THE JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS

and Art Criticism

IN ARTIBUS SAPIENTIA QUO SENSU.

Augustinus

Number Seven

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The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, published quarterly by The Philosophical Library, Inc., 15 East 40th Street, N. Y., Winter 1942/43, Vol. II, No. 1, $4.00 per year; $7.00 for two years. Foreign Postage $1.00. Entered as second class matter under the Act of March 3, 1879 at the Post Office of New York, N. Y.

Psychological Aspects in the Practice and Teaching of Creative Dance

BY

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I

The Problem Stated

We can never see our entire body as it is seen by others, but can only see parts at one time and can never see certain parts at all without the aid of a mirror. The dancer cannot make use of the mirror image to see his art, since, in order to see the image he must fix the posture of the head and neck. This changes the tone of the muscles in the rest of the body and forces specific co-ordinations. As soon as the dancer begins to move in front of the mirror, he can no longer see his image. If he continues to focus on his mirror image he sees a distorted movement which he would not make if freed from the fixation point in the mirror.

The dancer has no way of seeing the forms he is producing, or of knowing whether those forms are the ones he wishes the audience to see.* He must rely entirely on his subjective interpretation of the movements he is making. Most of the other arts may be evaluated more or less objectively by their creator since they are transposed or transferred from the person, the artist, to another medium or substance. A painting, a piece of sculpture, a drawing, a symphony, a poem, these all may be dissociated from the individual and seen with his eyes or heard with his ears. They may be seen or heard many times in exactly the same form and

* Even the moving picture does not reproduce his art since space is lacking. In the Film of The Ballet Russe there is one small section which gives part of the illusion . . . that section in which the image of the dancers is shown in a convex wall mirror.

may eventually be objectively evaluated even by their creator. The dance form can only be felt by the dancer and undergoes slight changes each time it is performed. Its medium is the human body which is never exactly the same since it includes physiological and psychological elements which are constantly varying in character and intensity. For this reason the dance requires a specific kind of nervous sensitivity to make it possible for the dancer to visualize the forms of his activity. Vocal music, the spoken word and the art of acting have similar problems.

Dance is concerned with the formulation of human fantasy and emotion as projected by the motility of the body passing through space and time. This is not merely the physical body considered in a detached scientific manner but is composed of the actual physical body structure of the dancer together with his subjective conception of that body at the specific moment or moments when it is seen and interpreted by an observer. The subjective conception of our body is fantasy based partly on reality and partly on the emotional and intellectual make-up of the individual, and is called the body image.* It must constantly be revised and re-established through experimentation since it must be brought in line with the form which is seen by the observer. That form seen and interpreted by an observer is the body appearance. The dancer and teacher of dance are ultimately concerned with the body appearance in motion.

The dancing individual must acquaint himself thoroughly with the fundamental structure of the human body, its physical make-up and function (anatomy, physiology and mechanics as studied on his own body during activity). He must also become conscious of his own body-image and learn to visualize as well as feel its form. How does he conceive it to look? What is its relation to the physical body? What is its relation to the body appearance? Does the concept of his body-image change when he takes different positions in relation to space? Does it change when he moves through space at varying speeds? Does it change through the influence of different emotional states and fantasies? In other words, what are the psychological factors involved in using one's own body creatively as the medium for projection of fantasy?

The dancer is simultaneously the creator and the material project-

* Paul Schilder, *Image and Appearance of the Human Body.*

ing the substance he is trying to express. As soon as an observer is present the creator's performing body becomes the body appearance in movement. The medium which the dancer uses is his body-image, yet the audience is impressed by the body appearance. It is, therefore, necessary for the dancer to adjust his conception of his body-image to his body appearance, or to so modify his body appearance that it is adjusted to his body image. The young child may wish to perform a witch dance. He will transform himself from the pleasing form of the child to a distorted creature with clawing fingers, hunched back, grotesque facial expression and gestures. Even the sounds which he makes will be cacophonous rather than euphonious. If he wishes to be a young happy child, he will try to transform himself into an harmoniously co-ordinated little person. This is very likely to be as clear an expression as he is able to make of his "ego ideal". As applied to our discussions, that "ego ideal" is a subconscious expression of his conception of his ideal body-image. As we said before, this body-image is a fantasy, a combination of the knowledge of how the actual physical body looks and how an individual believes himself to appear to others or how he would like to look to others. As a further illustration we might take the degree of identification of our own mirror image with ourselves. Either we accept the mirror picture as a true image of ourselves, or we refuse to identify ourselves with the image seen. The readiness to accept the identification depends on the person's ability to reconcile body-image with body appearance. If the "ego ideal" becomes the permanent dance ideal, then there is a stagnation and limitation of dance expression. Most of the various dance concepts of the present time have become fixed in an ideal body-image and must, by self-inflicted compulsion, express everything in the same gesture language—presenting to the public the same body appearance for every theme.

The dancing individual should constantly change. This is the premise for his work. He is dealing in motion and motion is action and change. As soon as he sets a form he must break it in order to re-establish it or to develop a new form. This means that even within large forms there must be constant activity and adjustment of the smaller forms. This cannot be done purely physically, but must be an emotional and psychological re-establishment of the reason behind the forms or gestures. It therefore involves, not

only the gesture which is being emphasized, but the entire body and calls for minute motility in every part. A gesture can remain visible only for a short time, after which its significance to the observer is lost unless it is allowed to disappear. It can appear again in the same form and hold attention but it can be repeated only a limited number of times if it is to register any effect on the observer. Too much repetition may dullen that effect. In dance the visual image in repetition impresses the audience more through its rhythm, the timing of the action necessary to re-form the image, than only through its actual form. By repeating the same or similar form with new timing and accent, a memory image of the original gesture can be re-established in the observer and a succession of associations may be evoked.

A dancer should be able to allow his body to follow in movement the devious paths of "free association" or those of repetition.

At this point, for the sake of clarification, a reference to psychiatry is instructive. Repetition beyond a certain point is compulsion. Free association carried to the extreme is a symptom of schizophrenia.

The dancer must execute free association as well as repetition and must know how far he may go in order not to come too close to the two extremes: either schizophrenic or compulsive and manneristic gestures. As a matter of fact, he must be able to approach the two states of schizophrenia and compulsion without actually becoming psychotic.

Some schizophrenic patients, untrained in dance, have an excellent dance feeling for a while. They have a space control or suspension which dancers strive for and seldom achieve. They have a form of dynamic repetition which starts with a large gesture and becomes smaller and smaller or it starts with a small gesture and grows larger. Within each pattern there is absolute logic from the movement point of view. This type of logic also occurs in their other art work and may be due to their being temporarily split off from inhibitions. Coupled with this ability is a fear of certain movements since, in the patient, the sense of reality of the body and its place in space seems to be lost. As an example, one schizophrenic boy developed well co-ordinated rhythmic gestures during the activity of playing a number of drums. His beating became more and more forceful and his gestures larger

and larger. However, he was not able to stop and the intensity of the beating grew constantly stronger, almost destructive. Another time the same boy suddenly started a foot rhythm which began in place and then moved forward and backward and stopped as suddenly as it began. However, when he was asked to turn a backsomersault, he carried out the initial impulse and each time stopped before his back touched the floor and his legs went over his head, to ask, "What will happen to me? Will I die?" He had to watch someone else a few times before he dared to do it, and had to be helped at first. Then he repeated it with all the signs of enjoyment and pleasure. The movement of turning upside down and putting his legs over his head brought out his insecurity in space and his uneasiness about the reality of his body (unclear body-image due to pathological processes) and made him fear that he would lose his body during the activity. The normal individual, through self-observation, knows that distortions and activity, short of injury, do not affect the real relation of the limbs to each other or the body in its entirety.

A schizophrenic adult, a dance student, started a circular swing of the torso, beautifully co-ordinated. Gradually as she continued, the movement became smaller and smaller until it circled only within the pelvic girdle and spiralled around the spine. Another time the same person began a movement in place stretching up and bending down to the floor alternately. This too became smaller until she stopped it in a crouched position finally falling forward on the floor in an unsuccessful somersault.

Where is the borderline between psychotic movement and dance activity as an art? It seems to be in the ability to organize, consciously control and direct action towards a thematic goal, an ability which the psychotic patient lacks.

To recapitulate: There are definite changes in muscle tone as well as in psychological attitudes which accompany changes in posture in space and changes in tempo of movement. The dancing individual must know the fundamental structure of his own body and his body-image. Then he must become aware of the changes which take place in the physical body as well as in the concept of his body-image during physical activity. That means that he must realize the transformation of his outer physical form in relation to postures, tempo and content of his movements and his

associated thoughts and emotions. He must be able, through transforming the entire quality of his muscle tone, to change his body-image to coincide with the emotional content and physical appearance of his fantasy. He must also find the tempo of movement and spatial direction which evolves out of his fantasy. Therefore he must be able clearly to experience and visualize for himself the varying forms his body-image creates as he moves through space, at the same time realizing the emotional source of these forms. His body appearance and his activity will then project to the audience that which was planned. In other words, the activity itself is not the end but the means toward projecting the concept created by another's observaion of our body-image and appearance in certain series of postural changes as directed by an idea (the body appearance in motion as directed by the content of the thought).

II

Teaching Approaches

From the preceeding discussion it becomes evident that during the entire period of teaching the dance creatively, we are dealing with three concepts:

1. The physical human body and its mechanics;
2. Its transformations in quality and form in accordance with subjective fantasies; and
3. The objective form which is visible to the observer.

In teaching we must, therefore, consciously take these into consideration.* The study of the mechanics of the human body and the isolation and control of muscles and groups of muscles in relation to activity (physiological, anatomical and mechanical function and control) must constantly run parallel to the actual dance training outlined below. The procedures to be used during the entire period of teaching creative dance would be:

1. Spontaneous action by the pupil,
   passive observation by the teacher;

* *Teaching the Lay-Dancer*, F. Boas, Progressive Physical Educator, Vol. XXIII, No. 2. May 1941.

2. Directed correction and interpretation of the pupil's spontaneous action by the teacher,
   passive observation on the part of the pupil;
3. Active self-direction by the pupil,
   active observation by the teacher.

The pupil will pass through these three phases of clarification for each new problem or theme. The finished dancer will direct himself through these stages by self-observation and analysis of content.

It is of greatest importance to allow the child and adult to experiment without direction with his own motility and body-image. In this way the instructor gains insight into the thought processes and fantasies of the pupil as well as his physical co-ordination. Without this insight it is impossible to know what direction should be taken and what results may be expected.

The child is constantly experimenting and exploring his body and its relation to space.* This experimentation brings with it confidence and pleasure which in turn make for better co-ordination.

The child and adult must learn to place their own bodies in unaccustomed positions and movements. Rolling, forward and back somersaults, shoulder stands, head stands, cartwheels and bridges of all sorts, crawling on knees or feet and hands and all types of variations of these movements should be encouraged. The degree of proficiency and the number of positions that will be taken depend on the age of the student as well as the muscular co-ordination and fears and anxieties present in the pupil.

During these activities the teacher may become active and extend the position into a passive one for the pupil by exaggerating it through his intervention; for instance with the small child who tries to turn a somersault but cannot move beyond the point where the head and feet are still on the floor. The teacher may step in and turn him over. Or with the older child who wishes to stand on his shoulders. When this is accomplished the teacher may pick him up by the legs until his hands are touching the floor. Or he may turn around his own axis while holding the child's legs thereby giving him the experience of "flying" head downward.

With the larger child and the adult where these things are not

* *Creative Dance in Therapy*, American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, Vol. XI, No. 2, April 1941. Lauretta Bender, M.D., F. Boas.

possible without the aid of rings or bars which can bear the weight, the pupil must be urged to use his ingenuity with occasional steadying help from the instructor.

This experience in placing the body in strange positions in relation to space and then resolving those positions into the habitual posture, establishes assurance in the reality of a fundamental body-image and broadens our conception of motility forms. Through motility the individual learns to establish a concept of his body-image.*

The adult must be led back to this experience. This stage of experiment is important since it forces him back to his physical body and re-awakens in him the consciousness of his fundamental body-image which may have been lost or buried. Certainly this experience is essential for anyone who wishes to become a professional dancer.

The natural dynamic development of this primitive type of motility is the process from the simplest crawling and rolling through more complicated somersaults, headstands, handsprings, back-bends, cartwheels to passive suspensions and finally active suspensions in jumps and leaps in all forms from various heights. In other words, the pupil has gone through all space levels, always with the attraction to the depth; the affinity to the ground, to the middle space and to the air.**

When the attraction to height begins to take shape, we are confronted with the problems and rhythms of walking, running, leaping and their variants. Also with the relation of the torso, arms, head and neck to the lower extremities. Whereas in the first type of movement the body has remained rather compact, arms and legs serving as supporting points, we now have only the legs as supports. The body begins to fall apart into many movable segments: ankles, knees, hips, pelvis, chest, shoulders, elbows, wrists, fingers, neck, head.

In every movement in the standing position there is the question of the balance of these parts over the narrow base which becomes even narrower when one foot is freed from the floor. It is therefore necessary to re-establish the body as an entity, such as it was during the action on the floor, without losing its minute motility. This can

* Paul Schilder, *Image and Appearance of Human Body.*

** *Creative Dance,* Bender and Boas.

be accomplished if the pupil can be sensitized sufficiently to feel himself surrounded by a "zone of extension of the body-image into space".* If he can come to feel himself surrounded by a sensitive zone which can transmit feeling of support to his body, the body will then be balanced in space, space which changes shape according to his movements and which receives impulses from without when approached by another body or by an object, thereby transmitting to the body-image the necessity for change in contour or its place in that space beyond "the zone of extension of his body-image".

This is a similar conception to that which applies to sculpture, open spaces are not holes but are substance which is enclosed or surrounded by the solid parts of the sculptured form. The figure holds the space within its gesture. In sculpture there are single space forms which are made visible while in dance there is a constant reforming and re-establishing of space forms which accompany the moving figure.

It is therefore not enough to train only the muscles and joints in physical co-ordination and strength. We must train the sensitivity of the entire body and the mind to register the body-image with its zone of extension.** This must then become automatic so that the body will react by itself to any given situation which the action demands. The mind must then look on and choose that which is most relevant to the idea to be expressed. It is like a dream in which you are actively participating while you also are watching the action from without, the difference being that in the case of the dream you are a helpless bystander, while in the case of the dance you can direct and plan your actions.

To summarize, these are the consecutive phases a dancer must experience in his development:

I. Passive contemplation of playful and experimental activities of the physical body in relation to varying postures. The purpose is to clarify the concept of one's own body in reality. This concept creates the fantasy: our body-image.

(A latently creative activity).

II. Active transformation of one's own body-image according to specific fantasies. A manifest creative activity, using the psycho-

* Paul Schilder, *Image and Appearance of Human Body.*

** *Teaching the Lay Dancer,* Boas.

logical changes occuring in I. to stimulate and realize fantasies.

III. Passive contemplation is rendered active. The dance creator becomes his own audience while visualizing the action of his body-image by means of a process of mental detachment. At the same time the imaginary audience is conceived by the dancer. Clarification of content and direction of form.

IV. The validity of the dance is established when a concept is developed and projected in time and space by active transformation of the body-image and can be recognized as the crystallization of a specific theme, either real or imaginary, projected by the body-appearance in action.

We hit upon all types of psychological problems in the course of this training. Inhibitions of all sorts come to the foreground, from simple outspoken physical fears, to fears due to the tying up of certain types of movement with personal emotional associations and taboos. We contact also social blocks, aggressive tendencies, and depressions leading to immobility. All these problems must be faced and worked through in order to eliminate the carrying over of resistances in the further dance development. It is important here to realize that from the point of view of art any fantasy, whether normal or abnormal, is acceptable material provided it is sublimated and projected as an objective form.*

III

*Some Examples of Problems***

In order to illustrate some of the types of problems which arise, we may take one phase of the dance, the tremendous dynamic force of weight displacement through space. There are many other themes which are expressed through rhythmic and dynamic body motility. However, these may be considered as expressions in various stages of maturity or as subdivisions of this fundamental theme and without the balance between dynamic force and body control these themes can never be realized in an art form.

* *Creative Dance in Therapy*, Bender (conclusions).

** The following pages are from a lecture and dance demonstration presented at the Paul Schilder Club, March 3, 1941, Bellevue Hospital, New York City.

Referring back to the first stage of dance training, bouncing, rolling, crawling, swaying and swinging, climbing, jumping, turning and tumbling, are all elemental experiments in the dance. They are experiments by which the child learns the mechanics of his body; by which he explores space and time; and through which he will eventually gain confidence in his body. To be passively set in motion, to be carried, swung, turned and rolled by an adult is also important in order to extend the confidence beyond the self.

This type of investigation and learning should be allowed to continue to the point of saturation when the chaotic type of disorganized movement and theme begins to form itself in rhythmic repetitions and recognizable fantasies.

