



TWO ANCIENT CHRISTOLOGIES

A STUDY IN THE
CHRISTOLOGICAL THOUGHT OF THE
SCHOOLS OF ALEXANDRIA AND ANTIOCH
IN THE EARLY HISTORY OF
CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE

BY

R. V. SELLERS, D.D.

*Warden of St Augustine's House
Reading*

Published for the Church Historical Society

LONDON

SOCIETY FOR PROMOTING
CHRISTIAN KNOWLEDGE
NORTHUMBERLAND AVENUE, WC 2

1940

To
THE MEMORY OF
MY FATHER

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN

PREFACE

IN the nineteenth century, when, in the reaction against “other-worldliness”, emphasis came to be laid on the notion of immanence, and values were looked for in this world and its civilization, it was but natural that Christian thinkers should urge the re-exploration of Christianity, and see in the Man of Nazareth and the revelation of God which is to be found in Him the message for the age. Moreover, it was in keeping with this changed habit of thought that students of the early history of Christian dogma should select, as their special field of enquiry, the teaching of the Antiochene theologians, whose writings reveal a lively interest in anthropology; and, as is well known, of recent years much important work has been done on this subject.

Now, however, when there appears to be a general dissatisfaction with a civilization which fails to bring with it the healing of man and nation, the pendulum, it seems, is swinging away from immanentism, and there are signs that the coming years will see a demand, not for a religion which proclaims as its basic conception that the Divine is to be found in the soul, but for one which proclaims that God, a living and personal Being, while immanent in creation, certainly transcends it, and that, since He is not “wholly other”, but One to whom man can lift up his whole being, knowing that no phase of human life lies completely outside of the divine life, it is in a relationship of mutual love that man’s cravings for a more abundant life can be satisfied. It seems likely, then, that in the future more attention will be paid to the work of the Alexandrine theologians, who, while affirming the immanence of God in the world and in man, start from the thought of the loving-kindness of the God who transcends the world, and set at the forefront of their teaching the principal assertion of Christianity—namely, that, in order that man, released from sin, might enjoy the fulness of life in perfect communion with his Maker, God has Himself come down and undergone human experiences in the Person of Jesus Christ.

But in this reaction against immanentism it is important that

what has been gained and proved worthy should be preserved—both what we have learned, and are still learning, concerning the immanence of God, and what concerning the historic Christ. And the same holds good in respect of our knowledge of the teaching of the Antiochene theologians. Indeed, if the conclusion which has been reached in this study is correct, it would seem that, as we make use of ancient Christological thought in our attempt to understand (so far as human limitations will allow) the *mysterium Christi*, we cannot avoid turning to the contribution made by the teachers of this school. For, though at first sight the Antiochenes appear to establish their doctrine on a dualistic conception of God and man, it seems clear that, as we look beneath the surface and concentrate rather upon what they were meaning to say than upon what, in the heat of controversy, they actually said, it is found that these, too, though from their own point of view, were upholding, and seeking to explain, the Christian affirmation that Ἰησοῦς Χριστός is Θεοῦ Υἱός and Σωτήρ—and, what is more, that in their teaching on the reality of the Lord's human consciousness they supply what is lacking in the system of the Alexandrines, as these start from the same affirmation. As is claimed in this work, if we are to see old things in a new light, we must turn to our treasure, and out of it bring forth together both these ancient Christologies, since the one without the other cannot be deemed wholly satisfactory.

It remains for me to express my gratitude to the Regius Professor of Divinity at Cambridge, the Rev. Canon C. E. Raven, D.D., for his help and encouragement, and, for his valuable advice and criticism, to the Dean of Clare College, the Rev. W. Telfer, D.D., in what has been a lengthy course of study. At the end of it I have the honour of being able to say that the work has earned for me a doctorate in divinity at Cambridge.

I would also gratefully acknowledge my indebtedness to the Church Historical Society and to the Managers of the Hort Fund for their generosity in helping me with the publication of this book; and, for their careful printing and proof-reading, to the workmen and staff of the Cambridge University Press.

Finally, I would say that had I not enjoyed the privilege of being Warden of the Foundation of St Augustine in Reading, this work would not have been written; for it was the wish

of the Foundress, the late Mrs Eleanor Barrett Palmer, that St Augustine's should provide leisure for the pursuit of theological studies. To her, therefore, and to the Trustees of the Foundation, I owe no small debt.

R. V. SELLERS

Reading

8 May 1939

Ἐπόμενοι τοίνυν τοῖς ἁγίοις πατράσιν
ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ὁμολογοῦμεν Υἱὸν τὸν Κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν

πρὸ αἰώνων μὲν ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς γεννηθέντα
κατὰ τὴν θεότητα
ἐπ' ἔσχατων δὲ τῶν ἡμερῶν τὸν αὐτὸν δι' ἡμᾶς καὶ διὰ τὴν
ἡμετέραν σωτηρίαν ἐκ Μαρίας τῆς παρθένου τῆς θεοτόκου
κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα

ἐν δύο φύσεσιν
ἀσυγχύτως ἀτρέπτως ἀδιαιρέτως ἀχωρίστως
γνωριζόμενον

*Definitio Fidei apud
Concilium Chalcedonense*

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	page xiii
CHAPTER I. ALEXANDRINE CHRISTOLOGY	
I. The Teaching of Athanasius and his Predecessors	i
II. The Teaching of Apollinarius of Laodicea and his School	45
III. The Teaching of the Cappadocian Fathers	65
IV. The Teaching of Cyril	80
CHAPTER II. ANTIOCHENE CHRISTOLOGY	
I. The Soteriological Teaching of the Antiochene Theologians	107
II. The Christological Teaching of the Antiochene Theologians	143
CONCLUSION	
I. The Conflict between the two Schools of Thought and its Outcome	202
II. The Value of the Alexandrine and the Antiochene Christologies	243
INDEX	259

INTRODUCTION

THE purpose of this study is to examine the Christological teaching of the Alexandrine and the Antiochene theologians in the early history of Christian dogma with a view to showing that, in reality, they were both contending for the same fundamental truths, and that, in consequence, the conflict which raged between these two ancient schools of thought, and had as its outcome the break-up of the school of Antioch, is to be regarded as one of the major tragedies in the history of the Early Church.

We shall first consider the Alexandrine Christology. Its early exponents, Greeks, living in a Greek world, may betray signs of the influence of the thought and religion of Hellenism, but it seems clear that their Christological teaching, even if, in some of its aspects, it must be deemed unsatisfactory, has at its root ideas which are essentially Christian. Their successors in this Greek doctrinal tradition carry forward and develop the same basic Christological principles, only now these appear against a background which is, apparently, more in keeping with Christian fundamentals. These Christological principles are, first, that Jesus Christ is one Person, God Himself, who has become man for man's salvation, and, second, that in Him are the two elements of Godhead and manhood, these remaining real in their union in this one Person; as they are seen from the point of view of what they are meant to deny, the one may be called the anti-Nestorian, the other the anti-Eutychian principle. It is upon the first of these principles that the Alexandrines, in their determination to resist the Nestorian doctrine, lay particular stress; the second lies at the root of their teaching, but, as we shall try to show, while they hold that the Lord's manhood is real, and that it possesses the faculty of self-determination, they fail to develop what they accept as a principle.

The Antiochenes approach the Christological problem from a different standpoint, for if the Alexandrines can be called Christian Platonists, these, brought up in what is known as the Syrian doctrinal tradition, can be called Christian Aristotelians.

Yet, as we would show, these, too, building on the same Christian fundamentals, uphold the same two Christological principles. The difference between these theologians and those of the school of Alexandria would appear to lie in this: that while maintaining the first of these principles (though, if attention is paid merely to some of their terms, it may seem that a very different verdict is called for), the Antiochenes, intent on rejecting the error of Eutychianism, lay emphasis on the second, and, what is more, as it seems, succeed where their opponents fail, in that these make use of the doctrine of the reality of the Lord's manhood to the full extent, and do not hesitate to apply the principle of its individuality.

So we would conclude that the Council of Ephesus (431), instead of marking the beginnings of a process which ended in the disruption of the Syrian school of theology, might have stood as the place where two ways met—and that to the benefit of the Christian Church. Perhaps in these modern days, when thought is such that the doctrine of the Antiochenes has a special appeal, we can carry forward their work—only, it would seem, we should be prepared to make use of the contribution of the Alexandrine teachers as well as that of the teachers of the school of Antioch, since, the two contributions being complementary, both are necessary in the interest of sound Christological thought.

CHAPTER I

ALEXANDRINE CHRISTOLOGY

I. THE TEACHING OF ATHANASIUS AND HIS PREDECESSORS

THE Christological thought of the Alexandrine school of theology in the history of the Early Church finds its highest expression before the Council of Chalcedon (451) in the teaching of Cyril, who came to be venerated as the defender of orthodoxy against the peril of Nestorianism. But the faith which this theologian proclaimed was not his own creation. Central to the Alexandrine Christological tradition are both the great Athanasius and Apollinarius of Laodicea, whose doctrine (apart, that is, from the particular error of the latter) Cyril carried forward. But the principles upheld by Athanasius had been upheld before him by earlier Greek teachers, and in particular by Origen. So it is that, if we are to appreciate the development of the Alexandrine doctrine concerning the Person of Jesus Christ, we must first consider the teaching of Athanasius as it is seen in the light of that of his predecessors.

Now behind any given Christology there must needs lie certain ideas concerning God and man and the relations between them. It follows, then, that we cannot fully understand the Christological teaching of the Alexandrine theologians without first enquiring into their root ideas. Besides, an enquiry of this sort is necessary in view of the important consideration that if these ideas are not essentially Christian, it cannot but be that the doctrinal structure which is founded upon them is, correspondingly, faulty. So we begin with an investigation of the doctrine of God as this was expounded by Athanasius and those who had gone before.

Perhaps it will be well if, by way of introduction to our subject, we try to realize the difficulties that confronted the early exponents of Christianity as these set out to explain their faith to their neighbours. The Greeks had entered into the heritage bequeathed to them by Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics, and, as in Neo-Platonism, were now seeking to effect a closer fusion of

traditional philosophical ideas with that essentially religious idea which is to be found at the heart of the Hellenic genius, namely, that blessedness is to be found as the human soul, liberated from all earthly bonds, mounts higher and higher in its contemplation of the Divine. So God was looked upon as the One, utterly transcendent and unknowable, the Father, the God, who, as Plato had said, stands "beyond knowledge and being".¹ But the Christian conception of God—a conception which has its roots in Hebraic Theism—is radically different from this. Christianity proclaims, not that God is the One who, highly exalted and enshrouded in mystery, is banished from the world, but that He is the all-holy and all-loving Creator, who, yearning that man, made in His image, should enjoy perfect communion with Him, and rule his life in accordance with the divine will, again and again intervenes in history—"rising up early and sending"—as He works out His good purpose for His creation. Clearly, then, the task facing early Christian teachers was no light one. How were they to present their message to a world long accustomed to vastly different ideas? Can we blame them if they set out to discover what common ground there was between the Greek and the Christian, and, having discovered such common ground, at once made use of it? Indeed, it must be admitted that such perspicacity is greatly to their credit. Or, can we blame them if, when speaking of God, they adopt terms and phrases which have no ethical significance but are bound up with the Greek philosophical conception of the Divine? After all, they must have felt that it was only in this way that they could be sure of gaining a hearing.² But this is far from saying that they were themselves

¹ *Rep.* vi. 509.

² It may seem that Justin Martyr, for instance, anxious to commend the Gospel to his Greek neighbours as the only safe and profitable philosophy (*Dial.* 8), thinks of God as the nameless, far-distant Being whom men cannot discover, but it is evident that basic to his teaching is the Christian truth that God is Father and Creator, the Lord and Master of all, who of His goodness has created man, in order that, in his obedience to the divine commandments, he might reign with Him (*Apol.* i. 8, 10; ii. 7; *Dial.* 7), and who, beholding him now subject to the powers of evil, has intervened, and Himself sent His Logos as man among men in order to effect his deliverance (*Apol.* i. 28, 63; ii. 6). Similarly Athenagoras, answering the charge of "Atheism", pleads that the Christians "acknowledge one God, uncreated, eternal, invisible, impassible, incomprehensible, illimitable, who is apprehended by the understanding only and the reason, who is encompassed by light and beauty and

taken captive by the very thought which they were attempting to overcome. As seems clear, they never surrender the fundamentals of their faith; at its core, their doctrine does not vary: the God of the Christians, they proclaim, is an ethical God.

And, especially at Alexandria, might we have expected Christian teachers to have been so strongly influenced by the spell of Hellas that in their hands the gospel came to be deprived of its essential character. For at this centre of Greek culture, with its Library and Museum, Eastern thought in its manifold forms was being mingled with the philosophy of Greece. Here Philo, making use of Hellenic conceptions, had sought to present Judaism as a religious philosophy; here the leading Gnostics, Basilides and Valentinus, had flourished. It was here, too, that the first of the Neo-Platonists, Plotinus (204–270), had studied under the renowned Ammonius before he settled at Rome. The tradition of learning for which Alexandria was famed was continued among the Christians, who set up their catechetical school—a school which was to give to Christendom teachers who could make their valuable contribution to Christian theology. But, even if the earliest and most influential heads of the school of Alexandria, Clement († before 215) and Origen (185–254), were Greeks by birth and outlook, they were never unmindful of their Christian calling. They were Christians living in an atmosphere of Greek thought—but Christians they remained.

Clement, intent upon attracting the educated Greeks to the Christian message, lays all stress on the thought that the supreme gift which Christianity has to offer to men is knowledge of the Divine, and makes use of their language. God, he says, is "above all speech, all conception, and all thought, being inexpressible even by His own power"; He is "ranked as the All on account of His greatness"; He is "the One, indivisible, without dimensions and limit, without form and name".¹ Certainly, such

spirit and power ineffable" (*Suppl.* 10). But, as is clear, this Apologist, too, does not consider that God is removed from the world; rather, for him, is He the world's Creator and Framer, who moulds it according to His will, just as the potter moulds the clay (*ibid.* 8, 9, 15).

¹ *Strom.* v. 10, 12; vii. 1. It may be noted that Plato's words, "It is a hard task to find the Father and Maker of this universe, and when you have found Him, it is impossible to declare Him to all" (*Timaeus*, 28c), are quoted three times by Clement, and that with manifest approval: "Well done, Plato; thou hast touched on the truth" (*Protrept.* vi (ed. Dindorf, i. p. 74); *Strom.* v. 12, 14).

expressions, viewed by themselves, are not consistent with the cardinal truth of the gospel that God can, and does, reveal Himself, but, while owing a big debt to Greek philosophy, Clement is a Christian. Fundamental to his doctrine is the conception that God is the Creator who loves all the things which He has made, who, a God of purpose, gave to the world as its instructors the Law of Moses and the philosophy of the Greeks, and who, to complete this process of education, has in these last days sent "Him from whom all instruction comes", the Logos made man, that through Him man might possess that perfect knowledge, the attainment of which spells his salvation.¹

It is reasonable to conclude that the same ethical conception of God is to be found behind the theology of him who, an outstanding mind in his own and succeeding generations, was the first to offer to the Church a *summa theologiae*, and in it, greatly daring, to face, and to give an answer to, doctrinal problems, the importance of which had yet to be realized. Origen, indebted to Plato and Philo, the Alexandrian Jew, drew up a system which may well have appeared to thoughtful Greeks as simply another product of Hellenic erudition, and it is easy to understand why Porphyry, the disciple of Plotinus, should say of this great thinker that while his life was that of a Christian, his opinions concerning the Deity were those of the Greek.² He affirms that God is "incorporeal, a simple intellectual nature", incomprehensible, impassible, and uncircumscribed; he adopts the Pythagorean "Monad"—nay, not satisfied with this, he would establish a new term 'Ενός.³ Again, he speaks of God as Mind and Ousia; indeed, he goes farther and declares that He is "Mind, or something transcending Mind and Ousia".⁴ Clearly, it is possible to argue that Origen pushes the idea of divine transcendence to its farthest limit.⁵

But his doctrine has another, and, as it seems, a more fundamental aspect. The foundation of his system, he explicitly states, lies in the revelation given in Scripture and the truth of the apostolic tradition; nay, as he himself confesses, it is in order to

¹ *Paed.* i. 8; *Protrept.* xi.

² Eusebius, *H.E.* vi. 19.

³ *De Princ.* i. i. 5, 6; *c. Celsum*, vi. 64.

⁴ *C. Celsum*, vii. 38.

⁵ See, for instance, the view taken by De Faye, *Origène, sa Vie, son Œuvre, sa Pensée*, iii. pp. 27 ff.

express these fundamentals that he makes use of sound philosophical teaching.¹ So, building upon this foundation, he can establish the thought which is central to his system—the thought, that is, of God's creative activity. With his view of an eternal act or process of creation we are not here concerned. What should be noticed is that for him this activity proceeds not from "God" regarded as a metaphysical abstraction, but from a self-conscious Being whose very essence, as it is made known to man, is goodness, and who, just because He is what He is, must reveal Himself,² this divine self-revelation being seen first and foremost in the Incarnation itself.³

At the same time, it cannot be denied that with Origen the historical—and the Christian faith is, of course, bound up with history—recedes into the background: as a Platonist, he is concerned rather with the eternal, the only true reality, than with the temporal which is but the shadow of that reality—a characteristic which, as we shall see, is reflected in his Christology. Moreover, it is not unlikely that those who succeeded him as heads of the catechetical school—notably, Theognostus⁴ and Pierius (whom Jerome calls "Origen Junior"⁵)—had the same point of view. But, if we take as our criterion the letter of Hymenaeus and the five other bishops⁶ who assembled at Antioch (c. 268) to pass judgment on the teaching of Paul of Samosata, it is clear that the thought of the intervention of the Divine in the temporal was given first place by churchmen who themselves looked upon Origen as their master. These may use philosophical terms when speaking of God and say that He is one, unoriginate, unseen, unchanging, incomprehensible to man except in so far as He is made known through the Son, but it does not appear justifiable to conclude from this that theirs is the *Deus philosophorum*. For, upholding against the Samosatene the

¹ *De Princ.*, *Praef.* 4-10.

² *Ibid.* i. ii. 13. But, as his argument against Marcion shows, Origen holds that God is just as well as good (*ibid.* ii. v. 3).

³ See esp. the important chapter on the Incarnation in *de Princ.* ii. vi.

⁴ But it should be noted that, according to Photius (*Cod.* cvi), Theognostus in his *Hypotyposes* deliberately repudiates the notion that an incarnation of the Logos is an impossibility. It may be argued, then, that at the root of his teaching is the conception that God is an ethical God.

⁵ *De Vir. Illustr.* 76.

⁶ The text is to be found in Loofs, *Paulus von Samosata*, pp. 324 ff.

doctrine of the individual being of the Logos, they proceed to show how "the begotten Son, the Only-begotten, and God", who was "always with the Father fulfilling the paternal will towards all creation", was God's instrument in creation, in the revelation to the Patriarchs, and in the giving of the Law, and how He was sent from heaven by the Father, and became incarnate, and was made man. Surely, behind such statements we can trace the presence of the conception of an ethical God who has a purpose for mankind, and works for its fulfilment.¹

We are now in a position to consider Athanasius' doctrine of God. As is often said, his is an interest which is not philosophical, but religious: he is rather the great religious reformer than the systematic theologian. In this respect he differs from his distinguished predecessors at Alexandria. For the ethical idea of God, which had at times, as it seems, been seriously overshadowed by the Greek idea of Him, is now crystal clear. From first to last Athanasius focuses attention upon the supreme truth expressed in the opening words of the *Benedictus*: "Blessed be the Lord God of Israel; for He hath visited and redeemed His people"; for central to his teaching is the Christian fundamental that God Himself has intervened in history in order to effect man's redemption. His view of God, then, is not that in His transcendence He is utterly removed from the world of finite beings, but that He is the living and personal Creator who Himself draws nigh to His creation, as, of His goodness, He desires that man shall draw nigh to him. This is not to say that Athanasius does not use the terms and expressions of the Greek philosophical schools—he certainly does; but, as we say, he is dominated by an interest which is altogether religious. Thus he uses the term "ousia", the word that philosophers used in their class-rooms, but, it should be observed, he uses it in its simple meaning of "being": "When we hear 'I am that I am'," he says, "we understand the ousia of Him that is."² Again, he may adopt Plato's words—words which, of course, sum up the thought of

¹ Cf. in this connection the *Praeparatio* and the *Demonstratio Evangelica* of Eusebius of Caesarea, who stands in the Origenistic tradition. In these works the theme "God in history" is uppermost.

² *De Synod.* 35. It is noteworthy that we find no trace in the writings of Athanasius of the question which had disturbed Origen: Is God above ousia in dignity and power, or is He Himself ousia? See *c. Celsum*, vi. 64.

the Neo-Platonists concerning the super-essential One—that God is "beyond all being",¹ but, as Robertson points out,² it is significant that he inserts the word "created", saying that God is "beyond all created being"; and, as is seen when one refers to the passages in the *contra Gentes*³ in which the expression occurs, uppermost here is the thought of God's "nearness" to man. Moreover, he adopts the celebrated saying in the *Timaeus* to suit his purpose: God is "good", or rather He is "essentially the source of goodness", who grudges existence to none, but desires all to exist as objects of His loving-kindness—a loving-kindness which, he goes on to show, is seen in the presence of His Logos in creation and (here bringing out the truth which ever separates the message of the Gospel from the ideas of Neo-Platonism⁴) in the coming of that Logos in a human body for our salvation.⁵

Again, one side of their Logos-doctrine plainly illustrates that the earlier Alexandrine teachers would uphold the Christian conception of God. For if the Christian fundamental that in Jesus Christ God Himself has come down as man among men is to be maintained, it must be asserted that the Logos who became man is co-eternal with the Father—and this is what they do assert. At the same time, as it has been put, "the doctrine of the Logos, great as was its importance for theology, harboured deadly perils in its bosom".⁶ In confessing the Godhead of Jesus Christ, theologians were at once brought face to face with the problem as to how they were to express the distinction between the Father and the Son, and at the same time to preserve the truth concerning the unity of God which they had inherited from ancient Israel. The Sabellians had their answer, but this meant the denial of the Son's personal existence. The answer which came from the other side, the answer of Subordinationism,

¹ *Rep.* vi. 509.

² "Athanasius", in *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, *Proleg.* p. lxxii.

³ *C. Gentes*, 2, 35, 40.

⁴ Cf. the celebrated statement of Augustine, *Confessions*, vii. 9: the Greek could agree that the Logos is all that is said of Him in the opening words of the Fourth Gospel, but in no Neo-Platonic writing was it said that "the Logos became flesh and dwelt amongst us", or that "God spared not his own Son, but delivered Him up for us all".

⁵ See *c. Gentes*, 41, and *de Incarn.* 3, Athanasius here making use of *Timaeus*, 29 E.

⁶ So G. L. Prestige, *God in Patristic Thought*, p. 129.

was unsatisfactory because it always carried with it the suggestion that God is the transcendent, self-sufficient, and distinct Being, and that there must needs be a mediator, a "second God", between Him and the world, if the world is to be accounted for. As is well known, the principle of the Son's subordination to the Father is to be found side by side with that of His co-eternity with the Father in Clement and Origen. Neither is there any need for us to enlarge on the subject that it was Origen's teaching on the subordination of the Son, at the expense of that on His eternal generation, which was developed by his followers, as these were intent upon resisting the Sabellian doctrine, and that this teaching, being carried even farther by the Lucianists, had its outcome in the Arian scheme of logical deductions—itsself a witness to what could be built on the foundation of Subordinationism, once the doctrine that the nature of the Son is the same as that of the Father had been cast aside.

But, now that Arianism was in the field, Athanasius sees full well that it is no longer possible for Christian teachers to hold together the two contradictory principles of the complete divinity of the Son and His inferiority to the Father; now, as he realizes, if the fundamental Christian conviction that it is God Himself, and not a second and inferior God, Himself a creature, who has made the world and redeemed mankind is to be upheld, it must—and that with all boldness—be asserted that the being of the Son is identical with that of the Father. Let the Scriptures be set up as a light upon its candlestick, he declares, and it will be understood that it must be confessed that the Logos, the very Son of the Father, is no creature or work, but an offspring (γέννημα) proper to the Father's ousia—and, therefore, very God, and "homoousios" with the Father.¹ What he teaches, then, is that whatever the Father is such is the Son—that, as he has it, "the fulness of the Father's Godhead is the being of the Son, and the Son is whole God",² the Godhead of the Father and the Son being one.³ Moreover, he insists that there is all the difference in the world between "begetting" and "creating". The Son is not a creature, but the offspring proper to the Father, as

¹ *C. Arian.* i. 9.

² τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς τοῦ Πατρὸς θεότητός ἐστι τὸ εἶναι τοῦ Υἱοῦ, καὶ ὅλος θεὸς ἐστὶν ὁ Υἱός (*ibid.* iii. 6).

³ *Ibid.* iii. 11.

are rays of light to the sun: the rays are of the sun, but they are inseparable from it. So also, he goes on, is the Son of the Father's ousia, while the ousia, the Godhead, is indivisible; He is other as offspring, but the same as God, He and the Father being one "in the identity of the one Godhead".¹

It is, then, through this Logos who is "Whole God" that, Athanasius insists, God has created the world. To say—as, in effect, the Lucianists had said—that God made the Son alone and then committed the rest to Him because He did not deign to make them Himself is, he exclaims, to say what creation itself will condemn as unworthy of God. There is no pride in God: as the Lord Himself has told us, this teacher affirms, God exercises His Providence even down to things so small as a hair of the head, a sparrow, and the grass of the field—therefore it cannot be unworthy of Him, through a Logos who is proper to Him and no creature, to make all things.² Thus is rejected the idea of an utterly transcendent and self-sufficient Being: God is indeed a transcendent Being, but His transcendence is not such that He is removed from His creation. In fact, this latter point is upheld again and again by Athanasius when he speaks of the function of the Logos. "It pleased God", he says, "that His own wisdom should condescend to the creatures so as to introduce an impress and semblance on all in common and on each, that what was made might be manifestly wise works and worthy of God";³ so does God, "because He is good, guide and settle the whole creation by His own Logos who is Himself God, . . . that creation may have light and abide always securely"—for "it would have come to nothingness but for the maintenance of it by the Logos".⁴ According to Athanasius, then, it is no medium, inferior to the Supreme, but God Himself who, through a Logos who is proper to Him, creates the world, and who, while transcendent, is also, through this same Logos, immanent in creation: not only

¹ *Ibid.* iii. 4 (cf. *de Decret.* 12).

² *Ibid.* ii. 24 f. Eusebius of Nicomedia, Arius, and Asterius the Sophist had declared in writing that "God, willing to create originate nature, when He saw that it could not endure the untempered hand of the Father", creates the Logos "that, through Him as a medium, all things might thereupon be brought to be".

³ *Ibid.* ii. 78.

⁴ *C. Gentes*, 41; see also, on the "marvellous and truly divine harmony" which the Logos produces in the cosmos, *ibid.* 42.

"through Him" but also "in Him" all things consist.¹ The cosmic relations of the Logos are still maintained, but no longer is the distinction between Him and the Father expressed in terms of creation; rather, the distinction is now lifted to its highest plane, and set within the divine ousia itself.

But the great Alexandrine is much more interested in the problem of redemption than in that of creation: for him, the chief function of the Logos is to become man in order to restore a fallen humanity. Clement and Origen had emphasized His function as the Revealer of the Divine: as the Power, the Wisdom, the Knowledge, and the Truth of the Father, the former declares, the Logos has ever been the Instructor in the divine mysteries,² and, to give men the fulness of light, has in these last days Himself become flesh; and Origen, while teaching that the Logos became man in order to take away sin, and that the redemption which He has wrought is visible to all, holds that for the more advanced Christ is the divine Teacher, whom these appreciate rather as Wisdom than as Redeemer.³ But Athanasius, whose, as we have said, is not a philosophical but a supremely religious interest, proclaims that the Logos made man is essentially man's Redeemer, redeeming him from his present sinful state—and, he insists, no depotentiated God, no creature, but only One who is very God could bring about the required restoration. He argues in this way: If the Logos who became God had been a creature, man would have remained what he was, not joined to God, for succour could not have come from like to like when one as well as the other needed it; a creature could not have undone God's sentence against man and remitted sin, for it is God alone who, as the prophet Micah says, "pardoneth iniquity and passeth by transgression"; therefore, what was necessary has indeed taken place—the Lord, the Son, who is the proper Logos and image of the Father's essence, even He who at the beginning sentenced man to death on account of sin, has

¹ Cf. *de Incarn.* 8, where Athanasius makes the point that the Logos visited the earth in which He was yet always present: "The Logos . . . came to our realm, though He was not far from us before [οὐτι γέ μακρὸν ὦν πρότερον]. For no part of creation is left void of Him: He has filled all things everywhere, while remaining present with His own Father."

² *Strom.* vii. 2; iv. 25; vi. 8.

³ See below, pp. 26 f.

Himself become man, and made him free.¹ Clearly, behind all this we mark both the presence of the thought of an ethical God who, of His goodness, Himself intervenes in man's history for man's everlasting good, and, at the same time, the direct rejection of the conception that God is the Supreme who, far above the world, cannot thus "stoop down" in a desire to redeem it.

From Athanasius' conception of God, let us turn to his conception of man, once again viewing his teaching in the light of that of his predecessors. Here especially do we perceive a distinct difference between his outlook and theirs.

The Christian doctrine of man is that he is a reasonable being, endowed with freedom of choice, who, made in the image of God, is capable of communion with Him, it being his chief end "to glorify God and to enjoy Him for ever". But it is also an essential part of this doctrine that man is sinful and guilty, and so stands in need of redemption—and that a redemption which must come from without, from God Himself, if man is to attain the end for which he was created.

Now there can be no doubt that the earlier Alexandrines upheld the former of these two ideas: theirs is the fundamental truth that man is so constituted that it is possible for him to be a partaker of the divine nature. Man, they teach, is a rational creature and the image of the Logos, who is Himself the Father's image²—so can he enter into fellowship with the Divine. "Man," says Clement, "alone of all the other living creatures, was in his creation endowed with an understanding of God";³ he is "a God-loving being";⁴ "a heavenly plant born for the contemplation of heaven"; he is "constituted by nature for fellowship with the Divine".⁵

The same thought lies at the root of Origen's doctrine of man's origin and destiny⁶—a doctrine which is part of that larger

¹ *C. Arian.* ii. 67.

² See esp. Clement, *Strom.* v. 14, and Origen, *Comm. in Johan.* ii. 2 (ed. Brooke, i. p. 59).

³ *Strom.* vii. 2.

⁴ *Protrept.* x.

⁵ *Paed.* ii. 8.

⁶ Cf. Origen's explicit statement on the kinship between God and man which is to be found at the beginning of his *de Princ.* (I. i. 7): "The mind bears a certain relationship to God, of whom the mind itself is an intellectual image, and by means of this it may come to knowledge of the nature of the Divine, especially if it be purified and separated from bodily matter."

piece of speculation of his whereby he would account for the diversities of the present order. All spirits, he holds, were created *ab aeterno*, and endowed with freedom of choice—freedom being the chief characteristic of the whole spiritual creation. But, in exercising this freedom, all, save one, fell, with the consequence that God was no more “all in all”. Therefore, in His just judgment, God arranged according to a regular plan each “in proportion to the desert of his declension and dejection”,¹ some spirits becoming the angels, others the heavenly bodies, others the souls of men, and others the opposing powers.² For human souls the world, created of such quality and capacity as to be able to contain them, became a training-ground, in order that, while being free, they might through God’s grace win back what had been lost, and, through gradual advance, arrive at that perfect likeness to God which has been reserved for the consummation;³ for this likeness is possible since the soul was made in the divine image.⁴ So Origen can teach that man, as he exercises his diligence in the imitation of God, can receive “the whole band of virtues innate in the divine essence”;⁵ “the possibility of attaining to perfection being his at the beginning through the dignity of the divine image”, he can reach the end, the perfect realization of the divine likeness, when, every cloud of wickedness having been swept away, “all which any rational understanding feels or understands or thinks is wholly God”, and God Himself is “all in all”.⁶

But further enquiry into the thought of these teachers reveals that the Greek religious spirit has here left its distinct mark. For them it is the escape of the soul from this earthly prison-house to its true home in the super-sensible world that is the matter of primary importance. “Apathy” and “gnosis” occupy a place at the forefront of their teaching on man and his destiny—let a man shut himself off from troubles without and storms of

¹ *De Princ.* I. vi. 3, I.

² *Ibid.* I. vi. 2; I. viii. 1, 2, 4; II. viii. 3; II. i. 1 ff.; *Praef.* 8.

³ *Ibid.* III. v. 4; III. vi. 1, 2, 3; I. vi.

⁴ *Ibid.* III. vi. 1; *c. Celsum*, vi. 63. Cf. in this connection Origen’s statement that if, through neglect, the human mind falls away, it possesses in itself the seeds of restoration and renewal, since the “inner”, or “rational”, man is renewed after the image of the God who created him (*de Princ.* IV. i. 36).

⁵ *De Princ.* IV. i. 37.

⁶ *Ibid.* III. vi. 1, 3.

passion within,¹ and, as, God helping him,² he contemplates the Divine, his soul will mount ever upward till, in his perfect knowledge, he attains likeness to God. Faith, they say, is essential, but only as the first step which a man must take towards understanding the divine mysteries—it is “gnosis” which effects the soul’s transformation to the better.³ The salvation which these teachers proclaim, then, consists rather in the illumination of the individual than in the restoration of the whole human race as it labours under the burden of sin. Sin they are inclined to regard rather from an intellectual than from a moral point of view, and it is significant that Clement can treat of the state of “apathy” as a possibility which the reasonable man tries to achieve, without taking into real account the frailty of human nature. According to Clement, man’s outlook is perverted through ignorance of the true Reason—but one can rise above such a state as, passions quelled, one devotes oneself to the contemplation of the splendour of the Divine which has been manifested in Jesus Christ;⁴ and, even if Origen includes in his system a doctrine of its universality,⁵ it is evident that for him

¹ According to Clement, the ideal is to be “deified into apathy” (*Strom.* iv. 22); indeed, in this passage he says that, if it were possible to distinguish between salvation and knowledge, the true Gnostic would choose the latter, since the former carries with it an element of desire. For an illustration of Origen’s insistence on “apathy”, see Gregory Thaumaturgus, *Panegyric on Origen*, xi. Cf. also the quotation from *de Princ.* I. i. 7 set out above, p. 11 n. 6.

² It is noteworthy that while both teachers follow the Stoic tradition in laying stress on the autonomy of the human will, they recognize that divine grace is necessary at every stage of man’s development: “God wills us to be saved by means of ourselves” says Clement—but he also prays the Spirit of Christ to bring him to his Jerusalem (*Strom.* vi. 12; iv. 26); and, while the principle of human freedom has a central place in his teaching on created spirits, Origen readily declares that “the human will of itself is weak to accomplish any good, since it is by divine help that it is brought to perfection in everything” (*de Princ.* III. ii. 2). Cf. also the following statement: “From which (*i.e.* from Ps. xxvii. 1–3, which Origen has just quoted) I infer that a man perhaps would never be able of himself to vanquish an opposing power, unless he had the benefit of divine assistance” (*ibid.* III. ii. 5).

³ Cf. *Strom.* vii. 10. But neither Clement nor Origen makes any severe distinction between those who are still in the stage of faith, and those who are ascending to the eternal power of God. All can philosophize, says the former, even children of tender years; and it is one of Origen’s main assertions that the Logos comes to enlarge the knowledge of every man according to his capacity, God accepting “the faith of the meanest as well as the more refined and intelligent piety of the learned” (*c. Celsum*, vi. 2; vii. 46).

⁴ *Paed.* i. 13; *Strom.* ii. 15. Cf. *Paed.* i. 2.

⁵ See esp. *c. Celsum*, iii. 61–6; vii. 50.

sin is at bottom that which is "unreal" and "non-existent", since, as he teaches, good will in the end triumph over evil, and, the antagonism having been removed, all spirits will at the last return to God.¹ Moreover—as is in keeping with this conception of man and man's salvation—it is the thought that Christ is Illuminator, and that His is the pattern-life, rather than the more fundamental thought that He is the Healer of a fallen humanity, on which, as we shall see,² these teachers lay particular emphasis. So it is reasonable to conclude that while their foundations are of Christian origin, their edifice in its completed form contains material drawn from a different source. For have we not here clear traces of the influence of the religious ideal of the Greek—for whom, as he sets out to "know himself", the self-sufficiency of the sage is the ideal manner of life, and who, his outlook dominated by the spirit of optimism, is bound to regard as unnecessary, if not as repugnant, those ideas of a fallen race and of the need for redemption and atonement which have their place at the very heart of the Christian message?

But no such evidence of the influence of the Greek spirit is to be found in Athanasius. He is at one with his predecessors in upholding the truth that man is a rational being, who, made in the image of the Logos, is capable of knowing God.³ Thus, he can say, all things were created in the Logos, and "everyone who directs his thoughts to the Lord . . . will go forward to the brightness in the light of truth";⁴ "His impress [τύπος] is in us", and it has been brought into being "that the world might recognize its own Creator, the Logos, and through Him the Father";⁵ God "did not barely create men as He did all the irrational creatures on the earth, but made them after His own image, giving them a portion even of the power of His own Logos, so that, having as it were a kind of reflexion of the Logos, and being made rational, they might be able to abide ever in blessedness, and live

¹ See the argument in *Comm. in Johan.* ii. 7 (ed. Brooke, i. pp. 74 f.).

² See below, pp. 19, 26 f.

³ Thus Athanasius can say: "As of the Son of God, considered as the Logos, our Logos is an image, so of the same Son considered as Wisdom is the wisdom which is implanted in us an image; in which wisdom we, having the power of knowledge and thought, become recipients of the All-framing Wisdom; and through It we are able to know Its Father" (*c. Arian.* ii. 78).

⁴ *De Decret.* 17.

⁵ *C. Arian.* ii. 78.

the true life".¹ Now, however, all insistence is laid on those fundamentally Hebraic ideas concerning man to which special attention had been paid by the representatives of the Asiatic school of theology.² Thus making use of the doctrine of Methodius of Olympus, of Irenaeus, and of Melito of Sardis, and employing their categories, Athanasius takes as his starting-point the conception that man is a fallen creature. Man's first parent, he declares, had an inward grasp of knowledge as to the Father, since, besides being made in the image of the Logos, he possessed the gift of the Holy Spirit. But, he goes on, Adam fell, with the consequence that this gift was taken away, and man was disinherited.³ So, having "altered", did man cease to be "in God". Though, still a rational creature, he had not completely robbed himself of the faculty of appreciating the good, his will gradually grew weaker, and the image in which he was made became more and more defaced with the filth of sin;⁴ indeed, man would have gone from bad to worse in this state of "corruption", and the world would have returned to the nothingness out of which it had been created, had not God of His goodness found for man the way of salvation.⁵

For this teacher, then, who so clearly upholds the doctrine of its universality and considers sin from a definitely moral point of view, redemption consists in the deliverance of the whole human race from the bondage of corruption into the liberty of the children of God. What was necessary, he argues, was not repentance (which could not have sufficed), but the coming of a Second Adam who could sum up the human race in Himself, and so be the root of a new creation.⁶ But no mere man could have fulfilled what was required—for a mere man could have

¹ *De Incarn.* 3; cf. also *ibid.* 11.

² As illustrating the different outlook which now belongs to the Alexandrine Church as this is represented by its bishops, it is noteworthy that Alexander († 328), the sponsor of Athanasius, had himself made use of the writings of Melito of Sardis (see Robertson, *op. cit.* p. lxviii n. 1).

³ *C. Arian.* i. 37; iii. 33. Surely, it is this, the gift of the Holy Spirit, and not, as Harnack, *History of Dogma*, iii. p. 272, argues, the rational element in man, which the Alexandrines regard as the *donum superadditum*.—Cyril has exactly the same thought (see below, p. 82).

⁴ *C. Gentes*, 8, 33, 34.

⁵ *Ibid.* 4.

⁶ See esp. *c. Arian.* ii. 65 ff. What Athanasius says here should, of course, be compared with the thought of Methodius, *Conviv. Dec. Virg.* iii. 3 ff., and that of Irenaeus, *adv. Haeres.* iii. xviii, xix.

done no more than heal himself.¹ What was necessary was that God Himself should come down and assume a manhood altogether like ours, that, through such a joining-together of God and man, man might be "in God" once more. Accordingly, this is Athanasius' main assertion: in Jesus Christ God Himself has indeed come down as man for man's salvation, for He is the very God made man. So, he teaches, has the union of God and man been established. Moreover, since the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Son, the gift which man had lost since Adam transgressed the divine command is now restored to him.² Therefore, as man is "in Christ", he is redeemed: he is brought from death to life, from corruption to incorruption, from passibility and mutability to impassibility and immutability, and knit into the Godhead itself—in a word, he is "deified".

But, it may be urged, does not this use of categories which are realistic rather than ethical seem to indicate that, according to Athanasius, the redemption is a quasi-physical process in which human nature is transfused with divine qualities? If this is the case, we are faced with the implication that he is building upon the conception that Godhead and manhood are antithetical ousiai, two substances, which come together only to result in the transformation of the latter into the former. But, as we look deeper, it seems that Athanasius' is a moral and spiritual view of man's salvation, even if, as must be granted, he uses terms which are not in keeping with such a view.

Certainly the outstanding idea is that the salvation wrought by Christ brings about man's victory over death, but it may be said that Athanasius takes for granted the conception that death is due to sin, and that it is through Him who, as the Conqueror of death, is the Conqueror of sin that man has the victory and can enjoy eternal life.³ Again, when he alludes to the blessings of incorruptibility, of impassibility, and of immutability, it seems clear that his is the moral point of view, and that his is the thought that as man is "knit into the Logos from heaven", Who, "manifested to take away our sin", has Himself destroyed human passions, he, in his sinlessness, becomes free from them for ever.⁴

¹ *Ad Epict.* 11.

² *C. Arian.* i. 46, 47; iii. 24 ff.

³ Cf. *ibid.* iii. 33; *de Incarn.* 27 ff., 44.

⁴ Cf. *c. Arian.* iii. 33 ff.

Moreover, it appears that even if it does not occupy a foremost position, the purely spiritual aspect of the redemption is always present in Athanasius' teaching. The grace of the spirit, he says, which deserted fallen man "remains irrevocably" to those, the penitent, who, having received it through Christ, are again called Sons of God by adoption.¹ Further, when he speaks of being "in Christ", and through Him "in God", he is, apparently, thinking of an experience which is essentially spiritual: man still remains man, and God still remains God, he teaches,² only the true relationship between them is now restored, since, being "in Christ", man through Him "knows" the Father, and "is introduced into the Kingdom of Heaven after His likeness".³ And does not the conception that man, having been redeemed, can enjoy perfect fellowship with God and, becoming like Him as he is thus "knit into the Godhead", can be called divine, lie behind Athanasius' use of the word "deification"? His, we may safely say, is simply the Scriptural view: he does not mean that in the redemption the human ousia is transformed into the divine, and so "deified". His great saying, "the Logos became man that we might be made God", is based on Scripture:⁴ as men are in Christ, he teaches, they are again called "gods" and "sons of the Most High" (Psalm lxxxii. 6); through Him they "become partakers of the divine nature" (2 St Peter i. 4). Thus it would seem that here—if, that is, we concentrate, not on his categories as they stand, but on the message which they are meant to convey—as in other aspects of his doctrine, this teacher is seeking to maintain what is fundamental to the Gospel.

Such, then, are the ideas concerning God and man and the relations between them which constitute the basis of Athanasius' Christology. As we have said, his principal assertion is that in Jesus Christ God has become man for our salvation. With this as his starting-point, he upholds two all-important Christological principles. At this stage of our enquiry it will suffice if we say

¹ *Ibid.* i. 37; iii. 25.

² It may be noted that Athanasius explicitly states that God and man, as he is redeemed, are still distinct (*ibid.* iii. 23). His *ἕτερον καὶ ἄλλο* here shows that for him the redemption does not mean that the human ousia no longer remains what it was.

³ *Ibid.* ii. 70.

⁴ See, for instance, *ad Adelph.* 4, where the saying and 2 St Pet. i. 4 appear together.

that the first of these is that it is God Himself who has become man, the stress being laid on the thought that Jesus Christ is a divine Person, and that the second is that God has become "man", the stress here being laid on the thought that, since the manhood of Jesus Christ is real, He is at once truly God and truly man. Now it is apparent that in maintaining these two principles Athanasius is but carrying forward what he has already received from his predecessors. For, as we are about to see, these principles are fundamental to the teaching of Clement and Origen—even if it must be confessed that they introduce ideas which are incompatible with them; indeed, in the greatness of his mind the latter already appreciates problems which were to be tackled by later theologians, and anticipates the lines on which these work out the two principles. Moreover, it is clear that Origen's immediate followers build upon the same foundation, and that their leading light, Malchion the Sophist, using his master's terms and expressions, may be said to anticipate to some extent the Laodicene's work of attempting to sum up the Alexandrine doctrine concerning Christ in carefully chosen phrases. It behoves us, then, by way of introduction to our study of the Christological thought of Athanasius, to enquire into that of these earlier theologians.

First, in regard to Clement. That Jesus Christ is a divine Person he asserts again and again. "The Logos Himself", he says, "has come down to us from heaven";¹ "the Logos has generated Himself that he might be seen";² our Instructor is "God in the form of man".³ Instances could be multiplied. Again, it is reasonable to conclude that the second Christological principle of the Alexandrine teachers is also basic to his thought. He affirms that the body assumed by the Logos was real and passible;⁴ the Economy, he says, could not have reached its end if the Head had not passed through life in the flesh.⁵ Moreover, he explicitly affirms that Jesus Christ is at once both God and man: "This very Logos", he states, "has now Himself appeared

among men, He alone being both God and man" (νῦν δὴ ἐπεφάνη ἀνθρώποις αὐτὸς οὗτος ὁ Λόγος, ὁ μόνος ἄμφω, θεὸς τε καὶ ἄνθρωπος);¹ "the Logos Himself is the manifest mystery—God in man, and man in God; the Mediator is the Logos, who is common to both (κοινὸς ἄμφω)".²

Yet, while Clement deliberately condemns Valentinus and Marcion,³ it cannot be denied that he himself at times puts forward teaching which is akin to that of the Docetists. How are we to account for the presence of such teaching? He can say, for instance, that "having assumed the flesh which is by nature passible, the Logos trained it to the habit of impassibility".⁴ Or there is the well-known passage in which he states that the Saviour ate, not for the sake of His body, which did not demand the necessary aids in order to maintain its duration, but lest His companions should think that He was manifested in a phantasmal shape, and then goes on to say that Christ was "entirely incapable of suffering [ἀπαξιαπλῶς ἀπαθῆς ἦν], and inaccessible to any emotion, whether of pleasure or of pain".⁵ Clearly, Clement would portray Christ as the heavenly Guide, who, by His own example, shows men how they can reach perfection as the body is "deified into apathy".⁶ What have we here, then, save the mark of the influence of the essentially Greek idea that human passions must be repressed before the soul can find perfect enlightenment and knowledge of God? When his teaching is viewed from this angle, it would indeed seem that Clement's is the Christ of the Docetists, but, as we have already seen, he is not so influenced by Greek religious ideas that he surrenders the fundamentals of the faith. So, in respect of his Christology, it is legitimate to conclude that the two main doctrinal principles are basic to his thought, even if the Docetic element is manifestly inconsistent with his assertion that in Jesus Christ the Logos has become "man".

We turn from the moralist to the systematic theologian. As we have said, in developing the root principles of the Alexandrine Christology, Origen anticipates the thought of the later teachers of the school.

¹ *Protrept.* xi (ed. Dindorf, i. p. 112). ² *Strom.* v. 3. ³ *Paed.* i. 2.

⁴ *Strom.* vii. 2; v. 6; cf. *Paed.* ii. 2, where Clement says that the Incarnate "Himself also partook of wine, for He was also man".

⁵ *Strom.* iii. 17. It is noteworthy that, against the doctrine of the Valentinians, Clement insists that Christ could not have abolished death if he had not been "homousios" with men (*ibid.* iv. 13).

¹ *Protrept.* i (ed. Dindorf, i. p. 8).

³ *Strom.* vii. 17.

⁶ *Ibid.* vi. 9; cf. *Paed.* i. 12.

² *Paed.* iii. 1.

⁴ *Ibid.* vii. 2.

⁶ Cf. *Strom.* iv. 22.

Central to Origen's doctrine is the conception that in Jesus Christ the Logos has become man through taking to Himself the one human soul which had remained inseparably and indissolubly in Him from the beginning of creation and afterwards (*ab initio creaturae et deinceps inseparabiliter ei atque indissociabiliter inhaerens*), and employing this soul as the medium between Himself and a human body.¹ So from the outset he insists that Jesus Christ is "God". The proposition of Celsus that this Jesus was "but a mortal body" he rules out as utterly impossible:² "it must be believed", he says, "that the very Logos of the Father, the very Wisdom of God, existed within the limits of the Man who appeared in Judaea, and was born an infant, and uttered wailings like the cries of little children".³

Upon this foundation, then, he builds, introducing ideas which do not appear again till more than a century after his death. Thus, like Athanasius, Apollinarius and Cyril, he asserts that the Incarnation has not involved any change in respect of the divine being of the Logos: it must not be supposed, he says, that "all the majesty of His divinity was confined within the limits of His slender body", or that He did not "operate anywhere else besides";⁴ for He still exists as Logos (τῆ οὐσίᾳ μένων Λόγος).⁵ Clearly, Origen has already perceived that a sound Christology necessitates the positing of the thought that, while incarnate, the Logos still maintains His creative activity. Again, we must notice that this pioneer in the sphere of Christian doctrine is at one with his successors in establishing the principle that, in order to become man, the Logos has emptied Himself of His divine power. "We are lost in deepest amazement", he declares, "that such a pre-eminent nature"—as that of the Son of God—"should have divested itself of its condition of majesty and become man" (*quod eminens omnium ista natura exinaniens se de statu majestatis suae homo factus sit*);⁶ "He"—the Son—"left the Father and the heavenly Jerusalem, the

¹ *De Princ.* II. vi. 3: "This existence of a soul, being intermediate between God and the flesh—it being impossible for the nature of God to mingle with a body without an intermediate instrument—the God-Man is born (*nascitur Deus-Homo*)... But, on the other hand, it was not opposed to the nature of the soul as a rational existence (*utpote substantia rationalis*) to receive God."

² *C. Celsum*, iii. 41.

³ *De Princ.* II. vi. 2.

⁴ *Ibid.* IV. i. 30; similarly, *c. Celsum*, vii. 16.

⁵ *C. Celsum*, iv. 15.

⁶ *De Princ.* II. vi. 1.

mother, and came to this earthly place, delivering up His soul into the hands of His enemies".¹ For such self-emptying, Origen sees, was necessary if God was to be seen by man. He illustrates the point in this way: a statue, so enormous that it fills the whole world, can be seen by no one; but let there be made another statue, of smaller size yet altogether like it, and on seeing the latter men will acknowledge that they have seen the former. "By such a similitude"—a *comparatio*, he confesses, *quasi in rebus materialibus posita*—"the Son of God emptied Himself of His equality with the Father, and showed us the way to knowledge of Him."² Moreover, it is especially noteworthy that Origen makes use of this theory in order to explain how the Logos could become a speechless and ignorant child—a problem which he was the first to attempt to solve. His answer is that, "while we cannot say that Wisdom in Itself was ignorant and acquired knowledge by learning, it is true of Wisdom as It was made flesh".³ May we not conclude, then, that this teacher is, to say the least, feeling after the principle that in His incarnate life the Logos allowed His humanity to go through its own laws? As we shall see, this principle, even if the later Alexandrine theologians do not make full use of it, is maintained by them. Origen may differ from them in that for him "the self-limitation is not a permanent condition of the incarnate life", but "an act so transient in its effects as to last only until the end of Christ's adolescence",⁴ but the very fact that he can think in this way is a further indication of his place as one who is already aware of the problems which were to confront the Christologians of a later generation.

Let us now consider his doctrine of the union of God and man in Christ. Though possessing its own freedom of choice, the human soul of Jesus, he asserts, had always elected to love righteousness, and in its "firmness of purpose" and "immensity of affection" possessed immutability.⁵ So was it completely at one with the Logos.⁶ To designate this unity Origen

¹ *Hom. in Jerem.* x. 7.

³ *Hom. in Jerem.* i. 8; cf. *Hom. in Luc.* xix.

⁴ So Raven, *Apollinarianism*, pp. 28 f.

² *De Princ.* I. ii. 8.

⁵ *De Princ.* II. vi. 5.

⁶ "That which formerly depended upon the will was changed by the power of long custom into nature" (*longi usus affectu jam versum sit in naturam*), says Origen (*ibid.*).

uses the terms "unification" and "mixture" (ένωσις, άνάκρσις)¹—for the body and soul were not merely "associated" (κοινωνία) with the Logos.² His conception is that just as "he that is joined unto the Lord is one spirit" (1 Corinthians vi. 17) so, though in this case in a more divine and far greater degree, is the soul joined to the Logos, with the consequence that Jesus Christ is "one composite Being" (έν σύνθετον):³ the Incarnate is ό σύνθετος, and σύνθετόν τι χρήμα.⁴ Such language, especially when it is taken in conjunction with the statement that the soul and body, "after sharing in the divinity of the Logos, were changed into God",⁵ may seem to indicate that Origen teaches the absorption of the human into the divine element in Christ, but, as we shall see when we consider the way in which he develops the principle that Jesus Christ is "man", this is evidently not the case—though his teaching on the glorified Christ is another matter. Here what he would emphasize is the thought of the closeness and indivisibility of the union of the two elements in the Person of the Logos: the human soul, which is perpetually in God and inseparable from Him, and, indeed, "is God in all that it does, feels, and understands", is like iron placed in the fire—the iron is in the fire, and the fire in the iron, the properties of the one becoming those of the other, but they still remain iron and fire.⁶ We shall see that the same thought, and the terms which he employs in order to express it, together with his famous simile, are to be found in Apollinarius and his disciples and in Cyril himself, as these uphold the doctrine of the "one Person" against the Nestorian position—a position which, it will be understood, Origen has already condemned.⁷

We must also notice how in two other directions Origen anticipates the thought of the later Alexandrine teachers as he develops the principle that God Himself has become man. In the first place, it will be recognized that he is but upholding this truth when, for instance, he says that it ought to be believed that

¹ *C. Celsum*, iii. 41.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.* ii. 9.

⁴ *Ibid.* i. 66.

⁵ *Ibid.* iii. 41.

⁶ *De Princ.* ii. vi. 6.

⁷ It is interesting to note that, in his *Comm. in Johan.* xxxii. 17 (ed. Brooke, ii. p. 199), Origen, appealing to the text 1 Cor. vi. 17, says that the humanity of Jesus and the Logos are not "two". Cf. also *de Princ.* iv. i. 31: "We do not assert that the Son of God was in the soul as He was in the soul of Paul or Peter and the other saints, in whom Christ is believed to speak as He does in Paul."

God was born an infant,¹ or when he justifies the use of the expression, "the Son of God died",² or when he exclaims: *Qui immortalis est moritur, et impassibilis patitur, et invisibilis videtur.*³ But, like his successors, he is careful to explain what he means when he writes in this way. Thus he speaks of the Virgin as "Theotokos", but, as we know, "he interprets how [πώς] he uses the title, and discusses the matter at some length".⁴ Again, he points out that the Son of God is said to have died "according to that nature which could admit of death" (*pro ea scilicet natura quae mortem utique recipere poterat*),⁵ and when he says that the Immortal died, that the Impassible suffered, and that Christ who knew no sin became sin for us, he explains that these things can be said *quia (Dominus majestatis) venit in carne*: it was *dum in carne positus*, he says, that Christ became sin and could be slain as the Victim.⁶ It would seem, then, that Origen distinguishes between the Logos in His eternal being and the Logos as He has become man: as Logos, He is impassible, but as the Logos incarnate, He can be said to be passible. A distinction of this order, we shall notice, is made by the later theologians of the school. Secondly, it is evident that Origen would say that all the actions and sayings reported of Christ in the Gospel are those of the one Person, the Logos made man. It was the Logos, he declares, who spoke to man both before and when He became man;⁷ it was the Son of God, "when He had divested Himself of His majesty"—that is, during His *praesentia, quam ostendit in corpore*—who performed the miracles and wonders;⁸ it was the same Logos and Wisdom of the Father who, "existing within the limits of the Man who appeared in Judaea", Himself (*ipse*) declared "My soul is exceeding sorrowful, even unto death", and it was He who at the last was brought to that death.⁹ This doctrine,

¹ *De Princ.* ii. vi. 2 (quoted above, p. 20).

² *Ibid.* ii. vi. 3.

³ *Hom. in Lev.* iii. 1.

⁴ So Socrates (*H.E.* vii. 32), referring to the first tome of Origen's *Comm. in Rom.*, the original of which is lost.

⁵ *De Princ.* ii. vi. 3.

⁶ *Hom. in Lev.* iii. 1.

⁷ *De Princ., Praef.* i.

⁸ *Ibid.* ii. vi. 1.

⁹ *Ibid.* ii. vi. 2. It may be noted that, commenting on the same passage (St Mt. xxvi. 38) elsewhere, Origen says that the words were spoken by "the Saviour Himself (*ipse Salvator*)—that is, of course, "the Son of God" who, desiring the salvation of the human race, had assumed not only a body, but also a human soul (*ibid.* iv. i. 31).

we consider, is fundamental to the Christology of Athanasius, Apollinarius and Cyril: these, like their predecessor, would not say that the Lord does what is divine in His divine, and what is human in His human, nature.¹

Turning to that aspect of Origen's teaching which has its ground in the principle that in Jesus Christ God has become "man", we find that here again his ideas and expressions are similar to those of his successors in the school. He sees the importance of upholding the reality of Christ's human soul, and in this connection it has to be said that he insists on the thought of its freedom to a more marked degree than do the Alexandrines of the fourth and fifth centuries. Further, it has to be noted that he is the first to speak of Jesus Christ as "the God-Man".² But what is worthy of particular notice is the fact that, like later thinkers, he perceives that it must be maintained that the divine and human elements—*naturae*, he calls them—of Jesus Christ are different, and that they must be seen as different, if a true doctrine concerning Him is to be established. In other words, Origen not only upholds the principle of the "two natures", but also sees its place as a bulwark against Docetic ideas. We shall see that exactly the same thought is upheld by Athanasius, Apollinarius and Cyril, as these would give the lie to Eutychianism. This important point deserves fuller consideration.

Thus, at the beginning of the *de Principiis*, in his chapter "On Christ", Origen writes:

In the first place it behoves us to understand [*scire*] that one thing is the nature of the divinity which is in Christ, since He is the Only-begotten of the Father, and another the human nature, which He assumed in the last times for the dispensation.³

We would set beside this a similar passage which occurs in the same work. After stating that, as a man stands before the mystery of the Incarnate, he thinks of a God and sees a mortal, and again, thinking of a man, he sees One who returns from the

¹ See below, pp. 38, 56 f., 90.

² Cf. *de Princ.* II. vi. 3 (quoted above, p. 20 n. 1).

³ *Primo illud nos scire oportet, quod alia est in Christo deitatis ejus natura, quod est unigenitus filius patris, et alia humana natura, quam in novissimis temporibus pro dispensatione suscepit (ibid. I. ii. 1).*

grave, having vanquished death—a statement which itself contains the thought of the "two natures"—he goes on:

Therefore is the spectacle to be contemplated [*contemplandum est*] with all fear and reverence, that the reality of each nature in one and the same Person may be demonstrated; so that nothing unworthy and unbecoming may be perceived in that divine and ineffable ousia, nor again the things done be considered as illusions of imaginary appearances.¹

Clearly, Origen has already perceived the worth of the principle of "recognizing the difference of the natures" in the one Person as that which must be laid down in order to counteract any Docetic notion of Christ's Person. Let the second passage be compared with the similar statements of Athanasius and Apollinarius,² and it will be seen that these were introducing nothing new.

It will be worth our while, too, to notice how Origen adopts this principle in his Scriptural exegesis. It will suffice if we put out three examples. As we have said, he holds that all the actions and sayings recorded of Christ in the Gospels are those of the Logos incarnate, but—to use Cyril's expression—he "recognizes the difference of the sayings". Thus, on the basis of the conception that the natures are to be seen as different in "the composite Person", he can say that the words "I am the way, and the truth, and the life" (St John xiv. 6)—which, as he says, were spoken by "Jesus Himself"—were spoken "concerning the divinity which is in Him", while the words "But now ye seek to kill me, a man that hath told you the truth" (St John viii. 40) were spoken "concerning His being in a human body".³ Again, holding that it was "the Saviour Himself" who said "Now is my soul troubled" (St John xii. 27), he points out that the Only-begotten, the First-born of all creation, the divine Logos, is not to be understood as a soul "sorrowful and troubled";⁴ and, commenting on "Now is the Son of man glorified, and God is glorified in him" (St John xiii. 31), he sets this text

¹ *Propter quod cum omni metu et reverentia contemplandum est, ut in uno eodemque ita utriusque naturae veritas demonstratur, ut neque aliquid indignum et indecens in divina illa et ineffabili substantia sentiatur, neque rursum quae gesta sunt falsis inclusa imaginibus aestimentur (ibid. II. vi. 2).*

² See below, pp. 40, 59.

³ *C. Celsum*, I. 66.

⁴ *De Princ.* IV. i. 31. See above, p. 23 n. 9.

beside the one quoted above (St John viii. 40), and gives it as his opinion that God exalted this One who became obedient to death; "the divine Logos", he goes on, "does not admit of being exalted".¹ It would seem, then, that this great Alexandrine teacher is in all this but distinguishing between the sayings in order to safeguard the doctrine of the reality of the two natures and their difference in the union. For he sees that if a distinction of this sort is not maintained, there is the danger of attributing human passions to the divine ousia, in which case one would have "unworthy and unbecoming" thoughts concerning the Divine, and divine attributes to the humanity assumed by the Logos, in which case one would be taking the view that "the things done" were but "illusions of imaginary appearances". As we shall try to show, it is for the same reason that Origen's successors upheld the difference between the sayings.

But while Origen can thus make a valuable contribution to sound Christological thought, it is clear that his teaching contains conceptions which have their root in the Greek religious ideal. Emphasis is laid on the thought that Jesus Christ is "the Pattern of the most virtuous life",² and it is in keeping with this that Origen can say that the Lord's manhood, after the earthly sojourning, is changed into "the ethereal and divine".³ He is man no longer, he declares;⁴ He is "the same" in God.⁵ The doctrine that Christ is the Redeemer who comes into the world to ransom mankind from the tyranny of sin has indeed its place in the system of this great teacher, but he distinguishes between this, a redemption bound up with time, and the work of the Logos in revealing to man the knowledge of God—a work which transcends time. Apparently, it is the consideration that men vary according to need and capacity that moves him to make this distinction. Though Jesus Christ is one, he says, He is more things than one according to the relations (ἐπινοίαι) in which He is seen by His beholders: He did not appear the same to the sick who stood at the foot of the Mount of Transfiguration as to

¹ *Comm. in Johan.* xxxii. 17 (ed. Brooke, ii. pp. 198 f.).

² *C. Celsum*, i. 68.

³ *Ibid.* iii. 41.

⁴ *Hom. in Jerem.* xv. 6.

⁵ Cf. *Comm. in Johan.* xxxii. 17 (ed. Brooke, ii. p. 199).

those who by reason of their strength were able to go up the mountain and there to see Him in His diviner appearance.¹ There are those, he teaches, who need Him as Physician, Shepherd, and Redemption; but there are others—"those who by reason of their perfectness [διὰ τελειότητος] are able to receive the best gifts"—who, needing Him as such no longer, see Him as Wisdom, Logos, Righteousness.² For whereas to sinners He is sent as Physician, to those who are already pure and sin no more He is sent as "Teacher of the divine mysteries".³ Certainly this is an unsatisfactory element in Origen's Christology: Jesus Christ is shown to be, not so much the Healer of a fallen race, as the Illuminator of the individual who, seeking to "know himself", accepts Him as Guide both here and hereafter, when, like the Guide Himself, he is "separated from bodily matter".⁴ Such ideas, as is clear, reveal the influence of the religious thought of the Greeks. But this is not to say that the Christian foundations have been removed. Rather, those foundations remain intact, and all that we have here is a part of the superstructure which, as must be acknowledged, is inconsistent with them.

There was no one among Origen's followers who was equal to the task of carrying forward the developed Christological thought of the master—a man "too great for his age"; besides, they were suspicious of his doctrine of the pre-existence of souls, a doctrine which, as we have seen, has a central place in his system. Nevertheless, outstanding among them was Malchion the Sophist, the exponent of the thought of those Origenist Bishops who were responsible for the downfall of Paul of Samosata. He and those with him, indebted to Origen for their ideas and phrases, were seeking to express the Alexandrine faith in such a way that their position would be altogether clear—though these, contending against the Antiochene doctrine as it was represented by the Samosatene, devoted their attention solely to the first of the Alexandrine Christological principles. Thus, as we say, can these Origenists be regarded as the precursors of Apollinarius.

¹ *C. Celsum*, ii. 64; vi. 77.

² *Comm. in Johan.* i. 22 (ed. Brooke, i. p. 25).

³ *C. Celsum*, iii. 62.

⁴ Cf. *de Princ.* i. i. 7 (quoted above, p. 11 n. 6).

As their Statement of Belief¹ reveals, they start from the cardinal assertion that the Son of God has been sent from heaven, and has become man as Jesus Christ. The Incarnation, they affirm, has not involved any change in respect of the divine being of the Logos, who remains what He was: the body which is from the Virgin, they say, has "without change" (ἀτρέπτως) been united to the Godhead;² or, as Malchion has it, despite the self-emptying the divine Wisdom *indiminuta atque indemutabilis exstitit*.³ So they would teach that He, the Logos, is still "one and the same Being",⁴ though now incarnate. When speaking of Christ's "Person", they use the term "ousia" in the sense of "a particular entity"—as the equivalent, that is, of "prosopon".⁵ Accordingly, seeing in the doctrine of the Samosatene the "dividing" of the one Christ into two Sons, the Logos, that is, and Jesus Christ (regarded as the Man whom the Logos assumed), they insist that Jesus Christ (whom they regard as the Logos made man) is "a Person personally existent in a body" (οὐσίᾳ οὐσιωμένη ἐν σώματι),⁶ and that in Him God is "personally united with" (συνουσιωμένος) manhood;⁷ in fact, Malchion is but speaking for the rest when he says that there has been "a personal union" (οὐσιώδης ἕνωσις) of the Logos with His own body.⁸ As we shall see, a similar use of "ousia" is made by the Laodicene and his disciples, as these would enforce against the teaching of Diodore of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia and their school the self-same thought that the Person of Jesus Christ is the Person of the Logos who has become man, and that

¹ This, and the Synodal Letter, and the fragments in connection with Malchion's debate with Paul have been collected by Loofs, *Paulus von Samosata*, pp. 324 ff. The six Bishops who were responsible for the statement were Hymenaeus of Jerusalem, Theotecnus of Caesarea, Maximus of Bostra (who, as we know, were determined Origenists) and Theophilus, Proclus, and Bolanus.

² Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 329.

³ *Ibid.* p. 336, Frag. 4.

⁴ According to the statement, He is ἐν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τῆ οὐσίᾳ—"before the ages as Power and Wisdom of God", and, in the incarnate life, "as Christ" (*ibid.* p. 330).

⁵ The use of "ousia" by the Alexandrines is discussed below, p. 48.

⁶ Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 333, Frag. 13; see also *ibid.* p. 332, Frags. 7, 8; p. 337, Frag. 5d.

⁷ *Ibid.* p. 334, Frag. 14.

⁸ *Ibid.* p. 336, Frag. 3. The same phrase is to be found in Apollinarius (see below, pp. 52 f.). As Loofs points out (*op. cit.* p. 246 n. 2), Malchion understands by the phrase what Cyril understands by his "natural union".

it is impossible to think of Him as "two". Further, we must observe that Malchion affirms that in Jesus Christ there has been a "composition" (σύνθεσις) of the Logos and His body,¹ a "concurrence" (συνδρομή) of the divine Logos and what is of the Virgin,² a "weaving together" (σμπλοκή) of God and man,³ so that He, like ourselves who consist of body and what is in the body, is a "composite Being" (σύνθετον ζῶον),⁴ and the Logos Himself is "part of the whole" (μέρος τοῦ ὅλου).⁵ Thus does Malchion develop the teaching of his master on the unity of Christ's Person. If we understand him aright, it is not that he would deny that our Lord's manhood is complete as it exists in this composition in the Person of the Logos; in expressing himself, in this way, his purpose is, rather, to uphold against the idea of "division" that of the *unitio*⁶ of Godhead and manhood in the Person of the Logos—the idea, that is, which is summed up in his statement that Jesus Christ, *qui ex Deo Verbo et humano corpore, quod est ex semine David, unus factus est, nequaquam ulterius divisione aliqua sed unitate subsistens*.⁷ As we shall see, Apollinarius and his followers, and Cyril himself, use the same expressions, and that with the same purpose in view.

There is a further point in connection with the teaching of these Origenists on the unity of Christ's Person: seemingly, they would attribute all the actions and sayings of Jesus Christ, without distinction, to the incarnate Logos Himself—to the one Person, that is, at once God and man. Thus the Bishops can say that the God who bore the manhood was partaker of human sufferings, and that the manhood was not shut out from the

¹ *Ibid.* p. 337, Frag. 5b; cf. also p. 336, Frag. 4.

² *Ibid.* p. 335, Frag. 2a.

³ *Ibid.* Frag. 2c.

⁴ *Ibid.* Frag. 2a.

⁵ *Ibid.* Frag. 2c. It should be noted that the Bishops in their Synodal Letter anticipate Apollinarius and Cyril in their use of the analogy of the union of soul and body in man to illustrate that of the Logos and manhood, in Jesus Christ: the divine Logos was in Jesus Christ, they say, "what the inner man is in us" (*ibid.* p. 332, Frag. 8; cf. Loofs' remarks, *ibid.* pp. 261 f.). Cf. also—though the text is corrupt (see Loofs' remarks, *ibid.* pp. 244 f.)—the fragment from the record of Malchion's debate with the Samosatene, *ibid.* p. 335, Frag. 2a, where, as Loofs says, the Sophist would elucidate his "personal union" by adopting this analogy.

⁶ Cf. the use of ἕνωσις in the Synodal Letter, where the Bishops say that the body was "united" to the Godhead (*ibid.* p. 329).

⁷ *Ibid.* p. 336, Frag. 4.

divine works;¹ in another place, they declare that it was God who was performing the signs and wonders recorded in the Gospels, and that it was "the Same" who, having become partaker of flesh and blood, was tempted in all points like as we are, yet without sin.² But, while they would thus say that both the miracles and the sufferings are to be attributed to the Logos as He has become man, it seems likely that, if not they, at any rate Malchion their spokesman would draw a distinction between what belongs to the Logos in His incarnate state and what belongs to Him in His eternal being.³ We have already seen that this thought appears in Origen: it is to be found, too, in the doctrine of the later Alexandrines.

But while these disciples of Origen develop the first of the Alexandrine Christological principles—as indeed is understandable in view of their determination to uphold the doctrine of the "one Person" against the Nestorian notion of "two Sons"—we find that they pay but little attention to the second: unlike their master, they do not attempt to work it out in the anti-Eutychian interest. All the same, implicit in their teaching is the conception that in Jesus Christ there are the two elements of Godhead and manhood. Thus in their Statement of Belief the six Bishops affirm that Jesus Christ is "the same, God and man"—God, who has emptied Himself, and man of the seed of David according to the flesh;⁴ and, as we have already noticed, Malchion speaks of Him as *ex Deo Verbo et humano corpore . . . unus*.⁵ Moreover, the Sophist has two interesting statements which plainly reveal that he would say that in Jesus Christ there is manhood and there is Godhead. After insisting on the unity of the Lord's Person, he goes on to say that "in the first place [προηγουμενως], there was formed as it were a man in the womb, and in the second [κατὰ δὲ δεύτερον λόγον], God was in the

¹ Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 333, Frag. 14. As it seems to us, it is in the light of such a passage as this that we should interpret the statement in the Synodal Letter that the body was changelessly united to the Godhead and was "deified" (*ibid.* p. 329).

² *Ibid.* p. 329; see Loofs' comments on this passage, *ibid.* pp. 268 f.

³ *Ibid.* p. 336, Frag. 3. The fragment is not complete (cf. *ibid.* pp. 226 f.), but it seems clear that Malchion would distinguish between the Logos ἄσαρκος and the Logos ἑνσαρκος: when ἄσαρκος, "He did not need the Holy Spirit"; when ἑνσαρκος, He was under the Law, and "the Spirit received of Him" (cf. St Jn. xvi. 14).

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 329.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 336, Frag. 4.

womb, personally united to manhood".¹ Again, after saying that Christ received John's witness that after him there would come as man One who was before him as God, Malchion declares: "He was tired, was hungry, was thirsty, slept, and was crucified for our infirmity, in the first place as man, but, in the second place, [it was] God who suffered on account of the union, since He had accepted and assumed a human body in order that He might be able to suffer."²

Accordingly, it seems legitimate to say that these teachers uphold the principle that Jesus Christ is "man". But this is the important question: What do they mean by "man"?³ Do they hold that Christ's is a manhood complete with a human rational soul? We should expect to find, in the writings of the followers of one who gave such a prominent place in his system to the doctrine of Christ's human freedom, at least some reference to this point, but this is not the case. There is indeed a passage in their Synodal Letter in which they say that our Lord's flesh was "animated with a rational soul",⁴ but as Loofs points out, the reference here is to "a human soul", no distinction being made between a "rational" and a "fleshly" soul.⁵ Yet this scholar, while insisting that it is Origenism in an enlarged form that we have in Malchion and the Synodal Letter, is prepared to say that the doctrine of these Origenists anticipates that of Apollinarius. His point is that the Sophist and those with him agree with the Laodicene in favouring the terms τὸ σῶμα and τὸ ἀνθρώπινον when speaking of our Lord's humanity,⁶ and that another mark of the kinship between them and the heresiarch is to be seen in their view that in Jesus Christ there is a composition of Logos

¹ *Ibid.* p. 334, Frag. 14.

² *Ibid.* p. 334, Frag. 15.

³ Our conclusion is that the Origenists do not attempt to answer this question—a point illustrated by the position of Eusebius of Caesarea, whose doctrinal system is, as Dorner puts it, "a chameleon-hued thing, a mirror of the unsolved problems of the Church of that age" (*The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ*, I. ii. p. 218). Like the rest, Eusebius can say that in Jesus Christ the Logos has become "man", but, as when he says that the Logos played upon the manhood as a player plays upon a harp (*Dem. Ev.* iv. 13), it is clear that he has not realized what is involved when this confession is made. At the same time we can hardly imagine that such a crude statement, containing as it does the denial of the reality of Christ's human rational soul, would have been made by Malchion.

⁴ Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 332, Frag. 9.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 260.

Ibid. p. 262.

and body, in which the Logos is "part of the whole according to the weaving together of God and man".¹ But, as we have seen, the Letter of Hymenaeus speaks of Jesus Christ, the Logos incarnate, as God and "man";² and in that document it is expressly declared that, having become partaker of flesh and blood, the Same was tempted in all points as we are, yet without sin—statements which seem to show that these Origenists would say that our Lord's was a complete humanity. Further, while it may be deduced from Malchion's use of "composition" and "weaving together" that he is thinking of an organic and physical union of the Logos and the body, it is reasonable to infer that in using such expressions he is but following Origen in emphasizing the thought of the absolute unity of the Person of Jesus Christ. Undoubtedly, there is that in this teaching which, when taken *au pied de la lettre*, lends support to the view that what we have here is anticipatory of the doctrine of Apollinarius, but, as it seems to us, we are on safer ground if we say that Malchion and those with him, suspicious of their master's doctrine of the pre-existence of human souls, fall back upon the Christological thought of an earlier age, and are satisfied with the formula that Christ is the Logos incarnate, Himself God and man, without entering into the question as to what is involved when it is said that He is "man". Indeed, it would seem that it was not till the second half of the fourth century that this question came to the fore.³

¹ Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 260.

² The Bishops say: τὸν δὲ υἱὸν . . . σαρκωθέντα ἐνηθρωπήκεναι; they also affirm that Jesus Christ is ὁ αὐτὸς θεὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος (*ibid.* pp. 328 f.).

³ That the Anomoeans held that the Logos had taken the place of the human rational soul in Christ is perfectly clear, their view being that unless the manhood were deprived of its faculty of self-determination there would be set up "two natures"—two individual existences, that is, the one striving against the other—with the consequence that Christ would no longer be one Person. Apollinarius, of course, argues in the same way. [See Raven, *op. cit.* pp. 115 f., where are to be found quotations from Lucius of the Anomoean, who became Bishop of Alexandria in 374, and Eudoxius of Constantinople († 370).] But can we be sure that Lucian of Antioch and Arius himself had dealt with this question in their generation? Epiphanius (*Anchoratus*, 33) and Theodoret (*Haeret. fabul.* v. 11) tell us that these had taught that the Logos assumed a body but not a soul, and that the Logos Himself took the place of the soul. But the former can hardly be regarded as a completely reliable witness, and Theodoret is writing more than a century after Arius. A similar account of the heresiarch's teaching is to be found in *c. Apollinarium*, ii. 3, but here again the evidence comes from a later age, for it would

We can now discuss the Christology of Athanasius. Fundamental to it are the same two doctrinal principles that we have seen in the teaching of his predecessors; consequently, we must expect to find here conceptions which have already made their appearance. But there is an important difference between Athanasius and his predecessors: it is not merely that, unlike

seem that this work, falsely attributed to Athanasius, belongs to the later part of the fifth, if not to the beginning of the sixth, century (cf. Raven, *op. cit.* pp. 242 ff.). There is nothing in the existing fragments of Arius' writings which makes it plain that he denied that Christ had a human soul. It is true that, in the confession of faith which he and Euzoios put forward, it is said that the Logos became "flesh" [τὸν Λόγον . . . σαρκωθέντα (Socrates, *H.E.* i. 26); . . . σάρκα ἀναλάβοντα (Sozomen, *H.E.* ii. 27)], and that here we have not the qualifying expression, became "man" (ἐνανθρωπήσαντα); but this—though unusual in credal forms—is hardly enough to warrant the assumption that, according to Arius, the Logos assumed no more than "flesh" (i.e. a body without a human soul). The only piece of contemporary evidence that has come down to us is to be found in a fragment of the *de Anima* of Eustathius of Antioch. Writing against the Lucianists, he says: "Why do they make so much of showing that Christ assumed a body without a soul, as they weave their earth-born notions? In order that, if they could corrupt any to lay down that this is so, they might the more easily persuade them, by attributing changes of affection to the divine Spirit, that the changeable is not begotten of the unchangeable nature" (*P.G.* xviii. 689B). But is it certain that this Antiochene is here referring to a definite affirmation made by the disciples of Lucian? We think not. As it appears to us, the passage represents the argument of one who, starting from the position that Christ possesses a human soul and that it is altogether real, examines the statements of his opponents (e.g., as we conjecture, "the Logos was born", or "suffered", or "was put to death"), and is convinced that those responsible for them are attributing human passions to the Divine [see Eustathius' declarations to this effect in his *Disc. on Prov.* viii. 22, and his *Interpret. of Ps. xcii*, *P.G.* xviii. 681D, 684C, 688A, 688B (quoted in the present writer's *Eustathius of Antioch*, pp. 112 f.)]. Accordingly, we suggest that here the Bishop is arguing that his opponents are, from their writings, "showing"—it will be noted that he does not use a word like "assert"; his basis is what they themselves were saying—that they teach that Christ has a body without a soul (else, his thought would seem to be, they would have attributed human passions to the manhood of Christ, to which they belong) and that they are only seeking someone to put out this doctrine, and then they will have a real case for upholding their main contention that the Logos is a creature, since then, human passions clearly belonging to Him, there would be no doubt at all concerning the mutability of the Logos. So it would seem that we can by no means be certain that the doctrine that the Logos took the place of the human soul in Christ "dates from an early period of the [Arian] controversy" (cf. Gwatkin, *Studies of Arianism*, p. 26 n. 5). The evidence, rather, leads one to suspect that we have here an illustration of the tendency to saddle the "fathers" of a heresy with the thought of its later exponents. Perhaps it is not without significance that—excluding, as we think we must, that of Eustathius—our earliest direct evidence comes from the *Anchoratus* which was written (apparently in 374) at a time when the question of the reality of Christ's human rational soul was being discussed both by the Anomoeans and by Apollinarius of Laodicea.

that of Clement and Origen, his doctrine contains no element which can be said to be inconsistent with his foundation principles, for, as we have tried to show, his soteriological thought is wholly derived from ideas essentially Hebraic, and, unlike theirs, betrays no evidence of the influence of the Greek religious ideal; it is, rather, that from now onwards the two Christological principles of the Alexandrine school are seen in their soteriological bearing: now, most emphatically, is it being maintained that the doctrine of Christ's work as Redeemer cannot be separated from that of His Person. Athanasius is principally interested in the problem of redemption, and, as has been pointed out, puts forward two main conceptions in this connection: first, that only One who is very God, and, secondly, that only One whose manhood is like ours, can save a sinful race—ideas which are brought together in such a statement as this:

We had not been delivered from sin and the curse unless it had been by nature human flesh which the Logos put on, and man had not been deified unless the Logos who became flesh had been by nature from the Father, and true and proper to Him.¹

These are now carried over into Christology to become the basis of the two Christological assertions that Jesus Christ is the divine Logos Himself, living a human life, and that He is at once God and man. Let us see how this is the case.

