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DREAMS OF A SPIRIT-SEER

ILLUSTRATED BY

DREAMS OF METAPHYSICS

BY

IMMANUEL KANT

TRANSLATED BY EMANUEL F. GOERWITZ

AND

EDITED, WITH AN INTRODUCTION AND NOTES,

BY FRANK SEWALL



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TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.



The difficulties which Kant's style presents to the translator into English need not be dwelt upon with those who are familiar with his works. My main endeavour has been to produce a readable translation. I have, therefore, laid stress on the faithful and lucid representation of the author's thought, while the preservation of the periodic constructions of the original was of secondary interest. I am, however, conscious that I have not in all places succeeded in sailing with even keel between the extremes of strictly literal translation and paraphrase.

EMANUEL F. GOERWITZ.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS., U.S.A.,

July, 1899.

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THE EDITOR'S PREFACE.

Kant's "Dreams of a Spirit-Seer,"* illustrated by those of Metaphysics," was published in the year 1766. His mental attitude at the time has been well described by his latest biographer and critic, M. Kronenberg: *Kant; Sein Leben, and Seine Lehre: München: Beck: 1897. 8vo. VII., 312.* The writer says in regard to the alleged scepticism of Kant about the year 1764: "All around the metaphysicians were still directing their telescopes to the farthest ends of the universe: Kant, on the contrary, having long returned from this high-strung flight, was making himself comfortably at home on earth." (p. 157.) Of the "Dreams of a Spirit-Seer" he says:—

"Between the visions of Swedenborg and those of the metaphysicians of his time, Kant drew a surprising parallel. Swedenborg believed himself to be as familiarly acquainted with the beyond as with his own house. Was

* The common title, "Dreams of a Ghost-Seer," is not retained because it is a manifestly false rendering of the term "Geisterseher." This means simply a seer of "spirits," not of "ghosts." Had the latter been Kant's intention he would have used the word "Gespenst," ghost, and not "Geist," spirit.—F.S.

not the case the same with the philosophers? Kant believed himself to be in a position to explain these delusions, the one by the other, and so to get rid of both.

“So entirely did Kant look down upon Swedenborg and his contemporaries the metaphysicians that he merely played with them, handling them now with serious irony, now with sly humour, sometimes pouring upon them his gallish scorn and dealing them the sharpest blows of his cynical wit. Such a tone is only assumed by one who sees his subject far beneath him. So did Kant hold himself in regard to the metaphysicians, to general philosophical knowledge, yea even to knowledge itself as a whole.” (pp. 161, 163).

This judgment may be compared with Kuno Fischer: *Geschichte der neu. Phil.*, Bd. III., p. 232: 2nd Ed., 1869, for remarkable agreements.*

That the “Dreams of a Spirit-Seer” was a humorous critique aimed chiefly at the philosophers of his day, using Swedenborg as a convenient because non-combative and comparatively unknown mark for his blows, is now generally conceded. But the century and a half that have elapsed since that time have brought Swedenborg out of his obscurity into light, and his real relation to Kant and the latter’s great indebtedness to him is now

* “Swedenborg and Metaphysics were, to use a familiar phrase, for Kant ‘two flies to be killed at one slap.’ He went laughingly at it. The comparison was itself a witty one, and the philosophers took it up good-naturedly, and with all indulgence followed it out to its respective conclusions.” Kuno Fischer, *Gesch. d. neu. Phil.* III., 232.

first seriously arousing the attention of the students of German philosophy. See especially the notices by Professor Vaihinger, of the University of Halle, in his *Commentar zur Krilik d. R. V.*, Vol. II., pp. 143, 345, 431, 512, 513, Stuttgart, 1893; and in *Kant Studien*, Vol. I: II., on Kant and Swedenborg: also Heinze's "Observations on Kant's Lectures on Metaphysics" in *Abhandlungen der Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften*. Leipzig, 1894: P. von Linds *Kants Mystische Weltanschauung, ein Wahn der Modernen Mystik*; Munich 1892: Du Prel's Essay on *Kant's Mystical View of the World*, in his edition of Kant's *Lectures on Psychology*, Leipzig, 1809; and *Der Angebliche Mysticismus Kants*: Robert Hoar, Brugg, 1895.

In these investigations it comes to light that not only did Kant find in Swedenborg a system of spiritual philosophy so parallel to that of the philosophers in reasonableness that the validity of the one could be measured by that of the other, but that the very system finally followed by Kant himself when he came, later in life, as a lecturer in the University on Psychology and Metaphysics, to enter upon the domain of these inquiries, was largely identical with that of the "Dreams" he had once affected to be amused at. The fair and rational vision of a *mundus intelligibilis* avowedly erected on the testimony of Swedenborg,* in Chapter II. of the

* "It would be beautiful if such a systematic constitution of the spiritual world could be concluded, or at all events could be surmised with probability, not merely from the general concept of

First Part of the treatise here published, he amuses himself with tearing down by the negative criticism of Chapter III., little foreseeing that in four years' time, for his inaugural dissertation of 1770, he would be choosing no other theme than that of the same vision he had thus destroyed—that namely of a *mundus intelligibilis et mundus sensibilis*,* and that all through his subsequent teaching and writing, including the *Critique* and the *Religion i. d. Gr.*, he would be finding the basis of his positive idealism only in those principles of the *Arcana* he had once affected to despise. Will not this circumstance account for the instruction given by Kant to his editor Tieftrunk (see Kant's Werke: Edition Hartenstein: Bd. VIII., 812). "I assent with pleasure to your proposal for collecting and editing my minor writings. Only I wish you would not include writings earlier than 1770. In this case a German translation of my Inaugural Dissertation *De Mundi Sensibilis atque Intelligibilis Forma et Principiis* might form the beginning." Thus omitting the "Dreams."

In view of these investigations the importance of the *Traüme* as a potent factor in Kant's development is

the nature of a spirit, which is all too hypothetical, but from some actual and universally conceded observation. Presuming upon the reader's indulgence, I insert an attempt of the kind, somewhat out of my way, to be sure, and far from a demonstration, but nevertheless giving occasion, it seems to me, for not unpleasant surmises." —From the *Traüme*, Werke, II. 342.

* See Kant's "Inaugural Dissertation" of 1770, with an introduction, &c., by William G. Eckoff, Ph. D., New York, 1894.

so manifest as to make a longer delay in its translation into English inexcusable.

At the same time the growing appreciation among students of the profound philosophic principles which underlie the teachings of Swedenborg make the occasion of this publication an opportune one for placing side by side with the leading affirmations made by Kant in the Dissertation and his University Lectures, a citation of those passages in Swedenborg by which they were evidently suggested or with which they stand in interesting relation.

In this way the "Seer," however it may fare with the "Metaphysicians" in Kant's hands, will at least be allowed to speak for himself, and the reader may form his judgments at first hand. To the student of modern philosophical development it will not be time lost to witness here, where it has been least suspected, the first decided and controlling influence of Swedenborg's spiritual philosophy upon modern idealistic thought.

To aid the reader in arriving at a truer understanding and appreciation of these "Dreams" and of their import in Kant's entire system I have translated and brought together the recent utterances of German and other philosophers on the subject of Swedenborg's real influence upon Kant, as shown especially in the latter's *Lectures on Psychology* and *Lectures on Metaphysics*.

FRANK SEWALL.

Washington, D.C., U.S.A., December, 1899.

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INTRODUCTION.



RECENT GERMAN DISCUSSION

OF THE

RELATION OF KANT TO SWEDENBORG.

INCLUDING NOTES FROM

Professor VAHINGER, *Commentar zu Kants Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*: Vol. II.

The *Kant-Studien*, edited by Professor VAHINGER at the University of Halle:

The *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*. Berlin: 1895.

Professor Heinze of Leipzig in *Abhandlungen der Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften*, Leipzig, 1894.

P. von Lind: *Kants Mystische Weltanschauung*: Munich: 1892.

Carl du Prel: *Kants Vorlesungen über Psychologie*: 1889.

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I.

PROFESSOR VAIHINGER ON KANT'S
DOCTRINE OF THE TWO WORLDS AND
ITS RELATION TO SWEDENBORG.

In his Commentary on "Kant's Transcendental Æsthetic, Lecture i. on Space,"* where the problem is under discussion whether space be (i.) purely Objective and *a posteriori* (Newton), or (ii.) purely subjective and *a priori* (Kant), or (iii.) according to Treudelenburg's "Third Possibility," at once Objective and Subjective (Leibnitz), Professor Vaihinger introduces a note on Lambert's suggestion. "Our space is a simulacrum of true space" (Lambert's *Recension*, 1773, on *Herz Betrachtungen*, Allg. Deut. Bibli. 20, 228), and quotes Lambert's letter to Kant, 1770:

* *Commentar zu Kants Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*, by Dr. H. Vaihinger, A. O. Professor der Philosophie an der Universität Halle. Motto: Die Schriften Kants sind doch einmal der Codex, den man nie in philosophischen Angelegenheiten, so wenig als das Corpus juris in juristischen aus der Hand legen darf. W. v. Humboldt. Zweiter Band. Stuttgart, Berlin, Leipzig. Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft. 1892.

“I thought that the simulacrum (appearance) of Time and Space in the Thought World could easily be brought into contemplation with your sublime theory.” Also Mendelssohn in his letter to Kant, Dec. 23, 1770, regarding time says :

“Time is, according to Leibnitz, a phenomenon, and has, like all phenomena, *something objective and something subjective.*”

Kant has, moreover, touched upon the problem in the Dissertation (*i.e.*, the Inaugural Dissertation on the Two Worlds: 1770). He asks outright in § 16 :

quonam principio ipsa haec relatio omnium substantiarum nitatur, quae intuitive spectato vocatur spatium ?

To what seems to us *spatium* there corresponds then an *ipsa substantiarum relatio*. He answers this *subtilis quaestio* thus: that the connection of all appearances in space is a reflection (Gegenbild) of the connection of all substances in the primal Being, “*ideoque spatium, quod est conditio universalis et necessaria compraesentiae omnium sensitive cognita, dici potest omnipraesentia (sic) phenomenon (Scholion 22).*” “Therefore Space, which is the universal and necessary condition of the united presence of all things, sensitively known, may be called omnipresence as phenomenon, or the phenomenal omnipresence”^{*} Still Kant is unwilling to enter

^{*} Kant's Dissertation was produced in 1770. It was about the year 1769 that Swedenborg wrote in *Canones Novae Ecclesiae* the doctrine that space and time are not forms of things in themselves, but by correspondence there is such relationship (between

farther upon such mystic surmises (*indagationas mysticas*), which, he says, suggest Malebranche, but which more truly recall Swedenborg, and he very distinctly asserts further on (§ 27) that "it is impossible for the human intellect to know in *substantiis immaterialibus* these *relationes externas* which correspond to Space as the condition of the relation of material but only apparent (*erscheinende*) things. Kant therefore recognizes relations of the *things in themselves* which correspond to Space, but regards them as unknowable. On the other hand, Lambert's suggestions hold good still and with all the more force: That to reason by analogy—at least to a certain extent—from the spatial relations of appearances to the true relations of things in themselves is not

phenomena and noumena). Thus: "God's infinity as corresponding to spaces is called 'immensity'; and as corresponding to times 'eternity'; yet there is nothing of space in his immensity, and nothing of time in his eternity." See also Swedenborg's statement in *Divine Love and Wisdom*, 69-73: "The Divine apart from space fills all the spaces of the universe. . . . The Divine is in all time, apart from time." On Space and Time as forms of human thinking, or of the universe as "sensitively known," see Swedenborg, *Arcana Cœlestia*, 7381 (published 1753). "The ideas of interior thought pertaining to man, although they are above material things, yet terminate in natural things, and where they terminate they appear to be. Thence the man perceives what he thinks. If the idea from time and space were taken away he would not know what he thinks. . . . Man cannot in anywise think without the idea of time and space. The idea adheres to everything which man thinks. If the idea from time and space were taken away he would not know what he thinks—scarcely whether he thinks. The ideas of space arise from measuring by times; wherefore where the one is there is the other."

only allowable but required."* (Vaihinger: Kant Commentar: ii., p. 143.)

* The Doctrine of the Reason as taught by Swedenborg and its bearing on our knowledge of reality may in general be seen from the following extracts from the "Arcana," and other works:—

"Three things constitute the external man: the rational, the scientific, and the external sensuous. The rational is interior, and is that through which the interior man is conjoined with the external; in itself it is nothing unless affection flows into it and makes it active; and it thence becomes such as is the affection. When the affection of good inflows, this becomes in the rational the affection of truth; the contrary when the affection of evil inflows." (Swedenborg's *Arcana Cœlestia*, 1589.)

"What goes on in the internal man cannot be apprehended by the man himself because it is above the rational from which he thinks. To the inmost or internal man is subject the rational faculty or principle which *appears as if* belonging to man. Into this there inflow through the internal man the celestial things of love and of faith; and through this rational down into the scientific things which belong to the external man. But the things which flow in are received according to the state of each." (*Ibid.*, 1941.)

"Man is born into nothing rational, but only into the faculty of receiving it, and as he learns and imbues all things so he becomes rational. This is done by the way of the body. But there is something constantly flowing in from the interior which receives the things thus entering [through the bodily senses] and disposes them into order. Hence is their order *and the relationships among them*, from which it is evident that the rational faculty of man is from divine celestial good as its father." (*Ibid.*, 2557.)

"The things of reason illustrated by the divine are appearances of truth. All appearances [phenomena] of truth in which is the divine are of the rational faculty, *insomuch that rational truths and appearances of truth are the same*, whereas scientific things belong to the natural plane. Rational truths can never be and come forth except from an inflowing of the divine into the rational faculty of man; and *through the things of reason into the scientific things which belong to the natural plane of the mind*. The things that then

take place in the rational appear in the natural plane as an image of many things together in a mirror." (*Ibid.*, 3368.)

"Rational things, or what is the same, appearances of truth, that is, spiritual truths, are not knowledges [acquired by the senses, F. S.], but are in knowledges; for they are of the rational or internal man. For knowledges being of the natural man are vessels which receive rational things." (*Ibid.*, 3391.)

"When man is in the world his rational is distinct from his natural [plane of thought]; insomuch that he can be withdrawn from external sensuous things and in some degree from interior sensuous things and be in his rational, thus in spiritual thought." (*Ibid.*, 3498.)

"It is not he who can ratiocinate from scientific facts who enjoys the rational faculty. A fatuous lumen produces this skill. But he enjoys the rational who can see clearly that good is good and truth truth; consequently that evil is evil and falsity falsity. Thus the scientific [sensuous] knowledges are means for perfecting the rational faculty and also for destroying it; and those who by means of scientific knowledges have destroyed their rational faculty are more stupid than those versed in no knowledges." (*Ibid.*, 4156.)

"The faculty of thinking rationally regarded in itself, is not of man, but of God with him. Upon this depends human reason in general." (*Divine Love and Wisdom*, 23.)

ON THE RELATION OF MAN TO OTHER THINKING BEINGS.

From Professor Vaihinger's Kant Commentar. Vol. II.

“Kant delights in the assertion that we are imprisoned by the senses, *i.e.*, by the limitations of sensuous appearances . . . ‘The highest Being will surely not be subject to all these appearances which sense unavoidably imposes on those intelligences derived by us through experience.’ (A. 640). ‘All Nature exists only for us . . .’ This Kant formulates expressly as the result of the *Æsthetic* in the *Prolegomena*, § 36: ‘How is nature possible in material relation, that is, viewed as the concept of appearances? how are Space, Time, and what fill these as objects of sensation possible? The answer is: By means of the peculiar quality of our sensuous faculty? (*unserer Sinnlichkeit*): according to which our Sense in a way of its own is moved by objects which in themselves are not known to it and *are altogether different* from these appearances.’ The appearance of Space answers therefore only for this empirical nature and for us as empirical subjects: it is not valid either for all objects in themselves, nor for all subjects . . .” * p. 344.

* On Time and Space in the Spiritual World, see Swedenborg in *Divine Love and Wisdom*, as follows:—

The above reference of Kant to "other thinking beings" is not, as has been so generally supposed, a mere critical suggestion, but is made in thorough earnest. The existence and nature of the "Spirit World" was from the beginning an interesting problem with Kant. In the *Natural History of the Heavens*, R. VI., 179, and especially 206, "On the Inhabitants of the Stars," Kant sets forth his theories about the "various classes of intelligent beings," the "kinds of thinking natures," and

"In the spiritual world the progressions of life appear to be in time; but since state there determines time, time is only an appearance. Time in the spiritual world is nothing but the *quality of state*. Times are not there constant as in the natural world, but change according to the state of life, having relation especially to changes of wisdom. Time there is one with thought from affection. (70-74.)

"But time and space as fixed or measured by material standards are proper to nature, and as such belong only to a limited world, and cannot be applied to infinite being. Time and space belong to nature, just as finiteness or limitation belong to a created world. For nothing which is proper to nature can be predicated of the Divine, and space and time are proper to nature. Space in nature is measurable, and so is time. Nature derives this measurement from the apparent revolution and annual motion of the sun of this world. But in the spiritual world it is different. (73.)

"Times which are proper to nature in its world are in the spiritual world pure states which *appear* progressive, *because angels and spirits are finite*; from which it may be seen that in God they are not progressive, because He is Infinite, and infinite things in Him are One; and hence it follows that the Divine in all time is apart from time. (75.)

Schopenhauer in his essay, "Versuch ueber Geisterseher and was damit zusammenhaengt," in the volume entitled "Parerga and Paralipomena," Vol. I., pp. 241, 328, calls attention to an existing order of things:—

"Entirely distinct from that of nature where the purely formed

on the various "dwelling-places" of these "intelligent creatures." He speaks at length about the dependence of the "spiritual faculties" of the various Planet-inhabitants on the grosser or finer, heavier or lighter, matter as determined by the "distance of these abodes from the sun . . ." The inhabitants of Jupiter or Saturn belong to the "most exalted class of intelligent creatures. These at least have a different Time-idea from ours; they are not subject to death in the same degree that we are . . ." Man occupies a middle ground between these most excellent and the more imperfect grades of

laws of nature do not apply, hence where time and space do not separate individuals any more, and where separation and isolation resulting from time and space do not offer obstacles to influence of will or to communication of thought. . . . Here, be it said, that the true idea of *actio in distans* is that the space between the worker and the worked upon, whether full or empty, has no influence at all on the working; it is the same whether the distance be an inch or a billion of Uranus orbits." (p. 282.)

We commonly imagine that the reality of a spiritual world is overthrown when we have shown that such a world is only subjectively conditioned. But what weight can that argument have with one who knows from Kant's doctrine how strong a share of subjective conditions is involved in the appearance [to our senses] of the corporeal world; how for instance this world with the space in which it stands, the time in which it moves, and the causality in which the being of matter consists, according to its whole form therefore, is only a form of brain-functioning, according as the impressions are awakened by shock on the nerves of the sense organ." (p. 318.)

And this shock, which it is the main purpose of Schopenhauer in this essay to prove, may really occur from internal as from external causes. And therefore, as he says, "there remains left only the question as to the *Ding an sich*."

“thinking natures.”* These thoughts, to which by Kant “probability” is frankly attributed, are carried out at length in the “Dreams of a Spirit-seer, &c.,” in the half serious, half ironical style which characterises this remarkable work. (Du Prel makes another application of this thought: *The Planet-dwellers*; 1880, pp. 114-175.) See Fortschr. d. Met. Ros. I., 497: “We could imagine an immediate representation of an object, not through the conditions of sense, but by the understanding. But we have no tangible idea of such knowledge. Still, it is necessary for us to think of such in order not to subject all beings capable in intelligence to only our way of seeing things. For it may be that some world-beings might behold the same objects under another form. It can also be that this form is, and of necessity must be, the same in all world-beings, although we do not understand this necessity.” Kant refers to this last possibility also later in his Note II. to the second edition of the *Æsthetic*, but remarks that this extension of the Space-

* Compare Swedenborg’s *De Telluribus, &c.*: “Earths in the Universe and their Inhabitants, &c.: also their Spirits and Angels: from what has been heard and seen . . .” This work appeared in sections inserted in successive volumes of the *Arcana* from the year 1749 to 1756, and was published in a volume in London in 1758. Kant’s *Theory of the Heavens* appeared in 1755. Swedenborg also treats of the inhabitants of Jupiter and Saturn as described by the spirits from those planets in the spiritual world. He, too, treats of their character in relation to their planetary conditions, but describes them mainly as to their spiritual place or function in relation to the *Maximus Homo* or entire order and form of the heavenly society.

view to "all finite thinking beings" would not change its subjectivity.

Kant declares very distinctly in the *Grundl. z. Met. d. Sitten*: 3, *Abchnitt, Ros. VIII.*, 84: "that the world of sense may be very different according to the difference of sense perception in various world beholders, while the world of understanding which lies at its foundation remains always the same." Kant has therefore adhered in all earnest, even in his "critical" period, to this idea conceived at an earlier time.—Vaihinger: *Kant Commentar II.*, pp. 344-346.

In a chapter devoted to a discussion of the *Origin of Kant's Doctrine of Space and Time*, especially as to whether Kant's attitude in the year 1770 as represented by the *Dissertation on the Two Worlds* was wholly the result of his own thinking or caused partly by Leibnitz' *Nouveaux Essais*, with its clearly marked distinction between the *mundus sensibilis* and the *mundus intelligibilis*, as well as by other external influences, Prof. Vaihinger, in a footnote remarks as follows:—

"Laas calls attention to the influence of Euler, whose 'Letters to a German Princess,' 1769, Kant quotes very favourably in the *Dissertation* § 27, 30. The same author, in *Anschluss an Dühring, Krit. Gesch. d. Phil.*, 396, finds in Kant's dissertation Swedenborgian influences, a view at first surprising but not to be dismissed too abruptly. Attention has been already called to this subject (referring to the passages above quoted from

pp. 143, 344). We only need to recall that in the 'Dreams' I. 2 and II. 2 Swedenborg's theory of the 'Two Worlds' is thoroughly discussed, and that Swedenborg, who regarded the sensuous world in space as only a 'Phænomen' of the unspatial spiritual world, applied precisely the same terms to both worlds which Kant has used: *mundus intelligibilis et sensibilis*. Compare also Kant's Vorl. ueber Met. herausg. v. Poelitz (1821), S. 257. The same passages have led also Riehl, Krit. I., 229, to accept Swedenborg's influence upon Kant. Compare my review of the edition of *Kant's Vorlesungen über Psychologie: mit einer Einleitung: 'Kant's mystische Weltanschauung,'* by Du Prel (1889), in Arch. f. Gesch. d. Phil. IV., 721 ff.* If the last author considerably

* Says Kant, as quoted by Du Prel:—

"The thoughts of Swedenborg are in this connection (that is, with regard to the two worlds) very sublime. He says the spiritual world constitutes an especially real universe; this is the intelligible world, *mundus intelligibilis*, which must be distinguished from the sensible world, *mundus sensibilis*."

"Through Kant's 'Lectures on Psychology,' his 'Dreams of a Spirit-Seer' are placed in an altogether new light. One might suppose that this work was so clearly written that an erroneous interpretation of it would be an impossibility, but the aversion of our century to mystic thinking has brought about a misconception of the 'Dreams.' It has been interpreted as a daring venture of Kant's genius in making sport of superstition; the accent has been laid on Kant's negations, and his affirmative utterances have been overlooked. The 'Lectures on Psychology' now show, however, that these utterances were very seriously intended; for the affirmative portions of the 'Dreams' agree very thoroughly with the lengthier exposition of the 'Psychology,' and the wavering

exaggerates the connection of Kant with Swedenborg, still we are not to fall into the other error of denying altogether a positive relation of Kant to Swedenborg which shows itself occasionally even in the period of the 'Critique,' as for example *Critique of Pure Reason*: A. 394: A. 808: B. 836 (idea of the *Corpus mysticum* of rational beings). *Critique of the Practical Reason*, I. 2, 7 (Ros. VIII., 242; Hart V., 112).—Vaihinger: Kant Commentar II., p. 431.

Finally, in a chapter of General Observations, the author compares Kant's *intuitus originarius* with Swedenborg's "pneumatische Anschauung" or "Soul-vision":

"As B. Erdmann (Reflex II., 313) rightly remarks,

attitude of Kant is here no longer perceptible." (Du Prel—Introduction to Kant's "Lectures on Psychology," pp. vii., viii.)

"The faculty ascribed to Swedenborg answers completely to Kant's conception of a being inhabiting two worlds at the same time." (Du Prel,—*Ibid.*, p. xxiv.)

That Kant at the time of the letter to Fraulein von Knobloch felt the deepest interest in Swedenborg is freely admitted by Robert Hoar in his Inaugural Discussion, entitled *Der Angebliche Mysticismus Kant's*. Brugg: 1895.

"So soon as Swedenborg's 'Arcana Cœlestia' was printed, for whose publication he had been eagerly waiting, he bought the volumes at seven pounds sterling, and this at a time when Kant, the privat-docent, was anything but well off, and when that amount of money meant more than it does now. That he also studied other works of Swedenborg besides the 'Arcana,' appears from a letter of Hamann to Scheffner, Nov. 10, 1784, where he mentions Swedenborg and Kant: 'As our Kant at that time prescribed to himself all the works of the Dreamer, so I had the patience to wade through the whole set of thick Quartos.'"

the acceptance of this 'soul-vision' stands in manifest connection with the 'philosophic invention' of a *mundus intelligibilis* with its 'spiritual' constitution. The spiritual world is visible only to the spiritual sight. Man does not possess this; only God does. But that man may come to possess this vision which is for a time denied him, Kant does not deny. Indeed, the immortality of man consists in just this possession, in the change from the sensuous spatial vision into the timeless and spaceless spiritual vision: and this is itself 'the other world.' The other world is therefore not another place, but only another view of even this world. This hypothesis appears in the 'Dreams;' also in the period between 1770 and 1780 in the 'Lectures on Metaphysics,' p. 225; and even in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, A. 393; especially in the *Methodenlehre*, A. 779, where Kant admits of our accepting such a 'transcendental hypothesis," yea, approves of it. He proposes, indeed, in the same line of thought, the following hypothesis: 'That this life is nothing more than the mere appearance, *i.e.*, the sensuous semblance of the pure spiritual life, and the whole sense world is but a picture which hovers before our present modes of knowing, and, like a dream, has no reality in itself; and that, if we should know and see things and ourselves as they really are, we should see ourselves in a world of spiritual natures.' That 'world of spiritual natures' constitutes then that timeless '*corpus mysticum* of rational beings' (A. 808, B. 836). Of this *corpus mysticum* Kant

has already spoken in the 'Dreams,' where he mentions the 'spiritual body' and the 'society of spirits' (Ros. VII., A. 96).^{*} These expressions of Kant offered at

^{*} On the change from the natural to the spiritual world Swedenborg says :—

“MAN AFTER DEATH IS IN ALL SENSE, MEMORY, THOUGHT, AND AFFECTION, IN WHICH HE WAS IN THE WORLD, AND LEAVES NOTHING EXCEPT HIS EARTHLY BODY.