If children are allowed to experiment with rhythmic movement without interference at a very early age, I believe they may outgrow this type of movement as a form of mere self-indulgence and chaotic behavior and will be able later to use the control and body quality gained through that experimentation for the formulation of fantasies. In other words, the primitive animal impulses might become material for sublimation into an art expression. During the transition period it will be necessary for the teacher to direct toward a subconscious sublimation. Those children who have been blocked in the process of sublimation will either stay in the infantile type of movement or will develop gestures which are escape patterns. They will be unable to clarify sufficiently to formulate their fantasies. As an example, a very bright ten-year old boy was entirely unable to control his infantile exhibitionism. His usual reaction to the stimulus of the dance situation was to run wildly through the room, roll on the floor, turn somersaults and crawl in such a manner that he was always in the path of the other children, then he would lie with his head under a chair and suck his thumb. At home among other things he would use the narrow hallway and practice climbing up to the ceiling like an Alpine climber in a crevice. Occasionally in the dance hour he showed excellent co-ordination and rhythm far beyond that of the other children. These were only flashes of the sublimated form. This was a case of over-indulgence in chaotic primitive movement impulses. The block had occurred, from the point of view of the dance teacher, during the process of formulation of motility impulses into sublimated dance material.

If it had been possible to work over a long period of time with this child he could have learned to use this activity productively. It would not have been possible, however, without the aid of a psychiatrist unless the teacher herself had been equipped to handle all the psychological problems.

Many adults are still fixed in this type of movement quality. Some skipped the experience as children; in others a block occurred which led them to associate dance with infantile satisfaction in movement. The person who has never experienced this type of movement will at first be concerned with its mechanics, while the other will be playing with his fantasies, but neither will be able to formulate consciously as art. If during the effort to formulate (i.e. sublimate) this type of movement, fear should occur over the mechanical problems or anxiety over the content of the fantasies, then the whole process of development in dance will become an external shell of movement technique. Unless the psychological problem involved is faced and worked through a stagnation in superficial forms will result. Those adults who were not blocked in childhood and who are not blocked by additional factors will be able to use the animal qualities of this movement combining it with intellectual values.

As in all teaching it is not possible to solve all the problems by the use of one medium alone. It is often necessary to resolve a block or resistance which is apparent in the dance by using an entirely different artistic medium such as clay, paint, wood or charcoal and chalk. An interesting factor is to see the correlation between the problem in dance and the new medium which is chosen.

One adult enjoyed wallowing on the ground, using the body sensuously. The teacher must, in such a case, use the presence of physical pleasure observed in the student as a positive factor and must direct her towards its sublimation. This translation into an art form must be gradually induced by indirect methods which will teach the student to change the tone of her muscle tension (reduce the amount of relaxation or passivity in the movement). The student must also be made conscious of the audience outside of herself in order that her movement may be dissociated from self-indulgence and may thus attain a less direct release from the original tension. This same person had not yet tried to use clay

as a medium of expression. She was immediately fascinated by it, enjoyed the feel of the substance, enjoyed even the task of mashing the hard lumps of clay and kneading it in preparation for the actual modeling. After a few awkward attempts at manipulation of the clay she quite suddenly was able to mould the material and create objects which gave expression in an objective form to her preoccupation with her body and her inner self. (Among other things she had been in an accident which had distorted her face. Her figures all had flat broad noses). The handling of the clay, the tactile element, was an adequate performance during the phase this person was in. By concentrating the pleasure sensation which had been distributed over her whole body to her hands and fmgers, she could free her fantasies and form them in a medium removed from herself. It seemed that the sensuous feeling enjoyed while working with clay enabled her to formulate what she could not express with her own body. Since that time her dance movement has begun to change and she is better able to clarify in both media.

A different example is that of a child of high intelligence who was constantly surrounded by adults. She had been taught extreme orderliness and cleanliness. She was told that she had no right to her own opinion because she was a child. Her fantasied stories had been criticized as falsehoods. At the age of four she had a bed time ritual of neatly folding her clothes and placing them precisely on the chair, the shoes had to stand parallel, exactly in the center between the two legs of the chair, her covers had to be carefully tucked in so that there were no wrinkles, and she had to hold a handkerchief in her hand before she could go to sleep. A year later she developed what seemed to be a fear of bed wetting which actually never occurred. Each night she repeatedly demanded to be taken to the toilet even though she had just been and for a few nights shouted incessantly when her parents refused to conduct her there. She was cured of this particular condition by a sudden change of environment. There the child was told that she could wet the bed if she wished, it did not matter. This astonished her so that she became silent and fell asleep in a few minutes. This particular condition did not return.

This child is now eight years old, is very excitable and has facial ticks. The parents have stopped censoring her quite as much as during her early childhood. However, she is blocked in her

fantasies. She considers herself unimaginative. She dislikes playing with clay because she dirties her hands or might spot her clothes. She thinks that any person who likes her drawings or anything she makes is "crazy" as she puts it. Evidently she uses adult standards to judge her own products. She is easily distracted, asks irrelevant questions during class, has very little originality in movement when dancing with open eyes, but shows good coordination, grace and ease when dancing with closed eyes. She is fundamentally musical, imaginative, and rhythmically co-ordinated, but at present is concerned with externals such as hair, clothes, fingernails. The first clay figure which she modeled consisted of a child's head with curls and a hair-ribbon, no arms and no body, but a dress with long legs was fastened directly to the head. The most outstanding feature, as mentioned, is her ability to dance freely with closed eyes. The externals which are as a rule her center of attention become temporarily eliminated. A sensitivity toward her body which she usually disregards, becomes manifest. A block is overbridged for a time. By using as one device the closed eyes during dancing, she can be guided towards a consciousness of inner values.

Another device used with this child was rhythmic repetition of sound of which more will be said later. After about twenty-four hourly lessons distributed over nine months, the child responded to the continuous playing of drum rhythms, first with her usual distraction, asking questions, getting a drink, cleaning her hands, looking out of the window—then suddenly with fifteen minutes of continuous dancing in the form of crawling, rolling, turning and arm and hip gestures. In response to continuous repetitious gong melodies, she gradually softened her tone of voice and muscle tension until on two occasions the complete relaxation of emotional tension was expressed by lying on the floor and falling asleep.

We find that those individuals who have been blocked must return to infantile attitudes before they can psychologically and mechanically enter the phase of work which leads towards artistic conscious creation.

The elemental, primitive qualities, we may call them animal qualities, physical power, the positive acceptance of the act of being, cannot and must not be rejected by the adult. The feeling of his own physical strength and the ability to control and direct

it is a phase into which the dancer merges after having freed himself from the anxiety and fear over the dynamic violence of the primitive motility and its associated emotions.

For the dancer the anxiety and fear of dynamic movement springs from insecurity in the concept of his own body-image and from resistance to consecutive changes of his own self.

Exploration of the dynamic power of movement brings to the foreground instincts of self-preservation, destructive and constructive drives and through their mastery brings about an understanding of these elements within man. In the case of successful sublimation it should lead to a feeling of security through the knowledge of the emotional sources which underlie these drives and therefore to their control. The Hindu and Balinese dance, particularly that of men is tremendous in the projection of controlled power. The difficulty in teaching this to present-day adults in our own civilization is the conventional rejection and fear of the animal in man.

The ability to manipulate our body on the floor must be learned. It is partly a technical problem and is also a purposeful reversal to infantile movement. Often most of this type of movement is resisted by the adult or even the child because they were taught at some time that such activity was not proper. In permitting this activity on the dance floor one block is removed and the path is opened for acceptance of the psychological content through sublimation in dance form.

If, however, the adult is still unable to enjoy this state of reversal, if he has learned technically to perform leaps and falls and rolls without experiencing pleasure, then we deal with a further block. Such a person will reject this type of movement and will exclude it from his dance. He will go through the external motions of technically controlled gestures but will avoid clarifying its content. In my opinion an observer sensitive to movement forms, a teacher who is aware of the psychological factors, will recognize in such a performance a substitution of form for content and will see in it an anxiety block. On the whole a definite block becomes apparent again and again. Of course the block may not be constant and the intended sublimation can assert itself for moments during an improvisation. However, one can only eliminate the block by a therapeutic approach.

It must be approached from many angles: physical and mental

relaxation in movement, combined with the use of rhythm and sound accompaniment are one way. The use of drums, gongs, cymbals and rattles as accompaniment for the dance activity will concentrate the student's attention on the rhythmic pattern and the quality of the atmosphere so that his attention will be diverted from the actions of his physical body.* The concentration on sound and the repetition of the same kind of sound activates the body in spite of itself, muscle tone and balance become more homogeneous and the fear of physical injury becomes lessened. The mind is freed from this particular worry and the movement fantasy is set in motion. This dissociation of mind and body exists in some schizophrenic children to a high degree. It appears to be a suspension, a complete physical balance in an unbalanced emotional state. One such child could in a standing position perform a deep back bend with apparently no effort. The complete circular swing of the torso in the adult schizophrenic is another example. As was already stated, dancers can only acquire such a use of body dynamics, the continuation of an uninterrupted flow of movement through the entire body, after extensive training. The mechanism enabling the schizophrenic to do this is I believe still a matter of research and the reason for spontaneously starting such movements is not clarified as yet. Sometimes the movement can be induced in the schizophrenic but sometimes there is no reaction. The particular patterns described did not result from a verbal demand but came as a reaction to rhythmic sound.

It is extremely important for the teacher of dance to be able to recognize psychological problems as they become apparent in the choice of theme, movement forms and reactions of the pupil. He must also be able to deal with these problems. For this he needs training in insight and should be in contact with groups of psychiatrists and psychologists who are working on problems of character development and human relations. It is the task of the psychologist to assist the dance teacher as well as the creator in dance in order to make the various aspects conscious. Only when an improvisation has become a conscious part of an artistic plan, a methodic forming, a mastering of the theme, only then is the

* F. Boas, *Notes on Percussion Accompaniment for the Dance,* Dance Observer, Vol. V, No. 5, May 1938, Pg. 71.
F. Boas, *Percussion Music and its relation to the Modern Dance, Fundamental Concepts,* Dance Observer, Vol. VII, No. 1, Pg. 6.

artist on his way towards an objective attitude to the subject matter. This is the point where the personal elements become integrated with the detached process of creating. A dancer blocked before reaching this stage cannot become a productive artist. She or he needs the help of the understanding psychologist. The latter s work embraces diagnosis and therapy, if possible. It seems, however, that most prominent creative artists can overcome their blocks in relation to their art by means of their own initiative and intuition.

On the other hand, we know that even the insane can use an artistic medium for self-expression and further than that: the production of a creation which may have value in itself may occur. Of course, the premise for such an event is first, the removal of blocks; second, the ability of the patient to technically master his medium of expression. Professor Wygandt of Hamburg had trained an inmate of the Insane Asylum to weave. This man made a tapestry showing birds in flight. Some of the birds left a visible airpath behind them. They were, as the patient conceived them, vibrations of the air produced by the passing wings. They looked like expanding circles similar to those which are produced by a pebble thrown into quiet water. Those who saw the tapestry were under the impression that it was a masterpiece made by a genius. If not for the therapy instituted by the psychiatrist, this inner release as well as the objective form of the feeling of the air stirred by the flying birds, would never have found expression. Such translations of a felt event into a definite medium which can be communicated to and understood by others, is encountered among other artists. Leonardo da Vinci in his later drawings was occupied with trying to make visible the dynamic forces of wind and rain and their effect upon the earth with its plant and animal life.*

In another form it occurs in primitive cultures. The visual presentation of an echo performed during a certain ceremonial dance of the Indians of British Columbia is an example. The description was given by an Indian who is an informant for a well known anthropologist.** The echo dancer wears a mask and emits a sound. Then he quickly changes the mouth on his mask by applying a series of different mouths one after the other. Thus the repetitious sound of the echo is symbolically rendered visible.

* Catalogue of Drawings of Leonardo da Vinci, Windsor Castle, London, England.
** Dan Cranmer to Franz Boas.

An accoustic phenomenon is expressed visually. This is a conscious act of artistic forming. The underlying factor is the clear, conscious communication of an idea to the onlooker. The enactment of the echo by means of wooden mouths consecutively applied to the mask cannot be misunderstood.

A modern dance dealing with the conception of forces under water illustrates the use of dynamic power in this medium. The theme was the activation of two persons conceived as bodies, by the aggressive force of a center figure which disturbed the quiet of the space in which all three were suspended. There resulted a transmission of power to the formerly passive forms. There is of course always the human emotion to be reckoned with in dance. In this case the activity of the center figure created annoyance and unrest which resulted in aggression against the disturbing force thereby driving it into passivity. From this condition the center figure emerged on an emotional level with the two figures so that the final solution could be a unification of effort.

If a psychologist can help an artist to gain clarification of his purpose, then the psychologist's mission is fulfilled. The rest is up to the potentialities of the artist himself. In dance some themes may call for an allegorical expression as the echo just described. Another theme may have to be made visual by using the activation of the air surrounding the dancer. The teacher and psychologist will have to understand why a specific theme is depicted in a specific form by a specific person and must guide that person towards realization of the attempted task. But for the most part the dance teacher and psychiatrist will not be dealing with true artists and will, therefore, have to be satisfied with stimulating and guiding the pupil by means of improvisation to pleasure in movement and an understanding of himself and his relations to a group during rhythmic and dynamic physical activity.

The Humanistic Approach To Modern Architecture

BY

PAUL ZUCKER

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The humanist can be no better employed than in trying in his own particular field to educate the public away from the mere rationalistic point of view. Unfortunately, this materialistic perspective seems to be second nature for the majority of students. Speaking generally, they have been brought up in an atmosphere dominated by an economic, sometimes a technical, viewpoint and by an emphasis on the natural sciences. It is perhaps not too difficult to overcome this one-sided attitude in teaching literature, music or the history of painting and sculpture; it presents a real problem to the teacher whose subject is modern architecture.

However machine-conscious, functional and specialized our contemporary civilization may be, its humanist side can be discerned just as in any period of the past. Even the enlightment of the 18th century, disintegrating so many traditional values, finally led to a new humanistic attitude. In our time, likewise, proof of a new humanistic attitude has already become obvious in almost any contemporary work of art, in literature and music as well as in many paintings and sculptures. In all these arts the merely imitative naturalism and materialism began to vanish shortly after 1900, that is, after the epoch of Paul Bourget and Zola, of Debussy and Richard Strauss, and of the Impressionists.

What of *architecture* today? Setting aside Schelling's truism, "Architecture is frozen music," which is not a real definition but only a rather general comparison, we may define architecture as *frozen contemporary life.*

Let us consider functionalism as the architectural expression of and the stagesetting for this our contemporary life. Does not this functionalism mean precisely the triumph of materialism, emphasizing technical construction, material, and practical functions? And are *these* values not contradictory to both human and humanistic values?

With Comte, we may define humanism as "the emphasis laid on the dignity of humanity and the appreciation of human values." The ancients were the first of our civilization to enunciate this humanism; yet, there is no reason for us to imitate their artistic forms in order to reach a goal like theirs. There exists not the slightest logical or historical reason to identify humanism with classical design or the organization of past periods. Humanism merely means order,—*any* kind of order where the logic of human forms is the center and measure of all things.

Modern architecture is now definitely a fact, repudiating the historic imitations of the 19th century, led by the principle of Louis Sullivan, "form follows function". The fight for this principle was waged by the generation just preceding ours, in this country from Louis Sullivan to Frank Lloyd Wright, in France from Tony Garnier to Auguste Perret, in Austria from Joseph Hoffman to Adolf Loos, in Germany from Peter Behrens to Walter Gropius, in the Lowlands from H. P. Berlage to J. J. Dudok. Victory was definitely achieved between the years 1920 and 1930, during which these pioneers used mainly the argument of functionalism, learning from the engineer the condensed expression of practical needs, shorn of all superfluous decoration.

However, *now* the time has come to make both laymen and students see the difference which still exists between the most functional work of modern architecture and the merely rational work of the engineer. We must not succumb to the romantic fallacy of machine rhapsodies, we must try not to be overwhelmed and blinded by the impact of technique. It is certainly not superfluous to stress this danger of exaggeration since there has rarely been *any* period of transition and new development in art which tried so hard to defend its creations by explanations and theories.

It happened just once before: in the beginning of the Renaissance when the pioneer artists were exactly as conscious of the decisive and definite rupture with the preceding last centuries of the Middle

Ages. Then, also, the art loving public was inundated by theoretical tracts intended to help in a general understanding of the new art.

Fortunately some of the leading architects who did the pioneering like Frank Lloyd Wright and Walter Gropius, supported and encouraged by art critics like Russell Hitchcock, Lewis Mumford, and Nicholas Pevsner, have stated very clearly in their writings that they consider themselves creative and independent artists beyond their functional procedure. They were fully aware that throughout history a new style in architecture has never come into existence by following any *a priori* created aesthetic principles.

The time has passed when the slogan of Le Corbusier, "the house—a machine for living", can confuse the public mind. I even think that Le Corbusier himself now regrets the coining of this formula. It only proved a kind of inferiority complex of the architect towards the engineer, of an architect still ashamed of the sins his 19th century ancestors had committed against the engineer. Really, following this principle and consistently carrying it out would have meant the end of architecture as an art beyond engineering.

Incidentally, functionalism is not at all an exclusive achievement of our period. Many earlier periods, even though they had not learned to use our modern media—iron, steel, concrete, glass—believed in functionalism, as expressed in the building materials available to them. It must not be forgotten that each revival of ancient forms, from the Renaissance to the Classical Revival at the beginning of the 19th century, considered these ancient forms so beautiful *because* they were true, simple, and natural—what we would call functional. Our conception of classic architecture may not entirely agree with these statements; yet the mere fact that the classical enthusiasts mentioned these characterisics as *positive advantages* proves that even those periods approved functionalism as a decisive factor in architecture.

