

THE JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM

AESTHETIC IDEAS AS THE BASIS OF MUSICAL STYLES

HUGO LEICHTENTRITT

Music is not able to use the aspects of nature, the visible, material world directly as the starting point of its creative impulses. In this respect the other arts, painting, sculpture, poetry, and drama differ considerably from music, as they spring from the model of the outward world, which they depict, describe or interpret. Lacking this immediate model, music must get its problems not from concrete reality, but from the world of the spirit, from ideas, sentiments, and emotions. It is the aim of this essay to point out at least a few of these fundamental ideas from which were derived what we call the various styles in the history of music. Some of these basic ideas are mathematical in their nature; others are architectural, philosophical, psychological, poetic and dramatic. In spite of their different origin all these ideas, as they are applied to art, become aesthetic ideas.

All music is dominated by the idea of "up" and "down," high and low, or rising and falling, though strictly speaking there is actually no up and down at all in the world of sound. What we call higher or lower sounds are in reality only different frequencies of vibrations, air waves not discernable in space at all, but only in time. Yet the attributes of space are universally applied to an art existing in time only, for practical reasons, symbolically, and for the sake of an easily explainable theory of music. When in ancient Greek music the twenty-four letters of the alphabet were made to serve likewise as the names for the twenty-four tones of the Greek system of vocal music, the idea of up and down was not yet connected with this nomenclature. But already in that early stage it was found necessary to take refuge in the idea of high and low when the twenty-four tones were subdivided into groups of four tones each. For these tetrachords the names of "hypaton" (low), meson (middle), hyperbolaion (high) were invented as practical marks of distinction.

A still greater importance was attached to these terms of space when the *eight-tone* groups, the *octaves* were introduced into the theory of music, and when to them the name of "*Scala*" was given. Here is added to the rather vague, indefinite concept of high and low the idea of a strictly regulated progress from one tone to its neighbor. Also in this "*scala*," (staircase) on which the tones promenade up and down according to a certain norm, distinctions are made. In a certain scale each tone may be equally distant from its next neighbor, in another scale this equality of distance or interval is replaced by two or even three kinds of intervals. Thus the "*chromatic*" scale is composed only of half

tones, twelve within an octave. The "diatonic," so-called major scale introduces two different kinds of intervals, half tones and whole tones, following each other in a certain norm: 2 whole tones plus 1 half tone; 3 whole tones plus 1 half tone. In what we call a "minor scale" an interval of one and one-half tones is added to the whole and half tones.

A great variety of scales, based on whole and half tones, is manifest in the literature of music; indeed the study of scale formation has become a favorite topic of modern musical research. The importance of scales for the art of music is easily understood as soon as one has comprehended the fact that scales are an essential aesthetic factor. On the structure of the various scales the character, expressive value and style of melody depend largely. The scale indeed is comparable to the *alphabet* in language; scale is a reduced alphabet. The severe, ecclesiastic, sublime expression of Gregorian chant is conditioned by its diatonic church modes, a rejuvenation of the ancient Greek modes. Major and minor scales have determined the melodic invention of more recent music of a song and dance type, in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The emotional ecstasy of romantic melody is a consequence of the chromatic scale mixed with major and minor. The chromatic half tone, used more profusely, is a realistic echo of wailing, sighs, of question, melancholy soliloquy, anxiety and agitation as well as sensuous delight. The works of Chopin, Schumann, Liszt, and Wagner offer abundant examples. The pentatonic scale with its holes and jumps, its five tones, instead of the seven of the major scale, is largely responsible for the strange charm, the far-away mood of the music of the distant East, China, Siam, India, and Java as well as the northern tinge of ancient Scotch, Irish, Finnish, and Russian melodies.

From Oriental music Debussy has taken over his six-tone scale, with six whole tones to the octave, which in this case is not any more the eighth tone of the scale, but the seventh tone. The absence of half tones in this scale and the upsetting of the octave balance give these hexatonic melodies their exotic tinge. Arabic and other Asiatic music makes use also of quarter and three-quarter tones, which in the European system and notation have no place at all. They cannot be reproduced on any of the European instruments, but only by phonographic records, nor can they be indicated by our system of notation.

The possibilities of scale formation are far from exhausted. The great musician Ferruccio Busoni has found out by experimental trial that in the tempered tuning of our modern piano more than one hundred and ten different scales are possible between the tone C and its higher or lower octave. Most of these scales do not even possess a name and have hardly ever been exploited in actual melodies. Nicolas Slonimsky has been very inventive in tracking down novel scale formations in a highly stimulating volume of scale studies. This means that plenty of new types of melody are still possible.

Another idea of vital importance for music is the conception of *motion*. With motion the idea of rhythm is inseparably linked. The involuntary bodily functions of the heart beat, pulse, breathing and circulation of the blood stream are one source of rhythm, as employed in music. Another source is derived from the voluntary activities of the animal body: walking, marching, dancing,

jumping, creeping, limping, crouching, and running, etc. Music is very apt in translating into its own terms these numerous types of motion, so that they may be recognized. Though motion is perceptible both in space and in time, yet motion in music generally occurs only in time. Motion in space cannot be perceived by the ear, but only by the eye. Only when music is linked with drama, in an opera scene or ballet, motion in time and in space are combined. Motion is indeed an important attribute of style, different styles being dominated and characterized by certain well defined types of motion and rhythm. Thus the ecclesiastic Ambrosian hymn of mediaeval times, the model for the later German Protestant chorale and the English hymn tune, has a solemn rhythm, due to its broad, slowly moving tones, its absence of sharp, cutting accents. These hymn melodies are adapted to the measured steps in a solemn religious procession. With stronger accents on the down beats and a little faster motion this procession rhythm is changed to a march rhythm, of which music has quite a variety, from the funeral march to the festive, military and quick-step march. With the march one generally couples the dance. In both march- and dance-music the ideas of *repetition* and "*symmetry*" are added to motion. A certain rhythmic pattern characterizes every type of dance, and this characteristic pattern is repeated as often as required, sometimes repeated in the literal sense, more frequently, however, repeated not on the identical notes, but in what are called transpositions, either higher or lower, or repeated with slight variants.

The principle of repetition is one of many rudimentary, constructive ideas latent in the musical mind and applied by instinct already in early stages of human civilization. Such primitive ideas, however, become aesthetic factors only when applied not instinctively any more, but with consciousness and knowledge of facts. Repetition in music, very much like repetition in architecture, is a means of obtaining the effects of continuity, coherence, order and symmetry. It is, therefore, evidently a primary factor of importance for artistic work. Of all constructive ideas repetition is the simplest and most elementary one, because the easiest thing to do for the mind with any idea just uttered is to repeat it. Thus any characteristic pattern of motion, a "*motive*" in musical terminology, may be repeated exactly, once, twice or many times.


This is what primitive people in remote parts of the globe have done and are still doing in their music as a first step towards a more involved art. But also in highly developed art music this kind of constant repetition of a motive is still practiced at present. Russian music delights in these so-called "*ostinato*" phrases, now, however, changed from a primitive, monotonous device into a much more ingenious procedure, as a "*basso ostinato*," a constantly repeated phrase in the bass, accompanied by ever changing counter melodies, "*counter-points*" in the higher parts. The "*Crucifixus*" in Bach's B minor Mass shows the aesthetic possibilities of basso ostinato in the most exalted manner. In a lyric, idyllic mood Chopin's "*Berceuse*" is a masterpiece of basso ostinato. Other much-admired examples occur at the close of the first movement of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony and at the very beginning of Wagner's "*Die Walküre*."

When a short ostinato phrase of one or two measures is expanded into a

coherent theme of eight or more measures, and when this bass theme is constantly repeated, with ever new counterpoints in the upper parts, the form of the *passacaglia* or *Chaconne* is obtained. Some of the greatest and most ingenious music in existence is moulded into this form. Bach in his organ *passacaglia* and his *chaconne* for violin solo and Brahms in the finale of his Fourth Symphony represent the culmination accessible to this structural plan.

Only a few of the inexhaustible manifestations of motion in music can be briefly touched in a short essay. The most up-to-date variant of that idea has been the introduction of the machine-like "motoric" motion, with speed and force combined. The master craftsman of this new "motoric" music is Stravinsky. He applied it most convincingly in his ballet "Petrouschka," with its world of mechanical dolls, assuming human passions. In this exceptional case the soulless, but brilliant motoric music was legitimate. It has later been abused for burlesque, grotesque, and satirical effects. It represents a modernized variant of the older, more amiable, humorous and gay "moto perpetuo," of which we find outstanding samples in a few Haydn quartet finales, in the finale of Weber's C major piano sonata, in Paganini's brilliant Moto Perpetuo, in Schumann's Toccata and in Rimsky-Korsakoff's "Flight of the Bumble-Bee."

Another ingenious and advanced variant of the repetition principle is *canon*, one of the oldest and most important forms of musical structure. In canon the same tune is exactly repeated by several voices. The different voices participating do not, however, sing the same tune simultaneously, nor does one of them wait until its predecessor has finished the tune, but the repetition of the tune is started by the second voice somewhere midway, just a little after the first voice has started the tune, but before it has finished it. A simple diagram may illustrate the different types of repetition.



This overlapping of melodic lines raises a number of new problems of a harmonic, contrapuntal, rhythmical nature with which the masters of the art had to grapple for at least three centuries, roughly from 1300 to 1600. Only one of these novel problems can be treated briefly here.

In canon the principle of *strict imitation* of one voice or instrument by another had been developed. Netherlandish masters devised besides canon a method of *free imitation*, relaxing the rigid constraint of canon and thus opening a road to new possibilities. Not any more a whole tune, but only a short phrase of one or two measures is stated by one voice and reiterated exactly or approximately by several other voices in succession. The result is not a canon, but a dialogue based on the identical thematic matter, thus ensuring logical coherence. Fugue also is based on the principle of free imitation, as well as the form of the motet. Every sonata, quartet, and symphony makes constant use of this principle. In its most concentrated type it is found in the fugue, which may be

compared to an animated conversation of three or four people on a certain theme. The conversation is not dominated by one leading speaker. All participants discuss the main theme in dialogue, none of them being superior or inferior in the contents of his part, and all of them are intent on speaking logically, remaining always close to the theme, not allowing themselves to be far diverted from it. How to produce the effect of *logical coherence* in music is indeed one of the most amazing discoveries. Imagine the material of sound, nothing but air waves, and associate with this fleeting, unsubstantial motion of the air the idea of logical coherence! It seems absurd at first sight, and for thousands of years the problem was never even approached, just on account of this apparent absurdity. Yet the invention of counterpoint, the conception of constructive music, of architecture and form pointed out the right direction for the solution of this gigantic, unheard-of problem.

The principle of *symmetry* was taken over into music from the metres, verses and rhymes of poetry. The metrical schemes of Greek and Latin poetry have dominated music for centuries, especially in the form of song.

With symmetry must be coupled its opposite, *asymmetry*. The asymmetric principle is derived from the prose recitation in a language, with its irregular accents and subdivisions. This musical *recitative* in its oldest form is a descendant both of Greek drama and the Hebrew psalmody. It became the main pattern of the declamatory Gregorian chant of the mediaeval Christian church, as the so-called *accentus*, whereas the Ambrosian Hymns preserved the metrical symmetry of ancient poetry, in the style of *concentus*.

In the later development of the art of music, in the polyphonic, contrapuntal styles, still later in the instrumental sonata and symphonic styles the ideas of symmetry and asymmetry were mixed in an endless variety of combinations. The aim of this mixture was to impart to the music both the stability of symmetry and the interesting animation of asymmetry. Too much symmetry becomes tiresome; an excess of asymmetry endangers the coherence, tends towards a vague formlessness. But in mixing asymmetric phrases at well chosen points into a symmetrical melodic line new, interesting effects were gained. The details of this mixture, never yet adequately formulated and described, would fill a sizable chapter in a book on the constructive laws of music, the evolution of musical forms. The simplest samples of such a mixture may be found in plain, songlike melodies, where the prevalent four-bar phrase is occasionally replaced by a three-bar or five-bar phrase, with the result of diminution or enlargement of a certain phrase.

A great complication of this method occurs in the "free rhythms" of Netherlandish polyphonic music in the sixteenth century where the different voices in a motet or partsong often sing in different time simultaneously, thus mixing $4/4$ with $3/4$ or $6/8$ time, in a manner upsetting the common measure. This mingling of irregular, unexpected accents and different time results in a fascinating interplay of accents, lost in modern music with its regular bar-lines. It is comparable to the play of the small waves on the surface of a river, or to the fascinating motion of clouds in the sky, producing always changing, unpredictable patterns.

A discovery of immense artistic value and incalculable consequences was made in the Gothic Age of France and later during the sixteenth century in Italy when the dimensions of space were for the first time utilized for music. So far in mediaeval times music had been in one dimension only, one-part music, without accompaniment. Gregorian chant, purely linear, melodic, without any addition of chords, or harmony is indeed the ideal realization of the first one of the three dimensions of space: length, width or breadth, depth.

These three dimensions in musical terms would be: (1) Linear extension or melodic line = length or height. (2) Harmonic or contrapuntal filling out, *accompaniment* = breadth. (3) Dynamic and color effect = depth. Melody and rhythm are the only attributes of the linear element of length, horizontal extension, as we find it in Gregorian chant and the troubadours' songs of the thirteenth century. The combination of Gregorian chant and troubadours' song in the French motet of 1200, a startling novelty in spite of its harmonic crudeness, added to the dimension of length for the first time the element of breadth. Vertical extension, or breadth is provided by the opposition of one or two counter-melodies to the Gregorian theme in the tenor. If Gregorian chant is comparable to the groundplan of a one room bungalow, as an architect sketches it on a sheet of paper, the French motet of *ars antique* may be likened to the façade of a structure of three widely different stories, one placed on top of the other. This combination of two dimensions of space was so fundamentally novel and striking in effect that it must be considered one of the great basic discoveries of lasting value to all later music.

The Gothic idea of a complex musical structure distinguishes European from antique and oriental music, and in its enormous consequences it is certainly the most fruitful idea ever applied to the art of music. In its most primitive aspect the combination of length and width is perceived when one plays with both hands on the keyboard of a piano or an organ: the right hand represents the horizontal element of linear extension, length, the left hand, accompanying adds the element of breadth. Quite appropriately even the aspect of the two staves in piano music suggests length and breadth.

For three centuries music was contented with these two dimensions, exploited in the most refined and ingenious manner by the Netherlandish masters in their linear, contrapuntal art, which one may liken to a "white and black" design.

A principle peculiar to music and hardly applicable in any other art is that of *inversion*. It is used in three meanings in music. Reading a melody backward, from its close to its start, in so-called *retrograde* or *cancer*, crab *motion*, is a device frequently applied in contrapuntal music. Bach's fugues and canons are full of such inversions, but also in recent music it is not rare, and the leader of radically modern music, Arnold Schönberg, makes the "crab" inversion one of the pillars of his sensational "twelve-tones system." This kind of inversion is comparable to reading in a book a sentence backward. But whereas in a language this inversion generally makes no sense, it may in music make good sense, under certain conditions, by evolving from a melody an entirely new and different melody, without changing a single note, merely by retracing the melody's path from the positive, plus direction, geometrically speaking, in the opposite, nega-

tive, minus direction. In architecture and in the ornamental arts this kind of inversion is also used, but in a much more restricted sense, when a certain geometrical or ornamental pattern is turned about its axis from right to left, as a pendant to the original pattern,—the ordinary mirror inversion. Here the effect of symmetry in opposite directions is intended; still the pattern remains essentially the same, whereas in music a crab inversion changes the effect and the expression of the original melody fundamentally.

Besides this inversion from right to left, the inversion from high to low, top to bottom, is also a much-used device in music. The so-called double and triple, invertible counterpoints depend on this idea. This kind of inversion is not applicable in a tune without accompaniment. It presupposes two voices that may be exchanged, a soprano becoming a bass, and vice versa, like turning a sleeve inside out. If three voices are written according to the rules of triple counterpoint the same three parts can be exchanged with each other in six different combinations, every time with a different effect, according to the formula:

$$\begin{array}{l} a-b-c, b-a-c, c-a-b \\ a-c-b, b-c-a, c-b-a. \end{array}$$

Four parts written in quadruple counterpoint: a-b-c-d, even admit of twenty-four exchangeable combinations. The five-part triple fugue in C sharp minor in the first part of Bach's Well Tempered Clavichord shows the artistic possibilities of three themes in ever changing inversions and combinations in the most eminent degree.

The third species of inversion answers every step or leap upward in the theme by a corresponding leap downward in the inversion, and vice versa. The piece thus inverted becomes an entirely new piece, with altogether different harmonies. What Bach achieves with inversions of all three kinds in the "Art of Fugue" and in the *Musikalisches Opfer* is unique in its kind and has no parallel anywhere in the world, either in nature or in any other art. Some of these mirror fugues, canonic fugues in inversion and augmentation and diminution of the theme are technical virtuoso feats never surpassed in the ease and elegance with which the greatest structural complications are treated. To find a parallel to some of these pieces one would have to imagine a whole house turned upside down, with the roof below and the basement on top, yet not falling apart, but preserving its coherence and orderly arrangement, its logic of structure. The reflection of a house in a pond would be a parallel. But while this reflection is only an illusion of the eye, the musical inversion has concrete reality.

From the spectacular progress of Renaissance painting in Italy, music profited immensely in the sixteenth century by adopting the principle of color, and adding to the dimensions of length or height and width also *depth* and background, perspective, so to speak. Plastic effect, projecting of contours in space, light and shade, color impressions, dynamic and agogic effects, forte, piano, sforzato accents, crescendo and diminuendo, ritardando, accelerando, etc. are new attainments, invented by the masters of the Italian madrigal. The incitement for these innovations came from the picturesque Italian poetry, the canzone

and sonetti of Petrarch, Tasso and their schools, that served as texts for the madrigal writers. This was the age of tone painting. Composers exercised their imagination and inventive power to suggest to the listener the pictures evoked by the poetry. The new, colorful chromatic harmony, introduced by Luca Marenzio, Claudio Monteverdi, Gesualdo Principe di Venose, the three greatest madrigalists, was of great assistance in these coloristic efforts, but also the cut of the melodic line, rhythm, dynamic accents and polyphonic structure were powerful means for tone-painting.

In an aesthetic sense the problem of *expression* has become a central problem. Art acquires value in proportion to what it expresses. Expression is the opposite of impression. To express something one first has to be impressed, and in order to impress somebody else one has to express something. Impression is made possible by the senses of seeing, hearing, and feeling. Thus we get in a general way realistic, objective impressions from the physical, outer world, the experiences of daily life. The problem of art is to translate these sensual impressions into expressions fit to impress others in their turn.

The elaborate history of musical expression has not yet been written. Yet the headlines of the chapters in such a book may be briefly sketched out here. The importance of emotional expression was stressed in Greek antiquity by Plato when he defined the expressive character of the various modes and scales, the sensuous, dissolute, Asiatic Phrygian mode, as opposed to the more constrained, manly, native Dorian mode. Perhaps the oldest more detailed description of the expressive power of music is given by St. Augustine in his commentary on the Twenty-second Psalm. In enthusiastic and inspired words he describes the effect of the jubilant strains in the brilliant coloraturas traditional for this psalm in the Jewish temple service: "One who is jubilant does not utter words but sounds of joy without words." This "jubilus" was taken over into Gregorian chant, together with its opposite, the wailing "tractus," expressive of sorrow by coloraturas of different character. In both cases we are concerned with coloraturas; i.e., more or less extended chains of tones sung on one syllable, a vowel. The precise expression of the words in their meaning was something of less importance to mediaeval music. The declamatory psalmody sufficed for centuries. Only around 1500 Netherlandish music began to tackle the problem of the words. In the meantime the newly discovered Gothic art of counterpoint, polyphony, was fascinated with expressing the entirely new ideas of construction in terms of space dimensions, as above explained. Attention was called to the words of the text in a new sense when the humanistic tendencies of the Renaissance, the more profound study of Greek and Latin literature made the masters of music also conscious of the rhetoric and expressive power of the words in antique poetry. Josquin de Près is credited with the idea of the so-called *wortgezeugte*, word-engendered motives; i.e., thematic phrases that take their rhythm, accent, tempo and mood from the dominating words of a motet, translating these rhetoric features into musical terms faithfully and thus multiplying their expressive value by the recurrence of the same motives in the dialogue of the voices.

All the new art styles with their different demands on expression, are also reflected in music. The Romanesque ideal dominates Gregorian chant, the Gothic mind builds up its elaborate polyphonic structures, the Renaissance mentality adds the rhetoric element and a little later, in the Italian madrigal, the concepts of tone-painting, of color, light and shade in the sound quality, plus illustrative effects. The Baroque taste adds pomp and grandeur, in polychoral structures, of which we find the most striking examples in Heinrich Schütz' *Concerti ecclesiastici*, in Handel's oratorios and Bach's Passion music. A few only of the numerous attributes of Baroque style in music can be hinted at in this rapid review. They have been described at greater length in a chapter of the author's book, *Music, History and Ideas*. The new Baroque interest in sumptuous, resplendent colors, in *clair-obscur*, the fascinating effects of light and shade has been transferred to music in the amazing, chromatic harmony of Monteverdi around 1600, which found its parallel only in the romantic music of Chopin, Liszt and Wagner. The severity of the Gregorian modes, the orderly structure of the major and minor tonalities are suggestive of a linear art of drawing clear outlines, whereas the new Baroque chromaticism suggests color, by deliberately obscuring the purity of the linear design. Monteverdi can be coupled with Rembrandt.

