

# THE JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM

---

---

## SOME ASSOCIATIVE ASPECTS OF COLOR

HILAIRE HILER

This discussion must begin with an apology and a statement regarding the point of view expressed. The apology is connected with the fact that except in the field of psycho-analysis the writer has received no training in psychology; the point of view is that of a practicing painter and worker in pigment-color with only the scantiest of scientific pretensions. There will be little presumption therefore to being informative, but perhaps some effort to be suggestive.

Experience leads to the belief that some precision in the handling of color should be of interest to psychologists, particularly in relation to possible associative factors. The premise advanced is that comparatively slight differences in the hue content of a color have an immediate and definite effect on the associative factors. Thus there is introduced the necessity for questions of order, structure, systematization, standardization and terminology. An attempt will be made to treat these questions in a manner which may compensate for its elementary character by its practical simplicity and the ease with which the theory may be applied in practice.

The problem will be attacked arbitrarily from the standpoint of opaque surface colors as they are obtained with current commercial pigments. The standpoint is that of psychology rather than that of physics, which is utilized in such a case only as a means of registration and measurement of the colors and thus in a purely technical or secondary manner.

Our interests are connected with color as a sensation; its psychological and optical impact. We need not be concerned with its status or qualities when light or spectators are absent, and even its wave-length is of interest only as a means of registration. Intensity, purity, vividness, brilliance, brightness, "psychological temperature," depth, richness, lightness, darkness or dullness, their possible effect in relation to the area displayed and the surroundings as they may act as a stimulus to human beings, are relevant to the field. Purple is absent from the spectrum, but it is potentially one of the strongest colors, psychologically considered. Black, ignored by the physicist, is in similar case, even if only negatively regarded.

It may be assumed that color is presented experimentally under suitable conditions, with a simple or complex form factor, and in appropriate scale-areas as to size of the specimens. The combinations of pairs or other arrangements of colors displayed simultaneously will not be discussed here. It seems obvious that proper control and the establishment of accurate data in relation to such

experimental procedure must be dependent to a large extent on the standardization and registration of the color elements utilized. Their systematization in a reasonably precise manner is therefore desirable. From our premise, it follows that this should be accomplished from a psychological standpoint. It will be shown that colors may from this standpoint be divided into classes or groups, according to the impression they make on the spectator through their simple characteristics of brightness, lightness, dullness, darkness, etc. Another consideration which must be borne in mind, again from the standpoint of psychology, is that everything in color is relative and that we must keep at all times a relativistic attitude.\*

It might be well to mention in passing some contributory factors which might function between the objects which make up our system, the subject spectator and the psychologist or observer. These factors may influence associations with the colors displayed.

1. Temperature in the place of experiment.
2. Lighting factors.
3. Sex of subject.
4. Age of subject.
5. Threshold of subject (Color-weak or color-blind) (blue-weak or red-weak)<sup>24, 42</sup>
6. General background.
7. Physiological "type" (See Sheldon, endocrine set up, "haptic" or visual types, etc.)<sup>54</sup>

Another factor stressed in all serious discussions of the associative psychology of color is that of ambivalence. There seems to be little doubt that colors may have widely divergent or opposing symbolic or associational "meanings."<sup>9</sup> There is a persistent impression, however, that students of this field were better psychologists than color experts, for they based their findings on such rather loose and general concepts as those implied by the terms "yellow," "red," etc., and only in rare cases made any attempt to define the term more exactly and in a referential fashion. The result is that differing associations with colors which were probably different in reality were often explained by their assumed ambivalent quality, when it may have been a question of greatly different reaction and association in the case of slightly differing colors. Such differences, in the case of a clear warm yellow versus a "saffron" yellow, or in the cases of the different reds denoted by such terms as scarlet, red, crimson, carmine, rose-red, etc., which associationally or symbolically differ enormously, result in considerable confusion.<sup>7</sup> It follows that *discrimination* in what any layman in the world of color might call slight color differences is important to the psychologist who is handling color. He must have excellent referential control of his elements and be a color expert as well as a psychological technician if his results are to be controlled and his work scientifically accurate.

A simple technique and some elementary tools for the accomplishment of this discrimination will be suggested. Fortunately, the height of the threshold in-

\* Avera, F. L., "Color relativity: the relativity of psychological and physical color terms." *Amer. Journ. Optom. & Arch. Amer. Acad. Optom.*, 1941, 18, 455-464.

volved is not at present great for there seems little doubt that the "associative threshold" is considerably lower than the threshold necessary in other aspects of color work.

Our first problem then is one of the erection of a structure and a system; of a grammar and "semantics"; the establishment of a vocabulary, and of order and relationship in the manipulation of our color elements.

#### SYSTEMATIZATION

It would hardly seem necessary to review the history of attempts at color systematization here or to dissect and criticize present existing systems.<sup>44</sup> This has been done in a specialized fashion and excellent bibliographical material is available, such as that published by the I.S.C.C. and in periodical literature.\* It must suffice to say here that existing systems are in general too arbitrary, insufficiently relativistic and elastic. They are also unnecessarily complicated as to registration and terminology, and give the impression that the system was created first and the color-objects made to fit into the structure by persons only partially acquainted with the actual limitations and peculiarities of tangible coloring materials. An intelligent artist in possession of a general, contemporary education would seem much nearer to the viewpoint of the psychologist than the average physicist, who is a student of color, might be. There is, for instance, as Kandinsky rightly observes, "no such thing as a dark yellow." It is impossible, for optical reasons, to erect a completely balanced color circle or to tint out a light pigment like Hansa yellow into an equal number of steps such as those which can be obtained with a dark pigment such as ultramarine blue. Any color system, therefore, which coincides even roughly with the objective facts and the limitations of the materials for their formulation in a systematic manner, will be *asymmetrical* in structure and thus connected with the more recent physicomathematical outlooks which have had such an all-prevailing influence on contemporary systematization in general.<sup>32</sup> This fact introduces questions which, although their potential importance should not be underestimated, are beyond the mathematical capacities of the author. A general point of view, however, may be at least hinted at, which, it is hoped, may prove fruitful in more competent hands. Such mistakes as those stemming from a confusion of the data of additive and subtractive mixture may thus be at least partially avoided.

The foundation of every current color system is a color circle, which for our purposes should not present any obvious psychological gaps. Investigation has resulted in the construction of a thirty color circle, as a practical minimum, the thirty colors being arranged in ten groups of three colors each. The construction of this circle and relevant questions have been discussed elsewhere.† The question of a threshold is a most controversial one and should probably

\* Example: Bond, M. E. and Nickerson, D. "Color-order Systems, Munsell and Ostwald," *J. Opt. Soc. Amer.*, 1942, 32, 709-719.

† Hiler, H., *Color Harmony and Pigments*, Chicago, 1942, p. 13 *et seq.* For a chart of this circle combined with a scale of values, limited by considerations making it available for use in schools, see the "Hiler Color Chart" (15th. ed. Los Angeles, 1945.)

vary with the requirements of the work in hand. It may thus perhaps be best resolved by each investigator through empiric experience. The important consideration in this connection is that the "dimensions" and the "directions" of color relationship be clearly and fundamentally grasped and mentally graphed. With structural requirements well in mind, divisions may be conveniently accomplished with sufficient accuracy, perhaps by a version of decimal systematization.

The elements for handling actual steps and groups of color and color concepts in a material and practical, structural manner are few and simple. They consist of the most brilliant range of lightfast pigments it is possible to obtain, ground in a binding oil; a chemically inert white; and a carefully *neutralized* black. Seven pigments are the minimum number requisite in 1946, although theoretically this number might be reduced by progress in chemistry, making possible the manufacture of genuinely "true" primaries; but until this ideal is accomplished we must utilize one yellow, two reds (a warm and a cold), two blues (one on the violet side and one on the green side), a neutral black, and white. The reasons for this arrangement are given by Ostwald in his discussion of the semi-chrome theory. From a purely practical standpoint it will be found that we need this number for mixtures of sufficient intensity. The advantages of using a limited number of pigments are somewhat doubtful because of the seemingly inevitable workings of the well known law concerning the number of basic elements, which posits the fact that complications or the multiplication of elements will take place somewhere in the process of amplification, no matter where or how they are introduced. In other words, we must establish our minimum of thirty bright colors at some point, and whether we obtain them as manufactured, or mix them, is largely a matter of preference for type of structure. There is an advantage in procuring them as manufactured, for they are more brilliant in this form than those which can be obtained by admixture. This is due to the fact that all pigments contain unavoidable impurities, so that any mixture of two pigments may be represented by the equation:  $p$  (pigment) plus  $i$  (impurity) equals  $2p$  plus  $2i$  ( $2p2i$ ). The ratio of  $i$  to  $p$  in mixtures varies furthermore (by cancellation) in direct ratio to the distance of the pigments on the color circle from one another.

Let us therefore assume for purposes of this discussion that we are in possession of our thirty brilliant pigments and that we have labeled them by numbers or other appropriate symbols. (See Table.) White is represented by  $W$  and neutral black by  $D$  ( $D$  for dark, to avoid later confusion with the symbol for blue). Our next step is the establishment of an appropriate achromatic scale or scale of value in apparently equal intervals of neutral gray. This scale as established on a geometrically logarithmic basis by Koenig and Dietrici has been questioned as to accuracy; and I should not care to make any observations on this point, except to say that the establishment of such a scale on a truly accurate psychological basis is a fundamental need.

Possessing the color circle and an accurate equidistant (psychol.) gray scale, we are in a position to proceed with our theoretical systematization. This is accomplished by the addition of white, or of black, or of both (gray), to our

brilliant hues. In the Ostwald equation,  $C$  (equals color) plus  $W$  plus  $D$  equals  $X$ . The symbolization or registration of the results thus obtained may be very simply and satisfactorily carried out in a fashion which is easily remembered: by using the number or symbol of the hue, plus the number of parts (however the proportion is established) of one or the other of the elements ( $W$  or  $D$ ), or both of them, and differentiating by the size and position of these numbers in relation to the number or symbol of the hue. In accordance with the positional, psychological concept of  $W$  at the top and  $D$  at the bottom of the gray scale considered vertically, the number of parts of  $W$  would be indicated by placing a small number next to the hue symbol thus:  $Y$  (yellow) written  $Y^4$  would indicate a given quantity of the pigment (yellow), plus four parts of white. The total might be fixed at one hundred parts by volume. Thus the symbol  $Y^4$  would automatically indicate 96 parts of  $Y$  and 4 parts of  $W$ .\* In the case of black, the number of parts would be written at the bottom thus:  $Y_4$ , and if both black and white were added, it would, of course, be written thus:  $Y_4^4$ . We would thus be in possession of a very simple and reasonably accurate way of registering any surface colors, recognizing at a glance to which class they belonged, and with a little practice, being able to visualize the resultant color approximately from a look at the simple and consistent symbol. We would have the advantage of mixing directions being indicated at the same time. There is no doubt about the practical workability of this simple system, or the appropriateness of the means of representation of the formulation, since it has been tried out at some length in actual daily practice.

There are other factors desirable in connection with a practical and workable systematization and standardization of color swatches for the use of psychologists, which are not, so far as is known, satisfied even approximately by any system so far executed. Among them the following desiderata may be mentioned.

1. Minimum size of standards. Four square inches has been found empirically to be the minimum size for grading and matching by color experts in the commercial world; standard playing card size the most easily maneuverable by average operators.

2. A flexible loose leaf or other format by which each standard may be easily isolated, as opposed to fixed attachment in books or on sheets.

3. Arrangement by which groups may be seen at the same time and the relationship of the standards thus easily grasped.

4. Standards provided with an aperture of appropriate size for "mask matching."

5. Execution in standardized oil colors, soil resistant and washable.

6. All information on the reverse size of standards, so that when it is necessary to handle several standards at one time the difficulties of checking by number in

\* The operations inherent in the necessary manipulation could be simply carried out as directed in the "Match Box" of the International Printing Ink Co. In this case the openings of the tubes are standardized and the pigment strength standardized so that the pigment is merely carefully squeezed out along a unit scale, and parallel to it, and the parts by volume easily established in units of any practical minimum size.

a separate source are avoided. The information should consist of the number and symbol of the color, the name of the color in several languages including Latin, mixing directions, wave length (where possible) or other physical registration data, symbol of the color in other systems, etc.

7. These recommendations form a minimum of qualities for a practical color system. They have been largely ignored in systems erected thus far. The establishment of such a system would of course involve considerable labor, and it could be better carried out by an institution than by an individual. There should be collaboration between chemists, physicists, psychologists, artists, and semanticists or epistemologists.

#### TERMINOLOGY

The importance of terminology in connection with the systematic handling of color-concepts should not be underestimated. It is perhaps the chief obstacle to agreement between "experts" at every color council meeting and round table discussion. Emotional factors are often present in such discussions, as is shown by the apparent inability to clarify the situation, and the rather heated defense of positions which should hardly need such defense if they were sound. Observations regarding this state of affairs on the part of such a worker as C. K. Ogden might be of great value, for he is a psychologist, epistemologist, semanticist and aesthetician who has also done considerable work with color.

A. B. Johnson (*op. cit.*) makes some remarks which may be germane when he says, "After we find by examination that an object is a unit, red, hard, solid, we must examine the object further to learn the meaning of the words unit, red, hard, and solid; for the meaning of the words varies with every application of it. My hand is red, blood is red, hair is often red, the moon is sometimes red, fire is red, and Indians are red. These objects possess a congruity of appearance that entitles them to the appellation of red; but the precise meaning of the word in each application is the sight itself which the object exhibits. Whether the object shall or not be called red is a question which relates to the propriety or the phraseology, and with which nature has no concern; but the meaning of the word in each application is a question which relates solely to nature, and with which language has no concern . . . at least language possesses over it no control."

When the approach to color and its function in a given situation has been defined it would not seem that questions of terminology would be insuperable. They would vary with each situation, as exemplified by their occasionally elaborate use among "primitive tribes."<sup>1</sup> Leonardo da Vinci has been followed by Geiger, Rivers and Woodward in their studies of the manner in which color terms may have come into the language.<sup>2</sup> The French object to our custom of utilizing the color term before the object on logical grounds. Maerz and Paul (as far as I have been able to determine) give no definitions or standards for the basic color names "red," "yellow," "blue," "green," etc. This problem is apparently left to the dictionary, where, at least in some cases, it has been capably handled. Our terminology would doubtless be in better state had other students of the subject respected the *status quo* as represented by the dictionary.

<sup>1</sup> Hiler, H., *From Nudity to Raiment*, p. 67 *et seq.* and index.

<sup>2</sup> Luckeish, M., *The Language of Color*, p. 45. Schweisheimer, W., "Look What We Missed in Color Names." *Textile Colorist and Converter*, Nov. 1944.

From the standpoint of the psychologist there are two classes of color names which are of differing interest. Like other scientists, he may object to the use of flowers as objects from which color names stem, as being a basis too variable in nature; but unlike other scientists he may have more interest in the "fanciful" color-names which are constantly being coined and changed in the worlds of commerce and fashion. The first class, the "classic" names which exhibit much more stability, should be useful for designation; the second may be very interesting associationally on more than one "level."

As to the comparatively "stable" names, which are psychologically basic, we might expect the dictionary to be of some help. What is needed is a set of "labels". When different editions of dictionaries are consulted, one very interesting fact at once makes itself manifest: in the newer editions, such as the 1944 edition of Webster's *New International*, a consistent and quite complete distinction between the outlooks of physics and psychology is repeatedly made. Unfortunately, the actual color standards given in this work are so inaccurate and established by such antiquated processes of reproduction as to be scientifically or artistically practically worthless. Some terms have become more vague with the passage of time, for no very easily ascertainable, logical reason. The very excellent work on color standardization presented in older editions of Funk & Wagnall's *New Standard Dictionary* has been all but lost, as the work has apparently gone out of print and is no longer current as a reference source. The article on color merits republication. It was established by classic dictionary technique from thousands of currently named color samples originating in different industries, which were standardized with Maxwell disks by Prof. William Hallock, then (1892) of the Department of Physics at Columbia. It is unfortunate that more attention was not given it by later workers in the field, who failed to improve upon it in any important or fundamental way.

In spite of a considerable bibliography, which will not be given here, as even a cursory treatment would require an effort of considerable length, a work of synthesis and coordination is still sorely needed. There are certain aspects of the subject, however, which are so fundamentally basic and so astonishingly obvious that they should at least be touched upon briefly. Among these are the terms for "yellow," "red," "blue," and "green," which seem nowhere to be psychologically defined. The Canadian color expert, Tudor-Hart, has done this very satisfactorily for the artist, even if only verbally in the process of teaching—for he seems very reluctant to publish his findings in the field of color. Yellow, according to this authority, is the color with a wave-length of about 5786 m.m. which is "free from traces of green or of orange"; red, around 6770 m.m., "the freest from traces of orange or purple (about the color of a pigeon's blood ruby and therefore not of a hot but of a neutral temperature)"; blue, around 4738 m.m., free from violet or green (to be obtained in pigments by a mixture of cobalt and ultramarine); and green, around 5235 m.m., ("midway between blue and yellow and about the color of the green cloth used to cover billiard tables"). These definitions nowhere conflict with those of the older dictionaries where the wave-lengths were given for the "typical" color. They may help to clear up the interminable discussions regarding the differences between "violet," the color of the average flower of that name (around 4176 m.m.), and

"purple," which should still remain the color furnished by the *murex* as it was originally, so that we may thus save a label by giving the wave-length of its complementary (520 m.m.). This unfortunate terminology, exemplified by the use of such terms as "yellow ochre," a broken or grayed down shade of yellow-orange, might also be at least kept in consciousness.

It is difficult but not impossible to establish a reasonably accurate set of terms, based on past usage, at least for the thirty basic colors of our hue circle. If these were established and accepted, even if only in the field of psychology, an important step would have been made, for a great many variations could be named with these terms as a point of departure.\*

If we keep our assumption that the elements of color are hue, neutral black, and white, by following the terminology of Ostwald (*op. cit.* p. IX *et seq.*) as translated by J. Scott Taylor, we have in our possession a few simple terms which do little violence to the general use of English, and will be found useful for a more accurate color designation than is at present current. For a pure color, one free as possible from black and from white, we have the word *hue*, which is generally thus defined. For a hue plus white, we have the word *tint*, also widely used; (Webster tells us that "ping" is a *tint* of red). We need then coin only two additional words to cover the classes of the world of related color, viz. *shade*, for a hue dulled by the addition of both black and white, and *tone*, for a hue which has been darkened by the addition of neutral black. The hues are thus psychologically the bright clear colors; the tints, the light clear colors; the shades, the light middle or dark *dull* colors; and the tones, the dark clear colors. "Maroon" is a tone of red. "Golden brown" is a tone of scarlet.

With practice, the elements of such a formulation become visually manipulatable by the projective imagination of the specialist. Typical light and dark tints, shades, and tones are quite clearly conceived of, and the conceptions fit with the general associative galaxies or manifolds of the relatively psychological, invariant aura of the key hue. To anyone handling color, such a comparatively extensional or referential formulation is of great value. It is roughly equivalent to the learning of a new language, for we can verbalize coherently and quite fluently in a manner comprehensible to others in possession of the formulation, by the use of such terms as "a very light tint of crimson," "a very dark, dull shade of purple," "a slightly toned magenta," etc.

#### SYMBOLISM IN LITERATURE

The connection of such relatively accurate abilities of visualization with work on color symbolism in literature at once makes itself apparent.<sup>7</sup> Such a knowledge would avoid many mistakes, for instance, in connection with possible ambivalence; whereas a lack of it on the part of the investigator causes such confusion as that exhibited by Fichter when he fails to differentiate sufficiently between the colors of the terms *encarnado*, *cardeno*, *carmesi*,<sup>10, 40, 30</sup> etc. A similar confusion may result in the handling of such terms as "yellow," as a portion of the ambivalence attributed to them may in fact be due to slight differences.

\* See table.



COLOR NAMES OF THE HUES ON THE COLOR CIRCLE

NUMBER	WAVE LENGTH	RIDGEWAY	MAERZ & PAUL	BRIT. HORT	MARTIN-SENOUR	WEBSTER	PIGMENT NAME	SUGGESTED NAME
1	570	Lemon Yellow		Canary Yellow	Aureolin	Yellow	Lemon Cadmium	Yellow
2	575-580	Light Cadmium	Golden Rod	Lemon Yellow	Golden Glow	Golden Yellow	Cadmium Yellow Pale	Golden Yellow
3	585	Deep Chrome	Golden Yellow	Saffron	Spanish Yellow	Orange	Cadmium Yellow Deep	Yellow-orange
4	590	Orange	Tangier	Tangerine	Tangier	Mandarin Orange	Cadmium Orange	Orange
5	600	Orange Chrome	Golden Poppy	Spectrum Orange	Bitter Sweet Or.	Mandarin Orange	Saturn Red, Cad.	Red Orange
6	630	Flame Scarlet	Indian Orange	Saturn Red	Flamingo	Oriental Red	Scarlet Vermillion	Orange-Scarlet
7	650	Scarlet	Poppy	Fire Red	Brigand	Cherry (!)	Cadmium Scarlet	Scarlet
8	655	Scarlet Red	Artillery	Vermillion	Geranium Red	Geranium	Cadmium Red Medium	Scarlet-red
9	660	Spectrum Red	Carnival Red	Geranium Lake	Camilla	Red	" Deep.	Red
10	490	Carmine	Jack Rose	Crimson	Crimson	Crimson	Alizarin Crimson	Crimson
11	485	Tyrian Rose		Solferino Purple	Casino Pink	Crimson	Talen's Rose	Magenta
12	500	Purple (true)	Cellini	Cyclamen Purple	China Rose	Magenta	Cobalt Violet Light	Purple
13	520	Purple (true)	Patriarch	Bishop's Violet	Oriental Fuchsia	Purple	Cobalt Violet	Violet
14	565	Hyacinth Violet	Roman Purple	Violet	Patria	Violet	Permanent Violet	Blue-violet
15	430	Spectrum Violet	Prelate	Aster Violet	Gloxinia	Fluorite Violet	(Mixture of #14 & #16	Violet-blue
16	435	Blue Violet		Lobelia Blue	Hyacinth Blue	Ultramarine	Ultramarine	Ultramarine
17	480	Phenyl Blue	Liberty	French Blue		Ultramarine	Blue	Blue
18	460			Spectrum Blue	Bonnie Blue	Jouence Blue	Cobalt Blue	Blue
19	470	Leitch's Blue		Cerulean Blue	Egyptian Blue	Italian Blue	Monastral Blue	Monastral Blue
20	475	Oxide Blue		Porcelain Blue	Murillo	Cerulean Blue	(Mixture of #18 & #20)	Green-blue
21	480		Kashan	Indian Blue	Drake	Turquoise Blue	Cerulean Blue	Cerulean Blue
22	482	Benzol Green		Capri Blue	Jouence Blue	Peacock Green	(See #19)	Turquoise
23	485	Guinea Green		Jade Green	Sorrento Green	Turquoise Green	Monastral Green	Benzol Green
24	495	Viridian Green			Paddock	Marine Green	" "	Jade Green
25	500	Vivid Green	Guinea Green	Chrysocolla Green	Mediterranean Gr.	Green	" "	Seagreen
26	510			Nickle Green	Ski	Emerald Green	(Mixture of X22 & X1)	Green
27	560	Apple Green	Emerald Green	Cyprus Green	Shamrock Green	Yew Green	Permanent Green Light.	Emerald Green
28	560	Bright Green Yellow	Love Bird	Sea Green	Bud Green	Apple Green	(Mixture of #27 & #1)	Leafgreen
29	565	Greenish Yellow	Endive	Sap Green	Viridine Yellow	Chartreuse	" " " "	Apple green
30	568				Citronelle		" " " "	Chartreuse
							" " " "	Greenish Yellow

Note. When no name is to be found in the source which is a satisfactory approximate match the space is left blank. The thirty hues are about those on the small Hiler Color Chart. Whenever possible the names in Webster's *New International Dictionary* were followed for the "Suggested Names," particularly when the 1912 Ed. and the 1944 Ed. were in agreement, which they generally were.

BRIT. HORT. is an abbreviation for "Horticultural Colour Chart," edited by Robert F. Wilson and executed in collaboration with The *British Colour Council* and the *Royal Horticultural Society*. The data of the *British Colour Council* covered only nine of the thirty names and of these nine, seven were the same as those of the chart, so it was of no advantage to tabulate it. The French, "Repertoire" of the Soc. des Chrysothantemistes, (Bib. 48.) also showed too few correspondences to warrant listing.

Munsell gives symbols rather than names. Where the few names given by Ostwald (44) could be utilized, this was done as they are gaining currency through present activities of such organizations as the Container Corp. of America. Examples, Seagreen, Leafgreen, etc.

The suggested list of names would make it possible to indicate with a fair degree of accuracy any color, by using them with the terms, hue, tint, shade and tone as explained. Familiarity with artist's pigments and the actual manipulation of them, not only to construct a circle, but to see the results as they are formed, is certainly a great aid; hence the names of artist's "lightfast" pigments are given. Risking repetition, it must again be stressed that if black is used it must be "neutralized," as directed.