Now, what is left to the modern architect so that he may make buildings real works of art, beyond the fulfillment of all functional, economic, hygienic and sociological demands? Surely not the way of another repetition of traditional imitative forms!

The basis for his creation of an architecture, *metatechnical* beyond mechanization, manifold and individualistic beyond standardization, is one specific phenomenon. It is a phenomenon of general validity,

universal and common to all of us: the entirely new conception of space, totally different from the two-dimensional feeling of the 19th century. Although *indirectly* caused by technical development, it became entirely independent of our feeling for mere technical consistency.

Since not only architecture, city planning and industrial design found entirely new expressions but painting and sculpture, too, these new forms cannot be based *only* on the articulation of functional needs. They rely actually also upon the general development of a "new vision"—as Moholy-Nagy calls this phenomenon—shared by all of us, creative artist and receptive layman. Our perception is more different from the perception of the last generation than the visual approach of Queen Victoria from that of Mme. Dubarry. For the 19th century was a century of *planes,* the 20th century is a century of *space.* This new, general feeling for all three dimensions is the *only comprehensive explanation* for the new development in *all* visual arts, also in architecture,—even more than functionalism.

This third dimension is perceived not only by vision, but also by touch, not only by our eyes, but by our fingertips, too. It is a new kind of "feel" for material and texture, not existent in the 19th century. Qualities like smooth and rough, dull and shiny, porous and dense, have become living and are no longer merely terms for experts. On another scale, this fact proves the re-discovery of the third dimension, too.

It goes without saying that this vision and this feeling is not historically new or original: Egyptian and archaic Greek art, the last centuries of the Middle Ages, the Baroque period in its end, prove the existence of this experience. But since the end of the 18th century, the world has become flatter and flatter.

Our new conception is really a general and common one, not at all limited to creative artists. The most obvious of these experiences in daily life is the entirely changed feeling for nature and landscape. The decisive factor is the increasing psychological consciousness of *motion,* the so-called "kinetic sensation". There is a definite difference between moving in a *train,* the usual means of overcoming distance in the 19th century, and moving in a *car* through the countryside. The train does not give you immediately the impression of overcoming differences in altitude. By train you never get the feeling of the amount of time necessary for progress

through *space.* You think only of the distance in *one* direction. But the car makes you realize the connection between time and space, for you yourself have to do something to conquer space in time.

Here the objection might be raised that in the 19th century those people who hiked did already overcome differences in altitude and distance. But then the amount of time involved was so large and the space covered so small that spatial differences could not be perceived.

Even the trivial daily routine of using the elevator is—by the contrast of the vertical movement to our usual horizontal movement —a contribution for our realization of the third dimension.

This feeling for space has been immensely increased by *flying.* Here, the conquest of distances in *all three* dimensions is imposed with such immediacy and in such condensation upon the flyer, that this experience becomes very specific. Now, this sensation is by no means a privilege of the small number of people who really fly. The movies have thoroughly popularized this experience and have incorporated it into the general consciousness, so that the birdseye view has become again part of general consciousness like in the 18th century.

The movies have helped the development of our new spatial feeling. Not only by imposing the experience of flying upon the general mind. By their incessant accumulation of visual impressions and unceasing coercion to new perceptions, they created a new visual sensitiveness. Speed of transportation and motion pictures, both have led us to summarize and simplify visually. Thus we learned almost to forget or at least to overlook the detail. Only the great forms penetrate into our consciousness.

So much for the *new perception of space* of which the change of our feeling for *nature* is just *one* effect. I mention it to show that this experience is not confined to the creative artist. However, to him, the artist, it is left to create on this basis new shapes formed by the human mind and therefore expressions of human personalities, not only of mere functions.

Three facts characterize the articulation of the new forms in architecture. It is *first* the dissolution of space into different planes, and the organization of these planes into new spatial shapes; *second,* the integration of these planes by interlocking, overlapping

and transparency; *third,* the unification of surface which makes it appear not as a supporting system in itself but merely as an enclosing skin for a definite volume.

Some examples may prove our point of view:

A) Proof of the change in the conception of space: juxtaposition of landscape photographs between 1840 and 1870 and of modern landscape photographs. Juxtaposition of sculptures of the 19th century and of modern sculptures from Maillol to Archipenko.

B) Proof of the development of technical forms and their influence on architecture: forms of the locomotive, of the airplane, and of the steamer in their historical sequence. Examples of modern architecture adopting their forms: Dutch, German and Scandinavian buildings between 1920-30.

C) Proof of the influence of modern technical structures upon contemporary painting: Leger, Sheeler.

D) Proof of the parallel feeling as to the disintegration of space into different planes and as to transparency: juxtaposition of modern paintings from Braque to Picasso and of corresponding modern buildings and interiors.

E) Proof of the independency and freedom of modern architects as to the choice of their artistic means in spite of identical functional needs and structural suppositions. Variant forms of bridges, plants, silos, railway stations, etc., under equal conditions.

Construction changes into expression. In this way modern architecture becomes a subject of humanism. To what extent, only *one* man can prove, the engineer! He will be able to tell us how far the final shape of modern buildings has changed from the mere execution of constructive elements of tension, pressure and calculated masses.

Oliver Cromwell said, "A man never goes quite so far as when he does not know where he is going." So did modern architecture! Based upon the expression of rational conditions and functional needs, it became as independent, free and even emotional as any work ever created by man — therefore approachable from the humanistic point of view.

"Fantasia" and the Psychology of Music

BY

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Though Walt Disney's *Fantasia* played to crowded audiences, music critics and the musically sensitive for the most part groaned with distate. A fundamental problem in psychological esthetics seems to be raised by this interesting experiment. *Fantasia* purports to present on the screen the kind of images which come to mind when listening to certain famous orchestral works. The drawings have all the strength and all the now familiar weaknesses of the Disney formula. There are scenes of great beauty and there are unforgivable banalities. All this, however, is irrelevant to the central intention to weld into one significant, artistic whole the music and the visual forms which are suggested by the music. This intention the writer believes foredoomed to failure.

The error does not lie in that music is joined to a dramatic production. Such combination of music with theater is as old as the theater itself. Indeed drama, as we know it, grew out of ritual dances in ancient Greece; and apparently a parallel development is to be discerned in other cultures. Hence there has always been a kind of music which has been deliberately subordinated to drama. In our youth "Hearts and Flowers" signalized the sad or tender parts of the traveling melodrama. The motion picture, from the beginning, has been run off to the accompaniment of incidental music, often music of great beauty arranged from master works. More important, of course, is the use of music in both light and grand opera.

Wherein, then, lies the difference between this historical development and *Fantasia?* In this: hitherto the visual production—the

acted drama—has been primary; music has been used merely to enhance the story. Exception may seem needed in the case of opera. The opera plots are often silly or trivial, are almost invariably unbelievable; one does not call to mind more than a handful which, as they stand, would be tolerable theater without the music. Yet the historical fact is that the libretto comes first and the score is written around the story. It is the function of the music to transfigure these trivial tales into believable, yet endurable, tragic experience, or—in case of light opera—into believable entertainment. The music is indeed far more important than the drama, and much of it is capable of standing alone just as music, or is more enjoyable without the irrelevancies of the story. Yet to the extent that operatic music is part of the opera, it is a handmaid to drama. Opera may thus be a less noble form of music than symphony or chamber music—certainly it is less independent—but it clearly serves sound psychological needs when it thus supports and intensifies drama.

Some of the music used in *Fantasia* was originally written in similar fashion about a specific story—The Sorcerer's Apprentice, for example. No violence is done to the composer's intent when such music is presented to visual accompaniment—the screen is merely substituted for the stage.

In most of the *Fantasia* selections, however, it is the music which is the fundamental structure; the music does not grow out of, but rather is supposed to lead up to, the visual forms on the screen. That this is a clear reversal of the historical relationship is perhaps less important than the fact that it ignores the inherent differences between visual forms and musical forms—ultimately between vision and audition.

Both the ear and the eye are distance receptors, but the ear, in all mammals, at least, has become specialized for the reception of signals. In man these signals are commonly symbolic. Thus few man-made sounds directly mimic nature; for man, sounds have become abstractions. It is surely not without significance, then, that the receptor for music is also the receptor for speech sounds. Like speech, or because it is indeed a form of speech, music is the carrier of an infinite variety of plastic meanings. Musical sounds have no fixed meanings because they may mean so many things.

Visual forms, on the other hand, are much less symbolic and abstract. Even in the form of visual images, they remain subbornly concrete and representative. To be sure, abstract painting is—demonstrably—not impossible, but it remains to the last degree esoteric because the eye is the organ of reality, not of symbolism. So strong is this "realism" in the case of vision that even that which is written or printed, still more that which is pictured, has an acceptability far greater than that which is heard. Seeing, not hearing, is believing.

From this persistent difference between audition and vision come differences in their use for art, and particularly in their artistic combination. Milano, in an interesting "grammar of film-music relationships" classifies them as *dominantly aural* and *dominantly visual.*[1] Our contention is that, except incidentally, the *dominant aural* does not work psychologically.

A verbal or visual experience does not—except for a very few of the musically gifted—immediately or imperatively suggest music or indeed any stable pattern of sounds. Thus the opera composer, beginning with a written and acted story, has a wide range within which to create the music which is consonant with, and which can support and glorify, the representative modes of experience, whether visual or verbal. When, on the other hand, we begin with the music, each of us creates his own individual pattern of responding. Some of us create visual images but they are likely to be indistinct and evanescent. When we do create explicit visual images, they are the products of personal and individual experience. Some of us do not respond in images but only by changes in mood or emotion. Some respond in a way which is hard to analyze psychologically but may be described as a sort of identification with the intricate tonal pattern. There cannot be, therefore, any universally "right" visual pattern for one of Bach's fugues or even for highly programmatic music. Each of us must create his own mode of response out of his own experiences, even out of his momentary mood.

How individual the response to music is has been shown by the careful experiments of Dr. Melvin Rigg of Oklahoma Agricultural

[1] See "Music in the Film: Notes for a Morphology" by Paolo Milano in *Jour. of Aesthetics and Art Criticism,* 1941, 1, pp II and 89-94. This interesting sketch came to the writer's attention after this critique had been formulated, otherwise Milano's "grammar" might have been consistently utilized.

and Mechanical College.[1] Rigg found that when the music was unfamiliar to the listener so that he approached it free from stereotyped response, the associations were extra-ordinarily varied, corresponded with most varied moods and emotions. Whether trained in music or untrained, the subjects could agree upon only the crudest classification of the emotional tone; they would agree that it was light or heavy, sad or gay, exciting or depressed—beyond that each listener had to write his own "program notes." This individuality of the musical response may come as a relief, incidentally, to those who have been bulldozed into thinking themselves unmusical because their response is different from that of some critic. Whoever joyfully responds to music for himself is "musical;" and he who merely parrots the stereotyped phrases of the critics without response of his own is truly the unmusical one.

The partial success of experiments with the color organ, so far from contradicting our thesis, gives point to it. It is the representative element in visual experience which cannot be artistically and universally subordinated to sound, even the noblest of sounds. A cloud-like succession of colors, representing nothing concrete, is, like music, plastic to the mood and individual experience of the respondent and may easily be joined to a dominant aural experience. Indeed most of the satisfying moments in *Fantasia* were those wherein representative visual form gave way to unstructured movement of color or abstract design.[2]

It thus appears that the effort to visualize one's impressions of music must always fail to satisfy anyone else who is really listening to the music. Long wont may, indeed, stereotype our responses, as when a familiar wedding march suggests images of orange blossoms or bridal veils. (Though even here note that there are individual alternatives). That, however, is only to say that familiarity and social pressure have in large degree substituted a social symbol for a genuine personal response. To encourage people to look for and upon Mr. Disney's or anyone else's images is to encourage them to do something in the presence of music besides

[1] See especially "An experiment to determine how accurately college students can interpret the intended meanings of musical compositions," by M. G. Rigg, *J. Exper. Psychol.*, 21, 1937, 223-229.

[2] And it is interesting to note that many of these were removed when the film was cut for second-run theaters.

respond to music, is to make them to that extent less musical. When we are really responding to music, we are creating something unique and individual; and at the moment of such creation, anyone else's response, be it ever so beautiful, is only a distraction and an annoyance.

Art in a Democratic Society

BY

WILLIAM SENER RUSK

A society is a group of individuals small enough to have a common set of values, yet large enough to permit expression of individuality. A hamlet may be too large; a world, too small.

A democratic society is one in which the intention is to share the values as widely as individual powers of assimilation allow.

Art can be equated to life and yet be too exclusive; it can be embodied in a coffee-cup and connote much of non-artistic significance. As used here, art will mean forms created objectively by human beings seeking.

The most difficult parts of our title to define are the smallest words in it. Do we mean *of,* or *through,* or *in?* Do we mean *a* or *the?* Clarity demands a specific answer.

If we were to use *of,* some traditional forms would have to be discarded and we must include both traditional and modern forms, which exist *in spite of* as well as *because of* democracy. If we were to use *through,* we would run the risk of implying that a particular mode of society is an instrumentality of art creation. Although *and* may be preferred to *in* in the last analysis, since vagueness is preferable to ambiguity, *in* is the favored preposition to make the desired distinction and at the same time to preserve the close relationship between Art and Society. As for *the* or *a,* the former would shift the emphasis to the second part of the title, whereas actually we want to discuss art and mention democracy merely as the necessary concomitant for art's full expression. Although the latter may suggest a utopian locale, it does have the advantage of abolishing time and place.

With our title established, the first factor to note is that we are living in a new America with new art forms taking shape, and that before we can orient ourselves we will be living in a new world.

If responsible statesmen say that the spring of 1943 is too early to announce war aims, it will clearly be futile to discuss art in that new world. We do not yet know what the cultural climate will be or even whether history will have become archaeology. We know only that if it is a humane world, it will be vitalized by art.

What is meant by a new America? What are some of the factors already envisaged by "intelligent laymen"? We all know that eye and ear are stimulated, soothed, and kept alert as never before, if childhood memories or the sayings of the fathers can be used as authorities. Illustrated magazines and radio programs are with us and will outlive any of the present company.

Leisure is becoming more abundant, whether induced by labor-saving gadgets, by work-hour reforms, by technological or cyclic unemployment, or by any of a dozen other causes. And like many another rosy dream which turns drab when one awakes, enough leisure may prove to be too much. Our mothers and fathers gained leisure, or at least recreation, by changing their occupations in the endless round of duties; they did not sit in motion-picture theatres or at bridge tables or by the radio listening to play-by-play reports of the games "of the century".

Again, we live in a radically enlarged mental world. We are no longer merely locally conscious, but world-conscious, as the mis-pronunciation of strange names and places on the radio keeps reminding us. We also live in a past and in a future world, and even unconscious mental states are being brought to the level of consciousness. The past is presented through cavalcade and pageant programs, every hour brings reports of passing present events, and without the gift of prophecy or the spell of inspiration we anticipate the future. Time and space tend to become functions of each other, and being tends to lose meaning, leaving only one rather sordid way of life, that of ceaseless doing. The mediaeval symbol gave way to the perspective of the Renaissance, and now the conscious to the sub-conscious. Can art in a democratic society find freedom of expression in the surreal?

Security is being sought on the level of social well-being as never before. Spiritual security may be ignored, science may look askance at intellectual security, but physical security, we are told, is a cornerstone of any well-planned society. Housing projects and government patronage of artist and musician are so desirable,

although so dangerous, that we will have to find a place for them in our picture. It is dangerous to experiment in these fields in somewhat the same way as it is dangerous to live.

And then there is the new world of machinery and indirect handicraft. The brain which creates and the hand which executes no longer belong to the same personality. Indirection connotes dehumanization, again a dangerous dilemma. Mirror and clock and scales, as Lewis Mumford has suggested, began the downward path as man grew first self-conscious, and then conscious of plan rather than of experience and of volume rather than of value. Can the human being once more find freedom rather than regimentation through this monstrous brain-child of his? Will the child grow up, or has it sprung full-grown from the forehead of Man? Is Man himself still the child, and his machines stray matches whose use he does not comprehend? But there are signs that Man is coming to love his machine, and love is adult and human.

We can agree, can we not, that we are living in a new America? The new art forms are as obvious as the new webs and woofs of our social environment and mental consciousness. The Museum of Modern Art in New York has just organized a Department of Photography; its Film Library has already passed its experimental stage. Television is reported as ready for the market and no longer limited to use as a side-show at a World's Fair. Staticless radio is about to recreate the world of sound and meaning and rhythm. Hallie Flanagan points out that the enclosed room of the theater is expanding to the space of the cinema screen; the sound of a speaker or soloist or orchestra has become disembodied.

In another direction chemistry is replacing craftsmanship. Plastics are doubtless as completely natural as wood or clay. And the potter's wheel has long since accustomed man to the interposition of machinery between his purpose and his object. But, as with the developed machine, the emphasis on intelligence has become so great, and potentially so controlling, that the craftsman is likely to withdraw unnoticed. It is difficult for the camel to go through the eye of a needle; it is difficult for the machinist to possess his machine; it is difficult for the scientist to see the unseen—but if faith can remove mountains, what cannot love do?

