

# **Psychology as Science of Self**

**By Mary Whiton Calkins**

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## **Psychology as Science of Self**

### **I. Is The Self Body Or Has It Body?**

**Mary Whiton Calkins (1908a)**

First Published in *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, 5, 12-20.

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THE main results so far reached by this discussion are the following: I have defined psychology in a provisional way as science of consciousness and have pointed out that, as thus regarded, it may more definitely be conceived (1) as science of ideas or contents, often [p. 13] named structural psychology, or (2) as science of mental functions, so-called functional psychology, or, finally, (3) as science of the conscious self. I have; then insisted that the third form of psychology is really fundamental to the others and implied by both of them. An idea-as-such, I have argued, is a needlessly artificial abstraction every idea is experienced as idea-of-a-conscious-possessor-of-ideas. And, similarly, a mental function is experienced as activity of a mental functioner or agent. Such a possessor of ideas, or mental functioner, may best be called a self; and I have next, therefore, to discuss the nature of the self.

Among the different views of the "self," or mental functioner, as object of scientific psychological study, there are two which stand out sharply in contemporary discussion. The first identifies the self, an mental functioner, with the psychophysical organism -- in a word, it conceivers the self as mind-in-body or mind-plus-body: according to this view, body constitutes part of self. The second theory conceives of self as non-inclusive of body: according to this view, body is *not* part of self, though it may well be regarded as closely related to self. On the basis of these two theories of the psychologist's self, there are three distinguishable forms of self-psychology. (1) In the first place, the self may be conceived as psychophysical organism and psychology may be regarded as science of the processes or functions of the conscious body, the mind-and-body-complex. This seems to me to be the practical procedure of most of our present day functional psychologists -- especially it seems to be the conclusion of American psychologists. The use of the term "self" in this sense is expressly sanctioned by Professor Angell in his most recent

paper.[1] The objection to this view is the following: in regarding mind and body as together making up a complex the psychologist compounds phenomena which are in great degree distinct, and he thus fails to account for the admitted distinction of the functions of the so-called psychophysical organism. If it were justifiable to regard mind and body as compounded, or united, in a psychophysical organism, then all the functions of this organism should be neither physiological nor psychical, but themselves psychophysical. Functional psychologists, however, though they point to certain psychophysical functions -- such as selection, adaptation, variation -- yet never escape the necessity of distinguishing from these the "purely psychical" and the "merely physiological" functions. Implicitly or explicitly, they all perforce agree with Angell in admitting the existence of "dominantly physiological functions . . . assimilation, reproduction, motion," which they distinguish from "the categories" -- sensibility, for instance -- "appropriate to the psychical [p. 14] alone." [2] But if it is still necessary to distinguish psychical from physiological functions, nothing seems gained by the doctrine that the functioner is psychophysical. It is surely quite as simple and more logical to admit the existence of a psychical functioner of psychic functions in close relation to a physical functioner of physical functions than to insist on the identity of the two functioners while yet one is obliged to distinguish the two groups of functions as radically different.

(2) A second, logically possible form of self-psychology would regard the self, or mental functioner as mind-without-body, self unrelated to body. So far as I know, nobody nowadays champions this doctrine and I should not take time to mention it were it not that Professor Angell attributes it to me. "Such a functional psychology," he says, "as I have been presenting would be entirely reconcilable with Miss Calkins's 'psychology of selves' . . . were it not for her extreme scientific conservatism in refusing to allow the self to have a body, save as a kind of conventional biological ornament. The real psychological self, as I understand her, is pure disembodied spirit . . ." It ought not to be necessary for me to explain that I have never held, or meant to teach, a psychology of disembodied spirit. I do indeed believe that it is possible to analyze, classify, and (in a sense) to explain psychic phenomena without reference to their physiological or biological correlates: in other words, I hold, with Professor Warren, that "psychological investigation can be carried on without . . . physiological research." [3] But the intimate connection, to ordinary observation, of psychical and physical -- the facts that certain psychical phenomena, notably perceptions, are inexplicable psychologically and yet in close relation to physical phenomena, and that still other phenomena, as those of "instinctive" liking and interests, are biologically, not psychologically, explicable -- these considerations speak unequivocally against a conception of psychic self its unrelated to body.

(3) The third view (and the one which I hold) of the psychologist's self regards the self as distinct from body, but related to it. Thus, so far from "refusing to allow the self to have a body," I insist that it precisely *has* a body, and does not *consist in* body, is not made up of body-and-mind. This procedure avoids the difficulty, already stated, of the psychophysical organism conception which, however successful in uniting two functioners, loses all the value of the union since it has still to distinguish two sorts of

functions, psychical and physiological. And, positively, this conception of the [p. 15] self as *having* body, related to body, may be enriched by all the facts, physiological and biological of functional psychology. That is to say, it is germane to self-psychology both to teach that the bodily phenomena which regularly accompany consciousness have values in the perpetuation of biological individual and of race, and to show that certain physical facts are the regular antecedent or accompaniments of certain facts of consciousness. "Such a settlement of the issue," Angell would object, "is easy and logically consistent. But does it not leave us with a gulf set between the self as mind and tire self as body for the crossing of which we are forthwith obliged to spend much needless energy, as the gulf is of our own inventing?" [4] To this objection I should answer: first, I do not think that the gulf is of our own inventing. As scientists, we have to start out from the standpoint of every-day adult consciousness and for this the distinction between mind and body is already clearly made. And, secondly, I can not admit that undue energy is needed to cross the gulf. As psychologists, once more, we are not, concerned with the philosophical problem of the relation of mind and body; we take for granted the existence of the two, and their relation, on the ground of observation behind which we, as scientists, have no business to probe. It is perfectly simple to treat the relation between psychical and physical as that of concomitance, antecedence, or consequence, without taking sides with interactionist, parallelist, epiphenomenalist, or panpsychist. And, finally, as I have so often insisted, this "gulf" between psychical and physical must be bridged not only by upholders of this doctrine of "the self which has body," but by advocates of the psychophysical organism doctrine. The difference is simply that: the gulf lies, in the one case, between self and body and, in the other case, between purely mental function and physiological function.