“That man when he passes out of the natural world into the spiritual, as is the case when he dies, carries with him all things that are his, or which belong to him as a man, except his earthly body, has been testified to me by manifold experience; for man when he enters the spiritual world, or the life after death, is in a body as in the world; to appearance there is no difference, since he does not perceive nor see any difference. But his body is then spiritual, and thus separated or purified from earthly things, and when what is spiritual touches and sees what is spiritual, it is just as when what is natural touches and sees what is natural: hence a man, when he has become a spirit, does not know otherwise than that he is in his body in which he was in the world, and thus does not know that he has deceased. A man-spirit also enjoys every external and internal sense which he enjoyed in the world; he sees as before, he hears and speaks as before, he also smells and tastes, and when he is touched, he feels the touch as before; he also longs, desires, craves, thinks, reflects, is affected, loves, wills, as before; and he who is delighted with studies, reads and writes as before. In a word, when a man passes from one life into the other, or from one world into the other, it is as if he passed from one place into another; and he carries with him all things which he possessed in himself as a man, so that it cannot be said that the man after death, which is only the death of the earthly body, has lost anything of himself. He also carries with him the natural memory, for he retains all things whatsoever which he has in the world heard, seen, read, learned, and thought, from earliest infancy even to the end of life; the *natural objects*, however, which are in the memory, *because they cannot be reproduced in the spiritual world, are*

once a welcome meeting ground to the 'mystics,' from Jung-Stilling down to Du Prel. Schopenhauer has also turned Kant's transcendental idealism to the support of mysticism as occasion has offered; but especially was Jung-Stilling an admirer of the *Æsthetic*, because he traced through its involved argumentation the direct influence of Swedenborg. The latter's ideas Kant calls "very sublime." (*Metaphysik*, Ed. Poelitz, p. 257; compare Du Prel, *Kant's Vorlesungen über Psychologie*, 1889; comp. Riehl, *Krit. I.*, 229).

"Swedenborg says: The Spiritual World is a very real

quiescent, as is the case with a man when he does not think from them; but still they are reproduced when it pleases the Lord. That such is the state of man after death, the sensual man cannot at all believe, because he does not comprehend it; for the sensual man cannot think otherwise than naturally, even about spiritual things.

"But still the difference between the life of man in the spiritual world and his life in the natural world, is great, as well with respect to the external senses and their affections, as with respect to the internal senses and their affections. Those who are in heaven perceive by the senses, that is, they see and hear, much more exquisitely, and also think more wisely, than when they were in the world; for they see from the light of heaven, which exceeds by many degrees the light of the world; and they hear by a spiritual atmosphere, which likewise by many degrees surpasses that of the earth. The difference of these external senses is as the difference between sunshine and the obscurity of a mist, in the world, and as the difference between the light at mid-day and the shade at evening; for the light of heaven, because it is divine truth, gives to the sight of the angels to perceive and distinguish things the most minute. Their external sight also corresponds to the internal sight, or to the understanding; for with angels one sight flows into the other, so that they act as one; hence they have so great acuteness."—From "Heaven and Hell," Nos. 461, 462.

universe. It is the *mundus intelligibilis* which must be distinguished from this *mundo sensibili*. He says that all spiritual natures are connected with one another, &c. Even now our souls stand in this connection and society and, indeed, in this very world where we are; only we do not here see this association, because here we enjoy only the sensuous vision. But although we cannot see it, we are nevertheless now in this spiritual society. If this hindrance to our spiritual vision were once removed, we should see ourselves in the midst of this spiritual society, and this is the 'other world,' which is not a world of other things, but of the same things seen differently by us."

"Whether these words date from 1788 or from 1774 (Erdmann, Phil. Mon. XIX., 129, properly chooses the latter), they admit perhaps of the conclusion that Kant found himself in sympathy with Swedenborg in this contrast between the sensuous and the intelligible worlds, so that the Dissertation of 1770, and with this the *Æsthetic*, do stand, in however loose, still, a very positive relation to the Dreams of 1766, and so with Swedenborg himself. But the wildly fermenting must of the Swedenborgian Mysticism becomes with Kant clarified and settled into the noble, mild, and yet strong wine of criticism."

To this paragraph Prof. Vaihinger adds this footnote :

"Notwithstanding, or rather for this very reason, would it be entirely unjust to classify Kant among the 'mystics' in the modern sense. Even though certain

Swedenborgian conceptions had, to some degree, entered into his position of 1770, which we have admitted to be entirely possible, still, even in 1770 Kant had declined to enter further upon such *indagationes mysticas*. As completely as Kant from the middle of the year 1770 set himself to the working out of the germs of his *Criticism*, *i.e.*, his critical doctrine of experience, as this is developed in the *Analytic*, just so completely must henceforth all serious contemplation of Swedenborg's phantasies be given up. That he had, for a time, lent an ear to these phantasies served henceforth as a warning against any attacks from Swedenborg's delusion. If he speaks in the *Critique of Pure Reason* of the *corpus mysticum*, still this is not mysticism, for the grossly dogmatic teaching of Swedenborg becomes changed in Kant to merely "a bare but still practical idea." If a somewhat drastic comparison may be allowed, one might say: as little as the various tar-products are tar itself, so little are these 'ideas' of criticism to be identified with dogmas of mysticism. Kant's world of experience, governed, as it is, by the 'analogies of experience,' excludes all invasion of the regular system of nature by incontrollable 'spirits'; and the whole system of modern mysticism, so far as he holds fast to his fundamental principles, Kant is 'bound to forcibly reject.'"—Vaihinger, *Kant Commentar*, vol. II., pp. 512, 513.

II.

OBSERVATIONS BY THE PRESENT EDITOR.

With these sober and rational conclusions of Professor Vaihinger regarding Kant's relation to existing "mysticism," meaning, as he doubtless does, modern "spiritism," every one will concur, and none more readily and heartily than the followers and admirers of Swedenborg.* He more impressively and more effectually than any subsequent writer has warned his readers against the delusions and snares of the so-called modern "medium" and the mis-named "spiritual" *seance*. We would only call attention here to the misapprehension to which the concluding note of Professor Vaihinger might give rise, namely, that, because Kant rejects the absurdities of modern spiritism, therefore we are to cancel from his system all influences from Swedenborg's teaching. As matter of fact, a student equally conversant with both systems—those of Kant and Swedenborg—would see in the reserve of Kant over against Swedenborg's "revelations from things seen and heard" the only attitude possible to a critical student of the powers of pure reason to evolve knowledge *a priori* or from itself. The great mission of Kant was to establish just

* See Note 37 : to p. 72 of the "Dreams."

this negative or neutral ability of the reason. It can neither create a knowledge of the spiritual world, nor can it deny the possibility of such a world. It can affirm indeed the rationality of such a conception, but the *reality* of it does not come within its domain as pure reason. It is interesting to note all through Kant's "critical" period this forced attitude of neutrality as long as the inquiry is simply and solely as to the power of the reason as such to create a knowledge of things transcending experience. He is strictly and manfully consistent with himself in rejecting as conclusions of pure reason any experiences of an objective world experimentally observed, whether on this material plane of existence or any other. To refuse to deny the possibility of other planes of existence and other modes of knowing than we now experience, is as far as he will go. As for admitting the direct communication of "spirits," or of the seer himself whose system of the two worlds he has so carefully studied, as elements of purely rational knowledge, this was of course out of the question. The nearest approach to the break down of the barrier between Kant's "pure reason" and Swedenborg's knowledge *ex visis et auditis in mundo spirituali*, is in the *Æsthetic* with its doctrine of the subjective origin of Time and Space. Here of course Kant throws down all his defences against whatever charge of idealism or spiritualism. The question is no longer, can an "intelligible world" exist? or, are there existences other than that of which we become aware through the

senses of this body? Since the spatial extent and the endurance, or what we would call the "reality," of even this sensuous world is seen, in the *Æsthetic*, not to exist in the world itself but in something more real, of which we are in some secondary sense subjectively the agents—the real question remaining is, granting that many such worlds may exist and with them the various modes of cognition, what connection of these worlds and their mutual relation or their internal order shall we regard as consistent with the demands of pure reason? And here it is that Kant's recognition of Swedenborg's system of the two worlds and their correspondence as "sublime" finds its real and only important significance. Neither of the two great system builders asks the support of the other. Their mutual testimony, while of use for illustration, would be only a source of weakness if accepted in a constructive sense. If Swedenborg has given future spiritual philosophy the legend seen in one of his symbolic visions: *nunc licet intellectualiter intrare in mysteria fidei*, he would resent any trifling with that fair instrument, the intellect, through a bias of whatever kind, spiritual or anti-spiritual. Kant was equally consistent in saying to spirits and to spirit-seers: My mission is neither to confirm nor reject your messages, it is to define the limits of the intellectual judgment itself, and to keep the mind a clear and perfect instrument for the disposing of all subjects that are brought for its reception and determination. As Kant was necessarily critical, this being the

office of the pure reason itself, so was Swedenborg dogmatical, this being the office of experience. But the dogmas of Swedenborg's experience lie, unlike other dogmas, according to Swedenborg's repeated asseverations, subject always to the verdicts of "sound reason," and the soundest reason in Kant is, as we see, that wherein his fundamental principles are identical with those of Swedenborg.

Professor Vaihinger's simile of the fermenting must and clarified wine is too happy a one to be rejected altogether, even if the application be somewhat faulty. Not alone with Swedenborg, but with all investigators, including especially a man like Kant, the crude facts of experience are what truly constitute the fermenting "must," so long as they have not, by reduction and clarification from error, become settled into the wine of a thoroughly rational, harmonious, and consistent system. The process of the reduction of experimental knowledge into rational intelligence is what is constantly going on. But it would be a mistake to conceive of Swedenborg as merely the collector of crude experiences, however truly his *visa et audita* may impress a hasty reader as such: his knowledges are also elsewhere in his own works reduced to the "wine" of a system as profound, as clear, and as steady as that of any of his contemporaries. That so able a judge as Professor Vaihinger should find them in the clear and vigorous depth of Kant's best reasoning, is only another tribute to their universal and enduring value.

FRANK SEWALL.

III.

Professor Vaihinger, in the *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 1895, Berlin, calls attention to the work of P. von Lind: *Kants Mystische Weltanschauung, ein Wahn der Modernen Mystik*: Munich, 1892, in which the author criticises Du Prel's favourable view of Kant's so-called mystic tendency, and remarks that:—

Lind has correctly pointed out that Du Prel has interpreted the *Träume* too favourably for Swedenborg, but still he fails to recognise that Kant must have had a strong sympathy for the metaphysical hypotheses which he brings forward to explain Swedenborg's phantasies.

The well-known place in which Kant calls certain views of Swedenborg (regarding the two worlds to which we belong) "sublime," Lind endeavours in vain to interpret ironically. I called Du Prel's attention to this passage, which occasioned his new edition of the Kantian "Lecture on Psychologie." The passage also, Heinze admits, points out an inner *principielle* relation between the doctrines of both, which Kant discovered; indeed he took perhaps this doctrine of two worlds from Swedenborg direct. But only the doctrine! Not Swedenborg's pretended empirical proofs, which Kant has always discarded as phantasies. (Compare my Index of Du Prel's edition in *Archiv*. IV., 722, and also my Extracts in *Commentary*, II. 512ff). But Du Prel is in error, in that from that agreement in single points of theory he concluded that Kant would give up his opposition to the *Praxis* in view of the facts of modern spiritism. Lind has done valuable service in showing that Kant knew very familiarly this pretended *material of facts*, and always rejected it with the same determination. Lind has shown this by many extracts from Kant's works, especially from the *Anthropology*. On the other hand Lind goes far beyond the mark when he seeks to

dispute away the "transcendental subject" of Kant, whose relationship to the spiritual Ego of Swedenborg is unmistakable. . . . This is not affected either by Von Lind's further explanation in Hallier's Recension of his article in the *Altpr. Manuscript XXIX.*, 449f, on these questions. Compare also the favourable comment on Von Lind's article by Güttler, in the *Zeitschr. f. Philos.*, Bd. 104, S. 146-152, and also the there cited article in the *Zeitschrift*, "Sphinx," 1892 and 1893.

The well-known testimony of Kant in Jachmann, that he "has nothing to do with mysticism," refers only to the practices (of spiritism), and to the *Mysticism of the Feelings*; it does not apply to the rational belief of Kant in the "*corpus mysticum* of the intelligible world."

IV.

Together with the German critics above cited, President Schurman, of Cornell University, in the *Philosophical Review* for March, 1898, also makes note of the inevitable return of Kant's mind to those ideas of the *corpus mysticum*, and of a *mundus intelligibilis*, which he tries in vain in his work on Swedenborg to laugh away.

Professor Schurman says :—

“The disparity between the reach and the grasp of his thought engendered in him a bitterness of spirit, the pathos of which is unknown to the mere sceptic. Hence the still sad music which he that hath an ear may hear beneath the banter and the persiflage of Swedenborg and Metaphysics.

“In the ‘Dreams of a Spirit-Seer,’ we have the critical part of the ‘Right Method in Metaphysics.’ Here Swedenborg serves as a whipping post for the Metaphysicians whom Kant scourges most unmercifully. Knowledge of the supra-sensible is put on the same level with arts of necromancy. In the one case it is a dream of sense ; in the other a dream of reason—in both an illusion. (p. 146.)

“But though Kant, in virtue of the divorce between the theoretical and practical element of his thought, gibed at the metaphysical proof of those dear interests, which his heart was still open to shelter, it required some effort to overcome the rationalizing aspirations of early years, and the struggle occasionally found vent in a bitterness of feeling like the hatred of a deserted friend or the despair of a rejected lover.”

No better illustration of this return of Kant's mind to the spiritual realities so vividly impressed upon him by

Swedenborg could be desired than that which is afforded in the following extracts from Heinze's "Observations on Kant's Lectures in Metaphysics," which fully bear out all that Professor Vaihinger has asserted as to the deep hold that Swedenborg's doctrine of the two worlds had taken on Kant's mind. I have translated them from the *Abhandlungen der Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften*: Leipzig, 1894.

V.

EXTRACTS FROM PROFESSOR HEINZE'S
"OBSERVATIONS ON KANT'S LECTURES ON
METAPHYSICS."

As to the state of the soul after death Kant will say nothing with assurance, since the limits of our "reason" stop here. Nevertheless *he speaks with more certainty than one would expect from this precaution!*

After death the soul possesses self-consciousness, otherwise it would be the subject of spiritual death, which has already been disproved. With this self-consciousness necessarily remains personality and the consciousness of personal identity. This and the self-consciousness rest upon the *inner sense* which remains without body, and thus the personality remains.

But if the body is a hindrance to life and yet the future life be the perfect life, then it must be purely spiritual; *the soul cannot therefore resume its body.* If we ask as to the future place of the soul we are not to think of the separation of the soul from the body as a change of place, since the soul has no determined place in a corporeal world, and, in general, occupies no *place*, but is in the spiritual world and in communion with spirits.

If the soul is in the society of good and holy beings then it finds itself in heaven; if with the evil, then in hell. Thus *the soul does not enter into hell if it has lived wickedly, but it will only now find itself in the society of evil spirits, and this is called being in hell; and so conversely with heaven.**

Similarly in the "Religion within the Bounds of the Pure

* Swedenborg, in "Heaven and Hell," says "That the Lord casts no one into hell, but evil spirits cast themselves in," &c. (545.)

Reason," Kant shows heaven to be the Seat of Righteousness, that is, the association with all the good. The Resurrection and Ascension of Christ signify, "when regarded as ideas of reason," the beginning of the new life, and the entrance into the above named association. (Religion within the Bounds of the Pure Reason, p. 138.)

It is remarkable how Kant proceeds further to describe without any hesitation the condition of the soul after death, in that *it exchanges its sensuous vision which it enjoyed during life, with the spiritual vision, and that this is the other world!* (Pölitz, p. 255.)

As regards the objects of that world they remain the same; they are not different in substance but only changed in being *seen spiritually!*

Erdmann in his *Reflexionen*, No. 1277, remarks on this passage:—

"The other world will not present other objects, but only the same objects seen (intellectually, that is) in their relations to ourselves; and the knowledge of things through the divine vision, and at the same time the feeling of blessedness through this, is no longer the world but is heaven."^{*}

When one comes into the other world he does not come into connection with other things, as if with another planet, but one remains in this world, only having a different vision. The other world is heaven for me if I have lived a righteous life and enter into the society of such righteous spirits, and therewith enjoy spiritual vision. It is true this view of the other world cannot be demonstrated, but it is a necessary hypothesis of reason (which can be maintained against its opponents).[†]

Kant here becomes so enthusiastic as to call "very sublime" the thought of Swedenborg about the spiritual world, which according to him [Swedenborg] is a very real universe—even though in the work "The Dream of a Visionary," &c., he had called Swedenborg

* This reflection of Erdmann is evidently an attempt on the part of the modern decadent philosophy to adapt Kant's truly splendid conception to the materialism of modern thought in explaining *away* a real life after death and reducing heaven to a certain state of mind in this world.—F. S.

† Wanting in Pölitz.

the Arch-fanatic and enthusiast—and had remarked of his great work that it consists of “eight volumes full of nonsense.”

That Kant here uses the word sublime in an ironic sense, as Lind tries to show in his work on “Kant’s Mystic View of the World,” no one can admit, since Kant’s view, as here presented, bears at least a resemblance to the idea of Swedenborg. Nor is there anything contradictory in the fact that Kant finds something inconsistent in Swedenborg’s doctrine of one’s being able to see in a certain manner the society of departed spirits with which one’s own soul, which is not yet departed, stands associated as a spirit. Naturally; since the soul in this world has only sensuous vision and cannot at the same time have spiritual vision, one cannot be wholly in this and in the other world at the same time. (Heinze, p. 557.)

This inclination of Kant to Swedenborg at the time of these lectures (1775-1780) is not so surprising, since in his “Inaugural Dissertation” Kant himself clearly distinguished between the two worlds, the *mundus sensibilis* and the *mundus intelligibilis*, and in this it is probable that he was influenced by Swedenborg.

Kant differs distinctly from Swedenborg in that he does not believe in the possibility of the association of any soul which is still bound to the body with absent souls; as he also rejects the idea that souls which spiritually are already in the other world appear in visible acts in this visible world. If we accept this, then there is no more use of reason in this world at all, for then the spirits can be made to account for many transactions.

It is of this kind of vision or representation that Kant speaks in his earlier* and his later works. His utterances in the “Critique” leave the impression that he has not entirely rid himself of these ideas of the Lectures.

In the “Paralogism of the Pure Reason” (p. 230, German edition), he says: “The idea that the thinking subject could have thought before connection with the body, would be thus expressed: ‘Before the beginning of the kind of sensation wherein something appears to us in space, the same transcendent objects which in our present state appear as bodies may have been seen in an entirely different way!’

“The idea that the soul also after the body’s death could still

* “Dreams,” &c., S. 27.

think, would take this form: 'If the kind of sensation whereby transcendental objects and those at present entirely unknown appear as a *material world* should cease, still all vision would not thereby cease, and it would be quite possible that even the same unknown objects should continue, although not indeed under the aspects of bodies, but still continue to be knowable to the thinking subject.'

It is true he speaks altogether in the critical manner regarding these views, insisting that dogmatically nothing can be adduced either for or against them.

[Compare "Lecture on the Philosophy of Religious Doctrine," p. 106: "Of this immediate vision of the understanding have we as yet no notion: but whether the departed soul, as intelligence, instead of the sensuous vision, may not obtain some such vision, wherein, in the Ideas of God, he may behold the *things in themselves*, cannot be denied, neither can it be proved."]

Something similar, and reminding one of the Lectures, but still of Swedenborg, we find in the section (of the "Paralogisms of the Pure Reason") on the description of the Pure Reason in regard to Hypothesis. There we read (p. 592) that, "one may use as a weapon against materialism the argument that the separation from the body is the end of our sense knowledge and the beginning of our intellectual knowledge. The body helps the sensual and animal part, but hinders the spiritual part of our nature. And against other criticisms of the doctrine of Immortality one may adduce the transcendental hypothesis:—

"All life is essentially only intellectual and not subject to time changes, neither beginning with birth nor ending with death. This world's life is only an appearance, a sensuous image of the pure spiritual life, and the whole world of sense only a picture swimming before our present knowing faculty like a dream, and having no reality in itself. *For if we should see things and ourselves as they are we would see ourselves in a world of spiritual natures with which our entire real relation neither began at birth nor ended with the body's death.*"

One sees here Kant's strong inclination to these views and how easy it is to establish them by his distinguishing of the appearance from the thing in itself, and on his acceptance of a world of rational beings (*mundus intelligibilis*) as a kingdom of *ends* to be thought f

as under its own ruler and as necessary to the moral conception of the world, even if at the time of the "Critique" he is afraid to insist on these views dogmatically.

If we add to this the idea of the *corpus mysticum* of rational beings in the sense-world—that it "consists in the free will of these rational beings under moral laws, this being in perfect systematic unity with the freedom of themselves and of each other,"* we cannot wonder that both in modern and earlier times the "mystics" have claimed Kant as being of their number, even if we can in no case admit that modern spiritism has any claim on him.

Jachmann has reported Kant as denying totally that his words have any mystic sense, or that he is in any way a friend to mysticism. It all depends on what is meant by the *mystic*. Truly the whole idea of freedom is with Kant a mystic one. Where he differs from mysticism is seen from the Lectures (Pölitz, 101), where he says: "If one supposes there are thinking beings of whom one can have intellectual vision, that is mysticism, *so long as the vision remains only sensual.*"

From Heinze's "Observations on the Lectures of 1790—91, on Rational Psychology," we quote:—

When Kant says of the virtuous man "he is in heaven," but cannot see himself there and only infers this from reason, the statement resembles the thought of Swedenborg which Kant communicated in his earlier lectures, but without clearly designating it as his (Swedenborg's).

Now our souls are all as spirits, associated in this union and society, even in this world; only here we do not see ourselves as being in this society, because here we have only our sensuous vision; but although we do not see ourselves in this society (of spirits), we are nevertheless in it. If a man has lived righteously in the world, and his will has been well disposed, and he has endeavoured to obey the moral law, he is in this world already in the society of all well-disposed and righteous souls, whether they be in India or in Arabia, only he does not see himself to be in this

* Compare passages from the "Ecstatic Journey of a Dreamer through the Spiritual World" in the "Dreams," etc.

society until he is freed from the sensuous vision. In the same way the wicked is in the society of the wicked. (p. 577.)

The following is an extract from the Lectures themselves :—

Life reveals nothing but appearances ; “another world” means nothing more than “another way of seeing things.” The *Dinge an sich selbst* are unknown to us here ; whether in another world we shall come to know them we do not know. (Beilage III., Heinze, p. 677.)

What is very remarkable is the theory last advanced by Du Prel, which is noticed by Professor Vaihinger in the *Kant-Studien*, Vol. I., 1896-97, p. 477, under the heading, “Kant and Swedenborg : Dr. Carl Du Prel.” Du Prel is here said to attribute the spirit-vision described in the letter of Kant to Fraülein von Knobloch, to Swedenborg’s “Clairvoyance brought about by Mono-ideism” :—

This appears to Du Prel as the most probable explanation, and not the intromission of Swedenborg into the spiritual world, which to Kant seemed even more plausible because it corroborated his own philosophic views regarding the double nature of man.

It is strange to find the discussion of the German metaphysicians resulting in the bringing forward of Kant as a witness to the rationality of Swedenborg’s claims to spirit vision ! It might seem almost to be the long-delayed retribution for Kant’s scornful treatment of them in the “Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, illustrated by those of Metaphysics.”

FRANK SEWALL.

DREAMS OF A SPIRIT-SEER.

ILLUSTRATED BY DREAMS OF METAPHYSICS.

BY
IMMANUEL KANT.

Velut aegri somnia, vanae
Finguntur species.
—HORACE.

A PREFACE

WHICH PROMISES VERY LITTLE FOR THE DISCUSSION.



The land of shadows is the paradise of dreamers. Here they find an unlimited country where they may build their houses *ad libitum*. Hypochondriac vapours, nursery tales, and monastic miracles, provide them with ample building material. Their ground plans are sketched by the philosophers, who keep on changing or rejecting them, as is their wont. Holy Rome alone possesses in this land profitable provinces; the two crowns of the invisible kingdom support the third, which is the frail diadem of earthly sovereignty; and the keys which open the gates of the other world open at the same time, sympathetically, the money chests of the present. Such jurisdiction of the spirit world, when policy furnishes the proofs for its claims, is far above all feeble objections of the learned, and its use, or abuse, is already too venerable to feel the need of being exposed to their depraved scrutiny. But the common tales which are so strongly believed by some, while disputed by others, who have as little foundation for their opinion, why do they still float about for no visible reason, and

yet unrefuted, and creep even into systems of doctrine, although they do not have in their favour that most convincing of proofs, the proof derived from utility (*argumentum ab utili*)? What philosopher has not at one time or another cut the queerest figure imaginable, between the affirmations of a reasonable and firmly convinced eye-witness, and the inner resistance of insurmountable doubt? Shall he wholly deny the truth of all the apparitions they tell about? What reasons can he quote to disprove them?

Shall he, on the other hand, admit even one of these stories? How important would be such an avowal, and what astonishing consequences we should see before us, if we could suppose even one such occurrence to be proved?¹ * A third way out, perhaps, is possible, namely, not to trouble one's self with such impertinent or idle questions, and to hold on to the *useful*. But because this plan is reasonable, therefore profound scholars have at all times, by a majority of votes, rejected it!

Since it is just as much a silly prejudice to believe without reason *nothing* of the many things that are told with an appearance of truth, as to believe without examination *everything* that common report says, the author of this book has been led away partly by the latter prejudice, in trying to escape the former. He confesses, with a certain humiliation, that he has been naïve enough to trace the truth of some of the

* The figures refer to the extracts from Swedenborg in Appendix I.

stories of the kind mentioned. He found—as usual where it is not our business to search—he found nothing. This is indeed by itself a sufficient reason for writing a book ; but add to this what has many a time wrung books from modest authors, the impetuous appeals from known and unknown friends. Moreover, he had bought a big work,* and, what is worse, had read it, and this labour was not to be thrown away. Thence originated the present treatise, which, we flatter ourselves, will fully satisfy the reader ; for the main part he will not understand, another part he will not believe, and the rest he will laugh at.

* This refers to his purchase of Swedenborg's *Arcana*. See quotation from Hoar, in foot-note on page 14.

PART FIRST,

WHICH IS DOGMATIC.



CHAPTER FIRST.

A COMPLICATED METAPHYSICAL KNOT WHICH CAN BE UNTIED
OR CUT ACCORDING TO CHOICE.