When in the middle of the eighteenth century rationalism began to invade the European mentality, we see the reflex of this new philosophy also in music in a new analysis of expression, manifest in the new doctrine of thematic invention in the symphonies of the Mannheim School and of Philipp Emanuel Bach, the direct predecessors of Haydn and Mozart. Here the various "affetti" are mixed as in a bottle, as ingredients of melody rapidly changing its emotional expression within a very few measures.

In a similar manner one might continue to point out the influence of dominating aesthetic ideas in Gluck, Beethoven, the great romanticists of the nineteenth century, in Wagner, Brahms, Debussy and Stravinsky. But to do this would by far exceed the limits set to a magazine article and must be left to a later occasion. Enough, however, it is hoped, has been said here to show to what an extent the growth and change of the art of music depend on aesthetic ideas born in the sphere of the intellect and transferred in a hardly explainable creative process to the sphere of imagination, the real soil of art. Yet this soil is in constant need of fertilizers and of ploughing over the ground, and the aesthetic ideas, though apparently dry, act as fertilizers with often amazing effect.

IN DEFENSE OF "ABSTRACT" ART¹

L. MOHOLY-NAGY

Because he is not informed about the historic sequence of the artist's efforts, the layman is often unable to find the main direction, the "sense" in the art-isms of his contemporaries. There may be too many names: impressionism, pointillism, neoimpressionism, fauvism, expressionism, cubism, futurism, suprematism, neoplasticism, dadaism, surrealism, constructivism, nonobjectivism. But in analyzing the paintings of these various groups one soon finds a common denominator, the supremacy of color over "story"; the directness of perceptual, sensorial values against the illusionistic rendering of nature; the emphasis on visual fundamentals to express a particular concept. Contemporary art generally tends more toward the direct and sensuous than the literary conceptual values. It emphasizes more the general, the universal than the special. It is based more upon biological than symbolic function.

It is a favorite saying that an artist has to start from nature, that no painting or sculpture exists which hadn't been stimulated by direct visual experience. Such statements are often quoted to disparage the efforts of the younger generation. "There is no abstract art. You must always start with something. Afterwards you can remove all traces of reality."—Picasso.

It is time to make a counter-suggestion, and show that such statements are erroneous because it is only the relationship between visual elements, and not the subject matter, which produces visual structure with an intrinsic meaning.

Like the semanticist, who strives for logical cleanliness, a clearing away of loosely trailing connotative associations in the verbal sphere, the abstract artist seeks to disengage the visual fundamentals from the welter of traditional symbolism and inherited illusionistic expectations. We should exult in this puritanic task and not merely be frightened or stumble into a possible richness which the old connotations may yet yield. We must leave the arts with a clean surface that only permanent and vital meaning, native to the age yet to come, may adhere.

The intrinsic meaning of an abstract painting, as a peculiar form of visual articulation, lies mainly in the integration of the visual elements, in its *freedom from the imitation* of nature and the philosophy connected with it. In the past, nature—observance and contemplation of it—has been a mighty stimulus because of its balanced, organic performance. But the naive idea of identity taken over from late Greek culture led only to a servile imitation. The first powerful lever of liberation was concomitantly developed with the empirical technic of scientific research, that is, the "laboratory aspect" of science where the conditions of observation can be produced and varied at will. Impressionism and cubism brought a re-evaluation of nature in terms of visual research still

¹ This article is a chapter from the book *Vision in Motion*, to be published by Paul Theobald, Chicago.

intermingled with naturalistic elements. The art of the postcubist period derived its first abstraction from nature, but later it freed itself from that departure and articulated the basic means of visual impact—shape, size, position, direction, point, line, plane, color, rhythm—and built with them a completely new structure of vision. This was their attempt to grasp emotionally the problems of space-time. One function of abstract art was and is the experimental demonstration of the forceful possibility of such an approach and to extend it also to the problems of the inner vision and the inner vision in motion.

This fundamental concept and concern of the abstract painter does not seem to be involved in the details of "social reality." Consequently, abstract art is often interpreted by the social revolutionaries as the art of the escapists. But the artist's duty is not to be always in opposition. He sometimes can better concentrate his forces on the central problem of visually constituting this world *in statu nascendi* and only treat the shortcomings of society as transitory facts on the periphery of his efforts. In a deeper sense, the interpretation of space-time with light and color is a truly revolutionary act.

Color and light are the prime movers of abstract, nonobjective painting; the basis of a research which serves with its pure structural values, not only as a measuring rod for a new aesthetics, but in their symbolic values for a desirable new social order. On another lever, abstract painting can be understood as an arrested, frozen phase of a kinetic light display leading back to the original emotional, sensuous meaning of color.

In the renaissance, the function of color was auxiliary to the perfect illusion of objects in space. Monocular perspective was devised to produce that illusion with the help of color. It is important to observe that these paintings had to be viewed from one certain point whence the scene would appear undistorted. We find unbearable this fixed relationship of the spectator to the painting in which his observation is permanently bound. (In fact, we find unbearable all other fixed and rigid relationship in this world today.) Renaissance painting wiped out the prerennaissance directness of visual experience and became not only static but also strongly illustrative. Prerennaissance painting did not try to imitate reality. It admitted that it had been painted to express moods, devotion, wonder, and ecstasy with the sensuous and emotional power of color. It emphasized less the "story" and more the vital performance of color to which the spectator could react directly without reasoning and conscious analysis. The decay started with the vanishing-point perspective which seemed to be a dazzling performance, since the painter could render scenes as the eyes perceived them. Suddenly every effort was concentrated on the perfection of imitation with the result that three hundred years of practice by the "perspectivists" taught everybody to evaluate painting by its illusionistic potency. Their method of rendering became the automatic possession of generations who did not even have to learn the original rules of geometric construction; who knew by heart "how to do it."

When photography appeared, the excitement of this manually produced space and object illusion diminished; it could not stand the competition of the mechani-

cally perfect execution of most complicated, though also monocular, photographic perspectives. Contemporary painters, confronted with the static, restricted vision of a fixed perspective, countermarched to color and produced on the flat surface a new *kinetic* concept of spatial articulation, vision in motion.



Vision in motion is seeing while moving.

Vision in motion is seeing moving objects either in reality or in forms of visual representation as in cubism and futurism. In the latter case the spectator, stimulated by the specific means of rendering, recreates mentally and emotionally the original motion.

Vision in motion is simultaneous grasp. Simultaneous grasp is creative performance—seeing, feeling and thinking in relationship and not as a series of isolated phenomena. It instantaneously integrates and transmutes single elements into a coherent whole. This is valid for physical vision as well as for the abstract.

Vision in motion is a synonym for simultaneity and space-time; a means to comprehend the new dimension.

Vision in motion also signifies planning, the projective dynamics of our visionary faculties.

MYTH, MIND, AND HISTORY

WALTER ABELL

The mythological and religious subjects which characterize so large a portion of the world's art and literature have, in the main, been treated by art historians in a purely descriptive, uninterpretable manner. They have been identified with this or that god or demon if such identification was possible. Otherwise they have been classified in general as gods, heroes, devils, or monsters. Rarely has an effort been made to penetrate beyond what Freud might call the "manifest content" of the subject and determine why the human mind evolved such concepts and what relation they bear to psychic and historical realities.

One or the other of two assumptions has usually been made with regard to subjects of this kind. If the observer was a believer in the particular religion involved, he conceived the god or demon as an objective part of the natural universe, to be accepted, like clouds and rivers, as its face value. If, on the other hand, he was a rational critic, he regarded mythological beings as imaginative or fanciful creations to be sharply differentiated from the objective world. In the latter critical view, which has mainly prevailed in art history, rationality and fact, on the one hand, and irrationality and fantasy, on the other, have opposed each other in irreconcilable dualism. In this dualistic order, facts received studious attention as constituting "reality"; fantasies were largely neglected because supposedly "unreal."

As an illustration of such attitudes we may note some typical references to the gargoyles and chimeras of the Gothic period. Pijoan characterizes them simply as "fanciful monsters";¹ Gardner as "fantastic and chimerical forms of the world of imagination . . . born probably of pure fancy."² Elaborate monographs on Gothic iconography, such as Mâle's *Religious Art in France, XIII Century*, go little further. "What can be the meaning," asks Mâle, "of the long-necked gargoyles which howl there in the heights . . .? No age has conceived more terrible spectres, partly wolf, partly caterpillar, partly bat, yet with a strange and horrible appearance of reality. . . . The fact is that conceptions of this kind are of essentially popular origin. The gargoyles like churchyard vampires, or the dragons subdued by ancient bishops, came from the depths of the people's consciousness, and had grown out of ancient fireside tales."³

Mâle's question is well put; his answer is disappointing. He does indeed approach the threshold beyond which a deeper understanding could be gained when he traces the mythological creatures to the "depths of the people's consciousness," but there he stops. What lay in and behind those depths, and why they engendered monster fantasies, he does not attempt to determine.

In this state of knowledge a 13th century statue of a chimera might be described as a typical feature of Gothic art, catalogued as to style and provenance,

¹ Joseph Pijoan, *History of Art*, 1927, Vol. II, p. 380.

² Helen Gardner, *Art Through the Ages*, revised edition, p. 323.

³ Emile Mâle, *Religious Art in France, XIII Century*, 1913, pp. 58-59.

and admired for its line, form, or imaginative appeal; it might perhaps be purchased at great price to augment a museum collection; and yet despite all this be almost completely ignored in its basic identity as a monster fantasy. To one degree or another the same holds true of most other mythological and religious art.

It is doubtful whether more would have been accomplished prior to the discoveries of Freud, Jung, and other psychoanalysts. Today it appears that a deeper understanding of many art problems would result if we could correlate the products of the arts with the findings of analytical psychology, and these in turn with recent concepts in such fields as history and economics. As one effort toward such correlation I submit below a tentative statement of some of the problems and observations involved in a study upon which I am now engaged; a study the results of which I hope later to present more fully in book form under the title, *The Collective Dream in Art*.

Let us begin by reconsidering the supposedly "fanciful" creations of mythology in the light of current psychological attitudes. This aspect of the subject can conveniently be approached in terms of a related psychic phenomenon, the dream. Apparently fanciful and unintelligible in their nature, dreams are nevertheless now known to be extraordinarily accurate transcriptions of unconsciously apprehended realities. Without attempting to enter into the intricacies of Freudian dream analysis, let me illustrate the principle of special interest to us by citing a specific example.

Some years ago I dreamed that I stood on the side of a mountain and rolled a stone down the slope. This in turn started other stones and I was soon surrounded by a vast Niagara of sliding rock. Panic-stricken, I expected to be swept away. Instead I remained firmly on my feet in the midst of the rock-slide, awed and in the end inspired by the cosmic display of energy around me.

Obviously this dream, like all others, was a mental fantasy. There was no actual mountain, no sliding rock. The whole thing was merely a flash of mental activity in my sleeping brain. But now let us note certain further facts concerning it. In the first place, its purely subjective nature did not, in sleep, prevent me from experiencing it with as much completeness, vividness, and apparent sensuous directness as though I had experienced it in the objective world. There are, in other words, mental conditions under which subjective fantasies assume an apparent objective reality; conditions under which it becomes impossible for the human mind to distinguish between the subjective and the objective aspects of its experience. Under such mental conditions, fantasies are accepted as, and are indistinguishable from, facts.

In the second place the dream, which at first glance might have seemed purely fanciful, revealed a definite objective significance when more closely examined. It occurred during a period in which I was wrestling with many problems involved in the organization of a new field of work. At times I feared that these problems would get beyond my control; nevertheless I clung to a faith that I could eventually master them. My mental state was thus divided between two opposite tensions: anxiety and confidence. Now assume that these tensions were to be expressed imaginatively in some form of pictorial image. What kind of imagery

could be used to embody them? It would be difficult to conceive a more impressive embodiment than that provided by my dream-picture. The rock-slide which threatened to sweep me away was a symbolical expression of my fears; my success in keeping my position in the midst of it, a corresponding expression of my confidence in ultimate success. Judged literally the dream would have appeared a mere figment of the imagination. Interpreted symbolically, it proved to be an extraordinarily apt image of a real psychic state which in turn had resulted from real circumstances of objective experience. The dream was thus a psychic transformation into symbolical form of actual facts related to the outer world.

From this example, we may draw a general law: psychic tensions tend spontaneously to express themselves in appropriate forms of mental imagery. The mental activity involved in such expression—an activity as unconscious as glandular action or metabolism—may conveniently be called the *tension-imagery* process. Apart from dreams and day-dreams, this process appears to be responsible for various other mental products, including the more subjective forms of inspiration in the arts and, what immediately concerns us, myths.

For tension-imagery to achieve a mythological status, two conditions must be operative which are not involved in the case of most dreams. In the first place, the tension which generates the imagery must be a *collective* rather than an individual one. No doubt the inception of the imagery takes place in an individual mind, but if the psychic state which motivated it is collectively shared, then the imagery will be recognized as collectively valid. Suppose that an intense fear dominates the mind of a certain individual and in one of his dreams, nightmare-fashion, generates the image of a monster which threatens him with destruction. If the cause of his fear is a personal one, such as an unconscious awareness of an impending physical breakdown, then the significance of the imagery remains individual and is confined to the scope of a dream. But if the fear which animates the dream is shared by all the members of a community, as it might be if its cause were a threatened famine, or an impending attack by an enemy tribe; and if, on awakening, the dreamer describes his vision to others, then these others will recognize in the image a symbol of their own fears. Because the image embodies a real state of collective emotion it will be collectively accepted as a reality. In being thus accepted, it satisfies the first condition for the birth of a myth.

But since the mythical image is a mental fantasy, subjectively meaningful but objectively non-existent, a second condition must be fulfilled before a myth can actually arise. Accurate and rational observation of the objective world would show that the supposed monster does not exist as an outward reality, but is a creature of the imagination. For the mental imagery to gain social acceptance as a supposed objective reality it must therefore exist in a realm of experience within which the community is unprepared to exercise accurate and rational observation. The collective mentality in which it evolves must be an undifferentiated one: a mentality, that is, such as all of us return to in sleep, in which the mind is incapable of differentiating the subjective from the objective aspects of its experience.

In communities which have not yet accumulated a large amount of factual

data, this uncritical mental state characterizes the minds of men even in their waking hours, and is collectively shared. Not having developed sufficient analytical technique to differentiate the objective from the subjective, or at best having done so only in certain limited fields of experience, the community projects its tension-imagery into the world around it. It accepts as equally real that which it sees mentally and that which it observes factually, confusing the one with the other in a general undifferentiated continuum of experience.

In his book, *My Life with the Eskimo*, Vilhjalmur Stefansson gives a fascinating account of a community in this mental state. It comprised a remote tribe which had had but little contact with the remainder of the Eskimo world and none with white civilization. Members of this tribe at first mistook the exploring party for supernatural spirits. In their view, spirits were much more likely to appear than unknown men. Later, when Stefansson tried to impress them with the wonders of modern science, he failed completely. When they learned that a rifle could not shoot a deer on the other side of a mountain and that binoculars could not see into the future, they were not impressed. Their medicine men, they said, *could* do these things; hence they concluded that the white man was less advanced than they were. Mythical concepts permeated their world to such an extent that they judged objective realities in terms of them and condemned the real but limited powers of modern applied science as inferior to supposedly unlimited powers associated with their own mental projections.

Such, to one degree or another, has been the mentality of all pre-analytical societies. Through most of human history—as late as the Renaissance we find many instances of it—man has fulfilled his days in this undifferentiated continuum of fantasy and fact. Awake and in society he has confused his imagery with his knowledge, inhabiting a world of which he believed whatever he imagined and imagined whatever his psychic tensions impelled. For him the outer and the inner world were gloriously—and on their negative side, damnably—one. His spectres and his gods, his hells and his heavens, were so many projections, visualized in mental imagery, of the complex movements of his own spirit. They were essentially dreams; dreams accepted and perpetuated in social tradition; collective dreams shared by society as a whole and only gradually recognized by daring and heretical thinkers as subjective rather than objective in origin.

The theory of myth formation briefly outlined above may be summarized as follows. Mythical concepts are a form of mental imagery generated by the same tension-imagery process which motivates our dreams, but are collectively accepted because they embody collective tensions and are confused with objective reality because analytical standards of differentiation are not available to distinguish them from objective facts.

At this point we must beware of perpetuating the rationalistic assumption that because myths are thus to be differentiated from facts they are therefore “fanciful” in the sense of unrelated to facts. We have already connected them with psychic tensions, and psychic tensions are in themselves psychological facts. Furthermore—and this leads to the second main step in our interpretation—

tensions have causes and those causes may, and frequently do, involve the objective facts. My dream-image of the rock-slide arose from tensions of anxiety and confidence; those tensions in turn were a result of an objective situation involving certain tasks to be accomplished, certain personalities to be dealt with, and other realities of the world around me. There are thus three levels of significance to be considered in connection with tension-imagery phenomena: first, the manifest nature of the image itself; secondly, the nature of the psychic tensions which impelled its formation; and third, the circumstances, usually involving facts of the objective world, which gave rise to the tensions.

Now let us examine some specific mythological figures in terms of these three levels of significance. For this purpose it will be interesting to include the Gothic chimeras already mentioned, but preferable not to limit ourselves to them. Psychic phenomena, to use a medical phrase, "have a history." The psychoanalyst usually has difficulty in discovering the essential facts of his patient's experience from a single dream, but give him a series of dreams over a period of time and he begins to detect significance both in their recurring elements and in the changes which are gradually introduced. So with mythological forms. If we place them in their developmental sequence, we are able to study them more effectively.

In the Gothic gargoyles and chimeras—at least up to that point in their development when they ceased to be compulsive social expressions—we have mediaeval monster imagery in a late stage of its evolution. Mythical enemies of men, "fell spoilers," "doers of mischief," had haunted the human mind from much earlier times. As typical instances for comparative study we may take the monster, Gougou, described by certain Canadian Indians to Samuel de Champlain, and the monsters of the 8th century epic, *Beowulf*. Combining these with the Gothic chimeras, we have one monster-concept representing humanity in a neolithic stage of development, one from the dark ages, and one from the high middle ages.

The most striking fact to emerge from a comparison of these examples is that, as we pass from the myths of one epoch to those of the others, the monsters diminish progressively in their terribleness and their supposed power over humanity. Gougou is a giant of such size and malignity as to defy all thought of human resistance. "They told me that it had the form of a woman, but most hideous, and of such size that according to them the tops of the masts of our vessels would not reach above his waist . . . and they say that he has often devoured and still devours many savages . . . when they speak of him it is with unutterably strange terror. . . ."⁴

Of the three monsters in *Beowulf*, one is woman-like, one manlike, save that they are "greater in size than any man" and possess "terrible claws"; the third is "an evil naked dragon that . . . flieth by night enfolded in fire. Him the earth-dwellers dread exceedingly." The inroads of these monsters upon humanity are vigorous and terrible. Grendel, the man-monster, entering the king's hall

⁴ *Works of Samuel de Champlain*: Edition of the Champlain Society, Toronto, 1922 Vol. I, Part II, pp. 186-8.

at night, “. . . siezed quickly on a sleeping thane, tore him taken unawares, bit into his bone frame, drank the blood from his veins, and swallowed him down piece by piece. Soon had he bolted all the lifeless body, hand and foot.”⁵

Such depredations are no less terrible than those ascribed to Gougou, and we might infer from this that there had been little change in mythological concepts between neolithic times and the dark ages. Nevertheless a difference appears if we consider the positive as well as the negative side of the mythological register. The reign of terror imposed upon the Indian mind by Gougou had gone unchallenged. Nowhere in the mythology of the Indians involved do we meet a god or hero capable of meeting so overwhelming an enemy. Positive tension-imagery in this neolithic culture was as vague and colorless as the negative was definite and vivid. There was indeed some inkling of a “Father,” but as a grand sagamore of the Montagnais remarked in the course of a long theological discussion with Champlain, this Father was “not very good.”⁶

Such is not the case in the mythical world of *Beowulf*. By this time there is a positive as well as a negative mythology. Heroes have arisen to challenge and eventually to destroy the monsters. The warrior, Beowulf, champion of humanity, fights with the monsters and kills each of them in turn, though he loses his own life in the last of these encounters. Here we have a mythical cosmology evenly balanced between negative and positive imagery; monster and hero are of approximately equal strength and impressiveness.

By the time of the Gothic grotesque still further change is noticeable. The monsters have now become relatively helpless survivors in an alien land. They still plague men as far as they are able, but their powers are limited. From many accounts in mediaeval literature, we learn that they could be foiled by the simple expedient of employing religious formulas. By calling upon the Virgin, by making the sign of the cross, and other such means, their intended victims are able to save themselves. Mankind was now protected from its mythical enemies by an invincible savior and a host of other heavenly champions.

The mythological evolution just considered might be graphically presented by an X-pattern in which one of the lines indicated the monster sequence, and the other that of the humanity's protectors. The accompanying diagram approximates such a pattern.

The line tracing the succession of monsters declines; that indicating the beneficent beings rises. In neolithic times, the monster is transcendent, defense against it practically non-existent. In the dark ages, monster and hero meet on equal terms and slay each other. In the middle ages, beneficent beings are transcendent; the demons are reduced to comparative helplessness.