In this new world with its new arts there is confusion, but fortunately not chaos. Those who are seeking are finding. The values

of play and of expression are being appreciated at adult as well as at child levels. Patronage is moving from individuals to large and more disinterested groups. The human senses are once more being considered. The spirit of the pioneer is being recovered at the more mature stage of being, beyond that of doing.

In a recent discussion with an adult group on the art of Brazil, included in a series of lectures on South America with good neighborliness and defense problems to the fore, a N. Y. A. girl asked, Is art practical? The answer was as trite as the truth sometimes is. Art and religion are the only really practical things there are. Brazilian coffee is doubtless a good article to purchase in these perilous times, but Portinari and Kipling's *Brazilian Sketches* and W. H. Hudson's *Purple Days* represent values independent of trade balances and totalitarian crises.

If now we agree "in principle" with the foregoing, we are ready to relate Art to a Democracy girding its loins for a future, albeit our emphasis is on the present.

I agree with Sigfried Giedion who in his Charles Eliot Norton lectures pointed out that the range of the relation of art and society extends from useful articles to regional planning. He finds that the 19th century neglected man's inner life and contends that only by realigning thinking and feeling can an equilibrated life be recaptured. With such a scope for re-creation democracy will surely have a full opportunity for expression.

The means suitable for such a realignment are already at hand—appropriate education for the student of whatever age and provision of a fertile environment for the mature artist and amateur and scientist. In a sense art appreciation and art creation cannot be taught. But tools can be sharpened, their uses can be explained, enthusiasms can be shared, and the whereabouts of the Muses can be hinted.

For early adolescence learning by doing is the well tested means which still holds true. Moreover, as Thomas Munro has pointed out, the study of art will help, not only specifically in its fostering of appreciation continuously from early youth on, but psychologically may well be a primary factor in helping the infant become the well-adjusted adult.

For the older student without professional interests the present world has three approaches—all matured in a short span of years.

History, practice, and psychology are the means by which the democratically bred individual can reach toward his full heritage as an art lover in his later years.

The history of art is the best means now available for the important task of integrating the student's education and hence his personality. The Classics used to perform the same function. It is not necessary to enumerate all of the many ways in which this is true. Patently, the history of art of a period illuminates and clarifies the significance of the period. The direct connection between the art expression of a people and their other cultural expressions is also easily demonstrable. The problems of the literature, music or philosophy of a people oftentimes resolve when their art forms are taken as the catalytic agent.

Less obvious at first glance, but equally pertinent, are the relationships to be pointed out to the college student between art history and the sciences, whether social, biological, or physical. The whole field of regional planning might illustrate the first, man as the primary concern of the sculptor or the recent cult of the primitive, the second, and the nature of color relations, x-ray processes, or plastics, the third. Yes, a college student can well use his art courses to integrate and patternize the mosaic of his college program.

Practice courses are now also widely offered. The difference between nature and art, between representation and expression, between style and styles, between taste and fashion become apparent without words, once he makes his own mistakes and then his own designs. The technique used, the method of the teacher, the presence or absence of a "gift" matter little, once the student is given the freedom of the city of art. After trying varied experiments with visiting teaching and non-teaching professional artists and with artists-in-residence more or less interested in awakening young people to the world of sight, it is now generally agreed that a college can do without a gymnasium as suitably as without a studio. How could it ever have been thought otherwise?

The newest approach, and one still in the stage of profundity and clichés is psychology. The psychological benefits of art instruction in the lower schools have already been referred to, and the philosophical and aesthetics aspects of psychology are as old as Aristotle and neo-Platonism. But with the Gestalt psychology of Koehler and Koffka a new tool seems in process of being forged for the student

of art. In a world being studied under the thought-forms of unity, the time-space of Einstein, the experience patterns of psychology, and the flowing space of contemporary architecture seem all of a kind. Koffka has mentioned some of the suggestive possibilities of this new approach open to the art student. The essential value to the spectator of measuring the significance of an art form, or the mental ambiguity resulting from failure to distinguish between art and propaganda are cases in point. Form and content are found to overlap.

If the college student can have his program of arts and sciences integrated for him by art history, his inner world freed of inhibitions by art expression, and his mental life stabilized by psychological interpretations, he will enter the adult democratic world a citizen ready to be and to do—an individual who plays the game.

The student who plans to be a professional artist should take the same training as his fellows insofar as circumstances allow. The ivory towers are doomed and the philistines are weakening. The only difference would be the greater emphasis placed on acquiring technical skill with speed. We may even hope that in time industrial art will cease to be separated from fine art and that the term, "commercial art," will have to be explained in footnotes found in histories of nineteenth century culture.

And just as we will find it increasingly difficult to distinguish between the programs of the art student and the general student, so the artist and the adult amateur will tend to fuse as each knows and feels the same things in a democratic world. The tripod of psychology and history and practice will raise the student to wisdom; the tripod of artist, amateur, and scientist will support nothing so appropriate as a Winged Victory.

The means by which the adult can be contacted are many. They include the writings of the art critic, whether journalist or essayist, the educational program of the local museum, and the discussions provoked by planning boards of the several communities. Overcoming sales resistance by the use of appropriate forms for useful products, the opening of a National Gallery of Art in a war-torn world, the strident voice of a Robert Moses brilliantly accomplishing magnificent feats of civic planning provide adult education at its best.

Art which has been created is dead, although like everything which has lived, it is eternal. All art which is yet to be created is

hidden from our eyes. Hence not art in a democratic society, but the environment of the artist-amateur-scientist must now be our concern, as we are limiting our discussion to the immediate present. What are some of the things we are seeing, some of the ways we are looking at them, some of the indications of how a democratic people are helping the artist re-create his experience and give life to a memory, a value?

There is *Fantasia,* very indigestible, but wonderful for jaded appetites. The sound-track brought to life is an inspiration; the science taken out of museum galleries in the shape of prehistoric monsters and made animate are clever; and the relations of the non-objective art of the painter and cinematic art are suggestive. But the fade-outs of Leopold Stokowski and his orchestra, and the impertinence of mingling the music of Bach with color fantasies may be too much. Reality and abstraction are not fused, nor appeals to eye and ear integrated.

Then there is the idea that art and nature are one. In a sense, of course, they are. But art is human in proportion as it is not nature. Blossfeldt with his *Art Forms in Nature* and Georgia O'Keefe with her voluptuous flower designs would provide suggestive data for the affirmative side of any such discussion. But fortunately at the moment we are moving away from both non-objective art, a form of animism, and photographic art, a form of machine eroticism, and are moving to a new grasp of how to set down what the eye has seen in a frame of reference appropriate to the experience and the technique employed. All enduring art has always done just that. Kandinsky has historical significance rather than aesthetic. Architecture designed with rotogravure reproduction in mind is as cramped as when it was a blue-print to be pulled out, accordion-wise. And Clarence Kennedy in his marvellous photographs of Greek sculpture succeeds because he does not allow his camera to compete with the sculptor.

But if we are moving toward a new classicism, a new serenity, a new plateau of human experience—witness the waffle-iron facades of Radio City, the W. P.A. regional exhibits, the Greenbelt communities—we need a new rationalization. Space is doubtless the concept which is proving most fruitful for this purpose, though the word threatens to be as overworked and become as colorless as *form* was a short while back. And yet each of these concepts has

powerful implications. The fact that they are logically opposites does not preclude their use together. In the world of art, as in a democratic way of life, logic has only experimental rather than final value. The East has long had a feeling for significant space in architecture, in painting, even in sculpture, where space is needed to give vividness to movement. The West has emphasized form perhaps, though space in Roman architecture, in Byzantine architecture, and in Gothic architecture with all its defiance of gravity, has been a recurring theme. Now space has found a role in architecture, sculpture, painting, cinema, and town-planning, for space permits motion and motion connotes life—democratic life. The essays edited by Martin, Nicholson and Gabo under the title, *Circle,* and Giedion's lectures, issued as *Space, Time, and Architecture,* are pertinent discussions.

As we artists and amateurs and scientists look at the world around us, then, we are likely to agree that Art and Life are not identical in a democratic society—they are rather the obverse and reverse of the same coin. And when art and the democratic or moral way of life are integrated intellectually and emotionally, we can expect to attain to a sense of holiness or wholeness, a state which Eric Gill has said is the inevitable result of such a fusion.

Beauty As Harmony

BY

JARED S. MOORE

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Two writers in the initial number of this *Journal,* Thomas Munro and Van Meter Ames, are determined hereafter to exclude rigidly the ancient problem of the nature of beauty—that "conceptual will-o-the-wisp", that "endlessly debatable and ambiguous" "abstraction", as Professor Munro calls it (page 5)—from the consideration of aestheticians, and to direct their attention in future solely to questions about art. I suppose if these gentlemen were plotting to revise Shakespeare, they would not attempt such a hackneyed performance as "*Hamlet* with Hamlet left out", but the more novel endeavor of *Romeo and Juliet* without Romeo! For aesthetics is as truly concerned with art *and* beauty as is Shakespeare's great romantic tragedy with Juliet *and* Romeo. Nor does my good friend Professor Munro seem to be willing to confess on the printed page what I am confident he knows in his heart far better than I do—namely, how *very* ambiguous is the concept of art, and how debatable are all the questions about its nature, functions, etc., etc. And in fact, on the very next page to that cited above, Mr. Munro admits that such *words* as "beauty", the "sublime", etc., "are phenomena" which "can be objectively studied"; and if this is true of the words, it must certainly be true of their much more important referents, though obviously we can never study the *nature* of beauty without employing the *word.*

In what follows, then, I propose to tackle the perilous concept of beauty, to consider briefly the leading theories about it, and then to analyze it with the aid of one of the oldest of these theories, one so famous and persistent as to deserve the name of "the classic theory" —the theory, namely, which defines beauty in terms of *harmony,* or "unity-in-variety." It is hoped then to show that by a proper mod-

ernization of this theory the idea of beauty can be so analyzed as to find a place for all the truths set forth in the other theories as well. First, then, as to the

*Theories of Beauty**

The leading theories of beauty in the field today seem to be of two main classes: (1) *empirical* or *subjective* theories, which identify beauty with the experience of the beautiful; and (2) *rationalistic* or *objective* theories, which conceive of beauty rather as a quality in things that arouses certain kinds of experiences in us when we become aware of that quality. In his book *Concerning Beauty* (1935), Professor Frank Jewett Mather, Jr., poses the question as to which of the following is the more "accurate statement of [an] experience of beauty": "This is a beautiful object, and I am enjoying its beauty"; or, "I am enjoying an experience of beauty apropos of this object."[1] Mr. Mather himself adopts the second statement as the truer one, thus associating himself with the subjectivists on the question; whereas the objectivists would prefer the other, certainly the more natural, formula. Of the subjective theories the only living one today is *hedonism,* which defines beauty somehow in terms of pleasure. Objective theories are more diverse, but before we can understand the difference between them we must enter upon the first stage in our analysis.

Every aesthetic objject, or object judged either beautiful or ugly, may be thought of from two different points of view: (1) as *form,* a pattern or arrangement of sensuous materials—colors, shapes, tones, etc.; and (2) as having *significance,* or as *expressive* of certain emotions, ideas, images, etc. Although "form" is the word almost universally used to designate the first of these factors, the other factor is variously referred to as "significance", "meaning", "expression", "substance", or "idea." It is the last of these terms that we shall preferably employ; understanding, of course, that in aesthetics the word "idea" covers feelings, emotions, sensations, etc., as well as concepts and mental images. Most simply these two aspects of every aesthetic object may be distinguished as follows: *Form* is

* These are tabulated at the close of this article.

that aspect which appeals to the senses of the observer (*i.e.,* what can be seen or heard, etc.); and *Idea* that aspect which appeals to the intellect, imagination, or emotions (*i.e.,* what can only be thought, imagined, or felt).

On the basis of this distinction, objective theories of beauty fall under two heads: (a) *formalistic* theories, which define beauty entirely in terms of Form; and (b) *idealistic* theories, which define it entirely in terms of Idea. As we proceed in the investigation of these theories we shall observe that none of them is complete in itself, and that a really satisfactory theory must include the partial truths found in all of them.

Formalism is the classic theory already referred to which defines beauty in terms of order or formal harmony—as that which possesses unity-in-variety, that which presents a variety of details combined into a unity of general effect. Variety without unity, this theory points out, is confusing, and unity without variety is monotonous and uninteresting: *order* is the principle which brings unity of general effect out of what would otherwise be a confused jumble of details, and produces a harmonious and beautiful whole. Carleton Noyes, in his charming book of many years ago, *The Gate of Appreciation* (1907), offers the instance of a locomotive works which to the layman gives the impression of utter confusion and chaos, but in which to him who understands such things there is perfect order, because he sees clearly how every machine and every machinist in the building is contributing a necessary share to the end for which the whole exists. So the appreciator of beauty enjoys at the same time the variety of details, the unity of the whole, and the way in which every detail contributes to that unity.

But the defects of this celebrated theory are as noteworthy as its apparent appropriateness. In one way it presents too broad a definition of beauty, and in another way a too narrow definition. It is too broad in its identification of beauty with harmony; for although all beautiful things undoubtedly manifest a unity-in-variety, not all unity-in-variety is aesthetic. The harmony in the locomotive works is a utilitarian harmony, a harmony necessary for practical efficiency, and not aesthetic at all; just as the harmony found in a scientific theory is an intellectual harmony, not an aesthetic one. On the other hand, the formal definition of beauty is too narrow just because it *is* purely formal, and ignores the spirit which lies behind

the form and manifests itself through it. Formal harmony is but one condition of beauty, and not the most important one at that; for the life behind the form is more important than the form that embodies it. Beauty *involves,* indeed, a harmonious medium of expression, but beauty *itself* is an ideal value; and the true theory must define the *Idea* of Beauty, not merely describe the general outward characteristics of a beautiful object.

Aesthetic idealism endeavors to do just that, but there seem to be two distinguishable idealistic theories, each with a notable historic tradition behind it. One of these is the theory of the characteristic, associated with such great names as those of Goethe and Taine, and traceable in its underlying principle to Plato. According to this theory an object is beautiful if it exactly embodies the essential characteristics of that object—its "Idea" or "Form" in the Platonic sense. A tree, for example, is beautiful if it has all the characteristics which it *should* have *as* a tree; and a picture of a tree is beautiful if it represents correctly the essential characteristics displayed by its model. Now there is undoubtedly some truth in this theory, and we shall later find a place for it, but it seems hardly applicable to all cases: for example, a healthy hog would scarcely be described by anyone but an unaesthetic farmer as "beautiful."

This brings us to our final distinctive theory, which we may call the spiritual theory (spiritualism) because it defines beauty as that in the realm of the senses (nature or art) which responds to the needs of man's spiritual nature. According to this theory we call an object beautiful when we find in it something akin to ourselves: the ideal within us becomes the key to the actual beyond us, and by a kind of spiritual empathy we project ourselves wholeheartedly into the object. As Mr. Noyes strikingly phrases it: "where the spirit of man comes into harmony with a harmony external to it, there is beauty."[2] It is still a harmony, as in the formal theory, but here a harmony between the spirit of man and the spirit (life or idea) of the object. This theory is Plotinian rather than Platonic, and is the most profound of all the theories we have been examining; but obviously it is somewhat obscure in itself, and is decidedly in need of supplementation.

As we look back over the path we have just traversed we are impressed by the fact that each theory we have considered contributes its share to our understanding of the nature of beauty, but that none

is by itself adequate. As between the formalistic and idealistic theories in general, each takes account of one of the two main aspects of a beautiful object, but ignores the other equally important one. Form and significance are not separable parts of an aesthetic object, but inseparable aspects: neither has any existence apart from the other, and each finds its value only in its relation to the other. Or, as Mr. Mather puts it, a work of art is not merely form *plus* meaning, but "form-meaning" or "meaning-form."[3]

A. C. Bradley has given us a strikingly simple example of this in his classic Oxford lecture on "Poetry for Poetry's Sake" (1901): "People say, for instance, 'steed' and 'horse' have the same meaning; and in bad poetry they have, but not in poetry that *is* poetry.

> 'Bring forth the horse!' The horse was brought:
> In truth he was a noble steed!

says Byron in *Mazeppa.* If the two words mean the same here, transpose them:

> 'Bring forth the steed!' The steed was brought:
> In truth he was a noble horse!

and ask again if they mean the same."[4] Of course they don't! The change in effect produced by such a slight alteration of the words is truly remarkable, and all this applies equally well to every other art. If an object is to be considered beautiful, then, the form must appear to us as the natural and necessary embodiment of the idea.

A complete analysis of beauty, to which we must now address ourselves, will reveal the truths involved in each of the objective theories we have examined, and will also take account of the facts on the psychological side that are set forth by the empirical theories. Such a complete analysis, then, will result in a comprehensive view of beauty which is a synthesis of all the others.

Analysis of Beauty

In any complete analysis of beauty, three factors must be taken into consideration: (1) the *form,* or material object as perceived by the senses; (2) the *idea,* content, or spiritual significance of the object; and (3) the psychological *subject* of the aesthetic experience —the observer, or contemplating mind. The first and second of

these, and the intimate relation that subsists between them, we have already said enough about: together, when all the necessary conditions have been met, they constitute "the beautiful object"; but in a complete anlalysis the subject plays fully as significant a part.