In insisting that self-psychology, conceived as science of the "conscious self which has body," is in essential harmony with the characteristic teachings of functional psychology, I am delighted to find myself in substantial agreement with Professor Judd, as I read his recently published "Psychology." The book "aims" explicitly "to develop a functional view of mental life" and yet it teaches that "psychology deals with the self." [5] The self, Dr. Judd definitely teaches, is not "independent in its development of bodily organs." Yet, the self certainly is not, as conceived by Judd, a mere psychophysical organism. It is "the center of all possible forms of relationship . . . to other selves, to the physical world, . . . to all other phases of known reality . . . . It is characterized," Professor [p. 16] Judd adds, "by a unique type of activity which . . . we describe when we use the word 'consciousness.'"

The conclusion that the self, or the basal fact of psychology, stands in close relation to its body, presses the question: What, more precisely, is the nature of this relation? Differently phrased, the question may read: What reference shall the psychologist make to physical phenomena? In order to answer this question it is necessary to ask more generally wherein adequate scientific procedure consists. The task of any scientist is twofold: first, to describe or portray and, secondly, so far as possible to explain the phenomena which he treats. Observation, analysis, and classification are, taken together, the main factors of scientific description; and psychological description, "the exact portrayal of conscious life," involves keen observation of the psychic fact, complete

analysis of it into its constituent factors, and adequate classification of it by its likeness and unlikeness to other phenomena. Explanation, in the narrowly scientific sense, consists in the discovery of the additional phenomena, psychic and physical, to which a given psychic fact is related (otherwise than by its likeness or its difference). This other phenomenon may itself be a psychic fact --as when a memory is "explained" as due to repeated perception; or it may be a fact of another order physical (in the narrow sense), or physiological, or biological. It will be observed that nothing in this conception essentially contradicts the doctrine that science is always descriptive, never explanatory an answer always to the question "how?" not to the question "why?"[6] For the kind of explanation which such a doctrine excludes froth science is explanation of the ultimate, metaphysical sort, not explanation conceived as a tracing of antecedent and consequent or of simultaneous correlates. One further statement must be made with reference to the ideal scientific explanation. Such an explanation would serve to classify the phenomena which it explained. For phenomena may be grouped and classified not only according to their internal likenesses and unlikenesses, but also with reference to the likenesses and differences of the phenomena which explain them.

This simple distinction, rather generally admitted, between explanation and description indicates clearly, I think, the part which physiology and biology -- and, to less degree, physics -- have to play in psychology. It is clear that psychic phenomena are incapable of scientific analysis into non-psychical factors: an emotion can no more be described by an enumeration of the frontal lobe excitations, the [p. 17] contractions of unstriped muscles, and the instinctive attitudes which precede or accompany it than a picture can be described by an account of tire mixing of the pigments used in painting it. On the other hand, it has become increasingly evident that psychic phenomena may be (in the scientific sense already outlined) more or less adequately explained by linking them with physical, physiological, and biological phenomena. It is not possible in the limits of my space to consider in detail the adequacy and extent of these explanations, but a few more specific comments are needed. The explanation of facts of consciousness by physical phenomena is admitted to hold only partially. It is possible to distinguish sensational consciousness front every other sort, as that which follows primarily on physical stimulation, and to differentiate most forms of sensational stimulus from each other; but no close correspondence van be traced between the physical and the psychical. In particular, a simple physical stimulus (as colored light) often conditions a complex sensational experience, whereas a highly complex stimulus (white light, for example) may be the antecedent of relatively simple sense consciousness.

The explanation of psychic fact by physiological is a far more adequate procedure. The account of sensational consciousness as correlated with the excitation of end organs and of fixed parts of the central nervous system and as regularly accompanied by characteristic muscular contractions[7] represents the most assured results of this method of explanation, but fruitful theories abound with reference to the physiological accompaniments of affective and even of relational and volitional consciousness. The insufficiency of the purely physiological explanation must, however, be admitted. In the first place, much of it is avowed hypothesis -- it can not, for example, be claimed that any physiological explanation of the sensation of pain, or of the consciousness of extensity, or

of the affective experience is at present stably assured. It is evident, in the second place, that the physiological explanations are entirely inadequate to the classification of psychic phenomena. For even granting that distinctions in physiological accompaniment mark off from each other the large divisions of our conscious experience, no such distinctions can be found corresponding with the finer differentiations of the conscious life. By aid of physiology one may indeed dis- [p. 18] tinguish perception from imagination, visual from auditory imagination, and (less certainly) imagination from thought, and both imagination and thought from emotion. But no one has ever suggested a distinction of connecting fibers or of association centers which provides a reasonable basis for the clearly marked difference between discrimination and generalization or between egoistic and sympathetic joy.

The relation of biological to psychological phenomena has finally to be considered. The biological conception of consciousness is that of a reaction-to-environment which is, on the whole, beneficial, and is either immediate or delayed, either an adaptation or an interference. From the point of view of the biologist this may appear to be a description of consciousness, but to the psychologist it is evident that one gives no account of consciousness-as-such by naming it useful reaction, whether accommodating or selective, to environment. Really to describe consciousness, one must recognize it as, let us say, dominantly sensational or affective, as receptive or assertive, as individualizing, and as "egoistic." But while biology can furnish us no description of consciousness, it goes farther in providing us with explanations (in the sense already made clear). This becomes evident through a study of biological phenomena -- in particular, of organic reactions and attitudes. The main distinction made here by biologists and by biological (often called functional) psychologists is the familiar one between (1) immediate or "short circuit" organic responses and (2) delayed or "long circuit" responses.[8] From this point of view our relatively simple sensational and affective experiences are explained as accompaniment or result of immediate organic responses and are thus definitely marked off from thought, emotion, and the volitional consciousness -- experiences of which the characteristic antecedents or correlates are complex attitudes and delayed activities. It is evident that the immediate response to environment is necessary to the preservation and perpetuation of primitive and relatively undifferentiated organisms and that it is similarly a useful sort of reaction for the developed organism in many phases of its life; and it is equally obvious that the delayed reaction is essential to the survival, and consequently to the propagation, of the complex organism which has need to respond in varying fashion to surroundings of various sorts. Within this second group, that of the delayed reactions, it is possible, also, to make further differentiations. One may, as already indicated, distinguish reactions which are mere adaptations to environment from those which in some way alter or control the environment; one may also distinguish reactions of advance front reactions of with- [p. 19] drawal; and one may, finally, characterize given organic responses according as they are the continuations or the interruptions of preceding reactions. Emotional activities may, for example, be regarded as interruptions both of habitual and of simple voluntary responses;[9] and then, within this group of delayed and interrupting reactions, rage may be explained as an emotion characterized by its reaction of advance, tending to interfere with the environment, and making for self-preservation; liking play be explained as an emotion accompanied by an adaptive reaction of advance,

which makes for the perpetuation of the race; fear as all emotion correlated with an adaptive movement of withdrawal, which is essential to self preservation. Of course, all these characteristic attitudes and reactions may be regarded as survivals of the instinctive responses of primitive organisms