If we put all together, that the school-boy rehearses, that the crowd relates, and that the philosopher demonstrates about spirits, this would seem to constitute no small part of our knowledge. Nevertheless, I dare assert that all these smatterers could be placed in a most awkward embarrassment, if it should occur to somebody to insist upon the question, just what kind of a thing that is about which these people think they understand so much. The methodical talk of learned institutions is often simply an agreement to beg a question which is difficult to solve, by the variable meaning of words. For we seldom hear at academies the comfortable and oftentimes reasonable "I do not know." Certain newer philosophers, as they like to be called, overcome this question easily. A spirit, they say, is a being possessed of reason. Then it is no miracle to

see spirits ; for he who sees men, sees beings possessing reason. But, they continue, this being in man, possessing reason, is only a part of man, and this part, the animating part, is a spirit. Very well then. Before you prove that only a spiritual being can have reason, take care that first of all I understand what kind of conception I must have of a spiritual being. Self-deception in this matter, while large enough to be seen with eyes half-open, is moreover of very evident origin. For, later on and in old age, we are sure to know nothing of that which was very well known to us at an early date, as children, and the man of thoroughness finally becomes at best a sophist in regard to his youthful delusions.

Thus I do not know if there are spirits, yea, what is more, I do not even know what the word "spirit" signifies. But, as I have often used it myself, and have heard others using it, something must be understood by it, be this something mere fancy or reality. To evolve this hidden meaning, I will compare my badly understood conception of it with sundry cases of application, and, by observing with which it conforms, and to which it is opposed, I hope to unfold its hidden sense.*

* If the conception of a spirit were something taken out of our own empirical conceptions, the procedure to make it clear would be easy ; for we should only have to point out those characteristics which the senses reveal to us in that kind of beings, and whereby we distinguish them from material things. But people talk of spirits even while it is doubtful if there are such beings. Thus the conception of spiritual nature cannot be drawn from experience. But if you ask, how could this conception arise at all, if not from experience? I answer: many conceptions arise in secret and

Take, for example, the space of a cubic foot, and suppose something filling this space, *i.e.*, resisting the intrusion of any other thing. Then nobody would call the substance occupying that space "spiritual." It evidently would be called material, because it is expanded, impenetrable, and, like everything corporeal, subject to divisibility and to the laws of impact. Thus far we are still on the smooth track of other philosophers. But imagine a simple being, and impart to it at the same time reason. Would that, then, comprise the meaning of "spirit?" To discover this, I will leave to the aforesaid simple being reason as an inner quality, and will consider that being only in its external relations. And now I ask, if I want to place this simple substance in that space of one cubic foot, which is full of matter, would a single element have to make room for it, so that the spirit might enter? You think yes? Very well, then this supposed space would have to lose a second elementary particle — were it to take in a second spirit, and thus, if you keep on, a cubic foot

obscure conclusions incidental to experiences, and afterwards are transmitted to other minds without even the consciousness of that experience or conclusion which has first established the conception. Such conceptions may be called "surreptitious." Many of that kind are partly only delusions of imagination, partly also true, since obscure conclusions do not always err. Usage, and the context in different accounts in which the same expression is found, give to the expression a definite meaning. This meaning can, therefore, be evolved by drawing this hidden sense out of its obscurity through a comparison of sundry cases of application, so as to see with which it agrees, and which it contradicts.

of space would be filled with spirits whose mass exists just as well by impenetrability, as if it was full of matter, and, just like the latter, must be subject to the laws of impact. But substances of this kind, although they might contain the power of reason, would not differ at all from the elements of matter of which also we know only the powers which they exert externally by their very existence, and do not at all know what might belong to their interior qualities. Thus it is beyond doubt that simple substances of that kind, of which masses could be accumulated, would not be called spiritual beings. You will, therefore, be able to retain the conception of a spirit only if you imagine beings who can be present even in a space filled with matter,* thus beings who do not possess the quality of impenetrability, and who never form a solid whole, no matter how many you unite. Simple beings of this kind would be called immaterial beings, and, if they have reason, spirits. But simple substances which, if combined, result in an *expanded and impenetrable whole*, would be called material units,

* It will be easily recognized that I am speaking only of spirits which are parts of the universe, and not of infinite spirit which is originator and preserver of the universe. For the conception of the spiritual nature of infinite spirit is easy, because it is merely negative, and consists in the denial of those qualities of matter which conflict with infinite and absolutely necessary substance. But with a spiritual substance, which is to be conjoined with matter, as is the case with the human soul, the difficulty arises that I must conceive of a mutual combination of it with corporeal beings for the sake of forming a whole, and yet must remove the only connective which is known to exist among material beings.

and their whole, matter. Either the name of a spirit is a mere word without any meaning, or, its significance is of the nature described.

From the explanation of what a spirit consists in, it is a long step indeed to the proposition that such natures are real, yea, even possible. We find in the works of philosophers many good and reliable proofs that everything which thinks must be simple; and that every substance which thinks according to reason, must be a unit of nature; and that the undivisible Ego could not be divided among many connected things which make up a whole. My soul, therefore, must be a simple substance. But this proof leaves still undecided, whether the soul be of the nature of such things as, united in space, form an expanded and impenetrable whole; whether, therefore, it be material, or whether it be immaterial, and, consequently, a spirit; and, what is more, whether such beings as are called spirits, are possible.

At this point I cannot but recommend caution against rash conclusions which enter most easily into the deepest and obscurest questions. For that which belongs to the common conceptions of experience is commonly regarded as if the reason why it existed was also comprehended. But of that which differs from experience, and cannot be made comprehensible by any experience, not even by analogy, we of course can form no conception, and, therefore, are apt to reject it immediately as impossible. All matter offers resistance in the space in which it is present, and on that account is called

impenetrable. That this is so, experience teaches us, and the abstraction of this experience produces in us the general conception of matter. But this resistance which something makes in the space in which it is present, is in that manner indeed *recognized*, but not yet *conceived*. For this resistance, as everything that counteracts an action, is true force, and, as its direction is opposed to the prolonged lines of *approach*, it is a force of *repulsion* which must be attributed to matter and, therefore, to its elements. Every reasonable man will readily concede that here human intelligence has reached its limit. For while, by experience alone, we can perceive that things of this world which we call "material" possess such a force, we can never conceive of the reason why they exist.² Now, if I suppose other substances being present in space with other forces than that *propelling* force which has for its consequence impenetrability, then, of course, I cannot think in the concrete of their activity, because it has no analogy with my conceptions from experience. And if, in addition, I take away from those substances the quality to *fill* the space in which they are present, I miss a conception which makes thinkable the things which come within the range of my senses ; thence, necessarily, they must become in a way unthinkable. But this cannot be said to be a recognized impossibility, for the very reason that the *possibility of the existence of its opposite remains also unintelligible*, although its reality comes within the range of my senses.

The possibility of the existence of immaterial beings

can, therefore, be supposed without fear of its being disproved, but also without hope of proving it by reason. Such spiritual natures would be present in space in such a manner that it would still be penetrable for corporeal beings. For by their presence they *operate* in space, but do not *fill* it, *i.e.*, they cause no resistance, which is the basis of solidity.³ If such a simple spiritual substance be supposed,—notwithstanding its indivisibility,—it can be said that the space where it is immediately present is not a point, but itself a space. For, calling in the aid of analogy, even the simple elements of the body must occupy there a space which is a proportionate part of its whole extension, inasmuch as points are not parts but limits of space. Thus space is filled by means of an active force—repulsion. But the fact that it is being filled is apparent only by a greater activity of its components. The way, therefore, in which it is being filled—by accumulating individual elements—does not at all conflict with its simple nature, although the possibility of this cannot be pointed out more clearly, for this can never be done with first causes and effects. In the same way I shall meet with at least no demonstrable impossibility, although the thing itself remains incomprehensible, if I state that a spiritual substance, although it is simple, still can occupy a space, *i.e.*, can immediately be active in it without *filling* it, which means without offering resistance to material substances in it.⁴ Such an immaterial substance also could not be said to possess expansion, any more than the units of matter. For only

that which, existing separate and for itself alone, occupies a space, possesses extent ; but the substances which are elements of matter occupy space only by the exterior effect which they have upon others. But for themselves alone, where no other things can be thought of as being in connection with them, and as they contain in themselves nothing which could exist separately, they contain no space. This applies to corporeal elements. The same would apply also to spiritual natures. The limits of extent are determined by the figure of a thing. Consequently, we cannot think of the figures of spiritual natures. These are reasons for the supposed possibility of the existence of immaterial beings in the universe, but they can be comprehended with difficulty. He who is in possession of means which can lead more easily to this intelligence, should not deny instruction to one eager to learn, before whose eyes, in the progress of research, Alps often rise where others see before them a level and comfortable footpath on which they walk forward, or think they do so.

Suppose now that it had been proved that the soul of man is a spirit (although it may be seen from the preceding that this, as yet, has *not* been proved), then the next question which might be raised is—Where is the place of this human soul in the corporeal world? I would answer, that body the changes of which are *my* changes, is *my* body, and its place is, at the same time, *my* place. If the question be continued, where then is your (your soul's) place in that *body*? then I might

suspect that there is a catch in the question. For it is easily observed that it presupposes something which is not known by experience, but rests, perhaps, in inaginary conclusions, namely, that my thinking Ego is in a place which differs from the places of other parts of that body which belongs to me. Nobody, however, is conscious of occupying a separate place in his body, but only of that place which he occupies as man in regard to the world around him. I would, therefore, keep to common experience, and would say, provisionally, where I sense, there I *am*.⁵ I am just as immediately in the tips of my fingers, as in my head. It is myself who suffers in the heel and whose heart beats in affection. I feel the most painful impression when my corn torments me, not in a cerebral nerve, but at the end of my toes. No experience teaches me to believe some parts of my sensation to be removed from myself, to shut up my Ego into a microscopically small place in my brain from whence it may move the levers of my body-machine, and cause me to be thereby affected. Thus I should demand a strong proof to make inconsistent what the schoolmasters say: my soul is as a whole in my whole body, and wholly in each part. Common sense often perceives a truth before comprehending the reasons with which to prove or explain it. I should not be entirely disconcerted by the objection, that thus I am believing that the soul possesses extension and is diffused through the whole body, just as it is pictured for children in the "orbis pictus." For I would remove this obstacle

by saying : the fact that the soul is present in the whole body goes only to prove the extent of its sphere of exterior activity, but not a multiplicity of its inner parts and thus no extension or figure, for these exist only in a being which occupies a space set apart for itself, *i.e.*, if the being contains parts which exist outside of each other. Finally, I should either claim to know this little of the spiritual quality of my soul, or, if that should not be conceded, I should be satisfied that I know nothing about it.

If one would insist upon showing how incomprehensible, or, what amounts to the same for the most people, how impossible these thoughts are, I would admit even that ; and then I would sit down at the feet of the wise to hear them talk as follows : The soul of man has its seat in the brain, and its abode there is indescribably small ;*

* There are examples of injuries whereby a good part of the brain has been lost without causing the loss of life or of thought. According to the common conception, which I quote here, the removal of an atom would have been sufficient to cause instant death. The prevalent opinion which assigns to the soul its seat in the brain, seems to originate mainly in the fact, that we feel distinctly how, in deep meditation, the nerves of the brain are taxed. But if this conclusion is right it would prove also other abodes of the soul. In anxiety or joy the sensation seems to have its seat in the heart. Many affections, yea most of them, manifest themselves most strongly in the diaphragm. Pity moves the intestines, and other instincts manifest their origin in other organs. The reason why the meditating soul seems to feel especially in the brain is, perhaps, the following. All meditating requires the instrumentality of *signs* that ideas may be created, and that, accompanied and supported by these signs, the required amount of clearness may be attained. But the signs of our ideas are mainly such as have been

there it exercises its sensitive faculty, as the spider in the centre of its web. The nerves of the brain push or shake it, and cause thereby that not this immediate impression, but the one which is made upon quite remote parts of the body, is represented as an object which is present outside of the brain. From this seat it moves the ropes and levers of the whole machinery, causing arbitrary movements at will. Such propositions can be proved only very superficially or not at all, and as the nature of the soul is, indeed, not well enough known, they can be just as weakly combatted. And so I do not care to join in that kind of learned dispute, in which both parties usually have most to say about that of which they know nothing. But I will follow only the conclusions to which a doctrine of this nature must lead me. In the first instance, according to the propositions so much recommended to me, my soul does not differ from any element of matter in the way in which it is present in space. Further, the power of reasoning is an internal quality which I could not perceive anyhow,

received either by hearing or sight, both of which senses are stimulated by impressions in the brain, as their organs are also next to this part. Now, if the production of these signs which Cartesius calls "ideas materiales," is properly an irritation of the nerves such as to produce a movement similar to that which formerly caused the sensation, then, in meditation, the tissue of the brain will be compelled to quiver as with the former impressions and it is chiefly the brain, therefore, that will become tired. But, if the thinking be accompanied by affections, we feel not only the brain to be taxed, but also those irritable parts which, usually, are in sympathy with the soul.

although it might be found in all these elements. From these considerations no valid reason can be brought forward, why my soul should not be one of the substances of which matter consists, nor why its peculiar manifestations should not originate in the place which it occupies in such an ingenious machine as the human body, where the combination of nerves favours the inner faculty of thinking and of will-power. In that case, however, there would remain no peculiar characteristic of the soul by which it could be surely recognized and distinguished from crude elementary matter, and the jocose suggestion of Leibnitz would not be laughable any more, that in our coffee we swallow, perhaps, atoms which are to become human souls. But in such a case would not this thinking Ego be subjected to the common fate of material natures, and, as it was drawn out of the chaos of all elements to vivify an animal machine, why should it not, after this casual combination has ceased, return in future to its origin? It is at times necessary to frighten the thinker who is on the wrong path, by the consequences, so that he may pay more attention to the principles by which he has been led off as in a dream.

I confess that I am very much inclined to assert the existence of immaterial natures in the world, and to put my soul itself into that class of beings.* But then, how

* The reason of this, which appears to myself very obscure, and probably will remain so, concerns at the same time that which sensates in animals. Whatever in the world contains a principle of life, seems to be of immaterial nature. For all life rests on the

mysterious does the communion of soul and body become?⁸ But, at the same time, how natural that it is incomprehensible, inasmuch as our conceptions of external actions are derived from those of matter, and are always connected with the conditions of impact and pressure, which do not exist in this case. For how could an immaterial being be such an obstruction so that matter in its motion could collide with it, a spirit; and how could corporeal things act upon an unknown being which does not oppose them with impenetrability, and which does not hinder them in any way from being at the same time present in the space in which it is itself? It seems that a spiritual essence is inmosty present in matter, and that it does not act upon those forces which determine the mutual relations of elements, but upon the inner principle of their state. For every substance, even a simple element of matter, must have an inner activity

inner capacity to determine one's self by one's own will power.⁶ But the essential characteristic of matter is that it fills space by a necessary force which is limited by counteraction from without. Thus the state of everything that is material is externally dependent and forced. But those entities which are said to contain the cause of life, which act from themselves and from inner power, in short, the intrinsic nature of which is to be able to change themselves at will, can hardly be said to be material. It cannot reasonably be expected that we understand, in their sub-divisions, under their various species, such unknown beings,—the existence of which we know for the most part only by hypothesis. We can see, however, that those immaterial beings which contain the cause of animal life, are different from those which comprise reason in their self-activity, and are called spirits.⁷

as the reason for its external efficiency, although I cannot specify in what it consists.*⁹

But what is the necessity which causes a spirit and a body to form a unit ; and, again, what is the cause which breaks up this unit in case of certain disturbances ? These are questions which, among various others, are above my intelligence.¹⁰ And although I have as a rule hardly the daring to measure my power of reasoning with the secrets of nature, I should, nevertheless, have sufficient confidence not to be afraid, in such a case, of putting any opponent to the test, if it were my nature to be inclined to fight, nor of attempting to refute him by contrary reasons, which with scholars means nothing else but the art of convincing another that he does not know.

* Leibnitz says that this inner reason of all the external relations and changes of a substance is the *power of conception*, and later philosophers received this undeveloped thought with laughter. But they would have done better if they had first considered whether a substance of the nature of a simple particle of matter is possible without any inner state. If then they would not have excluded such a state, it would have been incumbent upon them to think out another possible inner state than that of conceptions and the activities which depend upon them. Everybody recognizes at once that, even if a power of obscure conceptions is conceded to the simple elementary parts of matter, it does not follow thence that matter itself possesses power of conception, because many substances of that kind, united into a whole, can yet never form a thinking unit.

SECOND CHAPTER.

A FRAGMENT OF SECRET PHILOSOPHY AIMING TO ESTABLISH
COMMUNION WITH THE SPIRIT-WORLD.

Gross reason which cleaves to the bodily senses has, I trust, by this time become so accustomed to higher and abstract conceptions that now it can see spiritual figures, devoid of corporeal clothing, in that dusk in which the faint light of metaphysics renders visible the kingdom of shadows. We will venture therefore upon the dangerous road, since we have endured such laborious preparation for it.

Ibant sub nocte per umbras
Perque domos Ditis vacuas et inania regna.

VIRGIL.

The characteristics of the dead matter which fills the universe are stability and inertia ; it further possesses solidity, expansion, and form, and its manifestations, resulting from all these three causes, admit of *physical* explanations, which, at the same time, are mathematical, and, collectively, are called mechanical. But let us direct our attention to the kind of beings which contain the cause of *life* in the universe—those which therefore neither add to the mass and extent of lifeless matter, nor are influenced by it according to the laws of contact and

collision, but which rather, by inner activity, move themselves and dead matter as well—and we shall find ourselves convinced, if not with the distinctness of demonstration, still with the presentiment of well applied reason, that immaterial beings exist. Their peculiar laws of operation we may call “spiritual,” or, in so far as bodies are the medium of their operation in the material world, “organic.” As these immaterial beings are self-active principles, consequently, substances and natures existing by themselves, the conclusion which suggests itself first is, that, immediately united with each other, they might form, perhaps, a great whole which might be called the immaterial world (*mundus intelligibilis*). For what reason could render the assertion probable that such beings of similar nature could communicate only by means of other beings (*corporeal*) of dissimilar nature? This latter supposition would really be much more mysterious than the first.

This *immaterial world*, therefore, can be regarded as a whole existing by itself, and its parts, as being in mutual conjunction and intercourse without the instrumentality of anything corporeal. The relation by means of things corporeal is consequently to be regarded as accidental; it can belong only to a few; yea, where we meet with it, it does not hinder even those very immaterial beings, while acting upon one another through matter, from standing also in their special universal relationship, so that at any time they may exercise upon one another mutual influences by virtue of the laws of their immaterial existence. Their

relation by means of matter is thus accidental, and is due to a special divine institution, while their direct relation is natural and insoluble.¹¹

By combining in this way all principles of life in the whole of nature, as so many incorporeal substances, communicating with each other, partly also united with matter, we conceive of the immaterial world as a great whole, an immeasurable but unknown gradation of beings and active natures by which alone the dead matter of the corporeal world is endued with life. But to which members of nature life is extended, and which those degrees of it are which are next to utter lifelessness, can, perhaps, never be made out with certainty.¹² Hylozoism imputes life to everything ; materialism, carefully considered, kills everything. Maupertuis attributed to the organic particles of the nutriment of all animals the lowest degree of life, other philosophers see in them nothing else but dead masses which serve only to augment the lever-apparatus of animal machines.¹³ The undoubted characteristic of life in that which appeals to our external senses is, I may say, the free movement which shows that it is arbitrary, but the conclusion is not certain that, wherever this characteristic is not found, there is no degree of life.¹⁴ Boerhave says somewhere : The animal is a plant which has its roots in the stomach (inside). Another might, perhaps, play without censure with these conceptions by saying : The plant is an animal which has its stomach in the root (outside). The plants, therefore, may lack the organs of arbitrary

movement, and thus the external characteristics of life. These are necessary to the animals, because a being which has the instruments of nourishment inside must be able to move about according to its needs ; but a being where these are outside and planted in the nourishing element, is already sufficiently maintained by external forces. Such a being contains indeed a principle of inner life in the fact of vegetation, yet it does not need an organic apparatus for external free activity. I do not propose to use any of these considerations as evidence, for, aside from the fact that I could say very little in favour of such conjectures, they have the ridicule of fashion against them, as being dusty antiquated fancies. The ancients, namely, thought that they could assume three kinds of life, the vegetable, the animal, and the reasonable. In uniting in man the three immaterial principles of those kinds of life, they very likely erred ; but so far as they distributed the three principles among the three kinds of growing beings which propagate their kind, they indeed said something undemonstrable, but not, on that account, unreasonable, especially not in the judgment of one who considers the close relation of the polyps and other zoophytes with the plants, or who takes into account the special life belonging to the separated parts of some animals, irritability—that quality of the fibres of an animal body and of some plants, so well demonstrated, and, at the same time, so inexplicable. But, after all, the appeal to immaterial principles is a subterfuge of bad philosophy.

Explanations of that kind should be avoided as much as possible, so that those causes of the world's phenomena which rest on the laws of motion of matter alone, and which solely and alone are capable of being conceived, may be recognized in their full extent.¹⁵ Nevertheless, I am convinced that Stahl, who likes to explain animal processes organically, is often nearer to the truth than Hofmann, Boerhave, and others, who leave immaterial forces out of their plan and keep to mechanical reasons. Yet these follow thereby a more philosophical method, which sometimes perhaps fails, but oftener proves right, and which alone can be applied to advantage in science. For the influence of beings of incorporeal nature can only be said to exist, but it can never be shown how it proceeds, nor how far its efficiency extends.¹⁶

The immaterial then would primarily comprise all created intelligences. Some of these are combined with matter, thus forming a person, and some not. It further comprises the sensating subjects in all kinds of animals, and finally all the principles of life wherever in nature they may be found, although such life may not make itself evident by the external characteristics of arbitrary movement. All these immaterial natures, I say, whether they exercise their influences in the corporeal world or not, and all the rational beings who are, accidentally, in an animal state, here on earth or on other terrestrial bodies, while they may be vivifying gross matter now or in future, or may have done so in the past, nevertheless form, according to these conceptions, a communion

in conformity with their nature.¹⁷ And this communion would not rest upon the conditions by which the relations of bodies are limited, but distance in space and time,¹⁸ which forms in the visible world the great cleft severing all communion, would disappear. We should, therefore, have to regard the human soul as being conjoined in its present life with two worlds at the same time, of which it clearly perceives only the material world, in so far as it is conjoined with a body, and thus forms a personal unit.¹⁹ But as a member of the spiritual world it receives and gives out the pure influences of immaterial natures, so that, as soon as the accidental conjunction has ceased, only that communion remains which at all times it has with spiritual natures.²⁰ *

* If one speaks of heaven as the seat of the happy, common conception likes to place it above, high up in the immeasurable universe. But one does not consider that our earth, viewed from those regions, must also appear as one of the stars of heaven, and that the inhabitants of other worlds, with as good reason, may point to us and say, "See there the dwelling-place of eternal joys, a heavenly abode, prepared to receive us some day."²¹ For a queer illusion makes the high flight which hope takes, always to be connected with the idea of rising physically, without considering that however high we may have risen, we have to descend again to land eventually in another world. According to the ideas just mentioned, heaven would be properly the spirit-world, or, perhaps, the happy part of it, and this we would have to seek neither above nor below, because such an immaterial whole must be conceived of, not according to the further or nearer distances of corporeal things, but according to the spiritual connections of its parts with each other. Its members, at least, are conscious of themselves only according to such relations.²²

It begins to be a real trouble for me, always to use the cautious language of reason. Why should I, too, not be allowed to talk in academical style? This exempts the writer as well as the reader from thinking, which, after all, sooner or later must lead only to annoying indecision. Thus "it is as good as demonstrated," or, to be explicit, "it could easily be proved," or still better, "it will be proved" I don't know where or when, that the human soul also in this life forms an indissoluble communion with all immaterial natures of the spirit-world, that, alternately, it acts upon and receives impressions from that world of which nevertheless it is not conscious while it is still man and as long as everything is in proper condition.²³ On the other hand it is probable that the spiritual natures on their side can have no immediate conscious sensation of the corporeal world,²⁴ because they are not conjoined with any part of matter which could make them aware of their place in the material world-whole, nor have they elaborate organs for entering into the mutual relations of beings of spacial extent. But they can, probably, flow into the souls of men as into beings of their own nature, and it is likely that they are actually at all times in mutual intercourse with them, yet, in such a way that those conceptions which the soul entertains as a being dependent on the corporeal world cannot be communicated to the other purely spiritual beings; nor can the conceptions of these latter, being conceptions of immaterial things, be transferred into the consciousness of men, at least not as

long as these conceptions preserve their peculiar quality, for the components of the two sets of ideas are of different kind.

It would be beautiful if such a systematic constitution of the spirit-world, as we conceive it, could be determined, or only with some probability supposed, not merely from the conception of spiritual being in general, which is altogether too hypothetical, but from an actual and universally conceded observation. Therefore I venture upon the indulgence of the reader and insert here an attempt at something of this kind which, although somewhat out of my way, and far enough removed from evidence, still seems to give occasion for not unpleasant surmises.

* * * * * *

Among the forces which move the human heart, some of the most powerful seem to lie outside of it. They consequently are not mere means to selfishness and private interest, which would be an aim lying inside of man himself, but they incline our emotions to place the focus in which they combine, outside of us, in other rational beings. Thence arises a struggle between two forces, the proprium which refers everything to itself, and the public spirit by which the mind is driven or drawn towards others outside of itself.²⁵ I do not dwell upon that instinct which causes us to depend so much and so universally upon the judgment of others, to consider outside approbation or applause requisite to a good opinion of ourselves. Sometimes a mistaken conception

of honour comes up in this matter, but nevertheless there is even in the most unselfish and open natures a secret leaning to compare with the judgment of others what we have by ourselves recognized to be good and true, so as to make both concordant ; on the other hand there is an inclination to stop, so to speak, each human soul on its way to knowledge, when it seems to go another path than that upon which we have entered. All this comes, perhaps, from our perception of the dependence of our own judgment upon the common sense of man, and it becomes a reason for ascribing to the whole of thinking beings a sort of unity of reason.