Now for complete beauty, *harmony* within each of these elements and in all the relations between any pair of them is essential. With this key in mind the analysis itself proceeds smoothly and without effort, yielding immediately three main types of harmony, with various subtypes that gradually emerge.* The principal varieties are: (1) an *objective* harmony among the elements in "the beautiful object"; (2) an *objective-subjective* harmony between the beautiful object and the contemplating mind; and (3) a *psychological* or purely subjective harmony within the mind of the observer. As we consider these and their subvarieties one by one we shall find a place for each of the theories examined in our earlier section.

The objective harmony is that which Carleton Noyes speaks of as "a harmony external to" "the spirit of man" with which the latter must "come into harmony" if beauty is to be found.[5] If we remember what has been said of the factors in the beautiful object and their interrelation we shall perceive at once that this objective harmony involves three subordinate ones: (a) a *formal* harmony among the parts of the material object itself; (b) an *ideal* harmony among the parts of the idea, or (if we prefer so to say) among the various ideas, embodied in the material object; and (c) an *expressive* harmony between idea and form, so that the material object exactly embodies the idea, as in the illustration quoted from A. C. Bradley a few pages back. Obviously the formal harmony is that which "the classic theory", as we have called it, demands, but which that theory falsely holds to be sufficient for beauty, whereas we have (I hope) shown it to be altogether too narrow for an adequate conception. Similarly the theory of the characteristic puts the expressive harmony forward as sufficient, ignoring the other equally important varieties. And though no special theory seems to stress ideal harmony, it is clear that unless the various ideas embodied in an object are consistent with one another, the beauty of the whole will be seriously reduced.

These points may perhaps be made somewhat more forceful if we point out that the objective conditions of beauty correspond to

* These are tabulated at the close of this article.

those requisite for a good logical argument. In such an argument three conditions must be met: (1) the thoughts must be logically consistent (ideal harmony), (2) the words which ocnvey the ideas must be grammatically correct (formal harmony), and (3) the words must express the thoughts precisely (expressive harmony). Of course we must acknowledge a difference in the emphasis of the various types of harmony in the logical and aesthetic fields; for as a beautiful object is necessarily a material or sensible one, aesthetic harmony is primarily formal and only secondarily ideal, though "secondary" does not mean "inessential"; whereas, contrariwise, a logical argument is primarily a sequence of thoughts, and ideal harmony therefore the first condition of its excellence, though if an argument is ambiguously expressed it obviously loses its force. But notwithstanding differences in emphasis, the general parallel between the two fields in which harmony is essential prevails.

The objective-subjective harmony, or that between the beautiful object and the contemplating mind, includes two subordinate varieties: (a) a *spiritual* harmony between the ideal object and the spiritual nature of the observer; and (b) a *psychophysical* harmony between the material object (the form) and the psychophysical organism of the observer. The former of these is the one exclusively stressed by what we have called the spiritual theory, and described by Carleton Noyes in the passage above cited as a harmony of "the spirit of man" with "a harmony external to it." The psychophysical harmony is emphasized by certain psychophysiological principles not yet mentioned—the principle of empathy, the principle of absorption, and the principle of neural assimilation. The concept of empathy is well known and needs no further description here. By the principle of absorption I mean the familiar fact that when one is intensely interested in an object of contemplation he has a feeling of oneness with the object.[6] And under the name of the principle of neural assimilation I refer to a certain principle once suggested by James Mark Baldwin[7] to the effect that the sense of beauty depends on the ease with which the stimuli from the beautiful object are assimilated into the neuronic patterns already existent in the brain.

Now we make no claim that the absence of one of the elements of harmony so far appearing in our analysis entirely destroys the beauty of the object, but we do contend that it leaves that beauty incomplete. Whether or not it is possible to have degrees of truth

or of reality, certainly it *is* possible to have degrees of beauty. For example, a "beautiful" face on a person of evil character or of a low grade of intelligence (the type vulgarly known as "beautiful but dumb"!) possesses formal harmony but lacks true spiritual significance, whereas a "homely" face on a person of noble character or high intelligence possesses ideal harmony but lacks a harmonious embodiment; but it is legitimate to characterize either of these as in some sense or in some degree "beautiful." The classic instances of these are, of course, Alcibiades and Socrates respectively, and the famous comparison by Alcibiades of Socrates with the images of Silenus[8] illustrates perfectly the second type referred to above. Note also that in both of these cases *expressive* harmony is lacking; since formal beauty is the natural embodiment of goodness and truth, while evil and falsity find *their* natural expression in a *dis*harmonious exterior.

Aesthetic harmony is complete, then, only when all the elements so far specified are present; and when they *are* present there is produced in the mind of the observer the final type of harmony which we have called *psychological* or purely subjective—a sense of pleasure which not merely adds itself to the sense of beauty, but enters into and becomes a part of it.[9] This inner harmony has been finely described by Miss Puffer as an "aesthetic repose" which brings the personality into a state of "unity and self-completeness"[10] —a unity of the subjective, not only with the object (absorption, objective-subjective harmony), but with itself. The principle has also been formulated by Barrows Dunham, in his *Study in Kant's Aesthetics,* under the name of "the ultimate principle of taste", in the following language: "an object is beautiful to the extent and the degree in which, by its form and sensuous qualities, it excites all the activities of the human self to the most refined and harmonious interplay of which they are capable."[11]

Impressive and Expressive Beauty

Our analysis is now concluded, but it does not seem entirely out of touch with the general spirit of this article to add a further section on the question of *kinds* of beauty. The familiar distinction

between beauty of form and beauty of significance or expression is open to objection on the ground that it involves the diremption of the two equally essential aspects of every beautiful object (form and idea), and limits each type of beauty to one or the other; and yet there *is* an important distinction of kinds of beauty based on the *relations* which subsist in each case between these two elements, both necessarily being present in either case. When it comes to finding names to apply to these two classes we meet with difficulty, since any names are subject to misunderstanding; but *some* names must be used, and we shall attempt to avoid confusion by first carefully defining our terms and then amplifying and illustrating our points.

The names I should like to suggest for the two types are "impressive" and "expressive" beauty, defining them as follows: Impressive beauty is that in which the idea is found *entirely* in the form, as in the beauties of nature, absolute music, abstract painting and sculpture, the decorative arts, etc. Expressive beauty is that in which the idea is found only *partly* in the form, as in poetry, traditional painting and sculpture, program music, etc.

The distinction, therefore, is not between form and idea, since *all* beauty has these, but between those cases where the idea is found *entirely* in the form, and those in which the idea *overflows* (as it were) the form. So long as the aesthetic meaning or value of the object (*i.e.,* the idea) is found just *in* the material form of that object (*i.e.,* in its colors, tones, etc.), we have impressive beauty *only*: so soon as the idea (*i.e.,* in this case, the imagination, emotions, or intellect) calls us *beyond* the material form in order to appreciate it fully, the object acquires *also* expressive beauty. Whatever God had in mind, for example, in creating a snow-capped mountain at the head of a woodland lake, whatever Bach had in mind in composing his Brandenburg Concerto No. 2, is in the one case discoverable only by an intense contemplation of the mountain and lake themselves, and in the other by an intense contemplation of the musical tones and their relationships; and so we call them impressively beautiful. But to discover what Leonardo had in mind in his creation of the Mona Lisa, or Wagner in his composition of the Liebestod, one must know, or at least speculate upon, who the subject of the portrait was and how she really looked, and one must know something at least about love and death and the story of

Tristram of Lyonnesse: hence we say that though the two compositions are lovely to look upon or to listen to, they also express something more than merely the delight that springs from the perception of beautiful colors and musical tones, and so may be called in a specialized sense expressively beautiful. Similarly, whatever beauty a face may have when it is in repose will be chiefly impressive, but the beauty of a face in activity is chiefly expressive.

It will be observed that the language used above distinctly implies a kind of unsymmetrical relation between these two varieties of beauty. Some things, we have said, "have impressive beauty *only*": others have "*also* expressive beauty." In other words, expression *alone* (in our restricted sense of this term) cannot make an object beautiful, but only *adds* to an already existing beauty: objects must be *at least* impressively beautiful if they are to be called beautiful at all, but they *may* possess expressive beauty *also;* and when both conditions are fulfilled, the expressive element may predominate. For example, if Leonardo and Wagner had not conformed to the laws of pictorial and musical composition as rigidly as God and Bach did in *their* creations, the results of their work would have no true aesthetic value and they would not be the mighty artists which the appreciative world acclaims them to be; but, nevertheless, Leonardo and Wagner had more in mind in their works cited above than *merely* to create a beautiful work. Personally, I might add, I could never consent to calling La Gioconda a beautiful woman, but her painter has doubtless represented her with superlative excellence, and has used luscious colors and good simple composition in portraying her: the picture, then, has both impressive and expressive beauty, but, lovely as its colors are, certainly it is the expressive quality which predominates.

TABLE I: THEORIES OF BEAUTY

I. Empirical or Subjective
   Hedonism

II. Rationalistic or Objective
   A. Formalism ("the classic theory")
   B. Idealism
      1. The Theory of the Characteristic
      2. Spiritualism

TABLE II: ANALYSIS OF BEAUTY

Types of Harmony	*Parallel Theories*
I. Objective	
A. Formal	Formalism
B. Ideal	
C. Expressive	Characteristic
II. Objective-Subjective	
A. Spiritual	Spiritualism
B. Psychophysical	Psychological Principles: Empathy; Absorption; Neural Assimilation; Aesthetic Repose
III. Psychological or Subjective	Empiricism

FOOTNOTES

[1] *Op. cit.*, page 9.

[2] *Op. cit.*, pages 183 f.

[3] *Op. cit.*, page 128.

[4] *Oxford Lectures on Poetry*, by A. C. Bradley, Lecture 1.

[5] *V. sup.*, page 5

[6] This principle is developed by Ethel Puffer in her *Psychology of Beauty*, Chapter III.

[7] Reported in *The Essentials of Aesthetics*, by George Lansing Raymond (1906), pages 387-390.

[8] Plato, *Symposium*, 215 B. 216 D.

[9] Empiricism would define beauty in terms of this element alone.

[10] *Op. cit.*, page 49.

[11] *Op. cit.*, page 131. It is the last clause of this description that characterizes the psychological harmony: the earlier ones mention formal harmony alone, and the formulation is incomplete as a definition of beauty because of its omission of the other types.

ELEMENTS IN AESTHETIC HARMONY



The numbers and letters correspond to those in Table II.

The Aesthetic Life of Communities*

BY

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This article will report a study of methods of measuring certain features of the aesthetic life of cities such as could be used on a wide scale without great expense, and certain conclusions from the application of these methods to seven cities of Pennsylvania and Western New York.

The features chosen were the residences, schools and churches, the front yards, and the shop-windows of certain stores. Streets were selected at random from those named in the local telephone book, and houses at random from each street. These houses were photographed. All the schools and churches on each selected street in each city were photographed. All the shop windows of the sorts specified were rated. This procedure produced the following photographic material:

		Photographs of Residences	Photographs of Schools and Churches
City I	I	63	16
" II	B	54	16
" III	O	42	15
" IV	K	71	17
" V	L	53	17
" VI	S	50	24
" VII	P	28	11

Each of these photographs has been rated by six judges.

* The investigation reported here was one of a number of studies of American cities supported by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation.



Fig. 1.



Fig. 2.

The front yards chosen by a similar process numbered 216, 217, 216, 210, 194, 15,* and 192 for cities I to VII respectively. They were rated on the spot during the fall of 1939 by Dr. Ella Woodyard, for all cities.

The store windows numbered 74, 110, 87, 11, 89, 103, and 114 for cities I to VII respectively. They included all the drug, furniture, jewelry, clothing, and ten or twenty-five-cent stores of the city. They were rated in all cities by the same observer, Mrs. Harford Powel.

The photographs and the ratings of yards and shop-windows can be obtained at a cost of two days' time for two persons and a car, and a hundred photographs per city, and the work of obtaining them will be instructive to anybody interested in the life of communities. The later ratings of the photographs should be made by persons of good taste with the aid of scales showing seven or more steps between Fig. 1 and Fig 2. Approximately four hours of work from each of four judges per city will be needed, though less will still give a useful result, and more will not be wasted.

Before discussing the merits and defects of such observations and the allowances which should be made in using them to compare a city with itself at an earlier or later date, or with other cities, it will be well to state what the observations show when taken at their face value.

Let us begin with the photographs of residences. As a simple way of expressing the ratings, let us call the average aesthetic merit of the residences in Fig. *1* 90 and that of those in Fig. *2* 10. This is arbitrary, and those of Fig. *2* doubtless in one sense deserve negative scores; but let us operate with a scale such that the best we may expect to find will score about 100, and the worst we may expect to find will score about 0. On such a scale there are in city I as many houses above *44.7* as below *44.7*. Similar medians (i.e. mid-scores or 50 percentile scores) for the other cities are as shown in Table *1*. One fourth of the houses from city I have ratings above 57.5. Similar "upper quartiles" or "75 percentiles" for the other cities are as shown in Table 1. Three fourths of the houses in City I have ratings above 38.0. Similar "lower quartiles" or "25 percentiles" for the other cities are as shown in Table 1. There are very reliable differences between the cities I, II, III and IV on the one

* In City VI most of the houses front directly on the street.

hand and cities V, VI and VII on the other. In general, if measures of every house in the city had been photographed the 50 percentile would always be within 5 of the amount stated in Table 1. It will be observed that the cities fall into nearly the same order whether the 25 percentiles, 50 percentiles, or 75 percentiles are used for the comparison. The esthetic quality of a city's domestic architecture as rated by impartial judges can thus, as common knowledge would lead one to expect, be measured rather easily and reliably. Although there is a great variation in merit among the houses in each city, significant measures of total status can be got, to somewhat the same degree that we can get significant measures of the cubic feet in a city's houses by photographing each against a screen scaled off in feet, and having enough impartial judges rate the cubic capacity of each.

Table 1

RATINGS OF HOUSES FROM PHOTOGRAPHS

	50 percentile Score	Rank	75 percentile Score	Rank	25 percentile Score	Rank
City I	44.7	2	57.5	1	38.0	2
" II	42.3	3	48.3	3	36.2	3
" III	40.5	4	46.1	4	33.2	4
" IV	49.3	1	55.9	2	44.2	1
" V	35.3	5	42.5	5	29.1	5
" VI	27.8	6	33.9	7	22.7	6
" VII	26.2	7	37.5	6	22.0	7

The ratings of the photographs of schools and churches give less reliable differences between the cities, partly because there are only a third as many of these as of houses and partly because the disagreement among the judges is greater. The median (i.e. 50 percentile) score for a city is however fairly characteristic of it and suitable for use along with the scores for houses. The ratings and ranks of the cities for schools and churches are as shown in Table 2.

About 220 front yards in each of six cities were rated on four scales for the appearance of the walks, lawns, shrubbery and trees. In city VI very few houses had any front yards; consequently its ratings should probably be disregarded. For various reasons the

Table 2

RATINGS OF SCHOOLS AND CHURCHES FROM PHOTOGRAPHS

	MEDIAN RATING	RANK	RANK FOR HOUSES
City I	52	2	2
" II	43	5	3
" III	46	4	4
" IV	56	1	1
" V	48	3	5
" VI	30	7	6
" VII	42	6	7

ratings for trees may well be considered separately from the other three.

Each scale included seven possible measures: +3, +2, +1, 0, −1, −2, and −3. Of the 1403 houses whose yards were judged, the percentages in the different groups were as follows:

	Walks	Lawns	Shrubs
+3	10.7	9.3	16.4
+2	30.0	24.9	24.6
+1	24.5	23.6	28.4
0	10.5	17.4	18.9
−1	17.3	12.9	8.2
−2	6.4	9.8	3.3
−3	0.9	2.2	0.3

A score of +3 is approximately that of the best appearing tenth of front yards; a score of +2 is approximately that of the next best appearing quarter of them; a score of +1 is that of the next best appearing quarter; −3 represents approximately the worst hundredth; −2 represents approximately the next worst sixteenth. In any wide use of ratings of yards a scale of colored photographs should be used to define the ratings.

The average ratings for each city on each scale appear in Table 3. Using only the ratings for walks, etc., lawns, etc., and shrubbery, etc., and calling the score for a yard which rates +8, 90, and the score of a yard which rates −8, 10, these seven cities rate from 58½ to 71. The differences among the seven cities would correlate with those computed by another similar batch of yards by over .90,

Table 3
RATINGS OF FRONT YARDS

	Walks	Rank	Lawns	Rank	Shrub	Rank	Sum of W, L and S.	Rank	Rating on 10 to 90 Scale	Rank
City I	1.08	2	1.02	2	1.37	1	3.47	2	67.35	2
" II	.95	3	.65	4	1.45	5	3.05	4	65.25	5
" III	.91	4	.97	3	1.33	4	3.21	3	66.05	3
" IV	.65	7	.05	7	1.01	6	1.72	7	58.6	7
" V	1.32	1	1.20	1	1.66	2	4.18	1	70.9	1
" VI	.73	6	.40	6	1.33	7	2.46	6	62.3	6
" VII	.78	5	.62	5	1.43	3	2.83	5	64.15	4

and so are reliable for the observer in question. It is unlikely that a different observer would have put the cities in a different order or would have varied greatly the relative differences between them. This, however, should be checked; and it would have been better to have had four observers (all competent, but representing various forms of taste), rate the yards, each one rating one fourth of them. In general practice this would cost only a trifle more than our method, but was not possible for us.