So much for the manifest imagery of our selected mythological examples. What about our second level of significance, that of the psychic tensions which motivated this imagery? In terms of our theory, we presume the monsters to have been projections of negative tensions involving various degrees of collective insecurity, fear, and frustration. The heroes and gods, on the other hand, we

⁵ C. G. Child, *Beowulf and the Finnsburh Fragment*. Passages quoted above are from pp. 37, 62, 20-21.

⁶ *Works of Samuel de Champlain*: Vol. I, p. 112.

interpret as expressing positive states of collective feeling such as relief, hope, and the sense of security. And since the monster imagery declined with the passage of time and the savior imagery increased, we are led to infer a corresponding reversal of collective psychic states. Thus we arrive at the supposition that in neolithic times collective fears were so powerful that positive psychic states like confidence and hope made little headway against them; that in the dark ages collective fears were still powerful but that collective confidence had developed to a point at which it matched the fears in intensity; and that in the Gothic era confidence had emerged triumphant as the dominant element in collective psychology, fear having subsided to a subordinate mental position.

Thus far our interpretation has been theoretical. In attempting to pursue it further, we must descend to our third level of significance and look for possible causes of the psychic tensions which we have been led to assume. As the psychiatrist investigates the life of his patient, considering parental influences, childhood experiences, and the like, so must we investigate the life of society in



the epochs we are studying in an attempt to discover whether the actual circumstances of collective existence in those ages were of such nature as to support and clarify our analysis. At this point our research leads us into the field of history.

Adequate quotation from historical sources is impossible within the scope of an already crowded essay, but a brief resumé will perhaps suffice to recall some of the pertinent facts.

According to explorers who have left us records of their native conditions, the Indians who believed in Gougou were subject to frequent and terrible dangers. Food supplies were so limited under a hunting economy in a northern climate that population was hardly more than a scattering, famine frequent, and death from starvation almost a commonplace. Attack from enemies might come at any time, and if made by stronger tribes brought death and devastation, sometimes tribal annihilation. Capture was frequently followed by slow torture. Chroniclers like Champlain give vivid accounts of all these types of calamity.

That the communities exposed to them should have been subject to profound collective fears was inevitable.

Actual records of such fears are given by Champlain in more than one passage. "The whole time they were with us," he says of one group of natives, "they were in such constant dread of their enemies, that they often took fright at night in their dreams and would send their wives and children to our fort. . . . They are very timid and fear their enemies greatly, and hardly ever sleep quietly wherever they are. . . ." ⁷ On another occasion, one of the members of an Indian party having dreamed that their enemies were pursuing them "they went and spent the whole night in the high bulrushes which are in the lake St. Peter, for fear of their enemies." ⁸ Thus we seem to have historical grounds to support our interpretation. Objective dangers inspired profound fears; these fears motivated the tension-imagery process in dreams. If they were further to project themselves into the realm of mythology, monsters like Gougou would be the type of fear-imagery to be expected. That such monsters owe their existence to these causes seems to be the logical conclusion.

Little need be said to establish grounds for the persistence of collective fears in the age which produced *Beowulf*. The turbulence, insecurity, and ideological conflict of the period are written into the very name "dark ages." The difficulty, if there be any, consists in explaining the emergence of the hero as a typical proponent of dark age mythology. In view of the chaotic aspects of life at this time, could there have been a sufficient degree of collective security and well-being to inspire positive psychic states as well as negative ones, and thus to generate a resolute and conquering symbol like the figure of *Beowulf*? Doubtful as this may seem at first glance, the answer nevertheless appears to be in the affirmative.

Barbarism, in the sequence of cultural evolution, is a state of transition between savagery and civilization. Despite the military and ideological chaos of the times, indeed to some degree because of them, the western European peoples were then laying the foundations of their civilization-to-be. Agriculture had replaced hunting as an economic basis of life and was producing a new abundance of food which in turn furthered the growth of population, the establishment of settled communities, and the achievement of that economic surplus which is essential to cultural expansion. Military conquest resulted, not only in disorder, but also in the expansion of social units from tribes to nations and under Charlemagne, to an empire. Within these larger political unities, law and order were slowly but surely establishing their domain, as we see by the Salic law and the capitularies of Charlemagne. Aided by the vestiges of ancient learning, courts and monasteries were pressing rapidly forward to new frontiers of knowledge. Replacement of pagan faiths by Christianity was another of the many hope-revealing and hope-inspiring characteristics of the time.

When all is weighed there seems to have been a fairly even balance between the disruptive and the constructive aspects of dark age life, with the further advantage for the positive elements that as the period progressed they tended to

⁷ *Works of Samuel de Champlain*: Vol. II, pp. 50-51.

⁸ *Works of Samuel de Champlain*: Vol. II, p. 103.

increase and the negative ones to diminish. Culture history thus provides an objective foundation for mythological tension-imagery in which monster and hero are matched with each other on even terms. It is significant to note that the name "Beowulf" is linguistically related to the Old English word for grain, *beow*, which in turn had been employed as the name of an early grain-god, Beow.⁹ As in our dreams we sometime awake and perceive the real world vaguely through our dream-images, so here we seem to glimpse reality through mythology, monster and hero appearing as the projections of famine and plenty.

By the high middle ages, despite the persistence of war and at intervals even famine and plague, man's mastery over the conditions of his existence had attained an ascendancy which permitted the flourishing of one of the world's great civilizations. Recent agricultural inventions, such as the iron horse shoe and a new type of horse collar, had for the first time given the world the inestimable benefit of efficient animal power. Agricultural methods were being improved in many other respects, providing the economic basis for a greater security and a greater liberation of cultural impulses than western Europe had ever before known. Technical skills had increased to a point which permitted the construction of such engineering marvels as the Gothic vault and buttress systems and the defense of towns with the inestimable comfort of high fortress walls. Through the Peace of God, the Truce of God, and other efforts, the reign of law and order, backed by the moral power of the church, was constantly being expanded.

It is true that the security and surplus resulting from these developments were not shared equally by all classes of society. There were still large serf populations which produced the material basis of civilization without enjoying any large share of its own product. It is equally true that the manuscripts and enamels, the castles and cathedrals, with which we deal in the history of art were not created by serfs. They were chiefly the work either of monks or of free artisans, and the communities which they represented—the monasteries and the newly established free towns—were precisely the first economically secure, socially stable, and culturally integrated communities of western Europe. These communities enjoyed a degree of economic well-being, political freedom and technical efficiency never before known to the Celtic and Teutonic peoples. In them life was flowering as it had never previously been able to flower among the races involved. The age long dread of famine, military disruption, and other destructive forces must often have seemed, first to the monks and somewhat later to the free townsmen, a thing of the past, even though subsequent history was to reveal this as over-confidence.

The first impact of this new security and well-being cannot have been, psychically, but an immense surge of relief and exaltation; a profound experience of the goodness and wonder of life. From reservoirs of collective feeling thus drained of terror and filled with thanksgiving emerged the mythology of the high middle ages: a mythology of conquering deities, saints and angels, and of conquered demons and monsters. Psychically speaking, a Gothic cathedral is a projection into material form, on a vast scale, of the tension-imagery of the

⁹ Cf. R. W. Chambers, *Beowulf; An Introduction to the Study of the Poem with a Discussion of the Stories of Offa and Finn*. 2nd ed., 1932, p. 87.

society which produced it. In its architecture we behold the technical mastery and apprehend the emotional exaltation of that society: in the gods and saints of its portals and windows we meet the dream-transformation of its sense of collective well-being. In its vestigial monsters, trodden under the feet of saints or banished to the outer world roofs and towers, we behold the quiescent recollection of its former terrors, fast becoming humorous in the prevailing atmosphere of relief and security.

Two conclusions may be drawn from this rapid survey of a vast field—a survey all too rapid to do more than suggest a few aspects of a complex and elusive subject. In the first place, we seem justified in asserting that mythological and religious subject-matter is far from being merely “fanciful” or visionary. On the contrary, it appears to be as closely related to facts as are the most rational and sober of scientific or historical statements; but whereas the latter present the facts in a literal fashion through conscious channels, myth presents them in symbolical fashion through unconscious channels. There can be no doubt that each type of statement has its value for human life; the one as an instrument of investigation and analysis, the other as an instrument of expression and synthesis. In their original manifestations, mythological expressions probably relieved collective tensions and certainly inspired collective unity. In their artistic perpetuations they offer us a condensation, a figurative vividness, an emotional power, never surpassed and rarely equalled among the statements of human experience. They might well be called the poetry of history.

Secondly, and on a more general plane, we seem to envisage the possibility of new perspective regarding the whole motivation of art history. If our analysis is correct the typical forms of art in the historic periods we considered owe their nature and their evolutionary direction to states of collective psychology which in turn were determined by states of collective security and well-being. In this sense art becomes a mirror, not first and foremost of nature, but of the conditions of man’s social existence as mirrored in the state of his soul. It seems to me at least a provocative thesis—personally I regard it as a probable truth—that the development from primitive and archaic to mature and decadent forms which meets us in the cycles of art history, is due less to increasing technical experience or other intrinsically artistic causes than to the psycho-cultural evolution of the producing societies. In this view a cycle of art history becomes the unconscious autobiography of a collective soul, embodied in a sequence of collective dreams. This possibility I plan to discuss more fully in the book already mentioned.

ART AS EXPRESSION AND SURFACE

HENRY DAVID AIKEN

In contemporary aesthetic theory two rival views of the subject matter of aesthetics have long been predominant. One of them, which has recently derived additional support from the semanticists, tends to approach the problems of aesthetics through an analysis of the different 'functions' of symbols in discourse. According to this conception, whereas in science symbols are used exclusively as a means of explanation and description, and in morals exclusively as a means of persuasion, in the arts the respective mediums of language, color, and sound are used exclusively to express or evoke emotional attitudes.¹

The adequacy of such a theory of art, or of aesthetic experience generally, we have presently to consider. I merely wish to indicate here that it leads to a result essentially different from that of another theory which also is often based upon the formulation of differences that are said to exist between scientific discourse and aesthetic experience. According to this view, art discloses immediately qualitative 'surfaces' of experience, while science is concerned solely with the determination of general laws for the purpose of prediction. The scientist, it is said, has no interest in the particular fact as such: his purpose is to 'abstract' from the particular contextual character of the individual event, with a view merely to its relevance as evidence for the confirmation of some predictive hypothesis. The artist, on the other hand, is concerned only with qualitative characters in their felt immediacy.

Although these ways of distinguishing the aesthetic field are often confused, a little reflection suffices to show why they are not the same. If the characteristically aesthetic aspect of experience lies in its sensuous 'surface,' then it follows either that feeling and emotion are aesthetically significant only as they appear directly *in* the surface itself, or else that they are not in themselves a 'part' of aesthetic experience as such, even though they are its normal *effects*. Precisely the opposite result ensues, however, if the aesthetic object is regarded as essentially 'expressive.' From this it follows that the perceptual object, although doubtless a necessary condition of the aesthetic 'effect,' is simply a vehicle by which feeling is incited.

Lest I be accused of setting up false dichotomies, or of exaggerating the differences between emotion and feeling on the one hand, and 'aesthetic surface' on the other, let me say that it is no part of my own intention to reduce aesthetic experience exclusively to either of these factors. Without doubt most aesthetic experience is expressive in some degree; and certainly all fine art, perhaps the

¹ It is worth pointing out that this conception of art is prevalent not only among aestheticians and semanticists, but also among critics and students of poetry as a fine art. Perhaps the most distinguished and certainly the most influential literary critic and poet of our time, T. S. Eliot, has expressly held that the poet's concern is not with 'thought,' but with its emotional equivalent. According to him, the purpose of Dante or Shakespeare was not to state or inculcate metaphysical truths, but, rather, "to express the greatest emotional intensity of his time, based on whatever his time happened to think."

most important species of aesthetic experience, is characterized by 'qualitative surface.'

My purpose here is to point out (a) that the differentiae by which the above theories are distinguished are not the same, as sometimes seems to be implied; and (b) that if either of them is adhered to rigorously, it is impossible to include the factor emphasized by the other theory without either relegating it to the plane of *mere* condition, cause, or effect, or else so extending the sense of 'expression' or 'qualitative surface' that it no longer retains any useful or clearly recognizable meaning. This latter result, I submit, is precisely what has happened in the case of Professor D. W. Prall's analysis of aesthetic 'orders.'² For him, apparently, these 'orders' of sound and color are the very stuff or substance of the aesthetic. But since it is as evident to him as to everyone else that feeling and emotion and, indeed, imaginative association and suggestion, are also in some sense 'present' in most forms of aesthetic experience; and since whatever value is attributed to them is often due to precisely these factors, Prall is obliged to extend the notion of 'qualitative surface' so as to include them as well as the purely sensuous factors with which he starts. When employed in this way, however, the notion of 'surface' becomes so indefinite in meaning that it excludes nothing whatever that could possibly be experienced.

The difficulties which confront both theories in accounting for accepted modes of aesthetic experience thus indicate that contemporary aesthetic theory has not as yet provided an acceptable and unequivocal delimitation of the aesthetic field. But these difficulties are not simply definitional. Of more importance, perhaps, is the result which nearly always accompanies faulty definitions. Both theories involve us in aesthetic paradoxes which are resolved, if at all, only by means of *ad hoc* 'explanations' of one sort or another that misconceive the factor to be explained, or else so broaden the principle of explanation that it no longer provides a significant clue to what we desire to know. It is evident, however, that in any aesthetic experience of sufficient scope there are present a complex of factors—cognitive, emotional, and, above all, affective. It seems wise, therefore, not to define, *ab initio*, the aesthetic quality in terms of some one of the components of aesthetic experience, but, rather, to look for it in some relational character or mode of organization which may be found, upon analysis, to be consistently present in all forms of experience which are usually conceded to be aesthetic.

II

In order to determine whether or not such a characteristic relational or organizational property exists, it will be well to consider in somewhat closer detail what actually is involved in the occurrence of such factors as 'expression' and 'surface' themselves, since they are commonly regarded as the most fundamental of the properties usually attributed to the genuinely aesthetic.

According to the theory of art as 'expression,' that which is expressed or evoked by the object of art, and which both distinguishes it as aesthetic and confers upon it its characteristic value, is feeling or emotion. Now, in the first place, it is

² Cf. Prall, D. W., *Aesthetic Analysis*.

evident that emotions do not exist in a vacuum; they are, rather, products of particular experiential situations, and arise as responses to objects, cognized as sources of danger or delight. Even in the most tenuous or 'generalized' mood there is some 'objective' state of affairs through recognition of which the emotion is aroused and by means of which it is located.

While every emotion, however vague or diffuse, has its own perceptual counterpart, or, to use T. S. Eliot's phrase, its "objective correlative," it is commonly thought that the "objective correlative" in a work of art is introduced by the artist as a kind of after-thought by which he seeks to communicate to or evoke in others the same emotional state which he himself feels.³ But this view involves not only a misconception of the aesthetic process itself, but also a distortion of the way in which feeling and its object are related, both in the process of artistic creation and in the response of the appreciative observer. The art-process is essentially plastic and formative. The particular emotional character of the individual art product, its own individual expressiveness, emerges for the artist, as well as for his audience, only through the formation of some pattern of sound, color, or words.

In all art the 'expressiveness' of the object is determined, at each point, by a process of formation or reformation of 'objective' structures in interaction with which the total emotional effect is produced, and in relation to which alone it is understood. The factor of expression, therefore, cannot be disengaged from the total aesthetic process and identified as *the* unique artistic intent or as *the* intrinsic aesthetic quality. The object, as it is perceived in aesthetic experience, is not felt to be simply a vehicle for the expression of feeling; indeed, the relation between the object and emotion is not one of means and end at all, but, rather, of mutually supporting components within a relational whole.

It remains to be considered whether the theory of art as 'expression' sheds any light upon the distinctive *value* of aesthetic experience. This problem is of crucial importance for any aesthetic analysis, since, after all, our interest in the theory of art is to determine, if possible, principles of criticism in the light of which we may establish a rationale for taste.

If it is supposed that aesthetic quality is attributable essentially to 'expression,' then in determining wherein consists the value which is predicated of aesthetic experience, we are left with two alternatives: either to regard value as intrinsic to aesthetic experience itself, so defined, or else as extrinsic to it. In the former case we would have to regard expression itself as valuable in the absence of any other property. But it seems evident that this cannot be true. Save as objects capable of sustaining interest in themselves, emotions, no more than chairs or money, possess value. No one would predicate value, either positive or negative, of the emotion of fear merely as such.

Still less would one regard it as *aesthetically* valuable, unless it were somehow relished or enjoyed. Moreover, were we to regard expression itself as intrinsically aesthetic, it would follow that other elements, such as design, which are commonly regarded as sources of aesthetic value, would either have to be denied value altogether or else regarded as wholly non-aesthetic. On the other hand,

³ Cf. Ducasse, C. J., *Philosophy of Art*, p. 36.

to regard the value of aesthetic experience as wholly extrinsic is even more unacceptable. There are few aestheticians, save for the followers of Plato and Tolstoy, for whom the value of a work of art is something wholly extrinsic to it.

If, then, it is conceived simply as a system of expressions of states of feeling, no clue remains as to the value which by common consent is attributed to all aesthetic experience as such. We may go further, I think, and say that, in the absence of any aspect of delight or satisfaction, an expressive object not only lacks value, but also the very character 'aesthetic' itself; whereas our assurance that a work of art *is* 'aesthetic' is rendered increasingly certain as we note our own quickening and recurring interest in whatever properties it manifests.

Thus we are left in the predicament of being unable to deny intrinsic value to aesthetic experience, and yet unable to attribute this to 'expression' alone. But even if it were conceded that although expression *per se* is not valuable, it *becomes* the primary aesthetic value when it is the object of an interested attitude, most of our difficulties still remain. For it is still a question whether our interest in works of art is directed simply to the emotional state which they incite; and it is still a question if, as I believe, this is not the case, whether we are to deny the attribute of 'aesthetic value' to the non-expressive aspects of the object of such interests. To both of these questions, I think, we must answer in the negative. Just as emotion itself does not exist apart from a perceptual context, so our interest, ordinarily, is sustained not by the former alone, but rather by the total experiential pattern in which it is embedded.⁴

III

Since the power of music rests largely in the sounds themselves as they appear to the auditory sense and imagination, it is music, more than the other arts, which renders initially plausible the conception of aesthetic experience as mere sensuous 'surface' or 'appearance.' At first glance, it may seem *possible* to

⁴ There are, of course, other senses of the term 'expression,' as used in modern aesthetic theory, which are not definable solely in terms of emotional excitation. Although this latter use of the term is, I think, primary, particularly as employed in musical and literary criticism, there are other uses of 'expression' which it is of capital importance to distinguish clearly from this primary use. Perhaps the most important of these is the sense in which, for example, one sometimes speaks of a certain face as 'expressive.' Here the 'expressive' object is simply understood as the visible or audible *sign* of emotion.

Recognition of the signs of emotion in an object of art is one thing, however, and its capacity to evoke emotion in the observer is quite another. There is nothing, however, in the concept of 'expression' in the former sense which qualifies it to be regarded as intrinsically aesthetic. There are many works of art which in no way signify or represent emotional states, while, on the other hand, some objects of art which are very expressive in this sense remain uninteresting.

Once the distinction between these two senses of 'expression' is noted, it becomes apparent that there is no need to search for some recondite symbolic power in works of art to account for their emotional effect. Nor is there any reason to be mystified because works which are very expressive in our second sense sometimes leave us cold. Music, for example, is perhaps the most expressive or moving of all the arts in its capacity to capture instantaneously a mood and to transport us immediately into a world of precise but immaterial feeling. Yet music has not proved an effective medium, on the whole, for representing or symbolizing feelings.

regard a piece of music simply as a rhythmic sequence of sensory impressions accompanied by an aura of feeling. A closer examination of music itself discloses, however, that even musical experience cannot be understood solely in terms of sensuous 'surface.' Full apprehension of the formal relations of sounds in great music calls upon cognitive powers which often require almost incredible feats of memory, recognition, and anticipation. The experienced object, far from being a mere sequence of successive impressions and feelings, is interpenetrated with meaning; that is, with allusions and references, which, although not 'objective,' nevertheless call upon essentially the same powers of mind which are involved in the understanding of verbal meanings.

In the second place, even though it may be unobjectionable for purposes of convenience to speak of emotion 'objectified' or 'embodied' in the object itself, it is false both psychologically and actually to regard the work of art as though *it* were literally gay or sad in the same sense that it is loud or soft or in the key of C. It is true of emotions and feelings, I believe, as Professor Perry has pointed out in the case of affective qualities, that "the more closely these are examined the more clearly do they appear to be either modes of attitude or impulse . . . They rapidly lose all semblance of that inherence in the object which becomes increasingly clear and unmistakable in the case of color."⁵

Unless the emotional effect of a work of art is located *in us* rather than in the object itself, we fall at once into aesthetic paradoxes which have continually beplagued the theorist. If, as Prall suggests, we *identify* the solemnity or gaiety of a work of music with its specifications of tempo, loudness, timbre, pitch, and so on; if, as he says, a "quick solemnity is a contradiction in terms," then, I think, it becomes unintelligible why it is that the same specifications of tempo, loudness, and so on, do *not* express the same specifications of feeling to all people, or even to all discriminating observers. In point of fact, the different values which different qualified observers attribute to the same work are, in part, due precisely to the fact that while they perceive the same, or closely similar, sensory surfaces, these do not succeed in evoking in each of them the same degree or even the same kind of emotional feeling. Indeed, the variability in the 'expressiveness' which the same work of art has for different observers largely explains why there exists such a wide discrepancy between the descriptions of the quality of the impact which the same works of art produce upon different observers.