But I pass over this otherwise not unimportant consideration, and, for the present, take up another which, as far as our purpose is concerned, is more obvious and pertinent. When we consider our needs in relation to our environment, we cannot do it without experiencing a certain sensation of restraint and limitation which lets us know that a foreign will, as it were, is active in us, and that our own liking is subject to the condition of external consent. A secret power compels us to adapt our intentions to the welfare of others, or to this foreign will, although this is often done unwillingly, and conflicts strongly with our selfish inclination. The point to which the lines of direction of our impulses converge, is thus not only in ourselves, but there are besides powers moving us in the will of others outside of ourselves. Hence arise the moral impulses which often carry us away to the discom-

future of selfishness, the strong law of duty, and the weaker one of benevolence. Both of these wring from us many a sacrifice, and although selfish inclinations now and then preponderate over both, these still never fail to assert their reality in human nature. Thus we recognize that, in our most secret motives, we are dependent upon the *rule of the will of all*, and thence arises in the community of all thinking beings a *moral unity*, and a systematic constitution according to purely spiritual laws.²⁶ If we want to call the fact that we feel forced to adapt our will to the will of all, *the sense of morality*, we thereby describe only a manifestation of that which actually takes place in us, without settling upon its causes. Thus Newton called the established law that all particles of matter have the tendency to approach each other, *gravitation*, because he did not want to have his mathematical demonstrations mixed up with possible philosophical disputes over the causes of gravitation. Nevertheless, he did not hesitate to treat gravitation as the true effect of a general interaction of matter, and therefore gave to it also the name of *attraction*.²⁷ Should it not be possible to conceive the phenomenon of moral impulses in the mutual relations of thinking creatures as the consequence of an actual force, consisting in the fact that spiritual natures flow into each other? The sense of morality then would be the sensation of this dependence of the individual will upon the will of all, and would be a consequence of the natural and universal interaction whereby the immaterial

world attains its unity, namely, by conforming itself to a system of spiritual perfection, according to the laws of this sense of morality, which would constitute its mode of cohesion. If we grant to these thoughts so much probability as to make it worth while to measure them by their consequences, we shall be drawn by their charm, perhaps unconsciously, into being partial to them. For in this case there seem to disappear most of the irregularities which otherwise, owing to the contradiction between the moral and physical relations of men here on earth, strike us as being so strange. The moral quality of our actions can, according to the order of nature, never be fully worked out in the bodily life of men, but it can be so worked out in the spirit-world, according to spiritual laws.²⁸ The true purposes, the secret motives of many endeavours, fruitless by impotency, the victory over self, or the occasional hidden treachery in apparently good actions, are mostly lost as to their physical effect in the bodily state, but in the immaterial world they would have to be regarded as fruitful causes, and, consequently, according to spiritual laws and on account of the connection between the individual will and the will of all, they would mutually produce and receive effects appropriate to the moral quality of free will. For just because the morality of an action concerns the inner state of the spirit, it naturally can only in the immediate communion of spirits have an effect adequate to its full morality. Thus it would happen that man's soul would already in this life have to take its place among the

spiritual substances of the universe according to its moral state, just as, according to the laws of motion, the matter of the universe arranges itself into an order conformable to its material forces.* When finally through death the communion of the soul with the body-world is abolished, life in the other world would be only a natural continuation of such connections as were formed with it already in this life, and all the consequences of the morality exercised here we would find there in the effects which a being standing in indissoluble communion with the whole spirit-world would have already achieved, according to spiritual laws.³⁰ Present and future would be, as it were, out of one piece and constitute a continuous whole, even according to the order of nature. This latter circumstance is of especial importance. For in a speculation based merely upon reasoning there is a great difficulty if, in removing the inconvenience which follows from the incomplete harmony of morality and its consequences in this world, we have to resort to an extraordinary idea of the divine will. For, though our judgment of it might, according to our conceptions, be probable, a strong suspicion would

* The interactions of man and the spirit-world, taking place by means of morality, according to the laws of spiritual influences, might be defined in such a way that thence a closer association of a good or a bad soul with good or evil spirits respectively would naturally arise, and thus the evil spirits would, from themselves, associate with that part of the spiritual republic that is in accordance with their moral quality, undergoing all the consequences which thence might follow according to the order of nature.²⁹

remain that the weak conceptions of our understanding were applied to the Highest perhaps very erroneously. For it is incumbent upon man to judge of the divine will only from the harmony which he actually perceives in the world, or which, by the rule of analogy, according to the order of nature,³¹ he may suppose to be in it; he is not entitled to imagine new and arbitrary arrangements in the present or future world, according to some scheme of his own wisdom which he prescribes to the divine will.

* * * * *

We now turn our consideration again into the former path, and approach the aim which we have set before ourselves. If the facts of the spirit-world be such as we have stated, and the share of our soul in it be truly pictured in the sketch just made, then scarcely anything appears more strange than that communion with spirits is not quite a common and ordinary thing; and what is extraordinary about it is rather the scarcity of apparitions than their possibility. This difficulty is tolerably easy to remove and already has been partly removed. For the conception which the soul of man has of itself as of a spirit, which, moreover, it has obtained through contemplation of the immaterial, *i.e.*, by observing itself in its relation to beings of similar nature, this conception is entirely different from that where its consciousness conceives itself as a man, by means of an image originated in the impression of corporeal organs and conceived of in relation to none but corporeal things. It is, therefore, indeed one subject, which is thus at the same

time a member of the visible and of the invisible world, but not one and the same person ; for, on account of their different quality, the conceptions of the one world are not ideas associated with those of the other world, thus, what I think as spirit, is not remembered by me as man, and, conversely, my state as man does not at all enter into the conception of myself as a spirit. Moreover, my ideas of the spirit-world may be ever so clear and perspicuous,* still that would not suffice to make me, as

* This may be elucidated by a certain double personality which belongs to the soul even in this life. Certain philosophers think that, without fear of the least objection, they can refer to the state of sound sleep when they want to prove the reality of obscure ideas, since nothing can be said about that state with certainty, except that, in the waking state, we do not remember any of the ideas which we might have had in sound sleep. From this fact, however, follows only this much, that the ideas were not clearly represented while we were waking up, but not that they were obscure also while we slept. I rather suppose that ideas in sleep may be clearer and broader than even the clearest in the waking state. This is to be expected of such an active being as the soul when the external senses are so completely at rest. For man, at such times, is not sensible of his body. When he wakes up his body is not associated with the ideas of his sleep, so that it cannot be a means of recalling this former state of thought to consciousness in such a way as to make it appear to belong to one and the same person. A confirmation of my idea of sound sleep is found in the activity of some who walk in their sleep, and who, in such a state, betray more intelligence than usual, although in waking up they do not remember anything. Dreams, however, *i.e.*, the ideas which one remembers in waking up, do not belong here. For then man does not wholly sleep, he perceives to a certain degree clearly, and weaves the actions of his spirit into the impressions of the external senses. He therefore remembers them in part afterwards, but finds in them only wild and absurd chimeras, since ideas of phantasy and of external sensation are intermingled in them.

a man, conscious of that world; and so, however clear an idea one may, by reasoning, derive of himself, *i.e.*, of his soul, as a spirit, still, this idea is with no man an object of actual sight and experience.

This difference, however, in the nature of spiritual ideas and those belonging to the body-life of man must not be considered so great an obstacle as to remove all possibility of becoming, sometimes, conscious of the influences of the spirit-world even in this life. For spiritual ideas can pass over into the personal consciousness of man, indeed, not immediately, but still in such a way that, according to the law of the association of ideas, they stir up those pictures which are related to them and awake analogous ideas of our senses. These, it is true, would not be spiritual conceptions themselves, but yet their symbols.³³ For, after all, it is one and the same substance which is a member both of this world and the other, and both kinds of ideas belong to the same subject and are connected with each other. How this is possible can be made intelligible by considering how our higher conceptions of reason, which approach the spiritual pretty closely, ordinarily assume, as it were, a bodily garment to make themselves clear.³³ Thence it is that the moral qualities of deity are represented by the ideas of anger, jealousy, mercifulness, revenge,³⁴ &c.; for the same reason poets personify the virtues, vices, and other qualities of human nature, though this is done in such a way that the true idea of the meaning shines through; in the same way the geometrician represents

time by a line, although time and space have conformity only by relation and therefore agree, indeed, according to analogy, but never according to quality. This is the reason why the idea of divine eternity assumes even with philosophers the appearance of infinite time,³⁵ be they never so careful not to mix them up; and one great cause why mathematicians are generally loath to admit the monads of Leibnitz may be that they cannot help but imagine these monads as little masses. Thus it is not improbable that spiritual sensations can pass over into consciousness if they act upon correlated ideas of the senses. In such a way ideas which are communicated by spiritual influx, would clothe themselves with the signs of that language which man uses for his other purposes. Thus the sensation of the presence of a spirit becomes converted into the picture of the human figure; the order and beauty of the immaterial world into fantasies which, under other circumstances, give pleasure to our senses in this life,³⁶ &c.

Nevertheless this kind of apparition cannot be a common and ordinary thing but can occur only with persons whose organs* have an unusual sensitiveness for intensifying, by harmonious motion, according to the inner state of the soul, the pictures of the imagination, to

* I do not mean by this the organs of external sensation, but the sensory of the soul, as it is called, *i.e.*, that part of the brain the motion of which, according to the opinion of philosophers, is wont to accompany the various images and ideas of the soul when thinking.

a higher degree than is usually the case, and should be the case, with healthy persons. Such abnormal persons would be confronted, in certain moments, with the appearance of many objects as if they were outside of themselves. They would think that spiritual natures present with them were affecting their bodily senses, while yet this is only a delusion of the imagination, occurring, however, in such a way that its cause is a true spiritual influence, not, indeed, perceivable immediately, but revealing itself to consciousness by correlated pictures of the imagination which assume the appearance of sensations.

Conceptions derived from education and all sorts of fancies that have crept into the mind would exercise their influence here, where delusion is mingled with truth, a real spiritual sensation being, indeed, the foundation, but converted into phantoms of sensuous things. It will further be admitted that the power to thus develop the impressions of the spirit-world into the clear perception of this world can hardly be of any use, because in such a process the spiritual sensation becomes necessarily so closely interwoven with the fancies of the imagination that it cannot be possible to distinguish the truth from the gross surrounding delusions. Such a state would likewise indicate a disease, because it presupposes an altered balance of the nerves, which are put into unnatural motion merely by the activity of purely spiritual sensations of the soul. Finally, it would not be at all strange to find the spirit-seer to be at the same time a dreamer, at

least in regard to the mental pictures which he makes of his visions ; because ideas, unknown to him by their very nature and incompatible with those of his bodily state, crowd in and drag into external sensation badly adjusted pictures, creating thereby wild chimeras and curiously distorted figures, which float in trailing garments before the senses, deceiving them in spite of the fact that such chimeras may be based upon a true spiritual influence.³⁷

Now we need no longer be at a loss to give apparently rational causes for the stories about apparitions which so often cross the path of philosophers, as well as to account for all sorts of influences from spirits of which the rumour goes here and there.³⁸ Departed souls and pure spirits can indeed never be present to our external senses, nor communicate with matter in any other way than by acting upon the spirit of man, who belongs with them to one great republic. The spirits must act in such a way that the ideas which they call up in man's mind clothe themselves in corresponding pictures according to the law of imagination, thus causing any objects which fit into the picture to appear as if they were outside of him. This deception can affect any one of the senses, and, however mixed it may be with incongruous fancies, it should not keep one from supposing spiritual influences in it. I should encroach upon the penetration of the reader if I should stop to apply this mode of explanation. For metaphysical hypotheses are possessed of such an immense flexibility that one must be very awkward not to be able to adapt this one to any

story he hears even before investigating its truthfulness, which is in many cases impossible, and in still more is impolite to the narrator.

But if we balance against each other the advantages and disadvantages which might accrue to a person organized not only for the visible world, but also, to a certain degree, for the invisible (if ever there was such a person), such a gift would seem to be like that with which Juno honoured Teiresias, making him blind so that she might impart to him the gift of prophesying. For, judging from the propositions above made, the knowledge of the other world can be obtained here only by losing some of that intelligence which is necessary for this present world. I am not sure if even certain philosophers can be freed entirely from such a hard condition, when they turn their metaphysical telescopes upon such far-off regions and tell us of miraculous things. At least I do not grudge them their discoveries. But I am afraid that some man of sound sense but little polish might intimate to them what the coachman answered to Tycho Brahe, when, one night, the latter suggested to the man he might drive the shortest way by directing his course according to the stars: "My dear master, you may be an expert as to the sky, but here on earth you are a fool." ³⁹

THIRD CHAPTER.

ANTI-KABALA.

A FRAGMENT OF COMMON PHILOSOPHY AIMING TO ABOLISH
COMMUNION WITH THE SPIRIT-WORLD.

? Aristotle says, somewhere, "When we are awake, we have a common world, but when we dream, everybody has his own." It seems to me that it ought to be possible to reverse this latter proposition and say, if, among different human beings, every one has his own world, it may be supposed that they dream. With this understanding we will view the various imaginary worlds of these air-architects which each one inhabits quietly to the exclusion of others. Behold, for example, him who inhabits the Order of Things as it was framed by Wolf out of but little building material obtained from experience, but many conceptions gotten on the sly. Or we will view those who inhabit the world produced by Crusius out of nothing, by means of a few magical sayings about the thinkable and the unthinkable. And, as we find that their visions are contradictory, we will patiently wait until the gentlemen have finished dreaming. For if, at some time, by the will of God, they wake up, *i.e.*, open their eyes to such a view as does not exclude conformity with other people's common sense, then none

→ cf. Heraclitus

of them will see anything that does not appear evident and certain in the light of their proofs to others also, and the philosophers will then inhabit a common world, of the kind which mathematicians have already occupied for a long time. And this event cannot be delayed much longer, if certain signs and predictions, which for some time have appeared over the horizon of science, can be trusted.

Reason-dreamers have a certain relation with sensation-dreamers, among whom are usually counted those who occasionally deal with spirits. The reason is that they too, like the former, see something which no other healthy man sees, and have a communication of their own with beings which reveal themselves to nobody else, however keen the others' senses may be. If one supposes that the above-named apparitions rest upon mere fancies, the term "dreams" then becomes appropriate to them in so far as both are self-created pictures which nevertheless deceive the senses as if they were true objects. But if one imagines both kinds of deception to be so similar in their origin that the source of the one will be found sufficient for the other, he is greatly deceived. The man who, while awake, becomes so absorbed in the fancies and chimeras created by his ever active imagination as to pay little attention to the sensations of the senses with which he is mostly concerned at that moment, is justly called a waking dreamer. For the sensations of the senses need decrease only a little more in their intensity, and he will be asleep,

and his chimeras will then be true dreams. The reason why they are no dreams while the dreamer pursues them awake, is, because he then perceives the dreams as in himself, but other objects as outside of himself; consequently he considers the dreams as effects of his own activity, but the perception of objects as part of his received impressions from the outside. For in this situation everything depends upon the relation which man assumes the objects to have to himself as a man, and, consequently, also to his body. Thus, the same pictures can indeed occupy him very much in his waking state, but they cannot deceive him, however clear they may be. For although he has then, too, in his brain a fictitious impression of himself and his body, which he puts in relation to his fantastic pictures, nevertheless the real sensation of his body, by means of the external senses, establishes a contrast with those chimeras, or distinction from them, which goes to show the ones as self-created, the other as perceived.⁴⁰ If he falls asleep, the idea of his body derived from impressions disappears, and only the fictitious idea remains. In relation to this latter idea, the other chimeras are now assumed to be outside of himself, and they are found to deceive the dreamer as long as he sleeps, because there is no sensation present which would furnish a basis for a comparison of the two whereby the original could be distinguished from the phantasm, *i.e.*, the outside from the inside.

The spirit-seers, therefore, are entirely different from

waking dreamers not only in degree, but in kind. For while they are waking, and often while they are experiencing other sensations with great vividness, the spirit-seers place some imagined things among the external objects which they really perceive. The only question is, how it is possible that they place the phantoms of their imagination outside of themselves, and even put them in relation to their body, which they sense through their external senses. The great clearness of the fantasy cannot be the cause, for the point at issue is, the place where an object is put; and, therefore, I demand that it be shown how the soul places such an image as it should perceive to be contained in itself, into an entirely different relation, namely, into a place outside of itself and among those objects which are offered to its real perception. I shall not be satisfied with the quotation of other cases which bear some resemblance with this deception, such as perhaps occur in the state of fever; for be the deceived well or sick, we do not want to know *if* such a thing happens also elsewhere, but *how* this deception is possible.

We find, however, in using our external senses, that besides the clearness with which the objects are seen, we perceive at the same time their location, perhaps not always with the same accuracy, still as a necessary condition of sensation, without which it would be impossible to perceive things as being outside of ourselves.⁴¹ Here it becomes quite probable that our soul locates the perceived object at that point where the

different lines, indicating the direction of the impression, meet. That is why we see a radiating point at the meeting-place of those lines which we draw from the eye back in the direction of the rays. This point, which we call the point of vision, is, in its effect, the scattering point, but, in the way it is perceived, it is the point which collects the lines of direction determining the sensation (*focus imaginarius*). Thus we locate a visible object even with one eye alone; in the same way as, by means of a concave mirror, the image of an object is seen in the air just in that spot where the rays radiating from one point of the object meet before entering the eye.*

The same theory, perhaps, can be applied to the impressions of sound, because its shocks, too, are transmitted in straight lines. Then we should say that the sensation of sound is accompanied by the perception of a *focus imaginarius*, and that this is placed in that point where the straight lines meet which are drawn to the outside from the vibrating nerve-structure inside of the brain. For the place and distance of a sounding object

* This is the way in which optics usually represent the process of locating an object, and it agrees very well with experience. But the same rays which diverge from a point, are, on account of the refraction in the moistures of the eye, not thrown on the retina as divergent rays, but are there united into one point. If the sensation occurs only in this nerve, the *focus imaginarius* would, in consequence, have to be placed not outside of the body, but in the background of the eye itself. This creates a difficulty which I cannot solve at present, and which seems incompatible with the above-named propositions, as well as with experience.

is perceived to some extent, even if the sound is low and comes from the back, and although the lines drawn from such a position do not strike the opening of the ear, but other places of the head. This makes one believe that the soul continues the lines of vibration externally in imagination, and places the sounding object in their meeting-point.⁴² The same can, in my opinion, be predicated of the other three senses, differing from sight and hearing in this respect that the object of sensation is in immediate contact with the organs of these other senses, and the lines indicating the place of the organic stimulus find in the organs themselves their meeting-point.

In applying this to the pictures of imagination, permit me to take as basis the hypothesis of Cartesius, approved of by most of the philosophers after him, that all representations of the imagination are accompanied by certain movements in the nerve-tissue or nerve-spirit of the brain, which movements are called "*ideae materiales*"; *i.e.*, these representations are, perhaps, accompanied by the concussion or vibration of the fine element secreted by these nerve-tissues. This vibration is similar to the movements which the sense-impression might produce, and of which the nerve-vibration is a copy. But now I must ask that if it be granted that the principal difference between the nerve-movements in fantasies, and in sensations, consists in the fact that, with fantasies, the lines indicating the direction of the movement meet inside of the brain, while in sensation they meet outside; then, since the focus imaginarius in which the objects are

perceived in the clear sensations of the waking state is placed outside of myself, but the focus imaginarius of the fantasies entertained during the same state is placed inside of myself, I cannot fail, as long as I am awake, to distinguish from the sense-impressions these imaginations as fantasies.

If so much is admitted, it seems to me that I can adduce some reasonable cause for that kind of mind-disturbance called insanity, and, in its higher degree, trance. The peculiarity of this disease is that the confused individual places mere objects of his imagination outside of himself, and considers them to be real and present objects. Now I have stated that, according to the common order of things, the lines indicating the direction of the movement, and accompanying the fantasies in the brain as their material auxiliaries, must meet inside the brain, and that, consequently, the location of the picture in the subject's consciousness in the waking state must be placed inside of himself. If, therefore, I suppose that, by any accident or disease, certain organs of the brain are distorted or thrown out of their equilibrium in such a manner that the nerve movements, vibrating harmoniously with certain fantasies, occur according to such lines of direction as, continued, would meet outside of the brain, then the focus imaginarius would be placed outside of the thinking subject,* and the image produced

* Remotely resembling the above-mentioned accident is the state of drunken people, who see things double, because the swelling of the blood-vessels prevents the axes of the eyes from being adjusted

by mere imagination would be perceived as an object present to the external senses. Though such a phantom be only weak at the beginning, the consternation at the appearance of a thing which ought not to be there according to the natural order of things, will soon arouse attention, and will give to the phantom sensation such a vividness that the deluded person cannot doubt its reality. This delusion can affect any one of the external senses, for of each we have copied images in imagination, and the contortion of nerve-tissue can cause the focus imaginarius to be placed in that spot, whence the organic impression of a really existing bodily object would come. It is not astonishing, then, if the visionary believes to see or hear many a thing which nobody perceives besides him, or if these fancies appear to him and disappear suddenly, or if they beguile the sense of vision, for example, and can be apprehended by no other sense (if they cannot be felt, for instance), and thus seem to him

so that their continuation may meet in the point where the object is. Similarly, a distortion of brain fibres, perhaps only temporary, and, while it lasts, affecting only a few nerves, may occasion certain fantasies of imagination to appear to be outside of ourselves even in the waking state. A very common experience may be compared with this deception. After having slept, we often regard—with drowsy and half-opened eyes—the variegated threads of the bed-curtains, or of the covering, or the small spots of the nearest wall, and easily form out of them figures of human faces and similar things. The delusion ceases at will and as soon as attention is aroused. In this case the transfer of the focus imaginarius of the fantasies is, to some extent, subject to our discretion, while in the trance it cannot be controlled by any will power.

intangible. The common ghost-stories depend so much on such indications as these that they easily justify the suspicion of hailing from such a source. In the same way the current conception of spiritual beings which we evolved out of common phraseology, is very much of the nature of this delusion, and does not belie its origin, since the quality of an intangible presence in space is said to constitute the essential characteristic of this conception.

It is further very probable that the idea of spectres, imbibed from education, furnishes the head of a diseased person with materials for deluding apparitions, and that a brain free from all such prejudices would not so soon hatch out phantasms of this kind, even though some aberration might befall it. Furthermore, as the disease of the visionary concerns not so much the reason, as a deception of the senses, it will be easily recognized that the unfortunate subject cannot remove the delusion by any reasoning; for a true or apparent impression of the senses precedes all the judgments of the reason, and carries with it immediate evidence, far excelling all other persuasion.⁴³

The consequence resulting from all these considerations is in so far inconvenient, as it renders entirely superfluous the deep conjectures of the preceding chapter; and the reader, though he was ready to receive with some approval its idealistic notions, will nevertheless prefer that conception which allows of more comfort and brevity in judging, and which promises to find the more general approval. For, aside from the fact that it seems

to conform more with a reasonable frame of mind to find the means of explanation in the material furnished by experience, than to lose one's self in the dizzy conceptions of a reason, partly inventing, partly jumping at conclusions, there is always found, in such speculations, occasion for scoffing, than which, whether justifiable or not, there is no stronger means of keeping back idle investigation. For it creates at once grave suspicion for one to attempt seriously to expound the fancies of a visionary, and the kind of philosophy which is found in such bad company is open to question. It is true, I have, in the preceding, not contested the insanity of such apparitions. Rather, while I have not made insanity to be the cause of an imagined communion with spirits, I have yet connected the two by considering insanity as the natural consequence of such communion. But what foolishness is there which could not be harmonized with a bottomless philosophy? Therefore, I do not at all blame the reader, if, instead of regarding the spirit-seers as half-dwellers in another world, he, without further ceremony, despatches them as candidates for the hospital, and thereby spares himself any further investigation. But, if everything then is to be treated on such a basis, the manner of handling such adepts of the spirit-world must be very different from that based upon the ideas given above; and if, formerly, it was found necessary at times to burn some of them, it now will suffice to give them a purgative. Indeed, from this point of view, there was no need of going so far back as to metaphysics,-

for hunting up secrets in the deluded brain of dreamers. The keen Hudibras could alone have solved for us the riddle, for he thinks that visions and holy inspirations are simply caused by a disordered stomach.*

* This sentence is a free rendering of the German, the outspokenness of which is hardly bearable in English. The original reads as follows:—“Der scharfsichtige Hudibras haette uns allein das Raetsel aufloesen koennen, denn nach seiner Meinung: wenn ein hypochondrischer Wind in den Eingeweiden tobt, so kommt es darauf an, welche Richtung er nimmt, geht er abwaerts, so wird daraus ein F—, steigt er aber aufwaerts, so ist es eine Erscheinung oder eine heilige Eingebung.”

FOURTH CHAPTER.

THEORETICAL CONCLUSION FROM THE WHOLE OF THE CONSIDERATIONS OF THE FIRST PART.

The inaccuracy of scales used for commercial measurements, according to civil law, is discovered, if we let the merchandise and the weights exchange pans. So the partiality of the scales of reason is revealed by the same trick, without which, in philosophical judgments, no harmonious result can be obtained from the compared weighings. I have purified my soul from prejudices, I have destroyed any blind affection which ever crept in to procure in me an entrance for much fancied knowledge. I now have nothing at heart ; nothing is venerable to me but what enters by the path of sincerity into a quiet mind open to all reasons—be thereby my former judgment confirmed or abolished, be I convinced or left in doubt. Wherever I meet with something instructive, I appropriate it. The judgment of him who refutes my reasons, is my judgment, after I first have weighed it against the scale of self-love, and, afterwards, in that scale against my presumed reasons, and have found it to have a higher intrinsic value. Formerly, I viewed human common sense only from the standpoint of my own ; now I put myself into the position of a foreign reason outside of

myself, and observe my judgments, together with their most secret causes, from the point of view of others. It is true, the comparison of both observations results in pronounced parallaxes, but it is the only means of preventing the optical delusion, and of putting conceptions in regard to the power of knowledge in human nature into their true places. You may say that this is very serious talk in connection with so trifling a problem as that under consideration, which deserves to be called a plaything rather than a serious occupation, and you are not exactly wrong in thus judging. But although one ought not to make a great ado about a small matter, yet one may perhaps be allowed to make use of such occasions; and unnecessary circumspection in small matters may furnish useful example in important matters. I find no attachment nor any other inclination to have crept in before examination, so as to deprive my mind of a readiness to be guided by any kind of reason *pro* or *con*, except one. The scale of reason after all is not quite impartial, and one of its arms, bearing the inscription, "Hope of the Future," has a constructive advantage, causing even those light reasons which fall into its scale to outweigh the speculations of greater weight on the other side. This is the only inaccuracy which I cannot easily remove, and which, in fact, I never want to remove. I confess that all stories about apparitions of departed souls or about influences from spirits, and all theories about the presumptive nature of spirits and their connection with

us, seem to have appreciable weight only in the scale of *hope*,⁴⁴ while in the scale of speculation they seem to consist of nothing but air. If the answer to the problem in question were not in sympathy with a prior inclination, what reasonable man would be doubtful as to whether it were more plausible to assume the existence of a kind of beings which have no similarity whatever with anything taught him by his senses, or to attribute certain alleged experiences to a kind of self-deception and invention which, under certain circumstances, is by no means uncommon.

In fact this seems to be in general the main reason for crediting the ghost-stories so widely accepted. Even the first delusions about presumed apparitions of deceased people have probably arisen from the fond hope that we still exist in some way after death. And then, at the time of the shadows of night, this illusion has probably deluded the senses, and created out of doubtful forms phantoms corresponding to preconceived ideas. From these, finally, the philosophers have taken occasion to devise the rational idea of spirits, and to bring it into a system. You probably will recognise also in my own assumed doctrine of the communion of spirits this trend to which people commonly incline. For its propositions evidently unite only to give an idea how man's spirit leaves*

* The old Egyptians had as symbol for the soul a butterfly, and the Greek name signifies the same. One can easily see that the hope, which makes death to be only a transformation, has caused such an idea, together with its symbol. But this does not at all invalidate

this world, *i.e.*, of the state after death. But how it enters, *i.e.*, of procreation and propagation, I make no mention. Nay, I do not even mention how it is present in this world, *i.e.*, how an immaterial nature can be in an immaterial body and act by means of it.⁴⁵ The very good reason for all this is that I do not understand a single thing about the whole matter, and, consequently, might as well have been content to remain just as ignorant as before in regard to the future state, had not the partiality of a pet notion recommended the reasons which offered themselves, however weak they were.

