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PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

In preparing this edition, care has been taken to bring the text of the book up to date and to introduce the reader to some outstanding problems of modern linguistics. One of these concerns the relations between morphology and syntax, on the one hand, and paradigmatic and syntagmatic phenomena, on the other. Recent discussion of this problem has also immediate connection with the treatment of the notion of "sentence". Much attention has accordingly been given to this set of problems in the appropriate places.

Some corrections have also been made in various parts of the book.

Its main purpose remains unchanged. It is meant to encourage the students to think on the essential problems of English language structure and to form their own views of the relevant questions.

B. Ilyish

September 1970

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

This book is intended as a textbook for the theoretical course on English grammar forming part of the curriculum in our Universities and Teachers' colleges. Its main purpose is to introduce the student to the many linguistic problems connected with grammatical structures and to the modern methods applied in dealing with them. I have endeavoured, as far as was possible, to point out the essence of the problems, and to state the arguments which have been, or may be, put forward in favour of one view or another. This should enable the reader to form a judgement of his own on the question involved and on the respective merits of the various solutions proposed.

It will be found that in many points the views expressed here differ from those laid down in my earlier work on the subject, published in Russian in 1948.¹ I have not thought it necessary or expedient to point out in every case the motives which have brought about these changes. The development of linguistics in the last few decades has been so quick and so manifold that a new insight has been gained into practically all the problems dealt with here, and into many others as well, for that matter. This of course was bound to be reflected in the contents of the book and in its very structure.

I have tried to avoid mentioning too many names of scholars or titles of books, preferring to call the reader's attention to the problems themselves. Some hints about authors have of course been given in the footnotes.

¹ Б. А. Ильиш, *Современный английский язык*, изд. 2-е, 1948. 1*

A few words may not be out of place here concerning the kind of work students may be expected to do in their seminar hours. This may include, besides analysis of modern texts from theoretical points of view treated in the book, reports on the same problems, and discussion of views held by various authors. Some of these problems will probably lend themselves more readily than others to such discussion; among them, the following may be suggested: parts of speech in English; the category of case in nouns and pronouns; the stative; aspect; the perfect and the problem of correlation; voice; prepositions and conjunctions; types of sentences; types of predicate; secondary parts of a sentence; asyndetic composite sentences. Of course much will depend in each case on the teacher's own choice and on the particular interests expressed by the students.

My sincere thanks are due to the chair of English grammar of the Lenin Pedagogical Institute, Moscow, and the chair of English philology of Leningrad University, for the trouble they took in reviewing the MS, and also to Mr William Ryan, postgraduate student of Oriel College, Oxford, who went through the MS and suggested many improvements in the wording of the text.

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INTRODUCTION

THE PURPOSE OF THE BOOK

The purpose of this book is to present a systematic study of the grammatical structure of Modern English. It presupposes a sufficient knowledge on the part of the reader of the practical rules pertaining both to the morphology and to the syntax of the language. Thus, we are not going to set out here the ways, for example, of forming the plural of English nouns, or those of forming the past tense of English verbs. It will be our task to give an analysis of English grammatical structure in the light of general principles of linguistics. This is going to involve, in a number of cases, consideration of moot points on which differing views have been expressed by different scholars. In some cases the views of scholars appear to be so far apart as to be hardly reconcilable. It will be our task to consider the main arguments put forward to sustain the various views, to weigh each of them, and to find out the most convincing way of solving the particular problem involved.

What the student is meant to acquire as a result of his studies is an insight into the structure of the language and an ability to form his own ideas on this or that question. This would appear to be a necessary accomplishment for a teacher of English (at whatever sort of school he may be teaching), who is apt to find differing, and occasionally contradictory, treatment of the grammatical phenomena he has to mention in his teaching. Such are, for example, the system of parts of speech, the continuous forms of the verb, the asyndetic composite sentences, etc.

In the course of the history of linguistics many different views of language and languages have been put forward. It is not our task to discuss them here. Suffice it to say that the treatment of a language as a system was characteristic of the grammarians of the 17th century (see, for instance, the French "Grammaire générale de Port-Royal", a grammar published in 1660). Though this was not a linguistic work in any modern sense, it was based on the assumption that the state of a language at a given period was a system and could be treated as such. This view of language structure was then abandoned in favour of a purely historical outlook until the early years of the 20th century, when the Swiss scholar Ferdinand de Saussure (1857—1913) laid the foundations of a new linguistic theory acknowledging the study of a system of a given language as such.¹ De Saussure's views were then developed and modified by various schools of modern linguistic thinking. Part, at least, of his views of language were adopted, with certain reservations, by

¹ P. de Saussure, *Cours de linguistique générale*, Geneve, 1922.

the bulk of Soviet scholars. It is on the basis of this view that a theoretical investigation of the grammatical system of a language at a definite point of its history becomes possible and fruitful.

A peculiarity of the modern trend of linguistics is the desire to arrive at results independent of the view of a particular scholar. There can hardly be any doubt that the ability to arrive at such results would mark a significant advance in linguistics, which has far too long been suffering from conflicts between contradictory views put forward by various authors and disputed by others. As far as can be foreseen at the moment, the area of objective results not to be disputed will gradually increase at the expense of the debated area, which, however, can hardly be expected ever to disappear altogether. In discussing this or that particular problem in this book, we will try to define what can be said to be firmly established and what remains controversial.

A word is necessary here about the limits of grammar as part of a language's structure and the other aspects (or "levels") of language, viz. the phonetic (phonological) and the lexical.

It need hardly be emphasised that a language is a whole consisting of parts closely united. The linguist's task is, accordingly, to point out the demarcation line separating those aspects or levels from one another, on the one hand, and the connections between them, on the other. This is by no means an easy task, as we shall more than once have occasion to observe. Our subject is the grammatical structure of English, and we shall have to delineate the borderlines and connections between grammatical structure, on the one hand, and phonetics (phonology) and the vocabulary, on the other.

LANGUAGE AND SPEECH

The distinction between language and speech, which was first introduced by Ferdinand de Saussure in his book on general linguistics, has since become one of the cornerstones of modern linguistics. Though differences of opinion still persist in the exact delineation of the boundaries between the two spheres, its general idea has been accepted by most scholars.

-Language, then, is the system, phonological, lexical, and grammatical, which lies at the base of all speaking. It is the source which every speaker and writer has to draw upon if he is to be understood by other speakers of the language.

Speech on the other hand, is the manifestation of language, or its use by various speakers and writers of the given language. Thus what we have before us, in oral or in written form, as material for analysis, is always a product of speech, namely something either-pronounced or written by some individual speaker or writer or, occasionally, a group of speakers or writers. There is no other way

for a scholar to get at language than through its manifestations in speech.

As we are here concerned with grammar only, we will not dwell on the problem of a language system in phonology, orthography, and lexicology, but we will concentrate on the system of grammar and of its manifestations in speech, where of course it can never appear isolated from phonology and lexicology.

Thus, in stating that English nouns have a distinction of two numbers, singular and plural, and that there are several ways of expressing the category of plural number in nouns, we are stating facts of language, that is, elements of that system on which a speaker or writer of English has to draw.

Similarly, the statement that in English there are phrases of the pattern "adverb + adjective + noun", is certainly a statement about language, namely, about the syntactical system of English on the phrase level. Thus, in building such concrete phrases as, *very fine weather*, *extremely interesting novel*, *strikingly inadequate reply*, etc., a speaker draws, as it were, on the stock of phrase patterns existing in the language and familiar to its speakers, and he fills the pattern with words, choosing them from the stock of words existing in the language, in accordance with the thought or feeling, etc., that he wants to express. For instance, the concrete phrase, *strikingly inadequate reply*, is a fact of speech, created by the individual speaker for his own purposes, and founded on a knowledge, (a) of the syntactical pattern in question, and (b) of the words which he arranges according to the pattern.

It may perhaps be said, with some reservations, that the actual sentences pronounced by a speaker, are the result of organising words drawn from the language's word stock, according to a pattern drawn from its grammatical system.

So it appears that the material which a scholar takes up for investigation is always a fact of speech. Were it not for such facts of speech, whether oral or written, linguistic investigation would not be all possible. It is the scholar's task, then, to analyse the speech facts which are at his disposal, in such a manner as to get through them to the underlying language system, without which they could not have been produced.

NEW METHODS

The last few years have seen a rapid development of various new methods of linguistic investigation, and there is a great variety of views as to their merits.

Briefly, the three main positions in this field may be summarised as follows:

(1) Some scholars think that the new methods now appearing mark the beginnings of linguistics as a science and that everything

that was done earlier in linguistics belongs to a "prescientific age".

(2) Other scholars are sceptical about the new methods and think that they tend to lead linguistic science away from its proper tasks and to replace it by something incompatible with its essential character.

(3) There is the view that the new methods mark a new period in the development of linguistics, and should be tried out, without implying that everything done in earlier periods should therefore be considered as valueless and "prescientific".

Without going into details about this discussion we will merely state that the view mentioned last appears to be the most reasonable one and the one likely to prevail in the long run, as has more than once been seen in the history of different branches of learning.

We will therefore keep in our treatment of English grammatical structure many ideas and terms inherited from traditional grammar, such as, for instance, the theory of the parts of speech and parts of the sentence, and at the same time point out what new light is shed on these problems by recently developed methods, and what change the formulation of the very issues should undergo in the light of the new ideas. It will not be too much to say that a considerable number of familiar statements about grammatical facts cannot now be upheld without essential modification, and it would be pointless to ignore this fact. On the other hand, much of what is convincing and useful in the new views has not yet attained a shape which would make it convenient for presentation in a textbook like the present. It will therefore be our task to introduce the reader at least to some of these problems, and to help him prepare for reading the numerous special treatises on these subjects.

What appears to be most essential in the light of new ideas which tend to make linguistics something like an exact science, is a distinction between problems admitting of a definite solution which can be convincingly demonstrated and cannot be denied, and problems admitting of various opinions, rather than of a definite solution. This must not be taken to mean that problems of the second kind should be abandoned: they should be further discussed and their discussion is likely to be fruitful. The point is that an opinion, which can exist side by side with another opinion, should not be presented as a final solution admitting of no alternative. It is especially in the sphere of syntax that problems admitting of various opinions rather than of definite solutions are to be found.

Although in some cases the line between the two sets of problems may be rather hard to draw, the basic difference between them should be always kept in mind. This will help the student to put both the problems themselves and the views of different authors in the proper perspective.

In discussing grammatical categories, we shall often have to mention oppositions, that is, pairs of grammatical forms opposed to each other in some way. A simple case in point is the opposition between the singular and the plural number in nouns, with their definite meanings: one as against more than one.

It is often found that of two members of an opposition one has quite a definite meaning, whereas the meaning of the other is less definite, or vague. This is found, for instance, in the opposition between the forms *was writing* and *wrote*: the meaning of the form *was writing* is quite definite, while that of the form *wrote* is hard even to define. The terms usual for such cases are, "marked" and "unmarked". Thus, the form *was writing* is the marked, and the form *wrote*, the unmarked member of the opposition. We shall have more than one occasion to apply these terms.

ON GRAMMATICAL STATEMENTS

As the teaching of a language to foreigners requires the formulation of rules which the learner has to observe if he is to speak and write the language correctly, practical grammars, written both by speakers of the language in question and by foreigners, tend to be excessively strict in laying down what is "inadmissible" in the language. Numerous specimens of exaggerations may be found practically in every grammar book.

Let us consider a few of the most characteristic examples of such exaggerations.

It is frequently laid down as a rule that verbs of perception, such as *see*, *hear*, *feel* (in the meaning 'experience'), also those denoting emotions, such as *love*, *like*, *hate*, etc., cannot be used in any of the continuous forms.

This rule, thus bluntly formulated, is not borne out by actual usage. All of these verbs can, under certain circumstances, be used in the continuous forms though of course they are less commonly used in these forms than, say, verbs of physical action, such as *walk*, *beat*, *strike*, *jump*, *run*, etc., or verbs of position in space, such as *stand*, *sit*, *lie*, *hang*, *kneel*, etc. To be sure, *was seeing* is a much rarer form than *was running*. And yet *was seeing* is not impossible, nor is *was hearing*, *was liking*, etc., and also *was being*, e. g., in the sentence *He was being polite to you*. In a similar way, the verb *feel* can be used in the continuous form, as for instance in a question addressed to a sick person: *Are you feeling better to-day?*

Another example of a rule formulated too bluntly is that about the use of tenses in a conditional *if*-clause. It usually runs something like this: "In a conditional *if*-clause the present tense is used instead of the future." There are two points to be noted here.

(1) The expression "instead of the future" has no reasonable sense at all. What is meant here is that if the action mentioned in a conditional *if*-clause refers to the future the present tense of the verb is used. (2) Besides, the rule, thus formulated, is much too strict, and requires some modification. If it is taken literally at its face value, it should mean that in a clause of this type the groups "*shall* + infinitive" and "*will* + infinitive" are completely inadmissible. This, however, is rather far from the truth, at least, in so far as the group "*will* + infinitive" is concerned. This group may, in fact, be found in conditional *if*-clauses. The verb *will* apparently has a certain trace of its lexical meaning preserved, but the group nevertheless is an analytical form of the future tense, as will be seen from the following example: *Twenty thousand francs for you, Madame, if you'll stop breathing on my neck and go away.* (R. WEST) Thus, an absolute prohibition of the use of "*will* + infinitive" in conditional *if*-clauses proves to be a misstatement of the facts of the language. With reference to the group "*shall* + + infinitive" the statement appears to be more true. Indeed it is hard to find examples of such a use, and the rule may be laid down with a very high degree of probability.

Careful observation of the facts of the language and attention to their possible stylistic colouring (compare also p. 354 ff.) will often help to modify some too strict prohibitions and assertions of impossibility to be found in grammarians' statements.

SOME GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ON THE STRUCTURE OF ENGLISH

It is a very common statement that Modern English is an analytical language, as distinct from Modern Russian, which is synthetic. Occasionally this statement is slightly modified, to the effect that English is "mainly analytical" and Russian "mainly synthetic". These statements, on the whole, are true, but they remain somewhat vague until we have made clear two important points, viz. (a) what we mean by "analytical language", and (b) what are the peculiar features distinguishing Modern English from other analytical languages, for instance, Modern French. It would be a gross error to suppose that English and French, being both analytical, are exactly alike in their grammatical structure.

The chief features characterising an analytical language would seem to be these:

(1) Comparatively few grammatical inflections (viz., case inflections in nouns, adjectives, and pronouns, and personal inflections in verbs).

(2) A sparing use of sound alternations to denote grammatical forms.

(3) A wide use of prepositions to denote relations between objects and to connect words in the sentence.

(4) Prominent use of word order to denote grammatical relations: a more or less fixed word order.

Now, features distinguishing the Modern English language from, say, Modern French, are also fairly numerous.

Without going into more minute details, it may be pointed out here that English adjectives are not inflected for either gender or number, whereas French adjectives are, or that English has no future tense formed without auxiliary verbs, whereas French has one, or again, that in English the attributive adjective (with a few exceptions) comes before its noun, whereas in French such an adjective (with a few exceptions, too) comes after it, etc. These examples may be sufficient to show that by calling the English language analytical we do not give an adequate description of its structure. We shall arrive at that adequate description only at the end of the book.

ORDER OF DISCUSSION

The order in which we are going to deal with the problems of English grammatical structure is roughly the following.

First, we shall have to attempt an approximate definition of the boundaries between morphology and syntax in present-day English.

Then, at the start of our morphological investigation, we shall have to establish the morphological resources of the English language, viz. the morphemes and other means of expressing morphological categories.

Our next point will be a general survey of the system of word classes (the so-called "parts of speech"), and a detailed investigation of the structure of each of them in particular. That will be the end of the morphological section.

The syntactical part will consist of two very unequal items: the theory of phrases and the theory of the sentence. These parts are bound to be unequal because the theory of phrases (in its syntactical aspect) seems to be the least developed element of English grammar, whereas the theory of the sentence has a long-drawn-out and fruitful history.

The phrase theory will have to deal with the various types of phrases (noun and verb, verb and adverb, etc.) in their grammatical, as distinct from their lexical, aspect. The theory of the sentence will include a review of the types of simple sentence and parts of the sentence, and of the various types of composite sentences.

At the end we shall try to give a general view of Modern English grammatical structure on the basis of the preceding investigation.

Wherever it may seem desirable and illuminating, we shall draw parallels between the English language and other languages, notably Russian and German, pointing out both resemblances and discrepancies between them. This ought to help the reader acquire a more profound insight into the peculiarities of the language he is specialising in.

MORPHOLOGY AND SYNTAX

Though the difference and the boundary between morphology and syntax seem obvious enough as a matter of principle, drawing a clear-cut line between them in a given language sometimes proves to be a task of some difficulty. Let us consider a few cases of this kind in Modern English.

The usual definition of morphology, which may be accepted as it stands, is this: Morphology is the part of grammar which treats of the forms of words.¹ As for the usual definition of syntax, it may be said to be this: Syntax is the part of grammar which treats of phrases and sentences.²

These definitions are based on the assumption that we can clearly distinguish between words and phrases. This, however, is far from being the case. Usually the distinction, indeed, is patent enough. E. g., *indestructibility* is obviously a word, long as it is, whereas *came here*, short as it is, is a phrase and thus falls under the heading of syntax. But now what are we to make of *has been found*? This is evidently a phrase since it consists of three words and thus it would seem to fall under syntax, but it is also a form of the verb *find* and thus it would seem to fall under morphology.

Of course many more examples might be given of a phrase being at the same time a form of a word. It is obvious that we have here a kind of overlapping of syntax and morphology. It seems most advisable to include all such cases under morphology, considering the syntactical side of the formation to have been put, as it were, at the disposal of morphology.

The problem becomes more complicated still if we take into account such formations as *has been often found*, where one word (*often*) comes to stand between two elements of the form of another word (*find*). Such formations will have to be considered both under morphology and under syntax.

There are also other cases of overlapping which will be pointed out in due course. All this bears witness to the fact that in actual

¹ We will not consider here those definitions of morphology which include word-building.

² Different authors have differing views on the relations between the two parts of syntax.

research work we do not always find hard-and-fast lines separating phenomena from each other, such lines as would make every single phenomenon or group of phenomena easy to classify. More than once we shall have to deal with more involved groupings which must be treated accordingly. For the present the usual preliminary definition of the borderline between morphology and syntax must suffice.

There is also another way of approach to the problem of distinguishing between morphology and syntax.

Let us take as an example the sentence *Could you take me in to town?* (GALSWORTHY)

The word *take* which is used in this sentence can be considered from two different viewpoints.

On the one hand, we can consider it in its surroundings in the sentence, namely in its connection with the word *you*, which denotes the doer of the action, with the word *me*, which denotes the object of the action, etc. This would be analysing the syntagmatic connections of the word *take*.

On the other hand, we can consider *take* as part of a system including also the forms *takes, taking, took, taken*; we can observe that this system is analogous, both in sound alternation and in meanings, to the system *forsake, forsakes, forsaking, forsook, forsaken*, and, in a wider perspective, to the system *write, writes, writing, wrote, written; sing, sings, singing, sang, sung*, etc., and in a wider perspective still, to the system *live, lives, living, lived; stop, stops, stopping, stopped*, etc. This would be analysing the paradigmatic connections of *take*, and this gradually opens up a broad view into the morphological system of the language. It should be emphasised that this view is basically different from any view we might obtain by analysing the syntagmatic connections of the form in the sentence. For instance, the connection between *took* and *wrote* is entirely unsyntagmatic, as a sequence *took wrote* is unthinkable.

It may be said that, in a way, morphology is more abstract than syntax, as it does not study connections between words actually used together in sentences, but connections between forms actually found in different sentences and, as it were, extracted from their natural surroundings.

In another way, however, morphology would appear to be less abstract than syntax, as it studies units of a smaller and, we might say, of a more compact kind, whereas syntax deals with larger units, whose types and varieties are hard to number and exhaust.

The peculiar difficulty inherent in the treatment of analytical verb forms mentioned above, such as *have done, will go*, etc., lies in the fact that they have both a morphological and a syntactical quality. They are morphological facts in so far as they belong to the

system of the verb in question, as the auxiliary verb adds nothing whatever to the lexical meaning expressed in the infinitive or participle making part of the analytical form. But the same forms are facts of syntax in so far as they consist of two or three or sometimes four elements, and occasionally some other word, which does not in any way make part of the analytical form, may come in between them. It is true that in Modern English possibilities of such insertions are not very great, yet they exist and must be taken into account. We will not go into details here and we will only point out that such words as *often*, *never*, such words as *perhaps*, *probably*, etc. can and in some cases must come between elements of an analytical verb form: *has always come*, *will probably say*, etc. Since it is impossible that a word should be placed within another word, we are bound to admit that the formation *has... come* is something of a syntactical formation. The inevitable conclusion is, then, that *has come* and other formations of this kind are simultaneously analytical verb forms and syntactical unities, and this obviously means that morphology and syntax overlap here (see above, p. 13). This is perhaps still more emphasised by the possibility of formations in which the auxiliary verb making part of an analytical verb form is co-ordinated with some other verb (usually a modal verb) which does not in any way make part of an analytical form, e. g. *can and will go*. This would apparently be impossible if the formation *will go* had nothing syntactical about it.¹

According to a modern view, the relation between morphology and syntax is not so simple as had been generally assumed. In this view, we ought to distinguish between two angles of research:

- (1) The elements dealt with; from this point we divide grammatical investigation into two fields: morphology and syntax.
- (2) The way these elements are studied; from this viewpoint we distinguish between paradigmatic and syntagmatic study. Thus we get four divisions:

- 1 a paradigmatic morphology
 - b syntagmatic morphology
- 2 a paradigmatic syntax
 - b syntagmatic syntax

According to this view, whenever we talk of parts of speech (substantives, adjectives, etc.), we remain within the sphere of morphology. Thus the statement that an adjective is used to modify a substantive, or that an adverb is used to modify a verb, is a state-

¹ The same applies to the Russian language: there, too, a word can come in between the auxiliary and the infinitive, as in the formation *буду завтра заниматься*, and the auxiliary may be co-ordinated with another verb, as in *хочу и буду заниматься*.

ment of syntagmatic morphology. Syntax should have nothing to do with parts of speech: it should only operate with parts of sentence (subject, predicate, etc.).

Of these four items, the first and the last require no special explanation. Paradigmatic morphology is what we used to call morphology, and syntagmatic syntax is what we used to call syntax. The two other items, however, do require some special comment. Syntagmatic morphology is the study of phrases: "substantive + substantive", "adjective + substantive", "verb + substantive", "verb + adverb", etc.

Paradigmatic syntax, on the other hand, is a part of grammatical theory which did not appear as such in traditional systems. Paradigmatic syntax has to deal with such phenomena as

My friend has come.
My friend has not come.
Has my friend come?
My friend will come.
My friend will not come.
Will my friend come?
My friends have come.
My friends have not come, etc.

All these are considered as variation of one and the same sentence.

It would seem that the term *sentence* is here used in a peculiar sense. As units of communication *My friend has come* and *My friend has not come* are certainly two different sentences, as the information they convey is different. To avoid this ambiguity of the term *sentence*, it would be better to invent another term for "paradigmatic sentence". However, inventing a new term which would be generally acceptable is very difficult. In this book we shall use the term *sentence* in its old communicative sense.

GRAMMAR AND WORD-BUILDING

The relations between word-building, grammar, and lexicology have not yet been made quite clear. By and large three views have been expressed: (1) word-building is part of lexicology, (2) word-building is partly at least a matter of grammar, (3) word-building is a special sphere intermediate between lexicology and grammar and occasionally encroaching upon either.

According as one or another of these views is endorsed, word-building is either ignored in a book on grammar, as something lying beyond its sphere, or it is treated of in grammar book to some extent, at least.

The difficulty of the question is illustrated by the very fact of such different views being taken by scholars.

We will not here take up the question in its entirety, as it is obviously a question of general linguistics rather than of English linguistics, and we will merely state some points which we will follow in our treatment of the matter.

A complete enumeration of all suffixes and prefixes existing in a language and used to build words cannot be the task of a grammar. The meaning of such word-building suffixes as, e. g., *-ness* or *-er* for nouns, *-ful* or *-less* for adjectives, etc., cannot and should not be considered in grammar, any more than grammar can give a complete list of nouns, adjectives, etc. The grammatical aspect of word-building is, that words belonging to a certain part of speech are (or can be) derived by means of certain morphemes, chiefly suffixes (but in a few cases also prefixes), vowel alternation, and so forth.

From this viewpoint it is essential to note that a few word-building morphemes are unambiguous, that is, a word containing them is sure to belong to a certain part of speech, whereas others are ambiguous, that is, the morpheme is not in itself sufficient to make sure that a word belongs to a definite part of speech.

We need not give here any complete list of affixes of either type. A few typical examples will be all that is needed.

Affixes unambiguously showing to what part of speech a word belongs are very few. Among them is the suffix *-ity* for nouns. In such cases as *scarcity*, *necessity*, *peculiarity*, *monstrosity*, etc., there is no doubt that the word is a noun. In the sphere of adjectives there is the suffix *-less* and the suffix *-ous*. For instance, *useless*, *harmless*, *fatherless*, *meaningless* can be identified as adjectives by the mere fact of their having this suffix, and so can the words *copious*, *hazardous*, *luminous*, *callous*, *ubiquitous*, and so forth.

In the sphere of verbs we may note the suffix *-ise* (also spelt *-ize*) as an unambiguous sign of a word being a verb: cf. *crystallise*, *immunise*, *organise*, *mobilise*, *vaporise*, and the like.

Most word-forming morphemes are ambiguous, that is, they do not with certainty point to any definite part of speech but leave some choice which has to be decided by other criteria. The wideness of the choice varies with different morphemes. Thus, for instance, the suffix *-ful* leaves us only one alternative: the word can either be an adjective, which is the more usual case (*useful*, *careful*, *truthful*, *masterful*, *needful*, *sinful*, etc.), or a noun, which is much rarer (*handful*, *spoonful*, *mouthful*, *pocketful*, *roomful*, etc.). It will be readily seen that the second type is limited to formations in which the first element denotes some physical object having a certain volume.

In a similar way, the suffix *-ment* leaves open the choice between noun and verb, of which the first is much more frequent: compare

the nouns *instrument*, *tenement*, *merriment*, *government*, *sentiment*, *pigment*, *basement*, and the verbs *implement*, *regiment*, *augment*. It will be seen that most of these have homonyms among the nouns. It might perhaps be argued that *-ment* itself is a noun-forming, not a verb-forming suffix, and that verbs like *implement* have been formed from the corresponding nouns without any suffix at all. This may be true, but it is irrelevant: the fact remains that in contemporary English we have both nouns and verbs containing the suffix *-ment* followed by no other word-forming suffix.

Other suffixes may leave us a choice between three or more possibilities, for instance the suffix *-ly* leaves open the choice between adjectives, adverbs, nouns, modal words, and particles. We shall give a few examples of each category. Adjectives in *-ly*: *orderly*, *friendly*, *comely*, *sickly*, *masterly*; adverbs: *kindly*, *safely*, *generally*, *merrily*, *joyfully*; nouns: *daily* (a newspaper published every day; a woman coming in as daily help), *orderly* (a soldier assigned to an officer for carrying messages); modal words: *possibly*, *probably*, *certainly*, *presumably*, *admittedly*; particles: *exclusively*, *merely*, *solely*. If modal words are not accepted as a separate part of speech, or if words like *merely* are included among adverbs, the number of possibilities will be reduced by one or two items. But even so we shall have to admit that the suffix *-ly* is of comparatively little value for determining the part of speech to which a word belongs.

Prefixes are only rarely found to distinguish one part of speech from another.¹ Here are some well-known examples: *endear* v. vs. *dear* adj., *enlarge* v. vs. *large* adj., *enmesh* v. vs. *mesh* n., *behead* v. vs. *head* n.,² *belittle* v. vs. *little* adj.

A few more examples of this kind may be found, but there is not a single prefix to show definitely to what part of speech a word belongs. For instance, the negative prefix *in-* may be found in nouns (*independence*, *intransigence*), in adjectives (*independent*, *intransigent*, *inconclusive*), in verbs (*incapacitate*) and in adverbs (*independently*, *inconclusively*, *inconsistently*), so that as an indication of a part of speech it is valueless.

The prefix *under-* is also to be found in nouns, adjectives, and verbs, for instance, *understudy*, *undersecretary* (nouns), *underfed*,

¹ We are not here concerned with the historical origins of this state of things, and therefore we do not dwell on the fact that, for instance, the verb *behead* comes from Old English *beheafdian*, which was derived from the Old English noun *heafod* by means of a suffix as well as of a prefix, nor do we make similar remarks about the verb *endear*, etc. However such a state of things may have originated, the fact remains that in Modern English the two parts of speech are distinguished by the prefix alone.

² It might be argued that there is a verb *head* as well. But the meanings of the two verbs are so very far apart that this argument does not seem convincing.

underdeveloped, underdone (adjectives), *undervalue, underestimate, undermine* (verbs).

Other means of word-building are vowel alternations and consonant alternations. However, these are so limited in their application that the presence of this or that vowel or consonant in a word can never be a sure sign of its belonging to a definite part of speech. For example, the alternation [u:] — [i:], in spelling, *oo* — *ee*, is found in a few noun-verb groups (*doom* — *deem*, *food* — *feed*), but it does not follow that the vowel [i:] (spelt *ee*) is a sign of a verb: there are numerous words belonging to other parts of speech having this vowel in their root: *spleen, beech, deed* are nouns; *keen, green, deep* are adjectives, etc. We need not give any more examples. The same is also true of consonant alternations, for example, the alternation [k] — [tʃ] in such pairs as *speak* — *speech, break* — *breach*, etc. Important as they are from a lexical viewpoint, their grammatical significance is next to nil.

Thus the grammatical aspect of word-building, at least in English, is rather unimportant; the main phenomena of word-building belong to the sphere of lexicology.

In concluding our observations on word-building we may note some so-called nonce-words formed without any suffixes. Thus, in the following example a nonce-word, namely a verb, is formed from an adverb without any suffixes and it is characterised as a verb merely by its surroundings in the sentence. This is a dialogue between a mother and her daughter who was rather late in coming back home from school. "*Then where have you been? It's late.*" "*Nowhere.*" "*What?*" "*Nowhere.*" "*Don't nowhere me. I know how long it takes to walk home from school.*" (WOODHILL) The third *nowhere* is shown to be the infinitive of a verb by its position between *don't* and *me*. Its meaning is clear from the context. *Don't nowhere me* obviously means much the same as, *Don't say "nowhere" to me*, or, *Don't try to deceive me by saying "nowhere"*. In the following example even an unfinished sentence consisting of two words is treated in this way: "*Now, Dora — " he began. "Don't you 'Now, Dora' me!" she said in a loud voice, frantically striking the sides of the chair with her hands. "I just can't stand this any longer! I just can't!"*" (E. CALDWELL) Such formations are not very frequent, and they are conversational rather than literary.

Our study of Modern English morphology will consist of four main items, viz. (1) essentials of morphology: general study of morphemes and types of word-form derivation, (2) the system of parts of speech, (3) study of each separate part of speech, the grammatical categories connected with it, and its syntactical functions.

Part One

Morphology

ESSENTIALS OF MORPHOLOGY

MORPHEMES

The morpheme is one of the central notions of grammatical theory, without which no serious attempt at grammatical study can be made. Definition of a morpheme is not an easy matter, and it has been attempted many times by different scholars. Without going into particulars of the discussions that have taken place, we may briefly define the morphemes as the smallest meaningful units into which a word form may be divided. For instance, if we take the form *writers*, it can be divided into three morphemes: (1) *writ-*, expressing the basic lexical meaning of the word, (2) *-er-*, expressing the idea of agent performing the action indicated by the root of the verb, (3) *-s*, indicating number, that is, showing that more than one person of the type indicated is meant. Similarly the form *advantageously* can be divided into three morphemes: *advantage* + *ous* + *ly*, each with a special meaning of its own.

Two additional remarks are necessary here: (1) Two or more morphemes may sound the same but be basically different, that is, they may be homonyms. Thus the *-er* morpheme indicating the doer of an action as in *writer* has a homonym — the morpheme *-er* denoting the comparative degree of adjectives and adverbs, as in *longer*. Which of the two homonymous morphemes is actually there in a given case can of course only be determined by examining the other morphemes in the word. Thus, the morpheme *-er* in our first example, *writer*, cannot possibly be the morpheme of the comparative degree, as the morpheme *writ-* to which it is joined on is not the stem of an adjective or adverb, and so no comparative degree is to be thought of here.

(2) There may be zero morphemes, that is, the absence of a morpheme may indicate a certain meaning. Thus, if we compare the forms *book* and *books*, both derived from the stem *book-*, we may say that while *books* is characterised by the *-s*-morpheme as being a plural form, *book* is characterised by the zero morpheme as being a singular form.

In modern descriptive linguistics the term "morpheme" has been given a somewhat different meaning.¹ Scholars belonging to this trend approach the problem from this angle: If we compare the four sentences: *the student comes*, *the students come*; *the ox comes*, *the oxen come*, it will be seen that the change of *student* to *students* is

¹ See, for example, H. A. Gleason Jr., *An Introduction to Descriptive Linguistics*, 1955, Chapter V.

paralleled by the change of *ox* to *oxen*. That is, the meaning and function of the *-en* in *oxen* is the same as the meaning and function of the *-s* in *students*. On this account the *-s* and the *-en* are said to represent the same morpheme: each of them is a morph representing the morpheme, and they are termed allomorphs of the morpheme. Furthermore, as in the word *goose* the form corresponding to *students* and *oxen* is *geese*, where nothing is added, but the root vowel is changed, the morph representing the morpheme in this case is said to be the very change of [u:] into [i:] (graphically, *oo* and *ee*). Thus the morpheme, in this case, has three allomorphs, (1) *-s*, (2) *-en*, (3) [u:] → [i:].

This latter item entails some difficulty, as a morph is shown not necessarily to be a material entity, that is a phoneme, or a combination of phonemes; sometimes it may be a change of one phoneme into another.

Similarly, in the past tense of verbs the morpheme of the past tense has two allomorphs, (1) *-ed*, (2) the change of vowel, as [ai] → [ou] (*write* — *wrote*), [i] → [æ] (*sing* — *sang*), etc.

We will apply the term "morpheme" only to material units including zero.

In grammar, we are of course concerned with the grammatical, or structural, meaning of morphemes: we do not here study the meanings of root morphemes, which are necessarily lexical, and as to derivation morphemes, i. e. those which serve to build words, we are only interested in them in so far as they are grammatically relevant, and that is the case if they show that the word belongs to a certain part of speech, and if they serve to distinguish one part of speech from another. This grammatical significance of derivation morphemes, if it is there at all, is always combined with their lexical meaning. For instance, if we take this pair of words: *write* v. and *writer* n., the derivative morpheme *-er* has a grammatical significance, as it serves to distinguish a noun from a verb, and it has its lexical meaning, as the lexical meaning of the noun *writer* is different from that of the verb *write*.

Inflection morphemes have no lexical meaning or function. There is not the slightest difference in the way of lexical meaning between *live* and *lived*, or between *house* and *houses*. However, an inflection morpheme can acquire a lexical meaning in some special cases, for instance if the plural form of a noun develops a meaning which the singular form has not; thus, the plural form *colours* has a meaning, 'flag', which the singular form *colour* has not. These are cases of lexicalisation (compare below, p. 36).

There is in Modern English a case where a boundary line between inflection and derivation is hard to draw, and a morpheme does duty both ways. This is the morpheme *-ing* with its function of a suffix deriving verbal nouns and of an inflection serving to

form a gerund, which is one of the non-finite verb forms. This appears to be quite a special case in English, and it does not seem to find any parallel in Russian.

Terminology

It should be noted that there is some confusion in the use of the terms "suffix" and "inflection" or "ending".

According to one view, the term "suffix" is taken in a wide sense, and applied to any morpheme coming after the root morpheme, whether it is derivative or inflectional. If this view is endorsed, an inflection is a special kind of suffix, since it falls under the general definition of a suffix just mentioned.

According to another view, the term "suffix" is taken in a narrow sense, and applied to derivational post-root morphemes only. In that case an inflection is not a special kind of suffix but a morpheme of a different kind, having no lexical meaning of any sort.

We will adhere to this latter view, as it seems better to have a clear distinction than to use the term "suffix" in a vague sense.

There is also some slight vacillation in the use of the term "inflection" (or "ending"), and it is connected with the twofold use of the term "suffix" considered above.

According to one view, the term "inflection" (or "ending") is applied to any morpheme serving to derive a form of a word and having no lexical meaning. So the morphemes characterising the infinitive, for instance, in Russian or German, will be termed inflections.

According to another view, the term "inflection" (or "ending") is only applied to morphemes expressing case and number in nominal parts of speech, and to those expressing person and number in verbs. From this viewpoint the morpheme characterising the infinitive in Russian or German or the morpheme characterising the gerund in English would not be an inflection or ending, whereas the morpheme *-s* in forms like *writes*, *buys*, would be one.

We will apply the term "inflection" to every morpheme serving to derive a grammatical form and having no lexical meaning of its own.

Last not least, a question should be mentioned in this connection, which concerns adjectives and adverbs, namely that of degrees of comparison: are formations like *longer*, *longest* forms of the adjective or the adverb *long*, or are they different words? This means: is there a difference in the lexical meaning between *long*, *longer*, and *longest*, or is there not? This question has been treated in various ways, but the view seems to be prevalent that there is no difference in the lexical meaning here. We will take this view, too, and class the morphemes used to derive degrees of comparison among inflections (see below, p. 58).

TYPES OF WORD-FORM DERIVATION

These fall under two main headings, (a) those limited to changes in the body of the word, without having recourse to auxiliary words (synthetic types), (b) those implying the use of auxiliary words (analytical types). Besides, there are a few special cases of different forms of a word being derived from altogether different stems.

Synthetic Types

The number of morphemes used for deriving word-forms in Modern English is very small (much smaller than either in German or in Russian, for instance). They may be enumerated in a very short space.

There is the ending *-s* (*-es*), with three variants of pronunciation, used to form the plural of almost all nouns, and the endings *-en* and *-ren*, used for the same purpose in one or two words each, viz. *oxen*, *brethren* (poet.), *children*.

There is the ending *'s*, with the same three variants of pronunciation as for the plural ending, used to form what is generally termed the genitive case of nouns.¹

For adjectives, there are the endings *-er* and *-est* for the degrees of comparison.

For verbs, the number of morphemes used to derive their forms is only slightly greater. There is the ending *-s* (*-es*) for the third person singular present indicative, with the same three variants of pronunciation noted above for nouns, the ending *-d* (*-ed*) for the past tense of certain verbs (with three variants of pronunciation, again), the ending *-d* (*ed*) for the second participle of certain verbs, the ending *-n* (*-en*) for the second participle of certain other verbs, and the ending *-ing* for the first participle and also for the gerund.

Thus the total number of morphemes used to derive forms of words is eleven or twelve, which is much less than the number found in languages of a mainly synthetical structure.

It should also be noted that most of these endings are monosemantic, in the sense that they denote only one grammatical category and not two or three (or more) at a time, as is the case in synthetic languages. For example, the plural *-s* (or *-es*) denotes only the category of plural number, and has nothing to do with any other grammatical category, such as case.

It would, however, mean oversimplifying matters if we were to suppose that all English inflectional morphemes are monosemantic. This is certainly not the case with the *-s* (*-es*) of the third

¹ The problem of the genitive case will be dealt with in Chapter III (see p. 41 ff.).

person singular. It expresses at least three grammatical categories: person (third), number (singular), and mood (indicative). In certain verbs it also expresses the category of tense: thus, in the form *puts* only the *-s* shows that it is a present-tense form.

Sound Alternations

By sound alternations we mean a way of expressing grammatical categories which consists in changing a sound inside the root. This method appears in Modern English, for example, in nouns, as when the root vowel [ae] of the singular form *man* is changed into [e] to form the plural *men*, or similarly the root vowel [au] of *mouse* is changed into [aɪ] in *mice*, and a few more cases of the same kind.

This method is much more extensively used in verbs, such as *write* — *wrote* — *written*, *sing* — *sang* — *sung*, *meet* — *met* — *met*, etc. On the whole, vowel alternation does play some part among the means of expressing grammatical categories, though its part in Modern English has been much reduced as compared to Old English.

Analytical Types

These consist in using a word (devoid of any lexical meaning of its own) to express some grammatical category of another word.

There can be no doubt in Modern English about the analytical character of such formations as, e. g., *has invited* or *is invited*, or *is inviting*, or *does not invite*. The verbs *have*, *be*, and *do* have no lexical meaning of their own in these cases. The lexical meaning of the formation resides in the participle or infinitive following the verb *have*, *be* or *do*. Some doubt has been expressed about the formations *shall invite* and *will invite*. There is a view that *shall* and *will* have a lexical meaning.¹ We will not go into this question now and we will consider *shall* and *will* as verbs serving to form the future tense of other verbs. Thus, *have*, *be*, *do*, *shall*, and *will* are what we call auxiliary verbs, and as such they constitute a typical feature of the analytical structure of Modern English.

While the existence of analytical forms of the English verb cannot be disputed, the existence of such forms in adjectives and adverbs is not nowadays universally recognised. The question whether such formations as *more vivid*, *the most vivid*, or, again, *more vividly* and *most vividly* are or are not analytical forms of degrees of comparison of *vivid* and *vividly*, is controversial. We can only say here that if these formations are recognised as analytical forms of degrees of comparison, the words *more* and *most* have to be numbered among the analytical means of morphology.

¹ See below, p. 87.

Suppletive Formations

Besides the synthetical and analytical means of building word forms in Modern English, there is yet another way of building them which stands quite apart and is found in a very limited number of cases only. By a suppletive formation we mean building a form of a word from an altogether different stem. Examples in point are, the verb *go*, with its past tense *went*; the personal pronoun *I*, with its objective case form *me*, the adjective *good* with its comparative degree form *better*, and a few more. We consider, for instance, *go* and *went* as, in a way, two forms of one word, because in the vast majority of verbs the past tense is derived from the same stem as the present or infinitive, e. g. *live* — *lived*, *speak* — *spoke*, etc. It is against this background that the units *go* and *went* come to be considered as forms of one word, formed from different stems. In the morphological system of Modern English suppletive formations are a very insignificant element, but they concern a few very widely used words among adjectives, pronouns, and verbs.

Such, then, are the means of deriving the forms of words in Modern English. We shall have to ascertain the exact meaning and function of each of them as we proceed on our survey of the parts of speech.

Chapter II

PARTS OF SPEECH (General Survey)

The problem of parts of speech is one that causes great controversies both in general linguistic theory and in the analysis of separate languages. We shall have to examine here briefly a few general questions concerning parts of speech which are of some importance for Modern English.

The term "parts of speech" (as well as the corresponding terms in Russian, German, French, and other languages), though firmly established, is not a very happy one. What is meant by a "part of speech" is a type of word differing from other types in some grammatical point or points. To take the clearest example of all, the verb is a type of word different from all other types in that it alone has the grammatical category of tense. Thus, while it is perfectly reasonable to ask, "What is the past tense of the word *live*?" (the answer of course is, *lived*), it would make no sense to ask, "What is the past tense of the word *city*?" or "What is the past tense of the word *big*?" Those words just have not got any past tense, or any tense whatever, for that matter: the notion of tense cannot be applied to them. Tense is one of the distinctive features characterising the verb as against every other type of word. However, the question is much less simple with reference to some other types of words, and a general definition of the principles on which the classification of parts of speech is based becomes absolutely necessary.

We cannot here go into the controversy over these principles that has lasted a considerable time now, and we will limit ourselves to stating the principles of our classification and pointing out some difficulties inherent in it.

The principles on which the classification is based are three in number, viz. (1) meaning, (2) form, (3) function. Each of these requires some additional explanations.

(1) By **meaning** we do not mean the individual meaning of each separate word (its lexical meaning) but the meaning common to all the words of the given class and constituting its essence. Thus, the meaning of the substantive (noun) is "thingness". This applies equally to all and every noun and constitutes the structural meaning of the noun as a type of word. Similarly, the meaning of the verb as a type of word is that of "process", whatever the individual meaning of a separate verb may happen to be. We shall have to dwell on this later in considering every part of speech in detail.

(2) By **form** we mean the morphological characteristics of a type of word. Thus, the noun is characterised by the category of number (singular and plural), the verb by tense, mood, etc. Several types of words (prepositions, conjunctions, and others) are characterised by invariability.

(3) By **function** we mean the syntactical properties of a type of word. These are subdivided into two, viz. (a) its method of combining with other words, (b) its function in the sentence; (a) has to deal with phrases, (b) with sentence structure. Taking, as we did previously, the verb as a specimen, we can state that, for example, a verb combines with a following noun (*write letters*) and also with a following adverb (*write quickly*). As to (b), i. e. the syntactical function of a verb in a sentence, it is that of a predicate.¹

Two additional remarks are necessary before we proceed to the analysis of parts of speech in detail.

In the first place, there is the question about the mutual relation of the criteria. We cannot be sure in advance that all three criteria will always point the same way. Then, again, in some cases, one of them may fail (this especially applies to the criterion of form). Under such circumstances, it may prove necessary to choose between them, i. e. to attach to one of them greater value than to another. We may say, provisionally, that we shall treat them in the order in which they have been enumerated, viz. meaning shall come first, form next, and function last.

It will also be seen that the theory of parts of speech, though considered by most scholars to be a part of morphology,² cannot do without touching on some syntactical problems, namely on phrases and on syntactical functions of words (point 3 in our list of criteria). We shall regard the theory of parts of speech as essentially a part of morphology, involving, however, some syntactical points.

THE SYSTEM OF PARTS OF SPEECH

1. Proceeding in the usual order, we start with the **noun**, or substantive.³

Its characteristic features are the following.

(1) Meaning: thingness. Thus, nouns include not only *chair* and *iron*, etc., but also *beauty*, *peace*, *necessity*, *journey*, and everything else presented as a thing, or object.

¹ We do not consider here the functions of the infinitive, participle, and gerund.

² Some scholars took a different view of the problem. Thus, Academician A. Shakhmatov held that parts of speech should be treated in Syntax. (See A. A. Шахматов, *Синтаксис русского языка*, 1941.)

³ In the prevailing Modern English terminology the terms "noun" and "substantive" are used as synonyms. According to an earlier view, the term "noun" was understood to cover all nominal parts of speech, including substantives, adjectives, pronouns, and numerals, thus corresponding to the Russian term *имя*.

(2) Form. Nouns have the category of number (singular and plural), though some individual nouns may lack either a singular or a plural form. They also, in the accepted view, have the category of case (common and genitive); see, however, p. 42 ff.

(3) Function. (a) Combining with words to form phrases. A noun combines with a preceding adjective (*large room*), or occasionally with a following adjective (*times immemorial*), with a preceding noun in either the common case (*iron bar*) or the genitive case (*father's room*), with a verb following it (*children play*) or preceding it (*play games*). Occasionally a noun may combine with a following or a preceding adverb (*the man there; the then president*). It also combines with prepositions (*in a house; house of rest*). It is typical of a noun to be preceded by the definite or indefinite article (*the room, a room*). (b) Function in the sentence. A noun may be the subject or the predicative of a sentence, or an object, an attribute, and an adverbial modifier. It can also make part of each of these when preceded by a preposition.

2. Next, we come to the adjective.

(1) Meaning. The adjective expresses property.¹

(2) Form. Adjectives in Modern English are invariable. Some adjectives form degrees of comparison (*long, longer, longest*).

(3) Function. (a) Adjectives combine with nouns both preceding and (occasionally) following them (*large room, times immemorial*). They also combine with a preceding adverb (*very large*). Adjectives can be followed by the phrase "preposition + noun" (*free from danger*). Occasionally they combine with a preceding verb (*married young*). (b) In the sentence, an adjective can be either an attribute (*large room*) or a predicative (*is large*). It can also be an objective predicative (*painted the door green*).

3. The pronoun.

(1) The meaning of the pronoun as a separate part of speech is somewhat difficult to define. In fact, some pronouns share essential peculiarities of nouns (e.g. *he*), while others have much in common with adjectives (e. g. *which*). This made some scholars think that pronouns were not a separate part of speech at all and should be distributed between nouns and adjectives. However, this view proved untenable and entailed insurmountable difficulties. Hence it has proved necessary to find a definition of the specific meaning of pronouns, distinguishing them from both nouns and adjectives. From this angle the meaning of pronouns as a part of speech can be stated as follows: pronouns point to the things and properties without naming them. Thus, for example, the pronoun *it* points to a thing

¹ The property may be either permanent or temporary; cf. *a red tie* and *a face red with excitement*. Thus the idea of permanence should not be mentioned in defining the meaning of the adjective as a part of speech.

without being the name of any particular class of things. The pronoun *its* points to the property of a thing by referring it to another thing. The pronoun *what* can point both to a thing and a property.

(2) Form. As far as form goes pronouns fall into different types. Some of them have the category of number (singular and plural), e. g. *this*, while others have no such category, e. g. *somebody*. Again, some pronouns have the category of case (*he* — *him*, *somebody* — *somebody's*), while others have none (*something*).

(3) Function. (a) Some pronouns combine with verbs (*he speaks*, *find him*), while others can also combine with a following noun (*this room*). (b) In the sentence, some pronouns may be the subject (*he*, *what*) or the object, while others are the attribute (*my*). Pronouns can be predicatives.

4. Numerals. The treatment of numerals presents some difficulties, too. The so-called cardinal numerals (*one*, *two*) are somewhat different from the so-called ordinal numerals (*first*, *second*).

(1) Meaning. Numerals denote either number or place in a series.

(2) Form. Numerals are invariable.

(3) Function. (a) As far as phrases go, both cardinal and ordinal numerals combine with a following noun (*three rooms*, *third room*); occasionally a numeral follows a noun (*soldiers three*, *George the Third*). (b) In a sentence, a numeral most usually is an attribute (*three rooms*, *the third room*), but it can also be subject, predicative, and object: *Three of them came in time*; *"We Are Seven"* (the title of a poem by Wordsworth); *I found only four*.

5. The stative. The next item in our list of parts of speech is a controversial one. Such words as *asleep*, *ablaze*, *afraid*, etc. have been often named adjectives, though they cannot (apart from a few special cases) be attributes in a sentence, and though their meaning does not seem to be that of property. In spite of protracted discussion that has been going on for some time now, views on this point are as far apart as ever. We will expound here the view that words of the *asleep* type constitute a separate part of speech, and we will consider the various arguments for and against this view in Chapter IX. As for the term "stative", it may be used to denote these words, on the analogy of such terms as "substantive" and "adjective".¹

(1) Meaning. The meaning of the words of this type is that of a passing state a person or thing happens to be in.

(2) Form. Statives are invariable.

¹ The term "stative" is used by English philologists to denote a special category of verbs in Hebrew (see, for instance, Webster's *New International Dictionary*).

(3) Function. (a) Statives most usually follow a link verb (*was asleep, fell asleep*). Occasionally they can follow a noun (*man olive*). They can also sometimes be preceded by an adverb (*fast asleep*). (b) In the sentence, a stative is most usually a predicative (*he fell asleep*). They can also be objective predicatives (*I found him asleep*) and attributes, almost always following the noun they modify (*a man asleep in his chair*).

6. The verb.

(1) Meaning. The verb as a part of speech expresses a process.

(2) Form. The verb is characterised by an elaborate system of morphological categories, some of which are, however, controversial.¹ These are: tense, aspect, mood, voice, person, and number.

(3) Function. (a) Verbs are connected with a preceding noun (*children play*) and with a following noun (*play games*). They are also connected with adverbs (*write quickly*). Occasionally a verb may combine with an adjective (*married young*). (b) In a sentence a verb (in its finite forms) is always the predicate or part of it (link verb). The functions of the verbals (infinitive, participle, and gerund) must be dealt with separately.

7. The adverb.

(1) The meaning of the adverb as a part of speech is hard to define. Indeed, some adverbs indicate time or place of an action (*yesterday, here*), while others indicate its property (*quickly*) and others again the degree of a property (*very*). As, however, we should look for one central meaning characterising the part of speech as a whole, it seems best to formulate the meaning of the adverb as "property of an action or of a property".

(2) Form. Adverbs are invariable. Some of them, however, have degrees of comparison (*fast, faster, fastest*).

(3) Function. (a) An adverb combines with a verb (*run quickly*), with an adjective (*very long*), occasionally with a noun (*the then president*) and with a phrase (*so out of things*). (b) An adverb can sometimes follow a preposition (*from there*). (c) In a sentence an adverb is almost always an adverbial modifier, or part of it (*from there*), but it may occasionally be an attribute.

8. Prepositions. The problem of prepositions has caused very heated discussions, especially in the last few years. Both the meaning and the syntactical functions of prepositions have been the subject of controversy. We will treat of this matter at some length in Chapter XVIII, and here we will limit ourselves to a brief statement of our general view on the subject.

(1) Meaning. The meaning of prepositions is obviously that of relations between things and phenomena.

(2) Form. Prepositions are invariable.

(3) Function. (a) Prepositions enter into phrases in which they are preceded by a noun, adjective, numeral, stative, verb or adverb, and followed by a noun, adjective, numeral or pronoun. (b) In a sentence a preposition never is a separate part of it. It goes together with the following word to form an object, adverbial modifier, predicative or attribute, and in extremely rare cases a subject (*There were about a hundred people in the hall*).

9. **Conjunctions.** The problem of conjunctions is of the same order as that of prepositions, but it has attracted less attention. We will reserve full discussion of the matter to Chapter XIX and we will only state here the main points.

(1) Meaning. Conjunctions express connections between things and phenomena.

(2) Form. Conjunctions are invariable.

(3) Function. (a) They connect any two words, phrases or clauses. (b) In a sentence, conjunctions are never a special part of it. They either connect homogeneous parts of a sentence or homogeneous clauses (the so-called co-ordinating conjunctions), or they join a subordinate clause to its head clause (the so-called subordinating conjunctions).

A further remark is necessary here. We have said that prepositions express relations between phenomena, and conjunctions express connections between them. It must be acknowledged that the two notions, relations and connections, are somewhat hard to distinguish. This is confirmed by the well-known fact that phrases of one and the other kind may be more or less synonymous: cf., e. g., *an old man and his son* and *an old man with his son*. It is also confirmed by the fact that in some cases a preposition and a conjunction may be identical in sound and have the same meaning (e. g. *before* introducing a noun and *before* introducing a subordinate clause; the same about *after*). Since it is hard to distinguish between prepositions and conjunctions as far as meaning goes, and morphologically they are both invariable, the only palpable difference between them appears to be their syntactical function. It may be reasonably doubted whether this is a sufficient basis for considering them to be separate parts of speech. It might be argued that prepositions and conjunctions make up a single part of speech, with subdivisions based on the difference of syntactical functions. Such a view would go some way toward solving the awkward problem of homonymy with reference to such words as *before*, *after*, *since*, and the like. However, since this is an issue for further consideration, we will, for the time being, stick to the traditional view of prepositions and conjunctions as separate parts of speech.

10. **Particles.** By particles we mean such word as *only*, *solely*, *exclusively*, *even* (*even old people came*), *just* (*just turn the han-*

dle), etc. These were traditionally classed with adverbs, from which they, however, differ in more than one respect.

(1) Meaning. The meaning of particles is very hard to define. We might say, approximately, that they denote subjective shades of meaning introduced by the speaker or writer and serving to emphasise or limit some point in what he says.

(2) Form. Particles are invariable.

(3) Function. (a) Particles may combine with practically every part of speech, more usually preceding it (*only three*), but occasionally following it (*for advanced students only*). (b) Particles never are a separate part of a sentence. They enter the part of the sentence formed by the word (or phrase) to which they refer. (It might also be argued that particles do not belong to any part of a sentence.)

11. Modal words. Modal words have only recently been separated from adverbs, with which they were traditionally taken together. By modal words we mean such words as *perhaps*, *possibly*, *certainly*.

(1) Meaning. Modal words express the speaker's evaluation of the relation between an action and reality.

(2) Form. Modal words are invariable.

(3) Function. (a) Modal words usually do not enter any phrases but stand outside them. In a few cases, however, they may enter into a phrase with a noun, adjective, etc. (*he will arrive soon, possibly to-night*). (b) The function of modal words in a sentence is a matter of controversy. We will discuss this question at some length in Chapter XXI and meanwhile we will assume that modal words perform the function of a parenthesis. Modal words may also be a sentence in themselves.

12. Interjections.

(1) Meaning. Interjections express feelings (*ah*, *alas*). They are not names of feelings but the immediate expression of them. Some interjections represent noises, etc., with a strong emotional colouring (*bang!*).

(2) Form. Interjections are invariable.

(3) Function. (a) Interjections usually do not enter into phrases. Only in a few cases do they combine with a preposition and noun or pronoun, e.g. *alas for him!* (b) In a sentence an interjection forms a kind of parenthesis. An interjection may also be a sentence in itself, e. g. *Alas!* as an answer to a question.

So far we have been considering parts of speech as they are usually termed and treated in grammatical tradition: we have been considering nouns, adjectives, verbs, etc. Some modern linguists prefer to avoid this traditional grouping and terminology and to establish a classification of types of words based entirely on their morphological characteristics and on their ability (or inability) to

enter into phrases with other words of different types. Thus, for instance the words *and* and *or* will fall under one class while the words *because* and *whether* will fall under another class.

These classes are not denoted by special terms, such as "noun" or "adjective"; instead they are given numbers; thus, the words *concert* and *necessity* would belong to class 1, the words *seem* and *feel* to class 2, etc. Without even going into details, it is easy to see that the number of such classes is bound to be greater than that of the usual parts of speech. For instance, in the classification proposed by C. C. Fries¹ there are no less than 19 classes of words.

It must be recognised that classifications based on these principles yield more exact results than the traditional ones, but the system thus obtained proves to be unwieldy and certainly unfit for practical language teaching. Whether it can be so modified as to be exact and easily grasped at the same time remains to be seen.

THE PROBLEM OF NOTIONAL AND FORMAL WORDS

In giving a list of parts of speech, we have not so far mentioned the terms "notional" and "formal". It is time now to turn to this question. According to the view held by some grammarians,² words should be divided into two categories on the following principle: some words denote things, actions, and other extralinguistic phenomena (these, then, would be notional words), whereas other words denote relations and connections between the notional words, and thus have no direct bearing on anything extralinguistic (these, then, would be the formal words, or form words). Authors holding this view define prepositions as words denoting relations between words (or between parts of a sentence), and conjunctions as words connecting words or sentences.³

However, this view appears to be very shaky. Actually, the so-called formal words also express something extralinguistic. For instance, prepositions express relations between things. Cf., e. g., *The letter is on the table* and *The letter is in the table*: two different relations between the two objects, the letter and the table, are denoted by the prepositions. In a similar way, conjunctions denote connections between extralinguistic things and phenomena. Thus, in the sentence *The match was postponed because it was raining* the conjunction *because* denotes the causal connection between two processes, which of course exists whether we choose to express it by

¹ See C. C. Fries, *The Structure of English*, 1961, pp. 76—104.

² See, for instance, В. Н. Жигadlo, И. П. Иванова, Л. Л. Иофик, *Современный английский язык*, 1956, стр. 16—17.

³ See, for instance, В. Н. Жигadlo, И. П. Иванова, Л. Л. Иофик, *op. cit.*, стр. 193, 202.

words or not. In the sentence *It was raining but the match took place all the same* the conjunction *but* expresses a contradiction between two phenomena, the rain and the match, which exists in reality whether we mention it or not. It follows that the prepositions *on* and *in*, the conjunctions *because* and *but* express some relations and connections existing independently of language, and thus have as close a connection with the extralinguistic world as any noun or verb. They are, in so far, no less notional than nouns or verbs.

Now, the term "formal word" would seem to imply that the word thus denoted has some function in building up a phrase or a sentence. This function is certainly performed by both prepositions and conjunctions and from this point of view prepositions and conjunctions should indeed be singled out.

But this definition of a formal word cannot be applied to particles. A particle does not do anything in the way of connecting words or building a phrase or a sentence.

There does not therefore seem to be any reason for classing particles with formal words. If this view is endorsed we shall only have two parts of speech which are form words, viz. prepositions and conjunctions.¹

It should also be observed that some words belonging to a particular part of speech may occasionally, or even permanently, perform a function differing from that which characterises the part of speech as a whole. Auxiliary verbs are a case in point. In the sentence *I have some money left* the verb *have* performs the function of the predicate, which is the usual function of a verb in a sentence. In this case, then, the function of the verb *have* is precisely the one typical of verbs as a class. However, in the sentence *I have found my briefcase* the verb *have* is an auxiliary: it is a means of forming a certain analytical form of the verb *find*. It does not by itself perform the function of a predicate. We need not assume on that account that there are two verbs *have*, one notional and the other auxiliary. It is the same verb *have*, but its functions in the two sentences are different. If we take the verb *shall*, we see that its usual function is that of forming the future tense of another verb, e. g. *I shall know about it to-morrow*. *Shall* is then said to be an auxiliary verb, and its function differs from that of the verb as a part of speech, but it is a verb all the same.

After this general survey of parts of speech we will now turn to a systematic review of each part of speech separately.

¹ If we should think it fit to unite prepositions and conjunctions together as one part of speech, as hinted above (see p. 32—33), we should of course have only one part of speech as form words.

Chapter III

THE NOUN

The noun in Modern English has only two grammatical categories, number and case. The existence of case appears to be doubtful and has to be carefully analysed.

The Modern English noun certainly has not got the category of grammatical gender, which is to be found, for example, in Russian, French, German and Latin. Not a single noun in Modern English shows any peculiarities in its morphology due to its denoting a male or a female being. Thus, the words *husband* and *wife* do not show any difference in their forms due to the peculiarities of their lexical meanings.¹

NUMBER

Modern English, as most other languages, distinguishes between two numbers, singular and plural.²

The essential meaning of singular and plural seems clear enough: the singular number shows that one object is meant, and the plural shows that more than one object is meant. Thus, the opposition is "one — more than one". This holds good for many nouns: *table — tables*, *pupil — pupils*, *dog — dogs*, etc. However, language facts are not always so simple as that. The category of number in English nouns gives rise to several problems which claim special attention.

First of all, it is to be noted that there is some difference between, say, *three houses* and *three hours*. Whereas three houses are three separate objects existing side by side, three hours are a continuous period of time measured by a certain agreed unit of duration. The same, of course, would apply to such expressions as *three miles*, *three acres*, etc.

If we now turn to such plurals as *waters* (e. g. *the waters of the Atlantic*), or *snows* (e.g. "*A Daughter of the Snows*", the title of a story by Jack London), we shall see that we are drifting further away from the original meaning of the plural number. In the first place, no numeral could be used with nouns of this kind. We could not possibly say *three waters*, or *three snows*. We cannot say how many waters we mean when we use this noun in the plural number. What, then, is the real difference in meaning between *water* and *waters*, *snow* and *snows*, etc.? It is fairly obvious that the plural form in every case serves to denote a vast stretch of water (e. g. an ocean), or of snow, or rather of ground covered by snow (e. g. in the arctic regions of Canada), etc. In the case of *water* and *waters* we

¹ In such pairs as *actor — actress*, *prophet — prophetess*, etc. the difference between the nouns is a purely lexical one.

² Some languages have a third number, the dual. Among these are ancient Greek, Sanskrit, and Lithuanian.

can press the point still further and state that *the water of the Atlantic* refers to its physical or chemical properties (e. g. *the water of the Atlantic contains a considerable portion of salt*), whereas *the waters of the Atlantic* refers to a geographical idea: it denotes a seascape and has, as such, a peculiar stylistic value which *the water of the Atlantic* certainly lacks.¹ So we see that between the singular and the plural an additional difference of meaning has developed.

Now, the difference between the two numbers may increase to such a degree that the plural form develops a completely new meaning which the singular has not got at all. Thus, for example, the plural form *colours* has the meaning 'banner' which is restricted to the plural (e. g. *to serve under the colours of liberty*). In a similar manner, the plural *attentions* has acquired the meaning 'wooing' (*pay attentions to a young lady*). A considerable amount of examples in point have been collected by O. Jespersen.²

Since, in these cases, a difference in lexical meaning develops between the plural and the singular, it is natural to say that the plural form has been lexicalised.³ It is not our task here to go into details about the specific peculiarities of meaning which may develop in the plural form of a noun. This is a matter of lexicology rather than of grammar. What is essential from the grammatical viewpoint is the very fact that a difference in meaning which is purely grammatical in its origins is apt under certain conditions to be overshadowed by a lexical difference.

Pluralia Tantum and Singularia Tantum

We must also consider here two types of nouns differing from all others in the way of number: they have not got the usual two number forms, but only one form. The nouns which have only a plural and no singular are usually termed "pluralia tantum" (which is the Latin for "plural only"), and those which have only a singular and no plural are termed "singularia tantum" (the Latin for "singular only").

Among the pluralia tantum are the nouns *trousers, scissors, tongs, pincers, breeches; environs, outskirts, dregs*. As is obvious from these examples, they include nouns of two types. On the one hand, there are the nouns which denote material objects consisting of two halves (*trousers, scissors, etc.*); on the other, there are those which denote a more or less indefinite plurality (e. g. *environs*

¹ It is much the same in Russian: compare, for example, вода Черного моря and воды Черного моря.

² See O. Jespersen, *A Modern English Grammar on Historical Principles*, Part II, Syntax, vol. I, 1927, p. 85 ff.

³ O. Jespersen used the term "differentiated plural", See *ibid.*, p. 85.

'areas surrounding some place on all sides'; *dregs* 'various small things remaining at the bottom of a vessel after the liquid has been poured out of it', etc.). If we compare the English pluralia tantum with the Russian, we shall find that in some cases they correspond to each other (e. g., *trousers* — брюки, *scissors* — ножницы, *environs* — окрестности, etc.), while in others they do not (квасцы — *alum*, деньги — *money*, etc.). This seems to depend on a different view of the objects in question reflected by the English and the Russian language respectively. The reason why a given object is denoted by a pluralia tantum noun in this or that language is not always quite clear.

Close to this group of pluralia tantum nouns are also some names of sciences, e. g. *mathematics*, *physics*, *phonetics*, also *politics*, and some names of diseases, e. g. *measles*, *mumps*, *ricketts*. The reason for this seems to be that, for example, mathematics embrace a whole series of various scientific disciplines, and measles are accompanied by the appearance of a number of separate inflamed spots on the skin (rash). However, the reasons are less obvious in the case of phonetics, for instance.¹ Now, it is typical of English that some of these pluralia tantum may, as it were, cease to be plural. They may occasionally, or even regularly, be accompanied by the indefinite article, and if they are the subject of a sentence the predicate verb may stand in the singular.

This way of treating pluralia tantum, which would be unthinkable in Russian, is of course connected with the structure of English as a whole.

The possibility of treating a plural form as if it were singular is also seen in the use of the phrase *the United Nations*, which may, when it is the subject of a sentence, have the predicate verb in the singular, e. g. *the United Nations is a world organisation*.

Examples of a phrase including a noun in the plural being modified by a pronoun in the singular and thus shown to be apprehended as a singular are by no means rare. Here are a few typical examples. *I myself still wonder at that six weeks of calm madness*. . . (CARY) The unity of the period of time, measured in the usual units of months, weeks, and days, is thus brought out very clearly. *Bessie, during that twenty-four hours, had spent a night with Alice and a day with Muriel*... (CARY) The unity of the space of time referred to is even more obvious in this example than in the preceding one; twenty-four hours is a commonly received unit of measurement of time (in Russian this would be expressed by a single noun — сутки). The variant *those twenty-four hours* would

¹ From the historical point of view it should be noted that these pluralia tantum may be due to Latin influence; namely, they may have been formed on the analogy of such Latin neuter plurals as *politica*, *mathematica*, etc.

be inappropriate here, as it would imply that the statement was referring to every single hour of the twenty-four taken separately.

This way of showing the unity of a certain quantity of space or time by modifying the phrase in question by a pronoun in the singular, and also (if the phrase be the subject of the sentence) by using the predicate verb in the singular, appears to be a very common thing in present-day English.

The direct opposite of *pluralia tantum* are the *singularia tantum*, i. e. the nouns which have no plural form. Among these we must first note some nouns denoting material substance, such as *milk*, *butter*, *quicksilver*, etc., and also names of abstract notions, such as *peace*, *usefulness*, *incongruity*, etc. Nouns of this kind express notions which are, strictly speaking, outside the sphere of number: e. g. *milk*, or *fluency*.¹ But in the morphological and syntactical system of the English language a noun cannot stand outside the category of number. If the noun is the subject of a sentence, the predicate verb (if it is in the present tense) will have to be either singular or plural. With the nouns just mentioned the predicate verb is always singular. This is practically the only external sign (alongside of the absence of a plural inflection in the noun itself) which definitely shows the noun to be singular.

Some nouns denoting substance, or material, may have a plural form, if they are used to denote either an object made of the material or a special kind of substance, or an object exhibiting the quality denoted by the noun. Thus, the noun *wine*, as well as the noun *milk*, denotes a certain substance, but it has a plural form *wines* used to denote several special kinds of wine. The noun *iron*, as well as the noun *quicksilver*, denotes a metal, but it may be used in the plural if it denotes several objects made of that metal (утюги). The noun *beauty*, as well as the noun *ugliness*, denotes a certain quality presented as an object, but it may be used in the plural to denote objects exhibiting that quality, e. g. *the beauties of nature*; *His daughters were all beauties*. Many more examples of a similar kind might be found. Accordingly, the nouns *wine*, *iron*, and *beauty* cannot be called *singularia tantum*, although in their chief application they no more admit of a plural form than *milk*, *quicksilver*, or *ugliness*.

Collective Nouns and Nouns of Multitude

Certain nouns denoting groups of human beings (*family*, *government*, *party*, *clergy*, etc.) and also of animals (*cattle*, *poultry*, etc.)

The question *how much?* could of course be asked with reference to milk, and the answer might be, *a bottle of milk*. This would apply to quantity, not to number. With the noun *fluency* the question *how much?* would not make sense.

can be used in two different ways: either they are taken to denote the group as a whole, and in that case they are treated as singulars, and usually termed "collective nouns" (in a restricted sense of the term); or else they are taken to denote the group as consisting of a certain number of individual human beings (or animals), and in that case they are usually termed "nouns of multitude".

The difference between the two applications of such nouns may be briefly exemplified by a pair of examples: *My family is small*, and *My family are good speakers*.¹ It is quite obvious here that in the one sentence the characteristic "small" applies to the family as a whole, while in the other sentence the characteristic "good speakers" applies to every single member of the family ("everyone of them is a good speaker" is what is meant, but certainly not "everyone of them is small"). The same consideration would also apply to such sentences as *The cattle were grazing in the field*. It is also quite possible to say, *Many cattle were grazing in the field*, where the use of *many* (not *much*) clearly shows that *cattle* is apprehended as a plural.

The following bit of dialogue is curious, as the noun *board*, which is the subject of the first sentence, is here connected with a predicate verb in the singular, but is replaced by a plural pronoun in the second sentence: "*Does the Board know of this?*" "*Yes,*" said John, "*they fully approve the scheme.*" (A. WILSON)

With the noun *people* the process seems to have gone further than with any other noun of this kind. There is, on the one hand, the noun *people*, singular, with its plural *peoples* (meaning 'nations'), and there is, on the other hand, the noun *people* apprehended as a plural (*There were fifty people in the hall*) and serving as a kind of plural to the noun *person* (*There was only one person in the hall*). *People* can of course be modified by the words *many* and *few* and by cardinal numerals (*twenty people*).

In the following sentence the word *people* is even modified by the phrase attribute *one or two*, although the numeral *one* in itself could not possibly be an attribute to the noun *people* in this sense: *One or two people looked at him curiously, but no one said anything*. (A. WILSON) Strictly speaking we might expect the phrase *one man or two people*; however, this variant does not appear to be used anywhere. The perfect possibility of the phrase *two people* appears to be sufficient ground for making the phrase *one or two people* possible as well.

Recently a peculiar view of the category of number was put forward by A. Isachenko.² According to this view, the essential

¹ We shall treat of concord of predicate verb with subject in a later chapter (see p. 175 ff).

² See A. В. Исаченко. *О грамматическом значении*. Вопросы языкознания, 1961, № 1.

meaning of the category (in nouns) is not that of quantity, but of discreteness (расчлененность). The plural, in this view, expresses fundamentally the notion of something consisting of distinguishable parts, and the meaning of quantity in the usual sense would then appear to be a result of combining the fundamental meaning of the category as such with the lexical meaning of the noun used in the plural. Thus, in *scissors* the category of plural number, which, in Isachenko's view, expresses discreteness, combines with the lexical meaning of the noun, which denotes an object consisting of two halves, whereas in *houses* the same meaning of the grammatical category combines with the lexical meaning of the noun, which denotes separate objects not coalescing together, as in the case of *scissors*. Accordingly, the resulting meaning is that of a number of separate objects, i. e. the plural number in the usual sense of the term. These views put forward by A. Isachenko throw a new light on the problem of number in nouns and certainly deserve close attention. It is yet too early to say whether they can provide a final solution to the complex problem of number in nouns.

CASE

The problem of case in Modern English nouns is one of the most vexed problems in English grammar. This can be seen from the fact that views on the subject differ widely. The most usual view is that English nouns have two cases: a common case (e. g. *father*) and a genitive (or possessive) case (e. g. *father's*). Side by side with this view there are a number of other views, which can be roughly classified into two main groups: (1) the number of cases in English is more than two, (2) there are no cases at all in English nouns.

The first of these can again be subdivided into the views that the number of cases in English nouns is three, or four, or five, or even an indefinite quantity. Among those who hold that there are no cases in English nouns there is again a variety of opinions as to the relations between the forms *father* and *father's*, etc.

Before embarking on a detailed study of the whole problem it is advisable to take a look at the essence of the notion of case. It is more than likely that part, at least, of the discussions and misunderstandings are due to a difference in the interpretation of case as a grammatical category. It seems therefore necessary to give as clear and unambiguous a definition of case as we can. Case is the category of a noun expressing relations between the thing denoted by the noun and other things, or properties, or actions, and manifested by some formal sign in the noun itself. This sign is almost always an inflection,¹ and it may also be a "zero" sign, i. e. the

¹ Occasionally, a case may be denoted by change of the root vowel; for instance, in Old English the noun *mann* 'man' had the form *menn* for its dative case.

absence of any sign may be significant as distinguishing one particular case from another. It is obvious that the minimum number of cases in a given language system is two, since the existence of two correlated elements at least is needed to establish a category. (In a similar way, to establish the category of tense in verbs, at least two tenses are needed, to establish the category of mood two moods, etc.). Thus case is part of the morphological system of a language.

Approaching the problem of case in English nouns from this angle, we will not recognise any cases expressed by non-morphological means. It will be therefore impossible to accept the theories of those who hold that case may also be expressed by prepositions (i. e. by the phrase "preposition + noun") or by word order. Such views have indeed been propounded by some scholars, mainly Germans. Thus, it is the view of Max Deutschbein¹ that Modern English nouns have four cases, viz. nominative, genitive, dative and accusative, of which the genitive can be expressed by the '-s'-inflection and by the preposition *of*, the dative by the preposition *to* and also by word order, and the accusative is distinguished from the dative by word order alone.

It should be recognised that once we admit prepositions, or word order, or indeed any non-morphological means of expressing case, the number of cases is bound to grow indefinitely. Thus, if we admit that *of the pen* is a genitive case, and *to the pen* a dative case, there would seem no reason to deny that *with the pen* is an instrumental case, *in the pen* a locative case, etc., etc. Thus the number of cases in Modern English nouns would become indefinitely large. This indeed is the conclusion Academician I. I. Meshchaninov arrived at.² That view would mean abandoning all idea of morphology and confusing forms of a word with phenomena of a completely different kind. Thus, it seems obvious that the number of cases in Modern English nouns cannot be more than two (*father* and *father's*). The latter form, *father's*, might be allowed to retain its traditional name of genitive case, while the former (*father*) may be termed common case.³ Of course it must be borne in mind that the possibility of forming the genitive is mainly limited to a certain class of English nouns, viz. those which denote living beings (*my father's room*, *George's sister*, *the dog's head*) and a few others, notably those denoting units of time (*a week's absence*, *this year's elections*), and also some substantivised adverbs (*to-day's newspaper*, *yesterday's news*, etc.).

¹ See M. Deutschbein, *System der neuenglischen Syntax*, 1928, S. 155 ff.

² See И. И. Мещанинов, *Члены предложения и части речи*, 1945, стр. 297 сл.

³ The term "common case" was first used by Henry Sweet in his book *A New English Grammar, Logical and Historical*, Part I, 1892.

It should be noted, however, that this limitation does not appear to be too strict and there even seems to be some tendency at work to use the *-s*-forms more extensively. Thus, we can come across such phrases as, *a work's popularity*, *the engine's overhaul life*,¹ which certainly are not stock phrases, like *at his fingers' ends*, or *at the water's edge*, but freely formed phrases, and they would seem to prove that it is not absolutely necessary for a noun to denote a living being in order to be capable of having an *-s*-form. The more exact limits of this possibility have yet to be made out.

The essential meaning of this case would seem to require an exact definition. The result of some recent investigations into the nature of the *-s* form² shows that its meaning is that of possessivity in a wide sense of the term. Alongside of phrases like *my father's room*, *the young man's friends*, *our master's arrival*, etc., we also find such examples as *nothing could console Mrs Birch for her daughter's loss*,³ where the implied meaning of course is, 'Mrs Birch lost her daughter'. The real relation between the notions expressed by the two nouns may thus depend on the lexical meaning of these nouns, whereas the form in *-s* merely denotes the possessive relation.

Up to now we have seen the form in *-s* as a genitive case, and in so far we have stuck to the conception of a two-case system in Modern English nouns.

There are, however, certain phenomena which give rise to doubts about the existence of such a system — doubts, that is, about the form in *-s* being a case form at all. We will now consider some of these phenomena. In the first place, there are the expressions of the type *Smith and Brown's office*. This certainly means 'the office belonging to both Smith and Brown'. Not only Brown, whose name is immediately connected with the *-s*, but also Smith, whose name stands somewhat apart from it, is included in the possessive relation. Thus we may say that the *-s* refers, not to *Brown* alone, but to the whole group *Smith and Brown*. An example of a somewhat different kind may be seen in the expression *the Chancellor of the Exchequer's speech*, or the *Oxford professor of poetry's lecture*. These expressions certainly mean, respectively, 'the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer', and 'the lecture of the Oxford professor of poetry'. Thus, the *-s* belongs to the groups *the Chancellor of the Exchequer* and *the Oxford professor of poetry*. The same of course applies to the groups *the Duke of Edinburgh's speech*, *the King of England's residence*, and many others.

¹ Quoted after R. Yezhkova (see next note).

² See notably P. В. Ежкова. *К проблеме падежа существительных в современном английском языке*. Автореферат канд. дисс., 1962.

³ Example given by M. Deutschbein, *System der neuenglischen Syntax*, S. 290.

A further step away from the category of case is taken in the groups *somebody else's child*, *nobody else's business*, etc. Here the word immediately preceding the *'s* is an adverb which could not by itself stand in the genitive case (there is an obvious difference between *somebody else's child* and, e. g., *to-day's news*, or *yesterday's paper*). The *'s* belongs here to the group *somebody else* as a whole. It cannot, then, be an inflection making an integral part of a word: it is here part of a whole phrase, and, accordingly, a syntactical, not a morphological, element.

Formations of this kind are by no means rare, especially in colloquial style. Thus, in the following sentence the *'s* is joined on to a phrase consisting of a noun and a prepositional phrase serving as attribute to it: *This girl in my class's mother took us [to the movies]* (SALINGER), which of course is equivalent to *the mother of this girl (who is) in my class*. It is only the lexical meaning of the words, and in the first place the impossibility of the phrase *my class's mother*, that makes the syntactical connection clear. Compare also: . . . *and constantly aimed to suggest a man of the world's outlook and sophistication*. . . (The Pelican Guide to English Literature)

The *'s* is still farther away from its status as an inflection in such sentences as the following: *The blonde I had been dancing with's name was Bernice something — Crabs or Krebs*. (SALINGER); *I never knew the woman who laced too tightly's name was Matheson*. (FORSTER)

This is the type usually illustrated by Sweet's famous example, *the man I saw yesterday's son*,¹ that is, the type "noun + attributive clause + *'s*".

Let us have a look at J. D. Salinger's sentence. It is obvious that the *'s* belongs to the whole group, *the blonde I had been dancing with* (it is her name he is talking about). It need hardly be emphasised that the preposition *with* cannot, by itself, be in the genitive case. Such constructions may not be frequent but they do occur and they are perfectly intelligible, which means that they fit into the pattern of the language.

All this seems to prove definitely that in the English language of to-day the *'s* can no longer be described as a case inflection in nouns without, at least, many reservations. This subject has been variously treated and interpreted by a number of scholars, both in this country and elsewhere. The following views have been put forward: (1) when the *'s* belongs to a noun it is still the genitive ending, and when it belongs to a phrase (including the phrase "noun + attributive clause") it tends to become a syntactical element, viz, a postposition; (2) since the *'s* can belong to a phrase

H. Sweet, *A New English Grammar*, Part I, pp. 318—319.

(as described above) it is no longer a case inflection even when it belongs to a single noun; (3) the *-s* when belonging to a noun, no longer expresses a case, but a new grammatical category, viz. the category of "possession", for example, the possessive form *father's* exists in contradistinction to the non-possessive form *father*. An essential argument in favour of this view is, that both the form without *-s* and the form with *-s* can perform the same syntactic functions; for instance, they can both be subject of the sentence (cf. *My father was a happy man and My father's was a happy life*). It should be noted that the views listed under (2) and (3) lead to the conclusion that there are no cases in the Modern English noun.¹ Though the question is still under discussion, and a final agreement on it may have to wait some time, we must recognise that there is much to be said in favour of this view. We will, then, conclude the discussion by saying that apparently the original case system in the English nouns, which has undergone a systematic reduction ever since the earliest times in the history of the language, is at present extinct, and the only case ending to survive in the modern language has developed into an element of a different character — possibly a particle denoting possession.

Different views have also been expressed concerning the scope of meaning of the *-s*. Besides phrases implying possession in the strict sense of the term (*my father's books*, etc.), the *-s* is also found in other contexts, such as *my father's friends*, *my father's arrival*, *my father's willingness*, etc. The question now arises how wide this scope may be. From this point of view it has been customary to point out that the relation expressed by the collocation "noun + *-s* + noun" is often a subjective relation, as in *my father's arrival*: *my father's* expresses the subject of the action, cf. *my father arrives*. This would then correspond to the so-called subjective genitive of inflected languages, such as Russian or Latin. It would, however, not do to say that the noun having the *-s* could never indicate the object of the action: cf. the example *Doughty's famous trial and execution*,² where the implied meaning of course is 'Doughty was tried and executed'. This would correspond to the so-called objective genitive of inflected languages. Now, though this particular use would seem to be far less frequent than the subjective, it is by no means impossible or anomalous. Thus it would not be correct to formulate the meaning of the *-s* in a way that would exclude the possible objective applications of the *-s*-formation.

Parallel use of the *-s*-form and the preposition *of* is seen in the following example: *In the light of this it was Lyman's belief and it is mine — that it is a mans duty and the duty of his friends to see*

¹ See on this issue: P. В. Ежкова, op. cit.

² Quoted by M. Deutschbein. *System der neuenglischen Syntax*.

to it that his exit from this world, at least, shall be made with all possible dignity. (TAYLOR)

It should also be noted in this connection that, if both the subject of an action and its object are mentioned, the former is expressed by a noun with -'s preceding the name of the action, and the latter by an of-phrase following it, as in *Coleridge's praise of Shakespeare*, etc. The same of course applies to the phrases in which the object is not a living being, as in *Einstein's theory of relativity*, or *Shakespeare's treatment of history*.

The -'s-form can also sometimes be used in a sense which may be termed qualitative. This is best illustrated by an example. The phrase *an officer's cap* can be interpreted in two different ways. For one thing, it may mean 'a cap belonging to a certain officer', and that, of course, is the usual possessive meaning (фуражка офицера). For another thing, it may mean 'a cap of the type worn by officers', and this is its qualitative meaning (the Russian equivalent for this is офицерская фуражка). Only the context will show which is meant. Here are a few examples of the qualitative meaning; it is only the context that makes this clear: if it were not for the context the usual possessive meaning might be ascribed to the form. *She perceived with all her nerves the wavering of Amanda's confidence, her child's peace of mind, and she understood how fragile it was.* (CARY) The meaning of the phrase *her child's peace of mind* is in itself ambiguous. Taken without the context, it may mean one of two things: (1) 'the peace of mind of her child' (the usual possessive meaning), or (2) 'her peace of mind, which was like a child's' (the qualitative meaning). Outside the context both interpretations would be equally justified. In the sentence as it stands in the text the surrounding words unmistakably point to the second, that is, the qualitative interpretation: the whole sentence deals only with Amanda herself, there is no question of any child of hers, so that the usual possessive meaning is not possible here. A somewhat similar expression is found in the phrase, *a small cupid's mouth*, which might mean, either the mouth of a small cupid, or a small mouth, like that of a cupid. The context also confirms that the intended meaning is the qualitative one.

A special use of the -'s-forms has also to be mentioned, which may be illustrated by such examples as, *I went to the baker's; we spent a week at our uncle's*, etc. *Yes, Mary, I was going to write to Macmillan's and suggest a biography..* (GR. GREENE)

The older view was based on the assumption that the -'s-form was an attribute to some noun supposed to be "understood", namely *I went to the baker's shop, we spent a week at our uncle's house*, etc. However, this interpretation is doubtful. It cannot be proved that a noun following the -'s-form is "understood". It seems more advisable, therefore, to take the facts for what they are and to

suppose that the *-s* is here developing into a derivative suffix, used to form a noun from another noun. This is also seen in the fact that the famous cathedral in London is very often referred to as *St. Paul's*. A historical novel by the nineteenth-century English writer W. Harrison Ainsworth bears the title "*Old St. Paul's*", and it appears to be quite impossible here to claim that this is an attribute to the noun *cathedral* which is "understood": if we were to restore the word which is supposed to be omitted, we should get *Old St. Paul's Cathedral*, where the adjective *old* would seem to modify *St. Paul*, rather than *Cathedral*, just as in any other phrase of this type: *old John's views*, *young Peter's pranks*, etc.

MUTUAL RELATIONS OF NUMBER AND CASE

In Old English, the notions of number and case were always expressed by one morpheme. Thus, in the Old English form *stana* the ending *-a* expressed simultaneously the plural number and the genitive case. That was typical of an inflected language. A change came already in Middle English, and in Modern English the two notions have been entirely separated. This is especially clear in the nouns which do not form their plural in *-s*: in the forms *men's*, *children's* number is expressed by the root vowel and the inflection *-ren*, while the *-s* expresses case alone. But this applies to nouns forming their plural in *-s* as well. E. g. in *father's* the *-s* expresses possessivity, whereas the notion of singular has no material expression. In the plural *fathers'* the *-s* expresses the plural number, whereas the notion of possessivity has no material expression in pronunciation (in the written language it is expressed by the apostrophe standing after the *-s*). In spoken English the two forms may of course be confused. Thus, in the phrase [ðə 'boiz 'buks] it is impossible to tell whether one or more boys are meant (in written English these variants would be distinguished by the place of the apostrophe: *the boy's books* as against *the boys' books*), unless the context gives a clue. Thus, in [mai 'mAðəz ə'pinjən] it is obvious that *my mother's* (singular) is meant, whereas in [auə 'mAðəz ə'pinjənz] the meaning is doubtful (*our mother's* or *our mothers'?*). It is natural, therefore, that ambiguity is better avoided by using the *of*-phrase instead of the possessive, e. g. *the opinions of our mothers*, etc.