But it is obvious, once more, that this procedure, however illuminating does not suffice to differentiate all distinguishable forms of consciousness -- in other words, that the biological conception (whether conceived as explanation or as description) does not furnish a sufficient classification of psychic phenomena. The function of emotion as a whole may indeed be distinguished from that of reasoning, and the function of joy from that of grief, the function of love from that of hate. But it certainly is not possible to differentiate, on the basis of function alone, between, let us say, memory and imagination or between malice and envy. There is, in truth, no need to argue this point, for all "biological" psychologists make some use of other-than-biological distinctions in their classification of consciousness that is, they treat the biological as supplementary to the instinctively psychological procedure. Angell, indeed, admitting "the paucity of the basic modes" of biological utility, argues that the biological method is valuable precisely "by virtue of the strong relief into which it throws the fundamental resemblances of processes often unduly severed for psychological analysis."<sup>[10]</sup> This means, of course, that the biological explanation of phenomena of consciousness, important as it is, is insufficient as discrimination of distinguishable facts from each other.

The general conclusions of our examination of these non-psychical principles of explanation are thus the following: on the one hand, it is evident that all ideally complete psychology must take account of those facts of physics, physiology, and biology which border on the domain of psychology. To neglect these groups of phenomena would be, indeed, to overlook the obvious relations of [p. 20] consciousness to the rest of reality; and this neglect would involve, also, a loss for psychology of fruitful methods and applications. For precisely because physiological conditions and organic reactions are more directly and often more readily controllable than psychic states a knowledge of them may have both methodological and practical value. On the other hand, it has been shown, first, that the physical, physiological, and biological explanations of psychic phenomena are -- many of them -- insufficiently established and hypothetical in nature, and, secondly, that they afford an insufficient classification of psychic phenomena.

But apart from these criticisms on the success of these explanations of psychic phenomena in non-psychic terms, it must be expressly reiterated that such explanations, however complete and well verified, can never exhaust the procedure of the psychologist, that they are indeed subsidiary to his basal purpose, the description, or portrayal, of the psychic fact. "The distinctive aim of the psychologist," in the words of Professor Stout, "is to investigate mental events themselves, not their mechanical accompaniments or antecedents."<sup>[11]</sup> The distinctions between ether and air vibration, between rod and cone excitation, between short-circuit and long-circuit response, or even between self-preserving and race-perpetuating activity, are not distinctions within consciousness. Such distinctions may, indeed, serve to group facts of consciousness, but they form no part of a description of facts of consciousness. In other words, these non-psychological principles

of explanation, useful as they are, are supplementary to the description of conscious experiences by psychological analysis." [12]

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### Footnotes

[1] *The Province of Functional Psychology*, " *loc. cit.*", p. 82 and note.

[2] *Op cit.*, pp. 76-77.

[3] C. Warren, "The Fundamental Functions of Consciousness," *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. III., p. 218.

[4] *Op. cit.*, p. 82, note.

[5] *Psychology General Introduction*, " p. 315. *Cf.* pp. 310-311.

[6] *Cf.* K. F. Pearson, "The Grammar of Science," 2d ed., pp. 306, 332, 344 et al.

[7] The "biological" psychologists (the prevailing American type, as has appeared, of functional psychologists) often assume that the study of muscular reactions belongs exclusively to them, and accuse the physiological psychologists of a too exclusive concern with afferent fibers and nerve centers. The truth is, of course, that the conception of contracting muscles and of body in motion is, at base, physiological, becoming biological when supplemented by the notion of organic adaptation.

[8] *Cf.* Angell, "The Province of Functional Psychology," *op. cit.*, p. 74.

[9] *Cf.* John Dewey, "The Theory of Emotion," *Psychological Review*, Vol. II. pp. 13 ff.; Angell, "Psychology," pp. 321 ff.

[10] *The Province of Functional Psychology*, " *loc. cit.*", pp. 74<sup>1</sup> and 73<sup>3</sup>.

[11] *Analytic psychology*, " I., p. 3.

[12] For brief treatment of explanation in psychical terms, *cf.* a later paper of this series. Because of the limits of my space, I do not here refer to Münsterberg's theory, that description is communication and that communication is only possible in terms of physical objects, since only such are sharable by several subjects. To this it may, I think, be objected: first, that description does not logically involve communication -- one might, in other words, be a scientist-in-solitude; secondly, that the difficulty is rather philosophical than psychological, and that the psychologist may properly *assume* a parallel experience in other selves.



## II. The Nature of the Self

Mary Whiton Calkins (1908b)

First Published in *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, 5, 64-68.

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ONCE more to take account of stock, the following conclusions have been reached: The basal fact of psychology, implied both by idea and by mental function, is the conscious self;[1] this self stands in close relation to a body; and its varying experiences may, in part, be "explained" and classified by reference to correlated non-physical phenomena in particular by reference to nerve excitations, to muscular contractions, and to organic accommodations and controls. This self, finally, is no philosopher's or epistemologist's self: it should not, for example, be characterized as free, responsible, or endless, and the question of its more or less ultimate reality is never raised.[2] The psychologist takes for granted, without meta- [p. 65] physical reflection and on the ground of every-day observation that there are conscious selves, just as the botanist starts from the observation that there are plants, and the neurologist from the observation of nerve structures.