“Only the very God can save sinners”: we would note, in the first place, how Athanasius develops the principle that Jesus Christ is the Logos Himself who has become man. Like Origen and the Origenists, he asserts that this becoming man has not involved any change in respect of the eternal existence of the Logos: He has not become other than Himself, but remains the same (οὐκ ἄλλος γέγονε τὴν σάρκα λαβὼν, ἀλλ' ὁ αὐτὸς ὢν);² “Jesus Christ is the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever.”³ So he holds that, while quickening the body which He had put on, He was at the same time quickening the universe: He is one and the same, walking as man, quickening all things as Logos, and as

¹ *C. Arian.* ii. 70.

² *Ibid.* ii. 8.

³ *Ibid.* i. 48. Cf. also Athanasius' use of Malachi iii. 6 (*ad Epict.* 5).

Son dwelling with the Father.¹ As he says: “The Logos did not cease to be God when He became man; neither, since He is God, does He shrink from what is man's.”² What has taken place is that He, the Logos who is eternal with the Father, has in these last days assumed flesh—but He is still the same Person both before and after the Incarnation. Aaron was still Aaron, he says, after he had put on the high-priest's vesture.³ Here, clearly, Athanasius is drawing near to the thought that the incarnate life of the Logos is an “addition to” the life which is His by nature—a thought which, as we shall see, is to be found in Cyril.⁴

But does Athanasius, who so firmly insists that the Logos has become man as Jesus Christ, allow that He, while not undergoing any change in respect of His eternal being, has, in the Incarnation, limited Himself in order to meet human conditions? We think that he does, though we must not expect anything like a clear expression of a doctrine of the divine self-emptying—the principle is there, but no more. To take an illustration: in respect of our Lord's ignorance, he declares that the words “But of that day and hour knoweth no man, not even the Son” were spoken by the Logos “when He became man”, or “as man”, adding that He said this, “that ignorance might be the Son's when He was born of man” (ἵνα τοῦ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γενομένου Υἱοῦ ἡ ἄγνοια ᾗ).⁵ The thought here would seem to be that since, as he says, “ignorance is proper to man”, and the Logos has become man, the Logos as incarnate was ignorant—that is, that the Logos, while remaining omniscient in His divine being, has of His own free will withheld His power of omniscience in the Incarnation. Again, is it not possible to see behind his statements that the Logos “allowed” His own body to suffer (ἠνείχετο πάσχειν τὸ ἴδιον σῶμα),⁶ and that “when the Logos came in His own body, He was conformed to our condition” (αὐτὸς γενόμενος τῷ ἡμῶν σώματι, τὰ ἡμῶν ἐμιμήσατο),⁷ the conception that the Logos—to

¹ *De Incarn.* 17. In *c. Arian.* i. 42, we have: “As He was ever worshipped as being the Logos, and existing in the form of God, so being what He ever was, though become man and called Jesus, He none the less has creation under foot.”

² *C. Arian.* iii. 38.

³ *Ibid.* ii. 8.

⁴ See below, pp. 84 f.

⁵ *C. Arian.* iii. 43, 45.

⁶ *Ibid.* iii. 58; cf. also iii. 35, 55.

⁷ *Ibid.* iii. 57.

use Hilary's word—"tempered"¹ His powers that there might be a real incarnation? Yet, as we have said, even if Athanasius realizes that his doctrine demands the positing of the kenosis of the Logos, he makes no attempt to develop the thought: indeed, as we shall see, it is not developed by any of the later upholders of the Alexandrine Christology.

We now come to the heart of his doctrine. In accordance with his fundamental assertion that in Jesus Christ the Logos Himself has become man, Athanasius lays all emphasis on the truth of the unity of His Person, and denounces the notion that in Him are two Persons set side by side. In Jesus Christ, he declares, the Logos has taken to Himself a human body, and made it His own (ἰδιοποιεῖτο τὰ τοῦ σώματος ἴδια).² So he insists that the body is not "that of another" (ἑτέρου τὸ σῶμα), but "the own" (τὸ ἴδιον) of the Logos.³ As is to be gathered from his important letter to Epictetus of Corinth (written c. 361), who sought his advice when he, the Bishop, found himself called upon to settle a dispute between two parties who were holding different Christological views, the one, as we think, standing for the doctrine of the Alexandrine school, the other for that of the school of Antioch⁴—as well as from his letters to Adelphius, an

¹ *De Trin.* xi. 48: after stating that Christ remained in the form of God when He took the servant's form, and that He remained master of Himself though He was emptied, Hilary goes on: *dum se usque ad formam temperat habitus humani ne potentem immensamque naturam assumptu humilitatis non ferret infirmitas* . . .

² *C. Arian.* iii. 53, 54, 56; *ad Epict.* 6.

³ *De Incarn.* 18; *c. Arian.* iii. 22.

⁴ The *ad Epictetum* is one of those documents which came to be regarded as standards of orthodoxy. Thus it was appealed to by Cyril when he set out to explain his Anathematisms (see *Apol. adv. Orient.* i, ed. Pusey, *Works*, vi. pp. 274 ff.), and when he sought to justify his action in receiving the Orientals into communion in 433 (see his *Ep. ad Acac.*, and his *Ep. i ad Succen.*, *P.G.* lxxvii. 200 c, 237 B). It was also appealed to by the Antiochenes who, after the Council of Ephesus (431), suggested that, together with the Nicene Creed, this letter might form the basis of an agreement between Cyril and his party and themselves (see below, p. 234 n. 2). But it would seem that the *ad Epictetum* is important for another reason. Raven (*op. cit.* pp. 104 ff., 242 ff.) has shown—and that most conclusively—that this, and Athanasius' letters to Adelphius and Maximus have not, as used to be thought, any connection with the "heresy" of Apollinarius: rather have we here a group of letters connected with the dispute at Corinth, an account of which Epictetus had previously given to the Alexandrine in the form of a memorandum (*ad Epict.* 2). Now from this memorandum it is clear that the dispute was of a Christological nature, and that it was between two parties. Can we arrive at

Egyptian bishop, and Maximus, presumably the Cynic philosopher who plays a part in the life of Gregory Nazianzen, which, written about the same time, have to do with this dispute at Corinth—Athanasius deliberately rejects the idea of "two Sons".

the doctrinal position of these parties? As it seems to us, it is hardly fair to say that the one stood for a crude Docetism and the other for a crude Ebionism (cf. Raven, *op. cit.* p. 104). Surely, it was far too late in the day for anyone to assert that "the Lord wore a body putatively", or that "the Logos descended upon a holy man as upon one of the prophets". But if we take the statements set down in the memorandum as the charges which the one party was levelling against the other, a more reasonable solution is arrived at. On this basis, then, we find that one party is accused of teaching that the Logos has been changed into flesh, bones, and hair, that the Godhead is the seat of Christ's sufferings, that His body is from heaven, and that the Lord wore a body putatively—and that the other party is condemned because these do not hold that God had proceeded from Mary, or that God had suffered in the flesh, but teach that in Jesus Christ "God has descended on a holy man", and that "one [ἕτερος] is Christ and another [ἕτερος] the divine Logos", and so introduce a Tetrads in place of the Trinity. How far, then, does all this take us? It is most significant that exactly the same charges were brought by the Antiochenes against the Alexandrines and by the Alexandrines against the Antiochenes but a few decades later. Hence it would seem that the dispute at Corinth lay between two parties which stood, the one for the Christological thought of the school of Antioch, the other for that of the Alexandrine school. That this is a justifiable conclusion is borne out by the evidence which is to be found in the documents themselves. An examination of the memorandum of Epictetus, and of Athanasius' criticisms in these three letters, reveals that one party was determined to "separate" the body from the Logos, and that the other was affirming that the body of Christ is "homoousios" with the Logos. There can be little doubt, then, that the former in their attitude to the Alexandrine teaching stand in the same line as Paul of Samosata and Eustathius before them, and Diodore of Tarsus and his school after them; for, one and all, the Antiochenes are determined to "separate the natures" of Christ in order to safeguard the reality of His manhood. But what are we to say concerning the position of the latter party? We cannot be definite on this point, but it seems highly probable that they should be set down as the predecessors of the Polemianists, who, very soon to come on the scene—it may be noted that Timothy of Berytus, one of the leaders of this section of the followers of Apollinarius of Laodicea, was condemned at Rome in the year 378—took "ousia" in the sense of "prosopon", and used the word "homoousios" to express the doctrine that the manhood of Christ (i.e. "manhood", as they understood it) was not that of some other ousia (= "person"), but that its ousia was "the same" as that of the Logos (see below, p. 53 n. 2)—though how far the party at Corinth had developed their doctrine it is impossible to say. In any case one thing is clear: these are certainly Alexandrines who, like Apollinarius and Cyril, oppose the doctrine of the Antiochenes because in their view it amounts to the dividing of the one Christ, the Logos incarnate, into a duality of Sons. So we conclude that the *ad Epictetum* is an important document in the history of the Christological controversies, not only because it came to be recognized as a standard of orthodox belief, but also because it throws light on the earlier stages of the conflict between the two schools of thought which was soon to begin in grim earnest.

How can they be called Christians, he asks, who say that the Logos entered into a holy man, just as He entered into the prophets, and not that He became man, taking the body from Mary, and dare to assert that one is Christ and another the divine Logos?¹ He does not "divide the Son from the Logos", but recognizes that the Son—that is, He was so called at His Baptism and Transfiguration—is the Logos Himself who has become man.² For such a dividing, he argues, means the setting up of a mere man, whose death would have been solely on his own behalf—no mere man can draw all men into himself;³ besides, Christians are not man-worshippers.⁴ Thus does he anticipate the attack that was soon to be launched by Apollinarius, and after him by Cyril, against Nestorian thought. His standpoint, like that of his successors, is that "the body" of Jesus Christ is that of God, who at the end of the ages came to put away sin;⁵ if it is separated from the Logos, and regarded as "that of another", the conception of the reality of man's redemption through Christ is altogether lost—a conception, which, as we have seen, governs the whole of his doctrinal outlook.

Athanasius' teaching on the unity of Christ's Person has another important aspect: for him, Jesus Christ is God Himself living an incarnate life, and it is to Him—to the incarnate Logos—that all that appertains to that life must be ascribed. All the actions and sayings of Jesus Christ which are recorded in Scripture, he teaches, are those of the Logos made man. It was He who performed the mighty works, and it was He, the same Person (ὁ αὐτός), who, having taken a passible body, wept and was hungry;⁶ it was "the Logos in the flesh" who uttered the prayer in Gethsemane and the bitter cry on Golgotha;⁷ it was "the Logos when He became flesh" who said that He was ignorant of the time of the Parousia.⁸ Let us be certain of this: Athanasius would not say that the Logos who has become man does or says this as God and that as man. What he maintains is that whatever was done or said was done or said by one Person⁹—the Logos in His incarnate state.

¹ *Ad Epict.* 2.

² *Ibid.* 11.

³ *Ad Max.* 2.

⁴ *Ibid.* iii. 54.

⁵ *Ibid.* iii. 35, where is an explicit statement to this effect (quoted below, p. 40).

⁶ *Ibid.* 12.

⁷ *Ad Adolph.* 3; cf. *c. Arian.* ii. 16.

⁸ *C. Arian.* iii. 55.

⁹ *Ibid.* iii. 43.

But here, it should be noted, Athanasius makes the same careful distinction that is made by Origen and Malchion. Because the Logos has made His own the things of the flesh, he affirms, it must be said that "God suffered"; for the same reason, as is clear, he uses the title "Theotokos" when speaking of the Virgin.¹ But he carefully distinguishes between what must be said of the Logos in His divine and eternal being, and what must be said of Him as He has become man. He would not have it thought that he attributes passibility to the Divine: in His divine being, the Logos remains what He was. So, explaining how the expression "God suffered" should be interpreted, he appeals to "that trustworthy witness, the blessed Peter". The Apostle, he points out,² has declared that Christ suffered for us "in the flesh" (1 St Peter iv. 1)—hence it is only to the Logos "in the flesh" that passibility can be ascribed. But ascribed it must be, Athanasius would say, since He who suffered was the God who assumed flesh for our salvation.

Such are the aspects of Athanasius' teaching which may be grouped under what we would call the first foundation principle of the Alexandrine Christology. This we now venture to summarize as follows: *In Jesus Christ, the Logos, while remaining what He was, has, for our salvation, united manhood to Himself, thereby making it His own; He is not, therefore, two Persons, but one Person, the Logos Himself in His incarnate state.*

Let us now go back to the second idea fundamental to the soteriology of the great Alexandrine. As we have seen, he lays down, not only that the Redeemer must be "true God by nature", but also that that which the very God puts on must be "by nature human flesh"; for the redemption itself could not have been effected if a second Adam had not come into existence to be the root of a restored creation. Upon this he builds the Christological assertion that in Jesus Christ there is not only true Godhead but also true manhood: there are in Him, he says, two elements—δύο πράγματα, he calls them³—which remain, each with its properties. Here again the letters which he wrote in connection with the doctrinal controversy at Corinth are of real value for an appreciation of Athanasius' point of view. As it

¹ *Ibid.* iii. 14, 29, 33.

² *Ibid.* iii. 32 ff.

³ See the fragment in *P.G.* xxvi. 1257.

seems to us, he misunderstands the doctrinal position of those who were saying that the body of Christ is "homouosios" with the Logos; for these, we consider, were in all probability the forerunners of the Synousiasts, and were using this term in order to enforce the principle of the unity of Christ's Person, without denying the reality of His body.¹ Nevertheless, his reply to Epictetus is most significant: he denounces the notion that the body is "homouosios" with the Godhead of the Logos, and, believing that the party at Corinth thought in this way, classes them with the Valentinians, the Marcionists, and the Manichaeans.² Such men, he declares, will not accept the truth of the Incarnation:³ they deny what is proper to Christ's body—and he who denies Christ's human properties "denies utterly also His sojourn among us".⁴ Clearly, then, he takes a firm stand by the doctrine of the reality of the Lord's manhood, and in anticipation condemns Eutychianism, just as in anticipation he condemns Nestorianism.

But we can say more than this. Athanasius, like Origen before him, sees that any Christology, if it is to be sound, must include the principle of "recognizing" in Christ the elements of Godhead and manhood, and, in accordance with their properties, seeing the difference between them. To quote what he says in this connection:

If we recognize what is proper to each—i.e., to the Logos and to "His own body"—and see and understand that both these things and those are performed by one Person, we believe aright, and shall never go astray [Ἐκάστου γὰρ τὸ ἴδιον γινώσκοντες, καὶ ἀμφοτέρω ἐξ ἑνὸς πραττόμενα βλέποντες καὶ νοοῦντες, ὀρθῶς πιστεύομεν . . .]. But if a man, looking into what was done by the Logos divinely, denies the body, or, looking into the properties of the body, denies the coming of the Logos in flesh, or, from what is human, entertains low ideas concerning the Logos, such a one, like the Jewish vintner [cf. Isaiah i. 22, LXX], mixing wine with water, will count the Cross a scandal, or, as the Greek, deem the preaching foolishness.⁵

¹ On what seems to have been the doctrinal position of the two parties at Corinth c. 361, see above, p. 36 n. 4, and on the Synousiasts, below, p. 53 n. 2.

² *Ad Adolph.* 2; *ad Epict.* 4, 8.

³ *Ad Adolph.* 1.

⁴ *Ad Max.* 3.

⁵ *C. Arian.* iii. 35—which should be compared with the kindred statements of Origen (above, pp. 24 f.) and Apollinarius (below, p. 59).

First of all, as bearing out what has been said above concerning his doctrine of the unity of Christ's Person, it should be noted that Athanasius maintains that all the actions and sayings of Jesus Christ, whether human or divine, proceed ἐξ ἑνός—that is, from the Logos made man. But he also maintains that in this one Person there is Godhead and there is manhood, each with its properties. So what he means in the passage which we have just quoted is that if anyone would hold a sound Christological belief, he must not only see Jesus Christ as one Person, the Logos Himself in His incarnate state, but he must also "recognize"—that is, see as real—the properties of His Godhead and those of His manhood. For, he argues, if one sees only the human properties, one arrives at the position that it was not the Logos Himself who was present as man among men—indeed, on this basis, one can "entertain low ideas concerning the Logos", and with the Arians think of Him as a creature; and if one sees only the divine properties, one arrives at the position that the body was not real; in the one case, as in the other, what is being denied is the reality of the Redemption and of the Incarnation which it has necessitated. Obviously, the enforcement of the principle of "recognizing" the two natures of Jesus Christ, and seeing each with its properties, carries with it the rejection of the Eutychian error. As we shall see, this principle was carried forward by Apollinarius and Cyril; indeed, it would seem that in Cyril's hands it becomes the ground of a particular Christological theory. Of this we shall speak later on.

Now we can attempt to summarize what we would call the second foundation principle of the teaching with which we are dealing: *In Jesus Christ, the two elements of Godhead and manhood, each with its properties, are to be recognized; therefore, since these remain in their union in His Person, any idea of confusion or of change in respect of these elements must be eliminated.* This and the first foundation principle, we contend, form the backbone of the Alexandrine Christology.

But before we leave Athanasius, another important question must be discussed. As we have noticed, he holds that the manhood of Jesus Christ is real, and that its properties remain in the union. So we ask: Does he hold that the manhood still possesses the power of self-determination? Or, to put it another way: Is

he, or is he not, to be set down as an Apollinarian? Undoubtedly there are many passages in his writings in which he refers to the Lord's human nature as "flesh" or "body",¹ but, to our mind, it is possible to read too much into his frequent use of these terms. It is important to remember, we think, that Athanasius lived at a time when what was meant by the term "manhood" was still awaiting careful definition—Apollinarius had not yet been condemned. Again it may seem that his description of the manhood as the "instrument", or the "shrine", of the Logos² points to a latent Apollinarianism. But can we be sure? Later theologians spoke in the same way, and these, it is clear, deliberately rejected the Apollinarian error. On the other hand, it seems to be going too far to appeal to the statement in the *Tomus ad Antiochenos* that "the Lord had a body which was not without a soul, neither was it without sense or intelligence" (ἄψυχον, οὐδ' ἀναισθητον οὐδ' ἀνόητον),³ and to take this as evidence that Athanasius explicitly affirms the reality of Christ's human rational soul. Certainly he presided over the Council of Alexandria (362) which issued this document, but we have to reckon with the possibility—perhaps we should call it the probability—that the statement which we have just quoted proceeds from the Antiochenes who were present at the Council, these, pre-

¹ See the passages quoted by Raven, *op. cit.* pp. 83 ff., 91 ff. But Athanasius also uses such terms as "man", "one man", "the man of the Lord", and "manhood" (cf. *ibid.* p. 92). Raven, however, who regards the Christology of this Alexandrine as essentially Apollinarian, takes the view that these terms are used interchangeably with, and in the same sense as, "body" and "flesh". The alteration, this scholar says, is "one of words, but not of thought", Athanasius being moved by the consideration that the Arians, who could accept "was made flesh", could not accept "was made man" (*ibid.* pp. 91 f.). But is it not legitimate to take his terms the other way round, and to see in his "man" etc. what he means by "flesh" and "body"? Surely, as his appeal to Joel ii. 28 (cf. *c. Arian.* iii. 30) shows, he thinks of "flesh" as "common humanity", and there appears to be no reason against assuming that, when he uses this term, he is but following what is set down in St John i. 14. Moreover, in regard to his use of "body", it may be noted that Cyril himself often employs the same word—and it is clear that this teacher stands for the position that in Christ the Logos assumed a human nature complete with human rational soul (see below, p. 102). We venture to suggest, then, that, when speaking of our Lord's humanity, Athanasius is but adopting terms current among the Alexandrine theologians, and that the very fact that he can, and does, use the term "man" would seem to indicate that he would teach that the humanity was altogether like ours.

² E.g. *de Incarn.* 42, 43, 44; *c. Arian.* iii. 34, 52.

³ *Tomus ad Antioch.* 7.

sumably, being intent upon seeing in writing one of the main Christological assertions of the school of thought which they represented. Nevertheless, the fact that he accepts—and that without question—such carefully chosen words is itself by no means without significance. Further, his doctrine that "the whole man must be saved"¹ should be taken into consideration in this connection, for this clearly implies that he regards Jesus Christ as *totus homo*. Thus it is reasonable to suppose that, had he been alive at the time, he would have held fast by the principle that "that which was not taken was not redeemed", and without hesitation would have laid bare the error of Apollinarius, even if he was his friend.

But the real test comes when we investigate his interpretation of those Scriptural passages which have direct bearing on the point at issue. Thus, in his comments on the texts "Now is my soul troubled...", "Remove this cup from me", and "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" we find that Athanasius, as he argues against the Arians, makes a special point of saying that these affections were "not proper to the nature of the Logos"—on the contrary, "the flesh was thus affected",² "these affections were proper to the flesh",³ and, in Gethsemane, "the flesh was in terror".⁴ May we not say, then, that in his view the "flesh", as "flesh", was at these times really moved to assert itself?—that, had he been pressed, he would have acknowledged that the "flesh" possessed the power of self-determination? What we mean is that the thought of the individual character of the Lord's manhood would seem to be implicit in his teaching. But does he make use of this principle? It is apparent that he does not. For one sees in Athanasius the idea that the Logos so intervenes in the human life of Jesus Christ that it is robbed of the individual character which must belong to it if it is to be truly human. The Logos Himself, he says, "lightened" the sufferings of the flesh;⁵ the terror was "destroyed" by the Divine.⁶ But this does not mean that Athanasius is an Apollinarian: surely, it means no more than that a principle, implicit in his teaching, is not brought out.

¹ E.g. *ad Epict.* 7.

² *Ibid.* iii. 56.

³ *Ibid.* iii. 56.

⁴ *C. Arian.* iii. 55.

⁵ *Ibid.* iii. 57.

⁶ *Ibid.* iii. 57.

That this would seem to be a justifiable conclusion is seen when we turn to his interpretation of the crucial text, St Luke ii. 52. Does he allow that progress belongs to the "flesh"? He certainly does. Contending against the Arian use of the text in support of the doctrine of a mutable Logos, he asks: "What kind of progress could He have who was eternally equal with God?"—how could Wisdom advance in wisdom? Rather, he goes on, "the progress belongs to the body"—it was "Jesus" who advanced in wisdom and grace.¹ Once again, it will be noted, the principle that Christ's is a manhood which is individual in its qualities is implicit in Athanasius' doctrine. But is it developed? It is clear that while he holds that Christ's physical growth is real, he regards Christ's intellectual and spiritual growth as "the [gradual] manifestation of the Godhead to those who saw it": "as the Godhead was more and more revealed", he says, "by so much more did His grace as man increase before all men".² We shall see that Cyril has exactly the same thought.³

What are we to say, then? Undoubtedly there is that in the language of this great Alexandrine which seems to point to the presence of Apollinarian thought, but, we consider, it is necessary to examine the roots of his teaching in order to arrive at a true estimate of his position. Then, as it seems, it becomes clear that he builds on the soteriological idea that Jesus Christ is the second Adam, and that, carrying forward this thought, he upholds the truth that He is *totus homo*—though he did not live long enough to perceive that it was necessary for him to put forward an explicit declaration concerning the constituent parts of the *totus homo*. Nevertheless, Athanasius' Christology cannot be said to be wholly satisfactory. His failure, presumably, lies in this: while he maintains the representative and, in theory, the individual character of Christ's manhood, this second conception he does not work out in practice; for, as his scriptural exegesis plainly reveals, he is unable to posit a relationship between the Godhead and the manhood in the one Person of Jesus Christ in which the manhood really possesses its own individuating characteristics. But, as we go farther in our study, we shall see that this failing does not belong to Athanasius alone: it is common to all the Greek theologians.

¹ *C. Arian.* iii. 51, 52.

² *Ibid.* iii. 52.

³ See below, pp. 103 f.

II. THE TEACHING OF APOLLINARIUS OF LAODICEA AND HIS SCHOOL

The Christological principles which are fundamental to the teaching of Athanasius are also fundamental to those of Apollinarius and Cyril, the only difference being that with the coming of the Laodicene these principles now receive definite expression, and in this form are carried forward by the later representatives of the Alexandrine doctrine.¹ So we would preface this section

¹ It is outside the scope of this essay to enter into a full discussion of the teaching of Didymus the Blind († c. 398), who for some time had been head of the catechetical school at Alexandria. We may, however, briefly note that this admirer of Origen, who, as is clear, has nothing new to offer in the field of Christology, and whose doctrine is much less developed than that of Athanasius [for, as has been shown, while Athanasius stands in the midst of the movement, and treats of Christology directly, Didymus stands outside it, and treats of this subject only by the way—see E. Weigl, *Christologie vom Tode des Athanasius bis zum Ausbruch des nestorianischen Streites* (373–429) (München, 1925)], upholds the two foundation principles of the Alexandrine teaching. Like Athanasius, he starts from the soteriological point of view (see esp. *de Trin.* iii. 4, 5; *P.G.* xxxix. 829D, 836D, 841C), and affirms that the only-begotten God has Himself become man on our behalf (*de Trin.* iii. 4; *P.G.* xxxix. 829D), and, through mixing earthly things with heavenly, has established for us perpetually a new salvation (*ibid.*; *P.G.* xxxix. 840A). Again and again does Didymus affirm that the Logos has become man "without change". It is noteworthy, too, that he upholds the principle of the divine self-emptying, and in this connection this statement of his will be regarded as most praiseworthy: . . . συγκαταβάς εἰς πάντα, καὶ πτωχεύων τῆ τοῦ δούλου μορφῇ, καὶ μεταπλάσας τῷ λόγῳ ἑαυτὸν ἀτρέπτως εἰς τὸ κοινόν, καὶ πᾶσαν τῆς ἐνανθρωπήσεως ἀκολουθίαν φυλάττων, καὶ μηδὲν τοῦ χαρακτῆρος τῆς ἀληθείας ἀφανίζων (*de Trin.* iii. 21; *P.G.* xxxix. 901C). His teaching on the union is deficient: he does not use the terms *μίξις*, *κρᾶσις*, *συγκρασις*, *συνάφεια* which were in common use among the representatives of the Alexandrine school of thought, and even *ἔνωσις* does not appear as a current term in his writings; neither do we find here any reference to an "essential" union, or to the truth that in the Incarnation the Logos made the manhood "His own" (see Weigl, pp. 110, 113). At the same time, it is plain that, though the expression *ἐν πρόσωπον* may be used only once (*ibid.* p. 109), Didymus would strenuously maintain the doctrine of the unity of Christ's Person against the idea of *ἄλλος*. . . *ἄλλος*: the Apostle Peter was not thinking of "two" when he wrote that Christ suffered in the flesh (*de Trin.* iii. 6; *P.G.* xxxix. 844A, B); the Logos who became man is *εἰς καὶ ὁ αὐτός* (*de Trin.* ii. 8; *P.G.* xxxix. 589A). Again, true to his upbringing, this teacher emphasizes the truth that this Person is "God": he alludes to the Virgin as "Theotokos", and ascribes two births to the Logos (for references, see Weigl, p. 105 nn. 2, 4)—though he does not stop to explain what is meant, and what is not meant, when one speaks in this way. It should be observed, too, that Didymus would distinguish between the Logos in His eternal being and the Logos as incarnate: his interpretation of the proof-texts of the Arians is based on this principle, and especially interesting are his statements that "the Logos, as He knew and willed, tasted

of our study with a brief enquiry into the terms which the theologians of the East could use as they sought to express the doctrine that Jesus Christ is one "Person", and that in Him there are united the two "elements" of Godhead and manhood.

First, they had the non-metaphysical term "prosopon". The original meaning of the term is, of course, "face". From this sense, and from others derived from it, it came to express "the external being or individual self as presented to an onlooker"¹—a person, that is, as seen from the outside. In the technical sense of "person" the word had been used in the East in connection

death in the flesh, and continued immortal, even then (καὶ τότε) bestowing life upon all", and that He continued καὶ ἀπαθὴς τῇ θεότητι καὶ ἐν τοῖς παθήμασιν (*de Trin.* iii. 21; *P.G.* xxxix. 905B, 912B).

It is equally clear that the second doctrinal principle of the Alexandrine school is at the root of Didymus' Christology. Though he never uses the expression δύο φύσεις, it is certain that for him Jesus Christ consists of two elements—Christ is ἄνθρωπος ἕνα καὶ θεός (*Frag. in Act. Ap.*, *P.G.* xxxix. 1657A)—which are in Him "without confusion": the Son of God, he says, is shown κατὰ τὸ ἐξ ἁμφοῖν (*de Trin.* iii. 22; *P.G.* xxxix. 916A), and again and again does he affirm that the Son became man ἀσυγχύτως (for references, see Weigl, p. 105 n. 10). He most emphatically rejects the doctrine that the Incarnation was a φάντασμα (*de Trin.* iii. 10; *P.G.* xxxix. 857B), or that Christ's body was only in appearance (*de Trin.* iii. 21; *P.G.* xxxix. 904A), or that that body was from heaven and not human (*de Trin.* iii. 8; *P.G.* xxxix. 849C). We must notice, too, that, against the Arian doctrine of a σάρξ ἄψυχος, he insists that Christ's was a σάρξ ἐμψυχος (*de Trin.* iii. 21; *P.G.* xxxix. 904A), and, as is evident from his appeal to Scripture—himself, presumably, prepared to take the trichotomous view of man's constitution (see *de Spir. S.*, 55, 59; *P.G.* xxxix. 1080B, 1082B)—that he would say that the manhood possessed freedom of choice; thus he can speak of "the will of the manhood" (*de Trin.* iii. 12; 860B). It may be that he even uses such expressions as ψυχὴ λογικὴ, or ψυχὴ νοερά—though these occur in the *Expositio in Psalmos*, which contains statements to be found word for word in Diodore of Tarsus and Eustathius of Antioch (see Weigl, p. 101 n. 3), and such words as: . . . ἦν ἠνώσεν ἑαυτῷ σάρκα ἐμψυχωμένην ψυχῇ λογικῇ τε καὶ νοερᾷ (*in Ps. lxxi.* 5; *P.G.* xxxix. 1465C) certainly have a Cyrilline flavour (see below, p. 102 n. 5); moreover, it is significant that Didymus never mentions Apollinarius by name—a point which seems to show that he paid no close attention to the question at issue. But, even if Didymus would uphold the principle of the complete reality of the Lord's manhood, he, like all the Greek theologians, never applies it: he quotes Heb. v. 7, 8, but merely says that the Son of God "accepted obedience" and took away the former disobedience (*de Trin.* iii. 21; *P.G.* xxxix. 916B); and, in his explanation of the prayer in Gethsemane, he says that the Lord brought to light the fear of death which was present with Him, in order that the devil, who had drawn nigh in the Wilderness when the Saviour spoke things proper to manhood, and had fled when, through His wonders, He had shown Himself to be God, might once more consider Him a mere man, and not God appearing in flesh, and be himself hurt who was cunningly devising to hurt the unconquerable God (*ibid.*; *P.G.* xxxix. 908A, B).

¹ So Prestige, *op. cit.* p. 157.

with Trinitarian doctrine seemingly from the days of Hippolytus, who, as is probable, took it as the Greek translation of Tertullian's *persona*. So it is the term which is most frequently used by Apollinarius when he speaks of the Lord's "Person"; the Cappadocians, too, and Cyril use it in the same way. In the writings of these teachers instances are to be found of the use of "prosopon" in its older meanings,¹ but it seems—and here, as we think, we can mark the difference between the Alexandrine and the Antiochene use of the term—that it is not so employed in doctrinal discussion.

A second term which they could use was "hypostasis". As Prestige has recently shown in his *God in Patristic Thought*,² the word, as used by the Greeks, had both an active and a passive meaning: it could mean both "that which gives support" and "that which underlies". In the former case the emphasis is on the idea of "concrete independence", and so "hypostasis" could be used to signify "particular objects or individuals"; in the latter case, the idea of "basis or foundation"—"the raw material, stuff, or 'matter' out of which an object is constructed"—is being emphasized, and so the term could be used to signify "reality and genuineness".³ Both usages were recognized by the Church: after the Council of Alexandria in 362, it became legitimate to speak of "three hypostases" or of "one hypostasis" when discussing "Theology".⁴ Thus its equivalents were, respectively, "prosopon", and—the meaning which was more readily understood by the West—*substantia*, its philological equivalent. The term was regularly used by Cyril in these two senses. Thus—to give but one example at this point—he speaks of "one incarnate hypostasis of the Logos", and of the coming together in Jesus Christ of "things or hypostases".⁵

¹ For instances, see Driver and Hodgson, *Bazaar of Heracleides*, Appendix III, pp. 406 ff. For a discussion on the use of "prosopon" by the Antiochenes, see below, pp. 156 ff. ² Pp. 162 ff.

³ Thus Athanasius, in a well-known passage, says that "hypostasis" means "being" ("ousia"), and that it has no other significance than simply αὐτὸ τὸ ὄν (*ad Afros* 4).

⁴ Cf. the distinction between "ousia" and "hypostasis" (in "Theology") made by Basil of Caesarea: "'ousia' has the same relation to 'hypostasis' as the common has to the particular" (*Epp.* ccxiv, ccxxxvi)—a patristic text to which appeal could be made in support of the use of "hypostasis" in the sense of "person".

⁵ *Ep.* iii *ad Nestor.*, *P.G.* lxxvii. 116A; *Apol. adv. Theod.* i., ed. P. E. Pusey, *S. Cyrilli archiepisc. Alex.* . . . (Oxford, 1868-77), vi. p. 396.

Thirdly, they had the term "ousia", the technical value of which had been fixed by Aristotle's "primary" and "secondary ousia". In accordance with the philosopher's definition of a "primary ousia", the word had been used by Origen in the sense of a particular existence, an individual,¹ and Malchion the Sophist had adopted this meaning in his doctrine concerning the Lord's "Person".² As we are to see, it is used in the same way by the Synousiasts or Polemianists, a section of the followers of the Laodiceans,³ and at times by the heresiarch himself.⁴ Indeed, it is clear that the use of "ousia" in the sense of "prosopon" was never completely abandoned by the Greek theologians.⁵ Yet, as a result of the setting up of "homousios", the term came to be more generally used, and that in accordance with Aristotle's definition of a "secondary ousia", as denoting "substantial existence", the essential quality shared by a number of particulars—as the equivalent, that is, of the Latin *substantia*.

But "ousia" was the term of the philosophers, and in popular usage its place was taken by "nature", which is "an empirical rather than a philosophical term". So it is not surprising that Athanasius, after the "Dated" Creed of 359 had condemned the use of "ousia" because, besides being unscriptural, it was not understood by the people, and so gave rise to difficulties, turns to this word in order to explain the meaning of "homousios".⁶

¹ Thus Origen can say that in relation to the Father the Son is ἕτερος κατ' οὐσίαν καὶ ὑποκείμενον (*de Orat.* 15). Cf. also his use of the phrase οὐσία ἰδίᾳ (*Comm. in Johan.* ii. 6, ed. Brooke, i. p. 70). Again, νοεραὶ οὐσίαι are for him the same as λογικαὶ ὑποστάσεις (*de Princ.* II. ix. 1; III. i. 22). For a similar usage in Dionysius of Alexandria and Pierius, see Raven, *op. cit.* p. 64 n. 4.

² See above, p. 28.

³ See below, p. 53 n. 2.

⁴ See below, pp. 52 f.

⁵ Thus the usage "ousia" = "prosopon" is to be found among the Monophysites, Timothy Aelurus (see J. Lebon, "La Christologie de Timothée Aelure", in *Revue d'Hist. ecclés.*, t. ix, pp. 602, 604), Severus of Antioch (see P.G. lxxxvi. 924A, 1921B), and Julian of Halicarnassus (see R. Draguet, *Julien d'Halicarnasse*, append., *Fragmenta Dogmatica*, p. 62, Frag. 72), using as equivalents the terms "ousia", "nature" and "hypostasis". Presumably the Monophysites adopted this usage because it was already to be found in the Apollinarian writings which constituted one of their main sources of appeal; besides, as Harnack says, "in the course of the transition from the fifth to the sixth century, Aristotelianism once more became the fashion in science".

⁶ See *de Synod.* 50, 52, 53, and *c. Arian.* iii. 65, where Athanasius uses "nature" to explain what he understood by "ousia" and "hypostasis" (= *substantia*).

Once it was understood—though the relation between the two terms remained undefined—that "nature" could be used as an equivalent of "ousia", it came to bear the same two meanings: it could refer either to the particular or to the general.¹ And, it should be clearly understood, the theologians of the Alexandrine school were at home with both usages: they employ "nature" in the sense of "an individual existence" (i.e., as the equivalent of "prosopon") and in its generic sense; they speak of "one incarnate nature of the divine Logos", but they also speak of "the divine nature", "the nature of the Godhead", "our nature", "man's nature", and "human nature".²

So then, understanding that the Alexandrine teachers had at

¹ It is noteworthy that the Anomoeans were using "nature" in the sense of "prosopon" at the same time as Apollinarius. See the Creed of Eudoxius, who died in 370 (Hahn, pp. 261 f.), and the statement of Lucius, who was made bishop of Alexandria in 374 (quoted by Raven, *op. cit.* p. 116).

² Thus—to quote examples of the Alexandrines' use of "nature" in the sense of *substantia*—we find in Apollinarius: "human nature" (*de Un.* 11, Lietzmann, *Apollinaris von Laodicea und seine Schule*, p. 190) and "our nature" (*Anaceph.* 23, *ibid.* p. 244). Further, writing against Diodore of Tarsus, the Laodicean says that Christ's body in its union with Godhead does not alter from being a body, "just as a man's body remains in its own nature" (*ibid.* Frag. 134). Cf. also the statement (to be found in his argument that it would mean the destruction of a self-determinating being if it were to lose its power of self-determination) that God has not destroyed "the nature" which He Himself created (*Apod.*, *ibid.* Frag. 87). Or, turning to Cyril, we have: "the divine nature" (*Apol. adv. Theod.* i; *Scholia*, xxvii f.; ed. Pusey, VI. pp. 396, 548, 556); "the nature of the Godhead" (*de Recta Fide ad Reg.* (i); *Quod unus sit Christus*: ed. Pusey, VII. pt. i. pp. 232, 353); "our nature" (*Quod unus . . .*; *Scholia*, xxix; ed. Pusey, VII. pt. i. p. 340; VI. p. 558); "the fleshly nature" (*Apol. adv. Theod.* i; ed. Pusey, VI. p. 396); "man's nature" (*Scholia*, xxvii; *Comm. in Jo. Ev.* vi. 38 f., xii. 27 f.; *Frag. in Ep. ad Rom.* v. 18 f.; *de Recta Fide ad Reg.* (ii): ed. Pusey, VI. p. 548; III. p. 487; IV. p. 318; V. p. 186 f.; VII. pt. i. p. 302); "human nature" (*Apol. adv. Theod.* ii; ed. Pusey, VI. p. 404); "the same nature as ours" (*Comm. in Jo. Ev.* x. 14, 15, ed. Pusey, IV. p. 232). Tixeront (*History of Dogmas*,² iii. p. 59) thinks that for this Alexandrine "the word 'nature' means a concrete and independent nature, i.e. a person", and that "when he uses his own terminology, Cyril never calls the humanity (of Jesus Christ) 'nature'"—he had, rather, "to employ his opponents' language, particularly when he had to prove that he admitted no confusion of the two elements in Jesus Christ". But, as the instances taken from his *Comm. in Jo. Ev.* reveal, it is clear that Cyril uses "nature" in the sense of *substantia* in writings which are not controversial. The point would seem to be that we cannot speak of Cyril's "own terminology": he does but adopt a current terminology, according to which "nature" could be used in two senses. Apollinarius before him had used the term in this way, and a similar usage is to be found in those who followed him (see, for instance, the explanation of the use of the term put forward by Severus of Antioch—quoted below, p. 50 n. 1).

their disposal these four terms, "prosopon", "hypostasis", "ousia", and "nature", when they wished to refer to the "Person" of Jesus Christ, and that they could adopt any one of the last three,¹ when they sought to mention the elements of which he is composed, let us see how he who stands as the pioneer in this work of formulating the Christological principles of the school makes use of them.

Apollinarius of Laodicea, dominated, like Athanasius and all the Alexandrine teachers, by a profound interest in soteriology, sets it up as his main Christological assertion that Jesus Christ is the Logos Himself who, for man's salvation, has become flesh—"flesh", that is, as he understands the term.

This becoming flesh, he maintains, has not been brought about through any change of the divine ousia of the Logos. Thus he expressly anathematizes any who would say that the Logos has been changed into flesh,² and quotes against them the text "I am the Lord, I change not" (Malachi iii. 6).³ The Logos, he teaches, still maintains His cosmic relations even if He has become flesh: "at once He permeates all things and is in a peculiar

¹ An excellent illustration of the various ways in which the terms "hypostasis", "ousia", and "nature" were taken by the Alexandrine theologians is to be found in the letter of Severus of Antioch to Eupraxius the chamberlain (ed. and trans. by E. W. Brooks, *A Collection of Letters of Severus of Antioch, Patrologia Orientalis*, t. xiv, fasc. i, pp. 28 f.): "We use the name nature sometimes generally of 'ousia', and sometimes specifically signifying the hypostasis of a man. We term all mankind one nature, as in the text, 'Every nature of beasts and of birds and of things that are in the water is subjected and made subject to human nature' (James iii. 7): and again we call a man 'nature', Paul, for instance, or Peter, or James. Where we name all mankind one nature we use the name 'nature' generically in place of 'ousia', but when we speak of one nature of Paul, we employ the name 'nature' in place of 'individual hypostasis'. So also when we say that the Trinity is one nature, as in the text, 'In order that we may be sharers of the divine nature' (2 St Peter i. 4), we use the name 'nature' in place of the general designation 'ousia'. . . . But, when we say 'one incarnate nature of God the Word', we say 'nature' in place of an individual designation, and thereby denote one single hypostasis of the Word, like that of Paul, or Peter, or any single man. Therefore also, when we say 'one nature which became incarnate', we do not say so absolutely, but we say 'one nature of the Word Himself', and clearly denote that it is one hypostasis. But again let no one stain the divine nature that is raised above all things with anything lowly taken from the example of Paul and Peter. For, although these are of the same ousia, they differ not only in hypostasis but also in power and operation, and stature and shape, and in the various kinds of impulses that are in men's minds. The Trinity, however, differs by the difference of hypostases only, and in every point is unvarying in equality, and in the fact that it is of the same ousia."

² *Ad Jov.* 3, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* p. 253.

³ *Ad Jov.* 2, *ibid.* p. 252.

sense commingled with the flesh".¹ For the same reason he denies that the Logos has been limited by the body—had it been so, he argues, "the universe would have been made void".² What he insists on is that the Logos is the same Person both before and after the Incarnation:³ the Invisible is seen composite with a body, while remaining invisible and uncomposite;⁴ Christ is "God invisible changed in form by His visible body, God uncreate made manifest by a created limitation, self-limited in assuming the form of a servant, unlimited, unaltered, unimpaired in His divine essence".⁵ Clearly his position is that the Logos, while remaining what He was, has in addition become incarnate: remaining *ἀσύνθετος* and *ἄσαρκος* in His eternal being, He has become *σύνθετος* and *ἐνσαρκος* in the Incarnation.

What is Apollinarius' teaching on the self-emptying? As Raven says, for this theologian it is "identical with the whole condition of Christ's life upon earth, a continuous process of voluntary renunciation".⁶ His "great definition" is that "incarnation is self-emptying" (*σάρκωσις κένωσις*)⁷—a principle which, it would seem, lies behind the teaching of Athanasius on this subject. But now the thought is more clearly developed. In a passage which reminds us of the statement of Irenaeus that the Logos was "quiescent" at the time of the Temptation,⁸ the Laodicean declares that the suffering of Christ "only appears in proportion to the restraint and withdrawal of the divine will";⁹ and in another he affirms that "the energy of the Godhead acts on each occasion either separately or in combination as is necessary", and gives as an example the Lord's fasting: "when the Godhead, with its capacity for superiority to want, acted in combination, His hunger was appeased; when it did not employ its capacity to resist the feeling of want, His hunger increased".¹⁰

¹ Ἡ Κατὰ Μέρος Πίστις, II, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* p. 171.

² Lietzmann, *op. cit.* Frag. 138.

³ K.M.Π. 36, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* p. 181.

⁴ Lietzmann, *op. cit.* Frag. 133.

⁵ *De Un.* 6, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* pp. 187 f. (trans. as in Raven, *Apollinarianism*, p. 203).

⁶ *Op. cit.* pp. 202 ff., where the subject is discussed at length.

⁷ *C. Diod.*, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* Frag. 124.

⁸ Irenaeus, *adv. Haeres.* III. xix. 3.

⁹ From Apollinarius' commentary on St John—a fragment to be found in Cramer, *Cat. Graec. Patr. in N.T.* ii. 315 (quoted by Raven, *op. cit.* p. 205).

¹⁰ *C. Diod.*, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* Frag. 127 (trans. as in Raven, *op. cit.* p. 205).

But, as Raven points out, it must not be supposed that Apollinarius presents us with a system of Christology in which the self-emptying is regarded as complete: it is just here, we consider, that the weakness in the teaching of the Greek Fathers is to be marked, for had they developed the doctrine of the Lord's individual manhood, they would have been compelled to posit the complete self-emptying of the Logos. Nevertheless, it seems undeniable that the conception that the Logos must limit Himself in respect of the powers which are His by nature if He is indeed to become man has a definite place in the Alexandrine doctrinal tradition, and, as we shall see, Cyril, working on the basis of Apollinarius' definition, can offer a formula which, provided that one does not hesitate to make full use of it, is of real value in this connection.¹

How then, according to Apollinarius, has the Logos become flesh? While remaining what He was, the Logos has taken to Himself a human body, and made it His own, this body being altogether inseparable from Him whose body it is.² Making use of terms which had been current among the Greek theologians for more than a century,³ he says that there has been a real "unification" (ἔνωσις),⁴ a "composition" (σύνθεσις), a "coming together" (σύνδοδος),⁵ a "commingling" (κρᾶσις, ἀνάκρασις, σύγκρσις),⁶ of Godhead and flesh in the Person of the Logos: σὰρξ . . . εἰς ἕν πρόσωπον ἦνωται τῇ θεότητι.⁷ This union, he affirms, is a "personal union": anticipating Cyril's "hypostatic" or "natural" union—though he uses another term—he says that it is οὐσιώδης,⁸ the flesh having been "personally united with"

¹ See below, p. 86.

² *De Un.* 2, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* p. 186.

³ See above, pp. 22, 29, for the use of these terms by Origen and the Origenists. Apollinarius was, then, drawing upon a common stock—the same stock used by the Cappadocians (see below, p. 96 n. 1).

⁴ Like all the Alexandrines, Apollinarius uses the word in the sense of *unio*: τὰ πράγματα ἦνωται κατὰ τὴν τῆς σαρκὸς πρὸς θεότητα ἔνωσιν (*de Un.* 13, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* p. 190). See also K.M.Π. 2, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* p. 168, and Lietzmann, *op. cit.* Frag. 164.

⁵ *Ad Dion.*, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* p. 260.

⁶ *C. Diod.*, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* Frags. 134, 137.

⁷ Lietzmann, *op. cit.* Frag. 164.

⁸ *Ibid.* Frag. 12: "that which has been inseparably joined to God", Apollinarius says, is divine "on account of the personal union [διὰ τὴν ἔνωσιν τὴν οὐσιώδη]". The same expression is to be found in Malchion the Sophist (see above, p. 28).

(συνουσιωμένη)¹ the Godhead in the Person of the Logos.² So is the Logos a φύσις which is now σεσαρκωμένη; or, as it was put

¹ *Ibid.* Frag. 36.

² Here we can conveniently enquire into the standpoint of the Synousiasts or Polemianists, a section of the followers of the Laodicene who were represented by such teachers as Polemon (or, Polemius), Timothy of Berytus, Eunomius of Beroea in Thrace, Julian, and Job, a bishop. These boldly asserted that the flesh of Christ is "homoousios" with God. Naturally they were misunderstood, and, even by the other followers of Apollinarius, were condemned as upholders of the notion that in the union Christ's manhood had become "of one essence" with His Godhead (see esp. the abusive criticism which they received from Valentinus, who, with Homonius, led the opposing section, in his *Capita apologiae*, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* pp. 287 ff.). But the Polemianists' was, certainly, not a doctrine of this order. It is noteworthy that Apollinarius himself more than once says that it is not to be thought that the Lord's flesh is consubstantial with His Godhead (see his letter to Terentius the Comes at Antioch, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* Frag. 163, and the anathema at the end of the confession of the Apollinarians, *Tom. Synod.*, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* p. 263). Besides, these teachers themselves assert that the flesh remains flesh in the union. Timothy, while holding that it is "homoousios" with God, declares that it is human and "homoousios" with us (Lietzmann, *op. cit.* Frag. 181); and Bishop Job anathematizes those who would say that it is "homoousios" with "the incorporeal ousia of the ineffable Father" (*ibid.* p. 287). In what sense, then, do these Polemianists use "homoousios"? It seems clear that they are taking "ousia" in the sense of "prosopon". For how, otherwise, is it possible to account for their emphatic condemnation of the doctrine of the consubstantiality of Christ's flesh with His Godhead? Besides, the use of "ousia" in this meaning had been current from the days of Malchion (see above, p. 28). What, then, is their standpoint? Timothy of Berytus in his letter to Homonius says that to deny that the flesh is συνουσιωμένη with the Logos is to destroy the unity of the one life and hypostasis, and to make the union that of a holy man with God (*ibid.* p. 278). Clearly, the principle which they would lay down is that the "flesh"—and by this they mean a body and an animal soul—is not "that of another beside the Logos": holding that the flesh has its properties, and that these remain in the union (see their appeal to the words of Apollinarius on this subject in the same letter, *ibid.* p. 278), they maintain that these properties are not those of another "Person". Their position is that Jesus Christ is one Person, the Logos Himself, who has made the flesh His own—that flesh is, therefore, "personally united with" Godhead in that Person. Similarly their declaration that the flesh is "homoousios" with the Logos is put forward to counteract the notion that in Jesus Christ there are two parallel "ousiai" (two parallel personal existences)—a holy man and the Logos. Their point is that the ousia of the Logos is the ousia of the flesh—that the flesh has "the same ousia" as the Logos. Of course this comes near to denying the reality of its individuating quality—and these teachers, following Apollinarius, took this step—but this denial is not necessarily involved in the statement that the flesh is "homoousios" with the Logos: one can say, and be orthodox, that the "Person" of the Logos is the "Person" of the manhood, since in the Incarnation that manhood, remaining real manhood, has been united to the Person of the Logos. And, we would suggest, it is this conception which the Synousiasts were meaning to uphold: against the Nestorian idea of two parallel existences (those of the Logos and a holyman), they were insisting on the idea of a "composition"—a composition

by one of his disciples, the Person (φύσις) who from eternity was simple is now composite (σύνθετος).¹ Since, then, the flesh has been compounded into the Person, this Person, now incarnate or composite, is one: Jesus Christ is μία φύσις (οὐσία) σύνθετος,² or—to quote the formula which later generations were to accept as genuinely Athanasian—μία φύσις τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου σεσαρκωμένη.³

Let us notice how central to his teaching is the principle that Jesus Christ, the Logos made flesh, is one Person. We will first consider his opposition to the Nestorian thought that in Christ there are two Persons set side by side. In Him, Apollinarius affirms, there are not two ousiai (=“persons”) but one, “according to the composition of God with a human body”;⁴ Jesus Christ is “one in being according to the one ousia, not in two prosopa which exist according to their spheres and dignities”;⁵ the one prosopon cannot be divided into two, for the body is not to be regarded as an ἰδίᾳ φύσις, having an individual existence beside the Logos,⁶ but just as man, who consists of body and soul, is one nature, so also is Christ⁷—an analogy which was to be used again and again by the Laodicean’s successors in the Alexandrine doctrinal tradition. Thus he will not allow that in Christ there are two persons existing side by side: God did not

of Godhead and flesh in the Person of the Logos. Undoubtedly, this use of “homoousios” is dangerous, though the Synousiasts (like those teachers at Corinth during the episcopate of Epictetus who seem to have been using the term in the same way—see above p. 36 n. 4) were hardly deserving of the condemnation which was meted out to them: they may have been unsound in their doctrine of the Lord’s manhood, but they realized the peril of Nestorianism, and saw that it could be overcome only through a firm insistence on the truth of the unity of His Person.

¹ So Eunomius of Beroea, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* Frag. 178.

² So Julian, also a Polemianist, *ibid.* Frag. 180. Bishop Job can say that Christ is “one composite hypostasis and prosopon” (*ibid.* p. 286).

³ The celebrated formula is to be found in the *ad Jovianum* (Lietzmann, *op. cit.* p. 281), a work—in all probability that of Apollinarius himself—which was ascribed to Athanasius. On the way in which the expression would seem to have been built up, see below, p. 89 n. 2.

⁴ *Syllog.*, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* Frag. 119; cf. also Frag. 158.

⁵ *De Incarn.*, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* Frag. 9.

⁶ *Ad Dion.*, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* p. 257.

⁷ *Ibid.* At the same time, it may be noted, Apollinarius is careful to explain to the Antiochenes that when he uses this analogy he has no thought of “confusing” the elements in Christ. Thus: “If man possesses both soul and body, and these remain in unity, much more does Christ, who possesses divinity and body, keep both constant and unconfounded” (*c. Diod.*, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* Frag. 129).

take a man to be “another beside Himself” (ἕτερος παρ’ αὐτόν),¹ for if that had been the case we should have had a divinely inspired man—but no mere prophet or apostle could have been the world’s Saviour;² rather, his position is that the flesh has its place in the composition which is in the Person of the Logos.

Again, it is in order to enforce the cardinal truth that Jesus Christ is God Himself made flesh that he insists that the Virgin must be called “Theotokos”. Neither he, nor his followers, nor, for the matter of that, any person who considers himself to be sane, he declares, would say that the flesh itself is consubstantial with the Godhead, or that it is from heaven;³ but since the mystery of man’s salvation lies in the incarnation of the Logos, who is inseparable from His own flesh, the Virgin must be given this title⁴—for He who was born of a woman is θεὸς ἔνσαρκος.⁵ With the same purpose in view he uses the expressions “God was crucified”, “God died”.⁶ But it should be understood that when he speaks in this way he is thinking of the Logos as He has become flesh. For Apollinarius is careful to make a distinction between the Logos in His incarnate state and the Logos in His eternal being, in which He is impassible. It was “when the Logos became flesh”, or, “as man”, that He died and rose again;⁷ the divine Logos preserved His presence in all things, and while the sufferings belonged to the flesh, His power possessed its own impassibility—one does not attribute the sufferings to the Power, he exclaims.⁸ As Raven says, this “distinction between the unlimited and self-limited aspects of Christ’s Godhead” is a most important feature of the Christology of Apollinarius.⁹ At the same time, it is evident that it is not peculiar to this theologian.¹⁰

¹ Lietzmann, *op. cit.* Frag. 186. The words were attributed to Felix of Rome and accepted as such by Cyril, who makes use of them (see below, p. 90 n. 2). Cf. also K.M.Π. 28 (Lietzmann, *op. cit.* p. 177) where those are condemned who would worship τὸν ἐκ Μαρίας ἀνθρώπων ὡς ἕτερον ὄντα παρὰ τὸν ἐκ θεοῦ θεόν.

² *Anaceph.* 1, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* p. 242.

³ On Apollinarius’ denial that the flesh is homoousios with the Godhead, see esp. Raven, *op. cit.* pp. 217 ff., where the apposite passages are set down.

⁴ *De Fid. et Incarn.* 5, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* p. 196; *ad Jov.* 1, 2, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* pp. 250 f.

⁵ *Apod.*, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* Frag. 50.

⁶ Cf. *Apod.*, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* Frags. 50, 52, 95.

⁷ *Apod.*, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* Frag. 93.

⁸ K.M.Π. 11, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* p. 171. ⁹ *Apollinarianism*, pp. 203 ff.

¹⁰ As we have tried to show, the same distinction is to be found in Origen, Malchion the Sophist, and Athanasius (above, pp. 22 f., 29 f., 39). It appears, too, in the Cappadocians and in Cyril (below, pp. 73 f., 87 f.).

Further, maintaining the principle that Jesus Christ is one Person, the Laodicene holds that all His actions and sayings are those of the Logos Himself as He has become incarnate. Like Athanasius—and, as we shall see, like Cyril—he does not think on the lines of any alternate action, as if the Lord did this in His divine and that in His human nature; his view, rather, is that everything, whether divine or human, belongs to the one incarnate Person. The precedent, he says, is to be found in Holy Scripture itself, in which “no division is made between the Logos and His flesh, [He being regarded as] one nature, one hypostasis, one activity, one prosopon, the Same wholly God, wholly man”.¹ So he takes the words “What He sees the Father doing He also does” (cf. St John v. 19), as applying to “the flesh, wherein the Incarnate is separate from the non-incarnate Father”²—that is, they are to be ascribed to the one Person, the Logos made flesh. Again, in regard to the prayer in Gethsemane, he expressly states that “He who uttered the words was God wearing flesh, with no distinction in the exercise of His will”.³ Similarly, he can say that the words “Glorify thou me with the glory which I had with thee before the world was” (St John xvii. 5) are those of “the whole”,⁴ and that the saying “Sit thou at my right hand” (Psalm cx. 1) is to be referred to the Lord “as man”—that is, to the Logos Himself in His incarnate state.⁵ Indeed, Apollinarius goes farther, and—to quote what his disciple, Julian the Polemianist, said of him—“the first to bring into clear light the mystery which had been hidden from all”, asserts that Jesus Christ is “one composite ousia and nature, moved by solely one will, and performing both the miracles and the sufferings”.⁶ Undoubtedly, the phrase μία οὐσία καὶ φύσις σύνθετος is new, and it stands to the credit of the Bishop of Laodicea that he could so clearly express what is implicit in the Alexandrine teaching. For him, Jesus Christ is one perfect living Being (ἐν ζωῶν), consisting of Godhead and flesh, of

¹ *De Fid. et Incarn.* 6, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* p. 199.

² *C. Diod.*, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* Frag. 131.

³ *De Manif.*, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* Frag. 109.

⁴ *De Un.* 7, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* p. 188.

⁵ *De Incarn.*, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* Frag. 3.

⁶ Lietzmann, *op. cit.* Frag. 180. That Julian is here giving a faithful account of Apollinarius' teaching is seen from the fragment of the letter which the master wrote to his disciple, *ibid.* Frag. 151.

Mover and moved—for the flesh has been compounded with the ruling principle from heaven—who possesses one will and one activity, and Himself performs both what is divine and what is human.¹ Neither would it be wrong to suppose that Polemon is but echoing the thought of the master when he declares that this one Person possesses “one operative motion” (μία ἐνεργητική κίνησις) which is seen “as well in the miracles as in the sufferings”.² Clearly, in all this we can trace an attempt to give definite expression to the doctrine that Jesus Christ is one composite Person, at once divine and human, whose is one theandric will and operation—only, in their determination to resist the Nestorian notion that in Jesus Christ there are two (parallel) self-impelling individual existences (δύο φύσεις αὐτοκίνητοι),³ each with its will and operation, Apollinarius and the members of his school, themselves undoubtedly capable theologians, spoil the worth of their contribution through denying that Christ possessed a human rational soul. Others there were who, even if they were unable to express themselves with such precision, stood for the same fundamental thought, and were not prepared to give way on the point that Christ's is a manhood in every respect consubstantial with ours.

Now let us see how Apollinarius upholds the second foundation principle of the Alexandrine Christology. For him, Jesus Christ is one Person, in whom are the two elements (πράγματα)⁴ of Godhead and flesh: He is φύσις μία ἐξ ἑκατέρου μέρους—the uncreated and the created; like man, who consists of body and soul, He is ἐκ δύο μερῶν.⁵ By this root conception he holds firm. Again and again he uses “composition” when speaking of the union of Godhead and flesh in Christ, but he explicitly denies that the elements have been changed as a result of the union.⁶ As we have seen, he insists that the Logos does not change into

¹ *Apod.*, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* Frag. 107.

² So Polemon in his letter to Julian, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* Frag. 176.

³ See the fragment of Julian's letter to Polemon, *ibid.* Frag. 180.

⁴ For instances of Apollinarius' use of this word, see *de Un.* 11, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* p. 190, and 13 (quoted above, p. 52 n. 4).

⁵ *De Un.* 5, *ibid.* p. 187.

⁶ Cf. in this connection the passages from Apollinarius quoted by Raven, *op. cit.* pp. 208 ff., who very rightly draws attention to this aspect of the Laodicene's teaching, and shows that he should be acquitted of “the monstrous insinuation of his ancient and modern opponents that he taught the consubstantiality of the flesh and the Godhead” (*ibid.* p. 210).

flesh; similarly, he holds, the body assumed by the Logos still remains in its human nature.¹ Not for a moment—though his enemies accused him of holding this doctrine—does he think that the Logos brought His body with Him from heaven: indeed, he deliberately condemns those who would accept such an idea.² The body may share in the properties of the Logos, so that it can be called a “divine body”, and the Logos may share in the properties of the body, but they remain, according to nature, body and Logos.³ He is most definite on this point:

The flesh of the Lord, while remaining flesh even in the union—its nature being neither changed nor lost—shares in the names and properties of the Logos; and the Logos, while remaining Logos and God, in the incarnation shares in the names and properties of the flesh.⁴

Neither should it be thought that his use of such expressions as “commingling” and “mixture”⁵ necessitates a different verdict. He uses them, it should be understood, in order to enforce the thought of the inseparability of the divine and human elements in their union in the Person of the Logos. He certainly does not mean that in their union one element has been transformed into the other.⁶ It may be said that to employ such terms is injudicious, but it is certain that this teacher cannot be accused of upholding the doctrine of “confusion”.

Indeed, it is most significant that, intent upon resisting any such error, he maintains the very same principle which we have

¹ Lietzmann, *op. cit.* Frags. 134, 160.

² Cf. *ad Jov.* 3, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* p. 253, Frags. 112, 159, 162, 164; *ad Dion.*, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* p. 259.

³ Cf. his use of Origen's simile of the iron heated in the fire (*de Princ.* II. vi. 6): “If the blending of iron with fire, which makes the iron itself appear as fire and brings it about that it performs the works of fire, does not change its nature, so, too, the union of God with the body implies no change of body, although the body extends its divine energy to those who can touch it” (*c. Diod.*, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* Frag. 128).

⁴ So Apollinarius, as quoted by Timothy of Berytus in his letter to Homonius (*ibid.* p. 278).

⁵ Cf. the exclamation: ὦ καινὴ κτίσις καὶ μίξις θεοπεσίαι· θεὸς καὶ σὰρξ μίαν ἀπετέλεσαν φύσιν (where, undoubtedly, φύσις = πρόσωπον), Lietzmann, *op. cit.* Frag. 10, and the statement that “the incarnate Logos is Mediator between God and man, neither wholly man nor wholly God”—i.e. not a man only or the Divine only—“but a mixture of God and man” (θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπου μίξις), Lietzmann, *op. cit.* Frag. 113.

⁶ Cf. his careful explanation in the fragment from the *c. Diod.*, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* Frag. 134.

seen in Origen and Athanasius¹—namely, that of “recognizing the difference of the natures” according to their properties. In the commingling, he says, there is the uncreated and the created;² there has been a union of what is of God and what is of the body: there is “the adorable Creator, who is Wisdom and Power eternal”, and there is the Son of Mary, born in the last time, worshipping God, progressing in wisdom, and being strengthened with power;³ “the human [nature] partakes of the divine energy so far as it is able”, though it is distinct [ἐτέρον], as is the least from the greatest—the one servant and creature, the other Lord and Creator.⁴ So also in his Scriptural exegesis he distinguishes between what is proper to the Lord's Godhead and what is proper to His manhood—though, as we have said, he carefully points out that everything that is recorded concerning Jesus Christ in Scripture is to be referred to the one Person, the Logos incarnate. Thus in the *de Unione*,⁵ taking the text “For their sakes I sanctify myself” (St John xvii. 19), he says that therein is preserved the one prosopon and the indivisibility of the one living Being, but, perceiving what is demanded by an accurate discernment of what goes to make up that one Person, he proceeds to make a distinction between that which sanctifies, which is divine, and that which is sanctified, which is human nature—for one is Creator, the other creature. He gives another example. When St Paul says that Christ has been exalted and given the name which is above every name (Philippians ii. 9), Apollinarius holds, the Apostle is speaking of “the whole” as having been exalted, but, he goes on, properly it is the flesh which was exalted, since the Godhead ever remains in its immutability. Then he establishes this principle:

He who cannot perceive [εἰδέναι] what is proper to each in the different [elements] which have been united will fall into opinions which are inconsistent; but he who recognizes the properties [τὰ ἴδια γινώσκων] and preserves the union will neither speak falsely concerning the nature, nor go wrong concerning the union.⁶ If this is compared with the similar statements of Origen and Athanasius,⁷ it will be seen that Apollinarius is here upholding

¹ See above, pp. 24 f., 40.

² *De Un.* 5, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* p. 187.

³ *C. Diod.*, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* Frag. 125.

⁴ *Ibid.* Frag. 130.

⁵ 10 ff., Lietzmann, *op. cit.* pp. 189 ff.

⁶ *De Un.* 17, *ibid.* p. 192.

⁷ See above, pp. 25, 40.

a principle which is already established in the traditional teaching of the Alexandrine school as that which must be insisted upon in the interest of sound belief. So long as one "recognizes"—that is, sees as real—the properties of each element in their union in the one Person of Jesus Christ, this teacher would say, one will understand that the "nature" is that of the Logos incarnate, and one will make no mistake concerning the union in which the two elements of Godhead and flesh remain without confusion. Thus the principle that Jesus Christ is ἐν πρόσωπον ἐκ δύο [φύσεων] γνωριζόμενον is already set up—and Eutychianism is already condemned.

Thus far Apollinarius' teaching is altogether in line with that of the other representatives of the Alexandrine school of thought; in fact, as we shall see, the phrases which he uses in expressing the Christological principles of the school now become part of its recognized language. But after this he pursues a course of his own. He can say that Jesus Christ is "man",¹ but He is man "titularly" (ὀμωνύμως):² He possesses a body and an animal soul (ψυχή), but He is not a human mind (πνεῦμα, νοῦς), since in Him the heavenly mind of the Logos takes the place of the highest element in us. As he openly confesses, Christ "is not a man but as man, since He is not homoousios with man in the crowning element".³

Raven has clearly demonstrated what Apollinarius understands by the human mind. To quote what this scholar says: "To him a human mind implies 'a self-determining subject, impelled naturally by its own volition', and supplying the motive power to the flesh which is purely passive. It is this power of self-determination or freedom of will which to him constitutes the very essence of mind: without it mind ceases to be mind."⁴ If then, the Laodicene argues, there are two such self-deter-

¹ It is noteworthy that Apollinarius can say that Christ is ὁλος ἄνθρωπος (*de Fid. et Incarn.* 3, 6, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* pp. 194, 199): He has indeed a νοῦς, but it is a heavenly νοῦς, which is now ἑνωστικός (cf. *Apod.*, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* Frags. 69, 72).

² *Anaceph.* 4, 16, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* pp. 243, 244.

³ *Apod.*, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* Frag. 45. According to Rufinus, the Laodicene at first taught that Christ "assumed only a body and not a soul at all", and that it was only later that he adopted the trichotomous view. Raven (*op. cit.* pp. 160 ff.) holds that the Laodicene had this view from the start.

⁴ *Apollinarianism*, p. 182.

minating subjects in Christ, the foundation principle of the unity of His Person is completely overthrown. "Two separate principles of mind and will", he says, "cannot dwell together without one striving against the other";¹ "such a subject would be in a state of perpetual turmoil, distracted by the conflicting wishes of the elements of which it consists".² So he sees that his main principle will be set beyond all question if—seemingly on the basis that the two are akin—he says that in Christ the heavenly takes the place of the human mind: Christ can still be called "man", and there will be no doubt concerning the oneness of His Person, for, under such a constitution, there can be in Him but one will, one activity, one operative motion, the Logos Himself being the "mover", and the flesh the "moved". This is the answer which, he realizes, he can give to Diodore of Tarsus and his followers, who, "separating the natures", were, as he thought, dividing the one Christ and teaching a duad of Sons.

But we must look deeper if we would appreciate Apollinarius' real motive in depriving Christ of a human mind. Saint as well as theologian, and, like Athanasius, ever seeing the Christological in the light of the soteriological problem, he would ensure the reality of the redemption through ensuring the absolute sinlessness of the Redeemer. His basal conception concerning the human mind is that it is "changeable and the prey of sordid thoughts";³ it can fall away through weakness.⁴ Therefore, to place it altogether beyond doubt that the Redeemer is utterly sinless, he denies all possibility of moral conflict in Him: in Him the unchangeable mind of the Divine takes the place of what is changeable in us. For, as he says, "if there is in Christ a human along with a divine mind, the work of the Incarnation, which is the overthrow of sin, is not accomplished by Him";⁵ "if the same nature that is in us is in Christ, He is but the old man, a living soul, not a life-giving spirit".⁶ Thus he attains his end through ruling out the *posse non peccare*, and setting up—and that in clearest terms—the *non posse peccare*. Apollinarius had

¹ *De Unit.*, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* Frag. 2 (quoted by Raven, *op. cit.* p. 182).

² *Ad Julian.*, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* Frag. 151 (quoted by Raven, *op. cit.* p. 184).

³ *Ad Diocæs.* 2, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* p. 256 (quoted by Raven, *op. cit.* p. 184).

⁴ *Apod.*, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* Frag. 76. ⁵ *Ibid.* Frag. 74.

⁶ *Anaceph.*, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* pp. 244 f. Cf. also the passage in *c. Apoll.* i. 2, which is quoted by Raven (*op. cit.* p. 244) as "perhaps genuinely Apollinarian".

still to learn that there is no need to deprive Christ of a human mind in order to establish the doctrine of His sinlessness: this doctrine can be established on the basis of the perfect harmony that existed between a human mind, continuing real and free, and the mind of the Divine—though among the ancients it was rather the Antiochenes, with whom, as we have yet to see, the moral interest was uppermost, than the Alexandrines who were best fitted to work out such an answer.

In their denial of the place of the human mind in Christ, Apollinarius and his disciples, we consider, stand apart from the other representatives of the Alexandrine doctrinal tradition. But Raven, in his *Apollinarianism*, takes a different view. His contention is that "Greek thought was essentially Apollinarian", and that "Apollinarianism grew naturally and inevitably from the parent stock of Christian Hellenism".¹ At the time of Apollinarius, this scholar argues, the Church's doctrine concerning Christ was in a state of chaos. The Greek Fathers, taking it as fundamental that God and man were naturally opposites, had been unable to posit that God had become true man. They had set up one single Person, Himself divine, and had accounted for the Lord's humanity by merging it and the human mind which belonged to it in His Godhead. So, "a speculative thinker of profound and daring genius", Apollinarius "set himself to the creation of a clear-cut and logical theory which should express in definite form the convictions of his compatriots and of the Christian conscience". He built upon the same foundation, and upheld the same cardinal truth that Jesus Christ is one Person, the Logos who had assumed human flesh—but, "too fine a spirit to resort to subterfuge and quibbling", he gave precision to the belief that the Lord's manhood was impersonal through setting up the doctrine of the "heavenly mind".²

Certainly, as they stand, the terms which he uses when speaking of God can leave us with the impression that Apollinarius is "a typical Greek, with his strongly physical conception of deity",³ but, as we have said, it should be remembered that, in setting out to present the Gospel to the Greek world, Christian teachers were compelled to use terms with which that world was familiar. This, however, is not to say that they took over the

¹ Pp. 90, 273.

² *Ibid.* pp. 188, 228 f.

³ *Ibid.* p. 202.

ideas with which these terms were associated among the Greeks. Further, the contrast between God and man as the sinless and the sinful, the changeless and the changeable, may seem to point to the presence of the conception that God and man are eternal opposites, but here again this does not necessarily mean that such a conception is fundamental to Apollinarius' position. As we have tried to show, the conception of an ethical God who was so made man that he can enter into fellowship with Him lies behind the teaching of Athanasius. The same conception, we shall see, is to be found in the writings of the Cappadocians, and in those of Cyril. So then—even if, as must be confessed, those controversial works of his which are extant do not provide us with direct evidence in support of our claim—it is reasonable to assume that this teacher, an Alexandrine by birthright as well as by outlook, also builds on this foundation. And if this is the case, it would seem that the theory—upheld by Dorner, who has been followed by scholars of more recent date—that Apollinarius "viewed the Logos in Christ as the eternal humanity, probably on the ground of His being the archetype of universal humanity", is by no means untenable.¹

Again, it has to be granted that one can produce passages from the Fathers—and in this direction the writings of Gregory of Nyssa can prove a very fruitful field—which seem to show that they merge Christ's manhood into His Godhead. But, if we judge them aright—and, as we proceed, we shall try to make this point clear—their position is that they see the manhood, complete with its properties, as real in its union with Godhead in the Person of the Logos. Of course they deny the (Nestorian) notion that the manhood is "personal" in the sense that it had a hypostasis parallel to that of the Logos, but they would not deny that it possesses its own faculty of self-determination as it exists in the composition in the Person of the Logos. So it can be said that they stand for the doctrine of a personal manhood—though whether, having accepted it, they are prepared to work it out is a different question.

That they would uphold this doctrine is implied in the reply which was made to Apollinarius by his contemporaries. In their

¹ See Dorner, *op. cit.* i. ii. pp. 371 ff., and, for a criticism of this view, Raven, *op. cit.* pp. 185 ff.

criticism of his teaching, the Cappadocians undoubtedly make the mistake of crediting him with that which he never held—namely, the doctrine of a pre-existent manhood¹—but they are right in perceiving that, through mutilating Christ's manhood, the Laodicene's teaching is destructive of the truth that for our salvation the Logos became *totus homo* in the real sense of the words. Gregory of Nazianzus in his *ad Cledonium*² pleads that Apollinarius and his followers were denying the very element which before all else stood in need of sanctification. Going back to Adam's transgression, he sees that "the mind was the first to be affected", in that it failed to keep the command which it had received, and that on this account it is "most in need of salvation". Therefore, on the basis of "sanctifying like by like", he affirms that "that which needed salvation was that which the Saviour took upon Him". Gregory's may be the argument from soteriology, but it is clear enough that, though he may not have given full consideration to the doctrine in its Christological bearing, he was not prepared to give way on the point that Christ possessed a truly human mind. And in regard to the *Antirrheticus*—the treatise in which Gregory of Nyssa attacks the Laodicene—while it cannot be denied that this work reveals that its author is one whose ideas are not sufficiently matured and whose ability to deal with the Christological problem is of an order inferior to that of the man whose teaching he criticizes,³ it is clear from his arguments that he would maintain that Christ's was a manhood which possessed the faculty of self-determination; indeed, it is noteworthy that at one point he seems to suggest that the doctrine of Christ's sinlessness must have as its basis the thought that "virtue is the right exercise of free-will".⁴ As we shall see, these critics of Apollinarius certainly agree with him in upholding the same root principles, but they do not agree with him in denying that the Lord's was a complete manhood. It is on this point of difference that they seize, and make it their axiom—an axiom which was to be adopted

¹ For a full treatment of this subject—and the complete vindication of Apollinarius as the teacher who, while insisting on the closeness of the union of Godhead and manhood in Christ, rejects all idea of the "confusion" of these elements—see esp. Raven, *op. cit.* pp. 212-19.

² *Ep. ci.*

³ Cf. Raven, *op. cit.* pp. 262 ff.

⁴ *Antirrheticus*. 41 (quoted by Raven, *op. cit.* p. 270).

by the later Alexandrine theologians—that τὸ ἀπρόσληπτον ἀθεράπευτον.¹ It was on such grounds that Apollinarius was condemned both in the East and in the West,² and ever afterwards, when they spoke of the manhood of the Incarnate, Eastern teachers were careful to say that they meant a manhood complete with a human rational soul: Jesus Christ, they say, possesses a ὁῶμα ἐμψυχόν τε καὶ ἔννοον. The controversy with Apollinarius, even if he had been sadly misjudged, had served to make it clear that the doctrine of the reality of Christ's human will and activity is an essential part of the Christological teaching of the Alexandrine school of thought.

III. THE TEACHING OF THE CAPPADOCIAN FATHERS

The coming of the Laodicene marks the beginning of a fresh stage in the development of the Alexandrine doctrine concerning Christ's Person, for now its exponents are provided with carefully worded phrases which sum up the essentials of their faith. But before we proceed to examine the teaching of the one who, though ignorant of the source whence they came, owed no small debt to the Apollinarian writings, we must first consider that of the Cappadocian Fathers—Basil of Caesarea († 379), his brother Gregory of Nyssa († c. 394), and Gregory of Nazianzus († 390)—who stand as representatives of the Alexandrine Christological tradition, inheriting what had been said by Origen and by Athanasius. These, brought up in the best philosophical schools of the day, seek to present Christianity philosophically—though from the standpoint that philosophy is the handmaid of religion. As is well known, their main contribution to Christian doctrine lies rather in the sphere of "Theology" than in that of Christology, for here their thought is not mature. Lacking the clear-cut expressions of Apollinarius, their language is at times unsatisfactory; moreover, they introduce conceptions concerning the Lord's manhood which can be pronounced heterodox.