Another view of the case system in English nouns must also be mentioned here, namely the view that we should distinguish between a nominative and an objective case, though there is no difference between the two in any English noun.¹ Such a differen-

¹ See, for example, M. Bryant, *A Functional English Grammar*, 1945; see also Н. Ф. Иртенъева, *Грамматика современного английского языка*, 1956, стр. 42.

tiation could only be based on the fact that personal pronouns (*I, he, she, we, they*) and the pronoun *who* have different forms for these cases (*I — me, etc.*). If, therefore, we start on the assumption that the system of cases is bound to be the same in these pronouns and in all nouns, we shall be led to acknowledge the two cases in nouns. However, there would seem to be no necessity to endorse this view. It is probably more advisable to consider the case system of nouns without taking into account that of the personal pronouns.

THE ARTICLE

The article presents the student with one of the most difficult and intricate problems of language structure. Although a great number of philologists have treated the article both in English and in other languages, it will be only fair to say that even the most essential points concerning the theory of the articles still remain doubtful.

In embarking now on a study of the Modern English article, we should first of all eliminate those problems which are of no real scientific interest, though they have been occasionally discussed. Thus, we will not dwell on the problem whether the article is a separate part of speech, since neither an affirmative nor a negative answer would in any way affect the really relevant questions concerning the article. We have not included the article in our list of parts of speech; but this should not be taken to mean that it cannot be included in that list. The problem is irrelevant.

Another problem, which, though not irrelevant, appears to have been frequently misstated, is this: is the article a word or a morpheme? It has been solved in different ways by different authors. There would always be some argument in favour of the article being a separate word, and some argument to show that it was a morpheme.¹ This kind of approach, however, does not seem to be the right one. It would mean that we start examining the article, a very peculiar phenomenon, with ready-made notions of what a word and what a morpheme is. Instead we should first study the article as it actually exists and functions in the language, and only then see whether it will fit into any ready-made category. It may well happen that it will not; then we shall have to face the situation and take it for what it is worth.

With respect to the article we must state, in the first place, that there are languages which have no article. Besides Russian and most other Slavonic languages, the Latin language belongs here. Ancient Greek had only one article — the definite one. Many languages (Italian, Spanish, German, Swedish, etc.) have two articles — the definite and the indefinite. As far as its form is concerned, the article is usually a separate unit which may be divided from its noun by other words, chiefly adjectives. However, in certain languages the article may also be a morpheme attached to the noun as a kind of suffix.

¹ This applies to Modern English. In speaking of the German language, it would be impossible to assert that the article was a morpheme, since it is declined and, therefore, every form of it consists of two morphemes, e.g. genitive singular neuter *d-es*, as distinguished from the nominative and accusative *d-as*.

This is the case, for instance, in Bulgarian, where we find such formations as *селото* 'the village', *линията* 'the line', etc. The same may be said of Rumanian, e. g. *universul* 'the universe', *curentul* 'the courier', etc., where *-l* is the definite article corresponding etymologically to French *le*, Latin *ille*. A suffix article is also found in Swedish; compare, e. g., *dag* 'day', *dagen* 'the day'; *rum* 'room', *rummet* 'the room'. Alongside of this suffix article Swedish also has an article separate from the noun, as in *den* 'the'. The fact that a suffix article exists in several languages must of course be taken into consideration in a general theory of the article.

NUMBER AND MEANING OF ARTICLES

It has been a long debated question how many articles there are in English. Obviously there are only two material articles, the definite article *the* and the indefinite article *a* (*an*). The distinction thus is between, for instance, *the language* and *a language*. However, the noun *language*, and indeed many other nouns, are also used without any article, as in the sentence *Language is a means of communication*. It is obvious that the absence of the article in this sentence is in itself a means of showing that "language in general", and not any specific language (such as English, or French, etc.), is meant. Hence we may say that there are three variants: (1) *the language*, (2) *a language*, (3) *language*. Now the question arises, how this third variant is to be treated. The older grammatical tradition described it as "omission of the article", which is obviously inadequate, since there is not the slightest reason to believe that the article in such cases was ever "omitted". Another view is that we should describe this as "absence of the article", and sometimes this notion is made more precise and the phenomenon is called "meaningful absence of article".¹ A third view, which has been gaining ground lately, is that the very absence of the article is a special kind of article, which is then termed "zero article". According to this view, then, there would be three articles in English: definite, indefinite, and zero.

This idea of a zero article takes its origin in the notion of "zero morpheme", which has been applied to certain forms in inflected languages, — namely to forms having no ending and differing by this very absence from other forms of the same word, which have each their individual ending. A case in point in Russian is the genitive plural of some nouns (chiefly of the feminine gender), e. g. *рук*, which is characterised as a special form by the absence of any ending, as distinct from nominative singular *рука*, genitive singu-

¹ See, for example, Т. Н. Сергеева, *О значащем отсутствии артикля перед именами существительными в современном английском языке*. Иностранные языки в школе, 1953, № 1.

lar руки, dative plural рукам, etc. The notion of "zero morpheme" may also be applied in English, for instance, to the singular form of nouns (*room*) as distinct from the plural form with its *-s*-inflection. If, therefore, we were to interpret the article as a morpheme, the idea of a zero article would make no difficulty. If, on the other hand, we take the article to be a word, the idea of a "zero word" would entail some difficulty. It has been pointed out that the notion of a "zero copula" has been applied to such Russian sentences as он здоров, where there is no verb. In this sentence the present tense is implied as distinct from он был здоров and он будет здоров, where the past or future tense is expressed by a form of the verb быть. However, in this case it is not a "zero copula", but a "zero form" of the copula быть. We might thus formulate the following tense system of this copula: present tense — "zero", past tense был, future tense будет. So even in this particular case the notion of a "zero word" seems very doubtful. Still more doubtful is the notion "zero" with reference to the English article, if the article is a word. We will therefore proceed on the assumption that the notion "zero article" is only possible if the article is not a word.

The two main views of the article are, then, these: (1) The article is a word (possibly a separate part of speech) and the collocation "article + noun" is a phrase (if of a peculiar kind). (2) The article is a form element in the system of the noun; it is thus a kind of morpheme, or if a word, an auxiliary word of the same kind as the auxiliary verbs. In that case the phrase "article + noun" is a morphological formation similar to the formation "auxiliary verb + .+ infinitive or participle", which is an analytical form of the verb.¹

Now, the very fact that two such widely divergent views of the article are possible shows that there are some quite peculiar difficulties here. Besides those already mentioned, there is the problem of the meaning of each article: we must find out whether it has one or several meanings, each of them appearing in a different context.

We can illustrate this problem by comparing, for example, the two sentences: (1) *The dog has come home* and (2) *The dog is a domestic animal*. Of course it is at once obvious that *the dog* in the former sentence means one individual dog, whereas *the dog* in the latter sentence means the dog in general, as a zoological species. The question, then, is whether the article itself has two distinct meanings (if so, the second of these is termed "the generic article") or whether the meaning of the article is the same in both

¹ This view of the article has of late been emphatically stated once more. See Т. В. Строева и Л. Р. Зиндер, *Грамматическая категория соотносительности имени существительного в немецком языке*. Проблемы языкознания. Учёные записки ЛГУ им. А. А. Жданова, Серия филол. наук, вып. 60. 1961, стр. 218—232.

sentences, and the difference in meaning between them depends on some other factor.

If we endorse the first view, we shall say that the definite article has at least two distinct meanings, viz. (1) it means that an object is singled out from all objects of the same class, (2) it means that the whole class of objects, as distinct from other classes, is referred to.

If we endorse the second view, we shall say that the definite article has one meaning only, viz. that of something singled out from other entities. Now, whether the essence thus singled out is a separate object or a whole class depends not on the article at all but on the other elements in the sentence, usually on the predicate.

Reverting to the two sentences, (i) *The dog has come home* and (2) *The dog is a domestic animal*, we shall see that each of the predicates has several peculiarities which influence the meaning of the sentence one way or another. Let us analyse each of these. First, the grammatical peculiarities. In (1) the predicate is a verb in the present perfect tense, in (2) it is a group "link verb + predicative", and the link verb is in the present tense. That of course would not in itself be sufficient to show the different meanings of the sentences, but it does give a certain indication this way: the verb in the present perfect tense is more likely than not to express a concrete action (i. e. one that has taken place once), while the group "link verb in the present tense + predicative" is very likely to express some general characteristic.

Now, these grammatical points are supplemented by some lexical points, which make the difference quite clear. In (1) the verb *come* and the adverb *home* denote a concrete physical action and the place to which it is directed, while in (2) the predicative *a domestic animal*¹ denotes a zoological idea and thus proves that by *the dog* is meant not an individual dog but the whole species. According to this view, then, the meaning of the definite article itself is the same in both sentences, and the difference proceeds from the peculiarities of the predicates and the words expressing them.

Which of the two views is the more convincing one? Both views seem to be defensible, and the decision will have to be made on the ground of some guiding principle.

Such a principle may be that of the invariable, i. e. of a stable element in the meaning of a word preserved throughout all the changes and combinations in which the word may be found. This principle of the invariable has been recently very forcefully defended by A. Isachenko in his paper on grammatical meaning.² The

¹ We will not dwell here on the syntactic problem concerning the place of the attribute *domestic* within the predicative phrase. This will be considered in Chapter XXVIII (see p. 223).

² See A. В. Исаченко, *О грамматическом значении*. Вопросы языкознания. 1961, № 1.

principle may be briefly formulated in this way: "State an invariable wherever possible," or negatively in this way: "Do not state differences wherever this is not strictly necessary." In short, the principle amounts to this. Whenever a word, or a word-form, appears to have different meanings in different contexts, look for that element of its meaning which is always there and does not depend on any context: that is the invariable. If we adhere to this view (as it appears we should) we will say that there is no difference in the meaning of the definite article between the sentences *The dog has come home* and *The dog is a domestic animal*; the difference proceeds from other sources, as we have explained above. It is obvious, however, that not everybody will accept the principle of the invariable, and for those who will not do so, the question of the meaning of the definite article will appear in a different light. The same may be said about the indefinite article. If we compare the two sentences, (1) *There is a hill behind our house*, and (2) *A hill is the opposite of a valley*,¹ the question will arise, whether the indefinite article with the noun *hill* has different meanings in the two sentences. If we think it has, we shall say that in

(1) it serves to denote an individual object, without reference to its individual peculiarities, and in (2) any object of a given class. If, on the other hand, we endorse the principle of the invariable, the article will be said to have the same meaning of indefiniteness in both sentences, and the difference in meaning will have to be sought elsewhere. We shall first of all note the different types of predicate in the two sentences. In (1) we have the predicate *there is*,² in (2) the group "link verb + predicative", and the predicative is a noun. There is, besides, an adverbial modifier in (1) and an object in (2). From the lexical point of view, it is important to note that in (1) we find three words with a meaning pointing to a concrete situation, viz. *behind*, denoting a relation in space, *house*, and especially *our*. In (2), on the other hand, there is the group *the opposite of a valley*, which expresses some general notion, not restricted to any concrete position in space or time. The indefinite article before *valley* is of course quite parallel to that before *hill*, and they are bound to be used in quite the same way. All these peculiarities in

(2) point to the sentence having a general meaning, i. e. expressing a definition. Such, then, are the factors on which the general meaning of each sentence and the use of the indefinite article depend. Taking this line, then, we should say that the invariable in the indefinite article is its meaning of taking an object without its

¹ Example given by H. Sweet (*A New English Grammar*, Part II, § 2044).

² we need not discuss here the various problems connected with the expression *there is*.

individual peculiarities. Whether the noun used with this article is used to denote "a certain hill" or "any hill", is outside the meaning of the article itself, and depends on a series of different factors, which we have tried to point out. It must be emphasised, of course, that if the principle of the invariable is not accepted the result of the analysis will be different.

In coming now to the difference in meaning between the definite and the indefinite article, we should start by comparing two sentences which are exactly alike in everything except that one has the definite article where the other has the indefinite. We ought to find several pairs of this kind, and then try to get at the essence of the difference between them. So let us take these two, in the first place: *Give me a newspaper, please!* and *Give me the newspaper, please!* Here the difference is obvious: the one sentence means, 'Give me some newspaper, no matter which', and the other means, 'Give me that particular newspaper that you are reading at the moment, or the one that is lying on the table, or the one that you had in your hand as you came in', etc., depending on the situation. Of course many similar pairs of sentences might be found. Here, then, the difference is that between "individual object with its own characteristics", and "some object belonging to that particular class of objects". This may indeed be called the difference between definite and indefinite in the usual sense of the words.

However, this distinction will not apply to all cases and we must proceed to look at the sentences where the line of distinction is of another kind. Let us now take these two sentences, *The door opened, and the young man came in,* and *The door opened, and a young man came in.* We need not deny that at the bottom of this distinction there is one between "definite" and "indefinite"; however, another element has come in here, which may be briefly described like this. We can only say *The door opened, and the young man came in,* if we knew in advance that the person standing, say, in the corridor was a young man; if there was a knock at the door, and we did not know who had knocked, and we said, "Come in," we can only say, *The door opened, and a young man came in,* which might be made more explicit in the following way, *...and the person who came in proved to be a young man* (implying, not an old man, not a young girl, etc.). Thus the fact that it was a young man would be new, it would be the central point of the sentence. Coming back now to the sentence with the definite article, we can say that its meaning is approximately this, *The door opened, and the young man (did not stay out but) came in!* Here, then, the central point would be that he came in.¹ Now, this element of the sentence which

¹ In Russian, this difference would be expressed by word order. Compare *Дверь открылась, и молодой человек вошел* and *Дверь открылась, и вошел молодой человек.*

is the central point may be said to correspond to the semantic predicate, or the rheme.¹ Then the indefinite article, as opposed to the definite article in sentences of this kind, would be a means of expressing the semantic predicate of the sentence. How should we then define its meaning? To use the simplest words possible, we might say that the indefinite article expresses what is new, and the definite article expresses what is known already, or at least what is not presented as new. This opposition would then be superimposed on that between definite and indefinite.

To make the point quite clear, let us consider two more sentences. Let us assume that we are speaking about what happened in a classroom during a lesson: *The door opened and a teacher came in.* — *The door opened and the headmaster came in.* In both cases we did not know in advance who was coming, we only learnt it when the door opened. We would then say, *...a teacher came in*, but not *...a headmaster came in*. How are we to account for the difference? Obviously the reason is this. There are many teachers in a school, but only one headmaster. Therefore the sentence *The door opened, and a headmaster came in* would have no reasonable sense. Apparently, the idea of definiteness (there being only one headmaster in every school) takes the upper hand and the idea of newness is not expressed at all. Thus, the sentence *The headmaster came in*, which in this case corresponds to the Russian *вошел директор*, might, in another context, correspond to the Russian *директор вошел*: in that case *came in*, and not *the headmaster*, would be the semantic predicate.

Let us now see in what relation the absence of the article stands to the meanings of the definite and the indefinite article.

When we consider the absence of the article, we have to distinguish between the singular and the plural number. Broadly speaking, the absence of the article with a noun in the plural corresponds to the indefinite article with that noun in the singular, whereas the absence of the article with a noun in the singular stands apart and does not correspond to anything in the plural.²

We will first consider the absence of the article with a noun in the singular and start with nouns which can equally be used with the definite and the indefinite article and without any article. One of these is the noun *language*. We take three sentences: *Language is a means of communication. English is the foreign language I know best. Everyone must study a foreign language.* The difference here is obvious enough. *Language* without article does not refer to any one language (Russian, English, German, etc.) but to the general

¹ This question will be dealt with at some length in Chapter XXV.

² As to the first part of this statement, it should be added that the pronouns *some* and *any* may also correspond in the plural to the indefinite article in the singular.

idea of that means of communication. Compare also the following three sentences: *He has eaten the egg. He has eaten an egg. He has egg on his sleeve.* In the latter sentence, what is meant is not a "unit", an oval-shaped hen's egg, but some "material", which happens to have stuck to his sleeve. Similar observations might be made on a number of other nouns.

From this we may also draw some conclusions about nouns which cannot be used with the indefinite article. Compare: *Water boils at 100° centigrade* and *The water is boiling*; *Snow is white* and *The snow has melted.* In each of these pairs, the first sentence expresses a general truth, without reference to any particular occasion, while the second expresses a concrete occurrence at a certain moment (this is seen from the form of the verb used in each case). The noun *water* without any article is the name of the substance in general, whereas with the article it denotes a certain quantity of that substance found at a certain concrete place. The same of course applies to the noun *snow*. The indefinite article is not possible with these nouns.

The absence of the article with a noun in the plural, as we have said, corresponds to a certain extent to the indefinite article with the noun in the singular. However, this is far from being always the case. This may be shown by some very simple examples. If we take, for instance, the sentence *I have read a novel by Thackeray* and if we want to change it in such a way as to show that more than one novel is meant we will of course say *I have read some novels by Thackeray*, i. e. we shall have to use the word *some*, and not merely drop the article. Though the word *some* is not an article, it does come close in meaning to the indefinite article in one of its uses.

The absence of the article with a noun in the plural is the only possibility in sentences expressing general statements, such as, *Dogs are domestic animals*, or *Goose quills were in common use formerly.* The article is also absent in such sentences as, *Pencils, pens, and sheets of paper were strewn all over the table*, where indefinitely large quantities are meant.

Such would seem to be the main factors determining the use of the definite or indefinite article and the absence of the article. They do not cover all possible cases, and a considerable number of examples will be found to be outside the sphere of the grammatical system and to be due to occasional causes which sometimes remain obscure. To give only a few examples, if a noun is modified by the adjective *wrong* meaning 'not the one needed', the definite article is always used with it, as in *I took the wrong bus*, or *He walked in the wrong direction.* The underlying idea seems to be that there were two alternatives, the one right, and the other wrong, and the wrong one happened to be chosen. This, however, is not quite

convincing, since, for example, in the case of buses, there often would be more than one bus line which might prove "wrong". Such peculiar cases do not easily fit into any system.

Another peculiar case is that of the absence of the article with nouns used in pairs. A typical example is the sentence *In the quiet, quaintly-named streets, in town-mead and market place, in the lord's mill beside the stream, in the bell that swung out its summons to the crowded borough-mote, in merchant-gild and church-gild and craft-gild, lay the life of Englishmen who were doing more than knight and baron to make England what she is . . .* (J. R. GREEN) No article is found here either with the noun *knight* or with the noun *baron*. If only one of these nouns had been used, the article could not possibly be absent. This also applies to the other nouns in this sentence, and this usage may be found elsewhere. It appears to be strictly literary.

There are many other special cases defying grammatical analysis, such as the use of the definite article with certain geographical names, etc.

Having considered the main meanings of the articles and the main factors determining their use, we will now look into the question of the essence of the article and its place in the English language.

The question arises whether the group "article + noun" can be a form of the noun in the same way as, for example, the group *will speak* is a form of the verb *speak*. If we were to take that view, some nouns would have three forms, two of them analytical, e. g. *room, the room, a room*; while other nouns would have two forms, one of them analytical, e. g. *water, the water*, etc. It must be said that the problem is hard to solve, as unmistakable objective criteria are missing. There seems to be nothing to prevent us from thinking that *a room* is an analytical form of the noun *room*, and there seems to be nothing to compel us to think so. If we endorse the view that the group "article + noun" is an analytical form of the noun we shall have to set up a grammatical category in the noun which is expressed by one or the other article or by its absence. That category might be called determination. In that case we could also find a "zero article". If, on the other hand, we stick to the view that the group "article + noun" is not an analytical form of the noun and the group is a peculiar type of phrase, no "zero article" is possible, and the meanings of each of the two articles (definite and indefinite) are to be taken as individual meanings of words. The choice between the two alternatives remains a matter of opinion, rather than admitting of a binding conclusion. On the whole the second view (denying the analytical forms of nouns) seems preferable, but we cannot, for the time being at least, prove that it is the only correct view of the English article.

Chapter V

THE ADJECTIVE

There is not much to be said about the English adjective from the morphological point of view. As is well known, it has neither number, nor case, nor gender distinctions. Some adjectives have, however, degrees of comparison, which make part of the morphological system of a language. Thus, the English adjective differs materially not only from such highly inflected languages as Russian, Latin, and German, where the adjectives have a rather complicated system of forms, but even from Modern French, which has preserved number and gender distinctions to the present day (cf. masculine singular *grand*, masculine plural *grands*, feminine singular *grande*, feminine plural *grandes* 'large').

By what signs do we, then, recognise an adjective as such in Modern English? In most cases this can be done only by taking into account semantic and syntactical phenomena. But in some cases, that is, for certain adjectives, derivative suffixes are significant, too. Among these are the suffix *-less* (as in *useless*), the suffix *-like* (as in *ghostlike*), and a few others. Occasionally, however, though a suffix often appears in adjectives, it cannot be taken as a certain proof of the word being an adjective, because the suffix may also make part of a word belonging to another part of speech. Thus, the suffix *-ful* would seem to be typically adjectival, as is its antonym *-less*. In fact we find the suffix *-ful* in adjectives often enough, as in *beautiful*, *useful*, *purposeful*, *meaningful*, etc. But alongside of these we also find *spoonful*, *mouthful*, *handful*, etc., which are nouns.

On the whole, the number of adjectives which can be recognised as such by their suffix seems to be insignificant as compared with the mass of English adjectives.

The only morphological problem concerning adjectives is, then, that of degrees of comparison.

DEGREES OF COMPARISON

The first question which arises here is, how many degrees of comparison has the English adjective (and, for that matter, the adjective in other languages, such as Russian, Latin, or German)? If we take, for example, the three forms of an English adjective: *large*, *larger*, *(the) largest*, shall we say that they are, all three of them, degrees of comparison? In that case we ought to term them positive, comparative, and superlative. Or shall we say that only the latter two are degrees of comparison (comparative and superlative), whereas the first (*large*), does not express any idea of comparison and is therefore not a degree of comparison at all? Both views have found their advocates in grammatical theory. Now, if we define a

degree of comparison as a form expressing comparison of one object or objects with another in respect of a certain property, it would seem that the first of the three forms (*large*) should not be included, as it does not express any comparison. Then we should have only two degrees of comparison *larger*, (*the*) *largest*, and a form standing apart, coinciding with the stem from which the degrees of comparison are formed, and which may be described as the basic form.

However, in a very few adjectives the basic form differs from the stem in sound. This difference is of some importance, though it is not reflected in the spelling.

This applies to two adjectives in *-ng*, namely *long* and *young*; their stems are [lɒŋ-] and [jʌŋg-] and the degrees of comparison formed from these stems are, *longer* ['lɒŋgə], *longest* ['lɒŋgɪst] and *younger* [jʌŋgə], *youngest* ['jʌŋgɪst]. The basic forms, on the other hand, are *long* [lɒŋ] and *young* [jʌŋ], without the final [-g] which is impossible after [-ŋ] in modern literary English.¹

A somewhat similar phenomenon is found in adjectives ending in *-r* or *-re*, such as *poor*, *pure*, *rare*, *sure*. Their stems are [pʊər-], [pjuər-], [rɛər-], [Suər-] and the suffixes of the degrees of comparison are added on to these stems, whereas the basic form loses its final [-r], unless it is followed without pause by a word beginning with a vowel, as in the phrases *poor idea*, *rare image*, and the like.

Now it is well known that not every adjective has degrees of comparison. This may depend on two factors. One of these is not grammatical, but semantic. Since degrees of comparison express a difference of degree in the same property, only those adjectives admit of degrees of comparison which denote properties capable of appearing in different degrees. Thus, it is obvious that, for example, the adjective *middle* has no degrees of comparison. The same might be said about many other adjectives, such as *blind*, *deaf*, *dead*, etc. However, this should not be taken too absolutely. Occasionally we may meet with such a sentence as this: *You cannot be deader than dead*. In a novel by E. Hemingway the hero compares the ways one and the same word sounds in different languages: *Take dead, mort, muerto, and todt. Todt was the deadeast of them all*. But as a rule adjectives having such meanings do not appear in forms of comparison.²

¹ In some dialects (more especially in the North) final [g] may be pronounced after [ŋ].

² It is sometimes stated that qualitative adjectives form degrees of comparison, whereas relative adjectives (such as *wooden*, *woollen*, *Asian*, *oriental*) do not. But the division of adjectives into qualitative and relative is not grammatical but a semantic division, and some qualitative adjectives have no degrees of comparison either, e.g. *perfect*, *main*, etc.

A more complex problem in the sphere of degrees of comparison is that of the formations *more difficult*, *(the) most difficult*, or *more beautiful*, *(the) most beautiful*. The question is this: is *more difficult* an analytical comparative degree of the adjective *difficult*? In that case the word *more* would be an auxiliary word serving to make up that analytical form, and the phrase would belong to the sphere of morphology. Or is *more difficult* a free phrase, not different in its essential character from the phrase *very difficult* or *somewhat difficult*? In that case the adjective *difficult* would have no degrees of comparison at all (forming degrees of comparison of this adjective by means of the inflections *-er*, *-est* is impossible), and the whole phrase would be a syntactical formation. The traditional view held both by practical and theoretical grammars until recently was that phrases of this type were analytical degrees of comparison. Recently, however, the view has been put forward that they do not essentially differ from phrases of the type *very difficult*, which, of course, nobody would think of treating as analytical forms.

Let us examine the arguments that have been or may be put forward in favour of one and the other view.

The view that formations of the type *more difficult* are analytical degrees of comparison may be supported by the following considerations: (1) The actual meaning of formations like *more difficult*, *(the) most difficult* does not differ from that of the degrees of comparison *larger*, *(the) largest*. (2) Qualitative adjectives, like *difficult*, express properties which may be present in different degrees, and therefore they are bound to have degrees of comparison.

The argument against such formations being analytical degrees of comparison would run roughly like this. No formation should be interpreted as an analytical form unless there are compelling reasons for it, and if there are considerations contradicting such a view. Now, in this particular case there are such considerations: (1) The words *more* and *most* have the same meaning in these phrases as in other phrases in which they may appear, e. g. *more time*, *most people*, etc. (2) Alongside of the phrases *more difficult*, *(the) most difficult* there are also the phrases *less difficult*, *(the) least difficult*, and there seems to be no sufficient reason for treating the two sets of phrases in different ways, saying that *more difficult* is an analytical form, while *less difficult* is not. Besides, the very fact that *more* and *less*, *(the) most* and *(the) least* can equally well combine with *difficult*, would seem to show that they are free phrases and none of them is an analytical form. The fact that *more difficult* stands in the same sense relation to *difficult* as *larger* to *large* is of course certain, but it should have no impact on the interpretation of the phrases *more difficult*, *(the) most difficult* from a grammatical viewpoint.

Taking now a general view of both lines of argument, we can say that, roughly speaking, considerations of meaning tend towards recognising such formations as analytical forms, whereas strictly grammatical considerations lead to the contrary view. It must be left to every student to decide what the way out of this dilemma should be. It seems, on the whole, that the tendency towards making linguistics something like an exact science which we are witnessing to-day should make us prefer the second view, based on strictly grammatical criteria.

If that view is adopted the sphere of adjectives having degrees of comparison in Modern English will be very limited: besides the limitations imposed by the meaning of the adjectives (as shown above), there will be the limitation depending on the ability of an adjective to take the suffixes *-er* and *-est*.¹

A few adjectives do not, as is well known, form any degrees of comparison by means of inflections. Their degrees of comparison are derived from a different root. These are *good*, *better*, *best*; *bad*, *worse*, *worst*, and a few more. Should these formations be acknowledged as suppletive forms of the adjectives *good*, *bad*, etc., or should they not? There seems no valid reason for denying them that status. The relation *good: better = large: larger* is indeed of the same kind as the relation *go: went = live: lived*, where nobody has expressed any doubt about *went* being a suppletive past tense form of the verb *go*. Thus, it is clear enough that there is every reason to take *better*, *worse*, etc., as suppletive degrees of comparison to the corresponding adjectives.

The Definite Article with the Superlative

When giving above the forms of the superlative degree we always added the definite article in parentheses. We did so because it remains somewhat doubtful whether the article belongs to the noun defined by the adjective in the superlative degree, or whether it makes part and parcel of the superlative form itself. To find an answer to this question, it is, apparently, necessary to know whether the definite article is ever used with a superlative form where it cannot be said to belong to a noun. Some examples, rare though they are, go some way to prove that the definite article can at least be said to have a tendency to become an appendix of the superlative form itself, rather than of the noun to which the adjective in the superlative degree is an attribute.

¹ We will not discuss here the question of what adjectives can take these suffixes, since we could not add anything to what is common knowledge.

This appears to be quite incontrovertible in the few cases where the definite article is joined to the superlative form of an adverb, so that there is no noun to which it might, directly or indirectly, be said to belong. Here is an example from a nineteenth century novel: *The world hears most of the former, and talks of them the most, but I doubt whether the latter are not the more numerous.* (TROLLOPE) There are two phrases including a superlative form here, namely, *hears most of the former*, and *talks of them the most*. While there might be some doubt about the grammatical status of the first *most* (whether it is rather an object, that is, a substantivised adjective, or an adverbial modifier, that is, an adverb), the second *most* gives rise to no such doubts: the verb *talk* cannot take any object of that kind. So *the most* is bound to be an adverb and in any case there is no noun whatever to which the article might be attached. So we must draw the conclusion that the definite article has here become an integral part of the adverb's superlative form. Such instances are rare, but they do at least show that there is a tendency for the article to become an integral part of the superlative form, whether of an adjective or of an adverb.

Special Meanings of the Superlative

The basic meaning of the superlative is that of a degree of a property surpassing all the other objects mentioned or implied.

However, there are cases when the meaning is different and merely a very high degree of a property is meant, without any comparison with other objects possessing that property. Thus, in the sentence *It is with the greatest pleasure that we learn of...* the phrase *the greatest pleasure* does not mean that that particular pleasure was greater than all other pleasures, but merely that it was very great. The same may be said of the sentence *In Brown's room was the greatest disorder* and of other sentences of this kind. This meaning of the form is usually described as the elative.¹ It can be recognised as such only owing to the context, and it seems to have (in some cases, at least) a peculiar stylistic colouring, being essentially uncolloquial.

The forms of the superlative degree are never used with the indefinite article. The phrase "*most* + adjective", on the other hand, may be used with the indefinite article and expresses in that case a very high degree of a property, without implying any comparison, e. g. *a most satisfactory result*. The meaning of the phrase is thus the same as that of the superlative degree in its elative application.

¹ A similar phenomenon is also found in other languages, for instance in Russian: с величайшим удовольствием; философ, величайшего ума человек (ЧЕХОВ), etc.

The possibility of using the phrase "*most + adjective*" with the indefinite article seems to be an additional argument in favour of the view that this is not an analytical form of the superlative but just a free phrase.

SUBSTANTIVISATION OF ADJECTIVES

It is common knowledge that adjectives can, under certain circumstances, be substantivised, i. e. become nouns. This is a phenomenon found in many languages, e. g. in Russian: compare *ученый человек* and *ученый*; *рабочий стаж* and *рабочий*. In German, compare *ein gelehrter Mann* and *ein Gelehrter*; in French, *un homme savant* and *un savant*, etc. The phenomenon is also frequent enough in English. The questions which arise in this connection are: (a) what criteria should be applied to find out if an adjective is substantivised or not? (b) is a substantivised adjective a noun, or is it not?

As to the first question, we should recollect the characteristic features of nouns in Modern English and then see if a substantivised adjective has acquired them or not. These features are, (1) ability to form a plural, (2) ability to have a form in *-s* if a living being is denoted, (3) ability to be modified by an adjective, (4) performing the function of subject or object in a sentence. If, from this point of view, we approach, for example, the word *native*, we shall find that it possesses all those peculiarities, e. g. *the natives of Australia*, *a young native*, etc.

The same may be said about the word *relative* (meaning a person standing in some degree of relationship to another): *my relatives*, *a close relative*, etc. A considerable number of other examples might be given. There is therefore every reason to assert that *native* and *relative* are nouns when so used, and indeed we need not call them substantivised adjectives. Thus the second of the above questions would also be answered.

Things, are, however, not always as clear as that. A familiar example of a different kind is the word *rich*. It certainly is substantivised, as will be seen, for example, in the title of a novel by C. P. Snow, "*The Conscience of the Rich*". It is obvious, however, that this word differs from the words *native* and *relative* in some important points: (1) it does not form a plural, (2) it cannot be used in the singular and with the indefinite article, (3) it has no possessive form. Since it does not possess all the characteristics of nouns but merely some of them, it will be right to say that it is only partly substantivised. The word *rich* in such contexts as those given above stands somewhere between an adjective and a noun.

The same may be said of *the poor*, *the English*, *the Chinese*, also *the wounded*, *the accused* (which were originally participles), and

a number of other words. We might even think of establishing a separate part of speech, intermediate between nouns and adjectives, and state its characteristic features as we have done for parts of speech in general. However, there would appear to be no need to do so. We shall therefore confine ourselves to the statement that these words are partly substantivised and occupy an intermediate position.

Sometimes the result of substantivisation is an abstract noun, as in the following examples: *The desire for a more inward light had found expression at last, the unseen had impacted on the seen.* (FORSTER) *Her mind was focused on the invisible.* (Idem) Nouns of this type certainly have no plural form.

ADJECTIVISATION OF NOUNS

There is also the question of the opposite phenomenon — that of nouns becoming adjectives. For a variety of reasons, this question presents a number of difficulties and has, accordingly, given rise to prolonged and inconclusive discussions. The facts are, briefly stated, these. In Modern English a noun may stand before another noun and modify it. Witness numerous formations of the type *stone wall, speech sound, peace talks, steel works, the Rome treaty*, etc. The question, as usually asked, is, whether the first component of such phrases is a noun or whether it has been adjectivised, i. e. become an adjective.¹ Different views have been put forward here. The view that the first element of such phrases as *stone wall* is a noun has been defended by H. Sweet² and others, the view that it is an adjective or at least approaches the adjective state, by O. Jespersen³ and others, and finally the view has also been expressed that this element is neither a noun nor an adjective but a separate part of speech, viz. an attributive noun.⁴ The very variety of opinions on the subject shows that the problem is one of considerable difficulty.

We shall become aware of that peculiar difficulty if we attempt to apply here the criteria serving to distinguish a noun from an adjective. It must be stated at once, though, that one criterion, namely that of degrees of comparison, is useless here. The first element of those phrases is indeed unable to form degrees of comparison, but that in itself does not prove that the element is not

¹ Another question concerning these formations is whether they are phrases or compound nouns. We will not go into this question here.

² H. Sweet, *A New English Grammar*, Part I, § 173.

³ O. Jespersen, *A Modern English Grammar*, Part II, p. 310 ff.

⁴ See Э. П. Шубин, *Атрибутивные имена в языке Шекспира и их генезис*. Ученые записки Пятигорского Гос. Педагогического Института т. 14, 1957.

an adjective, since many adjectives, e. g. *wooden*, *woollen*, *European*, do not form degrees of comparison either.

The criteria to be applied here are the following: (1) Has the first element of those phrases number distinctions? (2) Is it able in the cases when it denotes a human being to have a possessive form? (3) Does it denote a substance or a property? Strangely enough all these questions are very hard to answer. As to (1), it must be stated that the first element usually appears only in one number form, which is either singular or plural, e. g. *stone wall*, not *stones wall*; *house fronts*, not *houses fronts*; *goods van*, not *good van*, etc. However, that observation leads us nowhere. It is quite possible to argue that the first element is a noun, capable of number distinctions, but always appearing in a definite number form when making part of that phrase. So the application of criterion (1) proves to be inconclusive. As to criterion (2), we also run into difficulties. If, for example, we take the phrase *the Einstein theory* and ask whether the first element can take the possessive form, we shall have to concede that of course it can; thus the phrase *Einstein's theory* is quite possible, and indeed, it occurs in actual texts. However, those who hold that it is not a noun, but either an adjective or an attributive noun (meaning a special part of speech) argue that the word in the phrase *the Einstein theory* is not the same word as in the phrase *Einstein's theory* and that the word in the first of these groups is incapable of taking a possessive form. Thus, it appears to be impossible to come to a definite conclusion on the basis of this criterion. Now we proceed to criterion (3). How are we to decide whether the word *Einstein* in the former group denotes a substance or a property? There seems to be no perfectly convincing argument either way. We might say that it denotes a substance but this substance only serves to characterise the property of the thing denoted by the noun.

Thus, we reach the conclusion that no perfectly objective result can be attained in trying to determine what part of speech the first element in such phrases is. This explains the existing difference of views on the subject and we are compelled to recognise that the question can only be solved in a somewhat subjective way, according as we start from one premise or another. If we start from the premise that we shall not speak of homonyms, or indeed new parts of speech, unless this is made strictly necessary by indisputable facts, we will stick to the view that the first element of such phrases as *stone watt* or *speech sound* is a noun in a special syntactical function. It is this view that appears to be the most plausible,

THE PRONOUN AND THE NUMERAL

THE PRONOUN

As we have already seen (p. 30), the definition of pronouns as a separate part of speech has caused many difficulties. More than once in the history of linguistics the very existence of pronouns as a part of speech has been denied.¹ However, attempts of this kind have not proved successful and in present-day grammars, both English and Russian, pronouns are recognised as a part of speech. This in itself seems to prove that they indeed have some peculiar features which cannot be "explained away".

Thus, the pronouns *I, you, he*, etc., though pointing to things (in the widest sense of the word) and in so far resembling nouns, cannot as a rule be modified by adjectives. (Phrases like *poor me* appear to be rare.) These pronouns differ from nouns in that they cannot be connected with any article, or modified by a prepositional phrase, etc. We will therefore start on the assumption that pronouns do constitute a separate part of speech, and proceed to investigate their grammatical properties.

CLASSIFICATION OF PRONOUNS

We usually find in grammars a classification of pronouns into personal, possessive, interrogative, indefinite, relative, etc. It is clear, however, that some points in that classification are not grammatical at all. Thus, if we say, for example, that a pronoun is indefinite we do not characterise it from a grammatical but from a semantic point of view. There is no doubt that the pronoun *something* is indefinite in its meaning, but that indefiniteness of meaning is in no way reflected either in its morphological properties or in its syntactical functions. This is as much as to say that the indefiniteness of its meaning is irrelevant from the grammatical viewpoint. In a similar way, if we state that the pronoun *nothing* is negative, we characterise its meaning (and a most important characteristic it is, too), but, again, this is irrelevant for grammar, since it does not entail anything concerning the morphological or syntactical peculiarities of the word. Therefore, in proceeding to a study of pronouns, we will try to keep the grammatical viewpoint firmly in mind, though this will not always be an easy thing to do.

CASE

In dealing with the category of case in pronouns, we must bear in mind that they need not in this respect be similar to nouns.

¹ See, for example, Л. В. Щерба, *О частях речи в русском языке*. Избранные работы по русскому языку, 1957, стр. 68 сл.

Some of them may, and indeed do, have peculiarities which no noun shares.

Some pronouns distinguish between two cases which are best termed nominative and objective (instead of nominative we might also say subjective). These are the following:

Nomin. *I he she (it) we (you) they who* Obj. *me
him her (it) us (you) them whom*

The two pronouns in brackets, *it* and *you*, might have been left out of the list. We have included them because they share many other peculiarities with the pronouns *I*, *he*, *she*, *we*, and *they*. No other pronoun, and, indeed, no other word in the language has that kind of case system.

A certain number of pronouns have a different case system, viz. they distinguish between a common and a genitive case, in the same way as the nouns treated above (see p. 41 ff.). These are, *somebody*, *anybody*, *one*, *another*, and a few more.

All other pronouns have no category of case (*something*, *anything*, *nothing*, *everything*, *some*, *any*, *no*, *my*, *his*, etc.; *mine*, *hers*, etc.).

The case system in pronouns of the *somebody* type is identical with that of the nouns of the *father* type. So we need not go into this question any further.

The case system of the pronouns given on this page, on the other hand, is quite isolated in the language, and requires special investigation.

It is very well known that the form *me*, which is an objective case form, is not only used in the function of object (direct or indirect), but also as predicative, in sentences like *It is me*. The sentence *It is I*, though still possible, is rarely used: it has acquired a kind of archaic flavour as its stylistic peculiarity and has therefore become inappropriate in colloquial speech. However, in the construction *it is... who* the form *I* is usual: "*It's I who am tiresome*" he replied. (FORSTER) As to the other pronouns of this group, the sentences *It is him*, *It is her*, *It is us*, *It is them*, with the objective case form used as a predicative, do occur, but they seem still to have a somewhat careless or "low colloquial" colouring and they have not superseded the variants *It is he*, *It is she*, *It is we*, *It is they*. Here is an example: *No, I don't suppose it will prove to be them*. (FORSTER)

The form *me* can occasionally be found in the function of subject, provided it does not immediately precede the predicate verb, as in the sentence: *That's the law of the state, Ham, and there's nothing me or you can do about it*. (E. CALDWELL) The form *me* could not have been used here if there had not been the second subject *you*, in the sentence. This confirms the view that stress plays

an important part in determining the use of *I* or *me* in such conditions. The form *her* as subject is found, for instance, in the following sentence from a short story by the same author. *Lujean's the likable kind. You and her will get along just fine before you know it.* (E. CALDWELL) It should be noted, however, that the form *her* is possible here because it is part of the group *you and her*, and therefore gets some sentence-stress. If a feminine pronoun were to be the only subject of the sentence, the form would have to be *she*, no matter what the style of the sentence was.

Opinions on the precise stylistic colouring of such sentences differ to some extent. What seems certain here is that the nominative forms *I*, *he*, etc. are being gradually restricted to the function of subject, whereas the objective case forms *me*, *him*, etc., are taking over all other functions. This process seems to have gone further with the 1st person singular pronoun than with the others; the reason for this is not yet clear. It is the isolated position of this case system in the language which must be held responsible for the change. The distinction between *I*, *he*, *she*, *we*, *they*, on the one hand, and *me*, *him*, *her*, *us*, *them*, on the other, is thus changed from a case distinction to one of a different character — that of unstressed and stressed forms of pronouns. This is similar to the process which has long since been completed in the French language (and in other Romance languages, such as Italian, or Spanish), where the original nominative form (e. g. French *je*, from Latin *ego*) has been restricted to the function of subject of the sentence, whereas the original objective case form (e. g. French *moi*, from Latin *me*) has taken over its other functions, mainly that of predicative. Cf. *Je suis ici* 'I am here' and *C'est moi* 'it is me'; *Il est ici* 'he is here' and *C'est lui* 'it is he (him)'. The development in Modern English seems to be following the same lines, on the whole, but it does differ from the French in so far as the use of *I* as a predicative is still quite possible, whereas in French that possibility is completely lost for the forms *je*, *tu*, etc. Here is a curious example from a modern play by S. Taylor:

Maude (*suspecting*). Is there someone you want to marry?
(*Sabrina nods*)

Who is it?

Sabrina (*turning to Linus*). Him!

Linus. For God's sake, Sabrina, watch your grammar.

Sabrina. It is he!

With the pronoun *who* the development is partly similar, and partly different. It is similar in the main point: the case difference between *who* and *whom* is quite obviously disappearing. But here it is the original objective case form that is giving way, and it is no longer preserved in any specific syntactic function. Thus, the sentence *whom did you see?* is being superseded by the variant, *who*

did you see?, and, similarly, *who* tends to take the place of *whom* in such sentences as, *This is the man who(m) you wanted to see.*

Examples of this use are found as early as in Shakespeare, for instance *Between who?* ("Hamlet"), and also occur in the 18th century, for instance in a novel by Jane Austen in a conversation between educated speakers: *But who are you looking for? Are your sisters coming?* An example from a modern play: *Who were you private secretary to?* (TAYLOR)

E. Sapir has devoted several pages of his book on language to a detailed discussion of all factors contributing to the use of *who* instead of *whom* in such contexts.¹ Be that as it may, the gradual elimination of the objective form *whom* is beyond doubt.

Thus the general tendency is clearly towards the disappearance of the opposition between nominative and objective in pronouns.

NUMBER

It ought to be emphasised that what we mean here is the grammatical category of number, and the question is, in what pronouns and to what extent that category is actually found.

, It will be easily seen that the category of number has only a very restricted field in pronouns. It is found in the pronouns *this/these, that / those, other / others* (if not used before a noun). We need not dwell here on the very peculiar means which are used to form the plural of *this* and of *that*. The question is one of the history of English, rather than of Modern English structure. We can limit ourselves to the statement that the method by which each of the two words forms its plural is quite individual and unanalysable from the viewpoint of the modern language.

As to the pronouns *I / we; he, she, it / they*, it must be stated that there is no grammatical category of number here. *We* is not a form of the pronoun *I*, but a separate word in its own right. In a similar way, *they* is not a form of *he*, or *she*, or *it*, or of all of them, but a separate word.

There is no grammatical category of number either in the pronouns *my / our; his, her, its / their*, and *mine / ours; his, hers / theirs*. E. g., *her* and *their* are different words, not different forms of one word.

A peculiar difficulty arises here with reference to the pronouns *myself / (ourself), ourselves; yourself / yourselves; himself, herself, itself / themselves*.

If we compare the two pronouns *myself* and *ourselves*, we shall see at once that the difference between the first elements of the two words is purely lexical (just as in the corresponding words *my*

¹ E. Sapir, *Language*, 1921, pp. 166—174.

and *our*), whereas the second elements differ from each other by the same suffix -s that is used to form the plural of most nouns.¹ Thus we are brought to the conclusion that *ourselves* is essentially a different word from *myself*.

There are no other grammatical categories in the English pronoun: there is no category of gender. The pronouns *he*, *she*, *it*, and also the pronouns *his*, *her*, *Us*; *his*, *hers*; *himself*, *herself*, *itself*, are all separate words. Thus, *she* is not a form of the word *he* but a separate word in its own right.

DISTINCTION OF TYPES OF PRONOUNS

There are many examples in English pronouns of the same phonetic unit used to express different meanings in different contexts. So the question arises whether this is a case of polysemy, that is, different meanings of the same word, or of homonymy, that is, different words sounding alike. We may state the following cases in point: *that* demonstrative and *that* relative; *who* interrogative and *who* relative; *which* interrogative and *which* relative; *myself* (and the other *self*-pronouns) reflexive, and the same pronouns intensive (non-reflexive).

That seems to be the easiest of the problems to settle, as we can apply the test of the plural form here. The demonstrative *that* has a plural form *those*, whereas the relative *that* remains unchanged in the plural.

It is obvious that the *that* which remains unchanged in the plural cannot be the same word as the *that* which has the plural form *those*. So we arrive at the conclusion that there are two different pronouns: *that* (relative) and *that* / *those* (demonstrative, parallel to *this*).

With the other pronouns mentioned above no criterion of this kind can be applied, as they, none of them, have any special plural form. So, if that question is to be solved at all, we shall have to look for criteria of a different kind, which may not prove so decisive as the one we applied in the case of *that*.

We shall have to rely on meaning and syntactical function. It is not hard to distinguish between the interrogative and the relative meaning in the pronouns *who*, *what*, and *which*. It is also evident that the relative *who*, *what*, and *which* can introduce subordinate clauses. However, it is not so easy to say whether the pronoun *what* is interrogative or relative in a sentence like the following: *I know what you mean*. On the one hand the meaning of the pronoun *what* seems to be the same as in the sentence *I know what*

¹ And of course also by the alternation [f]/[v], just as in the nouns *shelf/shelves*, *wolf/wolves*, etc. This is irrelevant here.

has happened (a so-called indirect question), where it is obviously interrogative. On the other hand, it can hardly be denied that *what* may be taken here as equivalent to *that which* and as connecting the subordinate clause with the main clause.¹ Since no clear distinction can be established, it seems unjustified to separate the two and to say that they are homonyms. More or less similar considerations apply to the other cases enumerated on page 70. We will therefore speak of "the pronoun *himself*", etc., without distinguishing "the reflexive pronoun *himself*" and "the emphatic pronoun *himself*".²

LIMITS OF THE PRONOUN CLASS

The limits of the pronoun class are somewhat difficult to define. That is, there are words which have some pronominal features, without being full pronouns, or, even, have other features which are *not* pronominal at all. We may take the word *many* as a case in point.

Many is in several respects similar in meaning and function to the pronouns *some* and *several*; -cf. *some children, some of the children, some of them; several children, several of the children, several of them; many children, many of the children, many of them*. In this respect *many* differs from adjectives, which of course cannot be followed by the group "*of + noun or pronoun*". That would favour the view that *many* belongs to the pronoun class. On the other hand, however, *many* has an important characteristic which separates it from pronouns and brings it together with adjectives; it has degrees of comparison: *more, (the) most*. No pronoun has degrees of comparison, and indeed the pronouns *some* and *several*, which stand so close to *many* in other respects, cannot form such degrees. So, in determining the part of speech to which *many* belongs we have to decide which of its characteristics is more essential, unless we prefer to state that *many, few, much* and *little* are hybrids, partaking both of pronouns and of adjectives. Since the choice of the more essential feature remains somewhat arbitrary, the conclusion on the word *many* may be affected by it. If, for example, we decide that the morphological feature is more essential, we will say that *many* is an adjective, but we shall have to add that it shares some vital syntactical features with pronouns.

Another case in point is the word *certain*. When used as a predicative it is of course an adjective, as in the sentence, *We were*

¹ For a general theory of subordinate clauses, see Chapter XXXIV.

² The question of polysemy and homonymy of words is of course a lexicological, not a grammatical, question. We only touched on it here because we have to express a view of these words when we speak of their grammatical peculiarities.

quite certain of the fact. Things are different, however, when *certain* is used as an attribute standing before a noun and has a meaning much the same as *some*, e. g. *There are certain indications that this is true*, or, *A certain Mr Brown wants to see you*. The question arises, is this the same word, the adjective *certain* as in the first sentence, or is it a pronoun? Here, too, we should apply some objective tests. One of the peculiarities of the word is that it can be preceded by the indefinite article, which generally is not the case with pronouns.¹ We must also find out whether *certain* can be followed by the group "*of + noun or pronoun*". If no such examples are met with, we shall have to conclude that there are no sufficient reasons to class *certain* with the pronouns, in spite of the peculiar meaning it has in such sentences.

Other problems of this kind would have to be treated along similar lines.

THE NUMERAL

With numerals, even more than with pronouns, it is difficult to keep the strictly grammatical approach and not to let oneself be diverted into lexicological considerations. O. Jespersen has quite rightly remarked that numerals have been treated by grammarians in a different way from other parts of speech. This is what he says, "...the grammarian in this chapter on numerals does what he never dreamed of doing in the two previous chapters (those on nouns and adjectives. — *B. I.*), he gives a complete and orderly enumeration of all the words belonging to this class."²

It seems therefore all the more necessary to stick to the grammatical aspect of things when dealing with this particular category of words. What, indeed, ought to be said about numerals from a grammatical viewpoint?

There are no grammatical categories to be discussed in numerals. There is no category of number, nor of case, nor any other morphological category. The numerals are, to all intents and purposes, invariable. So there is only the function of numerals to be considered, and also possibilities of their substantivisation.

The most characteristic function of numerals is of course that of an attribute preceding its noun. However a numeral can also perform other functions in the sentence (it can be subject, predicative, and object) if the context makes it clear what objects are meant, as in: *We are seven, Of the seven people I was looking for I found only three.*

¹ A special case is *another*; here the indefinite article has become an integral part of the pronoun in the singular.

² O. Jespersen, *The Philosophy of Grammar*, p. 37.

An ordinal numeral can also be modified by an infinitive denoting the action in which the object mentioned occupies a definite place; a characteristic example of this usage is, *He was the first to come*.

The numerals, both cardinal and ordinal, share certain peculiarities of syntactic construction with pronouns. Cf., e. g., *five children, five of the children, five of them; some children, some of the children, some of them*; also *the first travellers, the first of the travellers, the first of them*. This, however, does not seem a sufficient reason for uniting pronouns and numerals into one part of speech, and such a union has not so far been proposed.¹

¹ Academician L. Ššerba proposed in his paper on parts of speech in Russian to establish a part of speech called quantitative words (количественные слова), which would include both cardinal numerals and words such as *many, several*, etc. He has not been followed in this by any other scholar. (See Л. В. Щерба, *О частях речи в русском языке*. Избранные работы по русскому языку, стр. 73.)

THE STATIVE

It has been pointed out above (pp. 29—30) that the essence of the words *asleep*, *afloat*, *astir*, *ablaze*, etc. and their position in the system of parts of speech is still under discussion. We take the view that they constitute a special part of speech, which may be called "stative" and is characterised by the prefix *a-*.

Now we will consider some grammatical problems concerning the statives.

SYNTACTICAL FUNCTIONS

The main function of the statives is that of predicative and in this case they are preceded by a link verb, most usually the verb *be*, but occasionally also *fall*, *keep*, *feel*. Examples with the link verb *be* are very numerous and varied. A few will suffice: *The child was fast asleep*. *The whole house was astir*. *Something is afoot*. With the link verb *fall* we find the stative *asleep*, as in the sentence *He soon fell asleep*. The link verb *keep* is found with statives, e. g. in *...but in a crafty madness keeps aloof*. (SHAKESPEARE) The link verb *feel* is found in the sentence *He felt ashamed of himself*.. (LINKLATER)

Statives are also occasionally found in the function of objective predicatives, particularly after the verb *find* or *have* and a noun or pronoun, as in the sentences *He found his sister alone*. (LINK-LATER) *Then Skene spoke, and in a moment had his audience afire*. (Idem)

The basically predicative quality of the statives is equally evident in all of these cases. It is somewhat weakened when a stative has the function of an attribute following its noun: *A man alive to social interests*. And the predicative quality of the stative is further weakened when it precedes a noun as its attribute (this is very rare indeed). The word *aloof* seems to have gone further than any other stative in this respect. Thus, we find such phrases as *his aloof attitude*, *an aloof manner*, etc. On the other hand, the word *asleep* can only be a prepositive attribute when it is preceded by the adverb *fast*, as in the phrase *a fast-asleep child*.

The phrase "*be* + stative" may sometimes be synonymous with the continuous form of the corresponding verb. Cf., e. g., *He is asleep* and *He is sleeping*, *He was asleep* and *He was sleeping*. We are therefore entitled to ask whether these two ways of expression are always interchangeable, or whether a difference of some kind or other exists between them. This question has not been finally answered so far.

Proceeding now to compare the statives in English with those in Russian, we find that they do not correspond to each other, i. e. a Russian stative is, it seems, never translated by an English

stative, and vice versa. A few examples will suffice to illustrate the point. Such typical Russian statives as жаль, лень, тепло, холодно are never translated by statives into English: мне его жаль — *I pity him*, or *I feel some pity for him*; жаль усов — *I feel sorry for my moustache*; ему лень было вставать — *he fell too lazy to get up*; здесь тепло — *it is warm here*; ему холодно — *he is cold*, or *he feels cold*, etc. On the other hand, *he is asleep* corresponds to the Russian он спит; *the ship is afloat* to the Russian судно в плавании; *the house was ablaze* to the Russian дом был в огне, etc. It follows that the phenomena which can be expressed by statives in Russian and in English, are far from being the same.

The existence of statives as a separate part of speech is not universally recognised either for the Russian or for the English language. We will not enter into details of the problems in reference to Russian but we will briefly consider some objections which have been raised against the stative as a part of speech in Modern English. L.S.Barkhudarov in an article published in 1958¹ denies the existence of statives in English on the following grounds: (1) the meaning of "state" is merely a special variety of the meaning of "property" typical of adjectives, (2) words of this category can be preceded by the word *more*: *more ashamed*, etc., (3) they can be modified by adverbs (*painfully alive*), by prepositional phrases (*alive with stars*) and they can be the predicative, a postpositional or detached attribute, and, less frequently, a prepositive attribute: *In the United States the problem of dealing with names of foreign extraction is an alive one.* (MCKNIGHT)

The conclusion L. Barkhudarov arrives at is that words of this type are adjectives, which of course is the traditional view. However, these arguments are not binding. They are based on several assumptions which are by no means self-evident or necessary. Thus, there is nothing to prove that the notion of "state" cannot be the foundation of a separate part of speech. Each of the theories here discussed is based on certain conceptions which pave the way to the respective conclusions. The choice should be made in favour of the one that gives a simpler and more consistent presentation of language facts.

¹ See Л. С. Бархударов, *О так называемой «категории состояния»*. Иностранные языки в школе, 1958, № 6, стр. 114.

Chapter VIII

THE VERB: ASPECT

It is but natural that the verb should take up as much, or indeed, more space than all the other parts of speech we have so far considered, put together. It is the only part of speech in present-day English that has a morphological system based on a series of categories. It is the only part of speech that has analytical forms,¹ and again the only one that has forms (the infinitive, the gerund and the participle) which occupy a peculiar position in its system and do not share some of the characteristic features of the part of speech as a whole.

In analysing the morphological structure of the English verb it is essential to distinguish between the morphological categories of the verb as such, and the syntactic features of the sentence (or clause) in which a form of the verb may happen to be used. This applies especially to the category of voice and, to a certain extent, to the categories of aspect and tense as well.

The order in which we shall consider the categories of the verb may to a certain extent be arbitrary. However, we should bear in mind that certain categories are more closely linked together than others. Thus, it stands to reason that the categories of aspect and tense are linked more closely than either of them is with the category of voice. It is also plain that there is a close connection between the categories of tense and mood. These relations will have to be borne in mind as we start to analyse the categories of the verb.

One last preliminary remark may be necessary here. It is always tempting, but it may prove dangerous, to approach the morphological system of the verb in one language from the point of view of another language, for example, the student's mother tongue, or a widely known language such as Latin. Of course the system of each language should be analysed on its own, and only after this has been done should we proceed to compare it with another. Anyway the assessment of the system of a given language ought not to be influenced by the student's knowledge of another language. Neglect of this principle has often brought about differences in the treatment of the same language, depending on the student's mother tongue.

We will begin the analysis of each verbal category by examining two forms or two sets of forms differing from each other according to that category only.

¹ This statement is based on the assumption that the noun and the adjective in Modern English have no analytical forms (compare p. 57 and p. 60).

As is well known, not every verb is commonly used in the form "be + first participle". Verbs denoting abstract relations, such as *belong*, and those denoting sense perception or emotion, e. g. *see*, *hear*, *hope*, *love*, seldom appear in this form. It should be noted, however, that the impossibility of these verbs appearing in this form is sometimes exaggerated. Such categoric statements give the reader a wrong idea of the facts as they are not verified by actual modern usage. Thus, the verbs *see*, *hope*, *like*, *fear* and others, though denoting perception or feelings (emotions), may be found in this form, e. g. *It was as if she were seeing herself for the first time in a year.* (M. MITCHELL) The form "be + first participle" is very appropriate here, as it does not admit of the action being interpreted as momentaneous (corresponding to the perfective aspect in Russian) and makes it absolutely clear that what is meant is a sense perception going on (involuntarily) for some time.

This use of the form is also well illustrated by the following bit of dialogue from a modern short story: *"Miss Courtright — I want to see you," he said, quickly averting his eyes. "Will you let me — Miss Courtright — will you?" "Of course, Merle," she said, smiling a little. "You're seeing me right now."* (E. CALDWELL) It might probably have been possible to use here the present indefinite: *"You see me right now,"* but the use of the continuous gives additional emphasis to the idea that the action, that is, the perception denoted by the verb *see*, is already taking place. Thus the descriptive possibilities of the continuous form are as effective here with the verb of perception as they are with any other verb.

A rather typical example of the use of the verb *see* in the continuous aspect is the following sentence: *Her breath came more evenly now, and she gave a smile so wide and open, her great eyes taking in the entire room and a part of the mountains towards which she had half turned, that it was as though she were seeing the world for the first time and might clap her hands to see it dance about her.* (BUECHNER)

Here are some more examples of continuous forms of verbs which are generally believed not to favour these forms: *Both were visibly hearing every word of the conversation and ignoring it, at the same time.* (CARY) The shade of meaning provided by the continuous will be best seen by comparing the sentence as it stands with the following variant, in which both forms of the continuous have been replaced by the corresponding indefinite forms: *Both visibly heard every word of the conversation and ignored it, at the same time.* The descriptive character of the original text has disappeared after the substitution: instead of following, as it were, the gradual unfolding of the hearing process and the gradual accumulation of "ignoring", the speaker now merely states the fact that the two things happened. So the shades of meaning differen-

tiating the two aspect forms are strong enough to overcome what one might conventionally term the "disclination" of verbs of perception towards the continuous aspect.

We also find the verb *look* used in a continuous form where it means 'have the air', not 'cast a look': *Mr March was looking absent and sombre again.* (SNOW) This is appropriate here, as it expresses a temporary state of things coming after an interruption (this is seen from the adverb *again*) and lasting for some time at least. Compare also the verb *hope*: *You're rather hoping he does know, aren't you?* (SNOW) If we compare this sentence and a possible variant with the present indefinite: *You rather hope he does know, don't you?* we shall see that the original text serves to make the idea of hope more emphatic and so the form of the continuous aspect does here serve a useful purpose. *But I'm hoping she'll come round soon. ..* (SNOW) Let us again compare the text with a variant: *But I hope she'll come round soon. ..* The difference in this case is certainly much less marked than in the preceding example: there is no process going on anyway, and it is clear from the context (especially the adverbial modifier *soon*) that the feeling spoken of only refers to a very limited space of time. So the extra shade of meaning brought by the continuous form appears to be only that of emphasis.

Our next example is of the link verb *be* in the continuous aspect form: *There were a few laughs which showed however that the sale, on the whole, was being a success.* (SNOW) With the non-continuous form substituted: *There were a few laughs which showed however that the sale, on the whole, was a success.* In this instance, once more, the difference would appear to be essential. In the text as it stands, it is certain that the laughs mentioned were heard while the sale was still going on, whereas in the second variant this is left to conjecture: they might as well have been heard after the sale was concluded, when some people were discussing its results. So the continuous form of the link verb has an important function in the sentence. Compare also the following: *You are being presumptuous in a way you wouldn't be with anyone else, and I don't like it.* (TAYLOR) Compare also: *"I think you are being just," Charles said...* (SNOW) Here the continuous is perhaps more necessary still, as it clearly means that the person's behaviour in a certain concrete situation is meant, not his general characteristic, which would be expressed by saying, *"I think you are just."* Compare also: *Perhaps I'm being selfish...* (LINKLATER) The link verb *be* is also used in the continuous aspect in the following passage: *What I think is, you're supposed to leave somebody alone if he's at least being interesting and he's getting all excited about something.* (SALINGER) *He is being interesting* obviously means here, 'he is behaving in an interesting way', or 'he is trying to be

interesting', and it implies a certain amount of conscious effort, whereas *he is interesting* would merely mean that he has this quality as a permanent characteristic, without reference to any effort of will and without limitation to any period of time. Compare also: *Now you are being rude.* (TAYLOR)

TERMINOLOGY

Each of the two aspects must be given some name which should of course be as adequate as possible to the basic meaning of the aspect. It seems easier to find a name for the type *is writing* than for the type *writes*. The term **continuous aspect** has now been in use for some time already and indeed it seems very appropriate to the phenomenon which it is used to describe. As to the type *writes*, a term is rather more difficult to find, as the uses of this form are much more varied and its intrinsic meaning, accordingly, less definite. This state of things may be best of all described by the term **common aspect**, which is indefinite enough to allow room for the various uses. It also has the merit of being parallel with the term **common case**, which has been discussed above and which seems the best to denote the phenomenon if a case system in English nouns is recognised at all. Thus we will use the terms **continuous aspect** and **common aspect** to denote the two aspects of the Modern English verb.

SPECIAL USES

However, the problem of aspects and their uses is by no means exhausted. First of all we must now mention the uses of the continuous aspect which do not easily fit into the definition given above. Forms of this aspect are occasionally used with the adverbs *always*, *continually*, etc., when the action is meant to be unlimited by time. Here are some typical examples of this use: *He was constantly experimenting with new seed.* (LINKLATER) *Rose is always wanting James to retire.* (CARY) The adverbial modifier *always* shows that Rose's wish is thought of as something constant, not restricted to any particular moment. So the difference between the sentence as it stands and the possible variant, *Rose always wants James to retire* does not lie in the character of the action. Obviously the peculiar shade of meaning in the original sentence is emphatic; the action is represented as never ceasing and this gives the sentence a stronger emotional colouring than it would have with the form of the common aspect: the lexical meaning of *always* is reinforced by the emphatic colouring of the continuous aspect. It is quite clear that these are exaggerated statements, where the form of the continuous aspect is used emotionally, to present an

action as going on and on without interruption, whereas that, in the nature of things, is not possible. Such a use is consistent with the basic meaning of the form and illustrates its possible stylistic applications. We shall have to refer to it to elucidate some moot questions concerning these forms. It is the descriptive value of the continuous aspect forms which makes such a use possible at all.

DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS

The interpretation of the opposition *writes* — *is writing* given above is not the only one to be found in works dealing with the English language. We will now consider some different interpretations proposed by various scholars.

O. Jespersen¹ treated the type *is writing* as a means of expressing limited duration, that is, in his own words, expressing an action serving as frame to another which is performed within the frame set by that first action. A somewhat similar view has been propounded by Prof. N. Irtenyeva,² who thinks that the basic meaning of the type *is writing* is that of simultaneity of an action with another action. In assessing these views it must be said that they are plausible for some cases, especially for a complex sentence, in which the type *writes* is used in the main clause, while the type *is writing* is used in the subordinate clause, or vice versa. This can only be found when the narration refers to the past time, as in the following example: *But once she was in the car and Andre was bending over her, tucking her rug about her, her sense of freedom left her.* (R. WEST) This use is of course very common. The view propounded by these authors does not fit in with the use of the present *is writing*, which is never, for aught we know, used in a complex sentence of that structure. In sentences such as *What is he doing? He is reading*, there is no other action with which the action expressed by the type *is writing* could be simultaneous or to which it might be a "time frame".³ N. Irtenyeva answers this possible objection by saying that in such cases the action expressed by the *is writing* type is simultaneous with the act of speech.⁴

¹ See O. Jespersen, *The Philosophy of Grammar*, p. 277 ff.

² See Н. Ф. Иртеньева, *Грамматика английского языка*, 1956, стр. 82.

³ The present continuous is occasionally used in sentences containing mention of another action expressed by a verb in the present tense, as in the following examples: *As she speaks I am thinking of the founders of the city.* (DURRELL) *But when you are dying you suddenly find yourself in funds.* (IDEM) *My toothbrush is a thing that makes my life unhappy when I'm traveling.* (JEROME K. JEROME, quoted by N. Irtenyeva) These are special cases, however. In the first example the forms of the present are used to narrate past actions, and in the other two examples repeated or habitual Actions are meant.

⁴ See Н. Ф. Иртеньева, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

However, that completely changes the situation. The act of speech is not mentioned in the speech. Moreover, simultaneity with the act of speech is the definition of the present tense,¹ and not of the type *is writing* as such. Besides (and this appears to be very essential) if we take simultaneity with another action to be the basic meaning of the type *is writing* we cannot account for that descriptive power which this type obviously has in the cases when it is used in connection with such adverbs as *always*. Thus a view which does not take into account the category of aspect in this matter does not appear to be convincing.

Another view is held by Prof. I. Ivanova.² She recognises the existence of the aspect category in English, but treats it in a peculiar way. According to Prof. Ivanova, *is writing* is an aspect form, namely that of the continuous aspect, but *writes* is not an aspect form at all, because its meaning is vague and cannot be clearly defined. So the author reaches the conclusion that some finite forms of the Modern English verb have the category of aspect, and are in so far "aspect-tense forms", while others have no aspect and are therefore "purely tense forms". Concerning this view it must be said that on the basic point it agrees with the view put forward above: the distinction between the type *writes* and the type *is writing* is a distinction of aspect. But Prof. Ivanova denies the existence of the common aspect. This seems rather a difference of wording than one of essence. "No aspect" seems something like another version of "common aspect". And it must be said that the idea of "common aspect" answers the facts better than does the idea of "no aspect". The difficulty of formulating the meaning of the common aspect need not worry us. That is one more case of distinction between a marked and a non-marked member of an opposition. The continuous aspect is marked both in meaning and in form (*be* + first participle), whereas the common aspect is non-marked both in meaning and in form; no formal characteristic of the common aspect can be given except the negative one: in contradistinction from the continuous aspect, it is not expressed by "*be* + first participle". Thus the theory of common and continuous aspect may be upheld.³

¹ See below, p. 86 ff.

² See И. П. Иванова, *Вид и время в современном английском языке*, 1961, стр. 57 сл., 77 сл.

³ When we discuss the meaning of the unmarked member of an opposition we sometimes find it difficult to formulate. This is true, for example, of the common case, as opposed to the genitive, and also of the common aspect as opposed to the continuous, etc. Of course attempts should be made to find an adequate definition of the meaning of unmarked members, but the difficulty should not deter us from stating the existence of the unmarked member, as grammatically opposed to the marked one.

DIFFERENT TERMS

Besides the various theories put forward with reference to the opposition *writes* — *is writing*, we must mention various terms that have been proposed to denote its members. H. Sweet used the term "definite tenses" for what we call the continuous aspect.¹ This term cannot be said to be a happy one, as the word "tense" disguises the fact that we find here a peculiar grammatical category different from that of tense.

Another term which has been used is, "expanded form", or "progressive form". The term "form" cannot be described as satisfactory since it leaves the basic grammatical question open: we might as well speak of the past form, or of the passive form, etc. As to the adjectives modifying the word form, it must be said that *expanded* merely gives a characteristic of the analytical structure of the form, without indicating its meaning. As to *progressive*, it does indicate the meaning, but is hardly preferable to the adjective *continuous*. So we will stick to the term "continuous aspect".

ASPECT AND CHARACTER OF THE VERB

The problem of aspect is intimately connected with a lexicological problem, which we shall therefore have to touch upon here. It may be well illustrated by the following series of examples. If we have, for example, the sentence, *A young man sat in the corner of the room*, we can say, instead, *A young man was sitting in the corner of the room*, without affecting the basic meaning of the sentence. The same situation may be described in both ways, the only difference between them being that of stylistic colouring: the variant with the common aspect form is more matter-of-fact and "dry", whereas the one with the continuous aspect form is more descriptive.

The absence of any actual difference in meaning in such a case is brought out in the following passage from a modern novel: *Mr Bodiam was sitting in his study at the Rectory. The nineteenth-century Gothic windows, narrow and pointed, admitted the light grudgingly; in spite of the brilliant July weather, the room was sombre. Brown varnished bookshelves lined the walls, filled with row upon row of those thick, heavy theological works which the second-hand booksellers generally sell by weight. The mantelpiece, the overmantel, a towering structure of spindly pillars and little shelves, were brown and varnished. The writing-desk was brown and varnished. So were the chairs, so was the door. A dark red-brown carpet with patterns covered the floor. Everything was brown in the room, and*

¹ H. Sweet, *A New English Grammar*, Part I, § 288.

there was a curious brownish smell. In the midst of this brown gloom Mr Bodiham sat at his desk. (HUXLEY)

By comparing the first and the last sentence of this passage it will be seen that they tell of the same situation, but in different ways. The first sentence is clearly descriptive, and it opens a rather lengthy description of Mr Bodiham's room, its furniture, books, etc. The last sentence of the passage, on the other hand, confirms the fact that Mr Bodiham sat in his study, as if summing up the situation. So the same fact is told a second time and the difference in the stylistic qualities of the continuous and the common aspect is well brought out.

On the other hand, if we have the sentence *He brought her some flowers* and if we substitute *was bringing* for *brought* and say, *He was bringing her some flowers*, the meaning will be affected and the two facts will be different. With the common aspect form *brought* the sentence means that the flowers actually reached her, whereas the continuous aspect form means that he had the flowers with him but something prevented him from giving them to her. We might then say that *he sat = he was sitting*, whereas *he brought ≠ he was bringing*. What is the cause of this difference? Here we shall have to touch on a lexicological problem, without which the treatment of the continuous aspect cannot be complete. The verb *sit* differs from the verb *bring* in an important way: the verb *sit* denotes an action which can go on indefinitely without necessarily reaching a point where it has to stop, whereas the verb *bring* denotes an action which must come to an end owing to its very nature. It has now been customary for some time to call verbs of the *sit* type cursive, or durative, and verbs of the *bring* type terminative. We may then say that with cursive, or durative verbs, the difference between the common and the continuous aspect may be neutralised whereas with terminative verbs it cannot be neutralised, so that the form of the common aspect cannot be substituted for the form of the continuous aspect, and vice versa, without materially changing the meaning of the sentence.¹

A final note is necessary here on the relation between the aspects of the English verb and those of the Russian verb.

¹ The theory of durative and terminative verbs with reference to the English language was propounded by Prof. G. Vorontsova (see Г. Н. Воронцова, *О лексическом характере глагола в английском языке. Иностранные языки в школе*, 1948, № 1) and it was adopted, with some modifications, by other authors. Prof. I. Ivanova considers durativeness and terminativeness to be grammatical characteristics of the verb (see И. П. Иванова, *Вид и время в современном английском языке*, стр. 63 сл.). We need not go into this question any further here. It should only be noted that a verb which is durative in its chief meaning may be terminative in a secondary meaning, and vice versa. Thus, the verb *sit* would be terminative in its secondary meaning 'sit down'.

Without going into details, we may assume that the Russian verb has two aspects, the perfective and the imperfective. All other varieties of aspectual meanings are to be considered within the framework of the two basic aspects.¹ It is obvious at once that there is no direct correspondence between English and Russian aspects; for instance, the English continuous aspect is not identical with the Russian imperfective. The relation between the two systems is not so simple as all that. On the one hand, the English common aspect may correspond not only to the Russian perfective but also to the Russian imperfective aspect; thus, *he wrote* may correspond both to *написал* and to *писал*. On the other hand, the Russian imperfective aspect may correspond not only to the continuous but also to the common aspect in English; thus, *писал* may correspond both to *was writing* and to *wrote*. It follows from this that the relation between the English and the Russian aspects may be represented by the following diagram:

English	Common	Continuous
Russian	Perfective	Imperfective

On this question see В. В. Виноградов, *Русский язык*, 1947, стр. 493 сл.

Chapter IX

THE VERB: TENSE

While the existence of the aspect category in English is a disputed matter, the tense category is universally recognised. Nobody has ever suggested to characterise the distinction, for example, between *wrote*, *writes*, and *will write* as other than a tense distinction. Thus we shall not have to produce any arguments in favour of the existence of the category in Modern English. Our task will be on the one hand to define the category as such, and on the other, to find the distinctions within the category of tense, that is, to find out how many tenses there are in English and what each of them means and also to analyse the mutual relations between tense and other categories of the English verb.

GENERAL DEFINITION OF TENSE

As to the general definition of tense, there seems no necessity to find a special one for the English language. The basic features of the category appear to be the same in English as in other languages. The category of tense may, then, be defined as a verbal category which reflects the objective category of time and expresses on this background the relations between the time of the action and the time of the utterance.

The main divisions of objective time appear to be clear enough. There are three of them, past, present, and future. However, it by no means follows that tense systems of different languages are bound to be identical. On the contrary, there are wide differences in this respect.

ENGLISH TENSES

In English there are the three tenses (past, present and future) represented by the forms *wrote*, *writes*, *will write*, or *lived*, *lives*, *will live*.

Strangely enough, some doubts have been expressed about the existence of a future tense in English. O. Jespersen discussed this question more than once.¹ The reason why Jespersen denied the existence of a future tense in English was that the English future is expressed by the phrase "*shall/will* + infinitive", and the verbs *shall* and *will* which make part of the phrase preserve, according to Jespersen, some of their original meaning (*shall* an element of obligation, and *will* an element of volition). Thus, in Jespersen's view, English has no way of expressing "pure futurity" free from modal shades of meaning, i. e. it has no form standing on the same grammatical level as the forms of the past and present tenses.

¹ See, for example, O. Jespersen, *The Philosophy of Grammar*, p. 50.

However, this reasoning is not convincing. Though the verbs *shall* and *will* may in some contexts preserve or indeed revive their original meaning of obligation or volition respectively, as a rule they are free from these shades of meaning and express mere futurity. This is especially clear in sentences where the verb *will* is used as an auxiliary of the future tense and where, at the same time, the meaning of volition is excluded by the context. E. g. *I am so sorry, I am afraid I will have to go back to the hotel* — (R. WEST) Since the verb *will* cannot possibly be said to preserve even the slightest shade of the meaning of volition here, it can have only one meaning — that of grammatical futurity. Of course numerous other examples might be given to illustrate this point.

It is well known that a present tense form may also be used when the action belongs to the future. This also applies to the present continuous, as in the following example: *"Maroo is coming, my lad," he said, "she is coming to-morrow, and what, tell me what, do we make of that?"* (BUECHNER) The adverbial modifier of time, *to-morrow*, makes it clear that the action expressed by the verb *come* in the present continuous tense actually belongs to the future. So it might also have been expressed by the future tense: *Maroo will come, my lad, she will come to-morrow*. But the use of the present continuous adds another shade of meaning, which would be lost if it were replaced by the future tense: Maroo's arrival to-morrow is part of a plan already fixed at the present; indeed, for all we know, she may be travelling already. Thus the future arrival is presented as a natural outcome of actions already under way, not as something that will, as it were, only begin to happen in the future.

So the three main divisions of time are represented in the English verbal system by the three tenses. Each of them may appear in the common and in the continuous aspect. Thus we get six tense-aspect forms.

Besides these six, however, there are two more, namely, the future-in-the-past and the future-continuous-in-the-past. It is common knowledge that these forms are used chiefly in subordinate clauses depending on a main clause having its predicate verb in one of the past tenses, e. g., *This did not mean that she was content to live. It meant simply that even death, if it came to her here, would seem stale*. (R. WEST) However, they can be found in independent clauses as well. The following passage from a novel by Huxley yields a good example of this use: *It was after ten o'clock. The dancers had already dispersed and the last lights were being put out. To-morrow the tents would be struck, the dismantled merry-go-round would be packed into waggons and carted away*. These are the thoughts of a young man surveying the scene of a feast which has just ended. The tenses used are three: the tense which we call past perfect

to denote the action already finished by that time (*the dancers had dispersed*), the past continuous to denote an action going on at that very moment (*the lights were being put out*) and the future-in-the-past to denote an action foreseen for the future (*the merry-go-round would be packed and carted away*). The whole passage is of course represented speech ¹ and in direct speech the tenses would have been, respectively, the present perfect, the present continuous, and the future.

The future-in-the-past and future-continuous-in-the-past do not easily fit into a system of tenses represented by a straight line running out of the past into the future. They are a deviation from this straight line: their starting point is not the present, from which the past and the future are reckoned, but the past itself. With reference to these tenses ² it may be said that the past is a new centre of the system. The idea of temporal centres propounded by Prof. I. Ivanova as an essential element of the English tense system seems therefore fully justified in analysing the "future-in-the-past" tenses. It should be noted that in many sentences of this kind the relation between the action denoted by the verb form and the time of the utterance remains uncertain: the action may or may not have taken place already. What is certain is that it was future from the point of view of the time when the action denoted by the verb form took place.³

A different view of the English tense system has been put forward by Prof. N. Irtenyeva. According to this view, the system is divided into two halves: that of tenses centring in the present, and that of tenses centring in the past. The former would comprise the present, present perfect, future, present continuous, and present perfect continuous, whereas the latter would comprise the past, past perfect, future-in-the-past, past continuous, and past perfect continuous. The latter half is characterised by specific features: the root vowel (e.g. *sang* as against *sing*), and the suffix *-d* (or *-t*), e.g. *looked*, *had sung*, *would sing*, *had been singing*.⁴ This view has much to recommend it. It has the advantage of reducing the usual threefold division of tenses (past, present, and future) to a twofold

¹ See Chapter XLII, p. 333.

² And, of course, also the future-perfect-in-the-past and the future-perfect-continuous-in-the-past.

³ Prof. I. Ivanova thinks the term "future-in-the-past" inappropriate and suggests for these forms the term "dependent future". It would appear that both terms will do equally well, and it is undesirable to change a term unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. We will therefore keep the term "future-in-the-past", (See В. Н. Жигadlo, И. П. Иванова, Л. Л. Иофик, *Современный английский язык*, стр. 109.)

⁴ See Н. Ф. Иртеньева, *Грамматика современного английского языка*, стр. 77.

division (past and present) with each of the two future tenses (future and future-in-the-past) included into the past or the present system, respectively. However, the cancellation of the future as a tense in its own right would seem to require a more detailed justification.

A new theory of English tenses has been put forward by A. Korsakov.¹ He establishes a system of absolute and anterior tenses, and of static and dynamic tenses. By dynamic tenses he means what we call tenses of the continuous aspect, and by anterior tenses what we call tenses of the perfect correlation. It is the author's great merit to have collected numerous examples, including such as do not well fit into formulas generally found in grammars. The evaluation of this system in its relation to other views has yet to be worked out.

¹ See A. Korsakov, *The Use of Tenses in English*. Lvov University Press. 1969.

Chapter X

THE VERB: THE PERFECT

BASIC QUALITIES OF THE PERFECT FORMS

The Modern English perfect forms have been the subject of a lengthy discussion which has not so far brought about a definite result. The difficulties inherent in these forms are plain enough and may best be illustrated by the present perfect. This form contains the present of the verb *have* and is called present perfect, yet it denotes an action which no longer takes place, and it is (almost always) translated into Russian by the past tense, e. g. *has written* — написал, *has arrived* — приехал, etc.

The position of the perfect forms in the system of the English verb is a problem which has been treated in many different ways and has occasioned much controversy. Among the various views on the essence of the perfect forms in Modern English the following three main trends should be mentioned:

1. The category of perfect is a peculiar tense category, i. e. a category which should be classed in the same list as the categories "present" and "past". This view was held, for example, by O. Jespersen.¹

2. The category of perfect is a peculiar aspect category, i. e. one which should be given a place in the list comprising "common aspect" and "continuous aspect". This view was held by a number of scholars, including Prof. G. Vorontsova.² Those who hold this view have expressed different opinions about the particular aspect constituting the essence of the perfect forms. It has been variously defined as "retrospective", "resultative", "successive", etc.³

3. The category of perfect is neither one of tense, nor one of aspect but a specific category different from both. It should accordingly be designated by a special term and its relations to the categories of aspect and tense should be investigated. This view was expressed by Prof. A. Smirnitsky. He took the perfect to be a means of expressing the category of "time relation" (временная отнесенность).⁴

This wide divergence of views on the very essence of a verbal category may seem astonishing. However, its causes appear to be clear enough from the point of view of present-day linguistics. These causes fall under the following three main heads:

¹ See O. Jespersen, *The Philosophy of Grammar*, p. 254 ff.

² See Г. Н. Воронцова, *Очерки по грамматике английского языка*, 1960. стр. 191 сл.

³ Ibid.

⁴ See А. И. Смирницкий. *Перфект и категория временной отнесённости*. Иностранные языки в школе, 1955, № 1, 2.

1. Scholars have been trying to define the basic character of this category without paying sufficient attention to the system of categories of which it is bound to make a part. As we shall see presently, considerations of the system as a whole rule out some of the proposed solutions.

2. In seeking the meaning of the category, scholars have not always been careful to distinguish between its basic meaning (the invariable) and its modifications due to influence of context.

3. In seeking the basic meaning of the category, scholars have not always drawn a clear line of distinction between the meaning of the grammatical category as such and the meanings which belong to, or are influenced by, the lexical meaning of the verb (or verbs) used in one of the perfect forms.

If we carefully eliminate these three sources of error and confusion we shall have a much better chance of arriving at a true and objective solution. Let us now consider the views expressed by different scholars in the order in which we mentioned them above.

If we are to find out whether the perfect can be a tense category, i. e. a tense among other tenses, we must consider its relations to the tenses already established and not liable to doubts about their basic character, i. e. past, present, and future. There is no real difficulty here. We need only recollect that there are in Modern English the forms¹ present perfect, past perfect, and future perfect. That present, past, and future are tense categories, is firmly established and has never been doubted by anyone. Now, if the perfect were also a tense category, the present perfect would be a union of two different tenses (the present and the perfect), the past perfect would likewise be a union of two different tenses (the past and the perfect) and the future perfect, too, would be a union of two different tenses (the future and the perfect). This is clearly impossible. If a form already belongs to a tense category (say, the present) it cannot simultaneously belong to another tense category, since two tense categories in one form would, as it were, collide and destroy each other. Hence it follows that the category of perfect cannot be a tense category. We need not consider here various views expressed by those who thought that the perfect was a tense, since their views, whatever the details may be, are shown to be untenable by the above consideration. So the view that the perfect is a special tense category has been disproved.

In order to find out whether the perfect can be an aspect category, we must consider its relations to the aspects already established,

¹ We use here the non-committal term "form" to avoid any pre-judgement concerning the essence of the category in question. We will use the term in similar contexts elsewhere.

viz. the common and the continuous aspects.¹ This problem does not present any particular difficulty, either. We need only recollect that there are in Modern English such pairs as *is writing* — *has been writing*, *was writing* — *had been writing*, *will be writing* — *will have been writing*, i. e. present continuous and present perfect continuous, past continuous and past perfect continuous, future continuous and future perfect continuous. All of these forms belong to the continuous aspect, so the difference between them cannot possibly be based on any aspect category. For example, since both *was writing* and *had been writing* belong to the continuous aspect (as distinct from *wrote* and *had written*), they cannot be said to differ from each other on an aspect line; otherwise they would at the same time belong to one aspect and to different aspects, which is obviously impossible. Hence the conclusion is unavoidable that the perfect is not an aspect. The views of those who consider the perfect to be an aspect need not therefore be discussed here in detail.

Since the perfect is neither a tense nor an aspect, it is bound to be some special grammatical category, different both from tense and from aspect. This view, though not quite explicitly stated, was first put forward by Prof. A. Smirnitsky in a posthumous article.² It is in complete harmony with the principle of distributive analysis, though Prof. Smirnitsky did not, at the time, use the term "distributive analysis".

The essence of the grammatical category expressed by the perfect, and differing both from tense and from aspect, is hard to define and to find a name for. Prof. Smirnitsky proposed to call it "the category of time relation", which is not a very happy term, because it seems to bring us back to the old view that the perfect is a special kind of tense — a view which Prof. Smirnitsky quite rightly combated. Later it was proposed to replace his term of "time relation" by that of "correlation" (соотнесённость), which has the advantage of eliminating the undesirable term "time". This is decidedly the term to be preferred.

As to the opposition in such pairs as *writes* — *has written*, *wrote* — *had written*, *will write* — *will have written*, *is writing* — *has been writing*, *was writing* — *had been writing*, *will be writing* — *will have been writing*, Prof. Smirnitsky proposed to denote it by the correlative terms "non-perfect" and "perfect". While this

¹ We are proceeding here on the assumption that the existence of these two aspects, and, indeed, of aspect as a category of the English verb has been recognised. If its existence is denied the problem presents itself in a different light (see p. 81).

² See А. И. Смирницкий, *Перфект и категория временной отнесённости*. Иностранные языки в школе, 1955, № 2. See also А. И. Смирницкий, *Морфология английского языка*, 1959, стр. 274—316. Compare И. П. Иванова, *Вид и время в современном английском языке*, стр. 112—113.

latter proposal may be fully accepted, the definition of the meaning of the category presents considerable difficulty. Its essence appears to be precedence: an action expressed by a perfect form precedes some moment in time. We cannot say that it always precedes another action: the present perfect form is most commonly used in sentences which contain no mention of any other action.

On the other hand, the use of a non-perfect form does not necessarily imply that the action did not precede some moment in time. It may, or it may not, have preceded it. To find this out, the reader or hearer has to take into account some other feature of the context, or, possibly, the situation, that is, an extralinguistic factor. Thus, the opposition between perfect and non-perfect forms is shown to be that between a marked and an unmarked item, the perfect forms being marked both in meaning (denoting precedence) and in morphological characteristics (*have* + second participle), and the non-perfect forms unmarked both in meaning (precedence not implied) and in morphological characteristics (purely negative characteristic: the collocation "*have* + second participle" not used). On the whole, as a general term to denote the basic meaning of the perfect the term "correlation" in the above-mentioned meaning seems quite acceptable and we propose to make use of it until a better term is found, which may take some time to happen.