There is still another factor which should not be overlooked in considering the relation of 'sensuous surface' to 'expression.' As Prall points out, feelings have their own qualitative character and intensity. It is true that a "tooth-ache is a perfectly determinate characteristic feeling, of its own unique degree, in any given case, of intensity and extent."⁶ At the same time it should be noted that awareness of a feeling is not the same thing as awareness of the object of one's feeling. Thus when Prall says that "a feeling is never the feeling of nothing," it is necessary to inquire whether he means (a) that a feeling is a mode of cognition by which something *else* is perceived, or (b) that a feeling itself is always 'felt,' *i.e.*, perceived, or (c) simply that there is always a consciously

⁵ Perry, R. B., *General Theory of Value*, p. 31.

⁶ Prall, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

present 'object' of feeling in the sense mentioned earlier in this paper. Prall seems to mean both (a) and (b), and sometimes (c) as well.⁷ But if so, it may be replied that one may be conscious of the 'object' of one's feeling, that is, of that which arouses it, without at the same time being immediately aware of the feeling itself as a distinct qualia. The perception of emotion is a different perception from the perception which arouses or 'embodies' it; and one may be, and often is, so absorbed in the object itself that, although one may be very moved, one may not *know* this until afterward. I would say of emotion what Professor Perry says of interest, namely, that while it "cannot exist without cognition, it can and does exist without cognition of itself."⁸

Unquestionably, then, the concept of 'surface' is insufficient as a defining attribute of the aesthetic field. Aesthetic experience, both cognitively and emotionally, continually overflows the limits of perceptual surface. The reason for this, as in the case of 'expression,' is simply that our *interest* in the aesthetic object itself goes beyond its immediately presented surface or aspect.

IV⁹

The 'aesthetic' cannot be adequately defined or described in terms either of cognition or emotion alone. However broadly or narrowly these terms are conceived, they either include or exclude too much. *Any* cognitive act or emotional state *becomes* aesthetic just to the extent that interest is taken in it as an experience.¹⁰ Actually most theorists have implicitly conceded that this is so, even though they may have seemed to deny it, for in the end they nearly always add to the notions of 'surface,' 'expression,' or 'imagination,' the condition that these be 'satisfying in themselves.' On the present view all of these or any of them may be either aesthetic, non-aesthetic, or unaesthetic, as the case may be,

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 154 ff.

⁸ Perry, R. B., *op. cit.*, p. 353.

⁹ In a recent book, *New Bearings in Esthetics and Art Criticism*, Mr. B. C. Heyl has raised the question whether there is any reason to "presuppose" the existence of a common quality connoted by the term 'aesthetic.' In answering in the negative, however, Mr. Heyl considers only those types of theory which reduce the 'aesthetic' either to some simple, unanalyzable quality or emotion, *or* to those 'objective' properties such as surface or expression which, I agree, are aesthetically valuable only in some aesthetic objects. Mr. Heyl's analysis, however, does not touch the present type of theory, which he seems not to have considered. My view, I think, involves none of the "tautologies," "vicious circles," or the "questionable metaphysics" which characterize the definitions of 'aesthetic' which Mr. Heyl considers. When he raises the question, "If various kinds of objects are valued for all sorts of reasons, what can they, or do they, have in common?" there is no more reason for embarrassment than there is when, with precisely the opposite point in mind, Mr. G. E. Moore asks of any property which is suggested as the definition of value, "But is it good?" To be sure, if I like apples because they taste sweet, and you like them because of their red color, these are two different 'reasons,' just as two different patches of red are different 'reds.' But just as the latter still possess a common quality, so do the former; namely, the relational property of being objects of interest.

¹⁰ The present theory differs from that of Professor H. N. Lee in his *Perception and Aesthetic Value*. For Professor Lee, as for the present writer, value is intrinsic to all aesthetic experience. He further qualifies the aesthetic field, however, by limiting it to perceptual experience.

depending upon the nature of the attitude with which they are viewed. *So long as the interest which is taken in them is directly focused upon and renewed by the satisfaction resulting from the experience itself, it is aesthetic, regardless of whatever components of sensation, perception, emotion, or imagination it may include.*

When aesthetic experience is conceived in terms of the characteristic interest which is taken in it, it becomes possible for the first time to resolve most of the so-called paradoxes which have beset most theories of art as 'expression' or 'surface' or even 'imagination.' But even more important, we are provided with a basis for a theory of aesthetics and criticism on which it is *explainable* why we commonly predicate such terms as 'aesthetic,' 'beautiful,' 'unaesthetic,' and 'ugly' of an apparently heterogeneous assortment of events, while denying them to others which nevertheless possess other alleged prerequisites such as qualitative distinctness, expressiveness, imaginative complexity, order or unity. If the aesthetic is defined in terms of 'surface,' any appearance is aesthetic, however drab or uninviting it may be. If the aesthetic is defined in terms of expression, any experience which produces emotion is aesthetic, regardless of the quality of character of the experience. But if the aesthetic is defined in terms of the kind of interest with which aesthetic experience is characteristically viewed, then it is easy to understand how the same object, as any history of taste will show, may be regarded as both aesthetic and unaesthetic, or neither. A perceptual or apprehendable manifold *becomes* aesthetic, on the present view, when the observer takes an immediate interest in apprehending its characteristic qualities, whatever they may be. The 'aesthetic appeal' of any object thus refers not simply to its inherent perceptual or expressive character, but, rather, to the capacity of these to arouse and sustain an affective attitude which focuses attention directly upon them.¹¹

On this view it is unnecessary to regard the aesthetic field as one which excludes such properties as abstractness, universality, or even utility. Thus no work of art gains or loses any special advantage through the presence or absence in it of sensuous immediacy, expressiveness, or qualitative structure. These may be valued for themselves, and may be ranked according to the degree and scope of the interest which they arouse, regardless of their failure to adhere to some preconceived or arbitrary canon of judgment.

To employ the terms 'beautiful' and 'aesthetic' in this broad and inclusive sense is, of course, not without precedent. It is not merely in a figurative sense that the terms 'artistic' or 'beautiful' are often ascribed to elegant demonstrations in mathematics or to functionally perfect works of engineering or architecture. Many individuals in our time have regarded the generality of the former or the usefulness of the latter as unaesthetic. But this is in part because our civilization has so emphasized the predictive and instrumental values of science and the useful arts that it has become difficult for most individuals to contemplate

¹¹ The disinterestedness which Kant and others have regarded as the hallmark of the aesthetic attitude is different from that which characterizes the moral attitude. The moral attitude is disinterested in the sense of 'impartial,' while the aesthetic attitude is disinterested in the sense of being directed to the object itself rather than to its ulterior purposes.

their qualities of economy, elegance, or imaginative grasp with immediate relish and satisfaction.

The soundness of the present view is convincingly sustained especially when it is compared with the other theories which we have considered with respect to the 'unaesthetic' or ugly. On the present view, since 'aesthetic,' like 'moral,' is essentially a term designating value of a certain kind, it follows that the 'unaesthetic' or ugly are to be understood as modes of negative value or interest. On the theories of art as expression or surface, however, a clear notion of the unaesthetic or non-aesthetic is difficult to obtain. As we have seen, there is nothing in sensuous surface or in expression which, in the absence of interest, provides a clue to the aesthetic value of these modes of experience. It is even more difficult to see how the unaesthetic could be accounted for solely in terms of them. If sensuous surface is aesthetic, then how does it, in some instances, come to be regarded as unaesthetic? If one tries to solve the problem by reference to such properties as 'order,' 'coherence,' or 'relevance,' one has still to ask *why* these aspects of aesthetic surface have aesthetic value, and their negatives do not, since disorder, incoherence, and irrelevance are as clearly manifested in appearance as the former. Only when the factor of interest is introduced, do these terms become designations of modes of the unaesthetic, and then only because they are immediately felt to distract or disrupt attention and to introduce antagonism and displeasure. Similarly, in the case of expression, if mere expressiveness is constitutive of aesthetic quality, then the emotionally deranged and distracting must also be regarded as aesthetic. Only when the factor of interest is introduced into the context of emotion and expression is it possible to obtain a criterion which provides a clue to the distinction between the beautiful in expression and the revolting or ugly.

v

Before concluding, I should like to call attention to the light which the present theory sheds upon the relation of aesthetic experience to morals and the good life. Conceived in terms of interest which is perpetually renewed and sustained by the satisfaction which it provides, aesthetic experience may be seen as a kind of microcosm of well-being itself. It thus provides an instance of what the moral consciousness envisages as its own goal or end. The experience of great art is a kind of foretaste of what life itself ideally might be, in which desire is continually renewed and satisfied in experience itself, and in which no longing is unrequited, and no act is submitted to merely for the sake of some ulterior thing. There is also present in the higher forms of aesthetic experience an aspect of dedication and devotion similar to that which characterizes the moral, with this difference: the aesthetic attitude is motivated not by a mere effort of will or the promise of some ulterior happiness, but, rather, arises naturally and gratefully from a consciousness of happiness already possessed.

At the same time we must not confuse the quite legitimate moral significance of aesthetic experience described above with the 'art for art's sake' aestheticism of writers who, like Pater, would make out of the arts themselves a regimen for

living. If the experience of beauty is a microcosm of the good life, it is a microcosm only. This in no way justifies the aestheticism which regards the arts as an escape from life, or as the moral end itself. From the standpoint of the impartial and inclusive interest of the moralist in all values, whether presently enjoyed, or merely aspired to and hoped for, a too exclusive preoccupation with the beautiful is no more to be condoned than is any other partial or exclusive concern. Unfortunately, the contemplation of beauty in an exigent world can never be the sole preoccupation of man. It must be judged, therefore, not simply in terms of its own powers to absorb and to delight, but also in relation to the other interests which it may enhance or impede.

The danger to a proper estimate of the value of the beautiful lies not in the impartial and disinterested criticism of the moralist, whose only concern is to remove conflict and to organize the totality of our impulses and desires into an integrated and unwarlike whole. It lies, rather, in the unintentional disparagement of those aestheticians and critics of the arts who conceive aesthetic experience too narrowly in terms of one or the other of its modes. It is the aesthete himself, seduced by the pretensions of an overweening semantics, or misled by the theoretical heresies of abstractionism and expressionism, who unwittingly does injustice to the realm of beauty. The hope of the viewpoint suggested in this paper is for a conception of aesthetic theory generous enough to include the whole gamut of beauty on every level of experience on which it is manifest, and which, at the same time, will neither inflate nor inadvertently disparage the place of aesthetic value in the scheme of human goods.

THE "PRINCIPLES" OF ART

CARL THURSTON

So much has been written about the "principles" of art, which are better known as the principles of composition—symmetry, balance, proportion, dominance, gradation, contrast, harmony, unity, and the like—that one can hardly hope to say anything very new about them. Nevertheless, I believe that there are certain interrelationships between these principles which have never been thoroughly explored, and that, even at the risk of repeating a good many familiar facts, it will be worth while to suggest very briefly where a few of them may be found.

In the first place, as far as I am aware the group of principles commonly listed under that name has never been carefully defined as a class. It is rare to find two lists of these principles that agree in every item, and it is rarer still to find any attempt to formulate the criteria for admission to such a list. It is obvious, of course, that each of these principles denotes a type of relationship between some or all of the details of a work of art, yet it is equally obvious, as soon as one begins to think about it, that many such relationships are never included in any list of the principles of composition. For example, the specific relationship between two musical tones which is called a fifth is never regarded as one of these principles, and neither are the common architectural relationships of parallelism and perpendicularity; and one might naturally guess that they are excluded because each is applicable to only a very small number of arts and to an equally small number of details in each one of them. It seems plausible to suggest that no relationship is likely to be classed as a principle of composition unless it can be regarded as a *type* of relationship, under which a variety of specific relationships, between a variety of ingredients, can be grouped. Such a principle, one might say, is essentially a genus rather than a species. One might even go a step further and say that the relationship must be an open relationship rather than a closed one. Equality, for example, would hardly be considered a principle of composition but repetition unmistakably is, because the idea of extension to further details is implicit in the meaning of the word. Similarly, no term which denotes primarily a product, or even a partial product, will ever be ranked as a principle; a composition may need a theme, a pattern, or a design, but these are merely stages in its development rather than the underlying formulas or ideals which guide this development. Incidentally, too, the idea of a theme or a design is too complex to serve the major purpose of a principle of composition, which is to help the artist to decide exactly what to do at any stage in his work. Simplicity and definiteness are essential if it is to afford him a clear answer; he may be embarrassed by the multiplicity of principles from which he must choose, but when he has once chosen his oracle he can depend on it to give him a precise and practical reply.

Yet oftener than not this simplicity is merely the simplicity of the molecule, which can still be broken down into diverse atoms. The analysis of art has its

sentimental school, which is always ready to stretch the facts to the breaking point to prove that one principle or another is common to all the arts. They put great stress, for example, on the fact that the word *rhythm* enters into the literature of every art, without bothering to inquire whether its meaning remains the same throughout this range—and *balance* is another of their favorites.

The *Century Dictionary* gives as its basic definition of rhythm, "movement in time", and few people would question its general applicability to music and poetry. Yet even a superficial analysis shows time is only one of several ingredients which fuse together to constitute rhythm rather than the full essence of its being. It is something more than a bare pattern of durations. A succession of durations counts for nothing, aesthetically, until they have somehow been marked off from each other, and it counts for comparatively little until they have been strongly differentiated—by an alternation of sound and silence, by some change of pitch or tone-color, by placing an extra emphasis on certain of these units, or, less sharply, by the use of diminuendos or crescendos. Even in music these supplementary ingredients are as necessary to the full development of music as time itself; time is, so to speak, little more than the surface of the stream on which they float, in a rhythmic order. (Some proof of this innate complexity in rhythm can be found in the effort to simplify it by introducing the additional concept of meter and assuming that it dealt solely with patterns built of successive durations, while accent patterns were to be called rhythms. The distinction has tended constantly to break down, and in much of the literature of music the two words are used interchangeably. And when we move on to the closely related art of dancing the word meter disappears almost completely.)

If we try to apply the *Century* definition of "movement in time" to the rhythm of the dance we have to put a relatively stronger emphasis on the movement and proportionately less on the time. Anyone who is watching a waltz certainly thinks much less of the three-four time on which it is based than of the distinctive swaying and swinging of those who are dancing it. And when we pass to the static art of painting we find that although critics still speak of its rhythms the word no longer has any specific reference to time, or even to any definite movements in space. The rhythm of a painting may have a temporal flavor—slow, fast, staccato, or something of the sort—but there are no permanent or measurable durations whatsoever. And the only movement that enters into the experience is the movement which the distribution of spots and lines suggests to the eyes of the observer, a sort of dance-routine which the artist has tried his best to prescribe for anyone who contemplates his work. Oftener than not when we speak of the rhythm of a painting we mean primarily a certain distinctive, but rather indescribable, quality in the lines or in the pattern as a whole, which can easily be apprehended without thinking in terms of motion at all. At best it is a less important ingredient in painting than in music, and there are many fine pictures in which any use of the term is barely justified. A great deal of confusion might be avoided by recognizing frankly that rhythm—and the same can be said of balance—is not an invariable which runs through the arts like a vein of gold, but that it varies as widely from one art to another, in both form and function, as homologous organs such as fore-limbs, teeth, and

skin do from one species of animal to another—monkeys, elephants, birds, and fish.

The changes which some of these principles undergo within the limits of a single art, as it evolves toward maturity, are hardly less striking. The first artists who gave any thought to the theory of composition must have had a fairly clear notion of the principle of symmetry, for they applied it unremittingly to all their arts, from weaving and the decoration of pottery to sculpture and architecture, and it would probably have been hard for them to imagine a good substitute for anything so highly organized and so satisfying. Yet when symmetry began to grow monotonous and to prove itself too inflexible for the demands of a growing art they experimented cautiously with a substitute—and with our present knowledge of such things we can see that it was not a wholly arbitrary substitute but a direct development from one of the less conspicuous ingredients in symmetry. A symmetrical figure is not quite as simple a structure as it seems; it contains at least four distinct moments, or aspects. There is the equality of shape between its two halves; there is the reversal of one of these halves so that it becomes essentially the mirror image of the other; there is the equidistance of corresponding points from the central axis; and there is, finally, the subtle and inconspicuous equality between the respective pull on our attention exercised by each point in such a pair. Of these four it is only the last that can be detached in any practical way from the rigid equalities of the other three, rendered flexible, and developed into a new system of equalities, and this is the one our artists instinctively chose. For an equality of such pulls can be established without an equality of distance from a central axis as a base. If one of two points of interest is nearer the axis than the other a balance can be created between them by making the nearer point more interesting than the more remote one, somewhat as a small weight at the end of the long arm of a steelyard will balance (with respect to the very different force of gravitation) a much larger weight near the point of support. As the equality that results is of the sort that can be expressed by an indeterminate equation, in which distance and attention-value are the two variables, the number of ways in which such a balance can be set up are theoretically infinite in number.

But this evolution can be pushed one step further. Surround the two points by a frame and it immediately becomes more important to establish a more intricate balance, or set of balances, of the same type, between all six of these units than to maintain the original balance between the first two of them. The axis loses its importance; it becomes necessary to interpolate a variety of other points to make this set of balances entirely satisfactory; and the whole constellation of points takes on a character so different from that of a simple one-to-one balance that it seems desirable to label it with a different word. *Equilibrium* seems as suitable as any.

The connection between the opposite extremes of this series, symmetry and equilibrium, is tenuous at best, and not likely to be recognized at a glance by anyone who is not familiar with the intervening links, yet it has been widely noted in the literature of art. Balance is frequently described as a variant on symmetry, or symmetry is treated as a species of balance, being differentiated as

"formal" balance while the more elusive types are labeled informal, hidden, or occult balance. In the hope of dispelling some of the confusion which has resulted from this habit, I have emphasized elsewhere the difference between symmetry and balance rather than the similarity, but I am glad to take this opportunity to admit that some continuity between them can be traced. The innate inflexibility of the principle of symmetry and the slightness of the cranny in which variability found sufficient foothold to support a luxuriant growth would seem to make it an outstanding example of the origin of species in the field of composition.

A third source of misunderstanding with regard to these principles lies in the widespread assumption that they are all essentially of equal rank and importance—or it might be better to say, the general failure to point out that they are not of equal rank and importance. Their differences in value can be readily brought to light by considering the various functions which they perform in art.

The functions of any element in a work of art fall naturally into two primary groups, mechanical functions and psychological functions, and the second of these groups splits easily into three subgroups, which might be described as static functions, dynamic functions, and sculptural functions. Whether a given principle happens to serve any mechanical purpose or not—they consist chiefly in keeping the eye moving easily around a composition and leading it successively to all the important places—is largely incidental to its other functions and plays only a slight part in determining its rank. A principle may be said to have a static function when it leads toward some structure which tends to inspire a static type of contemplation, which clearly satisfies our desire for visual order or provides some pattern which can be grasped at first glance. Symmetry does this very conspicuously. So, on a lesser scale, do contrast, gradation, proportion, and repetition. A principle with a dynamic function, on the other hand, tends, when it is embodied in a work of art, to set the observer to exploring the work, to pushing forward from one detail to another, to savoring the climax toward which they lead; it makes him an active participant in the work instead of a mere observer. Gradation accomplishes this on a small scale; dominance is considerably more effective, when it is well managed. (One is able to rate these principles at all only by taking each at its maximum effectiveness.) Balance, harmony, and unity, however, belong in a different class, because they not only provide material for appreciation, or motive power, but shape in their own image whatever consciousness is fully exposed to them. This is what I have ventured to call the sculptural function of art. When anyone abandons himself completely to a work that is in full equilibrium his own consciousness gradually slips into an equilibrium of its own. The centrifugal forces with which it ordinarily bristles somehow cancel each other; all its potential tangents swing inward like the spokes of a wheel; its state is anything but inert, but all its drives toward action are so balanced that none of them eventuate in action, or even in a desire for action. It is essentially the condition ordinarily described as "the aesthetic attitude," but it is equally accurate to call it a state of equilibrium. It possesses aesthetic value primarily because it is a state in which all one's faculties are free to attend to the work which has originally inspired it, but I believe that in addition

to this it possesses aesthetic value in its own right because it has acquired one of the characteristics which are most important in the objective work of art. I might cite as one bit of evidence favoring this belief the fact that such a state tends to persist for some time after the object which inspired it has passed out of one's field of vision—and also to remain enjoyable.

Harmony tends to evolve into unity, somewhat as symmetry does into equilibrium though in a rather different direction. Harmony is relatively diffuse; unity is concentrated, organized, focussed. Both in turn become qualities of the perceiving consciousness and, like equilibrium, aid appreciation and become themselves objects of appreciation, though less consciously so than the objective work of art. All three of these qualities are, of course, in the original work of art, comprehensive and immanent, where such lesser qualities as gradation, contrast, and proportion are relatively limited and superficial, but this difference in scope and in capacity tells only part of the story. I am inclined to see in the fact that the few principles which absorb and dominate all the rest in the objective work of art are, in general, those which in consciousness contribute most to the evocation of the aesthetic attitude, a problem with some of the complexities of the mind-body problem.

