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The Beauty of Nature and Art

BY

RALPH B. WINN

I

THERE is no intrinsic ambiguity about aesthetic feelings in their individual expression: they are no less definite and immediate than anything in the human mind. But when beauty becomes an object of thought, as a concept underlying all aesthetic experience, differences of opinion come to the foreground; for it seems to be by far more difficult to comprehend the meaning and function of beauty than merely to enjoy it. The authorities in aesthetics are themselves in discord on this point, the main reason for it being that the word "beauty" is ambiguous in at least three ways, namely:

(1) The beauty of objects is a matter of taste and opinion, rather than of knowledge and truth. The fact is that aesthetic experiences are highly subjective, not only in the sense that men disagree on what is beautiful and what is not, but also in the sense that appreciation of beauty is a question of mood: it is likely to change, within one and the same individual, from year to year or even from hour to hour. No two persons feels beauty in one and the same manner or at the same times; nor do they apply their aesthetic inclinations to identical objects. One person may be enthusiastic, for instance, about Cézanne's still life, while another is completely cool towards it. An individual may admire Turner's paintings at one period of his life and despise them at another. This is always a question of personal attitude. Consequently, no dispute about what "ought to" be generally recognized as beautiful is justified; one simply feels an aesthetic experience or one does not.

(2) The quality and quantity of aesthetic responses have little to do with the clarity and soundness of one's ideas concerning beauty. Both artists and philosophers considerably disagree, among themselves, on the conceptual meaning of beauty, even when they agree on what specific objects are beautiful. The history of thought demonstrates that countless theories can be and have been entertained in regard to the nature of aesthetic experience. Beauty, as a concept, is as elusive as many other abstractions. It appears to be as difficult to determine the essence of beauty in intellectual terms as it is to put the essence of truth in emotional terms. We are willing to concede, to be sure, that there is a grain of truth almost in every idea concerning the function or the criteria of beauty; nevertheless, it is necessary to acknowledge that, in all probability, none of the ideas accounts fully for the manifoldness of aesthetic experiences of mankind. The situation is by no means hopeless, of course; but, before artists and thinkers come to some satisfactory agreement on the problem, much fundamental research and much discriminative thinking will have to be done.

(3) The word "beauty" is one, but the phenomena it refers to are of several types. Few people make clear-cut distinctions among, or an exhaustive classification of, various kinds of beauty and various sources of aesthetic experience. Among these distinctions, the primary one between the beauty of nature and the beauty of art has never been adequately analyzed and elucidated. We all agree that both are capable of producing aesthetic experience in us. Yet we cannot deny that there is some basic difference between objects of beautiful nature and objects of beautiful art. We know, for example, that art is man-made, while nature on the whole is not; that the former expresses therefore human intentions and serves social purposes, while the latter expresses such intentions only insofar as it is controlled, and serves social purposes only incidentally. This fact should not be misconstrued, of course, as signifying that artists should stay away from, or neglect, nature; it may be true even that "perfect art returns to nature," in Kant's expression. Nevertheless, it is hardly deniable that art is primarily creative, fundamentally original, and expressive of genius, and that, consequently, "art only begins where imitation ends," as O. Wilde put it—whether it be imitation of

nature or of recognized masterpieces.

Aesthetic experience can be neither prescribed nor proscribed: it is invariably subjective and transitory. When one ascribes beauty to a shabby dog, one's aesthetic experience is no less genuine than that of an artist standing before Leonardo da Vinci's "Last Supper." If we speak of good or bad aesthetic taste and sensitivity at all, it is because in one case they conform to certain objective standards of beauty, in another they do not. But even the most sensitive of men have moments of aesthetic dullness and fluctuations of taste. In R. M. Ogden's words,¹ "the appreciation of beauty comes when the bid is accepted. Some say they cannot 'understand' music. It makes no bid for their appreciation." Apart from exposing the individual to richer opportunities in the contemplation of beauty—which can be accomplished to a degree by training in art, education and travel—we are rather helpless to remove the ambiguity of the first kind. Beauty is bound to remain a matter of personal taste and subjective opinion.

Attempts at the intellectual understanding of beauty lead commonly to controversies. A certain amount of disagreement in this connection is unavoidable; it may be even wholesome, as indicative of intense mental activity. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that only those controversies are fruitful which lead to the elimination of confusions and errors of judgment or to an advance in knowledge and a deepening of insights. Disputes of the "trial-and-error" type, as an expression of aesthetic preference without any thorough foundation, no matter how vigorously or skilfully conducted, will not help us eradicate the sources of confusion. Only when these sources are definitely identified and elucidated, can we expect to combine high aesthetic sensitivity with the clarity of our ideas concerning the nature of beauty. Hence the ambiguity of the second kind can be removed only by thinking men who ground their insights in well-established facts of aesthetic experience.

It is hardly possible, however, to locate these facts and to gain relevant insights, unless the contemplation of beauty is subjected to a thorough analysis neglecting no vital distinction among the phenomena and experiences it scrutinizes. These distinctions, and the resulting classification, constitute a proper starting point for all sound thinking concerning the meaning,

the function, and the criteria of beauty. They alone can help us overcome the ambiguity of the third kind and lead us to a degree of unanimity in aesthetic judgments. And the first and most important step in this connection is to arrive at a clear differentiation between the beauty of nature and the beauty of art, which problem we now shall proceed to discuss.

II

Let us consider first the beauty of nature, as exemplified by the silhouette of a mountain range, a sunset, the coloring of a tree, the shape of a swan, or a woman's face. Various as these phenomena are, the aesthetic experiences aroused by them have certain features in common, namely:

(1) The beauty of nature has always a positive value to the subject enjoying it. When (and as long as) an object is regarded as beautiful, it necessarily pleases. To say that a beautiful object is unpleasant to look at is a material contradiction in terms, insofar as one refers to one's own experience: the object is either beautiful or unpleasant to look at; it cannot be both to the same person and at the same time. This should not mean, however, that whatever is pleasant is therefore beautiful—which would be a fallacy of conversion—for, whereas *all* beautiful things of nature are pleasant, only *some* pleasant things are beautiful. For instance, a check for \$1,000, received in one's own name, may be very pleasant for economic or other reasons, but it would be wrong to regard it as more beautiful than a similar check for \$10. As long as we do not commit, then, a fallacy of conversion, we are justified in contending that the beauty of nature is always pleasant to the subject. There seems to be no serious disagreement on this point among the thinkers. As H. S. Langfeld declares,² "aestheticians are unanimous in the belief that the beautiful is pleasant and the ugly unpleasant, but this obvious fact is the only one upon which they are entirely agreed."

(2) There is substantial, though possibly not entire, agreement also on the following contention: Aesthetic experiences are ascribed to external objects rather than to our mind; that is to say, they are projected to their source. When we regard something as beautiful—say, a bunch of flowers—we refer their exquisiteness not to

our feelings about them, but to the flowers themselves. In other words, beauty is in flowers, not in us. We are not inclined, therefore, to remark or to think that "these flowers please my sense of beauty," but rather that "these flowers are beautiful." This is, we presume, the meaning of Santayana's definition of beauty as "an objectified or externalized pleasure;" or that of W. P. Montague's statement³ that beauty is "not mere pleasure but rather objectified pleasure."

(3) Insofar as the beauty of nature is externalized, it makes our aesthetic feelings objective. We are seldom as selfish about it as we are about our property; in fact, we seldom attempt to reserve beautiful things of nature exclusively to ourselves, but are usually quite willing to participate in contemplating them. We seem to refer them to reality common to all men. We do not think that the beauty of things is our own virtue, though we may believe that an ability to recognize and appreciate beautiful objects is a personal talent or achievement. Consequently, our attitude towards aesthetic pleasures is markedly different from the attitude manifested towards delicious food, drink, and other things giving us a "non-objectified", or distinctly subjective, pleasure.

(4) The enjoyment of the beauty of nature belongs to the class of "participant" values; and these values are quite different from "non-participant" values, such as food or money. To explain: if you divide one hundred dollars equally among 100 individuals, each one gets only one-hundredth of the total sum, that is, one dollar. But the contemplation of a sunset, for instance, does not diminish one's share of enjoyment, just because a multitude of other people watch it simultaneously. Each person receives an undiminished amount of aesthetic pleasure, all other conditions being equal, whether he watches the sunset alone or in a company of other people. Whereas the division of "non-participant" values is subject to ordinary arithmetics (represented by the formula 1 equals $\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2}$), the division of "participant" values tends to preserve each person's share of enjoyment and leads to the increase of the total value (which fact may be represented by the formula 1 equals $1 + 1 + 1 + \dots$). In this regard, aesthetic values are like knowledge or morality: they grow by spreading.

A noteworthy substantiation of the last of the above truths is found in a Biblical parable:⁴ "But Jesus said unto them (his dis-

ciples), They (the multitude of people) need not depart; give ye them to eat. And they say unto him, We have here but five loaves and two fishes. He said, Bring them to me. And he commanded the multitude to sit down on the grass, and took the fives loaves, and the two fishes, and looking up to heaven, he blessed and brake, and gave the loaves to his disciples, and disciples to the multitude. And they did all eat, and were filled: and they took up of the fragments that remained twelve baskets full. And they that had eaten were about five thousand men, beside women and children." If we agree that this parable refers to spiritual ("participant") values, it is easy to grasp its profound meaning. For aesthetic, cognitive or moral values are characterized by the power of giving satisfaction to countless people without diminishing it in proportion to the number of shares; what is enough to satisfy ten persons, in this connection, is also enough to satisfy ten thousand.

III

All the above points apply also to the beauty of art, with two significant exceptions:

(1) Art is man-made, while the beauty of nature on the whole is not. This characteristic of art has an important implication: that art, like all other human activities, is inseparable from individual as well as collective feelings, desires, and ideas. When Michelangelo declared that "the highest object of art for thinking men is man," he indicated the ultimately unavoidable purpose of creative activity, in his own field. And Walt Whitman put it even more clearly, in application to literature, in saying that it "is big in only one way, when it is used as an aid to the growth of human ties." Art, then, is through and through social, having man and society for its source, for its inspiration, for its purpose, and even to a large degree for its subject-matter. Whereas the beauty of nature is incidental, or indifferent as it were, to human experience, masterpieces of art are addressed to fellow-men. Art presupposes the public, that is, real or potential spectators, readers or listeners; it is designed for the communication and enrichment of experience, for the sharing and deepening of aesthetic appreciation. Nature is in itself beyond approbation or condemnation; it yields ugliness as freely as beauty. But the artist

yearns to be of service or seeks approbation—even when he condemns something—because he is a man and his work is human, with all that these words imply.

(2) The identification of beauty with externalized pleasure—which is the leading theory of Winckelmann, J. David and Home (Lord Kames) as well as of Santayana—does not quite apply to art. And the aestheticians who “unanimously” maintain that “the beautiful is pleasant and the ugly unpleasant,”⁵ are simply wrong in regard to that art which arouses fear or indignation and which deals with the ugly. For it would be a definite mistake to believe that, not only the beauty of nature, but also the beauty of art possesses necessarily the quality of pleasing. If we accept Emerson’s phrase that “the creation of Beauty is Art,” we do so in some other sense; for, whereas the objects of beauty in nature please precisely because they are recognized as beautiful, the objects of art may and often do deal with what we call ugly in actual life.

Were it true that all art concerned merely with pleasantly beautiful things and images, music would be confined to cheerful melodies; painting to sunsets, the starry sky, flowers, and pretty young faces; sculpture to healthy bodies and heroic figures; poetry to love, virtue and magnificent landscapes; novels to happy scenes, sentimental romances, and the like. But art is definitely not so narrow. It dares to transcend the boundaries of the pleasantly beautiful and to portray ugliness, suffering, and death. If we still apply the word “beauty” to masterpieces of this sort, the word must have an entirely different meaning from that generally applied to beautiful objects of nature.

Consider the facts: Is Rodin’s “Courtesan” a pleasant sight? Is Epstein’s “Genesis” a touching figure?

Did Rembrandt, perhaps the greatest of portraitists, paint solely handsome faces and bodies? Is Van Gogh’s “Self-Portrait” attractive? Is Daumier’s “Third Class Carriage” a scene of godlike individuals?

Did Beethoven and Wagner concern themselves exclusively with the creation of sonorous, harmonious sounds and melodies? Are Stravinsky’s pieces delightful to the ear?

Was Cervantes’ Don Quixote a handsome man? Was Shakespeare’s Shylock a noble character? Was Hugo’s hunchback of

Notre Dame a pretty figure?

As literature admits of ready illustrations in print, let us examine the following pieces of poetry:

... Under the sun
 Are sixteen million men,
 Chosen for shining teeth,
 Sharp eyes, hard legs,
 And a running of warm blood in their wrists.

And a red juice runs on the red grass;
 And a red juice soaks the dark soil.
 And the sixteen million are killing . . .

(C. Sandburg, *Killers*)

Roll on, thou deep and dark blue Ocean, roll!
 Ten thousand fleets sweep over thee in vain;
 Man marks the earth with ruin, his control
 Stops with the shore; upon the watery plain
 The wrecks are all thy deed, nor doth remain
 A shadow of man's ravage, save his own,
 When, for a moment, like a drop of rain,
 He sinks into thy depths with bubbling groan,
 Without a grave, unknell'd, uncoffin'd, and unknown.

(Byron)

Hear the hot glass crashing,
 Hear the stone steps hissing,
 Coal black streams
 Down the gutter pour.
 There are cries of help
 From a far fifth floor.

(V. Lindsay, *The Fireman's Ball*)

What is the subject-matter of these poetic excerpts? Is it beauty or ugliness? And what is your response? Is it one of pleasure?

Or just recall Dante's *Commedia Divina*, with its passages of intolerable suffering and torture, Voltaire's *Candide* exposing perversions of the human mind, T. Mann's *Magic Mountain*, with

its story of disease and death, and Remarque's *All Quiet on the Western Front*, with its episodes of despair and organized cruelty.

It may be useful to quote at length from the last-mentioned book:⁶

"A patrol has to be sent out to discover just how far the enemy position is advanced. Since my leave I feel a certain strange attachment to the other fellows, and so I volunteer to go with them. We agree on a plan, slip out through the wire and then divide and creep forward separately. After a while I find a shallow shell-hole and crawl into it. From here I peer forward.

Cautiously I glide over the edge and snake my way forward. I shuffle along on all fours a bit farther. I keep track of my bearings, look around me and observe the distribution of the gunfire so as to be able to find my way back. Then I try to get in touch with the others.

The night is windy and shadows flit hither and thither in the flicker of the gun-fire. It reveals too little and too much. Often I peer ahead, but always for nothing. Thus I advance a long way and then turn back in a wide curve. I have not established touch with the others. Every yard nearer our trench fills me with confidence—and with haste, too. It would be bad to get lost now.

A shell crashes. Almost immediately two others. And then it begins in earnest. A bombardment. Machine-guns rattle. Now there is nothing for me but to stay lying low. Apparently an attack is coming. Everywhere the rockets shoot up. Unceasing.

I lie motionless. Somewhere something clanks, it stamps and stumbles nearer—all my nerves become taut and icy. It clatters over me and away; the first wave has passed. I have but this one shattering thought: what will you do, if someone jumps into your shell-hole? Swiftly I pull out my little dagger, grasp it fast and bury it in my hand. If anyone jumps in here, I will go for him, it hammers in my forehead; at once, stab him clean through the throat, so that he cannot call out; that's the only way; he will be just as frightened as I am; when in terror we fall upon one another, then I must be first.

Already it has become somewhat lighter. Steps hasten over me. The first. Again, another. The rattle of machine-guns becomes an unbroken chain. Just as I am about to turn round a

little, something heavy stumbles, and with a crash a body falls over me into the shell-hole, slips down, and lies across me.

I don't think at all, make no decision—I strike madly home, and feel only how the body suddenly convulses, then becomes limp, and collapses. When I recover myself, my hand is sticky and wet.

The man gurgles. It sounds to me as though he bellows, every gasping breath is like a cry, a thunder — but it is only my heart pounding. I want to stop his mouth, stuff it with earth, stab him again; he must be quiet, he is betraying me. Now at last I regain control of myself, but have suddenly become so feeble that I cannot any more lift my hand against him.

So I crawl away to the farthest corner and stay there, my eyes glued on him, my hand grasping the knife — ready, if he stirs, to spring at him again. But he won't do so any more, I can hear that already in his gurgling."

Pretty, noble, inspiring, is it not? If this scene is beautiful in some sense, surely it is not in the portrayed contents, nor in the state of the hero's mind. Nevertheless, it is great literature. Obviously, then, there is such a thing as the art of the ugly, that is to say, the art of dealing with suffering, misery, vice, poverty, bestial instincts, just as there is the art of the beautiful, dealing with happiness, joy, virtue, wealth, and humane inclinations. Hence, the beauty of nature and the beauty of art are by no means qualitatively similar: they may at times be of opposite character.

IV

If the proper material of art is not circumscribed by the beautiful, but includes also much of what we call ugly and indifferent (neither beautiful nor ugly), and if the phrase "beauty of art" is ambiguous and misleading, what is art dealing with?

We may avoid a direct answer by extending Virginia Woolf's view concerning literature and by declaring with her⁷ that "the proper stuff of fiction does not exist; everything is the proper stuff of fiction, every feeling, every thought; every quality of brain and spirit is drawn upon, no perception comes amiss." Or, if we prefer to be straight-forward, we can simply express our conviction that the subject-matter of art is Life — the life of nature, but especially that of man, with his typical characteristics and accidental whims, with his common traits and exceptional attitudes,

with his individual desires and collective aspirations, with his immediate needs and distant goals. Anyway, the reach and function of art are much wider than they are often assumed to be. Pleasure and pain lie at its source; and through pleasure and pain we learn from the masters how to understand life, from its loftiest peaks to its basest ditches.

To some, art is sheer entertainment; to some, a refuge from intolerable ennui; to some, a convenient escape from reality; to some, a realm of day-dreams; to some, nourishment of love and hatred; to some, an educational medium. It is indeed all of it, and more: for, when we forget what individuals may derive from the contemplation of art and view it broadly, we comprehend that art is, in the last analysis, "a lever of culture."⁸

We may or may not continue to speak of the beauty of art. But if we do, let us at least remember that the realm of art goes far beyond that kind of externalized pleasure which Santayana called beauty, and that the great masters live not only in the Paradise of Life, but also in its Hell. Like science and philosophy, art knows no limits, though men often try to fetter it to the shrinking horizon of their bias, much to their own detriment. The ultimate function of art consists, in our opinion, in freeing us from whatever self-imposed limitations we happen to possess, in refining and sharpening our understanding of fellow-men, and in making the progress of mankind a matter of sensitive heart, no less than that of thoughtful head and powerful muscle. There is sagacity in J. Dewey's contention⁹ that "works of art are the only media of complete and unhindered communication between man and man that can occur in the world full of gulfs and walls that limit community of experience."