If this view is taken, the system of verbal categories illustrated by the forms *writes*, *is writing*, *has written*, *has been writing*, *wrote*, *was writing*, *had written*, *had been writing*, *will write*, *will be writing*, *will have written*, *will have been writing*, — is based on three groups of notions, viz. **tense**: present vs. past vs. future; **aspect**: common vs. continuous; **correlation**: non-perfect vs. perfect. As is seen from this list, the latter two of the three oppositions are double (or "dichotomic"), i.e. they consist of only two items each, whereas the first (the tense opposition) is triple (or "trichotomic"), i. e. it consists of three items.

We will accept this state of things without entering into a discussion of the question whether every opposition must necessarily be dichotomic, i. e. consist of two members only.

Thus, the opposition between *writes* and *wrote* is one of tense, that between *wrote* and *was writing* one of aspect, and that between *wrote* and *had written* one of correlation. It is obvious that two oppositions may occur together; thus, between *writes* and *was writing* there are simultaneously the oppositions of tense and aspect; between *wrote* and *will have written* there are simultaneously the oppositions of tense and correlation, and between *wrote* and *had been writing* there are simultaneously the oppositions of aspect and correlation. And, finally, all three oppositions may occur together: thus, between *writes* and *had been writing* there are simultaneously the oppositions of tense, aspect, and correlation.

If, in a system of forms, there is only one opposition, it can obviously be represented graphically on a line. If there are two oppositions, they can be represented on a plane. Now, if there are three oppositions, the system obviously cannot be represented on a plane. To represent it, we should have recourse to a three-dimensional solid, viz. a parallelepiped. Prof. A. Smirnitsky has given a sketch of such a parallelepiped in his book.¹ However, a drawing of a parallelepiped cannot give the desired degree of clarity and we will not reproduce it here.

USES OF THE PERFECT FORMS

We have accepted the definition of the basic meaning of the perfect forms as that of "precedence". However, this definition can only be the starting point for a study of the various uses of the perfect forms. Indeed, for more than one case this definition of its meaning will seem wholly inadequate, because its actual meaning in a given context will be influenced by various factors. Though a very great amount of investigation has been carried on in this field and many phenomena have by now been elucidated, it is only fair to say that a complete solution of all the problems involved in the uses and shades of meaning of the perfect forms in Modern English is not yet in sight.

Let us first, ask the question: what kinds of linguistic factors can be expected to have an influence on the use and shades of meaning of the perfect forms? We will try to answer this question in a general way, before proceeding to investigate the possible concrete cases.

These factors, then, would seem to be the following:

- (1) the lexical meaning of the verb;
- (2) the tense category of the form, i. e. whether it is the present perfect, past perfect, or future perfect (we cannot be certain in advance that the tense relation is irrelevant here);
- (3) the syntactical context, i. e. whether the perfect form is used in a simple sentence, or the main clause, or again in a subordinate clause of a complex sentence.

To these should be added an extralinguistic factor, viz.

- (4) the situation in which the perfect form is used.

Let us now consider each of these factors separately and then come to the question of their possible interaction.

(1) The meaning of the verb used can affect the meaning of the perfect form in so far as the verb may denote either an action which is apt to produce an essential change in the state of the object (e. g. *He has broken the cup*) or a process which can last indefinitely

¹ See A. И. Смирницкий, *Морфология английского языка*, стр. 310.

without bringing about any change (e. g. *He has lived in this city since 1945*), etc. With the verb *break*, for instance, the shade of meaning would then be the result of the action (the cup is no longer a cup but a collection of fragments), whereas with the verb *live* no result in this exact sense can be found; we might infer a resultative meaning only in a somewhat roundabout way, by saying that he has now so many years of life in this city behind him. Thus the meaning of result, which we indeed do find in the sentence *He has broken the cup*, appears to be the effect of the combined meanings of the verb as such (in whatever form) and the perfect form as such. It is quite natural that this meaning should have more than once been taken to be the meaning of the perfect category as such, which was a misconception.¹

To give another example, if the verb denotes an action which brings about some new state of things, its perfect form is liable to acquire a shade of meaning which will not be found with a verb denoting an action unable to bring about a new state. We may, for instance, compare the sentences *We have found the book* (this implies that the book, which had been lost, is now once more in our possession) and *We have searched the whole room for the book* (which does not imply any new state with reference to the book). Of course many more examples of this kind might be given. The basic requirement is clear enough: we must find the meaning of the form itself, or its invariable, and not the meaning of the form as modified or coloured by the lexical meaning of the verb. If this requirement is clearly kept in mind, many errors which have been committed in defining the meaning of the form will be avoided.

(2) The possible dependence of the meaning of perfect forms on the tense category (present, past or future) is one of the most difficult problems which the theory of the perfect has had to face. It is quite natural to suppose that there ought to be an invariable meaning of the phrase "*have* + second participle", no matter what the tense of the verb *have* happens to be, and this indeed is the assumption we start from. However, it would be dangerous to consider this hypothesis as something ascertained, without undertaking an objective investigation of all the facts which may throw some light on the problem. We may, for instance, suspect that the present perfect, which denotes "precedence to the present", i. e. to the moment of speech, may prove different from the past perfect, denoting precedence to a moment in the past, or the future perfect, denoting precedence to a moment in the future: both the past and the future are, of course, themselves related in some way to the

¹ This was very aptly pointed out by Prof. G. Vorontsova in her book (p. 196), where she criticised this conception of the English perfect found in several authors.

present, which appears as the centre to which all other moments of time are referred in some way or other. One of the chief points in this sphere is the following. If an action precedes another action, and the meaning of the verb is such a one that the action can have a distinct result, the present perfect form, together with the lexical meaning of the verb (and, we should add, possibly with some element of the context) may produce the meaning of a result to be seen at the very moment the sentence is uttered, so that the speaker can point at that result with his finger, as it were. Now with the past perfect and with the future perfect things are bound to be somewhat different. The past perfect (together with the factors mentioned above) would mean that the result was there at a certain moment in the past, so that the speaker could not possibly point at it with his finger. Still less could he do that if the action he spoke about was in the future, and the future perfect (again, together with all those factors) denoted a result that would be there in the future only (that is, it would only be an expected result).¹ All this has to be carefully gone into, if we are to achieve really objective conclusions and if we are to avoid unfounded generalisations and haphazard assertions which may be disproved by examining an example or two which did not happen to be at our disposal at the moment of writing.

(3) The syntactical context in which a perfect form is used is occasionally a factor of the highest importance in determining the ultimate meaning of the sentence. To illustrate this point, let us consider a few examples: *There was a half-hearted attempt at a maintenance of the properties, and then Wilbraham Hall rang with the laughter of a joke which the next day had become the common precious property of the Five Towns.* (BENNETT) *Overton waited quietly till he had finished.* (LINDSAY) *But before he had answered, she made a grimace which Mark understood.* (R. WEST) The action denoted by the past perfect in these sentences is not thought of as preceding the action denoted by the past tense.

Another possibility of the context influencing the actual meaning of the sentence will be seen in the following examples. The question, *How long have you been here?* of course implies that the person addressed still is in the place meant by the adverb *here*. An answer like *I have been here for half an hour* would then practically mean, 'I have been here for half an hour and I still am here and may stay here for some time to come'. On the other hand, when, in G. B. Shaw's play, "Mrs Warren's Profession" (Act I), Vivie comes into the room and Mrs Warren asks her, "*Where have you been, Vivie?*" it is quite evident that Vivie no longer is in the place about

¹ See also below (p. 111) on the modal shades of the future.

which Mrs Warren is inquiring; now she is in the room with her mother and it would be pointless for Mrs Warren to ask any question about that. These two uses of the present perfect (and similar uses of the past perfect, too) have sometimes been classed under the headings "present (or past) perfect inclusive" and "present (or past) perfect exclusive". This terminology cannot be recommended, because it suggests the idea that there are two different meanings of the present (or past) perfect, which is surely wrong. The difference does not lie in the meanings of the perfect form, but depends on the situation in which the sentence is used. The same consideration applies to the present (or past) perfect continuous, which is also occasionally classified into present (or past) perfect continuous inclusive and present (or past) perfect continuous exclusive. The difference in the meaning of sentences is a very real one, as *will* be seen from the following examples. "*Sam, you know everybody,*" she said, "*who is that terrible man I've been talking to? His name is Campofiore.*" (R. WEST) *I have been saving money these many months.* (THACKERAY, quoted by Poutsma) *Do you mean to say that lack has been playing with me all the time? That he has been urging me not to marry you because he intends to marry you himself?* (SHAW) However, this is not a difference in the meaning of the verbal form itself, which is the same in all cases, but a difference depending on the situation or context. If we were to ascribe the two meanings to the form as such, we should be losing its grammatical invariable, which we are trying to determine.

Of course it cannot be said that the analysis here given exhausts all possible uses and applications of the perfect forms in Modern English. We should always bear in mind that extensions of uses are possible which may sometimes go beyond the strict limits of the system. Thus, we occasionally find the present perfect used in complex sentences both in the main and in the subordinate clause — a use which does not quite fit in with the definition of the meaning of the form. E. g. *I've sometimes wondered if I haven't seemed a little too frank and free with you, if you might not have thought I had "gone gay", considering our friendship was so far from intimate.* (R. WEST) We shall best understand this use if we substitute the past tense for the present perfect. The sentence then would run like this: *I have sometimes wondered if I hadn't seemed a little too frank and free with you...* An important shade of meaning of the original sentence has been lost in this variant, viz. that of an experience summed up and ready at the time of speaking. With the past tense, the sentence merely deals with events of a past time unconnected with the present, whereas with the present perfect there is the additional meaning of all those past events being alive in the speaker's mind.

Other examples might of course be found in which there is some peculiarity or other in the use of a perfect form. In the course of time, if such varied uses accumulate, they may indeed bring about a modification of the meaning of the form itself. This, however, lies beyond the scope of our present study.

The three verbal categories considered so far — aspect, tense, and correlation — belong together in the sense that the three express facets of the action closely connected, and could therefore even occasionally be confused and mistaken for each other. There is also some connection, though of a looser kind, between these three and some other verbal categories which we will now consider, notably that of mood and that of voice. We will in each case point out the connections as we come upon them.

THE VERB: MOOD

The category of mood in the present English verb has given rise to so many discussions, and has been treated in so many different ways, that it seems hardly possible to arrive at any more or less convincing and universally acceptable conclusion concerning it. Indeed, the only points in the sphere of mood which have not so far been disputed seem to be these: (a) there is a category of mood in Modern English, (b) there are at least two moods in the modern English verb, one of which is the indicative. As to the number of the other moods and as to their meanings and the names they ought to be given, opinions to-day are as far apart as ever. It is to be hoped that the new methods of objective linguistic investigation will do much to improve this state of things. Meanwhile we shall have to try to get at the roots of this divergence of views and to establish at least the starting points of an objective investigation. We shall have to begin with a definition of the category. Various definitions have been given of the category of mood. One of them (by Academician V. Vinogradov) is this: "Mood expresses the relation of the action to reality, as stated by the speaker." ¹ This definition seems plausible on the whole, though the words "relation of the action to reality" may not be clear enough. What is meant here is that different moods express different degrees of reality of an action, viz. one mood represents it as actually taking (or having taken) place, while another represents it as merely conditional or desired, etc.

It should be noted at once that there are other ways of indicating the reality or possibility of an action, besides the verbal category of mood, viz. modal verbs (*may, can, must, etc.*), and modal words (*perhaps, probably, etc.*), which do not concern us here. All these phenomena fall under the very wide notion of modality, which is not confined to grammar but includes some parts of lexicology and of phonetics (intonation) as well.

In proceeding now to an analysis of moods in English, let us first state the main division, which has been universally recognised. This is the division of moods into the one which represents an action as real, i. e. as actually taking place (the indicative) as against that or those which represent it as non-real, i. e. as merely imaginary, conditional, etc.

THE INDICATIVE

The use of the indicative mood shows that the speaker represents the action as real.

¹ See V. B. Виноградов, *Русский язык*, стр. 581.

Two additional remarks are necessary here.

(1) The mention of the speaker (or writer) who represents the action as real is most essential. If we limited ourselves to saying that the indicative mood is used to represent real actions, we should arrive at the absurd conclusion that whatever has been stated by anybody (in speech or in writing) in a sentence with its predicate verb in the indicative mood is therefore necessarily true. We should then ignore the possibility of the speaker either being mistaken or else telling a deliberate lie. The point is that grammar (and indeed linguistics as a whole) does not deal with the ultimate truth or untruth of a statement with its predicate verb in the indicative (or, for that matter, in any other) mood. What is essential from the grammatical point of view is the meaning of the category as used by the author of this or that sentence. Besides, what are we to make of statements with their predicate verb in the indicative mood found in works of fiction? In what sense could we say, for instance, that the sentence *David Copperfield married Dora* or the sentence *Soames Forsyte divorced his first wife, Irene* represent "real facts", since we are aware that the men and women mentioned in these sentences never existed "in real life"? This is more evident still for such nursery rhyme sentences as, *The cow jumped over the moon*. This peculiarity of the category of mood should be always firmly kept in mind.

(2) Some doubt about the meaning of the indicative mood may arise if we take into account its use in conditional sentences such as the following: *I will speak to him if I meet him*.

It may be argued that the action denoted by the verb in the indicative mood (in the subordinate clauses as well as in the main clauses) is not here represented as a fact but merely as a possibility (I may meet him, and I may not, etc.). However, this does not affect the meaning of the grammatical form as such. The conditional meaning is expressed by the conjunction, and of course it does alter the modal meaning of the sentence, but the meaning of the verb form as such remains what it was. As to the predicate verb of the main clause, which expresses the action bound to follow the fulfilment of the condition laid down in the subordinate clause, it is no more uncertain than an action belonging to the future generally is. This brings us to the question of a peculiar modal character of the future indicative, as distinct from the present or past indicative. In the sentence *If he was there I did not see him* the action of the main clause is stated as certain, in spite of the fact that the subordinate clause is introduced by *if* and, consequently, its action is hypothetical. The meaning of the main clause cannot be affected by this, apparently because the past has a firmer meaning of reality than the future.

On the whole, then, the hypothetical meaning attached to clauses introduced by *if* is no objection to the meaning of the indicative as a verbal category.¹

THE IMPERATIVE

The imperative mood in English is represented by one form only, viz. *come(!)*, without any suffix or ending.²

It differs from all other moods in several important points. It has no person, number, tense, or aspect distinctions, and, which is the main thing, it is limited in its use to one type of sentence only, viz. imperative sentences. Most usually a verb in the imperative has no pronoun acting as subject. However, the pronoun may be used in emotional speech, as in the following example: "*But, Tessie—*" *he pleaded, going towards her. "You leave me alone!" she cried out loudly.* (E. CALDWELL) These are essential peculiarities distinguishing the imperative, and they have given rise to doubts as to whether the imperative can be numbered among the moods at all. This of course depends on what we mean by mood. If we accept the definition of mood given above (p. 99) there would seem to be no ground to deny that the imperative is a mood. The definition does not say anything about the possibility of using a form belonging to a modal category in one or more types of sentences: that syntactical problem is not a problem of defining mood. If we were to define mood (and, indeed, the other verbal categories) in terms of syntactical use, and to mention the ability of being used in various types of sentences as prerequisite for a category to be acknowledged as mood, things would indeed be different and the imperative would have to go. Such a view is possible but it has not so far been developed by any scholar and until that is convincingly done there appears no ground to exclude the imperative.

A serious difficulty connected with the imperative is the absence of any specific morphological characteristics: with all verbs, including the verb *be*, it coincides with the infinitive, and in all verbs, except *be*, it also coincides with the present indicative apart from the 3rd person singular. Even the absence of a subject pronoun *you*, which would be its syntactical characteristic, is not a reliable feature at all, as sentences like *You sit here!* occur often enough.

¹ We will consider some other cases of modal shades possible for the indicative later on (see p. 111).

² There seems to be only one case of what might be called the perfect imperative, namely, the form *have done (!)* of the verb *do*. It has to a great extent been lexicalised and it now means, 'stop immediately'. The order is, as it were, that the action should already be finished by the time the order is uttered. This is quite an isolated case, and of course there is no perfect imperative in the English verb system as a whole.

Meaning alone may not seem sufficient ground for establishing a grammatical category. Thus, no fully convincing solution of the problem has yet been found.

THE OTHER MOODS

Now we come to a very difficult set of problems, namely those connected with the subjunctive, conditional, or whatever other name we may choose to give these moods.

The chief difficulty analysis has to face here is the absence of a straightforward mutual relation between meaning and form. Sometimes the same external series of signs will have two (or more) different meanings depending on factors lying outside the form itself, and outside the meaning of the verb; sometimes, again, the same modal meaning will be expressed by two different series of external signs.

The first of these two points may be illustrated by the sequence *we should come*, which means one thing in the sentence *I think we should come here again to-morrow* (here *we should come* is equivalent to *we ought to come*); it means another thing in the sentence *If we knew that he wants us we should come to see him* (here *we should come* denotes a conditional action, i. e. an action depending on certain conditions), and it means another thing again in the sentence *How queer that we should come at the very moment when you were talking about us!* (here *we should come* denotes an action which has actually taken place and which is considered as an object for comment). In a similar way, several meanings may be found in the sequence *he would come* in different contexts.

The second of the two points may be illustrated by comparing the two sentences, *I suggest that he go* and *I suggest that he should go*, and we will for the present neglect the fact that the first of the two variants is more typical of American, and the second of British English.

It is quite clear, then, that we shall arrive at different systems of English moods, according as we make our classification depend on the meaning (in that case one *should come* will find its place under one heading, and the other *should come* under another, whereas *(he) go* and *(he) should go* will find their place under the same heading) or on form (in that case *he should come* will fall under one heading, no matter in what context it may be used, while *(he) go* and *(he) should go* will fall under different headings).

This difficulty appears to be one of the main sources of that wide divergence of views which strikes every reader of English grammars when he reaches the chapter on moods.

It is natural to suppose that a satisfactory solution may be found by combining the two approaches (that based on meaning and that based on form) in some way or other. But here again we are faced with difficulties when we try to determine the exact way in which they should be combined. Shall we start with criteria based on meaning and first establish the main categories on this principle, and then subdivide each of these categories according to formal criteria, and in this way arrive at the final smallest units in the sphere of mood? Or shall we proceed in the opposite way and start with formal divisions, etc.? All these are questions which can only be answered in a more or less arbitrary way, so that a really binding solution cannot be expected on these lines. Whatever system of moods we may happen to arrive at, it will always be possible for somebody else to say that a different solution is also conceivable and perhaps better than the one we have proposed.¹

Matters are still further complicated by two phenomena where we are faced with a choice between polysemy and homonymy. One of these concerns forms like *lived*, *knew*, etc. Such forms appear in two types of contexts, of which one may be exemplified by the sentences, *He lived here five years ago*, or *I knew it all along*, and the other by the sentences, *If he lived here he would come at once*, or, *If I knew his address I should write to him*.

In sentences of the first type the form obviously is the past tense of the indicative mood. The second type admits of two interpretations: either the forms *lived*, *knew*, etc. are the same forms of the past indicative that were used in the first type, but they have acquired another meaning in this particular context, or else the forms *lived*, *knew*, etc. are forms of some other mood, which only happen to be homonymous with forms of the past indicative but are basically different.²

The other question concerns forms like *(I) should go*, *(he) would go*. These are also used in different contexts, as may be seen from the following sentences: *I said I should go at once*, *I should go if I knew the place*, *Whom should I meet but him*, etc.

The question which arises here is this: is the group *(he) would go* in both cases the same form, with its meaning changed according to the syntactic context, so that one context favours the temporal meaning ("future-in-the-past") and the other a modal meaning (a mood of some sort, differing from the indicative; we will not go now into details about what mood this should be), or are they

¹ It may be noted here that similar difficulties, though perhaps on a smaller scale, are to be found in analysing moods in Russian. See, for example, В. В. Виноградов, *Русский язык*, стр. 584 сл.

² In this discussion we treat merely of the present state of things, not of its origins.

homonyms, that is, two basically different forms which happen to coincide in sound? ¹

The problem of polysemy or homonymy with reference to such forms as *knew*, *lived*, or *should come*, *would come*, and the like is a very hard one to solve. It is surely no accident that the solutions proposed for it have been so widely varied. ²

Having, then, before us this great accumulation of difficulties and of problems to which contradictory solutions have been proposed without any one author being able to prove his point in such a way that everybody would have to admit his having proved it, we must now approach this question: what way of analysing the category of mood in Modern English shall we choose if we are to achieve objectively valid results, so far as this is at all possible?

There is another peculiar complication in the analysis of mood. The question is, what verbs are auxiliaries of mood in Modern English? The verbs *should* and *would* are auxiliaries expressing unreality (whatever system of moods we may adopt after all). But the question is less clear with the verb *may* when used in such sentences as *Come closer that I may hear what you say* (and, of course, the form *might* if the main clause has a predicate verb in a past tense). Is the group *may hear* some mood form of the verb *hear*, or is it a free combination of two verbs, thus belonging entirely to the field of syntax, not morphology? The same question may be asked about the verb *may* in such sentences as *May you be happy!* where it is part of a group used to express a wish, and is perhaps a mood auxiliary. We ought to seek an objective criterion which would enable us to arrive at a convincing conclusion.

Last of all, a question arises concerning the forms traditionally named the imperative mood, i. e. forms like *come* in the sentence *Come here, please!* or *do not be* in the sentence *Do not be angry with him, please!* The usual view that they are mood forms has recently been attacked on the ground that their use in sentences is rather different from that of other mood forms. ³

All these considerations, varied as they are, make the problem of mood in Modern English extremely difficult to solve and they seem to show in advance that no universally acceptable solution can be hoped for in a near future. Those proposed so far have been extremely unlike each other. Owing to the difference of approach to moods, grammarians have been vacillating between two extremes — 3 moods (indicative, subjunctive and imperative), put forward by

¹ Here, too, it should be kept in mind that we are dealing merely with the present state of things, not with its historical origins.

² We may note in passing that quite similar difficulties of choice between polysemy and homonymy are met with in the sphere of lexicology (note the discussions on such words as *head*, *hand*, *board*, etc.).

³ See above, p. 101.

many grammarians, and 16 moods, as proposed by M. Deutschbein.¹ Between these extremes there are intermediate views, such as that of Prof. A. Smirnitsky, who proposed a system of 6 moods (indicative, imperative, subjunctive I, subjunctive II, suppositional, and conditional),² and who was followed in this respect by M. Ganshina and N. Vasilevskaya.³ The problem of English moods was also investigated by Prof. G. Vorontsova⁴ and by a number of other scholars. In view of this extreme variety of opinions and of the fact that each one of them has something to be said in its favour (the only one, perhaps, which appears to be quite arbitrary and indefensible is that of M. Deutschbein) it would be quite futile for us here either to assert that any one of those systems is the right one, or to propose yet another, and try to defend it against all possible objections which might be raised. We will therefore content ourselves with pointing out the main possible approaches and trying to assess their relative force and their weak points. If we start from the meanings of the mood forms (leaving

Meaning	Means of Expression
Inducement (order, request, prayer, and the like)	<i>come (!)</i> (no ending, no auxiliary, and usually without subject. 2nd person only)
Possibility (action thought of as conditionally possible, or as purpose of another action, etc.)	(1) <i>(he) come</i> (no ending, no auxiliary) (2) <i>should come</i> (<i>should</i> for all persons) (3) <i>may come (?)</i>
Unreal condition	<i>came, had come</i> (same as past or past perfect indicative), used in subordinate clauses
Consequence of unreal condition	<i>should come</i> (1st person) <i>would come</i> (2nd and 3rd person)

We would thus get either four moods (if possibility, unreal condition, and consequence of unreal condition are each taken

¹ M. Deutschbein, *System der neuenglischen Syntax*, S. 112 ff. ² See *Русско-английский словарь*, под общим руководством проф. А. И. Смирницкого, 1948, стр. 979; А. И. Смирницкий, *Морфология английского языка*, 1959, стр. 341—352. ³ М. Ganshina and N. Vasilevskaya, *English Grammar*, 7th ed., 1951, P. 161 ff. ⁴ Г. Н. Воронцова, *Очерки по грамматике английского языка*, 1960, стр. 240 сл.

separately), or three moods (if any two of these are taken together), or two moods (if they are all three taken together under the heading of "non-real action"). The choice between these variants will remain arbitrary and *is* unlikely ever to be determined by means of any objective data. If, on the other hand, we start from the means of expressing moods (both synthetical and analytical) we are likely to get something like this system:

Means of Expression	Meaning
<i>come</i> (!) (no ending, no auxiliary, and usually without subject) (<i>he</i>)	Inducement
<i>come</i> (no ending in any person, no auxiliary) <i>came, had come</i>	Possibility
<i>should come</i> (for all persons)	Unreal condition Unlikely condition
<i>should come</i> (1st person)	Matter for assessment ¹ Consequence of unreal condition
<i>would come</i> (2nd and 3rd person)	Wish or purpose
<i>may come</i> (?)	

In this way we should obtain a different system, comprising six moods, with the following meanings: (1) Inducement (2) Possibility (3) Unreal condition (4) Unlikely condition (5) Consequence of unreal condition (6) Wish or purpose Much additional light could probably be thrown on the whole vexed question by strict application of modern exact methods of language analysis. However, this task remains yet to be done.

¹ The group "*should* + infinitive" may, among other things, be used to denote a real fact which, however, is not stated as such but mentioned as something to be assessed. This use is restricted to subordinate clauses. Here are two typical examples: *That he should think it worth his while to fancy himself in love with her was a matter of lively astonishment.* (J. AUSTEN) Here the predicate group of the main clause includes a word expressing assessment (*astonishment*), and the group "*should* + infinitive" denotes the fact which is being thus assessed. *It was wonderful that her friends should seem so little elated by the possession of such a home; that the consciousness of it should be so meekly borne.* (J. AUSTEN) We find here the same typical features of this kind of sentences: a word expressing assessment (*wonderful*) as a predicative

We will now turn our attention to those problems of polysemy or homonymy which have been stated above.

It would seem that some basic principle should be chosen here before we proceed to consider the facts. Either we shall be ready to accept homonymy easily, rather than admit that a category having a definite meaning can, under certain circumstances, come to be used in a different meaning; or we shall avoid homonymy as far as possible, and only accept it if all other attempts to explain the meaning and use of a category have failed. The choice between these two procedures will probably always remain somewhat arbitrary, and the solution of a problem of this kind is bound to have a subjective element about it.

Let us now assume that we shall avoid homonymy as far as possible and try to keep the unity of a form in its various uses.

The first question to be considered here is that about forms of the type *lived* and *knew*. The question is whether these forms, when used in subordinate clauses of unreal condition, are the same forms that are otherwise known as the past indefinite indicative, or whether they are different forms, homonymous with the past indefinite.

If we take the view stated above, the *lived* and *knew* forms will be described in the following terms:

They are basically forms of the past tense indicative. This is their own meaning and they actually have this meaning unless some specified context shows that the meaning is different. These possible contexts have to be described in precise terms so that no room remains for doubts and ambiguities. They should be represented as grammatical patterns (which may also include some lexical items).

Pattern No. 1 (for the *lived* or *knew* forms having a meaning dif-

$$If + \left\{ \begin{array}{c} \text{noun} \\ \text{pronoun} \end{array} \right\} + \left\{ \begin{array}{c} \textit{lived} \\ \textit{knew} \end{array} \right\} + \dots + \left\{ \begin{array}{c} \text{noun} \\ \text{pronoun} \end{array} \right\} + \left\{ \begin{array}{c} \textit{should} \\ \textit{would} \end{array} \right\} + \text{infinitive} + \dots$$

Appearing in this context a form of the *lived* or *knew* type denotes an unreal action in the present or future. Pattern No. 2 (for the same meaning):

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{c} \text{noun} \\ \text{pronoun} \end{array} \right\} + \textit{wish} + \left\{ \begin{array}{c} \text{noun} \\ \text{pronoun} \end{array} \right\} + \left\{ \begin{array}{c} \textit{lived} \\ \textit{knew} \end{array} \right\} + \dots$$

Appearing in this context, too, a form of the *lived* or *knew* type denotes an unreal action in the present. Pattern No. 3 (for the same meaning):

$$It \textit{ is time} + \left\{ \begin{array}{c} \text{noun} \\ \text{pronoun} \end{array} \right\} + \left\{ \begin{array}{c} \textit{lived} \\ \textit{knew} \end{array} \right\} + \dots$$

ferent from the past indicative):

We cannot give here a complete list of patterns. However, such a list is necessary if the conditions of a peculiar application of the *lived* or *knew* forms are to be" made clear.

We might also take the view that wherever a difference in meaning is found we have to deal with homonyms. In that case we should say that there are two homonymous *lived* forms: *lived*₁ is the past indicative of the verb *live*, and *lived*₂ is its present subjunctive (or whatever we may call it). The same, of course, would apply to *knew* and to all other forms of this kind. However, this would not introduce any change into the patterns stated above. We should only have to change the heading, and to say that, for example, Pattern No. 1 shows the conditions under which *lived* or *knew* is the form of the present subjunctive. It becomes evident here that the difference between the two views affect the interpretation of grammatical phenomena, rather than the phenomena themselves.

A similar problem concerns the groups "*should* + infinitive" and "*would* + infinitive". Two views are possible here. If we have decided to avoid homonymy as far as possible, we will say that a group of this type is basically a tense (the future-in-the-past), which under certain specified conditions may express an unreal action — the consequence of an unfulfilled condition.¹

¹ With these groups the problem is further complicated by the fact that both "*should* + infinitive" and "*would* + infinitive" have other meanings, besides the temporal and the modal ones, "*Should* + infinitive" can, as is well known, denote obligation and thus be synonymous with "*ought* + to-infinitive", whereas "*would* + infinitive" can also denote repetition of the action (as in the sentence *He would come and sit with us for hours*) and volition (as in the sentence *Try as I might, he would not agree to my proposal*). The exact delimitation of all these possibilities is a somewhat arduous task. A complete theory of the matter would require a complete list of patterns for every possible meaning of each group.

Here is an extract from a novel by Jane Austen which is interesting from this viewpoint: *Thorpe defended himself very stoutly, declared he had never seen two men so much alike in his life, and would hardly give up the point of its having been Tilney himself*. Since there is, in this sentence, a verb denoting speech in the past tense (*declared*) and an object clause attached to it, with its predicate verb in the past perfect tense (*had never seen*), it would be all but natural to suppose that *would ... give up* is a future-in-the-past and a second predicate in the object clause whose first predicate is *had ... seen*. It is only the lexical meanings of the words (*hardly, give up*) that show this interpretation to be a mistake: in reality the predicate *would hardly give up* is a third predicate in the main clause, whose first two predicates are *defended* and *declared*. From this it becomes evident that *would hardly give up* is a compound predicate, meaning, approximately, 'did not want to give up...' To illustrate further the importance of the lexical meanings, let us substitute other words for the ones in the text, leaving the pattern "*would* + infinitive" untouched; for instance, *Thorpe defended himself very stoutly, declared he had never seen two men so much alike in his life, and would never believe it was another man*. In that case the "*would* + infinitive" might quite well be the future-in-the-past.

The patterns in which this is the case would seem to be the following (we will give only two of them) : Pattern No. 1:

$$\text{If} + \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{noun} \\ \text{pronoun} \end{array} \right\} + \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{lived} \\ \text{knew} \end{array} \right\} + \dots + \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{noun} \\ \text{pronoun} \end{array} \right\} + \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{should} \\ \text{would} \end{array} \right\} + \text{infinitive} + \dots$$

Pattern No. 2:

$$\text{Should} + \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{noun} \\ \text{pronoun} \end{array} \right\} + \text{infinitive} + \dots + \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{noun} \\ \text{pronoun} \end{array} \right\} + \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{should} \\ \text{would} \end{array} \right\} + \text{infinitive} + \dots$$

As a third pattern, it would be necessary to give the sentence, in which there is no subordinate clause, e. g. *I should be very glad to see him*. Here, however, the distinction between the temporal and the modal meaning is a matter of extreme subtlety and no doubt many lexical peculiarities would have to be taken into account. Especially in the so-called represented speech (see p. 333) the conditions for the one and the other meaning to be realised are very intricate, as will be seen from the following extract: *To the end of her life she would remember again the taste of the fried egg sandwich on her tongue, could bite again into the stored coolness of the apple she picked up from the red heap on a trestle table. ...She would never again see the country round Laurence Vernon's home as she saw it the first time with Roy.* (R. WEST) A variety of factors, both grammatical and lexical, go to show that the meaning here is that of the future-in-the-past. Compare: *But Isabelle could do nothing, she and Marc had been brought by the Bourges, who were now murmuring frenetically, that they would feel better at the Sporting Club* (Idem), where it is hard to tell which meaning is preferable.

If we endorse the other view, that is, if we take the temporal and the modal groups "should (would) + infinitive" to be homonyms the patterns themselves will not change. The change will affect the headings. We shall have to say, in that case, that the patterns serve to distinguish between two basically different forms sounding alike. Again, just as in the case of *lived* and *knew*, this will be a matter of interpreting facts, rather than of the facts as such.

GROUPS WHICH OUGHT NOT TO BE CLASSED UNDER MODAL CATEGORIES

Among these we must mention first the groups *let me go*, *let us go*, and *let him (them) go*, i. e. the patterns "let + personal pronoun (in the objective case) or noun (in the common case) + infinitive" which may be used to denote (1) a decision of the 1st person sin-

gular (i. e. of the speaker himself) to commit an action, or (2) an appeal to the 1st person plural, that is to one or more interlocutors to commit an action together with the speaker, or (3) an appeal to the 3rd person (singular or plural) to commit some action.

There is the question whether groups of this structure can or cannot be recognised as analytical forms of the imperative. This question must be answered in the negative for the following reasons. The noun or pronoun following the verb *let* stands in an object relation to this verb. This is especially clear with personal pronouns, which are bound to appear in the objective case form: *Let me go* (not *I*), *let him go* (not *he*), etc. If we were to say that the formation "*let* + personal pronoun + infinitive" is a form of the imperative, we should have to accept the conclusion that the subject is expressed by a pronoun in the objective case (the nominative being impossible here), which is obviously unacceptable, as it would run counter to all the principles of English syntactic structure. This formation is therefore not an analytical form of the imperative mood, and the verb *let* not an auxiliary of that mood (or, indeed, of any other grammatical category). Expressions of the type *let me go*, *let us go*, *let him go* are therefore not in any way morphological phenomena. They belong to syntax. The imperative mood is represented by 2nd person forms only.

It might be argued that, since there are no other persons within the system of the imperative, the 2nd person is not opposed to any other person and does not therefore exist as a grammatical category. If we take this view we should have to say that there is no category of person at all in the imperative. This view is quite defensible, provided we take the system of the imperative as something existing in its own right and not within the wider framework of the verb system as a whole. If, on the other hand, we do place it in this wider framework we shall recognise that the form *come* (!) bears the same reference to person as the form (*you*) *come* (!) and we shall not deny it the right to be called a 2nd person form. Here, indeed, the decision arrived at will depend on the view we take of the problem on a wider scale.

MOOD AND TENSE

We have already discussed some relations between mood and tense in dealing with such forms as *lived*, *knew*, and such forms as *should come*, *would come*.

There are, however, some other problems in this field, which we have not so far touched upon.

First of all, there is the use of the future tense to denote an action referring to the present and considered as probable (not

certain). We can illustrate this use by examples of the following kind: *The House will know that...* (used, for example, in parliament speeches).

The sources of this use seem clear enough. The original meaning of such sentences seems to have been, approximately, this: 'It will appear (afterwards) that you know', etc.

In a similar way the future perfect can be used to denote an action which is thought of as finished by the time of speaking and represented as probable. This is seen in such sentences as the following: *...You'll not have spoken to her mother yet?* (LINKLATER), which is equivalent to *Probably you have not spoken to her mother yet?* The origin of this use is analogous to that of the future as shown above. The sentence just quoted would have meant, 'It will appear (afterwards) that you have not spoken', etc. In the following example the future-in-the-past and the future-perfect-in-the-past are used in this way: *I made for my lodgings where by now Melissa would be awake, and would have set out our evening meal on the newspaper-covered table.* (DURRELL) It is the adverbial modifier *by now* which makes the meaning perfectly clear.

In this way both the future and the future perfect can acquire a peculiar modal colouring. As in some previous cases, we ought to look for certain patterns, including, probably, lexical as well as grammatical items, in which this modal colouring is found.¹

An interdependence between mood and tense which has a much wider meaning may be found if we analyse the system of tenses together with that of moods. When the question arises, how many tenses there are in the Modern English verb and what these tenses are, examples for that kind of analysis are always taken from the indicative mood.² Indeed, it is only in this mood that we find the system of tenses fully developed. In no other mood, however we may classify those other moods, shall we find the same system of tenses as in the indicative. The cause of this is evident enough: it is the indicative mood which is used to represent real actions, and it is such actions that are described by exact temporal characteristics. As to those actions which do not take place in reality but are thought of as possible, desirable, etc., they would not require a detailed time characteristic. Time is essentially objective, while all moods except the indicative are subjective.

¹ A similar phenomenon is found in Russian, as when a verb in the future form (chiefly the verb *быть*) is used to denote something referring to the present, with a peculiar modal colouring, e.g. *До меня верст пять будет* (ТУРГЕНЕВ), *А кто ж такая будете?* (Idem) See В. В. Виноградов, *Русский язык*, стр. 575.

² This is of course also true of Russian grammar: the analysis of the three tenses of the Russian verb is always based on material provided by the indicative mood.

Things are quite clear in the sphere of the imperative. Since its basic meaning is an appeal to the listener to perform an action it is obviously incompatible with the past tense. A difference might exist between present and future, in the sense that the speaker might appeal to the listener to perform the action either immediately or at some future time. However, no such difference is found in the imperative forms either in English or in most other languages.¹

As to the moods expressing condition, desire, and the like, the problem of tense is somewhat more complicated. If we compare the two well-known types of conditional clauses:

- (1) *If he knew this, he would come,*
- (2) *If he had known this, he would have come,*

we are faced with a complexity of interwoven problems. Evidently our interpretation of these phenomena will depend on our treatment of the forms *knew*, *would come*, *had known*, and *would have come* (see above).

If we take the view that *knew* is the past indicative which in this context is used to express an unreal action in the present, and *would come* the future-in-the-past, which in this context is used to express an unreal consequence in the present, there is nothing more to be said about the tense or any other category appearing in this type of sentence.

In a similar way, if we take the view that *had known* is the past perfect indicative which in this context is used to express an unreal condition in the past, and *would have come* the future-perfect-in-the-past which in this context is used to express an unreal consequence in the past, there is nothing more to be said about it.

If, on the other hand, we interpret the forms *knew*, *had known*, *would come*, and *would have come* as special mood forms, we shall have to characterise the difference between *knew* and *had known* and that between *would come* and *would have come* in another way. We shall have to find an answer to the question, what grammatical category underlies the oppositions:

knew — *had known*
would come — *would have come*.

Here we are faced with a peculiar difficulty. If we judge by the means of expression (the auxiliary *have* is used in the second

¹ The Latin language does distinguish between a present imperative, e.g. *dic* 'say!' (now), and a future imperative, e.g. *dicito!* 'say!' (afterwards). But this distinction is rarely made use of.

column, but not in the first) we shall compare this opposition to that between

knows — has known
will know — will have known,

and reach the conclusion that the opposition is based on the category of correlation, as defined above. In that case there would not be any tense category at all in the system of these moods.

But it might also be argued that, according to meaning, the opposition is one of tense (present vs. past). In that case there would be the category of tense in these moods but no correlation.

The choice between these two views remains arbitrary. For the sake of the unity of the system it would seem preferable to stick to the view that wherever we find the pattern "*have* + second participle" it is the category of correlation that finds its expression in that way.

To sum up the whole discussion about the categories of the verb found in conditional sentences, the simplest view, and the one to be preferred is that we have here forms of the indicative mood in a special use. Another view is that we have here forms of special moods, and that they are distinguished from each other according to the category of correlation.

If we endorse the view that there are no homonymous forms in the English verb a sentence like *if he knew this he would come* will be interpreted as containing the past tense of the verb *know* and the future-in-the-past of the verb *come*, the very existence of mood as a special grammatical category in Modern English becomes doubtful, since it will appear lacking any specific means of expression. This might be the way to "cut the Gordian knot" of problems posed by the analysis of modal meanings in the verb.

This ends our discussion of aspect, tense, correlation, and mood.

Chapter XII

THE VERB: VOICE

The category of voice presents us with its own batch of difficulties. In their main character they have something in common with the difficulties of mood: there is no strict one-way correspondence between meaning and means of expression. Thus, for instance, in the sentence *I opened the door* and in the sentence *the door opened* the meaning is obviously different, whereas the form of the verb is the same in both cases. To give another example: in the sentence *he shaved the customer* and in the sentence *he shaved and went out* the meaning is different (the second sentence means that he shaved himself), but no difference is to be found in the form of the verb.

We are therefore bound to adopt a principle in distinguishing the voices of the English verb: what shall we take as a starting-point, meaning, or form, or both, and if both, in what proportion, or in what mutual relation? ¹

As to the definition of the category of voice, there are two main views. According to one of them this category expresses the relation between the subject and the action. Only these two are mentioned in the definition. According to the other view, the category of voice expresses the relations between the subject and the object of the action. In this case the object is introduced into the definition of voice.² We will not at present try to solve this question with reference to the English language. We will keep both variants of the definition in mind and we will come back to them afterwards.

Before we start on our investigation, however, we ought to define more precisely what is meant by the expression "relation between subject and action". Let us take two simple examples: *He invited his friends* and *He was invited by his friends*. The relations between the subject (*he*) and the action (*invite*) in the two sentences are different since in the sentence *He invited his friends* he performs the action, and may be said to be the doer, whereas in the sentence *He was invited by his friends* he does not act and is not the doer but the object of the action. There may also be other kinds of relations, which we shall mention in due course.

The obvious opposition within the category of voice is that between active and passive. This has not been disputed by any

¹ Difficulties of a somewhat similar kind are also found in dealing with voices of the Russian verb. On the one hand, the same external sign (the affix *-ся*) may express different meanings, viz. reflexive (*бриться*), reciprocal (*ссориться*), passive (*строиться*), etc., and on the other, the same meaning (passive) may be expressed both by the affix *-ся* and by the pattern "быть + participle in *-н-* or *-м-*", e. g. *дом строился* — *дом был построен*. See В. В. Виноградов, *Русский язык*, стр. 639 сл.

² See *Грамматика русского языка*, т. 1, 1953, стр. 412. The problem is treated in Academician V. Vinogradov's book, p. 607 ff.

scholar, however views may differ concerning other voices. This opposition may be illustrated by a number of parallel forms involving different categories of aspect, tense, correlation, and mood. We will mention only a few pairs of this kind, since the other possible pairs can be easily supplied:

invites — *is invited*
is inviting — *is being invited*
invited — *was invited*
has invited — *has been invited*
should invite — *should be invited*

From the point of view of form the passive voice is the marked member of the opposition: its characteristic is the pattern "be + second participle", whereas the active voice is unmarked: its characteristic is the absence of that pattern.

It should be noted that some forms of the active voice find no parallel in the passive, viz. the forms of the future continuous, present perfect continuous, past perfect continuous, and future perfect continuous. Thus the forms *will be inviting*, *has been inviting*, *had been inviting*, and *will have been inviting* have nothing to correspond to them in the passive voice.

With this proviso we can state that the active and the passive constitute a complete system of oppositions within the category of voice.

The question now is, whether there are other voices in the English verb, besides active and passive. It is here that we find doubts and much controversy.

At various times, the following three voices have been suggested in addition to the two already mentioned:

- (1) the reflexive, as in *he dressed himself*,
- (2) the reciprocal, as in *they greeted each other*, and
- (3) the middle voice, as in *the door opened* (as distinct from *I opened the door*).

It is evident that the problem of voice is very intimately connected with that of transitive and intransitive verbs, which has also been variously treated by different scholars. It seems now universally agreed that transitivity is not in itself a voice, so we could not speak of a "transitive voice"; the exact relation between voice and transitivity remains, however, somewhat doubtful. It is far from clear whether transitivity is a grammatical notion, or a characteristic of the lexical meaning of the verb.

In view of such constructions as *he was spoken of*, *he was taken care of*, *the bed had not been slept in*, etc., we should perhaps say that the vital point is the objective character of the verb, rather than its transitivity: the formation of a passive voice is possible if the verb denotes an action relating to some object.

Last not least, we must mention another problem: what part are syntactic considerations to play in analysing the problem of voice?

Having enumerated briefly the chief difficulties in the analysis of voice in Modern English, we shall now proceed to inquire into each of these problems, trying to find objective criteria as far as this is possible, and pointing out those problems in which any solution is bound to be more or less arbitrary and none can be shown, to be the correct one by any irrefutable proofs.

THE PROBLEM OF A REFLEXIVE VOICE

Taking, then, first the problem of the reflexive voice, we will formulate it in the following way. Can the group "verb + *self-pronoun*" (i. e. *myself*, *himself*, *ourselves*, etc.) be the reflexive voice of a verb, that is, can the *self-pronouns* ever be auxiliary words serving to derive a voice form of the verb? This is putting the problem in purely morphological terms. But it also has a syntactical side to it. From the syntactical viewpoint it can be formulated in another way: does a *self-pronoun* coming after a verb always perform the function of a separate part of the sentence (the direct object), or can it (in some cases at least) be within the same part of the sentence as the verb preceding it (in the vast majority of cases this would be the predicate)?

If we approach this question from the point of view of meaning, we shall see that different cases may be found here. For instance, in the sentence *He hurt himself badly* we might argue that *himself* denotes the object of the action and stands in the same relation to the verb as any other noun or pronoun: *he hurt himself badly* would then be parallel to a sentence like *he hurl me badly*. On the other hand, in a sentence like *He found himself in a dark room* things are different: we could not say that *he found himself* is analogous to *he found me*. We could not, indeed, say that he performed an action, that of finding, and the object of that action was himself. Here, therefore, doubt is at least possible as to whether *himself* is a separate part of the sentence, namely, a direct object, or whether it is part of the predicate. We might possibly have to class *he hurt himself* and *he found himself (in a dark room)* under different headings and this would influence our general conclusions on the category of voice.

Considerations of this kind cannot, however, bring about a solution that would be binding and could not be countered by a different solution which might also be confirmed by more or less valid reasons. If we are to achieve some objective solution, we have to rely on objective data in this case, as in so many other cases.

Objective investigation requires that we should find various syntactic contexts or patterns in which the group "verb + *self-*

pronoun" can appear. For instance, we ought to look for examples of the pattern "verb + *self*-pronoun + *and* + noun or pronoun". If such examples can be found, they will argue in favour of the view that the *self*-pronouns standing after a verb are actually treated as standing in the same relation to the verb as any other noun or pronoun denoting the object of the action. If, on the other hand, no such example could be found, this would go some way towards proving that a *self*-pronoun is not apprehended as standing in the same relation to the verb as any other noun or pronoun following it, and this would be an argument in favour of acknowledging a reflexive voice in the Modern English verb. Other considerations of a syntactical character might also influence our judgement on this question.

The problem has been treated by O. Ovchinnikova,¹ who has collected some examples of the pattern "verb + *self*-pronoun + *and* + noun or pronoun", for instance, / *see this man Meek doing everything that is natural to a complete man: carpentering, painting, digging, pulling and hauling, fetching and carrying, helping himself and everybody else ...* (SHAW) and also examples of a noun functioning as apposition to the *self*-pronoun which comes after a verb, e. g. / *am defending myself — an accused communist.* (FOX) These cases, few as they are, show that a *self*-pronoun following a verb can at least be apprehended as a separate member of the sentence. If it were only part of the predicate it obviously could not have an apposition attached to it. So we may take it as proved that in some cases at least the *self*-pronoun following a verb is not an auxiliary word serving to express a voice category of the verb.

But the question remains, what we are to make of cases such as the following: *It was done, and Catherine found herself alone in the Gallery before the clocks had ceased to strike.* (J. AUSTEN) Here the *self*-pronoun cannot either be joined by *and* to a noun (pronoun), or have a noun in apposition attached to it. Without going into many details concerning these cases, we can merely say that two ways are here open to us.

One way is to say that, since in a number of cases the *self-pronoun* is not an auxiliary word used to form a verbal voice, it is never an auxiliary. Then we should have to treat such cases as *he found himself*. . . etc. as phraseological units and refer their peculiarities to the sphere of lexicology rather than of grammar.

The other way would be to say that in some cases a *self-pronoun* does become an auxiliary of voice. Then *to find oneself* would be treated as a form of the reflexive voice of the verb *find* and the

¹ See O. Г. Овчинникова, *Сочетания „глагол + self-местоимение" и вопрос о возвратном залоге в современном английском языке.* Автореферат канд. дисс., 1963.

group (and, of course, other groups of a similar kind) would remain in the sphere of grammar and we should recognise a reflexive voice in English. There seems at present no binding argument in favour of one or the other solution. We shall have to leave the question open until such a solution can be found.

The treatment of the problem would be incomplete if we did not mention the cases when a verb is used without a *self-pronoun* to denote an action which the "doer performs on himself. Examples of this kind are not numerous. We can mention the verb *dress*, which may be used to mean 'dress oneself, and the verb *wash*, which may be used to mean 'wash oneself'. This is seen, for example, in sentences like the following: *At daybreak the next morning Hame got up and dressed.* (E. CALDWELL) As we see, these verbs denote habitual everyday actions and this appears to be essential for the possibility of such a usage. It would not, for instance, be possible to use the verb *hurt* in the sense of 'hurt oneself', or the verb *accuse* in the sense of 'accuse oneself', etc. Since in the sentence *he dressed quickly* there is no *self-pronoun* and no other special sign to indicate that the doer is performing the action on himself, we cannot include such cases under the category of the reflexive voice even if we were to recognise the existence of such a voice, which, as we have seen, cannot be objectively established.

Cases of this kind will best be considered together with the problem of the middle voice, which see (p. 119 ff.).

THE PROBLEM OF A RECIPROCAL VOICE

Under this heading we will consider formations like *greeted each other*, or *loved each other*, or *praised one another*. The problem is somewhat similar to that of the reflexive voice, and it is this: Does the group *each other* (and the group *one another*) make part of an analytical verb form, that is, is it an auxiliary element used for forming a special voice of the verb, the reciprocal voice, or is it always a separate secondary part of the sentence (though it is hard to tell exactly what part of the sentence it may be)?

We might seek a solution to the question on the same lines as with the reflexive voice, that is, we might try to find out whether the group *each other* (or *one another*) is ever found to be coordinated with a noun or pronoun serving as object to the verb. We should have to see whether such a sentence is ever found as this one: *They kissed each other and the child*, etc. However, such a search would be very hard and not promising at all. Very possibly, we would not find a single example of that kind, but this could not be considered as a proof that *each other* (or *one another*) does serve as an auxiliary to form the reciprocal voice of the verb (*kiss* in this example).

We will not go into this question any deeper and we will limit ourselves to the following conclusion. The solution of the question must remain to a certain extent arbitrary. But, putting together this question and the question of the reflexive voice as discussed above, we may state that the grounds for assuming a special reciprocal voice are weaker than those for assuming a reflexive voice. Therefore if we reject the reflexive voice, we will certainly reject the reciprocal voice as well. If, on the other hand, we accept the reflexive voice, the question about the reciprocal voice will remain open.

As in the case of the reflexive voice, we must also mention the instances, which are rather few, when a verb denotes a reciprocal action without the help of the group *each other* or *one another*. For instance, in the sentence *They kissed and parted*, *kissed* is of course equivalent to *kissed each other*. Since there is no external sign of reciprocity, we cannot find here a reciprocal voice even if we should admit its existence in the language. These cases will also best be considered under the heading "middle voice".

THE PROBLEM OF A MIDDLE VOICE

This problem arises chiefly in connection with the possible double use of a number of verbs in Modern English. Compare, for instance, such pairs of sentences as these:

I opened the door	The door opened
I burnt the paper	The paper burnt
I boiled the water	The water boiled
We resumed the conference	The conference resumed
We apply the rule to many cases	The rule applies to many cases

First let us formulate what is established and does not depend on anybody's point of view or interpretation, and then we will proceed to analyse the questions which admit of different solutions.

The facts, then, are these. In the sentences of the first and in those of the second column we have verb forms sounding alike but differing from each other in two important points:

(1) In the first column, the verb denotes an action which is performed by the doer on an object in such a way that a change is brought about in that object, for instance, the door was closed and then I acted in such a way that the door became open; the paper was intact, but I subjected it to the action of fire, and it was reduced to ashes, etc.

In the second column a process is stated which is going on in the subject itself: the door opened (as if of its own will), the paper disappeared in flames, etc. Compare, e. g., *His camp had filled*. (LINKLATER) *The teas making*. (L. MITCHELL)

This, of course, is a difference in the relation between the subject and the action (and, for the first column, the object).

(2) In the first column, the verb is followed by a noun (or pronoun) denoting the thing which is subjected to the action denoted by the verb. In the second column, the verb is not followed by any noun (or pronoun). In the first column the verb is transitive, in the second column the verb is intransitive.

What we have said so far is nothing but an objective description of the state of things found in these sentences, no matter what theory a scholar may prefer.

Now we must turn our attention to the possible theoretical interpretation of these facts, and here the problem of voice will arise.

One possible interpretation is this. In every line we have in the two columns two different verbs which may be represented in some such way as: *open*₁, verb transitive, *open*₂, verb intransitive; *burn*₁, verb transitive, *burn*₂, verb intransitive, etc. If this interpretation were adopted, the whole problem would be shifted into the sphere of lexicology, and from the grammatical viewpoint we should have to state that *open*₁ here stands in the active voice (correlative with *was opened*), and *open*₂ has no voice distinction at all (since from the intransitive verb *open*₂ no mutually opposed voice forms can be derived).

Another interpretation would run something like this. In both columns we have the same verb *open*, the same verb *burn*, etc. and the difference between the two is a difference of voice: in the first column it is the active voice (showing an action performed by the doer on the object), while in the second column it is the middle voice, denoting a process going on within the subject, without affecting any object. The difference between the voices, though not expressed by any morphological signs, would then be a difference in meaning and in syntactical construction, the active voice characterised by connection with a following noun or pronoun denoting the object of the action, and the middle voice characterised by the impossibility of connection with such a noun or pronoun. This interpretation would mean the admission of a special voice, the middle voice.

Still another interpretation would be the following. The verb in both columns is the same and the voice is the same, too, since there is no morphological difference between the two columns, and differences of meaning and of syntactical construction are not sufficient reason for establishing a difference of voice. If this view is accepted, we should have to define the category of active voice in such a way that it should include both the first-column and the second-column examples.

The choice between these interpretations depends on the principles which a scholar considers to be the most essential and the

most likely to yield an adequate picture of language facts. If, for instance, it is considered essential that a difference in grammatical categories should find its outward expression by some morpheme, etc., the second of the three suggested interpretations will have to be rejected. If, on the other hand, it is considered possible for two morphological categories to be distinguished in meaning and syntactical use without any special morphemes to show the distinction, that second interpretation will be found acceptable.

Without prejudice to the first or second interpretation, we will now follow up the third, which seems to present the greatest interest from a theoretical point of view. In doing so, we will assume that we do not accept either a reflexive or a reciprocal or a middle voice, so that only two voices are left, the active and the passive. If, then, we are to bring under the heading of the active voice such cases as *the door opened*, *the paper burnt*, *the water boiled*, etc., we shall have to give that voice a definition wide enough to include all uses of that kind as well (this may make it necessary to change the term for the voice, too).

Let us now consider the opposition between the voices: *opened* (in any sense)/ *was opened*; *burnt* (in any sense)/ *was burnt* from the point of view of meaning. It should at once be clear that the second member of the opposition (*was opened*, etc.) has a much more definite meaning than the first: the meaning of the type *was opened* is that the subject is represented as acted upon, whereas the meaning of the first member (*opened*, etc.) is much less definite. We could, then, say that *opened* is the unmarked, and *was opened*, the marked member of the opposition. The meaning of the unmarked member is, as has often been the case, hard to define. What seems the essential point in its meaning is, that the subject is represented as connected with the origin of the action, and not merely acted upon from the outside. Some such definition would seem to cover both the type *he opened the door*, and the type *the door opened*. Whether the subject produces a change in an object, or whether the action is limited to the sphere of the subject itself — all these and similar points would depend partly on the syntactical context (on whether the verb is followed by a noun / pronoun or not), partly on the lexical meaning of the verb and its relation to the lexical meaning of the noun expressing the subject (compare *the old man opened...* and *the door opened*), partly, probably, on a number of other factors which are yet to be studied. The question whether it is more advisable to keep the term "active voice" or to substitute another term for it would also have to be discussed.

If this view is adopted, all the special cases considered above: *he shaved* (in the reflexive meaning), *they kissed* (in the reciprocal meaning) would fall under the heading of the active voice (if this

term is kept) and their peculiarities would have to be referred to the context, the lexical meaning of the verb in question, etc.

The following phenomena would also belong here: *the book sells well*, *the figures would not add*, *the rule does not apply in this case* (as different from *we do not apply the rule*), and a number of others, which have been variously treated as "absolute use",¹ use of the active form in a passive meaning, etc.

As to form, it has been already said above (p. 115) that the passive is the marked, and the active the unmarked member of the opposition. Thus, then, the passive is marked both in meaning and in form and the active as unmarked both in meaning and in form.

This solution of the voice problem in Modern English appears to be convincing. However the other interpretations (mentioned above as first and second) ought also to be reasoned out to their logical conclusions.

¹ See M. Deutschbein, *System der neuenglischen Syntax*, S. 101, on such cases as *the work does not pay*.

Chapter XIII

THE VERB: PERSON AND NUMBER. OTHER MORPHOLOGICAL CATEGORIES

The categories of person and number must be considered in close connection with each other, since in language of the Indo-European family they are expressed simultaneously, i. e. a morpheme expressing person also expresses number, e. g. in Latin the morpheme *-nt* in such forms as *amant*, *habent*, *legunt*, *amabant*, *habebunt*, *legerunt*, etc., expresses simultaneously the 3rd person and the plural number.

We shall, however, start by considering the meaning of each of these categories, and then proceed to the analysis of their state in Modern English.

The category of person in verbs is represented by the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd person, and it expresses the relation between the speaker, the person or persons addressed, and other persons and things. The 1st person, of course, expresses the speaker or a group of which the speaker makes a part; the 2nd person, the person or persons spoken to, and the 3rd, that person or thing (or those persons or things) which are neither the speaker nor the person(s) spoken to.¹

The category of number expresses the quantity of the subjects (one or more than one). Speaking deductively, we might build the following system of personal and numerical categories:

- 1st person singular — the speaker
- 2nd person singular — one person spoken to
- 3rd person singular — one person or thing (neither speaker nor spoken to)
- 1st person plural — the speaker and another person or other persons
- 2nd person plural — more than one person spoken to
- 3rd person plural — more than one person or — thing (neither speakers nor spoken to)

However, this system does not hold good for the Modern English verb, and this for two reasons,

First, there is no distinction of persons in the plural number. Thus, the form *live* may, within the plural number, be connected with a subject of any person (1st, 2nd, or 3rd).

¹ It will certainly not do to say that the 3rd person represents that which is spoken about. E.g. in the sentence *You must come at once, you is* the person spoken about but it is not the 3rd person.

Second, there is no distinction of numbers in the 1st or 2nd person. Thus, the form *live* in these persons may refer both to one and to more than one subject.¹

So what we actually find in the Modern English verb is this:

3rd person singular	—	<i>lives</i>
All the rest	—	<i>live</i>

If we analyse this state of things in the Modern English verb in exact terms we shall reach the following conclusion. The opposition *lives I live*, or, in general terms, stem + *s* / stem + \emptyset , expresses the relation: 3rd person singular / any person of both numbers except 3rd person singular.

It is quite clear that the first item of the opposition is marked both in meaning (3rd person sing.) and in form (*-s*), whereas the second item is unmarked both in meaning (everything except the 3rd person sing.) and in form (zero-inflection). We ought to add that the category of mood is implied in this opposition, the form *lives* belonging to the indicative mood only, whereas *live* may also be any person of both numbers in the subjunctive mood (as far as we recognise its existence at all). Another consequence of this analysis is, that the *-s*-inflection in verbs conveys 4 meanings: 1) 3rd person, 2) singular number, 3) present tense, 4) indicative mood. The present tense is of course characterised by other signs as well: by the absence of the *-d* (or *-t*) morpheme denoting the past tense in regular verbs, and by alternation of the root vowel (e. g. [ɪ] in *drinks* as against [æ] in *drank*) in irregular verbs. But in verbs of the type *put* the *-s* is the only distinctive sign of the present.

The ending *-s* having four meanings to express simultaneously is of course a synthetic feature, standing rather by itself in the general structure of Modern English.

Some verbs do not fit into the system of person and number described above and they must be mentioned separately both in a practical study of the language and in theoretical analysis. We will limit ourselves to the verb *can* (the verbs *may*, *shall*, and some others sharing some of its features) and the verb *be*, which stands quite apart and, of course, is very widely used.

The verb *can*, as is well known, takes no *-s*-inflection parallel to such forms as *lives*, *writes*, *takes*, etc. Hence it follows that this verb has no category of person or number at all.

¹ We do not consider here the forms *livest*, *livedst*, etc., which do not make part of the grammatical system of literary and colloquial English. See p. 125.

The verb *be* has a system of its own both in the present indicative and in the past. Its system in the present indicative is as follows:

1st person singular	— <i>am</i>
3rd person singular	— <i>is</i>
2nd person (without distinction of number) Plural (without distinction of person)	— <i>are</i>

In the past tense the system is:

1st and 3rd person singular	— <i>was</i>
2nd person (without distinction of number) Plural (without distinction of person)	— <i>were</i>

In analysing the system of person and number we have so far bypassed the forms of the type *livest, takest, livedst, tookest*. These forms are associated with the personal pronoun *thou* and are only used in religions and occasionally in poetical texts and among Quakers. As they stand outside the received grammatical system we need not go into details concerning them. Suffice it to say that with these forms the category of number appears within the category of the 2nd person and the whole system of person and number (including the past tense) must be presented in a different shape.

OTHER MORPHOLOGICAL CATEGORIES Negative Forms

The English language has in its verbal system a peculiarity distinguishing it both from Russian, German, French, and other Indo-European languages. To express the notion that an action did not take place, the English verb does not always simply add a negative particle to the verb form, as in the example *has come* — *has not come*. In many cases a special auxiliary verb, namely the verb *do*, is used if the negative idea is to be expressed.¹ Since the negative *has* (at least partly) its own auxiliary verb, it must be acknowledged as a special morphological category of the English verb.

This fact has of course been observed a long time since, and attempts have been made to tackle it. Academician A. Shakhmatov,

¹ Something broadly similar is found in some Finno-Ugrian languages, e.g. Finnish and Estonian.

comparing the Russian negation and the English, pointed out that there is a special auxiliary for the negative in English, and put forward the idea that in English there is a special negative mood.¹ This idea, however, cannot be accepted by modern linguistics, as the negative forms may be found in every mood: compare, for instance, *does not take*, *do not take (!)* (imperative). Since the negative is compatible with different moods, it cannot itself be a mood. In other words, if the opposition *takes* — *take (!)* is an opposition of mood, the opposition *takes* — *does not take* cannot also be an opposition of mood. The opposition *takes* — *does not take* must be based on some other category, whose concrete manifestations are the affirmative and the negative. It is hard to find a name for this general category. Perhaps we might term it "quality".² Of its two components (affirmative and negative) the former is unmarked and the latter is marked: its marks are the group "*do + not*" in some forms and the particle *not* alone in others.

As the auxiliary *do* appears in some negative forms only, it might be argued that the category of quality is found only in these forms. However, it seems preferable to state this category for the English verb as a whole, and to differentiate the means of expressing it into "*do + not*" and *not* (alone).

We need not give here a full list of forms in which the one or the other of these means is used to express negativity. The use of the pattern "*do + not*" is restricted to the forms which have no other auxiliary of any kind. That is, the auxiliary *do* is incompatible with any other auxiliary verb.

Interrogative Forms

An important question arises concerning the interrogative forms of the English verb. It is well known that the auxiliary *do is* used here in the same way as in the negative forms and that interrogative-negative forms exist, in which the auxiliary *do* is used on the same principle.

Since the verb *do* is an auxiliary to form the interrogative, we must conclude that the opposition between declarative and interrogative forms (e. g. *takes* — *does . . . take?*) is also based on some grammatical category, which is no less difficult to define and to give a name to. We might perhaps think that the interrogative should be included as a third item in the opposition "affirmative — negative", thus forming a triple grouping "affirmative — interrogative — negative". But this is rendered impossible by the fact that in-

¹ See A. A. Шахматов, *Синтаксис русского языка*, 1941, стр. 482.

² The term "quality" is used in logic to distinguish between affirmative and negative propositions.

terrogative and negative can be united in one form, as in *does ... not take?* Since interrogative and negative can be combined in one form, they cannot possibly belong to the same category but have to be assigned to different categories. We may put the four categories: affirmative, negative, interrogative, and interrogative-negative together in the following diagram:

Non-interrogative	Interrogative
Non-negative <i>takes</i>	<i>does ... take?</i>
Negative <i>does not take</i>	<i>does ... not take?</i>

The diagram, simple as it is, shows that we have here a system of 2 X 2 categories completing each other. The peculiar thing is, that only one of the four forms does not include the auxiliary *do*, and that the two items of the second line differ from each other *only* by word order, while the two items of the first line differ from each other by the use or non-use of the auxiliary verb.

The question may be asked: what is the meaning of the auxiliary *do* in the negative-interrogative form *does ... not take?* Is it an auxiliary of interrogation or an auxiliary of negation, or does it combine the two meanings? There seem to be no objective criteria in this matter, and if a somewhat subjective view may be expressed, we will say that the auxiliary *do* in the negative-interrogative form combines both meanings.

However, the whole problem of negative and interrogative forms of the English verb requires some deeper investigation.

Emphatic *do*-forms

Another question arises concerning the so-called emphatic *do*-forms, such as *he does know*, *she did go*, meaning more or less the same as *he really knows*, *she really went*, etc. The specific meaning of such formations is well known, but their status in the morphological system of the verb has not been clearly defined.

In the first place, we must find out whether the verb *do* does or does not introduce any lexical meaning of its own into the formation. Apparently it does not: it merely emphasises the meanings expressed by the infinitive following the form of the verb *do*. If this view is endorsed, we must conclude that these are analytical verb forms, that is, the verb *do* is an auxiliary verb here just as it is an auxiliary in the negative and interrogative formations of which it is a necessary component. If that is so, the opposition between *knows* and *does know*, or that between *went* and *did go*, etc., must be based on some grammatical category or other. It is also evident that the forms *does know*, *did go*, etc., are the marked members of the opposition, while the forms *knows*, *went*, etc., are its

unmarked members. This is obvious both from the meaning and the form of each member: *does know*, *did go*, etc. are necessarily emphatic and they have the auxiliary as a means of expressing emphasis, that is, they cannot be used unemphatically; *knows*, *went*, etc., on the other hand, are not necessarily unemphatic: they may very well become emphatic if pronounced with the appropriate intonation, even though they have no special auxiliary or any other material sign to mark them off. The category which lies at the basis of this opposition may perhaps be briefly termed emphasis.

It should also be noted that the *do*-forms do not cover the entire field of the English verb: they are only found in the finite verb form (thus not in the infinitive, participle, or gerund), and only in those which have no auxiliary in the unemphatic form.

We may add that for all those forms of the verb which do not fall under this definition the way to express emphasis is purely phonetic: the verb form is pronounced with strong stress; in writing the form is usually underlined, and in print it is given in italics.

The auxiliary *do* is also occasionally used as a kind of homogeneous part parallel to a modal verb and marking the reality of the action denoted by the following infinitive, as distinct from, and opposed to, its mere possibility or necessity, etc., expressed by the modal verb. Here is an example of this use: *Life could and did go on almost as usual.* (M. MITCHELL)

Hierarchy of Verbal Categories

It is natural to assume that in the system of verbal categories there is some hierarchy, that is, some categories are above others, determining their possibilities. To give a clear example: the category of voice to some extent dominates that of aspect, as there are fewer continuous forms in the passive than in the active voice: such continuous forms as *shall be writing*, *have been writing*, *had been writing* find no counterpart in the passive. We could also say that the passive voice limits the possibilities of the continuous aspect.¹

The category of mood, as we take it, dominates the category of tense. In the indicative mood there are (at least) three tenses, whereas in the "oblique" moods there are at any rate not more than two, and the imperative mood has no tenses at all.

¹ In this the English language fundamentally differs from Russian, where the category of aspect dominates. As Academician V. Vinogradov puts it, the category of aspect dissects the entire system of the Russian verb (see В. В. Виноградов, *Русский язык*. М., 1947, стр. 493). Thus, in the imperfective aspect in the indicative mood there are three tenses, while in the perfective there are only two.

A peculiar relation obtains between the categories of number and of person. Leaving aside for the moment the verb *be* with its individual system of forms, number and person of English verbs have a positive (that is, non-zero) expression only in the *-s*-ending of the 3rd person singular present indicative. We might even suppose that in Modern English there are not two separate categories, number and person, but one "combined" number-person category. It is, however, doubtful whether such interpretation of phenomena would in any way yield a clearer and more consistent view of the verbal system. The notions of "number", that is, the difference between one and more-than-one doer, on the one hand, and that of "person", that is, distinction between the speaker, the one spoken to, and that which is neither speaker nor spoken to, seems too far apart, to be united under a common heading.

In pursuing this subject further, it should be possible to work out a system of verbal categories, something of a "pyramid"; however, there would probably arise some doubts and difficulties in assigning a place to this or that category.

Chapter XIV

THE VERB: VERBALS

In so far as the verbals (infinitive, gerund, and participle) make up a part of the English verb system, they have some features in common with the finite forms, and in so far as they are singled out amid the forms of the verb, they must have some peculiarities of their own.

Let us first consider the system of verbal categories which are expressed in the English verbals. They have some of them, and they lack some others. We must also observe that it is by no means certain in advance that all the verbals are in the same position as regards the verb categories.

It is clear that none of the verbals has any category of person or mood. The English verbals have no category of number either, though this is not so in some other languages. What we must examine is the categories of aspect, tense, correlation, and voice.

With reference to aspect we shall have to examine each of the verbals separately.

In the infinitive, we find an opposition between two sets of forms:

(to) speak — *(to) be speaking*
(to) have spoken — *(to) have been speaking*,

which is obviously the same as the opposition in the sphere of finite forms between:

speak — *am speaking*
spoke — *was speaking*
etc.

The conclusion here is quite obvious: the infinitive has the category of aspect, viz. there is a distinction between the common and the continuous aspect. The continuous infinitive is found, for example, in the following sentence: *He seems to be enjoying himself quite a lot.* (R. WEST)

In our next example the continuous infinitive of the verb *love* is used: *I can recollect yet how I loved him; and can dimly imagine I could still be loving him if — No, no!* (E. BRONTE) The variant with the simple infinitive would be: *I can recollect yet how I loved him; and can dimly imagine I could still love him, if* — The difference in this case seems to be that the continuous infinitive gives more prominence to the idea of the continuity of her love, and this is obviously much stronger than the mere statement that love might still be there now. The stylistic difference is thus unquestionable, but there would seem to be also a grammatical difference. The meaning of the continuous aspect is well brought out here, though the lexical meaning of the verb *love* would seem to go against it.

With the gerund and the participle, on the other hand, things are different. Generally speaking, they exhibit no such distinction. Neither in the one nor in the other do we find continuous forms.

Occasionally, however, a continuous participle is found, as in the following sentence from a novel by Jane Austen: *The younger Miss Thorpes being also dancing, Catherine was left to the mercy of Mrs Thorpe and Mrs Allen, between whom she now remained.* It is not clear here what exactly is added to the meaning of the sentence by using the continuous participle *being dancing* rather than the usual participle *dancing*. Be that as it may, this example shows that a continuous first participle is at least potentially a part of the morphological system of the English verb. But this use appears to be obsolete.

In the following sentence there are even three continuous participles, with one auxiliary common to all of them: *Catherine had no leisure for speech, being at once blushing, tying her gown, and forming wise resolutions with the most violent dispatch.* (J. AUSTEN) The word order (the phrase *at once* coming after the auxiliary *being*) clearly shows that the auxiliary belongs to all three participles (*blushing, tying, and forming*). The use of the continuous participles seems to be a means of giving prominence to the fact that the actions indicated were actually happening at that very moment.

TENSE AND CORRELATION

The problem of the category of tense and that of correlation have to be considered together, for reasons which will become clear immediately.

In the infinitive, we find the following oppositions:

(to) speak — (to) have spoken
 (to) be speaking — (to) have been speaking,

and in the gerund and the participle the oppositions

speaking — having spoken being spoken
 — having been spoken

The question now is, what category is at the base of these oppositions?

The considerations which can be put forward in this matter might be compared to those which were applied to similar phenomena in the forms *should speak — should have spoken*, but here everything is much simpler. If we start from the way these forms are derived we shall say that it is the category of correlation which finds its expression here, the first-column forms having no pattern "have + second participle" and the second-column forms having this very pattern. If we turn to the meaning of the second-column

forms, we shall find that they express precedence, whereas the first-column forms do not express it. Once again we see that in each pair one item is unmarked both in meaning and in form whereas the other (the perfect) is marked both in meaning (expressing precedence) and in form (consisting of the pattern "*have* + second participle").

If this view is accepted it follows that the category of correlation is much more universal in the Modern English verb than that of tense: correlation appears in all forms of the English verb, both finite and non-finite, except the imperative, while tense is only found in the indicative mood and nowhere else.

Since the verbals are hardly ever the predicate of a sentence, they do not express the category of tense in the way the finite verb forms do. Thus, it seems pointless to argue that there is a present and a past tense in the system of verbals.

We will therefore endorse the view that the opposition between *(to) speak* and *(to) have spoken*, and that between *speaking* and *having spoken* is based on the category of correlation.

VOICE

Like the finite forms of the verb, the verbals have a distinction between active and passive, as will readily be seen from the following oppositions:

<i>(to) read</i>	—	<i>(to) be read</i>
<i>(to) have read</i>	—	<i>(to) have been read</i>
<i>reading</i>	—	<i>being read</i>
<i>having read</i>	—	<i>having been read</i>

As to other possible voices (reflexive, reciprocal, and middle) there is no reason whatever to treat the verbals in a different way from the finite forms. Thus, if we deny the existence of these voices in the finite forms, we must also deny it in the verbals.

To sum up, then, what we have found out concerning the categories in the verbals, we can say that all of them have the categories of correlation and voice; the infinitive, in addition, has the category of aspect. None of the verbals has the categories of tense, mood, person, or number.

THE SECOND PARTICIPLE

The second participle, that is, forms like *invited*, *liked*, *written*, *taken*, etc., presents many peculiar difficulties for analysis. In analysing the category of correlation and that of voice in the participle and in stating that the participle has no category of tense, we have so far not mentioned these forms at all.

Now we must give them some special consideration.

First of all we must emphasise that we will analyse the meaning and the use of the second participle when it does not make part of an analytical verb form, whether it be the perfect (*have invited, have taken*), or the passive voice (*was invited, was taken*). When the second participle makes part of an analytical form, it loses some of its own characteristics, and indeed we may doubt whether it should still bear the name of participle in those cases.

Again, in analysing the meaning and the functions of the second participle, we must exclude the cases where it has been adjectivised, that is, changed into an adjective, and is no longer a participle, for example, in such phrases as *written work*, which is used as the opposite of *oral work*, or *devoted friend*, where *devoted* does not designate an action, or, indeed, the result of an action, but a property.

The use of the second participle outside the analytical formations is comparatively limited. We find it either as a predicative in such cases as *The door is shut*, when it does not denote an action (compare, *The door is shut at nine p. m. every day*) but a state of things, or as an objective predicative, e. g. *He found the door shut*, or as an attribute following a noun, more often with some words accompanying it, as in *This is the new machine invented by our engineers*, and less often an attribute preceding the noun, as in "*The Bartered Bride*" (the title of Smetana's opera). We can note that the use of second participles as prepositive attributes is on the whole limited in English. For example, the title of the opera just mentioned could not be rendered in English with the help of the participle *sold*, as this participle cannot be used in that way.

Analysis of the grammatical categories expressed in the second participle is a matter of great difficulty, and so is the problem of finding its place among the other participles.

Let us first consider the problems of aspect, tense, and correlation with reference to this participle. Let us take our examples with intransitive verbs, so that the problem of voice may be left aside for the moment.

It was pointed out long ago that many intransitive verbs have no second participle that could be used outside the analytical forms of the perfect. For instance, such forms as *been, laughed, run, sat, lain, wept*, etc. can only appear within a perfect form and do not exist as separate participles. A few second participles of intransitive verbs can, however, be used as attributes, e. g. *retired* in expressions like *a retired colonel*, or *a retired teacher*. We may also compare the word *runaway* (spelt as one word, from the phrase *run away*), for example, in the expression *a runaway horse*.

On the whole, then, with intransitive verbs the second participle does not constitute an integral part of the verbal system at all,

and it may be left out of consideration when we analyse that system.

Things are different with transitive verbs. Here, though the use of the second participle as an attribute is limited, there can be no doubt that it exists as a separate form of the verb and not merely as a component of the analytical perfect or passive.

It is also clear that as far as the category of voice goes the past participle of transitive verbs belongs to the passive. We need not illustrate this by examples, since this is common knowledge. It is only necessary to mention the few special cases in which the second participle has no passive meaning in the usual sense, e. g. *a well-read man* 'one who has read much', not 'one who has been read', or *he was drunk*, and a few more. These are separate phenomena restricted to a few verbs.

As to aspect, tense, and correlation, the problem appears to be this: Which of these categories find expression in the form of the second participle itself, i. e. do not depend either on the lexical meaning of the verb or on the context? This proviso is necessary, because differences in meaning can be found which do depend on lexical peculiarities of the verb and on the context. We can, for instance, compare such phrases as the following: (1) *a young man liked by everybody*, (2) *a young man killed in the war*. It is clear at once that the action denoted by the participle *liked* is going on, whereas that denoted by the participle *killed* is finished. This certainly should not be interpreted as two different meanings of the participle as a grammatical form, since it depends on the lexical meaning of the verb (the verb *like* denotes an emotional attitude, which can last indefinitely, while the verb *kill* denotes an action which reaches its end and does not last after that). We must then say that the meaning of the form as such is not affected by these differences.

The conclusion about the grammatical categories in the second participle (of transitive verbs) is, then, this. The only category which is expressed in it is that of voice (namely, the passive voice); the other categories, namely, aspect, tense, and correlation (and, of course, mood, person, and number) find no expression in it. Owing to these peculiarities, the second participle occupies a unique position in the verbal system, and it is impossible to find for it a place in a table where special columns or lines are allotted to aspect, tense, and correlation.

As far as voice is concerned, the second participle of transitive verbs (e. g. *invited*) joins the other passive participles (e. g. *being invited* and *having been invited*) as against the active participles *inviting* and *having invited*. However, from the formal point of view we run into difficulties here. In all other passive forms, whether finite or non-finite, the category of the passive voice is ex-

pressed by the group "*be* + second participle", whereas the second participle itself, of course, goes without the verb *be*. We have to choose between accepting this state of things and excluding the second participle from the passive system (that is, if we insist that every passive form must contain the verb *be*). As this latter alternative appears to be still more undesirable, we shall have to recognise this peculiar position of the second participle among the forms of the passive voice.

THE *ing*-FORMS

So far we have spoken of the *ing*-forms as of two different sets of homonymous forms: the gerund (with its distinctions of correlation and voice) and the participle (with its distinctions of correlation and voice). As there is no external difference between the two sets (they are complete homonyms), the question may arise whether there is reason enough to say that there are two different sets of forms, that is, whether it could not be argued that there is only one set of forms (we might then call them *ing*-forms), which in different contexts acquire different shades of meaning and perform different syntactical functions. Such a view (though without detailed argumentation) was indeed put forward by the Dutch scholar E. Kruisinga.¹ In some passages of his book he merely speaks of "the *ing*", though in other parts he uses the terms "gerund" and "participle".

It must be said that this is one of the questions which do not admit of a definite solution. The solution largely depends on what view we take of the unity of a grammatical form and on the extent to which we are prepared to allow for shades of meaning in one form (or one set of forms). If we are prepared to admit any amount of variety in this sphere rather than admit the existence of grammatical homonyms, we shall have to develop a detailed theory of the mutual relations between the various shades of meaning that the form (or set of forms) can have. If, on the other hand, we are prepared to admit homonymy rather than let the unity of the form (or set of forms) disintegrate, as it were, in a variety of "shades", we shall be justified in keeping to the traditional view which distinguishes between gerund and participle as between two different, though homonymous, sets of grammatical forms.

The difference between the gerund and the participle is basically this. The gerund, along with its verbal qualities, has substantival qualities as well; the participle, along with its verbal qualities, has adjectival qualities. This of course brings about a corresponding difference in their syntactical functions: the gerund

¹ See E. Kruisinga, *A Handbook of Present-Day English*, vol. II, p. 55 II,

may be the subject or the object in a sentence, and only rarely an attribute, whereas the participle is an attribute first and foremost.

We should also bear in mind that in certain syntactical contexts the difference tends to be obliterated. For instance, if in the sentence *Do you mind my smoking?* (where *smoking* is a gerund) we substitute *me* for *my*, in the resulting sentence *Do you mind me smoking?* the form *smoking* may, at least, be said to be the participle. Again, in the sentence *Do you mind her smoking?* where *her* may be the possessive pronoun, corresponding to *my*, or the objective case of the personal pronoun, corresponding to *me*, the gerund and the participle are practically indistinguishable. We may say, in terms of modern linguistics, that the opposition between them is neutralised.¹

If, on the other hand, we prefer to abandon the distinction and to speak of the *ing*-form, we shall have to formulate its meaning and its functions in such a way as to allow for all the cases of the *ing*-forms to be included. For instance, instead of distinguishing between substantival and adjectival qualities, we shall speak, in a more general way, of nominal qualities, so as to embrace both the substantival and the adjectival ones, and so forth. Such a view seems also quite possible, and the decision to be taken will, as we have seen above, depend on the general attitude one adopts in matters of this kind.

¹ The notion of neutralisation was first introduced by N. Trubetzkoy in his book on essentials of phonology (*Grundzüge der Phonologie*, Prague, 1939; the book also appeared in a Russian translation in 1960).

The essential idea at the bottom of neutralisation in phonology may be briefly stated as follows. An opposition existing between two phonemes may under certain circumstances (which are to be strictly defined in each case) disappear, that is, it may lose its validity and become irrelevant. Such cases probably occur in every language. It will perhaps be best to give an example of neutralisation in Russian phonology. The sounds [t] and [d] are certainly different phonemes in Russian, as the difference between them may be the only means of distinguishing between two words. Compare, e.g., том 'volume' and дом 'house', or там 'there' and дам 'I shall give'. However, the difference between the two phonemes disappears at the end of a word (and also in some 'other cases'). Thus, for example, the words рот 'mouth' and род 'genus' sound alike, a voiced [d] being impossible at the end of a word in Russian. Trubetzkoy says, accordingly, that the opposition between [t] and [d] is neutralised in those conditions. To put it more exactly, whereas in the word том the relevant features of the initial phoneme are three, namely, it is (a) a forelingual consonant, (b) a stop, and (c) voiceless, and the initial consonant of дом also has three relevant features, namely, it is (a) a forelingual consonant, (b) a stop, (c) voiced, the final consonant in рот or род has only two relevant features: it is (a) a forelingual consonant, and (b) a stop. No third relevant feature is found here. The consonant is of course phonetically voiceless, but the voicelessness is phonologically irrelevant, as the corresponding voiced consonant cannot appear in this position.

The notion of neutralisation has since been applied to grammar as well.

Chapter XV

THE VERB: POLYSEMANTIC AND HOMONYMOUS FORMS

Modern lexicology has in many cases to solve the problem whether we have to deal with two or more meanings of one word or with two or more different words sounding the same. Such questions have arisen concerning, for example, the nouns *hand*, *head*, *board*, the verbs *draw*, *bear*, and a number of other words.

Similar problems confront us in the field of grammar as well. In quite a number of cases we are faced with a choice between two possible interpretations of established linguistic facts, notably in the sphere of verb morphology: is a certain form one grammatical form with two or more different meanings, or two or more different grammatical forms sounding alike?

We have dealt with each of these problems as they arose in the course of our study of the verb system. Now it may prove expedient to cast a look at the problem in its entirety. We will first take up those cases in which there has been a general discussion and both, varying views have found more or less wide support, and then we will pass on to the problems in which one view is more or less prevailing, and only a few dissenting voices are heard.

(1) Is the form *knew* in the sentence *He knew it all along* and the form *knew* in the sentence *If he knew this, he would be here* the same form, or are they two different forms sounding the same? The question also applies to forms of the type *lived*, *stopped*, *told*, etc.

(2) Is the form *had known* in the sentence *He had known it all along* and the form *had known* in the sentence *If he had known this, he would have come* the same form, or are they two different forms sounding the same? The question also applies to forms of the type *had lived*, *had stopped*, *had told*, etc.

(3) Is the form *should come* in the sentence *I said I should come soon* and the form *should come* in the sentence *If I were you I should come at once* the same form, or are they two different forms sounding the same? Is the form *would come* in the sentence *She said she would come soon* and the form *would come* in the sentence *If she knew this she would come at once* the same form, or are they two different forms sounding the same?

(4) Is the form *should have come* in the sentence *I thought I should have come before he rang up* and the form *should have come* in the sentence *If I had known this I should have come at once* the same form, or are they two different forms sounding the same? Is the form *would have come* in the sentence *He thought he would have come before you rang up* and the form *would have come* in the sentence *If he had known this he would have come at once* the same form, or are they two different forms sounding the same?

(5) Is the form *would come* in the sentence *If he knew this he would come at once* and the form *would come* in the sentence *In those days he would come and sit with us for hours, and tell us about his life* the same form, or are they two different forms sounding the same?

(6) Is the form *laughing* in the sentence *I found a laughing little boy* and the form *laughing* in the sentence *He answered by laughing* the same form, or are they two different forms sounding the same?

(7) Is the form *having found* in the sentence *Having found the solution of the problem, he published a paper on the subject* and the form *having found* in the sentence *He was proud of having found the solution of the problem* the same form, or are they two different forms sounding the same?

Those were questions that had been answered in different ways by different scholars. Now comes a question that has had no special attention focused upon it:

(8) Is the form *wrote* in the sentence *He wrote it* and the form *wrote* in the sentence *They wrote it* the same form, or are they two homonymous forms sounding the same?

There is a consideration in favour of the view that they are two different homonymous forms; the verb *be* has different forms for the singular and the plural in the past tense (*was, were*) — from this fact the inference may be drawn that in Modern English there is the category of number (singular and plural) in the past tense, and consequently in the verbs where no distinction in sound is found between singular and plural, we have to recognise homonymous forms. It may be further argued that in all verbs which admit of a past continuous form, or of a past passive, or of a past continuous passive, that is, of forms derived by means of the verb *be*, the category of number is found in the past tense: compare, e. g., *was writing, were writing, was written, were written, was being written, were being written*, or, *was driving, were driving, was driven, were driven, was being driven, were being driven*, etc.

(9) If the argument laid down in (8) is followed up, it may also be asked whether the forms *know* (1st person singular) and *know* (plural) are one form, or different forms sounding alike. In favour of the latter view it may be argued that in the verb *be* the corresponding forms do not sound the same: *am, are*, so this verb has a material distinction along these lines, and, consequently, all verbs in which no material distinction is found have homonymous forms. It may further be argued that verbs which have a present continuous, or a present passive, or a present passive continuous, or two, or all of these forms, also show that distinction: compare *am driving, are driving; am driven, are driven, am being driven, are being driven*, etc.

In proceeding now to consider different arguments referring to the nine questions enumerated here, we will first of all point out the problem of various structural meanings inherent in a grammatical form and of an invariable meaning, that is, one to be found in every possible single application of a form. This has been treated in different ways with reference to such questions as the general meaning of a case, for instance of the genitive case in Russian or Latin, etc.