¹ So Gregory of Nazianzus, *Ep. ci.* (*ad Cled.*). Cyril uses the same phrase; see below, p. 102 n. 3.

² Cf. the decree of the Roman Synod, held under Damasus in 377 (when Apollinarius and Timothy of Berytus were condemned): *Si imperfectus homo susceptus est, imperfectum Dei munus est, imperfecta nostra salus, quia non est totus homo salvatus* (Damasus, *Ep. ii*, Fr. ii; *P.L.* xiii. 353).

Nevertheless, it seems impossible to deny that they would uphold the same two Christological principles which had been upheld by those who had gone before.

Very briefly, let us consider the root ideas of these Cappadocian teachers. They proclaim the unknowableness of God against Eunomius and his adherents who, teaching that He is absolutely simple and that, being such, is perfectly comprehensible to the human mind, were robbing the divine nature of its mysteriousness, but theirs is not the *Deus philosophorum*: in this they are but accentuating the difference between the infinite and the finite.¹ Behind all their teaching is the conception of an ethical God, who Himself stoops down to bring man to Himself. "The economy 'through the Son'", says Basil, is to be regarded as "the voluntary solicitude in goodness and pity, working effectually for His own creation according to the will of the Father";² in another place he says that He who had gone through all things pertaining to the healing of the human race—succouring His own creation first through the Patriarchs, then through the Law, then through the prophets, who foretold the salvation to come, and through judges, kings, and righteous men—"bestowed on us the boon of His own sojourning among us".³ Or, as Gregory of Nyssa has it, God is Power, Goodness, Wisdom and Righteousness, who "by a personal intervention works out the salvation of men".⁴

¹ Thus Basil in his letter to Amphilochius: "The mind which is impregnated with the Godhead of the Spirit is at once capable of viewing great objects; it beholds the divine beauty, though only so far as grace imparts and its nature receives. . . . The judgment of our mind is given us for the understanding of the truth. Now our God is the very truth. So the primary function of our mind is to know one God—but to know Him as the infinitely great can be known by the very small" (*Ep.* cxxxiii. 1, 2; trans. here, as in other quotations from the Cappadocians, from *Nicene and post-Nicene Fathers*). Similarly, Greg. Naz., after quoting Plato's saying that to know God is difficult and to define Him in words an impossibility (*Tim.* 28c—Greg. thus expressing the idea which seems to be in the mind of Clement when he uses the saying: see above, p. 3 n. 1), goes on to say that even those who are highly exalted, and love God, cannot comprehend "the whole of so great a Subject"—"seeing that the darkness of this world and the thick covering of the flesh is an obstacle to the full understanding of the truth" [*Orat.* xxviii (*Theol. Orat.* ii), 4]. But, while declaring that man cannot know, from His works, what God is but only that He is (cf. Greg. Naz. *ibid.* 5, 6), the Cappadocians would never say that God and man are essentially "other"—as their teaching on man plainly indicates, they would directly oppose such an idea.

² *De Spiritu Sancto*, 18.

³ *Ep.* cclxi. 1.

⁴ *Orat. Catech.* xxiv, xx.

And in regard to their doctrine of man, it is clear that they hold that he is made to be a partaker of the divine nature. Thus, explaining the text "The Kingdom of God is within you", the Bishop of Nyssa can say that these words "point to the fact that the divine good is not something apart from our nature"—they refer to that which is in each of us, though this element may be ignored and unnoticed till the will is aroused to seek it.¹ Or there is his argument in his *Oratio Catechetica*: it was of His great love that God created man, and He created him in order that he might share in the divine goodness; but for this it was necessary that there should be in man that which is akin to God—so was man made in the divine image.² And what the others say concerning the divine image makes it fully apparent that according to these teachers man is so constituted that he can enjoy fellowship with his Maker. Thus Gregory of Nazianzus: "The scope of our art is to provide the soul with wings, to rescue it from the world, and to give it to God, and to watch over that which is in His image if it abides, to take it by the hand if it is in danger, to restore it if it is ruined, to make Christ to dwell in the heart by the Spirit: and in short to deify, and to bestow heavenly bliss upon, one who belongs to the heavenly hosts."³ Similarly, Basil: "Only after a man is purified. . . and has come back to his natural beauty, and is as it were cleaning the royal image and restoring its ancient form—only thus is it possible for him to draw near to the Paraclete. And He, like the Son, will by the aid of thy purified eye show thee in Himself the image of the invisible, and in the blessed spectacle of the image thou shalt behold the unspeakable beauty of the archetype. Through His aid hearts are lifted up, . . . and, shining upon those that are cleansed from every spot, He makes them spiritual by fellowship with Himself."⁴

¹ *De Virgin.* xii. Noteworthy, too, is Gregory's explanation of the finding of the Lost Coin: a man finds the image of God in which he is made, and is restored to that "divine delight and festivity" which is His as he gazes upon the Beautiful and the Good (*ibid.*).

² v, vi. Cf. also *ibid.* x, where Gregory speaks of "recognizing a certain unity and approximation of a divine nature in relation to the human" (θείας φύσεως ἑνωσιν τινα καὶ προσεγγισμὸν γνωρίσαντας πρὸς τὸ ἀνθρώπινον).

³ *Orat.* ii. 22. See also *Orat.* xvi. 9 where, speaking of the Beatific Vision, the Bishop of Nazianzus says that the ineffable light of the Holy Trinity which now shines upon the elect will shine with even greater brilliancy and purity when "it unites itself wholly to the soul".

⁴ *De Spiritu Sancto*, 23.

So the Cappadocians lay all emphasis on the thought that God Himself has intervened in the Person of Jesus Christ in order to establish man in newness of life, and so to "deify" him.¹ Such is "the Gospel mystery". Man, they proclaim, is a fallen creature, and the Incarnation has been rendered necessary by the Fall. The point is worked out by Gregory of Nyssa who is pre-eminently the thinker among them. Like Athanasius, he is indebted to Methodius of Olympus, and, starting from the conception of the universality of sin, sees that the redemption must consist in the lifting up of the whole human race from its present evil state—and, to raise up fallen men, to restore to him the gift of life, and to effect his ransom, God, he teaches, who might have issued some direct command, "submitted Himself to the condition of a human body, was born, and died, and rose again, and in this way accomplished His object".² *Cur Deus homo?* The Bishop's answer is that the Incarnation was the best way in which God's attributes of power, goodness, wisdom and righteousness could be manifested,³ that only thus could men be delivered from the state of death, itself the result of sin, which began in one man,⁴ and that man is redeemed as the beginning of the Resurrection-life extends through the Redeemer to the whole of humanity.⁵ But is Gregory thinking of a process which is purely physical? Does he mean that the redemption is effected as the divine nature pervades the whole of human nature? Does he mean that both in the Redeemer and, through Him, in the redeemed the human is so transfused with divine qualities, as a result of the "commingling", that it is human no longer? Certainly he speaks of the "lump" of humanity, and uses the mixing of liquids to illustrate his doctrine concerning the Lord's manhood, but what has been said in the case of Athanasius seems

¹ Cf. Greg. Naz. *Orat.* xxx. 14 (he is speaking of Christ's intercession for us): "He still pleads even now as man for my salvation; for He continues to wear the body which He assumed till He has made me God by the power of the Incarnation." Basil's statement that souls cleansed from every spot, and illuminated by the Spirit, themselves become spiritual and, "abiding in God", become "like to God" and, highest of all, are made God (*de Spiritu Sancto*, 23) shows what these teachers understand by man's "deification"—it is an essentially spiritual process. What they say here should, of course, be set beside the celebrated saying of Athanasius, quoted above, p. 17.

² *Orat. Catech.* xv.

⁴ *Ibid.* viii.

³ *Ibid.* xvii ff.

⁵ *Ibid.* xvi.

applicable here: realistic categories are being used to describe what is understood as a moral and spiritual process.¹

Upon these ideas concerning God and man and man's redemption, the Cappadocians built their Christology. While from the point of view of their expressions they can be regarded as the successors of the Origenists, their doctrine is, rather, akin to that of Athanasius—the one in whom soteriology and Christology are inseparably brought together. With them, as with him, the two cardinal principles are seen in their soteriological bearing—though, as we say, we miss here that clearness of thought which might have been expected now that the Christological problem is to the fore.

For man and his salvation, these teachers hold, God has Himself become man as Jesus Christ, the divine Logos having assumed a nature like ours. The Logos Himself, says Gregory of Nazianzus, "came to His own image, and took on Him flesh for the sake of our flesh, and mingled Himself with an intelligent soul for my soul's sake, purifying like by like; and in all points except sin was made man".² And this becoming man, they say, has not involved any change in respect of the divine existence of the Logos. Denouncing "the carnal and grovelling doctrines" of those who were making Christ a creature, this same Gregory declares:

He whom you now treat with contempt was once above you; He who is now man was once uncompounded [*ἄσύνθετος*]; for what He was He continued to be, and what He was not He assumed.³

The Logos, then, though He has united man's nature to Himself, is still the same Person, the only difference being that He who was once *simplex* is now, through His becoming man, *compositus*.

Further, the Cappadocians, it seems, appreciate that, in order to become man, the Logos must accommodate Himself to human conditions. In this connection, a passage in the *adversus Eunomium* of Gregory of Nyssa is of distinct value. Eunomius was saying that "if he can show that God, who is over all, who is the unapproachable Light, was incarnate, or could be

¹ Cf. Dorner's verdict that Gregory's is "a strictly ethical estimate of Christianity" (*op. cit.* II. i. p. 514).

² *Orat.* xxxviii. 13.

³ *Orat.* xxix (*Theol. Orat.* iii), 19.

incarnate, came under authority, obeyed commands, came under the laws of man, bore the Cross, then let him say that light is equal to The Light". Thus, as Gregory says, Eunomius, who, as is clear, would distinguish between the Son as "light" and the Father as "The Light",¹ was ranking the Son with Creation, not worshipping Him equally with the Father, and, seeing in the Cross evidence of weakness, holding that He could not have experienced His sufferings had He not had a nature capable of such suffering. The Cappadocian then gives his answer to the Anomoean: it is, in effect, that one can posit an incarnation of One who is truly God because—a truth "surprisingly wonderful"—He accommodates Himself to conditions external to His nature. Clearly, it is the answer of one who would maintain the Hebraic conception of God against one who was to no small extent being influenced by ideas essentially Greek. This is what the Bishop of Nyssa says: in making the suffering on the Cross to be "a sign of divergence in essence, in the sense of inferiority", Eunomius fails to perceive that

while nothing which moves according to its own nature is looked upon as surprisingly wonderful, all things that overpass the limitations of their nature [ὅσα τοὺς ὄρους ἐκβαίνει τῆς φύσεως] become especially the objects of admiration. . . . Hence it is that all who preach the word point out the wonderful character of the mystery in this respect—that "God was manifested in flesh", that "the Word was made flesh", that "the Light shined in darkness", that the Life tasted death. . . . Whereby is increased the marvellous character of Him who manifested the superabundance of His power by means external to His nature.²

Nothing like this, it would seem, is to be found in Basil or Gregory of Nazianzus. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that,

¹ The above translation of the quotation from Eunomius (taken, in the main, from that in *Nicene and post-Nicene Fathers*, vol. v, p. 176) is based on the Φ reading in Jaeger's text (*Gregorii Nysseni Opera*, Berlin, 1921)—Ἰσον τῷ φωτὶ φῶς. It is unlikely that this would have formed from the Π reading, Ἰσον τῷ φωτὶ τὸ φῶς ("the Light is equal to the Light", as in trans. in *N. and p.-N. F.*), while the converse is not unlikely. The Φ text is comprehensible. Eunomius has declared the Ingenerate to be ἀπρόσιτον φῶς in contradistinction to diffused φῶς: He is thus to be called τὸ φῶς, but the Son φῶς—just as Asterius argues that the Son is called in Scripture δύναμις and σοφία, distinguishing His being from ἡ δύναμις τοῦ Θεοῦ etc.

² *Adv. Eunom.* v. 3; cf. also *Orat. Catech.* xxiv. Both passages are quoted by Gore in his *Dissertations on subjects connected with the Incarnation*, pp. 142 f.

speaking of our Lord's ignorance, the latter can say: "It is clear to everyone that He knows as God, and knows not as man—if one may separate the visible from that which is perceived",¹ and the former that "one who refers the ignorance to Him who in the Incarnation [οἰκονομικῶς] took everything upon Himself, and advances in wisdom and in favour with God and man, will not fall outside the right understanding of the matter".² At the same time, we must not read too much into this evidence, for, beside these passages which seem to point to the recognition of the thought that the Logos limited Himself in order to become man, we must set others which show that these teachers hesitate to make full use of the idea of a self-emptying.³ As we say, none of the theologians of the Early Church attempted to work out this doctrine.

In their insistence on the fundamental truth that in Jesus Christ the Logos Himself has become man, the Cappadocians firmly uphold the doctrine of the unity of the Person of the Incarnate. Adopting current expressions,⁴ they speak of the union of the divine and the human in Him as a "composition", a "mixture", a "commingling". But it should not be thought that the use of these words points to the presence of the Euty-chian view of our Lord's Person. Rather do these teachers speak in this way in order to give the lie to the idea of dividing Christ into a duad of Sons through emphasizing the thought of the closeness of the union. Their point is that the union of the Logos with human nature is such that it is utterly impossible to consider that in Jesus Christ there can be two Persons, one divine,

¹ *Orat.* xxx (*Theol. Orat.* iv), 15.

² *Ep.* ccxxvi. 1.

³ Thus, interpreting the text "Of that day and hour. . ." (St Mt. xxiv. 36), Gregory of Nazianzus can say that it is "only the Father" who knows the hour of the Parousia, the Son being ignorant of it apart from the Father's communication (*Orat.* xxx. 16). The same interpretation is preferred by Basil (*Ep.* ccxxxvi. 2).

⁴ Origen and the Origenists had already used these terms (see above, pp. 22, 29); they were also being used at this time by Apollinarius and his followers (see above, p. 52). It may be noted, too, that the term "mixture", which was being used by Epiphanius (*Anchor.* 81—quoted below, p. 73 n. 2), is to be found in Irenaeus (*adv. Haeres.* iii. xx. 1—(?*Homo*) *Commixtus Verbo Dei*), in Tertullian (*Apol.* 21—*Homo Deo mixtus*), and in Cyprian (*de Idol. Van.* 11—*Deus cum homine miscetur*). The same word was to be employed later on by Leo of Rome, what he says plainly revealing his reason for adopting it: "This wonderful child-bearing of the holy Virgin produced in her Offspring one Person, truly divine, truly human; not in such a way that. . . there could be a dividing of Person, but in such a way that one nature was blended (*misceretur*) with the other" (*Sermo xxxviii, in Nativ. Dom.* iii).

the other human, each having His own individual existence. Thus Gregory of Nyssa affirms that the text "God hath made that same Jesus whom ye have crucified, both Lord and Christ" (Acts ii. 36) should not be taken as meaning that one (ἄλλος) suffered, and another (ἕτερος) was honoured by exaltation. What is said here, he declares, refers to one Person (ἐν πρόσωπον), to whom both the sufferings and the honour are to be ascribed.¹ Gregory of Nazianzus is equally emphatic. We turn to his *ad Cledonium*—a letter in which (as in the second letter which he wrote to this friend of his) he answers the charge brought forward by the Apollinarians that Cledonius was dividing the one Christ.² To quote what he says in this connection:

We do not separate the manhood from the Godhead, but we lay down as a dogma the unity and identity of Person, who of old . . . was unmingled with a body or anything corporeal, but who in these last days has assumed manhood for our salvation. . . . He is One and the Same, perfect man and also God. . . . If any assert that the manhood was formed and afterward clothed with Godhead, he is to be condemned. For this were not the begetting of God but the shirking of begetting. If any introduce the notion of two Sons, one of God the Father, the other of the Mother, and discredits the unity and identity, may he lose his part in the adoption promised to those who believe aright.

So is Nestorianism expressly condemned.³ Then follows the well-known passage which shows that, while rejecting the teaching of "two Sons", Gregory would not go to the other extreme and teach the confusion of the two natures:

There are two natures, God and man [φύσεις μὲν γὰρ δύο, θεὸς

¹ *Adv. Eunom.* v. 3.

² It is noteworthy that these two letters (*Epp.* ci, cii) were accepted as documents of the faith at Ephesus (431) and Chalcedon (cf. Mansi, iv. 826).

³ This is undoubtedly the case, even if—and this illustrates the point that these have no precise Christological formulas (see above, p. 65)—their language is at times quasi-Nestorian. See the passages from Greg. Naz. collected by A. J. Mason, who comments: "If his language were taken according to its strict grammatical sense, it might sometimes be pressed to mean that in the Incarnate Saviour a human person co-existed with the Eternal Word" (*The Five Theological Orations of Gregory of Nazianzus*, pp. xvi ff.). For an illustration of the quasi-Nestorian language of Gregory of Nyssa, see his *adv. Eunom.* v. 5. It may be noted, too, that this writer, when speaking of the "union", often uses the term *συνάφεια*—the term favoured by the Antiochenes.

καὶ ἄνθρωπος], as also body and soul are; but there are not two Sons or Gods; there are not two men in one because Paul speaks of an inner and an outer man.¹ To put it in a word: in regard to the elements out of which [ἐξ ὧν] the Saviour is [composed], there is one [ἄλλο] and there is another [ἄλλο]—for the invisible is not the same as the visible, nor the timeless as that which is subject to time—but there is not one Person [ἄλλος] and another Person [ἄλλος]. God forbid! For both elements are one by the commingling,² God on the one hand who was made man, and man on the other who was made God—or however one should express it.

Clearly, then, these stand with Origen and his followers, with Apollinarius and Cyril, as upholders of a scheme of doctrine which is inherently anti-Nestorian: they will not countenance teaching which, as the Bishop of Nazianzus puts it, shirks the begetting of the Logos in the flesh.

It has to be observed, too, that the Cappadocians hold that all the acts and sayings recorded of Jesus Christ in the scriptures are to be attributed to this one Person—the Logos who has assumed flesh. Gregory of Nazianzus especially is emphatic on this point. Thus in the third (*de Filio*) of his *Five Theological Orations* we find such expressions as these: He who hungered was He who fed thousands and is the Bread that giveth life; He who thirsted is He who promised that fountains should flow from those who believe; He who was weary is He who is the Rest of the heavy-laden; He who is called a Samaritan and demon-possessed is He who saves him that fell among thieves; He who prays is He who hears prayer; He who weeps is He who causes tears to cease; He who asks where Lazarus was laid is He who raises him; He who is sold is He who redeems the world; He who as a sheep is led to the slaughter is He who is Shepherd of Israel and of the whole world; He who is nailed to the tree is He who restores us by the Tree of Life; He who died is He who gives life and by His death

¹ It is interesting to find that the Antiochenes appealed to the Pauline text (2 Cor. iv. 16) in support of their assertion that it is necessary to "separate" the natures (see below, p. 199). Perhaps, then, Gregory was mindful of this fact when he wrote the words quoted above.

² On the use of ἐν here (τὰ γὰρ ἀμφοτέρα ἐν τῇ συγκράσει), see below, p. 76 n. 6. Origen, it will be remembered had spoken of Jesus Christ as ἐν σύνθετον (see above, p. 22). It is noteworthy that the contemporary of the Cappadocians, Epiphanius, was saying: ὁ αὐτὸς Θεός, ὁ αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος, οὐ σύγγχυσιν ἀπεργασάμενος, ἀλλὰ τὰ δύο κεράσας εἰς ἐν (*Anchor.* 81).

destroys death.¹ The passage is, of course, highly rhetorical, but Gregory's meaning is clear: because in Jesus Christ the divine Logos has assumed flesh, the actions and sayings are those of God Himself—indeed, if one is to believe aright, it is essential that they should be regarded as such.² But he does not mean that God is passible in His divine nature: he would agree with the other Gregory in saying that “while not attributing our salvation to a man, we do not admit that the divine nature is capable of suffering and mortality”.³ So he makes a distinction between what belongs to Christ in His eternal being, and what belongs to Him as He has become flesh—to Him, that is, who is “the new Adam, and God made capable of suffering [θεῶν παθητῶν] to battle against sin”.⁴ The explanation can be put out in a sentence; he says:

What is lofty you apply to the Godhead and the nature which is superior to passions and a body; but what is lowly you apply to Him who is composite and emptied Himself for your sake and was incarnate—yes, for it is no worse thing to say it—and was made man [τῶ συνθέτῳ καὶ τῶ διὰ σὲ κενωθέντι καὶ σαρκωθέντι . . . καὶ ἀνθρώπισθέντι].⁵

In this way, he points out, references to “the Logos”, to “Him who was in the beginning”, to “the only-begotten Son”, to “the Way, the Truth, and the Life”, to “Wisdom” and “Power”, to “Effulgence”, “Image”, “Seal”, “Lord” and “King”—all these point to the Godhead of the Son; on the other hand, references to “Servant”, “was obedient”, “gave”, “learnt”, “was commanded”, “was sent”, and those to ignorance, subjection, prayer, asking, increasing, being made perfect, and (to come to more humble things) those references to sleeping, being hungry, being in agony, and fearing—all these have to do with the Son's economy.⁶ In all this, it will be understood,

¹ *Orat.* xxix. 20.

² So Gregory in his *ad Cleonium* can say that the man who does not confess that the Virgin is Theotokos is “severed from the Godhead” (*Ep.* ci).

³ *Adv. Eunom.* vi. 1.

⁴ *Orat.* xxx (*Theol. Orat.* iv), 1. ⁵ *Orat.* xxix (*Theol. Orat.* iii), 18.

⁶ It is interesting to note that a similar insistence of the need of making a distinction between the Logos in His pre-incarnate, and the Logos in His incarnate, state is to be found in the Fourth Book of the *adversus Eunomium*, which, though ascribed to Basil, is, with the Fifth, probably the work of Didymus the Blind (for his teaching, see above, p. 45 n. 1). The Book contains

the Bishop of Nazianzus is but emphasizing a doctrinal principle which has an important place in the Christology of the Alexandrine school of thought. As we have said, the representatives of this school do not think that the Incarnate acts and speaks now in His divine, now in His human, nature: everything, whether divine or human, they hold, is performed by the one Person,¹ the God made man, and His acts and sayings are those of God—though not of God as He is eternally (for in His divine nature God is impassible), but of God who, while remaining what He was, has entered into a novel state through the Incarnation, having become θεὸς παθητὸς for us men and for our salvation.

Let us see how the second main principle of the Alexandrine Christology has its place in the teaching of the Cappadocians. As has been pointed out, it would be a mistake to suppose that their language indicates the presence of Eutychian ideas. Gregory of Nazianzus, for instance, who does not hesitate to employ the terms “mixture” and “commingling” and—without a word of explanation—boldly speaks of the “deification” of the human element by the divine,² directly refutes the notion of “confusion”. The body of the Lord, he says in his letter to Cleodnius, “has not been swallowed up by the Son, as the

sylogisms on the chief passages of Scripture which were being adopted by the Arians. Thus, under Prov. viii. 22 (LXX), we find the statement that the words “God hath made that same Jesus whom ye have crucified, both Lord and Christ” (Acts ii. 36) “were spoken of Him who according to the flesh is of Mary”; the writer, to emphasize his point, here quotes St Lk. ii. 11 (“Unto you is born this day . . . a Saviour . . .”), saying that “the words ‘this day’ could never be understood of Him who was before the ages” (*P.G.* xxix. 704). Similarly, the words “I live by the Father” (St Jn. vi. 57) and “All authority hath been given unto me in heaven and on earth (St Mt. xxviii. 18), he says, are to be understood “as having been spoken in reference to the Incarnation, and not to the Godhead” (*P.G.* xxix. 697, 693).

¹ Cf. the direct statement to this effect in Greg. Nyss., *adv. Eunom.* v. 3 (see above, p. 72).

² Thus in the well-known passage in Gregory's *Oratio de Epiphania seu Nativitate* (*Orat.* xxxviii. 13) we have the expression: τὸ μὲν ἔθεωσε, τὸ δὲ ἐθεώθη. But in view of what he says elsewhere—and this, it should be remembered, is a highly rhetorical passage—it seems clear that the Bishop does not mean that the human has been transformed into the divine nature as a result of the union. It may be supposed, then, that had his thought been fully developed, Gregory would have offered the explanation of the statement which was put out by John of Damascus—namely, that such words are used “not according to a change of nature, but according to the economic, that is, the hypostatic, mind . . . and the interpenetration of the natures with one another” (*de Fid. Orth.* iii. 17, *P.G.* xciv. 1069A).

Manichees fable, . . . neither has it been poured out, and dissolved in the air like a voice or a stream of perfume, or a flash of lightning".¹ In Jesus Christ, he affirms, there are two natures (δύο φύσεις);² He is twofold (διπλοῦς)³ and, accordingly, One "out of two" (ἐκ δύο).⁴ Further, we must note that this teacher makes use of the principle of "recognizing the difference of the natures" in their union in the one Person of Jesus Christ.⁵ That this is the case is seen when we enquire into his interpretation of Scripture. Thus, arguing against the Arian use of the text "The God of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Father of Glory" (Ephesians i. 17), as proof that the Father is "God" of the Logos, he points out that an error of this kind cannot be made "whenever the natures are distinguished" (ἡνίκα αἱ φύσεις διίστηναι), since then the names are distinguished in thought, and one sees that "although both express One"—i.e. the names "Christ" and "Glory" are those of the one Person, though the first refers to the Lord's manhood, and the second to His Godhead—"this is not so by nature, but by the coming together of these [natures]".⁶ Clearly, in all this Gregory is but following what had been laid down by Athanasius—namely, that if one "recognizes what is proper to each", it is impossible to "entertain low ideas

¹ *Ep.* ci.

² *Ibid.* (quoted above, p. 72).

³ *Orat.* xxx (*Theol. Orat.* iv), 8; *Orat.* xxxviii. 15.

⁴ *Orat.* ii. 23, xxxviii. 3, and *Ep.* ci, where we have ἐν ἐκ δύο (see below, n. 6).

⁵ It is interesting to find that Amphilochius of Iconium († after 394), who was regarded as the most prominent ecclesiastic in the East after his friends Basil and Greg. Naz., upholds the same principle. Thus the fragment of his discourse on "My Father is greater than I", which is preserved in the *Dialogues* of Theodoret, begins: "Distinguish me now the natures—that of God and that of man [διάκρινόν μοι λοιπὸν τὰς φύσεις, τὴν τε τοῦ θεοῦ, τὴν τε τοῦ ἀνθρώπου]; . . . I am speaking of God and man." Then, explaining the text on this principle, he goes on: "Sometimes I call Myself equal to the Father, and sometimes I say that the Father is greater—not contradicting Myself, but showing that I am God and man, for God is of the lofty, and man of the lowly." One may note—as illustrating the point that these theologians sometimes use quasi-Nestorian language (see above, p. 72 n. 3)—that Amphilochius here speaks of assigning the lowly titles τῶ ἐκ Μαρίας ἀνθρώπῳ (Theodoret, *Dialogues*, i, ii, ed. Schulze, *Op.* iv. pt. i. pp. 66, 152; *P.G.* xxxix. 109A, Frag. XII; cf. also Frags. II, VII, XI—preserved by Theodoret, *Dial.* iii, ed. Schulze, iv. pt. i. pp. 248 f.—*P.G.* xxxix. pp. 100B ff.).

⁶ *Orat.* xxx. (*Theol. Orat.* iv), 8: εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὸ συναμφοτέρον ἐν, ἀλλ' οὐ τῇ φύσει, τῇ δὲ συνόδῳ τοῦτων. In his comment on these words, Mason says: "So Gregory rejects . . . the heresy of Eutyches. It might, however, have been still better if he had said εἰς. The ἐν, of course, means a single whole" (*op. cit.* p. 120 n. 11).

concerning the Logos".¹ At the same time, he explicitly rejects the Eutychian doctrine: it is "not by nature" that the two express the One.

But it is a weakness in the Christology of his namesake of Nyssa that this Cappadocian does not sufficiently appreciate the necessity of defending the faith against the idea of "confusion". As is well known, there are times when he puts forward the doctrine that in Jesus Christ there is but one, and that a divine, nature. By the commingling, he declares, the body in which the Lord underwent the Passion is made to be ὅπερ ἡ ἀναλαβοῦσα φύσις ἐστίν;² the Lord's human nature he likens to a drop of vinegar mingled with the sea:

the perishable nature, being, by its commixture with the Divine, made anew in conformity with that which overwhelms it [κατὰ τὸ ἐπικρατοῦν], participates in the power of the Godhead, as if one were to say that mixture makes a drop of vinegar mingled in the deep to be sea, by reason that the natural quality [ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ποιότης] of this liquid does not continue in the infinity of that which overwhelms it;³

and in another place he expressly says that the flesh "no longer remains in its own limitations and properties, but is taken up into that which is overwhelming and transcendent".⁴ All the same, Gregory of Nyssa can hardly be called the forerunner of those who, in a later age, were deserving of the name "Monophysite", and, as is often said,⁵ it is likely that, influenced by the teaching of Origen, he considered that it was only after the Resurrection that the human in Christ was changed into the divine. For his doctrine here has another side. Thus we find him saying: "The contemplation [θεωρία] of the properties of the flesh and of the Godhead remains without confusion so long as each of these is contemplated by itself" (ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν).⁶ Again, in a passage in which he defends the position that the Logos was subject to suffering "in the flesh", he says that the pain, slumber, need, trouble, wounds and death which Christ endured were real, and that they belong to the flesh which has its "peculiar attributes", his point being that "just as it is not possible to

¹ See above, p. 40.

² *Adv. Eunom.* v. 3.

³ *Ibid.* v. 5 (similarly, *Antirrhet.* 42).

⁴ *Adv. Eunom.* v. 5—οὐκ ἔτι ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτῆς ὄροις τε καὶ ἰδιώμασι μένει.

⁵ For a different view, see Raven, *op. cit.* p. 267. ⁶ *Adv. Eunom.* v. 5.

contemplate the peculiar attributes of the flesh as existing in the Logos that was from the beginning, so also we may not conceive those which are proper to the Godhead as existing in the nature of the flesh".¹ Certainly Gregory's use of the word "contemplate" in this connection is unfortunate, since it can give the impression that in his view the natures are different, not in reality, but only in thought, but it seems legitimate to argue from such passages that he is aware of the principle of "recognizing the difference of the natures", and, indeed, would apply it. Moreover, it is worthy of note that in his *Dialogues* Theodoret of Cyrus—who, as leading representative of the Antiochene doctrinal tradition, is determined to safeguard the reality of the Lord's human nature in its union with the Logos—can appeal to the Bishop of Nyssa in support of his "*Inconfusus*", and adduce quotations from his writings in which the distinction is made between what is divine in Christ, and what is human.²

We can say, then, that the Cappadocians uphold the principle that in Jesus Christ the Logos has become "man". But do they mean by this that the manhood which He has assumed is at once both representative and individual? Now it cannot be doubted that, like Athanasius, these teachers stand for the conception that the Incarnate is the Representative Man, altogether like ourselves.³ He is the firstfruits of all human nature, who presents it to its God and Father.⁴ Indeed, they could hardly be more definite on this point. In his celebrated letter to Cledonius, the Bishop of Nazianzus proclaims that if the Lord had been without a mind, only the half of us would have been saved; rather is He *totus homo*, and, the whole man being mingled with the Godhead, the whole of our nature is saved.⁵ He is called man, he says in the fourth of his *Theological Orations*, that "by Himself He may sanctify humanity, and be as it were leaven to the whole lump, that, by uniting to Himself that which was condemned, He may release it from all condemnation, becoming for all men all things that we are, sin excluded—body, soul, mind".⁶ Gregory of Nyssa speaks in the same way. The Lord, he says, is "Son"—not only Son of God, but also Son of Man, since "the

¹ *Adv. Eunom.* vi. 1. ² *Dial.* ii, ed. Schulze, iv. pt. i, pp. 150 f.

³ On this subject, see esp. Dorner, *op. cit.* i. ii. pp. 344 ff., 513 ff.

⁴ Cf. Greg. Nyssa., *adv. Eunom.* ii. 8. ⁵ *Ep.* ci. ⁶ *Orat.* xxx. 21.

whole compound nature of man is in Him".¹ He is the Head, in whom the whole of humanity dies, and in whom it is raised and exalted.² What was needed, he declares, was the lifting up from death of the whole of our nature, and to meet this need, the Lord, having taken flesh which proceeds from "the concrete lump of our nature", has stretched forth His hand and raised the whole man, for, the flesh being raised up in the Resurrection, the Resurrection principle passes through the entire race, as if it were a single living being, by virtue of the oneness of nature.³ There is no need to say more on this subject: that these teachers upheld the conception of the representative character of Christ's manhood is abundantly clear.

But do they so clearly maintain the individual character of that manhood? They say that the redemption could not have been real had not the Logos taken to Himself a manhood complete with a human rational soul. Do they, then, see in the Incarnate a manhood which possesses its own faculty of self-determination? Has it, according to them, its own individuating quality? Let us put their teaching to the test by enquiring into their interpretation of crucial texts. We will base our judgment on the statements of Gregory of Nazianzus. Thus, how does he explain St Luke ii. 52? We find that, like Athanasius, he takes the view that from the first Christ was perfect, and that in Him the qualities of wisdom and favour, not being capable of increase, were "gradually disclosed and displayed".⁴ Again, take his comment on the prayer in Gethsemane. His explanation makes it clear that he gives no real place to the human will of Christ: it is altogether taken into God (θεωθέν ὄλον), he says, the words "Not My will, but Thine, be done" simply meaning that the Son has not "a will of His own beside that of the Father".⁵ And what is his comment on the words "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me"? From him it is not the cry of One who is experiencing the desolation of the Cross, but that of One who is expressing the feelings of sinful man as he is being brought back to God.⁶ As we said in the case of Athanasius, so must we say here: the Greek theologians fail at this point—they do not apply that which they set up as a principle.

¹ *Adv. Eunom.* iii. 4. ² *Orat. Catech.* xvi.

⁴ *Orat.* xliiii. 38. ⁵ *Orat.* xxx (*Theol. Orat.* iv), 12.

³ *Ibid.* xxxii.

⁶ *Ibid.* 5.

IV. THE TEACHING OF CYRIL

Cyril of Alexandria (412-† 444) occupies an outstanding place among the exponents of the Alexandrine Christology. He is the finished theologian,¹ the disciple of Athanasius and the Cappa-

¹ As the "finished theologian" who can make full use of appropriate terms and phrases, and enter more deeply into Christological problems, Cyril differs from his uncle Theophilus (Bishop of Alexandria, 385-† 412), who, though his is "a good Christological knowledge"—so Weigl, whose account of the Patriarch's teaching should be consulted (*op. cit.* pp. 113 ff.)—introduces nothing new by way of explaining the *simplicia ecclesiasticae fidei decreta*, to which he appeals especially when resisting the Apollinarians. It is outside our purpose to consider the acts of this domineering and unscrupulous prelate who waged war against Alexandrian paganism, took violent measures against the Origenists, and struck down Chrysostom, his rival, at Constantinople, and we confine our attention to the main features of his Christology. [For details of his attack on Origen, see Weigl, *op. cit.* pp. 115 f.] Our evidence is in the main derived from three of Theophilus' *Epistolae paschales* (for the years 401, 402, 404) which were translated by Jerome (*Epp.* xcvi, xcvi, c; *P.L.* xxii. 774 ff.); quotations from these letters are to be found in Cyril and Theodoret. In addition, we have a few fragments of other writings of his (see *P.G.* lkv. 48 ff.). Like the rest of the Alexandrines, the Patriarch insists that He who became man is θεός ἀληθινός, and that Jesus Christ is "Emmanuel" (Jerome, *Ep.* xcvi. 3; *P.L.* xxii. 776: quoted by Cyril, *de Recta Fide ad Reg.* (i), *P.L.* xxii. n. e). The Logos, he says, μένει ὁ ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς θεός (*Ep.* xcvi. 4; *P.L.* xxii. 777: quoted by Theodoret, *Dial.* ii, *P.L.* xxii. n. a); *coepit esse quod nos sumus, et non desinit esse fuerat* (*Ep.* xcvi. 4; *P.L.* xxii. 749 f.). Moreover, though he does not adopt the expression μία φύσις, it is undeniable that this teacher would maintain the doctrine of the "one Person", and denounce the Nestorian idea of "two": there are not "two Saviours", he affirms (*Ep.* xcvi. 3; *P.L.* xxii. 776); the body is τὸ οἰκεῖον σῶμα of the Logos (*Ep.* xcvi. 7; *P.L.* xxii. 797), who possesses our subsistence ἐν ἑαυτῷ (*Ep.* xcvi. 4; *P.L.* xxii. 777: quoted by Theodoret, *Dial.* ii—for text see *P.G.* lkv. 56 D); it is the body of the Saviour Himself which He built for Himself from Mary, and not that of any other man (*Sermo de Poenitentia*, Dickamp, *Doctrina Patrum*, p. 120—quoted by Weigl, *op. cit.* p. 119); the flesh is *caro dominica* (Jerome, *Ep.* c. 11; *P.L.* xxii. 822). Accordingly we may say that, though Theophilus speaks of an *assumptio hominis* (cf. *Ep.* xcvi. 4, 6 ff.; *P.L.* xxii. 795 ff.), his is the doctrine of a "personal union". It should be observed that he, too, distinguishes between what belongs to the eternal Logos and what is His as the Logos incarnate: *Dominus gloriae in ipsa passione monstratus est, impassibilis divinitatis permanens majestate, et carne passibilis* (*Ep.* c. 11; *P.L.* xxii. 822 ff.). Again, while the Patriarch may not use the phrases δύο πράγματα, δύο φύσεις, it is plain that he would uphold the principle for which they stand: for him Jesus Christ is God and man (*Ep.* xcvi; *P.L.* xxii. 776). Thus he can say: ἀνθρώπος μὲν φαινόμενος, ὡς ἡμεῖς. . . ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἔργων ἀποδεικνύμενος, ὅτι τῶν ἀπάντων δημιουργός καὶ Κύριός ἐστιν (*Ep. pasch.* v; *P.G.* lkv. 60 B); He is neither wholly mortal nor wholly immortal, but δεκτικὸς ἑκτέρου (*ex Cat. in Gen.*; *P.G.* lkv. 65 B). Theophilus, it seems, makes no mention of the principle of "recognizing the difference" of the natures, and has nothing to say concerning its worth in order to reject the Eutychian doctrine. Nevertheless, it is clear enough that he is utterly opposed to that

docian Fathers, who reaps where Apollinarius of Laodicea had sown. The extent of his influence upon his own and succeeding generations it is impossible to exaggerate. During his lifetime, and still more after his death, he was regarded as the authority in matters concerning the faith, for this was he who, as the champion of orthodoxy, had put an end to the blasphemies of Nestorius, and in his writings had bequeathed to his successors weapons which they could use against the "Nestorianizers".

Before we turn to his teaching to see how he carries forward the principal assertions of his predecessors, and presents the Alexandrine Christology in an even more developed form, let us first enquire into his root ideas. His foundation, it will be seen, is identical with that of Athanasius.

God, Cyril teaches, is the *fons et origo* of all goodness, and of man's happiness;¹ He is the beneficent Being who, a lover of

doctrine: our likeness was not changed into the nature of the Godhead; the Logos left remaining nothing belonging to the human likeness, except sin (Jerome, *Ep.* xcvi. 4, 3; *P.L.* xxii. 777, 776); and the notion that the body was of some precious substance, a heavenly body, he emphatically denies—rather, He who formed man αὐτὸς ἐκ παρθένου καινοπρεπῶς προῖόν ἀνθρώπου (*Ep. pasch.* vi; *P.G.* lkv. 60 c). And especially noteworthy is what he says against Apollinarianism: . . . *neque enim inanimam carnem habuit, et pro anima rationali ipse in ea Deus Verbum fuit, sicut dormitantes Apollinaris discipuli suspicantur* (Jerome, *Ep.* xcvi. 4; *P.L.* xxii. 795); he makes his appeal to such Scriptural passages as St Mt. xxvi. 38, St Jn. x. 18, and Ps. xvi. 10, as he exhorts his hearers to find confidence in the ecclesiastical verity, lest they should deny the *principalem et majorem hominis partem in Salvatore*; for it should be understood, he declares, that the Logos, *totum corpus totamque animam sibi socians, perfectum in se hominem demonstravit, ut perfectam cunctis hominibus in se et per se largiretur salutem* (*ibid.* 6 f.; *P.L.* xxii. 797 f.). Thus is his criticism of the Apollinarian position like that of the Cappadocians: Jesus Christ must be *totus homo*, if man's redemption is to be complete. [We may notice that Theophilus charges the Apollinarians with saying that the soul of Christ can be called *prudencia carnis* (*ibid.* 5; *P.L.* xxii. 796). These were indeed saying that because Christ had not a human πνεῦμα, τὸ φρόνημα τῆς σαρκός was not ranged against it (see *Tom. synod.*, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* p. 263). So it may be that an assertion of this sort became the basis of one of their syllogisms, and that it was from such a syllogism that the Alexandrine made his deduction.] At the same time, he appreciates Apollinarius' work against the Arians and the Eunomians, and his disputation against "Origen and other heretics" (Jerome, *Ep.* xcvi. 6; *P.L.* xxii. 797). It is reasonable to conclude, then, that the teaching of Theophilus is of interest as throwing light on the state of the Alexandrine Christology, as this was maintained by renowned ecclesiastics, before the coming of the influence of the writings of Apollinarius and his school: root principles are firmly upheld, but precise definition is lacking.

¹ *Comm. in Oseam*, iv. 6; xiii. 4-6, ed. Pusey, i. pp. 99, 265. ἐξ ἐμφύτου χρηστότητος ἀγαπᾷ ὁ θεός, says Cyril (*Comm. in Oseam*, iii. 1, *ibid.* p. 83). But God is ἀγιος as well as ἀγαθός, he says (*Comm. in Oseam*, xi. 9, 10, *ibid.* pp. 236 f.).

man,¹ dwells in the pure in heart.² He may describe God as immutable and illimitable, and say that there is a vast difference between Him and His creation,³ but it is clear that he does not think of the Divine as an utterly transcendent Being, far removed from man: he insists on the difference between the Creator and the creature, but, at the same time, proclaims that man is so made that he can enter into a spiritual relationship with his God.⁴ Man, he teaches, is a rational being, who has within him the seeds of wisdom and of divine knowledge—he has, also, those forms of light which are “as rays proceeding from the ineffable brightness”.⁵ So the first man was perfect in understanding, preserving pure and unsullied this light from God. His body continued in a state of tranquillity; because the Creator had set His Holy Spirit—“the God-given good” (τὸ θεόσδοτον ἀγαθόν)⁶—within him, his mind was occupied in the vision of God;⁷ and, possessing the power to work every form of good, he was indeed complete as the image of his Maker.⁸

But, Cyril goes on, Adam, who, created a free being, was charged to bridle his desires,⁹ turned and fell. The consequence was that the Holy Spirit was driven away, and a state of corruption arose, man becoming more and more ignorant of his Creator.¹⁰ Therefore it was necessary that God Himself should come down as man among men:¹¹ only One at once divine and human could bestow afresh the gift of the Spirit, and be the Second Root of a new humanity¹²—a humanity no longer subject to sin and corruption. So, through Christ, he declares, man is

¹ *Comm. in Oseam*, iv. 6, ed. Pusey, I. p. 99.

² *Comm. in Oseam*, iii. 4, 5; ed. Pusey, I. p. 88; in *Abacuc*. ii. 19, 20, ed. Pusey, II. p. 116.

³ *Comm. in Jo. Ev.* i. 3; iii. 31, ed. Pusey, III. pp. 67, 241, 244.

⁴ Cf. *Comm. in Jo. Ev.* vi. 27, ed. Pusey, III. p. 449: ἐν ἰδίᾳ γὰρ φύσει τὸ θεῖον κείσεται καὶ μεθέξει μὲν αὐτοῦ τὸ πεποιημένον δι' οικειότητος πνευματικῆς, ἀναβήσεται δὲ οὐδαμῶς εἰς τὸ ἐκείνη προσὸν ἀπαραλλάκτως ἀξίωμα. Cf. also *Comm. in Jo. Ev.* xiv. 11, ed. Pusey, IV. pp. 453 f.

⁵ *Comm. in Jo. Ev.* i. 9, ed. Pusey, III. p. 111.

⁶ *Comm. in Jo. Ev.* vii. 39, ed. Pusey, III. p. 693.

⁷ *Comm. in Jo. Ev.* i. 9, ed. Pusey, III. p. 111.

⁸ *Comm. in Jo. Ev.* xiv. 20, ed. Pusey, IV. pp. 485 ff.

⁹ *Ibid.*, ed. Pusey, IV. p. 485.

¹⁰ *Comm. in Jo. Ev.* i. 32, 33, ed. Pusey, III. pp. 182 ff.

¹¹ E.g. *De Recta Fide ad Reginas* (i), ed. Pusey, VII. pt. i. p. 225.

¹² *Adv. Nestor.* v. 1, ed. Pusey, VI. p. 209. Similarly Cyril can **speak of Christ as the ἀρχὴ τοῦ γένους δευτέρα** (*Scholia*, iii, ed. Pusey, VI. p. 504).

crowned with the glory which was his at the beginning.¹ For He Himself joins together the Divine and those on the earth; He, whose is the Spirit, bestows that gift upon believers, making them “partakers of the divine nature”,² and one with the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.³

Surely, in all this we have an essentially ethical conception of man's redemption: through the Incarnation, itself the manifestation of the divine goodness, man is restored to communion with the One in whose image he was made. Admittedly, the terms “incorruptibility”, “immutability” and “immortality” occur again and again in Cyril's writings, but, as we said when we were considering the teaching of Athanasius, attention should be focused, not upon their categories—which, as cannot be denied, are of a materialistic order—but upon the message which these categories are meant to convey, if we would gain a real estimate of the teaching of the Alexandrine theologians on the redemption. So it is that what Cyril says concerning the process of man's sanctification is of no small importance in this connection. Unity with God, he teaches, depends on moral perfection: sin often takes hold of us, and separates us from God;⁴ it also depends on faith—faith in the incarnate God who has taken away our former guilt⁵—for “only through faith in Christ are we brought into relationship with the Divine”.⁶ But faith, says Cyril, is only the first stage in the process. After it, there comes knowledge: Christ is the Mediator through whom and in whom man knows the Father, and is made one with Him;⁷ and with knowledge comes life: for, knowing, man obtains the blessing of the Spirit, so that when He dwells in the heart we are made

¹ *Comm. in Joel.* ii. 28, 29, ed. Pusey, I. p. 338—i.e. man is capable of receiving the image as it was at the first (cf. *de Dogmatum Solutione*, ed. Pusey, v. p. 555).

² *Adv. Nestor.* v. 7, ed. Pusey, VI. p. 239.

³ See *Comm. in Jo. Ev.* xvii. 20, 21, ed. Pusey, IV. p. 737. Cf. also *Scholia*, i, ed. Pusey, VI. p. 500, where Cyril says that since, through Adam's transgression, sin reigned in the world, and, in consequence, the Holy Spirit had departed from humanity, it was necessary that in the mercy of God there should again be established a humanity which, restored to its former state, should be worthy of the Spirit's presence.

⁴ *Comm. in Oseam*, xii. 6, ed. Pusey, I. p. 249.

⁵ *De Recta Fide ad Theodos.*, ed. Pusey, VII. pt. i. p. 120; but “faith” often means orthodox belief.

⁶ *Comm. in Jo. Ev.* x. 7, ed. Pusey, IV. p. 212.

⁷ *Comm. in Oseam*, ii. 20; vi. 6, ed. Pusey, I. pp. 75, 142.

anew and live as sons of the constitution which is incorruptible.¹ Indeed, it is noteworthy that, according to this teacher, it was for the very purpose of bringing life and knowledge of God to the world that the Logos, out of His love for what He had created, became man.² We do not mean that these ideas appear in a clear-cut form; in fact it has to be confessed that, especially in his Eucharistic teaching, Cyril's thought undoubtedly contains a materialistic strain;³ but it seems clear that, viewed fundamentally, his teaching, like that of Athanasius, has as its foundation the Christian conception of God and man and the relations between them.

Now we can turn to his Christology. Let us see how he carries forward the two doctrinal principles which, as we are trying to show, constitute the basis of the Alexandrine teaching.

The Incarnation, Cyril maintains, has not involved any change in respect of the divine being of the Logos. The Logos, he constantly affirms, "remains what He was".⁴ If we interpret him aright, his view is that the Logos, who, "being true God, is never external to His own dignity",⁵ has "added"⁶ to His eternal being this—that He has undergone "a voluntary self-emptying"⁷ through becoming man for man's salvation. Thus we find that he says that the Logos, while existing eternally in the form of the

¹ *Comm. in Jo. Ev.* vi. 69; xvii. 3, ed. Pusey, III. p. 576; iv. p. 669: "knowledge is life" he says (*ibid.*).

² *Comm. in Jo. Ev.* xvii. 1, ed. Pusey, iv. p. 660.

³ Thus he says that "the communion is not only spiritual, but also corporeal" (*Comm. in Jo. Ev.* xv. 1, ed. Pusey, iv. p. 543), and more than once he takes σύσσωμοι (cf. Eph. iii. 6) in a materialistic sense (e.g. *Comm. in Jo. Ev.* xvii. 20, 21, *ibid.* pp. 735 ff.). But it should be noted that there are references to "concorporeality" which are set in a context of ideas essentially spiritual—e.g. *Comm. in Jo. Ev.* xvii. 3, *ibid.* p. 669, where it is associated with "the whole power of the mystery", which itself consists in the knowledge which is life; cf. also his comment on "I am the True Vine" (which immediately precedes teaching on "the natural partaking" of the Body and Blood of Christ): through a right disposition of mind, through perfect love, through unperverted faith and virtuous and pure reasoning, we are in Christ "spiritually" (*Comm. in Jo. Ev.* xv. 1, *ibid.* pp. 541 f.).

⁴ The expression is to be found: at least 16 times in *adv. Nestor.*, 7 in *Apol. adv. Orient.*, 15 in *de Recta Fide ad Reg.* (i, ii), 9 in *Quod unus sit Christus*, and 10 in the *Scholia*. The corresponding expression "without ceasing to be God" occurs with even greater frequency.

⁵ *Comm. in Jo. Ev.* xvii. 4, 5, ed. Pusey, iv. p. 677.

⁶ It is particularly noteworthy that this thought is to be found in the writings of certain modern scholars. See below, p. 246.

⁷ Cyril is constantly using this phrase.

Father, "besides this" (πρός γε τούτω) took the form of a servant,¹ and that He counted it not a prize to be on an equality with God, but "besides this" (προσέτι τούτω) took the form of a servant—which He had not before—though possessing the fulness (of Godhead) in His own nature.² Again, it should be noted that he can say that the Same, remaining what He was, and becoming what we are, manifested an activity which was twofold (διπλῆν τὴν ἐνέργειαν)—"suffering as man and energizing as God".³ Even if it is not developed, this would appear to be a workable idea.

We must notice, too, that Cyril, building on the principle that "Incarnation is self-emptying",⁴ carries forward the thought of his predecessors, who had realized that their system demanded the inclusion of the conception that in the Incarnation the Logos has accommodated Himself to earthly conditions. While for him, as for all the teachers of the Alexandrine school, the Incarnation is a supreme mystery, he sees that the self-emptying of the Logos, who in His divine being cannot suffer any change, is to do and to say what is human through the economic union with the flesh.⁵ To separate Him from what is human, he argues against the Antiochenes, is to overturn the whole mystery.⁶ So he asserts that the Logos "went through the laws of human nature".⁷ But he perceives that a real incarnation is only possible if the Logos limits Himself in respect of His divine powers. Hence, with Athanasius, he can say that the Logos "allowed" the humanity to fulfil its own measures.⁸ But this is not all. Especially significant in this connection is the following remark of his: the Logos, he says, might have taken the Babe out of the swaddling clothes and lifted Him (at once) to the fulness of

¹ *Quod unus sit Christus*, ed. Pusey, VII. pt. i. p. 373.

² *Adv. Nestor.* v. 2, ed. Pusey, VI. p. 219; similarly, *de Recta Fide ad Reg.* (ii), ed. Pusey, VII. pt. i. p. 268.

³ *Frag. Homil.* xv, ed. Pusey, v. p. 474.

⁴ Thus Cyril can say: ἔχων γὰρ τὸ εἶναι κατὰ φύσιν ἐν ἰσότητι τοῦ πατρὸς κεκένωκεν ἑαυτὸν, καὶ μορφήν δούλου λαβὼν, τούτέστιν ἀνθρώπος γεγονώς (*de Recta Fide ad Reg.* (i), ed. Pusey, VII. pt. i. p. 238).

⁵ *Apol. adv. Theod.* iv, ed. Pusey, VI. p. 343.

⁶ *Apol. adv. Theod.* x, ed. Pusey, VI. p. 474.

⁷ *Adv. Nestor.* i. 1, ed. Pusey, VI. p. 63.

⁸ *Comm. in Jo. Ev.* vi. 38, 39, ed. Pusey, III. p. 487: ἐπιτρέπει γεμῆν ὡς ἐν σαρκὶ γεγονώς ὑπομένειν τὰ ἴδια τῆ σαρκί. Similarly, *Apol. adv. Theod.* x, ed. Pusey, VI. p. 476.

manhood, but this would have been mere wonder-working, and out of harmony with the conditions of the economy; rather—

the mystery was accomplished noiselessly. Therefore, in accordance with the economy, He permitted the measures of the manhood to prevail over Himself [ἤφει δὴ οὖν οικονομικῶς τοῖς τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος μέτροις ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ τὸ κρατεῖν].¹

Here again we have an important contribution to Christological thought, and even if it has to be confessed—and to this point we shall return—that Cyril “restricts the reign of law to the material sphere, excluding it from the intellectual and moral”,² it stands as a sound principle, and one which can be developed: the Logos, while still remaining the Creative Word, assumes manhood, and in so doing subjects Himself to human laws.³

Accordingly he maintains that the Logos is the same Person both before and after the Incarnation.⁴ The only difference, he would say, is that He who existed ἄσαρκος is now (though without any change in respect of His divine being) ἐνσώματος;⁵ the nature or hypostasis of the Logos is now σεσαρκωμένη; the Logos Himself is now σεσαρκωμένος.⁶ And, Cyril affirms, the Logos has become man through making what is human His very own. The union of Godhead and manhood in Jesus Christ, he teaches, is “hypostatic” and “natural”, and by this he means what Malchion

¹ *Quod unus sit Christus*, ed. Pusey, VII. pt. i. p. 399. Cyril also alludes to the “noiselessness” of the power of the mystery in *adv. Nestor.* iii. 4, ed. Pusey, VI. p. 166.

² So Bruce, *The Humiliation of Christ*, p. 54. As the passages from Cyril which this writer has brought together show, the verdict is indisputable. See also below, pp. 102 ff.

³ Cf. Cyril's statement: μένει γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς εἰ καὶ γέγονεν ἀνθρώπος, ἀποσώζων δὲ πανταχῆ τῆς μετὰ σαρκὸς οἰκονομίας τὸν λόγον (*Comm. in Jo. Ev.* iv. 22, ed. Pusey, III. pp. 276 f.). Again, speaking of the Lord's ignorance, he can say: οὐκοῦν οἶδε μὲν θεϊκῶς ὡς σοφία τοῦ πατρὸς, ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὸ τῆς ἀγνοουμένης ἀνθρωπότητος ὑπέδου μέτρον, οικονομικῶς οἰκειούται καὶ τοῦτο μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων (*Apol. adv. Theod.* iv, ed. Pusey, VI. p. 432)—a passage which, like that in Athanasius (see above, p. 35), seems to be established on the principle of a real self-accommodation on the part of the divine Logos in order to meet human conditions; it will be noticed, too, that Cyril is here distinguishing between what belongs to the Logos in His divine nature (θεϊκῶς . . .), and what is His now that He has become incarnate—a principle which, it seems, is common to all the Alexandrine theologians.

⁴ *Ep. i ad Succen.*, P.G. lxxvii. 229D.

⁵ *Explan. xii Capp.* ii, ed. Pusey, VI. p. 245. Cf. also the following from Cyril's *adv. Nestor.* ii. 12 (ed. Pusey, VI. p. 126): ἦν γὰρ καὶ ἐτι κατὰ φύσιν θεός, καὶ πρὸ τῆς κενώσεως, καὶ ὅτε τὴν κένωσιν ὑπομείναι λέγεται, γεγονός καθ' ἡμᾶς.

⁶ See below, p. 89 n. 2.

and Apollinarius had meant by their ἐνωσις οὐσιώδης¹—namely, a “personal” union, which has its centre in the Logos Himself; for, as he explicitly states, “the ‘nature’ or the ‘hypostasis’ of the Logos is the Logos Himself”.² Thus is rendered an utter impossibility the Nestorian idea of two parallel existences. Indeed, Cyril sees in his “hypostatic union” a real safeguard against such an idea: “If we reject the ‘hypostatic union’ as being either impossible or unseemly,” he says in the *Epistola dogmatica*, “we fall into predicating two Sons.”³ Moreover, again and again does he assert—as Athanasius and Apollinarius had asserted before him—that since the manhood is “the own” of the Logos, it cannot be “that of another” (ἐτέρου τινος);⁴ the Logos made man is one prosopon.⁵ His starting-point, then, is the truth summed up in the Johannine formula: Jesus Christ, he maintains, is the Logos made flesh; the Person of Jesus Christ is the Logos who “has united to Himself hypostatically, in an ineffable and inconceivable manner, flesh animated with a rational soul”;⁶ therefore Jesus Christ is “God in flesh”, “God with flesh”,⁷ “God manifested in flesh”.⁸

It is to enforce this cardinal truth that the Alexandrine fights on behalf of “Theotokos”. The Virgin, he says, must be given this title, not because the Logos in His divine nature owed the beginning of His existence to her, but because the Logos as He was united to flesh was born of her. The titles suggested by the Antiochenes—“Theodochos”, “Christotokos” and

¹ See above, pp. 28, 52.

² ἡ τοῦ Λόγου φύσις ἦγον ὑπόστασις, ὁ ἐστὶν αὐτὸς ὁ Λόγος. . . (*Apol. adv. Theod.* ii, ed. Pusey, VI. p. 404).

³ P.G. lxxvii. 48B; T. H. Bindley, *The Oecumenical Documents of the Faith*, p. 107.

⁴ E.g. *Quod unus sit Christus*, ed. Pusey, VII. pt. i. p. 349. We may note that in five of his Anathematisms Cyril condemns the idea that the manhood is “that of another”. See below, p. 210 n. 5.

⁵ The Logos, says Cyril, while partaking of flesh and blood, μεμνήκεν ὁ αὐτὸς . . . εἰς ὧν καὶ μόνος, καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἕτερος μεθ' ἑτέρου, ἵνα καὶ ἐν αὐτοῦ νοήται πρόσωπον (*Quod unus sit Christus*, ed. Pusey, VII. pt. i. p. 371).

⁶ *Ep. ii ad Nestor.*, P.G. lxxvii. 45B, 48C; Bindley, *op. cit.* pp. 105, 107.

⁷ See, for instance, *de Recta Fide ad Reg.* (i), ed. Pusey, VII. pt. i. pp. 173, 208, 227.

⁸ It should be understood that the text 1 Tim. iii. 16 is regarded by all the Alexandrines as a *locus classicus*, having an importance second only to that of the Johannine text. See Cyril's explanation of it in *de Recta Fide ad Reg.* (i), ed. Pusey, VII. pt. i. pp. 297 ff., and *Scholias*, xi, ed. Pusey, VI. pp. 520 f.

"Anthropotokos"—he affirms, simply miss the point.¹ For if Mary did not bring forth after the flesh God incarnate, one is bound to say that she brought forth an ordinary man—and such a notion is destructive of the whole mystery of the Incarnation.² So he composes complete treatises in defence of the title,³ claiming that it has the support of those teachers whose soundness in the faith it was impossible to deny.⁴ Similarly he insists that orthodox demands that one should affirm "God was born". But, he points out, in making this affirmation one does not mean that the Logos, who "was in the beginning with God", first came into existence at the time of the Incarnation; the expression must be used because, though in reality the Virgin gave birth only to the manhood, the Logos, personally united to that manhood, was born of her. In fact, says Cyril, the royal way is being pursued when one confesses that the Logos endured two births, since He is one and the same Son, who was begotten of the Father, and born of a woman according to the flesh.⁵ Again, he is constantly using the expressions "God suffered", "God died"—not that he would have it thought that he teaches that the God-Logos in His divine being suffered and died. For, like his predecessors, Cyril appeals to the Scriptures (Hebrews ii. 9; 1 St Peter iv. 1), which say that He suffered "in the flesh",⁶ and, distinguishing between the Logos in His eternal being and the Logos "in the flesh", affirms that while the Logos suffered in His own flesh, He in Himself was extraneous to suffering, that He was in death, yet superior to death,⁷ and that—a phrase which sums up this thought—"He suffered impassibly" (ἐπαθεν ἀπαθῶς).⁸ But he definitely lays down that it must be

¹ See *Apol. adv. Theod.* i, *adv. Nestor.* ii. 2, ed. Pusey, vi. pp. 398, 101.

² *De Recta Fide ad Reg.* (i), ed. Pusey, vii. pt. i. pp. 158, 161.

³ Thus: *Quod sancta Virgo deipara sit et non Christipara*, and *Quod beata Maria sit deipara* (P.G. lxxvi. 250 f.).

⁴ Thus Cyril quotes Peter of Alexander and the *ad Epict.* of Athanasius in defence of his Anath. i in *Apol. adv. Orient.*, ed. Pusey, vi. p. 274, and appeals to Athanasius, Theophilus, Basil, Gregory and Atticus in his *Ep. ad Acac. Ber.*, P.G. lxxvii. 97B. ⁵ *Adv. Nestor.* i. 6, ed. Pusey, vi. p. 80.

⁶ See, for instance, Cyril's defence of his Anath. xii in *Apol. adv. Theod.*, ed. Pusey, vi. pp. 492 f. ⁷ *Ep. ad Acac.*, P.G. lxxvii. 213A.

⁸ *Quod unus sit Christus*, ed. Pusey, vii. pt. i. pp. 402, 407, and *de Recta Fide ad Reg.* (ii), ed. Pusey, vii. pt. i. p. 310. It was God incarnate who suffered, Cyril says; God "in His own nature" remained impassible (*Apologeticus*, ed. Pusey, vii. pt. i. p. 433). (The same distinction is made, it seems, in respect of our Lord's ignorance. See above, p. 86 n. 3.)

said that "God" suffered: otherwise, if it was not the Logos, as He had become man through making His own a passible flesh, who suffered, a Man, "another beside the Logos", must have suffered—and no mere man can be the Saviour of the world.¹

So, against the Nestorian notion that in Jesus Christ there are two prosopa existing side by side, he holds fast to the doctrine of the unity of the Person of the Incarnate: Jesus Christ is one prosopon—or in the words of the formula which was rapidly becoming an important watchword of the Alexandrine orthodoxy, the nature or hypostasis (φύσις, ὑπόστασις) of the divine Logos (τοῦ θεοῦ Λόγου), which is now an incarnate (σεσαρκωμένη) nature or hypostasis, is one (μία).² In Jesus Christ, he declares—using terms which, as we have seen, had long been current among Greek theologians—there has been a "concurrence" (συνδρομή) or a "coming together" (σύνοδος) of Godhead and manhood into a unity (εἰς ἐνότητα);³ in Him there has been a

¹ *Quod unus sit Christus*, ed. Pusey, vii. pt. i. p. 356.

² As we have said, in all probability the formula owes its origin to Apollinarius himself. It is to be found in the *ad Jovianum*, the Apollinarian writing attributed to Athanasius (see above, p. 54), and Cyril accepts it as a genuine utterance of the great Alexandrine (see *Apol. adv. Orient.* viii, ed. Pusey, vi. p. 318, and *de Recta Fide ad Reg.* (i), ed. Pusey, vii. pt. i. p. 161). As J. Lebon (*Le Monophysisme sévérien*, pp. 300 ff.) has pointed out, the Alexandrine teachers regarded the formula as consisting of three members: (1) "the nature of the divine Logos", (2) "incarnate", and (3) "one". Thus Cyril emphasizes the importance of (2) when he insists that, so long as the word "incarnate" is added to the formula, there can be no thought that in the Incarnation the one element has been transformed into the other (*Ep. ii ad Succen.*, P.G. lxxvii. 241A, B), and of (3) when he says that the "dividing" of the sayings is impossible, since "assuredly the nature of the Logos is 'one'" (*Ep. ad Acac.*, P.G. lxxvii. 193B). The formula, then, was built up thus: (1) "the nature of the divine Logos"—i.e. the Person of the Logos, who is contemplated in His eternity, and is thus seen as ὁ Λόγος ἄσκαρος; (2) "incarnate"—this word referring to the new state in which the Logos is to be found, now that He has united manhood to Himself; (3) "one"—this word being added to the expression "the incarnate nature of the divine Logos", in order to rule out Nestorian ideas concerning the Person of Jesus Christ, the incarnate Logos. From this it will be clear that, so long as the term "nature" is employed in the sense of "person", it makes no difference whether the word "incarnate" is placed in the nominative to agree with "nature", or in the genitive to agree with "Logos"—since, as Cyril says, the "nature" of the Logos is "the Logos Himself" (see above, p. 87). Thus we find that this teacher himself at times uses the genitive: μία φύσις υἱοῦ σεσαρκωμένου (*Quod unus sit Christus*, ed. Pusey, vii. pt. i. p. 366); and: μίαν εἶναι πιστεύομεν τὴν τοῦ υἱοῦ φύσιν ὡς ἐνός, πλὴν ἐνανθρωπήσαντος καὶ σεσαρκωμένου (*Ep. ad Acac.*, P.G. lxxvii. 193B).

³ *Quod unus sit Christus*, ed. Pusey, vii. pt. i. p. 360.

real union, a unification (*unitio*), of these two elements, the term "union" signifying a concurrence into a unity (εἰς ἓν τι) of the things which have been united.¹ Again, he speaks of the union as a "composition" (σύνθεσις): the Godhead and the manhood are "compounded" into the one Person of Jesus Christ, just as—an analogy which he is constantly employing—the individual man consists of soul and body. Like the Laodicene, and the Cappadocians, he sees that these terms can be used with no small success in combating the Nestorian idea that in Christ there are two Persons, each having His own personal existence—the manhood assumed by the Logos, he repeatedly affirms, is not that of another beside Him (ἑτέρου τινος παρ' αὐτόν).² Hence, like his predecessors, he insists that all the actions and sayings recorded of Christ in the Gospels, whether they are God- or man-befitting, are those of this one Person (ἑνὸς τὰ πάντα τὰ θεοπρεπιῆ καὶ προσέτι τὰ ἀνθρώπινα, he says; ἕξ ἑνὸς προσώπου τὰ πάντα λαλέξεται).³ He flatly rejects the notion that some should be attributed to the Logos, and others to a manhood regarded as having a prosopon alongside of that of the Logos—all, without exception, are the actions and sayings of the God who has become man. As we say, Cyril's position is that Jesus Christ is the Logos incarnate: the Logos, not despising the measures of humanity, has taken to Himself a complete manhood, consisting of a body and a human rational soul, and made it His very own. Accordingly, one cannot think that He consists of two Persons set side by side; rather, in Jesus Christ there is Godhead, and there is manhood, but that manhood has been "compounded" into the Person of the Logos, and so has its place as a reality in the "composition" in the Person—a "composition" which was set up when that Person became man.

We would now consider the place which the second foundation principle of the Alexandrine Christology holds in Cyril's teaching. Jesus Christ, he says, is "One", but He is "One out

of two" (εἰς ἓκ δύο), since in the Incarnation Godhead and manhood have been "compounded" into the Person of the Logos. Like Athanasius and Apollinarius, he alludes to these two elements as δύο πράγματα: Jesus Christ is not "twofold" in the Nestorian sense, but "is understood as constituted out of two different things into an inseparable unity" (οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ διπλοῦς ὁ εἰς καὶ μόνος Χριστός, κἄν ἐκ δύο νοῆται καὶ διαφόρων πραγμάτων εἰς ἐνότητα τὴν ἀμέριστον συνενηνεγμένος).¹ More frequently he calls them "natures" and "hypostases", employing these terms "generically"—i.e. in the sense of "ousia" (= *substantia*).² So he can say that the Logos has been truly united to human nature (ἀνθρωπιεία φύσει ἑνωθείς),³ that the incarnate Logos is "the one and sole Christ out of two and different natures" (ἐκ δύο καὶ διαφόρων φύσεων),⁴ that there has been "a coming together of things or hypostases" (σύνστροφος πραγμάτων ἡγουν ὑποστάσεων),⁵ and that "the form of a servant and [the form] of God have not been united without their hypostases" (οὔτε δίχα τῶν ὑποστάσεων).⁶ So is Christ understood as "One out of both" (εἰς ἕξ ἀμφοῖν).⁷

These two elements, Cyril insists, remain without confusion in the union. One could quote instance after instance to show that he is directly opposed to Eutychian thought. It is essential, he says, to preserve the confession "the one and sole Christ is out of two and different natures"—otherwise, "the adversaries of sound doctrine will say, If the whole is one nature, how did the Logos become flesh, and what was the manner of the flesh which He made His own?"⁸ The Logos, he asserts, has become flesh not by being changed into flesh, or by a change in respect of the ousia of the flesh.⁹ As he explicitly states:

When we consider the manner of the Incarnation, we see that two natures have been united without confusion or transfor-

¹ *Ep. iii ad Nestor.*, P.G. lxxvii. 116A; Bindley, *op. cit.* p. 127. In *Apol. adv. Orient.*, iv, ed. Pusey, vi. p. 288, we have: ἐκ δύο πραγμάτων ἄμοιων.

² It should be understood that Cyril is equally at home with either usage: "nature"="ousia" (= *substantia*), or "nature"="prosopon". See above, p. 49 n. 2.

³ *Apol. adv. Theod.* ii, ed. Pusey, vi. p. 404.

⁴ *Ep. i ad Succen.*, P.G. lxxvii. 233A.

⁵ *Apol. adv. Theod.* i, ed. Pusey, vi. p. 396.

⁶ *Apol. adv. Theod.* ii, ed. Pusey, vi. p. 406.

⁷ *Scholia*, xxvii, ed. Pusey, vi. p. 548; similarly, *Apol. adv. Theod.* x, ed. Pusey, vi. p. 484.

⁸ *Ep. i ad Succen.*, P.G. lxxvii. 233A.

⁹ *Ep. in sanct. Symbol.*, P.G. lxxvii. 304A.

¹ *Ep. iii ad Nestor.*, P.G. lxxvii. 112B; Bindley, *op. cit.* p. 125.

² E.g. *Quod unus sit Christus*, ed. Pusey, vii. pt. i. pp. 356, 358, 361. See also *Apol. adv. Orient.* vii (ed. Pusey, vi. p. 306), where Cyril quotes the Apollinarian writing attributed to Felix of Rome which contains the phrase.

³ *Quod unus sit Christus*, ed. Pusey, vii. pt. i. p. 355; *adv. Nestor.* ii, ed. Pusey, vi. p. 94. For similar statements see also *Explan. xii Capp.* iv, and *Apol. adv. Theod.* iv, ed. Pusey, vi. pp. 248, 428 (quoted below, p. 95).

mation; for the flesh is flesh and not Godhead, though it has become the flesh of God; and the Logos is God and not flesh, though, in virtue of the Incarnation, He has made the flesh His own.¹

Or, there is that statement of his, the last clause of which came to be incorporated into the *Definitio* of Chalcedon:

While the natures which are brought together into the real unity are different, yet out of both is the one Christ and Son—not as though the difference of the natures was abolished by the union,²

It may be noted, too, that he is careful to make it clear that when he uses such terms as “mingling”, he, like those Fathers who had used it before him, would not introduce the idea of “confusion”, but would merely lay stress on the closeness of the union of the two elements in Christ.³ Moreover, he affirms that the properties of the natures are different in the union. Certainly, as his “types” of the union reveal, he holds that the human properties became those of the Logos, and the properties of the Logos those of the flesh,⁴ but he would not deprive the manhood of its own qualities. Thus, taking the “live coal” of Isaiah’s vision as a “type” of the union, he says that, as the charcoal was penetrated by the fire, and received in this process the power of fire, though the fire remained what it was, and the charcoal did not cease to be wood, so the divine Logos, who united manhood to Himself, remained what He was, and, while He appropriated what is human and “conferred upon it the operation of His own nature”, preserved the manhood in all that it was (τετηρήκε αὐτήν τοῦθ’ ὅπερ ἦν).⁵ Further, he holds that the two elements remain each in its “natural quality” (ποιότης φυσική),⁶ and that in

¹ *Ep. i ad Succen.*, P.G. lxxvii. 232 C, D.

² *Ep. ii ad Nestor.*, P.G. lxxvii. 45 C; Bindley, *op. cit.* p. 105.

³ *Adv. Nestor.* i. 3, *Apol. adv. Theod.* xi, ed. Pusey, vi. pp. 72, 488. Compare the remark: “He is very ignorant who says that there has been a φυσιώδης and a σύγκρασις (*Quod unus sit Christus*, ed. Pusey, vii. pt. i. p. 366). Cf. also Cyril’s declaration concerning “composition”—the term, he says, points to “the difference of the things which have been brought together” in Christ (*Ep. ii ad Succen.*, P.G. lxxvii. 241 B).

⁴ See, for instance, *de Recta Fide ad Reg.* (i), ed. Pusey, vii. pt. i. p. 245, and *de Incarn. Unig.*, P.G. lxxv. 1241 B. Origen and Apollinarius have the same teaching (see above, pp. 22, 58).

⁵ *Scholium*, ix, ed. Pusey, vi. pp. 514 f.

⁶ *Ep. ad Acac.*, P.G. lxxvii. 193 B, D. For Nestorius’ criticism of Cyril’s “natural quality”, see below, p. 213 n. 2.

the union Godhead and manhood differ “according to manner of being” (κατὰ τὸν τοῦ πῶς εἶναι λόγον);¹ and even more significant is his statement that the nature of the Logos was not changed into that of the flesh, or that of the flesh into that of the Logos—rather, “each remains and is perceived in its natural property” (ἐν ιδιότητι τῇ κατὰ φύσιν ἑκατέρου μένοντός τε καὶ νοουμένου).²

Again, we must notice that, like Athanasius and Apollinarius—and like Origen before these—Cyril upholds the principles of “recognizing the difference of the natures”. Thus he urges against the Antiochenes that they are going too far in demanding the “separating” of the natures in order to defeat the idea of “confusion”: all that is necessary, he maintains, is that one should “recognize” that the natures are different in the union, and the end is secured without dividing the one Christ into a duad of Sons. He writes:

One Person is He who before the Incarnation was true God, and, in humanity, remained what He was and is and will be. The one Lord Jesus Christ should not, therefore, be divided into a Man existing separately and God existing separately. We say that He is one and the same, Jesus Christ, though we recognize the difference of the natures [τὴν τῶν φύσεων εἰδότες διαφορὰν], and preserve them without the one being confused with the other.³

In other words, Cyril fully realizes the value of the principle as the means whereby the orthodox faith could be safeguarded against Eutychian thought—he perceives that it has a purpose which is definitely anti-Eutychian. An “otherness” (ἑτερότης), he says, exists between the Logos and the manhood,⁴ and it behoves one to recognize (εἰδέναι) that the flesh is one thing, “according to

¹ *Adv. Nestor.* ii. 6, ed. Pusey, vi. p. 113.

² *Ep. ii ad Succen.*, P.G. lxxvii. 241 B, D.

³ *Scholium*, xiii, ed. Pusey, vi. p. 528. Cf. also the statement in the letter to John of Antioch: “There is one Lord Jesus Christ, although the difference of the natures is not ignored, out of which we say that the ineffable union has been wrought” (P.G. lxxvii. 180 B; Bindley, *op. cit.* p. 170). Cyril’s position is admirably summed up in the following from his *Comm. in Jo. Ev.* ix. 37 (ed. Pusey, iv. p. 200): ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ θεὸς Λόγος, ἕτερος νοεῖται παρά τὴν σάρκα· ἡ δὲ σὰρξ ἐστὶν, ἕτερον τι παρά τὸν Λόγον· ἡ δὲ γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἐκ θεοῦ Πατρὸς Λόγος, ἀργήσῃ παυτελῶς τὸ ἕτερος καὶ ἕτερος διὰ τὴν ἀβήτητον ἑνωσίαν τε καὶ σύνοδον. εἰς γὰρ μόνος Υἱὸς καὶ πρὸ τῆς πρὸς σάρκα συνόδου καὶ ὅτε συνῆλθε σαρκί.

⁴ *Scholium*, xiii, ed. Pusey, vi. p. 548.

its own nature", and that the Only-begotten is another "according to His nature".¹ So he differentiates between the properties of the natures. To the flesh, having regard to the properties of the body, belong increase and growth,² hunger and weariness, and, having regard to the properties of the soul, fear, grief, conflict and death.³ To the nature of the Logos, on the other hand, belongs everything that is His as the Logos unincarnate, since His nature has not undergone any change by reason of the Incarnation. Similarly, in respect of the sayings, Cyril recognizes that some are God-befitting, while others are human. Answering the charge brought against him by his Antiochene opponents that he was teaching a mixture of the elements because, as they thought, he was attributing everything to the divine Logos (for these did not appreciate Cyril's point that everything was done and said by the Logos in His incarnate state),⁴ he says that he has never abolished their difference,⁵ and to Nestorius he gives an example of his method of "recognizing" this difference. The sayings "He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father" and "I and the Father are one", he says, are God-befitting, and here "we recognize His divine and ineffable nature, according to which through identity of ousia He is one with His own Father (τὴν θείαν αὐτοῦ . . . ἐννοοῦμεν φύσιν); but, he goes on, the saying "Now ye seek Me, a Man who hath spoken to you the truth" is again uttered by the one Person, who "does not despise the measure of the manhood", and "we know [ἐπιγινώσκομεν] Him no less fully as the divine Logos . . . though [the Logos] in the measures of His humanity".⁶ Or, as summing up his method of interpretation: "I recognize [οἶδα] that the Lord speaks now after a divine, now after a human, fashion, since He is at once God and man."⁷ But, let us repeat, Cyril does not mean that Christ spoke now in His divine, now in His human, nature. In all this he is but "recognizing the

¹ κατὰ φύσιν ἰδίαν. Cf. *Apol. adv. Orient.* vi, *Apol. adv. Theod.* vi, ed. Pusey, vi. pp. 286, 448.

² *Apol. adv. Orient.* iv, ed. Pusey, vi. p. 302.

³ *De Incarn. Unig.*, ed. Pusey, vii. pt. i. p. 65.