1. *The Psychology of Art*, 16.
2. "The Role of Feeling and Emotion in Aesthetics," *Feelings and Emotions*, Wittenberg Symposium, 1928.
3. *The Ways of Things*, 562.
4. *St. Matthew's Gospel*, ch. xiv.
5. H. S. Langfeld, *op. cit.*
6. E. M. Remarque, *All Quiet on the Western Front*, pp. 211, 215-219, with omissions.
7. *The Common Reader*.
8. F. Mehring, *The Lessing Legend*, 44.
9. *Art as Experience*, 105.

The Growth and Structure of Croce's Philosophy

BY

EDOUARD RODITI

THERE seem to be two ways of studying methodically a philosopher's total work. The first is historical, biographical or psychological: an investigation and analysis of the works, studied in the order in which they were written, and of the influence of events, readings, controversies, and even conversations on the gradual development of the total system of thought. In such an approach to the philosophy of Benedetto Croce, literary histories, volumes of essays, philosophical treatises, studies of linguistics, of art, even of local history, all these would first have to be dated and classified in chronological order; and this would require immense preliminary toil of purely historical technique and discipline. The other approach is generally simpler: a conceptual method which, in Croce's case, would progress from the *Logic*, where the philosopher defines the nature of the concept and the laws of its manipulation, to two other volumes of his *Philosophy of the Spirit*, the *Aesthetic* and the *Philosophy of the Practical*, in which concepts are used and manipulated to explore and define fields of the beautiful and the good, thence to the fourth volume in which, as a historian, Croce finally applies his aesthetic and practical philosophies to the investigation of historical problems, philosophy of history and historiography. From the *Philosophy of the Spirit*, one can then progress to the philosophical essays, thence to literary and historical works, finally to occasional articles and *obiter dicta*. Such a method assumes, in a pyramidal structure whose apex is the *Logic*, or philosophy of

reason, a rational development which manipulates rules of the true to construct philosophies of the beautiful and the good, then a philosophy of history. Since Croce repeatedly affirms that philosophy is primarily rational and logical cognition of the general or of universals, that art is intuitional cognition of the individual and particular, and that historiography is art, such a conceptual method ought to facilitate an analysis of philosophical, hence rational, writings. But one soon discovers that the terms of Croce's trichotomy of mind, sense, intuition and reason, are convertible: an activity, such as art, which is primarily intuitional, also contains secondary elements of sensuous and rational cognition, just as the good can also be beautiful and true, etc . . . If rigorously followed, either of our two methods would, however, lead us far beyond the material scope of this essay; we must therefore content ourselves with indicating them and a few of the more important problems which they uncover.

Croce's parents were pious and conservative. Naples, their home, had been the comic-opera capital of a pleasantly despotic monarchy which Croce's grandfather, employed by the state, had served faithfully and happily for many years. In modern democratic Italy, Naples was fast becoming provincial. Croce's parents avoided politics, were conscious of their city's glorious past, interested in its history, monuments, art and literature. Croce tells us, in *An Autobiography*, that they distrusted the progressive, patriotic and anticlerical ideas of modern Italy; they even avoided relatives, such as the famous Spaventa brothers, who were active in the intellectual and political life of the newly united kingdom.

Croce was an intelligent and studious child. He tells us that he lost his faith in Catholicism at an early age when one of the priests, in his high-school, expounded a philosophy of religion which was intended to counteract disturbing influences of the age but, apparently, had the opposite effect of awakening, for the first time, the future philosopher's critical intelligence. But Croce was anxious to avoid hurting the feelings of his parents; he concealed his new agnosticism which never troubled him very much. This process of drifting away from parental ideals might have continued uneventfully for many years; but an earthquake tragically bereaved Croce of his parents and he then went to live with his closest relatives, the Spaventa family, in Rome, new capital of

united Italy. He now found himself in the heart of the nation's intellectual and political life, in which his guardian was active. Croce was vaguely unhappy there for a while, soon returned to his beloved Naples where he joined a society of local antiquarians or historians, and devoted all his time and talent to the history of Neapolitan culture.

But Rome, where he had studied under the famous socialist Labriola, was not so easily forgotten; and Croce, too critical to rest content with mere history-writing, soon began to consider the methodological and philosophical problems of historiography. Inspired by a romantic interest in the past, the nineteenth century had seen a great renaissance of all historical studies; since *Vico*, *Fichte* and *Hegel*, philosophies of history had been discussed more and more passionately. Towards the end of the century, positivists and marxists affirmed that history follows fixed laws and that historiography is an exact science. Theories of evolution, inspired by *Hegel* or *Darwin* and launched by *Taine*, *Brunetière* and others, were absurdly popular. Much pseudo-scientific and pseudo-philosophical gossip was seriously discussed in the most scholarly periodicals. Croce suddenly stepped into the fray and declared, in 1893, that history-writing is not a science but an art.

He argued that history is a series of individual and particular events from which no general laws can be deduced; that art is likewise concerned with knowledge of the particular; and that laws of history are the result of a confusion which interprets history in terms of theories of the mind such as those of *Vico* or *Hegel*. This was not all expressed clearly in Croce's first essay; in ensuing controversies, he was forced to state his argument more thoroughly. Historians, who believed that they were scientists or philosophers, were all shocked; had not *Lombroso* recently explained that art is a product of genius which is akin to madness? Historians must then be mad artists! Besides, the purpose of art is to provide pleasure and entertainment, whereas that of history, and of all science, is knowledge. Croce replied that the purpose of art too is knowledge, but intuitional cognition of the particular rather than rational cognition of the general, or ultimately of universals, which is the purpose of science or philosophy.

In 1895, Croce found himself involved in another controversy; *Labriola* asked him for advice about a commentary on the *Com-*

munist manifesto and Croce began a criticism of the Marxist philosophy of history. In 1902, to explain his position to both positivists and marxists, he published his *Aesthetic*; in the next few years, he added three volumes of a whole idealist *Philosophy of the spirit*. The titles of its four volumes are significant: *Aesthetic as science of expression and general linguistic*, *Logic as the science of the pure concept*, *Philosophy of the practical: economic and ethic*, *Theory and history of historiography*.

Croce has now published, in Italian, some fifty other volumes. Seven are philosophical and contain corrections or additions to his main body of philosophy, twenty-nine apply this general philosophy to studies of history, literature, politics, language and many other particular subjects; the rest are so varied that one can classify them together only very arbitrarily. An appreciation of Croce which is based on his aesthetics or on his translated works alone must necessarily be very misleading. His few translated works sometimes betray the translator's great ignorance of philosophical terminology, whether English or Italian; and they give a very confused and incomplete view of a philosophy which the author has often corrected in his untranslated works. Even the *Aesthetic* of 1902 cannot be amputated from the complete *Philosophy of the spirit*, or theory of mind, which explains it and where it represents only the field of intuition while the fields of reason and sense are studied in the other volumes; nor can it be amputated from Croce's other aesthetic writings, which often contradict and correct it.

Croce's main asset, as a philosopher, is his unusual ability to observe distinctions which others have neglected or confused. In his earliest philosophical essays, when history, as a term, was still indiscriminately used to designate a number of related concepts, Croce at once distinguished history, as an accumulation of facts and events to be studied, from history as a synthetic philosophy of history and, again, from history-writing and theory of historiography. Later, he criticized his own masters, the philosophers who have influenced his thought; here, his distinctions are particularly valuable. He observes, for instance, that the philosophizing of De Sanctis, a great historian of literature, does not constitute a proper and coherent philosophy: that Vico's distinctions of the ages of history, by applying a theory of mind to history, establish

a primitive age of pure sense-perception as if primitive men, though perhaps unable to use them, had not been endowed also with intuition and reason, then an age of intuition, when reason was still ignored, before the final age of reason; that Hegel's tendency to treat all distinctions as contraries often allows him to invent a hypothetical synthesis when there has been no true thesis-antithesis and a hypothetical thesis-antithesis to explain what he assumes to be a synthesis. In his *Logic*, Croce observes that reason presupposes imagination as the abstract presupposes the concrete, so that the good, in his practical philosophy, must necessarily be useful, though the useful need not be good, and art or literature, in his aesthetic, must necessarily presuppose language and general linguistic. This distinction is, in a way, analogous to Ockham's distinction between terms of first intention and terms of second intention; but Ockham's terms of second intention, though they necessarily presuppose terms of first intention and not *vice-versa*, are all strictly logical terms, such as "predicate", which do not exist *in re* and cannot be proved dialectically to include other concepts, whereas Croce's terms are classes of ideas, such as "ethics", which include an indefinite number of other terms and concepts, such as "good" and "evil", many of which, such as "man", are concrete and exist *in re*. Croce thus proposes, like Kant, axiological hierarchies rather than, like Ockham, logical distinctions.

But Croce's ability to observe such distinctions is counterbalanced by his frequent inability to coordinate them; his system does not exclude paradox and contradiction and, when these occur, he is, unlike Plato, the first to be disconcerted. Hence too the fundamental paradox of his philosophy: in his criticism of dialectical systems, instead of establishing, as Aristotle did in his critique of Greek sophistry, a set of univocal terms which would allow him to proceed logically as an outsider, Croce has entered into the "spirit" of the dialectics which he criticizes, has tried to infuse logic into them, and produced a hybrid dialectic disguised as a logic. And this leads him to an idealistic realism where the word is sometimes equivalent to the concept and need not presuppose any object or quality outside of the thinker's mind, so that purely verbal distinctions, even rhetorical figures such as metaphors or synonymies, can be treated as distinct concepts because,

the words being different, the ideas and objects of reference must also be different.

Croce first asserted himself as a philosopher by insisting that there can be no science or philosophy of history because there can be no science or philosophy of the individual and the particular. He then added that art, which is not a science nor a philosophy, is concerned, like history, with knowledge of the individual and the particular. In his criticism of philosophies of art, even in *La critica letteraria* of 1895, he disposes of the theory of literary genres by asserting that cognitions of the individual and particular, such as works of art, can be grouped only very arbitrarily according to genres; and that each work of art, by itself, actually constitutes an individual and particular genre because there exist greater differences between two tragedies, for instance, than between individual specimens of a species such as those of the animal world. One cannot say that *Hamlet* is a tragedy in the same way as one says that Fido is a dog, dogs are mammals and mammals are animals. But to clarify his own position in the ensuing controversies, Croce develops a philosophy of art and finally a philosophy of history, thus contradicting himself by proposing a science and a philosophy of the individual and particular.

Croce's most popular contribution to modern thought is unquestionably his philosophy of art. His *Aesthetics* and other aesthetic writings have been translated and read more widely than any of his other works, even than his philosophy of history, which, however, has profoundly influenced modern historiography. But the pyramidal structure of his philosophy was lop-sided from the very start, for chronological and affective reasons. The *Aesthetic* was written and published before the *Logic*, and cannot be said to illustrate a philosophy of reason and of the concept which is suggested in it, but was formulated and elaborated later as an after-thought. And Croce displays, consciously or unconsciously, a distinct initial prejudice in favor of intuition and art, remaining true to this first love throughout his philosophical writings. In the first pages of the *Aesthetic*, he deals summarily with reason and logic; the real apex of the pyramid is the philosophy of intuition instead of the philosophy of reason. His whole system, in its origins, is intuitional; it is then elaborated rationally because philosophy is supposed to be rational, so that the *Aesthetic*

can be viewed almost as a rationalized work of art. Croce was forced to become a philosopher when he developed his first controversial musings to explain his irrational tastes in terms of reason.

The convertability of the terms of Croce's theory of the mind is no mere quibble. Throughout the *Aesthetic*, activities which are primarily intuitional are secondarily rational or sensuous, or *vice versa*. True to his original criticism of Vico's epistemological view of history, Croce manipulates the three modes of cognition in such a manner that they can never be properly separated. In the first pages he thus asserts that there are two types of cognition, intuitional and logical. After a long apologetic defence of intuition, he admits that it is distinct from intellectual cognition, which he had previously identified with logical reasoning, and also from a third type, the perception of the real which is achieved through the senses. He soon returns, however, to his defence of the Cinderella of epistemology, but rapidly becomes confused: it is not longer clear whether intuition, as term or concept, designates the epistemological faculty of intuiting, or the object intuited by this faculty. In an idealistic system such as Croce's, distinctions of subject and object are easily blurred, since the object's reality depends on that of the subject: solipsism is always in the wings, ready to leap forth when we and the philosopher least expect it. Again, intuition may mean a quality, in the object intuited, which is revealed only to intuitive cognition: the abstract reasoner, Croce avers, has no living intuition of certain situations. Croce then concludes that "the head of an ox on the body of a horse" is not an intuition but a product of the arbitrary. Here, we see, he begins unconsciously to convert his terms. For it is generally agreed that the arbitrary is, by definition, irrational: if the irrational cannot be an intuition, there must be some quality of rationality in intuition. But Hieronymus Bosch, Breughel the Elder, Goya, today Dali and the surrealists, have all intuited worse than horses with heads of oxen; Croce must certainly agree that their art, though arbitrary, is not non-intuitional and, since art must be intuitional, therefore non-art. Are centaurs, satyrs and mermaids, even Bottom wearing his ass-head, all products of the arbitrary? Yet none of these phantasms can be distinguished logically from imaginary

portraits where the head of one human model has been added to the body of another. This concept of the arbitrary, whose contrary must be the probable, is borrowed from the aesthetics of Horace, most matter-of-fact of all critics, whose theory of genres Croce most systematically rejects. Does Croce adopt, from sense-perception, some pragmatic value-distinctions which prove centaurs to be more significant than other freaks of the cock-eyed world of hallucination? Or does he adopt Horace's concept of verisimilitude? In either case, he must admit that pure intuition, in his own system, can no longer exist: it must also be rational or somehow connected with sense-perception.

When Croce later asserts that intuition is expression, he raises a host of other problems. Throughout the *Aesthetic*, verbal identities or distinction, synonymies, metaphors, all rhetorical devices and figures, are repeatedly used as evidence in a dialectic which often neglects casual or logical relationships. On one occasion, Croce insists that thought cannot exist without words; yet Diderot had already claimed, in his *Lettre sur les aveugles à l'usage de ceux qui voient*, as early as 1749, that the limitation of thought to the perceptions of any one sense is extravagant, and that the deaf-mute, though ignorant of sound and speech, can yet be credited with thoughts formulated in terms of other sense-perceptions. Croce avoids this objection by adding that he has used the term "words" as a synecdoche to designate all expression, not only verbal. But he destroys his own argument when he later asserts that figures of speech do not really exist: if metaphor is the use of one word, in a figurative sense, instead of another more literal word, why thus substitute when the literal would have been sufficient? Croce concludes that the metaphor is the literal word, since no word more literal can serve the same purpose. If, therefore, figures of speech must be taken literally, he has no right to use synecdoche and then to indicate that thought and verbal expression, according to his own standards, both are and, in this one case, are not identical.

Further discussion of the many paradoxes contained in the *Aesthetic* would mean endless quibbling; and the purpose of this essay is to demonstrate that the paradox is an inevitable feature of Croce's philosophy, rather than to quarrel with him because he contradicts himself. He introduces new terms and arguments

for their rhetorical effect and immediate dramatic or persuasive value in controversy, often neglecting later to coordinate them. He thus repeatedly contradicts what he has stated elsewhere; and a realization of this weakness, especially in his earlier work, also his permanent interest in aesthetic problems, have since prompted him to correct himself in a series of elaborations of his *Aesthetic*, of appendices to it, and restatements, summaries or corrections of it. Some of Croce's philosophy of art, such as his objection to the theory of genres, was already contained in an earlier essay, *La critica letteraria*, of 1895; it was further elaborated in the *Lineamenti* of 1900; it appears as a complete and paradoxical philosophy in the *Aesthetic* of 1902, some aspects of which were corrected or expanded in *La liricita dell'arte*, a paper read to the Heidelberg philosophical congress in 1908. In 1915, Croce published a corrected summary of the *Aesthetic*, his *Breviary of Aesthetic*; in 1917, *La Totalita dell'arte* introduced some corrections and new concepts; in 1929, the article on *Aesthetics* in the *Encyclopaedia britannica* summarized and simplified Croce's whole philosophy of art; in 1936, *La poesia* stated many old problems in new terms, raised new problems, proposed new solutions to old ones.

G. A. Borgese has distinguished three different philosophies of art in Croce's writings: the negative *Aesthetic*, more controversial than systematic, the romantic-idealist systematization of the *Breviary*, the simplified credo in the *Encyclopaedia britannica*. Indeed, it is easier to deduce several philosophies of art, often more than three from a single work, than any single and consistent philosophy from all Croce's works. True, Croce never forsakes his original faith in the identity of intuition and expression; but artistic intuition alone can be said to be identical with expression, and only if one ignores chronological distinctions to identify the chicken with the egg, or psychological distinctions to identify subject with object. Artistic intuition tends toward expression just as scientific intuition demands, or tends towards, verification, and as the intuition of the practical, in economics and ethics, tends towards action. Artistic intuition can thus be defined as a perception of reality, or of the potential, which is still free from any criticism; it is an intuition of formal values and relationships, just as scientific intuition is one of material

identities or relationships which must be proved, and practical intuition is one of economic or ethical expediencies, needs or duties which must be tested or satisfied in action. Croce therefore soon realizes that if, as he asserts, art is an intuition, which is expression, then every intuition which is expression must be art. Language is thus expression, intuition and art; and grammar is to language as rhetoric and theories of genre to literature, mere methods of investigation, definition and classification. Grammar is not a part of language and genres do not exist in art; each work is a genre of its own, each word is used correctly whenever and however it is used.

This atomistic philosophy offered the advantage, in 1902, of reaffirming the spiritual and ideal nature of art at a time when aesthetics were being reduced to pseudo-science, positivist, materialist or determinist. Croce made the pendulum of controversy now swing as far, in the opposite direction of idealistic relativism, as it had already swung in the direction of mechanist or materialist relativism. But he soon found himself obliged to distinguish various levels and hierarchies of expression, intuition and art: art is the "dream" of all cognitive activity, not a cognitive fact. By distinguishing three classes of theory and practice, intuitional, logical, and economic or ethical, he had already affirmed the independence of each, so that intuition and art cannot be subordinated to the other classes, but only coordinated with them. Each of these branches has its own criteria which cannot be used indiscriminately: since economic activity is pre-ethical and ethical activity is superior and posterior to it, political activity, though it represents the highest level of the economic, cannot be judged according to ethical criteria and, neither good nor evil, can be only successful or unsuccessful. Within each branch of theory or practice, Croce thus begins to establish hierarchies, distinguishing qualitative or quantitative differences between the various levels of each branch. Since intuition is expression and art is also expression, Croce now defines art as an intuition, or expression, which also has an affective content, a quality of sentiment which he calls, at one time, lyricism and, at another, the personality of the artist, the moral judgment, emphasis or significance which we have learned to expect from him. In 1908, Croce

thus establishes, in *L'intuizione pura e il carattere*, the basis of all the aesthetics of interest, of character and of accentuated meaning which others, such as Clive Bell, have since elaborated. This reduces criticism to an investigation of individuality, of originality contained or expressed in the work of art; personality represents those pre-existing data or forces which, in the artist's mind, determine the particular and individual formula whereby he conquers diversity and reduces it to the unity, or uniformity, of art. Lyricism, Croce says, is such an expression of personality: pure intuition, at its highest level, is lyrical and represents a state of mind, not an abstract concept. Croce's psychology of art thus begins to coincide with that of Schopenhauer, also with that of all romantic-idealist theories of genius.