Whether we think it necessary to find an invariable structural meaning which manifests itself in different ways in different applications of a grammatical category, or whether we deny the necessity of such an invariable meaning, is a matter which largely depends on a scholar's theoretical views on the meaning of grammatical categories and grammatical forms in general. We can hardly expect either of these views (for or against an invariable structural meaning for every category and every form) to be definitely proved as the only right one. We will assume that an invariable meaning does exist, and then try to find out what it is in every case.

Starting, then, with the question of polysemy or homonymy of forms like *knew* or *lived*, which may either denote a real action in the past, or an unreal supposition in the present or future, we may look for an invariable meaning comprising both these concrete applications. This meaning would seem to be something like "an action not actually happening in the present", or an action removed from present reality, that is, either having occurred in the past and in this way cut off from present reality or else only vaguely supposed, or even definitely unreal, and in this second way cut off from present reality.¹ This would justify the view that *knew* or *lived* in all its applications is one and the same form, which we may call past indicative, and which is used in certain syntactical contexts to denote an unreal action in the present or future.

While this way of interpreting facts will probably never be proved to be the only correct one, -there are many arguments in its favour and we will here endorse this view of forms like *knew* and *lived*.

If that is accepted, a similar reasoning will hold good concerning the forms *had known* and *had lived*. The common element of meaning, that is the invariable to be found both in the sentence *I had known this before* and in the sentence *If I had known this I should have come* may be defined as follows: an action not really

¹ This idea was propounded, in a somewhat different context, by Prof. A. Potebnia with reference to some facts of Slavonic languages; e.g. in Russian the form of the conditional mood *сказал бы* is a combination of the past tense form *сказал* with the particle *бы*, which itself is by origin a past tense form of the verb *быть*.

happening at a given period in the past; the two applications of that common invariable would then result in the following meaning: (a) an action happening before that period of the past which is being considered, and (b) an action merely supposed, and not actually happening in the past. The additional difficulty in this second item is, that everything has to be treated as belonging to the past (in some way or other), whereas with the first item the distinction was between the past and the present.

This approach to things is also possible in the case of our item (3), where the forms in question are, *should come* and *would come*, respectively. In trying to arrive at an invariable meaning for these forms, we will look for something which might establish a connection between an action unreal in the present and an action expected to happen at some moment future from the point of view of past time. The invariable in this case may be defined something like this: an action not really happening either in the present or in the specified period of the past; that idea is then substantiated either (a) as something merely supposed for the present or future, or (b) as an action viewed from a past viewpoint as happening in the future.

A similar reasoning would of course have to be applied to forms like *should have come* and *would have come*, with everything shifted, as it were, one step further back into the past: the invariable in this case would be something like "an action not actually happening either in the past, present, or future", and the applications would be, (a) an unreal action in the past, and (b) an action viewed from a past viewpoint as completed at a certain time in the future. In this last type of forms the past dominates throughout.

Similar considerations will hold good with reference to forms like *should be coming*, *would be coming*, *should have been coming*, *would have been coming*, which, however, are rarely found in their temporal application (future-continuous-in-the-past, future-perfect-continuous-in-the-past). Everything stated so far would also apply to the corresponding forms of the passive voice, wherever a verb admits of passive forms at all.

The next item, which we gave under number 5, is of a somewhat different character, and presents us with new difficulties. Besides being used to denote an unreal action in the present, and an action expected in the future from a past viewpoint, the phrase *would come* (in this particular case the verb *would* is completely dissociated from the verb *should*) can also express a repeated action in the past. For this problem, there seems to be no convincing way of finding an invariable meaning able to cover both the meaning of unreality in the present and expectation in the future from a past viewpoint. So, unless and until such common ground for an invariable is found, it will be well to say that *would come* denoting un-

reality in the present and expected action in the future from a past viewpoint, on the one hand, and *would come* denoting a repeated action in the past are two different formations sounding the same.¹

Now we come to items (6) and (7), concerning the *ing*-form or *ing*-forms in their different applications. The traditional view is, that we have here two homonymous forms: the participle (present or perfect) and the gerund (present or perfect). A more recent view, put forward by E. Kruisinga, is that there are not two different forms sounding the same but one form, which he shortly terms "the *ing*", being used in various ways in the sentence.

It is a peculiar feature of this *ing*-problem that in some contexts the two "ings" come very close together and additional factors are required to draw a distinction between them. The two "ings" coincide in such sentences as, *He was afraid of her knowing the truth*,² where the "ing" is a gerund if *her* is a possessive pronoun, and a participle if *her* is a personal pronoun in the objective case; also in the sentence *He was glad at John's coming* the "ing" is a gerund, but if *John's* is replaced by *John*, the "ing" seems to be a participle, though this is not acknowledged by all scholars: M. Deutschbein believed the "ing" to be a gerund in both cases.

The question is a very difficult one. Since up to now it has not been possible to find a convincing invariable meaning to cover both participle and gerund, we shall do well again, until such an invariable is discovered, to hold to the traditional view which has it that the participle and the gerund are two essentially different forms sounding the same. This of course applies equally to present and perfect, active and passive participles and gerunds.

The last two items of our list include questions connected with the whole system of grammar and the principles of stating grammatical categories. In item (8) the essence of the problem is this. All Modern English verbs, however many they may be, have no distinction of number in the past tense, with one exception only, the verb *be*, which distinguishes in the past tense between the singular (*was*) and the plural (*were*).³ Should this peculiarity of the verb *be* bring us to the conclusion that the category of number in the past tense exists in all English verbs, and that, accordingly, all verbs

¹ From the viewpoint of synchronic analysis of Modern English the fact that the source of the auxiliary *would* is in both cases the same (past tense of *will*) is of course irrelevant.

² The example is taken from M. Deutschbein, *System der neuenglischen Syntax*, S. 154.

³ We will for the moment overlook the fact that in non-standard English there is a strong tendency to do away with the distinction and to use the form *was* without regard to number: *I was, he was, we was, you was, they was*.

except *be* have here homonymous forms? This is the view held by L. Bloomfield. Bloomfield thinks that the existence of one word of a certain category, which has a certain grammatical distinction, is sufficient reason for stating that all words of that category have that distinction, and all of them but the one in question have homonymous forms. In his own words, "The existence of even a single over-differentiated paradigm implies homonymy in the regular paradigms."¹

This view, however, is completely arbitrary and unacceptable. If we were to endorse it, we should arrive at very strange conclusions indeed. For example, starting from the fact that two English words which may be used as attributes to a noun, namely the words *this* and *that*, have a distinction between singular and plural (they agree in number with their head word, e. g. *this street*, but *these streets*, *that street*, but *those streets*), we might infer that all words thus used also have the category of number; for example, we should have to say that the word *new* has a distinction of singular and plural: in the phrase *new house* the word *new* is in the singular, but in the phrase *new houses* it is in the plural; the singular and the plural forms would be homonyms.

Besides being queer in itself, such a view would lead to a very peculiar interpretation of the development of a language. We interpret the development of adjective morphology in English by saying that the category of number, which was clearly expressed in Old English and to some extent in Middle English, has completely disappeared in Modern English, the adjectives having become invariable except for degrees of comparison. If we were to endorse Bloomfield's view we should have to say that the category of number in adjectives has not disappeared, that it still exists, but the forms of singular and plural have become homonymous. That view would give a distorted idea of the development of the language. So the fact that one verb, namely *be*, has preserved a distinction of number in the past tense, will not influence our view of the past tense of all other verbs.

The other consideration that has been put forward in this respect deserves special attention: the verb *be* takes part as an auxiliary in the formation of the past continuous, past passive, and past continuous passive of all verbs having those forms, and in so far it may be said that these verbs have a distinction of number in these forms; for example, the verb *write* has a distinction of number in the past continuous, past passive, and past continuous passive. Does this fact, or does it not, lead to the conclusion that there is a distinction of number in the past tense of all verbs generally? For

L. Bloomfield, *Language*, 1955, p. 224.

example, from the fact that there is a distinction between *was writing I were writing*, *was written I were written*, *was being written / were being written*, does it follow that there is the same distinction between *(he) wrote / (they) wrote*, the forms being homonymous?

This appears to be one of those questions which admit of different opinions rather than of a definite objective solution that might be described as the only correct one. Generally speaking, a negative answer would seem rather more appropriate: it is fair to say that there is a distinction of number in the past forms enumerated above but not in the past indefinite, active. However, the other view might also be defended.

The same thing is true about the distinction in number between the first person singular of the verb *be* (*am*) and the first person plural of this verb (*are*): it should not be considered sufficient reason to establish this difference of number in all other verbs and to say that, for example, the forms *(I) write* and *(we) write* are homonyms.

As to the argument that the verb *be* is used to form the present continuous, present passive, and present continuous passive of other verbs, so that these tense forms have a distinction of number in the first person, it will have to be treated in the same way as the corresponding argument about number in the past tense: as a problem admitting of opinions rather than a definite solution, with much to be said in favour of a negative answer.

THE VERB: THE PROBLEM
OF MORPHOLOGICAL CLASSES

The question of verbal classes in Modern English has given rise to conflicting statements. Various systems have been proposed both in the way of theoretical investigation and in the way of practical language teaching. The terms "weak and strong verbs", "regular and irregular verbs", "living and dead conjugation", and some others have been used, and a given verb included into one class or another as the case might be.

However, one main problem has not so far been solved, or even properly formulated with reference to the English language: which of the forms of a verb ought to be taken as a starting point, that is, as a form from which all the other forms of the verb might be derived, as it were, automatically. Putting this in the language of modern linguistic science, we should find the form of the verb on whose basis the other forms may be predicted.

In English, much as in German, the task is far from being an easy one. If we take the infinitive as a starting point, we shall have to admit that in a number of cases the form of the infinitive gives no possibility to predict the other forms of the verb. For instance, in the infinitives *live* and *give* there is nothing to suggest that the past tense of the one is *lived*, and of the other, *gave*. Again, in the infinitives *shine* and *pine* there is nothing to suggest that the past tense is *shone* and *pined*, respectively. We might then think that maybe another form of the verb would yield more possibilities for predicting the remaining forms on its basis. We might think of the past tense and of the second participle.

Let us now inquire into this matter and see whether either of these forms does yield such a possibility. Or, rather, let us ask the questions: Are there cases in which the form of the past tense does not predict that of the infinitive and that of the second participle? And are there cases in which the form of the second participle does not predict that of the infinitive and that of the past tense?

Forms of the type *lived*, *called*, *stopped*, *attempted* are unambiguous enough in this respect. They predict without any provisos the infinitive forms *live*, *call*, *stop*, *attempt*, and also the fact that the past tense and the second participle sound the same. Indeed, the number of such cases is large enough (it does not matter here whether we take the past tense, or the second participle as the starting point). But how do things stand with such forms of the past tense as, for instance, *wrote*, *drank*, *won*, *stole*, *bore*, *held*, etc.? Here we run into difficulties. We could establish that a past tense with the vowel [ou] predicts an infinitive with the vowel [ai] and a second participle with the vowel [i] and the suffix *-n*. Then we could say that the form *wrote* predicts the infinitive *write* and the

second participle *written*, and the same could be said about the past tense forms *drove* and *rose*. But the form *stole*, which has the same vowel sound and the same vowel letter as *wrote*, *drove* and the rest of them, does not fit into this type: the corresponding infinitive is *steal* and the corresponding second participle *stolen*. So the form *stole* would have to be included in a special list. The same must be said about the past tense forms *chose* and *froze*, which also have the same vowel sound and the same vowel letter and do not predict their infinitives *choose*, *freeze*, and their second participles *chosen*, *frozen*. So *chose* and *froze* would also have to be put on a special list. If we take the past tense forms *bore*, *tore*, *wore*, *swore*, we may say that they do predict their infinitives *bear*, *tear*, *wear*, *swear*, and their second participles *born(e)*, *torn*, *worn*, *sworn*. There seems to be no case contradicting this, that is, no past tense form with the vowel sound [o:] and the letter *o* which would correspond to an infinitive and a second participle of a different structure from those just mentioned. So that may be accepted without provisos.

To arrive at a definite conclusion in this matter, a thorough investigation of all the material available ought to be undertaken. It goes without saying that we cannot expect to arrive at a system that might do without "exceptions", that is, special cases which would have to be entered on a special list. However, a moderate degree of regularity would seem to be attainable, after all. Probably different systems might be worked out in this sphere, each having its advantages and its drawbacks, and it would be a question of choosing the one that was most likely to give a comprehensive view of the whole and required as few special lists as possible.

Chapter XVII

THE ADVERB

In giving a general review of parts of speech, we have already mentioned some general problems connected with the adverbs. It will be our task now to look at these problems more closely.

We will accept that definition of the meaning of adverbs which, though not quite satisfactory, enables us to distinguish what is an adverb from what is not. The adverb, then, expresses either the degree of a property, or the property of an action, or the circumstances under which an action takes place.

In adopting this definition, we have not included under adverbs words expressing the speaker's view of the action spoken of in the sentence, and have classed them under modal words. Thus, the words *perhaps*, *maybe*, *certainly*, *possibly*, *indeed*, etc. do not fall under the head of adverbs.

Among the adverbs there are some which admit of degrees of comparison, and others which do not. In mentioning this, we need not go into details, since we can apply here everything that has been said about degrees of comparison of adjectives. Thus, if we do not admit such phrases as *more difficult*, *(the) most difficult*,¹ we shall not admit, e. g., *more quickly* and *most quickly* to be analytical degrees of comparison of the adverb *quickly*. In that case, there would be only two types of degrees of comparison in adverbs: (1) the suffix type, for instance, *quickly*, *quicker*, *quickest*, or *fast*, *faster*, *fastest*, and (2) the suppletive type, represented by a few adverbs, such as *well*, *better*, *best*, or *badly*, *worse*, *worst*.

Adverbs may sometimes be preceded by prepositions, which means that they become partly substantivised. This is seen in such phrases as *from here*, *from there*, *since when*, *up to now*, etc.

VERB AND ADVERB GROUPS

Special attention has been paid by many scholars to groups of the type *come in*, *go out*, *set up*, *put down*, *bring up*, etc., i. e. groups consisting of a verb and an adverb so closely united in meaning that the adverb does not indicate a property of the action or a circumstance under which the action takes place. This is especially true of such groups as *bring up*, meaning 'educate', which certainly does not name an action denoted by the verb *bring*, performed under circumstances denoted by the adverb *up*. This also applies to such groups as *put up* (with something), in which nothing remains either of the meaning of the verb *put* or of that of the adverb *up*.

¹ See above, p. 80.

These groups have been treated by different scholars in very different ways. The main difference is between those who think that formations of the type *bring up* are phrases and those who think that they are words. If they are phrases, the next question is, what part of speech the second element is. The prevailing view is that the second element is an adverb, but some scholars think it necessary to modify this statement in some way or other. Thus, H. Palmer thinks that they are "preposition-like adverbs".¹ Much the same view was held by Prof. A. Smirnitsky.² Prof. I. Anitchkov thinks that they are a special kind of adverbs, which he calls "adverbial postpositions".³ Prof. N. Amosova thinks that they are a special kind of form words, which she calls "postpositives".⁴ The opposite view, namely that formations of the type *bring up* are words, and consequently their second part is a morpheme, was expressed by Y. Zhluktenko.⁵ In his view, *up* in *bring up* and similarly the second element of other formations of this kind are "postpositive prefixes". To support this view, Zhluktenko pointed out that in some cases we find such correspondences as *income* (noun) and *come in* (verb), *upbringing* (noun) and *bring up* (verb), *upkeep* (noun) and *keep up* (verb), etc. An intermediate view was proposed in my earlier book, where I held that the second element of these formations was a separate part of speech, namely a postposition, and that postpositions were half words, half morphemes.⁶ The very variety of views on the subject is a sure sign of its complexity.

In approaching the subject now from the viewpoint of present-day linguistics, we cannot accept the view that the second part of these formations is a morpheme and the whole formation a word. If this were really so, phrases, like *brought them up* or *put it down* would be impossible. Y. Zhluktenko's theory is based on the assumption that there are "analytical words", that is, words consisting of two parts which are not only written separately but may even be separated from each other by another word (such as the personal pronouns in *brought them up* and *put it down*). This view is unacceptable, since it would destroy the notion of a "word" altogether.

On the other hand, there seems to be no need to constitute the

¹ H. E. Palmer, *A Grammar of Spoken English*, 1930, p. 179.

² See A. И. Смирницкий, *Морфология английского языка*, 1959, стр. 374 сл.

³ See И. Е. Аничков, *Английские адвербиальные послелогии*. Докт. дисс., 1947.

⁴ See Н. Н. Амосова, *Основы английской фразеологии*, 1963, стр. 134.

⁵ See Ю. А. Жлуктенко, *О так называемых "сложных глаголах" в современном английском языке*. Вопросы языкознания, 1954, № 5.

⁶ See Б. А. Ильиш, *Современный английский язык*, изд. 2-е, 1948, стр. 243 см.

postpositions as a separate part of speech. The peculiarity of meaning, seen in the fact that the second element in *bring up* or *put down* does not indicate the circumstances in which the action takes place (the whole has a meaning entirely different from the meanings of the components), may be put down as phraseology. In this view, for example, *bring up* would be a phraseological unit consisting of the verb *bring* and the adverb *up*, and the analysis of its meaning would completely fall under the domain of lexicology, of which phraseology is a part.

Another difficulty involved in adverbs is that of words like *after* and *before*, which are variously used, e. g. *I had never seen him before*, *I had never seen him before last Sunday*, *I had never seen him before he arrived in Moscow*, similar examples might be given with the word *after* and some other words. We have treated this problem briefly in the chapter on parts of speech and we will turn to it again in Chapter XIX (see p. 156 ff.).

THE PREPOSITION

It is common knowledge that prepositions are a most important element of the structure of many languages, particularly those which, like Modern English, have no developed case system in their nominal parts of speech.

We have briefly discussed the problem of the meaning of prepositions but here we shall have to consider it at some length.

It is sometimes said¹ that prepositions express the relations between words in a sentence, and this is taken as a definition of the meaning of prepositions. If true, this would imply that they do not denote any relations existing outside the language. However, this is certainly not true, and two or three simple examples will show it. If we compare the two sentences: *The book is lying on the table*, and *The book is lying under the table*, and ask ourselves, what do the prepositions express here, it will at once be obvious that they express relations (in space) between the book (the thing itself) and the table (the thing itself). The difference in the situations described in the two sentences is thus an extralinguistic difference expressed by means of language, namely, by prepositions. It would certainly be quite wrong to say that the prepositions merely express the relations between the word *book* and the word *table*, as the definition quoted above would imply. The same may be said about a number of other sentences. Compare, for instance, the two sentences, *He will come before dinner*, and *He will come after dinner*. It is absolutely clear that the prepositions denote relations between phenomena in the extralinguistic world (time relations between "his coming" and "dinner"), not merely relations between the word *come* and the word *dinner*.

We must add that there are cases in which a preposition does not express relations between extralinguistic phenomena but merely serves as a link between words. Take, for instance, the sentence *This depends on you*. Here we cannot say that the preposition *on* has any meaning of its own. This is also clear from the fact that no other preposition could be used after the verb *depend* (except the preposition *upon*, which is to all intents and purposes a stylistic variant of *on*). Using modern linguistic terminology, we can say that the preposition *on* is here predicted by the verb *depend*. The same may be said about the expression *characteristic of him*. If the adjective *characteristic* is to be followed by any prepositional phrase at all the preposition *of* must be used, which means that it is predicted by the word *characteristic*. Returning now to our examples *The book is lying on the table* and *The book is lying under the table*, we must of course say that neither the preposition *on* nor the

¹ See, for instance, *Грамматика русского языка*, т. I, стр. 41.

preposition *under* is predicted by the verb *lie*. If we put the sentence like this: *The book is lying ... the table*, the dots might be replaced by a number of prepositions: *on, in, under, near, beside, above*, etc. The choice of the preposition would of course depend on the actual position of the book in space with reference to the table. Similarly, if we are given the sentence *He will come . . . the performance*, the dots may be replaced by the prepositions *before, during, after*, according as things stand. Now, in defining the meaning of a preposition, we must of course start from the cases where the meaning is seen at its fullest, and not from those where it is weakened or lost, just as we define the meaning of a verb as a part of speech according to what it is when used as a full predicate, not as an auxiliary.

We need not go further into the meanings of various prepositions in various contexts, since that is a problem of lexicology rather than grammar. What we needed here was to find a definition based on the real meaning of prepositions.

The next point is, the syntactical functions of prepositions. Here we must distinguish between two levels of language: that of phrases and that of the sentence and its parts. As far as phrases are concerned, the function of prepositions is to connect words with each other.¹ On this level there are patterns like "noun + preposition + noun", "adjective + preposition + noun", "verb + preposition + noun", etc., which may be exemplified by numerous phrases, such as *a letter from my friend, a novel by Galsworthy, fond of children, true to life, listen to music, wait for an answer*, etc.

On the sentence level: a preposition is never a part of a sentence by itself; it enters the part of sentence whose main centre is the following noun, or pronoun, or gerund. We ought not to say that prepositions connect parts of a sentence. They do not do that, as they stand within a part of the sentence, not between two parts.

The connection between the preposition, the word which precedes it, and the word which follows it requires special study. Different cases have to be distinguished here. The question is, what predicts the use of this or that preposition. We have already noted the cases when it is the preceding word which determines it (or predicts it). In these cases the connection between the two is naturally strong. In the cases where the use of a preposition is not predicted by the preceding word the connection between them is looser, and the connection between the preposition and the following word may prove to be the stronger of the two. This difference more or less corresponds to that between objects and adverbial modifiers expressed by prepositional phrases. Thus, in a sentence like *This depends on*

¹ This statement will require some modification when we come to the function of prepositions in such cases as "*Under the Greenwood Tree*", etc. (see p. 158).

him the preposition is predicted by the verb and the phrase *on him* is of course an object, whereas in a sentence like *The book is lying under the table* the preposition is not predicted by the verb and the phrase is an adverbial modifier. However, this criterion does not hold good in all cases.

Sometimes the boundary line between a preposition and another part of speech is not quite clear. Thus, with reference to the words *like* and *near* there may be doubtful cases from this viewpoint. For instance, there certainly is the adjective *near*, used in such phrases as *the near future*. On the other hand, there is the preposition *near*, found in such sentences as *they live near me*.

The adjective has degrees of comparison, and the preposition of course has none. In this connection let us examine the following sentence, which presents us with a whole bundle of problems involving both that of parts of speech and that of subordinate clauses: *When they had finished their dinner, and Emma, her shawl trailing the floor, brought in coffee and set it down before them, Bone drew back the curtains and opened wide the window nearest where they sat.* (BUECHNER) The question about the word *nearest* is closely connected with that about the ties between the *where*-clause and the main clause. As to the word *nearest*, there are obviously two ways of interpreting it: it is either an adjective in the superlative degree, or a preposition. Each of the two interpretations has its difficulties. If we take *nearest* as an adjective in the superlative degree, it will follow that this adjective (that is, the adjective *near*) can take an object clause, in the same way as it takes an object within a clause, e. g. *near our house, near midnight*, etc., and this would mean that the subordinate clause *where they sat* is treated very much like a noun. If, on the other hand, we take *nearest* as a preposition, we should have to state that there is a special preposition *nearest* in Modern English: it would obviously not do to say that the preposition *near* has degrees of comparison. There would appear to be no valid reason to prefer the one or the other of the two views, and a third possibility seems to present itself, viz. saying that we have here a borderline case of transition between an adjective in the superlative degree and a preposition.

This is one more example of language phenomena requiring a careful and wholly undogmatic approach: it would be futile to expect that every single language fact would fit easily into one pigeonhole or another prepared for it in advance. Language phenomena have as it were no obligation to fit into any such pigeonholes and it is the scholar's task to approach them with an open mind, to take into account their peculiarities, and to adjust his system as best he can to receive such "unorthodox" facts. Another example of this kind has been considered above: it concerned the status of the words *many, much, few, and little* (see pp. 71—72).

A special case must now be considered. In some phrases, which are not part of a sentence, a preposition does not connect two words because there is no word at all before it, and so its ties are one-sided: they point only forwards, not back.

As characteristic examples we may quote the titles of some poems and novels: "*To a Skylark*" (SHELLEY), "*On a Distant Prospect of Eton College*" (GRAY), "*Of Human Bondage*" (MAUGHAM), "*Under the Greenwood Tree*" (TH. HARDY). The syntactical function of the prepositions in cases of this type is a peculiar one. The preposition either expresses a relation between the thing expressed by the noun and something not mentioned in the text (as in "*To a Skylark*"), or it gives the characteristic of the place where something not specified takes place ("*Under the Greenwood Tree*").

It is evident that in such cases the preposition has only a one-sided connection, namely with the noun following it, but we may ask whether it has not also some reference to something not expressed which may be imagined as standing before the preposition.

Let us, for instance, compare the actual title of W. Somerset Maugham's novel, "*Of Human Bondage*", with a possible variant "*Human Bondage*", without the preposition. In this way the meaning and function of the preposition become clear: the preposition *of* is here used as it is used in the phrases *speaking of something*, *thinking of something*, etc. In the title as it stands, the preposition implies that the author is going to speak of human bondage, that is, human bondage is going to be discussed.¹

We shall arrive at a similar conclusion if we compare the actual title of Th. Hardy's novel, "*Under the Greenwood Tree*", with the possible variant "*The Greenwood Tree*". The preposition implies that we shall be reading about something happening under the tree, rather than about the tree itself. So it will probably be right to say that something is implied (very vaguely, it must be admitted).

We should especially note some peculiar uses of the preposition *about*, namely in such sentences as, *There were about twenty people in the room*, which of course means that the number is given approximately. The preposition here has only a one-sided connection, namely with the numeral, and has no connection at all with the preceding verb. It certainly does not express any relation between *were* and *twenty*. Syntactically, it makes an element of the subject group (*about twenty people*). Indeed we may be inclined to doubt whether the word *about* is a preposition at all in such a case. It rather approaches the status of a particle.

This is still more confirmed by examples in which the group introduced by *about* stands after another preposition, as in the

¹ The title is actually a translation of Spinoza's title "De servitute humana" (a book of his "Ethics"), but this is irrelevant for our analysis.

sentence, *This happened at about three o'clock*. The group *about three o'clock* here follows the preposition *at* in quite the same way as the group *three o'clock* would follow it in the sentence *This happened at three o'clock*. The group *about three o'clock* is a designation of a certain time as much as the group *three o'clock*, and to establish its relation with the verb *happened* it also requires the preposition *at* to be used.

We also find two prepositions close to each other in different contexts. Compare, for instance, the following sentence: *He sat until past midnight in the darkness while grief and sorrow overcame him*. (E. CALDWELL) Here also belongs the phrase *from under* in a sentence like *The cat stretched its paw from under the table*. It seems quite possible to take this in the same way as we took *at about* in the preceding example, and to say that *under the table* denotes a certain place and *from* indicates movement from that place. However, it is also possible to view this case in a somewhat different way, namely to suppose that *from under* is a phrase equivalent to a preposition, and then we should not have two prepositions following one another here. This problem should be further investigated.

Prepositions can sometimes be followed by adverbs, which apparently become partly substantivised when so used. The groups *from there*, *from where*, *since then*, *since when* are too widely known to require illustrative examples. Another case in point is the following: *She is beautiful with that Indian summer renewal of physical charm which comes to a woman who loves and is loved, particularly to one who has not found that love until comparatively late in life*. (O'NEILL)

Prepositions in English are less closely connected with the word or phrase they introduce than, say, in Russian. It would be impossible in English for a preposition to consist of a consonant only, that is, to be non-syllabic, which is the case with the three Russian prepositions *в*, *к*, *с*. This greater independence of English prepositions manifests itself in various ways.

There is the possibility of inserting, between a preposition and the word or phrase it introduces, another phrase, which can, in its turn, be introduced by a preposition. Here is an example of this kind: *The first of these, "The Fatal Revenge", appeared in 1807, and was followed by, among other, "The Milesian Chief" ...* (COUSIN) The two prepositions, *by* and *among*, stand one after the other, but there is certainly no syntactic connection between them, and probably there is a pause, corresponding to the comma of the written text. The connection between *followed* and *by* appears to be closer than that between *by* and the phrase which it introduces, namely, *"The Milesian Chief"*. Unless it were so, the preposition *by* would come after the inserted phrase *among others*, rather than

before it. But that variant, though perhaps not impossible, would certainly be less idiomatic than that in the text.

This way of making one preposition come immediately after another, showing the independence of the first preposition, is also seen in some cases where the status of the second preposition may be doubted, that is, it may be doubted whether the word is really a preposition in that context (compare what has been said on p. 152). The following sentence, which is fairly characteristic of modern usage, will show the essence of the phenomenon: *His industry was marvellous, and its results remain embodied in about 40 books, of which about 25 are commentaries on books of Scripture.* (COUSIN) Of course all this is made possible by the fact that prepositions in English do not require the word they introduce to have a specified case form.

Sometimes even a parenthetical clause come between the preposition and the noun it introduces, e. g. *Some weeks ago Mr Blessington came down to me in, as it seemed to me, a state of considerable agitation.* (CONAN DOYLE)

The looseness of the tie between the preposition and the following noun can be offset by a closer tie between the preposition and the preceding word. This may be seen, for instance, in some passive constructions with the phrase "verb + noun + preposition" acting as a kind of transitive unit. Examples of this use are well known. Compare the following sentence: *Their conference was put an end to by the anxious young lover himself, who came to breathe his parting sigh before he set off for Wiltshire.* (J. AUSTEN) The active construction would have been, *The young lover put an end to their conference*, where *an end* would be a non-prepositional, and *to their conference* a prepositional object. It might be argued, however, that *put an end* is something of a phraseological unit and should therefore be treated as the predicate. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the noun *end* is included into the passive form of the verb, and the subject of the passive construction is the noun which, in the active construction, would have been part of the prepositional object.

It should also be noted that a preposition does not necessarily connect the word which immediately precedes it with the one that follows. Cases are frequent enough in which there is no connection at all between the preposition and the preceding word. For instance, in the sentence, *This beauty is a trifle dimmed now by traces of recent illness* (O'NEILL) there is no connection between the words *now* and *by*. The preposition *by* is of course connected with the passive participle *dimmed* and the adverb *now* could be left out without affecting the connections and the functions of the preposition: *This beauty is dimmed by traces of recent illness*. The same may be said about the sentence *I get the same tale of woe from*

every one in our part of the country (Idem); the preposition *from* is not connected with the noun *woe* which precedes it, it is connected with the verb *get*, which is separated from it by five other words. Many more examples of this kind might be given. This should warn us against an oversimplified understanding of the syntactical function of a preposition.

Special attention must be given to groups of words whose meaning and functions in the sentence are the same as those of prepositions. Here belong the groups *out of*, *as to*, *as for*, *instead of*, *in spite of*, etc. We cannot term these groups prepositions, since a preposition is a word, not a word group, and it is essential to keep up the distinction between words and word groups; neglect of it would bring about a muddle both in grammar and in lexicology. The current haziness in the treatment of such groups and the vague terms "compound preposition" and the like are not conducive to a clear and consistent grammatical theory. Since much the same can be said about phrases equivalent in meaning and function to conjunctions, we will return to this problem after having considered the conjunctions.

Chapter XIX

THE CONJUNCTION

Taking up the definition of a conjunction given above in our general survey of parts of speech, we must first of all, just as we have done with prepositions, consider the question of the meaning of conjunctions. Many authors, in defining a conjunction, limit themselves to indicating that they serve to connect words (or parts of the sentence) and clauses.¹ This would seem to imply that conjunctions have no meaning of their own, that is, that they do not themselves express any phenomena of the extralinguistic world. This is untenable, as may be very easily shown by the simplest examples. Compare, for instance, the two sentences, *He came because it was late*, and *He came though it was late*. The different conjunctions obviously express different real relations between two extralinguistic phenomena: his coming and its being late. The causal connection between them exists outside the language, and so does the concessive relation expressed in the latter of the two sentences. There is no difference whatever in the grammatical structure of the two sentences: the difference lies only in the meanings of the two conjunctions. The same observation can be made on comparing the two sentences, *We will come to see you before he comes back*, and *We will come to see you after he comes back*, and also in a number of other cases. All this goes to prove that every conjunction has its own meaning, expressing some connection or other existing between phenomena in extralinguistic reality.

So far our reasoning and our conclusions have been the same as in the case of prepositions. Now, however, comes a point in which conjunctions are different from prepositions. When discussing prepositions, we noted that in a certain number of cases the use of a given preposition is predicted by the preceding word: thus the verb *depend* can only be followed by the preposition *on* (or *upon*), the adjective *characteristic* only by the preposition *of*, etc. In such cases the preposition has no meaning of its own. Conjunctions in this respect are entirely different. The use of a conjunction is never predicted by any preceding word. We will no longer inquire into the meanings of conjunctions, as this is a question of lexicology rather than grammar.

In studying the syntactical functions of conjunctions, we have, just as with prepositions, to distinguish between two levels — that of phrases and that of sentences.

On the phrase level it must be said that conjunctions connect words and phrases. It is the so-called co-ordinating conjunctions that are found here, and only very rarely subordinating ones.

¹ See, for example, *Грамматика русского языка*, т. I, стр. 665.

On the sentence level it must be said that conjunctions connect clauses (of different kinds). Here we find both so-called co-ordinating and so-called subordinating conjunctions.

The division of conjunctions into co-ordinating and subordinating is one that can hardly be dealt with outside syntax: co-ordinating conjunctions imply co-ordination of clauses, and subordinating conjunctions imply subordination of clauses. So we shall have to look again into this question when we come to syntax.¹ Here it will be sufficient to say that there is nothing in the conjunction itself to show whether it is co-ordinating or subordinating, and even in the structure of the clauses there is no unmistakable sign of this (as is the case, for instance, with word order in Modern German).

Conjunctions can sometimes lose their connecting function, as is the case with the conjunction *if* in sentences expressing wish, like the following: *If only she might play the question loud enough to reach the ears of this Paul Steitler.* (BUECHNER) Probably we shall have to say that *if* here is no longer a conjunction but a particle. We will consider such cases in Syntax as well.²

PREPOSITIONS AND CONJUNCTIONS

In comparing prepositions with co-ordinating and subordinating conjunctions we cannot fail to notice that while prepositions have nothing in common with co-ordinating conjunctions, some prepositions are very close in meaning to subordinating conjunctions, and in some cases a preposition and a subordinating conjunction sound exactly the same. As examples of similarity in meaning we may give, for instance, such phrases and clauses: *during his illness* = *while he was ill*, examples of complete identity in meaning and sound are the words *before*, *after*, *since*.

All this presents us with intricate problems. On the one hand, it seems doubtful whether we are right in uniting subordinating conjunctions (that is, words like *when*, *as*, *after*, *before*, *since*) together with co-ordinating conjunctions (that is, words like *and*, *but*, *or*) into one part of speech and separating them from prepositions (that is, words like *of*, *from*, *after*, *before*, *since*), with which they obviously have much more in common. On the other hand, it remains doubtful how we should treat the relations between the preposition *after* and the conjunction *after* (and similarly, *before* and *since*). None of the treatments so far proposed seems satisfactory.

One way is to say, there is the word *after*, which may function both as a preposition and as a conjunction. But then the question

¹ See below, p. 315 ff.

² See below, Chapter XXXVII, p. 293 ff.

arises, what part of speech is *after*? If it can only **function** as a preposition and as a conjunction, this would mean that it is neither the one nor the other.

Another way is to say that *after* the preposition and *after* the conjunction are homonyms. This will not do either, since homonymy, by definition, supposes complete difference of meaning, as between *saw* 'instrument for sawing' and *saw* 'old saying', whereas the meaning of *after* the preposition and *after* the conjunction is absolutely the same.

These considerations apply as well to the words *before* and *since*, and here the question is further complicated by the fact that they can also be adverbs.¹

The difficulty with the word *after* would be overcome if we were to unite prepositions and conjunctions into one part of speech (as hinted above, p. 33), which would then have to be given a new name. The difference between what we now call the preposition *after* and the conjunction would then be reduced to different syntactical uses of one word. But the difficulty with the adverbs and preposition-conjunctions *before* and *since* would not be solved by this: it would not do to say that an adverb and a word uniting the qualities of preposition and conjunction are the same word.

A fully convincing solution of this problem has yet to be found.

As to the relation between prepositions, co-ordinating conjunctions, and subordinating conjunctions, it must be said that on the ground of the peculiarities which have been pointed out a completely different treatment of the three types of words is possible. An idea to this effect was put forward by the French scholar L. Tesnière in a book on general principles of syntax. Tesnière classes what are usually called co-ordinating conjunctions as a type for itself: he calls them "jonctifs" (that is, junctives), whereas prepositions and what we call subordinating conjunctions come together under the name of "translatifs" (translatives) and are distinguished from each other as subclasses of this large class: prepositions are called "translatifs, premier degré" (translatives, first degree) and subordinating conjunctions, "translatifs, second degré" (second degree).² This is quite natural in a book on syntax, in which things are looked at from a syntactical angle and words classified according to their functions in the sentence.

It should also be noted that the difference between prepositions and conjunctions is much less pronounced in Modern English than in Russian, where prepositions are closely connected with cases, while conjunctions have nothing whatever to do with them. In English, with its almost complete absence of cases, this difference be-

¹ *After* is also an adverb in the phrase *ever after*.

² L. Tesnière, *Elements de syntaxe structural*, 1959, pp. 386—387,

tween prepositions and conjunctions is very much obliterated. While in Russian the substitution of a conjunction for a preposition makes it necessary to change the case of the following noun, in English no such change is necessary or, indeed, possible. So the distinction between preposition and conjunction is based here only on semantic criteria and, also, on the use of these words in other contexts, where they are not interchangeable.

In discussing prepositions, we noted that there are in English, as well as in Russian and in other languages, certain phrases which cannot be termed prepositions, since they are not words, but which are similar to prepositions in meaning and in syntactical function. The same is true of conjunctions. A certain number of phrases (consisting of two or three words) are similar in meaning and in function to conjunctions. Among them we can quote such phrases as *in order that*, *as soon as*, *as long as*, *notwithstanding that*, etc. Just as prepositional phrases, these will be analysed in a special chapter in Syntax (see p. 179 ff.).

THE PARTICLE

To include a word in the class of particles we must find out whether it has the characteristic features of particles which we have described in our general survey of parts of speech, and we should not apply any other criteria. We shall not inquire whether the word has one syllable, or two, or many; this phonetic quality of a word is irrelevant to its grammatical status: just as, for example, a preposition may have one syllable (*of, to*) or four (*notwithstanding*), a particle may have one syllable (*just*) or four (*exclusively*). Thus the diminutive suffix *-icle* should not be taken to refer to the length of the word.

In dealing with particles, we will limit ourselves to the grammatical side of the matter. We will not discuss either their meanings, which belong to the sphere of lexicology, nor the morphemes making them up, which should be considered in the theory of word-building.

When speaking of particles in our review of parts of speech we have noted already that they usually refer to the word (or, sometimes, phrase) immediately following and give special prominence to the notion expressed by this word (or phrase), or single it out in some other way, depending on the meaning of the particle.

This usage, which is by far the most common one, can be illustrated by a variety of examples. We will give a few: *One just does what is reasonable, and everything is bound to go all right.* (R. WEST) *She could feel anger stir, even at this late date, as she thought of that night, but she subdued it and tossed her head until the earrings danced.* (M. MITCHELL)

Sometimes a particle occupies a different position in the sentence. This question will be dealt with in the chapter on word order.

The question of the place of a particle in sentence structure remains unsolved. It would appear that the following three solutions are possible: (1) a particle is a separate secondary member of the sentence, which should be given a special name; (2) a particle is an element in the part of the sentence which is formed by the word (or phrase) to which the particle refers (thus the particle may be an element of the subject, predicate, object, etc.); (3) a particle neither makes up a special part of the sentence, nor is it an element in any part of the sentence; it stands outside the structure of the sentence and must be neglected when analysis of a sentence is given.¹

¹ The latter view is the common one. It is put forward by the authors of the book *Грамматика русского языка* (т. I, стр. 639).

Each of these three views entails some difficulties and none of them can be proved to be the correct one, so that the decision remains arbitrary.

The view that a particle is a part of the sentence by itself makes it necessary to state what part of the sentence it is. Since it obviously cannot be brought under the headings either of object, or attribute, or adverbial modifier, we should have to introduce a special part of the sentence which ought then to be given a special name.

The second view would be plausible if the particle always stood immediately before (or immediately after) the word or phrase to which it belongs. But the fact that it can occasionally stand at a distance from it (for example, within the predicate, while referring to an adverbial modifier) makes this view impossible of realisation; compare, for instance, *I have only met him twice*.

The last view, according to which a particle stands, as it were, outside the sentence, seems rather odd. Since it is within the sentence, and is essential to its meaning, so that omission of the particle could involve a material change in the meaning, it is hard to understand how it can be discounted in analysing the structure of the sentence.

Since, then, the second view proves to be impossible and the third unconvincing, we shall have to adhere to the first view and to state that a particle is a separate secondary part of the sentence which ought to be given a special name.

THE PARTICLE *Sot*

The particle *not* deserves special attention. It can, as is well known, be used in two different ways. On the one hand, it may stand outside the predicate, as in the following sentence: *Not till Magnus had actually landed in Orkney did he consider the many difficulties that confronted him.* (LINKLATER) It also stands outside the predicate in a type of so-called short answers, in which the negative is expressed by the particle *not*, if it is accompanied by a modal word like *certainly*, *perhaps*, or a phrase equivalent to a modal word, e. g. *of course*: *Certainly not. Perhaps not. Of course not.*¹ Compare also: *I am afraid not, I think not*, etc. In these cases the particle *not* appears to be the main part of the sentence.

Another use of the particle *not* is that within the predicate. In these cases it is customary to treat it as part of the verb itself. The usual way of putting it is this. The negative form of the present indicative, e. g., of the verb *be*, is: *(I) am not, (he) is not*, etc., or, the negative form of the present indicative, e. g., of the verb

¹ The use of these modal words and phrases with the sentence-word *no* is impossible.

sing is, (*I do not sing*, (*he docs not sing*, etc. The particle *not* is thus treated as an auxiliary element making part of the verb form. This of course appears to be especially necessary with verbs whose negative form includes the auxiliary verb *do*, i. e. with the vast majority of Modern English verbs. Here the particle has obviously no syntactic function of its own, and is an auxiliary element within the morphology of the verb.¹

The particle *not* undergoes further fusion with forms of the verb in the following cases, where indeed it is no longer a word at all but a morpheme within a verb form. The first step in this direction is clearly seen in the form *cannot*, where it preserves its vowel sound, and the next step in the contracted forms *isn't*, *aren't* (also the subliterate *ain't*), *wasn't*, *weren't*, *haven't*, *hasn't*, *hadn't*, *shan't*, *won't*, *shouldn't*, *wouldn't*, *don't*, *doesn't*, *didn't*, *mayn't*, *mighn't*, *mustn't*, *oughtn't*, *can't*, and occasionally also *usen't* for *used not*. Here the two elements have quite coalesced into a unit, and some of these forms (e. g. *shan't*, *won't*, and *don't*) cannot now even be divided into morphemes.

DOUBTFUL WORDS

There are some words which may be classed either as particles or as adverbs, since the criteria which we apply to distinguish between these two parts of speech do not appear to yield a clear result here.

Among these we should cite the words *almost* and *nearly*, which are close to each other in meaning. Taking a sentence like *The boat almost overturned*, we can say that it is a matter for discussion whether the word *almost* does or does not denote the manner in which the action of the verb was conducted. Again, taking the sentence *He is nearly thirty years old now*, we can also doubt whether the word *nearly* does or does not modify the word *thirty* (or, perhaps, the phrase *thirty years*). It would rather seem that it does not, but any judgement on this issue is bound to be subjective to a considerable extent, since, as we pointed out above, objective criteria do not yield any clear results. Accordingly, the syntactical function of the words *almost* and *nearly* will also remain doubtful and a matter for subjective opinion.

In weighing different considerations that may be put forward in favour of including the word *nearly* into one or other morphological category, it is essential to bear in mind a phenomenon which quite definitely speaks against including this word in the class of particles. The word *nearly* may occasionally have the adverb *very*

¹ See above, p. 125 ff.

standing before it and modifying it, as in the sentence: *The time is very nearly seven fifteen*. In the sentence *The time is nearly seven fifteen* we might bring forward certain arguments to prove that *nearly* is a particle. However, the possibility of its being modified by the adverb *very* is a powerful argument against that view: a particle cannot be modified by an adverb, or by any other kind of word, for that matter. Since the status of the word *nearly* was doubtful anyway, the phrase *very nearly* casts a definite weight against its being a particle and in favour of its being an adverb.

We may also note that there is a difference here between the word *nearly* and the word *almost*, close as they are in meaning: *almost* cannot be modified by any word, and the phrase *very almost* is certainly impossible. Whether this is sufficient reason to put them into different parts of speech is another matter.

MODAL WORDS

The distinction between modal words and adverbs is, as we saw in our general survey of parts of speech, based on two criteria: (1) their meaning: modal words express the speaker's view concerning the reality of the action expressed in the sentence, (2) their syntactical function: they are not adverbial modifiers but parentheses, whether we take a parenthesis to be a special part of the sentence or whether we say that it stands outside its structure. The latter problem is one that we will discuss in Syntax.¹

We must emphasise that this view is far from being the only one possible: one might argue that the meaning of an adverb as a part of speech might be described in such a way as to include what we call modal words, and to mention the function of parenthesis among the syntactical functions of adverbs. Where clear objective morphological criteria fail there will always be room for different interpretations. We will not argue this point any further but start on the assumption that modal words do constitute a separate part of speech.

Modal words have been variously classified into groups according to their meaning: those expressing certainty, such as *certainly*, *surely*, *undoubtedly*; those expressing doubt, such as *perhaps*, *maybe*, *possibly*, etc. The number of types varies greatly with different authors. We need not go into this question here, as this is a lexicological, rather than a grammatical, problem. From the grammatical viewpoint it is sufficient to state that all modal words express some kind of attitude of the speaker concerning the reality of the action expressed in the sentence.

In the vast majority of cases the modal word indicates the speaker's attitude towards the whole thought expressed in the sentence (or clause), e.g. *Look, there are those doves again. The one is really quite a bright red, isn't it?* (R. WEST) *She is a delicate little thing, perhaps nobody but me knows how delicate.* (LAWRENCE)

If the modal word in each of the sentences is eliminated the whole thought will lose the modal colouring imparted to it by the modal word, and will appear to be stated as a fact, without any specific mention of the speaker's attitude.

However, occasionally a modal word may refer to some one word or phrase only, and have no connection with the rest of the sentence. It may, for example, refer to a secondary part of the sentence, as in the following example: *No one expected his arrival, except Rose presumably.* (LINKLATER)

The use of modal words depends to a great extent on the type of the sentence. This will be discussed in Chapter XXIV,

¹ See Chapter XXIX.

A modal word can also make up a sentence by itself. This happens when it is used to answer a general question, that is, a question admitting of a *yes-* or *no-*answer. *Certainly, perhaps, maybe,* etc. may be used in this way. In these cases, then, modal words are the main part of the sentence. This brings them close together with the sentence words *yes* and *no*.¹ However, they differ from the sentence words in that the modal words can also be used as parentheses in a sentence. Thus, the question, *Are you coming?* may equally be answered, *Certainly I am,* or *Certainly*. The sentence words *yes* and *no* cannot be used as parentheses. Whether the answer is *Yes,* or *Yes, I am,* the *yes* is a sentence in both variants.

It might be possible to argue that if the answer to the question *Are you coming?* is *Certainly,* the word *certainly* is a parenthesis, and the rest of the answer, *I am,* is "understood". While such a view cannot be disproved, it seems unnatural and far-fetched, and we will prefer the view that *Certainly* in this case is a sentence.

The problem of modal words is connected with the very difficult problem of modality as a whole. This has been treated repeatedly by various scholars both with reference to English and to Russian and in a wider context of general linguistics as well.² We will not investigate here all the aspects of the problem. We will only mention that there are various means of expressing modality — modal words, modal verbs (*can, must,* etc.) and the category of mood. Since two of them or even all three may be used simultaneously, it is evident that there may be several layers of modality in a sentence. A great variety of combinations is possible here.

¹ See p. 168.

² See, for example, В. В. Виноградов, *О категории модальности и модальных словах в современном русском языке*. Труды Института русского языка, т. II, 1950.

THE INTERJECTION. WORDS
NOT INCLUDED IN THE CLASSIFICATION

Interjections have for a long time been an object of controversy. There has been some doubt whether they are words of a definite language in the same sense that nouns, verbs, etc. are, and whether they are not rather involuntary outcries, provoked by violent feelings of pain, joy, surprise, etc., not restricted to any given language but common to all human beings as biological phenomena are.

In our days this controversy is outdated. We can now safely say that interjections are part of the word stock of a language as much as other types of words are. Interjections belonging to a certain language may contain sounds foreign to other languages. Thus, for instance, the English interjection *alas* contains the vowel phoneme [ae], which is not found either in the Russian or in the German language; the Russian interjection *ax* contains the consonant phoneme [x], which is not found in English, etc.

The characteristic features which distinguish interjections from practically all other words lie in a different sphere. The interjections, as distinct from nouns, verbs, prepositions, etc., are not names of anything, but expressions of emotions. Thus, the emotion expressed by the interjection *alas* may be named despondency, or despair, etc., but of course it cannot be named *alas*. Another characteristic feature of the meaning of interjections is, that while some of them express quite definite meanings (for instance, *alas* can never express the feeling of joy), other interjections seem to express merely feeling in general, without being attached to some particular feeling. The interjection *oh*, for example, may be used both when the speaker feels surprised and when he feels joyous, or disappointed, or frightened, etc. The meaning of the interjection itself is thus very vague. We will not enter more deeply into this, as it is a question of lexicology rather than of grammar.

The grammatical problems involved in the study of interjections are to be considered on the usual two levels: that of phrases and that of the sentence.

On the phrase level the problem is whether an interjection can be part of any phrase, and if so, what types of words can be connected with it.

In the vast majority of cases an interjection does not make part of any phrase but stands (in this sense) isolated. However, that does not mean that it is impossible for an interjection to make part of a phrase.

For instance, the interjection *alas* can be connected with the group "preposition + noun", naming the person or thing which causes the feeling expressed by the interjection: *Alas for my friends!*

The interjection *oh* can be followed by the adjective *dear* to form a phrase which itself is the equivalent of an interjection: *Oh dear!*

However, on the whole the possibility of an interjection being part of a phrase is very limited indeed. As far as we can see, an interjection can only be the first component of a phrase and never occupies the second or any other place within it.

On the sentence level the function of interjections is a controversial matter. How, for example, are we to interpret the syntactical function of the interjection in a sentence like this: *Oh! she used awful grammar but I could see she was trying hard to be elegant, poor thing* (M. MITCHELL) ? The usual interpretation is that the interjection stands outside the structure of the sentence.¹ Another view is that it is syntactically a kind of parenthesis at least in some cases.² The controversy cannot be decided by objective investigation and the answer only depends on what we mean by sentence structure on the one hand, and by some element or other being outside the sentence structure, on the other.

We will start on the assumption that no element belonging to a sentence can be outside its structure, and we will treat the syntactical functions of interjections accordingly.³

An interjection, then, is, syntactically, a part of the sentence loosely connected with the rest of it, and approaching a parenthesis in its character.

However, an interjection can also stand quite apart and form a sentence by itself, as in the following passage: *"He refused to marry her the next day!" "Oh!" said Scarlett, her hopes dashed.* (M. MITCHELL)

Phrases consisting of two or more words and equivalent to interjections, such as *Dear me! Goodness gracious! Well I never!* etc., will be discussed in the chapter on phrases.

After having considered in some detail the morphological and syntactical peculiarities of different types of words described as parts of speech, we will now turn to certain words which have not been included in our classification.

The possibility, and even probability of such words existing in a language has been convincingly shown by Academician L. Ščerba in his paper on parts of speech in Russian, published in 1928.⁴ He pointed out that there may be words in a language which are not

¹ See, for example, *Грамматика русского языка*, т. I, стр. 674,

² See В. Л. Жигadlo, И. П. Иванова, Л. Л. Иофик, *Современный английский язык*, стр. 301.

³ See below, p. 234.

⁴ See Л. В. Щерба, *О частях речи в русском языке*. Избранные работы по русскому языку. стр. 66.

included under any category, and then, as he aptly put it, they would belong nowhere. It would indeed be no more than a prejudice to suppose that every word of a language "must" belong to some part of speech. There is nothing in language structure to warrant that assumption.

Academician Ščerba's idea is fully confirmed by some facts of Modern English. If, for instance, we take the word *please*, used in polite requests, we shall be at a loss to say to what part of speech it belongs. Traditionally, it was described as an adverb, but there appears to be no reasonable ground for this, either in the meaning of the word or in its syntactical function. (The morphological criterion of course yields nothing here, as the word is invariable like many words belonging to various parts of speech.) Rather than "squeezing" the word into some part of speech at whatever cost, we had better put up with the fact that it does not fit into any of them, and leave it outside the system.

Another case in point are the words *yes* and *no*. These were also traditionally treated as adverbs, though this was far less justified than even in the case of *please*. These two words can form sentences without any other word being joined on to them. It might be possible, after all, to take this as their basic feature, and to say that they form a special part of speech, namely, sentence words. However, such a procedure is extremely doubtful, both because that feature seems hardly sufficient for constituting a part of speech, and because the number of words involved is so small. It seems therefore preferable to leave these two words, like the word *please*, outside the system of parts of speech.

Other words deserving similar treatment may be found, and the possibility of being left outside the system of parts of speech should be left open to them.

Part Two

Syntax

In giving a general preview of our subject on p. 12 we pointed out that within the domain of syntax two levels should be distinguished: that of phrases and that of sentences. In giving characteristics of a part of speech we consistently kept apart the two layers in so far as they concern the syntactical functions of parts of speech — their ability to combine with other words into phrases, on the one hand, and their function in the sentence, on the other.

In starting now to analyse problems of syntax itself, we must first of all try to elucidate as far as possible the sphere belonging to each of the two levels. After that we will proceed to a systematic review of each level.

We will term "phrase" every combination of two or more words which is a grammatical unit but is not an analytical form of some word (as, for instance, the perfect forms of verbs). The constituent elements of a phrase may belong to any part of speech. For instance, they may both be nouns, or one of them may be an adjective and the other a noun, or again one of them may be a verb and the other a noun, or one may be a preposition and the other a noun; or there may be three of them, one being a preposition, the other a noun, and the third a preposition, etc.

We thus adopt the widest possible definition of a phrase and we do not limit this notion by stipulating that a phrase must contain at least two notional words, as is done in a number of linguistic treatises.¹ The inconvenience of restricting the notion of phrase to those groups which contain at least two notional words is that, for example, the group "preposition + noun" remains outside the classification and is therefore neglected in grammatical theory.

The difference between a phrase and a sentence is a fundamental one. A phrase is a means of naming some phenomena or processes, just as a word is. Each component of a phrase can undergo grammatical changes in accordance with grammatical categories represented in it, without destroying the identity of the phrase. For instance, in the phrase *write letters* the first component can change according to the verbal categories of tense, mood, etc., and the second component according to the category of number. Thus, *writes a letter, has written a letter, would have written letters*, etc., are grammatical modifications of one phrase.

With a sentence, things are entirely different. A sentence is a unit with every word having its definite form. A change in the form of one or more words would produce a new sentence.

¹ See, for instance, *Грамматика русского языка*, т. III, 1954, ч. 1, стр. 10.

It must also be borne in mind that a phrase as such has no intonation, just as a word has none. Intonation is one of the most important features of a sentence, which distinguish it from a phrase.

Last not least, it is necessary to dwell on one of the most difficult questions involved in the study of phrases: the grammatical aspect of that study as distinct from the lexicological.

The difference should be basically this: grammar has to study the aspects of phrases which spring from the grammatical peculiarities of the words making up the phrase, and of the syntactical functions of the phrase as a whole, while lexicology has to deal with the lexical meaning of the words and their semantic groupings.

Thus, for instance, from the grammatical point of view the two phrases *read letters* and *invite friends* are identical, since they are built on the same pattern "verb + noun indicating the object of the action". From the lexicological point of view, on the other hand, they are essentially different, as the verbs belong to totally different semantic spheres, and the nouns too; one of them denotes a material object, while the other denotes a human being. Thus, the basic difference between the grammatical and the lexicological approach to phrases appears to be clear. However, it is not always easy to draw this demarcation line while doing concrete research in this sphere.

It is to the phrase level that the syntactical notions of agreement (or concord) and government apply.

In studying phrases from a grammatical viewpoint we will divide them according to their function in the sentence into (1) those which perform the function of one or more parts of the sentence, for example, predicate, or predicate and object, or predicate and adverbial modifier, etc., and (2) those which do not perform any such function but whose function is equivalent to that of a preposition, or conjunction, and which are, in fact, to all intents and purposes equivalents of those parts of speech. The former of these two classes comprises the overwhelming majority of English phrases, but the latter is no less important from a general point of view.

TYPES OF PHRASES

The type "noun + noun" is a most usual type of phrase in Modern English. It must be divided into two subtypes, depending on the form of the first component, which may be in the common or in the genitive case.¹

The type "noun in the common case + noun" may be used to denote one idea as modified by another, in the widest sense. We

¹ We will use these terms here in the traditional way. On the problems concerning them, see above p. 41 ff.

find here a most varied choice of semantic spheres, such as *speech sound*, *silver watch*, *army unit*, which of course deserve detailed study from the lexicological viewpoint. We may only note that the first component may be a proper name as well, as in the phrases *a Beethoven symphony* or *London Bridge*.

The type "noun in the genitive case + noun" has a more restricted meaning and use, which we need not go into here, as we have discussed the meaning of the form in '-s at some length in Chapter III.

Another very common type is "adjective + noun", which is used to express all possible kinds of things with their properties.

The type "verb + noun" may correspond to two different types of relation between an action and a thing. In the vast majority of cases the noun denotes an object of the action expressed by the verb, but in a certain number of phrases it denotes a measure, rather than the object, of the action. This may be seen in such phrases as, *walk a mile*, *sleep an hour*, *wait a minute*, etc. It is only the meaning of the verb and that of the noun which enable the hearer or reader to understand the relation correctly. The meaning of the verb divides, for instance, the phrase *wait an hour* from the phrase *appoint an hour*, and shows the relations in the two phrases to be basically different.

In a similar way other types of phrases should be set down and analysed. Among them will be the types, "verb + adverb", "adverb + adjective", "adverb + adverb", "noun + preposition + noun", "adjective + preposition + noun", "verb + preposition + noun", etc.

An important question arises concerning the pattern "noun + verb". In our linguistic theory different opinions have been put forward on this issue. One view is that the phrase type "noun + verb" (which is sometimes called "predicative phrase") exists and ought to be studied just like any other phrase type such as we have enumerated above.¹ The other view is that no such type as "noun + verb" exists, as the combination "noun + verb" constitutes a sentence rather than a phrase.² This objection, however, is not convincing. If we take the combination "noun + verb" as a sentence, which is sometimes possible, we are analysing it on a different level, namely, on sentence level, and what we can discover on sentence level cannot affect analysis on phrase level, or indeed take its place. Besides, there is another point to be noted here. If we take, for

¹ See, for instance, В. П. Сухотин, *Проблема словосочетания в современном русском языке*. Вопросы синтаксиса современного русского языка, стр. 127—182.

² See В. В. Виноградов, *Понятие синтагмы в синтаксисе русского языка*. Вопросы синтаксиса современного русского языка, стр. 183—256.

instance, the group *a man writes* on the phrase level, this means that each of the components can be changed in accordance with its paradigm in any way so long as the connection with the other component does not prevent this. In the given case, the first component, *man*, can be changed according to number, that is, it can appear in the plural form, and the second component, *writes*, can be changed according to the verbal categories of aspect, tense, correlation, and mood (change of person is impossible due to the first component, change of number is predetermined by the number of the first component, and change of voice is made impossible by its meaning). Thus, the groups, *a man writes*, *men write*, *a man wrote*, *men are writing*, *men have written*, *a man would have been writing*, etc., are all variants of the same phrase, just as *man* and *men* are forms of the same noun, while *writes*, *wrote*, *has written*, etc. are forms of the same verb. It is also important to note that a phrase as such has no intonation of its own, no more than a word as such has one. On the sentence level things are different. *A man writes*, even if we could take it as a sentence at all, which is not certain, is not the same sentence as *Men have been writing*, but a different sentence.

This example is sufficient to show the difference between a phrase of the pattern "noun + verb" and a sentence. The existence of phrases of this type is therefore certain. The phrase pattern "noun + verb" has very ample possibilities of expressing actions as performed by any kind of subject, whether living, material, or abstract.

Besides phrase patterns consisting of two notional words with or without a preposition between them, there are also phrases consisting of a preposition and another word, mainly a noun. Thus, such groups as *in the street*, *at the station*, *at noon*, *after midnight*, *in time*, *by heart*, etc. are prepositional phrases performing some function or other in a sentence. Some of these phrases are phraseological units (e.g. *in time*, *by heart*), but this is a lexicological observation which is irrelevant from the grammatical viewpoint.

Phrases consisting of two components may be enlarged by addition of a third component, and so forth, for instance the phrase pattern "adjective + noun" (*high houses*) may be enlarged by the addition of an adjective in front, so that the type "adjective + adjective + noun" arises (*new high houses*). This, in its turn, may be further enlarged by more additions. The limit of the possible growth of a phrase is hard to define, and we will not inquire into this subject any further.

SYNTACTICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COMPONENTS OF A PHRASE

These fall under two main heads: (1) agreement or concord, (2) government.

Agreement

By agreement we mean a method of expressing a syntactical relationship, which consists in making the subordinate word take a form similar to that of the word to which it is subordinate. In Modern English this can refer only to the category of number: a subordinate word agrees in number with its head word if it has different, number forms at all.¹ This is practically found in two words only, the pronouns *this* and *that*, which agree in number with their head word. Since no other word, to whatever part of speech it may belong, agrees in number with its head word, these two pronouns stand quite apart in the Modern English syntactical system.

As to the problem of agreement of the verb with the noun or pronoun denoting the subject of the action (*a child plays, children play*), this is a controversial problem. Usually it is treated as agreement of the predicate with the subject, that is, as a phenomenon of sentence structure. However, if we assume (as we have done) that agreement and government belong to the phrase level, rather than to the sentence level, and that phrases of the pattern "noun + verb" do exist, we have to treat this problem in this chapter devoted to phrases.

The controversy is this. Does the verb stand, say, in the plural number because the noun denoting the subject of the action is plural, so that the verb is in the full sense of the word subordinate to the noun? Or does the verb, in its own right, express by its category of number the singularity or plurality of the doer (or doers)?²

There are some phenomena in Modern English which would seem to show that the verb does not always follow the noun in the category of number. Such examples as, *My family are early risers*, on the one hand, and *The United Nations is an international organisation*, on the other, prove that the verb can be independent of the noun in this respect: though the noun is in the singular, the verb may be in the plural, if the doer is understood to be plural; though the noun is plural, the verb may be singular if the doer is understood to be singular. Examples of such usage are arguments in favour of the view that there is no agreement in number of the verb with the noun expressing the doer of the action.

The fact that sentences like *My family is small*, and *My family are early risers* exist side by side proves that there is no agreement

¹ In some other languages, such as Russian, there is also agreement in case and gender.

² This question was raised with reference to Indo-European languages in general by A. Meillet in his book *Introduction a l'étude comparative des langues indo-européennes*, 6^{ème} ed., 1924, p. 323, and with reference to the Russian language by A. Peshkovsky (see A. M. Пешковский, *Русский синтаксис в научном освещении*, изд. 7-е, 1956, стр. 183 сл.).

of the verb with the noun in either case: the verb shows whether the subject of the action is to be thought of as singular or plural, no matter what the category of number in the noun may be.

Thus, the sphere of agreement in Modern English is extremely small: it is restricted to two pronouns — *this* and *that*, which agree with their head word in number when they are used in front of it as the first components of a phrase of which the noun is the centre.

Government

By government we understand the use of a certain form of the subordinate word required by its head word, but not coinciding with the form of the head word itself — that is the difference between agreement and government.

The role of government in Modern English is almost as insignificant as that of agreement. We do not find in English any verbs, or nouns, or adjectives, requiring the subordinate noun to be in one case rather than in another. Nor do we find prepositions requiring anything of the kind.

The only thing that may be termed government in Modern English is the use of the objective case of personal pronouns and of the pronoun *who* when they are subordinate to a verb or follow a preposition. Thus, for instance, the forms *me*, *him*, *her*, *us*, *them*, are required if the pronoun follows a verb (e. g. *find* or *invite*) or any preposition whatever. Even this type of government is, however, made somewhat doubtful by the rising tendency, mentioned above (p. 66 ff.), to use the forms *me*, *him*, etc., outside their original sphere as forms of the objective case. The notion of government has also become doubtful as applied to the form *whom*, which is rather often superseded by the form *who* in such sentences as, *Who(m) did you see?* (compare p. 69).

As to nouns, the notion of government may be said to have become quite uncertain in present-day English. Even if we stick to the view that *father* and *father's* are forms of the common and the genitive case, respectively, we could not assert that a preposition always requires the form of the common case. For instance, the preposition *at* can be combined with both case forms: compare *I looked at my father* and *I spent the summer at my father's*, or, with the preposition *to*: *I wrote to the chemist*, and *I went to the chemist's*, etc. It seems to follow that the notion of government does not apply to forms of nouns.

Other Ways

In Russian linguistic theory, there is a third way of expressing syntactical relations between components of a phrase, which is termed *примыкание*. No exact definition of this notion is given:

its characteristic feature is usually described in a negative way, as absence both of agreement and of government. The most usual example of this type of connection is the relation between an adverb and its head word, whether this is an adjective or a verb (or another adverb, for that matter). An adverb is subordinate to its head word, without either agreeing with or being governed by it. This negative characteristic cannot, however, be said to be sufficient as a definition of a concrete syntactical means of expression. It is evident that the subject requires some more exact investigation. For instance, if we take such a simple case as the sentence, .. . *lashes of rain striped the great windows almost horizontally* (R. WEST) and inquire what it is that shows the adverb *horizontally* to be subordinate to the verb *striped*, we shall have to conclude that this is achieved by a certain combination of factors, some of which are grammatical, while others are not. The grammatical factor is the fact that an adverb can be subordinate to a verb. That, however, is not sufficient in a number of cases. There may be several verbs in the sentence, and the question has to be answered, how does the reader (or hearer) know to which of them the adverb is actually subordinated. Here a lexicological factor intervenes: the adverb must be semantically compatible with its head word. Examples may be found where the connection between an adverb and its head word is preserved even at a considerable distance, owing to the grammatical and semantic compatibility of the adverb. Compare, for instance, the following sentences: *Nobly, nobly Cape Saint Vincent to the North-West died away.* (BROWNING) *Swiftly he thought of the different things she had told him.* (DREISER)

An adverb can only be connected with its head word in this manner, since it has no grammatical categories which would allow it to agree with another word or to be governed by it. With other parts of speech things stand differently in different languages. In inflected languages an adjective will agree with its head word, and even in French and Italian, though they are analytical languages, adjectives agree with their head words both in number and gender. In Modern English no agreement is possible. The same can be said about many other types of phrases.

However, there is another means of expressing syntactical connection which plays a significant part in Modern English. It may be called "enclosure" (Russian замыкание) and its essence is this. Some element of a phrase is, as it were, enclosed between two parts of another element. The most widely known case of "enclosure" is the putting of a word between an article and the noun to which the article belongs. Any word or phrase thus enclosed is shown to be an attribute to the noun. As is well known, many other words than adjectives and nouns can be found in that position, and many phrases, too. It seems unnecessary to give examples of adjectives

and nouns in that position, as they are familiar to everybody. However, examples of other parts of speech, and also of phrases enclosed will not be out of place here. *The then government* — here the adverb *then*, being enclosed between the article and the noun it belongs to, is in this way shown to be an attribute to the noun.¹ In the phrase *an on-the-spot investigation* the phrase *on-the-spot* is enclosed between the article and the noun to which the article belongs, and this characterises the syntactic connections of the phrase.

The unity of a phrase is quite clear if the phrase as a whole is modified by an adverb. It is a rather common phenomenon for an adverb to modify a phrase, usually one consisting of a preposition and a noun (with possible words serving as attributes to the noun). Here, first, is an example where the phrase so modified is a phraseological unit: . . . *that little thimbleful of brandy ... went sorely against the grain with her.* (TROLLOPE) The adverb *sorely* cannot possibly be said to modify the preposition *against* alone. So it is bound to belong to the phrase *against the grain* as a whole.

An adverb modifying a prepositional phrase is also found in the following example: *The funeral was well under way.* (HUXLEY) The adverb *well* can only modify the phrase *under way*, as a phrase *well under* is unthinkable. This is possible because the phrase *under way*, which is a phraseological unit, has much the same meaning as *going on, developing, etc.*

A phrase may also be modified by a pronoun (it should be noted, though, that in our example the whole phrase, including the pronoun, is a phraseological unit): *Every now and again she would stomp and move her mouth as though to speak, but nothing was said.* (A. WILSON) It is clear that a phrase *every now* would not be possible. A similar case is the following: *Every three or four months Mr Bodiharn preached a sermon on the subject.* (HUXLEY) It is quite evident that the whole phrase *three or four months* is here modified by the pronoun *every*. This may be to some extent connected with the tendency to take phrases consisting of a numeral and a noun in the plural indicating some measure of time or space as denoting a higher unit (compare p. 38).

The phrase "noun + *after* + the same noun" may be a syntactic unit introduced as a whole by a preposition, thus: *She spent the Christmas holidays with her parents in the northern part of the State, where her father owned a drug-store, even though in letter after letter Eve Grayson had urged and begged her to come to New Orleans for the holidays, promising that she would meet many interesting men while she was there.* (E. CALDWELL) That the preposition *in* introduces the whole phrase *letter after letter* is evident

¹ Another view is that *then* is an adjective here.

from the fact that it would not be possible to use the noun *letter* (alone) after the preposition without either an article or some other determinative, such as, for example, *her*.

In the following example the preposition *with* introduces, not a noun, but a phrase consisting of a noun, a preposition (*upon*) and the same noun repeated. *Brown varnished bookshelves lined the walls, filled with row upon row of those thick, heavy theological works which the second-hand booksellers generally sell by weight.* (HUXLEY) That the preposition *with* introduces the phrase *row upon row* rather than the noun *row* alone, is evident from the fact that it would not be possible to say *.. filled with row of those .. works ..*. The noun *row* could not be used without the article, to say nothing of the fact that one row of books was not enough to fill the walls of a room.

Sometimes a phrase of the pattern "adverb + preposition + noun" may be introduced by another preposition. Compare this sentence from Prof. D. Jones's Preface to his "English Pronouncing Dictionary": *For help in the preparation of this new edition I am particularly indebted to Mr P. A. D. MacCarthy, who supplied me with upwards of 500 notes and suggestions.* The phrase *upwards of 500 notes and suggestions* means the same as *more than 500 notes and suggestions*, and this may explain its use after the preposition *with*. But the fact remains that a preposition (*with*) is immediately followed by a prepositional phrase (*upwards of*).

PHRASES EQUIVALENT TO PREPOSITIONS AND CONJUNCTIONS

Under this heading we will treat such formations as *apart from*, *with reference to*, *as soon as*, *so long as*, etc., which quite obviously are phrases rather than words, and which quite definitely perform the same function in a sentence as prepositions and conjunctions respectively.

The treatment of these units in grammatical theory has been vague and often contradictory. Most usually they are treated as prepositions or conjunctions of a special type, variously described as compound, analytical, etc. This view ignores the basic difference between a word and a phrase and is therefore unacceptable. We will stick to the principle that a phrase (as different from a word) cannot be a part of speech and that phrases should be studied in Syntax.

An obstacle to this treatment was the view that a phrase must include at least two notional words (see above, p. 170). As we have rejected this limitation, we can include under phrases any groups, whether consisting of a form word and a notional word, or of two form words, etc.

Among phrases equivalent to prepositions we note the pattern "adverb + preposition", represented, for instance, by *out of*, *apart from*, *down to*, as in the sentences, "*I love you so*," *she answered*, "*but apart from that, you were right*." (R. WEST) *As the cool of the evening now came on, Lester proposed to Aram to enjoy it without, previous to returning to the parlour.* (LYTTON) *All within was the same, down to the sea-weed in the blue mug in my bedroom.* (DICKENS) The phrases equivalent to prepositions (we may accept the term "prepositional phrases") perform the very functions that are typical of prepositions, and some of them have synonyms among prepositions. Thus, the phrase *apart from* is a synonym of the preposition *besides*, the phrase *previous to* a synonym of the preposition *before*, etc.

Another pattern of prepositional phrases is "preposition + noun + preposition", e. g. *in front of*, *on behalf of*, *with reference to*, *in accordance with*, as in the sentences, *His friend was seated in front of the fire.* (BLACK) *Caesar crossed in spite of this.* (JEROME K. JEROME) It must be admitted that there may be doubts whether a group of this type has or has not become a prepositional phrase. Special methods can then be used to find this out. For instance, it may prove important whether the noun within such a phrase can or cannot be modified by an adjective, whether it can or cannot be changed into the plural, and so forth. Opinions may differ on whether a given phrase should or should not be included in this group. On the whole, however, the existence of such prepositional phrases is beyond doubt.

Other types of phrases ought to be carefully studied in a similar way, for example the phrase *of course*, which is the equivalent of a modal word, etc.

The number of phrases equivalent to conjunctions is rather considerable. Some of the more specialised time relations are expressed by phrases, e. g. *as soon as*, *as long as*. Phrases with other meanings also belong here, e. g. *in order that*, *notwithstanding that*. These phrases may be conveniently termed "conjunctive phrases", though this term is not so usual as the term "prepositional phrases".

There are several patterns of conjunctive phrases. One of them is "adverb + adverb + conjunction" (*as soon as*, *as long as*, *so long as*). The first component of the two former phrases is probably an adverb, though it might also be argued that it is a conjunction. We may say that the distinction between the two is here neutralised.

There is also the pattern "preposition + noun + conjunction", as in the phrase *in order that*, which is used to introduce adverbial clauses of purpose, or in the phrase *for fear that*, which tends to become a kind of conjunctive phrase introducing a special kind of clause of cause: *For fear that his voice might betray more of his feel-*

ings, which would embarrass the old lady so involved still with her voyage and getting away to where it would be quiet again, so without such sudden, sick floods of sentiment herself, he simply repeated again how good, good it was to see her... (BUECHNER)¹

It would appear that the treatment of such phrases attempted here does better justice both to their structure and function than a treatment which includes them under prepositions and conjunctions proper and thus obliterates the essential difference between words (parts of speech) and phrases (groups of words).

In passing now from a study of phrases to that of the sentence we are, it should be remembered, proceeding to a different level of language structure. Notions referring to the phrase level should be carefully kept apart from those referring to the sentence and its members. An indiscriminate use of terms belonging to the two levels (as, for instance, in the familiar expression "subject, verb and object") leads to a hopeless muddle and makes all serious syntactic investigation impossible. It must, however, be pointed out that in some cases distinction between the two levels proves to be a very difficult task indeed.² We will try in such cases to point out whatever can be urged in favour of each of the diverging views and to suggest a solution of the problem.

¹ From the lexicological viewpoint some of these phrases functioning as equivalents of prepositions and conjunctions must certainly be described as phraseological units. This, however, is irrelevant for their grammatical characteristic.

² We shall see this when we come to the problem of the attribute, (p. 222 ff).

THE SENTENCE

The notion of sentence has not so far received a satisfactory definition, which would enable us by applying it in every particular case to find out whether a certain linguistic unit was a sentence or not.

Thus, for example, the question remains undecided whether such shop notices as *Book Shop* and such book titles as *English* are sentences or not. In favour of the view that they are sentences the following consideration can be brought forward. The notice *Book Shop* and the title *English Grammar* mean 'This is a book shop', 'This is an English Grammar'; the phrase is interpreted as the predicative of a sentence whose subject and link verb have been omitted, that is, it is apprehended as a unit of communication. According to the other possible view, such notices as *Book Shop* and such titles as *English Grammar* are not units of communication at all, but units of nomination, merely appended to the object they denote. Since there is as yet no definition of a sentence which would enable us to decide this question, it depends on everyone's subjective view which alternative he prefers. We will prefer the view that such notices and book titles are not sentences but rather nomination units.

We also mention here a special case. Some novels have titles formulated as sentences, e. g. *The Stars Look Down*, by A. Cronin, or *They Came to a City*, by J. B. Priestley. These are certainly sentences, but they are used as nomination units, for instance, *Have you read The Stars Look Down?*, *Do you like They Came to a City?*¹

With the rise of modern ideas of paradigmatic syntax yet another problem concerning definition of sentence has to be considered.

In paradigmatic syntax, such units as *He has arrived*, *He has not arrived*, *Has he arrived*, *He will arrive*, *He will not arrive*, *Will he arrive*, etc., are treated as different forms of the same sentence, just as *arrives*, *has arrived*, *will arrive* etc., are different forms of the same verb. We may call this view of the sentence the paradigmatic view.

Now from the point of view of communication, *He has arrived* and *He has not arrived* are different sentences since they convey different information (indeed, the meaning of the one flatly contradicts that of the other).

¹ The same may be found in Russian, for instance in some titles of plays by Alexander Ostrovski: *Бедность не порок*, *Свои люди — сочтемся*, *Не в свои сани не садись*.

CLASSIFICATION OF SENTENCES

The problem of classification of sentences is a highly complicated one, and we will first consider the question of the principles of classification, and of the notions on which it can be based.

Let us begin by comparing a few sentences differing from each other in some respect. Take, for example, the following two sentences: (1) *But why did you leave England?* (GALSWORTHY) and (2) *There are to-day more people writing extremely well, in all departments of life, than ever before; what we have to do is to sharpen our judgement and pick these out from the still larger number who write extremely badly.* (CRUMP)

Everyone will see that the two sentences are basically different. This is true, but very general and not grammatically exact. In order to arrive at a strictly grammatical statement of the difference (or differences) between them we must apply more exact methods of observation and analysis.

Let us, then, proceed to a careful observation of the features which constitute the difference between the two sentences.

1. The first sentence expresses a question, that is the speaker expects an answer which will supply the information he wants. The second sentence expresses a statement, that is, the author (or speaker) states his opinion on a certain subject. He does not ask about anything, or expect anybody to supply him any information. This difference is expressed in writing by the first sentence having a question mark at the end, while the second sentence has a full stop.

2. The first sentence is addressed to a certain hearer (or a few hearers present), and is meant to provoke the hearer's reaction (answer). The second sentence is not addressed to any particular person or persons and the author does not know how anybody will react to it.

3. The two sentences differ greatly in length: the first consists of only 6 words, while the second has 39.

4. The first sentence has no punctuation marks within it, while the second has two commas and a semicolon.

5. The first sentence has only one finite verb (*did ... leave*), while the second has three (*are, have, write*).

These would seem to be some essential points of difference. We have not yet found out which of them are really relevant from a grammatical viewpoint. We have not included in the above list those which are quite obviously irrelevant from that viewpoint; for example, the first sentence contains a proper name (*England*), while the second does not contain any, or, the second sentence contains a possessive pronoun (*our*) while the first does not, etc.

Let us now consider each of the five points of difference and see which of them are relevant from a purely grammatical point of view, for a classification of sentences.

Point 1 states a difference in the types of thought expressed in the two sentences. Without going into details of logical analysis, we can merely say that a question (as in the first sentence), and a proposition (as in the second) ¹ are different types of thought, in the logical acceptance of that term. The problem now is, whether this difference is or is not of any importance from the grammatical viewpoint. In Modern English sentences expressing questions (we will call them, as is usually done, interrogative sentences) have some characteristic grammatical features. These features are, in the first place, a specific word order in most cases (predicate — subject), as against the order subject — predicate ² in sentences expressing propositions (declarative sentences). Thus word order may, with some reservations, be considered as a feature distinguishing this particular type of sentence from others. Another grammatical feature characterising interrogative sentences (again, with some reservations) is the structure of the predicate verb, namely its analytical form "do + infinitive" (in our first sentence, *did* .., *leave* ..., *not left*), where in a declarative sentence there would be the simple form (without *do*). However, this feature is not restricted to interrogative sentences: as is well known, it also characterises negative sentences. Anyhow, we can (always with some reservations) assume that word order and the form "do + infinitive" are grammatical features characterising interrogative sentences, and in so far the first item of our list appears to be grammatically relevant. We will, accordingly, accept the types "interrogative sentence" and "declarative sentence" as grammatical types of sentences.

Point 2, treating of a difference between a sentence addressed to a definite hearer (or reader) and a sentence free from such limitation, appears not to be grammatical, important as it may be from other points of view. Accordingly, we will not include this distinction among grammatical features of sentences.

Point 3, showing a difference in the length of the sentences, namely in the number of words making up each of them, does not in itself constitute a grammatical feature, though it may be more remotely connected with grammatical distinctions.

Point 4 bears a close relation to grammatical peculiarities; more «specially, a semicolon would be hardly possible in certain types of sentences (so-called simple sentences). But punctuation marks within a sentence are not in themselves grammatical features: they

¹ As a matter of fact, our second sentence contains more than one proposition; but this does not affect the basic difference between the two types of sentences.

² We will here provisionally accept the terms "subject" and "predicate" without definition. For a full discussion of these terms see p. 198 ff.

are rather a consequence of grammatical features whose essence is to be looked for elsewhere.

Point 5, on the contrary, is very important from a grammatical viewpoint. Indeed the number of finite verbs in a sentence is one of its main grammatical features. In this particular instance it should be noted that each of the three finite verbs has its own noun or pronoun belonging to it and expressing the doer of the action denoted by the verb: *are* has the noun *people*, *have* the pronoun *we*, and *write* the pronoun *who*. These are sure signs of the sentence being composite, not simple.¹ Thus we will adopt the distinction between simple and composite sentences as a distinction between two grammatical types.

The items we have established as a result of comparing the two sentences given on page 183 certainly do not exhaust all the possible grammatical features a sentence can be shown to possess. They were only meant to illustrate the method to be applied if a reasonable grammatical classification of sentences is to be achieved. If we were to take another pair or other pairs of sentences and proceed to compare them in a similar way we should arrive at some more grammatical distinctions which have to be taken into account in making up a classification. We will not give any more examples but we will take up the grammatical classification of sentences in a systematic way.

It is evident that there are two principles of classification. Applying one of them, we obtain a classification into declarative, interrogative, and imperative sentences. We can call this principle that of "types of communication".

The other classification is according to structure. Here we state two main types: simple sentences and composite sentences. We will not now go into the question of a further subdivision of composite sentences, or into the question of possible intermediate types between simple and composite ones. These questions will be treated later on (see pages 200 and 254 respectively). Meanwhile, then, we get the following results:

Types of Sentences According to Types of Communication

- (1) Declarative
- (2) Interrogative
- (3) Imperative

Sentences belonging to the several types differ from each other in some grammatical points, too. Thus, interrogative sentences are

¹ We use the term "composite sentence" in the same meaning as that attributed to it in H. Poutsma's *Grammar of Late Modern English*, namely as opposite to the term "simple sentence".

characterised by a special word order (see Chapter XXX). In interrogative sentences very few modal words are used, as the meanings of some modal words are incompatible with the meaning of an interrogative sentence. It is clear that modal words expressing full certainty, such as *certainly*, *surely*, *naturally*, etc., cannot appear in a sentence expressing a question. On the other hand, the modal word *indeed*, with its peculiar shades of meaning, is quite possible in interrogative sentences, for instance, *Isn't so indeed?* (SHAKESPEARE)

There are also sentences which might be termed semi-interrogative. The third sentence in the following passage belongs to this type:

"Well, I daresay that's more revealing about poor George than you. At any rate, he seems to have survived it." "Oh, you've seen him?" She did not particularly mark her question for an answer, but it was, after all, the pivot-point, and Bone found himself replying — that indeed he had. (BUECHNER) The sentence *Oh, you've seen him?* is half-way between the affirmative declarative sentence, *You have seen him*, and the interrogative sentence, *Have you seen him?* Let us proceed to find out the precise characteristics of the sentence in the text as against the two sentences just given for the sake of comparison. From the syntactical viewpoint, the sentence is declarative, as the mutual position of subject and predicate is, *you have seen*, not *have you seen*, which would be the interrogative order. In what way or ways does it, then, differ from a Usual declarative sentence? That is where the question of the intonation comes in. Whether the question mark at the end of the sentence does or does not mean that the intonation is not that typical of a declarative sentence, is hard to tell, though it would rather seem that it does. To be certain about this a phonetic experiment should be undertaken, but in this particular case the author gives a context which itself goes some way toward settling the question. The author's words, *She did not particularly mark her question for an answer*, seem to refer to the intonation with which it was pronounced: the intonation must not have been clearly interrogative, that is not clearly rising, though it must have differed from the regular falling intonation to some extent: if it had not been at all different, the sentence could not have been termed a "question", and the author does call it a question. Reacting to this semi-interrogative intonation, Bone (the man to whom the question was addressed) answered in the affirmative. It seems the best way, on the whole, to term such sentences semi-interrogative. Their purpose of course is to utter a somewhat hesitating statement and to expect the other person to confirm it.

Imperative sentences also show marked peculiarities in the use of modal words. It is quite evident, for example, that modal words expressing possibility, such as *perhaps*, *maybe*, *possibly*, are incom-

patible with the notion of order or request. Indeed, modal words are hardly used at all in imperative sentences.

The notion of exclamatory sentences and their relation to the three established types of declarative, interrogative, and imperative sentences presents some difficulty. It would seem that the best way to deal with it is this. On the one hand, every sentence, whether narrative, interrogative, or imperative, may be exclamatory at the same time, that is, it may convey the speaker's feelings and be characterised by emphatic intonation and by an exclamation mark in writing. This may be seen in the following examples: *Bat he can't do anything to you!* (R. WEST) *What can he possibly do to you!* (Idem) *Scarlett, spare me!* (M. MITCHELL)

On the other hand, a sentence may be purely exclamatory, that is, it may not belong to any of the three types classed above. This would be the case in the following examples: *"Well, fiddle-dee-dee!" said Scarlett.* (M. MITCHELL) *Oh, for God's sake, Henry!* (Idem)

However, it would perhaps be better to use different terms for sentences which are purely exclamatory, and thus constitute a special type, and those which add an emotional element to their basic quality, which is either declarative, or interrogative, or imperative. If this view is endorsed, we should have our classification of sentences according to type of communication (see p. 185) thus modified:

- (1) Declarative (including emotional ones)
- (2) Interrogative (including emotional ones)
- (3) Imperative (including emotional ones)
- (4) Exclamatory

This view would avoid the awkward contradiction of exclamatory sentences constituting a special type and belonging to the first three types at the same time.

Types of Sentences According to Structure

- (1) Simple
- (2) Composite

The relations between the two classifications should now be considered.

It is plain that a simple sentence can be either declarative, or interrogative, or imperative. But things are somewhat more complicated with reference to composite sentences. If both (or all) clauses making up a composite sentence are declarative, the composite sentence as a whole is of course declarative too. And so it is bound to be in every case when both (or all) clauses making a composite sentence belong to the same type of communication (that is the case in an overwhelming majority of examples). Sometimes, however, composite sentences are found which consist of clauses

belonging to different types of communication. Here it will sometimes be impossible to say to what type of communication the composite sentence as a whole belongs. We will take up this question when we come to the composite sentence.

Some other questions connected with the mutual relation of the two classifications will be considered as we proceed.

THE SIMPLE SENTENCE

We will now study the structure of the simple sentence and the types of simple sentences.