The same ignorance makes me so bold as to absolutely deny the truth of the various ghost stories, and yet with the common, although queer, reservation that while I doubt any one of them, still I have a certain faith in the whole of them taken together. The reader is free to judge as far as I am concerned. The scales are tipped far enough on the side containing the reasons of the second chapter to make me serious and undecided when listening to the many strange tales of this kind. But, as reasons to justify one's self are never lacking when the mind is prejudiced, I do not want to bother the reader with any further defence of such a way of thinking.

As I am now at the conclusion of the theory of spirits,

the confidence that the conceptions thence evolved are right. Our inner perception, and the conclusions drawn from it, being like reason, bring us, if they remain uncorrupted, to that point to which reason itself would lead us if it were more enlightened, and of a greater scope.⁴⁶

I am bold enough to say that this study, if properly used by the reader, exhausts all philosophical knowledge about such beings, and that in future, perhaps, many things may be thought about it, but never more known. This assumption sounds rather vainglorious. For of such multifariousness are the problems offered by nature, in its smallest parts, to a reason so limited as the human, that there is certainly no object of nature known to the senses, be it only a drop of water or a grain of sand, which ever could be said to be exhausted by observation or reason. But the case is entirely different with the philosophical conception of spiritual beings. It may be complete, but in the negative sense, by fixing with assurance the limits of our knowledge, and convincing us that all that is granted to us is to know the diverse manifestations of life in nature and its laws; but that the principle of this life, *i.e.*, the unknown and only assumed spiritual nature, can never be thought of in a positive way, because for this purpose no data can be found in the whole of our sensations; that therefore we have to resort to negations for the sake of thinking something so entirely different from everything sensuous; but that the possibility of such negations rests likewise neither upon experience nor upon conclusions, but upon invention, to which a reason deprived of all other expedients finally resorts. With this understanding pneumatology may be called a doctrinal conception of man's necessary ignorance in regard to a supposed kind of beings, and as such it can easily be adequate to its task.

And now I lay aside this whole matter of spirits, a remote part of metaphysics, since I have finished and am done with it.⁴⁷ In future it does not concern me any more. By thus making the plan of my investigation more concentrated, and sparing myself some entirely useless inquiries, I hope to be able to apply to better advantage my small reasoning power upon other subjects. It is generally vain to try to extend the little strength one has over a wide range of undertakings. It is therefore a matter of policy, in this as other cases, to fit the pattern of one's plans to one's powers, and if one cannot obtain the great, to restrict one's self to the mediocre.

PART SECOND,

WHICH IS HISTORICAL.



CHAPTER FIRST.

A STORY, THE TRUTH OF WHICH THE READER IS RECOMMENDED
TO INVESTIGATE AS HE LIKES.

Sit mihi fas audita loqui.—VIRGIL.

Philosophy, which on account of its self-conceit exposes itself to all sorts of empty questions, finds itself often in awkward embarrassment in view of certain stories, parts of which it cannot *doubt* without suffering for it, nor *believe* without being laughed at. Both difficulties we find to a certain degree united in the current accounts of spirit visions, the first in listening to him who avouches their truth, the second in communicating them to others. In fact, there is no reproach more bitter to the philosopher than that of credulity, and of yielding to common fancies. And as those who know how to appear wise with little effort sneer at all those things which equalise, so to speak, the wise and the ignorant, in being incomprehensible to both of them, it is not astonishing that the apparitions, so

frequently asserted, are finding wide acceptance, and yet, before the public, are either denied or hushed up. You may depend upon this much: an Academy of Sciences will never make this matter its prize question. Not that its members are entirely free from any belief in the opinion referred to, but because policy rightly shuts out questions raised either by presumption or vain curiosity. Thus stories of this kind will have at any time only secret believers, while publicly they are rejected by the prevalent fashion of disbelief.

Meanwhile, as this whole question seems to me to be neither important enough nor well enough studied out to be finally pronounced upon, I do not hesitate to relate here some information of the kind mentioned, and to submit it with absolute indifference to the kind or unkind judgment of the reader.

There lives at Stockholm a certain Mr. Swedenborg, a gentleman of comfortable means and independent position. His whole occupation for more than twenty years is, as he himself says, to be in closest intercourse with spirits and deceased souls; to receive news from the other world, and, in exchange, give those who are there tidings from the present; to write big volumes about his discoveries; and to travel at times to London to look after their publication. He is not especially reticent about his secrets, talks freely about them with everybody, seems to be entirely convinced of his pretensions, and all this without any apparent deceit or charlatanry. Just as he, if we may believe him, is

the Arch-Spiritseer among all the spiritseers, he certainly is also the Arch-Dreamer among all the dreamers, whether we judge him by the description of those who know him, or by his works. But this will not hinder those who, otherwise, are favourable to influences from spirits, from supposing that there is some truth back of such phantasms. Still, as the credentials of all plenipotentiaries from the other world consist in the proofs⁴⁸ which, by certain tests, they give of their calling in the present world, I must quote from what is spread abroad to authenticate the extraordinary capacities of the above-mentioned gentleman at least that which, with most people, still finds some credit.

Towards the end of the year 1761, Mr. Swedenborg was called to a princess, whose great intelligence and insight ought to render deception of such a nature impossible. The call was occasioned by the common report about the pretended visions of this man. After some questions which were intended to amuse her with his illusions, the princess dismissed him, after having charged him with a secret mission concerning his communication with spirits. Several days afterwards, Mr. Swedenborg appeared with an answer which was of such a nature as to create in the princess, according to her own confession, the liveliest astonishment, for the answer was true, and at the same time, could not have been given to him by any living human being. This story is drawn from the report sent by an ambassador at the court there, who was present at that time, to another foreign ambassador in

Copenhagen ; it exactly agreed also with all that special inquiry has been able to learn.

The following stories have no other proof than common report, which is rather doubtful evidence. Madame Marteville, the widow of a Dutch envoy at the Swedish court, was reminded by a goldsmith to pay some arrears due on a silver-service furnished her. The lady, knowing the economy of her deceased husband, was convinced that this debt must have been settled already in his lifetime, but she found no proof whatever among the papers he left. Woman is especially prone to credit the stories of soothsaying, interpretation of dreams, and similar wonderful things. The widow discovered therefore her trouble to Mr. Swedenborg, requesting him to procure from her husband in the other world information about the real facts of the claim—if it were true, as people said of him, that he had intercourse with deceased people. Mr. Swedenborg promised to do it, and, a few days afterwards, reported to the lady in her house, that he had obtained the desired information, and that the requisite receipts were in a hidden partition of a closet which he showed to her, and which, in her opinion, had been entirely emptied. A search was made at once, according to his description, and, together with the secret Dutch correspondence, the receipts were found, making void all claims.

The third story is of a kind of which it must be very easy to completely prove either the truth or the untruth. It was, if I am rightly informed, towards the end of the

year 1759, when one afternoon Mr. Swedenborg, coming from England, landed in Gothenburg. The same evening he was invited to meet some company at the house of a resident merchant. After being present a short while he proclaimed, with evident consternation, the news that, just at that moment, a terrible fire was raging in Stockholm, in the Sudermalm. After the lapse of several hours, during which he had from time to time left the company, he reported to them that the fire was checked, and how far it had spread. This wonderful news was noised abroad the same evening, and the next morning was all over the town. Not until two days after did the first report from Stockholm arrive in Gothenburg. It agreed entirely, it is said, with Swedenborg's visions.⁴⁹

It will probably be asked what on earth could have moved me to engage in such a contemptible business as that of circulating stories to which a rational man hesitates patiently to listen; nay, that I should even make them the subject of a philosophical investigation. But as the philosophy which we prefixed was equally a tale from the Utopia of metaphysics, I do not see anything unseemly in letting both appear together. Anyhow, why should it be more creditable to be deceived by blind confidence in the pretences of reason than by incautious belief in misleading stories?

The borders of folly and wisdom are marked so indistinctly that one can hardly walk long in the one region without making at times a little digression into

the other. But so far as that sense of honour is concerned, which may sometimes be persuaded even against resisting reason, it seems to be a remnant of the old ancestral loyalty which, to be sure, does not exactly fit in with the present state of things, and therefore often becomes folly, yet, on that account, is not to be considered the natural heirloom of stupidity. I leave it, therefore, to the discretion of the reader to reduce the queer story with which I am meddling,—a doubtful mixture of reason and credulity,—into its components, and to make out what are the proportions of both ingredients in my mind. For, seeing that the main point in such a criticism is to preserve proper decorum, I am sufficiently guarded against ridicule by the fact that with this folly, if you want to call it by that name, I am in quite good and numerous company, and this, as Fontenelle believes, is alone sufficient at least to prevent one's being regarded as unwise. For it always has been, and, probably, always will be the case, that certain nonsensical things are accepted even by rational men, just because they are generally talked about. To that class belong sympathetic healings, the wand, forebodings, the effect of the imagination of pregnant women, the influences of the changing moon upon animals and plants, &c. Yea, a short time ago, the common peasantry made scholars pay them handsomely for so habitually ridiculing their credulity. For, by a good deal of hearsay from children and women, a great many intelligent men were finally persuaded to take a common

wolf to be a hyena, although any rational man can easily see that an African beast would not disport itself in the woods of France. The weakness of man's reason, together with his curiosity, brings it about that, in the beginning, truth and deceit are snatched up promiscuously. But, gradually, the ideas are purified; a small part remains, the rest is thrown away as offal.

He to whom these ghost stories seem to be of importance, if he has money enough and nothing better to do, may, at any rate, make a journey for the sake of more accurate information, just as Artemidor travelled in Asia Minor to satisfy himself about the interpretation of dreams. Posterity of the same turn of mind will be very grateful to him for making it impossible for a second Philostratus to rise after many years, and make out of our Swedenborg a new Apollonius of Tyana, when the hearsay shall have matured to positive proof, and the inconvenient, though highly necessary, examination of eye-witnesses will have become impossible.

SECOND CHAPTER.

A DREAMER'S ECSTATIC JOURNEY THROUGH THE WORLD
OF SPIRITS.

Somnia, terrores magicos, miracula, sagas,
Nocturnos lemures, portentaque Thessala.

HORACE.

I cannot take it as in any way amiss in the cautious reader, if, during the development of this work, he should have grown doubtful about the manner of proceeding adopted by the author. For, as I treated the dogmatic part before the historic, and thus set reasons before experience, I gave cause for the suspicion of underhand-dealing, by having the whole thing before my mind from the start, and then feigning to know nothing but abstract considerations, so that I might finally surprise the reader who is expecting no such thing, by a pleasing confirmation from experience. In fact, this is a trick which philosophers have used at several times with very good success. To wit, all knowledge has two ends of which you can take hold, the one *a priori*, the other *a posteriori*. It is true, several modern scientists have pretended that one must, of necessity, begin at the latter. They think they can catch the eel of science at the tail, by first procuring enough knowledges from experience, and then

ascending gradually to general and higher conceptions. But although this may not be unwise, it is not nearly learned enough, nor philosophical. For in this manner one soon arrives at a why which cannot be answered, and that is just as creditable for a philosopher as it is for a merchant to pleasantly ask one to come some other time when a bill of exchange is presented to him for payment. To avoid this inconvenience acute men have begun at the opposite farthest border, the outmost point of metaphysics. But a new difficulty is here incurred, of beginning I don't know where, and of coming I don't know whither; also that the reasoning, when continued, does not seem to fall in with experience; yea, it seems as if the atoms of Epicurus, after having fallen and fallen from eternity, might sooner meet by chance some time and form a world, than that common ideas will meet and exemplify these abstract principles. When the philosopher thus clearly saw that his reasons on the one hand and actual experience or report on the other might, like two parallel lines, run alongside each other into infinity without ever meeting, he agreed with others, as by mutual consent, that each should take the starting-point in his own way; each then should guide the reason not by the straight line of logic, but by giving to the lines of evidence an imperceptible twist, and so, by stealthily squinting in the direction of certain experiences or testimonies, each one should bring the reason to the point of proving just what, unsuspected by the trustful pupil, he all the time had in mind as the experience

to be rationally proved. Add to this that they call this road the road *a priori*, although they have imperceptibly directed it to the point *a posteriori*, by following a road already staked out. They do not tell you that, of course, because it is only fair for the initiated not to betray the tricks of the profession. With this ingenious method several men of merit have caught even secrets of religion by pure reasoning; just as a novelist makes the heroine flee into remote countries that there, by a lucky adventure, she haply may meet her lover; "et fugit ad salices, et se cupit ante videri." (Virgil). With such celebrated predecessors, I need not have been ashamed even if I really had made use of the same trick to help my work to a good ending. But I earnestly beg of the reader not to believe such a thing of me. Anyhow, of what use would it be to me now when I can deceive nobody any more, having given away the secret? Moreover, I undergo this misfortune, that the testimony which I have stumbled upon, and which resembles so uncommonly the philosophical creation of my own brain, looks desperately misshapen and foolish, so that I must rather expect the reader to consider my reasons as absurd on account of their relation to such confirmations, than that he will consider these latter reasonable on account of my reasons. I therefore declare without more ado that in regard to the alleged examples I mean no joke, and I declare once for all, that either one has to suppose more intelligence and truth to be in Swedenborg's works than a first glance will reveal, or that it is only chance when

he coincides with my system ; as poets sometimes, when they are raving, are believed to prophesy, or at least profess that they do, when, now and then, events bear them out.

I come to the point, the works of my hero. If many authors who are now forgotten, or, at least, in future will be without fame, deserve no small credit because, in the composition of big works, they took no heed of the expenditure of their reason, Mr. Swedenborg doubtless should carry highest honours among them all. For, surely, his bottle in the lunar world is quite full, and is inferior to none among all those which Ariosto has seen there, filled with the reason that was lost here, and which the owners one day will have to seek again ; so utterly empty of the last drop of reason is his big work.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, such a wonderful agreement we find there with what reason can obtain on the same subject by the most subtle investigations, that the reader will pardon me if I discover here that rare play of imagination which so many other collectors have found in the plays of nature, when, for example, in spotted marble they make out the Holy Family, or in stalactite formations they make out monks, baptismal fonts, and church organs, or even as the banterer Liscow discovered on the frosted window-pane the number of the beast and the triple crown, all of which nobody else sees but he whose head is filled with it beforehand.

The big work of this author comprises eight volumes quarto full of nonsense. He puts them before the world

as a new revelation under the title of "Arcana Cœlestia," and applies therein his visions mostly to the discovery of the hidden sense in the first books of Moses, and to a similiar mode of explanation of the whole of Scripture. All these fantastic interpretations do not concern me here, but, whoever desires it, may look up Dr. Ernesti's Theological Library, volume first, for some information about them. Only the "audita and visa," *i.e.*, what he professes to have seen with his own eyes and heard with his own ears, we will extract, principally from the appendices to his chapters, because they are the foundation of all the other fancies, and are also pretty well in the same line with the adventure which, in the foregoing, we have undertaken in the balloon of metaphysics. The author's style is plain. His stories and their arrangement seem really to be based upon fanatic observation, and afford little reason to suspect that fancies of a wrongly speculating reason have moved him to invent them, and use them for deception. In so far they are of some importance, and are really more deserving of being presented in a condensed form than many a plaything of brainless reasoners which swells our quarterlies. For a systematic delusion of the senses is a much more remarkable phenomenon than the deception of reason, the causes of which are well enough known; and which mostly could be prevented by an effort to guide the powers of mind, and to restrain somewhat an empty inquisitiveness. The delusion of the senses, on the other hand, concerns the first foundation of all judgments,

against the perversion of which the rules of logic have little power. I distinguish, therefore, with our author, between delusions and the deductions thence, and pass over his incorrect reasonings, the consequences of his not stopping at his visions,—just as we often have to separate in a philosopher that which he observes from what he reasons, and just as even seeming experiences are, for the most part, more instructive than seeming reasons. While thus robbing the reader of some of the moments which otherwise he might have put to the study of the exhaustive discussion of the matter, without, however, being much more benefited, I have taken care, nevertheless, of his sensitive taste by leaving out many of the wild chimeras of the book, and reducing its quintessence to a few drops. I expect for that just as much gratefulness from the reader, as a certain patient believed he owed to his doctors because they made him eat only the bark of cinchona, while they might easily have compelled him to eat the whole tree.

Mr. Swedenborg divides his visions into three kinds. In the first kind he is liberated from the body, in a state mediate between sleeping and waking, in which he has seen, heard, even felt spirits. This he has experienced only three or four times. The second is being led away by the spirit, when he may be out walking on the street without losing himself, while at the same time his spirit is in entirely different regions and sees clearly elsewhere houses, men, forests, &c., and this perhaps for several hours, until he suddenly becomes aware again of his real

place. That happened to him two or three times. The third kind of visions is what is usual with him, those which he has daily while wide awake; and from these visions his stories are taken.

All men, according to his testimony, are in equally close conjunction with the spirit-world; most men, however, do not perceive it, the difference between himself and others consisting only in the fact that *his interiors are opened*, a gift of which he always speaks with reverence (*datum mihi est ex divina Domini misericordia*). It may be seen from the context that this gift is supposed to consist in the faculty of becoming conscious of the obscure ideas which one's soul receives by its continual connection with the spirit-world. He distinguishes therefore in man the outer and the inner memory. The former he has as a person belonging to the visible world. On this fact also the distinction between the outer and inner man is founded; his own privilege consists in seeing himself already in this life as a person in the company of spirits, and in being recognised by them as man.⁵¹ In this inner memory everything is preserved which has disappeared out of the outer,—nothing of all the perceptions of a man is ever lost. After death the remembrance of everything that ever entered his soul, also of what was formerly hidden to himself, forms the complete book of his life.⁵²

The presence of spirits, it is true, affects only his inner sense. But this makes them appear to him as being outside of himself, and in the form of the human figure.

The language of spirits is an immediate communication of ideas, but it is always connected with the appearance of that language which the observer ordinarily speaks, and is represented as being outside of himself.⁵³ A spirit reads in the memory of another spirit the ideas which are contained in the inner memory with clearness. Thus the spirits see in Swedenborg the perceptions which he has from this world, with such clearness, that they deceive themselves, and often imagine they perceive immediately those things which it is impossible for them to see;⁵⁴ for no spirit has the least sensation from the corporeal world. Also, through communication with the souls of other living men, they can receive no idea of this world, because the interior of such men is not opened, and contains only ideas entirely obscure. For this reason Swedenborg is the very oracle of the spirits, who are just as curious to view in him the present state of the world, as he is curious to observe in their memory, as in a mirror, the wonders of the spirit-world. Although these spirits are also in the closest conjunction with the souls of all other men, operating upon them and being operated upon by them, they yet know this as little as men know it; so entirely obscure is that interior sense which belongs to the spiritual personality of men. The spirits therefore believe that those things which have been effected in them through the influence of the souls of men, have been thought by themselves alone; just as men in this life think no otherwise, than that all their thoughts and inclinations

come from themselves, although, as a matter of fact, they often flow into them out of the other world.⁵⁵ Each human soul has already in this life its place in the spirit-world, and belongs to a society, always in accordance with the inner state of good and truth, *i.e.*, of will and understanding.²⁹ But the places of spirits among themselves have nothing in common with space in the corporeal world. Thus the soul of a man in India can be next to the soul of another man in Europe, as far as their spiritual places are concerned, while those which, according to the body, live in one house, may be spiritually very far from one another. When man dies, the soul does not change its place, but only perceives itself to be in that place which, in relation to other spirits, it occupied already in this life. But although the relation of spirits among themselves is no real space, it has still with them the appearance of it,⁵⁶ and their conjunctions are perceived under the accessory condition of nearness, their differences, on the other hand, as distances. In the same way spirits possess no extent, but yet present to each other the appearance of human figures. In this imaginary space there exists a universal community of spiritual natures. Swedenborg talks with departed souls at will, and reads in their memory (power of perception) that state which they observe in themselves, and sees it just as clearly as with bodily eyes. Moreover, the enormous distances which divide the rational inhabitants of the world are nothing in regard to the spiritual universe, and

it is just as easy for one to talk with an inhabitant of Saturn, as with a deceased human soul. Everything depends on the condition of the interior state, and upon the conjunction in which spirits are according to the harmony of their states of good and truth. And the more remote spirits can easily enter into mutual communication through the intermediation of others. Thus man does not need to have actually dwelt in the other worlds for the sake of knowing them some day with all their wonders. His soul reads in the memory of the deceased citizens of other worlds the perceptions which they possess about their life and dwelling-place, and thereby sees objects as easily as by immediate observation.⁵⁷

A principal conception in Swedenborg's phantasm is the following:—Corporeal beings have no substance of their own, but exist only through the spirit-world, not, however, that each body exists through one spirit, but through all taken together. For that reason the knowledge of material things has a double significance, an external meaning in regard to the inter-relations of matter, an internal meaning in so far as material effects indicate the powers of the spirit-world which cause them. Thus the parts in the body of man stand in relation to each other according to material laws. But in so far as the body is preserved by the spirit living in it, its various members and their functions are of value in indicating those powers of the soul by the operation of which they

have their form, activity, and stability.⁵⁸ This inner meaning is unknown to man, and it is that which Swedenborg, whose interiors are opened, wants to make known to the world. With all other things of the visible world the case is the same; they have, as I say, a signification as things, which amounts to little, and another as signs, which amounts to much.⁵⁹ This also is the origin of all the new interpretations which he would make of the Scripture.⁶⁰ For this inner meaning, the internal sense, *i.e.*, the symbolic relation of all things told there to the spirit-world, is, as he fancies, the kernel of its value, the rest only the shell. Again, the important point in this symbolic conjunction of corporeal things, as images, with the interior spiritual state, is the following. All spirits present themselves to each other under the appearance of figures possessing extent; and the influences of all these spiritual beings among each other at the same time call forth the appearance of still other spiritual creatures possessing extent, thus, as it were, the appearance of a material world. The scenes of this world, however, are only symbols of its inner state; nevertheless they cause such a clear and enduring deception of the senses as to equal the real sensation of such objects. (A future interpreter will conclude from this that Swedenborg was an idealist, because he denies to this world its independent subsistence, and therefore held it to be only a systematic appearance, arising from the constitution of the spirit world.) Thus he talks about the gardens, vast countries, the dwelling-places, galleries, and arcades of the

spirits, which he claims to see with his own eyes in the clearest light. And he assures us that, having spoken after their death with all his friends, he had nearly always found that those having died recently could persuade themselves with difficulty that they had died, because they beheld a similar world ; also, that societies of spirits of the same inner state live in the same appearance in regard to the country and other things there, and that a change of state is accompanied by the appearance of a change of locality. The mass of wild and unspeakably absurd forms and figures which our dreamer believes to see quite clearly in his daily intercourse with spirits must be derived from the fact that, whenever spirits communicate their thoughts to the souls of men, these thoughts take the appearance of material things, which, however, present themselves to the subject only on the strength of their relation to an inner meaning, but, still, with all appearance of reality.

I have already stated that, according to our author, the many powers and qualities of the soul are in sympathy with those organs of the body which they govern. The whole outer man therefore corresponds to the whole inner man. If, then, a perceptible spiritual influx from the invisible world flows mainly into some one of the powers of the soul, he harmoniously feels its apparent presence also in the corresponding member of his outer man. Under this head he classifies a great variety of sensations in his body which he claims are always connected with spiritual contemplation. But their

foolishness is too great for me to dare to quote even one of them.

From these data, if it be considered worth while, one may now form a conception of that most extravagant and queerest of fancies in which all his dreams culminate. Just as various powers and capacities form that unity which constitutes the soul or the inner man, in the same way also various spirits (whose principal traits have the same relation to each other as the many faculties of a single spirit have among themselves) form a society which has the appearance of a great man.^{17:36} In this image each spirit finds himself in that place and in that apparent member which is in accordance with his peculiar office in such a spiritual body. Again, all societies of spirits together, and the world of all these invisible beings, finally presents itself in the appearance of the *Grand Man*, *Maximus Homo*.⁶¹ A colossal and gigantic fancy, which, perhaps, has grown out of an old childish conception, just as in schools sometimes, as an aid to memory, a whole continent is pictured to the pupils under the image of a sitting virgin, &c. In this enormous man there is a universal, most intimate communion of one spirit with all others, and of all with one; and, whatever may be the positions or changes of living beings in regard to each other in this world, still each has his place in the Grand Man entirely distinct from his place here, a place which he never changes, which is in immeasurable space only according to appearance, but in reality signifies only a particular character of his relations and influences.

I am tired of copying the wild chimeras of this worst of all dreamers, and forbear continuing them to his descriptions of the state after death. I have still other scruples. For, although a collector of objects of natural history puts up in his press among the prepared objects of animal procreation not only such as are formed naturally but also abortions, he nevertheless has to be careful not to show them too plainly and not to everybody. For among the curious there might easily be some pregnant persons who might receive an injurious impression. And as among my readers some might be just as likely in an interesting condition in regard to spiritual conceptions, I should be sorry if they had received a detrimental shock by anything I have told. However, as I have warned them right at the start, I am responsible for nothing, and hope not to be burdened with the moon-calves which their fruitful imagination might bring forth on this occasion.

As it is, I have not substituted my own fancies for those of our author, but have offered his views in a faithful extract to the comfortable and economic reader who does not care to sacrifice seven pounds for a little curiosity. It is true, I have mostly avoided quoting the visions themselves, as such wild chimeras only disturb the sleep of the reader, and the confused meaning of his revelations has been brought now and then into somewhat intelligible language; but the main traits of the sketch have thereby not suffered in accuracy. Nevertheless, it is only in vain that one would hide the fact

which, after all, is conspicuous to everybody, that all this labour finally comes to nothing. For, as the pretended private visions narrated in the book cannot prove themselves, the motive for bothering oneself with them could lie only in the supposition that the author might offer in substantiation happenings of the above-mentioned kind which could be confirmed by living witnesses. But nothing of the kind is found. And thus we retire with some confusion from a foolish attempt, making the rational though somewhat belated observation that it is often easy to think wisely, but unfortunately only after one has been for some time deceived.

I have treated an unfruitful subject which the inquiries and importunity of idle and inquisitive friends has forced upon me. By submitting my labours to their curiosity, I have still left their expectation unrewarded, and have satisfied neither the curious by novelties, nor the studious by reasons. If I had been animated in this work by no other intentions than those just stated, I should have wasted my time; for I have lost the confidence of the reader, whom, in his inquisitiveness and eagerness to know, I have led by a tiresome roundabout way to the same point of ignorance from which he started. But I really had an aim in view that seemed to me more important than the pretended one, and that, I believe, I have attained. Metaphysics, with which it is my fate to be in love, although only rarely can I boast of any favours from her, offers two advantages. The first is

that it serves to solve the tasks which the questioning mind sets itself when by means of reason it inquires into the hidden qualities of things. But here the result only too often falls below expectation, and also this time the answer has evaded our too eager grasp.

Ter frustra compressa manus, effugit imago,
Par levibus ventis volucrique simillima somno.

—VIRGIL.