But it may well be urged that, the self, as so far considered, is a very empty sort of phenomenon to which, as yet, no positive characters have been attributed. Why, it may be objected, protest that the basal fact of psychology is not idea and not function, but self, if all that one actually knows of the self could as well be stated in terms of idea and of function -- that is, if one knows nothing of the self save that, on the one hand, it is sensorially, affectively and relationally conscious, and, on the other hand, that it functions adaptively or selectively? This is a fair question, but not (I think) unanswerable. On the contrary, the self is found to have certain positive characters, which do not belong to idea or to function. The self is, in the first place, in some degree permanent or persistent. By "persistence" is not meant the ultimate self-identity, which may well be part of the self as conceived by the philosopher, but rather the kind of identity of which one is immediately conscious notably in anticipating and in recognizing. Not only mental imagery, but the consciousness of myself as "the same ego then as now,"[3] is essential to recognition; and the direct consciousness of self-identity is as immediate a constituent of any anticipation as the sensorial and affective consciousness involved in it. It is plain that this character of immediately experienced persistence differentiates the self from its ideas. Every one admits, since Hume so brilliantly expounded the truth, that identity can not lie attributed to ideas (mental structures or contents) because these are, by hypothesis evanescent and fleeting. It follows that identity is a character of the self, not of the idea; and the fact that we are directly conscious of identity as part of our unambiguously mental experience becomes the most persuasive argument for the existence of a self which is not a mere series of ideas. It is not, on the other hand, at first sight so evident that persistence belongs to self, not to mental function. For, it may be urged, "functions . . . persist as well in mental as in physical life. We may never have twice exactly the same idea . . . , but general functions like memory [are] persistent." [4] But, if one scrutinize the real meaning of the statement "memory -- or reason, or will -- is a persistent function,"

one finds it to be [p. 66] simply this, that one and the same self at any time may remember, or reason, or will. The special function of remembering or of reasoning has as little permanence as the particular idea: that which persists is the rememberer or the reasoner.

The self is, in the second place, not only persistent, but inclusive; it is, in other words, a complex of ideas, functions, experiences. This is the character of the self which gives to the idea and function conceptions of psychology their hold on psychological thought; for against ideas or functions regarded as parts, or aspects, of the self no crucial objection need be urged. There is little need of further comment, for the complexity of self is admitted on any view of it.

A third significant character of the self is its uniqueness. This uniqueness is, of course, experienced most clearly in our emotional and volitional consciousness: when we reflect upon it we may describe it as a consciousness of a this which-could-not-be-replaced-by-another.[5] Now we simply are not conscious of ideas and functions as, in this sense, unique. A given self, with a different idea, is still this self; whereas a given idea is this or that idea according as it belongs to this or that self. I am I whether I see or hear, whether I fear or hope, but another self's vision or fear, however similar, is not this experience, but another. The emphasized consciousness of uniqueness may be described as individualizing consciousness and is a distinguishing character of certain experiences, notably of emotion and of will.

The fourth of these fundamental characters of the self is its relatedness. I think of myself not only as unique, but as related, not only as a this-not-another, but as a this-in-relation-with-another.[6] In other words, whether perceiving or thinking, feeling or willing, I am always conscious of something-other-than-myself to which I stand in some relation, receptive or assertive; and according as I am more emphatically conscious of myself, or of this "other," the relation may be termed egoistic or altruistic. This immediate, or direct, awareness not only of "myself," but of an other-than-self, is, as Ward and Stout insist, a truth to be admitted and not argued by the psychologist.[7] For the metaphysician and the epistemologist, indeed, "duality of subject and object" presents a problem; for the psychologist it is an admitted character of experience. It is important to note also that the immediately experienced self-relatedness differs from the relations inferred to exist between ideas in that the relation of one idea to another is an addition to the "idea," not an inherent part of it.[8] The term "mental function," on the other hand, when function is not limited to the strictly biological, might be used as a synonym for self-relation.[9]

The psychologist has next to characterize the other-than-self, or environment. This may be of various types: it may be personal -- that is, the self may be conscious of itself as related to other selves, or the environment may be abstractly conceived as the ideas or functions of the self -- that is, the self may relate itself to its own past or future, as in recognition and in some phases of willing; or, finally, the environment, may be realized as "impersonal" or "external." The first of these forms of the other-than-myself is, however, to my thinking, most significant. I can not, indeed, describe or distinguish

myself except in terms of my relatedness to other selves:[10] if I drop out of my conception of myself the consciousness of being child, brother, friend, and citizen, I simply lose myself. The awareness of impersonal object, and still more the consciousness of idea, or function as distinct from self, are certainly later and less essential than the primary consciousness of other self -- as is indicated by the child's early tendency to personify inanimate objects.[11]

These Condensed and abstract statements are, I realize, insufficient to make vivid or every plausible this doctrine of the self. But, before attempting, in the following section, the more detailed desertion of consciousness in these terms I wish to emphasize the truth that all these characters of the self are immediately experienced. Only as such, I hold, have we a right to rise them in describing consciousness.[12] For though psychology like every science, [p. 68] deals with concepts reflectively formed, not with immediate experiences,[13] yet the peculiarity of psychology is precisely this, that it has to do with the concept of *immediate experience*. That which can not be immediately experienced is, in other words, no object of psychology. Now, the commonest objection to the doctrine that psychology is science of the self is the belief that self-consciousness is a relatively late stage in conscious experience.[14] This objection is due, I think, to the neglect of the distinction between the ever-present inchoate self-consciousness of each experience and the reflective consciousness of self which I have tried, in this paper, to formulate. In the former sense only, all consciousness is self-consciousness, that is, one never is conscious at all without an awareness, however vague, confused, unanalyzed, and unexpressed, of oneself-being-conscious. (Of course, I make this assertion on the basis of my own introspection -- for there is no other way of making it -- and it is open to others to disavow this experience. Such a denial of self-consciousness must, however, itself be based on introspection; and I believe that those who deny, always by their own account betray, this same vague and intimate awareness of self.) And if this be granted, it is evident that we must form our concept of consciousness from this, "the only experience immediately accessible to us." [15] It follows that there is no middle course between the conclusion that an animal or a baby is unconscious and the inference that it possesses self-consciousness of the thin and undifferentiated sort already described. Such consciousness, it must be repeated, lies at a far remove from the reflective self-consciousness of the psychologist.

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### Footnotes

[1] This expression is, of course, tautological, but is employed to distinguish the conception of self from the Lockian concept of "soul" or "spiritual substance " which, on his view, might conceivably not be conscious. The statement that the self is basal fact of psychology does not, it may be added, forbid the psychologist to occupy himself temporarily with " idea," "function" or "experience" of the self, supposing that he always keeps in mind its abstract nature.