THE NEWER CONCEPTS OF TIME AND THEIR RELATION TO THE TEMPORAL ARTS

WILLIAM FLEMING

It is customary to divide the arts into two main classifications on the basis of space and time. Architecture, sculpture, and painting fall into the spatial group, while the dance, drama, moving picture, the novel, poetry, and music belong in the temporal group. These classifications grew up in a world permeated by the Newtonian doctrine of an "absolute space that always remains the same by virtue of its own nature, unrelated to outward circumstances, and immovable." The corollary of this theory was that "absolute, true, mathematical time flows on by virtue of its own nature, uniformly and unrelated to any outward circumstance."

Now if we classify the arts according to Newton's concepts, they would of necessity have to fall into either one or the other of these two hard and fast categories. There can be no overlapping of frontiers. But it will readily be seen that this is impossible in the case of the so-called temporal arts. The dance, drama, moving picture, all involve the spatial dimension directly. Even literature, while unfolding in the temporal sense, constantly infers space through word symbols and concepts. Music is usually conceived as existing purely in time, unrelated, as Newton says, to any outward circumstance.

Newton's categories, which were invented as hypotheses for certain physical investigations, have long since been discarded by science. Traditional aesthetics, however, still clings to them. So much so, that we are dwelling as far as art is concerned in a categorical world which no longer exists. Time and movement are inextricably interwoven, since all time is measured by movement and change of relative position, and all mobility has, of necessity, duration. Hence the degree of mobility can serve as a criterion for another type of classification. Accordingly, on the spatial side, architecture would be at the more static pole, then would come in order sculpture and painting. On the temporal side the arts would range from the drama, the dance, and the moving picture, all the way to literature and music. In each division we have a polar extreme. Music of all the arts is regarded as the most purely temporal in character, while architecture is considered to be the most purely spatial. But is the difference one of kind, or merely one of the degree of mobility? Is architecture purely static? Is it wholly independent of time? Does music have nothing to do with space?

In order to answer these questions let us start with music. First of all, music depends for its very existence and its transmission from mind to mind upon vibrations in the air which most assuredly have to do with space. Acoustical problems of all kinds are intimately bound up with the realization of music's expressive qualities, particularly with reference to dynamics, amplitude, volume, and tone quality. One of the delights of listening to a full symphony orchestra in a large hall, for instance, is the size and spaciousness of its sound. This is one of the qualities which is missing in radio or recorded performances where the

sound is focussed into one point of space. Through volume, largeness and smallness of sound is achieved. Antiphonal effects where instrumental or vocal choirs repond to each other demand the spatial dimension for their tonal realization. Further, through the element of dynamics, music is able to suggest processional and recessional effects, and through variations in softness and loudness the effect of distance and proximity is attained. Thus the spatial dimension is by no means foreign to the tonal art, while the use of space in the dance, the movie, drama, and literature are all quite obvious.

Now what are the temporal aspects of painting, sculpture, and architecture? In painting, movements and events are suggested through bodily postures or through symbolized action. In sculpture, through fluidity of line, movement may be portrayed. This is particularly evident in Baroque sculpture, for instance, where action is important to its mode of expression. In painting, sculpture, and architecture, historical time may be expressed through objects of a temporal character—costumes, furniture, attitudes, and events. With particular reference to the external aspect of architecture, it is impossible to think of a structure without reference to its period, history and the various influences affecting its style. The arrangement of its parts are perceived as having rhythm. This in itself demands through perception the element of duration in the consciousness of the perceiver, motion and time both being mental syntheses, not objects.

Architecture, according to Baker Brownell and Frank Lloyd Wright in *Architecture and Modern Life*, creates patterns of activity for those who inhabit its structures. In fact, as they say, architecture, "writes the figure of a dance that all who enter must perform." The activity of the designing and building process, as well as the temporal functioning and eventual decline of the structure, are all a part of the larger meaning of the art of architecture, which must also include the giving of form and design to the life which takes place within its walls. It will be readily seen that this is not removed from the time dimension. In fact the mere bricks and mortar are no more important to the wider meaning of the art of architecture than the static printed page is to poetry or the score to the living symphony. In short, to speak of the timelessness of architecture or the pure temporality of music is to use a mere figure of speech.

Modern scientific views have gone far beyond aesthetics in breaking down the arbitrary classification barriers of time and space, which was the principal error of the Newtonian world view. According to these new theories we inhabit a world which consists of a spacio-temporal continuum in which all events are related in four-dimensional space-time. So if a scientific world in which this sharp dividing line is made no longer exists, why should the aesthetic world cling to these rigid out-moded categories? It is high time that aesthetics discards its isolationist views which are based on the older notions of the absolute nature of space and time, and moves into the more rarified atmosphere of spacio-temporal unity.

If we were to adopt the four-dimensional world of space-time, we could classify the arts more accurately on the basis of their principal dimension, allowing always for the symbolic inference of the other dimensions. Architecture and

sculpture use three dimensional space and suggest time symbolically and psychologically. Painting employs a two dimensional surface suggesting depth through perspective and time through symbols and motional attitudes. Drama and the dance use all four dimensions with the accent on the unfolding of their action in time. The moving picture uses time and two dimensions of space, suggesting the third by the perspective mechanism of the camera. Literature employs the flow of the time dimension through a sequence of images and concepts, suggesting the four dimensions of space-time through verbal symbolism. The novel may thus be conceived as symbolic drama unfolding in the time dimension but including all dimensions through symbolism. Poetry is likewise action using the rhythmic imagery of motion and emotion. Music is the most heavily weighted on the time dimensional side, but suggests the three dimensions of space symbolically—height and depth through pitch, perspective through dynamics and possibly tonality, and size through volume.

From this, then, would emerge two principal classifications: firstly, the Space-Time arts of architecture, sculpture and painting; and secondly, the Time-Space arts of the drama, dance, moving picture, literature, and music. This allows for a more dynamic conception of all the arts, and all works of art can be viewed as presenting living moments and living rhythms which spring from the inexhaustible depths of human creativeness. It unfreezes architecture from the state in which it has remained since Goethe classified it as frozen music, and at the same time it gives music the solidity of form which it needs to keep it from evaporating like a fog on a warm day.

In addition to the problem of classification, lingering overtones of Newton's world still remain in aesthetic thinking about the time dimension itself. Time, that is the temporal unfolding of the movement, is still often conceived in a strictly linear way. In discussing musical analysis, for instance, the late Sir Donald Francis Tovey, undoubtedly the most brilliant musicologist of our time, says: "The first condition for correct analysis of any piece of music is that the composition must be regarded as a process in time. . . . Some students begin their analysis of a sonata by glancing through it to see 'where the second subject comes' and where other less unfortunately named sections begin. This is evidently not the way to read a story. The listener has no business even to know that there is such a thing as a 'second subject' until he hears it." He then proceeds to differ from a statement attributed to Mozart in which the composer said that he imagined his music simultaneously, that is, in a "coup d'oeil" or a stroke of the mind's eye.

I venture to suggest that the eminent musicologist is wrong and that the even more eminent musician is right. When Mozart said that he could think of the whole of his opera *Don Giovanni* at a given moment, he was violating no fundamental law of human experience. In fact this is closely related to one of the tenets of the Gestalt school of psychology, namely, that it is easier to remember a Gestalt (i.e., a form or whole) than to recall any one of its parts. It is easier to recall a forest than to remember the details or the position of any individual tree. We therefore can have an image of an entire symphonic movement as a whole without being able to recall momentarily any particular theme. However,

if any part were played it would be instantly recognized. Psychologically this is in harmony with the fact that experience is no mere additive process. Each individual experience is mirrored on an entire background of past experiences and each new experience is constantly interwoven into the fabric of the whole of the individual's experiential life. It is, therefore, possible to recall the whole of a long series of experiences at a particular moment without mentally reliving the entire series in the original span of time. Proof of this lies in the psychological experience of dreams where we relive whole experiences often in a few seconds.

Tovey further says, in an article in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, that "music, being in time and not in space, is never comprehended in a 'coup d'oeil', but always in a momentary present connecting a remembered past with an imperfectly anticipated future." Here he is on firmer ground, but this notion violates the importance of the previous experience of a composition. It is a truism that a musical work is enjoyed only imperfectly at the first hearing. Repeated hearings, or better yet detailed study of a work, mean that we have our perception of the whole in mind, and any given moment derives its significance from its interconnection with the past and future conceived as a unit. The future, therefore, is not "imperfectly anticipated"; it is known (or at least knowable), and this fact greatly enhances the aesthetic experience.

Some of the new philosophical concepts have departed from the strictly linear idea of time. The notion of recurrence and anticipation, for instance, is a fundamental part of our very conception of life. We would be unable to imagine a world in which we should be finding ourselves constantly in new situations which could not be related to the past. To quote from Henri Bergson: "Now, there are not two identical moments in the same conscious being. Take the simplest feeling, consider it unchanging, and let the personality be completely absorbed in it: the consciousness that accompanies this feeling will not be able to remain the same during two successive moments, because the following moment always contains the memory of the preceding moment, which the latter has left to it. A consciousness that could have two identical moments would be a consciousness without memory." And so Bergson has defined the experience of time as "the continuous progress of the past, which gnaws into the future and which swells as it advances." His concept of duration is similar in that it is "a series of qualitative changes which melt into and permeate one another without precise outlines."

Such a flowing idea of time which carries the past along with it and which creatively anticipates the future is, according to Bergson, the spirit of life and its symbolic representation is in art. Thus Bergson gets away from the usual trimodal conception of time with its categories of past, present, and future which have as little relation to true time as the points on our clocks which divide time into seconds, minutes and hours. These have only practical significance and have no relation to the qualitative conception of the time experience. He tells us further that reality is "mobility", and with intuition we grasp this reality through the perception of rhythmic motion. In music and the dance there is also the factor of "anticipation of movement" which is perceived; and through this, as Bergson expresses it, one may "grasp the future in the present." Thus

the eminent philosopher reveals to us his idea of the dynamic character of the aesthetic experience, and in regard to the particular art medium through which this is done, he says: "The deeper joys and sadnesses may be translated into words if necessary, if no better medium is at hand. But we do have a much finer medium, one closer to the senses than either poetry or painting; and this is music. By ordering of sounds and rhythms music can offer at once the profounder phases of our feeling. Music will seize certain rhythms of life and respiration which will reveal the *living law* of the emotions of each individual."

Thus the arts by reason of their relatedness in time allow us to perceive present objects mirrored on the past and shaping the future. As Van Meter Ames has so well put it: "Like life, music is always nine tenths memory or premonition, since what is given at any instant is only one tone or harmonious complication of tones. It is in listening to music that we understand how every act and thought is reminiscent (and at the same time) prophetic."

The theory that the present is no mere knife edge between the past and future was also developed by William James and Alfred North Whitehead. However, it was the latter who first emphasized its aesthetic implications. In his general theory Whitehead emphasizes that the modern points of view are process, activity, and change. "At an instant there is nothing. Each instant is only a way of grouping matters of fact. . . . Thus, all the interrelations of matters of fact must involve transition in their essence. All realization involves implication in the creative advance." So it is possible to understand how the future is immanent in the present. In Whitehead's theory it is because "the present bears in its own essence the relationships which it will have to the future." And it is through the Time-Space arts that the categories of the past, present, and future are finally dissolved. It is through the dynamic nature of the aesthetic experience that the future is actually perceived. This very fact assures us that the future is not nothing. "It lives actively in its antecedent world. Each moment of experience confesses itself to be a transition between two worlds, the immediate past, the immediate future. . . . Also this immediate future," continues Whitehead, "is immanent in the present with some degree of structural definition."

Thomas Mann also has a very well developed theory of time which is a recurrent theme in two of his novels, *The Magic Mountain* and *The Beloved Returns*. For him what he calls time-life or biography is synonymous with life and development. Everything, he says, is tiresome and monotonous that has its being in time, by which he means external time, instead of having time within itself, that is, the capacity to make its own time-life or biography. The true kind of being, according to Thomas Mann, is a circular concept of time. Not time in a straight line moving toward a goal which implies death at the moment of achievement, but time "moving in its own circle, always at the end, yet always at the beginning." This is Mann's idea of "the true kind of being, working in on oneself, so that being and becoming, working and work, past and present were one and the same thing. . . ." This, in his conception, would produce a stability, an order and a permanence "that would be endless progress, growth and perfectionment." That art and science are not so far apart is certainly evidenced

by the similarity of the view expressed by the philosopher-scientist Sir Arthur Stanley Eddington, when in a vein similar to Thomas Mann's, he says: "We may appeal to consciousness to suffuse the whole—to turn existence into happening, *being* into *becoming*."

Through all these theories runs the persistent notion of the breaking down of the rigid time barriers which separate the past, present, and future. Josiah Royce goes even one step farther when he discards the idea of the trimodality of time altogether and throws all into the single category of the present which he calls the *Eternal Now*. Aesthetics must take these theories into account, and if this is done it will be clearly seen that it is through the arts that we are able to expand the horizon of the present and perceive this *Now*. Time in these terms is no longer linear in nature but rather resembles the constantly expanding circles in a pool of still water after a pebble is dropped into it. A truly dynamic conception of *all* the arts thus emerges as a possibility, and the time dimension is no longer to be viewed as inhering solely in the temporal arts but is the active principle in all. Movement, then, which is the outward manifestation of the life of all living things finds its symbolic externalization through the work of art. In this light Plato's conception of time as the moving image of eternity takes on new meaning for aesthetics. In this dynamic aesthetic ideal the time dimension mirrors the essence and flow of an active, unfolding, and an eternally moving image of life which is revealed through the arts.

MUSICAL EMINENCE AND YEAR OF BIRTH

PAUL R. FARNSWORTH

While granting that the term "eminence" has a variety of meanings, all of us will probably agree with Webster that it refers to "an elevated condition among men; a place or station above men in general, either in rank, office, or celebrity." Only the names of those "above men in general" in some characteristic or other are met in encyclopedias and histories or receive eminence ratings. And only names of these sorts will concern us in this article—an article which will deal with eminence in music.

There have been several attempts to study variables which might conceivably be associated with eminence. Lehman¹ reports that the period of maximum musical output for compositions of the very highest merit tends to occur earlier in the eminent man's career than does the period of maximum output for compositions of lesser merit. In two studies the present writer² has shown to be false the Adlerian dogma which states that musical eminence is due to overcompensations resulting from the possession of inferior auditory equipment. In another study³ he has made it clear that musical eminence is not related to month of birth, that the claims of the astrologers regarding musical "signs" are completely erroneous.

In 1938 the writer polled the members of the American Musicological Society⁴ with requests that each list the ten people of history who had contributed most to music. Ninety two names in all were collected and ranked for number of votes. These names were then treated in a variety of ways. They were given to several other groups for eminence-ranking,—to fifth graders, sixth graders, high school students and to college sophomores. Second, handbooks of phonographic recordings were examined and the number of discs listed under each of the ninety two names was tabulated. Third, programs of serious music from one of California's leading radio stations were analyzed over a period of three years to learn how often each of the composers of the list had one of his compositions selected. Fourth, the relative amounts of space in lay and in musical encyclopedias devoted to each of the ninety two musicians were tabulated for editions published in the early 1900's, the 1920's, the 1930's and currently. Fifth, the relative numbers of page mentions for each of the eminent names in histories of music published during the same four periods were tabulated. These five procedures yielded over a score of eminence rankings which were found to agree among themselves surprisingly well.

¹ Lehman, H. C., "Man's most creative years; quality versus quantity of output", *Sci. Mon.*, N. Y., 1944, 59, 384-393.

² Farnsworth, P. R., "Auditory acuity and musical ability in the first four grades", *J. Psychol.*, 1938, 6, 95-98: "Further data on the Adlerian theory of artistry", *J. Gen. Psychol.*, 1941, 24, 447-450.

³ Farnsworth, P. R., "Aesthetic behavior and astrology", *Char. & Pers.*, 1938, 6, #4, 335-340.

⁴ Farnsworth, P. R., "Stereotypes in the field of musical eminence", *Genet. Psychol. Monogr.*, 1941, 24, 347-381.

One of the many problems of interest which emerged from these researches concerned the relation between rated eminence and the period in which the composer lived. Were these most eminent men largely from the long distant past, were they mainly contemporary composers or was the birth year largely unrelated to degree of eminence? To answer one aspect of this question the time since birth of each of the ninety two composers was ranked from longest to shortest. This rank order was then correlated successively with each of the more than twenty eminence ranks obtained through the five methods outlined above. The coefficients were found to range from $+.21$ to $-.36$ with the median value falling at $-.15$. These values were almost all near zero, only a few even approaching statistical significance. Had *time since death* been used instead of *time since birth* the values would have been approximately the same as the two times series correlated one with the other above $+.99$. The overall picture, then, disclosed little relationship between the relative eminence of the men in this highly selected list and time since birth or death.

The relation of the year of birth to eminence was studied in part by plotting the birth years of these eminent men and finding the central tendencies. The median birth year was found to fall in the decade of the 1720's. The modal year came later in the 1810's with a secondary mode in the 1860's.

It was next planned to employ longer lists of less rigidly selected musicians to view the effects of broadening the concept of "high eminence." Accordingly, some two hundred ten names were chosen. These included the original list of ninety two and others mentioned as eminent by current musicologists in their articles and books. The median birth year of this less highly selected group fell in the decade of the 1800's. There was no distinct modal year for this list but rather a flat top to the distribution from the 1830's through the 1870's. The general picture, then, showed later central tendencies than for the original ninety two names and for the mode again to fall considerably after the median.

To study the effect of broadening the selection still more, of considering, for example, all names mentioned in typical encyclopedias of music, the birth years were examined for all the musicians mentioned in two current works, the *Oxford Companion to Music* and the *International Cyclopedia of Music and Musicians*. The data were plotted in ten-year intervals and a median and a modal year were computed for each of the encyclopedias. Their median decades were the late 1820's (*Oxford Companion*) and the early 1850's (*International Cyclopedia*). The curves for the birth years were strikingly similar for the two works. They both climbed more and more rapidly to a peak or mode in the 1870's and then fell precipitously. Here, again, the modes appeared later than the medians; and both types of averages appeared later than was true of the two more highly selected lists.

Does the fact that these encyclopedias were found to show gains of approximately six hundred twenty five (*Oxford Companion*) and twenty-five hundred per cent (*International Cyclopedia*) in the number of births from 1650 to 1870 mean that it was vastly easier for the musician born in the 1870's to gain encyclopedia recognition than it was for the musician born in the 1650's? To answer this query we should know the number of musicians in the general population in

1650 and in 1870. For if the growth in the number of musicians has kept pace with the birth increases found in the encyclopedias, the selections for those born in the 1870's were no less rigid than they were for those born in the 1650's. But, unfortunately, pertinent data can not be obtained for the solution of this aspect of our problem. Valid occupational figures were not being gathered in 1650. We will probably agree that there were more professional musicians by the latter date; but how many more is anyone's guess. At least it can be said that the encyclopedia gains far outstripped the gain in the general population which appears to have been approximately two hundred fifty per cent for Europe and the Americas during the period 1650 to 1870.

Further attention should perhaps have been paid the rapidity with which the encyclopedia curves dropped after the modal decade of the 1870's was passed. In consideration of Lehman's finding that the peak of work of the highest quality occurs relatively early in a composer's career we might have anticipated a mode closer to the present decade than the seventy years our data disclose. The answer is probably to be found in a fact of common observation. A man's reputation is rarely made by his best piece alone, but rather by his total output. His later compositions, while possibly far less original, serve to emphasize his unique contributions. So he continues to grow in stature, even perhaps long after physical death. We know from studies in the psychology of music that it may take considerable time before even the so-called expert appreciates what he later rates as a great contribution. The production may be so foreign to contemporary taste that it and other compositions of similar style must be heard repeatedly before their composer is appreciated to any great degree. So the modal decade must, of necessity, precede the present decade by a considerable period of time.

From these studies, then, we have assembled a number of interesting facts. We have found the degree of eminence of men in a highly selected list of composers to be unrelated to the length of time since their births or deaths. We have learned that the average birth year of men listed in two contemporary encyclopedias of music occurred much later than did the average of a more highly selected group, and that the average birth year of this latter group came several decades after the average birth year of a still more highly selected group. It would seem, therefore, that the more musicians we rate as eminent the more likelihood there is that we will include in our larger list a greater proportion of composers from the centuries just past.

The median birth year for all of these groups was found to precede the modal year by several decades. The distribution curves showed long periods of rapid increase and then precipitous drops. The increase in the populations of Europe and the Americas from 1650 to 1870 was found not to have kept pace with the increase in encyclopedia names. But the more pertinent facts—what the gain in the number of professional musicians may have been over this period—can not be ascertained. It would appear, however, that the selection of eminent musicians born toward the end of this period was somewhat less rigid than for those born during earlier times. The rapid drop in the distribution curves is presumably a function of the fact that the worth of a composer is not always immediately appreciated, even by the experts.

TRUTH AS MATERIAL IN ART

BERTRAM E. JESSUP

My discussion has to do with the truth theory of art, not in the sense that beauty is truth, or truth beauty; that is, that truth value is the whole value or the ultimate value of the aesthetic experience, but rather in the sense that truth can occur in some works of art as an essential feature of their aesthetic character.

The theory in this sense holds that art can be referential to fact, and that when it is, the report, representation or judgment of fact which it gives must be understood in order that it be aesthetically appreciated. It does not, of course, follow that for aesthetic appreciation there must be agreement with such report of fact.