The other advantage is more adapted to human reason, and consists in recognizing whether the task be within the limits of our knowledge and in stating its relation to the conceptions derived from experience, for these must always be the foundation of all our judgments. In so far metaphysics is the science of the boundaries of human reason. And as a small country always has many boundaries, and is generally more careful to intimately know and defend its possessions than blindly to set out upon conquests, it is this use of metaphysics, as setting boundaries, which is at the same time the least known and the most important, and which further is obtained only late and by long experience. In this case I indeed have not accurately defined the boundaries; but I have indicated them for the reader so far that, after further consideration, he will find himself able to do without such vain investigations about a question the data of which he has to seek in a world different from that of which he is sensible. Thus I have wasted my time that I might gain it. I have deceived the reader so that I might be of use to him,

and although I have offered him no new knowledge, I have nevertheless destroyed that vain belief and empty knowledge which inflates reason, and, in its narrow space, takes the place which might be occupied by the teachings of wisdom and of useful instruction.

The impatience of the reader, whom our considerations thus far have only wearied without giving instruction, may be appeased by the words with which Diogenes is said to have cheered his yawning listeners when he saw the last page of a tiresome book: "Courage, gentlemen, I see land!" Before, we walked, like Demokritus, in empty space, whither we had flown on the butterfly-wings of metaphysics, and there we conversed with spiritual beings. Now, since the sobering power of self-recognition has caused the silky wings to be folded, we find ourselves again on the ground of experience and common sense. Happy, if we look at it as the place allotted to us, which we never can leave with impunity, and which contains everything to satisfy us as long as we hold fast to the useful.

THIRD CHAPTER.

PRACTICAL CONCLUSION FROM THE WHOLE TREATISE.

It is the zeal of a sophist to inquire into any idle proposition and to set to the craving after knowledge no other limits than impossibility. But to select from among the innumerable tasks before us the one which humanity must solve, is the merit of the wise. After science has completed its course, it naturally arrives at a modest mistrust and, indignant with itself, it says: How many things there are which I do not understand! But reason, matured by experience so as to become wisdom, speaks through the mouth of Socrates when, among all the merchandise of a fair, he says serenely: "How many things there are which I do not need!" In this manner two endeavours of a dissimilar nature flow together into one, though in the beginning they set out in very different directions, the one being vain and discontented, the other staid and content. To be able to choose rationally, one must know first even the unnecessary, yea the impossible; then, at last, science arrives at the definition of the limits set to human reason by nature. All hollow schemes, perhaps not unworthy in themselves but lying outside of the sphere of men, will then flee to the limbus of vanity. Then even metaphysics will become that from which at present

it is rather far off, and which would seem the last thing to be expected of her—the companion of wisdom. As long as people think it still possible to attain knowledge about things so far off, wise simplicity may call out in vain that such great endeavours are unnecessary. The pleasure accompanying the extension of knowledge will easily make it appear a duty, and will consider deliberate and intentional contentedness to be foolish simplicity, opposed to the improvement of our nature. The questions about the spiritual nature, about freedom and predestination, the future state, &c., at first animate all the powers of reason, and through their excellency draw man into the rivalry of a speculation which reasons and decides, teaches and refutes without discrimination, just according to the nature of the apparent knowledge in each case. But if this investigation develop into philosophy which judges its own proceedings, and which knows not only objects, but their relation to man's reason, then the lines of demarcation are drawn closer, and the boundary stones are laid which in future never allow investigation to wander beyond its proper district. We had to make use of a good deal of philosophy to know the difficulties surrounding a conception generally treated as being very convenient and common. Still more philosophy moves this phantom of knowledge yet further away, and convinces us that it is entirely beyond the horizon of man. For in the relations of cause and effect, of substance and action, philosophy at first serves to dissolve the complicated phenomena, and to reduce

them to simpler conceptions. But when one has, finally, arrived at fundamental relations, philosophy has no business any more. Questions like "How something can be a cause, or possess power," can never be decided by reason; but these relations must be taken from experience alone. For the rules of our reason are applicable only to comparison in respect to identity or contrast. But in the case of a cause something is assumed to have come from something else; one can find therefore no connection in regard to identity. In the same way, if this effect is not already implied in what preceded, a contrast can never be made out; because it is not contradictory to merely assume one thing and abolish another. Thence the fundamental conceptions of causes, of forces, and of actions, if they are not taken from experience, are entirely arbitrary, and can be neither proved nor disproved.^{2:8:9} I know that will and understanding move my body, but I can never reduce by analysis this phenomenon, as a simple experience, to another experience, and can, therefore, indeed recognize it, but not understand it. That my will moves my arm is not more intelligible to me than if somebody said to me that he could stop the moon in his orbit. The difference is only that the one I experience, but that the latter has never occurred to me. I recognize in myself changes as of a living subject, namely, thoughts, power to choose, &c., &c., and, as these terms indicate things different in kind from any of those which, taken together, make up

my body, I have good reason to conceive of an incorporeal and constant being. Whether such a being be able to think also without connection with a body, can never be concluded from this empirical conception of its nature. I am conjoined with beings kindred to myself by means of corporeal laws, but whether I am, or ever shall be, conjoined according to other laws which I will call spiritual, without the instrumentality of matter, I can in no way conclude from what is given to me. All such opinions, as those concerning the manner in which the soul moves my body, or is related to other beings, now, or in future, can never be anything more than fictions. And they are far from having even that value which fictions of science, called hypotheses, have. For with these no fundamental powers are invented; only those known already by experience are connected according to the phenomena; their possibility, therefore, must be provable at any moment. It is different in the former case, when even new fundamental relations of cause and effect are assumed, the possibility of which can never, nor in any way, be ascertained, and which thus are only invented by creative genius or by chimera, whichever you like to call it. That several true or pretended phenomena can be comprehended by means of such assumed fundamental ideas, cannot at all be quoted in their favour. For a reason may be given for everything, if one is entitled to invent at will actions and laws of operation. We must wait, therefore, until perhaps in the future world, by new experiences, we are informed about

new conceptions concerning powers in our thinking selves which, as yet, are hidden to us. Thus the observations of later days, analysed by mathematics, have revealed to us the power of attraction in matter, concerning the possibility of which we shall never be able to learn anything further, because it seems to be a fundamental power. Those who would have invented such a quality without first having obtained the proof from experience, would rightly have deserved to be laughed at as fools. Because, in such cases, reasons are of no account whatever, neither for the sake of inventing, nor of confirming the possibility or impossibility of certain results: the right of decision must be left to experience alone. Just as I leave to time, which brings experience, the ascertainment of something about the famous healing-powers of the magnet in cases of toothache, when experience shall have produced as many observations to the effect that magnetic rods act upon flesh and bones, as we have already proving their effect on steel and iron. But, if certain pretended experiences cannot be classified under any law of sensation that is unanimously accepted by men: if, therefore, they would only go to prove irregularity in the testimony of the senses—which, indeed, is the case with rumoured ghost-stories—then it is advisable to simply ignore them. For the lack of unanimity and uniformity makes the historic knowledge about them valueless for the proof of anything, and renders them unfit to serve as basis for any law of experience within the domain of reason.

Just as, on the one hand, by somewhat deeper investigation, one will learn that convincing and philosophic knowledge is impossible in the case under consideration, one will have to confess, on the other hand, in a quiet and unprejudiced state of mind, that such knowledge is dispensable and unnecessary. The vanity of science likes to excuse its occupations by the pretext of importance; thus it is pretended in this case that a rational understanding of the spiritual nature of the soul is very necessary for the conviction of an existence after death; again, that this conviction is very necessary as a motive for a virtuous life. Idle curiosity adds that the fact of apparitions of departed souls even furnishes us with a proof from experience of the existence of such things. But true wisdom is the companion of simplicity, and as, with the latter, the heart rules the understanding, it generally renders unnecessary the great preparations of scholars, and its aims do not need such means as can never be at the command of all men. What? is it good to be virtuous only because there is another world, or will not actions be rewarded rather because they were good and virtuous in themselves? Does man's heart not contain immediate moral precepts, and is it absolutely necessary to fix our machinery to the other world for the sake of moving man here according to his destiny? Can he be called honest, can he be called virtuous, who would like to yield to his favourite vices if only he were not frightened by future punishment? Must we not rather say that indeed he shuns

the doing of wicked things, but nurtures the vicious disposition in his soul; that he loves the advantages of actions similar to virtue, but hates virtue itself? In fact, experience teaches that very many who are instructed concerning the future world, and are convinced of it, nevertheless yield to vice and corruption, and only think upon means cunningly to escape the threatening consequences of the future.⁶² But there probably never was a righteous soul who could endure the thought that with death everything would end, and whose noble mind had not elevated itself to the hope of the future. Therefore it seems to be more in accordance with human nature and the purity of morals to base the expectation of a future world upon the sentiment of a good soul, than, conversely, to base the soul's good conduct upon the hope of another world. Of that nature is also that moral faith, the simplicity of which can do without many a subtlety of reasoning, and which alone is appropriate to man in any state, because, without deviations, it guides him to his true aims. Let us therefore leave to speculation and to the care of idle men all the noisy systems of doctrine concerning such remote subjects. They are really immaterial to us, and the reasons pro and con which, for the moment, prevail, may, perhaps, decide the applause of schools, but hardly anything about the future destiny of the righteous. Human reason was not given strong enough wings to part clouds so high above us, clouds which withhold from our eyes the secrets of the other world. The curious who inquire about it so anxiously may receive

the simple but very natural reply, that it would be best for them to please have patience until they get there. But as our fate in the other world probably depends very much on the manner in which we have conducted our office in the present world, I conclude with the words with which Voltaire, after so many sophistries, lets his honest Candide conclude: "*Let us look after our happiness, go into the garden, and work.*"

Travaillons au jardin

APPENDIX I.



EXTRACTS FROM SWEDENBORG.

(Referred to by figures in Text).

1 (p. 38).—"That the spirit of man after being loosed from the body is a man, and, in a similar form, has been proved to me by the daily experience of several years ; for I have seen and heard them a thousand times, and I have spoken with them also on this subject, that men in the world do not believe them to be men, and that those who do believe, are reputed by the learned as simple. The spirits are grieved at heart that such ignorance should still continue in the world, and chiefly within the church. But this faith, they said, emanated first from the learned, who thought concerning the soul from things of corporeal sense, from which they conceived no other idea respecting it than as of thought alone, which, when without any subject in which and from which it is viewed, is as something volatile, of pure ether, which cannot but be dissipated when the body dies. But because the church, from the Word, believes in the immortality of the soul, they could not but ascribe to it something vital, such as is of thought, but still not any thing with sensation, such as man has, until it is again conjoined to the body. On this opinion is founded the doctrine in regard to the resurrection, and the faith that there is to be a conjunction when the last judgment comes. Hence it is, that when any one thinks about the soul from doctrine and at the same time from hypothesis, he does not at all comprehend that it is a spirit, and that in a human form. To this is added, that scarcely any one at this day knows what the spiritual is, and still less that those who are spiritual, as all spirits and angels are, have any human form. Hence it is, that almost all who come from the world wonder very much that they are alive, and that they are men equally as before, that they see, hear, and speak, and that their body has the sense of touch as before, and there is no difference at all. But when they cease to wonder at themselves, they then wonder that the church should know nothing about such a state of men after death, nor about heaven and hell, when yet all

who have ever lived in the world, are in another life, and live as men.—*De Cælo et ejus mirabilibus et de inferno ex auditis et visis* (Swedenborg). *Heaven and its wonders and Hell: from Things heard and seen.* No. 456.

2 (p. 46).—“Without a knowledge of discrete degrees nothing whatever can be known of the distinction between spiritual and natural, thus nothing of correspondence. Nor, indeed, can anything be known of any difference between the life of men and that of beasts, or between the more perfect and the less perfect animals: neither of the differences among the forms of the vegetable kingdom, nor among the matters of the mineral kingdom. From which it can be seen that they who are ignorant of these degrees are unable by any judgment to see causes; they see only effects, and from these judge of causes, which is done for the most part by an induction that is continuous with effects. But causes do not produce effects by continuous but by discrete modes; for cause is one thing, and effect is another. The difference between the two is like the difference between prior and subsequent, or between that which forms and that which is formed.

“I am not aware that anything has been known hitherto about discrete degrees, yet nothing of the real truth about cause can become known without a knowledge of degrees of both kinds. These degrees therefore shall be treated of throughout this Part (III.), for it is the object of this little work to uncover causes, that effects may be seen from them, and thus the darkness may be dispelled in which the man of the church is in respect to God and the Lord, and in respect to Divine things in general which are called spiritual things. This I may mention, that the angels are in grief for the darkness on the earth; saying that they see light hardly anywhere, and that men eagerly lay hold of fallacies and confirm them, thereby multiplying falsities upon falsities; and to confirm fallacies men search out, by means of reasonings from falsities and from truths falsified, such things as cannot be overturned, owing to the darkness in respect to causes and the ignorance respecting truths.”—*Swedenborg: Sapientia angelica de divino amore et de divino sapientia. Angelic Wisdom concerning the Divine Love and Wisdom.* Nos. 185, 188.

3 (p. 47).—“*There are in the natural world spaces and times, but these are in the spiritual world appearances.*

“The reason of this is, that all things which appear in the spiritual world exist immediately from the sun of heaven, which is the divine love of the Lord; whereas all things which appear in the natural world exist from the same source, but by means of the sun of this world, which is pure fire. Pure love, from which all things exist immediately from the Lord, is immaterial; but pure fire, through which all things exist mediately in the natural world, is material. Hence it is that all things which exist in the spiritual world are, from their origin, spiritual; and that all things which exist in the natural world, are, from their secondary origin, material. Material things are also in themselves fixed, stated, and measurable. They are fixed, because, however the states of men change, they continue permanent, as the earth, mountains, and seas. They are stated, because they constantly recur in their turns, as seasons, generations, and germinations. They are measurable, because all things may be defined; as spaces, by means of miles and furlongs, and these by means of paces and yards; times again, by means of days, weeks, months, and years. But in the spiritual world all things are as if they were fixed, stated, and measurable, but still they are not so in reality; for they exist and continue according to the states of the angels, so that with these very states they make one; they therefore vary also, as these states vary.

“I can positively affirm that the objects which exist in the spiritual world are even more real than those in the natural; for that which is in nature added to the spiritual principle is dead, and does not produce reality, but diminishes it. That there is this diminution arising from this cause is plainly evident from the state of the angels of heaven compared with that of men on earth, and from all the objects existing in heaven compared with all those existing in the world.

“Since there are in heaven objects similar to those which exist in our world, there are therefore spaces and times there also; but the spaces, like the earth itself there and the objects upon it, are appearances. For they appear according to the states of the angels; and the extensions of spaces, or the distances, are according to the similarities and dissimilarities of these states.”—*Swedenborg: De Symbolo Athanasiano. On the Athanasian Creed. Nos. 105, 106.*

4 (p. 47).—“That this is so can hardly be comprehended by a natural idea, because in such there is space; but by a spiritual idea,

such as angels have, it can be comprehended, because in such there is no space. But even by a natural idea this much can be comprehended, that love and wisdom (or what is the same, the Lord, who is divine Love and divine Wisdom) cannot advance through spaces, but is present with each one according to reception.”—*D. L. and W.*, III.

It is to be constantly borne in mind that with Swedenborg the divine Love and Wisdom are not only substantial entities, but they are the very substance itself; the divine Love being the Substance itself, and the divine Wisdom the Form itself, from which proceed all substances and all forms. On this profoundest of all metaphysical subjects Swedenborg says :—

“The idea of men in general about love and about wisdom is like something hovering and floating in thin air or ether; or like what exhales from something of this kind. Scarcely any one believes that they are really and actually substance and form. Even those who recognise that they are substance and form still think of the love and the wisdom outside the subject and as issuing from it. For they call substance and form that which they think of outside the subject and as issuing from it, even though it be something hovering and floating; not knowing that love and wisdom are the subject itself, and that what is perceived outside of it and as hovering and floating is nothing but an appearance of the state of the subject in itself. There are several reasons why this has not hitherto been seen, one of which is, that appearances are the first things out of which the human mind forms its understanding, and these appearances the mind can shake off only by the exploration of causes; and if the cause lies deeply hidden, the mind can explore it only by keeping the understanding for a long time in spiritual light; and this it cannot do by reason of the natural light which continually withdraws it. The truth is, however, that love and wisdom are the real and actual substance and form that constitute the subject itself.”—*D. L. W.*, 40.

5 (p. 49).—“The reason that there is life in all the several and most minute parts of man is, that the various and diverse things existing in him, which are called members, organs, and viscera, numerous as they are, so make one that he has no other knowledge than that he is a simple, rather than a compound being. That there is life in his most minute parts is evident from the following facts: that from his own life he sees, hears, smells, and tastes, which would not be

the case unless the organs of those senses also lived from the life of his soul; that the whole surface of his body is endued with the sense of touch, since it is the life, and not the skin without it, which produces this sense. The reason that there is life in all the several and most minute parts of man is, that the animal form, of which we have treated above, is the essential form of life."—*Athan. Cr.*, 109.

6 (p. 53) — "*Love or the will is man's very life. . . .* As all things of the body depend for existence and motion upon the heart, so do all things of the mind depend for existence and life upon the will. It is said, upon the will, but this means upon the love, because the will is the receptacle of love, and love is life itself (see above, n. 1-3), and love, which is life itself, is from the Lord alone.

"And as the human form is made up of all the things there are in man, it follows that love or the will is in a continual conatus and effort to form all these. There is a conatus and effort towards the human form, because God is a Man, and Divine Love and Divine Wisdom is His life, and from His life is everything of life. Any one can see that unless Life which is very man acted into that which in itself is not life, the formation of anything such as exists in man would be impossible, in whom are thousands of thousands of things that make one thing, and that unanimously aspire to an image of the Life from which they spring, that man may become a receptacle and abode of that Life. From all this it can be seen that love, and out of the love the will, and out of the will the heart, strives unceasingly towards the human form."—*D. L. W.*, 399-400.

7 (p. 53).— "Man is man from his spirit, and not from his body; and that the corporeal form is added to the spirit according to its form, and not the reverse, for the spirit is clothed with a body according to its own form. For this reason the spirit of man acts into every part, yea, into the minutest particulars of the body, insomuch that the part which is not actuated by the spirit, or in which the spirit is not acting, does not live. That this is so, may be known to every one from this fact alone, that thought and will actuate each and all things of the body with such entire command that every thing concurs, and whatever does not concur is not a part of the body, and is also cast out as something in which is no life. Thought and will are of the spirit of man, and not of the body. That the spirit does not appear to man in a human form, after it is loosed from the body, nor in another man, is because the body's organ of sight, or its eye, so

far as it sees in the world, is material, and what is material sees what is material only.

“ A deed or work, therefore, viewed in itself, is only an effect, which derives its soul and life from the will and thought, insomuch that it is will and thought in effect, consequently it is will and thought in an external form. Hence it follows that such as the will and thought are which produce a deed or work, such likewise is the deed and work : if the thought and will be good, then the deeds and works are good ; but if the thought and will be evil, then the deeds and works are evil, though in the external form they may appear the same.”—*H. and H.*, 453, 472.

“ The mind (that is, the will and understanding) impels the body and all its belongings at will. Does not the body do whatever the mind thinks and determines? Does not the mind incite the ear to hear, and direct the eye to see, move the tongue and the lips to speak, impel the hands and fingers to do whatever it pleases, and the feet to walk whither it will? Is the body, then, anything but obedience to its mind : and can the body be this unless the mind is in its derivatives in the body? Is it consistent with reason to think that the body acts from obedience simply because the mind so determines? in which case there would be two, the one above and the other below, one commanding, the other obeying. As this is in no way consistent with reason, it follows that man’s life is in its first principles in the brains, and in its derivatives in the body (according to what has been said above, n. 365) ; also that such as life is in first principles, such it is in the whole and in every part (n. 366) ; and that by means of these first principles life is in the whole from every part, and in every part from the whole (n. 367) ; and that all things of the mind have relation to the will and understanding, and that the will and understanding are the receptacles of love and wisdom from the Lord, and that these two make the life of man.”—*D. L. W.*, 387.

8 (p. 53).—“ Influx is effected by correspondences ; it cannot be effected by continuity.”—*D. L. W.*, 88.

“ Respecting the life which proceeds from the Lord, respecting also the existence of all things in the universe derived from it, every man who is wise in heart may see that nature does not produce anything from itself, but that, for the purpose of producing, it merely ministers to the spiritual principle proceeding from the sun of

heaven, which is the Lord ; as the instrumental cause ministers to its principal cause, or a dead force to its living force. From this it is evident how much men are in error, who ascribe to nature the generations of animals and productions of vegetables ; for they are like those who ascribe magnificent and splendid works to the tool rather than to the artist, or who worship a sculptured image in preference to God. The fallacies, which are innumerable in all reasoning on spiritual, moral, and civil subjects, originate in this source ; for a fallacy is the inversion of order ; it is the judgment of the eye, rather than of the mind, the conclusion drawn from the appearance of a thing, rather than from its essence. To reason therefore from fallacies about the world and the existence of the things contained in it is to confirm, as it were, by argument that darkness is light, that that which is dead is alive, and that the body enters by influx into the soul, rather than the contrary. It is, however, an eternal truth that influx is spiritual, and not physical ; that is, it is from the soul, which is spiritual, into the body which is natural, and from the spiritual world into the natural ; and further that it is the Divine Being proceeding from Himself, and as He created all things by that which proceeds from Himself, so also He sustains all things by it ; and lastly, that sustentation is perpetual creation, as subsistence is perpetual existence.”—*Athan. Cr.*, 102.

9 (p. 54).—“ The end is the all of the cause, and through the cause is the all of the effect ; and thus end, cause, and effect are called first, middle, and last end ; further the cause of the cause is also the cause of the thing caused ; and there is nothing essential in causes except the end, and nothing essential in motion except conatus ; also, the substance that is substance in itself is the sole substance.

“ From all this it can clearly be seen that the Divine, which is substance in itself, that is, the one only and sole substance, is the substance from which is each and every thing that has been created ; thus that God is the All in all things of the universe.”—*D. L. W.*, 197, 198.

“ The principal end is the love of man’s will, the intermediate ends are subordinate loves, and the ultimate end is the will’s love existing as it were in its own effigy. Since the principal end is the will’s love, it follows that the intermediate ends, because they are subordinate loves, are foreseen, provided, and produced, through the understanding ; and that the ultimate end is the use foreseen,

provided, and produced by the will's love, through the understanding ; for everything that love produces is use."—*Athan. Cr.*, 77.

10 (p. 54).—“ *The conjunction of man's spirit with his body is by means of the correspondence of his will and understanding with his heart and lungs, and their separation is from non-correspondence.*—As it has heretofore been unknown that man's mind, by which is meant the will and understanding, is his spirit, and that the spirit is a man ; and as it has been unknown that man's spirit, as well as his body, has a pulse and respiration, it could not be known that the pulse and respiration of the spirit in man flow into the pulse and respiration of his body and produce them. Since, then, man's spirit, as well as his body, enjoys a pulse and respiration, it follows that there is a like correspondence of the pulse and respiration of man's spirit with the pulse and respiration of his body,—for, as was said, his mind is his spirit, consequently, when the two pairs of motions cease to correspond, separation takes place, which is death. Separation or death ensues when from any kind of disease or accident the body comes into such a state as to be unable to act in unison with its spirit, for thus correspondence perishes, and with it conjunction ; not, however, when respiration alone ceases, but when the heart's pulsation ceases. For so long as the heart is moved, love with its vital heat remains and preserves life, as is evident in cases of swoon and suffocation, and the condition of fetal life in the womb. In a word, man's bodily life depends on the correspondence of its pulse and respiration with the pulse and respiration of his spirit ; and when that correspondence ceases, the bodily life ceases, and his spirit departs and continues its life in the spiritual world, which is so similar to his life in the natural world that he does not know that he has died.”—*D. L. W.*, 390.

11 (p. 57).—“ The two worlds, the spiritual and the natural, are so distinct as to have nothing in common with each other ; yet so created as to have communication, yea, conjunction, by means of correspondences.

“ The universe in general is divided into two worlds, the spiritual and the natural. In the spiritual world are angels and spirits, in the natural world men. In external appearance these two worlds are entirely alike, so alike that they cannot be distinguished ; but in internal appearance they are entirely unlike. The men themselves in the spiritual world, who are called angels and spirits, are spiritual, and, being spiritual, they think spiritually and speak spiritually.

But the men of the natural world are natural, and therefore think naturally and speak naturally; and spiritual thought and speech have nothing in common with natural thought and speech. From this it is plain that these two worlds, the spiritual and the natural, are entirely distinct from each other, so that they can in no respect be together."—*D. L. W.*, 83, 163.

12 (p. 57).—"Man enjoys this privilege which the angels do not, that he is not only in the spiritual world as to his interiors, but also at the same time in the natural world as to exteriors. His exteriors which are in the natural world, are all things of his natural or external memory, and of thought and imagination therefrom; in general, knowledges and sciences, with their delights and gratifications, so far as they savour of the world, and also many pleasures belonging to the sensuels of the body, together with his senses themselves, his speech, and actions. All these also are the ultimate things into which the divine influx of the Lord closes; for it does not stop in the midst, but proceeds to its ultimates. From these things it may be manifest that in man is the ultimate of divine order, and because it is the ultimate, that it is also the basis and foundation. Because the divine influx of the Lord does not stop in the midst, but proceeds to its ultimates, as was said, and because the medium through which it passes is the angelic heaven, and the ultimate is with man, and because there is nothing given which is unconnected, it follows that such is the connection and conjunction of heaven with the human race, that the one subsists from the other, and that the human race without heaven would be as a chain when the hook is removed, and heaven without the human race would be as a house without a foundation."—*H. H.*, 304.

13 (p. 57).—"That nothing in nature exists or subsists, but from a spiritual origin, and by means of it.

"The reason of this is that nothing can exist except from something else, and this lastly from Him, who is and who exists in Himself, and He is God; therefore also God is called *esse* and *existere*. The reason that nothing in nature exists but from a spiritual origin is, that there cannot be anything in existence unless it has a soul; all that which is essence being called soul; for that which has not in itself an essence, does not exist—it is a nonentity; because there is no *esse* from which it can derive existence. Such is the case with nature; its essence, from which it exists, being the

spiritual origin or principle, because this possesses in itself the divine esse, and also the divine force—active, creative, and formative. This essence may also be called soul, because all that is spiritual lives; and when that which is alive acts upon that which is not so, upon that, for instance, which is natural, it causes it either *to live as if from itself*, or to derive from it something of the *appearance of life*; the former is the case with animals, the latter with vegetables. The reason that nothing in nature exists but from a spiritual origin or principle is, that no effect is produced without a cause. Such is the case with nature; all the several and most minute objects belonging to it are effects produced from a cause, which is prior, interior, and superior to it, and proceeding immediately from God. For since there exists a spiritual world, which is prior, interior, and superior, to the natural world, therefore all that belongs to the spiritual world is cause, and all that belongs to the natural world is effect.”—*Ath. Cr.*, 94.