The ratings for trees cannot be interpreted safely until more than seven cities have been studied.

The numbers of shop windows were 74, 110, 87, 11, 89, 103, and 114 in Cities I, II, III . . . VII, respectively. In the case of each shop window we have two measures, a general impression from −3 to +3, and the quotient of the number of pleasing objects divided by the number of displeasing objects (by a hasty count or estimate). The results appear in Table 4. If we transpose the general rating to a scale in which −3=0 and +3=90, the scores vary from 49 to 79.

Table 4
RATINGS OF SHOP WINDOWS

	A Average General Rating	Rank	B Likes Median Dislikes	Rank	Rating on 0-90 Scale
City I	2.28	1	5.75	1	79
" II	1.68	4	2.88	4½	70
" III	1.75	3	5.50	2	71
" IV	.27	7	.42	7	49
" V	1.48	5	2.88	4½	67
" VI	.87	6	1.85	6	58
" VII	1.78	2	3.20	3	72

The measures are fairly reliable for the observer in question, for all cities except IV, which is a suburb with very few shops. It will be better to have at least four persons of good taste make these ratings for each city, each person rating one fourth of the shops in each. But the ratings for a suburban city will be of doubtful value in any case because the taste of most of its residents in respect to furniture, clothing, and jewelry may not be represented by its shops, but by those of the larger city which the suburb adjoins.

The facts for the reliability of the samples of houses, schools and churches, yards, and shop windows are shown in full in Table 5, in which A and B are two random halves of the streets used, or of the shops used, and the amounts are deviations from the averages for the seven cities. The amounts are in units corresponding to, but not necessarily equal to, the units used in Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4.

Table 5

THE RELIABILITY OF THE RATINGS. RATINGS FOR TWO RANDOM HALVES OF EACH CITY EXPRESSED AS DEVIATIONS FROM THE AVERAGE RATING FOR THE SEVEN CITIES.

	HOUSES		SCHOOLS and CHURCHES		FRONT YARDS		SHOP WINDOWS	
	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B
City I	8	62	35	8	7	1	8	7
" II	20	8	—27	—4	0	0	1	3
" III	15	—17	4	18	—2	5	1	4
" IV	55	60	22	70	—14	—13	—8	—17
" V	—5	4	26	—15	13	9	0	0
" VI	—43	—61	—80	—69	—7	—5	—2	0
" VII	—53	—57	21	0	0	—4	0	5

The correlations of A with B are:

.84 for houses
.70 for schools and churches
.86 for yards
.83 for shop windows.

If we combine the four A scores and the four B scores of Table 5 after multiplying the scores for front yards by 5 and those for shop windows by 7 to give them as much weight as the scores for schools and churches, we have the facts of Table 6. The facts of Table 6

show that even with the crude methods of our investigation a sampling of 50 houses, 18 schools and churches, 200 yards, and the windows of certain sorts of shops, gives a reliable total. The correlation of A with B in Table 6 is .95.

Table 6

Total Scores for Houses, School and Churches, Yards, and Shop Windows with weights of 1-1/6, 1, 1 and 1, respectively, for two random halves of each city.

	A SCORE	B SCORE
City I	134	124
" II	0	25
" III	16	54
" IV	—49	—54
" V	86	34
" VI	—172	—155
" VII	—32	—42

How valid would this total from our four measurements be as a measure of a total made up from a complete set of symptoms of aesthetic status including ratings of the back yards, the furniture inside the houses, the music of the churches, the music of the schools, the selections made from radio programs, the movies preferred, and all other facts of aesthetic significance? This question cannot be answered satisfactorily until measurements are available of a wider variety of aesthetic symptoms than our four; and from more cities than our seven. But some inklings of the answer appear in the intercorrelations of our four symptoms. These are as follows:

Houses with Schools and Churches	.81
Houses with Yards	—.11
Houses with Shop Windows	—.10
Schools and Churches with Yards	.08
Schools and Churches with Shop Windows	.01
Yards with Shop Windows	.69
Houses and Yards combined with Schools and Churches and Shop Windows combined	.60

These correlations suggest that the aesthetic life of a community is rather specialized, so that any valid measure of it will need to include a rather wide variety of symptoms.

We may now consider the defects of our four series of observations and the allowances which may need to be made when they are used as symptoms of the esthetic life of a community.

A city may suffer from having much of its building done during an aesthetically bad period. A city's yards may suffer from certain physical features such as steep slopes. A city's shops may represent predominatingly the taste of its poorer or more careless buyers, if the more affluent and provident buy their furniture, clothing, etc., in some nearby city. Smoke from factories and fumes from smelters and refineries may damage what is built or planted. Temporary weather conditions may complicate the likeness of the photographs to reality. Attitudes of the observers toward a community as a whole may complicate their ratings of its yards and shops.

By intelligent and impartial allowances for such influences the ratings can be improved. However, this requires expert knowledge and opens the way to favoritism. It may not be generally necessary. By the proper use of such symptoms as garages, built all in recent times, window gardens, which are independent of the terrain, movies, which few travel many miles to see, and glass and china, which resist smoke and fumes, a sufficient check may be had. Color photographs of front yards and shop windows would permit them to be rated in entire ignorance of what community they came from and reduce the influence of prejudice to zero. How much harm these disturbing factors do cannot be measured from our experiments. More communities must be observed, and in more respects.

The Fine Arts as Humanistic Studies

BY

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Efforts have recently been made to expand and develop the study of fine arts in the American college. The reasons are numerous, among them being the generous support, both spiritual and material, of the Carnegie Foundation. One of the results—perhaps more accidental than intentional—has been a substitution of fine arts for some of the more traditional humanistic studies. In many colleges "survey courses" have been introduced which embrace broad fields of scholarly interest, namely, the physical sciences, the biological sciences, and the social sciences. What is left over often goes into a course called "the humanities." Here one may expect to find whatever is left of Cicero's educational ideal, *humanitas*: philology and literature, the philosophy and history of Oxford's *literae humaniores,* and those relics of the seven liberal arts which have not been absorbed by Natural Science.

When one examines a survey-course in the humanities, one may or may not find history in it. That seems to depend somewhat on the historians concerned. At one university it is said that history was first assigned to the social sciences, but when the historians found that the importance of their subject was not fully appreciated by their colleagues in economics, government, and sociology, they withdrew and joined the humanities, where they were better able to determine and control the content and method of this division of learning.

History does not necessarily choose the content and direct the course of these newer attempts to study the humanities at once and for all. A recent volume called *The Humanities, Applied Aesthetics,*[1] appears to neglect both the history and philosophy of

[1] By Louise Dudley and Austin Faricy. New York, 1940.

the *literae humaniores.* Nor is attention given to philology. Instead, a "movement" is assumed, beginning with the Renaissance, in which the name "humanities" was given to the study of the arts, languages, and science. This meaning, it is said, became narrowed as first the physical and then the social sciences broke away, to be followed by the separation of Latin and Greek. Now, we are told, the humanities are acquiring a "broader sense" which embraces "all the subjects of learning except the sciences." This broader interpretation, "for the purposes of this book," and, one may suppose, for the purposes of a general education as well, consists of the fine arts, literature, music, architecture, painting, and sculpture.

It may be unfair to characterize a modern survey-course in the humanities by the contents of one book. Other survey-courses on the subject are known to be historical and more or less philosophical in their ways and means. What one seems to miss in all is a philological approach which emphasizes the "grammar," "logic," and "rhetoric" of the traditional trivium. Some modern educators seem to suppose that the analysis and mastery of man's chief means of expression, language, which in the past was cultivated through the study of Latin and Greek, can now be safely left to the common sense of all who can speak, read, and write.

Is it possible that such eminently teachable subjects as Latin and Greek, together with their modern complements, French, German, and English, have no special merit as means of promoting thought, understanding, and appreciation? Are thinking, understanding, and appreciation served as well by study of the fine arts? Surely we must agree that the function of the humanities, whatever the content, is to make one intelligent and appreciative in the terms of expression which man has acquired. These terms are mainly lingual, for language is the chief vehicle of communication, reflection, and thought. It is not the only vehicle, however, and a philological training which sees nothing beyond words and their usages is narrow and may be misleading. Communication, reflection, and thought are elegantly symbolized in mathematics. Dramatic performance, the dance, music, and all the varied arts of construction and design—free and applied, graphic and tectonic—are likewise means devised by man to express his ideas and his longings. It must therefore follow that these are also worthy to share in the

cultivation of Cicero's educational ideal. As educators, however, the obligation falls upon us to defend critically the employment of the fine arts for the old and still cogent purpose of rendering man humane. To judge by the varied and miscellaneous content of different survey-courses on the humanities, it may be doubted if those who sponsor them are always quite clear what they are trying to do. One obvious thing, and perhaps the most important, is to find a place where those subjects which do not claim to be "scientific" can make their appeal to all students. It is worthy of remark that these subjects which once dominated the liberal arts college should now be on the defensive. Foreign languages and literatures, philosophy, and even history, must defend their claims to consideration while triumphant Natural Science exploits its victory as the true basis of knowledge!

Into this situation the newer curricular subjects of the fine arts have made their appearance. Students who fail to master a foreign language, or even their own tongue; who find literary masterpieces, philosophical theory, and the course of history dull and uninspiring, will sometimes consent to cultivate minor talents for acting, story-writing, dancing, singing, drawing, painting, and modeling. Since any decent interest is better than none, here are ways to arouse reluctant scholars. With many young people now in college who have never been trained to use language and number critically, here is an opportunity to begin with something which they can and will do. There is a danger, however, that these subjects will remain isolated from each other, and from the rest of the curriculum. The training a student may receive in music, for instance, is often separate from everything else he is doing. If he really is talented, the training he gets in college is apt to be less than he needs in order to become a musician, and if he is not gifted he may waste much time and effort on music without notable achievement.

After all, the business of a college is a general one, and in order to find an appropriate place in its curriculum the fine arts must achieve ends that fit in with the ends of the other subjects which the college professes to teach. A knowledge of natural science in its broad aspects needs supplementation by a knowledge of man's creative and expressive ways. The fine arts exemplify the highest achievements of contemplation. An educated man will know these results, and will be able to appreciate them even though he cannot

practise them. The practice of the fine arts in college is properly an exercise in understanding,, and not the refined cultivation of a talent for which other schools may be better equipped.

If the study of fine art in the college is to carry on the humanistic tradition, its teachers must themselves be humanists. They must not only know their respective subjects well enough to practise them—at least for the purpose of exemplification; they must also know history and philosophy. A teacher of music, for instance, should realize the relation of his art to painting and literature, and should understand the impulse of creative expression which explains all art. If fine art is to rival philology, its comparative study is as important as the comparative study of language and literature.

It should be noted that the appreciation of art may not lend itself to criticism without a certain loss at first of one's sense of beauty. As Santayana states the case:

"Many writers of the last century called the philosophy of beauty *criticism,* and the word is still retained as the title for the reasoned appreciation of works of art. We could hardly speak, however, of delight in nature as criticism. A sunset is not criticized; it is felt and enjoyed. The word 'criticism,' used on such an occasion, would emphasize too much the element of deliberate judgment and of comparison with standards. Beauty, although often so described, is seldom so perceived, and all the greatest excellences of nature and art are so far from being approved of by a rule that they themselves furnish the standard and ideal by which critic's measure inferior effects."[2]

Appreciation and criticism are distinct. There is no guarantee that an appreciation of art will lead to criticism and the cultivation of any reasoning power, or that criticism will improve one's capacity to appreciate art. Yet both these psychological processes are important in the study of fine art. Without exposing students to the appreciation of works of art, under conditions suitable to enjoying them, the students will not know what the subject is which they are studying. One often hears that an interest in good literature has been spoiled by compulsory reading and analysis. The same result may follow the faulty presentation of any other work of art. Sufficient though it may be to discover beauty where one can, and enjoy the moment without ulterior interest, such a moment

[2] The Sense of Beauty, 1896, p. 15.

is never a study of art. Neither is such a moment of beauty an end towards the achievement of which some curricular device can be turned. The most that can be done is to present the work of art and hope that its beauty may be apparent. The art-gallery, the theatre, the concert-hall—these are places where beauty may be discovered. If such places are accessible to students, so much the better are the means of studying art. Failing such places, reproductions of art, reading of plays, and listening to phonograph-records, will serve the purpose. As a basis for criticism these "laboratory" means of presenting works of art are indispensable.

In addition to these facilities, and much more important, is the character of teaching. The teacher of art, like Cicero's ideal of the ancient orator, must be broadly equipped to know art in its history, theory, and practice as related to life and understanding. It is desirable, too, that the teachers of these subjects should know one another's arts, as the ancient orator knew history and philosophy, including politics and social ethics. This order is a large one, yet should be no more difficult of attainment than was the mastery of humane interests by a teacher of Latin who could be called a "Professor of Humanity." Surely, if there is merit in requiring all college students to take a survey-course in "the humanities," there is an obligation to staff the course with teachers who have mastered, at least, the philosophical implications of this large division of the field of learning.

One speaks of a "common language of art" as though one could teach and use it as Latin, the language of scholarly discourse, was once taught and used. Rich and informative though it is, this common understanding of art is something other than, and different from, the understanding of words in whatever tongue. Understanding art is more a matter of *feeling* than of *knowing*. It is founded in our sensibility to form, and has an emotional setting; whereas to know is to be able to enumerate, part by part, the features of an object or a discourse. We know and understand a language through its parts of speech, and mastery comes only as a result of discipline wherein the forms of speech are not only felt to be precise and elegant, but are also known to be such. A like discipline attaches itself to the performance of an artist in the selection and composition of his materials. Yet the elements of an artist's vocabulary are not, like the words of an argument,

separate and self-contained. The notes of a musical composition, taken one by one, may be as significant of a composer's argument as are the words chosen by a poet or an orator. Yet the two kinds of composition, musical and literary, though analogous, are essentially different. Musical notes are but symbols of sound, and music consists of these sounds. Words, on the other hand, are symbols of complex things and events, and have attained a certain independent existence in their own rights. Thus, a deductive or an inductive argument can be expressed in words, but not in tones. One learns with words to communicate the most varied observations and reflections, while tones have little associative meaning apart from their intervals, harmony, and rhythm. A musical discipline is significant chiefly for the understanding of music, and only secondarily for the understanding of anything else. The verbal discipline which makes a poet may, on the other hand, also lend validity to the most practical business of living.

The discipline of the constructive arts, drawing, painting, modeling, and all tectonic performances, has a larger immediate significance in practical affairs than music, though a smaller one than language. Many things can be more adequately expressed by drawing, constructing, or dramatizing than by words; but these are, for the most part, concrete things. The reflection of our personalities, our feelings and relationships, our movements and judgments, is best expressed by words devised for these several purposes. Revealed though these meanings are in pictures, plans, and actions, the meaning is seldom precise without the accompaniment of its proper verbal sign.

The teaching of fine arts assumes directions so different that a common language of art is not always evident. (1) There are courses in the appreciation of art in which students are familiarized with masterpieces, which are classified with some analysis. (2) Courses in the history of an art may be more "scholarly." Histories of painting, sculpture, and architecture provide fields that have been cultivated in great detail. Accordingly, these historians have assumed an important, not to say dominating, position among the teachers of collegiate art. (3) Courses in the practice of the fine arts are as numerous as the arts themselves. They are taught by specialists—as a rule, artists—who sometimes emphasize performance, and sometimes creative composition. (4) Courses in theory

are taught by philosophers, psychologists, and critics. Here falls the highly-varied and controversial subject of aesthetics. There are almost as many theories of aesthetics as there are aestheticians, and in displaying them different writers employ different terms, and adopt very different points of view.

To establish a common language of art in these four directions of study is a most legitimate aim, and one which must be achieved in some measure before the fine arts can play an important part in humanistic studies. We must not be impatient, however, if this "common language" does not quickly emerge; for the language does not yet exist. All that one can properly ask at present is tolerance and readiness to understand the terms of expression employed by all who profess to teach art.

Let the teacher of the appreciation of art realize and make clear to his students that there are "cross-references" from the art he professes to many others, and that beauty is not confined to the particular forms to which he gives his special attention. Let the historian of art realize and make clear to his students that all art has a common origin in human impulse, and that again reference to the development of other fine arts than his own, and to the general course of cultural history, is indispensable to his interpretation. Let the practitioners of art have a bowing acquaintance with artists in other fields, with their problems, their resources, and their comparative means of expression. Let the theorists possess, at least, a summary comprehension of the pertinent philosophical, psychological, and scientific approaches to the study of art; for students need assistance of this sort before they can bring notions of the several arts into one body of knowledge. Needless to say, each teacher following one of these four directions should be conscious and tolerant of the other three in order that the student may be induced to synthetize his knowledge.

