δύναμις, δευτέρα
126 δὲ ἢ τοῦ ε. ἐπεὶ οὖν πᾶν ὃ πρῶτον καὶ δευτέρον μέρος ἔχει πρὸς αἴσθησιν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐλάχιστον πρὸς αἴσθησιν, φαίνεται δὲ ἢ κατὰ τοὺς γραμματικούς βραχεῖα συλλαβὴ πρῶτον καὶ δευτέρον ἔχουσα, οὐκ ἂν εἴη πρὸς αἴσθησιν ἐλαχίστη¹ καὶ βραχεῖα συλλαβή. μουσικοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἴσως ἀλόγους τινὰς χρόνους καὶ φωνῶν παραυξήσεις δινησονται ἀπολιπεῖν· τοῖς δὲ μὴ χωροῦσι τὸ τοιοῦτον βάθος [γραμματικοῖς] τῆς ἀπειρίας,² ἀλλ' αὐτὸ μόνον

¹ ἐλαχίστη cj. Bekk. : ἐλάχιστος mss., Bekk.

² ἀπειρίας Fabr. : ἀπορίας Bekk.

either ; for just as when the elements are destroyed the syllables, too, are destroyed with them, so also, if the syllables are non-existent, neither the words will exist nor the parts of speech in general, nor, consequently, speech itself.

In order that a short syllable may exist, it must ¹²⁴ be settled beforehand that there is a minimal and a short time wherein it exists : but there is not a minimal time, for every period of time is divided to infinity,^a as we shall prove later on ; and if it is divided to infinity it is not minimal. Hence, there will not exist a short syllable occupying a short time.— And if they should now say that what they are calling a short and minimal syllable is not that which is minimal by nature but that which is minimal for sense, they will be adding to their difficulty. For we ¹²⁵ shall find that what are termed by them short syllables are divisible for sense,—for example the syllable ἐρ. For in its case we perceive by sense that the sound ε is uttered before the sound ρ. And conversely, if we were to say ρε, we shall again perceive that the sound ρ comes first in order and the sound ε second. Since, then, everything which has ¹²⁶ for sense a first part and a second is not a minimal for sense, and since the short syllable of the Grammarians evidently has a first part and a second, there will not exist for sense a minimal and short syllable. Musicians perhaps will be able to leave us certain irrational times and extensions of tones ; but to those who have no room for such a depth of infinitude, but

^a Cf. Adv. Mus. 62.

εἰς βραχεῖαν καὶ μακρὰν διαιρουμένοις τὴν γενικὴν συλλαβὴν, οὐκ ἔστι συγγνωμονεῖν δίκαιον. οὐκοῦν ἀνυπόστατός ἐστιν ἡ βραχεῖα συλλαβή.

- 127 Καὶ μὴν ἡ μακρὰ πάλιν ἔσται ἀνύπαρκτος· δίχρονον μὲν γὰρ αὐτὴν εἶναι λέγουσι, δύο δὲ χρόνοι οὐ συνυπάρχουσιν ἀλλήλοις. εἰ γὰρ δύο εἰσὶ, τούτῳ διορίζονται ὅτι εἰσὶ δύο, τῷ τὸν μὲν ἐνεστήκεναι τὸν δὲ μὴ· εἰ δὲ ὅς μὲν ἐνέστηκεν ὅς δὲ οὐκ ἐνέστηκεν, οὐ συνυπάρχουσιν ἀλλήλοις.
- 128 διόπερ καὶ ἡ μακρὰ συλλαβὴ εἶπερ ἐστὶ δίχρονος, ὀφείλει, ὅτε μὲν αὐτῆς ἐνέστηκεν ὁ πρῶτος χρόνος, τότε ὁ δεῦτερος μὴ ἐνεστήκεναι, καὶ ὅτε ὁ δεῦτερος ἐνίσταται, τότε ὁ πρῶτος μηκέτι εἶναι. ἀσυνυπάρκτων δὲ αὐτῆς ὄντων τῶν μερῶν ὅλη μὲν οὐχ ὑφέστηκε, μέρος δὲ τι αὐτῆς. ἀλλὰ τό γε μέρος αὐτῆς οὐκ ἦν αὐτή, ἐπεὶ οὐ διοίσει τῆς βραχεῖας
- 129 ἡ μακρὰ συλλαβή. οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ μακρὰ τις ἔστι συλλαβή. εἰ δὲ λέγοιεν κατὰ συμμημόνευσιν νοεῖσθαι μακρὰν συλλαβὴν (τοῦ γὰρ προλεχθέντος φθόγγου μνημονεύοντες καὶ τοῦ νῦν λεγομένου ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων συντιθέμενον μακρὰν ἐνενοήσαμεν συλλαβὴν)—εἰ δὴ τοῦτο λέγουσι, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ἀνυπόστατον ὁμολογήσουσιν
- 130 εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην συλλαβὴν. εἰ γὰρ ὑφέστηκεν, ἦτοι ἐν τῷ προαναφωνουμένῳ φθόγγῳ ὑφέστηκεν ἢ ἐν τῷ ἐπαναφωνουμένῳ. οὔτε δὲ ἐν τῷ προαναφωνουμένῳ οὔτε ἐν τῷ ἐπαναφωνουμένῳ· ἐκάτερος γὰρ αὐτῶν κατ' ἰδίαν μὴ ὑφέστως οὐδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν συλλαβὴ ἔστιν· ὥστε οὐδὲ ὑφέστηκεν. ὑφέστῳσα¹ δὲ βραχεῖα ἐστὶν ἀλλ' οὐ μακρὰ συλλαβή. οὔτε

¹ ὑφέστῳσα cj. Bekk. : ὑφέστως mss., Bekk.

merely divide the class of syllables into short and long, it is not right to extend pardon. Wherefore the short syllable is non-existent.

Moreover, the long syllable, too, will be non-existent; for they say that it is "dichronous" (or two-timed), but two times do not co-exist with each other. For if they are two, they are distinguished as being two by the fact that the one is in present existence, the other not; but if one is present and the other is not present, they do not co-exist with each other. Consequently, if the long syllable is "dichronous," it must follow that when its first time is present, then its second is not present, and when the second becomes present, then the first no longer exists. And as its parts are not co-existent the whole syllable does not exist but only a part of it; but the part of it is not itself, since otherwise the long syllable will not differ from the short. Therefore no long syllable exists. And if they should say that the long syllable is perceived through "joint memory" (that is to say, that it is by remembering the sound already uttered and sensing that which is now being uttered that we have perceived the combination of both as a long syllable),—if they should say this, they will simply be confessing that a syllable such as this is non-existent. For if it exists, it exists either in the sound pronounced first or in that pronounced later; but it does not exist either in the sound pronounced first or in that pronounced later; for as neither of these exists by itself, it is not a syllable at all; so that the long syllable does not exist. But if it exists, it is a short, and not a long, syllable. Nor, again, does it

^a Or "concurrent recollection," a Stoic term, cf. P.H. iii. 108.

δὲ ἐν ἀμφοτέροις· ὁ γὰρ ἕτερος αὐτῶν τοῦ ἑτέρου ὑφεστῶτος οὐχ ὑφέστηκεν, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἐπινοῆσαι συγκείμενον ὡς ἐκ μερῶν. οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τις μακρὰ συλλαβή.

- 131 Ἀνάλογον δὲ τούτοις ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ περὶ λέξεως καὶ τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν ἀπορεῖσθαι οφείλοντα. πρῶτον μὲν γάρ, ὡς μικρῶ πρότερον ὑπεδείκνυμεν, μὴ οὐσης συλλαβῆς μηδὲ λέξιν εἶναι δυνατόν· ἐκ συλλαβῶν γὰρ αἱ λέξεις λαμβάνουσι τὴν ὑπόστασιν. εἶτα καὶ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐφοδὸν ἐξέσται προηγουμένως ἐπ' αὐτῆς τῆς λέξεως τὰς αὐτὰς χειρίζειν ἀπορίας. ἢ γὰρ συλλαβὴ ἐστὶν ἢ ἐκ συλλαβῶν συνέστηκεν· ὅπως δ' ἂν ἔχη, τὰς ἐκκειμένας ἡμῖν
- 132 ἐπὶ τῆς συλλαβῆς ἀπορίας ἐπιδέξεται. ἀλλ' ὁμως ἵνα μὴ καινοτέρων ἐλέγχων ἀπορεῖν δοκῶμεν, προσφωνητέον τι κἀνταῦθα τοῖς γραμματικοῖς.

Ὅταν γὰρ μέρη τινὰ λόγου καλῶσιν, οἷον ὄνομα ῥῆμα ἄρθρον καὶ τὰ λοιπά, πόθεν λαβόντες; ἤτοι γὰρ ταῦτα ὅλον¹ τὸν λόγον καλοῦσιν, ἢ ταῦτα μέρη ἐκείνου, μήτε δ' ἐκείνου ὡς ὅλου νοεῖσθαι δυνατόν μήτε τούτων ὡς μερῶν ἐκείνου. λαμβανέσθω δὲ τὰ εἰς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν παραδείγματα, ὡς μὴ ἀπίωμεν² τῶν τῆς γραμματικῆς θεωρημάτων.

133 ἔστω τοίνυν ὑποθέσεως χάριν λόγος μὲν ὁ σύμψας οὗτος ὁ στίχος,

μῆνιν ἄειδε θεὰ Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος,

μέρη δὲ αὐτοῦ ταῦτα, τό τε μῆνιν προσηγορία

¹ ὅλον cj. Bekk.: ὅλα mss., Bekk.

² ἀπίωμεν scripsi: ἀπίωμεν mss., Bekk. (ἀποστῶμεν cj. Bekk.).

* Cf. § 123.

exist in both the sounds; for when the one of them exists the other does not exist, and from an existent and a non-existent it is impossible to conceive anything compounded as though from parts. Hence no long syllable exists.

Analogous to these are the difficulties which ought 131 to be raised regarding the "word" and the "parts of speech." For in the first place, as we showed a short while ago,^a if the syllable does not exist, the "word" cannot exist either; for words derive their substance from syllables. And next, in the same line of attack, it will be possible to employ the same objections directly against the "word" itself. For either it is a syllable or it is composed of syllables; but in either case it will be open to the objections we set forth against the syllable. All the same, lest we 132 should appear to be at a loss for fresh arguments, we must have something to say on this point also to the Grammarians.

When they term certain things "parts of speech,"—such as the name (or noun), the verb, the article, and the rest,—whence do they derive the designation? For they designate them thus either as being the whole of speech or as being parts of it, when neither can speech be conceived as a whole nor these as its parts. Let us take examples which bear on 133 their assumption, so that we may not depart from the theorems of Grammar. Let us suppose, then, that the whole of this verse is a "speech" (or sentence)—μῆνιν ἄειδε θεὰ Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος

(Sing, O goddess, the wrath of the son of Peleus, Achilles),^b

and that its parts are these,—μῆνιν, which is a noun,

^b This is the first verse of the *Iliad*: cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 350.

καθεστώς, καὶ τὸ ἄειδε ῥῆμα προστακτικόν, καὶ τὸ θεά προσηγορία πάλιν θηλυκή, καὶ τὸ Πηληιάδew ὄνομα πατρωνυμικόν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὸ ἄχιλῆος ὄνομα κύριον. οὐκοῦν ἤτοι ἄλλο τί ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος παρὰ τὰ μέρη αὐτοῦ καὶ ἄλλα τὰ μέρη παρὰ τὸν λόγον, ἢ τὸ ἄθροισμα τῶν μερῶν ὁ λόγος ὑπέληπται. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἄλλο τι τῶν μερῶν ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος, αἰρομένων δηλονότι τῶν ἐκκειμένων τοῦ λόγου μερῶν ὑπολειφθήσεται ὁ λόγος. τοσοῦτον δὲ ἀπέχει ὁ προειρημένος στίχος τοῦ μένει πάντων αἰρομένων αὐτοῦ τῶν μερῶν, ὡς κἂν ἐν ὀδηποτοῦν αὐτοῦ μέρος ἀνέλωμεν, οἶον τὸ μῆνιν ἢ τὸ ἄειδε, 134
 134 μῆκετι στίχος ὑπάρχειν. εἰ δὲ τὸ ἄθροισμα τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν νοεῖται λόγος, τῷ μηδὲν εἶναι τὸν ἄθροισμὸν παρὰ τὰ ἠθροισμένα καθάπερ καὶ τὸ διάστημα παρὰ τὰ διεστηκότα, οὐδὲν ὑπάρξει ὁ λόγος οὐ νοηθήσεται τινα μέρη. μηδενὸς δὲ ὄντος ὅλου λόγου οὐδὲ μέρη τινα τούτου γενήσεται. ὡσπερ οὖν εἰ μηδὲν ἐστὶν ἀριστερόν, οὐδὲ δεξιὸν ἐστὶν, οὕτως εἰ μὴ ἐστὶ τι ὅλον λόγος, οὐδὲ τὰ 135
 136 μέρη ὑπάρξει. καθόλου τε, εἰ τὸν ἄθροισμὸν τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν ὅλον ἠγήσονται λόγον, ἀκολουθήσει αὐτοῖς τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου ἀλλήλων λέγειν εἶναι μέρη. εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν ὑπόκειται ὅλον παρ' αὐτὰ οὐ γενήσεται μέρη, ἀλλήλων ἔσται μέρη.
 137 τοῦτο δὲ ὡς ἔστιν ἀλογώτατον, σκοπῶμεν. τὰ γὰρ μέρη πάντως ἐμπεριέχεται ἐκείνοις τοῖς ὄλοις¹ ὧν λέγεται μέρη, ἴδιον τόπον ἐπέχοντα καὶ ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν ἔχοντα, ἐν ἀλλήλοις δὲ οὐκ ἐμπεριέχεται. οἶον ἀνθρώπου μὲν μέρη χεῖρες

¹ (ὄλοις) addidi.

and ἄειδε an imperative verb, and θεά also a noun and feminine, and Πηληιάδew a patronymic noun, and besides these ἄχιλῆος a proper noun. Then either 134 the sentence is something else than its parts and the parts something else than the sentence, or the aggregate of the parts is assumed to be the sentence. And if the sentence is something else than its parts, then it is plain that when the expressed parts of the sentence are removed the sentence will be left. But the verse we have given above is so far from remaining when all its parts are removed that, if we should remove even any one single part, such as μῆνιν or ἄειδε, the verse ceases to exist. But if the aggre- 135 gate of the parts of the sentence is conceived to be a sentence, then because the aggregation is nothing apart from the parts aggregated, just as distance is nothing apart from the objects which are distant, the sentence of which any parts shall be conceived will not be anything. And when the whole sentence is nothing, neither will any parts of it exist. Thus, just as, if there is no left-hand, neither is there a right-hand, so too if a sentence does not exist as a whole, neither will its parts exist.—If, then, they shall regard 136 the aggregation of the parts of the sentence as the whole sentence, the general consequence will be that they will have to say that the parts of the sentence are parts of one another. For if no whole subsists other than themselves whereof they may be parts, they will be parts of one another. But let us consider how extremely irrational this is. For the parts are 137 certainly included in the wholes of which they are said to be parts, each occupying its own place and having its own reality, but they are not included in one another. For example, the hands are parts of the

καθεστᾶσι, χειρῶν δὲ δάκτυλοι καὶ δακτύλων ὄνυχες. διόπερ ἐν μὲν ἀνθρώπῳ χεῖρες περιέχονται, ἐν χερσὶ δὲ δάκτυλοι, ἐν δακτύλοις δὲ ὄνυχες, καὶ οὐχ ἡ μὲν δεξιὰ χεὶρ τὴν ἀριστερὰν συμπληροῖ, ὁ δὲ λιχανὸς τὸν ἀντίχειρα δάκτυλον ἀπαρτίζει, ἡ δὲ κεφαλὴ τοὺς πόδας συντίθησι καὶ οἱ πόδες 138 τὸν θώρακα. ὅθεν καὶ τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου οὐ ῥητέον ἀλλήλων εἶναι μέρη, ἐπεὶ ἐν ἀλλήλοις αὐτὰ δεήσει περιέχεσθαι, τὸ μὲν μῆνιν ἐν τῷ ἄειδε, τὸ δὲ ἄειδε ἐν τῷ θεά, καὶ καθόλου πάντα ἐν πάσιν, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον. οὐ τοίνυν ἀλλήλων τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν δυναμένων εἶναι μερῶν διὰ τὸ ἀνόητον τοῦ πράγματος, οὔτε ὅλου τινὸς εὕρισκομένου λόγου παρὰ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ μέρη, μηδενὸς τε εὕρισκομένου πράγματος παρ' αὐτὰ τὰ μέρη οὐ λέξομεν εἶναι τὰ μέρη, λείπεται λέγειν ὡς οὐδὲν ἔστι μέρος λόγου. διὰ δὲ τοῦτ' οὐδὲ λόγος.

139 Ἐπακτέον δὲ καὶ οὕτως. εἶπερ τὸ μῆνιν μέρος ἐστὶ τοῦ στίχου, ἤτοι ὅλου τοῦ στίχου μέρος ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ "ἄειδε θεὰ Πηληιάδω Ἀχιλῆος." ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν τοῦ ὅλου στίχου μέρος ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ ὅλος σὺν αὐτῷ τῷ μῆνιν νοεῖται, καὶ ἑαυτοῦ μέρος συμπληρωτικὸν γενήσεται τὸ μῆνιν, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ μείζον ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἥττον, μείζον μὲν ἑαυτοῦ ἢ συμπληροῦται ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ (τὸ γὰρ ὑπὸ τινος συμπληρούμενον μείζον ἐστὶ τοῦ συμπληροῦντος αὐτό), ἔλασσον δὲ ἢ συμπληροῖ ἑαυτό· τὸ γὰρ τινος συμπληρωτικὸν ἔλασσόν ἐστι τοῦ συμπληρουμένου. οὐ πάνυ δὲ ταῦτα πιθανά· οὐκ ἄρα τοῦ 140 ὅλου στίχου μέρος ἐστὶ τὸ μῆνιν. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῦ λειπομένου, φημὶ δὲ τοῦ "ἄειδε θεὰ Πηληιάδω Ἀχιλῆος." πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ τὸ μέρος

man, the fingers of the hand, and the nails of the fingers. Hence the hands are included in the man, the fingers in the hand, and the nails in the fingers; but the right hand does not help to fill up the left, nor does the forefinger complete the thumb, nor the head compose the feet, nor the feet the chest. Hence also 138 we must not say that the parts of the sentence are parts of one another, for if so they will have to be included in one another,—μῆνιν in ἄειδε, ἄειδε in θεά, and in short all in all,—which is impossible. Since, then, the parts of the sentence cannot be parts of one another, because the thing is inconceivable, and since no whole sentence is found other than its own parts, and nothing is found other than the parts themselves whereof we can say that they are the parts, it remains to say that no part of the sentence exists. Consequently, neither does the sentence exist.

We may also make the following attack. If μῆνιν 139 is a part of the verse, it is either a part of the whole verse or of ἄειδε θεὰ Πηληιάδω Ἀχιλῆος. But if it is a part of the whole verse, then, since it is with the inclusion of μῆνιν itself that the verse is conceived as a whole, μῆνιν will come to be a supplementary part of itself, and therefore both greater and less than itself; it will be greater than itself inasmuch as it is supplemented by itself (for that which is supplemented by anything is greater than the thing which supplements it), and it will be less inasmuch as it supplements itself (for that which supplements anything is less than the thing supplemented). But these results are by no means credible; therefore μῆνιν is not a part of the whole verse. Nor, in fact, is it a part of the re- 140 mainder of the verse,—I mean of ἄειδε θεὰ Πηληιάδω Ἀχιλῆος. For, firstly, the part is included in that

περιέχεται ἐν τῷ οὐ ἔστι μέρος, τὸ δὲ μῆνιν οὐκ ἐμπεριέχεται ἐν τῷ "ἄειδε θεὰ Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος," ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη μέρος τούτου. εἶτα δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ "ἄειδε θεὰ Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος" χρήζει συμπληρώσεως· κατὰ γὰρ τὸν ἴδιον λόγον συμπληθῆρωται. ἀλλὰ ὅλος ὁ λόγος, λέγω δὲ ὁ στίχος, οὐκ ἔστι τὸ "ἄειδε θεὰ Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος." τοίνυν οὐδὲ τούτου μέρος ἔστι τὸ μῆνιν. ἀλλ' εἰ μήτε τοῦ ὅλου στίχου μέρος ἔστι τὸ μῆνιν μήτε τοῦ ἀπολειπομένου μέρους, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἄλλο ὑπόκειται, οὐδενὸς λόγου μέρος ἔστι τὸ μῆνιν.

141 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν καθολικώτερον πρὸς τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου ρητέον· ἐμβάντες δὲ εἰς τὰς κατὰ μέρος παρ' αὐτοῖς περὶ τούτων τεχνολογίας πολὺν λήρον εὐρήσομεν. καὶ τοῦτο πάρεστι μαθεῖν οὐκ ἐπὶ τὴν πᾶσαν ὕλην φοιτήσαντας (ἀδόλεσχον γὰρ ἔστι καὶ γραμματικῆς γρασιολογίας πλήρες), ἀλλ' ὁμοίον τι τοῖς οἰνοκαπήλοις ποιήσαντας,¹ καὶ ὃν τρόπον ἐκεῖνοι ἐξ ὀλίγου γεύματος τὸν ὅλον δοκιμάζουσι φόρτον, οὕτω καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν λόγῳ μέρος προχειρισάμενοι, καθάπερ τὸ ὄνομα, ἐκ τῆς περὶ τούτου τεχνολογίας συνοψόμεθα καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τῶν γραμματικῶν ἐντρέχειαν.

Ζ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΟΝΟΜΑΤΟΣ

142 Αὐτίκα τοίνυν ὅταν τῶν ὀνομάτων τὰ μὲν ἀρσενικὰ φύσει λέγωσι τὰ δὲ θηλυκὰ τὰ δὲ οὐδέτερα, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐνικὰ τῷ ἀριθμῷ τὰ δὲ δυϊκὰ τὰ δὲ πληθυντικά, καὶ ἤδη τὰς ἄλλας ἐπισυνείρωσι

whereof it is a part, but μῆνιν is not included in ἄειδε θεὰ Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος, so that it will not be a part thereof. And next, the phrase ἄειδε θεὰ Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος does not need supplementing; for it is a complete sentence in itself. But the whole sentence, —I mean the verse,—is not ἄειδε θεὰ Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος. Thus μῆνιν is not a part of this (remainder) either. But if μῆνιν is a part neither of the whole verse nor of its remaining part, and nothing else besides these exists, then μῆνιν is not a part of any sentence.

These are the objections to be stated against the 141 parts of speech (or of the sentence) in general; and when we go on to their particular technical theories regarding them we shall find much idle talk. This we may learn not by roving over the whole field (for it is empty verbiage and full of the old wives' prattle of the Grammarians), but rather by doing much as the wine-merchants do; for just as they judge of the whole cargo from a little taste, so too we, when we have first dealt with a single part of speech, such as the noun, will gain, from their "technology" concerning this, a general view of the skill of the Grammarians in treating of the other parts.

CHAPTER VII.—CONCERNING THE NOUN

When, for instance, they say that some nouns are 142 "naturally" masculine, some feminine and some neuter, and some singular in number, some dual and some plural, and link on to these all their other

¹ ποιήσαντας Fabr.: ποιήσαντες mss., Bekk.

143 διαιρέσεις, ἐπιζητήσωμεν τί ποτε ἔστι τὸ ἐπι-
 φωνούμενον τοῦτο φύσει. ἢ γὰρ ὅτι οἱ πρῶτοι
 ἀναφθεγξάμενοι τὰ ὀνόματα φυσικὴν ἐποίησαντο
 τὴν ἀναφώνησιν αὐτῶν ὡς καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀλγείν
 κραυγὴν καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ τῷ ἠδεσθαι ἢ τῷ θαυμάζειν
 ἐκβόησιν, οὕτω λέγουσι φύσει τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα εἶναι
 τῶν ὀνομάτων τὰ δὲ τοιάδε· ἢ ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ
 παρόντος ἕκαστον αὐτῶν φυσικῶς ἡμᾶς κινεῖ ὅτι
 ἀρρενικόν, κἂν ἡμεῖς μὴ νομίζωμεν αὐτὸ ἀρρενικόν
 εἶναι, καὶ πάλιν φυσικῶς αὐτὸ ἐνδείκνυται ὅτι
 144 θηλυκόν ἐστι, κἂν ἡμεῖς μὴ θέλωμεν. ἀλλὰ τὸ
 μὲν πρῶτον οὐκ ἂν εἴπωμεν. πόθεν γὰρ γραμ-
 ματικῇ παχύτητι διαγωνίσκειν πότερον φύσει ἢ
 θέσει τὰ ὀνόματα, ἢ τινὰ μὲν οὕτως τινὰ δὲ ἐκείνως;
 ὅτε οὐδὲ τοῖς ἐπ' ἄκρον ἤκουσι φυσιολογίας εὐ-
 145 μαρὲς εἰπεῖν διὰ τὰς ἐκατέρωθεν ἰσολογίας. ἄλλως
 τε καὶ ἰσχυρὸς ἀντικάθηται τούτῳ λόγος, πρὸς
 ὃν οὐδ' εἰ καταπέλτην ὑπομένοινεν, φασίν, οἱ γραμ-
 ματικοὶ δυνήσονται τι συνιδεῖν ἰκνούμενον. εἴπερ
 γὰρ φύσει τὰ ὀνόματα ἦν καὶ μὴ τῇ καθ' ἕκαστον
 θέσει σημαίνει, ἐχρῆν πάντας πάντων ἀκούειν,
 Ἑλλήνας βαρβάρων καὶ βαρβάρους Ἑλλήνων καὶ
 βαρβάρους βαρβάρων. οὐχὶ δὲ γε τοῦτο· οὐκ ἄρα
 φύσει σημαίνει τὰ ὀνόματα. ὥστε τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ
 146 ἐροῦσιν· εἰ δ' ὅτι φυσικῶς διαδείκνυσιν ἕκαστον
 ὄνομα ὅτι ἀρρενικόν ἐστὶν ἢ θηλυκόν ἢ οὐδέτερον,
 φασὶ τὰ μὲν τοιάδε τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα τυγχάνειν,
 ἴστωσαν λειότερον αὐτοῖς τρίβοντες τὸν κλοιόν.
 147 πάλιν γὰρ φήσομεν ὅτι τὸ φύσει κινοῦν ἡμᾶς

• Cf. P.H. ii. 214, iii. 267.

distinctions, let us inquire what exactly is meant by
 the designation "naturally." Either it means that 143
 those who first gave utterance to the nouns produced
 their "natural" sound; and just as crying is natural
 in pain and shouting in joy or in admiration, so some
 nouns, they say, are "naturally" of this sort and
 others of that sort. Or else it means that at the
 present moment each of them naturally affects us as
 being masculine, even if we do not consider that it
 is masculine, or again naturally indicates that it is
 feminine, even if we are not willing. But they will 144
 not declare for the first alternative; for how could the
 Grammarians' stupidity decide whether names are
 due to nature or to convention, or some to the one
 and some to the other, when even for those who have
 attained the summit of natural science it is no easy
 matter to settle because of the equipollence of the
 arguments on either side? Moreover, this view is 145
 confronted by a strong argument to which the Gram-
 marians—even if they could (as men say) stand up
 against a bolt from a cross-bow—will be unable to
 discover any fitting reply. If nouns exist "by
 nature" and are not significant in each instance by
 reason of convention, then all men ought to under-
 stand the speech of all, Greeks that of barbarians
 and barbarians that of Greeks and barbarians that of
 (other) barbarians.^a But this is not the case; there-
 fore nouns are not "naturally" significant. This, then,
 they will not assert.—But if it is because each noun 146
 "naturally" indicates that it is masculine or feminine
 or neuter that they assert that some are of this sort
 and others of that sort, let them know that they are
 rubbing their collar smoother. For we shall tell them 147
 again that what affects us "naturally" affects all men

ὁμοίως πάντας κινεῖ, καὶ οὐχ οὓς μὲν οὕτως οὓς δὲ ἐναντίως. οἶον φύσει τὸ πῦρ ἀλεαίνει, βαρβάρους Ἑλληνας, ἰδιώτας ἐμπείρους, καὶ οὐχ Ἑλληνας μὲν ἀλεαίνει βαρβάρους δὲ ψύχει· καὶ ἡ χιών φύσει ψύχει, καὶ οὐ τινὰς μὲν ψύχει τινὰς δὲ θερμαίνει. ὥστε τὸ φύσει κινεῖν ὁμοίως τοὺς ἀπαραποδίστους

148 ἔχοντας τὰς αἰσθήσεις κινεῖ. τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ ὀνόματα οὐ πᾶσιν ἔστι τὰ αὐτά, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν ἄρρηνικὰ τοῖς δὲ θηλυκὰ τοῖς δὲ οὐδέτερα. οἶον Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν τὴν στάμνον λέγουσι θηλυκῶς, Πελοποννήσιοι δὲ τὸν στάμνον ἄρρηνικῶς, καὶ οἱ μὲν τὴν θόλον οἱ δὲ τὸν θόλον, καὶ οἱ μὲν τὴν βῶλον οἱ δὲ τὸν

149 βῶλον. καὶ οὐ διὰ τοῦτο οὗτοι ἢ ἐκεῖνοι λέγονται ἁμαρτάνειν· ἕκαστος γάρ, ὡς τεθεμάτικεν, οὕτω χρῆται. καὶ οἱ αὐτοὶ δὲ διαφόρως ταῦτα ὅτε μὲν ἄρρηνικῶς ἐκφέρουσιν ὅτε δὲ θηλυκῶς, λέγοντες τὸν λιμόν καὶ τὴν λιμόν. οὐκ ἄρα φύσει τῶν ὀνομάτων τὰ μὲν ἄρρηνικὰ τὰ δὲ θηλυκὰ, ἀλλὰ

150 τοιαῦτα. καὶ μὴν εἴπερ φύσει τῶν ὀνομάτων τὰ μὲν ἦν ἄρρηνικὰ τὰ δὲ θηλυκὰ, ὥφειλον αἱ ἄρρηνικαὶ φύσεις αἰεὶ ποτε ἄρρηνικοῖς ὀνόμασι προσ-
αγορευέσθαι καὶ αἱ θηλυκαὶ θηλυκοῖς καὶ μήτε αἱ ἄρρηνικαὶ φύσεις μήτε αἱ θηλυκαὶ οὐδετέρως.

151 οὐχὶ δὲ τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ἄρρηνικὰς φύσεις θηλυκῶς καλοῦμεν καὶ τὰς θηλυκὰς ἄρρηνικῶς καὶ τὰς οὔτε ἄρρηνικὰς οὔτε θηλυκὰς ἦτοι ἄρρηνικῶς ἢ θηλυκῶς, οὐχὶ δὲ οὐδετέρως. οἶον κόραξ

alike, and not some in one way and others in an opposite way.^a Fire, for instance, "naturally" warms barbarians and Greeks, unskilled and skilled, and does not warm Greeks but chill barbarians; and snow "naturally" chills, and does not chill some but heat others. Thus, that which affects us "naturally" affects in a similar way those who have their senses unimpaired. But the same nouns are not the same 148 for all, but are masculine for some, feminine for others, and for others neuter. The Athenians, for example, speak of ἡ στάμνος ("the jar") in the feminine,^b but the Peloponnesians of ὁ στάμνος in the masculine, and some of ἡ θόλος ("the rotunda"), others of ὁ θόλος, and some of ἡ βῶλος ("the lump"), others of ὁ βῶλος; and neither the 149 one set nor the other is said to be wrong because of this; for each treats the word as laid down by custom. And even the same people utter the same nouns differently, at one time as masculine, at another as feminine, saying both ὁ λιμός ("the hunger") and ἡ λιμός. So it is not "by nature" that some nouns are masculine, others feminine, but it is by conventional usage that some are of one sort and some of the other. Moreover, if some nouns had 150 been masculine and others feminine by nature, male objects ought to have been called always by masculine names and female by feminine names, and objects neither male nor female by neuters. This, however, 151 is not so, but we call male objects by feminine names, and female by masculine, and objects which are neither male nor female by names which are either masculine or feminine, and not by neuters. Thus, even in the case of the female, the masculine name is

^a Cf. P.H. iii. 179.^b Cf. § 187, *infra*.

μὲν λέγεται ἀετός κώνωψ κάνθαρος σκορπίος μῦς
 ἀρρενικῶς καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ θήλεος, καὶ πάλιν χελιδῶν
 χελώνη κορώνη ἀκρίς μυγαλῆ ἐμπίς καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ
 152 ἀρρενος τὴν φύσιν θηλυκῶς. ὡσαύτως δὲ κλίνη
 θηλυκῶς ἐπὶ τῆς μήτε ἀρρενος μήτε θηλείας τὴν
 φύσιν, καὶ στῦλος ἀρρενικῶς ἐπὶ τοῦ οὐδετέρου.
 τοίνυν εἰ φύσει οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἀρρενικὸν ἢ θηλυκὸν
 ὄνομα, ζητῶ πῶς ὁ γραμματικὸς ἐπιλήψεται τοῦ
 διαστρόφως λέγοντος ὁ χελιδῶν καὶ ἡ ἀετός.
 ἦτοι γὰρ ὡς φύσει τοῦ ὀνόματος τῆς χελιδόνος
 θηλυκοῦ ὄντος, ἐκείνου δὲ ἀρρενικὸν αὐτὸ τῷ
 ἄρθρῳ βιαζομένου γενέσθαι, ἢ ὡς τῆς κοινῆς
 συνηθείας θηλυκὸν αὐτὸ θεματισίας ἀλλ' οὐκ
 153 ἀρρενικόν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ὡς φύσει θηλυκοῦ καθ-
 εστῶτος, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν φύσει θηλυκὸν ἔστι καθὼς
 παρεστήσαμεν, ἀδιάφορον τὸ ὅσον ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἕαν
 τε οὕτως ἕαν τε ἐκείνως ἐκφέρηται· εἰ δ' ὡς ὑπὸ
 τῆς κοινῆς συνηθείας ἀντὶ θηλυκοῦ θεματισθέν,
 γενήσεται τοῦ τε εἰς λεγομένου καὶ μὴ κριτήριον
 οὐχὶ τεχνικὸς τις καὶ γραμματικὸς λόγος ἀλλ' ἢ
 ἀτεχνος καὶ ἀφελὴς τῆς συνηθείας παρατήρησις.

154 Τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ ταῦτα μετακτέον καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἐνικά
 καὶ πληθυντικὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων. Ἀθήναι γὰρ λέ-
 γονται πληθυντικῶς ἢ μία πόλις καὶ Πλαταιαί,
 καὶ πάλιν Θήβη ἐνικῶς καὶ Θήβαι πληθυντικῶς,
 καὶ Μυκῆνη καὶ Μυκῆναι. ρηθήσεται δὲ ἐπι-
 μελέστερον περὶ τῆς ἐν τούτοις ἀνωμαλίας προ-
 βαίνουσας τῆς ζητήσεως.

Τὰ νῦν δὲ ἐπεὶ καὶ ὑποδειγματικῶς καταπτεύ-

* Cf. §§ 195 ff.

given to κόραξ ("raven"), ἀετός ("eagle"), κώνωψ
 ("gnat"), κάνθαρος ("beetle"), σκορπίος ("scorpion"),
 μῦς ("mouse"), and conversely the feminine, even
 when they are of the male sex, to χελιδῶν ("swal-
 low"), χελώνη ("tortoise"), κορώνη ("crow"), ἀκρίς
 ("locust"), μυγαλῆ ("shrew-mouse"), ἐμπίς ("mos-
 quito"). So likewise κλίνη ("couch") is feminine, 152
 though the object itself is neither of the male nor of
 the female sex, and στῦλος ("pillar") is masculine,
 though applied to what is neuter. If, then, no noun
 is masculine or feminine by nature, I ask how the
 Grammarian will censure the man who perversely
 says ὁ χελιδῶν and ἡ ἀετός. Either (he will do so) on
 the ground that the noun χελιδῶν is feminine by
 nature, whereas the man forces it to become mascu-
 line by means of the article, or else on the ground
 that common usage has ruled it to be feminine and
 not masculine. But if he takes the ground that it is 153
 feminine by nature, then, since none is feminine by
 nature, as we have established, it is, so far as this goes,
 a matter of indifference whether it is expressed in
 this way or in that. If, on the other hand, he assumes
 that the noun is ruled to be feminine by common
 usage, the criterion of correct and incorrect speech
 will not be any technical and grammatical theory but
 untechnical and simple adherence to actual usage.

We may use the same arguments against singular 154
 and plural names. Thus Ἀθήναι in the plural is the
 name given to one city, as is Πλαταιαί, and Θήβη
 conversely in the singular as well as Θήβαι in the
 plural, and both Μυκῆνη and Μυκῆναι. But with
 these anomalies we shall deal more carefully as our
 inquiry proceeds.^a

For the present, now that by means of examples

καμεν τὴν ἐν τούτοις τῶν γραμματικῶν ἀκρίβειαν, φέρε κάκεινο, πρὶν ἐπ' ἄλλον τρόπον ἀπελθεῖν, 155 ἐξετάσωμεν, φημί δὲ τίνα λόγον καλοῦσιν ἢ μέρη λόγου. ἦτοι γὰρ αὐτὴν τὴν σωματικὴν φωνὴν ἐροῦσιν ἢ ἀσώματον λεκτόν, διαφέρον ταύτης. οὔτε δὲ τὴν φωνὴν ἐροῦσιν ταύτης μὲν γὰρ ῥηθείσης πάντες ἀκούουσιν, Ἕλληνες τε καὶ βάρβαροι, καὶ ἰδιῶται καὶ οἱ παιδείας ἐντός, τοῦ δὲ λόγου καὶ τῶν τούτου μερῶν Ἕλληνες μόνοι καὶ οἱ τούτου ἔμπειροι. τοίνυν οὐχ ἡ φωνὴ ἐστιν 156 ὁ λόγος καὶ μέρη λόγου. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀσώματον λεκτόν. πῶς γὰρ ἀσώματον ἔτι ἐστι τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτο παρὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὸ κενόν, πολλῆς καὶ ἀνηγύτου γενομένης παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις περὶ αὐτοῦ διαμάχης; εἰ μὲν γὰρ κινεῖται, σῶμά ἐστιν· τὸ γὰρ κινούμενον σῶμα· εἰ δὲ μένει, δεχόμενον μὲν τὰ εἰς αὐτὸ φερόμενα σώματα καὶ μὴ ἀντιτυποῦν κενὸν γενήσεται, κενοῦ γὰρ ἴδιον τὸ μὴ ἀντιτυπεῖν, ἀντιτυποῦν δὲ τοῖς εἰς αὐτὸ φερομένοις σῶμά ἐστιν, ἰδίωμα γὰρ σώματος τὸ ἀντι- 157 τυπεῖν. ἄλλως τε ὁ λέγων ἀσώματόν τι λεκτόν ὑπάρχειν ἦτοι φάσει μόνον ἀκρούμενος λέγει ἢ ἀπόδειξιν παραλαμβάνων. ἀλλὰ φάσει μὲν ἀκρούμενος ἐν ἀντιφάσει ἐπισηθεῖσεται· ἀπόδειξιν δὲ παραλαμβάνων, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὴ δι' ἀναμφισβητήτων ὀφείλει λημμάτων προάγειν, τὰ δὲ λήμματα ἐστὶ λεκτὰ, προαρπάζων τὸ ζητούμενον ὡς ὁμολογού- 158 μενον ἀπιστος ἐσται. παρ' ἣν αἰτίαν λοιπόν, εἰ μήτε ἡ φωνὴ λόγος ἐστὶ μήτε τὸ σημαινόμενον

^a Cf. § 78.

^b The only two "reals" admitted by the Epicureans.

we have gained an insight into the precision of the Grammarians in regard to these matters, come and before we turn away to another subject let us investigate this point too,—I mean what, in their view, 155 is speech or the parts of speech. Either they will say that it is the corporeal sound of the voice, or that it is the incorporeal "lekton" (or meaning)^a which differs from the sound. But they will not say that it is the sound; for when this is uttered all men hear it, Greeks and barbarians, plain people and people of culture, but speech and the parts of speech are heard (and understood) only by the Greeks and those who are skilled therein. So, then, speech and the parts of 156 speech are not the sound.—Neither indeed are they the incorporeal "lekton." For how can there still exist any other incorporeal of the sort beside body and void,^b when there has been a great and endless dispute about it amongst the philosophers? For if it moves it is a body; for what moves is corporeal; and if it is stationary, it will be void if it admits the bodies which move into it without resistance (for not to resist is the property of void), but, if it resists the bodies moving into it, it is body, for resistance is the property of body.—Moreover, he who says that an incorporeal 157 "lekton" exists, in saying so relies only on assertion or else adduces a proof.^c But if he relies on assertion he will be rebutted by a counter-assertion; and if he adduces proof, then, since the proof itself must proceed by means of unquestioned premisses, and the premisses are "lekta," by begging of the question, as though it were settled, he will be discredited. And 158 for this reason, if neither the sound of the voice is speech, nor yet the incorporeal "lekton" signified by

^c Cf. § 188.

ὑπ' αὐτῆς ἀσώματον λεκτόν, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα νοεῖν οὐδὲν ἐνδέχεται, οὐδὲν ἐστὶ λόγος.

*Ἐστω δὲ νῦν καὶ ὁ λόγος καὶ μέρη τούτου ὅποσα θέλουσιν οἱ γραμματικοὶ ὑπάρχειν. ἀλλ' εἰπάτωσάν γε ἡμῖν πῶς τὸν λόγον μερίζουσιν.

H'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΜΕΡΙΣΜΟΥ

- 159 Ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸν μερισμὸν τὸν τῶν μέτρων ἐν δυοὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἀναγκαιοτάτοις κείσθαι συμβέβηκεν, ἔν τε τῷ βαίνειν, τούτεστι τῇ εἰς τοὺς πόδας διανομῇ, καὶ ἐν τῇ εἰς τὰ τοῦ λόγου μέρη διαιρέσει, ἀκόλουθον μὲν ἦν τοῖς τελέως πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀντιλέγουσιν ἐκάτερον κινεῖν, τὸν τε τρόπον τοῦ βαίνειν, σκελίσαντας αὐτῶν ἅπαντας τοὺς οἷς βαίνουνσι πόδας ὡς ἀνυπάρκτους, καὶ ἔτι τὸν τρόπον τῆς τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν διανομῆς, δείξαντας τὸ
160 ἀδύνατον τῆς διαιρέσεως. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ κἀν τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς μουσικοὺς προηγουμένως περὶ ποδῶν ζητούμεν, ἵνα μὴ προλαμβάνωμεν τὰ μελλήσοντα πρὸς ἐκείνους λέγεσθαι ἢ μὴ δις τὰ αὐτὰ λέγωμεν, ταύτην μὲν τὴν ἀπορίαν εἰς τὸν δέοντα καιρὸν ὑπερθησόμεθα, περὶ δὲ τῆς διαιρέσεως τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν σκεψόμεθα.
- 161 Ὁ οὖν μερίζων τινὰ στίχον τὰ μὲν ἀφαιρεῖ τὰ δὲ προστίθῃσι, καὶ ἀφαιρεῖ μὲν τὸ μῆνιν, εἰ τύχοι, χωρίζων τοῦ παντὸς στίχου, καὶ πάλιν τὸ ἄειδε καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ μέρη, προστίθῃσι δὲ τοῖς κατὰ συναλοιφήν ἐκφερομένοις, οἷον τῷ "αἷμ' ἐμέων" τὸ α, τὸ γὰρ πλήρες ἦν "αἷμα ἐμέων," καὶ πάλιν τῷ "βῆ δ' ἀκέων" τὸ ε, κατὰ γὰρ ἐκπλήρωσιν

the sound, and no alternative other than these can be conceived, nothing is speech.

But for the present let it be granted that both speech exists and as many parts of it as the Grammarians desire. Yet let them tell us how they divide speech into parts.

CHAPTER VIII.—CONCERNING DIVISION OF SPEECH INTO PARTS

Since it happens that the division of metres is 159 mainly into the two most necessary parts, namely, scansion,—that is, the division into feet,—and distinguishing the parts of the sentence, it follows that those who are completely refuting the Grammarians attack each of these,—both the method of scansion, by upsetting all the feet with which they scan as being non-existent, and also their method of distinguishing the parts of the sentence, by showing the impossibility of their distinctions. But seeing 160 that in our treatise *Against the Musicians* we are specially discussing "feet," in order to avoid forestalling what will then be said against them, or saying the same things twice, we shall postpone this difficulty to the proper time and consider now the question of the division of the parts of the sentence.

Now he who divides a verse subtracts some words 161 and adds others: he subtracts, let us say, *μῆνιν*, separating it from the whole verse, and likewise *ἄειδε* and the rest of the parts^a; but he adds to words uttered with elision,—*α*, for example, to *αἷμ' ἐμέων* ("vomiting blood"), for the full expression is *αἷμα ἐμέων*,^b and likewise *ε* to *βῆ δ' ἀκέων* ("he went

^a Cf. §§ 133 ff.

^b Cf. Hom. *Il.* xv. 11.

οὕτως εἶχε “βῆ δὲ ἀκέων.” μηδενὸς μέντοι μήτε ἀφαιρεῖσθαι δυναμένου ἀπὸ τινος μήτε προστίθεσθαι τινι πεφυκότος ἀδύνατος γίνεται ὁ κατὰ
 162 γραμματικὴν μερισμός. τὸ δὲ ὅτι οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς ἀφαιρεῖται μάθοιμεν ἂν τόνδε τὸν τρόπον. εἰ γὰρ ἀφαιρεῖται τι ἀπὸ τινος, ἢ ὅλον ἀφ’ ὅλου ἀφαιρεῖται ἢ μέρος ἀπὸ μέρους ἢ ὅλον ἀπὸ μέρους ἢ μέρος ἀπὸ ὅλου. ὅλον μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ ὅλου οὐκ ἀφαιρεῖται· ἐνὸς γὰρ ὑποκειμένου στίχου, εἰ ὅλον ἐστὶ τὸ ἀφαιρούμενον, ὅλον στίχον ἀφελοῦμεν. καὶ οὕτως εἰ μὲν ἔτι μένει ὁ στίχος ἀφ’ οὗ ἢ ἀφαιρέσεις, οὐδὲ ὅλως ἔσται γεγонуῖα τις ἀφαιρέσεις ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ· πῶς γὰρ ἔτι μένειν οἷον τέ ἐστὶ τὸ ὅλον, εἴπερ ἀφήρηται; εἰ δὲ μὴ μένει, δῆλον ὡς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος οὐκ ἐστὶ πάλιν γεγонуῖα ἀφαιρέσεις.
 163 ὥστε ὅλον ἀπὸ ὅλου οὐκ ἀφαιρεῖται. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ὅλον ἀπὸ μέρους· ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ μέρει οὐκ ἐμπεριέχεται τὸ ὅλον, οἷον τῷ μῆνιν τὸ “(μῆνιν)¹ ἄειδε θεὰ Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος,” τὸ δὲ ἀφαιρούμενον ὀφείλει ἐμπεριέχεσθαι τῷ τὴν ἀφαίρεσιν ἐπιδεχομένῳ. λείπεται ἄρα ἢ μέρος ἀφ’ ὅλου ἢ μέρος ἀπὸ μέρους ἀφαιρεῖσθαι. ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτ’ ἄπορον. τὸ γὰρ μῆνιν εἰ μὲν ἀφ’ ὅλου ἀφαιρεῖται τοῦ στίχου, καὶ ἀπὸ αὐτοῦ ἀφαιρεῖται· σὺν αὐτῷ γὰρ ὅλος ὁ στίχος ἐνοεῖτο. καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ ἀφ’ ὅλου ἀφαιρεῖται, τὸ δ’ ὅλον ἦν “μῆνιν ἄειδε θεὰ Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος,” ὧφειλεν ἠλαττώσθαι καὶ τὸ “ἄειδε θεὰ Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος” καὶ μὴ μένειν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, παντὸς τοῦ ἀφαιρέσιν ἐπιδεξαμένου
 164 μὴ μένοντος ἐν ταῦτῳ. ἐχρῆν δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ

¹ (μῆνιν) add. Heintz.

^a Cf. Hom. *Il.* i. 34.

in silence”), for when fully expressed it is βῆ δὲ ἀκέων.^a Since, however, nothing can really be subtracted from anything or added to anything,^b grammatical division becomes impossible. And we may 162 learn the fact that nothing is subtracted from anything in this way: if anything is subtracted from anything, either a whole is subtracted from a whole, or a part from a part, or a whole from a part, or a part from a whole. But a whole is not subtracted from a whole; for when a single verse is set down, if it is the whole that is subtracted we shall be subtracting the whole verse. And thus, if the verse from which the subtraction is made still remains, no subtraction at all will have been made from it; for how is it possible for the whole still to remain when it has been subtracted? And if it does not remain, clearly no subtraction has taken place from what does not exist. Consequently a whole is not subtracted from a whole. 163 Nor, again, is a whole subtracted from a part. For the whole is not included in the part,—μῆνιν ἄειδε θεὰ Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος, for instance, in μῆνιν,—but what is subtracted ought to be included in that which suffers the subtraction. It remains, then, to say that either a part is subtracted from a whole or a part from a part. But this too is questionable. For if μῆνιν is subtracted from the whole verse, it is also subtracted from itself; for the whole verse was conceived as including it. Besides, if it is taken from the whole, and the whole was μῆνιν ἄειδε θεὰ Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος, then ἄειδε θεὰ Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος ought also to have been diminished and not to have remained unaltered, since nothing which suffers subtraction remains unaltered. And μῆνιν itself, too, when being sub- 164

^b Cf. P.H. iii. 85, *Adv. Phys.* i. 280 ff., 308 ff.

μῆνιν, ἀφ' ὅλου ἐκείνου λαμβάνον τὴν ἀφαίρεσιν, ἔχειν τι ἐξ ἐκάστου τῶν ἐν ἐκείνῳ, ὃ πάλιν ἐστὶ ψεῦδος. εἰ οὖν μῆτε ὅλον στίχον ἀπὸ στίχου δυνατὸν μερίζειν μῆτε μέρος στίχου ἀπὸ μέρους μῆτε ὅλον ἀπὸ μέρους μῆτε μέρος ἀφ' ὅλου, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἐνδέχεται ποιεῖν, ἀδύνατος τῷ γραμματικῷ ὁ μερισμός.

- 165 Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὰς συναλειπτικῶς ἐκφερομένης λέξεις τινῶν πρόσθεσις οὐκ ἔσται. καὶ τοῦτ' ἔσται σαφές, ἂν μὴ ἐπὶ συλλαβῶν ἢ στοιχείων χειρίζηται ὁ λόγος, ὧν μάλιστα τὰς προσθέσεις ἐν τοῖς μερισμοῖς ποιοῦνται οἱ γραμματικοί, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ὅλων λέξεων. ὑποκειμένου τοίνυν ἡμιστιχίου τοῦ "ἄειδε θεὰ Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος" (ἔστω γὰρ πρὸς τὸ παρὸν τουτὶ ἡμιστιχίον, καὶ προσλαμβάνετω τὸ μῆνιν, ὥστε τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ἠρωικὸν γενέσθαι μέτρον) ζητοῦμεν
 166 τίμη ἢ πρόσθεσις γίνεται; ἤτοι γὰρ ἑαυτῷ τὸ μῆνιν προστίθεται ἢ τῷ προϋποκειμένῳ ἡμιστιχίῳ ἢ τῷ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ἀποτελεσθέντι ἠρωικῷ μέτρῳ. καὶ ἑαυτῷ μὲν οὐκ ἂν προστεθῆι· μὴ ὄν γὰρ ἕτερον ἑαυτοῦ καὶ μὴ διπλασιάζον ἑαυτὸ οὐκ ἂν λέγοιτο ἑαυτῷ προστίθεσθαι. τῷ δὲ προϋποκειμένῳ ἡμιστιχίῳ πῶς ἐνδέχεται; ὅλω μὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ προστιθέμενον καὶ αὐτὸ παρισσώμενον ἐκείνῳ
 167 ἡμιστιχίον γενήσεται, αὐτῆ τε ἀκολουθήσει καὶ τὸ μέγα ἡμιστιχίον λέγειν εἶναι βραχύ, βραχεῖ συνεξισούμενον τῷ μῆνιν, καὶ τὸ βραχὺ μέγα, μείζονι ἀντιπαρῆκον τῷ ἡμιστιχίῳ, εἶπερ τῷ παντὶ ἡμιστιχίῳ προστίθεται τὸ μῆνιν, ὅλον τῷ ἄειδε (καὶ τὰ λοιπά).¹ καὶ εἰ μὲν μόνον αὐξήσει τὸ ἄειδε, τὸ ὅλον οὐ ποιήσει στίχον. λείπεται οὖν φάσκεν

tracted from that whole verse ought to have extracted something from each of the parts of that whole; and that again is false. If, then, it is not possible to divide the whole verse from the whole or a part of the verse from a part or the whole from a part or a part from the whole, and no other operation besides these is feasible, division is impossible for the Grammarian.

Moreover, even in phrases which contain elisions 165 there will be no addition of any letters. And this will be clear if language be treated not as a matter of syllables or elements,—and it is mainly these which the Grammarians use as additions in their divisions,—but as a matter of whole phrases. So if the half-verse ἄειδε θεὰ Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος is set down (for let it be granted for the present that this is a half-verse, and let it have μῆνιν added to it so that the combination forms a hexameter), to what, we ask, is the addition made? For μῆνιν is added either to itself or to the 166 half-verse already set down or to the hexameter made up of the two together. But it will not be added to itself; for as it is not other than itself and does not double itself it will not be said to be added to itself. And how can it be added to the half-verse already set down? For as it is added to the whole of it, it too being made equal to the half-verse will become a half-verse, and thus it will follow that we must say that the 167 large half-verse is short, being made equal to the short one, μῆνιν, and the short one large, as being equal in extent to the larger half-verse, if in fact μῆνιν is added to the whole half-verse, such as ἄειδε etc. But if it shall increase ἄειδε only, the whole will not make a verse. It remains then to assert that

¹ (καὶ τὰ λοιπά) addidi.

τῷ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, αὐτοῦ τε τοῦ μῆνιν καὶ τοῦ προ-
 ὑποκειμένου ἡμισιχίου, ἀποτελουμένῳ ἑξαμέτρῳ
 καὶ ἥρωικῷ στίχῳ προστίθεται. ὁ τελέως ἦν
 168 ἀπίθανον· τὸ γὰρ ἐπιδεχόμενον πρόσθεσιν προ-
 ὑπόκειται τῆς προσθέσεως, οὐ μὴν τὸ γινόμενον
 ἐκ τῆς προσθέσεως προὑπόκειται ταύτης. οὐκ
 ἄρα οὖν τῷ γινομένῳ ἐκ τῆς προσθέσεως τοῦ
 μῆνιν ἑξαμέτρῳ στίχῳ προστίθεται τὸ μῆνιν· ὅτε
 μὲν γὰρ γίνεται ἡ πρόσθεσις, οὐπω ἑξαμέτρος
 ἔστιν, ὅτε δὲ ἔστιν ἑξαμέτρος, οὐκέτι γίνεται ἡ
 πρόσθεσις. πλὴν συνήκται τὸ προκείμενον, καὶ
 μήτε προσθέσεως μήτε ἀφαιρέσεως οὐσης ἀναιρεῖται
 ὁ προειρημένος τοῦ μερισμοῦ τρόπος.
 Ἄλλὰ δὴ πάλιν τὴν ἐν τούτοις τῶν γραμματικῶν
 ἀκρίβειαν κατανοήσαντες, φέρε καὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ
 γράφειν αὐτῶν δυνάμει ἀποπειραθῶμεν.

Θ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΟΡΘΟΓΡΑΦΙΑΣ

169 Τὴν γὰρ ὀρθογραφίαν φασὶν ἐν τρισὶ κείσθαι
 τρόποις, ποσότητι ποιότητι μερισμῷ. ποσότητι
 μὲν οὖν, ὅταν ζητῶμεν εἰ ταῖς δοτικαῖς προσθετέον
 τὸ ι, καὶ εὐχάλινον καὶ εὐώδιναις τῷ ι μόνον
 γραπτέον ἢ τῇ εἰ· ποιότητι δέ, ὅταν σκεπτώμεθα
 πότερον διὰ τοῦ ζ γραπτέον ἔστι τὸ σμιλίον καὶ
 τὴν Σμύρναν ἢ διὰ τοῦ σ· μερισμῷ δέ, ἐπειδὴν
 διαπορώμεν περὶ τῆς ὄβριμος λέξεως, πότερόν
 ποτε τὸ β τῆς δευτέρας ἔστι συλλαβῆς ἀρχὴ ἢ
 τῆς προηγούμενης πέρασ, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἀριστίων
 170 ὀνόματος ποῦ τακτέον τὸ σ. πάλιν δ' ἡ τοιαύτη
 τεχνολογία, ἵνα μηδὲν τῶν ἀπορωτέρων κινῶμεν,
 μάταιος εἶναι φαίνεται, πρῶτον μὲν ἐκ τῆς δια-
 100

μῆνιν is added to the combination of the two,—of
 μῆνιν itself and the previously stated half-verse,—
 which is the complete hexameter and heroic verse. 168
 But this is wholly incredible; for that which receives
 addition subsists before the addition, but that which
 results from the addition certainly does not subsist
 before it. Therefore μῆνιν is not added to that which
 results from the addition of μῆνιν to the hexameter
 verse; for when the addition is being made, it is not
 as yet a hexameter, and when it is a hexameter the
 addition is no longer being made. Howbeit the task
 we proposed is now concluded, and, as neither addition
 exists nor subtraction, the method of division
 stated above is destroyed.

But now that we have again had an insight into the
 precision of the Grammarians in these matters, come
 and let us make trial of their power in the matter of
 writing.

CHAPTER IX.—CONCERNING ORTHOGRAPHY

Orthography, they say, is to be found in three 169
 modes,—quantity, quality, division. In quantity
 when we inquire if ι should be added to datives and
 whether εὐχάλινον and εὐώδιναις should be written
 with an ι only or with εἰ. And in quality when we
 consider whether σμιλίον and Σμύρναν are to be
 written with a ζ or with a σ. And in division when
 we question regarding the word ὄβριμος whether the
 β is the beginning of the second syllable or the end
 of the first, and in the case of the name Ἀριστίων
 where we should place the σ. But here again, not to 170
 raise any worse objections, technology of this sort
 appears to be useless, firstly because of the disagree-

φωνίας, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων. καὶ ἐκ μὲν τῆς διαφωνίας, ἐπεὶ περὶ οἱ τεχνικοὶ μάχονται τε καὶ εἰς αἰῶνα μαχέσονται πρὸς ἀλλήλους, τῶν μὲν οὕτως τῶν δὲ ἐκείνως
 171 τὸ αὐτὸ γράφειν ἀξιούντων. ὅθεν καὶ οὕτως αὐτοὺς ἐρωτητέον. εἰ χρειώδης ἐστὶν ἢ περὶ ὀρθογραφίας τεχνολογία τῷ βίῳ, ἐχρῆν ἡμᾶς τε καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν διαφωνούντων περὶ αὐτῆς γραμματικῶν, ἀνεπικρίτου ἀκμῆν καθεστῶσης τῆς κατὰ ταύτην διαφωνίας, παραποδίζεσθαι εἰς ἃ ἂν δέη
 172 γράφειν. οὔτε δὲ ἡμῶν οὔτε τούτων ἕκαστος παραποδίζεται, ἀλλὰ συμφώνως πάντες τυγχάνουσι τῆς προθέσεως, ἅτε δὴ μὴ ἀπ' ἐκείνης ἀλλ' ἀπὸ κοινοτέρας τιμῆς καὶ συμφώνου ὀρμώμενοι τριβῆς, καθ' ἣν τὰ μὲν κατ' ἀνάγκην ὀφείλοντα παραλαμβάνεσθαι στοιχεῖα πρὸς τὴν μήνυσιν τοῦ ὀνόματος πάντες παραλαμβάνουσι, καὶ οἱ γραμματικοὶ καὶ οἱ μὴ γραμματικοί, περὶ δὲ τῶν μὴ κατ' ἀνάγκην ἀδιαφοροῦσιν. οὐκ ἄρα χρειώδης ἐστὶν ἢ περὶ ὀρθογραφίας παρὰ τοῖς γραμματικοῖς ὑφήγησις.
 173 Ἄλλ' ὁ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς διαφωνίας ἔλεγχος τοιούτους, ὁ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων ἐμφανής. οὐδὲν γὰρ βλαπτόμεθα, εἴαν τε σὺν τῷ ι γράφωμεν τὴν δοτικὴν πτώσιν εἴαν τε μὴ, καὶ εἴαν τε διὰ τοῦ σ τὸ σμιλίον καὶ τὴν Σμύρναν εἴαν τε διὰ τοῦ ζ, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἀριστίων ὀνόματος εἴαν τε τῇ προηγουμένῃ συλλαβῇ τὸ σ προσμερίζωμεν εἴαν τε τῇ ἐπιφερομένη
 174 μένῃ τοῦτο συντάττωμεν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ παρὰ τὸ διὰ τοῦ σ ἀλλὰ μὴ διὰ τοῦ ζ γράφειν τὸ σμιλίον οὐκέτι σμιλίον γίνεται ἀλλὰ δρέπανον, καὶ εἰ παρὰ τὸ τοῦ Ἀριστίων ὀνόματος οὕτως ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐκείνως συντάσσεσθαι τὸ σ ὁ Ἀριστίων, καθὼς φησὶ τις τῶν
 102

ments about it, and next because of its actual results themselves. Because of the disagreements, inasmuch as the technicians fight and will fight to eternity with one another, some insisting on writing the same word in this way and some in that. Hence 171 we must question them in this wise: If the technology which deals with orthography is profitable for life, both we and each of the Grammarians who dispute about it ought to have been in a tangle as to what we ought to write, seeing that the dispute about it is still unsettled. But neither any of us nor 172 any of them is in a tangle, but we all achieve our purpose without dispute, inasmuch as we set out not from this technology but from more general and undisputed practice, in accordance with which we all—Grammarians and non-Grammarians alike—adopt the elements which necessarily must be adopted for the indication of the noun, while as to such as are not necessary we are indifferent. Therefore the instruction given by the Grammarians regarding orthography is not profitable.

Such, then, is the refutation based on their disagree- 173 ment, and that based on the actual results is obvious. For we are in no wise injured whether we write the dative case with an ι or without one, and whether we write σμιλίον and Σμύρναν with a σ or with a ζ, and whether, in the case of the name Ἀριστίων, we attach the σ to the preceding syllable or assign it to that which follows. For if σμιλίον, because it is written 174 with a σ and not with a ζ, no longer is σμιλίον ("a scalpel") but δρέπανον ("a sickle"), and if, because the σ in the name Ἀριστίων is assigned to this syllable rather than to that, Ἀριστίων ("the breakfast")—as one of the witty fellows says—becomes Δειπνίων

χαριεντιζομένων, Δειπνίων γίνεται, ἤρμοξε μὴ ἀδιαφορεῖν. εἰ δ' ὅπως ἂν ἔχη τὰ τῆς γραφῆς, τὸ σμιλίον (ἔστι σμιλίον),¹ εἴαν τε διὰ τοῦ σ εἴαν τε διὰ τοῦ ζ κατάρχηται, ὃ τε Ἀριστίων ἀεί ποτέ ἐστιν Ἀριστίων, εἴαν τε τῷ ι εἴαν τε τῷ τ τὸ σ προσμερίζωμεν, τίς χρεία τῆς πολλῆς καὶ ματαίας παρὰ τοῖς γραμματικοῖς περὶ τούτων μωρολογίας;

175 Κεφαλαιωδέστερον δὴ καὶ περὶ ὀρθογραφίας διεξιόντες, ἴδωμεν εἰς συμπλήρωσιν τῆς πρὸς τὸ τεχνικὸν μέρος αὐτῶν ἀντιρρήσεως πότερον ἔχουσι τινα πρὸς τὸ ἐλληνίζειν συνεστῶσαν μέθοδον ἢ οὐδαμῶς.

I.—ΠΕΡΙ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΣΜΟΝ

176 Ὅτι μὲν δεῖ τινα φειδῶ ποιεῖσθαι τῆς περὶ τὰς διαλέκτους καθαριότητος, αὐτόθεν συμφανές· ὃ τε γὰρ ἐκάστοτε βαρβαρίζων καὶ σολοικίζων ὡς ἀπαιδευτος χλευάζεται, ὃ τε ἐλληνίζων ἱκανός ἐστι πρὸς τὸ σαφῶς ἅμα καὶ ἀκριβῶς παραστήσαι τὰ νοηθέντα τῶν πραγμάτων. ἤδη δὲ τοῦ ἐλληνισμοῦ δύο εἰσὶ διαφοραί· ὃς μὲν γάρ ἐστι κεχωρισμένος τῆς κοινῆς ἡμῶν συνηθείας καὶ κατὰ γραμματικὴν ἀναλογίαν δοκεῖ προκόπτειν, ὃς δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἐκάστου τῶν Ἑλλήνων συνηθειαν ἐκ παραπλάσμου καὶ τῆς ἐν ταῖς ὁμιλίαις παρατηρή-

177 σεως ἀναγόμενος. οἷον ὁ μὲν τῆς Ζεὺς ὀρθῆς πτώσεως τὰς πλαγίους σχηματίζων τοῦ Ζεὸς τῷ Ζεῖ τὸν Ζέα κατὰ τὸν πρότερον τοῦ ἐλληνισμοῦ χαρακτήρα διαλέλεκται, ὁ δὲ ἀφελῶς τοῦ Ζηνός λέγων καὶ τῷ Ζηνί καὶ τὸν Ζῆνα κατὰ τὸν δευτέρον καὶ συνηθέστερον ἡμῖν. πλὴν δυοῖν ὄντων τῶν ἐλληνισμῶν εὐχρηστον μὲν εἶναι φαμεν τὸν

(“the diner”), then it would be fitting not to be indifferent. But if, whatever be the form of writing, σμιλίον is σμιλίον, whether it begins with a σ or with a ζ, and Ἀριστίων is always Ἀριστίων, whether we attach the σ to the ι or to the τ, what is the use of the long, vain and stupid disputation about these points which is carried on by the Grammarians?

And now that we are discussing orthography in 175 rather a summary fashion, in order to complete our confutation of their technical section let us consider whether or not they have any systematic method of dealing with “hellenism” (or “Greek idiom”).

CHAPTER X.—CONCERNING GREEK IDIOM

That one must preserve with some care purity of 176 speech is at once plain; for the man who is constantly using barbarisms and solecisms is jeered at as one of no culture, whereas he who speaks good Greek is capable of presenting his ideas both clearly and exactly. But now there are two distinct kinds of “hellenism”: one stands apart from our common usage and seems to proceed in accordance with grammatical analogy; the other conforms to the common usage of each of the Greeks and is derived from framing words and from observation in ordinary converse. For 177 example, the man who forms from the nominative Ζεὺς the oblique cases Ζεός, Ζεῖ, Ζέα, frames the declension in accordance with the first kind of “hellenism,” but he who simply says Ζηνός, Ζηνί, Ζῆνα frames it in accordance with the second, the one more usual with us. Only, as two forms of “hellenism” exist, we declare, for the reasons already stated, that the

¹ (ἔστι σμιλίον) addidi (σμιλίον post γραφῆς add. c. j. Bekk.).

δεύτερον διὰ τὰς προειρημένας αἰτίας, ἄχρηστον
 178 δὲ τὸν πρῶτον διὰ τὰς λεχθησομένας. ὥσπερ γὰρ
 ἐν πόλει νομίσματος τινος προχωροῦντος κατὰ τὸ
 ἐγχώριον ὁ μὲν τούτῳ στοιχῶν δύναται καὶ τὰς
 ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ πόλει διεξαγωγὰς ἀπαραποδίστως
 ποιεῖσθαι, ὁ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν μὴ παραδεχόμενος ἄλλο
 δέ τι καινὸν χαράσσειν ἑαυτῷ καὶ τούτῳ νομι-
 στεύεσθαι θέλων μάταιος καθέστηκεν, οὕτω καὶ
 τῷ βίῳ ὁ μὴ βουλόμενος τῇ συνήθως παραδεχθείσῃ,
 καθάπερ νομίσματι, ὀμιλία κατακολουθεῖν ἀλλ'
 179 ἰδίαν αὐτῷ τέμνειν μακρὰς ἐγγὺς ἐστίν. διόπερ εἰ
 οἱ γραμματικοὶ ὑπισχυοῦνται τέχνην τιὰ τὴν καλου-
 μένην ἀναλογίαν παραδώσειν, δι' ἧς κατ' ἐκείνον
 ἡμᾶς τὸν ἑλληνισμὸν ἀναγκάζουσι διαλέγεσθαι,
 ὑποδεικτέον ὅτι ἀσύστατός ἐστιν αὕτη ἡ τέχνη, δεῖ
 δὲ τοὺς ὀρθῶς βουλομένους διαλέγεσθαι τῇ ἀτέχνῳ
 καὶ ἀφελεί κατὰ τὸν βίον καὶ τῇ κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν
 τῶν πολλῶν συνήθειαν παρατηρήσει προσανέχειν.
 180 Εἴπερ οὖν ἔστι τις περὶ ἑλληνισμὸν τέχνη, ἥτοι
 ἔχει ἀρχὰς ἐφ' αἷς συνέστηκεν ἢ οὐκ ἔχει. καὶ
 μὴ ἔχειν μὲν οὐκ ἂν φαίεν οἱ γραμματικοί· πᾶσα
 γὰρ τέχνη ἀπὸ τιος ἀρχῆς ὀφείλει συνίστασθαι.
 εἰ δὲ ἔχει, ἥτοι τεχνικὰς ταύτας ἔχει ἢ ἀτέχνους.
 καὶ εἰ μὲν τεχνικὰς, πάντως ἢ ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν ἢ
 ἀπ' ἄλλης τέχνης συνέστηκεν, κάκειν πάλιν ἀπὸ
 τρίτης, καὶ ἢ τρίτη ἀπὸ τετάρτης, καὶ τοῦτ' εἰς
 ἀπειρον, ὥστε ἀναρχὸν γιγνομένην τὴν περὶ ἑλλη-
 181 νισμὸν τέχνην μηδὲ τέχνην ὑπάρχειν· εἰ δὲ ἀτέχνους,
 οὐκ ἄλλαι τινὲς εὐρεθήσονται παρὰ τὴν συνήθειαν.
 ἢ ἄρα συνήθεια τοῦ τί τέ ἐστιν ἑλληνικὸν καὶ τί
 ἀνελληνιστὸν γίνεται κριτήριον, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλη τις
 182 περὶ τὸν ἑλληνισμὸν τέχνη. ἄλλως τε, ἐπεὶ τῶν

second is of great use, but the first useless, for reasons
 now to be stated. For just as in a city where a certain 178
 local coinage is current, he who makes use of this is
 able to carry on his business in that city without
 hindrances, but he who does not adopt it, but coins
 for himself some new money and desires to have this
 passed, is a fool, so also in ordinary intercourse the
 man who refuses to follow the mode of converse—
 like the coinage—which is usually adopted, and cuts
 out a new way of his own, is near to madness. Where- 179
 fore, if the Grammarians promise to present us with
 an art described as “ analogy,” by which they compel
 us to discourse in accordance with that kind of
 “ hellenism,” one must point out that this art has no
 foundation, and that those who wish to discourse
 correctly must cleave to the non-technical, simple and
 ordinary style and to the observing of the rules which
 accord with the usage of the majority.

If there does exist any art concerned with “ hellen- 180
 ism,” it either has or has not principles upon which it
 is based. That it has none the Grammarians would
 deny, for every art must be based on some principle.
 But if it has some, the principles it has are either
 technical or non-technical. If they are technical,
 they certainly are constructed either from themselves
 or from another art, and that again from a third, and
 the third from a fourth, and so on to infinity, so that
 the art dealing with “ hellenism ” is found to have
 no beginning (or principle) and thus to be no art. And 181
 if its principles are untechnical, none will be found
 other than common usage. Thus common usage
 becomes the criterion of what is “ hellenic ” and what
 is not “ hellenic,” and not some other art concerning
 “ hellenism.”—Again, since some arts—such as 182

- τεχνῶν αἱ μὲν τῷ ὄντι εἰσὶ τέχναι, ὡς ἡ ἀνδριαντο-
 ποικὴ καὶ ζωγραφία, αἱ δὲ ἐπαγγέλματι μὲν εἰσὶ
 τέχναι, οὐ πάντως δὲ καὶ κατ' ἀλήθειαν, ὡς
 Χαλδαϊκὴ τε καὶ θυτική, ἵνα μάθωμεν πότερον
 ποτε καὶ ἡ περὶ τὸν ἑλληνισμὸν λεγομένη τέχνη
 ὑπόσχεσις μόνον ἐστὶν ἢ καὶ ὑποκειμένη δύναμις,
 δεήσει κριτήριόν τι ἡμᾶς ἔχειν εἰς τὴν ταύτης
 183 δοκιμασίαν. τοῦτ' οὖν τὸ κριτήριον πάλιν ἦτοι
 τεχνικὸν τί ἐστί καὶ περὶ ἑλληνισμὸν, εἶγε καὶ τῆς
 περὶ τὸν ἑλληνισμὸν κρινούσης, εἰ ὑγιῶς κρίνει,
 δοκιμαστικὸν καθέστηκεν, ἢ ἀτεχνον. ἀλλὰ τε-
 χνικὸν μὲν περὶ ἑλληνισμὸν οὐκ ἂν εἶη διὰ τὴν
 προειρημένην εἰς ἄπειρον ἔκπτωσιν· ἀτεχνον δ'
 εἰ λαμβάνοιτο τὸ κριτήριον, οὐκ ἄλλο τι εὐρήσομεν
 ἢ τὴν συνήθειαν. ἢ ἄρα συνήθεια καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν
 περὶ ἑλληνισμὸν τέχνην κρίνουσα οὐ δεήσεται
 τέχνης.
- 184 Εἵπερ δὲ οὐκ ἄλλως ἐστὶν ἑλληνίζειν ἢ μὴ
 παρὰ γραμματικῆς μάθωμεν τὸ ἑλληνικόν, ἦτοι
 ἐναργές ἐστί τοῦτο καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ βλεπόμενον ἢ
 ἀδηλότερον. ἀλλ' ἐναργές μὲν οὐκ ἐστὶν, ἐπεὶ
 σύμφωνον ἂν ἦν παρὰ πᾶσιν ὡς τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν
 185 ἐναργῶν. καὶ ἄλλως πρὸς μὲν τὴν τοῦ ἐναργοῦς
 ἀντίληψιν οὐδεμιᾶς τέχνης ἐστὶ χρεία, καθάπερ
 οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸ λευκὸν ὄραν ἢ γλυκέος γεύεσθαι ἢ
 θερμοῦ θιγγάνειν· πρὸς δὲ τὸ ἑλληνίζειν μεθόδου
 τινὸς καὶ τέχνης κατὰ τοὺς γραμματικούς ἐστὶ
 χρεία. οὐκ ἄρα ἐναργές ἐστί τὸ ἑλληνίζειν.
- 186 ἀδηλον δὲ εἶπερ ἐστί, πάλιν ἐπεὶ τὸ ἀδηλον ἐκ
 τινος ἑτέρου γνωρίζεται, ἦτοι φυσικῶ τινὶ κατ-
 ακολουθητέον κριτηρίῳ, ἐξ οὗ διαγιγνώσκεται τί
 τὸ ἑλληνικόν καὶ τί τὸ ἀνελλήνιστον, ἢ τῇ ἐνὸς

statuary and painting—are really arts, but others
 which are claimed as arts—such as astrology and the
 art of the haruspex—are not wholly and truly arts,
 in order that we may learn whether the so-called art
 of “hellenism” is merely a profession or a sub-
 stantial power, it will be necessary for us to possess
 some criterion by which to test it. Then this criterion, 183
 too, is either a technical one and deals with “hellen-
 ism”—since it is to test whether the art which judges
 “hellenism” judges soundly—or it is non-technical.
 But it will not be a technical one concerning “hellen-
 ism” because of the regress *ad infinitum* already
 stated^a; and if the criterion is to be taken as non-
 technical, we shall find no other criterion than
 common usage. Common usage, then, as judging the
 art of “hellenism” itself, will not need art.

But if it is not possible to speak good Greek other- 184
 wise than by learning good Greek from the Art of
 Grammar, either it is something evident and seen of
 itself or it is obscure. But it is not evident, since then
 it would have been agreed upon by all men, like all
 other evident things. And besides, there is need of 185
 no art for the perception of what is evident, any more
 than for seeing the white object, tasting the sweet,
 or feeling the hot; but for speaking good Greek there
 is need, according to the Grammarians, of a certain
 method and art. Therefore, speaking good Greek
 is not evident.—But if it is obscure, then again, since 186
 what is obscure is revealed by something else, we
 must either be guided by some natural criterion by
 means of which it is determined what is good Greek
 and what is not, or we must employ, in order to grasp

^a Cf. § 180.

187 συνηθεία ὡς ἄκρως ἐλληνίζοντος χρηστέον πρὸς
 τὴν τούτου κατάληψιν, ἢ τῇ πάντων. ἀλλὰ
 φυσικὸν μὲν κριτήριον εἰς τὸ ἐλληνικὸν καὶ τὸ
 μὴ τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν ἔχομεν· τοῦ γὰρ Ἀττικοῦ τὸ
 τάριχος λέγοντος ὡς ἐλληνικὸν καὶ τοῦ Πελοπον-
 νησίου ὁ τάριχος προφερομένου ὡς ἀδιάστροφον,
 καὶ τοῦ μὲν τὴν στάμμον ὀνομάζοντος τοῦ δὲ τὸν
 στάμμον, οὐδὲν ἔχει ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ κριτήριον πιστὸν
 ὁ γραμματικὸς εἰς τὸ οὕτως ἀλλὰ μὴ οὕτως δεῖν
 188 λέγειν, εἰ μὴ ἄρα τὴν ἐκάστου συνήθειαν, ἣτις
 οὔτε τεχνικὴ οὔτε φυσικὴ ἐστίν. τῇ δὲ τινὸς
 συνηθείᾳ δεῖν ἀκολουθεῖν εἴπερ ἐροῦσιν, ἦτοι
 φάσει μόνον ἐροῦσιν ἢ ἐμμεθόδοις ἀποδείξεισι
 χρῆσάμενοι. ἀλλὰ φάσιν μὲν λέγουσι φάσιν ἀντι-
 θήσομεν περὶ τοῦ τοῖς πολλοῖς μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ ἐνὶ
 δεῖν ἀκολουθεῖν· ἐμμεθόδως δὲ ἀποδεικνύντες ὅτι
 οὗτος ἐλληνίζει, ἀναγκασθήσονται ἐκείνην τὴν
 μέθοδον κριτήριον ἐλληνισμοῦ λέγειν δι' ἣν καὶ
 οὗτος ἐλληνίζων δέδεικται, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τοῦτον.
 189 λείπεται οὖν τῇ πάντων συνηθείᾳ προσέχειν. εἰ
 δὲ τοῦτο, οὐ χρεῖα τῆς ἀναλογίας ἀλλὰ παρατηρή-
 σεως τοῦ πῶς οἱ πολλοὶ διαλέγονται καὶ τί ὡς
 ἐλληνικὸν παραδέχονται ἢ ὡς οὐ τοιοῦτον ἐκκλί-
 νουσιν. τό γε μὴν ἐλληνικὸν ἦτοι φύσει ἐστὶν ἢ
 θέσει. καὶ φύσει μὲν οὐκ ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἂν ποτε
 ταῦτόν τοῖς μὲν ἐλληνικὸν ἐδόκει τυγχάνειν τοῖς
 190 δὲ οὐχ ἐλληνικόν· θέσει δὲ εἴπερ ἔστι καὶ νόμῳ
 τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὁ συνασκηθεὶς μάλιστα καὶ τριβεὶς
 ἐν τῇ συνηθείᾳ, οὗτος ἐλληνίζει, καὶ οὐχ ὁ τὴν
 ἀναλογίαν ἐπιστάμενος. καὶ γὰρ ἄλλως ἔνεστι

it, either the habit of speech of one man, as being
 pre-eminent in "hellenism," or that of all men. But 187
 we possess no natural criterion regarding what is good
 Greek and what is not; for when the man of Attica
 uses τὸ τάριχος ("the dried fish") as being good
 Greek,^a while the Peloponnesian enunciates ὁ τάριχος
 as being correct, and the one speaks of ἡ στάμμος
 ("the jar"), the other of ὁ στάμμος, the Gram-
 marian possesses no criterion which is of itself reliable
 for deciding that one ought to speak in this way rather
 than in that way, unless indeed it be each man's prac-
 tice, and this is neither technical nor natural. And if 188
 they shall declare that we must follow the customary
 practice of a certain person, they will declare this
 either by mere assertion or by employing methodical
 proofs. But to their assertion we shall reply by the
 counter-assertion that one ought to follow the many
 rather than the one; and if they try to prove method-
 ically that this man speaks good Greek, they will be
 forced to say that that method by which this man has
 been proved to speak good Greek is the criterion, and
 not this man himself. It remains, then, to hold fast 189
 by the common usage of all men. And if so, there is
 no need of analogy but of observing how most men
 converse and what they adopt as good Greek or avoid
 as not good.—However, good Greek exists either by
 nature or by convention. But it does not exist by
 nature,^b since then the same phrase would never have
 seemed good Greek to some and not good Greek to
 others; and if it exists by convention and human 190
 enactment, the man who speaks good Greek is he
 who is most practised and versed in common usage,
 and not he who understands analogy.—By another

^a Cf. § 148.^b Cf. § 145.

παραστήσαι ὅτι οὐ δεόμεθα πρὸς τὸ ἐλληνίζειν
 191 τῆς γραμματικῆς. ἐν γὰρ ταῖς ἀνὰ χεῖρα ὀμιλίαις
 ἤτοι ἀντικόψουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ πολλοὶ ἐπὶ τισὶ λέξεσιν
 ἢ οὐκ ἀντικόψουσιν. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀντικόψουσιν,
 εὐθὺς καὶ διορθῶσονται ἡμᾶς, ὥστε παρὰ τῶν ἐκ
 τοῦ βίου καθεστῶτων ἀλλ' οὐχὶ παρὰ γραμματικῶν
 192 ἔχειν τὸ ἐλληνίζειν. εἰ δ' οὐ δυσχεραίνουσιν ἀλλ'
 ὡς σαφέσι καὶ ὀρθῶς ἔχουσι συμπεριφέροντο τοῖς
 λεγομένοις, καὶ ἡμεῖς αὐτοῖς ἐπιμενοῦμεν. κατὰ
 τε ταύτην τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἤτοι πάντες ἢ οἱ πλείστοι
 ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ διαλέγονται· οὔτε δὲ πάντες οὔθ' οἱ
 πλείστοι οὔθ' οἱ πολλοί· μόλις γὰρ δύο ἢ τρεῖς
 τοιοῦτοι εὐρίσκονται, οἱ δὲ πλείστοι οὐδὲ ἴσασιν
 193 αὐτήν. τοῖωνν ἐπεὶ τῇ τῶν πολλῶν συνηθείᾳ καὶ
 οὐ τῇ τῶν δυοῖν ἀναγκαῖον κατακολουθεῖν, ρητέον
 τὴν παρατήρησιν τῆς κοινῆς συνηθείας χρησι-
 μεύειν πρὸς τὸ ἐλληνίζειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὴν ἀναλογίαν.
 ἐπὶ πάντων γε μὴν σχεδὸν τῶν χρησιμευόντων τῷ
 βίῳ μέτρον ἐστὶν ἰκανὸν τὸ μὴ παραποδίζεσθαι
 194 πρὸς τὰς χρεῖας. διόπερ εἰ καὶ ὁ ἑλληνισμὸς διὰ
 δύο μάλιστα προηγούμενα ἔτυχεν ἀποδοχῆς, τὴν
 τε σαφήνειαν καὶ τὴν προσήνειαν τῶν δηλουμένων
 (τούτοις γὰρ ἔξωθεν κατ' ἐπακολούθησιν συνέ-
 ζευκται τὸ μεταφορικῶς καὶ ἐμφατικῶς καὶ κατὰ
 τοὺς ἄλλους τρόπους φράζειν), ζητήσομεν οὖν ἐκ
 ποτέρας ταῦτα μᾶλλον περιγίνεται, ἀρὰ γε τῆς
 κοινῆς συνηθείας ἢ τῆς ἀναλογίας, ἵνα ἐκείνη
 195 προσθώμεθα. βλέπομεν δέ γε ὡς ἐκ τῆς κοινῆς
 συνηθείας μᾶλλον ἢ ὅτι ἐκ τῆς ἀναλογίας. ἐκείνη
 ἄρα ἀλλ' οὐ ταύτη χρηστέον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῆς
 ὀρθῆς πτώσεως ὁ Ζεὺς οὐσης τὰς πλαγίους προ-
 φέρεσθαι Ζηνός Ζηγὶ Ζῆνα καὶ τῆς κύου κυνός

argument also it is possible to establish the fact that
 we do not require the Art of Grammar in order to
 speak good Greek. In familiar intercourse ordinary 191
 people will either oppose us about certain phrases or
 will not oppose us. And if they oppose us, they will
 at once correct us, so that we have good Greek from
 those who live ordinary lives and not from the Gram-
 marians. And if they are not vexed but concur in the 192
 phrases we use as being clear and correct, we too
 shall abide by them.—Further, either all men, or
 most, or many converse in accordance with this
 "analogy" of theirs; but neither all, nor most, nor
 many do so; in fact hardly two or three are found to
 do so, and most men do not even know of it. Since, 193
 then, we must necessarily follow the customary usage
 of the many and not that of the two, one must declare
 that the observing of the common usage is useful for
 speaking good Greek, and not analogy. Certainly,
 in the case of nearly all the things which are of use in
 ordinary life, the fact that one is not hindered in
 supplying one's needs is a sufficient criterion. Where- 194
 fore, if "hellenism" has met with acceptance for
 two main reasons, its clear and agreeable presentation
 of the things described,^a—and following on these
 qualities and externally joined to them is the employ-
 ment of metaphor and emphasis and the other figures
 of speech,—we shall inquire by which of the two are 195
 these qualities better secured, by common usage or
 by analogy, so that we may adhere to it. And we
 clearly see that they are better secured by common
 usage than by analogy. So then the former and not
 the latter must be employed. Now when the nomin-
 ative case is Ζεὺς the formations Ζηνός, Ζηγί, Ζῆνα

^a Cf. § 176.

κυνί κύνα σαφές, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπρόσκοπον τοῖς πολλοῖς εἶναι φαίνεται· τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ τῆς κοινῆς συνηθείας· τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Ζεὺς ὀρθῆς Ζεός λέγειν καὶ Ζεῖ καὶ Ζέα, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς κύων σχηματίζειν κύωνος κύωνι κύωνα, ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς κυνός γενικῆς ἀξιοῦν τὴν ὀρθὴν κῦς ὑπάρχειν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ῥηματικῶν φερῆσω λέγειν καὶ βλεπήσω ὡς ποιήσω καὶ θελήσω, οὐ μόνον ἀσαφές ἀλλὰ καὶ γέλωτος ἔτι δὲ προσκοπῆς ἄξιον εἶναι
 196 δοκεῖ· τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται ἀπὸ ἀναλογίας· τοῖνυν, ὡς ἔφην, οὐ ταύτη χρηστέον ἀλλὰ τῇ συνηθείᾳ.

Μήποτε δὲ καὶ περιτρέπονται, καὶ ἐάν τε θελήσωσιν ἐάν τε καὶ μή, ἀναγκασθήσονται χρῆσθαι μὲν τῇ συνηθείᾳ παραπέμψιν δὲ τὴν ἀναλογίαν σκοπῶμεν δ' ἐντεῦθεν τὸ λεγόμενον, τουτέστιν ἐκ
 197 τῆς πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀκολουθίας· ζητούμενου γὰρ τοῦ πῶς δεῖ λέγειν, χρῆσθαι ἢ χρᾶσθαι, φασὶν ὅτι χρᾶσθαι, καὶ ἀπαιτούμενοι τούτου τὴν πίστιν λέγουσιν ὅτι χρῆσις καὶ κτήσις ἀνάλογά ἐστιν ὡς οὖν κτᾶσθαι μὲν λέγεται κτήσθαι δὲ οὐ λέγεται, οὕτω καὶ χρᾶσθαι μὲν ῥηθήσεται χρῆσθαι δὲ οὐ
 198 πάντως· ἀλλ' εἰ ἐπακολουθῶν τις αὐτοῖς πύθιτο "αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο τὸ κτᾶσθαι ὅτι ὀρθῶς εἴρηται, ἀφ' οὗ καὶ τὸ χρᾶσθαι ἀποδείκνυμεν, πόθεν ἴσμεν;" φήσουσιν ὅτι ἐν τῇ συνηθείᾳ λέγεται· τοῦτο δὲ λέγοντες δώσουσι τὸ τῇ συνηθείᾳ δεῖν ὡς κριτη-
 199 ρίῳ προσέχειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τῇ ἀναλογίᾳ· εἰ γὰρ ὅτι ἐν τῇ συνηθείᾳ λέγεται κτᾶσθαι, ῥήτεον καὶ χρᾶσθαι, ὀφείλομεν παρέντες τὴν ἀναλογικὴν τέχνην ἐπὶ τὴν συνηθειαν ἀναδραμεῖν, ἀφ' ἧς κάκεινή ἤρτηται.

Καὶ μὴν ἡ ἀναλογία ὁμοίων πολλῶν ὀνομάτων

as the oblique cases,—and κυνός, κυνί, κύνα, from the nominative κύων ("dog")—are clear and also appear to ordinary men unobjectionable; and these are the formations in common use. But to derive Ζεός, Ζεῖ, Ζέα from the nominative Ζεός, and from κύων to form κύωνος, κύωνι, κύωνα, or from the genitive κυνός to claim that the nominative is κῦς, and in the case of the forms of verbs to speak of φερῆσω and βλεπήσω, like ποιήσω and θελήσω, seems to be not only obscure but also deserving of ridicule and objectionable; and these are formations due to analogy. So then, as I 196 have said, we should not employ this, but common usage.

Perhaps they may shift their ground; but whether they wish it or not, they will be forced to employ customary usage and to dismiss analogy. Let us examine what they say by the method of pressing their own argument against themselves. When 197 it is asked whether one should say χρῆσθαι or χρᾶσθαι, they reply χρᾶσθαι, and on being asked for a proof of this, they assert that χρῆσις and κτήσις are analogous; as then we say κτᾶσθαι and do not say κτήσθαι, so we shall say χρᾶσθαι and never χρῆσθαι. But if one should press them further and 198 ask how do we know that this word κτᾶσθαι itself, from which we deduce χρᾶσθαι, is a correct form, they will reply that it is the form customarily used. And in so saying they will be granting that one should adopt common usage as the criterion and not analogy. For if one ought to say χρᾶσθαι be- 199 cause κτᾶσθαι is the customary form, we ought to give up the art of analogy and go back to customary usage upon which the former depends.

Now analogy, in fact, is the comparison of many

ἐστὶ παράθεσις, τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα ταῦτα ἐκ τῆς
 συνηθείας, ὥστε καὶ ἡ σύστασις τῆς ἀναλογίας
 200 ἀπὸ τῆς συνηθείας πρόεισιν. τούτου δὲ οὕτως
 ἔχοντος ἐρωτητέον τρόπῳ τῷδε. ἤτοι ἐγκρίνετε
 τὴν συνηθειαν ὡς πιστὴν πρὸς διάγνωσιν ἑλλη-
 νισμοῦ ἢ ἐκβάλλετε. εἰ μὲν ἐγκρίνετε, αὐτόθεν
 συνήκται τὸ προκείμενον, καὶ οὐ χρεία τῆς ἀνα-
 λογίας· εἰ δὲ ἐκβάλλετε, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ ἀναλογία ἐκ
 ταύτης συνίσταται, ἐκβάλλετε καὶ τὴν ἀναλογίαν.
 καὶ πάλιν, ἄτοπον τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὡς πιστὸν προσ-
 201 ἴεσθαι καὶ ὡς ἄπιστον παραιτεῖσθαι. οἱ δὲ
 γραμματικοὶ θέλοντες τὴν συνηθειαν ὡς ἄπιστον
 ἐκβάλλειν καὶ πάλιν ταύτην ὡς πιστὴν παραλαμ-
 βάνειν, τὸ αὐτὸ πιστὸν ἅμα καὶ ἄπιστον ποιήσουσιν.
 ἵνα γὰρ δείξωσιν ὅτι οὐ διαλεκτέον κατὰ τὴν
 συνηθειαν, εἰσάγουσι τὴν ἀναλογίαν· ἡ δὲ ἀναλογία
 οὐκ ἰσχυροποιεῖται, εἰ μὴ συνηθειαν ἔχοι τὴν
 202 βεβαιούσαν· τῇ ἄρα συνηθείᾳ ἐκβάλλοντες τὴν
 συνηθειαν τὸ αὐτὸ πιστὸν ἅμα καὶ ἄπιστον ποιή-
 σουσιν. ἐκτὸς εἰ μὴ τι φήσουσι μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν
 συνηθειαν ἐκβάλλειν ἅμα καὶ προσίεσθαι, ἀλλ'
 ἄλλην μὲν ἐκβάλλειν ἄλλην δὲ προσίεσθαι. ὅπερ
 καὶ λέγουσιν οἱ ἀπὸ Πινδαρίωνος. ἀναλογία,
 φασίν, ὁμολογουμένως ἐκ τῆς συνηθείας ὀρμάται·
 203 ἔστι γὰρ ὁμοίου τε καὶ ἀνομοίου θεωρία, τὸ δὲ
 ὁμοιον καὶ ἀνόμοιον ἐκ τῆς δεδοκμασμένης λαμ-
 βάνεται συνηθείας, δεδοκμασμένη δὲ καὶ ἀρχαιο-
 τάτη ἐστὶν ἢ Ὀμήρου ποιήσις· ποίημα γὰρ οὐδὲν
 πρᾶσβύτερον ἦκεν εἰς ἡμᾶς τῆς ἐκείνου ποιήσεως.
 διαλεξόμεθα ἄρα τῇ Ὀμήρου κατακολουθοῦντες
 204 συνηθείᾳ. ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν οὐχ ὑπὸ πάντων
 ὁμολογεῖται ποιητῆς ἀρχαιότατος εἶναι Ὀμηρος·

similar nouns, and these nouns are taken from
 customary speech, so that the substance of analogy is
 derived from customary speech. This being so, one 200
 must question them in this way : Either you accept
 customary usage as reliable for the distinguishing of
 "hellenism" or you reject it. If you accept it, the
 problem before us is settled of itself, and there is no
 need of analogy ; but if you reject it, you reject
 analogy as well, since from it analogy derives its
 substance.—Again, it is absurd to admit a thing as
 trustworthy and to dismiss it as untrustworthy. But 201
 the Grammarians, in their desire to reject common
 usage as untrustworthy and contrariwise to accept it
 as trustworthy, will cause the same thing to be at
 once trustworthy and untrustworthy. For in order to
 prove that we should not converse in accordance with
 common usage, they introduce analogy ; but analogy
 is not made secure unless it has common usage to
 support it ; so by rejecting common usage by means 202
 of common usage, they will cause the same thing to
 be at once trustworthy and untrustworthy. Unless,
 indeed, they shall declare that they do not accept
 and reject simultaneously the same common usage,
 but reject one sort and accept another sort. And
 that is what is said by the School of Pindarion.
 Analogy, they say, confessedly sets out from common
 usage ; for it is the consideration of the like and the 203
 unlike, and the like and the unlike are derived from
 approved common usage, and the poetry of Homer is
 that which is approved and most ancient ; for no
 poem older than his poetry has come down to us.
 Thus we shall converse following the usage of Homer.
 But, in the first place, it is not agreed by all that 204
 Homer is the most ancient poet ; for some say that

ἔνιοι γὰρ Ἡσίοδον προήκειν τοῖς χρόνοις λέγουσιν,
 Λίνον τε καὶ Ὀρφέα καὶ Μουσαῖον καὶ ἄλλους
 παμπληθεῖς. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ πῦθάνον ἐστὶ γεγο-
 νέναι μὲν τινὰς πρὸ αὐτοῦ καὶ κατ' αὐτὸν ποιητάς,
 ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὸς πού φησι

τὴν γὰρ αἰοιδὴν μᾶλλον ἐπικλείουσ' ἄνθρωποι
 ἤτις ἀκούοντεςσι νεωτάτῃ ἀμφιπέληται,

τούτους δὲ ὑπὸ τῆς περὶ αὐτὸν λαμπρότητος
 205 ἐπεσκοπήσθαι. καὶ εἰ ἀρχαιότατος δὲ ὁμολογοῖτο
 τυγχάνειν Ὀμηρος, οὐδὲν εἴρηται ὑπὸ τοῦ Πιν-
 δαρίωνος ἰκνούμενον. ὥσπερ γὰρ προηγοροῦμεν
 περὶ τοῦ πότερόν ποτε τῇ συνηθείᾳ ἢ τῇ ἀναλογίᾳ
 χρηστέον, οὕτω καὶ νῦν διαφορήσομεν πότερον
 τῇ συνηθείᾳ ἢ τῇ ἀναλογίᾳ, καὶ εἰ τῇ συνηθείᾳ,
 ἀρα τῇ καθ' Ὀμηρον ἢ τῇ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων.
 206 πρὸς ὅπερ οὐδὲν εἴρηται. εἶτα κἀκείνην μάλιστα
 δεῖ τὴν συνηθειαν μεταδιώκειν ἢ προσχρώμενοι
 οὐ γελασθησόμεθα· τῇ δὲ Ὀμηρικῇ κατακολου-
 θοῦντες οὐ χωρὶς γέλωτος ἐλληνιοῦμεν, μάρτυροι
 λέγοντες καὶ "σπάρτα λέλυνται" καὶ ἄλλα τού-
 των ἀποπώτερα. τοίνυν οὐδ' οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος
 ὑγιής, μετὰ τοῦ συγκεχωρηθῆαι τὸ κατασκευα-
 ζόμενον ὑφ' ἡμῶν, τουτέστι τὸ μὴ χρῆσθαι ἀνα-
 207 λογίᾳ. τί γὰρ διήνεγκεν εἶτ' ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν πολλῶν
 εἶτ' ἐπὶ τὴν Ὀμήρου συνηθειαν ἔλθειν; ὥς γὰρ
 ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν τηρήσεώς ἐστι χρεία ἄλλ'
 οὐ τεχνικῆς ἀναλογίας, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς Ὀμήρου
 τηρήσαντες γὰρ αὐτοὶ πῶς εἴωθε λέγειν, οὕτω καὶ
 208 διαλεξόμεθα. τὸ δὲ ὄλον, ὥς αὐτὸς Ὀμηρος οὐκ
 ἀναλογία προσεχρήσατο ἀλλὰ τῇ τῶν κατ' αὐτὸν
 ἀνθρώπων συνηθείᾳ κατηκολούθησεν, οὕτω καὶ

Hesiod preceded him in time, Linos, too, and Orpheus
 and Musaeus and a host of others. And, in fact, it is
 probable that there were some poets before Homer
 and in his time (since he himself says somewhere a—

Surely that song above all by men is most loudly applauded
 Which to their listening ears as the newest of songs re-
 soundeth),

and that these poets were eclipsed by his own brilli-
 ance. And even if it should be agreed that Homer 205
 is the most ancient, what Pindarion has asserted is
 not convincing. For just as we questioned before
 whether one should adopt common usage or analogy,
 so, too, now we shall be in doubt whether to adopt
 common usage or analogy; and if usage, is it to be
 that of Homer or that of all other men; and as to this
 Pindarion has said nothing. Further, we should 206
 follow that usage above all the adoption of which will
 not bring ridicule upon us; but if we follow Homer's,
 our Greek speech will not escape ridicule, when we
 say μάρτυροι (for μάρτυρες) ^b and σπάρτα λέλυνται (for
 σπάρτα λέλυται), ^c and other things still more absurd.
 Neither, then, is this argument sound, besides the
 fact that our contention is conceded, namely, that
 analogy should not be used. For what's the odds 207
 whether we have recourse to the usage of the many
 or to that of Homer? For just as there is need of
 observation, but not of technical analogy, in the case
 of the usage of the many, so there is also in the case
 of that of Homer; for when we have observed how he
 is wont to speak, we ourselves too will converse in the
 same way. To sum up, just as Homer himself made 208
 no use of analogy but followed the usage of the men of

^a Cf. Hom. Od. i. 351 f.