[2] If I understand the criticism of my teaching; expressed by Mr. W. Boyce Gibson in a sympathetic review (*Mind* 1906, N. S., 57, pp. 106 ff.) of "Der doppelte Standpunkt in der Psychologie," I should meet his objection that I neglect "the point of view of the personal experiment," which is also "a teleological point of view," by urging that this neglected point of view is (as Mr. Gibson indeed implies) a philosophical standpoint and thus outside the domain of the psychologist as such.

[3] Note 33 to Vol. II., Chapter XIV., &sect; 7, of James Mill's "Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind."

[4] Angell, "The Province of Functional Psychology," *loc. cit.*, p. 66<sup>2</sup>. (Angell, however, does not make this assertion as an objection to self-psychology.)

[5] This will be recognized as Royce's analysis of individuality

[6] *Cf.* Judd, *op. cit.*, p. 311.

[7] *Cf.* Ward, "On the Definition of Psychology," *loc. cit.*, pp. 19 and 24.

[8] Hume's admissions of this, "A Treatise of Human Nature." Bk. I., Part IV., &6, paragr. 3; Appendix; *et al.* By "relations inferred to exist, between ideas," I mean the relations assumed by associationist theories as holding between ideas; the causal relation, for example, of one idea to another. I do not, of course, refer to the relational elements of consciousness, which, as I believe, are inherent constituents of most ideas. (*Cf.* the first paragraphs of the next paper of this series.)

[9] I and not claiming that the terms function is generally so used, but that it might be so used, since the usual conception of function, "reaction on environment," includes the conception of relation to environment. *Cf.* a paper on "A Reconciliation between Structural and Functional Psychology," *Psychological Review* Vol. XIII. pp. 72 ff.

[10] *Cf.* J. M. Baldwin, "Mental Development in the Child and the Race," Chapter XI. &sect; :3; J. Royce, "Studies in Good and Evil," pp. 33 ff.; and my "An Introduction to Psychology," p. 152.

[11] "For further discussion of this subject, *cf.* the next section.

[12] *Cf.* the emphatic teaching of Stumpf that file "immediately given" is the subject matter of psychology. Herein, he holds, psychology has all epistemologically advantage over tile other sciences ("Zur Einteilung der Wissenschaften," Abhandlung der kgl. preuss. Akad., 1907, p. 21; *cf.* also the monograph earlier cited). Professor Pillsbury's criticism of self-psychology, already quoted, proceeds entirely on the false assumption that the self is "presupposed" not "found."

[13] *Cf.* K. F. Pearson, *op. cit.*, Chapter II., §6; and W. C. D. Whetham, "The Recent Development of Physical Science," Chapter 1.

[14] Cf. Titchener, *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XV., p. 94. For a similar misconception, cf. A. E. Taylor, "Elements of Metaphysics," *Ilk. IV.*, Chapter III., §§4-5. For another statement of my own position, cf. *Psychological Review*, Vol. XI II pp. 67, 68, and note.

[15] Cf. my paper on "The Limits of Genetic and of Comparative Psychology," *The British Journal of Psychology*, Vol. I., p. 283. For argument that the nature of animal consciousness must be inferred from that of our own, cf. Ward, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

### III. The Description of Consciousness

Mary Whiton Calkins (1908c)

First Published in *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, 5, 113-122.

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THE main problem of this section is the following: to indicate briefly how the doctrine of the self as basal fact of consciousness is essential to the adequate description of our actual experience. I have described the self, in the preceding section, as persistent, inclusive, unique, and related; and I must now try to show that these distinctions are always implied in a full account of any experience.

This proposed description of consciousness, in terms of the characters of the conscious self, can not take the place of the so-called structural analysis of consciousness into elements. On the contrary, the structural analysis, which is common to all forms of psychology, must supplement the description peculiar to self-psychology. From the structural standpoint consciousness, though conceived as self, is regarded (spite of its inherent relatedness and persistence) as if in artificial isolation from surrounding phenomena and as if momentary. The results of the analysis of consciousness, thus conceived, are the so-called elements of consciousness. Concerning the nature of these elements there is, as is well known, much discussion. I have elsewhere argued<sup>[1]</sup> for the recognition of three groups of them: (1) sensational, or substantive, elements, (2) attributive elements (including at least affections and feelings of realness), and (3) relational elements. For lack of time I shall not here repeat my reasons for this classification since my present concern is rather to outline and to estimate the different forms of psychological procedure than to discuss any one of them in detail. It is, however, worthy of note that the tendency of contemporary psychology is everywhere toward a supplementation of the older view<sup>[2]</sup> which recognized only sensational, or at most sensational and affective, elements. Structural psychologists who, like [p. 114]

Titchener, oppose the doctrine are, I think, misled by their inclination to classify psychic phenomena by reference to physiological distinctions.<sup>[3]</sup>

Since, however, the basal fact of psychology is the conscious self, immediately known as persistent, inclusive, unique, and related, it is evident that a structural analysis, although essential, does not supply a complete description of any conscious experience. Such analysis is, in fact, subsidiary to the study of these characters of the self as other-than-momentary-and-isolated. It must be borne in mind, throughout, that -- on this view -- our consciousness always includes in varying proportion and degree the awareness of the inclusiveness, the persistence, the uniqueness, and the relatedness of the self: only, therefore, as emphasized, or as further differentiated, may these characters serve to distinguish one form of consciousness from another. So far, now, as I can observe, the consciousness of myself as *including* self is equally present in all kinds of experience and is not, therefore, a distinguishing mark of any; the awareness of *persistence* is emphasized in recognition, in anticipation, and in the other experiences which involve a consciousness of past or of future; the emphasized consciousness of *uniqueness* -- in other words, the individualizing consciousness -- is a factor in many kinds of experience (It should be noted that although uniqueness is primarily a character of the self -- not merely the I, or myself, and the related other self, but even the impersonal object of consciousness may be individualized.) The consciousness, finally, of at least two sorts of *self-relatedness* is characteristic of all sorts of experience. My consciousness is always known (immediately or reflectively) as either receptive or assertive, and as either egoistic or altruistic -- that is, as emphasizing either my central subject-self [p. 115] or else that other-than-self, to which I am related. And when this "other" is an other self, then the altruistic consciousness becomes a sharing, or sympathetic, experience.