14 (p. 57).—“That nature serves as a covering for that which is spiritual, is evident from the souls of beasts, which are spiritual affections, being clothed from materials in the world, it being well known that their bodies are material; so also the bodies of men. The reason that the spiritual can be clothed from the material is, that all the objects which exist in nature, whether they belong to atmosphere, to water, or to earth, are, as to every individual of them, effects produced from the spiritual as a cause. The effects again act as one with the cause, and are in complete agreement with it, according to the axiom, that nothing exists in the effect that is not in the cause. But the difference is, that the cause is a living force, because it is spiritual, while the effect derived from it is a dead force, because it is natural. From this it is, that there are in the natural world such objects as are in complete agreement with those which exist in the spiritual world, and that the former can be suitably conjoined with the latter. Hence then it is, that it is said that nature was created that the spiritual may be clothed from it with forms to serve for use. That nature was created that the spiritual may be terminated in it, follows from what has been already said, that the objects in the spiritual world are causes, while those in the natural world are effects, and effects are limits.”—*Ath. Cr.*, 95.

15 (p. 59).—“Effects teach nothing but effects; when effects alone are considered no cause is brought to light; but causes reveal effects.

To know effects from causes is to be wise ; but to search for causes from effects is not to be wise, because fallacies then present themselves, which the investigator calls causes, and this is to turn wisdom into foolishness. Causes are things prior, and effects are things posterior ; and things prior cannot be seen from things posterior, but things posterior can be seen from things prior. This is order.”—*D. L. W.*, 119.

16 (p. 59).—“ Those who are in the one world cannot see those who are in the other world. For the eyes of man, who sees from natural light, are of the substance of his world, and the eyes of an angel are of the substance of his world ; thus in both cases they are formed for the proper reception of their own light. From all this it can be seen how much ignorance there is in the thoughts of those who, because they cannot see angels and spirits with their eyes, are unwilling to believe them to be men.

“ Hitherto it has not been known that angels and spirits are in a totally different light and different heat from men. It has not been known even that another light and another heat are possible. For man in his thought has not penetrated beyond the interior or purer things of nature. And for this reason many have placed the abodes of angels and spirits in the ether, and some in the stars—thus within nature, and not above or out of it. But, in truth, angels and spirits are entirely above or out of nature, and in their own world, which is under another sun. And since in that world spaces are appearances (as was shown above), angels and spirits cannot be said to be in the ether or in the stars ; in fact, they are present with man, conjoined to the affection and thought of his spirit ;—for man, in that he thinks and wills, is a spirit ; consequently the spiritual world is where man is, and in no wise away from him. In a word, every man as regards the interiors of his mind is in that world, in the midst of spirits and angels there ; and he thinks from its light, and loves from its heat.”—*D. L. W.*, 91, 92.

17 (p. 60).—“ As heaven is a man in greatest form, and a society of heaven, in less form, so is an angel, in least form ; for in the most perfect form, such as the form of heaven is, there is a likeness of the whole in a part, and of a part in the whole. The cause that it is so is, that heaven is a communion ; for it communicates all its own to every one, and every one receives all that is his from that communion : an angel is a receptacle, and thence a heaven in the

least form ; as also was shown above in its proper article. Man also, as far as he receives heaven, is likewise so far a receptacle, is a heaven, and is an angel.”—*H. H.*, 73.

18 (p. 60).—“An idea of anything without origin cannot exist with the natural man, thus neither can the idea of God from eternity ; but it exists with the spiritual man. The thought of the natural man cannot be separated and withdrawn from the idea of time, for this idea is inherent in it from nature, in which it is ; so neither can it be separated and withdrawn from the idea of origin, because origin is to it a beginning in time ; the appearance of the sun’s progress has impressed on the natural man this idea. But the thought of the spiritual man, because it is elevated above nature, is withdrawn from the idea of time, and instead of this idea there is the idea of a state of life, and instead of duration of time, there is a state of thought derived from affection which constitutes life.” (See also Note 21.)—*Ath. Cr.*, 32.

19 (p. 60).—“All men, as to the interiors which belong to their minds, are spirits, clothed in the world with a material body, which is, in each case, subject to the control of the spirit’s thought, and to the decision of its affection ; for the mind, which is spirit, acts, and the body, which is matter, is acted upon. Every spirit also, after the rejection of the material body, is a man, in form similar to that which he had when he was a man in the world.”—*Ath. Cr.*, 41.

20 (p. 60).—“What is material sees only what is material, but what is spiritual sees what is spiritual. On this account when the material of the eye is veiled and deprived of its co-operation with the spiritual, spirits appear in their own form, which is human ; not only spirits who are in the spiritual world, but also the spirit which is in another man, while he is yet in his body.”—*H. H.*, 453.

“When the body is no longer able to perform its functions in the natural world, corresponding to the thoughts and affections of its spirit, which it has from the spiritual world, then man is said to die. This takes place when the respiratory motions of the lungs and the systolic motions of the heart cease ; but still man does not die, but is only separated from the corporeal part which was of use to him in the world ; for man himself lives. It is said that man himself lives, because man is not man from the body, but from the spirit, since the spirit thinks in man, and thought with affection makes man.

Hence it is evident, that man, when he dies, only passes from one world into another."

21 (p. 60).—"The worldly and corporeal man does not see God except from space, he thus regards God as the whole inmost principle in the universe, consequently as something extended. But God is not to be seen from space; for there is no space in the spiritual world, space there being only an appearance derived from that which resembles it."—*Ath. Cr.*, 19.

22 (p. 60).—"It can in no case be said that heaven is without, but that it is within man; for every angel receives the heaven which is without him according to the heaven that is within him. This plainly shows how much he is deceived who believes that to go to heaven is merely to be taken up among the angels without regard to the quality of one's interior life: that is, that heaven may be given to every one from immediate mercy: when yet, unless heaven is within a person, nothing of the heaven which is without him flows in and is received."—*H. H.*, 54.

"The angelic societies in the heavens are distant from each other according to the general and specific differences of their goods. For distances in the spiritual world are from no other origin than from a difference in the states of the interior life: consequently in the heavens, from a difference in the states of love."—*H. H.*, 41, 42.

23 (p. 61).—"So long as man lives in the world he knows nothing of the opening of these degrees within him, because he is then in the natural degree, which is the outmost, and from this he thinks, wills, speaks, and acts; and the spiritual degree, which is interior, communicates with the natural degree, not by continuity but by correspondences, and communication by correspondences is not sensibly felt."—*D. L. W.*, 238.

24 (p. 61).—"Man whilst he lives in the world, is in conjunction with heaven, and also in consociation with the angels, although both men and angels are ignorant of it. The cause of their ignorance is, that the thought of man is natural, and the thought of an angel spiritual, and these make one only by correspondences. Since man, by the thoughts of his love, is inaugurated into the societies either of heaven or of hell, therefore, when he comes into the spiritual world, as is the case immediately after death, his quality is known

by the mere extension of his thoughts into the societies, and thus every one is explored ; he is also reformed by admissions of his thoughts into the societies of heaven, and he is condemned by immersions of his thoughts into the societies of hell.”—*Ath. Cr.*, 3.

“To the above it is proper to add that every man, even while he lives in the body, is as to his spirit in society with spirits, although he does not know it ; a good man is through them in an angelic society, and an evil man in an infernal society ; and he comes also into the same society after death. This has been frequently said and shown to those who after death have come among spirits. A man does not indeed appear in that society as a spirit, when he lives in the world, because he then thinks naturally ; but those who think abstractly from the body, because then in the spirit, sometimes appear in their own society ; and when they appear, they are easily distinguished from the spirits who are there, for they go about meditating, are silent, and do not look at others ; they are as if they did not see them, and as soon as any spirit speaks to them, they vanish.”—*H. H.*, 438.

25 (p. 62)—“There is a love of rule springing from a love of performing uses, which is a spiritual love, because it makes one with love towards the neighbour. Still this cannot be called a love of rule, but a love of performing uses.

“There are two loves which are the head of all the rest, that is, to which all other loves are referable ; the love which is the head of all heavenly loves or to which they all relate, is love to the Lord : and the love which is the head of all infernal loves, or to which they all relate, is the love of rule springing from the love of self. These two loves are diametrically opposed to each other.”—*D. L. W.*, 141.

26 (p. 64).—“The affections of man, from which his thoughts proceed, extend into the societies [of the spiritual world] in every direction, into more or fewer of them, according to the extent and the quality of his affection. Within these societies is man as to his spirit, attached to them as it were with extended cords circumscribing the space in which he walks. As he proceeds from one affection to another, so he proceeds from one society to another, and the part of the society in which he is, is the centre from which issue his affection and the thought originating in it to all the other societies as circumferences. These societies are thus in unbroken connection with the affections of the centre, from which he at the time thinks

and speaks. He acquires for himself this sphere—which is the sphere of his affections and their thoughts—whilst he is in the world; if he is evil, in hell; but if he is good, in heaven. He is not aware that such is the case, because he is not aware that such things exist. Through these societies the man, that is, his mind, walks free, although bound, led by the Lord, nor does he take a step into which and from which he is not so led. It is moreover, continually provided that he should have no other knowledge than that he proceeds of himself in perfect liberty.”—*Ath. Cr.*, 68.

27 (p. 64).—“The life which is from the Lord is *attractive*, because it is from love: for all love possesses in itself a force of attraction, because it wills to be conjoined even unto one.”—*Arcana Cœlestia*, 8604.

28 (p. 65).—“When the first state after death is passed through, which is the state of the exteriors, the man-spirit is let into the state of his interiors, or into the state of his interior will and its thought, in which he had been in the world when left to himself to think freely and without restraint. Into this state he glides without being aware of it, in like manner as in the world, when he withdraws the thought which is nearest to the speech, or from which the speech is, towards his interior thought, and abides in that. When, therefore, the man-spirit is in this state, he is in himself and in his own very life; for to think freely from his own affection is the very life of man, and is himself.

“The spirit in this state thinks from his own very will, thus from his own very affection, or from his own very love; and in this case the thought makes one with the will, and one in such a manner that it scarcely appears that the spirit thinks, but that he wills. The case is nearly similar when he speaks, yet with this difference, that he speaks with some degree of fear lest the thoughts of the will should go forth naked, since by civil life in the world this habit also had become of his will.”—*H. H.*, 502, 503.

29 (p. 66).—“All man’s will and love remains with him after death (n. 470—484). He who wills and loves evil in the world, wills and loves evil in the other life, and then he no longer suffers himself to be withdrawn from it. Hence it is that the man who is in evil is tied to hell, and likewise is actually there as to his spirit, and after death desires nothing more than to be where his own evil is; consequently it is man after death who casts himself into hell, and not the

Lord. For no one comes into hell until he is in his own evil and in the falsities of evil, since it is not allowed any one there to have a divided mind, namely, to think and speak one thing and to will another. Every evil spirit must there think what is false derived from evil, and must speak from the falsities of evil; in both cases from the will, thus from his own love and its delight and pleasure; just as in the world when he thought in his spirit, that is, as he thought in himself when he thought from interior affection. The reason is that the will is the man himself, and not the thought, only so far as it partakes of the will, and the will is the very nature itself or disposition of the man; thus to be let into his will is to be let into his nature or disposition, and likewise into his life."—*H. H.*, 547, 510.

30 (p. 66).—"Every one comes to his own society in which his spirit had been in the world; for every man as to his spirit is conjoined to some society, either infernal or heavenly, a wicked man to an infernal society, a good man to a heavenly society (see n. 438). The spirit is brought to that society successively, and at length enters it. An evil spirit when he is in the state of his interiors, is turned by degrees to his own society, and at length directly to it, before this state is ended; and when this state is ended, then the evil spirit casts himself into the hell where his like are."—*H. H.*, 510.

31 (p. 67).—"The Lord never acts contrary to order, because He Himself is Order. The divine truth proceeding from the Lord is what makes order, and divine truths are the laws of order, according to which the Lord leads man. For this reason to save man by immediate mercy is contrary to divine order, and what is contrary to divine order is contrary to the Divine. Divine order is heaven with man, which order man had perverted with himself by a life contrary to the laws of order, which are divine truths. Into that order man is brought back by the Lord out of pure mercy, by means of the laws of order; and so far as he is brought back, so far he receives heaven in himself, and he who receives heaven in himself, comes into heaven. Hence again it is evident that the divine mercy of the Lord is pure mercy, but not immediate mercy."—*H. H.*, 523.

32 (p. 69).—"There is a connection of the natural world with the spiritual world, and this is why there is a correspondence of all things which are in the natural world with all things which are

in the spiritual. According to this law of correspondence the Word was written in which all the words and senses of the words are correspondences, and thus contain a spiritual or internal sense, in which the angels are. For this reason, when man reads the Word and perceives it according to the sense of the letter, or the external sense, the angels perceive it according to the internal or spiritual sense; for all the thought of the angels is spiritual, whereas the thought of man is natural. These thoughts indeed appear diverse, but still they are one, because they correspond. . . . The natural ideas of man thus pass into spiritual ideas with angels, without their knowing anything of the sense of the letter of the Word; as of a new heaven and a new earth, a new city of Jerusalem, its wall, the foundations of the wall, and the measures. Nevertheless the thoughts of angels make one with the thoughts of man, because they correspond. They make one almost like the words of a speaker, and the understanding of them by a hearer who does not attend to the words, but only to the meaning. . . . When, therefore, the angels think thus spiritually, and man thus naturally, they are conjoined almost like soul and body: the internal sense of the Word also is its soul, and the sense of the letter is its body. Such is the Word throughout: hence it is evident that it is a medium of the conjunction of heaven with man, and that its literal sense serves for a basis and foundation.”—*H. H.*, 303, 307.

33 (p. 69).—“In the natural world there are three degrees of ascent, and in the spiritual world there are three degrees of ascent. Man alone is a recipient of the life both of the three degrees of the natural world and of the three degrees of the spiritual world. From this it is that man can be elevated above nature, while the animal cannot. Man can think analytically and rationally of the civil and moral things that are within nature, also of the spiritual and celestial things that are above nature, yea, he can be so elevated into wisdom as even to see God.”—*D. L. W.*, 66.

34 (p. 69).—“An opinion has prevailed with some, that God turns away His face from man, rejects him from Himself, and casts him into hell, and that he is angry with him on account of evil; and with some it is supposed still further, that God punishes man and does evil to him. In this opinion they confirm themselves from the literal sense of the Word, where such things are said, not being aware that the spiritual sense of the Word, which explains the sense

of the letter, is altogether different; and that hence the genuine doctrine of the church, which is from the spiritual sense of the Word, teaches otherwise, namely, that God never turns away His face from man and rejects him from Himself, that He does not cast any one into hell and that He is not angry with any one. Every one also whose mind is in a state of illustration when he reads the Word, perceives this to be the case, from the fact that God is good itself, love itself, and mercy itself; and that good itself cannot do evil to any one, also that love itself and mercy itself cannot reject man from itself, because it is contrary to the very essence of mercy and love, thus contrary to the Divine Itself. Wherefore they who think from an enlightened mind when they read the Word, clearly perceive that God never turns Himself away from man, that He deals with him from good, love, and mercy; that is, that He wills his good, that He loves him, and that He is merciful to him. Hence also they see that the literal sense is spoken in accommodation to the apprehension of man, and according to his first and common ideas.”—*H. H.*, 545.

“When things that are contrary to the Divine are treated of in the Word, they cannot be presented otherwise than according to the appearance . . . for such as man is, so does the Lord appear to him.”—*Arcana Cælestia*, 3425, 3605.

35 (p. 70).—“Now, times which are proper to nature in its world are in the spiritual world pure states, which appear progressive because angels and spirits are finite; from which it may be seen that in God they are not progressive because He is Infinite, and infinite things in Him are one (as has been shown above, n. 17-22). From this it follows that the Divine in all time is apart from time.”—*D. L. W.*, 75.

36 (p. 70).—“Because God is a Man, the whole angelic heaven in the aggregate resembles a single man, and is divided into regions and provinces according to the members, viscera, and organs of man. Thus there are societies of heaven which constitute the province of all things of the brain, of all things of the facial organs, and of all things of the viscera of the body; and these provinces are separated from each other, just as those organs are separated in man; moreover, the angels know in what province of man they are. The whole heaven has this resemblance to man, because God is a Man. God is also heaven, because the angels, who constitute

heaven, are recipients of love and wisdom from the Lord, and recipients are images."—*D. L. W.*, 288. (See also note 32.)

37 (p. 72).—"Visions are often spoken of which indeed are really seen, but in phantasy. The spirits which induce such phantasies work upon persons of weak minds, and who are easily credulous; such persons are visionaries, and the things which they see are illusions conjured up from outward objects, especially in obscure light. Visions caused by enthusiastic spirits are similar to these, but refer to subjects of belief."—*Arcana*, 1967-68.

"Genuine visions are the actual sight of things which exist in the other life, and are seen by the eyes of the spirit, *not of the body.*"—*Arcana*, 1970.

38 (p. 72).—That angels are spirits and cannot see into the world except by some one as a medium whose interior senses are opened to perceive the things of the spiritual world.—See *Arcana*, 1880.

"Spirits of all kinds perceive the very thoughts of man: angelic spirits the interiors of thought; angels the causes and ends which are still more interior."—*Arcana*, 1931.

"The spirits attendant upon man perceive not the objects presented to the man's sight, or the words he hears, but the subjects of his thoughts."—*Arcana*, 6319.

39 (p. 73).—How little Kant was capable of making a true psychological estimate of Swedenborg's experience is abundantly shown in this single allusion which reveals the fact that either Kant was entirely ignorant of Swedenborg's public life, or else that he, like others since his time, shirked the difficult problem of reconciling Swedenborg's political activity as a trusted and highly valued member of the House of Nobles, and as an important contributor to the science of his time, with these charges of "foolishness" and "lack of this world's intelligence." The "*Träume*" was published in 1766. In 1760 Swedenborg had presented in the Diet of Sweden the following papers:

Memorial in favour of returning to pure metallic currency.

Appeal in favour of the Restoration of a Metallic Currency.

Additional Considerations with respect to the Course of Exchange.

Memorial to the King against the exportation of Copper.

Memorial declining to become a Commissioner on Exchange.

See *Documents concerning Swedenborg.*—By R. L. Tafel, I., 509.

It is difficult to conceive that a man deserving to be characterised as "a fool on earth," and as "lacking in this world's intelligence" should have been invited by the Swedish House of Knights and Nobles to sit as a member of a private Commission on Exchange. The fact is also to be borne in mind that, at this date, Swedenborg's *Arcana* had not only been entirely published and circulated, but that his own authorship of the work, printed anonymously, was now publicly revealed. In the same year, 1761, in which he was writing several of his minor treatises, on the *Spiritual World*, and on the *Sacred Scriptures*, on *Faith*, and on the *Last Judgment*, he was engaged in a political controversy with Councillor Nordencranz in defence of Von Hoepken and the Swedish Government, and sent a Memorial to the Diet on *The Maintenance of the Country and the Preservation of its Freedom* (Documents I., 510-538). Swedenborg filled the office for many years of Assessor of the Royal College of Mines, was one of the Founders of the Royal Academy of Sciences at Stockholm, was a member of the Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg, and of the Society of Sciences at Upsala. Christian Wolf and foreign men of learning addressed him by letter, in order to obtain his ideas on subjects which they found it difficult to fathom. [See also Sir Samuel Sandel's Eulogy over Swedenborg in the House of Nobles, in the name of the Royal Academy of Sciences, October 7th, 1772.]

40 (p. 76).—Swedenborg states that the things recorded in his "Memorabilia" are not "visions" properly so called, but scenes beheld in the most perfect state of bodily wakefulness and which "I have now experienced for several years." *Arcana*, 1885. He describes two other kinds of vision which he rarely experienced, one as being "taken out of the body" or reduced to a certain state between sleeping and waking: during his continuance in this state he cannot but know that he is wide awake. This is such as is mentioned in Cor. xiii., 3. The other kind of vision is that which is called "being carried by the spirit into another place," I. Kings xviii. 12; II. Kings ii. 16; Acts viii., 39. The experience is described, *Arcana*, 1883-84. Of dreams Swedenborg says:

"Visions of the night are so called because they are obscure revelations. Revelations are made variously: 1, by Dreams; 2, by Visions of the Night; 3, by Visions of the Day; 4, by Speech which the man hears within him; 5, by Speech heard without by a

visible angel ; 6, by Speech heard without by an angel not visible.
—*Arcana*, 6000.

41 (p. 77).—On the subjective origin of sight, as of all the senses, Swedenborg treats in the following numbers of the *Arcana* :—

“ It is not the body that sees and otherwise sensates, but the spirit in the body ; hence, when the body is put off by death, the spirit is in full enjoyment of its senses.”—4622.

“ The corporeal man as the receptacle of the sensitive consists of sensual faculties subject to the understanding and will. Sight is the principal of these, subject to the intellectual part ; and hearing to the voluntary part ; smell and taste conjoin both.”—5077.

“ The sensual faculty of sight has its life from the intellectual because the latter sees from the light of heaven.”—5114.

“ Divine Truth from the Lord is light, which light illumines the mind of man and gives him internal sight or understanding.”—9399.

“ What the will, or voluntary part of man, determines into form, appears to the sight in the intellectual part, which sight is thought.”—9915.

42 (p. 79).—“ The sight of the eye, strictly speaking, is nothing but the sight of the spirit produced outwards.”—*Arcana*, 1806.

43 (p. 82).—“ The five sensories of the body, by virtue of an influx from within, are sensible of the impressions which enter by influx from without ; the influx from within is from the spiritual world, but the influx from without is from the natural. With these facts the laws inscribed on the nature of all things are in concert, and these laws are : 1. That nothing exists, subsists, is acted upon or moved by itself, but by some other being or agent ; whence it follows that everything exists, subsists, is acted upon and moved by the First Being, who has no origin from another, but is in Himself the living force which is life. 2. That nothing can be acted upon or moved, unless it is intermediate between two forces, of which the one acts and the other re-acts ; thus, unless one acts on one part, and one on the other ; and, further, unless one acts from within, and the other from without. 3. And since these two forces, whilst they are at rest, produce an equilibrium, it follows that nothing can be acted upon or moved, unless it is in equilibrium, and that when it is acted upon, it is out of the equilibrium ; and, further, that everything acted upon or moved seeks to return to an equilibrium. 4. That all activ ties

are changes of state and variations of form, and that the latter are derived from the former. By state in man we mean his love ; and by changes of state the affections of love ; by form in him we mean his intelligence, and by variations of form, his thoughts ; the latter also are from the former.”—*Ath. Cr.*, 45.

44 (p. 87).—The reality of heaven is deduced by Swedenborg not from the hopes of man, but from the laws of divine order.

“The laws of order are called the laws of the Divine Providence, and of these the natural mind can have no knowledge, unless it is enlightened. And because man has no knowledge of them, and thus forms his conclusions concerning the Divine Providence from contingencies in the world, and by these means falls into fallacies and thence into errors, from which he afterwards with difficulty extricates himself, they must therefore be brought to light. But before they are brought to light, it is of importance that it should be known, that the Divine Providence operates in all the several things which belong to man, even in the most minute of them all, for his eternal salvation ; his salvation having been the end of the creation both of heaven and earth. For the end was, that out of the human race might be formed heaven, in which God might dwell, as in his own special abode, and therefore the salvation of man is the all in all of the Divine Providence. But the Divine Providence proceeds so secretly, that man scarcely sees a vestige of it, and yet it is active in the most minute particulars relating to him, from infancy to old age in the world, and afterwards to eternity ; and in every one of them it is eternity which it regards. *Because the divine wisdom in itself is nothing but an end, providence therefore acts from an end, in an end, and with reference to an end ; the end being that man may become wisdom and love, and thus the dwelling-place and the image of the divine life.*”—*Ath. Cr.*, 36.

45 (p. 88).—“*There is a correspondence of the will and understanding with the heart and lungs, consequently a correspondence of all things of the mind with all things of the body.*—This is new : it has hitherto been unknown because it has not been known what the spiritual is, and how it differs from the natural ; therefore it has not been known what correspondence is ; for there is a correspondence between things spiritual and things natural, and by means of correspondence they are conjoined. It is said that heretofore there has been no knowledge of what the spiritual is, or of what its correspondence

with the natural is, and therefore what correspondence is ; yet these might have been known. Who does not know that affection and thought are spiritual, therefore that all things of affection and thought are spiritual? Who does not know that action and speech are natural, therefore that all things of action and speech are natural? Who does not know that affection and thought, which are spiritual, cause man to act and to speak? From this who may not see what correspondence is between things spiritual and things natural? Does not thought make the tongue speak, and affection together with thought make the body act? There are two distinct things : I can think without speaking, and I can will without acting ; and the body, it is known, neither thinks nor wills, but thought falls into speech, and will descends into action.”—*D. L. W.*, 374.

46 (p. 88).—“ *The practical ability of the reason dependent on the will.*—Every man is born into a capacity to understand truths to the inmost degree in which the angels of the third heaven are ; for the human understanding, rising up by continuity around the two higher degrees, receives the light of their wisdom. Therefore man has the ability to become rational according to his elevation ; if raised to the third degree he becomes rational from that degree, if raised to the second degree he becomes rational from that degree, if not raised he is rational in the first degree. It is said that he becomes rational from those degrees, because the natural degree is the general receptacle of their light. The reason why man does not become rational to the height that he might is, that love, which is of the will, cannot be raised in the same manner as wisdom, which is of the understanding. Love, which is of the will, is raised only by shunning evils and sins, and then by goods of charity, which are uses, which the man thereafter performs from the Lord. Consequently, when love, which is of the will, is not at the same time raised, wisdom, which is of the understanding, however it may have ascended, falls back again down to its own love. Therefore if man’s love is not at the same time with his wisdom raised into the spiritual degree, he is rational only in the lowest degree.”—*D. L. W.*, 258.

47 (p. 90).—How far from being “ done with ” this subject of a Spiritual World Kant really was, appears from his choosing the subject of the *Two Worlds* as that of his Inaugural Dissertation in 1770, as well as from the *Lectures on Metaphysics*, where he dwells

at length on the arguments for the existence of a spiritual world and on the nature of the life after death. See the Introductory Essay for the present work, p. 28.

48 (p. 93).—“A law of the Divine Providence is: *That man should not be reformed by external means, but by internal; by external means are meant miracles and visions, fears and punishments; by internal, the truths and goods derived from the Word and the teaching of the church, and looking to the Lord. For these means enter by an internal way, and cast out the evils and falsities which reside within; but external means enter by an external way, and do not cast out the evils and falsities, but shut them in.*—If man could have been reformed by miracles and visions, then all men throughout the whole world would be so. It is, therefore, a holy law of the Divine Providence that internal freedom should not in the least degree be violated; for by it the Lord enters with regard to man, even into the hell where he is, and by it He leads him there; and if man is willing to follow, He brings him out, and introduces him into heaven, there bringing him nearer and nearer to himself.”—*Ath. Cr.*, 53.

49 (p. 95).—A full account of all these clairvoyant experiences narrated of Swedenborg will be found in Tafel's Documents concerning Swedenborg, II., 613—692, under the heading, “Three remarkable facts.”