⁴ E.g. Theodoret's reply to Cyril's *Anath.* iv, ed. Pusey, vi. p. 420.

⁵ *Apol. adv. Theod.* iv, ed. Pusey, vi. p. 426; similarly *Ep. ad Acac.*, P.G. lxxvii. 200B.

⁶ *Ep. iii ad Nestor.*, P.G. lxxvii. 116B f.; Bindley, *op. cit.* p. 128.

⁷ *Ep. ad Acac.*, P.G. lxxvii. 200B.

difference", in order to safeguard the Alexandrine doctrine against the false doctrine of Eutychianism. In actual fact, he would say, all the sayings and actions which are reported of the Lord in Scripture are those of one Person—πάσας . . . φωνάς, τὰς τε ἀνθρωπίνους καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰς θεοπρεπείς, ἐνὶ προσώπῳ προσόπτουμεν¹—the Logos incarnate, that is, who, at once divine and human, "operates at once both divinely and humanly" (θεϊκῶς τε ἅμα καὶ σωματικῶς ἐνεργῶν).² In other words, it seems true to say that Cyril's conception of the one Christ, whose are τὰ τε θεοπρεπῆ καὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα,³ is that He is a theandric Person, whose activity is also theandric. This conception, we venture to think, which is clearly expressed in the writings of the pseudo-Areopagite at the end of the century (or at the beginning of the next),⁴ is already implicit in the teaching of the pre-Chalcedonian Alexandrine teachers.

We now come to what is certainly no easy question: What does Cyril mean when he speaks of "One (nature) after the union"? Enough has been said concerning his denial of the Eutychian position to put it beyond doubt that, when he uses this phrase, he is not taking "nature" in the sense of *substantia*; for assuredly he would not teach that "after the union"—these words being understood in a temporal sense—the Lord's humanity was transformed into His Godhead. So we can be sure that Cyril is here taking "nature" in the sense of "prosopon", and that he adopts the phrase in order to enforce the doctrine of the unity of Christ's Person. But does he mean that the Person is one because the Logos takes to Himself, not a real manhood, but only the attributes of manhood? Loofs,⁵ who follows Dorner—

¹ *Explan. xii Capp.* iv, ed. Pusey, vi. p. 248.

² *De Recta Fide ad Reg.* (i), ed. Pusey, vii. pt. i. p. 249. See also *Comm. in Jo. Ev.* vi. 53, ed. Pusey, iii. p. 530, where Cyril, speaking of the raising of Jairus' daughter, says that the Lord, "giving life as God by His all-powerful command, and again giving life through the touch of His holy flesh, shows through both one kindred operation" (μίαν τε καὶ συγγενῆ δι' ἁμφοῖν ἐπιδείκνυσαι τὴν ἐνέργειαν).

³ *Apol. adv. Theod.* iv, ed. Pusey, vi. p. 428.

⁴ See below, pp. 251 f.

⁵ *Leontius von Byzanz*, pp. 43 ff.; Dorner, *op. cit.* ii. i. pp. 64 ff.; Harnack, *op. cit.* iv. p. 177. Against the view taken by Harnack, Weigl, who would show that, according to Cyril, "the human nature is individual, not general" (*op. cit.* pp. 167 ff.), argues that there is no evidence that the Alexandrine has the formula "Two natures before, one after the union", but that what is

and Harnack has the same conclusion—considers that Cyril thinks in this way. According to this scholar, the Alexandrine would say that the manhood existed ideally—“before the union”, as it were—and that in the Incarnation the Logos assumed its essential properties as determinations or attributes, He Himself holding them together as their centre.¹ So, on this basis, it is argued, the Lord is spoken of as “One out of two natures” and as “One after the union”; there were two natures “before the union”, but “after the union” the manhood was carried into the being of the Logos—though, but only in thought (θεωριᾷ μόνῃ), it is still possible to distinguish in Him the two natures. But, while it must be granted that Cyril’s is primarily an anti-Nestorian, and not an anti-Eutychian, interest, it seems impossible to deny that for him the humanity, as it exists in the composition in the Person of the Logos, is real and complete. As is pointed out by Lebon² in his criticism of the view taken by Loofs, Cyril explicitly states that the union is one of “things”, of “natures”, of “hypostases”—in Jesus Christ there has been “a coming together of things and hypostases”;³ “the form of a servant and [the form] of God have not been united without their hypostases”.⁴ It will be observed that there is no mention here of properties and accidents. Further, is it legitimate to suppose that Cyril would say that “before the union” the man-

clearly brought out is that the Logos is “the Same before and after the union”. This scholar draws attention to a passage in Cyril’s *Ep. ad Acacium* (P.G. lxxvii. 192D—quoted below, p. 98), which, as he says, may seem to lend support to Harnack’s thesis, but, he points out, Cyril is not here asserting that previous to the union two natures existed, or that the human nature continued by itself. Rather: *Cyrrill wollte eine begriffliche Erläuterung geben und abstrahiert gedanklich von der konkreten Einigung* (Weigl, *op. cit.* pp. 171 f.). At the same time, Weigl does not here develop what, as we see it, is implicit in the passage from the *ad Acacium*, viz. the conception of “two”, though only in contemplation” (see below, pp. 99 f.), though it is noteworthy that he states that discussions (on the union) always steer to the thought that, while, after and in spite of the union two natures are present, there exists a real and indivisible unity (Weigl, *op. cit.* p. 172).

¹ Thus, as Tixeront puts it, “in this view there is no *enhypostasia* of the nature but only an *insubstantiatio* of the human properties in the Word” (*History of Dogmas*,² iii. p. 70).

² *Op. cit.* pp. 379 ff.

³ See above, p. 91. It may be noted, too, that Cyril affirms that Jesus Christ is ἐκ δύοῖν τελεσίων, perfect in Godhead and perfect in manhood (*de Recta Fide ad Theodos.*, ed. Pusey, vii. pt. i. p. 74).

⁴ Quoted above, p. 91.

hood existed ideally? Surely, for him “before the union” would represent that stage in God’s dealings with man when the Logos was still ἄσαρκος—was not σεσαρκωμένος—the flesh as yet not having come into existence; moreover, it is worthy of note that he definitely asserts that it is not part of his belief that the Logos brought His body with Him from heaven.¹ Again, Loofs’ conclusion seems to be arrived at on the supposition that Cyril employs the whole phrase “One, out of two natures” in connection with his doctrine of the oneness of the Lord’s Person. But, as we would contend, the second part of the phrase, “out of two natures” (ἐκ δύοῖν), is distinct from the first, “One”, and is introduced to enforce the second main Christological principle of the Alexandrine teachers, according to which Jesus Christ must be said to be “out of two natures” if His Godhead and manhood remain real in the union.² Finally, it seems reasonable to argue that when Cyril speaks of “contemplating” the natures, he does not mean that the natures are not real, and are to seem “only in thought”: as we would now try to show, his is a very different idea.

What, then, does he mean by his “One, after the union”? It will be best if, first of all, we turn to what he says in defence of his Third Anathematism, in which the phrase “after the union” occurs: “If anyone divides the hypostases after the union in respect of the one Christ. . . let him be anathema.”³ Now it is interesting to find that, both in his *Apologia adversus Theodoretum* and in his *Apologia adversus Orientes*, when he uses the phrase “after the union”, he also upholds the principle of “recognizing the difference”.⁴ Thus he says here that one recognizes that the flesh is one thing and the Godhead another, and allows that one can “contemplate” the Godhead and the man-

¹ See, for instance, *Quod unus sit Christus*, ed. Pusey, vii. pt. i. p. 346, and *de Recta Fide ad Reg.* (i), where Cyril quotes the passage from the Apollinarian writing *ad Jovianum* (which he accepts as the genuine work of Athanasius) in which an anathema is pronounced against those who say that the Lord’s body is from heaven (*ibid.* p. 163).

² See the passage from Cyril’s *Ep. i ad Succen.*, P.G. lxxvii. 233A, quoted above, p. 91.

³ *Ep. iii ad Nestor.*, P.G. lxxvii. 120C; Bindley, *op. cit.* p. 131.

⁴ For a good example of Cyril’s use of “after the union” in contexts where he would uphold the necessity of “recognizing the difference of the natures”, see *adv. Nestor.* ii, ed. Pusey, vi. p. 94. See also *Comm. in Jo. Ev.* xx. 30, 31, ed. Pusey, v. pp. 154 f.

hood which have come together in a real union,¹ and “peer into the power of the mystery with the eyes of the understanding”.² So the question arises: What, according to Cyril, does one see as one embarks on this process of contemplation? Here what he says in defence of his Third Anathematism does not help us, and we must turn, for our answer, to a passage in the oration *de Recta Fide* which is addressed to the Emperor Theodosius, and to the letters which he wrote to his supporters after the reunion of 433.

In the oration³ he condemns the dividing of Jesus Christ into a man and the divine Logos, each having an individual existence, since this is to make Emmanuel “an image with two faces” (διπρόσωπος). He then goes on to say that one should not in any way, and especially so that “two” appear, divide (the natures) after the union, and consider each by itself; one should know that, while the human mind contemplates a certain difference of the natures, it also admits (the conception of) the concurrence of both into a unity. Beside this we would set three passages from the letters to Acacius of Melitene and Succensus of Diocaesarea. Thus in his letter to the former we have:

As we accept in thought [ὡς ἐννοοῖται δεχόμενοι] those things out of which is the one and sole Son and Lord Jesus Christ, we say that the natures which have been united are two; but after the union, the cleavage into two having disappeared, we believe that the nature of the Son is one—but [one nature] made man and incarnate.⁴

And:

When the manner of the Incarnation is investigated, the human intelligence inevitably sees that the things which are brought together ineffably and without confusion are two, yet what has been united one in no wise divides, but believes that out of both there is One, both God and Son, and Lord and Christ.⁵

Similarly, in his first letter to Succensus:

So far as appertains to the understanding, and solely to the vision with the eyes of the soul, of the manner in which the

¹ *Apol. adv. Theod.* iii, ed. Pusey, vi. p. 418.

² *Apol. adv. Orient.* iii, ed. Pusey, vi. p. 286. ³ Ed. Pusey, vii. pt. i. p. 76.

⁴ *Ep. ad Acac.*, P.G. lxxvii. 192D. ⁵ P.G. lxxvii. 193C.

Only-begotten was made man, we say that the natures which have been united are two; but [we confess] one Christ and Son and Lord, the Logos of God the Father, made man and incarnate.¹

It is, then, “duality” that, according to Cyril, one can see in contemplation:² in recognizing the difference of the natures, one can see them as “two”—two natures existing side by side, that is, and if this theologian does not state that each can be contemplated as having its individual existence (so that one can contemplate two prosopa), such an idea is certainly implied. But it is also part of his theory that “after the union” there can be no such “dividing into two”, since then, the mind having been brought back from the imaginary duality to the real unity, there is seen only the one Person of the incarnate Logos—the one Person, that is, in whom the two elements have been brought together.

Accordingly we may say that Cyril’s “One, after the union” is directly connected with this idea of contemplating “two”—an idea which is itself based on the principle of “recognizing the difference of the natures”. Apparently, then, his “after the union” refers to “the thought” of the union—the thought of the συνδρομή εἰς ἓν τι, of the one Christ and Son and Lord, the incarnate Logos—to which one comes back after seeing “two” “solely with the eyes of the soul”. So it is that, if this is a correct interpretation of Cyril’s use of the phrase, it cannot be too strongly emphasized that for him “after the union” has no temporal significance.

To show that we are justified in thinking that Cyril was teaching on these lines, let us turn to Severus of Antioch, who is ever his faithful interpreter.³ First, we may notice that the

¹ P.G. lxxvii. 232D f.

² It should be understood that Cyril does not mean that the “natures” are to be seen only in contemplation, for, according to him, these are “things” and “hypostases” (see above, p. 91), and therefore real: it is simply this “duality”—this dividing so that “two” appear—which can be only in contemplation. What Leontius of Byzantium (*adv. Argum. Sev.*, P.G. lxxxvi. 2, 1932C) says of “the Fathers” is especially true of Cyril.

³ Cf. Lebon’s verdict: *Sans doute il [Sévère] fut moins novateur qu’on ne l’avait, en général, pensé et prononcé: son effort, comme nous le dirons plus loin, fut moins un progrès, qu’un retour énergique au langage et aux explications d’une époque antérieure* (so in his “preliminary remarks”, *Le Monophysisme sévérien*, pp. 236 f.).

Monophysite Patriarch not only makes use of the Cyrilline theory but also develops it. He can say that in contemplation the mind can see “two imaginary prosopa, or natures, or hypostases”—that is, one can so contemplate the two natures that each appears as an individual existence, the one beside the other; as we have said, the idea is implicit in Cyril’s “‘two’ in contemplation”. Moreover, like Cyril, Severus holds that “after the union” one sees only the one incarnate nature of the divine Logos, since now all idea of “two” must vanish as unreal.¹ But especially important for our present purpose is this teacher’s explanation of “after the union”. In his *contra Grammaticum* (written soon after he had been expelled from Antioch in the year 518) he attacks John the Grammarian who, with other supporters of the Chalcedonian orthodoxy, was upholding the formula that Jesus Christ is “in two natures after the union”. Naturally, John was intent upon defending the faith against the notion that in Christ there is but one, and that a divine, nature. But the Monophysite, who stands for the old ways of Cyril and not for the ways of those “Nestorianizers” who had betrayed the faith at Chalcedon, will not accept such an expression. As the blessed Cyril said, he asserts, so will he say: “After the union, one nature.” And he explains what this means: *Duo quidem videre solummodo in contemplatione intellectus licet, discernendo differentiam quasi in qualitate naturali; illud autem, quod post unionem, id est post cogitationem unionis, absolutum est minimeque separatur divisione dualitatis, unum ex duobus et Deum et Filium et Christum et Dominum esse, credere oportet et inconcusse admittere.*² *Post unionem, id est post cogitationem unionis*, says Severus—and, surely, this is what Cyril means, though he may not express himself so clearly.

¹ Thus, according to Eustathius Monachus, Severus says in *c. Gramm.*: μετὰ γὰρ τὴν τῆς ἐνώσεως ἔννοιαν, ἀναφανισμένης μίας φύσεως τῆς τοῦ Λόγου σαρκαγωγίας, ἢ ἐπινοίας τῶν φαντασθεισῶν δύο προσώπων ἢ φύσεων ἢ ὑποστάσεων ὑπεξίσταται; he also speaks of ἡ φαντασθείσα τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ τῶν ὑποστάσεων καὶ προσώπων διῶς (Eustathius Monachus, *Ep. de duobus naturis*, P.G. lxxxvi. 921 B, 908 A).

² *C. Gramm.* III. i, ed. J. Lebon, *Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium, Scripta Syr.*, ser. iv, tom. v, p. 214. See also *ibid.* p. 128. Similarly in the *Philalethes* (a work composed 509–11—see Lebon, *Le Monoph. sévér.* pp. 125 ff.) we have: . . . *quando autem idea unionis introducitur . . . and cum vero mente nostra sensum unionis apprehendimus* (ed. A. Sanda, . . . *Severi Philalethes*, Beirut, 1928, pp. 12, 100).

There is a further point in this connection: Why is it, we ask, that Cyril thus develops the principle of “recognizing the difference”? It is most significant that he lays stress on his theory in his letters to those of his supporters who in 433 were convinced that the Antiochenes, who had put forward their *Formulary* with its mention of “two natures”, were still Nestorians at heart; they held, too, that their leader, in accepting the *Formulary*, was to be blamed for having “tolerated and even praised the ‘two natures’”.¹ To allay their fears, and at the same time to justify his action in entering into communion with those who had opposed him at Ephesus,² Cyril, in these letters, points out, first, that one can say “two natures” without being heterodox, for the phrase points to the difference of the elements out of which the one Christ is constituted (and Nestorius himself, he says, is right in speaking of “two natures”, thus demonstrating the difference between the flesh and the divine Logos: where he errs is in “not confessing the union with us”),³ and, secondly, that it is possible to speak of “two” in respect of Christ, though only in contemplation—which way of thinking, he says, belongs to “the brethren in Antioch” who, “accepting simply, as though in imagination only”, the diversity of the natures, “in no wise divide the things which have been united”.⁴ But the theory of contemplating “two” was not welcomed by the ardent anti-Nestorians; indeed, as we gather from Theodotus of Ancyra († before 446),⁵ these urged that it should be dropped since the “Nestorians” were speaking of a “separation which is in thought”—there was no point in giving them a handle which they could use to prove their orthodoxy. So it seems that no more would have been heard of “‘two’—but only in contemplation”, had not Severus, defending the formula “One, after the union”, brought it to light some eighty or ninety years later.

¹ *Ep. ad Eulogium*, P.G. lxxvii. 225 A. We do not mean that the theory appears for the first time after the year 433—for it may be said to occur in the *Comm. in Jo. Ev.* xx. 30, 31, ed. Pusey, v. pp. 154 f., which can be dated before 429 (see Weigl, *op. cit.* pp. 127 ff.)—but that the circumstances which arose c. 433 seem to have caused Cyril to bring it into prominence.

² See below, pp. 234 ff.

³ *Ep. ad Eulog.*, P.G. lxxvii. 225 A.

⁴ *Ep. ad Acac.*, P.G. lxxvii. 193 D. See also below, p. 213 n. 2.

⁵ See the statements of Theodotus (who supported Cyril at Ephesus), P.G. lxxvii. 1356 D, 1361 C. See also below, p. 198 n. 3.

We come to our final question: What is Cyril's teaching on the relation between the Godhead and the manhood in their union in the one Person? It will have been noticed that he maintains that in the Incarnation the Logos "permitted the measures of humanity to prevail over Himself", and that both the body and soul of Christ were allowed to go through the laws proper to them.¹ It will have been noticed, too, that he insists that the properties of the flesh were preserved in the union;² and, in this connection, it should be borne in mind that Cyril is no follower of the Apollinarian error:³ he explicitly states that the Logos became τέλειος ἄνθρωπος, σῶμα λαβὼν ἔμψυχόν τε καὶ ἔνουν;⁴ Jesus Christ, he says, possesses σάρκα οὐκ ἄψυχον οὐδὲ ἄνουν, ἀλλ' ἔμψυχόν τε καὶ νοεράν.⁵ Taken together, these are workable

¹ See above, p. 86. Cf. the following from the *de Recta Fide ad Reg.* (ii): ὡς περ δὲ οἰκονομικῶς συγκεχώρηκε τῇ ἰδίᾳ σαρκὶ καὶ παθεῖν ἔσθ' ὅτι τὰ ἴδια οὕτω πάλιν συνεχώρει καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ τὰ οἰκεία παθεῖν καὶ τὸ τῆς κενώσεως μέτρον τετήρηκε πανταχοῦ, καίτοι θεὸς ὢν φύσει καὶ ὑπὲρ πάσαν τὴν κτίσιν (ed. Pusey, VII. pt. i. p. 328).

² See above, pp. 85 f.

³ It is noteworthy that Cyril, too, upholds the axiom that "that which is not taken is not saved" (*Comm. in Jo. Ev.* xii. 27, 28, ed. Pusey, IV. p. 318).

⁴ *Scholium*, xxvii, ed. Pusey, VI. p. 547.

⁵ *Apol. adv. Theod.* v, ed. Pusey, VI. p. 442 (similarly vii, *ibid.* p. 452). That Cyril is no Apollinarian is seen from the following citations from his writings: (1) In his comment on St Jn. i. 14, he writes: "For he [the Evangelist] plainly sets forth that the Only-begotten became and is called Son of man; for this and nought else does his saying that 'the Word became flesh' signify: for it is as though he said more nakedly 'The Word was made man'", and, quoting Joel ii. 28 to show what is meant here by "flesh" (Athanasius, it will be remembered, had appealed to the same text—see above, p. 42 n. 1), declares that "we do not suppose that the Prophet says that the divine Spirit should be bestowed upon human flesh soul-less and alone (for this would be by no means free from absurdity): but comprehending the whole by the part, he names man from the flesh. . . . Man, then, is a creature rational, but composite, of soul, that is, and of this perishable and earthly flesh" (*Comm. in Jo. Ev.* i. 14, ed. Pusey, III. p. 138; trans. as in *S. Cyril on S. John*, in Library of the Fathers, vol. i. p. 108); (2) In his work on the Epistles to the Corinthians, Cyril explicitly states that in the Incarnation the Only-begotten of God, the Logos, made earthly flesh His own, putting on a mortal and human body and having ψυχὴν τὴν λογικὴν (*in Ep. ii ad Cor.* iv. 8 f., ed. Pusey, v. p. 345) [we may note here that again and again does this teacher say that there was united to the Logos σὰρξ (or σῶμα) ψυχὴν ἔχουσα τὴν λογικὴν (*adv. Nestor.* ii. 6; iii. 2; iv. 3; iv. 6; v. 2, *Expl. xii Capp.* i, ii, *Apol. adv. Orient.* i, *Apol. adv. Theod.* i, ii, *Scholium*, xxvii—ed. Pusey, VI. pp. 112, 151, 188, 200, 218, 243, 246, 260, 400, 406, 547), or σὰρξ (or σῶμα) ψυχὴν ἔχουσα τὴν νοεράν (*Apol. adv. Theod.* i, iii, xi—*ibid.* pp. 396, 414, 490)]; (3) In a fragment of one of his Homilies, having quoted Heb. ii. 14, he says that the Logos took from the holy Virgin not a σῶμα ἄψυχον, "as is thought by certain of the heretics", but a σῶμα, ἔμψυχωμένον ψυχῇ λογικῇ (*Frag. Hom.* viii, ed. Pusey, v. p. 463); (4) In a fragment of his work against Diodore of Tarsus, he

principles: the Logos subjects Himself to earthly conditions, and the manhood, possessing the power of self-determination, is allowed to pursue what is proper to it. But does Cyril work them out? We have to confess that he does not.

Take, for instance, his interpretation of the crucial text St Luke ii. 52. As Bruce has shown,¹ Cyril does not hesitate to speak of a physical, but will not go so far as to posit a moral and intellectual, growth—according to Cyril the manhood of Jesus Christ is perfect in wisdom from the start. So for him, as for Athanasius, the growth in wisdom is not real but apparent. It is the gradual manifestation of a wisdom already present, for "it would have been an unwonted and strange thing if, yet being an infant, He had made a demonstration of His wisdom worthy of God"—therefore:

expanding it gradually and in proportion to the age of the body and [in this gradual manner] making it manifest to all, He might be said to increase [in wisdom] very appropriately.²

Or, the growth in wisdom is "simply a holding back or concealment of wisdom existing in perfection from the first, out of respect to the physical law",³ the growth being rather that of the habit of those who were wondering at this Person:

It was in a sense necessary that He should adapt Himself to the custom of our nature, lest He should be reckoned something strange as man by those who saw Him, while His body gradually advanced in growth He concealed Himself and appeared daily wiser to those who saw and heard Him; . . . because He was even wiser and more gracious in the esteem of beholders, He is said

emphatically denies that his teaching is that the divine Logos took the place of the ψυχὴ in Christ, "according to that very strange opinion which some hold" (c. *Diod. Tars.* Frag. θ', ed. Pusey, v. p. 496; Frag. ιβ' contains a similar rejection of the Apollinarian position—*ibid.* p. 497); (5) In his *de Recta Fide ad Reg.* (ii) he appeals to Scripture (St Jn. xii. 27, 28; St Mt. xxvi. 37, 38; St Lk. xxiii. 46) in order to show, "against those who were giving way to the opinion of Apollinarius", that the Logos became man (ἄνθρωπος), οὐκ ἄψυχόν τε καὶ ἄνουν σῶμα λαβὼν, ἔμψυχωμένον δὲ μᾶλλον ψυχῇ καὶ λογικῇ καὶ τελείως ἔχουσα (ed. Pusey, VII. pt. i. p. 327).

¹ See his *The Humiliation of Christ*, pp. 366 ff., where a collection of Cyrilline passages bearing on the subject is to be found.

² *Adv. Nestor.* iii. 4, ed. Pusey, VI. p. 166 (quoted, Bruce, *op. cit.* p. 368).

³ So Bruce (*op. cit.* p. 370) comments on the Cyrilline passage which follows.

to have grown in wisdom and grace, so that His growth is to be referred rather to the habit of those who wondered at His wisdom than to Himself.¹

Thus the principle that the manhood was allowed to go through its own laws is, in effect, surrendered: instead, we have a moral and intellectual growth which is only in appearance.

Let us take another point of view. What is his thought concerning the Lord's human trials? Cyril holds that the Temptation was necessary in order that Satan, the vanquisher of old, might be overthrown, and that we might enjoy life in the new order through sharing in Christ's victory. But that victory is not won through a moral struggle. Christ appears as the Second Adam, before whom, as the One who is perfectly sinless, Satan, seeing in Him something new, retires ashamed.² There is no expression here of the idea of a quiescent Logos;³ rather is it the other way round, for according to Cyril Christ conquered θεϊκῶς. Seemingly, he is intent upon making the redemption sure, believing that this could be only if the Logos had supreme control over the manhood. But in his desire to preserve the reality of the redemption, Cyril sacrifices the reality of the manhood: Christ may be the Representative Man, holding all men in Himself,⁴ but the redemption is not brought about through a Redeemer who is suffered to endure any real inward conflict.

That this is the case is seen when we look into his interpretation of the text "Now is my soul troubled. . ." (St John xii. 27). Cyril allows that the thought of death troubled Jesus, but, he goes on, the power of the Godhead immediately (εὐθύς) subdued the feelings that had been stirred, and at once (παραρρημα) changed fear into boldness. To his mind, the humanity was moved in two and necessary ways (οἰησόμεθα. . . κεννησθαι τὰ ἀνθρώπινα διὰ δύο τε καὶ ἀναγκαιούς τρόπους): being human it

¹ *Thesaurus*, Assert. xxviii (quoted, Bruce, *op. cit.* p. 370). Cf. also *Comm. in Jo. Ev.* i. 15, ed. Pusey, III. p. 144, for the same thought: "He is said to increase, not in that He is Logos and God, but because He, ever more greatly marvelled at, appeared more full of grace to those who saw Him, through His achievements, the disposition of those who marvelled advancing, as is more true to say, in grace, than He who is perfect as God" (trans. as in *S. Cyril on S. John*, vol. i, p. 112, in Library of the Fathers).

² Cf. *de Recta Fide ad Reg.* (ii), ed. Pusey, VII. pt. i. p. 302.

³ As is to be found in Irenaeus, *adv. Haeres.* III. xix. 3.

⁴ *Adv. Nestor.* i. 1, ed. Pusey, VI. p. 60.

was moved to seek human things, but it was thus moved, not that it might gain the mastery, but that its passions might be broken by the power of the Logos. In this way, he declares, is our healing effected.¹ To quote what he says in this connection:

The passions of the flesh were aroused, not in order that they might gain control as with us, but that, having been aroused, they might be brought to nought [καταργηθῆ] by the power of the Logos dwelling in the flesh, the nature being remodelled into that which is better.²

Such words speak for themselves. Similar thought is to be found in Cyril's interpretation of the Agony in Gethsemane. He allows that the cry "Father, if thou be willing, let this cup pass from me" was real, springing from a flesh which was weak and in fear of death—for "the divine Logos suffers the flesh to undergo things proper to it, that He may be shown to be truly man";³ and he expressly states that the θάνατος was ἀβούλητος τῷ Χριστῷ.⁴ But there is no mention here of any inward struggle; instead, the Logos, united with it, here again intervenes, "bringing back human nature, which is seen to be feeble even in Christ Himself, to a God-befitting boldness, and re-training it to powerful purpose".⁵ How, then, can Christ be in all points tempted like as we are if, as soon as temptation arises, the Logos steps in and uses His power to quash the human impulse? The Representative Man He certainly is, but He is hardly One whose manhood can be said to be individual if its faculty of self-determination is never allowed free play.

Yet one can exaggerate the extent of this weakness which Cyril shares with all the Alexandrine teachers, and it is well that we should see it as a flaw, though by no means a major flaw, in

¹ *Comm. in Jo. Ev.* xii. 27, 28, ed. Pusey, IV. pp. 315 ff.

² *Ibid.*, ed. Pusey, IV. p. 320.

³ *Comm. in Jo. Ev.* vi. 38, 39, ed. Pusey, III. p. 487.

⁴ *Ibid.*, ed. Pusey, IV. p. 488.

⁵ *Ibid.*, ed. Pusey, IV. p. 487. We may also note Cyril's explanation of the cry "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" which Severus of Antioch quotes as coming from the Alexandrine's *Commentary on St Matthew*. Here Cyril says that one must not think that Christ spoke these words as if in need of help. The cry was uttered by one who was free from all sin on behalf of a humanity which, on account of the original transgression, could not freely appeal to God (*c. Gramm.* III. i. 6, ed. Lebon, pp. 56 f.). Compare Gregory of Nazianzus' interpretation of St Mt. xxvii. 46 (above, p. 79).

a doctrinal structure for which, in its entirety, we can, surely, have nothing but praise. The failing is understandable. Cyril, and those before him, had been brought up in the Platonic tradition, and were inclined to emphasize the abstract rather than the concrete. As we are now to see, the theologians of another school of thought succeed where these fail just because, theirs being the Aristotelian outlook, they lay stress on the concrete, and are particularly interested in man as a free agent.

CHAPTER II

ANTIOCHENE CHRISTOLOGY

I. THE SOTERIOLOGICAL TEACHING OF THE ANTIOCHENE THEOLOGIANS

FOUNDED by the Seleucid kings, and the third city of the Roman Empire, Antioch was a centre of Greek culture, famed, as Cicero tells us,¹ for letters and the arts. But its geographical position caused it also to be a centre of Semitic life and thought: it was the capital of Syria, and there—in the plain of the Antioch Lake—trade routes from the West met the equally ancient roads leading to the Euphrates and the Tigris. So it is that throughout the period in the history of the Christian Church with which we are here concerned, there were at Antioch upholders of two different doctrinal traditions—the one Greek, the other Syrian. In the second half of the third century Malchion was head of “the sophist school of Grecian learning”,² and at the beginning of the following century there flourished the school of Lucian—a school which provided Antioch with some of its bishops; later (about the year 373) Apollinarius himself was lecturing there, and his coming must have done much towards furthering the cause of the Alexandrine Christology in Syria.³ Moreover, those brought up in the Greek tradition would readily welcome the Apollinarian writings; so it is not surprising that the Alexandrine doctrine, as it was being expounded by Cyril, found a home for itself especially in the monasteries of Palestine, Syria and Mesopotamia. But the Syrian tradition also had its exponents. While Malchion and the Lucianists were upholding the teaching which had its fount at Alexandria, Paul of Samosata and Eustathius of Antioch were,

¹ *Pro Archia*, 3.

² Eusebius, *H.E.* vii. 29.

³ We mean that through the coming of the Laodicene the principle of the “one Person” would be more definitely upheld in Syria. At the same time his own doctrine concerning Christ’s manhood had its supporters: Vitalis presided over an Apollinarian congregation at Antioch (see Raven, *Apollinarianism*, pp. 139 ff.), and Apollinarius’ disciple Timothy was, till he was condemned (see above, p. 53 n. 2), Bishop of Berytus.

on their side, upholding the principles of the Syrian teaching, and after them, building upon the foundation which these had already laid, there came Flavian and Diodore, the earlier members of a school which was soon to rise to the height of its glory. To Flavian, and his friend Carterius, Chrysostom owed part of his early education, and these could congratulate themselves upon having had as their pupil the most distinguished among the Antiochenes—the one who could offer a scheme of Christian doctrine established on this traditional thought—Theodore of Mopsuestia. To Theodore those who came after him were greatly indebted; neither did they forget the extent of that debt, for they never referred to him without reverence and admiration. Andrew of Samosata, Nestorius, and Theodoret of Cyrus—these, learning from “The Interpreter”, developed his teaching, and exhibited the Antiochene Christology in what was destined to be its final form.

It is with the teaching of these theologians, the representatives of the Syrian tradition in the early history of Christian dogma, that we are now to deal. Later on we shall enquire into the conflict between the two schools of thought—a conflict which, as we shall see, came to an end only when the Alexandrines had effected the complete break-up of the school of Antioch. Here our purpose is to show that the Antiochene theologians, though they approach the Christological problem from another angle and, as must be confessed, use expressions which cannot be deemed satisfactory, are in reality at one with their opponents in maintaining the same root principles—a conclusion, which, if it is right, means that the downfall of the Antiochene school is to be regarded as one of the tragedies in the history of the Early Church.

First of all, let us ask what was the outlook of these teachers. As we have just said, Antioch itself was a centre of Greek culture. Hence it does not come as a surprise to find that when the celebrated rhetorician Libanius († 395) settled there, not only the Cappadocians, Basil and Gregory of Nazianzus,¹ and Apollinarius of Laodicea (who could claim the Sophist’s friendship)² took advantage of his presence, but also those who were

¹ Socrates, *H.E.* iv. 26; Sozomen, *H.E.* vi. 17.

² See Raven, *op. cit.* p. 128.

being brought up in a different school of thought; for to him there came John Chrysostom, who might have taken his place “had not the Christians stolen him away”,¹ and, as is almost certain, the great Theodore himself.² But these teachers, it is clear, came under an influence much wider than that which was to be found in Antioch itself. The point is that, if we are to appreciate their outlook, we must take into account the fact that during the first five centuries of the Christian era there flourished in Northern Syria, and beyond to the East, a type of Greek culture which possessed a strong Aristotelian bias—and there are clear indications of its effect on Christian thought in this region. Malchion the Sophist, it will be remembered, in seeking to express his doctrine concerning the Lord’s “Person”, had shown a preference for the term “ousia” understood in the sense of Aristotle’s “primary ousia”; and may not the determination of the members of the Lucianic school to bring everything to the touchstone of reason be taken as indicative of this same influence? But especially among the upholders of the Syrian doctrinal tradition do we find that which is altogether consistent with a Greek culture on Aristotelian lines. Their rationalism, seen particularly in their mode of Scriptural exegesis, their ethical interest, and, above all, their interest in man as a free agent³—in these ways is their standpoint akin to that of the Peripatetics and, at the same time, different from that of the theologians of Alexandria, whose place is in the Platonic tradition. For these are not idealists, but realists, taking as their basis the historical and empirical; to these the particular rather than the general makes its appeal; theirs is not so much the metaphysical as the ethical point of view. So it is that we can say that if the Church has her Christian Platonists, she has also her Christian Aristotelians.

With this as our background, then, let us begin, as we began our study of the Christology of the Alexandrine teachers, with

¹ So Libanius himself, according to Soz. *H.E.* viii. 2.

² See Raven, *op. cit.* p. 275.

³ An outstanding example of the interest of the Antiochenes in man, both in regard to what he is and in regard to that of which he is capable, is to be found in the *de Natura Hominis* of Nemesius, who, as is generally agreed, was Bishop of Emesa in Phoenicia at the beginning of the fifth century. The date is likely, since, in this work, while he mentions Eunomius and Apollinarius, no reference is made either to Nestorius or to Eutyches. See below, pp. 112 n. 2, 113 nn. 2, 7.

an enquiry into the fundamental ideas of the Antiochenes—their ideas, that is, concerning God and man and the relations between them. Now it has to be granted that there are passages in their writings which at first sight seem to show that to these teachers God and man are essentially “the one” and “the other”. Thus, to offer one or two examples, in the recently discovered Syriac version of the *ad Baptizandos*, or the *de Interpretatione Symboli trecentorum decem et octo sanctorum Patrum*, of Theodore of Mopsuestia¹—a work which, as the title indicates, contains the instruction on the Creed of Nicaea which the Bishop was accustomed to give to candidates for Baptism—we find that the author, refuting the Arian doctrine of the creaturehood of the Son, asks:

What possible relation can exist between One who is eternal and another who at one time was non-existent and came into existence later? It is well known that the One who is eternal, and the one whose existence came into being later, are separated from each other, and the gulf between them unbridgeable. The One who is from the beginning has no limits, while the one whose existence has a beginning, his very existence is limited. . . . It is not possible to limit and define the chasm that exists between the One who is from eternity and the one who began to exist at a time when he was not. What possible resemblance and relation can exist between two beings so widely separated from each other?²

Similar statements are to be found elsewhere in this work. Again, Chrysostom, in his *On the Statues*, can say:

So great is the interval from man to God as no language can at all express. . . . If men are not of the same ousia as God, and indeed they are not, still they have been called His image, and it were fitting that they should receive honour on account of this appellation;³

and in his *Homilies on St John*:

What hath God in common with man? Why dost thou mix that which cannot be mixed? Why confound things which are separate, and why bring low what is above?⁴

¹ The work was discovered by A. Mingana, and edited by him under the title of “The Commentary of Theodore of Mopsuestia on the Nicene Creed” in *Woodbrooke Studies*, vol. v. [In quotations from this work we adopt Mingana’s translation.]

² Mingana, *op. cit.* pp. 45 f. Cf. also *ibid.* pp. 19 f., 25 f.

³ *Hom.* iii. 19.

⁴ *Hom.* iii. 2.

Or, to turn to Nestorius: in *The Bazaar of Heracleides*¹ he declares that “the Maker is in every way other than that which is made”,² and—referring to man’s restoration through Christ—that though the man who receives Jesus Christ is made His kin by adoption, he does not possess the divine nature.³ Similarly in his *Dialogues*, Theodoret affirms that the difference between God and man is “infinite”—it is as wide as, nay, it is much wider than, that which divides a gnat from the whole of creation;⁴ “He is God, and we are men,” says this teacher, “and the difference between God and man is incalculable.”⁵

As we say, such statements can easily lead us to suppose that basic to the doctrinal system of the Antiochenes is the thought that God and man are eternal opposites—God immutable, impassible, uncreated, and eternal, and man mutable, passible, created, and temporal; and, if these are their premisses, it naturally follows that it is impossible for them to uphold the doctrine of the Incarnation. But, as it seems to us, we must approach the picture from a different angle if we would understand their doctrine aright. As we shall see, these teachers, in order to resist the idea of “confusion”, are determined to maintain the difference of the two natures which are brought together in Jesus Christ, and, while it must be confessed that at times they seem to be taking as their foundation a dualistic conception of God and man, it should be remembered that they have this purpose in view when they enforce the contrast between the nature of God and the nature of man. As their teaching on the divine indwelling shows, for them God is not so far removed from man that He cannot come into contact with him. Rather, as Theodore says in a well-known passage,⁶ dwelling in all things “according to ousia”, for the divine nature cannot be limited,

¹ This and all further quotations from the *Bazaar* are taken from the English translation by G. R. Driver and L. Hodgson, the references being according to the pagination of this translation.

² *Bazaar*, p. 27.

³ *Ibid.* p. 49.

⁴ *Dial.* i, ed. J. L. Schulze, *B. Theodoret Opera Omnia*, iv. pt. i. p. 12.

⁵ ὁ μὲν γὰρ θεός, οἱ δὲ, ἄνθρωποι· πλείστον δὲ ὄσον θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπων τὸ μέσον (*Dial.* iii, Schulze, iv. pt. i. p. 211).

⁶ *De Incarn.* vii, Swete, *Theodore of Mopsuestia on the Minor Epistles of S. Paul*, ii. pp. 293 f. It may be noted that the same distinction between indwelling “according to ousia” and indwelling “according to good pleasure” is to be found in Nestorius (*Bazaar*, p. 56) and Theodoret (*Comm. in 1 Cor.* xv. 28, ed. Schulze, iii. pt. i. p. 274).

and "according to activity", for God is omnipresent in His operations, He dwells in "those who are eager to cling to Him"—apostles, and righteous men, and all who fear Him—"according to good pleasure", bestowing upon them "the best and highest will of God". Surely, underlying all this is the conception of an ethical God who, working by persuasion and not by force, desires that His creation shall be at one with Him, not only in purpose and will, but also in spirit? Certainly here Theodore's is the moral interest, but this is not to say that he is unmindful of man's capacity for communion with his God. Man, he teaches his catechumens, has been redeemed through Jesus Christ, with the consequence that there is now laid up for him the crown of righteousness; but, while declaring that this redemption "will take place in reality in the next world, . . . when we shall contemplate only Christ, of whose Kingdom we shall partake", he also tells them that as, in union with Him, they love "as much as possible a heavenly life, spurning visible things and aspiring after future things", they are already partakers of that glory.¹ The Antiochenes, in their interest in ethics, may lay great stress on the perfection which lies in perfect obedience to the will of God, but, at the same time, they would agree that man will do justly, and love mercy, as he walks humbly with his God. Moreover, in any attempt to appreciate their underlying principles, this consideration should be borne in mind: they emphatically reject the notion that in Jesus Christ an ordinary man has been conjoined with the Logos in a moral relationship—a position which would have been theirs had they started from a dualistic conception of God and man. Rather, as we shall try to show, fundamental to their Christology is the doctrine that in Jesus Christ the Logos, through uniting to Himself real manhood, has Himself become man—a position which implies the complete denial of the conception that God and man are essentially "other".

Now let us consider their doctrine concerning man—as he was, as he is, and as, through Christ, he can be.

Holding that Adam possessed a body and an immortal soul²

¹ *Ad Bapt.*, Mingana, *op. cit.* pp. 19 f.

² Cf. Nemesius' definition of man: he consists of an understanding soul and a body (ἐκ ψυχῆς νοερῆς καὶ σώματος), though there are those (including Apollinarius) who think that he is composed of three elements; "God

—a body liable to death in case of sin,¹ and a soul capable of choosing either the good or the evil²—these theologians teach that before his soul "accepted the advice of error",³ our first parent continued in obedience to the divine will,⁴ and that on this account he did not see death, and his soul remained immutable.⁵ But, they would say, the consequence of Adam's disobedience went much deeper than this. At the beginning, harmony reigned between heaven and earth. Adam was made in the image of God: that is, he had the "likeness" of God. All things were put in subjection under his feet, and, with the heavenly powers at his side to assist him, his was the work of world-government,⁶ there being no one superior to him on earth just as there is no one superior to God in heaven.⁷ He was, then,

brought forth man, the truly reasonable creature" (τὸ ἀληθῶς λογικὸν ζῷον) [*de Nat. Hom.* 1, P.G. xl. 504A, 512A]. For an excellent illustration of the Antiochene teaching on the immortality of the soul, see Theodore, *ad Bapt.*, Mingana, *op. cit.* pp. 58 f.

¹ So Theodoret can say: "Sin is the mother of death and the devil its father" (*Dial.* iii, ed. Schulze, iv. pt. i. p. 197).

² Cf. the teaching of Nemesius on human freedom: "If man inclines to bodily things, and sets his affections thereon, he is choosing the life of creatures void of reason . . . and on this account will be called an earthly man, to whom will apply the words 'Earth thou art, and unto earth shalt thou return.' . . . But if he inclines to what is reasonable, and chooses to follow that blessed and divine life which befits him, then will he be called a heavenly man" (*de Nat. Hom.* 1, P.G. xl. 512C f.).

³ Thus Theodore, as he insists that sin proceeds from the evil will (*ad Bapt.*, Mingana, *op. cit.* p. 57).

⁴ Cf. the explicit statement of Nestorius: "As the image of God he [Adam] ought to have kept himself for God without spot and blemish, and that by willing that which God wills, since he had the prosopon of God. For to have the prosopon of God is to will what God wills, whose prosopon he has [? had]" (*Bazaar*, p. 59; see also the statement set out below, p. 114 n. 3).

⁵ According to the Antiochenes, mortality and mutability came as a direct result of sin. See the quotations from Theodore set out below, p. 116 n. 5.

⁶ See esp. Theodore, *in Eph. i. 10, ii. 2, in Col. i. 16*; Swete, *op. cit.* 1. pp. 129 f., 143, 267 ff.

⁷ Thus Chrysostom: "What is the sense of this 'after our image and after our likeness'? The image of government is that which is meant; and as there is no one in heaven superior to God, so let there be none upon earth superior to man" (*On the Statues, Hom.* vii. 3; see also *in Col., Hom.* v). Similarly Theodoret says that it is solely to the idea of government that "the image of God" refers; Diodore of Tarsus, as quoted by Theodoret, has the same expression (*in 1 Cor. xi. 3*, ed. Schulze, iii. pt. i. p. 234; *Quaest. in Gen.* i, ed. Schulze, i. pt. i. p. 29). Similarly Nestorius: *Bazaar*, p. 61, where he quotes Ps. viii. 6 to illustrate the point. Cf. also Nemesius' statement that man is the governor of creation, and that it is his duty to use all things as convenience and necessity require, and not to be a tyrant towards the governed (*de Nat. Hom.* 1, P.G. xl. 525C). We would quote, too, his words of eulogy on

to use Dorner's expression, "a cosmical God", "an *alter Deus*".¹ Indeed we can say more concerning the use which these teachers make of this idea of "likeness". It seems clear that, at any rate for Nestorius, Adam was so created that his likeness was the likeness of God, since, at the first, God being in him, he willed that which God willed;² neither, according to this Antiochene, was God in any other in the same manner till "the Man whom the Logos assumed" came into being.³

But Adam fell. What, then, is the doctrine of the Antiochenes concerning the consequences of his transgression? Because of this, they say, the harmony that formerly existed between heaven and earth was dissolved, the heavenly powers departed, and creation, which once found its unity in man as its head, henceforward groaned and travailed with him in pain.⁴ Moreover, the death to which he was always liable—the death, that is, which threatened him as the outcome of wrongdoing⁵—now became a *fait accompli*. But farther than this they hesitate to go: they find it difficult to understand why the whole of mankind should suffer on account of one man's transgression.⁶ Rather is all stress laid on the thought of the responsibility of the individual for his

man: "Who does not rightly admire the distinction of this living creature who brings together in himself what is mortal and what is immortal, and combines in one what has reason and what is without reason? He bears in his nature the image of all creatures, and on this account is he properly called 'a little world' (μικρὸς κόσμος); . . . he the creature for whom God became man" (*P.G.* xl. 532 c f.).

¹ *Op. cit.* II. i. p. 43.

² For Nestorius the "likeness" is the "prosonon" (see below, p. 134 n. 2) and "to have the prosonon of God is to will what God wills" (see below, p. 148).

³ Thus Nestorius can say: "He [the Logos] has received His [the Man's] prosonon as something created, in such wise as not originally to be man, but at the same time Man-God by the incarnation of God, who in Him is what God was in the first man" (*Bazaar*, p. 60). See also below, pp. 133 f.

⁴ Cf. Theodore, in *Eph. i.* 13, 14; Swete, *op. cit.* i. pp. 133 f.

⁵ Thus Theodore can say: *Subintroducta est mors peccantibus nobis*; and: *Propter peccatum facti sumus mortales* (in *Eph. i.* 10, in *Col. i.* 16; Swete, *op. cit.* i. pp. 129, 268). But the Bishop does not mean that man can never become immortal. Cf. the following statement of his: *Dominus Deus mortales quidem nos secundum praesentem vitam instituit: resuscitans vero, iterum immortales nos facere promisit et faciet*; and (Theodore's comment on Gen. ii. 17): *Non ait "mortales eritis", sed "morte moriemini"* (in *Gal. ii.* 15, 16, and *de Pecc. Orig.* iv, Frag. 1; Swete, *op. cit.* i. pp. 25 f., II. p. 336). Noteworthy, too, in this connection is the statement of Nemesius that man is neither wholly mortal nor wholly immortal (*de Nat. Hom.* I, *P.G.* xl. 513 B).

⁶ See, for instance, Chrysostom, *Comm. in Rom.* v. 12 ff.

actions and their outcome.¹ Sin, they maintain, has its origin in the will of the soul,² and man is called upon to resist the evil will. So, reviewing the days "before grace came", they take note of those who, God helping them,³ endured the conflict and were steadfast in their obedience to the divine will: such were Abel, Enoch, Noah, Melchizedek, the Patriarchs, and those who were illustrious in keeping the Law.⁴ They see, too, those under the new dispensation who, ever mindful of the divine commands, have sought to live the life of righteousness before God: such were the Apostles, prophets, and martyrs. In these, as in all who set themselves to obey the divine will, they declare, the God who is omnipresent "according to being", and "according to activity", dwells "according to good pleasure, bestowing upon them "the best and highest will of God";⁵ moreover, these will have their reward at the Lord's coming, when they will be endowed with immortality of body and immutability of soul. On the other hand, they see that there were those who, in former days, their wills set upon evil-choosing, followed a life contrary

¹ Thus Theodore combats the notion that φύσει καὶ οὐ γνώμῃ πταίειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. His use of such texts as Rom. ii. 6, Gal. vi. 5, and Rom. xiv. 10 in this connection is particularly noteworthy (*de Pecc. Orig.* iii, Frag. 3; Swete, *op. cit.* II. p. 334).

² So Theodore, *ad Bapt.*, ed. Mingana, p. 56. Similarly Theodoret: "Sin is the product of evil-choosing"—it does not arise naturally, but through man's freedom of choice (see his comments on Ps. l. 7 and Ezek. iii. 6, ed. Schulze, I. pt. ii. p. 936, II. pt. ii. p. 701). We may also note that this teacher affirms that "the old man" denotes the evil will (cf. *Comm. in Rom.* vi. 6, ed. Schulze, III. pt. i. p. 62), and that he takes the οἱ πολλοὶ of Rom. v. 19 in the sense of "many" (*ibid.* p. 59).

³ It should be understood that the Antiochenes insist that man cannot obey God's will without the *gratia co-operans*. Thus Theodore, commenting on Phil. ii. 13, says that in order to think and to do what is pleasing to God, it is necessary that He should co-operate with us (Swete, *op. cit.* I. p. 225). So also Chrysostom: "We learn a great doctrine—man's willingness is not sufficient unless he receives succour from above, and we gain nothing by the succour unless there be willingness" (in *St Mt.* xxvi. 34, 35, *Hom.* lxxxii. 4). Similarly Theodoret: "The will of itself, deprived of grace, can effect nothing good; there is need both of man's desires and of divine succour" (in *Phil. ii.* 29 f., ed. Schulze, III. pt. i. p. 452). Seemingly, according to these teachers, the *gratia praeveniens* is itself conditioned by the human will. Cf. Chrysostom: "Even when He called Paul from above by a voice, He manifested both His own grace and Paul's obedience" (in *St Mt.* ii. 3, *Hom.* vi. 5).

⁴ So Theodoret, in *Rom.* v. 19, ed. Schulze, III. pt. i. p. 59. Similarly Theodore, *de Pecc. Orig.* iii, Frag. 3; Swete, *op. cit.* p. 334.

⁵ See esp. Theodore's explicit statement concerning the divine indwelling (*de Incarn.* vii; Swete, *op. cit.* pp. 293 ff.).

to the Law, and that there are those now who deliberately spurn the Lord's Anointed. All these must expect the punishment they deserve. Can one lay blame on the reins when the horses, having thrown out the riders, dash down precipices? Not the reins but the charioteer himself must receive the blame.¹ So, at the Day of Judgment, will these be condemned to eternal perdition.² According to the teachers of this school, then, the state in which man now finds himself, besides being one of mortality, is also one of mutability—and, being such, it is a state in which sin can abound the more.³ It is the wicked will, they affirm,⁴ which is the root of the present mischief—let this be removed, and in his perfect obedience man will enjoy immortality and immutability; for then, sin abolished, its consequences will be abolished with it.⁵

So then, we ask: If the Antiochenes take this view of man as he was and as he is, what are their ideas concerning his redemption? It is often said that these teachers are first and foremost anthropologists, having very little interest in soteriology. Dorner, for instance, at the beginning of his chapter on "The Christology of the Antiochene School" in his monumental work, *The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ*, declares that "this school . . . devoted itself with all its weight, and with whatever creative power it

¹ So Chrysostom, in *I Cor. vi. 14*, *Hom. xvii. 5*.

² Cf. Theodore, in *Eph. ii. 5*; in *2 Thess. i. 9* (Swete, *op. cit.* I. p. 145, II. p. 45).

³ Thus Theodore says that mutability ministers to human passions (cf. in *Gal. ii. 15, 16*; in *Eph. ii. 10*; Swete, *op. cit.* I. pp. 27, 147), and that, as death is the consequence of sin, so is sin the consequence of death (cf. in *Eph. iv. 22*, *ibid.* p. 173).

⁴ Cf. Theodoret, *Dem. per Syllog. ii. 5*, ed. Schulze, IV. pt. I. pp. 269 f.—"Sin is not of the nature, but of the evil will" (τῆς κακῆς προαιρέσεως).

⁵ It is clear that according to the Antiochenes death and mutability are the outcome of sin. Cf. the following from Theodore's *ad Bapt.*, Mingana, *op. cit.* pp. 57 f.—"The enemy of the soul had to be removed first, and then that of the body, because if death is from sin, and the same death is the corruption of the body, sin would have first to be abolished, and the abolition of death would follow by itself. It would be possible to save the body from death and corruption if we first made the soul immutable, and delivered it from the passions of sin, so that by acquiring immutability we would also obtain deliverance from sin. The abolition of death would then be effected by the abolition of sin, and after the abolition of death our body would remain without dissolution and corruption"; and: "When sin is abolished from every place, and has no more entry into the soul which has become immutable, every kind of condemnation will rightly be abolished, and death also will perish."

could boast, to anthropology—indeed, in general to the historical and empirical aspects of theological enquiries".¹ Again, Harnack, who takes the view that it cannot be thought that the Christology of the Antiochenes is "soteriologically determined", says that these teachers "rarely took the doctrine of redemption and perfection as the starting-point of their arguments, or, when they did, conceived of it in such a way that the question is not of restitution, but of the still defective perfection of the human race, a question of the new second *katastasis*".² Accordingly, it has been said, the representatives of this school do not base the need of the Incarnation on the Fall, but, contrasting the present with the future, see in Jesus Christ the One who comes to inaugurate a new stage (*katastasis*) in man's history, when the present order, in which he is subject to mortality and mutability, will give place to the order of perfection (τελείωσις), in which, as he of his own free will is in union with Jesus Christ, he will be established in immortality and immutability.³

But, as it seems to us, there are good grounds for saying that the Antiochenes are indeed interested in soteriology, even if, as must be confessed, their thought is not fully developed. As we have said, these are humanists, and, consequently, we find that one of their fundamental ideas is that if man is to be redeemed, there must come into the world a man who in his perfect obedience to the will of God will be the Man, the Second Adam, the firstfruits of a renewed humanity and a renewed creation. But—and one cannot lay too much stress on this point—their thought is essentially theo-centric: they see that only through an act on the part of God Himself can this Second Adam be brought into existence; for, as they readily acknowledge, it is impossible for man by himself to save himself.⁴ And, they declare, this act of divine intervention has verily taken place. Starting from St Paul's words in Philippians ii. 5 ff.—the text which, it should be noted, occupies the place in their system that St John i. 14 occupies in that of the Alexandrine teachers—they say that in Jesus Christ the Logos has emptied Himself and assumed the

¹ II. i. p. 25.

² *History of Dogma*, IV. pp. 166, 169.

³ Cf. Srawley, art. "Antiochene Theology", *E.R.E.* I. pp. 509 f.

⁴ See, for instance, Nestorius' statement to this effect, *Bazaar*, pp. 212 f. (quoted below, pp. 128 f.).

.. Aristotle
... Philo

form of a servant (and, as we shall try to explain, by this they mean that the Logos has united to Himself real manhood and thus become man) in order to effect man's renewal, and, through his renewal, that of the whole of creation—man's renewal being, in fact, nothing less than his restoration to that state of sinlessness which was his before Adam fell. But while the thought of the condescension of the Divine has a fundamental place in their system, they have also clearly marked ideas concerning "the form of a servant" or, to use another term of theirs, "the Man". The Man whom the Logos took to Himself, they insist, is altogether unique among men. He is unique because He alone has gone through human trials and sufferings without flinching in His obedience to the divine will—and such implicit obedience, they maintain, was essential if He was to be the Second Adam through whom the restoration of man and of the cosmos was to be brought about.

We would consider these two root ideas in more detail. That the later Antiochenes would say that the purpose of the Incarnation was to effect man's redemption will become clear as we proceed. Here we must ask whether any traces of this conception are to be found in the teaching of their predecessors.

It may be thought that we are going too far in suggesting that Paul of Samosata may have established his Christology on a soteriological basis, but, even if we cannot speak with any certainty, it would seem that this possibility should be taken into account. The view is often taken that the Samosatene is to be regarded as a Dynamic Monarchian, who, the successor of the Ebionites, of Theodotus of Byzantium and Theodotus "the Banker", of Artemon and the rest of the Adoptianists, was teaching that Jesus Christ was no more than an ordinary man upon whom the Power of God descended at His Baptism, and who, on account of a holy life, was at last rewarded with a seat at God's right hand. But, as we shall see, it appears unfair to the man to accuse him of psilanthropism,¹ and, in regard to his doctrine of the Logos, the evidence would seem such that we cannot comfortably dismiss him as a unitarian. After all, though he may make no clear distinction between the terms "Logos" and "Wisdom", Paul must have been accustomed to the use of

¹ See below, pp. 130 ff.

the baptismal formulae and the doxologies which had long been in vogue in the Church,¹ and one of his predecessors at Antioch, Theophilus (c. 180), had already spoken of a "Triad";² besides, it seems that there is a sense in which he could refer to the "existence" of the Logos. So it is that, as it seems to us, we are nearer the mark if, following the investigations of Loofs in his important work, *Paulus von Samosata*, we allow that there are good grounds for concluding that the teaching of this early Antiochene is akin to that of Marcellus of Ancyra. Paul's is not, of course, the philosophical conception of the Bishop of Ancyra, but it seems reasonable to argue that he, too, would say that the Logos was in God "potentially" (δυνάμει), and that with the beginnings of the self-communication of the Monad, who is one prosopon, this Logos came forth as an activity, an ἐνέργεια δραστηκή, of the Divine to be the author of creation, and—later, and for the purpose of redeeming mankind—to dwell in a complete manhood, and thus, as "the Son", to become in some sense personal.

Paul's starting-point is the truth that God is one; yet, though denounced as a Jew, he was a professed Christian, seeking also, as it seems, to do justice to the Christian truth that Jesus of Nazareth is indeed God among men. Like that of his successors in the Syrian school, his is an outlook which is ethical rather than metaphysical. His Logos is not the Logos of philosophy: he does not, like his opponents, start from the conception of a Second God beside the Father. Rather, for him—and in this way he carries forward the teaching of Theophilus³—the Logos is the λόγος ἐνεργής,⁴ "immanent" in God, as reason is in man,⁵

¹ True that Paul was accused of stopping "hymns to our Lord Jesus Christ"—but these were "modern productions of modern men" (Eusebius, *H.E.* vii. 30).

² *Ad Autol.* ii. 15; the three days before the creation of the lights—Theophilus is explaining Gen. i—"are types of the Triad, God and His Logos and His Wisdom".

³ As is well known, only eighty years before Theophilus had spoken of the "immanent" and "projected" Logos (*ad Autol.* ii. 10, 22).

⁴ So *c. Apoll.* ii. 3; Loofs, *Paulus von Samosata*, p. 338, Frag. 2, and pp. 248 ff.

⁵ According to Epiphanius (*Haeres.* 65. 1; quoted by Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 162), Paul "said that 'God [the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are] is one God, and that His Logos [and His Spirit were] was always in God, just as his own reason is in the heart of a man'". [We follow Lawlor, *J.T.S.* xix. No. 73, p. 35 in placing in square brackets what are "probably glosses".] Similarly *Haeres.* 65. 6; quoted by Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 162 n. 2.

and "put forth" with the beginnings of the divine activity.¹ If the evidence which is to be found in the memorandum drawn up by the Homoiousians, George of Laodicea and Basil of Ancyra, is trustworthy, Paul, who is here coupled with Marcellus, understood "Logos" as a spoken word and utterance from the mouth of God;² according to the writer of the *de Sectis*, a sixth-century work, the term was used by him as signifying "an order or a command" proceeding from God.³ Hence the Samosatene cannot speak of a Logos who is personal and eternal: for him the Logos is not ἀυθπρόστωτος,⁴ and "there is no one but God".⁵ Epiphanius tells us that his followers were declaring that God with the Logos is one prosopon, as man and his logos are one,⁶ and there seems to be no doubt that the Bishop took this view, holding that the Logos was ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ θεῷ.⁷ We know that the Synod which condemned him condemned also the use of the term "homoousios", and it appears that Hilary's statement⁸ concerning the way in which he was interpreting the word explains both why its use was forbidden, and why there was on the part of orthodox churchmen such a dislike of it both at and after the Nicene Council. Paul, it seems likely, taking "ousia" in the sense of "person", could say that the Logos is "homoousios" with God, meaning thereby that God is "uni-personal".⁹

¹ See Loofs, *op. cit.* pp. 207 ff.

² Epiphanius, *Haeres.* 73. 12; quoted by Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 65.

³ *P.G.* lxxxvi. 1213D; quoted by Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 85.

⁴ So the author of *de Sectis* (see previous note).

⁵ Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 334, Frag. 1, where Paul is distinguishing between the Logos and "Him from David": "And this [Man] the Virgin bore by the Holy Spirit, but Him [the Logos] God begat without a Virgin and without any one, there being no one but God" (οὐδενὸς ἄντος πλὴν τοῦ θεοῦ).

⁶ *Haeres.* 65; quoted by Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 338, Frag. 2.

⁷ So Epiphanius reports (*Haeres.* 65). In this connection we may note that, according to this witness, Paul appealed to St Jn. xiv. 10 and Deut. vi. 4 as testimonies in support of his view of the unity of God; apparently, he also used Rom. ix. 5 (see *c. Apoll.* ii. 3, *P.G.* xxvi. 1136).

⁸ Hilary, *de Synodis* 81, says that Paul adopted "homoousios" in order to teach that "God is sole and at once Father and Son to Himself", and that, contrary to the Church's teaching, he denied to the three Persons each its own individuality (*negata personarum proprietate*).

⁹ On the rejection of "homoousios" by Paul's opponents, see Loofs, *op. cit.* pp. 147 ff., and Raven, *op. cit.* pp. 63 f. In his recent work, *God in Patristic Thought* (pp. 201 ff.), Prestige, favouring the explanation of Athanasius (*de Synodis*, 45) and Basil (*Ep.* lii), who say that the term was rejected because Paul in his sophistical reasoning was objecting to it on the ground that it could be taken in a material sense, holds that "homoousios" always meant

Yet, as we have said, it seems that the Samosatene can speak of the "existence" of the Logos when active. According to him, the Logos went forth and was joined to "Him from David", and "thus it was that the Logos came into existence" (καὶ οὕτως ὑπέστη ὁ λόγος).¹ Wisdom, he says, had dwelt in the prophets, and especially in Moses, and in many lords, but in this case the divine indwelling was such that "He who [descended] from David, who was anointed, was not an alien [ἄλλοτριος] to Wisdom, and that Wisdom should not so dwell in (any) other".² Clearly, what Paul means is that the conjunction was such that separability became impossible: it was a conjunction, which, established with the creation of the Man in the Virgin's womb,³ was permanent.⁴ So he can say that ὁ ἐκ Μαρίας συναφθεις τῇ σοφίᾳ is εἰς⁵—and, he holds, this Person, in being before the ages τῷ προορισμῷ but now τῇ ὑπάρξει,⁶ is "Jesus Christ" and "Son". That he would thus distinguish between the "Logos" and the "Son" is clear from his own statements: he will not divide Him before the ages from Him at the end of days, for he fears to speak of "two Sons" and "two Christs";⁷ one is Jesus Christ, he affirms, and another the Logos;⁸ and, he argues, if Jesus Christ is Son, and Wisdom is Son, two Sons exist, Wisdom and Jesus Christ.⁹ It is in this way, as it seems, that Paul would express the truth of the Son's manifestation: "God was from Nazareth"¹⁰ he is reported to have said.

"of the same stuff". But we have not here the forceful explanation of the reason for the opposition to the setting-up of the term at Nicaea that comes with Hilary's statement.

¹ Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 334, Frag. 1.

² *Ibid.* p. 331, Frag. 6.

³ See below, p. 131.

⁴ As Loofs says, according to Paul, "the Man conjoined with Wisdom" was "one"; consequently there could be no ἀλλοτριούσθαι of Wisdom and the Man. See also the quotation from Diodore which Loofs introduces here (*op. cit.* p. 253).

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 337, Frag. 8. It seems clear, then, that Paul's is not the position ascribed to him by Malchion: *Et hoc etiam dicis, quod sapientia habitaret in eo sicut habitamus et nos in domibus, ut alter in altero* (*ibid.* p. 336, Frag. 4).

⁶ *C. Apoll.* ii. 3, *P.G.* xxvi. 1136; quoted by Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 139.

⁷ Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 337, Frag. 8.

⁸ *Ibid.* p. 331, Frag. 6.

⁹ *Ibid.* p. 333, Frag. 10; see also, for Loofs' verdict, p. 209.

¹⁰ So *c. Apoll.* ii. 3 (see above, n. 6), where the author says that like "all heretics", Paul confesses θεὸν ἐκ Ναζαρέτ γεγενῆσθαι. Paul, he says, θεὸν ἐκ τῆς παρθένου ὁμολογεῖ, θεὸν ἐκ Ναζαρέτ ὄφθέντα, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν τῆς ὑπάρξεως τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐσχρηκότα καὶ ἀρχὴν βασιλείας παρειληφότα.

So we ask: Why does Paul insist on the uniqueness of the divine indwelling in "Him from Mary", and see in Him, as He is conjoined—and that, seemingly, from the beginning—with Wisdom, the manifestation of the Son? May it not be that, again like Marcellus, he would in this way express the Christian fundamental that in Jesus Christ God has sent His Son to seek and to save that which was lost? Certainly we cannot produce direct evidence in support of what appears to be a reasonable conclusion, but if we add to his teaching on "the Son" that concerning the uniqueness of the Man who possessed the divine indwelling,¹ it becomes clear that for this early Antiochene ὁ ἐκ Μαρίας συναφθεῖς τῇ σοφίᾳ comes into the world having a special rôle to fulfil. We may not be able to go farther, but, as will be granted, we are already moving in the direction of a doctrine which has a real soteriological foundation.

A more satisfactory conclusion is arrived at when we turn to Eustathius. But, first of all, let us briefly enquire into his doctrine of the Logos. Loofs thinks that, like that of the Samosatene, Eustathius' doctrine may be akin to that of Marcellus, and that his may be the conception of the expansion of the Monad into a δυνάς with the "Incarnation", and into a τριάς with the outpouring of the Spirit—though it should be added that this scholar confesses that "even in their entirety" his arguments cannot be called decisive.² From those writings of his which are extant it is clear that this Antiochene teacher never speaks of the "hypostasis" of the Son, or of His eternal generation; moreover, on the basis of some of his statements, it may seem that for him the Logos does not "come down", but, while dwelling in the Man, "continues in the Father's bosom".³ From this point of view it may be argued that the Lucianists, led by Eusebius of Nicomedia, and supported by Eusebius of Caesarea, had good grounds for accusing him of "Sabelianism". But the question has its other side. There is this important difference between the Logos-doctrine of Paul of Samosata and that of Eustathius: for the latter, the eternal Logos is "Son"—"the Son" is not set up with the indwelling of Wisdom in the Man. He speaks of a "real" begetting,⁴ and

¹ See below, pp. 130 f.

² *Op. cit.* pp. 296 ff., 300 f.

³ See below, p. 124.

⁴ See p. 123 n. 5.

alludes to the Father as "the divine Parent".¹ The Son, he says, is the Father's image;² He is "true Son of God by nature";³ He is "God by nature, begotten of God";⁴ and—this being particularly noteworthy—Eustathius, after pointing out that the words in Deuteronomy xiii. 3 introduce "the δυνάς of the Father and the only-begotten Son", he goes on: ἄλλον μὲν τὸν ἐκπειράζοντα κύριον ὠνόμαζεν, ἄλλον δὲ παρὰ τοῦτον εἶναι τὸν ἀγαπώμενον κύριόν τε καὶ θεόν, ἵνα ἐκ δυνάδος τὴν μίαν ἀποδείξοι θεότητα καὶ τὴν ἀληθῆ θεογονίαν.⁵ His ἄλλον παρὰ τοῦτον εἶναι here would seem decisive, and, it may be argued, Eustathius' teaching on the personal existence of the Son is not so definite as that of his successors simply because he, in his generation, was called upon to resist the Subordinationism of the Lucianists. Consequently, as we should expect, he lays all emphasis on the truth that *Divinitatis una est substantia*.⁶

Taking it, then, that for Eustathius the Son has His own hypostasis, we approach our main question: Does he hold that this divine Person has Himself "condescended" and become man for man's salvation? He says that the Logos "dwelt in", "was clothed with", and "bore" the manhood, which he frequently designates "the Man of Christ". Such expressions may lead us to think that his is the doctrine, not of an incarnation, but of a divine indwelling in a man who is conjoined with the Logos in a moral relationship. But certain other considerations must be taken into account before arriving at a verdict. Eustathius, we find, alludes to the manhood as "the own temple",⁷ "the own house",⁸ "the own body"⁹ of the Logos, and, what is more, definitely states that the Logos built a temple and bore the manhood, companying in a body with men (σώματι ἐν ἀνθρώποις

¹ *Discourse on Prov. viii. 22*, P.G. xviii. 681 c. ² *Ibid.*, P.G. xviii. 677 d.

³ *De Engastrimytho contra Originem*, x, P.G. xviii. 633 b.

⁴ *Interpret. Ps. xcii*, P.G. xviii. 688 b. ⁵ *De Eng.* xxiv, P.G. xviii. 664 a.

⁶ See the Syriac fragment, entitled *Patri et Filio unam esse substantiam*, his *verbis ostendit*—quoted in the present writer's *Eustathius of Antioch*, p. 83 n. 8. Eustathius' determination to uphold the doctrine of the true divinity of the Son is seen, for instance, in his constant use of the expressions ὁ θεὸς καὶ Λόγος or ὁ Λόγος καὶ θεός: he adds the θεός καὶ (or the καὶ θεός—as in the passage from *de Eng.*, quoted in the text) to show that the Logos is truly God, and not subordinate to the Father.

⁷ *Discourse on Prov. viii. 22*, P.G. xviii. 681 c; *de Eng.* xvii, P.G. xviii. 652 a.

⁸ *Discourse on Prov. viii. 22*, P.G. xviii. 681 c.

⁹ *Ibid.*, P.G. xviii. 680 a; *de Anima*, P.G. xviii. 689 a (quoted below, p. 125).

ἐπιφοιτῶν).¹ Surely, such evidence is sufficient to warrant the conclusion that this teacher would say that the Logos Himself has become man in Jesus Christ. There is, however, a passage in his *de Anima* which, at first sight, seems to show that for him the Logos did not "come down". Commenting on the words "I ascend unto my Father and your Father, and my God and your God" (St John xx. 17), he says that these were uttered by the Man "who had not yet after His death gone back to the Father", and not by "the Logos and God who cometh down and continueth in the Father's bosom" (ὁ οὐρανὸθεν ὀρμώμενος καὶ ἐν τοῖς κόλποις διαιτώμενος).² So it may be urged—as by Loofs³—that this use of the present tense (ὀρμώμενος) seems to indicate that, according to Eustathius, the Logos did not "come down" (ὀρμηθεῖς) in the sense that, being a Person, His was a definite act of condescension, but dwelt in the Man as a divine activity which is all the while in God. But it would seem that here, as throughout his writings, Eustathius, intent upon safeguarding the truth of the divine immutability, would uphold the doctrine that, though He has become man, the Logos, in respect of His divine nature, remains all that He was⁴—an interpretation which, if correct, rules out an appeal to this passage as witnessing to a denial of the coming down of a personal Logos.

We can now proceed to our main question: Does this Antiochene hold that the Logos has become man for our salvation? It is clear that he does. Thus in his *Discourse on Proverbs viii. 22*, insisting that it must not be thought that the Logos Himself was "under the Law" because the Christ Child was presented in the Temple, he says:

But even if, having taken the human organ from the Virgin, He [the Logos] bore it and was under the Law, and was purified according to the rite of the first-born, it was not because He

¹ *Discourse on Prov. viii. 22*, P.G. xviii. 677c.

² *Ibid.*, P.G. xviii. 680d.

³ *Op. cit.* p. 297.

⁴ That this is a plausible explanation of what Eustathius means here is borne out by what he says in *de Eng.* xviii, P.G. xviii. 652d, where, after quoting St John i. 18 ("No man hath seen God at any time; the only-begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him"), he points out that it should be understood that Christ κόλπων εἰσὼ διαιτώμενος καὶ τῆ γῆ θεοπρεπῶς ἐπεδήμει καὶ πᾶσιν ὁμοῦ παρῆν οἷα θεός. As the οἷα θεός indicates, Eustathius is insisting that the divine nature of the Logos did not undergo any change when the Logos lived on earth (as man).

Himself [αὐτός] stood in need of such observances that He submitted to treatment, but that He might redeem from the bondage of the Law those who had been sold to the doom of the curse.¹

Or there is this from the *de Anima*:

He [the Logos] voluntarily gave up His own body to the destruction of death for the sake of the salvation of men.²

We agree that there is very little in the existing fragments upon which we can draw in support of our view that for Eustathius the Incarnation and the effecting of man's renewal are inseparably linked together, but this evidence itself would seem to be well-nigh conclusive; besides, as we have yet to see, soteriological ideas are bound up with other aspects of his Christology.

By the later Antiochenes, as we say, it is definitely affirmed that in Jesus Christ God has intervened in man's history, and, in the Person of the Logos, has Himself become man in order to bring about man's salvation.³ Let us turn first to Theodore of

¹ P.G. xviii. 680c.

² *Ibid.* 689a.

³ Adamantius, the author of the five dialogues, *de Recta in Deum Fide*—a work which has come down under the name of Origen—who, it seems, lived shortly after the middle of the fourth century (see Weigl, *op. cit.* p. 27), provides us with further evidence of the interest of the Antiochenes in soteriology. Especially valuable for our purpose is section iv of this work. In this, as the defender of the Christian faith before Eutropius, a heathen philosopher, as *judex*, Adamantius opposes Marinus, who appears as a follower of Bardesanes. Marinus is made to uphold the thesis that Christ did not assume flesh ἐκ τῆς ἡμετέρας ὑποστάσεως, and that it must be maintained that He assumed a heavenly flesh (P.G. xi. 1828d). Our author replies that such a doctrine, which he sets down as being that of Valentinus and Marcion, must mean that Christ suffered not in reality but in appearance, that the trials before Herod, Caiaphas, and Pilate were in appearance, that Christ came down and ascended only in appearance, and that "the salvation of man is in appearance and not in reality" (*ibid.* 1832c). But, he affirms, our salvation is real, and has been brought about by an act of God Himself; for One who was God has come down from heaven, and taken a flesh which could die for us and give us freedom: ὁ μὲν καταβὰς ἐξ οὐρανοῦ ἦν ὁ θεός, ἵνα δὲ ἡμᾶς ἐλευθερώσῃ, προσελάβετο σάρκα τὴν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἀποθανεῖν δυνήσασθαι, δι' ἧς ἡλευθερώθημεν (*ibid.* 1848a). So he can contrast Adam, through whom came death, with Christ, through whom came the resurrection (*ibid.*). Further—and this in connection with what we are referring to as the second soteriological idea of the Antiochenes—we may observe that Adamantius would emphasize the important rôle in the work of effecting the redemption which was played by the Man assumed: the Logos, he says, came down and assumed [the] Man from the unspotted Virgin Mary in the womb, and Christ was born without a man's co-operation, οὗτος ὁ ληφθεὶς enduring all

Mopsuestia. We will quote two passages from his *ad Baptizandos* in which this doctrine is expressly upheld. Besides, these passages form an excellent illustration of the way in which the Antiochenes interpret the Nicene Creed: they maintain—in order to avoid any “confusion” of the Godhead and manhood of Jesus Christ—that from *And in one Lord Jesus Christ* down to *Who for us men, and for our salvation came down*. . . , the Fathers at Nicaea were speaking of the Logos in His divine nature, and that at this point they begin to speak of the Economy—of the Logos as He has become man, that is.¹ But, as we shall see, this does not mean that they cannot say that it is the Logos Himself who has become man. Indeed, Theodore himself upholds this very truth, stating the reason why the Logos became man, in the first passage which we would quote. It runs:

Our Fathers rightly thought not to overlook the humanity of our Lord which possesses such an ineffable union with the divine nature, but added: *And in one Lord Jesus Christ*, as if they had said, “We believe in one Lord who is of the divine nature, to which the name of Lord and God is truly due.” In speaking of God the Logos they said: *By whom are all things*, as the Evangelist said: “All things were made by Him, and nothing was made without Him” [St John i. 3]. It is as if they had said, “This One we understand to be one Lord who is of the divine nature of God the Father, who for our salvation put on a man in whom He dwelt, and through whom He appeared and became known to mankind.”²

In the second passage, which is part of Theodore’s interpretation of the clause, *Who for us men, and for our salvation came down*

the human sufferings in order that He might save mankind (*P.G.* xi. 1844B). It is clear, not only that the author of these dialogues was an Antiochene, for, as has been pointed out (by Weigl, *op. cit.* p. 28), Christologically he represents the θεός ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ, but also that, like his predecessors and his successors in this school, he was determined to uphold the reality of Christ’s manhood against thought which seemed to contradict this doctrine—and, as he saw it, the teaching of those whom he was attacking (themselves, it may be, the precursors of the disciples of Apollinarius) on the heavenly manhood meant the denial of the reality of that manhood, and with it the denial of the reality of the redemption. It is noteworthy that Theodoret, *Haeret. fab.* i. 25, ed. Schulze, iv. pt. i. p. 318, mentions Adamantius among those who, starting with Justin, wrote against the doctrine (which the Bishop of Cyrus ascribes to Apelles, the follower of Marcion) that Christ had a σώμα, οὐκ ἀνθρώπειον, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου οὐσίας.

¹ See below, pp. 206 f.

² Mingana, *op. cit.* p. 37.

from heaven, And was incarnate. . . And was made man, we have direct teaching on the purpose of the Incarnation:

Because they [i.e. the Nicene Fathers] were on the point of speaking about the Economy of His humanity, they were bound to show the purpose of it, as they could not do this with the words which dealt with the divinity of the Only-begotten, and in which they spoke to us how He was eternally with the Father. Since they took pains to teach us concerning His humanity, it is with justice that before everything they set forth the reason for which the divine nature humbled itself to the extent of taking upon itself the form of a servant for us and of caring for our salvation. . . . It was also fitting on their part to place the words *for our salvation* after the words *for us children of men*, in order that they might show the aim of His coming which was not only for “the children of men” but also “for their salvation”. He came down to save and to deliver from evil by an ineffable grace those who were lost and given up to iniquities.

Then the Bishop shows how this “coming down” on the part of the Logos has been brought about without any loss in respect of His divine activity:

He came down not in the sense that He moved from place to place. . . . To this the blessed John bears witness [St John i. 10 f.]. . . . He says here that “He was in the world”, and that “He came unto the world”; but if He was in the world, how did He come to it? Indeed, how can we say that a man came to a place where he was? He, therefore, said “He was in the world” in order to show that He was everywhere, and he added: “He came unto His own” about the Economy of His humanity. Likewise the blessed David said: “He bowed the heavens and came down” [Psalm xviii. 9], in order to make manifest to us the deliverance from their tribulations which God effected for them. He called the condescension of God the “coming down” of God, in the sense that He who was so much above all came down to deliver them from their tribulations.