For brevity's sake I propose, in place of a detailed description from both these standpoints, an annotated summary of the main results of such a description of consciousness; an in order that the summary may in some sense represent the full conclusions of this

PSYCHOLOGICAL CLASSIFICATION OF

	PSYCHICAL PHENOMENA.			RELATED NON-PSYCHICAL PHENOMENA.	
	<i>Through emphasis of dominant structural elements:—</i>	<i>As unique, persistent and related.</i>		<i>Physiological excitation: in particular, of</i>	<i>Biological reaction:—</i>
		<i>Immediately known as:—</i>	<i>Reflectively known as:—</i>		
Perception.	Sensational.	Receptive.	Sharing with unparticularized other selves; Particularizing impersonal object.	End-organs; Afferent fibers; Sense-centers.	Immediate.
Imagination (and Memory).	Sensational.		Receptive; <sup>4</sup> Private; Particularizing impersonal object.	Association fibers; Sense-centers.	(Relatively) immediate.
Thought <sup>5</sup>	Relational (non-temporal).		Receptive; <sup>4</sup> Sharing with unparticularized other selves.	Association-centers (?); Association fibers (?).	Delayed.
Recognition and Anticipation.	Relational (temporal).	Persistent.	Receptive. <sup>4</sup>	Association centers (?); Association fibers (?); Sense-centers.	Immediate or Delayed.
Emotion.	Affective.	Receptive; Individualizing; Egoistic or Altruistic.		Frontal lobes (?); Rolandic areas; Unstriped muscles.	Delayed and Interrupted.
Will.	Relational; Attributive (feeling of realness).	Assertive; Individualizing; Egoistic.		Cortical centers; Skeletal muscles (Excitations following consciousness).	Delayed and Selective (Reactions following consciousness).
Faith (or Loyalty).	Relational; Attributive (feeling of realness).	Assertive; Individualizing; Altruistic (sympathetic).		Cortical centers; Skeletal muscles (Excitations following consciousness).	Delayed and Adaptive (Reactions following consciousness).

[p. 116] series of papers I shall include an enumeration of the more important physiological and biological phenomena which I have treated as explaining, or at least as serving to classify, consciousness.[6] I must, however, say explicitly that only the general outline of this scheme is drawn with confidence. It will, I trust, be modified not only by my critics, but by myself, and it needs at many points to be filled in by the results of observation, both experimental and purely introspective.[7]

I ought not to discuss in detail these different experiences, so briefly described, for, in essentials, this account of consciousness closely resembles that, which I have elsewhere

given. Certain amplifications and corrections of my earlier statements must, however, be mentioned. The first of these is purely verbal: I have replaced the terms "passive" and "active" by the more closely descriptive expressions "receptive" and "assertive." By this usage I hope to meet the objection that consciousness is never rightly viewed as passivity, while I retain a distinction in itself important.[8]

A more important amendment of my teaching is the following: I have tried to differentiate carefully between immediate and inferred distinctions; that is, between the immediately experienced factors of a given consciousness and the characters which, in the effort to classify, we reflectively attribute to it.[9] This change, I [p. 117] think, meets the most frequent objection of detail to my description of conscious experiences. I have heretofore said that perception and imagination, indistinguishable on the basis of structural analysis (since both are sensational), may be opposed in that the perceiver is conscious of himself as sharing the experience of unparticularized other selves. To this account of perception many of my critics have replied by the assertion that their consciousness in perceiving certainly does not include this awareness of similarly conscious other selves.[10] No one, however, has denied that we reflectively make this distinction, that we say "I was perceiving, for these others also shared my experience" or "I imagined it, for no one else shared the vision." This means that even though there be no immediately experienced difference between perception and imagination there is still a distinction in psychological terms -- that is, that we reflectively describe perception as a sharing, a common experience. The description of imagination as self-consciousness is (as, indeed, I have always taught) in exclusively reflective terms. Not at the time of imagining, but in later psychologizing moments, does one compare one's imagining with one's perceiving and realize its privacy.

A third amplification of my earlier account of consciousness is the distinction of the other-than-self, of whom one is always conscious, according as it is personal or impersonal, that is, self or not-self.[11] In this way I have tried to meet the objection of those of my critics who believe that I have heretofore conceived the [p. 118] relations of the self as too exclusively personal, leaving out of account the fact that the self is aware of its relations to situations, objects, and ideas, as well as of its relations to persons.[12] It is evident that most of the characters which I attribute to consciousness hold equally whether or not the other-than-self be conceived as personal or impersonal, as self or as external. The self may be receptive in relation to person or to thing, it is "altruistic" when it lays stress on the other-than-self, however regarded; it may individualize other self or object. Only the conception of sharing or sympathizing requires the conception of the other-than-self as personal.

It is noticeable that this explicit recognition of the other-than-self as either impersonal or personal facilitates the description of perception and thought by ascribing to each a twofold object.[13] In perceiving and in thinking I am conscious (immediately or reflectively) not only of selves who share my experience, but of the impersonal object of our common experience; and both together constitute the total object of my consciousness, that is to say, my environment. Similarly, sympathetic emotion and faith in a person may have impersonal as well as personal object: for instance, I may



sympathize with Lieutenant Peary in his yearning for the North Pole. In egoistic emotion and in will, on the other hand, my object is either personal or impersonal. Thus, I dislike person or thing, and I dominate other self or impersonal environment. It should be noticed that the impersonal object of emotion or of will is distinguished in the following way from the impersonal object of imagination or of perception: both objects are particularized, that is, looked on as unique, but the object of emotion or of will is always immediately known as particular, whereas the object of perception or imagination is only reflectively individualized. My admiration or my distaste for a certain house includes a consciousness of its uniqueness, whereas I perceive or imagine the house without being conscious of it as either particular or general, and only later, on reflection, classify it as a "this," not an "any."