50 (p. 101).—Kant, for reasons of his own, indulges in the pleasantry of characterising as “full of nonsense” and “void of the last drop of reason” the great work which he forthwith proceeds to subject to a careful analysis, resulting in conclusions so similar to those of speculative reason that he is compelled to admit the resemblance, even at the risk of the one falling or standing with the other. This affected ridicule was necessary to the carrying out of the purpose of the book itself, which was the discrediting of metaphysics as a source of knowledge. It is possible that he foresaw, in the course of his ingenious and daring essay, that the rationality of a spiritual world, such as Swedenborg described from experience, *ex visis et auditis*, might, after all, be turned by the reader to a corroboration of metaphysical doctrine rather than an argument against it, and that, therefore, unless he should undo his work and abandon his plan altogether there remained for him only one course, and that was to call Swedenborg's system “nonsense,” while he treated it with the seriousness of the deepest rational and practical reflection.

How Kant's critique of Swedenborg was regarded by his contemporaries may appear from the following letter of the Dutch banker-poet, John Christian Cuno (1708-1780, the *David Paulus ab Indagine*, author of a widely published Letter to Swedenborg), addressed to a friend in Hamburg, in 1771. In this letter Cuno says of Swedenborg :—

“I am quite willing to confess that I do not know what to make of him. He remains to me a riddle which I cannot solve. In 1766 a little work was published in Koenigsberg, by John James Kanter, bearing the title : ‘Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, explained by Dreams of Metaphysics.’ The author is anonymous. In volume IV. of the ‘Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek,’ which is published in Berlin, (p. 281), he is called I. Kant.* But this is a satire which is directed more against the learned in general, than against the spirit-seers in particular.

* The editor of the “Sammlung einiger Nachrichten,” &c., adds here : “This is quite right. His name is Immanuel Kant, and last year, viz., 1770, he became professor of logic and metaphysics in Koenigsberg.” In the third volume of the *Griefswalde Neue Kritische Nachrichten* (p. 257) we read as follows :

“The author of this work, who is said to be a Mr. Kant, M.A., of Koenigsberg, had his attention directed to the writings of Swedenborg and his phenomena, and he was induced to institute investigations, the results of which he now communicates to the world. His work consists of two parts, a dogmatic and an historical. In the latter he relates the principal phenomena of Mr. Swedenborg, most of which are known to our readers, and which perhaps might be augmented by them with additional ones; and afterwards he gives extracts of the peculiar sentiments of the author. In reality, however, he considers simply “the things heard and seen,” without taking into consideration the *Arcana Cælestia*, a work filling eight quarto volumes, and in which is contained an entire hermeneutical and theological system. We leave to Mr. Kant to answer for his judgment, which sometimes is very severe and bitter.”—*Tafel's Documents II.*, 485.

51 (p. 104).—“The man of the church at this day knows scarcely anything about heaven and hell, nor about his life after death, although they are all described in the Word; yea, also many who

were born within the church deny those things, saying in their heart, who has come thence and told us? Lest therefore such denial, which reigns especially with those who have much of the wisdom of the world, should also infect and corrupt the simple in heart and the simple in faith, it has been given me to be together with angels, and to speak with them as man with man, and also to see the things which are in the heavens and in the hells, and this during thirteen years; and now to describe them from things seen and heard, hoping that thus ignorance may be enlightened and incredulity dissipated. That at this day such immediate revelation exists, is because this is that which is meant by the coming of the Lord."—*Introduction to H. H.*

52 (p. 104).—“Man has an external and an internal memory, an external memory which is of his natural man, and an internal which is of his spiritual man; and every thing which man has thought, willed, spoken, done, also which he has heard and seen, is inscribed on his internal or spiritual memory; and the things which are there are never erased, since they are inscribed at the same time on the spirit itself, and on the members of its body, as was said above; and thus the spirit is formed according to the thoughts and acts of its will. I know that these things appear as paradoxes, and consequently are scarcely believed, but still they are true. Let not man therefore believe that any thing which one has thought in himself, and has done in secret, is concealed after death; but let him believe that each and all things then appear as in clear day.

“Although the external or natural memory is in man after death, still the merely natural things which are therein are not reproduced in the other life, but the spiritual things which are adjoined to the natural things by correspondences; which things, nevertheless, when they are presented to the sight, appear in a form altogether like that in the natural world; for all things which appear in the heavens, appear in like manner as in the world, though in their essence they are not natural, but spiritual, as may be seen shown in the chapter on representatives and appearances in heaven (n. 170-175). But the external or natural memory, as to those things in it that are derived from what is material, and from time and space, and from all other things proper to nature, does not serve the spirit for that use in which it had served it in the world; for man in the world, when he thought from the external sensual, and not at the same time from the internal sensual, or the

intellectual, thought naturally and not spiritually. Yet in the other life, when the spirit is in the spiritual world, he does not think naturally, but spiritually, and to think spiritually is to think intellectually or rationally. Hence it is that the external or natural memory, as to those things which are material, is then quiescent, and those things only come into use which man has imbibed in the world by means of material things, and has made rational."—*H. H.*, 463, 464.

53 (p. 105).—"The speech of an angel or a spirit with man is heard as sonorously as the speech of a man with a man ; yet it is not heard by others who stand near, but by himself alone ; the reason is, because the speech of an angel or spirit flows first into the man's thought, and by an internal way into his organ of hearing, and thus moves that from within ; but the speech of man with man flows first into the air, and by an external way into his organ of hearing, and moves it from without. Hence it is evident that the speech of an angel and of a spirit with man is heard in man, and, because it equally moves the organs of hearing, that it is also equally sonorous."—*H. H.*, 248.

54 (p. 105).—See Note 38.

Compare Goethe's *Faust*, Act V., "Pater Seraphicus," to the "Seligen Knaben :

" Steigt herab in meine Augen
Welt—und erdgemäss Organ !
Könnt sie als die euren brauchen :
Schaut euch diese Gegend an !"

55 (p. 106).—"Man has no other knowledge than that he thinks and wills from himself, though he does not do so in the smallest degree ; for thought and will cannot be so united to the recipient as to be his own, precisely as the light and heat of the sun cannot be united to a subject of the earth, and become, like it, material. But the light and heat of life affect and fill the recipient, precisely according to the quality of the acknowledgment that they are not his own, but the Lord's ; and the quality of the acknowledgment is precisely according to the quality of the love in acting according to the Commandments, which are uses."—*Ath. Cr.*, 39.

56 (p. 106).—"Although all things in heaven appear in place and in space just as in the world, still the angels have no notion and idea of place and space. All progressions in the spiritual world are made

by changes of the state of the interiors, so that progressions are nothing else than changes of state. From these things it may be seen that, although in heaven there are spaces as in the world, still nothing there is estimated according to spaces, but according to states; consequently that spaces cannot there be measured as in the world, but only be seen from the state, and according to the state of the interiors of the angels."—*H. H.*, 191, 192, 198.

57 (p. 107).—"That there are many earths, and men upon them, and spirits and angels from them, is very well known in the other life; for it is granted to every one there who from the love of truth and thence of use desires it, to speak with spirits of other earths, and to be confirmed thereby in regard to a plurality of worlds, and to be informed that the human race is not only from one earth, but from innumerable ones."—*H. H.*, 417.

58 (p. 108).—"It is well known that the will and understanding rule the body at pleasure, for what the understanding thinks, the mouth speaks; and what the will wills, the body does. From this it is plain that the body is a form corresponding to the understanding and will. And because form also is predicated of understanding and will, it is plain that the form of the body corresponds to the form of the understanding and will. But this is not the place to describe the nature of these respective forms. In each form there are things innumerable; and these, on either side, act as one, because they mutually correspond. It is from this that the mind (that is, the will and understanding) rules the body at its beck, thus as entirely as it rules its own self. From all this it follows that the interiors of the mind act as one with the interiors of the body, and the exteriors of the mind with the exteriors of the body."—*D. L. W.*, 136.

59 (p. 108).—"All things which exist in nature, from the least to the greatest, are correspondences. That they are correspondences is because the natural world, with all things in it, exists and subsists from the spiritual world, and both from the Divine. It is said that it also subsists, because everything subsists from that from which it exists, for subsistence is perpetual existence; and because not anything can subsist from itself, but from something prior to itself, thus from the First; from whom therefore if it be separated, it utterly perishes and vanishes.

"All that is correspondent which in nature exists and subsists from divine order. The divine good, which proceeds from the

Lord, makes divine order ; it begins from Him, proceeds from Him through the heavens successively into the world, and is terminated there in ultimates. The things which are according to order there are correspondences ; and all things are according to order there which are good and perfect for use, for every good is good according to use ; form has relation to truth, because truth is the form of good. Thence it is that all things which are in the whole world, and in the nature of the world, relate to good and truth.”—*H. H.*, 106, 107.

60 (p. 114).—“In each single word of the Word there is a spiritual meaning from the Divine wisdom, and a celestial from the Divine love ; and these are perceived by angels when the Word is devoutly read by man.”—*D. L. W.*, 280.

“I have sometimes spoken with angels about the Word, and said that it is despised by some on account of its simple style, and that nothing at all is known about its internal sense, and that for this reason it is not believed that so much wisdom lies concealed in it. The angels said that the style of the Word, though it appears simple in the sense of the letter, is still such that nothing can be at all compared to it in excellence, because divine wisdom lies concealed, not only in the entire sense, but also in each word ; and that this wisdom shines forth in heaven ; they wished to have it said that it is the light of heaven, because it is divine truth, for divine truth in heaven shines (see above, n. 132). They said also that without such a Word there would be no light of heaven with the men of our earth, thus neither would there be conjunction of heaven with them ; for as far as the light of heaven is present with man, so far there is conjunction, and so far likewise divine truth is revealed to him by the Word. The reason why man does not know that this conjunction is by the spiritual sense of the Word corresponding to its natural sense, is because the man of this earth does not know anything about the spiritual thought and speech of the angels, and that it is different from the natural thought and speech of men ; and unless he knows this, he cannot at all know what the internal sense is, and that by it such conjunction can be given. They said also that if man knew that there is such a sense, and should think from a knowledge of it when he reads the Word, he would come into interior wisdom, and would be still more conjoined with heaven, since by it he would enter into ideas similar to those of the angels.”—*H. H.*, 310.

61 (p. 110).—“That heaven in the whole complex resembles one man, is an arcanum not yet known in the world ; but in the heavens it is very well known. To know that, and the specific and particular things concerning it, is the chief of the intelligence of the angels there : on that also depend many more things, which, without that as their common principle, would not enter distinctly and clearly into the ideas of their mind. Because they know that all the heavens, together with their societies, resemble one man, therefore also they call heaven THE GREATEST and THE DIVINE MAN ; Divine from this, that the Divine of the Lord makes heaven.”—*H. H.*, 59. (Compare St. John xvii. 21 ; Romans xii. 4.)

See also the full explanation of the proposition : “THE WHOLE HEAVEN IS THE GRAND MAN (Maximus Homo), AND IS CALLED THE GRAND MAN BECAUSE IT CORRESPONDS TO THE LORD’S DIVINE HUMAN : FOR THE LORD IS THE ONLY MAN.”—*Arcana Cœl.*, 4219, 4224.

THE LIFE THAT LEADS TO HEAVEN.

62 (p. 121).—“Some people believe that to live the life which leads to heaven, which is called spiritual life, is difficult, because they have been told that man must renounce the world and deprive himself of the lusts which are called lusts of the body and the flesh, and that he must live spiritually. And these things they do not understand otherwise than that they must reject worldly things, which consist chiefly in riches and honours ; that they must walk continually in pious meditation about God, about salvation, and about eternal life ; and that they must spend their life in prayers and in reading the Word and pious books. This they esteem to be renouncing the world, and living in the spirit and not in the flesh. But that the case is altogether otherwise it has been given me to know by much experience, and from conversation with the angels ; and indeed that they who renounce the world and live in the spirit in this manner, procure to themselves a sorrowful life, which is not receptive of heavenly joy ; for with every one his own life remains. But to the intent that man may receive the life of heaven, it is quite necessary that he live in the world and engage in its business and employments, and that he then by moral and civil life receive spiritual life ; and that spiritual life cannot otherwise be formed with man, or his spirit prepared for heaven. For to live internal life and not external

at the same time, is like dwelling in a house which has no foundation, which gradually either sinks, or becomes full of chinks and breaches, or totters till it falls."—*H. H.*, 528.

THE MOTIVES OF SPIRITUAL LIVING.

“ If the life of man be viewed and explored by rational intuition, it is discovered to be threefold, namely, spiritual life, moral life, and civil life, and those lives are distinct from each other. The spiritual man believes in the Divine, and he acts sincerely and justly, not merely because it is according to civil and moral laws, but also because it is according to divine laws. For the spiritual man, inasmuch as he thinks about divine things when he acts, communicates with the angels of heaven, and as far as he does this, he is conjoined with them, and thus his internal man is opened, which viewed in itself is a spiritual man. When man is of such a character, he is then adopted and led by the Lord while he himself is not aware of it, and then in doing acts of sincerity and justice which are of moral and civil life, he does them from a spiritual origin; and to do what is sincere and just from a spiritual origin, is to do it from sincerity and justice itself, or to do it from the heart. His justice and sincerity in the external form appear altogether like the justice and sincerity with natural men, even with evil and infernal men; but in the internal form they are altogether dissimilar. For evil men act justly and sincerely merely for the sake of themselves and the world; and therefore if they did not fear the law and its penalties, also the loss of reputation, of honour, of gain, and of life, they would act altogether insincerely and unjustly, inasmuch as they neither fear God nor any divine law, and are not restrained by any internal bond. They would therefore in such case to the utmost of their power defraud, plunder, and spoil others, and this from delight. . . . Although such a person does not commit adultery, still because he believes it allowable, he is perpetually an adulterer; for as far as he can, and as often as it is permitted, he commits it. Although he does not steal, yet inasmuch as he covets the goods of others, and regards fraud and evil arts as not contrary to law, in intent he is continually acting the thief. The case is similar as to the precepts of moral life, which teach not to bear false witness and not to covet the goods of others. Such is the character of every man who denies

the Divine, and who has not a conscience grounded in religion. That such is his proper character appears manifestly from similar spirits in the other life, when, on the removal of things external, they are let into their internals; then, inasmuch as they are separated from heaven, they act in unity with hell, and so are consociated with those who are in hell. It is otherwise with those who have in heart acknowledged the Divine, and in the acts of their lives have had respect to divine laws, and have acted according to the three first precepts of the decalogue equally as according to the rest. When these, on the removal of things external, are let into their internals, they are wiser than when in the world; for when they come into their internals it is like coming from shade into light, from ignorance into wisdom, and from a sorrowful life into a blessed one, inasmuch as they are in the Divine, thus in heaven. These things are said to the intent that the quality of the one and of the other may be known, though both have lived a similar external life."—*H. H.*, 528, 531.

APPENDIX II.



IMMANUEL KANT'S LETTER ON SWEDENBORG TO CHARLOTTE VON KNOBLOCH.*

“I would not have deprived myself so long of the honour and pleasure of obeying the request of a lady who is the ornament of her sex, in communicating the desired information, if I had not deemed it necessary previously to inform myself thoroughly concerning the subject of your request. . . . Permit me, gracious lady, to justify my proceedings in this matter, inasmuch as it might appear that an erroneous opinion had induced me to credit the various relations concerning it without careful examination. I am not aware that anybody has ever perceived in me an inclination to the marvellous, or a weakness tending to credulity. So much is certain that, notwithstanding all the narrations of apparitions and visions concerning the spiritual world, of which a great number of the most probable are known to me, I have always considered it to be most in agreement with sound reason to incline to the negative side ; not as if I had imagined such a case to be impossible, although we know but very little concerning the nature of a spirit, but because the instances are not in general sufficiently proved. There arise, moreover, from the incomprehensibility and inutility of this sort of phenomena, too many difficulties ; and there are, on the other hand, so many proofs of deception, that I have never considered it necessary to suffer fear or dread to come upon me, either in the cemeteries of the dead or in the darkness of the night. This is the position in which my mind stood for a long time, until the report concerning Swedenborg came to my notice.

* The German original of this letter is contained in Borowsky's "Darstellung des Lebens und Charakters Immanuels Kant." Königsberg, 1804, pp. 211 to 225.

“This account I received from a Danish officer, who was formerly my friend, and attended my lectures; and who, at the table of the Austrian Ambassador, Dietrichstein, at Copenhagen, together with several other guests, read a letter which the Ambassador about that time had received from Baron de Lutzow, the Mecklenburg Ambassador in Stockholm, in which he says that he, in company with the Dutch Ambassador, was present at the Queen of Sweden’s residence at the extraordinary transaction respecting Swedenborg, which your ladyship will undoubtedly have heard. The authenticity thus given to the account surprised me. For it can scarcely be believed, that one Ambassador should communicate to another for public use a piece of information which related to the Queen of the Court where he resided, and which he himself, together with a distinguished company, had the opportunity of witnessing if it were not true. Now, in order not to reject blindfold the prejudice against apparitions and visions by a new prejudice, I found it desirable to inform myself as to the particulars of this surprising transaction. I accordingly wrote to the officer I have mentioned, at Copenhagen, and made various inquiries respecting it. He answered that he had again had an interview concerning it with Count Dietrichstein; that the affair had really taken place in the manner described; and that Professor Schlegel, also, had declared to him that it could by no means be doubted. He advised me, as he was then going to the army under General St. Germain, to write to Swedenborg himself, in order to ascertain the particular circumstances of this extraordinary case. I then wrote to this singular man, and the letter was delivered to him, in Stockholm, by an English merchant. Information was sent here, that Swedenborg politely received the letter, and promised to answer it, but the answer was omitted. In the meantime I made the acquaintance of a highly-educated English gentleman who spent the last summer at this place, and whom, relying on the friendship we had formed, I commissioned, as he was going to Stockholm, to make particular inquiries regarding the miraculous gifts which Swedenborg is said to possess. In his first letter, he states that the most respectable people in Stockholm declare that the singular transaction alluded to happened in the manner you have heard described by me. He had not then had an interview with Swedenborg, but hoped soon to embrace the opportunity; although he found it difficult to persuade himself that

all could be true, which the most reasonable persons of the city asserted, respecting his secret communication with the spiritual world. But his succeeding letters were quite of a different purport. He had not only spoken with Swedenborg himself, but had also visited him at his house ; and he is now in the greatest astonishment respecting such a remarkable case. Swedenborg is a reasonable, polite, and open-hearted man ; he is also a man of learning ; and my friend has promised to send me some of his writings in a short time. He told this gentleman, without reserve, that God had accorded to him this remarkable gift of communicating with departed souls at his pleasure. In proof of this he appealed to certain well-known facts. As he was reminded of my letter, he said that he was aware that he had received it, and that he would already have answered it had he not intended to make the whole of this singular affair public before the eyes of the world. He would proceed to London in the month of May this year, where he would publish a book in which an answer to my letter in every point might be met with.

“ In order, gracious lady, to give you two proofs, of which the present existing public is a witness, and the person who related them to me had the opportunity of investigating them at the very place where they occurred, I will narrate to you the two following occurrences.

“ Madame Herteville (Marteville), the widow of the Dutch Ambassador in Stockholm, some time after the death of her husband, was called upon by Croon, a goldsmith, to pay for a silver service which her husband had purchased from him. The widow was convinced that her late husband had been much too precise and orderly not to have paid this debt, yet she was unable to find this receipt. In her sorrow, and because the amount was considerable, she requested Mr. Swedenborg to call at her house. After apologizing to him for troubling him, she said that if, as all people say, he possessed the extraordinary gift of conversing with the souls of the departed, he would perhaps have the kindness to ask her husband how it was about the silver service. Swedenborg did not at all object to comply with her request. Three days afterward the said lady had company at her house for coffee. Swedenborg called and in his cool way informed her that he had conversed with her husband. The debt

had been paid several months before his decease, and the receipt was in a bureau in the room upstairs. The lady replied that the bureau had been quite cleared out, and that the receipt was not found among all the papers. Swedenborg said that her husband had described to him, how after pulling out the lefthand drawer a board would appear, which required to be drawn out, when a secret compartment would be disclosed, containing his private Dutch correspondence, as well as the receipt. Upon hearing this description the whole company arose and accompanied the lady into the room upstairs. The bureau was opened; they did as they were directed; the compartment was found, of which no one had ever known before; and to the great astonishment of all, the papers were discovered there, in accordance with his description.

“The following occurrence appears to me to have the greatest weight of proof, and to place the assertion respecting Swedenborg’s extraordinary gift beyond all possibility of doubt.

“In the year 1759, towards the end of September, on Saturday at four o’clock p.m., Swedenborg arrived at Gottenburg from England, when Mr. William Castel invited him to his house, together with a party of fifteen persons. About six o’clock Swedenborg went out, and returned to the company quite pale and alarmed. He said that a dangerous fire had just broken out in Stockholm, at the Södermalm (Gottenburg is about fifty German miles from Stockholm), and that it was spreading very fast. He was restless, and went out often. He said that the house of one of his friends, whom he named, was already in ashes, and that his own was in danger. At eight o’clock, after he had been out again, he joyfully exclaimed, ‘Thank God! the fire is extinguished; the third door from my house.’ This news occasioned great commotion throughout the whole city, but particularly amongst the company in which he was. It was announced to the Governor the same evening. On Sunday morning Swedenborg was summoned to the Governor who questioned him concerning the disaster. Swedenborg described the fire precisely, how it had begun and in what manner it had ceased, and how long it had continued. On the same day the news spread through the city, and as the Governor thought it worthy of attention, the consternation was considerably increased; because many were in trouble on account of their friends and property, which might have been involved in the disaster. On Monday evening a messenger

arrived at Gottenburg, who was despatched by the Board of Trade during the time of the fire. In the letters brought by him, the fire was described precisely in the manner stated by Swedenborg. On Tuesday morning the Royal Courier arrived at the Governor's with the melancholy intelligence of the fire, of the loss which it had occasioned, and of the houses it had damaged and ruined, not in the least differing from that which Swedenborg had given at the very time when it happened; for the fire was extinguished at eight o'clock.

“What can be brought forward against the authenticity of this occurrence (the conflagration in Stockholm)? My friend who wrote this to me has examined all, not only in Stockholm, but also, about two months ago, in Gottenburg, where he is well acquainted with the most respectable houses, and where he could obtain the most authentic and complete information, for as only a very short time has elapsed since 1759, most of the inhabitants are still alive who were eye-witnesses of this occurrence. He has also given me an account of the manner in which, according to Mr. Swedenborg, his intercourse with other spirits takes place, and also the ideas which he communicates regarding the condition of departed spirits. This portrait is remarkable, but time fails me to describe it. How I wish that I might have questioned this remarkable man myself, for my friend is not so proficient in method as to ask just those questions which would throw the most light on the subject. I await with longing the book that Swedenborg is about to publish in London. I have made every provision for receiving it as soon as it shall leave the press.

“This is as much as I can do up to the present in satisfying your worthy desire. I do not know, gracious lady, whether you care to know what judgment I would pronounce on so slippery a matter. Much greater talents than the small one allowed to me have been able to arrive at little that is reliable. Still, whatever may be the worth of my opinion I shall feel myself bound to communicate it to you in writing, if you remain in the country, and I cannot confer with you in person. I regret to have abused the privilege of writing to you in detaining you too long with this hasty and awkward epistle, and am with deepest respect, &c.,

“Königsberg, 10th August,

IMMANUEL KANT.”

1758? 1761? 1763? 1768? [See Appendix III.]

APPENDIX III.

THE RELATIVE PRIORITY OF THE "LETTER" AND THE "DREAMS."

Regarding the disputed date of this letter the reader is referred to a lengthy discussion in the Reclam edition of the *Träume*, ed. Kehrbach, Leipzig, 1880: pp. 25-33, and to the documents concerning Swedenborg, Tafel: Vol. II., pp. 620-625. The former editor favours 1763, the latter 1758, as the true date. Inasmuch as several events mentioned in the letter occurred, as all now agree, subsequent to 1758, that date may be regarded as now set aside by universal consent. The circumstance that Kant speaks in the letter of being entirely unacquainted with Swedenborg's writings, whereas in the "Dreams" he professes to have read the *Arcana* through, would seem to favour a date for the letter considerably prior to that of the "Dreams," 1766. On the other hand, the mention in the letter of Swedenborg's intended journey to London the "next year" to publish a volume which would answer Kant's inquiries, a journey actually made in 1769, when the work on the "Two Worlds," *De Commercio*, was brought out discussing the theories of Aristotle, Descartes and Leibnitz, this also being Swedenborg's only journey to London since 1761, would seem to be strong evidence in favour of 1768. Against this conclusion, however, may be brought the fatal circumstance that Fraülein von Knobloch was married in the year 1763 or 1764 to a General von Klingshorn, and hence could hardly have been addressed in 1768 under her maiden name. (See Reclam ed. p. 32.)

As to the significance of the date as bearing upon the question of Kant's final estimate of Swedenborg's philosophy of the two worlds I think it has been much over-rated, for the two following reasons: I. That the humorous and flippant style of the "Dreams" forbid our attaching very serious weight to anything whether of fact or

opinion alleged therein ; II. The true and sufficient evidence of Swedenborg's influence on Kant is unmistakably shown in his Inaugural Dissertation on the Two Worlds written in 1770, the year following the publication of Swedenborg's *De Commercio*, and in subsequent lectures on Metaphysics and Psychology which have recently been edited by Du Prel and Heinze. See Introduction p. 35.

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APPENDIX IV.

KANT'S PRIVATE AND PUBLIC OPINION OF SWEDENBORG.

“The opinion expressed by Swedenborg’s editor, Dr. J. F. Immanuel Tafel, of the University of Tübingen, in the *Sammlung von Urkunden*, iv., 255, that it was Kant’s fear of ridicule among his philosophical colleagues that led him to affect so trifling an attitude toward an author who had in reality deeply and lastingly impressed him, seems to be borne out by the passages quoted by Tafel from Kant’s letter to Moses Mendelssohn.*

KANT ON SWEDENBORG IN LETTERS TO MOSES MENDELSSOHN.


From the letter of February 7th, 1766.

“I have sent you by post some ‘*Träumereien*,’ and beg most respectfully that after retaining a copy yourself, if you so please, you will send the others to the Court-Precacher Sack, to the Councillor of the Consistory Spaulding, to Provost Süssmilch, to Professors Lambert, Sultzer, and Formey. It is a hastily prepared treatise, and presents rather an outline of the manner in which questions of this kind may be treated than the treatment itself.”

From the letter of April 8th, 1766.

“As a matter of fact it would be difficult for me to conceive of a method of so clothing my thoughts that I shall not subject myself to ridicule. It seemed to me the wisest course to take advantage of others and first do the ridiculing myself; and in this I have been perfectly frank since the attitude of my own mind is inconsistent and, so far as these stories are concerned, I cannot help having a slight inclination for things of this kind, and indeed, as regards their reasonableness, I cannot help cherishing an opinion that there is some validity in these experiences in spite of all the absurdities involved in the stories about them, and the crazy and unintelligible ideas which deprive them of their real value.”

* *Kants Werke* : ed. Rosenkranz u. Schubert : XI. 1, 1842.



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