This theory may be advanced with various degrees of inclusiveness. It may be held to apply to all arts, or only to some kinds of art and not to others; for example, to poetry, but not to music; or to some transverse modes of art, but not to others; for example, to representational treatment in any art, such as program music, realistic portrait painting, and descriptive poetry; but not to pure music, non-objective painting, and sheerly lyrical poetry. My discussion in defense of the theory supposes only the minimum claims; namely, that some modes in some kinds of art may present truth value.

Correspondingly, the theory may be opposed in varying degrees of inclusiveness. Its validity may be admitted for some types or some works of art, such as the beautifully written philosophical essay or poem, the sociological novel, and the problem play. Or it may be denied of all works of art. It is the latter, the radical counter-truth-theory, which needs to be met in defending the minimum truth theory of art.

Truth theory and counter-truth-theory of art since Plato have had a continuous history of conflict. The truth theory has at times seemed discredited beyond possibility of serious revival. But it has persisted. However, within the past two generations, and especially the present decades, counter-truth-theory has been ascendent. Almost all the various movements and schools in modern art practice, from impressionism to dadaism and beyond, are grounded in some form of anti-truth doctrine. A new school of literary criticism calling itself scientific and neo-Aristotelian has set itself up on the principle that the literary work is self-contained and non-referential. And there is in process of development a new aesthetic, aesthetic positivism, aimed to demonstrate the logical impossibility of truth in art, and thus calculated to consolidate once for all the anti-truth position.

Several specific types of rejection of truth claims in art emerge from this general position. A first states broadly that art has nothing to do with truth and cannot convey knowledge. A second holds that art (especially literature) may express truth, but that when it does, it does so adventitiously or accidentally. Thus, says one writer who holds this view, the poem "contains truth when at all, by an aesthetic accident and not as a part of its poetic nature." (Sidney Zink, "Poetic Truth," *The Philosophical Review*, March 1945, p. 133.)

Another, alleging the intellectual cheapness as well as the aesthetic inconsequence of truth when it does occur poetically, declares that "the ideas in poetry are usually stale and often false and no one older than sixteen would find it worth his while to read poetry merely for what it says." (George Boas, *Philosophy & Poetry*, p. 9.) A third variation of the anti-truth position maintains that all art which in fact employs ideas is for that reason impure and imperfect. A good example of this stand is found in Professor Max Schoen's *The Understanding of Music*. It is argued that only music of all the arts is purely aesthetic, for only in it is the material through and through feelingful and non-intellectual. In other arts, such as the visual, "the intellectual always obtrudes and interferes with the aesthetic."

The general, positivistic, theory upon which such opposition rests is in its basic postulates simple and formidable. Taken in its own terms it seems unanswerable. Broadly, it alleges two points: (1) That truth belongs exclusively to symbolic or scientific language, that is, to propositional statement, which can never occur in art. (2) That art always speaks emotively to express feeling, which can never be veridical or referential.

In its own terms, I say, the theory seems unanswerable. But it may be questioned whether it should be accepted in its own terms; that is, it may be questioned factually whether art experience—making art, enjoying art, and talking about art can get along successfully without employment of or reference to fact, or, in other words, whether the actual field of art is denoted by the theory. It may be observed at once that art experience seems unconvinced. This may merely mean, of course, that the referential habit is long-standing and difficult to eradicate. However that may be, most artists, even abstractionists, continue to work from models; readers of great literature continue with Santayana to find in a Hamlet or an Achilles a "standard of naturalness," and even cautious psychologists in some degree discover experimentally what many common listeners take for granted, that they can agree with composers who tell them musically that life is sometimes sad, sometimes joyful. (Cf. M. G. Rigg, "The Expression of Meaning and Emotions in Music," in *Philosophical Essays in Honor of Edgar Arthur Singer, Jr.*) Sometimes, too, the referential habit, if that is what it is, betrays even them who set themselves to cure it; so that we read, for example, in a work arguing and exhibiting the self-sufficiency of modern art, emancipated from representationalism, that it is characterized "by a particular and essential quality . . . which can be intensified today as never before . . . as a reflection of the intensity of contemporary life." (Sheldon Cheney, *A Primer of Modern Art*, pp. 36-37.)

To decide whether such *de facto* examples of belief in truth in art are indeed merely evidences of a persistent aberration, or whether they do rest on genuine possibility of truth in art, it is necessary to examine further the two seemingly unanswerable points against it. The first is that art cannot speak a veridical language; the second, that art exclusively expresses feeling, not fact.

The first point has been expressed in saying that "literally, the 'truth' of poetry must mean the agreement of poetic assertions with the things to which they refer." (Zink, *loc. cit.*, p. 133.) The contention is that there are no things

to which poetic assertions refer. But this contention seems to me to rest upon an entirely too narrow and arbitrary idea of what referential things are. To be telling it must exclude not only the intended metaphorical objects of some poetry, but also the larger abstractions and useful fictions of science, and the generalizations of history as well.

The following excerpt provides good material for showing how, if consistently applied, the restriction must over-reach itself in working both ways. In an article, "The Russians," by Alexander Kaun, in the *University Review* (vol. X, no. 3), the truth judgment is made that "The Russians love a penitent sinner." This judgment is supported by the statement: "Recall Roskolnikov, in *Crime and Punishment*, going out on the public square, at the request of Sonia, and making a confession of his murder. Recall the celebrated trials in Moscow, at which man after man, leader after leader, stood up and confessed treasonable actions that called for no less punishment than death."

My point is obvious: We are asked to accept a true representation in a novel and also a set of historical facts as both speaking a general truth about Russian character. I think, presumably in agreement with the author of this article, that both are valid. Did space permit, examples could be multiplied. I content myself with only one more, a much bolder one—Shelley's lyrical lines,

Many a green isle needs must be
In the deep, wide sea of misery,

These lines, I maintain, are referential and true, whatever else they are—as referential and true as the psychologist's matching generalization to the effect that a person to be integrated must possess wide and various interests.

The conclusion concerning this point is that truth statements, symbols or representations may occur essentially as material in many works of art, and that a recognition of their presence and an understanding of their meanings are necessary to appreciation of such works.

If truth quality is to be denied of art of this kind, it must also be denied of all scientific statement and intellectual generalization in which there is no immediate and single referent.

Whether truth can occur as material in art does not seem to me to be seriously questionable. The fact is that it does. However, the further and more interesting question can still be raised, the question, namely, whether truth when it does occur in art is essential to it or aesthetically accidental and adventitious?

The view that truth in art is accidental implies that the truth in such works can (and presumably should) be neglected in appreciation, in spite of the fact that it is presentationally there. Against this it would seem sufficient to argue simply the impossibility of doing so. Ideational material is as thoroughly inextricable from the form or quality of a work of art as is the physical material. It is no more possible to aesthetic perception of Milton's lines,

Alas! what boots it with uncessant care,
To tend the homely, slighted, shepherd's trade,

to banish the (I think) intended truth judgment that life often seems futile, than it is to undo the blank verse cadences or to blot out the metaphoric images in which it is expressed. Ideational material, when it occurs in art, is just as intrinsic as physical material, and ideational material may include truth statements.

In urging the intrinsicity of truth as material in art, I am not urging truth value as the defining value of art. I am insisting merely that ideational and referential material is as possible and important to art as physical material, that the one can be aesthetically organized as well as the other, that statements of truth, as well as stone, pigment, and sound can be given aesthetic composition and result in aesthetic quality.

The second main consideration upon which counter-truth-theory stands is that art expresses feeling, not fact. In part this has already been answered in the foregoing remarks, but something further may be said concerning it.

Feeling may be admitted to be essential to aesthetic experience, but only in a sense in which no impossibilities of truth follow. To be aesthetic, it is only necessary for an object to *evoke* feeling satisfaction, not to report or express feeling. That is to say, art does not exclusively express feeling in the sense apparently alleged when it is said that an aesthetic "statement" is typically like the feeling statement "Hurrah for our side!" The essential aesthetic emotion *may* be evoked by an expression of emotion, but equally well by a statement of thought, or by both together, or by neither—as in much music and some poetry.

This interpretation of aesthetic emotion, if correct, eliminates the second basic ground for denying the possibility of truth in art. Art does not necessarily fail to be veridical because it is emotional, for the emotion which is necessary to art is in the reception of the work and is consequent not upon emotional content, but upon aesthetically successful organization of content either emotional or intellectual, or neither.

The possibility of truth in art, though it is best argued on the grounds of its availability as aesthetic material, may also be maintained with a different emphasis in terms of "excellence" as a principle of aesthetic quality. Excellence as a source or form of aesthetic quality can adhere to any object in any category besides that primarily aesthetic. It may be found in practical building, religious deliverance, prose communication, and in any production of use and want. A good example of the practically excellent object attaining aesthetic quality by virtue of that excellence is noted in the following description of the Majolica drug jar, by William M. Milliken, in *Art and Medicine*.¹ He writes:

The Albarello or drug jar made as a simple object of utility for the storing of drugs has often achieved a value far beyond that which its function suggests. . . . Many of these humble earthenware productions have survived the centuries and now grace the vitrines of museums and the cabinets of the greatest collectors, although in the first instance, they were merely planned as workmanlike performances which would fulfill adequately and decora-

¹ *Bulletin of the Medical Library Association*, vol. 32, no. 3, July, 1944.

tively the simple purpose asked. Majolica, an earthenware glazed with a stanniferous, or tin, glaze was a most practical answer to a need. It was resistant and it was cleanly.

The same principle exhibited here in the conjunction in excellence, of aesthetic quality and practical purpose realized, results in a large class of art which includes truth statement, either subsidiary or primary. It can be used to explain aesthetic meaning and aesthetic integrality of intended truth themes in such literary works as the historical or sociological novel, and also to explain the felt aesthetic enjoyment in such primarily intellectual discourses as the works of some of the great philosophers and scientists writing soberly and unemotionally about their subjects.

EDITOR'S COMMENT:

A COLLEGE PROGRAM IN AESTHETICS AND THE ARTS

The close of the war has impelled many educators to call for a renewal of emphasis on the arts and humanities in higher education. Such a corrective is needed to some extent on all educational levels, but most seriously in high schools and colleges, where the pressure toward vocational specialization has been most severe. It was needed before the war, but the war necessarily intensified the trend toward specialization on immediately practical skills and technologies. Now many returning veterans realize that their general education was scanty and superficial. Teachers of the humanities are returning from war jobs, and hoping for a revival of perennial cultural values.

Yet it is also recognized that the clock can not be turned entirely back to the old, Victorian type of liberal education, based on the classical languages, mathematics, and a biased view of ancient history. For all students, we need a substantially new selection of those elements in world civilization, ancient and modern, which now seem most important on each level of the educational ladder. We need new methods of adapting these cultural essentials to the requirements of students with different abilities, interests, and vocational aims. We need new curricula in high schools, colleges, and professional schools, which will be flexible but not too disorganized; not lacking in guidance along continuous lines of organic growth.

There will be many new curricula in the general field of the arts and humanities, adapted to various student needs, to the resources of various institutions, and to the interests of various professors. There is no one right curriculum, for liberal education or for special training in aesthetics. Each teacher will rightly wish to emphasize his own approach to some extent, whether that of visual arts or literature, psychology, sociology, or semantics.

At this critical time, however, it would be well for aesthetics in general, and for students who may be attracted to it, if some active leadership could be offered in working out new curricula which will give a fairly adequate place to this subject. Through the American Society for Aesthetics and this *JOURNAL*, we now have for the first time a professional body capable of exerting organized influence, and a printed medium for discussing different attitudes toward the problem. The opportunity now exists for those interested in aesthetics to assert their opinions and to make their influence felt. Otherwise, far-reaching educational decisions will be made without consulting them, to the consequent disadvantage of aesthetics and of liberal education in general. What basic points can we agree upon, and advocate collectively?

Two problems, connected but distinct, are involved here. One is that of the contribution which aesthetics and the arts can make to general, liberal education, for large numbers of students on the college level. The other is that of the education best suited to prepare a student for postgraduate and professional work in aesthetics, as a writer, teacher, and independent thinker. What training is necessary for original research and creative scholarship in aesthetics?

The pages of the JOURNAL are open to articles and letters on either of these problems, and on the general subject of aesthetics and the arts in postwar education.¹ These may outline, defend, or attack various methods in a general way, or discuss the work of particular institutions. What colleges and universities now offer the best opportunities to a student who wishes to study aesthetics and a theoretical, comparative approach to the arts? What specific combinations and sequences of courses can he take? What is their content in the way of materials to be observed, experience and training to be secured? Brief descriptions of the present offering and future plans of various colleges will be published from time to time.

To start discussion and perhaps controversy, the following propositions are advanced. They deal especially with the *training of an aesthetician*.

1. Aesthetics can not be adequately studied as a single, isolated course, or in relation to other courses in philosophy only. It can not be adequately taught as a highly specialized, abstract subject concerned only with general theories of beauty, value, aesthetic experience, and the like. These studies have their place, but should be based on more specific, concrete studies of various arts and other contributory subjects. Aesthetic theory can best be studied after, and along with, systematic observation and analysis of works of art.

2. Students should be aided in securing a diversified, balanced program of courses on different arts and approaches to art. Those interested in intensive specialization from a technical or historical point of view should be allowed to do so; but those interested in aesthetics should be allowed a more extensive selection. Students should not be forced to specialize on a single art, but should be helped to acquire, as undergraduates, a basic knowledge and appreciation of all the principal arts, including music, literature, the visual arts, and the theatre arts. They should not be forced, in advanced courses, to specialize on minute historical periods and problems. They should be helped to combine various approaches to the arts, such as the historical, theoretical, and practical; the philosophical, psychological, and sociological; the appreciative, educational, and critical. They should be helped to gain some experience of the practicing artist's attitude toward his materials and problems, without having to take a long, intensive, professional course on any one medium, technique, or instrument.

3. Diversified, extensive study of the arts is not necessarily superficial, "a mere smattering," as specialists often charge. It is possible to specialize on generalization; on the discovery, testing, and formulation of principles having wide application. Aesthetics is the subject in which this is undertaken with respect to the phenomena of art and related modes of experience. Without a definite course or courses in aesthetic theory, diversified courses on particular arts are in danger of appearing to the student as unrelated. Aesthetics is needed to help integrate them by explicit, systematic comparison and generalization. However, the whole task of presenting a coherent picture of the arts in human

¹ One symposium on this subject has already been published, in vol. III, no. 9-10 of the JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS. It is followed up in J. Donald Young's article, "Art in the Liberal Arts College: How it Has Been Taught and How it Should be Taught." *College Art Journal*, vol. V, no. 1, Nov. 1945.

experience should not be left to the aesthetics teacher. Courses on particular fields need not be narrowly isolated and self-contained, but should frequently suggest wider relationships. Elementary courses on particular arts, like those on particular sciences, should not all be taught mainly for the benefit of students who are going to specialize in those particular fields. Some of them should try to present, quickly and simply, the essential meaning and importance of each field to the layman, and to the world in general.

4. To prepare a student for effective graduate work in aesthetics, it should be made easy for him to secure undergraduate instruction in the *following subjects*. ("Making easy" involves a recognized, established combination of courses leading toward the bachelor's degree. It is too much to expect the immature student to pick the right ones for himself, among a bewildering variety of courses in remote departments. Faculty advisers should be prepared to help him choose what is most needed for a major in aesthetics and comparative arts.)

5. *Subjects other than art*, contributing directly to aesthetics and needed as background:

- a. Logic and introduction to philosophy; history of philosophy; contemporary philosophy. Scientific methods, including statistics.
- b. General psychology; psychology of the individual personality and its development; social psychology; abnormal psychology and psychoanalysis. Educational psychology if desired.
- c. Survey of social sciences, including anthropology, economics, sociology, political science. History of ideas in these fields.
- d. Cultural history; history of world civilization, with attention to the history of religion, technology, science, and social institutions.
- e. Physical geography; topography, climate, raw materials (in brief).
- f. Foreign languages: at least French and German.
- g. For aesthetics, advanced mathematics and physical science are least necessary among the sciences, and need be studied only from the layman's point of view. Principles of biology, including evolution, are more relevant.

6. *Subjects in the general field of art*, in the broad aesthetic meaning of that term:

- a. *Literature*: English composition; history of English literature (including American); recent English literature. Comparative literature; world literature in translation, including primitive and oriental as well as occidental, to be studied historically in relation to cultural history, and also theoretically, through analysis of literary types and styles. Some reading in foreign languages. Literary criticism; aims and values of different types of literature, including prose and verse, epic, novel, and drama. Opportunity to do some creative writing, and to become acquainted with important living writers.
- b. *Visual arts*: "Art appreciation," or introductory survey of the visual arts as to their media, techniques, social functions, aims and types of value sought, contemporary tendencies and leaders, controversial issues in criticism. History of the visual arts, including oriental and primitive,

and including architecture, city planning, painting, sculpture, landscape design, interior design, furniture, pottery, textiles and other useful arts, photography, and the visual phases of theatre art, dancing, and motion pictures. Opportunity to see good, original examples of these arts. Opportunity to meet living artists and to experiment with practice of one or more of these arts, to "get the feel of the medium." Travel to foreign museums and other art centers is desirable.

- c. *Music*: "Appreciation of music," or introductory survey of principal types of musical form; instruments in the orchestra; choral music, oratorio; opera; modern styles and trends; issues in criticism. History of music, including medieval, renaissance, oriental, and modern primitive. Opportunity to hear good music, and play, sing, and compose if desired.

Is this a large order? Certainly, but there is value in stating an objective clearly, even if its attainment seems remote. In four short years of college, it would of course be impossible to acquire a thorough grasp of all these subjects. But a first step could be taken along many lines, which would help the student to go ahead for himself after graduation. No past or present aesthete has had the benefit of such a program in college. We have had to seek it out laboriously in later years, with little guidance.

Much more of it can be given in college than is given anywhere at present, by eliminating non-essentials and improving teaching methods. Extreme acceleration is harmful, but we have learned during the war that many kinds of instruction can be speeded up advantageously. Short units are often preferable to the old-time full-year or half-year course. New devices such as motion pictures will be useful at certain points in the program. All subjects can be outlined more selectively, with less dawdling and fumbling by teachers and students alike. More of the subjects mentioned above can be taught in secondary school than at present. There is no reason why a first course in art history, logic, psychology, or cultural history should be postponed until college, for the more intelligent students.

What is now being done, and where, to provide better training for advanced work in aesthetics? What can we do to improve it still further?

T. M.

BOOK REVIEWS

CURT J. DUCASSE. *Art, the Critics, and You*. New York, 1945, Oskar Piest, pp. 170. \$2.00.

Professor Ducasse has addressed his clearly and simply written book to the large audience of persons who occasionally enjoy various forms of art and who have an interest in understanding this kind of value-experience and the remarks made in ordinary life about it. The author's purpose is to provide this audience of "consumers" of art with "the text of a declaration of independence in matters of taste; and to encourage them to cultivate their own taste through abundant and varied but always positive exercise thereof, rather than passively allowing it to be molded into the shape of the taste of some supposed authority." (p. 10).

This purpose is admirably accomplished in a concise statement of a relativistic viewpoint in value-theory and its implications for criticism and enjoyment of the arts. Professor Ducasse's position is thorough-going and consistently carried out. There is no attempt, for example, to reintroduce "validity" of taste on the level of comparisons of individual tastes in respect to sensitivity or discriminatory power. To the person with less discriminating taste, the person who can literally see or hear more in a work of art may appear "oversophisticated", "effete", etc., and there is no way of theoretically demonstrating that one of the parties to the disagreement is right.

The central chapters give an abbreviated and simplified version of the "essentials" of Professor Ducasse's earlier and more technical book *The Philosophy of Art*. Art is defined as "the language of feeling, mood, sentiment, and emotional attitude." (p. 52.) In artistic creation, the artist "expresses", or "objectifies", his feelings in a work of art; in aesthetic contemplation, the consumer of art adopts a receptive attitude towards the "feeling import" of the work (in a way similar to the way in which one is receptive in listening for sounds). "Beauty" is defined as a relational property of objects, namely as the capacity of the object to cause pleasure in subjects who contemplate it aesthetically. Criticism as scientific study about works of art is distinguished from criticism as appraisal. The limitations of the former sort of criticism as an aid to enjoyment of art and the relativity of the latter to the individual contribution of the critic are pointed out.

To comment in detail on any of the foregoing points would involve, in effect, reviewing Professor Ducasse's earlier book—so I shall confine my comments to the following brief remarks. The interpretation of art as a kind of language has a renewed interest today in view of the results yielded by the fairly recent studies of scientific language. It has been suggested that just as these studies have clarified and systematized many long-standing problems in the field of epistemology, so appropriate semiotical studies of art might clarify and systematize in analogous ways the problems of aesthetics. However, Professor Ducasse's precise specification of the generic resemblance between art and the language of assertion (a resemblance which is confined to the property of being a means of expression, or objectification, of inner states), makes it plain that differences between the two sorts of languages in regard to what is expressed, and how, and why, may preclude any completely analogous treatment of art and scientific discourse. For example, in regard to the language of feeling, the semantic dimension seems of little, if any, importance.

The last two chapters of Professor Ducasse's book contain material which does not appear in *The Philosophy of Art*, and are well worth the study of the technical student of philosophy as well as of the general reader. These chapters give, respectively, an account of the importance of art (as a means of educating feeling) in the complete education of a human being, and an analysis and appraisal of "the one among the decorative arts that alone is practised by almost everyone, namely, the cosmetic art." The final chapter should, I think, be read by all aestheticians. It is written with wit and humor and philosophical insight. Professor Ducasse is able to take sympathetically the point of view of the cosmetic art, a point of view from which intellectual and moral traits of our personality are regarded, along with enamelled green finger-nails and exotic perfumes, simply as means of acquiring personal fascination.