In 1915, Croce admits that his *Aesthetic* was a negative criticism of existing philosophies of art; the *Breviary* now attempts to systematize his beliefs in a new philosophy. Art is an intuition which must become expression, distinguished from intuitions which need not be expressed; it is an emphatic and emphasized state of being which blends intuition, sentiment and expression, through will, in lyricism. Such stress on the individual-psychological nature of lyricism reduces all art to a phenomenon of self-affirmation, of the artist's isolation and faith in himself, irrespective of objective results in the work of art. Sincerity is but a measure of talent: though as sincere, Byron is more superficial than Dante. The *Breviary* also distinguishes various types of art; Croce points out that these distinctions are not contraries, as in Hegel, so that no Wagnerian synthesis of all art, no tragedy which is also symphony, fresco, sculpture and architecture, is ever possible. He finally concludes that art is an aspiration, an intuition of a thing passionately desired which, though it need not exist *in re*, the artist expresses in a formal representation; and form, in the philosophy of Croce as in the criticism of De Sanctis, is generally not so much structure as appearance or that quality of the work of art which is immediately accessible to the senses. Aspiration is to representation as intuition to expression, and as nature, or the artist's idea, to imitation. Croce then affirms that translation is impossible: if successful, a translation is a new work of art and, if unsuccessful, is no work of art. He adds that all works of art are equal; no

classification is possible and, if some works of art appear greater or more significant than others, this greatness is a mere metaphor or an optical illusion produced by history which stresses the significance, at one time, of one work of art and, at another time, that of another.

In the *Encyclopaedia britannica*, Croce seems, at first, to repeat and resume briefly some doctrines of his *Aesthetic*. But he has now become aware of all their implications and, at once, distinguishes all problems of technique and communication from those of intuition and expression. He relegates communication to the philosophy of the practical, to economics and ethics, together with technique and the means of communication; he thus formulates an aesthetics of invention and expression rather than one of imitation and communication. An intuition, he repeats, is already expressed in the artist's mind before it has been put on paper or canvas; the work of art, on which all the speculations of classical aesthetics were concentrated, exists only, as an idea, in the mind of the artist. But in spite of this romantic idealism, Croce advocates a retreat from romanticism: the real problem of aesthetics, in our age, is to rehabilitate and defend classicism. Yet how can he hope to achieve this if he constantly rejects all classical concepts of art, such as genres, which are the premises of all the classical art which they produced? He offers us only a romantic philosophy, more complex than the neo-romantic theories, such as futurism, expressionism or surrealism, which deny art, but based on the same premises, on individualism, expression and invention.

Later, in the *Ultimi saggi*, Croce returns to the problem of communication and wonders whether, if an intuition which has not been communicated is still an expression, the real problem of art and of aesthetics is not, after all, the relationship of intuition and expression to communication rather than that of intuition to expression. The consequence of this ultimate doubt is to stress again the importance of form and those attributes of art which appeal directly to the senses; and to arouse, in the reader, a suspicion that Croce may have identified aesthetics, in all his earlier work, with metaphysics or psychology, with appreciation of art or an understanding of the artist's credo and processes of creation, rather with an investigation of the exact nature of the work of art. Finally, in *La poesia*, Croce establishes a new hierarchy of

five levels of intuition or art: the sentimental, the poetic, prose, eloquence, pure literature. The lowest level, mere sentiment, is that of such linguistic phenomena as the "prose" which Molière's Monsieur Jourdain found himself speaking when he asked for his slippers; the poetic level is that of proverbs, idioms and other linguistic phenomena of "heightened" speech; prose is the lowest level of expository literature which then rises, through the persuasive art of ciceronian rhetoric, to the autotelic and pure art of great literature, whether verse or prose. In an idealistic philosophy, such hierarchies correspond, by stressing the material hypostasis of the idea, to the formal classifications of genres. In all aesthetics, Croce has consistently rejected the theory of genres; yet the whole problem of genres is one of defining terms so that a tragedy is defined to include all dramatic works which, without necessarily having five acts or respecting the unities, yet offer enough other specifically tragic features; it is no more absurd or difficult to class *Hamlet* and *Oedipus Tyrannus* together as tragedies and all tragedies and epics as poems, as to say that Croce and Mussolini are Italians, that Italians and Ethiopians and Jews are men and that men and dogs are mammals. But such formal classifications do not recognize the elusive essence, spirit, or "je ne sais quoi" of tragedy or of Italianism; and the idealist hierarchies which stress, in aesthetics, the supposedly spiritual essence of matter will produce, in ethics and politics, the quibbles of fascism which denies that Italians, Jews and Ethiopians are equal, as men, and argues that Ethiopians or Jews do not possess that essential Italianism, a nordic or aryan "je ne sais quoi", which raises Italians above all other men just as the *Divine Comedy* exhibits an essential "je ne sais quoi" which raises it above the "prose" of such poets as Trissino, Erasmus Darwin or Martin Tupper. Aristotelian aesthetics will never recognize arguments which are founded on any *a priori* neoplatonic "je ne sais quoi"; the perfection of the *Divine Comedy* can be analyzed formally in terms of the known, so why obscure the issues by introducing the unknown? It is significant that, while indulgently rejecting the term "je ne sais quoi" of Gravina, Du Bos and other Italian or French critics of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Croce enthusiastically approves the concept and traces the whole history of modern aesthetics back to this source. No wonder, then, that his "return to

classicism", proposing a "spirit of classicism", would be distinctly romantic and owe much to the pre-romantic neo-classicism of Winkelmann and Lessing, to the *Sturm und Drang*, to the neo-hellenic romanticism of Chénier, Foscolo, Byron, Hoelderlin and Canova.

If art is considered as a form of knowledge, we must accept the principle that either all human activity leads to knowledge and is knowledge, or there are different types and hierarchies of knowledge so that knowledge achieved in art is not the same as that achieved through logic or science, or as that which practical experience, economic or ethic, offers all living beings in their daily rounds. We must either fuse all types of knowledge in one or distinguish them all clearly; and we can distinguish them dialectically according to *a priori* idealistic hierarchies, or logically according to their causes, for instance, material, formal, effective and final. But Croce first confuses all types of knowledge, then distinguishes them again dialectically, to suit his momentary purpose, and thus avoids the consequences of subordinating art to the criteria of ethics, politics, science, economics or logic, or of any other type of philosophy, of knowledge or of human activity which is not primarily aesthetic: but he never distinguishes art, or any type of knowledge or activity, according to its purpose. Yet a millstone and a statue, though both are cut stones and both may finally land in a museum as fine examples of the arts and crafts of the past, and be equally admired there, yet serve different purposes. Croce asserts that art is a permanent function of the human spirit, as any other function that he mentions; but he tends to consider all these other functions as inferior to art and, in an almost evolutionary sense, prior to it, more primitive, so that he really subordinates everything to the criteria of art and judges the millstone according to the standards of statuary. The value of art, he says, is not determined by immediate usefulness, political expediency, sociological significance, ethical or moral value, scientific or historic truth, logical exactitude, economic rarity; the significance of art is greater than its immediate use. In the *Encyclopaedia britannica*, Croce defines art by negation, as Scotus Eriugena defined God, and finally defines art by tautology, just as God is said to be the only example of pure being. By analogy, we may therefore assume that art, in the idealism of Croce, occupies the supreme

throne which God once held in the neoplatonic hierarchies of Christian philosophers. But Croce's dialectical system is not based on contraries, so that his highest art is not a synthesis of everything and of all arts, though there may be evidence of his highest art in all inferior arts, just as there is evidence of God in every particle of nature though God is no synthesis of all creation.

In this earliest works, Croce already stated his main distinctions when he separated history-writing as an art from the historical disciplines of research which are scientific or logical and not necessarily historical. If history is primarily an art, what constitutes the purely aesthetic or poetic "essence" of historiography and of all art, distinguishing art from logic and science? Croce is never concerned with the techniques and forms which would distinguish a historical work, as an example of a literary genre, from other genres, such as tragedy, satire or the novel; nor does he attempt to define his various literary hierarchies according to the degree to which they are autotelic, so that those forms of art which serve a useful purpose, such as moral or political propaganda, would be inferior to those which are their own purpose; he seeks to define the sublime which is common to all genres and which history, though factually true, can share with the epic, at one end of his literary hierarchy, or with pure poetry, and, at the other end, with all speech and language. The historian and the artist, Croce says, must have aesthetic beliefs, a philosophy of that which they are seeking to achieve; they must never lose sight of this ultimate objective, ideal and aesthetic rather than true, factual, logical or scientific. Croce has devoted many years to formulating such a credo, approaching it repeatedly, in a long and fruitful life, from many different view-points and on many levels of thought. He has written histories of aesthetics, taste and criticism, tracing the development of such beliefs, conscious or unconscious, through different periods and ages of our history; histories of literature and monographs where he deduces these beliefs from the works of an age, a school, an individual artist; political histories and historical monographs which indicate the contexture of these beliefs with events; philosophical essays and a complete *Philosophy of the spirit* to evaluate and criticize these beliefs; finally, he has sought confirmation of his own beliefs and

doubts in the work of other artists, illustrations of them in popular art, anonymous folklore and linguistic phenomena.

But there seems to be an inescapable curse of contradiction on his philosophy. His original sin was haste, born of controversy and the desire rather to contradict other doctrines than to formulate any of his own. He never distinguishes properly the artist from the work of art, the work of art from the man who appreciates it, the subject from the object, psychology or epistemology from aesthetics. Yet the most inspired artist need not necessarily produce the finest work of art; and the same "thrill" of the sublime can be produced, in one or several men, by many different objects. Inspiration and the sublime, as concepts, belong to psychology and metaphysics rather than to art-criticism or aesthetics; and this confusion of approaches has led Croce along the path of most idealist thinkers, an infinite regress where each dialectical definition achieves only verbal accuracy and, later confronted with facts or other definitions, must seem inaccurate, paradoxical or tautological. Endless contradictions must appear, at each turn, within such expanding systems of thought; and there is no rest for the thinker. For he must ever restate his definitions, write new works to correct the old, solve new contradictions which arise from his works as fast as he writes them, till death alone, or indifference to his own work, can release him at last from his infinite and infernal task.

The Aesthetics of Thomas Reid

BY

DAVID O. ROBBINS

CONTEMPORARY discussions of epistemology and metaphysics have led to a mild revival of interest in a neglected and misunderstood figure in the history of philosophy — Thomas Reid. In broaching an account of his aesthetic theory it is not at all my purpose to try to tease history into a proof that Reid “anticipated” modern realistic aesthetics or even “influenced” it. Rather I wish simply to call attention to an early investigation of aesthetic philosophy, an investigation that is fruitful and stimulating because it is essentially modern in the problems attacked and in its terminology. Hence for the most part I shall confine myself to exposition, with only a few brief historical and critical comments.

In the last few decades of the eighteenth century, when English aesthetics had run stale after its promising start in Addison and Shaftesbury,¹ Reid stands out by contrast and in his own right as an original thinker. Among the many adherents of the Scottish common-sense philosophy, he is the only one that can be credited with drawing the implications of intuitional philosophy for problems of taste and beauty.

Reid’s philosophy must be considered as based on both of the two movements in English thought distinguishable as empiricism, and as Platonism, rationalism, or intellectualism. For the actual method of philosophy he believes in empirical psychology, in Baconian induction applied to mind. He is not willing, however, to say with Locke, Berkeley, and Hume that representative or atomistic sensation can account for all our knowledge. Men of understanding have inherent principles of reasoning that do not derive

from sense-experience, but are present by virtue of man's rational constitution. This natural capacity for self-evident and indubitable knowledge, that refutes the absurdities of Berkeley and Hume, is called by Reid and his associates "common sense."

The refutation of Berkeley and Hume is to be accomplished by returning to Locke and correcting his theory of perception and of secondary qualities. His error with respect to the latter lay in appropriating the name of a sensation, such as "heat," to the subjective experience, when it has an equal propriety for the objective quality and cause of the feeling. Moreover, with every perception there is, besides the feeling or sensation, an intuitive belief or judgment of the quality's existence, a belief that has final validity. Berkeley and Hume in thinking away matter and mind were thus wrong because they outraged common sense.

Since Reid draws the consequences of these theories for aesthetics, he may be classed like Francis Hutcheson as a mixture of the two sources just mentioned, empiricism and rationalism. His composition is much more thorough than Hutcheson's, and an attempt to discuss his aesthetics in terms of the influence of each would not do it justice. That Reid, one of the "Scotch empirics," should evidence both these sources is not so curious as might seem. Shaftesbury, too, had rebelled against Locke and insisted on inherent rational principles. His notion of an internal sense of beauty and virtue found followers among the professors of Aberdeen, Glasgow, and Edinburgh, whose ethical theories are clearly derived from Shaftesbury, and whose aesthetic theories, though chiefly based on Locke and Addison, have ever contained germs of rationalism.² As will appear, Reid expressed his belief that he was following Plato and Shaftesbury. Of all the earlier writers, Richard Price is most like Reid, and the latter refers several times to the second chapter of Price's *Review of the Principal Questions in Morals*.

Reid's aesthetics appears in his *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man* (1785), published when he was seventy-five years of age.³ According to it, the intellectual powers of understanding may be divided into these faculties: external senses, conception or simple apprehension, abstraction, judgment, reasoning, and taste. Moral perception he treats in *Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind* (1788).

Taste, therefore, is a separate faculty of the mind and is not simply a derivative of something like association of ideas. It may properly be called a sense since it includes a feeling and judgment, but it is not an external sense, because for the perception of beauty there must be an additional perception of the nature and structure of objects. Moreover, the division of external senses is according to the external organs. But this is not possible in the other case, and an attempt to divide them according to the objects of taste would soon exhaust the most copious language. Hence there is no reason whatever for supposing like Hutcheson and others a multiplicity of internal senses for every kind of beauty or sublimity ingenuity can discover.

The most obvious thing about objects of taste, noticed by everyone, is that in the perception of them there is an emotion or feeling in our minds. Following Addison's division of the aesthetic categories into (1) the new, (2) the grand or sublime, and (3) the beautiful, Reid first of all describes the psychological events in an experience of novelty.

(1) Whatever is new gives pleasure, if it is not disagreeable in itself, by rousing our attention and occasioning an agreeable exertion of our faculties. If it be possible for beings to continue with the same unvaried sensations, it is certain that man is not one of them. His good consists in the vigorous exertion of his intellectual and active powers. To be progressive and not stationary is his nature; otherwise he would sink into indolence and decay. Providence has seen to it that activity and pleasure are connected, so that we may say of men in general what was said of the Athenians, that they spend their time in hearing, or telling, or doing some new thing. (2) The emotion aroused by objects of grandeur and sublimity is awful, solemn, and serious. The Supreme Being, of course, is the most sublime object. The feeling aroused by Him is devotion, which inspires magnanimity and inclines to the most heroic acts of virtue. All grand objects produce an emotion similar to devotion, in a lesser degree — it disposes to seriousness, elevates the mind above its usual state to a kind of enthusiasm, and inspires a contempt for all that is mean. All this may be summed up as *admiration*. Burke was misled to saying everything sublime is terrible by his confusion of dread and admiration. (3) The third category, of beauty, whatever the object may be,

arouses an emotion that is gay and pleasant.

It sweetens and humanises the temper, is friendly to every benevolent affection, and tends to allay sullen and angry passions. It enlivens the mind, and disposes it to other agreeable emotions, such as those of love, hope, and joy.⁴

He quotes Addison's description^{4a} of how beauty makes its way directly to the soul and immediately diffuses a secret satisfaction and complacency through the imagination. The emotion of beauty has the general name of *love*, whether the object be personal and so an object of benevolence, or whether it be merely inanimate.⁵

Reid is far from being content with this mere psychological explanation for aesthetics. He repeatedly inveighs against the subjectivistic spirit of the time and gives an account of how such miserable scepticism came to be.

At first men were prone by nature and habit to give all their attention to things external. What were no more than conceptions or feelings of the mind were endowed with external existence, such as the eternal and self-existent ideas of Plato, or the first matter and substantial forms of Aristotle. This prevailed until the time of Descartes, when philosophy took a contrary turn. That great man discovered that many things supposed to have an external reality are in fact no more than mental conceptions or feelings. Mr. Locke went this far also, to reduce many things to secondary qualities, but his successors down to Hume went to the opposite extreme of the ancients and resolved everything into mental phenomena, leaving nothing at all external.

It was then a natural progress to conceive that beauty, harmony, grandeur, all the objects of taste, as well as the objects of the moral faculty, are nothing but feelings and sentiments.

. . . it is become a fashion among modern philosophers, to resolve all our perceptions into mere feelings or sensations in the person that perceives, without anything corresponding to those feelings in the external object. According to those philosophers, there is no heat in the fire, no taste in a sapid body; the taste and the heat being only in the person that feels them. In a like manner, there is no beauty in any object whatsoever; it is only

a sensation or feeling in the person that perceives it.⁶

The error that led to this has been mentioned, viz., that the name of a sensation had been taken to apply to the subjective experience alone, whereas it should have been recognized as referring to the objective quality also. When Locke distinguished between what we feel and what is in the object, he was right. He was also right in observing that the relation between quality and sensation is that of cause and effect, and not of similitude, as the Peripatetics had taught. But the common sense of men, as against the opinion of a few philosophers like Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, is right in ascribing the quality, say, of "heat," to objects, and not to ourselves. Whenever we experience the sensation of an object, we have two things: an internal feeling, but also a belief or affirmation that the quality pertains to the object.

Of these two elements of every perception, including of course aesthetic perception, we have already described the first, the emotion or pleasure.

We consider now the second element, the intuitive judgment or conviction that the quality of excellence resides in the body perceived. Obviously the feeling depends upon and follows the judgment, for if we had no belief of the object's value, we would never be moved by it to love for its beauty or admiration for its sublimity and grandeur.⁷

If I say Vergil's "Georgics" is a beautiful poem, and I mean only that I have a beautiful feeling, why should I express myself in such contrary language? The common sense of mankind displays itself in common language; even those who believe beauty is a feeling betray themselves by their speech. Philosophers should be very cautious in opposing the common sense of mankind, for when they do, they rarely miss going wrong.

When we pronounce an object to be grand or beautiful, we affirm something of that object, and every affirmation or denial expresses a judgment. With every sensation this cognitive element is present as an immediate conviction and judgment of the existence of the quality. The same is true of aesthetic perception, where we affirm or deny the existence of some quality of perfection. The feeling is in the mind, and so is the judgment; but this judgment, like all others, must be either true or false. Obviously the affirmations of a natural and inherent faculty would not al-

ways be false. But if the judgment is true, then there is a real and objective value in the object. To deny the reality of the beauty all men perceive is to attribute to man fallacious senses and to impugn the character of God, who is no deceiver. Here we are led out of subjectivism, says Reid — the only effort of the century to go beyond Addison and Burke that can be taken with any seriousness.

