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JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS AND ART CRITICISM

A Quarterly Devoted to the Advancement of Aesthetics and the Arts

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The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism deals with the fundamental principles and problems of aesthetics and art criticism. It will concern itself also with developments in the arts, in art history, and with the relations of the artist and the arts to society. It affords a common ground for interchange of views between aestheticians, art historians, art educators, museum workers, and all who are by profession or avocation interested in the progressive development of aesthetics and the arts. It aims at constructive and critical thinking and appeals to all, professionals and laymen, who desire to keep abreast of the significant movements in aesthetics and the arts.

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Editorial

A FEW years ago there burst upon the philosophical scene a group of militant logic-choppers determined to rid the world forever of metaphysics. Out of the intellectual dust raised and blown about by this group there has come a renewed interest in the nature of language and of meaning. The problem of meaning has become a prominent focal point in contemporary epistemological thinking which, in turn, has produced several frameworks for the study of meaning, including that of C. W. Morris.

More recently, some aestheticians have taken up the problem of meaning and its relations to the aesthetic experience, the creative process, the aesthetic object. In these investigations meaning theories are freely borrowed from contemporary epistemological thought. An illustration of this is afforded in at least one of the essays in this issue of the *Journal*. In a sense, this is a desirable development in aesthetic theory, for it is necessary that we break down the too rigid barriers that have been developing between the various fields of philosophical inquiry. But there is another aspect to this matter which is equally worthy of attention and which at this point is more difficult to appraise.

Putting aesthetic theorizing into a particular schema, devised in the field of epistemology for the purpose of investigating the nature of meanings as they occur in cognitive situations, involves the placing of definite limitations upon aesthetic inquiry. What is assumed in such a procedure is that the aesthetic experience is basically a cognitive experience—which is quite different from recognizing the occurrence of cognitive elements in the aesthetic experience and dealing with them as parts of a complex whole. The usual result of confining aesthetic inquiry within the framework of a particular method for studying meanings is a restatement of what is already known about aesthetic values and the aesthetic experience in the terms of the meaning theory framework adapted; and such results are of questionable value. Briefly, the aesthetician who borrows a method of meaning-analysis from the

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field of epistemology for his own use should always ask of such adaptations whether they further the processes of aesthetic inquiry. There is no need for aestheticians to imitate the errors of many past—and some present—social scientists who have borrowed freely from the concepts of physics and biology only to retard social inquiry.

Perhaps a more fruitful application of contemporary meaning analyses in aesthetics would be their use as aids in clarifying the inflated polyglot literature of aesthetic theory and art criticism. The verbiage strewn throughout much art history and art criticism has done more to keep these fields in the realm of dilettantism than any other single factor. Aesthetics, by more or less close association with art history and art criticism, has been characterized—rightly and wrongly—as having some of the same undesirable traits. Certainly no harm and much good can come from aestheticians, art critics and art historians being more careful about what they say and how they say it; and in this meaning analysis is a prerequisite.

Elsewhere in this issue we are reminded that there are ontological elements in the aesthetic experience and that these—rather than cognitive or other factors—constitute the point of departure of aesthetic inquiry. This view often suffers from the very perplexities and mystifications which the above mentioned anti-metaphysicians would (with more than a little justification) tear out of traditional philosophizing. Aesthetic values, like all values, must have some existential status and this is the truth on which the ontological approach to aesthetic problems is based. On the other hand, aesthetic inquiry should not be restricted to an investigation into the ontological status of aesthetic values. We can no more afford to ontologize aesthetics than we can to epistemologize it.

Such reflexions as these suggest that the issues involved in determining the proper subject matter (s) of aesthetics and the method (s) of aesthetic inquiry are still very much alive.

—H.G.S.

The Formal Structure of The Aesthetic Object*

BENBOW RITCHIE

THIS paper proposes to investigate the formal structure of the aesthetic object. At the outset let us assume the distinction between those values of the aesthetic object which are formal and those which are extra-formal. A *formal value* satisfies an interest which has been aroused by some aspect of the aesthetic object. An *extra-formal value* satisfies an interest which has been brought ready-made to the object. For example, the satisfaction we gain from the way that Shakespeare treats politics in *Julius Caesar* is a satisfaction of an extra-formal interest, an interest we bring with us. On the other hand the satisfaction we derive from Anthony's funeral oration is of a different kind. Here the satisfied interest is one which was aroused by a variety of factors which are inextricably bound up with the plot and characters. It is obvious that this distinction between formal and extra-formal values lacks precision in its present form. It is hoped that this paper will enable us to sharpen that distinction. At any rate, it is clear that the formal values of the aesthetic object in some sense set the framework within which the total aesthetic response takes place. How this framework is created is, then, the subject of our discussion.

Since aesthetic activity is a kind of activity which creates value, we must begin with a short analysis of how value is created. A human organism is a system of potential and actual activities, each of which under specifiable circumstances tends to pursue its own career within the total environment. As changes take place within this environment the activities tend to change also. Thus, an activity is said to adjust

**Editor's note.* This and the following two papers were read at the Pacific Coast division meeting of the American Society for Aesthetics on April 24, 1943.

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itself to a change in the environment if it selects an appropriate way of pursuing its career within the new environmental situation. In a similar fashion activities tend to adjust themselves to each other, so that each activity can follow its own career within the total environment. When all the activities of the organism are adjusted both to each other and to the environment, then we shall say that they are in *equilibrium*, a condition in which each activity finds a state of affairs within the total environment suitable to its career. It is this tendency, as we shall see, of an organism to maintain an equilibrium among its activities, that constitutes the ground for the creation of value.

An activity is frustrated, blocked or checked (1) if the conditions in the environment demand that it become overt, and (2) if, at the same time, its environment is unfavorable to the carrying on of the activity. When such frustration takes place the equilibrium is upset, and in reaction to this distortion of the equilibrium a new activity begins. Considered solely as a reaction to the distortion, such newly initiated activity is called impulsive, and the act viewed in its raw, primitive, "reactive" stage is called an impulse. Such raw activity is dispersive and without clear direction. The activity becomes "purposive" or gains direction only when the effects which it has upon the environmental situation are taken as signs of future situations, and thus signs of future stages of activity. When the human organism has begun to take account of its activity in this manner, and to symbolize to himself *plans of action*, then the activity has become interested activity. Throughout the ensuing complex act we may say that the impulse remains the same only if the activities which were originally frustrated remain so. That is, the impulse remains constant only so long as (1) the conditions that demand the activities, and (2) their unsuitable environments remain constant. When either of these factors are removed the impulse is fulfilled, the equilibrium is restored. Furthermore, the plans of action when regarded as relevant to the fulfilment of an impulse, are called *interests*. Any member of the class of modifications which tend to be effected by repeated enactment of an interest, is a product of that interest. Such a product is the object of the interest, the *value* which satisfies that interest. When a value of a complex of values succeeds in fulfilling an impulse this value of a value-complex is a *good*. Consequently, an interest is said to be relevant to an impulse if its value

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will either produce a partial or total fulfilment of the impulse.

Although it is not apparent at first sight, the domain of values and goods, as here defined, largely conforms to the domain set by common sense. Anything is a value when it is believed to be relevant to the fulfilment of an impulse. Anything is a good when it does in fact fulfill the impulse. Although the pursuance of a course of action is generally required for the occurrence of a good, it is not logically necessary. Occasionally happenings, such as lightning bolts, sunsets, or earthquakes, take place and, although they are not causally connected with our activities, nevertheless succeed in removing our distortions. Such events then, are genuine goods. This is the status, in this view, of those pleasures which traditional value theory calls "contemplative."

Such in stark outline is the way in which values and goods are created. But this outline is so bare that it demands a somewhat detailed example in order to make what is involved concrete. Sherlock Holmes was a comparatively simple system of activities (pipe-smoking, violin-playing, and crime-solving) organized in a highly delicate equilibrium. Thus, whenever Dr. Watson would tell him of some new crime Holmes would jump up impulsively and stalk about the room. Then after a moment or two of dispersive bafflement he would begin to sort clues out of the jumbled mass of facts. From these clues he would draw up tentative plans of action. He would become interested in one of these plans (i.e., he would regard the plan as relevant to his impulse) and plunge into action. The enactment of this plan would bring forth further clues (i.e., values) and from these he would form further plans of action. Eventually he would find the final clue and the culprit would be discovered. Thus Holmes' equilibrium would be established again, and he could return to Baker Street and resume his customary activities which had been dislocated by the original distortion.

The creation of an aesthetic object is, I believe, similar in many important ways to the crime-solving of Mr. Holmes. In both cases the activity begins with an impulse resulting from a disorder in the environment and consists of converting this disorder into an order which is a good. The order develops *in* the experience; it evolves as the experience progresses. In the typical aesthetic experience this order develops as the material of the medium is worked upon and yields clues of what to expect, and therefore, of what to do. The direction is pointed out

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by signs which arise during the process. The man who orders the furniture in his room according to customary formula is performing a drudgery. The man who begins by changing the position of one piece of furniture with the idea of discovering from this change clues, signs, ideas for further changes, creates an order, and in doing so, creates an aesthetic object. There is no essential difference between this process and that involved in the writing of *Paradise Lost* or the composition of a Bach fugue.

To be able to create the latter kind of aesthetic object, a work of art, the artist must know a great deal about the structural properties of his medium. Thus, a painter like Matisse, who uses color as a unifying principle must have an extensive knowledge of the "spatial" peculiarities of colors. Since so little is known about these matters by those of us who are not artists, it is impossible here to give a detailed account of the structural uses of color. We do, however, know perhaps some of the elementary facts; namely, that certain shades of red tend to overrun their boundaries, to expand and surge forward to the front of the painting, while various shades of blue tend to recede and contract. Other colors have similar spatial peculiarities. Certain shades of yellow, for example, are spatially ambivalent. Suppose, for example, that we have a patch of this yellow between a red and a blue patch. When the yellow is perceived in relation to the red patch it seems to share the "aggressive" character of the red. On the other hand when it is perceived in relation to the blue patch, it seems to share the latter's "cool reticence".

An artist begins a painting with a large body of such knowledge funded in his painting habits. The situation is similar in many respects to the beginning of a game of chess by an experienced player. The latter has knowledge (1) of the permissible moves (the structural properties of the medium) and (2) of the characteristics of the various openings in relation to further plans of action (the relation of certain initial combinations of plastic elements to further possible combinations).

A painter begins then by searching for a combination of colors which will be satisfactory, which will be a partial good. In his search he may hit upon a vivid red which seems peculiarly exciting. He puts a patch of this red upon the canvas, and then gives himself up to the enjoyment of the warmth of this color. For some reason he feels that

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this particular red patch is "just right;" "it hits the mark!" During this phase of enjoyment he begins to realize vaguely "what he's after;" that is, he begins to realize what kind of a painting he is trying to ex-press. The feeling of direction becomes stronger and stronger until he realizes that it will be a painting in which this red patch will be restrained by a soft blue line. Somehow he feels that the vigor of the red patch demands the restraint of a cool blue. He puts the blue line on the canvas, and at once the combination "clicks". He marvels anew at the fitness of the combination. Then out of this marvelling phase comes a further clarification of the painting he is trying to ex-press. He gains another hint about how to proceed. This process continues until finally a certain patch or line completes the painting. Nothing more is demanded and nothing more can be added.

This description of the painter's procedure is intended to illustrate the psychological process involved in the interaction between the artist and his medium. Thus, we do not intend to overlook the fact that there is a great deal of individual variation in the concrete ways in which artists may set about their work. The main point is, however, that the artist's impulses are always controlled by him in terms of their consequences in a specific medium.

We may now describe the general structure of the aesthetic experience. It begins like any other experience, with a blind search for value, for a color combination that will be satisfactory. The ensuing process is continuous but contains two kinds of activity which succeed each other in dominating the experience. First comes an exploration of the stuff of the medium (a mixing of the pigments on the palette). In this exploration some of the stuff is so formed that it is made to satisfy some interest which is partially relevant to the impulse which initiated the experience. This forming of the stuff of the medium (the putting of the red patch on the canvas) has created a thing with value which is a partial good. Succeeding and growing out of this phase of active exploration comes one of enjoyment and contemplation, in which the value (the exciting red patch) is scrutinized and studied. First, it is studied in relation to the impulse or distortion (to whatever made the painter feel that he had "a painting in him to ex-press"). In this manner the direction of the original impulse is made more specific by viewing it in relation to the value which has just been created.

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Second, as a result of this specification of the direction of the original impulse we get a rough indication of the general kind of values for which we are searching. That is, expectations are aroused of further similar values (further colored patches and lines which will also "hit the mark") latent within the unexplored and unformed stuff remaining.

The newly formed value (the red patch) is now taken to be a sign since it is perceived and used as a link between the aroused expectations and further values. The designatum of this sign consists of all those values which will satisfy the interested expectations aroused by the sign. Further active exploration into the stuff of the medium is now guided by the designation which this sign supplies. The search for value which at the outset was blind, has grown more definite by being converted into a search for the denotatum of this sign. Then with the creation of a new value (the blue line which has the restraint demanded by the red patch) comes another phase of enjoyment. During it we gain a still more precise indication of the kind of values for which we are searching. Consequently, this second value (the blue line) is converted into a sign of further values to be extracted from the remaining stuff. As the experience progresses, the two phases interplay continuously. The expectations aroused become more and more precise until the experience ends with the creation of a total complex value which fulfils the impulse. No further interests or expectations are aroused for the experience has been consummated and is at an end.

In describing this process we have referred to the creation of value and the embodying of value in the stuff of the medium. These statements suffer from a certain ambiguity due to the fact that values are often regarded as mentalistic phenomena which are, in Santayana's terms, somehow "objectified" and made to seem as properties of perceptual objects. In our view, on the contrary, values are not mentalistic, they are merely properties of objects relative to organisms with the relevant interests. There is a common objection to this which maintains that the perception of values lacks the "immediacy" or "intimacy" which characterizes the perception of colors and shapes. The latter properties seem to have unambiguous spatial location and extent, and are in some sense "surface" properties. Values on the other hand lack this spatial specificity and thus appear ephemeral and ghostly. But this objection can hardly be taken seriously for it would make ghosts out

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of such primary properties as weight, hardness, elasticity, and so forth. The empirical fact seems to be that only a few of nature's many properties have spatial spread and thus are surface properties. The rest are properties which pervade and suffuse their objects, and are without trace of surface spread.

Furthermore, to say merely that "our expectations are satisfied" is to be guilty of another serious ambiguity. At first sight such a statement seems to deny the obvious fact that much of our enjoyment is derived from surprises, from betrayals of our expectations. The solution to this paradox is to find some ground for a distinction between "surprise" and "frustration". Roughly, the distinction can be made in terms of the effects which the two kinds of experiences have upon us. Frustration blocks or checks activity. It necessitates new orientation for our activity, if we are to escape the *cul de sac*. Consequently, we abandon the frustrating object and return to blind impulsive activity. On the other hand, surprise merely causes a temporary cessation of the exploratory phase of the experience, and a recourse to intense contemplation and scrutiny. In the latter phase the surprising elements are seen in their connection with what has gone before, with the whole drift of the experience, and the enjoyment of these values is then extremely intense. Finally, it appears that there must always be some degree of novelty or surprise in all these values if there is to be a progressive specification of the direction of the total act.

In reading a poem, in listening to a quartet, or in looking at a picture, we follow the development of the object by discriminating a texture of inter-related values. "A temporal work of art is developed," says Mr. Pepper, "inductively from the qualities of the detail to the qualities of the whole. A spatial work of art is developed deductively from a sense of the general character of its totality to confirmations of this throughout all the details." But both the temporal and the spatial arts exhibit the same general formal value structure. The difference between them that Mr. Pepper points out, is important but not fundamental, since both the temporal and spatial arts are created "inductively," and any aesthetic experience tends to exhibit a continuous interplay between "deductive" and "inductive" operations. To make clear what is involved in these "deductive" and "inductive" procedures we must give a precise account of the formal structure of the aesthetic

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object. To do this we must first specify in what sense the elements of the object are signs, that is, we must show what kind of signs they are.

From what I have said so far, it is clear that what the red patch denotes is the value of the blue line, and not the blue line as such. The primary problem then is: "In what way does the red patch denote this value?" It certainly does not denote the value in the same sense that the word "good" denotes some value which is a good. Secondly, it does not denote merely by directing our attention to the value, as would an indexical gesture of pointing. Thus, we must conclude that if the red patch is a sign it must be an icon denoting the value of the blue line in somewhat the same way that a map denotes a certain geographical area. The semantical rule of usage for icons such as these states that the icon denotes any object which has certain of the properties of the icon. That is to say, anything which is interpreted as a sign of some other thing by virtue of a relation of similarity between the two things, is an icon. Our red patch, however, is a special kind of icon and differs from a diagram or a map, since the only similar property that the blue line must have, in order to be denoted by it, is the same value property. In short, the blue line must partially fulfill the same impulse as is fulfilled by the red patch if the two are to have the same value. And, as we have pointed out earlier, the impulse remains the same in so far as the originally frustrated activities remain frustrated. Such signs are called *icons of value*.

Now, both formal and extra-formal signs in a work of art may be icons of value. Mr. Morris has discussed at length the iconic character of extraformal signs. The main point of his discussion is that "representative" or extraformal signs in an aesthetic object must be values, rather than merely suggestions of values. If the painted flowers in a Matisse merely symbolically indicate the value of actual flowers, they do not perform an aesthetic function, for the attention and interest go straight through the sign-vehicle to what is designated. But since icons of value have the values of the things they designate we can fix our attention upon the value of the painted flowers. Put in other words "when an interpreter apprehends directly an iconic sign-vehicle he apprehends directly what is designated".

Mr. Morris makes little reference, however, to formal signs, other than to acknowledge them as a sort of "secondary symbolism . . . serv-

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ing to direct the attention . . . from one part of the aesthetic sign-vehicle to another". He adds that these signs are neither iconic nor aesthetic. However, from what we have said thus far, it is clear that formal signs as well as extra-formal signs are iconic of value. The difference between them, and this difference is fundamental, is that formal icons have within the aesthetic object other denotata than themselves. The painted flowers, on the other hand, when considered as iconic of the value of flowers, can have no denotatum within the aesthetic object other than themselves. Thus, the denotata of extra-formal icons are external to the object in the sense that in order to know what value is designated by painted flowers, we must at some time have had direct enjoyment of the value of unpainted, botanical flowers. On the other hand, we can know what value the red patch designates merely by turning to and enjoying the value of the blue line. Acquaintance with all other values is irrelevant.

At the beginning of this paper we made a rough distinction between formal and extra-formal values, by stating that a formal value is one which satisfies some interest aroused by some aspect of the aesthetic object, while an extra-formal value is one which satisfies an interest which we bring ready-made to the object. This rough distinction can now be made more precise by stating that *formal values are the denotata of formal icons, while extra-formal values are identical with extra-formal icons.*

Mr. Morris makes some very suggestive remarks about the possibility of aesthetic syntactics. In our terms, aesthetic syntactics would be a study of the syntactical relations between formal icons of value. From a study of the "structural" properties of any medium we ought to be able to construct various syntactical systems. These systems would be analogous to mathematical systems, or systems of logic. In each of these systems certain sign-vehicles would be "primitive terms". "Formation rules" would determine the possible combinations of these sign-vehicles, while "transformation rules" would determine the possible transitions from one sign-vehicle combination to another. Consequently, with an adequate knowledge of the structural properties of the various media, we could describe any particular work of art as a certain kind of syntactical system, and further, we could show the relation of this system to certain wider and more general systems such as traditions.

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In this paper I have attempted to describe what I believe to be the genesis and nature of the formal structure of the aesthetic object. From this analysis we can draw several conclusions. First, the germs of such formal aesthetic structures are to be found in every activity which produces a good. All the elements in such an activity function to fulfil the impulse partially, and consequently have similar values. When these elements are interpreted in this way and are viewed in abstraction from all but their similar value properties, these elements as organized, constitute a formal aesthetic structure. The main reason that ordinary experience is so rarely perceived aesthetically is that it is geneally shot through with stereotypes. Recognition, as Mr. Dewey puts it, takes the place of aesthetic perception.

Second, any combination of formal values is *sui generis* and untranslatable in the sense that it is a constituent of a particular syntactical system, and such systems are autonomous. This emphasizes the fact that formal values satisfy unique interests, interests aroused by the formal icons of the object.

Third, since the formal structure of any work of art is an autonomous system this structure will be common to the aesthetic experiences of all those who know the primitive terms, and the formation and transformation rules of the system. Thus, although the interest bias which the perceiver brings to the aesthetic object will have a serious effect upon the enjoyment of the extra-formal values, it will have no bearing upon the enjoyment of the structure of formal values. All that is required for an enjoyment of the latter values is an adequate training in the structural properties of the medium.

Finally, we can understand that the status of a work of art must be determined in terms of the status of the formal value structure. It is obvious that we cannot legitimately criticize an aesthetic object because it fails to have certain extra-formal values. All that we can do is to criticize the way in which its elements are related.

Iconic Signs and Expressiveness

ISABEL P. CREED

MR. Ritchie has presented a very lucid development of C. W. Morris's view that the work of art can be defined as an iconic sign that designates values. He has also shown how Morris's definition can be based upon Dewey's account of the aesthetic experience as a unified experience which achieves a restoration of equilibrium between organism and environment, the equilibrium having been upset by an environmental thwarting of an impulse. In this brief essay I wish, not to disagree with the account presented by Mr. Ritchie of the aesthetic experience and the work of art, but to indicate certain omissions, certain directions in which supplementation is needed, if the views of Dewey and Morris are taken as *definitive* of, respectively, aesthetic experience and the work of art. In what follows I shall limit myself mainly to the situation in which an organism appreciates aesthetic values, concentrating on the values which may be found in works of art.

The Deweyan account of aesthetic experience, so far as it concerns creative processes, leaves no place for the works of art (and there seem to be such) which are the *celebrations* of an equilibrium achieved and thus not themselves worked out in the struggle to maintain equilibrium. Nor is there a place for the work of art which may result from a "playing around" with a medium whose structures and potentialities for novel combinations fascinate the artist. Again, in connection with the appreciator, as distinguished from the creator of aesthetic values, the kind of unsought for, accidentally encountered, yet often intense aesthetic experience of natural object remains to be explained. A mere chance turn of the head, and an aesthetic value may be realized, apparently as independent of our struggling with our environment as the gift of grace in the old church doctrine. Dewey's organism, in whatever context he considers it, seems forever struggling, forever earnest and

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unrelaxed in its endeavor to maintain itself; yet the complete and integrated experience which Dewey has in many respects so well described often appears to come without the genesis which is included by him in its definition. I do not maintain that the apparent exceptions cannot be reduced to the general rule in question, but their reduction would presumably involve the noticing of additional conditions which might turn out to be of extreme importance in understanding aesthetic phenomena.

In order not to limit too narrowly the generating conditions of aesthetic experience, I shall adopt a broader conception of "interests" than that of Mr. Ritchie—making them equivalent to *any* motor-affective attitude or behavioral pattern, i. e. any attending to or turning away from environmental objects, whether or not generated by frustration. Values, I shall interpret, as properties of objects correlative to any such attitudes.¹ On the basis of this broader conception, I wish to supplement Mr. Ritchie's account of the work of art in two interrelated directions: first, in indicating the multiplicity of interests which may be evoked and organized by the work of art, and secondly, in making out how the many interests are organized, in particular how so-called "formal" and "extra-formal" values are integrated.

The work of art is experienced as a perceptual structure, the features of which are gradually grasped by the percipient in a series of perceptions having a cumulative character. (The old distinction between the spatial and temporal arts is useful if referred to differences in the way in which a perceptual grasp of the work of art as a whole is built up.) In so far as the aesthete considers only that aspect of the perceptual experience which is focused on sensuous qualities and their organization, the values realized are usually called "formal." However, the term "formal" fails to indicate that the sensuous aspect of the perceptual object has an expressive as well as a structural character. As Mr. Ritchie's account of the red-blue combination makes clear, the two colors are perceived not only as contrasting (and, I would add, as creating tensions) in terms of their distance, in a color scheme, from one another, but also in terms of the exciting quality of the par-

¹ Values may be said to be "realized" in an object when an object satisfies an interest.

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ticular red and the soothing quality of the particular blue, i. e. in terms of the contrasting expressive qualities.

Expressiveness is a concept of pragmatics, not of semantics. It may be roughly defined in the following way. When X expresses Y for an organism Z, X does not designate, or represent Y. Rather, Y is some emotional quality, mood, feeling-tone, idea, type of behavior, or way of functioning, which through some process of fusion, has come to characterize X itself for Z. Thus, a certain configuration of the human face is expressive to us of anger, another of joy—that is, the face is perceived *as angry* or *as joyful*. If, however, the facial configuration becomes for the percipient a sign of certain psychological processes in the possessor, anger is not an expressive quality of the face but a designatum.

The values realized in the perceptual grasp of expressive and dynamic organizations of sensuous qualities, I shall call “aesthetic,” rather than “formal,” using “aesthetic” in the context of this paper more or less in its etymological meaning. Aesthetic values may then be said to be basic to the total grasp of a work of art and to possess the greatest degree of immediacy in the following senses of these terms. Aesthetic values are basic in that the realization of other values in a way relevant to the work of art presupposes the realization of the values of an organization of sensuous qualities. They possess the greatest degree of immediacy in that their realization is least dependent upon the mediation of cognition and the various kinds of past, non-aesthetic experience which the organism brings to the work of art.¹

Next in the scheme are what I shall call “artistic values.” Unless one believes in a Platonic God, these values are absent in aesthetic enjoyment of natural objects. They may be described as the satisfying of interests in the skillful exploitation of the aesthetic possibilities of a medium. Media have two characteristics which distinguish them from mere totalities of discriminable sensory qualities and structures. First, they are these totalities as ordered by the various schemes of selection or scales and rules for combination which constitute artistic traditions.

¹ It should be kept in mind that the experience of a work of art is a process and hence that the various values which the work may have are realized gradually and realized together as attention shifts from one aspect of the work to another.

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Secondly, there is a reference in the meaning of "medium" to the physical and chemical materials and instrumental means involved in producing certain aesthetic effects for percipients. Thus, the medium of music consists in musical tones, ordered in one scale or another, and produced by pianos, violins, etc. The medium of the dance consists in motions in definite space performed by a human body and these motions have been ordered by various selections of principles of the dynamics of the human body—and so on for the other arts.

The competent percipient whom I shall assume in this paper brings to the work of art a knowledge of the structure of its medium as explored by various traditions and a knowledge of the various physical means and techniques of producing certain perceptual effects. He will notice, for example, that Peter Breughel has fused into a perceptual unity two diverse traditions in treating spatial forms, namely the painterly and the linear. He will be interested in the quality of color, possible to oil, which Breughel has achieved. In watching a dance, he will be aware of the system of movements within which the work is constructed, (for example, the developments of the principle of fall and recovery as used by Doris Humphrey) and he will be interested in the extent to which this principle is basic in bodily motions and has been consistently and fully developed by the choreographer. (Also, in the arts where a performer is required, the degree to which the potentialities of the composition are fulfilled becomes important to the percipient.)

The interests which I have just described are obviously different from aesthetic interests and far more conditioned by cognition. When these interests enter the aesthetic situation there is, of course, a danger that the perceptual structure becomes a sign merely of various techniques and traditions and that attention wanders off to them as designata. However, since the skillful exploitation of the aesthetic potentialities of a medium is actualized in the perceptual structure, the interests generative of artistic values, though broader than the interests generative of aesthetic values, may remain centered upon the perceptual structure. The structure then becomes expressive, rather than designative, of traditions and techniques, and artistic values reinforce rather than disrupt aesthetic ones.