^b Cf. Hom. Il. ii. 302.

^c Cf. Hom. Il. ii. 135.

ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἀναλογίας πάντως ἐξόμεθα βεβαιωτὴν ἐχούσης Ὅμηρον, ἀλλὰ τὴν συνήθειαν τῶν καθ' αὐτοὺς ἀνθρώπων παραπλασόμεθα.

- 209 Ἄρτι μὲν οὖν ἐκ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς γραμματικούς ἀκολουθίας συνήκται τὸ παρέλκειν μὲν τὴν ἀναλογίαν πρὸς ἑλληνισμὸν, ἐπιχρηστεῖν δὲ τὴν τῆς συνηθείας παρατήρησιν· δῆλον δὲ ἴσως ἔσται ἐκ
210 τῶν ῥητῶν. ὀριζόμενοι γὰρ τὸν τε βαρβαρισμὸν καὶ τὸν σολοικισμὸν φασὶ “βαρβαρισμὸς ἐστὶ παράπτωσις ἐν ἀπλῇ λέξει παρὰ τὴν κοινὴν συνήθειαν” καὶ “σολοικισμὸς ἐστὶ παράπτωσις ἀσυνήθης κατὰ τὴν ὄλην σύνταξιν καὶ ἀνακόλουθος.”
211 πρὸς ἃ δυνάμεθα λέγειν εὐθύς, ἀλλ' εἰ ὁ μὲν βαρβαρισμὸς ἐστὶν ἐν ἀπλῇ λέξει ὁ δὲ σολοικισμὸς ἐν συνθέσει λέξεων, δεδεικται δὲ ἔμπροσθεν ὡς οὔτε ἀπλῆ ἔστι λέξις τις οὔτε σύνθεσις λέξεων,
212 οὐδὲν ἐστὶ βαρβαρισμὸς ἢ σολοικισμὸς. πάλιν εἰ ἐν λέξει μιᾷ ὁ βαρβαρισμὸς νοεῖται καὶ ἐν συνθέσει λέξεων ὁ σολοικισμὸς, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις πράγμασι, πῶς ἡμάρτον εἰπὼν “οὔτος,” δείκνυμι δὲ γυναῖκα, ἢ “αὐτῆ,” δείκνυμι δὲ νεανίαν; οὔτε γὰρ ἐσολοίκισα· οὐ γὰρ σύνθεσιν πολλῶν ἀκαταλλήλων λέξεων προηνεγκάμην, ἀλλ'
213 ἀπλὴν τὴν οὔτος λέξιν ἢ αὐτῆ· οὐτ' ἐβαρβάρισα· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀσύνηθες εἶχεν ἢ οὔτος λέξις, ὡς ἢ παρὰ τοῖς Ἀλεξανδρεῦσιν ἐλήλυθαν καὶ ἀπελήλυθαν.

Πλὴν τοιαῦτα μὲν πολλὰ πρὸς τοὺς γραμματικούς
214 τικούς ἐνδέχεται λέγειν· ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοκῶμεν ἐν πᾶσιν ἀπορητικοὶ τυγχάνειν, ἐπὶ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν ἀναδραμόντες φήσομεν ὡς εἴπερ ὁ βαρ-

his age, so too will we by no means cleave to an analogous form which has the authority of Homer, but will conform our speech to the usage of the men of our own age.

So it has just been concluded by the method of 209 pressing the Grammarians' arguments against themselves, that analogy is superfluous for "hellenism," whereas the observance of common usage is serviceable; and this will, no doubt, be plain from their own assertions. Thus in defining "barbarism" and 210 "solecism" they say that "barbarism is a blunder in a single word contrary to common usage,"^a and "solecism is a blunder contravening common usage in respect of the whole construction, and incoherent." To this we can at once reply, that if the "barbarism" 211 is in a single word and the "solecism" in a combination of words, and it has been shown above^b that no simple word nor any combination of words exists, then neither "barbarism" nor "solecism" is anything. Again, if the "barbarism" is perceived in 212 one word and the "solecism" in a combination of words, but not in the underlying objects, how am I wrong in saying οὔτος when I point to a woman, or αὐτῆ when I point to a young man? For I have not committed a solecism, since I have not uttered a combination of many incongruous words, but only the single word οὔτος or αὐτῆ; nor have I been 213 guilty of a barbarism, for the word οὔτος contains nothing contrary to common usage, as does the Alexandrians' ἐλήλυθαν and ἀπελήλυθαν.^c

However, it is possible to bring many such arguments against the Grammarians. But lest we should 214 seem to be sceptical about everything, returning to the original theme we shall assert that if a "bar-

^a Cf. § 231.

^b Cf. §§ 131, 165 ff.

^c Instead of the regular 3 pers. plur. endings in -θασι.

βαρισμός παράπτωσις ἐστὶ παρὰ τὴν κοινὴν συν-
 ήθειαν ἐν μιᾷ λέξει θεωρούμενος, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ
 ὁ σολοικισμὸς ἐν πολλαῖς λέξεσι τὴν ὑπόστασιν
 λαμβάνων, καὶ ἔστι βάρβαρον μὲν τὸ τράπεσα
 διὰ τὸ μὴ σύνηθες εἶναι τὸ ῥῆμα, σόλοικον δὲ τὸ
 “πολλὰ περιπατήσας κοπιᾷ μου τὰ σκέλη” διὰ
 τὸ μὴ λέγεσθαι τῇ κοινῇ συνηθείᾳ, ὡμολόγηται
 ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἀναλογιστικὴ τέχνη ὄνομα κενόν ἐστὶ
 πρὸς τὸ μὴ βαρβαρίζειν ἢ σολοικίζειν, δεῖ δὲ τὴν
 συνήθειαν παρατηρεῖν καὶ ἀκολουθῶν αὐτῇ δια-
 215 λέγεσθαι. εἰ μὲν γὰρ μετακαθίσαντες λέγουεν
 βαρβαρισμὸν ἀπλῶς παράπτωσιν ἐν ἀπλῇ λέξει,
 δίχα τοῦ προσθεῖναι τὸ παρὰ τὴν κοινὴν συνή-
 θειαν, καὶ σολοικισμὸν παράπτωσιν κατὰ τὴν ὅλην
 σύνταξιν καὶ ἀνακόλουθον, χωρὶς τοῦ παραλαβεῖν τὸ
 ἀσύνηθες, ἔτι¹ χειρόν τι κινήσουσιν ἑαυτοῖς πρᾶγμα.
 τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα καθ’ ὅλην τὴν σύνταξιν ἀνακολου-
 θοῦντα² ἔξουσιν, “Ἀθῆναι καλὴ πόλις, Ὁρέσσης
 καλὴ τραγωδία, ἡ βουλή οἱ ἐξακόσιοι.” ἂ δεήσει
 σολοικισμοὺς λέγειν, οὐχὶ δὲ γε σολοικισμοὶ
 216 τυγχάνουσι διὰ τὸ σύνηθες. οὐκ ἄρα ψιλῇ τῇ
 ἀκολουθίᾳ κριτέον τὸν σολοικισμὸν, ἀλλὰ τῇ
 συνηθείᾳ.

Εὐδ’ ἂν ἔχοι καὶ μετὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς ἀκολουθίας
 καὶ τῶν ῥητῶν ἔνστασιν ἔτι καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς κατὰ τὸ
 217 ὅμοιον μεταβάσεως αὐτοὺς δυσωπεῖν. εἴπερ γὰρ
 τοῦ ὁμοίου θεωρητικοὶ καθεστήκασιν, ἐπεὶ τῶ
 εἰς ἀντικνήμιον τύπτεσθαι ἀνάλογόν ἐστὶ τὸ εἰς

¹ ἔτι scripsi: ἡ mss., Bekk.: ἡ Fabr.

² ἀνακολουθοῦντα Fabr.: ἀκολουθοῦντα mss., Bekk.

^a The usual construction would have περιπατήσαντος, genitive agreeing with μου (“My legs ache from walking much”).

barism” is a blunder contrary to common usage and
 observed in a single word, and likewise a “solecism”
 finds its existence in a number of words, and the
 word τράπεσα (for τράπεζα, “a table”) is a barbarism
 because it is contrary to common usage, and the
 sentence πολλὰ περιπατήσας κοπιᾷ μου τὰ σκέλη^a is a
 solecism because it is a construction not employed in
 common usage,—then, if so, it is conceded that the
 art of analogy is an empty name, useless for the
 avoidance of barbarisms or solecisms, and one ought
 to observe the rules of common speech, and converse
 in accordance therewith. For if they were to change 215
 their ground and say simply that “barbarism” is a
 “blunder in a single word,” without adding “con-
 trary to common usage,” and that “solecism” is “a
 blunder in respect of the whole construction and
 incoherent,” without the addition of “contravening
 common usage,” they will bring upon themselves a
 still worse consequence. For “in respect of the whole
 construction” they will have such “incoherent”
 sentences as these,—Ἀθῆναι καλὴ πόλις, Ὁρέσσης
 καλὴ τραγωδία, ἡ βουλή οἱ ἐξακόσιοι,^b which they will
 have to term “solecisms,” whereas they are not
 solecisms because in common use. Hence, the sole- 216
 cism is not to be judged by grammatical concord
 alone but by common usage.

After our objection based on pressing their argu-
 ments and on their rules^c it would be well also to
 put them to shame in respect of transition based on
 analogy. For if they are observant of similarity, inas- 217
 much as εἰς τὴν ῥίνα τύπτεσθαι (“to be struck on the

^b Termed “solecisms” because (1) Ἀθῆναι is plur. in agreement with the sing. καλὴ πόλις; (2) Ὁρέσσης masc. with fem. καλὴ τραγωδία; (3) ἡ βουλή fem. sing. with masc. plur. οἱ ἐξακόσιοι.

^c Cf. § 209.

τὴν ῥίνα τύπτεσθαι καὶ τὸ εἰς τὴν γαστέρα, λέγεται δὲ τὸ πρῶτον ἀντικνημάζειν, ἀναλόγως καὶ τὸ γαστρίζειν ἢ μυκτηρίζειν. τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἰππάζεσθαι καὶ κατακρημνίζεσθαι καὶ ἠλιάζεσθαι ὑποδεικτέον. οὐ λέγομεν δὲ ταῦτα διὰ τὸ παρὰ τὴν κοινὴν εἶναι συνήθειαν· τοῖνυν οὐδὲ τὸ κηῖσω οὐδὲ τὸ φερῖσω καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα, ἅπερ ἀναλογίας ἐστὶν ὀφειλόμενα λέγεσθαι, διὰ τὸ μὴ

218 κατὰ τὴν συνήθειαν λέγεσθαι. οὐ μὴν ἄλλ' εἶπερ ἄριστα μὲν θρακιστὶ διαλέγεσθαι φαμεν τὸν ὡς σύννηθές ἐστι Θραξὶ διαλεγόμενον, καὶ κάλλιστα Ῥωμαῖστὶ τὸν ὡς σύννηθες Ῥωμαίους, ἀκολουθήσει καὶ τὸ ἑλληνιστὶ ὑγιῶς διαλέγεσθαι τὸν ὡς σύννηθες Ἕλλησι διαλεγόμενον, ἐὰν τῇ συνηθείᾳ ἀλλὰ μὴ τῇ διατάξει κατακολουθῶμεν. τῇ ἄρα συνηθείᾳ, οὐ τῇ ἀναλογίᾳ κατακολουθοῦντες ἑλληνιοῦμεν.

219 καθόλου τε ἤτοι σύμφωνός ἐστι τῇ συνηθείᾳ ἢ ἀναλογία ἢ διάφωνος. καὶ εἰ μὲν σύμφωνος, πρῶτον μὲν ὡς ἐκείνη οὐκ ἐστὶ τεχνικὴ, οὕτως οὐδὲ αὕτη γενήσεται τέχνη· τὸ γὰρ ἀτεχνία συμφωνοῦν πάντως καὶ αὐτὸ ἐστὶν ἀτεχνον. καὶ ἄλλως τὸ κατ' ἐκείνην ἑλληνικὸν καὶ κατὰ ταύτην¹ ἐκείνην συμφωνοῦσαν γενήσεται ἑλληνικόν, καὶ τὸ κατ'

220 ἐκείνην ἔσται τοιοῦτον. τούτου δ' οὕτως ἔχοντος οὐ δεησόμεθα τῆς ἀναλογίας πρὸς διάγνωσιν τοῦ ἑλληνισμοῦ, ἔχοντες εἰς τοῦτο τὴν συνήθειαν. εἰ δὲ διάφωνός ἐστιν αὕτη, πάντως ἐτέραν εἰσηγούμενὴν συνήθειαν παρ' ἐκείνην καὶ οἰονεὶ βάρβαρον ἀδόκιμος γενήσεται καὶ ὡς προσκοπήν ἐμποιοῦσα τελέως ἄχρηστος.

¹ κατὰ ταύτην scripsi: κατ' αὐτήν mss., Bekk. (? εἰ) τὸ κατὰ ταύτην, deletis κατ' ἐκ. ἑλλ.).

nose ") and εἰς τὴν γαστέρα (" on the belly ") are analogous to εἰς ἀντικνήμιον τύπτεσθαι (" to be struck on the shin "), and this is expressed by ἀντικνημάζειν, we must also say by analogy γαστρίζειν or μυκτηρίζειν. Other examples of the same rule are ἰππάζεσθαι (" to be driven ") and κατακρημνίζεσθαι (" to be thrown down headlong ") and ἠλιάζεσθαι (" to sun oneself "). But we do not employ these words since they are contrary to common usage. So, too, we do not use the forms κηῖσω or φερῖσω, or any of the other formations which by analogy ought to be used, because they do not conform to the common 218 usage. If, however, we declare that he talks the best Thracian who talks as is customary with the Thracians, and he the best Latin who talks as is customary with the Romans, then it will follow that he who talks as is customary with the Greeks is talking good Greek, if we are to follow customary usage and not an artificial system. Thus by following common usage and not 219 analogy we shall speak good Greek.—In general, too, analogy either agrees with common usage or disagrees. And if it agrees, then, firstly, since the latter is not a matter of art, so too the former will not be an art; for what agrees with the artless must certainly be artless itself.—Further, what is Greek according to common usage will also be Greek according to analogy which agrees therewith, and the Greek commonly used will be of that kind. This being so, 220 we shall not need analogy for distinguishing good Greek, since for this purpose we possess common usage. If, on the other hand, analogy disagrees, then, since it introduces another usage beside the common,—that of barbarians, as it were,—it will be disapproved and, as causing offence, it will be completely useless.

221 Ἐπιχειρητέον δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς συστάσεως τῆς τέχνης αὐτῶν. θέλουσι μὲν γὰρ καθολικά τινα θεωρήματα συστησάμενοι ἀπὸ τούτων πάντα τὰ κατὰ μέρος κρίνειν ὀνόματα, εἴτε ἑλληνικά ἐστὶν εἴτε καὶ μὴ· οὐ δύνανται δὲ [καὶ] τοῦτο ποιεῖν διὰ τὸ μῆτε τὸ καθολικὸν αὐτοῖς συγχωρεῖσθαι ὅτι καθολικὸν ἐστὶ, μῆτ' ἄλλως ἀναπτυσσόμενον τοῦτο 222 τὴν τοῦ καθολικοῦ σώζειν φύσιν. λαμβανέσθω δὲ εἰς τοῦτο παράδειγμα ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν γραμματικῶν. ζητήσεως γὰρ οὔσης ἐπὶ τινος τῶν κατὰ μέρος ὀνομάτων, οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ εὐμενῆς, πότερον χωρὶς τοῦ σ προενεκτέον ἐστὶ τὴν πλάγιον πτώσιν, εὐμενοῦ λέγοντας, ἢ σὺν τῷ σ, εὐμενοῦς, πάρεσιν οἱ γραμματικοὶ καθολικὸν τι προφερόμενοι καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου τὸ ζητούμενον βεβαιοῦντες. φασι γὰρ “ πᾶν ὄνομα ἀπλοῦν, εἰς ἧς λήγον, ὀξύτονον, τουτὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης σὺν τῷ σ κατὰ τὴν γενικὴν ἐξενεχθήσεται, οἷον εὐφυῆς εὐφυοῦς, εὐσεβῆς εὐσεβοῦς, εὐκλεῆς εὐκλεοῦς. τοῖνυν καὶ τὸ εὐμενῆς ὀξύτόνως ἐκφερόμενον παραπλησίως τούτοις 223 λέγοντας.” οὐκ ᾔδεσαν δὲ οἱ θαυμάσιοι πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ὁ εὐμενοῦ ἀξίων λέγειν οὐ δώσει αὐτοῖς καθολικὸν εἶναι τὸ παράπηγμα· τοῦτο γοῦν αὐτὸ τὸ εὐμενῆς ἀπλοῦν ὄνομα καθεστῶς καὶ ὀξύτονον οὐ φήσει σὺν τῷ σ ἐκφέρεσθαι, ἀλλὰ ἐκείνους τὸ 224 ζητούμενον ὡς ὁμολογούμενον συναρπάζειν. ἄλλως τε, εἰ καθολικὸν ἐστὶ τὸ παράπηγμα, ἦτοι πάντα τὰ κατὰ μέρος ὀνόματα ἐπελθόντες καὶ τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀναλογίαν κατανοήσαντες συνέθεσαν αὐτό, ἢ οὐ πάντα. ἀλλὰ πάντα μὲν οὐκ ἐπεληλύθασιν· ἄπειρα γὰρ ἐστὶ, τῶν δὲ ἀπειρῶν οὐκ ἔστι τις

One may argue also from the structure of their Art. 221 For after constructing certain universal rules they desire to judge by these all the particular words, as to whether they are good Greek or not ; but this they are unable to do since it is not conceded to them that their “ universal ” is universal, nor yet that it retains its nature as universal when applied in detail. To 222 make this clear let us take an example from the Grammarians themselves. When an inquiry is made respecting one of the particular words, such as εὐμενῆς, as to whether one should form the genitive case without the σ, and say εὐμενοῦ, or with the σ, εὐμενοῦς, the Grammarians come forward and propose a universal rule, and by this establish the point in question. For they assert that “ every simple word ending in ης and oxytone must necessarily be declined in the genitive with σ, as for instance εὐφυῆς εὐφυοῦς, εὐσεβῆς εὐσεβοῦς, εὐκλεῆς εὐκλεοῦς. Hence, as εὐμενῆς, like these, is pronounced as oxytone, we must decline it in the genitive with σ, and say εὐμενοῦς.” But our estimable friends failed to notice that, in 223 the first place, he who claims to say εὐμενοῦ will not grant them that their rule is universal: he will assert that this very word εὐμενῆς, which is a single word and oxytone, is not declined with a σ ; but they, by taking as settled the point in doubt, “ beg the question.”—Furthermore, if the rule is 224 universal, they have constructed it either after surveying all the particular words and noting the analogy they present, or else not all of them. But they have not surveyed all of them, for they are infinite in number, and there is no knowledge of

γνώσις. εἰ δὲ τινά, πόθεν ὅτι πᾶν ὄνομα τοιοῦτόν
 ἔστιν; οὐ γὰρ ὅτι τισὶ συμβέβηκεν ὀνόμασι, τοῦτο
 225 καὶ πᾶσιν. ἀλλ' εἰσὶ τινες οἱ πρὸς τοῦτο γελοίως
 ἀπαντῶντες καὶ λέγοντες ὅτι ἐκ πλείονων ἔστι
 τὸ καθολικὸν παράπηγμα. οὐχ εἴρων γὰρ ὅτι
 πρῶτον μὲν ἄλλο τί ἔστι τὸ καθολικὸν καὶ ἄλλο
 τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, καὶ τὸ μὲν καθολικὸν οὐδέ-
 ποτε ἡμᾶς διαψεύδεται, τὸ δ' ὡς τὸ πολὺ κατὰ
 226 τὸ σπάνιον· εἶθ' ὅτι καὶ εἰ ἐκ πολλῶν ἔστι τὸ
 καθολικόν, οὐ πάντως τὸ τοῖς πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι
 συμβεβηκός, τοῦτο ἔξ ἀνάγκης καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς
 ὁμοειδέσι συμβέβηκεν, ἀλλ' ὄν τρόπον ἐν πολλοῖς
 καὶ ἄλλοις φέρει τινὰ κατὰ μονοειδειαν ἢ φύσις,
 ὅλον ἐν ὄφεσι μὲν ἀπίροισι οὖσι τὸν κεράστην
 κερασφόρον, ἐν τετράποσι δὲ τὸν ἐλέφαντα προ-
 βοσκίδι κεχρημένον, ἐν ἰχθύσι δὲ τὸν γαλεὸν
 ζωοτόκον, ἐν λίθοις δὲ τὸν μάγνητα σιδηραγωγόν,
 οὕτως εὐλογόν ἔστι καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς ὁμοιοπτῶτοις
 ὀνόμασιν εἶναί τι ὄνομα ὃ μὴ ὁμοίως τοῖς πολλοῖς
 227 ὀνόμασι κλίνεται. ὅθεν παρέντες ζητεῖν εἰ ἀνά-
 λογόν ἔστι τοῖς πολλοῖς, σκοπῶμεν πῶς αὐτῷ
 χρῆται ἢ συνήθεια, πότερον ἀνάλογον ἐκείνοις ἢ
 κατὰ ἴδιον τύπον· καὶ ὡς ἂν ἢ χρωμένη, οὕτω καὶ
 ἡμεῖς προοισόμεθα.

Περιδιωκόμενοι δὴ ποικίλως οἱ γραμματικοί
 228 θέλουσιν ἀναστρέφειν τὴν ἀπορίαν. πολλαὶ γάρ,
 φασίν, εἰσὶ συνήθειαι, καὶ ἄλλη μὲν Ἀθηναίων
 ἄλλη δὲ Λακεδαιμονίων, καὶ πάλιν Ἀθηναίων
 διαφέρουσα μὲν ἢ παλαιὰ ἐξηλλαγμένη δὲ ἢ νῦν,

infinites. And if they have surveyed some, how do
 they know that every word is of a like kind? For
 that which is a property of some words is not a
 property of all. But to this there are some who make 225
 an absurd reply, saying that the universal rule is
 based on the majority of cases. For they have failed
 to see that, firstly, what is "universal" is one thing
 and what holds good "for the most part" is another,
 and that which is universally true we never find false,
 but what is true "for the most part" is false occa-
 sionally; nor, secondly, have they seen that even if 226
 the universal is composed of many, it is not always
 the case that the property of the many words is
 necessarily the property of all words similarly formed,
 but just as in many other things nature produces
 some with a unique form,—as, for instance, the
 horned "cerastes" among the infinite number of
 serpents, and amongst quadrupeds the elephant
 furnished with a proboscis, and amongst fish the
 viviparous shark, and amongst stones the magnet
 which attracts iron,—so also it is reasonable that
 amongst the many words of similar declension there
 should exist a certain word which is not declined like
 the many words. Hence, let us forgo any inquiry 227
 as to its analogy with the many and consider how it
 is treated by common usage, whether as analogous
 to the many or as a peculiar type; and whichever
 way it is treated, in that way we too will pronounce it.

The Grammarians, then, being chased round by
 various means, desire to reverse the Sceptics' argu-
 ment. The usages of speech, they say, are many,— 228
 there is one of the Athenians, another of the Lacedaemonians;
 and of the Athenians, again, the old
 usage is of one sort and the present usage of a differ-

καὶ οὐχ ἢ αὐτὴ μὲν τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἀγροικίαν ἢ αὐτὴ δὲ τῶν ἐν ἄστει διατριβόντων, παρὸ καὶ ὁ κωμικός λέγει Ἀριστοφάνης

διάλεκτον ἔχοντα μέσσην πόλεως,
οὔτ' ἀστείαν ὑποθηλυτέραν
οὔτ' ἀνελεύθερον ὑπαγροικότεραν.

- 229 πολλῶν οὖν οὐσῶν συνηθειῶν, [ὡς] φασί, ποῖα χρησόμεθα; οὔτε γὰρ πάσαις κατακολουθεῖν δυνατὸν διὰ τὸ μάχεσθαι πολλάκις, οὔτε τινὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν, ἐὰν μὴ τις τεχνικῶς προκριθῆ. ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν, φήσομεν, τὸ ζητεῖν ποῖα χρηστέον συνηθεία ἐστὶν ἴσον τῷ εἶναι τινα τέχνην περὶ ἑλληνισμὸν. αὐτὴ γάρ, φημί δ' ἢ ἀναλογία, ὁμοίου καὶ ἀνομοίου ἐστὶ θεωρία· τὸ δὲ ὅμοιον καὶ ἀνόμοιον λαμβάνετε ἀπὸ τῆς συνηθείας· κἂν μὲν ἢ τετριμμένον, χρησθε αὐτῷ, εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐκέτι.
- 230 πεισόμεθα οὖν καὶ ἡμεῖς, ἀπὸ ποίας συνηθείας λαμβάνετε τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόμοιον; πολλὰ γάρ εἰσι καὶ πολλάκις μαχόμεναί. ὅπερ δὲ ἀπολογούμενοι πρὸς τοῦτο ἐρείτε, τοῦτο καὶ παρ' ἡμῶν ἀκούσεσθε. καὶ πάλιν ὅταν λέγητε τὸν βαρβαρισμὸν παράπτωσιν ἐν ἀπλῇ λέξει παρὰ τὴν συνηθειαν, ἀνταπορήσομεν λέγοντες ποίαν φατέ πολλῶν οὐσῶν, καὶ ἢ ἂν εἴπητε, ταύτη φήσομεν
- 232 καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀκολουθεῖν. κοινῆς οὖν οὐσης ἀπορίας οὐκ ἀπορος ἢ παρ' ἡμῶν ταύτης ἐστὶ λύσις. τῶν γὰρ συνηθειῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσι κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας αἱ δὲ κατὰ τὸν βίον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ὀνομάτων τινῶν ἐστὶν ἀποδοχὴ καὶ ἐν ἰατρικῇ ἐξαιρέτως, καὶ ἤδη κατὰ μουσικὴν καὶ γεωμετρίαν. ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ βιωτικὴ τις ἀφελῆς συνηθεία τῶν

ent sort; and that of country folk is not the same as that of townspeople, so that Aristophanes the comic poet says,^a—

Speaking like middle-class citizens all,
Not with the fop's effeminate drawl,
Nor with the rustics' vulgar bawl.

The usages, then, being many, which of them (they 229 ask) are we to adopt? For it is not possible to follow them all, since they often conflict, nor yet some one of them, unless some one be preferred on grounds of art. But firstly, we shall reply, to inquire which usage should be adopted is equivalent to asserting the existence of an art of "hellenism." And this art,—I mean "analogy,"—is the consideration of the similar and dissimilar^b; and you take over the similar and dissimilar from common usage; and if it be a form in current use you employ it, otherwise you do not. So we 230 too shall inquire from which usage do you take over the similar and dissimilar. For usages are many and often conflicting. And the answer you give, in self-defence, to this question is what you shall hear in turn from us. And again, when you say that a "barbar- 231 ism" is a blunder in a single word contrary to common usage, we shall retort with the question, "Which of the many usages do you mean?" and whichever you mention, that, we will say, is the one we too follow. The doubt, then, being shared by us both, the solution 232 we give of it is not open to doubt. Of usages in speech some are found in the sciences, some in ordinary converse. Thus in philosophy and in medicine especially certain terms are in favour, and so too in music and geometry. And there is the plain untechnical usage of

^a Cf. Arist. *Frag.* 552 (Dindorf).

^b Cf. § 202.

- 233 ἰδιωτῶν, κατὰ πόλεις καὶ ἔθνη διαφέρουσα. ὅθεν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ μὲν τῇ τῶν φιλοσόφων στοιχῆσομεν, ἐν ἰατρικῇ δὲ τῇ ἰατρικωτέρᾳ, ἐν δὲ τῷ βίῳ τῇ συνηθεστέρᾳ καὶ ἀπερίττῳ καὶ ἐπιχωριαζούσῃ.
- 234 παρὸ καὶ διχῶς τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος λεγομένου πειρασόμεθα πρὸς τὰ παρόντα ἀρμολόμενοι πρόσωπα τὸ μὴ γελῶμενον προφέρεσθαι, ὁποῖόν ποτ' ἂν ᾖ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν. οἷον τὸ αὐτὸ ἀρτοφόριον καὶ πανάριον λέγεται, καὶ πάλιν τὸ αὐτὸ σταμνίον καὶ ἀμίδιον καὶ ἕγδις καὶ θυῖα. ἀλλὰ στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ καλῶς ἔχοντος καὶ σαφῶς καὶ τοῦ μὴ γελᾶσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν διακονούντων ἡμῖν παιδαρίων καὶ ἰδιωτῶν πανάριον ἐροῦμεν, καὶ εἰ βάρβαρόν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀρτοφορίδα, καὶ σταμνίον, ἀλλ'
- 235 οὐκ ἀμίδα, καὶ θυῖαν μᾶλλον ἢ ἕγδις. καὶ πάλιν ἐν διαλέξει ἀποβλέποντες πρὸς τοὺς παρόντας τὰς μὲν ἰδιωτικὰς λέξεις παραπέμψομεν, τὴν δὲ ἀστειότεραν καὶ φιλολόγον συνήθειαν μεταδιώσομεν· ὡς γὰρ ἡ φιλολόγος γελᾶται παρὰ τοῖς ἰδιώταις, οὕτως ἡ ἰδιωτικὴ παρὰ τοῖς φιλολόγοις. δεξιῶς οὖν ἐκάστη περιστάσει τὸ πρέπον ἀποδιδόντες δόξομεν ἀμέμπτως ἑλληνίζειν.
- 236 Ἄλλως τε, ἐπεὶ ἐγκαλοῦσιν ὡς ἀνωμάλῳ καὶ πολυειδεῖ τῇ συνηθείᾳ, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀφορμῆς αὐτοῖς ἐγκαλέσομεν. εἰ γὰρ ἡ ἀναλογία ὁμοίου παράθεσις ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ ὁμοῖον ἐκ τῆς συνηθείας, ἡ δὲ συνηθία ἀνωμαλὸς τε καὶ ἀστατος, δεήσει καὶ τὴν ἀναλογίαν μὴ ἔχειν ἐστῶτα παρα-
- 237 πηγμάτα. καὶ τοῦτο πάρεστι διδάσκειν ἐπὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ τῶν ῥημάτων καὶ μετοχῶν καὶ

ordinary folk which differs from one State or Nation to another. Hence, in philosophy we shall fall in with the 233 usage of the philosophers, and in medicine with that proper to that science, and in ordinary intercourse with that which is more usual, free from affectation, and native to the district. Consequently, when the 234 same object is indicated by two names we shall try to suit ourselves to the persons present by employing the name which they do not laugh at, whatever the object's natural name may be. For instance, the same object is called ἀρτοφόριον ("bread-basket") and πανάριον or again σταμνίον and ἀμίδιον ("chamber-pot"), or ἕγδις and θυῖα ("mortar"). But, aiming at propriety and clearness and the avoidance of ridicule from our serving lads and ordinary folk, we shall use the terms πανάριον (even if it is barbarous^a), not ἀρτοφορίς, and σταμνίον, not ἀμῖς, and θυῖα rather than ἕγδις. And 235 again, in serious discussion, having regard to the company present, we shall put aside commonplace phrases and pursue after a more refined and cultured manner of speech; for just as the cultured manner is ridiculed by ordinary folk, so is the ordinary manner by men of culture. Thus, by discreetly adapting our style to suit each occasion, we shall be held to be speaking Greek faultlessly.

Moreover, when they charge common usage with 236 being inconsistent and multiform, we too will make our charge against them on the same grounds. For if "analogy" is "the juxtaposition of the similar," and the similar is taken from common usage, while common usage is inconsistent and variable, it must follow that analogy, too, has no invariable rules. And 237 one can show this in the case of nouns and verbs and

^a i.e. Latin.

καθόλου τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων. οἶον ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ὀνομάτων παρόσον τὰ κατὰ τὰς ὀρθὰς πτώσεις ἀνάλογα ὄντα καὶ ὅμοια, ταῦτα κατὰ τὰς πλαγίους ἀνομοίως τε καὶ οὐκ ἀναλόγως σχηματίζεται, οἶον Ἄρης Χάρης χάρτης—Ἄρεως Χάρητος χάρτου, καὶ Μέμνων Θέων λέων—Μέμνονος Θέωνος λέοντος, Σκόπας μέλας Ἄβας—Σκόπα μέλας Ἄβαντος. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ῥηματικῶν πολλὰ ὁμοίως κατὰ τὸν ἐνεστῶτα χρόνον λεγόμενα οὐκ ἀναλόγως ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις χρόνοις σχηματίζεται, ἐνίων δὲ σύζυγαι τινές ἐκλελοίπασιν, οἶον ἀλλεῖ ἀρέσκει—ἠύληκεν ἀρήρεκεν. καὶ κτείνεται μὲν λέγεται, ἔκτανκε δὲ οὐ λέγεται· ἀλήλιπται μὲν εἴποι τις ἄν, ἠλειπται δὲ οὐκέτι. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν μετοχῶν βοῶν σαρῶν νοῶν—βοῶντος σαροῦντος νοοῦντος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν προσηγοριῶν ἀναξ ἄβαξ—ἀνακτος ἄβακος, γραῦς ναῦς—γραός νηός. ὡσαύτως δὲ

239 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων. ἄρχων γὰρ λέγεται καὶ ὀνοματικῶς καὶ ὁ τὴν ἀρχὴν διέπων· ἀλλ' Ἄρχωνος μὲν γίνεται κατὰ πλάγιον πτῶσιν τὸ ὀνοματικόν, ἄρχοντος δὲ τὸ μετοχικόν. καὶ κατὰ ὅμοιον τρόπον μένων θέων νέων μετοχικὰ ὄντα καὶ ὀνοματικὰ διαφερούσας λαμβάνει τὰς κλίσεις· Μένωνος μὲν γὰρ γίνεται τὸ ὀνοματικόν, μένοντος δὲ ἡ μετοχή, καὶ Θέωνος μὲν τὸ ὀνοματικόν, θέοντος δὲ ἡ

240 μετοχή ἐστίν. πλὴν ἐκ τούτων συμφανὲς ὡς τῆς συνηθείας ἀνωμάλου καθεστῶσης οὐχ ἔστηκε τὰ παραπήγματα τῆς ἀναλογίας, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἀποστάντας αὐτῶν τοῖς κατὰ τὴν συνήθειαν σχηματισμοῖς προσέχω, παρέντας τὸ ἀνάλογον.

participles and all the other forms without exception. For example, in the case of nouns, inasmuch as those which are analogous and similar in the nominative case are formed dissimilarly and not by analogy in the oblique cases,—for instance Ἄρης Χάρης χάρτης—Ἄρεως Χάρητος χάρτου, and Μέμνων Θέων λέων—Μέμνονος Θέωνος λέοντος, and Σκόπας μέλας Ἄβας—Σκόπα μέλας Ἄβαντος. And in the case of verbs, 238 many which are of similar formation in the present tense are not formed by analogy in the other tenses, and the conjugations of some are partly defective,—for instance, ἀλλεῖ ἀρέσκει—ἠύληκεν ἀρήρεκεν. And the form κτείνεται is used, but not ἔκτανκε, and one may say ἀλήλιπται, but not ἠλειπται. In the case of participles we find βοῶν σαρῶν νοῶν—βοῶντος σαροῦντος νοοῦντος: and in the case of substantives ἀναξ ἄβαξ—ἀνακτος ἄβακος, γραῦς ναῦς—γραός νηός. So too with similar cases. Thus, ἄρχων is used both as a 239 proper name and as meaning the holder of office, but the proper name becomes Ἄρχωνος in the genitive case, whereas the participial becomes ἄρχοντος. And in like manner μένων, θέων, νέων, which are participial and also proper nouns, take different declensions; for the proper noun becomes Μένωνος but the participial μένοντος, and the proper noun Θέωνος but the participial θέοντος. In short, it is evident from all this 240 that, as common usage is inconsistent, the rules of analogy are not fixed, but we must necessarily depart from them and hold by the forms used in common speech, forsaking analogy.

ΙΑ'.—ΠΕΡΙ ΕΤΥΜΟΛΟΓΙΑΣ

241 Τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ λεκτέον πρὸς αὐτοὺς καὶ ὅταν δι' ἐτυμολογίας κρίνειν θέλωσι τὸν ἑλληνισμόν. πάλιν γὰρ ἦτοι σύμφωνός ἐστι τῇ συνηθείᾳ ἢ ἐτυμολογία ἢ διάφωνος· καὶ εἰ μὲν σύμφωνος, παρέλκει, εἰ δὲ διάφωνος, οὐ χρηστέον αὐτῇ ὡς προσκοπὴν ἐμποιοῦση μᾶλλον τοῦ βαρβαρίζειν ἢ σολοικίζειν. καὶ καθόλου μετακτέον τὰς ὁμοίας ἀντιρρήσεις

242 ταῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἡμῖν ἀποδοθείσαις. ἰδιαίτερον δὲ ἐκεῖνο λεκτέον. τὸ ἐτυμολογία κρινόμενον ὄνομα ὅτι ἑλληνικόν ἐστιν, ἦτοι ἔτυμα πάντως ἔχειν ὀφείλει τὰ προηγούμενα αὐτοῦ ὀνόματα ἢ εἰς τινα τῶν φυσικῶς ἀναφωνηθέντων καταλήγειν. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀπὸ ἐτύμων πάντων, κατὰ τοῦτο εἰς ἄπειρον τῆς ἐκπτώσεως γινομένης ἀναρχος ἔσται ἢ ἐτυμολογία, καὶ οὐκ εἰσόμεθα εἰ ἑλληνικόν ἐστι τὸ ἔσχατον λεγόμενον ὄνομα, ἀγνοοῦντες ποῖον ἦν

243 τὸ ἀπ' οὗ πρῶτον κατάγεται. οἶον εἰ ὁ λύχνος εἴρηται ἀπὸ τοῦ λύειν τὸ νύχλος, ὀφείλομεν μαθεῖν εἰ καὶ τὸ νύχλος ἀπὸ τίνος ἑλληνικοῦ εἴρηται, καὶ τοῦτο πάλιν ἀπ' ἄλλου· καὶ οὕτως εἰς ἄπειρον γινομένης τῆς ἀνόδου, καὶ ἀνευρέτου καθεστῶτος τοῦ πρῶτον ἀναφωνηθέντος ὀνόματος, συνακαταληπτεῖται καὶ τὸ εἰ ἑλληνικῶς ὁ λύχνος εἴρηται.

244 εἰ δὲ ἐπὶ τινα τῶν ἀνετύμως κειμένων ὀνομάτων καταλήγοι τὸ ἐτυμολογούμενον ὄνομα, ὃν τρόπον ἐκεῖνα τὰ εἰς ἃ κατέληξεν οὐ διότι ἔστιν ἔτυμα παραδεξόμεθα, ἀλλὰ διότι τέτριπται κατὰ τὴν συνήθειαν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ δι' ἐτυμολογίας κρινόμενον

136

CHAPTER XI.—CONCERNING ETYMOLOGY

We must also use the same arguments against them 241 when they propose to judge "hellenism" by "etymology." Once again, etymology either agrees or disagrees with common usage; and if it agrees it is superfluous, while if it disagrees one should not make use of it, as that would cause more offence than using barbarisms or solecisms. And in general one may transfer and apply counter-arguments similar to those already set forth. But this special objection should 242 be stated:—The word which is adjudged to be "hellenic" by etymology must either have the words which precede it as in all cases its *etyma* (or "true roots"), or be traced back to some word naturally pronounced. And if it is derived in all cases from *etyma*, since in this respect there is a regress *ad infinitum*, the etymology will be without a beginning, and we will not know whether the ultimate word is good Greek, seeing that we do not know the nature of the word from which it is first derived. Thus, if the 243 word λύχνος ("lamp") comes from λύειν τὸ νύχλος ("dissolving the darkness"), we ought to find out whether νύχλος comes from a Greek word, and this in turn from another; and as the regress thus goes on *ad infinitum* and the word first pronounced is indiscoverable therewith it is rendered impossible to ascertain whether λύχνος is a good Greek word. If, on the 244 other hand, the word of which the etymology is sought should be traced back to some words which are without *etyma* (or "roots"), just as we shall admit the words from which they are derived not because they are *etyma* but because they are current in common usage, so also we shall admit the word judged to be

παραδεξόμεθα οὐ διὰ τὴν ἐτυμολογίαν ἀλλὰ διὰ
 τὸ σὴνθες. οἶον προσκεφάλαιον ἀπὸ τοῦ τῆ
 κεφαλῆ προστίθεσθαι εἴρηται, ἢ δὲ κεφαλῆ καὶ
 τὸ πρὸς, ὃ ἐστὶ πρόθεσις, ἀνετύμως κέκληται.
 245 τοῖνυν ὡς ταῦτα χωρὶς ἐτυμολογίας πεπίστευται
 ὅτι ἐστὶν ἐλληνικά, τῆς συνηθείας αὐτοῖς χρωμένης,
 οὕτω καὶ τὸ προσκεφάλαιον δίχα ἐτυμολογίας
 ἔσται πιστόν. ἄλλως τε ἐνίοτε τὸ αὐτὸ πρᾶγμα
 δυσὶν ὀνόμασι καλεῖται, τῷ μὲν ἐτυμολογίαν
 ἐπιδεχομένῳ τῷ δὲ ἀνετυμολογήτῳ, καὶ οὐ διὰ
 τοῦτο τὸ μὲν ἔτυμον λέγεται ἐλληνικὸν τὸ δὲ
 ἀνέτυμον βαρβαρικόν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐκεῖνο ἐλληνικόν,
 246 οὕτω καὶ τοῦτο. οἶον τὸ ὑφ' ἡμῶν καλούμενον
 ὑποπόδιον Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Κῶοι χελωνίδα καλοῦσιν·
 ἀλλ' ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν ὑποπόδιον ἔτυμον, ἢ δὲ χελωνίς
 ἀνέτυμον, καὶ οὐ διὰ τοῦτο οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι
 λέγονται βαρβαρίζειν ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐλληνίζειν, ἀλλ'
 247 ἀμφοτέρω ἐλληνίζειν. τοῖνυν ὡς ἐκεῖνοι διὰ τὴν
 συνηθειαν καὶ οὐ διὰ τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐτυμότητα
 λέγονται ἐλληνίζειν, οὕτω καὶ ἡμεῖς διὰ τὸ ἐν τῇ
 αὐτῶν συνηθείᾳ τετριμμένον ἔχειν τὸ τοιοῦτον
 ὄνομα καὶ οὐ διὰ τὴν τῆς ἐτυμολογίας πίστιν
 ἐλληνιοῦμεν.
 Ἄλλ' ὅτι μὲν τὸ τεχνικὸν μέρος τῆς γραμματικῆς
 ἀνυπόστατόν ἐστιν, αὐτάρκως ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων
 δέδεικται· χωρῶμεν δὲ ἀκολουθῶς καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ
 ἱστορικόν.

Greek by etymology not because of its etymology
 but because it is commonly used. προσκεφάλαιον
 ("pillow"), for instance, is so named from being
 placed at the κεφαλῆ ("head"), but κεφαλῆ, and the
 πρὸς ("at") which precedes, are words without
etyma ("roots"). So then, as these words are be- 245
 lieved to be good Greek apart from etymology,
 since they are used in common speech, so too προσ-
 κεφάλαιον will be believed apart from etymology.—
 Again, the same object is sometimes called by two
 names, the one admitting of etymology, the other
 void of etymology, but neither is the *etymon* said to
 be good Greek for this reason nor the *non-etymon*
 to be barbaric, but as the former is good Greek so also
 is the latter. For example, that which is called by us 246
 ὑποπόδιον ("foot-stool") the Athenians and Coans
 call χελωνίς: but ὑποπόδιον is an *etymon*, whereas
 χελωνίς is a *non-etymon*, yet the Athenians are not
 said on this account to be using a barbarism, and we
 to be speaking good Greek, but rather both are said
 to be speaking good Greek. Since, then, they are 247
 said to be speaking good Greek not because the word
 they employ is an *etymon* but because it is in common
 use, so too we shall be speaking good Greek because
 the word we employ is current in our own customary
 speech and not because of our trust in etymology.

That the technical section of the Art of Grammar is
 without foundation has been proved sufficiently by
 what has now been said. Let us proceed in the next
 place to deal with the "historical" section.

CHAPTER XII.—IS THE HISTORICAL PART
CONSISTENT?

Now it is evident that "history" is regarded as 248

IB'.—ΕΙ ΣΥΣΤΑΤΟΝ ΤΟ ΙΣΤΟΡΙΚΟΝ

248 Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀξιοῦται τοῦτο ὀλοσχερῶς εἶναι
138

μέρος γραμματικῆς, συμφανές. Ταυρίσκος γοῦν ὁ Κράτητος ἀκουστής, ὡσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι κριτικοί, ὑποτάσσων τῇ κριτικῇ τὴν γραμματικὴν, φησὶ τῆς κριτικῆς εἶναι τὸ μὲν τι λογικὸν τὸ δὲ τριβικόν 249 τὸ δ' ἱστορικόν, λογικὸν μὲν τὸ στρεφόμενον περὶ τὴν λέξιν καὶ τοὺς γραμματικοὺς τρόπους, τριβικόν δὲ τὸ περὶ τὰς διαλέκτους καὶ τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν πλασμάτων καὶ χαρακτήρων, ἱστορικόν δὲ τὸ περὶ 250 τὴν προχειρότητα τῆς ἀμεθόδου ὕλης. Διονύσιος δὲ ὁ Θράξ ἔξ μέρη γραμματικῆς εἶναι λέγων, ἅπερ ἡμεῖς ἀνώτερον ὀλοσχερῶς τρία προσηγορεύσαμεν, ἐν τούτοις καὶ τὸ ἱστορικὸν ἀποδίδωσιν εἶναι γάρ φησι γραμματικῆς μέρη ἀνάγνωσιν ἐντριβῆ κατὰ προσωδίαν, ἐξήγησιν κατὰ τοὺς ἐννύπάρχοντας ποιητικοὺς τρόπους, λέξεων καὶ ἱστοριῶν ἀπόδοσιν, ἐτυμολογίας εὔρεσιν, ἀναλογίας ἐκλογισμὸν, κρίσιν ποιημάτων, ἀτόπως διαιρούμενος καὶ τάχα μὲν ἀποτελέσματα τινα καὶ μόρια γραμματικῆς [οὐ] μέρη ταύτης ποιῶν, 251 ὁμολόγως δὲ τὴν μὲν ἐντριβῆ ἀνάγνωσιν καὶ τὴν ἐξήγησιν καὶ τὴν κρίσιν τῶν ποιημάτων ἐκ τῆς περὶ ποιητῆς καὶ συγγραφῆς θεωρίας λαμβάνων, τὴν δὲ ἐτυμολογίαν καὶ ἀναλογίαν ἐκ τοῦ τεχνικοῦ, τοῖς δὲ τὸ ἱστορικὸν ἀντεκτιθεῖς, ἐν ἱστοριῶν 252 καὶ λέξεων ἀποδόσει κείμενον. Ἀσκληπιάδης δὲ ἐν τῷ περὶ γραμματικῆς τρία φήσας εἶναι τὰ πρῶτα τῆς γραμματικῆς μέρη, τεχνικὸν ἱστορικὸν γραμματικόν, ὅπερ ἀμφοτέρων ἐφάπτεται, φημὶ δὲ τοῦ ἱστορικοῦ καὶ τοῦ τεχνικοῦ, τριχῇ ὑποδιαιρεῖται τὸ ἱστορικόν. τῆς γὰρ ἱστορίας τὴν μὲν τινα ἀληθῆ εἶναι φησι τὴν δὲ ψευδῆ τὴν δὲ ὡς ἀληθῆ, καὶ ἀληθῆ μὲν τὴν πρακτικὴν, ψευδῆ δὲ

entirely a division of the Art of Grammar. Tauriscus, at least, the disciple of Crates, like the other critics, in subordinating grammar to criticism, declares that of the critical art one part is literary, another practical, and another historical; that which deals with 249 language and the grammatical tropes is literary, that concerned with dialects and the distinctions of formations and characters is practical, and that which treats of readiness in handling unarranged material is historical. And Dionysius the Thracian, in asserting 250 that there are six parts of grammar,—which we have described above * as three in all,—includes amongst them the historical; for he says that “the parts of grammar are skilled reading according to the scansion, explanation concerning the tropes which the poems contain, exposition of the phrases and histories, the discovery of etymologies, the reckoning of analogy, the judging of compositions,”—thus making absurd divisions and perhaps making out to be parts of grammar what are only certain results and particles of it, and avowedly taking away from the art which treats 251 of poets and composers the skilled reading and the explanation and the judgement of their compositions, and from the technical part etymology and analogy, in opposition to which he sets the historical part which consists of the exposition of phrases and histories. And Asclepiades, after stating in his treatise on 252 grammar that the primary parts of grammar are three, the technical, the historical and the grammatical (which has contact with both, I mean with the historical and the technical), subdivides the historical into three; for he says that “of history one division is true, one false, one as if true: the factual is true,

* Cf. § 91.

τὴν περὶ πλάσματα καὶ μύθους, ὡς ἀληθῆ δὲ οἶα
 253 ἔστιν ἢ κωμῳδία καὶ οἱ μίμοι. τῆς δὲ ἀληθοῦς
 τρία πάλιν μέρη· ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἔστι περὶ τὰ πρόσωπα
 θεῶν καὶ ἡρώων καὶ ἀνδρῶν ἐπιφανῶν, ἢ δὲ περὶ
 τοὺς τόπους καὶ χρόνους, ἢ δὲ περὶ τὰς πράξεις.
 τῆς δὲ ψευδοῦς, ταυτέστι τῆς μυθικῆς, ἐν εἶδος
 μόνον ὑπάρχειν λέγει τὸ γενεαλογικόν. ὑπο-
 τάσσεσθαι δὲ τῷ ἱστορικῷ κοινῶς φησί, καθὼς
 καὶ Διονύσιος, τὸ περὶ τὰς γλώττας· ἱστορεῖ γὰρ
 ὅτι κρήγνον ἀληθές ἐστιν ἢ ἀγαθόν. ὡσαύτως
 δὲ καὶ τὸ περὶ παροιμιῶν καὶ ὄρων.

Ἄλλ' ὅτι μὲν γραμματικῆς εἶναι μέρος βού-
 λονται τὸ ἱστορικόν, ἐκ τούτων ἔστι συμφανές·
 254 λοιπὸν δέ, ἐπεὶ οἱ πλείους ὠμολογήκασιν αὐτὸ
 ἄτεχνον εἶναι καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἀμεθόδου ὕλης τυγχάνειν,
 ἀπολελύκασιν μὲν ἡμᾶς τῆς ἐπὶ πλείον πρὸς αὐτοὺς
 ἀντιρρήσεως, ὅμως δ' οὖν ὑπὲρ τοῦ μη ἀνεπισή-
 μαντον παρελθεῖν τὸν τόπον οὕτως ἐρωτητέον.
 ἥτοι τέχνη ἐστὶν ἢ γραμματικῆ ἢ οὐκ ἔστι τέχνη.
 καὶ εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, αὐτόθεν συμβεβίβασται τὸ
 προκείμενον· εἰ δὲ τέχνη ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ τὰ τῆς τέχνης
 μέρη πάντως ἔστι τεχνικά, τὸ δ' ἱστορικόν ἀμέ-
 255 γραμματικῆς μέρος τὸ ἱστορικόν. καὶ ὅτι τῷ
 ὄντι τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν, αὐτόθεν σχεδὸν ὑπέπιπτεν.
 οὐ γὰρ ὡσπερ ἀπὸ καθολικῆς τινὸς μεθόδου καὶ
 τεχνικῆς δυνάμεως λέγει ὁ μὲν ἱατρός ὅτι τόδε
 τὸ ἐπὶ μέρους ὑγιεινόν ἐστι καὶ τόδε νοσερόν, ὁ
 δὲ μουσικός ὅτι τόδε ἡρμωσμένον καὶ τόδε ἀνάρμο-
 στον, καὶ ἡρμωσμένον μὲν κατὰ τήνδε τὴν συμφω-
 νίαν ἀλλ' οὐχὶ κατὰ τήνδε, οὕτω καὶ ὁ γραμματικὸς

that of fictions and legends is false, and as if true are
 such forms as comedy and mimes." And of true 253
 history, again, there are three parts : one sort is that
 about the persons of gods and heroes and notable
 men, another about places and times, the third about
 actions. And of false history (that is, the legendary)
 there is, he says, one kind only, the genealogical.
 And he says, like Dionysius, that the section dealing
 with "glosses" (rare or obsolete words) commonly
 comes under the head of the historical part ; for
 it reports that κρήγνον " means " true " or " good."
 And so too the section about proverbs and definitions.

From all this it is plain that they wish the " historical"
 to be a part of the Art of Grammar. Moreover, 254
 since the majority of them have agreed that it is non-
 technical and consists of unmethodical matter, they
 have relieved us from having to argue further against
 them ; notwithstanding, in order not to pass over the
 topic and leave it unnoticed, we must argue with
 them in this wise :—Grammar either is or is not an
 art. And if it is not an art, the question before
 us is settled of itself. But if it is an art, since the
 parts of an art must certainly be technical, and it
 is agreed that the historical part is without method,
 the historical will not be a part of the Art of
 Grammar. And it is almost self-evident that this 255
 is really so. For whereas, arguing from a general
 method and a technical faculty, the physician pro-
 nounces that this particular thing is healthy, this
 other diseased, and the musician that this is in
 harmony and that out of harmony,—in harmony
 because of this note, out of harmony because of that
 note,—it is not so with the Grammarian : he cannot

• Cf. Hom. *Il.* i. 106.

δύναται ἀπὸ ἐπιστημονικῆς τινὸς καὶ καθολικῆς θεωρίας ἀπαγγέλλειν ὅτι ὁ μὲν Πέλοπος ὤμος ἐλεφάντινος ἦν ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἄρεως ἢ ὑπὸ Δήμητρος βρωθεῖς, ἢ δὲ τοῦ Ἡρακλέους κεφαλὴ ἐψέδνωτο ρυεισῶν αὐτοῦ τῶν τριχῶν ὅτε ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐφορμῶντος 256 τῆ Ἡσιόνη κήτους κατεπόθη, ἀλλ' ἵνα τούτων ποιῆσθαι τὴν ἔκθεσιν, ὀφείλει πᾶσι τοῖς κατὰ μέρος ἱστοροῦσι περὶ αὐτῶν ἐντυχεῖν. τὸ δὲ πάντων τῶν κατὰ μέρος ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀνάληψιν αὐτοῖς ἐντυγχάνοντα τοῖς κατὰ μέρος οὐκ ἔστι τεχνικόν. οὐκ ἄρα ἔκ τέχνης τινὸς μεθοδεύεται 257 τοῖς γραμματικοῖς τὸ ἱστορικόν. καὶ μὴν ἐπεὶ τῆς ἱστορίας ἢ μὲν τίς ἐστὶ τοπικὴ ἢ δὲ χρονικὴ ἢ δὲ περὶ τὰ πρόσωπα ἢ δὲ περὶ τὰς πράξεις, δῆλον ὡς εἰ μὴ τεχνικὴ ἐστὶν ἢ τῶν τόπων καὶ ἢ τῶν χρόνων ἀπόδοσις, οὐθ' ἢ τῶν προσώπων οὐθ' ἢ τῶν πράξεων τεχνικὴ γενήσεται. τί γὰρ διήνεγκε τούτων ἢ ἐκείνων ἀποκρατεῖν; ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲν ἔχει τεχνικόν τὸ ἀποδιδόναι τοπικὴν ἱστορίαν, λέγοντας ὅτι, εἰ τύχοι, Βριλησὸς μὲν καὶ Ἀράκυνθος τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἐστὶν ὄρος, Ἀκάμας δὲ τῆς Κυπρίας ἀκρωτήριον, ἢ χρονικὴν ἐκτίθεσθαι, καθάπερ ὅτι Ξενοφάνης Κολοφώνιος ἐγένετο περὶ τὴν τεσσαρακοστὴν Ὀλυμπιάδα. τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ ὁ μὴ ὢν γραμματικὸς ἄλλως δὲ περίεργος δυνή- 258 σεται ποιεῖν. τοίνυν οὐδὲ τὸ περὶ προσώπων καὶ πράξεων ἀπαγγέλλειν τεχνικόν γενήσεται, οἶον ὅτι Πλάτων μὲν ὁ φιλόσοφος Ἀριστοκλῆς πρότερον ἐκαλεῖτο καὶ ἐτέτρητο τὸ οὖς ἐλλόβιον

declare, on the ground of any scientific and general consideration, that the shoulder of Pelops, after it was devoured by Ares or by Demeter, was of ivory and that Heracles' head became bald as his hair fell off when he was swallowed by the sea-monster which was attacking Hesione,^a but in order that he may 256 record these events he must have met with all the particular historians of these events. But to repeat all the particular events by meeting the particular historians is not a technical method. Therefore the historical part is not methodically derived by the Grammarians from any art. Moreover, since one 257 kind of history deals with places, another with times, another with persons and another with actions, it is plain that if the exposition of places and times is not technical, neither will that of persons and actions be technical; for what difference is there to make you prefer these rather than those? But, in fact, there is nothing technical about recounting a "history" of a place, as when we assert (shall we say?) that Brilesus, and Aracynthus too, is a mountain of Attica, and Acamas a headland of Cyprus; or about a statement of time, as that Xenophanes of Colophon was born in the fortieth Olympiad.^b For even the man who is no Grammarian but otherwise occupied will be able to do this. Neither, then, will the making announce- 258 ments about persons and actions be technical, as for instance that Plato the philosopher was first called Aristocles and that, when a youth, he had an ear

^a The story is that Heracles, in rescuing Hesione, spent three days (like Jonah) in the monster's belly, hacking it to pieces.

^b *i.e.* 620 B.C., but as this date is too early, we ought perhaps to read *πεντηκοστὴν*, "fiftieth" (*i.e.* N' for M'); *cf.* Diog. Laert. ix. 20.

φορήσας ὅτ' ἦν μεираκίσκος, Πυθιάς δὲ ἡ Ἀριστοτέλους θυγάτηρ τρισὶν ἀνδράσιν ἐγαμήθη, πρῶτον μὲν Νικάνορι τῷ Σταγειριτῇ, οἰκείῳ ὄντι Ἀριστοτέλους, δευτέρῳ δὲ Προκλεῖ Δημαράτου τοῦ Λακεδαίμονίων βασιλέως ἀπογόνῳ, ὃς καὶ δύο ἐξ αὐτῆς τεκνοῦται παῖδας, Προκλέα τε καὶ Δημάρατον τοὺς παρὰ Θεοφράστῳ φιλοσοφῆσαντας, τρίτῳ δὲ Μητροδώρῳ ἱατρῷ, Χρυσίππου μὲν τοῦ Κνιδίου μαθητῇ Ἐρασιστράτου δὲ ὑφηγητῇ, ᾧ 259 γίνεται παῖς Ἀριστοτέλης. ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ τούτοις ὅμοια πρὸς τῷ τελέως ἀχρηστεῖν ἔτι οὐδεμίαν ἐμφαίνει τεχνικὴν δύναμιν, ὥστε οὐδὲ ἡ τῶν ἱστοριῶν¹ ἀπόδοσις ἐστὶν ἐντεχνος. ἄλλως τε καθὼς² ἀνώτερον ὑπεδείξαμεν, οὔτε τῶν ἀπείρων οὔτε τῶν ἄλλοτε ἄλλως γινομένων ἔστι 260 τις τεχνικὴ γνῶσις. αἱ δὲ γε κατὰ μέρος ἱστορίαι ἀπειροί τε διὰ τὸ πλήθός εἰσι, καὶ οὐχ ἐστώσαι διὰ τὸ μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ παρὰ πᾶσιν ἱστορεῖσθαι. οἷον (οὐκ ἄτοπον γὰρ ἵνα συμφυέσι τε καὶ οἰκείοις χρῆσώμεθα τῶν πραγμάτων παραδείγμασιν) ὑπόθεσιν γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς ψευδῆ λαμβάνοντες οἱ ἱστορικοὶ τὸν ἀρχηγὸν ἡμῶν τῆς ἐπιστήμης Ἀσκληπιὸν κεκεραυνῶσθαι λέγουσιν, οὐκ ἀρκούμενοι τῷ ψεύσματι, ἐν ᾧ καὶ ποικίλως αὐτὸ 261 μεταπλάττουσι, Στησίχορος μὲν ἐν Ἐριφύλῃ εἰπὼν ὅτι τινὰς τῶν ἐπὶ Θήβαις πεσόντων ἀνιστᾷ, Πολύανθος δὲ ὁ Κυρηναῖος ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς Ἀσκληπιδῶν γενέσεως ὅτι τὰς Προΐτου θυγατέρας

pierced and wore an earring, and that Pythias, the daughter of Aristotle, was married to three men, first to Nicanor of Stageira, a connexion of Aristotle, secondly to Procleus, a descendant of Damaratus the Lacedaemonians' king (who had by her two sons, the Procleus and Damaratus who studied philosophy with Theophrastus), and thirdly to Metrodorus the physician, a disciple of Chrysippus^a of Cnidos and teacher of Erasistratus, whose son was Aristotle.^b For these 259 stories and those like them, besides being perfectly useless, evince no technical faculty, so that the recital of histories too is void of art.—Furthermore, as we have shown above, there is no technical knowledge either of things infinite or of things which vary from hour to hour. But particular histories are both in- 260 finite, because of their great number, and without fixity, because the same facts are not recorded by all respecting the same person. For instance (for it is not out of place to use familiar and appropriate examples of the facts), the historians adopting a false assumption say that Asclepius, the founder of our science, was struck by lightning,^c and not content with this falsehood they invent many variations of it,—Stesichorus^d saying in *Eriphylē* that it was be- 261 cause he had raised up some of the men who had fallen at Thebes,—Polyanthus of Cyrenē, in his work on the origin of the Asclepiades, that it was because he had cured the daughters of Proetus who had

^a A physician, *circ.* 350 B.C.,—not the famous Stoic philosopher.

^b *i.e.* Aristotle junior, called after his grandfather.

^c Cf. Virgil, *Aen.* vii. 770 ff. Sextus, as a medical man, calls Asclepius "the founder of our Science."

^d Stesichorus was a famous lyric poet of Sicily, *circ.* 580 B.C.

¹ ἱστοριῶν cj. Bekk. : ἱστορικῶν mss., Bekk.

² καθὼς cj. Bekk. : καὶ ὡς mss., Bekk.

κατὰ χόλον Ἡρας ἐμμανεῖς γενομένης ἰάσατο, Πανύσις δὲ διὰ τὸ νεκρὸν Τυνδάρεω ἀναστήσαι, Στάφυλος δὲ ἐν τῷ περὶ Ἀρκάδων ὅτι Ἴππόλυτον ἐθεράπευσε φεύγοντα ἐκ Τροεζῆνος κατὰ τὰς παραδεδομένας κατ' αὐτοῦ ἐν τοῖς τραγωδουμένοις 262 φήμας, Φύλαρχος δὲ ἐν τῇ ἐνάτῃ διὰ τὸ τοὺς Φινεὺς υἱοὺς τυφλωθέντας ἀποκαταστήσαι, χαριζόμενον αὐτῶν τῇ μητρὶ Κλεοπάτρῃ τῇ Ἐρεχθέως, Τελέσαρχος δὲ ἐν τῷ Ἀργολικῷ ὅτι τὸν Ὀρίωνα ἐπεβάλετο ἀναστήσαι. οὐ τοίνυν τῆς οὕτως ἀπὸ ψευδοῦς ὑποθέσεως ἀρχομένης καὶ ἀδιεξίτητου κατὰ πλῆθος καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐκάστου προαίρεσιν μεταπλαττομένης γένουτ' ἂν τις τεχνικὴ θεωρία.

263 Πρὸς τοῦτοις ἐπεὶ τῶν ἱστορουμένων τὸ μὲν ἔστιν ἱστορία τὸ δὲ μῦθος τὸ δὲ πλάσμα, ὧν ἡ μὲν ἱστορία ἀληθῶν τινῶν ἔστι καὶ γεγονότων ἔκθεσις, ὡς ὅτι Ἀλέξανδρος ἐν Βαβυλῶνι δι' ἐπιβούλων φαρμακευθεὶς ἐτελεύτα, πλάσμα δὲ πραγμάτων μὴ γενομένων μὲν ὁμοίως δὲ τοῖς γενομένοις λεγομένων, ὡς αἱ κωμικαὶ ὑποθέσεις καὶ οἱ μῖμοι,

264 μῦθος δὲ πραγμάτων ἀγενήτων καὶ ψευδῶν ἔκθεσις, ὡς ὅτι τὸ μὲν τῶν φαλαγγίων καὶ ὄφρων γένος Τιτῆνων ἐπέπουσιν ἀφ' αἵματος ἐζωγονήσθαι, τὸν δὲ Πήγασον λαίμοτομηθείσης τῆς Γοργόνης ἀπὸ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἐκθορεῖν, καὶ οἱ μὲν Διομήδους ἐταῖροι εἰς θαλασσίους μετέβαλον ὄρνις, ὁ δὲ 265 Ὀδυσσεὺς εἰς ἵππον, ἡ δὲ Ἐκάβη εἰς κῦνα,—τοι- αὐτῆς δὲ οὐσης τῶν ἱστοριῶν διαφορᾶς, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔστι τέχνη τις περὶ τὰ ψευδῆ καὶ ἀνύπαρκτα,

^a An epic poet, of Halicarnassus, *circa* 480 B.C.

^b A Boeotian hunter, slain by Artemis; and placed, after death, among the stars.

become mad owing to the wrath of Hera,—Panyasis,^a that it was owing to his raising up the dead body of Tyndareôs,—Staphylus, in his book about the Arcadians, that it was because he had healed Hippolytus when he was fleeing from Troezen, according to the reports handed down about him in the tragedies, —Phylarchus, in his ninth book, that it was because 262 he restored their sight to the blinded sons of Phineus, as a favour to their mother Cleopatra, the daughter of Erechtheus,—Telesarchus in his *Argolicum*, that it was because he set himself to raise up Orion.^b Thus, of an assumption which begins with a falsehood and is so multiform that it cannot be checked, and changes its shape at each man's fancy, there can be no technical treatment.

Moreover, since of the subjects of history one part 263 is history, another legend, another fiction,—and of these history is the recording of certain things which are true and have happened, as that Alexander died at Babylon through having been poisoned by plotters; and fiction is the narrating things which are not real events but are similar to real events in the telling, such as the hypothetical situations in comedies and mimes; and legend is the narrating of events which 264 have never happened and are false, like the story that the species of venomous spiders and snakes were born alive from the blood of the Titans, and that Pegasus sprang from the head of the Gorgon when her throat was cut,^c and that the companions of Diomedes were changed into sea-birds, Odysseus into a horse, and Hecuba into a dog,—such then being 265 the variety in histories, since there exists no art which deals with things false and unreal, and the

^c Cf. Hesiod, *Theog.* 280.

ψευδῆ δέ ἐστι καὶ ἀνύπαρκτα τὰ περὶ τοὺς μύθους καὶ τὰ πλάσματα, περὶ ἃ μάλιστα τοῦ ἱστορικοῦ μέρους ἢ γραμματικῆ καταγίνεται, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τις τέχνη περὶ τὸ ἱστορικὸν μέρος τῆς γραμμα-
 266 τικῆς. ὅθεν καταγελᾶν ἄξιον τῶν λεγόντων ὅτι εἰ καὶ ἡ ὕλη τῆς ἱστορίας ἐστὶν ἀμέθοδος, ἢ μέντοι κρίσις ταύτης γενήσεται τεχνικῆ, δι' ἧς γινώσκουμεν
 267 τί τε ψευδῶς ἱστορήται καὶ τί ἀληθῶς. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐ παραδεδώκασιν ἡμῖν οἱ γραμματικοὶ τῆς ἀληθοῦς ἱστορίας κριτήριον, ἵνα καὶ ἐξετάζωμεν πότε ἀληθῆς ἐστὶν αὕτη καὶ πότε ψευδῆς. εἶτα καὶ μηδεμίαν οὐσίαν ἀληθοῦς ἱστορίας παρὰ τοῖς γραμματικοῖς οὐδὲ τὸ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς κριτήριον ὑποστατὸν ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ πῶς οὐκ ἔργον, τινὸς μὲν λέγοντος ὅτι Ὀδυσσεὺς ὑπὸ Τηλεγόνου παιδὸς κατὰ ἀγνοίαν ἀνήρηται, τινὸς δὲ ὅτι λάρου κέντρον θαλασσίας τρυγόνος ἀφέντος αὐτοῦ τῇ κεφαλῇ διεφώνησεν, ἄλλου δὲ ὅτι εἰς ἵππον μετέβαλε τὴν μορφήν, θέλει ἐν οὕτως ἀπερρωγόσι πράγμασι εὐρεῖν τὰληθῆς; πρότερον γὰρ δεῖ ὑποστήναι ἐν τοῖς διαφωνοῦσι τὸν ἀληθεύοντα, καὶ τότε ζητεῖν
 268 τί ἐστὶν πάντων δὲ ἀπίθανα καὶ ψευδῆ λεγόντων οὐδὲ τεχνικῶ τινὶ κριτηρίῳ δίδοται πάροδος.

Καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ δι' ὧν ἂν ἱστορία καλῶς γραφείη διδάσκουσιν οἱ γραμματικοὶ, ἵνα κατ' ἀναφορὰν τὴν ὡς ἐπὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα θεωρήματα λέγωμεν τεχνικὸν τι μέρος ὑπάρχειν παρ' αὐτοῖς τὸ ἱστο-
 269 ρικόν· τοῦτο γὰρ ῥητορικῶν ἐστὶ τὸ ἔργον. ὥστε εἰ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐξομολογούνται ἀμέθοδόν τι εἶναι παράπηγμα τὴν ἱστορίαν καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐπελογισάμεθα, καὶ ἄλλως οὐδὲν τεχνικὸν θεώρημα πρὸς τὴν γνώσιν αὐτῆς ἢ σύστασιν παραδεδώκασι, ῥητέον

150

legends and fictions, which form the main subjects of the historical part with which grammar is concerned, are false and unreal, it will follow that there exists no art which deals with the historical part of grammar. Hence they deserve to be laughed at who assert that 266 even if the subject-matter of history lacks method, yet the judging of it will be a matter of art, by means of which we ascertain what is falsely related and what truly. For, firstly, the Grammarians have not 267 furnished us with a criterion of true history, so that we might determine when it is true and when false. In the next place, as the Grammarians have no history that is true, the criterion of truth is also non-existent; for when one man says that Odysseus was killed in ignorance by his son Telegonus,^a and another that he breathed his last when a sea-gull^b dropped on his head the spike of a roach, and yet another that he was transformed into a horse, surely it is a hard task to try to discover the truth in such incoherent accounts. For we must establish first which of these dissentient narrators is telling the truth, and then inquire as to the facts; but when all relate what is improb- 268 able and false no opening is given for a technical criterion.

Nor yet do the Grammarians instruct us as to how history should rightly be written, so that by a reference to such rules we might declare that with them the historical part is a technical one; for this is the task of the Rhetoricians. So that, if even they them- 269 selves confess that history is a chronicle without method and we have confirmed this by logic, and if, moreover, they have provided no technical rule for understanding or constructing it, we must declare

^a His son by Circè.^b Cf. Hom. *Od.* xi. 134.

καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἱστορικὸν μέρος ἀσύστατον εἶναι τὴν γραμματικὴν.

ΙΓ'.—ΤΟ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥΣ ΠΟΙΗΤΑΣ ΜΕΡΟΣ

270 "Ἦδη μὲν δυνάμει καὶ τὸ περὶ ποιητὰς καὶ συγγραφεῖς μέρος τῆς γραμματικῆς ἡμῶν ἀνήρηται, δείξασι τὸ ἀδύνατον τοῦ κατὰ τὰς τεχνολογίας καὶ τοῦ ἱστορικοῦ¹. χωρὶς γὰρ τούτων οὐκ ἀπευθύνεται τις ποιήσεως ἐξήγησις. ὅμως δ' οὖν καὶ τὰ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ μέρει πειρασόμεθα κοινότερον δυνάμενα λέγεσθαι σκοπεῖν, καὶ μάλιστα ὅτι οὕτως ἐπιθεαρρήκασιν αὐτῷ οἱ γραμματικοὶ ὡς καὶ τὸ βιωφελές τῆς γραμματικῆς καὶ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἀναγκαῖον ἐξ αὐτοῦ τολμᾶν πιστοῦσθαι. φασὶ γοῦν ὡς ἡ ποιητικὴ πολλὰς δίδωσιν ἀφορμὰς πρὸς σοφίαν καὶ εὐδαιμόνα βίον, ἀνευ δὲ τοῦ ἀπὸ γραμματικῆς φωτὸς οὐχ οἶόν τε τὰ παρὰ τοῖς ποιηταῖς διοραῶν ὁποῖά ποτε ἐστίν· χρειώδης ἄρα ἡ γραμματικὴ. τὸ δ' ὅτι συχνὰς δίδωσιν ἡ ποιητικὴ ἀφορμὰς πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν δῆλον ἐκ τοῦ τὴν ὄντως κρατίστην καὶ ἠθοποιὸν φιλοσοφίαν ἀπὸ τῆς παρὰ τοῖς ποιηταῖς γνωμολογίας τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐρριζώσθαι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοὺς φιλοσόφους, εἴ ποτε παραινετικῶς τι λέγοιεν, ταῖς ποιητικαῖς φωναῖς ὡςπερὶ σφραγίζεσθαι τὸ ὑπ' αὐτῶν λεγόμενον. καὶ ὁ μὲν ἐπ' ἀρετὴν παρακαλῶν φησὶν

ἀρετὴ δὲ κἂν θάνη τις οὐκ ἀπόλλυται·

ὁ δὲ φιλαργυρίαν φεύγειν ἐγκελευόμενος προφέρειται τὸ

μὴ Πλοῦτον εἶπης· οὐχὶ θαυμάζω θεὸν
ὄν χῶ κάκιτος ῥαδίως ἐκτήσατο·

¹ τοῦ ἱστορικοῦ scripsi: τὸ ἱστορικὸν MSS., Bekk.

that as regards its historical part also the Art of Grammar is without foundation.

CHAPTER XIII.—THE PART DEALING WITH WRITERS

The part of Grammar which deals with poets and 270 prose-writers we have virtually abolished already by showing the impossibility of the technological part and of the historical; for without these no exposition of composition can proceed rightly. Nevertheless, we shall endeavour to examine also what can be said in a general way of this part, especially because the Grammarians are so confident about it that they dare to prove from it the practical usefulness of grammar and its necessity for happiness. They assert, at least, that poetry furnishes many aids to wisdom and a happy life, but without the light of grammar it is not possible to discern clearly what the poets' sayings really mean; therefore grammar is useful. And that 271 poetry furnishes many aids to happiness is plain from the fact that the best and character-forming philosophy had its original roots in the gnomic sayings of the poets, and on this account the philosophers, when giving exhortations, always stamped, as it were, their injunctions with phrases from the poets. Thus one of them, in exhorting to virtue, says—

Yet virtue doth not perish though one die.^a

And another, enjoining us to flee covetousness, proclaims—

Speak not of Wealth: I honour not a god
Whom e'en the basest makes his own with ease.^b

^a Cf. Eurip. *Temen.* (Frag. 734 Nauck).

^b Cf. Eurip. *Aeolus* (Frag. 20 Nauck).

ὁ δὲ αὐτάρκειαν ὑπαγορεύων συμπιστοῦται τὸ δόγμα ἐκ τοῦ τὸν Εὐριπίδην λέγειν

τί γὰρ δέει βροτοῖσι πλὴν δυοῖν μόνον,
Δήμητρος ἀκτῆς πώματός θ' ὕδρηχόου,
ἃ δὴ πάρεστι καὶ πέφυχ' ἡμᾶς τρέφειν;

272 καὶ τὸ μὲν τοὺς ἄλλους φιλοσόφους τοῦτο ποιεῖν οὐ παράδοξον, αὐτοὺς δὲ εὐρήσομεν τοὺς τῆς γραμματικῆς κατηγορούς, Πύρρωνά τε καὶ Ἐπίκουρον, ἐξομολογουμένους τὸ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῆς· ὧν ὁ μὲν Πύρρων ἱστορεῖται τὴν Ὀμηρικὴν διὰ παντός ποιήσιν ἀναγινώσκων, μὴ ἂν ποτε τοῦτο ποιήσας εἶπερ μὴ ἐγίνωσκεν αὐτὴν χρησίμην καὶ 273 διὰ τοῦτο τὴν γραμματικὴν ἀναγκαίαν, ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος φωρᾶται τὰ κράτιστα τῶν δογμάτων παρὰ ποιητῶν ἀνηρπακώς. τὸν τε γὰρ ὄρον τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ἡδονῶν, ὅτι ἡ παντός ἐστι τοῦ ἀλοοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσις, ἐξ ἑνὸς στίχου δέδεικται λαβῶν,

αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ πόσιος καὶ ἐδητύος ἐξ ἔρον ἔντο·

τόν τε θάνατον, ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστι πρὸς ἡμᾶς, Ἐπίχαρμος αὐτῷ προμεμήνυκεν, εἰπὼν

ἀποθανεῖν ἢ τεθνᾶναι οὐ μοι διαφέρει.

ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὰ νεκρὰ τῶν σωμάτων ἀναισθητεῖν παρ' Ὀμήρου κέκλοφε, γράφοντος

κωφήν γὰρ δὴ γαῖαν ἀεικίζει μενεαίνων.

274 καὶ μὴν οὐ ταῦτα μόνον τοῖς ποιηταῖς δεξιῶς εἰρησθαι φαίνεται ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ περὶ θεῶν, οἷόν ἐστι καὶ 154

And another, in recommending self-sufficiency, supports his doctrine by a quotation from Euripides^a—

What do men need save only these two things,
Earth's corn and draughts of water from the spring?
These are to hand, our natural nutriment.

That the rest of the philosophers do this is not 272 paradoxical, but we shall find even those accusers of grammar, Pyrrho and Epicurus, acknowledging its necessity. Of these it is recorded that Pyrrho was constantly reading Homer's poetry, which he would never have done unless he knew that it was useful, and that grammar therefore was necessary; and 273 Epicurus has been detected as guilty of having filched the best of his dogmas from the poets. For he has been shown to have taken his definition of the intensity of pleasures,—that it is “the removal of everything painful,”—from this one verse—

When they had now put aside all longing for drinking and eating.^b

And as to death, that “it is nothing to us,” Epicharmus had already pointed this out to him when he said,—

To die or to be dead concerns me not.

So, too, he stole the notion that dead bodies have no feeling from Homer, where he writes,^c—

'Tis dumb clay that he beats with abuse in his violent fury.

Moreover, it is evident that it is not only these things which have been happily expressed by the poets, but 274 also notions about the gods, such as that expressed by

^a Cf. Eurip. *Frag.* 884 (Nauck).

^b Cf. Hom. *Il.* i. 469.

^c Cf. Hom. *Il.* xxiv. 54.

τὸ παρὰ τῷ Εὐριπίδῃ λεχθὲν ἐν Φριζίῳ,

ὅστις δὲ θνητῶν οἶεται καθ' ἡμέραν
κακὸν τι πράσσειν τοὺς θεοὺς λελθέναι,
δοκεῖ πονηρὰ, καὶ δοκῶν ἀλίσκεται
ὅταν σχολὴν ἄγουσα τυγχάνῃ δίκη.

ἀλλ' εἴπερ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τούτοις εὐκόστα χρειώδη
ἐστί, λαμβάνεται δ' οὐ χωρὶς γραμματικῆς, ἔσται
276 καὶ ἡ γραμματικὴ τῶν βιωφελῶν. ἔχει δ' ἂν τινα,
φασίν, ἐξαιρέτως καὶ ταῖς τῶν μανθανόντων
αὐτῆν πατρίσιν ἀναγκαῖα. Λεβεδίων γοῦν δια-
φερομένων πρὸς τοὺς ἀστυγείτονας περὶ Καμανδώ-
δοῦ ὁ γραμματικὸς τὸ Ἰππωνάκτειον παραθέμενος
ἐνίκα,

μηδὲ . . . μοι μὴ
λαλεῖν Λεβεδίην ἰσχάδ' ἐκ Καμανδώδοῦ.

ὁμηλικούς τε παρεχομένη τοὺς προσέχοντας αὐτῇ
εὐθύς καὶ ταύτῃ [καὶ] τοῖς πέλας κατὰ πολλὰς
276 περιστάσεις ὀνησιφόρος γίνεται. πάρεστι δὲ τὸ
λεγόμενον σκοπεῖν ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων.
Σώστρατος γάρ, ὡς φασίν, ἀποσταλεῖς ὑπὸ Πτολε-
μαίου πρὸς τὸν Ἀντίγονον βασιλικῆς τινὸς ἔνεκα
χρείας, κάκεινου εἰκαιότερον ἀποκρινομένου, ἐπ-
ἔτυχεν εἰπῶν

οὕτω δὴ κέλειαι, γαιήοχε κυανοχαῖτα;
τόνδε φέρω Διὶ μῦθον ἀπηγέα τε κρατερόν τε;
ἢ τι μεταστρέψεις; στρεπταὶ μὲν τε φρένες
ἐσθλῶν.

ταῦτα γὰρ ἀκούσας Ἀντίγονος μετεβάλετο.

* Cf. Eurip. *Phrixus* (Frag. 832 Nauck).

Euripides in his *Phrixus*,^a—

Whoe'er of mortals, sinning day by day,
Deemeth the gods are blind to his misdeeds,
Thinks wrongly, and in thinking thus is caught
When Justice, haply, has some leisure time.

But if these and similar sayings are useful, and are not apprehended without the Art of Grammar, then grammar too will be profitable for life. And it will 275 also contain, they say, some things which are especially necessary for the countries of those who learn it. Thus, when the Lebedians^b were quarrelling with their neighbours about Camandodus, the Grammarian won the victory by quoting from Hipponax^c—

Mutter not to me
Of figs Lebedian from Camandodus.

Also, by rendering those who attend to it sociable, in this way too it obviously becomes helpful to their neighbours in many circumstances. The truth of this 276 statement one can judge from the actual results. For when Sostratus,^d as they say, was sent to Antigonus by Ptolemy to make some request for the king, and the former gave a rather hasty reply, Sostratus gained his point by saying,—

Biddest thou thus, Earth-shaker, whose locks are the blue
of the sea-waves?
Shall I bear unto Zeus this harsh and stubborn answer?
Wilt thou not alter at all? Yet the minds of the good may
be altered.*

For on hearing this Antigonus changed his mind.

^b i.e. inhabitants of the (Ionian) Greek city Lebedos, on the coast of Lydia.

^c Hipponax of Ephesus wrote satirical verse in iambics, circ. 530 B.C.

^d Famous architect under Ptolemy I, King of Egypt, who was opposed by Antigonus ("King of Asia" Minor), circ. 320-310 B.C.

* Cf. Hom. *Il.* xv. 201 ff.

277 Πολλῶν δὴ τοιούτων λεγομένων εἰς τὸ χρησιμώτατον εἶναι τὸ τῆς γραμματικῆς μέρος τὸ περὶ ποιητὰς καὶ συγγραφεῖς καταγιγνώμενον, δείγματος χάριν τοῖς ἐκκειμένοις ἀρκεσθέντες λέγωμεν πρὸς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν. τὸ τοῖνυν βιωφελῆ εἶναι τὴν ποιητικὴν γνωμολογίαν καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἀρχήν, ταύτης δὲ ἀποδοτικὴν ὑπάρχειν τὴν γραμματικὴν, 278 ὄντως γραμματικόν ἐστίν. πρῶτον μὲν γάρ, ἵνα συνδράμωμεν αὐτοῖς μηδὲν ποιητικῆς κατειπόντες, ἀλλ' οὖν γε ἐκείνο πρόδηλόν ἐστίν ὅτι ὅποσα μὲν βιωφελῆ καὶ ἀναγκαῖα εὐρίσκεται παρὰ ποιηταῖς, οὐδ' ἐστὶ τὰ γνωμικὰ καὶ παραινετικά, ταῦτα σαφῶς αὐτοῖς πέφρασαι καὶ οὐ δεῖται γραμματικῆς, (ὅποσα δὲ δεῖται γραμματικῆς)¹ καθάπερ τὰ ἐν ξέναις ἱστορίαις κείμενα ἢ αἰνιγματωδῶς ἐκφερόμενα, ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἄχρηστα, ὥστε καὶ τῇ ἀπ' ἐκείνων ὠφελεία μὴ συνεισέρχεσθαι αὐτῶν τὸ 279 χρεῖωδες τῆς γραμματικῆς καὶ τῇ τούτων ματαιότητι συμπεριφέρεσθαι. εἶτα φάσις μόνον ἐστὶν ἡ γνώμη, καθάπερ τὸ τοιοῦτο,

σοφὸν γὰρ ἐν βούλευμα τὰς πολλὰς χέρας
νικᾷ, σὺν ὄχλῳ δ' ἀμαθία πλεῖστον κακόν·

φάσει δὲ οὐ πείθεται ὁ νοῦς περὶ τοῦ καλῶς εἰρησθαι ἢ μὴ [εἰρησθαι], ἀλλ' ἀποδείξεων δεῖται. αἱ δὲ ἀποδείξεις τῶν καθηκόντως λεγομένων ἢ μὴ οὐ γραμματικῆς εἰσὶν ἀλλὰ φιλοσοφίας· τοῖνυν καὶ ταύτη περισσὴν καὶ ματαίαν συμβέβηκεν εἶναι τὴν γραμματικὴν. καὶ μὴν εἴπερ διὰ τὸ πολλὰ καλῶς εἰρησθαι τοῖς ποιηταῖς καὶ βιωφελῶς

¹ (ὅποσα δὲ δεῖται γραμματικῆς) addidi: (ὅποσα δ' ἀσαφῆ) add. Shorey.

Seeing that many such arguments are used to 277 prove that the part of grammar which deals with poets and prose-writers is most useful, let us content ourselves with the samples we have now set forth and reply to each one of them. Thus, the statement that the gnomic sayings of the poets are useful for life and the origin of philosophy, and that grammar is expository of them, is truly worthy of the Grammarians. For, in the first place,—to concur with them in 278 making no charge against poetry,—it is certainly plain that all the sayings in the poets which are found useful for life and necessary,—such as are those of a gnomic and hortatory character,—are expressed by them clearly and have no need of grammar; while all those which have need of it,—such as those which consist of foreign stories or are enigmatically expressed,—are useless; so that the usefulness of grammar both fails to accompany the benefit of the former sayings and spins round with the idle talk of the latter. Secondly, the gnomic sentence is only 279 an assertion, such as this,^a—

For one wise head excels a hundred hands,
But crowd-clapp'd folly is a monstrous ill.

But reason does not put trust in an assertion, as to whether it is rightly stated or not, but demands proofs. And proofs of fair statements or unfair are matters for philosophy and not for grammar; so that it turns out that in this respect also grammar is superfluous and idle.—Furthermore, if it is because of the many fine and profitable sayings of the poets that

^a Cf. Eurip. *Antiopē* (*Frag.* 220 Nauck).

χρησίμη ἐστὶν ἢ προφήτης γραμματικὴ αὐτῶν,
ἐπεὶ πολλαπλασίονα τούτων διαστρόφως καὶ ἐπὶ
λύμῃ τοῦ βίου παρ' αὐτοῖς ἐξενήκεται, ἄχρηστος
γενήσεται. καθὰ γὰρ ἔστι τις ὁ εἰπὼν

μὴ Πλούτων εἴπης· οὐχὶ θαυμάζω θεὸν
ὄν χωὶ κάκιστος βραδίως ἐκτήσατο,

οὕτως ἔστι καὶ ὁ τούναντίον ἀποφανόμενος,

ὦ χρυσὲ δεξίωμα κάλλιστον βροτοῖς,
ὡς οὔτε μήτηρ ἡδονὰς τοίας ἔχει,
οὐ παῖδες ἀνθρώποισιν, οὐ φίλος πατήρ,
οἷας σὺ χοῖ σὲ δώμασιν κεκτημένοι.

καὶ πάλιν

εὖ πράσσει· τὰ φίλων δ' οὐδὲν ἦν τις δυστυχῆ.

καὶ

κάλλιστα μουσῶν φθέγγεται πλουτῶν ἀνήρ.

280 ἀναποδείκτως μὲν οὖν λεγομένων τῶν οὕτως
ἐναντιῶν ἐπιρρεπέστερον ἔχουσιν ἄνθρωποι πρὸς
τὴν τοῦ χείρονος ἐκλογὴν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο βλαπτικὴ
ἀναφαίνεται ἢ ποιητικὴ· διακρινομένων δὲ αὐτῶν,
καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀθετουμένων τῶν δὲ προκρινομένων,
χρειώδης γίνεται οὐχ ἢ γραμματικὴ ἀλλ' ἢ δια-
κρίνειν δυναμένη φιλοσοφία. ποιητικοῖς τε μαρτυ-
ρίοις χράνται οὐχ οἱ γνησίως φιλοσοφούντες
(τούτων γὰρ ὁ λόγος αὐτάρκης ἐστὶ πρὸς πειθῶ)
ἀλλ' οἱ τὸν πολὺν καὶ ἀγοραῖον φενακίζοντες

281 ὄχλον· οὐ γὰρ δυσχερὲς ποιητὰς μαχομένους καὶ
εἰς ὃ τι ἂν θέλωσιν ἄδοντας δείξαι, ὅτε καὶ οἱ
προηγουμένως φιλοσοφούντες πολλὰ μαχομένως
λέγουσιν. τῶν δὲ γραμματικῆς κατηγορῶν ὁ μὲν
Πύρρων παρ' ἕκαστα τὴν Ὀμηρικὴν διετύλισσε

grammar, their interpreter, is useful, it will be useless
when they utter sentiments, much more numerous
than the former, of a perverse character and ruinous
for practical life. For just as there is one who de-
clares,^a—

Speak not of Wealth; I honour not a god
Whom e'en the basest makes his own with ease;

so there is another who asserts the opposite,

Hail, gold, thou boon most fair to mortal men!
For neither mother doth such joys provide
To men, nor children, no, nor father dear,
As thou, and whoso hold thee in their homes.^b

And again,—

Fare well! The luckless man finds friendship naught.^c

And,—

Sweetest of music is the rich man's voice.

However, as statements so contrary as these are 280
made without proof, men are more prone to choose
that which is worse, and for this reason poetry is
openly seen to be injurious; and if they are being
distinguished, and the one sort set aside and the
other preferred, what is useful is not grammar but
that which is capable of making the distinction,
namely philosophy. Further, it is not the genuine
philosophers who make use of testimonies from the
poets (for with them the argument is sufficient of
itself to carry conviction), but those who humbug the
vulgar crowd; for there is no difficulty in showing 281
that the poets are at odds and sing to whatever tune
they please, when even the leading philosophers
make many conflicting statements. Of the accusers
of grammar, Pyrrho used to unroll the poems of

^a Cf. § 271.

^b Cf. Eurip. *Danaë* (*Frag.* 326 Nauck).

^c Cf. Eurip. *Phoeniss.* 403.

ποίησιν οὐ πάντως διὰ τὴν εἰρημένην αἰτίαν, ἀλλὰ
 τάχα μὲν ψυχαγωγίας χάριν καὶ ὡς εἰ κωμῶδῶν
 ἠκροᾶτο, τάχα δὲ καὶ τοὺς ποιητικούς παρατηρῶν
 282 τρόπους καὶ χαρακτήρας· λέγεται γὰρ αὐτὸν καὶ
 ποιῆσαι εἰς τὸν Μακεδόνα Ἀλέξανδρον γράψαντα
 μυρίοις χρυσοῖς τετιμηῆσθαι. οὐκ ἀπέοικε δὲ καὶ
 283 διεξήλθομεν. ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος οὐκ ἐκ τῶν Ὀμη-
 ρικῶν εἶληφε τὸν ὄρον τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ἡδονῶν.
 μακρῶ γὰρ διαφέρει τὸ λέγειν ὅτι ἐπαύσαντό τινες
 πίνοντες καὶ ἐσθιοντες καὶ τὴν αὐτῶν ἐπιθυμίαν
 πληροῦντες (τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ

αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ πόσιος καὶ ἐδητύος ἐξ ἔρον ἔντο)

τοῦ φάναι ὄρον εἶναι τῶν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς μεγεθῶν
 τὴν τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεισιν· τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ
 πάντως κρέασι καὶ οἴνῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς λιτοτάτοις
 284 πέφυκε γίνεσθαι. ἄλλως τε ὁ μὲν ποιητῆς ἐπὶ
 προσφερομένων μόνων ἐποίησατο τὴν ἀπόφασιν,
 Ἐπίκουρος δὲ ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν ἀπολαυστῶν, ἐν
 οἷς ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ ἀφροδίσιος μῆξις, περὶ ἧς πάντες
 ἴσασι οἷαν ἔσχε γνώμην Ὀμηρος. τό τε τὸν
 θάνατον [μὲν] μηδὲν εἶναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς εἴρηται μὲν
 ἴσως τῷ Σώφρονι, ἀποδέδεικται δὲ Ἐπικούρω,
 καὶ ἔστιν οὐ τὸ εἰπεῖν ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀποδείξαι θαυμαστόν.
 285 εἶτα οὐδὲ κατὰ τοῦτο ἔφησεν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος τὸν
 θάνατον μηδὲν εἶναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς, καθὼ ἀδιάφορόν
 ἐστὶν ἢ ζῆν ἢ μῆ· πολλῶ γὰρ αἰρετώτερον τὸ ζῆν
 διὰ τὸ αἰσθανομένων εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθόν· ἀλλ' ἐν
 ἀναισθησίᾳ οὔτε κακόν τι εἶναι οὔτε ἀγαθόν. τὸ

^a Cf. § 272.

^b Cf. § 273.

^c Sophron of Syracuse, writer of Mimes, circ. 440 B.C.: for

Homer one by one, and that not altogether for the
 reason stated,^a but possibly because of the pleasure
 they gave him, as if he were listening to a comedy,
 and perhaps with an eye to his poetic tropes and
 characters; for Pyrrho himself, it is said, wrote a
 282 poem for Alexander of Macedon and was rewarded
 with thousands of gold pieces. And it is not unlikely
 that there were also other reasons which we have dis-
 cussed in our *Pyrrhoneia*. And Epicurus did not take
 283 his definition of the intensity of pleasures from the
 Homeric poems.^b For there is a vast difference
 between saying that certain persons ceased from
 drinking and eating and satisfying their appetite (for
 that is the meaning of

When they had now put aside all longing for drinking
 and eating)

and saying that the definition of the intensities of
 pleasures is "the removal of the painful"; for this is
 the natural effect not of meats and wine only but also
 of the simplest foods. Moreover, the poet made his
 284 statement about viands only, but Epicurus about all
 enjoyable things, amongst which is sexual inter-
 course, and all know what opinion Homer held
 about it. That "death is nothing to us" was
 said, no doubt, by Sophron,^c but was proved by
 Epicurus, and it is not the saying but the proving
 that is admirable. Moreover, Epicurus did not
 285 assert that "death is nothing to us" in the sense
 that to be alive or not is a matter of indifference;
 for it is far preferable to be alive because the good
 belongs to the sentient; his meaning was that
 where sense is absent there is nothing evil or good.

the sentiment cf. "nil igitur mors est ad nos neque pertinet
 hilum" (Lucret. iii. 830), and *P.H.* iii. 229.

μὲν γὰρ ἀναισθητεῖν τὰ νεκρὰ τῶν σωμάτων οὐχ
ὁ ποιητῆς μόνος οἶδεν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ σύμπασι βίος.
μήτηρ γοῦν πολλάκις υἱὸν θρηνοῦσα φησὶν “ ἀλλὰ
σὺ μὲν τούτων οὐκ ἐπαισθάνη, ἐγὼ δὲ ταλαι-
πωρῶ ”· καὶ ἐνατενίζουσα ἐπιφθέγγεται “ τίς δέ
286 ἔστιν ἔτι σοι τούτων ὄνησις; ” οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ ἐὰν
ἔξετάζη τις, τὴν ἐναντίαν ἔχοντα δόξαν εὐρήσει
τὸν ποιητὴν. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ψυχαὶ κοινῶς διψῶσιν
αἵματος

(ἀλλ’ ἀποχάζεο βόθρου, ἄπισχε δὲ φάσγανον ὄξυ
αἵματος, ὄφρα πίω καὶ τοι νημερτέα εἶπω),

ὁ δὲ Τιτυὸς ὑπὸ γυπῶν διὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἥπατο-
φαγεῖται, ὁ δὲ Τάνταλος ἔστηκεν ἐν λίμνῃ,

ἢ δὲ προσέκλυζε γενεῖω·

στεῦτο δὲ διψῶν, πῖεεν δ’ οὐκ εἶχεν ἐλέσθαι.

287 καὶ μὴν ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ ὑπ’ Εὐριπίδου λεχθέντι περὶ
θεῶν, τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ οἱ ἰδιῶται δόξαν ἔχουσιν.
ἴσον γὰρ ἔστι τῷ

ὅστις δὲ θνητῶν οἶεται τοῦφήμερον
κακόν τι πράσσειν τοὺς θεοὺς λεληθέναι,
δοκεῖ ποιηρὰ, καὶ δοκῶν ἀλίσκεται
ὅταν σχολὴν ἄγουσα τυγχάνῃ δίκη

καὶ τὸ οὕτω παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς λεγόμενον,

ὄψε θεῶν ἀλέουσι μύλοι, ἀλέουσι δὲ λεπτά·

288 μόνω δὲ διενήνοχε τῷ μέτρῳ. ἂν δὲ καὶ ἐξετάσῃ
τις, πολλῶ χεῖρονα τῆς τῶν ἰδιωτῶν ὑπολήψεως
εὐρήσει τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν καὶ ὁ μὲν σκηνηκὸς

And that dead bodies are devoid of sense is a fact known not only to the poet but also to all mankind. Thus, a mother in her frequent laments over her son cries—“ But thou perceivest not these things, it is I that am in distress ”; and as she gazes at him fixedly she cries—“ What benefit from these things hast thou still ? ” Nevertheless, if one searches he will find the 286 poet holding the opposite opinion. For the souls commonly are thirsty for blood,—

Nay, keep away from the trench, from its blood averting
thy sharp sword,
So shall I drink my draught and announce to thee tidings
unerring.^a

And Tityos, because of his lust, has his liver eaten by vultures, and Tantalus stands in a lake,—

Against his chin was it dashing :
Hard strove he in his thirst, but failed to catch any for
drinking.^b

Furthermore, as regards what is said by Euripides 287 about the gods, ordinary folk too hold the same opinion. For the sentence^c—

Whoe’er of mortals, sinning day by day,
Deemeth the gods are blind to his misdeeds,
Thinks evil thoughts and thinking thus is caught
When Justice, haply, has some leisure time—

is matched by the sentence commonly quoted—

The mills of God grind slowly, but they grind exceeding
small^d;

for the difference is only in the metre. And if one 288 investigates one will find that the sentiments of the poets are much worse than the notions of ordinary folk. Yet he who has been proclaimed the philo-

^a Cf. Hom. Od. xi. 95 ff.