The important question whether there is a necessary connection between the emotion and the judgment, or whether they are conjoined by the good pleasure of God, Reid declines to discuss. He refers to and seems to concur in the opinion given by Price, who believed there was a necessary cause for the connection but gave no explanation. It might be hoped that the philosophy of intuition would have less dependence upon final causes and teleology, but this is the case in certain aspects only.

Before turning attention to the purely external properties of aesthetic objects, we must note a parallel distinction with respect to judgments of beauty and to qualities of beautiful things. First there is what Reid calls an *instinctive* judgment, which we make when we have only a general and vague notion of some excellence in the object approved and admired.⁸ The objects concerning which we make instinctive judgments

. . . strike us at once, and appear beautiful at first sight, without any reflection, without our being able to say why we call them beautiful, or being able to specify any perfection which justifies our judgment. Something of this kind there seems to be in brute animals and in children before the use of reason; nor does it end with infancy, but continues through life.⁹

The colors of natural objects like flowers and shells delight us, though we know not why. Such instinctive beauty is especially important in fundamental affairs like choosing our environment, constructing a habitat, or in sexual selection.

The character of objects that cause instinctive judgments is, or as Reid prefers to say,¹⁰ “may be compared to,” a *secondary* and occult quality. We know the object as it affects our senses, but not as it is in itself. All we can say is that the Author of our nature for a wise reason has established a connection between the contemplation of certain objects and a pleasurable emotion, be-

fore we are capable of perceiving any excellence in the objects.¹¹ This is the usual statement of English empirical aesthetics of the eighteenth century, but in Reid's case three important differences are to be noted: first, that this is only one part of the qualities have objective existence; and thirdly, that secondary qualities are not necessarily unknowable but are proper subjects of philosophical investigation.

The other kind of judgment is the *rational* judgment, which we make when we have a distinct conception of the superior excellence of an object.¹² For instance, an expert mechanic views a well-constructed machine. He sees everything to be made of the best materials and in the best form for accomplishing the appointed ends. He views the machine with the same agreeable emotion that a child views a beautifully colored pebble, but he can give a reason for his judgment and point out the particular perfections on which it is grounded. More of the principles of rational beauty will appear presently, when the real source of aesthetic value is discussed.

The property of the object that we rationally judge to be beautiful is not a secondary and occult quality, but is, or at least "may be compared to," a *primary* quality. For this Reid does not explicitly invoke the final cause of God, but seems to think it is "in our constitution" to be pleased by the contemplation of excellence and perfection. The pleasure is annexed to the judgment and is regulated by it.¹³ What the necessary connection is he does not say.

It has been shown how common sense and intuition lead to the certainty of the objective existence of aesthetic qualities. Novelty, of course, is not a quality of a thing, though neither is it a mere feeling. It is a real relation which a thing has to the knowledge of a person. In its own sake it is fit only for children. Novelty may be compared to a cipher in arithmetic, which in itself is nothing, but is important when added to significant figures. The objective aspect of grandeur and sublimity Reid does not bother to discuss in the customary terms of magnitude, power, obscurity, etc. He only says it is such a high degree of excellence as merits our admiration. What this means will appear in the following paragraphs. An examination of the qualities of beauty would be

chiefly of the kind concerning which we make rational judgments, though beauty judged instinctively may come to be judged rationally if we discover in it some latent perfection or use. Here, too, it is not necessary to describe in detail the qualities of objects, as enough of these will appear from the consideration which must now be given to the ultimate source of aesthetic value.

It would not be surprising if Reid, like many English aestheticians of the eighteenth century, stopped with a list of qualities. He goes further, however, and shows whence beauty and the sublime derive their value. Here we find the chief reason for placing Reid for the most part in the Platonic-Shaftesburian tradition, viz., that all aesthetic value according to him is a form or expression of intellectual perfection. He explicitly claims as his allies the Socratic school among the ancients, Lord Shaftesbury and Dr. Akenside among the moderns.¹⁴ From mind we went to objects, and now we are led back to mind. But before we were concerned with emotion and pleasure in this or that particular mind; here we are concerned with intellectual excellence in its metaphysical generality. He quotes Akenside:

Mind, mind, alone, bear witness, earth and heav'n!
 The living fountains in itself contains
 Of beauteous and sublime. Here hand in hand
 Sit paramount the graces. Here enthron'd
 Celestial Venus, with divinest airs,
 Invites the soul to never-fading joy.¹⁵

Of the two kinds of aesthetic value, original and derived, the first is what has just been mentioned, the intrinsic perfection of reason. This admits of no proof, but is established by the universal sentiment of mankind. We can as easily conceive of a constitution that should say two and three make fifteen, or that a part is greater than the whole, as of one that should say knowledge and virtue are not inherently more excellent than their opposites.

In the discussion of the second kind of aesthetic value, derived or reflected, there appears a typical inconsistency. True, it is not an inconsistency of his aesthetics, but of his method. Yet it helps explain why Reid's contemporaries were not convinced by the appeal to common sense. The inconsistency is this: to prove beauty is objective Reid takes it as conclusive that men attribute

beauty by the form of their language to objects, and not to their own feelings. If men meant other, they would say so. But now when it is convenient he does not hesitate to reverse the common-sense appeal. He says there is nothing commoner than a communication of attributes, a transference of the signified to the sign, the cause to the effect. In spite of the fact that men refer by their language to certain beauties as in sense-objects, and not as derived, Reid has no objection to opposing common-sense speech.

The excellences of the mind like power, knowledge, wisdom, virtue, and magnanimity, when present in an uncommon degree, constitute intrinsic grandeur. A great work is a work of great power, wisdom, and goodness, well-contrived for some important end. Power, wisdom, and goodness, however, are not qualities of the object, but of the mind of the object's creator. Deity, of course, is the most sublime of all things, since His created works reflect all the intellectual virtues in the highest degree. In no case is sublimity in a physical body; in every case it is an expression of a mental quality.

The same is true of beauty. Qualities that shine by their own light and arouse the emotion of love are qualities like innocence, gentleness, humanity, natural affection, knowledge, good sense, wit, humor, cheerfulness, good taste. Talents and skills in the fine or useful arts, or in exercises of physical ability, are also excellences of mind. All beauty dwells originally in these intellectual and active perfections, and all other beauty owes its being to them.

In the treatment of original and derived value it is clear that the original beauty (and sublimity) considered above is the top of the Platonic-Shaftesburian scale of perfection and beauty, which Reid explicitly avows. Therefore it is incumbent upon him to show that the lower part of the scale derives its value from the upper rational part.

At the bottom is inanimate matter, in which we perceive beauty as sound, color, form, and motion; the first as an object of hearing, the last three as objects of sight. (Since it is impossible to follow Reid in detail, a few examples must suffice.) A single note is beautiful only when sounded by a good voice or instrument. Hence its beauty is really the effect of the skill of the singer or

of the maker of the instrument. Again, regularity with variety indicates design and art, and, incidentally, makes the objects possessing it easier to comprehend. But the beauty or regularity must always yield to a higher and more intellectual kind, the fitness for an end, whence the inanimate furniture of earth derives its beauty as accomplishing the purposes of God. This is also the explanation of the beauty of the vegetable and animal realm. In the higher animals we begin to see signs of mental qualities like sagacity and affection. The highest object in the sensual region of the perfection scale is the human body, and especially the female body. For this he follows Spence's theory of human beauty as composed of color, form, expression, and grace.¹⁶ He adds, however, a definition of grace, which Spence thought indefinable, and reduces all to expression of some perfection of body as an instrument of mind, or of some amiable quality of the mind itself.

In sum, all aesthetic value is found originally and properly in qualities of mind, and it is discerned in objects of sense only by reflection, as the light of the moon and planets is truly the light of the sun. Those who look for it in mere matter seek the living among the dead.

Finally, the consequences of this aesthetics for the problem of the variety of tastes may be noted. Reid's central discussion occurs in the essay on "Judgment," where he is listing the subjects that admit of first principles, whether as contingent or necessary truths. Under the latter occur grammatical, logical, mathematical, moral, and metaphysical axioms, and axioms "of taste."¹⁷ Here it is clear that the theory of beauty and taste has risen to a respectable philosophical status and needs only a convenient word like "aesthetical" to fit into philosophical terminology.

Acquired taste, of course, admits of no standards, for it is the product of accidental habits and associations. Of natural taste, that which is animal or instinctive, arranged by the will of God, likewise admits of no standards. But rational taste we can explain by specifying the sources of excellence in objects. The judgments about these excellences are either true or false, and therefore have standards and first principles.¹⁸ To say that there is a great variety in tastes and hence no standards, is not a valid objection. for it is no more difficult to account for it than for the variety

of opinions which are based admittedly on judgments of truth.

Reid's aesthetics is the most philosophical and least amateurish of the whole English eighteenth-century speculation. In this way, as in other ways, it may be compared favorably to contemporary German aesthetics. His discussion is always of the central problems and shows few of the usual digressions. Nevertheless, the judgment of history has not been favorable to Reid, deciding that his common-sense beliefs result more from wishful repetition of the desired answers than from real reasons. He was not able to refute the implications of Lockian philosophy that Berkeley and Hume drew for metaphysics and that Addison and Burke drew for aesthetics. The whole course of aesthetics was little influenced by his opinions and went on with the subjectivity of value as defended chiefly in terms of the association of ideas. Subjectivism was so much the character of the age that during the century only two of the more important writers, Shaftesbury and Reid, asserted unequivocally the real and independent existence of beauty.

I have never meant to suggest that Reid's aesthetics can be defended as adequate or even that it can be revised to suit modern conceptions of what an aesthetics ought to be. There are certain features, such as the grand climax of aesthetic value as expression of a vague "intellectual perfection," which can justly be dismissed. Yet much of his discussion, especially when viewed in relation to his philosophy as a whole, is devoted to the analysis of just those problems considered significant by twentieth-century writers concerned with aesthetic perception and the metaphysics of beauty.

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1. Addison, "Pleasures of the Imagination," *Spectator*, Nos. 409, 411-21 (1712); Shaftesbury, *Characteristicks* (1711).

2. Shaftesbury, who wrote an essay entitled "Sensus Communis," has even been called the founder of Scottish realism.

3. References are to pages and columns of Sir William Hamilton's third edition (Edinburgh, 1852). Since most of his discussion occurs in Essay VIII (pp. 490a-508b), ordinarily references will be given only if they are not included therein.

4. P. 498b.

4a. *Spectator*, No. 412.

6. P. 490b

7. P. 453a.

8. Pp. 453a, 492b, 500b.

9. P. 500b.

10. P. 492b

11. P. 453b

12. Pp. 453b, 492b, 501a.

13. Pp. 453a, 453b

14. Pp. 502b, 503a. Cf. Reid's letter to Alison (1790), quoted pp. 89a-89b: "I am proud to think that I first in clear and explicit terms, and in the cool blood of a philosopher, maintained that all beauty and sublimity of objects of sense is derived from the expression they exhibit of things intellectual, which alone have original beauty." He refers to the same doctrine as held by Plato, Shaftesbury, and Akenside, but says they treated it as lovers and poets and enthusiasts, whereas he treats it "with the cool temper of philosophers." At least this distinguishes him from the majority of the Platonists of the century.

Mark Akenside published (1744) a long didactic poem *On the Pleasures of the Imagination*, which is superficially based on Addison's psychological aesthetics, but which is basically Shaftesbury's metaphysical aesthetics.

15. Akenside, *On the Pleasures of the Imagination*, I, 481-486.

16. Joseph Spence, a follower of the Platonic-Shaftesburian aesthetics, published an inferior dialogue on beauty in 1752.

17. Pp. 452a-454a.

18. Pp. 453a-453b.

Imitation and Expression in Art*

BY

IREDELL JENKINS

AMIDST all of the fuss and frolic which constitute this boisterous world, it is not often given to an idea — nor for that matter, to anything else — to arrive on the scene accompanied by the flourish of banners and the shrill blare of trumpets. If this rule should cry out in the night, and demand to be proved by an exception, the doctrine of art as expression can answer the call. From the moment of its first proud proclamation, the attitude toward it can most exactly be given in the old formula: The King is dead! Long live the King! The old king was the theory of imitation. He was buried with great dispatch and no regrets and a new order of things was predicted for the coming reign. There was to be a radical change in aesthetic categories; a new direction was to be given to aesthetic inquiry; a new standard of artistic worth had been found, and was waiting to be applied. This whole feeling of newness and promise is vividly stated by Roger Fry:

“In my youth, all speculation on aesthetic had revolved with wearisome persistence around the question of the nature of beauty. Like our predecessors we sought for the criterion of the beautiful, whether in art or in nature. And always this search led to a tangle of contradictions or else to metaphysical ideas so vague as to be inapplicable to concrete cases. It was Tolstoi’s genius that delivered us from this *impasse*, and I think that one may date from the appearance of “What is Art?” the beginning of fruitful speculation in aesthetic. It was not indeed Tolstoi’s preposterous valuation of works of art that counted for us, but his luminous criticism of past aesthetic systems . . . Tolstoi saw that the

*Read, with minor alterations, before the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, March 22, 1940, at New Orleans.

essence of art was that it was a means of communication between human beings. He conceived it to be *par excellence* the language of emotion. It was at this point that his moral bias led him to the strange conclusion that the value of the work of art corresponded to the value of the emotion expressed. Fortunately he showed by an application of this theory to actual works of art what absurdities it led to. What remained of immense importance was the idea that a work of art was not the record of beauty already existent elsewhere, but the expression of an emotion felt by the artist and conveyed to the spectator.”¹

Fry is here doing no more than formulating a universal attitude. This conviction of purification and re-birth shines through the work of all aestheticians from Eugene Véron in 1878 to the most recent historians and critics. The doctrine that art is imitation is everywhere attacked with violence and contempt: the idea that the artist imitates is regarded as both a falsification and an insult; the idea that the audience recognizes the object depicted is derided as sentimental and naive. And the theory as a whole is condemned on three grounds: because it contained a distorted view of the artistic process; because it established false criteria for judging artistic work; and because it erroneously confined man's search for aesthetic appreciation. There is similar accord that the theory of expression corrected these flaws; and that it corrected them all at once by questioning the basic dogmas of imitation, and by changing the direction of aesthetic inquiry.

In the face of such deep and wide-spread conviction it is perhaps heretical to doubt. But the issues involved are serious: the exponents of the modern schools are avowedly advancing a new set of explanatory principles, and recasting the fundamental terms in which we shall do our aesthetic thinking. In explaining the phenomena of beauty, we are told to reduce them to these new elements that have been discovered. Any such fresh suit of mental clothing demands a careful investigation. So I should like to glance briefly at the parentage and the importance of this idea. Was the change it introduced as drastic as the heralds announced? Was a novel direction given to aesthetic inquiry? Were new standards of art and beauty established? Were either artists or audiences given new clues as to where beauty could be found?

It is my thesis that the answer to these questions must be in

the negative. But this thesis needs to be carefully qualified. In the first place, I do not mean to question the value of expressionism as an historic event; it was undoubtedly a rejuvenating influence on both artistic theory and practice. I do mean to question its immaculate freshness, and its claim to being an ultimate principle, a final answer. In the second place, I do not mean to deny that there is one vast and fundamental difference between the doctrines of imitation and expression. I think there is, and I hope to point it out. However, I believe that this difference lies in the domain of metaphysics rather than of aesthetics; and I do not believe that it essentially changes the temper of aesthetic inquiry.

The first point can most simply be introduced by this question: With the advent of expressionism, was an idea born or only rechristened? The answer of modern aesthetics is unequivocal: the feeling is everywhere apparent that in the last years of the nineteenth century men had at long last discovered the true meaning of art, and the real nature of artistic creation and appreciation. Yet as we read these glowing pages an impression first arises vaguely, and then crystallizes into this awareness: these theories that are said to be so widely held, and are condemned as so corruptive, are ones of which I have never heard before; while the new doctrine, as it is further developed and more fully explained, has more and more the air of an old friend. The new seems as familiar as the old seems strange. To understand this impression, let us look first at the doctrine that is being attacked; as we do so, it becomes increasingly apparent that it is a doctrine that was never held by any reputable thinker. We have to do once more with the time-honored device of the "straw-man"; we are again participants at that ancient ritual in which a theory is first distorted, then denounced, and finally destroyed.

The imitative act, as it is conceived and denied by the exponents of the new schools, is exclusively mechanical and reproductive; it is said to reflect existence in an altogether neutral and colorless manner; it is regarded as the record of bare matter of

fact; it is always referred to as '*mere*' imitation, and is invariably likened to the taking of a photograph, or to the verbatim report of a stenographer. Similarly, we are told that the imitative theory regards the artist as passively responding to nature; as giving us a "servile reproduction of all the features and details of an object or event passing before his eyes."² as a skillful copyist, and as an expert in tricking the eye. And, finally, we are informed that the imitationists regard the act of appreciation as a mere re-acquaintance with nature; the spectator is to recognize a portrayal of real things or real life; and then he is to sentimentalize over them, and to applaud the talent of the artist. Thus Veron climaxes his indictment of the old doctrine in these terms: "What is it that we admire in imitation? The resemblance? We have that much better in the object itself . . . It is obvious that between the object and its counterfeit some new element intervenes. This element is the personality, or, at least, the skill of the artist. This latter, indeed, is what they admire who will have it that beauty consists in imitation."³

Such a theory is palpably ridiculous; we are immediately aroused against it, and so are ready to sympathize with the expressionists' views. But after a little thought it becomes difficult to refrain from a question: who ever believed all this, and advanced it as a doctrine? Is *this* the theory of imitation which was expounded by so many serious thinkers from Plato to Schopenhauer? The answer is quite obviously 'no'. Where, then, did these men derive the ideas they criticize? They seem too zealous and too fervent to be consciously attacking a dummy. What seems most probable is that they accepted this theory partly as the only possible explanation of the art they found around them, partly as implied in critical commentaries.⁴ In its origin, expressionism seems not so much a denial of false theory as a revolt against bad art.

And now what of the positive doctrines offered us by the new schools to replace the vain mouthings of "mere imitation" and "passive response." As we probe beneath the surface veneer of terms, these supposedly revolutionary theories reveal themselves as strikingly similar to those of the classic exponents of imitation. There are evidently differences of detail and of emphasis:

the method of approach has become — or has tried to become — scientific rather than philosophical; the strictly perceptual element in aesthetic enjoyment is much dwelt upon, and a valiant attempt is made to restrict art to the exploitation of surface qualities; great stress is laid upon the independence of the artist from any responsibility to reality; and the spectator is exhorted to free himself from all representative and realistic restraints. But these avenues have been explored and described, these ideas have been substantiated, more in the wish than in the deed. As the new aesthetic approaches fundamental issues, it reformulates the ideas, and even speaks the language, of the old theory of imitation.

In a brief compass, this meeting of the twain can be best exhibited by proceeding at once to the two inquiries which constitute the backbone of any theory of art or beauty: namely, the attempts to determine the exact nature of the aesthetic activity and of the aesthetic object. These are the essence of the aesthetic dilemma, with all other problems ancillary to them. The questions here at issue can be stated thus: First, what exactly is it that the artist and the spectator do in creating and appreciating art; what sort of process is this, and what is its place in man's economy? Secondly, what is it that is presented to us in this experience; of what are we made aware; with what new aspect of reality do we here become acquainted?