I wish now to consider the practically limitless set of interests which may be stimulated when the work of art is perceived as repre-

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senting familiar kinds of objects and situations. Morris's definition of the work of art makes it in every case an iconic sign, but an iconic sign of values. Apart from the difficulty of placing values in the semantic dimension, rather than the pragmatic, Morris's definition takes no account of the work of art as an iconic sign of properties other than value—properties of more or less familiar activities and objects, that is, of representation as that term is commonly used in connection with the arts. Obviously, the media of the various arts differ in regard to their capacities for being iconic of things of our everyday life. The medium of music cannot designate iconically the visual and tactual properties of our environment. It is dubious whether any resemblances to things outside the medium, other than resemblances to rhythms and tempos of various activities, are of much importance in music. The values appropriate to music seem to be largely artistic and aesthetic.

However, since the objects upon which are directed our practical, moral and cognitive interests are defined for us mainly in terms of visual and tactual qualities and forms, the media of painting and sculpture have great capacities for iconic designation. The questions which I wish to consider now are: 1. What are the characteristics of iconic designation in art? 2. Are the interests stimulated by such designation essentially destructive of aesthetic and artistic values or do they provide a possible source of further enrichment of aesthetic experience?

In regard to the first question, Morris's definition of an iconic sign as a sign which has properties in common with what it designates must be supplemented if it is to be useful in this context. The differences are as important as the resemblances when an iconic sign is a work of art. The basic difference between sign and designatum in art results from the fact that in art properties of objects are presented in a medium—the object itself is not reproduced. Secondly, the resemblances to familiar things rarely if ever consist in the repetition of identical qualities, but in approximate and often weak similarities. The artist selects certain properties of a familiar object and suppresses others. He distorts familiar shapes and properties—he takes shapes and colors from familiar contexts and presents them in new and strange contexts in his work. All these devices, of course, can be interpreted as mere devices for achieving perceptual unity in the work, and hence as generative only of aesthetic and artistic values. The resemblances which remain, however weak,

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may seem unavoidable facts which should be disregarded as far as possible because stimulative of interests antagonistic to aesthetic and artistic values. There are two true statements at the basis of this position. First, the interest in recognizing iconic signs of familiar objects is cognitive in character and, considered alone, is irrelevant to aesthetic values. The pleasure of merely identifying familiar shapes in a painting has no more to do with aesthetic values than the pleasure of identifying an old school friend in a photograph. Secondly, the interests aroused by noting resemblances, unless transformed by the aesthetic perceptual experience, are as antagonistic to aesthetic interest as the sentimental reveries that may be evoked by the recognition of the old school friend.

But the resemblances, together with the differences involved in the iconic character of a work of art can be instrumental in enriching both aesthetic and artistic values in the following ways. The interests aroused by the resemblance are modified or transformed by the differences. They can achieve an outlet or satisfaction *in* the work of art if the associations evoked are molded by the perceptual structure and become part of its expressiveness, an expressiveness which can reinforce or work together with the expressiveness of line, shape, or color. Thus, in Barlach's sculpture *The Avenger*, the outlines and volume seen as abstract, if that be possible, would be perceived as moving strongly in one direction. There would still be a quality of harshness, severity, and strength in the three-dimensional design. But the recognition of the iconic character of the form reinforces the movement and the emotions appropriate to the fiercely moving avenger are felt as characteristics of the perceptual form, not as designata or characteristics of designata. Further, the perceptual structure is not the bearer of an isolable, general feeling which without change might have another bearer. The feelings which become part of the expressiveness of the work are transformed and shaped by the individual perceptual structure itself. They are, as felt in the aesthetic situation, a function of that structure and cannot be specified or described except in terms of it. In addition, the blending and mutual reinforcing of the expressiveness of the design as abstract and the design as iconic is a source of further artistic values. Paul Klees' *Winter Garden* would serve as a good example here. In this work, the delicate fantastic quality of color, line, and design blend so as to be almost indistinguishable from the delicacy

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and phantasy expressed by means of the work's iconic character. The two examples given illustrate only one kind of fusion between the expressiveness of a work of art as abstract design and its expressiveness as iconic, namely, a fusion through similarity alone. The fusion and reinforcement may be one containing at least partially contrasting elements, as in Breughel's *The Blind*.

The work of art, then, is an exceedingly complicated perceptual object. It can satisfy in its own way, i. e. in terms of its medium, a practically limitless set of interests so far as they are transformed and governed by its perceptual structure.

The Concept of Expressiveness in Art History

HELMUT HUNGERLAND

AN art historian who does not want to restrict himself to a narrow sector of his special domain—i.e. to registering dates, facts, etc.—but who wants to present art-historical development as coherent and unified, finds himself confronted with the necessity of formulating (or accepting) certain theories and hypotheses in terms of which historical sequences can be understood. This necessity becomes especially clear if the attempt is made to discuss the position and function of art within the context of general cultural development. The formulation of such hypotheses involves, besides a factual knowledge which is an obvious prerequisite, the interpretation of works of art.

In this paper I wish to compare two concepts in terms of which works of art can be interpreted, and to point out the implications of the acceptance of either of the two. The comparison will be concerned with Alois Riegl's concept of the *Kunstwollen* (which has exerted considerable influence upon the writing of art history) and the concept of "expressiveness" as presented at this meeting by Dr. Creed. Since Riegl's ideas have not always been clearly understood a brief analysis of his theory is necessary.¹

What does Riegl mean when he speaks of *Kunstwollen* and what questions are answered by means of this concept? Alois Riegl formulated his theory of the *Kunstwollen* in opposition to the theories of Semper and his followers who maintained that the work of art was the product of material, technique and practical purpose. Riegl, who describes his theory as "teleological," contends that the work of art results

¹ The concept has been analysed at length by Erwin Panofsky in "Der Begriff des Kunstwollens," *Zeitschrift für Aesthetik und Allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*, XIV, 1920, 321-339..

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from a determined *Kunstwollen* which is aware of its aim and which expresses itself even in cases where material, technique or practical purpose are opposed to it. (*Stilfragen*, 1892). In presenting this theory Riegl not only rejects the notion that the work of art is a more or less accidental by-product but—and this important—he maintains that the *form* of the work of art is determined by the *Kunstwollen*. From this it follows that *Kunstwollen* cannot be identified with a general creative impulse in the psychological sense because that term (creative impulse) refers merely to a drive which is directed towards the creation of works of art as a class distinguished from other classes of objects such as useful instruments, tools, etc. Thus the general term “creative impulse” does not refer to the difference between different artistic structures and it is this difference which Riegl wants to explain by the concept of *Kunstwollen*. Instead of assuming a creative impulse in the psychological sense which is directed by a number of exterior factors (e.g. surroundings, tradition, material, etc.) Riegl assumes two objective structures which are immanent in works of art and towards which the psychological impulse is so-to-speak directed. These two objective, immanent structures of works of art constitute the artistic intent, i.e. the *Kunstwollen* which comprises both form as well as content.²

Riegl first defined these two immanent structures as “optic” and “haptic”³ (*Spätromische Kunstindustrie*, 1901); later he introduces the terms “subjectivistic” and “objectivistic” respectively (*Das holländische Gruppenporträt*, 1902), thus indicating that these two structures should not be considered merely as modes of formal composition but also as embodiments of two different basic attitudes towards the world (*Weltanschauungen*) and two different system of values. The various aspects of the artistic intent might perhaps be covered by the ambiguous word “meaning.”

It becomes clear, I believe, that in Riegl’s theory artistic intent is not a psychological concept and that therefore the term can be misleading because “intent” (or such synonyms as “volition,” “will,” etc.)

² I suggest “artistic intent” as a translation of *Kunstwollen* rather than Otto Rank’s “will-to-art” because Rank’s translation does not imply any specific aim, i. e. form towards which the “will” is directed and also emphasizes quite incorrectly the psychological connotations.

³ Riegl originally used *taktisch* (tactile) instead of *haptisch* (haptic).

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implies a decision in favor of, and probably a willful action towards, one of at least two possible aims (as different from a drive, urge, irresistible impulse, etc.). If one uses "artistic intent" in the psychological sense it would be applicable only to those periods of art history in which at least two artistic aims were imaginable (e.g. Mannerism, 16th cent.). It would not be permissible to assume that artists who were not and could not be aware of other possible artistic aims, made a willful decision in favor of the artistic structure embodied in the works of art which they produced.⁴ Thus, if used in the psychological sense, "artistic intent" is inapplicable to primitive and archaic art (or to the art of any period or region in which there was only one artistic structure known). Such a use of the term, however, is contrary to Riegl's theory. Every work of art, according to Riegl, embodies an artistic intent. Man's creative activity is determined by the immanent meanings—man experiences, selects, values his world "optically" (subjectively) or "haptically" (objectively), hence his art is intended either optically or haptically.

Since the artistic intent of a work of art (its immanent meaning) is not a psychological concept it cannot be disclosed by means of a psychological investigation of the artist but only by means of an interpretation of the work of art itself. Due to the fact that the term intent can be misleading, the mistake has been made of attempting to discover the artistic intent through psychological investigations of artists or by means of an appeal to the artists' reflections upon or statements about their art. Such an approach confuses the artist's intention with the artistic intent (in Riegl's sense). It is possible that the artistic intent which an interpreter finds in a work of art, agrees with the artist's statement of what he intended to do—such an agreement, however, is irrelevant. Riegl's theory accounts for the difference between artistic structures by considering them as the embodiment of objective meanings and values. An agreement between interpreter and artist then merely indicates that the artist became aware of the immanent meaning incorporated in his work, but this does not imply that the

⁴ It should no longer be necessary to point out that there is no such thing as one "correct" version of Nature given alike to all artists from which they may or may not depart by a voluntary choice.

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artistic intent is dependent upon or follows from the artist's intention. As the imbodiment of objective values the artistic intent (of Riegl's theory) is interpreted in terms of *a priori* categories but not in terms of the artist's psychological processes or his intentions.

It would seem that if one acknowledges the fact that the artistic intent is disclosed by means of interpretation—and I cannot see how it could be done otherwise—one would also have to concede the fact that the interpreter's personal point of view not only can but must be introduced. The interpretation of a painting or a sculpture is not merely a verbal description of the work of art. It is the interpreter's task not only to state what the artist has explicitly presented, but also what is potentially contained in the explicit presentation. These potentialities, however, the artist himself could of course not present and in order to disclose them the interpreter must introduce his own point of view. If, however, the interpreter's personal point of view is introduced there seems to me a difficulty in reconciling the personal interpretations with the assumption of *a priori* categories and objective values. In order to overcome this difficulty, as well as the complications which arise from the ambiguity of the term intent, I propose the use of the concept of expressiveness instead of Riegl's theory of the artistic intent. The concept of expressiveness, I believe, clarifies the process of interpretation and serves also as a check against too personal or imaginative interpretations by making the interpreter's experience the basis for the interpretation of a work of art by stating clearly the relativity of the interpreter's position.⁵

I suggest that different levels of "expressiveness" be distinguished. For instance the statement that a certain work of art is "painterly" or "optic," etc., can apply first to the formal structure of the work of art i.e. the particular work of art under consideration may be to an interpreter expressive of certain ways of handling the medium which are summed up under the headings "optic" or "painterly," etc. I can go beyond the purely formal expressiveness and state that "optic," "paint-

⁵ An interpreter's statements are of course limited by the actual facts concerning a work: (1) correct dating and attribution, (2) correct recognition of content and form, (3) correct information as to the original setting of a work of art, (4) correct information concerning the original cultural context of the work of art.

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erly," etc., are to an interpreter expressive of a certain attitude towards one's surroundings (*Weltanschauung*) (e.g. subjective) and I can proceed to interpret a particular work of art in terms of this assumption. In art history I can state that in a particular historical context a certain work of art is expressive of certain sentiments or modes of feeling and thought. Comparing the expressiveness of various works of art of different periods I can state an hypothesis concerning the changes in the expression of certain modes of feeling or thought (thus relating art history to cultural history). None of these levels necessitate the assumption of objective immanent structures or *a priori* categories. By using the term "expressive of 'x' to interpreter" I state clearly the relativity of the interpreter's position in relation to the artistic intent of a work of art. In other words, the assumed completely objective meaning is considered as a quality which is assigned to the work of art by the interpreter. The misunderstandings which are apt to arise from an ambiguous use of "intent"—speaking of an artistic intent of which the executing artist was not aware—are overcome by considering expressiveness (artistic intent) as a personal interpretation, as an hypothesis about the work of art which is subject to corrections according to the results of factual investigation. To the extent to which the interpreter succeeds in supporting his hypothesis by means of the results of factual investigations (psychological, historical, sociological, etc.) to that extent he is justified in claiming his interpretation to be more than an intuition or a personal assumption. An assumption, an intuition, may well be right even though the interpreter is unable to support it by means of factual evidence. However, in using the concept of expressiveness one avoids presenting a personal interpretation as a viewpoint necessarily valid for all.

In connection with the formulation of art-historical hypotheses I suggest that three kinds of expressiveness be distinguished:

- (1) A certain work of art is expressive of "x" to an interpreter now.
- (2) A certain work of art was expressive of "x" (a) to the artist and (b) to the artist's contemporaries.
- (3) A certain work of art was expressive of "x" to interpreters in different periods and/or regions.

The following example may serve to clarify this distinction. A group of undergraduate students with whom I worked did not find J. L.

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David's *Oath of the Horatii* or the *Rape of the Sabine Women* expressive of revolution. The compositions of Orozco on the other hand conveyed to them very forcibly the meaning of revolution. Their interpretation of the paintings in question i.e. the meaning or the artistic intent these students assigned to the works was far removed from the meaning the paintings had to J. L. David and his contemporaries. Only by means of introducing the expressiveness which these works of art had to the contemporary audience could the historical meaning be shown—this possibility, however, seems to me excluded if Riegl's concept of the objective immanent artistic intent is used.

If the concept of expressiveness does not necessitate the assumption of objective immanent meanings and *a priori* categories how are the terms gained which are used to describe the expressiveness of a work of art? The assigning of an artistic intent or of expressiveness to a work of art is a process of classification.⁶ Any such term as painterly, optic, etc. refers to classes which are gained through abstraction from actually existing works of art. Familiarity with a variety of works of art shows that within this variety different groups (classes) are distinguishable in terms of common characteristics (according to the interpreter's knowledge and interests different classes can be established e.g. formal classes, classes according to themes, etc. etc.). It seems permissible to suggest that such classes be defined in terms of the artistic traditions with which we are familiar. (Needless to say, "artistic tradition" does not imply that every local historical variation must be treated as a separate class; through a process of abstraction essential characteristics can be pointed out common to various schools, groups, etc.) An interpreter's familiarity with different artistic traditions enables him to decide to what class a particular painting belongs i.e. his knowledge and familiarity determine the expressiveness the work has to him (the artistic intent which he believes has been disclosed). These classes need not be restricted to purely formal characteristics (presupposing that purely formal qualities are distinguishable) but they can refer to modes of seeing or experiencing the world without necessitating the intro-

⁶ The aesthetic appreciation of a work of art is essentially the experience of an individual object. However, the historian's understanding of relationships between works of art necessitates classifications.

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duction of *a priori* categories.

The interpreter's experiences determine his manner of considering a work of art as well as the expressiveness it has to him (the artistic intent which he believes has been disclosed). A limit is thus provided which can be expanded by a widening of the interpreter's experiences of a variety of works of art. The greater the interpreter's knowledge of and familiarity with different artistic traditions the less effort it will be for him to see into which class (tradition) a particular work of art may fall. His familiarity with different artistic traditions will lead him to discern easily the essential traits of the different artistic traditions (classes) and the recognition of such characteristics will guide his consideration of particular works of art (and hence the expressiveness which they have to him). The recognition of such characteristic traits may be described as a "key experience" which determines the Gestalt character of the work of art. Lack of familiarity or one-sided training may make an interpreter unable to discover any other characteristics besides those for which he is conditioned to look, and may thus impair his ability to "place" certain kinds of art. A consideration of the variety of works of art will show whether or not a certain class (tradition) is applicable to a particular case (or whether the definition of the class itself is satisfactory), thus giving an opportunity for control by means of empirical evidence. The objection that artistic intent or expressiveness could not be a class concept because a single work of art might not belong to any of the familiar classes (established by abstraction) can be met by the possibility of considering it as the single member of its class.

There remains the question concerning the relationship between what was called key experience and tradition, i.e., the question: do not the artistic traditions result from the key experiences and does this not entail the assumption of *a priori* objective structures which determine these experiences? This question can be met by the naturalist's contention that all categories, as ways of seeing, understanding or evaluating the world arise ultimately from the interactions of the human organism with his environment. From certain of the interpreter's experiences there gradually develop principles which he uses to organize others. Their validity depends always upon their applicability to actual situations and hence they are subject to revision or even complete rejection.

The Intent and Tone of Mr. I. A. Richards

KATHARINE GILBERT

MR I. A. Richards' labors with words have had a large measure of practical intent. The final scope of this practical intent has been nothing less than the complete breadth of human relationships. He claims with respect to his *Interpretation in Teaching*: "Such work as this has bearings on the life of the world at large."¹ "Our purpose," he says again, is identical with that of Plato, to wit: "saving society and our souls."² If one had not realized the humanitarian impulse working from the beginning in his share of the authorship of *Meaning of Meaning*, one would have been made fully cognizant of it in the recent exchange of courtesies between him and the Prime Minister of England. Mr. Richards dedicated to Mr. Churchill as to a "Guardian" his translation of Plato's *Republic* into Basic English, and on his recent visit to Harvard University Mr. Churchill singled out Mr. Richards' work for words of praise. The end of semantic study and its branches, then, in conduction to peace and its goods—the amelioration of man's estate. Plato reported the legend that Justice (along with Reverence) was sent by pitying Jove to bloodthirsty first men as an ordering principle of cities and bond of friendship and conciliation.³ Justice for Mr. Richards is things in place, and words in place signify things in place. "The greatest evil is injustice, things out of place and therefore against one another—in a mind, in a nation, and in the World State."⁴ He is specific on the close connection between such word-study as he advocates and the present world-tragedy. "The choice be-

¹ *Interpretation in Teaching* (New York, 1938), p. 119.

² *The Republic of Plato* (New York, 1942), p. 11.

³ *Protagoras*, 322 C.

⁴ *How to Read a Page* (New York, 1942), p. 242.

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tween . . . totalitarian and democratic government . . . stem(s) from our understanding of these possibilities behind the words 'must' and MAKE."⁵ Study of the range of the word "love" in English and Chinese respectively will conduce to understanding between the Chinese and the English peoples,⁶ so that "the twain 'fated' never to meet," for Kipling's ideology, are to draw close to each other through Semantics. To make a good Dictionary, to translate great works into Basic, to teach in terms of multiple definition, and to read poetry in the light of a new rhetoric is to bring into being essential conditions of permanent peace.

A dominant practical purpose tends to strip itself for accomplishment. What is not an immediate part of the energy moving toward the foreseen goal is likely to be thrown off as positive hindrance. In Mr. Richards' case the practical aim has grown broader and richer with the passing of the years. It now "is the most inclusive of all purposes," having been shaped "through the extremest developments and reconciliations of theory." But even in the richer writings, there is the cutting decisiveness of the prophet's tone. He has been prone to condemn roundly as well as advocate earnestly. In his early work he treated a large part of the philosophical, philological, and critical tradition as wasted effort and as occupied with phantoms and bogus entities. Its terms were "more often than not mere *vacua* in discourse"⁷ or "should nowadays be obsolete."⁸ The bulk of the deposit from theories of rhythm and meter and critical analysis he declared valueless. His reformer's enthusiasm appeared in the announcement that "a new science, the Science of Symbolism, is now ready to emerge," that it will bring with it a new method of education,⁹ and "a new art and science of intellectual and emotional navigation."¹⁰ The criticism of the arts (especially literature), we were told, is largely finding one's way about among their terms, and no treatise to direct one in this endeavor has yet been written. Nor is Richards ignorant of what has been written.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 147.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 125.

⁷ *Principles of Literary Criticism* (New York, 1924; fifth edition, 1934), p. 20.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 139.

⁹ *The Meaning of Meaning* (with C. K. Ogden) (London, 1936), p. 242.

¹⁰ *Practical Criticism* (New York, 1929), p. 11.

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He and his associates have studied or have gathered from anthologies the treatment of words and aesthetic and critical standards in many earlier writers. Plato, Aristotle, Longinus, Plotinus, Bacon, Muratori, Hobbes, Locke, Kant, Hartley, Berkeley Schiller, Schelling, Hegel, Bentham, Coleridge, Bradley, and Croce, for example, are extensively or briefly handled. There are the famous sixteen definers of Beauty of *The Foundations of Aesthetics*. But forward-looking in emphasis and interest, with definite psychological predispositions,¹¹ and with an intent to write the directive treatise for critical navigation, Mr. Richards displays a tendency to dispose of "initial complications with philosophical matter."¹² Even in his 1942 essay on "The Interactions of Words" he casts a satirical glance at the uselessness of philosophy in its present state.¹³ Indeed, throughout, Mr. Richards is severe on earlier thinkers: "The best minds pondering . . . the fundamental questions which criticism is required to answer . . . have yielded an almost empty garner."¹⁴ He voices distrust of the "metaphysical family, with the deep duplicity that, covertly or openly, is constitutional in all the progeny of Plato."¹⁵ Earlier work, when conceded a positive value, often figures as sporadic anticipation rather than as part of a genuine development. In the case of Coleridge the psychological part is lifted up and given a high place in critical theory,¹⁶ and the metaphysical is assigned the part of heavy obscurity.¹⁷ Many would feel that this interpretation yields not the complex historical Coleridge as is supposed, but Richards himself, introducing a new plane into his picture. Mr. Richards is not apparently greatly interested in how his "Semantics" has come into being, but

¹¹ See *Coleridge on the Imagination* (London, 1934): ". . . although technical psychology has improved almost out of recognition since Coleridge's day, current literary education (as the columns of the best contemporary reviews too much show) has not yet benefited" (p. 66).

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 11.

¹³ *The Language of Poetry*, "The Interactions of Words" (Princeton, 1942), p. 67.

¹⁴ *Principles of Literary Criticism*, p. 6.

¹⁵ *Coleridge on the Imagination*, p. 27.

¹⁶ See "But as psychology, and it was as psychology that the critic in the Coleridge of 1801 was most concerned with them, these views of the mind as an activity are a new charter of liberties (*ibid.*, p. 66).

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 144.

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rather in its rightness, practical efficacy, and beneficent potentialities.

What happens to the historical background of Mr. Richards' ideas happens, on the whole, to all that is other than his own immediate doctrine. He is impatient of otherness and tends to treat it as positive not-ness. Even ambiguities and nuances get classified and so cease to be nuances and ambiguities. Our practical reformer likes his map of things clear and distinct, as did the seventeenth-century discourses on method. Everywhere there is neat separation, confident assertion, and the march of certitude. "We need a spell of purer science and purer poetry."¹⁸ "There are two totally distinct uses of language."¹⁹ "These senses are completely distinct" [of the various uses of the word 'see' in relation to a picture].²⁰ The emphatic, practical tone sounds in the "purer," "totally," and "completely."

The impression of Mr. Richards' meaning recorded in these first paragraphs might be summed up by suggesting that he often uses a school-master's tone and apparatus. When the late Mr. Collingwood wrote of him: "One hears the lecturing voice, and sees the shape of the lecturer's fastidious Cambridge mouth . . ." ²¹ he evoked an external symptom of what he felt to be the tenor of Mr. Richards' tone:— Tone, according to Mr. Richards, is that kind or aspect of meaning which manifests a speaker's awareness of his relation to his audience. From first to last Mr. Richards seems to be unusually aware of the human destination of his words. Sometimes he is admonishing a sloppily speaking and writing generation to place their own and others' words more carefully in contexts; sometimes he is showing any teacher of any art using words how to do his work. Indeed, he explicitly argues for the thesis that the "proper construing" of poems is a teachable art, thus echoing the old debate of the *Protagoras*, "Can human excellence be taught?" "It [construing of poetry] is a craft, in the sense that mathematics, cooking, and shoemaking are crafts. It can be taught."²² Sometimes he seems almost an international evangelist heralding salvation through multiple definition. But from early didacticism to late

¹⁸ *Principles of Literary Criticism*, p. 3.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 261.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 148.

²¹ R. G. Collingwood, *Principles of Art* (Oxford, 1938), p. 264.

²² *Practical Criticism*, p. 312.

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mysticism he seems to have some practical goal clearly in view, and to be addressing an audience that is hardly taken into partnership, but is there to be set right.

Tangible evidence of this practical tone is the abundance of sensuous devices (diagrams and lists) used to ease semantic notions to learners; there are the ten chief difficulties of criticism²³; the four kinds of meaning²⁴; the four possibilities of misunderstanding²⁵; the seven methods of approach²⁶; the six canons of symbolism²⁷; the three tricks of subterfuge.²⁸ But more important are the little geometrical patterns. "Spatial metaphors," says Mr. Richards, "whether drawn as diagrams or merely imagined, are dangers only to the unwary."²⁹ But considering the frequency of recourse to them and their satisfying patness, the reader tends to feel that the protection afforded by this disarming announcement is rather verbal than real. Mr. Richards is conscious that the schema is his friend: "A diagram will always help."³⁰ A \triangle explicates for him the general meaning situation, the three angles of the triangle representing sign, mind, and object.³¹ And surely for us the distance along the sides of the \triangle between mind and sign, and then sign and object, seems correctly to express the real distance and the externality of relation held to obtain between these various entities. The process of the apprehension of a poem from the reception of the visual stimulus to the awakening of an attitude is elaborately represented.³² A diagrammatic table is drawn to analyze schematically the students' reactions to a given poem.³³ "The Panopticon itself in its concentric form (which) provides a model key to the functions of the various grammatical categories . . . (enjoys) a similar diagrammatic conciseness." "Operational constructions" are made vivid by pictures of a ground-crew man

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 13ff.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 181ff.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 189ff.

²⁶ *Meaning of Meaning*, p. 44.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 88ff.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p.133.

²⁹ *Principles of Literary Criticism*, p. 117.

³⁰ *Interpretation in Teaching*, p. 376.

³¹ *Meaning of Meaning*, pp. 11, 324.

³² *Principles of Literary Criticism*, p. 116.

³³ *Practical Criticism*, p. 365.

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surrounded by the curves of his possible gestures.³⁴ Directive words come alive as fish swimming in a fish-tank.³⁵ The distinction between Pulse I and Pulse II in metaphorical thinking is captured by and projected into a diagram.³⁶ At this point, after a caution about stretching a diagram's use, Mr. Richards says, "(A diagram's) service in exposition may be immense, and I should not be surprised if, in time, most of the theory of language came to be expounded chiefly through diagrams."³⁷

All teachers use diagrams. But is there not here an excessive bent toward the use of them, a taste for picture-thinking, and the fallacy of the contoured real? No objection can be made to this use of diagrams if they are kept in their place, but the servant grows toward the master, the schoolmaster's aid toward the thinker's referent. One cannot but observe how often the argument leans on examples of mechanism, of things with resistant edges, in spite of the awareness that "for the modern physicist . . . his ultimate particles become merely what they do."³⁸ In the early volumes books were "machines to think with"³⁹; later Mr. Richards is concerned with "trying to devise a sort of verbal machine . . . which may be a help in using tools as machines to *think* with."⁴⁰ The aesthetic response (coenesthesia) is likened to a chemist's reagent. Similarly, the process of organic reaction "is merely one of adding further and more delicate signs to the situation; it is analogous to attaching a recording lever to a barograph."⁴¹ And again, our responsiveness to things is best illustrated for Mr. Richards by comparing us to thermometers.⁴² Learning to read "is not fundamentally different from learning to be a good judge of wine, or of horses."⁴³

³⁴ *Psyche* X, No. 3 (1930), pp. 12, 18.