Then, once more, he proclaims the redemptive purpose of the Incarnation:

It is in this sense that God the Logos, the only Son of God, is said to have come down for our salvation, because He is eternally from the Father, is always with Him, and is above all as He is the cause of everything. For our salvation He condescended to come down to such a humility as to take upon Him the form of a

servant and be in it so that through it He might grant us to delight in His abundant gift. . . . Our blessed Fathers called the Economy of His humanity a "coming down from heaven", at which the blessed David was awe-struck and said: "What is man that Thou art mindful of him, and the son of man that Thou visitest Him?" [Psalm viii. 4].

What is His coming down and what is its aim? And what did man do that He humbled Himself to such an extent for him as to become like him and to take upon Him the form of a servant, and to be a man for our salvation, and to make Himself manifest to all, and to assume upon Himself all that which belonged to the nature of that man, and to be exercised in all human faculties? . . .

It is with justice, therefore, that our blessed Fathers said that He was incarnate and became a man, so that for the sake of our salvation He might act according to all this Economy whereby He was believed to be a mere man by those who were unaware of the Godhead which was dwelling in Him, and who only saw that which is visible.¹

Clearly, Theodore upholds the fundamental truth of the Gospel: God having taken compassion upon His creation, the Logos, who is co-eternal with the Father, has "humbled Himself to such an extent as to become a man" in order that man's redemption might be effected.

Or to turn to Nestorius. In the *Bazaar* he writes:

God the Logos was made man that He might therein make the humanity the likeness of God, and that He might therein renew [the likeness of God] in the nature of the humanity; and thereupon He renewed His material elements, and showed Him [to be] without sin in the observance of the commandments, as though He alone sufficed for renewing him who had originally fallen by the transgression of the observance of the commandments. Otherwise, He gave Himself for him to observe them because he sufficed not to keep himself without sin. . . . For this reason He took the likeness of a servant which was without sin in its creation in such wise as even in the observance of the commandments to receive a name which is more excellent than

¹ Mingana, *op. cit.* pp. 51 ff. Cf. also Theodore's explanation of *qui manifestatus est in carne* (1 Tim. iii. 16—a text to which the Alexandrines were constantly appealing): *Hoc est, "pietatis dilector mysterio eo quod sit magnum et supereminens: quoniam is qui invisibilis est Deus Verbum, Unigenitus Patris, manifestavit se hominibus, in carne adparens pro communi omnium salute"* (in 1 Tim., Swete, *op. cit.* II. p. 135).

all names, and so that whatsoever came into being through the renewal of His material elements might be confirmed by observances and by prudence; for which reason also the renewal of the material elements took place through the Incarnation by means of which He might contend against defeat.¹

Again, from the same work:

Because in fact He took this [likeness] in order to abolish the guilt of the first man, and in order to give to his nature the former image which he had lost through his guilt, rightly He took that which had proved itself guilty and had been made captive and had been subjected to servitude, with all the bonds of scorn and contempt.²

Surely, from such evidence as this we must conclude that the Antiochenes—even if the thought is never fully brought out by them—do indeed see that it is man's fall which has rendered the Incarnation necessary, and that their Christology is indeed "soteriologically determined"; for, as Nestorius here expressly affirms, it is to renew in man the divine image³ which was his at the first that the Logos takes man's fallen nature upon Him.

We could quote passage after passage from the writings of the Bishop of Cyrus to show that he, too, holds that the effecting of man's redemption is the purpose of the Incarnation. Thus—to quote but two—we have this in his *Dialogues*:

To put the matter briefly, both [i.e. the two texts, St John i. 14 and Philippians ii. 5, 8, which Theodoret has just quoted] teach that being God and Son of God, and clad with the Father's glory, and having the same nature and power with Him that begat Him, He that was in the beginning, and was with God, and was God, and was Creator of the world, took upon Him the form of a servant, and it seemed that this was all that was seen; but it was God clad in human nature, and working out the salvation of men [ἦν δὲ θεός, ἀνθρώπειον περικείμενος φύσιν, καὶ τῆν τῶν ἀνθρώπων πραγματοποιούμενος σωτηρίαν].⁴

¹ *Bazaar*, pp. 212, 213.

² *Ibid.* p. 62. Cf. also the following from Nestorius' first sermon on "Theotokos": *Et non hoc solum Christianis praedicandum, quia incommutabilis est Deus Christus, sed et benignus, formam servi accipiens et quod subsistebat existens. . . . suscipere autem humanum genus per hominem et reconciliare Adam multa justitiae circumspicere est* (*Sermo ix*, Loofs, *Nestoriana*, pp. 254 f.).

³ Nestorius' teaching on "the divine image" is considered below, pp. 133 f.

⁴ *Dial.* i, ed. Schulze, iv. pt. i. pp. 41 f.

Again, in his letter to the Magistrates of Zeugmatensis, rejecting the notion that in the Incarnation the nature of the divine Logos had undergone mutation into human nature, he writes:

The teaching handed down to the churches from the beginning recognizes, even after the Incarnation, one Son, one Lord Jesus Christ, and confesses the Same to be everlasting God, and man made at the end of days; made man, by the assumption of manhood, not by the mutation of Godhead. . . . For we have learnt from the divine Scripture that, being in the form of God, He took the form of a servant; and took on Him the seed of Abraham, not was changed into Abraham's seed; and shared as we do both in flesh and blood, and in an immortal and spotless soul. Preserving these for our sinful bodies He offered His sinless body and for our souls His soul free from stain. For this reason, then, we have hope of the common resurrection, for the race will assuredly share with its first-fruits, and as we have shared with Adam in his death, so shall we share in life with Christ the Saviour.¹

Here again, then, we have the same doctrine: the Logos, the Second Person of the Trinity, Himself becomes man and, the Second Adam having thus come into existence, works out the salvation of men, redeeming them from the state of sinfulness which had been theirs ever since Adam fell.

We would now examine the second of the soteriological conceptions of the Antiochenes—the conception, that is, that through His perfect obedience to the will of the Logos who “took” Him, the Man plays His part in this work of effecting the world's redemption.

First of all, let us try to make it clear that theirs is no psilanthropism. They do not think that the Logos dwelt in a mere man, as He dwelt in the prophets; neither do they regard the Man as a man who, on account of his progress in a life of obedience, was at length rewarded with a seat at God's right hand. Rather is it fundamental to their doctrine that this Man is the Chosen One of God, foreordained as the instrument of the Logos as He comes down to restore the human race, and that in Him, as the Chosen One, the Logos dwells from the first.

As Loofs² argues, Paul of Samosata's is not the doctrine of the “mere man”. This early teacher speaks of the indwelling of the Logos in the human Jesus, but the point which he would bring

¹ *Ep.* cxxv.

² *Op. cit.* esp. pp. 254 f.

out is that in this particular case the divine indwelling was different from that in the saints. It was such, he says, that “Wisdom should not so dwell in [any] other”.¹ Again, Wisdom, he declares, was in the prophets, and especially in Moses; it was also in many lords, and especially in Christ, it being in Him “as in a temple”²—a phrase which should be compared with Theodore's “as in a Son”.³ But there is another statement of Paul which shows even more plainly that for him “He from Mary” is no ordinary man. After asserting—evidently against a false interpretation of some such expression as “God was born of a woman”—that “Mary did not bring forth the Logos, for she was not before the ages: Mary received the Logos, and is not older than the Logos”,⁴ he goes on:

But she brought forth a man like one of us [ἡμῖν ἴσον], though superior to us in every respect, since grace was upon him from the Holy Spirit, and from the promises, and from the things that are written.⁵

How are we to interpret this passage? Surely, Paul is explaining why the Man who is “like one of us” is “in every respect superior to us”, and would illustrate this superiority from three points of view. First, the Man possesses “grace from the Holy Spirit”, that is, in accordance with what is said in St Matthew i. 20, He is—to quote Loofs,⁶ who offers a careful explanation of this saying of the Samosatene—“a direct creation of the Spirit from the very conception”, and is so constituted that He differs from all other men;⁷ secondly, He possesses “grace from

¹ *Ibid.* p. 331, Frag. 6.

² *Ibid.* p. 331, Frag. 5.

³ See below, p. 133. These would seem to be parallel expressions.

⁴ Thus Paul is introducing the argument which is to be found again and again in the writings of the later Antiochenes: in saying that “God was born of a woman”, or that Mary is “Theotokos”, one must not suppose that the Logos possessed the beginning of His existence from her.

⁵ Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 331, Frag. 2.

⁶ *Ibid.* pp. 254 f. We are much indebted to Loofs at this point.

⁷ According to Paul, the “preparation” (κατασκευή) of Jesus Christ was different (ἑτεροίως) from that of other men (*ibid.* p. 332, Frag. 8). What does he mean by this “preparation”? It is noteworthy that his opponents use the word “constitution” (σύστασις) in this connection, and we suggest that it is the thought of the “constitution” of Jesus Christ that he has in mind: the human Jesus possesses the divine indwelling from the start, and is so constituted that He is different from all others. Paul's conception, then, may be compared with that of Nestorius, who holds that the Man assumed possessed the divine prosopon in His creation (see below, p. 134).

the promises", that is, following such texts as 1 St Peter i. 20, and Romans i. 4, He is "foreknown before the foundation of the world"; thirdly, He possesses "grace from the things that are written", that is, He is the One of whom it is written (the Lord Himself testifying, in St Luke iv. 18, that it is in Him that these words are fulfilled): "The spirit of the Lord God is upon me; because the Lord hath anointed me..." (Isaiah lxi. 1). In all this, as is clear, the underlying thought is not that "Jesus becomes Christ from His Baptism",¹ but that in the human Jesus the Logos dwells from the very first—"Mary received the Logos", Paul says—and that He, as He is conjoined with Wisdom, is, also from the very first, the Anointed One, fore-ordained to bring release to the captives.

The same conception that "the Man of Christ" is the Fore-ordained One is to be found in Eustathius. In one of the fragments of his *Discourse on Proverbs viii. 22* which have come down to us in Syriac, we find that he employs the text to drive home this very point:

Quando igitur ait: "Creavit me initium viarum suarum operibus suis", claro demonstrat argumento bonorum principium immutabile nobis existitisse hominem Christi, quoniam aptat nos ad viam caelorum—

words which show that for this Antiochene the Man has been foreordained to play His part in the work of redemption. Again, another fragment from the same work runs:

What wonder, or worthy of astonishment, that we say: "Of old the Man of Christ was known by God, and in the depth of the divine mind fixedly fitted"?²

¹ So Harnack, *op. cit.* III. p. 43, on the basis of the statement in the Λόγοι πρὸς Σαβίτων that "having been anointed with the Holy Spirit, He was named Christ" (Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 339, Frag. 1). But whether, as Harnack thinks, these sayings are Paul's, or whether, as we would suggest, they belong to a later age (see below, p. 137 n. 2), there would seem to be no evidence here that the author holds that "Jesus became Christ from His Baptism". The statement is merely to the effect that Jesus was anointed and so called "Christ"—but without any reference to the time of the anointing. In view of Paul's conception of the divine indwelling, it seems more likely that he would have said that Jesus is "Christ" from the time when "Mary received the Logos".

² The two fragments are to be found in F. Cavallera's collection, *Le Schisme d'Antioche*, Frags. 34, 35, and in *Analecta Sacra*, iv. pp. 213 (Syr.), 443 (Lat.), Extracts 8, 9. See also, for F. C. Burkitt's translation of these fragments (given above), *Eustathius of Antioch*, p. 73 n. 8.

And, Eustathius would say, the Logos was in this Man from the beginning: the Logos built the temple, and bore the Man¹ dwelling in Him "perpetually" (διηνεκῶς).² Here, too, then, we have no evidence of the doctrine that Jesus was no more than an ordinary man.

From Paul and Eustathius we turn to their successors.³ Thus, speaking of the indwelling of the Logos in the Man, the Bishop of Mopsuestia, in a well-known passage in his *de Incarnatione*, declares that he is not so mad as to say that in Him God dwelt as He dwelt in apostles and righteous men. On the contrary—

In Him towards whom He showed His good pleasure He dwelt as in a Son [ὡς ἐν υἱῷ]—that is to say, He united the Man assumed entirely to Himself, and fitted Him to share with Him in all the honour which He, the Indweller, who is Son by nature, possesses.⁴

And what does Theodore mean by his "as in a Son"? It seems clear that he means One who possesses the divine indwelling *a prima statim plasmatione*,⁵ One who is never separated from the Logos who assumed Him, and One who now shares in all the honour which belongs to the Son by nature. In a word, he is thinking of the Man as *the* Son of Man, the Second Adam, the One who, according to the foreknowledge of God,⁶ has been chosen by Him to be His Agent as He comes to inaugurate the new *katastasis*.

It is interesting to see how this conception that the Man is unique from the very beginning of His existence is developed by Nestorius.⁷ Adam, he teaches, till he fell, possessed the image

¹ Quoted above, pp. 123 f.

² *P.G.* xviii. 685 B.

³ We may note here that, to illustrate the conception that "Mary's flesh" was the Chosen One, Diodore of Tarsus appeals to the case of Levi, who "while yet in the loins was set apart, and when born came to honour" (*P.G.* lxxvi. 1449). Cf. also Theodoret's use of passages from the second of the Servant Poems (Isaiah xlix. 3, 5, 6) in his reply to Cyril's Anath. vi (ed. Schulze, v. pt. i. pp. 36 f.; ed. Pusey, *Works*, vi. p. 444).

⁴ *De Incarn.* vii, Swete, *op. cit.* II. p. 296.

⁵ *C. Apoll.* iii, Frag. 2, Swete, *op. cit.* II. p. 314.

⁶ See the fragment from Theodore's second sermon *pro Miraculis*, Swete, *op. cit.* II. p. 339.

⁷ Like his predecessors, Nestorius, it may be noted, holds that the Logos did not dwell in Christ as He dwelt in the prophets: "He is not like Moses, although Moses is called a god", he says (*Bazaar*, p. 206); and that the Man is the Foreordained One: the Logos took ὃν προὐρίσεν ἀνθρώπων, he says (Loofs, *Nestoriana*, p. 224).

of God—willing what God willed, he had the *prosopon* of God. His thought, we consider—and here we anticipate the results of our discussion of the meaning of “*prosopon*” as the term is used by the Antiochenes¹—is that when Adam was created, he, since God’s will was his will, had both “the appearance” and “the individuality” of God, and so could be called God (cf. Psalm lxxxiii. 16). It was this condition, then, which was man’s no longer after the first man had transgressed the commandment. But, Nestorius goes on, in order that this divine *prosopon*—or this “image” or “likeness” of God²—might be man’s once more, the Man whom the Logos took was so constituted that He possessed it from the start. He is “without sin in His creation”, this teacher says;³ He is called “holy” and “Son of God” (cf. St Luke i. 35), these titles “denoting the image and the likeness which the first man received in the creation, and which he kept not”; moreover, He has received the title “holy”, “not as the rest of mankind by virtue of obedience in faith and in works, but from [the moment of] coming into being by the creation of the Creator”.⁴ So does the Man differ from the rest of men: He is the Second Man, made from the start in the image of God, and so made that through Him God might give to Adam’s nature “the former image which he had lost through his guilt”.⁵ Let this doctrine of the constitution of the Man assumed be taken in conjunction with his doctrine of the Man’s determination to preserve the divine *prosopon* in order that the redemption might be brought about—a point with which we have yet to deal—and it will be agreed that here Nestorius makes a worthy contribution to the soteriological thought of the school which he represents.

And this Foreordained One, the Antiochenes teach, was, throughout a life in which He was tried to the uttermost, implicitly obedient to the will of the Logos, man’s salvation itself depending on such perfect obedience. Such, as we say, is their second soteriological conception. Let us see how it is developed.

Here, again, it may be that Paul of Samosata is anticipating the thought of the later theologians of the school. For may we not

¹ See below, pp. 156 ff.

² According to Nestorius, the “likeness” is the “*prosopon*” (*Bazaar*, p. 167).

³ *Ibid.* p. 213 (quoted above, p. 128).

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 62.

⁵ *Ibid.* pp. 59 f.

see behind his statement that “the conjunction” of the Logos with the human Jesus was “according to learning and communion” (συνάφεια κατὰ μάθησιν καὶ μετουσίαν)¹ the conception, to be found in his successors, that the Man learned obedience by the things which He suffered, and that in His perfect obedience He was in perfect union with the Divine, participating in the divine will and activity? Of course we have no indication here that the Samosatene sees this obedience in its soteriological bearing, but, in view of his teaching on the Foreordained One, it would seem that we cannot completely rule out the possibility of this being the case.

At any rate, it is clear that the connection between the thought of the perfect life of the Man and that of man’s redemption is maintained by that other precursor of the classical Antiochenes, Eustathius. The soul of Christ, he says, is a “holy” soul;² the temple in which the Logos dwells is “most beautiful, consecrated, inviolate”;³ the Man is “holy, undefiled, and spotless”;⁴ He is “the image of the Son” who bore Him.⁵ Surely, we have here the conception that the Man was sinless because of His perfect obedience to the will of God. But there are passages in his writings which show that this teacher sees this perfect obedience from the point of view of soteriology. As we have noticed, he says that “the Man of Christ fits us for the way of heaven” because He is the *bonorum principium immutabile*.⁶ Again, he can say:

The Man whom God bore determined of His own free will [*sponte*] to undergo the passion of death for the sake of man’s good.⁷

Clearly, for Eustathius the obedience of the Man of Christ has a real soteriological significance.

The conception that the Man’s obedience is essential if the redemption is to be real comes out more clearly in the writings

¹ Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 333, Frag. 13.

² *De Eng.* xviii, *P.G.* xviii. 652c.

³ *De Eng.* x, *P.G.* xviii. 633b.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Disc. on Prov.* viii. 22, *P.G.* xviii. 677d. It should be noted that it is this conception of the Man as the image of the Logos which is developed by Nestorius, when he says that the Man has “the divine *prosopon*” (see above, p. 134).

⁶ Quoted above, p. 132.

⁷ *C. Arianos*, *P.G.* xviii. 693, Frag. 7.

of the later Antiochenes. That it is adopted by Theodore of Mopsuestia may be seen from two points of view. In the first place, he teaches that the Man possessed the co-operating grace of the Logos from the very beginning, and that He received this grace "correspondingly with His own determination". But why does he insist on the need of the *gratia co-operans*? The answer is to be found in his own words:

As soon as He could decide between good and evil, He conceived a great hatred for evil, and joined Himself with an irresistible affection to goodness; and, by receiving the co-operation of the Logos correspondingly with His own determination, he was secured continuously without change or deviation towards evil.¹

In another place he says:

Because, when we were subjected to sin, we had no hope of deliverance, the grace of God kept that Man whom God put on for us free from sin.²

It seems obvious that at the back of Theodore's mind is the thought of man's redemption: if man is to be redeemed, the Man assumed must be perfect in His obedience, and to ensure that perfect obedience—and with it the reality of the redemption—He must be secured by the power of the Logos against all possibility of change.

Secondly, why does this teacher insist, against the doctrine of the Laodicene, that Christ possessed a human rational soul? It will be worth our while to consider what he says in his *ad Baptizandos* on this point.³ The Nicene Fathers, he here declares, confessed that the Lord "became incarnate" in order that we might understand that He "assumed a complete man, consisting of a body and an immortal and rational soul"—and this He did because He wished to effect man's restoration to sinlessness. Adam had sinned, and through his sin death had entered into the world. But it was not Adam's body that persuaded him to yield: it was his soul which "first accepted the advice of error". Therefore, Theodore goes on, "that the free gift and grace of God might abound unto many by the righteousness of

one man", it was necessary that Christ should assume, not the body only, but also the soul; for "the enemy of the soul had to be removed first", and then "the abolition of death would follow by itself". Clearly, the Bishop is upholding the reality of the Man's faculty of self-determination because he sees that if it is absent there can be no real struggle, no real obedience, and, consequently, no real redemption. As he puts it in his *de Incarnatione*:

If [the Man assumed] did not receive a soul, and if it was the Godhead that conquered sin, then what was effected can be of no possible advantage to us. The Lord's struggle would have been no more than the gratification of the love of display.¹

Further, it is interesting to note that the conception that the Man's perfect obedience is essential if the redemption is to be real is implied in the Λόγοι πρὸς Σαβίτων, sayings which, though attributed to Paul of Samosata, would seem to belong to the age of Theodore.² In four out of these five sayings it is significant

¹ *De Incarn.* xv, Swete, *op. cit.* II. p. 311.

² Harnack (*op. cit.* III. p. 39 n.), who is followed by Raven (*op. cit.* p. 52), regards these sayings as the *ipsissima verba* of the Samosatene. On the other hand, Loofs (*op. cit.* pp. 287 ff.) takes the view that they are the work of a forger, who, living at the time of the Monothelite controversy, and using as his basis the expressions "one will" and "one activity" which, as this scholar thinks, Paul is likely to have used in the debate with Malchion, produced a document in the anti-Dyothelite interest. Certainly we must regard it as possible that Paul did speak in this way, and, as the company which the fragments keep in the *Doctrina Patrum* (ed. Diekamp, p. 303)—where their place is after sayings attributed to Ebion, and before quotations from Nestorius, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Montanus and Mani—shows, it seems likely that they formed part of a "corpus" which could be appealed to by the Monothelites as these sought to prove that their opponents, in asserting "two wills and two activities" in Christ, were but following in the steps of the celebrated "heretics". But, as it seems to us, these fragments show that, whoever he was, the author was fully acquainted with the doctrine and the expressions of the school of Diodore and Theodore. Thus: (1) The conception of the Saviourhood of Christ that we find here lies behind the teaching of Theodore and is clearly in line with that of Nestorius; (2) The phrases "different natures" and "different prosopa" (Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 339, Frag. 2) remind us of the teaching on the "two natures" and "the prosopon of the nature" which is to be found in Theodore and Nestorius (see below, pp. 186 ff.); (3) The phrases "one will" and "one activity", whether they were used by Paul of Samosata or not, were certainly used by the same two Antiochene theologians (Theodore, *Ep. ad Donnum*, Swete, *op. cit.* II. p. 338 f., and Nestorius, *On the Chapters*, Loofs, *Nestoriana*, p. 219—quoted below, p. 161 n. 1). It would seem more likely, then, that these sayings were composed towards the end of the fourth or at the beginning of the fifth

¹ *De Incarn.* vii, Swete, *op. cit.* II. p. 296 (trans. as in Raven, *op. cit.* p. 307).

² *Ad Bapt.*, Mingana, *op. cit.* p. 60.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 54 ff.

that direct mention is made of the "Saviour" and that the theme which runs through them all is that of the harmony which existed between the Man and the Divine. Thus, to quote from two of them:

... By the changelessness of His disposition He was made like to God, and, continuing pure from sin, was united to Him, and was inspired to receive the power to work miracles. Thereby being proved to possess one and the same energy of will with God, He was named Redeemer of the race and Saviour.¹

Our Saviour... having been steadfast in virtue was joined to God, and in His progress in the good possessed one and the same will and activity with Him; this He preserved inseparably, and so received the name which is above every name, this being granted to Him as the reward of affection.²

Here again, it will be noticed, we have the one dominant thought: the Man, constant in His obedience to the will of the Divine, and inseparable from Him in will and activity, plays His part in the work of redemption.

But it is Nestorius who, especially in the *Bazaar*,³ brings out this root conception of the Antiochenes more clearly than the

century, when the influence of the Antiochene school was at its height, than that they belong to a later age when that influence had gone. Perhaps, though this is no more than a conjecture, the author was a follower of Paul of Samosata, for, as the testimony of Epiphanius and Chrysostom—the latter referring to "those who received" (though, as Loofs says, the οἱ διαδέξαμενοι here may mean "those who have again received") the madness of Paul of Samosata in a sermon which he preached in 391—shows, it is possible that there were Paulianists in and around Antioch a century after the Samosatene's deposition. But if a Paulianist was responsible for the Λόγοι, it would seem that he must have lived at the end of the fourth century (or very early in the fifth), since Theodoret, writing about 450, "includes the Paulianists among the heretics who have disappeared without leaving any trace" (see Loofs, *Paulus von Samosata*, pp. 172 f., where these authorities are quoted, this scholar remarking that this evidence "may be held to witness to the existence of 'Paulianists' even at this time"). At any rate, this conjecture makes it easier for us to see why the sayings were attributed to Paul. Moreover, it is interesting to find that the Paulianists themselves spoke of the Man as having His own prosopon (see below, p. 187)—a minor point, but one which shows that these could very well have used the expression "different prosopa", to which we have already referred.

¹ Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 339, Frag. 1 (trans. as in Raven, *op. cit.* p. 53).

² *Ibid.* Frag. 3.

³ But what Nestorius says in the *Bazaar* does not stand alone: this soteriological conception, it should be noted, is fundamental to his celebrated sermon on the Highpriesthood of Christ (*Sermo* v, Loofs, *Nestoriana*, pp. 231 ff.).

rest. Thus it is most significant that in the early sections of this work, where he passes under review the outstanding events in our Lord's earthly life,¹ the underlying thought is not that of the *prokope* of a mere man, or indeed that of the reality of the Man's moral struggle, but that of the Man's unflinching obedience to the will of God as He passes through the various stages of a truly human life—a life beset with temptations which arise not from the soul only, but also from the body.² The thought is summed up in these words of his:

Although He had all these things which appertain to our nature, anger, concupiscence and thoughts, and although they increased with the progress and increase of every age, He stood firm in thoughts of obedience.³

And, as he explicitly states, this "standing firm in thoughts of obedience", or—to put it another way—this preserving of the divine prosopon which was His from the start, was necessary if man was to be redeemed:

... it was needful for the divinity to renew the humanity and for the humanity to be renewed and to take the very image [of Him] who created it but not His own ousia; and it was needful that it should observe prudently the conduct of the man who had fallen, because especially for that was it created, to conduct itself according to the law which is in the nature of men and to preserve the very image of the Creator by the observance of the commandments without fault...⁴

Further, according to Nestorius, this Man knew that, in having "neither purpose nor will of His own, but that of Him whose

¹ *Bazaar*, pp. 56 ff. See the express denial that Jesus received "the name which is above every name", in consequence of moral progress (*ibid.* p. 57).

² Similarly Theodore of Mopsuestia says that the Lord in assuming flesh and soul "strove through each to win each"—"mortifying sin in the flesh, and subduing its lusts", and "training the soul to overcome its passions and to restrain the lusts of the flesh" (*de Incarn.* xv, Frag. 3, Swete, *op. cit.* II. p. 311).

³ *Bazaar*, p. 63.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 214. The words which follow the above quotation plainly show that, like Theodore (see above, p. 136), Nestorius sees that the Man must have the *gratia co-operans* of the Logos if His victory over sin is to be sure: "... without fault, the divinity making use of its own prosopon in the likeness of a servant in order that the humanity by means of that prosopon wherein it contended might be victorious, its victory being thereby confirmed". (On Nestorius' conception of the "taking and giving" of the prosopa in the union, see below, pp. 146 ff.)

prosopon and likeness He had",¹ He was playing His part in the work of redemption:

For until the time of His victory He was striving to make firm in God the image which had been given unto Him. But because He established His own image in all temptations perfectly and without failing and without falling short in anything, He comported Himself on our behalf, being zealous to rescue us captives from the violence of the tyrant and to draw us towards Him and to make all of us the sons of His own kingdom, the associates and the heirs and the sons of God. For the defeat of the tyrant was being [accomplished] without pity, when He threw him down openly from his primacy, and after He had thrown him down, He took from him his might; and when He had taken it from him, His own victory sufficed Him not, but it must henceforth be also ours for which sake He strove.²

So, Nestorius can say, this Man "comported Himself for all men, and kept Himself without sin, and, as one who had not sinned, gave Himself for salvation on behalf of all men";³ and because He "accounted Himself as nothing except to be confirmed to the will of God, and to become as God willed that He should become",⁴ He is the Second Adam who differs from the first in that, whereas the defeat of the latter brought about the defeat of all men, the victory of the former makes all men victorious.⁵

And what, according to the Antiochenes, is the result of this act of condescension on the part of the divine Logos in taking to Himself this Man who, especially chosen, always willed that which God willed? Man, they declare, has now been shown the pattern-life, the ideal of human virtue: let a man strive to follow this Man in the way of obedience to God's commandments, and he, too, will be rewarded with a place in heaven.⁶ But for these teachers Christ is far more than mere Example. He who has taken upon Himself the form of a servant has, they affirm, through the obedience even unto death of this form of a servant, overthrown the power of death, the penalty which man was

¹ Cf. *Bazaar*, p. 62.

² *Ibid.* p. 67.

³ *Ibid.* p. 213.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 69.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 63.

⁶ As illustrating this aspect of the teaching of the Antiochenes, Srawley (see above, p. 117 n. 3) draws attention to Chrysostom, *On St John*, Hom. xlviii.

undergoing on account of sin: death itself, as was necessary, has been brought into the arena, and through the obedience and immeasurable love of the Man the victory has been obtained not only for Himself but also for all men;¹ the tyranny of Satan has been abolished,² and the debt, which was due on account of man's disobedience, paid.³

Yet it is not so much upon the significance of the Lord's Death as upon that of His Resurrection that these teachers lay stress, Theodore going so far as to say that it is "the end of all the Economy of Christ".⁴ Through His Resurrection, they proclaim, Christ has become the firstfruits of a risen humanity: men now have the pledge of a life of sinlessness and, consequently, of a life of immortality and immutability—a life which will be theirs in the future when "the complete abolition of sin will have taken place".

But more than this, the Resurrection—with the consequent Ascension and Session—has revealed Him as the Head of a reunited creation: in Him, as the Second Adam, they affirm, all created things are summed up. *Omnia collecta sunt in unum*, says Theodore of Mopsuestia, *et ad unum quoddam inspiciunt, concordantes sibi*; now has been brought about the *renovatio, secundum quam et omnium redintegratur connexio, cujus primitiae sunt is qui secundum carnem Christus, in quo . . . omnium recreatio efficietur*; and the *consensus et concordia et connexio* that once existed between heaven and earth are re-established.⁵ The theme is common to all the teachers of the school, though it is Theodore who is foremost among them in developing it. Eustathius, nearly a century before him, had said that "the Man of Christ", now enthroned with the divine Spirit, possesses the *imperium rerum universarum*, and that He is *omnium creaturarum*

¹ Cf. Nestorius, *Bazaar*, p. 73.

² Cf. Theodore, in *Eph. iv. 8*, Swete, *op. cit.* i. pp. 166 f., and Theodoret, *Interpret. Ps. lxxvii. 2* and *de Prov. x*, ed. Schulze, i. pt. ii. p. 1067, iv. pt. i. p. 661.

³ Seemingly these theologians would say that, through the Death of one who was faultless in keeping the divine commandments, the debt was paid to the Law—a conception which is in harmony with their strong ethical interest. See Theodore, in *Gal. iii. 12, iv. 4, 5*, Swete, *op. cit.* i. pp. 41, 62, *ad Bapt.*, Mingana, *op. cit.* pp. 63, 69 f., Nestorius, *Bazaar*, p. 173, Theodoret, *de Prov. x*, ed. Schulze, iv. pt. i. p. 669. At the same time, it is clear that their thought on the Atonement is undeveloped.

⁴ *Ad Bapt.*, Mingana, *op. cit.* p. 75.

⁵ In *Eph. i. 10*, in *Col. i. 16*, Swete, *op. cit.* i. pp. 130, 169.

Dominator propter divini Verbi commistionem,¹ and after him Nestorius and Theodoret speak in the same way. Through "the just dispensation which has taken place on behalf of all", says the former, God has given to the Man assumed the victory, with the result that all rational powers adore the very name which is His, and peace and concord are made to reign on the earth.² Similarly, the Bishop of Cyrus declares that when all creation, since it was subject to corruption and death, stood in need of the healing power of the Incarnation, God intervened, so that now, the cloud of despair having vanished, human nature and all creation can rejoice together in the incorruptibility which is theirs through the *anacephalaisis*, and join in praise to Christ, who is the author of all these good things.³

Surely, for the Antiochenes this, "the second *katastasis*" as Theodore calls it, is not merely that which stands opposed to the present order. Rather does it seem that for them it represents the restoration of man and creation to that state which obtained before Adam transgressed the divine commandment: the sinlessness—the perfect obedience to the will of God which brought with it immortality and immutability—which was man's when he was first created, will be man's once more, and once more will the unity of the cosmos be established, all things being in subjection under the feet of Him who is *Princeps in omnibus*, just as, before he fell, they were put in subjection under the feet of the first Adam. It is true that this conception is never fully worked out, but the direct evidence of Nestorius, whose, as we have seen, is the thought that God has intervened in the world's history in order to re-establish man in the image which was his at the first, and that of Theodoret that "the Lord Christ has brought back [ἐπανήγαγεν] human nature which was taken captive through the transgression of the first man to its former high estate" (εἰς τὴν προτέραν εὐγένειαν),⁴ would seem to show

¹ P.G. xviii. 693, Frags. 3, 2. Cf. also the following statement from Eustathius' *c. Arianos*: *Si autem ipse igitur iste natus est primogenitus ex mortuis, qui morte circumamictus est: ipse vero sit PRINCEPS IN OMNIBUS, qui virtutes acquisitas suscepit* (*ibid.* 696, Frag. 2).

² *Bazaar*, p. 74. ³ *In Eph. i. 10*, ed. Schulze, III. pt. i. pp. 404 f.

⁴ *Interpret. Ps. lx*, ed. Schulze, I. pt. ii. p. 1011. Cf. also *de Prov. x*, ed. Schulze, IV. pt. i. p. 661, where Theodoret says that Christ has entered into the struggle and destroyed the tyranny of Satan, in order that we might receive a fresh τὴν προτέραν εὐγενείαν.

that the idea of restoration is fundamental to the doctrinal system of the Antiochenes, and that it is a legitimate conclusion that, while they contrast the present with the future, these teachers see both present and future against the background of the past.

II. THE CHRISTOLOGICAL TEACHING OF THE ANTIOCHENE THEOLOGIANS

In the preceding section we were attempting to make it clear that basic to the soteriological thought of the Antiochenes are these two main conceptions: the first, that the Logos, through taking the form of a servant, has Himself become man for man's salvation; the second, that this salvation could not have been secured had not the Man assumed been constant in His obedience to the will of Him who assumed Him. Now we would see how these conceptions are carried over into Christology, it being our purpose to demonstrate that from the point of view of its underlying principles the teaching of the Antiochene theologians is in no respect different from that of the theologians of the school of Alexandria.

Let us take, first, those of their Christological ideas which have as their foundation the conception that in Jesus Christ the Logos Himself has become incarnate in order to restore a fallen race.

Like the theologians of the school of Alexandria, they insist that, through taking the form of a servant, the Logos in His divine nature has not suffered any change: He remains all that He was—immutable and impassible. Paul of Samosata himself, believing that Malchion and those with him were teaching a "mixture" of Godhead and manhood in Christ, tells his opponents not to "degrade the excellence of Wisdom".¹ After him, Eustathius proclaims that "the incorporeal Wisdom", "the [divine] ousia", abides without spot and preserves its entire dignity, though Its own body is nailed to the Tree;² the Logos, he says, while dwelling in the body,

trod in heavenly places, filled all the earth, reigned over the depths, visited and judged the soul of every man, and continued

¹ Loofs, *Paulus von Samosata*, pp. 331, Frag. 4, 336, Frag. 5a.

² *Discourse on Prov. viii. 22*, P.G. xviii. 684c.

to do everything that God continually does, for the Wisdom that is on High is not imprisoned and contained within bodily matter. . . . But being a divine and ineffable Power, it embraces and confirms both what is within and what is without the temple, and thence proceeding beyond, It comprehends and sways all matter.¹

What Eustathius says here is an excellent illustration of the Antiochene conception that, though He has taken the servant's form, the Logos still continues His creative activity—though there does not seem to be forthcoming among these teachers the idea, to be found, as we have seen, in Cyril, that “in addition to” His eternal existence the Logos has become man.

By the later Antiochenes, as they in turn battle against their opponents of the Alexandrine school, the doctrine of the immutability and impassibility of the divine ousia is even more insisted upon: the Logos did not change into flesh when He became flesh; rather (to adopt the words of Nestorius) *incommutabilis est Deus Christus, sed et benignus, formam servi accipiens et quod subsistebat existens*.² Thus Flavian, commenting on St John i. 14, can say:

He is not turned into flesh, nor yet did He cease from being God [οὐδὲ ἀπέστη τοῦ εἶναι θεός], but while He was that from all eternity, He became this in the dispensation, He Himself [αὐτός] having built His own temple, and having taken up His dwelling in the passible creature.³

Theodore rails against what in his view is the Alexandrine interpretation of the ἐγένετο in the Johannine formula: the Logos, he affirms, did not “become” man in the sense that He was “changed into” man—and he appeals to the λαβών of the text in the Epistle to the Philippians as a safeguard against the idea of transformation.⁴ Again and again in the *Bazaar* does

¹ P.G. xviii. 684A, B; cf. also Eustathius' remark in *de Eng.* xviii (quoted above, p. 124 n. 4) that the Logos was everywhere present οἷα θεός.

² So in Nestorius' first sermon on “Theotokos”. Loofs, *Nestoriana*, p. 254.

³ The fragment is to be found in Theodoret, *Dial.* i, ed. Schulze, iv. pt. i. p. 46. [The fragments of Flavian have been collected by F. Cavallera in his work, *S. Eustathii Episc. Antioch. In Lazarum, Mariam et Martham Homilia Christologica*, pp. 101 ff., the one here referred to being No. 4 (p. 106) in this collection.]

⁴ See Theodore, *de Incarn.* ix. Frag. 1, and *c. Apoll.* iv. Frag. 2, Swete, *op. cit.* II. pp. 300, 319. See also below, pp. 182 f.

Nestorius assert that the Incarnation was not brought about by changing Godhead into manhood,¹ and, as is well known, the Bishop of Cyrus devotes one-third of his *Dialogues* to the refutation of the notion that in becoming man the Logos is no longer *immutabilis*. What this last teacher says in his reply to the First Anathematism of Cyril sums up the Antiochene teaching on the immutability of the Divine:

But all we who follow the words of the Evangelists state that the divine Logos did not become flesh by nature, nor was yet changed into flesh, for the Divine is immutable and invariable. . . . If then the Divine is immutable and invariable, it is incapable of change or alteration. And if the immutable cannot be changed, then the divine Logos did not become flesh by mutation, but assumed flesh and dwelt among us according to the word of the Evangelist. This the divine Paul expresses clearly in his Epistle to the Philippians in the words “Let this mind be in you. . . .” [Philippians ii. 5–7]. Now it is plain from these words that the form of God was not changed into the form of a servant, but remaining what It was [μένουσα ὁ ἦν], took the form of the servant.²

But if we are right in claiming that the Antiochenes would maintain that the Logos, while remaining what He was, has Himself become man and lived a human life, we shall expect to find in their writings indications that they realize that such a real incarnation is possible only if the Logos limits Himself in respect of His divine powers. Such indications are indeed to be found, though—and we suggest that the reason is that these teachers approach the Christological question rather from the ethical than from the intellectual point of view—it is clear that they do not make use of the opportunity which lies before them through taking Philippians ii. 5 ff. as their *locus classicus*.

As their statements reveal, the members of this school seem to be aware that the doctrine of the divine self-emptying is rendered necessary by their position. Thus Flavian of Antioch speaks of the Logos as “permitting” (συνεχώρησεν) “the divine body to experience death”³—a conception which, as we have

¹ E.g. *Bazaar*, pp. 24 ff., 33 ff., 182.

² *Reprehen. xii Capp.*, ed. Schulze, v. pt. i. p. 3.

³ The fragment—from Flavian's *Homily on the Traitor Judas*—has been preserved by Theodoret, *Dial.* iii, ed. Schulze, iv. pt. i. p. 251. [Cavallera, *op. cit.* p. 108, Frag. 7.]

seen, is to be found in Athanasius and Cyril.¹ Again, the Bishop of Mopsuestia, commenting on Hebrews ii. 9—which he reads as: “Apart from God He tasted death for every man”—says in the *ad Baptizandos*:

In this he [St Paul] shows that the divine nature willed that He should taste death for the benefit of every man, and also that the Godhead was separated from the One who was suffering, because it was impossible for Him to taste the trial of death if [the Godhead] were not cautiously remote from Him, but also near enough to do the necessary things for the nature that was assumed by It.²

It will be apparent that Theodore’s thought here is closely akin to that of Irenaeus, to which we have already alluded.³ And, on the basis of two statements of Theodoret, it seems legitimate to say that he, too, has the conception that the Logos has limited Himself in order to meet human conditions. Thus in his reply to Cyril’s Fourth Anathematism, this teacher insists that the Logos Himself was not ignorant, but the form of a servant, “who at that time—i.e. during the earthly life—knew as much as the indwelling Godhead revealed”. Even more significant is Theodoret’s remark—to be found in the same place—concerning the words in Gethsemane. After asserting that they were not the words of the divine Logos but those of the form of a servant, he goes on:

Surely the divine Logos permitted [συνεχώρησεν] the utterance of these words, allowing room for fear [χώρον δεδωκώς τῆ δειλίᾳ], in order that the nature of Him who was assumed might be manifest, and to prevent our supposing that the Son of Abraham and David to be an unreality or a phantom.⁴

But, as it seems to us, if we would have a positive declaration concerning the Antiochene teaching on the self-emptying of the Logos, we must turn to a striking passage in the *Bazaar* in which Nestorius would explain what he understands by the Incarnation.⁵ Now, as we shall see, this teacher definitely

¹ See above, pp. 35, 85 f., 102 n. 1 (where, it will be seen, Cyril uses the same Greek word).

² Mingana, *op. cit.* pp. 86 f.

³ See above, p. 51 n. 8.

⁴ *Reprehen. xii Capp.*, ed. Schulze, v. pt. i. pp. 23 f.

⁵ *Bazaar*, pp. 69 f.

affirms that for him Jesus Christ is one prosopon—one Person, that is, in whom the two ousiai of Godhead and manhood are brought together. But he also expressly asserts that each ousia has its own prosopon. His conception of the Incarnation—a conception which, it will be noted, is based on St Paul’s words in Philippians ii. 5 ff., the *locus classicus* of the Antiochene teachers—is, then, that the Logos “takes” the prosopon of the manhood, or of “the Man”, as His prosopon, and “gives” His divine prosopon to the manhood.¹ Thus he writes:

Consequently also God became incarnate in the Man through His own prosopon and made His prosopon His own prosopon. And there is no condescension comparable unto this, that the prosopon of the Man should become His own and that He should give Him His prosopon. And therefore He made use of His prosopon, in that He took it for Him[self]; but He took it in order to make it not honourable but contemptible, that He might show to whoever wished to serve [God] that all greatness grows great by condescension and not in exalting itself, [that] “in that He took the likeness of a servant, He has been found in *schêma* as a man”.²

¹ Here mention should be made of Loofs’ view of Nestorius’ teaching on the “giving and taking” of the prosopa (see *Nestorius and his place...*, pp. 91 ff.). This scholar considers that Nestorius, having rejected a “substantial” union, comes as near as possible to the idea of a union “on a spiritual plane”: “Nestorius says that the Incarnation took place ‘through an intelligent and rational soul’. By means of the soul a relation is set up between the Logos and the Man, and this relation is on both sides one of free will, a relation of love, a relation of giving on the one side and of taking on the other, a relation that is so close that the one presents itself to the other”; Nestorius’ conception, Loofs would say, can be explained by that of Kähler, who “thought that the union of Godhead will become intelligible if understood as a reciprocity of two personal actions, viz. a creative action on the part of the eternal Godhead, and a receiving action on the part of the developing manhood”. But two important considerations seem to weigh heavily against this view: (1) For Nestorius, it seems certain, it is not the Logos who gives and the Man who takes (so that one might speak of “a reciprocity of two personal actions”)—it is the Logos Himself who performs both actions, “giving us His and taking ours” (*Bazaar*, p. 225); as we shall try to show (see below, pp. 151 ff.), this teacher holds that the union has its centre in the Person of the Logos; (2) It would seem that what we have here is not the conception of a union “on a spiritual plane”, but a theory of the union—and that this is a justifiable conclusion is borne out by the evidence that Nestorius can appeal to his theory of “giving and taking” when he explains the working of the *communicatio idiomatum* (see below, pp. 167 ff.). It may be tempting to view this aspect of Nestorius’ teaching in the light of modern thought, but to regard him as one who would set up a non-meta-physical Christology is to remove him from his own age.

² *Bazaar*, p. 69.

But our difficulty lies in determining the meaning which is here being given to "prosopon". To anticipate what we shall say later on concerning the Antiochene use of this word, we venture to suggest that it could be used, first, in the sense of outward "appearance", secondly, in that of "individuality" or "ownness", and, thirdly, in that of the "person" or "personage"—one who could be named, that is—whose is this "appearance", and "individuality", and that Nestorius, in his doctrine of the Incarnation, uses it in all these senses, that is, not only in the technical sense of "person", but also in its non-technical senses. In the human prosopon, he says, the Logos "was revealed, and therein He taught, and therein and by means thereof He acts as though present and not as though absent";¹ "He took the flesh for His prosopon, and thereby He spoke in teaching and working and acting";² it was of "the prosopon of flesh and of man" that "He made use to make Himself known unto the world".³ Thus, Nestorius would say, in the Incarnation the Logos has taken a human "appearance". Further, he would say that the Logos has taken a human "individuality": His "ownness" in the Incarnation is the Man's ownness (which can be so since the Man was ever obedient to the divine will). And, more than this, the Logos has taken the Man's prosopon in the sense that He has become a human personage, and can be called "man" and "Son of Man". So, as summing up this idea of "taking", in the Incarnation the Logos has now a prosopon of "humiliation", of "kenosis".⁴ Similarly, in respect of the "giving" of the divine prosopon to the Man: in the Incarnation, Nestorius holds, the Man has a divine "appearance", for "the things of the divinity belong to the humanity whence it was made man";⁵ He has a divine "individuality", for "[to have] the prosopon of God is to will what God wills"—and, "serving Him altogether as He wished", the Man's purpose, will, and intelligence were always identical with those of the Logos;⁶ and the humanity can be called "God and Lord and Son of God".⁷ Thus, just as in the Incarnation the Logos has "taken" a prosopon of "humiliation",

¹ *Bazaar*, pp. 54 f.

² *Ibid.* p. 172.

³ *Ibid.* p. 158.

⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 70, 246.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 183; cf. p. 233.

⁶ *Ibid.* p. 59; similarly, p. 62: "For this is the likeness of God, to have neither purpose nor will of its own, but that of Him whose prosopon and likeness it has."

⁷ *Ibid.* p. 234.

so has the Man been "given" a prosopon of "exaltation" or of "adoption".¹

But if we are right in all this, it follows that for Nestorius there is in Jesus Christ a real incarnation of the Logos—He truly becomes man. Accordingly we ask whether he perceives that such a real incarnation necessitates that the Logos shall empty Himself of His divine powers and functions so as to be able to conform to human conditions. We think that he does. Coming at the end of his explanation of his view of the Incarnation is the following important statement. First he speaks of the Man as He has the divine prosopon. Of Him Nestorius says that "in manliness, and in authority, and in ordering of life and in judgment, as in all things, He was associated with God indivisibly", so that

He possessed nothing human of His own, in human things, but the will of God became His own will, when He was made firm in the actions and sufferings of the nature.

Then—and here is the striking passage—he speaks of the Logos as He has taken the human prosopon:

Thus also in things divine, nothing is His own apart from the human humiliation; but while remaining God in all things, [He is] that which the Man was by His nature in sufferings, even in impassibility.²

¹ *Ibid.* pp. 54, 70. So "the manhood is the prosopon of the Godhead, and the Godhead is the prosopon of the manhood" (cf. *ibid.* p. 190). Interpreting this saying, Bethune-Baker says: "These words are quite inconsistent with the idea of the co-existence of two separate and distinct persons side by side; they come near to eliminating 'personality', as we understand it, altogether, or at all events they suggest the merging of one personality in the other, each in each. This in fact seems to be the meaning of Nestorius. He is in search of the real centre of union, and he finds it here. He uses the term 'person' to express that in which both the Godhead and the manhood of our Lord were one, even while remaining distinct from one another, each retaining its own characteristics. The Godhead becomes the subject of human experiences by taking to Itself that which is the centre of human experiences; and the manhood becomes in turn the subject of Divine experiences by being taken up into the centre of the Divine experiences. But the Subject is nevertheless one" (*Nestorius and his Teaching*, p. 97). As it seems to us, this is what Nestorius' idea of the "exchange" of prosopa comes to mean as it is expressed in modern language. He does not take a psychological view of "prosopon", and considers a "person" as a "subject" with its "experiences", but he certainly thinks that in Jesus Christ there are two "wills", the one divine, the other human, and that, these being one, in the union the former becomes that of the manhood, and the latter that of the Godhead—and, as Bethune-Baker says, "will" is one of the chief notes of "personality" (p. 99).

² *Bazaar*, p. 70.

Or, in Nau's translation (his *même sans la passibilité*, we think, bringing out Nestorius' idea more clearly than the rendering "even in impassibility"):

*Il en est de même dans toutes les choses divines, rien ne lui appartenait en propre à part l'humiliation humaine; mais pour demeurer en toutes choses, dans les affaires de Dieu, [il est] ce qu'était l'homme par sa nature dans les souffrances, même sans la passibilité.*¹

Thus Nestorius' view would seem to be that through taking the human prosopon as His prosopon, the Logos, "while remaining God in all things", and continuing in His impassible nature, becomes "that which the Man is",² and having emptied Himself of His divine powers and functions does nothing "apart from the human humiliation". In other words, may we not say that according to this Antiochene, in the Incarnation—though only in the Incarnation—the Logos, whose is now a human "prosopon", allows Himself to be governed by the conditions of that real manhood which He has assumed? The reasonableness of this conclusion is seen when we turn to the analogies which Nestorius employs when he is referring to the "condescension" of the Logos. The king who "wishes to condescend and to become one of the soldiers", he says, "lays aside the purple of royalty", and puts on the equipment of soldiers, "concealing Himself in it, and talking with them on equal terms";³ or, as he has it in another place, the king who becomes one of the subjects "will be voluntarily under the law, though he is their own king".⁴ May we not conclude, therefore, that, when he uses such expressions as "nothing is His own apart from the human humiliation", "talking with them on equal terms", and "voluntarily under the law", Nestorius would say with Cyril that in the Incarnation "the Logos permitted the measures of

¹ *Le Livre d'Héraclide de Damas*, p. 67. [Does not the translation in Bethune-Baker, *Nestorius and his Teaching*, p. 132, miss the meaning through interpreting the passage throughout as if the subject were the Man, and His being made "a party to all the divine things"? Surely, Nestorius is carrying forward his idea of "taking and giving", referring first to the Man as He has been "given" the divine prosopon, and then to the Logos, as He has "taken" the human prosopon?]

² Elsewhere, it may be noted, Nestorius alludes to the Man as "the Man in whom He [the Logos] came to be" (quoted below, p. 160).

³ *Bazaar*, p. 21.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 90.

the manhood to prevail over Himself"?¹ At the same time, it cannot be disputed that, while they understand that the conception of the divine self-emptying must have a place in their Christological system, neither this, nor any other Antiochene theologian, makes any real attempt to work it out. It will be remembered that a similar conclusion was reached when we were considering the teaching of the Alexandrines on this subject.

Our next question is this: How, according to the Antiochenes, has the Logos become man? The answer would appear to be that He has become man through His own voluntary act in assuming real manhood, and uniting it to Himself. In other words, for them the union of Godhead and manhood in the Person of Jesus Christ is voluntary and personal.

Let us take first their teaching on the voluntary character of the union: it is "voluntary" because it depends on the will of the Logos. Theodore of Mopsuestia speaks of it as "the union according to good pleasure", but, it should be noted, he is thinking of the good pleasure of the Divine: by "good pleasure" he means, as he says, the best and highest will of God which He exercises when He takes pleasure in those who are ready to cling to Him.² Again, Nestorius, following the lead thus given to him, insists against the "hypostatic" or "natural" union of Cyril, that it is a "voluntary" union, but it is clear that for him it is "voluntary" because the Logos Himself has been willing to take the body and the rational and intelligent soul: "the union of God the Word with these", he declares, "is neither hypostatic nor natural, but voluntary, as consisting in the property of the will and not of the nature";³ or, as he has it in another place, the "appropriation" is "voluntary".⁴ Similarly Theodoret of Cyrus—who, in like manner, rejects the "hypostatic" and "natural" union—asserts that the union is "in purpose and will". But once again we must notice that the thought is that it was through the purpose and will of the Logos that He was united to the nature assumed from us.⁵

¹ See above, p. 86. ² *De Incarn.* vii, Swete, *op. cit.* II. p. 294.

³ *Bazaar*, p. 179; cf. also *ibid.* pp. 37, 181 f. It is noteworthy that Nestorius, too, speaks of a union "according to good pleasure"—see, for instance, the fragment of his *On the Chapters*, Loofs, *Nestoriana*, p. 220, Frag. e.

⁴ *Bazaar*, p. 163.

⁵ *Reprehen. xii Capp.*, ed. Schulze, v. pt. i. p. 15.

We turn to the second point: as their writings show, these teachers hold that the Logos has united manhood to Himself. Thus Theodore speaks in this way: the Logos was pleased to dwell in the very beginnings of the Man, "having united Him to Himself" (ἐνώσας αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ);¹ "by the indwelling He has united to Himself wholly the one assumed";² "He who was born of the Virgin without human seed was not separated from the Logos but was conjoined by a likeness of disposition, according to which, having manifested His good pleasure, He united Him to Himself";³ the Man who according to us by nature, having been fashioned by the power of the Holy Spirit in the Virgin's womb, He ineffably conjoined with Himself (συνῆψεν ἑαυτῷ).⁴ Again, as we have seen from what he says in the *Bazaar*, Nestorius holds that the Incarnation consists in the "giving and taking" of the prosopa of divinity and humanity—but it is particularly important for us to notice that his teaching is that it is the Logos Himself who "gives and takes". Elsewhere he can say that "the Logos was united to the temple" (*unitum Verbum templo*),⁵ that "God was invisibly conjoined with what is mortal",⁶ that He who was worshipped by the Magi was "not a babe seen singly, but a body ineffably conjoined with God",⁷ and that "Christ is not a mere man, but He who is conjoined with God the Logos".⁸ Moreover, it should be observed that for him the union is a *unio dominica*⁹—"dominica" because, like the *incarnatio* and the *dispensatio* (which he describes in the same way),¹⁰ it has its centre in Him who is *Dominus*, namely, the Logos Himself. Is it not clear, then, that, like the Bishop of Mopsuestia, Nestorius is firm on the point that the union has been set up through the action of the Logos in uniting manhood to Himself? Andrew of Samosata upholds the same principle: "That which

¹ *De Incarn.* xiv, Swete, *op. cit.* II. p. 308.

² *De Incarn.* vii, Swete, *op. cit.* II. p. 296.

³ *De Incarn.*, Swete, *op. cit.* II. p. 311.

⁴ From Theodore's Creed, Swete, *op. cit.* II. p. 329.

⁵ *Sermo xviii*, Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 303.

⁶ *Sermo v*, Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 242.

⁷ *Ibid.* p. 354 (from a saying quoted by Cyril).

⁸ From Nestorius' homily, *The Explanation of the Teaching*, Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 284.

⁹ *Ep. i ad Caelest.*, Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 166.

¹⁰ Cf. *Sermo ix*, Loofs, *op. cit.* pp. 263, 251.

is of the seed of David", he says, "was ineffably united to the Logos of the Father without confusion and without division".¹ And the Bishop of Cyrus is equally definite: the Holy Spirit formed in the Virgin's womb the temple of the Logos, the form of a servant, "which the divine Logos took from its very conception, uniting it to Himself" (ἦν . . . ὁ θεὸς Λόγος ἀναλαβὼν ἦνωσεν ἑαυτῷ);² the only-begotten Son "united our vanquished nature to Himself";³ Jesus Christ is Mediator because, God by nature, He has taken the form of a servant, "joining together in Himself [ἐν ἑαυτῷ] the distinct qualities of Godhead and manhood in the union of the natures".⁴ The Antiochenes may reject Cyril's "hypostatic" and "natural" union—because, as we shall see, taking "hypostasis" and "nature" in this connection in the sense of *substantia*, they are convinced that such expressions must mean that, as a result of the union, the human has been transformed into the divine *substantia* of Jesus Christ⁵—but it seems clear that they would uphold the very same truth which their opponents were upholding, namely, that in Jesus Christ the Logos has "personally" united manhood to Himself.

That this is a justifiable conclusion is seen from another point of view: the Antiochenes expressly deny that the manhood assumed by the Logos is "that of another beside Him" (ἐτέρου τινὸς παρ' αὐτόν); rather, do they assert, is it the "own" of the Logos. Let us see what Andrew of Samosata, acting as the spokesman of the members of this school, says in reply to Cyril, who, believing that they were adopting the view that the manhood of Christ is "that of another", emphatically condemns such a view in his *Twelve Anathematisms*.⁶ Thus, in reply to the Seventh Anathematism, in which the Alexandrine denounces the notion that Jesus "as a man" was energized by the divine

¹ So in Andrew's reply to Cyril's Anath. x, *Apol. adv. Orient.* x, ed. Pusey, VI. p. 340. Similar statements are to be found in his answer to Cyril's Anaths. xi, xii, ed. Pusey, VI. pp. 352, 366. Cf. also the fragment of a letter written by Andrew to Rabbûla of Edessa (see below, p. 238 n. 3), and quoted by Severus in his *Philalethes* (ed. Sanda, p. 24), which runs: *Dico . . . Unigenitum a Patre eum sibi univisse qui est ex semine David . . .* (trans. as in Sanda).

² *In Esaiam xi. I*, ed. Schulze, II. pt. i. p. 249.

³ *De Prov.* x, ed. Schulze, IV. pt. i. p. 661.

⁴ *Dial.* ii, ed. Schulze, IV. pt. i. p. 85.

⁵ See below, pp. 216 ff.

⁶ See below, p. 210 n. 5—the phrase occurs five times in the *Anathematisms*.

Logos as "another existing beside Him", Andrew explicitly affirms that they do not teach that our Lord Jesus Christ was energized by the Spirit "as being a man singly" (ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἄπλῶς)—like any righteous man, or prophet, or apostle.¹ So would he condemn what Cyril condemns. But this is not all. In the reply which this Antiochene makes to the Eleventh Anathematism, we find that the position of the school is set out in clearest terms. Making use of the analogy of the union of flesh and soul in the individual man, the Bishop of Samosata pointedly asks—Whose soul can be that of another? Each of us, he declares, has common flesh, but it is the "own" of each one of us, and not that of another—it is that of him whose is the flesh (ἑκείνου οὐ ἔστι σάρξ). So in respect of Jesus Christ: the flesh, he says, which "without confusion and without division has been united to the divine Logos", is His own and belongs only to the Lord Himself—it is "own and sole" (ἰδία καὶ μόνη).² And such, it should be understood, is a doctrine which is traditional in this school: as we have already pointed out, Eustathius himself had spoken of the manhood as the *suum templum* of the Logos.³

We conclude, then, that for the Antiochenes the union of Godhead and manhood in Christ is "voluntary" and "personal"—"voluntary" because it was the will of the Logos to condescend and to "take" real manhood, and "personal" because He united that manhood to Himself, and made it His own. After all, their soteriological ideas demand such a conception of the union. If there is to be a restoration of the cosmos, they see, a second Adam must come into existence. But they also see that this second Adam cannot arise from among men: God Himself, in the Person of the Logos, must by His own voluntary act, Himself condescend, and unite to Himself a man who will be the Man, that with Him as His instrument He, the Logos, may

¹ *Apol. adv. Orient.* vii, ed. Pusey, vi. p. 308.

² *Apol. adv. Orient.* xi, ed. Pusey, vi. p. 352. It seems certain that when Theodoret, in reply to Cyril's Anath. v, says: "If He shared in flesh and blood, He shared as being Another beside them [ὡς ἄλλος παρὰ ταῦτα]; and if the flesh was other beside Him [ἄλλο τι παρ' αὐτόν], He Himself was not changed into flesh" (*Apol. adv. Theod.* v, ed. Schulze, v. pt. i. p. 32; ed. Pusey, vi. p. 436), he is "separating the natures", in order to safeguard the doctrine of the immortality and impassibility of the Divine.

³ See above, p. 123.

carry out the work of man's salvation. Here again, it will be noted, we have teaching which is clearly in line with that of the Alexandrines: as we have seen, these emphasize the voluntary character of the union, and insist that it has its centre in the Person of the Logos.

We now approach the heart of the Christology of the Antiochenes. The Logos, they hold, has in Jesus Christ united to Himself real manhood. But, as they are always saying, theirs is not the doctrine of "two Sons"—the Logos and a man, set side by side. Rather do they constantly affirm that their doctrine, like that of their opponents, is that Jesus Christ is "one prosopon". What, then, do they mean when they speak in this way?

Now, from the outset, it is important for us to understand that the Antiochene teachers maintain, not that the union of Godhead and manhood in Jesus Christ has its ground in this one prosopon—as would have been the case if, fundamental to their system, had been the notion that the union was dependent on the oneness in purpose and will that existed between the Logos and the Man—but that the one prosopon is the result of the union. Theodore of Mopsuestia, for instance, uses such expressions as these: "According to the union, He [the Logos] constitutes [συντελεῖν] with Him [the Man assumed] one prosopon";¹ the indwelling differs from the ordinary indwelling of God because "we say that two natures have been united, and that the prosopon constituted by the union is one" (*adunari dicimus utrasque naturas et unam juxta adunationem effectam esse personam*);² "the mode of union according to good pleasure, which preserves the natures without confusion and without division, shows [δείκνυσιν] that the prosopon of both is one";³ "the prosopon constituted by the union [τῇ ἐνώσει ἀποτελούμενον] is one".⁴ Nestorius is equally definite. It was, as he says, "because He [the Logos] condescended" that "there was demonstrated one purpose, one will, one intelligence, indistinguishable and invisible as in One".⁵ According to this teacher, therefore, it is as a result of

¹ *De Incarn.* vii, Swete, *op. cit.* ii. p. 296.

² *De Incarn.* xiii, Swete, *op. cit.* ii. pp. 307 f.

³ *Ep. ad Domnum*, Swete, *op. cit.* ii. p. 329.

⁴ *De Incarn.* viii, Swete, *op. cit.* ii. p. 300.

⁵ *Bazaar*, p. 70 (see below, pp. 160 f.).

the Incarnation that the oneness of the Logos and the Man in purpose and will is demonstrated. Again, he expressly states that the natures "have been combined in one prosopon",¹ that the union "took place for the prosopon",² that "the union of the natures resulted in the one prosopon",³ that it "resulted" not in a hypostasis of nature, as, in his view, the Alexandrines were teaching, but "in a voluntary prosopon",⁴ and—with the same thought in mind—that "the union of the divinity came about, not for the completion of one ousia, but for the prosopon of the dispensation on our behalf".⁵

If, then, the one prosopon is the result of the union, it is the result of the voluntary act of the Logos in uniting real manhood to Himself—that is, the Logos has so assumed this manhood that there is constituted one prosopon, one Person, of Him who assumed and of that which was assumed, who, accordingly, is a Person at once divine and human. And this, as we would now endeavour to explain, is what these teachers mean when they say that Jesus Christ is "one prosopon".

But first we must consider the meaning of this term as it is used by the Antiochenes. Perhaps we can express the difference between the Alexandrine and the Antiochene use of "prosopon" in this way: whereas the Alexandrine theologians—though they are aware of the non-technical meanings which could be given to this word—seem to employ it in doctrinal discussion only in the technical sense of "person",⁶ the Antiochenes, or at any rate Theodore and particularly Nestorius, see the value of making use of the term in its non-technical senses, as they would bring out their teaching on the "one Person" of Jesus Christ.

Every real being, the theologians of this school would say, has its "prosopon".⁷ Thus the Bishop of Mopsuestia can declare that it is impossible for a hypostasis to be without a prosopon.⁸ Similarly, Nestorius: "The prosopon does not exist without the

¹ *Bazaar*, p. 313.

² *Ibid.* p. 218.

³ *Ibid.* p. 262.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 181.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 301.

⁶ See above, pp. 46 f.

⁷ As Hodgson puts it: "It [the prosopon] is a real element in the being of a thing, without which, or if it were other than it is, the thing would not be what it is" (*Bazaar*, Append. iv, p. 416).

⁸ *De Incarn.* viii, Swete, *op. cit.* II. p. 299 (quoted below, p. 187).

ousia"; "the natures [of Christ] subsist in their prosopon".¹ This, then, is our starting-point.

So, in accordance with the original meaning of the word, the "prosopon" of an ousia is, first, its "appearance":² it is that by which the ousia is known.³ Thus, to give two examples of this usage, Nestorius can say that Christ "showed in Himself the prosopon of the [human] nature free from sin"⁴—that is, Christ's "appearance", as He was seen by men, was one of sinlessness; and it is evident that Theodoret is using the word in this sense when, in his comment on Romans vii. 23, 24, he says that St Paul would show "what manner of prosopon" was man's before the coming of grace, and draws attention to the stress which the Apostle is here laying on the fact that at that time man was "obsessed by sin"⁵—that is, this teacher would say, before grace came man had a sinful "appearance".

¹ *Bazaar*, pp. 170, 218 f., 309. So also Nestorius can speak of "a natural and hypostatic prosopon" (*ibid.* p. 86)—i.e. the prosopon of a nature or hypostasis (see note in Driver and Hodgson *ad loc.*). It is true that, as Loofs says, for this teacher "everything had its prosopon, its appearance, its kind of being seen and judged" (*Nestorius and his place. . .*, p. 78), but we question whether it is right to say with this scholar that "for Nestorius. . . the main thing in his notion of prosopon was the external undivided appearance" (*ibid.* p. 76). The point would seem to be that in Christological discussion Nestorius uses the term in the various meanings which belong to its etymological growth—but he does so only to make it clear that he, and his fellow-Antiochenes, were upholding the truth of the "one Person". Surely, in view of the general use of the term in this sense both in "Theology" and in Christological doctrine, "the main thing in his notion of prosopon" could hardly be other than the "Person" (of Jesus Christ)—though he adopts the meanings of "appearance" and "individuality" in order to show that this "Person" is "one".

² Closely connected with the meaning of "appearance" is, of course, that of "representation". Thus—to quote examples adduced by Loofs (*op. cit.* p. 77)—Nestorius speaks of messengers and ambassadors as the "prosopa" of those who send them (i.e. those who send them have their "appearance", their "representation", in their ambassadors), and of himself, as he, a bishop, is preaching from the pulpit, as "the prosopon of the Church" (i.e. in him the Church has its "appearance", its "representation") [*Bazaar*, p. 57; Loofs, *Nestoriana*, p. 332].

³ Thus Nestorius can say that the one prosopon of Jesus Christ is that "by which and in which both the natures are known" (*Bazaar*, p. 157; similarly, pp. 319 f.).

⁴ *Sermo v*, Loofs, *Nestoriana*, p. 239.

⁵ *In Rom. vii*, ed. Schulze, III. pt. i. p. 79. We have here (as in the preceding instance) a "metaphorical use of the literal sense of 'face'". A similar use of "prosopon", as denoting "inner and spiritual characteristics", is to be found in Origen (quoted by Driver and Hodgson, *Bazaar*, pp. 403 f.).

The term could also be used when referring to "the individual peculiarity" of a being. Here what Babai, the Nestorian theologian, says concerning the meaning of the Syriac equivalent *paršôpâ* is of no small help to us. In his *de Unione* he writes: "As to *person*, it is that characteristic of the hypostasis which distinguishes it from other hypostases. The hypostasis of Paul is not the hypostasis of Peter. On the count of nature and of hypostasis, there is no difference between them;... But by *person* they are distinguished each from the other in virtue of the individual peculiarity which each possesses, whether it be on account of wisdom or of strength, or of figure, or of appearance or temperament, or of paternity or sonship, or by masculine or feminine sex, or in any way, whatever it may be, that distinguishes and reveals the particular characteristics...."¹ It is easy enough to see how this usage could arise. The "appearance" of a thing is itself that which distinguishes one thing from another thing. But—to adopt one of Babai's phrases—"that which makes the distinction"² is confined to that particular being which is thus distinguished from all other particular beings of the same *genus*—it is its "own". So, quite naturally, the term could be employed in order to express the idea of "ownness" or "individuality"—"individuality" as seen, that is, not from an abstract, but from a concrete, point of view. In this connection it may be noted that at the beginning of his *Dialogues*, where he is discussing the doctrine of the Trinity, Theodoret can say that "'prosopon' and 'hypostasis' and ἰδιότης mean the same thing".³

The more usual meaning of "prosopon" is that of "person", "personage"—the individual, that is, whose is the "appearance" and the "individual peculiarity", he having a name. Examples of this usage have been adduced by Loofs:⁴ when Nestorius speaks of "Cyril's prosopon" he means "Cyril", and when he speaks of "those prosopa", he means "those persons". Or to give examples from Theodoret: when reference is made to the blindness of Isaac in Scripture, he says, it is not to the body—though it was the body that possessed the weakness—but to

¹ Bethune-Baker, *op. cit.* p. 229. Though Babai lived in the seventh century, it seems legitimate to consider that he is here explaining a usage which had long been current in Syria.

² *Ibid.* ³ *Dial.* i, ed. Schulze, iv. pt. i. p. 8.

⁴ *Nestorius and his place...*, p. 77 (*Bazaar*, pp. 132, 133).

"the prosopon itself", it being recounted that "Isaac" was blind;¹ and, writing of Nathan's meeting with David, this teacher says that after the prophet had related the parable of the ewe lamb, he went on to lay bare "the prosopon of the accusation"²—that is, through his "Thou art the man", Nathan disclosed the particular individual against whom the accusation was being brought.

It would seem, then, that if we are to understand the meaning which is being given to "prosopon" in any particular passage in the writings of the Antiochenes, we must first see the term in relation to the context, and so discover the thought that is being brought out. As we have noticed, there are times in the *Bazaar* when we can be almost certain that Nestorius is using the term in the sense of "appearance"—as, for instance, when he says that the Logos made use of "the prosopon of flesh and of man" when He wished "to make Himself known unto the world".³ Moreover, it is likely that when speaking of the "one prosopon", he has the idea of "appearance" in mind. Thus in the passage to which we referred when we were considering his teaching on the divine self-emptying, we have the following: "He [Jesus Christ] is in them both, in the likeness of a servant and in the likeness of God, and possesses the same prosopon of humiliation and exaltation."⁴ Is not his meaning here that in Jesus Christ there is "one appearance", and that upon investigation this "appearance" is seen to be both an appearance of humiliation (the Logos having "taken" this appearance) and an appearance of exaltation (the Logos having "given" this appearance to the Man)? So his teaching would seem to be that in Jesus Christ there is one appearance which is at once both divine and human—a conception which, as we shall see, is in line with what he says concerning the "one prosopon" when he uses the term in its other senses.

¹ *Dial.* iii, ed. Schulze, iv. pt. i, p. 189.

² *Quaest. in III Reg.*, ed. Schulze, i. pt. i. p. 508.

³ Quoted above, p. 148. [It may be noted that, according to Driver and Hodgson, the word *schêma*, which Nestorius frequently uses in the *Bazaar* has hardly the same meaning as "prosopon": "the word *schêma* seems to mean the form or appearance at any given moment... But prosopon, whatever it is, must be a permanent element in the being of a thing..." (*Bazaar*, p. 15 n. 2).]

⁴ *Bazaar*, p. 70 (see also above, pp. 148 f.).

Again, we find that the word occurs in contexts where the thought of the one "individuality" of Jesus Christ is uppermost. We will put out one or two representative passages from Theodore of Mopsuestia and Nestorius. In his letter to Domnus the former writes in this way:

The union of the natures according to good pleasure effects by reason of identity [τῷ τῆς ὁμωνυμίας λόγῳ] one will, energy, authority, majesty, lordship, dignity, power between them which nothing can remove, there existing, and being shown, one prosopon between them in accordance with this union.

Again, from the same letter:

The mode of union according to good pleasure, while preserving the natures without confusion [ἀσυγχύτως] and without division [ἀδιαιρέτως], shows that one is the prosopon between them, one the will, one the operation, and, consequently, one the authority and the lordship.¹

In like manner, Nestorius insists that Jesus Christ is one in will and activity. Thus, to quote from the *Bazaar*:

Since in actions in bodily things He [the Man] preserved the likeness of God in all the sufferings of the body, it was preferable to Him that the will of God should be done, and not that of the flesh; and in actions He made Himself a likeness to will that which He [the Logos] wills, that there might be one and the same will in both of them and one prosopon without division.²

Similarly:

In whatsoever there was pain and vexation He [the Man] was firm in His thoughts, because His will was bound to the will of God, and there was nothing to draw Him away and make Him distinct from Him. For He was not living for Himself but for Him whose prosopon He was, and He kept the prosopon without blemish and without scar, and thereby gave victory to the nature.³

Or we may quote the following fragment of his work *de mysterio Epiphaniae*:

The divine Logos was not one Person [ἄλλος] and another [ἄλλος] the Man in whom He came to be [ἐν ᾧ γέγονεν]. Rather,

¹ Swete, *op. cit.* II. pp. 338 f.

² *Bazaar*, p. 66. As has been said, for Nestorius the "likeness" is the "prosopon" (see above, p. 134).

³ *Bazaar*, p. 64.

one was the prosopon of both in dignity and honour, worshipped by all creation, and in no way and no time divided by otherness of purpose and will.¹

From statements such as these, in which "prosopon" and "will" are brought together, it may seem that the former has for the Antiochenes a meaning approaching our "personality",² but, we must remember, their "person" is not one subject, possessing a central ego, but a person as he is seen from the outside. As seems clear, the dominant thought in these statements is that of "individuality", Theodore and Nestorius insisting that while the manhood of Christ is altogether real—as we shall see, Nestorius is but following Theodore in maintaining that, like the divine nature, it has its prosopon—that manhood possesses no "ownness" in the sense that its individuality is "other" than that of the Logos: there is "one prosopon without division". As we have said, Nestorius teaches that the Man assumed was created in this prosopon³ and—as his own statements reveal—it is one of his main assertions that the Man, in His perfect obedience, always retained it. The point that he would make is, then, that since He "kept the prosopon without blemish and without scar", the Man's individuality was ever identical with that of the Logos, there being in Christ one individuality which, while it was a divine, was also a human, individuality.

Most frequently, of course, the Antiochenes use "prosopon" in the sense of "personage", and just as Nestorius would say that in Jesus Christ there is one "appearance", one "individuality", so also would he say—and the rest of the Antiochenes with him—that He is one Person, one Personage, at once divine and human. Instance after instance could be given of their use of the term in this meaning. At this point the following from Theodoret will suffice for our purpose. God, says this teacher, foresaw the Incarnation of the Only-begotten (τὴν τοῦ μονογενοῦς

¹ Loofs, *Nestoriana*, p. 224. We may also note that, in a fragment from his *On the Chapters*, Nestorius speaks of one will and one activity as resulting from the union: ἡ κατὰ τὴν θέλησιν ἕνωσις . . . μίαν αὐτῶν (i.e. the natures) δεικνύσα πεποιημένην τὴν θέλησιν καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν (*ibid.* p. 219).

² At the same time we would say with Bethune-Baker that there is suggested here "the merging of one personality in the other, each in each" (see above, p. 149 n. 1).

³ See above, p. 134.

σάρκωσίν τε καὶ ἐνανθρώπησιν)—He foresaw how He, the Only-begotten, would take this nature from the Virgin, and so conjoin it with, and unite it to, Himself (ἐαυτῷ) that one prosopon of God and man would be perceived (ὡς ἐν πρόσωπον θεοῦ τε καὶ ἀνθρώπου νοεῖσθαι), and to Him (αὐτῷ) one worship would be offered by all creation.¹ Here, as it seems to us, is a statement which can be taken as setting forth what all the Antiochenes believe concerning the “one prosopon”: that one Person, Jesus Christ, is the only-begotten Son, the Logos, who has united to Himself real manhood—a manhood, that is, possessing the faculty of self-determination, which is always exercised in accordance with the will of the Logos—He being at once both God and man.

It cannot be denied that, as it is seen from certain angles, the teaching of the Antiochene theologians would seem to be that of “two Sons”: their constant use of the term “conjunction” when speaking of the union, their description of the action of the Logos in taking man’s nature as an “indwelling”, and their determination to “separate” the natures of Godhead and manhood in Christ, each of which, they assert, has its prosopon—all these features of their doctrine might seem to indicate that for them Jesus Christ is not one prosopon but “two”, the Logos and the Man in whom the Logos dwells, these two being conjoined in harmony of will and purpose. But, while it must be acknowledged that some of their expressions are unsatisfactory, their affirmations show that they do not teach a duad of Sons, but proclaim that in Jesus Christ the Logos, the Second Person of the Trinity, has taken to Himself a human nature altogether like ours, the consequence being that there is now set up one Person, whose are the two natures of Godhead and manhood, and whose, accordingly, are properties both divine and human.

Thus in a well-known passage, Theodore of Mopsuestia, in answer to the charge made against his teaching by the followers of the Laodicene, emphatically denies that, while he asserts “two natures”, he sets up “two Persons”:

Men are ready to say against us, “If we say that there are two perfect entities [δύο τέλει], we must allow that there are two Sons”.... But we do not speak of two Sons. We confess, and

¹ *Quaest. in Gen. i*, ed. Schulze, I. pt. i. pp. 23 f.

rightly, one Son, since the dividing of the natures ought of necessity to be upheld, and the inseparability of the unity of the prosopon to be preserved.¹

For Theodore, as his interpretation of the *locus classicus* of these teachers plainly illustrates, Jesus Christ is one Person, to whom both what is divine and what is human must be attributed. He says that when St Paul writes (in Philippians ii. 8) “becoming obedient even unto death, yea, the death of the cross”, the Apostle is not thinking of the *susceptus homo* as if He were *alius aliquis praeter Christum*,² but, while referring the death to the human nature, has in mind—as his “Who being in the form of God...” indicates—*una eademque persona*, Jesus Christ, to whom belong both *quaecumque oportebant de divina natura* and *illa quae humanitatis sunt propria*.³ And, as we have seen, “Jesus Christ” is for him the Logos, the Son, as He has taken man’s nature upon Him: “to the one Person of the Son”, he says in his *ad Baptizandos*, the Fathers at Nicaea ascribed both what is divine and what is human when they spoke of “the only Son” and “the First-born of all creatures”.⁴

Nestorius, it is clear, upholds the same position. As Bethune-Baker has shown,⁵ this Antiochene “forcibly refutes the idea that there are two persons, though he persistently maintains that there are two substances, in the one Christ, who is the one Son and Word of God”. Thus he can say:

Hear this plainly stated. Christ is indivisible in His being Christ, but He is twofold in His being God and His being man. He is single in His Sonship; He is twofold in Him who has assumed and Him who is assumed. In the Person of the Son

¹ *De Incarn.* xii, Swete, *op. cit.* II. p. 303. See also for a similar rejection of the “two Sons”, and the assertion that Jesus Christ is “one prosopon”, the Creed of Theodore, which, Raven says, “despite the protests of Facundus, is certainly his composition” (Swete, *op. cit.* II. pp. 329 f.; quoted by Raven, *Apollinarianism*, pp. 296 f.).