With respect to the first question, the new schools immediately exhibit a striking similarity with the old: they are much more sure of what the aesthetic activity *is not* than they are of what it *is*. We are told by all of them that it is neither perception nor conception; it is not a sensuous report and it is not rational knowledge; it is not a simple sensation, and yet it is not recognition of an object. In the aesthetic activity a content is completely given, so that we do not have to seek its meaning, or operate upon it logically; but it is not given under any of the usual forms, so that the experience does not culminate in any ordinary acquaintance with something external to ourselves. This special activity is further identified as *intuition*, *vision*, *grasp*, or *apprehension*; it is qualified as being *immediate*, *sympathetic*, *unified*, and *contemplative*; it is non-spatial and non-temporal,

so contains no stimulus to action, and exhibits values rather than facts; and, finally, in the aesthetic experience there is no distinction of knower and known, and the usual subject-object relationship disappears, conferring on this type of awareness sometimes a priority and always a superiority to other types.

The expressionists' conception of artistic creation exhibits these same ideas, with the emphasis placed on activity rather than receptivity: the artist has aesthetic experiences before nature, where others have them only before art; he discovers and explores what the audience can only receive and accept. In order to account for this special ability, the artist is characterized as detached from life and its ordinary concerns; he sees and hears and thinks in a unique and virginal manner; things do not have for him their usual meaning as merely clues to action, and he grasps them independently of the abstractions which direct the average attention. The artist thus sees nature in a way which is strange and alien to the ordinary spirit; and what he thus discovers he then objectifies in his work, and so brings to man an illumination which he could not unassisted get from nature. This is the strain that runs through all recent aesthetics; it is essentially the strain that has been familiar since the time of Plato.

When we turn to the modern conception of the aesthetic object, of what the artist discovers and illuminates through his art, the situation becomes more complex. Difficulties and ambiguities arise at this point, because modern theory is here marked by an uncertainty and hesitancy altogether foreign to the classic imitationists, who knew that beauty reveals ideals. The new schools become timid before this idea, and all exhibit a strong inclination to restrict art and beauty to "surface qualities", "imaginary objects", and "selected aspects"; they would assure us that art has no connection with reality, and merely enables us to taste impressions instead of gulping them down. Theorists strive to dis sever the appreciative act from "real things"; to identify it as a pure and purposeless type of perception; to associate it with play and "release mechanism"; and to assert that it has no knowledge content because it posits no object. The new critics would define works of art as expressions of the artist's spirit; as the record of his impressions and experiences; as the mere ob-

jectification of his emotions, which we are thus enabled to share. The exponents of the modern theory all have an evident wish to free art from responsibility and to rescue it from contamination; they look longingly at the ivory tower, and insist plaintively that art is an intrinsic value, with no meaning beyond itself.

But a difficulty at once arises to vitiate this attempt: when you free art from responsibility, you deprive it of importance; when you rescue it from contamination, you insulate it from life. Consequently, for almost all aestheticians, this doctrine soon becomes unsatisfactory; we do not rest content with the "surface qualities" of a poem, and the feeling we have before music and even painting demands a more substantial object than that offered by the mere rearrangement of sensory data. Aesthetic experience in its turn insists that it means more than merely this; that it serves some other function than to exhibit formal values or produce moments of repose. So modern theory soon finds itself called upon to meet this demand, and to find a more meaningful content for the experience of beauty. It takes a first tentative step when it speaks of art as "exhibiting the individual in all of his individuality"; it goes farther when it says that art gives us a reality different from ordinary "factual" or scientific reality; and it has entirely overcome its early shyness when it admits that art discovers values, reveals the inner significance of things, and serves as an illustration of what *is*. Consonant with this expansion, the artist takes on a new importance. The doctrine is developed that he has a special contact with nature, a direct access to an aspect of reality which is closed to most men. So that he finally emerges as a seer, who, in expressing himself, draws aside the veil of becoming and discloses the realm of being.

I do not think that it is necessary to stress the similarity of these views to the classic imitationist doctrines of genius, intuition, and revealed ideals. Sentiments such as these carry us back irresistibly to the "Phædrus" and "Symposium", and to the third book of "The World as Will and Idea"; and these sentiments can be found in the writings of almost any aesthetician from Veron to the present. In the light of this similarity, there arises one salient question: Why, with this final basic agreement, was there such sudden and general denial of the theory of imitation?

Why should that theory have been so grossly, if unintentionally, misinterpreted, and why should there have been such strong conviction that a new explanation of art was needed? The answer to these questions can, I think, be briefly stated, though it would admit of almost indefinite development: it is because, in the current philosophy, there was no longer anything worthy of imitation. The ideal or spiritual realm had been denied ontological status. Reality was material, perception was passive, and nature knew no values. There were only familiar physical objects to know and to copy; artists obviously did not do this; so they did not imitate; and they must therefore feel and interpret and express. The new aesthetics — be they doctrines of expression, empathy, significant form, isolation, or emotion — are but so many facets of nominalism. They say just what the old aesthetics said, but they refuse to admit that they mean it.

According to this interpretation, the modern schools have worked no changes in the fundamental concepts of aesthetics; no really new ideas have been introduced, and no important old ones have been rejected. The true status of the expressionist schools is simply this: they are the adherents and purveyors of the classical doctrines in a changed mental environment; they represent the attempt of aesthetics to accommodate itself to the transformations brought about in our habits of thought when the idealistic view of the world was replaced by the materialistic view. When the scientific tradition began to pervade all realms of thought, to define the terms in which nature is conceived and to determine the principles by which it is explained, aesthetics had perforce to adapt itself to the new conception. Aestheticians now felt it necessary to interpret and explain the phenomena of beauty in terms of the fundamental assumptions of the scientific metaphysic: the facts of the aesthetic life could be satisfactorily described only by reducing them to the postulates of the new world-view; the existence of works of art must be accounted for by referring them to the explanatory principles accepted by science, with no appeal beyond these. The intellectual orientation had changed, and aesthetic theory must be translated into the terms in which men were thinking. The doctrines, and even more the denials, of the modernists are all designed for

the single purpose of performing this act of acclimatization; the old ideas must be made to accord with the new tradition.

The basic dogma of this tradition is the conception of nature as materialistic and mechanistic: reality is exhausted when it is reduced to these terms, and what cannot be reduced to them is not a part of reality. The most obvious and most immediate effect of this philosophical materialism and nominalism is to cast the doctrines of imitation, as these were envisaged by the idealistic tradition, into utter disrepute. Art can no longer be regarded as a revelation of reality, for material reality is completely described by science, and there is no immaterial realm to be revealed by art; and, consequently, the acts of artistic creation and appreciation cannot be accounted for as discoveries of essence, or of the reality behind appearances. The new metaphysical conceptions reduce the act of imitation to a copying of the physical environment, and leave no place for the insight and enlightenment that we seem to find in the enjoyment of beauty. This being the case, some substitute for imitation must be found which will preserve the dignity of the artist and furnish a correct evaluation of the aesthetic experience. Since the phenomena of art can no longer be explained by referring them to nature, they must be referred elsewhere; and the only alternative is to emphasize the personal human element, as creator or appreciator.

When the tenets of recent aesthetic theory are looked at against this background, and in this perspective, much that at first seems obscure and anomalous is seen to be the inevitable consequence of hastily accepted premises. It now becomes clear why modern aesthetics is so very uncertain as to the nature and status of the aesthetic object, and reiterates the themes that in art the distinction between symbol and object is absent, and that art asserts neither the reality nor unreality of its object or itself. Further, it is now understandable why the new schools encounter such an obstacle in attempting to say what art is an expression of: they cannot adequately describe the process of expression, because they have no doctrine of the content grasped by the artist and objectified in his work; so they can only repeat that the artist expresses his spirit and communicates his feelings, why or about what they do not know. And finally, this shift of philosophical outlook accounts for the pervading contemporary uncer-

tainty and hesitancy regarding the significance of the aesthetic experience: since nominalism destroys the revelation doctrine, the first tendency of modern theory is to deprive beauty of any cognitive significance; and the act of appreciation is described as *reposeful, purposeless, disinterested, and pure*. But aesthetic experience itself gives the lie to these dogmas; it announces itself as heavy with significance, and demands an explanation of this. So then modern theory must assure us that art *illuminates, illustrates, reveals, uncovers, and manifests*. But since it cannot say what is revealed, its attempts to save the appearances end in the obscurity and contradictions which have been so characteristic of theoretical and especially of critical writings on art. These doctrines are what they are, and they lead to these difficulties, because they are the translation of the ideas of imitation, born of metaphysical realism, into the language and thought of metaphysical nominalism. The new doctrines are identical with the old as far as they go, but in accord with the nominalistic spirit they call a halt to investigation at an earlier stage in the process of inquiry, and so leave more questions unsettled.

These same considerations vitiate the conviction that the ideas of expressionism give a new direction to aesthetic inquiry. When we interpret modern theories in terms of this general philosophical bias from which they spring, it becomes clear that the basic aesthetic issues remain the same, though they are stated in a different language, studied with a different emphasis, and assigned a different significance. Inquiry must be pushed in the same directions as before; no new elements have been introduced, and we can but study the same phenomena as ever. Thus, in approaching the problem of artistic creation, the theory of imitation lays stress on that *to which* the artist reacts, expressionism on the manner *in which* he reacts; for both, inquiry must be directed toward the *content of his response*. Again, the old theory differentiated aesthetic experience from perception and cognition as a change in the object known; the new distinguishes it as a change of attitude. For both, there is a difference of content, and in each case it is only this which can be investigated. Finally, a work of art was formerly regarded as a revelation of reality; it is now looked upon as an expression of the artist's spirit; but

always its true value lies in the new significance that it bestows on things, whether this be discovered or invented.

So it would seem that there has been no drastic revision of our explanatory principles, at least as these effect aesthetics; so far as aesthetic theory is concerned the differences between "expression" and "imitation", "creative imagination" and "inspiration", "value" and "ideal", "pure perception" and "intuition", are more verbal than anything else. All that we have done is to trade metaphysics for meta-psychology, and the one can become as metaphorical as the other. The conceptions of the new critical aesthetics are sometimes just as vague and inapplicable as those condemned as metaphysical; as when I. A. Richards gives a "scientific" account of the aesthetic experience which consists largely of describing the human mind as a four dimensional system of magnets.⁵ A true aesthetic seems either as near or as distant as ever; we have either had it for a long time, or we do not have it yet. Until this question is settled, we can take consolation in one fact: a false — or misinterpreted — aesthetic does not seem to effect good art. It only determines the particular form to be taken by bad art. The old theory gave us a lot of "slavish imitations"; the new bids fair to flood us with "free expressions".

Tulane University.

1. From the essay "Retrospect" in "Vision and Design", London, 1920; pp. 292-293.
2. Veron, "L'Esthetique". Quoted from Rader, "A Modern Book of Esthetics". New York, 1935. p. 87.
3. *Ibid.* p. 90.
4. This view is, I think, substantiated by the opinions expressed, and especially by the examples cited, in the work of Veron, Tolstoi, Fry, Bell, and much of the New Criticism.
5. *Science and Poetry*. (New York, 1926).

Book Reviews

LIONELLO VENTURI: *Art Criticism Now*. Lectures delivered March 12, 13, 14, 19, and 20, 1941, at Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore. The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1941.

Is it not like a return to the golden age of criticism, the 18th century, if one takes the trouble to examine the standards and directions of present day art criticism? And now another reviewer is sitting down, testing the validity of the author's criticism on criticism of other authors on contemporary art. Has a magic wand transferred us to the desks of Addison and Lessing, to the leisures of Horace Walpole and the Prince of Anhalt-Dessau? Alas, the last trappings of the era of reason are going up in flames with the conflagration of the universe and with it a noble age is withdrawing from us.

Mr. Venturi shares with his reviewer the concern for sound reasoning and the belief in a hierarchy of values which his illuminate predecessors termed "ideals." This firmness of belief lends substance to an enterprise which otherwise would run the risk of being anemic verbalism. Some of these values such as meaningfulness, vitality, sincerity, he sees embodied in a few contemporary painters such as Matisse, Rouault, John Marin and Eilshemius, and he erects their "stelae" to counteract the blind worship of Picasso and abstract art, yet here ends the realm of reason and proofs. While we evaluate art by aesthetical and ethical standards, we can not measure other artists and their critics by personalities. Your Rouault may be my dark horse, and yet we may believe in the same structure of values. But the pleasant subjectivity of the critic on this point lends warmth and depth of artistic experience to his arguments.

What are these arguments? Based on the supposition that art deals basically with "simple, natural, spontaneous sensation," he pleads for an organic continuation of the tradition which culminates in French Impressionism. He recognizes a "plasticity" craze in modern criticism and opposes it by his emphasis on neglected coloristic problems which he sees carried forward in Matisse' decorative harmony and in Rouault's expressive color symbolism.

A second point is made in an analysis of the equation between reason and abstraction which modern criticism has fostered. In introducing a philosophical rejection of a referenceless abstraction in art, Mr. Venturi paves the way for a critic who can look out for emotion and motifs in the art work without the risk of being called a Victorian Mind.

For a long time, I have felt there was a word due against the formalism of Mr. Barnes and his school. As sound as his education for merely formal analysis of an art work may have been originally, replacing the biographical story teller and the milieu describer, the elimination of the psychological point of view and the omission of the "atmospheric"

values of period and place have transformed his art criticism into categorical descriptions of limited interest.

While there is too much formalism in the Barnes school, there is too little concern with form, according to Venturi, in the writings and in the art of Surrealism. The literary element seems a post festum excursion, and the artists catch butterflies while their houses are crumbling. Or, as Mr. Venturi puts it, "representation must be identified with concrete form. If representation is distinguished from form, when it is added to form you have the sum of two abstractions and not a concrete form" (p. 50).

The last chapter deals with a criticism of iconology as represented by Panofsky's last work, "Studies in Iconology" (New York, 1939), with laboratory criticism as presented in Allan Burrough's "Art Criticism from a Laboratory" (Boston, 1938), and with the history of vision with a belated remark on Heinrich (not Henry as on p. 29) Woefflin's "Principles of Art History" (Munich, 1916). He sees in the methods applied in these three specimens a deviation from the main path of art history. While Venturi's criticism, particularly in the case of Woefflin, seems too condensed and scanty to do justice to the writer, it urges the critic to tell what he understands under the term "art history." He defines it on the last pages of the book, in differentiating between the "history of taste", which deals with all the merely relative elements constituting the making of a picture, and the "history of art", which deals with the relationship between relative taste and the finished, final and absolute result called "art." The art historian thus deals with the processes but also with the results. "The process of the history of art is the dialectic of art and taste." (p. 62). This formulation which is further developed in Venturi's "History of art Criticism" (pp. 315-317), seems to the reviewer one of the happiest clarifications produced in the field of art history. If added to the definitions which Panofsky has given in his introduction to the "Studies in Iconology" we can say that art history has found its place in the field of the humanities. In bringing back the "absolute" art work to the iconologist, laboratory scientist and psychologist of visual forms, the creative essence will return to art history.

Although somewhat casually presented, there is reality, reason and definiteness in the set of values with which Venturi measures the contemporary art criticism and in so doing opens up a vista towards the future of art and its history.

—ALFRED NEUMEYER

BENDETTTO CROCE: *History as the Story of Liberty*. Translated by Sylvia Sprigge. New York. W. W. Norton and Co. 1941. 324 pp.

The five groups of essays that constitute this volume (issued in Italian in 1938) continue the considerations first published in "Theory and History of the Writing of History" in 1913 and pursued in several other of Croce's studies. Among the general essays of Part I is that which gives title to the book; it contains the comforting declaration that "liberty is the eternal creator of history and itself the subject of every history . . . liberty appears as abiding purely and invincibly and consciously in only a few spirits; but these alone are those that count historically . . ." Similarly dogmatic is the statement: "historical judgment is not a variety of knowledge itself; it is the form that completely fills and exhausts the field of knowing, leaving no room for anything else."

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Part II deals with "Historicism and its History"; Parts III and IV with Historiography, and Politics and Morals respectively. These emphasize the need for historical knowledge (by Croce's own insistence, the word historical is tautologous) before human action. Croce is throughout maintaining that this necessity is indeed generating impetus to the study of history, that the sole validity of history lies in its yielding a clear perception of practical and moral problems. The final section, "Prospects of Historiography", again ranges wide, with occasional direct thrusts at current perversions of historiography, as in the mention of "an imaginary history of the most ancient Germans, whom a bold invention joins to the Greek civilization, hailing them as authors of the latter as though it were one of the many admirable works that the Germans, with the liberality of a most humane people, have generously given to the world." Throughout, the author nobly insists that history (to him all knowledge) must be digested "in order to achieve an orientation in the world in which one lives, and in which one's own mission and duty has to be accomplished."

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"Designed as a one-volume reference library for the general reader and for students of American literature", this vade-mecum covers the literature as well as large sections of the life of the country down its turbulent years; The first two entries are "A.E.F." and "A.F. of L."; the last two "Zufii Indians" and "Zury, the Meanest Man in Spring County." In between are Charlie Chaplin and "How Beautiful With Shoes", Rutherford Hayes and Helen Hayes, The American Bible Society and The Devil's Dictionary, along with 893 summaries of American novels, poems, and plays, with biographical notes of men and women of cultural significance, and brief descriptions of many topics from Indian tribes and early wars to current literary schools and prizes. Twenty-five pages of chronological index, with social and literary events in parallel columns, complete a rich mine of information and ready reference in the wide field of American culture — a fit companion to the Oxford Companions to Classical and to English literature.

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Unfortunately, however, after admitting that classifications are misleading, Mr. Howard goes to an unwarranted extreme in juxtaposing under the all too relative and general caption of "unfamiliar idioms", those composers such as Copland, Harris, Sessions, and Piston with something per-

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It is fairly clear that the author has not gone too far out of his way to investigate his subject matter and thereby minimize the difficulty. He relies upon the clarification that will be imposed upon him as a result of cumulative performances over a period of the years to come.

ARTHUR BERGER.

Mills College

MIRIAM SCHILD BUNIM: *Space in Medieval Painting and the Fore-runners of Perspective*. Columbia University Press, New York. 1940. IX, 261 pp.

A document of fine scholarship, uniting a panoramic view of its difficult object with a sober analysis of abundant detail. The selection of space as the leading problem testifies to the author's courage and feeling for the essential. The purpose of the study is "to present the development of space in the medieval period as a whole." But Miss Bunim actually describes the spatial character of painting from paleolithic times to the latest contemporary accomplishments. She stresses the point that the unrealistic trends of contemporary art have helped to rediscover so-called primitive periods whose art is — as she ambiguously puts it — "symbolically adequate." To these periods belong the Middle Ages.