³⁵ *Basic English and Its Uses* (New York, 1943), p. 35.

³⁶ *Interpretation in Teaching*, p. 137.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 138.

³⁸ "The Interactions of Words," p. 84.

³⁹ *Principles of Literary Criticism*, p. 1.

⁴⁰ *How to Read a Page*, p. 9.

⁴¹ *Principles of Literary Criticism*, pp. 99-100.

⁴² *Principles of Rhetoric* (New York, 1936), p. 29.

⁴³ *How to Read a Page*, p. 45.

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The spatial metaphors and material illustrations finally affect the structure of discourse itself. Thinking, Mr. Richards says, is sorting. What is sorting? Is sorting for him finding the natural sections in the world, and compelling one's ideas to conform to an articulation out in nature? Or is it operating on the mixture before one, and taking distinctions in accordance with goals that shift with history and convenience, though he might add that this is a "positing in separation of that which is not separate."⁴⁴ Mr. Richards usually seems to say that it is the second. Meaning for him is multiple, dependent on context, context on ends, and ends come into being and pass away. Yet Mr. Richards' plastic world, when he is not expressly stating his semantic functionalism, shows deep clefs and cleavages. Causes are distinct from effects. Aesthetic objects are distinct from their values; the supposed values of poems are illusions, the values of different states of mind are real⁴⁵; private mental experiences of the artist are distinct from communicable public impulses, feelings from perceptions.

The rest of this essay will be occupied with three cases in which Mr. Richards' practical intent and tone seemed to me to have led him into exaggeration. He treats the word as (1) sign; (2) relative function; (3) soul. If these three persons of the Word could have been kept a little more subdued to their dramatic positions in the life and play of the Total Meaning, one might not always have had so distinct an impression, but one would have experienced less recalcitrance.

Although Mr. Richards distinguishes four main kinds of meaning: sense, feeling, tone, intent, his distinguishing of two kinds, descriptive or scientific, on the one hand, and evocative or emotional, on the other, stands out even more clearly. But whether Mr. Richards is referring to the plain description carried on by scientific speech, or the evocative stimulus of poetical language, he makes words signs and cuts them off from the things that are pointed out and the minds that are stirred. The basic diagram of the Δ which assigns a particular apex to each of these three facts—word as sign, mind as speaker or hearer, and thing as stimulus or referent—gives the system a shape for the picture-thinker in each of us. The failure to distinguish the word from the

⁴⁴ Coleridge on the Imagination, p. 163.

⁴⁵ Practical Criticism, p. 348.

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thing is treated as an elementary blunder and a superstitious relic. The chief distorting assumption about language, he says, "derives from the magical theory of the name as part of the thing."⁴⁶ And however quaint it sounds to say that the old witchcraft still lives with which priests supposedly clove mountains and rent skies because they voiced names, Mr. Richards charges that in practice we sometimes still react to words as if they were the permanent souls and ruling principles of things. There are still "Verbomaniacs," for example such hearers and speakers as assume a blessed essence in the words liberty and democracy, as the fabled old lady did in the word Mesopotamia. Connection in the nature of things between an object and the linguistic instrument by which we designate it there is none, he says. Even making analogies in this direction is a deadly mistake.⁴⁷

How, then, are words related to things? we may ask ourselves, and why is this deadly error so hardy? Now in so far as Mr. Richards and his associates are erecting the theory of the word as sign on the tomb of a crass view of the word as "ingredient" or "inherent" in the thing, they have, one feels, secured their foundations at slight cost. And though they direct their argument more against a "usage" doctrine of words than a magical inherence or participation view of names, they find this "silly and disabling doctrine"⁴⁸ of names as properties of things "one of the most curious features of modern thought."⁴⁹ One may then reflect briefly on the gross form of the error.

To answer the question: How are words related to things? requires a philosophy of things as much as of words. But in the body of writing we are concerned with a thoroughly functional and relativistic doctrine of words is developed while at the same time the traditional doctrine of things as mutually repellent substances or contoured reals is left largely standing. The relation of the reconstructed one term to the unreconstructed other term must in such a state of affairs be marked distinctness. It would be hard to find a real bond or valid analogy, to say nothing of inherence or ingredience when things are

⁴⁶ *Meaning of Meaning*, p. 243.

⁴⁷ *Interpretation in Teaching*, pp. 277-278.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 277.

⁴⁹ *Meaning of Meaning*, p. 29.

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left as separate as naive perception takes them to be, and words are put through the conjugating machine of Basic. A theory of things after reflection must become some sort of theory of nature and at the last a metaphysics or ontology. Mr. Richards does not seriously concern himself with a theory of things because he is practical, and finds his key to human betterment through dealing with words. There is evidence that the older he grows the more he is aware of the necessary involvement of his semantic doctrine with a total philosophy. Suddenly in *The Language of Poetry* we find the question "What is a word?" grouped with all the other "founding questions": "What am I?" "What is a fact?" and "What is God?"⁵⁰ and the modern physical doctrine according to which matter becomes activity, and physical elements merely "what they do" is referred to in passing.⁵¹ A kind of brilliant violence appears in this essay; for in it the empty seats of the so long ignored "things" suddenly get filled with the cherished words themselves. These become the best of things, souls, creative spirits. The words which were forbidden a magic bond with things have taken over both thinghood and magic into themselves.

Most intelligent persons would not question at all the thin generalization that words as signs are distinct from the things which they indicate. But the distinctness becomes upon examination by intelligence one of degree and kind. This is the thick and interesting business. Things ebb and flow in relation to their designations; they appropriate and reject appellations; they sort themselves into classes both before and after naming, because entities have soft and shifting edges, as truly as names have many and shifting uses. They have sensitive centers determining their kindred in intelligible speech as surely as words are the "delegated efficacy" of a mental context.

In descriptive science the distance between the thing and its name is at a maximum. The sign here used for reference is an artifact of thought's devising. But even the sorting of classes of entities by scientific nomenclature submits to the control of the properties of the things sorted, and readjusts and refines itself in response to them. How do you know the extension of the term "stars"—when to stop overlapping

⁵⁰ "The Interactions of Words," p. 68.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

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gods and planets? Only as empirical science alters for you the place and motion and constitution of stars. Stars in themselves then become something different. Terminology-change is entailed by nature-change. The right words to apply to musical systems (harmonies, keys, modalities, sonorities) play back and forth with what these things are taken to be. They are each successively the active and passive element in a unitary situation of being and defining. So with styles in painting and their names. Professor Walter Friedlander released his art-historian's consciousness into the porous and fluctuating body of fact called "Mannerism." Experience with this body as reacting with the body "High Renaissance" or "Classical" style moved him to establish the term "Anti-classical" as more just and less ironical than Mannerism.⁵² Dr. Strecker claims an even greater ontological significance for terms in psychiatry: ". . . a name given to a psychosis or a psycho-neurosis is not merely an inanimate word: Names are things, they certainly are influences—impressions are left and opinions are shaped by them"⁵³

Mr. Richards himself has lately allowed names to become things, living things even, when they are operated by poets.⁵⁴ Perhaps the coining of slang is proto-poetry. Surely the appropriateness of slang suggests a break-down of the division between names and things. In the following verbatim report of an informal dinner conversation the question under discussion is the meaning of "gub."

"You would have to know a gub to understand. A gub is—oh a gub is just a gubby person—there's no other way to say it."

We ventured "Is a gub a goof?"

"Oh, not exactly. A gub isn't as stupid as a goof."

And, although we gathered his manners aren't especially polished, he isn't as boorish as the notoriously bad-mannered goop. Of drips, who are wet-blankets or kill-joys, we had heard; but, no, a gub, it seemed, often tries to be gay, the very life of the party; he couldn't be classed as definitely a drip. One of our friends thought he might be a sort of drippy goop.

⁵² Walter Friedlander, *The Rise of the Anti-Classical Style in Painting* (New York University, 1941), p. 16.

⁵³ Edward A. Strecker, *Fundamentals of Psychiatry* (Phila., 1943), p. 28.

⁵⁴ See "The Interactions of Words."

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On second thought, though, that didn't seem satisfactorily to express what a gub is. He seemed to have attributes of all of these, but could not be defined in terms of anything else—he is just a gub.

The naming situation appears to be this: A new class of social entities has arisen, the boundaries and style of which require to be indicated. The namer of the new group is necessarily the experiencer of it—in other words, the expert in current social habits. In research for the right name, the expert is under the control of actual sound for surface-effect—gub contains dull vowel and consonant sounds. The total mass of the word seems slight, like the social thinness and inconsequence of this type of person. There also enter as controls near-sounds assimilated to near-classes. For however distinct the name 'goof' may be from the thing, or the name 'dud' from 'duds,' these terms have by the law of economy taken the place in experience of the full fact. In brief, in the generation of the new word, past traffic with things fuses indissolubly with the feel and reference of sound.⁵⁵ The fresh verbal tool that grasps the fresh thing fits into and makes terminate the thing. Of course, in an intelligible sense the word gub is distinct from the thing; it is surely always at least a detachable handle; but in a more lasting and also intelligible sense the coining of the word belongs in the true history of gubs.

In the folk-naming of flowers the name has often shown extraordinary facility in seizing upon and in trafficking with plant-ways and history. Writing of "the pity of it that the old names for flowers are fast becoming buried under the Latin titles," Miss Clare Leighton says: "One can understand the origin of some of these intimate names, such as Queen Anne's lace for the frothing filigree of the cow parsley, or son-before-the-father for the autumn crocus, where the flower emerges

⁵⁵ As Plato suggests in the *Cratylus*, the sound "r" may contain rough motion, "i" sharpness; some letters get spoken with a shiver or a shake, and therefore sounds of this kind have something in common with referents that have the identical properties. But appropriateness of meaning, as Plato himself mentions, ideally depends on a more inward community. Words such as "zoom" or the unusually imitative ones cited by Mr. Richards—the "chhk" of a chopper, the "whshh" of rent flesh, the "hwah" of knife parting bone—while akin to their referent, imitate the surface of the thing through sensuous features: sonority and rhythm (See *How to Read a Page*, pp. 218-219).

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from the bulb and blooms six months before the leaves are thrown up." She cites others: "meet-her-in-the-entry-kiss-her-in-the buttery" for wild pansy, Venus' looking-glass, Jack-by-the-hedge, cuckoo-pint, priest's pintle, lords and ladies, good King Henry.⁵⁶

Is a proper name a part of the person or place referred to? Not a part of the encapsulated physical body of the person or place, clearly. In such a name of a place as *One Ash* or *Four Hedges*, a feature of a thing, a farm or estate, is stressed in attention and by name, and it seems fair to say that in this process the form of the thing itself is affected. The tree or the hedge comes to dominate the spatial whole for naive perception partly by virtue of the selected title. Such place names are obviously not designative merely. They come soaked with the things they indicate because of the many emotional overtones the name calls up. Proust pursues this idea with a rich fancy in *Swann's Way*. The name Parma rose before him as compact, glassy, violet-tinted. Balbec contained the surging of waves; Bonodet—a "name scarcely moored that seemed to be striving to draw the river down into the tangle of its seaweeds."⁵⁷ Proust always remembers that he is dealing with dream-wares. But when the meaning of a term is admittedly more evocative than designative the distance for most namers lessens between name and thing. With emotion they descend into the psyche and rejoin, as they imagine, that "being" which was thought to have been left safely installed in the "stimulus." However, Mr. Richards does not gladly explore this dim psyche. How daintily he avoids these regions where subject and object tend to coalesce may be seen by examining Chapters III and VII of his *Coleridge on the Imagination*: "As metaphysics they [these transcendental idealist formulations] are, perhaps, inevitably incorrigible."⁵⁸ "With a free eye and a light hand,"⁵⁹ he translates metaphysical obscurities into psychological and semantic clarities. "I hope . . . to make more acceptable to some the position that the realist and the projective doctrines are—in the only interpretations in which either is true—both true. As currently formulated they un-

⁵⁶ Clare Leighton, *Four Hedges* (London, 1935), pp. 33, 34.

⁵⁷ Marcel Proust, *Swann's Way*, trans. by C. K. Scott Moncrieff (New York, 1930), pp. 501, 502.

⁵⁸ *Coleridge on the Imagination*, p. 66.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

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doubtedly seem to conflict, to be exclusive alternatives. I shall suggest that this appearance is the result of systematic linguistic illusions, arising in the course of the translation *from* the fact of mind *into* philosophic terminologies; that in the forms in which they conflict they are both false; and that in the forms in which they are true they combine to be a description of the fact of mind which is their ground and origin."⁶⁰

But Mr. Richards' basic objection to the attachment of a word to a thing is not so much to the attachment itself as to a consequence of it. Through being tied as it were to a grounded post the natural movement of meaning that gives life and variety to words is checked. The objection is the obverse of one imputed to a Heraclitean in the *Theaetetus*; viz., that *words*, since they possess fixity and firmness, have a bad way of bringing ever-flowing *things* to a standstill.⁶¹ For our semanticist, any handling of words that freezes or constricts the use and interpretation of terms is wrong for thought and harmful in practice. The point is: Words are functions. Meaning is a freely swinging relation. There is no one correct meaning of a word whether the oneness seems entailed by inherence or by a tyrannical law of custom. This latter form of the hardy superstition is, Mr. Richards says, that which now dominates. But the particular shape of the evil matters relatively little. "The usage doctrine comes forward as 'the only conceivable criterion' to replace these popular conceivings, as the only thing that will do the work that the soul-body, king-kingdom analogies were supposed to do: namely, *rule language*. As so often happens, however, when one form of government replaces another, changes of titles are more noticeable than changes in acts. The usage doctrine took over and perpetuated just those inadequacies that are the real ground for objecting to Rule by Divine Right."⁶²

The notion that words derive their force from their context or relevance is old and familiar, but Mr. Richards' practical intent invests it with a new social importance. "The first effect of a general practice of multiple definition would be a strange peace in philosophy. A philosopher engaged in refuting another—not of his own party—would become

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 146-147.

⁶¹ *Theaetetus* 157.

⁶² *Interpretation in Teaching*, p. 278.

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a laughable spectacle. Actually at the moment he is a more sinister figure. Nationalism in thought! The defense of the West! Of historic China! Poor little wretches that we are. For with the increasing pressure of world contacts we do pitiably need to understand on a scale we have never envisaged before.”⁶³

In dealing with verbal webs, then, we are to learn, first and foremost, that there is no single right meaning, no truth in them that excludes competitive truths. In the interpretation of passages we are to reconstruct settings and to experiment with variant readings. “Which word is it?” turns into “which use?”; and the question “Which construction?” into what “what implications?”⁶⁴ The fact that every context has “several kinds of meaning” becomes the “all important fact for the study of literature.”⁶⁵ “Fixed meanings” are smiled at⁶⁶; and the “Proper Meaning of a passage (what it really means)” is laid as a “kind of scholastic ghost.”⁶⁷

Meanings that are not only freed from tyranny and ghosts but deprived of any law and order at all would obviously not be socially useful. The problem then in reading Mr. Richards is to learn how the new freedom works and what its constitution is. You cannot make a physical world by multiplying mirrors, nor an intelligible one by multiplying meanings. What is the scheme for their reunion?

Mr. Richards’ books are filled with exercises and examples. It would be inconsistent with his aim and tone to fail in the application. All his books furnish abundant illustration of his method, but *Practical Criticism*, *Interpretation in Teaching*, and *The Mind of Mencius* are almost entirely this. The long commentary of *Practical Criticism* reporting the reactions of many Honor Students to thirteen poems put before them is a first step toward tracing the faint outlines of a really acceptable world of meanings. “Something like a plan of the ways in which the likely ambiguities of any given term or opinion-formula may radiate will make itself apparent.”⁶⁸ And yet hardly a world even in outline,

⁶³ *The Mind of Mencius* (London, 1932), p. 93.

⁶⁴ *How to Read a Page*, p. 20.

⁶⁵ *Practical Criticism*, p. 180.

⁶⁶ *How to Read a Page*, p. 237.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 94.

⁶⁸ *Practical Criticism*, p. 9.

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and a thing like a plan only by favor is here. "A somewhat arbitrary list of the difficulties" of readers is given⁶⁹ and detailed though scrappy documentation is furnished. There is no need for a critic of Mr. Richards to express doubt as to the reliability of the plan he is sketching in, for Mr. Richards has anticipated this doubt. The experiment is admitted to be superficial, and it is claimed that it ought so to be. It furnishes an "accessible" and "detachable" first cut into a difficult subject.

One seeks further and deeper, then, for the principle on which unity is recovered for the liberated signs. There seems always reason to keep the early doubt. Example after example of interpretation is furnished and many are satisfying as far as they go, but none seems to go very far. In certain cases the dissatisfaction with the superficiality passes into a more definite opinion that the reading is wrong. Mr. T. S. Eliot courteously and under reservations rejects Mr. Richards' commentary on his *Waste Land*. Mr. Eliot approaches his interpreter frankly and even humbly. "I speak of Mr. Richards' view with some diffidence," he says. A few sentences further the extent of the diffidence becomes clear. He acknowledges the doctrine of pluralism of meaning, and in the light of it declines to claim any priority in understanding his own poetry. "What a poem means is as much what it means to others as what it means to the author . . . When Mr. Richards asserts that *The Waste Land* effects a 'complete severance between poetry and all beliefs' I am no better qualified to say No! than is any other reader."⁷⁰ (As one might say: It is a wise poet that knows his own poem!) But having bowed to the claims of tolerance, Mr. Eliot's rooted paternal feeling rushes in, presumably from the depths of his Unconscious, where Mr. Richards' is quite willing to agree real motives would be found.⁷¹ "I will admit that either Mr. Richards is wrong, or I do not understand his meaning," says Mr. Eliot. In spite of the doctrine of contexts, not a full enough context has been brought in. Mr. Richards asserted that *The Waste Land* effected "a complete severance between

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 13-18.

⁷⁰ T. S. Eliot, *The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism* (London, 1933), p. 130.

⁷¹ *Practical Criticism*, p. 10.

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poetry and all beliefs” and that Mr. Eliot’s meanings are not there for reference to a state of affairs, but to liberate through music. Mr. Eliot will not admit such a separation. He indicates that the serious history of the faith behind the music counts for him.

In this case the one who made the meaning finds Mr. Richards’ interpretation wrong. And it is hard not to think that when a poet is also a critic and interested in theory he is not the best interpreter we have. A second case that arouses dissent is the interpreting of Mr. R. G. Collingwood’s sense in Chapter XII of *Metaphysics* where is examined Professor McDougall’s section on “The Method of Trial and Error” in his chapter on “Habit and Intelligence in Animals.” Saying that Mr. Collingwood illustrates “some of the most powerful and frequent techniques of misrepresentation with unusual clarity,”⁷² Mr. Richards proceeds to try to disarm the reader with: “With this, of course, I am prejudicing the case as much as I can. I am doing it of set purpose, counting on your natural tendency to ask if I am not perhaps doing the misreading.”⁷³ One is glad to oblige.

Mr. Collingwood labels Professor McDougall’s account of animal scratching and clawing “pseudo-science” because it is subsumed under “the method of trial and error.” Mr. Collingwood furnishes a statement of what he understands this method to be. He makes it include five stages of deliberate experimentation, among them the forming and testing of an hypothesis and a technique of discovery. These latter would be called “higher level processes.”

In discussing this act of Mr. Collingwood’s Mr. Richards says that anyone abreast of the psychology of the last forty years would know that the meaning of trial and error has been “technicalized” so as “to be carefully kept from implying any higher level “conceptual” processes.”⁷⁴ “Mr. Collingwood’s argument,” says Mr. Richards, “depends on the reader’s not knowing this.”

But if I understand the context of Mr. Collingwood’s argument, it depends not on a reader’s not-knowing, but on his developed theory of what real as distinguished from pseudo-psychology is. This real

⁷² *How to Read a Page*, p. 55.

⁷³ *Loc. cit.*

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

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psychology, he claims, investigates the soul: the feelings and their clarification in the formation of language through the expressive power of the imagination. On this level, the goal sought is not envisaged or even foreshadowed by the "stabilizing of a universal" because none exists. Mr. Collingwood believes that in applying the concept of the method of trial and error to animal fumbling, there is injected into the criterion used irrelevant fictions from man's intellect. Even Mr. Richards says that while scientific reflection and the mechanism of the conditioned reflex are on very different levels, and we must not crudely think of them as the same, "an impressive formal parallelism may be remarked between them. . . . The important thing in both is the discernment of the relevant universal."⁷⁵

Mr. Collingwood would say, in contrast, that it makes sense to measure an animal's fumbling and its sequences by the "impressive formal parallel" to be found in human feeling and imagination. It is natural that Mr. Richards should not sympathize with this definition of psychology, its work and its parts. He applauds "materialistic mechanistic" psychology.⁷⁶ There is no word for "soul" in Basic English, and "feeling"—while discussed—is not credited with being an extensive region of the mind with ways and characters of its own. Mr. Collingwood may be wrong in his total view of the mind and its levels. My only point is that Mr. Richards seems again not to have "read his page" in spite of his apparatus and his evangelism.

One other example. In interpreting Plato's *Symposium* Mr. Richards calls the *nisus* toward the good there described "a stream of gettings." "As Eros, man's love to God is acquisitive, a desire to get him for ourselves."⁷⁷ This kind of love is contrasted with Agape the Christian love, which is "a stream of givings." "As Agape, Love is all outgoing and purer Giving." This again seems to me a misinterpretation. Surely Diotima corrected Socrates, who, taught by her, corrected all the superficial interpreters of the meaning of love, as consummated bliss—as value secured. Love has not, Socrates teaches, Love is *an effort* to get, if one will, but never quite what is suggested by the English

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

⁷⁶ Coleridge *on the Imagination*, p. 67.

⁷⁷ *How to Read a Page*, p. 155.

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word "getting" and "acquisitive." Its color, Socrates taught, comes rather from the infusion into love of the race for an immortal life and glory. And the glory which draws man on is not what can in the common sense be "got" by the acquisitive instinct, but what denudes man of all but divine discontent, of all but straining toward the ever-disappearing nobler human excellence. From being like lust, love becomes, we learn, like the teacher's pouring out of wisdom to the pupil, or the benevolent statesman's labors for justice among the inequalities in life, or the scholar's unselfish thirst for and publication of knowledge. These are "givings" of the finest sort.

It is in one sense not fair to ask "deeper" interpretations of passages from Mr. Richards, because the continence of the practical man, the relevance to the purpose, always presupposes limitation. Mr. Richards disclaims scholarship. He is on the scene to help his fellow-men. And yet this distinction between a benevolent teacher and a scholar is one of those false cleavages that Mr. Richards seems both to countenance and discountenance. In remembering a conference many years ago in which one of the sixteen definers of beauty refused the interpretation in *Foundations of Aesthetics* put on him by Mr. Richards, I could not but recall, in contrast, how both relevant and thorough was that treatment of the Aristotelian concept of beauty given by a scholar, Mr. W. Jaeger in his *Paideia*. With the disarming but ironical smile on his "fastidious Cambridge mouth" Mr. Richards says: "I neither am nor hope to be a scholar." "There is a middle way wiser for the Children of this World."⁷⁸

We must be content then to leave to the scholar the fuller description of "the meaning, the whole meaning and nothing but the meaning" that "scholarship rightly makes . . . an ideal."⁷⁹ But beside the pointings of the swaying and insecure examples, Mr. Richards throws out hints of what he conceives the world of meaning to be like. Its law is like the law of gravitation, a master-rule, a system of archetypal patterns, potentially able to explain the relations of all ideas to each other, but having its stability only in the experienced operation of mutual understanding itself. Or it is like Plato's dialectic which has

⁷⁸ *Principles of Rhetoric*, p. 32.

⁷⁹ *The Republic of Plato*, p. 10.

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no resting-place for Reason, because the Intelligence lives through the motions and attractions and repulsions of question and answer. It is stability through interdependency. As a vision of the intelligible world, we have these fragments, Plato shining through.⁸⁰

It is Plato, too, that, shines through Mr. Richards' final concept of words as souls. The "society of words is rather more than an analogue of a soul; it is a symbol, the instance of a soul at work."⁸¹

Phaedrus 277 is a text around which Mr. Richards weaves his extremest praise of the world-saving power of poetry. When words are charged and set in order by wonder-workers, poets, who use their proper instruments of magic (truly poetical words),⁸² they become "growing cells," the living acts of men, souls⁸³—more than this, men-molders and world-makers. In the enthusiastic advocacy of their redeeming capacity, Mr. Richards says that a great poet's words are the voice of God (the trumpet that proclaims to the people from the Almighty what the pattern is for life and death⁸⁴). Indeed, if one can understand Mr. Richards, the poet becomes Creator, Providence, Savior. "What does the poet *make* and what does his work *create*? Himself and men. But if we ask that he shapes or molds or gives form to, we must answer with Aristotle that we can say nothing about that which has no form. There are always prior forms upon which the poet works, and how he takes these forms is part of his making. He apprehends them by taking them into forms of more comprehensive order. To the poet as poet, his world is the world, and the world is his world."⁸⁵

It seems strange and the opposite of truth to charge a thinker who makes a word nothing in itself, but all its place and work, with giving too much to the word by itself. Yet this seems inevitable. The word, having been cut off in the first place as a sign from its objective referendium and its mental bed, is also parted off in theory into a science of semantics, distinct from metaphysics and distinct from value-theory. So

⁸⁰ And is not there here the Substance become Subject, the restless Soul of Hegel's *Phenomenology*?—if any one reads the pages of Hegel now.

⁸¹ *How to Read a Page*, p. 103.

⁸² "The Interactions of Words," p. 85.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp. 72-73.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 86-87.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

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unnaturally cut off, it recovers the lost members by an abnormal growth. The word not only marks off the joinings of things through key-words and their interconnections, shown in the machine Panopticon, but it becomes a plant, a cell, a soul, almost a god. This, however, it would only do in the hands of one whose practical turn disposed him to look for a panacea.

The Language of Art

RALPH B. WINN

WHEN we refer to the language of art, we use the phrase in a figurative sense, meaning, in Martha Graham's emphatic and uncompromising words reminding us of Veron and Tolstoy, that "the function of art is communication." This statement invites a comparison with language, for its function is also communication; more precisely, it is speech. Like speech, which achieves its practical fulfillment in expression adapted to the listener's ways and needs, so art attains its full significance only when it reaches the social level of communication. It seems to follow that an aesthetic experience, at its best, is only an adumbration of art. An aesthetic image formed in the head of an accomplished artist is but a promise of art, seeking a well-fitting form. Even a finished product of creative work is not quite art, before the public has been reached; if, for instance, a painting perished in a fire before it was seen and appreciated by somebody else besides the artist himself, it was only a would-be art.

Insofar as there are many kinds of communication, it is obviously insufficient, however, to declare that the function of art is communication—and stop there. The question naturally suggests itself: precisely what kind of communication is art? To answer this question, it may be advisable to consider relevant findings of semantic research. The analysis of speech has demonstrated that it is, basically, relational. Four factors are involved in every instance of it, namely, a speaker (rather, the speaker's state of mind at the moment), listeners (the listeners' state of mind), a referent (the subject-matter of a particular verbal communication), and symbols (words and sentences). Art, in its functional sense, as communication, is also characterized by four similar factors. Instead of a speaker, we have an artist; instead of listeners, we have appreciative public; instead of a referent, we have

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a theme of art; and instead of verbal symbols, we have an aesthetic form rendered in some specific medium.