^b Cf. Hom. Od. xi. 583 f.; Adv. Phys. i. 69.

^c Cf. § 274.

^d Cf. Plutarch, p. 549 D.

ἀναγορευθεὶς φιλόσοφος ἔτι μετριώτερος φαίνεται,
λέγων μὴ εἶδέναι ᾧ προσεύχεται.

ὦ γῆς ὄχημα κάπῃ γῆς ἔχων ἔδραν,
ὅστις ποτ' εἰ σύ, δυστόπαστος εἰσιδεῖν,
Ζεὺς, εἴτ' ἀνάγκη φύσεος εἶτε νοῦς βροτῶν,
προσευξάμην σέ.

289 Ὅμηρος δὲ καὶ Ἡσίοδος κατὰ τὸν Κολοφώνιον
Ξενοφάνη

ὡς πλεῖστ' ἐφθέγγαντο θεῶν ἀθεμίτια ἔργα,
κλέπτειν μοιχεύειν τε καὶ ἀλλήλους ἀπατεύειν.

Κρόνος μὲν γάρ, ἐφ' οὗ τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον
γεγονέναι λέγουσι, τὸν πατέρα ἠνδροτόμησε καὶ
τὰ τέκνα κατέπιεν, Ζεὺς τε ὁ τούτου παῖς ἀφελό-
μενος αὐτὸν τῆς ἡγεμονίας

γαίης νέρθε καθέισε καὶ ἀτρυγέτιο θαλάσσης,
τῆλε μάλ' ἤχι βάθιστον ὑπὸ χθονός ἐστι βέρεθρον.

290 τῷ δὲ Διὶ ἐπιβουλευουσιν οἱ συγγενεῖς, παρὸ καὶ
ὑπὸ Θέτιδος βοηθεῖται,

ὄππότε μιν ξυνδήσαι Ὀλύμπιοι ἤθελον ἄλλοι,
Ἥρη τ' ἠδὲ Ποσειδάων καὶ Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη·

ὠμότατος γάρ ἐστι, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἀδελφὴν καὶ
γυναῖκα ἱεροσύλου τρόπον κρεμάσας οὐκ ἀρκεῖται,
ἀλλὰ καὶ ονειδίζει λέγων

ἦ οὐ μέμνη ὅτε τ' ἐκρέμω ὑψόθεν, ἐκ δὲ ποδοῖν
ἀκμονας ἦκα δύω, περὶ χερσὶ δὲ δεσμὸν ἦλα
χρῦσεον ἄρρηκτον, σὺ δ' ἐν αἰθέρι καὶ νεφέλῃσιν
ἐκρέμω, ἠλάστεον δὲ θεοὶ κατὰ μακρὸν Ὀλυμπον;

* Cf. Eurip. *Troad.* 884.

† Cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 193.

‡ Cf. Hom. *Il.* xiv. 204, and viii. 14.

sopher of the Stage seems still rather moderate when
he says that he does not know to whom he is
praying,^a—

Thou stay of earth, who hast on earth thy throne,
To see and know thee, who thou art, O Zeus,
Doth baffle wit! Art thou Necessity
Of Nature? Or mankind's Intelligence?
Howbeit, I invoke thee.

But Homer and Hesiod, according to Xenophanes of 289
Colophon,^b—

Tell full many a tale of the lawless deeds of immortals,
Thieving and wenching and dealing deceitfully one with
another.

For Cronos,^c in whose time, they say, was the life of
blessedness, castrated his father and swallowed his
children; while Zeus, his son, after robbing him of
his dominion,—

Under the earth he flung him and under the barren ocean,
Far away, under the earth where the pit of destruction is
deepest.^d

But Zeus' own brethren conspire against Zeus, and 290
so he is helped by Thetis,—

Whenas the other Olympians all were wishful to bind him,
Hera along with Poseidon, with Pallas Athenè to aid them.*

For he is most savage, and when he had hung up his
sister and wife like a temple-robber, not satisfied with
that he also reviles her, saying^f—

Hast thou already forgot how from heav'n thou didst
hang, with two boulders

Tied to thy feet, and about thy hands a chain did I fasten
Gold-wrought, not to be broken, and thou wast suspended
in heaven

High in the clouds; and the gods were enraged through-
out lofty Olympus?

* Cf. Hom. *Il.* i. 399 f.

† Cf. *Il.* xv. 18 ff. (addressing Hera).

291 τὸν δὲ Ἡφαιστον ὀργισθεὶς ῥίπτει ἀπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, ὁ δὲ

κάππεσεν ἐν Λήμνῳ, ὀλίγος δ' ἔτι θυμὸς ἐνήεν.
τὸν δὲ ἀδελφὸν ὑπερορᾷ

οἰκί' ἔχοντα

σμερδαλέ' εὐρώεντα, τά τε στυγέουσι θεοὶ περ.
πρόσσειτι δὲ αὐτῷ πρὸς τῇ ἀποτομία καὶ ἀκρασία,
ὃς θεασάμενος τὴν Ἥραν ἐπὶ τῆς Ἰδῆς κεκοσμη-
μένην οὐ καρτερεῖ μέχρι τῶν ἀποδεδειγμένων
αὐτοῖς θαλάμων ἔλθειν, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοῦ ὄρους χαμαὶ
ῥίψας ἑαυτὸν συγκυλίνδεται τῇ γυναικί,

τοῖσι δ' ὑπὸ χθῶν διὰ φύεν νεοθηλέα ποιήν,
λωτόν θ' ἐρσήεντα ἰδὲ κρόκον ἠδ' ὑάκυνθον.

292 ποικίλης οὖν πεφωραμένης τῆς ποιήσεως ἀνω-
φελῆς ἢ γραμματικῆ μὴ δυναμένη ἀποδείξει τίσι
πιστευτέον ἐστὶν ὡς ἀληθεῖσι καὶ τίσι ἀπιστητέον
ὡς μυθικοῖς ψεύσμασιν.

293 Ἀλλὰ πόλει φασι χρησίμην εἶναι τὴν γραμμα-
τικὴν, ἐπεὶ καὶ Λεβεδίοις νίκης αἴτιον ἐγένετο ἐκ
ποιητικῆς μαρτύριον. ἔνεκα δὲ τούτου καὶ τὴν
ὀρχηστικὴν ἀναγκαίαν λέγομεν εἶναι, ἐπεὶ Σώ-
στρατος ὁ Ἀντιόχου ὀρχηστής, λαβόντος ὑπο-
χείριον τὴν Πριήνην τοῦ βασιλέως πατρίδα οὖσαν
αὐτοῦ, καὶ παρὰ τὸ συμπόσιον τὴν ἐλευθερίαν
ἀναγκαζόμενος ὀρχεῖσθαι, οὐ καλὸν ἔφη τῆς
πατρίδος αὐτοῦ δουλευούσης αὐτὸν ἐλευθερίαν
ὀρχεῖσθαι· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐλευθερωθῆναι τὴν πόλιν.

^a Cf. Pl. i. 593.

^b Cf. Pl. xx. 65, said of Pluto.

^c Cf. Pl. xiv. 347 f.

^d § 275.

^e A Greek city in Caria. Antiochus was king of Syria.

And in his rage he hurls Hephaestus out of heaven, 291
and he—

Crashed in Lemnos, and little of life was remaining within
him.^a

And he treats his brother with contempt, as—

Having for dwelling
Grim halls, dismal and dank, detested e'en by immortals.^b

And in addition to his ruthlessness he is given to
incontinence, for on beholding Hera finely decked
out on Ida he cannot bear waiting to retire to their
appointed chamber, but flings himself to the ground
on the mountain and rolls over with his wife,—

Grass, fresh grass, for their couch did the earth shoot
forth ever kindly,
Hyacinths, too, with the crocus, and lotus besprinkled with
dewdrops.^c

The varied nature of poetry being thus exposed, 292
grammar becomes useless since it cannot show us
which parts of it we should believe as being true, and
which we should disbelieve as mythical falsehoods.

Still, they declare that the Art of Grammar is useful 293
for the State, seeing that even for the Lebedians^d a
testimony from poetry was the cause of victory. But
we reply that for the same reason the art of dancing
is necessary since Sostratus, the dancer of Antiochus,
—when the king had subjugated Prienê,^e which was
his homeland, and he was being forced at the banquet
to dance “the liberty dance,”^f—declared that it
was not right for him to dance a “liberty-dance”
while his country was enslaved; and because of this

^f Danced at the Feast of “Eleutheria” (“Liberty”) held
at Plataea in memory of the victory over the Persians.

294 εἶτα ἄλλο μὲν ἔστι τὸ πόλει χρήσιμον, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς. σκυτοτομικὴ γοῦν καὶ χαλκευτικὴ πόλει μὲν ἔστιν ἀναγκαῖον, ἡμῖν δὲ χαλκεῦσι γενέσθαι καὶ σκυτοτόμοις πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον. διόπερ καὶ ἡ γραμματικὴ οὐκ ἐπεὶ πόλει χρησίμη καθέστηκεν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ἡμῖν ἔστιν [ἢ] τοιαύτη. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὀμιλητικὴ οὐκ ἀπὸ
295 γραμματικῆς περιγίνεσθαι πέφυκεν ἀλλ' ἀπὸ κοινῆς τινὸς ἐντρεχειας, εἰ μὴ τι καὶ Δημάδης ὁ ῥήτωρ γραμματικὸς ἦν,¹ πολλοῖς τῶν Ἀθηναίων μετὰ τὴν ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ ἦτταν συναιχμαλωτισθεῖς, καὶ εἰπὼν πρὸς τὸν Φίλιππον ἀναγκάζοντα εὐχαλεῖσθαι

τίς γάρ κεν ἀνὴρ, ὃς ἐναίσιμος εἶη,
πρὶν τλαίη πάσασθαι ἐδητύος ἠδὲ ποτήτος,
πρὶν λῦσαί θ' ἐτάρους καὶ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖσιν
ιδέσθαι;

296 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν πρὸς τὰς τῶν γραμματικῶν ἐπιχειρήσεις λεγέσθω· προηγουμένως δὲ ῥητέον ὡς εἰ μὲν μόνον ἦσαν οἱ ποιηταὶ βιωφελεῖς, τάχα ἂν ἡ γραμματικὴ βιωφελὴς ἐγένετο περὶ τούτους πονουμένη, νῦν δὲ ἐπεὶ οὗτοι μὲν ἢ ἀνωφελεῖς εἰσὶν ἢ ὀλιγωφελεῖς, φιλόσοφοι δὲ καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ συγγραφεῖς διδάσκουσι τὰ ἀφέλιμα τῶν πραγμά-
297 των, οὐ δεόμεθα γραμματικῆς. καὶ ὅτι οἱ συγγραφεῖς μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ ποιηταὶ τὰ χρήσιμα τῷ βίῳ δηλοῦσιν, εὐεπιλόγιστον. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς στοχάζονται, οἱ δὲ ἐκ παντὸς ψυχαγωγεῖν ἐθέλουσιν, ψυχαγωγεῖ δὲ μᾶλλον τὸ ψεῦδος ἢ τὰληθές. τοῖνυν ἐκείνοις ἢ ὅτι τούτοις προσεκτέον τοῖς

¹ ἦν cj. Bekk. : ὡν mss., Bekk.

his city was set free. Moreover, usefulness for the 294 State is one thing, usefulness for ourselves another thing. Thus the arts of the cobbler and the copper-smith are necessary to the State, but it is not necessary for our happiness that we should become copper-smiths and cobblers. Hence, the Art of Grammar is not necessarily useful to us because it is useful to the State. For the art of conversation is not usually gained from grammar but from a general quickness of wit,—unless, indeed, Demades,^a the orator, was a 295 Grammarian, who (when he was captured along with many Athenians after the defeat at Chaeronea) said to Philip who was forcing him to join in a feast,—

Was there ever a man with a feeling for justice
Who in his heart could endure to share in eating and
drinking
Ere he had freed his companions and seen them standing
before him ?^b

Let thus much, then, be said in opposition to the 296 arguments of the Grammarians; but before all it should be stated that if the poets only were useful for life, then perhaps grammar, as occupied with them, had been useful for life, but as it is, seeing that the poets are either useless or of little use, whereas the philosophers and the other prose-writers instruct us in things that are useful, we do not need grammar. And the fact that the prose-writers rather than the 297 poets show what is useful for life is easy to demonstrate. For the former aim at the truth, but the latter seek by every means to attract the soul, and the false attracts more than the true. They, therefore, who expressly pursue what is false must listen to

^a Demades, the Athenian orator, opponent of Demosthenes, captured at Chaeronea in 338 B.C.

^b Cf. Hom. *Od.* x. 383 ff.

298 ἐπίτηδες τὸ ψεῦδος μεταδιώκουσιν. καθόλου τε, ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς ποιηταῖς, οὐχ οἷον ἀνωφελῆς τῷ βίῳ (ἢ γραμματικῇ)¹ ἀλλὰ καὶ βλαβερωτάτη. ἐπιτείχισμα γὰρ ἀνθρωπίνων παθῶν ἢ ποιητικῇ καθέστηκεν· καὶ ὡς

γέρων γέροντι γλώσσα ἡδίστην ἔχει,

οὕτως οἱ μὲν ἐρωτομανεῖς καὶ μέθυσοι τὰς Ἀλκαίου καὶ Ἀνακρέοντος ποιήσεις ἀναγνόντες προσεκαίονται, οἱ δὲ ὀργίλοι Ἱππώνακτα καὶ Ἀρχίλοχον ἀλείπτας ἔχουσι τῆς περὶ αὐτοὺς κακίας.

299 Τὰ μὲν οὖν ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων λεγόμενα κατὰ τὸν τόπον, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν Ἐπικουρείων, ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα· ἡμεῖς δὲ μηδὲν κατειπόντες τῆς ποιητικῆς ἄλλως ποιώμεθα τὰς ἀντιρρήσεις πρὸς τοὺς ἀξιοῦντας γραμματικὴν ἔχειν τέχνην τῶν παρὰ ποιηταῖς καὶ
300 συγγραφεῦσι λεγομένων διαγνωστικῇ. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν πᾶν σύγγραμμα καὶ πᾶσα ποίησις ἐκ λέξεων τῶν δηλουσῶν καὶ πραγμάτων τῶν δηλουμένων συνέστηκε, δεήσει τὸν γραμματικόν, εἴπερ ἔχει τέχνην διαρθρωτικὴν τῶν παρὰ συγγραφεῦσι καὶ ποιηταῖς λεγομένων, ἥτοι τὰς λέξεις μόνον ἢ τὰ ὑποκείμενα πράγματα γινώσκειν ἢ τὸ συναμφότερον. ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πράγματα, κὰν ἡμεῖς μὴ λέγωμεν, φαίνεται μὴ γινώσκειν. τούτων γὰρ τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ φυσικὰ τὰ δὲ μαθηματικὰ τὰ δὲ ἰατρικὰ τὰ δὲ μουσικά, καὶ δεῖ τὸν μὲν φυσικοῖς ἐπιβάλλοντα πράγμασιν εὐθὺς φυσικὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸν μουσικοῖς μουσικὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸν μαθηματικοῖς εὐθὺς εἶναι μαθηματικόν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως. ὁ μὲντοι γραμματικὸς ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ πάνσοφος καὶ

¹ (ἢ γραμματικῇ) add. cj. Bekk.

these rather than to those.—Further, to generalize, 298 so far as regards the poets, grammar is not merely useless for life but even most injurious. For poetry is a stronghold of human passions, and as

To ancient men an ancient's is the tongue most sweet,*

so too the love-maddened and the wine-bibbers are further inflamed by reading the poems of Alcaeus and Anacreon, while the irascible have for *aliptae* (or "trainers") in their vice Hipponax and Archilochus.

Such, then, are the things said by the rest, and 299 especially by the Epicureans, regarding this topic; but let us, without decrying poetry at all, set forth our counter-arguments against those who claim that there is an Art of Grammar capable of making distinctions in the statements of poets and prose-writers. Now since every composition and every 300 poem consists of indicating words and things indicated, it will be necessary for the Grammarian, if he possesses an art capable of discriminating among the things said by poets and prose-writers, to understand either the words only or the objects behind them or both. But that they do not understand the objects, even if we do not say so, is evident. For some of these are physical, some mathematical, some medical, some musical, and he who deals with the physical must of course be a physicist, he who deals with the musical a musician, and of course he who deals with the mathematical a mathematician, and similarly with the other sciences. That the Grammarian, however, is not simultaneously all-wise and skilled in every

* Cf. Meineke, *Com. Gr.* 5, p. 668.

πάσης ἐπιστήμης δαήμων, σὺν τῷ καὶ αὐτόθεν
 προσπίπτειν, ἔτι κάκ τῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων ἐλέ-
 301 γχεται. πού γάρ τις δύναται τῶν ὠφρυνμένων
 γραμματικῶν Ἡράκλειτον συνεῖναι καὶ Πλάτωνι
 παρακολουθήσαι λέγοντι “ τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ
 αἰὲ κατὰ ταῦτὰ ἐχούσης οὐσίας καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ
 σώματα μεριστῆς τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν συνεκεράσατο
 οὐσίας εἶδος, τῆς τε ταυτοῦ φύσεως καὶ τῆς
 θατέρου ” καὶ ἤδη τὰ ἐξῆς περὶ τὴν λέξιν, ἃ πάντες
 οἱ Πλάτωνος ἐξηγηταὶ ἐσίγησαν. ἢ πού τοῖς
 Χρυσίππου διαλεκτικοῖς θεωρήμασιν ἢ Ἀρχιμήδους
 τε καὶ Εὐδόξου μαθηματικοῖς ἐπιβάλλειν ἰσχύσει;
 302 καὶ μὴν ὡς ἐν τούτοις ἐστὶ τυφλός, οὕτω κὰν τοῖς
 περὶ αὐτῶν γραφεῖσι ποιήμασιν, οἷον Ἐμπεδο-
 κλέους λέγοντος

χαίρετ', ἐγὼ δ' ὑμῖν θεὸς ἄμβροτος, οὐκέτι
 θνητός,

πωλεῦμαι μετὰ πᾶσι τετιμένος,

καὶ πάλιν

ἀλλὰ τί τοῖσδ' ἐπίκειμ' ὡσεὶ μέγα χρῆμά τι
 πράσσων

εἰ θνητῶν περιέμι πολυφθερέων ἀνθρώπων;

303 ὁ μὲν γὰρ γραμματικὸς καὶ ὁ ἰδιώτης ὑπολήφονται
 κατ' ἀλαζονείαν καὶ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώ-
 πους ὑπεροφίαν ταῦτ' ἀνεφθέγγχθαι τὸν φιλόσοφον,
 ὅπερ ἀλλότριόν ἐστὶ τοῦ κὰν μετρίαν ἕξιν ἐν φιλο-
 σοφίᾳ ἔχοντος, οὐχ ὅτι γε τοῦ τοσοῦτου ἀνδρός·
 ὁ δὲ ἀπὸ φυσικῆς ὀρμώμενος θεωρίας, σαφῶς
 γινώσκων ὅτι ἀρχαῖον ὄλωσ τὸ δόγμα ἐστὶ, τοῖς
 ὁμοίοις τὰ ὅμοια γινώσκεισθαι, ὅπερ ἀπὸ Πυθα-
 174

science is proved by the results of experience, besides
 being obvious of itself. For how can any of the grave 301
 Grammarians comprehend Heraclitus or follow
 the meaning of Plato where he says,^a—“ Between
 the Being which is indivisible and remains always
 the same and the Being which is divisible in bodies,
 He blended a third form of Being compounded of
 the twain, that is to say, out of the Same and the
 Other,” and the rest of the context, about which all
 the interpreters of Plato keep silence? Or how will
 he be able to deal with the dialectical investigations
 of Chrysippus or the mathematical of Archimedes and
 Eudoxus? Moreover, as he is blind in respect of 302
 these things, so he is also in respect of the poems
 written about them, as when Empedocles says,—

Hail ye, but I as a deathless god, no longer a mortal,
 Walk in your midst and am honoured by all.

And again,—

Why do I urge these things, as though it were some great
 matter

If I do far surpass all mortals doomed to destruction?

For the Grammarian and the ordinary man will 303
 suppose that the philosopher gave utterance to these
 sayings out of boastfulness and contempt for the rest
 of mankind,—a thing alien to one who is even
 moderately versed in philosophy, not to speak of a
 man of such eminence. But the man who sets out
 from physical investigation knows clearly that the
 dogma “ like is known by like ” is nothing but an
 old one ^b which is thought to have come down from

^a Cf. *Timaeus* 35 A.

^b Cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 92, 121.

γόρου δοκοῦν κατεληλυθέναι κείται μὲν καὶ παρὰ Πλάτωνι ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ, εἴρηται δὲ πολὺ πρότερον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ Ἐμπεδοκλέους,

γαίη μὲν γὰρ γαίαν ὀπώπαμεν, ὕδατι δ' ὕδωρ,
ἥερι δ' ἥέρα διον, ἀτὰρ πυρὶ πῦρ αἰδηλον,
στοργὴν δὲ στοργῆ, νεῖκος δὲ τε νεϊκέϊ λυγρῶ,

συνήσει ὅτι ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς θεὸν ἑαυτὸν προση-
γόρευσεν, ἐπεὶ μόνος καθαρὸν ἀπὸ κακίας τηρήσας
τὸν νοῦν καὶ ἀνεπιθόλωτον τῶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ θεῶ τὸν
304 ἐκτὸς κατείληφεν. Ἄρατου τε μὴν γράφοιτος

ὄσσον ἀπ' ὀφθαλμοῖο βολῆς ἀπολάμπεται αὐγῆ,
ἑξάκις ἂν τόσση μιν ὑποδράμοι· αὐτὰρ ἑκάστη
ἴση μετρηθεῖσα δύω περιτέλλεται ἄστρα

οὐ γραμματικοῦ τοῦτο νοῆσαι, ὅτι ἡλίκη ἐστὶν ἡ
ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμῶν ὄψεως πρὸς τὴν ἀνατολὴν ἐκβαλλο-
μένη εὐθεία, ἑξάκις αὕτη ληφθεῖσα τὸν ζωδιακὸν
καταμετρήσει κύκλον ὥστε δύο αὐτὴν ἀποτέμνεσθαι
ζώδια, ἀλλὰ μαθηματικοῦ, γραμμικῶς αὐτὸ ἀπο-
δεικνύντος, ὅτι τὸ ἕκτον τοῦ ζωδιακοῦ κύκλου
μέρος ἀπὸ τῆς μέχρι τῆς ἀνατολῆς ἐκβαλλομένης
305 εὐθείας καθέστηκεν. Τίμωνός τε τοῦ Φλιασίου
τὸν Πύρρωνα ἡλίῳ ἀπεικάζοντος ἐν οἷς φησὶ

μοῦνος δ' ἀνθρώποισι θεοῦ τρόπον ἡγεμονεύεις,
ὃς περὶ πᾶσαν ἐλῶν¹ γαίαν ἀναστρέφεται,
δεικνὺς εὐτόρνου σφαίρας πυρικαύτορα κύκλον,

δόξει μὲν τοῖς γραμματικοῖς κατὰ τιμὴν αὐτὸ λέ-
γειν καὶ διὰ τὴν περὶ τὸν φιλόσοφον ἐπιφάνειαν·
ἄλλος δὲ ἐπιστήσει μήποτε καὶ μάχεται [τὰ

¹ ἐλῶν cj. Bekk. : ἐλῶν mss., Bekk.

Pythagoras and is found also in Plato's *Timaeus*; and it was stated much earlier by Empedocles himself,—

Verily earth by earth we behold, and water by water,
Aether divine by aether, and fire the destructive by fire,
Love, moreover, by love, and hate by dolorous hatred.

Such a man will understand that Empedocles called himself a god because he alone had kept his mind free from evil and unmuddied and by means of the god within him apprehended the god without. Again, 304 when Aratus writes,^a—

Far as the gleam of the ray from the eye doth reach in its shining,
Full six times such a space would he intercept; of the spaces
Each being equal in measure contains two signs of the star-world,—

it is not the part of the Grammarian to conceive that when the length of the straight line extending from our eye to the sun-rise is taken, six times this length will measure out the circle of the zodiac, so that it cuts off two of its Signs; rather it is the part of the mathematician, who proves by geometry that the sixth part of the circle of the zodiac is formed by the straight line which extends to the sun-rise. Also, when Timon of Phlius compares Pyrrho to the sun, ^b where he says,— 305

Thou, thou alone, art the guide of mankind, most like to the Sun-god,
Who the whole earth surveys as he revolves in his course,
Showing his globe well-turn'd, as a circle all-fiery and flaming,—

he will seem to the Grammarians to be saying it by way of commendation and on account of the philosopher's brilliance. But another man will ponder

^a Cf. Aratus, *Phaenom.* 541.

^b Cf. Lucretius (iii. 1043 f.), of Epicurus,—“omnes Praestinxit stellas, exortus ut aetherius Sol.”

παραδείγματα]¹ τῷ σκεπτικῷ βουλήματι τὰ ὑπὸ
 τοῦ Φλιασίου εἰς τὸν Πύρρωνα λεχθέντα, εἶγε ὁ
 μὲν ἥλιος τὰ πρότερον μὴ βλεπόμενα τῷ φωτὶ
 καταγάζων δείκνυσιν, ὁ δὲ Πύρρων καὶ τὰ προ-
 δήλως ἡμῖν ληφθέντα τῶν πραγμάτων εἰς ἀδηλό-
 306 τητα περιστάναι βιάζεται. τὸ δὲ οὐχ οὕτως
 ἔχει φαίνεται τῷ φιλοσοφώτερον ἐπιβάλλοντι, ἀλλ'
 ἡλίου τρόπον ἐπέχει φησὶ τὸν Πύρρωνα καθόσον
 ὡς ὁ θεὸς τὰς τῶν ἀκριβῶς εἰς αὐτὸν ἀτειζόν-
 των ὄψεις ἀμαυροῖ, οὕτω καὶ ὁ σκεπτικὸς λόγος
 τὸ τῆς διανοίας ὄμμα τῶν ἐπιμελέστερον αὐτῷ
 πρὶ ἰεχόντων συγχέει, ὥστε ἀκαταληπτεῖν περὶ ἐκά-
 στων τῶν κατὰ δογματικὴν θρασύτητα τιθεμένων.
 307 εἰ δὲ δεῖ περὶ ἰατρικῆς διεξέρχεται θεωρίας, καὶ
 παριστᾶν (ἔστιν)² ὡς καὶ ἐπιθετοὶ πολλάκις προσ-
 ριφέν ὑπὸ ποιητοῦ βαθὴν ἐμφαίνει καὶ, ἐπιστημονι-
 κὸν νοῦν, οἷόν ἐστι τὸ "βαθύσχοιον λεχεποῖον"
 παρ' Ὀμήρῳ. σημαίνει γὰρ ὁ μὴ δύναται νοῆσαι
 γραμματικὸς, (ὅτι)³ παραστατικὸν πρὸς συνου-
 σίαν ἐστὶ τὸ τῆς σχοίνου σπέρμα, λέχος καλοῦντος
 308 τοῦ ποιητοῦ τὴν μίξιν. ἢ τὸ παρὰ τῷ Εὐριπίδῃ
 ἐπὶ τῇ Λυκομήδους θυγατρὶ Δηδαμείᾳ λεγόμενον,
 ἢ παῖς νοσεῖ σου κἀπικυδύνως ἔχει.
 πρὸς τοῦ; τίς αὐτὴν πημονὴν δαμάζεται;
 μῶν κρυμὸς αὐτῆς πλευρὰ γυμνάζει χολῆ;⁴
 πυνθάνεται γὰρ μή τι πλευριτικὴ γέγονε διὰ τὸ
 τοὺς πλευριτικούς βήσσοντας ὑπόχολον ἀνάγειν.
 ὦν οὐδὲν οἶδεν ὁ γραμματικὸς.

¹ [τὰ παραδείγματα] del. Heintz.

² (ἔστιν) addidi (adduci potest Herv.).

³ (ὅτι) add. cj. Bekk.

χολῆ Valckenaer: χολῆς mss., Bekk.

whether the statements made by the man of Phlius
 about Pyrrho do not conflict with the Sceptics'
 doctrine, since the sun exposes things not previously
 seen by illuminating them with its light, whereas
 Pyrrho forces the things we have already perceived
 clearly to revert into obscurity. Yet it is plain to 306
 him who considers it more philosophically that this
 is not the case, but that he is declaring that Pyrrho
 is suspending judgement like the sun, in so far as that
 god dims the vision of those who gaze at him intently,
 and the Sceptics' argument likewise confuses the eye
 of the intellect in those who carefully attend to it, so
 that they fail to apprehend every one of the things
 postulated by the rash Dogmatists. And if one has 307
 to discuss medical doctrine, one can show how an
 epithet thrown out by a poet often conveys a deep
 and scientific meaning, as for instance Homer's βαθύ-
 σχοιον λεχεποῖον ("deep in rushes, with bed of
 grass").^a For it signifies what the Grammarian is
 unable to perceive,—namely that the seed of the
 rush (σχοίνος) is conducive to venery, as the poet
 gives the name of "bed" (λέχος) to sexual inter-
 course. Another example is the saying in Euripides^b 308
 about Deidameia, the daughter of Lycomedes,—

Thy daughter's ill and her condition's dangerous.

Because of what? What sort of plague doth hold her down?

Is it a chill which thus torments her side with bile?

For he is inquiring whether she is suffering from
 pleurisy, since sufferers from pleurisy bring up bile
 when they cough. But none of these things is known
 to the Grammarian.

^a Cf. *Il.* iv. 383.

^b Cf. Eurip. *Frag.* 683 (Nauck).

309 Καίτοι περιττὸν ἴσως ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχαιοτέρων καὶ τάχα ἐπιστημονικῶν δυσωπεῖν τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς γραμματικῆς, ὅτε καὶ τὸ τυχὸν ἐπιγραμματίον οὐχ οἰοί τ' εἶσι νοῆσαι, καθάπερ καὶ τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ Καλλιμάχου εἰς Διόδωρον τὸν Κρόνον συγγραφέν,

ἦνιδε κου κόρακες τεγέων ἐπι κοῖα συνήπται
κρώζουσιν, καὶ κῶς αὖθι γενησόμεθα.

310 ὅτι γὰρ διαλεκτικώτατος ἦν ὁ Κρόνος καὶ ἐδίδασκε πῶς κριτέον ἐστὶ τὸ ὑγιὲς συνημμένον, ὥστε διὰ τὸ ἐπικρατεῖν ἤδη τὴν διδασκαλίαν καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν δωμάτων κόρακας ἐκ πολλῆς τῆς κατηχήσεως κρᾶζειν τὴν κατ' αὐτὸν τοῦ συνημμένου κρίσιν, εἶποι ἂν ὁ γραμματικός, καὶ μέχρι τούτου συνήσει

311 τὸ καὶ παιδίοις γνώριμον· ἐλθὼν δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ “καὶ κῶς αὖθι γενησόμεθα” ἤσυχάσει, μὴ εὐρίσκων τὸ δηλούμενον πρᾶγμα. φιλοσόφου γὰρ ἦν εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἀρέσκει τῷ Διοδώρῳ μηδὲν κινεῖσθαι. τὸ γὰρ κινούμενον ἦτοι ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπῳ κινεῖται ἢ ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν· οὔτε δὲ τὸ πρῶτον οὔτε τὸ δεύτερον· οὐκ ἄρα κινεῖται τι. τῷ δὲ μηδὲν κινεῖσθαι τὸ μηδὲν φθειρεσθαι ἀκολουθεῖ. ὡς γὰρ 312 διὰ τὸ μήτε ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπῳ κινεῖσθαι τι μήτε ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν οὐδὲν κινεῖται, οὕτως ἐπεὶ τὸ ζῶον οὔτε ἐν ᾧ ζῆ χρόνῳ ἀποθνήσκει οὔτε ἐν ᾧ μὴ ζῆ, οὐδέποτε ἄρα ἀποθνήσκει. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, αἰεὶ ζῶντες κατ' αὐτὸν καὶ αὖθις γενησόμεθα.

^a See vol. i. p. xvi.

^b Cf. *P.H.* ii. 242, *Adv. Phys.* ii, 48. For Diodorus on the syllogism cf. *P.H.* ii. 110.

However, it is perhaps superfluous to put the 309 Grammarians to shame in respect of antiquated, or perhaps of scientific, diction when they are incapable of understanding even any chance epigram, such as that composed by Callimachus referring to Diodorus Cronos,^a—

Lo and behold how the daws on the roof-tops tell us by
croaking
What things are conjoined, also how we shall live on.

For the fact that Cronos was a great dialectician and 310 taught us how the logical validity of a hypothetical syllogism is to be judged, so that because of the influence of his doctrine even the daws on the houses, from hearing it constantly repeated, croak out his criterion of the valid “syllogism” (or “conjunction”),—all this the Grammarian might relate, and so far he will understand what is common knowledge even to children. But when he comes to “also how we shall 311 live on,” he will be dumbfounded, through not detecting what is indicated. For it belongs to the philosopher to explain that it is a tenet of Diodorus that nothing moves.^b For that which moves, moves either in the place where it is or in the place where it is not; but neither the first nor the second (is true); therefore nothing moves. And that nothing perishes 312 follows from the fact that nothing moves. For just as nothing moves because a thing moves either in the place where it is or in the place where it is not, so too, since the living creature does not die either during the time in which it lives or during that in which it does not live, consequently it never dies. And if this is so, since we are ever-living, according to him, “we shall live on.”

- 313 Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν πράγματα οὐ νοοῦσιν οἱ γραμματικοί. λείπεται τοίνυν τὰ ὀνόματα νοεῖν αὐτοῦς. ὁ πάλιν ἐστὶ ληρώδης. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἔχουσι τεχνικὸν εἰς τὸ λέξιν γινώσκειν. οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ τέχνης τινὸς μεμαθήκασιν ὅτι οἱ παρὰ τῷ Σοφοκλεῖ ποιμένες “ἰὼ βαλλήν” λέγοντες ἰὼ βασιλεῦ λέγουσι φρυγιστί, ἀλλὰ παρ’ ἄλλων ἀκούσαντες. διήνεγκε δὲ οὐδὲν ἢ βαρβάρου λέξεως ἐρμηνευτὰς γίνεσθαι ἢ τῆς κατὰ γλώσσαν προ-
- 314 ενεχθείσης, ὁμοίως οὔσης ἀσυνήθους ἡμῖν. εἶτα καὶ τοῦτ’ ἀδύνατον ἐστὶν ἀπίρων οὐσῶν λέξων καὶ ἄλλως παρ’ ἄλλοις ὀνοματοποιηθεισῶν ἢ ἐπὶ πράγμασιν οἷς ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἴσμεν τεθεισῶν. οἷον ἐστὶ τὸ <ἐβαρβάριζε τὸ ὄλον, ἔλκη ἔχον ἐν τῇ χειρί, τοῦ μὲν>¹ ἐβαρβάριζεν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐσύριζε κειμένου, βάρβαροι γὰρ οἱ Σύροι, τοῦ δὲ ὄλον ἀντὶ τοῦ παντός, ὄλον γὰρ καὶ πᾶν συνώνυμον, τοῦ δὲ ἔλκουσ ἀντὶ τῆς σύριγγος, εἶδος γὰρ ἔλκουσ ἢ σύριγγ. ὥστε τὸ ὄλον γίνεσθαι τοιοῦτον “ἐσύριζεν ὁ Πάν, σύριγγας ἔχων ἐν τῇ χειρί.” ἄλλως τε καὶ ποῦ ἴσασιν ἐνίας τῶν ἐπιστημονικῶν λέξεων οἱ γραμματικοί, καθάπερ τὴν παρὰ Ἀριστοτέλει ἐντελέχειαν ἢ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι; ἢ ποῦ συνήσουσι τίνα δύναμιν ἔχει παρὰ σκεπτικοῖς ἢ “οὐδὲν μᾶλλον” φωνή, πότερον πνευματικὴ ἐστὶν ἢ ἀξιωματικὴ, καὶ ἐπὶ τίνος τάσσεται, ἀρὰ γε τοῦ
- 316 ἐκτός ὑποκειμένου ἢ τοῦ περὶ ἡμᾶς πάθους; τί δὲ καὶ ἐροῦσιν ἐκ λέξεων τιῶν συντεθέντος τινὸς ποιήματος;

¹ <ἐβαρβάριζε . . . μὲν> add. cj. Fabr.

* Cf. Soph. Frag. 144, Aesch. Pers. 658.

So then, the Grammarians do not understand the 313 objects (behind the words). It only remains, then, that they understand the words. And that again is nonsense. For, firstly, they have no technical means for getting to know terms. For it is not by any art, but by hearing it from others, that they have learnt that when the shepherds in Sophocles^a say “ἰὼ βαλλήν” what they say is the Phrygian for ἰὼ βασιλεῦ (“O king”). And there is no difference between interpreting a barbarous word and one which is obsolete, as they sound equally strange to us. And, 314 secondly, even this is impossible, as words are infinite in number and are constructed differently by different people, or applied to objects of which we have no knowledge. For instance, ἐβαρβάριζε τὸ ὄλον, ἔλκη ἔχον ἐν τῇ χειρί, where ἐβαρβάριζε stands for ἐσύριζε (“piped”), for the Syrians^b are barbarians, and ὄλον stands for πᾶν (“all”), πᾶν and ὄλον being synonyms, and ἔλκος (“sore”) for σύριγγ (“pipe” or “fistula”), for a fistula is a kind of sore. So the whole phrase amounts to this—ἐσύριζεν ὁ Πάν, σύριγγας ἔχων ἐν τῇ χειρί (“Pan played the pipes, holding the pipes in his hand”). Further, how do the Gram- 315 marians know some of the scientific terms, such as Aristotle’s ἐντελέχεια (“entelechy”) or τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι (“essence”)? Or how will they comprehend the meaning of the Sceptics’ formula οὐδὲν μᾶλλον (“no more”),^c whether it is interrogative or declaratory, and to what it refers,—whether to the external object or to our subjective feeling? Or what will they say 316 when a poem is composed of certain obscure expressions?

^b Note the word-play on Σύροι-ἐσύριζε.

^c Cf. P.H. i. 191.

ἢ γάρ σοι δισοοῖσιν ὑπ' οὔρεσι δισὸς ἐραστῆς
 ἔφθιτο, καὶ νεάτην μοῦρ' ἀνέθηκε φύσιν.
 ἄρθρω ἐν ἀσπιδόεντι βεβηκότα γυῖα καθ' ὄλμου
 βλαισά¹ τροχαντήρων ἄχρι περιστρέφεται,
 σμερδαλέαι δ' ὑπένερθεν ἀλώπεκες, ἄχρι δοχαίης
 αἰῶνος χαλαρᾷ σύνδραμον ἁρμονίῃ.²

317 τοὺς γὰρ ἐραστὰς οὔτινές εἰσι καὶ τὰ ὄρη καὶ τὸ
 ἀσπιδόεν ἄρθρον καὶ τοὺς τροχαντήρας, ἔτι δέ
 καὶ τὸν ὄλμον καὶ τὰς ἀλώπεκας δοχαίην τε καὶ
 αἰῶνα καὶ ἁρμονίαν, μήτε τροπικῶς μήτε κατὰ
 ἱστορίαν ἀλλὰ κυρίως ἐξενεχθέντα ὀνόματα, κἄν
 μυριάκις ἐπιστήσωσιν, οὐ συνήσουσιν.

318 Εἰ οὖν μήτε τὰ πράγματα μήτε τὰς λέξεις
 ἴσασιν, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδέν ἐστιν ἢ ποιήσεις ἢ τὸ
 σύγγραμμα, οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιεν τέχνην ἐξηγητικὴν
 τῶν παρὰ ποιηταῖς καὶ συγγραφεῦσι λεγομένων.
 ἄλλως τε καὶ εἰ χρήζομεν γραμματικῆς, ἐπὶ τῶν
 ἀρίστων ποιημάτων χρήζομεν ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν μοχθη-
 ρῶν. ἀριστον δὲ ποιήμᾳ ἐστὶ κατ' αὐτοὺς τὸ

319 σαφές· ἀρετὴ γὰρ ποιήματος ἢ σαφήνεια, καὶ
 μοχθηρὸν τὸ ἀσαφές παρὰ γραμματικῆ. οὔτε
 οὖν ἐπὶ ἀρίστου ἐστὶ ποιήματος χρειώδης διὰ τὸ
 μὴ δεῖσθαι ἐξηγήσεως σαφές ὄν, οὔτε ἐπὶ τοῦ

320 μοχθηροῦ διὰ τὸ αὐτόθεν εἶναι μοχθηρὸν. τὸ τε
 ἀνεπικρίτως διαφωνούμενον ἀκατάληπτόν ἐστιν,

¹ βλαισὰ scripsi : βᾶσα mss., Bekk. (βαιὰ Hermann).

² σμερδαλέαι . . . ἀλώπεκες . . . χαλαρᾷ σύνδραμον ἁρμονίῃ
 Hermann : σμερδαλέα . . . ἀλώπεκος . . . χαλαρὰν σύνδρομον
 ἁρμονίης mss., Bekk.

Under a twofold mountain a twofold lover did perish :
 Destiny, nevertheless gave them a strange new form.
 Set in joints like a serpent's the crooked limbs of the body
 Turn'd and twisted around down to the joints of the
 hips ;
 Dread to behold were the foxes beneath, lax Harmony's
 race-mates,
 Down to the secret hold storing the ages to come.^a

For who the ἐρασταί (" lovers ") are, and the ὄρη 317
 (" mountains "), and ἀσπιδόεν ἄρθρον (" serpent-like
 joint "), and τροχαντήρες (" hip-joints "), and also
 ὄλμος (" trunk " of the body), and ἀλώπεκες (" foxes "
 = " loins "), and δοχαίη (" receptacle," " store-
 house "), and αἰών (" age," " posterity "), and ἁρμονία
 (" harmony "),—words used neither metaphorically
 nor as technical terms but in their proper sense,—
 these the Grammarians will not understand though
 they ponder them ten thousand times.

If, then, they know neither the objects nor the 318
 words, and the poem or the treatise is nothing beyond
 these, they will not possess an art capable of explain-
 ing what is said by the poets and prose-writers.—
 And further, if we have need of the Art of Grammar,
 we need it to deal with the best poems and not with
 the bad ones. But, according to them, the clear
 poem is the best ; for the excellence of a poem is its 319
 clearness, and, for the Art of Grammar, want of
 clearness is bad. Thus grammar is not needed
 either in the case of the best poem, since it, being
 clear, requires no explanation, nor in the case of the
 bad poem because it is obviously bad.—Also, that 320
 which is disputed without a decision is non-appre-

^a " The secret hold " etc. means " partes genitales, quibus
 spes posteritatis continetur " (Fabr.); and " Harmony "
 means " veneri amores " (Fabr.). The lovers were Cadmus
 and his wife Harmonia, who were both turned into serpents.

ἀνεπικρίτως δ' ἔτι διαφωνοῦσιν ἐν ταῖς ἐξηγήσεσιν οἱ γραμματικοὶ περὶ τῆς τοῦ συγγραφέως διανοίας· ἀκατάληπτος ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ συγγραφέως διάνοια, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἄχρηστος ἡ γραμματικὴ.

Ἄλλὰ γὰρ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἀπὸ τούτου τοῦ μαθήματος ἀναγομένους ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω· ἀπ' ἄλλης δὲ ἀρχῆς σκεψώμεθα καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ῥήτορας ἃ δεῖ λέγειν.

hensible ; but the Grammarians, in their explanation regarding the writer's meaning, still dispute without coming to a decision ; the writer's meaning, therefore, is non-apprehensible, and on this account grammar is useless.

Well then, let thus much be said in reply to those whose studies are based on this branch of learning ; and, making a fresh start, let us also consider what we ought to say in reply to the Rhetoricians.

ΠΡΟΣ ΡΗΤΟΡΑΣ

- 1 Τοῖς περὶ γραμματικῆς διεξοδευθεῖσιν ἡμῶν ἀκόλουθον ἂν εἶη καὶ περὶ ῥητορικῆς λέγειν, ἀνδρικωτέρας ἤδη καθεστῶσης καὶ τὸ πλεον ἐπ' ἀγορᾶς καὶ βημάτων ἐξεταζομένης. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ κοινὸν ὑπάρξειός τε καὶ ἀνυπαρξίας ἐστὶν ἡ ἔννοια, καὶ οὐδὲν τούτων ἕτερον οἶόν τέ ἐστι ζητεῖν μὴ προλαβόντας ὃ ἐστὶ τὸ ζητούμενον, φέρε πρῶτον σκεψώμεθα τί ἂν εἶη ῥητορικὴ, τὰς ἐπιφανεστάτας εἰς τοῦτο τῶν φιλοσόφων ἀποδόσεις παρατιθέμενοι.
- 2 Πλάτων μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ Γοργία κατὰ διοριστικὴν ἔφοδον τοιοῦτον εἰκὼν ἐξ ἐπισυνθέσεως ὅρον τῆς ῥητορικῆς ἀποδιδόναι “ ῥητορικὴ ἐστὶ πειθοῦς δημιουργὸς διὰ λόγων, ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς λόγοις τὸ κύριον ἔχουσα, πειστικὴ, οὐ διδασκαλική,” τὸ μὲν “ διὰ λόγων ” προστιθεὶς τάχα παρόσον πολλά ἐστὶ τὰ πειθῶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐνεργαζόμενα χωρὶς λόγου, καθάπερ πλοῦτος καὶ δόξα καὶ ἡδονὴ καὶ
- 3 κάλλος. οἱ γοῦν παρὰ τῷ ποιητῇ δημογέροντες, καίπερ ἐκπεπολεμημένοι καὶ τελῶς ἀπηλλοτριωμένοι πρὸς τὴν Ἑλένην ὡς κακῶν αἰτίαν γενομένην αὐτοῖς, ὁμως ὑπὸ τοῦ περὶ αὐτὴν κάλλους πείθονται,

AGAINST THE RHETORICIANS

FOLLOWING on our discussion of the Art of Grammar 1 we shall speak of the art of Rhetoric,—in itself a more manly art, and one which is for the most part tested in the Assembly and the Law-courts. But since the notion of a thing holds of it equally whether it be existent or non-existent, and it is impossible to investigate either of these states without having grasped beforehand what the object of investigation is, come and let us consider first what Rhetoric is by comparing the most notable accounts of it given by the philosophers.

Now Plato in the *Gorgias*,^a using his method of de- 2 finition, seems to set forth a composite definition of Rhetoric such as this,—“ Rhetoric is the creator of persuasion by means of words, having its efficacy in the words themselves, and being persuasive, not instructive ”; and he added the phrase “ by means of words ” probably because there are many things which effect persuasion in men without speech, such as wealth and glory and pleasure and beauty. Thus 3 the elders of the folk (in the poet Homer), although exhausted by war and wholly estranged from Helen as the cause of their woes, are yet persuaded by her

^a Cf. *Gorg.* 453 A.

καὶ προσιούσης τοιαυτὰ τινα πρὸς ἀλλήλους διεξίασιν,

οὐ νέμεσις Τρῶας καὶ ἑυκνήμιδας Ἀχαιοὺς
τοῖηδ' ἀμφὶ γυναικὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἀλγεα πάσχειν.

4 Φρύνη τε, ὡς φασίν, ἐπεὶ συνηγοροῦντος αὐτῆ
Ἰπερίδου ἔμελλε καταδικάζεσθαι, καταρρηξαμένη
τοὺς χιτωνίσκους καὶ γυμνοῖς στήθεσι προκυλιν-
δουμένη τῶν δικαστῶν πλείον ἴσχυσε διὰ τὸ κάλλος
τοὺς δικαστὰς πείσαι τῆς τοῦ συνηγοροῦντος
ῥητορείας. τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐπὶ χρημάτων ἐστὶν
ἡδονῆς τε καὶ δόξης· τούτων γὰρ ἕκαστον εὐρή-
σομεν οὕτω πείθον ὡς πολλάκις τινὰ τῶν καθη-
κόντων ὑπερβαίνειν. οὐ τοῖνυν ἀσκόπως ὁ Πλάτων
ἀποβλέπων εἰς τὴν δι' αὐτῶν γινομένην πειθὴν
ἔλεξεν ὅτι ῥητορικὴ ἐστὶ πειθοῦς δημιουργὸς οὐχ
5 ὅπως οὖν ἀλλὰ διὰ λόγων. καὶ μὴν οὐκ ἐπεὶ
λόγοις πείθει, πάντως ἐστὶ ῥητορικὴ (καὶ γὰρ ἡ
ιατρικὴ καὶ αἱ ὁμοειδεῖς ταύτῃ τέχναι διὰ λόγου
πειθοῦσιν), ἀλλ' εἴ τις ἐν αὐτοῖς προηγουμένως
τοῖς λόγοις ὑποκειμένην ἔχει τὴν ἰσχύν, καὶ οὐ
κοινῶς, ἐπέπερ καὶ ἡ γεωμετρία καὶ ἀριθμητικὴ
καὶ πᾶσα ἢ τῷ γένει θεωρητικῆ τέχνη ἐν λόγοις
προηγουμένως ἔχει τὸ κύρος, ἀλλ' ὅταν σὺν τού-
τοις μὴ διδασκαλικήν, ὡσπερ γεωμετρία, ἀλλὰ
πειστικὴν ποιῆται τὴν πειθὴν· ὅπερ ἦν ἴδιον
ῥητορικῆς.

6 Ξενοκράτης δὲ ὁ Πλάτωνος ἀκουστής καὶ οἱ
ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς φιλόσοφοι ἔλεγον ῥητορικὴν ὑπάρ-
χειν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ εὖ λέγειν, ἄλλως μὲν Ξενο-
κράτους τὴν ἐπιστήμην λαμβάνοντος καὶ ἀρχαϊκῶ

beauty, and at her approach they address one another
in this wise,^a—

Cause for anger is none that the Trojans and well-greav'd
Achaeans

Suffer for many a year sad woes for a woman so beautiful.

Phrynê too, as they say, when Hypereides was plead- 4
ing for her and she was on the point of being con-
demned, tore asunder her garments and with her
breasts bare flung herself at the feet of the judges,
and because of her beauty had more power to per-
suade her judges than the rhetoric of her advocate.
The same, too, holds good of money and pleasure and
glory; for we shall find each one of these so per-
suasive as often to make men overstep some of the
moral duties. It was not without reason, then, that
Plato, having regard to the persuasion they induce,
declared that rhetoric is "the creator of persuasion,"
not by any means you choose but "by means of
words." It is not, however, always rhetoric when 5
there is persuasion by words (for the art of medicine
also and arts similar to it persuade by speech), but
only if it is an art which has its efficacy dependent
mainly on words alone, and that not like the rest,
—since geometry, too, and arithmetic and every art
classed as theoretical depends for its efficacy mainly
on words,—but whenever, in addition, it employs
persuasion not in order to instruct, like geometry,
but to induce belief; for that is the special mark of
rhetoric.

But Xenocrates, the disciple of Plato, and the 6
Stoic philosophers asserted that rhetoric is "the
science of good speech"; though Xenocrates took
the word "science" in one sense,—i.e. in the old way,

^a Hom. II. iii. 156 f.

νόμῳ, ἀντὶ τῆς τέχνης, ἄλλως δὲ τῶν στωικῶν, ἀντὶ τοῦ βεβαίας ἔχειν καταλήψεις, ἐν σοφῷ μόνῳ φουομένην. τὸ δὲ λέγειν ἀμφότεροι παραλαμβάνουσιν ὡς διαφέρουν τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι, ἐπειδήπερ τὸ μὲν ἐν συντομίᾳ κείμενον κἂν τῷ λαμβάνειν
 7 καὶ δίδοναι λόγον διαλεκτικῆς ἐστὶν ἔργον, τὸ δὲ λέγειν ἐν μήκει καὶ διεξόδῳ θεωρούμενον ῥητορικῆς ἐτύγχανεν ἴδιον. ἔνθεν γοῦν καὶ Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεὺς ἐρωτηθεὶς ὅτῳ διαφέρει διαλεκτικὴ ῥητορικῆς, συστρέψας τὴν χεῖρα καὶ πάλιν ἐξαπλώσας ἔφη “τούτῳ,” κατὰ μὲν τὴν συστροφὴν τὸ στρογγύλον καὶ βραχὺ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς τάπτων ἰδίωμα, διὰ δὲ τῆς ἐξαπλώσεως καὶ ἐκτάσεως τῶν δακτύλων τὸ πλατὺ τῆς ῥητορικῆς δυνάμειος αἰνιττόμενος.
 8 Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν ῥητορικῶν τεχνῶν ἀπλούστερον παραδίδωσι τὴν ῥητορικὴν τέχνην λόγων. καὶ ζητουμένου πρὸς αὐτὸν ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἰατρικὴ τέχνη ἐστὶ λόγων ἰατρικῶν, ἀπολογούμενοί τινές φασιν ὅτι ἡ ἰατρικὴ τοὺς λόγους ἐφ’ ἑτερόν τι ἀναφέρει τέλος, καθάπερ τὴν ὑγείαν,
 9 ἡ δὲ ῥητορικὴ ἀντικρὺς ἐστὶ λόγων τέχνη. καὶ ἄλλους δὲ ἐκτίθεται ὁ ἀνὴρ οὗτος ὅρους, περὶ ὧν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν ἡμῖν λέγειν τοῖς μὴ προηγουμένως τὸν περὶ ῥητορικῆς διεξοδεύουσι λόγον, ἀλλ’ ὅσον τοῦ τὴν ιδιότητα ταύτης περινοῆσαι πρὸς τὴν χειρισθησομένην ἡμῖν ἀντίρρησιν. ἥς ἀρχὴ γένοιτ’ ἂν εὐθέως ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκκειμένης νοήσεως. ἐπεὶ γὰρ τέχνην ἢ ἐπιστήμην λόγων ἢ τοῦ λέγειν καὶ πειθοῦς περιποιητικὴν βούλονται τυγχάνειν τὴν ῥητορικὴν οἱ τὴν ἔνοιαν αὐτῆς ἀποδιδόντες, πει-

as a synonym for “art,”—whereas the Stoics took it in another, as meaning “the holding firm apprehensions,” which is inherent only in the Sage. But both parties assume that “speech” differs in sense from dialectical discussion, since speaking which is concise and consists in giving and receiving an account is the task of dialectic, but to speak on a given subject at length and with detailed exposition is the special characteristic of rhetoric. Hence, Zeno of Citium, when asked what is the difference between dialectic and rhetoric, clenched his fist and then opened it out and said, “This,”—comparing the compact and short character of dialectic to the clenching, and suggesting the breadth of the rhetorical style by the opening and extension of his fingers.⁴

In the first of his books on *The Art of Rhetoric* Aristotle describes rhetoric more simply as “the art of speech.” And when it is objected against him that the art of Medicine also is the art of medical speech, some say by way of defence that the medical art directs its speech to another end, such as health, whereas rhetoric is precisely the art of words alone. And Aristotle puts forward other definitions also, which it is unnecessary for us to mention as we are not primarily discussing the description of rhetoric, but only in so far as it enables us to perceive its special character with a view to the refutation we propose to take in hand. And a beginning of this may be made at once from the concepts already stated. For since those who offer a concept of rhetoric assert that it is an art, or a science, of speech, or productive of speech and persuasion, holding fast

⁴ Cf. Cicero, *de Fin.* ii. 6, *Orat.* 32.

ρασόμεθα καὶ ἡμεῖς τῶν τριῶν τούτων ἐχόμενοι διδάσκειν τὸ ἀνυπόστατον αὐτῆς.

- 10 Πᾶσα τοίνυν τέχνη σύστημα ἔστιν ἐκ καταλήψεων συγγεγυμνασμένων καὶ ἐπὶ τέλος εὐχρηστον τῷ βίῳ λαμβανουσῶν¹ τὴν ἀναφορὰν· ἡ δὲ ῥητορικὴ οὐκ ἔστι σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων, ὡς παρα-
 11 στήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν ἡ ῥητορικὴ. τῶν γὰρ ψευδῶν οὐκ εἰσὶ καταλήψεις, ψευδῆ δὲ ἔστι τὰ λεγόμενα τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἶναι θεωρήματα, τοιαῦτα ὄντα “οὕτω παραπειστέον τοὺς δικαστὰς καὶ ὄργην κινήσειν ἢ ἔλεον καὶ μοιχῶ συνηγορητέον ἢ ἱεροσύλω”· (οἰ’)² ἐμφαίνει τὸ καθήκειν οὕτω τοὺς δικαστὰς παραπειθεῖν καὶ ὄργην ἢ ἔλεον κινεῖν· ἄπερ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθῆ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀκατάληπτα. οὐ τοίνυν αὐτῶν εἰσὶν αἱ καταλήψεις· ὧ συνεσέρχεται τὸ μηδὲ τὴν ῥητορικὴν ὑπάρχειν.
 12 καθάπερ οὖν οὐκ ἂν εἶπομεν τὴν τοιχωρυκτικὴν εἶναι τινα τέχνην παραινούσαν τὸ “οὕτω δεῖ τοῖχον διορτυττεῖν,” καὶ τὴν κλεπτικὴν τὸ “οὕτω καθήκει κλέπτειν καὶ βαλαντιοτομεῖν” (ψευδῆ γὰρ ἔστι ταῦτα, καὶ οὔτε καθήκοντα οὔτε θεωρήματα), οὕτως οὐδὲ τὴν ῥητορικὴν ὑποληπτέον ἔχειν τεχνικὴν ὑπόστασιν, ἐπὶ τοιούτοις παραγγέλμασι σαλεύουσιν. ἀμέλει γέ τοι καὶ οἱ περὶ Κριτόλαον τὸν περιπατητικόν, καὶ πολὺ πρότερον οἱ περὶ Πλάτωνα, εἰς τοῦτο ἀπιδόντες ἐκάκισαν αὐτὴν ὡς
 13 κακοτεχνίαν μᾶλλον ἢ τέχνην καθοστηκυῖαν. καὶ μὴν ἐπεὶ πᾶσα τέχνη ἥτοι ἔστηκός ἔχει τὸ τέλος καὶ πάγιον, ὡς φιλοσοφία καὶ γραμματικὴ, ἡ τοῦ ὡς τὸ πολὺ ἐχόμενον, καθάπερ ἰατρικὴ τε καὶ κυβερνητικὴ, δεήσει καὶ τὴν ῥητορικὴν, εἴπερ

to these three descriptions we shall endeavour to show its unreality.

Now every art is “a system composed of co-
 10 exercised apprehensions directed to an end useful for life”^a; but, as we shall establish, rhetoric is not a system of apprehensions; therefore rhetoric does not exist. For of things false there are no apprehensions, but what are said to be the rules of rhetoric are false, being such as these,—“The judges must be misled by persuasion in this way,” “One must excite anger or pity,” “One must plead the cause of the adulterer or temple-robber,”—rules which declare the duty of thus misleading the judges and exciting anger or pity; but these are not true and consequently are not apprehensible. So there are no apprehensions of them; whence it follows that neither does rhetoric exist.—As, then, we would not
 12 say that burgling is an art which advises—“This is the way one ought to burgle a house,” or thieving an art which instructs us that “This is the right way to steal and to cut purses” (for these things are false, and neither duties nor rules), so we must not suppose that rhetoric has any technical foundation when it is based on such shaky injunctions. And in fact Critolaus the Peripatetic, and Plato long before him, in consideration of this, condemned rhetoric as being a base artifice rather than an art.—Moreover, since
 13 every art has an end which is either stable and fixed, like philosophy and grammar, or holds good for the most part, like medicine and piloting, rhetoric too,

^a Cf. P.H. iii. 188 for this Stoic definition.

¹ λαμβανουσῶν scripsi: λαμβανόντων mss., Bekk.
 (οἰ’) addidi (ἐμφαίνοντα, κ. cj. Bekk.).

14 ἔστι τέχνη, τὸ ἕτερον τούτων ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι. οὔτε
 δὲ ἐστηκὸς ἔχει πᾶν τέλος¹ (οὐδὲ γὰρ αἰεὶ περι-
 γίνεται [περὶ] τῆς τῶν ἀντιδίκων νίκης, ἀλλ' ἔσθ'
 15 ὅτε ἕτερον μὲν προτίθεται ὁ ῥήτωρ ἕτερον δὲ
 ἐξακολουθοῦν ἔχει τέλος) οὔτε τοῦ ὄς τὸ πολὺ
 ἐφιέμενον, ἐπεὶ πᾶς ῥήτωρ ἑαυτῷ συγκρινόμενος
 πολλάκις ἐλείφθη μᾶλλον ἢ ἐνίκησεν, ἅτε διὰ
 16 παντὸς ἐτέρου τὰς ἐπιχειρήσεις αὐτοῦ διαλύοντος.
 οὐκ ἄρα τέχνη ἐστὶν ἡ ῥητορικὴ. εἴπερ τε ἐνδέχεται
 γενέσθαι ῥήτορα μὴ μετασχόντα τῆς ῥητορικῆς
 τέχνης, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τις τέχνη ῥητορικὴ. ἐνδέχεται
 δὲ γε ἰκανῶς καὶ κατὰ τρόπον ῥητορεύειν μὴ
 μετασχόντα ῥητορικῆς, ὡς καὶ περὶ Δημάδου
 παρειλήφαμεν· κωπηλάτης γὰρ ὢν ὁμολογεῖται
 ἀριστος γεγονέναι ῥήτωρ, καὶ σὺν τούτῳ ἄλλοι
 17 παμπληθεῖς. τοίνυν οὐκ ἔστι τέχνη ἡ ῥητορικὴ.
 ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπεὶ τούτοις ἀπιστοῦμεν ὡς τοιούτοις
 γεγονόσι καὶ ἐν ἔξει κακ² τοιαύτης τινὸς τριβῆς
 ἐπὶ τῷ ῥητορεύειν παρεληλυθόσιν, ἀλλ' οὖν γε ἐν
 τῷ καθ' ἡμᾶς βίῳ πολλοὺς πάρεστιν ὄραν λέγοντας
 μὲν εὐφυνῶς ἐπὶ δικαστηρίων καὶ ἐν ἐκκλησίαις,
 τὰ δὲ τεχνικὰ τῆς ῥητορικῆς παραγγέλματα μὴ
 18 γινώσκοντας. καὶ ἀντιστρόφως, εἰ οἱ ἐξηκρι-
 βωκότες [ἐπὶ πλείον] καὶ ἐπὶ πλείον ἐκπονήσαντες
 τὸν τεχνικὸν τῆς ῥητορικῆς λόγον ἀδυνατοῦσι
 ῥητορεύειν ἐπὶ δικαστηρίων καὶ ἀγορᾶς, οὐ ῥητέον
 τεχνικὴν μέθοδον εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικὴν. ἀλλὰ μὴν
 ὡς ὁ σύμπασις οἶδε βίος, οἱ σοφιστεύοντες ἐπ' ἄκρον
 μὲν τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἐξήσκησαν τεχνολογίαν, ἰχθύων
 δὲ ἀφωνότεροι ἐπὶ τῆς ὑπαίθρου θεωροῦνται.

¹ an παν(τελῶς τὸ) τέλος? (καὶ πάγιον τὸ τ. Herv.).

² κακ cj. Bekk.: καὶ mss., Bekk.

if it is an art, will have to profess one or other of these. But it has not an end which is always stable 14 (for it does not always avoid being worsted by the opponents, and sometimes the rhetor proposes one end but finds the resultant end to be different); nor 15 does it attain its end for the most part, since every rhetor, when his own experiences are compared, turns out to have been often defeated rather than victorious, because the opponent constantly rebuts his arguments. Rhetoric, therefore, is not an art.—Also, if 16 it is possible to become an orator without being acquainted with the art of rhetoric, there will be no art of rhetoric. But it is possible to make a speech quite successfully and well without having studied rhetoric, as we have been told in the case of Demades^a; for though he was a boatman, it is agreed that he became a very fine orator; and besides him there are numerous other instances. Hence, rhetoric is not an art.—Moreover, if we do not believe that these men 17 were such as we have described and that they attained to oratory by experience and by practice, yet still we may see many in our daily life who speak admirably in the law-courts and assemblies though they have no knowledge of the technical rules of rhetoric. And conversely, if those who have studied 18 closely and worked hard at the technique of rhetorical speech are incapable of making a speech at the law-courts and assembly, one must deny that rhetoric is a technical method. But in fact, as all the world knows, our lecturers, though they have studied the technology of rhetoric to the utmost point, are seen to be more mute than fishes in open court. Thus none 19

^a Cf. *Adv. Gram.* 295.

19 τοῖνυν οὐ κατὰ τέχνην εἰσὶ τινες ῥήτορες. ὅθεν καὶ γελᾶν ἔστιν ἐπ' αὐτούς, ὅταν πρὸς τοῦτον ἀπολογούμενοι τὸν ἔλεγχον φάσκωσιν ὅτι, ὡς περ αἱ ἀκόνοι τέμνειν μὲν οὐ πεφύκασιν ὀξύνοσαι δὲ τὴν μάχαιραν τέμνειν παρασκευάζουσιν, οὕτω καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀδυνατοῦσι μὲν εἰπεῖν ὑπὸ τῆς ἀηθείας, ἄλλους δὲ διὰ τέχνης προάγοντες λέγειν ποιοῦσιν. οὐκ ἤδεσαν γὰρ οἱ θαυμάσιοι τὴν ἀνομοιότητα ταύτης τῆς εἰκόνας, εἰ γε ἡ μὲν ἀκόνη οὐχ ἦν εἶχε δύναμιν, ταύτην τῷ σιδήρῳ ἐμποικεῖν πέφυκεν, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐπαγγέλλονται ὡς προηγούμενον ἔργον, ἦν ἔχουσι τέχνην, ταύτην τῷ πέλας περιποιήσιν.

20 Οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Κριτόλαον καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἄκαδημίας, ἐν οἷς ἐστὶ Κλειτόμαχος καὶ Χαρμίδας, εἰώθασιν καὶ οὗτοι τοιαυτὰ τινα λέγειν, ὅτι τὰς μὲν τέχνας οὐκ ἐκβάλλουσιν αἱ πόλεις πάνυ τι βιωφελεῖς οὔσας ἐπιστάμεναι, ὡς οὐδὲ τοὺς μὲν οἰκονομικοὺς τῶν οἰκῶν ἐκβάλλομεν τοὺς δὲ βουκόλους ἐκ τῆς ἀγέλης, τὴν μὲντοι ῥητορικὴν πάντες πανταχόθεν ὡς πολεμιωτάτην ἐδίωξαν, ὡς περ ὁ μὲν Κρητικὸς νομοθέτης εἴρξας ἐπιβαίνειν τῆς νήσου τοὺς ἐν λόγῳ ἀλαζονευσαμένους,

21 ὁ δὲ Σπαρτιάτης Λυκούργος, ὡς ἂν ζηλωτῆς Θάλητος τοῦ Κρητὸς γενόμενος, τὸν αὐτὸν τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις νόμον εἰσηγήσατο· παρ' ἣν αἰτίαν πολλοῖς ὕστερον χρόνοις τὸν ἐπὶ ξένης ῥητορικῆν ἐκπονήσαντα νεανίαν ἐπανελθόντα ἐκόλασαν οἱ ἔφοροι, τὴν αἰτίαν προσθέντες τῆς καταδίκης ὡς δολεροῦς λόγους ἐπὶ παρακρούσει τὰς Σπάρτας ἐμελέτησεν. καὶ αὐτοὶ δὲ διέμειναν ῥητορικὴν

22 μισοῦντες, ἀφελεῖ δὲ βραχυλογία χρώμενοι. ὅθεν καὶ ὁ ἀντιχειροτονηθεὶς Ἀθηναῖος ὑπ' αὐτῶν

are orators by reason of art. Hence one may well laugh at them when, in defending themselves against this confutation, they assert that just as whetstones are not made to cut but by sharpening the knife enable it to cut, so also they themselves are incapable of making speeches through want of practice, yet they enable other men to do so by helping them to improve by means of art. For our fine gentlemen failed to notice the lack of similarity in this comparison, in that the whetstone is not of a nature to implant its own quality in the iron, whereas they profess, as their primary task, to convey to their neighbour the art which they themselves possess.

And Critolaüs and the men of the Academy, 20 including Cleitomachus and Charmidas,* are wont to argue like this,—that the cities do not expel the arts knowing them to be extremely useful for life, just as we do not expel skilled domestics from our houses or cowmen from our herds, but all men in every quarter have hunted down rhetoric as most inimical; for example, the Cretan lawgiver forbade those who prided themselves on their oratory to land on his island, and the Spartan Lycurgus, having become an 21 admirer of Thales the Cretan, introduced the same law for the Spartans; and for this reason, many years later, the Ephors punished on his return a young man who had studied rhetoric abroad, alleging as the cause of his condemnation that he practised a deceitful mode of speaking in order to lead Sparta astray. And the Spartans themselves continued to loathe rhetoric and to employ speech which is simple and 22 short. Hence, too, the man whom they had elected 22

* Both disciples of Carneades; cf. vol. i. p. xxxiii.

πρὸς Τισσαφέρην πρεσβευτῆς, τῶν Ἀθηναίων μακρὰς καὶ ποικίλας ῥήσεις διεξιόντων, δύο τῆ βακτηρία γραμμὰς κατὰ τοῦ ἐδάφους χαράξας, τὴν μὲν εὐθείαν καὶ μικρὰν τὴν δὲ ἐπιμήκη καὶ σκολιάν, "τούτων" εἶπεν, "ὦ βασιλεῦ, ὁποτέραν θέλεις ἐλοῦ," αἰνιττόμενος διὰ μὲν τῆς ἐπιμήκου καὶ σκολιᾶς γραμμῆς τὴν τερθρείαν τὴν ῥητορικὴν, διὰ δὲ τῆς βραχείας ἅμα καὶ εὐθείας τὴν ἀφελῆ
 23 καὶ σύντομον εὐθυρρημοσύνην, δι' ἣν οὐκ ἐν οἰκείοις μόνοις ἀλλὰ καὶ ξένοις τὴν ἀπεριττότητα τοῦ λόγου μεταδιώκουσιν. ἐκ μέσων μέντοι γε καὶ τὸν Χίων πρεσβευτὴν περὶ ἐξαγωγῆς πυροῦ δεόμενον, ἐπεὶ μακρῶς ἡρμήνευσε τὴν δέσμη, ἄπρακτον ἐξαπέστειλαν, ἐτέρου δὲ πεμφθέντος συντομωτέρου (ἤπειγε γὰρ ἀνάγκη τοὺς Χίους) ἔδοσαν· κενὸν γὰρ θύλακον αὐτοῖς οὗτος ἀνατείνας ἀλφίτων αὐτὸν ἔφη δεῖσθαι. ὁμῶς δ' οὖν καὶ τοῦτον ὡς ἀδολέσχην ἐμέμψαντο· ἀποχρώντως γὰρ κενὸς δειχθεὶς ὁ θύλακος ἐσήμνηε τὴν τῶν
 24 Χίων αἴτησιν. ἔνθεν ὁ τραγικὸς Ἴων κινήθει εἶπεν ἐπ' αὐτῶν .

οὐ γὰρ λόγοις Λάκαινα πυργοῦται πόλις,
 ἀλλ' εὖτ' Ἀρης νεοχμὸς ἐμπέση στρατῷ,
 βουλή μὲν ἄρχει, χεὶρ δ' ἐπέξεργάζεται,

ἄτε βουλευομένων μὲν τὰ κράτιστα, στυγούντων δὲ τὴν ῥητορικὴν. ὅθεν εἰ μὴ τὰς τέχνας ἐκβάλουσιν αἱ πόλεις, ἐκβεβλήκασι δὲ τὴν ῥητορικὴν,
 25 οὐκ ἂν εἴη τῶν τεχνῶν ἡ ῥητορικὴ. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀναστρέφειν, καὶ λέγειν ὡς καὶ φιλοσόφους ἐξώρισάν τινες τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων, εὐηθὲς ἔστιν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιεν τούτῳ παρασχεῖν

by vote as ambassador to Tissaphernes in order to oppose the Athenians, while the Athenians were making long and complicated harangues, drew two lines on the ground with his staff, the one straight and short, the other long and crooked, and said "Choose, O king, whichever of these two you please," with a riddling reference in the long and crooked line to the claptraps of rhetoric, and in the line that was at once both short and straight to simple and concise straightforwardness of speech; and to secure this they aim at speech void of superfluity not only amongst their own people but also amongst foreigners. And when the Chian ambassador made a request for the export of grain, they sent him away out of their assembly empty-handed because he made his request at great length; but when another man was sent who was more concise (for the Chians were hard pressed by necessity), they granted his request; for he held up before them an empty sack and said, "This needs barley-meal." All the same, they censured this man, too, as a chatterbox; for the showing of the empty sack sufficiently indicated the petition of the Chians. Hence, the tragic 24 poet Ion was moved to say about them,—

The battlements of Sparta are not words;
 But when the War-god strikes its host afresh,
 The head doth plan and rule, the hand perform,—

meaning that they are excellent in planning and detest rhetoric. Consequently, if the cities do not expel the arts but have expelled rhetoric, rhetoric will not be one of the arts. For to reverse the argument and allege 25 that some of the Greek cities have also banished philosophers is stupid. For, firstly, they will not be able to

* Cf. Herod. iii. 46.

μαρτυρίαν ὡσπερ ἐπὶ ῥητορικῆς οἱ τοῦναντίον συναγαγόντες· ἔπειτα εἰ καὶ ἐξέβαλόν τινες τῶν πόλεων φιλοσοφίαν, οὐ κατὰ γένος πᾶσαν ἐξέβαλον ἀλλὰ τινὰς αἰρέσεις, ὅλον τὴν Ἐπικούρειον ὡς ἡδονῆς διδάσκαλον, τὴν Σωκρατικὴν δὲ ὡς ἐκφωλίζουσιν τὸ θεῖον. αἱ μὲντοι γε προειρημέναι πόλεις οὐ τινὰ μὲν παρητήσαντο ῥητορικὴν τινὰ δὲ προσήκαντο, ἀλλὰ κοινῶς πᾶσαν περιέστησαν.

- 26 Πρὸς γε μὴν τοῖς εἰρημένοις, καὶ εἰ τέχνη πάντως ἐστὶν ἢ ῥητορικὴ, ἤτοι τῷ ἔχοντι ἢ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἔσται χρειώδης ὡς καὶ αἱ λοιπαὶ τῶν τεχνῶν· οὔτε δὲ τῷ ἔχοντι οὔτε ταῖς πόλεσιν ἔστιν ὠφέλιμος, ὡς παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα τέχνη καθέ-
 27 στηκεν. καὶ δὴ τῷ μὲν ἔχοντι οὐκ ἔστιν ὠφέλιμος, ἐπεὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἐν ἀγοραῖς καὶ γραμματοφυλακείοις ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι καλινδεῖσθαι, κἄν τε θέλη κἄν τε μὴ θέλη, μετὰ μοχθηρῶν καὶ παλιμβόλων καὶ συκοφαντῶν διατρίβειν, εἰς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐκείνοις τόπους κατερχόμενον, εἶτα καὶ τῆς αἰδοῦς ὀλίγην ποιεῖσθαι φειδώ, ἵνα μὴ εὐκαταφρόνητος
 28 εἶναι δοκῆ τοῖς πανουργότεροις, θρασέως δὲ λέγειν καὶ τὴν τόλμαν ὡσπερ ὄπλον προβεβλήσθαι, ἵνα φοβερός ἢ τοῖς ἀντιδίκους, ἀπατητικόν τε καὶ γόητα τυγχάνειν καὶ χειρίστοις ἐντεθραμμένον πράγμασι, μοιχείαις τε καὶ κλοπαῖς καὶ ταῖς πρὸς τοὺς γονεῖς ἀχαριστίαις, εἰς τὸ πραγματικῶς ταῦτα
 29 διελέγχειν ὅτε δεῖ, καὶ πάλιν ἐπιθολοῦν, ἔχειν δὲ ἐχθροὺς πολλοὺς καὶ μίσος πρὸς πάντας, τοὺς μὲν ὅτι ἀντηδικήθησαν, τοὺς δὲ εἰδότες ὅτι τοῦ μισθωσαμένου ἔστι, καὶ ὁ ἄλλους διέθηκε, τοῦτο καὶ αὐτοὺς ποτε πλείονι λήμματι δελεασθεῖς

furnish evidence for this, as do those who have come to the opposite conclusion in the case of rhetoric; and secondly, if indeed some of the cities did expel philosophy, they did not expel it all without exception but certain sects such as the Epicurean, as teaching pleasure, and the Socratic, as slighting the Divinity. But the cities mentioned above did not reject one sort of rhetoric and admit another but shunned it all without exception.

In addition to what has been said, if rhetoric is an art at all, it will be of use either to its possessor or to the cities, like the rest of the arts; but it is not of use either to its possessor or to the cities, as we shall establish; therefore it is not an art. Now to its possessor it is not useful, since, firstly, 27 he is compelled—whether he wishes or not—to spend his time at the assemblies and record offices, and to consort with knavish and double-dealing slanderers by going down to the same places as they; and, secondly, he has to be very sparing of modesty, lest he should seem to the more unscrupulous to be a contemptible fellow; and he has to speak out boldly 28 and thrust his audacity before him like a spear, so as to be terrible in the eyes of his opponents, and to be a cheat and a juggler and reared up amidst the worst kinds of conduct,—adulteries and thefts and acts of ingratitude towards parents,—so as to expose them, when necessary, in a practical way, or again to becloud them; he must also have many enemies and 29 hatred towards them all,—some because they have suffered retaliation, others because they are aware that it is the habit of one who has been hired, when enticed by a larger fee, to treat themselves in the same way that he has treated others. Besides all 30

30 διαθήσει, μετὰ τοῦ διὰ παντός ἀγωνιᾶν καὶ πειρατοῦ τρόπον ὅτε μὲν φεύγειν ὅτε δὲ διώκειν, ὥστε κοπούμενον νύκτωρ καὶ μεθ' ἡμέραν ὑπὸ τῶν πράγματα ἐχόντων ὀχλεῖσθαι, μεστὸν δὲ ἔχειν τὸν βίον θρήνων τε καὶ δακρύων, καὶ τινῶν μὲν εἰς δεσμωτήριον τινῶν δὲ ἐπὶ τύμπανον ἀπαγομένων. ὥστε τῷ μὲν ἔχοντι ἐπιβλαβῆς ἢ ῥητορικὴ.

31 Καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἔστιν ὠφέλιμος· οἱ γὰρ νόμοι πόλεων εἰσι σύνδεσμοι, καὶ ὡς ψυχὴ σώματος ἐκφθαρέντος φθείρεται,¹ οὕτω νόμων ἀναιρεθέντων καὶ αἱ πόλεις διόλλυνται. παρὸ καὶ ὁ θεολόγος Ὀρφεὺς τὸ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῶν ὑποφαίνων φησὶν

ἦν χρόνος ἠνίκα φῶτες ἀπ' ἀλλήλων βίον εἶχον
σαρκοδακῆ, κρείσσων δὲ τὸν ἥττονα φῶτα
δαίξεν—

32 μηδενὸς γὰρ ἐπιστατοῦντος νόμου ἕκαστος ἐν χερσὶ τὸ δίκαιον εἶχε, καὶ ὡς

ἰχθύσι (μὲν) καὶ θηρσὶ καὶ οἰωνοῖς πετεηνοῖς
ἐπιτέτραπται

ἔσθην ἀλλήλους, ἐπεὶ οὐ δίκη ἔστι μετ' αὐτοῖς—

μέχρις οὗτο ὁ θεὸς οἰκτεῖρων μογοῦσιν αὐτοῖς
θεσμοφόρους θεὰς ἐξαπέστειλεν, ἃς ἐπὶ τῷ τῆν
ἀλληλοφάγον ἀνομίαν καταλῦσαι πλέον ἢ ἐπὶ τῷ
καρποῖς ἡμερῶσαι τὸν βίον ἐθαύμασαν ἄνθρωποι.

33 ἐντεῦθεν καὶ οἱ Περσῶν χαριέντες νόμον ἔχουσι
βασιλέως παρ' αὐτοῖς τελευτήσαντος πέντε τὰς
ἐφεξῆς ἡμέρας ἀνομίαν ἄγειν, οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ δυσ-
τυχεῖν ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἔργω μαθεῖν ἡλίκον κακόν

¹ ψυχῆς σώματος ἐκφθάρσεως (ἄνθρωπος) φθείρεται cf. Bekk.

this, he must be engaged continually in contests and, like a pirate, now be fleeing and now pursuing, so that he is wearied and worried night and day by those in trouble, and has his life filled with tears and lamentations, as some are led away to prison and others to the whipping-post. Thus rhetoric is injurious to its possessor.

Furthermore, it is not useful to cities either. For 31 the laws are what bind cities together, and as the soul perishes when the body has perished, so the cities are destroyed when the laws are abolished. Hence, the theologian Orpheus^a hints at their necessity when he says,—

There was a time when every man liv'd by devouring his
fellow
Cannibal-wise, and the stronger man did feast on the
weaker,

(for when no law was in control each man maintained 32
his right by force of hand, even as it is permitted to

Fishes and beasts of the wild and the winged ravens and
vultures,
Each to devour the other, for justice exists not among
them),^b

until God in his pity for their misery sent to them law-bearing goddesses, and men admired these for the way they stopped the lawless cannibalism more than for the way they civilized life by means of the fruits of the earth. Hence, too, the shrewd Persians have a 33 law that on the death of their king they must practise lawlessness for the next five days, not in order to be in a state of misery but in order to learn by experience

^a Cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 15.

^b Cf. *Hesiod, Op. D.* 275 f.

ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνομία, σφαγὰς καὶ ἀρπαγὰς καὶ εἴ τι
 χεῖρόν ἐστὶν ἐπάγουσα, ἵνα πιστότεροι τῶν βασι-
 34 λέων φύλακες γένωνται. ἀλλ' ἢ γε ῥητορικὴ κατὰ
 τῶν νόμων εἰσκεκύκλῃται. τεκμήριον δὲ παμμέ-
 γεθες τὸ παρὰ μὲν τοῖς βαρβάροις, παρ' οἷς ἢ οὐδ'
 ὄλως ἢ σπανίως ἐστὶ ῥητορικὴ, τοὺς νόμους
 ἀσαλεύτους μένειν, παρὰ δὲ τοῖς προσημένους
 αὐτὴν ὀσημέραι νεοχμοῦσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ παρ'
 35 Ἀθηναίοις, καθάπερ καὶ Πλάτων ὁ τῆς ἀρχαίας
 κωμωδίας ποιητῆς λέγει· καὶ γὰρ τρεῖς εἴαν τις,
 φησί, ἐκδημῆση μῆνας, οὐκέτι ἐπιγινώσκει τὴν
 πόλιν, ἀλλὰ παραπλησίως τοῖς νυκτὸς περιπατοῦσι
 παρὰ τὰ τείχη καθάπερ τινὰς ἀγγάρους κατὰγεται,¹
 τὸ ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς νόμοις μὴ τῆς αὐτῆς οὔσης
 36 πόλεως. πρόδηλον δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τῶν νόμων
 αὐτὴν ὑπάρχειν καὶ ἐξ ὧν ἐν ταῖς κακοτέχνους
 τέχναις ὑποτίθενται. ὅτε μὲν γὰρ παραινουσί
 τῷ ῥητῷ καὶ ταῖς φωναῖς τοῦ νομοθέτου προσέχειν
 ὡς σαφέσι καὶ μηδεμιᾶς ἐξηγήσεως δεομέναις,
 ὅτε δὲ ἀναστρέψαντες μῆτε τῷ ῥητῷ μῆτε ταῖς
 37 φωναῖς ἀλλὰ τῇ διανοίᾳ κατακολουθεῖν· οὐδὲ γὰρ
 ὁ κολάζειν ἀξιῶν τὸν ἐπαταεινόμενόν τινα σιδηρον
 τὸν ὅπως οὖν ἐπαταεινάμενον, ὅλον δακτύλον, ἢ
 ὅποιον, καθάπερ βελόνην, κολάζειν ἠξίωσεν, ἀλλ'
 εἴαν τὴν διάνοιαν αὐτοῦ πολυπραγμονῶμεν, τὸν
 ἀνδροφονῆσαι τολμήσαντα τεθελῆκεναί τιμωρεῖσθαι.
 38 κελεύουσι δὲ ἐνίοτε καὶ κατὰ ἀποκοπὴν ἀναγινώ-
 σκειν τοὺς νόμους καὶ ἐκ τῶν λειπομένων ἕτερόν
 τι νόημα συντιθέναι. πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἀμφιβόλους
 λέξεις διαστέλλουσι, πρόσφορον ἑαυτοῖς κατα-

¹ κατὰγεται cj. Bekk. : κατὰγεσθαι mss., Bekk.

how great an evil lawlessness is, inflicting, as it does,
 murders and rapine and things which are, if possible,
 worse, so that they may become more trusty guardians
 of their kings. But rhetoric was brought to the front 34
 in opposition to the laws. A very strong proof of this
 is the fact that amongst the barbarians, amongst
 whom there is either no rhetoric at all or very little,
 the laws remain unmoved, whereas amongst those
 who cultivate rhetoric they are altered daily, as is the
 case with the Athenians, as Plato, the poet of the 35
 Old Comedy, affirms.^a For he says that if a man has
 been absent abroad for three months he no longer
 recognizes the city, but on his return (like walkers by
 night) he goes past the walls, as foreign couriers
 might do, since so far as regards the laws it is not the
 same city. And that rhetoric is against the laws is 36
 already plain from the statements they make in their
 mal-artful arts. For at one time they advise us to
 attend to the ordinance and words of the lawgiver as
 being clear and needing no explanation, at another
 time they turn round and advise us to follow neither
 the ordinance nor the words but the intention; for 37
 he who proposes to punish the man who holds an iron
 instrument over anyone does not propose to punish
 the man who holds it over him in any and every way,
 (as, for example, one might hold a ring), or of what-
 ever form if may be (a needle, for instance), but,
 if we inquire closely as to his intention, it is his
 desire to take vengeance on the man who has dared
 to commit murder. And sometimes they bid us cut 38
 out bits as we read the laws, and construct a different
 sense from what remains. Often, too, they make
 distinctions in ambiguous phrases and support the

^a Cf. Meineke, *Com. Gr.* 3 p. 692.

σκευάζοντες τὸ σημαίνόμενον, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία πρὸς ἀνατροπὴν τῶν νόμων ποιοῦσιν. ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Βυζάντιος ῥήτωρ ἐρωτηθεὶς πῶς ὁ Βυζαντιῶν 39 ἔχει νόμος εἶπεν “ὡς ἐγὼ θέλω.” καθὰ γὰρ οἱ ψηφοπαύκται τὰς τῶν θεωμένων ὄψεις δι’ ὄξυχειρίαν κλέπτουσιν, οὕτως οἱ ῥήτορες διὰ πανουργίαν τὰς τῶν δικαστῶν διανοίας ἀμαυρῶσαντες 40 τῷ νόμῳ συγκλέπτουσι τὰς ψήφους. τό γε μὴν τῶν παρανόμων ψηφισμάτων εἶδος οὐδεὶς ἐτόλμησε γράφειν ἀλλ’ ἢ οἱ ῥήτορες. τὸν γοῦν γραφέντα κατὰ Κτησιφώντος Δημοσθένους πολλὰ βοῶν καὶ τερατεύομενος ἤρπασεν. ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Αἰσχίνης “κακὸν ἔθος” φησὶν “εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια παρῆλθεν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ κατήγορος ἀπολογεῖται, ὁ δὲ φεύγων τὴν γραφὴν κατηγορεῖ, οἱ δὲ δικασταὶ ὧν μὴ εἰσὶ κριταί, περὶ τούτων ψηφοφορεῖν ἀναγκά- 41 ζονται.” ἀλλ’ εἰ κατὰ τῶν νόμων ἐστὶν ἡ ῥητορικὴ, πρὸς τῷ μὴ χρησιμεῖν τι καὶ βλαβερὰ καθέστηκεν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ οἱ δημαγωγοῦντες ῥήτορες ἐπ’ ἀγαθῷ τῶν πόλεων προβαίνουσι, ἀλλ’ ὄν λόγον ἔχει φαρμακοπώλης πρὸς ἰατρόν, 42 τοῦτον ὁ δημαγωγὸς πρὸς τὸν πολιτικόν. κακοδιδασκαλεῖ γὰρ τοὺς πολλοὺς τὰ κεχαρισμένα λέγων, καὶ διαβολαῖς αὐτοὺς ἐξαλλοτριεῖ πρὸς τοὺς ἀρίστους. λόγῳ μὲν γὰρ καὶ τῷ δοκεῖν ὑπερ τοῦ κοινῆ συμφέροντος ὑπισχνεῖται πάντα ποιήσειν, ταῖς δὲ ἀληθείαις ἀπ’ οὐθενὸς ὑγιοῦς τροφὴν πορίζεται, εὐκότῳ ταῖς τίθηται, αἶ μικρὸν τοῦ ψωμίσματος τοῖς παιδίοις διδοῦσαι τὸ ὅλον κατα- πίνουσι.

43 Τοσαῦτα μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῖς Ἀκαδημαϊκοῖς ἐν καταδρομῆς μέρει λέγεται περὶ ῥητορικῆς, ὥστε 208

signification which suits themselves; and they do thousands of other things which tend to the upsetting of the laws. Hence also, the Byzantine orator, when asked “How goes the Byzantians’ law?”, replied “As I choose.” For just as jugglers deceive 39 the eyes of the beholders by their sleight of hand, so the orators by their low cunning blind the minds of the judges to the law and so steal away the votes. More- 40 over, no one except the orators has dared to publish decrees of a kind contrary to the laws. Yet Demosthenes by his loud shouting and talking marvels snatched away the law which indicted Ctesiphon. Hence Aeschines says “—“An evil custom has entered the law-court; for the accuser defends himself, while the defendant acts as accuser, and the jurors are obliged to cast their votes concerning matters of which they are not judges.” But if 41 rhetoric is against the laws, it is not only of no use but actually harmful.—Furthermore, even the demagogic orators do not come forward for the good of the cities, but the demagogue bears to the statesman the relation which the druggist bears to the physician. For 42 he depraves the crowd by his doctrines, using flattering words, and sets them against the better class by his slanders. By word and in seeming he promises to do everything for the public benefit, but in reality he provides nourishment from no wholesome source, like nurses who offer the babes a morsel of the pap and then swallow the whole themselves.

Such, then, are the arguments used by the men of 43 the Academy ^b concerning rhetoric, by way of run-

^a Cf. Aeschin. *Adv. Ctesiph.* 193.

^b Cf. § 20.

εἰ μήτε τῷ ἔχοντι μήτε τοῖς πέλας ἐστὶν ὠφέλιμος, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τέχνη. ἀλλὰ πρὸς ταῦτα ἀπολογούμενοι τινὲς μὲν φασιν ὅτι διττῆς οὐσῆς ῥητορικῆς, τῆς μὲν ἀστείας καὶ ἐν σοφοῖς τῆς δὲ ἐν μέσοις ἀνθρώποις, τὴν κατηγορίαν γεγονέναι οὐ τῆς ἀστείας
 44 ἀλλὰ τῆς τῶν μοχθηρῶν. τινὲς δὲ καὶ ὑποδείγμασι χρῶνται· ὡς γὰρ ὁ τὸν πατέρα τύπτων παγκρατιαστῆς οὐ διὰ τὴν παγκρατιαστικὴν τέχνην γίνεται πατροτύπτης ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν τῶν τρόπων μοχθηρίαν, οὕτως ὁ ῥητορικὴν ἐξασκήσας, εἶτα πατρίδος αὐτῆ καὶ νόμων χρώμενος οὐ διὰ ῥητορικὴν τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἰδίαν πονηρίαν.
 45 λέληθε δὲ τοὺς μὲν πρώτους ὅτι ἄκοντες δεδώκασι τὴν ἀνυπαρξίαν τῆς ῥητορικῆς· μηδενὸς γὰρ εὕρισκομένου σοφοῦ, ἢ σπανίως γε εὕρισκομένου, δεήσει καὶ τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς ῥητορικὴν ἢ ἀνυπαρκτον
 46 ἢ σπάνιον εἶναι. πρὸς δὲ τοὺς δευτέρους ῥητέον ὅτι ἀνόμιόν ἐστι τὸ παράδειγμα τοῖς ἐν χερσὶ ζητουμένοις· ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἄθλησις οὐχ ὑποδείκνυσι τὴν πρὸς τὸ κακὸν χρήσιν αὐτῆς, οἷον τὴν πατροτυψίαν, ἢ δὲ ῥητορικὴ τοῦθ' ὡς προηγούμενον ἔργον διδάσκει, οἷον πῶς ἂν τὰ μικρὰ μεγάλα ποιήσαιμεν τὰ δὲ μεγάλα μικρά, ἢ πῶς ἂν τὰ μὲν
 47 δίκαια ἀδίκῃ φανείη τὰ δὲ ἀδίκῃ δίκαια. καθόλου δὲ τῆς ῥητορικῆς ἐξ ἐναντίων συνισταμένης λόγων οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὸν μὲν ἀστεῖον λέγειν ῥήτορα, τὸν δὲ μὴ τοιοῦτον οὐκέτι. ὁποῖος γὰρ ἂν ἦ ὁ ῥήτωρ, πάντως τοὺς ἐναντίους ἐκμελετᾶν ὀφείλει λόγους, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ ἀδικον· πᾶς ἄρα ῥήτωρ καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου συναγωνιστῆς ὢν ἀδικός ἐστιν.
 48 Ἄλλὰ ὅτι μὲν οὐ ῥητέον τὴν ῥητορικὴν τέχνην,

ning it down, so that, if it is useful neither to its possessor nor to his neighbours, it will not be an art. But in reply to all this some assert that as there are two forms of rhetoric, the one refined and in use among the wise, the other in use among inferior people, the accusation is not made against the refined kind but against that of the baser class. Some of 44 them, too, use illustrations: just as the pancratiast who beats his father is a father-beater not because of his pancratiastic art but because of his bad morals, so the man who has practised rhetoric and then used it against his country and its laws, does so not because of rhetoric but because of his own wickedness. But 45 the first group of these apologists fail to notice that, against their will, they have granted the nullity of rhetoric; for since the wise man is never, or at least rarely, found, it must follow that the rhetoric in use among the wise is likewise either non-existent or rare. And in reply to the second group one must 46 say that their example is not on a par with the matter now in question, for while athleticism does not suggest the employment of it for mischief, such as father-beating, rhetoric declares this to be its main task,— how, for instance, we are to make small things great and great things small, or how just things may be made to appear unjust, and the unjust just. And in 47 general, as rhetoric consists of opposite statements, one cannot say that the refined speaker is an orator, but the unrefined no longer an orator. For the orator, of whatever sort he may be, must certainly practise himself in contradictory speeches, and injustice is inherent in contradictions; therefore every orator, being an advocate of injustice, is unjust.

From all this it is plain that we must not call 48

ἐκ τούτων συμφανές· τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῆς ὕλης περὶ ἣν ἐστὶ σκοπῶμεν αὐτῆς τὸ ἀνυπόστατον· καίτοι προαποδέδοται ἡμῖν τὸ κεφάλαιον ἐν τῷ πρὸς τοὺς γραμματικούς· εἰ γὰρ περὶ λόγον ἢ ῥητορικὴ πονεῖται, οὔτε δὲ λέξις ἐστὶ τι οὔτε λόγος ἐκ λέξεων συγκείμενος, ὡς ἐπεδείξαμεν, διὰ τὸ οὐ τὰ μέρη μὴ ἔστιν ἀνύπαρκτον εἶναι, ἀκολουθήσει καὶ τὸ τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἀνυπόστατον
 49 ὑπάρχειν. ὅμως δ' οὐκ ῥητέον πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι οὐκ εἰ τὸν λόγον ἐξεπώνησεν ἢ ῥητορικὴ, πάντως ἐστὶν ἔντεχνος, ἀλλ' εἰ τὸν συμφέροντα. καθὰ γὰρ φαρμάκων διαφόρων ὄντων, καὶ τῶν μὲν θανασιμῶν τῶν δὲ σωτηρίων, ἢ μὲν ἐν τοῖς θανασιμῶσι ἔξις καταγιννομένη οὔτε τέχνη τίς ἐστὶν οὔτε ἰατρικὴ, ἢ δὲ περὶ τὰ σωτήρια καὶ τέχνη καὶ βιωφελής, οὕτω καὶ λόγων τῶν μὲν συμφερόντων τῶν δὲ βλαπτικῶν ὄντων, εἰ μὴ περὶ τοὺς συμφερόντας ἐστὶν ἢ ῥητορικὴ ἀλλὰ τοὺς βλαβερούς, πρὸς τῷ μὴ εἶναι τέχνη ἔτι καὶ κακοτεχνία γενήσεται. παρεστήσαμεν δὲ γε πρότερον ὅτι βλαπτικωτάτοις ἐνυποδύεται λόγοις· τοῖνυν οὐδὲ
 50 τέχνη καθέστηκεν. καὶ μὴν εἴπερ ἢ συκοφαντικὴ καὶ ἢ ὄχλοκοπικὴ τὸ λέγειν ἐξήσκησαν καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶ τέχναι, δῆλον ὡς καὶ ἢ ῥητορικὴ κατὰ ψιλὸν τὸ ἐκπεπονηκέναι τὴν ἐν τῷ λέγειν δύναμιν ἐξεταζομένη οὐ γενήσεται τέχνη. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἢ συκοφαντικὴ καὶ ἢ ὄχλοκοπικὴ τὸ λέγειν ἐξήσκησαν καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶ τέχναι· τοῖνυν οὐδὲ ἢ ῥητορικὴ.
 51 πρὸς γε μὴν τοῖς εἰρημένοις, οὐδὲ ἴδιον ῥητορικῆς ἐστὶ τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ τὸ κοινὸν παντὸς λογικοῦ μαθήματος· καὶ γὰρ ἰατρικὴ εὖ λέγει περὶ τῶν

rhetoric an art; and in the next place let us infer its unreality from the matter with which it deals. The sum of our argument, in fact, has been given already^a in our treatise *Against the Grammarians*, for if rhetoric has to do with speech, but, as we have shown, neither the word is anything nor the speech composed of words, then, as that object whose parts do not exist is non-existent, it will follow that rhetoric also is non-existent. None the less, we must affirm, 49 firstly, that if rhetoric deals with speech it is not necessarily technical, but only if the speech be beneficial. For just as in the case of drugs, which differ in quality, some being deadly, others salutary, the skill which busies itself with the deadly ones is neither the art of medicine nor any art at all, whereas that which deals with the salutary drugs is both an art and useful for life, so also in the case of speeches, of which some are beneficial, others harmful, if rhetoric is not concerned with the beneficial but with the harmful, besides not being an art it will also be a mischievous artifice. And, in fact, we have already established^b that it masks itself in most harmful speech; so it is not an art.—Moreover, if sycophancy and mob-courting 50 practise speaking but are not arts, it is evident that rhetoric, when examined, will not be an art by reason of the mere fact that it has gained by practice ability in speaking. But, in fact, sycophancy and mob-courting practise speaking and are not arts; neither, then, is rhetoric an art.—In addition to what has been 51 said, speech is not a property confined to rhetoric but is common to every branch of learning which uses words; for the art of medicine^c speaks well con-

^a Cf. *Adv. Gram.* 131 ff.^b Cf. §§ 41 ff.^c Cf. § 8.