² Thus Theodore anticipates the statement of Andrew of Samosata that the Antiochenes do not hold that the flesh of Christ is “that of another beside the Logos” (see above, pp. 153 f.).

³ *In Phil. ii. 8*, Swete, *op. cit.* I. pp. 219 f.

⁴ Mingana, *op. cit.* p. 37. As Theodore knew it, the Creed contained the latter phrase.

⁵ In his *Nestorius and his Teaching*, pp. 83 f. The passages quoted above have been taken from those collected by Bethune-Baker, in support of his contention: “‘Two Persons’ not the teaching of Nestorius”.

He is a single [Person], but, as with two eyes, He is different in the natures of manhood and Godhead. For we know not two Christs or two Sons or Only-begottens, or Lords. . . but One and the Same, who was seen in the created and the uncreated nature.¹

Or:

We do not hold two Christs or two Sons. . . but He who is one is Himself twofold [αὐτὸς ὁ εἷς ἐστὶ διπλοῦς], not in dignity, but in nature.²

And—again as illustrating that for Nestorius this “One” is at once divine and human—we can adduce such statements as these:

Our Lord the Christ is God and man.³

The visible and the invisible are one Son.⁴

He Himself [*idem ipse*] is new as man, but before the ages as God.⁵

Moreover, especially interesting in this connection is his use of the title “the Man-God”, which is to be found in the *Bazaar*: the Christ, he says, was “created in such wise as not originally to be man but Man-God by the incarnation of God”.⁶ From all this it seems clear that Nestorius is hardly deserving of the title “Nestorian”, and that this is a legitimate conclusion is borne out by statements of his which show that for him Jesus Christ is very God incarnate. Thus in the *Bazaar* he denounces those who “call Christ and the Son [of God] double in prosopon as well as in hypostasis—in like manner as the saints have received the indwelling of God”.⁷ Again, in the same work he asks how it can be thought that his doctrine is that there is one Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, and another Son, Christ, “who is only such as a man is”, when he directly affirms that

the Only-begotten, who is in the bosom of the Father, has expounded unto us God, whom no man has ever seen; and no one else than He who is in the bosom of the Father came and became flesh and dwelt among us.⁸

¹ *Sermo* xii, Loofs, *Nestoriana*, p. 280.

² *Ibid.*, *ibid.* p. 281.

³ *Ibid.*, *ibid.* p. 284.

⁴ *Sermo* xviii, Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 299.

⁵ *Sermo* x, Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 270.

⁶ *Bazaar*, p. 60. It would seem from the Syriac that we have here an original Ἀνθρώπου-θεός.

⁷ *Ibid.* pp. 45 f.

⁸ *Ibid.* p. 50. Cf. also Nestorius' acceptance of the statement of Gregory of Nyssa: “The King of Kings and Lord of Lords is clothed in the likeness of a servant” (*ibid.* p. 221). “God”, he says, condescended (*ibid.* p. 23).

Surely, we could not have a more explicit denial of the Nestorian position than this: for him Jesus Christ is one Person, the Logos made man, whose, since He is God and man, are properties divine and human.¹

Again, we could cite instance after instance to show that the Bishop of Cyrus denies that his is the doctrine of “two Sons”. He is truly amazed, he says, in his letter to Dioscorus of Alexandria, to hear of the charge which his accusers were bringing against him. These were saying that when preaching at Antioch he had upheld this Nestorian doctrine. But, he asks, because man consists of a mortal body and an immortal soul, does one say that a man is two men? All he does is to differentiate between the properties of the divine and human natures which have come together in the one Person—but he holds, and that most emphatically, that all the properties, whether divine or human, are those of this one Person. As he puts it in his *Dialogues*:

When arguing concerning the natures of Christ, we should give to each its own, but when we are discussing the Person [prosopon] we must then make what is proper to the natures common, and apply both sets of properties to the Saviour and call the Same both God and man, both Son of God and Son of Man, both David's Son and David's Lord, both seed of Abraham and Creator of Abraham, and so on.²

Or:

We preach such a union of Godhead and manhood as to understand one undivided Person [prosopon], and to acknowledge the Same to be God and man; . . . and we apply to the one Person [τῶν προσώπων τῷ ἐνί] all the attributes which are indicative alike of Godhead and manhood.³

¹ Thus, in respect of the properties of Christ, Nestorius can say: “Christ is both of them [i.e. ‘He who took the likeness of a servant’, and ‘the likeness of a servant’] by nature. For this reason the properties of the two natures befit also the one prosopon” (*ibid.* p. 166). He also speaks of “assigning the properties of the natures to the prosopon” (*ibid.* p. 157).

² *Dial.* ii, ed. Schulze, iv. pt. i. p. 108.

³ *Dial.* iii, *ibid.* p. 203. Here we may note that, like the rest, Andrew of Samosata denies that he teaches “two prosopa or two hypostases or two Sons”: for him “the Sonship is common to both natures”; he does not say “one and another”, but “One and the Same” (so in his reply to Cyril's *Anath.* x, *Apol. adv. Orient.* x, ed. Pusey, vi. pp. 338 ff.).

And we have already given several instances of Theodoret's doctrine that this "one Person" is the eternal Son, who, through uniting manhood to Himself, has become man.

But is not this the very doctrine which was being maintained by the Alexandrines? If the Logos has united manhood to Himself, that manhood has its place in His Person. We mean that though they are opposed to the use of the word "composition" (σύνθεσις) the Antiochenes themselves, in their teaching on the "one prosopon", are in reality standing for the very conception which their opponents were seeking to express through their use of this word¹—that, in reality, the phrase being understood in the sense which was given to it by those who coined it, they were upholding the position that Jesus Christ is μία φύσις σύνθετος,² one Person, that is, at once God and man. And we can go farther. The Antiochenes teach that in Jesus Christ the Logos Himself, very God of very God, has become man—that He who "until He took flesh in His own prosopon was called Son on account of the divinity" is He who "since He took flesh in His own prosopon, became flesh", and is the Son revealed in flesh.³ But what have we here save the doctrine that He who was once ἄσαρκος is now ἔσαρκος?⁴ Nay, more, may we not say that they are but teaching what is summed up in the Alexandrines' formula that Jesus Christ is μία φύσις τοῦ θεοῦ Λόγου σεσαρκωμένη?

Again, it is evident that these teachers are at one with the members of the opposing school of thought in adopting the principle of the *communicatio idiomatum*. Because Jesus Christ is one Person, both God and man, they say, His divine and human titles can be interchanged, and what is human transferred to the divine title, and what is divine to the human title. For this, as they fully realize, they have the authority of Scripture itself. Diodore of Tarsus acknowledges that "if anyone should wish through a figure of speech [καταχρηστικῶς] to name the Son of God [the divine Logos] 'Son of David', he is at liberty to do

¹ Nestorius, it seems clear, is maintaining the conception of a "composition" when, replying to the charge of Cyril that he was so dividing the natures that he was denying that Christ is "One and the Same", declares: "We understand neither that which took nor that which was taken in distinction [? separation] but that which was taken in that which took, while that which took is conceived in that which was taken" (*Bazaar*, p. 208).

² See above, p. 54.

³ See Nestorius' argument, *Bazaar*, p. 54.

⁴ See above, p. 51.

so, because He from David is the temple of the Logos"¹—Diodore, as is clear from his concluding words, holding that it is in virtue of the union of Godhead and manhood in the one Person of Jesus Christ that such an interchange of titles is possible. Again, Theodore of Mopsuestia in his *ad Baptizandos* expressly states that in view of "the wonderfulness and sublimity of the union, what is due to the one [nature] is also due to the other";² and in his explanation of certain Scriptural passages in which there is an interchange of titles, he says: "Any time the Book wishes to speak of things done to the human nature, it rightly refers them to the divine nature because they are high above our nature—in this it shows the union with that Man in order to make credible the things done by Him".³ Theodoret of Cyrus has the same teaching. Thus, he asserts that "the divine nature came down from heaven" and that "in consequence of the union it was called Son of Man", and explains that "The Crucified" is called "Lord of Glory" (he has previously quoted 1 Corinthians xi. 8) "by attribution of the title of the impassible nature to the passible".⁴ Or we may quote the remark which is to be found in his reply to Cyril's Sixth Anathematism:⁵ "We confess that the form of a servant is God because of the Son of God united to it."

And what of Nestorius? He, too, accepts the principle of transference, and allows that in Jesus Christ "the flesh is called God",⁶ and "God the Logos is called man".⁷ Neither does he

¹ *P.G.* lxxxvi. 1388c.

² Mingana, *op. cit.* p. 87.

³ *Ibid.* p. 89. Theodore is alluding to such passages as St Jn. iii. 13, vi. 62, Rom. ix. 5.

⁴ *Dial.* iii, ed. Schulze, iv. pt. i. p. 227.

⁵ *Reprehen. xii Capp.* vi, ed. Schulze, v. pt. i. p. 36.

⁶ *Bazaar*, p. 238. Cf. also the following statements of Nestorius: "The Virgin bore the manhood which is Son because of the Son who is joined thereto" (*Sermo x*, Loofs, *Nestoriana*, p. 274); "He who was of the race of Israel according to the flesh... was by the conjunction almighty God" (*Sermo viii*, *ibid.* p. 248); "He who was assumed, since He was conjoined with Him who assumed, is called God" (*Sermo ix*, *ibid.* p. 262; see also *ibid.* p. 254, where he says that the form of a servant is called God).

⁷ *Bazaar*, p. 252. Similarly, "As God the Word is by nature God incorporeal, nevertheless in the union with the flesh He is called flesh, and the flesh which is in its nature bodily frame and in its ousia also bodily frame, is yet God and Son by the union with God the Word the Son of God" (*ibid.* p. 159); "We name the Man God indeed on account of the union of the divinity, but man in nature; similarly... God the Word is God indeed in nature, but we call God man by reason of the prosopon of the humanity" (*ibid.* p. 248).

hesitate to attribute what is human to the Logos or what is divine to the Man. Thus he says that "the divinity is named 'Christ' after the humanity which was anointed",¹ and—in order to show how false was the Ephesine judgment against him that his teaching was contrary to that of the Fathers, some of whose statements (including this of Gregory's) were read at that Council²—declares with the Bishop of Nazianzus that "He who had a beginning and grew and was perfected is not God, though He is so called on account of the manifestation that took place gradually".³ But, we consider, Nestorius does more than accept the principle: on the basis of his theory of "taking and giving" he would, as it seems, offer an explanation of its working which rules out the possibility of any misunderstanding when the principle is employed. Moreover, he claims that in all this he has the support of the orthodox teachers of the Church, since one learns from their testimonies that they "give in compensation the [properties] of the humanity to the divinity, and those of the divinity to the humanity".⁴ What, then, is Nestorius' explanation of the working of the *communicatio idiomatum*?

Seemingly he starts from the conception that Jesus Christ, the Logos made man, is one prosopon, this one prosopon being "the common prosopon of the divinity and of the humanity".⁵ To this "common prosopon", he teaches, belong both divine and human properties. Hence, both what is divine and what is human must be ascribed to this one prosopon. As he says:

All the things which are called after the union in respect to both of these things which are united come to be with reference to the one prosopon.⁶

But how comes it about that, in the union of Godhead and manhood in this "common prosopon" of Jesus Christ, the Logos can be called "flesh" and the flesh can be called "God"? Nestorius' answer would appear to be that in the union the prosopa of the natures make use of one another. Thus, after maintaining that the divine and human ousiai are not conceived without

hypostases, and that these subsist "in the prosopon of the union", he goes on:

For in respect to the natural prosopon of the one the other also makes use of the same on account of the union; and thus [there is] one prosopon of two natures. The prosopon of the one ousia makes use of the prosopon of the other ousia in the same [way].¹

Thus it would seem that by means of this theory of the "exchange" of the natural prosopa this Antiochene would explain why "the names of the natural prosopa"² can be interchanged: in the union, the prosopon of the one nature becomes that of the other, with the consequence that God can be called "man", and the Man can be called "God".³

Yet this is not all. Evidently Nestorius would also show how it comes about that in virtue of the union human things can be ascribed to the Logos, and divine things to the Man. To quote an important passage in this connection:

The common prosopon of the two natures [is] Christ, the same prosopon whereof the natures make use. . . . Neither the divinity nor the humanity exists [by itself] in the common prosopon, for it appertains to both the natures, so that therein and thereby both the natures are known; for it is one in the ousiai. For even the ousia of the humanity similarly makes use of the prosopon of the ousia of the divinity and not of the ousia, and the ousia of the divinity makes use of the prosopon of the humanity similarly, and not of the ousia. . . .⁴

According to this, then, it is not only that in the union "the prosopon of the one [nature] makes use of the prosopon of the other", but also that the one nature makes use of the prosopon of the other nature. In other words, according to Nestorius, it is in this way that one can understand why human properties can be ascribed to the Logos and divine properties to the Man; and, as bearing out our point, it is significant that he appeals to this aspect of his theory when he explains Gregory's saying that "He who had a beginning. . . is called God",⁵ and his own

¹ *Bazaar*, p. 301.

² See below, p. 231.

³ *Ep. ci (ad Cledonium)*.

⁴ *Bazaar*, p. 261.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 149. For Nestorius' use of the phrase "the common prosopon", see *ibid.* pp. 171, 238, 319.

⁶ *Ibid.* p. 240.

¹ *Ibid.* p. 219.

² Cf. *ibid.* p. 58.

³ See the instances quoted above, p. 167 nn. 6, 7.

⁴ *Bazaar*, pp. 319 f. Similarly, *ibid.* p. 240.

⁵ See esp. *ibid.* pp. 241, 252 f., 261.

statement that "the divinity is named 'Christ' after the humanity which was anointed".¹

But, as will have been noticed, Nestorius again and again insists that it is only in respect of the prosopa of the natures that "the one is the other and the other the one"—in respect of the natures themselves, these "remain the one and the other".² So is he determined to safeguard both the doctrine of the immutability and the impassibility of the Divine, and that of the complete reality of the manhood which was assumed, fully realizing that he can secure this end through laying down that it is the prosopa, and not the natures, which "make use of each other". What he would avoid is all idea of "confusion". "He who had a beginning and grew and was perfected" is called "God", he says, not because God the Logos is both human and divine in ousia,³ but because in the union the divine ousia makes use of the human prosopon. As he puts it:

I proclaim eagerly in every place that the things which are said either about the divinity or about the humanity must be taken not of the nature but of the prosopon, so that there might be no unreality about the human qualities [as there would be] if both of them were united in the ousia.⁴

It is, then, as Bethune-Baker says, "the Catholic doctrine of the relation between the natures in the Person of the Incarnate Son of God, the doctrine commonly known by the term *communicatio idiomatum*"—which, as this scholar expresses it, "forbids us to ascribe human experiences to the Godhead or Divine experiences to the manhood: the special properties of either nature belong to it and to it alone, though the Person who is both God and man is the subject of them all"—that Nestorius is "anxious to maintain".⁵ It is "on account of the union", he is constantly insisting, that one can attribute what is human to "God" and what is divine to "man": "the divine Logos does not suffer the sufferings of the flesh, and accept them in His nature in His prosopon", and in nature "the flesh is outside participating not in the [properties] of the divinity in its own prosopon";⁶ "it was not that He was changed from the divinity; God indeed

¹ *Bazaar*, p. 301.

² *Ibid.* pp. 57, 218 f., 233, 252, 320.

³ *Ibid.* p. 261.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 157.

⁵ *Nestorius and his Teaching*, p. 81.

⁶ *Bazaar*, p. 261.

remained God and was made man; and man remained man and was made God; for they took the prosopon of one another, and not the natures".¹

Let us go a step farther in our investigation of the Antiochenes' acceptance of the principle of transference. It is important for us to notice that they have no intention of rejecting those expressions—arrived at on the basis of this principle—which the Alexandrine theologians declare must be upheld by all who say that theirs is the orthodox faith.

We will first consider their attitude to the affirmation that the Virgin is "Theotokos"—it being round this affirmation of theirs, as Cyril tells John of Antioch after the Reunion in the year 433,² that well-nigh the whole of the Alexandrines' contest on behalf of the faith had been waged.

There is a passage in the *contra Apollinarium* of the Bishop of Mopsuestia, of which it has been said that "if it stood alone we should infer from it that Theodore would have repudiated the title 'Theotokos' altogether".³ For instance, we find such statements as these: "It is ridiculous to say that God was born of the Virgin"; "it was not the Logos of God who was born of Mary"; "He who is consubstantial with the Father has not issued from the womb". But, surely, it is only a question of emphasis. There is a vast difference between saying "*God* was not born of a woman" and saying "God was *not* born of a woman": in the former case, one is denying that the divine nature was subjected to a human birth, but in the latter one is denying the reality of the Incarnation—and from what we have already seen of his teaching, there can be no doubt that Theodore has no intention of doing this. In fact, what he says here reveals his mind: from the first moment of its formation, he declares, the temple was "the temple of God", but "we must not on that account suppose the temple and the Logos, the God in the temple, to be the same". It is not that he rejects "Theotokos" but that he is desirous of its being correctly understood. That this is a reasonable conclusion is borne out by what he says in his *de*

¹ *Ibid.* p. 220.

² *P.G.* lxxvii. 177 c; Bindley, *op. cit.* p. 169.

³ So Raven, *op. cit.* pp. 294 f., who quotes the passage (*c. Apoll.* iii. Frag. 1, Swete, *op. cit.* ii. pp. 313 f.).

Incarnatione, where, confessedly, "he uses much more guarded language" than in the passage from his work against Apollinarius. Here we find:

When they ask us, "Was Mary Mother of man or Mother of God?" let us say "Both: the first by the nature of the fact, the second by relation [ἀναφορᾶ]. For she was Mother of man by nature since He who was in Mary's womb and issued from it was man; she was Mother of God since God was in the Man who was born, not circumscribed in His nature within man, but being in Him according to the disposition of His will.¹

Theodore, then, does not hesitate to say that Mary can be given the title, this teacher holding that she can be called "Mother of God" because He who was in the Man from the start was "God"; in other words, according to Theodore, Mary is "Theotokos" by reason of the union. But, while accepting the title, he also sees that it is necessary to speak of the Virgin as "Anthropotokos", lest it should be thought that "God" was born of a woman. The same attitude, as we are now to see, was taken up by his successors.

Nestorius' declaration is well known:

I have said many times that if any simple soul among you or anywhere else delights in the title, I have no objection to it. Only let him not make the Virgin a goddess.²

As he says, he can tolerate the word if it is properly understood, and if, at the same time, Mary is called "Anthropotokos".³ What he will not tolerate is the taking of "Theotokos" in any natural sense.⁴ There is a great difference, he argues, between

¹ *De Incarn.* xv, Frag. 2, Swete, *op. cit.* p. 310. The rendering given above is Raven's (*op. cit.* p. 295), except that we translate ἀναφορᾶ "by relation", taking this as referring to the relation of the Logos to the Man—"God was in the Man". As it seems to us, the latter statement is explanatory of the former, just as "He who was in Mary's womb was man" is explanatory of "by the nature of the fact". Raven does not follow the Latin rendering, *relazione*, but considers that *societas* is probably the meaning here.

² Loofs, *Nestoriana*, p. 353.

³ See *Ep. i ad Caelest.*, Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 167; *Ep. ii ad Caelest.*, Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 181; *Ep. ad Johan. Antioch.*, Loofs, *op. cit.* pp. 184 f.; *Sermo xviii*, Loofs, *op. cit.* pp. 301 ff., 309, 312 (see below, p. 199 n. 1).

⁴ The following statement illustrates Nestorius' attitude to "Theotokos": "By the union God the Word made these [properties] of the flesh His own, not that the divinity was born in the birth of the flesh, nor again that the flesh was born naturally in the birth of the divinity, but [that] by the union with the flesh God is called flesh and the flesh by union with the Son, God the

saying "God" and saying "Godhead", and Mary did not give birth to "God"—understood, that is, in the sense of "the divine and incorporeal substance";¹ a real mother must be of the same ousia as that which is born of her, and no mother ever gives birth to one who is already in existence;² strictly speaking, therefore, it is only to the Father of the divine Son that the title can be ascribed.³ But Nestorius has no intention of rejecting the title. "Because the Logos was united to the temple" (*propter unitum Verbum templo*), "on account of the union" (*propter unitatem*),⁴ because, that is (as he himself declares), the term "God" can properly be used of the temple of Godhead (*vox . . . "Deus" et templo divinitatis est apta*),⁵ the Virgin can be called "Theotokos". At the same time, it has to be granted that the title which he prefers is "Christotokos", "Mother of Christ", since this is Scriptural, and free from all ambiguity⁶—a position, the significance of which we have still to discuss.

Theodoret of Cyrus has the same view. We call the Virgin "Theotokos" and "Anthropotokos" at the same time, he says:⁷ "Theotokos, not because the Logos was naturally conceived of the Virgin, nor because He derived the beginning of His existence from her, but "on account of the union", the Logos having formed for Himself a temple in the Virgin's womb, and being with that which was formed and begotten; and "Anthropotokos", because she gave birth to the form of a servant.⁸ Indeed, in his letter to Dioscorus of Alexandria, this teacher declares that those who reject the former title are "alienated from true religion".⁹

Word, Son" (*Bazaar*, p. 191). Cf. also the following: "I would have you be very careful when you examine doctrinal statements. I would not have you confound the manhood which was assumed with the divine Logos, neither would I have you say that He who was born was an ordinary man, nor that the divine Logos was mingled or mixed, thus losing His proper ousia" (*Sermo xxvii*, Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 339).

¹ See the *Tragedy* of Nestorius, Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 205.

² *Ep. i ad Caelest.*, Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 167.

³ *Sermo x*, Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 276. We may note, too, Nestorius' argument that the title gives a handle to the pagans against the Christians (*Sermo xxvii*, Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 337).

⁴ *Sermo xviii*, Loofs, *op. cit.* pp. 303, 309.

⁵ See above, n. 1.

⁶ *Ep. ii ad Cyrill.*, Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 177; *Ep. iii ad Caelest.*, Loofs, *op. cit.* pp. 181 f.

⁷ See, for instance, Theodoret, *Ep. xvi* (to Irenaeus of Tyre) and *Ep. cli* (to the Monks of the East).

⁸ *Reprehen. xii Capp.* i, ed. Schulze, v. pt. i. pp. 3 ff.

⁹ *Ep. lxxxiii* (see below, p. 240).

Yet it should be observed that when he writes to that determined upholder of the Antiochene doctrine, Irenaeus of Tyre, he pleads that one would be "expressing the same opinion" if, avoiding the term which had become "the pretext of calumny", one were to say that Mary is "Christotokos"—"Mother of our Lord Jesus Christ".¹

Or—in support of our argument—we may notice that the Antiochenes do not challenge the right of their opponents to say that it is possible to ascribe two births to the Logos. What they deny is that it should be thought that the Logos in His divine nature was born of the Virgin. At first sight it may seem that Diodore of Tarsus rejects this idea of "two births", for in a fragment of his *contra Synousiastas*²—a work which, as the title shows, was directed against the teaching of the Alexandrine school of thought—he says:

The divine Logos did not undergo two births, one before the ages, the other in these last days.

But we must view the saying in the light of its context. Diodore also says:

In any discussion concerning the births according to nature, it must not be thought that the divine Logos is Son of Mary.

It is not, as may be inferred, that he would deny that the Logos can be said to have been born of the Virgin—for, as we have seen,³ he is prepared "through a figure of speech" to ascribe what is human in Christ to the Divine; what he would resist is the notion that the divine nature had its beginning from the Virgin: the "divine" Logos, he insists, did not experience a human birth. Nestorius adopts a similar attitude. As his writings show, he is fully aware that his opponents were speaking of "two births" in respect of the Logos, but not once does he condemn

¹ *Ep. xvi.* As is clear from what he says in his reply to Cyril's *Anath. i.*, Andrew of Samosata has no intention of questioning the validity of the use of the title (Cyril, *Apol. adv. Orient. i.*, ed. Pusey, vi, p. 284). In this connection, too, we can appeal to what the Antiochenes say in the *Formulary of Reunion*. Here they definitely confess that Mary is "Theotokos", and, moved, as it seems, by the consideration that the time had come (in 433) for them to make concessions for the sake of peace with Cyril, make no mention of "Anthropotokos" or of "Christotokos" (see below, p. 235).

² The fragment is preserved by Leontius of Byzantium in his *c. Nestor. et Eutychn.*, *P.G.* lxxxvi. 1388B.

³ See above, p. 166.

them for so doing. His contention in this connection is summed up in his own words: *Ego natum et mortuum Deum et sepultum adorare non queo*.¹ He will not hold that the Logos in His divine nature was born of the Virgin. The "divine" Logos, he says, was not born of a woman:² one must not introduce *duae natiuitates deitatis*,³ or say simply (*simpliciter*) *Deus de Maria natus est* (or *Deus est, qui natus est de Maria*).⁴ The insertion of *simpliciter* here reveals Nestorius' mind: he would guard against that confusing of the natures which the expression, unless it is properly understood, can easily introduce. But, it will be noted, he can still say "God was born of a woman"; indeed, as we have seen, through his theory of "exchange", he is ready to explain how it is possible to speak in this way.

Neither can it be said that the Antiochenes reject the Alexandrines' expressions, "God suffered" and "God died". We turn to their replies to Cyril's affirmation in his Twelfth Anathematism that he who does not confess that "the Logos of God suffered in the flesh, was crucified in the flesh, and tasted death in the flesh" is anathema.⁵ Nestorius, it should be observed, does not attack Cyril on account of his use of the principle of the *communicatio idiomatum*: his point is that such a statement is dangerous because it can easily lead one to think that the divine nature of the Logos is passible.⁶ So he declares that the sufferings

¹ *Sermo xxvii*, Loofs, *op. cit.* pp. 337 f.

² *Ep. ii ad Cyrill.*, Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 176; *Sermo xiv*, Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 288; *Sermo xvii*, Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 295.

³ *Sermo xvii*, Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 297; *Sermo xiv*, Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 288.

⁴ *Sermo xxvii*, Loofs, *op. cit.* pp. 337, 339. [On *Sermo xxvii* ("In answer to Proclus") see below, p. 221 n. 4.]

⁵ *P.G.* lxxvii. 121D; Bindley, *The Oecumenical Documents of the Faith*, p. 158.

⁶ Of Cyril's position Nestorius refuses to think otherwise than that (though the Alexandrine asserts that it can be said that God the Logos suffered "because His body tasted death") it is that God the Logos was passible in ousia (see *Bazaar*, pp. 150 f.). But never do we find him denying that it can be said "God suffered"; indeed, when he says that the Logos "made use of the prosopon of Him who died and was crucified and was exalted as His own prosopon" (*ibid.* p. 58) or that the Logos is "that which the Man was by His nature in sufferings" (*ibid.* p. 70—see above, p. 149), he himself is virtually saying "God suffered"—though not in His divine nature. Cf. also *ibid.* pp. 265 f., where, in answer to the accusations brought against him at Ephesus (431) by Acacius of Melitene, Nestorius says that while he could be charged with having denounced Cyril because he was teaching the passibility of the divine Logos, he (Nestorius) could not be charged with having refused to confess that "God the Word died".

of the flesh must not be attributed to the "divine" Logos (*Si quis confitens passiones carnis, has quoque tanquam Verbo Deo tribuerit. . . anathema sit*), else the difference of the natures is lost (*non discernens dignitatem naturarum*).¹ Again, Theodoret insists that "passion being proper to the passible", it was not "God" (ὁ θεός) who suffered, but "the Man assumed", "the form of a servant", "He who had the human nature". But while he thus "separates the natures", it is clear, even from what we have here, that he would accept the expression "God suffered", for he says that "the form of God . . . made sufferings its own on account of the union".² Or, to come to Andrew of Samosata, what we find is that he, too, denounces the notion that the Godhead is passible: it was not the Godhead that suffered, he says, but, the Godhead allowing it, the flesh suffered according to its nature. It is, then, because it is not sufficiently safeguarded—for he argues that it can be taken as implying that the Divine is passible, and that on this account it can be accepted both by the Patripassian and by the Arian—that he has no love for the expression "God suffered". But in all this there is not the slightest hint that the Bishop of Samosata denies that, having regard to the union of Godhead and mankind in the one Person of Jesus Christ, it is proper to use such an expression.³

At the same time, it is perfectly clear that, while not for a moment would they question the Godhead of our Lord Jesus

¹ Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 217.

² *Reprehen. xii Capp.* xii, ed. Schulze, v. pt. i. pp. 65 f. That Theodoret is ready to say "God suffered" is clear from his *Dialogues*. In *Dial.* iii he says that the Lord Jesus Christ is truly "our God", and that "as man" (i.e. when the Logos became man) He underwent the passion while remaining impassible "as God" (i.e. in His divine nature). So, answering "Eranistes'" question, "How does the divine Scripture say that the Son of God suffered?" he can say, "Because the body which suffered was His body"—"we deny that the passion was suffered by any other", he says (ed. Schulze, iv. pt. i. pp. 187, 190). This Antiochene may condemn the expression "He suffered impassibly" as "a ridiculous riddle" (*ibid.* p. 216), but it seems clear that he upholds the same underlying truth—namely, that the Logos, impassible in His own nature, can be said to have suffered since His was the body which suffered (see above, p. 167); for in the *Demonstrationes per Syllogismos* (in which he summarizes his argument in the *Dialogues*) he says that the divine nature was united to one undergoing the passion, and that thus conjoined with a human nature, while not receiving pain from the passion, "It made the passion Its own, since [it was that] of Its own temple and of flesh united to It" (ed. Schulze, iv. pt. i. pp. 278 f.).

³ Cyril, *Apol. adv. Orient.* xii, ed. Pusey, vi. pp. 366 ff.

Christ, the Antiochenes are well aware of the danger which can arise when one ascribes suffering to the Logos—the danger, that is, to adopt the words of Nestorius, of "humanizing the Godhead and dehumanizing the manhood".¹ Hence it is that just as they prefer to speak of Mary as "Christotokos", so they prefer to say "Christ" suffered and died—"Christ" being for them the term which signifies the one Person in whom, without confusion, are the two natures. And for ascribing both divine and human things to "Christ" they claim the authority of Scripture itself. Thus Nestorius, appealing to the *locus classicus* of the school, pleads that St Paul here says that it was "Christ" who was obedient to the death of the Cross, and, taking this as his standard, argues that, because the name is indicative of both the impassible and the passible ousia, "Christ" can without any danger be called "passible".² Again, he asserts that nowhere in the New Testament does one find that death is ascribed to God: on the contrary, it is ascribed to "Christ"—or to the "Son", or to the "Lord", names which he regards as equivalents—Scripture itself using the term now from the point of view of the Godhead, now from that of the manhood, and sometimes from both points of view.³ Theodoret teaches in the same way. In Scripture, he says, "passion is never associated with the name 'God'": Peter himself confesses that "Christ" suffered in the flesh (1 St Peter iv. 1), and, when he says "in the flesh", the Apostle is making it clear that it was only the flesh—and not the divine nature—that suffered.⁴

So we ask: What is the purpose of these teachers in maintaining that it is to "Christ" that what is divine and what is human should be ascribed? The answer, it would seem, comes out quite clearly once we realize what they mean by "Christ". He is the One, they say, in whom the two natures have been joined together. But who is this One? As we have tried to show in preceding pages, the Antiochenes hold that He is the Logos incarnate, and that we are justified in saying this is borne out by

¹ *Sermo v* (on the Highpriesthood of Christ), Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 242; see also Bethune-Baker, *op. cit.* p. 113.

² *Ep. ii ad Cyrill.*, Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 176.

³ *Sermo x*, Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 269.

⁴ *Dial.* iii, ed. Schulze, iv. pt. i. p. 215; see also *Dem. per Syll.*, ed. Schulze, iv. pt. i. pp. 276 f.

the direct statements of both Nestorius and Theodoret. The name "Christ", says the former, is "the name of the economy"¹—the name, that is, of the Logos as He has become man. The latter is even more explicit. Let us quote what he says in his *Dialogues* on this subject:

The name "Christ" in the case of our Lord and Saviour signifies the incarnate Logos [τὸν ἐνανθρωπήσαντα Λόγον], the Emmanuel, the "God with us", both God and man. But the name "God the Logos", so said, signifies the simple nature [τὴν ἀπλῆν φύσιν], before the world, superior to time, and incorporeal [ἄσώματον].²

So then, with these words of Theodoret to guide us, we can say that when the Antiochenes assert that in order to avoid ambiguity human things—such as the birth, the sufferings, and the death—should be ascribed to "Christ", they are in reality distinguishing between the Logos in His eternal existence (as ἄσώματος and ἀπλοῦς) and the Logos in His incarnate existence (as ἐνανθρωπήσας): the Logos in His incarnate existence is "Christ", and to Him these things must be attributed, and not to the Logos who, while becoming man, remains what He was. In other words, in making this distinction, their purpose is to uphold the immutability and the impassibility of the Logos in His divine nature. But, as we saw when we were considering their Christology,³ the Alexandrines make the same distinction and have the same end in view, the only difference being in respect of the means which the two schools adopt towards securing that end, for while the Antiochenes distinguish between "Logos" and "Christ", the Alexandrines lay stress on the ἐν σαρκί in the formula ὁ Λόγος ἐν σαρκί (as distinct from ὁ Λόγος ἄσαρκος) and on the σεσαρκωμένη in the formula μία φύσις τοῦ θεοῦ Λόγου σεσαρκωμένη, and say that these words denote the new estate in which the Logos, on becoming man, now finds Himself, and that it is only to the Logos "in the flesh" and to the

¹ *On the Chapters*, Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 218, Frag. a.

² *Dial.* iii, ed. Schulze, iv. pt. i. p. 213. Cf. also the following statement: "Now after the Incarnation God the Logos is called 'Christ', this name including all things—both whatsoever is proper to the Godhead and whatsoever is proper to the manhood" (*ibid.* pp. 228 f.).

³ See above, p. 55 n. 10.

"incarnate" nature of the Logos that suffering can be ascribed. Here again, then, we have evidence that, so far as root principles are concerned, the Antiochene theologians are at one with their opponents.

Let us try to summarize their Christological thought as we have thus far seen it. Taking St Paul's statement in Philippians ii. 5 ff. as their starting-point, the Antiochenes teach that, while remaining God, the divine Logos has, in order to restore the human race, undergone a voluntary humiliation, and united real manhood, or "the Man", to Himself, there coming into being as a result of this union one Person, our Lord Jesus Christ, who is "One and the same"—"the Man-God", to use Nestorius' expression—Himself divine and human; and because He is such, they uphold the doctrine of the *communicatio idiomatum*, at the same time fully realizing that it is essential, if the reality of the natures is to be preserved, that this must be properly understood. Though they speak of the Logos as "dwelling" in the man, and when referring to the union use the term "junction", they emphatically deny that theirs is what we call an "inspirationist" Christology. For them Christ is no "mere man" in whom, as in the prophets, the Logos dwelt, neither, though their expressions could lead their enemies to suppose that this was their teaching, do they proclaim "two Sons", conjoined in a moral relationship: besides their affirmations that theirs is not the Nestorian position, we have their own positive statements which clearly show that for them it was the Logos Himself, the Second Person of the Trinity, who became man as Jesus Christ. And, as we have been attempting to make plain, at all these points their doctrine is fundamentally the same as that of their opponents. So we would say that the first main Christological principle of the Alexandrine theologians is theirs too—that these, too, would say: *In Jesus Christ, the Logos, while remaining what He was, has, for our salvation, united manhood to Himself, thereby making it His own; He is not, therefore, two Persons, but one Person, the Logos Himself in His incarnate state.*

Passing now to the second part of our study of the Christology of the Antiochene theologians, we would consider their teaching on the "two natures" in its various aspects. Here again, it

would seem, we find thought which is no wise different from, indeed, at one point it appears to be superior to, that of their opponents of the school of Alexandria, and, as we shall endeavour to show, included in this teaching is the counterpart of their second soteriological conception—namely, that if the redemption is to be real, the Man assumed must ever will what the Logos who assumes Him wills.

First of all, let us briefly consider the terms which these teachers use when they speak of the two elements of Godhead and manhood in Jesus Christ. For them “ousia” and “nature” are terms which signify simply “that which exists”. Consequently, when they assert that there are “two ousiai” or “two natures” in Jesus Christ, we at once know what they are driving at—namely, that His is real Godhead, and that His is real manhood. It is to enforce this truth that they use the term “hypostasis”—the term which has as its fundamental idea that of “reality”. They agree that in “Theology” this word can be employed in the sense of “person”—as the equivalent, that is, of “prosopon”¹—but in Christological discussion they almost always² use it in its root meaning of “underlying existence”, and mean by it what the Western theologians meant when they used the word *substantia*. Once again, then, we know what they have in mind when they say that in Jesus Christ there are “two hypostases”: they would be even more definite in maintaining the reality of the natures.³ So it is that their terminology is much simpler than that of the Alexandrines: they refuse to take “ousia”, “nature” and “hypostasis” as signifying either a “person”, or that element which is common to a group of

¹ See, for instance, Theodoret, *Dial.* i, ed. Schulze, iv. pt. i. p. 7.

² We say “almost always” because instances are to be found of the use of “hypostasis” in the sense of “prosopon” by the Antiochenes when they are considering the “Economy”. Thus Andrew of Samosata, replying to Cyril’s Anath. viii, says: “We do not speak of two prosopa or two hypostases, or two Sons” (Cyril, *Apol. adv. Orient.* viii, ed. Pusey, vi. p. 314). Again, Theodoret points out that in adopting the simile of Isaac and the ram he means that there are two natures, not two hypostases, in Jesus Christ (*Dial.* iii, ed. Schulze, iv. pt. i. p. 203). It will be noticed, however, that here these teachers are but adopting their opponents’ terminology, in order to explain their own position.

³ So, as Bethune-Baker says, “Nestorius knew very well what he was doing when he insisted on the recognition of the ‘substances’ as well as the ‘natures’ in the Person of our Lord” (*op. cit.* p. 49).

particulars, but employ the three terms as signifying simply τὸ ὄν, τὸ ὑφ’εστὸς.¹

As is well known, the Antiochenes are utterly opposed to the idea of “mixture” or “confusion”: in the union of Godhead and manhood in the Person of Jesus Christ each element remains real, and the properties of each are left unimpaired. As Theodoret has it in his letter to the Monks of Constantinople (a letter in which he seeks to explain his position after he had been deposed by Dioscorus of Alexandria at the *Latrocinium* in 449):

While confessing that the only-begotten Son of God was made man [ἐνανθρωπήσαι], we do not deny the nature which He took, but confess, as I have said, both the nature which took and the nature which was taken: the union did not confound the properties of the natures. For if the air by receiving the light through all its parts does not cease to be air, nor yet destroy the nature of the light, . . . so would it be the height of folly to call the union of the Godhead and the manhood confusion. If created natures . . . remain unimpaired, and when the light withdraws the nature of the air is left alone, much more proper is it, I consider, that the nature which fashioneth all things, when conjoined with and united to the nature which it assumed from us, should be acknowledged as continuing in its purity, and, in the same way, as preserving unimpaired that which it assumed.²

And what the Bishop of Cyrus says here may be taken as illustrating the standpoint of all the Antiochene teachers: the natures are “two”—real and without confusion, that is—and “two” they remain.³

¹ An excellent illustration of the Antiochene usage of “ousia”, “nature”, and “hypostasis” in this sense is to be found in Theodoret, *Quaest. in Gen.* i. 3, ed. Schulze, i. pt. i. p. 6: “We were taught that the divine nature is unincircumscribed, uncreated, without beginning and eternal [ἀπερίγραφον . . . τὴν θεῖαν φύσιν]. But things which have a beginning of existence have, clearly, an existence which is circumscribed [περιγεγραμμένον ἔχει δηλονότι τὸ εἶναι]. Wherefore, when speaking of the incorporeal nature of angels we say that their hypostasis is circumscribed [περιγεγράφθαι . . . τὴν ὑπόστασιν]; and no one will deny, I think, that the angels have an ousia which is circumscribed [περιγεγραμμένην . . . τὴν οὐσίαν].” Cf. also Theodoret, *Dial.* ii, ed. Schulze, iv. pt. i. p. 113, where he charges “Eranistes” with dividing the Lord’s manhood, so that the soul is one thing and the body another existing thing (ἄλλο μὲν τι . . . ἄλλο δὲ τι εἶναι), the consequence being, so Theodoret argues, that his opponent would set up three “natures” in Jesus Christ.

² *Ep.* cxlv.

³ Thus Alexander of Hierapolis, the determined supporter of the Antiochene doctrine who refused to come to terms with Cyril in 433, can say that

The insistence of the Antiochenes on the reality of the divine nature of Jesus Christ is seen, for instance, in their determination to resist a false interpretation of the word "became" (ἐγένετο) in the text St John i. 14—the text which was constantly on the lips of their opponents. Let us not misunderstand their point of view. Not for a moment do they hesitate to accept the text; rather, what they are opposed to is the taking of "became" in the sense of "was turned into"—the meaning, that is, in which, as they seem to have pointed out, ἐγένετο is used in Genesis xix. 26 and Exodus iv. 3, where it is recorded that Lot's wife "became" a pillar of salt, and Moses' rod "became" a serpent¹—since this would mean that the Logos no longer remained in His own nature. So, to safeguard the doctrine that the Logos did not undergo any natural change when He became flesh, they set beside the *locus classicus* of the Alexandrines their own *locus classicus*, and say that the Logos "became" flesh in that He "took" flesh.² The point is brought out by Theodore in his *de Incarnatione*:

The word "became" can be interpreted only as meaning "according to appearance".... In appearance the Logos became flesh, and by "appearance" we mean, not that the Logos did not take real flesh, but that He did not "become" flesh. For when the Scripture says He "took", it means that He took not in appearance but in truth. But when it says He "became", then it is speaking "according to appearance"; for He was not transformed into flesh.³

two natures are recognized in the one Lord *usque in saecula infinita* (*P.G.* lxxxiv. 752; quoted below, p. 195 n. 1). Cf. also the statement of Theodore in his *ad Bapt.* (*Mingana, op. cit.* p. 90): "The natures will remain two because they are two."

¹ Cf. Cyril, *Quod unus sit Christus*, ed. Pusey, vii. pt. i. p. 339.

² So Theodore, *c. Apoll.* iv, Frag. 2, Swete, *op. cit.* II. p. 319: "We on our part affirm, and that most decidedly, that the divine Logos has 'taken'—we should never allow it to be said that He 'became' man in your sense of the words"—Theodore, that is, holding that the Apollinarians were taking "became" in the sense of "was turned into". Similarly Nestorius: "'The Logos became flesh' means 'He took flesh', and 'dwelt among us' means 'He put on our nature'" (*Bazaar*, p. 197; cf. also *Sermones* ii, xiv, xviii, Loofs, *op. cit.* pp. 226, 287, 305 f.), and Theodoret: "Unless the word 'became' is made quite clear, it suggests mutation and alteration, for, unless He became flesh by taking flesh, He became flesh by undergoing mutation" (*Dial.* i, ed. Schulze, iv. pt. i. p. 12; cf. *Dial.* i, *ibid.* p. 41). [Cf. the express words of Severian of Gabala († c. 408), the determined opponent of Chrysostom: "The words [in St Jn. i. 14] mean nothing other than the assumption of flesh" (quoted by Theodoret, *Dial.* i, ed. Schulze, iv. pt. i. p. 48).]

³ *De Incarn.* ix, Frag. 2, Swete, *op. cit.* II. p. 300.

Theodore, it will be noted, does not deny the reality of the Incarnation—it was the Logos Himself who "appeared" in true flesh; what he would resist is the notion that in the Incarnation the Logos was deprived of His divine nature.

Again, it is because they would maintain the reality of Christ's divine nature that these teachers insist—against thought which, as it seems to them, endangers this truth—that when the Logos became man He in His own nature remained impassible. For, as they see, to make God passible is to deprive Him of that wherein He is God. Instance after instance of their determination to uphold the doctrine of the impassibility of the divine nature is to be found in their writings. Eustathius again and again denounces the notion that the Divine in His own nature suffered the agony of the Cross: "the temple suffers", he affirms, "but the [divine] ousia abides without spot and preserves its dignity without defilement".¹ Theodore of Mopsuestia, commenting on Philippians ii. 8, says that "these things cannot possibly affect the divine nature: that nature which promised to raise the dead cannot suffer death".² Nestorius, believing that the Cyrillians were teaching that the Divine had been rendered passible, writes his *Against the Theopaschitans*,³ and preaches a sermon *Against those who put to death the Godhead of the Only-begotten and deify the manhood*;⁴ he denounces it as "an awful and dreadful thing" to tell men concerning the Son "that He has been changed from the impassible to the passible, from the immortal to the mortal, and from the unchangeable to the changeable".⁵ Andrew uses it as one of his arguments against Cyril's Twelfth Anathematism that it can be of no advantage to man if the Godhead of the Lord Christ is brought under suffering, since, as he says, it is just from the passible that man seeks to be removed, redemption consisting in his being raised from the passible to the impassible.⁶ And Theodoret in his summary of the third of his *Dialogues* (in which he shows that the Logos in

¹ *Discourse on Prov. viii. 22*, *P.G.* xviii. 684c; cf. also Eustathius' statements in the same work, *P.G.* xviii. 681D, and his *Interpret. of Ps. xcii*, *P.G.* xviii. 688A, B.

² *In Gal. iv. 5*, Swete, *op. cit.* I. p. 219.

³ Fragments of the work, *contra Theopaschitas seu Cyrillianos*, are to be found in Loofs, *op. cit.* pp. 209 ff.

⁴ *Sermo* x, Loofs, *op. cit.* pp. 265 ff.

⁵ *Bazaar*, p. 93.

⁶ Cyril, *Apol. adv. Orient.* xii, ed. Pusey, vi. p. 368.

His divine nature is *Impatibilis*) insists that since the Son is homoousios with the Father—and the Father, as Scripture says, is impassible—His is a nature which cannot undergo passion.¹ The same position is also forcibly upheld by this teacher when he replies to the *Twelve Anathematisms* of Cyril.²

But why do these teachers lay such stress on the reality of the divine nature of Jesus Christ? Why do they insist that the Logos was not “turned into” flesh, and that in His own nature He remained impassible? Is it merely because they would defend important theological conceptions? Unquestionably, in maintaining that the Logos is immutable and impassible in nature, they appeal to the authority of Holy Scripture and the writings of the Fathers, but, it would seem, the answer lies deeper than this. As we see it, they uphold the reality of Christ’s divine nature because—though, apparently, unconsciously rather than consciously—they are moved by the thought that if man is to be redeemed there is need of the divine nature, as divine nature, to fulfil its part in effecting this redemption. As we have seen, Nestorius says that man of himself could do nothing against the power of the enemy, and that, if the enemy was to be defeated, it was necessary that the Divine should condescend, and take to Himself “the form of a servant”. So he can say:

Men were in need of the divinity as for our renewal and for our formation anew and for [the renewal] of the likeness of the image which had been obliterated by us.³

Certainly the point is never fully discussed, but it seems clear that behind the Antiochene insistence on the reality of Christ’s Godhead we can see a real soteriological interest: if in the Incarnation the divine nature has become passible and mutable, then Jesus Christ is no longer divine—and if He is not divine, the whole process of the redemption is, from its very beginning, brought to nought. So would it appear that, in upholding the impassibility and the immutability of the Logos in His divine nature, these teachers are in reality upholding what we are alluding to in this study as their first soteriological conception—

¹ *Dem. per Syll.*, ed. Schulze, iv. pt. i. p. 273.

² See esp. Theodoret’s replies to Cyril’s Anaths. x, xii (ed. Schulze, v. pt. i. pp. 51 f., 65 f.).

³ *Bazaar*, p. 183.

namely, that God Himself must “condescend” if man is to be renewed in that divine image which was formerly his.

As we would now see, the second soteriological conception of the Antiochenes is bound up with their teaching on the reality of the Lord’s manhood. If there was need of a real divine nature, they would say, there was also need of a real human nature. The point is brought out in the *Bazaar*, where, immediately after the quotation given above, we have:

But [men had need also] of the humanity which was renewed and took its likeness anew; for the humanity was congruous, so as to preserve the order which had existed.¹

From Paul of Samosata onwards the doctrine that the nature which the Logos assumed is complete is upheld by the successive representatives of this doctrinal tradition. As we have noticed, Paul asserts against Malchion the Sophist that Mary “brought forth a man like one of us”,² and as this, and the statement that the Logos was conjoined with the human Jesus “according to learning and communion”,³ imply, would say that the Man whom Mary brought forth possessed to the full the faculty of self-determination. Eustathius insists that *ipsa veritate totum hominem indutus est Deus*,⁴ and by his “*totus homo*” means that the manhood which God put on consists not only of a body but also of a soul which is homoousios with the souls of men and rational (λογική), having the power of choice⁵—a conception which is reflected in all that he says concerning “the Man of Christ”. The Bishop of Mopsuestia, as we have seen,⁶ rails against the Apollinarian doctrine that the Logos took the place of the human soul in Christ, since such a doctrine not only renders God passible but also robs the manhood of its reality—and, Theodore argues, if this is not real, there is not that conquest over sin which must be seen in the Man assumed as He is assailed “both by the passions of the soul and by those of the flesh”, if man’s redemption is to be brought about. Similarly Nestorius maintains that the Lord’s manhood is homoousios with ours,⁷ and charges Cyril and his followers with denying its

¹ *Ibid.*

² Above, p. 135.

³ *Interpret. Ps. xv*, P.G. xviii. 685 D.

⁴ *Interpret. Ps. xv*, P.G. xviii. 685 D.

⁵ *Interpret. Ps. xv*, P.G. xviii. 685 D.

⁶ Above, pp. 136 f.

⁷ E.g. *Sermo xxvii*, Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 340; *Ep. ad schol. eunuch. imp. Theodos.*, Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 192.

² See above, pp. 130 f.

⁴ P.G. xviii. 693, Frag. 5.

⁶ Above, pp. 136 f.

reality through teaching a "mixture" of the natures,¹ and following the Arians and Apollinarians in holding that the manhood was deprived of a human rational soul. If Jesus Christ is "*totus homo*", he asserts, He must act in accordance with the nature of man: He must be "moved to and fro in the nature of His being"—and this cannot be if "the divine Logos is established to become the will and the purpose and the sensibility in the body and in the soul in such wise that He should act and suffer sensibly these bodily [sensations] and those of the soul: anger and wrath and lusts and fear and dread and thoughts and operations and judgment and voluntary choice".² The will and the intelligence which are part of the nature of humanity, he insists, were active in Jesus Christ, and from this doctrine he refuses to be moved.³ The same position is upheld by Theodoret. He denounces the notion of "confusion", since, according to this, the nature no longer remains in its "individuality";⁴ rather, he maintains, Christ's manhood was complete, possessing power of choice—it was a manhood which learned obedience by experience, which lived with godly fear, and which, with strong crying and tears, appealed to Him that is able to save, asking for release from death.⁵ For, as his *Dialogues* reveal, the Bishop of Cyrus is determined that there shall be no false conception concerning the soul which Christ assumed: one must ask "what kind of soul" it was, and the only possible answer—as such texts as St Luke ii. 40 and St Luke ii. 52 indicate—is that it was not a soul which was *ἄλογος* but one which was *λογική*.⁶

It is not surprising, then, that the Antiochenes, in their insistence on the reality of the individuating characteristics of Christ's manhood, should say that this manhood has its "proson" —that it has its "individuality", that it can be regarded

¹ E.g. *Ep. i ad Caelest.*, Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 166; *Bazaar*, pp. 210 f.

² *Bazaar*, p. 211. Cf. Nestorius' remark that Cyril regards the manhood as a mere instrument, "not having voluntarily practised obedience as a rational nature, with thought and with examination and with the choice of good and with the refusal of evil" (*ibid.* p. 248).

³ *Ibid.* p. 172; cf. also pp. 240, 247. What Nestorius says concerning the obedience of the Man assumed should also be taken into account in this connection—see above, pp. 138 ff.

⁴ *Reprehen. xii Capp.* ii, ed. Schulze, v. pt. i. p. 10: εἰσιτοῦσα δὲ ἡ σύγχυσις ἀφαιρεῖται τὴν ἐκάστης φύσεως ἰδιότητα.

⁵ *Reprehen. xii Capp.* x, ed. Schulze, v. pt. i. pp. 51 f.

⁶ *Dial.* ii, ed. Schulze, iv. pt. i. p. 112.

as a "person". This doctrine appears as early as Eustathius, who, commenting on St Matthew xix. 28, says:

"*Dum sederit*", ait, "*Filius hominis in sede majestatis suae*", *alia quidem videtur loqui persona; de altera autem facit manifeste sermonem*.¹

Again, in another fragment, he speaks of the *persona hominis*.² It is interesting, too, to find that the followers of Paul of Samosata later in the fourth century seem to have maintained the same thought, for, according to Epiphanius, these were saying that the words recorded in St Matthew xi. 25–27 were spoken by the Man "concerning Himself" (περὶ ἑαυτοῦ), and that

the Father with the Son is at once one God, but the Man manifests His own prosonon [τὸ ἴδιον πρόσωπον] from below, and thus two prosopa are completed.³

In the fifth century this conception of the reality of "the prosonon of the manhood", as it is set beside that of the reality of "the prosonon of the Godhead" of Jesus Christ, appears in a more definite form. Thus, to quote two passages from the *de Incarnatione* of Theodore of Mopsuestia:⁴

When we discern [διακρίνωμεν] the natures, we say that the nature of the divine Logos is complete, and that the prosonon is complete—for it cannot be said that a hypostasis is without its prosonon [ἀπρόσωπος]; and we say that the nature of the Man is complete, and likewise the prosonon.

The second passage runs:

We say that the ousia of the divine Logos is proper, and proper, too, that of the Man; for the natures are discerned—though the prosonon constituted by the union is one. So then, when we take in hand to discern the natures, we say that the prosonon of the Man is complete, and complete, too, that of the Godhead.

Again, Nestorius is even more emphatic on this point: as we have seen, the conception of the reality of "the prosopa of the

¹ *P.G.* xviii. 692c.

² *Ibid.* The two fragments are preserved by Facundus: there seems to be no doubt concerning their genuineness.

³ Loofs, *Paulus von Samosata*, p. 338, Frag. 5.

⁴ *De Incarn.* viii, Swete, *op. cit.* ii. pp. 299, 300.

natures" is basic to his theory of "exchange". Thus, to quote but one of the many passages which can be adduced in this connection:

I predicate two natures, that He indeed who is clothed is one, and He wherewith He is clothed another, and these two prosopa of Him who is clothed and of Him wherewith He is clothed.¹

Moreover, it should be noted that, speaking of the Man, Nestorius says that "He was not without activity in His own nature",² and that "the prosopon of the humanity is moved to and fro by the humanity in accordance with the nature of man"³—statements which most clearly reveal that for him the manhood is utterly real, possessing the faculty of self-determination. And though they may not express themselves so explicitly, it seems reasonable to suppose that the other members of the school hold the same view.⁴

So we ask: What is the root cause of this insistence on the reality of the manhood with its prosopon? Is it because these teachers would be faithful to their assertion—so clearly brought out in the first of the quotations from Theodore—that every hypostasis must have its prosopon? Or is it because they are convinced that their opponents fail to do justice to an important Christological truth, and that it behoves them to take a firm stand in the interest of sound doctrine? Undoubtedly these

¹ *Bazaar*, p. 218.

² *Ibid.* p. 233.

³ *Ibid.* p. 211.

⁴ The expression "the prosopon of the manhood" does not occur in the writings of Andrew and Theodoret against the *Twelve Anathematisms*, though it is clear that both "personalize" the manhood (see below, p. 193). Perhaps they considered it unwise to speak in this way, realizing that it might be taken as direct evidence that their opponents were right in accusing them of being teachers of Nestorianism: it may not be without significance that it was not till after his condemnation, when he wrote the *Bazaar*, that Nestorius was outspoken concerning the human prosopon of Jesus Christ. Yet Ibas of Edessa seems to have had no fears, for, according to the report of the party of Dioscorus at the *Latrocinium* (449), this staunch supporter of the Antiochene doctrine had said: "There is one prosopon—He who is of God the Father; and there is another prosopon—He who is of the Virgin" (Perry, *The Second Synod of Ephesus*, p. 108). [It is noteworthy that Theodoret himself can say that he applies divine and human attributes τῶν προσώπων τῷ ἐνί (*Dial.* iii, ed. Schulze, iv. pt. i. p. 203—quoted above, p. 165)—an expression which seems to show that, like Nestorius, he regards the one prosopon as the "common" prosopon of the prosopa of the natures. However, I have not come across any other similar reference to two prosopa in the writings of this teacher.]

considerations, and especially the latter, play their part, but it would seem that here again we must look deeper if we would understand their position. Surely, the reason why they so strenuously maintain the complete reality of Christ's manhood is because, at bottom, they are moved by the thought that if man is to be redeemed, the Man assumed, as He passes from trial to trial, must be ever at one with the divine Logos in purpose and will—a conception which renders essential the positing of a manhood endowed with the faculty of self-determination. Thus is the second soteriological conception of the Antiochenes carried over into Christology.

Before we go farther, let us notice that there is no fundamental difference between this and the corresponding teaching of the Alexandrines. For here the Antiochenes are but upholding the principle of the δύο πράγματα which, as we have seen, is one of the main foundations of the Alexandrine Christology. There is, however, this difference: far greater stress is laid on this principle by the Antiochenes than by the members of the opposing school of thought—a point which is easily understood once it is realized that the two schools have different ends in view; for while the former concentrate their efforts on the rejection of Eutychianism, and so lay stress on the reality of the two natures, the latter are determined to defend the faith against the Nestorian error, and so emphasize the truth of the unity of Christ's Person. But we can say more than this. There is no fundamental difference between the two parties in respect of their teaching on His manhood. As we attempted to show when we were discussing this aspect of their Christology, the Alexandrines maintain, at any rate in principle, the individuality of the human element in Jesus Christ. The difference, then, would seem to be that what is implicit in their case is explicit in that of the Antiochenes. But why this difference? The explanation would seem to be that the two schools emphasize each a different aspect of the place of the Lord's manhood in the redemption, and that, after all, it is largely a question of basic outlook. For while the Alexandrines, not completely forgetful of the individual character of the Lord's manhood, lay stress on the truth that He is Representative Man, the Antiochenes, while teaching that He is "The Man", the Second Adam, through whom the whole

human race is renewed, pay especial attention to the truth that He is "a man"—the one perfect human individual who was ever obedient to the divine will, that through such implicit obedience man's salvation might be won.

We would now see how at another point the Antiochenes are at one with the opposing school in maintaining the same Christological principle. We mean that, like the Alexandrines, these teachers assert that it is necessary to "recognize the difference of the natures" in order to avoid the idea of "confusion",¹ and that it is this principle which they would uphold when they speak of the necessity of "dividing" the natures.

Undoubtedly there is that in their doctrine which, at first sight, seems to show that their opponents had good grounds for claiming that Diodore and Theodore and their followers, while professing that they taught the unity of Christ's Person, were in reality rending asunder the one Person through "personalizing" the natures, and so setting up two Sons. In particular, the Alexandrines could point to the Antiochene method of "dividing" the sayings concerning Christ in Scripture as proof positive that these theologians, through attributing to the divine nature, and so to the Logos, what is God-befitting, and to the human nature, and so to the Man regarded as a human individual, what is man-befitting, were indeed setting side by side in Christ two Persons, the one divine, the other human.

Instance after instance of this "dividing" of Scriptural passages between the natures and seeing each as a "person" is to be found in their writings. Thus—to quote but a few of them—Theodore, commenting on Galatians iv. 4 ("God sent forth his Son, born of a woman, born under the law"), writes:

Clearly the Apostle is speaking of the Man [*de homine*], and is referring to Him who was made of a woman and lived under the Law. And rightly does he call Him "Son", seeing that above all men He was made partaker of filial adoption on account of the conjunction by which the divine Logos vouchsafed to conjoin Him [*eum*] with Himself [*sibi*].²

¹ The Antiochene standpoint is summed up in the words of Antiochus of Ptolemais († before 408), who opposed Chrysostom at Constantinople: μή συγχέης τὰς φύσεις. . . κρᾶται τὸν θεόν, δίδου τὰ πρέποντα τῷ θεῷ· δέχου τὸ ἀνθρώπινον, δίδου τὰ πρέποντα τῇ ἀνθρωπότητι (quoted by Leontius of Byzantium, *c. Nestor. et Eutych.*, P.G. lxxxvi. 1316A).

² Swete, *op. cit.* i. p. 62.

Or to quote his comment on Colossians i. 13 ("...translated us into the kingdom of the Son of his love"):

He does not say "of the Son", but "of the Son of His love", for we are not partakers of the Kingdom of the divine Logos—for how can we be joined to the Artificer of the universe? The Apostle meant that we are joined to the Man who was assumed [*suscepto homini*]. . . Hence he called Him [*eum*] "the Son of His love", for He is not the Son of the Father by nature, but through love was deemed worthy of the adoption of sons.¹

Nestorius interprets the sayings in the same way; indeed, it seems clear that he would enunciate this principle of exegesis when, refuting the notion—held, as he thought by his opponents—that everything, whether divine or human, should be attributed to the "one nature" (*una substantia*) of Jesus Christ, he says in the *Bazaar*:

The words of the divine Scriptures befit not Christ in any other manner than this; but as we have examined and found, all refer not to the union of the nature but to the natural and hypostatic prosopon.²

For, surely, what he means here is this: that one must "examine" each passage of Scripture and, having thus discovered to which of the two natures or hypostases it belongs, "refer" it to the prosopon of that nature or hypostasis.³ Thus—to quote examples of this method of exegesis from his celebrated sermon on the Highpriesthood of Christ—he says:⁴

He who [ὁ] is "Yesterday and to-day", according to the word of Paul [Hebrews xiii. 8] is seed of Abraham⁵—not He who says [ὁ λέγων] "Before Abraham was I am" [St John viii. 58].

He who [ὁ] assumed the fraternity of a human soul and body is "like unto His brethren in all things" [Hebrews ii. 17]—not He who says [ὁ λέγων] "He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father" [St John xiv. 9].

"Apostle" [Hebrews iii. 1] is, clearly, He who says [ὁ λέγων] among the Jews "The Spirit of the Lord is upon Me. . ." [St Luke iv. 18].

¹ *Ibid.* p. 260.

² *Bazaar*, pp. 85 f.

³ Driver and Hodgson (*ibid.* p. 86 n. 1) interpret the passage in this way.

⁴ *Sermo* v, Loofs, *op. cit.* pp. 234 f.

⁵ Compare with this the statement in the *Bazaar* (p. 309): "For 'Christ the same yesterday and to-day and for ever' [is] the same in prosopon, not in the same nature." Thus Nestorius divides the text in accordance with the natures: he does not deny the one prosopon.

Or—to adduce two more such sayings, the first quoted by Cyril, the second by Severus of Antioch:

Thus Scripture says: “God sent forth His Son, born of a woman, born under the Law” [Galatians iv. 4] . . . Demand of the contentious one—Who [τίς] was born under the Law? Was it the divine Logos? In no wise!¹

He who said “My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?” was the human nature, wise one.²

Again, turning to Theodoret,³ we find that in his reply to the Tenth Anathematism of Cyril he says (after quoting Hebrews v. 7, 10):⁴

Who [τίς], then, is He who was perfected by toils of virtue, not being perfect by nature? Who is He who learned obedience through trial, and before His experience was ignorant of it? Who is He that lived with godly fear, and with strong crying and tears offered supplication, not being able to save Himself, but appealing to Him that is able to save [σώζειν ἑαυτὸν οὐ δυνάμενος, ἀλλὰ τὸν δυνάμενον σώζειν προκαλῶν], and asking for release from death? Not the divine Logos, the Impassible, the Immortal, the Incorporeal. . . . On the contrary, it is that of David’s seed which was assumed by Him, the mortal, the passible, and that which is afraid of death. . . . It was the nature assumed from us for our sakes that experienced our sufferings without sin—not He that on account of our salvation took it.

And to make it clear that this teacher does not hesitate to “personalize” “that which was assumed”, we add what he says towards the end of his *Reprehensio*, apropos of the words “Consider the Apostle and High Priest of our confession. . . .” (Hebrews iii. 1, 2):

No one who holds the orthodox faith would call the uncreated

¹ *Sermo xvii*, Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 297 (Cyril, *adv. Nestor.* ii. 3, ed. Pusey, vi. p. 104).

² Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 360. From Severus’ *c. Gramm.* iii. i. 4 (ed. Lebon, *op. cit.* p. 29) we learn that the saying was to be found in Nestorius’ sermon *On St Mt. xviii.* 21 (see Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 332).

³ It may be noted that Theodoret expressly affirms that this method of “applying what was spoken in humility about the Lord, and suitably to the assumed nature, as to a man [ὡς ἄνθρωπος], and what is God-befitting and signifies the divine nature as to the Divine [ὡς θεῶν]” furnishes him and his fellow Antiochenes with the weapon which they can use, now that they are as it were “drawn up in battle array to oppose the madness of Arius and Eunomius” (see his letters to Flavian of Constantinople, and Eusebius Scholasticus—*Epp.* civ, xxi).

⁴ *Reprehen. xii Capp.* x, ed. Schulze, v. pt. i. pp. 52 f.

and unmade divine Logos, who is co-eternal with the Father, a creature—but, on the contrary, Him of David’s seed [τὸν ἐκ σπέρματος Δαβὶδ], who being free from all sin became our High-priest and Victim, He Himself having offered Himself on our behalf to God [αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν . . . προσενεγκῶν]—having in Himself [ἐν ἑαυτῷ] the divine Logos of God, united to Himself [ἦνω- μένον αὐτῷ], and inseparably conjoined.

Or, in Theodoret’s reply to Cyril’s Twelfth Anathematism, after the saying “But now ye seek to kill me, a man that hath told you the truth” (St John viii. 40), there is this:¹

What is threatened with death is not the very Life, but He that hath the mortal nature [ὁ ἔχων. . .].

Similarly Andrew, replying to the Tenth Anathematism, asks (after quoting Hebrews iv. 15, v. 4, 6):²

Who [τίς] is He who was tempted? Was it the divine Logos, or the human nature, the seed of David?

Who is He who in respect of the priesthood is likened to Aaron? Was it the divine nature?

And who, again, is represented according to the priesthood of Melchizedek?

We can well understand, then, why the Alexandrines should think that this “dividing of the natures” was leading the Antiochenes into the ways of Nestorianism. It seemed to them that these were starting from the two natures and, separating them and seeing each with its prosopon, were attempting to arrive at the doctrine of the unity of Christ’s Person—though, in reality, they were positing no more than the conjunction of a man with the Logos. Thus—to give here³ an instance of the Alexandrines’ attitude to this aspect of the teaching of the members of the opposing school of thought—Cyril was confident that Nestorius, despite all that he said to the contrary, was not proclaiming the

¹ *Ibid.* p. 66.

² Cyril, *Apol. adv. Orient.* x, ed. Pusey, vi. pp. 336 ff. Cf. also the fragment of Andrew’s letter to Rabbūla of Edessa which is preserved in the *Philalethes* of Severus of Antioch (ed. Sanda, p. 24). Here, after stating that the Orientals do not follow Marcion and the Manichees in teaching that Christ was not man in truth, he points out that they do not go to the other extreme—for if, “while confessing the Man, they did not confess with Him [cum eo] the Godhead”, they would be imitators of Photinus and Paul of Samosata.

³ See also below, p. 210

one Christ, but, everywhere dividing the natures, was setting up a man beside the Logos—an ordinary man in whom the Logos dwells and who is conjoined with Him in equality of dignity and honour.¹ Scripture, the Alexandrine Patriarch declares, does not say that the Logos united a man's prosopon to Himself (. . . ὅτι ὁ Λόγος ἀνθρώπου πρόσωπον ἦνωσεν ἑαυτῷ), but that He became flesh.²

But is it a true estimate of the doctrine of the Antiochenes to say that they begin with "two natures" and end with "two prosopa"? As we have already tried to show, they start from the Person of the Logos who unites to Himself real manhood, and flatly deny that they teach "two Sons".³ Moreover, they assert that for them the union is indivisible⁴—indeed, the word "without division" is as often on their lips, as is the word "without confusion", the two Chalcedonian adverbs already appearing together several times in their writings when they are speaking of the two natures.⁵ And, even more important in this connection is this assertion of theirs: they do not divide the one Person of Jesus Christ; for, they teach, like the union itself, the one prosopon is indivisible. So it is that Theodoret of Cyrus is speaking for all the members of this school when he says: "I am equally anxious to avoid both the impious 'confusion' and the impious 'division'; for to me it is equally abominable to divide the one Son into two, and to deny the duality of the natures."⁶

Their position, as it seems to us, is that Jesus Christ is one Person, the Logos made man, in whom two natures, real Godhead and real manhood, have been brought together, and that

¹ *Adv. Nestor.* ii, ed. Pusey, vi. pp. 93 f.

² *P.G.* lxxvii. 48c; Bindley, *op. cit.* p. 107. It should be understood that what Cyril is denying here is not that the Logos united to Himself a manhood complete with a human rational soul, but that the "union" is such that in Jesus Christ two prosopa, two Persons, are set side by side.

³ See above, pp. 162 ff.

⁴ As illustrating the Antiochenes' insistence on the indivisibility of the union, see, for instance, Nestorius' use of the analogy of the fire and the bush (*Bazaar*, p. 160). It would seem that Cyril himself could hardly improve on this.

⁵ E.g. Theodore, *ad Donnium* (quoted above, p. 160), Nestorius *de Fide* (quoted below, p. 195), Andrew of Samosata in his reply to Cyril's Anath. x (Cyril, *Apol. adv. Orient.* x, ed. Pusey, vi. p. 340), Alexander of Hierapolis (quoted below, p. 195 n. 1), and Theodoret, *Dial.* ii, ed. Schulze, iv. pt. i. p. 108, *Ep.* xxi (see below, p. 195).

⁶ *Dial.* ii, ed. Schulze, iv. pt. i. p. 109.

it is necessary to acknowledge that these are real in their union in this one Person. "One and the same", says Nestorius in one of the fragments of his work, *de Fide*, "is He who is seen [*conspicitur*] in the uncreated and the created nature", and in another fragment of the same work (though unfortunately the saying is not complete): "...so that in everything the two natures, complete, not confused, and not separated, are seen [*videantur*] in our Lord Christ, and each [nature] acknowledges what is proper to it".¹ Thus would he uphold the unity of the Person, and at the same time the difference of the natures. And especially illuminating is the testimony of Theodoret. Several times in his writings does he employ this analogy: a man is one person, but in that one man—without thinking of two men—are seen an immortal soul and a mortal body. A man, he says, "is understood to be one being [*ἐν ζῶον*], but we recognize [*ἴσμεν*] in the one man both the immortality of the soul and the mortality of the body, confessing the soul invisible and the body visible". So, he goes on, in respect of Christ: "We recognize [*ἴσμεν*] one Son—for the union is without division as it is also without confusion—but recognize too that the Godhead is without beginning, and the manhood of recent origin."²

It is against the background of this idea of acknowledging the Godhead and manhood as real in their union in the one Person of Jesus Christ, we consider, that we must view their principle of "dividing the natures". As is perfectly clear, they insist on it because they regard it as the means of overthrowing the idea of "confusion". Thus in his *de Incarnatione*, Theodore of Mopsuestia asserts that because the *adsumens* is different in nature from the *adsumptus*—

oportuit dividere quae circa Christum,

¹ Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 330 (*Syr.* p. 380). The two sayings are preserved by Severus of Antioch in his *c. Gramm.* iii. i. 3, 9, ed. Lebon, *op. cit.* pp. 20, 120. Cf. the following saying of Alexander of Hierapolis: *Si igitur persistit in iisdem Aegyptius, et non negat quidem capitula, confitetur autem Christum. . . Deum esse et hominem, eundem evidenter et Filium Dei propter naturam Dei Verbi et Filium hominis propter naturam quae est ex semine Abrahae et David. . . et usque in saecula infinita DUAS NATURAS AGNITAS IN UNO DOMINO ET FILIO ET CHRISTO INCONFUSE ET INDIVISE, nos nullam communionem cum eo habemus* (*P.G.* lxxxiv. 752).

² So in Theodoret's letter to Eusebius Scholasticus (*Ep.* xxi); see also his letter to the Monks of Constantinople (*Ep.* cxlv), *Dial.* ii, ed. Schulze, iv. pt. i. pp. 107 f., and *Reprehen. xii Capp.* iii (quoted below, p. 199).

and, after affirming that this “dividing” is consonant with what is to be found in Scripture, goes on:

*Sic neque naturarum confusio fiet, neque personae quaedam prava divisio.*¹

While preserving the unity of Person, then, Theodore would in this way uphold the reality of the natures against the “*confusio*”. Again, when Nestorius utters his celebrated saying, “I separate the natures, but unite the worship”, it is apparent, as the context shows, that, while maintaining that Jesus Christ is one Person, he would assert the “two natures” in order to resist the same notion.² And in clearest terms the Bishop of Cyrus declares why it is that they insist on this principle:

Dismissing the term “mixture”, we use the terms “union”, “conjunction” and “communion”, teaching the dividing of the natures, but also the unity of the Person. For in this way shall we refute the blasphemy of Apollinarius and Eunomius.³

But, we must notice, the Antiochenes (using here such words as χωρίζειν, διαίρειν, διατέμνειν) do not always speak of “dividing” and “separating” the natures when they would resist the idea of “confusion”. We also find that, with the same purpose in view, they speak of “discerning”, “seeing”, “conceiving”, and “recognizing” the natures.

Thus, in a passage in his *de Incarnatione* (to which we referred when we were discussing his teaching on the reality of a human prosopon in Jesus Christ) Theodore of Mopsuestia speaks of “discerning” (διακρίνειν) the natures:

When we discern the natures, we say that the nature of the divine Logos is complete, and that the prosopon is complete—for it cannot be said that a hypostasis is without its prosopon; and we say that the nature of the Man is complete, and likewise the prosopon. But when we look at the conjunction [ὅταν μέντοι ἐπὶ τὴν συνάφειαν ἀπιδώμεν], then we say that there is one prosopon.⁴

¹ *De Incarn.* v, Swete, *op. cit.* II. p. 292.

² *Sermo ix*, Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 262.

³ *P.G.* lxxv. 1473.

⁴ *De Incarn.* viii, Swete, *op. cit.* II. p. 299 (quoted above, p. 187). In the same fragment we have a similar statement (Swete, *op. cit.* II. p. 300; quoted above, p. 187) which contains the words ὅταν δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἕνωσιν ἀποβλέψωμεν. It is possible to read too much into the ἀπιδώμεν and the ἀποβλέψωμεν in

Again, it is most significant that in the very passage in the same work in which he says:

oportuit dividere quae circa Christum,

he can also use this word “discern”, and say:

*Quando naturas quisque discernit, alterum et alterum necessario invenit.*¹

Surely, then, we may say that it is no more than this “discerning” of the natures—that is, the recognizing of their reality—that Theodore has in mind when, in reply to the charge that he was teaching “two Sons”, he says:

We confess, and rightly, one Son, since the dividing of the natures ought of necessity to be upheld, and the inseparability of the oneness of the prosopon to be preserved;²

and, if we are right, this statement of his can be taken as expressing together the two Christological principles, which, as we are trying to show, are basic to the Antiochene doctrine.

Again, Nestorius, who so often speaks of “separating” the natures, appears at times to use the word “see”: “the two natures are seen [*videantur*] in our Lord Christ”.³ Further, it should be observed that in the *Bazaar*—after quoting the passage from Cyril’s *ad Acacium* in which the Alexandrine says that upon investigating the manner of the Incarnation the human intelligence sees (ὁρᾷ) that the things which have been united are two, yet believes that out of both there is One, both God and Son and Christ and Lord⁴—Nestorius asks what is this “One” of Cyril’s, and, obviously with the purpose of counteracting the idea that it is *una substantia*, declares that “the human intelligence sees those things which are united without confusion in their own natures and in their own ousia”, and that “thus they remain and are conceived”. “The one”, he goes on,

these two statements, but if Theodore’s idea is that of “looking away from other things [i.e. the natures with their prosopa] at” the union, it seems that he is here thinking on the same lines as Cyril, whose is the theory of seeing only the one Person of the Incarnate “after the union” (see above, pp. 95 ff.).

¹ See above, p. 196 n. 1.

² Quoted above, pp. 162 f.

³ Quoted above, p. 195.

⁴ The passage (*P.G.* lxxvii. 193 c) is quoted above, p. 98.

“is not conceived as the other in ousia nor the other as the one. For in the matter of the ousia there is a distinction in the nature of each one of them: it both is conceived and exists.”¹ It seems clear that what the Antiochene is saying here is that each nature has a real existence in the union, and that it can, and must, be conceived (? νοεῖσθαι), if the idea of “confusion” is to be rejected. But there is also this point: it seems likely that, if we had the original Greek, we should find that here Nestorius is speaking of “a separation which is conceived”, or “a separation which is in the mind”. Unfortunately, as Driver and Hodgson tell us,² the Syriac translator seems to have used the words “distinguish” and “separate” “very loosely and without any precise discrimination of meaning”. But in a fragment of Nestorius’ *Against the Theopaschitans*—and these would seem to be his own words³—we have:

The natures of the Son, in accordance with the identity of the ousia of the Father and of ours, are divided by a distinction in the mind,⁴

and in his *Sermon on St Matthew xxii. 2 ff.* this occurs:

The union of the nature is not divided: the ousiai of these, which are united, are divided. This [consists] not in the annulling of the union but in the understanding of the flesh and of the divinity.⁵

¹ *Bazaar*, p. 310.

² *Ibid.* p. 312 n. 2. As these editors of the *Bazaar* say here, there are times when the Syriac word rendered “distinct” requires the sense of “separate”.

³ Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 210 n., thinks that the words are those of “The Theopaschitan”. [The work is in the form of a dialogue between a Cyrillian and one (“The Orthodox”) who represents the Antiochene side.] But: (1) Severus of Antioch, who quotes the saying, regards it as coming from Nestorius himself (*c. Gramm.* III. i. 20; ed. Lebon, *op. cit.* p. 225); (2) Theodotus of Ancyra († before 446), a supporter of Cyril at the Council of Ephesus, found the expression ἐπινοίᾳ μόνῃ χωρίζω among the “Nestorians” (see his homily, *de Nativitate Christi*, P.G. lxxvii. 1356D, 1361C; quoted by Severus, *loc. cit.*).