These are of course often hinted at in the context, so that we may gain a conception of whether the yellow alluded to is the rich, brilliant golden hue associated with the dawn and Imperial China, or a grayed and cooler shade with quite diametrically opposite associations.<sup>1, 52</sup>

Examples of such usage may be found without too much difficulty in the writings of highly color-conscious men such as Lafcadio Hearn, Huysmans, Baudelaire, Rimbaud (with his color hearing), etc.<sup>45</sup> In the long run they have resulted in the many cliché-associations which are too well known to warrant repetition. The point of view is always important; the Scandinavian peoples usually allude to the devil as "black" (dark), while the black-skinned natives encountered by Marco Polo assured this explorer that the color of the devil was certainly white.

White,<sup>39</sup> as a Chinaman's mourning color, would have different associations for him and for an Occidental. Orange might be more or less unpleasant, according to the temperature of the immediate environment. Heraldic and Ecclesiastical literature offer rich fields for associational material,<sup>22, 59, 46</sup> as do diaries, biographies, magazines and newspaper articles, and such popular color literature as the works of Faber Birren.

Often there are interesting cases where a chain of associations is formed, where one association might become surrogate to another. The hue green, for instance, might symbolize to a "Son of Erin" his mother. Thus a long chain of associations, highly emotionally charged, might be formed. As Ernest Jones points out,<sup>23</sup> "Mother Erin" is also known as "Cathleen ni Houlihan," Morrín Ni Cullinan, Riosin Dubh, Shan Van Vocht (old woman), etc., which in the ensemble give considerable opportunity for further symbolic analysis. The long list of color terms utilized by "hep" negroes comes to mind with the specialized associations they might involve. Orange to a Hollander and certain blues to a Frenchman may carry national associations, including a feminine symbolism, in the case of Ireland or France; or a masculine symbolism in the case of Protestant England, John Bull, Germany, the *Vaterland*, or Uncle Sam.

A more direct technique can also be utilized interestingly in connection with color names; that is the technique of psycho-analytical "free association."

#### FREE-ASSOCIATION TECHNIQUE

The technique of free-association applied to color names is a simple one. A color is chosen, and all the names in different sources applying to that color and its immediately neighboring variations are collected. The names chosen are usually based upon general and current usage, and the associations arrived at are therefore contemporarily valid. The sources utilized in this case are given in the appended bibliography.

For example, we can begin with the Prometheanly masculine scarlet (orange-red), and it will at once become evident as the technique is continued that it is important not to confuse this color with "true red" or crimson. The name-complex is in most cases so abundantly evident that no interpretation or analysis is deemed necessary. For scarlet, the primitive color of man, blood, war and hell, we find slight variations with such names as Bonfire, Ember, Mephisto,

Flame, Fire Red, Fire Cracker, Firefly, Artillery, Spark, Sunglow, Sungod, Midnight Sun, Blaze, Flash, Emberglow, etc. As the color loses its yellow content, even a slight variation seems to make for different and weaker associations; for we find such terms as Castilian Red, Poinsettia, Begonia, Gaiety, Pimento, Chinese Vermillion, Paprika, Geranium, Cherry and Phantom, Carnival, Troubadour, Goya, Doge, and Hollyberry, which, while they still give a general impression, seem much less obvious. Much of the heat has been taken out of them.

As we proceed towards crimson, cerise, rose, magenta, and the deep pinks, the sexual significance becomes entirely different, more feminine, more sensuously pleasant until, as we go over to the colors composed of the "masculine" red plus the "feminine" blue, we reach a region where lavender, pansy, etc., give a masculine-homosexual tinge with branching implications which will possibly be readily recognized by any practicing analyst. Arbutus, Peach-blossom, Sweet Briar, France Rose, Casino Pink, Rose Neyron, Rose Breath, Opera, Baby, Cupid, Pink Pearl, Hermosa, d'Althoea, Sweet William, Strawberry, Folly, Camellia, Reverie, Chatenay, Rambler, Bridal and Bachelor's Buttons, are certainly suggestive of "*la vie en rose*."

If a slight blue content is added, we get into purple, which is defined as "brilliant, shining and beautiful; as purple patches in a literary work." Among the names are Bishop, Bishop's Violet, Ecclesiastic, Liserian Purple, Monsignor, Nuncio, Papal Purple and Pontiff, Byzantium, Roman Violet, Roman Purple, Prelate, Regal, Royal, Patriarch, and Canterbury.

In the shades and tones of orange, scarlet and red, the "browns" where the colors go in a different direction from light to dark and from bright to dull, we find a definitely autumnal atmosphere with possible over-tones of feminine homosexuality within the startling Hispano-Mauresque and Hispano-Indian atmosphere. Araby, Buccaneer, Brazil, Moroccan, Monterey, Jalapa, Mexico, Barberry, Rosario, Saravan, Sorolla Brown, Gypsy, Tarragona, Sierra, Alcazar, Saraband, Spanish Cedar, Havana Rose, Aragon, Manzanita, Cordova, Castellon, Caldera, Sarouk, Akbar, Algerian and Arabian Red, Malaga, Andorra, etc., do not exhaust the list. As a higher orange content is manifest we get again Brigand, Pirate, Spanish Main, Toreador and Sheik! Still another group of darker reds yield Claret, Bordeaux, Burgundy, Garnet, Crushed Berry, and Checker Berry. The very objectionable (in the U. S.) brilliant group of magentas, red purples, and their tints, are in general nameless!

The blues form an excellent example of how a slight change in hue content may affect the psychological atmosphere. The ambivalent "blue" color of coldness and of the firmament, the "true blue" of hope, constancy and fidelity, serenity, blue-bloodedness, generosity, truth and intelligence, changes its associations, perhaps on "blue Mondays," to symbolize melancholy and depressed spirits. The well known "Navy" (a tone) carries an aquatic atmosphere of quite another sort than the one evoked when more green content is present. Annapolis, Atlantic, Cadet Blue, Harbor, Marine Corps, Neptune, Ocean "Green", Pacific, Pilot Blue, Sailor Blue, Seabird, Seacrest, Seafoam, Sea "Green" (not to be confused with Ostwald's Sea-green—a more accurately descriptive color),

Seaman Blue, Sea-spray, Yacht, Columbia, etc., are some of the consistent terms in this segment.

When blue goes over on the slightly violet side it becomes a symbol of the air, the sky, twilight, distance and space. In tints, it becomes Sky blue, Airway, Daphne, Amparo Blue, Salvia Blue, Ether, Sky Grey, Twinkle, Zenith, and Starlight. Deeper and more saturated blues, slightly more violet as a rule, give a remarkably coherent atmosphere: Watteau, Dresden, Faience, Porcelain, Louis Philippe, Sèvres, Versailles, Brittany, Nattier, Beaucaire, Riviera, Pompadour, Lyons Blue, Directoire, etc.

Blue-green makes a cold transition ideologically as well as chromatically, as blue goes towards green. Aqua Green, Aquamarine, Drake, Duck Blue, Duckling (!), Glacier Blue, Grotto Blue, Niagara Green, Rapid, Ripple Green, Rivage Green, Sea Green, Teal Blue, Teal Duck, Waterfall and Waterfowl are some of the names.

Green, the color of youth and vigor, of inexperience, hope, victory, solitude, peace, plenty, immortality, of Mother Earth and Mother Ireland, is also that of the eyes of the monster, of envy and jealousy, illness and corruption. It has been suggested that its mooted restful quality is due to many centuries of natural adaptation; and in this connection it might be interesting to note whether its associations are the same for blue-eyed and brown-eyed subjects. It seems to have reference not only to the symbolic mother but to the persistent idea of death and rebirth, and is a predominant color in children's literature (see Kingsley's *Water Babies*). Little creatures are born from the green "Mystic Rose" of cabbage and lettuce heads, and the little people roam through regions rather obviously connected with the list of names beginning with Fern, Fluorite Green, Graphalium Green, Everlasting, Grass Green, Lettuce Green, Lichen, Lily Green, Immortality,—the mere listing of which brings the thought that an arrangement of such names would have delighted James Joyce. We may continue with Linden Green, Locarno Green, Meadowbrook, Meadowgrass, Meadow Green, Mint, Mytho Green, Naiad, Nymph, Nymphaea, Alpine, Alpine Green, Apple Green, Arcadian Green, Aspen, Asphodel, Balsam Green, Bayou, Bouquet Green, Bud Green, Celandine Green, Clematis, Corsage, Cowslip, Cres Green, Crocus (!), Cyprus Green, Elf, Elfin Green, Eden Green, Old Moss, Paradise Green, Peppermint, Pond Lily, Elm Green, Endive, Eucalyptus Green, Eve Green, Posy Green, Shadow Green, Shamrock Green, Sprite, Spring Green, Spring Beauty, Springtime, Swamp, Sweet Briar, Water Green, Water Sprite, Willow, etc.

The implications should be clear to anyone acquainted with psycho-analytical symbolism. It would seem that further research might be carried on, not only in English, but, for interesting reasons of comparison, in other languages. The hypothesis advanced, that slight differences in color result in differences in association which are sometimes out of all proportion to the color change, would seem amenable to experimental support or contradiction. Experiment with established forms, utilizing those which have already been employed for some time, and changing only the element of color, suggests itself as a fruitful means connected with "control."

It might be of advantage to have a simple, mathematically established basis, or better, a psycho-mathematical basis for the quantitative evaluation and estimation of the color elements or factors in every given situation. In this connection it would be desirable to attempt the establishment of an affective or associational threshold on the basis of the minimum variation likely to play a part psychologically.

Standardized pigments, of sufficient range to complete the erection of a satisfactory color circle (aside from printing inks), are manufactured by only two firms, as far as the author's somewhat limited knowledge may serve. In the form of artist's pigments, they are furnished by Talen's & Son of Appledoorn, Holland and Irvington, N. J.; in the more reasonably priced "house paints" or "decorators' colors", by Martin-Senour of Chicago. Both these runs of pigment have weaknesses, in that circles constructed with them can only be rendered psychologically equivalent by dulling the brighter colors. In the case of the Talens pigments, this is because the colors of the spectrum gap have a high fortuitous content of white and black, while in the case of the Martin-Senour colors, the oranges and warm reds have a high black content. An alternative is to compensate for these weaknesses by the introduction of substitute pigments obtained from other manufacturers by search and experiment.

A serious lack in pigments is that of a carefully neutralized neutral black, which should be standardized instrumentally. This lack can only be supplied by neutralizing existing blacks by the addition of a warm orange-red pigment in sufficient quantity to obtain a match with one of the existing neutral gray scales, as published by Munsell, Ostwald, etc.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Abell, Francis, *Prisoners of War of Britain (1756-1815)*. Oxford, 1914.
2. Bailey, Henry Turner, *Symbolism for Artists*. Worcester, Mass., 1925.
3. Bentley, Madison, *New Fields of Psychology*, 1934. British Color Council, *Dictionary*, etc. London, 1938.
4. Brown, W., "Practice in associating color names with colors." *Psychol. Rev.*, 1915, 22, 45-54.
5. Chandler, Albert R., *Beauty and Human Nature*. N. Y., 1934.
6. DuBois, P., "The sex difference on the color-naming test." *Amer. Jour. Psychol.*, 1939, 52, 380-383.
7. Ellis, Havelock, "The psychology of red." *Popular Sci. Monthly*, 1900, 57: 365-375 and 517-526. "The psychology of yellow." *Idem*. 1906, 68: 456-463.
8. Emery, Margurite, "An experiment in the color preference of psychiatric patients." *N. Y. Times*, April 11, 1936, p. 17.
9. Everts, Arrah B., "Color symbolism." *Psychoanal. Rev.*, vol. VI, no. 2, April, 1919, 125-157. Bib.
10. Fichter, W. L., "Color symbolism in Lope de Vega." *The Romantic Rev.* Vol. XVIII. no. 3, July-Sept. 1927, 220-231.
11. Foss, Carl E., *Harmony Manual*. Chicago, 1943.
12. Fox-Davies, Arthur Charles, *Complete Guide to Heraldry*. London, n.d.
13. Geissler, L. R., "Affective tone of color combinations." *Studies in Psych.*, *Titchner Commemorative Vol.*, Worcester, 1917, 150-174.
14. Guilford, J. P., "The prediction of affective values." *Amer. Jour. Psychol.*, 1913, 43, 469-478.
15. Harnik, Eugen J., "Pleasure in disguise; need for decoration, and sense of beauty." *Psychoanal. Quart.*, 1932-33.

16. Hastings, James, on "Color" in *Enc. of Rel. and Ethics*. N. Y., 1922.
17. Heline, C. D., "Healing and regeneration through color." Los Angeles, 1942, (pamphlet).
18. Hiler, H. and Moss, A., *Slapstick and Dumbell, a Casual Survey of Clowns and Clowning*. N. Y., 1924.
19. Hiler, H., *From Nudity to Raiment*. N. Y., 1929.  
*Color Harmony and Pigments*. Chicago, n.d.  
*Color Charts. Nos. I, II, III*. San Francisco, 1938-1945.  
 "Color in architecture." *Calif. Arts & Arch.*, Sept. 1943, pp. 11, 18, 46.  
 "The mural in terms of architecture." *Idem*. Apr. 1945.  
 "Color in terms of the mural." *Idem*. May, 1945, pp. 24, 46, 48.
20. Hodges, Lyetis, *Life Interpreted through Color*. Holyoke, Mass., 1926.
21. Hooper, U. G., *The Philosophy and Science of Colour*. London, n.d.
22. Hunt, Gaillard, *The History of the Seal of the U. S.* Washington, D. C., 1909.
23. Jones, Ernest, "The island of Ireland. A psycho-analytical contribution to political psychology." (In *Essays in Applied Psychoanalysis*, London, 1923, p. 398 *et seq.*)
24. Jaensch, E. R., "Gefühl u. Empfindung (Untersuchung ihres Verhältnisses am Beispiel des Farbensinnes)." *Bericht über den XV Kongress der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Psychol.*, Jena (1936) 65-70. *Trans. Psychol. Abstracts*. 1938, no. 768.
25. Jastrow, Jos., "The popular aesthetics of color." *Pop. Sci. Month.*, 1897, 50: 361-368.
26. Jayne, Walter Addison, *The Healing Gods of Ancient Civilizations*. New Haven, 1925.
27. *Jewish Enc.* "Color," N. Y., 1903.
28. Johnson, Alexander Bryan, *A Treatise on Language*. N. Y., 1836.
29. Kempf, Edw. J., "The psychology of 'the yellow jacket'." *Psycho-Anal. Rev.*, Vol. IV, no. 4.
30. Kenyon, Herbert A., "Color symbolism in early Spanish ballads." *Romantic Rev.*, VI (1915), 327-340.
31. Klopfer, Bernard, See Bib. in *The Rorschach Technique*. Yonkers, N. Y., 1942, pp. 407-429.
32. Korzybski, Alex, *Science and Sanity*. Lancaster, Penna., 1941.
33. Klincksieck, Paul, *Code des couleurs à l'usage des naturalistes, artistes, commerçants et industriels*, etc. Paris, 1908.
34. Koran of Mohammed. (Trans. by George Sale), Chicago, 1921.
35. Lang, Martin, (Pseud.) *Character Analysis Through Color*, etc. Westport, Conn., 1940.
36. Luckiesh, Mathew, *The Language of Color*. N. Y., 1918.
37. Maerz, Aloys John, and Paul, M. Rea, *A Dictionary of Color*. N. Y., 1930.
38. Lodovick, Louis, Martin-Senour, "Nu-Hue" *Directory*. Chicago, n.d.
39. Melville, Herman, *Moby Dick*.
40. Morley, S. Griswold, "Color symbolism in Turso De Molina." *Romantic Review*, Vol. VIII, no. 1, Jan.-March, 1917, 77-81.
41. Munsell Color Company, Inc., Baltimore. *Munsell Book of Color*, etc. 1929.
42. Murray, Elsie, "Anomalies in color vision." *The Scientific Monthly*, Oct. 1943, vol. LVII, 322-331.
43. M'Clintock, John, *Cyclopaedia of Biblical, Theological, Ecclesiastical Literature*, N. Y., 1896.
44. Ostwald, F. Wilhelm, *Colour Science*. London, 1931.  
*The Colour Album*. London, 1935.
45. Ozenfant, Amadée, *Art*. Paris, n.d.
46. Portal, Frédéric de, *Des couleurs symboliques dans l'antiquité, le moyen-âge et les temps modernes*. Paris, 1837. (English trans. *Symbolism of Colors*.)
47. Reed, F. O., "Color symbolism." *Mod. Lang. Notes*, Vol. XXXI, 1916, 176.
48. *Répertoire des couleurs*, Oberthur, R., and Dauthenay, H., Paris, 1905.
49. Rickers-Ovsiankina, Maria, "Some theoretical considerations regarding the Rorschach Method." *Rors. Res. Ex.*, 1943, 7: 41-35.

50. Ridgway, Robert, *Color Standards and Color Nomenclature*. Washington, D. C., 1912.
51. Rimbaud, Jean Arthur, "Sonnet on the vowels."
52. Robert, U. L. L., *Les signes d'infamie au moyen-âge: juifs, sarrasins, hérétiques, lepreux, cagots et filles publiques*. Paris, 1891.
53. Schachtel, Ernest G., "On color and effect, contributions to an understanding of the Rorschach Test," II. *Psychiatry*, Nov. 1943, 393-409.
54. Sheldon, W. H. and Stevens, S. S., *The Varieties of Human Physique: an Introduction to Constitutional Psychology* (1940). *The Varieties of Temperament: A Psychology of Constitutional Differences*, N. Y., 1942.
55. Smith, Henry Clay, "Age differences in color discrimination." *Jour. Gen. Psych.*, 1943, Vol. 29. "References," 224-226.
56. Telford, C. W., "Differences in response to colors and their names." *J. Genet. Psych.*, 1930, 37, 151-159.
57. Textile Color Card Assc. of the U. S. *Standard Color Cards of America*, etc.
58. Werner, A. G., *Nomenclature of Colours*, "*Werner's Suite of Colors*," etc. Edinburgh, 1821.
59. Wheeler-Holohan, V., *Boutell's Manual of Heraldry*. London, 1931.
60. Wilson, Katherine R., "A study in the associative origins of color preference in young adults." Thesis, Claremont College, Calif., 1941.

Sources of a "popular" or unscientific nature are included in this bibliography because they are often indicative when the psychoanalytical technique of free association is applied to them.

## PERISHABLE ART

ARNOLD ISENBERG

A tempest, seizing a ship in its grasp, equalizes the conditions of those aboard. Or so assumes the officious boatswain, firing orders at the crew, who shows little respect to the noble passengers and responds with some heat to the remonstrance of one of these, Gonzalo, "a faithful old councillor," from whom there is drawn the comment:

I have great comfort from this fellow. Methinks he hath no drowning mark upon him; his complexion is perfect gallows. Stand fast, good fate, to his hanging! Make the rope of his destiny our cable, for our own doth little advantage. If he be not born to be hang'd, our case is miserable.

A remarkable feat of synthesis, this speech, discouraging to the pretensions of analysis; an ornament, we may observe, in the composition, for it plays above and not within the dramatic structure, it contributes nothing to the development, the action is complete without it; a gratuity, then, freely conferred by the poet's mind as it lived with the prefatory events which are to land the distinguished party on the island; it is ample testimony to the genius of the dramatist. But to what quality or power does it testify in the mind of the character who speaks it? Gonzalo is a wit, undoubtedly: can we call him also an artist? It seems not, for he cannot *construct* such an episode as that of which he knows so well how to *take advantage*: the situation must be provided to him before he can act. Nor

can his effort rank, with the slightest aphorism of Rochefoucauld, as a *minor* production of art, because it cannot stand by itself. Taken out of context, it is devoid of the smallest merit, unless indeed it should prompt us to rescue the essential background by an effort of reconstruction. The most glorious fragment lacks the integrity of the most trivial whole; it lacks a meaning which is sufficient unto itself; it lacks the character of a making.

Yet Gonzalo's *experience*, at this juncture, is not inferior to Shakespeare's and our own. It is in fact identical with these, for it contains the same elements in the same relations, though supplied to him in greater part by the real course of events outside of him. He cannot devise an action, but he can pronounce a commentary on an action perceived—a commentary which must lose its meaning when the text is lost or altered, but which was not less brilliant or less necessary in its hour for that.

Such is the nature, and the destiny, of that insight which startles us, not uncommonly, in one who has seen what we have seen and knows what we know. Such are those admirable sayings which rely for their whole significance upon the awareness of something external—whose matter, we may say, is not expressed within them. They die, and leave no memorial. Art alone is an enduring monument to an activity of the mind, because it is the single form in which an experience reproduces itself entire. Let us not, moreover, exaggerate the value of these passing intuitions. For one thing, they lack the magnitude of a work of art—the experience is limited in its scope; and for another, they are too purely spontaneous and, without the advantage of revision, will remain rough hewn. But besides, we are obliged to notice that Gonzalo's "reality," the elements of his situation, which require only to be clinched by an act of imagination, has already an artistic structure; it is already informed by a dramatic purpose; the stage is designedly *set* for his intervention. Nature and history, in their crudeness, will seldom provide us with such an opportunity; and where the parts remain dead or formless, how should a single active element wield them into an organized whole? Accordingly, we find that any occurrence that draws a creative increment from our minds simultaneously impels us to go back and remodel it from the beginning—that is, to commence a work of art.

Yet this is to raise entirely different issues. There are good reasons why the normal, truncated act of imagination should not give us the full equivalent of an experience of art, but those reasons are beside my point. The words, "And calm of mind, all passion spent," which, one would suppose from innumerable lectures, were framed to illustrate the dramatic catharsis, are uttered in the light of what is for Milton's chorus a living action; so with the summary pronouncements of an Octavius, an Albany, a Horatio, an Othello. What we know to be art is not *their* art—it is nothing but matter for them. A superior matter because, as it happens, prefabricated. But "what is conceivable," as Hume says, "may exist." If life *did* enact such a pattern, it would have the value of the highest art; and conversely, we know better than to expect anything of a poem merely because it is certified as a product, in every syllable, of conscious design. *The question of quality can never be prejudiced by considerations of source.*

For another example, the *figure of speech* is but a single species of what I will



call the figurative use of language. "The seamy side of life" is immediately recognizable as a metaphor: the figurative structure appears, as it were, intact upon the page. (It is of no importance here whether we consider the figure to be "alive" or "dead.") But in "this is where I came in" or "that was a close shave" the metaphor is not inherent. The language with its meaning gives only one term of comparison—the other must be found in the external situation. Thus the act of expression is less comprehensive. But I am not ready to disparage these inventions in point of eloquence or power; and if these examples do not seem to justify my reservation, consider the following, from *Measure for Measure*:

*Pompey.* Come; fear not you: good counsellors lack no clients. . . . Courage!  
there will be pity taken on you; *you that have worn your eyes almost out in the service,*  
you will be considered.

These words do not demand a figurative interpretation. But they are addressed, as it happens, to a harlot, whose establishment is threatened with closing; and so the consciousness with which they are spoken and received is figurative.

So far I have been speaking of a total experience composed of an element given to the senses and an element issuing from the mind. The effect of pathos or irony or wit is dependent upon both, for without the mind's contribution the facts remain perfectly inert, but the mind in turn has made no attempt to ingest the facts and give them out in the form of an autonomous work—it relies to the last on the presence of the unexpressed. Now it will also rely sometimes not on the visible but on the known—on ideas rather than perceptible events; and since ideas, too, may be fugitive, the permanence of the work is affected. A modest example will be found in almost any issue of *The New Yorker*. A type of the miser is seen fondling a heap of old tires which he has stored in a shed. A flower breaks its way through the pavement at the toll gate on the Triborough Bridge. Hitler and his bride are visiting Niagara Falls. In every case there is an allusion to the strictly contemporaneous, which survives, at the moment of impact, as a memory trace in the reader's brain. The comedy lies not upon the expressive surface but in the play of that surface against the base of the contemporary fact. Undoubtedly the fact is *recalled* to us by the picture itself, for that is all we have before us. But it is not *conveyed* by the picture; we have only to remember, by way of comparison, what outlandish forms of experience are conveyed to us, in our ignorance, by certain works of fiction. These cartoonists, I may add, seldom or never take advantage of a pre-existing feeling towards the fact in question—rationing or the national enemy or the issues of the campaign. To make people laugh, as we know, it is not necessary to be funny, because the threshold for risibility declines when the subject is already irritating, provocative, or low; and the coarsest intelligence applied to the subject will suffice. Neutrality, then, in the spectator is the test, if not the condition, of the authentically comic. But *The New Yorker* achieves its effects, such as they are, by the legitimate techniques of comedy, and the subject retains no independent footing in the transmogrified whole.

This comedy, all the same, is headed for oblivion: it will prove unintelligible even to the next generation. Does that give an accurate measure of its value?

No, the work is ephemeral if the experience afforded is feeble or thin or counterfeit; or it is ephemeral if the experience is irrecoverable—and these are distinct criteria. The perishable wit of *The New Yorker* can be compared, in just one respect, with the “immortal” wit of Congreve or Molière. A masterstroke, in the drama, is not seldom the culmination of a sequence in itself indifferent. Now this prelude, though it is structurally united in the temporal dimension with the climactic episode, is already past when the other begins; so that it functions at that moment as mental background on which the incident of comedy is to impinge. And the facts on which the *cartoonist* comments, though they are never laid out side by side with the content of his work, nevertheless are formally related to it. The *psychological* situation is the same. This is not to suggest any comparison in point of aesthetic quality. But comparative *merits* are a matter for evaluation; they do not turn on the accident of presentation.