Apart from this aim to provide a common language and common understanding of art, these subjects must also be *disciplinary,* if they are to accomplish a humanistic purpose. Any subject worthy of a place in the college curriculum must be calculated to train and discipline the student. The fine arts have their own ways of discipline, but they also share in the ways that are common to all subjects of knowledge. The teacher and student of fine arts must use language with accuracy and precision; because, aside from

literature, language is also the chief means of communicating the knowledge and thought which go into any artistic creation. The arts must also employ mathematics — number and geometry — graphics and gestural forms, tonal relations, and colors. All these are important means of definition.

This disciplinary aspect of the study of art is not merely a translation of one art into the form of another. A great deal of so-called "art-criticism" consists of such translations. At his best, a writer like Walter Pater succeeds in composing an essay on art or music which is itself a work of art. This, however, is not the discipline to which we refer, but rather one which deals with an art in its own terms. The logic of musical, pictorial, or literary composition is itself a discipline; and while it lacks, as we have seen, the universality of a philological discipline, it has its own merits and values which philology, as commonly defined, does not possess.

Nor should we be scornful of special studies in art, though their connection with its common language may at first seem remote. A work of art is as good a subject for scientific, historical, or theoretical treatment as any physical or social phenomenon. In this connection, the writer may be permitted to illustrate the point by reference to his own special subject of psychology. The psychology of art appears remote from the interests of most teachers of art, whether their direction be the development of appreciative interest, historical knowledge, performance, or criticism. In a review of the writer's book, *The Psychology of Art*,[3] a teacher of art summarizes his view in the following words:

"While this book may not do much to stimulate interest in the critical understanding of art, or to guide those who are already interested, it is valuable as representing the understanding of art entertained by conventional academic psychology."[4]

The failure of this reviewer to value "conventional academic psychology" as a means of stimulating "interest in the critical understanding of art" is something more than a personal prejudice. However lacking my book may be in an appeal to readers who are not also psychologists, the problems which it chooses and attempts to solve are not negligible, nor can they be set aside in this

[3] New York, 1938.

[4] Cf. "Parnassus," December, 1938, p. 35.

cavalier manner. They are, instead, scientific problems, and their solution is as valuable a contribution to the understanding of art as are studies in history and appreciation.

Our reviewer is not alone in his resentment at objective analyses of art. Another writer,[5] in a personal letter, makes this more reasoned statement of an art-lover's objection to *The Psychology of Art*:

"You give a minutely accurate account of various aspects of art, but you make them all look like small, and rather lifeless, mechanical adjustments which have little to do with the tremendous driving power that it generates. You describe its various facets, but you do not take it apart to see what makes it tick. You mention few if any of the *intensifiers* by which an artist raises the otherwise negligible details of his work to an unforgettable intensity."

One wonders if a similar objection might not be made to a chemist's description of molecular structure, or a physicist's account of an atom. In both instances one might find that these structures "look like small, and rather lifeless, mechanical adjustments." As for the "intensifier" which makes an atom or a molecule "tick," a physical scientist might prefer to leave the explanation to a metaphysician. This remark does not mean that the work of art, the molecule, and the atom, are not something more than the details of their analysis. Analysis, if true, is always functional; and a whole can never be reduced to a sum of its parts. The economy of scientific analysis requires, nevertheless, a reduction into "aspects" and "facets." If these appear to be "lifeless," that is for want of imagination on the part of the analyst or his reader.

To introduce painting, sculpture, music, poetry, drama, and the dance into the curriculum of a liberal college is to add subjects which provide a new and delightful means of promoting a common knowledge among men. This desirable result will depend, however, upon the relations which are emphasized and employed. A common understanding which is the aim of general education will not result from "sight-seeing" and "listening" courses in which works of art are reviewed without analytic study. To be invited to sample the different kinds of bread in a bakery will not teach one how to bake bread, or even how to digest it. There is an art of baking, and there is a chemistry of bread, neither of which is a direct result

[5] Carl Thurston, author of "The Structure of Art," 1940.

of eating. In order to be understood and used beyond the limits of gratifying one's sense of taste, works of art must be studied in the same way in which one studies anything else. If the fine arts are to assume a position of importance and respect among humanistic studies they will not refuse to submit to every means of study which has proved valuable in man's slow process of understanding himself and the world in which he lives. The world of art is a prime source of such understanding, but it may not be usefully accepted as a world where only wonder and magic reign.

Long ago Aristotle commended the study of what we would now call practical arithmetic or accounting when he wrote:

"With a like view children may be taught drawing, not to prevent their making mistakes in their own purchases, or in order that they may not be imposed upon in the buying or selling of articles, but rather because it makes them judges of the beauty of the human form."[6]

[6] "Politics," 8.3, Jowett's translation.

Book Reviews

FRED O. NOLTE: *Art and Reality.* Lancaster, Pa.: Lancaster Press, 1942, 188 pp.

This little book presents some essentially sound critical analyses of such problems as: imitation as an aesthetic norm, the relation of art to legend and to the familiar, nature as a standard of art criticism, form for form's sake, and the place of the aesthetic experience in a consciousness (experience) philosophy. It is with regard to this last that *Art and Reality* bogs down; the author's Platonic bias—with which we take no particular issue—melts into a kind of mysticism, characterized by such statements as, "Consciousness was, apparently, here before we arrived; and it will, presumably, be here after we have gone." (p. 175) This statement, and others similar to it, are tossed off by the author without elaboration or explanation so that the reader is left in the dark regarding the philosophical foundations of the aesthetic theory presented. Fortunately, practically all such half-mystical statements are confined by the author to one chapter (VII); a fact which leads us to suggest that the book could be improved by the deletion of this chapter.

H. G. SCHRICKEL

Carnegie Institute of Technology

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This is a revised edition of a history of the visual arts in western civilization which appeared in its original edition in 1935. The authors state that "the material of the first edition has been rewritten, amplified, and brought up to date by inclusion of later monuments. In addition to this, a section on the Minor Arts has been added." (p. xix) The book deals primarily with architecture, sculpture, painting, and traces the development of each of these in turn. Besides numerous illustrations, the book is provided with a "selected critical bibliography" (pp. 978-1000), a glossary (pp. 1001-1014), a chronological table (pp. 1015-1035), an index ((pp. 1037-1045), and small art maps of Europe inside the front and back covers.

The authors are to be complimented on their choice of illustrations and their success in showing the relationships of the various arts to each other. The book is definitely weighted on the side of the technological development of the arts, a feature which might not be to the liking of those art history teachers who are becoming more insistent upon greater emphasis being given the relations of the arts to their social contexts. The authors

Book Reviews

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have "psychologized" extensively in their endeavors to make the arts meaningful and this part of their work is subject to some criticism; several passages illustrate only too well the need for a clarification of much of the psycho-literary descriptive devices that are now being used in art history and in allied fields.

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MARGARETE BIEBER, *Laocoon.* The influence of the group since its rediscovery. With photographs by Ernest Nash. Columbia University Press. New York 1942. Price $1.50.

When the Monsieur de Chantelou involved Lorenzo Bernini in a discussion about the comparative values of antique statuary, the sculptor told him that he preferred the (Belvedere) torso to the Laocoon (Tagebuch des Herrn von Chantelou, ed. H. Rose, Munich, 1918, p. 18). When Lessing expounded his classical theory of "ut pictura *non* poesis", he chose the Laocoon for demonstration. When Strindberg wished to illustrate the conflict between the revival of paganism in the Renaissance and the revival of conscience in the North, he gave one of the sketches in his "Historical Miniatures" the title "Laocoon". Thus from the point of view of the craftsman, of the aesthetician, and of the historian of culture, judgments have been drawn from, or cast upon, this showpiece from the villa of the emperor Titus. Such a compilation and analysis of the evaluation of the Laocoon throughout history could have been made indeed into a fascinating study on aesthetic approach and its relationship to given visual data.

The author, however, limits herself to a reprint of a poem by the humanist, Jacobus Sadoletus (1477-1547) and quotations from Winckelmann, Lessing, Goethe, and Heinse. She demonstrates, by reference to the three classical writers, the change from the moral reason to the formal one and the merely human analysis of the poet. She reviews the change of taste in the second part of the nineteenth century as expressed in the archeological description of Brunn, Murray, Mitchell, and E. A. Gardner. Finally, the modern narrative description is compared with the formal one by quotations from Amelung, and V. Mueller. The author comments very little on her excerpts.

Renaissance prints by Marco Dente and Boldrini, the marble group by Bandinelli, and a bronze group of the sixteenth century illustrate the contemporary interest in the newly discovered sculpture. The excellent interpretation of the unusual monkey-mock-Laocoon by Boldrini, based on a drawing by Titian as given by Oskar Fischel (quotation by the author in footnote 7) might have been used in the text to the advantage of the uninformed reader.

Speaking about the excavation of the statue in 1506, mention could have been made of the finding of a small "Laocoon" as early as 1488 (A. Warburg, Gesammelte Schriften Vol. I, Leipzig 1932, p. 176 and 367).

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Michelangelo and Titian already had commented upon the wrong restoration of the raised arm of the one son of the priest. The new composition as suggested in the cast of the Albertinum (Dresden) which is apparently based on the Florentine bronze group of the sixteenth century (figures 5 and 10) represents at the same time a piece of visual interpretation. A discussion of it by so experienced an archeologist as Margarete Bieber would have been welcomed.

Why has it been that so many voices have been raised in explanation of a work of such extravagant character? The answer is given in Warburg's profound article "Dürer und die italienische Antike": "the discovery of the Laocoon is but the external symptom of a process conditioned by and implicit with the history of style, and is located in the zenith and not in the beginning of 'Baroque decadence'. One only discovered what one had already looked for in antiquity and therefore one found it: a form for the representation of maximal values (Grenzwerte), of mimic and physiognomical expression, stylized in lofty tragedy." (G. Schr. II, 449; translation is mine). From such a statement it is made quite evident that a work of art which comes so close to the limits of what can be expressed in stone, could serve equally well as a point of departure for the innate desire of man to *transcend* the limitations of a given material or to *widen* the margin of the expressible. The Romantic theory of "ut pictura poesis" might yet find its Lessing to use the statue for exemplification had not Irving Babbitt somewhat forestalled such a move by writing his "Anti-Laocoon".

We cannot help thinking that this small book could have been made more substantial in actual material and intensive interpretation. Nearly twenty detail photographs by Nash demonstrate why the Laocoon has offered so much vital material and literary connotation for its artistic and intellectual interpretation.

ALFRED NEUMEYER

Mills College

ROBERT P. TRISTRAM COFFIN. *The Substance that is Poetry.* New York: Macmillan. xiii + 167 pp. 1942.

Just as philosophers of science frequently speak of "the Scientist", so aestheticians have a habit of speaking of "the Artist." Both would do better work if they had the testimony of a few scientists and artists as foundation stones for their disquisitions and such testimony has been very sparse. Mr. Coffin's Patten Lectures, delivered at Indiana University, are therefore a welcome contribution to a literature which is needed and, one is relieved to report, a valuable contribution.

Mr. Coffin is not only a poet and novelist, but also a teacher. He has consequently the background of the classroom and a happy expository manner. His reflections on poetry are presented clearly on the whole and are thoroughly illustrated with examples, examples chosen from his own works. We no longer need be ignorant of what at least one poet thinks he is doing when he is writing poetry.

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Mr. Coffin's argument is simple. The solid substance of poetry is the actual objects of experience as experienced, not concepts in the scientific sense, not abstractions. It transfers, one gathers, as accurately as is possible, the real experiences of one individual to the experience of another and does this by means of words. Hence the vividness of image, the intensity of emotion, the concreteness of impression. Poetry so conceived requires a certain kind of language, "the language of the definite article," in Mr. Coffin's words. The definite article is not that of the Platonic idea, which is precisely the sign of an abstraction, but rather a demonstrative, like the "this" which occurs in vulgar speech, when a person refers to "this man" at the beginning of a story without ever having mentioned any man to serve as antecedent. Thus the writer of a ballad will suddenly introduce the line,

Up then crew the red, red cock,

without having taken the trouble to tell the reader that the central figure in his poem owned a cock. The concreteness of experience which is transferred in a poem, indicates that the writer has not complete control over what he produces, so that when one uses the term "artistry" as a name for his work, one must not read into it too much awareness of what is going on. Poems, says Mr. Coffin, take hold of their writers, lead their writers on as if they had independent existence, exercise a kind of control over their own destinies, partly write themselves. His exposition of this process is one of the most interesting sections of his book. It is at least a partial answer to the problem which must have faced everyone looking at a poet's MSS: how does the poet know what to correct and what not to correct if he is not aware of the final poem before he begins to write, and if he is aware of it, why should any corrections be necessary?

This is but a small portion of an extremely interesting volume, a volume which can only be disfigured by paraphrase. One need have no hesitation in recommending it to everyone who prefers direct testimony to hearsay. Only one caution is needed: Mr. Coffin is not *the* poet any more than any other poet. The poems he writes are not poetry *ueberhaupt;* they are just some poems. Unless one assumes that "poetry" is a univalent term and that there is only one kind of poetry, there is no reason to conclude that Mr. Coffin is legislating for all poets. He writes to be sure, as if he were; but that is no doubt unavoidable. What is important is that here we have at least the words of one poet given by him and not by some critic speculating about what went on in his mind. He has at a minimum saved us all from reading a great quantity of nonsense.

GEORGE BOAS

ELMER G. SUHR. *Two Currents in the Thought Stream of Europe.* Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press. 1942. 469 pp.

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book is so remarkable for its good qualities as for its bad and that most books would be just as well unpublished. It was with all the good will in the world that the writer of this review went patiently through Mr. Suhr's volume with the hope of finding something somewhere which would be novel, well expressed, or even true. He failed lamentably in his task. As far as he could see, there is in these four hundred and sixty-nine pages nothing which has not been said before, said better, or more convincingly.

This is a pretty bad indictment of a book which has been written by a colleague who is worthy of one's respect and published by a press sponsored by a still reputable university. The reader may attribute it to bad manners, to an inherently sour disposition, or to just plain ignorance. Let us see whether the indictment can be justified.

Take the main thesis to begin with. It is that the history of European thought is to be characterised by a conflict between "rationalism" and its subject-matter. This conflict can obviously be met by forcing one's subject-matter into a rigidly rationalistic pattern on the one extreme, or by submitting all of one's ideas to the vagaries of experience and abandoning, if necessary, all hope of rational system. In between these extreme positions, there are clearly recognized compromises, such as that of John Locke, who, in spite of the elementary histories of philosophy, was far from being a simple sensory empiricist. The very dialogues of Plato, especially those sometimes called the early dialogues, represent a kind of compromise in which we *see* the embodiment of certain ideals but fail to *know* what we see. There is thus nothing original in pointing out that our theories inadequately cover experience; if they did not, the disagreement between various scientists and various philosophers would be inexplicable. But even in books which have especially treated the philosophy of science, the gap has been recognized. As recently as Emile Meyerson, the recognition of an "irrational" inexperience has been emphasized. It is, one might say with confidence, a commonplace of courses in epistemology.

But again, the idea that there are such things as national traits, racial minds, is particularly obnoxious in a serious book. A man with Mr. Suhr's knowledge of Greek, ought to be beyond talking about *"The Greeks,"* when what he really means is a small group of Athenians living between 460 and 430 B. C. Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle—to broaden our limits out of charity—are not *The Greeks.* The Athenians of the fifth century B. C. are not the Greeks. The Athenians of all centuries are not the Greeks. The attempt to find the Greeks arises, one guesses, from too much reading of Hegelians, men who certainly by now ought to be discredited. The truth is that the amount of Greek philosophical literature which survives is pitifully small, but even that small amount shows us that the Greeks were just as diverse as Americans, that they had a variety of ideals, that they disagreed about almost everything, and that they were just a lot of people and not a homogeneous group of thinkers in fundamental agreement at all.

When Mr. Suhr comes to modern Europeans, he becomes downright comic. His description of *The French* is astounding in its naiveté. It is

worse than Keyserling, which is pretty bad. The space at our disposal is limited, but how is this for a gem of ineptitude? — "He [the Frenchman] is an authority on cooking and dress, especially for women. He is negligent of his own dress, in the first place because he seldom sees himself and because woman is more dependent on dress for effect than man. He wants to see something in woman; he cares less about what she sees in him, and the rest of the world is fascinated by both. He is the most witty personality in the world, without being humorous. This wit, more superficial than humor, is very quick and flashy, it deals for the most part with words and their most subtle meanings and is highly entertaining for conversational purposes. Etc., etc., etc." (p. 396). You could undoubtedly find Frenchmen like that, but try to fit Descartes, La Fontaine, Bossuet, Auguste Comte, Cournot, and a hundred other representative Frenchmen into that picture and see where you come out.

But Mr. Suhr requires very little evidence for his characterizations. He even knows how Minoan man thought. He can tell from the architectural ruins and from potsherds. "The Minoan," we are told (p. 46), "is the finest example in Europe's history of an absolutist on the natural plane, one who never rose to the level of reflection or scepticism." What song the Sirens sang or what name Achilles assumed when he hid himself among the women would be no secret to Mr. Suhr.