⁴ Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 210 (*Syr.* p. 370); trans. as in *Bazaar*, p. 385. Lebon (*op. cit.* p. 225) translates: . . . *naturae vero Filii, pro consubstantialitate cum Patre atque nobiscum, separatione secundum cogitationem dividuntur.*

⁵ Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 280 (*Syr.* p. 374); trans. as in *Bazaar*, p. 388. This saying, too, is quoted by Severus in his *c. Gramm.* (*ad loc.*). Lebon (*op. cit.* p. 225) translates: *Igitur unio naturarum indivisibilis est, substantiae eorum, quae unita sunt, divisibiles, non sectione unionis, sed cogitatione divinitatis et humanitatis.*

So it would appear that in all these cases Nestorius is qualifying the strong term “divide” (χωρίζειν, etc.) by speaking of the process as a “dividing” which is in thought (τῆ ἐπινοίᾳ)—which again seems to show that when he “divides” he does no more than “recognize” the reality of each nature in the union.¹

And, apparently, the Bishop of Cyrus is often at pains to show that it is this “recognizing” of the natures with their properties, and no more, that the Antiochenes would uphold when they speak of “separating” the natures. “We do not divide the one Son into two”, he says, “but point out [δείκνυμεν] the difference of flesh and Godhead”;² “we understand [ἐπιστάμεθα] the difference of Godhead and manhood, but we confess the divine Logos made man”.³ So also he can say that, in order to avoid confusing the natures, “we endeavour to distinguish [διαγινώσκειν] how the Same is Son of God and Son of Man”,⁴ and that, “giving heed to the difference of the natures, we consider [σκοποῦμεν] what befits Godhead and what befits a body”.⁵ Again, in his reply to Cyril’s Third Anathematism, we have this statement:

If in the case of the one human person we divide [διαίροῦμεν] the natures, and call the mortal nature body but the immortal nature soul, and both man, much more reasonable is it to recognize the properties of the natures [τὰς τῶν φύσεων ιδιότητας γνωρίζειν], both of God who assumed and of the Man who was assumed.

Then follows his appeal to St Paul:

We find the blessed Paul dividing the one man into two [εἰς δύο διαίρουντα], as when he says: “Though our outward man perish, yet the inward man is renewed” [2 Corinthians iv. 16].⁶

¹ Cf. also the following from the sermon preached by Nestorius on 12 Dec. 430 after he had received Celestine’s letter and Cyril’s *Cum Salvatore* (with the *Twelve Anathematisms*): *Et ego una tecum clamo τὸ θεοτόκος. Sed et τὸ θεοτόκος dico et addo et τὸ ἀνθρωποτόκος. Hoc enim haereticus non patitur dicere propter eam [naturarum] divisionem, quae ex distinctione facta est quoque verborum* (*Sermo xviii*, Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 301).

² *Ep.* xcix.

³ *Ep.* ci; a similar statement is to be found in Theodoret’s letter to Dioscorus of Alexandria (*Ep.* lxxxiii).

⁴ *Dial.* iii, ed. Schulze, iv. pt. i. p. 226.

⁵ *Ibid.*, ed. Schulze, iv. pt. i. p. 193.

⁶ *Reprehen. xii Capp.* iii, ed. Schulze, v. pt. i. p. 16.

Surely, here is proof enough that for this teacher "to divide" is the same as "to recognize the difference of the natures according to their properties". And, particularly noteworthy, since he is using the very phrase which Apollinarius uses in seeking to enforce the principle of "recognizing the difference",¹ is this remark of Theodoret:

When discussing the natures we attribute to each its own, and recognize some as properties of the Godhead, and others as those of the manhood [εἰδέναι . . . ἰδίᾳ].²

So then, in view of what has been said concerning the teaching of the Antiochene theologians on the "two natures", it seems reasonable to claim that the second Christological principle which, as we have attempted to explain, lies at the root of the doctrine of the Alexandrines, lies also at the root of theirs, and that these, too, can say: *In Jesus Christ, the two elements of Godhead and manhood, each with its properties, are to be recognized; therefore, since these remain in their union in His Person, any idea of confusion or of change in respect of these elements must be eliminated.* At the same time it is, apparently, true to say that at one all-important point the teaching of the Antiochenes is more satisfactory than is that of the exponents of the Alexandrine Christology; for the former most clearly affirm that in the union the manhood of Jesus Christ possesses its individuating characteristics, and functions as a free agent—though always in accordance with the will of the Logos. Indeed, it would seem that in this way the representatives of the Syrian doctrinal tradition can offer a real contribution in answer to the problem of the relation of the manhood to the Logos in the union: that manhood is, not "that of another beside the Logos", so that one must think that in Jesus Christ there are two Persons, but the "own" manhood, the *suum templum*, of the Logos, which He has so united to Himself that, as a result of the union, there is one Person, at once God and man; and in this one Person, "the Man-God", the human will, which is real and free, is ever in accord with the will of the Divine. Apparently, then, it is the idea of the Man's perfect fellowship with the Logos that these

¹ See above, p. 59.

² *Dial.* ii, ed. Schulze, iv. pt. i. p. 108.

theologians can put forward in answer to the problem.¹ As we have said, it is here that the Alexandrines fail: they uphold the principle that the Lord's manhood possesses freedom of choice, but do not make use of it. The Antiochenes, on the other hand, not only uphold this principle, but also seek to work it out—though in so doing they rouse a storm of opposition, and for their pains are denounced as "Nestorians".

¹ See below, p. 255.

CONCLUSION

I. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TWO SCHOOLS OF
THOUGHT AND ITS OUTCOME

IF, then, we are right in concluding that there is no fundamental difference between the Christological teaching of the Alexandrines and that of the Antiochenes, one naturally asks why it was that the two parties could not see that they were each contending for the same cardinal principles. The answer is, of course, that from the second half of the third century the spirit of warfare prevailed between the two schools of thought, and that, in consequence, it was not a common understanding that was sought after, but the defeat of the enemy.

There were, in reality, two Antiochs—the one Greek, and the other Syrian—and, as was but natural, it was here that the conflict began. Bishop Demetrian, it is clear, was supported by the Greeks,¹ but he was followed by the Samosatene, and, for the time being, the Syrians were in the ascendant. Then, through the efforts of Malchion, “head of the school of Grecian learning”, and the Origenists who met at Antioch *c.* 268, Paul was deposed, and it is most significant—in that it shows quite plainly that the Greeks had once more come to the fore—that the son of Demetrian, Domnus, was appointed to take his place. Neither was this triumph lasting. Some sixty years afterwards, Eustathius,² a zealot on behalf of the Syrian cause, resisted the Lucianists, the Origenists of the second generation. The climax came when he refused to admit *ad clerum* certain promising members of Lucian’s school. Led by Eusebius of Nicomedia, who through underhand means was able to gain the ear of the

¹ Thus, by those who condemned Paul, Demetrian is applauded as one “who formerly presided over the see of Antioch in a distinguished manner” (Eusebius, *H.E.* vii. 30).

² For an account of Eustathius’ downfall, see the present writer’s *Eustathius of Antioch*, pp. 37 ff. As is said in this work (pp. 20 ff.), Philogonius of Antioch († 323) may have been an upholder of the Syrian type of doctrine, and perhaps the same is true of Paulinus, the immediate predecessor of Eustathius. Paulinus’ was a very short episcopate, but it is significant that Macedonius of Mopsuestia, a supporter of Eusebius of Nicomedia, was instrumental in bringing about his deposition.

Emperor, the Lucianists deposed Eustathius on account of his “Sabellianism”, and Paulinus of Tyre, an Origenist, and, after an interval, those very men whom the Bishop had refused to ordain, occupied the Antiochene see.¹ His followers, refusing to recognize any other as Bishop of Antioch, worshipped apart, the Eustathian schism itself witnessing to the fact that once more the Hellenists were in the ascendant.

What happened in the cases of Paul and Eustathius was but a foreshadowing of what was to take place on a much larger scale. For with the rise of a general interest in the Christological problem in the second half of the fourth century, the Hellenic-Syrian conflict came to be no longer confined to Antioch and environs: its borders were so enlarged that now the whole of Eastern Christendom was involved in the controversy, and Rome herself entered to take sides. The same two parties there were—the one Greek, the other Syrian; and so intent was each upon securing for itself the victory, that it would not stop to enquire whether its opponents did not after all believe what they said they believed. Once again, the supporters of the doctrine which had its home at Alexandria were triumphant, but the cost of their victory was the break-up of a school of thought, the representatives of which, seemingly as orthodox as themselves, were seeking to make their own—and that, as we think, a worthy—contribution to the doctrine concerning Christ. It is with this conflict in its final phase that we are here concerned.

The two parties were at loggerheads from the start. Evidence of the beginnings of the Christological controversy is, apparently, to be found in the dispute at Corinth during the episcopate of Epictetus. Then Hellenist and Syrian were opposed to each other, misunderstood each other, and hurled terms of abuse at each other.² On the one hand, the representatives of the Alexandrine Christology, it seems, seized upon the idea of “dividing” which was being upheld by their opponents, whom they denounced as teachers of the doctrine that in Jesus Christ “the Logos had descended upon a holy man as upon one of the prophets”; on the other, the representatives of the Antiochene

¹ Eustathius had refused to ordain Stephen, Leontius (344–58), and that out-and-out Hellenist, Eudoxius (358–60).

² See above, p. 36 n. 4.

school seem to have misunderstood the point of view of those who, following the example of Malchion the Sophist, were making use of the term "ousia" in order to express the doctrine of the Lord's "Person", and retaliated with the charge that these were teaching that "the Lord wore a body putatively". But surely it is true to say that such a crude Ebionism is as far from representing the doctrinal outlook of the one side as is such a crude Docetism from representing that of the other.

Some twenty years later Apollinarius of Laodicea was railing against the members of the school of Flavian and Diodore on account of their "dividing" of the natures. These, he laid down,¹ "have fallen into that dividing which was vilely introduced by the Paulianisers". "These slaves of Paul of Samosata", he went on, "say that the one element is of heaven, acknowledging that it is God, the other a man of the earth; the one they call uncreate, the other created; the one eternal, the other of yesterday; the one master, the other slave—so do they act impiously in worshipping him whom they call slave and creature, and in not worshipping Him who has redeemed us by His own blood". For, he asserted, "one prosopon cannot be divided into two; in the Incarnation the body is not a separate individual [ἰδίᾳ φύσιν], neither is the divinity; but just as a man is one person [μία φύσις], so also is Christ". But was the Laodicene right in describing these upholders of the Syrian tradition as "sycophants, who divide the Lord into two prosopa"?² Certainly their method of interpreting the sayings concerning the Lord could easily give rise to this impression—and it was, doubtless, upon their exegesis that Apollinarius was basing his view—but, as we have seen, they were asserting that for them Jesus Christ is "one prosopon"—one Person, that is, at once God and man—and, as it seems, were meaning by their "dividing" no more than that, since the natures are real in the union, they must be distinguished, each according to its properties, if the Eutychian position is to be avoided.

On the other side, Flavian of Antioch, convinced that they were teaching the "confusion" of the natures, was denouncing against the Hellenists as "Synousiasts", and after him Theodore of Mopsuestia was, in like manner, attributing to those brought up

¹ *Ad Dion.*, Lietzmann, *op. cit.* pp. 256 f.

² *Ibid.* p. 257.

in the Alexandrine faith that which these simply did not believe. "Is there any sane person", this great Antiochene teacher asked, "who would say with you that the Logos 'became' man, unless he happens to be suffering from the same want of understanding?"—he (Theodore) was not taking the "became" in St John i. 14 in the sense which these were giving to the word.¹ But Apollinarius and his disciples were definitely teaching that in the Incarnation the Logos remains all that He was: they themselves were altogether opposed to the notion that the Logos had been "turned into" flesh when He became flesh. Again, when he said that Christ could not have experienced the terror of the Passion "if, as you declare, the Godhead took the place of the *sensus* in Him who was assumed",² it may be that Theodore was aiming a blow at the strictly Apollinarian view of the Lord's manhood, though we cannot rule out the possibility that he was thinking of all the teachers of the Alexandrine school, but it cannot be denied that he was being unfair to Apollinarius in his criticism of the latter's use of the *communicatio idiomatum*. To follow the heresiarch's principle, the Antiochene maintained, and to hold that "He who was before the ages has become Him who is in these last times" is "to turn everything upside down", and "to abolish all distinction between the form of God and the form of a servant".³ But if there was one truth which the Laodicene was most definitely upholding it was that of the reality of the Godhead and of the flesh of Jesus Christ in the union. Neither can we say that the Bishop of Mopsuestia was justified in concluding, from their assertion "God was born", that those brought up in the Alexandrine doctrinal tradition had any intention of ascribing mutability or passibility to the Godhead: "it is ridiculous to say that 'God' was born of a virgin", he was declaring. But it was just this which the Alexandrine theologians were not saying.

¹ *C. Apoll.* iv, Swete, *op. cit.* II. p. 319. ² *C. Apoll.* iii, *ibid.* p. 315.

³ *C. Apoll.* iv, *ibid.* p. 320. It is noteworthy, as bearing out what we have said above (p. 167) concerning Theodore's use of the *communicatio idiomatum*, that this teacher does not say that it must not be affirmed that "He who was before the ages has become [γέγονεν] Him who is in these last times". He is opposed to the affirmation as it was being used by Apollinarius and his followers, who, to his mind, were taking the "has become" here (just as they were taking the *ἐγένετο* of the Johannine formula) in the sense of "has been turned into".

Then, as the controversy became more intense, and Cyril and Nestorius regarded each other as sworn enemies, the two parties more than ever indulged in mutual recrimination: Cyril and the Cyrillians, said the Antiochenes, were denying the reality of Christ's human nature—they were, therefore, "Apollinarians", "Arians", "Theopaschitans", and "would-be orthodox"; Nestorius and those who thought with him, said the Alexandrines, were teaching "two Sons"—they were, therefore, treading in the steps of Paul of Samosata. Let us see how each side was deliberately refusing to take the other at its word.

Cyril, we find, accuses Nestorius of interpreting the Creed of Nicaea "falsely and perversely": the Fathers who drew up this statement of belief, he says, meant nothing less than that He who is very God of very God, and consubstantial with the Father, Himself became man as Jesus Christ—any other interpretation cannot but be erroneous.¹ Seemingly, the Alexandrine fails to grasp the point which Nestorius would make in his *ad Cyrillum ii*,² where he is speaking of the order of the clauses in the Creed. As we have already noticed, the Antiochenes insist that the Fathers at Nicaea distinguish between what in their statement refers to the Logos in His divine nature and what to the Economy, the former holding that the latter make the dividing-line at "He came down from heaven and was incarnate"; and, they maintain, this distinction must be upheld in order to avoid any interpretation of the Creed which might rob the two natures of their reality in the union. We have already referred to what Theodore of Mopsuestia says on this subject in his *ad Baptizandos*;³ now we quote Nestorius himself:

For until His incarnation, they [the Fathers at Nicaea] taught us everything in terms of God the Word, and after He was made flesh they speak of this union which [proceeded] from the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary, of the birth and the flesh which was made flesh, the sufferings and the death and the resurrection and the ascension, . . . in order that we might suppose that the union was without confusion and further without change of ousia and of nature or mixture or natural composition. . . .⁴

¹ *Ep. ii ad Nestor.*, P.G. lxxvii. 45B; *Ep. iii*, P.G. lxxvii. 109C; Bindley, *op. cit.* pp. 105, 124.

² Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 175.

³ Above, p. 126.

⁴ *Bazaar*, p. 171; similarly, *ibid.* pp. 142 f.

But neither Nestorius nor any other Antiochene has any intention of denying the truth embodied in the Creed—namely, that the eternal Son of God, the Second Person of the Trinity, has in Jesus Christ taken the form of a servant and become man¹—and there is no reason to doubt that Theodoret of Cyrus is but speaking for all the members of this school of thought when, referring to the order of the words of the Creed, he says in his *Dialogues* that the object of the "thrice-blessed Fathers" was

to give to us at one and the same time instruction on the Theology and on the Economy, lest there should be supposed to be any distinction between the Person of the Godhead and the Person of the manhood.²

So we conclude that, had Cyril enquired more closely into Nestorius' teaching, he would have discovered that his opponent was but saying what he himself was saying—and that in a way which could give the lie to Eutychianism.

Again, following in the steps of the Laodicene, the Alexandrine Patriarch refuses to believe that it can be otherwise than that in "dividing the natures" the Antiochene is teaching "two Sons". His dictum is:

He who divides the natures posits two Sons; he does not believe the Scripture which says "The Word was made flesh".³

So he brings forward this direction: "Cease separating the natures after the union" (meaning by this, as it seems, that the thought of the *unitio* of Godhead and manhood in the one Person of the Incarnate altogether precludes the idea that in Jesus Christ there are two parallel prosopa); "it behoves those who would be prudent to see that the divine nature is one thing and the human another [ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἕτερόν τι καὶ ἕτερόν ἐστιν . . . εἰδέναι]—yes, I say, it is essential that this should be done".⁴ But, as we have seen,⁵ time and again does Nestorius affirm that his is not the doctrine of "two Sons", and, it would seem,⁶ when he "separates the natures", he (like all the members of the

¹ We have already discussed this point at some length; see above, pp. 151 ff. It may be noted that, looking back on the controversy, Nestorius can say that he had "taken his stand on the deposit of the three hundred and eighteen" (*Bazaar*, p. 264).

² *Dial.* iii, ed. Schulze, iv. pt. i. p. 228.

³ *Dial. cum Nestor.*, P.G. lxxvi. 252 c.

⁴ *Adv. Nestor.* ii. 8, ed. Pusey, vi. pp. 118 f.

⁵ Above, pp. 163 ff.

⁶ See above, pp. 197 ff.

Antiochene school) is doing just what Cyril here directs him to do: he upholds the *unitio* of the natures in the one prosopon of Jesus Christ, and “sees” that these are different, each according to its properties.

Further, while it is to be regarded as unfortunate that the Antiochenes make such an extensive use of the term “conjunction” when they speak of the union, it seems undeniable that Cyril is going too far when he takes the word as indicative of the character of their doctrine. He tells them—and, of course, he is right in this—that it can signify the joining together of a man and God in a unity of dignity or authority;¹ it implies, he says, a joining together like that of believers and the Lord, who are one spirit (cf. 1 Corinthians vi. 17), or like that of the curtains of the Tabernacle in the Wilderness, which were “coupled together” with clasps (cf. Exodus xxvi. 6)²—it signifies a *παράθεσις* rather than a *σύνθεσις*.³ But had he sought to understand their fundamental position, he would have come to the conclusion (we consider) that Nestorius was not upholding the doctrine of a *σχετική συνάφεια*, but that of a *σφόδρα*,⁴ an *ἄκρα*, *συνάφεια*⁵—meaning thereby a *unitio*, which (like the one prosopon which results from it) is altogether indivisible.

And, just as Cyril, in order to condemn them, seizes upon the “conjunction” of the Antiochene teachers, so does he seize upon their term, “indwelling”. He does not say, he points out, that the divine Logos dwelt in Him who was born of the Virgin as in a mere man, lest Christ should be regarded as a God-bearing man (*θεοφόρος ἄνθρωπος*);⁶ and, he goes on, “the indwelling is not to be defined as existing in Him after the same mode that there is said to be an indwelling in the saints, but. . . He effects

¹ *Ep. iii ad Nestor.*, P.G. lxxvii. 112B; Bindley, *op. cit.* p. 125.

² *Apol. adv. Theod.* x, ed. Pusey, vi. p. 472; *adv. Nestor.* ii. 6, ed. Pusey, vi. p. 112.

³ *Ep. iii ad Nestor.*, P.G. lxxvii. 112C; Bindley, *op. cit.* p. 125.

⁴ Cf. Nestorius, *Sermo xv*, Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 292.

⁵ Cf. *Sermo x*, Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 275.

⁶ Theodoret of Cyrus, it may be noted, replying to Cyril's Anath. v, accepts the expression “a God-bearing man”, but to explain his meaning makes use of Col. ii. 8, 9—the very text which Cyril uses when he would explain how the “indwelling” should be understood. Theodoret denies that it is “a mere indwelling”: “We call Him ‘a God-bearing man’, not as receiving some particular divine grace, but as possessing all the Godhead of the Son united” (*Reprehen. xii Capp.*, ed. Schulze, v. pt. i. p. 33).

such an indwelling as the soul of man is said to have in its own body”.¹ So does the Alexandrine maintain that there is a vast difference between an incarnation and an indwelling. “To say that the Logos became [a] man”, he affirms, “is not the same as to consider that God dwelt in a man”;² for, as he wisely remarks, the man who is merely inspired (*ὁ πνευματόφορος*) is not unaware that the Logos is unincarnate.³ It is not then that Cyril rejects the idea of indwelling: his point is that if one speaks of the relationship of the Logos to the human nature which He has made His own as one of “indwelling”, one must not think (as his opponents seemed to be thinking) that Jesus Christ is a mere man in whom the Logos dwells, but—on the basis of St Paul's words in Colossians ii. 8, 9—that He is, and is understood to be, one Person (*unus et est et intelligitur*), the Logos having made for Himself *per veram unitatem* an *inhabitatio in templo quod est natum ex Virgine*.⁴ But, though they do not define their position with the clarity that is called for, it is apparent that the teachers of the Antiochene school mean to say exactly the same. Most emphatically do they assert that in Jesus the Logos dwells “as in no other”—that the indwelling in Him is not like that “in the Saints”, since in this case it is altogether unique; and, denying that one is “the Dweller” and another “He in whom there is dwelling”, in the sense that these are two Persons, they maintain that in Jesus Christ the Logos has taken real manhood to Himself and dwells therein, there being constituted as a result of this indwelling one sole prosopon. One can sympathize with those who were thinking that it was plain enough that these teachers were approaching the position that Jesus Christ is no more than a divinely inspired man, but, especially in view of their determination to maintain the truth that the Logos Himself has become man as Jesus Christ, it seems clear that in reality they are at one

¹ *Ep. iii ad Nestor.*, P.G. lxxvii. 112A; Bindley, *op. cit.* p. 125. See also *adv. Nestor.* ii, ed. Pusey, vi. p. 93 and *Scholia*, xiii, ed. Pusey, vi. p. 528 (“the divine Logos did not dwell in a man by himself as in another Christ”).

² *Apol. adv. Theod.* v, ed. Pusey, vi. p. 440.

³ *Adv. Nestor.* i. 8, ed. Pusey, vi. p. 89.

⁴ *Scholia*, xxvii, ed. Pusey, vi. p. 550. Seemingly, Cyril takes the word “bodily” in Col. ii. 9 as illustrating the mode of the indwelling—it is “personal”, as is that of the spirit in man: *σωματικῶς, ὅ ἐστιν οὐσιωδῶς, ὡς σκεῖ καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ λέγοιτο κατοικεῖν τὸ πνεῦμα αὐτοῦ, οὐχ ἕτερον ἢ παρ' αὐτόν* . . . [*de Recta Fide* (ii), ed. Pusey, vii. pt. i. p. 286].

with their opponents in distinguishing between an incarnation and "a simple or mere indwelling"; for they uphold the former, but flatly reject the latter.

Again, Cyril could point to their method of interpreting the Lord's sayings, or what is written concerning Him in divine Scripture as direct evidence that his opponents were teaching "two Sons". For, as the quotations from the Antiochenes' writings which are set out above simply illustrate,¹ it certainly seems as if—to use the words of the Fourth Anathematism—they "assign the sayings to two prosopa or hypostases", and "apply some to a man considered as having his own existence beside the Logos who is of God, and others as God-befitting solely to the Logos of God the Father".² But here again, it seems, the Alexandrine refuses to appreciate the Antiochenes' point of view. For, as we have seen, these do but "divide the sayings", assigning them, some to the divine nature (with its prosopon) and others to the human nature (with its prosopon), in order to make it plain, against the Eutychian error, that each nature is complete: in reality, they would say, all the actions and sayings reported of Christ in the Gospels or in the apostolic writings are those of one Person, "the Lord", "the Son", "the Christ"—the Logos made man, that is—to whom belong both divine and human properties, He being at once both God and man.³ And is not this the view of Cyril himself, who, while maintaining that all the sayings, whether God- or man-befitting, are those of the one Person, the incarnate Logos, does not abolish their difference?⁴

And it is also easy to understand why Cyril was able to make out that Nestorius, instead of upholding the doctrine of the Incarnation, was teaching that in Jesus Christ "the Logos took a man's prosopon", and that the manhood was thus "that of another beside Him".⁵ After all, those brought up in the faith

¹ See above, pp. 190ff.

² *Ep. iii ad Nestor.*, P.G. lxxvii. 120D; Bindley, *op. cit.* p. 148.

³ See above, pp. 162ff.

⁴ See above, pp. 93ff.

⁵ It is most significant, as illustrating Cyril's view that Nestorius was teaching that the manhood of Christ is "that of another beside the Logos", that he condemns this notion in five of his *Twelve Anathematisms*: the sayings must not be applied some to the Logos and others *ὡς ἀνθρώπων παρὰ τὸν ἐκ θεοῦ Λόγον ἰδικῶς νοουμένων* (Anath. iv); it must not be thought that the Man Jesus was energized by the Logos *ὡς ἕτερος παρ' αὐτὸν ὑπάρχων* (Anath. vii);

represented by the Antiochene school were all of them accustomed to refer to the Incarnation as the "taking" on the part of the Logos (for was not Philippians ii. 5 ff. their *locus classicus*?), and, what is more, to allude to Christ's manhood as "the Man", "the Man whom the Logos assumed". So, turning this aspect of their teaching to his own advantage, he can say to Theodoret—as he says to Nestorius himself¹—that the Only-begotten of His own free will emptied Himself and became man (*γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος*) and did not, "as thou sayest", take a man (*οὐκ . . . ἀνέλαβεν ἄνθρωπον*), bestowing on him a mere association, and crowning him, as He crowns us, with the grace of sonship.² But here, too, Cyril is being grossly unfair to the Antiochenes, who though they may not express themselves so clearly as their adversary, are in reality at one with him; for, as we have seen, they flatly deny that for them the manhood assumed by the Logos is "that of another beside Him",³ and, by their "taking" mean that the Logos has "united to Himself" this manhood, which, through a union which is both "voluntary" and "personal", has now its place in the Person of the Logos, who has thus become man.

Let us turn to the other side, and consider the view which the Antiochenes were taking of Cyril's teaching. We can sympathize with these theologians when they examined the Alexandrine's letters to Nestorius and his *Twelve Anathematisms*: they looked in vain for a firm insistence on the reality of the Lord's human will, of the Man's constant obedience to the divine will, and of His sufferings as He was tried to the uttermost. Instead, they found that Cyril was referring what is human in Christ to the divine Logos: it was God who was born, and suffered, he was saying. But there was no need for them to jump to the conclusion that he was "attributing unto God the Word feeling and willing and suffering in all the things of humanity in His it must not be said that the Man assumed is to be worshipped with the divine Logos *tanquam alterum cum altero* (Anath. viii); on the text, see the note in Bindley, *op. cit.* p. 153); it must not be said that He who was made High Priest and Apostle is *ὡς ἕτερος παρ' αὐτὸν ἰδικῶς ἄνθρωπος ἐκ γυναικὸς* (Anath. x); the life-giving flesh of the Logos must not be regarded *ὡς ἑτέρου τινὸς παρ' αὐτὸν* (Anath. xi). See also *Ep. iii ad Nestor.* (P.G. lxxvii. 116D; Bindley, *op. cit.* p. 128): "We say that He is by nature the only-begotten Son of God; we do not attribute ἀνθρώπων . . . παρ' αὐτὸν ἑτέρῳ the name or the actuality of the Priesthood."

¹ See *Ep. ii ad Nestor.*, P.G. lxxvii. 48c; Bindley, *op. cit.* pp. 105, 107 (quoted above, p. 194).

² *Apol. adv. Theod.* iii, ed. Pusey, vi. p. 416.

³ See above, pp. 153 f.

nature",¹ and that, in consequence, his Anathematisms were "full of wicked purpose, and in accord with the teaching of Apollinarius, Arius, and Eunomius".² And, once they had made up their mind that Cyril was teaching the abominable "confusion", nothing could move them: they simply refused to take the Patriarch at his word.

Were not the very terms which he was using in order to describe the union, "mingling" (κρᾶσις) and "composition" (σύνθεσις),³ proof enough that, to say the least, he was in danger of confusing the natures? And did not his "out of two" (ἐκ δύο) point in the same direction? Nestorius was prepared to accept "in two natures" or a simple "of which" (ὧν), but, as he says, "this 'out of which' [ἐξ ὧν] sounds as if he [Cyril] spoke as regards the natures of the Lord of parts on one side and the other, which parts became one".⁴ But in his Second Letter

¹ So Nestorius, *Bazaar*, p. 240.

² So John of Antioch in his letter to the Emperor Theodosius, written when he was on his way to Ephesus in 431 (Mansi, iv. 1272). He cannot believe that Cyril is the author of the Anathematisms! (See his letter to Firmus of Caesarea in Cappadocia, *P.G.* lxxxiv. 579 ff.) Theodoret takes a similar view in his letter to John (*Ep.* cl). He, too, denounces Cyril as an "Apollinarian". He holds that a deadly poison, proceeding "from the sour root of Apollinarius", was now infecting the Church (*Ep.* cli), and that—this from the report, probably drawn up by the Bishop of Cyrus himself, of the Orientals after they had arrived at Ephesus and deposed Cyril and Memnon (of Ephesus)—Cyril was "trying, so to speak, to raise from Hades the impious Apollinarius, who died in his heresy" (*Ep.* clvii). Cf. also the famous letter of Ibas of Edessa to Maris of Ardashir (Mansi, vii. 241 ff.; Hefele, *A History of the Councils of the Church*, III. pp. 366 ff.), which opens with a short account of the controversy between Cyril and Nestorius, and a declaration that Cyril had fallen into the error of Apollinarianism, his Anathematisms showing that he was impiously affirming that "there is one nature of the Godhead and of the manhood of our Lord Jesus Christ".

³ See Nestorius' criticism of these terms, *Sermo x, On the Chapters*, Loofs, *Nestoriana*, pp. 273, 220 Fr. e. Cf. also his criticism of the term "deificatio": "They blasphemously assert by the very word 'deification' that the flesh conjoined to Godhead and changed into Godhead" (*Ep. i ad Caelest.*, Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 167; cf. *Sermo x*, Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 275). [From the first the Antiochenes had opposed the use of "composition": see Paul of Samosata's criticism of the term, Loofs, *Paulus von Samosata*, p. 337, Frag. 5c.]

⁴ See the fragment of Nestorius' letter to Theodoret, Loofs, *op. cit.* pp. 197 f., 365 f. (Syr.); quoted by Bethune-Baker, *op. cit.* p. 119 n. 1. Nestorius is here criticizing Cyril's statement in the latter's epistle to John of Antioch: "There is one Lord Jesus Christ, although the difference of the natures is not ignored out of which [ἐξ ὧν] we say that the ineffable union has been wrought" (*P.G.* lxxvii. 180B; Bindley, *op. cit.* p. 170). [Cf. Eutherius of Tyana's objection to the expression (as found in his letter to Alexander of Hierapolis, ed. Schulze, v. pt. i. p. 866): *Hoc ipso namque quod dixisti, ex quibus, alterum rursus praeter naturas significas, quod ex ipsis est.*]

to the Antiochene, Cyril explicitly states that "while the natures which were brought together into this real unity were different, yet of both of them [ἐξ ἀφοῖν] is the one Christ and Son, the difference of the natures not being abolished by the union,..."¹ Nestorius is full of praise for the saying—it is admirable as it stands, he declares, only the man has spoilt it by introducing his "hypostatic" union, and speaking as if the divine Logos were deprived of His nature in the Incarnation!²

Similarly these teachers could call attention to Cyril's "after the union, one nature", and say that he was simply acknowledging the Eutychian point of view. Thus in his *Dialogues* Theodoret asks how it is possible to attribute two sets of properties which are inconsistent with each other—a birth before the ages and a birth many generations after David, for instance—to this "one nature".³ And, summing up his argument in his *Syllogisms*, he says:

Those who believe that after the union there was one nature of Godhead and manhood destroy by this reasoning the peculiarities of the natures; and their destruction involves the denial of either nature. For the confusion of the united [natures] prevents us from recognizing either that the flesh is flesh or that God is God.⁴

¹ *P.G.* lxxvii. 45c; Bindley, *op. cit.* p. 105.

² See esp. *Bazaar*, pp. 145, 147, 149, 155, 157. This is a suitable place at which mention can be made of Nestorius' criticism of Cyril's statement (to be found in his letter to Acacius of Melitene, *P.G.* lxxvii. 193D) that "Godhead and manhood are not the same in natural quality". The Antiochene asserts that the "quality" of an ousia is not the ousia, but only the *schēma* of an ousia (on the meaning of *schēma* in Nestorius, see above, p. 159 n. 3), and that Cyril (who has just said that "the brethren in Antioch, accepting simply as though in imagination only [ὡς ἐν ψιλαῖς καὶ μόναις ἐνομοῖαι] the things whereof Christ is known [to have been formed], predicate the difference of the natures"—see above, p. 101) does not "accept the idea of the natures with the ousiai, but [says that] they are without hypostases and not subsisting, [and that] their origin indeed is from reflection, and that they are whole in [its] wholeness"—that is, according to Nestorius, Cyril holds that in Jesus Christ there is but one substance of Godhead and manhood, and that it is only in idea, and not in reality, that these two elements are seen (*Bazaar*, pp. 321 f.; see, also, p. 309). Against such a view, Nestorius affirms that "the natures are not without hypostases" (*Bazaar*, p. 320). But Cyril explicitly states that the form of God and the form of a servant have "not been united without their hypostases" (see above, p. 91)—and he is here using "hypostasis" in exactly the same sense which Nestorius is giving to the term.

³ *Dial.* ii, ed. Schulze, iv. pt. i. pp. 103 f.

⁴ *Dial.* iii, ed. Schulze, iv. pt. i. p. 268.

Nestorius criticizes the expression in the same way: one must either reject it and confess "two natures", or accept it and teach the abominable "confusion". So, in his homily *Concerning the Faith*, he writes:

But if those Theopaschitans confirming [the tenets of] the party of Apollinarius were to say "After the union there appeared one nature", we ought to turn our faces from these with great indignation, because they impiously alienate each nature from its properties by commixture and confusion, and, in regard to what belongs to them, do not allow either the divine [nature] or the human to remain in that which it is, in that each is deprived of its own ousia through the mixture and confusion, and is completely changed into the other. But if they say that the natures are neither commingled nor confused, of necessity there is not one nature, and they are bound to concede two [natures] of Christ, impassible and passible, and the dogma is established which confirms that Christ is consubstantial with the Trinity according to His Godhead.¹

But Cyril never meant that "nature" here should be taken in the sense of *substantia*, or that "after the union" should be understood as a temporal event.² All the same, as the Antiochenes said, the word could be used in that sense, and the phrase itself could be given a meaning which is truly Monophysite. But while it cannot be denied that the Antiochenes had grounds for complaint, it also seems undeniable that they were not prepared to do justice to the one who coined the phrase:³ they would not listen to his repeated denials that he was teaching that the natures had been robbed of their reality in the union.

Again, they approach the formula that Jesus Christ is "one incarnate nature of the divine Logos" only from the point of view of their own terminology: for them "nature" can have but one meaning, though, since they were living in an atmosphere of Greek culture, it is reasonable to suppose that they were acquainted with the use of the term in the sense of "person".

¹ Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 329.

² See above, pp. 95 ff.

³ Thus in reply to his request that he should be given an explanation of "one nature after the union", Theodoret makes "Eranistes" say: "I maintain that the Godhead remains, and that the manhood was absorbed [καταποθῆναι] by it" (*Dial.* ii, ed. Schulze, iv. pt. i. p. 114). It seems obvious that such a blatantly Monophysite explanation of the phrase would never have been put forward by Cyril.

Their attitude to the formula is seen in a fragment of Nestorius' *Against the Theopaschitans* (a work composed in the form of a dialogue between *Theopaschitan*, who represents the Alexandrine, and *Orthodox*, who represents the Antiochene point of view). First, *Theopaschitan* says:

The nature of the flesh is passible and changeable and newly created; yet it belongs to the Godhead in such wise that both [elements] subsist in one and the same nature. . . .¹

And how can we be charged with mingling a duality of natures when we say that Christ is one incarnate nature of God [the Logos]?

Theopaschitan, it is important to notice, does not say that Jesus Christ *has* one nature, but that He *is* one nature—that the Incarnate is one Person, that is; moreover, he does not deny the difference of the two elements which have been united in this one Person. Such, as we have seen,² is the Cyrillian interpretation of the formula, and it is thoroughly orthodox. But Nestorius will not attempt to appreciate *Theopaschitan's* point of view. With the Alexandrines' ἐκ δύο in mind, he is convinced that his opponents were teaching that in the Incarnation each nature is deprived of its reality (its hypostasis), and that, the two being "confused", there results "a one-natured hypostasis", which is neither divine nor human. So he causes *Orthodox* to reply:

Concerning the charge brought against thee, do not hope to excuse thyself. For thou hast confessed that it has been determined by your party that Christ is one nature out of [ex] the incorporeal and the body, and that there is a one-natured hypostasis τῆς θεοσαρκώσεως.³ But this is such a mingling of the two natures that these themselves are deprived of the hypostases which each possesses, in that they become mingled with one another.⁴

¹ It will be understood that here *Theopaschitan* is using "nature" in its two meanings.

² Above, p. 89 n. 2.

³ The passage is quoted by Severus of Antioch in his *c. Gramm.* III. i. 14, and I adopt the translation given by Lebon, *op. cit.* p. 172 (lit. "of the becoming flesh of the Divinity", as in the translation provided by Driver and Hodgson, *Bazaar*, p. 384).

⁴ Loofs, *op. cit.* pp. 209 f., 369 (Syr.).

Clearly, Nestorius simply refuses to consider that Cyril in the formula may be using "nature" in the sense of "person". Had he been determined really to understand the Alexandrine, he would have come to see that by his "incarnate nature" the latter meant what the Antiochenes were meaning when these said that the Logos had united real manhood to Himself and so had become man, He being now incarnate, and that by his "one" he meant what these were meaning when they asserted that Jesus Christ, the Logos made man, is one *prosopon*, one Person, at once God and man.

So also in regard to the opposition of these teachers to Cyril's "natural" union: Theodoret, replying to the Third Anathematism, may be justified in complaining that "the sense of the terms used is misty and obscure", for even in his explanations Cyril does not say any more than that by his "natural" union he means a "real" union, but he is scarcely justified in assuming—and in building his argument solely on this assumption—that the "very clever author" of the expression is here understanding "nature" in the sense of *substantia*. "Nature", says the Bishop of Cyrus, "has a compulsory force and is involuntary": we do not feel hunger or thirst, neither do we sleep or breathe, of our own free will, but of necessity. A "natural" union, then, must mean that the Logos has been united to the form of a servant "under compulsion of necessity", and not "by purpose and will". Let it be understood that the union is of this order, he argues, and it will be seen that there is no need to add this word "natural".¹ Nestorius writes in the same way. A "natural" union, since "those who are composed of [one] nature support of necessity the nature's own proper qualities which are naturally and not voluntarily theirs", means a union deprived of its voluntary character;² it means, too, that, since the Godhead has been compounded into the hypostasis of another nature,³ God Himself is made to suffer, and that the manhood can no longer function in accordance with its own nature.⁴ But here again it will be apparent that to take up an attitude of this sort, and to try to show that there was heresy where none was

¹ *Reprehen. xii Capp.* iii, ed. Schulze, v. pt. i. p. 15.

² *Bazaar*, pp. 85, 179.

³ *On the Chapters*, Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 220 (Frag. e).

⁴ *Bazaar*, pp. 84, 92 f.

meant, is altogether unfair to one who was trying to make it clear that his doctrine was that the union is without confusion, and that it is a "personal" union, the Logos, through His own voluntary act, having in Jesus Christ united what is ours to Himself—the very position, that is, which, as it seems, these theologians themselves were seeking to maintain.

It cannot be denied that the Antiochenes had good grounds for expressing their dissatisfaction with the Cyrilline phrases "after the union, one nature", "one incarnate nature of the divine Logos", and "a natural union", since, unless carefully explained, these could be interpreted in a Eutychian sense, and, if the first two expressions were not so already, they were soon to become the party-slogans of frenzied monks who, zealous supporters of the Alexandrine orthodoxy and, for the most part, unlearned in matters relating to theology, did not stop to think out what was the particular meaning of "nature" here. But we can hardly speak in the same way in regard to the opposition of these teachers to Cyril's "hypostatic" union. If they were ignorant of the sense in which the Alexandrine meant that "nature" should be used in the expressions mentioned above—though we cannot think that they were—they had but very little excuse for misunderstanding him when he used the word "hypostasis" in the sense of "person". They themselves were accustomed to speak of "three hypostases" when explaining the doctrine of the Trinity, and, as we have said, there are instances of their use of the term in this meaning even in Christological discussion.¹ The "hypostatic" union, however, they will not accept, since, as it seems to them, their opponent may be using it in the sense of a "substantial" union. Theodoret, for instance, writes against Cyril's Second Anathematism in this way:

We are wholly ignorant of the hypostatic union as being strange and foreign to the divine Scriptures and to the Fathers who have interpreted them. If the author of these statements means by the "hypostatic" union that there was a mingling of Godhead and flesh, we shall oppose his statement with all our might, and shall confute his blasphemy, for the mixture is of necessity followed by the confusion; and the admission of confusion destroys the individuality of each nature.²

¹ See above, p. 180.

² *Reprehen. xii Capp.* ii, ed. Schulze, v. pt. i. p. 10.

But how could "the author" mean that in the Incarnation there is "a mingling of Godhead and flesh", or "a mixture", when he would assure his opponents that for him the difference of the natures is preserved in the union? Nestorius, too, seems to be able to see nothing in the phrase but the doctrine of "confusion". As his Second Counter-Anathematism shows, it brings to his mind the thought of a local change in respect of the divine ousia, as though it had been once locally on earth, or of an infinite extension of the flesh so that it could contain the divine nature.¹ Again, in his opposition to the phrase, he points to the Alexandrines' favourite analogy of the union. You say, he argues, that the union of body and soul in man constitutes one nature, and this you call a "hypostatic" union. But in man the human soul suffers all that the body suffers. On this analogy, then, in the "hypostatic" union God the Logos suffers without His will all the sufferings of His manhood—the Son has been changed from the impassible to the passible, from the immortal to the mortal, and from the immutable to the mutable.² Here, it will be noticed, Nestorius is arguing from the assumption that the Alexandrines, when they speak of the "one nature" or the "one hypostasis" of man, are thinking of a human *substantia*, whereas the point they would emphasize is that of the unity of person, the soul and body of the human individual representing the two elements out of which the one Person of Jesus Christ is constituted—which elements, like the body and soul of man, remain in their difference. There seems to be no doubt that the Antiochenes were obstinate: they would not believe that Cyril was no upholder of the "confusion". Indeed, here especially is our sympathy rather with him than with them; for, as he tells us, his attempt to convince them that they were raising a lie against him was like trying to storm an impregnable fortress.³ If, before they criticized, Cyril's opponents had sought to understand his point of view, they would have come to see that by his "hypostatic" union he was but teaching what they themselves were teaching.

In this connection a passage in the *Bazaar*⁴ is full of interest. Nestorius asks what his adversary means by "this unintelligible

¹ Loofs, *op. cit.* pp. 212 f.

² *Bazaar*, pp. 85, 93, 161, 179.

³ *Apol. adv. Theod.* iii, ed. Pusey, vi. p. 416.

⁴ Pp. 155 ff.

hypostatic union", and how he understands it. Does he wish to regard a hypostasis as a prosopon, "as we speak of one ousia of the divinity and three hypostases, and understand 'prosopa' by 'hypostases'"? If so, he is calling the "prosopic" union "hypostatic". If, then, he is referring to "the one prosopon of Christ", and not using hypostasis in the sense of "the hypostasis of the ousia and of the nature", just as one speaks of "the form of His hypostasis" (cf. Hebrews i. 3),¹ and if he understands that there has been a union of the natures, and that (as indeed he confesses) the natures are different, his position is the same as Nestorius'. "I say that", says the latter—though he is not convinced that this is what Cyril really believes. However, the point is that here is an illustration of what could happen once the Antiochenes were prepared seriously to enquire into what Cyril was saying, and to take him at his word: Nestorius could claim that he was teaching in the same way. And, as it appears to us, the claim is altogether justifiable. Nestorius' "prosopic" union is based on the idea of the "taking and giving" of the prosopa of the natures: in the Incarnation the Logos "takes" the Man's prosopon as His prosopon and "gives" His prosopon to the Man—both being the actions of the Logos—there being as a result of the union "the one prosopon of Christ".² But what is this save a "hypostatic" union? Cyril says that in the Incarnation "the Logos united to Himself hypostatically flesh animated with a rational soul";³ Nestorius says that He took the form of a servant, real manhood, that is, to Himself, making its prosopon—its "appearance", its "individuality", its "person"—His prosopon, and giving His prosopon to it. In both cases the union has its centre in the Person of the Logos, the Alexandrine and the Antiochene both maintaining the same fundamental truth. Had there been the desire to arrive at a common understanding, Nestorius would have been convinced that Cyril, by his "hypostatic" union, meant, not that as a result of the union there is in Jesus Christ *una substantia* of Godhead and manhood, a *tertium quid*, but that the Logos has "personally" united to Himself a nature altogether the same as ours, and, on the other

¹ See the note in Driver and Hodgson, *op. cit.* p. 156 n. 2.

² See above, pp. 155 f.

³ *Ep. ii ad Nestor.*, P.G. lxxvii. 45B; Bindley, *op. cit.* p. 105.

hand, Cyril would have been convinced that Nestorius, by his "prosopic" union, meant, not that in Jesus Christ there are two parallel prosopa, "two Sons", but that the Logos has taken the Man's prosopon and given His prosopon to the Man, "the one being the other and the other the one" in the one prosopon of Christ, who is thus the Logos incarnate. But, as we have said, the spirit of warfare prevailed, and the Antiochenes were determined to show that Cyril was a heretic—just as Cyril on his side was determined to show that Nestorius was a heretic.

But, it may be urged, can it be right to say that all the Antiochenes were in reality upholding the same doctrine as Cyril, when Nestorius was expressly condemned both at Rome and at the Council of Ephesus?¹ It is important for us to see that in both cases the judgment was based on what was Cyril's view of his opponent's teaching, and that, this being so, our main conclusion still holds good.

The controversy reveals the Alexandrine in no happy light. Like Theophilus before him, and Dioscorus after him, he was ready to use every opportunity to make it plain to Christendom that no matter what might have been laid down at the Council of Constantinople in 381 (where by the "brief but momentous" Canon III it had been decided that the Bishop of Constantinople should be given "an honorary pre-eminence after that of the Bishops of Rome, because it is new Rome"),² the ancient throne of St Mark remained the ruling power in the East—and the quarrel with Nestorius provided him with such an opportunity. Neither was Cyril the man to allow himself to be mastered by adverse circumstances: once he had set himself the task of

¹ Of the condemnation of Theodore of Mopsuestia at the Council of Constantinople in 553 there is no need for us to say a great deal. He was condemned (together with the anti-Cyrrilline writings of Theodoret, and the letter of Ibas of Edessa to Maris) in the vain hope of winning over the Monophysites to the Chalcedonian faith, these zealous anti-Nestorians having been saying that the Bishop of Mopsuestia as the *fons et origo mali* should be pursued into his grave. It was hardly more than a political move, and it failed, like all schemes which aim at bringing to a saner judgment those who have already made up their minds that they are right and their opponents wrong; besides, bound up with the Monophysite cause were the national aspirations of the Copts and the Syrians, who could be expected to say "No" to anything that came from Byzantium.

² Hefele, *op. cit.* II. pp. 357 ff.; Bright, *Notes on the Canons of the First Four General Councils*, p. 92.

degrading the upstart see through striking at its new patriarch who was daring to assert himself, he was determined to carry it through, even if he might arouse the animosity of the Emperor—as indeed he did when, in the hope of winning their support, he addressed to Theodosius and the Emperor's two sisters, Arcadia and Marina, and to the Empresses Pulcheria and Eudocia, his treatises *de Recta Fide*, and received from Theodosius a severe letter in which he was rebuked for attempting to sow the seeds of discord, not only in the Church, but also in the royal house¹—and even, if it became necessary, to empty the coffers of his wealthy church to make sure that important officials at Court would not use their influence against him.² Yet it is possible to lay too much stress on this motive of self-interest, and perhaps it is well that we should remember that, the heat of the conflict preventing him from having any desire to discover what his enemy's standpoint really was, he was convinced that Nestorius was denying the "Theotokos", and that, since this meant that the truth of the Incarnation of the Son of God was being denied,³ it behoved him to act as *defensor fidei*, and, if the Patriarch would not retreat, to effect his downfall.

And at Constantinople the situation was one which the Patriarch of Alexandria could use to his own advantage. From the time that he became bishop (in 428), Nestorius had set himself up as the scourge of the heretics, and Arians, Quartodecimans, Macedonians, and Novatians had all been proceeded against. Then there were those who were uttering their party-cries of "Mary is 'Theotokos'" and "God suffered". Nestorius believed that these were in danger of blasphemy, since, as it seemed to him, they did not understand what they were saying. So, determined to make it clear that it was not "God" who was born and suffered,⁴ the eloquent preacher devoted the winter of

¹ Mansi, iv. p. 1109.

² For the list of *eulogiae* received by the Grand Chamberlain, Chrysoretos, see Kidd, *A History of the Church to A.D. 461*, III. pp. 258 f.

³ Cf. Cyril's letter to the Egyptian monks, which he wrote when these were expressing their alarm at Nestorius' sermon on "Theotokos": he is surprised that there should be any doubt concerning the title—of course Mary must be called "Mother of God", else her Son is not confessed as very God of very God (*Ep.* i, P.G. lxxvii. 40 ff.).

⁴ An excellent illustration of Nestorius' standpoint is to be found in what he says when, exercising his right as bishop, he sums up the teaching of

428–429 to giving instruction on the “Theotokos”, and so strongly did he feel the need of upholding the “two natures” in order to drive out the idea of “confusion” that he arranged that his sermons should be collected and sent far and wide. Some of his party appear to have gone farther: his own *syncellus*, Anastasius, a priest whom he had brought with him from Syria, stood up in St Sophia and declaimed against the title,¹ as also did Dorotheus of Marcianopolis in Moesia.² Of course the Patriarch was misunderstood, and the lawyer, Eusebius of Dorylaeum, a representative of the opposing party, set up in a prominent place his *Contestatio* in which, placing side by side the sayings of Paul of Samosata and those of Nestorius, he sought to show that the latter was but following the earlier heretic.³ Neither was Nestorius the man to deal with a delicate situation.

Proclus (who was then at Constantinople, and in 434 was to be made its bishop) after the latter had preached in support of “Theotokos”. Proclus’ highly rhetorical sermon (*P.G.* lxxv. 679–92) is itself one of the outstanding examples of the use which the Alexandrine theologians were making of the *communicatio idiomatum*. After an eloquent peroration, there follows this: “God was born of a woman, but not bare God; man, too, was born of her, but not mere man. . . . Be not ashamed of that birth, for it was the means of thy salvation. If God had not been born, He could not have died; if He had not died, He could not have destroyed him that had the power of death.” Proclus concluded his sermon, and the congregation applauded. Then Nestorius arose. That applause be given in honour of the Virgin is right (he says), because she is the temple *illius dominicae carnis*, which exceeds all praise. But to say simply *de Maria natus Deus* is to give a handle to the pagans: it is one thing—and an irreprehensible thing—to say that He who was conjoined with Him born of Mary is God, and another to say that the Godhead endured a birth in time. Surely, the people of Constantinople are like those of Antioch in possessing such knowledge of theology that they will not let it be said that *Deus pontifex factus est*. Did the divine Logos rise from the dead? *Si autem vivificator mortificatus est, quis erit qui conferat vitam?* And to say “God is He who was born of Mary” is but to assist the Arians in proclaiming their doctrine. There can be no blasphemy if the truth is expressed in this way: *alius quidem Deus Verbum est, qui erat in templo. . . et aliud templum praefer habitantem Deum*, since *Dominum nostrum Christum secundum naturam duplicem dicamus, secundum quod est filius, unum* (*Sermo* xxvii, Loofs, *Nestoriana*, pp. 337 ff.). Once again we would point out that Nestorius does not deny that it can be said that “God was born” or that “God suffered”: what he is anxious to uphold is the truth that God in His divine nature is impassible, and, he contends, there can be no “blasphemy” so long as one upholds the *alius. . . aliud*, and thus distinguishes between the natures which are those of the one Son. As we have said (above, p. 170), what he is contending for is a proper use of the principle of the *communicatio idiomatum*.

¹ Socrates, *H.E.* vii. 32.

² So the testimony of Cyril, *Ep.* xi, *P.G.* lxxvii. 81 B.

³ For the text of the *Contestatio*, see Loofs, *Paulus von Samosata*, pp. 69 f.

Monks uttered their protests, and appeared before his judgment seat, but, for their pains, they were cast into the cells attached to the episcopal palace. It is not surprising that a storm of indignation was aroused against one who could so insult holy men, or that the case of the monks was laid before the Emperor.¹ Moreover, the Patriarch did not improve his cause by giving shelter to those Pelagians who had been deprived by the Bishop of Rome—Celestius, one of the original heresiarchs, Julian of Eclanum and three other Italian bishops.² Rome could not forget that Nestorius’ attitude to these men was in some measure a challenge to her authority. It would be well, wrote Pope Celestine,³ if, instead of taking the part of those condemned on account of false doctrine, the man were to take to heart the words “Physician, heal thyself”; for Nestorius’ sermons had already found their way to Rome, where they were creating a bad impression.

Accordingly, the fates were already against the Patriarch of Constantinople when Cyril turned to Rome for help. The Pope had already written to him, asking him whether the sermons which he had received were really those of the Bishop at the capital. Cyril waited for a while, perhaps to be sure of his ground, and then wrote “a letter of great humility and great adroitness”,⁴ in which he finds it convenient to revive the tradition—purposely forgotten when Rome and Alexandria took opposite sides in the case of Chrysostom—of referring serious questions to the Bishop of Rome. He begs to inform Celestine of the distressing state of things at New Rome. There Nestorius

¹ Mansi, iv. 1105 A, B.

² See Nestorius’ *Ep. i ad Caelest.*, Loofs, *Nestoriana*, pp. 165 ff., in which he appeals to the Pope for details concerning the condemnation of the Pelagians (and, at the same time, complains of his difficulties with the “Apollinarians”). But it is clear that the Patriarch was not a Pelagian. To this Marius Mercator—who drew up his *Commonitorium* against Julian and his associates, and was instrumental in effecting their expulsion from the capital—himself testifies (*ad Nestor.*, *P.L.* xlvi. 183 ff.), and Celestine says that in his sermons Nestorius employs the language of orthodoxy when speaking of original sin. Moreover, the Patriarch was himself preaching against the Pelagian doctrine (see *Sermo* ix, Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 255). Yet he does not seem to have been completely blameless: he wrote a letter of sympathy to Celestius after the Pelagian had been banished at the order of the church at Constantinople (Loofs, *op. cit.* pp. 172 f.).

³ *Ep.* xiii.

⁴ So Duchesne, *The Early History of the Church*, III. p. 234.

has received Dorotheus into communion after hearing him anathematize those who, faithful to the truth, were calling the blessed Virgin "Theotokos". He himself has despatched his *First* and *Second Epistles*, urging the man to repent—but he is still obdurate. Monks, congregation, and senators have all forsaken him, and only a group of flatterers remains to support him; indeed, the East itself is turning away from him, and—this a carefully studied point, since these bishops owed their jurisdiction to Rome—the Macedonians in particular. What, then, must he do? He will not refuse to communicate with the Patriarch till he has received the Pope's judgment, which, he hopes, will help forward the cause which the East and the Macedonian bishops have in hand; and, that Celestine may be able to compare Nestorius' teaching with that of the Fathers, he ventures to send a *dossier* of documents, including his own letters and—apparently—the five books of his *adversus Nestorii blasphemias*.¹

Rome responded to Cyril's appeal in a way which must have exceeded all his hopes. In August 430 the Pope called together a synod, before which were laid Nestorius' sermons, his letter in which he enquired concerning the judgment passed on the Pelagians (which had been translated into Latin by John Cassian), and the documents provided by the Alexandrine Patriarch. From the beginning Celestine took the side of Cyril. Before the assembled bishops he remembers how Ambrose, on the day of the Lord's Nativity, had caused all the people to sing:

*Veni, Redemptor gentium,
Ostende partum Virginis;
Miretur omne saeculum;
Talis decet partus Deum.*

Ambrose, he declares, did not say "Talis decet partus hominem", and "our brother Cyril", when he calls the Virgin "Theotokos", means what Ambrose meant—that He whom the Virgin brought forth was God; and Celestine proceeded to show how the Latin Fathers, Hilary and Damasus, had spoken in the same way.² Accordingly, the Pope wrote to Cyril, commending him for his zeal on behalf of the truth of "Christ our God", and saying that a final effort should be made to reclaim the Patriarch

¹ Ep. xi, P.G. lxxvii. 79 ff.

² Ep. ix (*Append.*), P.L. l. 457 f.

who had forgotten his duties as pastor of the flock, and that, in the event of failure, the Bishop of Alexandria should "join the authority of the Roman see to his own", and carry out with the utmost strictness the sentence determined upon by the Synod—namely, that if within ten days after receiving it, Nestorius had not professed that his was the faith as to "the birth of Christ our God" which was held by the churches of Rome and Alexandria and by the universal church, his throne should be regarded as vacant, and he himself should be treated as "in every way separate from our body".¹ And, by letter, the Pope informed the occupants of the important sees in the East (Juvenal of Jerusalem, John of Antioch, Rufus of Thessalonica, and Flavian of Philippi) of the decision which had been arrived at. He also wrote to Nestorius, as well as to the clergy and people of Constantinople. He tells the former that he has been warned once and twice, and now, according to the rule of St Paul, is being warned for the third time; therefore, if he wishes to be in communion with his brother bishops he must—and that within ten days—condemn his novel teaching and affirm what "our brother Cyril" affirms.² To the clergy and people of the capital he says that he feels for them like him who had "the care of all the churches". Nestorius was denying the birth of God—his teaching being vastly different from that of their great Chrysostom, or that of their late bishops, so zealous on behalf of the true faith, Atticus and Sisinnius. Let them endure manfully, following the example of Athanasius, who, in exile, found solace in communion with Rome.³

Roma locuta est. But of what value is this decisive judgment? Does it represent a true estimate of Nestorius' doctrine? Surely, it does not. To hold that the Constantinopolitan Patriarch was denying the truth of "Christ our God" is to take Cyril's view, as his eyes were blinded in his determination to reveal his opponent as a heretic: for, as we have seen, this upholder of the Antiochene teaching has simply no intention of questioning the Godhead of the Lord. But Rome was influenced by "our brother Cyril", and by those Latins who were Cyril's staunch supporters. At Constantinople, for instance, there was Marius Mercator, the voluntary agent of Celestine, and we know from

¹ Ep. xi.

² Ep. xiii.

³ Ep. xiv.

his *Comparatio dogmatum Pauli Samosatemi et Nestorii*¹ that he was in complete agreement with Eusebius of Dorylaeum in maintaining that Nestorius should be classed with the Samosatene. This, indeed, seems to have been the attitude which Rome adopted towards the enemy of Cyril. John Cassian, because of his long residence in the East (he had been ordained by John Chrysostom, for whom he had the greatest admiration), had been requested to draw up a report on Nestorius' doctrine—and Cassian's view carried no small weight with the authorities at Rome. What that view was we know from his work, in seven books, *de Incarnatione Domini contra Nestorium*:² he considers that the doctrine of Nestorius is akin to the Adoptianism of the Pelagian monk Leporius, a native of Trèves.³ Nestorius, he says, separates the flesh from the divinity,⁴ and says that "Christ was born a mere man", and that He should be termed "Theodochos"⁵—thus making Him like other holy men,⁶ and, for the matter of that, like ourselves, since we ourselves are "Theodochoi".⁷ How can he say that Christ was a mere man at birth, Cassian asks, if he accepts the Creed in which he was brought up? The man was a Catholic at the first, but now he is an apostate; for the Creed clearly states that He who was before the ages is He who was born.⁸ It is this, the truth that Christ is very God, which He denies—a truth which is upheld both in the Old Testament and in the New.⁹ The words of St Paul that He is "over all, God blessed for ever" (Romans ix. 5), St Peter's confession, and the confession of St Thomas¹⁰—all these (besides other Scriptural passages which are here alluded to) show that Jesus Christ is not, as Nestorius thinks, Son of Man only, but also Son of God, He being the same Person who existed eternally, who descended, and who also ascended.¹¹ Finally, Cassian

¹ *P.L.* xlvi. 773 f.

² *P.L.* l. 9–272.

³ *De Incarn.* i. 4.

⁴ *Ibid.* iii. 6, 7.

⁵ *Ibid.* v. 2.

⁶ *Ibid.* v. 3.

⁷ *Ibid.* So Cassian claims that Nestorius' doctrine is to be associated with the error of the Pelagians, according to which "Christ is not to be worshipped for his own sake because He was God, but because, owing to His good and pious actions, He won this—namely, to have God dwelling in Him": Nestorius is "belching out the poison of Pelagianism, and hissing with the very spirit of Pelagianism" (*ibid.* v. 2). But it seems evident that the Patriarch is being falsely accused; see above, p. 223 n. 2.

⁸ *Ibid.* vi. 6 ff.

⁹ *Ibid.* ii. 3 ff.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* iii. 1, 12 ff., 15.

¹¹ *Ibid.* iv. 6.

appeals to the Fathers (Hilary, Ambrose, Jerome, Rufinus, Augustine, Gregory of Nazianzus, Athanasius, and Chrysostom)¹ to show that theirs is this doctrine, and concludes on the same note as Celestine in his letter to the clergy and laity of Constantinople: "Separate yourselves, my brethren, from that ravenous wolf who, as it is written, devours the people of God as if they were bread; be ye separate, and touch not the unclean thing."² That Cassian seriously misrepresents Nestorius' teaching seems undeniable—but, as we say, it was, apparently, Cassian's view that was accepted at Rome, a view based, of course, on the false report that the Patriarch was denying the "Theotokos". Had a different spirit prevailed, and had Celestine, instead of taking sides and going so far as to make Cyril his agent in the East, been determined to understand Nestorius through explaining to him what was the faith of the churches of Rome and Alexandria to which it was being required that he should conform, and requesting him to say whether or not he accepted such an explanation, there seems to be no doubt that—Nestorius speaking this time of his own doctrine and not of his view of that of his adversary—he would have been found as orthodox as his brother bishops.³ As things were, we cannot wonder at the Patriarch's complaint that Cyril had become the Bishop of Rome!⁴

But the plan of Rome and Alexandria was frustrated through the publication of the imperial order (dated 19 November 430), summoning the bishops with their suffragans to the Council of Ephesus at the coming Pentecost. It was a solution which suited Nestorius rather than Cyril, for, now that innovation had been forbidden till the meeting of the Council, the sentence passed by

¹ *Ibid.* vii. 24 ff.

² *Ibid.* vii. 31.

³ It is noteworthy that at this time Nestorius had a reputation for orthodoxy: the aged Acacius of Beroea (who had been the valuable ally of Theophilus against Chrysostom and whom Cyril was now approaching in the hope that he would serve him as he had served his uncle) is by no means prepared to condemn the Patriarch—he has heard from many, he says, that Nestorius' doctrine is consistent with what is laid down in the Creed of Nicaea (Cyril, *Ep.* xv, *P.G.* lxxvii. 99 f.); and John of Antioch who, having heard from Celestine, begs him to read the Pope's letter, and the letter which he (John) has received from Cyril, with care, says in his letter to Nestorius that he has it from several quarters that the Bishop's teaching is in harmony with that of the reputed Fathers of the Church (Mansi, iv. 1061 ff.).

⁴ See *Bazaar*, p. 132.

the Roman Synod could not be put into force; besides, the Patriarch of Alexandria, who, having called his suffragans together, had drawn up his *Third Letter*, to which were appended the *Twelve Anathematisms*, and had sent this, together with Celestine's sentence of excommunication, to Nestorius (who received it 6 December 430), must have felt that he was being placed in an awkward position: his judgment concerning the orthodoxy of the Bishop of Constantinople and his own teaching were both alike being challenged. But, as we have said, he was ready to take risks when circumstances seemed to be against him. So, when he came to Ephesus and found that John of Antioch and the Oriental bishops—the very party, that is, which was deeming him a heretic on account of his Anathematisms—had not arrived, and that their coming was delayed, he determined to carry out a *coup de force* to gain his end.¹ On his side, as he well knew, were Memnon of Ephesus with the Asiatic bishops, Flavian of Philippi with the bishops of Macedonia, and Juvenal of Jerusalem with the bishops of Palestine. He could, then, go forward and snatch a victory. Overruling the protests of the Count Candidianus, who, though he was not allowed to take part in the doctrinal discussions, was sent by the Emperor Theodosius to see that these were properly conducted by a complete assembly, as well as the protests of Nestorius himself, Cyril, on Monday, 22 June—according to the imperial order the Council was to meet on Whitsunday, 7 June—called together the bishops already present, some two hundred in number. The Patriarch of Constantinople received three citations to attend, the third naming him an accused person; these summonses he refused to recognize as valid.

¹ In this connection it is interesting to note that in the *Bazaar* Nestorius draws attention to the statement in the report of the proceedings at Ephesus which Cyril sent to the Emperor—namely, “we have perceived that the reverend John, bishop of Antioch, has this wish to seek to entertain friendship rather than to consider what is of advantage to the faith”, and remarks: “On this account you [Cyril] were constrained not to wait; so that if you had known that he agreed with you, you would have waited for him, and there would have been no constraint [laid] upon you . . .” (*Bazaar*, p. 125). Cf. also the following words of complaint: “You made the Council for yourselves, and not for us; you expelled those men from the Council, and of yourselves you acted for yourselves just as you wished, and you listened not unto those who called upon you not to hold a Council, but to wait for the bishops who had been summoned with you, and who were nigh unto coming” (*ibid.* p. 135).

Over this, the opening session of the Council, Cyril himself presided, claiming that he had been commissioned by Celestine to do so. The Creed of Nicaea was read, and after it Cyril's *Second Letter to Nestorius*. This the assembly acclaimed to be in complete harmony with the doctrine of the Nicene Fathers. Then followed the reading of Nestorius' reply to the Alexandrine: this was unanimously rejected. After this, Cyril brought before the Council the letter which he had received from Celestine and his own *Third Letter* (with the Anathematisms): these were read without any vote being taken. Then the bishops were told of the conversations which had taken place between Nestorius and two firm upholders of the Cyrilline orthodoxy, Theodotus of Ancyra and Acacius of Melitene—to the disadvantage of the accused. Passages were read from the Fathers down to Theophilus of Alexandria and Atticus of Constantinople, which included extracts from the writings of Athanasius, Ambrose, Gregory of Nazianzus and Gregory of Nyssa. Beside these were set Nestorius' own statements. It was held that he was not in agreement with the accepted teaching of the Church, and that he was worthy of deposition. Soon afterwards the Patriarch of Alexandria communicated to his rival the sentence of the Synod: Nestorius, new Judas, on account of his impious preachings and of his disobedience of the canons, was deposed, and had no longer any rank in the Church. On 10 July the three Roman delegates at last arrived, and these, in accordance with the instructions which they had received from Celestine, placed themselves unreservedly in the hands of Cyril. At the second and third sessions of the Council (10, 11 July) letters from the Pope were read, and the delegates, who requested that they might be informed of what had already taken place, were told of the deposition of Nestorius. Then Philip, “priest of the Church of the Apostles” at Rome, announced that Celestine gave his consent to the Council's decision.

We turn to John and the Orientals. As is well known, these arrived four days after the opening session (on 26 June), and, having heard on their way of what had taken place, at once assembled at the lodging of the Antiochene Patriarch, and, joined by Count Candidianus and those few bishops who had refused to be present at the meeting on 22 June (the assembly

now being composed of forty-three bishops), they deposed Cyril and Memnon and all who would not repudiate the *Twelve Anathematisms*. They were of opinion that Cyril had hurried on the condemnation of Nestorius in order to save himself from being put on trial for his doctrine—and, apparently, they were justified in adopting this view. But it cannot be said that they were right in holding their meeting without summons and without discussion. After all, lack of moderation was not the monopoly of the one side only. So they returned a flat refusal to the two citations that they should be present at the fourth session of the Council, and, in answer to the summons to the fifth session, John informed the Cyrillians that he and his supporters would have no further dealings with them. Cyril's reply was to excommunicate them—"that they should not be able, in virtue of their sacerdotal authority, to do anything which could harm or aid anyone whatsoever". "By which", as has been remarked, "we understand that they had not been able to depose Cyril and Memnon, and that they would not be able to restore Nestorius."¹ The next step was for the Alexandrine to inform Celestine and the Emperor of what had taken place—though the cause of Nestorius was also being pleaded at the Court by his friend, Count Irenaeus.

With this brief *résumé*—it is no more—of the events at Ephesus before us, let us consider the worth of the verdict which was there passed on the Patriarch of Constantinople. It seems clear that here, as at Rome in the preceding August, an assembly of bishops was influenced by, and made its decision solely on the basis of, Cyril's view of Nestorius' teaching. It was a one-sided judgment, and the latter could reasonably complain that at the Council Cyril was judge, accuser, and bishop of Rome—in fact, "Cyril was everything";² things were conducted "according to what he demanded", and "he carried everyone with him".³ "There was no judgment", the Patriarch declares, "because they made no examination."⁴ And this would seem to be true: Nestorius was accused and convicted without anything like a real enquiry into his doctrine. His *ad Cyrillum ii*⁵ the bishops

¹ Duchesne, *op. cit.* III. p. 249.

² *Bazaar*, p. 132.

³ *Ibid.* p. 187.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 255.

⁵ Loofs, *op. cit.* pp. 173 ff.

rejected with anathemas, but in this letter what he is attacking is the notion that in the Incarnation the Godhead (ἡ θεότης) became subject to human passions, and the charge of taking away from the deposit laid down by the Fathers at Nicaea is unjust, seeing that he is here but emphasizing the order in which the clauses of the Nicene Creed are placed—a point which, as we have already noticed,¹ the Antiochene teachers make as they would reject all idea of "confusion". Moreover, it can be shown that both Theodotus of Ancyra and Acacius of Melitene misunderstood what he was driving at in their discussions with him;² and, in regard to these passages from Athanasius, Ambrose, and the two Gregories which were quoted against him, he would prove, in that section of the *Bazaar*³ to which Nau would give the title *Réfutation des Accusations*, that what these Fathers say he also says. Neither, as it seems, can those statements of his which were brought before the Council be taken as showing that his was the heterodox position: here, too, though he may use the

¹ See above, pp. 206 ff.

² *Bazaar*, pp. 136 ff. On Nestorius' saying (reported to the Council by Theodotus), "God ought not to be called two or three months old", which, however it was understood by the bishops at Ephesus, came to be interpreted as meaning that the Patriarch would not call a babe God [cf. Socrates' report of the saying (*H.E.* vii. 34): "I could not give the name of God to one who was two or three months old"], see Bethune-Baker, *op. cit.* pp. 69 ff. As this scholar says: Nestorius "did not say that he could not bring himself to call a babe God, but he said that he could not bring himself to call God a babe. The word 'God' was the subject rather than the predicate. He refused to predict infancy of God rather than Godhead of an infant... He did not intend by the phrase to deny the Godhead of Him who was born. He intended to deny that God Himself could in His own being (in His essence, substance, ousia...) submit to a human birth and become a babe" (*ibid.* p. 77). Acacius of Melitene reported that Nestorius "had fallen into two errors at the same time: first by his improper question he laid upon those who were to answer it the necessity of either denying entirely that the Godhead of the Only-begotten became man, or confessing [which is impious] that the Godhead of the Father and of the Holy Spirit also became incarnate with the divine Logos" (Mansi, iv. 1181 D). We would suggest—as that which was to be expected from one who was regarded as "a man who proposed conundrums (subtle dialectical puzzles)" [so Bethune-Baker, *op. cit.* p. 78]—that his question might have been: "Did God [ὁ θεός] become man?" An answer in the negative would carry with it the denial of the incarnation of the Only-begotten, while an answer in the affirmative would carry with it the confession that the Father and the Holy Spirit were also incarnate—and piety would again be offended. Yet, assuming that this was his question, Nestorius was but seeking to drive home to the opposing party that it was not the divine nature which became man—that nature remained in all that it was.

³ Pp. 186 ff.

term "conjunction",¹ and speak in such a way that it may seem that he is setting up a duality of Sons,² he is but insisting on the reality of the two natures³—while holding that it is the divine Logos Himself who has become man.⁴ "You have nothing against me", says Nestorius, "because I have not said aught of the things whereof you have accused me"⁵—and he appears to be right.⁶ Had his teaching been honestly examined, it seems

¹ E.g. Mansi, iv. 1201D (*Bazaar*, p. 226), 1201E (*ibid.* p. 230).

² Thus the celebrated saying to be found in Nestorius' *Sermo* ix (on "Theotokos", Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 262) was quoted at Ephesus (Mansi, iv. 1201B; *Bazaar*, p. 217): "on account of Him who bears I worship Him who is being borne, and on account of Him who is invisible I worship Him who is visible. God is not separated from Him who is visible. Wherefore I do not separate the honour of Him who is not separated. The natures I separate, but the worship I unite." But the bishops also heard the following from his *Sermo* x ("Against those who put to death the Godhead of the Only-begotten, and deify the manhood", Loofs, *op. cit.* p. 275): "The divine Logos, even before the Incarnation, was Son and God and was with the Father, but in the latter time took the form of a servant. Yet, being called Son before this, He cannot after the taking be called a separated Son, lest we lay down 'two Sons' . . ." (Mansi, iv. 1201C; *Bazaar*, p. 222)—a statement which plainly reveals that its author would uphold the doctrine of the Incarnation and that of the "one Person".

³ In these statements Nestorius is insisting that the divine Logos remains in His own nature in the Incarnation: the Virgin did not give birth to the Son of God (*ibid.* 1197A; *ibid.* p. 188); the Logos was not born through the flesh (*ibid.* 1197E; *ibid.* p. 197); God the impassible did not suffer, but the possible temple which He quickened (*ibid.* 1201D; *ibid.* p. 228); nowhere in the New Testament is death imputed to God (*ibid.* 1205E; *ibid.* p. 256); it was not God by Himself (ὁ κατ' ἑαυτὸ θεός) who was found in the womb, nor was God by Himself entombed in the tomb (*ibid.* 1204B; *ibid.* p. 236). But, he maintains, it is of "Christ", or of the "Son", or of the "Lord"—i.e. of the Logos made man in whom the two natures exist without confusion—that these things must be said (see *ibid.* 1197A, 1201A; *ibid.* pp. 188, 207). As we have said (above, pp. 177 ff.), Nestorius would thus distinguish between what belongs to the Logos in His eternal being, and what is His in the Incarnation, in order to rule out the "mixing" of the natures—though it will be appreciated that at first sight such expressions as "the Virgin did not give birth to the Son of God", or "the Logos was not born through the flesh", would seem clear proof that he was denying the reality of the Incarnation.

⁴ See above, n. 2.

⁵ *Bazaar*, p. 265.

⁶ A further charge, brought against Nestorius by Peter, priest and notary of Alexandria, was that he had said that "the very teachers have not had time at all to set before them [i.e. their people] the teaching of the exact faith", Peter going on to say that Nestorius had openly declared that "none of the teachers before him had spoken before the people aught that he had spoken" (Mansi, iv. 1208B; *Bazaar*, pp. 263 f.). But, the Patriarch answers, had this been so, he would have been accusing the Nicene Fathers—and his teaching is in agreement with theirs, though his opponents do not realize it. Clearly, the persons whom he has in mind are those (Cyril included) whom he denounces as "Apollinarians" and "Arians".

safe to assume, a very different verdict would have been returned. But Cyril was determined to bring about the downfall of his adversary—and the bishops were, apparently, "abundantly convinced"¹ by him.

So it would seem that what happened at the Council of Ephesus may be regarded as one of the major tragedies in the history of the Early Church. There, two parties, each, as we think, standing for the same Christological principles, met, and denounced each other as heretics, and departed, refusing to hold communion with each other. Had the one side come to Ephesus prepared to see in the teaching of the other a contribution to Christological thought, the result, it is reasonable to suppose, might have been to the lasting good of the Christian Church. For the Antiochenes, as a result of the friendly criticism of the upholders of a different doctrinal tradition, might have come to speak more guardedly when they were maintaining the necessity of "separating the natures", and expressing the union as a "conjunction" and an "indwelling". On the other hand, the Alexandrines, appreciating the judgment of the Antiochenes might have sought to express with more care what they were meaning when speaking of "the one incarnate nature of the divine Logos", of a "natural" union, of "one nature after the union", and—though perhaps with less need—of a "hypostatic" union. But if, instead of discord, harmony had prevailed at Ephesus, there might have been an issue of far greater import than a determination on the part of the Alexandrine and the Antiochene theologians so to express their doctrine that there could be no misunderstanding: the one side might have come to recognize the elements of supreme worth in the Christological system of the other. Thus the Antiochenes might have realized the value of the Alexandrines' insistence on the unity of the Person of the Logos made man, and have come to see that these already possessed phrases which, properly safeguarded, could be employed in enforcing this truth against the error of Nestorianism—a doctrine to which they themselves were opposed; on their side, the Alexandrines might have seen in the insistence of the Antiochenes on the complete reality of the Godhead and manhood of Jesus Christ teaching which could be used against

¹ *Bazaar*, p. 265.

the error of Eutychianism—a doctrine to which these, on their side, were also opposed; moreover, the theologians of the Alexandrine school might have recognized that the Antiochenes were upholding the very truth concerning the individual character of the Lord's manhood which they themselves were failing to develop. What we mean is that at Ephesus in the year 431 after churchmen had been concentrating on the Christological problem for several decades, there might have been put forth as a gift to the Church, coming from the representatives of two different doctrinal traditions, the one Hellenic, the other Syrian, a *definitio fidei*, representing the best which each tradition had to offer—a *definitio*, that is, taking from the Alexandrines their teaching on the unity of Christ's Person, and from the Antiochenes their teaching on His two natures, and, what is more, that on the individuality of His manhood. But such a happy outcome was impossible; for "where envying and strife is, there is confusion and every evil way".

And, not only in respect of what might have been, but also in respect of that for which it was ultimately responsible, can Ephesus be counted as a serious calamity, affecting the well-being of the Church; for it was as a result of what took place at that Council that there came about the complete break-up of the ancient school of Antioch—a school which, as we are endeavouring to show, could make a worthy contribution to Christian doctrine. We are entering upon a subject which, of course, calls for a separate study, and here can do no more than treat of it in broad outline.

As a result of the deadlock at Ephesus, and the departure of the Orientals from communion with the Cyrillians, the Emperor Theodosius in April 432 put forward his plan for restoring peace: the Orientals were to abandon Nestorius, and Cyril was to withdraw his Anathematisms.¹ John of Antioch,² who, presumably,

¹ Theodosius wrote to John of Antioch, to Acacius of Beroea, hoping that the aged prelate would be able to influence John, and to the renowned Simeon Stylites, through whom he hoped to influence Cyril (Mansi, vi. 663 ff., 828 ff.).