First of all we shall have to deal with the problem of negative sentences. The problem, briefly stated, is this: do negative sentences constitute a special grammatical type, and if so, what are its grammatical features? In other words, if we say, "This is a negative sentence," do we thereby give it a grammatical description?

The difficulty of the problem lies in the peculiarity of negative expressions in Modern English. Let us take two sentences, both negative in meaning: (1) *She did not know when she would be seeing any of them again.* (R. MACAULAY) (2) *Helen's tremendous spell — perhaps no one ever quite escaped from it.* (Idem) They are obviously different in their ways of expressing negation. In (1) we see a special form of the predicate verb (*did... know*, not *knew*) which is due to the negative character of the sentence and is in so far a grammatical sign of its being negative. In (2), on the other hand, there is no grammatical feature to show that the sentence is negative. Indeed, there is no grammatical difference whatever between the sentences *Nobody saw him* and *Everybody saw him*. The difference lies entirely in the meaning of the pronouns functioning as subject, that is to say, it is lexical, not grammatical. The same is of course true of such sentences as *I found nobody* and *I found everybody*. On the other hand, in the sentence *I did not find anybody* there is again a grammatical feature, viz. the form of the predicate verb (*did... find*, not *found*).

The conclusion to be drawn from these observations is obviously this. Since in a number of cases negative sentences are not characterised as such by any grammatical peculiarities, they are not a grammatical type. They are a logical type, which may or may not be reflected in grammatical structure. Accordingly, the division of sentences into affirmative and negative ought not to be included into their grammatical classification.¹

¹ If we were to accept affirmative and negative sentences as grammatical types, we should find it very awkward to deal with sentences like *Nobody saw him* or *I found nothing*: we should have to class them as affirmative. The category of negation does of course exist in the morphological system of the English verb (see above, p. 123 ff.).

Before we proceed with our study of sentence structure it will be well to consider the relation between the two notions of sentence and clause. Among different types of sentences treated in a syntactic investigation it is naturally the simple sentence that comes first. It is with specimens of simple sentences that we study such categories as parts of the sentence, main and secondary; homogeneous members, word order, etc. It is also with specimens of simple sentences that we illustrate such notions as declarative, interrogative, imperative, and exclamatory sentences, as two-member and one-member sentences, and so forth. As long as we limit ourselves to the study of simple sentences, the notion of "clause" need not occur at all.

When, however, we come to composite sentences (that is, sentences consisting of two or more clauses), we have to deal with the notions of main clause, head clause, and subordinate clause. Everything we said about the simple sentence will also hold good for clauses: a clause also has its parts (main and secondary), it can also be a two-member or a one-member clause; a main clause at least must also be either declarative, interrogative, imperative, or exclamatory, etc. We will consider these questions in due course.

So then we will take it for granted that whatever is said about a simple sentence will also apply to an independent clause within a composite sentence. For instance, whatever we say about word order in a simple sentence will also apply to word order in an independent clause within a composite sentence, etc.

TYPES OF SIMPLE SENTENCES. MAIN PARTS OF A SENTENCE

It has been usual for some time now to classify sentences into two-member and one-member sentences.¹

This distinction is based on a difference in the so-called main parts of a sentence. We shall therefore have to consider the two problems, that of two-member and one-member sentences and that of main parts of the sentence, simultaneously.

In a sentence like *Helen sighed* (B. MACAULAY) there obviously are two main parts: *Helen*, which denotes the doer of the action and is called (grammatical) subject, and *sighed*, which denotes the action performed by the subject and is called (grammatical) predicate. Sentences having this basic structure, viz. a word (or phrase) to denote the doer of the action and another word (or phrase) to denote the action, are termed two-member sentences. However, there are sentences which do not contain two such separate parts; in these sentences there is only one main part: the other main part

¹ The Russian terms are, двусоставные and односоставные предложения.

is not there and it could not even be supplied, at least not without a violent change in the structure of the sentence. Examples of such sentences, which are accordingly termed one-member sentences, are the following: *Fire! Come on!* or the opening sentence of "An American Tragedy": *Dusk — of a summer night.* (DREISER)

There is no separate main part of the sentence, the grammatical subject, and no other separate main part, the grammatical predicate. Instead there is only one main part (*fire, come on, and dusk, respectively*). These, then, are one-member sentences.

It is a disputed point whether the main part of such a sentence should, or should not, be termed subject in some cases, and predicate, in others. This question has been raised with reference to the Russian language. Academician A. Shakhmatov held that the chief part of a one-member sentence was either the subject, or the predicate, as the case might be (for example, if that part was a finite verb, he termed it predicate).¹ Academician V. Vinogradov, on the other hand, started on the assumption that grammatical subject and grammatical predicate were correlative notions and that the terms were meaningless outside their relation to each other.² Accordingly, he suggested that for one-member sentences, the term "main part" should be used, without giving it any more specific name. Maybe this is rather a point of terminology than of actual grammatical theory. We will not investigate it any further, but content ourselves with naming the part in question the main part of one-member sentence, as proposed by V. Vinogradov.

One-member sentences should be kept apart from two-member sentences with either the subject or the predicate omitted, i. e. from elliptical sentences, which we will discuss in a following chapter.³ There are many difficulties in this field. As we have done more than once, we will carefully distinguish what has been proved and what remains a matter of opinion, depending to a great extent on the subjective views or inclinations of one scholar or another. Matters belonging to this latter category are numerous enough in the sphere of sentence study.

¹ А. А. Шахматов, *Синтаксис русского языка*, стр. 49—50. ² В. В. Виноградов, „Синтаксис русского языка" *акад. А. А. Шахматова*. Вопросы синтаксиса современного русского языка, 1950, стр. 108 сл. ³ See p. 252.

In studying the structure of a sentence, we are faced with a problem which has been receiving ever greater attention in linguistic investigations of recent years. This is the problem of dividing a sentence into two sections, one of them containing that which is the starting point of the statement, and the other the new information for whose sake the sentence has been uttered or written. This has been termed "functional perspective". We will illustrate it by a simple example. Let us take this sentence from a contemporary novel: *I made the trip out here for curiosity, just to see where you were intending to go.* (M. MITCHELL) Here the words *I made the trip out here* are the starting point, and the rest of the sentence (*for ... go*) contains the new information. It cannot be said that every sentence must necessarily consist of two such sections. Some sentences (especially one-member sentences) cannot be divided up in this way, and doubts are also possible about some other types. However, most sentences do consist of these two sections and the relation between the syntactic structure of the sentence and its division into those two sections presents a linguistic problem deserving our attention.

Before we go on to study the problem it will be well to establish the terms which we will use to denote the sections of a sentence from this viewpoint.

There have been several pairs of terms proposed for this purpose, such as "psychological subject" and "psychological predicate", "lexical subject" and "lexical predicate", "semantic subject" and "semantic predicate", and others. Some of these are distinctly unacceptable, as they either suggest a wrong view of the phenomena in question, or are incompatible with our general principles for analysing language phenomena.

Thus, the terms "psychological subject" and "psychological predicate", proposed by the German scholar H. Paul,¹ obviously will not do, as they introduce a notion of individual psychology, which lies beyond the sphere of linguistic investigation: the question we are discussing is not, what individual interpretation an individual reader or hearer may give to a sentence but what is objectively expressed in it, independently of a hearer's personal views or tastes.

The terms "lexical subject" and "lexical predicate", proposed by Prof. A. Smirnitsky,² will not do either, because they appear to take the whole problem out of the sphere of syntactic study and to include it into that of lexicology, which, however, has nothing to

¹ See H. Paul, *Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte*, 5. Aufl., 1937, S. 124.

² See А. И. Смирницкий, *Синтаксис английского языка*, стр. 110.

do with it. We are not going to analyse the lexical meanings of individual words, which are treated in lexicology, but the function of a word or word group within a sentence expressing a certain thought; their function, that is, in expressing either what is already assumed or what is new in the sentence uttered.

We would rather avoid all terms built on the principle of combining the already existing terms "subject" and "predicate" with some limiting epithets, and use a pair of terms which have not yet been used to express any other kind of notion.

The pair of terms best suited for this purpose would seem to be "theme" and "rheme", which came into use lately, particularly in the works of several Czech linguists, who have specially studied the problem, notably with reference to the English language, both from the modern and from the historic viewpoint. Among the Czech scholars who have widely used these terms we should first of all mention Jan Firbas, who has developed a theory of his own on the historical development of the English language in this sphere.¹

The terms "theme" and "rheme" are both derived from Greek, and are parallel to each other. The term "theme" comes from the Greek root *the-* 'to set', or 'establish', and means 'that which is set or established'. The term "rheme" is derived from the root *rhe-* 'to say', or 'tell', and means 'that which is said or told' (about that which was set or established beforehand). These terms are also convenient because adjectives are easily derived from them: "thematic" and "rhematic", respectively.

What, then, are the grammatical means in Modern English which can be used to characterise a word or word group as thematic, or as rhematic? We should note in passing, however, that it will hardly be possible to completely isolate the grammatical from the lexical means, and we shall have to discuss some phenomena which belong to lexicology rather than grammar, pointing out in each case that we are doing so.

The means of expressing a thematic or a rhematic quality of a word or phrase in a sentence to a great extent depend on the grammatical structure of the given language and must differ considerably, according to that structure.

Thus, in a language with a widely developed morphological system and free word order, word order can be extensively used to show the difference between theme and rheme. For instance, word order plays an important part from this viewpoint in Russian. Without going into particulars, we may merely point out the difference between two such sentences as *Старик вошел* and *Вошел*

¹ See J. Firbas, *Some Thoughts on the Function of Word-Order in Old English and Modern English*. Sborník prací filosofické fakulty brněnské university, 1959,

старик. In each case the word (or the part of the sentence) which comes last corresponds to the rheme, and the rest of the sentence to the theme. It is quite clear that no such variation would be possible in a corresponding English sentence. For instance we could not, in the sentence *The old man came in*, change the order of words so as to make the words *the old man* (the subject of the sentence) correspond to the rheme instead of to the theme. Such a word order would be impossible and we cannot make the words *old man* express the rheme without introducing further changes into the structure of the sentence.

In Modern English there are several ways of showing that a word or phrase corresponds either to the rheme or to the theme. We will consider the rheme first.

A method characteristically analytical and finding its parallel in French is the construction *it is ... that* (also *it is ... who* and *it is... which*) with the word or phrase representing the rheme enclosed between the words *it is* and the word *that* (*who*, *which*). Here are some examples of the construction: *For it is the emotion that matters.* (HUXLEY) *Emotion* is in this way shown to represent the rheme of the sentence. *But it was sister Janet's house that he considered his home.* (LINKLATER) *Sister Janet's house* represents the rheme.

In the following sentence the adverbial modifier of place, *here*, is thus made the rheme, and the sentence is further complicated by the addition of a concessive *though*-clause. *It was here, though the place was shadeless and one breathed hot, dry perfume instead of air — it was here that Mr Scogan elected to sit.* (HUXLEY) Without this special method of pointing out the rheme, it would be hardly possible to show that the emphasis should lie on the word *here*. In the variant *Mr Scogan liked to sit here, though the place was shadeless and one breathed hot, dry perfume instead of air* the emphasis would rather lie on the word *liked*: he liked it, though it was shadeless, etc.

Could it be, he mused, that the reliable witness he had prayed for when kneeling before the crippled saint, the mirror able to retain what it reflected like the one with the dark, gilded eagle spread above it before him now, were at fault in so far as they recorded all the facts when it was, after all, possibly something at another level that more crucially mattered?___ (BUECHNER) The phrase emphasised by means of the *it is ... that* construction is, of course, *something at another level*. The peculiarity of this example is that two parentheses, *after all* and *possibly*, come in within the frame of *it is ... that*.

In the following example a phrase consisting of no less than eleven words is made into the rheme by means of the *it is ... that* construction. *It was his use of the highly colloquial or simply the*

ungrammatical expression that fascinated her in particular, for in neither case, clearly, did he speak in such a manner out of ignorance of the more elegant expression but, rather, by some design. (BUECHNER) As the *that* is far away from the *is*, it seems essential that nothing should intervene between them to confuse the construction, and, more especially, no other *that* should appear there.

The question of the grammatical characteristic of such sentences will be dealt with in Chapter XXXV (p. 276) and Chapter XXXVII (p. 302).

Another means of pointing out the rheme in a sentence is a particle (*only, even, etc.*) accompanying the word or phrase in question. Indeed a particle of this kind seems an almost infallible sign of the word or phrase being representative of the rheme, as in the sentence: *Only the children, of whom there were not many, appeared aware and truly to belong to their surroundings, for the over-excited games they played, dashing in and out among the legs of their elders, trying to run up the escalator that moved only down, and the like, were after all special games that could be played nowhere but in the station by people who remembered that it was in the station they were.* (BUECHNER) The particle *only*, belonging as it does to the subject of the sentence, *the children*, singles it out and shows it to represent the rheme of the sentence.

It goes without saying that every particle has its own lexical meaning, and, besides pointing out the rheme, also expresses a particular shade of meaning in the sentence. Thus, the sentences *Only he came* and *Even he came* are certainly not synonymous, though in both cases the subject *he* is shown to represent the rheme by a particle referring to it.

'Another means of indicating the rheme of a sentence may sometimes be the indefinite article. Whether this is a grammatical or lexical means is open to discussion. The answer will depend on the general view we take of the articles, a problem we have been considering in Chapter IV. Treating the article here in connection with functional sentence perspective is justified, as it does play a certain part in establishing the relations between the grammatical structure of a sentence and its functional perspective.

Owing to its basic meaning of "indefiniteness" the indefinite article will of course tend to signalise the new element in the sentence, that which represents the rheme. By opposition, the definite article will, in general, tend to point out that which is already known, that is, the theme. We will make our point clear by taking an example with the indefinite article, and putting the definite article in its place to see what consequence that change will produce in the functional sentence perspective.

Let us take this sentence: *Suddenly the door opened and a little birdlike elderly woman in a neat grey skirt and coat seemed almost*

to hop into the room. (A. WILSON) The indefinite article before *little birdlike elderly woman* shows that this phrase is the centre of the sentence: we are told that when the door opened the person who appeared was a little birdlike elderly woman. This meaning is further strengthened by the second indefinite article, the one before *neat grey skirt and coat*. Since the woman herself is represented as a new element in the situation, obviously the same must be true of her clothes.

Now let us replace the first indefinite article by the definite. The text then will be *Suddenly the door opened and the little birdlike elderly woman in a neat grey skirt and coat seemed almost to hop into the room.* This would mean that the woman had been familiar in advance, and the news communicated in the sentence would be, that she almost hopped into the room. The indefinite article before *neat grey skirt and coat* would show that the information about her clothes is new, i. e. that she had not always been wearing that particular skirt and coat. This would still be a new bit of information but it would not be the centre of the sentence, because the predicate group *seemed almost to hop into the room* would still be more prominent than the group *in a neat grey skirt and coat*. Finally, if we replace the second indefinite article by the definite, too, we get the text *Suddenly the door opened and the little birdlike elderly woman in the neat grey skirt and coat seemed almost to hop into the room.* This would imply that both the elderly little woman with her birdlike look and her grey skirt and coat had been familiar before: she must have been wearing that skirt and coat always, or at least often enough for the people in the story and the reader to remember it. In this way the whole group *the little birdlike elderly woman in the neat grey skirt and coat* would be completely separated from the rheme-part of the sentence.

This experiment, which might of course be repeated with a number of other sentences, should be sufficient to show the relation between the indefinite article and the rheme, that is, functional sentence perspective.

There are also some means of showing that a word or phrase represents the theme in a sentence. Sometimes, as we have just seen, this may be achieved by using the definite article. Indeed the contrast between the two articles can be used for that purpose.

But there are other means of pointing out the theme as well. One of them, which includes both grammatical and lexical elements, is a loose parenthesis introduced by the prepositional phrase *as for* (or *as to*), while in the main body of the sentence there is bound to be a personal pronoun representing the noun which is the centre of the parenthetical *as-for*-phrase. This personal pronoun may perform different syntactical functions in the sentence but more often than not it will be the subject. A typical example of this sort of

construction is the following sentence: *As for the others, great numbers of them moved past slowly or rapidly, singly or in groups, carrying bags and parcels, asking for directions, perusing timetables, searching for something familiar like the face of a friend or the name of a particular town cranked up in red and gold...* (BUECHNER) After the theme of the sentence has been stated in the prepositional phrase *as for the others*, the subject of the sentence, *great numbers of them*, specifies the theme (pointing out the quantitative aspect of *the others*) and the rest of the sentence, long as it is, represents the rheme, telling, in some detail, whatever the others were busy doing at the time.

Sometimes a word or phrase may be placed in the same position, without *as for*: *The manuscript so wonderfully found, so wonderfully accomplishing the morning's prediction, how was it to be accounted for?* (J. AUSTEN) Here the first half of the sentence, from the beginning and up to the word *prediction*, represents the theme of the sentence, while the rest of it represents its rheme. The pronoun *it* of course replaces the long phrase representing the theme.

Here are a few more examples of the word or phrase representing the theme placed at the beginning of the sentence as a loose part of it, no matter what their syntactical function would have been if they had stood at their proper place within the sentence. *That laughter — how well he knew it!* (HUXLEY) There are two possible ways of interpreting the grammatical structure of this sentence. First let us take it as a simple sentence, which seems on the whole preferable. Then the phrase *that laughter* must be said to represent the theme of the sentence: it announces what the sentence is going to be about. In the body of the sentence itself it is replaced by the pronoun *it*, which of course is the object. Another possible view is that the sentence is an asyndetic composite one. In that case the phrase *that laughter* is a one-member exclamatory clause, and the rest of the sentence is another clause.

A somewhat similar case is the following, from the same author: *His weaknesses, his absurdities — no one knew them better than he did.* Just as in the preceding example, it seems preferable to view the sentence as a simple one, with the words *his weaknesses, his absurdities* representing the theme.

There are two more points to make concerning functional sentence perspective:

(1) The theme need not necessarily be something known in advance. In many sentences it is, in fact, something already familiar, as in some of our examples, especially with the definite article. However, that need not always be the case. There are sentences in which the theme, too, is something mentioned for the first time and yet it is not the centre of the predication. It is something about which a statement is to be made. The theme is here the starting

point of the sentence, not its conclusion. This will be found to be the case, for example, in the following sentence: *Jennie leaned forward and touched him on the knee* (A. WILSON) which is the opening sentence of a short story. Nothing in this sentence can be already familiar, as nothing has preceded and the reader does not know either who Jennie is or who "he" is. What are we, then, to say about the theme and the rheme in this sentence? Apparently, there are two ways of dealing with this question. Either we will say that *Jennie* represents the theme and the rest of the sentence, *leaned forward and touched him on the knee* its rheme. Or else we will say that there is no theme at all here, that the whole of the sentence represents the rheme, or perhaps that the whole division into theme and rheme cannot be applied here. Though both views are plausible the first seems preferable. We will prefer to say that *Jennie* represents the theme, and emphasise that the theme in this case is not something already familiar but the starting point of the sentence.

The same may be said of most sentences opening a text. Let us for instance consider the opening sentence of E. M. Forster's "A Passage to India": *Except for the Malabar Caves — and they are twenty miles off — the city of Chandrapore presents nothing extraordinary*. Leaving aside the prepositional phrase *except for the Malabar Caves* and the parenthetical clause *and they are twenty miles off*, the main body of the sentence may be taken either as containing a theme: *the city of Chandrapore*, and a rheme — *presents nothing extraordinary*, or it might be taken as a unit not admitting of a division into theme and rheme. The first view seems preferable, as it was in the preceding example. Similar observations might of course be made when analysing actual everyday speech.

(2) Many questions concerning functional sentence perspective have not been solved yet and further investigation is required. It is by no means certain that every sentence can be divided into two clear-cut parts representing the theme and the rheme respectively. In many cases there are probably intermediate elements, not belonging unequivocally to this or that part, though perhaps tending rather one way or another. J. Firbas in his analysis of English functional sentence perspective has very subtly pointed out these intermediate elements and described their function from this viewpoint.¹

The problem of functional sentence perspective, which appears to be one of the essential problems of modern linguistic study, requires further careful investigation before a complete theory of all phenomena belonging to this sphere can be worked out. The main principles and starting points have, however, been clarified to a degree sufficient to make such future studies fruitful and promising.

¹ See J. Firbas, *ibid.*

Chapter XXVI

PARTS OF A SENTENCE. THE MAIN PARTS

It is common in grammatical theory to distinguish between main and secondary parts of a sentence. Besides these two types there is one more — elements which are said to stand outside the sentence structure.

In starting now to study parts of the sentence in Modern English, we will begin by analysing the principle or principles on which this classification is based.

There are two generally recognised main parts of the sentence — the subject and the predicate. As to the secondary parts, their number varies slightly. Among them we usually find the object (with its subdivisions), the attribute, and the adverbial modifier. Other secondary parts are also sometimes mentioned — the apposition (its relation to the attribute is variously interpreted), the objective predicative, and occasionally some other parts, too.

The reason for calling the subject and the predicate the main parts of the sentence and distinguishing them from all other parts which are treated as secondary, is roughly this. The subject and the predicate between them constitute the backbone of the sentence: without them the sentence would not exist at all, whereas all other parts may or may not be there, and if they are there, they serve to define or modify either the subject or the predicate, or each other.

A linguistic experiment to prove the correctness of this view would be to take a sentence containing a subject, a predicate, and a number of secondary parts, and to show that any of the secondary parts might be removed without the sentence being destroyed, whereas if either the subject or the predicate were removed there would be no sentence left: its "backbone" would be broken. This experiment would probably succeed and prove the point in a vast majority of cases. We will therefore stick to the division of sentence parts into main and secondary, taking the subject and the predicate to be the main parts, and all the others to be secondary.

THE SUBJECT AND THE PREDICATE

The question now arises, how are we to define the subject of a sentence? The question may also be put in a different way: what criteria do we practically apply when we say that a word (or, sometimes, a phrase) is the subject of a sentence?

In trying to give a definition of the subject, we shall have to include in it both general points, valid for language in general, and specific points connected with the structure of Modern English. Thus the definition of the subject in Modern English will only partly, not wholly, coincide with its definition, say, in Russian.

First let us formulate the structure of the definition itself. It is bound to contain the following items: (1) the meaning of the subject, i. e. its relation to the thought expressed in the sentence, (2) its syntactical relations in the sentence, (3) its morphological realisation: here a list of morphological ways of realising the subject must be given, but it need not be exhaustive, as it is our purpose merely to establish the essential characteristics of every part of the sentence. . . .

The definition of the subject would, then, be something like this. The subject is one of the two main parts of the sentence. (1) It denotes the thing¹ whose action or characteristic is expressed by the predicate. (2) It is not dependent on any other part of the sentence. (3) It may be expressed by different parts of speech, the most frequent ones being: a noun in the common case, a personal pronoun in the nominative case, a demonstrative pronoun occasionally, a substantivised adjective, a numeral, an infinitive, and a gerund. It may also be expressed by a phrase.²

In discussing problems of the subject, we must mention the argument that has been going on for some time about sentences of the following type: *It gave Hermione a sudden convulsive sensation of pleasure, to see these rich colours under the candlelight.* (LAWRENCE) Two views have been put forward concerning such sentences. One is, that the pronoun *it* at the beginning of the sentence is the formal subject, and the real subject is the infinitive (in this particular case, *to see*). The other view is, that *it* is the subject of the sentence, and the infinitive an apposition to it. There is something to be said on both sides of the question. On the whole, however, the second view seems preferable, as the division of subjects into formal and real ones seems hard to justify in general syntactical theory.

¹ The term "thing" has to be taken in its widest sense, including human beings, abstract notions, etc.

² We do not speak here about subordinate clauses performing the function of subject, since in that case the sentence is composite. See below, p. 286 ff.

As we have seen, the definition of the subject given here includes mention of the predicate. This is in accordance with the view stated above, that the two notions are correlative, that is to say, there is a subject in two-member sentences only. In a similar way, a definition of the predicate will have to include mention of the subject.

Following the same pattern in the definition of the predicate, we arrive at the following result. The predicate is. one of the two main parts of the sentence. (1) It denotes the action or property of the thing expressed by the subject. (2) It is not dependent on any other part of the sentence. (3) Ways of expressing the predicate are varied and their structure will better be considered under the heading of types of predicate. Here it will suffice to say that among them are: a finite verb form, and a variety of phrases, for instance, phrases of the following patterns: "finite verb + infinitive", "link verb + noun", "link verb + adjective", "link verb + preposition + noun", etc.

The assertion that the predicate is not dependent on any other part of the sentence, including the subject, requires some comment. It is sometimes claimed that the predicate agrees in number with the subject: when the subject is in the singular, the predicate is bound to be in the singular, and when the subject is in the plural, the predicate is bound to be in the plural as well. However, this statement is very doubtful. As we have seen above (p. 182), there is much to be said in favour of the view that the category of number in the predicate verb is independent of the number in the subject. This is especially confirmed by sentences like *My family are early risers*, where the plural number in the link verb shows the plurality of the acting persons, though the subject noun is in the singular. Besides it should be noted that this question of concord or no concord is one that belongs to the level of phrases, not to that of the sentence and its parts. Thus, there seems to be no valid reason for thinking that the predicate is in any way dependent on the subject.

Types of Predicate

Predicates may be classified in two ways, one of which is based on their structure (simple and compound), and the other on their morphological characteristics (verbal and nominal).

If we take the structural classification as the basic one we obtain the following types:

A Simple predicate

- (1) Verbal
- (2) Nominal

B Compound predicate

- (1) Verbal
- (2) Nominal

If we were to take the morphological classification as the basic one the result would be the following:

A Verbal predicate

- (1) Simple
- (2) Compound

B Nominal predicate

- (1) Simple
- (2) Compound

The ultimate result is of course the same in both cases.

Most of the predicate types mentioned here do not call for any comment. However, something has to be said on two questions: the simple nominal predicate and the limits of the compound verbal predicate.

The simple nominal predicate, that is, a predicate consisting merely of a noun or an adjective, without a link verb, is rare in English, but it is nevertheless a living type and must be recognised as such.

The spheres of its use appear to be mainly two. One of these is found in sentences where the immediate neighbourhood of the subject noun and the predicate noun or adjective is used to suggest the impossibility or absurdity of the idea that they might be connected. Sentences with this kind of simple nominal predicate are always exclamatory, that is, they are pronounced with the exclamatory intonation, and have an exclamation mark in writing. For instance, the sentence from a play by Shaw, *My ideas obsolete!!!!!!* (with seven exclamation marks) expresses the speaker's indignation at hearing his ideas characterised as obsolete by a younger man.¹ It would not do to call such sentences elliptical (see also p. 261), since the link verb cannot be added without completely changing the meaning of the sentence.

In our next example the subject is followed by an infinitive with an inserted clause between them: *Such an old, old lady, he came near to saying out loud to himself, to come so far, on a train called the Blue Mountain, out of the south, into the north.* (BUECHNER) The infinitive *to come* here clearly performs the function of predicate.

¹ O. Jespersen calls such sentences "nexus of deprecation" (see O. Jespersen, *A Modern English Grammar*, Part III, p. 372 ff.).

Though there is no exclamation mark at the end of the sentence, it is clearly exclamatory. The idea expressed in it might also be expressed in this way: *That such an old, old lady... should come so far, on a train called the Blue Mountain, out of the south, into the north.* In our next example both sentences have a predicate infinitive without *to*: *George mind tennis on Sunday! George, after his education, distinguish between Sunday* — (FORSTER) This is said in reply to a suggestion that George would refuse to play tennis on a Sunday.

Another type of sentence with a simple nominal predicate is that in which the predicative comes first, the subject next, and no link verb is either used or possible. Such sentences seem to occur chiefly in colloquial style, for instance: *"Splendid game, cricket," remarked Mr Barbecue-Smith heartily to no one in particular; "so thoroughly English"* (HUXLEY) This is a sentence with a simple nominal predicate. There is inversion, no article with the predicative noun, and the style is very colloquial. The phrase representing the rheme comes first, and after it comes the word representing the theme. That it is the theme is made quite clear by the preceding context. Priscilla, the mistress of the house, is reading a newspaper at breakfast: *"I see Surrey won," she said, with her mouth full, "by four wickets. The sun is in Leo: that would account for it!"* Although the word *cricket* is not mentioned, it is quite evident, from the words *Surrey* (which here denotes a cricket team), *won* and *wickets*, that she has been reading about the latest cricket match. The latter part of Mr Barbecue-Smith's speech, *so thoroughly English*, adds another predicative to the first, *splendid game*, and also with no link verb to it. If changed into the usual compound nominal predicate pattern, the sentence would run: *"Cricket is a splendid game; it is so thoroughly English"*; the meaning would be quite the same as in the original sentence but the specific colloquial colouring would be gone altogether.

The Participle as Predicate

We should probably also class among sentences with a simple nominal predicate the sentences in which the function of predicate is performed by a participle. Sentences of this type received very little attention until quite recently, when they were discussed in a grammar by Prof. N. Irtenyeva¹ and in a dissertation by Y. Komissarova.²

¹ Н. Ф. Иртенъева, *Грамматика современного английского языка*, 1956, стр. 160.

² 10. И. Комиссарова, *Причастные предложения в современном английском языке*. Канд. дисс., 1962.

It will perhaps be best to start discussion of such sentences by considering a few characteristic examples. *And then to add to the nervousness and confusion engendered by all this, thoughts as to what additional developments or persons, even, he might encounter before leaving on his climacteric errand — Roberta announcing that because of the heat and the fact that they were coming back to dinner, she would leave her hat and coat — a hat in which he had already seen the label of Braunstein m Lycurgus — and which at the time caused him to meditate as to the wisdom of leaving or extracting it.* (DREISER) This of course is a complex sentence, with several subordinate clauses in it, and the main clause is a participle clause: *And then... Roberta announcing...* This might admit of two different interpretations: we may take the clause with *Roberta announcing* as a one-member clause, *Roberta* the main part and *announcing* an attribute to it, or we may think it is a two-member clause, with *Roberta* the subject and *announcing* the predicate. What criterion shall we apply to choose between the two alternatives? If we take it as a one-member clause it would fall under the same head as some sentences we have considered above, for instance, the one from "An American Tragedy": *Dusk — of a summer night*, or like so many stage-directions of the type, *A large room. Three chairs*, etc. Now the sentence containing *Roberta announcing* is evidently quite different in character. It tells the fact that Roberta announced that she would leave her hat and coat, etc.

Much the same may be said of the following example: *And then the next day at noon, Gun Lodge and Big Bittern itself and Clyde climbing down from the train at Gun Lodge and escorting Roberta to the waiting bus, the while he assured her that since they were coming back this way, it would be best if she were to leave her bag there, while he, because of his camera as well as the lunch done up at Grass Lake and crowded into his suitcase, would take his own with him, because they would lunch on the lake.* (DREISER) We need not dwell here on the subordinate clauses, which are irrelevant for our judgement of the structure of the participle clause. This example differs from the preceding in that the section of the sentence preceding the first subordinate clause, namely the text *And then the next day at noon, Gun Lodge and Big Bittern itself and Clyde climbing down from the train at Gun Lodge and escorting Roberta to the waiting bus* consists of two co-ordinate independent clauses, with the adverbial modifier *then the next day at noon* referring to both of them. The first main clause, namely *Gun Lodge and Big Bittern itself*, is quite clearly a one-member clause, with two co-ordinate main parts, and the second main clause a participle clause: *Clyde climbing down from the train at Gun Lodge and escorting Roberta to the waiting bus*. There are two participle predicates here: (1) *climbing (down)*,

(2) *escorting*. Even the neighbourhood of the one-member clause *Gun Lodge and Big Bittern itself* cannot, it would seem, be taken as proof that the clause *Clyde ... waiting bus* is a one-member clause.

Such examples as these go a long way to show that the participle, though it is a verbal, not a finite verb form, is able to perform by itself a function generally believed to be characteristic of finite verb forms only, namely that of predicate. This possibility, as well as the ability of the infinitive to be, in certain circumstances, the main part of a one-member sentence, should perhaps be taken into account in a definition of these forms and of verbals in general.

An additional remark may not be out of place here. In analysing sentences having an infinitive or a participle as predicate we have taken the predicate to be a nominal one. However, this view may be challenged on the ground that both the infinitive and the participle are forms of a verb, and there would seem to be some reason for claiming that the predicate of such sentences is a verbal one. It must be admitted that there are no binding reasons either way, as both the infinitive and the participle are verbals, that is, they share of the nature of a verb and of a nominal part of speech (noun or adjective). The reason why we considered such predicates to be nominal is, that an infinitive and a participle can function as predicative in connection with a link verb, and it may, at least, be argued that this shows them to be nominal elements of a predicate.

Other Types of Nominal Predicate

Besides these main cases of a simple nominal predicate there are also some rare types, such as in the text of weather bulletins, and the like, for instance: *Wind southerly, later veering westward, sea slight*, etc. Such sentences as these read like passages from a questionnaire, the adjective answering a question referring to the thing denoted by the noun (wind, sea, etc.).

Limits of the Compound Verbal Predicate

Now we come to the second question, about the limits of the compound verbal predicate. It arises from the fact that a rather considerable number of verbs can be followed by an infinitive, some of them with, others without the particle *to*. Among such verbs are: *shall, will, should, would, can, may, must* (without *to*); *ought, wish, want, desire, hate, fear, begin, start, continue, omit, forget, remember*, etc. (with *to*).

The relation between these phrases and parts of the sentence is of course not the same in all cases. We can at once eliminate the phrases "*shall, should, will, would* + infinitive", which consti-

tube tease or mood forms of the verb. Thus, the phrase *shall write* is a form of the verb *write* (as it does not differ from the forms *write*, *writes*, *wrote* in its lexical meaning) and, consequently, it is a simple verbal predicate. The phrases with the verbs *can*, *may*, *must*, *ought* (in the latter case with *to*) constitute a compound verbal predicate (this is almost universally recognised). But the phrases with the verbs *wish*, *want*, *desire*, *hate*, *fear*, *begin*, *start*, *continue*, etc. give rise to doubts and controversies. On the whole, there are two views expressed in this matter. According to one of them, all such phrases are also a compound predicate: the finite verb (*wish*, *begin*, etc.) does not denote any action of its own, it merely denotes the subject's attitude to the action expressed by the following infinitive (in the case of *wish*, *fear*, etc.), or a phase in the development of that action, namely, its beginning, continuation, etc. (in the case of *begin*, *continue*, etc.); consequently, it is argued, the phrase as a whole constitutes the predicate of the sentence: it is a compound verbal predicate, just as in the case of *can*, *may*, or *ought*. This argument, as will be easily seen, is based on purely semantic reasons: its decisive point is, that the finite verb does not denote any special action and only denotes the subject's attitude to it, or a phase of the action itself. But this is irrelevant from the grammatical viewpoint. What is more, this line of reasoning is dangerous: if we were to follow it to its logical consequences we should have to include into the predicate not only such phrases as *stopped laughing*, *avoided meeting*, and a number of other phrases including the gerund, but also such phrases as *began his work*, *continued his speech*, *liked his job*, and a number of other phrases containing a noun. Indeed, from the semantic viewpoint, on which the argument for *began to work* being the predicate is based, there is no difference between *began to work* and *began his work*.

Therefore, approaching phenomena from a grammatical viewpoint, which is the essential one here, we start from the assumption that in the phrase *began his work* the group *his work* is a separate (secondary) part of the sentence (an object).¹ This shows that the verb *begin* can be followed by a noun functioning as an object (the same of course applies to a number of other verbs). Since the verb *begin* can take an object there appears to be no reason to deny that an infinitive following this verb is an object as well. We might give here a table based on what is called transformation:

began to work — *began his work continued*
to work — *continued his work liked to sing*
 — *liked songs*

etc.

¹ We are not discussing here the syntactic position of the word *his* (the attribute). For this problem, see p. 229 ff.

On the other hand, no table of this kind is possible with such verbs as *can, may, must, ought*: they cannot under any circumstances be followed by a noun, and this is an important difference on which syntactic analysis should be based.

Another question of a similar kind arises with reference to sentences containing idioms of the pattern "verb + noun", e.g. *make a mistake, make one's appearance, have a look, have a smoke, take a glance*, etc. Here two different approaches are possible, and the approach chosen will predetermine all conclusions to be arrived at in considering concrete examples.

One approach would be to say that if a phrase is a phraseological unit, that is, if its meaning is not equal to the sum of the meanings of its components, it cannot be divided into two parts of the sentence, and has to be taken as one part, namely, the predicate.

The other approach would be to say that such phraseological phenomena belong to the sphere of lexicology alone and are irrelevant for grammar, that is, for sentence analysis.

The choice between the two approaches entirely depends on the view one takes of grammar, its place in linguistics, and its relation to lexicology. It does not seem possible to prove that one of the approaches is right and the other wrong.

One of the arguments in favour of the view that phraseological units should be treated as one part of the sentence, is this. If the phrase "verb + noun" is not a phraseological unit, a separate question can be put to the noun, that is, a question to which the noun supplies an answer. For instance, if we take the sentence *He makes toys* the question would be, *What does he make?* and the answer would be supplied by the word *toys*, which, accordingly, is a separate part of the sentence, namely, an object. If, on the other hand, we take the sentence, *He makes mistakes*, it would not be possible to ask the question, *What does he make?* and to give *mistakes* as an answer to it. Consequently, according to this view, we cannot say that *mistakes* is a separate part of the sentence, and we must conclude that the phrase *makes mistakes as* a whole is the predicate.

However, this sort of argument is riot binding. The method of asking questions, though widely used in school language teaching, is not a scientifically valid method of syntactic study. In a number of cases the choice of the question is arbitrary, and there are even cases when no question at all can be asked.

Thus, the decision between the two alternatives presented above rests with the scholar. This is, and most probably will always be, a matter of opinion rather than of proved knowledge.

Before we go further in this matter, let us consider another case also belonging here, namely phrases of the type *come in, bring up, put down*, etc., which we discussed in Chapter XVII, when studying

parts of speech. Should these phrases be taken as the predicate, or should the predicate be limited to the verb alone (*come, bring, put, etc.*)? This again is a matter of opinion. The phrase *come in*, for instance, can equally well be analysed as the predicate of the sentence, and as a combination of the predicate and a secondary part. On the other hand, the phrase *bring up* (as in the sentence, *They brought up three children*) would be taken to be the predicate, rather than a combination of the predicate with a secondary part, and this of course is due to the meaning of the phrase, which certainly is not equal to the sum of meanings of the verb *bring* and the adverb *up*. This semantic consideration is in favour of taking the whole phrase to be one part of the sentence (its predicate). But again, this argument is not binding. Whether such semantic considerations should or should not be taken into account in syntactic analysis is a matter of opinion. It is possible to argue that considerations of this kind should not weigh when we are engaged in syntactic studies. On the whole, we will adhere to the view that such considerations should be taken into account, and accordingly we will consider the phrases *bring up, set in, etc.*, as the predicate of the sentence.

The Compound Nominal Predicate

The compound nominal predicate always consists of a link verb (also called copula) and a predicative, which may be expressed by various parts of speech, usually a noun, an adjective, also a stative, or an adverb (as in the sentence *The lesson is over*). Often enough the predicative is represented by a phrase, most usually of the pattern "preposition + noun", which may or may not be a phraseological unit.

Now we must find the characteristic features of a link verb. It should first of all be noted that the term "link verb" (as well as the term "copula", after which it appears to have been coined) is not a very happy one. The idea of "link" suggests that its function is to connect the predicative with the subject. This, however, is hardly intelligible. Why should the predicative need some special word to connect it with the subject? It could stand side by side with the subject without the help of any "link". Indeed it does not require any link in sentences with the simple nominal predicate which we have discussed on p. 208 ff., and this is still more usual in Russian, where no link verb as a rule appears in the present tense. The true function of a link verb is not a connecting function. It expresses the tense and the mood in the predicate. The link verb *be*, which expresses these categories, and also those of number and person, is rightly considered to be the most abstract of all link verbs, that is, the one

most devoid of any meaning of its own. Other link verbs have each some lexical meaning.

Though the term "link verb" is purely conventional, we will retain it, as it is in common use and an attempt to substitute another term would stand little chance of success.

Besides the verb *be* there are a number of other link verbs with different meanings which we need not discuss here, for instance *become*, *get*, *continue*, *grow*, *turn*, e. g. *Then he grew thirsty and went indoors* (LINKLATER); *But presently the sea turned rough* (Idem), etc. It will be readily seen that some of them do not always perform this function but may also be a predicate in themselves, for instance the verb *grow* in the sentences *The child has grown*, or, *We grow potatoes*. Of course it is only the meaning of the noun following the verb that shows whether the noun is a predicative or an object: compare the two sentences *They have grown fine young men* and *They grow potatoes*. So if we say that a verb is a link verb this need not necessarily mean that it is always a link verb and cannot perform any other function.

To approach the subject of link verb and predicative from another angle, we may say that if a verb is followed by a predicative it is, to some extent at least, a link verb. The restriction "to some extent at least" is necessary because there are sentences in which the finite verb is a predicate in itself, that is, it contains some information about the subject which may be taken separately, but at the same time the verb is followed by a predicative (a noun or an adjective) and is in so far a link verb. This is found in sentences like the following: *He came home tired*, *She married young*, *He died a bachelor*, etc. The finite verb in such sentences conveys a meaning of its own (*he came*, *she married*, *he died*), but the main point of the sentence lies in the information conveyed by the predicative noun or adjective. We might retell the meaning of these sentences in another way, namely: *He was tired when he came home*, *She was young when she married*, *He was a bachelor when he died*, etc. The finite verb, besides being a predicate in itself, also performs the function of a link verb.

Since such sentences have both a simple verbal predicate and a compound nominal predicate, they form a special or mixed type: predicates of this kind may be termed double predicates.¹ Here are some examples:

¹ Corresponding phenomena in Russian have been treated by Academician A. Shakhmatov, who named such sentences "double-predicate sentences" (двусказуемые предложения). See A. A. Шахматов, *Синтаксис русского языка*, стр. 221 сл.

For a treatment of this type of predicate in English see M. M. Галинская, *О двусказуемых предложениях в современном английском языке*. Иностранные языки в школе, 1948, № 2.

Sunlight seeped thick and golden through the high, oblong windows above the cages and fell in broad shafts to the linoleum floor where he dropped his bucket. (BUECHNER) Compare also the following sentence: *Catherine's blood ran cold with the horrid suggestions which naturally sprang from these words.* (J. AUSTEN) The lexical meaning of the verb *run* is here almost wholly obliterated, as will also be seen by translating the sentence into Russian, or, indeed, any other language. The essence of the predication is of course contained in the predicative adjective *cold*.

Let us now look at a few more examples of sentences with a predicative coming after a full predicate with secondary parts attached to it. *She had set her feet upon that road a spoiled, selfish and untried girl, full of youth, warm of emotion, easily bewildered by life.* (DREISER) *A spoiled, selfish, and untried girl* is a predicative, coming after a fully developed predicate group consisting of the predicate itself, an object and an adverbial modifier. That the group *a spoiled, selfish and untried girl* is a predicative, is clear, because no other syntactical tie between this group and the preceding words in the sentence can be imagined. It is a peculiarity of this sentence that the predicative has three loose attributes belonging to it: *full of youth, warm of emotion, and easily bewildered by life*. They make this predicative group very weighty indeed. It may also be noted that the predicative group *a spoiled, selfish and untried girl, full of youth, warm of emotion, easily bewildered by life* represents the rheme of the sentence, while the preceding words in the sentence represent its theme. Indeed, the contents, or the purpose of the sentence, is not to inform the reader that she had set her feet on that road, but what kind of person she was at the time she did so. If the predicative (with its secondary parts) were to be dropped, the communication value of the sentence would be basically changed, and in the context in which it stands its value would be reduced to nought.

The same is found in the following examples: *You've come home such a beautiful lady.* (TAYLOR) *I sat down hungry, I was hungry while I ate, and I got up from the table hungry.* (SAROYAN)

It should also be noted that the verb preceding the predicative and therefore performing (at least partly) the function of a link verb, may be in the passive voice. This is especially true of the verbs *find, think, report*, as in the sentences, *He was found guilty, He was reported dead*, etc.

From such sentences there is an easy transition to sentences in which the finite verb is followed by an infinitive, as in *He was known to have arrived*, etc.

It may be the infinitive of the verb *be*, which is then in its turn followed by a predicative (a noun or an adjective), for instance, *He was said to be a great actor, He was reported to be dead*, etc.

As far as meaning is concerned, there seems to be no difference between the sentences *He was reported dead*, and *He was reported to be dead*, or between the sentences *He seemed clever* and *He seemed to be clever*. As far as structure is concerned, the second variant in each case is somewhat more complicated, in that the finite verb is first followed by an infinitive, which apparently is bound to be a predicative (since it comes after the link verb), but which is itself the infinitive of a link verb and therefore followed by another predicative.

Besides the combinations of different predicates, already mentioned various other combinations are possible and actually occur in texts. However, finding out all these possibilities is of no particular scientific interest.¹

¹ We shall have to touch on another question connected with the predicate after examining the secondary parts of the sentence (see p. 237 ff.).

SECONDARY PARTS

The theory of the secondary parts is one of the last developed sections of linguistics. The usual classification of these parts into objects, attributes, and adverbial modifiers is familiar to everyone, no matter what his mother tongue may be and what foreign language he may study. Yet it has many weak points. The characteristic features of each of the three types are not clearly defined, and describing a given word or phrase as an object or an attribute in some cases, or again describing it as an object or an adverbial modifier, in others, often proves to be a matter of personal opinion or predilection. Such statements then lack all scientific value. Indeed, with some scholars the theory of secondary parts of the sentence as usually given has been discredited to such an extent that they have attempted to discard it altogether. For instance, Prof. A. Peshkovsky, in his very valuable book on Russian syntax, does not use the notions of object, attribute, and adverbial modifier at all. Instead, he classifies the secondary parts of a sentence into those which are governed and those which are not.¹ The notion of government, however, properly belongs to the level of phrases, not to that of the sentence and its parts. So we will not follow Peshkovsky in this method of classification. But his decision to do without the traditional categories of secondary parts is very instructive as an attempt to do away with a method whose weaknesses he realised well enough.

We will now look at the three traditional secondary parts of a sentence (object, attribute, and adverbial modifier) and try to find out on what principles their distinction is based and what objective criteria can be found to identify them. Apart from that there will be a special problem concerning the attribute.

The object is usually defined in some such way as this: It is a secondary part of the sentence, referring to a part of the sentence expressed by a verb, a noun, a substantival pronoun, an adjective, a numeral, or an adverb, and denoting a thing to which the action passes on, which is a result of the action, in reference to which an action is committed or a property is manifested, or denoting an action as object of another action.²

If we take a closer look at this definition, which is typical in its way, we shall find that it is based on two principles, namely (1) the relation of the object to a certain part of speech, (2) the meaning of the object, that is, the relation between the thing denoted and the action or property with which it is connected.

¹ See A. М. Пешковский, *Русский синтаксис в научном освещении*, гл. XIII.

² See, for example, *Грамматика русского языка*, т. II, ч. 1, стр. 523.

The first of these principles is syntactical, based on morphology (morphologico-syntactical), the second is semantic.

The first item of the definition practically means that an object can refer to any part of speech capable of being a part of the sentence. The second item enumerates certain semantic points in the relation between the thing denoted by the object and the action (or the property) with which it is connected.

We can at once note that the second item of the definition is incomplete, as it does not include a very important case, namely an object denoting the doer of the action with the predicate verb in the passive voice, as in the sentences *He (Dickens) was asked by Chapman and Hall to write the letterpress for a series of sporting plates to be done by Robert Seymour who, however, died shortly after, and was succeeded by Hablot Browne (Phiz), who became the illustrator of most of Dickens's novels. (COUSIN) If Charles had inherited any of the qualities of the stern, fearless, not-tempered soldier who had been his father, they had been obliterated in childhood by the ladylike atmosphere in which he had been reared. (M. MITCHELL)* (Compare similar cases in Russian.) This part of a sentence is usually called object and certainly is neither an attribute nor an adverbial modifier of any kind. And so, the list of meanings which the object may have should be enlarged by adding one more, which might be put like this — the thing (or person) which is the origin of the action (with the predicate verb in the passive voice).

However, this addition will not make the second item of the definition satisfactory. Formulated as it is, it shows that the object can mean one thing and another (the number of these meanings is 5 or 6), but the essential question remains unanswered: what is the meaning of an object, or, what is that which unites all those 5 or 6 meanings into one category, called the object? If the definition is to be satisfactory it is bound to formulate this invariable, as we may call it, which will appear in different shapes in each particular case where an object is found in a sentence. It is certainly far from easy to give a definition of this invariable, but probably it should run something like this — "a thing (or person) connected with a process or a property". Before, however, adopting any definition of this kind, we should carefully check it in as many sentences as possible. This difficulty will become clearer after we have considered the definitions of the other secondary parts — the attribute and the adverbial modifier.

We will now take up the definition of the attribute and consider it as we have considered that of the object. Besides, as we have already hinted, there is a special question concerning the status of the attribute in relation to other parts of a sentence.

The usual kind of definition of the attribute is this: It is a secondary part of the sentence modifying a part of the sentence expressed by a noun, a substantival pronoun, a cardinal numeral, and any substantivised word, and characterising the thing named by these words as to its quality or property.¹

This definition, as well as that of the object, contains two items: (1) its syntactical relations to other parts of the sentence expressed by certain parts of speech, (2) its meaning. As far as meaning is concerned, the definition of the attribute is stricter than that of the object, as it practically mentions one meaning only (the terms "quality" and "property" may well be said to denote closely connected varieties of one basic notion). As far as the first item is concerned, the definition also gives a narrower scope of syntactic connections than was the case with the object: all parts of speech enumerated here are united by the notion of substantivity common to all of them.

If we now compare the definition of the attribute with that of the object we shall see at once that there are two main differences between them: (1) the attribute, as distinct from the object, cannot modify a verb, an adjective, or an adverb, and (2) the attribute expresses a property while the object expresses a thing.

They also have something in common: they both can modify a noun, a pronoun, and a numeral.

We shall see further on that the two definitions are not always a safe guide in distinguishing an attribute from an object.

Now let us consider the definition of an adverbial modifier. It may sound like this: It is a secondary part of the sentence modifying a part of the sentence expressed by a verb, a verbal noun, an adjective, or an adverb, and serving to characterise an action or a property as to its quality or intensity, or to indicate the way an action is done, the time, place, cause, purpose, or condition, with which the action or the manifestation of the quality is connected.² This definition is based on the same principles as two other definitions we have discussed: (1) the syntactical connection of an adverbial modifier with parts of the sentence expressed by certain parts of speech (and the list in this case is shorter than in either of the first two). (2) the meanings, which in this case are extremely varied, comprising no less than eight different items (and the list is not exhaustive at that). It appears to be particularly necessary here to look for an answer to the question: what does an adverbial modifier express, after all, so that the answer should not be a list, but just one notion — its invariable. It could probably be argued that all the meanings enumerated in the definition amount to one, viz.

¹ See *Грамматика русского языка*, т. II, ч. 1, стр. 522.

² See *Грамматика русского языка*, т. II, ч. 1, стр. 523.

the characteristic feature of an action or property. If we choose to put it that way, there remains only one "or" (action or property), which we might perhaps try to get rid of by looking for a term which would cover both actions and properties.

As to the first item of the definition, it has some peculiarities worth notice. In the list of parts of speech there is a point unparalleled in the other definitions which we have discussed, namely not every kind of noun can have an adverbial modifier, but only a verbal noun, that is, a noun expressing an action presented as a thing (see above, p. 28). So the characteristic features of a noun as a part of speech are not sufficient to enable it to have an adverbial modifier: it must belong to a certain lexical class.

Let us now proceed to compare the parts of speech enumerated in the definition of an adverbial modifier with those enumerated in the definitions of the other secondary parts of a sentence, and let us first take the list given in the definition of the object. There all the parts of speech capable of being parts of the sentence were given. So the parts of speech which the two lists have in common are, a verb, a verbal noun, an adjective, and an adverb.

If we now compare the list given for the adverbial modifier with that given for the attribute, we shall find that the only point which they have in common is the verbal noun: for the attribute it says "noun", which of course includes verbal nouns, and for the adverbial modifier it expressly says "verbal noun". Thus the sphere of overlapping between attributes and adverbial modifiers is very limited.

Summing up these comparisons we find that the first item of the definitions leaves room for ambiguity in the following cases: (1) if the part of the sentence which is modified is expressed by a noun, its modifier may be either an object or an attribute; (2) if it is expressed by a verbal noun, the modifier may be either an object, or an attribute, or an adverbial modifier; (3) if it is expressed by an adjective, the modifier may be either an object or an adverbial modifier; (4) if it is expressed by a cardinal numeral, the modifier may be either an object or an attribute; (5) if it is expressed by a verb, - the modifier may be either an object or an adverbial modifier; (6) if it is expressed by an adverb the modifier may be either an object or an adverbial modifier, too.

The above classification does not take into account the stative. If we add it to our list we shall get one more point: (7) if the part modified is expressed by a stative, the modifier may be either an object, or an adverbial modifier.

Since in these cases the first item of the definition does not lead to unambiguous results, we shall have to apply its second item, namely, the meaning of the modifier: a property, a thing, or whatever it may happen to be. For instance, if there is in the sentence a secon--

dary part modifying the subject which is expressed by a noun, this secondary part may be either an object or an attribute. (It cannot be an adverbial modifier, which cannot modify a part of the sentence expressed by a non-verbal noun.) Now, to find out whether the secondary part in question is an object or an attribute we shall have to apply the second test and see whether it expresses a thing or a property. This would seem to be simple enough, but is far from being always so. In a considerable number of cases, the answer to the question whether a secondary part expresses a thing or a property will, strangely enough, be arbitrary, that is, it will depend on the scholar's opinion, and not on any binding objective facts.

Take, for instance, the following sentence: *The dim gloom of drawn blinds and winter twilight closed about her.* (M. MITCHELL) Here the phrase *of drawn blinds and winter twilight* modifies the noun *gloom*, which is the subject of the sentence. Since it modifies a noun it may be either an object or an attribute, and the choice between the two has to be made by deciding whether it denotes a thing (of whatever kind) or a property. How are we to decide that? On the one hand, it may be argued that it denotes a thing and its relation to the other thing, called *gloom*, is indicated. Then the phrase is an object. This view can hardly be disproved. On the other hand, however, it is also possible to regard the matter differently, and to assert that the phrase expresses a property of the gloom and is therefore an attribute. That view is quite plausible, too, and there is nothing in the facts of the language to show that it is wrong. So we shall have to choose the answer that seems to us to be the "better" one, i. e. to apply personal taste and opinion. The result thus gained will inevitably be subjective. The matter may also be settled by convention, that is, we may declare that we shall consider, say, every prepositional phrase modifying a noun to be an attribute (this is actually done in most English grammars).

From a theoretical point of view the distinction is of no particular interest, and a convention may be accepted without prejudice to the scientific level of our study. We might even say that in such circumstances the distinction between object and attribute is neutralised, and propose some new term, which would be more general than either "object" or "attribute". This indeed would probably be the best way of making syntactic theory agree with the actual facts.

¹ We may suppose that that is the case in other spheres of syntax, too: if two views conflict in defining the essence of a certain phenomenon, and appear to be both of them right in their way, it is very likely that the distinction has been neutralised.

A similar situation is also possible with the object and the adverbial modifier. This is the case, for instance, in a sentence like this: *In her face were too sharply blended the delicate features of her mother, a coast aristocrat of French descent, and the heavy ones of her florid Irish father.* (M. MITCHELL) The question is, what part of the sentence is *in her face*. As it modifies a verb it can be either an object or an adverbial modifier. To decide between these, we apply the second item of the definitions, and find out whether the secondary part expresses a thing or characterises the action. Now, obviously it is possible to take it in two ways; we might say that the secondary part of the sentence expresses an object affected by the action, or that it expresses a characteristic of the action itself. Accordingly whoever said that it was an object would have something on his side, and so would he who said that it was an adverbial modifier. In this case it seems rather more difficult than in the preceding case (see above) to settle the matter by convention. We could not possibly set down that any prepositional phrase modifying a verb is an object, since in many cases that would be clearly untrue. So the choice between object and adverbial modifier is bound to be arbitrary and subjective. The right way out of this is to say that in these positions the distinction between object and adverbial modifier is neutralised, and to propose some new term which would be more general than either "object" or "adverbial modifier". Since it is always difficult to invent a new term that will stand a reasonable chance of being generally accepted, it might perhaps be the best solution to use the term "secondary part" for all cases when the distinction between object and attribute, or that between object and adverbial modifier, is neutralised. If this view were accepted, we should have in some cases an object, in others an attribute, in others again an adverbial modifier, and last, sometimes a secondary part as such.¹

In a few cases a similar doubt may be possible when we try to decide whether a phrase is an object without a preposition or an adverbial modifier, as in the sentence, *He walks the streets of London.* (THACKERAY, quoted by Poutsma) However, such cases appear to be very rare indeed.

After this preliminary survey of the three secondary parts, we will now proceed to examine each of them and their types.

¹ But see also below (p. 221 ff.) on the problems of the attribute.

SECONDARY PARTS IN DETAIL

THE OBJECT

It is well known that there are several types of objects and some kind of classification has to be found for them. Objects differ from one another, on the one hand, by their morphological composition, that is, by the parts of speech or phrases which perform the function of object, and on the other hand, in some cases objects modifying a part of the sentence expressed by a verb form (and that is most usually the predicate) differ by the type of their relation to the action expressed by the verb (it is to this difference that the terms "direct object" and "indirect object" are due).

Since the latter distinction applies only to a certain morphological type of objects, it will be convenient to take first the classification according to morphological differences.

From this point of view we must draw a distinction between non-prepositional and prepositional objects. Under the latter heading we will include every object of the type "preposition + noun or pronoun", no matter what preposition makes part of it, whether it be a preposition with a very concrete meaning, such as *between*, or a most abstract one, such as *of* or *to*. In establishing the two types of objects (non-prepositional and prepositional) we do not ask the question whether a prepositional object can or cannot be synonymous with a non-prepositional (as is the case with some objects containing the preposition *to*).

Both non-prepositional and prepositional objects (more especially the latter) may sometimes be hard to distinguish from adverbial modifiers (see above, pp. 215 and 216).

We will not attempt to give an exhaustive list of possible morphological types of non-prepositional objects but we will content ourselves with pointing out the essential ones.

These, then, are the important morphological types. An object may be expressed by a noun, a pronoun (of different types), a substantivised adjective, an infinitive, and a gerund. In some few special cases an object may be expressed by an adverb (as in the sentence *We will leave here next week*).¹

The classification of objects into direct and indirect ones applies only to objects expressed by nouns or pronouns (and occasionally substantivised adjectives). It has no reference whatever to objects expressed by an infinitive, a gerund, or a phrase. With objects of these kinds the question whether they are direct or indirect would

¹ The so-called complex object and related phenomena will be studied in Chapter XXXII (see p. 257 ff.).

be meaningless. But even with objects expressed by nouns or pronouns the distinction is far from being always clear.

We will begin our study of direct and indirect objects by a type of sentence in which both objects are found simultaneously and no other interpretation of the facts seems possible.

A case in point are sentences in which the predicate is expressed by the verbs *send*, *show*, *lend*, *give*, and the like. These verbs usually take two different kinds of objects simultaneously: (1) an object expressing the thing which is sent, shown, lent, given, etc., and (2) the person or persons to whom the thing is sent, shown, lent, given, etc. The difference between the two relations is clear enough: the direct object denotes the thing immediately affected by the action denoted by the predicate verb, whereas the indirect object expresses the person towards whom the thing is moved. This is familiar in sentences like *We sent them a present*, *You showed my friend your pictures*, etc. It is well known that when the two objects occur together in a sentence, they are distinguished by their relative places in the sentence, that is, by word order: the indirect object stands first, and the direct object comes after it.¹

However, even in sentences in which there are two objects simultaneously the distinction between direct and indirect objects is not always clear. With some verbs, and owing to their peculiar meanings, there are not sufficient objective facts to prove that one object is direct, and the other indirect. This is the case with the verbs *tell* and *teach*. They can take simultaneously two objects, one denoting the person addressed and the other the news told or the subject taught, as in the sentences, *He told me the whole story*, or *She taught the children geography*. So far the structure seems to be the same as in the above sentences with the verbs *send*, *show*, etc., and we might call the objects *me* and *the children* indirect, and the objects *the whole story* and *geography* direct. There is, however, something to be said against that view. The verbs *tell* and *teach* can also be used in a different way, as will be seen from the following sentences, *He told me about his success*, and *She taught children*. In the former sentence the first object denotes the person addressed but the second is expressed by a prepositional phrase and cannot be called a direct object; in the latter sentence there is no second object at all. Under these circumstances there would seem to be no reasonable objective ground for calling the first object in each of these sentences an indirect object.

There is another consideration here which rather tends toward the same conclusion. In studying different kinds of objects it is also essential to take into account the possibility of the correspond-

¹ We are not at the moment speaking of objects expressed by prepositional phrases.

ing passive construction. It is well known that in English there is a greater variety of possible passive constructions than in many other languages. For instance, the sentence *We gave him a present* can have two passive equivalents: *A present was given to him* (here the subject corresponds to the direct object in the active construction), and *He was given a present* (here the subject corresponds to the indirect object of the active construction). However, the second passive variant is only possible if the direct object is there, too. The sentence *He was given* in this sense (without the direct object) would not be possible. Now, with the verbs *tell* and *teach* things are different. It is quite possible to say *The story has been told many times* and *I have been told about it* (in this case the subject corresponds to the indirect object of the active construction, and there is no direct object in the sentence). In a similar way, it is possible to say *Geography is taught by a new teacher* and also *Children are taught by a new teacher* (without any direct object and indeed without any object corresponding to "geography"). From this point of view the sentences with the verbs *tell* and *teach* are different from those with the verbs *send*, *show*, *give*, etc. With the former there are not sufficient objective grounds for saying that one object is direct, and the other indirect.

As to sentences containing one object only, there are no grounds at all for saying that the object is "indirect". Sentences with the verb *help* are a case in point. In the sentence *We will help our friends*, for instance, there is nothing to show whether the object is direct or indirect.¹

The object with verbs meaning 'to call by telephone or telegraph' is another case in point. We might suppose that the object with such verbs is indirect. The usual type of sentence, with the verb in the active voice, does not give any clue to this. For instance, in the following sentence there is nothing to show whether the object of *telegraph* is direct or indirect: *"That's fine" she replied. "I'll telegraph Lee right away that I'm coming."* (BUECHNER) But there are cases in which a verb of this category is used in the passive voice, e. g. *Three days later, I was surprised to be rung up by Charles* (SNOW), that is, in the corresponding sentence with the predicate verb in the active voice, *he rang me up*, the object might equally be said to be a direct one.

Now, moreover, this question of direct and indirect objects is also connected with one type of object expressed by a phrase, namely the one of the pattern "to + noun or pronoun". It is common knowledge that the thought expressed in the sentence *He gave me*

¹ The fact that in Russian the corresponding verb *помогать* takes an indirect object, that is, a noun or pronoun in the dative case, is of course totally irrelevant here.

a present can also be expressed in a slightly different way, namely, *He gave a present to me. I* We may call the first of the two objects direct because it stands in the same relation to the predicate verb as in the sentence *He gave me a present. As* to the second object, which includes a preposition, it is doubtful whether it will serve any useful purpose to call it an indirect object, since objects of the pattern "preposition + noun or pronoun" cannot be direct,² so that for objects of this kind there is no opposition of direct and indirect. If, however, we insist that the function of *to me* in this sentence is the same as that of *me* in the sentence *He gave me a present*, we shall have to include all prepositional objects under the heading of indirect objects and to change the system of classification which we have so far followed, in accordance with this view. It must be admitted that either way entails difficulties. If we follow the line adopted, we have to separate *to me* in the sentence *He gave a present to me* from *me* in the sentence *He gave me a present*; but then we can restrict the division of objects into direct and indirect to noun and pronoun objects (without preposition). If, on the other hand, we take *to me* to be an indirect object, we are obliged to extend the category of indirect objects to the prepositional ones; by way of compensation, we can keep up the connection between *me* in the sentence *He gave me a present* and *to me* in the sentence *He gave a present to me*. It would seem that, on the whole, the first alternative is preferable.

There is another question to be discussed concerning prepositional objects. Let us compare the following two sentences: *We spoke about recent events*, and *We bought about twenty books*. In the first sentence, the preposition denotes a relation between the action denoted by the verb and the thing denoted by the noun. The sentence is based on the pattern "speak about something". In the second sentence, the verb *buy* is not associated with a preposition: there is no pattern "buy about something". The word *about* does not denote any relation between the action and the thing, and bears in fact no relation at all to the verb. It is connected with the numeral only and shows that the number denoted by the numeral is not here given as exact. It is even doubtful whether the word *about* is here a preposition, as both its meaning and function are different from those of prepositions.³ If we take this view, the object in this case will not be prepositional, and this is perhaps the best way out of the difficulty. If, however, we insist on the word *about* being a preposition we shall have to distinguish between two different types

¹ There is a difference in emphasis between the two sentences, but we need not dwell on it here.

² See, however, the next paragraph.

³ See above (p. 152) on the possibility of taking *about* as a particle.

of objects corresponding to the pattern "preposition + noun or pronoun"; a necessary feature of the type we are now considering would be the numeral preceding the noun, so that the pattern would be this: "preposition (*about, over, under*) + cardinal numeral + noun". A decisive point of difference between the types would be this. In type 1 (as in the sentence *We spoke about recent events*) the preposition cannot be left out: a sentence *We spoke recent events* is impossible. In type 2 the preposition can be left out without affecting the grammatical correctness of the sentence; only the idea of approximation conveyed by the word *about* in this context will disappear.

THE ATTRIBUTE

As we have already discussed the cases where the distinction between object and attribute is neutralised, so that a secondary part can equally be termed the one or the other (see above, p. 215), we need not dwell on these cases here but we can turn to the attribute as such.

An attribute can either precede or follow the noun it modifies. Accordingly we use the terms "prepositive" and "postpositive" attribute. The position of an attribute with respect to its head word depends partly on the morphological peculiarities of the attribute itself, and partly on stylistic factors.

We will discuss this question at some length in the chapter on word order (see pp. 246—247).

The size of a prepositive attributive phrase can be large in Modern English. This is mainly due to the fact that whatever is included between the article (definite or indefinite) and the noun, is apprehended as an attribute to the noun. Examples of attributes reaching considerable length are met with in usual literary (though not in colloquial) style. This is what we can see in the following sentence: *The younger, Leander, was above all young, it seemed to him, charmingly, crashingly so, with only a slightly greater than usual grace and a deep reserve to distinguish him from any of his friends who had joined them.* (BUECHNER) The phrase *slightly greater than usual* is characterised as an attribute by its position between the indefinite article and the noun *grace*, so that no misunderstanding is possible here. Compare the following example: *. . . her courage was not equal to a wish of exploring them after dinner, either by the fading light of the sky between six and seven o'clock, or by the yet more partial though stronger illumination of a treacherous lamp.* (J. AUSTEN) The attributive group here is rather long (*yet more partial though stronger*) but it is held together by being placed between the definite article and the noun *illumination*. It is essential that no other noun appears between the article and

illumination. In this example we have even the subordinating conjunction *though* introducing the second attributive adjective *stronger*, so that the structure of the attributive group almost oversteps the limits of a clause. Compare also the following sentence from a modern novel: *He was relieved when I motioned to him and started to wrap the by now almost insensible figure of Melissa in the soft Bokhara rug.* (DURRELL)

Such attributes can acquire enormous proportions in humorous writings, so that whole sentences with subordinate clauses are squeezed into them, as in the following example (from an article containing criticism of the most common types of British crime films): *Here are two possibilities only, and the threadbare variations are endlessly woven around them: the "I-ain't-askin'-no-questions-just-tell-me-what-to-do" kind and the "My-God,-Henry,-you-must-believe-me" kind (which can also be described as the "Why-the-devil-can't-you-leave-my-wife-alone-Can't-you-see-she's-distraught" kind).* The hyphens connecting the various elements do not of course mean that the whole has coalesced into one monstrous word: they merely serve to show the unity of the syntactical formation functioning as an attribute. It goes without saying that such possibilities are due to the absence of inflections for number, gender, and case in the part of speech which most usually performs the function of an attribute, namely, the adjective.

This consideration brings us to what is the most difficult question in the study of the attribute, its position in the general system of parts of the sentence. The question is briefly this: is the attribute a secondary part of the sentence standing on a footing of equality with the object and the adverbial modifier, or is it a unit of a lower rank? Approached from another angle, the question would be this: is the attribute a constituent of the sentence, or does it belong to the level of phrases? This is of course a problem of general linguistics, and it has been discussed with reference to different languages. Here we will treat it taking into account the specific conditions of Modern English.

The problem can best be approached in the following way. If we take the sentence: *History only emerged in the eighteenth century as a literary art.* . . (MOULTON) and if we want to state the parts of the sentence, we shall stop at the phrase *in the eighteenth century*. We shall have to choose between two views: (1) *in the century* is an adverbial modifier of time; *eighteenth* is an attribute; the two secondary parts of the sentence stand on the same syntactical level; (2) *in the eighteenth century* is an adverbial modifier of time and is (as a whole) a secondary member of the sentence, modifying the predicate verb *emerged*; *eighteenth* is part of that adverbial modifier, which is expressed by a phrase, and it is part of the phrase, not of the sentence: it stands on a lower level than the

sentence with its parts, i. e. it stands on the phrase level, being an attribute to the noun *century*.

The same reasoning and the same choice would of course apply to the phrase *as a literary art*. The two possible views of its syntactic function would be these: (1) *as a(n) art* is a part of the sentence, namely a predicative; *literary* is another part, namely an attribute, standing syntactically on the same level with it; (2) *as a literary art* as a whole is a part of the sentence, namely, a predicative; *literary* is part of the predicative, and thus not a separate part of the sentence: it is part of the phrase, namely an attribute to the noun *art*, and stands on a lower level than the sentence and its parts: it stands on the phrase level.

To give another example, let us take the sentence *In the rich brown atmosphere peculiar to back rooms in the mansion of a Forsyte, the Rembrandtesque effect of his great head, with its white hair, against the cushion of his high-backed seat, was spoiled by the moustache, which imparted a somewhat military look to his face.* (GALSWORTHY) We will consider the following phrases: *in the rich brown atmosphere; the Rembrandtesque effect; of his great head; with its white hair; a somewhat military look*: With all of these the following two ways of analysis are possible: (1) *in the atmosphere* is an adverbial modifier of place, *rich* and *brown* are attributes — secondary parts of the sentence, on the same level as the adverbial modifier; *the effect* is the subject of the sentence, *Rembrandtesque* is an attribute — a secondary part of the sentence; *with hair* is an object, *its* and *white* are attributes; *a look* is an object, *military* an attribute, *somewhat* an adverbial modifier of degree, the last two being separate secondary parts and outside the object; (2) *in the rich brown atmosphere* is an adverbial modifier of place, *rich* and *brown* are parts of the phrase and, being attributes, stand on a lower level than secondary parts of the sentence; *the Rembrandtesque effect* is the subject of the sentence; *Rembrandtesque*, the attribute, is part of the phrase, not of the sentence as such; *with its white hair* is an object; *white*, the attribute, a part of the phrase; *a somewhat military look* is an object, *military* and *somewhat* are parts of the phrase, not of the sentence as such, *military* being an attribute to the noun *look*.¹

There obviously is much to be said in favour of the view that the attribute in each case is a part of a phrase, rather than of the sentence. For one thing, it should be noted that in some cases the attribute cannot be left out without making the text grammatically incorrect. For instance, if we leave out the attributes *his* and *great* in the phrase *of his great head*, we shall get the impossible

¹ The function of the adverb *somewhat* and of other words in a similar position requires special discussion. See below, p. 224.

expression *the effect of head*. Then, in some cases, though the omission of an attribute would not make the construction wrong, it would deprive it of any reasonable sense, as in the end of our example, which would then run like this: . . . *the moustache, which imparted a look to his face*.

Against this latter point it may be argued that this is a semantic consideration which should have no influence on syntactic analysis, so that the point seems to remain doubtful. The first point seems more compelling, because it is strictly grammatical: the sentence without the attribute in question proves to be syntactically impossible.

Speaking more generally, the very fact that an attribute often comes within a part of the sentence (whether a main or a secondary one), for example, between the article and the noun to which the article belongs, and that in a number of cases it cannot be "extracted" without damaging the grammatical structure of the sentence, speaks strongly in favour of the view that the attribute stands on a lower level than the usual parts of the sentence (including the secondary ones) and that it should be considered a part of a phrase, not of a sentence. This view also gives the structure of the sentence a deeper perspective, as it opens up a syntactical sphere beyond that of parts of the sentence.

However, this view of the attribute also entails difficulties. To illustrate these, we may turn to the sentence from Galsworthy's "Man of Property" which we have just been considering. The end of the sentence runs like this: . . . *which imparted a somewhat military look to his face*. If we agree that the attribute *military* is not a separate part of the sentence but makes part of the phrase object whose centre is the noun *look*, this has its consequences for the adverb *somewhat*, which modifies the adjective *military*. If *military* is not a separate part of the sentence, *somewhat* obviously cannot be one either, as it is syntactically subordinate to a word which itself is not a part of the sentence. This leads to the conclusion that *somewhat* also makes part of the phrase of which *look* is the centre, and has to be treated accordingly. On the other hand, *somewhat* would seem to perform in this sentence a function similar to that which it performs in a sentence like *His look was somewhat military*, where *military* is the predicative, and *somewhat* an adverbial modifier belonging to it, and in this much a secondary part of the sentence. The functions of the word *somewhat* in the two sentences, though similar as far as its relation to its head word *military* is concerned, are different, according as the word *military* itself is a predicative or an attribute. It would seem to follow from this that a kind of double syntactic analysis is necessary. This question is a very difficult one indeed and a satisfactory solution has not so far been found.

THE ADVERBIAL MODIFIER

We must begin by stating that the term "adverbial modifier" cannot be said to be a very happy one, as it is apt to convey erroneous ideas about the essence of this secondary part. The word "adverbial" may give rise to two notions, both of them wrong. For one thing, we may suppose that an adverbial modifier is always expressed by an adverb, which of course is not true: an adverbial modifier may be expressed by different morphological means. Secondly, the term "adverbial" may give rise to the notion that an adverbial modifier always modifies a verb, which is also wrong! an adverbial modifier may modify a part of the sentence expressed by an adjective or by an adverb, as well as by a verb. As the term "adverbial modifier" is firmly established, it would be futile to try and substitute another term in its place. So we will keep the term, bearing in mind what has been said about its meaning.

There are several ways of classifying adverbial modifiers: (1) according to their meaning, (2) according to their morphological peculiarities, (3) according to the type of their head word.

Of these, the classification according to meaning is not in itself a grammatical classification. For instance, the difference between an adverbial modifier of place and one of time is basically semantic and depends on the lexical meaning of the words functioning as adverbial modifiers. However, this classification may acquire some grammatical significance, especially when we analyse word order in a sentence and one semantic type of adverbial modifier proves to differ in this respect from another. Therefore the classification of adverbial modifiers according to their meaning cannot be ignored by syntactic theory.

Classification according to morphological peculiarities, i. e. according to the parts of speech and to phrase patterns, is essential: it has also something to do with word order, and stands in a certain relation to the classification according to meaning.

Classification according to the element modified is the syntactic classification proper. It is of course connected in some ways with the classification according to meaning; for instance, an adverbial modifier can modify a part of the sentence expressed by a verb only if the type of meaning of the word (or phrase) acting as modifier is compatible with the meaning of a verb, etc.

A complete classification of adverbial modifiers according to their meaning, i. e. a list of all possible meanings they can have, is impossible to achieve, and it would serve no useful purpose. A certain number of meanings can be found quite easily, such as place, time, condition, manner of an action, degree of a property, etc., but whatever list we may compile along these lines, there are bound to be special cases which will not fit in. For instance, in the sentence

I saw him at the concert it is hard to tell whether the adverbial modifier *at the concert* expresses place or time; and the dilemma appears to be futile. Since all this depends on the lexical meanings of words, possibilities here are practically boundless. We must therefore content ourselves with establishing some main categories and abstain from trying to squeeze every single adverbial modifier that may occur in a sentence into a "pigeonhole" prepared for it.

As to the classification according to morphological peculiarities, it can probably be made exhaustive, although some of the morphological types are met with very seldom indeed.

The most usual morphological type seems to be the adverb. This is testified, among other things, by the fact that the very term for this part of the sentence is derived (in English, and also, for instance, in German) from the term "adverb". In some grammar books the two notions are even mixed up. Occasionally an author speaks of adverbs, where he obviously means adverbial modifiers.¹

Another very frequent morphological type of adverbial modifier is the phrase pattern "preposition + noun" (also the type "preposition + adjective + noun" and other variations of this kind). This type of adverbial modifier is one of those which are sometimes indistinguishable from objects, or rather where the distinction between object and adverbial modifier is neutralised.

A noun without a preposition can also in certain circumstances be an adverbial modifier. To distinguish it from an object, we take into account the meanings of the words, namely the meaning of the verb functioning as predicate, and that of the noun in question. It must be admitted, though, that even this criterion will not yield quite definite results, and this means that the decision will be arbitrary, that is, the distinction between the two secondary parts is neutralised here, too. Let us consider, for instance, the function of the noun *hour* in a sentence like *They appointed an hour* and in a sentence like *They waited an hour*. Since the noun is the same in both cases, the distinction, if any, can only be due to the meaning of the verb in its relation to that of the noun. In the first sentence we will take the noun *hour* as an object — on the analogy of many other nouns, which can also follow this particular verb (e. g. *appoint a director*), and which can all be made the subject of this verb in a passive construction (e. g. *A director has been appointed*). In the second sentence, things are different, as the verb *wait* can only be followed by a very few nouns without a preposition (e. g. *Wait a minute*), and a passive construction is impossible. This appears to constitute an essential difference between the two.

However, we should not overestimate the force of these observations. In the first place, there are cases when a noun following the

¹ See, for example, H. Sweet, *A New English Grammar*, Part II, § 1833.

predicate verb is doubtless an object, and yet a corresponding passive construction does not exist. In the second place, a passive construction proves to be possible in some cases when we should rather call the noun in the active construction an adverbial modifier. Something similar is found in the familiar example *The bed had not been slept in*, which corresponds to a sentence with the verb in the active voice, *Nobody had slept in the bed*. If we had been given only the latter sentence for analysis, we should probably have said that *in the bed* was an adverbial modifier of place; the possibility of the corresponding passive construction rather shows that it is an object. But the absence of a corresponding passive construction is hardly final proof of the secondary part being an adverbial modifier. Perhaps we will do best to say that the opposition between object and adverbial modifier tends to be neutralised here, too.

A very frequent morphological type of adverbial modifier is the infinitive or an infinitive phrase. This is especially true of the adverbial modifier of purpose, which may be expressed by the infinitive preceded by the particle *to* or the phrase *in order to*. However, we cannot say that every infinitive or infinitive phrase acting as a secondary part of the sentence must necessarily be an adverbial modifier of purpose, or indeed an adverbial modifier of any kind.

Let us compare the following two sentences: *I wanted to read the advertisement*, and *I stopped to read the advertisement*. From a purely structural point of view there would seem to be no difference between the two sentences. It is the meanings of the verbs *want* and *stop* which lie at the bottom of the difference. Grammatically speaking, a transformation test is possible which will bring out the difference in function between the two infinitives. In the sentence *I stopped to read the advertisement* we can insert *in order* before the particle *to*, or, in other words, replace the particle *to* by the phrase *in order to*: in doing so, we get the sentence *I stopped in order to read the advertisement*, which is good English and does not differ in meaning from the original sentence. With the sentence *I wanted to read the advertisement* such a change would not be possible. If we consider this experiment to be a grammatical proof we can say that the difference in the functions of the infinitive in the two sentences is grammatical. If we deny this the conclusion will be that the distinction between the two secondary parts is neutralised here too.

There are also cases when the infinitive is an adverbial modifier, but not one of purpose. This is the case, on the one hand, in such sentences as *I was glad to see him*, where the meaning of the adject-

¹ Thus, for instance, the verb *resemble* can, and even must, have a direct object, but it cannot be used in the passive voice. •

tive *glad* shows the semantic relations, and, on the other hand, in such sentences as the following: *Denis woke up the next morning to find the sun shining, the sky serene.* (HUXLEY) It is clear from the lexical meanings of the words *woke up* and *find* that the infinitive as adverbial modifier does not indicate the purpose of the action but the circumstances that followed it (Denis woke up and found the sun shining). The infinitive *to find* is indeed typical of such adverbial modifiers, as has been pointed out by E. Korneyeva.¹

The same is seen in the following example: *She balanced perilously there for a few more minutes, then lurched and fell back to awake with a start and grab at the horse . . .* (BUECHNER) (the horse mentioned here is a statue). It is evident from the lexical meanings of the verbs *fell* and *awake* that the infinitive does not express purpose but ensuing circumstances: it would be impossible for a person to fall in order to awake. So the lexical meanings of words are of first-rate importance for the status of the infinitive: the form of the infinitive does not in itself determine anything beyond that the phrase in question is a secondary part of the sentence. The following sentence is also a clear example of this kind of infinitive modifier: *A young man of twenty-two or so, wearing overalls and carrying an empty bucket, pushed open the wide, green doors of the aviary to be greeted by a gust of piercing whistles, trills, chirps and murmurings from the double row of cages that lined two walls of the long, low building.* (BUECHNER) The infinitive in question is here passive, but the grammatical category of voice does not in itself give sufficient material to judge of the type of modifier we have here: a passive action might after all be the purpose of an action. It is rather the lexical meanings of the words and "common sense" that make everything clear: it could not be the man's purpose to be greeted by whistles, etc., of birds. Thus the modifier is clearly one of subsequent events.

A different kind of relation between an adverbial modifier and its head word is found when the head word is an adjective or adverb preceded by the adverb *too*: *But Magnus's spirit was too robust and buoyant to admit of difficulties for long.* (LINKLATER) *At first he had been too surprised to feel any definite emotion.* (Idem)

The actual meaning resulting from the pattern "*too* + adjective (adverb) + *to* + infinitive" of course is, that the action denoted by the infinitive does not take place.

Roughly speaking, in summing up the relations between the semantic and the morphological types of adverbial modifiers, we may say that some general statements on their relations can be

¹ Е. А. Корнеева, *О некоторых обстоятельственных функциях приглагольного инфинитива в английском языке*. Ученые записки ЛГПИ им. Герцена, т. 154, 1958.

made: for example, an adverbial modifier of place can never be expressed by an infinitive; an infinitive can express either an adverbial modifier of purpose, or one of subsequent events, etc. No straightforward law about correspondences between the two classifications is possible.

As to the parts of the sentence which an adverbial modifier may modify, they have been enumerated on p. 213. It follows from this definition that an adverbial modifier cannot modify a part of the sentence expressed by a non-verbal noun; in other words, a secondary part modifying a part expressed by a noun cannot be an adverbial modifier. This may be taken as a guiding principle, though it is purely conventional, being the logical consequence of the definition adopted. But it must also be stated that from a scientific viewpoint it is irrelevant whether we call an adverb or phrase modifying a noun an attribute or an adverbial modifier.

PREDICATE, OR PREDICATE AND ADVERBIAL MODIFIER

A long discussion has been going on concerning the structure of such sentences as *He is here*, or *They are at home*, etc. Two views have been put forward.

The traditional view, which had remained undoubted for a long time, was that these were sentences with a simple verbal predicate, expressed by a form of the verb *be*, and followed by an adverbial modifier of place expressed either by an adverb or by a phrase of the pattern "preposition + noun". According to this view, sentences of this type are grammatically quite different from such sentences as, *He is tall*, or *They are on the move*, which of course have a compound nominal predicate consisting of the link verb *be* and a predicative expressed either by an adjective or noun, or by a phrase of the pattern "preposition + noun".

However, this view began to arouse doubts and it was pointed out that there was no essential difference between the meaning and function of the verb *be* in one type and in the other; accordingly it would seem that the verb was a link verb in all cases, and whatever followed it was a predicative in all cases, too. It is this view that we find in Prof. A. Smirnitsky's book on English syntax.¹ He considers the group *is here* in a sentence like *He is here*, and the group *are at home* in a sentence like *We are at home* to be a special kind of predicate, which he terms the adverbial predicate. In this way the types *They are in London* and *They live in London* are separated from each other: with the verb *be* the phrase "verb + preposition +", + noun" is an adverbial predicate, while with the verb *live* the verb alone is the predicate and the phrase "preposition + noun" is

¹ See A. И. Смирницкий, *Синтаксис английского языка*, стр. 115.

an adverbial modifier, that is, a secondary part of the sentence.

The type *They are in London* is thus brought closer together with the type *They are glad*, etc., where no doubt arises about the structure of the sentence.

It would seem that this is one of the questions which do not admit of a definite solution that might be proved to be the only correct one. The answer which this or that scholar will give to the question is bound to be subjective, that is, some personal predilection of his for this or that way of treating language phenomena is sure to play some part in it. For instance, there is a strong argument in favour of the view that the phrase "preposition + noun" is part of the predicate, not a special secondary part of the sentence, and this is the fact that without the prepositional phrase the sentence with the verb *be* would not be possible: we could not say *They are*. This is an important point, and a point marking a real difference between the sentences *They are in London* and *They live in London*: in the latter sentence we certainly might drop the prepositional phrase, and the sentence would not on that account become impossible: *They live* is quite a normal sentence, though its meaning is quite different from that of the sentence *They live in London*: *They live* means much the same as *They are alive*.

The sentence *They are in London* is similar to the sentence *They are glad*, in so far as in both cases it is impossible to drop what follows the verb *be*: in both cases the result would be *They are*, which is impossible.

Those, on the other hand, who would prove that the prepositional phrase is an adverbial modifier, might point out that the phrase *in London* in both cases shows the place of the action (it answers the question *Where?*) and that the impossibility of leaving out the prepositional group is irrelevant for defining its syntactic function.

In this way the argument might be protracted indefinitely. In order to arrive at some sort of decision, we must give such an answer as will best suit our view of syntactic phenomena with its inevitable subjective element. So if we have to choose one of the above alternatives, it would seem that the arguments in favour of the group *are in London* being the predicate are more convincing than those given by the other side. So we will rather prefer to say that in the sentence *They are in London* there is only the subject and the predicate and no adverbial modifier at all.

A similar question would of course arise in a number of other sentences and the same sort of reasoning would have to be applied there.

Chapter XXIX

THE APPOSITION, DIRECT ADDRESS, PARENTHESES, AND INSERTIONS. LOOSE PARTS

Now we come to speak of some parts of a sentence whose position in its structure has been variously treated by different authors. One of these is the apposition.

THE APPOSITION

It has been often regarded as a special kind of attribute, and sometimes as a secondary part of a sentence distinct from an attribute.

By apposition we mean a word or phrase referring to a part of the sentence expressed by a noun, and giving some other designation to the person or thing named by that noun. If the noun denotes a person, the apposition will often be a word or phrase naming the title, or profession, or social position of the person, etc., as the word *Captain* in the sentence, *For a moment, Melanie thought how nice Captain Butler was.* (M. MITCHELL) Concerning the apposition the same question may arise as concerning the attribute, namely, whether it is not part of a phrase rather than of a sentence, and arguments similar to those applied to the attribute may be put forward here.

As to the relation between an apposition and an attribute, there seems to be no convincing reason for considering the apposition a special kind of attribute. An apposition appears to have distinctive features strong enough to establish it as a separate secondary part: it is always expressed either by a noun, or by a phrase centred around a noun, and characterises the person or thing in a way different from that of an attribute. This will become clear if we compare the phrases *stone wall* and *President Roosevelt*: the relations between their components are entirely different.

THE DIRECT ADDRESS

There are some elements of the sentence which are neither its main parts, nor any of the usual secondary ones.

These are the direct address and the parenthesis.¹

¹ The term "parenthesis" has two meanings: it may denote either a part of the sentence or a punctuation mark also called brackets. We will here use the term in its first sense.