Let us conclude this melancholy survey by a few examples of Mr. Suhr's writing. We submit the following to any class in English I as an exercise in tracing pronominal antecedents: "It must be remembered, too, that all the movements of these figures [of Greek sculpture] have the appearance of being thought out carefully beforehand, hence the steadiness of hand and foot. Before they put the hand to an object or one foot before another, they made sure of their ground, they weighed carefully the relations between objects, they seem to have calculated the force they must exert and the resistance the object would put forth. Their motion shows no waste or by-products. Yet all this forethought, if it can be called thought, seems to be as much a matter of intuition as time-consuming reflection. If they slipped or fell, they themselves assumed the responsibility. Accidents, however, are exceptions and so found little place in an ideal art. In the Parthenon frieze all the movements are carried out in a carefully measured tempo; they give no quarter to exotic grasping and clutching and are none the less convincing because of their absence. Whether controlling their horses, donning their equipment, or carrying baskets on their heads, they move along self-confidently . . ."

Along with this syntactical puzzle, it might be interesting to submit a few rhetorical flights. We learn (p. 117) that "the deep browns, the dark shadows and chiaroscuro of the inner man reflected in experience" were unknown to the Greeks; we learn that the line of Polygnotus—whose frescoes, Mr. Suhr does not say, have not been seen by anyone,—"guides the attention of the observer along the vertical plane of emotion to the point where the limitations of experience are resolved on the threshold of pure

being";[1] we discover (p. 144) that the founders of Epicureanism and Stoicism were making an "attempt to impose a conduct of life upon individuals who had lost the power to engender it within themselves"; we read (p. 165) that "every religious movement, if it hopes to achieve permanence in Europe, must enlist the forms of the mind in its support or vanish like a passing fancy"; that "the lofty ideals of knighthood justified the waste and ruin they caused on earth" (p. 197); that "in Italy the mind is seldom sufficiently independent of human nature and its desires to behold the world from an objective point of view for any length of time."

One should not close a review of Mr. Suhr's book without indicating what can only be called a certain intellectual parochialism. Thus the Orient is referred to as having a "taste for display, lack of reserve, and laxity of form" (p. 133). This parochialism becomes funny at times when we learn that the succession of the Popes is "more of a spiritual than a blood connection," (p. 193) or that "the mathematics of Russell and Whitehead will never enslave us any more than the symphonies of Brahms and Beethoven, as long as they remain in their proper place" (p. 192); or that Saint Francis applied himself to his task "as Rachmaninoff absorbs himself in his keyboard" (p. 185); or that "it is strange someone has not dismissed the mind of Leonardo as unbalanced or abnormal" (p. 213).

Mr. Suhr is, however, at his worst when he falls back upon poetic quotations (*vide*, pp. 167, 196) and introduces moral reflections. "Women dote over doglets and canary birds; they listen much more attentively than husbands and seldom talk back" is one such gem (p. 183). "The criminal always arouses the curiosity of society" (p. 184), is another. "Even today many of us are more easily tempted to be led than to look for ourselves" (p. 203), is a third.

These are but a few of the passages which will strike a reader's eye as it traverses Mr. Suhr's pages. They suffice perhaps to show that the book need not be put upon the required reading list of students of either aesthetics or the history of thought. To have reprinted them was no doubt cruel and in view of the sponsorship of the volume bad taste. But sometimes the worm turns, as Mr. Suhr would point out.

GEORGE BOAS

FREDERIC TAUBES. *You Don't Know What You Like*: A Yardstick for Aesthetic Judgment in Painting. New York, Dodd, Mead & Company, 1942, pp. xi + 183.

Mr. Taubes presents in this book a set of standards of taste in painting based on his conviction that a standard yardstick of evaluation is possible, and that present standards of judgment are mostly nothing more than the whims and prejudices of art critics. The author holds out for an objective standard on the grounds that art is anchored in sound craftsmanship, and that sound craftsmanship means "the principles established in the workshops

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[1] Mr. Suhr may not be referring to Polygnotus; there is no way of telling; but he is the last artist mentioned.

of the old masters." His slogan is "Let us be craftsmen first, and let us allow the 'artistic' expression to take its predetermined course without our active pampering."

He contends, further, that "the layman, regardless of social standing or education, loves and admires the wrong thing in art" and that persons of "otherwise immaculate taste almost invariably show poor taste and lack of discrimination in matters of art." But this is true not only of the layman, for the professional art critic "has also a long record of errors in judgment against him" because he "often does not understand the technique of painting; and without knowledge of this technique, a complete understanding of art is not possible." Technique is neither mere manipulation of paint, nor mechanical dexterity. *"It is the aesthetic credo of the painter."* The professional critics also frequently fail to "listen to the painter's message but rather to their own comments about the painter's work . . . many books on art clearly attest the writer's whims rather than his serious preoccupation with the object of his investigation."

Nor does Taubes have a higher opinion of painters themselves as arbiters, because "painters often cannot see beyond their own field of perception" and "will favor that which reminds them of their own experiences and touches on personal problems."

A further cause of misjudgment of art is that most people "consider the liking or disliking of one or another type of art to be governed by personal taste," and art "must not be judged by personal likes or dislikes." Then again, misjudgment can be due to "lack of sensitivity or inartistic disposition." Finally, a "frequent error of appraisal in art is to attribute to a painting that relies upon some older established pattern the virtue of the original from which it derives its inspiration."

After Mr. Taubes has said all this, and said it well and convincingly, a question arises: How does he know but that he himself suffers from several or all of the strictures with which he charges art critics and painters? The evidence is rather that he is the victim of all of them. For instance, he does not like modern painting and tells why. But is this more than a matter of personal taste? He points out the merits and demerits of paintings by Matisse, Cézanne, Picasso, Soutine, Renoir, and several others; but one wonders whether other critics or painters would go along with him in his estimates. Does this mean that he is right and the others wrong, or does it not rather indicate that Taubes' standard of judgment is personal taste even in matters of craftsmanship, as is that of any other critic or painter.

The book also abounds in extremely dubious statements. For instance, it may be true that "popular awards are bestowed without fail on an inferior type of art, for here the public likes to be hoodwinked." But is it a fact that "practically all the great musicians were appreciated during their lifetime," and that "usually a great literary work is adjudged great upon the appearance of the first edition?" And is it true that "all we have to do to enjoy music is to loosen the reins of our emotions" while a painting

challenges simultaneously the mental and optical faculties?" And is a person who is rash enough to make such statements to be trusted as a guide to the good and the bad in art?

MAX SCHOEN

HELEN EVANGELINE REES: *A Psychology of Artistic Creation.* New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University. 1942. x. 209 pp.

One of the most difficult and most important subjects in the study of human behavior is the psychology of the creative process. An important source of information on the artistic creative process is to be found in the statements of artists themselves on how they go about their work and the experiences that they have during the processes of creation. In the majority of instances, however, these statements have proven only suggestive and without that type of intelligibility which is demanded by scientific description. The present work is an attempt to supply a scientific interpretation of such autobiographical statements (taken from no less than fifty-nine artists) in terms of four principles selected from Gestalt psychological theory. The book begins with a chapter bearing the expansive heading "A Philosophy: Art, School, and Society." Unfortunately, this is the most poorly constructed chapter in the book, consisting at times of nothing more than a disjointed array of quotations taken from the writings of many of our present day teachers-college-prophets. In the second chapter the author essays the task of explaining Gestalt psychology, what this psychology has to contribute to our understanding of the creative process, and how it forms the foundations of modern educational theory; all this in thirty-three pages. Settling down to her real task, Miss Rees discusses in chapters III-VI the value of the following four Gestalt principles in developing an understanding of the creative process: the principles of integration, of adjustment, of purposive differentiation and of prägnanz. The final chapter is a summary of the study. In addition to the usual bibliography there is a list of the artists quoted with brief sketches of their lives.

The four principles which the author has selected from Gestalt theory and utilized in her description of the creative process—while they do not constitute the whole of Gestalt psychology—make it possible for Miss Rees to discuss in a sometimes refreshingly new way the relations of the arts to each other and the continuity of artistic creation with other human activities and human development. Throughout these chapters the maximum development of the total self, both as an objective of modern education and as a description of the life of the artist, forms the background against which the author discusses the role of the arts in contemporary society and in the school. Miss Rees has done a commendable job of probing into autobiographical data and cannot be accused of making special selections from this data for the purpose of presenting her case.

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H. G. SCHRICKEL

Carnegie Institute of Technology

MILL AND MANSION. *A study of Architecture and Society in Lowell, Massachusetts,* 1820-1865, by John Coolidge. Pages xiii+261+48 pages of illustrations, largely half-tones. Columbia Studies in American Culture, No. 10, New York, Columbia University Press, 1942. $3.75.

This book is the work of one of the most brilliant of the young art historians, and it has a modern touch about it. Mr. Coolidge takes a big American problem and takes it whole, giving an account of the rationalization of textile manufacture on a mass-production basis which brought the city of Lowell into being, and presenting the architecture of the city as a consistent entity—the envelope of the life and process which gave the city significance. As a result the vast mills are no mere hulks, but the theatre of an epic industrial development; the group housing and more commonplace buildings of the city, instead of being merely examples of this or that style, are the crucibles of social and industrial experiment. Sociologists and planners will read the book attentively, and students of fine arts will do well to study it also, because it gives so favorable an opportunity for judging a kind of nineteenth century architecture which has until recently been ignored or despised as a matter of course. If there were more studies like this one, bringing forward ensembles of living and working architecture, it would be easier for us to realize that our real architecture is the living and working architecture, not the "Nachahmungen" which the polite architects and clients of the nineteenth century loved so much.

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The second part of the book, on Frost's philosophy, is necessarily less satisfactory. For few poets think out any philosophy very thoroughly and what they have to say to the reflective mind is said rather by suggestion than by argument. But he makes out a good case for Frost's scepticism and shows persuasively that to be a sceptic is not necessarily to throw up the sponge. But he does not demonstrate that Frost has any philosophic theory to justify his scepticism, and indeed Frost—and possibly Mr. Thompson—would be the first to admit that his philosophic position is a prejudice rather than a theory.

It is too bad that so good a book should be marred by what seem to this writer to be decided blemishes: long limping sentences, continued repetition of such metaphors as "threadbare", "outworn", long figurative passages, such as the paragraph which opens the book, in which English poetry is compared to a river, careless historiography, such as the reference to "the Greeks" (p. 194) as if there were any more agreement among the Greeks than among any other people. But these blemishes are not serious and in spite of them the book remains an important contribution to American literary criticism.

GEORGE BOAS

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Chapters two through nine take up, in turn, art instruction books and art teachers of pioneer days; pioneer landscapes, genre paintings, miniatures, portraits, sculptures, carvings, castings, plastics, poonah, theorem and stencil pictures. All these are treated with a directness and freshness that prepare the reader for serious consideration of the author's reflections upon folk art in America. Of the people who created this "folk art" the author observes, "They were 'folks' but, by all that's holy, they were not of the 'folk': 'folks' among them meant 'people'; 'folk' today means 'peasantry', or worse." The final chapter is titled, "Pattern for the Purposeful Collecting of Pioneer American Art" and contains not only many practical suggestions regarding this pursuit but also brief descriptions of such techniques and processes used in the development of our American pioneer art as Grecian painting, Indian japanning, transferring, Oriental tinting, sandpaper painting and drawing, carpet painting, etc.

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H. G. SCHRICKEL

Carnegie Institute of Technology

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MAX SCHOEN

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In a brief commentary of thirty-four pages of scholarly text and fifty excellent plates, the author has presented the history of Church Architecture from old St. Peter's to Chartres Cathedral in a new and effective manner. The original research involved here on early mediaeval churches gives decidedly important material not to be found elsewhere in such ready form. Most of the illustrations are from the author's own drawings, including restorations of buildings long destroyed, all of which are essential keys to explain the appearances of typical mediaeval church elements. By limiting himself to tracing the evolution of the basic engineering and architectonic forms of church building as inspired by mediaeval fervor and as determined by traditional forms and available materials, he has provided the reader

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promised land is that of facile generalization, forced analogies, and false conclusions. Music, he says, "tells how people think and act." How do they? And what people? "There are just two things," he states, "that the music-lover who wants to enjoy modern music need do. First, he must realize *why* it is what it is; why the composers of every age have written differently from those who preceded them. Secondly, he must acquaint himself, if only superficially, with a few of the methods used by modern composers to make their music different from eighteenth and nineteenth-century music." And he proceeds to explain these mysterious matters in a manner that only a well trained musician can grasp what he is talking about.

MAX SCHOEN

ART IN AMERICAN LIFE AND EDUCATION. Fortieth Yearbook, National Society for the Study of Education. Bloomington, Illinois. Public School Publishing Company, 1941, pp. xx + 819.

This volume is a tremendous accomplishment for the Committee on Art in American Life and Education under the chairmanship of Dr. Thomas Munro. It is well organized and every field of art is covered under the headings: Art in American Life; The Nature of Art and Related Types of Experience; Art Education: Its Aims, Procedures, and Agencies; The Preparation of Teachers of Art. The chapters contributed by Dr. Munro himself on The Psychological Approach to Art and Art Education, on Creative Ability in Art and Its Educational Fostering, on Powers of Art Appreciation and Evaluation, and on the Analysis of Form in Art, are beyond a shadow of a doubt the best contribution to the fundamental problems in art education in print and should be collected in a separate volume for wider circulation.

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with a clear, condensed version of the subject. The approach being a study of fundamentals it will appeal particularly to the architect.

Among the many elements listed are the open hall, pillared hall, basilica, rotunda, shed form, tower, spire, and vault forms including the use of the catenary curve. Each particular church style evolves from the inventive employment of the basic unit elements by the local architect. Examples of evolving style are illustrated by the manner in which the vertical motives of the wooden *Norse* church combined with the horizontal Roman Basilica type to form the western mediaeval church. This is of prime interest.

The first important Christian church building and perhaps the greatest is Old St. Peter's. This monumental composition was based on the formal canons of axial planning common to imperial Rome. It set the Basilica Style which never ceased to influence later manifestations. Then, two hundred years later, under the stress of eastern influences, appears St. Sophia determining Byzantine Architecture and later Russian churches with their fantastic vertical domes and pinnacle forms.

Mr. Conant is an architect, an archaeologist and an historian, and regarding contemporary influences upon evolving architectural forms and elements Mr. Conant states that "In each architectural style the characteristic interior space and exterior form result naturally from fundamental elements and their characteristic methods of agglomeration. Space Study by this method, conditioned as it is by the actual fabric, is more likely to be fruitful than many of the current fine-spun ideologies which deal with the artistic personality of space in a purely subjective and fanciful way."

W. FRANK HITCHENS & RAYMOND A. FISHER
Professors of Architecture
Carnegie Institute of Technology

IGOR STRAWINSKY: *Poétique Musicale.* Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 1942. 95 pp.

This book consists of the six Charles Eliot Norton Lectures for 1939-1940. The titles of the lectures are in order: Prise de Contact, Du Phénomène Musical, De La Composition Musicale, Typologie Musicale, Les Avatars de la Musique Russe, De l'Exécution et Épilogue. For those who seek a better understanding of this composer's music and the works of those influenced by him, this series of intimate yet profound talks will prove illuminating. The author does more, however, than attempt to explain his music. He ranges from musicology and philosophy of history to theory of performance and criticism. His comments on Wagner are pungent, and while he does not hesitate to denounce the more asinine comments of some contemporary Soviet musicologists we might equally well question the significance of some of Stravinsky's cerebrating on the ontological foundations of music as a phenomenon. There is also present in these lectures autobiographical material that will be of much interest to those who are seeking a better understanding of the processes of creative imagination as it operates in the arts. Challenging to social art theorists, these talks consti-

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tute the creed that must be seriously taken into account by any who would understand the nature of music and its role in the development of the human spirit.

H. G. SCHRICKEL

Carnegie Institute of Technology

FINE ARTS STAFF OF TEACHERS COLLEGE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY: *Art Education Today 1942*. New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University. 1942. 86 pp. 59 illus.

This year's annual presents a series of articles on *Art and the Community* pointed up to the theme, *Art Education, Democracy, and the War* which latter is briefly developed in a foreword by the editors. While much of the material in these articles is of primary interest to art teachers in that it is replete with practical suggestions on such matters as project organization and the thrifty use of salvaged materials in time of war, there are discussions that provide data for sociologists of art and museum workers. Particularly well written and stimulating is the article, *The Artist in the Community* by George Rickey who gives an excellent account of the social role of the roving professorial artist; here, better than anywhere else in the book, is the reader brought to feel the really vital role that is being and can be played by the artist in a democratic society. *The Utah Art Center* by Maud R. Hardman is an account of a very effective way of bringing art to bear on the affective and intellectual development of all members of the community. *The Department Store and Its Contribution to Art* by Vernon Clark is briefly suggestive of some of the potentialities of an already going concern in the field of art education, while *The Art Museum and the Community* by Eleanor M. Moore outlines some of the better means toward developing a more dynamic conception of the museum in community art education. Rather disappointing is *The Development of Modern Art in Latin America* by Marchal E. Landgren which reads too much like a popular lecture and thus does not have enough substance. *A State University Opens New Frontiers in Art Education* by Marie Lien is a commentary on the tendency of our midwestern Scandinavian-rooted citizens to cling to an outmoded and commercially sustained conception of the arts of the "old country;" it is at the same time a discussion of effective means that have been employed in uprooting this misconception and laying the foundations for interest in and appreciation of contemporary Scandinavian arts. As a group, these articles are good reading for all who would understand better the role of the artist and his works in the development of a democratic community.

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