The distinction between language and speech, as the structural and the functional aspects of verbal discourse, has proved to be exceedingly advantageous for the study of the problem. In art, however, no such distinction has ever been made. As a result, 'art' is a rich but vague word used, without much discrimination, in both its structural and functional senses. As long as this practice continues, we are bound to encounter serious difficulties in the analysis of the concept.

To correct this deficiency we propose to designate the entire functional pattern as *aesthesis*. This term will permit us to declare unambiguously that the function of art is communication; more precisely, it is *aesthesis*. Like speech, *aesthesis* is thoroughly relational. It cannot arise or exist apart from the four factors of communication. It starts with the creator of art, the artist; his mind selects and concentrates upon some aesthetic theme; it expresses itself in achievement, that is, in production of actual pieces of art; and it finds its social completion in the minds of an appreciative public.

This aesthetic pattern depends on an adequate co-ordination of all its factors. The artist's personal feelings, by themselves, are a private matter. His efforts to attain faithful imitation of nature can be excelled by photography. A pursuit of perfect forms is likely to be disappointing. And a vain desire to satisfy the public may interfere with his truly creative work. The value of *aesthesis* does not lie in impression or expression, realism or perfectionism, but in the quality of each factor of *aesthesis* and in a fine balance of the whole aesthetic process.

Nor can the artist expect that his masterpieces will be always appreciated by the right person. Suppose that an acknowledged connoisseur of art faces one of the most beautiful sculptures. Must he partake of *aesthesis*? Not necessarily. He may be conditioned by previous experiences against certain genres of art. The theme may require more attention than he can afford at the moment. Or he may not be in a proper mood. As R. M. Ogden put it in his *Psychology of Art*, "the experience of beauty comes when the bid is accepted."

Our parallel between the two kinds of communication, speech and *aesthesis*, should not be drawn too closely: in addition to certain essential similarities, they manifest also considerable differences, besides those of

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respective media. Speech is ordinarily a two-way communication, exemplified by conversation; aesthesis, on the other hand, is a one-way communication, from the artist to the public, but not the other way around. In this respect, aesthesis can be compared rather with creative writing, as found in scientific and philosophic literature. There, too, the scholar offers his findings and thoughts to the public, without receiving any similar value in return. In both cases, the creator is usually a gifted and trained person having something of worth to give; and even the recipient of this gift must be, to a degree, qualified, in one case by his power of understanding, in the other, by his aesthetic taste.

A similar difference between speech and aesthesis arises from the fact that ordinary talking is a temporally-limited transaction, whereas art, having been incorporated into more or less stable forms, largely transcends time and continues to be effective even after the artist's death. That is why we are still able to enjoy the works of Michelangelo, Rembrandt, Shakespeare, and Beethoven. In this respect, too, art can be compared with creative writing available in print, say, with the works of Newton or Descartes.

Another difference between the two types of communication is even more important. Speech conveys primarily percepts and concepts, that is, images, ideas, requests, commands; its emotive function is merely incidental, almost foreign to the nature of language itself. In aesthesis, however, the emphasis is reversed. Aesthetic communication deals primarily with feelings and emotions; percepts and concepts are secondary to it, being largely foreign to the intrinsic nature of art.

The word 'secondary' must be explained and justified. Art takes a perceptible form, no doubt, insofar as it must be put into some visible or audible medium. Reasons for that are to be looked for in human psychology. First, personal experience is fundamentally incommunicable, unless it avails itself of some mediating agency, such as speech, gestures, writings, printing and, of course, art, all in the form of some visible or audible reality. As communication, aesthesis cannot avoid availing itself of some perceptible material. Second, emotions themselves are invariably 'attached' to percepts; or, to put it differently, images are the necessary vehicle of emotional life. In fact, there is no such thing as fear or admiration of nothing in particular. To be frightened, one

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must be afraid of something or somebody; to admire, one must look up to somebody or something. There is really no misconception, therefore, in saying that aesthesis employs percepts only secondarily; it is what it is because of the transmission of emotions, not because of the use of perceptible forms. Consequently, we cannot fully accept Rembrandt's contention that "painting is nothing but seeing and feeling," or, to generalize, that artistic creation is nothing but perception and emotion. The presence of feeling, we maintain, is the essential condition and criterion of aesthesis; perception will take care of itself. Nor can we agree with G. B. Shaw's assertion that the function of drama (and presumably of any other art) is "to take this unmeaning, haphazard show of life, that means nothing to you, and arrange it in an intelligible order, and arrange it in such a way as to make you think very much more deeply about it than you ever dreamed of thinking about actual incidents that come to your knowledge." The function of art, we maintain, is to make people feel, not think; and art reveals the emotional appeal of life, not its intelligible order.

Aesthesis may exploit any medium capable of conveying its message. But that medium is just a means of sharing what the artist has to offer, a concession to the perceptual character of all communication. Unable to reveal his message directly, the artist avails himself of the language of emotions and incorporates them into some visible or audible form.

What is the language of emotions? Suppose we take this stanza by Shelley:

A widow bird sat mourning for her love
Upon a wintry bough;
The frozen wind crept on above,
The freezing stream below.

Or let us consider Van Wyck Mason's phrase: "Church clocks debating the exact moment of ten o'clock." Factually or scientifically, both statements are inadequate; but aesthetically, such lines are instructing the reader in an emotional comprehension of nature, society and self. That is what art is for: when sober sentences of speech fail, something may be awakened in man's heart by a convincing and arousing message.

The language of emotions is old. It comes from the days when

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danger lurked behind every bush, when heat, cold and wind had to be endured, when every move and action reflected the dependence of people's daily life on nature. Anger meant fight; fear, flight. Dark colors came with nightfall; light colors, with sunshine. The fast tempo of blood was excitement or joy; the slow, depression or sorrow. Proximity to nature, with its fluctuations and cycles, made feelings a part of throbbing life.

These connections with nature were active also in social relations. Love, grief, joy, anger, and fear were vividly expressed on people's faces, in their gestures, in the tone of voice; these emotions as well as their natural causes were readily understood and promptly shared.

With the retreat of civilized nations from original conditions of life and with the lessening of direct contacts with nature, the spontaneous understanding of both the physical environment and fellowman markedly decreased. The sea and sky, forest and meadow, wild animals and birds, rain and snow have become largely strangers, for they no longer stand for anything vital, inseparable from our existence. Emotional causes have grown so artificial and complex that the contagious power of facial expression, gesture and voice has weakened if not vanished. Strangers to nature, strangers to men, and even strangers to ourselves, we no longer experience emotions as something binding us both to nature and members of society.

Fortunately, the language of emotions has become also that of art. Science and philosophy give us only cold facts, figures and reason, useful beyond dispute, enlightening beyond denial. But when we feel the need of consolation, sympathy, hope, thrill, imaginary adventure, where do we turn? To a book of fiction, to a picture, to a symphony orchestra—in short to art. Only on its lower level, however, does art appeal to, and satisfy, man's primitive cravings; on its higher level, art trains man's heart, reveals the broad implications of nature, society and self, and leads to the summit of the true, good and beautiful. To be serenely and richly civilized, one must partake of donations of art, of the influence of aesthesis, if not on its creative side, then surely on its recipient side.*

*Aestheticians and art critics are often interested in a detailed examination of the field, for which purpose we may distinguish among four branches of aesthetics,

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namely: (1) aesthetic *genetics*, or the study of the creative aspect of art; (2) aesthetic *thematics*, or the study of subject-matter or themes of art; (3) aesthetic *morphology*, or the study of art masterpieces as well as techniques and styles of work; and (4) aesthetic *hedonics*, or the study of the enjoyment of art and natural beauty.

The Cognitive Character of Aesthetic Enjoyment

MAXIMILIAN BECK

HAVING an aesthetic experience, we enjoy something. And it must first be stated that *Beauty in the external world* is the main field of aesthetic enjoyment; the usual limitation of aesthetic research to art is completely arbitrary and has its origin in certain subjectivistic tendencies of aesthetics. It is not the essential function of art to create beauty, but to discover it and open the eyes of men for beauty which already exists really.

It is wrong to interpret *enjoyment* as joyful response or reaction of our psycho-physical organism to certain stimuli. In this case enjoyment would be nothing more than a subjective joyful feeling effected by the satisfaction of certain drives. Since the same external irritation can cause either joy or pain according to the different organism or individuals, the subjective character of enjoyment seems self-evident. And since this reaction of our psycho-physical organism is compulsory and beyond the control of our free will, there seems to be no doubt about the passive character of enjoyment.

Enjoyment seen in this way would be nothing more than an egoistic pleasure, a kind of animal sensuality contrary to man's spirituality, while human freedom and activity and the universal validity of obligations are essential to the moral attitude.

This conception of the mere subjective and passive character of enjoyment is therefore the presupposition of the *puritan* attitude; it is even alive in Kant's philosophy. There are, however, arguments which contradict that conception. Nobody can deny that the phenomena which seem to prove such a conception really exist; but they are different from the phenomenon of enjoyment. That enjoyment is completely different

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from a joyful feeling effected by the satisfaction of natural impulses or needs may be explained in the following way:

A feeling of joy automatically accompanies every satisfaction of natural impulses or needs. Normally there is no hungry man who does not always get pleasure out of eating. It seems evident that even animals find pleasure in satisfying their hunger. But pleasure and joy are not enjoyment. And enjoyment is not always and not regularly connected with the satisfaction of natural needs or impulses. It is far from being a necessary reaction to that satisfaction. Real enjoyment is rarely experienced, whereas the joy effected by the satisfaction of impulses and needs is a most frequent phenomenon.

The more impetuous and hasty this material satisfaction is, the less the real enjoyment is. The very satisfactions of natural needs or impulses prevent their being enjoyed. It is a well known fact that gourmets, those people who really enjoy, are not to be found among the hungry. One is unable to enjoy a fine wine when one is really thirsty. A wine drunkard is different from a wine connoisseur; a glutton is different from a gourmet.

If enjoyment were joy resulting from satisfaction or if it were organically conditioned, then enjoyment would be bound to certain satisfactions or reactions. But the condition for enjoyment can really be brought about voluntarily and has nothing to do with these satisfactions or reactions. The conditions for enjoyment consist rather of spiritual concentration, namely: a certain inner attitude of being open and quiet, and a certain detachment towards the enjoyed matter.

But first of all, one must be educated to be able to enjoy something. Education has, however, nothing to do with a compulsory organic reaction and satisfaction, but belongs to the field of free spiritual attitudes and efforts.

According to the facts, it is possible to distinguish between the joy caused by the satisfaction of impulses or wants and the enjoyment of this joy; both are different. Even pain can be enjoyed. And one can be made happy through the fulfilment of all one's needs and desires without actually enjoying happiness. It is possible, moreover, to be not only happy, but also to enjoy that happiness.

There is a joy that responds to certain stimuli which usefully affect the psycho-physical organism. This joy can be experienced as a

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subjective state of mind. It can also be experienced as a pleasant sensation of certain bodily organs. Bodily pleasure and psychic pleasure are different, but neither are enjoyment. However, either can become an object of enjoyment.

There is another experience: Through that subjective psychic pleasure and bodily sensation one can penetrate toward an objective value by perceiving it as objectively delightful in itself—not made delightful by oneself or one's own feeling.

For example: Many theories try to explain the phenomenon of music as a joyful reaction of the human psycho-physical organism to certain auditory impressions. And, indeed, there do exist those joyful reactions—but they are not representing the real music experience. A person's organs of hearing can be stimulated by the most pleasant impressions of physical sound vibrations without perceiving the slightest trace of music; one only experiences an agreeable nervous stimulation.

On the other hand, the most miserable record transmitted by a very poor radio can serve the realization of a very deep enjoyment of music, if the recorded music is, for instance, the work of Sebastian Bach and if the listening people are educated enough to understand this piece of music and music in general. The ability to comprehend music can be illustrated as follows: by using the acoustical phenomena in the same way in which letter type is used in reading. When really reading, one is not absorbed in the letters themselves, but in what they mean. The reader's attention is distracted when his eyes keep sticking to the letters themselves.

A similar phenomenon occurs when one watches the instrumental performance of a musical work instead of penetrating it spiritually and hearing what it means. That the acoustical phenomenon has only the above described mediating function is also proved by the following: Most musical persons can be ecstatically impressed by the mere reading of musical notes, almost to the same degree as when actually hearing the acoustical performance.

The enjoyment of music thus demonstrates that aesthetic experience has nothing to do with a subjective pleasure which is effected by sensual reactions and satisfactions. It is rather a sort of joyful perception of something which is not made by the person enjoying but only grasped by him.

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It is senseless to discuss the subjective joy effected by organic conditions. It is, however, not senseless to discuss enjoyments which certain objective values can grant to every one who is able and educated enough to perceive them. The famous sentence "De gustibus non est disputandum" contradicts experience; for one does distinguish a man of true and good taste from a man of false and poor taste. One is able to distinguish correctly between tastefulness and tastelessness. One can be educated to acquire a good and true taste. It is difficult to state the criteria of a good and true taste theoretically; they can only be taught and experienced practically. Nevertheless those objective criteria of taste do exist even if they cannot be explained expressively.

The active character of a certain kind of enjoyment is stressed by many philosophers in order to depict it as not offending human dignity, for they cannot deny that aesthetic enjoyment is spiritual and, has in some degree, an objective validity. Therefore, they distinguish aesthetic enjoyment from the plain sensual enjoyment. While the sensual enjoyment is declared as merely inherent in passive and subjective sensuality, the aesthetic enjoyment is said to be originating in some activity of the mind and, therefore is spiritual itself and shares the dignity and objective validity of spiritual values.

Those theories, however, contradict the facts. The aesthetic phenomenon does not start with certain formalizing, connecting, and objectifying acts which could be interpreted in the well known manner of idealistic theories. Plain sensual qualities can be spiritually enjoyed in the same way as the most complicated compositions; painters and musicians are aesthetically impressed by plain colors and sounds.

On the other hand, even the most complicated compositions of sensual qualities are perceived when enjoyed as objectively pre-given to the enjoying mind and not produced or shaped by the mind. A difference between sensual matter and spiritual form (the supposed elements of the aesthetic phenomenon) exists only in theory and not in reality. Of course, the aesthetic form and matter should not be confused with the aesthetic presentation and the aesthetically presented content.

The idealistic interpretation of the active character of enjoyment is wrong; nevertheless there is something implied in enjoyment that is of an active character; that activity, however, rather than producing

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or positively shaping the enjoyed contents, is only a way of keeping the mind open for the perception of the enjoyed contents by constantly stemming an opposite attitude of the egoistic individual. The individual tries to close the mind off from the enjoyable world. For it is the very egoistic interests of the individual which render the mind unable to enjoy, because, from the point of view of egoistic interests, enjoyment is merely a waste of energy on useless affairs. That active attitude attempts, furthermore, to ward off and remove disturbances and to preserve and maintain the peace of the enjoying person. It tries to isolate and to fix the enjoyed contents by separating them from the flux and the confusing richness of the situation. The attitude of enjoyment is, therefore, in a certain sense static and in this respect opposed to the practical utilitarian attitude, for when using something practically one does not take it and see it as it is in itself, but is only interested in its suitability to the ends which transcend it. When something is used, its quiddity is overlooked and the value within it. It is, however, essential for enjoyment to take the enjoyed good as an end in itself, and not just as a means to something else. This static character of enjoyment is not disproved by the fact that one can also enjoy speed, dynamic fluctuation, combat and disturbance, for in this case the dynamic does not belong to the attitude of enjoyment, but is the object of enjoyment. To the act of enjoyment, however, belongs even in this case the inner quiet of the enjoying person; he who is disturbed by anxiety is unable to enjoy anything.

If someone dares today to speak about beauty as something that he sees and hears about him, in the sensuous world, in the same way he sees and hears colors, forms, and sounds, he generally meets with a look void of understanding on the part of those who listen to him. "You speak, of course, of feelings," he will be told. It goes without saying in the opinion of intelligent people that beauty is a subjective event. To be sure, it occurs as something in the external world which, however, is only projected into it; it is only our own feelings and moods that we seem to perceive outside us.

However, the point is that closer analyses that have been made of this matter, have deprived these assertions of all plausibility. For instance, the element of pleasure that is an essential component of all beauty, is, as those doctrines maintain, our own pleasure projected into

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those things that appear beautiful. But as a matter of fact, it is precisely the best experts who are able to perceive beauty in a very cool and sober mood which lacks any feeling of pleasure at all. Moreover, as another matter of fact, it is not the case that we project our own feeling into things and thus make them appear beautiful to us, for the very opposite happens: the beauty of the external world affects us and cheers us up. We may be in a bad mood, but the beauty that we see has the power to deliver us from it. Our own mood and that of a melody just heard are often so contrary that this contrast may irritate us very painfully.

But the most important thing is that beauty as an objectively existing reality, has the power to assimilate us in some way to itself. Beauty frees man from the narrowness of his own self. There really exists the phenomenon of empathy, but in just the opposite direction to that explained by the common empathy-theories: not centrifugal, not going from within our feeling to the outside of the world, but centripetal, shaping us. We become wide in a wide landscape, grand in the grandeur of the mountains. The more we permit ourselves to be affected by the beauty of the different subjects, the richer and fuller we become ourselves. This, however, represents a moral phenomenon, if we keep in mind that it is the concrete effect of all moral efforts to shape, preserve and enlarge our inner personality. Moreover, the enjoyment of beauty presupposes the same anti-egoistic attitude as does moral behavior; it is not a passive attitude of sensuality and laziness, but one of spiritual activity. It presupposes a fight against the basic tendency of our Ego, namely to contract itself—a tendency which leads, by rendering it smaller, narrower, and harder, to spiritual death.

According to the common man, enjoyment of beauty has something to do with religion, since he holds beauty to be in itself divine or a manifestation of God and a guarantee of His presence. Beauty, so he believes, proves that there does really exist an absolute perfection in this world; where this, however, is possible—as a single matter of facts proves—there imperfection and nonsense of the world as a whole are rendered questionable.

Furthermore, in the extreme state of ecstasy, beauty is experienced as exuberant fullness of sheer existence, justifying suddenly the existence of everything.¹ "There does not exist any really ugly thing in this

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world," is the conviction rooted in the intuition of reality itself as a principle of worth. It is completely logical, for as to their reality all things are equal, although they may differ regarding their what and how as much as they really do. Therefore the well-known excess of optimism by persons who are enraptured with beauty is neither madness nor a vision of all things through the rosy glasses of their own subjective mood.

It may be kept in mind that religious experience also refers to plain reality as the principle of divine perfection, and to its fullness and plenitude as the perfection of the created world.

These brief hints may be sufficient to show the deepness and gravity of the aesthetic phenomenon, as the common man and all the great creators of art and literature have experienced it. This experience contradicts all philosophical attempts to degrade the aesthetic phenomenon to amusement and easiness, or play and arbitrariness, by tracing it back to certain feelings, moods, and the like, rather than acknowledging its cognitive capacity and its moral and religious relations.

¹ Cf. the author's paper on "Walt Whitman's Intuition of Reality," *Ethics*, Vol. 53, no 1, 1942.

Imitation, Expression, and Participation

ANANDA K. COOMARASWAMY

AS Mr. Iredell Jenkins has recently pointed out,¹ the modern view that "art is expression" has added nothing to the older and once universal (e.g. Greek and Indian) doctrine that "art is imitation," but only translates the notion of "imitation, born of philosophical realism, into the language and thought of metaphysical nominalism;" and that "since nominalism destroys the revelation doctrine, the first tendency of modern theory is to deprive beauty of any cognitive significance."² The older view had been that the work of art is the demonstration of the invisible form that remains in the artist, whether human or divine (Rom. I.20; Eckhart, *Exp. s. ev. sec. Johannem*, etc.); that beauty has to do with cognition (St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*, I.5.4. ad 1, I-II. 27.1 ad 3); and that art is an intellectual virtue (*ib.* I-II.57.3,4).

While Mr. Jenkins' proposition is very true, so far as expressionism is concerned, it will be our intention to point out that in the catholic (and not only Roman Catholic) view of art, *imitation*, *expression* and *participation* are three predications of the essential nature of art; not three different or conflicting, but three interpenetrating and coincident definitions of art, which is these three in one.

The notion of ("imitation" *mimésis*, *anukrti*, *prati-mā*, etc.) will

¹ "Imitation and Expression in Art," in the *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 5, 1942. Cf. J. C. La Drière, "Expression," in the *Dictionary of World Literature*, 1943.

² "Sinnvolle Form, in der Physisches und Metaphysisches ursprünglich polarisch sich die Waage hielten, wird auf dem Wege zu uns meer und meer entleert; wir sagen dan: sie sei 'Ornament.'" (Walter Andrae, *Die Ionische Säule, Bauform oder Symbol*, 1933, p. 65.) See also my "Ornament" in *Art Bulletin*, XXI, 1939.

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be so familiar to every student of art as to need only brief documentation. That in our philosophic context imitation does not mean "counterfeiting" is brought out in the dictionary definition: imitation is "The relation of an object of sense to its idea; . . . imaginative embodiment of the ideal form;" *form* being "the essential nature of a thing . . . kind or species as distinguished from matter, which distinguishes it as an individual; formative principle; formal cause" (Webster). Imagination is the conception of the idea in an imitable form.³ Without a pattern (*parádeigma*, exemplar), indeed, nothing could be made except by mere chance. Hence the instruction given to Moses, "Lo, make all things according to the pattern which was shewed to thee on the mount" (Ex. XXV. 40, Heb. VIII. 5).⁴ "Assuming that a beautiful imitation could never be produced unless from a beautiful pattern, and that no sensible object (*aisthéiton*, 'aesthetic surface') could be faultless unless it were made in the likeness of an archetype visible only to the intellect, God, when he willed to create the visible world, first fully formed the intelligible world, in order that he might have the use of a pattern wholly divine and incorporeal" (Philo, *De op, mund.* 16, cf. Plato, *Timaeus* 28 A, B and *Rep.* 601): "The will of God beheld that beautiful world and imitated it" (Hermes Trismegistos, *Lib.* I. 8B, cf. Plato, *Timaeus* 29 A, B.).⁵

Now unless we are making "copies of copies" (Plato *Rep.* 601), which is not what we mean by "creative art,"⁶ the pattern is likewise

³ *Idea dicitur similitudo rei cognitae*, St. Bonaventura, *I Sent.*, d. 35, a. unic., q.1.c. We cannot entertain an idea except in a likeness; and therefore cannot think without words or other images.

⁴ *Ascendere in montem, id est, in eminentiam mentis*, St. Bonaventura, *De dec. praeceptis*, II.

⁵ For the "world-picture" (Sumerian *gish-ghar*, Skr. *jagaccitra*, Grk. *noētós kósmos*, etc.) innumerable references could be cited. Throughout our literature the operations of the divine and human demiurges are treated as strictly analogous, with only this main difference that God gives form to absolutely formless, and man to relatively informal matter; and the act of imagination is a vital operation, as the word "concept" implies.

⁶ The human artist "imitates nature (*Natura naturans*, *Creatrix universalis*, *Deus*) in her manner of operation," but one who makes only copies of copies (imitating *Natura naturata*) is unlike God since in this case there is no "free" but only the "servile" operation.

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“within you” (cf. Philo, *De op. mundi*, 17 f., and St. Augustine, Meister Eckhart, etc., *passim*), and remains there as the standard by which the “imitation” must be finally judged (*Laws* 667 D. f., etc.). For Plato then, and traditionally, all the arts, without exception, are “imitative” (*Rep.* 392 C, etc.); this “all” includes such arts as those of government and hunting no less than those of painting and sculpture. And true “imitation” is not a matter of illusory resemblance (*homoióteís*) but of proportion, true analogy or adequacy *autò tò íson*, i.e. *kat’ analogían*), by which we are reminded⁷ of the intended referent (*Phaedo* 74, *Laws* 667 D f.); in other words, of an “adequate symbolism.” The work of art and its archetype are different things; but “likeness in different things is with respect to some quality common to both” (Boethius, *De diff. top.* III, cited by St. Bonaventura, *De sc. Christi* 2 c). Such likeness (*sādrśya*) is the foundation of painting (*Visnudharmottaram* XLII. 48); the term is defined in logic as the “possession of many common qualities by different things” (Das Gupta, *Hist. Indian Philosophy*, I. 318); while in rhetoric, the typical example is “The young man is a lion.”

Likeness (*similitudo*) may be of three kinds, either (1) absolute, and then amounting to sameness, which cannot be either in nature or works of art, because no two things can be alike in all respects and still be two, i.e. perfect likeness would amount to identity, (2) imitative or analogical likeness, *mutatis mutandis*, and judged by comparison, e.g. the likeness of a man in stone, and (3) expressive likeness, in which the imitation is neither identical with, nor comparable to the original but is an adequate symbol and reminder of that which it represents, and to be judged only by its truth, or accuracy (*orthótēs*, *integritas*); the best example is that of the words that are “images” of things (Plato, *Sophist* 234 C.).⁸ But imitative and expressive are not mutually exclusive categories; both are imitative in that both are images, and both expressive in that they make known their model.

⁷ Argument by analogy is metaphysically valid proof when, and only when, a true analogy is adduced. The validity of symbolism depends upon the assumption that there are corresponding realities on all levels of reference,—“as above, so below.” Hence the distinction of “le symbolisme qui sait” from “le symbolisme qui cherche.” Cf. my “Symbolism” in *The Dictionary of World Literature*, Philosophical Library, N. Y.

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The preceding analysis is based upon St. Bonaventura's,⁹ who makes frequent use of the phrase *similitudo expressiva*. The inseparability of imitation and expression appears again in his observation that while speech is expressive, or communicative, "it never expresses except by means of a likeness" (*nisi mediante specie, De red. artium ad theologiam*, 17), i. e. figuratively. In all serious communication indeed, the figures of speech are figures of thought (cf. Quintillian IX.f.117); and in the same way in the case of the visible iconography, in which accuracy is not subordinated to our tastes, but much rather we who should have learnt to like only what is true. Etymologically, "heresy" is what we "choose" to think; i.e. private (*idiótikós*) opinion.

But in saying with St. Bonaventura that art is expressive at the same time that it imitates, an important reservation must be made, a reservation analogous to that implied in Plato's fundamental question, About *what* would the sophist make us so eloquent? (*Protagoras*, 312E), and his repeated condemnation of those who imitate "anything and everything" (*Rep.* 396-8, etc). When St. Bonaventura speaks of the orator as expressing "what he has in him" (*per sermonem exprimere quod habet apud se, De red. artium ad theol.*, 4) this means the giving expression to some idea that he has entertained and made his own so

⁸ Plato assumes that the significant purpose of the work of art is to remind us of that which, whether itself concrete or abstract, is not presently, or never, perceptible; and that is part of the doctrine that "What we call learning is really remembering" (*Phaedo* 72 f., *Meno* 81 f.). The function of reminding does not depend upon visual resemblance, but on the adequacy of the representation: for example, an object, or the picture of an object, that has been used by someone may suffice to remind us of him. It is precisely from that point of view that representations of the Tree under which or Throne on which the Buddha sat can function as adequate representations of himself (*Mahāvamsa* I. 69, etc.); the same considerations underlie the cult of bodily or any other "relics." Where we think that an object should be represented in art "for its own sake" and regardless of associated ideas, the tradition assumes that symbol itself exists for the sake of its referent, i.e. that the meaning of the work is more important than its looks. Our worship of the symbols themselves is, of course, idolatrous.