In spite of the limited hold of the artist upon the material he uses, the topical cartoon is *art*. It appears, then, after all, that there is no definite nether limit to the activity of art. Art is volition exercising itself upon a material to a foreseen end. There will therefore be more or less art in the work of art, according to the degree of control exerted over the material; and in this sense an act of creation *ex nihilo* would be the sole example of unadulterated art. If the art of adornment consists in making the most of what you have, so also landscaping and interior decoration. In this province the massive core of the effect is not artistic but natural; yet the artist's subjection is removed only by degrees from the apparent sovereignty of the silversmith. And only by degrees from the painter, whose medium is sufficiently responsive—for here we recognize the ambiguity in the word ‘material’: it means materials, or medium; and it means subject-matter. Even where the physical material is pliant, the ideational material is still resistant, for no painter can effect a total emancipation from his sensory impressions. The knowledge of limitations, furthermore, enters beforehand into the artistic conception: the gardener does not dream of such arrangements as the painter may consider ordinary. The degree of control, therefore, must be judged not on the absolute basis but in relation to the purpose. The design of a painting, for example, is completed by a scrap of paper pasted on to the canvas. This area is then an unyielding natural fact, unresponsive to the nervous pressure that elsewhere defines every particle of the field; and art is found only in the position given to it, in its relations. There is therefore the sense in which the painter's command is the more limited the more he turns to the device of collage. But his *conception* is not of necessity less perfect; and in that conception the spot of paper has its exact rôle; so that the artist achieves what he intended. For obvious reasons we expect that greatness will appear where the conditions are relatively plastic so that the imagination is encouraged to assume full command—in architecture rather than horticulture, and in painting rather than in photography. But this is a sort of general prediction drawn from abstract considerations. It cannot possibly supplant the individual judgment which the finished work demands.

Now in literature, too, there are ways of putting shaping touches to a relatively

adamant substance. There are ways by which ready-made slabs of experience, themselves uncomposed, can be composed *with*, manoeuvred bodily into place in a significant design. This expedient is conspicuous everywhere in Yeats:

And that enquiring man, John Synge, comes next,  
Who, dying, took the living world for text  
And never could have rested in the tomb  
But that, long travelling, he had come  
Towards nightfall upon certain set apart  
In a most desolate stony place,  
Towards nightfall upon a race  
Passionate and simple like his heart.

I must leave it to the reader to judge how much remains when we abstract from what we know already about the life and work of Synge. It is certain that the biography without the poetry has a low value for emotion—for it is the mark of genuineness in these lines that they do not elicit a prepared emotion but compel a new one; and also that the poetry without the biography would still be wonderfully moving. But that it would suffer a certain loss of intelligibility seems obvious. The preceding stanza of this poem has Lionel Johnson for its subject, with whose career I am not familiar, and I can testify that I do not quite understand it. The language alludes to something more than what it communicates; it seems to know something that it does not say. The poet interprets his experience; but the experience is not taken up, without remainder, into the interpretation—it must also figure in its primal gruffness as an ingredient in the total contrivance. Thence comes the obscurity of Yeats—a very different thing from obscurity of *meaning*. Yeats is clear when the items which are not directly *meant* by his words are fitted into the pattern.

The issue is even less ambiguous in the case of *Easter, 1916*:

I have met them at close of day  
Coming with vivid faces  
From counter or desk among grey  
Eighteenth-century houses.  
I have passed with a nod of the head  
Or polite meaningless words,  
Or have lingered a while and said  
Polite meaningless words  
And thought before I had done  
Of a mocking tale or a gibe  
To please a companion  
Around the fire at the club,  
Being certain that they and I  
But lived where motley is worn:  
All changed, changed utterly:  
A terrible beauty is born.

The insurrectionists are *transfigured* in the light of their sacrifice. The *Transfiguration* of Jesus Christ plays beneath the surface of the entire poem, parallel to its theme, to which it gives immeasurable support. It can be urged that the

record of the Dublin rebellion is dispensable: the Gospel record is not. Yet the title, with its double allusion,<sup>1</sup> is the single clue to this significance, and the title is only reference, it is not art. The poet uses a fairly elaborate segment of experience which he neither invents nor modifies nor controls except to bring it into relationship with the manipulable surface of his text.

But that relationship, once constituted, is formal and intrinsic to the verse. The allusion has no independent status as a source of emotion: it is absorbed in the process of synthesis. The order, the interplay, of ideas is everything. For comparison let us remind ourselves that *impressionism* is sometimes said to be an art that "leaves a lot to the imagination." It is not clear how the imagination is *directed*, in its course, by the work. This, in short, is the interpretation of those who, insensitive to the impressionist's object—exactness of the aspect—imagine that he must be hinting at something which they are called upon to improvise for themselves. But there *is* an art which knows how to steer the ideas of the imagination to their place in a joint design.

We are dealing with a marginal phenomenon of aesthetic experience, not inherently of the greatest importance; for the conspicuous central feature of the arts is completeness of expression and established mastery over means.<sup>2</sup> And I doubt that it would prove very interesting to a psychologist, for whom the effects I have cited would represent certain side issues in semantics. But it has an interest and a value for criticism, precisely because it is so easily confused with the phenomenon of *failure*. What is failure but "incompleteness of expression"? No work of art commences without a feeling and an object to arouse it. The object is made over into art when it receives a form that expresses or defines the feeling. The commonest substitute for art lies in designating the object that is the source of emotion—as if I should say "Abraham Lincoln" and expect to produce feelings of reverence. The author is the worst judge of his own attainment while he is still mindful of those sources: he reads his words with emotion because they point to the situation which inspired him, and fails to observe that the feeling is not *contained* in them, that it has thrown up no formal counterpart, that it is unclarified and unexpressed. But in these remarks we assume that the object or situation in question is qualified to stimulate but not to embody the feeling.

<sup>1</sup> "Easter" does not of course refer us directly to the Transfiguration. But in Matthew 17 we read, "And was transfigured before them: and his face did shine as the sun, and his raiment was white as light." And in Matthew 28 (the Resurrection), the angel of the Lord is described: "His countenance was like lightning, and his raiment white as snow." The connection is indirect, by way of the likeness in terminology and idea.

<sup>2</sup> The term "symbolism," for instance, applied to an author like Hawthorne or Ibsen, is unfortunate; because "symbols" like the wild duck, the substitute woods, the Judge's fit of apoplexy appear, in temporal order, on a plane with the spiritual issues which they "symbolize," to which they stand in relations of resemblance and opposition, not of designation or reference. Functionally, they are foils, parallels, contrasts, reinforcements. Nothing beyond the frame of the work is foreshadowed in the work; for if it were, the artist would have relinquished his control of one set of terms and his ability to place them in interesting relationships with the other. There *are* such works, which bid us to look beyond the patterned surface to a profound meaning precisely in the amorphous, in what has never been worked; and it is not surprising that they should be tiresome.

Feeling is no longer inchoate when its formal equivalent *exists* even though it should not be *stated*; and this has been characteristic of all my examples. *The Waste Land* has both these things. It contains *allusions*, supplying (over and above their mere *meaning*) missing pieces by which fragments of the text are linked beneath the surface into a coherent order. And it contains a fetishism of emotion, that responds to the *names*, for example, of Buddha and St. Augustine as "representatives of eastern and western asceticism." So the scope of Eliot's formal control can easily be either over- or underestimated.

It seems that "expression" is ambiguous. Expression is achieved when the expressive content, by whatever means, is brought before consciousness. Or it is achieved only when that content is given explicit utterance as a product of art. Need I repeat that the difference is one of principle—that we are *usually* right to expect the most successful expression in the first sense where there is the fullest expression in the second?

In the rest of this section I shall continue to explore the same distinction. Koffka's is the latest restatement of an orthodox precept of aesthetic criticism:

"... the way in which the Ego is drawn into the situation must be demanded by the art-object and not by any outside factors which, however they may be suggested by the art-object, are not part of it. And so we have arrived at what we call purity of art: demands on the Ego must not issue from sources that are extraneous to the art-object."

But the borders of the art-object are not easy to define: particularly in the case of literature do we find it hard to say what falls "within" the work and what "outside"—for a rule which should restrict our experience to the sound pattern or the letters on the page would instantly condemn itself. I shall have to abandon this topic without carrying it more than a step; but let us borrow an observation from Bertrand Russell: "It is of the essence of the use of language that we can understand a sentence correctly compounded out of words that we understand even if we have never had any experience corresponding to the sentence as a whole." (Russell's example: "The inhabitants of Mars are as mad and wicked as those of this planet.") Now we stipulate that a literary work should offer its total experience to anyone who understands all the words it contains and the grammar of the language in which it is written. Let us apply this principle and see whether we can accept it. It provides for meaning as an "internal" factor. What it eliminates as extraneous can be divided into (1) the extra-aesthetic and (2) the infra-artistic.

(1) For the purpose of this analysis the *reference* of language is distinguished from its meaning. The words, "To-morrow fair and warmer," have a potential reference which may cause them to be received with delight. If we have learned to distrust the published weather reports, that cancels their reference without affecting their intelligibility. These words will then prove worthless for feeling, and this exposes the original pleasure as an extra-literary value.

"To rise to high position in society one must curry favor with the great." This has the same reference as Swift's "Climbing and crawling are performed in

<sup>3</sup> *Bryn Mawr Notes and Monographs*, IX, p. 244.

much the same attitude." The specific meaning is vastly different. The enormous difference in quality might be overlooked (for example, by a sociologist) until the reference is eliminated.

Our rule excludes from the work any emotional quality founded upon its reference, for the reference hinges on something more than the *understanding* of the work: it hinges, for example, on reasons we may have to think that things are as it declares them to be. The forms which confront us in art frequently stand as cause or as effect or, in the widest sense, in a symbolic relation to other things with which our desires and emotions are involved; and they can therefore arouse desires or emotions which don't *belong* to them. But a form can have acquired such a function only in its capacity as an example of a *kind*. Thus the ikon *A* represents the Virgin Mary through its membership in the general class of ikons *A*. Its individual elaboration is not essential for eliciting the attitude of worship (and just so, any one of a whole class of speech forms can represent the same set of facts). But this elaboration is the reason for its aesthetic existence. It follows that when the reference is broken, and the contingent response ruled out, it becomes possible to judge the work. To see the contemporary drama in its poverty, it is enough to change the names, uniforms, and nationalities of the characters: the interest vanishes because it was borrowed from the events to which they refer. So far our rule proves valid.

(2) We shall find an example of another kind if we quote Edmund Wilson on *A Farewell to Arms*: "Probably no other book has caught so well the strangeness of life in the army for an American in Europe during the war." This is at best a manner of speaking. The truth is that the mood has been "caught" so well that it imparts itself without loss to one who had never been an American in Europe during the war, to one who is qualified by nothing save the knowledge of English. The strangeness is "in" the book. Let us suppose it were not—many another fiction, if not this one, is redolent, for a circle of readers, of an atmosphere belonging to their past, which seeps between the lines and fills out their meaning. Accordingly, it would be necessary, in Russell's phrase, to have had the experience corresponding to the text as a whole. Our strictures cannot be directed at the aesthetic legitimacy of the evocation, for the images are revived, they are *present*, and they carry their strangeness on their faces. We shall be prompted to take the ground of the *artistic incompleteness* of such a work. Obviously, the artist must depend upon the revival of a past experience because he does not know how to *give* the full experience. The work is without solidity: it enjoys a support which must fall away from it with the lapse of a few special memories.

But this whole essay is a plea against the validity of this judgment, which substitutes an adventitious criterion for the truly *critical* one. The truth is, in all probability, that the "strangeness" imported bodily into fiction by recollection would be the shapeless strangeness of the original experience, of life, which it is just the function of the novel to *work*; and we have art appealing in its helplessness to a cruder stuff than itself. This judgment takes the ground of quality in the result. If it were possible (as it is), by the same associative channels, to bring genuine enhancement to the work from the "outside", the critical judgment will allow it—for whatever gives value is by that token admitted within.

But there are whole theories of aesthetic which have already taken sides on this very issue.

## II

In the last century the ruminative consciousness was admitted to the canon of aesthetic sensibility; and we are prepared to render a verdict on this lamented episode in the history of taste. Here is a first example, from Fechner's *Vorschule der Aesthetik*:

Does he who looks at an orange see nothing more in it than a round yellow spot? With the sensuous eye, yes; but in the spirit he beholds an object of charming fragrance and refreshing taste, ripened on a lovely tree, in a lovely land, under a warm heaven; he perceives, so to speak, all Italy therein, the land to which a romantic longing drew us of yore.

These divagations are dissimilar in content and in their affective quality to the musings of Walter Pater on the *Mona Lisa* (I allude, of course, to the experience of painting recorded in Pater's lines, not to the experience of those lines—a finished product of literary art—themselves), and to the sentimental or moralistic digressions of a Ruskin; but their manner of entrance into consciousness is the same. They exemplify the same style of appreciative response, notwithstanding the great disparity in point of feeling.

That style has not been known to every period of civilization, or if known, it has not been cultivated. It is a feature of the taste of an age, stretching at the utmost from Shaftesbury's time to our own. Within that age it influences the mode of composition; it enjoys the sanction of critical authority; and it figures in aesthetic theory, under the dignified title of Expression, as a universal factor of taste—an extrapolation which was encouraged by the reign of an introspective psychology, which analyzed the phenomena of meaning in terms of the accrual of images to a perceptual core. One third of Santayana's volume, *The Sense of Beauty*, published in 1896, is devoted to this highly specialized order of experience, interpreted as one of the three main departments of the aesthetic consciousness.

The sensibility displayed in Fechner's passage, and a thousand like it, is so miserably slack as to provoke a revulsion to formalism, by which associations as such are termed irrelevant—and that gives us our problem. Certainly, such a taste exists. Certainly, it is possible to treat an orange, or anything else, as an invitation to fantasy. The object cannot determine who shall come to it or how he will dispose of it. A monument of formal art, such as the Parthenon, submits without a murmur to the overgrowth of ideas which cling to it like ivy, vesting it with a charm that was never felt by its makers; and on the other hand no one can forbid us to hear *Till Eulenspiegel*, which is *intended* to set us dreaming, as an exercise in formal arrangement. The "problem of associations" is therefore not a psychological problem. The question is not whether the images occur, or how they occur, but whether they are *allowable*; that is, whether the standard of aesthetic value should be stretched to admit them. For the judgment of taste, as for other judgments, there must exist a domain of relevant considerations; for otherwise the problem raised by every conflict of tastes, difficult in any case,

would be hopeless. It is not immediately evident what should be admitted to this domain. Yet the critical faculty knows how to purify itself: by a process analogous to that by which the grounds of the logical inference are formulated in the development of logic itself, it can progressively define its field, extruding foreign substances that are mingled with it. Here I must discuss this question in application rather than in principle—in application to the case of the associative vagary.

An association *might* be illicit—so much is clear. Mental images acquire their function from the nature of the force that is prowling the body, and there is perhaps no dominant state of the organism—plans or desires, hopes or fears, purposes or expectations—that cannot be represented by an image in consciousness. The one picture—say, a picture of fruit—in my mind can prefigure what I *expect* to see as I enter an orchard or what I *intend* to purchase tomorrow or what I should *like* to taste here and now; or it may form part of a pattern of discursive thought. In each of *these* cases we do not hesitate to disqualify it for the rôle of aesthetic object, because aesthetic experience presupposes an attitude—of which a hundred text books have tried to give a precise definition—of imagination or perception for the sake of the thing directly imagined or perceived. Yet in no case does the image fail of acceptance merely because it is *associated*; a sensory impression may also bear a function that will rule it out—as when we are pleased by storm clouds because they promise rain. It will now be well to look at another text:

“... an old mansion . . . now mouldering away, in so romantic a situation, that I soon lost myself in dreams of days of yore—the tapestried room—the listed fight—the vassal-filled hall—the hospitable fire—the old baron and his young daughter: those formed a most delightful day-dream. . . .”

Robert Southey, 1793<sup>4</sup>

Let us marshal all the objections that can be brought against this experience:

1. The experience is extra-architectural. A false value will be set on the building in consequence of the reverie it has instigated; and the same attitude, if applied consistently to the constructions of man, will result in a systematic distortion of artistic values. Geoffrey Scott, in *The Architecture of Humanism*, has spoken the final word on that.

But this shows no more than that the object, for Southey, is not the building alone but something more. It does not impeach the legitimacy of Southey's vision, taken independently.

2. The same associations will not be stimulated in any two people, nor in the same person twice. Therefore Southey's images are private, where the building is public and variable where the building is stable.

But this point hardly tells against Southey. If we could assume that his experience was *valuable*, it would be matter for regret that it was not made public, that is, communicated—in its exact form—and preserved.

3. If the experience were literally a *day-dream*, as the psychologist understands that term, we should find a clear ground for rejecting it. For the material of the

<sup>4</sup> Quoted by Ferdinand Baldensperger, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. V, No. 1.



day-dream is determined, not by the pleasure of beholding that material, but by the need to possess the corresponding realities. The wish that creates the image is the wish for an object, not for an image; and it cannot be appeased by the latter—which therefore is without intrinsic value of any kind. The compensatory reverie is at a far remove from the autonomous act of imagining for the inherent pleasure of imagining, and this is a sufficient commentary on the theory that art is wish-fulfillment.

But there is no proof that the images are a merely vicarious object for Southey's interest; and there is no reason why they should not be independently gratifying, like a romantic painting.

4. If the images are *vague*, then we have the effect often termed specifically "romantic". Associations are stirred without being explicitly summoned, and they cluster dimly about the stimulating impression, suffusing it with a mysterious allure. The building is laden with a feeling for which its visible structure seems inadequate to account; and this feeling partakes of what is called "infinity", for the reason that where no definite image seizes the foreground of attention, whole vistas and trains of imagery, with attendant emotions, can be set in vibration.

To discuss this illustrious effect in the wake of critics from Schlegel to Santayana would carry us far afield, but fortunately it will not be necessary. Southey's images seem to be quite clear; and indeed, if we can credit him with a sufficiently graphic imagination, his fantasy is not remarkably different from one of those numerous pictures of the nineteenth century in which just such a spectacle, baron and all, is brought in clear colors before the bodily eye. Merely to suppress these associations could not in any case enhance their intensity (a point which Croce has already emphasized); for how should they possess a power in latency which they must immediately lose in manifestation? Only if they in turn contain many additional suggestions, which remain buried and unknown, can they contribute to the sense of the infinite—but we are speaking already about a *different object*.

The associations survive every test of legitimacy that is applied to them. Yet the variety of taste reflected in Southey's passage is abominable, and some explanation must be given for that.

5. Integrity, coherence, order, organization, form—the currency of these terms bespeaks the helplessness of our criticism. As descriptive categories they are perfectly non-committal, for the raw experience to which an artist imparts "order" and "form" has already an order and a form; and it is just the difference between the new form and the old that we are looking to define. And as normative categories they evince our sense of achievement without giving the reasons for it. It is the ineptitude of the critical vocabulary that forces us to adopt these devices. Well, Southey's associations are "formless." The combined structure of building and fantasy is like the detective story advertised as "a skillful blend of passion and fingerprints"—without coherence or mutual relevance of parts; and the fantasy, taken by itself and considered either as picture or as story, lacks any eminent quality of delineation, structure, or design. Compare it even with a canvas by Millais or a chapter of Scott, who take exactly such material but

work it up into some sort of art, and its crudity, its bareness are apparent. It is hard to believe that an adult will repair for entertainment to his own mind if he finds in it nothing but such drivel.

A page of fiction weaves meanings into a tissue determined in every fibre by a disciplined choice. The casual associations a work of art may provoke are themselves pre-artistic—subject to a whimsical and not a purposive control. That, in fact, is what recommends them—their easiness, the laxity of the demand they lay upon the mind. To turn from the precise and formidable structure of a painting to a loose chain of reveries or from the sounds of a composition for piano to the imagination of a subterranean cavern or a lot of little elves is to prefer to the labor of the artist whatever one may oneself improvise, with one's least power, in a few seconds of thought. It is to prefer the feebler experience to the greater.

Ruminations, then, are a form of aesthetic experience, legitimate but primitive. If we condemn them, it is as abortive art, not as matter wholly extraneous to the field of taste. And our criterion is not, in the last analysis, drawn from psychology. It is one with the general ground of the critical judgment—formal organization.

Romanticism certainly fostered a great many cheap states of mind; and that is something which prejudices our attitude toward even the greater art of the romantics. We forget that experience, considered as material for art, is as such almost invariably undistinguished. Take the "pathos of distance". These lines from the sonnet on the Elgin marbles,

So do these wonders a most dizzy pain  
Which mingle Grecian grandeur *with the rude*  
*Wasting of old time—*

tell us of a mood in which, for reasons that are explained above, I cannot think it desirable to approach any work of sculpture. But we shall be wrong if we think that the *poetry* requires of us a diffuse and not a concentrated frame of mind. The motions of the romantic imagination are here only subject-matter for a process of art, itself utterly articulate, which interprets them and molds them and yields—to avail myself of a word that is useful here though otherwise sufficiently objectionable—their essence. So further I would insist that "old unhappy far off things/ And battles long ago" is not in the least "suggestive" and that we can read

Insatiablement avide  
De l'obscur et de l'incertain

only if we are enamored of the definite and the distinct. Distance is an aspect of experience, like anything else, and in romantic art it achieves its determinate expression. It is the same with the related theme of escape. The poet who "exclaims": "Fuir! là-bas fuir!" could not have written this under the influence of an urge to get away: it is self-evident that he is facing the task in hand—the artistic task—and not avoiding it. The impulse of expression must be distinct from the escapist impulse to which expression is being given; and whatever may

be happening to the latter, the first is being carried to consummation. We, similarly, if we read aright, as an adolescent does not, shall find no encouragement in this poetry of our yearnings, no appeal to the active emotion of flight. But I am touching on larger issues, which must be deferred.

## HENRI BRÉMOND: POETICS AS MYSTAGOGY

EDOUARD RODITI

On October 24th 1925, when the French *Académie* held its opening session after the long summer vacation, there arose a controversy which threatened to develop almost into a battle like the eighteenth-century *Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes* which heralded the Age of Enlightenment. A member of the Academy, an Abbé and a Jesuit, dared read a paper in which he defended obscure poetry, criticized Classical and rationalist aesthetics and attacked even the *Poetics* of Boileau. When Chateaubriand had mentioned God in one of his orations to the *Académie*, his colleagues had been scarcely more shocked; only the *Idéologue* psychologist Cabanis, last champion of the Enlightenment in the gathering gothic gloom of Romanticism, had been overcome by an access of fever. But the Abbé Brémond, with his paper on *La Poésie Pure*, started in 1925 a controversy which lasted until the German occupation of France and shows signs, in the critical work published by such periodicals as *Fontaine*, of having survived even this upheaval.

The French *Académie*, in its three hundred years of existence, had devoted few discussions to poetry and poetics; and these had all been conducted on strictly Classicist or Cartesian lines, generally by adapting the arguments of Plato, Aristotle or Horace to the literary or critical tastes and fashions of the day. On various occasions, the *Académie* had also pronounced itself against mysticism and even against literary displays of a belief in God: Corneille's "Christian marvellous", Fénelon's Quietistic aesthetics, Chateaubriand's Romantic Augustinianism, all these had been bitterly attacked by this body of critics who felt themselves always bound to distinguish faith from reason, and who, under the pretext of not wanting religion to be compromised in purely secular discussions, had thus banned God and mystery in general from all their theories of poetry.

Yet the Abbé's intellectual heresy can easily be explained. As a liberal Catholic, he had always expressed a preference for the Romantic conception of Christianity, and, as early as 1910, his *Apologie pour Fénelon* had aroused suspicions, concerning his orthodoxy, in circles where the name of the long deceased Bishop of Cambrai still suggested at once all the aberrations of the Quietist philosophy that he had protected rather than practised. And in 1912, the Abbé Brémond's *Sainte Chantal* had caused a scandal and been placed on the *Index expurgatorius* on account of the errors that it might suggest to the ignorant.

In his priestly life, too, the Abbé had been suspended *a divinis*, by the Bishop of Southwark, in 1909, at the time of poor schismatic Tyrell's funeral, when Brémond had recited the ordinary liturgical prayers—though a non-liturgical prayer would have been enough.

But the Abbé had managed to survive all these manifestations of his liberalism, independence and non-conformism without ever truly compromising himself. His enemies, within the Church, watched him closely; but they often compromised themselves in their hasty attempts to compromise him, while friends, even in the Vatican, gladly attributed his unusual behavior to an unusually noble and generous temperament rather than to heterodox or schismatic beliefs. His non-conformist tendencies fully expressed themselves only towards the end of his life; and then in the French *Académie* rather than in the Church, not in religious controversy but in aesthetics.

He had been initiated into the non-conformist philosophy of Romantic aesthetics in the years of his noviciate as a Jesuit, when he went to complete his studies in England after 1882. He thus learned to appreciate the poetry of Keats, Shelley and Wordsworth as much as the more rigorous art of Malherbe and Racine, so that later, in France, he was the first member of the *Académie* to know and understand English literature as thoroughly as that of his own country. Other Academicians, such as Chateaubriand or Victor Hugo, had admired the poetry of Milton or of Shakespeare; but their appreciations had rather been those of outsiders discovering something exotic and vaguely misunderstood, whereas Brémond often wrote of English poets as an English critic might. Indeed, Brémond's work constantly rejoices in this discovery of English literature; in all his controversies, the Abbé quotes English Romantics, poets and prose-writers unknown to most of his opponents in the *Académie*, as aptly and with as unerringly sound taste and judgment as he quotes more Classicist French writers.