ἑαυτῆς θεωρημάτων καὶ μουσικῆ περὶ μουσικῶν. διόπερ ὡς ἐκάστη τούτων οὐκ ἔστιν ἕνεκα τοῦ λέγειν ῥητορικῆ, οὕτως οὐδὲ περὶ ἧς ἔστιν ἡ ζήτησις.

52 Συνελόντι δὲ φάναι, οὐδὲ κατασκευάζει καλὴν λέξιν ἢ ῥητορικῆ. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὑποδείκνυσι ἡμῖν τὴν εἰς τοῦτο τεχνολογίαν, οἷον ὅτι καλῆ λέξει χρῆται πρῶτον μὲν ὁ μὴ ἐκκλίνων τὰ κατὰ τὴν συνήθειαν λεγόμενα, καθὼς καὶ ἐν τῷ πρὸς τοὺς γραμματικούς ὑπεδείξαμεν, εἶτα καὶ ὁ τοῦ νοουμένου πράγματος ἀσφαλῶς κρατῶν· ῥέμβεται γὰρ ἢ λέξις ἀγνωσμένων τούτων, παρὸ καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ἀποβλέποντες ἀγαθὸν λέγομεν εἶναι ῥήτορα ἕκαστον
53 τῶν ἰδίων ἐπιτηδευμάτων. σὺν δὲ τούτοις καὶ ὁ περιεσκεμμένος τίνες τῶν λέξεων κατὰ τὴν συνήθειαν¹ κείνται καὶ τίνες δοξαστῶς, τὸ ἐκάστῳ πρόσφορον ἀποδίδωσιν. βαλανεῖον μὲν γὰρ ἀνδρεῖον κατὰ τὴν συνήθειαν¹ εἴρηται ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνδρας κακὸν τῶν δοξαστῶν· τό τε γὰρ τὸν θάνατον τῶν κακῶν εἶναι καὶ τὸν πλοῦτον τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀδηλον
54 καὶ δοξαστόν. χρῶτο δ' ἂν καλῶς λέξει καὶ ὁ κατελιφῶς τίνος ἕνεκα τὰς μεταλήψεις ποιούμεθα τῶν λέξεων, ἧτοι ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ εὐθυρρημονεῖν, προσκοπὴν φέροντος τοῦ εὐθέος ῥήματος, ἢ ὑπὲρ τοῦ τι σαφηνίζειν, ὡς ὅταν τὸ μὲν αἴτιον εἰς τὸ ποιοῦν μεταλαμβάνωμεν, τὸ δὲ σημεῖον εἰς τὸ
55 δηλοῦν. εἰ μὲν οὖν, ὡς ἔφη, ἐτεχνολογεῖτό τινα περὶ τούτων τοῖς ῥήτορσι, τάχα ἂν καὶ τὸ καλῶς

¹ ἀλήθειαν (bis) cj. Bekk.

cerning its own principles, and that of music concerning those of music. Hence, as none of these is rhetoric in virtue of its speech, neither is the subject of our inquiry.

And, to speak succinctly, rhetoric does not create 52 good speech. For it does not suggest to us the technical rules for it, as for instance that the man who uses good speech is, firstly, he who does not pervert the language in common use (as we have pointed out in our book *Against the Grammarians*),^a and secondly, he who is securely master of the subject in mind; for if the subjects are not understood, the language wanders off the point, and so, in view of this, we say that every man is a good orator about his own pursuits. Besides this, the person who has carefully 53 considered which of the words are employed according to common usage, and which have their source in (personal) opinion, attributes its due to each. Thus "a bath" is called ἀνδρεῖον according to common usage from the fact that it washes ἀνδρας (men)—, but when we say that the rich man is "blessed," or that death is "an evil," these descriptions have their source in opinion; for that death is one of the evils and wealth one of the goods is non-evident and a matter of opinion. He, too, will make a good use of language 54 who has grasped the reason why we substitute one word for another, whether in order to avoid straightforward speech, when the straightforward word causes offence, or in order to make a thing clear, as when we substitute "agent" for "cause," or "indication" for "sign." Now if, as I said, any tech- 55 nical rules on these matters were observed by the orators, they might possibly have derived from

^a Cf. *Adv. Gram.* 189 ff.

λέγειν καὶ τὴν κεκαλλωπισμένην λέξιν ἐκ ῥητορικῆς εἶχον. νῦν δὲ ἐπεὶ ταύτης τῆς θεωρίας οὐ ψαύουσιν, ἢ εἰ ψαύοιεν, οὐ τοί γε κατὰ ῥητορικὴν, λεκτέον μὴ ῥητορικῆς ἴδιον εἶναι τὸ καλλιλεκτεῖν.

56 ἢ τε λέξις καθ' ἑαυτὴν οὔτε καλὴ ἐστίν οὔτε μοχθηρὰ. τεκμήριον δὲ τὸ τῇ αὐτῇ ὑπὸ μὲν ἀστείου καὶ σεμνοῦ λεγομένη προσκόπτειν ἡμᾶς, ὑπὸ δὲ μίμου γελωτοποιούντος μηδαμῶς. διόπερ ὅταν λέγηται ὁ ῥήτωρ καλῆς λέξεως εἶναι κατασκευαστικός, ἦτοι κατὰ τοῦτο λέγεται καθὸ τὴν τὰ συμφέροντα πράγματα δηλοῦσαν λέξιν κατασκευάζει, ἢ τὴν οἷα ἐστὶν ἢ τοῦ ἐλληνίζειν, ἢ τὴν ἐναργῶς καὶ συντόμως καὶ ἐγκατασκευῶς

57 δηλοῦσαν τὰ πράγματα. οὔτε δὲ καθὸ τὴν τὰ συμφέροντα πράγματα μνηύουσιν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἴσασιν περὶ τούτων τῶν πραγμάτων οἱ ῥήτορες. οὔτε καθὸ τὴν οἷα ἐστὶν ἢ τοῦ ἐλληνίζειν· κοινὸν γὰρ ἦν τοῦτο τῶν τῇ συνηθείᾳ καὶ ταῖς ἐλευθέραις τέχναις προσεχόντων. οὔτε καθὸ τὴν σαφῶς καὶ συντόμως καὶ ἐγκατασκευῶς μνηύουσιν τὰ πράγματα· τὸναντίον γὰρ περίοδον καὶ ἐπιφώνημα θέλοντες λέγειν οἱ ῥήτορες, καὶ μὴ φωνᾶν φωνάεντι συγκρούειν, καὶ ὁμοιοτέλετον διάνοιαν κατακλίνειν, ἐκκλείονται τῆς σαφοῦς ἅμα καὶ

58 συντόμου τῶν πραγμάτων ἐρμηνείας. οὐκ ἄρα ῥητορικῆς ἐστὶ τὸ κατασκευάζειν καλὴν λέξιν καὶ τὸ εὖ λέγειν. δοθέντος τε τούτου οὐκ ἂν τις ἔλοιτο τὴν τοιαύτην φράσιν, πρῶτον μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ πίπτειν αὐτὴν εἰς τὴν κοινὴν τοῦ βίου χρῆσιν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἡμῶν οὕτω διαλέγεται ὡς οἱ ῥήτορες ἐπὶ τῶν δικαστηρίων, ἐπεὶ καταγελασθήσεται. καὶ αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐκεῖνοι πάντοτε ἐξελθόντες τῆς

rhetoric fine speaking and refined phraseology. But as it is, seeing that they do not touch this subject, or if they touch it it is not because of rhetoric, one must declare that fine speech is not peculiar to rhetoric.— Again, language of itself is neither good nor bad. A 56 proof of this is the fact that the same language which offends us when spoken by a cultivated and solemn person does not offend us in the least when spoken by the jester cracking jokes. Hence, when the orator is said to be capable of framing fine speech, it is either for the reason that he frames speech which expresses profitable things, or speech which is a form of good Greek, or speech which indicates objects clearly, concisely and competently. But it is not for the 57 reason that his speech indicates things of profit; for orators know nothing about those things. Nor is it because his speech is a form of good Greek; for this is also shared by those who keep to customary usage and the liberal arts. Nor is it because his speech indicates objects clearly, concisely and competently; on the contrary, in their desire to give out their well-rounded periods and concluding clauses, and not to let vowel collide with vowel, and to avoid similar sentence-endings, they preclude themselves from expounding things at once clearly and concisely. Therefore it does not belong to rhetoric to produce 58 fine phrasing and good speaking. And, this being granted, no one will choose a style such as theirs, and that because, firstly, it does not fit in with the common practice; for none of us talks as do the orators in the law-courts, since he would be jeered at. And they themselves, when they come away

διατριβῆς καὶ τοῦ ἀγῶνος ἄλλη χρῶνται πρὸς
59 τοὺς πέλας ἐρμηνεῖα. εἶτα καὶ ὡς ἔφην, προσκοπήν ἐμποιεῖ τὸ μετὰ προσοχῆς καὶ ῥητορείας λαλεῖν. μετακτεόν δὲ τὰ πρότερον πρὸς τοὺς ἀναλογιστικοὺς τῶν γραμματικῶν εἰρημένα, καὶ διδασκτέον ὅτι τῇ συνηθείᾳ προσεκτέον μᾶλλον ἔστι θέλοντας εὐ λέγειν ἢ περ τέχνη τινὶ περιεργοτέρα.

60 Τὰ νῦν δὲ μετελθόντες καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ τέλους τῆς ῥητορικῆς ποιῶμεθα τὰς ἐνοστάσεις. πάλιν τοίνυν λεκτέον ὡς εἰ μηδὲν ἔστι ῥητορικῆς τέλος, οὐδὲν ἔστι ῥητορικὴ διὰ τὸ πᾶσαν τεχνικὴν ἔξιν πρὸς τι τέλος λαμβάνειν τὴν ἀναφοράν. οὐχὶ δέ γε ἔστι τι ῥητορικῆς τέλος, ὡς δείξομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι
61 τέχνη ἢ ῥητορικὴ. οἱ μὲν οὖν πλείστοι καὶ χαρίεντες ἔσχατον οἴονται τῆς ῥητορικῆς ἔργον εἶναι τὸ πείθειν. καὶ γὰρ οἱ περὶ τὸν Πλάτωνα εἰς τοῦτο ἀπιδόντες δύναμιν εἰρήκασιν αὐτὴν τοῦ διὰ λόγων πείθειν, καὶ οἱ περὶ τὸν Ξενοκράτην πειθοῦς δημιουργόν, καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης δύναμιν τοῦ θεωρεῖν τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν. καὶ Ἀρίστων ὁ Κριτολάου γνώριμος σκοπὸν μὲν ἐκκείσθαι φησιν αὐτῇ
62 τὴν πειθῶ, τέλος δὲ τὸ τυχεῖν τῆς πειθοῦς. καὶ Ἐρμαγόρας τελείου ῥήτορος ἔργον εἶναι ἔλεγε τὸ τεθὲν πολιτικὸν ζήτημα διατίθεσθαι κατὰ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πειστικῶς. Ἀθήναιος δὲ λόγων δύναμιν προσαγορεύει τὴν ῥητορικὴν στοχαζομένην τῆς τῶν ἀκουόντων πειθοῦς, καὶ Ἰσοκράτης φησὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἐπιτηδεύειν τοὺς ῥήτορας ἢ
63 ἐπιστήμην πειθοῦς. ὅθεν καὶ ἡμεῖς στοιχοῦντες

from their business and the trial, always use another mode of expression towards their companions. And 59 secondly, talking in a studied and oratorical manner gives offence, as I have said. And one may transfer what has been said already against the Grammarians who rely on analogy,^a and affirm that if we wish to speak well we should pay attention to common usage rather than to any superfluous art.

For the present let us pass on and base our objections on the "end" ^b of rhetoric. So we must state, once again, that if there is no "end" of rhetoric, rhetoric is nothing, because every technical activity has reference to some end. But, as we shall show, rhetoric has no end; therefore rhetoric is not an art. Now most clever people suppose that the ultimate 61 task of rhetoric is persuasion. For Plato, with an eye to this, has said that it is "the ability to persuade by means of speech," and Xenocrates ^c that it is "the creator of persuasion," and Aristotle ^d that it is "the ability to discern the credible which is possible." Ariston, also, the friend of Critolaüs, declares that the professed aim of rhetoric is persuasion, and its end the securing persuasion. And Hermagoras used to say 62 that the task of the perfect orator is to settle the political question proposed as persuasively as possible. And Athenaeus calls rhetoric a power of speech which aims at the persuasion of the audience; and Isocrates asserts that orators pursue nothing else than the science of persuasion. Hence, we too, 63

^a Cf. *Adv. Gram.* 179 ff.

^b "End" in the sense of "aim" or "final cause."

^c But this definition is attributed by Quintilian to Isocrates; and the definition ascribed to Xenocrates in § 6 is different.

^d Cf. *Arist. Rhet.* I. ii. 1.

τῇ τούτων φορᾷ λέγομεν εὐθὺς ὅτι τὸ πιθανὸν
 προσαγορεύεται τριχῶς, καθ' ἓνα μὲν τρόπον
 ὅπερ ἐναργῶς τε ἀληθές ἐστι καὶ ἀληθοῦς ἐμ-
 ποιῶν φαντασίαν ἐπισπάται ἡμᾶς εἰς συγκατάθε-
 σιν, καθ' ἕτερον δὲ ὅπερ ψευδὸς ἐστι καὶ ἀληθοῦς
 ἐμποιοῦν φαντασίαν ἐπισπάται ἡμᾶς εἰς συγκατά-
 θεσιν (ὅπερ καὶ εἰκὸς ὀνομάζειν εἰώθασιν οἱ
 ῥήτορες ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰκὸς εἶναι τῷ ἀληθεῖ), κατὰ
 δὲ τὸν τρίτον τρόπον τὸ κοινὸν τοῦ τε ἀληθοῦς
 64 καὶ ψεύδους. τσσαυταχῶς δὴ λεγομένου τοῦ
 πιθανοῦ, ἀξιὸν ἐστι πυθέσθαι τῶν ῥητόρων κατὰ
 τί τούτων τῶν πιθανῶν οἴονται τὴν ῥητορικὴν
 τοῦ πείθειν ἐφίεσθαι, καὶ περὶ ποῖον αὐτῶν τεχνι-
 τεύειν αὐτὴν ἀξιόσιν, περὶ τὸ ἐναργῶς ἀληθές
 ἢ περὶ τὸ εἰκὸς τούτῳ ψεῦδος ἢ ὁ περὶ τὴν ἀμφο-
 65 τέρων κοινότητα στρέφεται. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τὸ
 ἐναργῶς ἀληθές οὐχ οἶόν τε· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐξ αὐτοῦ
 πείθει καὶ ἐπισπάται ἡμᾶς πρὸς συγκατάθεσιν,
 ὥστε παρέλκει τὴν ἐκ ῥητορικῆς ἐπ' αὐτοῦ
 συνισταμένην πειθῶ. καὶ καθάπερ οὐδεμιᾶς δεό-
 μεθα τέχνης πρὸς τὸ πείθεσθαι ὅτι νῦν ἡμέρα ἔστιν
 ἢ ὅτι νῦν ἐγὼ διαλέγομαι, πραγμάτων ὄντων
 ἐναργῶν καὶ αὐτοφωράτων, οὕτως οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸ
 συγκατατίθεσθαι τῷ ἀνδροφόνον εἶναι τὸν ἐπ'
 αὐτοφώρῳ ληφθέντα ἀνδροφόνον χρεῖα ῥητορικῆς.
 66 καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ τοῦ προδήλως ἀληθοῦς, ἢ πιθανὸν
 ἐστι, θεωρητικὴ καθέστηκεν ἢ ῥητορικὴ, πάντως
 καὶ τοῦ ἀπιθάνου γενήσεται θεωρητικὴ· ταυτὶ
 γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ὡς πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσιν λαμβάνεται,
 καὶ ὧ λόγῳ ὁ τὸ ἀριστερόν κατειληφώς ἐξ ἀνάγκης
 ἐπιβάλλει καὶ τῷ οὐ ἀριστερόν ἐστιν, οὕτως ὁ τὸ
 πιθανὸν ἀληθές διακρίνων ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ τοιούτου

following in their steps, affirm straightaway that the
 term "credible" (or "probable") is used in three
 senses,^a—in one sense of that which is plainly true
 and which, by implanting an impression of truth,
 draws us on to assent; in another sense of that which
 is false, but which, by implanting an impression of
 truth, draws us on to assent (and this the orators
 are accustomed to call "likely," from the fact that
 it is like the truth); and in a third sense of that
 which shares in truth and falsehood alike. The term 64
 "credible," then, being used in all these ways, it is
 proper to ask the orators in respect of which of these
 "credibles" do they suppose that rhetoric aims at
 persuasion, and to which of them do they claim that it
 addresses itself as an art,—is it to the obviously true,
 or to the false which is like the true, or to that which
 contains both together? But it cannot possibly be to 65
 the obviously true; for this persuades of itself and
 draws us to assent, so that persuasion regarding it
 produced by rhetoric is superfluous. And just as we
 need no art to be persuaded that "now it is day" or
 that "now I am talking," these being obvious and
 self-evident facts, so too there is no need of rhetoric
 to make us assent to the fact that the murderer taken
 in the act is a murderer.—And besides, if rhetoric 66
 has for its object the obviously true, in so far as it is
 credible, it will certainly be also concerned with the
 incredible; for these two are conceived as being
 relative the one to the other, and for the same reason
 that he who comprehends "left" necessarily con-
 ceives also that of which it is "left," he who discerns
 the "credible" which is true possesses knowledge
 also of the "incredible," from the fact of its not being

^a Cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 174.

67 γνῶσιν ἔχει καὶ τοῦ ἀπιθάνου. ἐπεὶ οὖν πᾶν ἀληθές, ὅποιόν ποτ' ἂν ᾖ, ἤτοι πιθανόν ἐστιν ἢ ἀπιθανον, ἀκολουθήσει τὴν ῥητορικὴν παντὸς ἀληθοῦς εἶναι θεωρητικὴν. τῷ δὲ παντὸς ἀληθοῦς εἶναι θεωρητικὴν ἀκολουθήσει τὸ καὶ παντὸς ψεύδους· ᾧ γὰρ λόγῳ ὁ διακριτικὸς τοῦ πιθανοῦ ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τοῦ ἀπιθάνου διακριτικὸς ἔσται, τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ ὁ παντὸς ἀληθοῦς ἐπιγνώμων συνεπιβαλεῖ¹ παντὶ τῷ ἀντικειμένῳ, τουτέστι τῷ ψεύδει. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔσται ἡ ῥητορικὴ γνῶσις ἀληθῶν τε καὶ ψευδῶν. οὐ πάνυ δέ γε τοῦτο· τοῖνυν οὐδὲ τοῦ αὐτόθεν ἀληθοῦς ἐστὶ θεωρητικὴ.

68 καὶ μὴν τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις συναγορεύει ἐπαγγέλλεται, τὰ δὲ ἀντικείμενα οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθῆ· οὐκ ἄρα τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἐφίεται ἡ ῥητορικὴ. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῦ ψεύδους· οὐδεμία γὰρ περὶ ψεύδος ἴσασται τέχνη, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι τὴν ῥητορικὴν τοῦτο μεταδιώκουσαν ἢ μὴ εἶναι τέχνην ἢ κακοτεχνίαν ὑπάρχειν, μετὰ τοῦ πάλιν τὰς αὐτὰς

69 ὑπαντιάζειν ἀπορίας. εἰ γὰρ περὶ τὸ πιθανόν ψεύδος καταγίνεται, πάντως εἴσεται καὶ τὸ ἀπιθανον. ἐπεὶ οὖν πᾶν ψεύδος ἤτοι πιθανόν ἐστιν ἢ ἀπιθανον, παντὸς ψεύδους ἐπιστήμη γενήσεται, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ παντὸς ἀληθοῦς, ὥστ' αὐτὴν μὴ διαφέρειν τῆς διαλεκτικῆς· ὁ κατὰ πολλοὺς

70 τρόπους ἐστὶν ἀποπον. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' εἰ τῶν ἀντικειμένων συνήγορος καθέστηκε, τὰ δὲ ἀντικείμενα οὐκ ἔστι ψευδῆ, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ψεύδους θεωρητικὴ. ἔτι εἴπερ εἰκὸς ἐστὶ τὸ τὰς πλείστας ἀφορμὰς εἰς τὸ ἀληθές εἶναι παρεχόμενον, καὶ παράλογον, ὃ δὴ τούτῳ ἀντίκειται, τὸ ὀλίγας ἀφορμὰς καὶ

¹ συνεπιβαλεῖ cj. Bekk. : συνεπιβάλλει mss., Bekk.

of the same character. Since, then, everything true, 67 of whatsoever sort it be, is either credible or incredible, it will follow that rhetoric is concerned with everything true. But from its concern with everything true will follow its concern with everything false as well; since, for the reason that he who can discern the credible will necessarily be able to discern also the incredible, for the same reason he who has knowledge of everything true will also perceive therewith everything of the contrary sort, that is to say, false. And if this is so, rhetoric will be the knowledge of things true and false. But this is certainly not so; hence, rhetoric has not the self-evidently true for its object.—Moreover, it professes 68 to advocate opposite causes, but opposites are not (both) true; therefore rhetoric does not aim at the true.—Nor yet at the false; for no art of the false exists, but it is necessary that rhetoric, if it pursues this, must either not be an art or be an evil technique, besides being confronted again with the same difficulties. For if it is concerned with 69 the credible falsehood, it will certainly know also the incredible. Since, then, every falsehood is either credible or incredible, it will be the knowledge of everything false and therefore also of everything true, so that it does not differ from dialectic; and this is in many ways absurd. If, however, it advo- 70 cates opposites, and opposites are not (both) false,^a it will not have the false for its object.—Further, if the “likely” is that which furnishes the most numerous grounds for supposing it to be true, and its opposite, the “improbable,” that which furnishes

^a i. e. of contradictory propositions one must be true.

σπανίους ἔχον εἰς τὸ ἀληθές εἶναι, πάντως ἡ
 ῥητορικὴ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον ἐπιχειροῦσα οὐ μᾶλλον
 71 τοῦ εἰκότος ἢ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου στοχάζεται. καὶ
 μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ κοινὸν τοῦ τε ἀληθοῦς καὶ ψεύδους
 μεταδιώκει· ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ καὶ ψεύδος κατεπέ-
 πλεκτο. ἄτοπὸν τε καθεστῆκει τὸ τέχνην ψευδέσι
 χρῆσθαι, σὺν τῷ κατὰ τὸν προὑποδεδειγμένον
 τρόπον ἀκολουθεῖν τὸ καὶ ἐπιστήμην αὐτὴν ἀληθῶν
 τε καὶ ψευδῶν γίνεσθαι, τοῦ πράγματος μὴ οὕτως
 ἔχοντος. ἀλλ' εἰ μήτε ἀληθές μήτε ψεύδος μήτε
 τὸ κοινὸν ἀμφοτέρων θεωρεῖν δύναται ἡ ῥητορικὴ,
 παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἐστὶ πιθανόν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη
 ῥητορικῆς τὸ πείθειν.

72 Ἡμεῖς μὲν οὖν ταύταις ἀξιούμεν ταῖς ἐνστάσεσι
 χρῆσθαι πρὸς τοὺς ῥήτορας, ἄλλοι δὲ καὶ τὰς
 λεχθησομένας εἰώθασι παραλαμβάνειν, αἷς ἐξέσται
 τῷ βουλομένῳ χρῆσθαι. φασὶ γάρ, ἤτοι τέχνη
 ἐστὶν ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἢ οὐκ ἐστίν. καὶ εἰ μὲν μὴ ἐστίν,
 μηδὲ τέλος αὐτῆς ζητῶμεν· εἰ δὲ ἐστίν, πῶς κοινὸν
 ἔχει τέλος καὶ τοῦ μὴ ῥήτορος; τὸ γὰρ πείθειν
 πολλοῖς πάρεστι διὰ πλοῦτον ἢ κάλλος ἢ δόξαν,

73 ὡς πρότερον ὑπεδείκνυμεν. ῥηθέντων τε πολλὰκις
 τῶν λόγων καὶ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς πεπεισμένων τῶν
 δικαστῶν οὐδὲν ἦττον προσμένουσιν οἱ ῥήτορες,
 ἕτερόν τι ἀπεκδεχόμενοι τέλος, καὶ προσμένοντες
 δέονται. οὐκ ἄρα τὸ πείθειν ῥητορικῆς ἐστὶ τέλος,

74 ἀλλ' εἰ ἄρα, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπακολουθοῦν. ἄλλως
 τε καὶ ἐναντίως ἐστὶν ὁ ῥητορικὸς λόγος πειθοῖ.
 πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ περιέργος καθέστηκεν, προσκό-
 75 πητοι δὲ οἱ πολλοὶ τῆ τοῦ λόγου περιέργια· εἴτα
 ὁ ἀσαφὴς λόγος οὐκ ἐστὶ πειστικός, ὁ δὲ τῶν

few and rare grounds for supposing it to be true, then
 rhetoric, since it argues both ways, certainly aims at
 the "likely" no more than at its opposite.—Nor 71
 again does it pursue after that which shares in both
 truth and falsehood; for this implies falsehood.
 And that an art should employ falsehoods is absurd,
 besides the fact that—according to our previous
 demonstration—it becomes in consequence the science
 of things true and false, which is not the case. But
 if rhetoric cannot have for its object either the true
 or the false or that which includes both, and besides
 these there is no other "credible," then persuasion
 will not belong to rhetoric.

These, then, are the objections which we deem it 72
 proper to use against the Orators, but others^a are
 accustomed to adduce those which shall now be
 stated, and which anyone who likes will be able to
 use. They argue thus: Rhetoric either is or is not
 an art; and if it is not, let us not seek for its "end";
 but if it is, how can it have an end which is shared by
 the non-rhetorician? For it is in the power of many
 to persuade by means of wealth or beauty or glory,
 as we previously indicated.^b—Moreover, often, when 73
 the speeches have been made and the judges in
 consequence persuaded of the facts, the Orators,
 none the less, wait on in expectation of gaining
 some further end, and as they wait they entreat.
 The end of rhetoric, therefore, is not persuasion
 but, if anything, that which follows after it.—
 Again, rhetorical speech is opposed to persuasion. 74
 For, firstly, it is superabundant, and most people
 are offended by its superabundance; and secondly, 75
 speech which lacks clarity is not persuasive, but

^a e.g. Plato (in the *Gorgias*) and Epicurus.

^b Cf. §§ 2, 5.

ῥητόρων λόγος ἐν περιόδοις κείμενος καὶ ἐνθυμή-
 μασις ἤττον ἐστὶ σαφής. οὐκ ἄρα πειστικός ὁ
 76 ἀπὸ τῆς ῥητορικῆς ἐστὶ λόγος. ὁ τε εὐνοίαν τοῖς
 δικασταῖς ἐμποίων λόγος, οὗτός ἐστι πειστικός·
 εὐνοίαν δὲ ἐμποιεῖ οὐχ ὁ ῥητορικός ἀλλ' ὁ ἀφελῆς
 καὶ τὸν ἰδιωτικὸν ὑποφαίνων τύπον. τῷ μὲν γὰρ
 τοῦ ῥήτορος ἀντίκεινται πάντες ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς
 φθονοῦντες· κἂν γὰρ δίκαια κατασκευάζῃ ὁ ῥήτωρ,
 δοκοῦσι μὴ διὰ τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων φύσιν ἀλλὰ διὰ
 τὴν τοῦ ῥήτορος πανουργίαν τὰ μὴ δίκαια τοιαῦτα
 77 αὐτοῖς φαίνεσθαι· τῷ δὲ τοῦ ἰδιώτου ὡς ἀσθενεῖ
 πῶς τις συναγωνίζεται, καὶ τῷ ἤττον δίκαιῳ
 προσδοξάζει τὸ μᾶλλον δίκαιον διὰ τὸ ὑπὸ ἀφε-
 λούς καὶ ἰδιώτου κατασκευάζεσθαι. παρ' ἣν
 αἰτίαν Ἀθηναῖοις τὸ παλαιὸν οὐκ ἐπετέτραπτο
 συνήγορον παρίστασθαι τοῖς κρινομένοις ἐπὶ τῆς
 ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλῆς, ἀλλ' ἕκαστος ὡς εἶχε
 δυνάμεως, ἀδιαστρόφως καὶ ἀπανούργως ὑπὲρ
 78 ἑαυτοῦ τοὺς λόγους ἐποιεῖτο. καὶ μὴν εἴπερ
 ἐπίστευον αὐτοῖς οἱ ῥήτορες ὅτι πειστικὴν ἔχουσι
 δύναμιν, ἐχρῆν αὐτοὺς μῆτε ἔλεον μῆτε οἴκτους
 μῆτε ὀργὰς ἢ ἄλλα τινα τοιαῦτα κινεῖν, ἅπερ
 πείθει μὲν οὐδαμῶς, παραλογίζεται δὲ τὴν τῶν
 δικαστῶν γνώμην καὶ ἀντισκοτεῖ τῷ δίκαιῳ.

Ἄλλ' ὅτι μὲν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πείθειν τέλος
 79 εἶναι ῥητορικῆς, δέδεικται· τινὲς δὲ τοῦτο μὲν οὐ
 λέγουσιν αὐτῆς τέλος, τὸ δὲ τοὺς ἐνδεχομένους
 εὐρεῖν λόγους, οἱ δὲ τὸ δόξαν ἐμποιεῖν τοῖς δικα-
 σταῖς περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων οἶαν οἱ λέγοντες
 θέλουσιν, ἄλλοι δὲ τὸ συμφέρον, τινὲς δὲ τὸ νικᾶν.
 80 ὧν πρὸς μὲν τοὺς πρῶτους ῥητέον ὡς εἴπερ τοὺς

the speech of the Orators, which consists of periods and enthymemes, is inferior in clarity. Therefore the speech derived from rhetoric is not persuasive.—Further, the speech which arouses goodwill 76 in the judges is that which is persuasive; but what arouses goodwill is not the rhetorical speech but that which is simple and reflects the ordinary style. For to the style of the Orator all those who detest airs of superiority are opposed. For even if the Orator maintains what is just, they imagine that unjust things seem to them just, not because of the real nature of the things but because of the trickery of the orator. But with the common man's speech 77 everyone sympathizes, feeling its weakness, and attributes greater justice to that which is less just because it is maintained by a plain and ordinary person. And for this reason the Athenians, in olden days, were not allowed to have an advocate to support those on trial at the court of the Areopagus, but each man, to the best of his ability, made a speech in his own defence without trickery or verbal jugglery.—Moreover, if the Orators believed their own statement 78 that they possess a power of persuasion, they ought not to excite pity or lamentation or indignation, or other feelings of that sort—things which do not persuade at all but pervert the minds of the judges and obscure justice.

Thus it has been shown that the "end" of rhetoric cannot be persuasion; and some say that 79 its end is not this but the discovery of appropriate words; others, that it is to implant in the judges an opinion about the facts such as the speakers wish; others, that it is the advantageous; and some that it is victory. In reply to the first of 80

ἔνδεχομένους εἰς τὰς ὑποθέσεις λόγους εὐρεῖν
 ἐπαγγέλλεται ἢ ῥητορικῆ, ἥτοι τοὺς ἀληθεῖς ἢ
 δυνατοὺς ῥηθῆναι ἐπαγγέλλεται. οὔτε δὲ τοὺς
 ἀληθεῖς· κανόνα γὰρ καὶ κριτήριον τῆς τῶν ἀληθῶν
 καὶ ψευδῶν διαγνώσεως αὐτοὺς ἔχειν δεῖ, ὅπερ
 οὐκ ἔχουσιν· οὔτε τοὺς δυνατοὺς ῥηθῆναι· ἀγνοοῦν-
 τες γὰρ τοὺς ἀληθεῖς οὐδὲ τοὺς δυνατοὺς ῥηθῆναι
 81 ἐπιγνώσονται. οὐκ ἄρα ῥητορικῆς ἐστὶ τὸ τοὺς
 ἐνότας καὶ δυνατοὺς εὐρίσκειν λόγους. ἢ τε
 ῥητορικῆ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ τοὺς ἔνδεχομένους
 εὐρεῖν λόγους, ὅθεν ὁ τοῦτο λέγων τέλος δυνάμει
 τῆν ῥητορικὴν τέλος εἶναι λέγει τῆς ῥητορικῆς.
 82 οὐ τε χάριν ἅπαντά φησι πράσσειν ὁ ῥήτωρ,
 ἐκείνο ἂν τέλος εἴη· οὐχὶ δέ γε χάριν τῶν ἐν-
 δεχομένων ἐπιχειρήσεων πάντα πράσσει ὁ ῥήτωρ,
 ἀλλὰ τοῦ μετὰ τὰς ἐπιχειρήσεις ἐπακολουθοῦντος·
 83 τοῖνυν οὐκ ἂν εἴη τέλος ἐκείνο. καὶ μὴν οὐπερ
 δεῖται τέλους τυχεῖν ὁ ῥήτωρ, τούτου καὶ ὁ μισθω-
 σάμενος αὐτὸν ιδιώτης· τοῦ δέ γε τοὺς ἔνδεχο-
 μένους εὐρεῖν λόγους οὐ σπεύδει τυχεῖν ὁ ιδιώτης,
 ἀλλ' ἐτέρου τινός· ἐκείνο ἄρα τέλος γενήσεται,
 84 καὶ οὐ τὸ τοὺς ἔνδεχομένους λόγους εὐρεῖν. καὶ
 μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ δόξαν ἐμποιεῖν τοῖς δικασταῖς περὶ
 τῶν πραγμάτων οἷαν οἱ λέγοντες θέλουσιν· τοῦτο
 γὰρ οὐ διήνεγκε τοῦ πείθειν, ἐπεὶπερ ὁ πεπεικῶς
 δόξαν ἐμπεποίηκε τοῖς δικασταῖς περὶ τῶν πραγ-
 μάτων οἷαν οὗτος θέλει. εἰδείξαμεν δὲ ἡμεῖς ὅτι
 οὐκ ἔστι τῆς ῥητορικῆς τέλος τὸ πείθειν, ὥστε
 85 οὐδὲ τὸ δόξαν ἐμποιεῖν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ συμ-
 φέρον, ὡς ἡξιώκασί τινες· ὃ τι γὰρ τοῦ μέρους

• Cf. P.H. ii. 14 ff., Adv. Log. i. 29 ff.

these we must say that if rhetoric professes to
 discover words pertinent to the assumptions, it pro-
 fesses to speak either true or possible words. But not
 such as are true; for they must possess a standard
 and criterion^a for distinguishing the true and the
 false, and that they do not possess; nor yet such as
 it is possible to speak; for not knowing the true
 words, neither will they know those which it is
 possible to speak. Therefore it does not belong to
 81 rhetoric to discover words which are pertinent and
 possible.—Again, rhetoric is nothing else than the
 discovery of appropriate words; accordingly, he who
 states this “end” is virtually stating that rhetoric
 is the end of rhetoric.—Also, that for the sake of
 82 which the orator declares that he does everything
 will be his end; but the orator does not do every-
 thing for the sake of the appropriate arguments, but
 for the sake of that which follows after the arguments;
 the former, then, will not be his end.—Moreover, the
 83 end which the orator needs to attain is that which
 the private person who hired him also needs; but
 the private person is not eager to attain the discovery
 of appropriate words, but something else; this latter,
 then, and not the discovery of appropriate words, will
 be the end.—Furthermore, neither will the end be
 84 the implanting in the judges such an opinion regard-
 ing the case as the speakers desire; for this does not
 differ from persuasion, since he that has persuaded
 has implanted in the judges such an opinion regarding
 the case as he himself desires. But we have shown^b
 that persuasion is not the end of rhetoric; neither,
 then, is implanting an opinion.—Nor, again, is “the
 85 advantageous,” as some have assumed^c; for that

• Cf. §§ 73 ff.

• Cf. § 79.

ἐστὶ τέλος, τοῦτο οὐκ ἂν εἴη τοῦ ὅλου τέλος· μέρους δέ γε τῆς ῥητορικῆς τοῦ συμβουλευτικοῦ τέλος λέγουσιν οἱ ῥήτορες εἶναι τὸ συμφέρον· οὐκ ἄρα τῆς ὅλης ῥητορικῆς ἐστὶ τέλος. ὅπερ τε πάσης τέχνης ἐστὶ τέλος κοινῶς, τοῦτο οὐκ ἂν εἴη τῆς ῥητορικῆς μόνης· τὸ συμφέρον δέ γε πάσης τέχνης ἐν τῷ βίῳ τέλος ἐστίν· οὐκ ἄρα τῆς ῥητορικῆς
 86 ἰδιαίτερον καθέστηκεν. λείπεται οὖν τὸ νικᾶν αὐτῆς εἶναι τέλος. ὁ πάλιν ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν. ὁ γὰρ πολλάκις μὴ τυγχάνων τοῦ κατὰ γραμματικὴν τέλους οὐκ ἂν εἴη γραμματικός, καὶ ὁ πολλάκις μὴ τυγχάνων τοῦ κατὰ μουσικὴν τέλους οὐκ ἂν εἴη μουσικός. τοίουν καὶ ὁ μὴ τυγχάνων πολλάκις τοῦ κατὰ ῥητορικὴν τέλους οὐκ ἂν εἴη ῥήτωρ.
 87 ὁ δέ γε ῥήτωρ πλειονάκις¹ [μᾶλλον] ἢ νικᾷ νικᾶται, καὶ τοσοῦτω πλειονάκις² ὅσω δυναμικώτερός ἐστι, τῶν τὰ ἀδίκᾳ ἐχόντων πράγματα ἐπ' αὐτὸν συντρεχόντων. οὐκ ἄρα ῥήτωρ ἐστὶν ὁ ῥήτωρ. ὁ τε μὴ τυχὼν τοῦ κατὰ ῥητορικὴν τέλους οὐκ ἂν ἐπαινοῦτο, ῥήτορα δὲ ἐνίοτε νικηθέντα ἐπαινοῦμεν· οὐκ ἄρα ῥητορικῆς τέλος ἐστὶ τὸ νικᾶν.
 88 Ὡστε εἰ μήτε ὕλην ἔχει ἢ ῥητορικὴ περὶ ἣν τεχνιτεύει, μήτε τέλος ἐφ' ὃ ἀνάγεται, οὐκ ἂν ὑπάρχοι ἢ ῥητορικὴ· οὔτε δὲ ὕλην ἔχει οὔτε τέλος, καθὼς παρεστήσαμεν· οὐκ ἄρα ὑπάρχει ἢ ῥητορικὴ.
 89 Ἐπαπορήσειε³ δ' ἂν τις αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν μερῶν αὐτῆς. μέρη δὲ λέγουσι ῥητορικῆς τὸ δικανικόν τε καὶ συμβουλευτικόν καὶ ἐγκωμιστικόν, τούτων δὲ τοῦ μὲν δικανικοῦ τέλος εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον, τοῦ δὲ συμβουλευτικοῦ τὸ συμφέρον,

which is the end of a part will not be the end of the whole; but the Orators say that "the advantageous" is the end of the deliberative part of rhetoric; therefore it is not the end of rhetoric as a whole.—Also, that which is the common end of all Art will not be the end of rhetoric alone; but "the advantageous" is the end of all art in our experience; therefore there is no end peculiar to rhetoric.—It remains, then, to say that "victory" 86 is its end; but this again is impossible. For he who often fails to attain the end of the Art of Grammar will not be a grammarian, and he who often fails to attain the end of the Art of Music will not be a musician. So also he who fails often to attain the end of the Art of Rhetoric will not be an orator. But 87 the orator is more often loser than victor, and the more so the more capable he is, as those who have an unjust case join in flocking to him. Therefore the orator is not an orator.—Also, he who fails to attain the end of rhetoric will not be praised; but we sometimes praise an orator when defeated; "victory," then, is not the end of rhetoric.

Consequently, if rhetoric has neither a subject- 88 matter^a which it treats technically nor an end to which it is directed,^b rhetoric will not exist; but, as we have established, it has neither subject-matter nor end; therefore rhetoric does not exist.

One may also raise difficulties for them based on 89 the parts of rhetoric. The parts of rhetoric, they say, are "the juridical, the deliberative and the laudatory," and of these "the juridical" has justice for its end, "the deliberative" has the advantageous,

^a Cf. §§ 48 ff.

^b Cf. §§ 60 ff.

¹ πλειονάκις ἢ cj. Bekk. : πλέον μᾶλλον ὁ mss., Bekk.

² πλειονάκις scripsi : πλέον mss., Bekk. (μᾶλλον cj. Bekk.).

³ ἐπαπορήσειε cj. Bekk. ; ἐναπορήσειε mss., Bekk.

τοῦ δὲ ἐγκωμιστικοῦ τὸ καλόν. ὅπερ εὐθέως
 90 ἄπορον ἔστιν. εἴπερ γὰρ ἄλλο τι καθέστηκεν ἢ
 δικανικὴ ὑπόθεσις καὶ ἄλλο τι ἢ συμβουλευτικὴ
 καὶ οὐ ταῦτόν ἢ ἐγκωμιστικὴ, πάντως τὸ τέλος
 τῆς δικανικῆς οὐκ ἂν εἴη καὶ τῆς συμβουλευτικῆς
 τέλος, καὶ τὸ ταύτης οὐκ ἔσται τῆς ἐγκωμιστικῆς,
 καὶ ἐναλλάξ. ἐπεὶ οὖν τῆς συμβουλευτικῆς τέλος
 ἔστι τὸ συμφέρον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τοῦτο τῆς δικανικῆς
 τέλος. ἦν δέ γε τῆς δικανικῆς τέλος τὸ δίκαιον·
 91 οὐκ ἄρα τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι συμφέρον. καὶ πάλιν,
 ἐπεὶ ὡς τὰ μέρη ταῦτα διαφέρει ἀλλήλων, οὕτω
 καὶ τὰ τέλη διοίσει, παρόσον τῆς ἐγκωμιστικῆς
 τέλος ἔστι τὸ καλόν, τῆς δὲ δικανικῆς τὸ δίκαιον,
 ἐνδέχεται τὸ καλὸν εἶναι μὴ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ
 92 δίκαιον μὴ καλόν¹. ὅπερ ἄτοπον. καὶ μὴν εἰ τῆς
 ὄλης ῥητορικῆς τέλος ἔστι τὸ πείθειν, τοῦ δὲ
 δικανικοῦ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τοῦ συμβουλευτικοῦ τὸ
 συμφέρον καὶ τοῦ ἐγκωμιστικοῦ τὸ καλόν, οὐ
 πάντως τὸ δίκαιον ἔσται πιθανόν, οὐδὲ τὸ συμ-
 φέρον, οὐδὲ τὸ καλόν· ὅπερ μάχεται τῷ διὰ παντός
 τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἐφίεσθαι τοῦ πείθειν.
 93 Ἄλλως τε ἐπὶ τοῦ δικανικοῦ ἦτοι διὰ δικαίων
 μόνον λόγων ἔλξει τοὺς δικαστὰς ἐπὶ τὸ τέλος ἢ
 ῥητορικὴ ἢ διὰ τῶν δικαίων ἅμα καὶ ἀδικίων.
 ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν διὰ τῶν δικαίων μόνον, ἀρετὴ γενή-
 σεται· οὐχὶ δέ γε ἀρετὴ ἔστιν ἢ στοχαζομένη τῆς
 ὀχλικῆς πειθοῦς, ἐν ἣ πολὺ τὸ εἰκαίον καὶ ἐξ-
 απατητικόν· οὐκ ἄρα διὰ τῶν δικαίων μόνον ἐπὶ
 94 τὸ τέλος ἄγειν πέφυκε τοὺς ἀκούοντας. εἴτα οὐδὲ
 συστήσεται ἐξ ἐναντίας λόγος αἰεὶ ποτε τὸ δίκαιον

¹ τῆς δὲ . . . μὴ καλόν Herv. (simil. Fabr.): μὲν εἶναι καὶ τὸ
 δίκαιον καλόν MSS., Bekk.

and "the laudatory" has the noble. But this is at
 once open to doubt. For if the juridical purpose is 90
 one thing, and the deliberative another, and the
 laudatory something different, certainly the end of
 the juridical will not also be the end of the delibera-
 tive, and the end of the latter will not be that of
 the laudatory, and *vice versa*. Since, then, the end
 of the deliberative is the advantageous, this will not
 be the end of the juridical. But the end of the
 juridical is the just; therefore the just is not ad-
 vantageous.—And again, just as these parts differ, 91
 so also the ends will differ; and therefore, inasmuch
 as the end of the laudatory is the noble and that of
 the juridical the just, it is possible for the noble not
 to be just and the just not to be noble; which is
 absurd.—Moreover, if persuasion is the end of rhetoric 92
 as a whole, but the just of the juridical part, and the
 advantageous of the deliberative, and the noble of
 the laudatory, then certainly the just is not per-
 suasive, nor is the advantageous, nor the noble; and
 this conflicts with the notion that rhetoric aims
 wholly at persuasion.

Furthermore, in the case of the juridical part, 93
 rhetoric will draw the jurors towards its end either
 by just speeches only or by unjust as well as by
 just speeches. But if it is by just speeches only,
 it will be virtue; but what aims at the persuasion
 of the crowd is not virtue, for it contains much that
 is rash and misleading; it is not, therefore, of a
 nature to lead the hearers to its end by just speeches
 only.—Moreover, if it always pursues justice, no 94
 contrary argument will be forthcoming, and when

ταύτης μεταδιωκούσης, τοῦ δ' ἐναντίου μὴ ὄντος λόγου οὐδὲ ῥητορικὴ τις γενήσεται, ὥστε οὐδὲ ταύτῃ τοῖς δίκαιοις μόνον χρήσεται λόγοις. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀδίκους, ἐπεὶ ἀδικος γενήσεται, καὶ πάλιν τοῦ ἐναντίου μὴ ὄντος λόγου ἀσύστατος ἔσται. λείπεται ἄρα δι' ἀμφοτέρων αὐτὴν βαδίζειν. ὁ πολλῶ τῶν προτέρων ἔστιν ἀποπύτερον ἔσται γὰρ ἅμα ἀρετὴ καὶ κακία, ὁ τῶν ἀδυνάτων καθέστηκεν. οὐ τοίνυν ῥητέον μέρος εἶναι τι ῥητορικῆς δικανικὸν ὁ τέλος ἔχει τὸ δίκαιον.

95 Πρὸς γε μὴν τοῖς εἰρημένους, εἶπερ ὑποδείξει τὸ δίκαιον τοῖς δικασταῖς ἐν τῷ δικανικῷ μέρει τῆς ῥητορικῆς ὁ ῥήτωρ προτίθεται, ἥτοι αὐτόθεν ἔστι φαινόμενον καὶ ὁμόλογον τὸ δίκαιον ὅπερ ὑποδείκνυσιν, ἢ ἀμφισβητήσιμον. ἀλλὰ φαινόμενον μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἶποιεν· ἐπὶ τούτου γὰρ οὐ συνίσταται ὁ ῥητορικὸς λόγος, ἀναμφισβητήτου

96 καθεστῶτος. λείπεται οὖν τὸ ἀμφισβητήσιμον. ὁ πάλιν ἔστιν ἄπορον· τοσοῦτον γὰρ ἀπέχουσιν οἱ εἰς τούναντίον ἐπιχειροῦντες τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν λύειν ὡς καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων αὐτὴν ἐπισφίγγειν, ἐπιθολοῦντες τὴν τῶν δικαστῶν γνώμην. καὶ τούτου πίστις ἢ περὶ Κόρακος φερομένη παρὰ

97 τοῖς πολλοῖς ἱστορία. νεανίας γὰρ πτόβῳ ῥητορικῆς κατασχεθεὶς προσῆλθεν αὐτῷ τὸν ὀρισθησόμενον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ μισθὸν δώσειν ἐπαγγελλόμενος, ἂν τὴν πρώτην νικήσῃ δίκην. συμφωνίας δὲ γενομένης, καὶ τοῦ μειρακίου ἱκανὴν ἔξιν ἐμφαίνοντος ἤδη, ὁ μὲν Κόραξ ἀπήτει τὸν μισθόν, ὁ δ' ἀντέλεγεν. ἀμφότεροι δὲ παρελθόντες εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ἐκρίνοντο, ὅτε καὶ πρῶτόν φασι τὸν Κόρακα τοιαύτῃ τινὶ χρήσθαι ἐπιχειρήσει, λέγοντα ὡς

there exists no contrary speech neither will rhetoric exist, so that on this showing, too, it will not use just speeches only.—Nor, again, will it use unjust speeches, for if so it will be unjust, and as the contrary speech is again non-existent, it will be non-existent. It remains, then, to say that it proceeds by means of both. But this is far more absurd than the former suppositions; for it will be at once virtue and vice, which is a thing impossible. One must, then, deny that there is a juridical part of rhetoric which has justice for its end.

In addition to what has been said, if the orator 95 proposes to explain to the judges what is just by the juridical part of rhetoric, the justice which he explains is either evident of itself and agreed or it is disputable. But they will not say that it is evident; for about this no rhetorical speech is composed, since it is undisputed. It remains, then, to say that it is dis- 96 putable. But this again is open to doubt. For those who argue on opposite sides are so far from settling the dispute that they even intensify it by their contradictions and befog the minds of the judges. And there is evidence for this in the story commonly told about Corax.* A young man seized with a desire for rhetoric 97 went to him and promised that he would pay him the fee he would charge, if he should win his first case. And when the compact was made, and the youth was now displaying sufficient skill, Corax demanded his fee, but the other said "No." Both then repaired to the court and had the case tried; and then, it is said, Corax first used an argument of this kind,—

* Noted Sicilian rhetorician, *circ.* 460 B.C. The same story is told of Protagoras by Diog. Laert. ix. 56.

- εἴαν τε νικήσῃ εἴαν τε μὴ, λαβεῖν ὀφείλει τὸν μισθόν,
 νικήσας μὲν ὅτι ἐνίκησεν, λειψθεὶς δὲ κατὰ τὸν
 τῆς συμφωνίας λόγον· ὠμολόγησε γὰρ αὐτῷ ὁ
 ἀντίδικος ἀποδώσει τὸν μισθὸν εἴαν τὴν πρώτην
 νικήσῃ δίκην, ἣν αὐτόθεν νικήσας ὀφείλει τὴν
 98 ὑπόσχεσιν χρεωλυτεῖν. θορυβησάντων δὲ τῶν
 δικαστῶν ὡς δίκαια λέγοντος αὐτοῦ, παραλαβὼν
 τοὺς λόγους ὁ νεανίας τῷ αὐτῷ ἐπιχειρήματι,
 μηδὲν μεταθείς, ἐχρήτο· “εἴαν τε” γὰρ “νικήσω”
 φησὶν “εἴαν τε νικηθῶ, οὐκ ὀφείλω τὸν μισθὸν
 ἀποδοῦναι Κόρακι, νικήσας μὲν ὅτι ἐνίκησα,
 λειψθεὶς δὲ κατὰ τὸν τῆς συμφωνίας λόγον·
 ὑπεσχόμην γὰρ ἀποδώσειν τὸν μισθὸν εἴαν τὴν
 πρώτην νικήσω δίκην, λειψθεὶς δὲ οὐκ ἀποδώσω.”
 99 εἰς ἐποχὴν δὲ καὶ ἀπορίαν ἔλθόντες οἱ δικασταὶ
 διὰ τὴν ἰσοσθένειαν τῶν ῥητορικῶν λόγων ἀμφο-
 τέρους ἐξέβαλον τοῦ δικαστηρίου, ἐπιφωνήσαντες
 τὸ “ἐκ κακοῦ κόρακος κακὸν ὦόν.”
 100 Οἷος δὲ ἐστὶν ὁ περὶ τοῦ δικανικοῦ μέρους λόγος,
 τοιοῦτος γένοιτ’ ἂν καὶ ὁ περὶ τοῦ συμβουλευτικοῦ,
 ἵνα μὴ μακρηγορῶμεν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐγκωμιαστικόν,
 σὺν τῷ ταῖς αὐταῖς ἀπορίας ὑπάγεσθαι, ἔτι καὶ
 101 ἀμέθοδόν ἐστίν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ οὔτε πάντες ἄνθρωποι
 ἐγκωμιάζεσθαι θέλουσιν οὔτε ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς, δεῖ
 τὸν μέλλοντα καλῶς ἐγκωμιάζειν εἰδέναι τὴν τοῦ
 ἐγκωμιαζομένου διάθεσιν· οὐ πᾶν δέ γε τὸ καθ’
 ἕτερον κίνημα ληπτὸν ἐστὶν ἐτέρῳ. καὶ ἄλλως
 οἱ ῥήτορες οὐ παραδεδώκασι τίνα μέθοδον δι’ ἧς
 εἰσόμεθα τὸ πότε καὶ τίνα ἐγκωμιαστὸν ἐστίν·
 οὐκ ἄρα δυνατόν ἀπὸ ῥητορικῆς ὑγιῶς ἐγκωμιάζειν.
 102 ἦτοι τε ἐπὶ τοῖς μὴ οὖσιν ἀγαθοῖς δοκοῦσι δὲ εἶναι,

that whether he won the case or lost it he ought to
 receive the fee ; if he won, because he had won, and
 if he lost, in accordance with the terms of the com-
 pact ; for his opponent had agreed to pay him the
 fee if he won his first case, so that if he did win it he
 was thereby bound to discharge the debt. And after 98
 the judges had applauded him for speaking justly the
 young man in turn began his speech and used the
 same argument, altering nothing : “ Whether I win,”
 he says, “ or whether I am beaten, I am not bound to
 pay Corax the fee ; if I win, because I have won ; and
 if I lose, in accordance with the terms of the compact ;
 for I promised to pay the fee if I should win my first
 case, but if I should lose I shall not pay.” The judges 99
 then, thrown into a state of suspense and perplexity
 owing to the equipollence of the rhetorical arguments,
 drove them both out of the court, crying “ A bad egg
 from a bad crow ! ”^a

To save a long account we may say that the argu- 100
 ment concerning “ the deliberative ” part will be
 similar to that concerning the juridical. As to the
 “ laudatory,” or eulogistic, part, besides being subject
 to the same doubts, it is also lacking in method. For 101
 since not all men wish to be eulogized, nor on the
 same grounds, he who is going to eulogize well must
 know the disposition of the person who is being
 eulogized ; but not every emotion in one man is
 perceptible by another. Moreover, the Orators have
 not furnished us with any method whereby we may
 know when and whom we ought to eulogize ; it is
 impossible, therefore, to eulogize properly by means
 of rhetoric.—Also, the orator will eulogize on account 102

^a A play on the name Corax, which is the Greek for
 “ carrion-crow ” (or “ daw ”). Cf. the Latin saying “ mali
 corvi malum ovum.”

ἢ ἐπὶ τοῖς κατ' ἀλήθειαν οὖσιν ἐγκωμιάσει ὁ
 ῥήτωρ. οὔτε δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς μὴ οὖσι, προσδιαφθείρει
 γὰρ τοὺς ἐγκωμιαζομένους, οὔτε ἐπὶ τοῖς οὖσιν·
 ἀγνοεῖ γὰρ ταῦτα, ὅτε καὶ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις διὰ
 τὴν ἀνεπίκριτον περὶ αὐτῶν μάχην ἐστὶν ἀκατά-
 ληπτα. οὐκ ἄρα δύναται τινα ἐγκωμιάζειν ὁ
 103 ῥήτωρ. οἱ τε μὴ εἰδότες ἐφ' οἷς ἐγκωμιαστέον
 ἐστὶν οὐδὲ ἐγκωμιάζειν δύνανται· οἱ δὲ γε ῥήτορες
 οὐκ ἴσασιν ἐφ' οἷς ἐγκωμιάζειν δεῖ, καθὼς παρα-
 στήσομεν· τοίνυν οὐδὲ ἐγκωμιάζειν δυνήσονται.
 ἐγκωμιαστέον γὰρ φασὶν ἀπὸ γένους καὶ κάλλους
 καὶ πλοῦτου καὶ πολυτεκνίας καὶ τῶν εἰοικῶτων,
 ἀνάπαλιν τε ψεκτέον ἀπὸ δυσγενείας καὶ δυσμορ-
 104 φίας καὶ πενιχρότητος. ὅπερ εὐθες· δεῖ γὰρ
 ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τῶν παρ' ἡμᾶς γινομένων τοὺς ἐπαίνους
 ἔλκειν καὶ ψόγους, εὐγένεια δὲ καὶ εὐτυχία κάλλος
 τε καὶ πολυτεκνία καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐκ ἔστι παρ'
 ἡμᾶς γινόμενα, ὥστε οὐκ ἐπαινετέον ἀπ' αὐτῶν,
 ἐπεὶ τοί γε εἰ ψιλῶς ἐπαινετέον τὴν εὐγένειάν ἐστι
 καὶ πολυτεκνίαν καὶ πᾶν τοιουτῶδες, ἐπαινετέος
 καὶ Βούσιρις καὶ Ἄμυκος καὶ Ἀνταῖος οἱ ξενο-
 κτόνοι, ὅτι Ποσειδῶνος ἦσαν υἱεῖς, ἐπαινετὴ δὲ
 105 καὶ ἡ Νιόβη, ὅτι πολύτεκνος. ἐναντίως τε εἰ ἡ
 ἀμορφία καὶ ἡ πενία ψεκτόν, ψεκτέος μὲν Ὀδυσ-
 σεύς, ὅτι χερνήτου λαβῶν σχῆμα

ἀνδρῶν δυσμενέων κατέδου πόλιν,

ψεκτέος δὲ ὁ Διὸς Περσεύς, ὅτι πήραν περιηρη-

^a Cf. the encomiastic *Busiris* of Isocrates.

of things that are not good but seem so, or else on
 account of things which are really good. But he does
 not do so either on account of things which are not
 good,—for then he is further corrupting the persons
 eulogized,—or on account of those which are ; for of
 these he is ignorant, since even for philosophers they
 are non-apprehensible owing to the unsettled contro-
 versy about them. Therefore the Orator is not able
 to eulogize anyone.—Also, those who do not know
 103 on what account one should eulogize are unable to
 eulogize ; but the Orators do not know on what
 account one ought to eulogize, as we shall demon-
 strate ; hence they will not be able to eulogize. For
 they assert that one should eulogize on the ground
 of birth and beauty and wealth and abundance of
 children, and the like ; and conversely one should
 blame on the ground of low birth and ugliness and
 poverty. But this is silly ; for we ought to attract
 104 praise and blame from things inherent in ourselves,
 but noble birth and good fortune and beauty and
 abundance of children and things of that sort are
 not inherent in ourselves, so that we should not be
 praised on account of them ; for, to be sure, if we are
 to praise unconditionally noble birth and abundance
 of children and everything of that kind, we must
 praise those slayers of guests, Busiris^a and Amycus
 and Antaeus, because they were sons of Poseidon,
 and also praise Niobê because she abounded in
 children. Conversely, if ugliness and penury are to
 105 be blamed, Odysseus is to be blamed because he took
 the form of a beggar^b when

He entered the foemen's city,

and Perseus, the son of Zeus, is to be blamed because

^b Cf. *Hom. Od.* iv. 244 ff.

μένος τὴν ἀνυδρον ᾧδευε Λιβύην, καὶ Ἡρακλῆς, ὅτι λεοντῆν καὶ ξύλον ἐπὶ τοὺς ἄθλους ἐπήγετο.

- 106 Συνελόντι δὲ φάναι, δεδοσθω ταῦτα μέρη εἶναι τῆς ῥητορικῆς. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τὸ δίκαιον, ὅτι ἔστι δίκαιον, καὶ τὸ συμφέρον, ὅτι ἔστι συμφέρον, καὶ τὸ καλόν, ὅτι ἔστι καλόν, ἀποδείξει παρίσταται, καὶ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἢ ἀπόδειξις, οὐδὲ ῥητορικῆ τι γενήσεται ἢ ἐπὶ τοιούτοις μέρεσι συνεστῶσα. ὅτι δὲ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἀκριβέστερον μὲν δείκνυται ἐν τοῖς σκεπτικοῖς ὑπομνήμασιν, ὑπο-
- 107 μνηστικώτερον δὲ καὶ νῦν παρασταθήσεται. εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν ὁ λόγος, οὐδὲ ἢ ἀπόδειξις ἔστι, ποιὸς λόγος οὐσα· οὐδὲν δὲ γέ ἐστι λόγος, ὡς παρεστήσαμεν, διὰ τὸ μήτε ἐν φωναῖς μήτε ἐν ἀσωμάτοις λεκτοῖς ἔχειν τὴν ὑπόστασιν· οὐδὲ ἀπόδειξις ἄρα
- 108 ἔστιν. ἄλλως τε, εἰ ἔστιν, ἦτοι ἐναργῆς καθέστηκεν ἢ ἀδηλος. οὔτε δὲ ἐναργῆς ἐστίν· ἀδηλον γὰρ τι περιέσχηκε, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἔστι διάφωτος, παντὸς τοῦ διαφωνομένου πράγματος ἀδήλου
- 109 τυγχάνοντος. λείπεται ἄρα ἀδηλον αὐτὴν εἶναι. ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο, ἦτοι αὐτόθεν ληφθήσεται ἢ ἐξ ἀποδείξεως. οὔτε δὲ αὐτόθεν ληπτή ἐστίν (ἀδηλος γὰρ ἦν, τὸ δὲ ἀδηλον αὐτόθεν λαμβανόμενον ἄπιστον) οὔτε ἐξ ἀποδείξεως διὰ τὴν εἰς ἄπειρον
- 110 ἔκπτωσιν· οὐκ ἄρα τις ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις. μὴ οὕσης τε γενικῆς ἀποδείξεως οὐδὲ εἰδικῆς τις ἔσται ἀπόδειξις, ὡσπερ καὶ μὴ ὄντος ζώου οὐδὲ ἀνθρώπου ἔστιν γενικῆ δὲ γὰρ ἀπόδειξις οὐκ ἔστιν, ὡς παραστήσομεν τοῖνυν οὐδὲ ἄλλη τις γενήσεται τῶν ἐπ' εἵδους. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀδηλὸς ἐστίν, ὡς προεπελογισάμεθα, ὀφείλει διὰ τίνος καταστήσθαι. διὰ

he walked through waterless Libya with a wallet hung round him, and Heracles because he took with him on his labours a lion's skin and a club.

To speak briefly, then, let it be granted that these 106 are the parts of rhetoric. But since the fact that the just is just and that the advantageous is advantageous and that the noble is noble is established by proof, and proof is nothing, neither will rhetoric, which is composed of these parts, be anything. That proof is nothing is shown more precisely in our *Notes on Scepticism*,^a and we shall now establish it more by way of a note or reminder. If speech is nothing, 107 neither does proof exist, being a kind of speech; but speech is nothing, as we have established,^b because it subsists neither in utterance nor in incorporeal *lekta*; therefore proof does not exist.—Further, if it exists it 108 is either evident or non-evident.^c But it is not evident; for it contains something non-evident, and because of this is disputable, as everything in dispute is non-evident. It remains then to say that it is non- 109 evident. But if so, it will be perceived either of itself or after proof. But it is not perceptible of itself (for it is non-evident, and the non-evident, if perceived of itself, is not to be trusted), nor after proof, because of the regress *ad infinitum*; therefore no proof exists.—Further, as generic proof^d does not exist, no specific 110 proof will exist, just as if “animal” does not exist neither does “man” exist; but generic proof does not exist, as we shall establish; so no other, specific, proof will exist. For since it is non-evident, as we previously argued, it must be confirmed by some-

^a Cf. P.H. ii. 134 ff., *Adv. Log.* ii. 299 ff.

^b Cf. *Adv. Gram.* 135 ff.

^c Cf. P.H. ii. 174-182.

^d Cf. P.H. ii. 172

111 τίνος οὖν; ἤτοι γὰρ διὰ γενικῆς ἢ εἰδικῆς ἀπο-
 δείξεως. οὔτε δὲ διὰ εἰδικῆς διὰ τὸ μήπω βέβαιον
 εἶναι τὴν τῆς γενικῆς ὑπαρξίν, οὔτε διὰ γενικῆς·
 αὐτὴ γάρ ἐστίν ἡ ἀμφισβητούμενη. οὐ τοίνυν
 ἔστι τις γενικὴ ἀπόδειξις. ὧ ἔπεται τὸ μηδὲ τὴν
 εἰδικὴν ὑπάρχειν. καὶ ἄλλως, ἡ γενικὴ ἀπόδειξις
 εἰ μὲν λήμματά τινα ἔχει καὶ ἐπιφοράν, οὐδὲ
 112 γενικὴ ἐστίν, εἰ δὲ οὐκ ἔχει, οὐδὲ κατασκευάσει
 τι, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον οὐδὲ τὴν ἐαυτῆς ὑπαρξίν. ἢ
 τε τὴν ἀπόδειξιν πιστούμενη ἀπόδειξις ἤτοι ζη-
 τεῖται ἢ ἀζήτητός ἐστίν. ἀλλ' ἀζήτητος μὲν οὐκ
 ἂν εἴη διὰ τὰς ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημένας αἰτίας, ζητου-
 μένη δὲ ὀφείλει ὑπ' ἄλλης κατασκευάζεσθαι,
 κακείνη πάλιν ὑπ' ἄλλης, καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ἄπειρον.
 οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τις ἀπόδειξις.
 113 Ἀλλὰ γὰρ καὶ πρὸς τὰ συνέχοντα θεωρήματα
 τῆς ῥητορικῆς ἀντειπόντες ἀπ' ἄλλης ἀρχῆς καὶ
 τῶν πρὸς τοὺς γεωμέτρους καὶ ἀριθμητικούς
 ἀποριῶν ἀπτώμεθα.

thing. By what then? Either by a generic or by a
 specific proof. Not by a specific, since the existence 111
 of the generic is as yet unconfirmed; nor yet by a
 generic; for that is the matter in dispute. So then,
 no generic proof exists. From this it follows that
 neither does the specific proof exist.—And besides,
 if the generic proof has premisses and a conclusion it
 is not generic, and if it does not it will not prove any-
 thing, and what is much worse, it will not even prove
 its own existence.—Also, the proof which confirms 112
 the proof is either questioned or unquestioned. But,
 for the reasons stated above, it will not be un-
 questioned, and if questioned it must be proved by
 another proof, and this again by another, and so on
ad infinitum. Therefore no proof exists.

So, now that we have refuted the main doctrines 113
 of Rhetoric, let us make a fresh start and deal with
 the objections to be raised against the Geometers
 and the Arithmeticians.

ΠΡΟΣ ΓΕΩΜΕΤΡΑΣ

1 Ἐπεὶ οἱ γεωμέτραι συνορῶντες τὸ πλήθος τῶν ἐπακολουθούντων αὐτοῖς ἀπόρων¹ εἰς ἀκίνδυνον εἶναι δοκοῦν καὶ ἀσφαλὲς πρᾶγμα καταφεύγουσι, τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως αἰτεῖσθαι τὰς τῆς γεωμετρίας ἀρχάς, καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι καὶ ἡμᾶς τῆς πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀντιρρήσεως ἀρχὴν τίθεσθαι τὸν περὶ τῆς ὑποθέσεως λόγον. καὶ γὰρ ὁ Τίμων ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς φυσικοὺς τοῦτο ὑπέλαβε δεῖν ἐν πρώτοις ζητεῖν, φημί δὲ τὸ εἰ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως τι ληπτέον. διόπερ καὶ ἡμᾶς οἰκεῖόν ἐστιν ἐκείνῳ στοιχοῦντας τὸ παραπλήσιον ποιεῖν ἐν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων διεξόδῳ. τάξεως δὲ ἕνεκα προληπτέον ὅτι πολλαχῶς μὲν καὶ ἄλλως ὑπόθεσις προσαγορεύεται, τὰ νῦν δὲ ἀπαρκέσει τριχῶς λέγεσθαι, καθ' ἓνα μὲν τρόπον ἢ δραματικὴ περιπέτεια, καθὸ καὶ τραγικὴν καὶ κωμικὴν ὑπόθεσιν εἶναι λέγομεν καὶ Δικαιάρχου τινὰς ὑποθέσεις τῶν Εὐριπίδου καὶ Σοφοκλέους μύθων, οὐκ ἄλλο τι καλοῦντες ὑπόθεσιν ἢ τὴν τοῦ δράματος περιπέτειαν. καθ' ἕτερον δὲ σημαινόμενον ὑπόθεσις προσαγορεύεται ἐν ῥητορικῇ ἢ τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους ζήτησις, καθὸ καὶ

¹ ἀπόρων cj. Bekk. ἀποριῶν mss., Bekk.

AGAINST THE GEOMETERS

SINCE the Geometers, perceiving the multitude of 1 difficulties which beset them, take refuge in a method which seems to be free from danger and safe, namely, to beg by "hypothesis" the principles of geometry, it will be well for us, too, to begin our attack against them with the argument about "hypothesis." For 2 Timon, in his book *Against the Physicists*, assumed that one ought to raise this question first of all, —I mean, whether anything should be accepted from "hypothesis." Hence it is proper for us, in conformity with him, to do likewise in our treatise against these Mathematicians. And, for the sake of 3 due order, one must premise that the word "hypotheses" is used in a number of different senses; but it will be enough now to mention three: in one sense it means the *peripeteia* (or "argument" or "plot") of a drama, as we say that there is a tragic or a comic "hypothesis," and certain "hypotheses" of Dicaearchus^a of the stories of Euripides and Sophocles, meaning by "hypothesis" nothing else than the *peripeteia* of the drama. And "hypothesis" is used 4 with another signification in rhetoric, as investigation of particulars, in which sense the sophists are wont

^a A voluminous writer, disciple of Aristotle.

οἱ σοφισταὶ πολλάκις εἰώθασιν ἐν ταῖς διατριβαῖς λέγειν “θετέον ὑπόθεσιν.” οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τρίτην ἐπιβολὴν ὑπόθεσιν καλοῦμεν ἀρχὴν ἀποδείξεων, αἴτησιν οὖσαν πράγματος εἰς κατασκευὴν 5 τινος. οὕτω γοῦν τρισὶν ὑποθέσεσι κεχρῆσθαι φαμεν τὸν Ἀσκληπιάδην εἰς κατασκευὴν τῆς τὸν πυρετὸν ἐμποιούσης ἐνστάσεως, μῆ μὲν ὅτι νοητοὶ τινές εἰσιν ἐν ἡμῖν πόροι, μεγέθει διαφέροντες ἀλλήλων, δευτέρα δὲ ὅτι πάντοθεν ὑγροῦ μέρη καὶ πνεύματος ἐκ λόγῳ θεωρητῶν ὄγκων συνηράνισται δι’ αἰῶνος ἀνηρεμήτων, τρίτη δὲ ὅτι ἀδιάλειπτοὶ τινες εἰς τὸ ἐκτὸς ἐξ ἡμῶν ἀποφοραὶ γίνονται, ποτὲ μὲν πλείους ποτὲ δὲ ἐλάττους πρὸς τὴν ἐνεστηκυῖαν περίστασιν.

6 Ἀλλὰ γὰρ τοσαυταχῶς νοουμένης τὰ νῦν τῆς ὑποθέσεως, πρόκειται τὰ νῦν ζητεῖν οὐ μὰ Δία περὶ τῆς δραματικῆς διατάξεως, οὐδὲ περὶ τῆς παρὰ τοῖς ῥήτορσι ζητήσεως, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς ἐν τέλει λεχθείσης ὑποθέσεως, ἣν ἀρχὴν ἀποδείξεως συμβέβηκεν εἶναι· ταύτην γὰρ καὶ οἱ γεωμέτραι λαμβάνουσι τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, βουλόμενοί τι γεω- 7 μετρικῶς ἀποδείξαι. διόπερ εὐθύς ῥητέον ὅτι καὶ ἐπεὶ οἱ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως λαμβάνοντές τι καὶ χωρὶς ἀποδείξεως ψιλῇ μόνον ἀρκοῦνται φάσει πρὸς τὴν ταύτης πίστιν, πύσεται τις αὐτῶν 8 τοιούτῳ τινὶ χρώμενος ἐπιλογισμῷ. ἤτοι ἰσχυρόν ἐστι καὶ βέβαιον πρὸς πίστιν τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως τι λαβεῖν ἢ ἀπιστόν τε καὶ ἀσθενές. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν ἰσχυρόν, καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ληφθὲν πιστόν γενήσεται καὶ βέβαιον, ὥστε θήσομεν τὰ

to say often in their discourses, “One must posit the hypothesis.” Moreover, in a third application we term the starting-point of proofs “hypothesis,” it being the postulating something for the purpose of proving something. Thus we say that Asclepiades ^a 5 made use of three “hypotheses” to demonstrate the initial condition which produces fever,—the first, that there exist in us certain intelligible (or “non-perceptible”) passages, differing from one another in size; the second, that particles of moisture and air are collected from all sides out of corpuscles perceived by reason and eternally in motion; the third, that certain unceasing effluvia are emitted from within us to the outside air, these being now more, now less, in number according to the condition prevailing at the moment.

Well then, “hypothesis” being now conceived in 6 these three ways, we certainly do not now propose to inquire about the arrangement in dramas, nor about oratorical questionings, but about the “hypothesis” in the sense mentioned last, which was “the starting-point of proof”; for this is the “hypothesis” which the Geometers adopt when they wish to prove anything geometrically. Consequently, we must state 7 at once that since those who assume a thing by hypothesis are satisfied with mere assertion, without proof, for its confirmation, one will interrogate them, employing some such reasoning as this:—Assuming 8 a thing by hypothesis is either a strong and firm confirmation or unreliable and weak.^b But if it is strong, its contrary, when assumed by hypothesis, will also be reliable and firm, so that we shall be posi-

^a Cf. P.H. iii. 32, ii. 140.

^b Cf. P.H. i. 173.

μαχόμενα. εἰ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ τὸ ἐναντίον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως λαμβάνοντος χωρὶς ἀποδείξεως ἀπιστόν ἐστιν ἢ ὑπόθεσις, ἀπιστος γενήσεται καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνου, ὥστε οὐδέτερον αὐτῶν θήσομεν. οὐ τοίνυν ληπτέον
 9 ἐστὶν ἐξ ὑποθέσεώς τι. καὶ μὴν τὸ ὑποτιθέμενον πρᾶγμα ἤτοι ἀληθές ἐστι καὶ τοιοῦτον ὅποιον αὐτὸ ὑποτιθέμεθα ἢ ψεῦδος. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἀληθές ἐστι, μηδὲ αἰτώμεθα αὐτό, εἰς πρᾶγμα ὑποψίας πλήρες καταφεύγοντες, τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, ἀλλ' αὐτόθεν λαμβάνωμεν, ἐπεὶ περ οὐθείς τάληθῆ καὶ ὄντα ὑποτίθεται, καθάπερ οὐδὲ τὸ νῦν ἡμέραν εἶναι ἢ ἐμὲ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ἀναπνεῖν ἢ γὰρ περιφάνεια τούτων τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτόθεν βέβαιοι ἔχει τὴν θέσιν καὶ οὐ δισταζομένην τὴν ὑπόθεσιν. ὥστε εἰ ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ πρᾶγμα, μηδὲ αἰτώμεθα
 10 αὐτὸ ὡς μὴ ὄν ἀληθές. εἰ δ' οὐκ ἔστι τοιοῦτο ἀλλὰ ψεῦδος καθέστηκεν, οὐδὲν ὄφελος ἀνακύψει ἐκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως· καὶ γὰρ μυριάκις αὐτὸ ὑποτιθέμεθα, σαθροῖς, ὡς φασί, θεμελίους [οὐκ]¹ ἀκολουθήσει τὸ συμπέρασμα τῆς ζητήσεως ἐξ
 11 ἀνυπάρκτων ὀρρωμένης ἀρχῶν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' εἰ τις οἷς ἂν ὑποθῆται, τούτοις τὰ ἀκολουθοῦντα πιστὰ τυγχάνειν ἀξιώσει, μήποτε πᾶσαν ἀναρεῖ ζήτησιν. εὐθέως γὰρ ὑποθήσεται ἕκαστος ἡμῶν τὸ τὰ τρία τέσσαρα εἶναι, καὶ τούτου δοθέντος συνάξει ὅτι καὶ τὰ ἐξ ὀκτώ ἐστιν· εἰ γὰρ τὰ τρία τέσσαρά ἐστι, τὰ ἐξ ὀκτῶ γενήσεται· ἀλλὰ μὴν τὰ τρία τέσσαρά ἐστιν, ὡς ἢ ὑπόθεσις δίδωσιν· τὰ
 12 ἄρα ἐξ ὀκτῶ ἐστιν. πάλιν τε αἰτήσομεν ὅτι μένει τὸ κινούμενον, καὶ συγχωρηθέντος τοῦ πράγματος συνάξομεν ὅτι ἢ φλόξ ἡρεμεῖ· εἰ γὰρ τὸ κινούμενον

¹ [οὐκ] del. Heints.

ting conflicting things simultaneously. But if the hypothesis is unreliable in the case of the man who assumes the contrary by hypothesis without proof, it will also be unreliable in the case of the other man, so that we shall posit neither of the things. Nothing, then, must be assumed by hypothesis.—Moreover, the thing which is assumed is either true and such as we assume it to be, or false. But if it is true, let us not postulate it, fleeing for refuge to a thing which is highly suspicious—namely, hypothesis,—but let us accept it straightaway, for no one assumes *ex hypothesi* things true and actual, such as “Now it is day,” or “I am talking and breathing”^a; for the very obviousness of these facts does of itself make the statement firm and the assumption undisputed. So that if the thing is true, let us not postulate it as though it were not true. But if it is not true but is false, no help will emerge from the hypothesis; for though we assume it a myriad times, on rotten foundations, as the saying goes, will follow the conclusion of the inquiry which starts from non-existent principles.—Moreover, if anyone shall maintain that the conclusions which follow from whatever assumptions are made are trustworthy, it is to be feared that he is destroying all inquiry. For example, each of us will assume that three is four, and, this being granted, will infer also that six is eight; for if three is four, six will be eight; but in fact, as the hypothesis grants, three is four; therefore six is eight. Again, we shall postulate that what moves is at rest, and this being agreed we shall infer that the flame is stationary; for if what moves is at rest, the flame is stationary;

^a Cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 242, ii. 144; *Adv. Rhet.* 65.

μένει, ἢ φλόξ ἡρεμεῖ· τὸ δέ γε κινούμενον μένει·
 ἢ ἄρα φλόξ ἡρεμεῖ. ἀλλ' ὃν τρόπον οἱ γεωμέτραι
 ἀτόπους ἐροῦσιν εἶναι ταύτας τὰς ὑποθέσεις (βέ-
 βαιον γὰρ εἶναι δεῖν τὸν θεμέλιον, ἵνα συνομολογηθῆ
 καὶ τὸ ἀκόλουθον), οὕτω καὶ ἡμεῖς πάντα τὰ
 ὑποθετικῶς αὐτοῖς λαμβανόμενα οὐ προσησόμεθα
 13 χωρὶς ἀποδείξεως. ἄλλως τε, εἰ βέβαιόν ἐστι καὶ
 πιστὸν τὸ ὑποτιθέμενον ἢ ὑποτίθεται, μὴ ταῦτα
 ὑποτιθέσθωσαν ἐξ ὧν ἀποδείξουσίν τι, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ
 τὸ ἀποδεικνύμενον, τουτέστι μὴ τὰ λήμματα τῆς
 ἀποδείξεως ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐπιφορὰν· ὃ γὰρ δύναται
 πρὸς πίστιν αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν ἐκκαλυπτόντων ἢ
 ὑπόθεσις, τοῦτο δυνήσεται καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐκκαλυπτο-
 μένων ἐκ τῆς ἀποδείξεως πραγμάτων. εἰ δ'
 ἄπιστόν ἐστι, κἄν πολλάκις ὑποτεθῆ, τὸ τῆς ἀπο-
 δείξεως συμπέρασμα χωρὶς ἀποδείξεως, ἄπιστον
 14 γενήσεται καὶ τὸ εἰς κατασκευὴν τούτου λαμβανό-
 μενον, εἰ μὴ δι' ἀποδείξεως διδάσκοιτο. νῆ Δί',
 ἀλλ' εἴπερ, φασί, τὸ ἀκολουθοῦν ταῖς ὑποθέσεσιν
 ἀληθὲς εὐρίσκειται, πάντως καὶ τὰ ὑποτεθέντα,
 τουτέστιν οἷς ἐπηκολούθησεν, ἀληθῆ γενήσεται.
 ὃ πάλιν ἐστὶν εὐήθες· πόθεν γὰρ ὅτι τὸ ἀκολουθοῦν
 τισὶν ἐν ἀποδείξει πάντως ἀληθὲς ἐστίν; ἢ γὰρ ἐξ
 αὐτοῦ μαθόντες ἐκείνου τοῦτ' ἐροῦσιν, ἢ ἐκ τῶν
 15 οἷς ἠκολούθησε λημμάτων. ἀλλ' ἐξ αὐτοῦ μὲν
 οὐκ ἂν εἴποιεν. ἄδηλον γὰρ ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ ἄδηλον
 ἐξ αὐτοῦ πιστὸν οὐκ ἔστιν· ἀποδεικνύου γοῦν
 τοῦτο ἐπιβάλλονται ὡς μὴ ἐν αὐτῷ τὴν πίστιν
 ἔχον. καὶ μὴν οὐδ' ἐκ τῶν λημμάτων· περὶ γὰρ
 τούτων ἐστὶν ἡ πᾶσα διαμάχη, καὶ μηδέπω αὐτῶν
 πεπιστωμένων¹ οὐδὲ τὸ ἀποδεικνύμενον ἐξ αὐτῶν

¹ πεπιστωμένων cj. Bekk. : πεπιστευμένων MSS., Bekk.

but what moves is at rest; therefore the flame is
 stationary. But just as the Geometers will say that
 these hypotheses are absurd (for the foundation must
 be firm in order that the inference which follows may
 be agreed), so too we shall refuse to accept any of
 their hypothetical assumptions without proof. More- 13
 over, if the assumption, as assumed, is firm and
 trustworthy, let them not assume the things from
 which they will prove something, but the thing
 proved itself,—that is, not the premisses of the proof
 but its conclusion; for the power for confirmation
 which their hypothesis possesses in the case of the
 things which reveal, the same power it will possess in
 the case of the things revealed by the proof. But
 if the conclusion of the proof without proof is un-
 trustworthy, though it be assumed many times over,
 that which is assumed in order to demonstrate it will
 also be untrustworthy unless it be taught by means
 of proof.—But in Heaven's name, they say, if what 14
 follows the hypotheses is found to be true, certainly
 the things assumed—that is, the things which it has
 followed—will be true. But this again is silly; for
 how do we know that that which follows certain things
 in a proof is in all cases true? For they will assert
 this as having learnt it either from the thing itself or
 from the premisses which it followed. But they will 15
 not assert it from itself. For it is non-evident, and
 the non-evident is not of itself trustworthy; at any
 rate they essay to prove it, as though it were not of
 itself convincing. Nor yet from the premisses; for
 the whole controversy is about these, and while they
 are still unconfirmed the thing which is being proved

16 βέβαιον εἶναι δύναται. ἔτι οὐδ' ἂν τὸ λήγον ἢ ἀληθές, εὐθύς καὶ τὸ ἡγούμενόν ἐστι τοιοῦτον. ὡςπερ γὰρ τῷ ἀληθεὶ πέφυκεν ἀληθές ἐπακολουθεῖν καὶ ψεύδει ψεύδος, οὕτως ἡξίωται καὶ ψεύδει ἀληθές συνεισάγεσθαι, καθάπερ [ἐν] τῷ πέτασθαι τὴν γῆν, ψεύδει ὄντι, τὸ εἶναι τὴν γῆν ἀληθές
 17 ὑπάρχον εἶπετο. ὅθεν οὐκ εἰ τὸ λήγον ἐστὶν ἀληθές, πάντως καὶ τὸ ἡγούμενον ἀληθές, ἀλλ' ἐνδέχεται τοῦ λήγοντος ἀληθοῦς ὄντος τὸ ἡγούμενον ὑπάρχειν ψεύδος.

Καὶ δὴ ὅτι μὲν οὐκ εὖ ποιούσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων ἐξ ὑποθέσεως λαμβάνοντες τὰς ἀρχὰς τῆς ἀποδείξεως καὶ ἐκάστου θεωρήματος, ἐπιφθεγγόμενοι τὸ δεδοσθω, διὰ τούτων αὐτάρκως
 18 κατεσκευάσται· μετελθόντες δὲ ἐξῆς διδάσκωμεν ὅτι ψευδεῖς καὶ ἀπιθάνους αὐτῶν συμβέβηκεν εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς τῆς τέχνης. καὶ δὴ πολλῶν εἰς τοῦτο δυναμένων λέγεσθαι, ὡς ἐναρχόμενοι τῆς ὑφ' ἡγήσεως εἶπομεν, τούτοις προσαχθήσεται τὰ τῆς ἀπορίας ὧν ἀναιρουμένων καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ συναυρεθήσεται. ἐπεὶ οὖν τῶν ἀρχῶν διαβληθειῶν οὐδὲ αἱ κατὰ μέρος ἀποδείξεις αὐτοῖς δύνανται προκόπτειν, λέγωμεν τὰ ἀρμόζοντα πρὸς τὰς ἀρχάς.

19 Εὐθέως τοίνυν ὡς πρῶτόν τι καὶ στοιχειωδέστατον διδάσκουσιν ἡμᾶς ὅτι σῶμα μὲν ἐστὶ τὸ τὰς τρεῖς ἔχον διαστάσεις, μήκος πλάτος βάθος, ὧν πρώτη μὲν διάστασις ἐστὶν ἢ κατὰ μήκος ἄνωθεν κάτω, δευτέρα δὲ ἢ κατὰ πλάτος ἀπὸ δεξιῶν ἐπ' ἀριστερά, τρίτη δὲ ἢ κατὰ βάθος ἀπὸ τῶν πρόσω εἰς τοῦπίσω. ὥστε τῶν τριῶν τούτων ἐξ γίνεσθαι παρατάσεις, δύο καθ' ἐκάστην, τῆς

by means of them cannot be firm.—Further, even if 16 the consequent is true, the antecedent is not inevitably true. For as the true naturally follows the true, and the false the false, so it is maintained that the true is a consequence of the false,—for example, that “the earth exists,” which is true, follows “the earth flies,” which is false. Hence, if the consequent is 17 true, the antecedent is not in all cases true, but when the consequent is true it is possible for the antecedent to be false.

So now, by these arguments it has been sufficiently established that the Mathematicians do no good by assuming *ex hypothesi* the principles of proof and of each theorem, repeating the formula “Let it be granted.” Passing on, let us show in the next place 18 that the principles of their art are in fact false and incredible. Now many arguments can be used to prove this, as we said when commencing our exposition, but our doubts shall be cast on those principles the destruction of which will involve that of the rest. So, since their particular proofs cannot go forward when the principles are under suspicion, let us state suitable arguments against the principles.

To start with they tell us, as a primary and most 19 fundamental fact, that “body” is that which has three dimensions,^a—length, breadth, depth,—and of these the first dimension, that of length, is up and down, the second, that of breadth, is from right to left, the third, that of depth, from before to behind. Thus there are six extensions of these three, two in

^a Cf. P.H. iii. 39 f.; Adv. Phys. i. 367 ff.

μὲν πρώτης τὴν ἄνω καὶ κάτω, τῆς δὲ δευτέρας
 τὴν ἐν ἀριστερᾷ καὶ ἐν δεξιᾷ, τῆς δὲ τρίτης τὴν
 πρόσω καὶ ὀπίσω. στιγμῆς μὲν γὰρ βύεισης
 γραμμὴν γίνεσθαι φασι, γραμμῆς δ' ἐπιφάνειαν,
 20 ἐπιφανείας δὲ στερεὸν σῶμα. παρὸ καὶ ὑπογρά-
 φοντες λέγουσι στιγμὴν μὲν εἶναι σημεῖον ἀμερὲς
 καὶ ἀδιάστατον ἢ πέρασ γραμμῆς, γραμμὴν δὲ
 μήκος ἀπλατὲς ἢ πέρασ ἐπιφανείας, ἐπιφάνειαν
 21 δὲ πέρασ σώματος ἢ πλάτος ἀβαθές. τάξει οὖν
 ἀναλαβόντες περὶ στιγμῆς λέγωμεν πρῶτον, εἶτα
 περὶ γραμμῆς, τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο περὶ ἐπιφανείας
 καὶ σώματος· τούτων γὰρ ἀναιρουμένων οὐδ' ἡ
 γεωμετρία γενήσεται τέχνη, μὴ ἔχουσα τὰ ἐφ'
 οἷς ἡ σύστασις αὐτῆς δοκεῖ προκόπτειν.
 22 Ἡ τοίνυν στιγμῆ, ἣν φασι σημεῖον ἀδιάστατον
 ὑπάρχειν, ἥτοι σῶμα νοεῖται ἢ ἀσώματον. καὶ
 σῶμα μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη κατ' αὐτούς· τὰ γὰρ μὴ
 ἔχοντα διάστασιν οὐκ εἶναι σώματα. λείπεται
 οὖν ἀσώματον αὐτὴν ὑπάρχειν, ὃ πάλιν ἐστὶν
 ἀπίθανον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀσώματον οὐδενὸς νοεῖται
 γεννητικὸν ὡσανεὶ ἀθιγὲς καθεστῶς, ἡ δὲ στιγμῆ
 23 νοεῖται τῆς γραμμῆς γεννητικῆ· οὐ τοίνυν ἐστὶ
 σημεῖον ἀδιάστατον ἢ στιγμῆ. καὶ μὴν εἶπερ
 οἷμιν τῶν ἀδήλων ἐστὶ τὰ φαινόμενα, ἐπεὶ οὐ
 δυνατὸν ἐν τοῖς φαινομένοις λαβεῖν τινὸς σημεῖον
 καὶ πέρασ ἀδιάστατον, δῆλον ὡς οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς
 νοητοῖς ληφθῆσεται τι τοιοῦτον. ἐν δὲ γε τοῖς
 αἰσθητοῖς οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἀδιάστατον λαβεῖν, ὡς
 24 παραστήσω· ὥστ' οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς. πᾶν
 τοίνυν τὸ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ὑποπίπτον τινὸς πέρασ

each case,—up and down of the first, right and left of
 the second, before and behind of the third. For they
 assert that the line is produced by the flow of the
 point, the surface by that of the line, and the solid
 body by that of the surface. So in describing these 20
 they say that “the point is a sign without parts or
 dimensions,” or “the limit of a line,” “the line is
 length without breadth,” or “the limit of a surface,”
 and “the surface is the limit of a body,” or “breadth
 without depth.” Taking these, then, in order, let us 21
 speak first about the point, next about the line, and
 after that about the surface and body; for if these
 are destroyed Geometry will not be an Art, as not
 possessing the conditions upon which success in its
 construction seems to depend.

Now the point, which they say is “a sign without 22
 dimensions,” is conceived as either a body or incor-
 poreal.^a And according to them it will not be a body;
 for things which have no dimension are not bodies.
 It remains, then, to say that it is incorporeal; but
 this again is incredible. For the incorporeal, as being
 impalpable, is conceived as generative of nothing, but
 the point is conceived as generative of the line; so
 the point is not a sign without dimensions.—More- 23
 over, if apparent things are “the vision of things non-
 evident,” then, since in apparent things it is impossible
 to perceive a limit of anything or sign which is with-
 out dimensions, it is plain that no such thing will be
 perceived in intelligible things either. But in fact,
 as I shall establish, it is impossible to perceive in
 things sensible anything without dimensions; so that
 it is also impossible in intelligibles. Now everything 24
 which is perceived in sensibles as the limit and sign

• Cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 377.

καὶ σημεῖον σὺν τούτῳ καταλαμβάνεται τινος ἄκρον, σὺν τῷ καὶ μέρος ἐκείνου, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄκρον, ὑπάρχειν· ἐὰν γοῦν ἀφέλωμεν αὐτό, μειωθήσεται τὸ ἀφ' οὗ ἢ ἀφαίρεσις. τὸ δὲ μέρος τινὸς ὑπάρχον εὐθύς καὶ συμπληρωτικὸν αὐτοῦ καθέστηκεν, ὃ δὲ ἐστὶ τινος συμπληρωτικόν, πάντως αὔξει τὸ μέγεθος ἐκείνου, καὶ ὃ ἐστὶ μεγέθους αὐξη-
 25 τικόν, τοῦτο ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔχει μέγεθος. πᾶν ἄρα τὸ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς σημεῖόν τινος καὶ ἄκρον μέγεθος ἔχον οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδιάστατον. ὅθεν εἰ καὶ τὸ νοητὸν μεταβατικῶς ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ νοοῦμεν, σὺν τούτῳ καθεστῶς σημεῖον καὶ πέρασ γραμμῆς αὐτὸ νοήσομεν, σὺν τῷ καὶ συμπληρωτικόν αὐτῆς ὑπάρχειν, ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸ διάστασιν ἔξει πάντως,
 26 ὃ γε διαστάσεώς ἐστι περιποιητικόν. ἄλλως τε τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ κέντρου ἐκβληθείσαν εὐθειᾶν φασὶ περιαισθημένην τῷ πέρατι ἑαυτῆς κυκλογραφεῖν τὴν ἐπίπεδον. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὸ ἄκρον ταύτης τῆς εὐθείας ἐστὶ σημεῖον, καὶ τοῦτο περιαισθημένον καταμετρεῖ τὴν περιφέρειαν, ἔσται τοῦτο συμπληρωτικόν τῆς περιφέρειας· ἢ δὲ γε περιφέρεια διάστασιν εἶχεν· τοίνυν καὶ τὸ συμπληρωτικόν αὐτῆς σημεῖον ἔξει
 27 τινὰ διάστασιν. ἢ γε μὴν σφαῖρα καθ' ἓν σημεῖον ἀξιοῦται τῆς ἐπιπέδου ἄπτεσθαι, ἐκκυλιόμενη τε γραμμὴν ποιεῖν, δῆλον ὡς τῶν ἐπικαταπιπτόντων σημείων τὴν ὅλην συντιθέντων γραμμὴν. τοίνυν εἰ τοῦ μεγέθους τῆς γραμμῆς συμπληρωτικόν ἐστὶ τὸ σημεῖον, ἔξει καὶ αὐτὸ μέγεθος. συγκεχώρηται δὲ τοῦ μεγέθους τῆς γραμμῆς συμπληρωτικόν αὐτὸ τυγχάνειν· καὶ αὐτὸ ἄρα μέγεθος ἔξει καὶ οὐκ ἀδιάστατον γενήσεται.

of something is apprehended as being likewise the extremity of something, and also as being part of that whereof it is the extremity; if, then, we take it away, that from which it is taken will be diminished. And that which is part of a thing clearly helps to complete that thing, and that which helps to complete a thing will certainly increase its magnitude, and what serves to complete a magnitude necessarily possesses magnitude. Therefore every 25 sign or extremity of anything in sensibles, as possessing magnitude, is not without dimensions. Hence, if we conceive the intelligible by transference from the sensible, we shall conceive it as being the sign and limit of the line, and also as helping to complete it, so that it too will certainly possess a dimension since it is productive of a dimension. Furthermore, they say 26 that the straight line drawn from the centre when it revolves describes a circle in the plane with its limit. Since then, the extremity of this straight line is a sign, and this by revolving measures out the circumference, it will help to complete the circumference; but the circumference possesses a dimension; so the sign, too, which helps to complete it will possess a dimension.—Moreover, it is held that the sphere 27 touches the plane at one sign, and by rolling forward makes a line, the signs which make contact successively composing, as is evident, the whole line. Then, if the sign helps to complete the magnitude of the line, it too will possess magnitude. But it has been agreed that it does help to complete the magnitude of the line; therefore it too will possess magnitude and will not be without dimensions.

- 28 Ἄλλ' εἰώθασι πρὸς τὰς τοιαύτας ἐπιχειρήσεις ὑπαντῶντες οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἐρατοσθένη λέγειν ὅτι τὸ σημεῖον οὔτε ἐπιλαμβάνει τινα τόπον οὔτε καταμετρεῖ τὸ διάστημα τῆς γραμμῆς, ῥυὲν δὲ ποιεῖ τὴν γραμμὴν. ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀδιανόητον. ῥεῖν γὰρ νοεῖται τὸ ἀπὸ τινος τόπου εἰς τινα τόπον ἐπεκτείνεσθαι, ὡσπερ τὸ ὕδωρ. εἰ δὴ τοιοῦτόν τι φαντασιούμεθα τὸ σημεῖον, ἀκολουθήσει οὐχ οἶον ἀμερὲς αὐτὸ τυγχάνειν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων πολυμερές.
- 29 Τοσαῦτα μὲν περὶ στιγματῆς· ἴδωμεν δὲ παρακει-
 μένως καὶ τὰ περὶ γραμμῆς ὀφείλοντα λέγεσθαι·
 αὕτη γὰρ μετὰ τὴν στιγματὴν ἐτέτακτο. τοῖον κὰν
 δοθῆ ὀσμὴ τις ὑπάρχειν, οὐκ ἔσται ἡ γραμμὴ.
 εἰ γὰρ αὕτη ῥύσις ἐστὶ σημείου καὶ μῆκος ἀπλατές,
 ἦτοι ἓν ἐστὶ σημεῖον εἰς μῆκος ἐκτεταμένον ἢ
 30 πολλὰ ἀδιάστατα¹ στοίχῳ κείμενα· οὔτε δὲ ἓν
 ἐστὶν εἰς μῆκος ἐκτεταμένον, ὡς παραστήσομεν,
 οὔτε πολλὰ σημεία στοίχῳ κείμενα, καθὼς καὶ
 τοῦτο ὑπομνήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶ γραμμὴ. εἰ
 γὰρ ἓν ἐστὶ [τὸ]² σημείον, ἦτοι τοῦτο³ τὸ σημεῖον
 ἓνα μόνον ἐπέχει τόπον, ἢ μετατίθεται τόπον ἐκ
 τόπου, ἢ ἐπεκτείνεται ἀπὸ τινος τόπου εἰς τινα
 31 τόπον. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἐνὶ ἐμπεριέχεται τόπῳ, οὐκ
 ἔσται γραμμὴ ἀλλὰ στιγματὴ· ῥυὲν γὰρ ἐνοεῖτο
 γραμμὴ. εἰ δὲ τόπον ἐκ τόπου μετέρχεται, ἦτοι,
 ὡς προείπον, ὃν μὲν ἀπολείπον ὃν δὲ ἐπιλαμβάνον
 μετέρχεται, ἢ οὐ μὲν ἐχόμενον τόπου εἰς ὃν δὲ
 ἐκτεινόμενον. ἀλλ' εἰ ὃν μὲν ἀπολείπον ὃν δὲ
 ἐπιλαμβάνον, πάλιν οὐκ ἔσται γραμμὴ ἀλλὰ

¹ ἀδιάστατα Heintz : διαστατὰ mss., Bekk.