"Evidently to describe such traits [i.e. moral, spiritual, or intellectual traits] as decorations of the person is to invert what we regard as the normal order of importance, as did the barber who congratulated a customer upon having a large brain, because that meant lots of blood in the head, which in turn made the hair grow. Yet that was the important thing from the barber's point of view, and there is such a point of view." (p. 169).

Furthermore, Professor Ducasse sees man's (or woman's) attempt to improve his (or her) face as a species of idealism, that is, as a manifestation of the fundamental human striving after self-improvement.

ISABEL CREED HUNGERLAND

PIET MONDRIAN. *Plastic Art and Pure Plastic Art 1937 and Other Essays, 1941-1943*. New York, 1945, Wittenborn and Company, pp. 63, 25 illustrations, with 2 color plates. \$2.00.

This book is one of the enterprising series *Documents of Modern Art*, "aimed primarily at the young artist who needs his material in English," edited by Robert Motherwell. It contains all the essays written by Mondrian in English, representing about a fourth of his texts on art. The other three quarters of his complete work were written in Dutch and French; the English material was produced in the last six years of his life. The title essay was first published in London, three others already had appeared in the United States before the present collection, and two have been published in this book for the first time. Together they present the beliefs and reflections of a man whose work as painter and theorist demonstrated one of the most consistent developments of an individual in the history of art.

Although Piet Mondrian for years has been considered the uncompromising leader of artists devoted to so-called pure abstraction, until recently his personal thoughts and avowed motivation have not been widely understood by English speaking readers. For the most part, only passing tribute has been paid to his attitude and accomplishment by writers such as Alfred Barr, James Johnson Sweeney, Moholy-Nagy and Sidney Janis. (At the time of this review, Mr. Sweeney's long promised book on Mondrian is not yet available.) The present collection of essays therefore is valuable as a personal exposition of the ideas which underlie the painting by one of the most important artists of our time. In it one finds a remarkably succinct statement of Mondrian's philosophy, and a brief account of his development.

Cutting through the confusing varieties of current definition, he says directly: "abstraction means reducing particularities to their essential aspect" (p. 17). Following through this not unfamiliar line of reasoning, he points out that, while particularities change, essentials are constant. Natural appearances are particular, therefore, for the artist the "denaturalization of matter is of fundamental importance" (p. 57). He feels that men too often are ruled by the particular, that they "will not always remain dominated by uncontrolled nature" because, through art, "man can create a new reality" (p. 31).

"Reality," he claims, "only appears to us tragical because of the disequilibrium and confusion of its appearances. . . . Our subjective vision and experience make it impossible to be happy. . . . If we cannot free *ourselves*, we can free our *vision*. . . . Our way leads toward a search for the equivalence of life's unequal oppositions" (p. 15).

If "vision" can be freed of the particular through abstraction, "reality can be expressed only through the equilibrium of *dynamic movement* of form and color" (p. 10). In his own work Mondrian found that "the right angle is the only constant relationship, and that, through the proportions of dimension, its constant expression can be given movement, that is, made *living*."

According to his own account, Mondrian devoted his life to a search for the visual symbols which express the condition of equilibrium in which he steadfastly believed. The rectangles by which his pictures have become identified were the by-product of oppositions in equipoise constructed through the right angle. But in time the rectangles came to be seen as "particular forms" that "must be neutralized through the composition, "so that he "accentuated the limiting lines, crossing them one over the other" (p. 13). Indeed Mondrian's unremitting anxiety in "the abolition of all particular forms" may be interpreted

as a lifetime rite of purification. His obsession with the immaculate might be seen, as Harriet Janis pointed out in her excellent article in the January *Arts and Architecture*, as a compulsion the nature of which was "the opposite of what even Mondrian believed he was achieving." In this book Mondrian inquires: "Does there not exist in human nature this powerful opposition: the desire for oppression and the desire to be free of it, this opposition which causes that long and continual struggle that life and art show until human equilibrium is neared?" (p. 38).

DOUGLAS MACAGY

LEVIN L. SCHÜCKING, *The Sociology of Literary Taste*. London 1944, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, pp. 78. Translated from the German by E. W. Dickes.

A concise analysis of the factors that determine the formation of tastes for different types of literature at different periods, this little book is a worthy companion to the excellent studies of the history of taste by Beverly Sprague Allen and Frank P. Chambers. *Die Soziologie der literarischen Geschmacksbildung* appeared in Germany in 1931, and this readable translation is part of the International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction.

Dr. Schücking is well acquainted, not only with English, French, and German literature, but with their social and cultural backgrounds. He is free from the typical German fault of over-systematization, and his sociology is an openminded awareness of actual social groups and forces, rather than a doctrinaire application of any special theories. While his examples are drawn mostly from the history of literature, much of what he says is applicable to the visual arts as well. He touches frequently on their mutual influence. The changes in public likes and dislikes which he seeks to explain are also, from the standpoint of art history, changes in style; hence the book can be taken as a study of the genesis of literary styles.

No single formula is advanced to explain these manifold phenomena. On the contrary, the author denies that they are caused by the inherent power of good art to win through, by some mystical "spirit of the age" which expresses itself in a certain kind of form, or by any other single factor. Instead, he distinguishes a considerable number of interacting factors, mostly external to art itself, which help determine the production and acceptance of new poetry, fiction, and drama.

In contrast with earlier periods, when tastes were determined largely by aristocratic or clerical interests, Schücking points out the complexity of modern social conditions. This is no simple Marxian approach, in terms of an exploiting class and an exploited one. It stresses the welter of overlapping groups within the same cultural environment, partly opposed and partly cooperating. In turn, the author surveys the influence and aesthetic tendencies of aristocracy, the middle and working classes, publishers, theatrical directors, artists as an economic group, aesthetic cliques of artists and admirers, officialdom, the church, the family, the school, the university, professional associations, literary salons and societies, advertising and publicity, literary critics, libraries, and book clubs. These are illustrated particularly in the conflicts between classicism, romanticism, naturalism, and expressionism in the past two centuries.

Schücking's approach is psychological as well as sociological, considering taste differences arising from sex, age, and personality type. Here, for example, is a terse account of age-level stages in the development of literary taste (p. 62):

The child's intelligence as it first begins to develop is most easily attracted by the description of familiar day-to-day incidents, usually regarding its own life; when its imagination awakes, without corresponding development of the critical faculty, it gets a taste for fairy stories; with the awakening youthful urge to activity it finds fascination in tales of adventure; puberty brings interest in the dreamy and sentimental; maturity brings a more realistic make-up; greater experience of life and the growing sense of reality bring a dislike of highly-coloured representation of things and a preference for keen and satirical observation over the merely fanciful. Most adults feel the awakening of interest in biography and a diminution at the same time of the fondness for fiction.

T. M.

JOSÉ GÓMEZ SICRE. *Cuban Painting of Today*. Havana, Cuba, 1944, Maria Luisa Gomez Mena, pp. 208. Text in Spanish and English. Profusely illustrated in black and white, with 19 color plates. \$1.75.

This excellent handbook opens with an historical introduction, with well selected illustrations, tracing the development of Cuban art through the nineteenth century as prelude to painting of today. Fourteen leading painters of Cuba today are allotted separate sections, each one preceded by a photograph of the artist, a brief outline of his life and discussion of his work, and illustrated by a selection of works, including one or more color plates in many cases. Five of the most promising young painters are grouped, with a condensed biography of each, some remarks concerning their work, and several illustrations. A section is devoted to popular painting, also well illustrated. Lists of exhibitions in which Cuban artists have been included, of Cuban institutions interested in art, and a bibliography complete the volume.

This is the first work with English text on Cuban art. It is the indispensable reference book, and has been well planned for wide usefulness. The author stresses advanced tendencies but appreciates quality in all styles. The text is carefully prepared, concise, informative, exact and readable; the illustrations are sufficiently numerous to be helpful in forming an idea of an exceedingly interesting and active contemporary school of art which has been almost unknown until the last two years.

GRACE L. McCANN MORLEY

SELECTED CURRENT BIBLIOGRAPHY

Covering the period from January 1st, 1945 to June 30th, 1945

In the following bibliography of publications relating to aesthetics an attempt has been made to be fairly comprehensive, but not exhaustive. The date of beginning chosen is arbitrary; however, it seemed permissible, in compiling a bibliography of *current* publications, to begin with the first of the current year. It is planned to publish such a bibliography twice a year, the January-June list appearing in the Fall issue and the July-December list appearing in the Spring issue of the following year. The selection of January 1, 1945 as the date for beginning meant the exclusion of a number of important previous publications. But it is hoped that it may be possible later to compile a bibliography covering the years previous to 1945, and also dealing with the material, for recent years, left uncovered by the bibliographies of E. N. Barnhart & F. Sullivan, G. N. Belknap, A. R. Chandler & E. N. Barnhart, and W. A. Hammond.

Probably no classification of items in a bibliography is satisfactory from every point of view, and the classification selected here (which uses the traditional headings) is not without defects, but will, it is hoped, serve our purposes. Suggestions for the modification of and addition to the bibliography will be welcomed. If readers will notify us of important items omitted, we will try to list them as addenda in a later issue.

The main purposes of the bibliography (in addition to the obvious one of helping to locate currently published material) are (a) to direct the attention of aestheticians to factual studies in fields which are outside but relevant to philosophical aesthetics; and (b) to bring to the notice of specialized workers in the study of the arts, works of general nature, such as works in value theory, which have applicability to aesthetics. It is hoped that a bibliography of this sort will tend to encourage (in Mr. Carl Thurston's words) "cross-fertilization" of the various fields concerned.

Thanks are due to the following persons who helped in compiling the bibliography: Henry D. Aiken, Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, Paul R. Farnsworth, Milton S. Fox, Isabel Creed Hungerland, Bertram Jessup, Helmut Kuhn, Hugo Leichtentritt, Margaret Lyon, Douglas MacAgy, Josephine Miles, Manuel Olguin, De Witt Parker, Wolfgang Stechow, and Carl Thurston.

H. H.

ARCHAEOLOGY

Levi, Doro. *Early Hellenic Pottery of Crete*. Princeton, N. J., 1945, Princeton University Press, pp. 64.

ARCHITECTURE & CITY PLANNING

Books

Churchill, Henry S. *The City is the People*. New York, 1945, Reynal & Hitchcock, pp. 186.

Hilberseimer, L. *The New City: Principles of Planning*. Chicago, 1945, Paul Theobald, pp. 192.

Mumford, Lewis. *City Development*. New York, 1945, Harcourt, Brace, pp. 248.

Wright, Frank Lloyd. *When Democracy Builds*. Chicago, 1945, Chicago University Press, pp. 131.

Articles

Reiner, Jan. "What is Modern Architecture?" *Architect and Engineer*, 1945, February, vol. 160, no. 2, pp. 24-28.

- Violich, Francis. "The Esthetics of City and Region." *Arts & Architecture*, 1945, June, vol. 62, no. 6, pp. 25, 46, 50, 52.

CULTURAL HISTORY

- Burckhardt, Jacob. *The Civilization of the Renaissance*. New ed., New York, 1945, Phaidon Press, pp. 485.
- Wilcox, Ruth Turner. *The Mode in Hats and Headdress*. New York, 1945, Scribner's pp. 346.

DANCE

- Ginner, Ruby. *The Revived Greek Dance: Its Art and Technique*. Third enl. ed., Forest Hills, N. Y., 1945, Transatlantic Arts, pp. 147.

EDUCATION

Articles

- Barr, Alfred H. "The Study of American Art in Colleges." *College Art Journal*, vol. IV, no. 4, May, 1945.
- Bowers, D. F., and Greene, T. M. "Graduate Work in Philosophy." *Jl. of Higher Education*, vol. XVI, no. 4, Apr. 1945.
- Longman, Lester D. "Why not Educate Artists in Colleges?" and replies by: W. Gropper, Z. Sepeshy, A. C. Barnes, O. Brendel, *College Art Journal*, 1945, March, vol. IV, no. 3, pp. 132-143.
- Further replies by: H. W. Janson, F. J. Mather, Jr., and concluding remarks by L. D. Longman, *College Art Journal*, 1945, May, vol. IV, no. 4, pp. 213-220.

LITERATURE

Books

- Bentley, Gerald E. *Shakespeare and Jonson, their Reputations in the Seventeenth Century Compared*. Chicago, 1945, Chicago University Press, 2 vols., pp. 156, pp. 310.
- Bowra, C. M. *Sophoclean Tragedy*. New York, 1945, Oxford Univ. Press, pp. 392.
- Chernowitz, Maurice E. *Proust and Painting*. New York, 1945, International University Press, pp. 261.
- Earnest, Ernest. *A Foreword to Literature*. N. Y., 1945, Appleton Century, pp. 339.
- Henriquez-Ureña, Pedro. *Literary Currents in Hispanic America*. (Charles Eliot Norton Lectures 1940-41.) Cambridge, Mass., 1945, Harvard Univ. Press, pp. viii, 351.
- Hoffman, Frederick J. *Freudianism and the Literary Mind*. Baton Rouge, La., 1945, Louisiana State University Press, pp. 354.
- Monneret, Jules. *La poésie moderne et le sacré*. Paris, 1945, Gallimard.

Articles

- Aldridge, A. O. "Lord Shaftesbury's Literary Theories." *Philological Quarterly*, 1945, January, vol. XXIV, no. 1, pp. 46-64.
- Aldridge, A. O. "Shaftesbury and the Test of Truth." *PMLA*, 1945, March, vol. LX, no. 1, Part 1, pp. 129-156.
- Baldensperger, F. "L'Opposition française à l'esthétique de Taine." *The Romanic Review*, 1945, April, vol. XXXVI, no. 2, pp. 122-133.
- Bate, W. J. "The Sympathetic Imagination in Eighteenth-Century English Literature." *E. L. H.* 1945, June, vol. XII, no. 2, pp. 144-164.
- Bensen, Alice R. "Problems of Poetic Diction, in Twentieth-Century Criticism." *PLMA* 1945, March, vol. LX, no. 1, Part 1, pp. 271-286.
- Bentley, Eric R. "The Drama at Low Ebb." *Kenyon Review*, 1945, Spring, vol. VII, no. 2, pp. 169-184.

- Bisson, L. A. "Proust, Bergson, and George Eliot." *The Modern Language Review*, 1945, April, vol. XL, no. 2, pp. 104-114.
- Bley, Edgar S. "Identification: A Key to Literature." *The English Journal*, 1945, January, vol. XXXIV, no. 1, pp. 26-32.
- Brooks, Cleanth. "Shakespeare as a Symbolist Poet." *Yale Review*, 1945, Summer (June), vol. XXXIV, no. 4, pp. 642-665.
- Brown, Stuart G. "Lucretius and Santayana: A Study in Classical Materialism." *New Mexico Quarterly Review*, 1945, Spring, vol. XV, no. 1, pp. 5-17.
- Bullit, J., and Bate, W. J. "Distinction between Fancy and Imagination in Eighteenth-Century English Criticism." *Modern Language Notes*, 1945, January, vol. LX, no. 1, pp. 8-15.
- Burke, Kenneth. "Container and Thing Contained." *The Sewanee Review*, 1945, Winter, vol. LIII, no. 1, pp. 56-78.
- Cargill, O. "The Laggard Art of Criticism." *The English Journal*, 1945, February, vol. XXXIV, no. 2, pp. 59-66.
- Carrera Andrade, Jorge. "Poetas Jovenes de los Estados Unidos." *Cuadernos Americanos*, 1945, Enero-Febrero, Año IV, vol. XIX, no. 1, pp. 211-224.
- Clarke, M. L. "Ciceronian Oratory." *Greece and Rome*, vol. XIV, 41-42, pp. 72-81.
- Davis, M. Gerard. "Colour in Ronsard's Poetry." *The Modern Language Review*, 1945, April, vol. XL, no. 2, pp. 95-103.
- Davis, Robert Gorham. "Art and Anxiety." *Partisan Review*, 1945, Summer, vol. XII, no. 3, pp. 310-321.
- Eliot, T. S. "The Man of Letters and the Future of Europe." *The Sewanee Review*, 1945, Summer, vol. LIII, no. 3, pp. 333-342.
- Fleissner, O. S. "Rilke und van Gogh." *The Germanic Review*, 1945, April, vol. XX, no. 2, pp. 94-104.
- Fowlie, Wallace. "Eliot and Tchelitchev." *Accent*, 1945, Spring, vol. V, no. 3, pp. 166-170.
- Frank, Joseph. "Spatial Form in Modern Literature, I." *The Sewanee Review*, 1945, Spring, vol. LIII, no. 2, pp. 221-240.
- Frank, Joseph. "Spatial Form in Modern Literature, II." *The Sewanee Review*, 1945, Summer, vol. LIII, no. 3, pp. 433-456.
- Gilbert, Allan H. "Can Dante's Inferno Be Exactly Charted?" *PMLA*, vol. LX, no. 2, June, 1945.
- Gorr, Adolph C. "Theories of some German Neo-Classicians." *The Germanic Review*, 1945, April, vol. XX, no. 2, pp. 138-146.
- Hammer, Carl, Jr. "Goethe's Estimate of Oliver Goldsmith." *The Journal of English and Germanic Philology*, 1945, April, vol. XLIV, no. 2, pp. 131-138.
- Henel, H. "Friedrich Schlegel und die Grundlagen der modernen literarischen Kritik." *The Germanic Review*, 1945, April, vol. XX, no. 2, pp. 81-93.
- Hillyer, R. "Modern Poetry and the Common Reader." *Saturday Review of Literature*, 1945, March 24th, vol. XXVIII, no. 12, pp. 5-7.
- Hyman, Stanley E. "Recent Criticism." *Accent*, 1945, Winter, vol. V, no. 2, pp. 107-14.
- Koht, Halvdan. "Shakespeare and Ibsen." *The Journal of English and Germanic Philology*, 1945, January, vol. XLIV, no. 1, pp. 79-86.
- Linn, Bettina. "The Fiction of the Future." *Yale Review*, 1945, Winter, vol. XXXIV, no. 2, pp. 241-253.
- McLuhan, H. M. "The New York Wits." *Kenyon Review*, 1945, Winter, vol. VII, no. 1, pp. 12-28.
- "Moral y Literatura." Debates de Sur: Victoria Ocampo, Enrique Anderson Imbert, Ricardo Baeza, José Bianco, Jorge Luis Borges, Roger Caillois, Bernardo Canal Feijóo, Augusto J. Durelli, Eduardo González Lanuza, Pedro Henriques-Ureña, Francisco Romero, Luis Emilio Soto. *Sur*, 1945, Abril, Año XIV, no. 126, pp. 62-84.
- Paul Zech, *Sur*, 1945, Junio, Año XIV, no. 128, pp. 90-91.

- Raine, Kathleen. "John Donne and the Baroque Doubt." *Horizon*, 1945, June, vol. XI, no. 65, pp. 371-395.
- Ratray, R. F. "The Modern Drama Renaissance." *The Quarterly Review*, 1945, April, vol. 283, no. 564, pp. 176-187.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul. "The Case for Responsible Literature." *Horizon*, 1945, May, vol. XI, no. 65, pp. 307-312.
- Savage, D. S. "The Aestheticism of W. B. Yeats." *Kenyon Review*, 1945, Winter, vol. VII, no. 1, pp. 118-134.
- Schwartz, Delmore. "T. S. Eliot as International Hero." *Partisan Review*, 1945, Spring, vol. XII, no. 2, pp. 199-206.
- Spender, Stephen. "Modern Writers in the World of Necessity." *Partisan Review*, 1945, Summer, vol. XII, no. 3, pp. 352-360.
- Toynbee, Philip. "Some Trends and Traditions in Modern French Literature." *Horizon*, 1945, May, vol. XI, no. 65, pp. 347-361.
- Trilling, Lionel. "A Note on Art and Neurosis." *Partisan Review*, 1945, Winter, vol. XII, no. 1, pp. 41-48.
- Wagenknecht, E. "Our Changing Literary Temper." *The English Journal*, 1945, May, vol. XXXIV, no. 5, pp. 235-242.
- Ward, William S. "Wordsworth, the 'Lake' Poets, and their Contemporary Magazine Critics." *Studies in Philology*, 1945, January, vol. XLII, no. 1, pp. 87-113.
- Wellesz, E. J. "The Earliest Example of Christian Hymnody." *Classical Quarterly*, vol. XXXIX, 1-2, pp. 34-45.
- Wiggins, Elizabeth L. "Logic in the Poetry of John Donne." *Studies in Philology*, 1945, January, vol. XLII, no. 1, pp. 41-60.
- Woodbury, L. E. "Quomodo risu ridiculoque Graeci usi sunt" (summary of dissertation on the notions of laughter and the ridiculous from Homer to Plato). *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, vol. LV, pp. 114-117.

MOTION PICTURES & PHOTOGRAPHY

Books

- Eder, Joseph Maria. *History of Photography*. New York, 1945, Columbia University Press, transl. Edward Epstein, pp. xx, 860.
- Editors of 'Look'. *Movie Lot to Beachhead*. New York, 1945, Doubleday, Doran & Co.
- Gassner, J., and Nichols, D., eds. *The Best Film Plays of 1943-1944*. New York, 1945, Crown Publishers.
- Farrell, James T. "The Language of Hollywood" and "More on Hollywood" in *The League of Frightened Philistines*. New York, 1945, Vanguard Press, p. 224.