The Abbé's whole literary career likewise illustrates the fundamental principles of the philosophy of poetry that he finally expressed. As a historian of mysticism and of religious sentiment, Brémond had devoted more than twenty years to studies of the French mystics who, since the Renaissance, had kept alive the tradition of Humanistic devotion. His *Histoire littéraire du sentiment religieux en France, depuis la fin des guerres de religion à nos jours*, published in six volumes between 1916 and 1922, is thus a masterpiece of history of literature and ideas; around it, Brémond's other works of the same sort can be grouped, from *L'inquiétude religieuse*, published in two volumes in 1901 and 1909, to *En prière avec Pascal*, published in 1923. His election to the French *Académie*, in 1923, came as a reward for this whole body of studies.

These works were nearly all written in the form of religious portraits similar to Sainte-Beuve's literary portraits. Infinitely more indulgent and subtle than the great critic of the French Romantic school, Brémond always tried to explain the religious life and mystical or literary writings of his subjects in terms of their psychology as individuals. And this leads him often to exaggerate, or at least to appear to exaggerate, the literary values and aesthetic beauties of the works that he is studying: his psychological investigations of his authors frequently

confuse, by rapid and imperceptible transitions, the mystical or religious experiences of the individuals with their literary remains, the value of these documents as expressions of the individual's psychology with their value as works of art. The individual, as source of both the document and the work of art, is the point where these two avenues of investigation meet; a psychological analysis of the individual can therefore explain the genesis of either mode of expression, but only a formal analysis of the work of art can truly establish its aesthetic value as a work of art rather than as a psychological document, just as only a doctrinal analysis of the writings can establish their value as religious testimony.

The Abbé Brémond's more strictly literary or aesthetic writings, until 1925, remained fairly sketchy. Except in reviews and numerous articles published in various journals, he had generally viewed literature only in its relationships to religion; for instance, in a number of volumes devoted to Sir Thomas More, Cardinal Newman, Fénelon, Bossuet and other great writers whose works are also of major significance in the history of religion or of mysticism. But one can already deduce, from all these studies, some critical or aesthetic principles that seem constantly to recur in the author's earlier as well as his later work.

In 1908, the Abbé published an introductory essay to the *Vingt-cinq années de vie littéraire* of his friend Maurice Barrès, the Wagnerian aesthete who became the great nationalistic spellbinder of twentieth-century French prose, a sort of French d'Annunzio dealing almost wholesale in the sublime. In 1923, the Abbé published a collection of essays, *Pour le romantisme*, where he reprinted this introduction to Barrès together with other apologetic studies, all in favor of Romanticism, that had previously remained scattered in various publications. Finally, in 1924, he devoted a long essay to the death of his friend Barrès and also published *Les deux musiques de la prose*, where he already states some of his views concerning pure poetry and verbal music.

The stage was thus set for his historic declaration of aesthetic faith. From mystical literature to literary mysticism, the transition is easy. *La Poésie pure*, later *Prière et poésie*, too, only develop and organize aesthetic principles that can easily be distilled from the Abbé's earlier works, from his historical studies of religious sentiment as well as from his essays. If the French *Académie*, in 1925, was shocked by the Abbé's scandalous beliefs, it had certainly studied his works very superficially before electing him, as a reward for his writings, to sit amongst the immortal but often obscure defenders of "la clarté française."

*La Poésie pure*, the published text of the Abbé's speech, actually restricts itself, in a few pages, to defending a limited number of ideas that academical or traditionalist criticism either still ignored, or disdained, or indeed constantly attacked. When he first delivered his broadside as a speech, the good Abbé defended, in its opening paragraphs, the poetics of Edgar Allan Poe, of Baudelaire, of Mallarmé and, even more scandalously, the poetics of Paul Valéry, who was at that time still considered, in *Académie* circles, a veritable avant-garde crackpot. Only the names of Novalis, Rimbaud, Lautréamont and one or two others were lacking to make of the Abbé's speech, in the ears of Academicians, almost the equivalent of a Surrealist manifesto. Monsieur Doumic, who presided over this Last Judgment of French Letters in the chair of an Eternal

Father (he was *secrétaire perpétuel*), had published a manual of French literature, unfortunately still used in most schools, where he devoted only a few contemptuous lines to Baudelaire, a mere sentence to Mallarmé, but many pages to a minute analysis of the literary genius of Madame de Maintenon and of La Grande Mademoiselle. The Abbé's speech was, indeed, an attack on all this academism, though such attacks were nothing new and had occurred year after year since the first night, in 1832, of Victor Hugo's *Hernani*; but these attacks had always been launched on the academic Bastille, more or less successfully, by outsiders, whereas this one was a revolt within the fortress. All those present now saw with horror that the house was divided against itself and could therefore no longer hope to stand very long.

The Abbé declared that the Romantic poets of the second generation, those of Baudelaire's age, then the Symbolists, were not "the dangerous innovators that one sometimes seems to think." And he went on, with Machiavellian ingenuity, to place them within the aesthetic tradition of the Abbé Dubos who, from 1722 to 1742, had occupied Monsieur Doumic's chair as *secrétaire perpétuel* of the *Académie*, and within the poetical tradition of the *Pleiade*, in the French Renaissance, of the Italian Petrarchan poets and of the poets of classical antiquity.

The Abbé Brémond concerns himself little with the factual content of a poem: "it contains first and foremost a quantity of the ineffable that is narrowly bound, besides, to this or that." To this "mysterious reality that we call pure poetry", every poem owes its peculiarly poetic character. In these few words of the third paragraph of Brémond's *La Poésie pure*, the whole theory of the sublime of Longinus and all of Neoplatonic aesthetics are revived. There is thus little ground for surprise when, towards the end of *Prière et poésie*, Brémond later explains Aristotle's concept of catharsis, more philologically than logically, by quoting a text from Plotinus: only to a Neoplatonist who can think of himself and of Plotinus as followers of the Aristotelian tradition is such a scholarly device valid.

The Abbé goes on to note that, "for the poetic state to affirm itself in us, there is no need . . . for us to have taken cognizance of the whole poem." All the poetry of the *Aeneid* thus springs from a few words: "*Ibant obscuri . . .*" And the first scene of Racine's *Iphigénie* "transports us . . . into a poetic state of grace."

"Prose and poetry, indeed, require different rituals. . . . The poet promises us . . . much more and much less than the novelist." A poem, the Abbé argues, follows no logical development, and its reader sets forth "into the night, without any baggage, sometimes with no compass." To read a poem poetically, we need not always understand its meaning; and a misunderstanding may sometimes reveal to us the poetic quality of a poem more thoroughly than an orthodox interpretation of its meaning. Brémond thus accepts the allegorical interpretation of Virgil's *Fourth Eclogue* as a prophecy of Christ's birth: "A misunderstanding on the one hand but an unerring intuition on the other; a victory of purity over impurity, of poetry over reason." Some poems, indeed, have no

intellectual content at all: some of the lyrics of Robert Burns and some folk-poems, for instance, do not offer even the appearance of a proposition or of an opinion, yet they are worth more than "a hundred volumes of reasonable verse." And sometimes, if one changes only one word in a beautiful line, without even altering its meaning, all poetry is thereby banished.

"Et les fruits passeront les promesses des fleurs" is thus not as beautiful as:  
 "Et les fruits passeront la promesse des fleurs."

In this line from a poem by Malherbe, from a somewhat unpoetic statement that "the crop will be good," the poet has been able to distill an infinite amount of poetry whose quantity is reduced as soon as one changes one article and one noun from singular to plural.

Brémond concludes that everything that, within a poem, "can immediately engage our surface activities, our reason, imagination or sensitivity", is impure; indeed, "all that the grammarian's or the philosopher's analysis can extract" from a poem, "all that a translation will retain." The ineffable resides in the very expression, but "all that the poet appears to us to have wanted to express and has actually expressed" is impure. To solve this fine paradox, Brémond first quotes Valéry: the poet is only a musician whose subtle and patient art is sometimes aided by fortunate coincidences. But pure music is no less mysterious than pure poetry: Valéry has only defined one unknown in terms of another unknown and verbal music is, in any case, not necessarily poetry.

Poetry is thus neither of the realm of reason nor of that of music. Verbal music has the value of a magical formula that transmits "a mysterious fluid," the value of "a veritable incantation." Brémond then quotes Baudelaire's "suggestive magic"; but this quality can be found in prose-works too, and the Abbé concludes that poetry is "contagion or radiation . . . creation or magical transformation, whereby we assume . . . the state of mind that made him a poet" rather than the ideas or emotions of a poet. The words of prose "stimulate . . . our customary activities"; those of poetry "appease them, would suspend them . . . divert us from our anti-mystical imperialism." And after firing this last shot at the Baron de Seillères' Hegelian aesthetics, the Abbé finally reveals to us his true beliefs: poetry is a "meditative magic . . . that invites us to quietude."

This is indeed the terminology of prayer and mysticism. Walter Pater had already suggested that all the arts aspire to join music. Brémond corrects him: "they all aspire, but each by means of its own peculiar intermediary magic . . . to join prayer." Then, one might object, if all the arts indeed aspire towards prayer, the most beautiful poem must be the one which, while still using an intermediary magic that is peculiar to poetry, comes closest to prayer or actually identifies itself with prayer. The medieval Latin "*Stabat mater dolorosa*," the final prayer to the Virgin in the thirty-third canto of Dante's *Paradiso*, or the prayers of T. S. Eliot's *Ash Wednesday* must surpass, as pure poetry, all of Shakespeare, of Virgil or of Goethe. Fortunately, the Abbé Brémond does not develop his theory into a hierarchy of evaluations of masterpieces. This would

lead him too far, to a new mystical Platonism where poetry, instead of serving an ethico-didactic purpose as in Plato, would be expected to replace prayer; and it would also lead him onto more controversial grounds, those of tastes rather than of beliefs.

*La Poésie pure* instigated one of the more important literary controversies of our century. The French *Académie* was not the only body to be involved and to protest. The Abbé Brémont was forced to explain and defend his position in an enquiry conducted among readers of the weekly *Les nouvelles littéraires*, and in replies to their questions. This lengthy debate, too vast and too confused to be analysed or summarized here, has been reported by Brémont himself, in a series of explanations appended to *La Poésie pure* when this speech was published as a volume. But in the course of this debate, the Abbé was forced to realize that his aesthetics of prayer deserved to be studied in greater detail and to be expounded less superficially. He therefore developed his new poetics in a second volume, *Prière et poésie*, which was published in 1926.

Brémont had noted four types of reaction amongst the readers who had participated in the enquiry: a "bourgeois" reaction, an "artist" reaction, a rationalist and a scientific reaction. The Abbé easily disposed of the "bourgeois" objections of the "gentleman who does not want to have his leg pulled" and of the objections of Paul Souday or the Classical rationalists: such people had no understanding of poetry at all. But he found a way to effect a compromise between art and science, between the poets and the phoneticians. *Prière et poésie* was the strange fruit of these dialectical acrobatics.

The principal argument of Brémont's new treatise remained the same as that of *Poésie pure*, though considerably expanded and superficially far more convincing or perhaps only more persuasive. It is impossible to draw here a detailed plan of the maze-like convolutions of the Abbé's prodigious argumentation as he brings poets to agree with phoneticians, explains the ineffable quality of poetry in terms of the indefinable quality of mysticism, one unknown in terms of another unknown, and dresses his obscure proofs with such dazzling rhetorical effects that the controversies he provoked have not yet died down. Professors of literary history such as Albert Béguin, near-surrealist poets and critics such as Rolland de Renéville, elderly and respected poets such as André Spire, Catholic thinkers such as Jacques Maritain, conservative pamphleteers such as Thierry Maulnier, these are but a few of the various types of French writers who have been drawn into this battle over the relationship, whether analogous or identical, of poetry to mysticism or magic.

In this game of metaphysical dialectics, where the formal, material, effective and final causes of poetry, mysticism or magic are never very clearly distinguished, a lot of beautiful but confused prose has now been written, stimulating to the poet but disappointing to the more methodical philosopher of art. When poets such as André Spire become fascinated by phonetics, and phoneticians such as the Abbé Jousse suddenly devote all their attention to poetics, the true nature of poetry is easily overlooked: it is more and more infrequently defined in terms of its own definable elements or parts, more and more often in terms of



some other activity. Inspiration, the state of mind that the poet tries to communicate to us, becomes indeed poetical only as soon as it is already communicated in a poem. Until the poem is born, inspiration remains a psychological force that can be expressed in music, in painting, in mysticism, or even in direct action as well as in poetry. Experimental psychology may some day be able to elucidate the mysterious chaos whence ordered art is born; but all philosophical explanations of the inspired state of mind that neglect the techniques peculiar to the study of the mind will tend to communicate inspiration to us poetically rather than philosophically, much as the poet communicates it to us in a poem. The Abbé Brémond's poetics thus remain, in some respects, closer to poetry itself than to any true philosophy of poetry.

## EMOTIONAL DISTANCE IN ART

STEPHEN C. PEPPER

I am bringing up for discussion in this paper a problem about the nature of emotion in art. It has to do with what Bullough has called *psychical distance*, and I am asking what is the psychological mechanism for producing distance in the emotions. This is a critical consideration, because a failure to achieve sufficient emotional distance destroys the aesthetic value of a work of art.

I am here supposing that the emotions expressed in art are essentially similar, if not identical, with those experienced in real life. Not but that certain ways of using sensuous materials in art—particularly the integrative use of them—have emotional reactions peculiar to themselves which yield what might almost be called *aesthetic emotion*; yet it can scarcely be denied that works of art embody many other emotions besides, and that these are often closely similar to the emotions of practical life.

Roughly speaking, there are two modes of emotional stimulation in art: the mode of direct stimulation, such as the excitement of a rapid rhythm or the startlingness of a sudden sound; and, secondly, the mode of indirect or symbolic stimulation, such as the attitudes, gestures, and words of represented characters. The second is the method peculiar to various degrees of realistic effect in art. It is this method that particularly raises the problem I have in view for the present discussion.

Let me choose an unquestionably emotional illustration that will raise the problem in as simple terms as possible. Alfred Noyes' "Highwayman" will suit our needs. I am not for the moment raising the question of how good a poem it is. There can be little doubt that it is emotional. The emotions are stimulated in part directly by a vigorous rhythmic pattern with a tense caesura in its midst, by the selection of vowels and consonants, assonance, rhymes, and so on; but in the part with which we shall be mainly concerned they are stimulated by

the indirect stimulation of conversations and images of characters in action. In some sense this indirect stimulation is, we should say, of the same emotions which a spectator of the actual scene in real life would have experienced, and occasionally the same emotions which the characters themselves are represented as experiencing, only greatly reduced by "psychical distance." We are asking what that reduction consists in.

The poet arranges his narration so as to give us the feeling that we are looking in upon a succession of scenes. A succession of emotions accompanies these scenes, which as a combination of emotions in sequence is convincing because they are the emotions engendered by the scenes and because the scenes causally succeed one another according to our conceptions of natural causation and psychological motivation. This principle of combining emotions may be fitly called "natural emotional sequence." There is often a distinct pleasure in recognizing the naturalness of such a sequence, which paradoxically critics often call logical, though nothing strictly speaking could be less logical or basically more empirical.

It is natural to find romantic love in the moonlight; natural that before such love an ostler should be madly jealous, that a highwayman should kiss the landlord's daughter, that he should gallop away, that a red-coat troop should occupy the inn, that Bess should be brutally mauled, that she should struggle to save her lover, that suspense should follow, that she should save him and die, that he should escape, and that then he should throw away his life in a fit of blind rage.

Those emotions follow each other naturally; and in a short length of time there is a surprising number of them and of a surprising variety. Within limits there are alternative modes of emotional reaction along this sequence. For instance, one may be moved *with* or *at* a represented character. If we are moved *with* a character, we identify ourselves in some degree with the character and feel the emotion the character is represented as feeling. In reading the poem we are moved with Bess and the highwayman in the love scenes. But a man probably centers his emotion in the highwayman, and, through identification with his love, then identifies with Bess' love as a man in love will—that is, from initially feeling with the highwayman, he feels with Bess, also. But a woman probably centers her emotion in Bess and thence to the highwayman. Both alternatives are relevant, though different. A single reader might at different times appreciate both readings. It is also possible to feel *at* one or both the characters with envy or annoyance or amusement, though I believe we should all agree this would be an inadequate emotional response to these scenes.

In the scenes with the ostler and the redcoats, however, we are intended clearly to feel *at* these characters. We hate the ostler as a villain frustrating us in our love embodied in Bess and her lover, and we despise the redcoats; yet secondarily or momentarily we may feel with the jealousy of the ostler and sadistically enjoy the brutality of the soldiers, though clearly feeling *with* these characters primarily would be a superficial emotional response to these scenes.

In Bess' struggle with her bonds I find myself alternatively looking at her like a bystander and being her, that is, alternatively being moved at and with her emotions; and in this scene, I believe, the alternation is necessary and expected, for adequate emotional response.

In the final scene of the distracted highwayman, I find myself feeling rather *at* than with him, though with flashes of the latter.

In the epilogue the love scene returns, but in a ghostly light. It is softened from the realism and vividness of the first of the poem. And, also, it contains something of that release of tension that goes with satisfaction. This is subtly expressed in its first line by filling in the gap of the caesura and so absorbing the tension of the gap:

“And still of a winter’s night, they say, when the wind is in the trees,”

The interpolated, “they say,” is emotionally one of the happiest devices in the poem.

Incidentally, the whole poem is like a complete love episode, a symbolic analogue, an icon, to use a modern semantic term. The poem is neither tragic nor silly. Nor even, below the superficial view, pathetic. Pathos is there, but essentially the poem is exhilarating.

Now, I think you will have followed me in most of these descriptive comments. Do you, at this point, discover the question in yourselves that I do: “Can it be that I really felt all these emotions in the ten minutes it takes to read the poem?” Unquestionably, I can inform myself, in some sense I had them. But in what sense? Not at the full intensity of emotion that Bess and her lover felt them; nor, at the other extreme, as mere intellectual concepts with denotative references to the emotions in question. What I felt was something midway between these two. And yet, they were not some mild emotion quite other than the emotions depicted, either. My hypothesis is that what I felt was anticipatory and apprehensive emotions based on supposals.

Let me explain what I mean. Suppose I have a dentist’s appointment this afternoon which I have reason to believe will be more than usually disagreeable. I have an actual apprehension about it. I am, of course, stoical and all that. But suppose I let myself feel the full intensity of my fear. This feeling is a real emotional experience. It is different, however, from the emotional experience of being in the dentist’s chair with the drill jabbing at my nerve and the actual pain and the self-controlled impulses to throw the drill out of my teeth and escape from the office. This latter is the source of the former. The ground of my apprehensive emotion is past experience with the source emotion.

Notice there is a good deal of similarity between the two emotions. Fear is present in both of them and the impulse to escape. With the assistance of imagery of the dentist’s office, the emotional impulses felt in the office may be almost duplicated in the emotional apprehension. If they are dwelt upon in a vivid imagination, the apprehensive emotion may even exceed in intensity the emotions actually felt in the source act. But there are these differences: (1) the actual pain of the drill is absent in the derived emotional act and, also, the instinctive dynamics of the reflexes to avoid it; (2) within limits the derivative apprehensive emotion is under voluntary control and can be turned on and off, whereas the pain of the source act and its instinctive dynamics cannot;

and (3) in general, though not always, the intensity of a derived emotional act is less than in the source act.

Now, let me carry this process a step further. Suppose I have not a dentist's appointment this afternoon, but only imagine that I have. This supposition, also, has its emotional aura. But it is twice removed from its original source act. The source act of this last supposition is the memory of times when I actually did have an appointment, which in turn has its source act in the memories, or rather, in the actual experience in the dentist's office. Here, in our last supposition is a doubly derived act; it is under much better voluntary control; its intensity is, in general, much reduced from that of the singly derived act and still more reduced from that of the source act.

My hypothesis is, that where emotions are stimulated in art by symbolic or representative means, these emotions are of the type of doubly derived emotional acts. They are genuine emotions. They are very similar to singly derived emotional acts, differing only in degree, and consequently are as similar, except for matters of degree, to the source acts as singly derived emotions are. Psychological distance, as applied to aesthetic emotions, consists then, on this hypothesis, in the differences just pointed out between a doubly derived emotional act and its source. A doubly derived emotion (1) lacks all or, at least, many of the sensory stimuli and instinctive reflex dynamics of the source act; (2) it is under complete, or nearly complete, voluntary control; (3) it is greatly reduced in intensity. These three differences constitute the psychological distance between an emotion in art and its represented source in real life.

This analysis confirms our initial guess that emotions in art are not qualitatively different from those of real life. Doubly derived emotions run through our practical every day life with much greater frequency than source emotions. They are biologically of great importance in giving us foretastes of the source emotions, to avoid them if painful and to seek them more strenuously if grateful. Art, by the way, goes far to carry on this biological function, and herein lies much its ethical significance. But our immediate comment is merely that art generates in such instances no special kind of emotions not had in real life; it only elaborates a kind of emotional act very common in real life.

Our example of the dentist was an instance of an apprehension. It is clear that the same sort of analysis would apply to pleasant anticipation, to a successful achievement, to the receiving of an honor or a gift or a sign of affection, to the meeting of a lover. For any of these there is the source act, the actual achievement or meeting, and the derived emotional act where these are only supposed.

Returning to "The Highwayman," I suggest that in the love scenes we are experiencing doubly derived emotional anticipations of the source emotions which Alfred Noyes depicts; that in the ostler scene we are experiencing a doubly derived emotional apprehension; that in the scenes with soldiers we are experiencing both emotional apprehensions and anticipations, the latter in Bess' successful achievement and her lover's escape. In the highwayman's final death we have emotional apprehensions raised and closed.

These emotions are real. There is nothing supposititious in doubly derived

emotions. They are simply emotions not generated by source acts nor by immediate apprehensions or anticipations of them, but by supposals of them. Such emotions closely resemble their source acts in the ways indicated earlier, but they have factors of distance or removal from these acts which render them particularly well adapted for the purposes of art.

## THE RÔLE OF THE 'STANDARD MIND' IN ART

BERTRAM MORRIS

The modern age is patently one of intensified specialization and standardization. It is an age in which separation of activities has advanced with alarming speed, and has affected all areas, including intellectual affairs. In the analysis of art, as elsewhere, our understanding has become obscured, owing very largely, it would seem, to our attempt to divorce art from life. More specifically, aesthetics has for the most part been closeted in the sphere of pure theory, and has shut off from itself the insights available to it through a more cordial relationship with art criticism. As a point of departure for indicating how this unfortunate separation may be at least in part overcome, we may consider Samuel Alexander's challenging idea of the "standard mind" in connection with some basic principles of art criticism.

The idea of the "standard mind" raises some intriguing, but extremely perplexing, questions for a philosophy of art. Alexander used the term in the hope of establishing—or shall we say, salvaging?—an objective norm which would place aesthetic values on a sure footing. Believing that the beautiful is that which disinterestedly satisfies an impulse, he pursues analysis to show that the beautiful is sharable and communicable, and is therefore to be judged by the standard mind. He agrees with Kant that the beautiful is not just beautiful *to me*, but is in its own nature beautiful. Hence, he also agrees with Kant that a clear-cut distinction must be made between that which pleases (which always involves a reference to the subject who is pleased) and that which is beautiful (which simply satisfies the sense of beauty for anyone and everyone who will take the trouble to discern the beauty of a thing).

I do not here wish to be a party to the age-long polemics as to whether beauty is objective or subjective, whether one can legitimately demand that all persons appreciate the beauty of, say, a Brahms sonata, or whether they should look only to the pleasurable thrills running up and down their spinal columns. Rather, I should like to inquire further into the office that the standard mind might perform in aesthetic theory, and its usefulness for art criticism. The method of this brief inquiry will be one that combines dialectic with what seem to be more or less obvious facts of the aesthetic experience. The springboard for discussion will be Samuel Alexander's aesthetics.

In many ways the realism of Alexander's aesthetics is indeed refreshing. His "standard mind" is not some transcendental ego, alien to human minds as we know them and have traffic with them in our ordinary activities. It is any mind that is able to appreciate the beauty of a work of art. And it is a standard mind just because that beauty is the same for all minds that do appreciate it. In short, all minds that understand the Brahms sonata share in a common experience, and are capable of passing informed judgments upon it. In Alexander's philosophy, art is a phenomenon that is through and through social, and it is mediated by judgments, and is therefore to be distinguished from mere sensation. If the beauty of a thing were sheerly a sensation, there would be no ground for asserting either its objectivity or our disinterested perception of it; and there would consequently be no distinction between that which merely pleases and that which has value. The beautiful as a value, it would seem, possesses within itself an inherent logic, which compels agreement of judgment in so far as a person is willing to study art and make sense of it.

Agreement on matters of art, however, differs in an important respect from that which we find in science. A work of art—so the time-honored assertion runs—is a unique thing. It is not merely a particular thing, but it is in individual thing. The scientist, though he is interested in particulars, is not interested in their individuality. He seizes upon particulars in order to generalize, to set up laws of nature. The artist, as well as the appreciator of art, is interested in the unique aspects of a thing, by which he can come to an understanding of its individuality. Although a work of art is unique, nevertheless the experience of it can be repeated by different minds, or by the same mind at different times. At least, this conclusion must be granted by those who insist that a mind which grasps the beauty of an object is a standard mind.