However, Miss Bunim does not try to define the various symbolic relations and conditions of the medieval treatment of space. The difference of spatial characteristics are, she says, manifestations of fundamentally different conceptions of space. But she never leaves the field of strict description to venture into the vagueness of cultural interpretation. She limits her study rigorously to "a simple exposition of the spatial characteristics without a detailed analysis of the various cultural factors which may affect the representation of space." In this exposition she proceeds primarily by describing the role of the picture plane. In a supplementary way, she analyzes the spatial representation of objects and figures.

Miss Bunim distinguishes two chief types of space in medieval art, the stage space (i.e. "the limited depth resulting from the juxtaposition of two planes at right angles, one forming the ground, the other, the rear wall"), and the stratified space in which the picture plane is divided in horizontal color zones which preserve some representative function. The contribution of the medieval period as intermediary between Roman painting and Renaissance, was, first, "to transform the picture plane into a material and substantial pictorial surface which has an independent existence apart from the figures and objects and then to divide this positive and active pictorial agent into the essential planes of tridimensional space upon which the Renaissance could elaborate". (pp. 179 ff.).

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While for the historian of art this very handsomely bound book will undoubtedly prove most valuable, the aesthete profits by it in one important respect: he will learn that artistic space is still far from being understood. Miss Bunim's concept of picture plane, though technically helpful in the analysis of space, covers a bundle of functions among which she does not always clearly distinguish. The picture plane is the carrier of the work of art proper; it is the "window into the unreal"; it is the surface plane of the space represented; it is the representing sensuous pattern; it can be a neutral "nothing", and it can even be the background. But it is never the represented space itself. Here much phenomenological work is still to be done, before the historian of art can safely pursue the ambitious task of describing the development of artistic space.

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¹ *In this connection Miss Bunim goes so far as to say that "new spatial concepts are the result of continual modification"!*

DONALD A. STAUFFER: *The Art of Biography in Eighteenth Century England*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1941, Vol. I, XIV, 572 pp. Vol. II. *Bibliographical Supplement*. VIII, 293 pp.

The extraordinary conscientiousness with which the author has collected and registered the valuable material of ten years of research commands so high a respect, that a reviewer cannot but hesitate in making a few suggestions on the author's *presentation* of the material.

The biographies collected by Stauffer embrace the period from the first of January, 1701 to the thirty first of December, 1800 (Cf. Stauffer's Chronological Table in Vol. II, pp. 285-293).

However, the eighteenth century includes the last decades of, let me call it, the blooming period of the Western European *court culture* (approximately 1550-1720), then the rapid decay of this culture (about 1720-1750), and finally the rise of a totally new, the *bourgeois* culture, which did not end on December 31 of the year 1880 — history unfortunately does not care about the calendar — but continued through the whole of the nineteenth century and even through the first decades of the twentieth century. It was not before 1920 that the bourgeois culture began to draw near its end.

In his mechanical delimitation (eighteenth century) Stauffer consequently ignored the periods and the caesuras which history herself has made within the periods. He took herewith the individualistic attitude of the specialist, who is exclusively interested in the single, isolated facts and not at all in the whole of life, to which the facts inseparably belong, so that they cannot be understood without their integration into the whole.

This attitude is, of course, justified, but then the author should have confined himself to the simple statement of the facts. In that he went beyond the statement, his interpretation of the facts, independent of the whole of life, could not but recoil on the author.

This is seen clearly in Stauffer's grouping of the facts. The available space does not allow me to expatiate. Therefore one typical example may suffice. The third Chapter of his book bears the title: "Biography and the Romantic Spirit".

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The extraordinary conscientiousness with which the author has collected and registered the valuable material of ten years of research commands so high a respect, that a reviewer cannot but hesitate in making a few suggestions on the author's *presentation* of the material.

The biographies collected by Stauffer embrace the period from the first of January, 1701 to the thirty first of December, 1800 (Cf. Stauffer's Chronological Table in Vol. II, pp. 285-293).

However, the eighteenth century includes the last decades of, let me call it, the blooming period of the Western European *court culture* (approximately 1550-1720), then the rapid decay of this culture (about 1720-1750), and finally the rise of a totally new, the *bourgeois* culture, which did not end on December 31 of the year 1880 — history unfortunately does not care about the calendar — but continued through the whole of the nineteenth century and even through the first decades of the twentieth century. It was not before 1920 that the bourgeois culture began to draw near its end.

In his mechanical delimitation (eighteenth century) Stauffer consequently ignored the periods and the caesuras which history herself has made within the periods. He took herewith the individualistic attitude of the specialist, who is exclusively interested in the single, isolated facts and not at all in the whole of life, to which the facts inseparably belong, so that they cannot be understood without their integration into the whole.

This attitude is, of course, justified, but then the author should have confined himself to the simple statement of the facts. In that he went beyond the statement, his interpretation of the facts, independent of the whole of life, could not but recoil on the author.

This is seen clearly in Stauffer's grouping of the facts. The available space does not allow me to expatiate. Therefore one typical example may suffice. The third Chapter of his book bears the title: "Biography and the Romantic Spirit".

Stauffer has taken Romanticism not in the strict sense it had during the first part of the nineteenth century. Romanticism was then the reaction to the miserable conditions in Western Europe, primarily in consequence of the Napoleonic wars; so we have to define it as an escape from the unbearable reality and a flight into an unreal world of dreams and sentiments and feelings, in order to find there the happiness, which real life refused. Romanticism is for Stauffer "dominance of imagination, in contradiction to the dominance of reason implied in Classicism" (p. 165). All sorts of questions crop up immediately. How can Stauffer speak of a dominance of imagination just in the second half of the eighteenth century, a period which the whole scientific world has unanimously called the period of Classicism, in which, according to Stauffer himself, reason dominated? Were then there two "dominances" at the same time? This would mean that there were no dominances at all. We are completely driven from our moorings when we read the title of the next Chapter, which teaches us, that there was in the period of dominance of imagination "Knowledge Infinite"! The confusion increases, when Stauffer begins to "explain" what the dominance of imagination in this period-of-dominance-of-reason has brought about. The period of *Classicism* was a period of democracy, because "Romanticism tends toward democracy, as opposed to the aristocracy of classicism" (p. 16). "Romanticism makes all men important in the social system; its motto there is *égalité, fraternité*, (p. 167). Now we know at last where the French Revolution did come from. It was not an abrupt solution of the acute economic-social conditions of this period; no, the guillotine was another proof of the imagination! The sentimentality of the second half of the eighteenth century was likewise a product of the imagination. Why? "Romanticism its motto there is *sensibilité*" (p. (167), etc.

Stauffer is a brilliant compiler. As a historian, however, he has, let me say, not succeeded. The great value of his publication lies in Vol. II. The grouping of his material and his further explanations in Vol. I are, to put it at the mildest, rather confusing.

LEO BALET.

Brooklyn College

JOHN CROWE RANSOME: *The New Criticism*. — New Directions: Norfolk, Conn. 1941. 339 pp.

This study, which defines the word *new* by the jacket subtitle: "An examination of the critical theories of I. A. Richards, T. S. Eliot, Yvor Winters, William Empson," begins with prefatory praise of R. P. Blackmur as exemplifying those already combining the best of the new techniques. These consist mainly in a closer examination, with all the resources of the new psychology and the new semantics afford, of the work of art itself. Richards, with his pupil Empson, is listed as the psychological critic; Eliot, as the historical; Winters, as the logical. The approach of each is sympathetically described and critically examined, with many quotations; each is found of value, yet with the inevitable straying of pioneers. In Winters the author finds, as well, "the moralistic illusion." Especially in the essay on Winters, too, the writer is busily trying "to take the critical principles out clean from the muddle", i.e., indicating his own preferences among the dicta of the critics examined. These personal desires become explicit in the final essay, "Wanted: An Ontological Critic", wherein the author,

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after preliminary praise of the semantics of Charles W. Morris, seeks to illustrate the satisfaction of his own demand.

J. T. S.

LEDGER WOOD: *The Analysis of Knowledge*. Princeton University Press, 1941. 256 pp.

Here in brief compass, with keen analysis and lucid exposition, is the contemporary epic epistemic battle in which opposing theories are slain and a psychological theory of epistemology advanced to victory over both rationalism and empiricism, realism and idealism. Certainly a work which quotes more from James's "Psychology" than from any one else presents a challenge to the epistemologist. The author has succeeded in performing a task long needed; namely, equating the results of psychological analysis with progress in theory of knowledge. With this psychological background, Professor Wood rounds out a consistent view of sensory knowledge, perception of things, perceptual memory, introspective knowledge, knowledge of other selves, conceptual knowledge, categorical knowledge and formal knowledge with a theory which he aptly characterizes as referential or intentional. From this standpoint he can say much without becoming bogged by ontologic possibilities. This leaves him with a recognizable pragmatic approach. When he turns to valuational knowledge, he leaves the student of aesthetics to draw his own conclusions, and an interesting task it would be, for he uses ethics as an example of his postulational theory of value, and indicates that his argument could be equally applied to the field of aesthetics. He concludes with a referential, intentional correspondence theory of truth as distinguished from a mere representational view. This work was well received in England and should find here an equally important niche in current epistemological literature.

LESTER E. DENONN.

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One finds this master of the early seventeenth century in almost every history of Japanese art under the name of Nitten. Some of his paintings rank among the best known examples of Chinese inspired monochromes. Fujimori depicts his hero primarily as a swordsman, the role for which he is most famous historically. He had founded a special school of the sword and left treatises about its technique, about warfare, administration and the attitude towards life. His mastery of weapon, brush and chisel were deeply anchored in the teachings of the contemplation sects of Buddhism, whose influence on this age of the roaming knight can not be overrated.

Among the merits of this colorful study, the reproduction of little known paintings should not be overlooked. Some of them still belong to the Hosokawa family which had employed the painter-warrior.

ALFRED SALMONY.

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For a long time the textiles in the Imperial household Collections in Japan have been of unbounded interest to the Western scholar, but the birth of scholarly studies has not contributed to the general enlightenment. It is therefore a surprise to find a scientific and comprehensive survey of the textiles in a small booklet in a thoroughly accessible form. Here we have an excellent summary of the history of Japanese weaving dating from the Asuka Period (552-644 A.D.). There is a clear exposition of historical development of weaving in Japan with its proper relation to the Korean and Chinese background; there is a scientific understanding and analysis of textile weaving, as well as a satisfactory explanation of the more frequent Japanese terms. All of it is bound together with reference to textile design and its significance. Truly we can not hope to find a more concise treatise, and we only hope the author keeps his word to place before us a larger exposition patterned upon this model and more extensive in scope.

ALVENA SECKAR.

GORHAM, HAZEL H.: *Netsuke, Their Origin and Development. Nippon Bunka Chuo Renmei, Tokyo, 1938, 26 pp.*

The title promises more than the pamphlet gives. Handicapped by the small size, the author gives little more to the task than a collector's love. She lacks the ability to press the diversified problems connected with the subject into a lucid and logical sequence. The Chinese origin of the netsuke, traceable to the T'ang period, is neglected. No development can be deduced from the mere enumeration of materials and schools. However, the explanations of Japanese terms used for the different types, incomplete as they are, may be of some use to the beginning collector.

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signs." He shows how the work of his master reflects his visionary political convictions, his devotion to Chinese tradition, and his interest in the achievements of Western art. As a result, Mr. Fujimori succeeds in bringing to life a painter who was more than "one of the many masters of his age."

ALFRED SALMONY.

MICHAEL GOLD: *The Hollow Men*. New York. International Publishers. 1941. 128 pp.

This irritating book originally appeared as a series of articles in the Daily Worker under the title "The Great Tradition: Can the Literary Renegades Destroy It?" It attempts to convince by a clatter of invective and abuse; its smugness is remarkable, as though extravagant contempt automatically conferred reasonableness or truth. It uses the rhetoric of the soap-box reformer, whether Billy Sunday or Hitler: "renegades," "cockroach aristocrats", "lackey traitors".

As literary criticism the book is inconsequential; as Marxist analysis it seems to this reviewer a shabby approximation — even the New Masses called it "one-sided". The book implies that the measure of a piece of contemporary literature and the integrity of the writer are determined — indeed, it is only on this basis that they are tolerable — by their "service" to "the people" ("the people", of course, being those who fall into Mr. Gold's scheme of things). Style, literary and aesthetic aims, technical innovation, and all the other preoccupations of the literary craftsman fall by the way: sheer subjectivism, wilfulness.

The author, and others likeminded, ignore or minimize the fact that, when they persist too long in one direction, literature and the other arts grow inane through the progressive deterioration of techniques and expressive power. If some writers do not devote themselves to the task of keeping language and literary expression from going dead, others will not be effective agents for any cause, through lack of proper tools. The forcefulness and effectiveness of much of the writing of the '30's (which Mr. Gold likes) derives largely from the experimentation and "aestheticism" of the '20's (which he does not like).

One will agree that "the rise of proletarian and Communist ideas" in America had great influence on our writing. But to claim for the rise of these ideas (itself not a primary cause, but a consequence) a unique importance in the formation of the art and literature of the '30's, is to make a mockery of "scientific" analysis.

Mr. Gold does not attempt to describe what he means by "The Great Tradition"; he alludes to "the democratic spirit of Walt Whitman". One learns that the "unbridled individualism of capitalism" can be traced in the "lack of human feeling, the absence of love for people that is such a major strain in modern bourgeois literature"; and then we find Hemingway manhandled because, in "For Whom the Bell Tolls", "he is forever searching for excuses for them (the Spanish fascists); he wants to find the 'humanity' in these people". One does not yield to Mr. Gold in his hatred of Fascism, yet certainly "a love of humankind" must lead to the discovery of motives and actions, whatever they may be; Fascists are people, too, no matter how black the shirt or the heart.

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ALFRED SALMONY.

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This irritating book originally appeared as a series of articles in the Daily Worker under the title "The Great Tradition: Can the Literary Renegades Destroy It?" It attempts to convince by a clatter of invective and abuse; its smugness is remarkable, as though extravagant contempt automatically conferred reasonableness or truth. It uses the rhetoric of the soap-box reformer, whether Billy Sunday or Hitler: "renegades," "cockroach aristocrats," "lackey traitors".

As literary criticism the book is inconsequential; as Marxist analysis it seems to this reviewer a shabby approximation — even the New Masses called it "one-sided". The book implies that the measure of a piece of contemporary literature and the integrity of the writer are determined — indeed, it is only on this basis that they are tolerable — by their "service" to "the people" ("the people", of course, being those who fall into Mr. Gold's scheme of things). Style, literary and aesthetic aims, technical innovation, and all the other preoccupations of the literary craftsman fall by the way: sheer subjectivism, wilfulness.

The author, and others likeminded, ignore or minimize the fact that, when they persist too long in one direction, literature and the other arts grow inane through the progressive deterioration of techniques and expressive power. If some writers do not devote themselves to the task of keeping language and literary expression from going dead, others will not be effective agents for any cause, through lack of proper tools. The forcefulness and effectiveness of much of the writing of the '30's (which Mr. Gold likes) derives largely from the experimentation and "aestheticism" of the '20's (which he does not like).

One will agree that "the rise of proletarian and Communist ideas" in America had great influence on our writing. But to claim for the rise of these ideas (itself not a primary cause, but a consequence) a unique importance in the formation of the art and literature of the '30's, is to make a mockery of "scientific" analysis.

Mr. Gold does not attempt to describe what he means by "The Great Tradition"; he alludes to "the democratic spirit of Walt Whitman". One learns that the "unbridled individualism of capitalism" can be traced in the "lack of human feeling, the absence of love for people that is such a major strain in modern bourgeois literature"; and then we find Hemingway manhandled because, in "For Whom the Bell Tolls", "he is forever searching for excuses for them (the Spanish fascists); he wants to find the 'humanity' in these people". One does not yield to Mr. Gold in his hatred of Fascism, yet certainly "a love of humankind" must lead to the discovery of motives and actions, whatever they may be; Fascists are people, too, no matter how black the shirt or the heart.

Despite the "lack of human feeling", the author points out that it was from "this same bourgeois class that the whole idea of democracy was born"; the Miltons, Voltaires, Diderots, Jeffersons, Lincolns and Walt Whitmans; also the Bill of Rights, the Declaration of the Rights of Man, the idea of Socialism, and other "vast treasuries of human culture." Which seems (even this scanty list) like a good deal.

—MILTON S. FOX

The Cleveland Museum of Art.

HELGE LUNDHOLM: *The Aesthetic Sentiment; A Criticism and an Original Excursion.* Cambridge, Sci-Art Publishers, 1941. 223 pp.

Professor Lundholm has approached aesthetics from its most forbidding side, — the demonstration and specification of what may broadly be termed an aesthetic mode of mind. This is certainly a psychological matter and it has at length received treatment from a psychologist. It has been a familiar topic especially in the hands of aestheticians who have worked "from the inside out," from the "subjective" motives and ideas of the artist and spectator to the "objective" natural scene or work of art. Emphasis should be placed on the fact that the topic is here approached deliberately as subject-matter of psychology and the "aesthetic sentiment" — for which there are of course numerous other synonyms in the literature — is at any rate not taken for granted as Clive Bell did "the aesthetic emotion." The "sentiment" is wisely left for definition to the later portion of the work after a psychological background has been provided for it. The preliminary analysis is necessary to indicate Professor Lundholm's general psychological position on such matters as cognition, motivation and conation.

The influence of S. Alexander's aesthetic theory upon the work is large and so acknowledged by the author (p. 14). Part I is devoted to a brief exposition of Alexander's opinions on "the aesthetic impulse" and the objectivity of beauty. He shows here, as later, dissatisfaction with Alexander's notion of "contemplation" as definitive of the impulse, insisting upon a more psychologically refined analysis of it (in the sense of providing psychological categories and theory), and upon a thoroughgoing distinction between the aesthetic activity of the artist and of the spectator which Alexander avoided.

The psychological theory is presented in occasionally complex terminology and often on a level of abstraction (as in Chapters VII and VIII on the theory of curiosity) which demands of the reader the patience to make his own concrete applications as he goes. The theory may be described as purposive throughout. Cognition is no passive register of fact. "No cognition occurs unless prompted by some interest or conation . . ." (p. 48). What the author calls artificial cognition is, however, said to be in part "contemplative" in Alexander's sense, "no longer serving practical purposes," (p. 49). The conative element here is "a drive that stirs one to cognize relations, as it were, for its own sake." (p. 61) This type of cognition has as its objects the subject-matter of logic and mathematics and also aesthetic objects. Two points of similarity between the two fields are discerned by the author: (1) both show "deference" to

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certain laws, (2) both show "deference" to certain things taken as basic and developing out of them (as theorems do from postulates).

As laws of aesthetics we are given such examples as closure, *crescendo-diminuendo* ("the relating activity in any kind of art" (p. 93), thesis-antithesis-synthesis and in general the idealistic criterion of unity-in-variety. The author clearly believes in a "dependence of beauty upon strict law" (p. 94), and, in revised approval of Birkhoff's aesthetic measure in terms of order and complexity, maintains that "beauty, in its most fundamental aspect, is independent of style and transcends time and cultural epoch." (p. 176). But aside from the reference to Birkhoff, the author nowhere presents us with any usable specific "laws of beauty", and this greatest will-o'-the-wisp of aesthetics since its very beginning seems to be still at large.