² [τὸ] del. Heintz.

But in answer to these objections Eratosthenes^a 28 is accustomed to say that the sign neither occupies any space nor measures out the interval of the line, but by flowing makes the line. But this is inconceivable. For flowing is conceived as extension from a place to a place, as water extends. And if we shall imagine the sign to be something of that sort, it will follow that it is not like a thing without parts, but of the opposite sort, abounding in parts.

So much, then, concerning the point : in the next 29 place let us see what ought to be said concerning the line ; for this comes next in order after the point. Now even though it be granted that a point exists, the line will not exist. For if it is " a flux of the sign " and " length without breadth," it is either a single sign extended in length or a number of signs placed in a row without intervals ; but it is neither a single 30 sign extended in length, as we shall establish, nor a number of signs placed in a row, as we shall also show ; therefore line does not exist. For if it is a single sign, this sign either occupies one place only or moves on from place to place, or is extended from a place to a place. But if it is contained in one place, it will not 31 be a line but a point ; for the line was conceived as the result of flux. And if it moves from place to place, either it moves—as I said before—by quitting one place and occupying another, or by keeping to one place and extending to another. But if it is by quitting one place and occupying another, again it will not be a line but a point ; for as it was conceived 32

^a Eratosthenes of Cyrenè, Head of the Library at Alexandria, *circa* 220 B.C., and specially noted for his writings on geography.

³ τοῦτο Heintz : αὐτὸ mss., Bekk.

- 32 *στιγμή· ᾧ γὰρ λόγῳ τόπον πρῶτον ἐπεσχηκὸς
στιγμή τις ἀλλ' οὐ γραμμὴ ἐνοείτο, τῷ αὐτῷ και-
τῶν δευτέρου ἐπιλαμβάνον τόπον νοηθήσεται στιγ-
μή. εἰ δὲ οὐ μὲν ἐχόμενον τόπου εἰς ὃν δὲ ἐκτει-
νόμενον, ἤτοι μεριστῶ τόπῳ ἀντιπαρεκτείνεται ἢ*
33 *ἀμερίστῳ. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀμερίστῳ τόπῳ ἀντιπαρεκ-
τείνεται, πάλιν οὐκ ἔσται γραμμὴ ἀλλὰ στιγμὴ καὶ
σημεῖον· τὸ γὰρ ἀμερῆ τόπον ἐπεσχηκὸς ἀμερές
ἔστιν, ὃ δὲ ἔστιν ἀμερές, στιγμὴ καὶ οὐ γραμμὴ
καθέστηκεν. εἰ δὲ μεριστῶ, πάντως ἐπεὶ τὸ μερι-
στῶ <παρεκτεινόμενον>¹ μέρη ἔχει, εἴγε ἅπαντι
παρεκτείνεται τῷ τόπῳ, τὸ δὲ μέρη ἔχον, οἷς
ἀντιπαρεκτείνεται τοῖς τοῦ τόπου μέρεσι, σῶμά
ἔστιν, ἔσται τὸ σημεῖον καὶ μεριστὸν καὶ σῶμα·
ὅπερ ἄτοπον. ὥστε οὐχ ἔν ἐστι σημεῖον ἢ γραμμὴ.*
34 *καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ [τὰ]² πολλὰ σημεῖα στοιχηδὸν κεί-
μενα. ταῦτα γὰρ τὰ σημεῖα ἤτοι ψαύοντα ἀλλήλων
νοεῖται ἢ οὐ ψαύοντα. καὶ εἰ μὲν οὐ ψαύοντα
ἀλλήλων, μεσολαβούμενα τόποις τισὶ διορισθή-
σεται, καὶ τόποις διοριζόμενα οὐκέτι ποιήσει μίαν
35 *γραμμὴν. εἰ δὲ ψαύοντα ἀλλήλων νοεῖτο, ἤτοι
ὅλα ὄλων ἄψεται ἢ μέρεσι μερῶν. καὶ εἰ μὲν
μέρεσι μερῶν ἄψεται, οὐκ ἔσται αὐτὰ ἔτι ἀδιά-
στατα καὶ ἀμερῆ· τὸ γὰρ μέσον δυοῖν σημείων
λόγου χάριν νοούμενον σημεῖον ἄλλῳ μὲν μέρει
ἄψεται τοῦ ἔμπροσθεν σημείου, ἄλλῳ δὲ τοῦ
ὀπισθεν, οὐ τῷ αὐτῷ δὲ τῆς ἐπιπέδου, διαφέροντι
δὲ τοῦ ἄλλου τόπου, ὥστε μηκέτ' αὐτὸ ταῖς*
36 *ἀληθείαις ἀμερές τυγχάνειν ἀλλὰ πολυμερές. εἰ
δὲ ὅλα ὄλων ἄψαιτο σημεῖα, δῆλον ὡς ἐν σημείois**

¹ μεριστῶ (παρεκτεινόμενον) scripsi : μεριστὸν MSS., Bekk. (cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 385).

as a point but not a line when it occupied the first place, so, by the same reasoning, it will be conceived as a point when it occupies the second place. And if it is keeping to one place and extending to another, it extends over place which is either divisible or indivisible. But if it extends over indivisible 33 place, once again it will not be a line but a point or sign, for that which occupies indivisible place is indivisible, and that which is indivisible is a point and not a line. And if it extends over divisible place, then,—since (that which extends over) the divisible has parts,—since it is extended over all the place, and that which has parts wherewith it extends over the parts of the place is body, the sign will certainly be both divisible and corporeal ; which is absurd. Consequently, the line is not one single sign.—Nor yet is it 34 a number of signs placed in a row. For these signs are conceived either as touching one another or as not touching. If as not touching one another, being intercepted they will be separated by certain spaces, and being separated by spaces they will no longer form one line. And if they are conceived as touching 35 one another, they will either touch wholes as wholes or parts with parts.^a But if they shall touch parts with parts, they will no longer be without dimensions and without parts ; for the sign which is conceived—shall we say ?—as midway between two signs will touch the sign in front with one part, and that behind with another, and the plane with a different part, and the other place with yet another, so that in very truth it is no longer without parts but with many parts. And if the signs as wholes should touch wholes, it is 36

^a Cf. *P.H.* iii. 45 f.

² [τὰ] del. Heintz.

σημεία περισχεθήσεται καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐφέξει τόπον· ταύτη τε οὐκ ἔσται στοιχηδὸν κείμενα, ἵνα γένηται γραμμὴ, ἀλλ' εἰ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπέσχηκε τόπον, μία καταστήσεται στιγμὴ. εἴπερ οὖν, ἢ ἐπινοηθῆ γραμμὴ, δεῖ προεπινοεῖσθαι¹ τὸ σημεῖον ἐξ οὗ λαμβάνει τὴν νόησιν, ἐπιδέδεικται δὲ μήτε σημεῖον οὐσα μήτε ἐκ σημείων σύνθετος, οὐδὲν ἔσται γραμμὴ.

- 37 Καὶ μὴν πάρεστιν ἀποστάντας τῆς τοῦ σημείου νοήσεως προηγουμένως ἀναιρεῖν τὴν γραμμὴν καὶ τὸ ἀνεπινοήτον αὐτῆς διδάσκειν. γραμμὴ γὰρ ἔστιν, ὡς αὐτῶν πάρεστιν ἀκούειν τῶν γεωμετρῶν, μήκος ἀπλατές, σκεψάμενοι δὲ ἡμεῖς ἀκριβῶς οὐτε ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς οὐτε ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς εὐρήσομεν
- 38 δυνάμενόν τι ληφθῆναι μήκος ἀπλατές. καὶ ἐν μὲν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς, ἐπεὶ περὶ ὃ ἂν λάβωμεν αἰσθητὸν μήκος, τοῦτο πάντῃ τε καὶ πάντως σὺν ποσῷ
- 39 πλάτει ληψόμεθα· ἐν δὲ τοῖς νοητοῖς, καθόσον ἕτερον μὲν ἐτέρου στενώτερον δυνάμεθα νοῆσαι μήκος, ὅταν δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ μήκος κατ' ἰσότητα φυλάττοντες σχίζωμεν τοῖς ἐπινοίαις τὸ πλάτος καὶ ἄχρι τινὸς τοῦτο² ποιῶμεν, ἔλαττον μὲν τὸ πλάτος καὶ ἔλαττον γινόμενον νοήσομεν, ἐπειδὴν δὲ ἅπαξ φθάσωμεν στερῆσαι τοῦ πλάτους τὸ μήκος, οὐκέτι οὐδὲ μήκος φαντασιούμεθα, ἀλλ'
- 40 ἀναιρεῖται καὶ ἡ τοῦ μήκους ἐπίνοια. καθόλου τε πᾶν τὸ νοούμενον κατὰ δύο τοὺς πρώτους ἐπινοεῖται τρόπους· ἢ γὰρ κατὰ περίπτωσιν ἐναργῆ ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναργῶν μετάβασιν, καὶ ταύτην τριστῆν ἢ γὰρ ὁμοιωτικῶς ἢ ἐπισυνθετικῶς ἢ ἀναλογιστικῶς. ἀλλὰ κατὰ μὲν περιπτωτικὴν

¹ προεπινοεῖσθαι Fabr. : προεπινοεῖσθαι mss., Bekk.

² τοῦτο cj. Bekk. : τὸ αὐτὸ mss., Bekk.

plain that signs will be contained in signs and will occupy the same place ; and thus they will not be placed in a row, so as to form a line, but if they occupy the same place they will form one point. If, then, in order that the line may be conceived it is necessary that the sign, from which the notion of it is derived, should first be conceived, and it has been shown that the line is neither a sign nor composed of signs, then the line will be nothing.

Moreover, leaving aside the notion of the sign we 37 can destroy the line directly and show its inconceivability. For the line, as one may learn from the Geometers themselves, is "length without breadth," but when we have examined the matter closely, we shall not find either amongst intelligibles or amongst sensibles anything that is capable of being perceived as length without breadth. Not amongst sensibles, 38 since whatever sensible length we perceive we shall in every case perceive it as combined with a certain amount of breadth ; nor amongst intelligibles, inas- 39 much as we can conceive one length as narrower than another, but when we keep the same length invariably and in thought cut slices from its breadth and keep doing this up to a point, we shall conceive the breadth as growing less and less, but when we reach the point of finally depriving the length of breadth we shall no longer be imagining even length, but even the notion of length will be destroyed.—In general, 40 also, everything conceived is conceived in two main ways, either by way of clear impression or by way of transference from things clear, and this way is threefold,—by similarity, or by composition, or by analogy.

ἐνάργειαν νοεῖται τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν καὶ γλυκὺ καὶ πικρὸν, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναργῶν μετάβασιν ὁμοιωτικῶς μὲν νοεῖται καθάπερ ἀπὸ 41 τῆς Σωκράτους εἰκόνας Σωκράτης αὐτός, ἐπισυνθετικῶς δὲ καθάπερ ἀπὸ ἵππου καὶ ἀνθρώπου ἵπποκένταυρος· ἵππεια γὰρ καὶ βρότεια μίξαντες μέλη ἐφантаσιώθημεν τὸν μήτε ἀνθρωπον μήτε ἵππον ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων σύνθετον ἵπποκένταυρον. 42 ἀναλογιστικῶς δὲ τι νοεῖται πάλιν κατὰ δύο τρόπους, ὅτε μὲν ἀξήτικῶς ὅτε δὲ μειωτικῶς, οἶον ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν ἀνθρώπων,

οἶοι νῦν βροτοὶ εἰσιν,

παραυξήτικῶς μὲν ἐνόησαμεν Κύκλωπα, ὃς οὐκ ἐΰκει

ἀνδρὶ γε σιτοφάγῳ ἀλλὰ ῥίψι ὑλήεντι,

μειωτικῶς δὲ τὸν πυγμαῖον ἀνθρωπον, ὃς οὐχ 43 ὑπέπεσεν ἡμῖν περιπτωτικῶς. τοσοῦτων δὴ νοήσεως ὄντων τρόπων, εἶπερ νοεῖται τι¹ ἀπλατές μήκος, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὀφείλει ἤτοι κατὰ περιπτωτικὴν ἐνάργειαν νοεῖσθαι ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναργῶν μετάβασιν. ἀλλὰ κατὰ περιπτωτικὴν μὲν ἐνάργειαν οὐκ ἂν νοοῖτο· οὐδενὶ γὰρ περιεπέσομεν 44 μήκει χωρὶς πλάτους. λείπεται οὖν κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναργῶν μετάβασιν λέγειν αὐτὸ νανοῖσθαι· ὃ πάλιν τῶν ἀδυνατωτάτων. εἰ γὰρ οὕτως ἐνόηθη, ἤτοι πάντως κατὰ ὁμοίωσιν ἢ κατὰ ἐπισύνθεσιν ἐνοεῖτο ἢ κατὰ ἀναλογίαν· κατ' οὐδένα δὲ τούτων τῶν τρόπων εἰς ἔννοιαν ἐλθεῖν πέφυκεν, ὡς παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα νοεῖται τι μήκος ἀπλατές.

¹ τι Heintz : τὸ mss., Bekk.

Thus, by clear impression are conceived the white, the black, the sweet and the bitter, and by transference from things clear are concepts due to similarity, —such as Socrates himself from a likeness of Socrates, and those due to composition,—such as the hippo- 41 centaur from horse and man, for by mixing the limbs of horse and man we have imagined the hippocentaur which is neither man nor horse but a compound of both. And a thing is conceived by way of analogy 42 also in two ways, sometimes by way of increase, sometimes by decrease ; for instance, from ordinary men—

Such mortals as now we see—

we conceive by way of increase the Cyclops who was

Less like a corn-eating man than a forest-clad peak of the mountains^a ;

and by way of decrease we conceive the pygmy whom we have not perceived through sense-impressions. Now the modes of conception being so many, if length 43 without breadth is conceived it must necessarily be conceived either by way of clear sense-impression or by way of transference from clear things ; but it will not be conceived by way of clear sense-impression ; for we have had no impression of any length without breadth. It remains, then, to say that it is conceived 44 by way of transference from clear things ; but this again is most impossible. For if it was conceived in this way, it was certainly conceived either through similarity or through composition or through analogy ; but in none of these ways can it naturally be conceived, as we shall establish ; therefore no length without breadth is conceived. For it is obviously im- 45

^a Cf. Hom. Od. ix. 191 Adv. Phys. i. 45, 395.

45 αὐτίκα γὰρ κατὰ μὲν τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῶν ἀμηχάνων
 ἐστὶ νοεῖν τι μῆκος ἀπλατές. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔχομεν
 ἐν τοῖς φαινομένοις μῆκος χωρὶς πλάτους [νοού-
 46 μενον],¹ ἵνα νοήσωμεν ὁμοίον τι τούτῳ μῆκος
 ἀπλατές. τὸ γὰρ τιμὴ ὁμοιον γινωσκομένῳ πάντως
 ἐστὶν ὁμοιον, τῷ δὲ μὴ γινωσκομένῳ οὐδὲ ὁμοιον
 εὐρέει δυνατόν. ἐπεὶ οὖν οὐκ ἔχομεν ἐναργῶς
 ὑποπίπτον ἡμῖν μῆκος χωρὶς πλάτους, οὐδὲ
 47 ὁμοίον τι αὐτῷ δινησόμεθα νοεῖν. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ
 κατ' ἐπισύνθεσιν οἷον τέ ἐστι προβαίνειν τοῖς
 γεωμέτραις αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν· εἰπάτωσαν γὰρ
 ἡμῖν τίνα τῶν ἐκ περιπτώσεως ἐναργῶς γινωσκο-
 μένων μετὰ τίνων συνθέντες νοήσομεν τὸ ἀπλατές
 μῆκος, ὡς πρότερον ἐπ' ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἵππου
 48 ποιοῦντες ἐφαντασιούμεθα ἵπποκένταυρον. λεί-
 πεται οὖν ἐπὶ τὸν κατὰ ἀναλογιστικὴν αὐξήσιν ἢ
 μείωσιν τὸν (τρίτον)² τῆς νοήσεως αὐτοῖς τρόπον
 49 συμφεύγειν· ὃ πάλιν τῶν ἀπόρων θεωρεῖται. τὰ
 γὰρ κατὰ ἀναλογίαν νοούμενα ἔχει τι κοινὸν πρὸς
 τὰ ἀφ' ὧν νοεῖται, οἷον ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ μεγέθους
 τῶν ἀνθρώπων παραυξητικῶς ἐνόησαμεν τὸν
 Κύκλωπα καὶ μειωτικῶς τὸν πυγμαῖον, ὥστε
 εἶναι τι κοινὸν τοῖς κατὰ ἀναλογίαν νοουμένοις
 πρὸς ἐκεῖνα τὰ ἀφ' ὧν νοεῖται. οὐδὲν δ' ἔχομεν
 κοινὸν τοῦ τε ἀπλατοῦς καὶ τοῦ σὺν πλάτει νοου-
 μένου μῆκος, ἢ ἀπ' ἐκείνου ὀρμηθέντες νοήσωμεν
 50 τὸ ἀπλατές μῆκος. μὴ ἔχοντες δέ τι κοινὸν αὐτῶν
 οὐδὲ κατὰ ἀναλογίαν ποιήσασθαι τὴν τοῦ ἀπλατοῦς
 μῆκος νόησιν ἰσχύσομεν. ὅθεν εἰ ἕκαστον τῶν
 νοουμένων κατὰ τοὺς ἐκκεκίμενους νοεῖται τρόπους,
 δεδίδακται δὲ κατὰ μηδέν' αὐτῶν νοούμενον τὸ

¹ [νοούμενον] del. Heintz.

² (τρίτον) add. cj. Bekk.

possible to conceive a length without breadth by way of similarity. For we have no length without breadth amongst things apparent by means of which we might conceive a similar length without breadth. For what 46 is similar to anything is certainly similar to a thing known, and it is impossible to find a thing similar to what is not known. Since, then, we possess no clear impression of a length without breadth, we shall not be able to conceive anything similar to it.—Nor yet is 47 it possible for the Geometers to get the notion of it by way of composition; for let them tell us which of the things clearly known from sense-impression are we to compound with which so as to conceive length without breadth, as we did before, in the case of man and horse, when we imagined the hippocentaur. It remains, then, for them to take refuge in 48 the third mode of conception, that of analogy, by way of increase or decrease; but this again is seen to be hopeless. For things conceived by analogy have 49 something in common with the things wherefrom they are conceived, as for instance from the common size of men we conceived by way of increase the Cyclops and by way of decrease the pygmy, so that things conceived by analogy have something in common with the things wherefrom they are conceived. But we find nothing in common between the length that is without breadth and that conceived along with breadth, so that by setting out from the latter we might conceive length without breadth. But if we find nothing common to them both we shall 50 not be able to form the conception of length without breadth by analogy. Hence, if each of the concepts is conceived according to the modes described, and it has been shown that length without breadth is

ἀπλατές μήκος, ἀνεπινοήτόν ἐστι τὸ ἀπλατές μήκος.
 51 Ὅμως δ' οὖν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς οὕτως ἐναργεῖς ἐλέγχους πειρῶνται κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν ἀνδριζόμενοι λέγειν οἱ γεωμέτραι ὅτι κατ' ἐπίτασιν νοεῖται τὸ
 52 ἀπλατές μήκος. λαβόντες γοῦν ὅποιονδήποτε μήκος σὺν ποσῷ πλάτει, φασὶν ὅτι μειοῦμεν κατ' ἐπίτασιν τοῦτ' ἐπιτάτος ἀεὶ καὶ μᾶλλον τὴν στενότητα ἐπιτείνοντες, εἶθ' οὕτως τὸ κατ' ἐπίτασιν νοούμενον ἀπλατές εἶναι μήκος λέγομεν· εἰ γὰρ κατ' ὀλίγον ἐλαττοῦνται στενοῦμενον τὸ πλάτος κατ' ἐπίτασιν, ἐλεύσεται ποτε καὶ εἰς ἀπλατές μήκος, καταληξάσης εἰς τοῦτο τῆς νοήσεως.
 53 ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐδείξαμεν, ἔρει τις, ὅτι ἡ παντελῆς στέρησις τοῦ πλάτους ἀναίρεσις ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ μήκους. εἶπα τὸ κατ' ἐπίτασιν τίνος νοούμενον οὐχ ἕτερόν ἐστι τοῦ προεπινοηθέντος, ἀλλ'
 54 αὐτὸ ἐκείνο ἐπιτεταμένον. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἀπὸ τοῦ ποσὸν ἔχοντος πλάτος κατ' ἐπίτασιν στενότητος νοησαί τι θέλομεν, τὸ μὲν πάντῃ πάντως ἀπλατές μήκος οὐκ ἐπινοήσομεν (ἕτερογενές γάρ ἐστι), στενὸν δέ τι ληψόμεθα πλάτος, ὥστε τὴν κατάληξιν τῆς νοήσεως ἐν ἐλαχιστοτάτῳ γενέσθαι πλάτει, πλὴν ὅμως πλάτει, τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο γενέσθαι τὴν ἐπιβολὴν τῆς διανοίας εἰς ἕτερογενές, καὶ ὃ μήτε
 55 μήκος ἐστὶ μήτε πλάτος. εἴπερ τε δυνατόν ἐστι μήκος τι νοήσαντας σὺν ποσῷ πλάτει στερήσει τοῦ πλάτους λαβεῖν μήκος ἀπλατές, ἐνδέξεται ποτε κατὰ τὸν ὅμοιον τρόπον καὶ σάρκα σὺν τρωτῷ ἰδιώματι νοήσαντας στερήσει τοῦ τρωτοῦ

^a Cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 403 ff.

^b Cf. § 39.

conceived according to none of them, then length without breadth is inconceivable.

Notwithstanding, even to arguments so clear as 51 these the Geometers manfully endeavour to reply, as best they can, saying that length without breadth is conceived by way of "intension."^a Thus, when we 52 have taken any given length along with a certain amount of breadth, they say that we diminish this breadth by "intension," intensifying ever more and more its narrowness, and so in the end we say that what is thus conceived by way of intension is length without breadth; for if the breadth is lessened little by little by being narrowed through intension, at some time it will come to be a length without breadth, the conception ending up in this. But surely, some- 53 one will say, we have proved that complete privation of breadth is also the abolition of length.^b Also, that which is conceived through the intension of something is not different from the thing preconceived but just that thing intensified. Since, then, we desire to con- 54 ceive a thing by way of intension of its narrowness from that which has a certain amount of breadth, we shall not conceive length which is entirely without breadth (for that is different in kind), but we shall apprehend a narrow breadth, so that the conception ends up in the very least amount of breadth, but still breadth all the same, and after this the notion in the mind passes into something different in nature, which is neither length nor breadth. And if it is possible to 55 apprehend length without breadth by privation of the breadth when we have conceived a certain length along with a certain amount of breadth, then it will be feasible in like manner when we have conceived flesh with the quality of vulnerability to conceive

ιδιώματος νοῆσαι ἄπρωτόν τε καὶ ἀπαθῆ ἰσάρκα,
 56 δυνατὸν δὲ ἔσται καὶ σῶμα νοήσαντας μετὰ
 ἀντιτύπου ιδιώματος στερήσει τῆς ἀντιτυπίας λα-
 βεῖν τι μὴ ἀντιτυποῦν σῶμα. ὅπερ τελέως ἔστιν
 ἀδύνατον καὶ παρὰ τὴν κοινὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων
 ἔννοιαν· τὸ γὰρ ἄπρωτον νοούμενον ἡμῖν οὐκέτι
 ἔστι σὰρξ, ἐπεὶπερ σὺν τῷ τρωτῷ ιδιώματι ἢ
 σὰρξ ἐνοεῖτο ὡς σὰρξ, καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀντιτυποῦν σῶ-
 μα οὐκέτι νοεῖται σῶμα· σὺν γὰρ τῷ ἀντιτύπῳ
 ιδιώματι ἐνοεῖτο τὸ σῶμα, καθὼ ἔστι σῶμα. ὅθεν
 καὶ τὸ νοούμενον μῆκος χωρὶς πλάτους οὐκ ἂν
 εἶη μῆκος· σὺν γὰρ τῷ ποσὸν ἔχειν πλάτος τὸ
 μῆκος ὡς μῆκος νοεῖται.

57 Ἄλλ' ὅ γε Ἀριστοτέλης, καίπερ ποικίλως κατα-
 σκευασθείσης τῆς τοῦ πράγματος ἀνεπινοησίας
 καὶ οὐκ ἐν ὀλίγῳ κειμένων ταραχῶ τῶν γεωμετρῶν,
 φησὶ μὴ ἀδιανόητον εἶναι τὸ ὑπὸ τούτων λεγόμενον
 μῆκος ἀπλατές, ἀλλὰ δύνασθαι χωρὶς πάσης περι-
 σκελείας εἰς ἔννοιαν ἡμῖν ἐλθεῖν. ἴσθησι δὲ τὸν
 λόγον ἐπὶ τινος ἐναργεστέρου ὑποδείγματος καὶ
 58 σαφοῦς. τὸ γοῦν τοῦ τοίχου μῆκος, φησὶ, λαμβά-
 νομεν μὴ συνεπιβάλλοντες αὐτοῦ τῷ πλάτει,
 διόπερ ἐνέσται καὶ τὸ παρὰ τοῖς γεωμέτραις
 λεγόμενον μῆκος χωρὶς πλάτους τινὸς ἐπινοεῖν,
 ἐπεὶπερ ὄψις τῶν ἀδήλων ἔστι τὰ φαινόμενα,
 πλανώμενος ἢ τάχα κατασοφίζόμενος ἡμᾶς. ὅταν
 γὰρ τὸ τοῦ τοίχου μῆκος χωρὶς πλάτους νοώμεν,
 οὐ χωρὶς παντὸς πλάτους αὐτοῦ νοοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ
 59 ὅθεν καὶ ἐνδέχεται συμπλέξαντας τὸ τοῦ τοίχου

* Cf. P.H. iii. 40.

ᵇ Cf. Adv. Phys. i. 412.

• Cf. § 23.

invulnerable and impassive flesh by privation of the
 quality of vulnerability; and it will be possible by 56
 conceiving body with the quality of solidity,^a and by
 privation of the solidity, to perceive a non-solid body.
 But this is perfectly impossible and contrary to the
 common notion of mankind. For that which we
 conceive as invulnerable is no longer flesh, for flesh
 includes the quality of vulnerability when conceived
 as flesh, and the non-solid body is no longer con-
 ceived as body, for body, *qua* body, is conceived as
 including the quality of solidity. Hence, the length
 conceived without breadth will not be length, for
 length, as length, is conceived as including the
 quality of having a certain amount of breadth.

But although the inconceivability of the thing has 57
 been established in a variety of ways, and the
 Geometers are in a state of no little confusion, yet
 Aristotle affirms that the length without breadth they
 talk of is not inconceivable but can come into our
 minds without any difficulty.^b He bases his argument
 on an obvious and clear example. Thus we perceive 58
 the length of a wall, he says, without thinking
 simultaneously of its breadth, and therefore it will
 be possible also to conceive of the "length without
 any breadth" talked of by the Geometers, seeing
 that "things evident are the vision of things non-
 evident"^c; but he is in error, or perhaps hum-
 bugging us. For whenever we conceive the length
 of the wall without breadth, we do not conceive it as
 wholly without breadth but without the breadth
 which belongs to the wall. And thus it is possible for 59
 us by combining the length of the wall with a certain

μηκός τινι πλάτει καὶ ὀψωδηποτοῦν νόησιν αὐτοῦ ποιεῖσθαι· ὥστε μήκος λαμβάνεσθαι τὰ νῦν οὐ χωρὶς παντὸς πλάτους, καθάπερ ἀξιούσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων, ἀλλὰ χωρὶς τοῦδέ τινος πλάτους. προύκειτο δὲ τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει παραστήσαι οὐχ ὅτι τινὸς πλάτους ἀμοιρεῖ τὸ κατὰ τοὺς γεωμέτρας λεγόμενον μήκος, ἀλλ' ὅτι παντὸς ἐστέρηται πλάτους· ὅπερ οὐκ ἀπέδειξεν.

- 60 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν περὶ τούτων· ἐπειδὴ δὲ οἱ γεωμέτραι καὶ πέρας ἐπιφανείας εἶναι λέγουσι τὴν γραμμὴν, ὃ ἐστὶ μήκος ἀπλατές, φέρε κοινότερον περὶ γραμμῶν ἅμα καὶ ἐπιφανειῶν διαπορώμεν· οὕτω γὰρ εὐδιάβλητος καὶ ὁ ἐπὶ τὸ σῶμα γενήσεται
- 61 λόγος· εἰ γὰρ ἡ γραμμὴ πέρας ἐστὶν ἐπιφανείας, μήκος ἀπλατές καθεστῶσα, δῆλον ὡς ὅταν ἐπιφάνεια ἐπιφάνεια παρατεθῆ, ἤτοι παράλληλοι γενήσονται δύο γραμμαὶ ἢ μία ἀμφοτέραι. καὶ εἰ μὲν μία αἱ δύο γραμμαὶ γίνονται, ἐπεὶ ἡ γραμμὴ πέρας ἐστὶν ἐπιφανείας, ἡ δὲ ἐπιφάνεια πέρας σώματος, τῶν μὲν δυοῖν γραμμῶν μιᾶς ἅμα γινομένων γενήσονται καὶ αἱ δύο ἐπιφάνειαι μία ἐπιφάνεια, τῶν δὲ δυοῖν ἐπιφανειῶν μιᾶς ἐπιφανείας γενηθεισῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔσται καὶ τὰ δύο σώματα ἐν σώμα, τῶν δὲ δυοῖν σωμάτων ἑνὸς γινομένων ἢ παράθεσις οὐκ ἔσται παράθεσις ἀλλ'
- 62 ἔνωσις. ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον. ἐπὶ τινῶν μὲν γὰρ σωμάτων δύναται ἡ παράθεσις ἔνωσις γίνεσθαι, καθάπερ ὕδατος καὶ τῶν εὐκότων τούτω, ἐπὶ τινῶν δὲ οὐδαμῶς· καὶ γὰρ λίθος λίθῳ παρατιθέμενος καὶ σίδηρος σιδήρῳ καὶ ἀδάμας ἀδάμαντι κατὰ γραμμὴν οὐχ ἐνοῦνται. ὥστε οὐκ ἂν γένοιντο αἱ δύο γραμμαὶ μία γραμμὴ. καὶ γὰρ
- 272

amount, however small, of breadth to form a conception of it ; so that in this case the length is perceived not without any breadth at all, as the Mathematicians claim, but without this particular breadth. But Aristotle's problem was to prove not that the length talked of by the Geometers is devoid of a certain breadth, but that it is wholly deprived of breadth ; and this he has not proved.

So much then, concerning these matters ; and seeing 60 that the Geometers declare that the line, which is "length without breadth," is also "the limit of the plane," come and let us raise doubts in a more general way concerning both lines and planes ; for thus the statement about body will become easy to refute. If, 61 then, the line, being length without breadth, is the limit of the plane, it is evident that when a plane is set beside a plane^a either the two lines will be parallel or both will become one. And if the two lines become one, since the line is the limit of the plane, and the plane the limit of the body, as the two lines become one the two planes also will simultaneously become one plane, and when the two planes have become one plane the two bodies also will necessarily be one body, and when the two bodies have become one, the juxtaposition will not be juxtaposition but unification.^b But this is impossible. For while 62 juxtaposition can become unification in some cases, as in that of water and things like it, in some cases it cannot ; for when stone is set beside stone and iron beside iron and adamant beside adamant they are not unified in respect of their lines. Consequently, the two lines will not become one line.—Moreover,

^a Cf. §§ 29 ff.

^b Cf. P.H. iii. 42 ; Adv. Phys. i. 260 ff.

ἄλλως, εἰ ἔνωσίς ἐστι τῶν δύο γραμμῶν μιᾶς
γενομένων καὶ σύμφυσις τῶν σωμάτων, ἔχρη τὸν
χωρισμὸν γίνεσθαι μὴ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ αὐτῶν πέρατα
ἀλλὰ κατὰ ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα μέρη ἀποσπωμένων,
ὥστε καὶ φθορὰν συμβαίνειν. οὐχὶ δέ γε τοῦτο
γινόμενον θεωρεῖται, ἀλλὰ τὰ πέρατα τῶν σωμάτων
καὶ πρὸ τῆς παραθέσεως καὶ μετὰ τὸν χωρισμὸν
τοιαῦτά ἐστιν ὅποια καὶ ἐν τῇ παραθέσει ὄντα
πρότερον ἐφαίνετο.¹ οὐ τοῖνυν αἱ δύο γραμμαὶ
63 μίᾳ γίνονται. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' εἴπερ αἱ δύο γραμμαὶ
μίᾳ γίνονται, δεήσει τὰ παρατιθέμενα ἀλλήλοις
σώματα ἐνὶ ἄκρῳ ἐλάσσω εἶναι· γεγόνασι γὰρ αἱ
δύο μίᾳ, ἥτις ἐν ἔχειν ὀφείλει πέρασ τε καὶ ἄκρον.
οὐχὶ δέ γε τὰ παρατιθέμενα ἀλλήλοις σώματα
ἐνὶ ἄκρῳ γίνεται ἐλάσσονα, ὥστε αἱ δύο γραμμαὶ
64 οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο μίᾳ γραμμῇ. εἰ δὲ παράλληλοι
γίνονται δύο γραμμαὶ κατὰ παράθεσιν δυοῖν
σωμάτων, τὸ ἐκ τῶν δυοῖν γραμμῶν μείζον ἔσται
τῆς μιᾶς γραμμῆς. εἰ δὲ τὸ ἐκ τῶν δυοῖν γινόμενον
γραμμῶν μείζον ἐστὶ τῆς μιᾶς γραμμῆς,
ἔχει ἂν ἑκάτερα αὐτῶν πλάτος, ὃ μεθ' ἑτέρας
μείζονα ποιεῖ τὴν διάστασιν, καὶ οὕτως οὐκ ἔστιν
ἀπλατὲς μῆκος ἢ γραμμῇ. δυοῖν οὖν θάτερον, ἢ
ἀναιρεῖν δεῖ τὴν ἐνάργειαν, ἢ μενούσης ταύτης
ἀθετεῖν τὴν τῶν γεωμετρῶν ἐπίνοιαν, καθ' ἣν
οἴονται τὴν γραμμὴν μῆκος ἀπλατὲς ὑπάρχειν.
65 Καὶ δὴ ταῦτα μὲν προηγουμένως ῥητέον ἐστὶν
ἡμῖν πρὸς τὰς τῆς γεωμετρίας ἀρχάς· μεταβάντες
δὲ διδάσκωμεν ὅτι καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐκείνων αὐτῶν
ὑποθέσεις οὐχ οἰὸν τε προβαίνειν τὴν ζήτησιν.
ἀρέσκει τοῖνυν αὐτοῖς τὴν εὐθεΐαν γραμμῆν, ὡς

¹ ἐφαίνετο cj. Bekk. : ἐφαίνοντο mss., Bekk.

if there is unification of the two lines which have become one and natural junction of the bodies, the separation ought to take place when they are pulled asunder, not at the same limits but now at one part and now at another, so that as a result they perish. This, however, is not found to occur, but the limits of the bodies both before the juxtaposition and after the separation are just the same as they originally appeared to be during the juxtaposition. So the two lines do not become one.—If, however, the two 63 lines do become one, the bodies set beside each other will have to be less by one extremity; for the two have become one, and this must have one limit and extremity. But the bodies set beside each other do not become less by one extremity, so that the two lines will not become one line.—And if the two lines 64 are parallel in the juxtaposition of two bodies, that which results from the two lines will be greater than the one line. But if that which results from the two lines is greater than the one line, one of the two will have breadth, which along with the other will make the dimension greater, and thus the line is not length without breadth.—Of two things one, then,—we must either do away with the evidence of the senses, or, if this remains unshaken, we must disallow the notion of the Geometers which leads them to suppose that the line is “length without breadth.”

This, then, is what we have primarily had to say 65 against the Geometers' principles; so now let us pass on and show that on their own assumptions it is not possible for their investigation to go forward. Thus, they are fain to believe, as we said above,^a that the

^a Cf. § 26.

καὶ ἀνώτερον ἐλέγομεν, στρεφομένην πᾶσιν αὐτῆς τοῖς μέρεσι κύκλους γράφειν· ὥπερ θεωρήματι ὄντι συνεκτικωτάτῳ μαχόμενον ἔστι τὸ τὴν γραμ-
 66 μὴν μῆκος ἀπλατῆς ὑπάρχειν. ζητῶμεν δὲ τὸν τρόπον τούτου. εἰ γὰρ κατ' αὐτοὺς πᾶν μέρος τῆς γραμμῆς ἔχει σημεῖον, τὸ δὲ σημεῖον στρεφό-
 μενον κύκλον γράφει, δεῖσει κατ' αὐτούς, ὅταν ἡ εὐθεῖα γραμμὴ στρεφομένη καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἑαυτῆς μέρεσι κυκλογραφοῦσα τὸ διάστημα καταμετρήῃ τὸ τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ κέντρου μέχρι τῆς ἐξωτάτω περι-
 φερείας ἐπιπέδου, τότε ἦτοι συνεχεῖς ἀλλήλοις ὑπάρχων τούς καταγραφομένους κύκλους ἢ δι-
 67 εστώτας ἀπ' ἀλλήλων. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν διεστώσιν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, ἀκολουθήσει μέρος τι εἶναι τῆς ἐπιπέδου τὸ μὴ κυκλογραφούμενον, καὶ τῆς εὐθείας μέρος τὸ κατὰ τούτου μὲν φερόμενον τοῦ διαστήματος, μὴ κυκλογραφοῦν δέ. ὅπερ ἔστιν ἀτοπον. ἡ γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος σημεῖον ἢ εὐθεῖα γραμμῆ, ἢ ἔχουσα οὐ καταγράφει κύκλον, ὦν ἐκάτερον παρὰ τὸν γεωμετρικόν ἔστι λόγον· καὶ πᾶν γὰρ μέρος τῆς γραμμῆς σημεῖον ἔχειν φασί,
 68 καὶ πᾶν σημεῖον στρεφόμενον κυκλογραφεῖν. εἰ δὲ συνεχεῖς ἀλλήλοις ὑπάρχειν οἴονται τοὺς κύκλους, ἦτοι οὕτως εἰσὶ συνεχεῖς ὡς τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπέχειν τόπον, ἢ ὥστε ἄλλον παρ' ἄλλον τετάχθαι μηδενὸς σημείου μεταξύ πίπτοντος· πᾶν γὰρ σημεῖον τὸ μεταξύ κατ' ἐπίνοιαν πίπτον ὀφείλει καὶ αὐτὸ κύκλον γράφειν. καὶ εἰ μὲν τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπέχουσι τόπον πάντες, εἰς γενήσεται κύκλος, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τῷ ἐλαχίστῳ κύκλῳ καὶ πρὸς τῷ κέντρῳ καθ-
 εστώτι ὁ μείζων καὶ ἐξωτάτῳ καὶ πάντων περι-
 69 ληπτικὸς καθεστῶς κύκλος ἴσος γενήσεται· εἰ γὰρ

straight line by revolving describes circles with all its parts ; but the view that the line is length without breadth is in conflict with this most convincing theorem. Let us probe the matter in this way. If, 66 as they say, every part of the line has a sign, and the sign as it revolves describes a circle, then, whenever the straight line by revolving and describing circles with all its parts measures off the distance from the centre to the outermost circumference of the plane, it will be necessary, according to them, that the circles described should be either continuous with one another or separate from one another. But if they are 67 separate from one another it will follow that there is a certain part of the plane which is not encircled, and a part of the straight line which moves over this interval but does not describe a circle. But this is absurd. For either the straight line has no sign in this part, or having one does not describe a circle ; but each of these alternatives is contrary to geometrical doctrine ; for they assert that every part of the line has a sign, and also that every sign when revolving describes a circle. And if they suppose 68 that the circles are continuous with one another, they are continuous either in such a way as to occupy the same place or so as to be ranged in order one beside another with no sign falling between ; for every sign which is conceived as falling between must of itself describe a circle. But if they all occupy the same place, there will be one circle, and therefore the circle which is greater and outermost and inclusive of them all will be equal to the smallest circle which is at

ὁ μὲν ἔξωτάτῳ κύκλος καὶ πρὸς αὐτῇ τῇ περι-
 φερεία μείζον ἐπέχει διάστημα καὶ ὁ ἐσωτάτῳ
 πρὸς τῷ κέντρῳ κύκλος μικρὸν ἐπέχει διάστημα,
 πάντες δὲ οἱ κύκλοι τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπέχουσι τόπον, ὁ
 τὸ μείζον ἐπέχων διάστημα ἴσος γενήσεται τῷ
 <τὸ>¹ ἐλάχιστον ἐπέχοντι διάστημα· ὅπερ ἐστὶν
 ἀπεμφαῖνον. οὐ τοίνυν οὕτως εἰσὶ συνεχεῖς οἱ
 70 κύκλοι ὡς τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον ἐπέχουν. εἰ δὲ παράλ-
 ληλοι τυγχάνουσιν ὥστε μεταξύ τι μὴ πίπτειν
 ἀμερές σημεῖον, συμπληρώσουσι τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ κέν-
 τρου μέχρι τῆς περιφερείας πλάτος. εἰ δὲ γε
 συμπληρώσουσιν, ἐπέχουσι τι πλάτος. ἦσαν δὲ
 γε οὗτοι γραμμαί. αἱ ἄρα γραμμαὶ ἔχουσι τι
 πλάτος καὶ οὐκ ἀπλατεῖς καθεστήκασιν.

71 Ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς αὐτῆς δυνάμεως ὀρμώμενοι ὁμοί-
 τροπον τῇ προαποδοθείσῃ συνθήσομεν ἐπιχείρησιν.
 ἐπεὶ γὰρ φασὶ τὴν κυκλογραφοῦσαν εὐθείαν γραμ-
 μὴν δι' ἑαυτῆς τὸν κύκλον καταγράφειν, συνερω-
 τῶντες αὐτοὺς φήσομεν, εἰ ἢ κυκλογραφοῦσα
 εὐθεῖα γραμμὴ δι' ἑαυτῆς τὸν κύκλον καταγράφειν
 πέφυκεν, οὐκ ἐστὶ μῆκος ἀπλατῆς ἢ γραμμῆ· ἀλλὰ
 μὴν ἢ κυκλογραφοῦσα εὐθεῖα γραμμὴ δι' ἑαυτῆς
 τὸν κύκλον καταγράφει, ὡς ἐκεῖνοι φασίν· οὐκ
 ἄρα μῆκός ἐστιν ἀπλατῆς ἢ γραμμῆ, ὡς ἡμεῖς
 72 τοῦτο ἀκόλουθον ὃν ἐκείνοις διδάξομεν. ὅταν
 γὰρ ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ κέντρου ἀγομένη εὐθεῖα στρέφηται
 καὶ δι' ἑαυτῆς καταγράφῃ κύκλον, τότε ἦτοι κατὰ
 πάντων τῶν μερῶν τοῦ ἐντὸς τῆς περιφερείας
 πλάτους φέρεται ἢ εὐθεῖα γραμμῆ, ἢ οὐ κατὰ
 πάντων ἀλλὰ κατὰ τινῶν. καὶ εἰ μὲν κατὰ τινῶν
 φέρεται, οὐδὲ καταγράφει κύκλον, καθ' ὧν μὲν
 μερῶν φερομένη καθ' ὧν δὲ οὐ. εἰ δὲ κατὰ πάντων

the centre; for if the outermost circle, that which is on 69
 the very circumference, occupies a greater distance,
 and the innermost circle at the centre occupies a little
 distance, and all the circles occupy the same place,
 then that which occupies the greater distance will be
 equal to that which occupies the least distance,—
 which is absurd. So, then, the circles are not contin-
 uous in such a way as to occupy the same place.
 And if they are parallel so that no indivisible sign falls 70
 between, they will fill up the breadth from the centre
 to the circumference. But if they fill it up, they
 occupy some breadth. Yet these circles are lines.
 Lines, therefore, possess a certain breadth and are
 not “without breadth.”

Starting with the same theory we shall construct 71
 a confutation similar to that already stated. Since
 they assert that the straight line which describes a
 circle describes the circle of itself, we shall reply with
 the objection,—if the straight line which describes a
 circle is by nature such as to describe the circle of
 itself, the line is not length without breadth; but in
 fact, as they assert, the straight line which describes
 a circle does describe the circle of itself; therefore
 the line is not length without breadth, this being the
 consequence of their theory, as we shall show. For 72
 when the straight line drawn from the centre revolves
 and of itself describes a circle, the straight line then
 either moves over all the parts of the breadth within
 the circumference, or not over all but over some.
 And if it moves over some, it does not describe a
 circle, as it moves over some parts but not over others.

¹ <τὸ> add. cj. Bekk.

φέρεται, ὅλον τὸ τῆς περιφερείας καταμετρήσει
 73 πλάτος, πλάτος δὲ καταμετρούσα ἔξει πλάτος· τὸ
 γὰρ τοῦ πλάτους καταμετρητικὸν ὀφείλει πλάτος
 ἔχειν, ὧ καταμετρεῖ. εἰ ἄρα ἡ¹ εὐθεία γραμμὴ
 κυκλογραφοῦσα² ὅλον καταμετρεῖ τὸ πλάτος <καὶ
 ἔχει πλάτος>,³ [καὶ] οὐκ ἔστι μῆκος ἀπλατὲς ἢ
 γραμμῆ.

74 Τὸ δ' αὐτὸ σαφέστερον δειχθήσεται καὶ ὅταν
 λέγωσιν οἱ γεωμέτραι τὴν πλάγιον τοῦ τετραγώνου
 πλευρὰν καταγομένην τὸ παραλληλόγραμμον ἐπί-
 πεδον καταμετρεῖν. εἴπερ γὰρ μῆκος ἀπλατὲς
 ἔστιν ἢ πλάγιος πλευρὰ τοῦ τετραγώνου κατ-
 αγομένη, οὐ καταμετρήσει τὸ παραλληλόγραμμον
 ἐπίπεδον τοῦ τετραγώνου δι' ἑαυτῆς· τὸ γὰρ κατα-
 μετρητικὸν πλάτους ὀφείλει πλάτος ἔχειν. εἰ δὲ
 καταμετρεῖ, πάντως πλάτος ἔχει. ὥστε πάλιν ἢ
 τοῦτο τὸ θεώρημα ψεῦδος εἶναι τοῖς γεωμέτραις,
 ἢ μηδὲν ὑπάρχειν τὸ νοούμενον μῆκος ἀπλατὲς.

75 Τὸν τε κύλινδρον φασὶ κατ' εὐθείαν γραμμὴν
 ἄπτεσθαι τῆς ἐπιπέδου καὶ ἐκκυλιόμενον τῇ ἀνά-
 μέρος ἄλλων καὶ ἄλλων εὐθειῶν θέσει καταμετρεῖν
 τὴν ἐπίπεδον. ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ κατ' εὐθείαν ἄπτεται
 τῆς ἐπιπέδου ὁ κύλινδρος καὶ κυλιόμενος τῇ ἀνά-
 μέρος ἄλλων καὶ ἄλλων εὐθειῶν θέσει καταμετρεῖ
 τὴν ἐπίπεδον, πάντως καὶ ἢ ἐπίπεδος συνέστηκεν
 ἐξ εὐθειῶν καὶ ἢ ἐπιφάνεια τοῦ κυλίνδρου πάλιν
 76 ἐξ εὐθειῶν πεπλήρωται. ὅθεν ἐπεὶ ἔχει καὶ ἢ
 ἐπίπεδος πλάτος καὶ ἢ ἐπιφάνεια τοῦ κυλίνδρου
 ὁμοίως, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπλατῆς, τὸ δὲ πλάτους

¹ εἰ ἄρα ἢ Heintz : ἢ ἄρα mss., Bekk.

² κυκλογραφοῦσα Heintz : κυκλοφοροῦσα mss., Bekk.

³ (καὶ ἔχει πλάτος) addidi.

And if it moves over all, it will measure out all the
 breadth of the circumference, and measuring out 73
 breadth it will possess breadth; for that which is
 capable of measuring out breadth must possess
 breadth wherewith it measures. Therefore, if the
 straight line in describing a circle measures out all
 the breadth and possesses breadth, the line is not
 "length without breadth."

The same thing will be shown more clearly when 74
 the Geometers state that when the downward side
 of the square is drawn it measures out the plane
 bounded by the parallel lines. For if it is length
 without breadth, the downward side of the square
 when drawn will not of itself measure out the plane
 surface of the square bounded by the parallel lines;
 for that which is capable of measuring out a breadth
 must possess breadth. And if it measures out, it
 certainly possesses breadth. So that, once again,
 either this theorem of the Geometers is false, or the
 concept "length without breadth" is nothing.

Also, they say that the cylinder touches the plane 75
 along a straight line and when rolling forward, by
 the placing of straight lines in turn, one after an-
 other, measures out the plane. But if the cylinder
 touches the plane along a straight line and when
 rolling measures out the plane by placing its straight
 lines in turn, one after another, the plane certainly
 is composed of straight lines and the surface of the
 cylinder, too, is made up of straight lines. Hence, 76
 since the plane possesses breadth, and the surface
 of the cylinder likewise is not without breadth, and

ποιητικὸν ὀφείλει καὶ αὐτὸ πλάτος ἔχειν, δῆλον οὖν ὡς ὅτι καὶ αἱ εὐθείαι γραμμαὶ συμπληρωτικαὶ οὐσαι τοῦ πλάτους ἐξ ἀνάγκης πλάτος ἔχουσιν, ὥστε μηδὲν εἶναι μῆκος ἀπλατές, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο μηδὲ γραμμῆν.

- 77 Εἰ δὲ καὶ δοίημεν τὴν γραμμὴν μῆκος εἶναι ἀπλατές, τὰ ἀκόλουθα τούτοις ἔτι τούτων ἀπορώτερα. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ σημεῖον ῥυὲν ποιεῖ γραμμῆν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ γραμμὴ ῥυεῖσα ποιεῖ ἐπιφάνειαν κατ' αὐτούς, ἥτις ἐστὶ, φασί, πέρασ σώματος δύο
- 78 ἔχον διαστάσεις, μῆκος καὶ πλάτος. εὔπερ οὖν ἡ ἐπιφάνεια πέρασ ἐστὶ σώματος, τό γε σῶμα πάντως πεπερασμένον ἐστίν· καὶ εἰ τοῦτο, ὅτε παρατίθεται δύο σώματα ἀλλήλοις, τότε ἦτοι τὰ πέρατα τῶν περάτων ἢ τὰ πεπερατωμένα τῶν πεπερατωμένων ἄψεται, ἢ καὶ τὰ πεπερατωμένα τῶν πεπερατωμένων καὶ τὰ πέρατα τῶν περάτων, οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀμφορέως, εἰ νοήσαιμεν πέρασ μὲν τὸ ἔξωθεν ὄστρακον πεπερατωμένον δὲ τὸν ἐν αὐτῷ οἶνον. δυοῖν οὖν ἀμφορέων παραβληθέντων
- 79 ἀλλήλοις ἦτοι τὸ ὄστρακον τοῦ ὄστράκου ἄψεται ἢ ὁ οἶνος τοῦ οἴνου ἢ καὶ τὸ ὄστρακον τοῦ ὄστράκου καὶ ὁ οἶνος τοῦ οἴνου. καὶ εἰ μὲν τὰ πέρατα τῶν περάτων ἄπτται, τὰ πεπερατωμένα ἀλλήλων οὐχ ἄψεται, τουτέστι τὰ σώματα, ὅπερ ἦν ἀπεμφαίνον. εἰ δὲ τὰ πεπερατωμένα μὲν ἀλλήλων ἄψεται, τουτέστι τὰ σώματα, τὰ πέρατα δὲ ἀλλήλων οὐχ ἄψεται, ἐκτὸς ἔσται τὰ σώματα τῶν οἰκείων
- 80 περάτων. εἰ δὲ καὶ τὰ πέρατα τῶν περάτων ἄπτται καὶ τὰ πεπερατωμένα τῶν πεπερατωμένων, ἐπισυνθήσομεν τὰς ἀπορίας· ἢ μὲν γὰρ τὰ πέρατα

what is productive of breadth must itself possess breadth, it is plain that the straight lines too, as they serve to fill up the breadth, necessarily possess breadth, so that no "length without breadth" exists, and consequently no line.

And even if we should grant that the line is 77 "length without breadth," the consequences of this will be even more hopeless than those stated. For as the sign when it has flowed ^a makes the line, so also the line when it has flowed makes, according to them, the plane, which is, they say, "the limit of the body," possessing two dimensions, length and breadth. If, then, the plane is the limit of the body, 78 the body certainly is limited; and if so, when two bodies are set beside each other, then either the limits will touch the limits or the things limited the things limited, or the things limited will touch the things limited and also the limits the limits,—as though, in the case of a jar, we were to conceive the external earthenware as the limit, and the wine 79 within it as the thing limited.^b When, then, two jars are set beside each other, either the ware will touch the ware or the wine the wine, or the ware will touch the ware and also the wine the wine. But if the limits touch the limits the things limited (that is, the bodies) will not touch each other, which is absurd. And if the things limited (that is, the bodies) shall touch each other, and the limits shall not touch each other, the bodies will be outside their own limits. And if both the limits touch the limits and the things 80 limited the things limited, we shall be multiplying the difficulties; for where the limits touch each other,

^a Cf. § 29; *Adv. Phys.* i. 376.

^b Cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 431.

ἀλλήλων ἄπτεται, τὰ πεπερατωμένα οὐχ ἄψεται ἀλλήλων, ἢ δὲ τὰ πεπερατωμένα, ἐκτὸς ἔσται τὰ σώματα τῶν οἰκείων περάτων, ἐπεὶ πέρασ μὲν 81 ἔστιν ἢ ἐπιφάνεια, πεπερασμένον δὲ τὸ σῶμα. τὰ τε πέρατα σώματά ἐστιν ἢ ἀσώματα. καὶ εἰ μὲν σώματά ἐστι, ψεῦδος ἔσται τοῖς γεωμέτραις τὸ ἀβαθῆ εἶναι τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν. εἰ γὰρ σῶμά ἐστιν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔξει καὶ βάθος· πᾶν γὰρ σῶμα ὀφείλει βάθος ἔχειν. εἶτα οὐδὲ ἄψεται τινος, ἀλλὰ πᾶν ἔσται ἀπειρομέγεθες. εἰ γὰρ σῶμά ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ πᾶν σῶμα πέρασ ἔχει, κάκεῖνο τὸ πέρασ σῶμα ὃν ἔξει πέρασ, κάκεῖνο ὁμοίως, καὶ τοῦτ' εἰς 82 ἄπειρον. εἰ δὲ ἀσώματόν ἐστι τὸ πέρασ, ἐπεὶ τὸ ἀσώματον οὐδενὸς δύναται θιγεῖν οὐδὲ θιχθῆναι, τὰ πέρατα οὐχ ἄψεται ἀλλήλων, τούτων δὲ μὴ ἀπτομένων οὐδὲ τὰ πεπερατωμένα ἄψεται ἀλλήλων. κἂν δῶμεν οὖν εἶναι μῆκος ἀπλατὲς τὴν γραμμὴν, ὁ περὶ τῆς ἐπιφανείας λόγος ἄπορος ἔστί. οἷς, κἂν ἡμεῖς μὴ λέγωμεν, ἀπόροις οὖσι συναπορεῖται καὶ τὸ στερεὸν σῶμα, ἐκ τούτων σύνθετον καθεστῶς.

83 Σκοπῶμεν δὲ καὶ οὕτως. εἰ γὰρ σῶμά ἐστιν, ὡς φασὶν οἱ γεωμέτραι, τὸ τὰς τρεῖς ἔχον διαστάσεις, μῆκος πλάτος βάθος, ἤτοι χωριστόν ἐστι τούτων τὸ σῶμα, ὥστε ἄλλο μὲν εἶναι τὸ σῶμα ἄλλο δὲ τὸ μῆκος τοῦ σώματος πλάτος τε καὶ βάθος, ἢ ὁ ἀθροισμὸς τούτων ἐστὶ τὸ σῶμα. ἀλλὰ χωρίζεσθαι μὲν τούτων τὸ σῶμα οὐ πιθανόν ἐστιν· ὅπου γὰρ μήτε μῆκος ἔστι μήτε πλάτος μήτε 84 βάθος, ἐκεῖ οὐχ οἷόν τε νοῆσαι σῶμα· εἰ δὲ ὁ

the things limited will not touch each other, and where the things limited touch, the bodies will be outside their own limits, since the surface is the limit and the body the thing limited.—Also, the limits are 81 either bodies or incorporeal. But if they are bodies, the Geometers will find that it is false that the surface is without depth. For if it is corporeal, it will of necessity have depth; for every body must have depth. Then, too, it will not touch anything but will all be infinite in magnitude. For if it is body, since every body has a limit, that limit too, being a body, will have a limit, and likewise this last one, and so on *ad infinitum*. And if the limit is incorporeal, since 82 the incorporeal cannot touch or be touched by anything,^a the limits will not touch each other, and as they do not touch neither will the things limited touch each other. So, even if we grant that the line is “length without breadth,” the account given of the plane surface is dubious. And these things being dubious, along with them doubt is cast—even if we do not affirm it—on the solid body, seeing it is composed of these.

Let us also consider the matter in this way:—If 83 body is, as the Geometers assert, that which has the three dimensions, length, breadth and depth, either the body is separable from these, so that the body is one thing and the length, breadth and depth of the body something different, or else the aggregation of these is the body. But that the body should be separated from these is not credible; for where neither length nor breadth nor depth exists, there it is impossible to conceive body; and if the aggrega- 84

^a Cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 255; “tangere enim et tangi nisi corpus nulla potest res,” *Lucret.* i. 304.

ἀθροισμὸς τούτων νοεῖται σῶμα καὶ ἄλλο παρὰ
 ταῦτα οὐδὲν ὑπάρχει, ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἐπεὶ ἕκαστον
 τούτων ἀσώματόν ἐστι, καὶ ἡ κοινὴ τῶν ἀσωμά-
 των σύνοδος γενήσεται ἀσώματος. ὡς περ γὰρ
 ἡ σύνθεσις τῶν στιγμῶν καὶ ἡ σύνοδος τῶν γραμμῶν
 ἀσωμάτων φύσει καθεστηκυῶν οὐ ποιεῖ
 στερεὸν καὶ ἀντίτυπον σῶμα, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τοῦ
 πλάτους καὶ ἡ τοῦ μήκους ἐτι δὲ καὶ ἡ τοῦ βάθους
 συνέλευσις ἀσώματος οὔσα οὐκ ἂν ποιῆσαι στερεὸν
 καὶ ἀντίτυπον σῶμα. εἰ δὲ μήτε χωρὶς τούτων
 ἐστὶ τὸ σῶμα μήτε ταῦτ' ἐστίν, ἀνεπινόητον,
 ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς γεωμέτραις, γίνεται τὸ σῶμα.
 85 πρὸς τούτοις, εἴπερ μήκους καὶ πλάτους καὶ
 βάθους σύνοδος ποιεῖ σῶμα, ἥτοι πρὶν τῆς συνόδου
 ἕκαστον τούτων νοεῖται περιέχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὴν
 σωματότητα καὶ τοὺς ὡς περ σωματικούς λόγους,
 ἢ μετὰ τὴν τούτων συνέλευσιν ἐπισυνέστη τὸ σῶμα.
 καὶ εἰ μὲν ἕκαστον τούτων πρὶν τῆς συνόδου
 νοεῖται περιεκτικὸν τῆς σωματότητος, ἔσται τού-
 των ἕκαστον σῶμα καὶ οὐ μετὰ τὴν σύνοδον
 86 αὐτῶν ἐκεῖνο γενήσεται. εἴτ' ἐπεὶ τὸ σῶμα οὐ
 μήκος μόνον ἐστίν, οὐδὲ πλάτος κατ' ἴδιαν, οὐδὲ
 βάθος κατὰ περιγραφὴν, ἀλλ' ὁμοσε τὰ τρία, καὶ
 μήκος καὶ πλάτος καὶ βάθος, τούτων τε ἕκαστον
 περιεῖχε τὴν σωματότητα, ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἔξει
 τὰ τρία, καὶ τὸ μήκος οὐ μόνον ἔσται μήκος ἀλλὰ
 καὶ πλάτος καὶ βάθος, καὶ τὸ πλάτος οὐ μόνον
 ἔσται πλάτος ἀλλὰ καὶ μήκος καὶ βάθος, καὶ τὸ
 βάθος ὁμοίως ἔσται καὶ μήκος καὶ πλάτος. ὅπερ
 87 τελῶς ἐστὶν ἀλογώτατον. εἰ δὲ συνελθόντων
 τούτων τότε νοεῖται ἡ σύστασις τοῦ σώματος,
 ἥτοι συνελθόντων αὐτῶν μένει ἡ ἀρχῆθεν φύσις

tion of these is conceived as body, and there is
 nothing else besides these, then, since each of these
 is incorporeal, the united assemblage of these in-
 corporeals will necessarily be incorporeal. For just
 as the combination of the points and the conjunc-
 tion of the lines, which are by nature incorporeal,
 do not make a solid and resistant body, so too the
 union of breadth and length, and depth as well,
 being incorporeal, will not make a solid and resistant
 body. But if the body is neither separate from these
 nor identical with these, the body is—so far as the
 Geometers' account goes—inconceivable.—Further- 85
 more, if the conjunction of length and breadth and
 depth makes body, either each of these is conceived
 as containing in itself corporeality and what we may
 call "the corporeal reasons" before the conjunction,
 or else body is constructed after these have come
 together. But if each of these is conceived as con-
 taining corporeality before the conjunction, each of
 these will be body, and body will not come into being
 after the conjunction.—Moreover, since body is not 86
 length alone, nor breadth by itself, nor exclusively
 depth, but the three together, length and breadth and
 depth, and each of these includes corporeality, each
 of them will possess the three, and the length will be
 not length only but also breadth and depth, and the
 breadth will be not breadth only but also length and
 depth, and similarly the depth will also be length and
 breadth. But this is most completely illogical.—
 And if the composition of body is conceived as taking 87
 place after these have come together, then either the
 original nature of those things which have come

τοῦ μὲν μήκους ὡς μήκους, τοῦ δὲ πλάτους ὡς πλάτους, τοῦ δὲ βάθους ὡς βάθους, ἢ μεταβέ-
 88 βληκεν εἰς τὴν σωματότητα. καὶ εἰ μὲν μένει ἢ ἀρχῆθεν αὐτῶν φύσις, ἐπεὶ ἀσώματα ἔστιν, οὐδὲ διάφορον ποιήσει σῶμα, ἀλλὰ καὶ μετὰ τὴν σύν-
 89 οδον ἀσώματα μενεῖ, τὴν φύσιν ὄντα ἀσώματα. εἰ δὲ συνελθόντα μεταβάλλει εἰς τὴν σωματότητα, ἐπεὶ τὸ ἐπιδεχόμενον μεταβολὴν εὐθέως ἔστι σῶμα, ἕκαστον τούτων καὶ πρὶν τῆς εἰς ταῦτο συνόδου ἔσται σῶμα, οὕτω τε καὶ τὸ ἀσώματον γενήσεται σῶμα. ὥσπερ τε τὸ σῶμα μεταβαλὼν ἄλλην μὲν ἀντ' ἄλλης ἔχει ποιότητα, μένει δὲ οὐδὲν ἥσσον σῶμα, ὅλον τὸ λευκόν, ἵνα μέλαν γένηται, καὶ τὸ γλυκύ, ἵνα πικρὸν, καὶ ὁ οἶνος, ἵνα ὄξος, καὶ ὁ μάλυβδος, ἵνα ψιμμύθιον, καὶ ὁ χαλκός, ἵνα ἰός, ἄλλην μὲν ἀντ' ἄλλης ἀναδέχεται ποιότητα, οὐκ
 90 ἐκβαίνει δὲ τοῦ σώματα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ μέλαν, ὅτε ἐκ λευκοῦ γέγονε μέλαν, καὶ τὸ πικρὸν, ὅτε ἐκ τοῦ γλυκέος γέγονε πικρὸν, καὶ τὸ ὄξος, ὅτε ἐκ τοῦ οἴνου γέγονεν ὄξος, μένει σώματα, οὕτω καὶ ταῦτα, εἴπερ μεταβάλλει [εἰς σώματα],¹ ἀλλὰ μὲν ἀντ' ἄλλων ἔσται ἀσώματα, ἀσώματα² δὲ οὐδὲν ἤττον· οὐ γὰρ ἐκβήσεται τὴν ἰδίαν φύσιν. εἰ οὖν οὔτε πρὶν τῆς συνελύσεως τούτων ἔστι νοῆσαι τὸ σῶμα οὔτε μετὰ τὴν συνέλευσιν αὐτῶν, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλως ἐπινοῆσαι, οὐδὲν
 91 ἔστι σῶμα. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, εἰ μηδὲν ἔστι μήκος μηδὲ πλάτος μηδὲ βάθος, οὐδὲ τὸ κατὰ μετουσίαν τούτων νοούμενον ἔσται σῶμα· οὐχὶ δὲ γε μήκος ἔστιν οὐδὲ πλάτος οὐδὲ βάθος, ὡς διὰ τῶν ἐμ-

¹ εἰς σώματα seclusi.

² ἀσώματα, ἀσώματα Heintz : σώματα, σώματα MSS., Bekk.

together remains,—that of length as length, of breadth as breadth, of depth as depth,—or it is changed to corporeality.^a But if their original 88 nature remains, since they are incorporeal they will not form a different body, but even after their conjunction they will remain incorporeal, being incorporeal by nature. And if after coming together they 89 change to corporeality, then, since that which admits of change is *ipso facto* corporeal, each of these will be body even before their coming together, and thus too the incorporeal will be body.—Also, just as the body when it has changed exchanges one property for another, but none the less remains body,—for example, white to become black, and sweet to become bitter, and wine to become vinegar, and lead to become white lead, and bronze to become rust, exchange one property for another yet do not cease to be bodies, but the black, when from being white it 90 has become black, and the bitter, when from being sweet it has become bitter, and the vinegar, when from being wine it has become vinegar, all remain bodies,—so these dimensions also, if they change, will change from one sort of incorporeal to another, but none the less (will remain) incorporeal; for they will not go out of their own proper nature.—If, then, it is not possible to conceive the body either before the coming together of these dimensions or after their coming together, and besides these no other alternative can be conceived, body is nothing.—And 91 further, if neither length is anything, nor breadth, nor depth, that which is conceived as participating in these will not be body; but length is not anything, nor is breadth, nor depth, as we have already pointed

^a Cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 371 ff.

προσθεν παρεμυθησάμεθα· οὐδὲ τὸ κατὰ μετουσίαν
ἀρα τούτων νοούμενον ἔσται σώμα.

92 Τὰς μὲν οὖν γεωμετρικὰς ἀρχὰς οὕτω συμβέβη-
κεν ἀνυποστάτους εἶναι· τούτων δὲ ἀναιρουμένων
οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι γεωμετρικὸν θεώρημα συστήναι
δύναται. ὁποῖον γὰρ ἂν ᾗ τοῦτο, γραμμικῶς
ὀφείλει ἀποδείκνυσθαι, ἐδείξαμεν δὲ ἡμεῖς ὅτι
οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἡ γενικὴ γραμμὴ, ᾧ ἀκολουθεῖ μηδὲ
τῶν ἐπ' εἴδους τινὰ ὑπάρχειν, εἴαν τε εὐθείαν τις
ταύτην ὑποτίθεται εἴαν τε κεκλασμένην εἴαν τε
93 ἄλλως πως ἔχουσιν. ὅθεν ἤρκει μὲν ἴσως ἐν
τούτοις περατοῦν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς γεωμέτρους
ἀντίρρησην· ὅμως δὲ ἐπαγωνιζόμενοι πειρασόμεθα
διδάσκειν ὅτι κὰν τῶν ἀρχῶν ἀποστῶμεν τῶν
τῆς γεωμετρίας, οὐ δύναται θεώρημα συστήσασθαι
94 οἱ γεωμέτραι οὐδ' ἀποδείξαι. καίτοι πρὶν τούτων
καὶ πρὸς τὰς ὑποβεβηκυίας αὐτῶν ἀρχὰς οὐκ
ὀλίγα δυνατόν ἐστι λέγειν, οἷον ὅταν φῶσιν εὐθείαν
εἶναι γραμμὴν τὴν ἐξ ἴσου τοῖς ἐαυτῆς μέρεσι
κειμένην. ἵνα γὰρ τὰ ἄλλα παρῶμεν, ἐκείνο μὲν
συμφανές ἐστιν ὅτι τῆς γενικῆς γραμμῆς μὴ οὔσης
οὐδὲ εὐθεία γραμμὴ γένοιτ' ἂν· ὡς γὰρ ζῶου μὴ
ὄντος οὐδὲ ἀνθρώπου ἔστι καὶ ἀνθρώπου μὴ ὄντος
οὐδὲ Σωκράτους ἔστιν, οὕτω τῆς γενικῆς ἀναιρου-
μένης γραμμῆς συνανήρηται καὶ ἡ ἐπίπεδος εὐθεία
95 γραμμὴ. εἶτα καὶ τὸ ἴσον λέγεται διχῶς, κατὰ
ἓνα μὲν τρόπον τὸ ἰσομέγεθες καὶ μήτε ὑπερέχον
ἐκείνου τοῦ ᾧ λέγεται ἴσον μήτε ὑπερεχόμενον,
καθὸ καὶ τὸ πηχυαῖον ξύλον ἴσον εἶναι λέγομεν
τῷ πηχυαίῳ, καθ' ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἔχον ἐξ ἴσου τὰ
μέρη κείμενα, τουτέστι τὸ ὁμαλόν· οὕτω γοῦν τὸ

out^a; therefore that which is conceived as partici-
pating in these will not be body.

Thus, as regards the principles of geometry, the 92
result is that they are unfounded; and as these are
abolished no other geometrical theorem can subsist.
For the theorem, of whatever sort it be, must be
proved by a diagram, but we have shown^b that the
generic line is nothing, and from this it follows that
none of the specific lines exist, whether one assumes
a straight one, or a curved one, or one of some other
form. Hence, it might, no doubt, have sufficed to 93
finish at this point our confutation of the Geometers;
however, we shall contend against them further and
try to show that, even if we disregard the principles
of geometry, the Geometers are unable to construct
or prove a theorem. Before this, however, no little 94
can be said against their underlying principles,—as,
for instance, when they declare that “a straight line
is that which is equally placed with its parts.” For,
to pass over all other objections, this one is obvious,—
that the generic line being non-existent, the straight
line will not exist; for just as “man” does not exist
if “animal” is non-existent, and “Socrates” does
not exist if “man” is non-existent, so if the generic
line is destroyed the plane straight line is destroyed
along with it.—Moreover, the term “equal” is used 95
in two senses, in one sense as “equal in magnitude”
and neither exceeding nor being exceeded by that
to which it is said to be equal (as we say that the
staff of a cubit's length is equal to a cubit's length),
in another sense of “that which has its parts placed
equally,” that is to say, “the even”; thus, for

^a Cf. § 86.

^b Cf. §§ 37 ff.

96 ἴσον ἔδαφος καλοῦμεν ἀντὶ τοῦ ὀμαλόν. διχῶς
 οὖν τοῦ ἴσου προσαγορευομένου, ὅταν οἱ γεω-
 μέτραι τὴν εὐθείαν γραμμὴν ὑπογράφοντες φῶσιν
 “εὐθειά ἐστι γραμμὴ ἢ ἐξ ἴσου τοῖς ἑαυτῆς
 μέρεσι κειμένη,” ἥτοι τὸ κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον σημαίνο-
 μενον λαμβάνουσιν ἴσον ἢ τὸ κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον.
 ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν τὸ κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον, τελέως εἰσὶν
 ἀνόητοι· οὐδένα γὰρ ἔχει νοῦν τὸ εὐθείαν εἶναι
 γραμμὴν τὴν ἰσομεγέθη τοῖς ἑαυτῆς μέρεσι καὶ
 μήτε ὑπερέχουσαν ταῦτα μήτε ὑπερεχομένην ὑπὸ
 97 τούτων. εἰ δὲ τὸ κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον, δι’ αὐτοῦ τὸ
 ζητούμενον¹ διδάξουσιν, εἶγε ὅτι μὲν ἔστιν εὐθεῖα
 παριστᾶσιν ἐκ τοῦ ὀμαλῶς τε καὶ ἐπ’ εὐθείας ἔχειν
 κείμενα τὰ μέρη, τὸ δὲ ἐπ’ εὐθείας τι κείσθαι οὐκ
 98 ἔστι μαθεῖν μὴ ἐπιβαλόντας τῇ εὐθείᾳ. πολλῶ δὲ
 ἀποπῶνται τυγχάνουσι κάκεινως ὀριζόμενοι “εὐ-
 θεῖά ἐστιν ἥτις ἐξ ἴσου τοῖς ἑαυτῆς πέρασι στρέ-
 φεται” ἢ οὕτως “ἥτις περὶ τὰ ἑαυτῆς πέρατα
 στρεφομένη πᾶσι τοῖς ἑαυτῆς μέρεσιν ἄπτεται
 τοῦ ἐπιπέδου.” πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ καὶ αὐταὶ αἰ
 ἀποδόσεις ὑποπίπτουσι ταῖς πρότερον εἰρημνείας
 ἡμῶν ἀπορίαις· εἶτα, καθὼς καὶ οἱ Ἐπικουρεῖοι
 φασιν, ἢ τοῦ κενοῦ εὐθεῖα εὐθεῖα μὲν ἐστίν, οὐ
 στρέφεται δὲ διὰ τὸ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ κενὸν μήτε ὅλον
 99 μήτε κατὰ μέρος κίνησιν ἐπιδέχσθαι. ἢ μὲν γὰρ
 ἐπὶ τέλει ἀπόδοσις καὶ εἰς τὸν δι’ ἀλλήλων ἐπιπίπτει
 τρόπον, ὅς ἐστι μοχθηρότατος. τό τε γὰρ ἐπί-
 πεδον διὰ τῆς εὐθείας διδάσκουσι τὴν τ’ εὐθείαν
 διὰ τοῦ ἐπιπέδου· εὐθείαν μὲν γὰρ εἶναι φασιν
 ἥτις εἰς πάντα τὰ μέρη τοῦ ἐπιπέδου ἄπτεται,

¹ δι’ αὐτοῦ τὸ ζητούμενον Heintz : δι’ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ζητουμένου
 mss., Bekk.

instance, we call a pavement “equal” instead of
 “even” (or “level”). The term “equal,” then, 96
 being applied in two ways, when the Geometers in
 describing the straight line say that “a straight line
 is that which lies equally with its parts,” they are
 taking the term “equal” either in the first significa-
 tion or in the second. But if it is in the first, they are
 perfectly senseless; for there is no sense in saying
 that the straight line is of equal magnitude with its
 parts, neither exceeding these nor being exceeded by
 these. And if it is in the second sense, they will be 97
 proving the matter in question by means of itself,
 seeing that they establish the fact that it is straight
 from the fact that it has its parts lying evenly and in
 a straight line, whereas it is not possible to learn that
 a thing lies in a straight line without having sensed
 the straight line. But they are far more absurd when 98
 they give the following definition,—“A straight line
 is that which revolves equally with its limits,” or
 this—“which in revolving round its limits touches the
 plane with all its parts.” For, firstly, these descrip-
 tions are subject to the doubts already expressed
 by us; and secondly, as the Epicureans affirm, the
 straight line of the void is, indeed, straight, but does
 not revolve because the void itself does not admit of
 motion either as a whole or in part. And the last de- 99
 scription falls also into the vice of circular reasoning,^a
 which is most unsound. For they both explain the
 plane by means of the straight line and the straight
 line by means of the plane; for they say that the
 straight line is that which touches the plane with all its

^a Cf. P.H. i. 117.

ἐπίπεδον δὲ τυγχάνειν δι' οὐ ἢ καταγομένη εὐθεία πᾶσι τοῖς μέρεσιν ἄπτεται, ὥσθ' ἵνα μὲν τὴν εὐθείαν μάθωμεν, πρῶτον τὸ ἐπίπεδον μαθεῖν δεῖ, ἵνα δὲ τοῦτο, ἀναγκαῖον προεγνωκέναι τὴν εὐθείαν. ὅπερ ἄτοπον. καθόλου τε ὁ διὰ τοῦ ἐπιπέδου τὴν εὐθείαν διδάσκων οὐδὲν ἄλλο ποιεῖ ἢ δι' εὐθείας τὴν εὐθείαν παρίστησιν, ἐπεὶ περ τὸ ἐπίπεδον πολλαί εἰσιν εὐθεῖαι κατ' αὐτούς.

- 100 Οἷος δὲ ἐστὶν ὁ περὶ τῆς εὐθείας λόγος, τοιοῦτος γένοιτ' ἂν καὶ ὁ περὶ τῆς γωνίας. πάλιν γὰρ ὅταν ὑπογράφοντες λέγωσιν ὅτι γωνία ἐστὶ δυοῖν εὐθειῶν μὴ κατάλληλα κειμένων τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν κλίσιν ἐλάχιστον, ἤτοι ἐλάχιστον λέγουσι τὸ ἄμερὲς σῶμα ἢ τὸ κατ' αὐτούς σημεῖον καὶ στιγμαίν. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἄμερὲς σῶμα οὐκ ἂν εἴποιεν, ἐπεὶ περ τοῦτο μὲν οὐδ' εἰς δύο μέρη δύναται διαιρεῖσθαι, ἢ δὲ γωνία κατ' αὐτούς ἐπ' ἄπειρον τέμνεται. καὶ ἄλλως, τῆς γωνίας ἢ μὲν μείζονά φασιν εἶναι ἢ μὲν μικροτέραν· τοῦ δὲ ἐλαχίστου σώματος οὐδὲν ἐστὶ βραχύτερον, ἐπεὶ ἐκεῖνο ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτο γενή-
- 101 σεται ἐλάχιστον. λείπεται ἄρα τὸ κατ' αὐτούς σημεῖον εἶναι λέγειν· ὁ καὶ αὐτὸ τῶν ἀπόρων. εἰ γὰρ πάντῃ πανταχῶς ἀδιάστατόν ἐστὶ τὸ σημεῖον, οὐ διαιρεθήσεται ἢ γωνία. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ μείζων τις ἔσται ἢ ἐλάσσων γωνία· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς μηδεμίαν ἔχουσι διάστασιν οὐκ ἂν εἴη τις κατὰ μέγεθος
- 102 διαφορά. ἄλλως τε, εἰ μεταξὺ τῶν εὐθειῶν πίπτει τὸ σημεῖον, διορίζει τὰς εὐθείας, διορίζον δὲ οὐκ
- 103 ἔσται ἀδιάστατον. νῆ Δία, ἀλλ' εἰώθασί τινες ἐξ

parts, and the plane is that which, when the straight line is drawn over it, it touches it with all its parts, so that in order to get to know the straight line we must first get to know the plane, and in order to do this, we must necessarily know beforehand the straight line ; which is absurd. And, in sum, he who explains the straight line by means of the plane is doing nothing else than establishing the straight line by means of the straight line, since, according to them, the plane is many straight lines.

The argument about the angle will be of much the 100 same kind as that about the straight line. For again, when in describing the angle they say that the angle is "the minimum under the inclination of two lines which do not lie parallel," they mean by "minimum" either the indivisible body or what they call the sign or point. But they will not mean the 101 indivisible body, since this cannot be divided into two parts, whereas, according to them, the angle is divided to infinity. And besides, in the case of the angle, one, they say, is greater, another lesser ; but nothing is smaller than the minimal body, for if so it, and not the body, would be the minimum. It remains 102 then to say that it is what they call the sign ; but this itself is also dubious. For if the sign is in every way wholly without dimensions, the angle will not be divided.—Moreover, no angle will be greater or lesser ; for in things which have no dimension there will be no difference in respect of magnitude. Be- 103 sides, if the sign falls between the straight lines, it divides the straight lines, and as dividing it will not be without dimensions.—But, in sooth, some of them 104

αὐτῶν γωνίαν λέγειν τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν κλίσειν πρῶτον διάστημα. πρὸς οὓς

ἄπλους ὁ μῦθος τῆς ἀληθείας ἔφν.

ἦτοι γὰρ ἀμερές ἐστὶ τὸ διάστημα τοῦτο ἢ μεριστόν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἀμερές, αἱ προειρημέναί τῶν ἀποριῶν ἀκολουθήσουσιν αὐτοῖς, εἰ δὲ μεριστόν, οὐδὲν ἔσται πρῶτον· τοῦ γὰρ ὑποσταθέντος πρῶτου ἕτερον εὔρεθήσεται πρότερον διὰ τὴν ἀρεσκο-
 105 μένην αὐτοῖς εἰς ἄπειρον τῶν ὄντων τομῆν. ἐὼ λέγειν ὅτι καὶ ἄλλη τιμὴ τεχνολογία μάχεται ἢ τοιαύτη τῶν γωνιῶν νόησις. διαιρούμενοι γὰρ φασι τῆς γωνίας τὴν μὲν τινα εἶναι ὀρθὴν τὴν δὲ ἀμβλείαν τὴν δὲ ὀξείαν, καὶ τῆς μὲν ἀμβλείας ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην μᾶλλον ἀμβλυτέραν εἶναι, ὡσαύτως δὲ
 106 καὶ τῆς ὀξείας. εἰ δὲ γωνίαν φημὲν τὸ ἐλάχιστον ὑπὸ τὴν κλίσειν διάστημα, οὐ σωθήσονται αἱ τοιαῦται τῶν γωνιῶν διαφοραί, παρόσον ὑπερέχουσι τε ἀλλήλας καὶ ὑπερέχονται ὑπ' ἀλλήλων. ἢ εἴπερ σώζονται, ἀναιρεῖται ἡ γωνία, μὴ ἔχουσα ἐσθηκὸς μέτρον ᾧ διαγνωσθήσεται.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν εὐθείας γραμμῆς καὶ γωνίας
 107 τοιαῦτα ῥητέον πρὸς αὐτούς· ὀριζόμενοι δὲ καὶ τὸν κύκλον φασι “κύκλος ἐστὶ σχῆμα ἐπίπεδον ὑπὸ μιᾶς γραμμῆς περιεχόμενον, πρὸς ἣν αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ κέντρου προσπίπτουσαι εὐθεῖαι ἴσαι εἰσὶν ἀλλήλαις,” ματαιάζοντες· τοῦ γὰρ σημείου καὶ τῆς γραμμῆς καὶ τῆς εὐθείας καὶ ἔτι τοῦ ἐπιπέδου καὶ τῆς γωνίας ἀνηρημένων οὐδὲ κύκλος ἐπινοηθῆναι δύναται.

108 Ἄλλ' ἵνα μὴ δοκῶμεν σοφιστικοὶ τινες εἶναι καὶ τὴν σύμπασαν τῆς ἀντιρρήσεως κατασκευῆν

are wont to say that the angle is “the first interval under the inclination.” Against whom

By nature simple is the tale which truth doth tell.*

For this interval is either without parts or with parts. But if it is without parts, they will find themselves beset in consequence with the difficulties already stated; and if it has parts, none of them will be “first”; for another will be found to be prior to that assumed to be “first” because of the division of existents *ad infinitum* which is approved by them. I forbear to argue
 105 that such a notion of the angles is in conflict with another piece of their technology. For in their classification they say that one class of angle is “right,” another “obtuse,” another “acute”; and that, of the obtuse angles, some are more obtuse than others, and so likewise with the acute angles. But if we affirm that
 106 the angle is “the least interval under the inclination,” such differences in angles will not be preserved, in so far as they both exceed one another and are exceeded by one another. Or, if they are preserved, the angle is destroyed, not possessing a fixed standard by which it can be distinguished.

Such, then, are the arguments we must use against them with respect to the straight line and the angle; and in defining the circle they say “The circle is a 107 plane figure enclosed by one line, and the straight lines from the centre which fall on this are equal to one another,” talking idly; for when the sign and the line and the straight line, and the plane, too, and the angle are destroyed, the circle cannot be conceived.

But in order that we may not seem to be sophistical
 108 people and to expend all the reasoning in our refuta-

* Cf. Eurip. *Phoeniss.* 469.

ἐν μόναις καταναλίσκευ ταῖς τῆς γεωμετρίας ἀρχαῖς, φέρε μετελθόντες, ὡς πρότερον ὑπεσχόμεθα, καὶ τὰ μετὰ τὰς ἀρχὰς αὐτῶν θεωρήματα
 109 ἐπισκεψώμεθα. ὅταν οὖν λέγουσι τὴν δοθεῖσαν εὐθείαν διχα τεμεῖν, ἤτοι τὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἄβακος διδομένην λέγουσι διχοτομεῖν ἢ τὴν ἀπὸ ταύτης κατὰ μετάβασιν νοουμένην. οὐτε δὲ τὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἄβακος δοθεῖσαν διχοτομεῖν ἐροῦσιν· αὐτῇ μὲν γὰρ μήκος καὶ πλάτος αἰσθητὸν ἔχειν φαίνεται, ἢ δὲ κατ' αὐτοὺς εὐθεία γραμμὴ μήκός ἐστιν ἀπλατές, ὥστε μὴ (γραμμῇ)¹ οὐσα κατ' αὐτοὺς ἢ γραμμῇ ἢ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἄβακος οὐδὲ διχα τμηθήσεται ὡς γραμμῇ.
 110 καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ἢ ἀπὸ ταύτης κατὰ μετάβασιν νοουμένην. ὑποκείσθω γὰρ λόγου χάριν ἐξ ἑνῆς στιγμῶν συνεστῶσα, ἀφ' ἑκατέρου μὲν τῶν ἄκρων τεσσάρων καὶ τεσσάρων ἀριθμουμένων, μίᾳ δὲ τὰς δύο τετράδας μεσολαβούσης στιγμῆς. οὐκοῦν εἰ διχα τέμνεται ἢ ὅλη γραμμῇ, ἤτοι μεταξύ ταύτης τῆς πέμπτης στιγμῆς καὶ τῆς ἑτέρας τετράδος ἐνεχθήσεται τὸ τέμνον, ἢ κατ' αὐτῆς τῆς
 111 πέμπτης, ὥστε καὶ αὐτὴν διχάζειν. τὸ μὲν οὖν μεταξύ τῆς πέμπτης στιγμῆς καὶ τῆς ἑτέρας τετράδος φέρεσθαι τὸ τέμνον τῶν ἀλόγων· γενήσεται γὰρ ἄνισα τὰ τμήματα, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐκ τεσσάρων στιγμῶν συγκείμενον τὸ δὲ ἐκ πέντε. τὸ δὲ αὐτὴν διχάζειν τὴν στιγμὴν πολλῶν τοῦ προτέρου ἀλογώτερον· οὐκέτι γὰρ ἀδιάστατον ἀπολείψουσι τὸ σημεῖον, ὃ γε διχάζεται πρὸς τοῦ
 112 τέμνοντος. ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπειδὴν φῶσι τὸν κύκλον εἰς ἴσα τέμνειν. εἰ γὰρ ὁ κύκλος εἰς ἴσα τέμνεται, πάντως ἐπεὶ μεσαίτατον ἔχει τὸ

¹ (γραμμῇ) addidi.

tion on the principles of geometry alone, come and let us pass on, as we previously promised,^a and investigate the theorems which come after their principles. When, then, they say that they will "bisect the given 109 straight line,"^b they mean that they are bisecting either that given on the board or that which is conceived by transference from it. But they will not mean that they are bisecting that given on the board; for this appears to possess sensible length and breadth, whereas, according to them, the straight line is "length without breadth," so that the line on the board, not being a line according to them, will not be bisected like a line. Nor, indeed, will the line which 110 is conceived by transference from that on the board. For let us assume, for the sake of argument, that it is composed of nine points, four being numbered from the one extremity and four from the other and one point occupying the middle place between the two sets of four. Then, if the whole line is bisected, the secant will strike either between this fifth point and one of the sets of four or on the fifth point itself so as to divide it in two. That the secant should 111 strike between the fifth point and one of the sets of four is, however, illogical; for the sections will be unequal, one being made up of four points and the other of five. But the dividing the point itself into two is much more illogical than the former alternative; for they will no longer be leaving the sign without dimensions,^c as it is divided into two by the secant.—And the argument is the same when 112 they say they are cutting the circle into equal parts.^d For if the circle is cut into equal parts, then, since it

^a Cf. § 93.
^b Cf. § 20.

^c Cf. Adv. Phys. i. 282 ff.
^d Cf. Adv. Phys. i. 284 ff.

κέντρον, ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ ἐστὶ σημεῖον, ἥτοι τῷδε τῷ
 τμήματι ἢ τῷδὲ [τινι] προσμερισθήσεται, ἢ καὶ
 αὐτὸ δίχα τμηθήσεται. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τῷδε ἢ τῷδε
 προσμερισθῆναι ἄνισον τὴν διχοτόμησιν ποιεῖ, τὸ
 δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ διχοτομῆσθαι μαχόμενόν ἐστι τῷ
 113 ἀδιάστατον καὶ ἀμερές ὑπάρχειν τὸ σημεῖον. τὸ
 τε τέμνον τὴν γραμμὴν ἥτοι σῶμά ἐστιν ἢ ἀσώ-
 ματον. οὔτε δὲ σῶμα δύναται τυγχάνειν ἀμερές
 γάρ τι καὶ ἀσώματον καὶ μὴ ὑποπίπτον αὐτῷ οὐκ
 ἂν τέμνοι· οὔτε ἀσώματον. τουτὶ γὰρ πάλιν εἰ
 μὲν στιγμή ἐστι, τῷ ἀμερέῳ εἶναι καὶ κατὰ ἀμερέους
 πίπτειν οὐκ ἂν τέμνοι, εἰ δὲ γραμμὴ, πάλιν ἐπεὶ τῷ
 πέρατι ἑαυτῆς ὀφείλει τέμνειν, τὸ δὲ πέρασ αὐτῆς
 114 ἐστὶν ἀμερές, οὐ τέμνει. ἄλλως τε τὸ τέμνον
 πέρασ ἥτοι μέσον τῶν δυοῖν στιγμῶν πίπτει δι-
 χοτομεῖ τὴν γραμμὴν, ἢ κατὰ μέσου φέρομενον
 τοῦ σημείου. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν κατὰ μέσου φέρεσθαι
 τοῦ σημείου τῶν ἀδυνάτων· δεήσει γάρ, ὡς
 πρότερον ἐλέγομεν, τὸ καθ' οὐ φέρεται μερι-
 στὸν εἶναι καὶ μηκέτι ἀδιάστατον τυγχάνειν.¹
 115 μεταξὺ δὲ τῶν δυοῖν στιγμῶν φέρεσθαι πολλῷ
 ἀλογώτερον. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν δύναται μετα-
 ξὺ συνεχείας μέσον πεσεῖν πέρασ· εἴτα κἂν δοθῇ
 τὸ τοιοῦτον ὡς δυνατόν, ὀφείλει μετακινεῖν τὰ ὦν
 μεταξὺ τάσσειται, εἴπερ ἐστὶ συνεχῆ· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν
 ἀκίνητα. τοίνυν ἄπορος καὶ ὁ περὶ τοῦ τέμνοντός
 116 ἐστὶ λόγος. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κἂν δώμεν αὐτοῖς τὰς
 ἀφαιρέσεις ποιείσθαι ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τούτων
 γραμμῶν, οὐ δυνήσονται οὐδ' οὕτως εὐδοῆσαι. ἢ

¹ τὸ καθ' οὐ φέρεται μ. εἶναι καὶ μ. ἀδ. τυγχάνειν scripsi: τὸ
 καθόλου φέρεσθαι μ. ἐὰν ἢ μ. ἀδ. τυγχάνη mss., Bekk.: τὸ καθ' οὐ
 φέρεται μ. εἶναι, ἵνα μ. cj. Bekk.

has the centre (which itself is a point), in the very
 middle, the centre will certainly be annexed either to
 this section or to that, or else it will itself be cut in
 two. But the fact of its being annexed to this section
 or that makes the bisection unequal; and that it should
 itself be bisected is in conflict with the fact that the
 sign is without dimensions and without parts.—Also, 113
 the secant which cuts the line is either a body or incor-
 poreal. But it cannot be a body; for, if so, it will not
 cut a thing without parts and incorporeal and on which
 it cannot strike; nor yet can it be incorporeal. For
 this, again, if it is a point, will not cut owing to its
 being without parts and striking on what is without
 parts; and if it is a line, again it does not cut since it
 must cut with its limit, and its limit is without parts.—
 Besides, the limit which cuts bisects the line either by 114
 falling between the two points, or by striking on the
 middle of the sign. But that it should strike on the
 middle of the sign is a thing impossible. For, as we
 said before, that on which it strikes will have to
 possess parts and be no longer without dimensions.
 And that it should strike between the two points is 115
 much more irrational. For, firstly, no limit can fall
 in the middle of what is continuous; and secondly,
 even if we allow that such a thing is possible, it must
 move apart the things between which it posts itself,
 if they are continuous; but these are immovable.
 So then, the account given of the secant is dubious.
 —Moreover, even if we grant them that subtrac- 116
 tions are made in the case of these sensible lines,
 even so they will be unable to make progress. For

γὰρ ἀφ' ὅλης τῆς γραμμῆς ἡ ἀφαίρεσις γενήσεται ἢ ἀπὸ μέρους, καὶ τὸ ἀφαιρούμενον ἢ ἴσον ἀπὸ ἴσου ἢ ἄνισον ἀπὸ ἀνίσου [ἢ ἐναλλάξ]¹ γενήσεται· οὐδὲν δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν εὐπορον, ὡς ἐν τῷ πρὸς τοὺς γραμματικούς καὶ ἐν τῷ πρὸς τοὺς φυσικούς ὑπομνήματι παρεστήσαμεν· οὐκ ἄρα δυνατόν ἐστι τοῖς γεωμέτραις ἀφαιρεῖν τι καὶ τέμνειν ἀπὸ γραμμῆς.

¹ [ἢ ἐναλλάξ] del. Heintz.

the subtraction will either be from the whole line or from a part, and the part subtracted will be either an equal part from an equal, or an unequal from an unequal; but none of these is feasible, as we have established in our treatise *Against the Grammarians*^a and in that *Against the Physicists*; therefore it is not possible for the Geometers to subtract or cut off anything from the line.

^a Cf. *Adv. Gram.* 162 ff.; *Adv. Phys.* i. 280 ff.; *P.H.* iii. 85 ff.

Δ

ΠΡΟΣ ΑΡΙΘΜΗΤΙΚΟΥΣ

- 1 Ἐπειδὴ τοῦ ποσοῦ τὸ μὲν ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς συνεχέσι σώμασιν, ὃ δὴ μέγεθος καλεῖται, περὶ ὃ ἔστι μάλιστα ἡ γεωμετρία, τὸ δὲ ἐν διεστώσιν, ὅπερ ἀριθμὸς καθέστηκεν, περὶ ὃν ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ καταγίνεται, σκοπῶμεν ἀπὸ τῶν γεωμετρικῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ θεωρημάτων μετελθόντες καὶ τὰ περὶ ἀριθμοῦ τούτου γὰρ ἀναιρεθέντος οὐθ' ἡ περὶ αὐτὸν συνισταμένη γενήσεται τέχνη.
- 2 Καθόλου μὲν οὖν οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων Πυθαγορικοὶ μεγάλην ἀπονέμουσι δύναμιν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς ὡς τῆς τῶν ὄλων φύσεως κατ' αὐτοὺς διοικουμένης. ὅθεν καὶ αἰεὶ ποτε ἐπεφώνουν τὸ

ἀριθμῷ δέ τε πάντ' ἐπέοικεν,

ὀμνύοντες οὐ μόνον τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν ὑποδείξαντα αὐτοῖς τοῦτον Πυθαγόραν ὡς θεὸν διὰ τὴν ἐν ἀριθμητικῇ δύναμιν, λέγοντες

οὐ μὰ τὸν ἀμέτερά ψυχᾶ παραδόντα τετρακτύν,
πηγὴν ἀενάου φύσεως ριζώματ' ἔχουσαν.

- 3 τετρακτὺς δὲ προσηγορεύετο παρ' αὐτοῖς ὃ ἐκ τῶν πρώτων τεσσάρων ἀριθμῶν συγκεῖμενος δέκα ἀρι-

BOOK IV

AGAINST THE ARITHMETICIANS

SINCE one kind of quantity, which is called "magnitude," and which is the chief concern of geometry, belongs to continuous bodies, and another kind, which is number, the subject of arithmetic, belongs to discontinuous, let us pass on from the principles and theorems of geometry and examine also those which deal with number; for if this is destroyed, the art which is constructed to handle it will not exist.

Now, speaking generally, the mathematical Pythagoreans^a ascribe great power to numbers, as though the nature of all things was governed in conformity with them. Hence, they constantly kept repeating—

All things, too, are like unto number.^b

And they swear not only by number but also by Pythagoras, the man who showed it to them, as though he were a god because of the power of arithmetic, saying,^c—

Nay, by the man I swear who bequeathed to our soul the Tetraktys,

Fount containing the roots of Nature ever-enduring.

And "tetraktys" was the name given by them to the number ten, it being composed of the first four

^a e.g. Philolaus and Archytas.

^b Cf. Adv. Log. i. 94, 109.

^c Cf. Adv. Log. i. 94.

θμός. ἐν γὰρ καὶ δύο καὶ τρία καὶ τέσσαρα δέκα γίνεται· ὅς ἐστι τελειότατος ἀριθμός, ἐπεὶ ἐπ' αὐτὸν φθάσαντες πάλιν ἀναλύομεν ἐπὶ τὴν μονάδα καὶ ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς ποιούμεθα τὰς ἀριθμήσεις. πηγὴν τ' ἀενάου φύσεως ριζώματ' ἔχουσαν εἰρήκασιν αὐτὸν διὰ τὸ κατ' αὐτοὺς ἐν αὐτῷ τὸν λόγον τῆς ἀπάντων κείσθαι συστάσεως, οἷον εὐθέως τοῦ τε σώματος καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς· ἀπαρκέσει γὰρ τούτων
 4 ὑποδειγματικῶς μεμνήσθαι. ἡ μὲν οὖν μονὰς ἀρχὴ τις ὑπόκειται τῆς τῶν ἄλλων ἀριθμῶν ἀπεργαστικῆ συστάσεως, ἡ δὲ δυὰς μήκους ἐστὶν ἀπεργαστικῆ. καθάπερ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν γεωμετρικῶν ἀρχῶν ὑπεδείξαμεν πρῶτον τίς ἐστὶν ἡ στιγμή, εἶτα μετ' αὐτὴν ἡ γραμμὴ μήκους ἀπλατὲς τυγχάνουσα, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος ἡ μὲν μονὰς τὸν τῆς στιγμῆς ἐπέχει λόγον, ἡ δὲ δυὰς τὸν τῆς γραμμῆς καὶ τοῦ μήκους· ποθὲν γὰρ ποι' ἔχώρησεν ἡ διάνοια ταύτην ἐννοουμένη, τοῦτο
 5 δ' ἦν μήκος. ἡ δὲ τριάς ἐπὶ τοῦ πλάτους καὶ τῆς ἐπιφανείας ἐτέτακτο· ποθὲν γὰρ ποι' (καὶ πάλιν ποι)¹ ἐφέρετο ὁ νοῦς, καὶ προστιθεμένης τῇ κατὰ μήκος διαστάσει τῆς κατὰ πλάτος διαστάσεως ἐπιφάνεια νοεῖται. ἀλλὰ κὰν ἐπιθεωρήσῃ τις τῇ τριάδι τετάρτην μονάδα, τούτέστι τέτατον σημείον, γίνεται πυραμῖς, στερεὸν σῶμα καὶ σχῆμα· καὶ γὰρ μήκος ἔχει καὶ πλάτος καὶ βάθος· ὥστε ἐν τῷ τέσσαρα ἀριθμῷ τὸν τοῦ σώματος περιέχει
 6 σθαι λόγον. καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸν τῆς ψυχῆς· ὡς γὰρ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον κατὰ ἀρμονίαν λέγουσι διοικεῖσθαι, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ζῶον ψυχοῦσθαι. δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ

¹ ποι scripsi: ποῦ mss., Bekk.