The direct address and the parenthesis are often said to be outside the sentence, in the sense that they are not an integral part of its structure but are, as it were, added to it "from the outside".¹ This view, however, seems hardly justified and it is based on a rather too narrow view of the structure of a sentence. If we were to take the term "outside the sentence" at its face value, we should have to omit these elements, for example, when asked to read a sentence aloud. This is never done, and should not be done. By "structure of the sentence" we should mean the whole of a sentence, with all the elements which it may contain, with their varying degrees of organic unity. In this sense, then, the direct address is no less a part of the sentence than any other word or phrase.

The direct address is a name or designation of the person or persons (or, occasionally, thing or things) to whom the speech or writing is addressed. We should not include in a definition of direct address the purpose of its use, as is done occasionally in grammars.² The purpose may be different in different circumstances, but this does not alter the fact that it is a direct address in all cases.

The direct address may consist of one word or of a phrase. If it is one word, this may be the person's name, or profession, or title, or it may denote a relationship between the person addressed and the speaker. If it is a phrase, this may again be any of the types just mentioned, or it may be some emotional address, whether friendly, as *my dear fellow*, or hostile, as *you swine*, *you old rascal*, etc. In the latter case, it is quite clear that the speaker's purpose in using a direct address is to express his attitude towards the person spoken to, whether it be friendly or otherwise. A few examples from modern fiction will do well to illustrate the various possibilities in the structure and function of the direct address: *Heathenish woman, how right they were to give you that outlandish name.* (A. WILSON) The adjective *heathenish* of course expresses very violent emotion on the part of the speaker towards the person addressed. Quite a different emotional note is struck in the following sentence: *Jennie, darling, you're looking very pretty," he said.* (Idem) The name *Jennie* as such is neutral in tone, but the second part of the direct address, *darling*, of course expresses the speaker's emotional attitude toward the person addressed.

The emotional range of the words and phrases used in direct address can of course be very wide indeed, and this deserves close study from a lexical and stylistic viewpoint, but it does not affect the grammatical aspect of the matter.

¹ For this view, see, for instance, *Грамматика русского языка*, т. II, ч. 2, стр. 122.

² See, for example, M. Ganshina and N. Vasilevskaya, *English Grammar*, 7th ed., 1951, p. 320.

PARENTHESES AND INSERTIONS

Besides the direct address, there are other syntactical elements which are usually said to be outside the sentence. Until recently, they used to be all taken together under the name of parenthesis. This term would then cover a considerable variety of syntactical elements. To illustrate this, we will give two extreme examples from modern texts: (1) *Of course Mrs Elsing was simply forced to it...* (M. MITCHELL) (2) *...he told Nelly that an old friend of his had visited him just as he was about to leave, and for politeness' sake — mere politeness, that frailty in human intercourse — he had brought her with him.* (LINKLATER) It will be readily seen that there is a great difference between the additional element in the two sentences: in (1) the phrase *of course* expresses the speaker's attitude towards the thought expressed in the sentence, whereas in (2) the additional element is of a different kind: it carries some extra information about something mentioned in the sentence.

The Academy's Grammar deviated from the usual view and introduced a new category, that of insertions, as distinct from parentheses. According to this grammar, a parenthesis should be defined as follows: words and phrases which have no syntactical ties with the sentence, and express the speaker's attitude towards what he says, a general assessment of the statement, or an indication of its sources, its connection with other statements, or with a wider context in speech.¹

In a vast majority of cases, a parenthesis refers to the sentence or clause as a whole. Sometimes, however, it refers only to a secondary part of the sentence. This may be seen, for example, in the following sentences: *I was deeply though doubtless not disinterestedly anxious for more news of the old lady.* (H. JAMES) Here the parenthesis *doubtless* refers only to the connection between *not disinterestedly* and *anxious*. *Miss Lavish he believed he understood, but Miss Bartlett might reveal unknown depths of strangeness, though not, perhaps, of meaning.* (FORSTER) The parenthesis *perhaps* refers only to the connection between *not of meaning* and *depths*. *She could only assure herself that Cecil had known Freddy some time, and that they had always got on pleasantly, except, perhaps, during the last few days, which was an accident, perhaps.* (Idem) The two parentheses *perhaps* refer to their special spheres in the sentence, without affecting the main predication expressed in it.

As to insertions, they are described as various additional statements inserted in the sentence. The main carcass of the sentence may be, as it were, interrupted by additional remarks, clarifications,

¹ See *Грамматика русского языка*, т. II, ч. 2, стр. 142.

corrections, extra information about something, or remarks containing comparison or contrasting something with what is expressed in the sentence, etc.¹

In analysing these definitions, we must first of all see what the difference between a parenthesis and an insertion is and what principle lies at the bottom of it.

It is obvious at once that the difference between the two types as stated here is, in the first place, semantic: it is a difference in the way the parenthesis or the insertion is connected with the main body of the sentence. The connection in the case of parentheses is much closer than in the case of insertions. This in itself is, however, hardly sufficient to describe the two as different grammatical types. We must therefore see what the syntactical aspect of the matter is like. This is not evident from the above definitions. Parentheses are described as having no syntactical connection with the sentence, and the insertions as statements inserted in the sentence, which of course amounts to the same thing. So the grammatical difference between the two types is not well brought out.

If the distinction between parentheses and insertions is to be upheld, a difference in their syntactic peculiarities must be found.

The difference would seem to be this. Parentheses are rather close to adverbial modifiers in their relation to the rest of the sentence. They are a part of the sentence and so they cannot be said to have no connection at all with it. Let us, for instance, compare the two following sentences, the first of which has an adverbial modifier at the beginning, while the second begins with a parenthesis: *Somehow it would come out all right when the war was over.* (M. MITCHELL) *Perhaps you know best about that, but I should say —* (Idem).

There is a clear difference between the two, yet at the same time there is something they have in common.

An interjection, or a phrase equivalent to an interjection, can also be considered a kind of parenthesis (unless, of course, it is a sentence in itself). Thus, the interjection *oh* in the following sentence: *Oh, but she depended entirely on her voice!* (FITCH) can be called a parenthesis, and so can the phrase *oh dear* in the sentence *Oh dear, I hope I shall be a success!* (Idem)

Now let us take a sentence with an insertion: *And the thought that, after all, he had not really killed her. No, no. Thank God for that. He had not. And yet (stepping up on the near-by bank and shaking the water from his clothes) had he?* (DREISER) Here things are quite different. The insertion contains some information about Clyde's movements as he was brooding in the way expressed by the main body of the sentence.

¹ See *Грамматика русского языка*, т. II, ч. 2, стр. 167.

The very fact that an insertion can only come in the middle of a sentence, interrupting its course, while a parenthesis can also be at the beginning or at the end of a sentence, is an important point of grammatical difference between the two.

This is not to say that these distinctions are always equally clear. As in so many other spheres, borderline cases, which show no clear and unmistakable signs of a word or a phrase performing this or that syntactical function, are quite possible here.

LOOSE PARTS

The theory of loose parts of the sentence is another backward element of syntactic theory. Even the terminology in this field is far from certain. The term "loose" is used in English grammars chiefly with reference to the apposition: close apposition and loose apposition are two notions opposed to each other in grammatical theory. Another term which may be used is "detached": detached attributes, detached adverbial modifiers, and so forth. We will use the term "loose".

By loose parts of the sentence we mean such parts as are less intimately connected with the rest of the sentence and have some sort of independence, which finds its expression in the intonation and, in writing, in the punctuation.

The question now is, what parts of the sentence can be loose. The main parts, subject and predicate, apparently cannot be loose, as they form the backbone of the sentence from which other parts may be "detached". Objects cannot apparently be loose either. So the following parts remain: attributes, adverbial modifiers, appositions, and parentheses.

Loose Attributes

These may be expressed by the same kind of words and phrases as the usual attributes. Their peculiarity is, that they are separated from their head word by a pause, by an intonation of their own, and by a punctuation mark (usually a comma) in writing. In actual speech such loose attributes often acquire additional shades of meaning, for example, causal or concessive, which are not expressed by any specific means, lexical or grammatical, and entirely depend on the meanings of the words in the sentence. Loose attributes have a somewhat larger sphere of application than ordinary ones: whereas a personal pronoun can hardly ever be a head word for an ordinary attribute, it can be one for a loose attribute. For instance, in the sentence: *Unable to sit there any longer with his mind tormented by thoughts of Tessie, he got up and started walking slowly down the road towards the Fullbrights' big white house* (E. CALDWELL)

the phrase *unable... Tessie* is a loose attribute to the subject, which is a personal pronoun. In this case the loose attribute acquires a distinctly causal shade of meaning, and this is due to the lexical meanings of the words (mainly, the words *unable to sit* and *got up*). Compare also: *Red in the face, he opened his mouth, but in his nervousness his voice emerged a high falsetto.* (A. WILSON) *Living or dead, she could not fail him, no matter what the cost.* (M. MITCHELL) The semantic connections between the loose attribute and the rest of the sentence are different in the two cases, but this depends entirely on the lexical meanings of the words involved. It is especially the conjunction *or* in the second example that gives the connection a concessive tinge (*living or dead — whether he was living or dead, no matter whether he was living or dead*).

A rarer case is seen in the following sentence, where the loose attribute refers to the object *her*: *Well read in the art of concealing a treasure, the possibility of false linings to the drawers did not escape her, and she felt round each with anxious acuteness in vain.* (J. AUSTEN) It is clear from the position of the form *read* immediately after *well* at the opening of the sentence that it is the second participle, and that the whole phrase is a loose secondary member which must be attached to some nominal part in the main body of the sentence. From the lexical meaning of the verb *read* it is evident that the word referring to the subject of this action must necessarily denote or point to a human being. Now, neither the subject *possibility* nor the nouns *linings* and *drawers* denote human beings, and the pronoun *her* is the first word to satisfy this condition. Accordingly, *well read* must refer to *her*, that is, to the object of the sentence. It must be noted, however, that this usage seems now obsolete.

Loose Adverbial Modifiers

Loose adverbial modifiers are perhaps more frequent even than loose attributes. This is especially true of those adverbial modifiers which do not modify any particular part of the sentence but refer to the sentence as a whole. They are often found at the beginning of the sentence and they point out the place, time, or the general conditions in which the action takes place. This is what we see, for example, in the following sentences: *The next day, Scarlett was standing in front of the mirror with a comb in her hand and her mouth full of hairpins...* (M. MITCHELL) *On the third of July, a sudden silence fell on the wires from the north, a silence that lasted till midday of the fourth...* (Idem) *In Aunt Pitty's house, the three women looked into one another's eyes with fear they could not conceal.* (Idem) Of course a loose adverbial modifier can also appear elsewhere in the sentence: *Their men might be dying, even*

now, on the sunparched grass of the Pennsylvania hills. (Idem) From such loose adverbial modifiers, which tend to be rather separated from the rest of the sentence, we can, step by step, arrive at parentheses and insertions.

Loose Appositions

As we pointed out above (p. 235), the term "loose" was first used in English grammatical theory with reference to appositions. It would seem that in this field the difference between loose and ordinary parts of the sentence was especially obvious to the authors of grammar books. And indeed, the difference between the type of apposition found in a sentence like *As for Uncle Peter, he took it for granted that Scarlett had come to stay* (M. MITCHELL) and that in a sentence like *These two ladies with a third, Mrs Whiting, were the pillars of Atlanta* (Idem) is most evident. The ordinary apposition (*Uncle*) makes a whole with its head word, it cannot be separated from it either in oral speech (that is, by a pause), or in a written text (that is, by some kind of punctuation mark), whereas a loose apposition (*Mrs Whiting*) is separated from its head word by these means. Loose appositions can contain various kinds of information about the person or thing denoted by the head word.

Loose Parentheses

Besides those parentheses which consist of one word or of a short phrase and are not separated from the main body of the sentence either in speech or in writing (e. g. *perhaps, probably, no doubt, etc.*), there are also parentheses consisting of a larger number of words and necessarily separated from the main body of the sentence. Their semantic relation to the sentence is basically the same as with parentheses of the first kind. A few examples will be enough to illustrate the point: *They know already, to be sure, and everybody knows of our disgrace.* (M. MITCHELL) *At all events, I've got as far as that.* (FORSTER) Extensive loose parentheses do not appear to be frequent in modern texts.

Chapter XXX

WORD ORDER

SOME GENERAL POINTS

The term "word order" is a singularly unhappy one, as it is based on a confusion of two distinct levels of language structure: the level of phrases and that of the sentence. To approach this problem from a viewpoint doing justice to modern linguistic theory, we should carefully distinguish between two sets of phenomena: the order of words within a phrase and the order of parts of the sentence within a sentence. Here we are again confronted with the problem of the attribute: if the attribute is a secondary part of the sentence, its place falls under the heading "order of the parts of the sentence"; if, on the other hand, the attribute is part, not of a sentence, but of a phrase, its place with reference to its head word must be considered within the theory of the phrase and its parts. Since this question has not been settled yet, we may consider the place of the attribute in this chapter.

All other questions ought to be discussed under the heading "order of sentence parts", but as it is hardly possible to introduce a change and to dismiss a term so firmly established, we will keep the term "word order", bearing in mind that it is quite conventional: what we shall discuss is the order of the parts of the sentence.

SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

The first question in this sphere is that of the relative position of subject and predicate. Although there are obviously only two possible variants of their mutual position ("subject + predicate", "predicate + subject"), this question has given rise to many discussions and different opinions have been expressed in the matter.

In the light of these discussions we can now state that the main problem is this: should one of the two possible orders be taken to be the general norm of a Modern English sentence, so that all cases of the opposite order come to be regarded as deviations from it, or should the normal order be stated for every type of sentence in particular?

If we take the first view, we shall say that the normal order in English is "subject + predicate", and every case of the order "predicate + subject" is to be considered as a deviation, that is, as an inversion. This has been the common view put forward in most grammars until recently.

If we take the second view we will, in the first place, distinguish between declarative and interrogative sentences. The normal order in declarative sentences will of course be "subject + predicate", but the normal order in interrogative sentences will be "pre-

dicate + subject". Speaking of interrogative sentences, therefore, we will not say that there is any inversion in these sentences.

We will take the second view, which has recently been very convincingly advanced in several special papers.¹ This is justified by the following simple considerations. If we take, for instance, the sentence, *Only at sunset did I leave the house* (GISSING, quoted by Poutsma), in which part of the predicate (the auxiliary verb *do*) comes before the subject, we have every reason to say that this order in a declarative sentence is due to the particle *only* coming at its beginning. If it were not for the particle, there would be the order "subject + predicate", which is the normal one in a declarative sentence: *At sunset I left the house*. The use of the particle, which gives special prominence to the adverbial modifier at *sunset*, to which it belongs, has caused the change of the usual declarative order, that is, it has caused an inversion. On the other hand, if we take an interrogative sentence like the following: *When did he leave the house?* we cannot say that the order "predicate + subject" (to be more exact, "part of the predicate + subject") is due to any special word being used in it. Even if we exclude the adverbial modifier *when*, which is essential for the meaning of the sentence, we shall get the sentence *Did he leave the house?* The order cannot be changed without the sentence ceasing to be interrogative and becoming declarative. The order "predicate + subject" is essential for the interrogative character of the sentence.²

Accordingly it is preferable to distinguish between two sets of phenomena: (1) normal order, which may be either the order "subject + predicate", as in most declarative sentences, or "predicate + subject", as in most interrogative and in some declarative sentences, and (2) inverted order, or inversion, which may be the order "predicate + subject" in a special type of declarative sentence, or "subject + predicate" in a special type of sentence characterised in general by the order "predicate + subject" (the latter is a very rare phenomenon indeed).

Up to now we have to some extent simplified the actual facts of the Modern English language. It is time now to point out the special cases which do not come under the general headings so far mentioned.

For one thing, there is a type of declarative sentence in which the order "predicate + subject" is normal. These are sentences stating the existence or the appearance of something in a certain place. The most widely known type of such sentences is the one

¹ See М. В. Лазаревич, *Порядок слов в современном английском языке*, Автореферат канд. дисс., 1961.

² We leave aside interrogative sentences of the type *Who has come? What has happened?*, where the order is "subject + predicate". (See p. 241.)

beginning with the words *There is ...* (we take the two words *there* and *is* as constituting together the predicate of the sentence). Examples of such sentences are too well known to need illustration here. Besides the type *There is ...*, there are also sentences beginning with the words *There came ...*, as *There came a thunderstorm; There appeared ...*, and others of the same kind, and also sentences without *there*, beginning with an adverbial modifier, mostly denoting place, and followed by the predicate and the subject. The verbs most usually found in such sentences are, *sit*, *stand*, that is verbs indicating the position of a body in space. For instance: *On the terrace stood a knot of distinguished visitors.* (HUXLEY) *In one corner sat the band and, obedient to its scraping and blowing, two or three hundred dancers trampled across the dry ground, wearing away the ground with their booted feet.* (Idem) Something of the same kind is found in the following sentence, where the predicate verb is *come*: *From below, in the house, came the thin wasp-like buzzing of an alarm-clock.* (Idem) Cf. also the following sentence: *On the corner, waiting for a bus, had stood a young woman, and just as he was about to pass she had dropped a coin which rolled on the sidewalk before him.* (BUECHNER) This example differs from the preceding ones in two points: in the first place, the predicate verb is in the past perfect, and secondly, between the adverbial modifier of place (*on the corner*) there is a participle phrase (*waiting for a bus*), which is probably best taken as an adverbial modifier of attendant circumstances, and which is in any case a secondary part of the sentence.

In the following sentence the order "predicate + subject" is sufficiently accounted for by the fact that there are two adverbial modifiers of place at the opening of the sentence. However, there is an additional factor here which is working in the same direction, namely the particle *only* singling out the adverbial modifiers and making them represent, partly at least, the rheme of the sentence

Only here and there among the neo-gothic buildings was there a lighted window, the sound of a voice, a shout or, in the distance, the noise of lonely footsteps on a stone path. (BUECHNER) Thus it appears that we have here normal order for this type of sentence, reinforced by the influence of *only*, which would have caused the order "predicate + subject" in any case.

Word order is influenced by an initial *only* even if the rest of the main clause is separated from it by a considerable amount of intervening words, as in the following sentence: *Only when, after a few minutes, he (the monkey) ceased spinning and simply crouched in the pale light, bouncing softly up and down, his fingers digging into the carpet, his tail curled out stiff, did he start to speak to them.* (BUECHNER) The particle *only* here serves to single out the adverbial clause of time beginning with the words *when, after a few*

minutes, and, with the dependent participle constructions, running down to the words *curled out stiff*. In the sentence we also find the characteristic feature of many absolute constructions (compare p. 260): the subject of the absolute construction is a noun denoting a part of the body of the being whose name is the subject of the sentence (in this particular case it is not the actual name of the being but the pronoun *he* replacing it).

A much rarer type of inversion is found in the following sentence: *Many were the inquiries she was eager to make of Miss Tilney: but so active were her thoughts, that when these inquiries were answered, she was hardly more assured than before of Northanger Abbey having been a richly endowed convent at the time of the Reformation...* (J. AUSTEN) The position of the predicative in each of the two first clauses is distinctly emphatic, and the inversion is here a sign of an emotional colouring, which, in a larger context, appears to be ironic.

Among interrogative sentences a well-known special type are sentences having an interrogative pronoun either as subject or as attribute to the subject; we might say, in a generalising way, having an interrogative pronoun within the subject group, as in the following examples: *What is your business with me this morning?* (SHAW) *Who in this house would dare be seen speaking to you ever again?* (Idem) *Oh, who would be likely to see us anyhow at tins time of night?* (DREISER) In the way of word order, then, such sentences correspond to declarative sentences. Inversion, that is, the order "predicate + subject", in such sentences appears to be entirely out of the question.

THE SECONDARY PARTS

The Object

The term "inversion" has sometimes been used to denote an unusual position of a secondary part of the sentence, that is, of an object or an adverbial modifier. That, however, is undesirable, since it might lead to misunderstandings and seriously hamper the study of word order. To illustrate our point, let us compare the following two sentences: *This he knew very well*, and, *A pretty paradise did we build for ourselves*. (THACKERAY, quoted by Poutsma) In both sentences the object stands at the beginning, which is not its usual place. After *this*, in the first sentence, come the subject and the predicate in their normal order for a declarative sentence, whereas in the second sentence the predicate comes before the subject. It is natural to say that in the first sentence there is no inversion, while in the second sentence there is one. Now, if we were to use

the term "inversion" for every case of the object occupying an unusual place, we should have to say that in the first sentence also there is inversion in some sense, which would certainly lead to confusion. We will therefore not apply the term "inversion" to a secondary part of the sentence.

It is well known that the usual place of the object is after the predicate, and if there are two objects in a sentence, their order is fixed: if they are both non-prepositional, the indirect object comes first and the direct object next; if one of the objects is prepositional, it comes after the non-prepositional. The tendency to place the object immediately after the predicate verb should not however be taken as an absolute law. Some other part of the sentence often does come in between the predicate verb and its object.

This intervening phrase will probably in most cases be a loose part of the sentence, as in the following extracts: *At the age of eight Ferdinando was so large and so exuberantly healthy that his parents decided, though reluctantly, to send him to school.* (HUXLEY) *In the visitors' book at Crome Ivor had left, according to his invariable custom in these cases, a poem.* (Idem) In the former example the phrase *though reluctantly* introduces some shade of meaning, weakening the effect of the verb *decided*, and it could not conveniently come at any other place in the sentence. In the latter example the rather extended phrase *according to his invariable custom in these cases* might have come between the subject *Ivor* and the predicate *had left*. The sentence would then run like this: *In the visitors' book at Crome Ivor, according to his invariable custom in these cases, had left a poem.* The effect of the original text, with the loose part separating the object from the predicate, appears to be that of postponing the mention of the poem and thus creating some tension since the words immediately following the predicate fail to make clear what it was that he left in the visitors' book.

An object may also be separated from the predicate by several intervening elements of the sentence. This is the case, for example, in the following passage: *He recognised suddenly in every face that passed him the reflection of what appeared a similar, lonely, speechless concern not with the station and the mechanics of arriving, departing, meeting someone, or saying good-bye, but with something more vital still and far beneath such minor embassies.* (BUECHNER) Owing to the adverbial modifier *suddenly* and the prepositional object with the attributive clause belonging to it, *in every face that passed him*, the direct object *the reflection* (with the other parts of the sentence belonging to it) is at a considerable distance from the predicate *recognised*. However, no misunderstanding is to be feared here, as there is no other noun that might be taken for the direct object in the main clause: the only noun that does come in here is the noun *face*, but it is too obviously connected with the preposi-

tion *in* that introduces it (along with its attribute *every*) to be taken for a direct object. This example, and many others of a similar kind, show that the principle "the object is bound to come immediately after the predicate verb" does not always hold good.

Quite the same sort of thing is seen in our next example, taken from the same novel: *He seemed to see in each figure that hurried by a kind of indifference to all but some secret, unexpressed care having little to do with their involving context.* (BUECHNER) Besides the role of rheme that belongs to the object in the sentence, there is another factor which may have been responsible for the order of words: the group centred around the object *kind* (or *kind of indifference*) is rather long, and placing it immediately after the predicate, before the phrase *in each figure that hurried by*, would result in a rather awkward rhythmical pattern of the sentence.

A non-prepositional object can be separated from the predicate even by two secondary parts, as in the following example: *She arose and turned on a lamp to read the letter again. He told and told well in it a little story.* (BUECHNER) Here both the adverbial modifier *well* and the prepositional object *in it* intervene between the predicate and the non-prepositional object.

An object may also be separated from the predicate by a parenthesis and a clause of time: *She had seen, of course, when she spoke, only Tristram.* (BUECHNER)

Adverbial Modifiers

The position of adverbial modifiers in the sentence is known to be comparatively more free than that of other parts. However, there is some difference here between types of modifiers. Those which are most closely linked with the part of the sentence they modify are the ones that denote the frequency or the property of an action. They come between the subject and the predicate, or even inside the predicate if it consists of two words — an auxiliary and a notional verb, or two elements of a compound predicate.

We cannot, however, say either that adverbial modifiers of these types cannot stand elsewhere in the sentence, or that adverbial modifiers of other types cannot occupy this position. Occasionally an adverbial modifier of frequency will appear at the beginning of the sentence. Occasionally, on the other hand, an adverbial modifier of another type appears between subject and predicate: *Catherine, for a few moments, was motionless with horror.* (J. AUSTEN) *Now Meiklejohn, with a last effort, kicked his opponent's legs from under him...* (LINKLATER)

The more usual position of the adverbial modifiers of time and place is, however, outside the group "subject + predicate + object",

that is, either before or after it. Which of the two variants is actually used depends on a variety of factors, among which the rheme plays an important part. If the main stress is to fall, for instance, on the adverbial modifier of time, i. e. if it contains the main new thing to be conveyed, this adverbial modifier will have to come at the end of the sentence, as in the following extract: "*Only think, we crossed in thirteen days! It takes your breath away.*" "*We'll cross in less than ten days yet!*" (FITCH) If, on the other hand, the main thing to be conveyed is something else, the adverbial modifier of time can come at the beginning of the sentence. It would, however, be wrong to say that the adverbial modifier, when not bearing sentence stress, must come at the beginning. It can come at the end in this case, too, and it is for the intonation to show where the semantic centre of the sentence lies. This may be seen in sentences of the following type: *Fleda, with a bright face, hesitated a moment.* (H. JAMES)

These are problems of functional sentence perspective, which we have briefly discussed above (p. 191 ff.). The position of adverbial modifiers of time and place has also to be studied in the light of this general problem.

An adverbial modifier can also occupy other positions in the sentence; thus, the auxiliary *do* of the negative form can be separated from the infinitive by a rather lengthy prepositional group acting as a loose secondary part of the sentence, which is probably best classed as an adverbial modifier of cause: *He was perhaps the very last in a long line of people whom Steitler at this time did not, for an equally long line of reasons, want to see, but, half perversely, half idly, he turned his steps in the direction of his friend's room.* (BUECHNER) This may be counted among cases of "enclosure", with one part of a sentence coming in between two elements of another part.

An adverbial modifier also comes in between two components of the predicate in the following sentence: *...he was acting not happily, not with an easy mind, but impelled to remove some of the weight that had for months, even through the excitement over Katherine, been pressing him down.* (SNOW) The analytical form of the past perfect continuous tense *had been pressing* is here separated by the intervening adverbial modifiers, *for months* and *even through the excitement over Katherine*, which come in between the two auxiliaries *had* and *been*. This does not in any way impede the understanding of the sentence, as the verb *had* does not in itself give a satisfactory sense and either a verbal (to complete an analytical verb form) or a noun (in the function of a direct object) is bound to follow. So there is some tension in the sentence. Analytical forms admit of being thus "stretched" by insertion of adverbial modifiers. However, they do not admit insertion of any objects, and this may

be another objective criterion for distinguishing between the two kinds of secondary parts of the sentence.¹

The usual statement about adverbial modifiers of time always coming either at the beginning or at the end of a sentence, and outside the subject-predicate group anyway, is much too strict and is not borne out by actual usage. Here are some examples of adverbial modifiers of time coming either between the subject and the predicate, or within the predicate, if it consists of more than one word: (1) *Bessie, during that twenty-four hours, had spent a night with Alice and a day with Muriel.* (CARY) (2) *Sir Peregrine during this time never left the house once, except for morning service on Sundays.* (TROLLOPE) (3) *His grandson had on each day breakfasted alone, and had left the house before his grandfather was out of the room; and on each evening he had returned late, — as he now returned with his mother, — and had dined alone.* (Idem) In the first of these examples the adverbial modifier of time is separated by commas from the rest of the sentence, and so must be accounted a loose secondary part of it. But in the second example a similar adverbial modifier, with the same preposition *during*, is not separated by commas, so the looseness does not appear to have any essential significance here. In our last example the adverbial modifier *on each day* in the first clause comes between the two elements of the predicate verb form, while in the second clause a similar modifier, *on each evening*, stands before the subject. The reason for the position of the adverbial modifier in the first clause (where it might also have stood at the beginning of the clause) probably is, that the subject of the clause, *his grandson*, represents the theme, whereas the adverbial modifier, *on each day*, belongs to the rheme, together with the predicate and all the rest of the clause,

We may also compare the following sentence: *She had not on that morning been very careful with her toilet, as was perhaps natural.* (TROLLOPE) Here the adverbial modifier of time also comes in between two elements making up the analytical form of the link verb. The variant *On that morning she had not been very careful with her toilet...* would certainly also be possible, but there would probably be some greater emphasis on the adverbial modifier, which would have tended to represent the theme of the sentence, as if the sentence were an answer to the question: *What happened on that morning?* Standing as it does within the predicate, the adverbial modifier is more completely in the shade.

¹ Objects can, as is well known, be inserted between elements of an analytical verb form in German, and they could also appear in this position in earlier English, namely in Middle English and even in Shakespeare's time. Compare the line from "Hamlet": *Mother, you have my father much offended*, which would not be possible in present-day English.

The adverbial modifier of time also stands between the subject and the predicate in the following sentence: *But I saw that he was distracted, and he soon fell quiet.* (SNOW) In this example, too, it remains in the shade.

As a contrast to these sentences we can now consider one in which the adverbial modifier of time stands at the beginning and is marked off by a comma, so that it is apparently a loose modifier: *Three days later, I was surprised to be rung up by Charles.* (SNOW) Now in this case it could not come in between the elements of the predicate, probably because it announces a new situation (not on the day described so far, but three days later) and this new element of the situation cannot be brought out properly if the part of the sentence containing it is left in the shade, as it certainly would be between the elements of the predicate.

This is also seen in the sentence, *In a few minutes she returned, her eyes shining, her hair still damp.* (SNOW) The adverbial modifier *in a few minutes* could not possibly come between the subject and the predicate. It might have come after the predicate, and would in that case have been more strongly stressed, as if the sentence were an answer to the question, *When did she return?* That is, the adverbial modifier of time would have represented the rheme, or at least part of it. As it stands in the original text, the adverbial modifier rather makes part of the theme, but it is not so completely in the shade as an adverbial modifier standing between the subject and the predicate (or within the predicate, for that matter) necessarily is.

Attributes

We pointed out above (see p. 238) that the position of the attribute as a part of the sentence is not certain. In this section we assume that it is a part of the sentence, and treat it accordingly.

The position of an attribute before or after its head word largely depends on its morphological type. An attribute consisting of a prepositional phrase can only come after its head word. As to adjectival attributes, their usual position is before their head word, but in some cases they follow it. Let us consider a few examples of this kind. *Darkness impenetrable and immovable filled the room.* (J. AUSTEN) It has been long noticed that adjectives with the *-ble* suffix are apt to come after the noun they modify. This may be partly due to their semantic peculiarity: they are verbal in character, expressing as they do the possibility (or impossibility) for the person or thing denoted by the head word to undergo the action denoted by the stem from which the adjective in *-ble* is derived (in our example these stems are: *penetr-*, cf. the verb *penetrate*, and *mov-*

respectively). This should not be taken to mean that adjectives of this type are bound to follow their head word, but the peculiarity of their meaning and structure makes it possible for them to do so. Postposition also occurs in certain stock phrases, such as *from times immemorial*, *the best goods available*, *cousin german*, etc., which are specially studied in lexicology. Apart from these cases, postposition of an attribute is possible in poetic diction and is a distinctive stylistic feature. Compare, for example, Byron's lines: *Adieu, adieu! my native shore / Fades o'er the waters blue*, or again, *Enough, enough, my yeoman good, / Thy grief let none gainsay*. Nowhere but in poetry would such phrases with postpositive attributes as *the waters blue*, or *my yeoman good* be possible.

An attribute expressed by an adverb (which does occur, though not too often) may come before its head word. Thus, the adverb *then* used as an attribute, as in the sentence *She was of the tallest of women, and at her then age of six-and-twenty... in the prime and fulness of her beauty* (THACKERAY, quoted by Poutsma) can only be prepositive, and besides it always stands between the definite article and the noun (a case of enclosure, see above, p. 177). It may be noted that the adverb *then*, when used in this manner, is an opposite of the adjective *present*, which occupies a similar position in such contexts as *the present state of affairs*.

Direct Address and Parentheses

The position of these parts of the sentence is probably more free than that of all other parts. Thus, a direct address can come in almost anywhere in the sentence, as will be seen from the following few examples: "*Child, I'll try.*" "*Oh, bat, Dotty, we can't go.*" "*Look here, Renny, why don't you come and work for me?*" "*Her smelling salts, Scarlett!*" "*What does that mean, Mr Kennedy?*" (all from M. MITCHELL) "*Instantly, Lieutenant, instantly.*" (SHAW)

Much the same may be said about parentheses. Some types of parenthesis usually come in between two constituent parts of the predicate: this is especially true of parentheses expressed by modal words, such as *perhaps*, *probably*, *certainly*, *doubtless*, and by the phrases *no doubt*, *without doubt*, *in fact*.

However, a parenthesis may also refer to one part of the sentence only, and is then bound to come before that part, e. g. "*Tell me,*" *she added with provoking and yet probably only mock serious eyes and waving the bag towards Roberta, "what shall I do with him?"* (DREISER) Here the parenthesis *probably* belongs to the attribute *only mock serious*, and it would have to go if that attribute were dropped.

Particles

If a particle belongs to a noun connected with a preposition, the particle will, as often as not, come between the preposition and the noun (this would be absolutely impossible in Russian). Here are a few examples of this use: *The younger, Leander, was above all young, it seemed to him, charmingly, crashingly so, with only a slightly greater than usual grace...* (BUECHNER) *She could not help thinking as the young man disappeared into the other room for ice, of the earlier evening at Tristram's apartment, also lit by only one lamp and with something of the same vague sense of anticipation in the dark air.* (Idem) In this latter sentence it would perhaps be possible to put the particle before the preposition, that is, to write, ... *lit only by one lamp*. However the original text appears to be somehow more expressive than the altered one here proposed. As to the former example, the corresponding change, that is, the variant *crashingly so, only with a slightly greater than usual grace*, would imply a considerable change of meaning in the sentence; in the original text, *only* clearly refers to *slightly* (even though it is separated from the adverb *slightly* by the indefinite article), and *only slightly* forms a definite sense unit. In the variant *only with a slightly greater than usual grace* the connections of the particle are quite different: it would here mean that the only remark necessary to make the description exact *is* the one about the slightly greater grace. Thus the particle *only* would here acquire a kind of connecting power, bringing it close to a conjunction. As will have been seen from these two examples, much will depend on the concrete grammatical and lexical context in which the particle and its head word appear.

Sometimes a particle refers to the word or phrase immediately preceding it. This can only happen if the particle stands at the end of the sentence or at least at the end of a section of the sentence marked by a pause in oral speech and by a comma or other punctuation mark in writing. This usage seems to be restricted to more or less official style, e. g. *This book is for advanced students only*.

Sometimes, however, a particle comes before the predicate or between two elements of the predicate, while it refers to some secondary part of the sentence standing further ahead. In these cases, then, the position of the particle is determined, not by its semantic ties, but by the structure of the sentence (it is joined on to the predicate whatever its semantic ties may be). Examples of such usage are numerous enough, e. g. *He only arrived at three o'clock*. The semantic connection obviously is not *only arrived* but *only at three o'clock* (not earlier). Generally speaking, the particle might refer to the word *arrived*, and then the sense would be 'at three o'clock he only arrived, and he did not do anything else at

the time'. Now, though this sense *is* conceivable, it is certainly much less natural or probable than the sense 'he arrived only at three o'clock, not earlier', and so a reader is much more likely to take the written sentence in this latter way. A similar analysis might be given of other examples of this type. Other particles do not seem to be used in this way.

On the whole, the problem of word order proves to be a highly complex one, requiring great care and subtlety in the handling. As far as we can see now, different factors have something to do with determining the place of one part of a sentence or another. It is the scholar's task to unravel this complex by weighing the influences exercised by each factor, and their mutual relations. It is possible, for instance, that two factors work in the same direction — and then the result can only be one. It is also possible that different factors work in different directions, and then one of them will take the upper hand. This manifests itself, among other things, in the fact that grammatical order may limit the possibilities of functional sentence perspective. In this case some other means has to be found to render the intended meaning as clearly as possible.

ONE-MEMBER SENTENCES AND ELLIPTICAL SENTENCES

We have agreed to term one-member sentences those sentences which have no separate subject and predicate but one main part only instead (see p. 190).

Among these there is the type of sentence whose main part is a noun (or a substantivised part of speech), the meaning of the sentence being that the thing denoted by the noun exists in a certain place or at a certain time. Such sentences are frequent, for example, in stage directions of plays. A few examples from modern authors will suffice: *Night. A lady's bed-chamber in Bulgaria, in a small town near the Dragoman Pass, late in November in the year 1885.* (SHAW) *The sixth of March, 1886.* (Idem) *The landing dock of the Cunard Line.* (FITCH) *Living room in the house of Philip Phillimore.* (L. MITCHELL)

Compare also the following passage from a modern novel: *No birds singing in the dawn. A light wind making the palm trees sway their necks with a faint dry formal clicking. The wonderful hushing of rain on Mareotis.* (DURRELL) Such sentences bear a strong resemblance to two-member sentences having a present participle for their predicate, which we have considered on p. 202 ff. It is the context that will show to which of the two types the sentence belongs. In some cases the difference between them may be vague or even completely neutralised.

There are some more types of one-member clauses and sentences. Let us consider a few examples of the less common varieties. *And what if he had seen them embracing in the moonlight?* (HUXLEY) The main clause, if it is to be taken separately, contains only the words *and what...?* It is clear, however, that the sentence *And what?*, if at all possible, would have a meaning entirely different from that of the sentence as it stands in Huxley's text. Be that as it may, the clause *and what* is clearly a one-member clause.

A different kind of one-member clause is seen in the following compound sentence: *A good leap, and perhaps one might clear the narrow terrace and so crash down yet another thirty feet to the sunbaked ground below.* (HUXLEY) The first clause in its conciseness is very effective. These are the thoughts of a young man standing on a hill and looking down a steep ravine. The meaning is of course equivalent to that of a sentence like *It would be enough to make a good leap*, etc. But the first clause as it stands in the text is certainly a one-member clause, as every addition to it would entirely change its structure.

A special semantic type of one-member clauses is characterised by the following structure: "predicative + adjective expressing emotional assessment + noun or clause expressing what is assessed

by the adjective", for instance, *Strange how different she had become — a strange new quiescence.* (LAWRENCE) The main clause might of course have been a two-member one: *It was strange how different she had become...* but this variant would be stylistically very different from the original. It is also evident that this type of sentence is limited to a very small number of adjective predicatives.

Imperative sentences with no subject of the action mentioned are also to be classed among one-member sentences, e. g. *Get away from me!* (M. MITCHELL) *Fear not, fair lady!* (Idem) *"Don't tell him anything," she cried rapidly.* (Idem)

It would not, however, be correct to say that imperative sentences must necessarily have this structure. Occasionally, in emotional speech, they may have a subject, that is, they belong to the two-member type, as in the following instance: *Don't you dare touch me!* (Idem)

INFINITIVE SENTENCES

Besides the types of sentence considered so far, which are more or less universally recognised, there are some types which are often passed over in silence, but which deserve special attention.

We will here dwell on a type of sentence belonging to this category, namely, infinitive sentences.

The infinitive sentence is a one-member sentence with an infinitive as its main part. Infinitive sentences may, as far as we can judge now, be of two kinds. One type is represented by a sentence, always exclamatory, in which the infinitive, with the particle *to*, stands at the beginning of the sentence, and the general meaning of the sentence is strong feeling on the part of the speaker, who either wishes the thing expressed in the sentence to happen, or else is enraptured by the fact that it is happening already. Let us first give a famous example from a poem by Robert Browning: *Oh, to be in England, I Now that April's there, I And whoever wakes in England / Sees, some morning, unaware, / That the lowest boughs and the brushwood sheaf / Round the elm-tree bole are in tiny leaf, / While the chaffinch sings on the orchard bough / In England, now!* The sentence is of course a complex one but the point is that the main clause is of the type we have just described. The exclamatory character is a necessary part of its characteristic.

Infinitive sentences are very common in represented speech (compare below, p. 333), for instance: *To be alive! To have youth and the world before one. To think of the eyes and the smile of some youth of the region who by the merest chance had passed her and looked and who might never look again, but who, nevertheless, in so doing, had stirred her young soul to dreams.* (DREISER) Compare also the two last sentences of the following extract: *These were*

thrilling words, and wound up Catherine's feelings to the highest point of ecstasy. Her grateful and gratified heart could hardly restrain its expressions within the language of tolerable calmness. To receive so flattering an invitation! To have her company so warmly solicited! (J. AUSTEN) These are obviously one-member infinitive sentences, exclamatory ones, expressing the heroine's feelings, which have been briefly characterised in the preceding two sentences by the author.

Another type of infinitive sentence is an interrogative sentence beginning with the adverb *why* followed by an infinitive without the particle *to*, and sometimes preceded by the particle *not*, e. g. *Why not give your friend the same pleasure?* ("Times", quoted by Poutsma) It would not be right to treat such sentences as elliptical, with the auxiliary verb and the pronoun *you* as subject omitted. We can, of course, replace the sentence just quoted by the sentence *Why should you not give your friend the same pleasure?*, but this would annihilate the original sentence and put an entirely different one in its place: the sentence resulting from such a change would be a two-member sentence, with a definite subject, and with the infinitive made into a component of an interrogative (or negative-interrogative) finite verb form. The interrogative adverb *why* appears to be a necessary element in the structure of this type of infinitive sentence.

So it seems evident that types of infinitive sentences have their peculiar characteristics: one of them is always exclamatory, and the other always interrogative. This of course shows that the sphere of infinitive sentences is a very restricted one.¹

ELLIPTICAL SENTENCES

By "elliptical sentences" we mean sentences with one or more of their parts left out, which can be unambiguously inferred from the context. We will apply this term to any sentence of this kind, no matter what part or parts of it have been left out.

The main sphere of elliptical sentences is of course dialogue: it is here that one or more parts of a sentence are left out because they are either to be supplied from the preceding sentence (belonging to another speaker) or may be easily dispensed with. We take a few examples of elliptical sentences from contemporary dramatic

¹ In Russian types of infinitive sentences are much more varied. While two of them correspond to the two types of English infinitive sentences (e.g., *Подумать только! Почему не сказать ему сразу?*), other types of Russian infinitive sentences find nothing to correspond to them in English. Among these various types we may mention sentences of a modal character, implying that something either must or cannot be done, e.g., *БЫТЬ беде! Вам не успеть, Здесь ее пройти*, etc.

works: **Charlie.** *Have you asked her yet?* **Captain Jinks.** *Not often enough.* (FITCH) It is clear here that the answer means: 'I have, but not often enough'. **Aurelia.** *And by the way, before I forget it, I hope you'll come to supper to-night — here. Will you? After the opera.* **Captain Jinks.** *Delighted!* (Idem) It is also clear here that Aurelia's second sentence means: 'Will you come to supper to-night?' and that the captain's answer means: 'I shall be delighted to come'. Whatever is understood from the preceding context is omitted, and only the words containing the rheme are actually pronounced. The same is found, for example, in the following bit of dialogue: **Matthew.** *Why, my dear — you have a very sad expression!* **Cynthia.** *Why not?* **Matthew.** *I feel as if I were of no use in the world when I see sadness on a young face. Only sinners should feel sad. You have committed no sin!* **Cynthia.** *Yes, I have!* (L. MITCHELL) Cynthia's first sentence obviously means: 'Why should I not have a sad expression?' and her second, 'Yes, I have committed a sin!' Similarly, in other cases everything but the words representing the rheme may be omitted.

Elliptical sentences or clauses can of course also occur outside dialogue.¹

¹ The use of elliptical sentences linked to the phenomena of representation and substitution, which will be dealt with on p. 51 ff.

Chapter XXXII

TRANSITION FROM SIMPLE TO COMPOSITE SENTENCES

Though the notions of simple sentence and composite sentence seem to be well defined and distinctly opposed to each other, this does not mean that there are no transitional elements between them. As in so many other cases, in the sphere of sentence types we find a considerable number of phenomena which, though not exactly transgressing the limits of the simple sentence, do not quite fit into it, and show some peculiarities which justify our treating them as transitional between the simple and the composite sentence.

Of these, we will consider the following syntactical phenomena: (1) sentences with homogeneous parts (sometimes also termed "contracted sentences"). (2) sentences with a dependent appendix, and (3) sentences with secondary predication. Different as they are in many respects, these phenomena are alike in that they gradually get out of the limits of the simple sentence and approach the composite sentence (some of them the compound, others the complex sentence).

SENTENCES WITH HOMOGENEOUS PARTS

By homogeneous parts of a sentence we mean parts of the same category (two or more subjects, two or more predicates, two or more objects, etc.), standing in the same relation to other parts of the sentence (for homogeneous secondary parts we should say: standing in the same relation to the same head word). According to the older terminology, such sentences used to be termed "contracted sentences", as if they had been "contracted" out of two or more simple sentences. For example, the sentence *I met my relatives and friends* would be said to have been "contracted" out of two sentences: *I met my relatives*, and *I met my friends*. This treatment does not seem to be justified, as it introduces a sort of historical element, implying the origin of such sentences, which is both doubtful and completely irrelevant for the study of these sentences as they exist in the modern language.¹

This category of sentences covers a wider variety of phenomena. Some types of sentences with homogeneous parts quite clearly fit into the general type of simple sentences. This is the case, for instance, with sentences having two or more homogeneous objects to one predicate, e. g. *Its literary equipment consists of a single fixed shelf stocked with old paper-covered novels, broken-backed, coffee-stained, torn and thumbed; and a couple of little hanging shelves*

¹ However, this treatment has been recently revived on new grounds, for example, by L. Tesnière in his book *Eléments de syntaxe structurale*, p. 325,

with a few gifts on them ... (SHAW) The same can be said about sentences having two or more homogeneous adverbial modifiers to one predicate: *I only came to thank you and return the coat you lent me.* (Idem) And this is also true of sentences having two or more homogeneous attributes to one head word — even if we take an attribute to be a secondary part of a sentence on the same level as objects and adverbial modifiers. If, on the other hand, we take an attribute to be a part of phrase, rather than of a sentence, the presence of homogeneous attributes is still more irrelevant for the general character of the sentence.

However, the number of homogeneous parts in a sentence can be much larger than that. We will not here give examples of the gradual growth of a sentence due to accumulation of homogeneous parts but we will at once proceed to sentences in which only the subject keeps, as it were, the sentence together: it is the case when there are two verbal predicates, and each predicate has its objects, adverbial modifiers, attributes to nouns functioning as objects, etc.: *Louka makes way proudly for her, and then goes into the house.* (SHAW) *Madame Michel put down her netting and surveyed him sharply over her glasses.* (R. MAGAULAY) Compare also: *She caught the thoughtful, withdrawn, disengaged look that rested on the girl and boy: and, glancing back at the girl, saw an expression in the sullen grey eyes that perplexed her.* (Idem)

The reason why we cannot call this sentence compound is that it has only one subject and thus cannot be separated into two clauses. If we repeat the subject before the second predicate we shall get a compound sentence consisting of two clauses and identical in meaning with the original sentence with homogeneous parts. Thus the sentence *Scarlett stood in her apple-green "second-day" dress in the parlor of Twelve Oaks amid the blaze of hundreds of candles, jostled by the same throng as the night before, and saw the plain little face of Melanie Hamilton glow into beauty...* (M. MITCHELL) cannot be described as a compound one because it has only one subject, but it cannot very well be described as a simple sentence either, as its unity depends on that subject alone while the predicates are different and each of them is accompanied by a set of secondary parts. So it will be safe to say that it stands somewhere between simple and compound sentences.

SENTENCES WITH A DEPENDENT APPENDIX

Under this head we will consider some phenomena which clearly overstep the limits of the simple 'sentence and tend towards the complex sentence, but which lack an essential feature of a complex

¹ Compare above, p. 222 ff.

sentence. Some of these phenomena are common to English, Russian, and other languages, while some of them are typical of English alone.

In the first place, there are the phrases consisting of the conjunction *than* and a noun, pronoun, or phrase following an adjective or adverb in the comparative degree, as in these sentences: *...I've known many ladies who were prettier than you...* (M. MITCHELL) *Come cheer up: it takes less courage to climb down than to face capture: remember that.* (SHAW) It would always be possible to expand this appendix into a clause by adding the required form of the verb *be* (or *do*, or, in some cases, *can*, etc.) Thus, for instance, the first of the above sentences can be expanded into *I've known many ladies who were prettier than you are . . .* and the second into *. . . it takes less courage to climb down than it does to face capture.* After this change we get a clause introduced by the conjunction *than* and the sentence is a complex one. But that should not make us think that in the original text the verb *be* or *do* has been "omitted". There is no ground whatever for such a view. The sentences have to be taken for what they are, and classified among those intermediate between a simple and a complex sentence.

Very similar to these are the sentences containing an adjective or adverb, which may be preceded by the adverb *as*, and an additional part consisting of the conjunction *as* and some other word (an adjective, a noun, or an adverb), as in the following examples: *His expression had been as bland and clear as the day without.* (BUECHNER) *The conduct of a widow must be twice as circumspect as that of a matron.* (M. MITCHELL) In each case a finite verb might be added at the end (either *be*, or *do*, or *have*, or *can*, etc.), and then the sentence would become a complex one. But this is irrelevant for the syntactical characteristic of the original sentences, as given above. They contain something which does not fit into the pattern of a simple sentence, yet at the same time they lack something that is necessary to make the sentence complex. So it is most natural to say that they occupy an intermediate position between the two.

Now we shall consider the type of sentence containing a phrase which is introduced by a subordinating conjunction: *Tristram had stood about picking up letters, arranging things, as though preparing with some difficulty just the situation he wanted.* (BUECHNER) The subordinate part *as though preparing* is here clearly distinguished from the secondary parts expressed by participle phrases, *picking up letters* and *arranging things*. *Catherine, though a little disappointed, had too much good nature to make any opposition, and, the others rising up, Isabella had only time to press her friend's hand and say, "Good-bye, my dear love," before they hurried off.* (J. AUSTEN) It seems much better to say that the phrase *though*

a little disappointed is a subordinate part than to suppose that it is a subordinate clause, with the subject *she* and the link verb *was* "omitted". As it is, the phrase had best be described as a loose attribute to the subject of the sentence. Compare: *Such a compliment recalled all Catherine's consciousness, and silenced her directly; and, though pointedly applied to by the General for her choice of the prevailing colour of the paper and hangings, nothing like an opinion on the subject could be drawn from her.* (J. AUSTEN) There are some few cases of a subordinating conjunction being used in a simple sentence, thus introducing no subordinate clause of any kind. It may be used to introduce a second homogeneous part: *With these feelings, she rather dreaded than sought for the first view of that well-known spire which would announce her within twenty miles from home.* (J. AUSTEN)

Sometimes a secondary part of a sentence is added on to it, connected with the main body of the sentence by a co-ordinating conjunction, although there is not in the main body any part that could in any sense be considered to be homogeneous with the part thus added. Here is an example of this kind of sentence: *Denis tried to escape, but in vain.* (HUXLEY) It is probably best not to suppose that anything has been "omitted" in this sentence and may be supplied. The sentence *Denis tried to escape, but it was in vain*, and possible other variants would be grammatically entirely different from the actual text.

The co-ordinating conjunction makes it difficult to term such phrases loose secondary parts of the sentence: it gives them something of a separate status. As in all preceding instances, each of the sentences might be made into a compound sentence by adding a noun or pronoun, and a link verb: *Denis tried to escape, but it was in vain.* The sentence thus obtained is compound, but it must not be taken as a starting point in the syntactical study of the original sentence, as given above, which is intermediate between a simple and a composite sentence.

Sentences containing a part thus introduced by a subordinating or co-ordinating conjunction are best classed as sentences with a dependent appendix.

SECONDARY PREDICATION

Another syntactical phenomenon which is best, considered under this heading of transition to the composite sentence is based on what is very aptly termed "secondary predication". Before starting to discuss the syntactical phenomena involved, we shall therefore have to explain briefly what is meant by secondary predication.

In every sentence there is bound to be predication, without which there would be no sentence. In a usual two-member sentence the

predication is between the subject and the predicate. In most sentences this is the only predication they contain. However, there are also sentences which contain one more predication, which is not between the subject and the predicate of the sentence. This predication may conveniently be termed secondary predication.¹

In Modern English there are several ways of expressing secondary predication. One of them is what is frequently termed the complex object, as seen in the sentences, *I saw him run*, *We heard them sing*, *The public watched the team play*, *I want you to come tomorrow*, *We expect you to visit us*, etc. Let us take the first of these sentences for closer examination. The primary predication in this sentence is between the subject *I* and the predicate *saw*. *I* is the doer of the action expressed by the predicate verb. But in this sentence there is one more predication, that between *him* and *run*: the verb *run* expresses the action performed by *him*. This predication is obviously a secondary one: *him* is not the subject of a sentence or a clause, and *run* is not its predicate. The same can be said about all the sentences given above.

On the syntactic function of the group *him run* (or of its elements) views vary. The main difference is between those who think that *him run* is a syntactic unit, and those who think that *him* is one part of the sentence, and *run* another. If the phrase is taken as a syntactic unit, it is very natural to call it a complex object: it stands in an object relation to the predicate verb *saw* and consists of two elements.

If, on the other hand, the phrase *him run* is not considered to be a syntactic unit, its first element is the object, and its second element is conveniently termed the objective predicative.

The choice between the two interpretations remains arbitrary and neither of them can be proved to be the only right one. In favour of the view that the phrase is a syntactical unit, a semantic reason can be put forward. In some cases the two elements of the phrase cannot be separated without changing the meaning of the sentence. This is true, for instance, of sentences with the verb *hate*. Let us take as an example the sentence, *I hate you to go*, which means much the same as *I hate the idea of your going*, or *The idea of your going is most unpleasant to me*. Now, if we separate the two elements of the phrase, that is, if we stop after its first element: *I hate you . . .*, the sense is completely changed. This shortened version expresses hatred for "you" which the original full version certainly did not imply.

¹ The Russian equivalent of the term "secondary predication" was introduced by Prof. G. Vorontsova in her excellent paper. See Г. Н. Воронцова, *Вторичная предикативность в английском языке*. Иностраннные языки в школе, 1950, № 6.

H. Sweet, discussing these phenomena, referred to the sentence / *like boys to be quiet*, which, as he pointed out, does not imply even the slightest liking for boys.¹

In other cases, that is, with other verbs, the separation of the two elements may not bring about a change in the meaning of the sentence. Thus, if we look at our example / *saw him run*, and if we stop after *him*: *I saw him*, this does not contradict the meaning of the original sentence: *I saw him run* implies that / *saw him*.

Another case in which the two elements of the phrase cannot be separated is found when the verb expresses some idea like order or request and the second element of the phrase is a passive infinitive. With the sentence *He ordered the man to be summoned* we cannot possibly stop after *man*.

There is no doubt, therefore, that with some verbs (and some nouns, for that matter) the two elements of the phrase following the predicate verb cannot be separated. It is, however, not certain that this is a proof of the syntactic unity of the phrase. This is again one of the phenomena which concern the mutual relation of the semantic and syntactic aspects of the language. The choice between the two possibilities: complex object or object and objective predicative remains largely a matter of arbitrary decision. If we make up our mind in favour of the second alternative, and state in each case two separate parts of the sentence, this will add to our list of secondary parts one more item: the objective predicative. The objective predicative need not be an infinitive: it may be a participle (*I saw him running*, *We heard them singing*), an adjective (*I found him ill*, *They thought him dead*), a stative (*I found him asleep*), sometimes an adverb, and a prepositional phrase. The sentence *I found him there* admits of two different interpretations. One of them, which seems to be the more usual, takes the sentence as an equivalent of the sentence *There I found him*: the adverb *there* is then an adverbial modifier belonging to the verb *find*. The other interpretation would make the sentence equivalent to the sentence *I found that he was there*. In this latter case the adverb *there* does not show where the action of finding took place, and it is not an adverbial modifier belonging to the predicate verb *found*. It is part of the secondary predication group *him there* and has then to be taken as an objective predicative: *I found him there* is syntactically the same as *I found him ill*, or *I found him asleep*.

The choice between the two alternatives evidently depends on factors lying outside grammar. From a strictly grammatical viewpoint it can be said that the difference between an adverbial modifier and an objective predicative is here neutralised.

¹ H. Sweet, *A New English Grammar*, Part I, § 124.

This type of secondary predication brings the sentence closer to a composite one.

O. Jespersen has proposed the term "nexus" for every predicative grouping of words, no matter by what grammatical means it is realised. He distinguishes between a "junction", which is not a predicative group of words (e. g. *reading man*) and "nexus", which is one (e. g. *the man reads*).¹ If this term is adopted, we may say that in the sentence *I saw him run* there are two nexuses: the primary one *I saw*, and the secondary *him run*. In a similar way, in the sentence *I found him ill*, the primary nexus would be *I found*, and the secondary *him ill*.

THE ABSOLUTE CONSTRUCTION

Another type of secondary predication may be seen in the so-called absolute construction. This appears, for instance, in the following example: *Only when his eyes at last met her own. . . was he reassured that for her what had happened had simply happened. She was prepared, the situation already falling gracefully into place about her, to consider it, incredibly enough he thought, as no more than that.* (BUECHNER) Here the phrase *the situation already falling gracefully into place about her* constitutes an absolute construction.² The absolute construction is of course a case of secondary predication, or, in Jespersen's terminology, a nexus. The participle *falling*, which denotes an action performed by the thing denoted by the noun *situation*, is not a predicate, and *situation* is not the subject either of a sentence or of a clause. This is evidence that the predication contained in the phrase is a secondary one.

Participles seem to be the most widely used types of predicative element in the absolute construction. We find them, for example, in the following sentences. *The preliminary greetings spoken, Denis found an empty chair between Gombauld and Jenny and sat down.* (HUXLEY) *Off the table leapt the monkey, the tails of his jacket flying out behind him and his silk hat knocked askew as he landed*

¹ See O. Jespersen, *The Philosophy of Grammar*, p. 97, 114 ff.; O. Jespersen, *A Modern English Grammar*, Part III, p. 203 ff. However, Jespersen used the term "nexus" in so wide a sense that, with him, it even penetrated into the sphere of lexicology: thus, he would call the noun *arrival* a nexus substantive on the ground that, for example, the phrase *the doctor's arrival* was in some general way analogous to the sentence *the doctor arrived*. Of course we will not accept this wide interpretation of the term and we will use it only in a syntactical sense, as a name for a predicative relation between two words or phrases.

² The term "absolute" is here used in the original sense of the Latin *absolutus*, that is, 'absolved', 'free', 'independent', and it has nothing to do with the meaning of the word which is the opposite of 'relative'. The term is clearly a conventional one.

and leapt again to a streak of light that sprawled in widening, criss-crossed perspective on the floor in the center of the room so that Emma and Bone had to turn about in their chairs to see him spin around and around there making no sound. (BUECHNER) The subject part of an absolute construction is sometimes represented by a noun or phrase denoting some part of the body or dress (here it is the dress) of the being denoted by the subject of the sentence. In this particular case it is *the tails of his jacket* and *his silk hat*, *his* referring to the monkey. This example has its peculiarity, however: the two absolute constructions have a subordinate clause attached to them, which in its turn has a subordinate clause of the second-degree (a clause of result) depending on it.

The absolute construction expresses what is usually called accompanying circumstances — something that happens alongside of the main action. This secondary action may be the cause of the main action, or its condition, etc., but these relations are not indicated by any grammatical means. The position of the absolute construction before or after the main body of the sentence gives only a partial clue to its concrete meaning. Thus, for example, if the construction denotes some secondary action which accompanies the main one without being either its cause or its condition, it always follows the main body of the sentence; if the construction indicates the cause, or condition, or time of the main action, it can come both before and after the main body of the sentence.

Thus the grammatical factor plays only a subordinate part in determining the sense relations between the absolute construction and the main body of the sentence.

The stylistic colouring of the absolute construction should also be noted. It is quite different in this respect from the constructions with the objective predicative, which may occur in any sort of style. The absolute construction is, as we have seen, basically a feature of literary style and unfit for colloquial speech. Only a few more or less settled formulas such as *weather permitting* may be found in ordinary conversation. Otherwise colloquial speech practically always has subordinate clauses where literary style may have absolute constructions.

A participle is by no means a necessary component of an absolute construction. The construction can also consist of a noun and some other word or phrase, whose predicative relation to the noun is made clear by the context. Here are a few examples: *Bone stood in a patch of sunlight on the gray carpet, his hands behind him, his face in shadow.* (BUECHNER) This example is characteristic in so far as the subject of the sentence is a noun denoting a human being, the predicate group tells of his position in space, and the subjects of the two absolute constructions are nouns denoting parts of his body (*his hands* and *his face*), while the predicative parts of the constructions describe

the position of these parts (*behind him* and *in the shadow*). *Breakfast over, Denis repaired to the terrace, and, sitting there, raised the enormous bulwark of the Times against the possible assaults of Mr Scogan.* (HUXLEY) *And here now he was beside Elizabeth, the memory of this encounter rich within him to bolster and pad, but sad in that it was presently and precisely incommunicable.* (BUECHNER) This absolute construction is somewhat more developed than usual, there are two predicatives in it (*rich . . . but sad*), and a subordinate clause attached to the latter predicative (*sad*). It might be possible to argue that in each of these sentences the participle *being* is "omitted", so that we have here an elliptical participial absolute construction after all. But if we firmly adhere to the principle that nothing ought to be considered omitted unless there is overwhelming evidence that this is really so, we shall recognise the absolute construction without participle as a construction in its own right, existing alongside of the participle construction.

In the following sentence there are two absolute constructions, one at the beginning, and the other at the end of the sentence: *Her golden arm stretched out, she pointed with a golden finger, and as usual Bone's eyes followed her direction and stopped at the bronze lady standing unclothed in the fountain before them, in her arms a shallow bowl from which water trickled.* (BUECHNER)

An absolute construction may be found in narrative style where it does not produce the impression of high-flown language, but is decidedly uncolloquial in character. Here are some examples from modern novels: *She had hoped that the war being over, life would gradually resume its old face.* (M. MITCHELL) Though this is a kind of indirect speech rendering the heroine's thoughts, it is fairly certain that her thoughts did not run like this: *The war being over, life will gradually resume its old face.* This is far too literary to have been in the mind of a person thinking silently, or even talking in an informal atmosphere. In the author's rendering of her thoughts, however, the absolute construction is perfectly all right. *In a few minutes she returned, her eyes shining, her hair still damp.* (SNOW) This again is normal narrative style. The semantic connections between the absolute constructions and the main body of the sentence are different in the two sentences, and they become clear from the lexical meanings of the words, and partly also from the position which the absolute construction occupies in the sentence. Thus, in our first example the absolute construction *the war being over* clearly has a temporal connection with the main body of the sentence, and in our second example it is evident, both from the lexical meanings of the words involved and from the position of the two absolute constructions after the main body of the sentence, that the relation is that usually called "accompanying circumstances".

In the following sentence both a parenthesis and an absolute construction come between the subject group and the predicate. *The entire question of whom one loved, he continued, Emma looking up from her work for the first time as she listened, seemed to him of relative unimportance.* (BUECHNER) It should also be noted that there is a subordinate clause (*of whom one loved*) belonging to the subject group, and another subordinate clause, *as she listened*, belonging to the absolute construction, so that the number of elements separating the predicate of the main clause (*seemed to be. . .*) from its subject (*the . . . question*) is quite considerable. However, no misunderstanding can arise here, though there are three finite verb forms (*loved, continued, and listened*) intervening between the subject *question* and its predicate *seemed . . .* This is due to the fact that each of these three finite verb forms is closely connected with its own subject (in every case a pronoun immediately preceding it), namely, *one loved, he continued, she listened*. Besides, it should be noted that neither *loved* nor *listened* would have made any sense in connection with the subject *question*, and as to the verb *continued*, it might be connected with the subject *question* only if the verb were followed by an infinitive of appropriate meaning, e. g. *the question continued to worry him*. As it is, *continued* here means 'continued to speak', which can only be connected with a subject representing a human being.

One more remark about the absolute construction is necessary here. It concerns the semantic ties between the absolute construction and the rest of the sentence. For example, we can say that in the sentence *She had hoped that the war being over, life would gradually resume its old face* the relations between the construction and the rest of the sentence are causal: we can say that the absolute construction is here a loose adverbial modifier of cause. On the other hand, in the sentence *Weather permitting, we shall start on an excursion* the relations between the construction and the rest of the sentence are those of condition, and the absolute construction may be said to be a loose adverbial modifier of condition. But now the question is, how do we know that it is cause in one example, and condition in the other? This is not expressed by any grammatical means and it only follows from the lexical meanings of the words and the general meaning of the sentence. What is expressed by grammatical means is merely the subordinate position of the absolute construction. All the rest lies outside the sphere of grammar.

Such, then, are the syntactical phenomena which occupy a place somewhere between the simple and the composite sentence and which may therefore be considered as a kind of stepping stone from the one to the other.

Now we proceed to study the various kinds of composite sentences.

Chapter XXXIII

THE COMPOSITE SENTENCE. COMPOUND SENTENCES

At the beginning of the syntactical part of this book we commented briefly on the problem of classifying composite sentences. We will adopt as a first principle of classification the way in which the parts of a composite sentence (its clauses) are joined together. This may be achieved either by means of special words designed for this function, or without the help of such words. In the first case, the method of joining the clauses is syndetic, and the composite sentence itself may be called syndetic. In the second case the method of joining the clauses is asyndetic, and so is the composite sentence itself.

SYNDETIK COMPOSITE SENTENCES

We should distinguish between two variants of syndetic joining of sentences, the difference depending on the character and syntactic function of the word used to join them.

This joining word (let us call it this for the time being) may either be a conjunction, a pronoun or an adverb. If it is a conjunction, it has no other function in the sentence but that of joining the clauses together.

If it is a pronoun or an adverb (i. e. a relative pronoun or a relative adverb), its function in the sentence is twofold: on the one hand, it is a part of one of the two clauses which are joined (a subject, object, adverbial modifier, etc.), and on the other hand, it serves to join the two sentences together, that is, it has a connecting function as well.

It is to syndetic composite sentences that the usual classification into compound and complex sentences should be applied in the first place.

These are the lines indicated for the Russian language by Prof. N. Pospelov in 1950.¹ The question of classifying asyndetic composite sentences will have to be considered separately (see below, Chapter XL).

We start, then, from a distinction of compound sentences and complex sentences. The basic difference between the two types would appear to be clear enough: in compound sentences, the clauses of which they consist have as it were equal rights, that is, none of them is below the other in rank, they are co-ordinated.

¹ See Н. С. Пospelов, *О грамматической природе и принципах классификации бессоюзных сложных предложений*. Вопросы синтаксиса современного русского языка, 1950, стр. 338—354.

In complex sentences, on the other hand, the clauses are not on an equal footing. In the simplest case, that of a complex sentence consisting of two clauses only, one of these is the main clause, and the other a subordinate clause, that is, it stands beneath the main clause in rank. Of course, there may be more than one main clause and more than one subordinate clause in a complex sentence.

So far the classification of syndetic composite sentences looks simple enough. But as we come to the problem of the external signs showing whether a clause is co-ordinated with another or subordinated to it, we often run into difficulties. As often as not a clear and unmistakable sign pointing this way or that is wanting. In such cases we have to choose between two possible ways of dealing with the problem. Either we shall have to answer the question in an arbitrary way, relying, that is, on signs that are not binding and may be denied; or else we shall have to establish a third, or intermediate, group, which cannot be termed either clear co-ordination or clear subordination, but is something between the two, or something indefinite from this point of view. It is also evident that the problem is connected with that of co-ordinating and subordinating conjunctions.

THE PROBLEM OF COMMUNICATION TYPES

When discussing simple sentences we had to deal with communication types: declarative, interrogative, imperative, and exclamatory sentences.

With compound sentences this problem requires special treatment. If both (or all) clauses making up a compound sentence belong to the same communication type it is clear that the compound sentence belongs to this type, too. But there are also compound sentences consisting of clauses belonging to different communication types. In that case it is impossible to state to what type the compound sentence as a whole belongs. Let us consider a few instances of this kind.

There are sentences in which one clause is declarative and the other exclamatory, as in the following example: *After all, she concluded, a monkey is a ridiculous animal, and how clever of Tristram to recognise the need for just such a ridiculousness among all his dinner parties.* .. (BUECHNER) Such examples, however, appear to be rare. The following sentence had best be considered a compound sentence, with the first clause declarative, and the second elliptical and interrogative: *These came nearer than most to meaning something to her, but what?* (BUECHNER) The second clause, if completed, would apparently run something like this: *.. but what did they mean? or, what could they mean?*

This absence of a unified communication type in some compound sentences has given rise to doubts whether what we call a compound sentence can be called a sentence at all. The solution of the problem will of course depend on what we consider to be the necessary features of a sentence. If we accept unity of communication type as one of them, formations lacking this feature will have to be excluded. This view would then make it necessary to develop a theory of units other than a sentence stretching between a full stop and another full stop, or a question mark, or an exclamation mark. We will not pursue this analysis any further but we will take the view that unity of communication type is not an indispensable feature, and go on recognising compound sentences as a special sentence type.

Compound sentences consist of clauses joined together by coordinating conjunctions. These are very few: *and, but, or, for, yet, so* (compare the chapter on conjunctions, p. 158). Concerning some of them there may be doubts whether they are conjunctions (thus, *yet* may also be supposed to be an adverb), and concerning the word *for* it may be doubtful whether it is co-ordinating or subordinating. The meanings of the conjunctions themselves are of course a question of lexicology. What concerns us here is the type of connection between the clauses in a compound sentence.

There has been some discussion about the degree of independence of the clauses making up a compound sentence. The older view was that they were completely independent of each other. It was supposed that these clauses were nothing but independent sentences with a co-ordinating conjunction between them indicating their semantic relations. Lately, however, the opinion has been expressed that the independence of the clauses, and especially of the second clause (and those which follow it, if any) is not complete, and that the structure of the second and following clauses is to some extent predetermined by the first. This view was put forward in the Academy's Grammar of the Russian language. It is pointed out here that the word order of the second clause may be influenced by the connection it has with the first, and that the verb forms of the predicates in co-ordinated clauses are frequently mutually dependent.¹ Part of this is more significant for the Russian language with its freer word order than for the English, but a certain degree of interdependence between the clauses is found in English, too.

We will now consider some questions of the grammatical structure of compound sentences in English.

The semantic relations between the clauses making up the compound sentence depend partly on the lexical meaning of the conjunc-

¹ See *Грамматика русского языка*, т. II, ч. 2, стр. 177—178.

tion uniting them, and partly on the meanings of the words making up the clauses themselves. It should be noted that the co-ordinating conjunctions differ from each other in definiteness of meaning: the conjunction *but* has an adversative meaning which is so clear and definite that there can hardly be anything in the sentence to materially alter the meaning conveyed by this conjunction. The meaning of the conjunction *and*, on the other hand, which is one of "addition", is wide enough to admit of shades being added to it by the meanings of other words in the sentence. This will be quite clear if we compare the following two compound sentences with clauses joined by this conjunction: *The old lady had recognised Ellen's handwriting and her fat little mouth was pursed in a frightened way, like a baby who fears a scolding and hopes to ward it off by tears.* (M. MITCHELL) *The bazaar had taken place Monday night and today was only Thursday.* (Idem) The first sentence has a shade of meaning of cause — result, and this is obviously due to the meanings of the words *recognised* and *frightened*. In the second sentence there is something like an adversative shade of meaning, and this is due to the relation in meaning between the word *Monday* in the first clause and that of the words *only Thursday* in the second. In a similar way other shades of meaning may arise from other semantic relations between words in two co-ordinate clauses.

Compound sentences with clauses joined by the conjunction *or* (or by the double conjunction *either — or*) seem to be very rare. Here are a few examples: *The light fell either upon the smooth grey black of a pebble, or the shell of a snail with its brown, circular veins, or, falling into a raindrop, it expanded with such intensity of red, blue, and yellow the thin walls of water that one expected them to burst, and disappear.* (V. WOOLF) *I think I see them now with sparkling looks; or have they vanished while I have been writing this description of them?* (HAZLITT) *Are you afraid of their biting, or is it a metaphysical antipathy?* (LAWRENCE)

As to the use of tenses in clauses making up a compound sentence, we should note that there is no general rule of their interdependence. However, in a number of cases we do find interdependence of co-ordinate clauses from this point of view. For instance, in the following compound sentence the tense of the first predicate verb is past perfect and that of the second past indefinite: *She had come to meet the Marquise de Trayas, but she was half an hour too early.* (R. WEST)

The number of clauses in a compound sentence may of course be greater than two, and in that case the conjunctions uniting the clauses may be different; thus, the second clause may be joined to the first by one conjunction, while the third is joined to the second by another, and so forth. We will only give one example: *Gerald was disappointed, for he had wanted a son, but he nevertheless was*

pleased enough over his small black-haired daughter... (M. MITCHELL)

A typical example of a compound sentence with the conjunction *so* is the following: *The band has struck, so we did our best without it.* (FITCH)

Besides the conjunctions so far considered, there are a few more, which are generally classed as subordinating, but which in certain conditions tend to become co-ordinating, so that the sentences in which they occur may be considered to be compound rather than complex, or perhaps we might put it differently: the distinction between co-ordination and subordination, and consequently that between compound and complex sentences, is in such cases neutralised. This concerns mainly the conjunction *while* and the adverbial clauses of time introduced by it, and the conjunction *though* and the adverbial clauses of concession introduced by it. We will discuss these cases when we come to the respective types of adverbial subordinate clauses (see p. 392 ff., 397 ff.).

COMPLEX SENTENCES

There is much more to be said about the complex sentence than about the compound. This is due to several causes, which are, however, connected with one another.

For one thing, the semantic relations which can be expressed by subordination are much more numerous and more varied than with co-ordination: all such relations as time, place, concession, purpose, etc. are expressly stated in complex sentences only.

Then again, the means of expressing subordination are much more numerous. There is here a great variety of conjunctions: *when, after, before, while, till, until, though, although, albeit, that, as, because, since*; a number of phrases performing the same function: *as soon as, as long as, so long as, notwithstanding that, in order that, according as*, etc. Besides, a certain number of conjunctive words are used: the relative pronouns *who, which, that, whoever, whatever, whichever*, and the relative adverbs *where, how, whenever, wherever, however, why*, etc.

We may note that the boundary line between conjunctions and relative adverbs is not quite clearly drawn. We shall also see this when we come to the adverbial clauses introduced by the word *when* and those introduced by the word *where* (see below, p. 286 ff.). Historically speaking, conjunctions develop from adverbs, and one word or another may prove to be in an intermediate stage, when there are no sufficient objective criteria to define its status.

TYPES OF COMPLEX SENTENCES

The notions of declarative, interrogative, and imperative sentence, and also that of exclamatory sentence appear to be applicable to some types of complex sentences as well. For instance, if the main clause of a complex sentence is interrogative or imperative, this implies that the complex sentence as a whole is also interrogative or imperative respectively. A few examples will suffice to illustrate our point. *Why couldn't she sense now that he was outside and come out?* (DREISER) The main clause *Why couldn't she sense now . . . and come out?* is clearly interrogative, and this is enough to make the whole complex sentence interrogative, though the subordinate clause *that he was outside* (an object clause) is certainly not interrogative, and should, if anything, be termed declarative. This, it may be noted in passing, is an additional proof that the clause *that he was outside* is a subordinate clause: its type of communication is irrelevant for the type of communication to which the sentence as a whole belongs, while the type of the clause *Why couldn't she sense . . . and come out?* is decisive for it.

The same will be found to be the case in the following example: *But who is to guarantee that I get the other sixty-five, and when?* (DREISER) This is a slightly more complicated case. The main clause of course is *who is to guarantee*, and it is interrogative. The subordinate clause is *that I get the other sixty-five*, and it is followed by the words *and when*, which will probably be best described as an elliptical second subordinate clause, whose full text would run, *and when I shall get it* (which is an indirect question). It might also be described as a detached adverbial modifier added on to the subordinate clause *that I shall get the other sixty-five*. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the interrogative main clause *But who is to guarantee.. .?* is enough to make the entire sentence interrogative, no matter to what type the subordinate clause or clauses belong.

Now let us take a complex sentence with an imperative main clause: *Never you mind how old she is.* (SHAW) The main clause *never you mind* is imperative and that is enough to make the whole sentence imperative as well.

The same may be said about a number of other sentences

TYPES OF SUBORDINATE CLAUSES

Above we defined a complex sentence as a sentence containing at least one subordinate clause. Any classification of complex sentences is therefore bound to be based on a classification of subordinate clauses. This will accordingly be our next task.

The problem of classifying subordinate clauses is one of the vexed questions of syntactic theory. Several systems have been tried out at various times, and practically each of them has been shown to suffer from some drawback or other. Some of the classifications so far proposed have been inconsistent, that is to say, they were not based on any one firm principle of division equally applied to all clauses under consideration.

We will first of all point out what principles of classification are possible and then see how they work when applied to Modern English. It is quite conceivable that a sort of combined principle will have to be evolved, that is, one principle might be taken as the ruling one, and the main types established in accordance with it, and another principle, or perhaps other principles, taken as secondary ones and applied for a further subdivision of clauses obtained according to the first principle.

It might also prove expedient to have two different classifications independent of each other and based on different principles.

As we proceed to point out the various principles which may be taken as a base for classification, we shall see that even that is a matter of some difficulty, and liable to lead to discussion and controversy.

The first opposition in the sphere of principles would seem to be that between meaning, or contents, and syntactical function. But this opposition is not in itself sufficient to determine the possible variants of classification. For instance, under the head of "meaning" we may bring either such notions as "declarative" (or "statement") and "interrogative" (or "question"), and, on the other hand, a notion like "explanatory". Under the head of "function" we may bring either the position of a clause within a complex sentence, defined on the same principles as the position of a sentence part within a simple sentence, or (as is sometimes done) on the analogy between a clause and a part of speech performing the same function within a simple sentence. Besides, for certain types of clauses there may be ways of characterising them in accordance with their peculiarities, which find no parallel in other clauses. For instance, clauses introduced by a relative pronoun or relative adverb may be termed "relative clauses", which, however, is not a point of classification (see below, p. 273 ff.).

In order to obtain a clearer idea of how these various principles would work out in practice, let us take a complex sentence and define its subordinate clauses in accordance with each of these principles. Let the sentence be this: *It was unreal, grotesquely unreal, that morning skies which dawned so tenderly blue could be profaned with cannon smoke that hung over the town like low thunder clouds, that warm noontides filled with the piercing sweetness of massed honeysuckle and climbing roses could be so fearful, as shells screamed into the streets, bursting like the crack of doom, throwing iron splinters hundreds of yards, blowing people and animals to bits.* (M. MITCHELL) Let us first look at the two subordinate clauses introduced by the conjunction *that*: (1) *that morning skies. . . could be profaned with cannon smoke*, (2) *that warm noontides. . . , could be so fearful*. From the point of view of meaning they may be called declarative clauses, or subordinate statements,¹ as they contain statements which are expressed in subordinate clauses. From the point of view of function they may be termed, if we consider them as something parallel to parts of a simple sentence, either appositions to the impersonal *it* which opens the sentence, or subject clauses, if we take the view that the *it* is merely an introductory subject, or a "sham" subject, as it is sometimes called. If, last not least, we wish to compare the clauses to the part of speech which might perform the corresponding function in a simple sentence, we may call them noun clauses, or substantive clauses, which is a very usual way of treating them in English school grammars.

¹ The latter term is used by H. Poutsma (see *A Grammar of Late Modern English*, Part I, 2nd half, p. 607 ff.).

Now let us turn to the clause coming after the noun *skies* of the first subordinate clause: *which dawned so tenderly blue*. From the viewpoint of meaning this clause can also be said to be declarative, or a subordinate statement. It may also be termed a relative clause, because it is introduced by a relative pronoun and has a relative connection with the noun *skies* (or the phrase *morning skies*). From the functional point of view it may be called an attributive clause, and if we compare it to the part of speech which might perform the corresponding function in a simple sentence, we may call it an adjective clause, which is also common in English school grammars. The same considerations also apply to the clause *that hung over the town like low thunder clouds*; it is evident from the context that the word *that* which opens the clause is a relative pronoun (without it the clause would have no subject). Now we take the last subordinate clause: *as shells screamed into the streets, bursting like the crack of doom, throwing iron splinters hundreds of yards, blowing people and animals to bits*. This again would be a declarative clause or a subordinate statement, and from the viewpoint of function it may be termed an adverbial clause, as it corresponds to an adverbial modifier in a simple sentence. More exactly, it might be termed an adverbial clause of time. Now, for the last item, if we compare it to the part of speech performing the corresponding function in a simple sentence, we might term it an adverb clause, which, however, is too close to the term "adverbial clause" to be of much use in distinguishing the two notions.

To sum up these various possibilities, we have, for the first two clauses, the following terms: declarative clause, or subordinate statement; apposition clause, or subject clause; noun clause. For the second two clauses: declarative clause, or subordinate statement; attributive clause; adjective clause. For the clause coming last: declarative, or subordinate statement; adverbial clause of time; adverb clause.

The next question is, what are we to make of all this variety of possible treatments, and what classification, or what classifications of subordinate clauses should be accepted as the most rational?

It is perhaps best to start with the last of the enumerated views, viz. that which draws a parallel between subordinate clauses and parts of speech. There is little to be said in favour of this view. The strongest argument here is probably the fact that in Modern English a clause may sometimes be treated like a noun, namely when it is introduced by a preposition, as, for instance, in the following sentence: *But after the initial dismay he had no doubt as to what he must do.* (LINKLATER)

This seems practically the only feature which shows some likeness between clauses of the given kind and nouns as such. As for the rest, the analogy is merely one of function: clauses and parts

of speech resemble each other only in so far as both of them can perform certain functions in the sentence, viz. that of subject, object, or attribute. This kind of similarity can hardly be said to be a sufficient ground for classifying clauses according to parts of speech. The term "noun clause", for example, can only mean "a clause which performs in a complex sentence one of the functions which a noun can perform in a simple sentence". In a similar way, the term "adjective clause" would mean "a clause which performs in a complex sentence one of the functions that an adjective can perform in a simple sentence". This treatment of clauses does not appear to have any serious foundation, and the only consideration in favour of it, that of clauses sometimes being introduced by prepositions (as if they were nouns), is not strong enough to prove the *case*. We will therefore not adopt the classification of subordinate clauses based on comparing them with parts of speech.

Now let us consider the principle according to which declarative and interrogative clauses (or subordinate statements and subordinate questions) are given as types. This principle has certainly something to say for itself. The difference between the subordinate clauses in the following two sentences viewed from this angle is clear enough: *However, she felt that something was wrong.* (M. MITCHELL) *Thereafter, when they talked it over, they always wondered why they had failed to notice Scarlett's charms before.* (Idem) It may accordingly be adopted as a criterion for the classification of subordinate clauses. It has a weak point, however, and this is that not every clause will fit into either of these categories. For instance, the subordinate clause in the following sentence cannot naturally be termed either a declarative or an interrogative clause: *If he had been destitute and she had had money she would have given him all he wanted.* (R. WEST) The clause *if ... money* expresses condition, it neither asserts anything nor does it ask any question. There are, of course, a number of clauses of a similar kind. It would appear, therefore, that the distinction between declarative and interrogative clauses (subordinate statements and subordinate questions) applies to certain types of clauses only and cannot be made a general principle of classification.

The term "relative clause" may very well be applied to any clause introduced by a relative pronoun or relative adverb.

O. Jespersen devotes several chapters of his book "A Modern English Grammar" to relative clauses. In accordance with his general view that elements of language may be divided into primaries, adjuncts, and subjuncts, he treats the syntactical functions of subordinate clauses as falling under these heads: "relative clauses as primaries" and "relative clause adjuncts".¹

¹ See O. Jespersen, *A Modern English Grammar*, Part III, p. 52 ff., 77 if.

From the viewpoint of function the subordinate clauses of these types are of course quite different, yet they may be all termed "relative clauses". This makes it evident that the notion "relative clause" is not a notion of syntactic function, since it cuts right across syntactical divisions.

It is also evident that the term "relative clause" cannot be an element of any system: the clauses which are not relative do not make any kind of syntactical type which might be put on the same level as relative clauses: what unites them all is merely the fact that they are non-relative.

Thus the notion of "relative clauses", which is doubtless useful in its limited sphere, as a description of a certain type of subordinate clauses characterised by a peculiarity they all share, is useless as an element of a general classification of clauses. In that respect it is no better than "declarative" or "interrogative" clauses.

There remains now the classification of subordinate clauses based on the similarity of their functions with those of parts of the sentence, namely the classification of clauses into subject, predicative, object, attributive, adverbial, appositional, and parenthetical clauses. In this way the general parallelism between parts of a simple sentence and subordinate clauses within a complex sentence will be kept up; however, there is no sufficient ground for believing that there will be complete parallelism in all respects and all details: on the contrary, it is most likely that differences between the two will emerge (especially in the sphere of adverbial modifiers and adverbial clauses). Subordinate clauses may well be expected to have some peculiarities distinguishing them from parts of a simple sentence.¹

In studying the several types of subordinate clauses, we will compare them with the corresponding parts of a simple sentence, and point out their peculiarities, and the meanings which are better rendered by a subordinate clause than by a part of a simple sentence. With this proviso we proceed to examine the various types of clauses.

¹ Compare Academician V. Vinogradov's remark: „Традиционная аналогия между так называемыми „придаточными" предложениями, проводимая в школьных учебниках с неуклонной и односторонней прямолинейностью, на самом деле может иметь очень ограниченное и условное значение", (В. В. Виноградов, *Русский язык*, стр. 706.)

SUBJECT AND PREDICATIVE CLAUSES

SUBJECT CLAUSES

The notion of a subject clause is not quite clearly defined. The idea at the bottom of the category is this: a clause which performs within a complex sentence the same function that the subject performs within a simple sentence. But in some cases this definition does not appear to be sufficient.

To make the essence of what a subject clause is quite clear let us first take some examples in which no other interpretation appears to be possible. Clauses of this kind are introduced either by a relative or interrogative pronoun or adverb, or by the conjunction *that*. We give some examples of each variety. *What had happened was that I had spent too much time in the French Quarter, mostly in jazz bars along Bourbon Street, but I planned to make up for it by getting my order book filled in Baton Rouge and Shreveport and thereby make a good showing at the sales conference in Dallas.* (E. CALDWELL) *What she considered his monkey's, Simon's, value, for instance, was not lost upon her.* (BUECHNER) In the following sentence there is one subject clause and two predicative clauses to it: *What they learn from me is that they're never going to have it so good again; that the great ones, the ones they read, saw it all as pretty black.* (Idem)

The following two examples are from A. Trollope: *That she must fear the result of the trial, he thought, was certain, but he could not bring himself to have any such fear.* The clause *he thought* is an inserted clause, so the clause *that she must fear the result of the trial* can only be the subject clause to the first half of the composite sentence, the predicate being *was certain*. Indeed, if the clause *that she must fear the result of the trial* is dropped, the predicate *was certain* has nothing to be attached to. A similar situation is found in the following sentence: *That this should be so cut Mr Mason of Groby to the very soul.* If the clause *that this should be so* is dropped the predicate of the main clause *cut* has no subject to perform the action of "cutting". *How they could get through it all, had often amazed Mrs Allen; and, when Catherine saw what was necessary here, she began to be amazed herself.* (J. AUSTEN) If the subordinate clause is dropped, and the sentence is allowed to begin with the words *had often amazed*, there is no subject in it; and that is sufficient reason for terming the subordinate clause a subject clause. *That the General, having erected such a monument, should be able to face it, was not perhaps very strange; and yet that he could sit so boldly collected within its view, maintain so elevated an air, look so fearlessly around, nay, that he should even enter the church, seemed wonderful to Cathe-*

rine. (J. AUSTEN) Each of the two complex sentences making up this passage has a subject clause, and indeed the second one has two of them. It is characteristic of this type that the subject clauses have (two out of the three) the group "should + infinitive" as their predicate, and that the predicates of the two main clauses contain adjectives expressing assessment (*strange* and *wonderful*).