The artist is generous to the appreciator and the critic in that he provides the work of art with a frame, by which he sets it off from other things that are irrelevant to it. The frame is a device for delimiting the context within which art criticism may be legitimately pursued, and thus provides a material aid to bolster the cherished, old maxim that criticism should not go beyond the frame of the work of art. (Of course, the actual frame is not necessary in many of the arts, such as in music or literature.) To ascertain what the logic of art is, the critic looks to the context limited by the frame, and there discovers the mediating judgments by which he, as a standard mind, can speak with authority. Otherwise, he is committed, in the absence of mediating judgments, to blank, dogmatic assertions that the thing either is or is not beautiful; and neither the positive or the negative judgment expresses any superior authority to the other.

The assumption throughout this discussion is that a work of art has a central core of meaning. Although such an assumption is not a matter of proof, its denial makes nonsense of that activity which is called art activity. If art is meaningless, it is difficult to understand why human beings have made so much to do about it throughout the ages; and it is even more difficult to see how anyone could ever have said anything significant about a work of art. Yet, however much nonsense has been written about art (and there has been plenty), nevertheless the great critics have spoken with authority, and taught us much. The

doctrine of the standard mind represents an attempt to realize the central core of the meaning of a work of art, or, if one prefers, to assert the logic of a work of art. It is not unreasonable to believe that when an artist creates a work of art, he has specifically an artistic intent, and that at the conclusion of his art activity he knows whether or not he has succeeded in his attempt. To be sure, he may not know precisely what his intent has been until his work is finished; but in the end he does know whether or not the outcome is satisfactory. Moreover, it is not necessary to rely simply upon what the artist says his intent is, for there is also the testimony of the appreciator and the critic in the re-creation of the work of art. When an appreciator can re-create the object by engaging in the process which becomes resolved as a work of art, then he is in a position to answer Carlyle's questions, "what the poet's aim really and truly was, how the task he had to do really stood before his eye, and how far, with such materials as were afforded him, he has fulfilled it." The appreciator not merely observes that the artist's intent is fulfilled, but also he can point out the steps by which this fulfilment occurs. A mind which can point out these steps that lead to the fulfilment of a work of art is a standard mind, and hence is in a position to declare that the intention of the artist has been realized. There seems to be reason, then, for believing in the reality of the standard mind, for it is possible to indicate the way in which it operates in forming its judgments of the work of art. Where there is agreement on the norms to be used in judging art, there can also be agreement in the conclusions that are arrived at.

This discussion, however, oversimplifies matters, and it now calls for correction. The argument sails along smoothly, on the assumption that the artist's intent is the *same* intent as that which the appreciating mind discovers in the re-creation of the work of art. Unfortunately, the only way the mind can discover the artist's intent is to go to the work of art itself. (To ask the artist what he really meant yields notoriously unsatisfactory results, for if he is honest, all he can do is to point to the thing and say, "Go, look!" Otherwise he prattles some nonsense about something entirely irrelevant, as when Beethoven referred the misguided inquirer of the meaning of the *Appassionata Sonata* to *The Tempest* of Shakespeare.) Moreover, the picture we have drawn does injustice to the work of the critic, who is not merely content to re-create the work of art, but who actually does something to it, and makes of it something new and different. And in this case what happens to our neatly simple idea of the "standard mind," a mind, it is recalled, which re-creates the work by making of it virtually a different thing? The idea may not be beyond repair, but if so, it must undergo a major transformation. By way of correction, I should like to point to certain features of art criticism in order to see some of the factors that must be taken into account if the standard mind is to be rehabilitated.

Discussion of a subject so controversial and complex as that of art criticism cannot, in such brief limits, yield a conclusive statement. Yet, there is opportunity for suggesting some principles of criticism that on the one hand are *prima facie* acceptable, and on the other have important implications for a sound aesthetic theory. The crux of the matter can be seen in the problem of how to determine what the artist's intent in a work of art is, and what justification there is

for judging that the appreciating mind can come to know the *same* intent. To view this problem in the light of art criticism is to observe how highly questionable it is to insist that criticism should not go beyond the frame of the work of art. Those critics who look to Croce's aesthetics to support their theory of criticism will, of course, insist upon the necessity of not going beyond the frame of the work of art. But their interest, as is Croce's, is primarily in the lyrical, and they stubbornly refuse to see that the critic should do something not merely for but *to* a work of art. They are consequently led to a kind of solipsism in art. But why should the critic slavishly attach himself to the artist, knowing as Ion did only his poet, deriving his inspiration from him, and having nothing to contribute of his own? If the magnetism of the critic is simply the weakened power derived from the poet, the lover of art had better go directly to the poet himself for his inspiration. If, however, the critic has something important to say, it must be because he himself brings something new to the work of art, and something which is both of general interest and which is supported by the work of art.

This last statement contains the gist of three principles of criticism I should like to enumerate. First, the critic should say something which is comprehensive in scope. Secondly, he should illumine some aspect of a work of art that would otherwise not be apparent. We may call this the principle of fecundity. Finally, he should show concretely how his judgments refer back to the work of art. We may call this the principle of documentation.

As to the principle of comprehensiveness of scope, we recognize that some forms of criticism are too specific to be of importance. Merely to point out random details about a work of art is to destroy deep-seated interest in art rather than to engender a growing, profound attachment to it. Thus when the eighteenth-century critic finds in *Othello* only that a lady should not marry a blackamoor and that she should be more careful of her linen, we are not impressed with the caliber of mind of the critic. He is harping on details that prevent us from sensing the structure as a whole. And what is more, his details are not energized by a theory that would permit new, basic insights into the work of art.

Final justification for the principle of comprehensiveness, as well as for our other two principles enumerated above, requires extended analysis and argument, beyond our present limits. Nevertheless, we may suggest the following considerations as relevant to establishing and justifying the first principle. We expect the critic to use standards that are comprehensive in scope, and that are not just *ad hoc*, applying merely to the particular work at hand. The reason for this is that to qualify as a critic a man must have more than sheer sensitivity to the sensuous and structural nature of a thing of beauty; he must have more or less explicit ideas of the relations of art to life, to morality, to religion, yes, even to science. Therefore his evaluations cannot be limited to the relations of works of art themselves, but also include the relations of art to other things. And it is this stricture which signifies that the critic cannot ignore philosophy, as, of course, no great critic has ever done. Thus, in the final analysis, metaphysics and art criticism are intimately interrelated. In short, the great critic must possess a philosophy of art, a view of the scheme of things in which art plays an important rôle in the life of man.



Second, is the principle of fecundity. Today it has become a commonplace that art must be reassessed in each different age. This can signify only that a work of art means something different to each age, and that with a changing outlook, judgments upon art must inevitably be altered. Surely we cannot profitably argue that any outlook is as good as any other; but on the other hand we cannot fail to realize that every outlook has some grasp of life, and that its insights are relevant to that view of life. Some outlook is necessary, and it is not really possible for human beings to encompass all outlooks in one synthetic view of all life. The Idealism of the past tried that, and failed. I do not mean to suggest that just *any* point of view a critic may adopt is acceptable. This is precisely the reason for introducing the criterion of fecundity, in order to account for new understanding and new interpretations of art, in harmony with the changing patterns of culture.

If the critic needs to be guided by general principles, it is no less urgent that he be guided by principles that help to reveal something new in a work of art, something beyond what is revealed by man's sensitivities, and something more fecund than what can be established through mere generality of scope. If only the intuitional sensitivities of man were involved in understanding art, as Croce seems to say, then criticism would be superfluous. In opposition to this point of view is the simple, but decisive, fact that criticism has been and is capable of yielding new insight into art. If, on the other hand, generality of scope were a sufficient principle, then the critic of today might simply repeat the criticism of yesterday. The principle of fecundity appears to have two interrelated foundations: (1) the personality of the critic, and (2) the pattern of his culture. That fresh and strong personalities arise and give expression to fresh and strong criticism is an often-repeated observation. But secondly, and perhaps more significant, is the fact that these personalities arise and mature amid changing patterns of culture in which new judgments are demanded in the light of new issues to be faced. Since art itself is sensitive to the demands of changing culture, it is only reasonable to expect that criticism too would respond to the creative and interpretive needs of the age.

Our final principle is that of documentation. Neither aesthetics nor art criticism can successfully proceed very far without concretely taking account of works of art. Theory is no substitute for keen perception, nor can it do double duty for itself and for experience too. For example, we cannot with reason say, that because certain theories of harmony work tolerably well for classical music, they will also work for Oriental and "primitive" music. A point of view that leaves the work of art untouched may be a neat, tidy point of view, but it is not one to be taken seriously by the critic.

Of the three criteria, that of documentation is subject to least controversy. It seems necessary to point out only that criticism is criticism *of art*, and that a critic who fails to manifest superior knowledge of the object of which he speaks is one who has no base of authority. To document his criticism, the critic requires: (1) a wide background of experience in his art, and (2) specific sensitivity to and keen perception of the work of art under consideration. He who knows only a single work of art is not to be trusted; and certainly he who, in spite of the fact

that he is blind to the intrinsic qualities of a work of art, nevertheless tries to evaluate it is more than worthless; he is a maniac. Criticism requires documentation, but not to the exclusion of the principles of comprehensiveness and fecundity.

Such a brief discussion can make no pretense to adequacy, but it may at least be useful for the light it throws on the doctrine of the "standard mind." We seem inevitably led to the conclusion that a naive theory of the objectivity of beauty is not acceptable, and that although we can expect a major degree of agreement on aesthetic matters, and can rely upon the fact that communication and intelligent criticism do actually occur, nevertheless a theory of the standard mind must ultimately take the point of view into account. It must take into account the relativism provided by that point of view. Once its principles are recognized, then agreement and disagreement become more intelligent, and then we may hope to give meaning to that most difficult of philosophical terms, objectivity. Thus our insistence is that a more adequate notion of objectivity in aesthetics will take into account the fact that great art criticism always goes beyond the frame of the work of art. That criticism does go beyond the frame is as it should be, for art cannot really be divorced from life without at the same time sounding its death knell. An acceptable aesthetic theory, as well as acceptable principles of criticism, will make room for the fact that art must continually be re-interpreted and reassessed in the light of man's changing ideals and experience.

#### ON "A COLLEGE PROGRAM IN AESTHETICS AND THE ARTS"

ALLAN H. GILBERT

In the December number of this *Journal*,<sup>1</sup> the Editor discusses the question: "What training is necessary for original research and creative scholarship in aesthetics?" He asks how such training can be improved and courageously provides a program for it. As a life-long student of English and Italian literature and of literary criticism, I should like to discuss the program set forth by Mr. Munro, with especial attention to its foundations.

Obviously the student in question must be one prepared to go far in making all knowledge his province, so that the Editor does not need to apologize for making his ideal program as difficult as Milton set forth in his *Tractate of Education*, with the remark that "this is not a bow for everyone to shoot in that counts himself a teacher." One must agree that, in the sense of an undergraduate program, "diversified, extensive study of the arts is not necessarily superficial, 'a mere smattering', as specialists often charge. It is possible to specialize in generalization; on the discovery, testing, and formulation of principles having wide application." The last presumably refers to discovery by the undergraduate for him-

<sup>1</sup> Vol. IV, no. 2, p. 115.

self rather than to new knowledge. Certainly the aesthetician is to deal with the question: What is art? He needs a solid basis for his answer.

The word *survey* occurs but twice in the Editor's program, yet the spirit of the whole is somewhat that of the survey. There is in Mr. Munro's program a great deal to be treated "in brief." Now Milton suggested the value of promiscuous reading, of "reading all manner of tractates and hearing all manner of reason." But such scurrying around—of undoubted value—needs to be balanced by intensive work such as is not demanded by Mr. Munro. What is being attempted is the training of a student who in mature years will bring out new and true ideas. Only a firm foundation can carry such a superstructure—"and the winds blew and beat upon that house, and it fell not." What is the value of generalizations that do not rest on the best knowledge yet attained?

But the "survey" can hardly do other than present conventionally accepted ideas. Indeed a teacher of original mind can hardly be patient with a survey, because it dooms him to repeating the consecrated formulas of text-books. He prefers to deal with the limited material which he has been able to reflect on until he can either approve, reject or modify the current idea. He hesitates to express revolt in other matters because he knows that his lack of knowledge will sometimes result in serious errors. Similarly the person of original mind will seldom write a history of such a subject as English literature. Bacon remarked that authorized books, censored by authority, are the language of the times. The history of English literature tends to be the language not even of the present but of the past, as far back as the eighteenth century. An advanced student of Shakespeare tells us that to a large extent the Shakespeare of our colleges is the creation of the critics of the seventeen hundreds. An aesthetic based on the current Shakespeare would be at best an eighteenth-century aesthetic. Such an aesthetic had its place in 1750 but is worthless now. Imperative then is an intensive study. Something of a solid aesthetic can be based on a genuine knowledge—acquired with whatever pain—of a single play or poem. No aesthetic can be based on out-moded, mistaken ideas such as must be the stock in trade of the survey—except in the hands of a historian such as is seldom found.

I shall continue with some remarks on the part of the program in which I feel most at home, that is, "6.a, Literature."

The teaching of English Composition is now generally so badly planned and executed as to be of minimum value. Would that it could be for a time in the hands of somebody with sound ideas in aesthetics or indeed even interested in practical results!

The history of English Literature is subject to all the diseases of the "survey." As commonly handled it is almost devoid of aesthetic value, tending to be historical in the worst sense, occupied with external minutiae of fact. Indeed recent critical thought has virtually abolished the old notion of the history of any literature. *Paradise Lost*, for example, is not to be explained by the continuity of English authors, though by a paradox it is more like the preceding English drama than history usually affirms. Its history is to be found in Homer, in Virgil, in Ariosto, in DuBartas, more than in the immediately preceding English verse. A teacher can tell pupils such a thing, but the knowledge becomes useful only

when the student has read the predecessor. It is fully intelligible only after intensive study of Milton such as can merely begin in a course wholly devoted to him. Indeed the competent teacher of Milton must spend much time in breaking down the errors disseminated by the histories.

As to American literature, it is happily difficult for a young person in America to escape *The One Hoss Shay*, *The British Prison Ship*, or the *Marshes of Glynn*. But as for special study, the issue rests on the type of poetry that provides a firm basis for generalizing to one who is to improve our answer to the question: What is poetry? Is the best basis furnished by the poetry of highest quality? Are Poe and Whitman as good witnesses as Sophocles and Dante? If not, much of the limited time of the young aesthete can hardly be spared for the Americans. The American scene is around him who will open his eyes, and perhaps Dante can serve to break the provincial shell better than can Whitman. Moreover, American literature is frequently, perhaps prevaingly, taught without benefit of aesthetic conceptions, consciously so. I quote from memory the dictum of a teacher of the subject: "The quality of most American poetry is such that it cannot be approached from a belletristic point of view. Therefore it must be considered as a commentary on American society." The work of the late Professor Parrington—an able man—emphasized this. He could edit the Connecticut Wits without being conscious of *Paradise Lost*, the key to some of their work. Milton to him meant the *Areopagitica*, because it dealt directly with a social problem.

Recent English literature is also open to him who has eyes; in my experience those eyes are often those of students whose courses are in the older great poets. It is difficult as an academic subject because few have been willing to pay the price of mastering it in the same way—or in a better way—as the older literature has been mastered. Various of the objections that can be made to American literature as a subject of formal study apply to it also.

Poetry in translation—for those who cannot read originals—is obviously a splendid thing. We can hardly have too many of the great authors accessible in English versions—new and better ones in the language of America today. Evidently a teacher of any literature should have read as widely as possible in other literatures, especially those likely to illuminate his own studies. A teacher of *Don Quixote* who is not also a teacher of *Orlando Furioso* and *Orlando Innamorato* is not living up to his opportunities. The comparative method must at times be used by all students, and some aspects of intensive study will hardly succeed without the use of comparison. For example, specialists in Milton's *Samson Agonistes* have until recently failed because they have not brought the work into comparison with English and yet more with Italian comedy. Yet the comparative method is not the same as comparative literature. To be sure, if a teacher is thoroughly grounded in what he teaches and has proper freedom, the department in which he appears does not matter. The danger run by the "comparatist" is that he sets out to compare things in which he is not properly informed. The comparison of four errors can hardly make a truth. Moreover, the proper method of study is an examination of one thing under light from all quarters. One may study Spenser in the light of Ariosto, or Ariosto in the light

of Virgil. The *sine qua non* is to exploit the possibilities of one poem as fully as possible. But if comparison is other than this, it fixes attention not on the poem itself, but merely on its similarities with another—not the main issue. Or the comparatist undertakes such minor matters as the Spanish students of Shakespeare; however interesting, this is quite different from the study of *Othello*.

Having been for many years a teacher of "comparative literature" so far as literary criticism is concerned, I cannot but agree heartily in Mr. Munro's call for that subject. Yet his detail for such a course suggests that he has not had opportunity to give the matter much thought, as appears in the repeated work *type*. It is evident that there are poems called epics, but recent study has pretty well disposed of such a category as more than an external convenience. Indeed a large amount of bad criticism has been brought upon us by assumption of the validity of literary types. That conception was once of some use to critics; it is now of less worth. The criticism of *Paradise Lost*, for example, is struggling to get rid of the notion that the poem is suitably characterized by putting it in the class with the *Iliad*, indebted to Homer though Milton was. On the other hand, it seems that as yet statistics, abnormal psychology, and psycho-analysis have so failed with the important problems of criticism that they have no place in the curriculum of the aesthetician.

As a believer in aesthetics, I suggest, though affirming the value of a manifold curiosity, that the indispensable center of training for the future aesthetician is close study of a few major examples from one or more of the great arts. This is more important than aesthetics itself. In fact there is no aesthetics worthy of the name that does not rest on such truth as we can attain about the work of art in itself. As Mr. Munro says: aesthetics is "based on more specific concrete studies of various arts and other contributory subjects." If the young man or woman is some day to contribute new ideas to aesthetics, he must be formed in a realm where new and sound ideas are at a premium. That realm is not that of the survey. It is rather to be found in the class of teacher who not only has an original mind but brings a wide variety of knowledge to bear on a narrow subject for a long period of time. Even such a teacher can hardly succeed with any of the arts unless he has at least implicit an aesthetic view of his material. The subject of the course matters less than the mind of the teacher. Ultimately the chief thing is the mind of the student himself. Teachers and courses may hinder or help; they cannot make.

## LETTERS PRO AND CON

To the Editor:

I do not believe that a *Letters to the Editor* section has been established as yet. But whether or not such a medium exists I should like to congratulate you on your thought-provoking note on "A College Program in Aesthetics and the Arts," with which I am in substantial agreement. As you say, there are many

disciplines with which the future student of aesthetics should become acquainted—almost too many for a four year college period. May I suggest, therefore, that for those who cannot afford the time for the psychology courses you suggest—general psychology, psychology of the individual personality and its development, social psychology, abnormal psychology, psychoanalysis, and educational psychology—a course in the psychology of music and/or art might serve reasonably well as a substitute for the pertinent high points one would be expected to absorb from this large range of courses.

For a number of years courses in the psychological aspects of aesthetics have been available in a handful of American colleges and universities. At Stanford I have for some years been offering a four quarter hour course limited to the psychology of music. This venture has proved of great benefit to me and, I hope, of some profit to the students. The topic coverage in the course is by no means complete, being frankly weighted along the lines of my own interests. The topics as recently treated are as follows:

- The social psychology of art norms (including the psychological tests of taste)
- The social psychology of the growth of musical scales.
- Methodologies and apparatus for the presentation of musical stimuli and the recording of the musical responses.
- Data from a variety of research areas (vibrato, etc.)
- “Capacity” and achievement tests in music.
- The behavioral characteristics of the musician.

PAUL R. FARNSWORTH

Dear Professor Ames,<sup>1</sup>

In your article in *J. Aesth.*, IV, p. 27 you suggest that there is no universal or traditional aesthetics having a real consistency, but only a variety of opinions expressed by individual philosophers. I would take issue with you on this. What I have sometimes called the ‘normal’ view of art is really a part of what Prof. Wilbur Urban calls the ‘common universe of discourse’ of the *Philosophia Perennis*. An English reviewer of my *Why Exhibit Works of Art?* speaks of the ‘massive agreement’ and ‘unanimous voice of spiritually educated mankind.’ It does seem to me that when you say the ‘appeal to tradition is confusing in view of the many traditions’ that you are using ‘tradition’ in the sense of ‘fashion’ rather than in the sense in which the word is used by those who do ‘appeal to tradition.’ As they see it, “Die Menschheitsbildung ist ein einheitliches Ganzes, und in den verschiedenen Kulturen findet man die Dialekte der *einen* Geistes-sprache”: and “Eine grosse Weltlinie der Metaphysik zieht sich durch aller Völker hindurch.” I have dealt with certain aspects of this situation in an article in the August ’45 issue of *Psychiatry* and many times elsewhere, e.g. in the immediately forthcoming issue of *Speculum*.

ANANDA K. COOMARASWAMY

<sup>1</sup> Having been shown the correspondence between Drs. Ames and Coomaraswamy, the Editor secured their permission to publish it.

Dear Dr. Coomaraswamy:

I appreciate very much your writing me as you did about my "Note on A History of Esthetics" in the Journal. You are quite right that I do not use the word 'tradition' as those use it who 'appeal to tradition.' They form an impressive company. And they must of course dismiss me as not belonging to the "spiritually educated"—in the phrase you say was used in reviewing your book. Here I can only say that I belong to a different tradition: pragmatic, humanist, pluralist. I was simply objecting to the omission of this standpoint in the book by Gilbert and Kuhn. It seems to me that the development of modern science, and the development of democratic ideas which took effect in the American and French revolutions, are having repercussions in aesthetics: not only by way of departure from a previous tradition, supposed to be massively and perennially universal, but also by way of a critique of belief in a former unity such as would depreciate what now seem to be the facts of cultural pluralism.

If you should be interested, I think you might get a clearer idea of what I found omitted in the Gilbert & Kuhn book, in the following articles of mine: "Social Esthetic, with Special Reference to Guyau," *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XLI, No. 4, February 17, 1944; "Volkelt's Saving Humor," *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. LIII, No. 3, May 1944.

VAN METER AMES

To the Editor:

In writing to Professor Ames (without thought of publication) I had not meant to discuss the relative merits of his and my points of view, but only to say that he did not seem to be using the word "tradition" in the "traditional" sense; and this he admits. I think I have shown in my *Why Exhibit Works of Art?* (1943, now o.p.) and *Figures of Speech or Figures of Thought?* (to appear immediately) that there is a theory of art that has been entertained universally, and with which there has been disagreement only at exceptional times or by individuals,—with respect to whom I would ask, with Plato "Why consider the inferior philosophers?" In any case, those "who appeal to tradition" are not putting forward views of "their own."

Professor Ames or anyone else is entirely free to disagree with the "traditional" theory. I do maintain, however, that this theory *must* be understood if we are to avoid the pathetic fallacy of reading into the minds of "primitive," classic, mediaeval and oriental artists our own aesthetic preoccupations. That this is a very real danger is made apparent in the way we use such terms as "inspiration" (see my article, s.v. in *Encyclopedia of the Arts*), "ornament," "nature," and even "art" itself in senses that are very different from those of the artists and theorists of the periods of which we are writing the history. And this makes it very difficult for the student to grasp the real spirit of the age that he is supposed to be studying objectively.

ANANDA K. COOMARASWAMY

## REVIEWS

GUGGENHEIMER, RICHARD. *Sight and Insight*. New York and London, 1945, Harper and Brothers, pp. ix + 246. 8 illustrations.

This is a difficult book to review. Its literary topography is as irregular as the Grand Canyon. At its lowest level it touches depths of illegibility that one seldom finds within the covers of a book. Too many sentences are sentences only by courtesy of the capital letter at the beginning and the period at the end, and too many words sound as if they had been drawn out of a hat. Consider, for example, this specimen from page 133: "For, out of the remote horizon, on a flat-surface representation such as a picture, must advance toward the self, or toward the horizon must recede from the self, a measured perspective which, on reaching the two-dimensional boundaries of the canvas surface, will continue their function to the completion of my latitudinal and longitudinal arcs, thus enveloping the seer to the full extent of his absorption." And note that there is another one of the same character in the same paragraph and two more no further away than the next page. Yet it must also be recognized that the same man who created these monstrosities can also write sentences that are brief and crisply epigrammatic and paragraphs that mount smoothly and nobly to their climax, and that many passages in the latter part of his book might be added together to form a stirring prose ode to the importance of inspiration in art.

The clue to this astonishing unevenness in style lies in this word "inspiration," but I did not recognize it until I came to a sentence on page 218: "The true painter has no need of consciously inventing and arranging on a canvas; in fact, the moment a painter does feel this need, it is an indication that he is not stirred by an authentic emotion, an aesthetic insight." It suddenly became clear that Mr. Guggenheimer, instead of being content, like so many preachers, to recommend his doctrine to others, had tried to practice it himself; and that when the inspiration was adequate the results were good, and when it was not they were very bad. He even seemed to confess his allegiance to this method in a sentence on page 222: "my mind now searches for the next words which shall materialize out of the vaporous immateriality of my thoughts an actualized expression that will say something to the reader."

One turns back with this key to the more difficult passages in the book—but only to decide that words in a sentence do need a good deal of "conscious arranging," and to suspect that brush-strokes on canvas require at least as much. Even in poetry and music the cases in which inspiration alone, uncontrolled and unaided, has produced even competent work are extremely rare. Mr. Guggenheimer's thesis is inspiring rather than sound.