² (καὶ πάλιν ποι) addidi: (κ. π. ποῦ) add. cj. Bekk.

numbers. For one and two and three and four make up ten; and this is the most perfect number, since, when we have reached it, we revert again to the one and make our numerations afresh. And they have called it the "fount containing the roots of Nature ever-enduring" because, according to them, the reason of the structure of all things resides in it, as for instance that of the body and the soul^a; for it will suffice to mention these by way of example. Now⁴ the monad (or one) is an underlying principle which produces the structure of all the other numbers, and the dyad (or two) is productive of length. For as in the case of the geometrical principles we explained^b first what the point is, and next, after it, the line which is length without breadth, similarly, in the case before us, the monad corresponds to the point and the dyad to the line and length; for thought in conceiving this moves from some place to some place, and this is length. And the triad (or three) is set⁵ over breadth and the plane; for the mind has moved from here to there (and on again to some other place), and when the distance in breadth is added to the distance in length the plane is conceived. But if, in addition to the triad one imagines a fourth monad, that is, a fourth sign, the pyramid is formed, a solid body and figure; for it possesses length and breadth and depth; so that the formula of the body is comprised in the number four. And so also is that⁹ of the soul; for they declare that as the whole Universe is governed according to harmony, so too the living creature is ensouled. And the perfect

^a Cf. *Adr. Log.* i. 99 ff.

^b Cf. *Adv. Geom.* 19 ff.

τέλειος ἄρμονία ἐν τρισὶ συμφωνίαις λαμβάνειν τὴν ὑπόστασιν, τῇ τε διὰ τεττάρων καὶ τῇ διὰ πέντε καὶ τῇ διὰ πασῶν. ἡ μὲν οὖν διὰ τεσσάρων ἐν ἐπιτίτῳ κείται λόγῳ, ἡ δὲ διὰ πέντε ἐν ἡμιολίῳ, ἡ δὲ διὰ πασῶν ἐν διπλασίῳ. ἐπίτιτος δὲ λέγεται ἀριθμὸς ὁ ἐξ ὄλου τινὸς ἀριθμοῦ συνεστηκὸς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τρίτου μέρους ἐκείνου, ὡς ἔχει ὁ ὀκτώ πρὸς τὸν ἕξ· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸν τὸν ἕξ περιέσχηκε καὶ τὸ τρίτον αὐτοῦ, τούτέστι τὴν δυάδα. ἡμιόλιος δὲ καλεῖται, ὅταν περιέχῃ ἀριθμὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ τὸ ἡμισυ ἐκείνου, ὡς ἔχει ὁ ἐννέα πρὸς τὸν ἕξ· συνέστηκε γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ ἕξ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἡμίσεος αὐτοῦ, τούτέστι τῶν τριῶν. διπλασίῳ δὲ προσαγορεύεται ὁ δυοῖν ἀριθμοῖς ἴσος,¹ ὡς ὁ τέσσαρα πρὸς τὸν δύο· δις γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν περιέσχηκεν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων, καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχῆθεν ὑπόθεσιν τεσσάρων ὄντων ἀριθμῶν, τοῦ τε ἐνός καὶ δύο καὶ τρία καὶ τέσσαρα, ἐν οἷς ἐλέγομεν καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἰδέαν περιέχεσθαι κατὰ τὸν ἐναρμόνιον λόγον, ὁ μὲν τέσσαρα τοῦ δύο καὶ ὁ δύο τῆς μονάδος ἐστὶ διπλασίῳ, ἐν ᾧ ἔκειτο ἡ διὰ πασῶν συμφωνία, ὁ δὲ τρία τοῦ δύο ἡμιόλιος (καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸν τὸν δύο περιέσχηκε καὶ τὸ ἡμισυ τούτου, ὅθεν καὶ τὴν διὰ πέντε συμφωνίαν ὑπέβαλλεν), ὁ δὲ τέσσαρα τοῦ τρία ἐπίτιτος, ὑπέκειτο δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἡ διὰ τεσσάρων συμφωνία. ὥστε εἰκότως τὸν τέσσαρα ἀριθμὸν παρὰ τοῖς Πυθαγορικοῖς εἰρησθαι πηγῆν ἀενάου φύσεως ριζώματ' ἔχουσαν.

10 Ἄλλ' ὅτι μὲν πολλὴν δύναμιν ἀπένεμον τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς, ἐκ τούτων συμφανὲς ὑποδειγματικώτερον εἰρημένον· πολλὸς γὰρ ὁ περὶ ἀριθμῶν παρ

¹ fortasse (ἴσος) ἴσος.

harmony is held to consist in three symphonies^a—that of the “By-Fours” and that of the “By-Fives” and that of the “By-Alls.” Now the “By-Fours” symphony consists of the “epitrite” (4 : 3 ratio), and that of the “By-Fives” in the ratio 3 : 2, and the “By-Alls” in the ratio 2 : 1. The number called “epitrite” is that composed of a certain number taken as a whole *plus* its third part—which is the ratio of eight to six; for the eight includes the six *plus* the third part of it, that is the dyad. And a number is said to be in the ratio 3 : 2 when the number includes a number *plus* its half,—the relation of nine to six; for the nine is composed of the six *plus* its half, that is, three. And that called “double” is that which is equal to two (equal) numbers,—the relation of four to two; for it includes the same number twice. Such, then, being the facts, and there being, according to the original assumption, four numbers—one, two, three and four—in which is included, as we said, the form of the soul according to the harmonical formula, the four is double the two and the two double the monad, and therein consists the “By-Alls” symphony; and the three is to the two in the 3 : 2 ratio (for it includes the two itself *plus* its half, and thus it supplies the “By-Fives” symphony); and the four is to the three in the “epitrite”⁹ or 4 : 3 ratio, on which is based the “By-Fours” symphony. So that naturally the number four is called by the Pythagoreans the “fount containing the roots of Nature ever-enduring.”

From what has been said by way of brief illustration¹⁰ it is clear that they ascribed much power to numbers; for the account they give of numbers is voluminous,

^a Cf. P.H. iii. 155; Adv. Log. i. 95 ff.

αὐτοῖς ἐστὶ λόγος, ὃν ἔασαντες τὰ νῦν μηκύνειν ἀπτόμεθα τῆς ἀντιρρήσεως, τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν λόγων ἀπὸ μονάδος ποιησάμενοι, ἥτις ἀρχὴ παντὸς ἀριθμοῦ καθέστηκε καὶ ἥς ἀναιρουμένης οὐδ' ἔστιν ἀριθμός.

- 11 Τὴν τοῦ ἐνὸς τοίνυν νόησιν διατυπῶν ἡμῶν πυθαγορικώτερον ὁ Πλάτων φησὶν “ ἐν ἔστιν οὐ μὴδὲν χωρὶς λέγεται ἐν ” ἢ “ οὐ μετοχῇ ἕκαστον ἐν τε καὶ πολλὰ λέγεται. ” τὸ γὰρ φυτόν, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ τὸ ζῶον καὶ ὁ λίθος προσαγορεύεται μὲν ἐν, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον λόγον ἐν, ἀλλ' ἐν¹ μετοχῇ ἐνὸς νοεῖται, τούτου μὴδενὸς τούτων καθεστῶτος.
- 12 οὔτε γὰρ φυτόν οὔτε ζῶον οὔτε λίθος οὔτε ἄλλο τι τῶν ἀριθμητῶν τὸ ὄντως ἐν ἔστιν. εἰ γὰρ φυτόν ἔστιν ἢ ζῶον τὸ ἐν, πάντως ὁ μὴ φυτόν ἔστι μὴδὲ ζῶον οὐ ῥηθήσεται ἐν. λέγεται δὲ καὶ φυτόν ἐν καὶ ζῶον καὶ ἄλλα μυρία· οὐδὲν ἄρα τῶν
- 13 ἀριθμητῶν ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν. τὸ δὲ οὐ ἕκαστον, ἐν μὲν καθ' ἑαυτὸ ἕκαστον πολλὰ δὲ ἀθροισμῶ² μετέχον, ἐν τε καὶ πολλὰ γίνεται τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον. ὅπερ πάλιν πλήθος οὐδὲν ἔστι τῶν πολλῶν, οἷον φυτῶν ζῶων λίθων· κατὰ μετοχὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐκείνου ταῦτα λέγεται πολλὰ, αὐτὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τούτοις.
- 14 πλὴν τοιαύτη μὲν ἢ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἰδέα νοεῖται τοῖς περὶ τὸν Πλάτωνα ἐπισυνάπτοντες δὲ ἡμεῖς λέγωμεν. ἥτοι ἐτέρα τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀριθμητῶν³ ἐστὶν ἢ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἰδέα, ἢ σὺν ἐκείνοις τοῖς μετέχουσι αὐτῆς νοεῖται. ἀλλὰ καθ' αὐτὴν μὲν (οὐχ ὑφέστηκεν, εἶγε)³ παρὰ τὰ κατὰ μέρος ἀριθμητὰ οὐδὲν νοεῖται

¹ ἐν Heintz : ἐν mss., Bekk.

² ἀριθμητῶν Heintz : ἀριθμῶν mss., Bekk.

³ (οὐχ ὑφέστηκεν, εἶγε) add. cj. Bekk.

but forbearing for the present to dwell on it, let us take up the confutation, beginning our argument with the monad, which is the principle of all number and with the destruction of which number ceases to exist.

Now Plato, in formulating in rather Pythagorean fashion the concept of the one, declares that “ One is that without which nothing is termed one,” or “ by participation in which each thing is termed one or many.” For the plant, let us say, or the animal, or the stone is called one, yet is not one according to its own proper description, but is conceived as one by participation in the One, none of them being actually the One. For neither plant nor animal nor stone nor any other numerable object is the essential One. For if a plant or an animal is the One, what is not a plant or an animal will certainly not be termed one^a; but a plant is termed one, as is an animal and countless other things; therefore none of the numerables is the One. But that by participation in which each thing is by itself each one thing, and a plurality by aggregation, is the One and Many of the individual things. But this Plurality, again, is none of the many things, such as plants, animals, stones; for it is by participation in it that these things are termed “ many,” but the Plurality itself is not one of them.—Such, then, is the Idea of the One as conceived by Plato; so let us subjoin our argument. Either the Idea of the One is different from the particular numerables, or it is conceived along with those things which participate in it. But it does not subsist by itself, since no One other than the particular numer-

* Cf. P.H. iii. 156 ff.

ἐν ὑποκείμενον. λείπεται ἄρα ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς μετ-
 15 ἔχουσιν αὐτοῦ νοεῖσθαι, ὃ πάλιν τῶν ἀπύρων. τὸ
 γὰρ ἀριθμητὸν ξύλον εἰ μετοχῇ μονάδος ἔστιν ἐν,
 ὃ μὴ ἔστι ξύλον οὐ λεχθήσεται ἐν· λέγεται δέ γε,
 ὡς ἀνώτερον ὑποδέδεικται· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν ἡ μονὰς
 ἧς μετοχῇ ἕκαστον τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀριθμητῶν
 16 μονὰς προσαγορεύεται. εἶτα τὸ πολλοῖς μετεχό-
 μενον πολλά ἔστι καὶ οὐχ ἐν, τὰ δὲ ἀριθμητὰ
 πολλά τέ ἐστι καὶ ἄπειρα· οὐκ ἄρα μετοχῇ τῆς
 17 μονάδος ἕκαστον τῶν ἀριθμητῶν ἐν ἔστιν. ὥσπερ
 οὖν ὁ γενικός ἀνθρώπος, ὃν τινες νοοῦσι ζῶον
 θνητόν, οὔτε Σωκράτης ἔστιν οὔτε Πλάτων, ἐπειδὴ
 οὐδεὶς λεχθήσεται ἀνθρώπος,¹ οὔτε καθ' ἑαυτὸν
 ὑφέστηκεν οὔτε μετὰ Πλάτωνος καὶ Σωκράτους,
 ἐπεὶ ἐθεωρεῖτο ἂν ὡς ἀνθρώπος, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐν
 μῆτε σὺν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος ἀριθμητοῖς μῆτε καθ'
 18 ἑαυτὸ ὑφεστηκὸς νοούμενον εὐθέως ἔστιν ἀνεπι-
 νόητον. τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ λεκτέον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δύο ἢ
 καὶ τρία καὶ καθόλου ἐπὶ παντὸς ἀριθμοῦ, ἵνα μὴ
 μηκύνωμεν. ἔνεστι δὲ καὶ οὕτως συνερωτᾶν. ἡ
 τοῦ ἐνὸς ἰδέα, ἧς μετοχῇ τι ἐν λέγεται, ἥτοι μία
 ἔστιν ἰδέα ἢ τοῦ ἐνὸς πλείους ἰδέαι τυγχάνουσιν.
 ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν μία ἔστιν, οὐ πολλοῖς μετέχεται· τοῦ
 γὰρ A, εὐσήμου χάριν διδασκαλίας, τὴν ὅλην τοῦ
 ἐνὸς ἰδέαν ἔχοντος, τὸ B μὴ μετέχον ταύτης οὐκέτ'
 19 ἔσται ἐν. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ πολυμερῆς καθέστηκεν,
 ἵνα πολλά ἢ τὰ μετέχοντα ταύτης· πρῶτον μὲν
 γὰρ ἔσται ἕκαστον οὐ τῆς τοῦ ἐνὸς ἰδέας μετέχον,
 μέρους δὲ αὐτῆς, εἶτα καὶ ἡ μονὰς ἀδιαίρετος καὶ

¹ (ἄλλος) add. cj. Warmington.

* Cf. the "generic Line" of *Adv. Geom.* 92.

^b For this definition cf. *P.H.* ii. 26.

ables is conceived as subsisting.—It remains, then,
 to say that it is conceived as included in those things
 which partake of it, which, again, is dubious. For 15
 if the numerable log is one by participation in the
 Monad, what is not a log will not be termed one ;
 but, as has been shown above, it is so termed ; there-
 fore the Monad, by participation in which each
 of the particular numerables is called a monad, does
 not exist.—Further, that in which many participate 16
 is Many and not One, and the numerables are both
 many and infinite ; each of the numerables, there-
 fore, is not one by participation in the Monad. So, 17
 just as the generic Man ^a—whom some conceive as
 " a mortal animal " ^b—is not Socrates or Plato (for, if
 so, nobody else will be termed man), and does not
 subsist of himself nor together with Plato and Socrates
 (for then he would have been observed as a man), so
 likewise the One, not being conceived either as sub-
 sisting by itself or along with the particular numer-
 ables, is *ipso facto* inconceivable. And the same must 18
 be said of the Two and the Three, and in general—
 not to make a long story of it—of every number.
 —One may also propound the following argument :
 The Idea of the One, by participation in which a
 thing is termed one, either is one Idea, or there are
 several Ideas of the One.^c But if it is one, many do
 not participate in it ; for (to explain the point clearly)
 if A possesses the whole of the Idea of the One, B,
 which does not participate in it, will no longer be one.
 —Nor yet is it multipartite, so that the things par-
 19 ticipating in it might be many ; for, firstly, each thing
 will be participating not in the Idea of the One but
 in a part of it ; and secondly, the Monad, according

^c Cf. *P.H.* iii. 158 ff.

ἀμερῆς ἐνοεῖτο κατ' αὐτούς. εἰ δὲ πλείους εἰσὶν
 ἰδέαι τοῦ ἐνός, ἕκαστον τῶν καθ' ἓν τασσομένων
 ἀριθμητῶν, ἦτοι τοῦ ἐνός ἢ τοῦ δύο, καθ' ἓν ἐκά-
 τερον, μετέχει τινὸς κοινῆς ἰδέας ἢ οὐ μετέχει.
 20 καὶ εἰ μὲν οὐ μετέχει, δεήσει καὶ ἅπαντα δίχα τοῦ
 μετέχειν ἰδέας κατὰ τὸ ἐν τετάχθαι, ὅπερ οὐ
 θέλουσιν. εἰ δὲ μετέχει, ἢ ἐξ ἀρχῆς συναχθήσεται
 ἀπορία· πῶς γὰρ μιᾶς τὰ δύο μεθέξει;

Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν περὶ μονάδος, ἧς ἀνηρημένης πᾶς
 21 ἀνήρηται ὁ ἀριθμὸς· ὅμως δ' οὖν ἐπισυνάπτωμεν
 καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς δυάδος. ἀπόρως γὰρ πῶς καὶ αὕτη¹
 συνίσταται κατὰ τὴν τῶν μονάδων σύνοδον, ὡσπερ
 καὶ Πλάτων διὰ τοῦ περὶ ψυχῆς πρότερον ὑπόρη-
 κεν. παρατεθείσης γὰρ μονάδος ἑτέρα μονάδι ἦτοι
 προσγίνεται τι κατὰ τὴν παράθεσιν ἢ ἀπογίνεται ἢ
 22 οὔτε προσγίνεται τι οὔτε ἀπογίνεται. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν
 οὔτε προσγίνεται τι οὔτε ἀπογίνεται, οὐκ ἔσται
 κατὰ παράθεσιν τῆς ἑτέρας μονάδος τῇ ἑτέρα ἢ
 δυάς. εἰ δὲ ἀπογίνεται τι κατὰ τὴν παράθεσιν,
 ἐλάττωσις ἔσται τοῦ ἐνός καὶ ἐνός, καὶ δυὰς οὐ
 γενήσεται. εἰ δὲ προσγίνεται τι, τὰ δύο οὐ γενή-
 σεται δύο ἀλλὰ τέσσαρα· δυὰς γὰρ ἢ ἐπιγνωμένη
 καὶ μονὰς καὶ ἑτέρα μονὰς τὸν τῶν τεσσάρων
 ἀριθμὸν συνίστησιν. οὐδὲν ἄρα ἔσται δυάς. ἢ
 δὲ αὕτη γένοιτ' ἂν ἀπορία καὶ ἐπὶ παντός ἀριθμοῦ,
 ὥστε μηδὲν εἶναι κατὰ τοῦτο ἀριθμὸν.

23 Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν μονάδος καὶ
 κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν ὁ ἀριθμὸς νοεῖται, δηλὸν ὡς ἐὰν
 τούτων ἑκάτερον παραστήσωμεν ἀδύνατον, οἰχί-

¹ ἀπόρως . . . αὕτη scripsi: ἀπορος . . . αὕτη MSS., Bekk.

• Cf. §§ 18, 16.

to them, is conceived as indivisible and without parts.
 And if there are several Ideas of the One, each of
 the numerables ranked as unities (whether it be a
 one or a two, both taken singly) participates in a
 certain common Idea, or it does not participate.
 But if it does not participate, all things, apart from 20
 participating in an Idea, will have to be ranked as
 unities,—a conclusion which they reject. And if
 they participate, the original difficulty^a will recur;
 for how will the twos participate in one Idea?

So much, then, concerning the monad, and if it is
 destroyed all number is destroyed; all the same, let 21
 us subjoin an attack on the dyad. For it is formed in
 a doubtful way by the conjunction of the monads,
 even as Plato formerly expressed doubts about it in
 his book *On the Soul*.^b For when a monad is set
 beside another monad, either something is added
 by the juxtaposition or something is subtracted, or
 nothing is either added or subtracted. But if nothing 22
 is either added or subtracted, the dyad will not exist
 through the juxtaposition of the one monad with the
 other. And if something is subtracted through the
 juxtaposition, there will be a diminution of the one
 and one, and a dyad will not be formed. And if
 something is added, the two will become not two
 but four; for the additional dyad *plus* the monad
 and the second monad make up the number four.
 Therefore nothing will be a dyad. And the same
 difficulty will exist in the case of every number, so
 that owing to this number is nothing.

Since, however, number is conceived as a result of 23
 the addition or subtraction of the monad, it is plain
 that if we shall establish that each of these two pro-

• Cf. *Phaedo* 96 ε ff.; *Adv. Phys.* ii. 302 ff.

σεται καὶ ἡ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ὑπόστασις. λέγωμεν δὲ
 πρῶτον εὐθὺς περὶ ἀφαιρέσεως, ὑποδειγματικῆ
 24 χρώμενοι τῇ διδασκαλίᾳ. ἡ τοίνυν ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπο-
 κειμένης δεκάδος ἀφαιρουμένη μονὰς ἦτοι ἀπὸ
 ὅλης τῆς δεκάδος ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς περιλειπομένης ἐν-
 νεάδος ἀφαιρεῖται· οὔτε δὲ ἀφ' ὅλης, ὡς παρα-
 στήσομεν, οὔτε ἀπὸ τῆς ἐννεάδος, ὡς διδάξομεν·
 οὐκ ἄρα ἀφαιρεῖται τι ἀπὸ τῆς ὑποκειμένης δε-
 κάδος. εἰ γὰρ ἀφ' ὅλης ταύτης ἀφαιρεῖται ἡ
 μονάς, ἦτοι ἡ δεκάς ἐστὶν ἑτέρα τῶν κατὰ μέρος
 μονάδων ἢ ὁ ἀθροισμὸς τούτων δεκάς προσαγο-
 25 ρεῦται. ἀλλ' ἑτέρα μὲν τῶν κατὰ μέρος μονάδων
 οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ δεκάς· καὶ γὰρ ἀναιρεθεισῶν ἐκείνων
 οὐδ' ἔστι δεκάς, καὶ τῆς δεκάδος ἀναιρεθείσης
 ὁμοίως αἱ μονάδες οὐκέτι ὑπάρχουσιν. εἰ δὲ ἡ
 αὐτὴ ταῖς μονάσιν ἐστὶν ἡ δεκάς, τουτέστιν εἰ αἱ
 κατὰ μέρος μονάδες εἰσὶ δεκάς, δῆλον ὡς εἴπερ
 ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάδος ἢ τῆς μονάδος ἀφαίρεσις γίνεται,
 ἀφ' ἑκάστης μονάδος ἀφαιρεθήσεται (αἱ γὰρ κατὰ
 μέρος μονάδες ἦσαν ἡ δεκάς), καὶ οὕτως οὐκέτι
 26 ἔσται μονάδος ἄρισ ἀλλὰ δεκάδος. ὥστε οὐκ ἀπὸ
 ὅλης τῆς δεκάδος αἴρεται ἡ μονάς. καὶ μὴν οὐδ'
 ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπολειπομένης ἐννεάδος ἢ ἄρισ αὐτῆς
 γίνεται· πῶς γὰρ ἔτι μετὰ τὴν ἄρισ αὐτῆς σῶός
 ἐστὶν ἡ ὑποκειμένη ἐννεάς; ἀλλ' εἰ μήτε ἀφ' ὅλης
 τῆς δεκάδος αἴρεται ἡ μονὰς μήτε ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπο-
 λειπομένης ἐννεάδος, οὐδεὶς ἀριθμὸς κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν
 27 συνίσταται. ἄλλως τε, εἰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐννεάδος αἴρεται
 ἡ μονάς, ἦτοι ἀπὸ ὅλης αἴρεται ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς τελευ-
 ταίας αὐτῆς μονάδος. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀπὸ ὅλης τῆς
 ἐννεάδος ἀφαιρεῖται ἡ μονάς, ἔσται ἄρισ τῆς ἐν-
 νεάδος· τὸ γὰρ ἀφαιρούμενον ἀφ' ἑκάστης μονάδος,

cesses is impossible, the reality of number, too, will
 be abolished. Let us, for instance, deal first with
 subtraction, using the method of demonstration by
 examples. The monad, then, which is being sub- 24
 tracted from the decad assumed is subtracted either
 from the whole decad or from the nine left over ^a ;
 but it is not subtracted from the whole, as we shall
 establish, nor from the nine, as we shall demonstrate ;
 nothing, therefore, is subtracted from the decad
 assumed. For if the monad is subtracted from this
 as a whole, either the decad is other than the par-
 ticular monads or the aggregate of these is termed a
 decad. But the decad is not other than the particular 25
 monads; for if these are destroyed the decad does
 not exist, and similarly if the decad is destroyed
 the monads no longer exist. And if the decad is the
 same as the monads,—that is to say, if the particular
 monads are the decad,—it is plain that if the sub-
 traction of the monad is from the decad, it will be
 subtracted from each monad (for the particular
 monads are the decad), and thus it will no longer be
 a subtraction of the monad but of the decad. Conse-
 quently, the monad is not subtracted from the whole
 decad. Nor, indeed, is it subtracted from the nine 26
 left over; for how will the assumed nine be still
 preserved after the subtraction? But if the monad
 is not subtracted either from the decad as a whole or
 from the nine left over, no number subsists through
 subtraction.—Besides, if the monad is subtracted 27
 from the nine, it is subtracted either from the whole
 or from its last monad. But if the monad is sub-
 tracted from the whole nine, there will be a subtrac-
 tion of the nine; for that which is subtracted from

^a Cf. P.H. iii. 88 ff.; Adv. Phys. i. 312 ff.

τῶν κατὰ μέρος μονάδων ἐννέα οὐσῶν, τὸν τῆς
 28 ἐννεάδος ἀριθμὸν συντίθησιν. εἰ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς τελευ-
 ταίας μονάδος γίνεται τὰ τῆς ἀφαιρέσεως, πρῶτον
 μὲν καὶ ἡ τελευταία μονάς, ἀμερήσις οὐσα, δειχθή-
 σεται μεριστῆ τυγχάνειν, ὅπερ ἄτοπον· εἴτα εἰ ἀπὸ
 τῆς τελευταίας μονάδος αἴρεται ἡ μονάς, οὐ δυνή-
 29 σεται ἔτι ὀλόκληρος μένειν ἡ ἐννεάς. καὶ ἄλλως,
 εἴπερ ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάδος γίνεται ἡ τῆς μονάδος
 ἄρισ, ἥτοι ἀπὸ οὐσης γίνεται τῆς δεκάδος [ἄρισ]
 ἢ ἀπὸ μὴ οὐσης· οὔτε δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς οὐσης γένοιτ'
 ἂν (ἐφ' ὅσον γὰρ μένει χρόνον δεκάς, οὐδὲν ἀπ'
 αὐτῆς ἀφαιρεθῆναι δύναται ὡς δεκάδος, ἐπεὶ οὐκ-
 30 ἐτι ἔσται δεκάς) οὔτε ἀπὸ μὴ οὐσης· ἀπὸ γὰρ
 τοῦ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲ ἀρθῆναι τι πέφυκεν. καὶ μὴν
 παρὰ τὸ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι οὐδὲν ἔστι νοῆσαι· οὐκ
 ἄρα αἴρεται τι ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάδος.

Ἄλλ' ὅτι μὲν ἀμύχανόν ἐστι κατ' ἀφαιρέσειν
 31 ἀριθμὸν τινα νοεῖν, ἐκ τούτων δέδεικται· ὅτι δὲ
 οὐδὲ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, ῥάδιον δεῖξαι τῶν ἀναλόγων
 ἐχομένων ἀποριῶν. πάλιν γὰρ μονάδος προστιθε-
 μένης δεκάδι ἥτοι τῇ ὅλῃ δεκάδι ῥητέον γίνεσθαι
 τὴν πρόσθεσιν ἢ τῷ τελευταίῳ μέρει τῆς δεκάδος.
 ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ὅλη τῇ δεκάδι προστίθεται ἡ μονάς,
 ἐπεὶ ἡ ὅλη δεκάς σὺν πάσαις ταῖς κατὰ μέρος
 μονάσι νοεῖται, δεήσει τὴν τῆς μονάδος πρόσθεσιν
 32 εἶναι πρόσθεσιν, ὅπερ ἄτοπον· ἀκολουθήσει γὰρ
 τῇ τῆς μονάδος προσθέσει τὴν δεκάδα εἰκοσάδα
 γίνεσθαι, ὃ τῶν ἀμύχανων ὑπήρχεν. οὐ τοῖνυν
 ὅλη τῇ δεκάδι τὴν μονάδα προστίθεσθαι ῥητέον.
 καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τῷ τελευταίῳ μέρει τῆς δεκάδος, ἐπεὶ
 οὐκ αὐξήθησεται ἡ δεκάς διὰ τὸ μὴ τὴν τοῦ ἐνός

each monad makes up the number of the nine, as the
 particular monads are nine. And if the subtraction 28
 is from the last monad, then, firstly, the last monad,
 which is indivisible, will be shown to be divisible,
 which is absurd; and secondly, if the monad is sub-
 tracted from the last monad, the nine will no longer
 be able to remain complete.—Further, if the sub- 29
 traction of the monad is from the decad, it is from the
 decad either as existent or as non-existent; but it
 will not be from the existent (for so long as the decad
 remains a decad nothing can be subtracted from it as
 a decad, for if so it will no longer be a decad), nor
 from the non-existent decad; for from what is non- 30
 existent nothing can be subtracted. And of course
 it is impossible to conceive anything other than
 existence and non-existence; therefore nothing is
 subtracted from the decad.

Now by these arguments it has been shown that it
 is not feasible to conceive any number by subtraction;
 and that it is not feasible by addition either is easy to 31
 show by continuing to raise difficulties of a like kind.
 For, again, if the monad is added to the decad, one
 must say that the addition is made either to the whole
 decad or to the last part of the decad. But if the
 monad is added to the whole decad, then, since the
 whole decad is conceived along with all the particular
 monads, the addition which is being made of the
 monad will have to be an addition to all the particu-
 lar monads of the decad, which is absurd; for it will 32
 follow that by the addition of the monad the decad
 becomes twenty, which is a thing impossible. We
 must say, then, that the monad is not added to the
 whole decad. Nor yet to the last part of the decad,
 since the decad will not be increased owing to the

μέρους αὐξησιν εὐθὺς καὶ τῆς ὅλης δεκάδος αὐξησιν
 33 εἶναι. [καὶ] καθόλου τε¹ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν, ἢ μενούση τῇ
 δεκάδι προστίθεται ἢ μονὰς ἢ μὴ μενούση. οὔτε
 δὲ μενούση προστεθείη ποτ' ἄν, ἐπεὶ οὐκέτι μένει
 δεκάς, οὔτε μὴ μενούση· τὴν γὰρ ἀρχὴν μὴ με-
 νούση οὐδὲ πρόσθεσις δύναται γενέσθαι.

34 Ἄλλ' εἶπερ ὁ ἀριθμὸς κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, ὡς ἔφην,
 καὶ κατ' ἀφαίρεσιν ὑφιστάμενος νοεῖται, ἐδείξαμεν
 δὲ ἡμεῖς ὅτι οὐθέτερον ἔστι τούτων, ῥητέον μηδὲν
 εἶναι ἀριθμόν. ὅθεν τοσαῦτα καὶ πρὸς γεωμέτρας
 καὶ ἀριθμητικούς ἀπορητικῶς διεξελθόντες ἀπ'
 ἄλλης ἀρχῆς καὶ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς μαθηματικούς
 ἀντίρρησιν ποιησώμεθα.

¹ καὶ καθόλου τε καὶ cj. Warmington.

fact that the increase of the one part is not *ipso facto*
 an increase of the whole decad.—Generally, too, 33
 and finally, the monad is added to the decad either
 remaining as it is or not remaining. But it will never
 be added to it while it remains, since in that case
 it will no longer remain a decad; nor yet while it
 does not remain, for it is absolutely impossible for
 an addition to be made to it if it does not remain.

But if number is conceived as subsisting through 34
 addition, as I said, and subtraction, and we have
 shown that neither of these exists, one must declare
 that number is nothing. Hence, now that we have
 stated at length all these sceptical arguments against
 the Geometers and Arithmeticians, let us start afresh
 and deliver our attack on the *Mathematici* (or
 "Astrologers").

ποιητικὸν ὀφείλει καὶ αὐτὸ πλάτος ἔχειν, δῆλον οὖν ὡς ὅτι καὶ αἱ εὐθείαι γραμμαὶ συμπληρωτικαὶ οὐσαι τοῦ πλάτους ἐξ ἀνάγκης πλάτος ἔχουσιν, ὥστε μηδὲν εἶναι μῆκος ἀπλατές, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο μηδὲ γραμμῆν.

- 77 Εἰ δὲ καὶ δοίμεν τὴν γραμμῆν μῆκος εἶναι ἀπλατές, τὰ ἀκόλουθα τούτοις ἔτι τούτων ἀπορώτερα. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ σημεῖον ῥυὲν ποιεῖ γραμμῆν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ γραμμῆ ῥυεῖσα ποιεῖ ἐπιφάνειαν κατ' αὐτοῦς, ἥτις ἐστὶ, φασί, πέρασ σώματος δύο
- 78 ἔχον διαστάσεις, μῆκος καὶ πλάτος. εἶπερ οὖν ἡ ἐπιφάνεια πέρασ ἐστὶ σώματος, τό γε σῶμα πάντως πεπερασμένον ἐστίν· καὶ εἰ τοῦτο, ὅτε παρατίθεται δύο σώματα ἀλλήλοις, τότε ἦτοι τὰ πέρατα τῶν περάτων ἢ τὰ πεπερατωμένα τῶν πεπερατωμένων ἄψεται, ἢ καὶ τὰ πεπερατωμένα τῶν πεπερατωμένων καὶ τὰ πέρατα τῶν περάτων, ὅλον ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀμφορέως, εἰ νοήσαιμεν πέρασ μὲν τὸ ἔξωθεν ὄστρακον πεπερατωμένον δὲ τὸν ἐν
- 79 αὐτῷ οἶνον. δυοῖν οὖν ἀμφορέων παραβληθέντων ἀλλήλοις ἦτοι τὸ ὄστρακον τοῦ ὄστράκου ἄψεται ἢ ὁ οἶνος τοῦ οἴνου ἢ καὶ τὸ ὄστρακον τοῦ ὄστράκου καὶ ὁ οἶνος τοῦ οἴνου. καὶ εἰ μὲν τὰ πέρατα τῶν περάτων ἄπτεται, τὰ πεπερατωμένα ἀλλήλων οὐχ ἄψεται, τουτέστι τὰ σώματα, ὅπερ ἦν ἀπεμφαῖνον. εἰ δὲ τὰ πεπερατωμένα μὲν ἀλλήλων ἄψεται, τουτέστι τὰ σώματα, τὰ πέρατα δὲ ἀλλήλων οὐχ ἄψεται, ἐκτὸς ἔσται τὰ σώματα τῶν οἰκειῶν
- 80 περάτων. εἰ δὲ καὶ τὰ πέρατα τῶν περάτων ἄπτεται καὶ τὰ πεπερατωμένα τῶν πεπερατωμένων, ἐπισυνθήσομεν τὰς ἀπορίας· ἢ μὲν γὰρ τὰ πέρατα

what is productive of breadth must itself possess breadth, it is plain that the straight lines too, as they serve to fill up the breadth, necessarily possess breadth, so that no "length without breadth" exists, and consequently no line.

And even if we should grant that the line is 77 "length without breadth," the consequences of this will be even more hopeless than those stated. For as the sign when it has flowed ^a makes the line, so also the line when it has flowed makes, according to them, the plane, which is, they say, "the limit of the body," possessing two dimensions, length and breadth. If, then, the plane is the limit of the body, 78 the body certainly is limited; and if so, when two bodies are set beside each other, then either the limits will touch the limits or the things limited the things limited, or the things limited will touch the things limited and also the limits the limits,—as though, in the case of a jar, we were to conceive the external earthenware as the limit, and the wine 79 within it as the thing limited.^b When, then, two jars are set beside each other, either the ware will touch the ware or the wine the wine, or the ware will touch the ware and also the wine the wine. But if the limits touch the limits the things limited (that is, the bodies) will not touch each other, which is absurd. And if the things limited (that is, the bodies) shall touch each other, and the limits shall not touch each other, the bodies will be outside their own limits. And if both the limits touch the limits and the things 80 limited the things limited, we shall be multiplying the difficulties; for where the limits touch each other,

^a Cf. § 29; *Adv. Phys.* i. 376.

^b Cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 431.

ἀλλήλων ἄπτεται, τὰ πεπερατωμένα οὐχ ἄψεται ἀλλήλων, ἢ δὲ τὰ πεπερατωμένα, ἔκτος ἔσται τὰ σώματα τῶν οἰκείων περάτων, ἐπεὶ πέρασ μὲν 81 ἔστιν ἢ ἐπιφάνεια, πεπερασμένον δὲ τὸ σῶμα. τὰ τε πέρατα σώματά ἐστιν ἢ ἀσώματα. καὶ εἰ μὲν σώματά ἐστι, ψεῦδος ἔσται τοῖς γεωμέτραις τὸ ἀβαθῆ εἶναι τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν. εἰ γὰρ σῶμά ἐστιν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔξει καὶ βάθος· πᾶν γὰρ σῶμα ὀφείλει βάθος ἔχειν. εἶτα οὐδὲ ἄψεται τινος, ἀλλὰ πᾶν ἔσται ἀπειρομέγεθες. εἰ γὰρ σῶμά ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ πᾶν σῶμα πέρασ ἔχει, κάκεινο τὸ πέρασ σῶμα 82 ἄπειρον. εἰ δὲ ἀσώματόν ἐστι τὸ πέρασ, ἐπεὶ τὸ ἀσώματον οὐδενὸς δύναται θιγεῖν οὐδὲ θιχθῆναι, τὰ πέρατα οὐχ ἄψεται ἀλλήλων, τούτων δὲ μὴ ἀπτομένων οὐδὲ τὰ πεπερατωμένα ἄψεται ἀλλήλων. κἂν δῶμεν οὖν εἶναι μῆκος ἀπλατὲς τὴν γραμμὴν, ὃ περὶ τῆς ἐπιφανείας λόγος ἄπορος ἔστιν. οἷς, κἂν ἡμεῖς μὴ λέγωμεν, ἀπόροις οὖσι συναπορεῖται καὶ τὸ στερεὸν σῶμα, ἐκ τούτων σύνθετον καθεστῶς.

83 Σκοπῶμεν δὲ καὶ οὕτως. εἰ γὰρ σῶμά ἐστιν, ὡς φασὶν οἱ γεωμέτραι, τὸ τὰς τρεῖς ἔχον διαστάσεις, μῆκος πλάτος βάθος, ἥτοι χωριστόν ἐστι τούτων τὸ σῶμα, ὥστε ἄλλο μὲν εἶναι τὸ σῶμα ἄλλο δὲ τὸ μῆκος τοῦ σώματος πλάτος τε καὶ βάθος, ἢ ὁ ἀθροισμὸς τούτων ἐστὶ τὸ σῶμα. ἀλλὰ χωρίζεσθαι μὲν τούτων τὸ σῶμα οὐ πιθανόν ἐστιν· ὅπου γὰρ μήτε μῆκος ἔστι μήτε πλάτος μήτε 84 βάθος, ἐκεῖ οὐχ οἷόν τε νοῆσαι σῶμα· εἰ δὲ ὁ

the things limited will not touch each other, and where the things limited touch, the bodies will be outside their own limits, since the surface is the limit and the body the thing limited.—Also, the limits are 81 either bodies or incorporeal. But if they are bodies, the Geometers will find that it is false that the surface is without depth. For if it is corporeal, it will of necessity have depth; for every body must have depth. Then, too, it will not touch anything but will all be infinite in magnitude. For if it is body, since every body has a limit, that limit too, being a body, will have a limit, and likewise this last one, and so on *ad infinitum*. And if the limit is incorporeal, since 82 the incorporeal cannot touch or be touched by anything,* the limits will not touch each other, and as they do not touch neither will the things limited touch each other. So, even if we grant that the line is “length without breadth,” the account given of the plane surface is dubious. And these things being dubious, along with them doubt is cast—even if we do not affirm it—on the solid body, seeing it is composed of these.

Let us also consider the matter in this way:—If 83 body is, as the Geometers assert, that which has the three dimensions, length, breadth and depth, either the body is separable from these, so that the body is one thing and the length, breadth and depth of the body something different, or else the aggregation of these is the body. But that the body should be separated from these is not credible; for where neither length nor breadth nor depth exists, there it is impossible to conceive body; and if the aggrega- 84

* Cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 255; “tangere enim et tangi nisi corpus nulla potest res,” *Lucret.* i. 304.

ἀθροισμὸς τούτων νοεῖται σῶμα καὶ ἄλλο παρὰ
 ταῦτα οὐδὲν ὑπάρχει, ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἐπεὶ ἕκαστον
 τούτων ἀσώματόν ἐστι, καὶ ἡ κοινὴ τῶν ἀσωμά-
 των σύνοδος γενήσεται ἀσώματος. ὡς περ γὰρ
 ἡ σύνθεσις τῶν στιγμῶν καὶ ἡ σύνοδος τῶν γραμ-
 μῶν ἀσωμάτων φύσει καθεστηκυῶν οὐ ποιεῖ
 στερεὸν καὶ ἀντίτυπον σῶμα, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τοῦ
 πλάτους καὶ ἡ τοῦ μήκους ἐτι δὲ καὶ ἡ τοῦ βάθους
 συνέλευσις ἀσώματος οὔσα οὐκ ἂν ποιῆσαι στερεὸν
 καὶ ἀντίτυπον σῶμα. εἰ δὲ μήτε χωρὶς τούτων
 ἐστὶ τὸ σῶμα μήτε ταῦτ' ἐστίν, ἀνεπινόητον,
 ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς γεωμέτραις, γίνεται τὸ σῶμα.
 85 πρὸς τούτοις, εἶπερ μήκους καὶ πλάτους καὶ
 βάθους σύνοδος ποιεῖ σῶμα, ἥτοι πρὶν τῆς συνόδου
 ἕκαστον τούτων νοεῖται περιέχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὴν
 σωματότητα καὶ τοὺς ὡς περ σωματικούς λόγους,
 ἢ μετὰ τὴν τούτων συνέλευσιν ἐπισυνέστη τὸ σῶμα.
 καὶ εἰ μὲν ἕκαστον τούτων πρὶν τῆς συνόδου
 νοεῖται περιεκτικὸν τῆς σωματότητος, ἔσται τού-
 των ἕκαστον σῶμα καὶ οὐ μετὰ τὴν σύνοδον
 86 αὐτῶν ἐκεῖνο γενήσεται. εἴτ' ἐπεὶ τὸ σῶμα οὐ
 μήκος μόνον ἐστίν, οὐδὲ πλάτος κατ' ἰδίαν, οὐδὲ
 βάθος κατὰ περιγραφὴν, ἀλλ' ὁμόσε τὰ τρία, καὶ
 μήκος καὶ πλάτος καὶ βάθος, τούτων τε ἕκαστον
 περιεῖχε τὴν σωματότητα, ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἔξει
 τὰ τρία, καὶ τὸ μήκος οὐ μόνον ἔσται μήκος ἀλλὰ
 καὶ πλάτος καὶ βάθος, καὶ τὸ πλάτος οὐ μόνον
 ἔσται πλάτος ἀλλὰ καὶ μήκος καὶ βάθος, καὶ τὸ
 βάθος ὁμοίως ἔσται καὶ μήκος καὶ πλάτος. ὅπερ
 87 τελέως ἐστὶν ἀλογώτατον. εἰ δὲ συνελθόντων
 τούτων τότε νοεῖται ἡ σύστασις τοῦ σώματος,
 ἥτοι συνελθόντων αὐτῶν μένει ἡ ἀρχῆθεν φύσις

tion of these is conceived as body, and there is
 nothing else besides these, then, since each of these
 is incorporeal, the united assemblage of these in-
 corporeals will necessarily be incorporeal. For just
 as the combination of the points and the conjunc-
 tion of the lines, which are by nature incorporeal,
 do not make a solid and resistant body, so too the
 union of breadth and length, and depth as well,
 being incorporeal, will not make a solid and resistant
 body. But if the body is neither separate from these
 nor identical with these, the body is—so far as the
 Geometers' account goes—inconceivable.—Further-
 85 more, if the conjunction of length and breadth and
 depth makes body, either each of these is conceived
 as containing in itself corporeality and what we may
 call "the corporeal reasons" before the conjunction,
 or else body is constructed after these have come
 together. But if each of these is conceived as con-
 taining corporeality before the conjunction, each of
 these will be body, and body will not come into being
 after the conjunction.—Moreover, since body is not 86
 length alone, nor breadth by itself, nor exclusively
 depth, but the three together, length and breadth and
 depth, and each of these includes corporeality, each
 of them will possess the three, and the length will be
 not length only but also breadth and depth, and the
 breadth will be not breadth only but also length and
 depth, and similarly the depth will also be length and
 breadth. But this is most completely illogical.—
 And if the composition of body is conceived as taking 87
 place after these have come together, then either the
 original nature of those things which have come

τοῦ μὲν μήκους ὡς μήκους, τοῦ δὲ πλάτους ὡς πλάτους, τοῦ δὲ βάθους ὡς βάθους, ἢ μεταβέ-
 88 βληκεν εἰς τὴν σωματότητα. καὶ εἰ μὲν μένει ἢ ἀρχῆθεν αὐτῶν φύσις, ἐπεὶ ἀσώματα ἔστιν, οὐδὲ διάφορον ποιήσει σῶμα, ἀλλὰ καὶ μετὰ τὴν συν-
 89 οδὸν ἀσώματα μένει, τὴν φύσιν ὄντα ἀσώματα. εἰ δὲ συνελθόντα μεταβάλλει εἰς τὴν σωματότητα, ἐπεὶ τὸ ἐπιδεχόμενον μεταβολὴν εὐθέως ἔστι σῶμα, ἕκαστον τούτων καὶ πρὶν τῆς εἰς ταῦτο συνόδου ἔσται σῶμα, οὕτω τε καὶ τὸ ἀσώματον γενήσεται σῶμα. ὥσπερ τε τὸ σῶμα μεταβαλὼν ἄλλην μὲν ἀντ' ἄλλης ἔχει ποιότητα, μένει δὲ οὐδὲν ἥσσον σῶμα, οἷον τὸ λευκόν, ἵνα μέλαν γένηται, καὶ τὸ γλυκύ, ἵνα πικρόν, καὶ ὁ οἶνος, ἵνα ὄξος, καὶ ὁ μόλιβδος, ἵνα ψιμμύθιον, καὶ ὁ χαλκός, ἵνα ἰός, ἄλλην μὲν ἀντ' ἄλλης ἀναδέχεται ποιότητα, οὐκ
 90 ἐκβαίνει δὲ τοῦ σώματα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ μέλαν, ὅτε ἐκ λευκοῦ γέγονε μέλαν, καὶ τὸ πικρόν, ὅτε ἐκ τοῦ γλυκέος γέγονε πικρόν, καὶ τὸ ὄξος, ὅτε ἐκ τοῦ οἴνου γέγονεν ὄξος, μένει σώματα, οὕτω καὶ ταῦτα, εἴπερ μεταβάλλει [εἰς σώματα],¹ ἀλλὰ μὲν ἀντ' ἄλλων ἔσται ἀσώματα, ἀσώματα² δὲ οὐδὲν ἦττον· οὐ γὰρ ἐκβήσεται τὴν ἰδίαν φύσιν. εἰ οὖν οὔτε πρὶν τῆς συνελεύσεως τούτων ἔστι νοῆσαι τὸ σῶμα οὔτε μετὰ τὴν συνέλευσιν αὐτῶν, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλως ἐπινοῆσαι, οὐδὲν
 91 ἔστι σῶμα. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, εἰ μηδὲν ἔστι μήκος μηδὲ πλάτος μηδὲ βάθος, οὐδὲ τὸ κατὰ μετουσίαν τούτων νοούμενον ἔσται σῶμα· οὐχὶ δὲ γε μήκος ἔστιν οὐδὲ πλάτος οὐδὲ βάθος, ὡς διὰ τῶν ἔμ-

¹ εἰς σώματα seclusi.

² ἀσώματα, ἀσώματα Heintz : σώματα, σώματα mss., Bekk.

together remains,—that of length as length, of breadth as breadth, of depth as depth,—or it is changed to corporeality.^a But if their original 88 nature remains, since they are incorporeal they will not form a different body, but even after their conjunction they will remain incorporeal, being incorporeal by nature. And if after coming together they 89 change to corporeality, then, since that which admits of change is *ipso facto* corporeal, each of these will be body even before their coming together, and thus too the incorporeal will be body.—Also, just as the body when it has changed exchanges one property for another, but none the less remains body,—for example, white to become black, and sweet to become bitter, and wine to become vinegar, and lead to become white lead, and bronze to become rust, exchange one property for another yet do not cease to be bodies, but the black, when from being white it 90 has become black, and the bitter, when from being sweet it has become bitter, and the vinegar, when from being wine it has become vinegar, all remain bodies,—so these dimensions also, if they change, will change from one sort of incorporeal to another, but none the less (will remain) incorporeal; for they will not go out of their own proper nature.—If, then, it is not possible to conceive the body either before the coming together of these dimensions or after their coming together, and besides these no other alternative can be conceived, body is nothing.—And 91 further, if neither length is anything, nor breadth, nor depth, that which is conceived as participating in these will not be body; but length is not anything, nor is breadth, nor depth, as we have already pointed

^a Cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 371 ff.

προσθεν παρεμυθησάμεθα· οὐδὲ τὸ κατὰ μετουσίαν ἄρα τούτων νοοῦμενον ἔσται σῶμα.

92 Τὰς μὲν οὖν γεωμετρικὰς ἀρχὰς οὕτω συμβέβη-
κεν ἀνυποστάτους εἶναι· τούτων δὲ ἀναιρουμένων
οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι γεωμετρικὸν θεώρημα συστήναι
δύναται. ὅποιον γὰρ ἂν ᾖ τοῦτο, γραμμικῶς
ὀφείλει ἀποδείκνυσθαι, ἐδείξαμεν δὲ ἡμεῖς ὅτι
οὐδέν ἐστιν ἢ γενικὴ γραμμὴ, ᾧ ἀκολουθεῖ μηδὲ
τῶν ἐπ' εἶδους τινὰ ὑπάρχειν, εἴαν τε εὐθεῖαν τις
ταύτην ὑποτίθεται εἴαν τε κεκλασμένην εἴαν τε
93 ἄλλως πως ἔχουσιν. ὅθεν ἤρκει μὲν ἴσως ἐν
τούτοις περατοῦν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς γεωμέτρας
ἀντίρρησην· ὁμως δὲ ἐπαγωνιζόμενοι πειρασόμεθα
διδάσκειν ὅτι κἂν τῶν ἀρχῶν ἀποστῶμεν τῶν
τῆς γεωμετρίας, οὐ δύνανται θεώρημα συστήσασθαι
94 οἱ γεωμέτραι οὐδ' ἀποδείξαι. καίτοι πρὶν τούτων
καὶ πρὸς τὰς ὑποβεβηκυίας αὐτῶν ἀρχὰς οὐκ
ὀλίγα δυνατόν ἐστι λέγειν, οἷον ὅταν φῶσιν εὐθεῖαν
εἶναι γραμμὴν τὴν ἐξ ἴσου τοῖς ἑαυτῆς μέρεσι
κειμένην. ἵνα γὰρ τὰ ἄλλα παρῶμεν, ἐκεῖνο μὲν
συμφανές ἐστιν ὅτι τῆς γενικῆς γραμμῆς μὴ οὐσης
οὐδὲ εὐθεία γραμμὴ γένοιτ' ἂν· ὡς γὰρ ζῶον μὴ
ὄντος οὐδὲ ἄνθρωπος ἔστι καὶ ἀνθρώπου μὴ ὄντος
οὐδὲ Σωκράτης ἔστιν, οὕτω τῆς γενικῆς ἀναιρου-
μένης γραμμῆς συναήρηται καὶ ἡ ἐπίπεδος εὐθεῖα
95 γραμμὴ. εἶτα καὶ τὸ ἴσον λέγεται διχῶς, κατὰ
ἓνα μὲν τρόπον τὸ ἰσομέγεθες καὶ μήτε ὑπερέχον
ἐκεῖνου τοῦ ᾧ λέγεται ἴσον μήτε ὑπερεχόμενον,
καθὸ καὶ τὸ πηχυαῖον ξύλον ἴσον εἶναι λέγομεν
τῷ πηχυαίῳ, καθ' ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἔχον ἐξ ἴσου τὰ
μέρη κείμενα, τουτέστι τὸ ὁμαλόν· οὕτω γοῦν τὸ

out^a; therefore that which is conceived as partici-
pating in these will not be body.

Thus, as regards the principles of geometry, the 92
result is that they are unfounded; and as these are
abolished no other geometrical theorem can subsist.
For the theorem, of whatever sort it be, must be
proved by a diagram, but we have shown^b that the
generic line is nothing, and from this it follows that
none of the specific lines exist, whether one assumes
a straight one, or a curved one, or one of some other
form. Hence, it might, no doubt, have sufficed to 93
finish at this point our confutation of the Geometers;
however, we shall contend against them further and
try to show that, even if we disregard the principles
of geometry, the Geometers are unable to construct
or prove a theorem. Before this, however, no little 94
can be said against their underlying principles,—as,
for instance, when they declare that “a straight line
is that which is equally placed with its parts.” For,
to pass over all other objections, this one is obvious,—
that the generic line being non-existent, the straight
line will not exist; for just as “man” does not exist
if “animal” is non-existent, and “Socrates” does
not exist if “man” is non-existent, so if the generic
line is destroyed the plane straight line is destroyed
along with it.—Moreover, the term “equal” is used 95
in two senses, in one sense as “equal in magnitude”
and neither exceeding nor being exceeded by that
to which it is said to be equal (as we say that the
staff of a cubit's length is equal to a cubit's length),
in another sense of “that which has its parts placed
equally,” that is to say, “the even”; thus, for

^a Cf. § 86.

^b Cf. §§ 37 ff.

96 ἴσον ἔδαφος καλοῦμεν ἀντὶ τοῦ ὀμαλῶς. διχῶς
 οὖν τοῦ ἴσου προσαγορευομένου, ὅταν οἱ γεω-
 μέτραι τὴν εὐθείαν γραμμὴν ὑπογράφοντες φάσιν
 “εὐθεία ἐστὶ γραμμὴ ἢ ἐξ ἴσου τοῖς ἑαυτῆς
 μέρεσι κειμένη,” ἥτοι τὸ κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον σημαίνο-
 μενον λαμβάνουσιν ἴσον ἢ τὸ κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον.
 ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν τὸ κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον, τελέως εἰσὶν
 ἀνόητοι· οὐδένα γὰρ ἔχει νοῦν τὸ εὐθείαν εἶναι
 γραμμὴν τὴν ἰσομεγέθη τοῖς ἑαυτῆς μέρεσι καὶ
 μήτε ὑπερέχουσαν ταῦτα μήτε ὑπερεχομένην ὑπὸ
 97 τούτων. εἰ δὲ τὸ κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον, δι’ αὐτοῦ τὸ
 ζητούμενον¹ διδάξουσιν, εἶγε ὅτι μὲν ἔστιν εὐθεία
 παριστᾶσιν ἐκ τοῦ ὀμαλῶς τε καὶ ἐπ’ εὐθείας ἔχειν
 κείμενα τὰ μέρη, τὸ δὲ ἐπ’ εὐθείας τι κείσθαι οὐκ
 98 ἔστι μαθεῖν μὴ ἐπιβαλόντας τῇ εὐθείᾳ. πολλῶ δὲ
 ἀποπάταται τυγχάνουσι κάκεινως ὀριζόμενοι “εὐ-
 θεία ἐστὶν ἥτις ἐξ ἴσου τοῖς ἑαυτῆς πέρασι στρέ-
 φεται” ἢ οὕτως “ἥτις περὶ τὰ ἑαυτῆς πέρατα
 στρεφομένη πᾶσι τοῖς ἑαυτῆς μέρεσιν ἄπτεται
 τοῦ ἐπιπέδου.” πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ καὶ αὐταὶ αἱ
 ἀποδόσεις ὑποπίπτουσι ταῖς πρότερον εἰρημέναις
 ἡμῖν ἀπορίαις· εἶτα, καθὼς καὶ οἱ Ἐπικουρεῖοί
 φασιν, ἢ τοῦ κενοῦ εὐθεία εὐθεία μὲν ἐστίν, οὐ
 στρέφεται δὲ διὰ τὸ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ κενὸν μήτε ὅλον
 99 μήτε κατὰ μέρος κίνησιν ἐπιδέχεσθαι. ἢ μὲν γὰρ
 ἐπὶ τέλει ἀπόδοσις καὶ εἰς τὸν δι’ ἀλλήλων ἐπιπίπτει
 τρόπον, ὅς ἐστι μοχθηρότατος. τό τε γὰρ ἐπί-
 πεδον διὰ τῆς εὐθείας διδάσκουσι τὴν τ’ εὐθείαν
 διὰ τοῦ ἐπιπέδου· εὐθείαν μὲν γὰρ εἶναι φασιν
 ἥτις εἰς πάντα τὰ μέρη τοῦ ἐπιπέδου ἄπτεται,

¹ δι’ αὐτοῦ τὸ ζητούμενον Heintz : δι’ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ζητούμενου
 mss., Bekk.

instance, we call a pavement “equal” instead of
 “even” (or “level”). The term “equal,” then, 96
 being applied in two ways, when the Geometers in
 describing the straight line say that “a straight line
 is that which lies equally with its parts,” they are
 taking the term “equal” either in the first significa-
 tion or in the second. But if it is in the first, they are
 perfectly senseless; for there is no sense in saying
 that the straight line is of equal magnitude with its
 parts, neither exceeding these nor being exceeded by
 these. And if it is in the second sense, they will be 97
 proving the matter in question by means of itself,
 seeing that they establish the fact that it is straight
 from the fact that it has its parts lying evenly and in
 a straight line, whereas it is not possible to learn that
 a thing lies in a straight line without having sensed
 the straight line. But they are far more absurd when 98
 they give the following definition,—“A straight line
 is that which revolves equally with its limits,” or
 this—“which in revolving round its limits touches the
 plane with all its parts.” For, firstly, these descrip-
 tions are subject to the doubts already expressed
 by us; and secondly, as the Epicureans affirm, the
 straight line of the void is, indeed, straight, but does
 not revolve because the void itself does not admit of
 motion either as a whole or in part. And the last de- 99
 scription falls also into the vice of circular reasoning,^a
 which is most unsound. For they both explain the
 plane by means of the straight line and the straight
 line by means of the plane; for they say that the
 straight line is that which touches the plane with all its

^a Cf. P.H. I. 117.

ἐπίπεδον δὲ τυγχάνειν δι' οὐ ἢ καταγομένη εὐθεία
 πᾶσι τοῖς μέρεσιν ἄπτεται, ὥσθ' ἵνα μὲν τὴν
 εὐθείαν μάθωμεν, πρῶτον τὸ ἐπίπεδον μαθεῖν δεῖ,
 ἵνα δὲ τοῦτο, ἀναγκαῖον προεγνωκέναι τὴν εὐθείαν.
 ὅπερ ἄτοπον. καθόλου τε ὁ διὰ τοῦ ἐπιπέδου
 τὴν εὐθείαν διδάσκων οὐδὲν ἄλλο ποιεῖ ἢ δι'
 εὐθείας τὴν εὐθείαν παρίστησιν, ἐπεὶ περ τὸ ἐπίπεδον
 πολλαί εἰσιν εὐθεῖαι κατ' αὐτούς.

- 100 Οἷος δέ ἐστιν ὁ περὶ τῆς εὐθείας λόγος, τοιοῦτος
 γένοιτ' ἂν καὶ ὁ περὶ τῆς γωνίας. πάλιν γὰρ ὅταν
 ὑπογράφοντες λέγωσιν ὅτι γωνία ἐστὶ δυοῖν εὐ-
 θειῶν μὴ κατάλληλα κειμένων τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν κλίσην
 ἐλάχιστον, ἥτοι ἐλάχιστον λέγουσι τὸ ἀμερὲς σῶμα
 101 ἢ τὸ κατ' αὐτούς σημεῖον καὶ στιγμαίν. ἀλλὰ τὸ
 μὲν ἀμερὲς σῶμα οὐκ ἂν εἴποιεν, ἐπεὶ περ τοῦτο
 μὲν οὐδ' εἰς δύο μέρη δύναται διαιρεῖσθαι, ἢ δὲ
 γωνία κατ' αὐτούς ἐπ' ἄπειρον τέμνεται. καὶ
 ἄλλως, τῆς γωνίας ἢ μὲν μείζονά φασι εἶναι
 ἢ δὲ μικροτέραν· τοῦ δὲ ἐλαχίστου σώματος οὐδὲν
 ἐστὶ βραχύτερον, ἐπεὶ ἐκεῖνο ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτο γενή-
 102 σεται ἐλάχιστον. λείπεται ἄρα τὸ κατ' αὐτούς
 σημεῖον εἶναι λέγειν· ὁ καὶ αὐτὸ τῶν ἀπόρων. εἰ
 γὰρ πάντῃ πανταχῶς ἀδιάστατόν ἐστὶ τὸ σημεῖον,
 οὐ διαιρεθήσεται ἢ γωνία. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ μείζων
 τις ἔσται ἢ ἐλάσσων γωνία· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς μηδεμίαν
 103 διαφορά. ἄλλως τε, εἰ μεταξὺ τῶν εὐθειῶν πίπτει
 τὸ σημεῖον, διορίζει τὰς εὐθείας, διορίζον δὲ οὐκ
 104 ἔσται ἀδιάστατον. νῆ Δία, ἀλλ' εἰώθασί τινες ἐξ

parts, and the plane is that which, when the straight
 line is drawn over it, it touches it with all its parts, so
 that in order to get to know the straight line we must
 first get to know the plane, and in order to do this, we
 must necessarily know beforehand the straight line ;
 which is absurd. And, in sum, he who explains the
 straight line by means of the plane is doing nothing
 else than establishing the straight line by means of
 the straight line, since, according to them, the plane is
 many straight lines.

The argument about the angle will be of much the 100
 same kind as that about the straight line. For again,
 when in describing the angle they say that the angle
 is "the minimum under the inclination of two lines
 which do not lie parallel," they mean by "mini-
 mum" either the indivisible body or what they
 call the sign or point. But they will not mean the 101
 indivisible body, since this cannot be divided into
 two parts, whereas, according to them, the angle is
 divided to infinity. And besides, in the case of the
 angle, one, they say, is greater, another lesser ; but
 nothing is smaller than the minimal body, for if so it,
 and not the body, would be the minimum. It remains 102
 then to say that it is what they call the sign ; but
 this itself is also dubious. For if the sign is in every
 way wholly without dimensions, the angle will not
 be divided.—Moreover, no angle will be greater or
 lesser ; for in things which have no dimension there
 will be no difference in respect of magnitude. Be- 103
 sides, if the sign falls between the straight lines, it
 divides the straight lines, and as dividing it will not
 be without dimensions.—But, in sooth, some of them 104

αὐτῶν γωνίαν λέγειν τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν κλίσειν πρῶτον διάστημα. πρὸς οὓς

ἀπλοῦς ὁ μῦθος τῆς ἀληθείας ἔφν.

ἦτοι γὰρ ἀμέρες ἔστι τὸ διάστημα τοῦτο ἢ μεριστόν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἀμέρες, αἱ προειρημένας τῶν ἀποριῶν ἀκολουθήσουσιν αὐτοῖς, εἰ δὲ μεριστόν, οὐδὲν ἔσται πρῶτον· τοῦ γὰρ ὑποσταθέντος πρώτου ἕτερον εὑρεθήσεται πρότερον διὰ τὴν ἀρεσκο-
 105 μένην αὐτοῖς εἰς ἀπειρον τῶν ὄντων τομῆν. ἐὼ λέγειν ὅτι καὶ ἄλλη τινὶ τεχνολογίᾳ μάχεται ἢ τοιαύτη τῶν γωνιῶν νόησις. διαιρούμενοι γὰρ φασι τῆς γωνίας τὴν μὲν τινα εἶναι ὀρθὴν τὴν δὲ ἀμβλείαν τὴν δὲ ὀξείαν, καὶ τῆς μὲν ἀμβλείας ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην μᾶλλον ἀμβλυτέραν εἶναι, ὡσαύτως δὲ
 106 καὶ τῆς ὀξείας. εἰ δὲ γωνίαν φασὲν τὸ ἐλάχιστον ὑπὸ τὴν κλίσειν διάστημα, οὐ σωθήσονται αἱ τοιαῦται τῶν γωνιῶν διαφοραί, παρόσον ὑπερέχουσί τε ἀλλήλας καὶ ὑπερέχονται ὑπ' ἀλλήλων. ἢ εἴπερ σώζονται, ἀναιρεῖται ἡ γωνία, μὴ ἔχουσα ἑστηκὸς μέτρον ᾧ διαγνωσθήσεται.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν εὐθείας γραμμῆς καὶ γωνίας
 107 τοιαῦτα ρητέον πρὸς αὐτοὺς· ὀριζόμενοι δὲ καὶ τὸν κύκλον φασὶ "κύκλος ἔστι σχῆμα ἐπιπέδον ὑπὸ μᾶς γραμμῆς περιεχόμενον, πρὸς ἣν αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ κέντρου προσπίπτουσαι εὐθεῖαι ἴσαι εἰσὶν ἀλλήλαις," ματαιάζοντες· τοῦ γὰρ σημείου καὶ τῆς γραμμῆς καὶ τῆς εὐθείας καὶ ἔτι τοῦ ἐπιπέδου καὶ τῆς γωνίας ἀνηρημένων οὐδὲ κύκλος ἐπινοηθῆναι δύναται.

108 Ἄλλ' ἵνα μὴ δοκῶμεν σοφιστικοί τινες εἶναι καὶ τὴν σύμπασαν τῆς ἀντιρρήσεως κατασκευῆν

are wont to say that the angle is "the first interval under the inclination." Against whom

By nature simple is the tale which truth doth tell.*

For this interval is either without parts or with parts. But if it is without parts, they will find themselves beset in consequence with the difficulties already stated; and if it has parts, none of them will be "first"; for another will be found to be prior to that assumed to be "first" because of the division of existents *ad infinitum* which is approved by them. I forbear to argue 105 that such a notion of the angles is in conflict with another piece of their technology. For in their classification they say that one class of angle is "right," another "obtuse," another "acute"; and that, of the obtuse angles, some are more obtuse than others, and so likewise with the acute angles. But if we affirm that 106 the angle is "the least interval under the inclination," such differences in angles will not be preserved, in so far as they both exceed one another and are exceeded by one another. Or, if they are preserved, the angle is destroyed, not possessing a fixed standard by which it can be distinguished.

Such, then, are the arguments we must use against them with respect to the straight line and the angle; and in defining the circle they say "The circle is a 107 plane figure enclosed by one line, and the straight lines from the centre which fall on this are equal to one another," talking idly; for when the sign and the line and the straight line, and the plane, too, and the angle are destroyed, the circle cannot be conceived.

But in order that we may not seem to be sophistical 108 people and to expend all the reasoning in our refuta-

* Cf. Eurip. *Phoeniss.* 469.

ἐν μόναϊς καταναλίσκεω ταῖς τῆς γεωμετρίας ἀρχαῖς, φέρε μετελθόντες, ὡς πρότερον ὑπεσχόμεθα, καὶ τὰ μετὰ τὰς ἀρχὰς αὐτῶν θεωρήματα
 109 ἐπισκεψώμεθα. ὅταν οὖν λέγουσι τὴν δοθείσαν εὐθείαν δίχα τεμεῖν, ἤτοι τὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἄβρακος διδομένην λέγουσι διχοτομεῖν ἢ τὴν ἀπὸ ταύτης κατὰ μετάβασιν νοουμένην. οὐτε δὲ τὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἄβρακος δοθείσαν διχοτομεῖν ἐροῦσιν· αὕτη μὲν γὰρ μήκος καὶ πλάτος αἰσθητὸν ἔχειν φαίνεται, ἢ δὲ κατ' αὐτοὺς εὐθεία γραμμὴ μήκός ἐστιν ἀπλατές, ὥστε μὴ <γραμμὴ>¹ οὐσα κατ' αὐτοὺς ἢ γραμμὴ ἢ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἄβρακος οὐδὲ δίχα τμηθήσεται ὡς γραμμὴ.
 110 καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ἢ ἀπὸ ταύτης κατὰ μετάβασιν νοουμένην. ὑποκείσθω γὰρ λόγου χάριν ἐξ ἑννέα στιγμῶν συνεστῶσα, ἀφ' ἑκατέρου μὲν τῶν ἄκρων τεσσάρων καὶ τεσσάρων ἀριθμουμένων, μιᾶς δὲ τὰς δύο τετράδας μεσολαβούσης στιγμῆς. οὐκοῦν εἰ δίχα τέμνεται ἢ ὅλη γραμμὴ, ἤτοι μεταξὺ ταύτης τῆς πέμπτης στιγμῆς καὶ τῆς ἑτέρας τετράδος ἐνεχθήσεται τὸ τέμνον, ἢ κατ' αὐτῆς τῆς
 111 πέμπτης, ὥστε καὶ αὐτὴν διχάζειν. τὸ μὲν οὖν μεταξὺ τῆς πέμπτης στιγμῆς καὶ τῆς ἑτέρας τετράδος φέρεσθαι τὸ τέμνον τῶν ἀλόγων· γενήσεται γὰρ ἄνισα τὰ τμήματα, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐκ τεσσάρων στιγμῶν συγκεῖμενον τὸ δὲ ἐκ πέντε. τὸ δὲ αὐτὴν διχάζειν τὴν στιγμὴν πολλῶν τοῦ προτέρου ἀλογώτερον· οὐκέτι γὰρ ἀδιάστατον ἀπολείψουσι τὸ σημεῖον, ὃ γε διχάζεται πρὸς τοῦ
 112 τέμνοντος. ὃ δὲ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπειδὴν φῶσι τὸν κύκλον εἰς ἴσα τέμνειν. εἰ γὰρ ὁ κύκλος εἰς ἴσα τέμνεται, πάντως ἐπεὶ μεσαίτατον ἔχει τὸ

¹ <γραμμὴ> addidi.

tion on the principles of geometry alone, come and let us pass on, as we previously promised,^a and investigate the theorems which come after their principles. When, then, they say that they will “bisect the given 109 straight line,”^b they mean that they are bisecting either that given on the board or that which is conceived by transference from it. But they will not mean that they are bisecting that given on the board; for this appears to possess sensible length and breadth, whereas, according to them, the straight line is “length without breadth,” so that the line on the board, not being a line according to them, will not be bisected like a line. Nor, indeed, will the line which 110 is conceived by transference from that on the board. For let us assume, for the sake of argument, that it is composed of nine points, four being numbered from the one extremity and four from the other and one point occupying the middle place between the two sets of four. Then, if the whole line is bisected, the secant will strike either between this fifth point and one of the sets of four or on the fifth point itself so as to divide it in two. That the secant should 111 strike between the fifth point and one of the sets of four is, however, illogical; for the sections will be unequal, one being made up of four points and the other of five. But the dividing the point itself into two is much more illogical than the former alternative; for they will no longer be leaving the sign without dimensions,^c as it is divided into two by the secant.—And the argument is the same when 112 they say they are cutting the circle into equal parts.^d For if the circle is cut into equal parts, then, since it

^a Cf. § 93.

^b Cf. § 20.

^c Cf. Adv. Phys. i. 282 ff.

^d Cf. Adv. Phys. i. 284 ff.

κέντρον, ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ ἐστὶ σημεῖον, ἥτοι τῷδε τῷ
 τμήματι ἢ τῷδε [τινι] προσμερισθήσεται, ἢ καὶ
 αὐτὸ δίχα τμηθήσεται. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τῷδε ἢ τῷδε
 προσμερισθῆναι ἄνισον τὴν διχοτόμησιν ποιεῖ, τὸ
 δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ διχοτομεῖσθαι μαχόμενόν ἐστὶ τῷ
 113 ἀδιάστατον καὶ ἀμερές ὑπάρχειν τὸ σημεῖον. τὸ
 τε τέμνον τὴν γραμμὴν ἥτοι σῶμά ἐστιν ἢ ἀσώ-
 ματον. οὔτε δὲ σῶμα δύναται τυγχάνειν ἀμερές
 γάρ τι καὶ ἀσώματον καὶ μὴ ὑποπίπτον αὐτῷ οὐκ
 ἂν τέμνοι· οὔτε ἀσώματον. τουτὶ γὰρ πάλιν εἰ
 μὲν στιγμή ἐστὶ, τῷ ἀμερῆς εἶναι καὶ κατὰ ἀμεροῦς
 πίπτειν οὐκ ἂν τέμνοι, εἰ δὲ γραμμὴ, πάλιν ἐπεὶ τῷ
 πέρατι ἑαυτῆς ὀφείλει τέμνειν, τὸ δὲ πέρας αὐτῆς
 114 ἐστὶν ἀμερές, οὐ τέμνει. ἄλλως τε τὸ τέμνον
 πέρας ἥτοι μέσον τῶν δυοῖν στιγμῶν πίπτει δι-
 χοτομεῖ τὴν γραμμὴν, ἢ κατὰ μέσου φερόμενον
 τοῦ σημείου. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν κατὰ μέσου φέρεσθαι
 τοῦ σημείου τῶν ἀδυνάτων· δεήσει γάρ, ὡς
 πρότερον ἐλέγομεν, τὸ καθ' οὐ φέρεται μερι-
 στὸν εἶναι καὶ μηκέτι ἀδιάστατον τυγχάνειν.¹
 115 μεταξὺ δὲ τῶν δυοῖν στιγμῶν φέρεσθαι πολλῷ
 ἀλογώτερον. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν δύναται μετα-
 ξὺ συνεχείας μέσον πεσεῖν πέρας· εἶτα κἂν δοθῇ
 τὸ τοιοῦτον ὡς δυνατόν, ὀφείλει μετακινεῖν τὰ ὦν
 μεταξὺ τάσσεται, εἶπερ ἐστὶ συνεχῆ· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν
 ἀκίνητα. τοίνυν ἄπορος καὶ ὁ περὶ τοῦ τέμνοντός
 116 ἐστὶ λόγος. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κἂν δώμεν αὐτοῖς τὰς
 ἀφαιρέσεις ποιέσθαι ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τούτων
 γραμμῶν, οὐ δυνήσονται οὐδ' οὕτως εὐδοῆσαι. ἦ

has the centre (which itself is a point), in the very
 middle, the centre will certainly be annexed either to
 this section or to that, or else it will itself be cut in
 two. But the fact of its being annexed to this section
 or that makes the bisection unequal; and that it should
 itself be bisected is in conflict with the fact that the
 sign is without dimensions and without parts.—Also, 113
 the secant which cuts the line is either a body or incor-
 poreal. But it cannot be a body; for, if so, it will not
 cut a thing without parts and incorporeal and on which
 it cannot strike; nor yet can it be incorporeal. For
 this, again, if it is a point, will not cut owing to its
 being without parts and striking on what is without
 parts; and if it is a line, again it does not cut since it
 must cut with its limit, and its limit is without parts.—
 Besides, the limit which cuts bisects the line either by 114
 falling between the two points, or by striking on the
 middle of the sign. But that it should strike on the
 middle of the sign is a thing impossible. For, as we
 said before, that on which it strikes will have to
 possess parts and be no longer without dimensions.
 And that it should strike between the two points is 115
 much more irrational. For, firstly, no limit can fall
 in the middle of what is continuous; and secondly,
 even if we allow that such a thing is possible, it must
 move apart the things between which it posts itself,
 if they are continuous; but these are immovable.
 So then, the account given of the secant is dubious.
 —Moreover, even if we grant them that subtrac- 116
 tions are made in the case of these sensible lines,
 even so they will be unable to make progress. For

¹ τὸ καθ' οὐ φέρεται μ. εἶναι καὶ μ. ἀδ. τυγχάνειν scripti: τὸ
 καθόλου φέρεσθαι μ. εἶν ἢ μ. ἀδ. τυγχάνη mss., Bekk.: τὸ καθ' οὐ
 φέρεται μ. εἶναι, ἵνα μ. cj. Bekk.

γὰρ ἀφ' ὅλης τῆς γραμμῆς ἡ ἀφαίρεσις γενήσεται ἢ ἀπὸ μέρους, καὶ τὸ ἀφαιρούμενον ἢ ἴσον ἀπὸ ἴσου ἢ ἄνισον ἀπὸ ἀνίσου [ἢ ἐναλλάξ]¹ γενήσεται· οὐδὲν δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν εὐπορον, ὡς ἐν τῷ πρὸς τοὺς γραμματικούς καὶ ἐν τῷ πρὸς τοὺς φυσικούς ὑπομνήματι παρεστήσαμεν· οὐκ ἄρα δυνατόν ἐστι τοῖς γεωμέτραις ἀφαιρεῖν τι καὶ τέμνειν ἀπὸ γραμμῆς.

¹ [ἢ ἐναλλάξ] del. Heintz.

the subtraction will either be from the whole line or from a part, and the part subtracted will be either an equal part from an equal, or an unequal from an unequal; but none of these is feasible, as we have established in our treatise *Against the Grammarians*^a and in that *Against the Physicists*; therefore it is not possible for the Geometers to subtract or cut off anything from the line.

^a Cf. *Adv. Gram.* 162 ff.; *Adv. Phys.* i. 280 ff.; *P.H.* iii. 85 ff.

Δ

ΠΡΟΣ ΑΡΙΘΜΗΤΙΚΟΥΣ

- 1 Ἐπειδὴ τοῦ ποσοῦ τὸ μὲν ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς συνεχέσει σώμασιν, ὃ δὴ μέγεθος καλεῖται, περὶ ὃ ἔστι μάλιστα ἡ γεωμετρία, τὸ δὲ ἐν διεστώσιν, ὅπερ ἀριθμὸς καθέστηκεν, περὶ ὃν ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ καταγίνεται, σκοπῶμεν ἀπὸ τῶν γεωμετρικῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ θεωρημάτων μετελθόντες καὶ τὰ περὶ ἀριθμοῦ· τούτου γὰρ ἀναιρεθέντος οὐθ' ἡ περὶ αὐτὸν συνισταμένη γενήσεται τέχνη.
- 2 Καθόλου μὲν οὖν οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων Πυθαγορικοὶ μεγάλην ἀπονέμουσι δύναμιν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς ὡς τῆς τῶν ὄλων φύσεως κατ' αὐτοὺς διοικουμένης. ὅθεν καὶ αἰεὶ ποτε ἐπεφώνουν τὸ

ἀριθμῶ δέ τε πάντ' ἐπέοικεν,

ὀμνύοντες οὐ μόνον τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν ὑποδείξαντα αὐτοῖς τοῦτον Πυθαγόραν ὡς θεὸν διὰ τὴν ἐν ἀριθμητικῇ δύναμιν, λέγοντες

οὐ μὰ τὸν ἀμετέρα ψυχῆ παραδόντα τετρακτύν,
πηγὴν ἀενάου φύσεως ριζώματ' ἔχουσαν.

- 3 τετρακτὺς δὲ προσηγορεύετο παρ' αὐτοῖς ὃ ἐκ τῶν πρώτων τεσσάρων ἀριθμῶν συγκεῖμενος δέκα ἀρι-

BOOK IV

AGAINST THE ARITHMETICIANS

SINCE one kind of quantity, which is called "magnitude," and which is the chief concern of geometry, belongs to continuous bodies, and another kind, which is number, the subject of arithmetic, belongs to discontinuous, let us pass on from the principles and theorems of geometry and examine also those which deal with number; for if this is destroyed, the art which is constructed to handle it will not exist.

Now, speaking generally, the mathematical Pythagoreans^a ascribe great power to numbers, as though the nature of all things was governed in conformity with them. Hence, they constantly kept repeating—

All things, too, are like unto number.^b

And they swear not only by number but also by Pythagoras, the man who showed it to them, as though he were a god because of the power of arithmetic, saying,^c—

Nay, by the man I swear who bequeathed to our soul the Tetraktys,

Fount containing the roots of Nature ever-enduring.

And "tetraktys" was the name given by them to the number ten, it being composed of the first four

^a e.g. Philolaüs and Archytas.

^b Cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 94, 109.

^c Cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 94.

θμός. ἐν γὰρ καὶ δύο καὶ τρία καὶ τέσσαρα δέκα γίνεται· ὅς ἐστι τελειότατος ἀριθμός, ἐπεὶ περ ἐπ' αὐτὸν φθάσαντες πάλιν ἀναλύομεν ἐπὶ τὴν μονάδα καὶ ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς ποιούμεθα τὰς ἀριθμήσεις. πηγῆν τ' ἀενάου φύσεως ῥιζώματ' ἔχουσαν εἰρήκασιν αὐτὸν διὰ τὸ κατ' αὐτοὺς ἐν αὐτῷ τὸν λόγον τῆς ἀπάντων κείσθαι συστάσεως, ὅλον εὐθέως τοῦ τε σώματος καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς· ἀπαρκέσει γὰρ τούτων
 4 ὑποδειγματικῶς μεμνήσθαι. ἡ μὲν οὖν μονὰς ἀρχὴ τις ὑπόκειται τῆς τῶν ἄλλων ἀριθμῶν ἀπεργαστικῆ συστάσεως, ἡ δὲ δυὰς μήκος ἐστὶν ἀπεργαστικῆ. καθάπερ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν γεωμετρικῶν ἀρχῶν ὑπεδείξαμεν πρῶτον τίς ἐστὶν ἡ στιγμὴ, εἶτα μετ' αὐτὴν ἡ γραμμὴ μήκος ἀπλατὲς τυγχάνουσα, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος ἡ μὲν μονὰς τὸν τῆς στιγμῆς ἐπέχει λόγον, ἡ δὲ δυὰς τὸν τῆς γραμμῆς καὶ τοῦ μήκους· ποθὲν γὰρ ποι¹ ἐχώρησεν ἡ διάνοια ταύτην ἐννοουμένη, τοῦτο
 5 δ' ἦν μήκος. ἡ δὲ τριάς ἐπὶ τοῦ πλάτους καὶ τῆς ἐπιφανείας ἐτέτακτο· ποθὲν γὰρ ποι¹ (καὶ πάλιν ποι)² ἐφέρετο ὁ νοῦς, καὶ προστιθεμένης τῇ κατὰ μήκος διαστάσει τῆς κατὰ πλάτος διαστάσεως ἐπιφάνεια νοεῖται. ἀλλὰ κἂν ἐπιθεωρήσῃ τις τῇ τριάδι τετάρτην μονάδα, τουτέστι τέταρτον σημείον, γίνεται πυραμὶς, στερεὸν σῶμα καὶ σχῆμα· καὶ γὰρ μήκος ἔχει καὶ πλάτος καὶ βάθος· ὥστε ἐν τῷ τέσσαρα ἀριθμῷ τὸν τοῦ σώματος περιέχε-
 6 σθαι λόγον. καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸν τῆς ψυχῆς· ὡς γὰρ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον κατὰ ἀρμονίαν λέγουσι διοικεῖσθαι, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ζῶον ψυχοῦσθαι. δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ

¹ ποι scripsi : ποῦ MSS., Bekk.

² (καὶ πάλιν ποι) addidi : (κ. π. ποῦ) add. cj. Bekk.

numbers. For one and two and three and four make up ten ; and this is the most perfect number, since, when we have reached it, we revert again to the one and make our numerations afresh. And they have called it the "fount containing the roots of Nature ever-enduring" because, according to them, the reason of the structure of all things resides in it, as for instance that of the body and the soul^a ; for it will suffice to mention these by way of example. Now ⁴ the monad (or one) is an underlying principle which produces the structure of all the other numbers, and the dyad (or two) is productive of length. For as in the case of the geometrical principles we explained^b first what the point is, and next, after it, the line which is length without breadth, similarly, in the case before us, the monad corresponds to the point and the dyad to the line and length ; for thought in conceiving this moves from some place to some place, and this is length. And the triad (or three) is set ⁵ over breadth and the plane ; for the mind has moved from here to there (and on again to some other place), and when the distance in breadth is added to the distance in length the plane is conceived. But if, in addition to the triad one imagines a fourth monad, that is, a fourth sign, the pyramid is formed, a solid body and figure ; for it possesses length and breadth and depth ; so that the formula of the body is comprised in the number four. And so also is that ⁹ of the soul ; for they declare that as the whole Universe is governed according to harmony, so too the living creature is ensouled. And the perfect

^a Cf. *Adr. Log.* i. 99 ff.

^b Cf. *Adv. Geom.* 19 ff.

τέλειος ἁρμονία ἐν τρισὶ συμφωνίαις λαμβάνειν τὴν ὑπόστασιν, τῇ τε διὰ τεττάρων καὶ τῇ διὰ πέντε καὶ τῇ διὰ πασῶν. ἡ μὲν οὖν διὰ τεσσάρων ἐν ἐπιτρίτῳ κείται λόγῳ, ἡ δὲ διὰ πέντε ἐν ἡμιόλιῳ, ἡ δὲ διὰ πασῶν ἐν διπλασίῳ. ἐπίτριτος δὲ λέγεται ἀριθμὸς ὁ ἐξ ὄλου τινὸς ἀριθμοῦ συνεστηκὸς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τρίτου μέρους ἐκείνου, ὡς ἔχει ὁ ὀκτώ πρὸς τὸν ἕξ· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸν τὸν ἕξ περιέσχηκε καὶ τὸ τρίτον αὐτοῦ, τουτέστι τὴν δυάδα. ἡμιόλιος δὲ καλεῖται, ὅταν περιέχη ἀριθμὸς ἀριθμὸν καὶ τὸ ἡμισυ ἐκείνου, ὡς ἔχει ὁ ἐννέα πρὸς τὸν ἕξ· συνέστηκε γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ ἕξ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἡμίσεος αὐτοῦ, τουτέστι τῶν τριῶν, διπλασίῳ δὲ προσαγορεύεται ὁ δυσὶν ἀριθμοῖς ἴσος,¹ ὡς ὁ τέσσαρα πρὸς τὸν δύο· δις γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν περιέσχηκεν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων, καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχῆθεν ὑπόθεσιν τεσσάρων ὄντων ἀριθμῶν, τοῦ τε ἐνὸς καὶ δύο καὶ τρία καὶ τέσσαρα, ἐν οἷς ἐλέγομεν καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἰδέαν περιέχεσθαι κατὰ τὸν ἐναρμόνιον λόγον, ὁ μὲν τέσσαρα τοῦ δύο καὶ ὁ δύο τῆς μονάδος ἐστὶ διπλασίῳ, ἐν ᾧ ἔκειτο ἡ διὰ πασῶν συμφωνία, ὁ δὲ τρία τοῦ δύο ἡμιόλιος (καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸν τὸν δύο περιέσχηκε καὶ τὸ ἡμισυ τούτου, ὅθεν ἡ τὴν διὰ πέντε συμφωνίαν ὑπέβαλλεν), ὁ δὲ τέσσαρα τοῦ τρία ἐπίτριτος, ὑπέκειτο δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἡ διὰ τεσσάρων συμφωνία. ὥστε εἰκότως τὸν τέσσαρα ἀριθμὸν παρὰ τοῖς Πυθαγορικοῖς εἰρησθαι πηγὴν ἀεναίου φύσεως ριζώματ' ἔχουσαν.

10 Ἄλλ' ὅτι μὲν πολλὴν δύναμιν ἀπένεμον τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς, ἐκ τούτων συμφανὲς ὑποδειγματικώτερον εἰρημένων· πολὺς γὰρ ὁ περὶ ἀριθμῶν παρ'

¹ fortasse (ἴσος) ἴσος.

harmony is held to consist in three symphonies^a—that of the “By-Fours” and that of the “By-Fives” and that of the “By-Alls.” Now the “By-Fours” symphony consists of the “epitrite” (4:3 ratio), and that of the “By-Fives” in the ratio 3:2, and the “By-Alls” in the ratio 2:1. The number called “epitrite” is that composed of a certain number taken as a whole *plus* its third part—which is the ratio of eight to six; for the eight includes the six *plus* the third part of it, that is the dyad. And a number is said to be in the ratio 3:2 when the number includes a number *plus* its half,—the relation of nine to six; for the nine is composed of the six *plus* its half, that is, three. And that called “double” is that which is equal to two (equal) numbers,—the relation of four to two; for it includes the same number twice. Such, then, being the facts, and there being, according to the original assumption, four numbers—one, two, three and four—in which is included, as we said, the form of the soul according to the harmonical formula, the four is double the two and the two double the monad, and therein consists the “By-Alls” symphony; and the three is to the two in the 3:2 ratio (for it includes the two itself *plus* its half, and thus it supplies the “By-Fives” symphony); and the four is to the three in the “epitrite”⁹ or 4:3 ratio, on which is based the “By-Fours” symphony. So that naturally the number four is called by the Pythagoreans the “fount containing the roots of Nature ever-enduring.”

From what has been said by way of brief illustration¹⁰ it is clear that they ascribed much power to numbers; for the account they give of numbers is voluminous,

^a Cf. P.H. iii. 155; Adv. Log. i. 95 ff.

αὐτοῖς ἐστὶ λόγος, ὃν εἴσαντες τὰ νῦν μηκύνειν ἀπτόμεθα τῆς ἀντιρρήσεως, τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν λόγων ἀπὸ μονάδος ποιησάμενοι, ἥτις ἀρχὴ παντὸς ἀριθμοῦ καθέστηκε καὶ ἧς ἀναιρουμένης οὐδ' ἔστιν ἀριθμός.

- 11 Τὴν τοῦ ἐνὸς τοίνυν νόησιν διατυπῶν ἡμῖν πυθαγορικώτερον ὁ Πλάτων φησὶν “ ἐν ἔστιν οὐ μὴδὲν χωρὶς λέγεται ἐν ” ἢ “ οὐ μετοχῆ ἕκαστον ἐν τε καὶ πολλὰ λέγεται.” τὸ γὰρ φυτὸν, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ τὸ ζῶον καὶ ὁ λίθος παραγορεύεται μὲν ἐν, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον λόγον ἐν, ἀλλ' ἐν¹ μετοχῆ ἐνὸς νοεῖται, τούτου μὴδενὸς τούτων καθεστῶτος.
- 12 οὔτε γὰρ φυτὸν οὔτε ζῶον οὔτε λίθος οὔτε ἄλλο τι τῶν ἀριθμητῶν τὸ ὄντως ἐν ἔστιν. εἰ γὰρ φυτὸν ἔστιν ἢ ζῶον τὸ ἐν, πάντως ὁ μὴ φυτὸν ἔστι μὴδὲ ζῶον οὐ ῥηθήσεται ἐν. λέγεται δὲ καὶ φυτὸν ἐν καὶ ζῶον καὶ ἄλλα μυρία· οὐδὲν ἄρα τῶν
- 13 ἀριθμητῶν ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν. τὸ δὲ οὐ ἕκαστον, ἐν μὲν καθ' ἑαυτὸ ἕκαστον πολλὰ δὲ ἀθροισμῶ, μετέχον, ἐν τε καὶ πολλὰ γίνεται τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον. ὅπερ πάλιν πλῆθος οὐδὲν ἔστι τῶν πολλῶν, οἷον φυτῶν ζῴων λίθων· κατὰ μετοχὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐκείνου ταῦτα λέγεται πολλὰ, αὐτὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τούτοις.
- 14 πλὴν τοιαύτη μὲν ἢ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἰδέα νοεῖται τοῖς περὶ τὸν Πλάτωνα ἐπισυνάπτοντες δὲ ἡμεῖς λέγωμεν. ἦτοι ἕτερα τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀριθμητῶν² ἐστὶν ἢ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἰδέα, ἢ σὺν ἐκείνοις τοῖς μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς νοεῖται. ἀλλὰ καθ' αὐτὴν μὲν <οὐχ ὑφέστηκεν, εἶγε>³ παρὰ τὰ κατὰ μέρος ἀριθμητὰ οὐδὲν νοεῖται

¹ ἐν Heintz : ἐν mss., Bekk.

² ἀριθμητῶν Heintz : ἀριθμῶν mss., Bekk.

³ <οὐχ ὑφέστηκεν, εἶγε> add. cj. Bekk.

but forbearing for the present to dwell on it, let us take up the confutation, beginning our argument with the monad, which is the principle of all number and with the destruction of which number ceases to exist.

Now Plato, in formulating in rather Pythagorean¹¹ fashion the concept of the one, declares that “ One is that without which nothing is termed one,” or “ by participation in which each thing is termed one or many.” For the plant, let us say, or the animal, or the stone is called one, yet is not one according to its own proper description, but is conceived as one by participation in the One, none of them being actually the One. For neither plant nor animal nor stone nor¹² any other numerable object is the essential One. For if a plant or an animal is the One, what is not a plant or an animal will certainly not be termed one^a; but a plant is termed one, as is an animal and countless other things; therefore none of the numerables is the One. But that by participation in which each¹³ thing is by itself each one thing, and a plurality by aggregation, is the One and Many of the individual things. But this Plurality, again, is none of the many things, such as plants, animals, stones; for it is by participation in it that these things are termed “ many,” but the Plurality itself is not one of them.— Such, then, is the Idea of the One as conceived by¹⁴ Plato; so let us subjoin our argument. Either the Idea of the One is different from the particular numerables, or it is conceived along with those things which participate in it. But it does not subsist by itself, since no One other than the particular numer-

^a Cf. P.H. iii. 156 ff.

ἐν ὑποκείμενον. λείπεται ἄρα ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς μετ-
 15 ἔχουσιν αὐτοῦ νοεῖσθαι, ὁ πάλιν τῶν ἀπόρων. τὸ
 γὰρ ἀριθμητὸν ξύλον εἰ μετοχῇ μονάδος ἔστιν ἐν,
 ὁ μὴ ἔστι ξύλον οὐ λεχθήσεται ἐν· λέγεται δέ γε,
 ὡς ἀνώτερον ὑποδέδεικται· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν ἡ μονὰς
 ἧς μετοχῇ ἕκαστον τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀριθμητῶν
 16 μονὰς προσαγορεύεται. εἶτα τὸ πολλοῖς μετεχό-
 μενον πολλά ἔστι καὶ οὐχ ἐν, τὰ δὲ ἀριθμητὰ
 πολλά τέ ἐστι καὶ ἀπειρα· οὐκ ἄρα μετοχῇ τῆς
 17 μονάδος ἕκαστον τῶν ἀριθμητῶν ἐν ἔστιν. ὡσπερ
 οὖν ὁ γενικός ἀνθρωπος, ὃν τινες νοοῦσι ζῶον
 θνητόν, οὔτε Σωκράτης ἔστιν οὔτε Πλάτων, ἐπειδὴ
 οὐδεὶς λεχθήσεται ἀνθρωπος,¹ οὔτε καθ' ἑαυτὸν
 ὑφέστηκεν οὔτε μετὰ Πλάτωνος καὶ Σωκράτους,
 ἐπεὶ ἐθεωρεῖτο ἂν ὡς ἀνθρωπος, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐν
 μῆτε σὺν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος ἀριθμητοῖς μῆτε καθ'
 18 ἑαυτὸ ὑφεστηκός νοούμενον εὐθέως ἔστιν ἀνεπι-
 νόητον. τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ λεκτέον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δύο ἢ
 καὶ τρία καὶ καθόλου ἐπὶ παντός ἀριθμοῦ, ἵνα μὴ
 μηκύνωμεν. ἔνεστι δὲ καὶ οὕτως συνερωτῶν. ἡ
 τοῦ ἐνὸς ἰδέα, ἧς μετοχῇ τι ἐν λέγεται, ἦτοι μία
 ἔστιν ἰδέα ἢ τοῦ ἐνὸς πλείους ἰδέαι τυγχάνουσιν.
 ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν μία ἔστιν, οὐ πολλοῖς μετέχεται· τοῦ
 γὰρ Α, εὐσήμου χάριν διδασκαλίας, τὴν ὅλην τοῦ
 ἐνὸς ἰδέαν ἔχοντας, τὸ Β μὴ μετέχον ταύτης οὐκέτ'
 19 ἔσται ἐν. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ πολυμερῆς καθέστηκεν,
 ἵνα πολλά ἢ τὰ μετέχοντα ταύτης· πρώτων μὲν
 γὰρ ἔσται ἕκαστον οὐ τῆς τοῦ ἐνὸς ἰδέας μετέχον,
 μέρους δὲ αὐτῆς, εἶτα καὶ ἡ μονὰς ἀδιαίρετος καὶ

¹ (ἄλλος) add. cj. Warmington.

* Cf. the "generic Line" of *Adv. Geom.* 92.

^b For this definition cf. *P.H.* ii. 26.

ables is conceived as subsisting.—It remains, then,
 to say that it is conceived as included in those things
 which partake of it, which, again, is dubious. For 15
 if the numerable log is one by participation in the
 Monad, what is not a log will not be termed one ;
 but, as has been shown above, it is so termed ; there-
 fore the Monad, by participation in which each
 of the particular numerables is called a monad, does
 not exist.—Further, that in which many participate 16
 is Many and not One, and the numerables are both
 many and infinite ; each of the numerables, there-
 fore, is not one by participation in the Monad. So, 17
 just as the generic Man^a—whom some conceive as
 " a mortal animal "^b—is not Socrates or Plato (for, if
 so, nobody else will be termed man), and does not
 subsist of himself nor together with Plato and Socrates
 (for then he would have been observed as a man), so
 likewise the One, not being conceived either as sub-
 sisting by itself or along with the particular numer-
 ables, is *ipso facto* inconceivable. And the same must 18
 be said of the Two and the Three, and in general—
 not to make a long story of it—of every number.
 —One may also propound the following argument :
 The Idea of the One, by participation in which a
 thing is termed one, either is one Idea, or there are
 several Ideas of the One.^c But if it is one, many do
 not participate in it ; for (to explain the point clearly)
 if A possesses the whole of the Idea of the One, B,
 which does not participate in it, will no longer be one.
 —Nor yet is it multipartite, so that the things par- 19
 ticipating in it might be many ; for, firstly, each thing
 will be participating not in the Idea of the One but
 in a part of it ; and secondly, the Monad, according

^c Cf. *P.H.* iii. 158 ff.

ἀμερῆς ἐνοείτο καθ' αὐτούς. εἰ δὲ πλείους εἰσὶν ἰδέαι τοῦ ἐνός, ἕκαστον τῶν καθ' ἓν τασσομένων ἀριθμητῶν, ἦτοι τοῦ ἐνός ἢ τοῦ δύο, καθ' ἓν ἐκάτερον, μετέχει τινὸς κοινῆς ἰδέας ἢ οὐ μετέχει. 20 καὶ εἰ μὲν οὐ μετέχει, δεήσει καὶ ἅπαντα δίχα τοῦ μετέχοντος ἰδέας κατὰ τὸ ἐν τετάχθαι, ὅπερ οὐ θέλουσιν. εἰ δὲ μετέχει, ἢ ἐξ ἀρχῆς συναχθήσεται ἀπορία· πῶς γὰρ μᾶς τὰ δύο μεθέξει;

Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν περὶ μονάδος, ἧς ἀνηρημένης πᾶς 21 ἀνήρηται ὁ ἀριθμὸς· ὁμῶς δ' οὖν ἐπισυνάπτωμεν καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς δυάδος. ἀπόρως γὰρ πως καὶ αὕτη¹ συνίσταται κατὰ τὴν τῶν μονάδων σύνοδον, ὥσπερ καὶ Πλάτων διὰ τοῦ περὶ ψυχῆς πρότερον ἠπόρηκεν. παρατεθείσης γὰρ μονάδος ἑτέρα μονάδι ἦτοι προσγίνεται τι κατὰ τὴν παράθεσιν ἢ ἀπογίνεται ἢ 22 οὔτε προσγίνεται τι οὔτε ἀπογίνεται. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν οὔτε προσγίνεται τι οὔτε ἀπογίνεται, οὐκ ἔσται κατὰ παράθεσιν τῆς ἑτέρας μονάδος τῇ ἑτέρα ἢ δυάς. εἰ δὲ ἀπογίνεται τι κατὰ τὴν παράθεσιν, ἐλάττωσις ἔσται τοῦ ἐνός καὶ ἐνός, καὶ δυὰς οὐ γενήσεται. εἰ δὲ προσγίνεται τι, τὰ δύο οὐ γενήσεται δύο ἀλλὰ τέσσαρα· δυὰς γὰρ ἢ ἐπιγνωμένη καὶ μονὰς καὶ ἑτέρα μονὰς τὸν τῶν τεσσάρων ἀριθμὸν συνίστησιν. οὐδὲν ἄρα ἔσται δυάς. ἢ δὲ αὕτη γένοιτ' ἂν ἀπορία καὶ ἐπὶ παντὸς ἀριθμοῦ, ὥστε μηδὲν εἶναι κατὰ τοῦτο ἀριθμὸν.