The reason for calling these clauses subject clauses would seem to be clear: if the clause is dropped, the subject is missing. Since in the sentences as they are the position which might be occupied by a noun-subject is occupied by a subordinate clause, this seems to be sufficient reason for terming the clause a subject clause.

Things are somewhat more difficult and controversial in sentences like the following: *It had seemed certain that their meeting was fortunate.* (R. WEST) Here the main clause has the pronoun *it* (in its impersonal use) occupying the position assigned to the subject of the sentence, and after the main clause comes a subordinate clause whose syntactical function we are to consider now. Two views appear to be possible here. One of them is that the pronoun *it* at the beginning of the main clause is only a "formal subject", or, as it is sometimes termed, a "sham subject", whereas the subordinate clause coming after the main one is the real subject. The other view is, that the position of the subject is occupied by the pronoun *it*, and, whether "formal" or not, it is the subject of the sentence, so that no room is left for any other subject. If this view is accepted, the clause will have to be some other kind of clause, not a subject clause. The best way of treating it in that case would be to take it as a kind of appositional clause referring to the subject of the main clause, namely the pronoun *it*.

The choice of either alternative must necessarily remain a matter of subjective decision, as no objective proof in favour of the one or the other view seems possible. The situation so far is the same as with some types of simple sentences, where the choice was between, taking a certain part as a "real" subject as distinct from the "formal" one, or as an apposition to it. We would definitely prefer the second view and we will therefore discuss this type of subordinate clauses when we come to appositional clauses (see p. 303).

PREDICATIVE CLAUSES

By predicative clauses we mean clauses like those in the following sentences. *This was exactly what she had expected him to say and for the first time she did not go closer and squeeze his hand intimately.* (E. CALDWELL) *"The only comforting feature of the whole business," he said, "is that we didn't pay for our dinner."* (LINKLATER) The following example is instructive: *It seemed as if a good view were no longer to be taken from the top of a high hill*

and that a clear blue sky was no longer a proof of a fine day. (J. AUSTEN) The conjunction *and*, which joins the two subordinate clauses, must be taken as a sign of their being syntactically parallel, though they are introduced by different means (*as if* and *that* respectively). Their parallelism is further shown by the use of the modifier *no longer* in each of them. Apparently, both clauses are predicative ones (coming as they do after the link verb *seemed*), and the difference in the use of conjunctions may be due to the fact that the conjunctive phrase *as if*, which has a more definite meaning, implying unreality, is not repeated at the opening of the second subordinate clause because the more neutral and colourless conjunction *that* may well be taken as a kind of substitute for it.

The reason for calling these clauses predicative is that if they are dropped the sentence will be unfinished: there will be the link verb, but the predicative, which should come after the link verb, will be missing. This seems sufficient reason for terming the clause a predicative clause.

We must also consider under the heading of predicative clauses the following type: "*It's because he's weak that he needs me,*" she added. (E. JAMES) Here the subordinate clause in question is included within the construction *it is . . . that* and thus singled out as the rheme of the complex sentence (compare what has been said on this construction in our chapter on functional sentence perspective, p. 193). This clause would occupy a different position in the sentence if it were not singled out; for instance, the sentence just mentioned would run like this: *He needs me because he's weak* and the clause would be a clause of cause. As the sentence stands, however, the clause is treated as a predicative one.

Sometimes we can even find two or three subordinate clauses singled out by being included into the frame *it is . . . that*. Here is an example which may be called extreme: *It was whether one loved at all, and how much that love cost, and what was its reception then, that mattered.* (BUECHNER) It may be interesting to note that it would probably have been impossible to have these three clauses as subject clauses, with the predicate *mattered*, and without the *it is . . . that* construction. That the three clauses are subordinate, is shown by several facts: (1) the conjunction *whether*, which is a sure sign of a subordinate clause, (2) the form of the predicate verb in the second subordinate clause: *cost*, not *did cost*, as it would have been in an independent clause (*how much did this love cost?*); as to the third subordinate clause, its subordinate status is shown by its being co-ordinated with the other two subordinate clauses by means of the conjunction *and*.

Not infrequently there is both a subject clause and a predicative clause in a complex sentence. The only element outside these clauses is then the link verb. In such cases there is nothing in the

sentence that might be termed a main clause. *What I am positive about is that he never expected a wife who would please the family.* (SNOW) As is the rule with *that*-clauses of this kind, the predicative clause gives a precise definition of the idea vaguely hinted at in the subject clause. Another example of this type of sentence is taken from another modern novel: *What she did not know was that in addition to liking things nice she infallibly, by her presence alone, tended to make them so.* (BUECHNER) The following example is of a somewhat different kind. *What I think is, you're supposed to leave somebody alone if he's at least being interesting and he's getting all excited about something.* (SALINGER) The subject clause here is exactly the same type as in the preceding examples, but the predicative clause is not introduced by *that*, or by any subordinating conjunction, for that matter, and that may give rise to doubts about its syntactical status. It will probably be right to say that this absence of a conjunction does not basically alter the character of the clause, and it may even be taken as a stylistic variant of a syndetic predicative clause: *What I think is that you are supposed.* .. The semantic ties are quite obviously the same as with *thai*-clauses, and the difference lies in the stylistic colouring of the text.

Similar questions may also arise with other kinds of asyndetic clauses. Let us, for instance, consider the following example. *"I'm so hungry I could eat anything," said Prue. "Even the sternal gulf fish."* (A. WILSON) If the text ran, *I'm so hungry that I could eat anything*, there would quite evidently be a clause of result, namely one of the type described on p. 395, introduced by the conjunction *that*, with the correlative adverb *so* in the main clause. As it is, there are no grammatical reasons to term the clause a subordinate one. Indeed, if there were a comma after *hungry* it would be an argument against subordination, and the clauses would look quite independent of each other. With no comma, the definition of the clause and of the sentence as a whole must necessarily remain either vague or arbitrary: the usual distinctions are neutralised here.

OBJECT CLAUSES AND ATTRIBUTIVE
CLAUSES

OBJECT CLAUSES

Object clauses are less easily defined and less easily recognizable than either subject or predicative clauses. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that views differ as to what the limits of the notion "object clause" should be. We may try to apply the same criterion that worked well in the case of subject and predicative clauses, viz. omit the subordinate clause and see what part of the sentence is missing and by what part of a simple sentence the vacant position might be occupied. But we shall not always arrive at a clear decision.

The easiest cases are those in which the subordinate clause can be replaced by a noun which would then be an object in a simple sentence. This applies, for instance, to sentences of the type *He bought what he wanted*. If we drop the subordinate clause *what he wanted* we get the unfinished sentence *He bought . . .*, which has no definite meaning until we add some word that will function as an object. This may of course be any noun denoting a thing that can be bought, for instance, *He bought a briefcase*. The similarity in syntactical position between *a briefcase* and the subordinate clause *what he wanted* appears to be sufficient reason for saying that *what he wanted* is an object clause. Compare the following example: *Owen had grown larger to her: he would do, like a man, whatever he should have to do*. (H. JAMES)

The same may be said about the sentence *Tom may marry whom he likes*.¹ Here the clause *whom he likes* may be replaced by any noun that will fit into the context, for instance, by any feminine name: *Tom may marry Jane*, where *Jane* will be an object. This, again, seems sufficient reason for stating that the clause *whom he likes* is an object clause: its syntactical function is the same as that of the noun *Jane* which we put in its place. This sentence differs from the preceding in one respect: the subordinate clause may be eliminated without the sentence becoming impossible or incomplete: *Tom may marry*. This of course depends on the meaning of the verb *marry*, which in the sense 'enter upon a married state' does not necessarily require a noun or pronoun to make the meaning of the sentence complete.

Here are some more examples: *And Cecil was welcome to bring whom he would into the neighbourhood*. (FORSTER) *But Steitler, no more than six or seven years the older as Motley correctly guessed, had made use of his seniority by developing what Motley was quick to recognise as a definite way with him, a generally*

¹ O. Jespersen, *A Modern English Grammar*, Part III, p. 62.

constant manner under cover — or in easy despite — of which he met the world, was recognised always as quite uniquely himself. (BUECHNER) The object clause coming after *developing* seems to go on as far as the noun *manner*, where a subordinate clause of the second degree begins, namely an attributive one to this noun. Object clauses of this type are very characteristically English, and in translating such sentences into another language, for example, into Russian, the turn of the sentence has usually to be changed altogether. Compare also: *Fes, my father can seldom be prevailed on to give the waters what I think a fair trial.* (J. AUSTEN) *Give somebody (something) a fair trial* is a phraseological unit, with both nominal elements in it necessary for its existence. This has not prevented, in the last example, the substitution of an object clause (*what I call a fair trial*) for the phrase *a fair trial*. This plainly shows that the subordinate clause is here exactly similar in function to the object in a simple sentence, and that the term "object clause" is therefore fully justified.

There is also another type of object clause. This is found in sentences having in the main clause a predicate verb which combines almost exclusively with object clauses and only with a very few possible objects (within a simple sentence). A typical verb of this kind is the verb *say*. Compare the following example: *She could not say what is was.* (LAWRENCE) If we drop the subordinate clause we get the unfinished sentence *She could not say. . .* The words that can come after the verb *say* and perform the function of object in a simple sentence are very few indeed: these are chiefly the pronouns *this, that, anything, everything*, and the noun *the truth*.

On the whole it may be said that subordinate clauses are much more characteristic of the verb *say* than an object in a simple sentence.

The same may be said about the verb *ask*. If we take the sentence *She asked whether this was true*, and drop the subordinate clause, we shall get the unfinished sentence *She asked. . .* The possibilities of completing this sentence by means of an object within the framework of a simple sentence are again very limited: there may be the pronouns *this, that, something, nothing*, and the noun *a question*. In this case, too, a subordinate clause is much more characteristic of the verb than an object in a simple sentence. Compare also the following example: *He merely suggested that Motley's peculiar gifts tended to make him animate and inflate whatever might, seem to him the most appealing among the host of potentialities attending any unextraordinary human situation; that if, as certainly might be the case, there were validity in his suspicions, he, Tristram, could be no more than very interested to hear of it.* (BUECHNER) The object clause, *whatever might seem to him the most appealing among the host of potentialities attending any unextraordinary human situation*, is rather long; yet it does not pro-

duce any difficulty for the reader to identify the *that* which comes immediately after it as a conjunction parallel to the first *that* (the one coming after *suggested*) and, consequently, to range the clause introduced by the second *that* as standing on the same level as the first *that*-clause (*that Motley's peculiar gifts. . .*).

The idea will naturally suggest itself of treating the subordinate clause as the typical element following the verb *say* or *ask*, rather than as something to be defined by comparing it to an object in a simple sentence.

Now let us pass on to the verbs with which a subordinate clause is the only formation that can follow them to express the contents of the action expressed by the verb.

The verb *exclaim* is a case in point. Completing it by a word functioning as an object in a simple sentence is impossible: none of the words suggested for the verbs *say* and *ask* will do here. Neither the pronouns *this*, *that*, *something*, *everything*, nor any noun could come after the verb *exclaim*. So if we apply the criterion which served for the preceding verbs, we cannot find an object of this kind in a simple sentence with this verb and argue that, since the subordinate clause is identical in function to that object, it is bound to be an object clause. The argument in favour of the view that it is an object clause would then have to be more far-fetched and it would have to be something like this: the subordinate clause after the verb *exclaim* is an object clause because its syntactical function is similar to that of the subordinate clause after the verb *say* or *ask*, and that clause is to be recognised as an object clause because its function is the same as that of a few pronouns and nouns which can come after the verb *say* or *ask* in a simple sentence.

Now this argument may or may not be found convincing. If it is, all clauses of this kind after the verbs *exclaim*, *wonder*, and a number of other "verba sentiendi et declarandi" will have to be accepted as object clauses (which of course is the traditional view). If it is not found convincing the subordinate clauses after such verbs will have to be taken as a special type of clauses, which in this case will not fit into the system of subordinate clause parallel to parts of a simple sentence but will have to be organised on some other principle. They might be termed "subordinate clauses of indirect speech". This is a possible view but it entails some inconvenience. In the first place, this type of clause would remain outside the system which is based on analogy with parts of a simple sentence; secondly, if we recognise clauses of indirect speech as a separate type, we shall obviously have to include in it the clauses following the verbs *say*, *ask*, etc. as well, though with these verbs a few pronouns and nouns are possible as objects in a simple sentence.

In this case, as in so many others, no binding decision is possible: the solution a scholar arrives at will largely depend on his

own opinion of the relative value of the arguments brought forward in favour of this or that view.

Occasionally an object clause may come before the main clause: .. *whatever courtesy I have shown to Mrs Hurtle in England I have been constrained to show her.* (TROLLOPE) In this example the object clause, which of course depends on the predicate *have been constrained to show* of the head clause, comes first. This is a clear indication that the object clause represents the theme of the sentence, whereas the rheme is represented by the head clause, and the most important element in this rheme is of course the word *constrained*. In fact the essential meaning of the sentence might have been put briefly in these words: *My courtesy to Mrs Hurtle was constrained*. In that case the theme would be represented by the subject group, and the rheme by the predicate.

In speaking of object clauses, special attention must be paid to clauses introduced by prepositions. These clauses may be termed prepositional object clauses, on the analogy of prepositional objects in a simple sentence.

We must note that a prepositional object in a simple sentence does not always correspond to a prepositional object clause: for instance, the verb *insist*, which always combines with the preposition *on* (or *upon*) in a simple sentence, never has this preposition when followed by an object clause.

Most verbs, however, which combine with a preposition in a simple sentence, do so in a complex sentence as well: a case in point is the verb *depend*, which always combines with the preposition *on* (or *upon*), no matter what follows: compare *It depends on what you will say*, *It depends on whether you will come*. Here are some examples: *The conversation was as brief and uncomplicated as that, freed from whatever implication the memory of their earlier encounter might have added to it.* (BUECHNER) This is a peculiarly English way of putting it, and it appears to be more idiomatic than the other way, which, however, is also possible, namely, *The conversation was as brief and uncomplicated as that, freed from any implication that the memory of their earlier encounter might have added to it.*

The following example is very illuminating since a prepositional clause going with the verb *think* is then followed by prepositional objects within the main clause: *He thought for a few minutes of what she had said — of Arthur's rottenness — socially and personally — and of all that they stood for — individually alive, socially progressive.* (A. WILSON) As the prepositional clause *of what she had said* stands on the same syntactic level as the prepositional phrases *of Arthur's rottenness* and *of all that they stood for* (the latter including an attributive subordinate clause), it is quite clear that their functions are identical, that is, the clause is an object clause.

A prepositional clause is also found in this sentence from a novel by A. Trollope: *After what had passed, young Round should have been anxious to grind Lucius Mason into powder, and make money of his very bones! After what had passed* clearly performs the same function in the sentence that would be performed, say, by the prepositional phrase *after these events* in a simple sentence. Since that prepositional phrase would have been an adverbial modifier of time (and this is seen from the lexical meanings of the words making it up), the same function must be ascribed to the prepositional clause that we have here.

Compare also the following example: *He questioned me on what Caroline had said.* (SNOW) By substituting a phrase for the clause introduced by the preposition *on*, we get a simple sentence with a prepositional object, e. g. *He questioned me on Caroline's opinion.* So the prepositional clause is clearly shown to be the equivalent, in a complex sentence, of a prepositional object in a simple one. Compare also the following example: *How far back did you burrow, Julia? To when our hearts were young and gay at Wellesley?* (TAYLOR)

An example of the syntactical equivalence of a word (or phrase) and a clause is also seen in the following sentence.

Vitiate the minds or what pass for the minds of the people with education, teach them to read and write, feed their imaginations with sexual and criminal fantasies known as films, and then starve them in order to pay for these delightful erotic celluloids. (A. WILSON) *What pass for the minds* stands obviously in the same relation as *the minds*, on the one hand to the words *of the people with education*, and on the other to the verb *vitiate*, to which both of them are objects. The syntactic equivalence of the noun *the minds* and the clause *what pass for the minds* is made especially clear by this syntactical tie in two directions. Such examples as these are the strongest argument in favour of classifying subordinate clauses on the same principle as parts of a simple sentence.

In our next example there are no homogeneous parts of this kind, but otherwise the function of the subordinate clause is seen very clearly: *I could not write what is known as the popular historical biography.* (A. WILSON) The corresponding simple sentence would be, *I could not write a popular historical biography.* So» if we term the noun *a biography* the direct object in the latter sentence, there seems to be no reason whatever to deny that the subordinate clause in the former sentence is an object clause. Compare also: *I've no doubt about that he is an estimable young man, but I knew nothing about him except what you have told me.* (LINKLATER)

Such sentences may be cited as an argument for recognising noun clauses" in Modern English (see above, p. 272 ff.). It is clear that constructions of this kind are only possible if prepositions in

a language do not require any special case and may be followed by practically any kind of word, including a conjunction.

The specific qualities of an object clause as distinct from an object in a simple sentence are not difficult to state.

An object clause (clauses of indirect speech included) is necessary when the notion to be expressed cannot conveniently be summed up in a noun, or a phrase with a noun as its head word, or a gerund and a gerundial phrase, but requires an explicit predicative unit, that is, a subject and a predicate of its own. Or, to put it in a different way: an object clause is necessary when what is to be added to the predicate verb is the description of a situation, rather than a mere name of a thing.

In some cases, though, an object in a simple sentence may have a synonymous object clause, as in the following cases: *I heard of his arrival* — *I heard that he had arrived*, etc. The meaning of the two sentences in each case is exactly the same, but there is a certain stylistic difference: the simple sentence with the prepositional object sounds rather more literary or even bookish than the complex sentence with the object clause, which is fit for any sort of style.

A peculiar case of a prepositional object clause is seen in this sentence: *George had drunk a cup of coffee with himself and Simon that morning, had told them of a play he planned to write, then, on to the subject of his weekend, all that he had seen, a good amount of what he had thought or wanted people to think that he had thought, and to the description of a, young man named Steitler.* (BUECHNER) The noun *amount* is head word to a prepositional clause, with two homogeneous predicates, *had thought*, and *wanted*; with the second of these predicates there is the complex object *people to think*, and the infinitive *to think* is head word to an object clause, *that he had thought*. Now this *had thought* in the object clause is understood to have as its object the pronoun *what* which immediately follows the words *amount of*. Thus, the word *what*, while being part of the first-degree subordinate clause, is object to the predicate of the second-degree clause.

ATTRIBUTIVE CLAUSES

A subordinate clause is said to be attributive if its function in the complex sentence is analogous to that of an attribute in a simple sentence. It differs from an attribute in so far as it characterises the thing denoted by its head word through some other action or situation in which that thing is involved. This could not, in many cases at least, be achieved within the limits of a simple sentence. Compare, for example, the sentence *By October Isabelle was settled in the house where, she intended, she would live until she died.* (R. WEST) The clause *where ... she would live* with the dependent

clause *until she died* contains information which could not be compressed into an attributive phrase within a simple sentence.

It is common knowledge that attributive clauses can be defining (or restrictive, or limiting) and non-defining (or non-restrictive, or descriptive). The non-defining ones do not single out a thing but contain some additional information about the thing or things denoted by the head word, e. g. *Magnus, who was writing an article for Meiklejohns newspaper, looked up and said, "That's an interesting little essay, isn't it?"* (LINKLATER) Non-defining attributive clauses pose the question of boundary line between subordination and co-ordination, which in this case becomes somewhat blurred. This is especially evident in the so-called continuative clauses, which are used to carry the narrative a step further, namely in sentences like the following: *But in the morning he went to see Meiklejohn, whose enthusiasm on hearing the news was very comforting.* (LINKLATER) *We shall have the governess in a day or two, which will be a great satisfaction.* (BAIN, quoted by Poutsma) Sentences of this kind may be taken as specimens of subordination weakened and a subordinate clause passing on to something like a co-ordinate position in the sentence. We shall see other varieties of this development in our next chapter.

The question about the place of an attributive clause deserves a few remarks. Most usually, of course, an attributive clause comes immediately after its head word. This is too common to need illustration. But that is by no means an absolute rule. Sometimes an attributive clause will come, not immediately after its head word, but after some other word or phrase, not containing a noun. This is the case, for instance, in the following sentence: *He wanted Ann to die, whom his son passionately loved, whom he had himself once come near to loving.* (SNOW) The intervening infinitive *to die*, coming between the attributive clauses and their head word *Ann*, does not in any way impede the connection between them.

A different kind of separation is found in the following sentence: *Jeremy saw the scene breaking upon him that he had dreaded all day and he felt no energy to withstand it.* (A. WILSON) The subordinate clause *that he had dreaded all day* has the noun *scene* as its head word. Now this noun forms part of the complex object *the scene breaking upon him*. No ambiguity is created by the separation, as the subordinate clause cannot possibly refer to the pronoun *him*, and there is no noun between *scene* and the subordinate clause. That the word *that* is the relative pronoun and not the conjunction, is seen from the fact that *dreaded*, being a transitive verb, has no object coming after it; that the phrase *all day* is not an object is obvious because if the thing denoted by it were thought of as the object of the action the phrase must have been *all the day*.

ADVERBIAL CLAUSES

We must start the discussion of adverbial clauses by pointing out that the term "adverbial" should not be taken as an adjective derived from the noun "adverb" (which would make it a morphological term), but as a syntactical term, in the same way that it is used in the phrase "adverbial modifier" denoting a secondary part of the sentence.

With reference to adverbial clauses a question arises that is not always easy to answer, namely: whether they modify some part of the main clause or the main clause as a whole. The answer may prove to be different for different types of adverbial clauses and the question will have to be considered for each type separately. The criteria to be applied in settling this question have, however (at least partly), to be stated in advance.

We will first try out a method that has proved valid, on the whole, for determining whether a clause is an object clause or not. It will serve both for finding whether a clause is an adverbial clause or not, and if it is one, what it modifies. The method consists in dropping the clause in question and finding out what has been lost by dropping it and what part of the main clause has been affected by the omission (it may be the whole of the main clause). If this method does not yield satisfactory results in some particular case we will think of possible other ways of ascertaining the function of the subordinate clause.

The conjunctions introducing adverbial subordinate clauses are numerous and differ from each other in the degree of definiteness of meaning. While some of them have a narrow meaning, so that, seeing the conjunction, we may be certain that the adverbial clause belongs to a certain type (for example, if the conjunction is *because*, there is no doubt that the adverbial clause is a clause of cause), other conjunctions have so wide a meaning that we cannot determine the type of adverbial clause by having a look at the conjunction alone: thus, the conjunction *as* may introduce different types of clauses, and so can the conjunction *while*. With these conjunctions, other words in the sentence prove decisive in determining the type of adverbial clause introduced by the conjunction.¹

TYPES OF ADVERBIAL CLAUSES

Some adverbial clauses can be easily grouped under types more or less corresponding to the types of adverbial modifiers in a simple

¹ A word of caution is necessary here. A subordinate clause introduced by the conjunction *because*, or *when*, etc., need not necessarily be an adverbial clause at all. It may, for instance, be a predicative clause, as in the sentence *This was because he had just arrived*. Since the subordinate clause comes immediately after the link verb *be* it cannot possibly be an adverbial clause but must be a predicative one.

sentence, which have been considered above (p. 225 ff.). Others are more specific for the complex sentence and do not fit into "pigeonholes" arranged in accordance with the analysis of the simple sentence. Among those that will easily fit into such "pigeonholes" are clauses denoting place, those denoting time (or temporal clauses), clauses of cause, purpose, and concession, and also those of result. There are also clauses of comparison and of degree.

We may mention briefly the types of clauses which do not give much occasion for theoretical discussion, and turn our chief attention to those which do, and also to comparing subordinate clauses to the corresponding adverbial modifiers in a simple sentence, as stated above.

Clauses of Place

There appears to be only one way of introducing such clauses, and this is by means of the relative adverb *where*, and in a very few cases by the phrase *from where*. For instance, . . . *Miss Dotty insisted on looking into all the cupboards and behind the curtains to see, as she said, "if there were any eyes or ears where they were not wanted."* (A. WILSON) This way of indicating the whereabouts of "eyes or ears" serves to characterise it by referring to a situation expressed by the subordinate clause, rather than to indicate the precise places meant. *Then go where you usually sleep at night.* (E. CALDWELL) Here the room where the person addressed is asked to go is characterised by what takes place there.

Here is an example of a prepositional *where*-clause denoting place in the literal sense of the term: *From where he stood, leaning in an attitude of despair against the parapet of the terrace, Denis had seen them.* . . . (HUXLEY) The clause *from ... the terrace* denotes the place from which the action of the main clause (*Denis had seen*) was performed. Occasions for this particular way of denoting the place of an action appear to be rather rare. Here, however, is another example: *I gathered up my damp briefcase and ancient mackintosh and made my way down to where a thin penetrating drizzle swept the streets from the direction of the sea.* (DURRELL)

Here are some more examples: *But Magnus stayed where he was.* . . . (LINKLATER) *But Meiklejohn lay where he had fallen.* (Idem) *This time she did not wave gaily, but went directly to where he stood . . .* (E. CALDWELL)

Occasionally a *where*-clause can be used together with an adverb indicating place, as in the sentence *"Come on here where I am, honey," Lujean called, at the same time beckoning urgently to her.* (E. CALDWELL) The adverbial modifier *here* would seem to indicate clearly enough where the speaker wants her friend to come, so the clause *where I am* serves to state the point more emphatically, rather than give any essentially new information.

There has been some discussion whether the word *where* introducing a subordinate clause of place is an adverb or a conjunction. The latter view was suggested by a certain analogy with the conjunction *when* introducing clauses of time. However, the possibility of the word *where* being preceded by the preposition *from*, as in some of the above examples, is a definite argument against its being a conjunction.

The number of sentences with an adverbial clause of place is negligible as compared with those containing an adverbial clause of time. The cause of this is plain enough. It is only in exceptional cases that the speaker or writer deems it necessary to denote the place of an action by referring to another action which occurred at the same place. In the vast majority of cases he will rather indicate the place by directly naming it (*at home, in London, at the nearest shop*, and so forth). Sentences with adverbial clauses of place are therefore used only in cases where the speaker or writer avoids naming the place of the action, or in sentences of a generalising character, or again in sentences where the place is perhaps hard to define and the name is unimportant.

Clauses of place can also be used in a metaphorical sense, that is, the "place" indicated may not be a place at all in the literal meaning of the word but a certain generalised condition or sphere of action. This of course is made clear by the context, that is, by the lexical meanings of the other words in the sentence. Compare the following sentences. *Where people wish to attach, they should always be ignorant.* (J. AUSTEN) *Wherever the choice has had to be made between the man of reason and the madman, the world has unhesitatingly followed the madman.* (DURRELL) Both the adverb *wherever* and the meaning of the sentence as a whole show that not a concrete place but a general review of conditions is meant.

Two very well known sentences are also cases in point: the proverb *Where there is a will there is a way* and the famous line from Thomas Gray's poem "On a Distant Prospect of Eton College": *Where ignorance is bliss, 'tis folly to be wise.*

It is of no special importance whether we shall term such clauses of metaphorical meaning clauses of place or invent a new term to denote them. Anyway, there would seem to be no basic objection to give them that name, provided we keep in mind that spatial notions are apt to be interpreted metaphorically.

Clauses of Time (Temporal Clauses)

The number of conjunctions used to introduce temporal clauses is very considerable, and it seems to be growing still at the ex-

pense of nouns denoting time units, with the definite article, such as *the moment*, *the instant*, etc. Temporal clauses are used much more frequently than clauses of space.

On the one hand, time relations are much more varied than space relations. If we want to indicate the time when an action occurred by referring it to another action, the time relations between the two may be various. The one action may be taking place at the very time when the other action was being carried out; or it may have begun a short while after the other action was finished, or it may have ended just as the other action was about to begin, etc., etc.

On the other hand, it is a very common occurrence to indicate the time of an action by referring it to the time of another action, with which it happens to be connected either by some causal link or by a fortuitous coincidence in time. The speaker or writer may in many cases use this way of indicating the time of an action, rather than an adverbial modifier of time in a simple sentence (such as, *at five o'clock*, etc.), because the exact time may be either unknown (this especially refers to actions in the future), or irrelevant. The time relation between the action of the main clause and that of the subordinate clause may be expressed with a very great degree of exactness: the two actions may be simultaneous, or the one may precede the other, or follow it, or it may last until the other has begun, etc.

There is one more point to be noted here. The action of the head clause may be connected with that of the temporal clause by some causal tie, that is, if the action of the temporal clause did not take place, that of the main clause would not take place either; or the connection may be purely temporal, with no causal relation implied. This is especially characteristic of temporal clauses indicating natural phenomena, such as sunrise, sunset, etc., which are not the cause of anything happening in human relations but merely an external method of reckoning time as it passes. The cases of the first kind (with causal relation implied) are to be seen in the following examples: *She made a little curtsy as he bowed...* (M. MITCHELL) *So, between sport and pedantry, she was busy enough, and on most nights her eyes closed the minute her head touched the pillow.* (R. WEST) A case of the second kind (with no causal relation implied) is seen in an example of a different character: *As she stood hanging to the sill, a deafening explosion burst on her ears, louder than any cannon she had ever heard.* (M. MITCHELL) Of course this difference depends entirely on the lexical meanings of the words making up the main and the subordinate clause.

Occasionally a *when*-clause indicates an action opposed to that of the main clause, rather than the time when that main action occurred: *Where on earth was the double game, when you've*

behaved like such a saint? (H. JAMES) Here, too, it is the lexical meanings of the words which make the relation clear. Of course a *when*-clause of this kind can only come after its head clause.

There are two more points to be mentioned in connection with temporal clauses, and they both bear on the temporal clause losing its subordinate character and tending to become independent of the clause with which it is connected.

One of these is the type of sentence which consists of a clause narrating some situation and followed by a *when*-clause telling of an event which burst into the situation and which is the central point of the whole sentence. Such a *when*-clause always comes after the main clause and this may be considered its grammatical peculiarity. A clear example of this type may be seen in the following sentence: *Judith had just gone into her room and closed the door when she heard a man's voice in the parlour, and in a few minutes she heard the closing of Eve's bedroom door.* (E. CALDWELL) It is quite clear here that the *when*-clause does not indicate the time when the action of the first clause took place but contains the statement which is the centre of the whole composite sentence. It is also evident that a *when*-clause of this kind must necessarily come after the head clause within the composite sentence. Compare also the following passages: *It was the middle of the August afternoon when Harry Emory got back to his office at the canning factory after lunch and he felt drowsy and sluggish and downright lazy in the summer heat.* (E. CALDWELL) Once more, we see from the lexical meanings of the words that the *when*-clause does not indicate the time when the action of the other clause took place. It might indeed be argued that it is the other way round: the first clause indicates the time when the action of the *when*-clause took place. This way of constructing the sentence seems to be designed to lay the main stress on the time indication, that is, to mark it out as the rheme of the whole sentence.

In the meanwhile, they proceeded on their journey without any mischance; and were within view of the town of Keynsham, when a halloo from Morland, who was behind them, made his friend pull up, to know what was the matter. (J. AUSTEN) That the *when*-clause does not indicate the time of the action of the main clause but contains the most important information of the sentence is clear from the character of the predicate *were within view*, which denotes something static, and of the predicate group *made his friend pull up* (the subject being *a halloo*), which indicates a sudden momentary action. Compare also: *The next Friday afternoon Fern was walking slowly along the street in front of the court-house when Judge Price crossed the lawn.* (E. CALDWELL)

In such a sentence the reasons for calling the *when*-clause a subordinate one are very much weakened. It most certainly does not

indicate the time when the action of the first clause took place, nor does it in any way correspond to an adverbial modifier of time in a simple sentence. This appears to be sufficient proof that the *when*-clause is not a subordinate clause, and the sentence which contains it is not a complex sentence. This might be termed "emancipation" of a subordinate clause.

Another phenomenon of "emancipation" affects clauses introduced by the conjunction *while* and following the main clause. The conjunction *while*, as is well known, expresses simultaneity of an action with another action. However, this meaning of simultaneity can, under certain conditions, change into a different meaning altogether. If, say, two people simultaneously perform quite different actions, possibly opposed to one another in character, this state of things may serve to characterise the two people as opposed to each other. This may be the meaning of a sentence like the following: *Magnus briefly outlined the case for the independent sovereignty of Scotland, while Frieda listened without any remarkable interest.* (LINKLATER) It is clear that the *while*-clause does not here express the time when the action of the first clause took place: it rather expresses an action opposed in its character to the first action, and in this much it serves to characterise the doer of the action. We might here put the conjunction *and* instead of *while* and the actual meaning would be the same, though the sentence would now be a compound one. Since, therefore, the function of the second clause is quite different from the usual function of a subordinate adverbial temporal clause, and since no purely grammatical peculiarities make it necessary to term the second clause a subordinate one, we may say that it is not subordinate and the sentence not complex.

A subordinate clause introduced by the conjunction *while* may sometimes express contrast, rather than time relation, even when it occupies front position, that is, when it precedes the main clause. Here is an example containing three *while*-clauses of this kind: *Thus, while I have a certain amount of intelligence, I have no aesthetic sense; while I possess the mathematical faculty, I am wholly without, the religious emotions; while I am naturally addicted to venery, I have little ambition and am not at all avaricious.* (HUXLEY) The lexical meanings of the words, both in the main and in the subordinate clauses, show beyond doubt that the connection between each of the *while*-clauses and the main clause following it is based not on time but on contrast. The sentence gives a characteristic of the man, and not a description of what he is doing at one time or another. Such examples, though they may not be numerous, go far to show that a *while*-clause may express contrast even though it precedes its head clause.

We shall meet with another case of "emancipation" when we come to clauses of concession.

There is some affinity between temporal and causal clauses, and also between temporal and conditional ones.

Causal Clauses

The affinity between temporal and causal clauses is manifested by the fact that both kinds of clauses can be introduced by the conjunction *as*, and nothing but the context, i. e. the lexical meanings of the words involved, will enable us to tell whether the clause is temporal or causal. Thus the difference between the two kinds is not grammatical in these cases. Let us consider the following two examples: *The rain neither enticed nor repelled, but only trickled down his big umbrella off onto the upturned collar of his old army-officer jacket as he walked down the path.* (BUECHNER) There obviously cannot be a causal tie between the fact stated in the main clause and that stated in the *as*-clause. *As they (Beaumont and Fletcher) are indissolubly associated in the history of English literature, it is convenient to treat of them in one place.* (COUSIN) Here the causal connection between the clauses is obvious.

Compare also two *since*-clauses: *For ever since he had fled from Kansas City, and by one humble device and another forced to make his way, he had been coming to the conclusion that on himself alone depended his future* (DREISER), with a clearly temporal meaning, and *"So," said Helen, "since you obviously don't know how to behave in Great Britain, I shall take you back to France directly, you are well enough to travel"* (R. MACAULAY), where the connection is causal.

There would be no necessity to analyse the meanings of the words, etc., if the subordinate clause were introduced by a conjunction which can have one meaning only, for instance, the conjunction *because*. No clause introduced by this conjunction could ever be a temporal clause.

A special problem, which has received much attention, attaches to clauses introduced by the conjunction *for*. In many ways they are parallel to clauses with *because*, and we may wonder whether there is any valid reason for saying that *because*-clauses are subordinate and *for*-clauses co-ordinate. Indeed the following two examples seem to prove the parallelism: *It was Richie who played, for Lucien had discouraging business paper to read.* (R. MACAULAY) *On earth there may be some truth in this, because the people are uneducated...* (SHAW)

But at the same time there is a basic difference between the two types. *Because*-clauses indicate the cause of the action expressed in the main clause. They can be used separately as an answer to the question *why...?*, as in the following bit of dialogue: *"I must have come." "Why?" "Because I must. Because there would have been no*

other way." (SHAW) A *for*-clause could not possibly be used in this way. The reason is that a *for*-clause expresses an additional thought, that is, it is added on to a finished part of the sentence, as in the following extract: "*What game are they all playing?*" *poor Fleda could only ask; for she had an intimate conviction that Owen was now under the roof of his betrothed.* (H. JAMES)

It would also be impossible to replace *because* by *for* in the following sentence: *But either because the rains had given a freshness, or because the sun was shedding a most glorious heat, or because two of the gentlemen were young in years and the third young in the spirit — for some reason or other a change came over them.* (FORSTER)

This peculiarity of *for*-clauses as distinct from *because*-clauses is in full harmony with the fact that *for*-clauses can also come after a full stop, thus functioning as separate sentences, much as sentences introduced by the conjunction *but* do, as in the following extract: *This thought, together with one other — that once more after dinner he was to see Roberta and in her room as early as eleven o'clock or even earlier — cheered him and caused him to step along most briskly and gaily. For, since having indulged in this secret adventure so many time, both were unconsciously becoming bolder.* (DREISER) The following solutions appear to be plausible:

- (1) *for*-clauses are always co-ordinate, never subordinate ones,
- (2) *for*-clauses are subordinate ones in all cases, and no objective difference is to be found between them and *because*-clauses,
- (3) *for*-clauses occupy an intermediate position, the difference between coordination and subordination being here neutralised, and tend sometimes toward the one, sometimes toward the other extreme. Possibly the last solution is the most acceptable.

Conditional Clauses

Conditional clauses may be introduced by several conjunctions such as *if* (the most general one), *unless*, *provided*, *supposing* (with more specialised meanings), and the phrase *in case*.

An essential peculiarity of conditional clauses, or, we should rather say, of conditional sentences (including both the main and the subordinate clause), is the use of verbal forms. Here the actual meaning of a verbal form depends entirely on the syntactical context: it may acquire a meaning which it would never have outside this context.

The classification of conditional sentences is familiar enough. The main types are three: (1) *If we can get to the bicycles, we shall beat him.* (R. MACAULAY) (2) *If they could derive advantage from betraying you, betray you they would . . .* (Idem) (3) *If you had*

been arguing about a football match I should have been ready to take a more lenient view of the case,.. (LINKLATER)

There may, however, also be other types, with the action of the subordinate clause belonging to the past and its consequence to the present, e. g. *Anyhow, if you hadn't been ill, we shouldn't have you here* (A. WILSON), etc.

As we have discussed the possible interpretations of forms like *knew, had known, should know, should have known* in Chapter XI, we need not go into that question here.

Subordinate conditional clauses can also, like some types of clauses considered above, get emancipated and become independent sentences expressing wish. From a sentence like *If I had known this in advance I should have done everything to help*, etc., the conditional clause may be separated and become an independent exclamatory sentence: *If I had known this in advance!* The conjunction *if* in such a case apparently ceases to be a conjunction, since there is no other clause here. The conjunction then becomes a particle typical of this kind of exclamatory sentence.¹ The following examples will illustrate this point: *If only she might play the question loud enough to reach the ears of this Paul Steitler.* (BUECHNER) Compare the following sentence: *If you will just send that back to him, — without a word.* (TROLLOPE) In the first example it is quite evident that the word *if* does not connect anything with anything else and can therefore hardly be termed a conjunction at all: it rather approaches the status of a particle used to introduce an exclamatory sentence. As to our second example, things are less clear. It might be possible to assume that this is a subordinate conditional clause, with a main clause, something like *it will be all right*, or, perhaps, something like *I shall be grateful*, but this of course could never be proved to be the case. If that view is rejected, nothing seems to remain but to assume that we have here an independent sentence, which is to all intents and purposes imperative (as it amounts to a request), and that here, too, the conjunction *if* has practically become a particle used to introduce that sort of sentence. Transition cases of this kind are most valuable for understanding the mechanism, as it were, of grammatical development.

The same is found in the third clause of the following compound sentence: *It's really rather ghastly and one oughtn't to laugh, but if you could see them, my dear.* (A. WILSON) One might say that this clause is subordinate and that a head clause is "omitted" after it, e. g. *you would understand me*. But it seems simpler to take the *if*-clause as an independent clause expressing something like wish and co-ordinated with the two preceding clauses.

¹ There are similar developments in other languages, such as Russian,^a French, and German.

Clauses of Result

Clauses of result give rise to some discussion, since the distinction between them and some other types of subordinate clauses is in some cases doubtful and to a certain extent arbitrary.

It should first of all be noted that the term "clauses of result" must not be taken to imply that the result was necessarily planned in advance, or that it was consciously aimed at. The result may have been brought about without anybody's intention. So these clauses might be termed "clauses of consequence", but since that term is also liable to different interpretations, we may as well stick to the usual term "clauses of result".

Clauses of result may be connected with the head clause in either of two ways: (1) the clause is introduced by the conjunction *that*, while in the head clause there is the pronoun *such* or the adverb *so*, which is correlative with the conjunction; (2) the subordinate clause is introduced by the phrase *so that*.

The latter variety does not give rise to any special discussion. Let us, for instance, take the sentence: *In the centre of the chamber candlesticks were set, also brass, but polished, so that they shone like gold.* (BOWEN, quoted by Poutsma)

The head clause describes a situation, and the subordinate clause says what the result (or consequence) of that action was.¹

Things are somewhat less clear with clauses of the first variety (those introduced by the conjunction *that*, with a correlative *such* or *so* in the head clause). Here two possible ways of interpreting the facts appear. Let us take a sentence with the adverb *so* in the head clause correlative with the conjunction *that* introducing the subordinate clause: *She was so far under his influence that she was now inclined to believe him.* (LINKLATER) One way to look at this sentence is this: the head clause tells of some state of things, and the subordinate clause of another state of things which came as a result or consequence of the first. Taken in this way, the clause appears as a clause of result. However, that is not the only possible way of taking it. The other way would be this: the subordinate clause specifies the degree of the state of things expressed in the head clause by illustrating the effect it had. If the sentence is taken in isolation, it is absolutely impossible to tell which of the two views gets closer to the mark. The question might be settled by finding (or adding) a sequel to this sentence, which would make the situation quite clear: one possible sequel would show that the state of things described in the subordinate clause had some interest in itself, so that it was not mentioned merely to illustrate the

¹ However, the phrase *so that* can also introduce clauses of purpose (see p. 296).

intensity of the state described in the head clause and in that case the subordinate clause would have to be taken as an adverbial clause of result. With another sequel, it would be obvious that the state of things described in the second clause had no interest as such, but was mentioned exclusively in order to illustrate the degree of the state of things described in the head clause. In that case the clause may be taken as an adverbial clause of degree.

Now reasonings of this sort are quite obviously non-grammatical. They are founded on an examination of a context outside the sentence, and a lexical, not a grammatical context at that. So from the grammatical viewpoint all this is irrelevant. The choice between the two interpretations appears to be arbitrary: neither of the two can be proved to be the only correct one.

It remains now for us to consider the mutual relations between an adverbial clause of result and an adverbial modifier of result in a simple sentence.

Adverbial modifiers of result in a simple sentence are extremely rare. Here is a case in point: *She was shaken almost to tears by her anger.* (BUECHNER) Taking into account the lexical meanings of the words involved, we may perhaps term the phrase *almost to tears* an adverbial modifier of result.

In the vast majority of cases the result is an action or a situation which cannot be adequately expressed without a subordinate clause.

Clauses of Purpose

Clauses expressing purpose may, as is well known, be introduced either by the conjunction *that* or by the phrase *in order that*. There is a basic difference between the two variants. A clause introduced by *in order that* is sufficiently characterised as a clause of purpose, and nothing else is needed to identify it as such. A clause introduced by *that*, on the other hand, need not necessarily be a clause of purpose: it can also belong to one of several other types (see p. 308 ff.). To identify it as a clause of purpose other indications are needed, and the most usual of these is the verb *may* (*might*) or *should* as part of its predicate.

A clause of purpose can also be introduced by the phrase *so that*, and some special signs are needed to distinguish it from a clause of result.

Let us take as an example the following sentence with two clauses introduced by the phrase *so that*. *Although slightly near-sighted, Elisabeth, so that nothing might damage the charm of her dark brown eyes, tragic and wide apart under straight brows, wore no glasses but carried instead a miniature lorgnette, for which she now searched in her purse, unobtrusively and on her lap so that Steitler, who was speaking to her son, would not notice.* (BUECHNER)

Both clauses here are clauses of purpose, not result, and this is seen from the following facts: as to the first clause, its position between the subject of the main clause (*Elizabeth*), and its predicate (*wore*), shows beyond doubt that it cannot express result: the result could not possibly be mentioned before the action bringing it about was stated. Another point speaking in favour of the clause being one of purpose is its predicate (*might damage*). As to the second clause introduced by *so that*, its position at the end of the sentence does not tell anything about its being a clause of purpose or of result. That it is a clause of purpose is seen from the predicate (*would not notice*), which would have no reasonable sense in a clause of result. If we make a slight change and replace the predicate *would not notice* by *did not notice*, the clause will decidedly be a clause of result. So the meaning of the clause appears to depend entirely on the verb *would*.

Compare also the following sentence: *Mrs Cox did not object to this so long as they talked English, so that she could keep a line on the conversation; if it was French, she did not know what they were up to.* (R. MACAULAY) Here the words *talked English* and *could keep a line* point to the meaning of purpose, rather than result.

Clauses of Concession

These clauses express some circumstance despite which the action of the main clause is performed. They are of several types. One type comprises clauses introduced by the conjunctions *though*, *although*, and (in a somewhat high-flown style) *albeit*, which can have no other meaning but the concessive. Another type is represented by clauses of the pattern "predicative (noun or adjective) + *as* + subject + link verb", in which the concessive meaning is not directly expressed by the conjunction *as* or, indeed, by any other single word, but arises out of the combined lexical meanings of different words in the sentence.

The first type may be illustrated by such sentences as: *Resolutely she smiled, though she was trembling.* (R. WEST) It does not call for any special comment for the time being. The second type may be seen, for example, in the sentence *Clever as he was, he failed to grasp the idea*, where the concessive meaning arises from the contrast in meaning between the word *clever*, on the one hand, and the phrase *failed to grasp*, on the other. If this needs any proof, it can be provided by the simple expedient of introducing a change into the head clause, namely, replacing the phrase *failed to grasp* by the word *grasped*: *Clever as he was, he grasped the idea* — here the meaning is causal, rather than concessive, and this of course depends only on the combination of lexical meanings of the words *clever* and *grasped*. The pattern of the sentence, with the conjunction

as a part of it, merely expresses some kind of connection between what is expressed in the subordinate clause and what is said in the head clause.

Adverbial modifiers of concession are occasionally found in a simple sentence, and the preposition *despite* or the phrase *in spite of* is the usual way of introducing them. When the obstacle opposing the performance of the action is some other action, especially when it is performed by another agent, the more usual way of expressing it is by a subordinate clause.

Clauses introduced by the conjunction *though* can also, in certain circumstances, go beyond their essential concessive meaning; that is, in these circumstances they do not denote an action or situation in spite of which the action of the other clause takes place. Such clauses may be emancipated, that is, they may acquire an independent standing, and even become a separate sentence, as in the following example: *I suppose that I am ticketed as a Red there now for good and will be on the general blacklist. Though you never know. You never can tell.* (HEMINGWAY) The sentence *Though you never know* does not express an obstacle to the statement contained in the preceding sentence, but a new idea, or an afterthought limiting what had been said before.

The second type of concessive clause is seen in the following sentences: . . . *and great as was Catherine's curiosity, her courage was not equal to a wish of exploring them* (the mysterious apartments. — *B. I.*) *after dinner.* (J. AUSTEN) It is the combination of lexical meanings *great ... curiosity, courage . . . not equal* that shows the meaning to be concessive. *But deplorable as it might be, and undoubtedly was, there was another aspect of the case that more vitally concerned himself.* (DREISER) It is the words *another* and *more vitally* that point to the concessive meaning. Compare also: *And yet somewhere through all this gentleness ran a steel cord, for his staff was perpetually surprised to find out that, inattentive as he appeared to be, there was no detail of the business which he did not know; while hardly a transaction he made did not turn out to be based on a stroke of judgement.* (DURRELL)

Another type again may be seen in a sentence like this: *Coinciding with his holiday inclinations this request might have been successful in whatever words it had been couched.* (LINKLATER) Here it seems to be the meaning of the pronoun *whatever* which lies at the bottom of the concessive meaning of the clause.

Clauses of Manner and Comparison

These two kinds of adverbial clauses are not easily kept apart. Sometimes the clause is clearly one of manner, and does not contain or imply any comparison, as in the following sentences: *You must*

explain Barbary to him as best you can. (R. MACAULAY) Sometimes, on the other hand, the clause is clearly one of comparison, and does not contain or imply an indication of manner, as in the following sentence: *His wife must be a lady and a lady of blood, with as many airs and graces as Mrs Wilkes and the ability to manage Taza as well as Mrs Wilkes ordered her own domain.* (M. MITCHELL)

But there are also sentences where it may be argued, either that the comparison is merely a way of indicating the manner of an action, or that the comparison is the essential point, and the indication of manner merely an accompanying feature.¹

Since the problem of which view is the correct one, that is, whether the comparison or the indication of manner is the essential point, cannot be solved by objective methods, it is best to say that in such cases the distinction between the two types is neutralised, and that is what makes us treat the two types under a common heading, "clauses of manner and comparison".

The most typical conjunction in such clauses is the conjunction *as* and indeed, historically speaking, this is its earliest application in the language. The conjunction *as* is of course also used to introduce clauses of time and of cause, and it is only the context, that is, the lexical meanings of the words, that makes it clear what the function of the clause is. For instance, in the following example it is the meaning of the words *make money*, repeated as they are, that shows the clause to be a clause of comparison and not a clause of time or cause: *With the idea that she was as capable as a man came a sudden rush of pride and a violent longing to prove it, to make money for herself as men made money!* (M. MITCHELL) It is typical of *as*-clauses of comparison that the conjunction may have a correlative element in the head clause, which is usually another *as*. This may be seen in the following example, which is somewhat peculiar: *Do you find Bath as agreeable as when I had the honour of making the enquiry before?* (J. AUSTEN) The *when*-clause as such is a temporal clause: it indicates the time when an action ("his earlier enquiry") took place. However, being introduced by the conjunction *as*, which has its correlative, another *as*, in the main clause, it is at the same time a clause of comparison. It would seem that these two characteristics do not contradict each other but are, as it were, on different levels: the temporal clause occupies a position which might also be occupied by an adverbial modifier of time within a simple sentence, if, for instance, the sentence ran like this: *Do you find Bath as agreeable as last year?* In that case the phrase *as last year* would have been a subordinate part expressing

¹ The possibility of a twofold interpretation of such clauses appears to be based on the primary meaning of comparison inherent in the conjunction *as*.

comparison, while *last year* as such would have been an adverbial modifier of time. Such different levels of syntactical analysis do not appear to have received sufficient attention so far.

There may be some argument about the exact status of the *as* in the head clause. It may be said either that it is an adverb modifying the adjective or adverb which follows it, or that it makes part of a double conjunction as ... as, whose first element is within the head clause, while the second element introduces the subordinate clause. The first view is distinctly preferable, as the idea of an element of a subordinating conjunction coming within the head clause and tending to modify one of its parts is theoretically very doubtful.

Another variant including the conjunction *as* is the phrase *in the same way as* (*in the same manner as*), whose composition and function may be a matter of discussion. It may be taken as a phrase equivalent in function to a conjunction, and thus belonging in its entirety to the subordinate clause. Or else the phrase *in the same way as* may be viewed as divided between the head clause and the subordinate clause, only *as* belonging to the subordinate, and *in the same way* making part of the head clause as an adverbial modifier of manner. There seems to be no valid objective method of setting this question and it remains largely a matter of individual opinion. It may perhaps be argued that some sentences rather incline toward one interpretation, and others toward the other.

Another conjunction used to introduce clauses of comparison is *than*. It is naturally always associated with the comparative degree of an adjective or adverb in the head clause, as in the sentence: *Nobody can appreciate it more than I do.* (SHAW) *Than*-clauses do not seem to offer occasion for any special comment.

Let us now turn to the question of clauses of manner and comparison and adverbial modifiers in a simple sentence.

It is quite clear from the outset that a clause of comparison or manner is used when an action described in the head clause is to be characterised by comparing it to some other action. Adverbial modifiers in a simple sentence give only limited possibilities for this. They can be used to express that sort of idea if the comparison is not, strictly speaking, between the actions themselves but between different subjects performing the same action. This particular kind of comparison may indeed be expressed with the help of the conjunction *like*, as in the following example: *I never see a young woman in any station conduct herself like you have conducted yourself.* (DICKENS, quoted by Poutsma) This usage belongs to low colloquial style.

A similar kind of idea can also be expressed by means of a dependent appendix introduced by the conjunction *as*. In fact in some cases the difference between a simple sentence with a dependent appendix of this type (see above, p. 255) and a complex sen-

tence with a subordinate clause of comparison appears to be very slight: one may be changed into the other by merely adding or dropping the corresponding form of the verb *do* or *be*: *He works as efficiently as you (do)*, *He was as excited as she (was)*, etc. It is therefore natural that sentences without the form of *do* or *be* should have been considered as elliptical, with the verb "understood". However, as we have adopted the principle of not admitting ellipsis unless this is strictly necessary, we have chosen to treat those sentences (without *do* or *be*) as simple ones with a dependent appendix. So, accordingly, comparing them now with the complex sentences, we may state that the difference in such cases appears to be stylistic rather than anything else. The complex sentences are somewhat more literary in style than the simple ones with the dependent appendix introduced by the conjunction *as*.

The same considerations apply to the subordinate clauses with the conjunction *that* and simple sentences with a dependent appendix introduced by the same conjunction: compare *I am taller than he (is)*, *He works better than they (do)*, etc.

Other Types of Adverbial Clauses

There will always be subordinate clauses that will not fit into any of the types and subtypes we have considered above. Since it would be unsound to try and squeeze them into one of the classes so far established, two ways are open to us in this respect: either we shall try to establish some new classes, based on the characteristic features of these clauses, or we shall leave them outside all classes, contenting ourselves with the statement that they are subordinate clauses.

One of these types has been extensively treated in Poutsma's grammar. It is the type represented by the sentences: *The more narrowly I look the agreeable project in the face, the more I like it.* (L. MITCHELL) *The more she thought about it, the more suspicious and upset she became, and she made up her mind to find out where he went and what he did every Friday night for week after week and month after month.* (E. CALDWELL) The characteristic features of this type are, the particle *the* with a comparative degree of an adjective or adverb at the beginning of each clause, and the meaning that two actions develop in a parallel way: as the one develops, so does the other. Another variety of the same semantic type may be seen in the sentence, *As I grew richer, I grew more ambitious.* (CONAN DOYLE, quoted by Poutsma) Here it is once again the conjunction *as* introducing the main clause, and only the meanings of the words make it clear that it belongs to this particular type. Poutsma calls such clauses "clauses of proportionate agreement". This is a plausible view, and those who would like to have a complete system, where, as far as possible, every single type of clauses

should be foreseen and assigned its proper place, will agree with Poutsma in this question.

Another type of subordinate clause, which Poutsma proposes to term "clauses of alternative agreement", may be seen in the following examples, taken from Poutsma's Grammar: *He is said to have worn a coat blue on one side and white on the other, according as the Spanish or French party happened to be dominant.* (From "Notes and Queries") *The day had been one long struggle between mist and sun, a continual lightening and darkening, big with momentary elations and more tenacious disappointments, according as to which of the two antagonists got the upper hand.* (GERARD)

As to these clauses, they are probably too rare to require a special category or "pigeonhole" to be arranged for them.

The same may be said about another type of subordinate clause found in Poutsma's Grammar, one which he terms "clauses of exception", and which he illustrates, among others, by the following examples: *The Somersetshire peasants behaved themselves as if they had been veteran soldiers, save only that they levelled their pieces too high.* (TH. B. MACAULAY) *Miss Blimber presented exactly the same appearance she had presented yesterday, except that she wore a shawl.* (DICKENS)

Sentences of the type *It is the emotion that matters* (HUXLEY) have also to be considered here. There are two ways of looking at a sentence of this type. Either we take it as a simple sentence with the construction *it is ... that* used to emphasise the word or words included in it (compare p. 193), or we take it as a complex sentence with a subordinate clause beginning with the conjunction *that* (or, in other cases, with one of the relative pronouns *who*, *which*, or *that*). If the latter alternative is preferred (and it seems to be preferable, on the whole), the question arises, what kind of subordinate clause we have here, and this is indeed difficult to decide. Such clauses bear some resemblance to attributive clauses, but they will not easily fit into the definition of such clauses. Perhaps they had better be considered a special type of subordinate clauses, peculiar to such constructions.

In a similar way other types of subordinate clauses might be found, and an exhaustive system would hardly be possible. Besides, there is another consideration that we must take into account. In analysing a simple sentence we do not call the phrase "*except + noun*" an adverbial modifier of exception; there would seem to be no sufficient reason, therefore, to term the sentence given above from Dickens' "Dombey and Son", and other sentences of the same kind, subordinate clauses of exception.

It seems better, therefore, to leave such clauses and others which may occur outside the exact classification, characterising them as adverbial subordinate clauses only.

APPOSITIONAL CLAUSES AND PARENTHETICAL CLAUSES

APPOSITIONAL CLAUSES

Speaking of the simple sentence and its parts, we recognised the apposition as a special part of the sentence, not as a variety of an attribute (*see* p. 231). In a similar way, we will treat appositional clauses as a special type of subordinate clauses, not as a variety of attributive clauses, though they have some features in common with these.

Appositional clauses always modify a noun, usually an abstract noun, such as *fact, thought, idea, question, suggestion*, and the like. An appositional clause is introduced by the conjunction *that* (never by the pronoun *that*), by the conjunction *whether*, and its meaning is to show what idea, thought, or question, etc., is spoken of. Here is a typical example: "*One suffers so much,*" *Denis went on, "from the fact that beautiful words don't always mean what they ought to mean."* (HUXLEY)

In this sentence it is the grammatical context that shows that the word *that* introducing the subordinate clause is a conjunction, not a relative pronoun. It cannot be a relative pronoun, because it cannot be the subject of the clause since there is a subject (*the beautiful words*), and it cannot be the object either, since there is an object clause to the predicate *don't mean*. So it cannot be a part of the clause and it can only be a conjunction introducing the clause. Compare also this sentence: *I had little hope that my reproof would get through so easily; and it did not.* (A. WILSON)

An appositional clause may be separated from its head word, as in the following example: *But he did announce his opinion to his daughter-in-law that the ends of justice would so be best promoted, and that if the matter were driven to a trial it would not be for the honour of the court that a false verdict should be given.* (TROLLOPE) The two appositional clauses, *that the ends of justice would so be best promoted*, and *that . . . it would not be for the honour of the court*, with the two subordinate clauses of the second degree of subordination attached to it, obviously have the noun *opinion* as their head word. However, the first of the appositional clauses is separated from its head word by the phrase *to his daughter-in-law*. No ambiguity can arise here, as the lexical meanings of the words contained in the appositional clauses show that the clauses cannot possibly have *daughter-in-law* as their head word: that combination would make no sense. So here again, as in the other examples we have considered, separation of the subordinate clause from its head word is permissible where the lexical meanings of the words prevent any ambiguity or misunderstanding.

In the following example the appositional clause is separated from its head word by a verb: *But before Scarlett could start the two on their homeward journey, news came that the Yankees had swung to the south and were skirmishing along the railroad between Atlanta and Jonesboro.* (M. MITCHELL) The subordinate clause, *that the Yankees ... Jonesboro*, of course has the noun *news* as its head word, and the predicate verb *came* cannot obscure the relation.

The same is found in the following sentence, where the appositional clause introduced by the conjunction *whether* is separated from the noun *word*, to which it belongs, by the adverbial modifier *now*. *They're waiting for Sir Robert's word now whether old Smokey's got to go.* (A. WILSON)

PARENTHETICAL CLAUSES

In our treatment of parenthetical clauses, we will follow the lines set down for treatment of parentheses in a simple sentence: we will distinguish parenthetical clauses from inserted clauses and state that their function is the same as that of parentheses in a simple sentence.

The relation between parenthetical and subordinate clauses gives rise to some discussion. The traditional view held by most grammarians was that parentheses are not parts of a simple sentence but are outside it, and in a similar way parenthetical clauses were held not to be an organic part of a complex sentence and, consequently, not to be subordinate clauses but to be outside the structure of the sentence. In the same way that we have abandoned this view with reference to parentheses in a simple sentence, and recognised them as parts of the sentence, we will abandon the traditional view with regard to parenthetical clauses, and we will treat them as subordinate clauses of a special kind. This view is confirmed by the fact that the same conjunction *as* which we found introducing attributive, temporal, causal, and other types of clauses, can also introduce a parenthetical clause of a very familiar type exemplified by the following sentence: *Catherine endeavoured to persuade her, as she was herself persuaded, that her father and mother would never oppose their son's wishes.* (J. AUSTEN) The clause introduced by the conjunction *that* is here subordinated to the main clause, and at the same time it is also subordinated to the *as*-clause, which is apparently a kind of parenthetical clause (having also a shade of meaning of comparison). In this way it is at the same time a first-degree subordinate clause from one viewpoint, and a second-degree clause from another.

The following example is also instructive: *Hope, if it was Hope, had not heard him, and the chances of their ever meeting again were as slight as they were unimportant to him.* (BUECHNER) Let

us consider what will be changed if the *if*-clause is dropped. What will be actually lost is the information that he was not quite certain whether it was Hope after all. If it was not she, he could not assert that she had not heard him. So this *if*-clause curiously vacillates between a conditional and a parenthetical clause, and of course no choice between the two is here possible on grammatical, or, indeed, on any other grounds.

There appears to be no reason to deny that a parenthetical clause of this kind is a subordinate clause. If this view is endorsed there is every reason to suppose that a sentence consisting of a main and a parenthetical clause is a usual kind of complex sentence.

Parenthetical clauses introduced without any conjunction do not belong here and they will be considered in the chapter on asyndetic composite sentences.

**SOME GENERAL REMARKS
ON SYNDETIC COMPOSITE SENTENCES**

SYNTACTICAL CONNECTIONS OF SUBORDINATE CLAUSES

With some types of subordinate clauses the question may be raised, whether they are connected with the head clause as a whole, or with some part of it. Of course this question does not arise with reference to subject and predicative clauses, for example: they quite obviously refer to the head clause as a whole.¹

But most types of subordinate clauses have to be considered from this point of view. Since it is by no means certain that there are clear objective criteria to be applied in every particular case, and since the decision in some cases may prove arbitrary, it is as well to set down in advance what our method is going to be in such cases. It would appear that there are two methods to choose from: (1) we may decide that we will consider a subordinate clause to be subordinated to the whole main clause unless there are objective signs to show that it is subordinated to one part of it, or, (2) we may decide that we will consider a subordinate clause to be subordinated to a part of the head clause unless there are clear objective signs to show that it is subordinate to the main clause as a whole. Now, the second alternative does not appear to be convincing. Subject clauses and predicative clauses, which require no special consideration from this viewpoint, are clearly subordinated to the sentence as a whole, and this indeed appears the chief and essential kind of subordination. We will accordingly settle on the first alternative and state that we will consider a clause as subordinated to the whole unless there is clear evidence that it is subordinated to some part of the head clause. Such a decision will make our task easier and will at the same time point out in advance the degree of arbitrariness inherent in this problem.

Let us begin by two types which present least difficulty from this viewpoint, namely by attributive and appositional clauses. These

¹ In speaking about subject clauses and predicative clauses, we are faced with a peculiar difficulty. There appears to be some contradiction between the subject and predicate being the main parts of the sentence, and subject and predicative clauses being subordinate clauses: a subordinate clause is said to be the main part of the sentence. However, it appears that this difficulty is to be met by observing that the notions of main and secondary parts of a sentence and those of co-ordinate and subordinate clauses belong to different aspects of syntactic theory: if a clause (e.g. the clause *Whoever said this...*) cannot exist outside a certain type of context (e.g. *Whoever said this must have been misinformed*) we call it a subordinate clause, even though it represents the subject of the complex sentence. That is to say, a subject clause (and a predicative clause, too) should be called a subordinate clause on the grounds given above. However, this question certainly requires further analysis.

obviously belong to a part of the head clause, namely the word denoting the thing which is further characterised in the attributive or appositional clause. If the part of the sentence to which an attributive clause belongs is dropped, the attributive clause must obviously be dropped along with it, as without that part there is nothing left for it to be attached to.

The same reasoning applies to appositional clauses. They refer to an abstract noun, which is a part of the head clause, and would have to go if that noun were dropped. It is another clear case of a subordinate clause connected with one part of the head clause, not with the head clause as a whole.

Now let us consider the adverbial clauses. Here matters are somewhat less clear, as different types of adverbial clauses appear to be different from this viewpoint. With temporal, causal concessive, conditional, and resultative clauses, it is obvious that they belong to the head clause as a whole, not to any particular part of it. Let us consider a complex sentence with a conditional clause, that is, a conditional sentence, as an example. Take the sentence *And if you tell father, he might tell the police, and set them hunting for them.* (R. MACAULAY) There would not seem to be any doubt that the conditional clause belongs to the head clause as a whole. There is no reason to say that it belongs only to the predicate of the head clause. And the same will be true of other types of adverbial subordinate clauses which we have just mentioned.

Doubts are possible about clauses of manner and comparison. As a clause introduced by the conjunction *than* is necessitated by the comparative degree alone, and would be absolutely impossible in its absence, the conclusion seems to impose itself that the clause belongs to that part of the head clause which is expressed by the adjective or adverb in the comparative degree. (If it is an adjective, it may be either a predicative, or an attribute; if an adverb, it can only be an adverbial modifier of some kind.)

Now we proceed to object clauses, and this part of the problem appears to be the most difficult. For instance, in the sentence *He bought what he wanted*, does the object clause *what he wanted* belong to the head clause as a whole, or to the predicate *bought* alone? Or again, in the sentence *She may marry whom she likes*, does the object clause *whom she likes* belong to the head clause as a whole, or to the predicate *may marry* alone? There appears to be no clear evidence either way. On the one hand, it may be argued that the object clause is a part of the sentence just as an object is part of a simple sentence; it may also be pointed out that there is some parallelism between a subject clause and an object clause; compare, for instance, *What he knew worried him* and *He told me what he knew*. On the other hand, it may be argued that the object clause fully depends on the predicate verb and must go if that verb

is dropped. For want of unmistakable evidence either way, let us apply the principle agreed and draw the conclusion that an object clause belongs to the head clause as a whole.

Parenthetical clauses, in the vast majority of cases, refer to the head clause as a whole. They express the speaker's or writer's attitude to the statement contained in the head clause. However, there may be sentences in which the parenthetical clause refers not to the whole of the head clause but only to some fraction of it. Here are two examples: *Fleda found Mrs Gereth in modest apartments and with an air of fatigue in her distinguished face — a sign, as she privately remarked, of the strain of that effort to be discreet of which she herself had been having the benefit.* (H. JAMES) The parenthetical clause as *she privately remarked* refers only to the loose apposition *a sign... discreet* (with the attributive clause *of which... the benefit* belonging to it). *Yes, but I hadn't heard from you then that you could invent nothing better than, as you call it, to send him back to her.* (Idem) Such cases appear to be very rare.

THAT-CLAUSES

From a purely descriptive viewpoint, we can establish a category of clauses beginning with *that*. An analysis of the surrounding elements (the context) is needed to find out whether *that* in a given case is a demonstrative pronoun, a relative pronoun, or a conjunction, and what kind of clause is introduced by it. We will not at present dwell on the question how we have found out that the word *that* opens a clause (that would necessitate some additional investigation which does not belong here); we will consider it as settled that it does come at the beginning of a new clause, and we will limit ourselves to the study of the questions indicated above.

Let us first take two examples of sentences with clauses introduced by *that*: (1) *And he had heard that the house was costing Soames a pretty penny beyond what he had reckoned on spending.* (GALSWORTHY) (2) *The light fell on her soft, delicate hair, that was full of strands of gold and of tarnished gold and shadow.* (LAWRENCE) To determine what the word *that* is in each case and what sort of clause it introduces, let us examine the context more closely. In the first sentence *that* is preceded by *had heard* (a form of the verb *hear*) and followed by a noun with its article (*the house*), after which comes *was costing* (a form of the verb *cost*). This is enough to make it clear that *that* is a conjunction: it cannot be either a relative or a demonstrative pronoun, for the following reasons. It cannot be a relative pronoun because there is no noun either immediately before it or, indeed, anywhere before it; it cannot be a demonstrative pronoun because there is no noun immediately after it: the word immediately following is the definite

article, and this makes it clear that the word *that* is not a demonstrative pronoun. So it can only be a conjunction.

As the clause introduced by the conjunction *that* immediately follows a form of the verb *hear*, the clause can only be an object clause (provided we accept the view of object clauses laid down on page 281).

In our second example things are quite different. The word *that* immediately follows the noun *hair* and is followed by a form of the verb *be* and the adjective *full*. The preceding noun *hair* does not in itself give any decisive information about the status of the word *that*: it may, in different contexts, be either a relative pronoun, or a demonstrative pronoun (for instance, in the context *she did her hair that day*, or *she did her hair, that being essential for ...* etc.), or it may be a conjunction, for example, in the context *she did her hair that she might look...* etc.). It is the words that come after *that* which are decisive: the words *was full* show that the word *that* is not a conjunction: if it were a conjunction there would be no subject in the subordinate clause, and the predicate *was full* must have a subject coming before it. *That* might after all be a demonstrative pronoun; if this were so, the clause which begins here would be an independent clause and the sentence a compound sentence. This is, however, most unlikely, as such a use of the demonstrative *that* in this context would be stylistically awkward. So the only likely possibility is, that *that* is the relative pronoun, and the clause which begins here, a relative attributive clause.

As may be seen from these examples, quite a number of factors have to be taken into account if we are to find out by reasoning what part of speech the word *that* is in each case and what kind of clause it introduces.

A somewhat similar analysis might be given of clauses introduced, for instance, by the word *when*. This would show whether it was an adverb or a conjunction, and what kind of subordinate clause it introduced. The latter question (about the kind of clause) would also have to be considered with clauses introduced by the conjunction *whether*, and possibly with some other types of clauses too.

In dealing with syntactical connections within a complex sentence, it will be well to bear in mind that special cases are always possible, which cannot be foreseen by any general theory. Thus, a very peculiar use of conjunctions is seen in the following complex sentence: *He did not know why, exactly, he wrote, he said, unless perhaps that she might know to what extent he was guilty in that he could not bring himself with any sincerity to repent a sin that had for him such charm and value.* (BUECHNER) The conjunction *unless* would seem to introduce a clause, as it always does. But in this sentence *unless* is followed by *perhaps*, after which a clause

begins which is introduced by the conjunction *that*. It is quite clear from the predicate of this clause (*might know*) and also from the adverb *why* in the object clause *why, exactly, he wrote*, that this *that*-clause is a clause of purpose. But what, then, is the function of the conjunction *unless*? Its function would be clear if the sentence ran like this: *He did not know why, exactly, he wrote, he said, unless perhaps it were that she might know...*, or, alternatively, *He did not know why, exactly, he wrote, unless perhaps he wrote that she might know...* In each of these variants the conjunction *unless* would introduce a subordinate clause of its own, to which the clause of purpose would, in its turn, be subordinated. In the original text *unless* in a peculiar way connects with the head clause a clause of purpose which already has its own conjunction, namely, *that*.

PARALLELISM OF SYNTACTIC FUNCTIONS

When we set out to characterise the syntactic function of some word, phrase, or clause, we are often at a loss for want of objective criteria which would justify this or that view of their function, and we are often reduced to subjective opinions, often incompatible with one another, instead of reaching conclusions binding on every one. The result is that the whole sphere to which such a question belongs, begins to look like one inaccessible to scientific treatment, and we either reconcile ourselves to this state of things, or else we decide that the question had better be dropped altogether.

Among these questions is that of the function of subordinate clauses in a complex sentence. In more than one case the description of a subordinate clause as belonging to this or that type appears to be a scholar's private opinion rather than anything else. We must therefore attach special value to any objective criterion that might be discovered here, and we must be on a constant look-out for such criteria.

Now, a very valuable criterion in this sphere is parallel use of a subordinate clause and of a word or phrase in the same syntactic function. If the syntactic function of the word or phrase has been established — and this is in many cases an easier thing to do than with subordinate clauses — the function of the subordinate clause may be defined on this ground with a much greater degree of objectivity than on any other. Unfortunately, cases of this kind do not seem to be frequent. The more value should be attached to the few cases that there are.

The following sentence affords a clear example of parallelism: *For himself, he did not mind this but if she made silly jokes about the old ladies at Potter's Farm he would get angry and then Mummy would say all that about his having to learn to take a joke and about his being highly strung and where could he have got it from, not*

from her. (A. WILSON) Towards the end of it there are three parts connected by the conjunction *and*: ...*all that about his having to learn to take a joke and about his being highly strung and where could he have got it from, not from her*. So the syntactical function of the three parts (1) *about his having to learn to take a joke*, (2) *about his being highly strung*, (3) *where could he have got it from, not from her*, are bound to be the same. So a clause is shown to be on the same syntactical level as the two prepositional phrases introduced by *about*. If we agree that the two prepositional groups, joined as they are to the words *all that*, are on that account to be considered as attributes, the subordinate clause is bound to be an attributive clause.

A parallel use of a word and a clause is found in the following passage: "*I have heard that something very shocking indeed will soon come out in London.*" *Miss Tilney, to whom this was chiefly addressed, was startled, and hastily replied, "Indeed! — and of what nature?" "That I do not know, nor who is the author."* (J. AUSTEN) This extract is interesting in more than one respect. On the one hand, the demonstrative pronoun *that* is here used to replace a clause, as implied from the question "...*of what nature?*" The full answer might have been "*Of what nature it is, I do not know.*" On the other hand, in the last sentence of the extract, the object *that* is connected with the clause *who is the author* by the co-ordinating conjunction *nor*, which shows that they are parallel elements of the sentence, standing in the same relation to the predicate *do not know*. Again, if we term the pronoun *that* an object, there seems no valid reason for denying the status of object to the clause *who is the author*.

A similar parallel use of a secondary part of a sentence and of a subordinate clause is also seen in the following example: *During the evening, and until they finally went to bed at midnight, Judith attempted several times to get Eve to tell her what kind of job she had and about the kind of work she did, but Eve always laughed and said it was too unimportant to discuss at a time like that when they had not seen each other for so long and had so many interesting things to talk about.* (E. CALDWELL) There are two cases of such parallel use in this sentence. (1) The adverbial modifier *during the evening* and the subordinate clause *until they finally went to bed at midnight* are joined together by the conjunction *and*. Their similarity in meaning is seen from the fact that they are both introduced by words referring to time (*during* and *until*) and both contain nouns expressing temporal units (*evening, midnight*). So if we term the phrase *during the evening* an adverbial modifier of time, there is every reason to term the clause an adverbial clause of time. (2) With the verb *tell* there are two syntactical units denoting the contents of the action denoted by this verb: the subordinate clause

what kind of job she had, and the phrase *about the kind of work she did*, and they are also joined together by the conjunction *and*. Their closeness in meaning is also shown by the fact that the subordinate clause contains the words *kind of job*, and the following phrase the words *kind of work* (*job* and *work* being of course synonyms), though this lexical closeness is not here essential to prove the syntactical parallelism of the two units. Again, if we term the phrase *about the kind of work she did* an object, there is every reason to term the subordinate clause an object clause.

What had seemed his defeat, her unsuccessful reaction to his account of Bone in the chapel, could be altered completely now by her consent. (BUECHNER) The two syntactical elements, the subordinate clause *what had seemed his defeat*, and the phrase *her unsuccessful reaction to his account of Bone in the chapel*, are clearly connected with each other. Probably the best way to take this connection is to say that the phrase *her... chapel* is an apposition to the subordinate clause, which then apparently must be the subject clause: if both the clause and the phrase are dropped there will be no subject in the sentence; and if the clause alone is dropped, the phrase will be the subject in its place, which of course is quite the rule with an apposition to the subject, in whatever way it may happen to be expressed.

COMPLEX SENTENCES AS A WHOLE

Of course a complex sentence does not always consist of one main and one subordinate clause. It may contain two, three, or more subordinate clauses, which may or may not be connected with one another. Two subordinate clauses are connected with one another if they belong to the same type (for example, if they are both object clauses). In that case they may be joined by a co-ordinating conjunction (*and*, *but*, *or*). We can see an example in the following sentence: *He thought what a handsome pair they made, Lucien and his mother, and how the abbe had no chance at all with them.* (R. MACAULAY)

Another type of structure is seen when the subordinate clauses are not connected with each other. For instance, one of two attributive clauses within a complex sentence may modify one part of the head clause, and the other attributive clause may modify another part: *On the contrary, here I have everything that disappointed me without anything that I have not already tried and found wanting.* (SHAW)

In a similar way two adverbial clauses within a complex sentence may belong to different homogeneous predicates in the head clause, etc.

It is obvious that many varieties are here possible.

And again, the subordinate clauses contained in one complex sentence may have different functions: one may be attributive, another an object clause, a third may be adverbial, and so forth.

So far we have only considered complex sentences with subordinate clauses of the first degree, that is, clauses immediately subordinated to the main clause. However, that is far from being the only possible structure of a complex sentence. A subordinate clause may in its turn have another clause subordinated to it, that is, a subordinate clause of the second degree. That clause of the first degree to which another clause (of the second degree) is subordinated, has thus a twofold syntactical connection: on the one hand, it is a subordinate clause with reference to the main clause, and on the other, it is a head clause with reference to the second-degree subordinate clause. This may be seen, for example, in the following complex sentence: *Across her face there was passing a constant stream of infinitesimally delicate changes of expression, the most minute possible contraction of the brows or pursing of the lips, which gave an indication of restlessness that, if at any moment these movements became more marked, would shift into a complete picture of misery.* (R. WEST) In this sentence there is an attributive clause of the first degree, an attributive clause of the second degree, and a conditional clause of the third degree.

Many questions remain to be solved concerning the types of clauses which may be subordinates of the first degree and have at the same time further subordinates of the second and higher degrees attached to them, etc. It also remains to be seen whether, for instance, interrogative or imperative clauses can be met with as subordinate clauses of different degrees, etc.

There may also be homogeneous clauses, that is, two or more subordinate clauses, connected either with or without a conjunction, and performing the same syntactical function in the sentence. These clauses may or may not be introduced by the same subordinating conjunction or connective.

Thus, in the following example there are three homogeneous subject clauses. *Why Motley had told him, why he must ridiculously, having no rights, question her, and what she might answer were problems he had tried since his first enlightenment to thrust from him.* (BUECHNER) That the three clauses are homogeneous is clearly shown by the fact that there is the conjunction *and* between the second and the third of them, and also by the fact that the predicate of the head clause is *were problems*, with its link verb in the plural. The words introducing the three clauses are only partly alike: *why* for the first clause, *why* for the second, but *what* for the third.

In our next example the conjunction *as* introduces the two homogeneous predicative clauses: *All this was as it had always been, as it should be, and there was even a special gift, as he crossed between*

the statues, a huge and moving point of gray between the immobility of gilt and bronze, and proceeded to the side-street that led to the garage. (BUECHNER) The semantic connection between the two predicative clauses is of course quite clear: the first of them states the fact that the thing had always been so, and the second confirms that this was not a fortuitous but a necessary phenomenon due to certain laws. This example illustrates another point, too: it shows that an *as*-clause can also be predicative (besides being adverbial or attributive).

It is time now to examine the base of the division of conjunctions into co-ordinating and subordinating ones and of clauses into co-ordinated and subordinated ones.

In trying to answer this question we must of course take into account the grammatical structure of the language which we are analysing. Thus, in Modern German the difference between coordinate (or independent) and subordinate clauses is quite plainly expressed by the difference in word order: in a subordinate clause the finite verb predicate invariably comes at the end while in an independent clause the finite verb predicate comes either after the subject, or after an initial secondary part. Accordingly, in German, those conjunctions are termed subordinating, which introduce clauses with word order typical of subordinate clauses.

In a language which does not have any such distinction in word order this criterion is of course inapplicable and we must look for some other. There would seem to be three criteria which are actually applied but not always clearly formulated as such, namely (1) the function of the clause as compared to the corresponding element in a simple sentence, (2) the lexical meaning of the conjunction itself, (3) the possibility or impossibility of the clause in question being used outside the syntactical context in which it is usually found.

We can also say that the following question is of some importance here: which is the guiding factor, that is, do we call a conjunction subordinating because it introduces subordinate clauses or do we call a clause subordinate because it is introduced by a subordinating conjunction, or do both these considerations stand, as it were, on the same level, so that they go hand in hand, without either of them being dependent on the other? It would seem that in different cases this question is treated differently. It seems on the whole to amount to a problem of mutual relations between a lexical and a syntactical, that is, a grammatical, factor.

Let us first consider the question of conjunctions as such. What reasons have we, for instance, for saying that the word *though* is a subordinating conjunction? Let us take the lexical side of the question first. *Though* expresses a concessive relation, that is, it expresses a relation between two actions (or situations, etc.), of

which one is an obstacle to another, and that obstacle proves insufficient to actually prevent the action from being performed (or the situation from arising). The action is performed in spite of the obstacle stated in the *though*-clause. We infer from this analysis that the *though*-clause contains some secondary point, whereas the clause with which it is connected contains the main point in the sentence: ¹ if the *though*-clause were dropped the information about the action which was performed after all would remain all the same. So the reasoning seems to be this: the conjunction *though* expresses a relation between two actions which stand on an unequal footing; consequently it is a subordinating conjunction and the clause it introduces is bound to be a subordinate clause.

The question can also be approached from the syntactic angle. Namely, we can apply the test whether a unit introduced by the conjunction *though* can exist separately, as an independent sentence. If we try to isolate the *though*-clause making part of the above example we shall find that it cannot,² and we shall conclude that *though* is a subordinating conjunction.

In studying the structure of complex sentences, an important question arises which has been dealt with by various authors recently, namely the question whether a subordinate clause is or is not necessary for the subordinating clause.

Here we must distinguish between two basically different cases, A certain type of subordinate clause may be either absolutely (grammatically) necessary, that is, without it the subordinating clause could not exist at all, or it may be relatively (semantically) necessary, that is, the subordinating clause might exist without it, but the meaning of the sentence would be completely changed, or even it might become almost meaningless. There may probably also be intermediate cases.

Let us first consider some examples of sentences where the subordinate clause is not at all necessary to make the subordinating clause possible. "*And you scowled at Jack as if you wanted to kill him.*" (BRAINE) The subordinate clause could quite easily be omitted. "*And you scowled at Jack*" would be quite a satisfactory sentence. The same may be said of the sentence *Now I was out I didn't know what to do.* (LESSING) Omitting the subordinate clause

¹ This should not be taken to mean that the *though*-clause cannot in certain circumstances be the rheme of the sentence as a whole. That can be the case when the main action is known already and the new information conveyed in the sentence is about the obstacle which proved unable to prevent it.

² In making this assertion here we merely rely upon our own speech instinct, which of course is not sufficient proof. To prove the point we ought to study a sufficient amount of texts and to find that in fact no such *though*-sentences occur there.

we get the sentence *I didn't know what to do*, which is quite acceptable. A last example is: *Suddenly I heard a tap-tap tapping that got louder, sharp and clear, and I knew before I saw her that this was the sound of high heels on a pavement though it might just as well have been a hammer against stone.* (Idem) Here three subordinate clauses can be dropped without making the remaining sentence impossible: *Suddenly I heard a tap-tap tapping (. . .), and I knew (...) that this was the sound of high heels on a pavement (...)*, whereas the clause *that this was the sound of high heels on the pavement* cannot be dropped, as without it the verb *knew* would not make sense. In this case, then, the object clause *that — pavement* is absolutely (grammatically) necessary: its omission would destroy the whole sentence.

Now some examples of absolutely necessary subordinate clauses. *I felt as if I'd been taken by the scruff of the neck and dropped through a sky of hands and each hand, Alice's; I looked at the cigar and remembered that I'd given up smoking.* (BRAINE) The object clause cannot be omitted: a sentence *I looked at the cigar and remembered* would not make sense.

The same can be said about the sentence *She was sure that Susan wouldn't marry me, and she was sure that she could hold me.* (BRAINE) If both subordinate clauses are dropped, we get the text *She was sure, and she was sure*, which is obviously impossible.

Now for some examples of clauses which are relatively (semantically) necessary. *The time it took to cross the space of rough grass to the door of the little house was enough to show Dorothy was right.* (LESSING) If we drop the subordinate clause we get the text: *The time was enough to show Dorothy was right*, which is grammatically satisfactory, but leaves the meaning obscure: what time was enough to show that she was right? Here, then, it is a case of a subordinate clause which is semantically necessary, although the grammatical structure as such could well do without it. The same can be said of the following sentence. *Though spring had come, none of us saw it.* (LAWRENCE) Grammatically the sentence *None of us saw it* is faultless, but semantically it is unsatisfactory, because we do not see what is meant by *it*. This pronoun replaces the substantive *spring* which is used in the subordinate clause (an adverbial clause of concession).

It may not always be equally easy to distinguish between grammatical and semantic necessity of a clause, but the principle of distinction should be clear enough.

Let us consider one more example. *She looked at him, as he lay propped upon his elbow, turning towards hers his white face of fear and perplexity, like a child that cannot understand, and is afraid and wants to cry.* (Idem) Let us make the following experiment: first drop the second-degree subordinate clause and then

both of them. Dropping the second-degree clause, we get the sentence *She looked at him, as he lay propped upon his elbow, turning towards hers his white face of fear and perplexity, like a child (...)*. This is satisfactory, though the point of the phrase *like a child* remains somewhat obscure. If both clauses are dropped the sentence runs like this: *She looked at him*, which is quite satisfactory in every respect.

Such analysis should of course be pursued further, and this would probably yield valuable information concerning both the grammatical and the semantic structure of sentences.

COMPOUND-COMPLEX SENTENCES

It goes without saying that a sentence need not necessarily be either only compound or only complex. It may combine both types of clause connections within its structure. Thus, for instance, there may be a compound sentence in which each of the main clauses has one or more subordinate clauses (possibly of different degrees) attached to it. Besides, the subordinate clauses may of course differ from one another in various ways; for example, one subordinate clause may be attributive while another is adverbial, and so forth. Only a detailed investigation of all these varieties as they actually occur in texts will give an adequate idea of the structure of the composite sentence in Modern English. Here we will content ourselves with illustrating the point by the following composite sentence containing both co-ordination and subordination: *This was a section that knew the chill of winter, as well as the heat of summer, and there was a vigor and energy in the people that was strange to her.* (M. MITCHELL)

Of course, various groupings are possible here: the sentence may be basically compound, with each of the co-ordinated clauses having one or more subordinate clauses (eventually of different degrees) attached to it, or it may be essentially complex, that is, consisting of a main clause and several subordinate clauses, some of which may be homogeneous and co-ordinated with one another, so that co-ordination appears here, as it were, on a lower level than subordination. The number of types is probably very great. However, much remains to be done in this sphere before the actual picture of composite sentences in Modern English is cleared up.

**ASYNDETIC COMPOSITE SENTENCES.
INSERTED CLAUSES**

As has been pointed out above, by asyndetic we mean composite sentences whose constituent clauses are not joined together either by a conjunction or by any kind of conjunctive word (relative pronoun or relative adverb: *who, which, that, when, where*, etc.). This does not mean that there is nothing at all at the beginning of the second clause to express some kind of relation between the clauses. The second (or third, etc.) clause may begin with some word that does indicate some relation of this kind: for instance, if it begins with the adverb *however*, this indicates a semantic relation between the clauses akin to that expressed by the co-ordinating conjunction *but*; if it begins by the adverb *instead* this, too, indicates some sort of relation. Something similar may be said about such words as *nevertheless, nonetheless, therefore, notwithstanding, still*, etc. It may also be said that a personal or demonstrative pronoun referring back to some person or thing mentioned in the first clause of an asyndetic composite sentence (the so-called anaphoric use) performs some connecting function. Yet we will consider sentences built in this way to be asyndetic, as they do not contain any grammatical link between the clauses.