This suggests a necessary expansion of the account of thought as given in the summary, which precedes, -- an account there abbreviated for sheer lack of space. There are two main forms of thought which differ with respect to two characters of the impersonal object of thought. The first is generalization, in which the imper- [p. 119] sonal object is immediately known as unparticularized, or general: we generalize when we discuss animal or triangle or choice in general, that is, when we are conscious of any animal or triangle or choice, and not of some special beast or figure or decision. In the other forms of thought -- for example, in comparison and in causal thinking -- the impersonal objects of our thinking may be known (but reflectively, and not immediately) as individualized, that is, as

particular. One traces the relation of this explosion to that lighted fuse, and one compares the odor of this rose with the fragrance of this lilac. Generalization differs, therefore, from the other forms of thought in that its impersonal object is (1) immediately (not reflectively) realized as (2) non-individualized. All forms of thought are, on the other band, alike in the reflective consciousness of sharing with unparticularized other selves; [14] and all are essentially receptive forms of consciousness, though most often occurring as result of volition. It is true that one conventionally describes thought as "active," or "voluntary," but as a matter of fact one is as receptive in one's consciousness of a given relation as in the consciousness of blue or of red. The attitude of thought is, in truth, radically different from the assertiveness of will; and we call thought voluntary, or active, only because of the voluntary attention to a given topic and the voluntary inhibition of distracting objects which, ordinarily, precede it.

It will serve to review and still further to elucidate all these principles of description if I dwell in slightly greater detail on the nature of emotion. I have described emotion as essentially an affective consciousness, immediately realized as individualizing, either egoistic or altruistic (often sympathetic), and receptive. The first of these epithets is the result of structural analysis and will not be disputed. On the other hand, it does not go without saying that emotion is a, receptive experience. For when one reflects upon the tumult of passion, the wildness of grief, the excitement of joy, one is tempted to regard emotion as preeminently an assertive kind of consciousness. I believe, however, that this view of emotion either

confuses bodily movement with the mental attitude of assertiveness (activity, in the narrower sense of that term), or that it gives the name emotion to an experience which is really a compound of emotion and will. By assertive consciousness I am sure that we mean either the imperious, dominating attitude which characterizes will, or the adoptive, espousing, acknowledging attitude of faith. And [p. 120] though emotion may, it, is true, be accompanied or followed by assertive consciousness, in itself it is no such assertive attitude, but a consciousness of receptive relation to the other-than-myself.

More distinctive than the realized passivity of emotion is its doubly individualizing character. On the one hand, my consciousness of my own individuality is vivid in my emotions -- in my likings and dislikings my hopes, my shame, my envy. Even esthetic emotion offers only a seeming exception, for my individuality, though altered, is not lost in it.[15] And I am equally conscious, in emotion, of the uniqueness of the other-than-self. I do not love "any" kindly person, or despise cowards in general, and I am not esthetically thrilled by "scenery": I love this person, and no other, however similar, will take the place; I scorn this particular turncoat; I feel the beauty of this misty ocean outlook. Within the class of emotions, thus defined, the most important distinction is that between the egoistic emotions, which conceive the other-than-self as merely ministering to narrow personal feeling, and the altruistic emotions especially sympathetic personal feeling -- in which one merges oneself in the happiness or in the unhappiness of another self. But I resist the temptation of commenting in more detail on this distinction and on other forms of consciousness, in the fear of obscuring the boundary outlines of my conception.

It is necessary, in conclusion, to consider certain fundamental objections to this theory of consciousness. Besides the criticisms already discussed, two serious objections have been brought forward. The first, which is urged by Titchener, is the following: self-psychology has no right to the use of structural analysis. "How a process consciousness," Titchener says,[16] "and an ego-consciousness can be analyzed into the same elements without the reduction of the latter to the former I can not see." [17] If by conscious self (Titchener's ego-consciousness) were meant a special kind of idea, this comment would obviously be correct. But by "conscious self" is meant, as has been shown, the concrete reality of which the idea is a mere abstraction. It follows that; all the positive content of the idea must be attributed to the self. In truth the analysis into elements is an analysis of the self's consciousness when the self is conceived without reference to other selves or to its own past or future. It is an analysis essential to the full understanding of the self, but it certainly is not an exhaustive account of our awareness of self. [p. 121]

The final criticism of this view of psychology assumes the general correctness of the description of consciousness in terms of self, but argues that such a description is unnecessary. The only detailed statement of this difficulty is, so far as I know, that of Professor Margaret F. Washburn. She states the issue clearly. Self-psychology, she holds, while often possible, "is not, therefore, a necessary adjunct to process psychology." [18] For instance, she says: "Let us take the emotion of sympathetic joy. I can describe this as the attitude in which I recognize and rejoice in the existence of joy in another self. I can also describe it perfectly well in terms of process psychology. The emotion of joy in

general may be structurally analyzed into the sensational elements of the idea or ideas occasioning the emotion, the sensational elements resulting from the bodily changes involved, and the resultant affective tone derived from all these sensational components. When the emotion is one of sympathetic joy, the only modification that our structural analysis needs is this: the occasioning idea is, in such a case, an idea of the emotion, that is, a weakened reproduction of the emotion associated with *certain ideas which mean to us the personality of another -- ideas of his appearance and movements or words, perhaps. When I think of my friend's joy I think of how he looks, what we will do and say, etc. My idea of his personality may be analyzed structurally into sensational and affective elements quite as well as my consciousness of the bodily effects of my emotion.*"

To my mind, Miss Washburn offers, in this passage, an admirable structural analysis of sympathetic joy and a convincing demonstration that such an analysis is inadequate. The elements of consciousness" which she names are indeed discoverable, but the enumeration falls far short of describing the emotion. In fact, Miss Washburn seems to me to yield the case for the opposition to self-psychology, by admitting that a consciousness of the "personality of another" does belong to sympathetic joy. For the analysis which she attempts of this consciousness of personality, in the statement to which I have given the emphasis of italics, is assuredly defective. The very expression "idea of personality" is a misleading one, if idea is taken in the technical sense. Assuredly, Damon could never be conscious of suffering with Pythias if Damon-being-conscious-of-Pythias consisted in one complex idea and Pythias-suffering consisted in another. My consciousness of my friend's appearance and words does indeed include these elements sensational and affective, but it includes more than this, else it would be impossible to explain why a feeling of joy [p. 122] does not accompany every complex of similar verbal and visual images; whereas, notoriously, two people looking and speaking alike may be objects, respectively, of my sympathy and of my indifference.