23 Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν μονάδος καὶ κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν ὁ ἀριθμὸς νοεῖται, δηλον ὡς ἐὰν τούτων ἐκάτερον παραστήσωμεν ἀδύνατον, οἰχθή-

¹ ἀπόρως . . . αὕτη scripsi: ἀπορος . . . αὕτη MSS., Bekk.

to them, is conceived as indivisible and without parts. And if there are several Ideas of the One, each of the numerables ranked as unities (whether it be a one or a two, both taken singly) participates in a certain common Idea, or it does not participate. But if it does not participate, all things, apart from 20 participating in an Idea, will have to be ranked as unities,—a conclusion which they reject. And if they participate, the original difficulty^a will recur; for how will the two participate in one Idea?

So much, then, concerning the monad, and if it is destroyed all number is destroyed; all the same, let 21 us subjoin an attack on the dyad. For it is formed in a doubtful way by the conjunction of the monads, even as Plato formerly expressed doubts about it in his book *On the Soul*.^b For when a monad is set beside another monad, either something is added by the juxtaposition or something is subtracted, or nothing is either added or subtracted. But if nothing 22 is either added or subtracted, the dyad will not exist through the juxtaposition of the one monad with the other. And if something is subtracted through the juxtaposition, there will be a diminution of the one and one, and a dyad will not be formed. And if something is added, the two will become not two but four; for the additional dyad *plus* the monad and the second monad make up the number four. Therefore nothing will be a dyad. And the same difficulty will exist in the case of every number, so that owing to this number is nothing.

Since, however, number is conceived as a result of 23 the addition or subtraction of the monad, it is plain that if we shall establish that each of these two pro-

* Cf. §§ 18, 16.

^b Cf. *Phaedo* 96 E ff.; *Adv. Phys.* ii. 302 ff.

σεται καὶ ἡ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ὑπόστασις. λέγωμεν δὲ
 πρῶτον εὐθὺς περὶ ἀφαιρέσεως, ὑποδειγματικῆ
 24 χρώμενοι τῇ διδασκαλίᾳ. ἡ τοίνυν ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπο-
 κειμένης δεκάδος ἀφαιρουμένη μονὰς ἦτοι ἀπὸ
 ὅλης τῆς δεκάδος ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς περιλειπομένης ἐν-
 νεάδος ἀφαιρεῖται· οὔτε δὲ ἀφ' ὅλης, ὡς παρα-
 στήσομεν, οὔτε ἀπὸ τῆς ἐννεάδος, ὡς διδάξομεν·
 οὐκ ἄρα ἀφαιρεῖται τι ἀπὸ τῆς ὑποκειμένης δε-
 κάδος. εἰ γὰρ ἀφ' ὅλης ταύτης ἀφαιρεῖται ἡ
 μονάς, ἦτοι ἡ δεκάς ἐστὶν ἕτερα τῶν κατὰ μέρος
 μονάδων ἢ ὁ ἀθροισμὸς τούτων δεκάς προσαγο-
 25 ρεῦται. ἀλλ' ἕτερα μὲν τῶν κατὰ μέρος μονάδων
 οὐκ ἐστὶν ἡ δεκάς· καὶ γὰρ ἀναιρεθεισῶν ἐκείνων
 οὐδ' ἐστὶ δεκάς, καὶ τῆς δεκάδος ἀναιρεθείσης
 ὁμοίως αἱ μονάδες οὐκέτι ὑπάρχουσιν. εἰ δὲ ἡ
 αὐτὴ ταῖς μονάσιν ἐστὶν ἡ δεκάς, τουτέστιν εἰ αἱ
 κατὰ μέρος μονάδες εἰσὶ δεκάς, δῆλον ὡς εἶπερ
 ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάδος ἢ τῆς μονάδος ἀφαιρέσεις γίνεται,
 ἀφ' ἐκάστης μονάδος ἀφαιρεθήσεται (αἱ γὰρ κατὰ
 μέρος μονάδες ἦσαν ἡ δεκάς), καὶ οὕτως οὐκέτι
 26 ἔσται μονάδος ἄρισ ἀλλὰ δεκάδος. ὥστε οὐκ ἀπὸ
 ὅλης τῆς δεκάδος αἶρεται ἡ μονάς. καὶ μὴν οὐδ'
 ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπολειπομένης ἐννεάδος ἢ ἄρισ αὐτῆς
 γίνεται· πῶς γὰρ ἔτι μετὰ τὴν ἄρισ αὐτῆς σώος
 ἐστὶν ἡ ὑποκειμένη ἐννεάς; ἀλλ' εἰ μῆτε ἀφ' ὅλης
 τῆς δεκάδος αἶρεται ἡ μονάς μῆτε ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπο-
 λειπομένης ἐννεάδος, οὐδεὶς ἀριθμὸς κατὰ ἀφαιρέσειν
 27 συνίσταται. ἄλλως τε, εἰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐννεάδος αἶρεται
 ἡ μονάς, ἦτοι ἀπὸ ὅλης αἶρεται ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς τελευ-
 ταιᾶς αὐτῆς μονάδος. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀπὸ ὅλης τῆς
 ἐννεάδος ἀφαιρεῖται ἡ μονάς, ἔσται ἄρισ τῆς ἐν-
 νεάδος· τὸ γὰρ ἀφαιρούμενον ἀφ' ἐκάστης μονάδος,

cesses is impossible, the reality of number, too, will
 be abolished. Let us, for instance, deal first with
 subtraction, using the method of demonstration by
 examples. The monad, then, which is being sub- 24
 tracted from the decad assumed is subtracted either
 from the whole decad or from the nine left over ^a ;
 but it is not subtracted from the whole, as we shall
 establish, nor from the nine, as we shall demonstrate ;
 nothing, therefore, is subtracted from the decad
 assumed. For if the monad is subtracted from this
 as a whole, either the decad is other than the par-
 ticular monads or the aggregate of these is termed a
 decad. But the decad is not other than the particular 25
 monads ; for if these are destroyed the decad does
 not exist, and similarly if the decad is destroyed the
 monads no longer exist. And if the decad is the
 same as the monads,—that is to say, if the particular
 monads are the decad,—it is plain that if the sub-
 traction of the monad is from the decad, it will be
 subtracted from each monad (for the particular
 monads are the decad), and thus it will no longer be
 a subtraction of the monad but of the decad. Conse-
 quently, the monad is not subtracted from the whole
 decad. Nor, indeed, is it subtracted from the nine 26
 left over ; for how will the assumed nine be still
 preserved after the subtraction ? But if the monad
 is not subtracted either from the decad as a whole or
 from the nine left over, no number subsists through
 subtraction.—Besides, if the monad is subtracted 27
 from the nine, it is subtracted either from the whole
 or from its last monad. But if the monad is sub-
 tracted from the whole nine, there will be a subtrac-
 tion of the nine ; for that which is subtracted from

^a Cf. *P.H.* iii. 88 ff. ; *Adv. Phys.* i. 312 ff.

τῶν κατὰ μέρος μονάδων ἐννέα οὐσῶν, τὸν τῆς
 28 ἐννεάδος ἀριθμὸν συντίθησιν. εἰ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς τελευ-
 ταιᾶς μονάδος γίνεται τὰ τῆς ἀφαιρέσεως, πρῶτον
 μὲν καὶ ἡ τελευταία μονάς, ἀμερῆς οὐσα, δειχθή-
 σεται περισσότερο τυγχάνειν, ὅπερ ἄτοπον· εἴτα εἰ ἀπὸ
 τῆς τελευταίας μονάδος αἴρεται ἡ μονάς, οὐ δυνή-
 29 σεται εἶτι ὀλόκληρος μένειν ἡ ἐννεάς. καὶ ἄλλως,
 εἴπερ ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάδος γίνεται ἡ τῆς μονάδος
 ἄρσις, ἥτοι ἀπὸ οὐσης γίνεται τῆς δεκάδος [ἄρσις]
 ἢ ἀπὸ μὴ οὐσης· οὔτε δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς οὐσης γένοιτ'
 ἂν (ἐφ' ὅσον γὰρ μένει χρόνον δεκάς, οὐδὲν ἀπ'
 αὐτῆς ἀφαιρεθῆναι δύναται ὡς δεκάδος, ἐπεὶ οὐκ-
 30 τοῦ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲ ἀρθῆναί τι πέφυκεν· καὶ μὴν
 παρὰ τὸ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι οὐδὲν ἔστι νοῆσαι· οὐκ
 ἄρα αἴρεται τι ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάδος.

Ἄλλ' ὅτι μὲν ἀμήχανόν ἐστι κατ' ἀφαίρεσιν
 31 ἀριθμὸν τινα νοεῖν, ἐκ τούτων δέδεικται· ὅτι δὲ
 οὐδὲ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, ῥάδιον δεῖξαι τῶν ἀναλόγων
 ἐχομένους ἀποριῶν. πάλιν γὰρ μονάδος προστιθε-
 μένης δεκάδι ἥτοι τῇ ὅλῃ δεκάδι ῥητέον γίνεσθαι
 τὴν πρόσθεσιν ἢ τῷ τελευταίῳ μέρει τῆς δεκάδος.
 ἄλλ' εἰ μὲν ὅλη τῇ δεκάδι προστίθεται ἡ μονάς,
 ἐπεὶ ἡ ὅλη δεκάς σὺν πάσαις ταῖς κατὰ μέρος
 μονάσι νοεῖται, δεῖσιν τὴν τῆς μονάδος πρόσθεσιν
 γινομένην πάσαις ταῖς κατὰ μέρος μονάσι δεκάδος
 32 εἶναι πρόσθεσιν, ὅπερ ἄτοπον· ἀκολουθήσει γὰρ
 τῇ τῆς μονάδος προσθήσει τὴν δεκάδα εἰκοσάδα
 γίνεσθαι, ὃ τῶν ἀμηχάνων ὑπῆρχεν. οὐ τοῖνυν
 ὅλη τῇ δεκάδι τὴν μονάδα προστίθεσθαι ῥητέον.
 καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τῷ τελευταίῳ μέρει τῆς δεκάδος, ἐπεὶ
 οὐκ αὐξήθησεται ἡ δεκάς διὰ τὸ μὴ τὴν τοῦ ἐνός

each monad makes up the number of the nine, as the
 particular monads are nine. And if the subtraction 28
 is from the last monad, then, firstly, the last monad,
 which is indivisible, will be shown to be divisible,
 which is absurd; and secondly, if the monad is sub-
 tracted from the last monad, the nine will no longer
 be able to remain complete.—Further, if the sub- 29
 traction of the monad is from the decad, it is from the
 decad either as existent or as non-existent; but it
 will not be from the existent (for so long as the decad
 remains a decad nothing can be subtracted from it as
 a decad, for if so it will no longer be a decad), nor
 from the non-existent decad; for from what is non- 30
 existent nothing can be subtracted. And of course
 it is impossible to conceive anything other than
 existence and non-existence; therefore nothing is
 subtracted from the decad.

Now by these arguments it has been shown that it
 is not feasible to conceive any number by subtraction;
 and that it is not feasible by addition either is easy to 31
 show by continuing to raise difficulties of a like kind.
 For, again, if the monad is added to the decad, one
 must say that the addition is made either to the whole
 decad or to the last part of the decad. But if the
 monad is added to the whole decad, then, since the
 whole decad is conceived along with all the particular
 monads, the addition which is being made of the
 monad will have to be an addition to all the particu-
 lar monads of the decad, which is absurd; for it will 32
 follow that by the addition of the monad the decad
 becomes twenty, which is a thing impossible. We
 must say, then, that the monad is not added to the
 whole decad. Nor yet to the last part of the decad,
 since the decad will not be increased owing to the

μέρους αὐξήσιν εὐθὺς καὶ τῆς ὅλης δεκάδος αὐξήσιν
 33 εἶναι. [καὶ] καθόλου τε¹ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν, ἢ μενούσῃ τῇ
 δεκάδι προστίθεται ἢ μονὰς ἢ μὴ μενούσῃ. οὔτε
 δὲ μενούσῃ προστεθείη ποτ' ἂν, ἐπεὶ οὐκέτι μένει
 δεκάς, οὔτε μὴ μενούσῃ· τὴν γὰρ ἀρχὴν μὴ με-
 νούσῃ οὐδὲ πρόσθεσις δύναται γενέσθαι.

34 Ἄλλ' εἴπερ ὁ ἀριθμὸς κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, ὡς ἔφην,
 καὶ κατ' ἀφαίρεσιν ὑφιστάμενος νοεῖται, ἐδείξαμεν
 δὲ ἡμεῖς ὅτι οὐθέτερον ἔστι τούτων, ῥητέον μηδὲν
 εἶναι ἀριθμόν. ὅθεν τοσαῦτα καὶ πρὸς γεωμέτρως
 καὶ ἀριθμητικούς ἀπορητικῶς διεξεληθόντες ἀπ'
 ἄλλης ἀρχῆς καὶ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς μαθηματικούς
 ἀντίρρησιν ποιησώμεθα.

¹ καὶ καθόλου τε καὶ cj. Warmington.

fact that the increase of the one part is not *ipso facto*
 an increase of the whole decad.—Generally, too, 33
 and finally, the monad is added to the decad either
 remaining as it is or not remaining. But it will never
 be added to it while it remains, since in that case
 it will no longer remain a decad; nor yet while it
 does not remain, for it is absolutely impossible for
 an addition to be made to it if it does not remain.

But if number is conceived as subsisting through 34
 addition, as I said, and subtraction, and we have
 shown that neither of these exists, one must declare
 that number is nothing. Hence, now that we have
 stated at length all these sceptical arguments against
 the Geometers and Arithmeticians, let us start afresh
 and deliver our attack on the *Mathematici* (or
 "Astrologers").

ΠΡΟΣ ΑΣΤΡΟΛΟΓΟΥΣ

1 Περὶ ἀστρολογίας ἢ μαθηματικῆς πρόκειται
 ζητῆσαι οὔτε τῆς τελείου ἐξ ἀριθμητικῆς καὶ γεω-
 μετρίας συνεστῶσης (ἀντειρήκαμεν γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς
 ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν μαθημάτων) οὔτε τῆς παρὰ τοῖς
 περὶ Εὐδόξον καὶ Ἰππαρχον καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους
 προρρητικῆς δυνάμεως, ἣν δὴ καὶ ἀστρονομίαν
 2 τινὲς καλοῦσι, (τήρησις γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐπὶ φαινόμενοις
 ὡς γεωργία καὶ κυβερνητικῆ, ἀφ' ἧς ἔστιν αὐχ-
 μούς τε καὶ ἐπομβρίας λοιμούς τε καὶ σεισμούς
 καὶ ἄλλας τοιοιτῶδεις τοῦ περιέχοντος μεταβο-
 λὰς προθεσπίζειν), ἀλλὰ πρὸς γενεθλιαλογίαν, ἣν
 σεμνοτέροις κοσμοῦντες ὀνόμασιν οἱ Χαλδαῖοι μα-
 θηματικούς καὶ ἀστρολόγους σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀν-
 αγορεύουσι, ποικίλως μὲν ἐπηρεάζοντες τῷ βίῳ,
 μεγάλην δ' ἡμῖν ἐπιτειχίζοντες δεισιδαιμονίαν,
 μηδὲν δὲ ἐπιτρέποντες κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον
 3 ἐνεργεῖν. καὶ τοῦτ' εἰσόμεθα μικρὸν ἄνωθεν προ-
 λαβόντες περὶ τῶν συντεινόντων πρὸς τὴν ἐπι-
 σκεπτικὴν αὐτῶν μέθοδον. ἔσται δὲ ἐπιδρομικώ-
 τερον καὶ ὀλοσχερέστερον τὸ τῆς ὑφήγησεως τοῖς

AGAINST THE ASTROLOGERS

THE task before us is to inquire concerning astrology 1
 or the "Mathematical Art"—not the complete Art
 as composed of arithmetic and geometry (for we
 have confuted the professors of these subjects); nor
 yet that of prediction practised by Eudoxus and
 Hipparchus* and men of their kind, which some
 also call "astronomy" (for this, like Agriculture and 2
 Navigation, consists in the observation of phenomena,
 from which it is possible to forecast droughts and
 rainstorms and plagues and earthquakes and other
 changes in the surrounding vault of a similar charac-
 ter); it is rather the casting of nativities, which
 the Chaldeans adorn with more high-sounding titles,
 describing themselves as "mathematicians" and
 "astrologers," treating ordinary folk with insolence
 in various ways, building a great bulwark of super-
 stition against us, and allowing us to do nothing
 according to right reason. This we shall understand 3
 after we have first traced back a little the things
 which contribute to their method of speculation; but
 our exposition will be somewhat cursory and sum-

* Eudoxus of Cnidos was a pupil of Plato and Archytas,
circa. 370 B.C., and a famous astronomer, as was also Hipparchus,
 of Nicaea in Bithynia, *circa*. 150 B.C.

γὰρ προηγουμένως μειοῦσι τὸ μάθημα τοῦτο τὰ τῆς ἀκριβείας συγκεχωρήσθω, ἡμῶν δὲ αὐταρκές ἐστι τούτων ἐπιμνησθῆναι ὧν χωρὶς οὐ δυνατόν ἐπιβάλλειν ταῖς πρὸς τοὺς Χαλδαίους ἀντιρρήσεις.

4 Ἐπὶ προϋποκειμένῳ τοίνυν τῷ συμπαιεῖν τὰ ἐπίγεια τοῖς οὐρανίοις καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐκείνων ἀποροίας ἐκάστοτε ταῦτα νεοχομῶσθαι

(τοῖος γὰρ νόος ἐστὶν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων οἶον ἐπ' ἡμαρ ἄγῃσι πατήρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε)

5 οἱ περιεργότερον ἀναβλέψαντες εἰς τὸ περιέχον Χαλδαῖοι δραστικῶν μὲν αἰτιῶν λόγον ἐπέχειν φασὶν εἰς τὸ ἕκαστον τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον συμβαινόντων ἐκβαίνειν τοὺς ἑπτὰ ἀστέρας, συνεργεῖν δὲ τὰ τοῦ ζωδιακοῦ μέρη. τὸν μὲν οὖν ζωδιακὸν κύκλον, ὥσπερ κατηγήμεθα, διαιροῦσιν εἰς δεκαδύο ζώδια, ἕκαστον δὲ ζώδιον εἰς μοίρας τριάκοντα (ἔστω γὰρ τοῦτο ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος σύμφωνον αὐτοῖς), ἐκάστην δὲ μοῖραν εἰς ἑξήκοντα λεπτά· οὕτω

6 γὰρ καλοῦσι τὰ ἐλάχιστα καὶ ἀμερῆ. τῶν δὲ ζωδίων τὰ μὲν τινα ἀρρενικὰ καλοῦσι τὰ δὲ θηλυκά, καὶ τὰ μὲν δίσωμα τὰ δὲ οὐ, καὶ τινὰ μὲν

7 τροπικὰ τινὰ δὲ στερεά. ἀρρενικὰ μὲν οὖν καὶ θηλυκὰ ἅπερ συνεργὸν ἔχει φύσιν πρὸς ἀρρενογονίαν ἢ θηλυγονίαν· κριὸς γὰρ ἀρρενικόν ἐστι ζώδιον, ταῦρος δέ, φασί, θηλυκόν, δίδυμοι ἀρρενικόν, καὶ ἐναλλάξ τὰ λοιπὰ κατὰ τὴν ὁμοίαν ἀναλογίαν,

^a Cf. *Adv. Phys.* I. 79 ff.

^b Cf. *Hom. Od.* xviii. 136 f.; *P.H.* iii. 214.

mary; for the exact details may be left to those who specialize in this branch of study, and it is enough for us to call attention to those points without which it is impossible to set about making our attack on the Chaldeans.

It being previously assumed, then, that things on earth "sympathize" with those in the heavens,^a and that the former are always newly affected by the effluences of the latter

(As is the day brought on by the Sire of gods and of mortals,
So are the thoughts of the hearts of us earth-inhabiting creatures),^b—

on this assumption the Chaldeans, having too curiously gazed up into the surrounding vault, declare that the seven stars^c stand in the relation of efficient causes for the bringing about of everything which occurs in life, and that with them the parts of the zodiac co-operate. Now, as we have been informed, they divide the circle of the zodiac into twelve "zodia" (or "Signs"), and each sign into thirty degrees (let this be near enough to their theories, for the present), and each degree into sixty *lepta* (or "minutes"),—for so they call what is minimal and without parts. And of the Signs some they term masculine, some feminine, and some bi-corporal and some not, and some "tropical" and others fixed. Masculine and feminine are those which possess a nature which aids the birth of males or females; thus the Ram is a masculine Sign, but the Bull, they say, is feminine, the Twins masculine, and the rest alternate in a similar proportion, some masculine, others femi-

^c i.e. Sun, Moon, Mars, Jupiter, Venus, Saturn and Mercury.

- 8 τὰ μὲν ἄρρενικὰ τὰ δὲ θηλυκὰ. ἀφ' ὧν, οἶμαι, καὶ οἱ Πυθαγορικοὶ κινηθέντες τὴν μὲν μονάδα ἄρρεν προσαγορεύουσι, τὴν δὲ δυάδα θῆλυ, τὴν δὲ τριάδα πάλιν ἄρρεν, καὶ ἀναλόγως [πάλιν] τοὺς λοιποὺς τῶν τε ἀρτίων καὶ περιττῶν ἀριθμῶν.
- 9 ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ ἕκαστον ζῴδιον εἰς δωδεκατημέρια διελόντες τῇ αὐτῇ σχεδὸν ἐφόδῳ χρῶνται, οἷον ἐπὶ κριοῦ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον δωδεκατημέριον αὐτοῦ κριόν τε καλοῦσι καὶ ἄρρεν, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ταῦρον τε καὶ θῆλυ, τὸ δὲ τρίτον διδύμους τε καὶ ἄρρεν· καὶ
- 10 ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων μοιρῶν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος. δίσωμα δὲ λέγουσιν εἶναι ζῴδια διδύμους τε καὶ τὸν διαμετροῦντα τούτοις τοξότην, παρθένον τε καὶ ἰχ-
- 11 θύας, οὐ δίσωμα δὲ τὰ λοιπά. καὶ τροπικὰ μὲν ἐν οἷς γινόμενος ὁ ἥλιος μεταλλάσσει καὶ ποιεῖ τοῦ περιέχοντος τροπᾶς, οἷον ἐστὶ ζῴδιον ὃ τε κριός καὶ τὸ τούτου διάμετρον, καθάπερ ζυγός, αἰγόκερως τε καὶ καρκίνος· ἐν κριῶ μὲν γὰρ ἑαρινὴ γίνεται τροπή, ἐν αἰγοκέρῳ δὲ χειμερινή, ἐν καρκίνῳ δὲ θερινή καὶ ἐν ζυγῶ φθινοπωρινή. στερεὰ δὲ ὑπειλήφασιν ταῦρον τε καὶ τὸ διαμετροῦν, τουτέστι σκορπίον, λέοντα καὶ ὑδροχόον.
- 12 Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντων τούτων τὰ ἐπὶ ἐκάστης γενέσεως κυριεύοντα ζῴδια πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων ἔκβασιν, καὶ ἀφ' ὧν μάλιστα τὰς προαγορεύσεις ποιοῦνται, τέσσαρά φασι εἶναι τὸν ἀριθμόν, ἅπερ κοινῶ μὲν ὀνόματι κέντρα καλοῦσιν, ἰδιαιτέρον δὲ τὸ μὲν ὠροσκόπον τὸ δὲ μεσουράνημα τὸ δὲ δύνον τὸ δὲ ὑπόγαιον καὶ ἀντιμεσουράνημα,

nine. And by them, I suppose, the Pythagoreans⁸ were moved to call the monad "male," and the dyad "female," and the triad again "male," and the rest of the even and odd numbers according to the same rule. Some, too, divide each Sign into twelve⁹ parts and use much the same method; as, for instance, in the case of the Ram, the first twelfth part of it they describe as the Ram and male, the second as the Bull and female, the third as the Twins and male; and the same rule holds for the other portions. And they say that the Twins, and the Archer dia-¹⁰ metrically opposite to it, and the Virgin and the Fishes are bi-corporal Signs, but the rest are not bi-corporal. And "tropical" Signs are those which¹¹ when the sun enters it changes its course and produces "tropes" (or "turnings") in the surrounding vault; such a Sign is the Ram and its diametrically opposite, that is the Scales, and Capricorn and the Crab. For the spring "trope" (or "solstice") occurs in the Ram, and the winter one in Capricorn, the summer one in the Crab, and the autumn one in the Scales. But they have assumed that the Bull and the Sign diametrically opposite—that is, Scorpio, Leo and Aquarius—are fixed Signs.

However, of all these Signs those which are¹² dominant at each geniture for the production of effective influences and from which they principally frame their prognostications are, they say, four in number; and to these they give the generic name of "Centres," and more specifically they call them "horoscope," "mid-heaven," "setting," "subterranean," and "anti-mid-heaven," this last being itself

13 δ καὶ αὐτὸ μεσουράνημα ἐστίν. ὠροσκόπος μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὅπερ ἔτυχεν ἀνίσχειν καθ' ὃν χρόνον ἢ γένεσις συνετελείτο, μεσουράνημα δὲ τὸ ἀπ' ἐκείνου τέταρτον ζώδιον σὺν αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ, δύνον δὲ τὸ διαμετροῦν τῷ ὠροσκόπῳ, ὑπὸ γῆν δὲ καὶ ἀντιμεσουράνημα τὸ διαμετροῦν τῷ μεσουρανήματι, οἶον (ἔσται γὰρ σαφὲς ἐπὶ παραδείγματος) καρκίνου ὠροσκοποῦντος μεσουρανεῖ μὲν κριός, δύνει 14 δὲ αἰγόκερως, ὑπὸ γῆν δὲ ἐστὶ ζυγός. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκάστου τούτων τῶν κέντρων τὸ μὲν προάγον ζώδιον ἀπόκλιμα καλοῦσι, τὸ δὲ ἐπόμενον

also "mid-heaven." * Now the "horoscope" is the 13 Sign which happens to arise at the time when the birth is completed; the "mid-heaven" is the fourth Sign therefrom, it being included; the "setting" Sign is that diametrically opposite to the "horoscope"; and the "subterranean" or "anti-mid-heaven" is that diametrically opposite to the "mid-heaven": thus (for an example will make it clear), when the Crab is the "horoscope" the Ram is the "mid-heaven," and Capricorn is the "setting," and the Scales is the "subterranean." Moreover, 14 in the case of each of these "Centres" they call the preceding Sign "declination" and the following one

* The diagram below, taken from Fabricius, will help to explain this passage.

	12 ἐπαναφορά. ἀρχὴν ζώδιον.	1 ὠροσκόπος.	2 ἀπόκλιμα. κακοῦ δαίμονος.	
11 ἀπόκλιμα. θεῆ.				3 ἐπαναφορά. ζυγῶν δαίμονος.
10 ἀντιμεσου- ρανήμα. υπόγειον.				4 μεσουρανήμα.
9 ἐπαναφορά. ἀγαθῆ τυχῆ.				5 ἀποκλιμα. κατὰ κριός. μορφοποιρία θ-ος.
	8 ἐπὶ κέντρῳ καὶ κατὰ κέντρῳ καὶ κατὰ κέντρῳ	7 ὠροσκόπος.	9 ἐπαναφορά. κατὰ κριός.	

15 ἐπαναφοράν. ἤδη δὲ τὸ μὲν προαναφερόμενον τοῦ ὠροσκοποῦντος ζώδιου, ἐν τῷ φανερώ ὄν, κακοῦ δαίμονός φασιν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο, ἐπόμενον δὲ τῷ μεσουρανοῦντι, ἀγαθοῦ δαίμονος, τὸ δὲ προάγον τοῦ μεσουρανοῦντος κάτω μερίδα καὶ μονομοιρίαν καὶ θεόν, τὸ δὲ ἐρχόμενον ἐπὶ τὴν 16 δύσιν ἀργόν ζώδιον καὶ ἀρχὴν θανάτου, τὸ δὲ μετὰ τὴν δύσιν ἐν τῷ ἀφανεί ποινήν καὶ κακὴν τύχην, ὅπερ καὶ διάμετρόν ἐστι τῷ κακῷ δαίμονι, τὸ δὲ ἐρχόμενον ὑπὸ γῆν ἀγαθὴν τύχην, διαμετροῦν τῷ 17 ἀγαθῷ δαίμονι, τὸ δὲ ἀποχωροῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀντιμεσουρανήματος ὡς ἐπ' ἀνατολὴν θεάν, διαμετροῦν τῷ θεῷ, τὸ δὲ ἐπιφερόμενον τῷ ὠροσκόπῳ ἀργόν, ὃ 18 πάλιν διαμετρῆι τῷ ἀργῷ. ἢ ἵνα συντομώτερον φῶμεν, τοῦ ὠροσκοποῦντος ζώδιου τὸ μὲν ἀπόκλιμα καλεῖται κακὸς δαίμων, ἢ δ' ἐπαναφορὰ ἀργόν· ὡσαύτως τοῦ μεσουρανήματος τὸ μὲν ἀπό- 19 κλιμα θεός, ἢ δ' ἐπαναφορὰ ἀγαθὸς δαίμων· κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ καὶ τοῦ ἀντιμεσουρανήματος τὸ μὲν ἀπόκλιμα θεά, ἢ δὲ ἐπαναφορὰ ἀγαθὴ τύχη· ὁμοίως τοῦ δύνοντος τὸ μὲν ἀπόκλιμα κακὴ τύχη, 20 ἢ δὲ ἐπαναφορὰ ἀργόν. ταῦτα δ' οἴονται οὐ παρέργως ἐξετάζειν· οὐ γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν ἔχειν ἡγούνται τοὺς ἀστέρας πρὸς τὸ κακοποιεῖν ἢ μὴ ἐπὶ τε τῶν κέντρων θεωρουμένους καὶ ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀναφοραῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀποκλίμασιν, ἀλλ' ὅπου μὲν 21 ἐνεργεστέραν ὅπου δὲ ἀπρακτοτέραν. ἦσαν δὲ

“ascension.” Also they say that that which ascends 15 before the Sign of the horoscope, and is in view, is that of “the evil daemon,” and that after it, which follows the “mid-heaven” Sign, is that of “the good daemon,” and that which precedes the “mid-heaven” sign is “inferior part” and “single portion” and “god,” and that which comes to the “setting” is an “ineffective” Sign and “principle of death,” and that which comes after the “setting” 16 and is out of view is “punishment” and “ill fortune,”—and it is diametrically opposite to the “evil daemon,”—and that which comes to the “subterranean” is “good fortune,” being diametrically opposite to the “good daemon,” and that which 17 comes next after the “anti-mid-heaven,” towards the orient, is “goddess,” being diametrically opposite to the “god,” and that which comes next to the “horoscope” is “ineffective,” and it again is diametrically opposite to the “ineffective.” Or, to 18 speak more concisely, the “declination” of the Sign of the “horoscope” is called the “evil daemon,” and its “ascension” “ineffective”; similarly the declination of the “mid-heaven” is “god,” and its 19 ascension “good daemon”; and in the same way the declination of the “anti-mid-heaven” is “goddess,” and its ascension “good fortune”; likewise the declination of the “setting” is “ill fortune,” and its ascension “ineffective.” And they think 20 that their searching out of these things is no mere by-play; for they believe that the stars have not the same power of doing, or not doing, harm when observed at the “centres” or at their ascensions and declinations, but their power is more effective in one position and less effective in another. And there 21

τινες Χαλδαιῶν οἱ καὶ ἕκαστον μέρος τοῦ ἀνθρω-
 πείου σώματος ἐκάστω τῶν ζωδίων ἀνατιθέτες
 ὡς συμπαθοῦν· κριὸν μὲν γὰρ κεφαλὴν ὀνομά-
 ζουσι, ταῦρον δὲ τράχηλον, διδύμους δὲ ὤμους,
 καρκίνον δὲ στέρον, λέοντα δὲ πλευράς, παρθένον
 22 δὲ γλουτούς, ζυγὸν δὲ λαγόνas, σκορπίον αἰδοῖον
 καὶ μήτραν, τοξότην μηρούς, αἰγόκερων γόνατα,
 ὑδροχόον κνήμας, ἰχθύας δὲ πόδας. καὶ ταῦτα
 πάλιν οὐκ ἀσκόπως, ἀλλ' ἐπέειπερ, ἐὰν ἐν τινι
 τούτων τῶν ζωδίων γένηται τῶν κατὰ τὴν γένεσιν
 κακοποιῶν ἀστέρων τις, πῆρωςιν τοῦ ὁμωνυμοῦν-
 τος ἀπεργάζεται μέρος.

Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν περὶ τῆς φύσεως τῶν ἐν τῷ ζω-
 23 διακῶ κύκλω κεφαλαιωδέστερον ὑποδεδείχθω· οὐκ
 ἄτοπον δὲ ἐξῆς διελθεῖν καὶ περὶ τῆς διαιρέσεως
 αὐτῶν. ἐπιστάσεως γὰρ οὔσης ὡς τῶν ζωδίων
 μὴ κατ' ἰδίαν περιγραφὴν θεωρουμένων ἀλλ' ἐπὶ
 ἀστέρων διεσπαρμένων παρατηρήσει, ἐπῆλθεν αὐ-
 τοῖς εἰς δώδεκα μοίρας τὸν ὅλον καταδιελεῖν κύ-
 24 κλον. ὑποδεικνύτες γὰρ τὴν ἔφοδον φασὶν (ὅτι)¹
 ἕνα τινὰ τῶν ἐν τῷ ζωδιακῶ κύκλω λαμπρὸν
 ἀστέρα παρατηρήσαντες ἀνατέλλοντα οἱ πάλαι,
 εἶτα ἀμφορέα τετρημένον πληρώσαντες ὕδατος
 εἶασαν ρεῖν εἰς τι ἕτερον ὑποκείμενον ἀγγεῖον μέχρι
 τοῦ τὸν αὐτὸν (αὐτίς)² ἀνασχεῖν ἀστέρα, στοχασά-
 μενοι τε ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ σημείου ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ση-
 25 μέιον γεγονέναι τὴν τοῦ κύκλου περιστροφὴν πάλιν
 ἐλάμβανον τὸ δωδέκατον τοῦ ρυέντος, καὶ ἐσκέ-
 ποντο ἐν πόσω τοῦτο ἔρρευσε χρόνῳ· ἐν τοσοῦτω
 γὰρ ἔλεγον καὶ τὸ δωδέκατον μέρος ἀνεληλυθέναι

¹ (ὅτι) add. cj. Bekk.

² (αὐτίς) add. Nebe.

have been some Chaldeans who have referred each part of the human body to one of the Signs as "sym-pathizing" therewith; thus they call the head the Ram, the neck the Bull, the shoulders the Twins, the breast the Crab, the sides the Lion, the buttocks the Virgin, the flanks the Scales, the pudenda and 22 womb the Scorpion, the thighs the Archer, the knees Capricorn, the shins Aquarius, the feet the Fishes.^a And this again is not done at random, but for the reason that if any one of the stars which are maleficent at the time of nativity is in any of these Signs it produces an imperfection in the part which bears the same name.

Let this then serve as a rather summary account of the nature of the things within the circle of the zodiac; and, next, it is not out of place to explain 23 the division of them. Being halted in their observations, because the Signs were not being viewed according to their own proper determinations but by keeping watch on seven dispersed stars, it occurred to them to divide up the whole circle into twelve portions. For 24 in indicating the method of their approach they say that the ancients, after observing the rising of some particular bright star in the circle of the zodiac, proceeded next to fill with water a jar which had holes in it and then let the water flow into another receptacle placed underneath until the same star had arisen again; and as they conjectured that the revolution of the circle was from the same Sign to the same Sign, they next took the twelfth part of the water which had 25 flowed through and calculated how long a time it took in flowing; for that, they said, was the length of time taken in covering the twelfth part of the circle,

^a Cf. Manilius ii. 456 ff., iv. 702 ff.

τοῦ κύκλου, καὶ τοῦτον ἔχειν τὸν λόγον τὸ ἀνεχ-
θὲν μέρος τοῦ κύκλου πρὸς τὸν ὅλον κύκλον, ὃν
ἔχει τὸ ρῦν τοῦ ὕδατος μέρος πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ὕδωρ.
28 ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἀναφορᾶς, φημί δὲ τοῦ δωδεκατη-
μορίου, τὸ τελευταῖον πέρους ἐσημειοῦντο ἀπὸ
ἀστέρος τινὸς ἐπιφανοῦς κατ' αὐτὸ θεωρουμένου
ἢ ἀπὸ τινος τῶν συνανατελλόντων βορειοτέρων ἢ
νοτιωτέρων. τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ ἐποίουν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
ἄλλων δωδεκατημορίων.

Ἄλλ' ἢ μὲν ἔφοδος καθ' ἣν εἰς τσοσάτας μοίρας
τὸν ζωδιακὸν καταδιαιροῦσι κύκλον, ἐστὶ τοιαύτη-
27 ἀνάλογος δ' ἔοικεν εἶναι καὶ καθ' ἣν τὸν ἐφ' ἐκά-
στης γενέσεως ὠροσκόπον ἀρχικῶς παρατηρη-
κέναι λέγουσιν. νύκτωρ μὲν γὰρ ὁ Χαλδαῖος,
φασίν, ἐφ' ὑψηλῆς τινὸς ἀκρωρείας ἐκαθέζετο
ἀστεροσκοπῶν, ἕτερος δὲ παρήδρευε τῇ ὠδινούσῃ
28 μέχρις ἀποτέξοιτο, ἀποτεκούσης δὲ εὐθύς δίσκῳ
διεσήμεναι τῷ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀκρωρείας· ὁ δὲ ἀκούσας
καὶ αὐτὸς παρεσημειοῦτο τὸ ἀνίσχον ζώδιον ὡς
ὠροσκοποῦν. μεθ' ἡμέραν δὲ τοῖς ὠροσκοπίοις
προσείχε καὶ ταῖς τοῦ ἡλίου κινήσεσιν.

29 Ἄλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν περὶ ζωδίων· τῶν δὲ ἀστέρων
ἐνίους μὲν ἀγαθοποιούς εἶναι λέγουσιν ἐνίους δὲ
κακοποιούς τινὰς δὲ καὶ κοινούς, ὅσον ἀγαθοποιούς
μὲν τὸν τοῦ Διὸς καὶ τὸν τῆς Ἀφροδίτης, κακο-
ποιούς δὲ τὸν τοῦ Ἄρεως καὶ Κρόνου, ἐπικοινωνοῦν
δὲ τὸν τοῦ Ἑρμοῦ, ἐπεὶ μετὰ μὲν ἀγαθοποιῶν
30 ἀγαθοποιὸς μετὰ δὲ κακοποιῶν κακοποιός. ἄλλοι
δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀστέρας κατ' ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην σχέ-
σιν ὅτε μὲν ἀγαθοποιούς ὅτε δὲ κακοποιούς ὑπάρ-
χουν νομίζουσιν· ἢ γὰρ παρὰ τὸ ζώδιον ἢ παρὰ
τοὺς τῶν ἄλλων ἀστέρων συσχηματισμούς οὔτε ὁ

and the part of the circle covered bears to the whole circle the same ratio as the part of the water which has flowed bears to the whole of the water. From 26 this proportion—that of the twelfth part, I mean—they marked off the final limit from some one conspicuous star observed at the time or from one of the more northerly or southerly stars which rise simultaneously. And they did the same in the case of the other twelfth portions.

Such, then, is the method of approach which led them to divide the circle of the zodiac into this number of portions; and analogous to it seems to be the 27 method by which, as they say, they originally came to observe the horoscope at each nativity. For by night, they say, the Chaldean sat on a high peak watching the stars, while another man sat beside the woman in labour till she should be delivered, and when she 28 had been delivered he signified the fact immediately to the man on the peak by means of a gong; and he, when he heard it, noted the rising Sign as that of the horoscope. But during the day he studied the horologes (or sun-dials) and the motions of the sun.

So much, then, for the Signs: as to the stars,^a they 29 say that some of them are "beneficent," some "maleficent," and some "common"; thus Jupiter and Venus are beneficent, but Mars and Saturn maleficent, while Mercury is "common" since it is beneficent when with beneficent stars, but maleficent when with maleficent. But others believe that the 30 same stars are at one time beneficent and at another maleficent according to their varying positions; for either by reason of the Sign, or by reason of the configurations of the other stars, the maleficent star

^a i.e. the "seven stars": see p. 325 n.

κακοποιὸς ἀστὴρ πάντως κακοποιὸς ἐστὶν οὔτε
 31 ὁ ἀγαθοποιὸς πάντως ἀγαθοποιὸς ἐστὶν. πλὴν τῶν
 ἑπτὰ ἡγεῖσθαι μὲν τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὴν σελήνην οἴ-
 ονται, ἐλάττωνα δὲ τούτων δύνάμιν ἔχειν πρὸς τὰς
 τῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων ἐκβάσεις τοὺς λοιποὺς πέντε·
 παρ' ἣν αἰτίαν οἱ Αἰγύπτιοι βασιλεῖ μὲν καὶ δεξιῶ
 ὀφθαλμῷ ἀπεικάζουσι τὸν ἥλιον, βασιλεῖα δὲ καὶ
 ἀριστερῷ ὀφθαλμῷ τὴν σελήνην, ῥαβδοφόροις δὲ
 τοὺς πέντε ἀστέρας, τῷ δὲ λοιπῷ λαῷ τοὺς ἄλλους
 32 ἀπλανεῖς. καὶ τῶν πέντε ἡλίω μὲν συμφωνεῖν καὶ
 συνεπικουρεῖν φασὶ Κρόνον τε καὶ Δία καὶ Ἑρμῆν,
 οὓς καὶ ἡμερινοὺς καλεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ τὸν ἥλιον, ᾧ
 συνεργοῦσι, τῶν μεθ' ἡμέραν γεννωμένων ἐπι-
 κρατεῖν, (σελήνη δὲ Ἄρην τε καὶ Ἀφροδίτην).¹
 33 τοὺς δὲ αὐτοὺς ἀστέρας μείζονα μᾶλλον ἴσχειν
 δύνάμιν ἢ παρὰ τὸ ἐν ἰδίῳ οἴκοις ὑπάρχειν ἢ
 ὑψώμασιν ἢ ὀρίοις, ἢ παρὰ τὸ δορυφορεῖσθαι τινας
 ὑπὸ τινων, ἢ παρὰ τὸ ἐπιβλέπειν ἀλλήλους καὶ
 συσχηματίζεσθαι ἀλλήλοις, ἢ παρὰ τὸ ἐπὶ κέντροις
 34 εἶναι. οἶκος δὲ ἐστὶ κατ' αὐτοὺς ἥλιον μὲν λέων,
 σελήνης δὲ καρκίνος, Κρόνου δὲ αἰγόκερως καὶ
 ὑδροχόος, Διὸς τοξότης καὶ ἰχθύες, Ἄρεως κριὸς
 καὶ σκορπιός, Ἀφροδίτης ταῦρος καὶ ζυγός, Ἑρ-
 35 μοῦ δίδυμοι καὶ παρθένος. ὑψώματα δὲ καλοῦσιν
 ἀστέρων, καὶ ταπεινώματα ὠσαύτως, τὰ ἐν οἷς
 χαίρουσιν ἢ ὀλίγην δύνάμιν ἔχουσιν· χαίρουσι μὲν
 γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὑψώμασιν, ὀλίγην δὲ δύνάμιν ἔχουσιν
 36 ἐν τοῖς ταπεινώμασιν. οἷον ἡλίου μὲν ὑψωμα
 κριός, καὶ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν ἢ ἔνεακαδεκάτη τού-
 του μοῖρα, ταπεινώμα δὲ τὸ διαμετροῦν ζώδιον,

¹ (σελήνη . . . Ἀφροδίτην) add. cj. Bekk.

is not entirely maleficent, nor is the beneficent en-
 tirely beneficent. They suppose, however, that the 31
 Sun and the Moon are the principal stars of the seven,
 and that the other five have less power than these for
 the issues of the " effects "; and for this reason the
 Egyptians liken the Sun to the king and the right eye,
 and the Moon to the queen and the left eye, and the
 five stars to lictors, and the other fixed stars to the rest
 of the people. And they say that, of the five, Saturn 32
 and Jupiter and Mercury are in accord with and join
 in aiding the Sun, and that these stars are called " di-
 urnal " because the Sun, with which they co-operate,
 governs those born by day, (and that Mars and Venus
 aid the Moon). They say also that the same stars 33
 have increased power owing to their being in their
 proper " houses " or " elevations " or " boundaries,"
 or owing to the fact that some are " guarded "
 by others, or because they " look towards " one
 another or are in a certain " configuration " one
 with another, or because they are at the " centres." ^a
 And, according to them, the Lion is the house of 34
 the Sun, the Crab of the Moon, Capricorn and Aqua-
 rius of Saturn, the Archer and the Fishes of Jupiter,
 the Ram and the Scorpion of Mars, the Bull and
 the Scales of Venus, and the Twins and the Virgin
 of Mercury.—And they term the positions in which 35
 the stars rejoice or in which they have little power
 " elevations " and " depressions " respectively; for
 they rejoice in their " elevations " but in their " de-
 pressions " they possess little power. Thus the Ram is
 the " elevation " of the Sun (or, to be exact, the nine-
 teenth part of it), and its " depression " is the Sign
 diametrically opposite; and of the Moon, again, the

^a See §§ 12 ff. (pp. 327 ff.).

σελήνης δὲ πάλιν ὕψωμα μὲν ταῦρος ταπεινώμα
 δὲ τὸ διαμετροῦν, Κρόνου ζυγός, Διὸς καρκίνος,
 Ἄρεως αἰγόκερως, Ἀφροδίτης ἰχθύες, Ἑρμοῦ
 παρθένος. καὶ ταπεινώματα τούτων, ὡς ἔφην, τὰ
 37 διαμετροῦντα τῶν ὑψωμάτων. ὅρια δὲ ἀστέρων
 προσαγορεύουσιν ἐν ἐκάστῳ ζωδίῳ ἐν οἷς ἕκαστος
 τῶν ἀστέρων ἀπὸ ποστῆς μοίρας ἐπὶ ποστὴν μοί-
 ραν πλείστον δύναται· περὶ ὧν οὐχ ἡ τυχοῦσα
 παρ' αὐτοῖς ἐστὶ καὶ κατὰ τοὺς πίνακας διαφωνία.
 38 δορυφορεῖσθαι δὲ ἀστέρας λέγουσιν, ὅταν μέσοι
 ὦσιν ἄλλων ἀστέρων ἐν συνεχείᾳ ζωδίων· οἷον ἐὰν
 τοῦ αὐτοῦ ζωδίου ὅς μὲν τις ἀστήρ τὰς πρώτας
 ἐπέχη μοίρας ὅς δὲ τὰς τελευταίας ὅς δὲ τὰς ἐν
 μέσῳ, δορυφορεῖσθαι λέγεται ὁ ἐν μέσῳ ὑπὸ τῶν
 39 τὰς ἐπ' ἄκροις ἐπεχόντων μοίρας. ἐπιβλέπειν δὲ
 λέγονται ἀλλήλους καὶ συμφωνεῖν ἀλλήλοις ὡς οἱ
 κατὰ τρίγωνον ἢ τετράγωνον φαινόμενοι. κατὰ
 τρίγωνον μὲν οὖν σχηματίζονται καὶ ἐπιθεωροῦσιν
 ἀλλήλους ἀστέρες οἱ [ἐπὶ] τριῶν ζωδίων ἔχοντες
 τὸ μεταξὺ διάστημα, κατὰ τετράγωνον δὲ οἱ δυοῖν.
 40 καὶ δοκεῖ κατὰ μὲν τρίγωνον ἀγαθοποιῶ κακο-
 ποιὸς συσχηματιζόμενος εὐεργετικὸς εἶναι καὶ πολὺ
 μᾶλλον ἀγαθοποιός, ἀγαθοποιῶ δὲ ἥπιος αὐτὸ μόνον,
 καὶ κακοποιὸς κακοποιῶ, κατὰ δὲ τετράγωνον
 ἀνάπαλιν. ἐπίκεντροι δὲ λέγονται οἱ ἐπὶ τινος τῶν
 κέντρων θεωρούμενοι, ἧτοι ἐπὶ τοῦ ὠροσκόπου ἢ
 τοῦ μεσουρανήματος ἢ δύσεως ἢ ἀντιμεσουρανή-
 ματος.

“elevation” is the Bull and the “depression” the Sign diametrically opposite; and the elevation of Saturn is the Scales, of Jupiter the Crab, of Mars Capricorn, of Venus the Fishes, of Mercury the Virgin. And the depressions of these, as I said, are the Signs diametrically opposite the elevations. And the 37 “boundaries” of the stars, as they call them, in each Sign are those within which, from a certain portion to a certain portion, they possess most power; and about these there is no little disagreement amongst them and in their tablets too. And they say that the 38 stars are “guarded” when they are in the middle of other stars and in continuity with the Signs; thus if in the same Sign one star occupies the first portions and another the last and another the midmost, then the star in the middle is said to be “guarded” by those occupying the extreme portions. And they 39 are said to “look towards” one another and to “agree with” one another, as in the case of those which appear in a triangular or quadrangular figure. Now the stars which occupy the middle interval of three Signs form a triangular figure and look towards one another, and those between two Signs form a quadrangular figure. And it is thought that when 40 a maleficent star is in opposition to a beneficent in a triangular figure it is “well-disposed” and much more beneficent, and that a kindly in opposition to a beneficent is just “kindly,” and so with a maleficent in opposition to a maleficent; but the reverse is the case when the figure is quadrangular. And they are called “epicentric” when they are observed at one of the “centres,” either at the “horoscope,” or at the “mid-heaven,” or at the “setting,” or at the “anti-mid-heaven.”

41 Ἀλλὰ γὰρ τούτων οὕτως ἡμῖν ὡς ἐν τύπῳ καὶ
 ὀλοσχερῶς ἐκκειμένων προληπτέον ὡς ἀπ' αὐτῶν
 ὀρμηθέντες οἱ Χαλδαῖοι τὰς προαγορεύσεις ποιούν-
 ται τῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων. διαφορὰ δὲ ἔστιν αὐ-
 τῶν, ἐπεὶ τὰ μὲν ἀπλούστερα καθειστήκει τὰ δὲ
 ἀκριβέστερα, καὶ ἀπλούστερα μὲν τὰ κατὰ ζῳδίου
 ἢ ἀπλὴν ἀστέρος δύναμιν γινόμενα, οἷον ὅτι ὄδε ὁ
 ἀστὴρ ἐν τῷδε τῷ ζῳδίῳ γενόμενος τοιοῦτους
 42 ποιεῖ, ἀκριβέστερα δὲ τὰ κατὰ συνδρομὴν καὶ ὡς
 αὐτοὶ λέγουσι τὰ κατὰ σύγκρασιν πλειόνων, οἷον
 "ἐὰν ὄδε μὲν ὠροσκοπῇ ὄδε δὲ μεσουρανή ὄδε
 δὲ ἀντιμεσουρανή οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι οὕτως ἔχωσι, συμ-
 βήσεται τάδε."
 43 Ὁ μὲν οὖν χαρακτήρ τῆς Χαλδαϊκῆς μεθόδου
 τοιοῦτος ἔοικεν εἶναι· ῥάδιον δ' ἔστι λοιπὸν ἐπὶ
 παραδοθέντι τούτῳ συμπεριφέρεσθαι ταῖς κομιζο-
 μέναις ἀντιρρήσεσιν. καὶ δὴ ἔνιοι μὲν ἀγροϊκό-
 τερον πειρῶνται διδάσκειν ὡς οὐ πάντως συμ-
 44 πάσχει τοῖς οὐρανίοις τὰ ἐπίγεια· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὕτως
 ἦνται τὸ περιέχον ὡς τὸ ἀνθρώπινον σῶμα, ἵνα
 ὄν τρόπον τῇ κεφαλῇ τὰ ὑποκείμενα μέρη συμ-
 πάσχει καὶ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις ἢ κεφαλῇ, οὕτω καὶ
 τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις τὰ ἐπίγεια, ἀλλὰ τις ἔστι τούτων
 45 διαφορὰ καὶ ἀσυμπάθεια ὡς ἂν μὴ μίαν καὶ τὴν
 εἰμαρμένης κινουσι λόγον· εἰ γὰρ μὴ πάντα γίνεται
 κατὰ εἰμαρμένην, οὐκ ἔστι Χαλδαϊκὴ ἢ τοῦτο
 ἀξιούσα [κατὰ εἰμαρμένην εἶναι]. οὐκ ὀλίγοι δὲ
 46 ἦσαν οἱ κάκεῖνο συνερωτῶντες. ἐπεὶ τῶν γινο-

But now that these matters have thus been ex- 41
 pounded by us in outline and summarily, it must first
 be grasped that the Chaldeans start from them in
 making their forecasts of the "effects." And in
 these there is a difference, since some are more
 simple, others more exact; more simple are those
 which occur by reason of the Sign or the simple power
 of a star,—as, for instance, that "this particular star
 when it is in this particular Sign produces men of such
 and such a kind"; and more exact are those which 42
 occur through concurrence and, as they say, through
 the blending of several factors,—as, for instance, "if
 this star is in the horoscope, and that in mid-heaven,
 and that other in anti-mid-heaven, and the rest are
 in certain other positions, then the effects will be as
 follows."

Such then, it seems, is the main outline of the 43
 Chaldean doctrine; and now that this has been
 expounded it is easy to follow intelligently the
 counter-arguments which are brought forward. Some
 people, indeed, try to argue quite bluntly that
 terrestrial things do not "sympathize" altogether 44
 with things celestial; for the surrounding vault is
 not unified in the same way as the human body, so
 that things on earth should "sympathize" with
 things in the heavens in the same way as the lower
 parts of the body sympathize with the head, and the
 head with the lower parts, but in respect of the
 former there exists a difference and want of sym-
 pathy, as they have not one and the same unification.
 —And others raise the argument concerning destiny; 45
 for unless all things happen according to destiny,
 astrology, which maintains this, does not exist.—And
 there have been not a few who propound the following

μένων τὰ μὲν κατ' ἀνάγκην γίνεται τὰ δὲ κατὰ
τύχην τὰ δὲ παρ' ἡμᾶς, πάντως οἱ Χαλδαῖοι, εἰ
δυνατῆς ἐφίενται προρρήσεως, ἤτοι ἐν τοῖς κατ'
ἀνάγκην ποιήσονται τὰς προαγορεύσεις ἢ ἐν τοῖς
47 κατὰ τύχην ἐκβαίνουσιν ἢ ἐν τοῖς παρ' ἡμᾶς. καὶ
εἰ μὲν ἐν τοῖς κατ' ἀνάγκην, ἀνωφελεῖς εἰσὶν ἐν
τῷ βίῳ· τὸ γὰρ κατ' ἀνάγκην συμβαῖνον οὐκ
ἔστιν ἐκκλίνειν, ἀλλ' ἐάν τε θέλωμεν ἐάν τε μὴ
θέλωμεν, ἐκβῆναι δεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτο. τότε δ' ἂν
χρειώδης ἐτύγχανεν ἢ πρόρρησις, εἰ πρὸς τὴν
ἐκκλισιν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀναφορὰν ἐλάμβανεν. εἰ δ' ἐν
τοῖς τυχηροῖς, ἀδύνατόν τι ἐπαγγέλλονται· ἄστατα
γὰρ τὰ τυχηρῶς γινόμενα, τῶν δὲ ἀστάτων καὶ
ἄλλοτε ἄλλως ἐκβαίνοντων οὐκ ἔνεστιν ἐστῶσιν
48 ποιεῖσθαι τὴν προαγορεύσιν.λείπεται οὖν ἐν τοῖς
παρ' ἡμᾶς γιγνομένοις αὐτοὺς ποιεῖσθαι τὰς προρ-
ρήσεις. ὁ πάλιν ἀμήχανον· τὸ γὰρ ἐπ' ἐμοὶ κεί-
μενον ἐκβῆναι ἢ μὴ, καὶ τὸ μὴ ἔχον ἀρχῆθεν
προκαταβεβλημένην αἰτίαν, οὐκ ἂν δύναίτο τις
προλέγειν. οὐκ ἄρα δυνατῆς ἐφίενται προρρήσεως
οἱ Χαλδαῖοι.

49 Οἱ μὲν οὖν πλείους διὰ τοιούτων τινῶν ἀκροβο-
λισμῶν πειρῶνται τὴν Χαλδαϊκὴν μέθοδον ἀναι-
ρεῖν· ἡμεῖς δὲ κατὰ τὸν ὁμόθεν¹ τῆς ἐπιχειρήσεως
τρόπον τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ ὡσπερ στοιχεῖα ταύτης
κινήσαντες ἔξομεν <σὺν> αὐτοῖς² καὶ τὴν τῶν
λοιπῶν θεωρημάτων σύστασιν ἠθετημένην.

50 Ἀρχὴ τοίνυν καὶ ὡσπερ θεμέλιος τῆς Χαλδαϊκῆς
ἐστὶ τὸ στήσαι τὸν ὠροσκόπον· ἀπὸ τούτου γὰρ
τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν κέντρων λαμβάνεται, τά τε ἀποκλι-

argument: Since some events occur by necessity, 46
some by chance, and some by our action, if the
Chaldeans aim at a possible prophecy, they will
certainly make their forecasts about events which
result either from necessity or from chance or from
our action. But if they do so about necessary events, 47
their forecasts are useless in practice; for it is im-
possible to avert what happens by necessity, for that
must take effect whether we like it or dislike it. And
the prophecy would have been useful only if it had
had reference to the means of averting it. And if it
is about chance events, they profess what is impos-
sible; for chance events are irregular, and of things
which are irregular and turn out differently at
different times it is not feasible to form a reliable
forecast. It remains, then, to say that they make 48
their prophecies about things which occur through
our own action. But this again is impossible; for
that which depends on me as to whether it occurs or
not, and which has no original predetermined cause,
no one can possibly predict. Therefore the Chal-
deans do not aim at a prophecy that is possible.

The majority, then, try to abolish the Astrologers' 49
doctrine by this sort of long range fire; but we shall
adopt a method of attack at close quarters, and when
we have overthrown its principles and elements, so
to call them, along with them we shall also find the
structure of the rest of their theories demolished.

The principle and foundation, as it were, of astrology 50
is the setting up of the "horoscope"; for the rest of
the "centres" are taken from this, also the declina-

¹ ὁμόθεν scripsi (cf. Xen. Cyr. 8. 8. 22): ὁμοιον Bekk.

² <σὺν> αὐτοῖς scripsi: αὐταῖς mss., Bekk.: αὐτῆς Herv.

ματα καὶ αἱ ἐπαναφοραὶ τὰ τε τρίγωνα καὶ τὰ
 τετράγωνα καὶ οἱ κατ' αὐτὰ σχηματισμοὶ τῶν
 ἀστέρων, ἀπὸ δὲ πάντων τούτων αἱ προαγορεύσεις.
 51 ὅθεν ἀναιρεθέντος τοῦ ὠροσκόπου κατ' ἀνάγκην
 οὐδὲ τὸ μεσοουρανοῦν ἐστὶν ἢ δύνον ἢ ἀντιμεσου-
 ρανοῦν γνώριμον· τούτων δὲ ἀκαταληπτουμένων
 52 συναφανίζεται πᾶσα ἡ Χαλδαϊκὴ μέθοδος. ὅτι δὲ
 ἀνεύρετον αὐτοῖς ἐστὶ τὸ ὠροσκοποῦν ζῳδιον
 ποικίλως ἔνεστι διδάσκειν. ἵνα γὰρ τοῦτο κατα-
 ληφθῆ, δεῖ πρῶτον μὲν τὴν γένεσιν τοῦ πίπτοντος
 ὑπὸ τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν βεβαίως κατειληφθαι, δεύτερον
 δὲ τὸ διασημαῖνον ταύτην ὠροσκόπιον ἀπλανὲς
 ὑπάρχειν, τρίτον δὲ τὴν ἀναφορὰν τοῦ ζῳδίου πρὸς
 53 ἀκρίβειαν συνῶφθαι. ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῆς ἀποτέξεως
 ἡ ἀναφορὰ τοῦ κατ' οὐρανὸν ἀνίσχοντος ζῳδίου
 τετήρηται, καθάπερ διακόνῳ πρὸς τὴν τήρησιν τοῦ
 ὠροσκόπου χρησαμένων τῶν Χαλδαίων· ἐπὶ δὲ τῇ
 ἀναφορᾷ ὁ συσχηματισμὸς τῶν ἄλλων ἀστέρων,
 ὅπερ διάθεμα καλοῦσι, καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ διαθέματι αἱ
 54 προαγορεύσεις. οὔτε δὲ τὴν γένεσιν τῶν ὑπὸ τὴν
 ἐπίσκεψιν πιπτόντων λαμβάνει δυνατὸν ἐστίν, ὡς
 παραστήσομεν, οὔτε τὸ ὠροσκόπιον ἀπλανὲς καθ-
 ἐστῆκεν, οὔτε τὸ ἀνίσχον ζῳδιον πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν
 καταλαμβάνεται. τοίνυν ἀσύστατός ἐστιν ἡ τῶν
 55 Χαλδαίων μέθοδος. λέγωμεν δὲ περὶ τοῦ πρώτου
 πρώτου.

Τὴν δὴ γένεσιν τῶν ὑπὸ τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν πεσου-
 μένων ἀρχαιώτερον ἦτο ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ σπέρματος
 καταβολῆς καὶ συλλήψεως λαμβάνουσιν ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς
 ἐκτέξεως. ἀλλ' ἀπὸ μὲν τῆς τοῦ σπέρματος κατα-
 βολῆς καὶ συλλήψεως οὐκ ἂν εἶποιεν ἀκατάληπτος

tions and the ascensions, and the triangular and
 quadrangular figures, and the resultant configurations
 of the stars, and the prognostications derived from all
 these. Hence, if the "horoscope" is abolished, in- 51
 evitably the "mid-heaven" is not known either, nor
 the "setting," nor the "anti-mid-heaven"; and these
 being non-apprehensible, therewith the whole astro-
 logical doctrine disappears. That the Sign of the horo- 52
 scope is indiscoverable by them one may show in many
 ways. For in order that it may be apprehended, in
 the first place the time of birth of the subject of
 investigation must be firmly apprehended, and
 secondly the "horologe" which signifies this must be
 unerring, and thirdly the "ascension" ^a of the Sign
 must have been observed accurately. For at the 53
 time of birth the ascension of the Sign which is rising
 in the heavens is observed, the Chaldeans using it as
 a minister for the observation of the horoscope; and
 after the ascension, the configuration of the rest of
 the stars, which they call the "disposition"; and
 after the disposition, the predictions. But, as we 54
 shall establish, it is not possible to perceive the time
 of birth of the subjects of the investigation, nor is
 the horologe unerring, nor is the rising Sign appre-
 hended accurately. The doctrine, then, of the Chal-
 deans is without substance. Let us deal with the 55
 first point first.

They take the time of birth of those who are to be
 the subjects of the investigation, in a rather primitive
 way, either from that of the depositing of the seed
 and conception, or from that of the parturition. But
 they will not say that it is from the depositing of the
 seed and conception, for the exact time of this is not

^a Cf. §§ 14 ff., 73 ff.

56 γάρ ἐστὶν ὁ ἀκριβὴς ταύτης χρόνος. καὶ εἰκότως· οὐ γὰρ ἔχομεν λέγειν εἴτε ἅμα τῇ θέσει τοῦ σπέρματος γέγονεν ἢ σύλληψις εἴτε καὶ μῆ. δύναται μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἅμα νοήματι τοῦτο συμβαίνειν, ὡσπερ καὶ τὸ προσαχθέν τοῖς διαπύροις τῶν κλιβάνων

57 στέαρ (τοῦτο γὰρ εὐθὺς κολλᾶται), δύναται δὲ καὶ μετὰ χρόνον, ἐπεὶ περ καὶ τὰ εἰς τὴν γῆν καταβαλλόμενα τῶν σπερμάτων οὐκ εὐθὺς ριζοβολοῦντα συμπλέκεται ταῖς ὑποκειμέναις βώλοισι. καὶ διαστήματος δὲ ὄντος ἀπὸ τοῦ στόματος τῆς μήτρας μέχρι τοῦ πυθμένος, ἔνθα καὶ τὰς συλλήψεις λέγουσι γίνεσθαι ἰατρῶν παῖδες, πάντως ἐν χρόνῳ τινὶ τὸ διάστημα τοῦτο ποιεῖν πέφυκεν ἢ καταβαλλομένη

58 τοῦ σπέρματος φύσις. οἱ δὲ τούτου ἀγνοοῦντες τὴν ποσότητα τοῦ χρόνου κατὰ τὸ ἀκριβὲς Χαλδαῖοι τὴν σύλληψιν οὐδέποτε καταλήψονται. τοῦ (γὰρ)¹ σπέρματος ὅτε μὲν εὐθυβολομένου καὶ αὐτοῖς προσπίπτοντος ὑφ' ἑν τοῖς εὐφύως ἔχουσι πρὸς σύλληψιν τῆς μήτρας τόποις, ὅτε δὲ πολυσπόρων ἐμπίπτοντος, ὑπ' αὐτῆς δὲ τῆς ἐν τῇ μήτρᾳ δυνάμεως εἰς ἓνα τόπον συνάγεσθαι δυναμένου, τῶν ἀγνώστων τὸ πότε γίνεται τὸ πρῶτον καὶ πότε τὸ δεύτερον, πόσος τε ὁ εἰς ἐκείνην τὴν σύλληψιν ἀναλισκόμενος χρόνος καὶ πόσος ὁ εἰς

59 ταύτην. ἀγνοουμένων δὲ τούτων οἴχεται καὶ ἡ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν τῆς συλλήψεως κατάληψις. εἶπερ τε, ὡς τινες τῶν φυσικῶν εἰρήκασιν, ἐψόμενον πρῶτον καὶ προμεταβάλλον ἐν μήτρᾳ τὸ σπέρμα τότε προσέρχεται τοῖς ἀναστομωθεῖσιν αὐτῆς ἀγγείοις, αὐτόθεν οὐκ εἰδότες τὴν ποσότητα τοῦ τῆς μεταβολῆς χρόνου οὐκ εἴσονται οὐδὲ τὸν τῆς συλ-

60 λήψεως καιρὸν. καὶ μῆν ὡσπερ κατὰ τὰ λοιπὰ

determinable. And naturally so; for we have no 56 means of saying whether the conception takes place at the same time as the depositing of the seed or not. For this can occur quick as thought—like the dough that is put in very hot ovens, for this coalesces at once,—but it can also occur after an interval, seeing 57 that the seeds deposited in the earth do not at once strike root and become entangled with the underlying soil. And as there is some distance between the mouth of the womb and its base (where, as the medical fraternity say, conceptions take place), the substance of the seed deposited will certainly occupy some time in covering this distance. And as they 58 are ignorant of the length of this time the Chaldeans will never apprehend precisely the moment of conception. For since at one time the seed is shot straight and falls all together on the very parts of the womb which are naturally suited for conception, while at another time it is dispersed in its fall, yet can be collected into a single place by the womb's own power, there is no knowing when the first process takes place and when the second, or how much time is spent over the former conception or how much over the latter. And when these things are unknown, 59 accurate apprehension of the conception vanishes.—Also if, as some of the physiologists affirm, the seed is first cooked and altered beforehand in the womb, and then enters those vessels of it which are gaping to receive it, as they do not know the amount of time consumed in the process of alteration, neither, of course, will they know the moment of conception.—Moreover, as women differ from one another in 60

¹ (γὰρ) add. Herv.

μέρη τοῦ σώματος ἐν ταῖς τῶν μερῶν ἐνεργείαις διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων αἱ γυναῖκες, οὕτως εἰκὸς αὐτὰς καὶ κατὰ τὴν τῆς μήτρας ἐνέργειαν διαφέρειν, τὰς μὲν θάπτον συλλαμβανούσας τὰς δὲ βράδιον. καὶ οὐ παράδοξον, ὅτε καὶ ἑαυταῖς συγκρινόμεναι νυνὶ μὲν εὐσύλληπτοι θεωροῦνται νυνὶ δὲ οὐδαμῶς.

61 τούτου δὲ οὕτως ἔχοντος τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστὶ λέγειν πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν τὸ πότε συνέσχηται τὸ καταβληθὲν σπέρμα, ἵνα καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου τοῦ χρόνου στήσωσιν οἱ Χαλδαῖοι τὸν τῆς γενέσεως

62 ὠροσκόπον. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ἔνεστι λέγειν ὡς διὰ σημείων τινῶν καταλαμβάνεσθαι πέφυκεν ὁ τῆς συλλήψεως χρόνος, καθάπερ ἐκ τοῦ κατεξήραθαί μεν μετὰ τὴν μίξιν τοὺς γυναικείους κόλπους, μεμυκέναι δέ, εἰ οὕτω τύχοι, τὸ τῆς μήτρας στόμιον, ἐπεσχῆσθαι δὲ τὴν ἔμμηνον κάθαρσιν, κίσσαν

63 δὲ ἐπιγίγνεσθαι. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα κοινοποιεῖται τὰ σημεῖα πρὸς τὰς μὴ συνειληφύϊας· εἴτα καὶ εἰ μὴ κοινοποιοῖτο, γενομένην ἤδη κατὰ πλάτος πλειόνων ἡμερῶν διελθουσῶν σύλληψιν δηλοῖ, καὶ οὐ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν καὶ ὑπόγυιον καὶ ἐν

64 ὠριαίοις κειμένην διαστήμασιν. χρεῖαν δ' ἔχουσιν οἱ Χαλδαῖοι πρὸς διάγνωσιν τῶν διαφερόντων βίωων οὐ τοῦ ὀλοσχεροῦς καὶ ἐν πλάτει χρόνου τῆς συλλήψεως, τοῦ δὲ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν.

Ἄλλα γὰρ ἐκ τούτων πρόδηλον ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε ἐστὶν ἀπὸ συλλήψεως τὸν ὠροσκόπον ἐστάναι.

65 καὶ μὴν οὐδ' ἐξ ἀποτέξεως.¹ πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἄπορόν ἐστι τὸ πότε ῥητέον ἀπότεξιν εἶναι, ἀρὰ γε ὅποταν ἀρχῆται προκύπτει εἰς τὸν ψυχρὸν ἀέρα τὸ ἀποτικτόμενον, ἢ ὅταν ὀλίγον ἐξίσχη, ἢ ὅταν

¹ οὐδ' ἐξ ἀποτέξεως Nebe: οὐδὲ ἀπὸ τέξεως mss., Bekk.

all the other parts of the body in respect of the activities of those parts, so it is likely that they differ in respect of the activity of the womb, some conceiving more quickly, others more slowly. Nor is this hard to believe, when, compared with themselves, women are seen to conceive easily at one time and by no means easily at another. And this being so, it is impossible to state precisely when the deposited seed is conceived, so that (by calculating) from this time the Chaldeans might set up the horoscope of the nativity.—Nor yet can one say that 62 the time of conception may naturally be apprehended by means of certain signs,—for example, from the drying up of the uterine folds after the intercourse, and, if it should so happen, the closing of the mouth of the womb, and the cessation of the menses, and the occurrence of longings peculiar to pregnancy. For, in the first place, these signs are shared by 63 those who have not conceived; and, secondly, even if not thus shared, they indicate that conception has taken place when already, roughly speaking, several days have elapsed, and the time of it is not fixed precisely and closely and within the space of hours. But for their diagnosis of the different lives what the 64 Chaldeans need is not a rough and loose estimate of the time of conception, but an exact one.

Well then, from this it is quite plain that it is not possible for a horoscope to be set up from the time of conception. Nor yet from that of birth. For, 65 firstly, the moment when birth should be said to take place is a matter of doubt,—is it when the child begins to emerge into the cold air, or when it has emerged a little, or when it is deposited on the

66 εἰς τὴν γῆν κατενεχθῆ. εἶτα οὐδὲ ἐφ' ἐκάστου
 τούτων δυνατόν ἐστι τὸν ἀκριβῆ τῆς ἀποτεξέως
 χρόνον ὀρίζειν· καὶ γὰρ διὰ παράστημα ψυχῆς καὶ
 δι' ἐπιτηδειότητα σώματος καὶ προδιάθεσιν τῶν
 τόπων καὶ δι' ἐμπειρίαν μαίας καὶ ἄλλας ἀπείρους
 προφάσεις οὐχ ὁ αὐτός ἐστι χρόνος καθ' ὃν προ-
 κύπτει τὸ τικτόμενον ῥαγέντων τῶν ὑμένων ἢ
 ἐκτὸς ὀλίγον γίνεται ἢ εἰς τὴν γῆν καταφέρεται,
 67 ἀλλ' ἄλλος ἐπ' ἄλλων. ὃν πάλιν μὴ δυνάμενοι
 ὠρισμένως καὶ ἀκριβῶς σταθμῆσθαι οἱ Χαλ-
 δαῖοι ἐκπεσοῦνται τοῦ δεόντως τὴν τῆς ἀποτεξέως
 ὥραν ὀρίζειν.

“Ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὸ ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς τῆς ἀποτεξέως
 χρόνοις ἐπαγγέλλονται μὲν τὸν ὠροσκόπον γινώ-
 σκειν Χαλδαῖοι, οὐκ ἴσασι δέ, ἐκ τούτων συμ-
 68 φανές· ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ ὠροσκόπιον ἀπλανές ἐστίν
 αὐτοῖς, πάρεστι κατὰ τὸν ὁμοίον ἐπιλογίζεσθαι
 τρόπον. ὅταν γὰρ λέγωσιν ὅτι ὁ παρεδρεύων τῇ
 ὠδινούσῃ τὴν ἀπότηξιν δίσκῳ σημαίνει τῷ ἐπὶ τῆς
 ἀκρωρείας ἀστεροσκοποῦντι Χαλδαίῳ, κἀκεῖνος εἰς
 οὐρανὸν ἀποβλέπων ἐπισημιοῦται τὸ ἀνίσχον ζώ-
 διον, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὑποδείξομεν αὐτοῖς ὅτι τῆς
 ἀποτεξέως ἀορίστου τυγχανούσης, καθὼς μικρῶ
 πρόσθεν παρεστήσαμεν, οὐδὲ τὸ δίσκῳ διασημαί-
 69 νειν ταύτην εὐκόλον. εἶτα ἔστω καὶ καταληπτὴν
 τυγχάνειν τὴν ἀπότηξιν, ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ πρὸς ἀκριβῆ
 χρόνον ταύτην παρασημιοῦσθαι δυνατόν ἐστίν.
 τὸν γὰρ τοῦ δίσκου ψόφον ἐν πλείονι χρόνῳ [καὶ
 ἐν συχνῶ],³ πρὸς αἴσθησιν δυναμένῳ⁴ μερίζεσθαι, κι-
 νεῖσθαι συμβέβηκεν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀκρῶρειαν. τεκμή-
 ριον δὲ τὸ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ὄρεινῃ δενδροτομουόντων

ground? Secondly, not even in each of these cases 66
 is it possible to determine the exact time of the
 birth; for owing to the present state of the soul and
 the fitness of the body and the predisposition of the
 parts and the skill of the midwife and countless other
 causes, the time at which, after the bursting of the caul,
 the child is emerging, or has emerged a little, or is
 deposited on the ground, is not the same but different
 in different cases. And as the Chaldeans are again 67
 unable to measure this time definitely and precisely
 they will fail to determine correctly the hour of
 birth.

From this it is evident that in so far as it depends on
 the times of birth, though the Chaldeans profess that
 they know the horoscope, they do not know it. And 68
 one may argue in like manner that their “horologe”
 is not unerring. For when they say that the man
 who is sitting beside the woman in labour signifies the
 time of birth by means of a gong to the Chaldean
 who is on a peak watching the stars, and that he
 gazing at the heaven notes the rising Sign, we shall
 point out to them, firstly, that the time of birth being
 undetermined—as we proved a moment ago,³—it is
 not easy to signify it by means of a gong.—Next, let 69
 it be granted that the time of birth is discoverable,
 still it is not possible to transmit it by sign at the exact
 time. For the fact is that in moving up to the peak
 the sound of the gong takes a considerable amount
 of time which perceptibly admits of division into
 parts. And what is observed in the case of those
 who fell trees on a mountain-side is a proof of this;

³ Cf. §§ 65 ff.

⁴ [καὶ ἐν συχνῶ] om. Herv. (an ὡς ἐν σ. ?).

⁵ δυναμένῳ cj. Hackforth: δυνάμενον mss., Bekk.

¹ προδιάθεσιν scripsi: πρὸς διάθεσιν mss., Bekk.

θεωρούμενον· μετὰ γὰρ ἰκανὴν ὥραν τοῦ κατενεχ-
 θῆναι τὸν πέλεκυν ἐξακούεται ἢ τῆς πληγῆς φωνῆ
 ὡς ἂν ἐν πλείονι χρόνῳ φθάνουσα ἐπὶ τὸν ἀκού-
 70 οὔτα. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοῖνον οὐκ ἔστιν ἀκριβῶς
 τοὺς Χαλδαίους τὸν χρόνον τοῦ ἀνίσχοντος ζωδίου
 καὶ κατ' ἀκρίβειαν ὠροσκοποῦντος λαμβάνειν. καὶ
 μὴν οὐ μόνον φθάνει πλείων διελθεῖν χρόνος μετὰ
 τὴν ἀπότεξιν, ἐν ᾧ γίνεται ὁ ἦχος ἀπὸ τοῦ ταῖς
 τῆς τικτοῦσης ὠδίσσι παρεδρεύοντος ὡς ἐπὶ τὸν
 ἀστεροσκοποῦντα· ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ᾧ οὗτος ἀναβλέπει
 καὶ περισκοπῶν ἐξετάζει τὸ ἐν τίνι τῶν ζωδίων
 ἐστὶν ἢ σελήνη καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἀστέρων ἕκαστος,
 φθάνει ἄλλοιον γενέσθαι τὸ περὶ τοὺς ἀστέρας
 διάθεμα, τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κινήσεως ἀλήπτω¹ τάχει
 περιφερομένης, πρὶν τηρητικῶς παραπλάσασθαι τῇ
 τοῦ γεννηθέντος ὥρᾳ τὰ κατ' οὐρανὸν βλεπόμενα.
 71 ἄλλως τε ἢ τοιαύτη παρατήρησις νύκτωρ ἴσως
 δύναται προκόπτειν τοῖς Χαλδαίοις, ὅτε τὰ τε ἐν
 τῷ ζωδιακῷ βλέπεται κύκλῳ καὶ οἱ σχηματισμοὶ
 τῶν ἀστέρων εἰσὶν ἐμφανεῖς. ἐπεὶ οὖν τινὲς καὶ
 μεθ' ἡμέραν γεννῶνται, ὅτε οὐδὲν τῶν προειρη-
 μένων δυνατὸν ἐστὶ παρασημειοῦσθαι, μόνας δέ,
 εἰ καὶ ἄρα, τὰς τοῦ ἡλίου κινήσεις, ῥητέον ἐπὶ
 τινῶν μὲν δυνατὴν εἶναι τὴν τῶν Χαλδαίων μέθοδον
 72 ἐπὶ τινῶν δὲ ἀδύνατον. ὅρα δὲ μή ποτε καὶ νύ-
 κτωρ οὐκ ἰσχύουσιν ἀπλανεῖς διὰ παντὸς ποιησθῆναι
 τὰς τῶν οὐρανίων παρατηρήσεις· πολλάκις γὰρ
 συννεφεῖς εἰσὶν αἱ νύκτες καὶ ἀχλυώδεις, ἀγαπη-
 τὸν δὲ ἦν πάσης ἀναιρουμένης τοιαύτης προφάσεως
 τὸ βέβαιον εὔρειν ἐν τῷ² μαθήματι, μήτοι γε

for the sound of the blow is heard a considerable
 time after the fall of the axe, so that it takes some
 time to reach the listener. So because of this it is 70
 not possible for the Chaldeans to take the time of
 the rising Sign which is the exact horoscope with
 accuracy.—Moreover, not only does a considerable
 time elapse after the birth, during which the sound
 passes from the man seated beside the woman in
 travail to the man who is watching the stars; but
 also, while the latter is gazing upward and looking
 round to discover in which of the Signs the Moon lies
 and each of the other stars, the “disposition” of the
 stars changes, as the Universe in its motion revolves
 at an incredible speed, before he has described after
 observation the things seen in the heavens at the
 child's natal hour.—Furthermore, the Chaldeans can, 71
 perhaps, have some success with this sort of observa-
 tion by night, when the objects within the circle of
 the zodiac are seen and the configurations the of
 stars are plain to view. Since, however, some are
 born in the daytime, when none of the objects
 mentioned above can be noted, but only, if anything,
 the motions of the sun, one must declare that the
 Chaldeans' method is possible in some cases, impos-
 sible in others. But beware lest even at night some- 72
 times they are unable to make observations of
 celestial objects that are entirely correct; for the
 nights are often clouded over and misty, and one
 might be well satisfied if, with all such occasions
 eliminated, one could find in this science substantial
 truth; but when there exists some obstacle to the

¹ ἀλήπτω Nebe: ἀλέκτω Bekk. (perpetua Herv.).

² (τούτῳ) τῷ cj. Warmington.

καὶ κωλύματός τινος ὄντος πρὸς τὴν ἀκριβῆ τῶν οὐρανίων κατάληψιν.

- 73 Ἀθετήσαντες δὴ καὶ τὸ κατὰ τοὺς Χαλδαίους ὠροσκόπιον, συντόμως τε παραστήσαντες ὅτι μετὰ τῶν τῆς γενέσεως χρόνων ἀληπτόν ἐστιν αὐτοῖς, ἐπὶ τὸ λειπόμενον τῆς ὑποσχέσεως μέρος χωρῶμεν. ἐλείπετο δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀναφορᾶς τῆς ἐν τῷ ζωδιακῷ κύκλῳ διελθεῖν, ἀποστάντας τῶν ἔμπροσθεν
- 74 ἔκκειμένων ἡμῖν ἐλέγχων. φάμεν τοίνυν ὅτι δυσδιόριστοί εἰσιν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀδυνάτως ἔχουσι κατὰ τὸ ἀκριβῆς ὀρισθῆναι αἱ τῶν ζωδίων μοῖραι, ἀλλ' εἰκός ἐστιν ἤδη ἀνεσχηκός ζωδίων δοκεῖν μήπω ἀνατεταλκέναι, καὶ ἀνάπαλιν μήπω
- 75 ἀνατεταλκός δοκεῖν ἤδη ἀνεσχηκέναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ προειρημένη τῶν ὕδριων ἔφοδος δύναται τι τοῖς Χαλδαίοις παρεπικουρεῖν, ἐπεὶ περ καὶ παρὰ τὸ ρέον ὕδωρ καὶ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀέρος κρᾶσιν ἀνώμαλα τὰ τῆς ρύσεως καὶ τῶν ἀντιπαρηκόντων τῇ ρύσει χρόνων. τὴν μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ὕδατος φορὰν εἰκός ἐστιν ἀνόμοιον γίνεσθαι κατ' ἀρχάς, ὅτε καθαρὸν ἐστι τὸ ρέον, καὶ ἐξ ὑστέρου, ὅτε ἰλυώδες καὶ
- 76 δυσρευστότερον· τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀέρος κρᾶσιν πιθανὸν ἀχλυώδους μὲν καὶ παχυτέρου ὄντος ἀντιπίπτειν τῇ ἐκρύσει, τρόπον τινὰ ἐμφράττουσαν αὐτὴν, διαυγοῦς δὲ καὶ λεπτομοροῦς καθεστῶτος συνεργεῖν
- 77 μᾶλλον. καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ ἀμφορεύς οὐχ ὡσαύτως ῥυήσεται πλήρης καθεστῶς, ὡσαύτως δὲ ἡμίκενος ἢ πρὸς τῷ κενοῦσθαι τυγχάνων, ἀλλ' ὅτε μὲν ὀξύτερον ὅτε δὲ βραδύτερον ὅτε δὲ μέσως, τῆς οὐρανίου φορᾶς ἰσοταχῶς διὰ παντὸς ἐλυνομένης.
- 78 τὸ δὲ πάντων κυριώτατον, ἕκαστον τῶν ζωδίων οὐ

accurate perception of celestial objects, it is far otherwise.

And now that we have demolished the "horologe" 73 of the Chaldeans and have shown concisely that it, together with the times of nativity, is beyond their grasp, let us proceed to the remaining part of our undertaking. What remains was to discuss the rising in the circle of the Zodiac without touching on the criticisms we have stated above. We assert, then, 74 that the portions of the Signs are hard to mark off from one another, or rather cannot possibly be defined with accuracy; indeed it is likely that a Sign which has already ascended should appear not to have risen as yet, and conversely that a Sign which has not yet risen should appear to have already ascended. For 75 the scheme of the waterpots, mentioned above,^a is of no avail to rescue the Chaldeans, since owing to the flow of the water, and owing to the mixture of the air, the flow itself and the times parallel to the flow do not correspond. For as regards the motion of the water, it is likely that it is not the same at the beginning, when the flowing water is clear, and later on, when it is turbid and flows less easily; and as to the 76 mixture of the air, it probably opposes the outflow, acting as a kind of block, when it is misty and rather dense, and gives it more aid when it is pellucid and of fine texture. The jar itself, too, will not leak 77 equally when it is full and when it is half-empty or nearly emptied, but more rapidly at one time and more slowly at another, and at yet another time at a medium pace, whereas the celestial motion continues constantly at an even speed. And most 78 important of all, each of the Signs is not a continu-

^a Cf. § 24.

συνεχές ἐστὶ σῶμα, οὐδ' ὥσπερ ἡρμολογημένον τῷ πρὸ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ μεθ' αὐτὸ συνήπται μηδεμιᾶς μεταξὺ πιπτούσης διαστάσεως, ἀλλ' ἐκ διεσπαρμένων ἀστέρων συνέστηκε καὶ μεταξυτήτας τινὰς ἐχόντων καὶ διαλείμματα, τοῦτο μὲν κατὰ τὴν 79 μεσότητά τοῦτο δὲ πρὸς τοῖς πέρασιν. ὅθεν πάντως, ἀριθμητοῖς μορίοις τῶν ἐν τῷ κύκλῳ ζῳδίων περιγραφομένων, πλάνην ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι γίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς παρατηροῦσι, λανθάνοντος αὐτοῦς τοῦ προσπίπτοντος διαλείμματος, εἴτε τοῦ προηγουμένου ζῳδίου πέρασ ἐστὶν εἴτε τοῦ ἐπιανιόντος ἀρχή. οἱ δὲ λόφοι ἀφ' ὧν αἱ ἀστεροσκοπία γίνονται, οὐχ οἱ αὐτοὶ πάντοτε διαμένουσιν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μοῦραν ἑτεροιοιμένοι καὶ μεταβάλλοντος τοῦ κόσμου ἤτοι κατακλυσμοῖς ἐξ ὄμβρων ἢ σεισμοῖς γῆς ἢ ἄλλοις τισὶ τοιούτοις παθήμασιν ἐνοχλοῦνται, ὥστε καὶ παρὰ τὴν τούτων ἐξαλλαγὴν μὴ τὰς αὐτὰς γίνεσθαι τῶν ἀστέρων παρατηρήσεις, ἀλλ' ἑτέραν μὲν <τοῖς>¹ ἀφ' ὕψους συμβαίνειν παρατήρησιν διαφέρουσιν δὲ τοῖς ἀπὸ χθαμαλοῦ βλέπουσι, καὶ τὸ ἐκείνους ὄφθην μὴ πάντως καὶ τοῖς 81 ἄλλοις τεθεωρηῆσθαι. συμπαραλάβοι δ' ἂν τις ἐνταῦθα καὶ τὴν τῶν αἰσθήσεων παραλλαγὴν· ἄλλοι γὰρ ἄλλων εἰσὶν ὀξυωπέστεροι, καὶ ὃν τρόπον τὸ μηδέπω βλεπόμενον ἡμῖν διὰ ποσὴν ἀπόστασιν, τοῦτο ὡς μέγιστον κατελήφασιν ἀετοὶ τε καὶ ἰέρακες δι' ὑπερβολὴν ὀξυωπίας, οὕτω τὸ ἀνίσχον ἤδη καὶ ὠροσκοποῦν ζῳδίων ἐκ μακροῦ διαστήματος τῷ μὴ ὀξυωποῦντι Χαλδαίῳ πιθανόν ἐστὶν ὡς μηδέπω ἀνατετακὸς δοξάζεσθαι, καὶ κατὰ σύγκρισιν ἀμ- 82 βλυωποῦντι. προσθετόν δὲ τούτοις ὡς ἐναργέστατον τῆς Χαλδαϊκῆς ἔλεγχον καὶ τὴν περὶ τῶν

ous body, nor is it connected, as though by joints, with the one which precedes it and the one which follows it, with no space intervening, but it is composed of scattered stars which have certain interspaces and intervals, this one at the centre and that one at the limits. Hence, as the Signs in the circle 79 are circumscribed by numerable portions, it is certainly necessary that those who are observing from the earth should fall into error, since they cannot tell whether the interval under observation is the limit of the preceding Sign or the commencement of that which comes next. And the peaks upon which 80 the watchings of the stars take place do not remain always the same, but, as the Universe alters and changes as fate decrees, either by floods caused by rain, or by earthquakes, or by some other accidents of a similar kind, they are disturbed, so that owing to their alteration the observations of the stars do not remain the same, but the observation taken by those on the height is of one kind and that taken by those who are gazing from the plain is of a different kind, and what is seen by the former is not in all cases visible to the others. And here one may also take account of the 81 differences in the senses; for some are more keen of sight than others, and just as an object which is not as yet seen by us owing to its great distance is perceived as a very large object by eagles and hawks owing to their excessively keen sight, so it is probable that the Sign which has already ascended and is the horoscope should appear as not yet risen to the Chaldean, who is not keen of sight but by comparison short-sighted, because of its vast distance. And to these we must 82 add, as the clearest disproof of astrology, the differ-

¹ <τοῖς> addidi.

ορίζοντι τοῦ ἀέρος διαφορὰν· εἰκὸς γὰρ ὅτι παχυ-
 μερεστάτου¹ αὐτοῦ καθεστῶτος κατὰ ἀνάκλασιν
 τῆς ὄψεως τὸ ὑπὸ γῆν ἔτι καθεστῶς ζώδιον δοκεῖν
 ἤδη ὑπὲρ γῆς τυγχάνειν, ὁποῖόν τι καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐφ'
 ὕδατος ἀντανακλωμένης ἠλιακῆς ἀκτίνος γίνεται·
 μὴ βλέποντες γὰρ τὸν ἥλιον αὐτὸν (ταύτην)² πολ-
 83 λάκις ὡς ἥλιον δοξάζομεν. τὸ δὲ πάντων συνεκ-
 τικώτατον, εἰ μὲν πᾶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην
 τὰ οὐράνια παρατηροῦσιν ἕκαστον τοῦ ζωδιακοῦ
 δωδεκατημόριον ἰσοχρόνως ἐφαίνετο καὶ κατὰ τὴν
 αὐτὴν εὐθεῖαν ἐθεωρεῖτο, τάχ' ἴσως ἂν ἐδύναντο
 Χαλδαίων παῖδες παγίως λαβεῖν τὸ περὶ τὸν ὀρί-
 84 ζοντα ἀνίσχον ζώδιον. νυνὶ δὲ ἐπεὶ οὐ παρὰ πᾶσιν
 ἰσοχρόνως ἀναφαίνεται ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν θάπτον τοῖς
 δὲ βράδιον καὶ τισὶ μὲν πλάγιον τισὶ δὲ ὀρθόν,
 ἐπακολουθεῖ τὸ μὴ πᾶσι τὸ αὐτὸ δοκεῖν ὠροσκο-
 πεῖν ζώδιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ τούτοις ἤδη δοκοῦν ἀνατε-
 ταλκέναι, τοῦτ' ἄλλοις ἀκμήν ὑπόγειον ὑπάρχειν,
 καὶ τὸ ἑτέροις φαινόμενον ἐν ἀποκλίματι τοῦ ὠρο-
 σκοποῦντος ζωδίου, τοῦτο ἑτέροις θεωρεῖσθαι
 85 ὠροσκοποῦν. καὶ ὅτι ταυθ' οὕτως ἔχει, πρόδηλον
 ἐκ τοῦ καὶ τοὺς ἀπλανεῖς ἀστέρας, καθάπερ ἀρ-
 κτοῦρον καὶ κύνα, μὴ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον τοῖς
 ἐν παντὶ κλίματι κατοικοῦσι φαίνεσθαι ἀλλ' ἄλλοις
 κατ' ἄλλον.

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται κατ' ἀκρίβειαν τὸ
 ὠροσκοποῦν ζώδιον λαβεῖν, διὰ δὲ τούτου οὐδὲ τῶν
 ἄλλων τι κέντρων, ἀφ' ὧν αἱ προαγορεύσεις γίνον-
 86 ται τοῖς Χαλδαίοις, αὐτάρκως παρεστήσαμεν. ἐκ

¹ ὅτι παχυμερεστάτου scripsi: ὅτι παχυμεροῦς mss., Bekk.
 (ἐνίστε π. cj. Bekk.).

² (ταύτην) add. cj. Bekk.

ence of the air at the horizon, for as it is of the
 greatest possible density, it is likely that, owing to
 the reflexion of the visual stream, the Sign which is
 still below the earth will appear to be already above
 the earth,—the sort of phenomenon which also occurs
 in the case of the solar ray which is reflected on
 water; for, though we do not behold the sun itself, we
 often imagine it to be the sun.—But the most con- 83
 clusive argument of all is this: If each twelfth portion
 of the zodiac appeared at the same time to all those in
 the world who are observing the celestial objects, and
 was seen in the same straight line, then perhaps the
 Chadean fraternity might have been able to perceive
 with certainty the Sign ascending at the horizon.
 But as it is, since it does not appear to all at the same 84
 time, but more quickly to some and more slowly to
 others, and to some obliquely but vertically to others,
 it follows that the same Sign does not seem to all to
 form the horoscope, but that which to one party
 seems to have risen already appears to others to be
 quite beneath the earth, and that which to some
 appears in the declination^a of the Sign of the horo-
 scope is by others viewed as the Sign of the horoscope.
 And that this is the case is quite evident from the fact 85
 that the fixed stars, such as Arcturus and Canis,
 do not appear to the dwellers in every region at
 the same time, but at different times to different
 people.

So now we have established by proofs sufficient in
 themselves that it is not possible to determine accu-
 rately the Sign of the horoscope, nor, consequently,
 any one of the other "centres" from which the
 Chaldeans derive their predictions. But over and 86

^a Cf. §§ 14, 18.

περιουσίας δὲ λεκτέον ὅτι κὰν καταληπτὸς ἦ ὁ ἀκριβῆς τῆς τούτων ἐπαναφορᾶς χρόνος, ἐκεῖνο μὲν συμφανὲς ὅτι οὐθεὶς τῶν παραγινόμενων πρὸς τοὺς Χαλδαίους ἰδιωτῶν τετηρηκῶς ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ τὸν ἀκριβῆ χρόνον παραγίνεται· πολλῆς γὰρ ἦν τεχνιτείας τὸ πρᾶγμα, ὡς πρότερον ἐδείκνυμεν, καὶ πλεόν ἢ κατ' ἰδιώτην ὑπέφαινε. ἐπεὶ οὖν ὁ Χαλδαῖος οὐκ ἐτήρησε τὸν ἀκριβῆ τῆς γενέσεως χρόνον ἐπὶ τοῦδε τοῦ ἰδιώτου ἀλλὰ παρ' αὐτοῦ τοῦτον ἀκούει, οὐτοσὶ δὲ ὁ ἰδιώτης τὰ μὲν δι' ἀπειρίαν τὰ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ πάνυ τι ἐσπουδακέναι περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα πάλιν οὐκ οἶδε τὸν ἀκριβῆ χρόνον, καταλείπεται ἄρα πρόρρησιν μὲν μηδ' ἠντινοῦν βεβαίαν, πλάνην δὲ καὶ φενακισμὸν ἀπὸ Χαλδαικῆς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις περιγίνεσθαι.

87 Εἰ δὲ ἀναστρέψαντες λέγοιεν μὴ τὸν ἀκριβῆ χρόνον λαμβάνεσθαι ἀλλὰ τὸν ὀλοσχερῆ καὶ ἐν πλάτει, ὑπ' αὐτῶν σχεδὸν ἐλεγχθήσονται τῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων· οἱ γὰρ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καθ' ὀλοσχέρειαν χρόνῳ γεννηθέντες οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔζησαν βίον, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν λόγῳ χάριν ἐβασίλευσαν οἱ δὲ ἐν πέδαις κατεγήρασαν. οὐθεὶς γοῦν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ τῷ Μακεδόνι γέγονεν ἴσος, πολλῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην συναποτεχθέντων αὐτῷ, οὐδὲ Πλάτῳ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ. ὥστε εἰ τὸν ἐν πλάτει τῆς γενέσεως χρόνον ὁ Χαλδαῖος ἐπισκέπτεται, οὐ δυνήσεται¹ παγίως λέγειν ὅτι ὁ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν² χρόνον γεννηθεὶς εὐτυχῆσει, πολλοὶ γὰρ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον τούτῳ γεννηθέντες ἐδυστύχησαν, καὶ ἀνάπαλιν ὅτι ὅδε τις ἀπορήσει· οὐκ ὀλίγοι γὰρ τῶν τὸ αὐτὸ διάθεμα

¹ δυνήσεται Nebe : δυνήθησεται mss., Bekk.

above the foregoing we should add the argument that even if the exact time of the ascent of these Signs is apprehensible, yet it is plain that none of the ordinary persons who apply to the Chaldeans has observed for himself the exact time before applying; for the task calls for much expertness, as we have shown above,^a and seems beyond the capacity of the ordinary man. Since, then, the Chaldean did not observe the exact time of the birth in the case of a particular ordinary person, but hears it from the person himself, and this ordinary person again, partly through want of skill and partly through not taking very much trouble about the matter, does not know the exact time, the result is that men gain from astrology no valid prediction whatsoever but error and deception.