I believe that the structure of the book can best be understood by regarding it as an application of the stream-of-consciousness method to the discussion of art. Mr. Guggenheimer presents a surprising range of ideas with the quick fluency of a kaleidoscope. Pattern succeeds pattern so rapidly that one begins to wonder whether they are bound together by any but the most superficial continuity of thought. It gradually becomes evident, however, that, as in a kaleidoscope, certain elements recur again and again. In Chapters IX, X, and XI, and later in XV and XVI, they shape up clearly enough to be accepted as the central thesis of the book. The essence of fine painting lies in the integration of the objects in a scene with the spaces that separate them, but this must be achieved by integrating both with the personality of the artist. Exposure to such an integration ought to be of ineffable value to a layman, but oftener than not he cannot benefit from it without profound preparation. If the remaining chapters are read as expansions of, commentaries on, or digressions from this theme they become considerably easier to understand than when they are taken in numerical order. Yet the best way to read it is as a sort of anthology of Mr. Guggenheimer's thoughts about many aspects of art, in which discontinuities and contradictions need not be taken too seriously. It will be a rich mine for anyone who will take the trouble to work it.

CARL THURSTON



MUELLER, GUSTAV E. *The World as Spectacle*. New York, 1944, Philosophical Library, pp. 207.

This book, subtitled "An Aesthetic View of Philosophy," begins with a "Prelude" describing the author's early "aesthetic existence" in Switzerland, Italy, Greece, Germany; moves through Greek thought to general considerations of nature (as viewed aesthetically), beauty, and art; then turns to a more concrete account of the various arts and artistic styles; and culminates in chapters on the art of living and the function of the art critic. The philosophical viewpoint is that of absolute idealism. Thus, for the author, "The dialectical whole of reality, the universe is the truth. . . ." "Beauty" is said to be "ontologically valid," is identified with "the living universe as one spectacle," and, according to the author, is "reflected" as "the one aesthetic ideal" by the many beauties in nature and in artistic symbols. These quotations should not discourage from reading the book those who belong among the "various psychologistic, positivistic, pragmatic, empiristic skeptics" who are rebuked throughout the work as in some sense denying that there is aesthetic experience. For, as Dewey has pointed out, the idealists have often well described the kind of organization typical of art, and one can profit from their descriptions without going on to attribute the organization of art to the universe at large. And Dr. Mueller exhibits in his work the aesthetic sensitivity to the potentialities for organization and expression of the various arts and an awareness of the peculiar values of art that have characterized, often, the idealists. Further, the book is not a mere echo of Hegel, whose influence the author acknowledges in the preface. The movement of the dialectic, under the guidance of Dr. Mueller, is comparatively sketchy and spasmodic. In fact, Dr. Mueller appears to be more interested in persuading the reader to share his aesthetic experiences and valuations of art and life, than in making dialectical transitions from topic to topic. Much of the book is written in the language of poetry and myth, and is, presumably, to be appreciated positively or rejected on grounds of artistic sympathy and taste rather than agreed with or not on theoretic grounds.

From the viewpoint of the reviewer, who regards the logic of science as adequate for dealing with any subject-matter, the book is theoretically weak. Its definitions are given in metaphorical terminology that does not admit of precision and impedes understanding of the theses in which the defined terms appear. The only developed argument in the work, that which attempts to establish something asserted by the sentence "Beauty is ontologically valid," is difficult to follow, since the meaning of the sentence is never made plain. One does gather that the thesis is offered as one denied by the various "positivistic, pragmatic, empiristic skeptics" and (that according to the author) the "skeptics," in denying it, are unable to distinguish aesthetic from other phenomena, cannot in fact even believe that there is artistic and aesthetic experience, and can "never advise anyone to see a play or to visit a beautiful spot, because there are no such things to refer to." But, to consider specific cases, it is difficult to see how the work of Santayana, Prall, Dewey, or Ducasse could have these consequences.

ISABEL CREED HUNGERLAND

GUYS, CONSTANTIN. *Femmes Parisiennes*. 24 collotypes. New York, Pantheon Books, 1945.

DAUMIER, HONORÉ. *Hunting and Fishing*. 24 lithographs. New York, Pantheon Books, 1945.

RICHARDSON, EDGAR P. *American Romantic Painting*. New York, E. Weyhe, 1944. 50 pp. text, 236 illus.

A famous art historian, well known for his theoretical, historical and aesthetic speculations, never would enter a museum or a private collection without complaining, "Why, these damned originals, they are so confusing." Although obviously uttered in a sense of irony, there is still a grain of truth in it. Art historians and aestheticians, accustomed to work to a large extent with reproductions, only too easily lose their feeling for the specific qualities of the original. Therefore three publications on art of the nineteenth century

deserve special mentioning here. In three different techniques, the quality of the respective originals is conveyed as nearly as possible. The colotype technique is used for reproducing Constantin Guys's sparkling drawings of Parisian life of the middle of the nineteenth century. These drawings from the collection of Henri Bernstein are reproduced here for the first time. The "Pantheon Books," which published them, did a wonderful job, bringing out the intimate shades and nuances of dark and light and the characteristic qualities of Guys's penstroke. The artistic qualities of one of the greatest masters of French drawings need not be discussed here, but it should be pointed out that, next to original drawings, this immaculate reproduction gives the best opportunity to explain specific possibilities of drawing to the student.

Three series of Daumier's inexhaustable graphic work are published also by Pantheon Books, a separate portfolio each, topically arranged: Hunting and Fishing; Married Life; Law and Justice. Here photogravure is used for the reproduction of the original lithographs. Although the publication actually represents a reproduction after a reproduction, Daumier's mastership in the lithographic technique is so superb that the twofold translation does not take away the essential spontaneity of expression. The interest in the subject matter only too often deviates the spectator from a consideration of the masterly economy of Daumier's stroke, which makes him never a mere illustrator but lifts his works from the realm of amusing and sometimes bitter narration into that of an ingeniously organized visual objectivation.

As to subject matter, Edgar P. Richardson's book represents another world. American Romantic painting is rather completely covered by one of the leading experts in this field. Beyond the analysis of its social and literary background, we find an exhaustive catalogue listing the main painters with their main works, giving all necessary data based on thorough research. However, these values would not motivate its mentioning here. It is the supreme quality of the halftones, so seldom experienced in art books, which makes this comprehensive publication far superior to the output of books on American art which now begins to overflow the market. Here is really meat in the analytical treatment of the subject as well as in the reproduction, enough of substance to make many second-hand treatments of the same subject appear superfluous.

PAUL ZUCKER

NAHM, MILTON C. *Aesthetic Experience and Its Presuppositions*. New York, 1946, Harper & Brothers Publishers, pp. xiii + 554.

Aesthetic experience, according to Dr. Nahm, presents certain conflicting aspects whose presence creates for the philosophy of art a problem, the correct resolution of which provides a key to an understanding of the place and function of art in life. This resolution Dr. Nahm seeks to provide in a book characterized by careful analysis and criticism of classical and contemporary aesthetic theories, closely reasoned argument abundantly supported by illustrations drawn from the world of art, and, at the conclusion, a dénouement which in its sweep and its ingeniousness left this reviewer somewhat breathless.

Specifically, the antinomies that fine art presents lie in that dual character which permits it to be condemned as deceptive, trivial, degrading, appealing to the brutish in man, and consequently producing discontent, at the same time as it is hailed as a source of inspiration, ennobling and liberating the spirit and releasing energy and creative power in such a manner as to produce a sense of exaltation.

For this dual character traditional theories of aesthetic are incapable of supplying either an explanation or a resolution. "Ateleological" theories, whether composed in terms of a beauty that is transcendental or in terms of "absolutely beautiful forms" that are immanent in the structural properties of objects, fail to render an empirical account of the value of art in terms of the concrete nature of the art work and the percipient's response to it. "Non-aesthetic teleological" theories, which explain the nature of art creation in terms of the achievement of practical ends (moral, political, religious), can account for the seriousness and value of art, but are unable to free it from the "tyranny" of utilitarian con-

cerns. On the other hand, theories of aesthetic surface, which restrict attention to the internal characteristics of the object, ignore that which is most important for an adequate understanding of aesthetic experience, namely the relation of the artist to the sources of his artistic ideas and to the work of art which embodies as symbol the feelings derived from those sources.

Fundamental to Dr. Nahm's entire aesthetic is his analysis of feeling. Feeling is a *continuum* of which "emotion" is the median range, "instinct" and "mood" the two extremes. Instinctive reactions to stimuli are overt, reflex, unselective, characteristic of animals and the "reproductive imagination" of man. Emotional responses are more peripheral, self-contained, and selective than instinctive ones, but still reflect an "unstable equilibrium." Mood, on the other hand, is definitely peripheral and incipient as behavior, and while it is a response to external factors and to that extent reproductive, is also productive and creative of novelty. Mood is the matrix of artistry and of aesthetic experience. The artist communicates his feelings by generic symbols which evoke in the percipient corresponding feelings, because the latter shares with the artist certain biological and cultural predispositions to react in typical ways. Since, however, to the extent that the aesthetic mood is reproductive, it recognizes its kinship with a level of uncontrolled response, of primitive, brutish response from which man has barely emerged, it is natural that aesthetic experience should be qualified by discontent. On the other hand, in the realization that man *has* evolved, that he is able, in mood, to respond to symbols in a way that does not require overt action, herein is to be found the secret of art's exalting power.

The solution of the original paradox suggests also the explanation of art's place and value in man's total existence. Aesthetic experience establishes "moods of creativity" and of freedom that render the experiencer more effective in non-aesthetic pursuits. "From the experience induced by reproductive imagination and hinting at discontent, but equally compact of freedom and exaltation induced by productive imagination, there is derived the courage to face new obstacles." (p. 483). "Art inquires of each man, 'What is there to fear?' " (p. 485). And the reply comes, "The measure of the enemy has been taken." And so we reach the somewhat astonishing conclusion that the prime end of art activity is to recharge the failing courage of men, to remind them that when "the problems of the present appear to burden them with insuperable difficulties, the experience of fine art . . . informs us that different foes, long since overcome, have given in the past the false appearance of invincibility." (p. 485).

In the reviewer's opinion the most significant contribution of the book is to be seen in its clarification of the relation between the aesthetic and non-aesthetic factors in art experience. Yet it may also be said that its major defect arises from a confusion of precisely these factors. For it seems apparent that, in the argument for his main thesis, Dr. Nahm gets out of the aesthetic experience a great deal more than is—phenomenologically speaking—to be found in it. Not all art, not even all profoundly moving art, stirs its percipients to an "awareness of man's progress." Exaltation, grounded in the emancipation from the passions, may come out of retrospective reflection on art experience, but that it is "the dominant feeling in aesthetic experience" (p. 486) is not likely to meet with general acceptance. The very subtlety of the argument tends to render dubious its validity.

It is to be remarked also that there appear to be two theories of exaltation provided. The one we have just examined. The other explains the exaltation that qualifies productive imagination as being associated with the successful organization of the factors within the created object which produce the aesthetic mood. I find no evidence that Dr. Nahm has disentangled these two doctrines, which appear to me distinct. It may be added that on the second doctrine, as on the first, exaltation seems to be superimposed on, rather than ingredient in, the aesthetic response as such.

Finally, it is worth observing that Dr. Nahm has given us an analytical and critical account of certain aspects of the history of aesthetics that is of very great value on its own account and quite apart from its special incidence upon the problem in which it had its inception.

KRENEK, ERNST (Ed.). RUSSELL G. HARRIS, VIRGINIA SEAY, and MARTHA JOHNSON. *Hamline Studies in Musicology*. St. Paul, Minn. 1945, Burgess Publishing Co., pp. vii + 99, 26 plates of musical examples.

The Hamline Studies in Musicology are written from a point of view which too rarely finds expression in scholarly works on music, the point of view of the creative artist. The editor, Ernst Krenek, at present Dean of the School of Fine Arts of Hamline University, is a well-known composer, and he has taken pains to introduce the three contributors to the volume as composers as well as serious students of their art. What a creative musician finds it profitable to study and analyze immediately takes on interest because of that fact. We understand certain aspects of Schumann's style when we know that he was devoted to the music of Bach. Krenek and his students, however, have turned rather to the ancient Gregorian melodies and to polyphonic vocal compositions of the fifteenth century.

The first study, by Russell G. Harris, is a comparison of the rhythmic and metric aspects of Gregorian chant with those of polyphonic masses by Dufay and his pupil Okeghem. Harris shows that the complex rhythms employed by these masters resemble similar effects in Gregorian song. Yet the resemblances, interesting though they are, raise certain questions of historical probability. It is, of course, only reasonable to expect that a composer who constructs a composition by adding melodies of his own to a Gregorian subject will harmonize his additions with the character of the traditional melody. But, even if we accept the Solesmes interpretation as the sole basis for discussion, (though it has received official sanction, it is not the only theory), we would still need to demonstrate that Gregorian song as Dufay and Okeghem experienced it conformed to these theories. Yet we know that before this period Gregorian song had begun to undergo deteriorating influences which, by the sixteenth century, led to the loss of its free rhythmic movement.

Virginia Seay, in the second essay, considers the problem of "mode" in Gregorian melodies and in later compositions for voices. Mode in this sense refers to the selection of particular tones as the basis for a composition. It may also refer to characteristic tone sequences. The paper demonstrates that the so called "Church Modes," the systematic arrangement of scales which serve as a basis for the classification of Gregorian song, do in fact form too narrow a basis for the description of certain melodies. The music is, in other words, richer and more varied than the theoretical concepts which were superimposed upon it. The inadequacy of theory becomes even more apparent when the "mode" of a polyphonic composition is in question. The usual rule according to which the mode of a composition is determined by that of the tenor is quite properly rejected as inadequate. Mode in a polyphonic work is, after all, an effect arising both from the characteristics of the individual voices and from their combinations.

In the final essay Martha Johnson compares the melodic and rhythmic patterns of Gregorian song with those employed in the twelve-tone technique. The composer of the fifteenth century chose a traditional melody as the basis of his vocal compositions. In a comparable fashion the modern composer may select a "tone row" from the chromatic scale which is repeated as a unifying device. In both cases the chosen tone-sequence also influences the character and the construction of the other parts of the composition. This study, however, is largely restricted to a discussion of characteristic melodic units as they are combined, repeated and varied in chosen Gregorian chants and in modern compositions by Webern, Schönberg and Krenek.

In general this volume, with its emphasis on technical analysis, will commend itself to the specialist rather than the reader with a general interest in the arts. Musically trained readers, however, will find it novel in approach and will be interested in its juxtaposition of the ancient and the contemporary in music.

CHARLES HUGHES

MIDDELDORF, ULRICH. *Raphael's Drawings*. New York 1945, H. Bittner and Co., pp. 56, 87 pl.

At the first perusal of a book on Raphael's drawings the modern observer may be left distanced by the self-contained typology of this artist's men and women, but he will feel

these drawings grow on him from one time to the next with ever increasing intensity. The absolute homogeneity of style in every line ever drawn by this master, his dwelling in a zone in which the existence of "Beauty" is not even questioned, the coinciding of flowing line and flowing pose, the dwelling of generalized concepts in moderately individualized bodies—all this creates the classical atmosphere of well-being which is to us men of the twentieth century no longer an instantaneous experience.

If I have to blame something on this excellent publication then it is the author's unquestioned acceptance of Raphael's "divinity," bolstering its claim up with innumerable and often charming quotations culled from wide readings in the literature of the 18th and 19th century. Yet we are suspicious about the exactitude of eulogies in the manner of Vasari's famous introduction to his vita of Raphael. Too similarly read some of his other introductions, proving thus more about the literary style of the Renaissance than about the artist described by him.

The book consists of 23 pages of text, of which the first 12 retell in a simple and precise manner the life of the artist and discuss the purpose and the method of his drawings. From page 13 on the author deals with the nature of Raphael's art and the story of his fame. From this point on the reviewer does not feel completely at ease. He shuns sentences like these: "Beauty, however, cannot be achieved artificially disregarding nature or doing force to it. The result would be failure." Such a sentence has validity for Raphael but only partially for Michelangelo, less for Greco and none for Picasso. Yet the author does not admit such strangers to his "Temple of the Muses". Raphael Mengs and Reynolds, Shaftesbury and Lessing, Ingres and Algarotti are invited to bear witness for "la religion de Raphael" (Ingres).

We are on safer ground in the 23 page catalogue in which each drawing is briefly but expertly described as we would expect it from one of the most reliable connoisseurs of the Renaissance period. Besides, the author pays devoted tribute to his (and this reviewer's) teacher, the late Oskar Fischel, to whom we owe the fundamental work on Raphael's drawings; in fact, one of the most exacting studies ever dedicated to the drawings of an individual artist. This critical catalogue too is "embellished" by classicist quotations, ten of which weigh less heavily than the observation by Max Klinger (No. 47, p. 41), "Raphael's drawings are made in preparation for painting. More or less clearly he had a picture in mind. Drawing served him to project his thoughts into a plane or to prepare for painting in line and form, the figures imagined." Purposefulness of his drawings and preconceivedness of his image world, inflated *a posteriori* with nature observation, these are the central facts for their understanding. From the point of view of the art historian very little could be added to the critical catalogue which is done with caution and experience. Only a few remarks may be added here: No. 46 (John the Baptist, London, Br.M.) has in this reviewer's opinion no relation to the Adam on the ceiling of the Stanza della Segnatura, but rather belongs to compositions such as the drawing of Mars (No. 82) which are reflected in the statue of Jonah by Lorenzetti in Santa Maria del Popolo in Rome, to which—according to Vasari—Raphael has lent his hand. No. 67 (draped figure and Apollo, Lille). Although on back of a drawing with studies for the "Disputa," the figures belong to the "School of Athens." Fischel has pointed this out for the bearded man (as mentioned in the catalogue) but the Apollo seems to be a sketch for the statue of the god in the "School of Athens."

The selection of the drawings is very convincing, demonstrating the various aspects of Raphael's draughtsmanship, with inclusion of some of the magnificent chiaroscuro drawings which are very little known. The reproductions come out excellently and their arrangement on the pages is agreeable. Here one feels the support of an understanding publisher who has done much for the publication of fine books on drawings. Altogether this is a pleasurable publication which does justice to a great draughtsman.

ALFRED NEUMEYER

## SELECTIVE CURRENT BIBLIOGRAPHY

July 1, 1945–December 31, 1945

The following bibliography covers primarily books and articles published during the period from July 1st to December 31st 1945. However, certain items published before July 1st 1945, which were not included in the previous bibliography,<sup>1</sup> appear here.

Thanks are due to the following members of the Society for help in compiling the bibliography: Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, Paul R. Farnsworth, Milton S. Fox, Isabel Creed Hungerland, Bertram Jessup, Craig LaDrière, Hugo Leichtentritt, Margaret Lyon, Jermayne MacAgy, Douglas MacAgy, Josephine Miles, Manuel Olguin, De Witt H. Parker, Catherine Rau, Wolfgang Stechow, Carl Thurston.

HELMUT HUNGERLAND

## ARCHITECTURE AND CITY PLANNING

- Faczynski, Jerzy. *Studies in Polish Architecture*. Liverpool 1945, University Press of Liverpool, pp. 12, 118 plates.
- Nelson, George and Wright, Henry. *Tomorrow's House*. New York 1945, Simon & Schuster, pp. 214.
- Sitte, Camillo. *The Art of Building Cities*. tr.: Charles T. Stewart. New York 1945, Reinhold Publishing Corporation, pp. xi + 128.
- Ware, Dora and Beatty, Betty. *A Short Dictionary of Architecture*. New York 1945, Philosophical Library, pp. 109.

## Articles

- Maza, de la, Francisco. "Las Capillas Abiertas de Mexico." *El Hijo Prodigio* Mayo 1945, vol. III, no. 26, Año III, pp. 80-81, 9 illustrations.
- Zucker, Paul. "Space Concept and Pattern Design in Radio-Centric City Planning." *Art Quarterly* Spring 1945, vol. VIII, no. 2, pp. 99-115.
- Zucker, Paul. "The Aesthetics of Space in Architecture, Sculpture, and City Planning." *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* September 1945, vol. IV, no. 1, pp. 12-19.

## CULTURAL HISTORY, SOCIOLOGY &amp; ANTHROPOLOGY

- Benesch, Otto. *The Art of the Renaissance in Northern Europe*. Cambridge, Mass. 1945, Harvard University Press, pp. 174, 80 plates.
- Bowers, David F. ed. *Foreign Influences in American Life*. Princeton 1945, Princeton University Press, pp. 254.
- Chen, Jack. *Soviet Art and Artists*. Forest Hills, N. Y., 1945, Transatlantic Arts, pp. 106, ill.
- Minns, Ellis. *The Art of the Northern Nomads*. New York 1945, Oxford University Press, pp. 54, ill.
- The Negro Comes of Age: A National Survey of Contemporary American Artists*. Albany, N. Y. 1945, Albany Institute of History and Art.

## Articles

- Cassirer, E. "Ficino's Place in Intellectual History." *Journal of the History of Ideas* October 1945, vol. VI, no. 4, pp. 483-501.
- Loewenfeld, Viktor. "Negro Art Expression in America." *Madison Quarterly* January 1945, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 26-31.

## DANCE AND THEATER ARTS

- Nathan, George J. *The Theater Book of the Year, 1944-1945*. New York 1945, A. A. Knopf, pp. 365.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, December 1945, vol. IV, no. 2, pp. 123-130.

Shipley, Joseph T. "Can We have an International Dance?" *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* September 1945, vol. IV, no. 1, pp. 29-31.

## LITERATURE

- Baldensperger, Fernand & Craig, H. S., Jr. *La Critique et l'Histoire littéraires en France au Dix-neuvième et au début du Vingtième Siècle*. New York, 1945, Brentano, pp. 244.
- Bate, Walter J. *The Stylistic Development of Keats*. New York 1945, Modern Language Association, pp. 225.
- Bennet, Joan. *Virginia Woolf: Her Art as a Novelist*. New York 1945, Harcourt, Brace, pp. 150.
- Boyd, Elizabeth F. *Byron's 'Don Juan': A Critical Study*. New Brunswick, N. J. 1945, Rutgers University Press, pp. ix + 193.
- Brooks, Cleanth & Heilman, Robert B. *Understanding Drama*. New York 1945, Henry Holt, pp. viii + 515.
- Burke, Kenneth. *A Grammar of Motives*. New York 1945, Prentice-Hall, pp. xxiii + 530.
- Cohen, Morris. *A Preface to Logic*. New York 1945, Henry Holt, (ch. 3: on meaning; ch. 5: on the logic of fiction, metaphor and figurative truth; ch. 8: values, norms and science).
- Draper, John William. *The Humors and Shakespeare's Characters*. Durham, N. C. 1945, Duke University Press, pp. 133.
- Dupee, F. W. ed. *The Question of Henry James: A Collection of Critical Essays*. New York 1945, Henry Holt, pp. 324.
- Farrell, James T. *League of Frightened Philistines and Other Papers*. New York 1945, Vanguard Press, pp. 224.
- Fox, Ralph. *The Novel and the People*. New York 1945, Devin-Adair, pp. 98.
- Granville-Barker, Harley G. *The Use of the Drama*. Princeton, N. J. 1945, Princeton University Press, pp. 97.
- Hall, Vernon, Jr. *Renaissance Literary Criticism: A Study of its Social Content*. New York 1945, Columbia University Press, pp. 260.
- Hodges, H. A. *Wilhelm Dilthey: An Interpretation*. Oxford 1945, Oxford University Press.
- Hopkins, Gerard Manley. *Gerard Manley Hopkins by the Kenyon Critics*—F. R. Leavis, Robert Lowell, Herbert Marshall McLuhan, Josephine Miles, Arthur Mizener, Austin Warren, Harold Whitehall, New York 1945, New Directions, pp. 144.
- Liljegren, S. B. *The Revolt against Romanticism in American Literature as Evidenced in the Works of S. L. Clemens*. Upsala, Sweden 1945, A.-B. Lundequista Bokhandeln, pp. 60.
- Rilke, Rainer Maria. *The Letters of Rainer Maria Rilke. 1892-1910*. transl. from the German by Jane B. Greene & M. D. Herter Norton, New York 1945, Norton, pp. 399.
- Shapiro, Karl. *Essay on Rime*. New York 1945, Reynal & Hitchcock, pp. 72.
- Slochow, Harry. *No Voice is Wholly Lost: Writers and Thinkers in War and Peace*. New York 1945, Creative Age Press, pp. 404.
- Spring, Powell. *The Spirit of Literature*. Winter Park, Fla. 1945, The Orange Press, pp. 145.
- Stahl, E. L. *Hölderlin's Symbolism: An Essay*. Oxford 1945, Basil H. Blackwell, pp. 54.
- Starr, Nathan Comfort. *The Dynamics of Literature*. New York 1945, Columbia University Press, pp. 123.
- Trueblood, Paul Graham. *The Flowering of Byron's Genius: Studies in Byron's Don Juan*. Stanford, Calif. 1945, Stanford University Press, pp. xi + 183.
- Weiss, T., ed. *Selections from the Notebooks of Gerard Manley Hopkins*. New York 1945, New Directions.

Willibrand, William. *Ernst Toller and his Ideology*. Iowa City 1945, University of Iowa Press, pp. 123.