⁹ Citations in J. M. Bissen, *L'exemplarisme divine selon Saint Bonaventura*, Paris, 1929, Ch. 1. I have also used St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*, I.4.3. and *Summa contra Gentiles* I. 29. The factors of "likeness" are rarely considered in modern works on the theory of art.

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that it can come forth from within him originally: it does *not* mean what is involved in our *expressionism* (viz., "In any form of art . . . the theory or practice of expressing one's inner, or subjective, emotions and sensations," Webster), hardly to be distinguished from exhibitionism.

Art is then, both imitative and expressive of its themes, by which it is informed, or else would be informal, and therefore not art. That there is in the work of art something like a real presence of its theme brings us to our last step. Levy-Brühl¹⁰ and others have attributed to the "primitive mentality" of savages what he calls the notion of a "mystic participation" of the symbol or representation in its referent, tending towards such an identification as we make when we see our own likeness and say "That's me." On this basis the savage does not like to tell his name or have his portrait taken, because by means of one the name or portrait he is accessible, and may therefore be injured by who can get at him by these means; and it is certainly true that the criminal whose name is known and likeness available can be more easily apprehended than would otherwise be the case. The fact is that "participation" (which need not be called "mystic," by which I suppose that Levy-Brühl means "mysterious") is not in any special sense a savage idea or peculiar to the "primitive mentality" but much rather a metaphysical and theological proposition.¹¹ We find already in Plato (*Phaedo* 100 D, cf. *Rep.* 476 D) the doctrine¹² that if anything is beautiful

¹⁰ For criticisms of Levy-Brühl see O. Leroy, *La raison primitive*, Paris, 1927; J. Przyluski, *La participation*, Paris, 1940; W. Schmidt, *Origin and Growth of Religion*, 2nd ed. 1935, 133-4; and my "Primitive Mentality" in *Q. J. Mythic Society*, XXXI, 1940.

¹¹ "Et Plato posuit homo autem materialis est homo per participationem" (St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum Theol.*, I. 18.4 fc. 1.44.1) i.e. in the Being of God, in whose "image and likeness" the man was made. St. Thomas is quoting Aristotle, *Phys.* IV.2.3. where the latter says that in the *Timaeus* [51A] Plato equates *húle* (primary matter, void space, chaos) with *tò metaleptikón* (that which can participate, viz. in form).

¹² Later expounded by Dionysius, *De div. nom.*, IV, 5, *pulchrum quidem esse dicimus quod participat pulchritudinem*. St. Thomas Aquinas comments: *Pulchritudo enim creaturae nihil est aliud quam similitudo divinae pulchritudinis in rebus participata*. In the same way, of course, the human artist's product participates in its formal cause, the pattern in the artist's mind.

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in its kind, this is not because of its color or shape, but because it participates (*metéchei*) in "that," viz. the absolute, Beauty, which is a presence (*paraúsia*) to it and with which it has something in common (*koinonía*). So also creatures, while they are alive, "participate" in immortality (*Rgveda* I. 164.21). So that even an imperfect likeness (as all must be) "participates" in that which it resembles (St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*, I.4.3.). These propositions are combined in the words "The being of all things is derived from the Divine Beauty" St. Thomas Aquinas, *De Pulchro et Bono*, in *Op. Omnia*, Op. VII, c.4, 1.5, Parma, 1864). In the language of exemplarism, that Beauty is "the single form that is the form of very different things" (Meister Eckhart, *Evans* I.211). In this sense every "form" is protean, in that it can enter into innumerable natures.

Some notion of the manner in which a form, or idea, can be said to be *in* a representation of it may be had if we consider a straight line: we cannot say truly that the straight line itself "is" the shortest distance between two points, but only that it is a picture, imitation or expression of that shortest distance; yet it is evident that the line coincides with

The notion of participation appears to be "irrational" and will be resisted only if we suppose that it is materially, and not formally, that the product participates in its cause; or, in other words, if we suppose that the form participated in is divided up into parts and distributed in the participants. On the contrary, that which is participated in is always a total presence. Words, for example, are images (Plato, *Sophist* 234 C); and if to use homologous words, or synonyms, is called a "participation" *metálepsis*, *Theatetus* 173 B. *Rep.* 539 D), it is because the different words are imitations, expressions and participations of one and the same idea, apart from which they would not be words, but only sounds.

Participation can be made easier to understand by the analogy of the projection of a lantern slide on screens of various materials. It would be ridiculous to deny that the form of the transparency, conveyed by the "image-bearing light," is not *in* the picture seen by the audience, or even to deny that "this" picture is "that" picture: for we see "the same picture" in the slide and on the screen; but equally ridiculous to suppose that any of the material of the transparency is in what the audience sees.

When Christ said "This is my body," body and bread were manifestly and materially distinct; but it was "not bread alone" of which the disciples partook. Conversely, those who find in Dante's "strange verses" only "literature," letting their theory escape them, are actually living by sound alone, and of the sort that Plato ridicules as "lovers of fine sounds."

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the shortest distance between its extremities, and that by this presence the line "participates" in its referent. Even if we think of space as curved, and the shortest distance therefore actually an arc, the straight line, a reality in the field of plane geometry, is still an adequate symbol of its idea, which it need not *resemble*, but must *express*. Symbols are projections of their referents, which are in them in the same sense that our three dimensional face is reflected in the plane mirror.

So also in the painted portrait, my form is there, *in* the actual shape, but not my nature, which is of flesh and not of pigment. The portrait is also "like" the artist ("Il pittore pinge se stesso"),¹³ so that in making an attribution we say that "That looks like, or smacks of, Donatello", the model having been my form, indeed, but as the artist conceived it.¹⁴ For nothing can be known, except in the mode of the knower. Even the straight line bears the imprint of the draughtsman, but this is less apparent, because the actual form is simpler. In any case, the more perfect the artist becomes, the less will his work be recognizable as "his;" only when he is no longer anyone, can he see the shortest distance, or my real form, directly and as it is.

Symbols are projections or shadows of their forms, in the same way that the body is an image of the soul, which is called its form, and as words are images (*eidōla*, Laws 959 B) of things, i.e. meanings. The form is in the work of art as its "content," but we shall miss it if we consider only the aesthetic surfaces and our own sensitive reactions to them, just as we may miss the soul when we dissect the body and cannot lay our hands upon it. And so, assuming that we are not merely playboys, Dante and Ásvaghosa ask us to admire, not their art, but the *doctrine* of which their "strange" or "poetic" verses are only the vehicle. Our exaggerated valuation of "literature" is as much a

¹³ Leonardi da Vinci; for Indian parallels see my *Transformation of Nature in Art*, 1935, Note 7.

¹⁴ From this consideration it follows that imitation, expression and participation are always and be only of an invisible form, however realistic the artist's intention may be; for he can never know or see things as they "are" because of their inconstancy, but only as he imagines them, and it is of this phantasm and not of any thing that his work is a copy. Icons, as Plato points out (Laws 931 A) are representations not of the "visible Gods" (Helios, etc) but of those invisible Apollo, Zeus etc).

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symptom of our sentimentality as is our tendency to substitute ethics for religion. *Nam qui canit quod non sapit, diffinitur bestia*¹⁵ . . . *Non verum facit ars cantorem, sed documentum* (Guido d'Arezzo, ca. 1000 A.D.; cf. Plato, *Phaedrus*, 265 A).

As soon as we begin to operate with the straight line, referred to above, we transubstantiate it; that is, we treat it, and it becomes for us, *as if*¹⁶ it were nothing actually concrete or tangible, but simply the

¹⁵ Skr. *paśu*, an animal or animal man whose behavior is guided, not by reason, but only by "estimative knowledge," i.e. pleasure-pain motives, likes and dislikes, in other words "aesthetic reactions."

In connection with our divorce of art from human values, and our insistence upon an *aesthetic* appreciation and denial of the *significance* of beauty, Emmanuel Chapman has very pertinently asked: "On what philosophical grounds can we oppose Vittorio Mussolini's 'exceptionally good fun' at the sight of torn human and animal flesh exfoliating like roses in the Ethiopian sunlight? Does not this 'good fun' follow with an implacable logic, as implacable as a bomb following the law of gravity, if beauty is regarded only as a name for the pleasure we feel, as merely subjective, a quality projected or imputed by the mind, and having no reference to things, no foundation whatsoever in existence? Is it not further the logical consequence of the fatal separation of beauty from reason? . . . The bitter failures in the history of esthetics are there to show that the starting-point can never be any subjective, *a priori* principle from which a closed system is induced" ("Beauty and the War," in the *Journal of Philosophy*, XXXIX, 1942, p. 495).

It is true that there are no timeless, but only everlasting, values; but unless and until our contingent life has reduced to the eternal now (of which we can have no sensible experience), every attempt to isolate knowing from valuation (as in the love of art "for art's sake") must have destructive, and even murderous or suicidal consequences; "vile curiosity" and the "love of fine colors and sounds" are the basic motives of the sadist.

¹⁶ "The Philosophy of 'As if,'" about which H. Vaihinger wrote a big book with the sub-title "A system of the Theoretical, Practical and Religious Fictions of Mankind" (English ed., London 1924), is really of immemorial antiquity. We meet with it in Plato's distinction of "probable truth" or "opinion" from truth itself, and in the Indian distinction of "relative knowledge" (*avidyā*, "ignorance") from knowledge (*vidyā*) itself. It is taken for granted in the doctrine of "multiple meaning" and in the *via negativa* in which all relative truths are ultimately denied, because of their limited validity. The philosophy of "as if" is markedly developed in Meister Eckhart, who says that "That man never gets to the underlying truth who stops at the enjoyment of its symbol," and that he himself has "always before my mind this little word *quasi*, 'like'" (Evans translation, I.186 and 213). The "philosophy of 'as if'" is implicit in many uses of *hōsper* (e.g. Hermes Trismegistus, *Lib. X. 7*), and Skr. *iva*.

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shortest distance between two points, a form that really exists only in the intellect; we could not use it, *intellectually*, in any other way, however handsome it may be; the line itself, like any other symbol, is only the support of contemplation, and if we merely see its elegance, we are not *using* it, but making a fetish of it. That is what the "aesthetic approach" to works of art involves.

We are still familiar with the notion of a transubstantiation only in the case of the Eucharistic meal in its Christian form; here, by ritual acts, i.e. by the sacerdotal art, and the priest as officiating artist, the bread is made to be the body of the God; yet no one maintains that the carbohydrates are turned into proteins, or denies that they are digested like any other carbohydrates, for that would mean that we thought of the mystical body as a thing actually cut up into pieces of flesh; and yet the bread is changed in that it is no longer mere bread, but now bread with a meaning, with which meaning or quality we can therefore communicate by assimilation, the bread now feeding both body and soul at one and the same time. That works of art thus nourish, or should nourish, body and soul at one and the same time has been, as we have often pointed out, the normal position from the Stone Age onwards; the utility, as such, being endowed with meaning either ritually or as well by its ornamentation, i.e. equipment. Insofar as our environment, both natural and artificial, is still significant to us, we are still "primitive mentalities;" but insofar as life has lost its meaning for us, it is pretended that we have "progressed." From this "advanced" position those whose thinking is done for them by such scholars as Levy-Brühl or Sir James Fraser, the behaviorists whose nourishment is "bread alone"—"the husks that the swine did eat"—are able to look down with unbecoming pride on the minority whose world is still a world of meanings.¹⁸

¹⁷ Cf. my "Ornament" in the *Art Bulletin*, XXI, 1939. We say above, "either ritually or by ornamentation" only because these operations are now and according to our way of thinking, unrelated: but the artist was once a priest, "chaque occupation est une sacerdoce" (Hocart, *Les Castes*, Paris, 1939); and in the Christian Sacrifice the use of the "ornaments of the altar" is still a part of the rite, of which their making was the beginning.

¹⁸ The distinction of meaning from art, so that what were originally symbols become "art-forms," and what were figures of thought, merely figures of speech

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We have tried to show above that there is nothing extraordinary, but rather something normal and proper to human nature, in the notion that a symbol participates in its referent or archetype. And this brings us to the words of Aristotle, which seem to have been overlooked by our anthropologists and theorists of art: he maintains, with reference to the Platonic conception of art as imitation, and with particular reference to the view that things exist in their plurality by participation in (*méthexis*) the forms after which they are named,¹⁹ that to say that they exist "by imitation," or exist "by participation," is no more than a use of different words to say the same thing (*Metaphysics*, I.6.4).²⁰

Hence we say, and in so saying say nothing new, that "Art is imitation, expression, and participation." At the same time we cannot help asking, What, if anything, has been added to our understanding of art, in modern times? We rather presume that something has been deducted. Our term "aesthetics" and conviction that art is essentially an affair of the sensibilities and emotions rank us with the ignorant, if we admit Quintillian's *Docti rationem componendi intelligunt, etiam indocti voluptatem!*²¹

(e.g. "self-control," no longer based on an awareness that *duo sunt in homine*, viz. the driver and the team) is merely a special case of the aimlessness asserted by the behavioristic interpretation of life. On the modern "philosophy of meaninglessness . . . accepted only at the suggestion of the passions" see Aldous Huxley, *Ends and Means*, 1938, pp. 273-277, and I. Jenkins, "The Postulate of an Impoverished Reality" in *Journal of Phil.* XXXIX, 1942, 533. For the opposition of the linguistic (i.e. intellectual) and the aesthetic (i.e. sentimental) conceptions of art see W. Deonna, "Primitivisme et Classicisme, les Deux Facts de l'Histoire de L'Art," *Bull. de l'Office International des Instituts d'Archéologie et d'Histoire d'Art*, vol. 4, No. 10, 1937; like so many of our contemporaries, for whom the life of the instincts is all-sufficient, Deonna sees in the "progress" from an art of ideas to an art of sensations a favorable "evolution." Just as for Whitehead "it was a tremendous discovery—how to excite emotions for their own sake!"

¹⁹ That things can be called after the names of the things impressed upon them is rather well illustrated by the reference of J. Gregory to "coins called by their name of their Expresses, as . . . saïth Pollux *καί εκάλείτο βοῦς hóti boûn éichen emtetupóménon*, from the figure of an ox imprinted," *Notes and Observations*, 1684. Any absolute distinction of the symbol from its referent implies that the symbol is not what Plato means by a "true name," but arbitrarily and conventionally chosen. But symbols are not regarded thus, traditionally; one says that the house is the universe in a likeness, rather than that it is a likeness of the

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universe. So in the ritual drama, the performer becomes the deity whose actions he imitates, and only returns to himself when the rite is relinquished: "enthusiasm" meaning that the deity is in him, that he is *éntheos*.

All that may be nonsense to the rationalist, who lives in a meaningless world: but the end is not yet.

²⁰ There can be little doubt that Aristotle had in mind *Timaeus* 51 A where Plato connects *aphomoíoiō* with *metámbánō*. That the one implies the other is also the opinion to which Socrates assents in *Parmenides* 132 E, "That by participation in which (*metéchonta*) 'like' things are like (*hómoia*), will be their real 'form,' I suppose? Most assuredly." It is not, however, by their "likeness" that things participate in their form, but (as we learn elsewhere) by their proportion or adequacy (*isótēs*), i. e. truth of the analogy; a visual likeness of anything to its form or archetype being impossible because the model is invisible; so that, for example, in theology, while it can be said that man is "like" God, it cannot be said that God is "like" man.

Aristotle also says that "thought thinks itself through participation (*metálēpsis*) in its object" (*Met.* XII.7.8).

For the sake of Indian readers it may be added that "imitation" is Skr. *anuḥāraṇa* ("making according to"), and "participation" *pratilabha* or *bhakti*; and that like Gk. in the time of Plato and Aristotle, Skr. has no exact equivalent for "expression;" for Gk. and Skr. both, an idea is rather "manifested" (*dēlōō*, *prakāś*, *vy-añj*, *vy-ākhyā*) than "expressed;" in both languages words than mean to "speak" and to "shine" have common roots (cf. our "shining wit," "illustration," "clarify," "declare," and "argument." Form (*eídos* as *idéa*) and presentation (*phainoménon*, *sōma*) are *nāma* (name, quiddity) and *rūpa* (shape, appearance, body); or in the special case of verbal expressions, *artha* (meaning, value) and *śabda* (sound); the former being the intellectual (*mānasa*, *noētós*) and the latter the tangible or aesthetic (*sprśya*, *aisthētikós*, *horatós*) apprehensions.

²¹ Quintillian IX.4.117, based on Plato, *Timaeus*. 80 B, where the "composition" is of shrill and deep sound, and this "furnishes pleasure to the unintelligent, and to the intelligent that intellectual delight which is caused by the imitation of the divine harmony manifested in mortal motions." (R. G. Bury's translation).

A Reply To Mr. Kimmelman*

MAX EASTMAN

MR. KIMMELMAN has given me such a prolonged and laborious drubbing that I am afraid the reader who wades through it, (if any) will only ask to have what little is left of me, and all of Mr. Kimmelman, removed from the scene. I must however, just out of curiosity, try and see whether I can still speak up. I can say thank you, at least, to Mr. Kimmelman for presenting my definition of metaphor very fairly before exterminating it. And having thus caught my breath, perhaps I can find a flaw or two in the process of extermination.

If I undertook to refute a theory of metaphor that claims to be scientific, I would feel obliged to bring forward some metaphors to which it does not apply. That would certainly be the first step. And the next, I should think, would be to bring forward some other theory of metaphor which applies to these, as well as to the ones already cited. Neither of these obvious steps occurs to Mr. Kimmelman. The latter, indeed, would be impossible, for there is no other theory of metaphor that claims to be scientific. At least, if there is, I don't know where—certainly not in the paltry remarks of I. A. Richards on the subject. The manner in which psychologists have ignored this problem has always astonished me.

Mr. Kimmelman's principal method of refutation, after tantalizing me with the remark that no one is better equipped than I to cope with these questions—for which again profound thanks—is to throw books at me.

*Cf. *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, vol. 2, no. 8, 1943.

"Nowhere," he says, do I "define mind, trace the genetic problems involved in its definition and indicate its place in nature . . . (cf. Baldwin, Ribot, Paulhan, MacDougal, Cohen, Spencer, Broad, Downey, Santayana.)"

To that I plead proudly guilty: I have refrained from defining mind and indicating its place in nature! Could anything—especially in one naturally equipped for such indulgence—be nobler or more self-sacrificing? Mind you, I am not promising to maintain this elevation. I shall probably end by defining mind and indicating its place in nature. But so far, and especially as the inventor of a

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theory of metaphor, I have remained within the realm of verifiable knowledge, and I am prepared, whenever convenient, to receive the thanks and congratulations of the public.

Professor Cattell gave credits in psychology to students who attended my course on Poetry at Columbia in 1910—some fifteen years, I permit myself to boast, before I. A. Richards introduced a similar revolution at Cambridge—and it was in that course that I first expounded my theory of metaphor (published three years later in *Enjoyment of Poetry*. Chapter III.) That arrangement with Cattell meant a great deal to me, for I was most earnestly trying not to be a philosopher—not to embed my theory of poetry in a speculative belief about the nature of being.

The next package of books Mr. Kimmelman throws at me is a little more disturbing. He is attacking my assertion that in practical life and evolution consciousness seems to arise where there is a blockage in the process of adaptation, where action does not flow freely. Mr. Kimmelman has two modes of objection to this: one is to remind me that there is "more to be said on the subject"; the other, to intimate that certain learned authorities may perhaps have a view of consciousness that is "diametrically opposed" to mine. In proving the first point, he says, among other things:

"Eastman fails to differentiate the various levels of primitive alertness, animal awareness, anticipatory attention, awareness with attention and interest, cognitional and conational levels, etc. (cf. Titchener, Kahler, James, Stout, Baldwin, MacDougall, Briffault, Pieron)."

I do fail to differentiate these things, and there certainly is more to be said on the subject. Indeed I could easily have spent twenty pleasant years working out the innumerable implications and applications of my concept of poetry. Short of writing an *Apologia Pro Vita Mea* I can only reply that I haven't had time. I had too much else to do. There aren't hours enough in a lifetime.

I do not consent on that account, however, to be dismissed as "challenging," "provocative," charmingly heretical, etc. All that stuff—politically motivated for the most part—makes me tired. The question is whether I have plumbed down through those admittedly relevant embranchments to the germ of the matter, whether my concept of elementary consciousness and its cultivation through metaphor, meter and the poet's peculiar accent on emotion, will remain after all those related problems have been elaborately, eruditely, exhaustively and eternally disagreed about.

I think it will, and I am encouraged in the opinion by Mr. Kimmelman's weakness of speech when it comes to finding a view of consciousness "diametrically opposed" to mine. Except by imputing to me a belief in epiphenomenalism, an artificial notion which I regard along with behaviorism as lacking in elementary common sense, he seems to have no luck at all in this enterprise.

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"The reader is referred," he says, "to the neurological work which has been performed by Sherrington and Head, to the psychological works of Paton, Holt, Marston, King, and Davies, and to the studies of abnormal psychology of Prince, Hart, etc., where sufficient neurological, physiological, and psychological material is gathered to form a basis for a conception of consciousness that is diametrically opposed to the one suggested by Eastman."

That is a long way from saying that any of these men opposes my conception of consciousness. It seems rather to be a threat from Mr. Kimmelman himself: "Wait till I catch you tomorrow and I'll have a conception of consciousness that will knock you into a cocked hat!"

While I am waiting, I will remark that the one he has with him today, far from being diametrically opposed to mine, seems to me little more than verbally contrasted with it. Consciousness depends upon the response and not the blockage of the nervous system," he says, "and its quantitative and qualitative character depend upon the *kind and variety of nerve paths* involved." But what, if not blockage of the unconscious impulse, causes this particular kind and variety of paths to become involved? I am not maintaining that *nothing* happens in the nervous system when we are vividly conscious. I am not pretending that "we are most conscious of that toward which our neuro-muscular organism does *not* react!" That is a foolishness which Mr. Kimmelman imputes to me, along with epiphenomenalism. My assumption is that the brain produces consciousness, and does so with intense activity, for much the same reason that the thyroid gland produces iodine, namely that it is useful to life.

There remains the question why life itself is produced. And there remains the similar question why does life, in times of idle energy, *seek* consciousness, and employ this cerebral instrument to produce it for its own sake? Why does poetry arise? I do not go into that question, because I think it transcends the present grasp of science. The answer would be a speculation about which persons of differing temperament could not be expected to agree. But I am not unaware of the complications it introduces into the general picture, and when Mr. Kimmelman calls them "inconsistencies," it is merely because he has not read my writings with enough sympathy—to say nothing of a little empathy!—to understand them.

With a warmer exercise of these amiable attributes, he could hardly have failed to note that *almost all* of the books which he cites to make my theory of metaphor look uneducated were published after it was—that is, after 1913. To be sure, I recapitulated my theory, with some technical elaboration, in *The Literary Mind; Its Place in an Age of Science*, and *Art and the Life of Action* (1931 and 1934). But there remains a considerable injustice in his ignoring the original time-sequence. There is still more injustice in the following remark:

"The whole concept of the 'heightened consciousness' is treated just as

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well from the purely literary standpoint by such people as Edith Sitwell, Perry, Graves, Drinkwater and Hart Crane. I can see no justification . . . for a substituted, scientific technique in a problem which has been treated adequately by another field of study unless it either substantiates that problem scientifically or provides additional, illuminating comment upon it."

My Enjoyment of Poetry was approaching its twentieth reprinting when Bliss Perry published his *Studies in Poetry* (1920), and Miss Sitwell was, I think, not yet in short skirts when I began "substantiating scientifically" what, when she grew up, she was destined to say.

I find unjust also Mr. Kimmelman's failure to recall—while expatiating on my neglect of the "genetic," the "physiological," the "neurological" etc—that the concept of organic life-impulse upon which my theory rests, was endorsed by one of the world's leading experts on the nervous system, C. Judson Herrick, who placed a quotation from me at the basis of the *Neurological Foundation of Animal Behavior*. I myself stated, in reporting this gratifying fact in *The Literary Mind*, that I needed all the support I could get from the laboratory, and I think Mr. Kimmelman might fairly have informed his reader that I had that much. Since the publication of that book, I have received so much more that I do not tremble at all when Mr. Kimmelman picks up a laboratorial book to throw at me.

Robert M. Yerkes, Professor of Psychobiology in Yale University, wrote me (with permission to quote):

"I find myself not only agreeing with you but doing so enthusiastically. I am interested and confident, that the view of the relation of scientific ideas to literature, perhaps even to all the fine arts, which you have set forth, is correct and will prevail."

The late Edward Sapir, Professor of Anthropology in the same university, added:

"As to the common herd of sociologists, social psychologists, cultural anthropologists and realistic students of human behavior in general, there are probably few who will not feel that Mr. Eastman is bringing a delightful coolness into an air which is surcharged with old perfume.

I received equally enthusiastic endorsements from five full professors of psychology, and from such men of general learning in science as Edwin Hubble, William F. Ogburn, William Pepperell Montague, C. I. Lewis, Bernard Berenson, and the late Preserved Smith. In fact *The Literary Mind* had a success among scientists quite equal to its failure among the literateurs. Margaret Floy Washburn described it as fulfilling "a long, long felt need," William MacDougall read

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it with "much agreement." And George Santayana, another of those with whose mere names Mr. Kimmelman attempts to lay me low, wrote:

"I heartily agree with the gist of your definition of poetry . . . I also agree with you in thinking that aesthetic feeling involves the inhibition of action and of transitive intelligence."

I would not indulge in all this self-advertising—at least perhaps I wouldn't!—had not Mr. Kimmelman called in question, on the basis of my supposed abysmal ignorance of the "Aesthetic Response," my competence to appeal to psychology on the subject of "Socialism and Human Nature." Mr. Kimmelman calls his concluding paragraph, in which he pulls this gentle surprise, a "footnote." I never saw a footnote in quite so prominent a place before, and I suspect it of being the Prime Mover of all that precedes. I called attention in the *New Leader* to the fact that out of ten authorities lined up to criticize my article on *Socialism and Human Nature*, the professional psychologist, Gordon Allport, was the only one who had no word of disagreement. The psychological findings appealed to in that essay are very spare and very elementary, and I think it would be better, if one disagrees, to argue against them directly, instead of trying to establish my general incompetence by this remote attack in the South Sea Island region of the Aesthetic Response.

Book Reviews

HORACE M. KALLEN: *Art and Freedom, A Historical and Biographical Interpretation of the Relations Between the Ideas of Beauty, Use and Freedom in Western Civilization from the Greeks to the Present Day*. Duell, Sloan and Pearce. 1942. Two vols. 1006 pp. \$6.50.

Professor Kallen has not been writing a book just on aesthetics or a history of aesthetics. He has done something much more valuable. There are plenty of such books and another, even as good as he could write, would not be nearly as helpful to aestheticians as the grist he provides for their mill. He does not especially intend this book for them. He does not seem to care much about writing by or for them. Relatively few of them figure in his pages. In view of his emphasis upon modern art, and upon its relation with recent science, technology and patterns of living which have developed most conspicuously in the United States in the 20th century, it is noticeable that Dewey is the only American psychologist or philosopher of art writing since 1900 who is taken up, unless James is regarded as such. Santayana has contributed to aesthetics since then and might be considered American, Ethel Puffer is mentioned, but who else? A number of people: neither psychologists nor philosophers in the professional sense, but thoughtful about art and freedom or unconsciously qualifying them. The machine is there, manufacturing "a new personality-image" in the technician, the scientist-engineer, to play hob with tradition like the Connecticut Yankee at King Arthur's Court. Veblen is there. The camera comes in, Leland Stanford's race-horses, moving pictures, and the painter trying to keep up with them "in the transformations of impressionism and in the development of post-impressionist conceptions and techniques," expressing "the primacy which motion had won in the common life" (680). James and Bergson do not appear because they have some ideas about art but because, with Mach and Poincaré, they help create the atmosphere of change and flow, and try to present motion, along with Cézanne, Rodin, Van Gogh, Gauguin, Matisse, Picasso, Braque, Kandinsky; above all, with the movies. The automobile comes, contemporary with the treatment of consciousness as a stream and thought as a vital function, to make "a goal of the going, for the common man."