Articles

- Amberg, George. "A Catalogue of Dance Films." *Dance Index*, 1945, May, vol. IV, pp. 62-82.
- Jones, Dorothy B. "Hollywood goes to War." *Nation*, 1945, January 27th, vol. 160, pp. 93-95.
- Kirstein, Lincoln. "French Films during the Occupation." *Museum of Modern Art Bulletin*, 1945, January, vol. XII, pp. 16-20.
- Tyler, Parker. "The Threat of Hollywood Genius." *Tomorrow*, 1945, January, vol. II, pp. 65-66.
- Tyler, Parker. "Supernaturalism in the Movies." *Theatre Arts*, 1945, June, vol. XXIX, pp. 362-369.
- Whelan, Russel. "The Legion of Decency." *American Mercury*, 1945, June, vol. LX, pp. 655-663.

MUSEUMS

Books

- Taylor, Francis H. *Babel's Tower*. New York, 1945, Columbia University Press, pp. 53.

Articles

- Thurston, Carl. "Esthetics and the Museums." *Museum News*, 1945, June, vol. XXIII, no. 4, pp. 7-8.
- Vaillant, George C. "Museum Cooperation in Research." *Museum News*, 1945, March, vol. XXII, no. 17, pp. 7-8.

MUSIC & MUSICOLOGY

Books

- Einstein, Alfred. *Mozart, his Character, his Work*. New York, London, 1945, Oxford University Press, Transl. Arthur Mendel and Nathan Broder, pp. x, 492.
- Haggin, Bernhard H. *Music for the Man who enjoys "Hamlet"*. New York, 1945, A. A. Knopf, pp. 128.
- Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, Felix. *Letters*. Ed. G. Selden-Goth. New York, 1945, Pantheon, pp. 372.
- Schoen, Max. *The Understanding of Music*. New York, 1945, Harper, pp. 187.
- Thomson, Virgil. *The Musical Scene*. New York, 1945, A. A. Knopf, pp. 301.
- Welch, Roy Dickinson. *The Appreciation of Music*. Rev. ed., New York, 1945, Harper, pp. 216.

Articles

- Adorno, T. W. "A Social Critique of Radio Musique." *Kenyon Review*, 1945, Spring, vol. VII, no. 2, pp. 203-217.
- Ashby, A. B. "Schweitzer on Bach." *Music & Letters*, 1945, April vol. XXVI, no. 2, pp. 102-112.
- Berger, A. "Form is Feeling." *Modern Music*, 1945, January-February, vol. XXII, no. 2, pp. 87-92.
- Boulton, John. "A Programme Survey. Concert Performances of Orchestral Music in England, Season 1944-45." *The Music Review*, 1945, February, vol. VI, no. 1, pp. 42-51.
- Bukofzer, Manfred. "The Neo-Baroque." *Modern Music*, 1945, March-April, vol. XXI, no. 3, pp. 152-156.
- Gray, Cecil. "Contingencies, Part III" (continued from Vol. V). *The Music Review*, 1945, February, vol. VI, no. 1, pp. 17-29.
- List, Kurt. "Schoenberg and Strauss." *Kenyon Review*, 1945, Winter vol. VII, no. 1, pp. 57-68.
- Lloyd, Ll. S. "The *a priori* Theorist and Music." *Music & Letters*, 1945, April, vol. XXVI, no. 2, pp. 97-102.
- McGlinchee, Claire. "American Literature in American Music." *Musical Quarterly*, 1945, January, vol. XXXI, no. 1, pp. 101-119.
- Piston, Walter. "The Music Criticism Racket." *Modern Music*, 1945, May-June, vol. XXII no. 4, pp. 282-283.
- Pope, Isabel. "Perspectivas Musicales." *Cuadernos Americanos*, 1945, Marzo-Abril, Año IV, vol. XX, no. 2, pp. 244-250.
- Scholes, Percy A. "Is Music Criticism a Dangerous Trade?" *The Musical Times*, 1945, February, no. 1224, pp. 45-46.
- Smith, Cecil M. "Music and the Humanities." *Modern Music*, 1945, January-February, vol. XXII, no. 2, pp. 99-102.
- Warrack, Guy. "Music and Mathematics." *Music & Letters*, 1945, January, vol. XXVI, no. 1, pp. 21-27.

PHILOSOPHY & GENERAL THEORY OF ART

Books

- Hoyland, Geoffrey. *The Tyranny of Mathematics: An Essay in the Symbiosis of Science, Poetry and Religion*. London, 1945, SCM Press, pp. 52.

Articles

- Beck, Maximilian. "The Cognitive Character of Aesthetic Enjoyment." *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 1945, vol. III, nos. 11-12, pp. 55-61.
- Creed, Isabel P. "Iconic Signs and Expressiveness." *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 1945, vol. III, nos. 11-12, pp. 15-21.
- Coomaraswamy, A. K. "Imitation, Expression and Participation." *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 1945, vol. III, nos. 11-12, pp. 62-72.
- Eastman, Max. "A Reply to Mr. Kimmelman." *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 1945, vol. III, nos. 11-12, pp. 73-77.
- Feibleman, J., and Friend, J. W. "The Structure and Function of Organization." *The Philosophical Review*, 1945, January, vol. XLIV, 1, no. 319, pp. 19-44.
- Gilbert, Katherine. "The Intent and Tone of Mr. I. A. Richards." *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 1945, vol. III, nos. 11-12, pp. 29-48.
- Gutman, James. "Integrity as a Standard of Valuation." *Journal of Philosophy*, 1945, April, vol. XLII, no. 8, pp. 210-216.
- Hoekstra, R. "Art and Truth." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 1945, March, vol. V, no. 3, pp. 365-378.
- Hungerland, Helmut. "The Concept of Expressiveness in Art History." *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 1945, vol. III, nos. 11-12, pp. 22-28.
- Lee, Otis. "Value and Interest." *Journal of Philosophy*, 1945, March, vol. XLII, no. 6, pp. 141-161.
- Ransom, J. C. "Art Worries the Naturalists." *Kenyon Review*, 1945, Spring, vol. VII, no. 2, pp. 282-299.
- Ritchie, B. "The Formal Structure of the Aesthetic Object." *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 1945, vol. III, nos. 11-12, pp. 5-14.
- Weitz, Morris. "The Logic of Art." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 1945, March, vol. V, no. 3, pp. 378-348.
- Wieman, Henry N. "Intrinsic, Instrumental, and Creative Value." *Journal of Philosophy*, 1945, March, vol. XLII, no. 7, pp. 180-185.
- Whiteside, Mary B. "The Creative Arts in the Postwar World." *The Personalist*, 1945, Winter, vol. XXVI, no. 1, pp. 72-81.
- Winn, Ralph B. "The Language of Art." *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 1945, vol. III, nos. 11-12, pp. 49-54.
- Zink, Sidney. "Quality and Form in the Aesthetic Object." *Journal of Philosophy*, 1945, March, vol. XLII, no. 5, pp. 113-128.
- Zink, Sidney. "Poetry and Truth." *Philosophical Review*, 1945, March, vol. LIV, no. 2, pp. 132-154.

PSYCHOLOGY

Books

- Katz, Elias. *Children's Preferences for Traditional and Modern Paintings*. New York, 1945, Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, pp. 111.

Articles

- Ames, Louise Bates. "Free Drawing and Completion Drawing: A Comparative Study of Preschool Children." *J. Genetic Psychol.*, 1945, June, vol. 66, Second Half, 161-165.
- Dunlap, K. "Defective Color Vision and its Remedy." *J. Comp. Psychol.*, 1945, April, vol. 38, no. 2, 69-86.
- Eagleson, O. W., and Clifford, A. D. "A Comparative Study of the Names of White and Negro Women College Students." *J. Soc. Psychol.*, 1945, February, vol. 21, First Half, 57-64.
- Elkisch, P. "Children's Drawings in a Projective Technique." *Psychol. Monogr.*, 1945, vol. 58, no. 1, pp. 31.

- Eysenck, H. J. "Graphological Analysis and Psychiatry: An Experimental Study." *British J. of Psychol.* (General Section), 1945, May, vol. 35, Part 3, 70-81.
- Feibleman, J. K. "The Psychology of the Artist." *J. Psychol.*, 1945, April, vol. 19, Second Half, 165-189.
- Hallowell, A. Irving. "The Rorschach Technique in the Study of Personality and Culture." *American Anthropologist*, n.s., 1945, April-June, vol. 47, no. 2, 195-210.
- Huang, I. "Abstraction of Form and Color in Children as a Function of the Stimulus Objects." *J. Genetic Psychol.*, 1945, March, vol. 66, First Half, 59-62.
- Knower, F. H. "Studies in the Symbolism of Voice and Action. V. The Use of Behavioral and Tonal Symbols as Tests of Speaking Achievement." *J. Appl. Psychol.*, 1945, June, vol. 29, no. 3, 229-235.
- Lannert, V., and Ullman, M. "Factors in the Reading of Piano Music." *Am. J. Psychol.*, 1945, LVIII, no. 1, 91-99.
- Luchins, A. S. "Social Influences on Perception of Complex Drawings." *J. Soc. Psychol.*, 1945, May, vol. 21, Second Half, 257-274.
- Murray, E. "Alleged Cures for Color Blindness." *Amer. J. Psychol.*, 1945, LVIII, no. 2, 253-261.
- Peel, E. A. "On Identifying Aesthetic Types." *British J. of Psychol.* (General Section), 1945, May, vol. 35, Part 3, pp. 61-69.
- Philip, B. R. "A Method for Investigating Color Preferences in Fashions." *J. Appl. Psychol.*, 1945, April, vol. 29, no. 2, 108-114.
- Rautman, A. L., and Brower, E. "War Themes in Children's Stories." *J. Psychol.*, 1945, April, vol. 19, Second Half, 191-202.
- Shipley, W. C., Coffin, J. I., and Hadsell, K. C. "Affective Distance and Other Factors determining Reaction Time in Judgments of Color Preference." *J. Exper. Psychol.*, 1945, June, vol. 35, no. 3, 206-215.
- Taylor, I. L., and Sumner, F. C. "Actual Brightness and Distances of Individual Colors when their Apparent Distance is held Constant." *J. Psychol.*, 1945, January, vol. 19, First Half, 79-85.
- Thorndike, E. L. "The Association of Certain Sounds with Pleasant and Unpleasant Meanings." *Psychol. Rev.*, 1945, May, vol. 52, no. 3, 143-149.
- Wyatt, Ruth F. "Improvability of Pitch Discrimination." *Psychol. Monogr.*, 1945, vol. 58, no. 2, pp. 58.
- Zipf, G. K. "The Repetition of Words, Time Perspective, and Semantic Balance." *J. General Psychol.*, 1945, January, vol. 32, First Half, 127-148.

SOCIOLOGY

- Martin, Alfred von. *Sociology of the Renaissance*. New York, 1945, Oxford University Press, pp. 110.

VISUAL ARTS

Books

- Breton, André. *Arcane dix-sept*. New York, 1945, Brentano's, pp. 176.
- Broadbent, Arthur T. *Sculpture to-day in Great Britain, 1940-1943*. Forest Hill, N. Y., 1945, Transatlantic Arts, pp. 48.
- Chiang Yee. *Chinese Calligraphy: An Introduction to its Aesthetic and Technique*. Forest Hill, N. Y., 1945, Transatlantic Arts, pp. 246.
- Der Nersessian, Sirarpie. *Armenia and the Byzantine Empire: A Brief Study of Armenian Art and Civilization*. Cambridge, Mass., 1945, Harvard University Press, pp. 201.
- Fernandez, Justino. *José Clemente Orozco* (ten reproductions of his mural paintings). New York, 1945, Paul A. Struck.
- Fielding, Mantle. *Dictionary of American Painters, Sculptors, and Engravers*. New York, 1945, Paul A. Struck.
- Gaunt, William. *The Aesthetic Adventure*. New York, 1945, Harcourt Brace, pp. 269.

- Georges-Michel, Michel. *Les Grandes Époques de la "Peinture Moderne" de Delacroix à nos Jours*. New York, 1945, Brentano's, pp. 239.
- Guggenheimer, Richard. *Sight and Insight: A Prediction of New Perceptions in Art*. New York, 1945, Harper, pp. 255.
- Kepes, Gyorgy. *Language of Vision*. Chicago, 1945, Paul Theobald, pp. 228.
- Mondrian, Piet. *Plastic Art and Pure Plastic Art*. New York, 1945, Wittenborn & Co., pp. 63.
- Navarro, José Gabriel. *Religious Architecture in Quito*. New York, 1945, Metropolitan Museum.
- Paalen, Wolfgang. *Form and Sense*. New York, 1945, Wittenborn & Co., pp. 64.
- Pagano, Grace. *Contemporary American Painting: The Encyclopaedia Britannica Collection*. New York, 1945, Duell, Sloane & Pearce.
- Soby, James Thrall. *Georges Rouault, Paintings and Prints*. New York, 1945, Museum of Modern Art, pp. 132.
- Venturi, Lionello. *Paintings and Painters: How to look at a Picture*. New York, 1945, Scribner's, pp. 270.

Articles

- Arnaiz y Freg, Arturo. "El Indio en las Bellas Artes." *Cuadernos Americanos*, 1945, Enero-Febrero, Año IV, vol. XIX, no. 1, pp. 175-177.
- Chermayeff, S. "Art and the Industrial Designer." *Magazine of Art*, 1945, February, vol. 38, no. 2, pp. 50-53.
- De Torre, Guillermo. "Recapitulacion del Cubismo." *Cuadernos Americanos*, 1945, Marzo-Abril, Año IV, vol. XX, no. 2, pp. 216-237.
- De Torre, Guillermo. "Apollinaire y la Sorpresa." *Sur*, 1945, Marzo, Año XIV, no. 125, pp. 56-60.
- Duchamp, Marcel. Marcel Duchamp Number, *View*, 1945, Series V, no. 1.
- Furst, H. "Defense of the Philistine." *Apollo*, 1945, January, vol. 41, no. 239, pp. 22-24.
- Furst, H. "New Wine or Old Bottles?" *Apollo*, 1945, March, vol. 41, no. 241, pp. 68-69.
- Goldwater, R. "Art and Nature in the Nineteenth Century." *Magazine of Art*, 1945, March, vol. 38, no. 3, pp. 104-108.
- Hayter, S. W. "The Convention of Line." *Magazine of Art*, 1945, March, vol. 38, no. 3, pp. 92-95.
- Hayter, S. W. "The Language of Kandinsky." *Magazine of Art*, 1945, May, vol. 38, no. 5, pp. 176-178.
- Huntley, G. H. "Notes on Victorian Art." *College Art Journal*, 1945, March, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 127-131.
- Howland, G. A. "Some Thoughts on Abstract Art." *The American Artist*, 1945, March, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 31-33.
- Janis, Harriet. "Notes on Piet Mondrian." *Arts & Architecture*, 1945, January, vol. 62, no. 1, pp. 28-30, 48-49.
- Newton, A. "Art in Relation to Truth." *Studio*, 1945, March, vol. 129, no. 624, pp. 74-77.
- Ozenfant, Amedée. "The Requirements for a Mural Art." *Magazine of Art*, 1945, February, vol. 38, no. 2, pp. 42-45, 70.
- Paulhan, Jean. "La Pintura Moderna y el Secreto Mal Guardado." *Sur*, 1945, Febrero, Año XIV, no. 124, pp. 7-11.
- Pevsner, N. "Thoughts on Henry Moore." *Burlington Magazine*, 1945, February, vol. 86, no. 503, pp. 47-49.
- Seddon, R. "The Critic and the Artist." *Studio*, 1945, March, vol. 129, no. 624, pp. 82-87.

NOTES AND NEWS

(Readers are invited to send in items for publication in this department. They may deal with activities of the Society, personal news about individual members, or events of general interest in the field, such as academic appointments, research projects, lectureships, and publications.)

GEORGE SANTAYANA, in a recent letter to the Editor from Rome, recalls the latter's enthusiasm for primitive Negro sculpture, and adds, "There is a theme for your Society to investigate philosophically and scientifically. I am glad you are approaching the vast subject of the arts from that side, rather than from that of precepts and taste. The philosophers have written a good deal of vague stuff about the beautiful, and the critics a good deal of accidental partisan stuff about right and wrong in art. If you will only discover why and when people develop such arts and such tastes you will be putting things on a sounder basis." The JOURNAL thanks Mr. Santayana for this excellent advice, and wishes him many more years of serene and fruitful work. It adds the hope that he may soon feel impelled to write another book on aesthetics and the arts.

COMMANDER GEORGE BOAS is still in Brussels, where he has been for about a year as Senior U. S. Naval Officer of the Mission attached to SHAEF. Since the disbanding of SHAEF his services have been retained to finish some of the work under way. He was active in securing the return of the Van Eyck "Adoration of the Lamb," found in a salt-mine, and was decorated by Prince Charles of Belgium as Officer of the Order of Leopold. Mrs. Boas writes that he was about to leave for Germany with trucks and guards to bring back other stolen Belgian treasures.

IRWIN EDMAN went to Rio de Janeiro this spring as visiting lecturer at the University of Brazil, under arrangements made by the Department of State, Division of Cultural Cooperation. Mrs. GRACE McCANN MORLEY and THOMAS MUNRO are members of the State Department's Advisory Committee on Art.

HENRY SCHAEFER-SIMMERN, recently with the Russell Sage Foundation, has gone to Berkeley to begin work as Visiting Professor of Art and Education at the University of California. His appointment was a pleasant sequel to the Society's convention at Cleveland in September, 1944, where he read a paper on his methods of teaching art, and met Professor Stephen C. Pepper.

DOUGLAS MACAGY was recently appointed Director of the California School of Fine Arts, which is affiliated with the University of California, and is located at 800 Chestnut Street, San Francisco.

The hopes of BARONESS HILLA V. REBAY, Curator of the Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation, are nearing fruition with the publication of Frank Lloyd Wright's remarkable plans for the Museum of Non-Objective Painting in New York.

LYNN D. POOLE is out of the Army Air Force, where he served as Public Relations Officer with the rank of major. He prepared and circulated several outstanding photographic exhibits. He has resigned from the Walters Gallery in Baltimore, and is now living at 101 South Oakland St., Pasadena 5, California.

The American Psychological Association in a recent reorganization has established a Division on Aesthetics. The Chairman is PAUL R. FARNSWORTH, the Secretary is NORMAN C. MEIER, and the Division Representatives are HERBERT S. LANGFELD and PAUL R. FARNSWORTH.

The Southern California Section of the A. S. A. held its fifth meeting at the California Institute of Technology on October 13th. HENRY PURMORT EAMES, of Claremont Graduate College, presided. The program as announced included the following papers: *Guyau's Problèmes de l'esthétique contemporaine*, by Mrs. HELEN L. MATHEWS; *Relationships between Technical and Aesthetic Qualities in Painting*, by THOMAS M. BEGGS, Professor of Art, Pomona College; *The Basic Elements of Expression in Art*, by ALOIS J. SCHARDT, Former Director of the National Museum, Berlin; *Creative Activity as Related to the Institu-*

tional Field, by MRS. EVELYN B. BULL; *Problems of Art Criticism*, by HELMUT HUNGERLAND; *The Aesthetics of the Educational Film*, by RAYMOND S. STITES, Department of Humanities, Redlands University.

The Ohio Division of the A. S. A. held its first fall meeting on October 17th at the Western Reserve Historical Society's building in Cleveland. The aesthetics group were guests of the American Institute of Archeology, Cleveland chapter. THOMAS MUNRO spoke on *Mystic Symbolism in Ancient and Oriental Art*.

At the time the December issue went to press, the 1945 Annual Meeting of the A. S. A. was being planned for November 23rd and 24th at Hunter College, New York City. Only a small out-of-town attendance was expected, because of travel restrictions. No election of officers was in prospect, since the president and vice-president hold office until the end of 1946, in accordance with the constitution adopted in 1944. A report of the meeting will be published in a later issue of the Journal.

WILLIAM FLEMING, formerly Professor of Music and Philosophy at Pomona Junior College, in California, has recently accepted the position of Professor of Fine Arts at Syracuse University, where he is now teaching courses in the History and Appreciation of Art and Music.

LT. COMDR. RAY N. FAULKNER, on leave of absence from the Art Department of Teachers College, is in Washington at the Bureau of Naval Personnel. He is chairman of the Committee on Fine and Applied Arts of the American Educational Research Association.

CONTRIBUTORS

WALTER ABELL is Associate Professor of Art at Michigan State College, East Lansing, Michigan.

HENRY D. AIKEN, recently at Harvard and Columbia, is now Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Washington in Seattle.

PAUL R. FARNSWORTH is Professor of Psychology at Stanford University.

WILLIAM FLEMING is Associate Professor of Fine Arts at Syracuse University.

BERTRAM E. JESSUP is Assistant Professor of English and Aesthetics at the University of Oregon.

HUGO LEICHTENTRITT, of Cambridge, Mass., is author of *Music, History, and Ideas*.

L. MOHOLY-NAGY is President of the Institute of Design in Chicago, and author of *The New Vision*.

CARL THURSTON, of Pasadena, Cal., is author of *The Structure of Art*, and a trustee of the American Society for Aesthetics.