It must be admitted that the boundary between syndetic and asyndetic joining of clauses in a composite sentence is not clear. To some extent it depends on the way we view a particular word. For instance, if the second clause of a composite sentence opens with the word *yet*, we may say that it is an adverb and the connection is asyndetic, or else, that it is a conjunction and the connection is syndetic. Such doubtful cases depending on the student's viewpoint do not invalidate the basic distinction between syndetic and asyndetic composite sentences, which is of considerable importance in syntactic theory.

In traditional grammar asyndetic sentences, just as syndetic ones, were classified into compound and complex. For instance, the sentence *She held out her hand to him; not taking it, he stepped back and opened the door for her* (R. MACAULAY) would be classed among the compound sentences, and the sentence *Everything I've done to him has been outrageous* (Idem) among complex ones.

This traditional treatment of asyndetic composite sentences was, with reference to the Russian language, attacked in an article by Prof. N. Pospelov in 1950.¹ His suggestions on the classification of syndetic composite sentences were later endorsed by the editing

¹ See Н. С. Пospelов, *О грамматической природе и принципах классификации бессоюзных сложных предложений*. Вопросы синтаксиса современного русского языка, стр. 338—345.

staff of the Academy's Russian Grammar. Attempts have been since made to apply these ideas to other languages as well. There are phenomena of Modern English, however, notably the so-called asyndetic attributive clauses, which cause some difficulty in this respect (see below, p. 320).

The Academy's Grammar, endorsing Prof. Pospelov's views, describes asyndetic composite sentences in the following way.

Composite sentences formed without connecting words can be neither compound nor complex. Some asyndetic composite sentences express a general meaning of enumeration or juxtaposition, while others express more complicated semantic relations.¹

This way of looking at asyndetic composite sentences has been adopted by a number of scholars, including some who have studied corresponding phenomena in English.²

Such an approach to asyndetic composite sentences gives, however, rise to several questions, some of them of a more general character, applicable probably to most, or perhaps even to all languages, and others having special reference to Modern English, with its peculiar syntactic constructions. Anyway, it would not be wise to adopt the classification just stated without first considering it on its merits and then taking into account the specific English phenomena alluded to above.

First, then, let us pose the question, on what principle the classification laid down in the Academy's Grammar is based, namely, whether this is a grammatical principle, and if not, what sort of principle it is.

The difference between enumeration and juxtaposition, which lies at the bottom of that classification, cannot in any way be said

¹ „Сложные предложения могут формироваться из простых предложений без помощи союзов и относительных слов; в этом случае их синтаксическая цельность обуславливается взаимосвязанностью значения и строения входящих в их состав частей и выражается теми или иными ритмико-интонационными средствами. Такие сложные предложения называются бессоюзными сложными предложениями. Отдельные предложения, входя в состав бессоюзного сложного предложения, теряют свою самостоятельность, но, так как они не связаны друг с другом союзами или относительными словами, все предложение в целом не может считаться ни сложносочиненным, ни сложноподчиненным в строгом смысле этих терминов... Предложения, образующие части бессоюзного сложного предложения, могут быть однотипны или разнотипны по характеру их взаимоотношений. Бессоюзные сложные предложения, состоящие из однотипных частей, могут иметь или общее значение перечисления, или общее значение сопоставления ... Бессоюзные сложные предложения, состоящие из разнотипных частей, могут выражать более сложные смысловые взаимоотношения, более сложные виды зависимости; интонационные средства при этом более разнообразны". (*Грамматика русского языка*, т. II, ч. 2, стр. 382—384.)

² See, for example, Л. П. Зайцева, *Типы бессоюзных сложных предложений в современном английском языке*. Автореферат канд. дисс., 1955.

to be a grammatical principle. Neither enumeration nor juxtaposition is a grammatical notion and the opposition between these two non-grammatical notions cannot be a grammatical opposition. .1 So we are bound to give a negative answer to the first part of the question formulated above. As to the second part, namely, what kind of principle it is, the answer obviously should be, that it is a semantic principle, which is not one on which a grammatical classification can be built. Besides, the rhythm and intonation, which are alluded to as the chief means of expressing the connection between the parts of an asyndetic composite sentence, are of course only perceptible in oral speech, and as in analysing facts we have mainly to deal with writings, that oral peculiarity cannot be taken as the base of grammatical characteristic or analysis.

Consequently, some other approach to asyndetic composite sentences has to be sought, namely one which would take into account their grammatical features in the first place.

As one such principle we may choose that of the grammatical connection between the clauses making up an asyndetic composite sentence. First of all we may look for examples of a clause referring to some part of the other clause within the asyndetic sentence.

Here we find a type of clauses parallel to attributive clauses in a syndetic composite sentence and differing from them by the absence of a relative pronoun or adverb. Such clauses have been variously termed either "attributive clauses with the relative pronoun omitted", or "contact-clauses" (this is O. Jespersen's term).¹ This type of clause is familiar enough and can be found in any style of speech, e. g. *Mr Tanner: you are the most impudent person I have ever met.* (SHAW) *This is the one question you must never ask a soldier.* (Idem)²

Proof that clauses of this kind are attached to one part of the other clause, and not to the other clause as a whole, if such proof be necessary, can be found in the fact that omission of the antecedent, that is the noun to which the clause refers, makes the clause pointless and unintelligible. Facts showing the parallel use of syndetic and asyndetic attributive clauses referring to the same head word and connected by a co-ordinating conjunction are instructive from this viewpoint. *"I dislike crawling in any case," said Ronald. "Particularly to men I don't care for and whose ability I despise."* (SNOW) It is quite clear that there are here two clauses joined by *and* referring to the same head word, namely the noun *men*: (1) *I don't care for*, (2) *whose ability I despise*. These are strictly paral-

¹ See O. Jespersen, *A Modern English Grammar*, Part III, p. 132 ff.

² Clauses of this type have been the subject of a special study by L. Isho. See Л. Х. Ишо, *Бессоюзные определительные предложения в современном английском языке*. Автореферат канд. дисс.. 1962.

lel semantically, and they might be replaced by homogeneous attribute adjectives, for instance *uninteresting* and *despicable*. The first of the clauses can be asyndetic because the notion *men* to which it refers would have been in an object relation to the verb *care* in the asyndetic clause, which, with a relative pronoun absent, ends in the preposition *for*. The second clause, on the other hand, must of necessity be syndetic, as the noun *men*, to which it refers, stands in an attributive relation to the noun *ability* with which it is immediately connected. The relative possessive pronoun *whose* could not possibly be dropped: the variant *men I don't care for and ability I despise* would be grammatically inadmissible and unintelligible. So the second clause cannot be made asyndetic on semantic and syntactical grounds. The homogeneity of the two clauses is not affected by this difference in the ways the syntactical ties are expressed.

It seems to follow from this analysis that there is no reason to deny the status of a subordinate clause to the clause *I don't care for*, though it is an asyndetic clause.

These considerations also apply to the following sentence: *When you're with Sabrina, you find yourself suddenly talking about things you've always wanted to do and that you've forgotten.* (TAYLOR) Other examples could no doubt be found.

There is every reason to term such clauses asyndetic attributive clauses and to take them into account when we come to a general classification of asyndetic composite sentences.

Next we consider a type of asyndetic sentence which contains a clause following a verb like *think*, *suppose*, *say*, *tell*, etc., and stating the contents of what was thought, said, etc. Examples of this type are frequent enough. Here is one of them. *Barbary said she would like to keep some of the things, such as a musical-box, a yellow scarf decorated with black kittens, a paint-box, a canary with a whistle, a cushion with a handle, and a small alarm clock.* (R. MACAULAY)

Clauses of this type were formerly described as object clauses with the conjunction *that* omitted. We will not follow this way of looking at them, as the idea of "omission" is wholly unfounded and introduces an arbitrary element not justified by language facts. We will consider such clauses for what they are. With reference to this type the same question arises that we have already discussed with regard to syndetic object clauses with verbs like *say*, *think*, etc.; namely, do they belong to the other clause as a whole, or merely to the predicate verb? If we apply here the same principle that was established above (p. 308) we shall reach the conclusion that clauses of this kind belong to the preceding clause as a whole. Whether we choose to term such asyndetic clauses object clauses or not depends on what exact definition we give to an object clause and

what criteria we apply in each particular case to decide whether a given kind of clause is an object clause. If the fact that it occupies a position identical with that occupied by an object in a simple sentence is considered sufficient (which it probably should be) the asyndetic clauses found in the above examples may well be recognised as object clauses.

As in a number of other cases, parallel use of different units is significant for determining their nature. An asyndetic clause may be used in a sentence on the same level as a syndetic one which is clearly an object clause. This is what is seen in the following example: *I think you ought to tell him you've admired him for a long time and that you'd like to become better acquainted with him.* (E. CALDWELL) *Robert Jordan, his head in the shadow of the rocks, knew they could not see him and that it did not matter if they did.* (HEMINGWAY) Here the conjunction *and* joins together two clauses, of which the first is asyndetic. This would appear to be a strong argument in favour of the view that the asyndetic clause performs the same syntactical function as the *that*-clause to which it is joined in this way, viz. that it is an object clause.

Another question is, whether the asyndetic attributive clauses (Jespersen's "contact-clauses") and the asyndetic object clauses just considered should or should not be termed subordinate. This may perhaps seem unimportant, but it is closely linked to the bigger question whether the notion of subordination is at all applicable to asyndetic sentences. There is something to be said on both sides of this question. Since the asyndetic object clauses are exactly like the syndetic object clauses considered on page 279 ff., and they equally correspond to an object in a simple sentence, there would seem to be no sufficient reason to deny their being subordinate, merely because there is no *that*-conjunction to introduce them. We would therefore rather allow for asyndetic subordinate clauses in some cases, at least.

After considering these two specifically English types of clauses (asyndetic attributive and object clauses), let us now take a look at those far more numerous types of asyndetic clauses which are common to English and other languages, including Russian.

It will be well to take first a type with a definite purely grammatical peculiarity. It is the type represented, for instance, by the sentence *Had it not been for the presence of Captain Smellie he would have been perfectly happy.* (LINKLATER)

The grammatical peculiarity is of course the order "predicate + ,'+ subject" (or "part of predicate + subject + part of predicate") in the clause which in this example, and indeed in the vast majority of examples, comes first in the composite sentence. Without this order the sentence would not be possible.

The typical start of such clauses is either "*should* + noun + infinitive", or "*had* + noun + second participle," or, much less often, "*did* + noun + infinitive", and also "*were* + noun", which can be followed by a *to*-infinitive. The form of the predicate verb in the second clause may vary greatly. The meaning of such asyndetic clauses does not give rise to any doubt: they always express the condition on which the action of the following clause takes place. The question now arises, where and how is the meaning of condition expressed here? It is obviously not contained in the lexical meaning of any particular word or phrase, but resides mainly in the order of words in the first clause, and in the fact that this clause is followed by another to form a composite sentence. We may well check this by dropping the second clause in each case and leaving the first clause alone, that is, making a simple sentence out of it. The result will be a sentence with no conditional meaning whatever: an interrogative sentence. This definitely proves that the second clause plays a notable part in creating the general meaning of condition. So it appears that the conditional meaning is brought about by purely syntactical means. The lexical meanings of the words making up both clauses do not seem to be of any importance here, and this is basically different from the *as*-clauses considered on p. 288 ff., where the lexical meanings of the words contribute to the creation of a temporal, or causal, or comparative meaning.

So here we, no doubt, have conditional clauses and the question may again be asked whether they are subordinate or not. As in the case of asyndetic attributive and object clauses, there would seem to be no sufficient reason for denying this, though the question itself is rather unimportant. Those appear to be the only types of asyndetic clauses which ought to be termed subordinate.

Now we come to those other types of asyndetic clauses which are far more difficult to classify.

The difference between various types of composite sentences with asyndetic clauses may be illustrated by the following examples: *Barbary and Raoul had their heads tilted back: warm beer, which they did not like, gurgled down their throats; they felt like two chickens drinking, watched by a fox.* (R. MACAULAY) Here the clauses make up the description of a situation. *Roly will sleep with me; David will have his own cot of course.* (Idem) *His heart turned over as he looked at her; his unslain passion surged in him like a great wave.* (Idem) In the last two sentences simultaneous situations or processes are described. *She held out her hand to him; not taking it, he stepped back and opened the door for her.* (Idem) *He exchanged penetrating stares with his contemporary; then David, with squeaks of indignation, began to pummel him with his fists.* (Idem) Here two consecutive actions are mentioned. *Of course she disliked Barbary; how shouldn't she?* (Idem) The second clause

contains a comment on the situation stated in the first. The differences between the various types here illustrated are important enough from the semantic point of view; but they have no bearing on the grammatical structure of the sentences.

We must also mention one more type of asyndetic sentence, which may be seen in the following example: *Her eyes overflowed, and then grew so hot they dried her tears.* (WOODHILL) The semantic connection between the adverb *so* in the main clause and the subordinate clause is absolutely clear (what is meant is result), but no grammatical connection between them is in any way expressed. The distinction between co-ordination and subordination thus appears to be neutralised and the facts justify merely a statement to the effect that the sentence is composite and that the relation between its two clauses is only seen from the lexical meanings of the words composing them. A similar clause is found in the following example: *Her mind made a wild revolution casting up so much she scarcely knew where to turn for her words.* (BUECHNER) The semantic connection between the phrase *so much* in the first clause and the second clause is doubtless, but there are no signs of grammatical subordination in the sentence. Compare also: *What you want is a good-sized canvas bag, not so big it looks funny, but big enough to hold what you slip in.* (R. MACAULAY)

There are essential differences of meaning here which of course should be studied and classified from the stylistic viewpoint both in themselves and by comparison with syndetic composite sentences, compound and complex, which might have been used to describe the same facts and situations, etc. But all these differences, whatever their importance from a stylistic, literary, or any other point of view, lie beyond the sphere of grammar. From the grammatical viewpoint what ought to be studied is the means which are used in the various types of asyndetic composite sentence to keep the clauses together. These may be such as the use of tenses in the clauses making up an asyndetic sentence; the use of other grammatical categories, such as mood, aspect, etc.; the use of any other syntactic means with the same function. However, very little study in this field has been done so far. When it is done, new possibilities will most probably emerge of classifying asyndetic sentences. At the moment they are not clearly visible.

Among clauses joined asyndetically we should also note those which correspond in meaning to parenthetical subordinate clauses of the syndetic type. Here are two examples: *She too, she felt, was of the religion.* (H. JAMES) *Any one who looks at me can say, I think, what's the matter with me.* (Idem) Of course it is the lexical meaning of the verb functioning as predicate in the clause (*feel, think*) which shows what the relation between it and the rest of the sentence is. In these cases there is no formal sign to show

whether the clause is subordinate or not, and thus the distinction may be said to be neutralised here.

We will do well, on the whole, to content ourselves with the conclusion that in some asyndetic composite sentences (those including attributive, object, and conditional clauses), there is a main and a subordinate clause, while the other types of asyndetic sentences do not admit of such a distinction.

INSERTED CLAUSES

By an inserted clause we mean a clause appearing within another clause and interrupting its structure. A clause of this kind may either be asyndetic, or it may be introduced by a conjunction, most usually perhaps by the conjunction *for*. An inserted clause usually contains some information serving to elucidate what is said in the main body of the sentence, or it may be a casual interruption due to the speaker suddenly thinking of something vaguely connected with what he is talking about, etc. There is certainly no reason to term an inserted clause subordinate, since no signs of subordination are to be found. Neither is there any valid reason for saying it is co-ordinate in the sense that clauses are co-ordinate within a compound sentence. Indeed there are no clear signs which would prove that a sentence with an inserted clause is a composite sentence at all — though this of course depends on the exact interpretation we give of the notion of "composite sentence". The question whether a sentence with an inserted clause should or should not be considered a composite sentence is, after all, of little theoretical interest, and we here content ourselves with stating that we will not take it as composite. The sentence with the inserted clause taken out of it is a simple sentence (unless of course it contains co-ordinate or subordinate clauses) and with the inserted clause it may be reckoned as a special type — a simple sentence with an inserted clause.

Now let us consider a few examples of a sentence with an inserted clause. In our first example the clause coming between the predicate and the subject of the main clause contains information about the author of the statement, - and in this respect is akin to parenthetical clauses. *The bird-fancier could tell him little, but there was, he had declared, no doubt a great deal of information on the subject somewhere in his notes and as soon as they were properly indexed he would exhume it.* (BUECHNER)

In the two following examples the inserted clause has nothing of a parenthesis about it: *Before he went down — patent leather was his final choice — he looked at himself critically in the glass.* (HUXLEY) *In the Times, therefore — he had a distrust of other papers — he*

read the announcement for the evening. (GALSWORTHY) The inserted clause *he had a distrust of other papers* explains why he (old Jolyon Forsyte) took up the "Times", and at the same time it adds a certain characteristic feature to the portrait of the man. If the clause were introduced by the conjunction *for*, which would not involve any essential change of meaning but would only make it somewhat more explicit, the clause would still be an inserted clause.

Our next example is somewhat different: *There was a great deal more pleasure than formerly, pleasure was practically continuous — dancing at the Country Club every Saturday night in summer and quite often in winter, lunch with cards or golf and dinner parties — Wilson and she had at least four or five invitations every week — and short and long trips by automobile.* (HERGESHEIMER) The inserted clause *Wilson and she had at least four or five invitations every week* comes in and interrupts a sequence of appositions to the subject *pleasure*, namely, *dancing... lunch... parties... trips*. It comes after *parties* and makes it clear how frequent the parties were. It would hardly be possible here to add the conjunction *for* in front of the inserted clause: that would make the statement too exact and introduce an element of superfluous accuracy which is out of place here.

It must be owned, however, that the boundary line between inserted clauses remaining, as it were, outside the structure of the sentence proper, and clauses making part of that structure, is not always easy to draw; in certain cases it may depend on the grammarian's view, that is, it may be to some extent arbitrary. We may, then, either leave the question open, or decide in advance that doubtful cases of this kind will be judged in a definite way, for instance, that we will consider such doubtful sentences to be inserted.

DIFFERENT TYPES OF MIXED SENTENCES

It would be vain to expect that every sentence we can meet with in a text is bound to be either syndetic or asyndetic, either compound or complex, etc. Several or indeed all of these characteristics may be found in a sentence at the same time. It may, for instance, consist of several clauses, some of them connected with each other syndetically, i. e. by conjunctions or connective words, while others are connected asyndetically, i. e. without any such words; it is also possible that some of the clauses are co-ordinated with each other, so that a certain part of the whole sentence is compound, while others are subordinate, so that another part of the whole sentence is complex, etc. The amount of variations is here probably bound-

less, though to assert this with any degree of certainty a detailed study of a great number of texts would have to be made.

It would serve no useful purpose to invent special terms for every possible variety of sentence that might be found. It will perhaps be best to term them "mixed sentences". Here is an example of a mixed sentence showing simultaneously several of the syntactical peculiarities which we have so far studied separately: *Barbary did not tell Mavis where she had stored the things; the sly secrecy of the maquis rose in her; she said she had hidden them somewhere safe.* (R. MACAULAY)

SEQUENCE OF TENSES

The term "sequence of tenses", though widely used both in practical language teaching and in theoretical investigation, has still not received a clear and commonly accepted interpretation which might be used as a firm basis for further research in this field.

The different interpretations of this term are first of all distinguished by the scope of its application. In the widest possible sense the term "sequence of tenses" might include practically all cases of the use of two or more finite verb forms within a sentence. Taken in this widest sense, "sequence of tenses" would include such phenomena as the use of tenses of two homogeneous predicates in a sentence, or that of the predicate verbs in two clauses within a compound sentence.

Starting from this widest application of the term we might then gradually narrow it down, until we arrived at the narrowest possible interpretation, which would run something like this: "By sequence of tenses we mean the use of a tense form in a subordinate clause which is not in accordance with the meaning of the tense form itself but is conditioned by the tense form of the predicate verb in the head clause." Sequence of tenses in this narrowest meaning is found, for example, in the sentence *What did you say your name was?* The past tense *was* in the subordinate clause is not used because of its own meaning: the question is not about what the person's name was in the past, but about what it is now. So the use of the past tense in the subordinate clause is due to the fact that there is a past tense in the head clause, and to this fact alone: it cannot be accounted for in any other way. Such cases, then, fit into the narrowest definition of sequence of tenses.

Halfway between the extreme cases we have considered so far are a number of other sentences which admit of a double interpretation: it may be possible to argue that the use of a past tense in the subordinate clause is due to the influence of the tense in the head clause, but it is also possible to argue that the use of the tense is due to its own structural meaning. This may be seen, for instance, in the following sentence: *Sir Angus realised that his description of Helen was largely responsible for the sharpness of the last word, and for the execution of the rose in bloom.* (R. MACAULAY)

A twofold interpretation is possible here. On the one hand, we can assert that the past form *was* of the link verb in the subordinate clause is used because the predicate verb of the head clause is in the past tense and does not admit of a present form in the subordinate clause. If we take that view, the sentence will appear as an example of sequence of tenses. But on the other hand, it may be

argued that the past tense in the subordinate clause is used owing to the form's own meaning: the action of the subordinate clause is simultaneous with that of the head clause and is accordingly expressed by the same tense form.

A similar reasoning applies to our next example: *The lines on his face reminded her that he had known long and atrocious sufferings from wounds in the war.* (R. WEST) It may be argued either that the past perfect in the subordinate clause is due to the principle of sequence, or that it is used in its own right.

The choice between the two alternatives is entirely dependent on a scholar's viewpoint and it is not possible to prove that either of the two is the only correct one. If we prefer the former view, the notion of sequence of tenses will be taken in a wider sense, so as to include those types of sentences which admit of a different explanation. If we adhere to the second, the notion of sequence will be narrower, and will include only the sentences which do not admit of any other explanation. According as the one or the other view is endorsed, both the definition and the treatment of the sequence of tenses will have to be adjusted to it.¹

Let us consider one more example before we proceed to final conclusions on sequence of tenses. Let us compare the two sentences: *He sits near the window so that he may have a wider view of the landscape,* and *He sat near the window, so that he might have a wider view of the landscape.* The question is, why is the verb *may*, which is part of a compound modal predicate in the subordinate clause, used in the past tense form *might* in the second sentence? Is this use due to the sequence of tenses, i. e. does the tense of the predicate verb in the head clause (*sat*) influence the tense in the subordinate clause, so that the present tense *may* is inadmissible after it? Or is the use of the past tense *might* in the subordinate clause to be explained by the meaning of the form *might*? The answer seems to be this. As the action denoted by the predicate of the subordinate clause is not necessarily limited to the past tense (his wider view of the landscape might well last into the present), there would appear to be no need for using the past tense form on account of its own meaning. The conclusion seems therefore to follow, that the use of the form *might* is indeed due to the influence of the predicate verb form in the head clause. However, that view may perhaps be disputed, namely if we think that the action of the subordinate clause is limited to the past.

Having to make up our mind in favour of either one or the other alternative, we will decide to choose the narrower view, that is, to

¹ The whole problem has been treated at some length by Prof. I. Ivanova (see И. П. Иванова, *Последовательность времен английского языка. Исследования по английской филологии*, ЛГУ, 1958).

define sequence of tenses as a use of a tense entirely and unequivocally due to the tense form of the predicate verb in the head clause.

Taken that way, the rule of sequence applies to a limited number of syntactic situations only. It will not do to assert that sequence of tenses is a general law applying to all kinds of subordinate clauses and then to class all cases where this does not hold good as exceptions. Sequence of tenses applies to certain types of subordinate clauses only, and these are, object clauses and adverbial clauses of purpose. We need not give examples here, as the sentences we have so far considered in this chapter all belong either to the one or to the other variety. And even with object clauses sequence of tenses is not always found to be operating. Sometimes an object clause has its predicate verb in the present tense, though the predicate verb of the head clause is in one of the past tenses. This may be due either to the contents of the subordinate clause, or to the stylistic colouring of the sentence. The contents of the subordinate clause may tell on the tense of its predicate verb if the statement contained in it is to be presented as something objectively true, rather than as somebody's utterance. This may be seen, for example, in the following passage, where the speaker, reporting another speaker's words, does not mean merely to report them as the other man's utterance but presents them as intrinsically true, no matter who the speaker may have been. Sentences like the following, with no sequence of tenses after a main clause with its predicate verb in one of the past tenses, are by no means rare: *She had made me understand that not only her mother and brother, but you also, are well acquainted with the story of my acquaintance with Mrs Hurtle.* (TROLLOPE) It is but natural that as the degree of objective value of somebody else's words may vary, so may the use of either the one or the other tense in indirect speech.

As for stylistic peculiarities connected with the use of tenses in an object clause, it may be noted that absence of sequence, that is, the use of a present tense in a subordinate clause with a head clause having its predicate verb in a past tense, seems to characterise informal speech.

The general conclusion on sequence of tenses would then appear to be this, that it is the rule in Modern English, but not a rule that holds good in all cases equally. Under certain conditions, partly semantic and partly stylistic, a use of tenses is also possible which runs counter to the rule of sequence.

INDIRECT AND REPRESENTED SPEECH

INDIRECT SPEECH

In characterising indirect speech as compared with direct, we must dwell on two special cases in which a distinction found in direct speech gets lost in a change into indirect speech.

The first of these is the distinction between the past indefinite and the present perfect tense (and also the past perfect). Both of these, when changed into forms appropriate to indirect speech, are replaced by the past perfect. In a similar way, both the past continuous and the present perfect continuous (and, for that matter, the past perfect continuous) of direct speech will be replaced by the past perfect continuous in indirect speech. This is too well known to need illustration.

In terms of modern linguistic science, we may say that the distinction between the past indefinite and the present perfect (and the past perfect) is neutralised in indirect speech. This, in its turn, sheds some new light on the categories of tense and correlation which we discussed above (Chapters IX and X). The question is this: if the past tense (as distinct from the present) has a tense characteristic, and the present perfect (again, as distinct from the present) has a correlation characteristic, what should we think of the past perfect, which corresponds to the one as well as to the other? We have not the slightest reason to give preference to tense and to declare that tense is the more essential category, or to correlation, and say that correlation is more essential: each of these statements would be quite arbitrary. If we are to stick to an objective and unprejudiced view of facts, the only reasonable and justified conclusion would appear to be this: in the past perfect the two categories of tense and correlation are merged into one, that is, the difference between them is neutralised. This would also seem to show that the past perfect is not entirely parallel to the present perfect, since in the present perfect no such merger is either real or imaginable.

We may also observe that in the opposite operation, that is, in changing indirect speech into direct, we do not know whether the past perfect of indirect speech should be changed into a past indefinite or into a present perfect (or, indeed, left as it is, namely, as a past perfect), unless we take into account the context of the speech (or perhaps even the situation in which it is being pronounced). We have, in making this change into direct speech, to differentiate between two verbal categories which are not distinguished in the indirect speech text. This may be illustrated by the following extract from a modern novel: *She remembered that she had come to his house that night only because at a certain time at Madame Guillaume's party, when the Princesse de Cortignac and Monsieur de*

Gazière were coming toward the alcove where they sat, he had gripped her wrist. (R. WEST) In changing this passage into direct speech, should we change the past perfect forms *had come* and *had gripped* into a past tense or into a present perfect, or should we, perhaps, leave them as they are? To decide on this, we must look at the context, and in this particular case it is the words *that night* and *at a certain time* that are decisive: the tense to be used in direct speech is the past indefinite.

Another case of two different verbal forms of direct speech being replaced by one and the same form in indirect speech is seen in sentences with their "predicate verb in the future tense and those with their predicate verb in the form "should + infinitive" to express a conditional action. Let us first consider a self-made example: *He said, "I shall come if I have time" and He said, "I should come if I had time."* In converting each of these sentences into indirect speech, we arrive at the same result in both cases, namely, *He said that he would come if he had time.* Thus the distinction between futurity and conditionally, which is clearly expressed in direct speech, is neutralised in the indirect. We may as well recollect here what we said above (p. 137 ff.) about the grammatical interpretation of forms like *I should come* in their different applications. We can add now that that analysis is confirmed and reinforced by considerations proceeding from indirect speech. If we accept the view that there are two homonymous forms, the future and the conditional present (*I should come, he would come, etc.*), we shall have to say that in the sentence *He said that he would come if he had time* we cannot, without a context or some other additional information, tell whether *he would come* is a future-in-the-past or a conditional present. If, on the other hand, we prefer the view that *I should come, he would come, etc.*, is always one and the same form (whatever name we may give to it), we shall say that in the sentence *He said that he would come if he had time, he would come* is that form and the context or some other additional information will only be necessary to find out what exact meaning (or application) the form has in the given case. This may perhaps be taken to be an argument in favour of the unity of the form and against the homonymity theory.

The same of course applies, to the forms *I should be coming, I should have come, I should have been coming*, and to the corresponding forms in the passive voice of verbs which admit of a passive, e. g. *I should be invited, I should have been invited.*

In all of these cases, then, the change of direct into indirect speech implies the neutralisation of an opposition existing in direct speech, and the opposite change from indirect to direct speech implies the introduction (or restoration) of an opposition which was not to be seen in the indirect speech.

REPRESENTED SPEECH

There is another way of reporting a character's speech, or, still more commonly, his thoughts, which is especially common in 20th century authors, but which may occasionally be found in much earlier writers. This is neither direct speech, which reproduces the speaker's exact words, as they were uttered, in quotation marks; nor is it indirect speech, which retells the character's words from the author's point of view, and is characterised by such formulas as, *He said that...* The third way of reporting a character's speech or his thoughts stands apart from those two. It is not direct speech, as it does not reproduce the speaker's words in their original form, and it is not indirect speech, as it does not introduce them by formulas like *He said that...*, though the changes in the personal pronouns, etc. are made.

A typical specimen of this third way, which is sometimes referred to as "represented speech", may be seen in the following extract from "Swan Song" by Galsworthy: *Jon Forsyte's sensations on landing at Newhaven, by the last possible boat, after five and a half years' absence, had been most peculiar. All the way by car to Wansdon under the Sussex Downs he was in a sort of excited dream. England! What wonderful chalk, what wonderful green! What an air of having been there for ever! The sudden dips into villages, the old bridges, the sheep, the beech clumps! And the cuckoo — not heard for six years! A poet, somewhat dormant of late, stirred within this young man. Delicious old country! Anne would be crazy about this countryside — it was so beautifully finished. When the general strike was over she could come along, and he would show her everything. In the meantime she would be all right with his mother in Paris, and he would be free for any job he could get.* The beginning of this passage, up to the words *excited dream*, belongs to the author. With the word *England* begins a passage which expresses Jon's feelings, and this goes on up to the word *six years*. Then comes the sentence *A poet . . . young man*, which clearly belongs to the author. The last part of the extract, from the words *delicious old country* to the words *he could get* again expresses Jon's feelings. If we try to state exactly what signs there are to show that one part of the passage belongs to the author and another expresses Jon's feelings, we will find the following. The points of exclamation clearly show that the sentences thus marked express the character's feelings. So do the one-member sentences *England!* and *Delicious old country!* That the sentence *A poet . . . young man* does not express Jon's feelings is obvious, among other things, from the words *young man*, which Jon would not use to refer to himself. A characteristic feature is the forms *would be*, *would show*, *would be*, *would be*. Jon's thoughts would run like this: "*When the general strike is over she*

can come along, and I will show her everything. In the meantime she will be all right with my mother in Paris, and I shall be free for any job I can get." The difference between this reconstruction and the actual text lies in the tenses of the verbs and in the use of personal pronouns (third person in the text and first person in our reconstruction). These latter traits make us think of indirect speech, yet what we find in the text is not pure indirect speech: there is no introductory sentence like *he said to himself* or *he thought* and the future-in-the-past forms *would be*, etc. do not appear as a result of sequence of tenses in subordinate clauses. The units in which the future-in-the-past forms are used are not subordinate clauses but independent sentences. These, then, are characteristic features of represented speech, distinct from direct as well as from, indirect speech.

An essentially similar use is also found in the following passage from a modern novel: *Stella was gone. She didn't count with Stella, never had, and never would.* (WOODHILL) These are the thoughts of a young girl who has seen her best friend go away in an angry state of mind. The tenses in her own thoughts, as they ran, were, of course, the present, past, and future respectively (*do not count, never have, and never shall*). In represented speech the tenses are the same as they would have been in indirect speech.

We will not" discuss here those problems of represented speech which are of a stylistic or literary, rather than of a grammatical character. What matters from the grammatical point of view is the use of exclamatory one-member sentences (as distinct from indirect speech) and the use of the future-in-the-past in independent sentences, which is distinct from direct speech.

It may also be noted that represented speech differs from both direct and indirect speech in that it is a mainly literary phenomenon.

In the overwhelming majority of cases, as in the above extract from Galsworthy, what is rendered in this way is not actual speech, that is, words pronounced by a character and heard by another, but thoughts which were not uttered aloud. In a few cases, however, actual loud speech or dialogue can also be rendered in this way. To illustrate this, here is an extract from a novel by Jane Austen, in which indirect speech changes into represented speech: . . . *the General, coming forwards, called her hastily, and, as Catherine thought, rather angrily back, demanding whither she were going? And what was there more to be seen? Had not Miss Morland already seen all that could be worth her notice? And did she not suppose her friend might be glad of some refreshment after so much exercise?* The transition is gradual, and it is achieved in the following way. The first question to come after the verb *demanding* is indirect. Only the question mark at its end, which may to some

extent indicate intonation, is something that does not fit into the pattern of indirect speech. The second question is formulated in a way pointing to represented rather than to indirect speech, as is seen from the word order. In an indirect question the order would have been: ... *what more there was to be seen*, with *there* and *was* in the same order as in a declarative sentence. The last two sentences are quite clearly represented speech.

Thus represented speech, alongside of direct and indirect speech, is a very effective means of rendering the thoughts, and sometimes the uttered words, of characters in a novel or short story.

PUNCTUATION

Though punctuation is not in itself part of the grammatical structure of a language, it cannot be passed over in silence in a treatise on grammar, as it may, and often does, acquire grammatical significance. The other layer of language with which punctuation is connected is of course its phonetic layer, namely intonation.

In different languages the relations between punctuation, intonation, and grammar (syntax) may be different, that is, punctuation may tend to indicate intonation to a greater or to a smaller extent. It certainly always has something to do with grammar. Now from this viewpoint it may be said that in English punctuation is connected with intonation to a greater extent than in Russian. Without going into details at the moment, we may content ourselves with recalling one fact. In Russian there is a strict principle saying that a subordinate clause is always marked off from its head clause by a comma. Thus, practically speaking, if there is no comma in a sentence, we may be certain that there is no subordinate clause in it. In English, on the other hand, there is no such general principle: sometimes a subordinate clause is not separated from its head clause by any punctuation mark whatsoever. This, for instance, is the case in the following sentence: *Only now, because of the fact that she felt that she needed a new hat to go with the coat, she decided to say that it cost one hundred and twenty-five instead of one hundred and fifteen.* (DREISER) There are several subordinate clauses here which are not marked off by any commas, namely, (1) *that she felt* (an appositional clause to *fact*). (2) *that she needed a new hat to go with the coat* (an object clause to *felt*). (3) *that it cost one hundred and twenty-five instead of one hundred and fifteen* (an object clause to *say*). The absence of commas here is due to the fact that in actual speech there is no intonational break between the subordinate clause and its head clause in any of these cases (this of course has to be ascertained by phonetic experiment and analysis). There are only two commas in the sentence, namely after *now* (this comma marks the beginning of the loose adverbial modifier *because of the fact...* with all the subordinate clauses belonging to it), and another after *coat*, to mark the end of the whole group. Thus from the number of commas no deduction could be made about the number of subordinate clauses found within the sentence.

This general characteristic of English punctuation as distinct from Russian should be kept in mind in dealing with it.

We will no longer speak of the intonational value of punctuation and we will concentrate on its grammatical significance.

Let us first take those punctuation marks which have reference to the sentence as such (that is, as a unit), and serve to point to the

end of a sentence and to its Communication type. These two functions, though essentially different, are performed by punctuation marks simultaneously.

The punctuation marks performing these functions are, the full stop (.), the question mark (?), and the exclamation mark (!).

The full stop may, in general, be said to be a signal of the end of a sentence, though its use as a sign of abbreviation (in such expressions as *a. m.*, *p. m.*, *B. C.*, *A. D.*, etc.) shows that its sentence-ending function is not necessarily the only one. However, with this reservation the function of the full stop as a signal of sentence end may be said to be almost certain.¹

The other function of the full stop refers to the communication character of the sentence. Namely, a full stop shows that the sentence is not interrogative and not exclamatory. That is the only conclusion in this way that can be drawn from it. The question whether the sentence *is* declarative or imperative cannot be settled by the presence of a full stop at the end. Imperative sentences with a full stop at the end are quite possible, though not exactly frequent. Here are a few examples: *Oh, just look at the collar, and those sleeves and those pockets.* (DREISER) *Don't go acting like this.* (Idem) The utmost that can be said in this respect is that it is much more likely for a sentence ending with a full stop to be a declarative than an imperative sentence.

The other two punctuation marks which can signal the end of a sentence are the question mark and the exclamation mark. This function of theirs may be said to be almost certain. We are, however, bound to say "almost", because we must take into account some special cases, mainly in direct speech, where there may be a question mark or an exclamation mark, though the sentence including direct speech may run on after that, as in the following examples: *"Renegade!" said Mr Blythe.* (GALSWORTHY) *"Why can one always tell an Englishman?" said John.* (Idem) Of course there are two things to be distinguished here. The sentence *"Renegade!"* as pronounced by Mr Blythe is certainly finished where the exclamation mark stands, and so is the sentence *"Why can one always tell an Englishman?"* as pronounced by John, at the point where the interrogation mark stands. But the sentences *"Renegade!" said Mr Blythe* and *"Why can one always tell an Englishman?" said*

¹ It should be noted, too, that in recent times the use of the full stop in abbreviations tends to be restricted. For instance, nowadays no full stop is used if the last letter of an abbreviation is the last letter of the word, as in *Mr*, *Mrs*. There is also a tendency to drop the full stop in such abbreviations as *n* (for noun), *v* (for verb) in dictionaries, etc. This makes the function of the full stop to mark the sentence end more certain.

John, as written by Galsworthy, are not finished at those points. They run on with the word *said* in both cases and the name of the speaker. So it will perhaps be best to say that the question mark and the exclamation mark do signal the end of the sentence in one way, and do not signal it in another way. There appear to be, as it were, two layers of sentence ends in such cases as these.¹

The functions of the two punctuation marks to show the communication type of the sentence are unmistakable.

The question mark certainly always shows the sentence to be interrogative, even though the question contained in it may be rhetorical, which does not affect the grammatical type of the sentence. The only thing to be noted here is that a question mark is also always used at the end of sentences with a so-called tag-question, as in the following example: *By the way, you didn't chance to bring along your dress suit with you, did you?* (DREISER) or *But you didn't have to fall all over and dream in his eyes, either, did you?* (Idem) Such sentences may be taken in different ways. They might, for instance, be termed half-interrogative, or they might be taken as compound sentences, with the first clause declarative, and the second interrogative. But whichever way we choose to look at them, some interrogative quality is found all the same, either in a diluted way in the sentence as a whole, or else in a concentrated state in the latter part of it.

The exclamation mark is a sufficiently certain signal of the sentence being either exclamatory or emotional (see p. 187). It is obvious that a non-exclamatory and non-emotional sentence cannot have an exclamation mark at its end. As to the other peculiarities of the sentence, namely, whether it is an exclamatory sentence, or an emotional, declarative, interrogative, or imperative one, the exclamation mark, of course, does not say anything.

The other punctuation marks have no reference to the sentence as such, except, we may say, indirectly. Some of them do, and some do not, show that the sentence is not finished. Let us first have a look at the punctuation marks which definitely show that the sentence is not finished. These are: the comma (,), the semicolon (;), and the colon (:). If we see any of these punctuation marks in the text, we may be quite sure that the sentence is not finished and will run on.

The other remaining punctuation marks are not certain signs of this. Let us, for instance, consider the dash (—). This may occasionally occur as a sign that the sentence is interrupted, that is,

¹ The full stop does not appear in such ambiguous positions. It is always replaced by a comma when the inserted sentence of the type *said he* is added.

it will not run on, though it is not syntactically rounded off. In this case the following word ought to begin with a capital letter: if it began with a small one, this would mean that the sentence is running on. Here are two examples of an interrupted sentence ending with a dash: "*But we ain't got Old Joe. We got —*" "*Shut up, you fool!*" (M. MITCHELL) "*Why, Uncle Peter! What on earth —*" (Idem)

The repeated dots (three and more often four) are also sometimes used in this way. They are a signal showing interruption, if the following word begins with a capital letter (we must set apart cases when that word is a proper name). Repeated dots are, however, much less frequently used in English than in Russian, where they are the usual means of showing interruption in the sentence. Here is an example of this rather rare use in English: *Was he not merely thinking of an accident that, had it occurred or could it but occur in his case. . . Ah, — but that could it but occur. There was the dark and evil thought about which he must not, he must not think. He MUST NOT. And yet — and yet.. . He was an excellent swimmer and could swim ashore, no doubt — whatever the distance.* (DREISER) Let us first consider the first repeated dots (after *case*). The sentence is obviously interrupted, as the attributive subordinate clause beginning with the pronoun *that* and modifying the noun *accident* is never brought to an end; it ought to have been resumed after the end of the second-degree subordinate clause (a clause of condition) *had it occurred or could it but occur in his case*, but is not resumed (the capital initial *A* of the following *Ah* proves that a new sentence is beginning there). So, in this particular case, the repeated dots stand at the end of an interrupted sentence, though they in themselves would not be sufficient proof that what follows is the beginning of a new sentence.

As to the repeated dots after *and yet*, it must be said that the words *and yet* (repeated twice) cannot in themselves be a sentence, and as the following word *He* begins with a capital Я, it is clear that it is again the beginning of a new sentence, so that the preceding sentence is shown to be interrupted, and the dots clearly stand at the end of this interrupted sentence.

In other cases, of course, both the dash and the repeated dots may come at a place in the sentence which is not its end: the following word begins with a small letter, which is proof that the sentence is continued. Let us first have a look at a dash in such circumstances: *It was wrong — wrong — terribly wrong.* (DREISER) As the second *wrong* and *terribly* begin with a small letter, it is clear that neither the first nor the second dash stands at the end of a sentence, which runs right on from the word *it* to the third and last *wrong*.

As for repeated dots used elsewhere than at the end of a sentence, they are very seldom met with in texts. Here is one example: *And yet as she walked home from this trivial and fairly representative scene, her heart was not nearly so angry as it was sad and sore because of the love and comfort that had vanished and was not likely ever to come again. . . ever. . . ever. Oh, how terrible. . . how terrible!* (DREISER) In both sentences the repeated dots are in each case followed by a word beginning with a small letter, and that proves that the sentence is running on.

So much for the possible significance of punctuation marks for the end of a sentence and for its communication type.

Now we come to the meaning of punctuation marks within a sentence.

We must first of all distinguish between punctuation marks going in pairs, those which can, but need not, form pairs, and those that never form pairs.

There are two of them belonging to the first category: brackets (parentheses) and inverted commas. These cannot occur in any other way but in pairs. Two other punctuation marks may, but need not necessarily, be used in pairs. These are dashes and commas. If we have a dash or a comma in a sentence we cannot at once tell whether it makes part of a pair or not: that will only appear as we read on. Two dashes occurring at a close interval from each other may or may not form a pair: this will only be made clear by the grammatical and semantic conditions of the sentence; and the same may be said about two commas.

Let us first have a look at sentences where two dashes do form a pair.

They — Messrs Foster, Crockett and Porter — had been used to make surgical instruments, which were what she would now require. (R. MACAULAY) *And the factory section which lay opposite the small city — across the Mohawk — was little more than a red and gray assemblage of buildings with here and there a smoke-slack projecting upward, and connected with the city by two bridges — a dozen blocks apart — one of them directly at his depot, a wide traffic bridge across which traveled a car-line following the curves of Central Avenue, dotted here and there with stores and small houses.* (DREISER) There are two pairs of dashes here: the first pair consisting of the dash after *city* and the one after *the Mohawk*, and the second consisting of the dash after *bridges* and the one after *apart*. That they really are pairs, and not merely a chance accumulation of dashes, is shown by grammatical and lexical features of the sentence, namely, for the first pair of dashes, by the fact that if we omit the words enclosed by the dashes, *across the Mohawk*, the sentence will lose a closer definition of the site of the factory section described, but will not be changed in any

other way: in fact the words *across the Mohawk* give a more exact description of the site, as characterised by the preceding text (*opposite the small city*). The phrase *across the Mohawk* is a loose adverbial modifier. As to the second pair of dashes, it clearly encloses a loose attribute to the noun *bridges*, the distance between them being stated to be a dozen blocks. In that case, too, if the words *a dozen blocks apart* are dropped, the distance between the two bridges will be unknown, but the structure of the sentence will not be otherwise changed.

In other cases two dashes, though they may be close to each other, do not form a pair, and this again becomes clear from grammatical and semantic considerations. Let us take an example from Galsworthy: *All I meant was that when you tell me a thing is going to cost so much, I like to — well, in fact, I — like to know where I am*. That these two dashes do not form a pair is clear from the fact that we cannot drop the words standing between them without getting an inadmissible text: *All I meant was that when you tell me a thing is going to cost so much, I like to like to know where I am*. So each of the two dashes has to be taken as a separate unit, and in fact, in this sentence each of them expresses a stopping, or hesitation on the part of the speaker.

In a similar way, we must find out whether two commas form a pair or not. Here is an example of two commas forming a pair: *He looked rather dirty and stupid, and even as much flaminess as that of the young cock, which he had tied by the leg, would never glow in him*. (LAWRENCE) If we drop the words between the comma which comes after *cock* and the one which comes after *leg*, we shall lose a characteristic of the cock (indeed, these words form a subordinate attributive clause), and the text would run on without them. Thus the two correlative commas are vised to single out a certain element in the sentence (a subordinate clause).

The same may be said about two commas forming a pair in the following sentence: *Life had worn him down on one side, till, like that family of which he was the head, he had lost balance*. (GALSWORTHY) The words *like that family of which he was the head*, consisting of a prepositional phrase and a subordinate attributive clause, may be dropped, and the result would be the loss of additional information based upon a comparison between "him" (Old Jolyon Forsyte) and his family: the sentence would run on: *Life had worn him down on one side till he had lost balance*.

In other cases, again, two commas within a sentence may have nothing to do with each other, as in this example: *His features were wide and flattened, and he had prominent, pale eyes...* (MAUGHAM) The comma after *flattened* and the comma after *prominent* are not in any way connected with each other, the words standing

between them do not form any sort of syntactical unit, and they could not be safely dropped without damaging the syntactical structure of the sentence, as will be seen from the following experiment: *His features were wide and flattened pale eyes*, which is not grammatically tenable. Indeed the two commas perform quite different functions here: the comma after *flattened* marks off the first clause of the compound sentence from its second clause, while the one after *prominent* serves to separate from each other two homogeneous attributes (*prominent* and *pale*) to the word *eyes*.

The number of single commas, that is, commas not connected with one another, is probably much greater than that of commas going in pairs.

The remaining punctuation marks never form pairs. For instance, semicolons, though of course there may be two or three or more of them within a sentence, never combine into pairs.

Let us take a sentence with two semicolons in it: *We must pass over De Quincey, whose romantic prose, as in the Mail Coach and the Opium Eater, is infused with the imaginative quality of a dream consciousness; Lamb, with his gentle, whimsical Elia; Hazlitt, whose high spirits and easy-flowing style in My First Acquaintance with the Poets belie his assurance that he found writing so hard.* (NORTON)

The same may be said about colons: they never go in pairs either, and it must be added that we seldom find more than one colon in a sentence.

Punctuation marks forming pairs always single out some separate part of the sentence. This may be either a loose secondary part, or a subordinate clause, or a parenthesis, or, last not least, an insertion. We will briefly consider some examples. *A number of young English poets — brought up, no doubt, to the notes of Henley's anthology, Lyra Heroica — were either killed during the World War or died while it was going on.* (CHADBURN) The two dashes single out a loose attribute, and the first two commas a parenthesis. *James Elroy Flecker was a more original poet. Though his poems are usually romantic — The Golden Journey to Samarkand, the prologue to his Eastern play, Hassan, might serve as a general title to them all — he is less oracular than Tennyson, less copious and more self-critical.* (CHADBURN) The inserted clause coming in between a subordinate clause of concession and the main clause is marked off by dashes.

Now, whether the portion of the sentence enclosed between two commas, or two dashes, or parentheses, is a loose part, or a subordinate clause, or an insertion, has of course to be determined by careful study of the text and even that may sometimes fail to give a completely certain result.

Now let us proceed to a study of the non-paired punctuation marks with their individual peculiarities, from the grammatical viewpoint.

What grammatical information do we derive from a semicolon in a sentence, that is, what can we suppose about the structure of the sentence, before we take a look at the actual words composing it? It is not possible here to say anything with absolute certainty, as the use of the semicolon is not circumscribed by strict rules. However, more likely than not, a sentence containing a semicolon will be a composite sentence, and very likely a compound one, with the semicolon separating two independent clauses from one another. This is the case, for instance, in the following examples: *He had tried to kill Mrs Moore this evening, on the roof of the Nawab Bahadur's house; but she still eluded him, and the atmosphere remained tranquil.* (FORSTER) Both before and after the semicolon there is at least one independent clause. *I had only seen the poor creature for a few hours when she was taken ill; really this has been needlessly distressing, it spoils one's home-coming.* (Idem) In this particular case what precedes the semicolon is a combination of a main and a subordinate clause; what follows it is a combination of two independent clauses. If we were to apply the term "sentence" somewhat loosely, we might say that the semicolon is preceded by a complex sentence and followed by a compound one. What matters, however, is that in each of the two halves there is an independent clause, and thus the sentence may be termed compound in the first place.

Occasionally, however, this general principle of a semicolon being a sign of a compound sentence will not hold good. There may be special reason inducing a writer to use a semicolon outside a compound sentence; and this will mainly happen in a sentence having a certain amount of commas within it, when some division in the sentence has to be marked off by some punctuation mark stronger than a comma. This is, for instance, the case in the sentence from Norton which we quoted on p. 342.

Thus the semicolon is a punctuation mark affording high probability, but not certainty, of the sentence being compound.

The colon, in so far as grammar is concerned, is rather similar in function to the semicolon. It also is a pretty sure signal of a compound sentence, with the additional shade of meaning of the latter part giving some explanation or illustration of what has been stated in the former. Here is a clear example from E. M. Forster: *And it seemed to him for a time that the dead awaited him, and when the illusion faded it left behind it an emptiness that was almost guilt: "This really is the end," he thought, "and I gave her the final blow."* What follows the colon is the statement of his thoughts»

illustrating the idea of guilt mentioned in the first part (that preceding the colon).

A similar example is found in the same author: *Fielding was a blank, frank atheist, but he respected every opinion his friend held: to do this is essential to friendship*. The part preceding the colon in this case is itself a compound sentence (in a somewhat loose application of the term); this, however, is irrelevant for the fact that the colon is a signal of a compound sentence, in so far as there is an independent clause on either side of it.

The function of the colon is somewhat more complicated because it is occasionally used to introduce direct speech. It is well known, however, that this use of the colon is much less characteristic of English than of Russian: in English direct speech is often preceded by a comma, especially if it does not begin a new paragraph.

The grammatical significance of the comma is much harder to define. Its uses are so varied that it appears to be practically impossible to give it a general characteristic: it may mark the end of a main clause, or of a subordinate clause, or it may stand between homogeneous members (whether subjects, predicates, predicatives, objects, adverbial modifiers, or attributes), or it may also mark off an apposition, a direct address, etc. The only thing that may perhaps be said about the function of the comma in general is, that it marks some kind of syntactical division. It will perhaps be best to illustrate this by pointing out contexts in which a comma would not be possible. These are:

(1) The group of attribute and head word (by attribute is meant one that is not loose). No comma would for instance be possible after the word *one*, or after *two*, or after *distinct* in the following sentence: *At one period two distinct tombs containing Esmiss Esmoor's remains were reported*. (FORSTER) (2) The group of subject and predicate. Thus, no comma would be possible after the word *Fielding* in the sentence, *Fielding said no more* (Idem), or after the word *Weeks*, or after *eyes*, or *Philip*, or *American* in the sentence *Weeks spoke seriously, but his gray eyes twinkled a little at the end of his long speech, and Philip flushed when he saw that the American was making fun of him*. (MAUGHAM) Commas are also impossible in certain other groups, as between a preposition and a noun. The essential point is, that a comma does mark some kind of grammatical division, at least that between homogeneous parts of a sentence or that between a loose secondary part and the rest of the sentence. The more exact function of a comma in every given case can only be made out by considering its syntactical surroundings.

Such, then, would appear to be the grammatical functions of punctuation marks. They might also be shown by a very simple experiment: dropping all punctuation marks from a certain passage in a text and finding out what points in the grammatical structure

of the passage are lost or at least obscured by this omission. This would reveal the exact value of punctuation from the grammatical viewpoint.¹

The function of inverted commas, or quotation marks (" "), stands somewhat apart from that of other punctuation marks. From the grammatical viewpoint inverted commas appear to have no significance.

¹ A similar investigation might be made about the grammatical value of intonation. But this would require experimental study of English pronunciation, which lies beyond the scope of this book. Some main points concerning the grammatical value of intonation are to be found in books on phonetics.

CONCLUSION

In this final section we will consider some general questions of the structure of Modern English.

Over the last few decades many new problems have arisen in the study of sentence structure. Some of them are strictly grammatical, others tend in some measure to reach into the lexical and semantic sphere. One of these problems is that of autosemantic and synsemantic sentences. These terms denote the difference between sentences whose meaning is clear in itself, and does not require either the preceding or the following environment (we might also say: either the left-hand or the right-hand environment) to make it clear, and sentences whose meaning does require such environment and is not clear without it.

As an example of autosemantic sentences we can take the opening sentence of some text: its meaning can certainly not depend on any preceding (left-hand) environment, since such environment is not available, and it is usually independent of any ensuing (right-hand) environment too.

Here is the opening sentence of the novel *Room at the Top* by John Braine: *I came to Warley on a wet September morning with the sky the grey of Gutsely sandstone*. The meaning of the sentence is perfectly clear without any outside help. Now let us take a look at the next sentence: *I was alone in the compartment*. Here things are different. The implications of the word *compartment* would not be clear without the preceding sentence. What is meant is of course the *compartment* of a railway carriage, and the idea of a railway carriage, though not expressly mentioned, is clearly suggested by the phrase *came to Warley*. Though the reader may not know what *Warley* is, the turn of the phrase suggests that it is a town and that the narrator arrived in it by train. Thus, the words *came to Warley* pave the way for a correct understanding of the word *compartment*. The second sentence in the text is synsemantic.

Now let us consider the beginning of another novel, *The White Peacock* by D. H. Lawrence. Here it is.

I stood watching the shadowy fish slide through the gloom of the mill-pond. They were grey, descendants of the silvery things that had darted away from the monks, in the young days when the valley was lusty. The whole place was gathered in the musing of old age.

The opening sentence is clearly autosemantic. The second sentence is not. The reader would not know what was meant by the pronoun *they* which is its subject. Only the connection with the opening sentence makes it clear that the pronoun *they* replaces the substantive *fish*, which is the object of the first sentence.

Now let us consider another passage further on in the same text:

I was almost startled into the water from my perch on the alder roots by a voice saying:

'Well, what is there to look at?' My friend was a young farmer, stoutly built, brown-eyed, with a naturally fair skin burned dark and freckled in patches. He laughed, seeing me start, and looked down at me with lazy curiosity.

The implication of the word *water* in the first sentence of this passage is made clear by the preceding text, where both *mill-pond* and *stream* occur. As to the words *my friend* in the second sentence of the passage, their meaning would be unintelligible without the direct-speech sentence that precedes it: *'Well, what is there to look at?'*; it is clear from this context that my friend is the person who pronounced those words. Thus we see here again a clear instance of a synsemantic sentence.

Now we consider an example of a somewhat different kind. This is the beginning of the novel *The World of William Clissold* by H. G. Wells.

Yesterday I was fifty-nine, and in a year I shall be sixty — "Getting on for seventy," as the unpleasant old phrase goes. I was born in November, 1865, and this is November, 1924. The average duration of life in England is fifty-one and a half, so I am already eight years and a half beyond the common lot. The percentage of people who live beyond sixty is forty-seven. Beyond seventy it is thirty. Only one in five thousand lives beyond one hundred, and of this small body of centenarians two-thirds are women.

In this passage all sentences but one are autosemantic, that is, each of them is perfectly intelligible without the help of any other. Only the last sentence but one is an exception. Indeed, if we had come across the sentence *Beyond seventy it is thirty*, we could not make sense of it — it might even appear to be absurd: how could thirty be beyond seventy? The full version of the sentence, which would make it autosemantic, would run — *The percentage of people who live beyond seventy is thirty*. As it is in the actual text, the entire phrase *the percentage of people who live* — has been replaced by the pronoun *it*, whose right understanding is of course completely dependent on the preceding sentence.

Detailed study of autosemantic and synsemantic sentences would most probably yield important information about the way language works.

Words establishing connections between sentences are of different kinds: here we find personal and possessive pronouns, partly also demonstrative pronouns, pronominal adverbs (such as *here, there, now, then*), also conjunctions and conjunctive adverbs (such as *instead, nevertheless, therefore, however*, etc.).

Purely grammatical means of establishing such connections are some verbal forms, e. g. the past perfect, which presupposes that the

action expressed by this form preceded some other action, which presumably was (or will be) expressed by the past indefinite, etc.

THE PROBLEM OF HIGHER SYNTACTICAL UNITS

This problem may be formulated as follows: is the sentence the highest existing syntactical unit, or are there higher syntactical units than the sentence — units of which a sentence is but a component part?

The traditional view of course is that the sentence is the highest syntactical unit and that whatever units we may find of a higher order will be not syntactical, but either stylistic, or literary. However, this traditional view has been questioned in a paper by Prof. N. Pospelov.¹ Although Pospelov treats of the Russian language only, his views have a bearing on linguistics in general, since his reasonings are not based on any specifically Russian material, but on material found in other languages as well, and possibly in all languages. Therefore we will devote some space to the analysis of these ideas, as they may be applied to the English language.

What reasons are there, then, to suppose that there exists a grammatical, that is, a syntactical unit higher than the sentence, and how are the limits of this higher unit to be delineated?

The chief consideration that may be laid down in favour of this view is, that sometimes co-ordinating conjunctions establish some sort of connection between independent sentences, separated from each other by a full stop. The two conjunctions that are especially frequent in this function are, *and* and *but*. The conjunction *and* is found in this function often enough, and some writers seem to have a special predilection for it. Here is a typical example from Th. Dreiser's "An American Tragedy": *They had been to all these wonderful places together. And now, without any real consciousness of her movements, she was moving from the chair to the edge of the bed, sitting with elbows on knees and chin in hands; or she was before the mirror or peering restlessly out into the dark to see if there were any trace of day. And at six, and six-thirty when the light was just breaking and it was nearing time to dress, she was still up — in the chair, on the edge of the bed, in the corner before the mirror. But she had reached but one definite conclusion and that was that in some way she must arrange not to have Clyde leave her.*

It might perhaps be said that the higher unit established by co-ordinating conjunctions is somewhat like what we call a "paragraph". But a conjunction of this kind may even be found at the

¹ See Н. С. Пospelov, *Проблема сложного синтаксического целого в современном русском языке*. Учёные записки МГУ, вып. 137, кн. 2, 1948

beginning of a paragraph. Thus, in the passage just quoted the sentence *And now, without any real consciousness...* stands at the opening of a new paragraph, and so does the sentence beginning with *But she had reached...*

Occasionally a conjunction of this kind may even stand at the opening of a new chapter, as is the case in the following extract from "An American Tragedy":

The beauty of the various houses along Wykeage Avenue and its immediate tributaries! The unusual and intriguing sense of movement and life there so much in evidence. Oh, if he were but of it!

Chapter XXIII

And then, one November evening as Clyde was walking along Wykeage Avenue, just west of Central, a portion of the locally celebrated avenue which, ever since he had moved to Mrs Peyton's he was accustomed to traverse to and from his work, one thing did occur which in so far as he and the Griffiths were concerned was destined to bring about a chain of events which none of them could possibly have foreseen.

If we were to take the view that a co-ordinating conjunction always forms some kind of grammatical unit, we should have to say, in this case, that the grammatical unit formed by the conjunction *and* embraces the end of one chapter and the beginning of another. That, however, would be most unnatural. If, therefore, we have to choose between the two alternatives: either to admit that a conjunction may join two independent sentences without forming any higher grammatical unit, or to say that a higher grammatical unit may include parts of two chapters, and so forth, we will decidedly prefer the first of them. This, however, will make it necessary to add something to the definition of a conjunction: a conjunction may unite words, parts of a sentence, clauses, and independent sentences as well (compare above, p. 31).

Let us study the means which are used to establish connections between sentences. And this leads on to a series of questions which may be said to lie on the border line of grammar.

What is meant is study of the structure of entire texts, such as short newspaper notices, poems, or novels. In this study it does not appear possible to stay strictly within the limits of grammar: some lexical phenomena will also have to be taken into consideration.

We will only give some hints as to the possible trends of investigation in this field, and we begin by studying some opening

paragraphs of a modern novel. Let this be *Eyeless in Gaza* by Aldous Huxley:

The snapshots had become almost as dim as memories. This young woman who had stood in a garden at the turn of the century was like a ghost at cockcrow. His mother, Anthony Beavis recognised. A year or two, perhaps only a month or two, before she died. But fashion, as he peered at the brown phantom, fashion is a topiary art. Those swan-like loins! That long slanting cascade of bosom — without any apparent relation to the naked body beneath! And all that hair, like an ornamental deformity of the skull! Oddly hideous and repellent it seemed in 1933. And yet, if he shut his eyes (as he could not resist doing), he could see his mother languidly beautiful on her chaise-longue, or, agile, playing tennis, or swooping like a bird across the ice of a far-off winter,

Now let us take a look at the elements in this passage which in some way or other tend to establish connections between sentences.

In the first sentence there is the past perfect form *had become*, which points to two time levels in the narration. In the second sentence, there is another past perfect form — *had stood* and this time it is correlated with the past indefinite form *was* in the same sentence.

In the third sentence the possessive pronoun *his* does not establish any connection with the preceding text, as there has so far been no mention of any man, to whom the possessive pronoun might refer. It refers to the name *Anthony Beavis*, which appears after the pronoun (this is not a frequent use). If there had been mention of a man in the preceding text this would be misleading. In the next sentence the pronoun *she* establishes a connection both with the second sentence (the phrase *this young woman*) and with the third (the phrase *his mother*).

In the next sentence, the conjunction *but* establishes a relation with the preceding text. So does the pronoun *he*, referring to the name *Anthony Beavis*, and also the phrase *the brown phantom*, which (as is clear from the context) refers to features of the woman in the photo. Then the pronoun *it* refers to the phrase *all that hair*, and would be unintelligible without this reference. Finally, the phrase *his mother* in the last sentence of the passage clearly refers back to the identical phrase *his mother* used in the third sentence.

Further investigation into such means of establishing connections between independent sentences should yield valuable conclusions about logical and semantic structure of larger text units. It is fairly obvious that here grammatical means go hand in hand with lexical ones, and the scholar's task should be to find out the precise part played by each of these, and the way they combine to produce the final result.

REPRESENTATION AND SUBSTITUTION

It will often be found in Modern English, as in other languages, that some element of a sentence apparently necessary to its meaning is not actually there and its function is taken up by some other element. We will first illustrate this general statement by two examples which will at the same time show two different ways of expressing the function of an element which is not there: (1) *I could not find him, though I wanted to.* (2) *He works more than you do.* The full text of these sentences would evidently run like this: (1) *I could not find him, though I wanted to find him.* (2) *He works more than you work.* What we have to discuss is, in what way the meaning of the words *find him* and *work* respectively is suggested without their being actually used in the sentence. In the first of the two sentences, *I could not find him, though I wanted to*, the meaning of the missing infinitive *to find* with the adhering pronoun *him* is suggested by merely using the infinitival particle *to* (after *wanted*) which, as it were, does duty for the infinitive and the pronoun (or it might be a noun, or indeed any phrase denoting the object of the verb *find*). No extra word is used here, that is, no word that would not stand in the full text of the sentence as we have reconstructed it. The particle *to* may be said to represent the infinitive and the noun or pronoun denoting the object of the action.

This way of suggesting the meaning of words not actually used may be termed "representation".

In our other example, *He works more than you do*, things are somewhat different. If we compare the text as it stands with the full version: *He works more than you work*, we see that there is in our text a word that is not found in the full version, namely the verb *do*. It is quite obvious that the verb *do* in such cases may replace any verb except the auxiliaries *be*, *have*, etc., and the modal verbs *can*, *may*, etc. It should also be noted that the verb *do* in this function need not necessarily be in the same tense, or mood, as the verb which it replaces.

This case differs from the one considered above in that a word appears which would not have been used in a full version of the sentence. This way may be termed "substitution", as distinct from representation.

Having established the main facts concerning representation and substitution, we can now proceed to point out some typical phenomena of both kinds in Modern English.

There are some cases of representation highly characteristic of the English language. Among these we must mention, in the first place, representation by an auxiliary verb of an analytical verb form of which it is a part. The auxiliary verbs capable of performing this function are, *be*, *have*, *shall*, *will*, *should*, *would*, e. g. "*Oh*,

shes fainted again." *"No I havnt."* (SHAW) The auxiliary always represents the analytical verb form which was last used in the sentence. This indeed appears to be the only natural and idiomatic way of expressing the ideas in question: if the speaker had used the full form, this would in every case sound strikingly awkward and inappropriate, no matter what the stylistic sphere of the text may be. Compare also: *"Which of us was the better fencer?" "I was."* *"Of course you were."* (Idem)

This kind of representation is found within the limits of one sentence, as in the example already quoted: *She didn't count with Stella, never had, and never would* (WOODHILL) and also in short answers in dialogue, as in the following extracts: *"I have a frightful feeling that I shall let myself be married because it is the world's will that you should have a husband."* *"I daresay I shall, someday."* (SHAW) *"Do you intend to tell him what you have been telling me to-night?" "I hadn't meant to. I had rather not."* (R. MACAULAY)

Auxiliary and modal verbs, and the infinitival particle *to* are the chief means of representation in Modern English.

The other way of suggesting the meaning of a word that is not actually used in the sentence is substitution. Instead of repeating a word that has already been used in the sentence, or in the preceding one, another word is used, whose own lexical meaning is irrelevant and which serves as a means of "hinting" at the meaning of the word that is not repeated.

The two main words used in this function are the verb *do* and the pronoun *one*, each in its own sphere, of course. The verb *do* can substitute any verb except those enumerated OB page 351, in fact it can substitute all the verbs with which it is used to form their interrogative and negative forms. For instance, it can substitute the verb *appreciate*, as in the sentence *Nobody can appreciate it more than I do* (SHAW), just as it is used in its interrogative and negative forms: *Do you appreciate it? He does not appreciate it*, etc. But it cannot be used to substitute, for instance, the verb *must*, just as it is not used to derive interrogative and negative forms of that verb.

It will be readily seen that in the sphere of verbs representation and substitution complete each other: in some verbal forms (present indefinite and past indefinite) substitution by *do* is used, whereas in all other forms (the analytical ones) representation is the method used.

Occasionally the verb *do* in this function can even precede the verb which it replaces. This is the case in the following sentence: *As he was accustomed to doing, Harry closed the sale and had the signed contract in his pocket within fifteen minutes.* (E. CALDWELL) It may even be said that the verb *do* here replaces the whole phrase *closed... fifteen minutes*.

As to the other substitution word, the pronoun *one*, it is of course used to substitute nouns. It is important to note that its use is limited. The noun to be substituted should be in its indefinite variety, that is, it should be accompanied by the indefinite article: otherwise its substitution by the pronoun *one* is not possible. Compare the two following bits of dialogue: (1) "*Have you found an English teacher?*" "*Yes, I have found one,*" but (2) "*Have you found the English teacher?*" "*Yes, I have found him (or her),*" not "*one*". Or again: "*Do you know a foreign language?*" "*Yes, I know one*" but "*Do you know the English language?*" "*Yes, I know it.*"

So the meaning of indefiniteness adheres to the pronoun *one* as it does to the indefinite article, whose doublet it actually is. However, the pronoun *one* differs from the indefinite article in that it has a plural form (*ones*), which the indefinite article of course has not.

On the other hand, however, the pronoun *one* can also be used with reference to a definite object, and in that case it is preceded by the definite article and some limiting attribute must come either before it (i. e. between the definite article and the pronoun) or after it, in the shape of an attributive clause with or without a relative pronoun. Hence the following types of groups are possible: (1) *the green one, the larger one*, (2) *the one which you mentioned, the one he bought*, etc. or in the plural, (1) *the green ones, the ones you mentioned*, (2) *the ones which you mentioned, the ones he bought*, etc.

Though the pronoun *one* is thus a very common substitute for a noun not repeated in the sentence, it by no means follows that the pronoun must be used wherever such repetition is avoided. Sentences are numerous enough in which the pronoun *one* is not used: we may say that in these cases it is the preceding attribute (which is usually, if not always, an adjective) that represents the omitted noun which is to be understood from a former part of the sentence, or from a preceding sentence. Here is a characteristic example from the beginning of a sketch by Jerome K. Jerome: "*Now, which would you advise, dear? You see, with the red I shan't be able to wear my magenta hat.*" "*Well, then, why not have the grey?*" "*Yes, yes, I think the grey will be more useful.*" "*It's a good material.*" "*Yes, and it's a pretty grey. You know what I mean, dear; not a common grey. Of course grey is always an uninteresting colour.*" "*It's quiet.*" "*And then again, what I feel about the red is that it is so warm-looking. Red makes you feel warm even when you're not warm. You know what I mean, dear.*" "*Well, then, why not have the red? It suits you — red.*"

In the whole of this extract the noun *material*, to which the words *red* and *grey* refer, has only been used once. It appears, too,

that the adjectives *red* and *grey* tend to be substantivised, as is seen from the use of the phrases *a pretty grey* and *a common grey*. Speaking of substitution in a wider sense, we might include personal pronouns of the third person, which more often than not perform this function. But this lies beyond that specific sphere or representation and substitution which we are considering here, and besides in this use of personal pronouns English does not appear to differ in any way from other languages.

GRAMMAR AND STYLE

Though problems of style as such are outside the scope of this book, some remarks concerning the stylistic value of grammatical categories and grammatical elements may prove appropriate to a thorough study of English grammatical structure.

From the stylistic viewpoint, it should first of all be noted that some grammatical categories and phenomena are neutral while others are not. To be more explicit, this means that some grammatical phenomena may appear in any sort of speech, whether oral or written, whether solemn or vulgar, etc., without in any way conflicting with the stylistic colouring of the text, whatever it may happen to be. Other grammatical phenomena, on the other hand, have a distinct stylistic colouring and will produce an effect of inappropriateness if applied outside their stylistic sphere.

To illustrate this general statement, we might say that the past indefinite tense is devoid of any stylistic colouring, it is stylistically neutral and it appears both in a solemn hymn and in a street song, and indeed in any kind of text without any exception whatsoever. On the other hand, the so-called absolute construction, as in the sentence *She picked up a large split-oak basket and started down, the back stairs, each step jouncing her head until her spine seemed to be trying to crash through the top of her skull* (M. MITCHELL) has a distinctly literary flavour. Constructions of this kind are not used in colloquial speech and if, say, an author were to put a construction of this kind into the mouth of a character in a comedy of modern English life, it would sound singularly inappropriate. To take a different example: the forms of the personal pronouns *him*, *her*, *us*, *them*, used in the function of a predicative after the subject *it* and the link verb *is*, or *was*, have a very distinct low colloquial tinge, and they would be completely inappropriate in a literary, still more so in a solemn context. A sentence like *It was them that did it* has that peculiar stylistic colouring which creates a certain atmosphere, even if nothing preceded that sentence (for example, if it were the opening sentence of some short story). All this has to be reckoned with in characterising the grammatical resources of the Modern English language.

We will now give a brief survey of the grammatical categories and the grammatical phenomena which bear (or tend to bear) some kind of stylistic colouring or other, first those of morphology, then those of syntax.

Morphology

In the sphere of nouns there is not much to be noted in the way of stylistic colouring.

In a very few cases where a noun has alternative plural forms, the irregular form (the one not in *-s*) naturally tends to have a high-flown, archaic, or poetic flavour. The very fact that there exists a plural form in *-s* alongside of it gives the other form the character of something unusual and restricted in use to special purposes. The only two words that have to be mentioned in this connection are, *brother* with its alternative plural form *brethren* differing from *brothers* not in stylistic colouring alone, and *cow*, with its alternative plural form *kine* having a very strong archaic and poetic tinge.

In the sphere of case it can be noted that the genitive in *'s* tends to acquire a specific stylistic flavour when formed from a noun not denoting a living being. As a rule the *of*-phrase is used to express relation between the thing denoted by the noun and that denoted by another noun. For instance, if this sort of relation has to be expressed between *England* and *history*, the usual, stylistically neutral way of expressing it is to say *the history of England*, and this, indeed, is the title, for instance, of most textbooks on the subject. But alongside of it the variant *England's history* is also permissible. It has a poetic and possibly patriotic shade about it and it will do very well in an emotional context, but would be out of place in a strictly scientific one.

The exact sphere of nouns whose forms in *'s* tend to acquire such a peculiar stylistic character is however extremely difficult, if not impossible, to define, as the forms in *'s* tend to spread in recent times, as we noted in our chapter on case (see p. 43). Much concrete observation and analysis is necessary before anything more definite can be said on the subject.

There is little to be said about adjectives, too, which have only degrees of comparison as a morphological characteristic.

What matters here is the stylistic colouring of degrees of comparison in *-er*, *-est* of such adjectives as do not usually possess such forms. Where such forms do appear they tend to have a peculiar solemn stylistic quality which would make them unfit for any other context. The English nineteenth-century writer and philosopher Thomas Carlyle would use a superlative in *-est* of two-syllable

adjectives derived from present participles in *-ing*, as will be seen from the following example: *With unabated bounty the land of England blooms and grows. Waving with yellow harvests, thick-studded with workshops, industrial implements, with fifteen millions of workers, understood to be the strongest, the cunningest and the willingest our Earth ever had...* Neither of these forms occur in ordinary style: the analytic formations *most cunning, most willing*, etc. would be used instead.

In the sphere of pronouns, there is the use of the forms *I* or *me*, etc., which we have already considered in Chapter VI, and we need not dwell on it here.

Another point to be noted about pronouns in the morphological way is the form *'em* in sentences like *I'll show 'em* alongside of *I'll show them*. Strictly speaking this is a morphological point if we consider *'em* to be a different form, not merely a phonetically weakened variant of *them*. If we take it that way we will state that the morphological variant *'em* for the objective case of the third person plural personal pronoun has a definite stylistic colouring of low colloquial style. It would be, for instance, entirely out of place in a serious scientific treatise. It is, however, quite appropriate in reproducing low colloquial (and possibly vulgar) speech.

The main bulk of stylistic remarks in the sphere of morphology belongs of course to the verb. There are a considerable number of details here which point to a peculiar stylistic colouring, either solemn and archaic, or low colloquial and eventually vulgar.

The first to be noted are the forms in *-th* for the third person singular, present indicative, that is, forms like *liveth, knoweth, saith, doth, hath*, etc. These have acquired (since the 17th century) a definite archaic and poetical flavour and cannot accordingly be used in any other, or in any neutral stylistic surroundings. Examples of their use in modern texts are rare indeed.

The same stylistic colouring as with the *-th*-forms is also inherent in forms in *-st* for the second person singular of both the present and the past indicative (that is, the forms *livest, knowest, sayst, dost, livedst, knewest, saidst, didst, hadst*, etc.) and also the forms *shalt, wilt, art, wert* (or *wast*) of the verbs *shall, will, be*. These forms are practically inseparable from the second person singular personal pronoun *thou*. In every other respect the *-st*-forms of the second person are exactly similar to the *-th*-forms of the third. They are quite rare in Modern English.

These, then, are forms which may, generally speaking, be derived from every verb.

The other forms with special stylistic colouring belong to definite individual verbs only, though some of them, belonging to verbs which are or may be auxiliary, can accordingly be brought into the system of all verbs which use the auxiliary.

Here we must first of all mention the form *ain't* pronounced [eint], or *ain* [ein] of the verb *be*, corresponding to the forms *am not*, *is not*, and *are not* of the stylistically neutral set. The essence of all of them is, of course, that the combination of a verb form with the negative particle *not* differs from the same form without the particle. The difference between *am not*, *is not*, and *are not* is in these cases neutralised. So this whole question also has some bearing on the categories of person and number in the verb *be*. The stylistic tinge of the form *ain't* is a very definite one: it is low colloquial with a clear tendency towards vulgarity, and of course it would be inadmissible in any serious literary style. Here are some examples: *The house aint worth livin in since you left it Candy.* (SHAW, Burgess's speech in "Candida") *Our quarrel's made up now, ain it?* (Idem) *James and me is come to a nunnerstanding — a honorable unnerstandin. Ain we, James?* (Idem)

A similar stylistic character attaches to the forms *has*, *is*, and *was* for the plural, e. g. *Yes: limes 'as changed mor 'n I could a believed.* (Idem) *I hused to wonder you was let preach at all.* (Idem)

As the verb *be* is an auxiliary of the continuous aspect and of the passive voice, the form *ain't* can accordingly appear in every verb possessing either of these categories, or both, e. g. *Ope you ain't lettin James put no foolish ideas into your ed?* (Idem)

Besides, a certain number of verbs have, alongside of their normal and neutral forms, some special ones, differing from the usual by a distinct archaic or solemn colouring, e. g. *spake* for *spoke* (past tense of the verb *speak*); *throve* for *thrived* (past tense of the verb *thrive*); *bare* for *bore* (past tense of the verb *bear*).

In the opposite way, there are some forms having at present a very distinct vulgar or illiterate stylistic character and only used in writing to characterise an illiterate speaker. They are forms of the past tense and second participle on *-ed* of verbs regularly deriving these forms by ablaut (vowel change) or by adding the *-n*-suffix for the second participle, e. g. *seed* for *saw* (past tense) or *seen* (second participle of the verb *see*); *knowed* for *knew* (past tense) or *known* (second participle of the verb *know*). These forms are distinctly illiterate and in this they differ from the form *ain't*, for instance, which is somehow within the standard, though certainly at the lowest level of it.

It would seem that no verb has archaic and vulgar variants at the same time, that is, no verb has three variants: the normal one, an archaic one, and an illiterate one. For instance, the verb *speak* has an archaic variant *spake* for its past tense *spoke* but it has no illiterate variant; on the other hand, the verb *see* has an illiterate variant *seed* for its past tense *saw* but it has no archaic variant, etc.

Some peculiarities in the sphere of stylistically coloured verb forms should also be noted in American English. The chief of these concerns forms of the present perfect tense. In low colloquial American style there is a very clear tendency to drop the auxiliary *have* (*has*) in the present perfect, so that only the second participle remains. Now, if the second participle is homonymous with the past tense, as is the case with most verbs, the result of the omission is a form not to be distinguished from the past tense, for instance, *I have found* > *I found*. If, however, the second participle is not homonymous with the past tense, the result of omitting the auxiliary is a new form, not coinciding with the usual past tense: *I have taken* > *I taken*, *he has written* > *he written*, etc. We may see this in the following quotation from an American author representing low colloquial speech: *I been around to see her a coupla times since then, only Esta didn't want me to say anything about that either.* (DREISER)

However, such forms may also be found in England, e. g. *James: three year ago, you done me a hill turn. You done me hout of a contrac.* (SHAW, Burgess's speech)

H. L. Mencken, the author of the well-known book, "The American language" (first published in 1919), treats such forms as *I taken*, *he written* as a past tense. He also asserts that with the auxiliary *have* preserved, the form of the second participle is *took*, *wrote*, etc., so that the British paradigms *take*, *took*, *taken*; *write*, *wrote*, *written* correspond to the American *take*, *taken*, *took*; *write*, *written*, *wrote*, and gives a list of irregular verbs arranged in this way.¹ Mencken's view appears to be an exaggeration not borne out by American narrative and dramatic literature. *I taken* is common enough in American colloquial style, but *I have took* does not appear to be so.

It is clear that forms like *I taken* have a stylistic tinge but their peculiarity is that they hardly appear outside the USA.

This is about all that can be said about stylistic values of morphological forms in present-day English.

Syntax

In the sphere of syntax we have to look for syntactical synonyms differing from each other by their stylistic colouring. We may look for two sets of cases: (1) each of the two syntactical synonyms has a peculiar stylistic colouring of its own, (2) of two syntactical synonyms one is stylistically neutral, that is, it may appear in every sort of style, while the other has a distinct stylistic colouring, that is to say, its use is limited to definite stylistic conditions.

¹ See H. L. Mencken, *The American Language*, 3rd ed., 1929, pp. 279—283.

The first of these sets of cases can hardly be frequent, since it would imply that there is no neutral syntactical means available to express the idea in question.

As a rare example of the first kind we can point to the variants *It is I* and *It is me*. The difference between them is certainly one of style, and it seems that neither of them is really neutral stylistically. *It is me* has a very clear colloquial colouring, while *It is I* is stiff and formal. This of course is a state of affairs due to a historical development in the course of which *It is me* has been steadily gaining ground, and most probably it will in a near future lose that specific colouring of colloquial style, and become the normal, that is, the stylistically neutral variant, while *It is I* will be relegated to a distinctly archaic sphere.

Far more numerous are the cases when one of a pair of syntactical synonyms has a specific stylistic colouring while the other is stylistically neutral. This is the case, for example, with the absolute construction and its synonyms — subordinate adverbial clauses of time or cause. The absolute construction has practically always — with very few exceptions, phraseological units like *all things considered*, or *weather permitting* — a distinctly literary or even bookish character.

A distinctly literary or bookish colouring also attaches to non-defining attributive clauses. For instance, the following sentence would not be possible in colloquial style: *Cathleen Calvert, who came out of the house at the sound of voices, met Scarlett's eyes above her brother's head and in them Scarlett read knowledge and bitter despair.* (M. MITCHELL)

These notes on the stylistic values of some grammatical facts are no more than hints. They are meant to suggest that alongside of grammatical phenomena that are indifferent to style there are some which have a distinct stylistic colouring and are decidedly inappropriate outside a certain stylistic sphere. This is most essential both from a purely theoretical viewpoint and from the viewpoint of teaching the language to foreigners. A bookish grammatical construction appearing in a colloquial context, though "grammatically correct", is as serious an error against English usage as a mistake in grammatical construction. This should especially be remembered in giving exercises of the kind providing for changing one construction into another (such as replacing a subordinate clause by an absolute construction, and the like).

In this book we have considered a number of problems presented by the grammatical structure of Modern English. In doing so we have applied certain methods developed by modern linguistics, which allow of a more exact analysis and evaluation of lan-

guage facts and reduce the sphere of subjective opinions incompatible with one another and admitting of no proof.

In this connection it has proved essential to distinguish as carefully as possible between two kinds of problems. On the one hand there are those which admit of a definite solution, so that an answer to the problem can be found and the problem need not be reconsidered unless and until some new facts emerge which may necessitate a change in the solution. On the other hand, there are the problems which, as far as we can see, do not admit of such a solution, but must remain a field of differing opinions, with the solution depending on a student's basic views of language phenomena in general, or of some narrower language sphere in particular. Some of the latter problems had better be abandoned altogether, since they offer no ground for any truly scientific analysis and only give rise to useless and unpromising dispute. Some of the problems connected with parts of a sentence clearly belong here: a typical example is the so-called problem as to whether a word or phrase accompanying a noun can be an object or must always be an attribute.

It is no use whatever to discuss such problems: the right way to deal with them is to adopt a certain definition (for example, a word or phrase accompanying a noun is termed an attribute) and then act according to the definition accepted. But there are other problems belonging to this category of doubtful cases, which cannot and should not be discarded. Among these is, for example, the problem of the category of voice, which has been causing lively discussion for a considerable length of time. We can by no means say that it has been solved, but in fact it deserves close attention, and its solution may be brought nearer by careful application of more exact and objective methods. It is essential for a student of English to bear in mind these various aspects of linguistic study, if a right perspective of this study is not to be lost sight of.

Another essential point to emerge from a careful scientific study of English grammatical structure is, the necessity of a very concrete approach to the individual structure of this one language, whose structure, such as it is, is probably not to be found in any other language on the globe. This fact tends sometimes to be obscured by a somewhat superficial application of the notions of "synthetic structure", "analytical structure", and the like. It is of course quite right to say that Modern English is a language mainly analytical in its structure but this general statement, true as it is, does not give us any clue to particular questions of grammatical structure, and it cannot replace careful study of these particular questions.

We may as well illustrate this point by an example or two. Both Modern English and Modern French are analytical languages, and that statement is certainly true. But it does not include some essential points of difference between the two languages. Thus, in

Modern English, adjectives have neither distinctions of gender nor any of number: for instance, the form *fine*, as it is, will do for all cases. Now, in Modern French, though also an analytical language, adjectives do have those categories, so that here we distinguish between four separate forms: masculine singular *fin*, masculine plural *fins*, feminine singular *fine*, feminine plural *fines*. Another point of difference between the two languages: English has only analytical forms for the future tenses (*shall write*, *shall have written*, *shall be writing*, *shall have been writing* in the active voice), while French, analytical as it is, has one synthetic future tense (*écrirai*) and one analytical (*aurai écrit*). The same may be said about forms expressing unreal action (whatever terms we may prefer to denote them): English has only analytical forms here (*should write*, *should have written*, *should be writing*, *should have been writing* in the active voice), whereas French has one synthetic form (*écrirais*) and one analytical (*aurais écrit*).

Similar caution is required when comparing English', a language basically analytical, with Russian, a language basically synthetic. These characteristics, though essentially true, should not be pressed too close.

In concluding our survey of English grammatical structure, we shall do well to emphasise that there remains much to be investigated in the future. To say nothing of the theory of phrases, which is still in its infancy, even those parts of grammar which have been studied for a hundred years or more present a number of unsolved problems where much energy and patient effort will have to be applied. The new methods aiming at a more exact and objective study of language facts should enable scholars to overcome outdated ideas and prejudices, which often constitute a formidable obstacle in the way of fundamental scientific research work, and further a complete and unbiassed view of Modern English grammatical structure as it presents itself to-day and as it tends to develop in the foreseeable future,

A LIST OF SOME LESS FAMILIAR TERMS

- Asyndetic sentence:** a sentence whose clauses are not connected either by a conjunction or by any other connective (compare **Syndetic sentence**)
- Complex sentence:** a sentence containing one or more subordinate clauses
- Composite sentence:** a sentence consisting of more than one clause, whether compound or complex
- Compound sentence:** a sentence consisting of two or more coordinated clauses
- Correlation:** a name suggested for the grammatical category which finds its expression in the difference between non-perfect and perfect forms, e. g. *took / had taken*
- Functional sentence perspective:** division of a sentence into its theme (the starting point) and rheme (the new information supplied)
- Junction:** a connection of two words or phrases without any predicative relation between them, as in *a new house, a barking dog*
- Nexus:** any connection of two words or phrases with a predicative relation between them, as in *he spoke; I heard him speak*
- Opposition:** any relation between two grammatical forms differing in meaning and in external signs, e. g. *street / streets; take / took*
- Rheme:** that element of a sentence which contains the new information; opposed to theme (see also **Functional sentence perspective**)
- Stative:** a part of speech expressing the state a subject is in, and characterised by the prefix *a-*, e. g. *asleep, ablaze, astir*
- Syndetic sentence:** a composite sentence whose clauses are connected either by a conjunction or by some other connective (mainly a relative pronoun or relative adverb)
- Theme:** that element of a sentence which contains the starting point, as opposed to rheme (see also **Functional sentence perspective**)

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