The failure of this effort to show the unessential character of description in terms of self-psychology leads me to reaffirm the assertion that an adequate account of consciousness includes, with an analysis into structural elements, an account of the self as unique, persistent, and in relation to an environment personal and impersonal. The merely structural psychologist's treatment of emotion, thought, recognition, and the rest is indeed true so far as it goes, yet it goes but part way toward portraying the tumultuous chaos of the conscious life. And psychology is both defective and artificial so long as it undertakes observation, experiment, and scientific description in disregard of the basal fact of the science.

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### Footnotes

[1] Cf. "An Introduction to Psychology," Chapters VIII.--X.; "Der doppelte Slandpunkt in der Psychologie," pp. 14-32.

[2] For recent indications of this tendency, *cf.* Stumpf, "Erscheinungen und Psychische Funktionen," Berlin, 1907; and R. S. Woodworth, "Imageless Thought," this JOURNAL, VOL III., pp. 701 ff., especially p. 705.

[3] *Cf.* *Philosophical Review*, 1906, Vol. XV., p. 93, for Titchener's criticism of the conception of relational elements. If I am right, the controlling reason for his refusal to recognize relational elements is the difficulty of assigning their exact nerve correlates. (For a similar comment on Titchener's procedure *cf.* Angell, "The Province of Functional Psychology," *loc. cit.*, pp. 81-82.) This reasoning is, however, inadmissible since psychological description should not take its cue from physiology. In his constructive treatment of relational experiences Titchener is driven to what seems to me the absurdity of describing them as essentially cases of verbal association. He says, for example: "We speak of a comparison of two impressions when the ideas which they arouse in consciousness call up the verbal associate 'alike' or 'different,' ("An Outline of Psychology," &sect; 85). This is surely an improbable hypothesis. The mere presence of verbal imagery obviously is not a distinctive mark of comparison, and if Titchener's meaning is that comparison is characterized essentially by the specific verbal images "alike," "different," then, on his principles, the German whose verbal reaction is "gleich" or "verschieden" would be incapable of discrimination.

[4] Memory and recognition are often, and thought is commonly, the result of assertive consciousness (will).

[5] For amplification *cf.* below, pp. 118, 119.

[6] It will be understood that the statements (necessarily condensed) of the table which follows attempt only to name distinguishing physiological correlates of the different kinds of consciousness. In no case, therefore, do they claim to be complete. In particular, they omit all reference to the motor accompaniments of sense consciousness (and the corresponding brain excitations), and to the excitation of sense centers during thought, emotion, will, and the like.

It will be noted, also, that will and faith are classified by reference to physiological and biological phenomena which follow, and do not precede, consciousness. In the ordinary "causal" use of the term, these phenomena could not, therefore, be named explanatory, though they may certainly be used as supplementary means of classifying will and faith.

[7] I may take this occasion to thank Dr. Jodl for constructive criticism of this sort in a review in the *Zeitschrift für Psychologie and Physiologie der Sinnesorgane*, 1906, Bd. 40, p. 306.

[8] *Cf.* Royce's opposition of "docility" to "mental initiative," in his "Outlines of Psychology."

[9] This procedure is rather an explanation than a description of consciousness, though the explanation is through reference not to physiological or biological, but to psychic

facts. Thus, the phenomena to which in this ease perception is linked are not facts of nerve structure, but unparticularized selves sharing the perceiver's experience. Purely psychological explanations in terms not of selves, but of ideas or of functions, also occur: for example, a particular train of imagination may be explained as due to the frequency or vividness of occurrence, in previous experience, of ideas similar to its initial image. I make these comments in order to show that my conception of psychology does not imply the doctrine (which, indeed, I heartily repudiate) that explanation is of necessity in non-psychic terms. (Cf. a valuable paper by Professor G. M. Stratton on " Modified Causation for Psychology," *Psychological Bulletin*, 1907, Vol. IV., pp. 129 ff.) For purposes of classification it is, however, clearly better to confine oneself, so far as possible, to descriptive distinctions.

[10] For the criticism, cf. H. J Watt, *Archiv für die Gesamte Psychologie*, 1906, p. 117; F. Arnold, *Psychological Bulletin*, 1905, Vol. 11., p. 370; M. F. Washburn, this *JOURNAL*, Vol. II. p. 715. It is fair to add that I have admitted in my different discussions the possibility that the "community" in perceiving is a reflectively observed character. Cf. "An Introduction to Psychology," p. 172, and " Der doppelte Standpunkt in der Psychologie," p. 44.

[11] Cf. my former statements of this distinction with reference to emotion, will, and faith: " An Introduction to Psychology," pp. 276 f., 310, 311; " Der doppelte Standpunkt in der Psychologie," pp. 63 ff. I still think, however, that the distinction between " external " and " internal " is not essential to the basal outlines of a psychological classification, and I am convinced that a division founded simply on these relations of the self must, be insufficient. Professor Angell, for example, in his "Psychology" considers consciousness under two heads: (1) "cognition," which informs us of objects and relations external to ourselves, and (2) "feeling," which informs us of our own internal condition. The insufficiency of the principles is evident in that Angell is driven to include under cognition "concepts," "judgments," and "meanings," which surely may be internal as well as external -- one may, for example, have a conception of feeling, and one may reason about, volition.

[12] Cf. K. Bühler, *Deutsche Literaturzeitung*, 1906, p. 312; F. Arnold, *Psychological Bulletin*, 1905, Vol. II., p. 371.

[13] The need of some. Such modification of my account of thought was indicated by Professor M. F. Bentley in a review published in the *American Journal of Psychology*, 1902, Vol. XIII., p. 167.

[14] Cf. Professor J. M. Baldwin's conception of thought, in particular his discussion of " community . . . the common or social factor in all the processes of thought," in the *Psychological Review*, Vol. XIV., p. 400.

[15] Cf. "An Introduction to Psychology," pp. 278-279.

[16] It will be remembered that mental process is Titchener's synonym for "idea" or "psychic content." For criticism of his right to use the term *cf.* the first paper in this series, this JOURNAL, Vol. IV., p. 678.

[17] Philosophical Review, 1900, Vol. X.V., p. 93. *Cf.* M. F. Washburn, *loc. cit.*, p. 716.

[18] This journal Vol. II., p. 715. Miss Washburn, it will be noted, follows Dr. Titchener in the use -- unjustified as I have tried to show -- of the word "process."

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