As painting and science both become "imaginative shorthand" rather than imitation or record of a fixed external reality, science may be considered as ap-

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proaching art and art as becoming science. It is suddenly easier to see all that they share than to say where they differ. Whatever differences there are in the techniques and media of art and science, both reshape material to human needs, "both look to uses that consummate as beauty and emerge as freedom" (719).

Artist and scientist become co-workers with all workmen in overcoming the coercions and constraints besetting life. In classical Greece and Rome the artist was considered a workman, but despised as such in the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. Yet Mr. Kallen notes that Plato's God was an "Artist of Artists . . ." a refinement and attenuation into an Idea of the lowly Greek craftsman . . ." (43) and that Aristotle's views were largely a systematization of the practice and teaching of craftsmen (50). That men whose work was appreciated while they were not could overcome in time their social handicap is attributed chiefly to unions, dating back to the Hellenistic world and able to survive the Roman Empire. When the Crusades enriched Italian cities and rivalry was intensified in them between craftsmen and traders, the "gilds were the organs and energies of the struggle" (94). It is argued that these associations had kept a continuity with the collegia or unions of antiquity. Though many artisans became priests after the triumph of Christianity, not all sought the safety of that status, for there remained free and secular societies, not only of masons and carpenters but of architects, painters, statuaries and others. "Whether as spontaneous formations or as historical mutations, until well into the 16th century the gilds tended to work as engines of liberty alike against political tyranny and ecclesiastical oppression" (96). Absolute monarchs of the new national states destroyed the gilds by appointing artists to the king and making them dependent upon patronage. The Industrial Revolution made artists enterprisers on their own until the revival in the United States of craft associations after 1900, in emulation of modern trades-unions. Artists were the last to organize on this basis, having become detached from other men in the competition of business enterprise, and having tried to justify their isolation by the theory of art for art's sake. Finally obliged to realize afresh the social significance of their work, men of art had their liberty vindicated by the New Deal. John Dewey gave a statement of that liberty which now Mr. Kallen has brilliantly identified with human liberty by showing their historical convergence.

He has written a history of culture alive with biography, aquiver with zeal for spontaneous variation and concern for the continuity of the human enterprise. Art and freedom he interprets through that zeal and this concern, but the zeal dominates the interpretation which is closer to the individualistic psychology and philosophy of William James than to the more social orientation of John Dewey, though loyal to both. Like the foci of an ellipse these two positions have much in common, yet enough difference to set up and threaten bi-polar tension, and the nub of Mr. Kallen's book, as stated in the Preface, hugs the James base: "the liberty of the artist that refuses to compromise the singularity of his vision. . . In the culture of free societies, this liberty has become the avatar of all the freedoms men fight and are ready to die for. It is the spontaneity and fertility of the very

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life of us, and so contagious that where the artist is free no other man can remain bond" (xiv).

The freedom of the artist, which he cannot really have unless other men have it too, has been feared and suppressed by authority at least since Plato, and Mr. Kallen considers the present conflict as the last battle of an age-old war to give all men the freedom of art. But the fight must involve transition from a conception of uncompromising singularity to one of compromising and cooperating sociality, from terms of James to terms of Dewey, at least for the duration of the emergency stretching far into the post-war vista. Freedom à la James, without qualification à la Dewey, opens the way to all kinds of unsocial and anti-social possibilities. The 18th century idea of freedom as release from governmental tyranny, then a progressive idea and continuing in the 19th century as laissez-faire individualism, becomes a mockery unless fused with the 20th century idea of freedom from fear and want, to be gained through social, political, economic and cultural organization of life. If anything at all equivalent to the individualism of James is to be recovered it must be within rather than without governmental planning which necessitates some restriction of spontaneity, and a good deal in a crisis. Much of what James and Kallen have cherished must be sacrificed in order to have any of it. Too much freedom may be given up or taken away in the effort to salvage the chance to build up freedom in the future. Mistakes and blunders, tragic losses, are part of the price. Dewey happens to agree with Kallen that the Soviet Union is guilty of horribly inexcusable crimes against freedom. This is a controversial question. But if Kallen is right that no art is possible without liberty, either the artist's freedom has not been as drastically suppressed in Russia as he contends or such work as that of Shostakovich and Sholokhov is not art. Against the prejudice that the Soviet Union is a totalitarianism of the same stripe as that of Germany and Italy, it may be observed that no comparable work is known to have issued from under the dictatorships of the latter countries except as produced by refugees.

Mr. Kallen says, "If art were merely the self-expression of the artist, it could be passed by and ignored. All censorship assumes that art stirs men's hearts and changes their wills, that it is communication essentially, not accidentally . . ." (907). He is glad to hold that this assumption is correct, and points out with Dewey that only in free societies will efforts to frustrate the liberating effect of art's communication fail. Kallen appears to agree with Dewey that art establishes "bonds of 'shared meanings' wherein the many bind themselves to live together as one" (908), though it is noted that Dewey is "apt to deprecate sheer individuality, social or intellectual discontinuity . . . Dewey's feel is all for the interdependence of interest and occupation characteristic of the twentieth-century industrial economy . . ." (911-912). It is even admitted that "the separatism and autonomy of the person" as taught by William James "arouses Dewey's aversion" (912). And Kallen seems to stick with Dewey in reference to Jefferson as having known "that any one man seeking to vindicate his inherent and inalienable rights

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might, like Napoleon, do so at the cost of the equal rights of every other man . . ." (920).

Yet Kallen, while recognizing the importance of social solidarity and the role of art in fostering it, thinks that art's collective as well as individual "meaning and value do not depend on the motivations or inventions of the maker but on the uses of the user" (959). Then what becomes of communication? Though the appreciator is free to respond in his own fashion to art, is it an illusion that the artist can at all anticipate and control "the uses of the user?" If these uses are not somewhat continuous with the maker's motivations and inventions, how can art be, as it is for Dewey and apparently for Kallen, "the prime vehicle of the continuity of culture?" (914) Dewey may be wrong that, contrary to science and philosophy, "art neither predicts nor interprets but reveals only" (914, 960), if he does hold this, but how can art be said to predict or interpret if its consequences are not its own but the user's only? Kallen calls James mistaken "to limit consequences to scientific perception and deny them to esthetic" (960), but if Kallen is to interrupt Dewey's conception of a continuous process of production-enjoyment, so that what a maker made is not enjoyed but only what a user makes of it, James was not mistaken.

In Kallen's real point here he is in accord with both James and Dewey, that beauty is a relation and not to be identified with a term of the relation: whether the object, as in formal and configurational aesthetics; the mind, as in psychological aesthetics (empirical or metaphysical); or a supreme reality, as in metaphysical aesthetics. Beauty is rather to be found "where it in fact lives and works—in the esthetic experience" (948). Since this experience is relative to time and place, person and mood, cannot last and can never be recovered the same, there is no guarantee that it will arise upon inspection of a work of art, and consequently no certainty that a work will be considered art. Distinction between things supposed to be inherently aesthetic and objects deemed abjectly non-aesthetic is invidious and impossible to maintain. There is no telling what unpromising item may become the focus of an experience suffused with value to the point of beauty. But most likely to become the center of such experience is something of liberating, rhythmic and consummating use. It may be a situation rather than a thing, but must be completely satisfying if beauty is to supervene. It is a more common experience than aestheticians are wont to realize. Plain people enjoy it without having a name for it, "as readily in factories and office-buildings as in museums and concert halls . . . For the most part it comes by way of a sudden redirection of their actions, a new enchannelment of their interests, a fresh orchestration of their passions, all mounting swiftly to the brief flood, and then falling . . ." (949).

The problem is that faced by Dewey: how to establish the continuity of aesthetic with the rest of experience and yet maintain a distinction. Kallen suggests that "the working of the artist" is more likely to be aesthetic than contemplation of his works. "The feel of mastery which any cumulative process

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brings when means compenetrates to become the ends they are means to, seems to pervade and sustain all modes of workmanship, all domains where materials assimilate and reshape forms and forms work out, use up and reshape materials" (948). It may distinguish art to say that it involves the exercise of skill and technique in a particular medium, in a way to fuse means and ends. Then is there aesthetic experience which does not involve the working of the artist? Appreciation of nature, ecstasy over tin cans on a dump? It may be that here the enjoyment takes place as if occasioned by art and is indirectly the result of familiarity with art. At any rate a person interested in aesthetics must wish that Mr. Kallen could have given more space to the analysis of such questions with regard to Dewey's aesthetic, since it is made basic to this whole work.

Mr. Kallen does say that for Dewey it is an error not to "discriminate the 'esthetic' and the 'artistic' " (913), interpreting him to mean that while any experience may become aesthetic, in the sense of becoming fully satisfactory, an experience does not become artistic unless intelligence intervenes "in a material of the artist's creative imagination so operating that the qualities of the perceived result have as such 'controlled the question of production' " (913). The artistic then would be something over and above the aesthetic. Yet at least on pages 46 and 119 of *Art As Experience* Dewey deplores the notion of a gap between them. He wishes there were a word to include the meaning of both, for to him "aesthetic" and "artistic" represent phases of the same process, not separate but interacting. Dewey does not like the idea of superimposing art upon the antecedently aesthetic, nor does he like to think of the aesthetic as merely following upon art so that "perception and enjoyment of it have nothing in common with the creative act." It seems accordingly to involve departure from Dewey, or else a confusing acceptance of contradiction in his thought, when Mr. Kallen speaks of aesthetic experience as arising without benefit of art, and of production as adding "something to the aesthetic as such."

But, regardless of technical difficulties in Dewey's account of the artistic and aesthetic, his approach to art as "ordinary experience enhanced" is proved here to have tremendous power. The range and edge of this conception, as an instrument for interpreting the development of western civilization, called for an author at ease in every stage of it; could be fully exhibited only by one whose capacity for retrospect was caught up in appreciation of the present and zest for the future. And Mr. Kallen has shown the historic affinity of art and freedom not by presenting philosophies of art in succession but rather by setting "in the foreground those personages in the trajectories of history with whom events took a new turn or through whom they moved to a new consummation . . ." (xiv). Brief biographies of such personages are handled with great skill and are often fascinating. Even when the reader is more or less familiar with them it is exciting to see how freshly they appear as *dramatis personae* of this argument. Dante and Michelangelo would be sure to assume the important roles they do here. More striking is the figure cut by Rousseau "in a struggle to overrule his im-

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pulses by his principles;" no romantic, fathering the French Revolution and romanticism in his affirmation of the common rights of humanity. "Romanticism paralleled, in the arts, the industrial revolution in England, the political revolution in America and in France, at once an expression of them and a compensation for them. Its high point was reached in Germany, where . . . only philosophy and the arts could imagine the liberation which government and business were achieving in England and France and America" (200). Yet Jonathan Edwards, with categories "spontaneously aesthetic" and needing "only to replace the word *God* by the word *Ego*" to transform Calvinism into romanticism (215), is offered as a more genuine representative of it than Goethe who "remained self-centered and self-regarding . . ." "His legend is a function of the fact that he was more fortunately placed . . ." (200). He comes off badly in comparison with other German romantics. His unromantic concern for the safe and his effort to ignore the progressive currents of his time, showing most in his attitude toward Napoleon after the betrayal of the Revolution, are contrasted with Beethoven's life theme as "the joy of man set free" (253). Shelley shines forth as a great prophet of freedom and love. "In him came to fruition what in Goethe was rarely much more than seed" (260). Byron also stands for the vindication of liberty as the fulfilment of art (274). So does Victor Hugo. From Poe through Baudelaire seems to be launched "the whole drama of that which may be called characteristically modern in the mutations of the arts and their philosophies" (399).

There is a fully Freudian portrait of Ruskin, but a plea that the ground of value for him was happy human beings, although his imitation theory of art, his enthusiasm for copying Gothic, and aversion to machinery, were reactionary as compared with Fergusson's consistent foundation of beauty in use. Oscar Wilde is analyzed as "an immoral Carlyle, a cynical and anti-social Ruskin, a brutalized and sensual Pater, and a conscienceless Whistler" (555) who killed art for art's sake by perverting their ideas and those of Matthew Arnold into paradoxes. If not discredited by Wilde, however, art for art's sake would have been by the work of Darwin and Spencer on the biological determination of beauty. In the turn toward art-for-life Guyau is shown to be a more whole-hearted Yea-sayer than Nietzsche. For Guyau art, to be great, must be social. Yet espousal of this idea is not felt by Kallen to be incompatible with satisfaction in the emphasis of Tarde, Fouillée, Boutroux and Renouvier on Darwin's "spontaneous variation."

Thus biographical sketches are followed up and mixed in with summaries of theories, skilfully done but so compact as to be difficult reading when unfamiliar, and likely to seem over-simplified when they are familiar. Empathy is treated as if it were just a feeling of confluence and sameness between personal identity and an object of interest, so that Santayana can appear as an empathist in holding that beauty arises when the feel of a delightful activity is projected upon its occasion (636). This would not suggest that bodily phenomena and the whole life of the practical self are ruled out by the Mother Church of *Einfühlung* as represented by Lipps and Volkelt. Yet Kallen does say that for Lipps "mental

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life was irreducible," including of course aesthetic empathy, and surely would not deny that for Santayana nothing is more reducible than mind. His derivation of the glow of beauty from sex and social passion is the worst heresy for the high priests of empathy.

One of the two bare references to Henry James occurs in a parallel drawn between the vogue of this theory and the rise of the psychological novel (632). In another place his fictions are cited as examples of decadence, "of the spirit-without-direction-going-nowhere" (554). This blindness to a spirit whose *Prefaces* as well as novels have a direction and a going that are increasingly, if not a goal, a focus of creative and critical thought, is unfortunate. For him might have been saved some of the space lavished on mathematical mysticism and numerological philosophy of history that may be assumed to have spread over the pages denied to experimental aesthetics, said not to have had any value (624), and kept free of *Kunstwissenschaft*, "a mixture of technique and rationalization" which, it is granted, "for the doubts of the patron or buyer . . . provides a magnificent ceremonial of reassurance" (652).

Bosanquet gets noticed as justifying "the strictures of the *Kunstwissenschaftler* upon the esthetician" who studies philosophies of art rather than works of art. Yet his *Three Lectures on Aesthetic* might have been mentioned for admirable discussion of Croce's failure to appreciate how the artist's intuition is qualified by medium and technique. Croce is effectively presented as the man with "courage to follow through the logic of the expressionist position," but it is a slip to say that beauty has degrees for him (742). Croce's beauty is a full intuition or completely successful expression, and to fall the least bit short of that is to miss beauty; though, inconsistently, he does recognize degrees of ugliness.

Denman Waldo Ross figures for his collections which he considered not as trophies but "instruments in the illumination of life," which he gave to museums and employed in schools, to expand the conception of what "the best" had been. Drawn by the Far East, he is said to have awakened Occidental appreciation of Oriental form. Unprecedented realization of the art-and-life of the ancient Near East, through the work of James Henry Breasted, might have been cited in this connection. And more might have been said about current education in art and its significance for life, being carried on in museums and schools beyond the influence of Ross. Mr. Kallen has included, organized and interpreted so much that one feels he need not have omitted anything.

He digs down to the real dirt where life and art are planted and displays the latest growth, with a stirring sense of how it is still growing. One wonders where else could be found such a clear account of modern art movements, their origin, interrelation, endless innovation, and contribution to our time. "If the arts borrow from industry and the sciences, they give as much as they get, and the houses men live in, the clothes they wear, the furniture they use, the vehicles they travel in and the roads they travel over receive their ever greater harmonies of form and direction from the arts" (925). Anyone at a loss about surrealism

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can find it here—stemming from a psychoanalyzed Freud—naturalized and marvelously rationalized.

A nice point overlooked is that musical surrealism in *excelsis*, here called swing, the successor of rag-time and jazz, should properly still be called jazz. Mr. Kallen is right, so far as he has in mind popular dance music. But for *aficionados*, who consider it immature to dance to anything worth listening to, swing is the name for commercial playing which is excessively rehearsed, smooth and mechanical, venturing only to be cute. It lacks the spontaneity, the abstract pattern solid with invention, the stomach, the ontological fury of jazz. The relation between this living jazz and the jazz dated between rag-time and swing should be worked out. To a great extent the jazz now enjoyed is period stuff heard from records, but also revived or newly produced by men who do it when they have finished a stint of earning their living with swing, or when they perform in places where they can be appreciated as well as paid. Most of them are Negroes, sophisticated, mocking sentimental words when they sing them, transmuting the yearning and resentment of social misfits, often marihuana smokers, into nothing but music in whose abstract being they can live. Among those legendary for achieving and sharing this escape are Louis "Satchmo" Armstrong, Tommy Ladnier, and Bessie Smith. Benny Goodman is a white virtuoso of the clarinet who lives three lives: in formal professional music, in swing, and in jazz. That the audience for jazz is considerable is indicated by the stunt of the magazine *Poetry* in recently sponsoring "a jam session" to raise money. The comment in *The Chicago Sun* of July 25, 1943, was that followers of *le jazz hot* would not be surprised, since they had long held it to be poetry of the purest sort.

What is said about the medium and meaning of poetry might have been expanded to include the rich new criticism of John Crowe Ransom, R. P. Blackmur, Cleanth Brooks, Kenneth Burke, and others. In prose, or on the verge of it, Gertrude Stein is taken almost as seriously as Marcel Proust and James Joyce. Their colleagues and successors, such as Thomas Mann and André Gide, do not appear. Among writers philosophical rather than literary who appear only incidentally or not at all, though their influence is seminal upon attitudes toward life and art, are Whitehead and Mead. But no slip or omission can vitiate the achievement of these thousand pages in showing that "Art is Victory, Art is Freedom." Professor Kallens' book is really a culture-history—something rarely undertaken by an American. The massive wisdom and experience of living accumulated here, as well as erudition, cannot be seized by a reader who skips and runs. But it is a joy to find such a work inviting and sustaining in style, with eloquence equal to the scope and variety of subject.

University of Cincinnati

VAN METER AMES

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HALLIE FLANAGAN: *Dynamo: An Adventure In The College Theatre.*

Duell, Sloan and Pearce. 1943 176 pp. Illustrated. \$2.75

To Mrs. Flanagan, Director of the Vassar Experimental Theatre, art is no mere act of isolated aestheticism. Her theatre achieves social and moral functions through artistic disciplines; the end is not simply enjoyment, but enjoyment *plus* use.

Education diverts the tremendous, flooding energies of youth into channels of control and development transforming the potential into the actual. Mrs. Flanagan contends that the theatre is especially successful in fulfilling this function. In the college theatre emotion and skill fuse many energies to make a play; this is art, and, at the same time, education for living.

This is Mrs. Flanagan's thesis. To demonstrate it, she reviews the history of the Vassar Experimental Theatre, showing the forms and artistic techniques by which this dynamic institution expresses and disciplines its members. There are testimonials from the press, notes from the author's diary, descriptions of scene and research,—all combined in a staccato helter-skelter which serves to indicate why any theatre under Mrs. Flanagan's direction is certain to be a lively affair.

The Vassar Theatre was a significant theatre,—experimental in the best sense of the word. It did many things well, and even what it did badly seemed somehow *worth* doing. It wrestled with new forms, it presented the past in present terms, and boldly staged plays dealing with contemporary (and controversial) issues. A complete list of Vassar productions is printed in the back of the book, a distinguished record of amazing variety and excellence. Within the immediate sphere of dramatic practice and production, Vassar's contribution to the American theatre can scarcely be over-estimated.

Yet the question remains, whether a theatre-group really performs the high function here assigned to it. Perhaps at Vassar, the Experimental Theatre did serve as an intellectual stimulant, and did provide an emotional discipline to those who worked in it. (There is a final chapter, compiled by Claudia Hatch Stearns, full of statistics and testimony from graduates to prove this).

Certainly the practical translation of dreams into fact does occur in the theatre. Co-operation, use of skills and science, critical exercise of emotion and brain,—all of these things can be learned in the process of staging a play. But this does not often happen. Most college theatres are unlike Vassar's. Most are imitative, unoriginal, devoid of discipline and integrated effort; many confirm their people in more petty vices than social virtues.

Perhaps the theatre becomes a "dynamo" only under the direction of such rare persons as Hallie Flanagan. Nevertheless, the book is a plea for something sound and valuable. Enthusiasm may lead Mrs. Flanagan to overstate the case, but essentially her notions about the value of art to its practitioners and audience are excellent.

It is curious that the book should seem to lack some of that "artistic discipline" which its author so rightly admires. Perhaps the reason is that she has

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tried to use in print those "shock techniques", choruses and montages which her theatre uses so effectively on stage. The cumulative effect of this method is impressive in dramatic production, but it cannot be literally transposed to the printed page. It is more of a method than the casual reader might suspect; the book might be produced with a capable cast, but it does not read very well. Still, it is well worth reading.

New York City

—JOHN F. MATTHEWS

ELIEL SAARINEN: *The City. Its Growth. Its Decay. Its Future.* Reinhold Publishing Corporation. 1943 xvi + 380 pp. Illustrated. \$3.50.

Mr. Saarinen is an architect, distinguished in this country chiefly for his superb design which won the second prize in the Chicago Tribune Tower Competition in 1922. Probably his most notable work in the civic field has been in Helsingfors, where the railroad station and square, related to a civic center, have been executed according to his composition. In 1915 he published an extensive study embodying a plan for that city.

As one reads the present book, one is continually impressed by the fact that the author is primarily an architect and has unlimited faith in his profession as a chief agency for human welfare. He says, "Any investigation of town building matters, to be accurate and significant, must be essentially an investigation of architectural standards." Again and again throughout the book he emphasizes this idea.

With architecture having a mission of such paramount importance, it follows, in the author's mind, that one of the worst of all sins is the production of buildings which imitate the styles of earlier periods instead of expressing the spirit of their own day. He says that "the latter part of the nineteenth century was the slum-breeding period par excellence—because this particular time brought to the market all those incredible architectural fallacies which now cause the growth of countless slums." In fact, he attributes the decline of the modern city to "two causes—the one a lack of creative impetus" (this imitative tendency), "the other a lack of cultural ambitions", which resulted from the addition of large numbers of new residents who "brought into the towns new view-points and methods which were not in harmony with the previous and prevailing form-order in these towns" and which "laid on the growing towns their stamp of materialistic superficiality and indolence in civic affairs."

These quotations indicate the character and scope of much of his thinking. The most valuable part of his book is the last, wherein he urges the "organic

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decentralization" of cities by moving industries and their workers into relatively small satellite communities, separated by green-belts containing rapid transit lines as well as parks, space for which would be gained, in many cases, by clearance of slum areas. The work would have been improved if the author had devoted more space to specific details as to how this could be carried out and had given less elaboration to far-fetched analogies between cities and biological organisms or physical and chemical phenomena. It is to be hoped that readers will not be wearied by the lengthy theorizing and lay the book aside before they reach this section, which contains considerable food for thought.

Massachusetts School of Art

—THERON I. CAIN

GEORGE WILBUR MEYER: *Wordsworth's Formative Years*. The University of Michigan Press. 1943. 265 pp. \$3.50

In this volume the author examines the poetry and prose of Wordsworth's first twenty-eight years, interpreting his work in the light of the poet's contemporary correspondence, rather than in terms of the autobiographical report of *The Prelude*. The distinctiveness and accuracy of Mr. Meyer's conclusions derive from his basic assumption that the current record of a career is more reliable biography than a subsequent poetic reconstruction.

Mr. Meyer discovers in Wordsworth's writing prior to 1798 three general stages or themes, which he treats as emphases in a uniform development rather than as clearly distinct periods. Wordsworth's first poetic efforts in *An Evening Walk* and *Descriptive Sketches* celebrate a "cottage felicity" of domestic affection and rural beauty, the inspiration for which Mr. Meyer finds in the domestic infelicity of the poet's youth and in his desire for financial independence and a rural home with his sister. Travel in France during the French Revolution, personal acquaintance with Michel Beaupuy, and the prevention by corrupt English courts of the Wordsworths' collection of a just debt, induce Wordsworth's second phase, in which he endorses republican principles and advocates governmental reform. This stage is represented in a portion of *Descriptive Sketches*, reaching its climax in the *Letter to the Bishop of Llandaff*, and diminishing in emphasis in *Guilt and Sorrow*. Finally, Wordsworth reaches a kind of fusion of his naturalistic and democratic tendencies in the transition from *Guilt and Sorrow* to *The Borderers*. While retaining his interest in social reform, Wordsworth no longer imputes to government the major guilt for the personal tragedies of the poor; and transfers his stress from political reform as the proper means for social improvement to the perfecting of the individual through a finer sympathy with nature.

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The conspicuous product of Mr. Meyer's research is biography, and its value as poetic criticism depends upon the general value of a poet's biography in the appreciation of his poetry. Mr. Meyer's attention to Wordsworth's poems is steadily guided by hypotheses concerning the psychological forces and doctrinal proclivities operating at the time of composition. The service of the poems in Mr. Meyer's enterprise is apparently as indicative data and demonstrative evidence of the history and structure of Wordsworth's personality; for it is the nature of the poet rather than the poem that is the object of Mr. Meyer's dominating concern. The feeling of this reviewer upon finishing the book is that of a better acquaintance with Wordsworth the man, but a very slightly improved preparation to appreciate his poetry.

Washington, D. C.

—SIDNEY ZINK

CHARLES H. MORGAN II: *Corinth—The Byzantine Pottery*. Harvard University Press. 1942. Profusely illustrated.

Published for the American School of Classical Studies in Athens, the new volume *Corinth; The Byzantine Pottery* by Charles H. Morgan II adds an invaluable source book to the increasingly rich ceramic literature of the world.

With its *catalogue* compiled from the inventoried pieces at Corinth; its presentation of Byzantine potting thru the ages—"the scientific investigation of which is still in its infancy"—Mr. Morgan's exhaustive study renders well-nigh incredible his assertion that "archaeological enthusiasts of the 19th century were so completely absorbed in Greek and Roman periods that things Byzantine were actually consigned to the dump as mediaeval rubbish."

In his chapter on *The Development of Byzantine Pottery*, the author admits that "the origins are still uncertain, nor do the results of the excavations at Corinth throw further light on them;" and he reminds us that, with Persian influence unquestionably the strongest "Corinth, during the 11th and 12th centuries, not only maintained close trade relations with other parts of the Byzantine empire, but regularly imported fine pottery from a number of different Moslem sources."

Of particular interest are the descriptions of the actual potteries; for excavations in recent years have unearthed "at least four mediaeval potteries" in the heart of the ancient city.

The Plan of the Market Place of Corinth about 1100 A. D. shows the importance of "an industry not mentioned in literature"—(with characteristic neglect)—with one pottery adjoining the Church of St. Paul where, it has been surmised, "suitable souvenirs for pilgrims and useful objects for regular communicants" may

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have been manufactured—no doubt with something akin to the modern commercial spirit.

The remarkable similarity between present-day peasant potteries and those of the ancients have made possible an accurate reconstruction of these workshops; while the date of the abandonment of one kiln was obtained from its hoard of coins, none of which was dated after 1100.