² As a result of the Emperor's intervention, John called together a Synod at Antioch, at which were present Acacius of Beroea, Andrew, Theodoret, and Alexander of Hierapolis. These drew up six propositions, the first of which was to the effect that the Creed of Nicaea and Athanasius' *ad Epict.* (as an exposition of that Creed) should form the basis of an agreement with

was thinking more of the preservation of the unity of the Church in the East than of the cause of Nestorius, seems to have had no difficulty in believing that it was right to sacrifice the Patriarch of Constantinople, though Andrew of Samosata and Theodoret at this time¹ refused to be won over to such a view. However, *condescensione opus est*, Andrew declared:² they were ready to begin discussions with the Alexandrine, hoping that they would not be called upon to pronounce a sentence of condemnation upon him who, in the words of the Bishop of Cyrus, "was bearing the brunt of the battle in the cause of true religion".³ So they produced the document which was to be known as the *Formulary of Reunion*: it had been drawn up, presumably by Theodoret himself, as a basis of reconciliation, when in August 431, Count John, the imperial commissioner who had taken the place of Candidianus, had tried without success to bring the two parties together—only now, most significantly, the anti-Cyrrilline prelude to this document was dropped.⁴ As is well known, the *Formulary* was carried to Cyril, who accepted it on the understanding that the Bishop of Antioch was prepared to anathematize Nestorius, and included it in his celebrated *Laetentur coeli*.⁵ Theodoret and Andrew, now assured that the Alexandrine Patriarch was in agreement with them, and that what he was now saying was "entirely opposed to his Twelve Chapters",⁶ entered into communion with the Cyrillians, and, so far as these Antiochenes were concerned, peace was re-established: Cyril was

Cyril; they also laid down that Cyril's explanations, and especially his *Twelve Anathematisms*, should be withdrawn (Mansi, v. 829; Hefele, *op. cit.* III. p. 121). Cyril's reply was that he could not withdraw what he had written against Nestorius, but that if they would agree to the Patriarch's deposition, an understanding could be arrived at (*Ep. ad Acac. Ber.*, P.G. lxxvii. 157 ff.). The effect of this letter was, apparently, to divide the Antiochenes into two camps—those who, like John, were prepared to come to terms with the Alexandrine, and those who, like Alexander and his following, were convinced that the enemy of Nestorius was a heretic, and would have no dealings with him.

¹ Cf. Theodoret in his letter to Alexander: "I have already informed your holiness that if the doctrine of the very holy and venerable Bishop, my lord Nestorius, is condemned I will not communicate with those who do so" (*Ep.* clxxv). See also his letter to Andrew (*Ep.* clxxvii).

² Mansi, v. 841.

³ *Ep.* clxxiii.

⁴ Mansi, v. 783.

⁵ P.G. lxxvii. 176 c f.; Bindley, *op. cit.* 167.

⁶ Theodoret, *Ep.* clxxi (to John of Antioch).

taking a different view,¹ and they had not been compelled to denounce their friend; and, on his side, Cyril could rejoice in that Maximian (consecrated 25 October 431) had been set up at Constantinople in the room of his adversary, who had been commanded to return to his monastery, and that he himself had escaped the ignominy of having to withdraw his Anathematisms.

But there existed among the upholders of the Antiochene teaching a small but forceful minority which persistently refused to have anything to do with the "second Pharaoh" and "heretic". This minority was represented by Alexander of Hierapolis, who in his unbending opposition to Cyril was supported by such prelates as Eutherius of Tyana, Helladius of Tarsus, Himerius of Nicomedia, and Dorotheus of Marcianopolis.² Local councils were held, and at Anazarbus the opposition met and excommunicated, not only the Patriarch of Alexandria, but also John of Antioch, who, it was held, had committed a sad breach of faith—he had accepted the decision of the Cyrillians' Council in regard to Nestorius,³ and had, in effect, acknowledged that the Orientals were schismatics; they even went so far as to appeal to the Pope of Rome, Sixtus III, asking him for his support against the Reunion.⁴ John urged Alexander to take a kindlier view of Cyril, and Theodoret and Andrew assured him that they would be satisfied with nothing less than the complete abrogation of the *Twelve Anathematisms*.⁵ But it was all to no end. The Bishop of Hierapolis refused to take part in such perfidy. To Theodoret he wrote: *Vivit omnium Dominus Deus meus, et Oasim et quemlibet*

¹ Cf. the attitude of Ibas of Edessa in his letter to Maris (Mansi, vii. 241 ff.), wherein the *Formulary* is referred to as "the true faith", and it is said that, Cyril having come to terms with John of Antioch, "those who so inordinately exalted themselves against the quick and the dead" (Ibas is thinking of Cyril's attack on Diodore, Theodore, and Nestorius) "now apologize for their folly, and teach the reverse of their former doctrine".

² It may be noted that, taking advantage of the general turmoil that ensued after the Ephesine Council, Maximian of Constantinople and the Pope's legates, together with others who had come from the Council, deposed Dorotheus, Himerius, Eutherius, and Helladius at a local synod held late in the year 431 (Mansi, v. 257, 822 f.).

³ Alexander, of course, held that Nestorius was thoroughly orthodox. Thus he writes to John of Antioch: *Ego, enim, sanctissimum episcopum Nestorium scio in sermonibus suis ea quae prophetae et evangelistae praedicantem* (*Synodicon*, P.G. lxxxiv. 753A). Cf. also his letter to Acacius of Beroea, *ibid.* 668A.

⁴ Mansi, v. 893 ff.

⁵ *Ibid.* 845; Theodoret, *Epp.* clxix, clxxv, clxxviii.

extremum vicum praefero communioni haeretici, et eorum qui orthodoxiam prodiderunt;¹ and to Andrew: *Neque communionem cum haereticis pacem Christi appello*!² The result was that in 435, by the order of the Emperor, he and thirteen other recalcitrants were banished to the Egyptian mines, there to suffer terrible hardship.³ In the following year Nestorius himself, his books proscribed by imperial edict, and his adherents—"Simonians", they were called, because like Simon Magus, they were "abandoning God"⁴—forbidden to meet together, went forth to his desert home. So had the School of Antioch been rent in twain.

Neither—to look, for the moment, farther afield—must one lose sight of the significance of the defection of Rabbûla of Edessa, the leading prelate in the far East; for with his determination to champion the Cyrilline cause, the power of the Syrian patriarchate, which had caused Eastern clerics to look for guidance to the Antiochene doctors, was broken. Rabbûla had indeed sided with the Syrians and voted for the condemnation of Cyril at the Council of Ephesus⁵—though if we may trust his biographer, he had already, and that in no uncertain terms, spoken on behalf of the title "Theotokos" at Constantinople, when Nestorius was still patriarch⁶—but very soon afterwards he was writing to the Alexandrine Patriarch, denouncing Theodore of Mopsuestia as the author of Nestorianism, and was in return being applauded as "the pillar and ground of truth to all the Easterns" on account of his zeal in driving out the new heresy.⁷ Moreover, he attacked the Antiochenes, accusing Andrew of Samosata because he had written against Cyril's *Twelve Anathematisms*.⁸ Of course, the Antiochenes replied. In his celebrated letter to Maris, Bishop of Ardashir, Ibas, who must always have been a thorn in the flesh to Rabbûla,

¹ *Synodicon*, P.G. lxxxiv. 674B.

² *Ibid.* 673B.

³ Mansi, v. 951-66.

⁴ *Ibid.* 413 f.

⁵ Rabbûla signed the letters of John and his party to the clergy and laity of Hierapolis, and to the deputies at Constantinople (Mansi, v. 776, 797).

⁶ See Burkitt, *Early Eastern Christianity*, pp. 110 ff. Rabbûla is reported to have said: "We say with uplifted voice, without deception, that Mary is Mother of God... For 'Mother of God' we call the Virgin... because God the Word was born from her when He became a man."

⁷ Cyril, *Ep.* lxxiii, P.G. lxxvii. 347 f.

⁸ So Theodorus Lector, *H.E.* ii. 40, P.G. lxxxvi. 205A.

denounced him as a turncoat, who, once a zealous student of the works of Theodore, had become his determined opponent,¹ and an effort was made at a synod at Antioch, presided over by John, to win over to the Syrian side the Bishop's suffragans: these, if it were true that Rabbûla was persecuting all who refused to follow the Alexandrine, were urged to suspend communion with him until the matter had been enquired into.² Neither, appreciating, as it seems, the issues at stake, did the pro-Cyrrilline Antiochenes hesitate to adopt the method of personal contact: Andrew himself, though he aroused the animosity of Alexander of Hierapolis and the opposition of his own clergy in so doing, determined to journey to Edessa with the object of trying to effect a reconciliation with its Bishop.³ But, whether the reconciliation was effected or not, Rabbûla, it seems, in his newly acquired zeal on behalf of the Alexandrine orthodoxy, preferred to join forces with that ardent anti-Nestorian, Acacius of Melitene.⁴ Thus was the Antiochene school humiliated, and Edessa fell into the hands of those who turned to Alexandria for their inspiration. It is true that Ibas, who succeeded Rabbûla in 435, sought to restore the reputation of Theodore in the East,⁵ and that the school of Edessa, founded by Ephraem Syrus when he had fled from Nisibis in 363, came to possess an atmosphere which its opponents might have said was positively "Nestorian", but after the triumph of the party of Dioscorus of Alexandria at the *Latrocinium* in 449, Ibas was expelled, and with him the "Nestorian" students of the school, among whom was Barsumas, his pupil.⁶ Ibas indeed returned after his re-instatement at Chalcedon, but for the next thirty or forty years anti-Nestorianism was predominant at Edessa. The final blow to what had once been the Syrian ascendancy in the East came when, in 489, the Emperor Zeno ordered the dispersal of "the

¹ Mansi, vii. 245 B.

² Mansi, v. 821 ff.

³ Mansi, v. 885 f. Perhaps it was at this time that Andrew wrote to Rabbûla, explaining his position. Fragments of such a letter are to be found in Severus' *Philalethes*, ed. Sanda, p. 24.

⁴ Thus, with Acacius, Rabbûla sought to put the Christians of Armenia Magna on their guard when the works of Diodore and Theodore were being translated into Armenian (Liberatus, *Brev.* 10, P.L. lxxviii. 990).

⁵ See below, p. 240 n. 4.

⁶ Here following Duchesne, *op. cit.* p. 392 n. 3, though this expulsion is sometimes placed after the death of Ibas in 457.

school of the Persians", "because it handed down the teaching of Nestorius and Theodore".¹

The second, and concluding, stage in the history of the break-up of the school of Antioch, it seems, began with the ascendancy of Dioscorus, who succeeded Cyril as patriarch of Alexandria in the year 444. Here was one who felt that he was called to be the defender of orthodoxy against Nestorianism, and who, though one of the "violent men" in the Church's history, was himself ready to face exile and death in his zeal on behalf of the doctrine of the "one nature".² To his mind, the *Formulary of Reunion*, which was now regarded as the norm of orthodoxy,³ should never have been: with its mention of "a union of two natures", it was, as it seemed to him, simply a shield behind which the "Nestorianizers" could hide and proclaim themselves sound in the faith. From Dioscorus, then, who, now that Flavian, the newly elected patriarch of Constantinople, was in disfavour, had the support of the government,⁴ and could find in Eutyches, who was venerated throughout the monastic world, a valuable ally, the remnant of the Antiochenes could expect no quarter. Count Irenaeus, the friend of Nestorius who had been banished in 435, returned and was made Bishop of Tyre. But the Alexandrine Patriarch refused to tolerate such a flagrant example of "Nestorianism" in the Church, and Irenaeus "the twice-married"

¹ Theodorus Lector, *H.E.* ii. 49, P.G. lxxxvi. 209A.

² At Chalcedon in 451 when Dioscorus was condemned and deprived—though it should be noted that this follower of Cyril was not condemned on account of false doctrine (for Anatolius of Constantinople made a statement to this effect at the fifth session of the Council, Mansi, vii. 104), but on account of what he had dared to do against ecclesiastical order—he stood almost alone: with the exception of four Egyptian bishops, all those who had sworn to support him crossed over to the other side before his eyes. Yet nothing could move him. The faith of the Fathers, he held, was being betrayed, and, come what may, he would not bow the knee before "the image with its two faces" which Leo of Rome and that assembly were setting up.

³ Thus the charge brought by Eusebius of Dorylaeum against Eutyches at the Home Synod of Constantinople in Nov. 448 was that the archimandrite was refusing to accept the *Formulary*. On this subject, see E. Schwartz, *Der Prozess des Eutyches*, esp. pp. 80 ff.

⁴ The Grand Chamberlain, Chrysaphius, himself the godson of Eutyches—it was he, says Gibbon, who "governed the Emperor and the Empire"—was now regarding the Patriarch of Alexandria as the leader of Eastern Christendom; Flavian's unhappy position was no doubt the result of the work of Dioscorus' agents at Constantinople.

was deprived by imperial edict, and Photius, the nominee of Eutyches, was consecrated in his stead.¹ Theodoret, who had been active in support of Irenaeus, had also been active in speaking and writing—in 446 or 447 he published his *Dialogues*—on behalf of the “two natures”. But Dioscorus and his associates were ever on the watch. Certain monks of Osrhoëne came to Alexandria and reported that the Bishop of Cyrus, when preaching at Antioch, had “divided the one Lord Jesus Christ into two Sons”. Accordingly, although the Antiochene had written to the Patriarch refuting the calumny,² the latter considered that it was high time that this “disturber of the peace” should be restrained, and he was charged to remain in his own diocese.³ Moreover, through the instrumentality of Eutyches, Ibas, the determined upholder of the Antiochene teaching at Edessa,⁴ was tried and deposed—though, but a short while before, he had been acquitted by an imperial commission after he had declared that his belief was in accordance with what was set down in the *Formulary of Reunion*, and had promised to anathematize Nestorius.⁵ Such events were clearly to the discredit of the remaining Antiochenes.

The climax came at the Second Council of Ephesus—the *Latrocinium*—held in August 449. By an assembly which was summoned by the Emperor Theodosius “to cut off the whole root of the calumny, and to expel from the churches those who were contending for the blasphemy of the impious Nestorius, and working for its restoration”,⁶ and was so controlled by Dioscorus that it would accept nothing save “the orthodox faith” as this had been established at Nicaea and Constantinople

¹ Mansi, v. 417 ff. The edict is dated 16 Feb. 448. Irenaeus, during his exile, had written an account—the *Tragoedia Irenaei*—of the troubles that had arisen since the publication of the Anathematisms.

² Theodoret, *Ep.* lxxxiii.

³ See Theodoret, *Epp.* lxxix–lxxxii—letters which the Bishop wrote to influential persons in the hope of obtaining redress.

⁴ Ibas had translated the works of Diodore and Theodore into Syriac (so Proclus, *Ep.* iii, *P.G.* lxxv. 875A). Noteworthy, also, are his words in praise of Theodore in his letter to Maris (Mansi, vii. 241 ff.): “. . . the blessed Theodore, that herald of the truth and doctor of the Church, who in his life-time stopped the mouths of the heretics with the true faith, and after his death has continued to do so, having left to the sons of the Church a spiritual armoury in his writings.”

⁵ Mansi, vii. 198 ff.

⁶ Mansi, vi. 589.

(381) and confirmed at Ephesus (431),¹ one after the other the representatives of the Syrian doctrinal tradition were condemned. Domnus, who in 441 had succeeded John as Bishop of Antioch, and of whose “Nestorianizing” ways Eutyches had already complained to Pope Leo of Rome,² was deprived.³ The sentences of deposition passed on Ibas and Irenaeus were confirmed.⁴ As for Theodoret, who had been forbidden to attend the Council, it was at once agreed that “it was he who had brought this trouble on the churches, since he had planted the seeds of false doctrine, and had had the audacity to write against the doctrine of the blessed Father, Cyril”. Therefore he, too, was cast out, and his anti-Cyrrilline treatises with him.⁵ And there can be no doubt that, had Andrew of Samosata been alive at this time, his would have been a similar fate.

From this severe blow the remnant of the Antiochene school never recovered. Domnus, after the ignominy which he had suffered at Ephesus, was glad to return to the monastery of St Euthymius near Jerusalem, whence he had come forth to succeed to the patriarchate. His place was taken by a certain Maximus—probably the same Maximus who, an ardent follower of Cyril, had found reason to accuse Domnus’ predecessor of “Nestorianism” after the reunion in 433.⁶ Thus, as aforesaid, had the enemy rooted out, and also taken possession. The Bishop of Cyrus had been one of the first victims of Dioscorus to be

¹ Dioscorus declared at the Council that whosoever unsettled the decisions made at Nicaea and Ephesus made void the grace of the Holy Spirit who had sat in these assemblies—so was he greeted with the cry “*Defensor fidei*” (*ibid.* 628).

² Leo, *Ep.* xx. It seems that this was Eutyches’ reply to the charge brought against him by Domnus: the latter had informed Theodosius that the archimandrite was an “Apollinarian”, and that he had had the audacity to anathematize Diodore and Theodore (Facundus, *pro defens.* xii. 5).

³ Perry, *Second Synod of Ephesus*, pp. 359 ff.

⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 44 ff., 170 ff.

⁵ Extracts were read from Theodoret’s *Apology on behalf of Diodore and Theodore, champions of true religion*, but it was clear from the tumult that ensued that the Synod had made up its mind as soon as it heard the title of the work (*ibid.* pp. 241 ff.). See Theodoret, *Ep.* cxiii, for his complaint that he had been condemned without a hearing.

⁶ Cf. Cyril, *Epp.* lvii, lviii, *P.G.* lxxvii. 320 ff.—until Cyril intervened, a group of Syrian monks, led by the archimandrite Maximus, refused to hold communion with John, their patriarch, believing that he was still a “Nestorian”. The point is of interest as illustrating the presence, and the power, of the supporters of the “one nature” at Antioch at this time. See above, p. 107.

recalled from exile,¹ but he did not appear at the Council of Chalcedon as a teacher of repute. Rather did he take his seat in that assembly amid cries of "To receive Theodoret is to condemn Cyril",² and the bishops were not satisfied until he had anathematized Nestorius³—to accept the *Definitio Fidei* and the *Tome* of Leo of Rome was not enough. A similar demand was made of Ibas of Edessa: his letter to Maris, despite its unfortunate references to Cyril, was deemed orthodox—though only after he had pronounced the required anathema.⁴ Reinstated these were, but they were still under a cloud as men who had been friends of the blasphemer, and so they continued to the end of their days.

When Theodoret of Cyrus left Chalcedon for the seclusion of Nicerte, and there "blocked the door of the monastery and declined to have intercourse with his friends",⁵ the school of Diodore and Theodore, it may be said, had come to an end. Henceforward the memory of its heroes was kept alive in certain of the monasteries—notably that of the *Akoimetoï* at Constantinople⁶—where their writings were surreptitiously preserved. Outside the Empire, in Persia, through the work of Barsumas, Archbishop of Nisibis († 492), the pupil of Ibas, there arose the "Nestorian" church:⁷ there it survived because it revered one who was an abomination to the Greeks. These had indeed won the day, and the Hellenic-Syrian conflict, which had continued from the time of Paul of Samosata, had at last been brought to an end. But the price which had to be paid for this conclusive victory of the Hellenists was not merely the rise of

¹ Cf. Theodoret, *Epp.* cxxxviii–cxl; Leo, *Ep.* lxxvii.

² Mansi, vi. 589.

³ What Theodoret said was: "Anathema to Nestorius, and to everyone who denies that the holy Virgin Mary is Theotokos, and divides the one Son into two. I have subscribed the Definition of the Faith and the Letter of Leo, and thus I think; now, fare ye well" (Mansi, vii. 189). As Duchesne (*op. cit.* III, p. 309) says, "His anathema carries with it, I think, a certain admixture of irony"—the Bishop knew that Nestorius had never "censured absolutely" the "Theotokos", nor had taught "two Sons".

⁴ Mansi, vii. 261.

⁵ Cf. Theodoret, *Ep.* cxlvi (*imit.*).

⁶ The "Sleepless Monks" revered the name of Theodore, and every year used to celebrate the memory of Nestorius (see *Chronicle of Zachariah of Mitylene*, vii. 7, trans. Hamilton and Brooks, p. 168).

⁷ One of Barsumas' important acts, it may be noted, was to set up at Nisibis the school which Zeno (in 489) had destroyed at Edessa.

a "separated" Church: the Church as a whole was impoverished through the departure of the Syrians. For now was she deprived of the presence of a school of thought which could make worthy contributions not only in the fields of history and Biblical exegesis, but also, as this study is meant to show, in the field of Christian doctrine. Its representatives may have been unfortunate in the choice of some of their expressions, but, it would seem, these, approaching the Christological problem in their own particular way, were as sound in the faith as were those brought up in the doctrine of the Greeks; indeed, they could include in their system the very truth concerning the individuality of the Lord's manhood which these last could never fully appreciate. Had they remained, and if, instead of discord, harmony and the desire to understand a different point of view had prevailed among the ancients, the upholders of the Syrian tradition could have supplied what was lacking in the Christological thought of the Alexandrine theologians—and that to the benefit of the Church in future ages.

II. THE VALUE OF THE ALEXANDRINE AND THE ANTIOCHENE CHRISTOLOGIES

So, at the conclusion of our study, we naturally ask: What is the value of these two ancient Christologies to-day? In attempting to answer this question, it will perhaps be best if we take in turn those ideas which can be grouped under the first and those which can be grouped under the second of the two foundation principles which, as we would contend, are common to both systems.

We will begin with those ideas which fall under the principle that—*In Jesus Christ, the Logos, while remaining what He was, has, for our salvation, united manhood to Himself, thereby making it His own; He is not, therefore, two Persons, but one Person, the Logos Himself in His incarnate state.*

We have tried to show that this principle is itself based on that conception of God in His relations with man which has its roots in Hebraic Theism. It seems clear that both the Alexandrine and the Antiochene teachers uphold a position which amounts to a direct denial of the conception that God is so utterly transcendent that He cannot come into direct contact with the world.

Rather is He an ethical God who cares for His creation and seeks to bring men into communion with Himself, in order that His will may be done on earth as it is in heaven. That the representatives of both schools of thought should use terms with which the Greek world was familiar is altogether understandable, but this does not mean that, when they use "ousia" or "nature", they must be thinking of God as an "unethical substance".¹ Nor if, when they speak of man's redemption, they use such terms as "incorruptibility", "immutability" and "immortality", does this mean that theirs must be a quasi-physical view of the redemption: it would seem that if we are to be just to these ancient theologians we should give first place to the thought which they would bring out—namely, that, out of His love for a race which, created that it might know Him, had so far succumbed to the forces of evil that it was in a state of decay, God Himself has "condescended", and become man, in order to effect man's salvation and to bring him to the perfect knowledge of the Divine. And, as it seems, these teachers would be ready to say that, man being what he is—a creature so made that he can enjoy communion with his Creator—such an incarnation is possible, and that possible, too, is perfect divine knowledge. The Antiochenes may lay stress on the moral relationship between God and man, but it can hardly be doubted that all the while these are not unmindful of the conception that sound morality has its source in spiritual intercourse between a man and his God; and by the Alexandrines the idea that man possesses the seeds of the Logos, and so can appreciate the divine light, which appears so clearly in Clement and Origen, has place in the teaching of Athanasius and Cyril. Neither school—though, at first sight, we might be led to suppose that the Antiochene system is built upon a dualistic foundation²—is, apparently, so influenced by the thought and religion of Hellenism that it starts from the conception that God and man are opposites. Surely, had it been so, neither would have been so intent upon maintaining the truth of the Incarnation.

Again, it stands to the credit of the Alexandrines and—if we

¹ See Mackintosh's criticism of the use of "ousia" and "nature" by the Greek Fathers (*The Person of Jesus Christ*, p. 421), and Gore's answer (*The Holy Spirit and the Church*, pp. 228 ff.).

² See above, p. 109 ff.

are right in our conclusion—the Antiochenes that, though they approach these subjects from different angles, they see the vital connection between the doctrine of Christ's Person and that of His redemptive work, and establish their Christology upon definite soteriological principles. From Athanasius onwards, the former maintain that He who comes to save must be "very God of very God", and that this very God must unite to Himself "our nature". The Antiochenes, as we have tried to show, have the same two conceptions, only in their case the emphasis is laid on the individuality of the manhood which was "taken": the world could not have been re-established in obedience to the divine will had not God Himself become man, and had not "that which was assumed" been "The Man", who, of His own free will, was utterly obedient to the will of Him who assumed Him. Both in that of the Alexandrines and in that of the Antiochenes, we venture to think, we have a Christology which is indeed "soteriologically determined".

We pass to the Christological thought of the two schools. Here, first of all, it is particularly noteworthy that both the Alexandrine and the Antiochene theologians uphold the doctrine of the cosmic Christ—a doctrine which, as will be granted, must be upheld if Christianity is not to die. Both uphold the idea of personal continuity, and say that the Logos, while incarnate, "remains all that He was"; moreover, the thought so clearly expressed by Origen, Athanasius, and Apollinarius,¹ that while in the body the Logos, as Logos, was quickening all things, else "the universe would have been made void", is also to be found among the Antiochenes,² even if it does not appear to be so fully developed. At first sight, it may seem absurd to say that even in the manger the Babe of Bethlehem was at the same time sustaining all things, but it is apparent that this must be said if the truth of the Incarnation is to be maintained—and, in effect, both Alexandrines and Antiochenes say it. Mary's Child is God, say the former; the Child and the Lord of the Child are "one and the same Person", says Nestorius.³

¹ See above, pp. 20, 34 f., 50 f.

² See above, pp. 143 f.

³ ὁ αὐτὸς ἦν βρέφος καὶ τοῦ βρέφους οἰκῆτωρ (*Sermo xv*, Loofs, *Nestoriana*, p. 292)—ὁ αὐτός, says Nestorius, signifies "one and the same prosopon" (*Bazaar*, p. 233).

But how can the Logos continue His creative and sustaining activity and still be incarnate? Is there anything in the writings of these teachers which can be of use to us in attempting to answer this question? Seemingly, most of them, whether Alexandrines or Antiochenes, are content with the statement that "while remaining all that He was" the Logos became man—a statement which, while it is perfectly sound, does not carry us very far. Cyril, however, as will have been noticed (though, presumably, without feeling the problem before us), says that "in addition to" His being in the form of God, the Logos took to Himself the form of a servant; and he considers that one may regard the Logos as thus possessing a "two-fold activity"—suffering as man, and energizing as God.¹ Surely, this is a workable suggestion; in fact, it is most significant that this idea has been brought forward by certain modern theologians. Adopting it, we can think of the incarnate existence of the Logos as an "addition to" His eternal existence, and can say that the Logos "stands in a dual relationship to us at one and the same moment".² He is at once the Lord of life and the Lord incarnate.

In the same connection there is this point: if, "in addition to" His eternal existence, the Logos is also incarnate, it necessarily follows that, if the incarnation is to be real, there is involved a voluntary limitation in respect of His divine powers. How far, then, do these teachers help us to answer the problem of the divine self-emptying? What Loofs³ says concerning the Alexandrine theologians is also true of the theologians of Antioch: neither the one side nor the other has any "theory" of the kenosis. The most we can say, as it seems to us, is that both the Alexandrines and the Antiochenes are aware that their doctrinal

¹ See above, pp. 84 f.

² So Weston, *The One Christ*, pp. xxxviii, 160 ff., 181. See also Archbishop Temple's *Christus Veritas*, pp. 140, 153, and Quick, *Doctrines of the Creed*, pp. 136 ff. Especially noteworthy in this connection is Quick's remark (*op. cit.* p. 138). Speaking of the supposition that He who is both creative Word and the Infant in the cradle is "at that time the subject of two distinct consciousnesses and experiences at once", he adds: "This may be the best way of thinking about the matter, provided we do not allow it to suggest to us that the Word was only partially incarnate; but it obliges us still to assume a kenosis, in so far as the consciousness of the Word made flesh is concerned. Granted that the Word, without ceasing His creative and sustaining work, added something to it, what He added is precisely that experience in which His divine consciousness was limited and His divine state surrendered."

³ *Leitfaden*, p. 269 n. 4.

position demands the recognition of the principle that in the Incarnation the Logos accommodated Himself to human conditions. At the same time, there are statements, notably those of Nestorius and Cyril, which can be of help to us to-day. As we have seen, the former says that in the Incarnation nothing is the "own" of the Logos "apart from the human humiliation",¹ and Cyril puts forward the valuable thought that, when made man, the Logos "permitted the measures of the manhood to prevail over Himself".² Both are striking expressions, offering us, as we think, direction as to the manner in which we should approach the problem. Following these statements, then, our first question should not be, In respect of what aspects of His divine power did the Logos limit Himself in order to become man?, but, What are "the measures of His manhood", and what do we mean by "the human humiliation"? It may be right that we should at times "play the immortal", but we should play it only "so far as we can"³—and to set up the theory that, on becoming incarnate, the Logos emptied Himself of His omnipotence, omnipresence, and omniscience does seem like an attempt to relate the divine self-emptying to what lies beyond the possibilities of human understanding. We can still safeguard the complete reality of Christ's manhood (holding that His was a knowledge and consciousness which was thoroughly human), and still uphold the majesty of the divine condescension, considerations which loomed large before the Kenoticists of the nineteenth century, if we take as our starting-point in this connection the human rather than the divine in Christ—only (and to this point we shall return) we must not hesitate to adopt to the fullest extent the principle which is contained in the statements of Nestorius and Cyril.

Moreover, it would seem that the teachers of both schools make an important contribution to doctrinal thought in differentiating between what belongs to the Logos in His eternal being and what is His in His incarnate state.⁴ Here especially

¹ See above, pp. 149 ff.

² See above, p. 86.

³ See Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 1177b.

⁴ Severus of Antioch, it may be noted, alludes to this distinction as a *temporalis distinctio*: it is a distinction between the Logos (*Verbum*) "*exinanitum*" and the Logos "*nondum exinanitum*"—between the *una et eadem persona* "*prius simplex et incorporea*", and that *persona* "*postea composita et incarnata*". The Monophysite adduces passages from Basil and Cyril to show that they "distinguished the times" (see *c. Gramm.* III. i. 7, ed. Lebon, *op. cit.* pp. 74 ff., 92).

noteworthy is what they say concerning the Lord's passibility. The Logos, the Alexandrines teach, has so entered into human experiences that the Passion has real meaning for Him as Logos: He has become θεός παθητός.¹ And, as we have attempted to demonstrate, though the Antiochenes—insisting that it was "Christ" and not "the Logos" who suffered—are fearful lest passibility should be attributed to the Logos in His divine nature, these do not question that it is right to assert that "God suffered"; in fact, Nestorius' theory that in the Incarnation the Logos took the Man's prosopon as His prosopon can hardly mean anything less than that in the Incarnation the Logos made human experiences His own. But, like the Antiochenes, the Alexandrines—differentiating between ὁ Λόγος ἄσαρκος and ὁ Λόγος ἐν σαρκί—insist that in His eternal being the Logos cannot but be impassible. Have we not here, then, teaching which we can accept as a contribution to the solution of the problem of the divine impassibility? It is, of course, outside the scope of this study to consider this problem in all its implications,² but perhaps, in this connection, we shall be allowed to say that if we are to uphold the Christian conception of God, a God who is first transcendent and then, and only then, immanent in His creation, it seems essential that we should make a distinction between God as He is, in all His perfection, and God as He exists in relation to the world—and it is just such a distinction as this that the ancient theologians make when they treat of the subject of the passibility of Jesus Christ.

We turn to the doctrine of the unity of Christ's Person as it is upheld by these teachers. Here it is particularly noteworthy that both the Alexandrines and the Antiochenes maintain that all the actions and sayings reported of Jesus Christ in Scripture are those of the one Person, the Logos as He has become man. The Alexandrines say that these proceed ἐξ ἐνός—from "the whole"; and the Antiochenes insist that to the one prosopon of Jesus Christ belong both divine and human properties. The criticism—a criticism often brought against the Chalcedonian transactions³

¹ See above, p. 75.

² On this subject, see Mozley, *The Impassibility of God*, esp. his "Six necessary questions", pp. 177 ff., and Quick, *op. cit.* pp. 184 ff.

³ Cf. Mackintosh, *op. cit.* pp. 214, 294 f.; Harnack, *op. cit.* iv. pp. 222 f.; Raven, *op. cit.* p. 207; Creed, in *Mysterium Christi*, p. 132. It is clear that there are passages in Leo's *Tome* which leave us with the impression that

—that Jesus Christ is regarded as performing what is divine in His divine, and what is human in His human, nature, does not hold, we venture to think, in respect of the teaching of these theologians. For a true appreciation of their point of view, it seems important that we should distinguish between the two

the Pope is thinking on the lines of an alternate action, as if the Logos did this in His divine, and that in His human, nature. Thus, to quote the passages to which exception was taken by certain Illyrian and Palestinian bishops (supporters of the Cyrilline orthodoxy) at Chalcedon, who in the light of these passages were inclined to take the view that Leo was not teaching with Cyril, but was expressing "the dividing of the Godhead and manhood of Christ" (Mansi, vi. 972 f.; vii. 27 ff., 31 ff.)—and, as will be understood, the modern criticism of Chalcedon is in line with that of these bishops—we have: (1) "In order to pay our debt the inviolable nature was united to a passible nature, so that as our salvation required, one and the same 'Mediator between God and man, the man Jesus Christ' might be capable of death in the one and incapable of it in the other" (*Tome*, 3); (2) "Each nature performs what is proper to it in common with the other [*Agit enim utraque forma cum alterius communione quod proprium est*]; the Logos, that is, performing what is proper to the Logos, and the flesh carrying out what is proper to the flesh. The one flashes forth in miracles, the other succumbs to injuries" (*ibid.* 4); (3) "Although in the one Lord Jesus Christ there is one Person of God and man, yet that whence the suffering is common to both is one thing, and that whence the glory is common to both is another; for from us He has the manhood inferior to the Father, while from the Father He has equal Godhead with the Father" (*ibid.*). But to appreciate what Leo says in the *Tome* we must turn to his explanatory letter to the Palestinian monks. There we find that, after asserting that the Person of the incarnate Logos is one, he goes on to say that the natures must be distinguished according to "the character of the actions" (*operum qualitates*). To quote the passage: "Although in our one Lord Jesus Christ, true Son of God and of Man, the Person of the Logos and the flesh is one, and both substances have their actions in common; yet we must understand the character of the acts themselves, and by the contemplation of sincere faith distinguish [*sincerae fidei contemplatione cernendum est*] those to which the humility of His weakness is brought from those to which His sublime power is inclined, and what it is that the flesh without the Logos or the Logos without the flesh does not do" (*Ep.* cxxiv. 5). In the next section of his letter Leo's position comes out even clearer: "No sort of division ever arose between the divine and the human substance, and through all the growth and changes of His body, the actions were of one Person the whole time [*unius Personae fuerint totius temporis actiones*]; yet we do not by any mixture confound these very acts which were done inseparably, and from the character of the acts we perceive what belonged to either form [*sed quid cuius formae sit, ex operum qualitate sentimus*]. . ." [*ibid.* 6]. Thus it would seem that in the *Tome* the Pope is simply "recognizing the difference of the natures", and that he is, in effect, upholding against Eutychianism the very principle which Cyril upholds. So we venture to suggest that this criticism would not have been made (though Leo's language can hardly be called fortunate, especially in the second passage) if a distinction had been made between what the Pope says under this (the anti-Eutychian) principle, and what he says under the principle relating to the "one Person", for here he explicitly affirms that "the actions were of one Person the whole time".

principles which lie at the root of their Christology, and realize that it is the doctrine of the unity of Christ's Person which is to the fore in the first, and that what is to the fore in the second principle is that of the reality of the two natures—it being laid down here that Jesus Christ must be “recognized” as possessing two natures, else there is the danger of Eutychianism. Once we connect with the first what really belongs to the second (and, apparently, the criticism to which we have just referred is arrived at through not distinguishing between the two principles) and do not sufficiently appreciate the importance of the place which the word “recognized” (γνωριζόμενος)¹ holds in the second principle, it would seem that we are being unjust to teachers who would say, not that Christ is to be “recognized” as doing this in His divine, or that in His human, nature, but that He is one Person, the Logos incarnate, who does all that is said of Him as one Person—though this Person is to be “recognized” as having the two elements of Godhead and manhood, since these have not been swallowed up the one by the other, but remain real in their union in this Person.

So then, as we confine our attention to what we are calling their first Christological principle, it becomes clear that, in their teaching on the oneness of Christ's Person, what the theologians of the Alexandrine school maintain, and, if our conclusions are right, what those of the school of Antioch mean to say,² is that in Christ the Logos has so taken man's nature to Himself that there is set up, not a “parallelism”, but a “composition” of Godhead and manhood in His Person. Cyril speaks of the “hypostatic” union, of a “concurrence into a unity” (εἰς ἓν τι), and of a σύνθεσις which rules out the idea of a παράθεσις.³ On their side, the Antiochenes teach a “personal” union, holding that the Logos has united real manhood to Himself, and emphatically deny that theirs is the doctrine of “two Sons”, maintaining that for them the manhood is not “that of another beside the Logos”.⁴ Surely, in this there is no “parallelism” of two natures, but the

¹ Thus, as it seems to us, it is important that we should emphasize the presence of this word in the celebrated passage in the *Definitio*, in which the two principles appear together: “We confess One and the Same, Christ, Son, Lord, Only-begotten—ἐν δύο φύσεσι. . . γνωριζόμενον” (Bindley, *op. cit.* p. 233).

² See above, pp. 162 ff.

³ See above, pp. 89 f., 207 f.

⁴ See above, pp. 153 f., 162 ff.

conception of a *unitas*—a *unitas* in the Person of the Logos which makes altogether impossible the Nestorian notion that in Jesus Christ there are two natures, each with its own prosopon, set side by side.

But when the Alexandrines use the term “composition”, they do not mean that the natures are composite but that the Person, in whom the natures are united, is composite. When they use their celebrated formula, they understand that the Logos, a divine Person (φύσις), is now “made flesh” (σεσαρκωμένη)—that is, that, through the agency of the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary, manhood is now His as well as the Godhead which was His from eternity. In fact, as we have noticed, some of the Alexandrine teachers—Apollinarius and his followers, the Synousiasts—explicitly affirm that Jesus Christ is “one composite Person”: He is μία φύσις (οἱ ὑπόστασις οἱ οὐσία) σύνθετος; He is ἐν πρόσωπον σύνθετον.¹ And, though the Antiochenes are opposed to the word “composition”, believing that, as it was being used by the opposing party, it represented the confession that the natures were “confused” in the union, these, as it seems, are in reality upholding this same truth. Again and again do they say that their teaching is that Jesus Christ is one Person (one prosopon), at once divine and human; and in this connection it will be remembered that Nestorius himself alludes to Him as the “Man-God”.² It is true that they do not possess the clear-cut expressions of their opponents, but it seems evident that they are, in effect, saying what these say: namely, that Jesus Christ has so taken to Himself the form of a servant that He is “one composite Person”—that He is “one theandric Person”. The expression “one theandric Person” (μία φύσις τε καὶ ὑπόστασις θεανδρική) only appears with the Monophysites, and is used by Severus of Antioch, who declares his indebtedness for it to “Dionysius the Areopagite, the Wise”,³ but it can hardly be disputed that

¹ See above, p. 54.

² See above, p. 164.

³ Severus, *Ep. iii ad Joann. Hegum.*—quoted by Diekamp, *Doctrina Patrum*, pp. 309 f. In this letter Severus declares that, following the statement of the Areopagite that through the humanification of God there arises a new theandric activity (ἀνδρωθέντος θεοῦ καινὴν τινα τὴν θεανδρικήν ἐνέργειαν ἡμῖν πεπολιτευμένον), he and those with him speak of μίαν φύσιν τε καὶ ὑπόστασιν θεανδρικήν, ὡσπερ καὶ τὴν μίαν τοῦ θεοῦ Λόγου σεσαρκωμένην, and confess—Christ being εἰς—μίαν ὡς ἐνὸς αὐτοῦ τὴν τε φύσιν καὶ τὴν ὑπόστασιν καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν σύνθετον.

it sums up the truth which both the Alexandrines and the Antiochenes were standing for in the pre-Chalcedonian era.

We can go farther. May we not say that another phrase which Severus adopts from the same source is expressive of what both the Alexandrine and the Antiochene teachers are meaning to say? Severus speaks of "one composite activity" (μία ἐνέργεια σύνθετος).¹ The Antiochenes, it is true, do not develop the conception that the Logos incarnate is one Agent, possessing one—that is, a composite—activity, but in their assertions that Jesus Christ is one prosopon at once divine and human, and that His are properties both divine and human, it is implied that they would acknowledge that He who speaks and acts is one, and that His activity is not now a solely divine, now a solely human, activity, but that it is an activity which is at once divine and human. The Alexandrines, as we have shown, have more to say on this subject. The Synousiasts pay attention to it, and say that in Christ there is "one operative motion" (μία ἐνεργητική κίνησις), but they spoil what might have been a notable contribution to pre-Chalcedonian Christological thought through rejecting the doctrine of the *totus homo*.² Cyril, however, upholding this doctrine, and maintaining that all the actions and sayings of Jesus Christ are those of one Person,³ holds that this one Person "operates at once both divinely and humanly".⁴ Thus would this teacher say that Christ's is "one composite activity"; nay more, the Monophysite Patriarch of Antioch, again dependent on the Areopagite, is but summing up Cyril's idea when he speaks of "a new theandric activity" (καινή τις θεανδρική ἐνέργεια)⁵ in respect of the Incarnate. Clearly, in all this there is no thought of any alternate action, as if the Lord did this as God, and that as man. On the contrary, the Alexandrine, and, as may be inferred, the Antiochene, standpoint is that in Christ—though, as He is constituted, it is something altogether unique in the world's history—there is a single personal life: the Logos incarnate is one Person, one Agent, at once divine and human, whose

¹ See above, p. 251 n. 3.

² See above, p. 57.

³ See above, p. 90.

⁴ See above, p. 95.

⁵ See above, p. 251 n. 3, and, for an explanation of the words of the Areopagite set out there, Diekamp, *op. cit.* p. 97, where we have this statement of his: θεανδρικῶς ἦγουν θεϊκῶς ἅμα καὶ ἀνδρικῶς τὰ τε θεῖα καὶ ἀνθρώπινα δράσας, ἢ σαφέστερον εἶπειν θεϊκὴν ἐν ταύτῳ καὶ ἀνδρικὴν ἐνέργειαν πεπολιτευμένος.

activity, proceeding from "one composite Person", is, as must be, composite, it being "a new theandric activity".

From the teaching of the Alexandrine and the Antiochene theologians concerning the Lord's "Person", we turn to that concerning His "natures". Now our basis is the second Christological principle which, as we think, is also common to the two schools of thought. We have summarized it as follows: *In Jesus Christ, the two elements, each with its properties, are to be recognized; therefore, since these remain in their union in His Person, any idea of confusion or of change in respect of these elements must be eliminated.*

The fundamental value of this principle is seen when it is called to mind that Christianity maintains that, while God and man are akin, they are certainly distinct: they may not be "wholly other", but, as Creator and creature, they are in a real sense "other". As it has been put: "Unless we are prepared to say that the divine is human and the human is divine, we must admit a distinction between the two in the Person of Christ, and discover a relationship between them which is dependent upon the fact that each of the terms 'divinity', 'humanity', expresses a real truth about the one whole Person"; and, as the same writer so pointedly remarks, the Christological problem would still remain even if we were to try to avoid the terms "nature" and "ousia".¹ So it is that in upholding the truth of the δύο πράγματα, and insisting that Christ's Godhead and manhood are real and genuine—that they are indeed ὑποστάσεις (*substantiae*)—each retaining its own properties in the union, and that, since this is the case, it is necessary to "recognize their difference" in the union, the Alexandrines, and especially the Antiochenes, whose, as we have said, is a definitely anti-Eutychian interest, are in reality maintaining what is fundamental to the Christian faith; for without the "two natures" there is the danger of a drift towards the doctrine of the *una substantia*, which represents a surrender to the pantheistic point of view.

But, when we assert that in Christ there are two natures, each with its properties, there is involved the question of the

¹ So Mozley, art. "The Incarnation", *Essays Catholic and Critical*, p. 191.

= Another

relationship between them in His one Person. Here we encounter difficulty, for in the coming of Jesus Christ we have something altogether novel, and, because of its novelty, we are bound to acknowledge that the psychology of the God-Man lies beyond human comprehension. Nevertheless, we must not shirk the problem. So we ask what help is forthcoming from the ancients in this direction.

The Alexandrines, it has to be confessed, do not give us a satisfactory answer to the problem. As was pointed out when we were considering their Christology, they hold that the manhood which in the Incarnation the Logos has united to Himself is homoousios with ours, consisting of a body, an animal soul, and a human rational soul; for, starting from the point of view that "what is not taken is not redeemed", they—with the exception, of course, of Apollinarius and his disciples—uphold the "totus homo". And in this connection it should be remarked that these theologians do not teach that Christ's manhood is "impersonal" in the sense that it is devoid of the faculty of self-determination: what they would say is that it is "anhypostatic" in the sense that, since it has its existence in the Person of the Logos who has taken it to Himself, it has not a hypostasis as the Logos has a hypostasis—else one is positing the Nestorian doctrine of two parallel hypostases; but they do not deny that, as it exists in the Person of the Logos, the manhood has its νοῦς; in fact, they are utterly opposed to the Apollinarian doctrine. Thus, in effect, they are saying that the manhood has and retains its "peculiar principle of existence",¹ the human soul being moved of its own free will.² But, as we have said, it is only in principle that the Alexandrines teach the individuality of the Lord's manhood; in practice, as their exegesis plainly reveals, they teach that Christ developed physically but not mentally and spiritually—in the latter respects His manhood is perfect from the beginning. It is just because of this weakness in what otherwise can be regarded as a most admirable Christological system that it is vain to expect help from these theologians on the point under discussion.

¹ σώζει τὸν ἴδιον τῆς ὑπάρξεως λόγον—the principle upheld by Leontius of Byzantium (*c. Nestor. et Eutych.*, P.G. lxxxvi. 1304B), and carried forward by the Dyothelites of the seventh century.

² Cf. John of Damascus, *de Fid. Orth.* iii. 18.

But the Antiochenes are more helpful. These are fully determined to resist any thought which may seem to involve a denial of the reality of the two natures, or of the reality of their properties. Moreover, in regard to Christ's manhood, the representatives of the Syrian doctrinal tradition from Paul of Samosata onwards uphold that it was real manhood which the Logos "took"—and by "real manhood" they mean a manhood possessing the power of self-determination. By this doctrine they stand firm; for, as we have tried to explain, it lies at the root of their soteriological and their Christological thought. "The Man assumed", they say, experienced a full human development: like us He passed through all the stages of human life, but, unlike us, though tried to the uttermost, He remained perfect in His obedience to the divine will. It is here, it appears, that these theologians can help us to answer the problem of the relationship between the two natures in the one Person of Jesus Christ. Nestorius teaches that "He who was assumed", possessing the divine prosopon from the start, ever preserved it, and asserts that "to have the prosopon of God is to will what God wills".¹ Seemingly, then, it is the idea of fellowship which this Antiochene has in mind when he makes this statement: the Man, ever willing what God wills, was in perfect union with Him. And it is interesting to find that this idea has a place in the thought of the earliest representatives of the school. Eustathius of Antioch speaks of the soul of Christ as "dwelling together with" (συνδιαιτωμένη)² the Logos and God, and before him Paul of Samosata had spoken of the conjunction of the human Jesus with the Logos "according to communion" (κατὰ μετουσίαν).³ The conception is never treated scientifically by the Antiochene teachers, but, it would seem, they show us how we should approach the problem if we would do justice to the truth that the manhood which in Jesus Christ the Logos has united to Himself is real manhood.

So then we would say that the representatives of the Greek and those of the Syrian doctrinal tradition are, though from different points of view, seeking to answer the question "What think ye of Christ?", and that, if we are right in concluding that

¹ See above, p. 148.

² *De Anima*, P.G. xviii. 689D.

³ See above, p. 135.

both Greeks and Syrians maintain the same basic ideas, it is not that these are to be rejected and those accepted, but that both are to be accepted as having gifts which they can offer to later generations of Christian thinkers as they in their turn are brought face to face with the same question. Thus, it is clear that the contribution of the former lies in their teaching on the unity of Christ's Person, and that that of the latter is to be found in their teaching on the reality of His human nature. And, it would seem, we appreciate the value of what each school has to offer as we develop what these did not develop, namely, the doctrine of the divine self-emptying,¹ and, following the teaching of the Antiochenes, do not hesitate to think of Christ's manhood as real manhood. After all, we are better equipped than were the ancients to deal with these subjects: having passed through an age when thought has had a strong psychological bias, there is ours to-day a deeper realization of the meaning of Christ's human knowledge and consciousness, and, as seems fully evident, if we are not to lose what has been gained in this way, we must make full use of the conception that the Logos limited Himself in order that He might truly become man. Thus we must be prepared to say with Nestorius that in the Incarnation the Logos possesses nothing of His own "apart from the human humiliation", and to say with Cyril that the Logos "permitted the measures of the manhood to prevail over Himself": in the Incarnation the Logos has condescended to be bound by human laws, and never to pass beyond those laws; He is God, but God as He has chosen to act under conditions specifically human; He has so limited Himself that not only His knowledge, but also His divine will and self-consciousness are conditioned by a human knowledge, a human will, and a human self-consciousness. Certainly, we are saying that in reality there are two wills and two self-consciousnesses in Jesus Christ, and it is true that a "theoretic duality of mental life" is "incongruous with an intelligible psychology".² But we would appeal to the second Christological principle of the ancient Christologists,

¹ Cf. Bethune-Baker's remark: "If we are to work with the orthodox theory of the Incarnation, I am sure we can only do so by making use of the conception of *kenosis* to the full extent" (*The Way of Modernism*, p. 98).

² Cf. Mackintosh, *op. cit.* pp. 470, 482.

and say that in this we are but "recognizing the difference of the natures", for we must posit the "two natures" if we are not to surrender the truth concerning the difference between God and man for which it stands. Yet while we "recognize" two wills and two self-consciousnesses, we say that, since in Jesus Christ the Logos has so "emptied" Himself that His will and self-consciousness are the same as that human will and self-consciousness which He has taken to Himself—a conception which, it is interesting to note, is apparently already implicit in the teaching of Nestorius on the "taking" and "giving" of the *prosopa* in the Incarnation—to Him belong one will and one self-consciousness, which are, accordingly, at once divine and human. At any rate, working on these lines, we can make use of the Alexandrine teaching on "the one incarnate Person", who, the God-Man, is a "composite" or "theandric Person", possessing one will and one self-consciousness, which are in like manner "composite" or "theandric"; and at the same time we can make use of the contribution of the Antiochenes as these uphold the reality of Christ's human soul, and teach that, ever in communion with "Him who assumed", "that which was assumed" ever willed that which He willed. As we say, it would seem that both these ancient Christologies are necessary in any attempt to answer the problem of the Lord's Person; for the one is the complement of the other.

not
of unit

INDEX

- Acacius of Beroea († 437), 227 n. 3, 234 nn. 1, 2
- Acacius of Melitene († 438), 175 n. 6, 231, 231 n. 2, 238; Cyril's letter to, 98, 101, 213 n. 2
- Adamantius, his Christology, 125 n. 3
- Adelphius, 36
- Akoimatoi*, monastery of the, 242
- Alexander of Alexandria († 328), 15 n. 2
- Alexander of Hierapolis (exiled 435), 181 n. 3, 195 n. 1, 234 n. 2, 235, 236 f.
- Alexandria, the centre of Hellenic culture, 3
- Alexandria, Council of (362), 47
- Ambrose of Milan († 397), 224, 229, 231
- Amphilochius of Iconium († after 394), 76 n. 5
- Anastasius, Nestorius' *syncellus*, 222
- Anatolius of Constantinople († 458), 239 n. 2
- Anazarbus, Synod held at (c. 433), 236
- Andrew of Samosata, 108, 153, 165 n. 3, 174 n. 1, 180 n. 2, 183, 188 n. 4, 193, 193 n. 2, 234 n. 2, 237
- Anomoeans, The, 32 n. 3, 49 n. 1
- Antioch, a centre both of Hellenic culture and of Semitic life and thought, 107 ff., 202 f.
- Antiochus of Ptolemais († before 408), 190 n. 1
- Apollinarius of Laodicea († c. 390), his use of "nature", 49 n. 2; his terms for the "union", 52; teaches that in Jesus Christ Logos Himself becomes man without change, 50 f.; upholds idea of a divine self-emptying, 51 f.; insists that Jesus Christ is one Person, 52 ff.; distinguishes between unlimited and self-limited aspects of His Godhead, 55; holds that His is one activity, 56 f.; that in Him are the two elements of Godhead and "flesh", 57 f.; that it is necessary to "recognize" what is proper to each, 58 f.; his error and condemnation, 60 ff.
- Apollinarius at Antioch, 107; the friend of Libanius, 108; his attack on the Antiochenes, 204
- Arianism, 8
- Aristotle, 48, 106, 109, 247 n. 3
- Arius, 9 n. 2, 32 n. 3
- Asterius the Sophist, 9 n. 2, 70 n. 1
- Athanasius († 373), his doctrine of God, 6 f.; of the Logos, 8 f.; of man and man's redemption, 14 ff.; teaches that in Jesus Christ the Logos Himself becomes man without change, 34 f.; has idea of a divine self-emptying, 35 f.; insists that Jesus Christ is one Person, 36 ff.; that in Him are the two elements of Godhead and manhood, 39 f.; that it is necessary to "recognize" what is proper to each, 40 f.; and that Christ's is a real manhood, 41 ff.—but does not apply this principle, 43 f.
- Athanasius' use of "ousia" and "hypostasis", 47 n. 3, 48 n. 6; statements of his read at Ephesus (431), 231
- Athenagoras of Athens, 2 n. 2
- Augustine († 430), 7 n. 4
- Babai, the Nestorian theologian, 158
- Barsumas of Nisibis, 242
- Basil of Caesarea († 379), 47 n. 4, 66, 67, 71 n. 3
- Bethune-Baker, J. F., 149 n. 1, 150 n. 1, 163, 180 n. 3, 231 n. 2, 256 n. 1
- Bindley, T. H., 87 n. 3
- Bright, W., 220 n. 2
- Bruce, A. B., 86 n. 2, 103
- Candidianus, Count, 228, 229, 235
- Carterius, 108
- Cassian, John († 435), 224, 226 f.
- Cavallera, F., 132 n. 2
- Celestine of Rome († 432), 223 f.
- Celestius (the Pelagian), 223

- Chalcedon, Council of (451), 242, 248, 250 n. 1
- Chrysaphius, Grand Chamberlain, 239 n. 4
- Chrysostom, John († 407), 108, 109, 110, 113 n. 7, 114 n. 6, 116, 140 n. 6, 223, 226, 227, 227 n. 3
- Clement of Alexandria († before 215), his doctrine of God, 3 f.; of the Logos, 8; of man, 11, 12 ff.; his Christology, 18 f.
- Creed, J. M., 248 n. 3
- Cyril of Alexandria (412-† 444), his use of "hypostasis" and "nature", 47, 49 n. 2; his doctrine of God, 81 f.; of man and man's redemption, 82 ff.; teaches that in Jesus Christ the Logos Himself, while remaining what He was, becomes man through "adding" an incarnate to His eternal existence, 84 f.; upholds idea of a divine self-emptying, 85 f.; insists that Jesus Christ is one Person, 86 f.; teaches a "personal" union, 87; fights on behalf of "Theotokos", 87 f., and insists on use of expression "God suffered", 88; how he understands the formula *μία φύσις τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου σεσαρκωμένη*, 89; rejects Nestorian position, asserting that Lord's manhood "not that of another beside the Logos", 90, 210 n. 5; holds that manhood has its place in the "composition" in the Person of the Logos, 90; holds that in Jesus Christ are the two elements of Godhead and manhood, 90 f.; that Jesus Christ is "One, out of both", 91, 212 n. 4; rejects idea of "confusion", 91 f.; maintains that it is necessary to "recognize" the difference of the natures and the sayings, 93 ff.; how he understands "One, after the union", 95 ff.; is no Apollinarian, 102 n. 5; but does not apply principle that the Lord's manhood possessed power of self-determination, 103 ff.; attacks teaching of Antiochenes, misunderstanding their position, 206 ff.
- Cyril's motives in attacking Nestorius, 220 f.; his relations with Celestine of Rome, 223 f.; his view of Nestorius accepted at Roman Synod (430), 225; his position of authority at Council of Ephesus (431), 229 ff.; his agreement with party of John of Antioch in 433, 235 f.; his attempt to reconcile the ardent anti-Nestorians, 101
- Damasus of Rome († 384), 65 n. 2, 224
- Definitio Fidei*, The (of Chalcedon), 92, 242, 250 n. 1
- Demetrian of Antioch (c. 253), 202
- Didymus the Blind († c. 398), his Christology, 45 n. 1, 74 n. 6
- Diekamp, F., 80 n. 1, 137 n. 2, 251 n. 3
- Diodore of Tarsus († before 394), 36 n. 4, 45 n. 1, 61, 108, 113 n. 7, 121 n. 4, 133 n. 3, 166 f., 174
- Dionysius the Areopagite, Pseudo-Dionysius, 251 f.
- Dioscorus of Alexandria († 454), 220, 238, 239 ff.
- Domnus [I] of Antioch († 274), 202
- Domnus [II] of Antioch († 451), 241
- Dorner, J. A., 63, 69 n. 1, 95, 116 f.
- Dorotheus of Marciapolis (exiled 435), 222, 224, 236
- Driver, G. R. and Hodgson, L., 111 n. 1, 157 nn. 1, 5, 159 n. 3, 191 n. 3, 198 n. 2, 215 n. 3
- Duchesne, L., 223 n. 4, 238 n. 6
- Ephesus, Council of (431), 101, 227 ff., 233 ff.
- Epictetus of Corinth, letter of Athanasius to, 36 n. 4, 203, 234 n. 2
- Epiphanius of Constantia († 403), 32 n. 3, 71 n. 4, 73 n. 2, 119 n. 5, 120 n. 7
- Eudoxius of Constantinople († 370), 32 n. 3, 49 n. 1, 203 n. 1
- Eunomius of Beroea (the Polemianist), 53 n. 2, 54 n. 1
- Eusebius of Caesarea († c. 340), 6 n. 1, 31 n. 3, 122
- Eusebius of Dorylaeum (c. 448-451), 222, 239 n. 3
- Eusebius of Nicomedia († 342), 9 n. 2, 122, 202
- Eustathius of Antioch (deposed c. 330), 32 n. 3, 36 n. 4, 45 n. 1; his doctrine of the Logos, 122 f.; his,

- of the Nestorian position, 72; his teaching on the reality of the Lord's manhood not completely satisfactory, 77 f.
- Statements of his read at Ephesus (431), 229, 231
- Gwatkin, H. M., 32 n. 3
- Harnack, A., 48 n. 5, 96, 132 n. 1, 137 n. 2, 248 n. 3
- Hefele, C. J., 212 n. 2, 220 n. 2
- Helladius of Tarsus (exiled 435), 236
- Hilary of Poitiers († 366), 36, 120 n. 8, 224
- Himerius of Nicomedia (exiled 435), 236
- Hippolytus († 236), 46
- Hodgson, L., 156 n. 7
- Homonius (the Apollinarian), 53 n. 2
- Hymenaeus of Jerusalem (an Origenist), 5, 28 n. 1
- Ibas of Edessa († 457), 188 n. 4, 212 n. 2, 236 n. 1, 237, 238, 240, 241, 242
- Irenaeus of Lyons, 15, 51, 71 n. 4, 146
- Irenaeus of Tyre, the friend of Nestorius (exiled 435, deposed 449), 230, 239, 240
- Job (the Polemianist), 53 n. 2, 54 n. 2
- John of Antioch († 441), 212 n. 2, 225, 227 n. 3, 228 ff., 234, 236, 238
- John, Count, 235
- John of Damascus, 75 n. 2, 254 n. 2
- John the Grammarian of Caesarea (a leader of the Chalcedonians opposed by Severus of Antioch c. 518), 100
- Julian of Eclanum, 223
- Julian of Halicarnassus († after 527), 48 n. 5
- Julian (the Polemianist), 53 n. 2, 54 n. 2, 56, 57 n. 3
- Justin Martyr, 2 n. 2
- Juvenal of Jerusalem († 458), 225, 228
- Latrocinium*, The (Second Council of Ephesus, 449), 240 f.
- Lebon, J., 89 n. 2, 96, 99 n. 3, 100 n. 2, 198 nn. 4, 5, 215 n. 3
- Leo of Rome († 461), 71 n. 4, 239 n. 2, 242, 248 n. 3
- Leontius of Byzantium († c. 543), 99 n. 2, 174 n. 2, 254 n. 1
- Eustathius of Antioch (*continued*) seemingly, the doctrine that the Logos became man for man's salvation, 123 ff.; his teaching on "the Man of Christ", 132 f.; on the Man's perfect obedience, 135; his the doctrine that, while incarnate, the Logos continues His creative activity, 143 f.; his teaching on the complete reality of the Lord's manhood, with its prosopon, 185, 187, 255
- Eutherius of Tyana (exiled 435), 212 n. 4, 236
- Eutyches, archimandrite of Constantinople († 453?), 239 nn. 3, 4, 241 n. 2
- Felix of Rome, Apollinarian writings published under name of, 55 n. 1, 90 n. 2
- Flavian of Antioch († 404), 108, 144, 145 f., 204
- Flavian of Constantinople († 449), 239
- Formulary of Reunion*, The (433), 101, 174 n. 1, 235, 239, 240
- Gore, C., 70 n. 1, 244 n. 1
- Gregory of Nazianzus († 390), his answer to Apollinarius, 64; his not the *Deus philosophorum*, 66 n. 1; his doctrine of man, 67; his the doctrine that the Logos, formerly *simplex*, is, through the Incarnation, *compositus*, 69; his thought concerning a divine self-emptying undeveloped, 70 f.; his condemnation of Nestorianism, 72 f.; his language at times unsatisfactory, 72 n. 3; his insistence on unity of Christ's Person, 73 f.; his rejection of the Eutychian position, 75 f.; his the doctrine of the complete reality of the Lord's manhood, but his also the failure to apply the principle that it is self-determinating, 79
- Statements of his read at Ephesus (431), 229, 231
- Gregory of Nyssa († c. 394), his answer to Apollinarius, 64; his not the *Deus philosophorum*, 66; his doctrine of man, 67 f.; his thought concerning a divine self-emptying, 69 f.; his condemnation

- Libanius, 108
Lietzmann, H., 49 n. 2
Λόγοι πρὸς Σαβίτων (attributed to Paul of Samosata), 132 n. 1, 137 f.
Loofs, F., 95, 119, 137 n. 2, 147 n. 1, 157 nn. 1, 2, 158, 246
Lucian of Antioch († 311), 32 n. 3, 107, 202
Lucianists, The, 8, 107, 122, 203
Lucius of Alexandria (c. 374), 32 n. 3
- Mackintosh, H. R., 244 n. 1, 248 n. 3, 256 n. 2
Malchion the Sophist, 18, 27 ff., 36 n. 4, 48, 53 n. 2, 107, 121 n. 5, 202, 204
Marius Mercator (*fl.* 418–460), 225 f.
Mason, A. J., 72 n. 3, 76 n. 6
Maximian of Constantinople (431–434), 236
Maximus, Athanasius' letter to, 37
Maximus of Antioch (449–455), 241
Maximus, a Syrian monk, 241 n. 6
Melito of Sardis, 15 n. 2
Memnon of Ephesus († 440), 228, 230
Methodius of Olympus, 15
Mingana, A., 110 n. 1
Mozley, J. K., 248 n. 2, 253
- Nau, F., 150, 231
Nemesius of Emesa, 109 n. 3, 112 n. 2, 113 nn. 2, 7, 114 n. 5
Neo-Platonism, 1, 7
Nestorius (Bp. of Constantinople, 428–431), his teaching on difference between God and man, 111; on man, 113 f.; on redemptive purpose of Incarnation, 128 f., 184 f.; holds that Man assumed has "image" (or *prosopon*) of God, 133 f.; insists on the perfect obedience of the Man, 138 ff.; teaches that Logos becomes man without change, 145; that in the Incarnation there has been a real self-limitation of the divine powers of the Logos, 147 ff.; and that the union of Godhead and manhood in Jesus Christ is "voluntary" and "personal", 151 f.; asserts that the one *prosopon* is the result of the union, 155 f.; his use of the term "prosopon", 156 ff., 159, 161; insists that his not the doctrine of
- "two Sons", 163 ff., 232 n. 2, 245 n. 3; has the conception of a "composition" in the Person of the Logos, 166 n. 1; his use, and explanation of the working, of the principle of the *communicatio idiomatum*, 167 ff.; does not reject "Theotokos", 172 f.; nor ascription of "two births" to Logos, 174 f.; nor expressions "God suffered", "God died", 175 f., 221 n. 4; his interpretation of ἐγένετο in St Jn. i. 14, 182 n. 2; insists that Logos in His divine nature is impassible, 183, 232 n. 3; that the Lord's manhood is complete with its *prosopon*, 185 f., 187 f.; "divides" the natures (and the sayings), 191 f.; but "divides" in the sense that he "recognizes the difference" of the natures, 195, 197 ff.; appeals to the order in which clauses of Nicene Creed are placed, 206; his view of Cyril's Anathematism, 211 f.; his criticism of Cyrilline terms for the union, and of Cyril's "out of two", 212 f.; his criticism of Cyril's "natural quality", 213 n. 2; of Cyril's "One, after the union", 214; of the formula μία φύσις τοῦ θεοῦ Λόγου σεσαρκωμένη, 214; of Cyril's "natural" union, 216; of Cyril's "hypostatic" union, 218 ff.
Nestorius' vigour against the "heretics", 221 f.; his attitude to Pelagianism, 223 n. 2, 226 n. 7; his complaint against decision of Council of Ephesus (431), 230 ff.; his removal, 237
- ὁμοούσιος, how understood by Alexandrine theologians in Christological discussion, 36 n. 4, 53 n. 2, 55 n. 3
How used by Paul of Samosata, 120
Origen, his doctrine of God, 4 f., 6 n. 2; of the Logos, 8; of man, 11 f.; his Christology, 19 ff., 58 n. 3; his use of "ousia", and "hypostasis", 48 n. 1
Origenists, The, their doctrine of God, 5 f.; of Logos, 8; their Christology, 28 ff.

- οὐσία, meaning of, as used by the Alexandrine teachers, 28, 36 n. 4, 48, 50 n. 1; as used by the Antiochene teachers, 120, 180 f.
- Paul of Samosata (Bp. of Antioch, c. 260–270), 34 n. 4; his doctrine of the Logos, 118 f.; of "the Son", 121; the possibility that his teaching has a soteriological foundation, 122; his not the doctrine that Jesus Christ was a "mere man", 130 ff.; his insistence on complete reality of Lord's humanity, 131; his teaching on the perfect obedience of the human Jesus, 134 f.
Paulinus of Antioch, 202 n. 2
Paulinus of Tyre, 203
Perry, F., 188 n. 4
Peter, priest of Alexandria (c. 431), 232 n. 6
Philo, 3
Philogonius of Antioch, 202 n. 2
φύσις, meaning of, as used by the Alexandrine teachers, 48 f., 50 n. 1; as used by the Antiochene teachers, 180 f.
Pierius, head of catechetical school of Alexandria, 5
Plato, 2, 3 n. 1, 6, 7
Polemianists, The, 36 n. 4, 53 n. 2
Polemon, 53 n. 2, 57
Prestige, G. L., 7, 47, 120 n. 9
Proclus of Constantinople († 446), his sermon on "Theotokos", 221 n. 4
πρόσωπον, meaning of, as used by the Alexandrine teachers, 46 f.; as used by the Antiochene teachers, 156 ff.
- Quick, O. C., 246 n. 2, 248 n. 2
- Rabbûla of Edessa († 435), 153 n. 1, 237 f.
Raven, C. E., 42 n. 1, 62 f., 120 n. 9, 132 n. 1, 137 n. 2, 172 n. 1, 248 n. 3
Robertson, A., 7
Rome, Synod at (430), which condemned Nestorius, 224 ff.
- Sabellianism, 7, 122, 203
Sanda, A., 100 n. 2
Severian of Gabala († c. 408), 182 n. 2
- Severus, Monophysite Patriarch of Antioch (expelled 518), 48 n. 5, 50 n. 1, 99 f., 101, 105 n. 5, 153 n. 1, 247 n. 4, 251 n. 3
Sixtus III of Rome († 440), 236
Srawley, J. H., 117 n. 3
Subordinationism, 7
Successus of Diocæsarea, letters of Cyril to, 98
Synousiasts (*see* Polemianists)
- Temple, W., 246 n. 2
Tertullian, 46, 71 n. 4
Theodore of Mopsuestia († 428), on difference between God and man, 110; on divine indwelling, 111 f.; on man, 113 f.; on redemptive purpose of Incarnation, 125 ff.; appeals to the order in which clauses of Nicene Creed are placed, 126; his "as in a Son", 133; on the Man's perfect obedience, 135 ff.; on "the second *katastasis*", 140 ff.; his interpretation of ἐγένετο in St Jn. i. 14, 144, 182, 205 n. 3; his ideas concerning a divine self-emptying, 146; upholds the "voluntary" and "personal" character of the union of Godhead and manhood in Jesus Christ, 151 f.; teaches that the one *prosopon* is the result of the union, 155; his use of "prosopon", 156, 160 f.; denies that he teaches "two Sons", 162 f.; his use of the principle of the *communicatio idiomatum*, 167; does not reject "Theotokos", 171 f.; insists that Logos impassible in His divine nature, 183; holds that Lord's manhood is complete with its *prosopon*, 185, 187; "divides" the natures (and the sayings), 190 f.; but "divides" in the sense that he "recognizes the difference" of the natures, 195 ff.
Theodore, venerated by his successors in the Antiochene school, 108, 240 n. 4, 242 n. 6; his attack on the teaching of the Alexandrines, 205; condemned at Council of Constantinople (553), 220 n. 1
Theodoret of Cyrus († c. 457), 108, 125 n. 3, 154 n. 2; on difference

Theodoret of Cyrus (*continued*)
 between God and man, 111; on man, 113 f.; on redemptive purpose of Incarnation, 129 f.; his teaching concerning man's restoration, 142 f.; insists that in Jesus Christ Logos becomes man without change, 145; his ideas concerning a divine self-emptying, 146; teaches that union of Godhead and manhood in Jesus Christ is "voluntary" and "personal", 151, 153; his use of "prosopon", 157 ff., 161 f.; denies that he teaches "two Sons", 165 f.; his use of "Theotokos", 173 f.; does not reject expressions "God suffered", "God died", 176; his explanation of the meaning of the name "Christ", 177 f.; his use of "ousia", "hypostasis", "nature", 180 n. 2, 181 n. 1; rejects notion of "mixture", 181; his interpretation of ἐγένετο in St Jn. i. 14, 182 n. 2; insists that Logos impassible in His divine nature, 183 f.; upholds complete reality of Lord's manhood, 186, 188 n. 4; "divides" the natures (and the sayings), 192 f.; but "divides" in the sense that he "recognizes the difference" of the natures, 195, 199 f.; appeals to the order in which clauses of Nicene Creed are placed, 207; denies that in Christ there is a mere indwelling, 208 n. 6; his view of Cyril's Anathematisms, 212 n. 2; his criticism of Cyril's "One, after the union", 213, 214 n. 3; of Cyril's "natural" and "hypo-

static" union, 216 f.; his attitude to Nestorius' teaching, 235

Theodoret, enters into communion with Cyril (433), 235; is attacked by Dioscorus of Alexandria, 240; deposed at *Latrocinium* (449), 241; and reinstated at Chalcedon (451), 242

Theodosius II, *Imp.* († 450), summons Council of Ephesus (431), 227 f.; his plan for restoring peace, 234; summons *Latrocinium* (449), 240

Theodotus of Ancyra († before 446), 101, 198 n. 3, 231, 231 n. 2

Theognostus, head of catechetical school of Alexandria, 5

Theophilus of Alexandria (385-† 412), 220, 227 n. 3, 229; his Christology, 80 n. 1

Theophilus of Antioch (c. 180), 119

Timothy Aelurus, Monophysite Patriarch of Alexandria († 477), 48 n. 5

Timothy of Berytus (the Polemianist), 36 n. 4, 53 n. 2, 65 n. 2

Tixeront, J., 49 n. 2, 96 n. 1

ὑπόστασις, meaning of, as used by the Alexandrine teachers, 47, 50 n. 1; as used by the Antiochene teachers, 180 f.

Valentinus (the Apollinarian), 53 n. 2

Weigl, E., 45 n. 1, 80 n. 1, 95 n. 5, 101 n. 1, 125 n. 3

Weston, F., 246 n. 2

Zeno, *Imp.* (474-491), 238 f.

PUBLISHED FOR THE CHURCH HISTORICAL SOCIETY

1. ST. AUGUSTINE'S CONVERSION.

An Outline of His Development to the Time of his Ordination.

By W. J. SPARROW-SIMPSON, D.D. 10s. 6d. net.

2. A HISTORY OF THE ICONOCLASTIC CONTROVERSY.

By EDWARD JAMES MARTIN, D.D. With Maps. 16s. net.

3. THE CARTHUSIAN ORDER IN ENGLAND.

By E. MARGARET THOMPSON. With a Frontispiece and Maps. 21s. net

4. THE NEW COMMANDMENT.

An Inquiry into the Social Precept and Practice of the Ancient Church.

By C. S. PHILLIPS, M.A., D.D. 6s. net.

5. STUDIES IN ENGLISH PURITANISM FROM THE RESTORATION TO THE REVOLUTION, 1660-1688.

By C. E. WHITING, D.D., B.C.L. With six Illustrations. 21s. net.

6. SITTING FOR THE PSALMS.

An Historical Study.

By the Rev. CLEMENT F. ROGERS, M.A. 1s. 6d. net.

7. A HISTORY OF THE CHURCH IN BLACKBURNSHIRE.

By JOHN EYRE WINSTANLEY WALLIS. With Maps and Plans. 7s. 6d. net.

8. EXORCISM AND THE HEALING OF THE SICK.

By REGINALD MAXWELL WOOLLEY, D.D. 3s. 6d. net.

9. THE RENEWED CHURCH OF THE UNITED BRETHERN, 1722-1930.

By WILLIAM GEORGE ADDISON, B.D., Ph.D. (Lond.). 12s. 6d. net.

10. THE KING'S BOOK, OR A NECESSARY DOCTRINE AND ERUDITION FOR ANY CHRISTIAN MAN, 1543.

With an introduction by T. A. LACEY. 6s. net.

- 11. THE REFORMATION AND THE IRISH EPISCOPATE.**
By the Very Rev. H. J. LAWLOR. 1s. net.
- 12. ANGLICAN ORDERS (ENGLISH).**
The Bull of His Holiness Leo XIII., September 15, 1896, and the answer of the Archbishops of England, March 29, 1897. 2s. 6d. net.
- 13. Also IN LATIN.**
Paper cover, 2s. 6d. net.
- 14. THE TREASURE OF SAO ROQUE.**
A sidelight on the Counter-Reformation. By W. TELFER. 8s. 6d. net.
- 15. CANTERBURY ADMINISTRATION.**
The administrative machinery of the Archbishopric of Canterbury illustrated from original records. By IRENE JOSEPHINE CHURCHILL, D.Phil., Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford; F.R.Hist.S.; Assistant Lambeth Librarian. Vol. I.: The Archbishop in his Diocese and Province. Vol. II.: Documents Illustrative and Lists. 42s. Not sold separately.
- 16. SAINT WULSTAN, PRELATE AND PATRIOT.**
A Study of his Life and Times.
By JOHN W. LAMB, M.A. 8s. 6d. net.
- 17. BISHOP BARLOW'S CONSECRATION AND ARCHBISHOP PARKER'S REGISTER; WITH SOME NEW DOCUMENTS.**
By CLAUDE JENKINS, D.D. 1s. 6d. net.
- 18. THE PASSION AND MARTYRDOM OF THE HOLY ENGLISH CARTHUSIAN FATHERS.**
The Short Narration, by Dom Maurice Chauncy, Prior of the Charterhouse of Sheen Anglorum within the walls of Bruges, formerly Monk of the London Charterhouse, A.D. 1570.
Edited by the Rev. G. W. S. CURTIS. With several illustrations. 8s. 6d. net.
- 19. THE CHURCH IN FRANCE, VOL. II., 1848-1905.**
By C. S. PHILLIPS, D.D. 12s. 6d. net.
Also Vol. I., 1789-1848. 8s. 6d. net.
- 20. THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF CHARLES INGLIS.**
His Ministry in America and Consecration as First Colonial Bishop, from 1759 to 1787.
By JOHN WOLFE LYDEKKER, M.A., Archivist to the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel. With 12 illustrations and a map. 12s. 6d. net.
- 21. THOMAS SHERLOCK, 1678-1761.**
By EDWARD CARPENTER, M.A., B.D., A.K.C. With a Frontispiece. 15s. net.
- 22. A STUDY OF BOSSUET.**
By W. J. SPARROW SIMPSON, D.D. 7s. 6d. net.
- 23. CONVOCATION OF THE CLERGY.**
A study of its antecedents and its rise with special emphasis upon its growth and activities in the thirteenth and fourteenth Centuries. By DOROTHY BRUCE WESKE, A.M., Th.D. 15s. net.
- 24. THE TREATISE ON THE APOSTOLIC TRADITION OF ST. HIPPOLYTUS OF ROME, BISHOP AND MARTYR.**
Edited by the Rev. GREGORY DIX. 12s. 6d. net.
- 25. THE ANAPHORA OR GREAT EUCHARISTIC PRAYER.**
An eirenical study in Liturgical History. By W. H. FRERE, C.R., D.D. 8s. 6d. net.
- 26. THE ENGLISH MISSIONARIES IN SWEDEN AND FINLAND.**
By C. J. A. OPPERMAN, M.A., Ph.D. 12s. 6d. net.
- 27. THE SAINTS OF EGYPT.**
By DE LACY O'LEARY, D.D. 12s. 6d. net.
- 28. THE CANDLE OF THE LORD.**
Studies in the Cambridge Platonists. By W. C. DE PAULEY, D.D. 7s. 6d. net.
- 29. PIERS PLOWMAN AND CONTEMPORARY RELIGIOUS THOUGHT.**
By GRETA HORT, M.A., Ph.D. 8s. 6d. net.
- 30. THE DOGMATIC AND MYSTICAL THEOLOGY OF JOHN DONNE.**
By ITRAT HUSAIN, M.A., Ph.D. 7s. 6d. net.
- 31. JOHN JAMES WETTSTEIN, 1693-1754.**
An account of his life, work, and some of his contemporaries. By C. L. HULBERT-POWELL, M.A. 12s. 6d. net.
- 32. THE RIDDLE OF THE DIDACHE.**
Fact or Fiction, Heresy or Catholicism?
By F. E. VOKES. 12s. 6d. net.
- 33. MEDIEVAL ENGLISH EPISCOPAL REGISTERS.**
By LOUIS A. HASELMAYER, Jn. 1s. net.
- 34. NENNIUS'S "HISTORY OF THE BRITONS."**
By A. W. WADE-EVANS. 7s. 6d. net.

35. THE HISTORY OF THE CREEDS.

By F. I. BADCOCK, D.D. Second Edition. 12s. 6d. net.

36. THE CHURCH UNIVERSAL AND THE SEE OF ROME.

A Study of the Relations between the Episcopate and the Papacy up to the Schism between East and West.

By HENRY EDWARD SYMONDS, B.D. 12s. 6d. net.

37. LONDON CHURCHES AT THE REFORMATION.

With an Account of their Contents.

By H. B. WALTERS. 25s. net.

38. REFORMATION ESSAYS.

By J. P. WHITNEY, D.D., D.C.L. 8s. 6d. net.