And if they turn round and say that the time is determined not exactly but roughly and approximately, the results themselves will be enough to refute them; for those who were born at what is roughly the same time have not lived the same life, but some, for example, have been kings while others have grown old in chains. Thus, though many throughout the world were born at the same time as he, none was equal to Alexander of Macedon, nor to the philosopher Plato. So that if the Chaldean considers what is roughly the time of birth, he will not be able to state definitely that he who was born at this time will have good fortune, for many who were born at the same time as he have had ill fortune; or conversely, that this particular man will be ill off; for not a few of those who shared in the same "disposi-

^a Cf. §§ 27 ff.

² τοῦτον τὸν scripsi : τὸν αὐτὸν mss., Bekk.

90 ἐσχηκότων εὐπορώτατοι κατεγήρασαν. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ μετρίως ἐλέγχειν φαίνεται τοὺς Χαλδαίους καὶ ὁ ἀναστρέφων πρὸς τὴν εἰρημένην ἐπιχείρησιν λόγος. εἰ γὰρ οἱ τὸ αὐτὸ διάθεμα τῆς γενέσεως ἔχοντες τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀποτελέσμασιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ περιπίπτουσι, πάντως καὶ οἱ διαφόρους ἔχοντες γενέσεις διάφοροι γίνονται. ὅπερ ἐστὶ ψεῦδος·

91 ὁρῶμεν γὰρ πολλοὺς κατὰ τε ἡλικίας διαφέροντας καὶ κατὰ μορφᾶς σωμάτων καὶ κατὰ ἄλλας παμπληθεῖς ιδιότητας παθῶν τῷ ὁμοίῳ τέλει περιπεπτωκότας καὶ ἤτοι ἐν πολέμῳ ἀπολομένους ἢ ἐν συμπτώσεσιν οἰκίῳ ἀποληφθέντας ἢ ναυαγίαις καταποντισθέντας· οἷς, εἴπερ ἔζων, πῶς ἂν ὁ Χαλδαῖος προειρήκει τὴν ἐσομένην τοῦ βίου κατα-

92 στροφήν, ἄξιον διαπορεῖν. εἰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν ἐν τῇ ἀκίδι τοῦ τοξότου γεννηθεὶς κατὰ τὸν μαθηματικὸν σφαγήσεται λόγον, πῶς αἱ τοσαῦται μυριάδες τῶν βαρβάρων ἀνταγωνιζόμεναι πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐν Μαραθῶνι ὑφ' ἐν κατεσφάγησαν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ γε ἐπὶ πάντων ὁ αὐτὸς ἦν ὠροσκόπος. καὶ πάλιν εἰ ὁ ἐν τῇ κάλπιδι τοῦ ὑδροχόου γεννηθεὶς ναυαγήσει, πῶς οἱ ἀπὸ Τροίας ἀνακομιζόμενοι τῶν Ἑλλήνων περὶ τὰ κοῖλα τῆς Εὐβοίας συγκατεποντίσθησαν;¹

93 ἀμήχανον γὰρ πάντας μακρῶ διαφέροντας ἀλλήλων ἐν τῇ κάλπιδι τοῦ ὑδροχόου γεγενῆσθαι. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ἔνεστι λέγειν ὅτι δι' ἓνα πολλάκις, ᾧ εἴμαρται κατὰ πέλαγος φθαρῆναι, πάντες οἱ ἐν τῇ νηὶ συναπόλλυνται· διὰ τί γὰρ ἡ τούτου εἴμαρμένη τὰς πάντων νικᾷ, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ διὰ τὸν ἓνα ᾧ εἴμαρται ἐπὶ

94 γῆς θανεῖν πάντες περισώζονται; ἄλλος δέ τις

tion "a have been exceedingly well off in their old age.—Moreover, the argument thus turned round to meet the attack mentioned appears to confute the Chaldeans very completely. For if those who have the same "disposition" at birth meet with the same results during life, then certainly those whose births are different become different. But this is false; for 91 we see many, who differ as to age and bodily shape and countless other peculiar affections, yet meeting with a similar end,—either perishing in war or being crushed by the collapse of houses or drowned in shipwrecks; and if these had lived, one may well be puzzled to know how the Chaldean would have foretold what the conclusion of their life was to be. For if the man who 92 was born in the arrow's point of the Archer is doomed—according to the astrological theory—to be slain, how is it that all those myriads of barbarians who fought against the Greeks at Marathon were all slain at one time? For the horoscope was not the same for them all. And again, if he who was born in the pitcher of Aquarius is doomed to suffer shipwreck, how is it that the Greeks who were being brought back from Troy ^b were all drowned together round the "Hollows" of Euboea? For that all these men, who 93 differed greatly from one another, could have been born in the pitcher of Aquarius is impossible. Nor yet is it possible to say that because of one man who was, for instance, destined to perish at sea all those in the ship perish along with him; for what reason is there why this man's destiny overmasters the destinies of them all, rather than that they should all be saved because of one man whose destiny it is to die on dry land?—And some other person will raise a doubt re- 94

¹ συγκατεποντίσθησαν Nebe; συγκατεποντώθησαν mss., Bekk.

^a Cf. § 53.

^b Cf. Eurip. *Hel.* 1126 ff.

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS

ἀπορήσει καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων. εἰ γὰρ
 παρὰ τοὺς συσχηματισμοὺς τῶν ἀστέρων τὰ κατὰ
 τὸν βίον ἀποτελέσματα πέφυκεν ἐκβαίνειν, ἐχρῆν
 ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τούτῳ τοῦ ζωδίου μορίῳ κάνθωνος
 ἄμα καὶ ἀνθρώπου γεννηθέντων τὴν αὐτὴν ἐν
 ἀμφοτέροις ἀκολουθεῖν τῶν βίων ἐκβασιμ, καὶ μὴ
 τὸν μὲν ἄνθρωπον πολλακίς ἐπιφανῶς πολιτευσά-
 μενον περισπούδαστον εἶναι τοῖς δήμοις, τὸν δὲ
 κάνθωνα διὰ παντὸς ἀχθοφορεῖν ἢ εἰς μύλωνας
 95 ἀπάγεσθαι. τοῖνυν οὐκ ἔστιν εὐλογον πρὸς τὰς
 τῶν ἀστέρων κινήσεις διοικεῖσθαι τὸν βίον· ἢ ἔπειρ
 ἔστιν εὐλογον, ἡμῖν πάντως ἀκατάληπτον.

Ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς αὐτῆς ὀρμώμενοι δυνάμεις δυσω-
 πήσομεν αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐν οἷς συνοικεῖοῦν θέλουσι τοῖς
 τῶν ζωδίων τύποις τὰς τε μορφὰς καὶ τὰ ἦθη τῶν
 ἀνθρώπων, οἷον ὅταν λέγωσιν, ὁ ἐν λέοντι γεννη-
 θεὶς ἀνδρείος ἔσται, ὁ δὲ ἐν παρθένῳ τετανόθριξ
 96 χαροπὸς λευκόχρως ἄπαις αἰδήμων. ταῦτα γὰρ
 καὶ τὰ τούτοις ὅμοια γέλωτος μάλλον ἢ σπουδῆς
 ἔστιν ἄξια. πρῶτον μὲν γάρ, εἰ ὅτι ἄλκιμον καὶ
 ἀρρενωπὸν ἔστιν ὁ λέων, φασι τὸν ἐν αὐτῷ γεννώ-
 μενον ἀνδρείον τυγχάνειν, πῶς τὸν ταύρον ἀναλο-
 97 γοῦντα τούτῳ θῆλυ νομίζουσι ζῶον; εἶτα μάταιον
 τὸ¹ οἰεσθαι ζώδιον κάλλιστον τὸν λέοντα τὸν ἐν
 οὐρανῷ ἀναλογίαν ἔχειν τῷ ἐπὶ γῆς· εἰκὸς γὰρ
 τοὺς παλαιοὺς τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὀνομάτων τίθεσθαι
 κατὰ ψιλὴν τὴν τοῦ χαρακτήρος ἐμφέρειαν, τάχα
 δὲ οὐδὲ κατ' αὐτὴν ἀλλ' εὐσήμου χάριν διδα-
 98 σκαλίας. τί γὰρ ὅμοιον ἔχουσιν ἄρκτω οἱ ἑπτὰ

¹ μάταιον τὸ Nebe (et ego) : μετὰ τοῦτο mss., Bekk. (*in-
 certum est Herv.*).

* But Manilius vi. 202 says "fecundus erit, quod mirum

garding the irrational animals. For if the effects in life naturally result from the configurations of the stars, then, when a pack-ass and a man are both born in this same portion of the Sign, the same kind of life ought to have followed as a result in both cases, instead of the man being, for example, conspicuous as a statesman and admired by the citizens, while the pack-ass is continually laden with burdens or led away to the mill-houses. So it is not reasonable that life is 95 ordered according to the motions of the stars; or if it is reasonable, certainly it is beyond our comprehension.

Starting from the same standpoint we shall also put them to shame when they propose to associate the shapes and characters of men with the figures of the Signs, as, for instance, when they say that the man born in Leo will be brave, and the man born in the Virgin will be straight-haired, bright-eyed, white-skinned, childless,^a and modest. For this and such- 96 like notions are deserving of ridicule rather than serious attention. For, in the first place, if they assert that the man born in Leo is brave because the lion is a valiant and manly beast, how is it that they reckon the Bull, which is on a par with the Lion, to be a womanish beast? And, secondly, it is nonsense to 97 suppose that the Lion in the heavens, that most beautiful Sign, bears any analogy to the earthly lion; for it is probable that the ancients gave them names of this sort merely because of the similarity of their figures, and perhaps not even for this reason, but just for the sake of clearness in exposition. For what 98 resemblance have the seven stars to a bear, separated

in virgine, partus" (hence Bekker conjectured *εὔπαις* for *ἄπαις*).

ἀστέρες, διεστῶτες ἀπ' ἀλλήλων; ἢ δράκοντος
κεφαλῇ οἱ πέντε, ἐφ' ὧν φησὶν ὁ Ἄρατος

ἀλλὰ δύο κροτάφους, δύο δ' ὄμματα, εἰς δ' ὑπ-
ἐνερθεν
ἐσχατιὴν ἐπέχει γένυος δεινοῖο πελώρου.

99 οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς ἀνώτερον ἐλέγομεν, τῶν ἐν
τῷ αὐτῷ ζῳδίῳ γεννωμένων οὐθ' αἱ μορφαί εἰσιν
αἱ αὐταὶ οὔτε τὰ ἦθη ἐστὶν ὁμοία, ἐκτός εἰ μὴ τὰς
μοίρας εἰς ἃς ἕκαστον διαιρεῖται ζῳδιον καὶ τὰ
λεπτὰ φήσουσι τῆς τοιαύτης διαφορᾶς εἶναι ποιη-
τικά. ὁ πάλιν ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον· ἐδείξαμεν γὰρ τὴν
ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς χρόνοις τῆς ἀποτέξεως καὶ ὠροσκο-
100 πῆσεως ἀκρίβειαν ἀσύστατον. δυοῖν τε θάτερον·
ἢ γὰρ ὅτι λέων λέγεται τὸ ζῳδιον, καὶ ὁ γεννηθεὶς
ἀνδρείος γίνεται, ἢ ὅτι τραπέντος τοῦ ἀέρος ὑπὸ
τοῦ κατ' οὐρανὸν λέοντος τοιαῦται συμβαίνουσι
καὶ περὶ τὸν ἀποτικτόμενον ἄνθρωπον διαθέσεις.
ἀλλὰ διὰ μὲν τὸ λέοντα καλεῖσθαι τὸ ὠροσκοποῦν
ζῳδιον οὐ πιθανὸν ἀνδρείον γίνεσθαι· τούτῳ γὰρ
τῷ λόγῳ ἐχρῆν καὶ τοὺς τῷ ἐπιγείῳ λέοντι συναπο-
τεχθέντας ἢ συντραφέντας ἀνδρείους ὑπάρχειν παρ-
101 ὅσον λέων λέγεται τὸ ψ̄ συνετράφησαν ζῳῷ. εἰ
δὲ διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀέρος τροπὴν, τί τοῦτο πρὸς τὴν
τοῦ βίου διαφορὰν; εἰς μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἰσχυρὸν τοῖς
σώμασι γίνεσθαι τὸ γεννώμενον καὶ θηριῶδες τοῖς
ἦθεσιν τάχα συμβάλλεται ἢ ποιά τοῦ ἀέρος κρᾶσις,
εἰς δὲ τὸ δανείους κατάχρευν γενέσθαι τὸ γεννώ-
μενον ἢ βασιλευεῖν ἢ δεθῆναι ἢ σπανότεκνον ἢ
σπανάδελφον ὑπάρχειν οὐδ' ὅτιοῦν φαίνεται συνερ-
102 γεῖν ὁ ἀήρ. καὶ πάλιν εἰ ὁ παρθένου ὠροσκοπού-
366

as they are from one another? Or the five to a
dragon's head,—the five stars whereof Aratus says *

But two sit on the temples and two on the eyes, and below
them

One has its seat on the base of the jaw of the terrible
monster.

Nor, in fact, as we said above,^b are those born in the 99
same Sign of the same shape or of similar character,
unless they shall say that the sections and sub-
sections into which each Sign is divided^c are capable
of producing differences of the sort. But this again
is impossible; for we have proved^d that accuracy as
regards the identical times of the birth and of the
horoscope-taking is not to be had.—Also, of two 100
things one: either the man born is brave because the
Sign is called the Lion, or because, when the air
under the celestial Lion is changed, dispositions of
that sort are brought about in the man who is being
born. But it is not credible that he should be brave
because the Sign of his horoscope is called the Lion;
for by this reasoning those who were born or reared
along with the earthly lion ought also to have been
brave, inasmuch as the animal along with which they
were reared is called a lion. And if it is because of 101
the change of the air, what has this to do with a differ-
ence in the life? For though a certain blend of the
air possibly contributes to the bodily strength and
beast-like character of the creature born, yet the air
does not seem to co-operate at all in causing the
creature to be involved in debt or to be a king or to
be put in gaol or to be lacking in children or brethren.
—And again, if he who has the Virgin for horoscope 102

* Cf. Aratus, *Phaenom.* 56 f. Aratus, *circ.* 270 B.C., wrote
astronomical poems.

^b Cf. §§ 89 ff.

^c Cf. § 5.

^d Cf. §§ 74 ff.

σης τετανόθριξ χαροπὸς λευκόχρως, δεήσει μηδένα τῶν Αἰθίοπων παρθένον ἔχειν ὠροσκοποῦσαν, ἐπεὶ δώσουσιν Αἰθίοπα λευκὸν εἶναι καὶ χαροπὸν καὶ
 103 τετανότριχα, ὃ πάντων ἐστὶν ἀτοπώτατον. καθόλου δέ, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ἐνδείκνυσθαι λέγουσιν αὐτοῖς τοὺς ἀστέρας τὰς τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων βίων διαφοράς, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ ταύτας συμπαρατηρηκέναι ταῖς τῶν ἀστέρων σχέσεσι, φημί ὅτι εἰ μελλήσει βέβαιος πρόρρησις γίνεσθαι, δεῖ τὴν αὐτὴν τῶν ἀστέρων σχέσιν μὴ ἅπαξ συμπαρατηρηκέναι τῷ τινὸς βίῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ δεύτερον δευτέρου καὶ τρίτον τρίτου, ἵνα ἐκ τοῦ διομαλίζειν ἐπὶ πάντων τὰς τῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων ἐκβάσεις μάθωμεν ὅτι τῶν ἀστέρων τοιούτων ἀναδεξαμένων τὸν σχηματισμὸν τότε πάντως
 104 ἔσται τὸ ἀποβησόμενον· καὶ ὃν τρόπον ἐν τῇ ἱατρικῇ ἐτηρήσαμεν ὅτι ἡ τῆς καρδίας τρώσις αἰτιὸν ἐστὶ θανάτου, οὐ τὴν Δίωνος μόνον τελευτήν αὐτῇ συμπαρατηρήσαντες ἀλλὰ καὶ Θέωνος καὶ Σωκράτους καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν, οὕτω καὶ ἐν μαθηματικῇ εἰ πιστόν ἐστιν ὅτι ὁδε ὁ συσχηματισμὸς τῶν ἀστέρων τοιούτου βίου μνηστικὸς καθέστηκεν, πάντως οὐχ ἅπαξ ἐφ' ἐνὸς ἀλλὰ πολλάκις ἐπὶ
 105 πολλῶν παρετηρήθη. ἐπεὶ οὖν ὁ αὐτὸς τῶν ἀστέρων συσχηματισμὸς διὰ μακρῶν, ὡς φασί, χρόνων θεωρεῖται, ἀποκαταστάσεως γινομένης τοῦ μεγάλου ἐνιαυτοῦ δι' ἐννεακισχιλίων ἑνακοσίων καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα καὶ ἑπτὰ ἔτων, οὐ φθάσει ἀνθρωπίνη γήρσις τοῖς τοσοῦτοις αἰῶσι συνδραμεῖν ἐπὶ μιᾶς γενέσεως, καὶ ταῦτα οὐχ ἅπαξ ἀλλὰ πολλάκις ἦτοι

^a Cf. § 95.

^b These are used as "stock names" (as we might say

is straight-haired, bright-eyed, and white-skinned,^a it must follow that none of the Ethiopians has the Virgin for horoscope, else they will be granting that an Ethiopian is white, bright-eyed and straight-haired, which is of all things the most absurd.—And 103 in general, since they declare that it is not the stars that inform them of the differences in men's lives but they themselves observe them together with the positions of the stars, I affirm that if the prediction is to be reliable, the same position of the stars ought not to be observed once only in connexion with the life of some one person, but a second time with a second life, and a third time with a third, so that from the equality of the resultant effects in all the cases we might learn that when the stars have assumed a certain configuration the result will certainly be of one particular kind; and just as in medicine we have observed that 104 a puncture of the heart is the cause of death, after having observed together with it not only the death of Dion but also of Theon and Socrates^b and many others, so also in astrology, if it is credible that this particular configuration of the stars is indicative of that particular kind of life, then it certainly has been observed not once only in one single case but many times in many cases. Since, then, the same con- 105 figuration of the stars is seen, as they say, at long intervals—the recurrence of "The Great Year"^c taking place after 9977 years,—human observation will not succeed in traversing so many centuries even in the case of one nativity, and that, too, when it is interrupted not once but oftentimes, either by the "Smith and Jones and Robinson"); they do not refer to the historical persons named: cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 269, ii. 289.

^c For various theories of "The Great Year" see Adam's *Republic of Plato*, vol. ii. p. 304.

*(τῆς)*¹ τοῦ κόσμου φθοῶς, εἰρήκασιν ὡς τινες, μεσολαβούσης αὐτήν, ἢ πάντως γε τῆς κατὰ μέρος μεταβολῆς ἐξαφανιζούσης τὸ συνεχές τῆς ιστορικῆς παραδόσεως.

106 Τοσαῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ πραγματικῶς δυνάμενα λέγεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς Χαλδαίους. μεθ' ἧς πάλιν ἀπ' ἄλλης ἀρχῆς σύντομον οὖσαν καὶ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς μουσικούς ζήτησιν ἀποδώσομεν.

destruction of the Universe, as some have declared, or certainly by a partial upheaval which wholly does away with the continuity of historical tradition.

Such, then, are the many valid objections which can be brought against the Chaldeans. After which, making a fresh start, we shall set out our criticism—which is brief—of the Musicians.

¹ *(τῆς)* add. cj. Bekk.

Z

ΠΡΟΣ ΜΟΥΣΙΚΟΥΣ

- 1 Ἡ μουσικὴ λέγεται τριχῶς, καθ' ἓνα μὲν τρόπον ἐπιστήμη τις περὶ μελωδίας καὶ φθόγγους καὶ ῥυθμοποιίας καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια καταγιγνομένη πράγματα, καθὸ καὶ Ἀριστόξενον τὸν Σπινθάρου λέγομεν εἶναι μουσικόν, καθ' ἕτερον δὲ ἡ περὶ ὀργανικὴν ἐμπειρία,¹ ὡς ὅταν τοὺς μὲν αὐλοῖς καὶ ψαλτηρίοις χρωμένους μουσικοὺς ὀνομάζωμεν, τὰς δὲ ψαλτρίας μουσικάς. ἀλλὰ κυρίως κατὰ ταῦτα² τὰ σημαίνόμενα καὶ παρὰ πολλοῖς λέγεται μουσική·
 2 καταχρηστικώτερον δὲ ἐνίοτε προσαγορεύειν εἰώθαμεν τῷ αὐτῷ ὀνόματι καὶ τὴν ἐν τινι πράγματι κατόρθωσιν. οὕτω γοῦν μεμουσωμένον τι ἔργον φαιμέν, κἂν ζωγραφίας μέρος ὑπάρχη, καὶ μεμουσῶσθαι τὸν ἐν τούτῳ κατορθώσαντα ζωγράφον.
 3 ἀλλὰ δὴ κατὰ τοσοῦτους τρόπους νοουμένης τῆς μουσικῆς, πρόκειται νῦν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀντίρρησην οὐ μὰ Δία πρὸς ἄλλην τινὰ ἢ πρὸς τὴν κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον νοουμένην σημαίνόμενον· αὕτη γὰρ καὶ ἐντελεστάτη παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας μουσικάς δοκεῖ καθ-
 4 εσσηκέναι. τῆς δὲ ἀντιρρήσεως, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ

¹ ἐμπειρία cj. Bekk. : ἐμπειρίαν mss., Bekk.

² κατὰ ταῦτα cj. Bekk. : κατ' αὐτὰ mss., Bekk.

BOOK VI

AGAINST THE MUSICIANS

THE term " Music " is used in three senses ; in one 1 as a science dealing with melodies and notes and rhythm-making and similar things, in which sense we say that Aristoxenus,^a son of Spintharus, was a musician ; in another sense it connotes instrumental skill, as when we describe those who use flutes and harps as musicians and female harp-players as musicians. It is with these significations that the 2 term " Music " is properly and generally used. But it is sometimes our habit to apply the same name in a loose sense to correctness in some performance. Thus we speak of a work as " musical," even though it be a piece of painting, and of the painter who has achieved therein correctness as " musical." While 3 music, then, is conceived in all these ways, it is certainly not our present purpose to frame our refutation of it if conceived in any other way than that first signified ; for Music in this sense, as compared with the other kinds, seems to be the most perfect. And, as in the case of Grammar, the 4

^a Aristoxenus of Tarentum, *circa* 320 B.C., was a musician and disciple of Aristotle.

γραμματικῆς, διττόν ἐστὶ τὸ εἶδος. οἱ μὲν οὖν δογματικώτερον ἐπεχείρησαν διδάσκειν ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι μάθημα πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν μουσική, ἀλλὰ βλαπτικὸν μᾶλλον, καὶ τοῦτο δείκνυσθαι ἔκτε τοῦ διαβάλλεσθαι τὰ πρὸς τῶν μουσικῶν λεγόμενα καὶ ἔκ τοῦ τούτους προηγουμένους λόγους ἀνασκευῆς ἀξιούσθαι· οἱ δὲ ἀπορητικώτερον πάσης ἀποστάντες τῆς τοιαύτης ἀντιρρήσεως ἐν τῷ σαλεύειν τὰς ἀρχικὰς ὑποθέσεις τῶν μουσικῶν ὥρῆσαν καὶ τὴν ὅλην ἀνηρῆσθαι μουσικὴν. ὅθεν καὶ ἡμεῖς ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ δοκεῖν τι τῆς διδασκαλίας χρεωκοπεῖν, τὸν ἑκατέρου δόγματος ἢ πράγματος χαρακτήρα κεφαλαιωδέστερον ἐφοδεύσομεν, μήτε ἐν τοῖς παρέλκουσιν ὑπερεκπίπτοντες εἰς μακρὰς διεξόδους μήτε ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαιοτέροις ὑστεροῦντες πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἐπείγοντων ἔκθεσιν, ἀλλὰ μέσην καὶ μεμετρημένην κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ποιούμενοι τὴν διδασκαλίαν.

7 Τάξει δὲ ἀρχέτω πρῶτον τὰ ὑπὲρ μουσικῆς εἰωθότα παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς θρυλεῖσθαι. εἴπερ τοίνυν, φασί, φιλοσοφίαν ἀποδεχόμεθα σωφρονίζουσαν τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον καὶ τὰ ψυχικὰ πάθη καταστῆλουσαν, πολλῶ μᾶλλον ἀποδεχόμεθα τὴν μουσικὴν, ὅτι οὐ βιαστικώτερον ἐπιτάττουσα ἡμῖν ἀλλὰ μετὰ θελγούσης τινὸς πειθοῦς τῶν αὐτῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων περιγίνεται ὧν περ καὶ ἡ φιλοσοφία. 8 ὁ γοῦν Πυθαγόρας μεῖράκια ὑπὸ μέθης ἐκβεβακχευμένα ποτὲ θεασάμενος ὡς μηδὲν τῶν μεμνηνόντων διαφέρειν, παρήνεσε τῷ συνεπικωμάζοντι τούτοις αὐλητῇ τὸ σπονδεῖον αὐτοῖς ἐπαυλῆσαι μέλος· τοῦ δὲ τὸ προσταχθὲν ποιήσαντος οὕτως αἰφνίδιον

¹ ἀποδεξόμεθα cj. Bekk. : ἀποδεχόμεθα mss., Bekk.

refutation is of two kinds. Some have tried in a dogmatical way to show that Music is a subject not necessary for happiness, but harmful rather, and to prove this both by finding fault with the statements made by the Musicians and by claiming to refute their leading arguments; whereas others, avoiding 5 all that sort of refutation, have held, in more sceptical fashion, that through the wrecking of the principal assumptions of the Musicians the whole of Music is likewise destroyed. Accordingly, in order to avoid 6 the appearance of cutting down at all our debt of exposition, we shall discuss in summary fashion the character of each of these dogmas or operations, neither divagating into long disquisitions regarding irrelevant matters, nor, as regards such as are relevant, failing to give a full account of the pressing points, but making our exposition as moderate and measured as possible.

First in order, let us state the views commonly expressed concerning Music by the majority of people. If, they say, we welcome Philosophy as regulating human life and repressing the passions of the soul, much more shall we welcome Music because it produces the same results as Philosophy not by commanding us in a violent manner but by means of a seductive persuasiveness. Thus Pythagoras, having noticed on 8 one occasion that the youths who were in a state of Bacchic frenzy from drunkenness differed not at all from madmen, advised the flute-player who was with them in their revels to play them the "spondean" tune^a; and when he had done as instructed, they

^a The sort of slow, solemn melodies used at *spondai* "libations").

μεταβαλεῖν σωφρονισθέντας ὡς εἰ καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν
 9 ἔνηφον. οἱ τε τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἡγούμενοι καὶ ἐπ'
 ἀνδρία διαβόητοι Σπαρτιάται μουσικῆς αἰεὶ ποτε
 στρατηγούσης αὐτῶν ἐπολέμουν. καὶ οἱ ταῖς
 Σόλωνος χρώμενοι παραιέσεσι πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ
 10 ἐνόπλιον κίνησιν. καὶ μὴν ὥσπερ σωφρονίζει μὲν
 τοὺς ἄφρονας ἢ μουσική, εἰς ἀνδρίαν δὲ προτρέπει
 τοὺς δειλοτέρους, οὕτω καὶ παρηγορεῖ τοὺς ὑπ'
 ὀργῆς ἐκκαίωμένους. ὀρώμεν γοῦν ὡς καὶ ὁ παρὰ
 τῷ ποιητῇ μνηίων Ἀχιλλεύς καταλαμβάνεται ὑπὸ
 τῶν ἐξαποσταλέντων πρεσβευτῶν

φρένα τερπόμενος φόρμυγι λιγείῃ
 καλῇ δαιδαλέῃ· ἐπὶ δ' ἀργύρεον ζυγὸν ἦεν.
 τὴν ἔλετ' ἐξ ἐνάρων, πόλιν Ἡετίωνος ὀλέσσας.
 τῇ ὃ γε θυμὸν ἔτερπεν

ὡς ἂν σαφῶς γινώσκων τὴν μουσικὴν πραγματεῖαν
 μάλιστα δυναμένην περιγίνεσθαι τῆς περὶ αὐτὸν
 11 διαθέσεως. καὶ μὴν δι' ἔθους ἦν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις
 ἥρωσιν, εἴ ποτε ἀποδημοίεν καὶ μακρὸν πλοῦν
 στέλλοιντο, ὡς πιστοτάτους φύλακας καὶ σω-
 φρονιστήρας τῶν γυναικῶν αὐτῶν ἀπολείπειν τοὺς
 μουσικούς. Κλυταιμνήστρα γέ τοι παρῆν αἰοῖδος,
 12 ταύτην σωφροσύνης. ἀλλ' ὁ Αἰγισθος πανοῦργος
 ὦν αὐτίκα τὸν αἰοῖδὸν τοῦτον

ἄγων εἰς νῆσον ἐρήμην
 κάλλιπεν οἰωνοῖσιν ἔλωρ καὶ κύρμα γενέσθαι·

* i.e. the Athenians.

suddenly changed and became sober just as if they
 had been sober from the beginning. The Spartans, 9
 too, the leaders of Hellas and renowned for their
 bravery, always had music to lead their army when
 they went to war. And those ^a who followed the
 counsels of Solon formed up their ranks to the sound
 of the flute and the lyre and made their movements
 10 under arms rhythmical.^b Moreover, as Music gives 10
 sober sense to those lacking in sense and incites the
 cowards to courage, so also it calms down those who
 are burning with anger. Thus we see how Achilles
 in his rage (as the poet describes him) is found by the
 messengers who had been sent to him ^c—

Giving delight to his soul with the tuneful notes of his
 zither;
 Goodly and cunningly wrought it was, with its cross-bar
 of silver,
 Which he did choose from the spoils when he sack'd
 Etition's city.

With this now he was soothing his soul,—

—as if he knew full well that the practice of music
 was the thing best able to overcome his state of
 mind. Furthermore, it was customary for the other 11
 heroes, whenever they left home and set out on a long
 voyage, to leave the musicians behind as being the
 most trusty guardians and controllers of their wives.
 Thus Clytaemnestra was accompanied by a minstrel,
 to whom Agamemnon gave strict orders regarding
 the chastity of his wife.^d But Aegisthus, who was a 12
 crafty rascal, straightway took this minstrel

Unto a desolate island,
 There did he leave him a prey to become and a spoil to the
 vultures;

^a The rhythm of war songs and dances was that of the
 "Cretic" (— —) or "Paeon" (— — —).

^b Cf. Hom. *Il.* ix. 186 ff. ^c Cf. Hom. *Od.* iii. 267 ff.

εἶθ' οὕτως ἀφύλακτον λαβὼν τὴν Κλυταιμνήστραν
διέφθειρεν, προτρεψάμενος αὐτὴν ἐπιθέσθαι τῇ
13 ἀρχῇ τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος. οἱ τε μέγα δυνηθέντες
ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, καθάπερ καὶ Πλάτων, τὸν σοφὸν
ὁμοίον φασιν εἶναι τῷ μουσικῷ, τὴν ψυχὴν ἡρμο-
σμένην ἔχοντα. καθὼ καὶ Σωκράτης καίπερ βαθυ-
γῆρως ἤδη γεγονώς οὐκ ἠδεῖτο πρὸς Λάμπωνα τὸν
κιθαριστὴν φοιτῶν, καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἐπὶ τούτῳ ὄνει-
14 δίσαντα λέγειν ὅτι κρεῖττόν ἐστιν ὀψιμαθῆ μάλλον
ἢ ἀμαθῆ διαβάλλεσθαι. οὐ χρὴ μέντοι, φασίν, ἀπὸ
τῆς νῦν ἐπιτρίπτου καὶ κατεαγυίας μουσικῆς τὴν
παλαιὰν διασύρειν, ὅτε καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι πολλὴν πρό-
νοιαν σωφροσύνης ποιούμενοι καὶ τὴν σεμνότητα
τῆς γε μουσικῆς κατελιφότες ὡς ἀναγκαϊότατον
15 αὐτὴν μάθημα τοῖς ἐκγόνοις παρεδίδουσαν. καὶ
τούτου μάρτυς ὁ τῆς ἀρχαίας κωμωδίας ποιητής,
λέγων

λέξω τοῖνυν βίον ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὃν ἐγὼ θνητοῖσι
παρεῖχον.

πρότερον γὰρ ἔδει παιδὸς φωνὴν γρύσαντος
μηδέν' ἀκοῦσαι,

εἶτα βαδίζειν ἐν ταῖσιν ὁδοῖς εὐτάκτως ἐς κιθα-
ριστοῦ.

ὁθεν εἰ καὶ κεκλασμένοις τισὶ μέλεσι νῦν καὶ γυ-
ναικῶδεσι ῥυθμοῖς θηλύνει τὸν νοῦν ἢ μουσική,
οὐδὲν τοῦτο πρὸς τὴν ἀρχαίαν καὶ ἑπανδρον μου-
16 σικήν. εἴπερ τε ἡ ποιητικὴ βιωφελὴς ἐστὶ, ταύτην
δὲ φαίνεται κοσμεῖν ἢ μουσικὴ μελίζουσα καὶ
ἐπωδὸν παρέχουσα, χρεῖώδης γενήσεται ἢ μου-
σική. ἀμέλει γέ τοι καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ μελοποιοῖ

* Cf. Plato, *Rep.* 410 E, 443 E, 554 E.

and then he took Clytaemnestra, who was now without
a protector, and seduced her, having urged her to seize
Agamemnon's dominion. Those also who have been 13
men of great ability in philosophy, such as Plato, say
that the sage resembles the musician as he has his
soul "harmonized." ^a Accordingly, Socrates, though
he was already far gone in years, was not ashamed
of going to get lessons from Lampon the lyre-player,
and in reply to one who jeered at him for this he said
that it was better to be accused of being late-learned
than unlearned.—Nor indeed, they say, ought we 14
to run down the ancient music because the present-
day music is hackneyed and effeminate, when the
Athenians, who devote great care to temperance,
appreciating the dignity of music have handed it
down to their descendants as a most necessary branch
of learning. A witness to this is the poet of the Old 15
Comedy,^b who says—

I will now relate from the start the life which I have pro-
vided for mortals.

The first rule was that none should hear from an urchin
the sound of a mutter,

Next, they must walk in order good on their way to their
master of music.

Hence, even if music now weakens the mind by its
effeminate tunes and womanish rhythms, this is no
argument against the ancient and virile music.—
Also, if poetry is useful for life,^c and music appears to 16
adorn it by its melodies and and by making it fit
for singing, then music will be beneficial. And, of
course, the poets^d are called "tune-makers," and of

^b V. 1 comes from Telecleides (*ap.* Athen. vi. p. 268 b), vv.
2, 3, from Aristoph. *Nub.* 963 f.

^c Cf. *Adv. Gram.* 272 ff.

^d i.e. lyric (or "melic") poets, like Pindar.

λέγονται, καὶ τὰ Ὀμήρου ἔπη τὸ πάλαι πρὸς λύραν
 17 ἦδδοτο· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὰ παρὰ τοῖς τραγικοῖς
 μέλη καὶ στάσιμα, φυσικόν τινα ἐπέχοντα λόγον,
 ὅποιά ἐστι τὰ οὕτω λεγόμενα,

γαῖα μεγίστη καὶ Διὸς αἰθῆρ,
 ὁ μὲν ἀνθρώπων καὶ θεῶν γενέτωρ,
 ἢ δ' ὑγροβόλους σταγόνας νοτίας
 παραδεξαμένη τίκτει θνατούς,
 τίκτει δὲ βορὰν φύλα τε θηρῶν,
 ὅθεν οὐκ ἀδίκως
 μήτηρ πάντων νενόμισται.

18 καθόλου γὰρ οὐ μόνον χαιρόντων ἐστὶν ἄκουσμα,
 ἀλλ' ἐν ὕμνοις καὶ εὐωχίαις καὶ θεῶν θυσίαις ἢ
 μουσικῇ· διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν τῶν ἀγαθῶν
 ζῆλον τὴν διάνοιαν προτρέπεται. ἀλλὰ καὶ λυπου-
 μένων παρηγόρημα· ὅθεν καὶ τοῖς πενθοῦσιν αὐλῶ¹
 μελωδοῦσιν οἱ τὴν λύπην αὐτῶν ἐπικουφίζοντες.

19 Τοιαῦτα μὲν ὑπὲρ μουσικῆς· λέγεται δὲ πρὸς
 ταῦτα τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ προχείρου
 διδόμενον τὸ φύσει τῶν μελῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι διεγερ-
 τικά τῆς ψυχῆς τὰ δὲ κατασταλτικά. παρὰ γὰρ
 τὴν ἡμετέραν δόξαν τὸ τοιοῦτο γίνεται. ὡσπερ
 γὰρ ὁ τῆς βροντῆς κτύπος, καθά φασιν Ἐπικου-
 ρείων παῖδες, οὐ θεοῦ τινὸς ἐπιφάνειαν σημαίνει
 ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἰδιώταις καὶ δεισιδαίμοσι τοιοῦτος εἶναι
 20 δοξάζεται, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλων σωμάτων ἐπ' ἴσης ἀλ-
 λήλοις προσκρουσάντων ὁμοίως ἀποτελεῖται κτύ-
 πος, ὡσπερ καὶ μύλου περιαγομένου ἢ χειρῶν
 συμπαταγουσῶν, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τῶν κατὰ
 μουσικὴν μελῶν οὐ φύσει τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα ἐστὶ τὰ δὲ
 τοιαῦτα, ἀλλ' ὑφ' ἡμῶν προσδοξάζεται. τὸ αὐτὸ γούιν

old the verses of Homer were sung to the lyre. So 17
 likewise were the songs and choral odes of the tragic
 poets, preserving a natural relation, such as are those
 in verses like these ^a—

Mightiest Earth and Aether of Heaven,—He of mortal
 men and of gods is the Sire,
 She takes to her bosom the drippings of rain, And she
 bears as her offspring mortal men,
 And food does she bear, herds too of wild-beasts ;
 Wherefore not without cause Mother of all is she deemed.

For, in sum, music is not only a sound of rejoicing, 18
 but is heard also in sacred hymns and feasts and
 sacrifices to the gods ; and because of this it incites
 the mind to emulate the good. It is, too, a consol-
 ation to those in grief ; and for this reason those who
 are trying to lighten the grief of mourners sing for
 them to the flute.

Such are the arguments in defence of music ; but 19
 in reply to these it is argued, firstly, that it is not
 conceded off-hand that some tunes are in their
 nature stimulating, others repressive. For such a
 thing is contrary to our belief. For just as a clap
 of thunder—as the Epicurean fraternity declare ^b—
 does not betoken the epiphany of a god, though
 supposed to do so by ignorant and superstitious folk,
 since a similar clap is produced by other bodies clash- 20
 ing together in the same way, as by a mill-stone
 revolving or the clapping of hands, so likewise in the
 case of musical tunes it is not by nature that some are
 of this kind and others of that kind, but it is we our-
 selves who suppose them to be such. Thus the same

^a Cf. Eurip. *Frag.* 836 (Nauck).

^b Cf. Lucret. vi. 96 ff.

¹ αὐλῶ scripsi : αὐλοῖ mss., Bekk. (αὐλοῖς Heintz).

μέλος τῶν μὲν ἵππων διεγερτικόν ἐστι, τῶν δὲ ἀνθρώπων ἐν θεάτροις ἀκουόντων οὐδαμῶς. καὶ τῶν ἵππων δὲ τάχα οὐ διεγερτικόν ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ
 21 ταρακτικόν. εἶτα κὰν τοιαῦτα ἢ τὰ τῆς μουσικῆς μέλη, οὐ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἡ μουσικὴ βιωφελὴς καθέστηκεν. οὐ γὰρ ὅτι δύναμιν ἔχει σωφρο-
 νιστικὴν, καταστέλλει τὴν διάνοιαν, ἀλλ' ὅτι¹ περισπαστικὴν· παρὸ καὶ ἡσυχασθέντων πως τῶν τοιοῦτων μελῶν πάλιν ὁ νοῦς, ὡς ἂν μὴ θερα-
 22 διάνοιαν. ὄνπερ οὖν τρόπον ὁ ὕπνος ἢ ὁ οἶνος οὐ λύει τὴν λύπην ἀλλ' ὑπερτίθεται, κάρων ἐμποιῶν καὶ ἔκλυσι καὶ λήθην, οὕτω τὸ ποιὸν μέλος οὐ καταστέλλει λυπούμενην ψυχὴν ἢ περὶ ὀργὴν σεσοβημένην τὴν διάνοιαν, ἀλλ' εἶπερ, περισπᾶ.
 23 ὁ τε Πυθαγόρας τὸ μὲν πρῶτον μάταιος ἦν, τοὺς μεθύοντας ἀκαίρως σωφρονίζειν βουλόμενος ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐκκλίνων· εἶτα καὶ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἐπανορθούμενος αὐτοὺς ὁμολογεῖ πλείον τι δύνασθαι τῶν φιλοσόφων πρὸς ἐπανόρθωσιν ἡθῶν τοὺς ἀλητάς.
 24 τό τε τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας πρὸς αὐλὸν καὶ λύραν πολεμεῖν τοῦ μικρῶ πρότερον εἰρημένου τεκμηρίον ἐστὶν, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τοῦ βιωφελῆ τυγχάνειν τὴν μουσικὴν. καθάπερ δ' οἱ ἀχθοφοροῦντες ἢ ἐρέσσοντες ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἐπιπόνων δρῶντες ἔργων κελεύουσιν εἰς τὸ ἀνθέλκειν τὸν νοῦν ἀπὸ τῆς κατὰ τὸ ἔργον βασάνου, οὕτω καὶ <οἱ>² αὐλοῖς ἢ σάλπιγξιν ἐν πολέμοις χρώμενοι οὐ διὰ τὸ ἔχειν τι τῆς διανοίας ἐπεγερτικόν τὸ μέλος καὶ ἀνδρικοῦ λήματος αἴτιον ὑπάρχειν τοῦτο ἐμηχανήσαντο, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῆς ἀγω-

¹ ἀλλ' ὅτι scripsi : ἀλλὰ ἢ mss., Bekk. (ἀλλὰ ἢ Shorey).

tune serves to excite horses, but not at all to excite men who hear it in a theatre. And even to horses it may prove not exciting but disturbing.—Secondly, ²¹ even if the tunes of music are of the kind stated, music is not on that account useful for life. For it does not repress the mental state because it possesses a moderating influence, but because its influence is distracting; consequently, when tunes of that sort have ceased to sound, the mind, as though not cured ²² by them, reverts to its original state. Thus, just as sleep or wine does not banish grief but puts it off by inducing torpor and languor and oblivion, so a certain kind of tune does not repress a soul in grief or a mind that is shaken by anger but, if anything, distracts it. And, as to Pythagoras,^a in the first ²³ place he was foolish in desiring to render drunkards sober at the wrong moment, instead of quitting the place; and secondly, by trying to reform them in this way he confesses that flute-players have more influence than philosophers for the reforming of morals. Also, the fact that the Spartans ²⁴ make war to the sound of flute and lyre is a proof of what was said a little while ago, but not of the usefulness for life of music. And just as men carrying loads or rowing a boat or doing any other toilsome work make rhythmical calls ^c in order to divert their minds from the distress caused by their work, so also when men make use of flutes or trumpets in war, it is not because the tune has any power to excite the mind, or because it produces a courageous spirit, that they have employed this device, but through anxiety to divert

^a Cf. § 8.

^b Cf. § 9.

^c e.g. ῥυθμικὰ Aristoph. *Ran.* 1073.

^d <οἱ> add. cj. Bekk.

νίας και παραχῆς ἀνθέλκειν ἑαυτοὺς σπουδάσαντες,
 εἶγε και στρόμβοις τινές τῶν βαρβάρων βουκινί-
 ζοντες¹ και τυμπάνοις κτυποῦντες πολεμοῦσιν· ἀλλ'
 25 οὐδὲν τούτων ἐπ' ἀνδρίαν προτρέπεται. τὰ δὲ
 αὐτὰ λεκτέον και ἐπὶ τοῦ μηνίοντος Ἀχιλλέως·
 καιτοί ἐρωτικοῦ ὄντος και ἀκρατοῦς οὐ παράδοξον
 26 τὴν μουσικὴν σπουδάζεσθαι. νῆ Δι', ἀλλὰ και
 οἱ ἥρωες τὰς ἑαυτῶν γυναῖκας ᾤδοίς τισὶν ὡς
 σώφροσι φύλαξι παρακατετίθεντο, καθάπερ ὁ
 Ἀγαμέμνων τὴν Κλυταιμνήστραν. ταῦτα δὲ ἥδη
 μυθολογούντων ἐστὶν ἀνδρῶν, εἶτα και παρὰ πόδας
 αὐτοῦς διελεγχόντων· πῶς γάρ, εἴπερ μουσικὴ περὶ
 τῆς τῶν παθῶν ἐπανορθώσεως ἐπιστεύετο, τὸν μὲν
 Ἀγαμέμνονα ἢ Κλυταιμνήστρα ἐπὶ τῆς ἰδίας ἐστίας
 κατέκτανεν ὡσπερ βοῦν ἐπὶ φάτῃ, εἰς δὲ τοὺς
 Ὀδυσσεῶς οἴκους ἢ Πηνελόπη ὄχλον ἄσωτον ἐπι-
 δέχεται μειρακίων, αἰεὶ δὲ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας αὐτῶν
 ἐλπιδοκοποῦσα και παραίξουσα μοχθηρότερον και
 χαλεπώτερον τῆς ἐπὶ Ἴλιον στρατείας τὸν ἐν
 27 Ἰθάκῃ πόλεμον ἤγειρε τῷ γήμαντι; και μὴν οὐδ',
 εἰ² οἱ περὶ τὸν Πλάτωνα μουσικὴν ἀπεδέξαντο,
 ῥητέον [οὐ] πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν αὐτὴν συντίειν,
 ἐπεὶ και μὴ λειπόμενοι τῆς τούτων ἀξιοπιστίας,
 καθάπερ οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον, ἠρνήσαντο ταύτην
 τὴν ἀντιποίησιν, λέγοντες τοῦναντίον αὐτὴν ἀσύμ-
 φороν εἶναι και

ἀργὴν, φίλοινον, χρημάτων ἀτημελῆ.

28 εὐθήεις δὲ εἰσι και οἱ τὴν ἀπὸ ποιητικῆς χρεῖαν
 συμπλέκοντες αὐτῇ πρὸς εὐχρηστίαν, ἐπεὶπερ δύ-
 νηται μὲν τις, ὡς και ἐν τῷ πρὸς τοὺς γραμματι-

themselves from the struggle and turmoil, seeing that
 some barbarians blow the trumpet with conches
 and beat drums as they make war; but none of
 these practices impels men to bravery. And of Achil-
 25 les^a in his anger the same may be said; although
 for one who was amorous and incontinent it is not
 surprising that he was devoted to music. Yet (say 26
 they) the heroes entrusted their wives, as did
 Agamemnon Clytaemnestra, to minstrels, thinking
 them to be sober-minded guardians. But these, of
 course, are the fictions of story-tellers who at the
 next moment confute themselves; for, if music was
 trusted as a means of rectifying the passions, how
 was it that Clytaemnestra slew Agamemnon on his
 own hearth-stone "like an ox at the stall,"^b and that
 Penelope admits into the halls of Odysseus a crowd
 of dissolute youths^c and by contantly luring on and
 strengthening their desires by false hopes raised up
 for her husband the war in Ithaca which was more
 grievous and bitter than the campaign against Troy?
 Moreover, if Plato^d admitted music, we should not 27
 therefore assert that music contributes to happiness,
 since others who are not inferior to him in trust-
 worthiness,—such as Epicurus,—have denied this
 contention, and declared on the contrary that music
 is unprofitable and

Wine-loving, idle, having no regard for wealth.

Simple-minded, too, are those who link with it 28
 the profit derived from poetry to prove its utility,
 since—as we stated in our book *Against the Gram*

^a Cf. § 10.

^b Cf. Hom. *Od.* xi. 411.

^c *i.e.* Antinoüs and the other "Suitors." ^d Cf. § 13.

¹ βουκινίζοντες *cf.* Bekk. : βουκινίζουσι *MSS.*, Bekk.

² οὐδ' εἰ . . . [οὐ] *Herv.* : εἰ οὔτε . . . οὐ *MSS.*, Bekk.

κοὺς ἐλέγομεν, ἀνωφελῆ διδάσκειν τὴν ποιητικὴν, οὐδὲν δὲ ἔλαττον κάκεινο δεικνύειν ὅτι ἡ μὲν μουσικὴ περὶ μέλος καταγινομένη μόνον τέρπειν πέφυκεν, ἡ δὲ ποιητικὴ καὶ περὶ διάνοιαν καταγινομένη δύναται συνωφελεῖν τε καὶ σωφρονίζειν.

29 Ἄλλ' ὁ μὲν πρὸς τὰ ἐγκεχειρημένα λόγος ἐστὶ τοιοῦτος· προηγουμένως δὲ λέγεται [καὶ] κατὰ μουσικῆς ὡς εἶπερ ἔστι χρειώδης, ἥτοι κατὰ τοῦτο λέγεται χρειοῦν παρόσον ὁ μουσικευσάμενος πλείον παρὰ τοὺς ἰδιώτας τέρπεται πρὸς μουσικῶν ἀκροαμάτων, ἢ παρόσον οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθοὺς γενέσθαι 30 μὴ προπαιδευθέντας ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ἢ τῷ τὰ αὐτὰ στοιχεῖα τυγχάνειν τῆς μουσικῆς καὶ <τῆς>¹ τῶν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν πραγμάτων εἰδήσεως, ὁποῖόν τι καὶ περὶ γραμματικῆς ἀνώτερον ἐλέγομεν, ἢ τῷ κατὰ ἄρμονίαν διοικεῖσθαι τὸν κόσμον, καθὼς φάσκουσι Πυθαγορικῶν παῖδες, δέεσθαί τε ἡμῶν τῶν μουσικῶν θεωρημάτων πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὅλων εἴδησιν, ἢ τῷ τὰ ποιά μέλη ἡθοποιεῖν τὴν ψυχὴν. 31 οὗτε δὲ τῷ τοὺς μουσικοὺς πλεον τέρπεσθαι παρὰ τοὺς ἰδιώτας ἀπὸ τῶν ἀκροαμάτων λέγοιτ' ἀν χρειοῦν ἢ μουσικῆ. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα ἰδιώταις ἢ τέρψις καθάπερ αἱ ἐπὶ λιμῷ ἢ δίψει ἢ κρύει γινόμεναι ὑπὸ <βρώματος ἢ>² πόματος ἢ 32 ἀλάς· εἴτα κἂν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὑπάρχωσι, δυνάμεθα χωρὶς μουσικῆς ἐμπειρίας αὐτῶν ἀπολαύειν. νήπια γοῦν ἐμμελοῦς μινυρίσματος κατακούοντα κοιμίζεται, καὶ τὰ ἄλογα τῶν ζώων ὑπὸ αὐλοῦ καὶ σύριγγος κηλεῖται, εἶ γε³ δελφίνες, ὡς λόγος, αὐ-

¹ <τῆς> add. cj. Bekk.

² <βρώματος ἢ> add. Herv., Fabr.

³ εἶ γε scripsi: οἱ τε MSS., Bekk.

marians^a—one can argue that poetry is useless, and prove equally well that while music, being concerned with melody only, naturally serves to give pleasure, poetry which is concerned with thoughts as well, is able to be of benefit and teach prudence.

Such, then, is the line of reasoning against the 29 attempts at defence; but the principal argument against music is that if it is useful it is alleged to be useful on the ground that he who has practised music compared with ordinary people gets more pleasure from hearing musical performances; or on the ground that it is not possible for men to be good unless they have already been trained by musicians; or because 30 the elements of music are the same as those of the science of the subject-matter of philosophy, (which is much like what we previously said about grammar); or because the Universe is ordered according to harmony,^b as the Pythagorean fraternity declare, and we need the theorems of Music in order to understand the Whole of things; or because tunes of a certain kind affect the character of the soul. But it 31 will not be stated that music is useful because musicians as compared with ordinary people get more pleasure from listening to performances. For, firstly, the pleasure felt by ordinary people is not inevitable as are those caused by food, drink and warmth after hunger, thirst and cold; and secondly, even if they 32 are inevitable we can enjoy them without musical skill; infants, certainly, are lulled to sleep by listening to a tuneful cradle-song, and irrational animals are charmed by the sound of the flute and pipe, seeing that dolphins, as we are told, swim up to ships as they

^a Cf. Adv. Gram. 277 ff., 297 ff.

^b Cf. Adv. Arithm. 3.

λῶν μελωδίαις τερπόμενοι προσνήχονται τοῖς ἔρρο-
 33 σομένοις σκάφειν· ὦν οὐδὲ ὀπότερον ἔοικε μου-
 σικῆς ἔχειν ἐμπειρίαν ἢ ἔννοϊαν. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο
 μὴ ποτε, ὃν τρόπον χωρὶς ὀψαρτυτικῆς καὶ οἴνο-
 γευστικῆς ἠδόμεθα ὄψου ἢ οἴνου γευσάμενοι, ὦδε
 καὶ χωρὶς μουσικῆς ἠσθεῖν ἂν τερπνοῦ μέλους
 ἀκούσαντες, τοῦ μὲν ὅτι τεχνικῶς γίνεται (τοῦ
 τεχνίτου)¹ μᾶλλον παρὰ τὸν ἰδιώτην ἀντιλαμβανό-
 34 μενου, τοῦ δὲ πλείον² ἠστικοῦ πάθους μηδὲν κερ-
 δαίνοντος. ὥστε οὐχ αἰρετὸν μουσικὴ παρόσον τοὺς
 εἰδήμονας αὐτῆς ἐπὶ πλείον τέρπεσθαι συμβέβηκεν.
 καὶ μὴ οὐδὲ τῷ προοδοποιεῖν τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς σοφίαν·
 ἀνάπαυτον γὰρ ἀντικόπτει καὶ ἀντιβαίνει πρὸς τὸ
 τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐφίεσθαι, εὐαγώγουσιν εἰς ἀκολασίαν καὶ
 35 λαιμαρτίαν παρασκευάζουσα τοὺς νέους, ἐπεὶ περ ὁ
 μουσικευσάμενος

μολπαῖσιν ἠσθεῖς τοῦτ' αἰεὶ θηρέεται.
 ἀργὸς μὲν οἴκοις καὶ πόλει γενήσεται,
 φίλοισι δ' οὐθείς, ἀλλ' ἀφαντος οἴχεται,
 ὅταν γλυκείας ἠδονῆς ἠσσωσιν τις ἦ.

36 κατὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὐδὲ (ἐκ τοῦ)³ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν στοι-
 χείων ὀρμάσθαι ταύτην τε καὶ φιλοσοφίαν εἰσ-
 ακτέον τὸ κατ' αὐτὴν χρεῖωδες, ὡς αὐτόθεν ἐστὶ
 συμφανές. λείπεται ἄρα τῷ καθ' ἁρμονίαν τὸν κό-
 σμον διοικεῖσθαι ἢ τῷ ἠθοποιοῖς μέλεσι κεχρηῆσθαι
 χρεῖωδη πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν λέγειν αὐτὴν τυγχάνειν.
 ὦν τὸ μὲν τελευταῖον ἤδη διαβέβληται ὡς οὐχ
 37 ὑπάρχον ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ κατὰ ἁρμονίαν διοικεῖσθαι

¹ (τοῦ τεχνίτου) . . . ἀντιλαμβανόμενου . . . κερδαίνοντος
 Heintz : ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι . . . κερδαίνοντες mss., Bekk.

² πλείον cj. Bekk., Heintz : πλείω mss., Bekk.

³ (ἐκ τοῦ) add. cj. Bekk.

are being rowed along because of the pleasure they
 take in the tunes played by flutes^a; yet neither the
 infants nor the animals are likely to have skill in
 music or understanding of it. And for this reason it
 33 may be that, just as we enjoy tasting food or wine
 though without the art of cooking food or that of
 wine-tasting, so also, though without the art of music,
 we take pleasure in hearing a delightful melody; for
 though the expert musician understands that it is
 artistically performed better than the ordinary man,
 he gets from it no greater feeling of pleasure. So
 34 that music is not choiceworthy on the ground that
 those who understand it receive in consequence more
 pleasure.—Nor yet because it prepares and leads on
 the soul to wisdom; for, on the contrary, it resists
 and opposes the striving after virtue, making young
 people easily led into incontinence and debauchery,
 seeing that he who cultivates music^b—

In songs delighting makes this always his pursuit. 35
 Whene'er a man is master'd by sweet pleasure's charm
 At home he will be idle, idle too in town,
 To friends no friend, he speeds away and disappears.—

In the same way, the usefulness of music must not be
 36 inferred (as is obvious at once) from the fact that it and
 philosophy are derived from the same elements.^c—
 It only remains, then, to say that it is useful for
 happiness because the Universe is ordered according
 to harmony, or because it employs tunes which form
 character. But the last of these reasons has already
 been denounced^d as not being true, and that the 37

^a So dolphins are called *φλαυλοι*, "flute-loving," in Eurip.
Electra 435.

^b Cf. Eurip. *Antiope* (*Frag.* 187, vv. 3 ff. Nauck).

^c Cf. § 30.

^d Cf. § 28.

τὸν κόσμον ποικίλως δείκνυται ψεῦδος, εἶτα καὶ ἂν ἀληθὲς ὑπάρχη, οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον δύναται πρὸς μακαριότητα, καθάπερ οὐδὲ ἢ ἐν τοῖς ὄργανοις ἄρμονία.

38 Ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἶδος τῆς πρὸς τοὺς μουσικοὺς ἀντιρρήσεως τοιουτότροπὸν ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον καὶ τῶν τῆς μουσικῆς ἀρχῶν καθαπτόμενον πραγματικώτερας μᾶλλον ἔχειται ζητήσεις. οἷον ἐπεὶ ἡ μουσικὴ ἐπιστήμη τίς ἐστὶν ἐμμελῶν τε καὶ ἐκμελῶν ἐνρhythμων τε καὶ ἐκρhythμων, πάντως εἰάν δείξωμεν ὅτι οὔτε τὰ μέλη ὑποστατά ἐστίν οὔτε οἱ ρhythμοὶ τῶν ὑπαρκτῶν πραγμάτων τυγχάνουσιν, ἐσόμεθα παρεστακότες καὶ τὴν μουσικὴν ἀνυπόστατον. λέγωμεν δὲ πρῶτον περὶ μελῶν καὶ τῆς τούτων ὑποστάσεως, μικρὸν ἄνωθεν καταρξάμενοι.

39 Φωνὴ τοίνυν ἐστίν, ὡς ἂν τις ἀναμφισβητήτως ἀποδοίη, τὸ ἴδιον αἰσθητὸν ἀκοῆς· καθάπερ γὰρ μόνης ὁράσεως ἔργον ἐστὶ τὸ χρωμάτων ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ μόνης ὁσφρήσεως τὸ εὐωδῶν καὶ δυσωδῶν ἀντιποιεῖσθαι καὶ ἥδη γεύσεως τὸ γλυκεῶν ἢ πικρῶν αἰσθάνεσθαι, οὕτω γένοιτ' ἂν ἴδιον αἰσθητὸν ἀκοῆς ἢ φωνῆς. τῆς δὲ φωνῆς ἢ μὲν τίς 40 ἐστὶν ὀξεῖα ἢ δὲ βαρεῖα, μεταφορικώτερον ἀπὸ τῶν περὶ τὴν ἀφήν αἰσθητῶν ἑκατέρου τούτων λαμβάνοντος τὴν προσηγορίαν· καθάπερ γὰρ τὸ κεντοῦν καὶ τέμνον τὴν ἀφήν ὀξύ προσηγόρευσεν ὁ βίος καὶ τὸ θλάσιν ἐμποιοῦν καὶ πιέζον βαρῦ, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τῆς φωνῆς τὴν μὲν οἰονεῖ τέμνουσαν τὴν ἀκοῆν ὀξεῖαν, τὴν δὲ ὥσπερ θλώσαν βαρεῖαν.

41 καὶ οὐ ξένον εἰ ὥσπερ φαῖαν τινα καὶ μέλαιναν καὶ λευκὴν φωνῆν ἀπὸ τῶν πρὸς τὴν ὄρασιν αἰσθητῶν

Universe is ordered according to harmony is shown to be false by a variety of proofs ; and further, even if it be true, a thing of this kind can be of no help towards felicity, just as the harmony in instruments is of no help.

38

Such, then, is the first kind^a of argumentation against the Musicians : the second kind, which deals with the principles of music, involves an inquiry of a more practical nature. Thus, since Music is a science of what is "in tune" and "out-of-tune," "in rhythm" and "out-of-rhythm," if we shall prove that neither are tunes existent nor rhythms realities, then we shall certainly have established that Music is non-existent. And first let us discuss tunes and their existence, starting with some preliminary matters.

Now sound, as one will grant without dispute, is the 39 sense-object peculiar to hearing ; for as it is the task of vision alone to perceive colours, and of smell alone to apprehend odours good and bad, and of taste to sense sweet things and bitter, so sound will be the proper sense-object of hearing. And of sound one 40 kind is "sharp," another "grave," each of these deriving its name by transference from the sense-objects of touch ; for just as custom has given the name of "sharp" to what pricks or cuts the sense of touch, and "grave" to that which causes crushing and compresses, in the same way it calls the sound which cuts, as it were, the hearing "sharp," and that which crushes it, as it were, "grave." Nor is it 41 strange if, just as we describe sounds as grey or black or white, calling them after the sense-objects of

^a For the two kinds cf. §§ 4, 5.

κεκλήκαμεν, ὧδε καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν πρὸς τὴν ἀφήν
 ἐχρησάμεθά τισι μεταφοραῖς. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἐπ'
 ἴσης ἐκφέρηται ἢ φωνὴ καὶ ὑπὸ μίαν τάσιν, ὡς
 μηδένα περισπασμὸν γίνεσθαι τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἤτοι
 ἐπὶ τὸ βαρύτερον ἢ τὸ ὀξύτερον, τότε ὁ τοιοῦτος
 42 ἤχος φθόγγος καλεῖται, παρὰ καὶ οἱ μουσικοὶ ὑπο-
 γράφοντές φασι "φθόγγος ἐστὶν ἐμμελοῦς φωνῆς
 πᾶσις ὑπὸ μίαν τάσιν." τῶν δὲ φθόγγων οἱ μὲν
 εἰσιν ὁμόφωνοι οἱ δὲ οὐχ ὁμόφωνοι, καὶ ὁμόφωνοι
 μὲν οἱ μὴ διαφέροντες ἀλλήλων κατ' ὀξύτητα καὶ
 βαρύτητα, οὐχ ὁμόφωνοι δὲ οἱ μὴ οὕτως ἔχοντες.
 43 τῶν δὲ ὁμοφώνων, ὡς καὶ τῶν οὐχ ὁμοφώνων,
 τινὲς μὲν ὀξεῖς τινὲς δὲ βαρεῖς καλοῦνται, καὶ
 πάλιν τῶν οὐχ ὁμοφώνων οἱ μὲν διάφωνοι προσ-
 αγορεῖονται οἱ δὲ σύμφωνοι, καὶ διάφωνοι μὲν οἱ
 ἀνωμάλως καὶ διεσπασμένως τὴν ἀκοὴν κινοῦντες,
 44 σύμφωνοι δὲ οἱ ὁμαλότερον καὶ ἀμερίστως. σαφέ-
 στερον δὲ μᾶλλον ἔσται τὸ ἐκατέρου γένους ἰδίωμα
 τῆ ἀπὸ τῶν πρὸς γεῦσιν ποιότητων μεταβάσει
 χρησαμένων ἡμῶν. ὡσπερ τοῖνυν τῶν γευστῶν
 τὰ μὲν τοιαύτην ἔχει κράσιν ὥστε μονοειδῶς καὶ
 λείως κινεῖν τὴν αἴσθησιν, ὅποιοι τὸ οἰνόμελι καὶ
 ἰδρόμελι, τὰ δὲ οὐχ ὡσαύτως οὐδὲ ὁμοίως, καθ-
 ἄπερ τὸ ὀξύμελι (ἐκάτερον γὰρ τούτων τῶν μιγ-
 μάτων τὴν ἴδιον ἐντυποῖ ποιότητα τῆ γεύσει), οὕτω
 τῶν φθόγγων διάφωνοι μὲν εἰσιν οἱ ἀνωμάλως τὴν
 ἀκοὴν καὶ διεσπασμένως κινοῦντες, σύμφωνοι δὲ
 οἱ ὁμαλότεροι. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἡ μὲν διαφορά τῶν
 45 φθόγγων τοιαύτη τίς ἐστὶ παρὰ μουσικοῖς· περι-
 γράφεται δὲ τινα πρὸς τούτων διαστήματα, καθ'
 ᾧ καὶ ἡ φωνὴ κινεῖται ἤτοι ἐπὶ τὸ ὀξύτερον ἀνα-

vision, so also we employ names derived by transference from those of touch. Whenever, then, the sound is expelled evenly and at one "tension" (or "pitch"), so that there is no diversion of the sense towards the "grave" or the "sharp," then such a sound is called a "note," and so the Musicians say 42 in their definitions "A note is the fall under one tension of a musical sound." And of notes some are "homophonous" (or "in unison"), others not "homophonous"; "homophonous" being those which do not differ from one another in respect of "sharpness" or "gravity," and not "homophonous" those which are not of this character. And of the "homophonous,"—as also of the not 43 "homophonous,"—some are termed "sharp," others "grave"; and of the not "homophonous," again, some are called "dissonant," others "consonant," "dissonant" being such as affect the hearing unevenly and intermittedly, and "consonant" such as affect it evenly and continuously. But the special 44 character of each kind will be more clear if we make use of a comparison with the qualities relating to taste. Thus, just as some of the objects of taste are of such a blend as to affect the sense uniformly and smoothly, like honey-wine and honey-water, whereas others affect it in distinct and dissimilar ways, as for instance honey-vinegar (for each of these constituents stamps its own quality on the sense of taste),—so also with notes, those which affect the hearing unevenly and intermittedly are "dissonant," and those which are even are "consonant." Such, then, is the distinction as to "notes" as laid down by the Musicians. —And by these, certain "intervals" are determined 45 within which the sound moves, either ascending

βαίνουσα ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ βαρύτερον ἀνιεμένη. παρ' ἣν αἰτίαν κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον τῶν διαστημάτων τούτων τὰ μὲν σύμφωνα τὰ δὲ διάφωνα προσηγόρευται, 46 καὶ σύμφωνα μὲν ὅποσα ὑπὸ συμφώνων φθόγγων περιέχεται, διάφωνα δὲ ὅποσα ὑπὸ διαφώνων. τῶν δὲ συμφώνων διαστημάτων τὸ μὲν πρῶτον καὶ ἐλάχιστον διὰ τεσσάρων οἱ μουσικοὶ προσαγορεύουσι, τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο μείζον διὰ πέντε, καὶ τοῦ 47 διὰ πέντε μείζον τὸ διὰ πασῶν. πάλιν τε τῶν διαφώνων διαστημάτων ἐλάχιστον μὲν ἐστὶ καὶ πρῶτον παρ' αὐτοῖς ἢ καλουμένη δίεςις, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ἡμιτόνιον, ὃ ἐστὶ διπλοῦν τῆς διέσεως, τρίτον 48 ὁ τόνος, ὃς ἐστὶ διπλασίον τοῦ ἡμιτονίου. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὃν τρόπον ἅπαν διάστημα κατὰ μουσικὴν ἐν φθόγγοις ἔχει τὴν ὑπόστασιν, οὕτω καὶ πᾶν ἦθος τὸ δ' ἐστὶ τι γένος μελωδίας. καθὰ γὰρ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἡθῶν τινὰ μὲν ἐστὶ σκυθρῶπα καὶ στυβαρώτερα, ὅποια τὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἰστοροῦσιν, τὰ δὲ εὐένδοτα πρὸς ἔρωτας καὶ οἰνοφλυγίας καὶ ὀδυρμῶν καὶ οἰμωγᾶς, οὕτω τὶς μὲν μελωδία σεμνὰ τινα καὶ ἀστεία ἐμποιεῖ τῇ ψυχῇ κινήματα, 49 τὶς δὲ ταπεινότερα καὶ ἀγεννῆ. καλεῖται δὲ κατὰ κοινὸν ἢ τοιουτότροπος μελωδία τοῖς μουσικοῖς ἦθος ἀπὸ τοῦ ἦθους εἶναι ποιητικὴ, καθάπερ καὶ τὸ χλωρὸν δέος τὸ χλωροποιόν, καὶ τὸ "νότοι βαρνήκοοι ἀχλυῶδεις κερηβαρικοὶ νωθροὶ διαλυτικοὶ" 50 ἀντὶ τοῦ τούτων δραστικοί. τῆς δὲ κοινῆς μελωδίας ταύτης τὸ μὲν τι χρῶμα λέγεται τὸ δὲ ἄρμονία τὸ δὲ διάτονον, ὧν ἢ μὲν ἄρμονία αὐστη-

towards the "sharp" or descending towards the "grave." And because of this some of these intervals are, by analogy, called "consonant," others "dissonant"; and "consonant" are all those contained by consonant notes, and "dissonant" all those contained by dissonant notes. Of consonant intervals the first and least is termed by the Musicians "By-Fours" (or "The Fourth"), the greater one which comes next to this "By-Fives" (or "The Fifth"), and the one which is greater than the By-Fives the "By-Alls" (or "The Octave").^a Also, of the dissonant intervals, again, the least and first 47 is what is called by them "Diesis" (or "Quarter-tone"); second is the "Semi-tone," which is double the "Diesis"; third, the "Tone," which is double the "Semi-tone."—Moreover, just as every 48 interval in music consists of notes, so also does every "Êthos" (or "character"); and it is a certain "Genus" of melody. For just as of human characters some are gloomy and stubborn, such as those of the ancients are reported to have been, while others yield easily to lusts and debauchery and lamentations and groanings, so a certain kind of melody produces in the soul stately and refined motions, another kind motions that are base and ignoble. Melody of this 49 sort is called, in general, by the Musicians "Êthos" from the fact that it is productive of "character," just as fear is called "pallid"^b for "pallor-causing," and South-winds "deaf" and "foggy" and "head-achey" and "dull" and "relaxing," instead of being said to be causes of these effects. And of this general 50 type of melody one kind is called "Chroma" (or "Colour," Chromatic), another "Harmony" (or "Enharmonic"), another "Diatonic"; and of these

^a Cf. P.H. iii. 155; Adv. Arithm. 6-9.

^b Cf. Hom. Il. vii. 479.

ροῦ τινὸς ἤθους καὶ σεμνότητος κατασκευαστικῆ
 πως ὑπῆρχεν, τὸ δὲ χρῶμα λιγυρόν τί ἐστι καὶ
 θρηνηῶδες, τὸ δὲ διάτονον ἔντραχυ καὶ ὑπάγρουικον.
 51 ἀλλὰ δὴ πάλιν τὸ μὲν ἀρμονικὸν μέλος τῶν μελω-
 δουμένων ἀδιαίρετόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ διάτονον καὶ τὸ
 χρῶμα εἰδικωτέρας τινὰς εἶχε διαφοράς, δύο μὲν
 τὸ διάτονον, τὴν τε τοῦ μαλακοῦ διατόνου καλου-
 μένην καὶ τὴν τοῦ συντόνου, τρεῖς δὲ τὸ χρῶμα·
 τὸ μὲν γάρ τι αὐτοῦ τονικὸν καλεῖται τὸ δὲ ἡμιτό-
 νιον τὸ δὲ μαλακόν.
 52 Πλὴν ἐκ τούτων συμφανὲς ὅτι πᾶσα ἡ κατὰ μελω-
 δίας θεωρία παρὰ τοῖς μουσικοῖς οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ
 τὴν ὑπόστασιν εἶχεν εἰ μὴ ἐν τοῖς φθόγγοις. καὶ
 διὰ τοῦτο ἀναιρουμένων αὐτῶν τὸ μηδὲν ἔσται ἡ
 μουσική. πῶς οὖν καὶ ἐρεῖ τις ὅτι οὐκ εἰσὶ φθόγ-
 γοι; ἐκ τοῦ φωνῆν αὐτοὺς κατὰ γένος ὑπάρχειν,
 φήσομεν, καὶ τὴν φωνῆν ἀνύπαρκτον ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς
 σκεπτικοῖς ὑπομνήμασι δεδειχθαι ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν δογ-
 53 ματικῶν μαρτυρίας. οἱ τε γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς Κυρήνης
 φιλόσοφοι μόνα φασὶν ὑπάρχειν τὰ πάθη, ἄλλο δὲ
 οὐδέν· ὅθεν καὶ τὴν φωνῆν μὴ οὐσαν πάθος, ἀλλὰ
 πάθους ποιητικὴν, μὴ γίνεσθαι τῶν ὑπαρκτῶν.
 οἱ γέ τοι περὶ τὸν Δημόκριτον καὶ Πλάτωνα πᾶν
 αἰσθητὸν ἀναιροῦντες συναιροῦσι καὶ τὴν φωνῆν,
 54 αἰσθητὸν τι δοκοῦσαν πράγμα ὑπάρχειν. καὶ γὰρ
 ἄλλως, εἰ ἔστι φωνή, ἦτοι σῶμά ἐστιν ἢ ἀσώ-
 ματον· οὔτε δὲ σῶμά ἐστιν, ὡς οἱ περιπαθητικοὶ διὰ
 πολλῶν διδάσκουσιν, οὔτε ἀσώματος, ὡς οἱ ἀπὸ
 55 τῆς στοᾶς· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι φωνή. ἄλλος δὲ τις κἂν
 ἐκείνως ἐπιχειρήσειε λέγειν, ὡς εἰ μὴ ἔστι ψυχὴ

the Enharmonic is of an austere ἔθος and produc-
 tive of solemnity, while the Chromatic is shrill and
 dirgelike, and the Diatonic somewhat rough and
 unrefined. And further, the Enharmonic tune is 51
 inseparable from the songs that are being sung, but
 the Diatonic and the Chromatic have certain distinct
 sub-species, the Diatonic two,—that of the so-called
 “Lax Diatonic” and that of the “Tense Diatonic,”
 —and the Chromatic three, called respectively the
 “Tonic,” the “Semi-tonic” and the “Lax.”

Now from this it is evident that the whole of 52
 the Musicians’ theory of melody is based on nothing
 else than notes. And, because of this, if these
 are destroyed Music will be nothing. How, then,
 can one assert that notes do not exist? From
 the fact, we shall say, that they come under the
 genus “sound,” and that sound is non-existent has
 been proved by us,^a in our *Sceptic Commentaries*,
 from the evidence of the Dogmatists. For the 53
 Cyrenaic philosophers^b assert that only the feelings
 exist, and nothing else; and hence that sound, not
 being a feeling but productive of feeling, is not an
 existent. Democritus,^c indeed, and Plato, by de-
 stroying every sense-object, destroy therewith sound,
 which is held to be an object of sense.—Furthermore, 54
 if sound exists it is either corporeal or incorporeal;
 but it is not corporeal, as the Peripatetics demon-
 strate by numerous arguments; nor is it incorporeal,
 as the Stoics prove^d; therefore sound does not
 exist.—And some other person will attempt to argue 55
 thus: If the soul does not exist, neither do the

^a Cf. *Adv. Log.* ii. 131 (though this is not the book re-
 ferred to).

^b Cf. vol. i. p. xvii, *P.H.* . 215; *Adv. Log.* i. 191.

^c Cf. vol. i. pp. xi f.

^d Cf. *Adv. Gram.* 155.

οὐδὲ αἰσθήσεις· μέρη γὰρ ταύτης ὑπήρχον. εἰ δὲ
 μὴ εἰσὶν αἱ αἰσθήσεις, οὐδὲ τὰ αἰσθητά· πρὸς
 αἰσθήσεις γὰρ ἢ τούτων ὑπόστασις νοεῖται. εἰ δὲ
 μὴ αἰσθητά, οὐδὲ φωνή· εἶδος γὰρ τι τῶν αἰσθη-
 τῶν ὑπήρχεν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδέν ἐστι ψυχὴ, καθὼς
 ἐν τοῖς περὶ αὐτῆς ὑπομνήμασιν ἐδείκνυμεν· οὐκ
 56 ἄρα ἔστι φωνή. καὶ μὴν εἰ μήτε βραχεῖά ἐστι
 φωνὴ μήτε μακρά, οὐκ ἔστι φωνή· οὔτε δὲ βραχεῖά
 ἐστὶν οὔτε μακρὰ φωνή, ὡς ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς
 γραμματικούς ὑπεμνήσαμεν, περὶ συλλαβῆς καὶ
 λέξεως ζητοῦντες πρὸς τούτους· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι
 57 φωνή. πρὸς τούτοις ἢ φωνὴ οὔτε ἐν ἀποτελέσματι
 οὔτε ἐν ὑποστάσει νοεῖται, ἀλλ' ἐν γενέσει καὶ
 χρονικῇ παρεκτάσει· τὸ δὲ ἐν γενέσει νοούμενον
 γίνεται, οὐδέπω δ' ἔστιν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ οἰκία γινο-
 μένη ἢ ναὺς καὶ ἄλλα παμπληθῆ εἶναι λέγεται.
 58 τοίνυν οὐθέν ἐστι φωνή. καὶ ἄλλοις δὲ συχνοῖς εἰς
 τοῦτο ἔνεστι λόγοις χρῆσθαι, περὶ ὧν, ὡς ἔφην,
 ἐν τοῖς Πυρρωνείοις ὑπομνηματιζόμενοι διεξήειμεν.
 νυνὶ δὲ φωνῆς μὴ οὔσης οὐδὲ φθόγγος ἔστιν, ὅς
 ἐλέγετο φωνῆς πτώσις ὑπὸ μίαν τάσιν· φθόγγου
 δὲ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲ διάστημα μουσικὸν καθέστηκεν,
 οὐ συμφωνία, οὐ μελωδία, οὐ τὰ ἐκ τούτων γένη.
 διὰ τοῦτο οὐδὲ μουσική· ἐπιστήμη γὰρ ἐλέγετο
 ἐμμελῶν τε καὶ ἐκμελῶν.

59 "Ὅθεν ἀπ' ἄλλης ἀρχῆς ὑποδεικτέον ὅτι κἂν τού-
 398

senses; for they are parts of the soul. And if the
 senses do not exist, neither do the sense-objects; for
 their existence is conceived as relative to the senses.
 And if sense-objects do not exist, neither does sound;
 for it is a species of sense-object. But, in fact, soul
 is nothing, as we have shown in our treatise concern-
 ing it^a; therefore sound does not exist.—Moreover, 56
 if sound is neither short nor long, sound does not
 exist; but sound is neither short nor long, as we
 have shown in our treatise *Against the Grammar-*
ians,^b when questioning their theory of the syllable
 and the word; therefore sound does not exist.—In 57
 addition, sound is conceived neither as a completed
 thing nor as a substantial thing,^c but as a thing which
 comes into being and has extension in time; but
 that which is conceived as coming into being is
 coming into being, but does not as yet exist,—just
 as a house which is coming into being, or a ship or a
 multitude of other things, is not said to exist. So,
 then, sound is nothing. There are also many other 58
 arguments one might use to prove this point, such as
 those with which, as I said, we have dealt fully in
 our comments in *Pyrrhoneia*.^d—Now, then, as sound
 does not exist, neither does the note, for it was de-
 scribed as “the fall of a sound under one tension”^e;
 and when the note does not exist, neither does the
 musical interval exist, nor symphony, nor melody, nor
 the Genera formed from these.^f Therefore, Music
 does not exist either; for it was described as “the
 Science of things in tune and out of tune.”^g

Hence, making a fresh start, we must show that, 59

^a No longer extant; but cf. *P.H.* ii. 31 ff., iii. 186.

^b Cf. *Adv. Gram.* 124 ff. ^c Cf. *Adv. Log.* ii. 131.

^d Another lost work.

^e Cf. § 42.

^f Cf. § 50.

^g Cf. § 38.

των ἀποστῶμεν, διὰ τὴν ἐγχειρηθησομένην ἐπὶ τῆς
 ῥυθμοποιίας ἀπορίαν ἀνυπόστατος καθέστηκεν ἡ
 μουσική. εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν ἐστὶ ῥυθμός, οὐδὲ ἐπι-
 στήμη τις ἔσται περὶ ῥυθμοῦ· ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲν ἐστὶ
 ῥυθμός, ὡς παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τις ἐπι-
 60 στήμη περὶ ῥυθμοῦ. ὡς γὰρ πολλάκις εἰρήκαμεν,
 ῥυθμός σύστημά ἐστιν ἐκ ποδῶν, ὁ δὲ πούς τὸ
 συνεστῶς ἐξ ἄρσεως καὶ θέσεως· ἡ δὲ ἄρσις καὶ ἡ
 θέσις ἐν ποσότητι χρόνου θεωρεῖται, ὧν τινὰς μὲν
 ἐπέειχεν ἡ θέσις τινὰς δὲ ἡ ἄρσις χρόνους. καθάπερ
 γὰρ ἐκ μὲν στοιχείων συλλαβαὶ ἐκ δὲ συλλαβῶν
 λέξεις συντίθενται, οὕτως ἐκ μὲν τῶν χρόνων οἱ
 61 πόδες ἐκ δὲ τῶν ποδῶν οἱ ῥυθμοὶ γίνονται. εἰ
 οὖν δείξωμεν ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐστὶ χρόνος, ἔξομεν συν-
 αποδεδειγμένον ὅτι οὐδὲ πόδες ὑπάρχουσιν, διὰ
 δὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ οἱ ῥυθμοί, ἐξ ἐκείνων τὴν σύστασιν
 λαμβάνοντες. ὧ ἀκολουθήσει τὸ μηδὲ ἐπιστήμην
 εἶναι τινα περὶ ῥυθμούς. πῶς οὖν; ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐστὶ
 χρόνος, ἥδη μὲν παρεστήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς Πυρρω-
 νείοις, οὐδὲν δὲ ἦττον καὶ τὰ νῦν παραστήσομεν
 62 ἐπὶ ποσόν. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τι χρόνος, ἦτοι πεπερασταὶ
 ἢ ἄπειρος ἐστίν. οὔτε δὲ πεπερασταὶ, ἐπεὶ ἐροῦμέν
 ποτε γεγονέναι χρόνον ὅτε χρόνος οὐκ ἦν, καὶ
 ἔσεσθαι ποτε χρόνον ὅτε χρόνος οὐκ ἔσται, οὔτε
 ἄπειρος καθέστηκεν· ἔστι γὰρ τι αὐτοῦ παρωχηκὸς
 [καὶ ἐνεστῶς]¹ καὶ μέλλον, ὧν ἐκάτερον εἰ μὲν οὐκ
 ἔστιν, πεπερασταὶ ὁ χρόνος, εἰ δ' ἔστιν, ἔσται ἐν
 63 ἄτοπον. οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι χρόνος. τό γε μὴν ἐξ

even if we lay aside these considerations, Music is non-existent owing to the doubt regarding rhythm-making which is now to be raised. For if rhythm is nothing, no science of rhythm will exist; but, in fact, rhythm is nothing, as we shall establish; therefore no science of rhythm exists. For as we have fre- 60 quently stated, rhythm is a system composed of "feet," and a "foot" is that which consists of "arsis" and "thesis"^a; and "arsis" and "thesis" are seen in quantity of time, for the "thesis" occupies certain periods of time and the "arsis" certain other periods. For just as syllables are composed of elements, and words of syllables, so feet are composed of times, and rhythms of feet. If, then, we 61 shall show that time is nothing, we shall have shown therewith that feet also do not exist, nor, consequently, rhythms, as they derive their consistence from feet. And from this it will follow that no science of rhythms exists. How then? That time is nothing we have already established in our *Pyrrhoneia*,^b but none the less we shall also establish it now, up to a point.—For if time is anything, it is 62 either limited or unlimited. But it is not limited, since, if so, we shall be saying that there was once a time when time did not exist, and that there will sometime be a time when time will not exist. Nor is it unlimited; for a part of it is past, a part future, and if each of these does not exist time is limited, and if each does exist, then both the past and the future will exist in the present, which is absurd. Therefore time does not exist.—Also, that which is 63

^a Terms derived from the motions of dancers in raising ("arsis") and setting down ("thesis") the feet.

^b Cf. *P.H.* iii. 136 ff.; *Adv. Phys.* ii. 169 ff.

¹ [καὶ ἐνεστῶς] del. Heintz.

ἀνυπάρκτων συνεστῶς ἀνυπαρκτον ἐστίν· ὁ δὲ
 χρόνος ἕκ τε τοῦ παρωχημένου καὶ μηκέτ' ὄντος
 καὶ ἕκ τοῦ μέλλοντος μηδέπω δὲ ὄντος συνεστῶς
 64 ἀνυπαρκτος ἐσται. ἄλλως τε, εἰ μὲν ἀμερῆς ἐστιν
 ὁ χρόνος, πῶς τὸ μὲν τι αὐτοῦ παρωχημένον τὸ
 δὲ ἐνεστῶς τὸ δὲ μέλλον λέγομεν; εἰ δὲ μεριστός
 ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ πᾶν τὸ μεριστόν ὑπὸ τινος αὐτοῦ μέ-
 ρους καταμετρεῖται, ὡς πήχυς μὲν ὑπὸ παλαιστοῦ,
 ὁ παλαιστής δὲ ὑπὸ δακτύλου, δεήσει καὶ αὐτὸν
 65 ὑπὸ τινος τῶν αὐτοῦ μερῶν καταμετρεῖσθαι. οὔτε
 δὲ τῷ ἐνεστῶτι δυνατὸν καταμετρεῖν τοὺς ἄλλους
 χρόνους, ἐπεὶπερ ὁ γινόμενος καὶ ὁ ἐνεστῶς χρόνος
 ὁ αὐτὸς ἐσται κατ' αὐτοὺς παρωχημένους καὶ
 μέλλων, παρωχημένος μὲν ὅτι τὸν παρωχημένον
 καταμετρεῖ χρόνον, μέλλων δὲ ὅτι τὸν μέλλοντα·
 ὅπερ ἄποπον. οὔτε τούτων τινὶ τῶν λειπομένων
 δυοῖν τὸν ἐνεστῶτα καταμετρητέον. δι' ἣν αἰ-
 66 τίαν οὐδὲ ταύτη λεκτέον εἶναί τινα χρόνον. πρὸς
 τούτοις ὁ χρόνος τριμερῆς ἐστι, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἔχει
 παρωχηκὸς τὸ δὲ ἐνεστῶς τὸ δὲ μέλλον, ὧν τὸ μὲν
 παρωχημένον οὐκέτι ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ μέλλον οὐπω
 ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ ἐνεστῶς ἦτοι ἀμερῆς ἐστιν ἢ μεριστόν.
 ἀλλ' ἀμερῆς μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη· ἐν ἀμερεῖ μὲν γὰρ
 οὐδὲν δύναται γίνεσθαι μεριστόν, ὡς φησὶ Τίμων,
 67 οἷον τὸ γίνεσθαι, τὸ φθεῖρεσθαι. καὶ ἄλλως, εἴπερ
 ἀμερῆς ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνεστῶς τοῦ χρόνου, οὔτε ἀρχὴν
 ἔχει ἀφ' ἧς ἀρχεται, οὔτε πέρας ἐφ' ὃ καταλήγει,
 διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ μέσον· καὶ οὕτως οὐκ ἐσται ὁ
 ἐνεστῶς χρόνος. εἰ δὲ μεριστός ἐστιν, εἰ μὲν εἰς
 τοὺς μὴ ὄντας χρόνους μερίζεται, οὐκ ἐσται χρό-
 νος, εἰ δ' εἰς τοὺς ὄντας χρόνους, οὐκ ἐσται ὅλος ὁ

¹ οὔτε scripsi; οὐ mss., Bekk.

composed of non-existents is non-existent; and time being composed of the past, which no longer exists, and of the future, which does not yet exist, will be non-existent.—Again, if time is indivisible, how is it 64 that we call a part of it “past,” a part “present,” and a part “future”? And if it is divisible, since everything divisible is measured by some part of itself,—as the cubit by the palm, and the palm by the finger,—time, too, will have to be measured by one of its own parts. But it is not possible to measure the 65 other times by the present, since, according to them, the same instant and present time will be both past and future,—past because it measures the past time, and future because it measures the future; which is absurd. Nor yet can one measure the present by one of the two remaining times. And, because of this, one must declare that thus, too, no time exists.—Furthermore, time is tripartite,^a and one part is past, 66 one present, and one future; and of these the past no longer exists, the future does not yet exist, and the present is either indivisible or divisible. But it will not be indivisible; for, as Timon asserts, no divisible thing, such as becoming and perishing, can become in indivisible time.—Again, if the present part of 67 time is indivisible, it has neither a beginning from which it begins, nor an end at which it ceases, nor, in consequence, a middle, and thus present time will not exist. And if it is divisible, then, if it is divided into the non-existing times, time will not exist; while if it is divided into the existing times, time will not exist as

^a Cf. P.H. iii. 144; Adv. Phys. ii. 197 ff., where, too, Timon is quoted.

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS

χρόνος, ἀλλὰ τῶν μερῶν αὐτοῦ τινὰ μὲν ἔσται
τινὰ δὲ οὐκ ἔσται. τοίνυν οὐδὲν ἔστι χρόνος, διὰ
δὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ πόδες, οὐδὲ ῥυθμοί, οὐδ' ἢ περὶ τοὺς
ῥυθμοὺς ἐπιστήμη.

68 Τοσαῦτα πραγματικῶς καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῆς μου-
σικῆς εἰπόντες ἀρχὰς ἐν τοσοῦτοις τῆν πρὸς τὰ
μαθήματα διέξοδον ἀπαρτίζομεν.

AGAINST THE PROFESSORS, VI. 67-68

a whole, but some of its parts will exist and others will not exist. So, then, time is nothing; and, consequently, feet, too, and rhythms, and the science of rhythms are nothing.

Having said thus much by way of effective 68 argument against the principles of Music, we here bring to a close our disputation against the Arts and Sciences.

INDEX OF NAMES

(Abbreviations used are: Gr. = "Against the Grammarians." R. = "Against the Rhetoricians." Gm. = "Against the Geometers." Ar. = "Against the Arithmeticians." Ast. = "Against the Astrologers." M. = "Against the Musicians." P. = "Against the Professors.")

- | | |
|---|--|
| Abas Gr. 237 | Aristotle P. 2; Gr. 258, 315; R. 8, 61; Gm. 57 ff. |
| Academies R. 20, 43 | Aristoxenus M. 1 |
| Acamas Gr. 257 | Aselepiades Gr. 47, 72, 252; Gm. 5 |
| Achaeans Gr. 42; R. 3 | Asclepiads Gr. 261 |
| Achilles Gr. 133, 139, 140, 163, 165; M. 10, 25 | Asclepius Gr. 260 |
| Aegisthus M. 11 | Athenaens R. 62 |
| Aeolian Gr. 78 | Athenians Gr. 87, 148, 228, 246, 295; R. 22, 77; M. 14 |
| Aeschines R. 40 | Athens Gr. 154 |
| Agamemnon M. 11 f., 26 | Attic Gr. 87, 89 |
| Alcaeus Gr. 298 | Attica Gr. 257 |
| Alexander Gr. 263, 282; Ast. 89 | |
| Alexandrians Gr. 213 | Babylon Gr. 263 |
| Ambracia Gr. 48 | Brileus Gr. 257 |
| Amycus R. 104 | Busiris R. 104 |
| Anacreon Gr. 298 | Byzantine (orator) R. 38 |
| Antaeus R. 104 | |
| Antigonus Gr. 276 | Cadmus Gr. 53, 54 |
| Antiochus Gr. 293 | Callimachus Gr. 48, 309 |
| Apollo Gr. 101 | Camandodus Gr. 275 |
| Aracynthus Gr. 257 | Cerastes Gr. 226 |
| Aratus Gr. 304; Ast. 98 | Chaeronea Gr. 295 |
| Arcadians Gr. 261 | Chaldeans Ast. 5, 21, etc. |
| Archiloehus Gr. 298 | Chares Gr. 76, 237 |
| Archimedes Gr. 301 | Charmidas R. 20 |
| Archon Gr. 239 | Chians R. 23 |
| Areopagus R. 77 | Chrysippus Gr. 258, 301 |
| Ares Gr. 101, 106, 237, 255 | Citium R. 6 |
| Argives Gr. 42 | Cleombrotus Gr. 48 |
| Argolicon Gr. 262 | Cleopatra Gr. 262 |
| Aristarchus Gr. 44 | Clitomachus R. 20 |
| Aristion Gr. 169, 173, 174 | Clytaemnestra M. 11 f., 26 |
| Aristocles Gr. 258 | Cnidus Gr. 258 |
| Ariston R. 61 | Coans Gr. 246 |
| Aristophanes Gr. 44; (Poet) Gr. 228 | Colophon Gr. 257, 289 |

INDEX OF NAMES

Corax R. 96 ff.
 Crates Gr. 44, 79, 248
 Creophylus Gr. 48
 Cretan (lawgiver) R. 20 f.
 Critolaüs R. 12, 20, 61
 Cronos Gr. 289. For the star see
 "Saturn"
 Cronos (Diodorus) Gr. 309 f.
 Ctesiphon R. 40
 Cyclops Gm. 42, 49
 Cyprus Gr. 257
 Cyrenaics M. 53
 Cyrenê Gr. 261

Deldameia Gr. 308
 Deipnion Gr. 174
 Demades Gr. 295; R. 19
 Demaratus Gr. 258
 Demeter Gr. 255, 271
 Demetrius (Chlorus) Gr. 84
 Democritus M. 53
 Democritus Gr. 59, 98; R. 40
 Dicearchus Gm. 3
 Diodorus (Cronos) Gr. 309 f.
 Diomedes Gr. 204
 Dion Ast. 104
 Dionysius (Thrax) Gr. 57, 72, 80,
 81, 250, 253
 Dorian Gr. 78, 87, 89

Eëtion M. 10
 Egyptians Ast. 31
 Empedocles Gr. 302 f.
 Epicharmus Gr. 273
 Epicureans Gr. 299; R. 25
 Epicurus P. 1, 3, 21, 272 f., 283 ff.;
 M. 27
 Erasistratus Gr. 258
 Eratosthenes Gm. 28
 Erechtheus Gr. 262
 Eriphylê Gr. 261
 Eteocles Gr. 62
 Ethiopians Ast. 102
 Euboea Ast. 92
 Eudoxus Gr. 301; Ast. 1
 Euripides Gr. 58, 62, 271, 274,
 287, 308; Gm. 3
 Eurytus Gr. 48

Gorgias (of Plato) R. 2
 Gorgon Gr. 264

Harmonia Gr. 316
 Hecuba Gr. 264
 Helen R. 3

Hephaestus Gr. 291
 Hera Gr. 261, 290 f.
 Heracleitus Gr. 301
 Heracles Gr. 255; R. 105
 Hermagoras R. 62
 Herodotus Gr. 58
 Hesiod Gr. 58, 204, 289
 Hesion Gr. 255
 Hipparchus Ast. 1
 Hippocentaur Gm. 41, 47
 Hippolytus Gr. 261
 Hipponax Gr. 275, 290
 Homer Gr. 48, 58, 203 ff., 272 f.,
 281, 284, 289, 307; M. 16
 Hyperelides R. 4

Ida (Mt.) Gr. 291
 Iolcia Gr. 48
 Ionian Gr. 88
 Isocrates R. 62
 Ithaca M. 26

Jupiter (planet) Ast. 29, 32 ff.

Lacedaemonians Gr. 228, 258. See
 also "Sparta, Spartan"

Lampon M. 13
 Lebedians Gr. 275, 293
 Lemnos Gr. 291
 Leo Ast. 10, 21, 95
 Libya R. 105
 Linus Gr. 204
 Lycomedes Gr. 308
 Lycurgus R. 21

Macedon Gr. 282; Ast. 89
 Marathon Ast. 92
 Mars (planet) Ast. 29, 34 ff.
 Memnon Gr. 237
 Menander Gr. 58
 Menon Gr. 239
 Mercury (planet) Ast. 29, 32 ff.
 Metrodorus Gr. 61, 258
 Musaeus Gr. 204
 Mysenae Gr. 154
 Mytilenê P. 4

Nausiphanes P. 2, 4
 Nicanor Gr. 258
 Niobê R. 104

Odysseus Gr. 42, 264, 267; R.
 105; M. 26
 Orates (of Euripides) Gr. 215
 Orion Gr. 262
 Orpheus Gr. 204; R. 31

INDEX OF NAMES

Pallas Athenê Gr. 290
 Pan Gr. 314
 Panyasis Gr. 261
 Pegasus Gr. 264
 Pelops Gr. 133, 139, 140, 163, 165
 Peloponnesian Gr. 148
 Pelops Gr. 255
 Penelope M. 26
 Peripatetics M. 54
 Perseus R. 105
 Persians R. 33
 Phillip Gr. 295
 Phineus Gr. 262
 Phlius Gr. 305
 Phoenician (signs) Gr. 53
 Phryxus (of Euripides) Gr. 274
 Phryniê R. 4
 Phylarchus Gr. 262
 Pindar Gr. 58
 Pindarion Gr. 202, 205
 Plataea Gr. 154
 Plato P. 2; Gr. 48, 58, 59, 98,
 258, 301, 303; R. 2, 4 f., 12,
 61; Ar. 11, 14, 17, 21; M. 13,
 27, 53
 Plato (Poet) R. 35
 Polyanthus Gr. 261
 Poseidon Gr. 290; R. 104
 Prienê Gr. 293
 Procles Gr. 258
 Proetus Gr. 261
 Ptolemy (King) Gr. 276
 Ptolemy (the Peripatetic) Gr. 60,
 72
 Pyrrho P. 1, 2, 5; Gr. 53, 272,
 281, 305
 Pythagoras Gr. 303; Ar. 2; M.
 8, 23
 Pythagoreans Ar. 2, 9; Ast. 8;
 M. 30
 Pythias Gr. 258

Saturn (planet) Ast. 29, 32 ff.
 Scopas Gr. 237
 Sirens Gr. 41

Smryna Gr. 169, 173
 Socrates R. 25; Gm. 40; Ast.
 104; M. 13
 Solon M. 9
 Sophocles Gr. 313; Gm. 3
 Sophron Gr. 284
 Sostratus Gr. 276, 293
 Sparta R. 21, 24
 Spartan R. 21 f.; M. 8, 24. Cf.
 Gr. 223, 258
 Spintharus M. 1
 Stageira Gr. 258
 Staphylus Gr. 261
 Stesichorus Gr. 261
 Syrians Gr. 314

Tantalus Gr. 286
 Tauriscus Gr. 248
 Telegonus Gr. 267
 Telesarchus Gr. 262
 Thales (the Cretan) R. 21
 Thebes Gr. 154, 261
 Theon Gr. 237, 239; Ast. 104
 Theophrastus Gr. 258
 Thracian Gr. 63, 72
 Thucydides Gr. 58, 59, 98
 Timæus (of Plato) Gr. 303
 Timon Gr. 53, 305; Gm. 2; M. 66
 Tisaphernes R. 22
 Titans Gr. 264
 Tityos Gr. 286
 Troezen Gr. 261
 Trojans Gr. 42; R. 3
 Troy Gr. 42, 101; Ast. 92; M. 26
 Tyndareüs Gr. 261

Venus (planet) Ast. 29, 84 ff.

Xenocrates R. 6, 61
 Xenophanes Gr. 257, 289

Zeno R. 7
 Zeus Gr. 48, 101, 177, 195, 276,
 288 ff.; R. 165. Cf. Ast. 29,
 32 ff.