Between 1075 and 1125 was the best period of ceramic industry in Corinth. Mr. Morgan, tracing its rise and fall tells us that during the early part of the 12th century this native industry cut heavily into the established monopoly of the important white wares; that after the invasion of Roger of Sicily home production was paralyzed, and, indeed, "it is possible that Roger of Sicily carried off the Corinthian potters during his sack of the city, thus leaving the remaining inhabitants no choice between patronizing home or foreign industry."

Under four main headings: *Plain-Glazed Wares*; *Painted Wares*; *Sgraffito Wares* (this group most widely known); and *Unglazed Wares*, Mr. Morgan has arranged chronologically and described with admirable clarity the many types of fabric and decoration that fall within these separate classifications.

This short review were incomplete, however, without a special word about the excellent illustrations: the water color studies by Piet de Jong, the originals of which are in the Mead Collection of Amherst College; the architectural drawings and profiles of the vases by Dr. Wulf Schaefer; the black and white copies of design drawn by Miss A. Elizabeth Williams; and the photographs by Hermann Wagner and Dr. Saul S. Weinberg, and by Mrs. Morgan.

Syracuse Museum of Fine Arts

—ANNA WETHERILL OLMSTEAD

WILLIAM A. McDONALD: *The Political Meeting Places of the Greeks.*

The John Hopkins Press. 1943 xix + 308 pp. Illustrated with 31 pictures and 19 plates. No. 34 in *The John Hopkins University Studies in Archeology.*

Man is a political animal, writes Aristotle. Yet modern scholarship dealing with Greek architectural practice has concentrated heavily on the Greek's temples and sacred precincts, on monuments erected for a dramatic or an athletic victory. To date, the abundant material on political buildings revealed by the steady work of the excavator in the Greek world, has been available only in isolated publications. *The Political Meeting Places of the Greeks* gathers together all of the information on the meeting places of the *Boule* and the *Ecclesia* in ancient Greece, on the basis of archaeological research coordinated with the pertinent epigraphical and

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literary evidence. The book fills a long felt need. The author has more than a theoretical knowledge of the field. He has taken part in the excavations at Olynthus and at Pylos; he has visited the sites of many of the buildings reported, and with the healthy skepticism that is the basis of all careful research, has rechecked measurements and made independent observations. He has conferred with many of the excavators of important sites,—e.g. Professor Thompson of the Agora excavations, Professor Rhomaïos of the Thermon project, etc. He has succeeded in getting the blessing of such an authority as Professor Blegen on the chapter on the Homeric period. The illustrations are really helpful and the nineteen plates exceptionally well executed and reproduced.

The book is organized on the chronological pattern. The chapter on the meeting places of the various federal leagues reads well against the contemporary background and stimulates one to rethink the experiences of those vigorous if turbulent, experiments towards a League of Nations. At the moment of writing, the suggestion is gaining attention that the peace be written in Athens this time, that Athens be the capitol of a new international world! One of the most helpful features of the study is the last chapter of comparisons and conclusions. In tabular form there are listed these facts about each of the places: the date, proportions, approximate dimensions, and seating arrangements of each of the buildings reported. Hence the salient characteristics of the meeting places of the *Boule* and the *Ecclesia* emerge; there is that same family resemblance which exists among State Capitols in the United States.

It would have been wiser if the chapter on *Crete in the Minoan Period* had been made introductory rather than a solid part of the main work. But the work is a masterly reference book, competently compiled and a real contribution to our knowledge about the senate chambers and assembly halls of the Greeks.

Hunter College

—VIOLA S. CHWOROWSKY

ARTHUR C. L. BROWNS *The Origin of the Grail Legend*. Harvard University Press. 1943 viii + 476 pp. \$5.00.

In *The Origin of the Grail Legend*, Professor Brown brings the weight of many years of patient research to bear in support of this theory that the origin of the Arthurian legend, and of the Grail legend in particular, lies in the mythology of the ancient Irish. Using as his point of departure the oldest French Arthurian tales that have survived, those of Chrétien de Troyes, he demonstrates the surprising extent to which ancient Irish journeys to fairyland seem to contain the germ of the marvelous episodes in Chrétien's romances. The enormous debt which

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civilization owes to early Irish missionaries and teachers is of course universally acknowledged, and Professor Brown would make the contribution even more imposing by attributing to the Irish the development, through Welsh or Breton intermediaries, of "a new school of storytelling in France in the twelfth century, which had a great vogue in all of western Europe, and which, in the form of the Arthurian legends, preserves its vitality even in our own day." As for the Grail itself, the theory is that the Old Irish word *criol*, meaning "bag," or "basket," or "box," was transmitted in mutated form by Breton or Welsh narrators to the Grail romance writers.

In support of his views Professor Brown leads the reader through a tangled forest of analysis, wherein he subjects first the Irish tales and then the marvelous episodes of Chrétien to thorough examination with a view to tracing and cataloguing all similarities to be detected. This detailed analysis, as Professor Brown himself concedes, is heavy going for those who are inexpert in Celtic lore, and judgment as to whether the evidence presented is sufficient to prove the main point must be rendered by specialists; but certainly the author establishes a strong presumption in favor of his views, and he wins respect by welcoming rigorous critical examination of his argument.

Though he calls attention also to resemblances of proper names, Professor Brown bases his conclusions chiefly upon resemblances of incident and character between the primitive Irish tales which he analyzes and the sophisticated romances of Chrétien. He is careful to assure us, however, that he does not ask for belief in any direct influence of Irish sources upon the French court author; he maintains only that the marvelous adventures sprang from Irish originals (no longer extant), whence they were borrowed by Welshmen and Bretons who served as intermediaries with the French romancers on whose foundational structure Chrétien's glittering edifice was reared. Meanwhile he disposes (perhaps too summarily) of various opposing theories—that Chrétien invented his marvels and "adorned them with a few Celtic names to give an exotic appeal;" that he drew upon Germanic or classical mythology, upon oriental folklore or Christian legend. The effect of Professor Brown's good-tempered argument and his cautious, painstaking method is to win confidence in the theory that Arthur's battles and the lovely legend of the Grail emerged in the dim past from wars between good and bad Celtic fairies.

Carnegie Institute of Technology

—AUSTIN WRIGHT.

IVOR WINTERS: *The Anatomy of Nonsense*. New Directions. 1943.
255 pp. \$3.00.

This is a group of essays on Henry Adams, Wallace Stevens, T. S. Eliot, and John Crowe Ransom, introduced by a chapter setting forth the author's general

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critical principles which he applies to the four subjects, and concluded by a consideration of certain further critical problems. The thread linking the four main chapters is an interpretation in terms of Mr. Winters's poetic theory, which develops certain sympathies among these four writers.

Mr. Winters gives this book the semblance of a theory of poetic criticism by his thesis that "the final act of judgment in both life and art . . . is a relationship between two elements, the national understanding and the feeling" (p. 20). Each of the writers treated is accused of an unnatural emphasis of "feeling" over reason, and to Henry Adams, considered in the first essay, is imputed a great share of the blame for the prevalence of this misconception among a large group of contemporary writers, which includes as the outstanding examples Stevens, Eliot, and Ransom. Starting from the theory of a general cosmological desintegration, Henry Adams discovered chaos as the essential characteristic of his times, and inferred that if the writer is to express the chaotic temper of his age, he must write chaotically. Somehow Winters makes Stevens, Eliot, and Ransom subscribe to this doctrine, in practice if not in theory. The explicit form in which the view appears in the later writers is that of an exaltation of "feeling" over "reason."

This very brief summary indicates the limitation of critical insight to be expected in a discussion based upon such general and stereotyped central terms. The virtue of the book is that in dealing with poetry it does not poetize, but builds its arguments upon principles recognized and referred to as basic. The major failure of the book is the neglect to develop these principles fully in the introductory section on "Preliminary Problems" and the uncritical and unorthodox use of such basic philosophic or psychological concepts as "reason," "feeling," "motivation," "moral," and "determinism." The terms are crucial because for Winters, "rational" and "moral" describe good poetry, whereas "emotionality" and "determinism" characterize bad poetry.

Washington, D. C.

—SIDNEY ZINK

OSCAR JAMES CAMPBELL: *Shakespeare's Satire*. Oxford University Press. 1943. xii + 227 pp.

No one maturely interested in Shakespeare, whether scholar or general reader, can afford to disregard Professor Campbell's latest work in Shakespearean interpretation. It is an impelling book. It invites major re-consideration and urges substantial revision and enlargement of the reading of Shakespeare in one specific direction—that of satire, heretofore discounted or minimized. It is contended: much of Shakespeare, in character and scene, and sometimes in entire play e.g.,

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Coriolanus), has been missed or misread for lack of knowledge of the poet's very considerable satirical impulse and intent. The Elizabethan play-audience in its various taste demanded satire. Shakespeare, following his fellow poets and dramatists, especially, Marston and Jonson, supplied it; sometimes as ingredients in the form of minor character or phase of character in otherwise unsatirical plays (*Mercutio* in *Romeo and Juliet* and *Hamlet* in *Hamlet*); sometimes as main intent, as in *Troilus and Cressida* and *Coriolanus*. Shakespeare was both incidental and systematic satirist.

In support of his thesis the author gathers widely from the practice of other Elizabethan poets and dramatists and from the social, political and intellectual records of the time much detailed evidence of interests which he finds satirically reflected in *Shakespeare*. The objects of Shakespeare's satire were familiar to his day: the affected courtier, the malcontent traveller, the pedantic grammarian and schoolmaster, the euphuist, the hurry-scurry romantic play, the simple life, and many other figures, foibles and attitudes.

Much of this evidence and much of the analytical application of it to the plays considered is reasonable and convincing. Much is not. Probably very few readers will go all the way with the author in his major re-interpretation. Many will hold out for the received views even in minor points. To trim *Coriolanus* down from his dark but genuine tragic height of too absolute nobility to a proper figure for mere scorn and derision will seem to many readers to require not merely re-interpretation, but also re-writing of the play. The interpretation of *Falstaff* as "a Puritan fallen from grace" may be innocent, but it does seem gratuitous. However, to remake *Benvolio*, the man of good will, as he shows himself in his every appearance, into "the *pugnacious Benvolio*" (*italics mine*), needs much more ground than that of the "satiric portrait" of the certainly mercurial *Mercutio*, quoted from the first scene of the third act of *Romeo and Juliet*.

In brief, we have here a book that at least in good half achieves that rare combination of being both original and sober. Its sane enlargement and deepening of understanding of many parts of the Shakespearean text—and its provocations, too—are more than worth its extravagances.

University of Oregon

—BERTRAM JESSUP

HOWARD BAKER: *Induction to Tragedy*. Louisiana State University Press. 1939. 247 pp. \$2.75.

Fifty years ago John W. Cunliffe, in concluding his dissertation on *The Influence of Seneca on Elizabethan Tragedy*, summarized his findings thus: ". . . that the influence of Seneca was paramount in the origin and development of

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Elizabethan tragedy has been proved by the testimony of contemporary critics, and by the still more convincing evidence of the tragedies themselves." Professor Cunliffe, following the lead of earlier scholars such as J. A. Symonds, gave classic expression to the theory of Senecan influence. As a result of his arguments and those of his many followers, it came to be generally believed that the plays of Seneca, translated into English early in Elizabeth's reign, were the most powerful single influence upon the technique and ideas of Elizabethan tragedy. The familiar five-act form of that tragedy, the frequent employment of the revenge motive and scenes of violence and horror, the use of a chorus, the repeated appearance of messengers and ghosts, the bombastic style, hundreds of individual "Senecan" passages—all were pointed to and accepted as evidence. In more recent years, however, there has been a growing tendency to attach less importance to the influence of Seneca in the development of English tragedy and more to that of native, medieval elements. Perhaps the most notable contribution to this school of thought is Willard Farnham's *The Medieval Heritage of Elizabethan Tragedy*. Now Howard Baker, in *Induction to Tragedy*, goes still further and asserts not only that Elizabethan tragedy grew largely out of technical and moral material inherited from the Middle Ages, but that Senecan influence, instead of being central, was actually of comparatively minor importance. It should be added, however, that though the anti-Senecan view is expressed time and again, it is not the sole theme of the books.

On the whole, Dr. Baker makes a convincing case against Seneca. He finds the origin of the five-act form in the conventions of classical comedy rather than Senecan tragedy; points to the presence of a chorus in certain early English plays; discovers ample evidence of a thirst for violence and murder in the mystery plays and in metrical tragedies such as *The Mirror for Magistrates*; reminds us of the repeated use of a messenger in the Towneley, Coventry, and York cycles and of the ghost in the metrical tragedies; discusses the popularity of the revenge motive in classical sources, metrical tragedies, and moral plays; and finds similar sources for Elizabethan rant and sensationalism and sententiousness. Having argued thus against the theory of Senecan origin of such structural elements, he proceeds to demonstrate that what he rightly calls the more significant structural principles in the great Elizabethan tragedy "developed fairly directly from the medieval metrical tragedy," and he concludes with a discussion of the ethical principles of pre-Shakespearean tragical literature, principles which he finds in embryonic form in the medieval system of values. "We have very good reason to believe," he summarizes, "that Seneca contributed rhetorical patches and practically nothing more tangible to the form of the English tragedy, certainly nothing worth mentioning to its philosophy."

Though Dr. Baker writes persuasively in support of his views, he may justly be accused of disposing too easily of contrary opinions. He is contemptuous, for example, of the parallel-passage argument as used by the Senecans ("What marvels such a sovereign method could be capable of!" he exclaims at one point),

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but he feels no compunction about employing it rather rashly for his own purposes. Thus, though he takes earlier scholars to task for assuming that similarities of thought and expression are in themselves proof of the authorship of two pieces by the same man or of the "influence" of one writer upon another, he leans gratefully upon lines in the *Induction to The Mirror for Magistrates* which suggests that Sackville borrowed from Gavin Douglas, upon a passage from *Titus Andronicus* which he compares with lines from *Venus and Adonis* to suggest Shakespearean authorship of the play, upon a passage in *Gorboduc* which he thinks has relationship to Sackville's *The Complaint of the Duke of Buckingham*, upon another passage which "seems to reproduce" a portrait in Sackville's *Induction*. Moreover, he is occasionally too hasty in assuming that arguments which he has presented establish the truth of his opinions. Thus in discussing the authorship of *Gorboduc* he argues (forcefully, it is true) that comparison of the play with other works of Norton and Sackville, together with a study of the political views of the two men, suggests that the last scene of the play is by Norton and the first scene by Sackville. He then calls his findings "a definite key" to the problem of authorship and throughout subsequent discussion seems to assume that the issue is settled. "However much one may be disinclined to carp," to quote Dr. Baker, such procedure is hardly justified. It may be asked, too, whether in his laudable and successful attack upon clearly top-heavy theories of Senecan influence, he does not go too far in minimizing that influence.

Something should be said in praise of the terse, spirited style in which *Induction to Tragedy* is written, and of the care which the author has taken with the organization of his materials. Particularly useful are the frequent summaries of what has just been presented and of the steps which are next to be taken. *Induction to Tragedy* is a lucid exposition of a complicated subject.

Carnegie Institute of Technology

—AUSTIN WRIGHT

WILLIAM DUNCAN STRONG, GORDON R. WILLEY AND JOHN M. CORBETT: *Archeological Studies in Peru* 1941-1942. Columbia Studies in Archeology and Ethnology, Vol. I, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4. Columbia University Press. 1943. viii + 224 pp. Abundantly illustrated with plates of sites and specimens, and additional figures reproducing drawings of sites, maps and specimens.

This volume, divided into four separate parts, deals with work done in Peru by the Institute of Andean Research under the auspices of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. The excavations carried on in this region

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were part of a large plan laid out by the Institute, comprehending "a series of stratigraphic excavations in certain key areas in Latin America," some of which have been previously reported and are already published for the Institute by various other study series and learned journals in the field, and are listed at the end of the present volume.

The general purpose of the series of excavations, was to supply more varied and widely distributed data than has been before available to American archeological studies. Though the richer centers and obviously important archeological sites in Latin American countries have long been well known and have been explored, bringing to light the examples of ceramics and other arts that are abundant in museums and collections of their countries of origin as well as in those of Europe and of the United States, many areas in which scattered and often undocumented finds had occurred, had undergone little or no serious scientific study. American archeology has needed greatly such a coordinated survey, based on stratigraphic excavations, exactly recorded not only to bring into proper focus the great centers in their relation to pre-Conquest cultures in the Western hemisphere as a whole, but also as factual guides in planning further excavations and research. The present studies are models of their type. The first, *Archeological Notes on the Central Coast*, by William Duncan Strong and Gordon R. Willey, reports on a general survey of the coast of Peru north from Lima to Pativilca, another south from Pachacamac, excavations near Puerto de Supe and in the shell mounds near Ancon.

The second, *A Ceramic Sequence at Pachacamac*, by William Duncan Strong and John M. Corbett, gives a brief account of this famous and important coastal site and especially of the Temple of the Sun, summarizes Max Uhle's excavations below the Temple of Pachacamac and the ceramic sequence reported by him as a result of his work there, and recounts the authors' own excavations below the Temple of the Sun, where two cuts and a number of test pits in carefully chosen locations were made to observe and record strata of ceramic and other remains. An immense amount of data on ceramic styles and types obtained as a result of this work is recorded, and has been illustrated by careful drawings and a summarization in detailed tables. A sequence of ceramic styles and periods at Pachacamac in correlation with periods of the Central Coast is suggested, based on the data obtained by the authors in their stratigraphic refuse heap excavations, and on Uhle's earlier report on burial stratification. The authors emphasize their conviction that this correlation is not complete and that much more data is necessary to round out the account of cultural development at Pachacamac. It is, however, certain that such an exact, minutely documented and clearly presented report as this, even on such relatively restricted work, is an invaluable contribution to the sum of knowledge on Pachacamac and on the coastal cultures in general.

The third report, *Excavations in the Chancay Valley*, by Gordon R. Willey, covers work done principally at Cerro de Trinidad, and, on a smaller scale, at Baños de Boza, both sites previously known, but here explored again systematically

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with stratigraphic cuts for additional data, and reconsideration of the Early Period in Chancay and correlation with cultural sequence of the central coast in general. A description of excavations of great interest including remains of structures and some burials, illustrated by careful drawings of strata examined and of pottery types and styles and of other artifacts discovered, the report includes tables of occurrence and percentage, and concludes with a summing up of the Early Period in the Chancay Valley and a comparison of Early Period Chancay cultures with other coastal cultures. Like the preceding report it is a valuable contribution in the amount of data gathered, described, and classified, and adds usefully to the fundamental information on which more general studies must be based.

The fourth report, also by Gordon R. Willey, is *A Supplement to the Pottery Sequence at Ancon*, based on the "description and chronological interpretation of a series of graves from the Ancon Necropolis." Like the other reports it is admirable for completeness and clarity of presentation.

All four reports are valuable additions to Peruvian archeological studies. They are indispensable to the specialist, and ultimately of importance to all interested in the history of the western hemisphere for their contribution to the reconstruction of the pre-Conquest past. Such volumes, because of their highly technical character, have a relatively limited public. The material they present is, however, basic, and extremely important in building a body of fact on which sound scholarship can grow.

Peru's pre-Conquest cultures are among the longest known, obviously richest and most widely explored of America, yet the field is limited for such surveys, followed by excavations, and reports such as these, in order to fill in detail with documented data, and to corroborate or refute the confusions of earlier and less meticulous studies. In other American regions of archeological interest the need for such work is even greater. The Institute of Andean Research has done well to undertake the task, and the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, in sponsoring and supporting projects of this scholarly type, has shown a regard for the long-range values of inter-American cultural understanding that goes far beyond the expediencies of the times, and builds soundly for the future.

San Francisco Museum of Art

—GRACE L. McCANN MORLEY

AUSTIN WARREN: *Richard Crashaw: A Study in Baroque Sensibility*. Louisiana State University Press. 1939, xii + 260 pp. Seven illustrations.

The stated primary aim of this study of the seventeenth-century English poet who beyond all others expressed the intense aesthetic religiosity of the Counter-

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reformation is to "translate the twentieth-century reader of Crashaw into the position of one who, three centuries ago, was informed upon the principal movements in English and Continental religion and art, and conversant with Latin, Italian, and English poetry."

The readers of Crashaw have always been few. To observe that their numbers will probably not be greatly increased by Professor Warren's study is no count against it. It is primarily a specialist's book for specialists. The wealth of data gathered on the post-reformation religious and art movements and on the inter-biographical relationships of Crashaw and his influencing contemporaries is so compressed in presentation that only an already instructed specialist in the field can profit largely from it.

In its main lines, the present interpretation of Crashaw is in agreement with those of other modern studies. The poet is presented as the superlative interpreter to the senses of "the world of man's inner life at its mystical intensity," of the world of "vision and rapture, tears and fire," rendered in "a rhetoric brilliant, expressive, and appropriate." The chief contribution of the study lies in its solid and detailed amplification and substantiation of the established interpretation. All data are carefully documented in a set of annotated notes invaluable as a guide to further reading.

There is much of interest in this work for scholars in several fields other than the strictly Crashavian. The concept of the "baroque," treated descriptively in a short middle chapter and applied in the study throughout, is common ground for the historian, the aesthetician, and the art critic, as well as for the general student of literature. And "symbolism," another concept of varied interest, well analyzed in a later section, gains considerable clarity in being competently applied to Crashaw's poetry.

For poetic theory and general aesthetics perhaps the most interesting aspect of the work is the position taken in the preface, and reiterated in chapters following, on the meaning of a poem. (And by implication, of any work of art.) Of the two extreme views that, on the one hand, the reader brings the meaning to the poem, and, on the other, "that the meaning of the poem is primarily the poet's," the author takes the latter. Hence the stated chief aim of the whole study: to translate the twentieth-century reader back into Crashaw's seventeenth. Of the intrinsic difficulties and probably always necessary incompleteness of such translation the author is shrewdly and subtly aware. Into the poet's meaning of a poem, he observes, goes all that the "man is at the *moment* when he writes a poem." (*Italics mine.*) And this all, it is wisely suggested, is extremely illusive. "Scholarship can but clumsily try to establish the date at which a poem was composed, and what, before and concurrently, was the movement of the poet's outer life of action and inner life of reaction." Yet, it is the author's conviction, scholarship alone can save in some responsible approximation the meaning of the poet from the infinite and chaotic regress entailed in the doctrine that there are as "many meanings as readers," or, ultimately, as many meanings as readings.

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His own present work is an impressive demonstration of how close scholarship strives to save the poet's meaning.

University of Oregon

—BERTRAM JESSUP

HERBERT ROSS BROWN: *The Sentimental Novel in America 1789-1860*.
Duke University Press. 1940. ix + 407 pp. \$3.00.

Here is indeed a rare book. The intelligent reader with no particular interest in the novel, sentimental or otherwise, will find it pleasurable. The student will feel that it leaves little more to be said. Both will be vastly entertained, at times positively chortling at its wit; this in no way means that Professor Brown is thinking of his audience first and of accuracy second, or that he does not arrive at serious critical judgments.

This discussion of what might be termed sub-literature begins with a survey of the American novel in the late eighteenth century, a novel which depended chiefly upon the materials bequeathed by Richardson and Sterne and avoided the artistic demands of Fielding's style. Heroines wrote letters until the instant the seducer entered the room, and "sigh-by-sigh, tear-by-tear accounts of the writer's last moments" were common. "An American novel," the author quotes an early writer as saying, "is such a moral, sentimental thing, that it is enough to give one the vapours to read one."

Professor Brown discerningly points out that in these novels the sensibility springing from Sterne is distinguished from Richardsonian sentimentality by the way in which conscience disappears and feeling becomes an end in itself. Although many critics pointed out the moral danger in sensibility, "the possession of sensibility became a requisite of emotional respectability."

The general interest in sensibility paved the way for Hawthorne's "d—d mob of scribbling women," who wrote stuffy, domestic tales in which women led lives of "creamy purity linked with a subservience grateful for every condescending notice." The sentimental heroine, "of an attractive pallor," brought with her delicacy of language and conduct, long suffering piety, and "a partiality for mortuary matters." Her babies were not babies, but cherubs, and were born between chapters. Indoors, the setting for her domestic rather than passionate love was the sanctified home, complete with framed marriage certificate; outdoors, it was likely to be a landscape "drenched in pale moonlight and painted in the ultra-romantic style." The novelists, says Professor Brown, observed one rule: Everything too much.

Coupled with feeling was the humanitarian impulse, which found good in

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everybody, including step-mothers. In the sentimental novel, with its shallow characters and sensational circumstances, humanitarians with a special cause to preach found a ready pulpit. The abolitionists found it especially convenient, for Southern settings had long been popular. The American Temperance Union in 1836 formally endorsed prose fiction as a weapon. It is interesting to note that, although there were no fictional answers to *Ten Nights in a Barroom*, fourteen sentimental pro-slavery novels, rejoicing in the Negro's happy condition, followed hard upon the publication of *Uncle Tom's Cabin*.

Besides novels of seduction, home, and slavery, there were the religious novels, in which skeptics generally saw the truth after some illness or danger, and people gathered round to hear the last words of Christians on deathbeds lighted by either the rising or the setting sun, whose rays gave promise of the life everlasting.

Professor Brown deserves great thanks for reading, "in ironic appreciation," through a mountain of novels that we wish to know about but scarcely to look at, and for his conclusions. He realizes that some of the novels "reveal the aspirations and hopes which . . . a generation of readers strove to achieve," but he condemns the sentimentalists. "Theirs was the captivating game of sporting decorously with indecency, of obscene thinking and straight-laced doing," of looking for material rewards for their piety. They failed to "enlighten the readers as to the real nature of their civilization." They avoided thought.

Carnegie Institute of Technology

—VINCENT FREIMARCK

BERTRAM MORRIS: *The Aesthetic Process*. Northwestern University Studies in the Humanities, No. 8. 1943. 189 pp. \$2.25.

"The point of view taken in this work is that in order to talk about beauty intelligently, one must understand the process by which it comes into being, and its place in human experience" (p. 1). Stressing process Professor Morris works away from the notion of beauty as atomic and immanent, simply there to be inspected and stated, as in hedonism. He holds that what seems to be immanent "actually engenders some kind of process, the successful culmination of which issues into the aesthetic experience" (p. 12). "The difference is between data which mean, and processes meaningfully lived through" (p. 15). It is true that aesthetic experience involves contemplation of something there, for its own sake, but contemplation is selective and there is dependence upon active impulses, drives being realized. What superficially looked at is a product, in full appreciation is a process.

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This process is essentially the same in creation and appreciation, making feeling "determinate through the molding of an object" (p. 62). Since the object is public its perceptual fullness constitutes communication, and art is "definitely a social enterprise." As such it is not luxury to be put off until social problems are solved but an important instrument in establishing social ideals. What is a more powerful argument against slums than good architecture? The artist being especially sensitive to the human situation, and able to make vague feeling explicit, is a reconstructive force. Since the main difficulty in the way of a more democratic order is lack of sympathy and understanding, nothing is more needed than the technique of communication which is art. This is argued persuasively, and the books as a whole relates art to the dynamic features of our time.

Consequently esoteric art presents a difficulty. The author is obliged to admit the existence of art which strikes him as a luxury, an otiose curiosity, though it may as an experiment have the germs of something significant. *Finnegans Wake* is mentioned as an example of this merely "interesting art" alleged to touch no real interests and evidently felt not to achieve genuine communication. But, if lacking in serious bearing upon life and unsuccessful as communication, it must not be a purposive process of motion embodied in perceptual imagination. Yet Joyce's last work is not denied to be such a process. A paragraph is hardly enough to devote to art which does and does not fit the author's conception. To dismiss this kind of thing as having "little popular appeal" and as "strange to a virile culture" scarcely seems aesthetically fair. In the same breath he says that it "formally satisfies the strictures of art-principles" and that "it seems to be more a social fact than a manifestation of art" (p. 182). This condemnation is not in keeping with his narrow assertion that "There is only one true judge of taste, and he is the artist" (p. 63), though perhaps consonant with his liberal assertion that the only way of determining what are aesthetically significant objects in nature or art is the test of satisfied imagination in one's own immediate experience (p. 129). The liberal alternative is weakened here by the author's confession of reluctance to name specific works in illustration of his disapproval (Footnote, p. 182).