The other analogy between logic and aesthetics is to be found in the "dominant" — a feature pervading each work of art, at once effective and pattern-forming, unifying the work of art. "Unity in art depends essentially upon the operation of all form-elements in one and the same cardinal emotional direction." This "law of the dominant" at once suggests the author's kinship with the idealistic school of aesthetics. The "dominant" of logic is, however, acknowledged to be different from the aesthetic dominant since the "logical act" lacks "affective tone." (p. 125). A further analogy is suggested with "the cognitive act of the laboratory subject" in psychological (introspective) experiment. But the upshot of these comparisons is that the formal elements are never precisely specified, and in the end the unification of form turns out not to be formal at all but effective. This notion of affective unity, or unity-in-variety, has acquired a status in aesthetics not so much by constant verification and exemplification but by the sheer repeated insistence upon it by the organistic school and by others far less subtle. There can, in short, be nothing new on that score until someone shows us just how it works. And until then it is, to say the least, asking too much to call it a "law." On the other hand, the author's idea that the artist in threading his way through alternatives of action in producing his work "rules out option from the progress of the cognitive act" (of the spectator) is really valuable and constructive. One would like to see it developed more fully and fortified with concrete examples.

The treatment of the idea of curiosity in connection with aesthetics seems the most original and important part of Professor Lundholm's essay. The "aesthetic sentiment" itself is identified with "general curiosity" which aims "at the sheer understanding of object-object relations of an infinite variety of kinds." Other types of "general impulses" (as distinguished from instincts and special sentiments) are "deference", which is the "conative agency in all belief", and sleep. (The linking of deference with belief emphasizes a somewhat neglected psychological aspect of the subject which one would like to hear more about.) The function of the "laws of beauty" according to Professor Lundholm is to effect restrictions within the field where object-object relations are contemplated, thus diverting these acts "from the most parsimonious forms of dissociative-asso-

ciative selection" which are the rule in practical (non-aesthetic) means-end situations. Thus "freedom and ease" are curiously brought into the aesthetic situation by the same agency which bridles it with "restrictions" and freedom-within-the-law becomes an adjunct to unity-in-variety.

Even with this cosmic leap in mind, "inspiration" is taken rather seriously toward the end and rests, to say the least, upon highly problematical metaphysical assumptions, both explicit and implicit. Inspiration, he says, "might be the reflection or sharing of the attitude of a supreme being, perhaps of a supreme being to whom the contemplative state is the natural state because he is too omnipotent and omniscient to have suffered struggle or agony." (page 220).

A general appraisal of this work should take note of the fresh point of view which is brought to bear upon an old subject-matter and which especially in the concept of curiosity may open up a new direction for psychological aesthetic analysis.

—KARL ASCHENBRENNER

Reed College

HARDIN CRAIG (Editor): *Stanford Studies in Language and Literature*: 1941; (Commemorating Fiftieth Anniversary of the Founding of Standard University. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1941.

This, like most *Festschriften*, is a highly miscellaneous miscellany. There is in it scholarship — critical, historical and philological. Also there is some diverting anecdote and some rather purple "appreciation." The volume opens with an article on the historical spirit, an able and widely ranging "meditation" as the author, Albert Guérard, modestly calls it, on large issues. There follows A. G. Kennedy's amusing account of the rough-and-tumble of early Anglo-Saxon scholarship, which in turn, is followed by studies on a Spanish ballad in New Mexico, on familiar figurative expressions, on the cultural background of the baroque in Germany, etc., etc. The book concludes with an article on diplomats in modern French literature.

Even if one were widely enough interested and widely enough informed to give all the various articles in this various book a capable reading, it would still be impossible to pass judgment on it as a whole for two reasons: first, because it is in no wise unitary, second, because there is no meaningful standard whereby anniversary miscellanies may be judged, which is perhaps another way of saying that there is no very good reason for their existence. There are valuable items in this *mélange*; one would want to send various students to Phillip Harsh's article on deeds of violence in Greek tragedy (another bit of proof that the "rules" actually were "discovered, not devised") to Merrel D. Clubb's lively account of how the critics have missed (and occasionally got) the point of the Houyhnhnms; one would like to read again Emily Pearson's curious description of Elizabethan widowhood, and possibly Arthur Hicks's glowing, though hardly significant, account of how well *The Cenci* "acted" in Bellingham, Washington. It is hard to see, though, why they should be all together in *Stanford Studies*. The gathering of special articles in special series, or the endowment of anniversary vol-

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University of California.

ERNEST LESLIE HIGHBARGER: *The Gates of Dreams*. An Archaeological Examination of Vergil, *Aeneid* VI, 893-899. (The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Archaeology, No. 30.) Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1940. 136 pp.; 8 plates.

Homer tells us of the gates of dreams, one of horn and one of ivory, through which, respectively, true and false dreams pass. Virgil, too, mentions these gates, telling us that Aeneas and the Sibyl left Elysium through the ivory gate. Hitherto no more than a play on words has been seen in Homer's two gates of dreams. But Dr. Highbarger attempts to prove a respectable antiquity for both with antecedents in Egypt and Babylonia. He amasses a huge amount of archaeological and literary material to support his conjectures. He argues that the horn gate was in origin a gate of horns, the sky-bull's horns through which men passed to the west, the realm of the dead; true dreams and ghosts are identical, and the gate of horns is the gate of Hades' House. I believe that he is right in respect to this gate.

But he has much more difficulty with the ivory gate, whose origin he wishes to find in the Egyptian and Mesopotamian gates of the rising sun, and I am more dubious about his conclusions. The gate of heaven and of Elysium, of life and joy, turns out to be the gate of false dreams. And there is no trace of ivory in the eastern gates of the earlier civilisations. I think it more likely that the Greeks made a pun on 'ivory' to correspond to their pun on 'horn.'

In his zeal to establish his conclusions Dr. Highbarger leads us to think that all gates in antiquity had something to do with hell or heaven; we would suppose that to all ancients the eastern and western gates were the very archetype of gate. He seems not to realise how

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commonplace the imagery of gates could become soon after the first gates were built.

He falls into the ancient error of associating Apollo with the sun. He talks much of a "garden of Phoebus", mentioned but once in a fragment of Sophocles, and identifies it with both Elysium and the garden of the Sun on the flimsiest evidence. The verses of Stesichorus that he adduces in support of his garden of Phoebus merely tell us that at sunset Apollo entered his sacred laurel grove.

His phrase 'suffering men' (page 7 and elsewhere) is a mistranslation of the Greek phrase, which means exhausted, worn-out men, that is, dead men.

—JOSEPH E. FONTENROSE

University of California.

MAITLAND GRAVES: *The Art of Color and Design*. New York: McGraw-Hill Co. 1941. 292 pp.

The point of view toward art which underlies this book is one that is prominent among many artists and critics of the time, though not held by all of them by any means. It is the attitude that art is entirely and intrinsically concerned with "surface", with lines, textures, colors, and other "elements" in organization and arrangements which have unity, repetition, harmony or some other quality. This point of view is stated plainly and directly in this book and it is assumed in the treatment throughout. In the opening chapter Mr. Graves dismisses "representational art" in three paragraphs. "The effect of the subject-matter of a picture lies on its appeal to reason, that is, upon our ability to recognize or perceive its meaning." (page 3). We know that the objects and space are illusory and "do not exist". In contrast to this, "a line, shape, texture or color is a concrete actuality. They are more real than the objects they represent. Their effect does not depend upon an appeal to our intellect but to our primary instincts, which are deeper, more fundamental . . . they evoke a direct, vigorous response." (page 3-4). This complete denial of the worth of the representational in art is found again in his attitude toward contemporary art, where he states that "Perhaps never before have artists been so devoid of common ideals and criteria. Esoteric cults and antagonistic "isms" such as Cubism, Vorticism, Dadaism, and Surrealism" have created new tensions and much confusion." (page 5). What is the treatment for this confused state in the body artistic? "It would seem evident therefore, that design principles and terminology need to be clarified and integrated on the basis of common experience, common understanding. On this neutral ground of reason the conservative and the radical artist may meet and exchange mutually helpful ideas." (page vi). For "all art, Modern, Primitive, Classical, or Oriental is built on a few simple, fundamental principles of structure. This common basis is the key to understanding." (page vii). When we inquire what these are we are told that there are five Principles of Design: repetition, harmony, gradation, contrast, and unity. These relation the seven elements: line, direction, shape, proportion, texture, value, and color. These are the "materials" of the artist, for he "builds with line, shape and color. It is upon the organization of these elements that the success of any composition depends." (page vii).

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Now leaving aside the naive view that divergences between movements in modern as provocative of created works and as lively as cubism and surrealism can be settled by a common discussion between artists over the meaning of terms such as unity and harmony and the agreement on the "principles of design", which here means the location of objects in the picture field, and the questionable use of many terms — how is a line "more real" than an object it represents? — let us attend to the basic idea here, which is, that the *only interests* in art are those which are concerned with the "surface" characteristics of the work: its colors, lines, and shapes *apart from and independent of the entities which they portray or present*, and their arrangements on the picture area. The stuff with which the artist works are our interests in the point-at-able lines and colors and groupings *in and for themselves*. It is solely out of these that he creates the works of art which stir and move us.

It seems almost incomprehensible to the reviewer that such an aesthetic theory would be considered after a moment's reflection. The complete denial of meaning because the entity which is depicted is illusory and not "real" seems incredible, as is the idea that because they are illusory they do not move us, they appeal only to our reason. If Mr. Graves were speaking only of decorative design we could follow him, though with many reservations. But his attitude suggests and his explicit statements reveal clearly that he is not. He is concerned with "all art, Modern, Primitive, Classical, or Oriental." And in all his illustrations of paintings and drawings, ranging from archaic Greek vase paintings to Hiroshige prints and modern commercial art, his only analysis and discussion of these works is in terms of their "surface" characteristics, with never a comment on their human interests through the things they portray or the attitudes they reveal.

There is the missing factor, the "human interests". Certainly in decorative art, the eye-beguiling, attracting sort of art, surface is almost all-important. But equally as certainly in art which represents entities of all sorts, the power and impact of the work comes from the *significance of that entity* — be it man or woman or landscape — to the perceiving and responding individual, and from his recognition of the *attitude the artist took toward the entity* which is revealed through the lines, colors and arrangement of it in the picture area and the manner in which they endow and characterize it with qualities and properties. It seems impossible that a print such as "Rain" by Hiroshige, which Mr. Graves discusses can be "analyzed" in toto into "oblique lines" and "movements" and "visual attractions". Why, here are men in the rain on a hill with the storm beating down. We are interested in their doings, the effect of the rain and wind on them, the beating trees, the houses huddled in the hollow, the imminence of winter in the air. These are the "materials" of the artist, our interests as humans in things like these which are part of our lives — not just lines, shapes or what-not neatly disposed with "unity" and "harmony."

The development of the book follows simply from the initial premise. All art consists in "design", in the organization in various ways of the Elements, lines, shapes, and so forth. Various "recipes" are given for securing harmony of colors and values, and for surface location. For surface division and proportion, the Golden Mean and Dynamic Symmetry are more or less followed. For values and colors, an elaborate

color scheme has been worked out so that any simpleton can secure "proper" colors for his work. However helpful such simplifications may be to the young student, and I am not too confident that they are, they are not enough by far. For we need an aesthetic theory for our art education that pays proper attention to human interests and values and their incorporation in works of art. As humans certain entities and objects concern us. The artist can present these directly or by using color and lines and arrangements can assume certain attitudes toward them which we understand and share. Such an aesthetic theory as the pragmatism of Dewey and the contextualism of Pepper provide a congenial framework for such a stand in art education. But its development can only be taken up in another place.

—E.N.B.

EDWARD DAHLBERG: *Do These Bones Live?* New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1941.

Mr. Dahlberg's essays are an excellent example of "creative enthusiasm". The language is that of impassioned prose and reveals an accomplished and acute literary scholar. Its tone, as the title suggests, has a "Waste Land" bitterness. He presents a penetrating review of American literature, suggesting slightly the approach of William Carlos Williams' "In the American Grain." But Mr. Dahlberg's writing is more rhapsodical and does not present the mass of factual material which gives to Dr. Williams' book such actuality. The charnel-house mood, incidentally, is Mr. Dahlberg's.

In an essay on Thoreau and Walden, Mr. Dahlberg argues in favor of Christian anarchy and would convince us of the irrationality of human thinking. Furthermore, he insists that we have in its place something which I would say is very much like blood-thinking — so much for the chirping of dry bones, which are not only beastly dead, but well dead.

In later essays one reads that all "states", Communist, Fascist, and Democratic, are unreservedly evil, and that throughout history politics has been only a demon hoax. Furthermore, the proletarian illusion places the Masses upon a sacrificial altar, so irredeemably is man lost in superstition. We have nothing to look for in organized religion. Each man is left to devour himself in a solipsistic eucharist.

The most brilliant essay in the book is on Woman, and includes a valuable analysis of Herman Melville. This writing is the closest to sustained literary criticism. The *dramatis personae* of this book is culled from world literature and Mr. Dahlberg recreates each character with remarkable vividness. The imagination burns fiercely in this work, and although I am entranced by the beauty of the writing, I must confess that I feel that the fire is kindled of books and gives off but little light.

—LLOYD J. REYNOLDS

Reed College

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Prof. Beach has a thorough knowledge of the technique of the novel. So skillfully does he lay bare the intricate organism of each book that we are led to understand and appreciate the characteristics of the writing without awareness of being told. Here is literary criticism in the classical style. Its purpose is not to stand between the reader and the book, recreating the original, but rather to act as a guide. Mr. Beach has done an excellent job. If there is any fault to find with this book it is in his hazy knowledge of the views of organized labor. This leads to misconceptions and omissions. One instance is his ignoring of the fact that "For Whom The Bell Tolls" has been roundly damned as a travesty of the Loyalist cause. The accusation raises a basic question in aesthetic criticism. The essay on Hemingway would be the richer for his facing the issue.

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CLARENCE DeWITT THORPE: *The Aesthetic Theory of Thomas Hobbes*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 1940, 339 pp.

As the author points out in his preface, the importance of Hobbes in the evolution of aesthetic theory has for a long time been overlooked. Neither Saintsbury nor Bosanquet in their standard works so much as mentions his name. Several more recent writers have contributed brief studies of phases of his aesthetics, but until the present volume was published there was no one who had sorted out and put together the miscellaneous but extremely important theories of Hobbes in this field.

The book throughout gives evidence of the fine scholarship of its author. Hobbes wrote only two essays in literary criticism: *The Answer to Davenant* and *The Virtues Of An Heroic Poem*. But he was deeply interested in literature and was friendly with a number of writers, among whom were Jonson, Cowley and Davenant. This interest was made evident by a large number of references both direct and indirect to the nature of literary creativeness scattered widely through his works. As is to be expected, these references were made for the

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most part in the interest of some other matter Hobbes was intent upon. A considerable part of Professor Thorpe's accomplishment consists in carefully noticing the contexts in which the passages occur, separating, and then correlating them. The result shows certain nearly incurable inconsistencies and ambiguities. There are several quite different definitions of fancy and imagination. There is a good deal of wavering about the relation of fancy to judgment in the creative process. In one notable passage Hobbes contradicts other remarks by talking like Sidney when he gives credit to the poet for most of the benefits of civilization. But the total result is not incoherent; the main strands of thought are relatively firm and are very illuminating.

'Fancy' appears as the name given to the process of selecting and combining; 'imagination' to the vivid calling of images from memory; 'judgment' to the power to discriminate and distinguish. Once these meanings become located in Hobbes, the nature of their importance as well as their use up to the time of Coleridge becomes much more clear. The theory of pleasure, too, looks forward particularly to Coleridge. The central point is that pleasure is essentially an extension of experience, a response which relates the immediate perception to the accumulated images of the past and makes for a richer response to future experiences.

The book is written almost entirely in terms of Hobbes' theories. Professor Thorpe did not intend to make specific personal applications of the ideas he so clearly sets forth. He is writing, however, primarily for literary people rather than philosophers, and literary people have a tendency to think concretely, in terms of literary material itself, rather than abstractly. The useful distinction between judgment and fancy would have been clearer if it had been abundantly illustrated. The two terms describe parts of the poetic process. Do these parts occur simultaneously or in sequence? Is a poet's change of an image in his manuscript necessarily an example of judgment or fancy? A detailed examination of short passages would have been illuminating. Take, for example, Gray's lines to the *Elegy*:

No children run to lip their sire's return,
Or climb his knees the envied kiss to share.

An earlier manuscript has 'coming' instead of 'envied.' 'Coming' indicates mere futurity and adds nothing to the activity of the image; it does not even suggest that the paternal kiss is desirable. 'Envied' starts a relevant 'trayne of imaginations' as Hobbes would put it: the contest between the children and the desirability of the reward. I suppose that this is a simple but genuine act of 'fancy.' In another passage, Gray has,

Hands that the rod of empire might have swayed . . .

He had substituted 'rod' for an earlier 'reins.' At first glance the two images might seem somewhat alike; but on second thought they are very different. The image of driving a horse is changed to that of holding a sceptre. Moreover, 'swayed' is an inexact description of manipulating reins. This seems to be an example of 'judgment' which distinguishes between two things apparently similar. Or, are these two suggestions wrong, and is there an element of both fancy and judgment present in every poetic act? The nature of critical terminology

becomes really clear only when it is put to work.

The objection might be made that the author is over scrupulous both in giving specific credit for ideas somewhat generally held and in establishing certain of his basic points. The passage in which he shows that Hobbes, although conveniently tagged as a rationalist can also be regarded as an empiricist is unnecessarily long, and was written, I suspect, as a defense against possible future carpers. In a number of places the reading is slowed by similar substantiations. It is also slowed by an occasional heaviness of style.

But these objections are trifling. Both the account of Hobbes' thought and the series of chapters on his influence are very illuminating. His contribution to the understanding of Dryden is particularly good. Formerly, Dryden presented the picture of a man of fine critical ability struggling with a critical method which was too formalistic and rigid to be satisfactory and at the same time having a good deal of respect for that method. It will be remembered that if Dryden admired variety and vitality in the drama, he also liked the 'regularity' of the old unities. Professor Thorpe has shown convincingly that Dryden, either directly or through Charleston, made use of many of the specific ideas of Hobbes and that these furnished him useful support for his opposition to the older theory.

The present book is very valuable and there is a great need for more like it. There is still far too much criticism which contents itself with the description of the adventures of a man's soul; such adventures are mildly interesting in a clinical way, but they are almost always uninforming. Criticism flourishes only when it feeds on adjoining fields. It needs to cultivate and use the products of psychology, philosophy and sociology before it can have a valuable body of its own. Professor Thorpe's book is one of too few which serves this need.

—GORDON MCKENZIE

University of California

DONALD FRANCIS TOVEY: *A Musician Talks*. Oxford University Press, 1941. 2 Volumes. Volume 1, *The Integrity of Music*, 161 pp.; Volume 2, *Musical Textures*, 89 pp.