*Articles*

- Aldridge, Alfred Owen. "Akenside and Imagination." *Studies in Philology* October 1945, vol. 42, no. 4, pp. 769-792.
- Alexander, Ian W. "Novelist-Philosophers, II: The Scepticism of Anatole France." *Horizon* January 1945, vol. 11, no. 61, pp. 31-49.
- "Anglo-French and Franco-American Studies: A Current Bibliography." *Romanic Review* October 1945, vol. 36, no. 3. (Eighth annual survey of books, articles, and reviews of 1944 dealing with Anglo-French and Franco-American culture and literary history from the sixteenth century to the present.)
- Annan, Noel. "Novelist-Philosophers, III: Turgenev." *Horizon* March 1945, vol. 11, no. 63, pp. 152-163.
- Ayer, A. J. "Novelist-Philosophers, V.: Jean-Paul Sartre." *Horizon* July 1945, vol. 12, no. 67, pp. 12-26. August 1945, vol. 12, no. 68, pp. 101-110.
- Bass, A. N. "What Criticism is, and Isn't." *Scholastic* February 1945, vol. 45, p. 24.
- Bezzola, Reto R. "Die Dichtung des absoluten Wortes." *Trivium* April 1945, Jahrgang III, Heft 2, pp. 130-141.
- Bishop, J. P. "Poetry and Painters." *Sewanee Review* April 1945, vol. 53, pp. 247-258.
- Blackmur, R. P. "The Economy of the American Writer." *Sewanee Review* April 1945, vol. 53, pp. 175-185.
- Bluhm, Heinz. "Ernst Cassirer und die deutsche Philologie." *Monatshefte für deutschen Unterricht* November 1945, vol. 37, no. 7, pp. 466-74.
- Bluth, T. K. "The Revival of Schelling." *Horizon* September 1945, vol. 12, no. 69, pp. 156-178.
- Boys, Richard. "The Detective Story Today." *Quarterly Review of the Michigan Alumnus* Spring 1945, vol. 51, pp. 235-245.
- Brace, Marjorie. "Thematic Problems of the American Novelist." *Accent* Autumn 1945, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 44-53.
- Brock, Erich. "Zum Problem der Stilkritik." *Trivium* Januar 1945, Jahrgang III, Heft 1, pp. 72-77.
- Brock-Sulzer, Elisabeth. "Klassik und Barock bei Ronsard." *Trivium* April 1945, Jahrgang III, Heft 2, pp. 148-155. (Critical review of: Marcel Raymond, *Classique et Baroque dans la Poésie de Ronsard*, Basel 1944.)
- Brock-Sulzer, Elisabeth. "Karl Krauss als Stilkritiker." *Trivium* October 1945, Jahrgang III, Heft 4, pp. 300-315.
- Brown, Stuart G. "Emerson's Platonism." *New England Quarterly* September 1945, vol. 18, pp. 325-345.
- Brown, Wallace C. "The 'Heresy' of the Didactic." *University of Kansas City Review* Spring 1945, vol. 11, pp. 178-184.
- Burgum, Edwin B. "The Place of Literature in a Liberal Education." *New Mexico Quarterly Review* Summer 1945, vol. 15, pp. 159-175.
- Burke, Kenneth. "Excerpts from a Grammar of Motives." *Accent* Autumn 1945, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 7-12.
- Cady, Edwin Harrison. "A Note on Howells and 'the smiling aspects of life.'" *American Literature* May 1945, vol. 17, pp. 175-178.
- Carpenter, F. I. "Modern Philosophical [literary] Criticism." *University of Kansas City Review* Summer 1945, vol. 11, pp. 247-251.
- Carpio, Campio. "Ideas Estéticas en las Antologías de Carlos Garcia-Prada." *Revista Iberoamericana* May 1945, vol. 9, pp. 209-215.
- Charles, Lucile Hoerr. "The Clown's Function." *Journal of American Folklore* January-March 1945, vol. 58, pp. 25-34.
- Chase, Richard. "The Sense of the Present." *Kenyon Review* Spring 1945, vol. 7, pp. 218-231.



- Collar, D. M. "Novelist-Philosophers, VI: André Malraux." *Horizon* October 1945, vol. 12, no. 70, pp. 226-235.
- Ellison, Ralph. "Richard Wright's Blues." *Antioch Review* June 1945, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 198-211.
- Engstrom, Alfred G. "The Formal Short Story in France and its Development before 1850." *Studies in Philology* July 1945, vol. 42, no. 3, pp. 627-639.
- Farber, Marjorie. "Subjectivity in Modern Fiction." *Kenyon Review* Autumn 1945 vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 645-653.
- Farrell, James T. "Fiction and the Philistine." *University of Kansas City Review* Spring 1945, vol. 11, pp. 185-187.
- Fogle, Richard H. "Romantic Bards and Metaphysical Reviewers." *E L H* September 1945, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 221-250.
- Frank, Joseph. "Spatial Form in Modern Literature, III (concluded)." *Sewanee Review* October-December 1945, vol. 53, no. 4, pp. 643-653.
- Freud, Sigmund. "Dostoyevski and Parricide." *Partisan Review* Summer 1945, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 530-545.
- Gilbert, Katherine. "A Spatial Configuration in Five Recent Poets." *South Atlantic Quarterly* October 1945, vol. 44, no. 4, pp. 422-431.
- Giovannini, G. "Agnolo Segni and a Renaissance Definition of Poetry." *Modern Language Quarterly* June 1945, vol. 6, pp. 167-173.
- Hart, Lawrence; Moore, Rosalie; Barlow, Robert; Wells, Marie; McGahey, Jeanne. "Ideas of Order in Experimental Poetry." *Circle* 1945, no. 6, pp. 1-30.
- Hays, H. R. "A Defense of the Thriller." *Partisan Review* Winter 1945, vol. 12, pp. 135-137.
- Heilman, Robert. "Mr. Bentley's Bad Boys: 'Reactionaries.'" *Sewanee Review* Winter 1945, vol. 53, pp. 103-119.
- Householder, Fred W. Jr. "The First Chapter of the Poetics." *American Journal of Philology* July 1945, vol. 66, pp. 266-278.
- Jarrell, Randall. "Stages of Auden's Ideology." *Partisan Review* Fall 1945, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 437-448.
- Kliger, Samuel. "The 'Goths' in England: An Introduction to the Gothic Vogue in Eighteenth-Century Aesthetic Discussion." *Modern Philology* November 1945, vol. XLIII, no. 2, pp. 107-117.
- Kwiat, Joseph J. "Thoreau's Philosophical Apprenticeship." *New England Quarterly* March 1945, vol. 18, pp. 51-69.
- Magny, Claude-Edmonde. "La Critique aux Limites de la Littérature." *Esprit* January 1945, vol. 13, pp. 161-184.
- Magny, Claude-Edmonde. "Système de Sartre." *Esprit* March 1945, vol. 13, pp. 564-580.
- Matthiessen, F. O. "The Problem of the Private Poet." *Kenyon Review* Autumn 1945, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 589-598.
- Masson, André. "A Crisis of the Imagination." *Horizon* July 1945, vol. 12, pp. 42-45.
- McMahon, Amos Philip. "Francis Bacon's Essay 'Of Beauty.'" *Publications of the Modern Language Association* September 1945, vol. 60, no. 3, pp. 716-760.
- Miles, Josephine. "From Good to Bright." *Publications of the Modern Language Association* September 1945, vol. 60, no. 3, pp. 766-775.
- Opler, Marvin and Obayashi, F. "Senryu Poetry as Folk and Community Expression." *Journal of American Folklore* January-March 1945, vol. 58, pp. 1-11.
- Peyre, Henri. "The Resistance and Literary Revival in France." *Yale Review* September 1945, vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 84-92.
- Pitcher, Seymour. "Aristotle's Good and Just Heroes." *Philological Quarterly* January 1945, vol. 24, pp. 1-11.
- Pitcher, Seymour. "Further Comment on Aristotle's Heroes." *Philological Quarterly* April 1945, vol. 24, pp. 190-191.
- Portuondo, José Antonio. "Aproximacion a la Poética de Dilthey." *Cuadernos Americanos* Septiembre-Octubre 1945, vol. 23, Año IV, pp. 108-131.

- Remenyi, Joseph. "Sincerity in Literature." *Personalist* Autumn 1945, vol. XXVI, no. 4, pp. 375-386.
- Schmid, Ruth. "Das 'Reine Theater' Racine's." *Trivium* Januar 1945, Jahrgang III, Heft 1, pp. 38-67.
- Schwartz, Delmore. "A Literary Provincial." *Partisan Review* Winter 1945, vol. 12, pp. 138-142 (on Yvor Winters).
- Scott, J. D. "Novelist-Philosophers, IV: André Gide." *Horizon* April 1945, vol. 11, no. 64, pp. 267-279.
- Silz, Walter. "Otto Ludwig and the Process of Poetic Creation." *Publications of the Modern Language Association* September 1945, vol. 60, no. 3, pp. 860-79.
- Simons, Hi. "The Genre of Wallace Stevens." *Sewanee Review* Autumn 1945, vol. 53, no. 4, pp. 566-580.
- Spoerri, Théophile. "Le Rythme Tragique." *Trivium* August 1945, Jahrgang III, Heft 3, pp. 161-184.
- Staiger, Emil. "Versuch über den Begriff des Schönen." *Trivium* August 1945, Jahrgang III, Heft 3, pp. 185-197.
- Stimson, Anna K. [Children's] "Cries of Defiance and Derision, and Rhythmic Chants of West Side New York City, 1893-1903." *Journal of American Folklore* April-June 1945, vol. 58, pp. 124-129.
- Stoll, Elmer Edgar. "The Validity of the Poetic Vision: Keats and Spenser." *Modern Language Review* January 1945, vol. 40, pp. 1-7.
- Sylvester, Harry. "A Note on Criticism: Roman Catholic." *Commonweal* March 23, 1945, vol. 41, pp. 562-564.
- Symons, Julian. "Restoration Comedy." *Kenyon Review* Spring 1945, vol. 7, pp. 185-197.
- Tate, Allen. "The New Provincialism." *Virginia Quarterly Review* Spring 1945, vol. 21, pp. 262-272.
- Taylor, Houghton W. "Particular Character: An Early Phase of a Literary Evolution." *Publications of the Modern Language Association* March 1945, vol. 60, no. 1, pp. 161-174.
- Tindall, W. Y. "The Symbolism of W. B. Yeats." *Accent* Summer 1945, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 203-212.
- Tracy, John E. "A Plea for Tolerance in Taste." *Quarterly Review of the Michigan Alumnus* Spring 1945, vol. 51, pp. 264-266.
- Tyler, Parker. "Kafka and the Surrealists." *Accent* Autumn 1945, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 23-27.
- Ullmann, Stephen de. "Romanticism and Synaesthesia." *Publications of the Modern Language Association* September 1945, vol. 60 no. 3, pp. 811-828.
- Viëtor, Karl. "Deutsche Literaturgeschichte als Geistesgeschichte." *Publications of the Modern Language Association* September 1945, vol. 60, no. 3, pp. 899-916.
- Waggoner, Hyatt Howe. "Hart Crane and the Broken Parabola." *University of Kansas City Review* Spring 1945, vol. 11, pp. 173-177.
- Ward, William S. "Some Aspects of the Conservative Attitude toward Poetry in English Criticism, 1798-1820." *Publications of the Modern Language Association* June 1945, vol. 60, pp. 386-398.
- Weevers, Th. "The Poetry of Dutch Resistance." *Modern Language Review* October 1945, vol. 40, no. 4, pp. 197-204.

## MOTION PICTURES AND PHOTOGRAPHY

- Bendick, Jeanne. *Making the Movies*. New York 1945, McGraw-Hill, pp. 190, ill.
- Fraprie, Edwin R. & Jordan, Franklin I., eds. *The American Annual of Photography*. Boston 1945, American Photographic Publication Co., pp. 200.
- Weegee. *The Naked City*. New York 1945, Duell, Sloan & Pearce, pp. 243.

## Articles

- Becker, Leon. "Synthetic Sound and Abstract Image." *Hollywood Quarterly* October 1945, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 95-6.
- Brockway, William W. "Television and Motion-Picture Processes." *Hollywood Quarterly* October 1945, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 85-94.
- Cohn, Morris E. "Author's Moral Rights: Film and Radio." *Hollywood Quarterly* October 1945, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 69-79.
- Fearing, Franklin. "Warriors Return: Normal or Neurotic?" *Hollywood Quarterly* October 1945, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 97-109.
- Fischer, Heinrich. "The Theatre and Cinema in Nazi Germany." *Tricolor* July-August 1945, III, pp. 114-8.
- Fiske, Marjorie and Lazarsfeld, Paul F. "The Columbia Office of Radio Research." *Hollywood Quarterly* October 1945, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 51-9.
- Howe, James Wong. "The Cameraman Talks Back." *The Screen Writer* October 1945, pp. 32-7.
- Jones, Dorothy B. "The Hollywood War Film: 1942-1944." *Hollywood Quarterly* October 1945, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 1-19.
- Kubik Gail. "The Composer's Place in Radio." *Hollywood Quarterly* October 1945 vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 60-8.
- MacDougall, Ranald. "Sound—And Fury." *The Screen Writer* September 1945, pp. 1-7.
- Madow, Ben. "Eisenstein and the Historical Film." *Hollywood Quarterly* October 1945, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 26-30.
- Matthews, William. "Radio Plays as Literature." *Hollywood Quarterly* October 1945, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 40-50.
- Nichols, Dudley. "Men in Battle: A Review of Three Current Pictures." *Hollywood Quarterly* October 1945, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 34-9.
- Oboler, Arch. "Look—Then Listen!" *The Screen Writer* December 1945, pp. 26-30.
- Pichel, Irving. "Creativeness Cannot Be Diffused." *Hollywood Quarterly* October 1945, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 20-25.
- Rubsamen, Walter. "Contemporary Music in Films." *Arts and Architecture* July 1945, vol. 62, no. 7, pp. 34, 46.
- Stern, Seymour. "The Birth of a Nation." *Sight and Sound* July 1945, vol. 14, no. 54, Special Supplement, Index Series no. 3.

## MUSEUMS

- Adams, Philip R. "The Case for a Study Collection." *Museum News* September 1945, vol. 23, no. 6, pp. 6-8.
- Finley, David E. "The Case for a Permanent Art Collection." *Museum News* September 1945, vol. 23, no. 5, pp. 7-8.
- Frankfurter, Alfred M. "A Model of a Major Modern Collection." *Art News* July 1945, vol. XLIV, no. 9, pp. 18, 34-35.
- IVINS, William M., Jr. "The Art Museum Library." *Museum News* October 1945, vol. 23, no. 8, pp. 6-8.
- Rich, Daniel Catton. "Special Exhibitions." *Museum News* October 1945, vol. 23, no. 7, pp. 6-8.

## MUSIC AND MUSICOLOGY

- Antheil, George. *Bad Boy of Music*. Garden City, N. Y. 1945, Doubleday, Doran, pp. 384.
- Bayard, Samuel, P. *Hill Country Tunes*. Harrisburg, Pa. 1945, (Memoirs of the American Folklore Society, vol. 39), pp. 157.

- David, Hans & Mendel, Arthur, eds. *The Bach Reader: A Life of Johann Sebastian Bach in Letters and Documents*. New York 1945, W. W. Norton, pp. 421, 35 ills.
- Eskman, Karl. *Sibelius: His Life and Personality*. New York 1945, Tudor Publishing Co., pp. 308.
- Eschman, Karl. *Changing Forms in Modern Music*. Boston, Mass. 1945, E. C. Schirmer Music Co., pp. xii + 180.
- Geiringer, Karl. *Musical Instruments: Their History in Western Culture from the Stone Age to the Present*. transl. from the German by Bernard Miall, New York 1945, Oxford University Press, pp. 296.
- Graf, Max. *Legend of a Musical City*. New York 1945, Philosophical Library, pp. 302.
- Hamburger, P. *Kulturkrisen—Musikalsk Set*. Copenhagen 1945, pp. 64.
- Herriot, Edouard. *La Vie de Beethoven*. Montreal 1945, Les Éditions Variétés, pp. 303.
- Hindemith, Paul. *The Craft of Musical Composition. Book I: Theoretical Part*. English translation by Arthur Mendel, (revised ed.), New York 1945, Associated Music Publishers, Inc., pp. 223.
- Hutchings, Arthur J. B. *Schubert*. New York 1945, Dutton, pp. 239.
- Katz, Adele T. *Challenge to Musical Tradition: A New Concept of Tonality*. New York 1945, A. A. Knopf, pp. xxviii + 408, 125 music examples.
- Kerr, Willard A. *Experiments on the Effects of Music on Factory Production*. (Applied Psychology Monographs, No. 5), Stanford, Calif. 1945, Stanford University Press, pp. 40.
- Krenek, Ernst, ed. *Hamline Studies in Musicology*. St. Paul, Minn. 1945, Burgess Publishing Co., pp. vii + 99. (Contributors: Russel G. Harris, Martha Johnson, Virginia Seay.)
- Matthey, Jessie Henderson. *The Life and Works of Tobias Matthey*. London & New York 1945, Boosey & Hawkes, pp. xiii + 108.
- Music in Latin America: A Brief Survey*. Vol. III of the series on literature-art-music. Washington, D. C. 1945, Pan-American Union, pp. 73.
- Quigley, Sister Anna de Paul. *The Cultural and Aesthetic Objective in Elementary School Singing. The Ward Method Exemplified by Comparison*. Rochester, N. Y. 1945, Congregation of the Sisters of Saint Joseph, pp. 124.
- Robertson, Alec. *Dvorák*. New York 1945, Dutton, pp. 242.
- Russel, Thomas. *Philharmonic Decade*. Forest Hills, N. Y. 1945, Transatlantic Arts, pp. 171.
- Slonimsky, Nicolas. *Music of Latin America*. New York 1945, Thomas J. Crowell Co., pp. vi + 374.
- Tchaikovsky, Peter Ilyitch. *The Diaries of Tchaikovsky*. transl. from the Russian by Wladimir Lakond, New York 1945, W. W. Norton, pp. 365.

#### Articles

- Acta Musicologica*, 1944-45, vol. 16-17. Copenhagen, Munksgaard. Containing "Index of New Books 1940-45," compiled by Herbert Rosenberg.
- Berger, Arthur V. "The Music of Aaron Copland." *Musical Quarterly* October 1945, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 420-447.
- Betz, Siegmund A. E. "The Operatic Criticism of the *Taller* and *Spectator*." *Musical Quarterly* July 1945, vol. 31, no. 3, pp. 318-330.
- Boulton, John. "B.B.C. Music: A Survey of Broadcast Performances of Orchestral Work." *Music Review* November 1945, vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 230-237.
- Brown, Maurice J. E. "Clairvoyance or Claptrap?" *Music Review* November 1945, vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 202-205.
- Burrows, G. E. "Songs of Uvea and Futuna." *Bernice P. Bishop Museum Bulletin* 1945, no. 183.
- Cazden, Norman. "Musical Consonance and Dissonance: A Cultural Criterion." *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* September 1945, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 3-11.
- Farnsworth, Paul R. "Musical Eminence and Year of Birth." *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* December 1945, vol. IV, no. 2, pp. 107-109.

- Hoffman, Dan G. "The Folk Art of Jazz." *Antioch Review* March 1945, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 110-120.
- Hoffmann, E. T. A., "Don Giovanni: A Marvelous Adventure which befell a Traveling Enthusiast." tr. by Abram Loft. *Musical Quarterly* October 1945, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 504-516.
- King, A. Hyatt. "Mountains, Music, and Musicians." *Musical Quarterly* October 1945, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 395-419.
- Leichtentritt, Hugo. "Ferruccio Busoni." *Music Review* November 1945, vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 206-219.
- Leichtentritt, Hugo. "Music in America." *Bulletin of the Boston Public Library* November-December 1945, vol. 20, nos. 9, 10.
- Leichtentritt, Hugo. "Aesthetic Ideas as the Basis of Musical Styles." *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* December 1945, vol. IV, no. 2, pp. 65-73.
- "Transcript of the Forum on Contemporary Music held under the Auspices of the Associate Members of the New School for Social Research, Aaron Copland presiding, December 17, 1945." *Musicology* Autumn 1945, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 61-69.

## PHILOSOPHY AND GENERAL THEORY OF ART

- Gardner, Rogert W. *A Primer of Proportion in the Arts of Form and Music*. New York 1945, Wm. Helburn, pp. 115.
- Longinus *On the Sublime* and Reynolds (Sir Joshua) *Discourses on Art*. Introd. by Elder Olson. Chicago 1945, Packard & Co., pp. 366.
- McMahon, Amos Philip. *Preface to an American Philosophy of Art*. Chicago 1945, University of Chicago Press, pp. 194.
- Pepper, Stephen C. *The Basis of Criticism in the Arts*. Cambridge, Mass. 1945, Harvard University Press, pp. 177.
- Read, Herbert. *A Coat of many Colours*. London 1945, Routledge, pp. viii + 325.

## Articles

- Abell, Walter. "Myth, Mind, and History." *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* December 1945, vol. IV, no. 2, pp. 77-86.
- Altman, Alexander. "Symbol and Myth." *Philosophy* July 1945, vol. XX, no. 76, pp. 162-71.
- Ames, Van Meter. "Note on A History of Esthetics." *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* September 1945, vol. IV, no. 1, pp. 26-28.
- Aiken, Henry David. "Value and the Moral Ideal." *Journal of Philosophy* June 1945, vol. XLII, no. 13, pp. 337-352.
- Aiken, Henry David. "Review of *Ethics and Language* by C. L. Stevenson." *Journal of Philosophy* August 1945, vol. XLII no. 17, pp. 455-470.
- Aiken, Henry David. "Art as Expression and Surface." *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* December 1945, vol. IV, no. 2, pp. 87-95.
- Asmus, V. "Basic Traits of the Classical Russian Esthetics." *Phenomenology and Phenomenological Research* December 1945, vol. vi, no. 2, pp. 195-211.
- Duncan-Jones, Austin. "Review of *Ethics and Language* by C. L. Stevenson." *Mind* July 1945, vol. LIV, no. 216, pp. 362-373.
- Edel, Abraham. "The Evaluation of Ideals." *Journal of Philosophy* October 1945, vol. XLII, no. 21, pp. 561-577.
- Feibleman, J. "The Hypothesis of Aesthetic Measure." *The Philosophy of Science* July 1945, vol. XII, no. 3, pp. 194-217.
- Fleming, William. "The Newer Concepts of Time and their Relation to the Temporal Arts." *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* December 1945, vol. IV, no. 2, pp. 101-106.
- Hungerland, Isabel Creed. "The Aesthetics of David Wight Prall." *David Wight Prall: In Memoriam* 1945, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 2-10.
- Jessup, Bertram E. "Truth as Material in Art." *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* December 1945, vol. IV, no. 2, pp. 110-114.

- Lepley, Ray. "Comments and Criticism: Stevenson's Questions on *Verifiability of Value*." *Journal of Philosophy* August 1945, vol. XLII, no. 16, pp. 434-437.
- Mitchell, E. T. "Dewey's Theory of Valuation." *Ethics* July 1945, vol. LV, pp. 287-297.
- Munro, Thomas. "Society and Solitude in Aesthetics." *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* September 1945, vol. IV, no. 1, pp. 32-42.
- Munro, Thomas. "A College Program in Aesthetics and the Arts." *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* December 1945, vol. IV, no. 2, pp. 115-118.
- Prall, David Wight. See: Hungerland, Isabel Creed; Sullivan, Celestine J., Jr.
- Smith, W. B. "Ethics and the Aesthetic." *Journal of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* September 1945, vol. VI, no. 1, pp. 87-107.
- Sullivan, Celestine J., Jr. "Beauty and the Social Order." *David Wight Prall: In Memoriam* 1945, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 11-16.
- Thurston, Carl. "The 'Principles' of Art." *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* December 1945, vol. IV, no. 2, pp. 96-100.
- Zink, Sidney. "The Poetic Organism." *Journal of Philosophy* August 1945, vol. XLII, no. 16, pp. 421-434.

## PSYCHOLOGY

- Brandt, Herman F. *The Psychology of Seeing*. New York 1945, Philosophical Library, pp. 256.
- Kardiner, Abram. *The Psychological Frontiers of Society*. New York 1945, Columbia University Press., pp. xxiv + 475.
- Linton, Ralph. *The Cultural Background of Personality*. New York & London 1945, D. Appleton-Century Co., pp. xix + 157.