Another puzzling point is the idea that there are degrees of expressiveness though not of beauty (p. 166). The analysis of the relation between natural and artistic beauty is acute, and there is good discussion of criticism. Art is instructively compared with science; the extent to which both rely upon hypothesis is indicated. Some passages suggest that the author is in transition from art-for-art's-sake to art-for-life's-sake (pp. 44, 168-169). But he goes clear over in the end: "Art is more than the fine arts. It is the creative process wherever and whenever it may occur."

University of Cincinnati

—VAN METER AMES

BOOK REVIEWS

EDWARD M. MAISEL: *Charles T. Griffes*. Alfred A. Knopf. 1943. xviii + 347 pp. \$3.50

A biography of Charles Tomlinson Griffes should offer much of interest to the student of American music. Griffes was born in Elmira, New York, and, although the four main years of his musical education were spent in Berlin where he studied with Jedliczka, Rüfer, Loewengard, and later, Galston, Klatte, and Humperdinck, the productive years of his life were spent in and around New York City.

Griffes made a modest living as instructor of music in a boys' school in Tarrytown, New York, supplementing his income slightly with royalties from his published compositions, private lessons, and other occasional items. With all his teaching, composing, and promotional activities, Griffes led a strenuous existence which was doubtless a contributing factor to his early death. He died in 1920, in his thirty-sixth year "of empyema, abscesses of the lungs, resultant upon influenza."

In Berlin Griffes acquired a solid knowledge of his craft and his early songs show a decided German influence. However, his subsequent works reveal the catholicity of his musical taste and reflect, without being imitative, his broad interest in the music of such men as Debussy, Ravel, Schoenberg, Stravinsky, and Busoni, as well as his interest in Oriental music and the music of the American Indian. Although he is best known for his art songs, his piano pieces—notably "The White Peacock"—and his orchestral composition, "The Pleasure Dome of Kubla Kahn," his biographer regards his piano *Sonata* as his most important work, characterizing it as "the first major utterance in American music."

Apart from his account of the trials and tribulations of the young composer trying to get his works before the American musical public and his chapter devoted to the interpretative analysis of the *Sonata*, Maisel seems to be largely interested in stressing two themes: Griffes's homosexuality and the obduracy of American music publishers. In neither of these points is he successful or convincing although his treatment of them add a gossipy, if not slightly morbid, interest to the narrative. In view of the difficulties surrounding the problem of the relation between artistic and sex experience it would seem that the study of the problem had best be left to specialists in the field. Certainly even a very slight acquaintance with the subject makes one skeptical of Maisel's assertion that American music affords no more forceful illustration of the thesis that the two manifestations are but different forms of one and the same yearning and delight. With regard to the author's second theme it is most regrettable that the author should see fit to descend to the level of personal attack and defamation even of those who have been notably most interested in the encouragement of American composers. Certainly the author's arguments seem specious in view of his own conclusions that the composer was not overlooked and that he was well appreciated in his time.

If the reader can make sufficient allowance for the distractions produced by

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the author's peculiar bias with respect to the foregoing topics, he will find much of interest in Maisel's account of the life and works of the man who was, in the minds of many who knew him and his work, "the most promising of American composers."

The author states that a definitive bibliography of Griffé's works will not be possible for some time, but it would have been helpful if he had included a list even though provisional. An appendix lists the recordings of Griffé's music, although unfortunately the publishers report that the *Sonata*, which the author regards as the most important composition, is out of stock at the present time. However, the scores of the *Sonata* and of most of the other works are available.

University of North Carolina

—GLEN HAYDON

KENNETH FREDERICK PERRY: *An Experiment with a Diversified Art Program*. Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York City. 1943. ix + 163 pp. \$1.85.

This book, practical and stimulating, is an excellent statement of many of the problems in art education today. It will prove invaluable to administrators and art teachers in both public and private schools, to directors of community and hospital workshops and to prospective teachers and their instructors and advisors.

This study, conducted at the Colorado State College of Education at Greeley, continued for seven summers from 1934 to 1940, inclusive. Suggestions for the improvement of teaching art in public schools as well as other related data were obtained from interviews with public school administrators. These interviews, totalling 234, each ranged from thirty minutes to one hour and a half. In addition to these responses, opinions on objectives in art of art teachers, industrial art teachers and students were considered.

In connection with the study, most revealing is the analysis of the comparative results of experimental work done for five summers in the laboratory school by students in grades one to twelve inclusive. In this workshop over fifty types of work were offered in both fine and industrial arts. Everything, from oil painting to metal spinning was available. Not only is this work discussed, but in addition there is a detailed list of supplies and tools, with prices, needed for the workshop.

Outcomes of the study and their implications for teacher education provide much food for thought. Finally, there is a small but well selected bibliography in this comparatively new field of education.

Northwestern University

—CLARA MACGOWAN

BOOK REVIEWS

WILLIAM IRVING BARTLETT: *Jones Very: Emerson's "Brave Saint."*
Duke University Press. 1942. xv + 237 pp. Illustrated. \$3.00.

When, in 1880, Jones Very died at the age of sixty-seven, there passed a poet who believed his works to be divinely inspired and who, unlike Emerson and the Transcendentalists in connection with whom he is chiefly remembered, seemed to enjoy a continuing experience with God rather than merely ideas about God. Not only his poems, but his ordinary physical movements were, he believed, results of his "obedience to the Spirit."

Very's insistence on the surrender of the personal will and his conviction that the Holy Ghost spoke through him lend a curious interest even to many of his scores of inconsequential or bad poems and, more importantly, are responsible for a handful of the best poems in American literature, poems of religious excitation which have been favorably compared with those of George Herbert. But in spite of its merits, Very's work is not well known. This is understandable, for he never wrote a poem of wide popular appeal; Hawthorne referred to him as "a poet whose voice is scarcely heard among us by reason of its depth."

Mr. Bartlett wants Very to be heard. His biography is the most ambitious of the attempts made in recent years to re-establish, or perhaps one should say to establish, the reputation of Jones Very as an important, if minor, American poet. Valuing him highly as the author of some excellent religious poems and as "the unique spiritual interpreter of nature in American poetry," Mr. Bartlett presents his subject as something more than a minor member of the Transcendental Club and the occasional object of Emerson's concern in the *Journals*.

The material to which Mr. Bartlett has had access is comparatively limited. The poet apparently never kept a journal, and most of his important manuscripts and letters from the New England great have been thoughtlessly destroyed. Unfortunately, the authorities of the McLean Asylum refused to allow inspection of the records, which might have proved most helpful in settling the question of Very's insanity. The full story of Jones Very, consequently, is not told, and Gamaliel Bradford's speculative essay still seems more penetrating than Bartlett's book, Mr. Bartlett is not as stimulating a critic as Yvor Winters, either. Curiously, although he has read Winters, he fails to dispute the latter's rather convincing argument that Very was not a transcendentalist at all, but a Puritan, a dogmatic Christian. Had he done so, we might understand more clearly why Mr. Bartlett considers Very "superbly transcendental."

On the more positive side is Mr. Bartlett's ingenious identification of Very in Emerson's essay *Friendship* and in passages in the *Journals*, and his study of the relations of the two men and their influence on each other. The book is very well documented; the author quotes a good deal of the poetry and provides valuable appendices of hitherto unpublished or otherwise unavailable poems.

Carnegie Institute of Technology

—VINCENT FREIMARCK

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THE HERITAGE OF SYMBOLISM. By C. M. Bowra. Macmillan & Co.
\$3.75.

Mr. Bowra begins his book with an excellent analysis of the Symbolist movement in 19th Century French poetry, which he terms a "mystical form of Aestheticism" arising from the conflict between science and traditional values. Following this introduction are five essays dealing with poets whose writing was influenced by Symbolist doctrines. Valéry, Rilke, George, Blok and Yeats are discussed in turn, and the work of each is explored and critically evaluated. The volume concludes with a general survey of the contributions, virtues and faults of post-Symbolist poetry.

There is a certain tendency in Mr. Bowra's method to oversimplify causal factors, but he justifies this by explaining that he is "not writing biography." He is concerned to judge his poet's lives and opinions only as they relate to the production of poetry; which leads one to conclude that although he does not underestimate the significance of "meaning" in poetry, he feels that the validity of "meaning-contents" is not among the criteria which may properly be applied to verse. However, when an understanding of a poet's work (George's, for example) depends so much upon an understanding of his personal life and philosophical position, one might wish that a criticism of the poetry would include a more discriminating criticism of the life and thought.

On the whole, however, Mr. Bowra's judgments are eminently fair and well-founded. His book is a valuable guide to, and apology for, the post-Symbolist movement, especially since it is the first work in English to treat the subject as a whole.

It might be noted that there are many quotations from the poems discussed. The French is permitted to stand without translation, the Russian is translated without the original, while Rilke and George are presented both in German and in English. The translations from the German sometimes suffer from attempts to reproduce the rhyme-scheme at the expense of the meaning.

RUFUS WILMOT GRISWOLD: *Poe's Literary Executor*. By Joy Bayless.
Vanderbilt University Press. \$3.50.

In histories of American literature, Griswold is dismissed as a man of little talent and less honor, to be remembered chiefly for a defamatory memoir of Poe,

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whose works he edited. Without whitewashing Griswold, Joy Bayless gives us the other side of the story. She shows us a more sincere man, who tried to judge Poe objectively while suffering unwarranted ridicule from the poet, whose ridicule "often followed an appeal for pecuniary aid." But her main purpose is to give a full account of the important activities of a shrewd editor in an age when great literary names were being made.

Griswold was at various times editor of various papers and journals, protégé of Horace Greeley, successor to Poe as editor of *Graham's Magazine*, which gave him his contacts with all the major writers, and compiler of collections of poetry (the best known being *The Female Poets of America*). He was, too, according to Miss Bayless, a first-rate social historian by reason of his study of the social life of Washington's administration, *The Republican Court*. In New York, from 1847 until his death in 1857, he was something of the figure he desired to be among the literati, many of whom sought his favor.

All of Griswold's activity, his colorful private life (which included three marriages), and his relations with Poe and the jealous women who knew both men, Miss Bayless presents most clearly. Hundreds of important notes, neatly collected in a thirty-five page section, indicate the thoroughness of her work, which is an excellent addition to the history of American literature.

THE AMERICAN WAY OF POETRY. By Henry W. Wells. Columbia University Press. \$2.75.

This volume is a critical discussion of sixteen American poets, selected "not so much by an aesthetic criterion as by the relevance of the poet to an analysis of the American spirit," and interpreted as representatives of the American tradition rather than as poets of the English literature. The critical principle applied is suggested in the Introduction: "a poem is viewed according to its artfulness in expressing the scenes, emotions, and ideas which it treats rather than in terms of the abstraction of its form." Accordingly, Mr. Wells' poetic criticism is limited largely to summary statement of the poem's content. The thesis linking the chapters on the several poets is an interpretation of this poetic content in terms of the relation of the poet to his environment. In each poet, from Phillip Freneau to Merrill Moore, is discovered an expression of the American temper or an advocacy of peculiarly American ideas and ideals. Mr. Wells' treatment of the American environment as a natural influence upon its poets and as a deliberate subject matter in their poems, is decidedly more convincing than his illustration of how these writers uniformly adhere to the "American Way." It is perhaps to the author's credit that he does not effectively force into a single, clearly defined category, subjects so diverse as Dickinson, Poe, Melville, Frost. But it gives rather a hollow ring to his thesis that, in an undefined way, these sixteen poets express an American soul which somehow embraces "democracy," "material-

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ism and mechanism," "transcendentalism," "Southern aristocracy and hedonism," "New England Puritanism." The reader begins to suspect that the 'soul of American democracy' is rather a democracy of highly individual souls.

AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE AND THE HUMANITIES. By Francis Shoemaker.
Columbia University Press.

This book is one of a series of studies by the Co-operative Research Group in the Humanities at Teachers College, Columbia University, and its purpose is to present a survey of certain modern ideas of aesthetic experience which appear to be running in some measure through courses in World Literature and Humanities which have been introduced widely in our colleges and universities during the past fifteen years. By modern ideas of aesthetic experience is meant anthropological and psychological, and Dr. Shoemaker is concerned with the main features of these broader interpretations and the modifications they have brought about in the traditional aesthetic approach to literature.

The book opens with a summary of the ideas of aesthetic experience from philosophy, modern psychology and anthropology that underlie Modern World Literature and Humanities courses, after which these ideas are traced in the writings of ten research and outstanding spokesmen, both groups and individuals, for various phases of the humanities. After a study of specific courses offered in forty-seven colleges and universities in the light of the preceding survey, the author presents a formulation of recent aesthetic ideas as they operate in these courses.

FUNDAMENTALS OF PERSPECTIVE. By Theodore de Postels. Reinhold Publishing Corp. \$2.50.

This is a series of plates which could be posted on a classroom bulletin board to illustrate a course of lectures on elementary architectural perspective. The diagrams are clearly executed, with many of the lines numbered and supplied with arrows to show the order and direction in which they should be drawn, and some of them in different colors to indicate their various purposes. By these means the author hopes that the illustrations will be self-explanatory, and accordingly has furnished very little text. Perhaps some unusually intelligent and persevering beginners will be able to puzzle out the procedure unaided, but it seems likely that to the average young student the book will be principally of value as an accompaniment to oral instruction. The more experienced draftsman may find helpful the protractor and table of angles which have been included. The subject-matter is confined to the parallel and angular linear perspective of extremely simple forms, done mainly by the method of direct projection from the plan.

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IRISH POETRY. By Russell K. Alspach. University of Pennsylvania Press.
\$1.75.

This book is a survey of Irish poetry from the English invasion in 1167 to the rebellion of 1798, "Irish poetry" being defined as "poetry in the English language written by an Irishman or Anglo-Irishman and inspired by Ireland or its people." Since this definition excludes as "Irish" such authors as Goldsmith, Sheridan, and Swift, Mr. Alspach finds extremely few poems of intrinsic merit, and his survey is therefore entirely historical. In Part I he considers the struggle for dominance in Ireland of the Gaelic and English languages, the origins of the meagre verse extant, and the dialects appearing in this verse. Part II, which occupies about two-thirds of the book and for which the preceding section is largely preliminary, traces the discovery and translation of the Gaelic myths. The general thesis seems to be that the recording of these myths, later to serve as subject-matter for the modern Irish poets, is Ireland's major contribution to poetry during this period. The book is careful, well documented, and clearly written.

PIONEER TO THE PAST: *The Story of James Henry Breasted*. By Charles Breasted. Scribner's. \$3.50.

This book is fascinating. It combines sheer physical adventure with intellectual stamina and daring, the romance of buried treasure with that of research, the charm of a diary with that of psychological novel's revelation of human relationships, humanistic study with natural science, science with art, art with life, and the far past of culture with the frontier of the future. Of specific art-interest is the account of uncovering the earliest known forerunners of Byzantine painting and of opening King Tutenkhamon's tomb. Though there is no doubt of the superb craftsmanship of the things found, there could be no better illustration of Professor Kallen's point that what transforms relics into priceless collections of fine art is "the suffusion of their immediacy by a context of historical meanings presently valuable for the intensification and liberation of personal consciousness."

OUR MARCHING CIVILIZATION, By Warren D. Allen. Stanford University Press.

The story of the musical march worked into the fabric of contemporary social history. The book consists of two parts entitled *Marching as to War* and *Marching after War*, and six chapters headed *A Brief History of the March*, *Marching America*, *The March of Hypocrisy*, *The Two-Way March*, *Musical and Social Organization*, *The Symphonic Principle* and *the Principle of Federation*. There is a selected bibliography, an appendix of notes and illustrations for Chapter I, and an index. The author uses numerous forced analogies to fit music into the social scene.

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PAGES DE JOURNAL (1929-1939). By André Gide. Gallimard

This volume, which would be unavailable now if not reprinted in Canada, bears on the red wrapper: "Why is André Gide so much discussed?" The answer is that he represents at once the aesthetic culmination of French culture and the belief that too much attachment to the past might prevent the future. His publication on this side of the water is significant in view of what he says here of the old-world fear that the advance of science and technology, associated with America, would bring mass production and standardization. He asks why America should stop with that. "Thanks to her, humanity begins to glimpse new problems, to evolve under a new sky. A sky without stars? No; but in which we have not yet learned to discover the stars."

MEDIEVAL AMERICAN ART: *A Survey In Two Volumes*. By Pal Kelemen. Macmillan. \$22.50.

This exciting work, of which the second volume consists of nearly a thousand expert photographs, gives a full presentation of pre-Columbian art in America. There are chapters on architecture, sculpture, pottery, weaving, metal-work, and other arts. The cultural setting of each geographical area is indicated. Style and technique are noted in detail, with reference to the illustrations. Aesthetic evaluations are ventured and the author's familiarity with the art of the Eastern Hemisphere enables him to make comparisons. But, aside from being an impressive scientific achievement, this book will be a delight to any lover of art and admirer of man's creativity. The contents certainly "demand attention for their beauty and power irrespective of dates and styles."

MARK TWAIN: *Man and Legend*. By DeLancey Ferguson. Bobbs-Merrill Company.

The publishers of this book remark justly that it is "a solid and absorbing biography of the man whom all Americans regard with pride and laughing affection, the river pilot who proved the most natively American of all our writers." Professor Ferguson has given us in this book the most balanced, convincing, and refreshing of all biographies of Mark Twain up to date. Mark Twain comes out of his pages the man we know in his books—the hardy, robust humorist and pessimist of a highly sensitive and honest nature.

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THOMAS WOLFE, A BIBLIOGRAPHY. By George R. Preston, Jr. Charles S. Boesen, 270 Park Ave., New York. \$4.00.

This handsome little volume, published by a dealer, is intended for the collector, to show him there are many Wolfe items he might not know about, including student pieces of the novelist "obviously having no relation to his eventual career." An excellent photograph of Wolfe is reproduced and a page of his manuscript. It is curious to see titles of his translated into German, Norwegian, Swedish and Czech. A student (for whom the bibliography is secondarily prepared) or any admirer of Wolfe's writing will be glad to learn what books contain criticism of him, and to see excerpts from periodical articles on him, after wandering through pages of mysteries no doubt pleasant to the collector, such as short rule, french rule, rules in blind, recto and verso, wrappers and endpapers, trimmed and rough-trimmed edges.

CREATIVE ART CRAFTS. By Pedro deLemos. Davis Press, Worcester, Mass. \$3.75.

Here is a handy manual with many illustrations—several in full color—by the editor of *School Arts*. It contains diagrams showing how to put into practice hundreds of projects for 'teen age students in paper craft, toy craft, and relief craft. The illustrative method of presenting the projects adds usefulness to what should prove to be an invaluable source of ideas for teachers in this field.

TWENTIETH CENTURY PHILOSOPHY. Edited by Dagobert D. Runes. Philosophical Library. \$5.00.

In 22 essays dealing with the various fields of philosophy and the leading philosophical schools, this volume affords a cross-section of contemporary philosophical thinking. It should prove a valuable source book for those interested in the philosophical ideas of our times.

THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MUSIC AND MUSICIANS. By Winthrop Parkhurst and L. J. de Bekker. World Publishing Co.

A lot of information is packed into this handy reference book intended for the lay library. What little information is given for each entry seems to be accurate in most instances, although we were disturbed to learn from one entry that the Pittsburgh Symphony Orchestra is no longer in existence. Page Dr. Fritz Reiner!

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HOW PRINTS LOOK: *Photographs With a Commentary.* By W. M. Ivins, Jr. The Metropolitan Museum of Art. \$5.00.

Mr. Ivins has given us in this excellent photographic study a much needed book. Lack of popular interest in prints can be successfully treated only by guidance in understanding and training in perception such as is to be found in *How Prints Look*. The layman who has found prints tedious and somewhat mystifying will find in this well illustrated account of woodcuts, engravings, intaglio processes, etc. an encouraging and enlightening introduction to one of the really intimate realms of art. In fact, anyone who wishes to know how to look at prints should study *How Prints Look*.

MODERN NEGRO ART. By James A. Porter. Dryden Press. \$3.25.

Walter Pach, in his Introduction to this volume, speaks of it as "testimony to the fact that the Negro does not stand apart in the civilization of the United States, but has an inherent share in it." In an objective and scholarly fashion the author unfolds a story of art in America, which though certainly not to our credit on every score suggests that, allowed to develop as fully as his white brother, the Negro can and will add ever more to the artistic genius of the United States. The book contains 85 half-tones as well as an extended bibliography. To those who think that the Negro's contribution to art in this country is limited to the spiritual this book will be a revelation; to the better informed it will be a lasting document.

ANCIENT GREECE IN MODERN AMERICA. By John Robertson MacArthur. Caxton Press, Caldwell, Idaho. \$6.00.

With a wealth of well-chosen illustrations from all realms of art, past and present, the author has developed a survey of Greek civilization showing the effects of that culture upon later times up to the present. Particularly well done are the 140-odd pages on Greek mythology and the rather complete index, the latter making the book very useful as a source of quick information on Greek antiquity. *Ancient Greece in Modern America* is a substantial contribution to popular classical education.

THE MUSIC LOVER'S HANDBOOK. Edited by Elie Siegmeister. William Morrow and Company. \$4.00.

Presenting "150 separate contributions written by 52 outstanding musical figures" this anthology is as large a collection of satisfying and informative reading as we have seen in one volume for some time. All points of view are represented

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and the subjects range from boogie woogie to George Gershwin, from autobiography by Benny Goodman to Igor Stravinsky's description of how he wrote *Petroushka* and *Le Sacre du printemps*. There are many hours of good reading in *The Music Lover's Handbook*.

THE THEATRE BOOK OF THE YEAR, 1942-1943. By George Jean Nathan. Alfred Knopf. \$3.00.

The first in a proposed series, this volume presents the judgment of one of our best drama critics on the year's stage offerings. This is not a mere collection of reviews but a series of carefully reworked critical essays, the whole constituting a seasoned appraisal of the year's stage events. It is to be hoped that the publisher will see fit to continue the series in the future after such an auspicious start.

THE PHILHARMONIC-SYMPHONY SOCIETY OF NEW YORK: *Its First 100 Years*. By John Erskine. Macmillan. \$2.50.

American musicologists will welcome this worthy addition to the history of music and musical taste in the United States. A summary is given of the beginning of the Society including data not valuable to Henry E. Krehbiel and James C. Hunecker who in the 50th and 75th anniversaries wrote accounts covering the first three quarters of the Society's development. Included are the programs of subscription concerts from 1917-1942.

THE LITERATURE OF ENGLAND, A.D. 500-1942. By William J. Entwistle and Eric Gillett. Longmans. \$2.40.

A compactly written book, this survey does not depart from the traditional approach but nevertheless manages to move along easily. Footnotes are used extensively for all dates and biographical details and for titles of books listed to extend the reading indicated in the text. Other devices employed in the table of contents and an index make the book a handy reference volume.

A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN DRAMA. By Arthur Hobson Quinn. Crofts. 2 v. \$10.00.

This is a new revised edition of the standard work on American drama. Minor changes to advantage have been made throughout volume I wherein also the bibliography and play list have been completely revised—the latter having added to it 450 more plays. The bibliography and play list of volume II have also been improved and brought up to date.

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PROBLEMS OF THE SCULPTOR. By Bruno Adriani. Nierendorf Gallery.
New York.

This is a provocative book for the aesthete and psychologist of art as well as the sculptor. The author deals with the problems of creative imagination as it struggles through the theory-practice process of sculpture. The book consists of four parts: Basic Ideas, The Process of the Work, The Relief, The Sculpture in the Round. The author develops admittedly classical opinions that seem as carefully chiseled as the sculptured marble of which he speaks; an effect which is heightened by the bold typography employed in the book. He speaks as from on high with a frequency which might in some instances, at least, defeat his ambition, which is to induce his readers "to concentrate more ardently upon the creative work of the artist"—in this case the sculptor. But this authoritarianism is a minor matter in a book which will be read not once, but several times by those whose good fortune it will be to become acquainted with it.

SHELTERING TREE. By Hubert H. Hoeltje. Duke University Press.
\$3.50.

This is *A Story of the Friendship of Ralph Waldo Emerson and Amos Bronson Alcott* sympathetically and very well told. The author's point of view is "internal and emotional rather than external and intellectually aloof" and his method is to employ wherever possible "the very language of the characters . . . —their voluminous diaries (as well as other primary sources) providing ample material from which to draw." This combination of viewpoint and method yields an intimate warm account which is free from pious sentimentalities and hollow-ringing hero worship. *Sheltering Tree* is to be recommended to all students of Emerson and to those who are interested in "the roots of American culture."

A SHORT VIEW OF ELIZABETHAN DRAMA. By Thomas Marc Parrott
and Robert Hamilton Ball. Scribner's. \$1.80.

The authors trace the development of Elizabethan drama from its medieval sources, re-create for the reader the physical stage of the times, and give personality sketches of some of the chief Elizabethan dramatists—Shakespeare excluded. Although no attempt is made at completeness—either in number of dramatists treated or in presentation of contemporary social condition—the book is a very readable introduction to one of the most interesting fields in drama.

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MUSICAL INTERLUDES IN BOSTON, 1795-1830. By H. Earle Johnson
Columbia University Press. Columbia University Studies in Music-
ology, No. 5. \$4.00.

Well documented but written in a very readable style, this study of musical life in Boston at the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th centuries is a worthy addition to the growing body of scholarly research in Americana. Musical historians will find this a necessary addition to their literature; it will obviously be a source of enjoyment to New Englanders.

A SHORT HISTORY OF MUSIC. By Donald N. Ferguson. Crofts. \$4.50.

This probably the best brief treatment of its subject in English today. The author of the well received *History of Musical Thought* has re-worked his materials to produce a well-balanced volume which is reduced some 20 per cent from the size of the original. Technical matters are so handled as to make the book valuable to the general reader as well as to the music student.

MUSIC FOR ALL OF US. By Leopold Stokowski. Simon and Schuster.
\$2.50.

Written by America's most publicized conductor, this is a book for laymen who would know more about the music they hear at concerts, movie theatres, on phonograph records, and over the radio. It is simply written and ranges lightly over many fields. Mr. Stokowski has written for his public; those music critics who would like to continue the controversy over his theories of performance will find no substantial grist for their mills here. *Music For All of Us* is definitely superior to most books on popular music education.

THE NEW SUN. By Taro Yashimo. Henry Holt. \$2.75.

The artist is more often than not the best judge of his times. This personal account of a young Japanese easel painter and cartoonist who, as a liberal and democrat, experienced suppression and jail under the Japanese secret police is a stark tale of what the present overlords of Japan stand for. The simple sentences and caricatures on these pages carry more power than reams of some of the journalism that has come out of the war. Here is the hope out of which a new Japan must be born.

Books Received

- What We Hear in Music* by Anne Shaw Faulkner. 11th rev. ed. RCA Manufacturing Co., Inc.
- Three Christian Transcendentalists: James Marsh, Caleb Sprague Henry, Frederick Henry Hedge* by Ronald Vale Wells. Columbia University Press. \$2.75.
- Arturo Toscanini: A Photobiography* by Susanne Winternitz Hoeller. Island Press.
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