The fundamental thesis stressed by the late Reid Professor of Music in the University of Edinburgh is that "there is no such thing as Art with a capital A." Art in general "consists in the integrity of each individual work of art." This belief may account for the fact that Tovey's published writings during his lifetime consisted largely of description, definition and analysis of particulars. His scholarly articles in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, essays on chamber music, annotated editions and program notes seldom start with generalizations into which details are fitted. These two little posthumous volumes, reprints of lectures delivered at the University of Glasgow in 1936 and the University of Liverpool in 1938 are almost the only writings in which Tovey tried to state his philosophy of music in general terms.

Even in these lectures, as the editor notes, Tovey needed the "tinder of performance" to fan the spark of verbal statement; we are warned that 'only those who were present at the delivery of the lectures can by comparison with this text have a real sense of how Tovey illuminated his words with the magic of his pianoforte playing.'

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Even so, the artist speaks truly when he reminds musicians and teachers of some eternal verities in pedagogy. Volume I is valuable for its development of the idea that musical works of art can express "our faith in the possibility of wholeness and coherence" (p. 6), but that it is a type of wholeness in time too often confused with that other wholeness found in the arts of space. (I, Lecture VII). Volume II makes a real contribution in pressing home the fact that fugue is not form, but texture; that the pendulum swing in music history came about when interest was transferred from texture to shape; that the "shapes" of music came to be studied as forms and formulas with a consequent misunderstanding of the principles involved.

—WARREN D. ALLEN

ERIC GILL: *Autobiography*. New York. Devin-Adair Co. 1941. 300 pp. and 25 plates of sculpture, woodcuts and drawings.

This is not just another book by an "artist" about himself and his feelings and failings. It is not to exhibit himself, but to talk "shop" that he occupies the stage. The book is the picture of a man "naturally inclined by justice to consider the good of the work to be done" (St. Thomas Aquinas) and therefore at war with a world no less naturally inclined by injustice to consider in the case of utilities (applied art) only their saleability, and in the case of inutilities (fine arts) only their value as means to irrational pleasure, commonly described as "aesthetic appreciation."

There is very little in his fierce criticism of a chaotic society governed by market values, or in his criticism of the failings of a Church of which he was virtually a member even before he joined it, with which many will disagree. But unlike most of us who may agree with him, he refused to compromise, and actually succeeded in living reasonably in an age of unreason.

"I did not believe," he says, "in Art or the art world . . . in yet another sense, I believed in art very much indeed . . . the artist as priest . . . art as *ritual* . . . But I was at variance with my high art friends. They were essentially aesthetes; that was the awful truth. What they really believed in and worked for was aesthetic emotion." It is striking that to speak of the artist as priest and of art as ritual recalls the very conditions under which, as a matter of fact, the greater part of the great work in the world has been done; the craftsman's vocation has been, actually, a "priesthood", and art a ritual, and has remained so in many lands until their culture patterns were destroyed by contact with our "civilisation." What he has to say about emotion is admirably illustrated in connection with the Gregorian Chant: "At the first impact I was so moved by the chant . . . as to be almost frightened. This was not ancient architecture such as the world had ceased to build . . . This was something alive . . . I knew, infallibly, that God existed and was a living God." This was certainly not an *aesthetic* emotion, but the shock of conviction that only an intellectual art can deliver. Nothing could be farther removed from this than the "appreciation" of music and the other arts to which the public is now persuaded by the exponents of culture; this is something far less fashionable, but also far more true to humanity. It is the shock of inevit-

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able truth, and not the shock of pleasure that we ought to expect from anything fit to be called great art, and the same in lesser degrees that we ought to expect in even the most utilitarian works of art.

To have been a skilled stone-mason and a maker of fair and legible scripts, and at the same time to live a perfectly normal or, as he would also have called it, a holy or sacramental life is all that Gill would have asked for from society on his own account. If, like Morris, he also became a preacher crying in a wilderness, it was not by choice, but because this was forced upon him by a world in which it is now very rarely possible to "do one's own work for which one is naturally fitted," and where also only the strongest minds can resist the pressure of a facile and all pervading scepticism.

Not the least interesting part of this American edition of the Autobiography is the printer's colophon. The intention was, within the limits possible, to make the book itself "a gesture of sincere regard for an artist who used letters in their dual function of form and meaning". It is said, too, that "The size used here, eleven point with two point space between lines, is related to page size, length of line, and bulk of volume, with the single purpose of presenting an important document without interference." That, I am sure, is a way of talking "shop" that McGill would have thoroughly approved of.

—ANANDA K. COOMARASWAMY

KENNETH BURKE: *The Philosophy of Literary Form; Studies in Symbolic Action.* University, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1941, 445 pp.

Approximately one-third of this work is a long essay, from the title of which the book takes its name, which has not previously been published. The remainder of the volume is composed of essays on various literary matters which have appeared in various periodicals, such as the "New Republic," "Southern Review," and "The Saturday Review of Literature," over a period of ten years or so. In addition to this compilation there is an appendix which includes a selection of shorter notes and reviews selected for their contribution to the main theme.

Mr. Burke is concerned with an analysis of the behavior of words in formal literature and in the rhetoric of daily speech. Following the "psychological approach" of I. A. Richards and influenced apparently by the pragmatist philosophy of Mead and Dewey, he undertakes an anatomizing of words as symbols operating in contexts. Some contexts are literary; some are not; some are the non-verbal settings and references that give the sentence full "meaning" and give the symbols their significance. In analyzing the symbolic actions and values of words, Burke is led to "psychological" and "social" forces and agencies in our culture, not neglecting those unconscious ones which the psychoanalyst traces, which give words their persuasive power. He is thus led to the development of a set of analytical terms for the dissection of the corpus of literary works and their ground in social and economic situations. He uses this analytical instrument in a neat dissection of the rhetoric of Hitler's "Mein Kampf" and of the literary works of S. T. Coleridge.

One cannot do justice in the space of a review to a work with such scope, falling as it does in the over-lapping fields of psychology,

able truth, and not the shock of pleasure that we ought to expect from anything fit to be called great art, and the same in lesser degrees that we ought to expect in even the most utilitarian works of art.

To have been a skilled stone-mason and a maker of fair and legible scripts, and at the same time to live a perfectly normal or, as he would also have called it, a holy or sacramental life is all that Gill would have asked for from society on his own account. If, like Morris, he also became a preacher crying in a wilderness, it was not by choice, but because this was forced upon him by a world in which it is now very rarely possible to "do one's own work for which one is naturally fitted," and where also only the strongest minds can resist the pressure of a facile and all pervading scepticism.

Not the least interesting part of this American edition of the Autobiography is the printer's colophon. The intention was, within the limits possible, to make the book itself "a gesture of sincere regard for an artist who used letters in their dual function of form and meaning". It is said, too, that "The size used here, eleven point with two point space between lines, is related to page size, length of line, and bulk of volume, with the single purpose of presenting an important document without interference." That, I am sure, is a way of talking "shop" that McGill would have thoroughly approved of.

—ANANDA K. COOMARASWAMY

KENNETH BURKE: *The Philosophy of Literary Form; Studies in Symbolic Action.* University, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1941, 445 pp.

Approximately one-third of this work is a long essay, from the title of which the book takes its name, which has not previously been published. The remainder of the volume is composed of essays on various literary matters which have appeared in various periodicals, such as the "New Republic," "Southern Review," and "The Saturday Review of Literature," over a period of ten years or so. In addition to this compilation there is an appendix which includes a selection of shorter notes and reviews selected for their contribution to the main theme.

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philosophy, aesthetics and the social studies, or even estimate with assurance the potential value of this approach for literary criticism or rhetorical analysis. But from similar analyses in other fields it certainly can be said that the analysis of symbols in many fields of human behavior has led to clarification of many problems and insight into many processes, and yet only a start has been made. Mr. Burke is one of the pioneers in the field of symbolic behavior in literature and effects an interesting tie-up with symbols persuasive in "social" fields. His work is very suggestive and despite a difficult and overly figurative style, surprising in an individual so sensitive to the needs of exactness in the use of words, presents his points cleanly and persuasively.

—E. N. B.

MACKINLEY HELM: *Modern Mexican Painters*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1941, 205 pp., 82 plates.

The rich and sturdy renaissance of the arts of painting and decoration in the republic to the south of us during the past twenty-five years has been a stirring phenomenon and one which has strongly affected our painters as well as our designers of commercial goods. In this book, magnificently illustrated with eighty-two full-page plates, Mr. Helm has traced the course of recent Mexican art in the lives and acts of its outstanding and influential painters. An art connoisseur and a trustee of the Boston Institute of Modern Art, Dr. Helm spent several years in Mexico working on this book. He knows personally most of the artists whom he discusses and has been able to write of their views and works with an intimate knowledge of the men themselves.

Of the outstanding figures in modern Mexican art the works of only three are widely known in this country. Rivera, Orozco, and Siqueiro's murals, lithographs and paintings are familiar to public and artist alike. But there are many other painters of distinction and importance, and Dr. Helm presents them to the reader through their careers and productions. He traces the development of Mexican painting from the influence of the semi-mythological Dr. Atl, through the various schools of neo-classicism, abstractionism, and surrealism, as well as in the work of those unique individuals who fall into no small category. The only comprehensive work of this scope available, this book should serve as a valuable introduction to the living artists south of the border.

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RALPH M. PEARSON: *The New Art Education*. New York: Harper and Bros. 1941. 256 pp. 187 illus.

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In his preface to this book on landscape architecture, the author says "There is real need for a new book that deals more broadly with the field and at the same time takes into account the changes of our modern life." To this statement, with which one must agree heartily, we must add with regret that by no stretch of the imagination can this book be what is needed.

It is difficult to see, considering the scope and treatment of the work, for whom it will be of value. Certainly it is not written in a style to intrigue the layman to read it. The professional landscape architect does not need it for he knows the value of his work and does not need to have it 'sold' to him, and he cannot practice his labors without knowing much more than is given here. It might be used on the beginning student in a professional course in landscape architecture. And it would have some value for reference and vocational training in a high school library. Here indeed it might fit in very well. For it does indicate the scope of the work of the landscape architect, brings in the many considerations that affect his plans and executions, and gives references for specialized study and illustrates with a large number of pictures, though rather small, various types of garden and landscape treatment. For high school or vocational school students who are interested in the subject as a possible career and want to know more about it this book would serve as an introduction with some effectiveness.

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Professor Parker has made an excellent beginning at a Milton allusion-book—he states frankly in his Preface that it is only a beginning—including facsimile reprints of several rare tracts attacking Milton. To the collection of allusions he has prefixed an extensive and most interesting introductory essay, in which he traces the development of Milton's reputation during the poet's lifetime. He concludes that in spite of the flurry of attacks on the divorce tracts, and in spite of the appointment in 1649 as Latin Secretary to the Council of State, Milton did not attain any wide public recognition for his powers of controversy — or for anything else except perhaps his strange views on divorce — until the publication of the first *Defensio pro Populo Anglicano*. Though based on evidence which is more negative than positive, and hence not as thoroughly satisfying as one could wish — Mr. Parker himself speaks of this deficiency in his Preface — the argument is a most valuable corrective to the exaggerated estimate of Milton's contemporary fame made with elaborate detail three quarters of a century ago by Masson and now become conventional. It seems a pity that Mr. Parker could not have made his book more complete and definitive before publishing it; but any fellow-scholar can understand his taking an unexpected opportunity for publication (see his Preface), and can understand also his uncertainty as to when he could finish any allusion-book of even a reasonable approach to completeness since “the time is out of joint” (see the Preface again), and much material in England is for the present unobtainable. Even in its present state, his work gives to students a provocative fresh interpretation of Milton's developing states of mind toward the public, plus some exceedingly useful apparatus for our further study *Johannis Miltoni, Angli*.

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WILLIAM CHARLES WHITE: *Chinese Temple Frescoes. A Study of Three Wall-Paintings of the Thirteenth Century*. Toronto, The University of Toronto Press, 1940, 230 pp., 76 ill.

Wall paintings of China came rather late to the attention of Western museums and collectors, and at first were not generally appreciated. Many connoisseurs considered them mechanical products of handcraft rather than full-fledged representatives of Chinese pictorial art. Undoubtedly, the avalanche of forgeries entering through the port of San Francisco substantiated this conception.

Using the three large wall paintings in the Toronto Museum as a basis, Mr. White surveys all aspects of origin, technique and iconography. Even though he makes a point of disregarding artistic quality, his study takes on the character of an exhaustive monography. Among the problems connected with the three paintings he treats particularly those of astrology, armor, dress and jewelry. There is scarcely a detail that escapes the attention of the learned author, except for the iconography of Kinnara and Kinnari, the happy pair of half human and half bird shape, simply called “Celestial Cherubs.”

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poulos in 1927, the questions of date and of the Wu Tao-tsu tradition have been all important. Mr. White assigned his set of paintings to the thirteenth century, without mentioning frescoes of T'ang or Sung date from China proper. Earlier attributions have been eliminated through P. Pelliot's contributions, published in 1928 (*Revue des Arts Asiatiques*, V, 3-4) and in 1931 (*Revue des Arts Asiatiques*, VIII, 4), in which he also compiles valuable information through a collection of references from Chinese texts concerning the removal of frescoes under the T'ang and Sung Dynasties. Neither of these sources is mentioned in White's book. However, the survival of the Wu Tao-tsu style has become firmly established, and it is this tradition that gives these frescoes a place among the great achievements of Chinese pictorial art.

—ALFRED SALMONY.

Institute of Fine Arts, New York

THEATRE IN THE WAR

Apart from the very generous contributions, of free entertainment for the men in service, of benefits to raise funds for war use, and of their own money many ways, that always mark the theatre folk in war time, the question rises as to the contribution of the stage itself. The query might be turned around: What is the influence of the war upon the theatre? Surely it is not confined to the fact that, either before the curtain rises or after its last fall, the audience stands at attention while the national anthem is played.

One of the first manifest changes is on the level of sex. More burlesque houses open; and the appearances of chorus and principals are even less concealed by clothing. Virtually as this nation girded its loins for action, the hip-swayers and strip-teasers ungirdled; one highlight of buresque shines forth as a movie star; another queen of exposure is revealed as—of all things—writer of a hit mystery story! On the level of musical comedy and revue the same story might be told, except that war relief has been tugging at the business man's purse for several years, and he has through those seasons also loosened his purse-strings for the comic relief of the musical stage.

Propaganda in the theatre is another story. Before the issues are joined, while feeling is hot but not fused into action, there is excitement in seeing the forces clash upon the stage. But when the conflict is upon us in life, theatre discussion seems talky and tame. There is, of scoure, the danger that a topical play will tip the wrong scales from men's eyes; Sherwood withdrew his successful "There Shall Be No Night" because Finland is fighting with the Axis. But timeliness no longer attracts an audience; a comic or homely individual touch of human interest may redeem a war play like "The Wookey", but without these extraneous or added elements, it is too much like daily life. "In Time To Come" shows Woodrow Wilson uttering words Franklin D. Roosevelt might have used in recent months; the play received critical acclaim; but it is a reminder, it is too grimly true.

The theatre in war time is a path to oblivion, an evening of Lethe, the quickest way out of one's thoughts. Whether they succeed or fail, the greatest number of plays seek to provide distraction—and they do provide the hits. Not merely comedy but nonsense—at least, inconsequence, a disregard for consistency and logic—winks across the footlights. "Arsenic and Old Lace" is followed by "Cuckoos On the Hearth" (cuckoo in the slang sense of "wacky"); or a mad medley of Civil War heroes and radio campaigns asks our spirits to "Spring Again." Fantasy, too, flits about, currently in the person, or the wraith that is the "Blithe Spirit", of Noel Coward's "improbable comedy," in which a dead wife, summoned by table-tapping or whatnot, refuses to leave her remarried husband. No playgoer fancies that this symbolizes the ghosts of World War I at the grim board of World War II. Nor does it; but rather the dream-desires of men to escape the thought of care and conflict, its threat perhaps hanging closer than in eighty years. The theatre has, in general, two divergent functions, of exhilaration, and of relaxation; in war time, its power to exalt the spirit is likely to fade, beneath the increasing presentation of plays that proffer rest to the weary mind.

—J. T. S.



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Notes and News

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NOTES AND NEWS

The American Society for Aesthetics took several steps toward more definite organization at its meeting in Washington, D. C., April 23rd through 25th. Thomas Munro, of the Cleveland Museum of Art, was elected president; Max Schoen, of the Carnegie Institute of Technology, treasurer; Ralph B. Winn, of the College of the City of New York, secretary. Felix M. Gatz, the founder and first president, was made honorary president. Membership, constitution and program committees were appointed, and membership dues fixed at two dollars per annum. The date of the next meeting was tentatively set for Christmas week of the present year.

Persons interested in becoming members should write to Dr. Munro, briefly stating their qualifications in the way of degrees or academic connections, if any, publications or artistic achievements. No exact requirements have yet been established, but membership will be restricted to those of professional standing or other indication of mature ability and serious interest in aesthetics and related fields. The Society's object is to encourage research, writing, discussion, and publication in these fields. Its membership includes persons interested in various arts from a theoretical standpoint as well as philosophers and psychologists.

The Washington meeting, organized by Dr. Gatz as the "Second American Congress for Aesthetics," was held at the Catholic University of America. The Rev. Dr. Charles H. Hart was chairman of the local committee, and the program was as follows:

APRIL 23, 8:15 P.M.

The most Rev. JOSEPH M. CORRIGAN: *Address of Welcome.*

(Rector, the Catholic University)

FELIX M. GATZ: *Opening Remarks.*

MAX SCHOEN: *Walter Pater on the Place of Music Among the Arts.*

CARROLL C. PRATT: *The Objectivity of Aesthetic Value.*

PADRAIC COLUM: *Form in Modern Poetry.*

APRIL 24, 2:30 P.M.

Rev. C. A. HART: *The Place of the Beautiful in Philosophy.*

LIONELLO VENTURI: *The Idea of Abstraction in the Visual Arts.*

EMMANUEL CHAPMAN: *The Aesthetics of Life and the Aesthetics of Death.*

ERNST KRENEK: *Music Meets Life in Opera.*

APRIL 24, 8:15 P. M.

FELIX M. GATZ: *The Autonomy of Art.*

MARGARET WEBSTER: *Objectives of Drama Today.*

RAISSA MARITAIN: *Poetry and Prayer.*

JACQUES MARITAIN: *Poetry Experience.*

APRIL 25, 10 A. M.

LOUIS W. FLACCUS: *Psychic Distance as an Aesthetic Concept.*

REV. MARIE-ALAIN COUTURIER: *Abstract Painting.*

VAN METER AMES: *The Novel, Between Art and Science.*

APRIL 25, 2 P. M.

OTTO ORTMANN: *Aesthetics of Melody.*

THOMAS MUNRO: *Aesthetic Form in the Visual Arts.*

MARTHA GRAHAM: *The Meaning of Dance.*

FELIX M. GATZ: *Closing Remarks.*

THOMAS MUNRO,

The Cleveland Museum of Art, Cleveland, Ohio

President

RALPH B. WINN,

City College, New York City

Secretary