## Articles

- Bridges, J. W. "Personality as a Work of Art." *Psychological Review* November 1945, vol. 52, no. 6, pp. 320-323.
- Christensen, Erwin O. "Unconscious Motivation in Gothic Art." *Journal of Clinical Psychopathology and Psychotherapy* January-April 1945, vol. 6, nos. 3-4, pp. 581-599.
- Dvorine, I. "Author's Comments upon the Review of Color Perception Charts." *American Journal of Psychology* July 1945, vol. LVIII, no. 3, pp. 397-399.
- Eisenberg, P. & Chinn, H. A. "Tonal Range and Volume Level Preferences of Broadcast Listeners." *Journal of Experimental Psychology* October 1945, vol. 35, no. 5, pp. 374-392.
- Hampton, Peter J. "The Emotional Element in Music." *Journal of General Psychology* October 1945, vol. 33, Second Half, pp. 237-250.
- Horn, C. A. & Smith, L. F. "The Horn Aptitude Inventory." *Journal of Applied Psychology* October 1945, vol. 29, no. 5, pp. 350-355.
- Koester, Theodore. "The Time Error and Sensitivity in Pitch and Loudness Discrimination as a Function of Time Interval and Stimulus Level." *Archives of Psychology* May 1945, no. 297, pp. 1-69.
- Koester, T. & Schoenfeld, W. N. "Modified Methods of Constant and Single Stimuli in Pitch Discrimination." *American Journal of Psychology* October 1945, vol. LVIII, no. 4, pp. 540-544.
- Mukerjee, Radhakamal. "The Meaning and Evolution of Art in Society." *American Sociological Review* August 1945, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 496-503.
- Murray, E. "A Reply to Dvorine's Comments." *American Journal of Psychology* July 1945, vol. LVIII, no. 3, pp. 399-402.
- O'Brien, Cyril C. "Tone Color Discrimination of Grade VII Boys." *Journal of Genetic Psychology* September 1945, vol. 67, First Half, pp. 77-80.
- Scheerer, Martin; Rothmann, Eva & Goldstein, Kurt. "A Case of 'Idiot Savant': An Experimental Study of Personality Organization." *Psychological Monographs* vol. 58, no. 4, pp. 1-63.

Wyatt, Ruth F. "Improvability of Pitch Discrimination." *Psychological Monographs* vol 58, no 2, pp 1-58.

## VISUAL ARTS

- Ackerman, Phyllis. *Ritual Bronzes of Ancient China*. New York 1945, Dryden Press, pp. 120.
- Adams, Philip R. *Auguste Rodin*. New York 1945, Duell, Sloan & Pearce.
- Art News Annual 1945*. New York 1945, Crown Publishers, pp. 210.
- Blanshard, Frances Bradshaw. *Retreat from Likeness in the Theory of Painting*. New York 1945, King's Crown Press, pp. 116.
- Breton, André. *Le Surrealisme et la Peinture*. New York 1945, Brentano, pp. 203.
- Drepperd, Carl W. ed., *Early American Advertising Art: A Collection of Wood Cut and Stereotype Illustrations used in American Newspaper & Almanac Advertising, 1750-1850*. New York 1945, Paul Struck.
- Fernandez, Justino. *Prometeo: Ensayo sobre Pintura Contemporanea*. Mexico, D. F. 1945, Editorial Porrúa, S. A.
- Gallatin, Albert E. *Aubrey Beardsley: Catalogue of Drawings and Bibliography*. New York 1945, Grolier Club, pp. 148.
- Gardner, Albert Ten Eyck. *Yankee Stonecutters: The First American School of Sculpture, 1800-1850*. New York 1945, Columbia University Press, pp. 96, ill.
- Goldwater, Robert & Treves, Marco. *Artists on Art* New York 1945, Pantheon Books, pp. xv + 497, ill.
- Hamann, Richard. *Geschichte der Kunst von der altchristlichen Zeit bis zur Gegenwart* (reprint of the 1933 ed.) New York 1945, Mary S. Rosenberg, pp. 968.
- Hiler, Hilaire; Miller, Henry & Saroyan, William. *Why Abstract?* New York 1945, New Directions, pp. 100.
- Holme, Bryan, ed. *Masterpieces in Color at the Metropolitan Museum of Art*. New York 1945, Studio Publications, pp. 75.
- Jewell, Edward Alden. *Georges Rouault*. New York 1945, Duell, Sloan & Pearce.
- Klingender, Francis D. ed. *Hogarth and English Caricature*. Forest Hills, N. Y. 1945, Transatlantic Arts, pp. 88, ill.
- Mazor, A. Hyatt. *The Bibiena Family*. New York 1945, H. Bittner & Co., pp. 38, 53 plates.
- Middeldorf, Ulrich. *Raphael's Drawings*. New York 1945, H. Bittner & Co., pp. 56, 87 plates.
- Parker, Karl Th. *The Drawings of Hans Holbein in the Collection of His Majesty the King at Windsor Castle*. New York 1945, Phaidon, pp. 147.
- Pope, Arthur Upham. *Masterpieces of Persian Art*. New York 1945, Dryden Press, pp. 210.
- Popham, A. E. ed., *The Drawings of Leonardo da Vinci*. New York 1945, Reynal, pp. 504.
- Raphael, Max. *Prehistoric Cave Paintings*. transl. by Norbert Guterman, New York 1945, Pantheon, pp. 100.
- Simon, Howard. *Five Hundred Years in Illustration*. Cleveland, Ohio, 1945 World Publishing Co., pp. 493.
- Soby, James Thrall. *The Prints of Paul Klee*. New York 1945, Curt Valentin, pp. 88.
- Sweet, Frederick A. *The Hudson River School and the Early American Landscape Tradition*. Chicago 1945, Art Institute of Chicago, pp. 123.
- Tolney, Charles de. *The Sistine Ceiling*. Princeton 1945, Princeton University Press, pp. 425, 164 ills.
- Tristram, E. W. & Constable, G., eds. *English Medieval Wall Painting: The Twelfth Century*. New York 1945, Oxford University Press, pp. 164, 60 plates.
- Vargas, Fray Jose Maria, O. P. *Arte Quiteno Colonial*. Quito 1945, Imprenta Romero.
- Vision Education*. Claremont, Calif., 1945, Claremont Graduate School, Claremont College, pp. 94.
- Ward, Alfred Charles. *Seven Painters: An Introduction*. New York 1945, Oxford University Press, pp. 82, ill.

Weisbach, Werner. *Religiöse Reform und Mittelalterliche Kunst*. Einsiedln & Zürich 1945, Benzinger, pp. x + 230, 33 plates.

*Articles*

- Acosta, Julio. "Nuevos Pintores Mexicanos." *El Hijo Prodigio* Octubre 1945, vol. x, no. 31, Año III, p. 16, 9 reproductions of the artists' paintings.
- Alford, John. "Review of *The Future of Aesthetics*, edited by Thomas Munro." *Art Bulletin* September 1945, vol. xxvii, no. 3, p. 209.
- "Art Criticism—A Symposium." (McCausland, E; Larkin, O.; Goodrich, L.) *Magazine of Art* December 1945, vol. XXXVIII, no. 8, pp. 306, 320-332.
- Barr, Alfred H., Jr. "Art in the Third Reich—Preview 1933." *Magazine of Art* October 1945, vol. XXXVIII, no. 6, pp. 212-222.
- Barreda, Octavio G. "Juan Soriano." *El Hijo Prodigio* Abril 1945, vol. VIII, no. 25, Año III, p. 24, 9 reproductions of the artist's paintings.
- Born, Wolfgang. "Heinrich Wölfflin—1864-1945." *College Art Journal* November 1945, vol. V, no. 1, pp. 44-47.
- Born, Wolfgang. "Sources of American Romanticism." *Antiques* November 1945, vol. XLVIII, no. 5, pp. 274-277.
- Brendel, Otto. "Photographs of Ancient Architecture." *College Art Journal* November 1945, vol. V, no. 1, pp. 3-8.
- Brieger, Peter. "The Baroque Equation." *Gazette des Beaux Arts* March 1945, Ser. VI, vol. XXVII (87th year) no. 937, pp. 143-164.
- "Critics' Choice at the Armory Show." *Art News* October 1945, vol. XLIV, no. 12, pp. 14-26.
- Drepper, Carl W. "The Woodworth Principle of Psychological Analysis applied to Art by the American People." *Art in America* July 1945, vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 133-138.
- Furst, Herbert. "The Value of Forgeries." *Apollo* October 1945, vol. XLII, no. 248, pp. 242, 245.
- Gardner, Albert Ten Eyk. "Scientific Sources of the Full-Length Landscape: 1850." *Metro-politan Museum of Art Bulletin* October 1945, vol. IV, no. 2, pp. 59-65.
- Goodrich, Lloyd. "Criticism and Scholarship." See: "Art Criticism—A Symposium."
- Hungerland, Helmut. "Problems of Descriptive Analysis in the Visual Arts." *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* September 1945, vol. IV, no. 1, pp. 20-25.
- Larkin, Oliver. "The Critic and the Work of Art." See: "Art Criticism—A Symposium."
- McCausland, Elizabeth. "The Social Function of Criticism." See: "Art Criticism—A Symposium."
- Moholy-Nagy, L. "In Defense of 'Abstract' Art." *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* December 1945, vol. IV, no. 2, pp. 74-76.
- Morse, A. Reynolds. "The Dream World of Salvador Dali." *Art in America* July 1945, vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 111-126.
- Noguera, Eduardo "La Ceramica Prehispanica." *El Hijo Prodigio* Enero 1945, vol. VII, no. 22, Año II, pp. 16-19, 9 ills.
- Rannels, Edward W. "The Theory of Requiredness in the Understanding of Art." *College Art Journal* November 1945, vol. V, no. 1, pp. 15-17.
- Rewald, John. "Pissarro and his Circle." *Art News* October 1945, vol. XLIV, no. 13, pp. 17-18.
- Roditi, Edouard. "William Harnett: American Necromantic." *View* November 1945, Series V, no. 4, pp. 9, 19-20.
- Sypher, Wylie. "Baroque Afterpiece: The Picturesque." *Gazette des Beaux Arts* January 1945, Ser. VI, vol. XXVII, (87th year), no. 935, pp. 39-58.
- Villa, Jose Moreno. "Claridades sobre Picasso: su Pintura, sus Poemas, su Política." *El Hijo Prodigio* Septiembre 1945, vol. IX, no. 30, Año III, pp. 149-157.
- Westheim, Paul. "La Estetica de la Piramide." (Version al castellano de Mariana Frenk), *El Hijo Prodigio* Junio 1945, vol. VIII, no. 27, Año III, pp. 157-162.
- Young, J. Donald. "Art in the Liberal Arts College: How it Has Been Taught and How It Should Be Taught." *College Art Journal* November 1945, vol. v, no. 1, pp. 8-15.



## NOTES AND NEWS

(Readers are invited to send in items for publication in this department. They may deal with activities of the Society, personal news about individual members, or events of general interest in the field, such as academic appointments, research projects, lectureships, and publications.)

## THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR AESTHETICS

The annual meeting for 1946 will be held at the Chicago Art Institute on September 5th, 6th and 7th, by invitation of the Director, DANIEL CATTON RICH. Papers for presentation should be sent to DR. THOMAS MUNRO, at the Cleveland Museum of Art, Cleveland 6, Ohio. If the paper is not yet finished, advance notice of desire to present one will help to reserve a place on the program. Details of the meeting will be announced to members during the summer.

The Southern California Section held its sixth conference at Pomona College on February 9th, with 43 participants. HENRY PURMORT EAMES, Chairman of the Section, presided. The general subject was "Music and the Comrade Arts." Papers were presented by EDMUND A. CYKLER, on "Music and Architecture"; HENRY P. EAMES, on "The Power and Versatility of Music"; MICKLOS ROZSA, on "Evolution of Music in the Films"; CARL THURSTON, on "Comparing the Arts"; and THEODORE M. GREENE, on "The Problem of Meaning in Music and the Other Arts." MILDRED ARMSTRONG of Pasadena was elected secretary. When this item went to press, a meeting of the entire Pacific Coast Division was planned for May in Los Angeles.

The Cleveland Society for Aesthetics, a branch of the A.S.A., met on January 26th at the home of Dr. and Mrs. F. KARL GROSSMAN in Lakewood, Ohio. MARGARET F. MARCUS spoke on "The Art of Flower Arrangement," with demonstrations. PAUL B. TRAVIS of the Cleveland School of Art was elected Chairman for 1946, and THOMAS MUNRO Secretary. On April 6th, a meeting was held at the home of Dr. and Mrs. JOSEPH REMENYI, and MAX FISCH spoke on "Art and Science in Early Modern Anatomy."

The New York Regional Chapter held its second meeting of the season on March 29th, with PAUL ZUCKER as Chairman. WELLER EMBLER of Cooper Union read a paper on "Naturalism and Pragmatism in American Literature."

## THE JOURNAL

Our subscription list is growing slowly but steadily, with gratifying increase in the number of library, institutional, and foreign subscribers. Some of these are from points as distant as Bombay, Delhi, Brazil, Buenos Aires, Honolulu, Manila, and New Zealand.

Readers are urgently requested to find out whether libraries in which they are interested are subscribing, or will do so. Library files should begin at least as early as the September 1945 issue, when the American Society for Aesthetics took over publication. A few copies of earlier issues are still available.

When philosophers are kings, the *Journal of Aesthetics* will pay a dollar a word for articles. At present, the Society's finances are barely enough to cover printer's bills, and not enough to send free copies to authors. Reprints of articles can be ordered in advance from the Waverly Press, which will send a schedule of rates on application.

This issue completes the first year under present management. Letters of criticism and suggestion are invited, whether for publication or not. What have been the *Journal's* best and worst features so far? How could it be improved, under present limitations of expense? Is the bibliography useful? What subjects would you like to see discussed?

## IN BRIEF

*Philosophy in American Education*, by BRAND BLANSHARD, C. J. DUCASSE, and others, is reviewed by MARTEN TEN HOOR in the *Journal of Philosophy* for February 14, 1946. He

asks "why theory of knowledge and aesthetics were not included" as basic courses in philosophy, and adds, "As for aesthetics, this subject seems to be quite as basic to some of the humanities as ethics is to the social sciences."

LT. ELIAS KATZ, formerly of Teachers College, and author of *Children's Preferences for Traditional and Modern Paintings*, is concluding his successful experiments at Crile Hospital in Parma, Ohio, on the treatment of neuro-psychiatric soldier patients by means of specially prepared color films.

BARCLAY S. LEATHEM, professor of drama and theatre at Western Reserve in Cleveland, is working out plans for dramatic presentations in television.

HERBERT READ, English author of *Art and Society*, *The Anatomy of Art*, *Education and Art*, and other books in the field of aesthetics, visited the United States this spring. He lectured at Yale University, the Cleveland Museum of Art, and elsewhere.

VIRGIL C. ALDRICH is now at Wells College.

EDWARD N. BARNHART has returned to the University of California at Berkeley.

HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER was visiting professor of philosophy at the University of Washington during the spring term of 1946, and at the University of Minnesota during the summer session.

LYNN D. POOLE is director of public relations at Johns Hopkins University.

## CONTRIBUTORS

HILAIRE HILER, author of *From Nudity to Raiment: an Introduction to the Study of Costume*, now lives in Santa Fé, New Mexico.

ARNOLD ISENBERG is instructor in philosophy at Queens College in Flushing, N. Y.

EDOUARD RODITI, of New York, wrote "The Growth and Structure of Croce's Philosophy" in the *Journal* for Spring, 1942.

STEPHEN C. PEPPER is professor of philosophy and aesthetics at the University of California in Berkeley; he recently published *The Basis of Criticism in the Arts*.

BERTRAM MORRIS, of Northwestern University's philosophy department, wrote *The Aesthetic Process*.

ALLAN H. GILBERT is professor of English and Italian literature at Duke University, and author of numerous works on literature of the middle ages and renaissance.

PAUL R. FARNSWORTH is professor of psychology at Stanford University.

VAN METER AMES, of Cincinnati University's philosophy department, wrote *Proust and Santayana: the Aesthetic Way of Life*.

ANANDA K. COOMARASWAMY is keeper of Indian art and fellow for research in Indian, Persian, and Muhammadan art at the Boston Museum of Fine Arts.

CARL THURSTON of Pasadena, California, wrote *The Structure of Art*.

ISABEL CREED HUNGERLAND is secretary of the Association for Symbolic Logic, and has been teaching philosophy at Berkeley this semester.

PAUL ZUCKER, professor of art at Cooper Union, edited *Architecture and City Planning of the Future*.

LUCIUS GARVIN is assistant professor of philosophy at Oberlin College.

CHARLES HUGHES is associate professor of music at Hunter College, New York.

ALFRED NEUMEYER is professor of art history and director of the art gallery at Mills College, Oakland, California.

INDEX TO VOLUME IV: SEPTEMBER, 1945 THROUGH JUNE,  
1946

- ABELL, WALTER: *Myth, Mind, and History*, 77  
*Aesthetics and Philosophy in American Colleges*, by THOMAS MUNRO, 180  
*Aesthetic Ideas as the Basis of Musical Styles*, by HUGO LEICHTENTRITZ, 65  
*Aesthetics of Space in Architecture, Sculpture, and City Planning, The*, by PAUL ZUCKER, 12  
AIKEN, HENRY D.: *Art as Expression and Surface*, 87  
ALLEN, WARREN D.: *Music and the Idea of Progress*, 166  
AMES, VAN METER: Letter by, 249  
AMES, VAN METER: Note on "A History of Esthetics," 26  
*Art as Expression and Surface*, by HENRY D. AIKEN, 87  
*Arts in Reconstruction, The*, by LAWRENCE K. FRANK, 135
- Bibliography, Selective Current, January through June '45, 123  
Bibliography, Selective Current, July through December '45, 256  
Brooks, Cleanth, and Robert B. Heilman: *Understanding Drama*, reviewed by BERTRAM E. JESSUP, 198
- Can We Have an International Dance?*, by JOSEPH T. SHIPLEY, 29  
CAZDEN, NORMAN: *Musical Consonance and Dissonance: A Cultural Criterion*, 3  
Churchill, Henry S.: *The City Is the People*, reviewed by PAUL ZUCKER, 195  
*College Program in Aesthetics and the Arts, A*, by THOMAS MUNRO, 115  
*Concept of Tragedy in Modern Criticism, The*, by GEORGE KIMMELMAN, 141  
COOMARASWAMY, ANANDA K.: Letters by, 248, 249
- Daumier, Honoré: *Hunting and Fishing*, reviewed by PAUL ZUCKER, 251  
Ducasse, Curt J.: *Art, the Critics, and You*, reviewed by ISABEL CREED HUNGERLAND, 119
- Emotional Distance in Art*, by STEPHEN C. PEPPER, 235
- FARNSWORTH, PAUL R.: *Musical Eminence and Year of Birth*, 107  
Letter by, 247  
FLEMING, WILLIAM: *The Newer Concepts of Time and Their Relation to the Temporal Arts*, 101  
FRANK, LAWRENCE K.: *The Arts in Reconstruction*, 135
- GARVIN, LUCIUS: Review of Milton C. Nahm's *Aesthetic Experience and Its Presuppositions*, 252  
GILBERT, ALAN H.: On "A College Program in Aesthetics and the Arts," 244  
GILBERT, KATHARINE, and HELMUT KUHN: *A Reply to Van Meter Ames's "Note on 'A History of Esthetics,'"* 187  
Guggenheimer, Richard: *Sight and Insight*, reviewed by CARL THURSTON, 250  
Guys, Constantin: *Femmes Parisiennes*, reviewed by PAUL ZUCKER, 251
- Henri Brémond: Poetics as Mystagogy*, by EDOUARD RODITI, 229  
Hilberseimer, L.: *The New City. Principles of Planning*, reviewed by PAUL ZUCKER, 195  
HILER, HILAIRE: *Some Associative Aspects of Color*, 203  
HUGHES, CHARLES: Review of Ernst Krenek's (ed.), Russell G. Harris's, Virginia Seay's and Martha Johnson's *Hamline Studies in Musicology*, 254  
HUNGERLAND, HELMUT: *Problems of Descriptive Analysis in the Visual Arts*, 20  
*Psychological Explanations of Style in Art*, 160  
HUNGERLAND, ISABEL CREED: Review of Curt J. Ducasse's *Art, the Critics, and You*, 119  
Review of Gustav E. Mueller's *The World as Spectacle*, 251
- In Defense of "Abstract" Art*, by L. MOHOLY-NAGY, 74  
*Index to Volumes I, II, and III*, by PRUDENCE MYER, 43  
ISENBERG, ARNOLD: *Perishable Art*, 217

- JESSUP, BERTRAM E.: *Truth as Material in Art*, 110  
 Review of Cleanth Brooks's and Robert B. Heilman's *Understanding Drama*, 198  
*Journal under New Management, The*, by THOMAS MUNRO, 1
- Katz, Adele T.: *Challenge to Musical Tradition*, reviewed by HUGO LEICHTENTRITT, 196
- Kernodle, George R.: *From Art to Theatre*, reviewed by PAUL ZUCKER, 194
- KIMMELMAN, GEORGE: *The Concept of Tragedy in Modern Criticism*, 141
- Krenek, Ernst (Ed.), Russell G. Harris, Virginia Seay, Martha Johnson: *Hamline Studies in Musicology*, reviewed by CHARLES HUGHES, 254
- KUHN, HELMUT, and KATHARINE GILBERT: *A Reply to Van Meter Ames's "Note on 'A History of Esthetics'"*, 187
- LEICHTENTRITT, HUGO: *Aesthetic Ideas as the Basis of Musical Styles*, 65  
 Review of Adele T. Katz's *Challenge to Musical Tradition*, 196
- MACAGY, DOUGLAS: Review of Piet Mondrian's *Plastic Art and Pure Plastic Art 1937 and Other Essays, 1941-1943*, 120
- McMahon, A. Philip: *Preface to An American Philosophy of Art*, reviewed by WILLIAM SENER RUSK, 197
- Middeldorf, Ulrich: *Raphael's Drawings*, reviewed by ALFRED NEUMEYER, 254
- MOHOLY-NAGY, L.: *In Defense of "Abstract" Art*, 74
- Mondrian, Piet: *Plastic Art and Pure Plastic Art 1937 and Other Essays, 1941-1943*, 120
- MORLEY, GRACE L. McCANN: Review of José Gómez Sicre's *Cuban Painting of Today*, 122
- MORRIS, BERTRAM: *The Rôle of the 'Standard Mind' in Art*, 239
- Mueller, Gustav E.: *The World as Spectacle*, reviewed by ISABEL CREED HUNGERLAND, 251
- Mumford, Lewis: *City Development*, reviewed by PAUL ZUCKER, 195
- MUNRO, THOMAS: *Aesthetics and Philosophy in American Colleges*, 180  
*College Program in Aesthetics and the Arts, A*, 115  
*Journal under New Management, The*, 1  
 Review of Levin L. Schücking's *The Sociology of Literary Taste*, 121  
*Society and Solitude in Aesthetics*, 32  
*Music and the Idea of Progress*, by WARREN D. ALLEN, 166  
*Musical Consonance and Dissonance: A Cultural Criterion*, by NORMAN CAZDEN, 3  
*Musical Eminence and Year of Birth*, by PAUL R. FARNSWORTH, 107
- MYER, PRUDENCE: *Index to Volumes I, II, and III*, 43
- Myth, Mind, and History*, by WALTER ABELL, 77
- Nahm, Milton C.: *Aesthetic Experience and Its Presuppositions*, reviewed by LUCIUS GARVIN, 252
- NEUMEYER, ALFRED: Review of Ulrich Middeldorf's *Raphael's Drawings*, 254  
*Newer Concepts of Time and Their Relation to the Temporal Arts, The*, by WILLIAM FLEMING, 101  
*Note on "A History of Esthetics,"* by VAN METER AMES, 26
- On "A College Program in Aesthetics and the Arts,"* by ALLAN H. GILBERT, 244
- PEPPER, STEPHEN C.: *Emotional Distance in Art*, 235  
*Perishable Art*, by ARNOLD ISENBERG, 217  
*"Principles" of Art, The*, by CARL THURSTON, 96  
*Problems of Descriptive Analysis in the Visual Arts*, by HELMUT HUNGERLAND, 20  
*Psychological Explanations of Style in Art*, by HELMUT HUNGERLAND, 160
- Reply to Van Meter Ames's "Note on 'A History of Esthetics,'" A*, by KATHARINE GILBERT and HELMUT KUHN, 187

- Richardson, Edgar P.: *American Romantic Painting*, reviewed by PAUL ZUCKER, 251
- RODITI, EDOUARD: *Henri Brémont: Poetics as Mystagogy*, 229
- Rôle of the 'Standard Mind' in Art, The*, by BERTRAM MORRIS, 239
- RUSK, WILLIAM SENER: Review of A. Philip McMahon's *Preface to An American Philosophy of Art*, 197
- Schücking, Levin L.: *The Sociology of Literary Taste*, reviewed by THOMAS MUNRO, 121
- SHIPLEY, JOSEPH T.: *Can We Have an International Dance?*, 29
- Sicre, José Gómcz: *Cuban Painting of Today*, reviewed by GRACE L. McCANN MORLEY, 122
- Society and Solitude in Aesthetics*, by THOMAS MUNRO, 32
- Some Associative Aspects of Color*, by HILAIRE HILER, 203
- THURSTON, CARL: *The "Principles" of Art*, 96
- Review of Richard Guggenheimer's *Sight and Insight*, 250
- Truth as Material in Art*, by BERTRAM E. JESSUP, 110
- Wright, Frank Lloyd: *When Democracy Builds*, reviewed by PAUL ZUCKER, 195
- ZUCKER, PAUL: *The Aesthetics of Space in Architecture, Sculpture, and City Planning*, 12
- Review of Constantin Guys' *Femmes Parisiennes*, 251
- Review of Edgar P. Richardson's *American Romantic Painting*, 251
- Review of Frank Lloyd Wright's *When Democracy Builds*, 195
- Review of George R. Kernodle's *From Art to Theatre*, 194
- Review of Henry S. Churchill's *The City Is the People*, 195
- Review of Honoré Daumier's *Hunting and Fishing*, 251
- Review of L. Hilberseimer's *The New City. Principles of Planning*, 195
- Review of Lewis Mumford's *City Development*, 195